ML17331A043
| ML17331A043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1993 |
| From: | Burdick T, Jacqwan Walker NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17331A042 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-OL-93-01, 50-315-OL-93-1, NUDOCS 9302230072 | |
| Download: ML17331A043 (10) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY 'COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-315/OL-93-01 Docket Nos.
50-315i 50-316'icenses No. DPR-58; DPR-74 Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name,:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and
-2 Examination Administered At:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Training Center P. 0.
Box 458
'ridgman, MI Examination Conducted:
Week of January 25, 1993 Examiners:
Contract Contract
- Examiner, Mark Parrish, INEL Examiner, Bill Steinke, INEL Chief Examiner:
P hn R. Walker Date Approved By:
Thomas M. Burdock, Chief Operator Licensing Section 2
g eZ Da e Examination Summar Examination Administered on week of Januar 25 1993 Re ort No. 50-315 OL-93-01 DRS Written and operating requalification examinations were administered to six Senior Rea'ctor Operators (SROs) and six Reactor Operators (ROs).
Two crews comprised of three SRO and three RO operators each were evaluated on the simulator portion of the NRC examination.
In addition, initial examination retakes (written portion only) were administered to one SRO and one RO on January 13, 1993.
Results:
All crews satisfactorily passed the NRC requalification examination.
Six ROs and five SROs passed all sections of their examinations.
One SRO failed the Job Performance Measures (JPM) portion of the examination.
In 93022300?2 930212 PDR ADOCK 05000315 V
accordance with the criteria of NUREG-1021, Revision 6,
~0 erator Licensin Examiner Standards, ES-601, the Donald C.
Cook Requalification Training Program was rated as satisfactory.
One SRO and one RO passed the initial retake examinations.
The following is a summary of the strengths and weaknesses noted during the performance of this examination.
Stren ths 0
Both crews made good use of alarms and alarm response procedures where appropriate.
Both crews use of extra personnel was effective in combating various failures.
(For details see Section 3)
Both crews reacted well to events occurring in both units simultaneously.
(For details see Section 3)
Weaknesses Communications on one of two crews were weak with little or improper feedback.
At times information was not being freely exchanged.
(For details see Section 3)
One crew made an unnecessary EOP transition resulting in a delay in recovery of the plant.
(For details see Section 3)
REPORT DETAILS l.
Examiners
- +John R. Walker; Chief Examiner, NRC,.Region. III Mark Parrish, INEL Bill 'Steinke, INEL 2 ~
Persons Contacted
~Facilit
+Ken R. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager, Production
+J.
R.
- Sampson, Operations Superintendent
+Joel S.
Wieke, Superintendent Safety and Assessment
- +Paul F. Carteaux, Training Superintendent
- +William R. Burgess, Simulator Supervisor
- +William J. Davidson, Administrator
- +William A. Nichols, Operations Training Supervisor
- +David G. Seipel, Senior Training Instructor
- +Scott F. Vince, Senior Training Instructor U.
S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission NRC Thomas Burdick, Chief, Operator Licensing Section 2
Jim Isom, Senior Resident Inspector
+David Passehl, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the Training Staff exit meeting on January 28, 1993.
3
~
+Denotes those present at the Management exit meeting on January 28, 1993.
Re uglification Trainin Pro ram Observations a
The DC Cook training program was found to be adequate in providing the necessary training to ensure that the licensed operators maintained the qualifications necessary to operate the facility in a safe and legal manner.
The following information is provided for evaluation by the licensee via their System Approach to Training (SAT) based training program.
No response is required.
a.
Written Examination
~
The examinations were well planned to ensure proper length and content.
The static portion of the examination essentially met the Examiner Standard guidance.
Weaknesses:
~
The Part B portion of the written examination required extensive modification.
Many questions were unclear regarding the knowledge that was being elicited.
Rewording was required to ensure that the questions were clear and concise.
Many questions on Part B were considered to have no real operational relevance or discrimination value.
The following are two examples of these type of"questions.
In order to isolate a leaking in-core detector. tube the
'seal table valve is closed.
How do you prevent tube damage when closing the valve?
a
~
b.
c ~
d.
Use a torque wrench Close until hand tight, then rotate 3-5 more turns.
Use 30-35 rotations for closure.
Close until leak. detection alarms clears.
ANSWER:
c.
Which one of the following provides a positive isolation point?
'a ~b.
cd.
Check valve Manual valve Air operated fail open valve Elevation difference ANSWER:
b.
The first question has little relevance to safe operation of the plant.
The question fails to elicit knowledge that discriminates between a competent and incom etent o erator.
p p
The second question deals with a knowledge level below that. required to determine if an operator is minimally competent.
In all cases, examination questions, should.=
be developed to test the ability of the operator to perform his or her job at least a minimum competency level.
These two questions fail to adequately test at that level.
b.
Job Performance Measures JPMs Stren ths Weaknesses:
~
No strengths or weaknesses were observed in this category during this examination.
c ~
D namic Simulator Scenarios Stren
~
Both crews made good use of alarms and alarm response procedures where appropriate.
~
Personnel, in general, knew locations of control board components.
~
Both crews made effective use of extra personnel though in some cases it was requested earlier than would be expected in an actual situation (assuming minimum shift administrative manning).
For example, during scenario RQ-E-1708, the first event was an oil leak on the East Main Feed Pump.
This required a power, reduction to 60> be performed.
The Assistant Shift Supervisor and Second Reactor Operator from unit one were immediately called in.
A power reduction is a routine evolution which should not require the extra personnel to be accomplished.
~
Both crews reacted well to events occurring in both units simultaneously.
The facility stated that dual unit problems had been used in training, but that support for the second unit had not been a part of the evaluation process.
The exam was conducted more realistically with a call for.
support from the other unit, initiating the dual unit event.
Weaknesses:
~
Communications on one of two crews were poor at times due to little or improper feedback.
Communications at times demonstrated the lack of freely exchanging necessary information for decision making.
This delayed some actions and caused other unnecessary actions to be taken.
4 ~
Trainin One crew made an unnecessary EOP transition resulting 'in a delay in recovery of the plant.
During a small break LOCA with a Steam Generator Tube Rupture, the crew tr'ansitioned to E-2, "Faulted Steam.Generator Isolation" upon the assumption that all four steam generators were depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner.
Upon followup questioning of the crew, by both the facility and NRC evaluators, the crew realized
. that the steam generators had not been depressurizing in an uncontrolled manner..
This added a delay in completing the actions of E-3 and making the proper ECA transition.
0 erations Securit Rad Protection
~
In general, the facility evaluators did a good job of evaluating and identifying concerns with both individuals and crews.
~
Cooperation between the facility and the NRC evaluation teams was good.
This helped to ensure an adequate
-and fair examination for all personnel.
~
The variance between the NRC and the facility grading on the written and operating portions of the examination conformed with existing standards.
~
Cooperation between the training and operations departments appeared to be strong.
This ensured that the content of the examination met the needs of both the Examiner Standards and the operations department.
k Weaknesses:
J
~
Some instances of unintentional cuing were identified during the administration of JPMs.
These instances were, in most cases, communicated to the evaluators involved by the NRC for correction.
5.
~
No JPMs were identified as being applicable at the SRO level only.
Though this is not a requirement, it does allow the SROs to be examined closely in the specific areas in which they function.
Simulator Observations No simulator discrepancies were identified during this examination.
Two cases were identified in which personnel errors caused problems with the simulator.,
~
During one morning scenario the Radiation Monitoring Section of 'the simulator stopped working properly.
This was. caused by a simulator technician requesting a
printout of data in'he computer room.
~
During the same scenaiio in the afternoon session the core model quit working.
This was also later identified as a simulator technician error.
In both cases the events occurred late'in the scenario so that the events did not invalidate the examination.
The facility is installing administrative safeguards to prevent this from happening again.
Initial License Trainin Pro ram Observations The initial training program was evaluated based on the administration of two initial written retakes.
Both the RO and the SRO successfully passed the examination-.
Based upon these two examinations only, the initial training program appears to have adequately provided remedial training for NRC license candidates.'xit Meetin A preliminary exit meeting with the facility training department was held at the DC Cook training center on January 28, 1993; and a final exit meeting with DC Cook Nuclear Plant management was held at the DC Cook training center on January 28, 1993.
Those attending the meetings are listed in Section 2 of this report.
The following items were discussed during the exit meeting:
~
Strengths and weaknesses noted in this report.
~
The general observations relating to, the
'equalification program as noted in Section 4.
The preliminary rating 'of. the DC Cook Nuclear plant requalification training, program was presented at the exit meeting.
The facility was informed that the results will be documented in this examination report.
ENCLOSURE 2
RE UALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT Facility:
Examiners:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
John R. Walker, Chief Examiner Mark Parrish, Contract Examiner, INEL Bill Steinke, Contract Examiner, INEL Date of Evaluation:
. Week of January 25, 1993 Areas Evaluated:
X Written X
Oral X
Simulator Examination Results:
RO SRO Total Evaluation Written Exam:
6/0 6/0 12/0 Operating Exam Oral Simulator 6/0 6/0 5/1 6/0 11/1 12/0 Evaluation of facility written examination grading Crew Examination Results:
Crew 1
Crew 2
Operating Examination Overall Pro ram Evaluation Pass Pass Satisfactory
ENCLOSURE 3
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility:
D.C.
Cook Nuclear Power" Station
'ocket Nos.
50-315; 50-316 Operating Tests Administered On:
Week of January 25, 1993 P
The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the January, 1993, requalification examination.
These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval-of the simulation facility other than to provide information which may be used in future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating
- tests, the following items were observed:
ITEM None DESCRIPTION None
ENCLOSURE 4
FACILITY COMMENTS AND NRC RESOLUTION OF COMMENTS UESTION 85 on the SRO RO:
I IF 2-OHP 4023.ES-0.2 "Natural Circulation Cooldown" has been entered from OHP 4023.ES-0.1 "Reactor Trip Response,"
which ONE of the following indications is used to recognize void formation in the reactor vessel head?
a.
Pressurizer level increasing and RVLIS Upper Plenum Indication greater than 934.
b.
Pressurizer level decreasing and Indication. greater that 100%.
RVLIS Upper Plenum c.
RCS pressure less than 1000 psig and pressurizer level decreasing.
d.
RCS pressure less that 1000 psig and RVLIS Upper Plenum Indication greater than 1004.
ANSWER: 085 (1.00).
b.
REFERENCE:
2-OHP 4023.ES-0.2, Rev.
2, Page 9, Step 14 RO-C-ER04, Rev 1.
Page 33, Objective 16.
FACILITY COMMENT:
This question was commented on dur'ing the pre-examination review conducted the week of January 5, 1993.
.The attached page from the original review indicates that distractors (b) and (d) were changed.
These changes made (a) the correct answer.
These'hanges were accepted by the Chief Examiner but the 'examination key was not changed.
Request that the answer key for this question be changed to (a) and the examination be graded accordingly.
NRC RESOLUTION:
Comment accepted Key changed.