ML17326B145

Suppl 2 to App R Evaluation of Auxiliary Bldg HVAC Duct Penetration & Containment Seismic Gaps.

ML17326B145
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	08/31/1984
From:	ENGINEERING PLANNING & MANAGEMENT, INC.
To:
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ML17326B144	List: ML17326B143 ML17326B145
References
NUDOCS 8408170327
Download: ML17326B145 (52)

Text

UNITED STA TES NUCLEAR REGULA TOR Y COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-315 DOCKET NO. 50-316 SUPPLEMENT TWO 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R, SECTION IIIC UNITS 1 8r2.

lNjDIANA8r. MICHIGAN ELECYRIC COMPANY AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM AUGUST t 984

.0 8408i70327 ADOCK 050003i5 8408i3'DR F PDR

PLEASE NOTE: The hand-written information in this report was inadvertently left out of the final copy of the report supplied to us by our consultant. It will be included in all future copies.

HVAC DUCT PENETRATION ANALYSIS APPENVDIX R EVALUATION OF AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC DUCT PENETRATIONS AND CONTAINMENT SEISMIC GAPS FOR THE DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PlANT 1.0 Introduction In March 1983, a report entitled "Safe-Shutdown Capability Assessment and Proposed Modifications" was issued for the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The report identified the safe shutdown system requirements relative to the fire protection guidelines of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.

As a result of the continuing fire protection program upgrade and modification implementation program, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company identified the following areas of concern with respect to Appendix R conformance at the D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant:

1. Twenty-two ventilation duct penetrations pass through fire area floors/ceilings at various elevations and are not supplied wi'th fire dampers.

2. The fire zones/areas adjacent to the Containment Building have seismic gaps which separate the floors, ceilings and walls of these zones/areas from the Containment Building.

Each of these concerns has been evaluated separately to determine their impact on the plant safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire. The analysis addresses the following:

1. Location of safe shutdown components and circuits.

2. Method of safe shutdown compliance used in a zone/area of concern.

3. Existing and proposed fire protection capabilities.

4. Combustible loading of the zone/area of concern.

Page 1

The March 1983 submittal will be the primary source of information with more detailed data supplied as it relates to specific zones/areas. This analysis includes attached figures and tables to provide a better understanding of specific concerns. Each concern will have a methodology, evaluation and conclusion section.

2e0 Ventilation Duct Evaluation Methodolo This analysis has been completed to provide technical justification for not installing fire dampers in the ventilation system duct penetrations which communicate between fire areas vertically from elevation to elevation. The ventilation ducts associated with the 22 penetrations were located on HVAC drawings showing the entire flow path of each duct. Penetrations into zones/areas equipped with rated fire dampers were eliminated and what remained is depicted on Figures 1 through 8 attached.

The registers in the remaining ducts were located with the direction of the arrows on each defining whether it is

(~) or (g+) . Each figure represents the elevat iona of

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the Auxiliary Building showing both units. The circled numbers on the figures represent fire zones/areas found and the numbers next to the arrows indicate the register number found in corresponding I'ables 1 through 6. Only the fire zones/areas containing the ducting of concern are represented on the figures.

The figures are letter-coded to identify the fire area involved and defined at the boundaries with the unique markings. For Page 2

detailed boundaries of each fire area or zone and specific general arrangement drawings, refer to t he Section 2 F~res 2.1 P

through 2.11 of the March 1983 submittal. The figures are meant to indicate the presence of the duct or register in a fire zone/area and not to provide specific locations 'ithin the zone/area. Tables 1 through 6 identify the specific American Electric Power Service Corporation HVAC drawing number and the drawing coordinates to locate the registers.

The 22 duct penetrations and associated registers were evaluated individually as depicted on the figures. The registers within a zone/area were evaluated with respect to safe shutdown component and circuit locations. The March, 1983 submittal considered fire damage to safe shutdown systems, components and circuits within areas and zones. This same information will be utilized as appropriate to resolve issues arising from the register locations within a fire zone/area. The general approach was to 1) consider the effect on Section III.G.2 compliance, i.e., evaluate the damage to redundant safe shutdown equipment and/or circuits, and 2) consider the effect on Section III.G.3, i.e., evaluate damage to alternate shutdown equipment and/or circuits. Thus, where an individual duct communicated with different zones or areas, the duct penetrations and registers were evaluated to determine the impact on the two cases just described. Both cases consider area/zone communication between elevations and at the fire area/zone boundaries where the duct Page 3

penetration was not provided with a fire damper. The impact of ducts and registers on safe shutdown also considers the location of suppression and detection systems, the amount of combustible material in the zone/area, and particularly the provided method of safe shutdown as described in the March 1983 submittal.

The stairways communicating between elevations have been provided with automatic suppression systems to maintain elevations as separate fire areas. The mechanical and electrical ceiling/floor penetrations are being provided with seals in accordance with the March 1983 submittal.

The combustible loading values and surface areas presented are given for the entire fire area. Plant walkdowns have been performed and physical raceway location drawings have been evaluated to determine that the combustible loading in the fire areas evaluated is uniformly distributed through the area. Fire areas containing concentrated combustibles will be, specifically discussed in the evaluation of the area.

2.1 Evaluation of Fi ure 1 The exhaust duct represented on this figure is designed to remove warm air from various areas of Unit 1 and discharges to the air shaft at the north end of Fire Zone 44. This figure shows two duct penetrations (30"x26" and 72"x30"). The following summary tables provide the fire protection features and safe shutdown compliance methods for the zones/areas of concern.

Page 4

o Fire protection features Fire Area/Zone Detection Suppression I

Ionization Detectors Automatic Suppressionl System in Stairway only 6N Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler Ionization Detectors Aut'omatic Preaction I Spr inkier I I

I 44N Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction I Spr inkier I I

o Safe shutdown compliance methods Fire Area/Zone Compliance Methods Cables required for safe shutdown are being provided with fire wrapping.

6M One division of redundant safe shutdown cables for each unit is being provided with fire wrapping.

6N Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

44N Modifications are be,ing implemented to I provide alternative shutdown capability, I

Page 5

As shovn in Figure 1, the air shaft extends up to the 633 ft elevation where the exhaust fans, creating a negative pressure in the air shaft, expel the warm air to the atmosphere. Fire Zone 1, on the 573 ft elevation, is a portion of Fire Area A vhich also contains fire zones 1A through lH. The safe shutdovn components within this area (RHR pumps and associated cables) will be protected from fire as defined in the March, 1983 submittal. The ventilation duct registers in this area, as shovn on Figure 1, are located within the north section of Fire Zone 1, vhich only contains RHR pump cables. The cables vithin Fire Zone 1 required for safe shutdovn (RHR pump power cables) are being provided vith fire vrapping and thus vould not be affected by hot gases or combustion products from the ventilation registers in this fire zone. In addition, the fire area has a very low combustible loading (2666 BTU/ft ) with an equivalent fire severity of two minutes. The area also contains automatic detection vithin each fir'e zone. The mechanical and electrical penetrations through the ceiling to the 587 ft elevation are sealed including the 30"x26" ventilation duct exiting Fire Zone 1 into Fire Zone 6N.

Fire Zone 6N contains the duct penetrating from below as shovn in Figure 1. Fire Zone GN on the 587 ft elevation is a portion of Fire Area B, which also contains Fire Zones 6M, 6S, 5, 64A, 64B, 65A and 65B. Fire Zone 6N contains motor control centers as veil as various redundant safe shutdovn system Page 6

component cables for Unit l. However, Fire Zone 6N, as described in the March 1983 submittal, will be provided with alternate shutdown capability. The zone is also equipoed with automatic suppression and detection (enhanced since March 1983 submittal).

Fire Area B has a very low combustible loading (9331 BTU/ft )

with an equivalent fire severity of seven minutes. The automatic suppression system for Fire Area B contains approximately 168 sprinkler heads which provide coverage for approximately 23,600 ft . Five of the sprinkler heads are located within a ten foot 4

cylindrical radius of the duct penetration through the floor and additional sprinklers are located in the vicinity of the registers and remaining duct work. The fire area also contains approximately 36 ionization type detectors. The registers in the area with the exception of register 5 are all located in the north section (Fire Zone 6N). Register 5 is located in fire Zone 6M which contains redundant safe shutdown circuits and which have been provided with fire wrapping protection of one redundant division for each unit as described in the March 1983 submittal.

Fire Zone 6M is also provided with automatic suppression and detection. These systems in concert with installed fire wrapping provide adequate protection from hot gases and combustion products potentially transmitted through the ventilation system.

Fire Zone 6N is provided with seals in the mechanical and electrical ceiling penetrations to the 609 ft elevation, including the ventilation duct exiting into Fire Zone 44N.

Page 7

Fire Zone 44N, located on the 609 ft elevation, is a part of the Fire Area C, which also contains Fire Zones 44S, 44A through 44H, and 37. Fire Zone 44N contains motor control centers and various redundant cables of systems required for safe shutdown.

As indicated on Figure l, all the registers are located in the north end. The large duct (72"x30") penetrating the floor from the 587 ft elevation has seven sprinkler heads at the 609 ft elevation within a ten foot cylindrical radius of the penetration. In total, Fire Area C contains approximately 240 sprinkler heads covering an area of approximately 20,000 ft The area also contains approximately 30 ionization type detectors. Adequate coverage for the duct and the registers is provided by these fire protection devices to ensure adequate protection from hot gases and combustible products potentially transmitted through the ventilation system. In addition, Fire Zone 44N will be provided with alternate shutdown capability. As indicated in Table 5-2 in Section 5 of the March l983 submittal, both Fire Zones 6N and 44N have the same systems and components potentially affected. Thus the communication of the two zones does not affect the compliance strategy nor the safe shutdown Fi'~< ~~<<C A~~ g~~ /u~ ~~gas).g/p

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~~~/p~) cuac, ~ Q ~ seuenrg~ opsia ~i~uP~m 2..2 Evaluation of Fi ure 2 Figure 2 has a similar duct configuration as Figure l, but represents Unit 2. This figure represents two duct penetrations (25"x28" and 36"x24"). The following summary tables provide the fire protection features and safe shutdown compliance methods for the zones/areas of concern.

Page 8

o Fire protection features I

I Fire Area/Zone Detection Suppression I

I Ionization Detectors Automatic Suppressionl in the Stairway only 6S Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler 6M Ionization Detect'ors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction I Sprinkler I

o Safe shutdown compliance methods Fire Area/Zone Compliance Methods Cables required for safe shutdown are being provided with Eire wrapping.

Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

6M One division of redundant safe shutdown cables for each unit is being provided with fire wrapping.

44S Modifications are being implemented to I provide alternative shutdown capability.

I Page 9

The fire zones are located within the fire areas previously described in the Figure 1 evaluation, so combustible loadings and fire severities are the same. The 573 ft elevation is the same as the Unit 1 side, including the cable and component configuration. The HVAC system configuration on the 587 ft elevation is similar to Unit 1. Fire Zone 6S will be provided with alternate shutdown capability and compliance in Fire Zone 6M is described in the Figure 1 evaluation.

The penetration through the floor to the 587 ft elevation within Fire Zone 6S has one sprinkler head to provide water suppression in the immediate vicinity of the vertical run. The penetration area of the 36"x24" duct is protected by four sprinkler heads in Fire Zone 44S within a ten foot cylindr ical radius of the duct to prevent duct related fire damage. Also, Fire Zone 44S will be provided with alternate shutdown capability with the exception of the component cooling water pumps which, as described in the March 1983 submittal, are protected to ensure the availability of at least two CCW pumps for safe shutdown.

2.3 Evaluation of Fi ure 3 Figure 3 has a similar configuration as Figure 2, but this figure represents a single duct with two penetrations (each 44"x24"). The following summary tables provide the fire protection features and safe shutdown compliance methods for the zones/areas of concern.

Page 10

o Fire protection features Fire Area/Zone Detection Suppression Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler 44S Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler 52 Ionization D'etectors I Automatic Preaction I l

Sprinkler I I I o Safe shutdown compliance methods Fire Area/Zone Compliance Methods 6S Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

52 Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

I The duct is part of the supply ventilation system coming from the 633 ft elevation down to the 587 ft elevation. As indicated on Figure 3, one register is on the 587 ft elevation in Fire Zone 6S. The shutdown method, fire protection features and combustible loading are described in the Figure 2 evaluation for this zone. The penetration in the ceiling of Fire Zone 6S is Page ll

protected by two sprinkler heads located in the 587 ft elevation within a ten foot cylind. ical radius of the duct penetration.

The duct from the floor to the ceiling within Fire Zone 44S is continuous with no register openings. Additional protection is provided by at least five sprinkler heads in the immediate vicinity of the duct in Fire Zone 44S. The duct penetrating into the 633 ft elevation has a register opening in the south end of Fire Zone 52, which is part of Fire Area D. The penetration through the floor into Fire Zone 52 has six sprinkler heads within a ten foot cylindrical radius of the duct. Fire Zone 52 has alternate shutdown provisions for the main steam system located outside Fire Area D, while all other safe shutdown systems within Fire Area D have at least one redundant train located outside the area. Cold shutdown systems require manual operation of valves which are also located outside of the area.

Fire Area D is equipped with automatic fire suppression and detection and contains approximately 222 sprinkler heads in Fire Zone 52 and approximately 87 spr inkier heads in Fire Zone 51.

Fire Area D has 39 ionization detectors, including 17 in Fire Zone 52. The two charcoal filter units in this fire zone are protected by automatic deluge systems actuated by a thermistor 6 1VCUlt ~

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2.4 Evaluation of Fi ure 4 rFigure 4 represents one duct penetration (30"x24") and is similar to Figures 2 and 3 (see Section 2.3). The exhaust duct shown communicates with r"ire Zones 6S and 44S, and is ducted to the air shaft yfi the extreme south end of rFire Zone 44S. The duct in Fire Zone 6S, has register openings, but is continuous with no register openings within Fire Zone 44S and is adjacent to the duct described in Figure 3. The sprinkler head arrangement is identical for both the ducts located in Fire Zone 44S as shown in Figures 3 and 4; therefore, the evaluation performed in Figure 3 applies to Figure 4.

For fire protect'on features and safe shutdown capability compliance methods, refer to Section 2.3, Fire Areas/Zones 6S and 44S.

2.5 Evaluation of Fi ure 5 Figure 5 represents two duct penetrations of the same size (52"x24") which communicate with Fire Zones 6N and 44N. The following summary tables provide the fire protection features and safe shutdown compliance methods for the zones/areas of concern.

o Fire protection features I

I Fire Area/Zone Detection Suppression I

6N Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler 44N Ionization Detectors Automatic Preaction Sprinkler Page 13

o Safe shutdown compliance methods I

I Fire Area/Zone Compliance Methods I

Modifications are being implemented to provide alternative shutdown capability.

44N Modifications are being implemented to I provide alternative shutdown capability. I I I The explanation of'safe shutdown, fire protection features, and combustible loadings are contained in the evaluation of Figure 1. The ducts shown are parallel to each other. The penetrations through the ceiling of Fire Zone 6N are protected by two sprinkler heads within a 16 foot cylindrical radius of the ducts. These ducts, as shown in Figure 5, are continuous in Fire Zone 44N with no register openings. Additional protection of the duct penetration is provided by two sprinkler heads each over the penetration from Fire Zone 44N into the supply air plenum.

2.6 Evaluation of Fi ure 6 Figure 6 represents one duct penetration (34"x30"). The duct, as indicated on Figure 6, enters the auxiliary cable vault in Unit 2 which is equipped with a rated fire damper. The duct continues from the auxiliary cable vault to Fire Zone 52 which is also equipped with a fire damper. For fire protection features and safe shutdown capability compliance methods refer to Section 2.3, Fire Zones 6S, 44S and 52. The duct penetration at the 609 Page 14

ft elevation is protected by the presence of three sprinkler heads within a ten foot cylindrical radius on the 6S side and two on the 44S side.

2.7 Evaluation of Fi ures 7 and 8 Figures 7 and 8 represent a total of l2 duct penetrations (four 45"x35", two 40"x40", two 36"x36", two 22" x 34" and two 28" x 34"), with Unit 2 being a mirror image of Unit 1 and each I

unit containing si.x duct penetrations. The following summary tables provide the fire protection features and safe shutdown compliance methods for the zones/areas of concern.

o Fire protection features Fire Area/Zone Detection Suppression 49 Ionization detectors Automatic deluge for and Thermistors for charcoal filter unit charcoal filter unit 50 Ionization detectors Automatic deluge for and Thermistors for charcoal filter unit charcoal filter unit 69 Ionization detectors Automatic deluge for and Thermistors for charcoal filter unit HVAC units Page 15

o Safe shutdown compliance methods Fire Area/Zone Compliance Methods At least one redundant division of safe shutdovn cables is located outside the fire area 50 At least one redundant division of safe shutdown cables is located outside the fire area 69 including I The locations contain no safe shutdown the HVAC vesti-I systems, components or cables.

bules on the I 650 ft eleva- I t ion I I

There are no registers or openings in the ducts shown on Figures 7 and 8, hovever, they do communicate from Fire Area D in Zones 49 (Unit 1) and 50 (Unit 2) to Fire Zone 69 including the HVAC vestibules at the 650 ft elevation. Fire Zones 49 and 50, as part of Fire Area D, have been analyzed for safe shutdovn vith

,the Section II1.G.2 compliance methods presented in the March 1983 submittal. Fire Zone 69 including the HVAC vestibules on the 650 ft elevation and the area in which they are contained have no safe shutdovn equipment or circuits located in them.

Fire Areas D and E were combined for the purposes of this analysis. Because Fire Area E contains no safe shutdown components or circuits, the combination of these areas does not change the method of safe shutdovn for Fire Area D. ~z'r(. A~a Ouel q l~w- ee eg~+A(w /OPAL>l(jg ~35 I If'/g z)> (~

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Page 16

3.0 Conclusions for Ventilation Duct Penetration Evaluation This analysis has been completed to provide technical justification for not installing fire dampers in the ventilation system duct penetrations which communicate between fire areas vertically from elevation to elevation. The fire protection features; e.g. suppression and detection systems and/or the low combustible loadings within these areas provide adequate assurance that fire damage related to ventilation ducting will not impair safe shutdown capability, The major emphasis, however, should be placed on the method of compliance and safe shutdown for each of the fire zones/areas involved. The center line fire zones on the 587 ft and 609 ft elevations will be provided with fire wrapping for safe shutdown circuits. The north and south portions of both elevations are being modified to provide alternate safe shutdown capability. Elevations 587, 609 and 633 have been modified to provide additional automatic suppression coverage. Also the registers between and within elevations have been evaluated and determined not to communicate between redundant safe shutdown components or circuits.

A single fire starting in one of the fire areas of concern, which are communicating through vertical undampered ducts, would not affect safe shutdown capability. The technical basis for this analysis is summarized below:

(1) Existing suppression systems in areas/zones which are provided with automatic suppression systems will extinguish the postulated fire and fire will not propagate outside of the area/zone.

Page 17

(2) Combustible loading contained in the fire areas/zones of concern is very low.

(3) In fire areas/zones which are not provided with automatic suppression systems, the required safe shutdown components and/or cables are being protected.

(4) A fire starting in an area could be assumed to propagate to the adjacent area through vertical undampered duct penetrations. However, safe shutdown outside of these areas still can be achieved using the unaffected train or alternate safe shutdown method, In conclusion, this analysis verifies that the safe shutdown system requirements relative to the guidelines of Appendix R are being met and the exemption from installation of fire dampers in the ventilation ducts is justified.

Page 18

4.0 Seismic Ga Evaluation Methodolo A seismic gap exists around the Containment Building of each unit vhich provides an opening of approximately 6" betveen the Containment Building and the walls, ceilings and floors of the structures immediately. adjacent to containment. The March 1983 submittal did not address the seismic gap when fire area boundaries vere defined. Thus, this evaluation has been performed to confirm that these seismic gaps in the fire boundaries do not affect safe shutdown capability.

The fire areas and zones adjacent to the perimeter of containment vhich contain seismic gaps are the folloving:

Fire Areas as Presented by Table 1-1 Fire Area Descri tion Elevation 7 Quadrant 1 Cable Tunnel 596 ft 8 Quadrant 4 Cable Tunnel 596 ft 10 Quadrant 3M Cable Tunnel 596 11 Quadrant 3S Cable Tunnel 596 ft 38 Quadrant 2 Cable Tunnel 612 ft Fire Areas as Presented by Table 1-2 Fire Area Descri tion Elevation 23 Quadrant 3N Cable Tunnel 596 ft 24 Quadrant 3M Cable Tunnel 596 ft 26 Quadrant 4 Cable Tunnel 596 ft 27 Quadrant 1 Cable Tunnel 596 ft 39 Quadrant 2 Cable Tunnel 612 ft Page 19

Fire Areas/Zones as Presented by Table 2-1 Fire Area/

Zone Descri tion Elevation 33B NESW Valve Area 612 ft 12 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel 596 ft 49 HVAC Vestibule 633 ft 69 Auxiliary Building 650 108 West Steam Valve Enclosure 612 ft Fire Areas/Zones as Presented by Table 2-2 Fire Area/

Elevation 34B NESW Valve Area 612 ft 22 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel 596 ft 50 HVAC Vestibule 633 ft 69 Auxiliary Building 650 ft 109 West Steam Valve Enclosure 612 ft The March 1983 submittal, the primary source of information for this analysis, con'tains additional information on the fire area and zone descriptions. The attached tables (l-l, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2) provide a summary of the evaluations performed on the areas or zones affected by seismic gaps.

The general methodology used was co evaluate the area/zone of concern in concert with the adjacent areas/zones on the left, right, and immediately above. The new area defined by this method (seismic gap evaluation area) was analyzed to determine the impact on safe shutdown components and circuits. Four fire areas, as previously defined in the March, 1983 submittal, contain multiple zones within the area and are part of this analysis.

Page 20

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The seismic gap evaluation areas only considers the zone or area immediately adjacent to the postulated fire area. This configuration assumes the seismic gap will allow communication between adjacent areas or zones. Due to distance, low combustible loading, location of combustibles and/or presence of detection and suppression systems the affect of the fire will not involve all areas and zones which communicate by seismic gaps.

Fire Zones 33 and 33A were not considered within the seismic gap evaluation as they are only adjacent to each other and Fire Zone 33B. Fire Zones 33, 33A and 33B were evaluated as one area in the March 1983 submittal. Fire Zone 33B is considered in this evaluation and includes Fire Zone 33A as part of the seismic gap evaluation area. The mirror image zones (34, 34A, 34B) in Unit 2 were considered in a similar manner. The communication between Fire Zones 49 and 50 is through Fire Zone 52 separated by over 150 feet. Fire Zone 51 is adjacent to 52. Fire Zones 49 (Unit

1) and 50 (Unit 2) are the only zones within the area which contain seismic gaps at the containment wall. The communication between fire zones 49 and 50 within this area was evaluated in the March, 1983 submittal. Fire Zone 52 is provided with automatic suppression and detection and thus provides adequate assurance that either a fire or related combustion products would be contained within Fire Zone 49 (the same configuration exists for Fire Zone 50). The fire'rea containing zones 3, 32, 36, 69, and 48 contain no safe shutdown equipment and could have been Page 21

included into a larger area but to minimize the size of fire areas these fire zones are considered as one area.

The compliance strategies (i.e., safe shutdown method) for each area or zone are maintained and used throughout the evaluation while taking into account additional considerations such as:

1. Distance between fire zones/areas

2. Location of combustibles

3. Combustible loading 4 ~ Detection and suporession systems 4.1 Evaluation of Tables 1-1 hnd 1-2, Five previously defined fire areas in each unit have automatic C02 suppression and detection systems in the area.

These areas are listed in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. The walls, floors, and ceilings of the ten areas (including both units) are constr'ucted to at least a l-l/2-hour fire rating. A seal in the seismic gaps provides a barrier for containing the gaseous suppression system. The seal is affixed to both the containment wall and the floor, ceiling or wall of the perimeter buildings.

The seal is made of glass fiber reinforced silicone sheeting and is a fire retardant material.

A fire originating within the areas containing automatic suppression would stay confined to that area and be extinguished by the automatic suppression system. Thus, each of these ten areas was evaluated as an isolated area based on the assumption that the fire within the areas containing suppression systems would be contained and extinguished in the area.

Page 22

4.2 Evaluation of Tables 2-1 and 2-2 Evaluations of areas or zones, wh*ich were not equipped with automatic suppression systems, considered the seal damaged in adjacent areas/zones (left, right and above) including those containing automatic suppression. Each newly defined evaluation area was reanalyzed on a safe shutdown system basis with the results presented in the system evaluation column in Tables 2-1 and 2-2. The areas and/or zones of concern which do not have automatic suppression systems have low combustible loadings and within the immediate vicinity of the seismic gaps are generally void of exposed fixed combustibles.

The zones/areas of concern are presented in Tables 2-1 and 2-2. Excluding the areas containing automatic suppression from the postulated fire location, the following combinations of areas/zones are evaluated:

Unit 1 Postulated Fire Locations and Associated Zones/Areas

l. 33B with 33A, 38, 108 and 49

2. 12 with 7, ll, 33B and 38

3. 49 with 69 and 108 69 with 108

5. 108 with 49 and 69 Unit 2 Postulated Fire Locations and Associated Zones/Areas

l. 34B with 34A, 39, 109 and 50

2. 22 with 27, 23, 34B and 39

3. 50 with 69 and 109

4. 69 with 109

5. 109 with 50 and 69 Tables 2-1 and 2-2 present the results of the system evaluation for each postulated fire location.

Page 23

5.0 Conclusion for Containment Seismic Ga Evaluation This seismic gap evaluation shows the safe shutdown capability for D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant (Units 1 and 2) has not been compromised as a result of seismic gaps. The analysis performed and the results presented in the tables indicate on a system basis, the capability to safely shutdown both units when considering fire damage to safe shutdown components and circuits contained in the seismic gap .evaluation areas. The method of analysis is conservative when considering the fire hazards involved in the vicinity of the seismic gaps. That is, it is not anticipated that the evaluated areas would be affected to the extent that fire would propagate through the seismic gaps and cause damage throughout the evaluation area. Combustion products would likely enter the adjacent areas or zones, however, damage to safe shutdown components and circuits would likely not occur.

ln any event, the analysis contained herein assumes the damage to safe shutdown components and circuits in the seismic gap evaluation area did occur and verifies that safe shutdown capability is maintained.

Page 24

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TABLE 1 AIR REGISTER LOCATION AIR REGISTER LOCATION DRAWING NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pump WL-4.5 8. W of WL-M 12-5713-4 Pipe Tunnel WL-4. 7 8, W of WL-M 12-5713-4 Drain Tank and Pun<p WL-5.3 It W of WL-M 1 2-57 13-4 Sump Pump Roo<n WL 4.5 8. E of WL L 12-57 13-4 Reactor Coolant Filter Unit 1 WL 5. 5 8 WL-M 12-5715-10 Valve Operating Gallery WL-3.6 8. WL-K 12-5715-10 Boric Acid Evaporating Roo<n WL 4 8 WL-K 12-5715-10 Seal water Injection Area WL 4.5 8 W ot WL-M 12-5715-10 Pipeway WL 4.5 8. WL-M 12-5715-10 10 Gas Decay Tank Room WL-4.6 8 W of WL-L 12-5715-10 Tunnel. Elevation 601 ft WL 5 8. W of WL-L 12-57 i 5-10 12 Volume Control Tank WL-5 8. E of WL-L 12-57 17-7 13 Concentrate Holding Tank WL-5.2 8. WL-K 12-57 17-7 14 Waste Gas Compressor Room WL-4.4 8. E of WL-K 12-5717-7 15 Concentrate Holding Tank WL-5.2 8. WL-K 12-5717-7 Page 1 of 1

TABLE 2 AIR REGISTER LOCAfION AIR REGISTER LOCATION DRAWING NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER Pipe Tunnel WL-7. 5 8 WL-M 12-5713-4 Reactor Coolant Drain Tank WI-7.3 8, WL-M 12-57 13-4 Sump Pump 8. Tank WL-7 8. WL-M 12-5713-4 Pipeway WL B 8, WL-M 12-5715-10 Seal Water Injection Filters WL 6 8 WL M 12-5715-10 ReaCtOr COOIant/Seal Wate( Filter WL-6.4 8. WL-hi 12-5/15-10 Monitor Tank Area Wf -0.4 8. WL-M 12-5717-7 Monitor Tank Area WL-B 8. WL-h'I 12-5717-7 Monitor Tank Area WL-7.6 8, WL-M 12-5717-7 10 Monitor Tank Area WL-7.3 8 WL-M 12-57 17-7 Volumn Control Tank Area WL-7 8. E of WL-M 12-57 17-7 12 Seal water Iieet Exchanger Area WL-7 8 E of WL-M 12-5717-7

TABLE 3 AIR REGISTER LOCATION AIR REGISTER LOCATION DRAWING NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER Behind MCC's on Elevation 587 WL-8 K E of WL-M 12-5715-10 I

Elevation 633 ft Uni t 2 Side WL-B.2 8. W of wL-M 12-57 19-7 Page 1 of 1

TABLE 4 AIR REGISTER LOCATION AIR REGISTER LOCATION DRAWING NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER Valve Gal lory Pipe Tunnel WL-7 8. W of WL-L 12-57 15- 10 Gas Decay Tank Room WL-7 It W of WL-L 12-5715-10 Boric Acid Evaporator WL-B 8. WL-K 12-5715-10 Valve Operat inO Gallery WL-B.5 8 WL-K 12-57 15-10 PaBe 1 of 1

TABLE 5 AIR REGISTER LOCATION AIR REGISTER LOCATION ORAWI NG NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER CVCS Facility WL-4.4 a WL-L 12-5715-10 CVCS Facility WL-4.4 8. WL-L 12-5715-10 Pape 1 of 1

TABLE 6 AIR REGISTER LOCATION AIR REGISTER LOCATION ORA WING NUMBER AREA COORDINATES NUMBER Monitor Puinps WL"B 8 WL-L 12-57 15- 10 PMUe 1 of

TABLE 1-1 UNIT 1 FIRE AREAS/ZONES PROTECTED BY AUTOMATIC C02 SUPPRESSION EQUIVALENT COMBUSTIBLE FIRE FIRE LOADI Ng AREA SEVERITY AREA~ (BTU/FT )- (FT ) I (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION Col Iht Err T 1 15. 031 9so I 88 C02 IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOMATIC C02 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATEO FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRARED ZONE ANO THE FIRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES I OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILI APPLY.

30 '95 1.SSO I 23 COZ IONIZATION EXISTlNG AUTOhlATIC COZ SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATEO FIRE It( THE AREA/

INFRARED ZONE AND THE F I RE WILL NOT PROPAGA lE OUTS I OE TYPES OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIAtrCE METHODS STILL APPLY.

10 103,542 800 78 COZ IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOh1ATIC C02 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTlNGUlSH ANY POSTULATED FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRARED ZONE AND THE FIRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE ARFA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE h1ETHODS STILL APPLY.

I 28,278 741 21 C02 IONIZATION I ExlsTIt<G AUT0MATlc c02 sUPPREssloN sYsTEM wILL AUTOhIATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATED FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRARED 20NE AND THE F IRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES I OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH. SEISMIC GAPS. THE I PREvlous sAFE sHUToowN cAPABILITY coMPLIANcE METHODS STILL APPLY.

38 39,181 2,650 I 29 C02 IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOMATIC CO2 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATED FIRE Itr THE AREA/

INFRARED I ZONE AND THE FIRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILL APPLY.

+FIRE AREAS AS DEF ItrED IN SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT OF MARCH 1983 SUBMITTAL PAGE 1 OF

TABLE 1-2 UNIT 2 FIAE ARFAS/ZONES PAOTECTED BY AUTOMATIC C02 SUPPRESSION EQUIVALENT COMBUSTIBLE FIRE FIRE LOADIN(I AREA SEVERITY AREA>> (BTU/FTi) I(FT2) (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION COMMENT 27 64,252 1,056 I C02 IGNI ZAT I ON EXISTING AUTOMATIC C02 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTUI.ATEO FIAE IN THE AREA/

INFAAREO 20NE AtID THE F IAE WILL NOT PAOPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIAtICE METHODS STjLL APPLY.

21, 747 2 '46 I COZ IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOMATIC COZ SUPPRESSION SYSTFM WILL AUTOMATI C AND EXTINGUISII ANY POSTULATED FIRE IN THE ARFA/

INFRAREO 20NE AND TtIE FIAE wlLL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOwN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILL APPLY.

24 77 '03 000 I 58 C02 IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOhIAT)C C02 SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATEO FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRAREO 20NE AND THE F IAE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE AAEA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILL APPLY.

23 27.630 640 I 21 COZ IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOh'IATIC COZ SUPPRESSIOtt SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATED FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRARED 20NE AND THE FIRE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF TtlE AREA/ZONE THROUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILL APPLY .

39 26 '30 3,667 I 21 C02 IONIZATION EXISTING AUTOMATIC COZ SUPPRESSION SYSTEM WILL AUTOMATIC AND EXTINGUISH ANY POSTULATED FIRE IN THE AREA/

INFRAAED I ZONE AND THE FIAE WILL NOT PROPAGATE OUTSIDE TYPES OF THE AREA/20ttE THAOUGH SEISMIC GAPS. THE PREVIOUS SAFE SHUTOOwN CAPABILITY COMPLIANCE METHODS STILL APPLY.

>>FIRE AREAS AS DEFINED Itt SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT OF MARCH 19B3 SUBMITTAL PAGE 1 OF 1

TABLE 2-1 UNIT 1 FIRE AREAS/ZONES OF CONCERN SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT EQUIVALENT POSTULATEO AREA/ZONE COMBUSTIBLE FIRE FIRE OF LOADINg )AREA SEVERITY LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FT ) I(FT2) (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 338 I NONE NONE FIRE ZONES 338, 33A. 38 108 ANO 49 ARE

~

COMBINED AS ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 33A AUTOMATIC THERMISTOR AVAILABILITYIS PRESENTFD BELOW:

DELUGE FOR FOR CHARCOAL MS - INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH CHARCOAL FILTER UNIT STEAM GENERATORS 1 AND 4 IS FILTER AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH MANUAL OPERATION OF ASSOC I ATEO h1RVs OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA.

39.161 l2.650 I 29 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION 2. AF TWO OUT OF THREE TRAINS OF THE AF C02 AND SYSTEMS ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE THE INFRARED EVALUATION AREA; THUS STEAM TYPES GENERATORS 1 AND 4 CAN BE SUPPLIED WITH AUXILIARY FEEOWATER.

3. RCS Tg AND Tg NORMAL INDICATIONS ARE 108 897 NONE NONE AFFECTED, BUT ALTERNATIVE INDICATION CAPABILITY IS BEING PROVIDED AS PRESENTED IN MARCH 65 '58 3.200 I 49 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION 1983 SUBMITTAL. AT LEAST ONE DELUGE FOR ANO TRAIN OF OTHER RCS PROCESS I CHARCOAL THERMISTOR MONITORING SYSTEM COMPONENTS IS FILTER FOR CHARCOAL LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION FILTER AREA. AREAR'XCEPT

4. CVCS- THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS ASSOCIATEO WITH THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION THE CABLE ASSOCIATEO WITH QRV-251, WHICH FAILS AT 50 GPh1 MINIMUM FLOW POSIT ION.

5. THE FOLLOWING SYSTEMS HAVE NO COMPONENTSI OR CIRCUITS IN THE EVALUATION AREA:

o ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER (ESW) o COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) o EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM (EPS) o RESIDUAL HEAT REh10VAL (RHR)

FIRE ZONES 33 33A AND 338 ARE CONTAINED IN A FIRE AREA

~ FOR WHICH THE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING IS 11,016 BTU/FT, AREA IS 2,890 FT AND EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY IS 8 MINUTES PAGE 1 OF 4

TABLC. 2-1 (continued)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA IAOJACENT I EQUI VALEttT IPOSTULATED IAREA/ZONE ive48u>TIBLE F IRE I FIRE OF LOAD IN(t AREA SEVERITY I LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FTc) (FT2) (MIN) SUPPRESSION D<TECTIOtq SYSTEM EVALUATION 12 515 17 ~ 812 NONE I NONE FiRE ZONE S 12. 7, >>, 338 AND 38 ARE COMBINED AS ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM I EVALUATION. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 115,031 960 AUTOMATIC ION I ZATION AVAILAB ILITY IS PRESEt<TED BELOWt C02 AND 1. MS AT LEAST ONE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUT-INFRARED OOwN COMPONENTS AttD CIRCUITS TYPES ASSOCIATEO WITH TtIIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF TtRE EVALUATION AREA.

28,278 741 21 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION 2. AF AT LEAST ONE TRAIN OF SAFE SHUT-C02 AND DOWN COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS OF INFRARED THIS SYSTEM ASSOCIATEO Wl Ttt TttE TYPES SAME UNAFFECTED MS TRAIN ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE FVALUATION AREA.

338 I NONE t<Ot~E 3. RCS Ttq ANO Tc t<ORMAL INDICATIONS ARE I AFFECTED, BUT AL'IERNATIVE INDI-CATION CAPABILITY IS BEIttG 38 39,161 I2,650 29 I AUTOMATIC IONIZATION PROVIDED AS PRESEttTED IN MARCH C02 AND 1983 SUBMITTAL. AT LEAST ONE INFRARED TRAIN OF OTHER SAFE SHUTDOWN TYPES PROCESS MONITORING SYSTCM COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA.

4. CVCS- THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS ANO CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITtt THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA. EXCEPT QRV-251, WHICH FAILS AT 50 GPM MINIMUM FLOW POSITION.

5. EPS AT LEAST ONE 1RAIN OF SAFE SHUT-DOwN COMPONENTS AttD CIRCUITS OF THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF!

THE EVALUATIOrt AREA. TttE ELSC LOCATEO IN TttE AREA, WttlCH COULD BE AFFECTED. SUPPLIFS POWER TO THE AFFECTED TRAItt OF SAFE StlUTDOWt1 INSTRUMENTATION 0)SCUSSED ABOVE.

6. RHR MANUAL OPFRATION OF TttE AFFECTED VALVES, WHICtt HAVE CABLES IN THE EVALUATION AREA, IS AVAILABLE.

(THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTlttUED ON TttE NEXT PAGE) 4 FIRE ZONES 33. 33A AND 338 ARE CONTAINED IN A FIRE AREA FOR WHICH THE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING IS 11,016 BTU/FT, AREA IS 2 ~ 890 FT2 ANO EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY IS 8 MINUTES PAGE 2 OF 4

TABLE 2-1 (co>>t inueu)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT EQUIVALEtlT POSTULATED AREA/ZONEI COMBUSTIBLE FIRE FIRE OF LOADINg iAREA SEVERITY LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FT ) I(FT ) (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 12 7. THE FOLLOWING. SAFE SHUTDOWN (cont.) AND CIRCUITS ARE LOCATEO SYSTEMS'OMPONENTS OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA:

o ESW o CCW 49 65 658

~ 3. 200 AUTDMATIC IONIZATION FIRE ZONES 49, 69 AND 108 ARE COMBINED AS DELUGE FOR ANO ONE AREA f'R THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION CHARCOAL THERMISTOR I REGARDING SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY I FILTER FOR CHARCOAL I ASSESSMENT. FIRE ZONES 49 ANO 69 CONTAIN F I LTEA NO SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS'OMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS LOCATED IN THIS EVALUATION 69 1,314 17.914 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION AAEA ARE THE COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS I DELUGE FOR aNO LOCATEO IN FIRE ZONE 108 FOR WHICH HVAC UNIT THERMI STORS COMPLIANCE METHOD IS PRFSENTED Itl 1983 I FOA HVAC SUBMITTAL.

I UNITS 108 897 NONE I NONE 69 1,314 17,914 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION FIRE ZONES 69 AND 108 ARE COMBINED AS DELUGE FOR AND ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION HVAC UNIT THEAtlISTOAS I REGARDING SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY I FOR ttVAC I ASSESSMENT. FIRE ZONE 69 CONTAINS NO UNITS SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS. COMPONENTS AND I CIACUITS. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COh'IPOtlENTS I AND CIRCUITS LOCATED IN THIS EVALUATION 108 897 I 0 NONE Not<E AREA ARE THE COMPONENTS AND CIRCuiTS LOCATEO IN FIRE ZONE 108 FOR WHICH COM-PL latlCE METHOD IS PRESENTED IN 1983 SUBMI'TTAL.

PaGE 3 OF 4

TABLE 2-1 (coiitinueu)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT EQUIVALENT POSTULATEO AREA/ZONE I COMBUSTIBLE FIRE F IRE OF LOADIN('t IAREA SEVERITY LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FTc) (FT ) (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 108 897 I 0 NONE NONE FIRE ZONES 49, 69 AND 108 ARE COMBlttED AS ONF AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION I REGARDING SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 65 658

~ 13 '00 I 49 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION ASSESSMENT. FIRE ZONES 49 ANO 69 COttTAIN OEI.UGE FOR AND ) tlO SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS, COMPONEttTS AND CHARCOAL THERMISTOR CIRCUITS. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONEttTS FILTER FOR CHARCOAL I ANO CIRCUITS LOCATED IN THIS EVALUATION FILTER I AREA ARE THE COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS LOCATED IN FIRE ZOttE 108 FOR WHICH COMPLIANCE MET1100 IS PRESENTED IN 1983 1,314 17,914 AUTOMATIC I Ott I ZAT I Ott SUBMITTAL.

DELUGE FOR AND HVAC UNIT THERMLSTORS I FOR HVAC UNITS PAGE 4 OF 4

TABLE 2-2 UNIT 2 FIAE AREAS/ZONES OF CONCERt(

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT IEQUIVALENT IPOSTULATEO ZONE I COMBUSTIBl.E FIAE I FIRE . OF LOAOItt(t IAREA S EVER I TY I LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FTz) I(FT ) (MIN) SUPPAESSION DETECTIOtt SYSTEM EVALUATION 348 NONE NONE FIRE ZONES 34B, 34A, 39. 109 ANO 50 ARE I I COMBINED AS ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 34A AUTOMATIC THERMISTOR AVAILABILITYIS PRESENTED BELOW:

DELUGE FOR FOR CHARCOAL 1. MS INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH CHARCOAL FILTER UN I T STEAM GENERATORS 1 AND 4 IS FILTER IN Itd 34A AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH 34A htANUAL OPERATION OF ASSOCIATED MAVs.

2. AF hlANUAL OPERATION OF AFFECTED I AUTOMATIC IONIZATION Fhl0212 AND 242 Itt CONJUNCTION WITHE 39 28.630 I2,667 I 21 COZ I AND REMOTE OPERATIOtt OF OT<<EA REQUIREDI INFRARED SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS OF THIS TYPES SYSTEM OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA WILL UTILIZE AF SYSTEM TO SUPPLY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TO 109 897 0 I NONE I NONE STEAM GENERATORS 1 AND 4.

3. ACS Ttq AND Tg NORMAL INDICATIONS ARE AFFECTED, BUT ALTERNATIVE INDI-50 48,878 I3,200 I 37 AUTOMATIC I ON I ZATIOtt CATION CAPABILITY IS BEING DELUGE FOR I AND PROVIDED AS PRESENTED IN hlARCH CHARCOAL THEAMISTOA 1983 SUBhtl TTAL. AT LEAST ONE FILTER I FOR CHARCOAL TRAIN OF OTHER RCS SAFE SHUTDOWN I FILTER PROCESS MONITORING SYSTEM COMPONENTS IS LOCATEO OUTSIDE AREAR'XCEPT OF THE EVALUATION AREA.

4. CVCS- THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM aRE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION THE CABLE ASSOCIATED 4 YtITH QRV-251. WHICH FAILS AT 50 GPM MINIMUM FLOW POSITION.

5. EPS SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS OF ONE TRAIN OF EPS WHICH INCLUDES OGAB ARE LOCATED I OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA.

(THIS FIRE ARE A IS CO NT INUEO ON THE NEXT PAGE) 4 FIRE ZONES 34, 34A AND 348 ARE CONTAINED IN A FIRE AAEA FOR WHICH TltE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING IS 5.809 BTU/FT , AREA IS 2.890 FT2 AND EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY IS 4 MINUTES PAGE 1 OF 5

TABLE 2-2 (contlnueu)

SF ISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA I

ADJACENT EQUIVALENT I POSTULATED ZONE I COMBUSTIBLE FIRE I FIRE OF LOAD IN(t AREA I SEYERITY I I LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FTc) (FT2) (MIN) I SUPPRESSION DETECTION SYSTEM FVALUATION I

I 348 6. CCW CIACUITS AND COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED (cant.) WITH THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR HOT I SHUTDOWN ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF I THE EVALUATION AAEA. MANUAL I OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES I AEQUIRFD FOR COLO SHUTDOWN IS I AVAILABLE. I

7. RHR hlANUAl OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES, WHICH HAVE CABLES IN THE EVALUATION AREA, IS AVAILABLE.

I 8. ESW NOT AFFECTED, EVALUATION AREA DOES t<OT CONTAIN COMPOHFNTS OR CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOwti.I I

I 22 591 8,460 HONE I HONF FIRE ZONES 22. 27, 23. 348 AND 39 ARE COhlB I NEO AS ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEhl EVALUATION. TIONON THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 27 84,252 I 1.056 I I AUTOhIATIC I ON I ZATION I AVAILABILITYIS PRESENTED BELOW:

C02 I AND 1. MS INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH INFRARED STEAM GENERATORS 1 AND 4 IS TYPES AVAILABLE IN CON JUtlCT ION Wl TH hlANUAL OPERATION OF ASSOCIATED MAVs OUTSIDE OF 1HE EVALUATION 23 27,830 840 I 21 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION AREA.

C02 AND 2. AF htAHUAL OPEAATION OF AFFECTED INFRARED FM0212 AND 242 AND FAV 247 IN TYPES CONJUNCTION WITH REMOTE OPEAATIOtt OF OTHER COhtPOttENTS OF THI S SYSTEM RFQUIRED FOR SAFE SttUTDOWtd 348 I HONE NONE OUTSIDE OF THE EVAI.UATIOH AREA WILL UTILIZE AF SYSTEM TO SUPPLY AUXILIARY FEEOWATER TO STEAM 39 28.630 2.667 21 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION GENERATORS 1 AND 4.

C02 AND 3. RCS Tn AHD Tc tlORMAL IttDICATIONS AAF INFAARED AFFECTED. BUT ALTERHATIVE INDICA-TYPES CAPABILITY I S BEING PROVIDED AS PRESENTED IN MARCH 1983 SUBhll TTAL. AS LEAST ONE TRAIN OF OTHER RCS SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCESS MONITORING SYSTEtl COMPONENTS IS LOCATED I OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AAEA.

(T HIS FIRE AREA IS COttTINUED Ott THE t<EXT PAGE)

FIRE ZONES 34, 34A ANO 348 AAE CONTAINED IN A FIAE AAEA FOR WHICH THE COMBUSTIBLE LOADIHG IS 5,809 OTU/FT, AREA IS 2 890 FT2

~

AND EQUIVALENT FIRE SEVERITY IS 4 MINUTES PAGE 2 OF 5

TABLE 2-2 (continueu)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA IAOJACENT EQUIVALENT POSTULATED ZONE COMBUSTIBLE FIRE FIRE OF LOAD IN@ AREA SEVERITY LOCATION CONCERN ~

(BTU/FTz) (FT ) (MIN) SUPPRESSION DETECTION SYSTEM EVALUATION 22 CVCS- THE SAFF SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS (cont.) ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA. EXCFPT CABLE ASSOCIATEO WITH QRV-251. WHICH FAILS AT 50 GPM hlINIMUM FLOW POSITION.

5. EPS SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS OF ONE TRAIN OF EPS WHICH INCLUDES DGAB ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION ARFA.

6. CCW CIRCUITS AND COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR tlOT SHUTDOWN ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA. MANUAL OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES REQUIRED FOR COLD SHUTDOWtl IS AVAILABLE.

7. RHR hlANUAL OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES, WHICH HAVE CABLES IN THE EVALUATION AREA, IS AVAILABLE.

8. ESW NOT AFFECTED, EVALUATION AftEA DOES NOT COtITA IN COMPONEttTS OR CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.

50 49,898 3 '00 3/ I AUTOMATIC IONIZATION FIRE ZONES 50, 69 AND 109 ARE COhlUINED AS I DELUGE FOR AND ONE AREA FOR THIS SYSTEM EVALUATION. THE I CHARCOAL THERMISTOR SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AVAILABILITYIS I FILTER FOR CHARCOAL PRESENTED BELOW:

I FILTER 1 . tJIS INSTRUhlENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH STEAM GENERATORS 1 AND 4 IS 69 1,314 17.914 I AUTOhlATIC IONIZATION AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH DELUGE FOR I AND MANUAL OPERATION OF ASSOCIATED HVAC UNIT 1'HERMISTORS MRVs OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION I FOR HVAC AREA.

I UNITS 2. AF ONE TRAIN OF THIS SYSTEM It1CLUDING PUMP PP-3W (AND ASSOCIATED CABLES)I AND FM0212 AND 242 AND ASSOCIATEO I 109 897 I 0 NONE NONE CABLES ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE I EVALUATION AREA.

I (THIS FIRE AREA IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE)

PAGE 3 OF 5

TABLE 2-2 (cont 1nueu)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT EQUIVALENT POSTULATED ZONE COMBUSTIBLE FIRE (tahiti)

F IRE OF LOAOINQ lAREA SEVERITY LOCATION COHCERN (BTU/FTi) (FT2) SUPPRESSIOH DETECTION SYSTEh1 EVALUATION 50 3. CVCS" COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED)

(cont.) WITH THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA, EXCEPT ONE OF THE CHARGING PUMPS SUCTION VALVE CABLE (REDUNDANT VALVE IS AVAILABLE).

4. CCW - CIRCUITS AND COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR HOT SHUTDOWN ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA. MANUAL OPERATION OF 1'tlE AFFECTED VALVES REQUIRED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN IS AVAILABLE.

I 5. RHR MANUAL OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES. WHICH HAVE CABLES IN THE.

EVALUATION AREA, IS AVAILABLE.

6. THE FOLLOWING SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA:

o RCS o EPS o ESW 69 1,314 17,914 I I AUTOMATIC IONIZATION FIRE ZONES 69 AttD 100 ARE COMBINED AS DELUGE FOR AND ONE AREA FOR TtlIS SYSTEM EVALUATION HVAC UNIT THERMISTORS REGARDING SAFE SHUTOOWH CAPABILITY FOR HVAC ASSESSMENT. FIRE ZONE 69 CONTAIttS tt0 UN I TS SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS. COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPONEttTS AND CIRCUITS LOCATED IN THIS EVALUATION 109 897 0 I NONE NONE I AREA ARE THE COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS LOCATED IN FIRE ZONE 108 FOR WHICtt COM-PLIAt<CE METHOD IS PRESENTED IN 1983 SUBh11 TTAL.

PAGE 4 OF 5

TABLE 2-2 (continued)

SEISMIC GAP EVALUATION AREA ADJACENT lEQUIVALENT POSTULATEO ZONE COMBUSTIBLE F IRE FIRE OF LOAD IN(t AREA SEVERITY LOCATION CONCERN (BTU/FTc) (FT2) (MIN)- SUPPRESSION DETECT I Ott SYSTEM FVALUATION 109 897 I NONE I NONE FIRE 20tlES 50, 69 AND 109 ARE COMBINED AS ONE AREA FOR 1HIS SYSTEt1 EvaLUATION. THE SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS AVAILABILITYIS 50 I 49.696 3,200 I AUTOMATIC 10tt IZATION PRESENTFD BELOW:

I DELUGE FOR I AND 1. MS INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH CHARCOAL THERMISTOR STEAM GENERATORS 1 ANO 4 IS F I LTER FOR CHARCOAL AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH FILTER MANUAL OPERATION OF ASSOCIATED MRVs OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION 69 1,314 17,914'7 AUTOMATIC IONIZATION 2. AF - AREa.

ONE TRAIN OF THIS SYSTEM INCLUDINGI DELUGE FOR AND PUhtP PP-3W (AND ASSOCIATEO CABLES)(

HVAC UNIT THERMISTORS AND Ft40212 ANO 242 AND ASSOCIATED FOR HVaC CABLES ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF Ttif UNITS EVALUATION AREA.

3. CVCS- COMPONENTS ANO CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE EVALUATION AREA, EXCEPT ONE OF THE CHARGING PUMPS SUCTIOtt VALVE CABLE (REDUNDANT VALVE IS AVAILABLE)

4. CCW - ~

CIRCUITS AND COMPONENTS ASSOCIATED WITH TttIS SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR HOT SHUTOOwN ARE LOCATEO OUTSIDE OF THF EVat.UATION AREA. MANUaL OPERATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES REQUIRED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN IS AVAILABLF.

5. RtlR MANUAL OPE RATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES. WHICH HAVE CABLES IN THE EvALUaTION AREA. IS AvaILABLE.

6. THE FOLLOWING SAFE SHU100WN SYSTEMS COMPONENTS AND CIRCUITS ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE FVALUATION AREA:

o RCS o EPS o ESW PaGE 5 OF 5