ML17342A895
| ML17342A895 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/02/1987 |
| From: | Kopp L, Mccracken C, Wing J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342A896 | List: |
| References | |
| OLA-2, NUDOCS 8709150064 | |
| Download: ML17342A895 (29) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD (Turkey Point Plant, Units 3
6 0)
In the Matter of
)
)
FLORIDA POWER AND LICHT COMPANY )
)
)
Docket Nos.
50-250 OLA-2 50-251 OLA-2 (SFP Expansion)
TESTIMONY OF JAMES WING, CONRAD E. MCCRACKEN AND LAUPENCF f. KOPP REGARDING CONTENTION 6 C'1.
Please state your name, your position, and the nature of your work at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
A1.
My name is James Wing.
I am employed by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a
Chemical Engineer in the Chemica I Engineering
- Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Peactor Regulation.
A summary of my professional qualifications and experience is attached.
My current duties include performing safety evaluations of material compatibility and corrosion potentials of the components that are wetted by water in the spent fuel pools of nuclear power plants.
My name is Laurence I.
Kopp.
I am a
Nuclear Engineer in the Reactor Systems Branch of the Division of Engineering and Systems Technology in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
My duties include performing safety evaluations of criticality analyses of fresh and spent fuel storage
~gyjgpggL'
racks.
'A summary of my professionai qualifications and experience is attached.
My name is Conrad E.
McCracken.
I am employed by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Acting Chief of the Chemical Engineering
- Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
A summary of C
my professional qualifications and experience is attached.
My current duties include responsibility for safety evaluations of material compatibility and corrosion potentials of the components that are wetted by water in the spent fuel pools of nuclear power plants.
02.
lYhat is the purpose of your testimony?
A2.
(IVing S
McCracken)
Our testimony concerns Contention 6
with regard to the issue stated by the Licensing Board in its March 25, 1987 Memorandum and Order concerning summa y disposition, specifically in regard to the Boraflex used in the spent fuel racks.
(Kopp)
The purpose of my testimony is to address Contention 6
regarding the surveillance of Boraflex to assure that the material does not degrade to the extent that spent fuel pool criticality exceeds NRC acceptance criteria.
Concerns about the degradation of Boraflex were raised by new information provided to this Board by BN-87-11, "Board Notification Regarding Anomalies in Boraflex Neutron Absorbing Material," dated June 15, 1987.
'I 1
Contention 6 states:
The Licensee and Staff have not adequately considered or analyzed materials deterioration or failure in materials integrity resulting from the increased generation and heat and radioactivity, as a result of increased capacity and long term storage, in the spent fuel pool.
In its March 25, 1987 Order, the Board denied summary disposition of Contention 6
and raised an issue as to "the, modes and effectiveness of surveillance of materials and the monitoring of the fuel storage-pool and contents to provide a
measured basis for safety during the extended period of use."
Order at 33.
Q3.
Shat is the purpose, of the Boraflex panels installed in the Turkey Point spent fuel pool?
A3.
(Kopp)
General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, "Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling,"
states that criticality in the fuel storage and handling system shall be prevented by physical systems or processes, preferably by use of geometrically safe configurations.
The NRC's acceptance criterion for assuring that GDC 62 is met is found in the Standard Review Plan (SRP),
Section 9.1.2, which requires maintaining a storage array neutron multiplication factor (k ff) less than or equal to 0.95 in spent fuel eff pools during normal and accident conditions.
Therefore, even for accident conditions, the Staff requires spent fuel pools to be at least 5% subcritical (k ff no greater than 0.95) to supply adequate eff margin to assure that the requirement of GDC 62 (k ff less than eff 1.0) is met.
The Boraflex captures neutrons which would have
otherwise been available for fission and therefore aids in providing r
the required subcriticality margin.
Q4.
What is the subcriticality margin when considering both Boraflex n
and the Techical Specification concentration of boron in the Turkey Point spent fuel pool?
A4.
(Kopp)
With both the Boraflex panels and the Turkey Point Technical S
cification concentration of 1950 ppm boron in the pool, the subcriticality margin is approximately 25 percent (k ff 0.75).
eff Q5.
Have there been any studies done on materials deterioration or failure in material integrity of Boraflex under an environment similar to that of the spent fuel pool water at the Turkey Point plant)
A5.
(Wing) Yes.
As stated in the NRC Safety Evaluation (SF),
dated November 14,
- 1984, Section 2.2 at 7,
Boraflex has undergone extensive testing to determine the effects of gamma irradiation in various environments and to verify its structural integrity and suitability as a
neutron absorbing material.
The evaluation tests have shown that Boraflex was unaffected by the pool water environment and would not be degraded by corrosion.
Tests were performed at the University of Michigan, exposing Boraflex up to
- 1. 03 x
10 rads of gamma radiation with substantial concurrent 11 neutron flux in borated water.
These tests indicated that Boraflex maintained its neutron attenuation capabilities after being subjected to an environment of borated water and gamma irradiation.
Irradiation. caused some loss of flexibility, but would not lead to breakup of the Boraflex.
Long-term borated water soak tests at high temperatures were also conducted.
The tests showed that Boraflex withstood a
borated water immersion at 240~F for 251 days without visible distortion or softening.
The Boraflex showed no evidence of swelling or loss of
-ability to maintain a uniform distribution of boron carbide.
At the Turkey Point Nuclear
- Plant, the spent fuel pool water temperatures under normal operating conditions are not expected to exceed 143 F, which is well below the 240 F test temperature.
In
- general, the rate of a chemical reaction, which could cause material deterioration, decreases exponentially with decreasing temperature.
On th'e basis of these
- tests, the Staff did not anticipate any significant deterioration of the Boraflex at the pool normal operating conditions over the design life of the spent fuel racks.
Q6.
Has materials deterioration or failure in integrity of Boraflex been found in operating nuclear power piantsf A6.
(V/ing)
Subsequent to the Staff's review and acceptance of the Turkey Point spent fuel pool
- racks, anomalies (minor physical changes or gaps) were identified in some spent fuel pools using Bora flex.
Specifically, by letter dated February 11,
- 1987, the IVIsconsin Electric Power Company provided the Staff with results of the surveillance program for Boraflex that is useo in the spent fuel
pools of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
The results showed that the 2-inch by 2-inch surveillance coupons, which had a
maximum exposure of 1.6 x 10 rads of gamma radiation, experi-10 enced some physical changes in
- color, size, hardness and brittleness.
A full-length Boraflex assembly, which had a maximum exposure of about 10 rads of gamma radiation, showed far less 10 physical changes than the surveillance coupons.
Neither the coupons nor the full-length Boraflex assembly showed any
. unexpected change in neutron attenuation properties.
By letter dated May 5, 1987, the Commonwealth Edison Company submitted the results of recent inspections of the Boraflex used in the spent fuel
~ pools at 'uad Cities
- Station, Units 1
and 2.
The inspection discovered numerous gyps in some Boraflex panels which had been exposed to an estimated radiation dose of 10 rads.
The Boraflex 9
~ assemblies showed anomalies in the neutron attenuation profiles.
These two reports were provided to the Board as part of Board Notification BN-87-11, dated June 15, 1987.
In addition, Licensee stated that'ne of the Boraflex surveillance coupons (8-inch.
by 12-inch) at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating
- Plant, Units 1
and 2,
showed some slight physical
~ changes or degradations similar to that of the surveillance coupons of the Point'each Nuclear Plant.
Letter from C. O. Woody, FPL, toNRC, dated July 10, 1987 (L-87-279), at 3.
Q7.
What caused these observed physical degradations?
A7.
(Wing)
The exact mechanisms that caused the observed physical degradations of Boraflex have not been confirmed.
But the Staff can postulate that gamma radiation from the spent fuel initially induced crosslinklng of the polymer in
- Boraflex, producing shrinkage of the Boraflex material.
When crosslinking became saturated, scissionlng (a process in which bonds between atoms are broken) of the polymer predominated as the accumulated radiation dose increased.
Scissioning produced porosity which allowed the spent fuel pool water to permeate the Boraflex material.
Scissloning and water permeation could embrittle the Boraflex material.
In
- short, gamma radiation from spent fuel is the most probable cause of the physical degradations, such as changes in
- color,
- size,
- hardness, and brittleness, that were found in the Boraflex material at the Point Beach plant.
The Staff does not have sufficient information to determine what caused the gap formation in some Boraflex panels of the Quad Cities Station.
- However, it is conceivable that if the two ends of a full-length Boraflex panel are physically restrained, then shrinkage caused by gamma radiation can break up the panel and lead to gap formation.
In a letter dated July 10, 1987 (L-87-279),
Licensee attributed the gap formation in Quad Cities'oraflex to a rack design and fabri-cation process which did not allow the Boraflex material to shrink without cracking.
Licensee stated that the fabrication
- process, which required the Boraflex material to be glued and firmly clamped
in place to the stainless steel fuel rack walls, did not allow for shrinkage of Boraflex,
- and, as
- such, gaps developed.
Licensee also stateci that the Boraflex panels at the Quad Cities Station were not constructed from a
single sheet of Boraflex, resulting in pre-existing breaks in the Boraflex panels.
L-87-279, enclosure at 3-4.
Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) hypothesized that Boraflex shrinkage caused by irradiation resulted in sufficient tensile stress to lead to breakage when it was restrained as in the Quad Cities spent fuel rack.
BN-87-11, enclosure letter dated May 5, 1987.
However, the report done by CECo's contractor, which is appended to the May 5, 1987
- letter, states
- that, while the use of discontinuous strips of Doraflex cannot be ruled
- out, it was unlikely since the Boraflex was received in fulI leng ths for the various matching stainless steel components.
"Preliminary Assessment of Boraflex Performance in the Quad Cities Spent Fuel Storage Racks" Report No.
NET 042-01 (hereafter "Quad Cities Report" ),
at 5-2.
- Thus, shrinkage with physical restraints was postulated as a potential mechanism for the observed gap formation at the Quad Cities Station.
In a
letter dated July 29, 1987 (Attachment 1),
Bisco
- Products, Inc., the manufacturer of Boraflex material, stated that the failure of the neutron absorber may be as much affected by the rest of the spent fuel racks as by its own properties, and that the Quad
Cities'acks included some manufacturing deficiencies.
It referenced a letter by Dr. Krishna P.
- Singh, dated July 27, 1987 I
(Attachment 2),
on the issues of fabrication induced weld damage,
- warpage, uneven clamping
- loads, and stretching during installation of Boraflex sheets to the racks.
In addition to these
- issues, Dr. Krishna P.
- Singh, the former Vice President of Engineering at Joseph Oat Corporation (the fuel rack fabricator for the Quad Cities Station),
stated in the letter that while he could not "comment on the actual tear[lng] of [Boraflex] material during handling with any certainty, such a
possibility should not be precluded from consideration.", at 2.
From Dr. Singh's statements it can be inferred that if actual tearing took place during installation of the Boraflex panels at the Quad Cities Station, gaps would have formed even before the panels were exposed to any radiation.
Q8.
Could the Boraflex material that is used in the spent fuel pools of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 also experience physical degradation caused by gamma radiation?
A8.
(Wing)
Gamma radiation-induced crosslinking and scissioning of the polymer in Boraflex can take place-in the spent fuel pool racks of the Turkey Point plant in the presence of spent fuels.
The Boraflex panel at the plant is attached to a stainless steel wrapper panel and the entire assembly is submerged in water.
Water can permeate into the
- Boraflex, especially at the edges of the panel.
I
10-
- Thus, minor degradations, such as changes in
- color, size,
- hardness, and brittleness, can be expected.
l-lowever, the Staff cannot predict with certainty whether or not gap formation will occur.
This is because the Staff has not identified the specific mechanism which causes gap formation in 1
Boraflex.
('Ihile Licensee may be correct in concluding that shrinkage with physical restraints would lead to gap formation, the Staff lacks sufficient information to concur in Licensee's
- analysis, particularly a
complete description of the fabrication, quality assurance/quality control and inspection to verify the fabrication.
For
- example, the Staff is not certain whether or not physical restraints exist in the Boraflex panels at Turkey Point which are sufficient to cause gap formation.
(McCracken) The Staff is collecting operating experience of Boraflex from plants that use l3oraflex, additional test data from the vendor, and fabrication information from spent fuel rack contractors.
The Staff will evaluate the information to arrive at the cause(s) of the observed gap formation.
Because the Licensee has stated (L-87-279, enclosure at 0) that the Boraflex panels at the Turkey Point plant were constructed from single sheets, the Staff does not expect that there were gaps in all the Boraflex panels prior to exposure to radiation from spent fuels, unless the panels were damaged by some means.
" 11
\\
By letter dated August 20, 1987 {L-87-348), the Licensee reported the results of testing on 54 Boraflex panels from storage cells in both Region I
and Reg ion I I of the spent fuel
- pool, that are
'epresentative of those storage locations which have received an estimated radiation dose of 7.8 x 10
- rads, the highest cumulated 9
exposure to date.
No indication of gaps, voids, or other spatial distribution anomalies was observed.
The results of this testing also verifies that no gaps existed In these 54 Boraflex panels prior to exposure to spent fuel, and that probably no physical restraints exist in these panels.
On the basis of all available data and information, if indeed physical restraints do not exist in the Boraflex
- panels, the Staff can reasonably state that gaps will not likely form in the Turkey Point Boraflex panels.
Q9.
What effect does physical degradation have on the neutron Ao attenuation properties of Boraftex?
Substantial physical degradation can alter the neutron attenuation properties of Boraflex and reduce the neutron absorption effectiveness of the Boraflex panels.
Consequently, physical degradation can decrease the margin of subcriticallty of the fuel pool.
Neutron attenuation of Boraflex is mainly due to boron-10 (a
boron isotope with a
mass number of 10) that is present in the boron carbide powder in Boraflex.
If the spatial distribution of boron-10 is not disturbed, the neutron attenuation properties of
12 Boraflex should remain unchanged.
Minor physical degradations, such as changes in
- color, size (shrinkage),
hardness and brittleness, that do not disturb the spatial distribution of boron-10, should not alter the neutron attenuation properties of Boraflex.
- However, large gap formation in a
Boraflex sheet could, alter the neutron attenuation profile.
Q10.
If gap formation should occur in the Boraffex panels at Turkey Point, what maximum gap size would you expect?
A10.
As stated
- above, the Staff cannot predict whether or not gaps will form in the Boraflex panels at Turkey Point because it does not have sufficient information to Identify the specific mechanism which causes gap formation.
For example, testing at Point Beach and Turkey Point indicates there are no gaps at accumulated levels of irradiation higher than at Quad Cities and there is information which suggests that the Quad Cities gaps may be related to fabrication and design of the racks.
Thus, it may be inferred that gap formation may result from a
combination of shrinkage due to irradiation and fabrication or rack design deficiencies.
Nevertheless, recognizing that such gaps may not form fn the Turkey Point Boraflex panels, a reasonably conservative approach would be to use the limited Quad Cities data the only data available indicating the occurrence of gaps to estimate the potential gap size fn the Boraflex panels at Turkey Point.
This estimation does not imply.that the factors that contributed to gap
'I formation at Quad Cities are in existence at Turkey Point.
13 Of the 203 Boraflex panels examined at Quad
- Cities, 31 gaps were found in 28 panels, and two three-to four-inch gaps were found among the 31 gaps.
Quad Cities
- Report, at 4-2 to 4-4.
- Thus, three-to four-inch
- gaps, the largest gap size identified, were found in one percent of the panels tested and 6 percent of the gaps examined.
This largest gap size was found in Boraftex panels having a
nominal length of 152 inches which were exposed to 10 9 rads
.of gamma radiation.
Therefore, if the conditions which resulted in gap formation at Quad Cities are present, Turkey Point will not likely have gaps greater than four inches in approximately one percent of its Boraflex panels.
Q11.
What actions have been taken with respect to Turkey Point in light of the new Information on Borafiex?
A11.
(Kopp)
At the Staff's
- request, Licensee performed a
sensitivity study to determine the effect of possible gaps in the Boraflex at Turkey Point on the margin of subcriticafity.
Since Region 1 of the spent fuel pool contains the higher Boraflex loading as well as the smaller subcriticality margin, the sensitivity study conservatively used the Region 1 spent fuel rack configuration.
As an additional conservatism, the calculations did not take credit for the boron in the pool water, i.e., the racks are flooded with pure water.
The results indicate that for fuel enriched to 4.5 weight percent U-235, the acceptance criterion of keff less than or equal to 0.95 is met for the case of a 2 inch gap at the same elevation ln all of the
Boraflex panels in the rack.
The acceptance criterion is also met for the case of almost a
4 inch gap at the same elevation in one-half of the Boraflex panels (2 of 4 panels In each storage ceil) in the rack.
The maximum enrichment of the fuel currently used at Turkey Point is only 3.6 weight percent U-235.
I Icensee estimates that in approximately three years, the maximum fuel enrichment at Turkey Point will be less than 4
1 weight percent U-235.
L 87 363, August 27, 1987.
For fuel of 4.1 weight percent enrichment, the 0.95 acceptance criterion would be met for a 3.5 inch gap in all the Boraflex panels and a
7 Inch gap in one-half of the panels in the rack.
The Staff considers Licensee's assumptions regarding the distribution of gaps to be conservative since if gaps were to
- develop, they would probably not all occur at the same elevation nor throughout the entire storage rack because radiation exposures differ from storage location to storage location within the racks.
In Quad Cities, for example, the distribution of gap sizes ranged from 0 to about 4 inches with the maximum size (between 3 to 4 inches) observed in only 1
percent of the Boraflex panels tested.
Therefore, conservatively assuming that the maximum gap size of 4 inches observed at Quad Cities occurs in 50 percent of the panels at Turkey Point, keff for the storage rack would only be 0.93 for 4.1 weight percent enriched fuel at Turkey Point.
In fact, as
previously mentioned,. the acceptance criterion of 0.95 would be met with as much as a
7 inch gap in 50 percent of the Boraflex panels for 4.1 weight percent fuel.
Q12.
Have you verified the Licensee's study?
A12.
(Kopp)
These results have been confirmed by similar calculations performed by the NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
Q13.
What actions will Licensee take to detect the effects of physical degradation of Boraflex at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant?
A13.
(Wing) In order to confirm that Boraflex is acceptable for continued
- use, Licensee had originally planned to perform an initial surveillance of Boraflex specimens after about five years of exposure in the spent fuel pool environment, as described in Section 4.8 of the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Spent Fuel Storage Facility Modification Safety Analysis Report, dated March 14, 1984.
ln a letter dated Jufy 10, 1987 (L-87-279),
Licensee described two types of examinations to be conducted on Boraffex to examine and evaluate its physical and nuclear characteristics.
- First, an in-service surveillance program will evaluate the Boraflex specimens in both Region I and Region II of the spent fuel pool for physical and nuclear characteristics, including the determination of uniformity of boron distribution and neutron attenuation measurement
- Second, a
surveillance program will detect any spatial distribution anomalies in the full-length Boraflex panels.
(Kopp) The second surveillance
- program, referred to as "blackness testing,"
is conducted in order to detect any spatial anomalies In the actual Boraflex panels used in the'torage racks.
These tests are performed using a
fast neutron source and thermal neutron detectors.
Any gaps in the Boraflex will be detectable by an increase in the number of thermal neutrons reflected back to the detectors.
This method has been used satisfactorily in other spent fuel pool facilities such as the Quad Cities Station Units 1 and 2 to detect spatial anomalies in Boraflex.
By retesting at regular intervals, any changes in the neutron attenuation properties or in the spatial distribution of the boron-1 0 in Boraflex should be detected and corrective actions taken should it be determined that gaps large enough to violate the keff acceptance criterion may occur.
In ear ly
- August, 1987, Licensee performed baseline blackness testing on the Boraflex panels that have received the highest cumulated radiation exposure to date.
Licensee expects to per form future surveillance testing of the Boraflex panels within three
- years, or sooner if industry experience indicates a shorter period for surveillance is warranted.
L-87-348, August 20, 1987.
In
- addition, Licensee made a commitment not to store any fuel with an enrichment greater than 4.1 weight percent U-235 prior to completion of the next surveillance.
L-87-363, August 27, 1987.
- 17 (McCracken)
The Staff believes that the next proposed surveillance should include a
representative sample of panels subjected to a
range of radiation exposure to provide reasonable assurance that fuel with enrichment up to 4.5 weight percent U-235 can be stored at Turkey Point and maintain the 0.95 k ff acceptance criterion.
eff Q14.
What assurance will surveillance of Boraflex provide regarding the detection of gaps in sufficient time to take corrective actions?
A14.
initial surveillance testing was performed by FPL during the first week of August 1987 in the Turkey Point Unit 3 spent fuel racks.
Storage locations were chosen In which the Boraflex panels would have experienced the highest accumulated gamma doses to date and, therefore, the largest percentage of shrinkage.
No indication of gaps or other spatial anomalies were observed.
The maximum accumulated gamma dose during this testing was estimated by.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the fuel vendor, to be 7.8 x 10 9 rads.
The next surveillance testing of the Boraflex panels at Turkey Point is scheduled in three years when the maximum accumulated gamma dose is estimated by Westinghouse to be 1.2 x 10 rads.
L-87-348, August 20, 1987.
10 (Wing)
Bisco
- Products, inc.
submitted additional test data of Boraflex on June 25, 1987 (Technical Report No.
NS-1-050 (interim)) and August 26, 1987 (Attachment 3).
The data showed that shrinkage in the Boraflex samples at the dose levels of 5 x 10 and 10 rads of gamma radiation was essentially the
- same,
18 averaging about 2.1 percent.
Irradiation at 2.5 x 10 rads showed 10 an average shrinkage of 2.4 percent.
The data indicated that no appreciable change in shrinkage of Boraflex material occurred between 5 x 10 and 2.5 x
10 rads.
The 54 Boraflex panels 9
10 tested at Turkey Point had an estimated radiation dose of 7.8 x 10 9 rads and an estimated maximum dose of 1.2 x 10 rads in three 10 years.
These dose levels are within the range of 5 x 10 and 2.5 9
x 10 rads where no appreciable change in shrinkage was found.
The Staff believes that the proposed Turkey Point surveillance interval is adequate.
- However, the Staff will continually monitor industry experience with Boraflex to determine whether a shorter time interval is warranted.
(Kopp)
In addition to the Boraflex surveillance, Turkey Point Technical Specification 3.17 requires the minimum boron concentra-tion while fuel Is stored in the spent fuel pit to be 1950 ppm and 1 able 4.1-2 requires that the boron concentration be sampled monthly.
NRC calculations have shown that under normal storage conditions at Turkey Point with the pool water borated to 1950 ppm of boron, all of the Boraflex panels could be removed and the 0.95 k ff acceptance criterion would be
- met, even with 4.5 weight eff percent fuel.
Therefore, the Staff feels that the boron concentration sampling and requirements provide additional assurance of safe fuel storage between surveillances of the Boraflex.
915.
Shat corrective actions are available if gaps do develop in the Boraflex panels at Turkey Point?
A15.
(Kopp)
Possible corrective actions to maintain the 0.95 k ff acceptance criteria would be to:
1.
Controi the placement of fuel so that some storage locations are not occupied by a
spent fuel assembly.
This would increase the effective spacing between assemblies and thus reduce the keff value.
2.
Consolidate two or more fuel assemblies into one cell location by removing the individual fuel rods and replacing them in a more compact configuration.
This consolidation process reduces the number of thermal neutrons available to cause fission and thereby reduces the k ff value.
eff 3.
Insert control rods or burnable poison rods into the fuel assembly to reduce k ff.
This would require measures to eff'revent these movable poisons from inadvertently being removed at a later time.
Insert poison panels into the space between the fuel assembly and the cell wall to reduce keff.
ln addition, by letter dated July 27, 1987 (L-87-363),
Licensee listed other possible corrective actions such as (a) preventing the loading of any fuel assembly into storage cell with degraded Boraflex and (b) replacing the degraded Boraflex.
k
- 20 016.
Please summarize your testimony regarding the acceptability of Boraftex.
A16.
The recent examination of the Boraffex material with the highest cumulated radiation exposure at Turkey Point uncovered no anomalies in the Boraflex assemblies.
Based on the data and SAR-ry'nformation available to date, the Staff does not expectsignificant degradation in the Turkey Point Boraflex panels.
Licensee plans to conduct surveillance
- programs, which includes blackness
- testing, on Boraflex specimens and panels at specified schedules that are adequate to detect physical degradations, including gaps.
If gaps should Dcc,,~
in the Boraflex panels at Turkey
- Point, the surveillance program will provide reasonable assurance that gap formation will be detected In sufficient time to enable Licensee to take corrective actions such that the NRC acceptance criterion of k ff less than or equal to 0.95 is met.
Therefore, Boraflex material eff continues to be acceptable for use in safe storage of the spent fuel at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.
I
)
PROFESS IONAL QUAL I F ICAT I ONS JAMES WINC My name is James Wing.
I am a
Chemical Engineer in the Chemical Engineering
- Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry from the University of Tennessee in
- 1949, a
Master of Science degree in Chemistry from Purdue University in
- 1953, and a
Ph.D.
degree in Chemistry from Purdue University in 1956.
Before joining the Commission, I
was employed by Argonne National Laboratory from 1955 to 1969 first, as Assistant Chemist and
- later, as Associate Chemist.
In this
- capacity, I
performed basic research in nuclear chemistry.
From 1969 to
- 1975, I
was employed by National Bureau of Standards as a research chemist and computer programmer.
In these two positions, I did research work on radiochemistry and wrote computer programs for laboratory automation.
I have written 28 technical papers
- topics, including nuclear chemistry, mathematics, and food technology.
was a
Fulbright Lecturer.
I am Society.
and
'l0 laboratory reports on various radiochemistry, air pollution, applied ln the academic year of 1964-1965, I
a member of the American Chemical I
have been a staff member of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission since January 1975.
I have served in the following capacities in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation:
a Nuclear Chemist in the Accident Analysis
- Branch, a
Senior Nuclear Engineer in the Efftuent Treatment Systems
- Branch, a Chemical Engineer in the Plant Systems Branch, and, currently, a Chemical Engineer in the Chemical Engineering Branch.
My duties included:
independent assessments of the radiological consequences of postulated accidents; control room habitability following a postulated accidental release of toxic chemicals; radioactive waste treatment systems; control of impurities in reactor coolant water, steam generator shell-side
- water, post-accident emergency cooling
- water, and spent fuel pool water; material compatibility and corrosion potential; process sampling; post-accident sampling; protective coating (paint) systems inside containment buildings; and fission product removal following a postulated loss-of-coolant accident.
Additional duties included management of technical assistance programs.
sf
~t
.STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF DR. LAURENCE I. KOPP Education:
Fairleigh Dickinson University, B.S.
- Physics, 1956 Stevens institute of Technology, M.S. Physics, 1959 University of Maryland, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineering, 1968 Professional xperience:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear En ineer (1965 -
resent)
Safety evaluations of reactor core design as described in applications for Construction Permits and Operating
- Licenses, topical reports submitted by reactor vendors and licensees on safety-related
- subjects, criticality analyses of fresh and spent fuel storage racks.
Westinghouse Astronuclear Laboratory Senior Scientist (1963 - 1965)
Design and analyses of reactor physics aspects of nuclear propulsion systems related to NERVA program including development of computer programs.
Martin-Marietta Corporation Senior En ineer (1959 - 1963)
Design and analyses of reactor physics aspects of advanced concept reactors such as the fluidized bed and compact space reactors.
Development of analytical methods and computer codes for nuclear reactor design and analysis.
Federal Electric Corporation Senior Pro rammer (1957 1959)
Developed and programmed various computer codes for DEWLINE project including payroll, statistical analysis of failure rates, and inventory control.
Curtiss Wright Research Division Ph sicist (1956 1957)
Professional Societies:
Assisted in development and programming of reactor analysis methods.
American Nuclear Societ (June 1985 - present)
Chairman of ANS-10 national committee on Mathematics and Computations Standards.
~ PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS CONRAD E. MCCRACKEN I am Acting Chief of the Chemical Engineering Branch of the Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Pegulation.
My responsibilities in this position include supervision of the evaluation of all PWR's for compliance with chemical and corrosion requirements of the Commission, material compatibility for spent fuel pool components and materials of nuclear power plants.
I have served in this capacity since April 1987.
Between February 1981 and November
- 1985, I
served as a
senior chemical engineer and section leader with the same
- branch, where my duties included the evaluation of materials compatibility and degradation issues at both operating plants and plants in the licensing process.
From November 1985 until April 1987 I served as a
section leader in the Division of Licensing and as Acting Chief of the Plant Systems Branch of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
From 1966 to 1981, I was employed by Combustion Engineering Corporation in a variety of management and engineering positions, the last of which was Manager of Chemistry Development from 1977 to 1981.
During this 15-year period, my prime technical responsibility was support to operating nuclear power plants and nuclear plants in construction in the area of chemical and radiochemical
- sampling, analysis, data interpretation, establishing chemistry specifications and conducting laboratory experiments to verify or support nuclear plant requirements.
In this
- capacity, I
made frequent visits to nuclear power plants where I
physically conducted sample and analysis programs or audited the utilities'apabilities in the chemistry and radiochemistry area.
During this
- period, I
was responsible for review, testing and approval of various organic and inorganic compounds for use in nuclear power plants.
From 1958 to
- 1966, I
served in the United States Navy where I
was Qualified in submarines for all nuclear duties.
For three years of this
- period, I
was an instructor, responsible for teaching office and enlisted personnel in the area of chemistry, corrosion and mechanical systems operation and control.
My final duty station in the Navy was on the USS Nautilus where I was responsible for all chemistry and corrosion control and personnel radiation exposure.
Education I attended the University of Hartford School of Enqineering and completed course work in 1970.
I am a Registered Professional Corrosion Engineer.