ML17324A938
| ML17324A938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1986 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17324A937 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606130317 | |
| Download: ML17324A938 (5) | |
Text
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TABLE 3. 3~~nelnned)
ENGINEERED SAPETY PEATURE AO
.ION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION O
A 8
FUNCTIONAL UNIT 3 ~
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION I
a.
Phase "A" Isolation M
- 1) Manual
- 2) From Safety In)ection Automatic Actuation Logic b.
Phase "B" Isolation TOTAL NO CHANNELS OF CHANNELS TO TRIP MINIMUM CHANNELS APPLICABLE OPERABLE MODES 1P2P3,4 1,2,3,4 ACTION 18 13
- 1) Manual
- 2) Automatic Actuation Logic
- 3) Containment Pressure-High-High 2
2 2
1 1P2P3P4 1 'P3P4 1,2,3 18 13 16 c.
Purge and Exhaust Isolation*
I CD
- 1) Manual
- 2) Containment Radioactivity>>
High Train A (VRS-2101, ERS-2301, ERS-2305)
- 3) Containment Radioactivity-High Train B (VRS-2201, ERS-2401, ERS-2405) 1,2d3P4 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4 17 17 17
- This specification 8606130317 PDR ADOCK P
only applies during purge.
860610 05000316 PDR
The OPERABILITY of the protective and ESF instrumentati.on systems and interlocks ensure that 1) the associated ESF action and/or reactor trip will be initiated vhen the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint,
- 2) the specified coincidence logic ks maintained,
- 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for protective and ESF purposes from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and miti.gation of acci.dent and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent vith the assumptions used in the acci.dent analyses.
Protection has been provided for main feedwater system malfunctions in MODES 3 and 4.
This protection is required vhen main feedpumps are aligned to feed steam generators in MODES 3 and 4. The avai.lability of feedvater isolation on high-high steam generator level terminates the addition of cold water to the steam generators in any main feedwater system malfunction.
The j total volume that can be added to the steam generators by the main feedwater system in MODES 3 and 4 is limited by this safeguards actuation and the fact that feedwater isolation on lov T
.setpoint coincident vith reactor trip can only be cleared above the lov-lov steam generator level trip satpoint.
avR The restrictions associated vith bypassing SSF trip functions belov either P-ll or P-12 provide protection against an 'increase in steam flov transient and are consistent vith assumptions made in the safety analysis.
The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards.
The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.
The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESF action function associated vith each channel is completed vithin the time limit assumed in the accident analyses.
No credit vas taken in the analyses for those channels vith response times indicated as not applicable.
Response
time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined.
Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors vith certified response times.
D. C.
COOK - VNIT 2 B 3/4 3-1 AMENDMENT NO.
82
0
h1 3.2.2 F (Z) shall be limited by the folloving relationships:
W e
u F~(Z) S p
[K(Z)]
Fq(
) 5 p
[K(Z)]
P ) 0.5 F (Z) g [3.94] [K(Z)]
F (Z) g [4.20] [K(Z)]
P < 0.5
~ p ~
RATED THERES POWER
~ F (Z) is the measured hot channel factor including a 3X manufac-
~turing tolerance'uncertainty and a SX measurement uncertainty.
<<K(Z) is the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for Westinghouse fuel and Figure 3.2-2(a) for Exxon Nuclear'ompany fuel..
MODE 1 MXIQE:
With F (Z) exceeding its limit:
a.
Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1t F (Z) exceeds the limitwithin 15 minutes and similarly reduce e Pover Range Neutron Aux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower AT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 1% for each
-1% F (Z) exceeds the limit,.
b.
Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to. increasing RGHtHAL POWER above the reduced limit required by a, above; TiKRMAL POWER may then be increased provided F (Z) is demonstrated through incore mapping to be vithin its Pimit.
D. C.
COOK - UNIT 2 3/4 2-5 AMENDMENT NO.
82
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