ML17340B057
| ML17340B057 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/20/1981 |
| From: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17340B058 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104240585 | |
| Download: ML17340B057 (10) | |
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7590-01 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Florida Power And Light Company (Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 a'nd 43
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Docket Nos. 50-250.
50-251
'RDER FOR MODIFICATION OF LICENSES The'Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee) holds Facility Ope&ating t
License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 which authorizes the licensee to operate the Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4 at power levels not in excess of 2200 megawatts thermal rated power.
The licenses were originally issued on July 19, 1972 And April 10, 1973 and both will expire on April 27, 2007.
The facility, which is located at the licensee's site in Dade County, Florida, is a pressurized water reactor (PMR) used for the commercial generation of electricity.
The Reactor Safety Study (RSS),
MASH-1400, i'dentified in a PMR an inter system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which is a significant contributor to risk of core melt accidents (Event Y).
The design examined in the RSS contained in-series check valves isolating, the high pressure Primary Coolant System (PCS) from the Low Pressure Injection System (LPIS) piping.
The scenario which leads to the Event Y accident is initiated by the failure of these check valves to function as a pressure isolation barrier.
This causes an overpressurization and rupture of the LPIS low pressure piping which results in a LOCA that bypasses containment.
7590-01 I
In order to better define the Event Y concern, all light water reactor licensees were requested by letter dated February 23, 1980, to provide the following in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f):
l.
Describe the valve configurations and indicate if an Event Y isolation valve configuration exists within the Class. I boundary of the high pressure piping connecting PCS piping to low pressure system piping; e.g.,
(1) No check valves V
in series, or (2)'wo check valves in series with a motor operated valve (MOY);
- 2. If either of the above Event Y configurations exist, indicate whether continuous surveillance or periodic tests are being performed on such valves to ensure integrity.
Also indicate'hether valves have been known, or found, to lack integrity; and
- 3. If either of the above Event Y configurations exist, indicate whether plant procedures should be revised or if plant modifications should be made to increase reliability.
In addition to the above, licensees were asked to perform individual check val ve 1 eak testing prior to pl ant startup after the next schedul ed outage.
By letter dated March 17, 1980, the licensee responded to our February letter.
Based upon the kRC review of this response as well as the review of previously docketed information for -the facility, I have concluded in consonance with the at. ached Sa,ety Evalua.ion (Attachment 1) that one or more valve con,iguration(s) o concern exist at the acility.
The at. ached Technical Evaluation Report (TER) (Attachment
- 2) provides, in Section 4.6, a
tabulation of the subject valves.
7590-01 w 3 The staff's concern has been exacerbated due not only to the large
'I number of plants which have an Event V configu'ration(s) but also because of recent unsatisfactory operating experience.
Specifically, two plants have leak tested check valves with unsatisfactory results.
At Davis-Besse, a pressure isolation check valve in the LPIS failed and the ensuing investigation found that valve internals had become disassembled.
At the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) injection check valves and one RHR recirculation check valve failed because valves jammed open against valve over-travel limiters.
It is, therefore, apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series check valves and when failure of,one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required.
Since these valves are important to safety, they should be tested periodically to ensure low probability of gross failure.
As a result, I have determined that periodic examination of check valves must be undertaken by the licensee as provided in Section III below to verify that each valve is seated properly and functioning as a pressure isolation device.
Such testing will reduce the overall risk of an inter-system LOCA.
The testing mandated by this Order may be accomplished by direct volumetric leakage measurement or by other equivalent means capable of demonstrating that leakage limits are not exceeded in accord-ance with Section 2.2 of the attached TER.
In view of the operating experiences described above and the potential consequences of check valve failure, I, have determined that prompt action is.
necessary to increase the level of assurance that multiple pressure isolation barriers are in place and will remain intact.
Therefore, the'public health, safety and interest require that this modification of Facility Operating License Wos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 be immediately effective.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 16li of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
- amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 is modified by the addition of the following requirements:
1.
Implement Technical Specifications (Attachment 3) which require periodic surveillance over the life of the plant and which specify limiting conditions for operation for PCS pressure isolation valves.
- 2. If check valves have not been (a) individually tested within 12 months preceding the date of the Order, and (b) found to coinply with the leakage rate criteria set forth in the Technica)
~ 0 Specifications described in Attachment 3, the hOV. in each line shall be closed within 30 days of the effective date of this Order and quarterly Inservice Inspection (ISI)
HOV cycling ceased until the check valve tests have been satisfactorily accomplished.
(Prior to closing the hOV, procedures shal I be implemented and operators trai'red to assure
0 7590-01 that the HOV remains closed.
Once closed, the HOV shall be tagged closed to further preclude inadvertent valve opening).
3.
The HOV shall not be closed as indicated in paragraph 2 above unless a
supporting safety evaluation has been prepared.
If the HOV is in an emergency core cooling system (ECCS), the safety evaluation shall include a determination as to whether the.requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 will continue to be satisfied with the HOV closed.
If the HOY is not in an ECCS, the safety evaluation shall include a deter-(
mination as to whether operation with the HOY closed presents an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2).
If the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K have not been satisfied, or if an unreviewed safety question exists as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, then the facility shall be shut down within 30 days of the date of this Order and remain shutdown until check valves are satisfactorily tested in accordance with the Techni-cal Specifications set forth in Attachment 3.
4.
The records of the check valve tests required by this Order shall be made available for inspection by the HRC's Office of. Inspection and Enforcement.
7590-01 IY The licensee or any other person who has an interest affected by this Order may request a hearing on this Order within 25 days of its publication io the Federal
~Re ister.
A request for hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.
A copy of the.request shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director at the same address, and to Nr. Robert Lowenstein,
- Esquire, Lowenstein,
- Newman, Reis and Axelrad,1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW,Suite 1214, Washington, DC
- 20036, attorney for the licensee.
If a hearing is requested by a person other than the licensee, that person shall describe, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.714(a)(2),
the manner in which his or her interest is affected by this Order.
ANY REQUEST FOR A HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIYENESS OF THIS 'ORDER.
If a hearing is requested by the licensee or other person who has an interest affected by this Order, the Commission will issue an order designating the time and place of any such hearing. If a hearing is held, the issues to be considered at such a hearing shall be:
(a) Whether the licensee should be required to individually leak test check valves in accordance with the Technical Spe'cifications set forth in Attachment 3 to this Order.
(b) Whether the actions required by Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section III of this Order must be taken if check valves have not been tested within 12 months preceding the date of this order.
'590-01 Operation of the facility on terms consistent with this Order is not stayed by the pendency of any proceedings on this Order.
In the event that a
need for further action becomes
- apparent, either in the course of proceedings on this Order or any other time, the Director will take appropriate action.
OR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Effective Date:
April 20, 1981
- Bethesda, Maryland Darrell
- isenhut, Director Division o Licensing Attachments:
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Saf ety E va 1 uat i on Report-2.
Techni ca l E valuat i on Report 3.
Technical Specifications