ML17333B129

LER 97-S01-00:on 971009,control of Vital Areas Lost Due to Personnel Error.Retrained Personnel Involved on Vital Area Breach Conditions & Modified Procedure Which Controls Removal of Missile block.W/971110 Ltr

ML17333B129
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	11/10/1997
From:	Blind A, Russell P INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-97-S01, LER-97-S1, NUDOCS 9711140196
Download: ML17333B129 (6)

Text

~ CATEGORY g REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9711140196 DOC.DATE: 97/11/10 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FAC1L:50-316 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, Indiana M 05000316 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION RUSSELL,P. Indiana Michigan Power Co.

BLIND,A.A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (formerly Indiana &, Michigan Ele RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-S01-00:on 971009,control of vital areas lost due to personnel error.Retrained personnel involved on vital area breach condit'ions 6 modified procedure which controls removal of missile block.W/971110 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE74T COPIES RECE1VED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: Safeguards Phys Sec Event Pt. 73.71 (Public Available)

NOTES:

C RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL HICKMAN,J 1 0 INTERNAL: AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 ILE CEN 1 1 NMSS/FCSS/FCOB 1 1 CT 1 1 RGN3 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: NRC PDR 1 1 D

C M

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY,YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, LISTS CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 7 ENCL 6

Indiana Michig~

Power Compan~

Cock'%mar p'art 9:e CwiP.'ace B.dgman, 'L~l 491 r6 INDUNA NICHICsMN PQMfJPR November 10, 1997 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Operating Licenses DPR-74 Docket No. 50-316 Document Control Manager:

97-S 001-00 Sincerely, A. A. Blind Site Vice President lmbd Attachment A. B. Beach, Region III E. E. Fitzpatrick P. A. Barrett S. J. Brewer J. R. Padgett D. Hahn Records Center, INPO NRC Resident Inspector 97iii40i96 97iii0 050003ib iiillllllllllllllllltlllilllllllll PDR ADOCK S PDR

NRC FORH 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY 'IIITH THI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWAR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMHENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TH

NFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWOR REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE 0 HANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) Page 1 of3 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant- Unit 2 50-316 TITLE <4)

Control of Vital Area Lost Due to Personnel Error SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAHE DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY NUMBER NUMBER None 10 09 97 97 --

S001 00 10 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERA'I IN G MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71(b)

POWER 100 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(v)

LEVEL (10) 20. 2203(a) (2) ( I ) OTHER (Specify in 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) and in Text, NRC Form 366A) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

NAHE TELEPHONE NUMBER <Include Area Code)

Mr. Pat Russell, Plant Protection Manager 616/465-5901, x3370 REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT HANUFACTURER To HPRDS TO NPRDS EXPECTED SUBMISSION YES X NO DATE 15 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten'lines) (16)

On October 9, 1997 at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, the control of a vital area was lost contrary to 10CFR73.55(d)(7)(i)(B). The missiles blocks that made up a portion of the physical boundary around the vital area containing the spent fuel pit were removed without establishing compensatory measures. Control of the vital area was reestablished at 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br /> the same day. Notification of this event was made in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) at 1909 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.263745e-4 months <br /> on October 9, 1997. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(d).

The cause for this event was determined to be personnel error. The personnel involved have reviewed the event and were retrained on the criteria for vital area breach conditions. The procedure which controls the removal of the missile block has been modified to include steps to notify Plant Protection of missile block removal and the need for a continuous compensatory security post.

During the period the breach existed the Spent Fuel Pit area was under surveillance by closed circuit television monitored in the security alarm stations. Alarm station operators monitor activities and would have responded to actions deemed inappropriate. The event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT CONTZNUATZON FORWARD COMHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHEN'I BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENI'ND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-316 97 S001 00 2OF3 TEXT (if more soeoe is e'siieo. ~se eo."is;we) iRC =o~2V>"s) I: i Conditions Prior to Event Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown.

Descri ion of Even On October 9, 1997 Unit 2 was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown. Work was underway which required access to the Unit 2 containment via the personnel hatch located next to the spent fuel pit area. This work had been ongoing for approximately four weeks.

The personnel hatch, which is the entrance to upper containment, is protected by a structure made up of missile blocks. The blocks are arranged to enclose the hatch and access to the hatch is through the structure formed by the blocks. The hatches for both units are located at the same elevation as the spent fuel pit with the spent fuel pit located between and slightly east of them. The vital area barrier consists of a fence running from the inner wall of one unit's upper containment personnel hatch protective structure to the other. With removal of the missile blocks between the hatch and the spent fuel pit, access to the spent fuel pit was possible from the upper containment hatch area by passing around the end of the fence.

On the day of the event, the missile blocks around the Unit 2 upper containment personnel hatch were removed in preparation for the upcoming refueling of the unit. Removal of the blocks began at approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> with compensatory measures being provided by the same security personnel who were controlling access to Unit 2 upper containment.

At approximately 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> the containment access security officer was informed by the workers that they were finished for the day. Following the routine established over the previous weeks the security officer called the Shift Security Supervisor for permission to close the post. Permission was granted and a second security officer was dispatched to functionally test the alarms and secure the gate to containment. Following the checks by the second officer the post was secured at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />. With the closing of this post the control over the spent fuel pit vital area was lost.

During turnover the missile block removal was reviewed by other security supervisors and it was determined a breach existed in the physical barrier around the spent fuel pit vital area. Actions were taken immediately to implement compensatory measures. The required compensatory measures were implemented at 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br /> the same day, with the stationing of a security officer to control access to the spent fuel pit vital area. The vital area access was uncontrolled for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 28 minutes.

The cause of the event was personnel error. The loss of control resulted from a failure to recognize or effectively communicate the need for compensatory measures. The expectation prior to the this event was that security personnel, at all levels of the organization, would recognize changing plant conditions and take appropriate actions.

P

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB HO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY IIITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECI'IOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT CONTINUATION FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,

'WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

YEAR SEOUENTIAL REVISION Cook Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 50-316 97 S001 00 3OF3 TEXT (if cere spsee ss ~ec~irec. ~se e".cisierel %C src 366~'s>:IT}

Anal sis of Event On October 9, 1997 at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br />, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 both in Mode 5, the control of the spent fuel pit vital area was lost contrary to 10CFR73.55(d)(7)(i)(B). The missiles blocl(s that made up a portion of the physical boundary around the vital area containing the spent fuel pit were removed without establishing compensatory measures.

Control of the vital area was reestablished at 1817 hours0.021 days <br />0.505 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.913685e-4 months <br /> the same day. Notification of this event was made in accordance with 10CFR73.71(b)(1) at 1909 hours0.0221 days <br />0.53 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.263745e-4 months <br /> on October 9, 1997. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR73.71(d).

Surveillance 'of the spent fuel pit vital area is augmented by closed circuit television which is monitored in the Security Alarm Station. Alarm station operators periodically monitor activities in the area and would have responded to actions deemed inappropriate during the time control over the spent fuel pit vital area had been lost. The loss of access control to the spent fuel pit vital areas did not result in a safety concern, nor did it create a hazard to the health and safety of the public.

Corrective Actions The event occurred due to personnel errors. The officers involved understand what failures occurred and how our defense in depth strategy should have identified and prevented this event from occurring. All security personnel were briefed on the chain of events that led up to the actual loss of.control of the access to this vital area.

1 The procedure which controls the removal of the missile blocks has been modified to include the notification of Security that the missile blocks are going to be removed. Additionally, a sign-off was included for the security officer stationed to provide the compensatory measure. This provides for the notification prior to missile block removal and-ensures that a security officer is in place to provide compensatory action prior to removal of the missile blocks.

Failed Com onent Identification None Previous Similar Eve ts None

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