ML17325A731
| ML17325A731 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17325A732 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-88-01, 50-315-88-1, 50-316-88-01, 50-316-88-1, NUDOCS 8805250231 | |
| Download: ML17325A731 (43) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1988001
Text
BOARO REPORT
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT
OF LICENSEE
PERFORMANCE
50-315/88001
50-316/88001
Inspection
Report
Indiana Michi an
Power
Com an
Name of Licensee
Oonald
C.
Cook Units
1 and
2
Name of Facility
October
1
l986 throu
h Februar
29
1988
Assessment
Period
SS05250231
SS0516
ADOCK 050003i5
O
TABLE OF CONTENTS
~Pa
e No.
I.
INTRODUCTION...........................
II.
CRITERIA....
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS............
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.I.
J.
K.
L.
Plant Operations.............
~ ..............
Radiological Controls................
Maintenance
.
S urvei llance................................
Fire Protection.................,.
Emergency Preparedness......................
Security ...........
4
~
~ t
~
~ t
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
0utages.
~ ...................................
Engineering/Technical
Support
Licensing Activities................,.......
Training and gualification Effectiveness....
guality Programs
and Administrative Controls
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
21
24
26
28
V ~
SUPPORTING
DATA AND SUMMARIES
32
A.
Licensee Activities....
B.
Inspection Activities
C.
Investigations
and Allegations Review.......
D.
Escalated
Enforcement Actions........
E.
Licensee
Conferences
Held During Assessment
F.
Confirmatory Action Letters (CALs)..........
G.
A Review of 10 CFR Part 21 Reports
and Licen
Event Reports
Submitted
by Licensee ...
~ ..
H.
Licensing Activities ..............
Period..
see
32
34
36
36
36
37
37
38
I.
INTRODUCTION
The Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee
Performance
(SALP) program ts
an
integrated
NRC staff effort to collect available observations
and data
on
a periodic basis
and to evaluate
licensee
performance
on the basis of
this information.
SALP is supplemental
to normal regulatory proces'ses
'sed to ensure
compliance with NRC rules
and regulations.
SALP is
intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide
a rational basis for
allocating
NRC resources
and to provide meaningful
guidance to the
licensee's
management
to promote quality and safety of plant operation
and maintenance.
An
NRC SALP Board,
composed of the staff members listed below,
met on
April 20,
1988, to review the collection of performance
observations
and
other related
data to assess
the licensee's
performance
in accordance
with the guidance
in
"Systematic
Assessment
of
Licensee
Performance."
A summary of the guidance
and evaluation criteria
is provided in Section II of this report.
This report is the
SALP Board's
assessment
of the licensee's
safety
performance at the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Generating
Plant for the period
October I, 1986,
through February
29,
1988.
SALP Board for Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Generating
Plant:
- C. E. Norelius
"E.
G.
Greenman
"H. J. Miller
- M. J. Virgilio
D. Wiggington
W.
L. Axelson
- W. G.
Guldemond
J. J. Harrison
G.
C. Wright
BE
L. Burgess
R.
N. Gardner
D.
H. Danielson
F. J. Jablonski
L.
R. Greger
M,
C.
Schumacher
W.
G. Snell
"B. L. Jorgensen
J.
K. Heller
J.
E. Foster
D.
M. Galanti
C.
F. Gill
R.
B. Holtzman
SALP Board Chairman, Director, Division of
Radiological Safety
and Safeguards
Director, Division of Reactor Projects
(DRP)
Director, Division of Reacto~ Safety
(DRS)
Acting Deputy Director,
Licensing Project Manager,
Chief, Technical
Support Staff
Chief, Projects
Branch 2,
Chief, Engineering
Branch,
Chief, Operations
Branch,
Chief, Reactor Projects Section
2A,
Chief, Plant Systems
Section,
Chief, Materials
and Processes
Section,
Chief, Maintenance
and Outage Section,
Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section,
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
(DRSS)
Chief, Radiological Effluents and Chemistry
Section,
DRSS
Chief, Emergency
Preparedness
Section,
DRSS
Senior Resident
Inspector
Resident
Inspector
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist
Security Specialist
Radiation Specialist
Radiation Specialist
R.
C.
Kazmar
L. Kelly
T. J.
Madeda
J.
M. Ulie
project Inspector
Licensing Engineer,
Security Specialist
Fire Protection Specialist
"SALP Board voting members.
II .
CRITERIA
The licensee's
performance is assessed
in selected
functional areas,
depending
on whether the facility is in a construction,
preoperational,
or operating
phase,
The functional areas
normally represent
areas
significant to nuclear safety
and the environment
and are
normal
programmatic
areas.
Some functional areas
may not be assessed
because
of little or no licensee activity or lack of meaningful observations.
Special
areas
may be added to highlight significant observations.
One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess
each
functional area:
A.
Management
involvement in assuring quality.
B.
Approach to resolution of technical
issues
from a safety standpoint.
C.
Responsiveness
to
NRC initiatives.
D.
Enforcement history.
E.
Reporting
and analysis of reportable
events.
F.
Staffing (including management).
However,
the
SALP Board is not limited to these criteria and others
may
have
been
used
where appropriate.
On the basis of the
SALP Board assessment,
each functional
area
evaluated,
is classified into one of three
performance
categories.
The definition
of these
performance
categories
follows:
~Cate or
1:
Reduced
NRC attention
may be appropriate.
Licensee
management
attention
and involvement are aggressive
and oriented toward
nuclear safety;
licensee
resources
are
ample
and effectively used
so that
a high level of, performance with respect
to operational
safety and/or
construction quality is being achieved.
~Cate or
2:
NRC attention
should
be maintained at normal levels.
Licensee
management
attention
and involvement are evident
and are
concerned with nuclear safety;
licensee
resources
are adequate
and are
reasonably effective
so that satisfactory
performance with respect
to
operational
safety and/or construction quality is being achieved.
~Cate or
3:
Both
NRC and licensee attention
should
be increased.
Licensee
management
attention or involvement is acceptable
and considers
nuclear safety,
but weaknesses
are evident;
licensee
resources
appear
to be strained or not effectively used
so that minimally satisfactory
performance with respect
to operational
safety and/or construction
quality is being achieved.
Trend:
The
SALP Board may decide to include
an assessment
of the
performance
trend of a functional area.
Normally, this performance
trend
is used only where both
a definite trend of performance is discernible
to the Board
and the Board believes that continuation of the trend
may
result in a change of performance level.
The trend, if used,
is defined
as follows:
a.
~im rovin
Licensee
performance
was determined to be improving near
the close of the assessment
period.
b.
~Declinin:
Licensee
performance
was determined
to be declining near
the close of the assessment
period.
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Functional
Area
A.
Plant Operations
B.
Radiological Controls
C.
Maintenance
D.
Surveillance
E.
Fire Protection
F.
Emergency
Preparedness
G.
Security
H.
Outages
I.
Engineering/Technical
Support
J.
Licensing Activities
K.
Training and Qualification
Effectiveness
Rating
6
Rating
This
Period
2 (improving)
2 (improving)
L.
Quality Programs
and
Administrative Controls
Affecting Quality
"New area for SALP 7.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A.
Plant
0 erations
l.
~Anal sls
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of plant
operations
was evaluated
by considering the results of
14 routine inspections
and two special
inspections
by the
resident inspectors,
and part of a quality verification and
implementation
(QVI) team inspection.
Enforcement history in this area during the 17-month assessment
period was good;
however,
a Severity Level
IV and
a Severity
Level III violation were issued.
The Severity
Level III
violation involved the fai lure to maintain adequate
safety
injection flow paths, for which a $ 50,000 civil penalty was
imposed
and paid.
This event occurred late in the previous
assessment
period and was discussed
in the
SALP 6 report.
The Severity Level IV violation, which occurred during this
appraisal
period,
involved not keeping the Unit
1 primary system
pressure/temperature
within specified limits during an April
1987 cooldown.
Although it lacked direct safety significance,
the event indicated inadequate shift direction and coordination
during the cooldown.
No violations were identified in the
QVI
team inspection.
Enforcement history in this functional
area
compares
favorably to that during the previous
assessment
period when two Severity Level IV violations were issued,
and
a Severity
Level III violation occurred.
Inspector eva'luations
and direct observations
noted that
operator
knowledge
and coordination
were
good in response
to
operating transients
and events.
A review of licensee
event reports
(LERs) identified 13 reactor
trips, ll of which are applicable to this functional area.
Six
were at power (above
15 percent) while five were nonpower trips.
The two additional trip actuations
(one nonpower
and one at-power
trip) are covered in the Surveillance
section of this report.
Of the
11 trip signals attributable to this functional area,
9 resulted primarily from various equipment, failures,
1 involved
personnel
error,
and
1 was
a combination of the two causes.
The number of reactor trip signals
(13 in 17 months)
improved
from the previous
SALP period (16 in 12 months).
In addition,
the causes
of the trips were not typical of past problems;
those
had included startup
level control
and
poor coordination of maintenance
and/or testing.
This shows
positive effects of the licensee's trip reduction program.
There were four other
LERs, not pertaining to reactor trips,
applicable to this functional area.
Two of them were the
result of personnel
error and the remaining
two resulted
from unanalyzed
system configurations,
one in the safety
injection flowpaths (noted in the Severity Level III violation)
and
one in the residual
heat
removal
f1owpaths.
Reportable
events
were reduced
in frequency
by about
50 percent compared
to that in the previous
assessment
period, with human factors
problems declining over 60 percent.
This is reflective of
the effectiveness
of the feedback
mechanisms
employed
by the
licensee
in addressing
causes
of reportable
events.
Management
involvement to ensure quality in this functional
area
was
good throughout the assessment
period.
Existing
programs for monitoring performance of personnel
and equipment
and for keeping
management
informed were continued or expanded.
New initiatives included
a reformalized "problem alarm"
resolution
program and an "outage avoidance" daily staff
meeting notesheet.
Material upgrading at the plant continued.
Examples
included
human factors modifications to control
room
panels,
panel painting and lighting changes,
and reduction
of standing
alarms.
Licensee initiatives for upgrading the
secondary
side included drawing verification, labeling, color
coding,
and operator aids activities.
A professional
atmosphere
is maintained
in the control
room.
The gVI inspection indicated that increased
attention
should
be paid to the
human element in the area of error prevention.
While errors in system lineups
and clearances
were infrequent
overall, they were more
numerous
in 1987 than they had been in
1986.
More effort is needed
in searching for common elements
among these errors to assure
corrective actions
are not too
narrowly focused.
The licensee consistently
took a conservative
approach
to
technical
issues
from a safety standpoint,
not hesitating to
commence
or complete
a unit shutdown
when necessary.
Both
units were operated
cont'inuously derated
throughout this
period
as
a precautionary
measure
to preserve
tubes.
Such conservatism
was evident at all levels of management
from the Shift Supervisor to the Plant Manager.
As an example,
the licensee voluntarily shut
down Unit 2 in August 1987 to
investigate
questions
about the strength of reactor coolant
pump
hatch cover studs.
Management
involvement was highly visible
during planned
and unplanned
shutdowns
and during startups.
Management's
conservative
approach
was further evidenced
by
a
decision to delay simultaneous
startup of both units in April
1987, which could have diluted supervisory/managerial
attention.
There were
no specific
NRC initiatives related to this
functional area;
however, the licensee
was typically responsive
and candid in day-to-day interactions with the resident
inspectors.
Staffing in this functional area
was maintained at ample levels
including five shift teams,
each with substantially
more than
the minimum staffing required
by technical
specifications.
2.
Conclusions
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area,
with an improving trend.
The licensee's
performance
was rated
Category
2 in this area during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendation
None.
B.
Radiolo ical Controls
1.
~Anal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of
radiological controls
was evaluated
by considering
the results
of six inspections
performed during this assessment
period by
regionally based specialists,
routine observations
by the
resident inspectors,
and part of a /VI team inspection.
While enforcement statistics
in this area indicated
some
improvement with five Severity
Level IV violations in the
current
17-month assessment
period as
compared to six Severity
Level IV violations and
one Severity Level
V violation identified
during the previous
12-month assessment
period,
the violations
indicate continuing weaknesses
in licensee
performance
regarding radiological
surveys,
radioactive material control,
and procedural
adherence.
No
LERs were identified relating directly to performance
problems in this functional area.
This generally reflects
good performance.
Staffing was adequate,
with chemistry staffing better than
radiation protection (RP).
A high turnover rate continued
for the
RP technician
and professional
staff; however,
the
licensee's criteria for replacement
has
been
adequate,
and the
licensee
expects overall staff performance to improve because
of the higher quality performance
expected
from the staff
replacements.
Late in the assessment
period, the licensee
began to emphasize
a higher level of performance
from its
technicians
and less reliance
on contract-provided
RP technicians
for significant-job coverage
and outage
supervisory duties.
The Chemistry staff was reorganized
during this assessment
period to more efficiently handle the work.
Management
involvement in this functional area
was adequate.
Administrative controls in the
RP program were weak, especially
early in the assessment
period with many poorly stated
and poorly
understood policies.
The conduct of licensee
audits of the
program
improved significantly this assessment
period,
and more
aggressive
and thorough corrective actions
have generally
been
required
by the auditors.
A licensee-NRC
management
meeting
was held
on December
10,
1987, to discuss
NRC concerns
over=.
continuing weaknesses
in management
control that affect the
radiation protection
program.
The licensee
presented
a program
to resolve the weaknesses,
including having the Assistant Plant
Manager
assume
personal
direction of the Technical-Physical
Science
Department for an interim period.
As a result of this.
tenure,
the licensee
implemented
a comprehensive
RP action
plan to address
existing programmatic
weaknesses.
Management
involvement in the chemistry program was evident; for
example,
most of the laboratory chemistry instrumentation
is
state-of-the-art,
improvements
were
made with regard to the
quality and reliability of the makeup water system
and the
in-line process
monitors.
Also, efforts by management
had
begun
to control
and reduce the chloride concentration
in the secondary
systems.
The licensee is developing
a good water quality program
consistent with the guidelines established
by the Electric Power
Research Institute.
Licensee
responsiveness
to
NRC issues
has
been
adequate,
demonstrating
occasions
of weak as well as
good responsiveness.
Responsiveness
was generally weak early in the assessment
period, particularly with regard to correction of NRC-identified
problems in the
RP program.
These
problems
included staffing,
radioactive material control,
management
controls,
and procedural
adherence.
A training module was developed that aimed at
improving radiations workers'nowledge
of health physics
and
practical
knowledge of radiation protection problems.
Licensee
responsiveness
improved significantly late in the assessment
period
when the licensee
implemented
a comprehensive
RP action
plan to address
programmatic
weaknesses.
Another example
of good performance
included improvements
in the quality
assurance/quality
control
(QA/QC) of chemistry laboratory
instruments.
The licensee
approached
resolution of technical
issues
adequately,
with performance
weaker in
RP than in chemistry.
The approach
to resolving
RP technical
issues
sometimes
lacked
thoroughness,
which often delayed resolution
because initial
corrective actions
were ineffective.
The licensee
had been
slow to adequately
resolve technical
issues
raised in internal
QA audit and consultant reports with regard to the
RP, AlMA,
and radwaste
programs.
Personnel
radiation exposures
of
670 person-rem for 1986
and
1987 were about equal to the
licensee's
average for the previous
5 years.
It is noted,
however, that significant unplanned
outage work involving
potentially high radiation dose
was accomplished
in Unit 2
during 1987.
The licensee's
recent
dose history is acceptable
and improvements
have
been
made to the
ALARA program.
The
licensee
needs to emphasize
the
ALARA program in order to
complete identified program improvements.
The number of
unidentified personnel
contaminations
increased
significantly
in 1987, apparently
because
of the more sensitive portal
monitors.
Late in the assessment
period, the licensee
arranged
for full-contract anti-C laundry services
as
one element in
reducing personnel
contaminations.
Gaseous
radiological
releases
decreased
while liquid effluent showed
no discernible
trend
during this assessment
period.
The licensee
continues to make
progress
in reducing the volume of solid radwaste
generated.
Two sets of radiological confirmatory measurements
were taken
during this assessment
period.
The licensee
showed
improved
analytical results in the most recent
set of measurements
when
74 agreements
were achieved in 75 comparisons;
the earlier set
had yielded
67 agreements
in 76 comparisons.
The results of
the nonradiological
confirmatory measurements
were generally
good:
there were
25 agreements
with the
NRC values in 30
initial analyses.
The results did demonstrate
some problems
related to weaknesses
in instrumentation
and lack of independent
control standards.
The licensee is in the process of correcting
the problems.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this area
during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
C.
Maintenance
1.
A~oal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of
maintenance
was evaluated
by considering
the results of
14 routine inspections
by the resident
inspectors
and part
of a /VI team inspection.
Enforcement history in this area
was quite good in that the
two Severity Level IV and two Severity Level
V violations
issued all involved events that occurred early in the 17-month
assessment
period.
This compares
favorably to the one Severity
Level III violation, one Severity Level IV violation, and
one
Severity Level
V violation that were identified during the
previous
12-month assessment
period.
A weakness,
though not
chronic,
was the performance
of unintentional
modifications
during maintenance.
This was evidenced
by one Severity Level
V
violation that involved replacing
a valve with a similar valve
from another manufacturer
without performing
a prior evaluation
to demonstrate
that the substitution
was acceptable.
In another
instance for which a Severity Level IV violation was issued,
material substituted
during welding should
have
been
handled
as
a modification.
The licensee
also identified occasional
similar
10
problems.
These
included the use of steel bolts in place of
aluminum in terminating
a power cable to a safety injection
pump motor,
and
use of a standard-grade
part in a nuc1eay-grade
flowmeter.
The remaining
two violations involved the failure
to complete
post-maintenance
testing
on an "A" train valve
before beginning "B" train repairs
and failure to return or
dispose of excess
weld rods
as required
by procedure.
Both
violations had minimal safety significance
and lacked generic
applicability.
Two LERs were issued during this assessment
period, neither
of which involved a regulatory violation.
One concerned
valve
setpoint drift; the other involved
a personnel
error
on the
part of an instrument technician
and resulted in a safety
injection actuation during non-power operations
The subject
of technician errors is discussed
in the Surveillance
section
of this report,
as it relates to licensee
responsiveness
to
NRC concerns.
The fact that neither of these
events
was of
safety significance is indicative of continuing
good performance
in the area.
Management
continued to be extensively involved in ensuring
quality.
The plant staff used thorough evaluation
and tracking
processes
to generate
a broad range of subjective
and statistical
reports to management.
As
a result of management
review of
this information,
ample equipment,
parts
and materials,
and
adequate
staffing (discussed
further below) were provided to
ensure
excellent major equipment material condition.
This
has contributed significantly to an historically low forced
outage rate
and high unit productivity.
During this appraisal
period, despite
two outages
to perform
100 percent eddy-current
inspection of all four Unit 2 steam generators,
Unit 2 was
available
80 percent of the time.
For this period, which
included
a major refueling, maintenance,
modification,
and
testing outage,
Unit I was available about
77 percent of the
time.
Among the initiatives expanded
upon during this period
were:
computerized "repetitive" clearances;
component
coding
and labeling;
computerized
Equipment Data Base,
and consolidation
of personnel
and offices.
New initiatives included
a computerized
Material Management
System
and
a "guality Maintenance
Teams"
concept involving a multi-discipline, employee-oriented,
quality
assurance
approach to maintenance.
Technical
issues
are routinely approached
from a conservative
safety standpoint.
They are thoroughly handled
and in most
cases,
are resolved
in a timely manner.
As an example,
when
NRC review showed
a valve
had required repetitive maintenance,
further review found that the licensee
had already included the
valve and other valves
as candidates
for the "live load" packing
program being developed.
In another instance,
when
a charging
pump power cable shorted out, the licensee
found that fuel oil
had apparently
intruded into embedded
conduit.
The licensee
initiated generic corrective actions that included
a study,
a
followup surveillance,
and relocation/replacement
of several
other cables in addition to the affected
one.
11
The licensee
was generally responsive
to
NRC initiatives and
proposed
acceptable
resolutions that'were technically
sound
and timely.
The
NRC staff reviewed the licensee's
program for
testing m'otor-operated
valves with regard to compliance with
IE Bulletin 85-03 pertaining to improper switch settings
on
action operated
valves.
The licensee
has
a good start in
implementing the requirements
of the Bulletin, and demonstrated
evidence of prior planning
and assignment
of priorities.
Adequate staffing was maintained to accomplish the previously
noted
good condition of major equipment
and good percentage
of
plant availability.
Concurrently,
preventive maintenance
was
routinely performed
as scheduled,
except for non-safety-grade
instrument calibrations.
The scope
and frequency of the
non-safety-grade
instrument
program was being reassessed
at
the
end of the assessment
period.
Maintenance
backlogs varied
at times over the period,
and in some instances
were substantial.
No significant backlog reduction
was accomplished
over the
course of the assessment
period.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance
is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this area
during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
Nonce
D.
Surveillance
l.
~Anal sin
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of surveillance
was evaluated
by considering the results of 14 routine inspections
performed
by the resident
inspectors,
two in-service inspections,
a reactor physics inspection,
and
a snubber observation
and
functional testing inspection
performed by regionally based
inspectors.
Enforcement history in this area
was good; only two Severity
Level IV violations were issued during the 17-month assessment
period.
This compares
very favorably to the
seven violations
noted during the previous
12-month assessment
period.
Neither
item (a test procedure
lacking adequate
acceptance
criteria
and
a failure to record data
as specified)
had major safety
significance or generic implications.
The first item was not
repetitive of previous violations, but shared
a trait (lack of
proper specificity in establishing
acceptable
performance)
with
a violation from the previous
SALP.
Though different systems
were involved, the licensee
approached
the question of
acceptance criteria generically.
12
Nineteen
LERs were identified as being associated
with this
functional area.
This compares
favorably to the
28
LERs
identified in the previous
12-month assessment
period.
In
contrast to previous
SALP periods,
most of the error-caused,
reportable
events
were administrative
(wrong limit, missed or
late testing) in nature, without "active" consequences.
Only
two examples
were noted that involved unnecessary
challenges
to systems
because
of inadvertent
safety feature actuations.
An IEC technician's
error (selecting
the wrong component during
a nuclear instrument test)
caused
a non-power reactor trip in
the middle of the period,
and
an operator error (selecting
the
wrong component during
a reactor trip breaker test) resulted in
an "at-power" reactor trip late in the assessment
period.
None
of the
LERs indicated
a programmatic
weakness.
Hanagement
involvement in ensuring quality of performance
in this functional
area
was broadly evident.
Management
has
supported
a wide range of procedural
upgrades
to minimize
errors
and confusion,
has provided specialized training and
dedicated staff to support infrequent or unique testing,
and
has reassigned
some testing responsibilities to sharpen
the
technical
focus.
A substantially
increased guality Control
group presence
in observing testing activities
has evolved over
the past year.
This has provided
an independent
emphasis
on
complete
compliance with procedures
in this functional area.
First line supervision is routinely and directly involved in
testing,
but senior
management
presence
is rare.
The licensee's
approach to technical
issues
and
NRC initiatives
typically placed primary emphasis
on safety considerations.
The licensee's
historical
tendency to deal with issues
and
events
as isolated
occurrences
has
shown
some
improvement during
the assessment
period.
This was evidenced
by the thorough
approach
taken in evaluating
an apparently ordinary Severity
Level IV violation (noted above) concerning
a component cooling
water test procedure that lacked adequate
acceptance
criteria.
The generic
approach
taken allowed the licensee
to discover that
the essential
service water pressure
drop across
the containment
spray heat exchangers
had increased
substantially.
Corrective
actions
were performed in a timely manner.
Engineering
evaluations of snubber surveillance,
when required,
were found
to be conservative
and thorough.
Two other areas of historical
NRC interest in the surveillance
functional area
have
been
procedure quality and personnel
errors
the latter especially
focused
on IEC technician errors.
The quality of surveillance
procedures
(accuracy, clarity,
achievability, etc.)
has
improved sufficiently, as
a result of
management-supported
upgrades
already mentioned, that this is
no longer
an area of specific concern.
This is exemplified by
the fact that
10
LERs involved deficient
18C test procedures
during the previous
SALP, but only 2 occurred during the current,
longer period.
I&C errors,
however,
though statistically
13
improved,
remain
something of a concern to
NRC.
The licensee
has
focused its attention
on this issue
and the functional
superintendent
is monitoring progress closely.
One instance
was identified where the licensee's
responsiveness
was poor.
In the area of reactor physics testing,
the licensee
emphasized
a narrow focus
on compliance
issues
and
on corrective
action.
This contributed to communication
and coordination
weaknesses,
and to delays
in resolving questions
during and
following the inspection.
Staffing was ample during this appraisal
period to perform
all required testing without delay,
and still support procedure
enhancement
reviews,
special
compensatory
testing
(when required),
and various augmentations
in training and record-keeping.
Reassignment
of some tests
improved focus
and resulted
in new
viewpoints.
Three full sections
in the Technical - Engineering
Department,
including Mechanical
and Electrical
Performance
and
the nuclear engineering staff,
have testing
as their major area
of focus.
2.
Conclusioh
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area
with an improving trend.
The licensee's
performance
was rated
Category
2 in this area during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
E.
Fire Protection
l.
~Anal ala
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of fire
protection
was evaluated
by considering the results of one
routine inspection
by regional
inspectors
and
a consultant,
a
NRR Safe
Shutdown preliminary assessment,
and
on routine
observations
by the resident inspectors.
Enforcement history was good in this area.
Three Severity
Level IV violations were issued.
Two of these
three violations
involved events that occurred before this
SALP period.
These
two violations involved different fire protection technical
specification
ACTION requirements.
Specifically,
each resulted
in fire watch patrols being implemented late or not at all.
The one violation that occurred during the current appraisal
period involved fai lure to perform several
required monthly
checks of fire extinguishers
on schedule
in February
1987.
The
individual responsible for performing these
checks apparently
documented
them as complete
when they had not been
done.
He
was fired and his responsibilities
were reassigned
under
improved administrative controls.
14
One
LER was issued for this functional area,
which compares
very favorably with the
17 events of the previous,
shorter
period.
This single event,
which was caused
by personnel
error, involved inspecting
a sample
(10 percent) of rated
assemblies
and dampers
rather than all of them.
Several
"special" reports
were also issued in which the events
were
accurately described.
Most involved preplanned
maintenance
that required fire hydrants to be isolated.
Housekeeping
was examined with a focus
on control of
combustibles
and maintaining continuous
ready access
to fire
fighting equipment
and material.
Housekeeping
has continued to
improve; for example,
an extensive painting effort was initiated
in the auxiliary and turbine buildings.
The licensee
maintains
an appropriate attitude toward minimizing combustibles
and
"clutter" in all parts of the plant.
Management
involvement in ensuring quality in the decision
making process
has usually appeared
to be at
a level that
ensures
adequate
management
review.
This was evident during
the regional inspectors'ite visit and in discussions
between
the licensee's
corporate
management
and in the interface with
NRC Region III.
A Plant Manager's
Standing Order
(PMSO .095)
was issued requiring proposed
new technical
specifications
to be implemented
as if they were in effect.
The resident
inspectors
found personnel
knowledgeable
about these
requiremepts.
This should minimize transition errors
when
the technical
specifications
take effect.
The licensee's
approach
to resolution of technical
issues
from
a safety standpoint
appears
generally viable and
sound.
For
example,
the licensee
has undertaken
extensive
revision of the
primary, safe-shutdown
emergency
operating
procedure
(EOP).
This results in a basic
change
in philosophy from the previous
safe-shutdown
so that priority is given to utilizing as
much of the fire-affected unit's equipment
as possible before
proceeding to cross-tie to the other unit.
At the beginning
of the
SALP period,
NRR performed
a site evaluation of the
safe-shut
down procedures
including
a walk-thru simulation
~
to determine
the adequacy
an ease of application during
a
postulated fire.
The licensee
had previously contracted with
a consultant
(IMPELL) to assist in procedure
preparation.
IMPELL along with licensee
management
were present at the site
meeting
and were responsive
to
NRC questions
and concerns.
The
procedures
were determined to be adequate
although there were
some minor changes
and one concern relating to the installation
of jumpers
needed for hot shutdown.
The licensee
adequately
addressed
these
concerns.
The simulated walk-thru uncovered
few
problems all of which were properly addressed.
The meeting
concluded with every expectation that the licensee
would be
fully prepared for the fire protection inspection that had been
anticipated
in 1987
and which was later postponed.
15
The licensee
was receptive to information concerning
ideas
and
problems at other plants,
and is implementing
an innovative
"bar code" automatic reading/recording
system for performance
and documentation
of routine surveillance of fire protection
components.
The licensee's
responsiveness
to
NRC initiatives was acceptable.
The adequacy
of resolutions generally
proposed is demonstrated
by the large
number of outstanding
NRC issues
closed during the
regional site visit.
Numerous fire protection
and safe
shutdown
issues
remain to be reviewed
by
NRC including
a recent revision
to the licensee's
"Safe-Shutdown"
document
submitted during
this assessment
period.
On
a day-to-day basis,
the licensee's
responsiveness
to resident inspector questions
or problems
was
typically thorough
and timely.
Staffing in this functional area
was ample to accomplish the
routine fire protection workload.
Plant staff were responsible
for all the routine technical
specification
survei llances;
a
contractor performed compensatory
surveillances.
Organizational
changes
during the period consolidated
the fire protection
activities performed
by these
plant personnel
into a
new Safety
and Assessment
Department
under the Assistant Plant Manager for
Organization
and Administration.
The size of the contracted
force maintained to perform fire tours
and firewatches
was
continuously scaled
back as material
improvement to barriers
and penetrations
permitted.
This crew had
been
reduced to
about
40 persons
(from more than
50 during the previous
SALP)
late in the current assessment
period.
A strong corporate
technical/engineering
staff, including several
degreed fire
protection engineers,
supports
the plant in this functional
area.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this area
during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None
F.
Emer enc
Pre aredness
l.
~Anal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of emergency
preparedness
was evaluated
by considering
the results of
four inspections
conducted
by regionally based
inspectors
during this assessment
period, including observation of a
1986
remedial drill and the
1987 annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
16
Enforcement history in this area indicated
a slight decline
in licensee
performance
during this assessment
period;
a
Severity
Level IV violation was identified, whereas
no
violations were identified during the previous
assessment
period.
The
1986 drill and
1987 Exercise
scenarios
were considered
complex
and challenging, fully testing licensee
personnel
and
procedures.
Exercise
performance
in 1987
showed
improvement
over the
1986 Exercise in that the problems evident in the
1986
Exercise (requiring
a remedial
Exercise) did not recur.
The Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures
were rewritten
during this period,
and were significantly improved.
However,
the last routine inspection disclosed that the administrative
procedures
for maintaining the emergency
response
program
had
not been
completed,
and
no tracking system existed to track
unique
and repetitive items.
A commitment
was received to have
these
in place within ninety days of the inspection.
With this
exception,
routine inspection results
were generally positive,
and the
number of outstanding
open items steadily declined during
the assessment
period.
Independent
audits of the program
have
been
conducted
in a timely and thorough manner,
and corrective
actions
have
been properly initiated on audit findings.
Staffing of emergency
preparedness
positions
and training of
involved personnel
were considered
adequate.
Interviews and
walkthroughs with plant personnel
indicated effective training
in emergency
procedure utilization and protective action
decisionmaking.
The training procedure for Emergency
Plan Overview for
managers
and technical staff training, including related
handouts,
was found acceptable.
Also, the minimum shift
staffing and functional capabilities
met the guidelines of
NUREG-0654 for emergency
response
organization.
Management
involvement in ensuring quality in this area
was adequate,
as evidenced
by the participation of Corporate
personnel
and plant management
in exit meetings following each
inspection
and their response
to identified
NRC concerns.
The
Emergency
Response
Coordinator position
now reports to the
Assistant Plant Manager - Technical
Support,
providing more
direct management
attention for the emergency
preparedness
function.
The licensee
has
been responsive
to
NRC concerns
by providing
viable and thorough
responses
and expending efforts to
adequately
close out identified items.
17
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this area
during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
G.
~Securi t
A~nal els
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of security
was evaluated
by considering
the results of four inspections
(three routine
and
one reactive)
by regional security
specialists.
The resident
inspectors
also routinely observed
security activities.
Enforcement history in this area
represented
a decline in
the licensee
performance
during the assessment
period.
Two
Severity
Level
IV and three licensee-identified violations were
identified, compared with the three violations that
NRC staff
identified during the previous
assessment
period.
No major
safety concerns
were identified.
One of the violations pertained
to
a fai lure to adequately
implement required compensatory
measures.
This violation resulted
from ineffective licensee
measures
to correct
a previous licensee identified problem.
The other violation pertained to an isolated
problem in the
personnel
access
control program.
In addition, four NRC identified weaknesses
were identified
in the security program in the area of management
effectiveness.
These
weaknesses
pertained to
a lack of adequate
procedural
guidance
in some areas
and to correcting adverse
trends.
Some
of these violations and weaknesses
identified during the
assessment
period could have
been
recognized
and should
have
been corrected
before the
NRC became
involved.
The most notable finding that required resolution during this
assessment
period pertained to an inattention-to-duty
issue
involving the contract security force and licensee
security
management's
inability to implement adequate
corrective measures.
Although the licensee
and the security contractor
have tried to
correct the problem,
the resul'ts
have not been satisfactory.
Management
involvement in assuring quality in this functional
area is generally at
an acceptable
level, except for the
inattention-to-duty
issue
noted above.
During this assessment
period,
the licensee
has
been in the process
of constructing
18
a
new protected
area
access
control building, which,
when
completed,
should
improve personnel
and vehicle access,
particularly during
a major outage that is planned for mid-1988.
The
new facility will be equipped with state-of-the-art
access
control equipment.
Seven security event reports
(SERs)
were submitted during
this assessment
period:
Two were equipment related,
two were
personnel
errors,
two pert'ained to inadequate
compensatory
measures,
and the last pertained to an information protection
'roblem.
One of the
SERs required
an
NRC followup and resulted
in a notice of violation being issued.
In the previous
assessment
period, five events
were reported.
Although the total
number of SERs is not significant,
do
indicate that occasional
licensee identified implementation
problems exist that
need to be resolved.
This was supported
by the licensee's
safeguards
event logs which showed that
approximately
70 percent of log entries
involved personnel
access
control errors.
The previous
SALP report identified the licensee's
development
and implementation of a security Performance
Improvement
Program (PIP) intended to correct potentially significant
problems
in the security program
and improve the effectiveness
of the security organization.
Inspection activities during
this assessment
period confirmed that goals/objectives
in the
PIP have
been adequately
completed within the required time
period
and that success
has
been demonstrated.
In addition,
licensee
management will continue to implement
many of the
programs that were stated
in the PIP.
However,
on the basis
of inspection activities during this
SALP period,
licensee
action to improve the effectiveness
of the security program
has not been fully effective, particularly as it applies to
attention-to-duty
issues
and personnel
access
control program
errors.
Staffing in this functional
area
appears
ample.
Licensee site
security
management
has
a staff of six individuals assigned
to
overview and monitor the contract security force.
During this
assessment
period,
a licensee training specialist position was
developed
and filled.
This position will provide attention to
the contractor's training program.
With the resources
available,
the licensee
should
be able to provide closer
and more thorough
management
attention to the security program to identify and
correct potential
problems before they become significant.
The
contract security force was adequately
supervised
and trained.
The licensee's
responsiveness
to
NRC initiatives was generally
adequate.
When violations and weaknesses
were identified, the
licensee
usually took corrective action in a timely and effective
manner.
19
2.
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this area
during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendation
None
H.
~outa
es
A~nal el s
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of outages
was evaluated
by considering
one inspection
by a regional
inspector
and routine observations
of outage-related
activities
by the resident inspectors.
Enforcement history was excellent,
and
no violations were
identified in this functional area.
Two LERs were noted in resident
inspector
reviews
as associated
with this functional area.
Each involved procedures
inadequate
to ensure literal technical specification
compliance:
one
involved calibration checking of the manipulator crane
load
cell
and the other involved completing all required actions
when reducing residual
heat
removal
(RHR) flow.
The items
were not repetitive of previously identified problems,
safety
significant, or generic in nature.
Management controls in ensuring quality in this functional
area
were broadly evident.
A high degree of prior planning
was
exhibited,
as were proper understanding
and implementation of
procedures
and thorough verifications and reviews.
The licensee
generally kept projects
on or near schedule,
but showed
a
willingness to adjust
schedules
when appropriate
to optimize
material conditions or foreclose safety or regulatory concerns.
As part of an internal reorganization,
personnel
dedicated
to forced outage
contingency planning were reassigned
to the
Operations
Department to improve access
to and communications
with licensed staff "experts" concerning prioritization,
configuration
and technical specification
requirements,
and
activities coordination.
The forced outages that occurred
during this assessment
period 'were all begun with a timely
(updated weekly), pre-packaged
outage
plan already available.
Necessary
revisions to the plan were considered
and approved at
the proper management
level.
Material resource
constraints
were
not a significant factor in determining the
scope of work.
20
The voluntary shutdown of Unit 2 in August
1987 to investigate
reactor
coolant
pump hatch cover studs,
and the two-week Unit 2
outage in July 1987 to reduce within-limit leakage,
both exemplify
a positive and conservative
approach to technical
issues
from a
safety standpoint.
The licensee
was responsive
to
NRC Region III and resident
inspector requests
involving the upcoming major Unit 2 outage
for steam generator repair,
and provided briefings on topics of
interest both at the site
and at the
NRC Region III
offices'taffing
in this functional area
was adequate
to perform all
required work, and sufficient flexibilityexisted to address
newly identified jobs in a reasonable
time.
Many activities
were performed
by contractors,
over whom the licensee
continued
to exercise
a generally effective set of controls,
As with
material
resources,
staffing resources
were not
a dominant
constraint
on decisionmaking.
The licensee
conducted
post-outage
system
and plant
testing effectively, pursuant
to integrated
schedules
that
comprehensively
and effectively controlled plant conversion
from outage to operating conditions.
As a result, after its
refueling outage
ended
on October 4,
1987, Unit
1 produced
power daily through the remaining five months of the
period.
2.
Conclusion
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
1 in this
area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
1 in
this functional area during the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None
I.
En ineerin /Technical
Su
ort
1.
~Anal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of
engineering/technical
support
was evaluated
by considering
the results of eight regional inspections,
observations
during
the routine resident inspections,
and evaluation of licensee
technical
submittals
by
NRC Headquarters
technical
reviewers.
Activities examined during region-based
inspections
included
the following:
repair of component cooling water piping cracks;
pipe support design discrepancies;
various modifications;
response
to IE Bulletin 82-02 (Threaded
Fasteners);
response
to
IE Information Notice 87-01 (Thinning of Pipe Walls); containment
hatch cover bolting deficiencies;
polar crane structural
deficiencies;
snubber inspections
(IE Information
Notice 86-102); electrical
design control, and;
safety evaluations.
21
Enforcement history consisted of one Severity Level IV violation
involving poor electrical
engineering
design control.
A
determination
has yet to be
made
as to whether there is
a
generic
weakness
in this area;
however,
one of the examples
in
the violation involved implementing engineering
judgment before
completing
a thorough documented
engineering
design review.
This
same description applies to a piping system repair (discussed
above
under Maintenance)
performed without a thorough engineering
evaluation.
Plant staff-has historically relied
on systems
engineers
in the corporate office for advice
and consent
on
engineering/technical
matters.
A verbal authorization is often
viewed as sufficient.
The communication of complex technical
matters
by phone (as
sometimes
occurs)
can increase
the chance
that the question or the answer
may be misunderstood.
Six
LERs were identified during resident
inspector
reviews
associated
with this functional area.
The six events
included two caused
by personnel
errors,
two
apparent
design deficiencies,
an intergroup coordination
problem
following a design
change,
and one voluntary report concerning
apparent
biased
instrument drift.
None were individually safety
significant nor did they repeat previously identified problems.
Management
involvement in this functional
area
was mixed.
With
respect
to safety evaluations,
an example of strong
management
involvement was the recent decision to require formal training
of plant personnel
performing
10 CFR 50.59 applicabi lity checks.
Another example
was the decision to request
the nuclear
steam
supply system
(NSSS)
vendor to perform
a complete safety analysis
addressing all applicable
areas
of the final safety analysis
report
(FSAR) in support of a special test (turbine volumetric
flow test).
The extent
and effectiveness
of management
involvement with respect
to quality verification was usually
good in that independent verification of the design
process
through in-depth technical
reviews
was generally accomplished.
However,
improvements
can
be
made in prior planning
by
conducting
more thorough predesign
walkdowns.
Two weaknesses
involving management
involvement were identified
in the area of design control.
The first was evidenced
by the
implementation of a design
change
on shutdown
and indication
panels without verifying the adequacy of the design before
declaring the
system fully operable.
The
second
concerns
the
availability of documentation
on design
bases.
This was
seen
in the equipment qualification'inspection.
As a result,
the
licensee
put several
programs into effect to update
the
documentation
of the design
bases
of the plant.
22
From
a safety standpoint,
the approach to technical
issues
was also mixed.
Though
a strong engineering
and technical
orientation to the study of problems
and questions
was typical,
the mixed results
involved whether
an adequately
generic review
was undertaken,
especially in reviews to address
an immediate
hurdle.
When the engineering
evaluations
are not under
a time
constraint,
such
as planned design
changes
and studies that are
under licensee
schedule control, results
are usually broadly
based
and well documented.
When time pressures,
plant
availability questions,
or other outside influences exist,
the
focus can narrow and documentation quality and review processes
weaken.
This applies to both violations discussed
above
and to
an "emergency" design
change
involving replacement
of battery
charger automatic timers, which contained discrepancies
in the
documentation
package.
Examples of high quality performance
on
licensee-identified
and controlled activities .included design
and installation of the
new control
room instrument distribution
(CRID) panels,
the replacement
of the
2CD battery
and rack, the
study of boron-10 depletion effects
on shutdown margin,
and the
final resolutions
on problems involving component cooling water
degradation,
fuel oil intrusion into embedded
conduit,
and
containment
spray heat exchanger fouling.
In addition, the licensee
has
shown strong engineering
and
technical
support in the area of licensing.
This was especially
evident in the
repair project where the licensee's
staff thoroughly researched
industry experience
before the
project started for lessons
learned
and the best approach for
the plant.
The
steam generator repair report submitted to the
staff for review and approval
demonstrated
a clear understanding
of both the technical
and regulatory issues
involved in replacing
the
The licensee
was generally cooperative with the
NRC staff
and responsive
to staff questions
and concerns.
The licensee
provided technical
information and performed adequate
reviews
on potential
issues relating to items
such
as ice condenser
containment design,
Barton brand transmitters,
auxiliary
system design
and
pump thrust bearing lubrication,
main steam safety valve orificing, Tube Turns brand penetration
cooling assemblies,
and IE Bulletin 82-02 concerning
degradation
of threaded fasteners.
However, after three pipe supports with
deficiencies
were discovered
in the component cooling water
system, it was found that IE Bulletin 79-14 (Seismic Analysis
For
As Built-piping Configurations)
data
were retrievable for
only one of the three
supports
and as-built drawings could be
found for only two of the supports.
In addition, the drawings
did not include the identified discrepancies.
A review by the office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR) of
the licensee's
10 CFR 50.59 process
found it to be thorough,
technically sound
and well documented.
A conservative
approach
is normally taken in response
to 10 CFR 50.59 questions.
23
Training and qualification effectiveness
in this area
was good.
Although staffing in the Nuclear Safety
and Licensing Section
appeared
good and improving on the basis of the quality of the
safety review memoranda
reviewed,
one indication of a potential
weakness
in tracking staff qualification was identified.
In one
instance,
an
un qual ified member of the plant staff performed
a
safety evaluation of a temporary modification.
The licensee
maintains
an ample engineering staff (several
hundred people),
who have
a broad range
and depth of technical
capability.
Though rarely necessary,
the licensee
has not
hesitated,
when appropriate,
to contract highly specialized
experts.
The vast majority of the licensee's
engineering staff,
however,
wor ks out of the corporate office in Columbus,
Ohio,
about three
hundred miles from the plant.
Although there
have
been
improvements
in getting corporate
system engineers
out to the site for certain projects,
both time and expense
continue to mitigate against
the degree of involvement that
would be possible with more engineers
on site.
The site
organization
and management
have fostered
an improving system
engineering
approach within the constraints
of site resources.
2.
Conclusions
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
Because this is
a new area,
no rating is available for the
previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None
J.
Licensin
Activities
1.
~Anal sl s
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of licensing
activities was evaluated
by considering
the support of licensing
actions that were either completed or had
a significant level
of activity during the assessment
period.
During the assessment
period, the licensee
made conscientious
efforts to meet commitments.
Responsiveness
by the licensee
facilitated timely completions of staff review of a large
number of licensing actions, i.e. 65,
and thus reduced
the
licensing backlog.
The quality of license
amendment
requests,
especially the "no significant hazards
considerations
determination,"
improved.
The licensee
responded
promptly
and accurately to various
surveys
conducted
during the
assessment
period.
In addition, the licensee,
at NRR's request,
provided submittals for NRR in a very short turnaround time.
This was especially evident in the licensee's
response
to NRR's
request
for additional information concerning
24
repairs,
where the licensee
was required to review a vast amount
of documentation
in a very short period of time.
The licensee's
response
was timely and of high quality.
For the most part,
the licensee
submitted license
amendment
applications
in a timely manner to prevent hardship
on staff
resources.
In one instance,
the licensee
submitted
a request
for a change to the technical
specifications
concerning testing
surveillance
extensions
and did not allow adequate
time for
the normal
30-day
comment period.
The staff had to process
the change
as
an emergency.
The problem was brought to the
attention of the licensee's
management
and resolved quickly.
The licensee's
management
has demonstrated
a very active role
in assuring quality in licensing-related activities.
Strong
management
involvement was especially evident where issues
had
potential for substantial
safety impact and extended
shutdowns.
Licensee
management
actively participated
in an effort to work
closely with NRR to promote
a good working relationship.
The
majority of submittals
were consistently clear
and of high
quality.
Licensee
management
frequently participated
in meetings
in Bethesda
on short notice.
Management
kept abreast
of current
and anticipated licensing
actions.
In this assessment
period, the most notable
areas
were the efforts related to steam generator
replacement,
the
surveillance
extension
associated
with reduced
power to prolong
the
steam generator life, and the completion of longstanding
and Salem
ATWS action items.
The management
continues to be directly instrumental
in the
licensee
focusing
on the major safety issues
and
on placing the
safety aspects
of reviews in the forefront of concerns.
The licensee's
approach to resolution of technical
issues
from a safety standpoint
was technically
sound
and very
thorough.
The licensee
demonstrated
a strong understanding
of the technical
issues
involved in licensing actions
and
proposed
sound
and timely resolutions.
This was evident in
several
areas,
including steam generator repair, fire protection,
and technical
specifications.
Conservatism is being exhibited
in relation to significant safety issues
on
a routine basis.
Consistently
sound technical justification is provided by
the licensee for deviations
from staff guidance.
The good
communications
between
the licensee
and
NRC staff have
been
beneficial in the processing
of licensing actions.
The licensing staff is ample to assure
timely response
to
NRC needs.
Positions
are identified and authorities
and
responsibilities
are well defined.
NRC considers
the licensing
staff and the quality of the support engineers
is a strength
for the licensee.
25
2.
Conclusions
The licensee's
performance
is rated Category
1 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 during the
previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None
K.
Trainin .and
uglification Effectiveness
1.
~Anal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional area of training
and qualification effectiveness
was evaluated
by considering
a requalification training effectiveness
inspection,
special
NRR team inspection,
maintenance
and functional testing
inspection,
emergency
preparedness
inspection,
observations
by resident
inspector s,
and the results of licensed operator
examinations
and associated
observations,
Although no violations and
no reportable
events
were identified
specifically associated
with this functional area,
some
violations assigned
to other functional areas
had training or
qualification effectiveness
implications:
incorrect limiting
condition for operation
(LCO) was applied
due to the failure to
integrate available information; reactor coolant
system pressure
and temperature
limits were violated as
a result of poor shift
teamwork;
inadequate
survey or control of contaminated material;
maintenance
procedure
was mis-coordinated
involving redundant
trains;
and other procedure violations identified.
Two Confirmatory Action Letters
(CALs) were issued to specify
actions to correct unsatisfactory requalification program
implementation.
CAL-RIII-87-012 was issued
as
a result of the
June
1987 requalification examination
(47 percent
pass rate)
and CAL-RIII-87-012, Amendment
1,
was issued
as
a result of
the August 1987 requalification examination
(53 percent
pass
rate).
As noted below, followup inspection
in this area
identified
a number of weakness
in the requalification program
A review of LERs involving personnel
errors
suggested
the
errors
were not attributable to programmatic training program
deficiencies.
The operational
events attributed to personnel
error by the licensee
in
LERs included five technical
specification violations
and four safety features
actuations.
In only one of these
nine events did the licensee
require
training as
a corrective
measure.
None of the remaining eight
appeared
to be
a result of inadequate
training'.
26
Management
involvement in ensuring quality in this functional
area
was mixed.
Resource
investments
included
a
new training
complex
on site with a state-of-the-art,
plant-specifjc, control
room simulator; classrooms;
shops;
laboratories;
a functioning
Technical
Support Center .simulator;
and associated
support
facilities.
One positive result was improved maintenance
training.
For example,
mock-up training on pressurizer
spray
valve repair resulted in improved valve performance.
On the
other hand,
even though the training facility was fully staffed,
the licensee
did not dedicate sufficient instructors to the
licensed operator requalification program.
Management
ensured that the skill and experience
levels of
training department
instructors
were appropriate
by transferring
experienced
personnel
from other plant departments
into the
training group.
All ten training programs
subject to INPO
accreditation
have
been accredited.
Additional programs
(technical
engineering,
safety evaluation)
were developed
by
similar means
and to similar standards
as those
used to achieve
accreditation.
Management
assurance
of quality was further
indicated
by the lack of differentiation in training, retraining,
and qualification of both licensee
personnel
and contractors,
with identical job requirements,
The licensee
evaluates
the effectiveness
of the training
programs
by an interactive trainer/trainee
dialogue involving
trainee-produced
appraisals;
by interaction
between
the
Training Department
and various plant functional departments
under
a Plant Manager's
procedure;
and by continuous critical
evaluation of corrective action program items involving
personnel
error.
In addition, the Training Department is
itself required to produce
an annual
performance
report for
evaluation
by the Plant Nuclear Safety
Review Committee.
Notwithstanding these activities, the licensee
neither
identified the problems associated
with the licensed operator
requalification program,
nor took effective corrective action
for problems identified as early as
1984,
when the
NRC
substituted
NRC questions for 75 percent of the licensee's
exam and only 29 percent of the operators
who took the
exam
passed it.
The licensee'
response
to
NRC initiatives and resolution of
technical
issues
was adequate.
In September
and October of
1987, the licensee requalification program was inspected
as
a result of the unsatisfactory rating previously achieved.
Weaknesses
were identified in the program,
such as:
only
25 percent of the available training time was spent in
structured
license training; attendance
could be waived;
significant redundancy
existed
among the several
annual
exams
given in the
same cycle;
and operators
were not provided with
27
feedback to their quiz grades
so they could take remedial
action
(learn the material).
Some of these
weaknesses
are reminiscent
of weaknesses
identified in 1985 and confirmed the necessity
of
the commitment to long-term actions.
In response
to the
NRC's
findings regarding the requalification program,
the licensee's
management
carried out appropriate
immediate corrective measures
and met with the
NRC staff to develop appropriate
long-term
actions.
Ouring this period,
replacement
exams
were administered to
26 license candidates:
22 of these
candidates
passed.
This
85 percent
pass rate is consistent with the previous
period and is about the industry norm.
2.
Conclusions
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 during the
previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
Although performance is rated Category
2, the Board notes that
requalification training deficiencies
continued
from previous
SALP appraisals
and warrants
increased
management
attention.
ualit Activities and Administrative Controls Affectin
ualit
1.
~Anal sis
The licensee's
performance
in the functional
area of quality
programs
and administrative controls affecting quality was
evaluated
by assessing
two related but separate
areas.
The
first is the effectiveness
of the licensee's
independent
quality organizations.
This includes the quality assurance
organization
as well as other organizations that independently
review licensee activities to identify problems for corrective
actions.
The
second
area is the licensee's
management activities
aimed at achieving quality in overall plant operations.
As such,
strengths
and weaknesses
identified in other functional areas
were reviewed to determine if common attributes could be
identified.
In addition, licensee initiatives to maintain
or improve the overall quality of operations
were considered.
The licensee's
independent quality oversight organizations
were
evaluated
by considering
routine inspections
by the resident
inspectors,
three inspections
by regional
inspectors,
and the
results of a QVI team inspection.
The regional inspectors
focused
on follow up to previously identified matters
in the
area of modifications,
procurement
and maintenance.
28
With respect to the effectiveness
of the independent quality
oversight organizations,
enforcement history in this functional
area
showed
some
improvement,
but was not exceptional.
A total
of six violations (Three Severity Level IV, three Severity
Level
V) were identified during this appraisal,
compared to
eleven violations noted during the previous,
shorter period.
This performance
continued
an improving numerical trend in this
area.
On the other hand, three of the violations involved the
procurement
area; either aspects
of qualifying suppliers to the
licensee's
Qualified Suppliers List (QSL) or to maintenance
and
utilization of the
QSL.
Some of these violations contained
two
or three examples.
In addition,
one of the violations pointed
to
a weakness
in the certification process for lead auditors.
Management
was involved in decisions that affected quality.
As
a consequence
of this involvement, efforts were completed
which enabled
inspection closeout of about sixty previously
identified findings,
open or unresolved
items,
and
recommendations.
Improvement
was noted in the licensee's
resolution
and close out of backlogged
Condition Reports,
backlogged
Requests
for Change,
onsite review committee
workload,
and overall corrective action program administration
at the site.
While the closeout of these
items is considered
commendable,
the licensee's
proposed
actions to correct
problems in the area of procurement
program weaknesses
were
not responsive
to
NRC concerns,
despite
considerable
dialog
between
the utility and
NRC management.
Rather,
the licensee
was defensive
and argumentative
about thi s issue.
Failure of
licensee
management
to followup on problems
and take effective
corrective action
has contributed to previous
SALP Category
3
ratings in this functional area.
Although improvement
has
been
noted in several
areas,
management
involvement at the corporate
QA level
was not effective in improving performance
in the
procurement
area.
Conscious decisions
were
made at the corporate
level not to provide direct oversight of activities with potential
impact
on the quality of safety-related
components
and services.
Specifically, the crankshafts
of the diesel
engines
for the
emergency
generator
were reclassified
from safety related to
non"safety related in order to expedite
procurement of repair
services
from an approved supplier.
This was done instead of
completing
a formal technical
and engineering
evaluation to
establish
what in-process
controls by the vendor and additional
reviews
by qualified licensee
inspectors
may be needed at the
supplier's facility.
Subsequent
to this assessment
period, senior
NRC and licensee
management
have
met to discuss
adequate
corrective action,
especially in the area of procurement.
The licensee
has
engaged
the services of an independent
contractor to evaluate
the apparent
problem in the area of procurement.
Results of
that effort will be reviewed
and evaluated
during the
SALP 8
assessment
period.
29
The approach
used
by the licensee
to resolve technical
issues
from a safety standpoint
was generally conservative
and,technically
sound,
but there
were exceptions.
For example,
AEP corporate
QA management
decided to revert to procurement
methods
which the
NRC had previously determined to be weak.
In
addition, safety related
items and services
were re-classified
as non-safety related
(Commercial
Grade) to expedite
procurement.
This resulted
in the procurement of services
and parts,
including the crankshafts for the emergency diesel
engine,
with questionable
or indeterminate quality.
Two organizations
provide routine independent quality
oversight at the site level.
A new Safety
and Assessment
Department
(S&A) was created
on site during this
SALP period,
to consolidate
the Quality Control group,
the certified
nondestructive
examination
(NDE) technicians
and examiners,
the Fire Protection
Group
and Fire Protection Coordinator,
and
the Shift Technical Advisors (STAs).
The
S&A Department
does
independent
inspections
and survei llances,
administers
the
corrective action
and trending programs,
and performs support
studies of events
and various technical
issues.
The
second
organization is the site Quality Assurance
(QA) organization,
which implements the
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
B auditing
requirements
and performs surveillance of other activities
at its own discretion.
The site
QA group is organizationally
independent
from plant and Nuclear Operations Division management.
The
S&A and site
QA organizations
were both effective,
conducting technically sound,
performance
oriented
verifications of the quality of activities at the working
level.
Both groups generally insisted
on
a broadly based,
effective corrective action for identified problems.
Of particular mention during this
SALP period was the
licensee's
decision to perform
a Safety
System
Functional
Inspection
(SSFI).
The Quality Assurance
corporate organization
sponsored this in-depth evaluation of the auxiliary feedwater
systems
at the
D.
C.
Cook plant.
Several
valuable observations
were
made
and
some subtle discrepancies
were identified.
This
type of challenging self-appraisal
is commendable.
Concerning the question of management activities aimed at
enhancing quality in overall plant operations,
a number of
attributes or activities
show involvement to ensure quality
and to resolve technical
issues
and
NRC concerns
from a safety
standpoint.
For example,
the licensee
maintains
strong
and
open communication
channels
from management
to staff and
back.
Responsibilities
are clearly assigned
among managers
for maintaining specified plant areas
and equipment in good
condition.
A broad-based,
visible corrective action program,
with built-in feedback,
which "grades"
problems
by significance,
analyzes for trends,
and requires participation
by senior-most
management,
is in daily use.
30
The licensee
has demonstrated
conservatism
in removing
a
unit from service
in order to resolve questions.
Substantial
material
resources
have
been provided to improve performance
capabilities (plant-specific simulator, auxiliary buildfng
upgrade);
to address
identified concerns
(request for change
backlog reduction,
warehouse
upgrade
and consolidation);
or
to improve material condition and/or appearance.
Ample staff
has
been provided in most functional areas.
The licensee
has
developed
and is implementing the innovative guality Maintenance
Team concept.
Thorough, detailed
LERs which provide
a good
understanding
of events,
root causes,
and corrective actions,
are typical.
There were also examples that indicate
some areas
need
continued or increased
management
attention.
For example,
changes
in base
documents
or commitments thereto (technical
specifications,
ASME Codes)
were not properly translated
into
working procedures
in several
cases.
Timeliness in upgrading
some weaker procedures
responses,
radiation
protection)
was poor.
The focus
on problem review for corrective
and preventive actions
was
sometimes
too narrow.
The licensee
relied,
on occasion,
on informal technical/engineering
input
or judgment to justify actions,
without always completing
a
previously documented
safety evaluation against all required
criteria.
Some contractors
performed important requirements
without strong-enough direct licensee
involvement and/or
supervision (radiation protection,
security) which caused
delayed or ineffective action
on performance
problems'dministration
of the gSL for safety related
procurement
was
associated
with several
violations, but comprehensive
corrective
actions
have not been
undertaken with a vigor appropriate
to
the degree of NRC concern in this area.
2.
Conclusions
The licensee's
performance is rated Category
2 in this area.
Particular
management
attention
should
be given to area of
procurement,
specifically addressing
vendor qualification
and the procurement of parts
and services.
The licensee's
performance
was rated Category
2 in this functional area during
the previous
SALP period.
3.
Board Recommendations
None.
31
V.
SUPPORTING
DATA AND SUMMARIES
A.
Licensee Activities
1.
Unit
1
D.
C.
Cook, Unit
1 began this
SALP assessment
period in routine
power operation.
Peak
power level
was normally restricted to
90 percent of licensed
power throughout the assessment
period
in order to preserve
tubes.
Unit 1's Cycle 9-10
refueling outage activities were completed during the middle
of the assessment
period,
and the unit ended the
SALP period
operating
again at nominal
90 percent
power levels.
Significant outages
or major events that occurred during the
assessment
period are
summarized
below:
Si nificant Outa es/Major
Events
a.
November 22-23,
1986 - Unit 1 was out of service following
a reactor trip caused
by drift of the turbine generator
thrust bearing wear detector circuit.
b.
April 8-21,
1987 - Unit
1 was shut
down because
of
increasing,
unidentified, primary coolant
system
leakage
of more than
one gallon per minute.
During the plant
cooldown,
the pressure/temperature
limits of technical
specifications
were violated.
After repairing leaks found
in both the primary and secondary
systems,
the unit was
returned to service.
C.
June
4,
1987 - Unit 1 tripped on steam generator
No.
12
high level because
of an operator error and controller
failure.
Some leaky valves were repaired
and the unit
was returned to service
June 5,
1987.
d.
June
27
October 4,
1987 - Unit 1 was shut
down for
its scheduled
refueling, maintenance,
and testing outage
(Cycle 9-10).
Activities included eddy-current testing of
refurbishment of reactor coolant
pump
seals;
NDE on various valves, fasteners,
and
hangers;
tube sheet
and annulus cleaning;
repair of train "A" emergency
core cooling system
(ECCS)
pump conduits;
and the reactor coolant
pumps
and Control
Rod Drive Mechanism
(CRDM) hatch covers.
32
e.
October
13-14,
1987
Unit
1 was out of service after
a reactor trip to repair the east
main feedwater
pump
lubricating oil pump,
whose failure had caused
the trip.
f.
January
13-14,
1988 - Unit
1 was out of service following
a reactor trip caused
by an operator error (attempting
to manipulate
the wrong reactor trip breaker for a test).
Unit
1 experienced
four reactor trips with the unit at greater
than or equal
to
15 percent
power;
two trip signals
occurred at
less
than
15 percent
power.
Two of the Unit
involved personnel/procedural
errors,
three were related to
mechanical/equipment
failures.
One resulted
from personnel
error combined with a mechanical
problem.
In addition,
one
engineered
safety features
actuation
(main
steam isolation valve
isolation signal) occurred, with the unit shut down, because
of
an equipment failure.
2.
Unit 2
D.
C.
Cook, Unit 2 was in routine power operation at
a nominal
80 percent
power limit (to preserve
tubes)
during the
SALP assessment
period.
Several
power reductions
and two outages
were conducted to perform maintenance activities.
Significant outages
or major events that occurred during the
assessment
period are
summarized
below:
Si nificant Outa es/Major Events
b.
C.
March 3-April 21,
1987 - Unit 2 was shut
down for a
maintenance
outage.
Activities included
100 percent eddy-current testing of all four steam
generators
and repairs to steam generator
leaks.
A total
of 110 tubes
were plugged.
June
1-3,
1987 - Unit 2 experienced
a brief outage after
a reactor trip that was caused
by low condenser
vacuum
resulting from leaking isolation valve.
July 14-23,
1987 - Unit 2 experienced
a reactor trip and
remained
shut
down to replace
a failed voltage regulator,
which caused
the event,
and to repair
some minor valve
leaks found during post trip containment inspections.
A second trip occurred during restart
on July 22 as
a
result of a feedwater controller failure.
33
d.
August 26-October
11,
1987 - Unit 2 was shut
down for
a
maintenance
outage which was precipitated
by discovery
of improperly installed bolts
on the reactor coolant
pump
(RCP) hatch covers.
Outage activities included resolution
of the hatch bolting problems,
and maintenance
and
surveillance activities (100 percent eddy-current testing
and required plugging)
on the steam generator
tubes.
Unit 2 experienced
three reactor trips at greater
than or
equal to
15 percent
power;
two trip signals occurred at less
than
15 percent
power.
One of the Unit 2 reactor trips
involved personnel/procedural
errors,
three were related
to mechanical/equipment
failures.
One resulted
from the
combination of an equipment failure and
a personnel
error.
In addition,
one Unit 2 safety injection system (SIS) actuation
signal occurred, with the unit in mode 5, which was caused
by
an instrument technician error during maintenance.
B.
Ins ection Activities
This assessment
(covering the period October
1,
1986, through
February
29,
1988) considered
the results of 45 inspections.
The
associated
inspection reports
are listed in paragraph
B. 1. below.
Significant inspection activities are listed in paragraph
B.2 of
this section,
Special
Inspection
Summary.
1. ~t<<i
0
Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook
Unit:
1
Docket No.: 50-315
Inspection
Report Nos.:
86013,
86035,
87001 through
87033 (excluding 87018,
not used)
and 88002 through 88007.
Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook
Unit: 2
Docket No.: 50-316
Inspection
Report Nos.:
86013,
86035,
87001 through
87033 (excluding 87018,
not used)
and 88002 through 88008.
86038 through 86043,
020,
and
021 - which were
86038 through 86043,
020,
and
021 - which were
Table I
Number of Violations in Each Severit
Level
Functional
Areas
A. Plant Operations
B. Radiological Controls
C. Maintenance
D. Surveillance
E. Fire
Protection'.
Emergency
Preparedness
G. Security
H. Outages
I. Engineering/Technical
Support
J.
Licensing Activities
K. Training 4 Qualification
Effectiveness
I. Quality Prog
8 Admin.
Controls Affecting
Quali ty
UNIT 1
III IV
V
1]*
1
2
UNIT 2
III IV
V
COMMON
III IV
V
]*
3
2
2
TOTALS
UNIT 1
UNIT 2
COMMON TO BOTH
III IV
V
III IV
V
III IV
V
5
1"
1
13
4
"These violations were discussed
during SALP 6 and issued
dur ing
SALP 7.
S ecial Ins ection
Summar
i)
An emergency
prepar edness
inspection/exercise
was
conducted
during February 9-11,
1987 (Inspection
Report
Nos.
315/87006
and 316/87006).
ii)
A Quality Verification and Implementation
team inspection
was conducted
October 19-30,
1987 (Inspection
Report
Nos.
315/87026
and 316/87026).
35
C.
Investi ation and Alle ations
Review
Four allegations with concerns
associated
with the
D.
C.
Cook
Nuclear
Power Station were received in the Region III office during
this
SALP assessment
period.
Three of these allegations
as well as
seven
previous allegations
were closed during this
SALP period.
Two
allegations
remained
opened at the
end of this assessment
period.
D.
Escalated
Enforcement Actions
One Severity
Level III violation was issued during the assessment
period.
The associated
civil penalty, in the amount of $50,000,
was paid
on April 10,
1987.
On September
5,
1986,
the licensee
had
failed to perform the required action to initiate a reactor
shutdown
when both safety injection trains lacked
an operable
flow path
(Inspection
Report Nos.
315/860041;
316/86041
and 315/86042;
316/86042,
and Enforcement
Case
No. EA-87-013).
E.
Licensee
Conferences
Held Durin
Assessment
Period
1.
January
21,
1987,
Region III Office:
An enforcement
conference
was held with licensee
representatives
concerning
the operation
of Unit 2 when
one safety injection train
had
no flow path
and
the alternate train flow path
was restricted.
2.
February
5,
1987, Site:
A management
meeting
was held with
licensee
representatives
to discuss
the Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee
Performance
(SAI P 6).
3.
February
5,
1987, Site:
A management
meeting
was held with
licensee
representatives
to discuss
the licensee's
plans with
respect
to Unit 2 steam generator
leaks.
4.
April 27,
1987,
Region III Office:
An enforcement
conference
was held with licensee
representatives
to discuss
the apparent
technical specification violation regarding
a unit cooldown in
which Unit
1 was operated
outside the primary coolant
system
temperature/pressure
limitations on April 8, 1987.
5.
July 24,
1987,
Region III Office:
A management
meeting
was held
with licensee
representatives
to discuss
the results of NRC's
administration of operator requalification examinations
and the
licensee
evaluations.
6.
September
17,
1987, Site:
A management
meeting
was held
with licensee
representatives
to discuss
and gain further
understanding
of potential
problems in the areas
of quality
control inspections
and procurement of products/services.
7.
September
30,
1987, Site:
A management
meeting
was held with
licensee
representatives
to discuss
equipment
hatch cover
bolting deficiencies
in Unit 2, the results of the analysis
for the as-found condition,
and proposed corrective actions.
36
8.
October 23,
1987,
Region III Office:
A management
meeting
was
held with licensee
representatives
to discuss
the
replacement
program in Unit 2.
9.
December
10,
1987,
Region III Office:
A management
meeting
was held with licensee
representatives
to discuss
NRC concerns
regarding
the radiation protection
program.
F.
Confirmator
Action Letters
One
CAL .and its amendment
were issued during this assessment
period
(CAL-RIII-87-012, July 15,
1987 and CAL-RIII-87-012A, September
4,
1987).
These
documents
addressed
the failure rate
on operator
requalification examinations
administered
during the weeks of June
22,
1987 and August 3,
1987.
G.
A Review of 10 CFR Part 21
Re orts
and Licensee
Event
Re orts Submitted
b
the Licensee
1.
Re orts
One Part
21 report
was issued
by the licensee
concerning
Brown-Boveri Electric Co. dry type tranformers, with terminal
corrosion
caused
by acid residue left on the leads
by the
manufacturing
process.
Corrective actions were reviewed
and
the item closed in
NRC Inspection
Report
Nos.
315/88003(DRS)
and 316/88004(DRS).
2.
Licensee
Event
Re orts
LERs
D.
C.
Cook, Unit
1
Docket No.: 50-315
LER Nos.:
85072,
86021 through 86024,
87001 through 87022,
and
88001.
Twenty-eight
LERs were issued during this assessment
period for
Unit 1.
LERs listed by basic
cause
are
shown below:
BASIC CAUSES
Unit
1
SALP 7
Personnel
Errors
Procedure
Inadequacies
Equipment/Component
Design Discrepancies
Other
37.5X
17.95
26.8X
14.3%
3.
6'00.OX
(10.5)*
( 5 0)
(
7 5)A'
4.0)
1.0
28.0)
- One event caused
by both personnel
error and component
failure
37
D.
C.
Cook, Unit 2
Docket No.: 50-316
LER Nos.:
86026 through 86031,
87001 through 87015,
and 88001.
Twenty-two LERs were issued during this assessment
period for
Unit 2.
LERs listed by basic
cause
are
shown below:
"BASIC CAUSES
Personnel
Errors
Procedure
Inadequacies
Equipment/Component
Design Discrepancies
Other
Unit 2
SALP 7
56.8% (12.5)"
9.1% ( 2.0)
2S.'O%%d ( S.'S)
00.0% ( 0.0)
~2.%
2.2
100% (22.0)
"One event caused
by both personnel
error
and equipment failure
Collectively, Unit
1 and Unit 2 issued
50
LERs during this
period.
The following table
shows
a comparison of LERs for
the
SALP 6 and
SALP 7 periods:
BASIC CAUSES
Per sonnel
Error s
Procedure
Inadequacies
Equipment/Component
Design Discrepancies
Other
SALP 6
30.1% (28)
31.1% (29)
23.7% (22)
10 '% (10)
~4. 3%
4
100% (93)
SALP 7
46.O% (23)
14.0% ( 7)
26.0% (13)
B.o%%d ( 4)
~6.N
3
100.0% (50)
Frequency of Issuance:
7.8 LERs/mo.
2 '
LERs/mo.
NOTE:
The above information was derived from review of LERs
performed
by
NRC staff and
may or may not completely coincide with
the unit cause
assignments
which the licensee
would make using
a
proximate
cause
per event,
and they may or may not coincide with the
multi-cause
assignments
discussed
in Section
IV of this
SALP report.
H.
NRR ACTIVITIES
NRR/LICENSEE MEETINGS
Appendix
R Safe
Shutdown,
Bethesda,
Repair,
Bethesda,
Tube Leakage,
Bethesda,
NRC -
SQUG Meeting,
Bethesda,
Control
Room Ventilation, Bethesda,
DATE
October
1986
December
12,
1986
March 6,
1987
June
29,
1987
July 24,
1987
38
Individual Plant Evaluation
SIMS Issues,
AEPSC Offices,
Columbus,
Modification to Crane Girder,
AEPSC
Offices,
Columbus,
Diesel Generator
Fuel Oil Surveillance
Requirements,
Bethesda,
2.
NRR/LICENSEE/REGION MEETINGS
Re-qualification
Exams
Proposed
Procedure
Changes
3.
NRR SITE VISITS/MEETINGS
Technical Specification
Upgrade
Program
Technical Specification
Improvements
Short-and-Intermediate-Term
Goals
Pump Hatches
New Project
Manager Orientation
Meeting,
AEPSC Office, Columbus,
Site Visit
4.
COMMISSION MEETINGS
None
5.
COMMISSIONERS SITE VISITS
None
6.
NRR EVENT BRIEFING
None
7.
ACRS MEETINGS
None
8.
EXTENSION GRANTED
None
July 31,
1987
August 21,
1987
October 20,
1987
November
16,
1987
September
9,
1987
November 19,
1987
November 31,
1986
March 23,
1987
July 17,
1987
September
30,
1987
February
10,
1988
February ll, 1988
39
9.
RELIEFS
GRANTED
Inservice Testing
RHR Valves
Inservice Testing
RHR Valves
10.
EXEMPTION GRANTED
December-19,
1986
December ll, 1987
None
11.
LICENSE AMENDMENTS ISSUED
Amendment 99/86,
Reactor Trip System
Instrumentation
Amendment 100/ -, Surveillance
Extension
Amendment
101/87,
Footnote
Change
on
Crane Travel
Amendment 102/88, Deletion of Maximum
Fuel
Rod Weight
Amendment
103/89,
Crevice Flushing of
Amendment - /90, Allow One-time
Substitution of Row 8 For
Row 9
Ice Basket Weights
Amendment
104/91, Editorial Changes
to
Requirements
Amendment 105/ -, Limit Hourly
Verification of quadrant
Power Tilt
Ratio to the First Twelve Hours
Amendment
106/92,
Add Reactor
Vessel
Instrumentation
System
and Core Exit
Thermocouples
to the Post Accident
Monitoring Instrumentation
Amendment
107/ -, Surveillance
Extension
for Cycle
9
Amendment 108/ -, Surveillance
Extension
for Ice Condenser
Amendment
109/ -, Burnup Extension for
Cycle
9 Core
Amendment 110/93, Allow Ice Condenser
Lower Inlet Door Surveillance
to be
Done in Modes
3 and
4
Amendment ill/94, Revise
Concentration for Refueling in the
and Accumulators,
Increase
Water Volumes
in the
RWST, Increase
the
RWST Temperature
and
Change Moderator Temperature
Coefficient
Amendment 112/95,
Add Requirements
for
Containment
Sump Level Instrumentation
December
10,
1986
December
20,
1987
February
28,
1987
March 27,
1987
April 1,
1987
April 3,
1987
April 7,
1987
April 7,
1987
Apl il 10,
1987
April 17, l987
May 8,
1987
May 19,
1987
May 29,
1987
Qune
10,
1987
December
10,
1987
40
December
17,
1987
December
18,
1987
Amendment 113/96,
Delete
Footnote which
Required that Main Hoist of Crane
be
De-energized
Whenever the
Load is Moved
over the Pool
Amendment -/97, Surveillance
Extensions
Amendment
114/98,
License
Changes - Name
Changes
from Indiana
and Michigan Power Co.
to Indiana Michigan Power Co.,
January
13,
1988
Amendment -/99, Surveillance
Extensions
February
29,
1987
12.
EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISSUED
Allows one-time substitution of
row 8 for
9 ice basket weights
Surveillance
Exten s i on s
13.
ORDERS
ISSUED
None
April 3,
198?
February
29,
1988