05000251/LER-1978-008, Update to LER 78-008/01X-1 on 780828:restricting Orifices Not Installed in Branch Connections from Containment Spray Headers to Emergency Containment Filter Spray Sys.Caused by Inadvertent Omission.Qc/Qa Program Initiated

Update to LER 78-008/01X-1 on 780828:restricting Orifices Not Installed in Branch Connections from Containment Spray Headers to Emergency Containment Filter Spray Sys.Caused by Inadvertent Omission.Qc/Qa Program Initiated

ML17338B006
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/06/1979
From:	Schoppman M FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17338B004	List: 05000251/LER-1978-008, Update to LER 78-008/01X-1 on 780828:restricting Orifices Not Installed in Branch Connections from Containment Spray Headers to Emergency Containment Filter Spray Sys.Caused by Inadvertent Omission.Qc/Qa Program Initiated
References
LER-78-008-01X, LER-78-8-1X, NUDOCS 7908160468
Download: ML17338B006 (4)

LER-1978-008, Update to LER 78-008/01X-1 on 780828:restricting Orifices Not Installed in Branch Connections from Containment Spray Headers to Emergency Containment Filter Spray Sys.Caused by Inadvertent Omission.Qc/Qa Program Initiated

Event date:
Report date:
2511978008R00 - NRC Website

text

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LtCENSEE EVENT REPORT LLS NUCI.EAR AliCULATORYCOJ444ISSION CONTROI EIJ'Cla:

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~0 covered that the restricting orifices.were not installed in the branch connections from the containment spray headers.to the emergency contain-ment filter spray system.

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~06 tion and function of these resgricting orifices.

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-78-8, Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

'PAGE TWO Additional Cause Descri tion and Corrective Action Subsequent to the discovery of the missing orifices, a. program was initiated to verify that orifices in other systems were properly'nstalled.

The orifices in the following locations were included in the program.

Installation was de-termined by either visual examination or flow measurement...

1.

RCS hot and cold leg RTD bypass loop manifolds.

2. 'tandpip'e outlet lines for normal No.

2 RCP seal leakage.

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No.

1 RCP seal bypass lines.'.

SI recirculation lines to RWST.

5.

CSP recirculation lines to RWST.

6.

SGFH pump discharge valve bypass.

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Between BA pumps and BA tanks.

The investigation revealed that the, orifices in the recirculation lines from the 4A and 4B Containment Spray pumps to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) had not been installed.

The omission of the recirculation orifices would not have impeded the containment spray system capability of limiting the containment pressure below its design pressure.

The proper recirculation orifices were procured and installed prior to restarting the unit.

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