ML17342A099
| ML17342A099 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/08/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342A100 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-49061, TAC-7318, NUDOCS 8202260364 | |
| Download: ML17342A099 (4) | |
Text
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY TME OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS-66 AID 48. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE HOS.
DPR-53 AND DPR-69 BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAP POWER PLANT, UNIT HOS.
1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS.
50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application dated July 27, 1977, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BGEE) requested changes to the. Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2. 'he proposed change tc TS 3,1.3.3 would allow'startup and power operation with one inoperable reed switch position indicator channel per control element assembly (CEA) group, provided that the associated CEAs can be moved to the full out position, and confirmed to be in this position.
Discussion and Evaluation Each control rod drive mech'Inism at Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 is provided with a reed switch system which provides positive indication of confro'od insertion status.
The Iced switch CEA position indication system utilizes a series of magnetically actuated reed switches, spaced at 2-inch intervals along the CEA housing and arI"anged with precision resistors in a voltage divider network, to provide voltage signals proportional to CEA position.
These signals are displayed in baI chart form by a cathode ray tube.(CRT) on the main control board.
A logic package associated with the CRT provides redundant alarm functions.
A backup readout is provided which can be utilized to read the output of any reed switch voltage divider.
The collection of position indicating reed switches for CEA are refered to as a reed switch position indicating channel.
In addition to the position indicating reed switches placed at 2-inch intervals,'.additional reed switches are located at the "full out" and "full in" CEA positions.
These reed switches provide verification of full-Gut/full-in status on a core mimic which is located on the main control panel.
At the present time, TS 3.:1.3.3 allows "credit" for the full-out or full-in reed switches.
Upon,failure of up to one position indicating reed switch channel per CEA group, TS 3.1.3.3 allows power operation to'continue provided that the positions of the associated CEAs are periodically verified yia the full-out or full-in reed switches.
The Basis for TS 3.1.3.3 states, in [art, '
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p "The CEA "Full In" and "Full Out" limits provide an additional independent means for determining the CEA positions when the'CEAs are at eithet their fully inserted or fully withdrawn positions.
Therefore, the ACTION statements applicable to inoperable CEA pos-ition indicators permit continued operations when the positions of CEAs with inoperable position indicators can be verified by the "Full In" or "Full Out"-
limits "
= Startup of the reactor with inoperable reed switch position indicating channel(s) is prohibited, however, since the requirements.of TS 3.0,4+'-
are applicable to TS 3,1.3.3.
By application dated July 27,
- 1977, BGLE requested a change to TS 3.1.3.3 which would allow startup. of the reactor with inoperable position indication reed switch channel(s) by specifying that TS 3.0.4 is not. applicable to-TS 3. 1.3.3.
Our review of BGEE's request indicates that the startup'of
'he reactor with inoperable reed switch position indicating channel(s) is not a greater concern than full power operation with these inoperable channel(s),
which is presently permitted under TS 3. 1.3.3.
A reasonable period of time, however, should be specified to achieve verification of the full out status of the CEAs.
Accordingly, the following requirement should be incorporated into TS 3.1;3,3:
"If the failure of the position indicator channel(s) is during STARTUP, the CEA group(s) with the inoperable position indicator channel must be moved to the "Full Out" position, and verified to be fully withdrawn via a "Full OUt" indicator, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The provisions of Specifica-tion 3.0.4 are not applicable."
The licensee has agreed to the above requirement.
Since the above require-ment is fully within the original Basis of TS 3. 1.3.3, no additional safety concerns'ave been introduced and the proposed
- change, as amended. by t'e NRC staff, is acceptable.
Environmental Cons iderati on We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power l.evel and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these'mendments.
3.0.
ss a general requirement wtfich prohibits changing operational Nodes (i.e. startup to power operation) if the remedial measures of a TS action statement (i.e. equipment inoperable) are implemented.
Conclusion Me have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissi'on's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date:. February 8, 1982 Principal Contributors:
. Dave Jaffe M. Wigdor, ICSB
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