ML17340B205

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 65 & 57 to Licenses DPR-31 & DPR-41,respectively
ML17340B205
Person / Time
Site: Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/12/1981
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17340B204 List:
References
NUDOCS 8105180051
Download: ML17340B205 (4)


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UNIT=0 STAT""S t'i~CLEAR R-"GUL~TORY CQfiifIISSiCl" L'WASHINGTON, O. C. ZC5 5 SAFE Y EVALUATION BY TH" OF IC OF i'NUCLEAR R AC TOR R O'" AT IO l RELATED TO Al>iEffDHENT NO.

65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-31 A'ID AtiE!!DMI~fiiI tqO. 57 TO FACILITY OP"VTiffG LICENSE NO.

DPR-41 FLORiDA POi'ER AffD LIGHT COiPAf!Y TURKEY POINT PLANT UNIT i%OS.

3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS.

50-250 AND 50-251 I.

Introduction Hy letters dated September 12, 1980 and triarch 10, 1981 Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) submitted applications to amend Facility Operating License Nos DPR-31 and.DPR-41 for the Turkey Point Plant Unit Nos 3 and 4.

The applications requested amendments to the Technical. Specifications, Appendix A to the licenses, regarding:

(1) a clarification of the term operability as it applies to the single fail'ure criterion for safety 'systems in power reactors and (2) 'an update of the organization chart, Figures 6.2-1 and 6.2-2.

H Item 2 is a routine update of the organization,'chart.

This is an administrative

'matter which does not decrease the sa,ety of the plant operation and therefore is acceptable.

It will not be evaluated any further.

II.

Discussion On April 10, 1980 we sent a letter to all power reactor licensees to clari y the m aning of the term "operable" and to request licensees to take specific actions to assure that is appropriately appl Ied at their facilities, IE information Notice 79-35, "Control of fiaintenance and Essential Equipment" also contained information on this subject.

Because o

the importance of assuring safety system availability, the staff had concluded that all facility Technical Specifications should contain opera-bility requirements similar to the NRC's Standard Technical Specifications, and that appropriate procedures should be implemented to assure that the necessary

records, such as plant logs or similar documents, are reviewed to determine conipliance with these speci,ications (1) promptly upon discovering a component, train, or subsyst m to be inoperable, and (2) prior to'removing a component rom service.

To be consistent with our guidance the time required for hot shutdown in should be increased from seven to eiaht hours.

I!e have discussed this wi the licensee sta, f.

They have concurred and the change has been made.

3.0.1 th III.

Evaluation The liicensee has su. mi eo Iechniccl Spe rev se Specification 1.-. to incorpo)cte I

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In addition, the Technical Specifications are revised to include references to indicate that Specification 3.0.1 applies in appropriate places.

li'e have reviewed the proposed revision, to Technical Speci, ication 1.4 and the addi ion of Technical Specifications 3.0.1 and 3.0.2 and find that they comply with the requirements of the Standard Technical Specifications as requested in our letter dated April 10, 1980.

The purposes of these changes are to clarify the meaning of the term Operable and to assure proper action is taken to preserve the single failure criterion for systems that are relied upon in the FSAR.

Essentially, the proposed changes do not change the intent of the existing T chnical Specification; the proposed changes more precisely define the proper courses of action to ensure sa,e operation of the units.

Based on our review

'we find that the proposed changes to the Technical Speci>ications are acceptable.

IV.

Conclusions Environmental Consideration We have determ'ined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in. power 'l.evel and will not result in any significant envirormental impact.

Having made this determination, we have fur.her concluded tha ~ the amendments involve zn action which is insignificant rem the standpoint of envi rormental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 651. 5(d)(4 ), that an envi rormental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance o

these amendments.

C one 1 us i on Me have concluded, based on..'e considerations discussed

abov, hat:

(1) because

.he amendments do not involve a significant increase in the pr obability'r consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease

',n a sa'fety margin, the amendments do no" involve a significant ha'zards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the prooosed

manner, and (3) such activities will be cond'ucted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and he issuance o

.hese amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and sa,etv o

the public.

Date:

Nay 12, 1981

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