ML17317B367

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IE Insp Repts 50-315/79-05 & 50-316/79-05 on 790305-09, 12-16,19-23,26-31 & 0401-06.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Implement Locked & Sealed Valve Procedure & Failure to Use Jumper Logs as Directed
ML17317B367
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 05/03/1979
From: Baker K, Masse R, Warnick R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17317B364 List:
References
50-315-79-05, 50-315-79-5, 50-316-79-05, 50-316-79-5, NUDOCS 7907270407
Download: ML17317B367 (22)


See also: IR 05000315/1979005

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Repor t No.

50-315/79-05;

50-316/79-05

Docket No.

50-315;

50-316

License

No.

DPR-58;

DPR-74

Licensee:

American Electric Power Service Corporation

Indiana

and Michigan Power

Company

2 Broadway

New York, New York

10004

Facility Name:

Donald

C.

Cook, Units

1 and

2

Inspection At:

Donald

C.

Cook Site,

Bridgman, Michigan

Inspection

Conducted:

March 5-9, 12-16,

19-23,

26-31 and

April 1-6,

1979

/F40 4

Inspectors:

R.

E. Masse

RFN L.

K. R. Baker

5"-9-7

(Date)

(Date)

Approved By:

R. F. Warnick, Chief

Reactor Projects Section

2

(Date)

Ins ection

Summar

Ins ection on March 5-9

12-16

19-23

26-31

and

A ril 1-6

1979

(Re ort No. 50-315/79-05

50-316/79-05)

Areas Ins ected:

Review of plant operations

including security;

maintenance;

new fuel receipt (Unit 1); preparation for refueling

(Unit 1); incore

excore detector calibration; training and re-

qualification training; radiation waste

system operations;

manage-

ment meeting;

licensee'

actions

on previous inspection findings;

IE bulletins and circulars;

QA program review; procedures;

and

safety injection event of March 23,

1979 (Unit 1).

The inspection

involved 197 inspector-hours

onsite

by two NRC inspectors.

Results:

No items of noncompliance

were identified in six of the

areas

inspected.

One item of noncompliance

was noted in each of

the two remaining areas.

(Infraction Failure to implement locked

and sealed

valve procedure

Paragraph

10;

and Infraction Failure

to use jumper logs as directed

Paragraph

2).

() $ p ) {)Q $

1

Details

1.

Persons

Contacted

J.

Dolan, Vice Chairman- Engineering

& Construction,

AEP

R. Jurgensen,

Chief Nuclear Engineer,

AEP

R. Kroeger,

gA Manager,

AEP

  • D. Shaller, Plant Manager
  • B. Svensson,

Assistant Plant Manager

  • R. Lease,

Operations

Superintendent

R. Dudding, Maintenance

Superintendent

  • E. Smarrella,

Technical Superintendent

  • H. Chadwell, Production Supervisor
  • C. Murphy, Production Supervisor
  • J. Stietzel,

QA Supervisor

The inspectors

also contacted

a number of operators,

technicians,

and maintenance

personnel

during the course of the inspection,

  • Denotes those present

at one more of the exit interviews.

2.

Review of Plant

0 erations

(Includin

Securit

)

The inspectors

maintained

continuous

cognizance of operations;

reviewed logs and operating records,

data sheets,

chart recorders,

and records of malfunctioning equipment;

and checked for trends

and significant changes.

The review included checks of:

a.

Control Room Logs

b.

Shift Operating Engineer

Log

c.

Auxiliary Logs (Radwaste,

Evaporators,

Makeup Plant,

Turbine Room, etc.)

d.

Operating Orders

e.

Standing Orders

f.

Jumper/Lifted Lead/Blocked Alarm Logs

g.

Condition Reports

The inspector noted that Temporary

Change

number

3 to Procedure

1-OHP 4021.032. 001, "Starting, Loading, Paralleling

and Shutting

Down Diesel-Generators"

requires

an entry into the Lifted Lead

Log when pulling and replacing field flash fuses for Unit 1

Diesel-Generator

starts.

Contrary to this procedure,

the

1

CD Diesel was started

on Harch 26,

1979 without a corresponding

entry into the log.

This finding represents

apparent

noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 relating to implementation of approved

procedures.

The inspectors

made several

tours of various areas

of the plant,

with observations

of the following:

a ~

b.

c ~

d.

e.

Instrumentation

was functioning adequately.

Radiation controls were adequate

General plant housekeeping

was adequate.

Fluid leaks were minimal.

Piping vibrations appeared

acceptable.

Selected

valves

and switches

were positioned in accordance

with existing plant conditions.

go

Equipment that was out of service

was tagged properly.

h.

Control room manning was in accordance

with Technical

Specifications.

Operators

were knowledgeable of Control Room conditions

and annunciators.

Selected

LCO's (Limiting Conditions for Operation)

and

LSSS (Limiting Safety System Setpoints)

were within

Technical Specifications.

k.

Fire controls

and equipment

were adequate.

Shift turnover in Control Room (nightshift to dayshift)

was in accordance

with procedure.

m.

Chemical analysis

techniques

were adequate.

n.

Random checks of various aspects

of security to ensure

security procedures

were being adequately

implemented.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

3.

Maintenance

The inspectors

observed various maintenance activities including

rewiring of auxiliary feedwater valve controls,

maintenance

of

Diesel-Generator

tachometer circuitry, and instrument adjustments

and calibration of a Rod Control System Module.

The inspectors

verified the following with regard to these activities:

a.

Required approvals

were obtained prior to initiating work.

b.

Approved procedures

were used.

c.

Work was inspected

by appropriate

personnel.

d.

Functional testing, etc.,

was used

to verify operability

following maintenance activities.

e.

Work was accomplished

by qualified personnel.

f.

Activities surrounding the maintenance

did not involve

a Reportable

Occurrence.

g.

Plant status

was such that maintenance

could be accom-

plished.

h.

Associated

systems

or components

were properly tagged.

Limiting conditions for operations

were met.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

4.

New Fuel Recei t (Unit 1)

Prior to inspection of new fuel, the inspector verified that

approved,

technically adequate

procedures

were available

covering receipt,

inspection,

and storage of new fuel.

The

inspector

observed

inspection

and storage of four new fuel

assemblies

and verified that these activities were in accor-

dance with procedures.

The inspector reviewed all documentation

associated

with fuel receipt

and inspection of all new

assemblies

to be installed in Unit 1 reactor during the re-

fueling outage.

All deficiencies

were of a minor nature

and were resolved

adequately.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

5.

Pre aration For Refuelin

(Unit 1)

Unit 1 was shutdown April 6,

1979, for a refueling outage

scheduled

to last approximately

50 days.

Prior to this shut-

down,

the inspector reviewed

the approved refueling procedures

and verified their adequacy.

Included in these procedures

were

the following:

a.

Fuel handling, transfers,

verifications.

b.

Fuel inspection.

c.

Handling and inspection of other core internals.

d.

Licensee's

overall outage control.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

6.

Incore-Excore Detector Calibration

The inspector

observed portions of an incore-excore

detector

calibration on Unit 2 and verified that the test

was in accor-

dance with procedures

(12-THP 4030.STP.362)

and was within the

frequency specified

by Technical Specifications.

The inspector

verified for the portions of the test

observed

that Axial Flux

Difference

(AFD) was maintained within specifications,

that

rods were above insertion limits, that procedures

including

prerequisites

and initial conditions were followed,

and that

data taking and documentation

were in accordance

with procedures.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

7.

Trainin

and

Re ualification Trainin

The inspector discussed

training with management,

staff, operators,

technicians,

maintenance

personnel,

administrative

and clerical

personnel.

The discussions

included the following aspects

of

training.

a.

Administrative controls

and procedures.

b.

Radiological health

and safety.

c.

Industrial safety.

d.

Security.

e.

Emergency plan.

f.

Ouality assurance.

g.

On-the-job training

{OJT)

h.

Technical training.

Fire brigade training.

The inspector also verified that females

are required to sign

a statement relating to instructions provided concerning pre-

natal radiation exposure,

and that these

statements

become

a

part of each individual's permanent

personnel

record.

The inspector attended

the initial orientation training including

Radiation Protection training to verify the adequacy

of train-

ing in these selected

areas.

The"inspector also attended

an operator requalification program

lecture pertaining to Mode

6 Technical Specifications

and veri-

fied the adequacy of the technical content of the presented

information,

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

8.

Radiation Vaste

S stem 0 erations

/

The inspector reviewed recent records of gaseous

and liquid

releases

and verified that releases

were properly sampled

and

approved prior to the release

and were in accordance

with pro-

cedures.

The inspector

has observed

portions of several liquid

releases

recently and reviewed associated

documentation for

each.

The inspector verified that release

procedures

require

testing prior to the actual release

of trip valves which would

terminate releases.

Instrumentation

setpoints

for control of

the valves are checked at that time.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

9.

Mana ement Meetin

A meeting was held with licensee

management

on March 30,

1979

at the Donald

C.

Cook site to discuss

the regulatory performance

of the D.C.

Cook Units

1 and 2, the Revised Inspection Program,

and other current topics.

IE Attendees:

J.

G. Keppler, Director, RIII

R. F. Heishman,

Chief, Reactor Operations

and Nuclear Support

Branch, RIII

J.

A. Hind, Chief, Safeguards

Branch, RIII

R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects

Section

2, RIII

K. R. Baker, Resident

Inspector, RIII

R.

E. Masse,

Resident

Inspector, RIII

Licensee Attendees:

J.

E. Dolan, Vice Chairman,

Engineering

and Construction

R.

W. Jurgensen,

Chief Nuclear Engineer

D. V. Shaller, Plant Superintendent

The licensee outlined plans

and actions which were being taken

to improve performance.

These actions included:

a.

Adjustments to improve personnel retention.

b.

Improved outage co-ordination

c.

Organizational

changes.

d.

Procedural

improvements.

e.

Physical

improvements.

10.

Licensee's

Actions on Previous Ins ection Findin s

The inspector reviewed

the licensee

actions regarding

the

findings from the following inspections:

(Closed)

IE Inspection Reports

(50-315/78-27;

50-316/78-31:

The licensee'

actions with respect

to the items of noncompliance

contained in the report were reviewed.

The licensee

actions

are as indicated in his December

21,

1978 letter.

(Closed)

IE Inspection Reports

(50-315/78-25:

50-316/78-23):

Licensee

has taken actions

as indicated in his October

16,

1978 letter.

(Closed)

IE Inspection Reports 50-315/78-09;

50-316/78-07):

Licensee

has taken actions

as indicated in his letter dated

August 10,

1978.

(Closed)

IE Inspection Report

(50-316/78-17):

Licensee is

or has taken actions

as indicated in his letters dated

September

29,

1978,

June

30,

1978,

and June

29,

1978.

(Open)

IE Inspection Report (50-315/77-24):

The licensee

replied to the violation contained in this report in a letter

dated February

17,

1978.

During earlier inspections

the in-

spector

had verified the licensee

was reviewing and revising

procedures

as indicated in his reply.

Included was the develop-

ment of a program to control locally operated

valves through

the use of seals

or locks.

The procedure

was

OHP '4030 STP.035,

"Locked or Sealed Valve Position Logging".

The procedure

was

revised in December

1978 to include

ASME B and

PV Code Section

XI requirements

also.

On April 4,

1979 the inspector

attempted

to audit implementation

of the procedure.

A notebook with log pages

and procedure is

maintained in the Shift Operating Engineer's office.

The pro-

cedure in the notebook

was

2

OHP 4030 STP.035

Rev.

1; dated

December

12,

1978.

The correct procedure revision was later found

to be 12

OHP 4030 STP.035

Rev.

2, dated Harch 13,

1979.

Revision

1 required 1-WD-230-1,2,4,5,7

and 8,

Gas Decay Tank Release

Isolation Valves to be sealed

closed

(Rev.

2 requires locking).

Log entries did not disclose

the position nor the method of

controlling the position (seal or lock) of these valves.

The

procedure requires valves listed in its Attachment

1 to be locked

or sealed in position and that "after changing position on any

valve on the Attachment

1 log entries

are to be made."

The

inspector

observed

the valves were locked not sealed.

A review

of records for gas

decay tank releases

revealed

that

on kfarch 28,

1979 number

7 gas decay tank had been released.

This requires

the changing of position of valve 1-WD-230-7.

No log entries

were made for the changing of position.

It was also noted that

the position of a number of other valves

such

as

2-RH-104 E,

104

W,

106 E,

106

W,

109 E,

109

W, 113 E,

and

113

W were not

logged.

This appears

to be in noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.8.1 requirements

to implement written procedures.

IE Bulletin/Circulars

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

response

and actions

associated

with the following:

(Closed)

IE Circular No. 78-05; Inadvertent

Safety Injections

During Cooldown:

Licensee

has reviewed the circular.

(Closed)

IE Circular No. 78-06; Potential

Common Mode

Flooding of ECCS Equipment

Rooms at

BWR facilities:

Licensee

reviewed facility design for generic aspects.

(Closed)

IE Circular No. 78-16; Limitorque Valve Actuators:

Licensee

reviewed the circular and adapted

procedures

to in-

sure valves are test operated after manual operation.

(Closed)

IE Circular No.

78-17;

Inadequate

Guard/Training

Qualifications

and Falsified Training Records:

Licensee

has reviewed circular and is taking appropriate action.

No items of noncompliance

or deviations

were identified.

The inspector reviewed

changes

in the licensee's

QA Program

and implementing procedures.

There have

been

no changes

in

the program within the last year.

A number of changes

have

been

made to the implementing procedures.

These

changes

were reviewed to determine that they were in conformance

with the program.

No items of noncompliance

were observed.

13.

Procedures

The inspector

reviewed selected

procedures.

The procedures

reviewed are listed below with comments.

The inspector

verified the procedures

had been reviewed

and approved

as

specified in the Technical Specifications.

12-OHP 4021. 001. 012 Determination of Reactor

Shutdown Margin,

Revision 6.

Procedure is somewhat

confusing

as it contains

temporary

changes

which are not applicable

to both units.

The licensee

agreed

to review this area

and provide separate

procedures

where

a procedure can't

be made applicable to both

units.

12-OHP 4021. 004. 001

CVCS Demineralizer Operation,

Revision 2.

Step 4.2 refers to a step which is not contained in the pro-

cedure.

The procedure

appears

to be basically

a valve manip-

ulation procedure

but it does not provide adequate

interfacing

of the operation.

For example,

the procedure

contains

a pre-

caution regarding boron changes

which may occur if unborated

resins are used;

however, it does not provide guidance

as

how to place the units in service to minimize the effects.

It does not provide interfacing with other departments

such

as informing the chemistry group that

a new demineralizer is

in operation

so that samples

can be obtained to determine

proper operation.

The inspector noted that the valve lineup for the demineralizer

isolated

the demineralizer vessel

completely

(no vent or drain

open)

when it was not in service.

A review of the prints

revealed

there was no relief on the demineralizer to protect

against

overpressure

caused

by temperature

changes.

FSAR

table 9.2-1 states

the demineralizers

are

ASME B and

PV Code

Section III class

C vessels.

The code appears

to require

overpressure

protection.

The licensee is reviewing this.

This

is considered

an unresolved

item.

1-OHP 4021. 002. 007 Pressurizer

Pressure

and Spray Control

System Operation Revision 1.

The maximum heatup rate allowed

by the procedure is 200

F/hr.

Technical Specification allows

a maximum of 100 F/hr.

The procedures

reference

as to the point

0

in the startup

a bubble is drawn is not in accordance

with the

licensee's

present

startup procedure.

The licensee

agreed

to

revise the procedure.

1-OHP 4024.120.001-100

Annunciator No.

20 Response,

Station

Auxiliary "CD".

When the procedure

was

compared

to the alarm

panel it was noted that there were two alarms which were not

in the procedure.

"DG CD room Vent damper abnormal"

(20) and

"1CD D/G load shed relay abnormal"

(30).

The licensee

agreed

to provide procedures

and is in the process

of comparing all

his response

procedures

to the annunciator

panels

to insure

a procedure exists for all alarms.

THP

6030

IMP 145 Pressurizer

Level Control.

No comment.

THP

6030 Rod Control/Rod Insertion.

No comment.

THP

6030 NI Detector Test

and Replacement.

No comment.

THP

4030

STP 058 Spent Fuel Area

(RMS-5).

No comment.

12

OHP 4030

STP 16 Reactor Coolant

System Leak Test,

Rev.

3.

Acceptance critieria only deals with unidentified leakage it

does not provide values for identified limit.

The procedure

appears

to restrict makeup additions during the test which

is impractical during certain periods or when leakage is high.

Calculation provided in the procedure

allows accounting for

makeup,

but the procedure

does not record the data.

The

licensee

agreed

to revise the procedure.

-10-

1-OHP 4021. 028. 002 Lower Containment Ventilation Revision 2.

Step

5. 8 requires reducing the lower containment

temperature

if a reactor cavity vent fan is lost.

The procedures

does not

provide guidance

as

how to do this.

The licensee

agreed

to

review the procedure.

1-OHP 4021. 028. 011 Auxiliary Building Ventilation.

No comment.

1-OHP 4021. 082. 008 Placing In/Removing From Service of Vital

Instrument

Buses.

The procedure

contains

a check off sheet.

The sheet

contains

no check offs nor is its use specified.

The licensee

agreed

to review the procedure.

1-OHP 4021.002.006 Pressurizer

Relief Tank Operation.

Step

0

4.1 specifies

a maximum temperature limit of 120 F.

Step

6.3.2 specifies

125

F.

The licensee

agreed

to correct the

procedure.

1-OHP 4022.012. 005 Full Length Rod Misalignment Rev.

3.

Pro-

cedure

does not address

detection

and

how to comply with

Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 action item (a) if the binding

is mechanical.

The procedure will not,

by itself, lead to

full compliance with the Technical Specification

and associated

action items.

The licensee

agreed

to revise

the procedure.

1-OHP 4023.019.001

Loss of Essential

Service Vater Rev.

0.

The procedure

appears

to be designed

for Unit 1 in operation,

Unit 2 under construction.

The licensee

agreed

to revise

the procedure to reflect two operating Units.

12

OHP 4023.001.004

Steam Generator

Tube Rupture,

Rev.

2.

Step 4. 2. 2 appears

to contradict

2. 1 in that one requires

isolation of steam from the affected generator

to the auxi-

liary feedwater

pump.

The other step requires isolating both

supplies.

Step

4. 2. 1 requires

implementing,

under certain

conditions,

the emergency plan.

The emergency

plan does not

deal with monitoring and estimating

the releases

from this

type of accident.

The licensee

stated

procedures

would be

corrected

by the 15th of April, 1979 by temporary

changes

and later by revising the procedure or Emergency Plan.

1

OHP 4023. 002. 001 High Reactor Coolant Activity.

No comment.

No items of noncompliance

were observed.

-11-

14.

Safet

In ection Event March 23

1979

On March 23,

1979 at 1549 hours0.0179 days <br />0.43 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.893945e-4 months <br /> Unit 1 tripped

and received

a

B train safety injection (SI)

(A train did not activate).

The trip and safety injection was due to a loss of power to

GRID I and II (instrument

power buses).

The safety injection

signal was reset at 1558 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00258 weeks <br />5.92819e-4 months <br />.

Reactor trip breakers

were

closed

again at 0125 hours0.00145 days <br />0.0347 hours <br />2.066799e-4 weeks <br />4.75625e-5 months <br />

on March 24,

1979.

The following

.items were noted by the inspector during his review of the

event:

a.

Log entries did not provide a complete description of the

event.

Such as the event

caused all four reactor coolant

pumps to trip or that reactor pressure

was reduced for

maintenance

on the pressurizer relief tank.

The licensee

agreed that the logs were deficient and stated

actions were

being taken to improve the information contained in the

logse

b.

It is not clear the licensee

attempted

to comply with

technical specification requirements

to have at least

one train of automatic

SI available in Mode

3 as reactor

trip breakers

were not closed until 0125 hours0.00145 days <br />0.0347 hours <br />2.066799e-4 weeks <br />4.75625e-5 months <br />

on the

24th restoring train B to automatic.

The closing of the

trip breakers

appeared

to be for testing prior to starting

rather than restoring SI.

The licensee

appears

to have

made no attempt to evalute

why train A did not activate

or if it was functioning properly during the time from the

first SI until the breakers

were closed.

The inspector's

review reveals

the licensee

complied with technical

specifications

during the time, but it appears

more the

result of circumstances

than logic and actions

taken.

The need to close the trip breakers

upon resetting

SI

was discussed

with the licensee.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspectors

comments

and agreed

a procedure

would be

provided to reset

the SI logic even if the breakers

could

not be closed

due to a standing" trip such

as steam generator

level.

-12-

i

C ~

The loss of power to the GRID's appears

to have been

caused

by equalizer

charge being conducted

on the

CD

battery causing

a higher than normal voltage to the CRID's

inverters which caused

a failure.

The licensee

agreed

to investigate

and to take action to reduce

the potential

for this occuring again.

d.

When the inspectors

attempted

to review the event it

appeared

that the licensee

had not completed

a detailed

review of the event to determine if the plants

response

had been proper

and if equipment

had functioned properly.

'Discussions

subsequently

inidicated that individuals had

probably looked at the various aspects

and determined

their limited areas

were proper,

but there

had been

no

overall review to insure. items had not fallen into "cracks"

nor was there any documentation

of these

reviews or opinions.

The licensee

agreed

to consider

the inspectors

comments.

15.

Unresolved

Items

Unresolved items are matters

about which more information is

required in order to ascertain

whether they are acceptable

items,

items of noncompliance,

or deviations.

An unresolved

item disclosed during the inspection is discussed

in Paragraph

13.

16.

Exit Interview

The inspectors

met with licensee

representatives

(denoted in

Paragraph

1) at the conclusion of weekly inspections

on March 9,

23,

30 and April 6,

1979.

The inspectors

summarized

the scope

and findings of the inspections.

Attachments:

Preliminary Inspection Findings

-13-

'

,ZKEil<QHARY XNSPECTXON FXNDXhGS

~ ~

~

~

~

I

1 ~

LICENSEE

'merican Electric Power Svc.

Corp.

Xndiana

b Hichigan Power Company

2 Broadway

.

New York, NY

10004

D. C.

Cook Unit 1:

Bxidgman,

YX

D.

C.

Cook Unit 2

. Brid man

YX

2.

REGXONAL OFFICE

1

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

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