ML17331A714

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Summary of 810318 Meeting W/Utils Re Hydrogen Control Measures & Survivability of Equipment within Containments. Attendance List & Handouts Encl
ML17331A714
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/1981
From: Miner S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8105110619
Download: ML17331A714 (15)


Text

11 Docket Nos 50-3 and

-316 APR Z0 )98)

LICENSEE:

Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (IKMEC)

FACILITY:

Donald C.

Cook Unit Nos.

1 5 2

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SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEFTING HELD ON MARCH 18, 1981 HITH ISMEC AND AMERICAN ELECTRIC POllER SERVICE COMPANY TO DISCUSS HYDROGEN CONTROLMEASURES FOR THE DONALD C.

COOK CONTAINMENTS AND THE SURVIVABILITYOF EQUIP-MENT MITHIN THE CONTAINMENTS By letter dated February 20, 1981 IMEC committed to install an Interim Distributed Ignition System (IDIS) in D. C. Cook for hydrogen control in the containments.

The letter further stated that I8MEC would be ready to have a technical meeting with the NRC staff on March 12, 1981 to discuss the hydrogen control measures.

The meeting was, held March 18, 1981.

The attendee list is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The meeting was divided into two sessions.

The first part concerned the design and the schedule for the installation and activation of'the hydrogen control system (IDIS).

The seco'nd part dI:ocused on the survivability of equip-ment necessary following a hydrogen burn'o achieve and maintain safe shutdown' conditions.

1.

H dro en Control Measures The portion of the IDIS system in the containment will be installed-during the next refueling outage for each unit.

A total of 68 igniters in two

.-trains (34 ehch, Craik)'ill'be instaIled.'he-.design criter5a,'"ma)or desfgn parameter s and the location of the igniters ar e'~IIown in Enclosure 2.

A comparison of the IDIS designs for the Cook plant viith those at McGuire and Sequoyah is shown in Enclosure 3.

As noted previously, AEP stated that in containment portion of the IDIS System will be installed during the upcoming refueling outage for both plants.

However, they also indicated that the out-of-containment portion of the system will be installed later.

Material for this had just recently been ordered and delivery is not expected for about 3 months.

Considering installation time it was roughly estimated (at the meeting) that the IDIS will not be ready for activation until sometime this fall.

Unit No.

2 was shutdown for refueling March 13, 1981 and is expected to startup in May.

Untt No.

1 is expected to be shutdown In dune and should be ready to startup Pc" q 6 to 8 weeks later; I8X051Z 0( ig OFFICEI SURNAME) 0ATE P NRC FOPM SI8 IIO/80) NRCM 0240, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY.

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R The next quarterly report is due to be submitted early in April.

AEP indicated they will include in the reports the information necessary for our review.

We made the following comments:

1.

We asked AEP to provide a firm schedule for installation, check out and ready for activation of the IDIS System.

2.

Any plan to have the IDIS ready for activation this fall is unacceptable.

Our position is that the hydrogeh control system has'o complete and ready for activation prior to startup for each unit following the 1981 refueling outage.

3.

AEP should be cognizant of the developments at the McGuire hearing and the issues that were considered during the hearing.

For example, continuous burning in the upper plenum of the ice condenser compartment and the effect it could have on foam insulation should be investigated.

4.

AEP should have final version of a control system (see example DIS) installed and approved by the end of January 1982 (the same schedule as Sequoyah).

To meet this information required for NRC acceptance of the final control system should be submitted by June or July schedule 5.

AEP was advised to consider modifying the proposed system to locate igniters near the ceilings in various regions-of the containment in order to go in more advantage from upward flans propagation limits.

E ui ment Survivabilit AEP provided a preliminary list of equipment that is required following a hydrogen burn to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions (Enclosure 4).

We indi-cated for the interim system an evaluation of the ability of the equipment to survive would be sufficient.

For the Final System we indicated that the requirement for D.

C.

Cook is the same as for McGuire and Sequoyah, i.e.,:

(1) the licensee must develop reliable calculational methods and complete scotiing studies by June

1981, (2) establish a relationship between the environment of the available tests and the expected containment environment by June
1981, (3) perform scoping test due equipment prepared to hydrogen burn in D.C. Cool by June, 1981 and (4) qualify equip-ment need to survive the hydrogen burn to the expected conditons prior to January 31,

'i982.

AEP indicated that in the near future no additonal experimental information will be available in the time frame needed for the IDIS system.

Further experiment-al work is being planned and in progress and will be available to support the final control system.

Original ".Igned >V Sydney 'f<iillel Sydney Miner, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch

¹1 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees
2. Desi n Criteria....

OFF1CEQ SURNAME/

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3.

Compar

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MEETING

SUMMARY

"'MEC OPERATING REACTORS BRANCH NO.

1 DIVISION OF LICENSING March 18, 1981 DISTRIBUTION Docket File~ /i+

NRC PDR Local PDR ORB No.

1 Rdg File J. Olshinski J.

Heltemes, AEOD B. Grimes (Emergency Preparedness)

S.

Varga Project Manager OELD OI&E (3)

C. Parrish ACRS (10)

NRC Participant NSIC TERA

f. Case cc:

Licensee with short cc list

gy,R REOIc,

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/p 0**~4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 April 20, 1981 Docket Nos.

50-315 and 50-316 LICENSEE:

Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (I&MEC)

FACILITY:

Donald C.

Cook Unit Nos.

1 8

2

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON MARCH 18, 1981 WITH I8MEC AND AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE COMPANY TO DISCUSS HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES FOR THE DONALD C.

COOK CONTAINMENTS AND THE SURVIVABILITYOF EQUIP-MENT WITHIN THE CONTAINMENTS By letter dated February 20, 1981 IMEC committed to install an Interim Distributed Ignition System (IDIS) in D.

C.

Cook for hydrogen control in the containments.

The letter further stated that I8MEC would be ready to have a technical meeting with the NRC staff on March 12, 1981 to discuss the hydrogen control measures.

The meeting was held March 18, 1981.

The attendee list is enclosed (Enclosure 1).

The meeting was divided into two sessions.

The first part concerned the design and the schedule for the installation and activation of the hydrogen control system (IDIS).

The second part focused on the survivability of equip-ment necessary following a hydrogen burn'o achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions.

1..

H dro en Control Measures The portion of the IDIS system in the containment will be installed during the next refueling outage for each unit ~

A total of 68 igniters in two trains (34 each train) will be installed.

The design criteria, major design parameters and the location of the igniters are shown in Enclosure 2.

A comparison of the IDIS designs'or the Cook plant with those at McGuire and Sequoyah is shown in Enclosure 3.'s noted previously, AEP stated that in containment portion of the IDIS System will be installed during the upcoming refueling outage for both plants.

However, they also indicated that the out-of-containment portion of the system will be installed later.

Material for this had just recently been or dered and delivery is not expected for about 3 months.

Considering installation time it was roughly estimated (at the meeting) that the IDIS will not be ready for activation until sometime this fall.

Unit No.

2 was shutdown for refueling March 13, 1981 and is expected to startup in May.

Unit No.

1 is expected to be shutdown in June and should be ready to startup 6 to 8 weeks later.

The next quarterly report is due to be submitted early in April.

AEP indicated they will include in the reports the information necessary for our review.

We made the following comments:

l.

We asked AEP to provide a firm schedule for installation, check out and ready for activation of the IDIS System.'.

Any plan to have the IDIS ready for activation this fall is unacceptable.

Our position is that the hydrogen control system has to complete and ready for activation prior to startup for each unit following the 1981 refueling outage.

3.

AEP should be cognizant of the developments at the McGuire hear ing and the issues that were considered during the hearing.

For example, continuous burning in the upper plenum of the ice condenser compartment and the effect it could have on foam insulation should be investigated.

4.

AEP should have final version of a control system (see example DIS) installed and approved by the end of January 1982 (the same schedule as Sequoyah).

To meet this 9ate information required for NRC acceptance of the final control system should"be submitted by"June or July;:

5.

AEP was advised to consider modifying the proposed system to locate igniters near the ceilings in various regions of the containment in order to go in more advantage from upward flans propagation limits.

E ui ent Survivabilit AEP provided a preliminary list of equipment that is required following a hydrogen burn to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions (Enclosure 4).

AEP indicated that in the near future no additional experimental information will be available in the time frame needed for the IDIS system.

Further -experimental work is being planned and in progress and will be available to support the final control system.

We indicated for the interim system an evaluation of the ability of the equipment to survive would be sufficient.

For the Final System we indicated that the require-ment forD. C.

Cook is the sa'me as for McGuire and Sequoyah, i.e.,:

(1) the licen-see must develop reliable calculational methods and complete scoping studies by June

1981, (2) establish a relationship between the environment of the available tests and the expected containment environment by June
1981, (3) perform scoping

'est on equipment exposed to hydrogen burn in D. C.

Cook by June, 1981 and (4) qualify equipment need to survive the hydrogen burn to the expected conditions prior to January 31, 1982.

Sydney Miner, P oject Manager Operating Reactors Branch

¹1 Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees
2. Design Criteria....

3.

Comparison of Designs

4. Preliminary List cc w/enclosures See distribution list

.'!r. Joh" Dolan

. ndi ana and Michi ga n E1 ectri c Co~any cc:

Mr. Robert M. Jurgensen Chief Nuclear Engineer American Electric Power Service Corporation 2 Broadway New York, New York 10004 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.M.

liashinqton, D.

C.

20036 laude Preston Palenske Memorial Library 500 Market Street St.

Joseph, Michigan 49085 Nr.

D. Shaller, Plant Hanager Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant P. 0.

Box 458

Sridgman, Michioan 49106 U.

S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Resident Inspectors Office 770 Red Arrow Highway Stevensvi lie, Michigan 49127

.Mill'am J.

Scanlon, Esquire 2034 Pauline Boulevard Ann Arbor, Michigan 48103

ATTENDANCE LIST -

H CONTROL Enclosure 1

NRC Sydney Miner J.

W. Shapaker C.

G. Tinkler W.

R. Butler BECHTEL Steve Kline AEPSC Kelvin Shiu Stephen J. Milioti K. J. Vehstedt NRC Sydney Miner P.

R. Matthews.

R.

G.

LaGrange F. Orr Z.

R. Rosztoczy E UIPMENT SURVIVABILITY AEPSC K. J. Vehstedt Stephen J. Milioti Kelvin Shiu BECHTEL Steve Kune

Enclosure 2

INTERIM DISTRIBUTED INGNITION SYSTEM DESIGN CRITERIA

- All igniters are located in areas well mixed by the hydrogen skimmer/air re-circul ation system.

- hll igniters are located above maximum flood-up level.

- All DIS cable inside containment will be in conduit.

- All DIS components will be seismically mounted (SSE).

- Trains "A" and "B" of the DIS are to be electrically isolated from each other.

MAJOR DESIGN PARAMETERS

- A total of 68 igniters; 34 per train

- 12 on outside of biological shield wall 2 in vicinity of PRT 4 in each of the two fan/accumulator rooms 2 in each SG/PZR enclosure (total of 10) 12 in upper volume

'dome area 2 on each SG/PZR enclosure (total of 10) 14 distributed in I.C. upper plenum

- Manual activation

- flormal and emergency power from ESF source

- Igniter "box" meets HEMA-4 specifications

- Utilizes GMAC model 7G glow plugs and Dongan transformers as were tested 9 Fenwal

SUBJECT COMPARISON OF DIS DESIGNS COOK PLANT HcGUIRE Enclosure 3

SE UOYAH No. of Igniters Igniters Igniter Assembly Igniter Mounting 68 GHAC 7G Seismic 62 GHAC 7G

-No Significant Differences-Seismic 45 GMAC 7G TVA "1-L" Igniter Locations

(

--Similar Locations Distributed Throughout Containment )

No. of Trains Power Supply Control Location of Control DIS Specific; 600V ESF Bus (EDG)

Manual Main Control Room or Auxi 1 iary Bui 1 ding Part of Standby Lighting (EDG)

Manual Aux. Building Part of Standby Lighting (EDG)

Manual Aux. B'uilding Clasix Analysis Temperature Reduction Due to LV Spray No Significant Differences- - - -)

ICC/"l<YDROGEN BURN" E UIPHENT*

Enclosure 4

Item SG Hr Level PZR Level PZR Pressure CT Sump Level Core Exit t/cs Loop RTDs RCS WR Pressure CT Pressure PORV/SV Indication PORV Block Valves Solenoids on PZR PORVs Air Return Fans H2 Skimmer Inlet Valves H2 Recombiners DIS Components ualification LOCA/NSLB LOCA/HSLB LOCA/NSLB IEEE-323 Engineering judgement LOCA/HSLB LOCA/NSLB LOCA/NSLB LOCA LOCA/HSLB LOCA/HSLB LOCA LOCA/HSLB Comment 2 of 3 per generator below flood-up In Instrument Room - Will not see burn In Instrument Room - Will not see burn Submerged

- Will not see burn Utilize fire retardant cables Below flood-up - Will not see burn Transmitter is Outside Containment Confirmatory Information; Hot Vital Peak "Clasix Temp." Below HSLB Temp.

Functionally not required following burn

  • Inside Containment

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