ML17319B036
| ML17319B036 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17319B034 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109100209 | |
| Download: ML17319B036 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASMINGTON, O. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIOH RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 49 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE HO.
DPR-58 AHD AMENDMEHT NO+
34 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO+
DPR 74 IiIDIANAAND MICHIGAN ELECTRIC COMPANY DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UN!T NOS.
1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS.
50-315 AND 50-316 Introducti on By letter dated December 10,. 1980, Indiana and Michigan Electric Company, (the l.icensee);
proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) appended to Facility Operating License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 for Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos 1
and 2.
The changes involve the incor-
'oration of certain of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements.
The licensees's request is in direct response to the HRC staff's letter dated July 2, 1980.
Back 'round Information By our letter dated September 13,
- 1979, we issued to all operating nuclear power plants requirements established as a result of our review of the TMI-2 accident.
Certain of these requirements, designated Lessons Learned Category "A" requirements, were to have been completed by the licensee prior to any operation subsequent to January 1, 1980.
Our evaluation of-the licensee's compliance with these Category "A" items was attached to our letter dated March 20, 1980.
Subsequently, by letter dated July 2, 1980, we requested that the licensee amend their TS to incorporate additional Limiting Conditions of Operation and Surveillance Requi r'ements, as appropri ate.
Included therein were model specifications that we had determined-to be acceptable.
The licensee's application is in direct response to our request.
Each of the issues iden-tified by the NRC staff and the licensee's response is discussed in the Evaluation below.
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Evaluation 2.1.1 Emer ency Power Su ly Re uirements The pressurizer water. level indicators, pressurizer relief and block valves, and pressurizer heaters are important in a post-accident situation.
Adequate emergency power supplies add assurance of post-accident functioning of these components.
The licensee has provided the requisite emergency power supplies.
The licensee has proposed revised technical specifications which provide appro-priate survei ll.ance and actions in the event of component inoperability and are thus acceptable.
We have reviewed these proposed TSs and find that the emergency power supplies are reasonably ensured for post-accident functioning of the subject components and are thus acceptable.
2.1.3.a Direct Indication of (of Flow Valve Position The licensee has provided a direct indication of power-operated relief valve (PORV) and safety valve position in the control room.
These indications are a diagnostic aid for the plant operator and provide no automatic action.
The licensee has provided TSs with a 31-days, channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requi rement; thus, the TSs are acceptable and they meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.
2.1. 3.b Instrumentation for Inadequate Core Coolin The licensee has installed an instrument system to detect the effects of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling.
These instruments; subcooling meters, neceive and process data from existing plant instirumenta-tion.
We previously reviewed this system in our Safety Evaluation dated March 20, 1980.
The licensee submitted TSs with a 31-day channel check and an 18-month channel calibration requirem'ents and actions to be taken in the event of component inoper'ability.
We conclude the TSs are acceptable as they meet our July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.
- 2. 1.4 Diverse Containment Isolation The licensee has modified the containment isolation system so that diverse parameters will be sensed to ensure automatic isolation of non-essential systems under postulated accident conditions.
We have reviewed this system in our Lessons Learned Category "A" Safety Evaluation'ated-March 20, 1980.
The modification is such that is does not result in the automatic loss of containment isolation after the containment isolation signal is reset.
Reopening of containment isolation would require deliberate operator action.
The TSs submitted by the licensee list each affected containment isolation valve and provide for the appropriate surveillance and actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
2:1.7.a Auto Initiation of Auxiliar Feedwater Systems The licensee has provided for the automatic initiation of auxiliary (emer-gency) feedwater flow.
He have previously reviewed the design and installa-tion of this system as part of our Lessons Learned Category "A" program.
The circuits are designed to be testable and the design retains the capabi3ity of manual actuation from the control room even in "the event of failure of the auto-initiating circuitry.
The TSs submitted by the licensee list the appro-priate components, descri6e the tests and provide for p)'oper test frequency.
. The TSs contain appropriate actions in the event of component inoperability; therefore, we conclude that the TSs are acceptable.
2.1.7.b Auxilia
<emergency Feedwater Flow Indication The licensee has installed auxiliary (emergency) feedwater flow indication that meets our testability and vital power rt;quiremen+..Me reviewed this
. system in our Safety Evaluation dated
.'<arch 10, 1980.
The. licensee has proposed a TS with 31-day channel check and 18-month channel calibration requirements.
Me find this TS acceptable as it, meets the criteria of our
. July 2, 1980 model TS criteria.
2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor STA Our request iridicated that the TSs related, to-minimum shift manning should be revised to reflect the augmentation of an STA.
The licensee's application would add one STA to each shift to perform the function of accident assessment.
ihe individual performing this function will have at le::st a
ba helor's degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline with special training in plant design, and response and'analysis of the plant for transients and accidents.,
Part of the STA duties are related to ope'rating experience reyiew function.
Based on our review, we find the licensee's submittal to satisfy our requirements and is acceptable.
EVALUATION TO SUPPORT..LICENSE. CONDITIONS 2.1.4 Inte rit of S stems Ouwide Containment Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license should be amended by adding a license condition related to a, Systems Integrity M asurements Program.
Such a condition would require the licensee to effect an appropriate program to eliminate or prevent the release of s'ignificant amounts of radioactivity to the environment yia leakage from engineered safety systems and auxiliary systems, which are located outside reactor containment.
By letter dated December 10, 1980, the licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly we have included this condition in the license.
2.1.8. c Iodine. Honitorin Our letter dated July 2, 1980, indicated that the license s'hould be amended by adding a license condiiion related to iodine monitoring.
Such a condiiion would require the licensee to effect.a program which would ensure the capability to determine the airborne iodine concentration in areas requiring personnel access under accident conditions.. Hy letter dated Oecember 10, 19GO
'he licensee agreed to adopt such a license condition; accordingly, we have included this condition in the license.
Environmental Consideration Me have determined'hat the amendment does not authorize a change in e fluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in ariy significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an "
action which is insignificant rom the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmenul impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
Conclusion Me have concluded, based on 'the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because that amendment'does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment.does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (3)
'such activities will:.be conducted in compliance with the Cotmission.'s regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comnon defense and security or to the health and safety of the publi c.
Date:
August 25, 1981
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