ML17329A395
| ML17329A395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1992 |
| From: | Burdick T, Shembarger K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17329A394 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-OL-92-01, 50-315-OL-92-1, NUDOCS 9202280196 | |
| Download: ML17329A395 (8) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COViNISSION REGION III Report No. 50-315/OL-92-01 Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316 Licenses No. NPR-58; NPR-74 Licensee:
Indiana t1ichigan Power Company 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, OH 43216 Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant Examination Administered At:
D. C.
Cook Examination Conducted:
Weeks of January 6,
20 and 27, 1992 Chief Examiner:
K.
S em arger D te Approved By:
T. H.
ur ic,
C le Operator Licensing Section 2
D e
Examination Summar Examination administered durin the weeks of Januar 20 and 27 1992 e ort o.
1 to erg t reactor operators an twe ve senior reactor operators.
In a dstion, during the week of January 6, 1992, an initial simulator retake exam was administered to one reactor operator candidate and an initial written retake exam was administered to one reactor operator candidate.
Results:
All individuals and crews passed the requalification examinations.
BBotl initial reactor operator candidates passed the retake examinations.
Generic Stren ths and Weaknesses:
Pro ram:
The D.C.
Cook Requalification Program exam banks, contain some wea nesses, primarily in the Part A and Part B question banks.
Overall, the exam banks satisfy the recommendations in NUREG-1021.
Administration of the exam by the training staff was very effective and efficient.
9202280l96
'720220 PDR ADOCK 05000315 V
JPH administration both in the plant and on the simulator went well.
JPH evaluators should provide the cues to the operator as written to ensure exam consistency and to ensure inadvertent prompting/cueing is avoided.
In addition, JPH evaluators should ensure followup questions are asked when the keyed response is not obtained and a more detai led response is all that is needed.
One question was deleted from a static exam following exam administration.
The facility should ensure that if concerns about a question are raised following exam preparation
- week, the concerns are brought to the attention of the NRC Chief Examiner to allow the issued to be addressed and resolved prior to exam administration.
The operators exhibited several knowledge and implementation weaknesses in regards to Emergency Operating Procedures during the dynamic simulator section of the exam (see section
- d. of this report for details).
Crew communications were weak at times during the dynamic simulator exam, which resulted in required actions being either delayed or not performed.
Some operators had difficulty during event classification with the use of the Emergency Plan Classification Procedure that currently exists.
Improvements in the wording of the procedure would allow the intent of the procedure to be more clear, and therefore would be an asset to the senior reactor operators during procedure implementation.
Overall, administration of all sections of the exam went very smooth.
Exam security was maintained at all times by the facility.
The depth in the training organization allowed for the use of multiple evaluators, which allowed the exams to progress with minimal delays.
0 erators:
The operators exhibited several Emergency Operating Procedure now e ge and implementation weaknesses, which resulted in marginal performance during the dynamic simulator exam.
In addition, communications between crew members, at times, were weak.
An operator failed to perform a cooldown of the RCS at a
maximum rate during a
SGTR event.
(This was a weakness that was also identified during administration of the initial retake examination.)
A crew failed to perform a depressurization of the secondary at a maximum rate during a loss of all AC power event.
A crew incorrectly transitioned to E-2, FAULTED STEAN GENERATOR ISOLATION and subsequently to E-l, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, following a steam line break outside containment and a
main steam isolation (which terminated the break and resulted in an increase in pressure in all steam generators).
A crew was unable to discriminate between an expected depressurization of the secondary due to the effects of cold SI flow during a large break LOCA event with operation of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater
- pump, and a depressurization of all steam generators due to all steam generators being faulted.
As a result, incorrect transitions to E-2, FAULTED STEAN GENERATOP, ISOLATION, and ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAN GENERATORS, were made.
A senior reactor operator was unaware that during an excessive cooldown event, auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators can be reduced to less than 240,000 PPH without implementing FR-H. 1,
RESPONSE
TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK.
A senior reactor operator was unaware that cooldown of the RCS during a
SGTR event must be terminated when 76K level in the pressurizer is reached, even though primary pressure has not yet been reduced to less than secondary pressure.
Although the Emergency Operating Procedure knowledge and implementation weaknesses did not result in adverse consequences during the administration of the scenarios, some of the identified weaknesses led to slow recovery from the events, and had the potential to degrade the condition of the plant.
REPORT DETAILS l.
Examiners T. Bardell K. Shembarger 2.
~Kit. I<c Section Chief 02/92 A
roved:
C. Hrsg Branch Chief 02/g 6/92-
SIIIIULATION FACILITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
D.
C.
Cook Facility Licensee Docket No. 50-315 Operating Tests Administered On:
Weeks of January 6,
20 and 27, 1992 During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were observed:
ITEN None DESCRIPTION