ML17341B359
| ML17341B359 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1982 |
| From: | Barrett R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17341B358 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8209010367 | |
| Download: ML17341B359 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION 8Y THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.
88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-31 AND AMENDMENT NO.
82 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-41 FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT NOS.
3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-250 AND 50-251 Introduction On April 15, 1982 the Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted proposed Technical Specification to License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos.
3 and 4.
The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications would allow operation at a peak power
- factor, Fq, equal to 2.30 for steam generator tube plugging (SGTP)
<5X, and at Fq equal to 2.125 for SGTP in range
>5%%d to <28K.
The initial license for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 allowed operation at F
equal to 2.32.
As both plants began to experience progressively more Q
serious levels of tube plugging, FQ has been decreased, based on repeated analyses.
Currently both plants are approved for operation at F
equal to 2.125 for SGTP up to 28%.
Q All steam generators in Unit 3 have recently been replaced, and a similar upgrade is planned for Unit 4.
Consequently, the licensee has requested approval to operate the upgraded units at F equal to 2.30 for SGTP up to 5%.
8209010367 820813 PDR ADOCK 05000250 P
The original CESAR for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 analyzed the double ended cold leg guillotine
{DECLG) break with C equal to 0;4, 0.6 and 1.0, and small break LCCA's ranging frcm 2 inch diam ter to l foot square.
Calculated values of peak clad temperature, maximum clad ox'dation and maximum hydrogen generation were within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 for the worst case LOCA, a DKLG with C equal to 0.4.
A range of transients was also analyzed.
As the degree of tube plugging increased, adjusted values for F were determined based on reanalysis of the DKXG break with Q equal to 0.4, and in scae cases also 0.6.
These analyses have assuned that the DECEG with C ~ to 0.4 is the worst case ElX'A regardless of the degree of tube plugging.
The latest analysis also covers only the DECLG with C equal to 0.4 and 0.6.
Although the replacement of the steam generators return the plants to the condition analyzed in the original FSAR, there are same differences in the new analysis.
Mst important1y, the model codes have changed considerably to account for better understanding of clad swelling and rupture, two phase flea and other phencnana.
Nevertheless, the new calculations for F~~ to 2.30 predict carpliance with the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46.
Furthernare, the dependence of peak clad temperature on the choice of C
{Figure l) leads to the conclusion that the pECLG with Cp equal to 0.4's still the worst'ase Non-DX'A transients have not been reanalyzed.
2200 0
2000 Cl 1800 o Original FSAR (Fq=2.32)
+ April 1982 Analysis (Fg2.30) 0 0
1600 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 FIGURE l.
Variation of peak clad temperature with discharge coefficient for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
EVALUATION The replacem nt of all steam generators constitutes essentially a return to the condition which was analyzed in the original PSAR.
Reanalysis of the large break LOCA with the latest approved Westinghouse model (1981 nadel) has. reinforced the original finding that the DECLG with C equal to 0.4 is the worst case ZOCA.
The calculated values of peak clad temperature, m:-mimum clad oxidation and minimum hydrogen generation are within the acceptance criteria of 10 CFR 50.46 for operation at F equal to 2.30 and tube plugging <.5%.
The original FSAR contained an extensive analysis of non-LOCA transients.
Because the design floe rate has been restored and F< is slightly reduced, the non-LOCA analysis fran the original FSAR is equally applicable today as it was for the issuance of the original license.
'I The justification for the use of F< equal to 2.125 for SGZP in the range
>5% to ~28% is based on the March 1981 analysis using the "1978" code with appropriate changes to account for clad swelling and rupture.
That analysis is still acceptable, and Unit 4 should be allowed to continue operation in this vade until its steam generators have been replaced.
~Summar The proposed changes to the technical specifications are acceptable.
The analyses presented are sufficient to justify the proposed amendrrent to allow operation of both units at FQ equal to 2.30 or steam generator tube plugging (SGTP)
<5%.
Continued operation of Unit 4 at F< equal to 2.125 for SGTP < 28%, is also acceptable, until its steam generators have been replaced.
The specification of F equal to 2.125 for SGTP in the range G% to
<28%
will not apply to future degradation of the new steam generators.
At such tine as the tube plugging in the new steam generators. exceeds 5%,
the licensee should sukmit a new QX'A analysis using the then curry accepted codes.
Consequently the specification for operation at Fg equal to 2.l25, and the corresponding K(Z) curve (Figure 3.2-3), will not. be valid when all the steam generators in Units 3 and 4 have been replaced.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4); that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Oate:
August 13, 1982 Principal Contributor:
R. Barrett