ML17309A596

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{{Adams | number = ML17309A596 | issue date = 12/31/1995 | title = Vols 1-VI to Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Improved Tss. | author name = | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | addressee name = | addressee affiliation = | docket = 05000244 | license number = | contact person = | document report number = NUDOCS 9601030010 | package number = ML17264A312 | document type = TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS | page count = 4104 }}

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{{#Wiki_filter:ANDRochesterGas5ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember1995SubmittalAttachmentCChapters3.5-5.0VolumeIII Accumulators3.5.13.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.1AccumulatorsLCO3.5.1TwoECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withpressurizerpressure>1600psig.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.lRestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursB.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.B.lRestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.1ANDC.2BeinMODE3.Reducepressurizerpressuretos1600pslg.6hours12hoursD.Twoaccumulatorsinoperable.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-1Draft8

Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREauENCVSR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hoursSR3.5.1.2Verifyboratedwatervolumeingachaccumulatoris~1126cubicfeet(50%)andz1154cubicfeet(82%).12hoursSR3.5.1.3Verifynitrogencoverpressureineachaccumulatoris~700psigands790psig.12hoursSR3.5.1.4Verifyboronconcentrationineachaccumulatoris>2100ppmands2600ppm.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.5."1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperatorwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600.psig.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-2DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and33.5.23.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-MODES1,2,and3LCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.NOTESl.InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedbyclosingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Powermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878Band8780forupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4.14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime..2.OperationinMODE3withECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureofbothRCScoldlegsexceeds375'F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETION'TIMEA.Onetraininoperable.A.lANDAtleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable.RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.-72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-3DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursC.Twotrainsinoperable.C.1Enter,LCO3.0.3ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.2.1Verifythefollowingvalvesareinthelistedposition.NumberPositionFunction12hours825A825B826A 826B826C 826D 851A 851B 856 878A 878BOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpen878CClosed878D-Open896A'pen896BOpenRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLeg'SIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSCold,LegRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSpray(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-4DraftB

ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.2.2VerifyeachECCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.3Verifyeachbreakerorkeyswitch,asapplicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.4VerifyeachECCSpump'sdevelopedheadatthetestflowpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.5.2.5VerifyeachECCSautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.5.2.6VerifyeachECCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.5.2.7Verify,byvisualinspection,eachRHRcontainmentsump'uctioninletisnotrestrictedbydebrisandthecontainmentsumpscreenshowsnoevidenceofstructuraldistressorabnormalcorrosion.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-5DraftB

ECCS-MODE43.5.33.5.3ECCS-MODE4LCO3.5.3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.RequiredECCSSafetyInjection(SI)subsysteminoperable.B.IRestorerequiredECCSSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE5.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-6DraftB ECCS-NODE43.5.3SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.3.1NOTEAnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapa'bleofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.SR3.5.2.4isapplicableforallequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE.InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-7DraftB RWST3.5.43.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1RestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.RWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits.B.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.4C.1BeinHODE3.ANDC.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-8DraftB RWST3.5.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.4.1VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeisz300,000gallons(88%).7daysSR3.5.4.2.VerifyRWSTboronconcentrationis>2300ppmands2600ppm.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-9Draft8 AccumulatorsB3.5.lB3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoftheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereafter,andtoprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.Thereactorcoolantinventoryisvacatingthecoreduringthisphasethroughsteamflashingandejectionoutthroughthebreak.TheblowdownphaseofthetransientendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.IntherefillphaseofaLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,thecoreisessentiallyinadiabaticheatup.Thebalanceofaccumulatorinventoryisavailabletorefloodthecore,andhelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoastoestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomofthecore.Theaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwithboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-1DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegvia,anaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinseries.Themotoroperatedisolationvalves(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref."I).ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3.Theaccumulatorsize,watervolume,andnitrogencoverpressureareselectedsothatoneofthetwoaccumulatorsissufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingaLOCA.TheneedtoensurethatoneaccumulatorisadequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.4).ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativeassump'tionsaremadeconcerningtheavailabilityofECCSflow.IntheearlystagesofalargebreakLOCA,withorwithoutalossofoffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.Theassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulations.andconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgothroughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios,theentirecontentsof.oneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-2DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeofthereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.Asaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.ThisdelayaccountsforSIsignalgeneration,thedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.Duringthistime,theaccumulatorsareanalyzedasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.1TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeofsmallbreaks,therateofblowdownissuchthatthe.increaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcooling.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsandsafetyinjectionpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingtheriseincladtemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthesafetyinjectionpumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingthetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby10CFR50.46(Ref.5)willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis~2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationis~0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;C.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactioniss0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbegeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-3Draft8 Accumulators83.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontainedwatervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulatorsareemptied,oncedischarged.Forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduetothereducedgasvolume.Apeakcladtemperaturepenaltyisanassumedincreaseinthecalculatedpeakcladtemperatureduetoachangeinaninputparameter.Forlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodingportionofthetransient.Theanalysisusesanominalaccumulatorvolumeandincludesthelinewatervolumefromtheaccumulatortothecheckvalveduetothesecompetingeffects.TheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisusedindeterminingthetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)System.Themaximumvalueof2600ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainmenttemperatureof60'F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-4DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thelargeand.smallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuationat800psig,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.8and9).TheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicy'Statement.LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulatorsareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.Twoaccumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillreachthecoreduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecon'tentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.IflessthanoneaccumulatorisinjectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECGSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.5)couldbeviolated.ForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,themotor-operatedisolationvalvemustbefullyopen,powerremovedabove1600psig,andthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYInMODESIand2,andinMODE3withRCSpressure>1600psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsarebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.(continued)R.E.Ginna-NuclearPowerPlantB3.5-5DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>1600psig.Atpressures~1600psig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequateinjectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CFR50.46(Ref.5)limitof2200'F.InMODE3,withRCSpressure~1600psig,andinMODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisallowsRCScooldownanddepressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA.1Iftheboronconcentrationofoneaccumulatoris.notwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthelimitswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theabilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybereduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalityduringrefloodsincetheaccumulatorwatervolumeisverysmallwhencomparedtoRCSandRWSTinventory.BoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringrefloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsin.thecore.Inaddition,'urrentanalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulatorsarenotexpectedtodischargefollowingalargesteamlinebreak.Eveniftheydodischarge,theirimpactisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-6DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1ACTIONS(continued)B.lIfoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsofoneaccumulatorcannotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.'heCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAundertheseconditions.C.1andC.2IftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto~1600psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreach,therequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.1"Ifbothaccumulatorsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-7(continued)DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES,(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.1.1Eachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveshallbeverifiedtobefullyopenevery12hours.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverifica'tion.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimely'discoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3Theboratedwatervolumeandnitrogencoverpressureshallbeverifiedevery12hoursforeachaccumulator.ThisFrequencyissufficienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignoftheaccumulator,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatortoidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.Haincontrolboardalarmsarealsoavailablefortheseaccumulatorparameters.OperatingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.SR3.5.1.4Theboronconcentrationshallbeverifiedtobewithinrequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTFrequencysincethestaticdesignoftheaccumulatorslimitsthewaysinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31daySTAGGEREDTESTFrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-8DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.1.5Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureis>1600psigensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultintheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,noaccumulatorswouldbeavailableforinjectioniftheLOCAwere,tooccurinthecoldlegcontainingtheonlyOPERABLE.accumulator.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.REFERENCES1.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."2.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGSE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicsVI-7.F,VII-3,VII-6,andVIII-2,"datedJune24,1981.3.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RGSE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedMay14,1975.4.UFSAR,Section6.3.5.10CFR50.46.6.UFSAR,Section3.11.7.10CFR50.49.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.9.UFSAR,Section15.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-9DraftB

ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.2ECCS-MODES1,2,and3BASES~.BACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefollowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andcoolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalchargingsystem;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledsteamreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theadditionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantpower.TherearetwophasesofECCSoperation:injectionandrecirculation.Intheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)andinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)throughthecoldlegsandreactorvesselupperplenum.WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalandthecontainmentsumphasenoughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedtoContainmentSumpBforrecirculation.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousECCSinjectionisusedtoreducethepotentialforboilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresultingboronprecipitation.TheECCSconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWSTarealsopartoftheECCS,butarenotconsideredpartofanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-10'raft8 ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSflowpathswhichcomprisetheredundanttrainsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheRHRpumps,heatexchangers,andtheSIpumps.TheRHRsubsystemconsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainsthatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.TheSIsubsystemconsistsofthreeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theseinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesignsprovidetheoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilizecomponentsfromoppositetrainstoachievetherequired100%flowtothecore.DuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,suctionheaderssupplywaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSpumps.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andcontainmentspray(CS)Systempumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-seriesmotor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations.TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.The"removalofDCcontrol'powereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.1).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B)whicharemaintainedopenbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisan.acceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-11DraftB ECCS-NODESI,2,and3B3.5.2BACKGROUND(continued)Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.3).ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAandBeachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(871Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseach.containinganormallyclosedmotoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum.,ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepressurizetheRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,thesteamgeneratorsprovidecorecoolinguntiltheRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aand896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-12DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.6).TheRHRpumpscanalsoprovidesuctiontotheCSpumpsforcontainmentpressurecontrol.Thishigh;headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,8966,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequatecoreandcontainmentcooling,theSIandCSpumpsremaininpull-stop.Duringrecirculation,flowisdischargedthroughthesamepathsastheinjectionphase.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumpsisusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHRthroughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.ThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainmentSumpBtotheRHRpumpsalsocontainamotoroperatedisolationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolation.valvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand851Barealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinanundesirableactuation(Ref.2).TheSIsubsystemofthe'ECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasasteamlinebreak(SLB).Thelimitingdesignconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,'imitationsareplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.(contin'ued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-13DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5'BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSIsignal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetimedelayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5.4,"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeetAIF-GDC44(Ref.8).APPLICABLETheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptanceSAFETYANALYSIScriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR50'.46(Ref.9),willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Maximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureisz2200'F;b.Maximumcladdingoxidationis~0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Maximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis~0.01timesthehypotheticalamountgeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.TheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialforaposttripreturntopowerfollowinganSLBeventandhelpsensurethatcontainmenttemperaturelimitsaremetpostaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-14Draft8 ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)BothECCSsubsystemsaretakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.6and10).ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasmallbreakLOCAevent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthepumps.TheSGTRandSLBeventsalsocredittheSIpumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:a.AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergency.coolingwaterisinjectedbytheSIpumpsintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.TheRHRpumpsinjectdirectlyintothecorebarrelbyupperplenuminjection.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.10and11).TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwatertomatchboiloffratesquicklyenoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoveredfollowingalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,theSIpumpsdeliversufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteam.generatorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-15(continued)DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASES(continued)LCOInMODES1,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanSIsignalandtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpB.ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow.EINPositionSecuredin'ositionB825A825B 826A826B 826C826D851A 851B 856878A878B878C878D 896A 896BOpenOpenClosedClosed ClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemoval Removal RemovalRemoval RemovalRemovalRemovalRemoval RemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofan.RHRpumpandheatexchangertakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andcapableofinjectingthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headrecirculationtotheSIandCSpumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-16DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2LCO(continued)AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(viaRHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationof-checkvalves870Aand870B.Theflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensure.thatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.APPLICABILITY.InMODES1,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprovideforreducedcoolingrequirementsinthelowerMODES.TheSIpumpperformancerequirementsarebasedonasmallbreakLOCA.MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODE1analysis.InMODE4,theECCSrequirementsareasdescribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4."InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft,"andLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."AsindicatedinNote1,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2hoursinMODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Theflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrol"roomorbyfieldtestpersonnel.ThenotealsoallowsanSIisolationMOVtobepoweredforupto12hoursfortheperformanceofthistesting.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-17DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"maybenecessarysincetheLTOParmingtemperatureisneartheMODE3boundarytemperatureof350F.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.WhenthistemperatureisneartheMODE3boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestoretheinoperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.InMODES4,5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.Mode4corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-Mode4,"andLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4."CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft,"andLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."ACTIONSA.lWithonetraininoperableandatleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.12)andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.AnECCStrainisinoperableifitisnotcapableofdelivering100%designflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableofperformingtheirdesignfunctionornecessarysupportingsystemsarenotavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.5-18DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)TheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofoneactivecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferenttrain,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthat100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponentsinoppositetrainsareinoperable.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.AneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.Areliabilityanalysis(Ref.2)hasshownthatthe'impactof.havingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.B.landB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-19DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCSpumpstotheRCSismaintained.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.MisalignmentofthesevalvescouldrenderbothECCStrainsinoperable.ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.ThesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionoFthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.TheverificationofthevalvebreakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3.HispositioningofthesevalvescandisablethefunctionofbothECCStrainsandinvalidatetheaccidentanalyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedvalveisunlikely'.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-20DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESPSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring;Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositioninmostcases,wouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorDCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.Ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencyHillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-21DraftB ECCS-MODESI,2,and3B3.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5;2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASMECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomplishedbymeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadatasinglepointofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesboththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASMECode.SectionXIoftheASMECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.SR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveact'uatestotherequiredpositiononanactualorsimulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpumpstartsonreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,and"equipmentperformanceismoni.toredaspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-22DraftB ECCS-MODES1,,2,and3B3.5.2SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.7PeriodicinspectionsofthecontainmentsumpsuctioninlettotheRHRSystemensurethatitisunrestrictedandstaysinproperoperatingcondition.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage,ontheneedtohaveaccesstothelocation,andbecauseofthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.ThisFrequencyhasbeenfoundtobesufficienttodetectabnormaldegradationandisconfirmedbyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RGEf,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.2.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18,"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."3.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RGRE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.42toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.-E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.79829),"datedJune3,1991.4.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,to'J.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.5.NUREG-0821.6.UFSAR,Section6.3.7.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGEE,'ubject:"SEPTopicIX-4,BoronAdditionSystem,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.8.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC44,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-23DraftB

ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESREFERENCES(continued)9.10CFR50.46.10.UFSAR,Section15.6.11.UFSAR,Section6.2.12.NRCMemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-24DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.383.5.3ECCS-MODE4BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE4,therequiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).TheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).TheRHRsubsystemmustalsobecapableoftakingsuctionfromcontainmentSumpBtoproviderecirculation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherearenoApplicableSafetyAnalyseswhichapplytotheECCSinNODE4duetothestableconditionsassociatedwithoperationinNODE4andthereducedprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDesignBasisAccident.Therefore,theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereducedinMODE4.ItisunderstoodinthesereductionsthatcertainautomaticSIactuationsarenotavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeisexpectedformanualactuationoftherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA.ThistimeisalsorequiredsincetheRHRSystemmaybealignedtoprovidenormalshutdowncoolingwhiletheSISystemmaybeisolatedfromtheRCSduetolowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)concerns.Therefore,onlyonetrainofECCSisrequiredforNODE4.ThisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailableforoperatorstorespondtoanaccident.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion4oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-25(continued)DraftB ECCS-MODE483.5.3BASES(continued)LCOInMODE4,oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowinganaccident.InMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.ThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringMODE4consistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfrom-theRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneoftwoisolationvalvesto'thereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandinjectingthroughoneoftwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredintheMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtotheRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.BasedontheexpectedtimeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduringMODE4,andtheconfigurationoftheRHRand'SItrains,ECCScomponentsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingreconfiguredtotheinjectionmode(remotelyorlocally)within10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes.LCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem"containsadditionalrequirementsfortheconfigurationoftheSIsystem.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5.2./InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-26DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3APPLICABILITY(continued)InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft,"andLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."ACTIONSA.lWithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelytoinitiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysomealternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.ThealternatemeansofheatremovalmustcontinueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoMODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRHRsubsystem.Therefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-27DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lWithnoECCSSIsubsystemOPERABLE,duetotheinoperabilityoftheSIpumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotpreparedtoprovidehighpressureresponsetoanaccidentrequiringSI.TheIhourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinMODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.IWhentheRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.3.1TheapplicableSurveillancedescriptionfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodi'fiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeofoperationandnototherwiseinoperable.ThisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringMODE',ifnecessary.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-28DraftB RWSTB3.5.4hB3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUNDTheRWSTsuppliesboratedwatertobothtrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)Systemduringtheinjectionphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)recovery.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andCSpumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandCSSystempriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.TherecirculationmodeisenteredwhenpumpsuctionistransferredtothecontainmentsumpbasedonRWSTlevel.UseofasingleRWSTtosupplybothtrainsoftheECCSandCSSystemisacceptablesincetheRWSTisapassivecomponent,andpassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50'Fand104'F(Ref.I).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.'IDuringnormaloperationinMODESI,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI),RHR,andCSpumpsarealignedtotakesuctionfromtheRWST.TheECCSandCSpumpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoperatingatornearshutoffheadconditions.TherecirculationlinesfortheRHRandCSpumpsaredirectedfromthedischargeofthepumpstothepumpsuction.TherecirculationlinesfortheSIpumpsaredirectedbacktotheRWST.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-29DraftB RWST83.5.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandCSpumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTandSIpumprecirculationflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstotheAuxiliaryBuildingandtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.ThisLCOensuresthat:a.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSandCSsystemduringtheinjectionphase;b.SufficientwatervolumeexistsinthecontainmentsumptosupportcontinuedoperationoftheECCSandCSpumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andc.ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultininadequateNPSHfortheRHRpumpswhenthetransfertotherecirculationmodeoccurs.ImproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDMorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswellasexcessivecausticstresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandCSpumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.3).ThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofLCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3";LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4";andLCO3.6.6,"ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems."TheseanalysesareusedtoassesschangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffectsinrelationtotheacceptancelimitsintheanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-30Draft8 RWSTB3.5.4APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheRWSTmustalsomeetvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincethevolumerequiredforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupisasmallfractionoftheavailableRCSvolume.ThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAandcontainmentanalyses.FortheRWST,thedeliverablevolumeisselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.Theminimumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumption.inthesteamlinebreak(SLB)analysistoensuretherequiredshutdowncapability.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptionintheevaluationofchemicaleffectsresultingfromtheoperationoftheCSSystem.ForalargebreakLOCAanalysis,theminimumwatervolumelimitof300,000gallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimitareusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore.TheupperlimitonboronconcentrationisusedtodeterminethetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolume'ndonchemical,effectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheCSSystem.Avalue~2600ppmwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50'F(Ref.I).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.I).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandc'austicstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-31(continued)DraftB

RWSTB3.5.4BASES(continued)LCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinthecontainmentsumptosupportECCSandCSpumpoperationintherecirculationmode.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewatervolumeandboronconcentrationlimitsestablishedintheSRs.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,RWSTOPERABILITYrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandCSSystemOPERABILITYrequirements.SinceboththeECCSandtheCSSystemmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLEtosupporttheiroperation.Corecoolingrequireme'ntsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.4,'!ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft,"andLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."ACTIONSA.IWithRWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinlimitswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedconsideringthetimerequiredtochangetheboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankarestillavailableforinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-32DraftB RWSTB3.5.4ACTIONS(continued)B.lWiththeRWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits,itmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinIhour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaMODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired.TheshorttimelimitofIhourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbasedonthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.landC.2IftheRWSTcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within.36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.4.1TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandCSSystempumpoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystableandtheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichprovidessufficientleakdetectioncapability,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-33DraftB RWSTB3.5.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.4.2TheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowin'gaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboronconcentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section3.11.2.10CFR50.49.k3.UFSAR,Section6.3andChapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-34DraftB Containment3.6.13.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1ContainmentLCO3.6.1ContainmentshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Containmentinoperable.A.1RestorecontainmenttoOPERABLEstatus.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE5.36hoursR.E.Ginna'uclearPowerPlant3.6-1DraftB Containment3.6.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.1.1NOTE-SR3.0.2isnotapplicable.Performrequiredvisualexaminationsandleakageratetestingexceptforcontainmentairlockandcontainmentmini-purgevalvetesting,inaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgramSR3.6.1.2VerifycontainmentstructuralintegrityinaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-2DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.23.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.2ContainmentAirLocksLCO3.6.2TwocontainmentairlocksshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSNOTES-l.Entryandexitispermissibletoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponents.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.3.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithonecontainmentairlockdoorinoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsA.l,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitispermissiblefor7daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothairlocksareinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-3DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.lANDA.2ANDA.3VerifytheOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.LocktheOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.1hour24hoursVerifytheOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-4DraftB 0 ContainmentAirLocks3.6'ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithcontainmentairlockinterlockmechanisminoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitofcontainmentispermissibleunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividual.B.lVerifyanOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.1hourANDB.2LockanOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.24hoursAND8.3--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifyanOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-5DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2tACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.OneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionAorB.C.1ANDInitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.ImmediatelyC.2Verifyadoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.ANDC.3RestoreairlocktoOPERABLEstatus.1hour24hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.D.lBeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-6DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.2.1NOTES-l.Aninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.2.ResultsshallbeevaluatedagainstacceptancecriteriaapplicabletoSR3.6.1.1.PerformrequiredairlockleakageratetestinginaccordahcewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgramSR3.6.2.2Verifyonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatime.24.monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-7Draft8

ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.33.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBoundariesLCO3.6.3EachcontainmentisolationboundaryshallbeOPERABLE.NOTES1.NotapplicabletothemainsteamsafetyvalvesinMODES1,2,and3.2.3.Notapplicabletothemainsteamisolationvalves(HSIVs)inMODE1,andinMODES2and3withtheHSIVsopenornotdeactivated.NotapplicabletotheatmosphericreliefvalvesinMODES'and2,andinNODE3withtheReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T,,)~500'F.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONS--------------NOTES1.Penetrationflowpath(s),exceptforShutdownPurgeSystemvalveflowpaths,maybeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.3.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebycontainmentisolationboundaries.4.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenisolationboundaryleakageresultsinexceedingtheoveral1containmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-8DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE---------Onlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswhichdonotuseaclosedsystemasa'ontainmentisolationboundary.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmentisolationboundaryinoperableexceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit.A.1ANDA.2Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,orcheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.--------NOTE---------Isolationboundariesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.4hoursVerifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationboundariesinsidecontainment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-9DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3tACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME8---------NOTE---------Onlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswhichdonotuseaclosedsystemasacontainmentisolationboundary.Oneormorepenetration.flowpathswithtwocontainmentisolationboundariesinoperableexceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit.B.lIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-10Draft8

ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3tACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC---------NOTE---------Onlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswhichuseaclosedsystemasacontainmentisolationboundary.C.IIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.72hoursOneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmentisolationboundaryinoperable.ANDC.2--------NOTE---------Isolationboundariesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationboundariesinsidecontainment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-11Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Oneormoremini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithonevalvenotwithinleakagelimits.D.1ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.24hoursD.2--------NOTE---------Isolationboundariesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.,Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpath.isisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationboundariesinside.containment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-12DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME'.Oneormoremini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithtwovalvesnotwithinleakagelimits.E.IANDInitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.ImmediatelyE.2Isolatetheaffectedpenetratio'nflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.IhourF.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.F.lBeinMODE3.ANDF.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-13DraftB 0 Containment"IsolationBoundaries3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.3.1Verifyeachmini-purgevalveisclosed,exceptwhenthepenetrationflowpath(s)arepermittedtobeopenunderadministrativecontrol.31daysSR3.6.3.21.-NOTES-Isolationboundariesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.2.Notapplicabletocontainmentisolationboundarieswhichreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignal.Verifyeachcontainmentisolationboundarythatislocatedoutsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionisperformingitscontainmentisolationaccidentfunctionexceptforcontainmentisolationboundariesthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.92days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-14Draft8 tSURVEILLANCEREgUIRBlENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3FREQUENCYSR3.6.3.32.NOTES-Isolationboundariesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Notapplicabletocontainmentisolationboundarieswhichreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignal.Verifyeachcontainmentisolationboundarythatislocatedinsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionisperformingitscontainmentisolationaccidentfunction,exceptforcontainmentisolationboundariesthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.PriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysSR3.6.3.4Verifytheisolationtimeofeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswithinlimits.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.6.3.5Performrequiredleakageratetestingofcontainmentmini-purge,valveswithresilientsealsinaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentLeakageRateProgram.SR3.6.3.6Verifyeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvethatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-15DraftB

ContainmentPressure3.6.43.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.4ContainmentPressureLCO3.6.4Containmentpressureshallbe~-2.0psigand<1.0psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,',3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Containmentpressurenotwithinlimits.A.1Restorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.8hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBein.MODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.4.1Verifycontainmentpressureiswithinlimits.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-16DraftB ContainmentAirTemperature3.6.53.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.5ContainmentAirTemperatureLCO3.6.5Containmentaverageairtemperatureshallbes120F.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,-3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithinlimit.A.1Restorecontainmentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimit.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinNODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.5.1Verifycontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithinlimit.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-17DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.63.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsLCO3.6.6TwoCStrains,fourCRFCunits,twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,andtheNaOHsystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCStraininoperable.A.1RestoreCStraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.Onepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable.B.lRestorepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.Twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.C.lRestoreonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintoOPERABLEstatus.'2hours9.NaOHsysteminoperable.D.1RestoreNaOHSystemtoOPERABLEstatus.72'hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'.6-18DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orDnotmet.E.1BeinMODE3.ANDE.2BeinMODE5.6hours84hoursF.OneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable.F.1'--------NOTE---------RequiredActionF.1onlyrequiredifCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.ANDDeclareassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable.ImmediatelyF;2RestoreCRFCunit(s)toOPERABLEstatus.7daysG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFnotmet.G.1ANDG.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-19Draft8 CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEH.TwoCStrainsinoperable.ORNaOHSystemandoneorbothpost-'accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.OR ThreeormoreCRFCunitsinoperable.OROneCSandtwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.H.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-20DraftB ECS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6.1PerformSR3.5.2.1andSR3.5.2.3forvalves896Aand896B.Inaccordancewith'pplicableSRs.SR3.6.6.2.VerifyeachCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.6.6.3VerifyeachNaOHSystemmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisinthecorrectposition.31daysISR3.6.6.4OperateeachCRFCunitfor~15minutes.31daysSR3.6.6.5Veri.fycoolingwaterflowthrougheachCRFCunit.31daysSR3.6.6.6Operateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfor~15minutes.31daysSR3.6.6.7VerifyeachCSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeIns'erviceTestingProgram(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-21DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.6.8VerifyNaOHSystemsolutionvolumeis~4500gal.184daysSR3.6.6.9VerifyNaOHSystemtankNaOHsolutionconcentrationisz30%byweight.184daysSR3.6.6.10Performrequiredpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewiththeVFTPSR3.6.6.11PerformrequiredCRFCunittestinginaccordancewiththeVFTP.InaccordancewiththeVFTPSR3.6.6.12VerifyeachautomaticCSvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.13VerifyeachCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.'l4VerifyeachCRFCunitstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.15Verifyeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraindamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-22DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6.16VerifyeachautomaticNaOHSystemvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.17Verifysprayadditiveflowthrougheacheductorpath.5yearsSR3.6.6.18Verifyeachspraynozzleisunobstructed.10yearsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-23Draft8 HydrogenRecombiners3.6.73.6.7HydrogenRecombinersLCO3.6.7TwohydrogenrecombinersshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onehydrogenrecombinerinoperable.A.l--------NOTE---------LC0.3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestorehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysB.Twohydrogenrecombinersinoperable.B.1ANDVerifybyadministrativemeansthatthehydrogen.controlfunctionismaintained.1hourANDOnceper12hoursthereafterB.2RestoreonehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-24DraftB HydrogenRecombiners3.6.7SURVEILLANCEFREqUENCYSR3.6.7.1Performasystemfunctionalcheckforeachhydrogenrecombiner.24monthsSR3.6.7.2*PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6'-25DraftB hContainmentB3.6.1B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.1ContainmentBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentconsistsoftheconcretecontainmentstructure,itssteelliner,andthepenetrationsthroughthisstructure.ThestructureisdesignedtocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)inaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC10and49(Ref.1).Additionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentisareinforcedconcretestructurewithacylindricalwall,aflatbasemat,andahemisphericaldomeroof.Theinsidesurfaceofthecontainmentislinedwithacarbonsteellinertoensureahighdegreeofleaktightnessduringoperatingandaccidentcondi.tions.Eachweldseamontheinsideofthelinerhasaleaktestchannelweldedoverittoallowindependenttestingofthelinerwhenthecontainmentisopen.Thelinerisalsoinsulatedwithclosed-cellpolyvinylfoamcoveredwithmetalsheetinguptothecontainmentsprayringheaders.Thefunctionofthelinerinsulationistolimitthemeantemperatureriseofthelinertoonly10FatthetimeassociatedwithmaximumpressurefollowingaDBA(Ref.2).ThecontainmenthemisphericaldomeisconstructedofreinforcedconcretedesignedforallDBArelatedmoments,axialloads,andshearforces.Thecylinderwallisprestressedverticallyandreinforcedcircumferentiallywithmildsteeldeformedbars.Thebasematisareinforcedconcreteslabthatisconnectedtothecylinderwallbyuseofahingedesignwhichpreventsthetransferofimposedshearfromthecylinderwalltothebasemat.Thishingeconsistsofelastomerbearingpadslocatedbetweenthebottomofthecylinderwallandthebasemat,andhighstrengthsteelbarswhichconnectthecylinderwallshorizontallytothebasemat(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-1DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BACKGROUNDThecylinderwallisconnectedtosandstonerocklocated(continued)beneaththecontainmentbyuseof160post-tensionedrockanchorsthatarecoupledwithtendonslocatedinthecylinderwall.Thisdesignensuresthattherockactsasanintegralpartofthecontainmentstructure.TheconcretecontainmentstructureisrequiredforstructuralintegrityofthecontainmentunderDBAconditions.Thesteellineranditspenetrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryofthecontainment.MaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLElimitstheleakageoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmenttowithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).SR3.6.1.1leakageraterequirementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB(Ref.4),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthe.containmentboundaryareapartofthecontainmentleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarrier:a.Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:1.CapableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.ClosedbyOPERABLEcontainmentisolationboundaries,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries."b.EachairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."APPLICABLEThesafetydesignbasisforthecontainmentisthattheSAFETYANALYSEScontainmentmustwithstandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitingDBAwithoutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-2DraftB 0 ContainmentB3.6.1APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheDBAsthatresultinachallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromhighpressuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccident(REA)(Ref.5).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthatthecontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,releasetotheenvironmentis.controlledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasoriginallystrengthtestedat69psig(115%ofdesign).Theacceptancecriteriaforthistestwas0.1%ofthecontainmentairweightperdayat60psigwhichwasbasedontheconstructiontechniquesthatwereused(Ref.5).Followingsuccessfulcompletionofthistest,theaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingaleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperday.Thisleakagerate,incombinationwiththeminimumcontainmentengineeredsafeguardsoperating(i.e.,either2post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandnocontainmentspray,1post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainand1containmentspraytrain,ornopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsand2containmentspraytrains)resultsinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)intheeventofaDBA.Theleakagerateof0.2%'ofthecontainmentairweightperdayisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB(Ref.4),asL.:themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateat'hecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressure(P,)resultingfromthedesignbasisLOCA.TheallowableleakageraterepresentedbyL.formsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposed.onallcontainmentleakageratetesting.L.isassumedtobe0.2%perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP.=60psig.SatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-3(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1LCOContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitingleakagetos1.0L.exceptpriortoenteringMODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofperiodictestingperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB.Atthattime,thecombinedTypeBandCleakagemustbe<0.6L.onamaximumpathwayleakagerate(HXPLR)basis,andtheoverallTypeAleakagemustbe<0.75L..Atallothertimespriortoperformingasfoundtesting,theacceptancecriteriaforTypeBandCtestingis<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakagerate(MNPLR)basis.InadditiontoleaknessconsiderationsfollowingadesignbasisLOCA,containmentOPERABILITYalsorequiresstructuralintegrityfollowingaDBA.CompliancewiththisLCOwillensureacontainmentconfiguration,includingpersonnelandequipmenthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleakagetothoseleakageratesassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Individualleakageratesspecifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO3.6.2)andmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals(LCO3.6.3)andadministrativelimitsforindividualisolationboundariesarenotspecificallypartoftheacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50,AppendixJ.Therefore,leakageratesexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultinthecontainmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaofAppendixJ.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODE5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsofthisMODE.Therefore,containmentisnot'requiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE5topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainment.TherequirementsforcontainmentduringMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.3,"ContainmentPenetrations."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-4(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lIntheeventcontainmentisinoperable,thecontainmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocorrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentduringHODES1,2,3,and4.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofanaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.B.1andB.2IfcontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-5(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.1MaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualexaminationsandleakageratetestrequirementsoftheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.Failuretomeetairlockandmini-purgevalvewithresilientsealleakagelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2andLCO3.6.3doesnotinvalidatetheacceptabilityoftheseoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributiontooverallTypeA,B,andCleakagecausestheselimitstobeexceeded.Asleftleakageprior.toenteringMODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofrequired10CFR50,AppendixJperiodictesting,isrequiredtobe<0.6L,forcombinedType8andCleakageonaHXPLRbasis,and<0.75L.foroverallTypeAleakage(Ref.6).Atallothertimesbetweentherequiredleakagetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakagelimitofs1.0L..ThisismaintainedbylimitingcombinedTypeBandCleakageto<0.6L.onaHXPLRbasisuntilperformanceofasfoundtesting.At~1.0Ltheoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysis.SRFrequenciesareasrequiredbytheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.Theseperiodictestingrequirementsverifythatthecontainmentleakageratedoesnotexceedtheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.2ThisSRensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwill.bemaintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestingandFrequencyaregenerallyconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.7)exceptthattendonmaterialtestsandinspectionsarenotrequired(Ref.8).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-6(continued)DraftB I;I(BASES(continued)ContainmentB3.

6.1REFERENCES

1.AtomicIndustryForum,GDC10and49,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section3.8.1.3.10CFR100.4.10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionBE5.UFSAR,Section6.2.6.NEI94-01,"IndustryGuidelineforImplementingPerformance-BasedOptionof10CFR50,AppendixJ,"Revision0.7.RegulatoryGuide1.35,Revision2.8.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.M.Kober,RGEE,

Subject:

"SafetyEvaluation,ContainmentVesselTendonSurveillanceProgram,"datedAugust19,1985.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-7DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.2ContainmentAirLocksBASESBACKGROUNDContainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundaryandprovideameansforpersonnelaccessduringallMODESofoperation.TherearetwocontainmentairlocksinstalledatGinnaStation,anequipmenthatchandapersonnelhatch.Bothairlocksarenominallyarightcircularcylinderwithadoorateachendtoallowpersonnelaccess.Thetwodoorsoneachairlockareinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopening.DuringperiodswhencontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.EachairlockdoorhasbeendesignedandtestedtocertifyitsabilitytowithstandapressureinexcessofthemaximumexpectedpressurefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)incontainment.Assuch,closur'eofasingledoorsupportscontainmentOPERABILITY.Eachofthedoorscontainsadouble-tongue,singlegasketedsealandlocalleakagerate.testingcapabilitytoensure'ressureintegrity.Toeffectaleaktightseal,theairlockdesignusespressureseateddoors(i.e.,anincreaseincontainmentinternalpressureresultsinincreasedsealingforceoneachdoor).Eachpersonnelairlockisprovidedwithlimitswitchesonbothdoorsthatprovideacontrolboardalarmifanydoorisopened.Asinglecontrolboardalarmexistsforallfouraccessdoors.Additionally,acontrolboardalarmisprovidedifhighpressureexistsbetweenthetwodoorsforeitherairlock.Thecontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Assuch,airlockintegrityandleaktightnessisessentialformaintainingthecontainmentleakageratewithinlimitintheeventofaDBA.Notmaintainingairlockintegrityorleaktightnessmayresultinaleakagerateinexcessofthatassumedintheplantsafetyanalyses.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-8(continued)DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealoss"ofcoolantaccidentandarodejectionaccident(Ref.1).Intheanalysisofeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainment.wasdesignedwithanallowableleakagerateof0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday(Ref.1).Thisleakagerateisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB(Ref.2),asL.=0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday,themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakc'ontainmentinternalpressureP.=60psigfollowingthedesignbasisLOCA.ThisallowableleakagerateformsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedontheSRsassociatedwiththeairlocks.ThecontainmentairlockssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.~LCOTheequipmenthatchandpersonnelhatchcontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Aspartofcontainment,theairlocksafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofthecontainmentleakageratefollowingaDBA.Thus,eachairlock'sstructuralintegrityandleaktightnessareessentialtothesuccessfulmitigationofsuchanevent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-9DraftB ContainmentAirLocks83.6.2LCO(continued)EachairlockisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.FortheairlocktobeconsideredOPERABLE,theairlockinterlockmechanismmustbeOPERABLE,theairlockmustbeincompliancewiththe10CFR50,AppendixJType8airlockleakagetest(i.e.,SR3.6.2.1),andbothairlockdoorsmustbeOPERABLEsuchthattheyareclosedwithleakagewithinacceptablelimits.Theinterlockallowsonlyonedoorofanairlocktobeopenedatatime.ThisprovisionensuresthatagrossbreachofcontainmentdoesnotexistwhencontainmentisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Closureofasingledoorineachairlockissufficienttoprovidealeaktightbarrierfollowingpostulatedevents.Nevertheless,bothdoorsarekeptclosedwhentheairlockisnotbeingusedfornormalentryintoandexitfromcontainment.Normalentryintoandexitfromcontainmentdoesnotrenderedtheairlockinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODE5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsof'thisMODE.Therefore,thecontainmentairlocksarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE5topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainment.TherequirementsforthecontainmentairlocksduringMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.3,"ContainmentPenetrations."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-10(continued)DraftB

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsentryandexittoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponent.Iftheouterdoorisinoperable,thenitmaybeeasilyaccessedtorepair.Iftheinnerdooristheonethatisinoperable,however,thenashorttimeexistswhenthecontainmentboundaryisnotintact(duringaccessthroughtheouterdoor).TheabilitytoopentheOPERABLEdoor,evenifitmeansthecontainmentboundaryistemporarilynotintact,isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichtheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.Aftereachentryandexit,theOPERABLEdoormustbeimmediatelyclosed.IfALARAconditionspermit,entryandexitshouldbeviaanOPERABLEairlock.AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarification.that,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.Intheeventtheairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria,Note3directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment."Thisevaluationshouldbeinitiatedimmediatelyafterdeclaringacontainmentairlockinoperable.Thisisrequiredsincetheinoperabilityofanairlockmayresultinasignificantincreaseintheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-11DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.lA.2andA.3Withoneairlockdoorinoneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperable,theOPERABLEdoormustbeverifiedclosed(RequiredActionA.1)ineachaffectedcontainmentairlock.Ifthebetweenairlockdoorvolumeexceedstheallowedleakagecriteria,andleakageisverifiedtobeintocontainment(e.g.,leakagethroughtheequalizingvalve),thentheinnerairlockdoorshallbedeclaredinoperableandthisConditionentered.Ifleakageexistsfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment,thenConditionCisentered.ThisensuresthataleaktightcontainmentbarrierismaintainedbytheuseofanOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisactionmustbecompletedwithin1hourandmayconsistofverifyingthecontrolboardalarmstatusfortheairlockdoors.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequirescontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.Inaddition,theaffectedairlockpenetrationmustbeisolatedbylockingclosedtheOPERABLEairlockdoorwithinthe24hourCompletionTime.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonableforlockingtheOPERABLEairlockdoor,considering.theOPERABLEdooroftheaffectedairlockisbeingmaintainedclosed.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-12DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)RequiredActionA.3verifiesthatanairlockwithaninoperabledoorhasbeenisolatedbytheuseofalockedandclosedOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisensuresthatanacceptablecontainmentleakageboundaryismaintained.TheCompletionTimeofonceper31daysisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelowlikelihoodofalockeddoorbeingmispositionedandotheradministrativecontrols.RequiredActionA.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstothese.areasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1specifiesthatRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedandRequiredActionsC.1,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.TheexceptionofNote1doesnotaffecttrackingtheCompletionTimefromtheinitialentryintoConditionA;onlytherequirementtocomplywiththeRequiredActions.Note2allowsuseoftheairlockforentryandexitfor7daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothairlockshaveaninoperabledoor.This7dayrestrictionbeginswhenthesecondairlockisdiscoveredtobeinoperable.ContainmententrymayberequiredonaperiodicbasistoperformTechnicalSpecifications(TS)SurveillancesandRequiredActions,aswellasotheractivitiesonequipmentinsidecontainmentthatarerequiredbyTSoractivitiesonequipmentthatsupportTS-requiredequipment.ThisNoteallowsperformingotheractivities(i.e.,nonTS-requiredactivities)ifthecontainmentisentered,usingtheinoperableairlock,toperformanallowedactivitylistedabove.ThisallowanceisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimethattheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-13Draft8 ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2ACTIONS(continued)B.lB.2and8.3Withanairlockinterlockmechanisminoperableinoneormoreairlocks,theRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesareconsistentwiththosespecifiedinConditionAwiththeexceptionthatbothairlockdoorsarestillOPERABLEandeitherdoorcanbeusedtoisolatetheairlockpenetration.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1specifiesthatRequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedandRequiredActionsC.l,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.Note2allowsentryintoandexitfromcontainmentthrough'nairlockwithaninoperableairlockinterlockmechanismunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividualstationedattheairlocktoensurethatonlyonedoorisopenedatatime(i.e.,theindividualperformsthefunctionoftheinterlock).,RequiredActionB.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-14DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2ACTIONS(continued)C.lC.2andC.3MithoneormoreairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanthosedescribedinConditionAorB(e.g.,bothdoorsofanairlockareinoperable),RequiredActionC.1requiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentairlocktestresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothdoorsinanairlockhavefailedasealtestoriftheoverallairlockleakageisnotwithinthelimitsofSR3.6.2.1.Inmanyinstances(e.g.,onlyonesealperdoorhasfailed),containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.1anditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationoftheinoperableairlockdoorwithinthe1hourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.1beforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,evenwithbothdoorsfailingthesealtest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweentheairlockleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.RequiredActionC.2requiresthatonedoorintheaffectedcontainmentairlockmustbeverifiedtobeclosedwithinthe'1hourCompletionTime.Thisspecifiedtimeperiodis,consistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.Additionally,theaffectedairlockmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe24hourCompletionTime.ThespecifiedtimeperiodisconsideredreasonableforrestoringaninoperableairlocktoOPERABLEstatus,assumingthatatleastonedoorismaintainedclosedineachaffectedairlockandthecontainmentoverallleakagerateisacceptable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-15DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6'BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheinoperablecontainmentairlockcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.2.1MaintainingcontainmentairlocksOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththeleakageratetestrequirementsoftheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.ThisSRreflectstheleakageratetestingrequirementswithregardtoairlockleakage(TypeBleakagetests).Theacceptancecriteriawereestablishedbasedonindustryexperience.Theperiodictestingrequirementsverifythattheairlockleakagedoesnotexceedtheallowedfractionoftheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.TheFrequencyisasrequiredbytheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.TheSRhasbeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIstatesthataninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.ThisisconsideredreasonablesinceeitherairlockdooriscapableofprovidingafissionproductbarrierintheeventofaDBA.Note2requi'resthattheresultsofthisSRbeevaluatedagainsttheacceptancecriteriaoftheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.Thisensuresthatairlockleakageisproperlyaccountedforindeterminingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-16DraftB

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTS(continued)SR3.6.2.2Theairlockinterlockisdesignedtopreventsimultaneousopeningofbothdoorsinasingleairlock.Sinceboththeinnerandouterdoorsofanairlockaredesignedtowithstandthemaximumexpectedpostaccidentcontainmentpressure,closureofeitherdoorwillsupportcontainmentOPERABILITY.Thus,thedoorinterlockfeaturesupportscontainmentOPERABILITYwhile'heairlockisbeingusedforpersonneltransitinandoutofthecontainment.Periodictestingofthisinterlockdemonstratesthattheinterlockwillfunctionasdesignedandthatsimultaneousopeningoftheinnerandouterdoorswillnotinadvertentlyoccur.Duetothepurelymechanicalnatureofthisinterlock,andgiventhattheinterlockmechanismisonlychallengedwhenthecontainmentairlockdoorisopened,thistestisonlyrequiredtobeperformedonceevery24months.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsofdoorandinterlockmechanismstatusavailabletooperationspersonnel.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.1.2.10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB.R.E..GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-17DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3B3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBoundariesBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentisolationboundariesformpartofthecontainmentpressurebarrierandprovideameansforfluidpenetrationstobeprovidedwithtwoisolationboundaries.Theseisolationboundariesareeitherpassiveoractive(automatic).Manualvalves,checkvalves,de-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedposition,blindflanges,andclosedsystemsareconsideredpassiveboundaries.Automaticvalvesdesignedtoclosewithoutoperatoractionfollowinganaccident,areconsideredactiveboundaries.TwoboundariesinseriesareprovidedforeachpenetrationsothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedslimitsassumedinthesafetyanalysesinaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53and57(Ref.I).TheseactiveandpassiveboundariesmakeuptheContainmentIsolationSystem.TheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovideisolationcapabilityfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forallfluidlineswhichpenetratecontainment.Allmajornonessentiallines(i.e.,fluidsystemswhichdonotperformanimmediateaccidentmitigationfunction)whichpenetratecontainment,exceptforthemainfeedwaterlines,componentcoolingwatertothereactorcoolantpumps,andmainsteamlines,areeitherautomaticallyisolatedfollowingan'ccidentorarenormallymaintainedclosedinMODESI,2,3,and4.Automaticcontainmentisolationvalvesaredesignedtocloseonacontainmentisolationsignalwhichisgeneratedbyeitheranautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)signalorbymanualactuation;TheContainmentIsolationSystemcanalsoisolateessentiallinesatthediscretionoftheoperatorsdependingon'heaccidentprogressionandmitigation.Asaresult,thecontainmentisolationboundarieshelpensurethatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytothecontainmentatmosphereasaresultofaDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-18DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforcontainmentisolationboundarieshelpensurethatcontainmentisisolatedwithinthetimelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequirementsprovideassurancethatthecontainmentfunctionassumedinthesafetyanalyseswillbemaintained.Inadditiontothenormalfluidsystemswhichpenetratecontainment,therearetwosystemswhichcanprovidedirectaccessfrominsidecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.ShutdownPureSstem36inchurevalvesTheShutdownPurgeSystemoperatestosupplyoutsideairintothecontainmentforventilationandcoolingorheatingandmayalsobeusedtoreducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccessbelowMODE4.Thesupplyandexhaustlineseachcontainoneisolationvalveandonedoublegasketedblindflange.Becauseoftheirlargesize,theshutdownpurgevalvesarenotqualifiedforautomaticclosurefromtheiropenpositionunderDBAconditions.Also,duetothedesignoftheblind.flangeassembly,theisolationvalveisnotrequiredtobecreditedasacontainmentisolationbarrier.Therefore,theblindflangesareinstalledinMODESI,2,3,and4toensurethatthecontainmentbarri.erismaintained(Ref.2).Mini-PureSstem6inchurevalvesTheMini-PurgeSystemoperatesto:a.Reducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithin.containmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccess,andb.Equalizeinternalandexternalpressures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-19DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BACKGROUNDMini-PureSstem6inchurevalves(continued)Thesystemisdesignedwithsupplyandexhaustlinesbothofwhichcontaintwoairoperatedisolationvalves.SincethevalvesusedintheMini-PurgeSystemaredesignedtomeettherequirementsforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalves,thesevalvesmaybeopenedasneededinMODESI,2,3,and4;however,emphasisshallbeplacedonlimitingpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasreasonablyachievable.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESCThecontainmentisolationboundaryLCOwasderivedfromtheassumptionsrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierduring.majoraccidents.Aspartofthe'ontainmentbarrier,OPERABILITYofdeviceswhichactascontainmentisolationboundariessupportsleaktightnessofthecontainment.Therefore,thesafetyanalysesofanyeventrequiringisolationofcontainmentisapplicabletothisLCO.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),andarodejectionaccident(Ref.3).OtherDBAs(e.g.,lockedrotor)resultinthereleaseofradioactivematerialwithinthereactorcoolantsystem.Intheanalysesforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisolationboundariesareeitherclosedorfunctiontoclosewithintherequiredisolationtimefollowingeventinitiation.Thisensuresthatpotentialpathstotheenvironmentandothersystemsthroughcontainmentisolationboundaries(includingcontainmentmini-purgevalves)areminimized.ThesafetyanalysesassumethattheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedateventinitiation.InthecalculationofcontrolroomandoffsitedosesfollowingaLOCA(rodejectionaccidentisassumedtobebounding),theaccidentanalysesassumethat25%oftheequilibriumiodineinventoryand100%oftheequilibriumnoblegasinventorydevelopedfrommaximumfullpoweroperationofthecoreisimmediatelyavailableforleakagefromcontainment(Ref.4).Thecontainmentisassumedtoleakatthedesignleakagerate,L.,forthefirst24hoursoftheaccidentandat50%ofthisleakageratefortheremainingdurationoftheaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-20DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThecontainmentisolationboundariesensurethatthecontainmentdesignleakagerateremainswithinL.byautomaticallyisolatingpenetrationsthatdonotservepostaccidentfunctionsandprovidingisolationcapabilityforpenetrationsassociatedwithEngineeredSafeguardsFunctions.Themaximumisolationtimeforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesis60seconds(Ref.3).Thisisolationtimeisbasedonengineeringjudgementsincethecontrolroomandoffsitedosecalculationsareperformedassumingthatleakagefromcontainmentbeginsimmediatelyfollowingtheaccidentwithnocreditfortransporttimeorradionuclidedecay.The60secondisolationtimetakesintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtodrainpipingoffluidwhichcanprovideaninitialcontainmentbarrierbeforethecontainmentisolationvalvesarerequiredtocloseandtheconservativeassumptionswithrespecttocoredamageoccurringimmediatelyfollowingtheaccident.Thecontainmentisolationtotalresponsetimeof60secondsincludessignaldelay,dieselgeneratorstartup(onlyformotoroperatedvalvesaffectedbyalossofoffsitepower),andcontainmentisolationvalvestroketimes.Thecontainmentmini-purgevalvesareairoperatedvalveswhichhaveisolationtimesshorterthan60secondssincethesepenetrationsmaybeopenedandprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironment.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatthesevalvesclosepriortoahotrodburst(20seconds)whichoccursfollowingalargebreakLOCAsincethehotrodburstdirectlyleadstohigherradiationconcentrationswithincontainment.A5secondisolationtimeforthemini-purgevalvesisusedforadditionalconservatism(Ref.3).The5secondtotalisolationresponsetimeincludessignaldelayandcontainmentisolationvalvestroketimes.ContainmentisolationisalsorequiredforeventswhichresultinhotrodburstsbutdonotbreachtheintegrityoftheRCS(e.g.,lockedrotoraccident).TheisolationofcontainmentfollowingtheseeventsalsoisolatestheRCSfromallnonessentialsystemstopreventthereleaseofradioactivematerialoutsidetheRCS.Thecontainmentisolation.timerequirementsfortheseeventsareboundedbythosefortheLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-21DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovidetwoinseriesboundariesforeachpenetrationsothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedsthelimitsinthesafetyanalyses.ThissystemwasoriginallydesignedinaccordancewithAIFGDC53(Ref.1)whichdoesnotcontainthespecificdesigncriteriaspecifiedin10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57(Ref.5).Ingeneral,theContainmentIsolationSystemmeetsthecurrentGDCrequirements;however,severalpenetrationsdifferfromtheGDCfromthestandpointofinstalledvalvetype(e.g.,checkvalveversusautomaticisolationvalve)orvalvelocation(e.g.,bothcontainmentisolationboundariesarelocatedinsidecontainment).TheevaluationofthesepenetrationsisprovidedinReference3.ThecontainmentisolationboundariessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOContainmentisolationboundariesformapartofthecontainmentpressurebarrier.Thecontainmentisolationboundaries'afetyfunctionisrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierleakageratesduringaDBA.TheboundariescoveredbythisLCOarelistedinReference6.Theseboundariesconsistofisolationvalves(manualvalves,checkvalves,airoperatedvalves,andmotoroperatedvalves),pipeandendcaps,closedsystems,andblindflanges.Therearethreemajorcategoriesofcontainmentisolationboundarieswhichareuseddependingonthetypeofpenetrationandthesafetyfunctionoftheassociatedpipingsystem:a.Automaticcontainmentisolationboundarieswhichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltoclosefollowinganaccident;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-22Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3LCO(continued)b.NormallyclosedcontainmentisolationboundarieswhicharemaintainedclosedinNODESI,2,3,and4sincetheydonotreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltocloseandthepenetrationisnotusedfornormalpoweroperation(butmaybeusedforalongtermaccidentmitigationfunction);andC.Normallyopen,butnonautomaticcontainmentisolationboundarieswhicharemaintainedopensincethepenetrationsarerequiredfornormalpoweroperation.Penetrationswhichutilizethesetypeofisolationboundariesalsocontainapassivedevice(i.e.,closedsystem),suchthatthenormallyopen,butnonautomaticisolationboundaryisonlyclosedafterthefirstpassiveboundaryhasfailed.Theautomaticcontainmentisolationboundaries(i.e.,valves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofclosingwithinthe,stroketimespecifiedinReference6.ThenormallyclosedcontainmentisolationboundariesareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthemanualvalvesareclosed,airoperatedormotoroperatedvalvesarede-activatedandsecuredintheirclosedposition,checkvalvesareclosedwithflowsecuredthroughthevalve,blindflanges,pipeandendcapsareinplace,andclosedsystemsareintact.Thenormallyopen,butnonautomatic,containmentisolationboundaries(e'.g.checkvalvesandmanualvalves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofbeingclosed.Inaddition,bothpenetrationsassociatedwiththeShutdownPurgeSystemmustbeisolatedbyablindflangecontainingredundantgaskets,orasinglegasketedblindflangewithade-'activatedautomaticisolationvalve(i.e.,twopassivebarriers).Containmentisolationboundaryleakageper10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeBandCtesting,isonlyaddressedbyLCO'.6.,l,"Containment,"andisnotaconsiderationindeterminationofcontainmentisolationboundaryOPERABILITY.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-23DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3LCO(continued)ThisLCOprovidesassurancethatthecontainmentisolationboundarieswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstocontrolleakagefromthecontainmentduringDBAs.TheLCOismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthattheLCOisnotapplicabletothemainsteamsafetyvalvesinMODES1,2,and3.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.1,"HainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs),"whichprovidesappropriateRequiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthattheLCOisnotapplicabletothemainsteamisolationvalves(HSIVs)inMODE1,andinNODES2and3withtheHSIVsopenorclosedandnotdeactivated.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.2,"HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValves."ThethirdNotestatesthattheatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODES1and2,andMODE3whentheReactorCoolantSystemaverage-temperature(T,,)is~500F.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.4,"AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs),"whichprovidesappropriateRequiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InNODE5,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsofthisMODE.Therefore,thecontainmentisolationboundariesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE5.TherequirementsforcontainmentisolationboundariesduringMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.3,"ContainmentPenetrations."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-24(continued)DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstNoteallowspenetrationflowpaths,exceptfortheShutdownPurgeSystemvalvepenetrationflowpaths,tobeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.Theseadministrativecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedindividualqualifiedinaccordancewithplantproceduresatthevalvecontrols,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforcontainmentisolationisindicated.Duetothesizeoftheshutdownpurgelinepenetrationandthefactthatthese'penetrationsexhaustdirectlyfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideenvironment,thepenetrationflowpathcontainingthesevalvesmaynotbeopenedunderadministrativecontrols.AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.ThisisacceptablesincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablecontainmentisolationboundary.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andsubsequentinoperablecontainmentisolationboundariesaregovernedbysubsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions.AthirdNotehasbeenaddedwhichensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystemsarerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablecontainmentisolationboundary,orastheresultofperformingthe'equiredActionsdescribedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-25DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)Finally,intheeventtheisolationboundaryleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria,Note4directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1.Thisevaluationshouldbeinitiatedimmediatelyafterdeclaringacontainmentisolationboundaryinoperable.Thisisrequiredsincetheinabilityofanisolationboundarytoclosemayresultinasignificantincreaseintheoverallcontainmentleakagerateifthein-seriesandredundantisolationboundaryhasalarge"as-left"leakagerateassociatedwithit.A.landA.2Intheeventonecontainmentisolationboundaryinoneormorepenetrationflowpathsisinoperable(exceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit),theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationboundarythatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationboundariesthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,ablindflange,andacheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.ForapenetrationflowpathisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.I,theboundaryusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavailableonetocontainment..RequiredActionA.Imustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODESI,2,3,and4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-26Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)A.landA.2ForaffectedpenetrationflowpathsthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe4hourCompletionTimeandthathavebeenisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathsmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccidentandnolongercapableofbeingisolatedfollowingasinglefailurewillbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,that-thoseisolationboundariescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthattheboundariesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationboundaries'insidecontainment,thetimeperiodspeci'fiedas"priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinview.oftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationboundariesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationboundarymisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationboundarieslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowstheseboundariestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsinthese'reashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseboundaries,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.ConditionAhasbeenmodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletothosepenetrationflowpathswhichdonotuseaclosedsystemasaconta'inmentisolationboundary.Forthosepenetrationswhichdouseaclosedsystem,ConditionCprovidestheappropriateactions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-27DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1Withtwocontainmentisolationboundariesinoneormorepenetrationflowpathsinoperable(exceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit),theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithinIhour.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationboundarythatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationboundariesthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.Checkvalvesandclosedsystemsarenotacceptableisolationboundariesinthisinstancesincetheycannotbeassuredtomeetthedesignrequirementsofanormalcontainmentisolationboundary.TheIhourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1.FollowingcompletionofRequiredActionB.I,verificationthattheaffectedpenetrationflowpathremainsisolatedmustbeperformedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2.ConditionBismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletopenetrationflowpathswhichdonotuseaclosedsystemascontainmentisolationboundary.Forthosepenetrationswhichdouseaclosedsystem,ConditionCprovidestheappropriateactions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-28DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)C.IandC.2Withoneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmentisolationboundaryinoperable,theinoperableboundaryflowpathmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.Acheckvalvemaynotbeusedtoisolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpath.RequiredActionC.Imustbecompletedwithinthe72hourCompletionTime.Thespecifiedtimeperiodisreasonableconsideringtherelativestabilityoftheclosedsystem(hence,reliability)toactasapenetrationisolationboundaryandtherelativeimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentintegrityduringMODESI,2,3,and4.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthroughasystemwalkdown,thattheseisolationboundariescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.IntheeventtheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionC.I,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisperiodicverificationisnecessarytoassureleaktightnessofcontainmentandthatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiringisolationfollowinganaccidentareisolated.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthattheboundariesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationboundariesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationboundariesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationboundarymisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-29DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletothosepenetrationflowpathswhichuseaclosedsystemasacontainmentisolationboundary.ThisNoteisnecessarysincethisConditioniswrittentospecificallyaddressthosepenetrationflowpathswhichutilizeaclosedsystemasdefinedinReference7.RequiredActionC.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationboundarieslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowstheseboundariestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.D.IIntheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontainonevalvenotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,mini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationboundarythatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationboundariesthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionD.ImusthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.3.5.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-30DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)D.2InaccordancewithRequiredActionD.2,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationis,necessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.This'RequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationboundariesandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.,TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationboundariesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsi'deringthefactthattheboundariesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationboundariesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationboundariesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationboundarymisalignmen'tisanunlikelypossibility.1'equiredActionD.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationboundarieslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowstheseboundariestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadmi'nistrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseboundaries,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-31DraftB 1ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.IIntheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontaintwovalvesnotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,RequiredActionE.1requiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentmini-purgeresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothmini-purgevalveshavefailedaleakagetestorarenotwithinthelimitso'fSR3.6.3.5.Inmanyinstances,containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.Ianditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationofthemini-purgepenetrationflowpathwithintheIhourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.Ibeforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,evenwithbothvalvesfailingtheleakagetest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweenthemini-purgevalveleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.E.2RequiredActionE.2requiresthatthemini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithinIhour.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeett'hiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionE.2musthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.3.5.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.FollowingcompletionofRequiredActionE.1,verificationthattheaffectedpenetrationflowpathremainsisolatedmustbeperformedinaccordancewithRequiredAction0.2.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-32DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)F.landF.2IftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within"36hours.The'allowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinan,orderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.3.1ThisSRensuresthatthemini-purgevalvesareclosedexceptwhenthevalvesareopenedunderadministrativecontrol.Themini-purgevalvesarecapableofclosingintheenvironmentfollowingaLOCA.Therefore,thesevalvesareallowedtobeopenforlimitedperiodsoftime.Thevalvesmaybeopenedforpressurecontrol,ALARAorairqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,maintenanceactivities,orforSurveillancesthatrequirethevalvestobeopen.Tobeopened,thevalvesmustbecapableofclosingunderaccidentconditions,thecontainmentisolationsignaltothevalvesmustbeOPERABLE,andtheeffluentreleasemustbemonitoredtoensurethatitremainswithinregulatorylimits.The31dayFrequencyisbasedontherelativeimportanceofthesevalvessincetheyprovideadirectpath.totheoutsideenvironmentandtheadminist'rativecontrolsthatareinplace.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-33DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.3.2ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachcontainmentisolationboundarylocatedoutsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionisperformingitscontainmentisolationaccidentfunction.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentbarrieriswithindesignlimits'hisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationboundariesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Thisincludesmanualvalves,blindfl'anges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationboundariesaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationboundarytagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowanda92dayFrequencytoverifytheircorrectpositionisappropriate.TheSRspecifiesthatisolationboundariesthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheboundariesareopen.TheSRismodifiedbytwonotes.ThefirstNoteappliestocontainmentisolationboundarieslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowstheseboundariestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringMODESI,2,3and4forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseisolationboundaries,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.TheSecondNotestatesthatthisSRisnotapplicabletocontainmentisolationboundarieswhichreceiveanautomaticsignalsincetheisolationtimesofthesevalvesareverifiedbySR3.6.3.4andtheboundariesarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.6-34Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.3.3ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachcontainmentisolationboundarylocatedinsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionandisperformingitscontainmentisolationaccidentfunction.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentbarrieriswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationboundariesinsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Thisincludesmanualvalves,blindflanges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationboundariesaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationboundarytagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowandFrequencyof"priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isappropriate.TheSRspecifiesthatisolationboundariesthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheyareopen.TheSRismodifiedbytwonotes.ThefirstNoteappliestocontainmentisolationboundarieslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowstheseboundariestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringNODESI,2,3,and4forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseisolationboundaries,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.TheSecondNotestatesthatthisSRisnotapplicabletocontainmentisolationboundarieswhichreceiveanautomaticsignalsincethesignalprovidesassurancethevalve'illbeclosedfollowinganaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-35Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.3.4VerifyingthattheisolationtimeofeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswithinlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.Theisolationtimetestensuresthevalvewillisolateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheisolationtimeandFrequencyofthisSRareinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.6.3.5Forcontainmentmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals,additionalleakageratetestingbeyondthetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB,isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITY.Operatingexperiencehasdemonstratedthatthistypeofsealhasthepotentialtodegradeinashortertimeperiodthandoothersealtypes.Basedonthisobservationandtheimportanceofmaintainingthispenetrationleaktight(duetothedirectpathbetweencontainmentandtheoutsideenvironment),aleakageacceptancecriteriaof<0.05L.whentestedat>P.isspecifiedforeachmini-purgeisolationvalvewithresilientsealsintheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.TheFrequencyoftestingisalsospecifiedintheContainmentLeakageRateProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-36Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.3.6AutomaticcontainmentisolationvalvescloseonacontainmentisolationsignaltopreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainmentfollowingaDBA.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvewillactuatetoitsisolationpositiononacontainmentisolations'ignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForumGDC53and57,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-4,"ContainmentPurgingDuringNormalOperation."3.UFSAR,Section6.2.4andTable6.2-15.4.RegulatoryGuideI.4,Revision2.5..10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57.6.GinnaStationProcedureA-3.3.7.NUREG-0800,Section6.2.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-37DraftB ContainmentPressure83.6.483.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.4ContainmentPressureBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentpressureislimitedduringnbrmaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Theselimitsalsopreventthecontainmentpressurefromexceedingthecontainmentdesignnegativepressuredifferentialwithrespecttotheoutsideatmosphere.Containmentpressureisaprocessvariablethatismonitoredandcontrolled.Thecontainmentpressurelimitsarederivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalysis.ShouldoperationoccuroutsidetheselimitscoincidentwithaDBA,postaccidentcontainmentpressurescouldexceedcalculatedvalues.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmentpressureoutsidethelimitsoftheLCO,violatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentinternalpressureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysesperformedtoestablishthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressure.The1'imitingDBAsconsidered,relativetocontainmentpressure,aretheLOCAandSLB,whichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.TheworstcaseSLBgenerateslargermassandenergyreleasesthantheworstcaseLOCA.Thus,theSLBeventboundstheLOCAeventfromthecontainmentpeakpressurestandpoint(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-38Draft8 ContainmentPressureB3.6.4APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Theinitialpressureconditionusedinthecontainmentanalysiswas15.7psia(1.0psig).ThemaximumcontainmentpressureresultingfromtheworstcaseSLB,'59.8psig,doesnotexceedthecontainmentdesignpressure,60psig.Thecontainmentwasalsodesignedforanexternalpressureloadequivalentto-2.5psig.However,internalpressureislimitedto-2.0psigbasedonconcernsrelatedtoprovidingcontinuedcoolingforthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainment.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Therefore,fortherefloodphase,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).ServiceWaterSystem,(LCO3.7.8)temperatureplaysanimportantroleinbothmaximizingandminimizingcontainmentpressurefollowingaDBAresponse.ContainmentpressuresatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintaining,containmentpressureatlessthanorequaltotheLCOupperpressurelimitensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theresultantpeakcontainmentaccidentpressurewillremainbelowthecontainmentdesignpres'sure.MaintainingcontainmentpressureatgreaterthanorequaltotheLCOlowerpressurelimitensuresthatthecontainmentwillnotexceedthedesignnegativedifferentialpressure.However,thelowerpressurelimitspecifiedforthisLCOissetatamorelimitingpressuretoensurecontinuedcoolingofthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainmentwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLEforalargeportionofMODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-39(continued)DraftB ContainmentPressureB3.6.4APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.Sincemaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitsisessentialtoensureinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesaremaintained,theLCOisapplicableinNODES1,2,3and4.InNODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentpressurewithinthelimitsoftheLCOisnotrequiredinNODE5or6.ACTIONSA.1WhencontainmentpressureisnotwithinthelimitsoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithintheselimitswithin8hours.TheRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis'he8hourCompletionTimeisgreaterthantheACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.However,duetothelargecoptainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeofthecontainmentMini-PurgeSystem,8hoursisallowedtorestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.ThisisjustifiedbythelowprobabilityofaDBAduringthistimeperiod.B.1andB.2IfcontainmentpressurecannotberestoredtowithinlimitswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-40(continued)DraftB ContainmentPressureB3.6.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1Verifyingthatcontainmentpressureiswithinlimitsensuresthatplantoperationremainswithinthelimitsassumedinthecontainmentanalysis.'hisverificationshouldnormallybeperformedusingPI-944.The12hourFrequencyofthisSRwasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingofcontainmentpressurevariationsduringth'applicableMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmentpressurecondition.CalibrationofPI-944orothercontainmentpressuremonitoringdevicesshouldbeperformedinaccordancewith.industrystandards.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50,AppendixK.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-41DraftB

ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5B3.6.5ContainmentAirTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperaturelimitisderivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalyses.ThisLCOensuresthatinitialconditionsassumedintheanalysisofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotviolatedduringplantoperations.ThetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfromcontainmentbytheContainmentSpray(CS)andContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC)Systemsduringpostaccidentconditionsisdependentupontheenergyreleasedtothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellastheinitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighertheinitialtemperature,.themoreenergythatmustberemoved,resultinginhigherpeakcontainmentpressureandtemperature.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmenttemperatureinexcessoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentaverageairtemperatureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysestoensure'hatthetotalamountofenergywithincontainmentiswithinthecapacityoftheCSandCRFCSystems.Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureisalsoanimportantconsiderationinestablishingthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforbothpressureandtemperature.Thelimitforcontainmentaverageairtemperatureensuresthatoperationismaintainedwithin'heassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesforcontainment(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-42DraftB ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmentOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtothecapabilityoftheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemstomitigatetheaccident,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.Consequently,theESFsystemsmustcontinuetofunctionwithintheenvironmentresultingfromtheDBAwhichincludeshumidity,pressure,temperature,andradiationconsiderations.ThelimitingDBAforthemaximumpeakcontainmentairtemperatureisanSLB.Theinitialcontainmentaverageairtemperatureassumedinthedesignbasisanalyses(Ref.I)is120'F.Thisresultsinamaximumcontainmentairtemperatureof374'F..TheinitialtemperaturelimitspecifiedinthisLCOisalsousedtoestablishtheenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforcontainment.ThemaximumSLBpeakcontainmentairtemperaturewascalculatedtoexistforonlyafewsecondsduringthetransient.Thebasisofthecontainmentdesigntemperature,however,istoensuretheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinsidecontainment(Ref.2).Thermalanalysesshowthatthetimeintervalduringwhichthecontainmentairtemperaturepeakedwasshortenoughthattheequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelowtheirdesigntemperatures.Also,theequipmentandcablinginsidecontainmentareprotectedagainstthedirecteffectsofaSLBbyconcretefloorsandshields.Therefore,itwasconcludedthatthecalculatedtransientcontainmentairtemperaturefollowingaLOCA(286F)becomes'imitingforenvironmentalqualificationreasons.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-43Draft8 ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thecontainmentpressuretransientissensitivetotheinitialairmassincontainmentand,thereFore,totheinitialcontainmentairtemperature.ThelimitingDBAforestablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureisaSLB.Thetemperaturelimitisusedinthisanalysistoensurethatintheeventofanaccidentthemaximumallowablecontainmentinternalpressurewillnotbeexceeded.ContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaverageairtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperaturelimit,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthecontainmentdesigntemperature.Asaresult,theabilityofcontainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctionisensuredandtheOPERABILITYofequipmentwithincontainmentismaintained.APPLICABILITYInNODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InNODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentaverageair'emperaturewithinthelimitisnotrequiredinMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.lWhencontainmentaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithinthelimitwithin24hours.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The24hourCompletionTimeisacceptableconsideringthesensitivityoftheanalysistovariationsinthisparameterandprovidessuFficienttimetocorrectminorproblems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-44Draft8

ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5ACTIONS(continued)B.1andB.2IfthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturecannotberestoredtowithinitslimitwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEin,whichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.5.1VerifyingthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithintheLCOlimitensuresthatcontainmentoperationremainswithinthelimitassumedforthecontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethecontainmentaverageairtemperature,anarithmeticaverageiscalculatedusingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthecontainmentselectedtoprovidearepresentativesampleoftheoverallcontainmentatmosphere.Thereare6containmentairtemperatureindicators(TE-6031,TE-6035,TE-6036,TE-6037,TE-6038,andTE-6045)suchthata.minimumofthreeshouldbeusedforcalculatingthearithmeticaverage.The12hourFrequencyofthisSRisconsideredacceptablebasedonobservedslowratesoftemperatureincreasewithincontainmentasaresultofenvironmentalheatsources(duetothelargevolumeofcontainment).Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmenttemperaturecondition.Calibrationofthesetemperatureindicatorsshallbeperformedinaccordancewithindustrystandards.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50.49.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-45DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CFRC),NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsBASESBACKGROUNDTheCSandCRFCsystemsprovidecontainmentatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandtemperatureincontainmenttolessthanthedesignvalues.ReductionofcontainmentpressureandtheiodineremovalcapabilityoftheCSSystem,NaOHSystem,andtheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconnectedtotheCRFCunitsreducesthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheenvironment,intheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),towithinlimits.TheCS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsaredesignedtomeettherequirementsofAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61(Ref.1).TheCS,NaOH,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsalsoaredesignedtolimitoffsitedosesfollowingaDBAwithin10CFR100guidelines.TheCRFCSystem,CSSystem,NaOHSystem,andtheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemareEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systems.Theyaredesignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapabilityrequiredduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeattainedandreducethepotentialreleaseofradioactivematerial,principallyiodine,fromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.TheCSSystem,CRFCSystem,NaOHSystem,andtheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemprovideredundantmethodstolimitandmaintainpostaccidentconditionstolessthanthecontainmentdesignvalues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-46DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ContainmentSraandNaOHSstemsTheCSSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesapump,sprayheaders,sprayeductors,nozzles,valves,andpiping(seeFigureB3.6.6-I).EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateESFbus'.Therefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)suppliesboratedwatertotheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphaseofoperationthroughacommonsupplyheadersharedbythesafetyinjection(SI)system.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,CSpumpsuctioncanbetransferredfromtheRWSTtoContainmentSumpBviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)system.TheCSSystemprovidesasprayofcoldboratedwatermixedwithsodiumhydroxide(NaOH)fromthesprayadditivetankintotheupperregionsofcontainmenttoreducethecontainmentpressureandtemperatureandtoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphereduringaDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisanimportantfactorindeterminingtheheatremovalcapabilityoftheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphase.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,heatisremovedfromthecontainmentsumpwaterbytheresidualheatremovalcoolers.However,theCSSystemcanprovideadditionalcontainmentheatremovalcapabilityifrequired.EachtrainoftheCSSystemprovidesadequatespraycoveragetomeetthesystemdesignrequirementsforcontainmentheatremoval.TheNaOHmixtureisinjectedintotheCSflowpathviaaliquid'eductorduringtheinjectionphaseofanaccident.TheeductorsaredesignedtoensurethatthepHofthespraymixtureisbetween8.3and9.1.TheresultingalkalinepHofthesprayenhancestheabilityofthespraytoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheNaOHaddedinthesprayalsoensuresanalkalinepHforthesolutionrecirculatedinthecontainmentsump.ThealkalinepHofthecontainmentsumpwaterminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheoccurrenceofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentsexposedtothefluid(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-47DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BACKGROUNDContainmentSraandNaOHSstems(continued)IThe'CSSystemisactuatedeitherautomaticallybyacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignalormanually.DBAswhichcangenerateanautomaticactuationsignalincludethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).AnautomaticactuationopenstheCSpumpmotoroperateddischargevalves(860A,8608,860C,and860D),opensNaOHadditionvalves836Aand836B,startsthetwoCSpumps,andbeginstheinjectionphase.AmanualactuationoftheCSSystemrequirestheoperatortoactuatetwoseparatepushbuttonssimultaneouslyonthemaincontrolboardtobeginthesamesequence.TheinjectionphasecontinuesuntilanRWSTlowlevelalarmisreceivedsignalingthestartoftherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.3and4).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.5).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwith896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhighheadrecirculationisolationvalve'sunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequateinjectionflowforcorecooling,theSIpumpsremaininpull-stop.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,6-48DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BACKGROUNDContainmentSraandNaOHSstems(continued)TheCSSystemisonlyusedduringtherecirculationphaseifcontainmentpressureincreasesaboveapressureatwhichcontainmentintegrityispotentiallychallenged.Otherwise,thecontainmentheatremovalprovidedbytheCRFCunitsandContainmentSumpB(viatheRHRsystem)isadequatetosupportcontainmentheatremovalneedsandthelimitsonsumppH(Refs.2and6).OperationoftheCSSystemintherecirculationmodeiscontrolledbytheoperatorinaccordancewiththeemergencyoperatingprocedures.ContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstemTheCRFCSystemconsi.stsoffourfanunits(A,8,C,andD).Eachcoolingunitconsistsofamotor,fan,coolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,highefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters,ductdistributorsandnecessaryinstrumentationandcontrols(seeFigureB3.6'.6-2).Themoistureseparatorsfunctiontoreducethemoisturecontentoftheairstreamtosupporttheeffectivenessofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.CRFCunitsAandDaresuppliedbyoneESFbuswhileCRFCunitsBandCaresuppliedbyaredundantESFbus.AllfourCRFCunitsaresuppliedcoolingwaterbytheServiceWater(SW)Systemviaacommonloopheader.Airisdrawnintothecoolersthroughthefananddischargedintothecontainmentatmosphereincludingthevariouscompartments(e.g.,steamgeneratorandpressurizercompartments).Duringnormaloperation,atleasttwofanunitsaretypicallyoperating.TheCRFCSystem,operatinginconjunctionwithothercontainment'ventilationandairconditioningsystems,isdesignedtolimittheambientcontainmentairtemperatureduringnormalplantoperationtolessthanthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentAirTemperature."ThistemperaturelimitationensuresthatthecontainmenttemperaturedoesnotexceedtheinitialtemperatureconditionsassumedfortheDBAs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-49DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BACKGROUNDContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstem(continued)InpostaccidentoperationfollowingaSIactuationsignal,theCRFCSystemfansaredesignedtostartautomaticallyifnotalreadyrunning.ThedischargeofCRFCunitsAandCthentransfertoforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.ThetemperatureofthecoolingwatersuppliedbySWSystem(LCO3.7.8)isanimportantfactorintheheatremovalcapabilityofthefanunits.ContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSstemTheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesanairtightplenumcontainingtwobanksofcharcoalfiltercellsforremovalofradioiodines(seeFigure3.6.6-2).Airflowenterstheplenumthroughtwoholesinthebottom(oneateachend),passesthroughthecharcoalfilterbankstothecenter,andisexhaustedfromtheplenumthroughaholeinthetop.Twonormallyclosedairoperateddampersisolateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfromCRFCunitsAandC(dampers5871and5872for.TrainAand5874and'5876forTrainB).ASIsignalopensthesedampersandclosestwobypassdampersfromtheCRFCunits(dampers5873forGRFCunitAand5875forCRFCunit,C)toforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSSystemandCRFCSystemlimitthetemperatureandpressurethatcouldbeexperiencedfollowingaDBA.ThelimitingDBAsconsideredaretheLOCAandtheSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandtemperaturetransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtocontainmentESFsystems,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-50DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)Theanalysisandevaluationshowthatundertheworstcasescenario,thehighestpeakcontainmentpressureis59.8psigandthepeakcontainmenttemperatureis374F(bothexperiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeettheintentofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentTemperature,"foradetaileddiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsassumeaplantspecificpowerlevelof102%,oneCStrainandonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperating,andinitial(pre-accident)containmentconditionsof120'Fand1.0psig.Theanalysesalsoassumearesponsetimedelayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculatedcontainmentpressureandtemperatureresponses.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,theeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.7).TheeffectofaninadvertentCSactuationisnotconsideredsincethereisnosinglefailure,includingthelo'ssofoffsitepower,whichresultsinaspuriousCSactuation.ThemodeledCSSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysisisbasedona'esponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHi-HipressuresetpointtoachievingfullflowthroughtheCSnozzles.ToincreasetheresponseoftheCSSystem,theinjectionlinestothesprayheadersaremaintainedfilledwithwater.TheCSSystemtotalresponsetimeof37.5seconds(assumingthecontainmentHi-Hipressureisreachedattimezero)includesdieselgenerator(DG)startup(forlossofoffsitepower),openingofthemotoroperatedisolationvalves,containmentspraypumpstartup,andspraylinefilling(Ref.8).(contin'ued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-51DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemodeledCRFCSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysisisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingtheSIactuationlevelstoachievingfullCRFCSystemairandsafetygradecoolingwaterflow.TheCRFCSystemtotalresponsetimeof44seconds,includessignaldelay,DGstartup(forlossofoffsitepower),andservicewaterpumpandCRFCunitstartuptimes(Ref.9).DuringaSLBorLOCA,aminimumoftwoCRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintaincontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits.TheCS,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsoperatetoreducethereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofaDBA.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactiveiodinewithincontainmentaretheLOCAorarodejectionaccident(REA).Intheanalysisforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatadequatecontainmentleaktightnessisintactateventinitiationtolimitpotentialleakagetotheenvironment.Additionally,itisassumedthattheamountofradioactiveiodinereleasedislimitedbyreducingtheiodineconcentrationpresentinthecontainmentatmosphere.TherequirediodineremovalcapabilityoftheCS,NaOH,andContainmentPost-Acciden'tCharcoalSystemsisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDBA,whichisaLOCA.Theaccidentanalyses(Ref."10)assumethateithertwotrainsofCS(takingsuctionfromtheNaOHSystem),oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsoperatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheCSSystem,NaOHSystem,CRFCSystem,NaOHSystem,andtheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-52(continued)DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6LCODuringaDBA,aminimumof2CRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintainthecontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits(Ref.8).Additionally,twoCStrainstakingsuctionfromtheNaOHSystem,twoCRFCunitswithpostaccidentcharcoalfilters(i.e.,unitsAandC),oroneCRFCunitwithpostaccidentcharcoalfiltersincombinationwithoneCStrainarealsorequiredtoremoveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphereandmaintainconcentrationsbelowthoseassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Toensurethattheserequirementsaremet,twoCStrains,fourCRFCunits,andtwopost-accide'ntcharcoalfiltertrainsandtheNaOHSystemmustbeOPERABLE.Therefore,intheeventofanaccident,atleastoneCSandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,theNaOHSystem,andtwoCRFCunitsoperates,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurs.EachCStrainincludesaspraypump,sprayheaders,nozzles,valves,sprayeductors,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanESFactuationsignalandmanuallytransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpBviatheRHRpumps.FortheNaOHSystemtobeOPERABLE,thevolumeandconcentrationofsprayadditivesolutioninthetankmustbewithinlimitsandairoperatedvalves836Aand836BmustbeOPERABLE.EachCRFCunitincludesamotor,fancoolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,HEPAfilters,ductdistributors,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.ForCRFCunitsAandC,flowthrougheitherthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterorthebypassisrequiredfortheunitstobeconsideredOPERABLE.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludesaplenumcontainingcharcoalfilterbanksandisolationdamperstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.CRFCunitsAandCarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-53(continued)DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperaturerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem,CRFCSystem,NaOHSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystem.InNODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Thus,theCSSystem,CRFCSystem,NaOHSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6.ACTIONSA.1WithoneCStraininoperable,theinoperableCStrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEsprayandCRFCunitsareadequatetoperformtheiodineremovalandcontainmentcoolingfunctions.The72hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheredundantheatremovalcapabilityaffordedbytheCSSystem,theredundantiodineremovalaffordedbytheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystem,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-54DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6ACTIONS(continued)B.lWithonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable,theinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainiscapableofproviding50%oftheradioactiveiodineremovalrequirementsfollowingaDBA.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCalsoresultsinitsassociatedpost-accidentcharcoal'filtertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.The7dayCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.1torestoretheinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,includingtheCRFCunit,isjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedby'theCSandNaOHSystemsandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.C.1Withbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,atleastonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimetorestoreoneinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.Theinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludes,butisnotlimitedtoinoperableCRFCunitsAandC.D.lWiththeNaOHSysteminoperable,OPERABLEstatusmustberestoredwithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimetorestoretheNaOHSystemisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-55DraftB CS,'CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6ACTIONS(continued)E.landE.2IftheinoperableCStrain,post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,ortheNaOHSystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within84hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheextendedintervaltoreachMODE5allowsadditionaltimeforattemptingrestorationoftheinoperablecomponent(s)andisreasonablewhenconsideringthedrivingforceforareleaseofradioactivematerialfromtheReactorCoolantSystemisreducedinMODE3.F.1andF.2WithoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable,theaffectedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltermustbedeclaredinoperableimmediatelyandtheinoperableCRFCunit(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheinoperableCRFCunitsprovidedupto100%ofthecontainmentheatremovalneedsandupto50%oftheiodineremovalneeds.The7dayCompletionTimeisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantheat..removalcapabilitiesaffordedbycombinationsoftheCSSystemandCRFCSystemandthelowprobabilityofDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.IfbothCRFCunitsAandCareinoperable,thenConditionCmustalsobeentered.RequiredActionF.IismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisrequiredactionisonlyapplicableifCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCresultsintheassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-56DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued)G.landG.2IftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFofthisLCOarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus.,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.H.1MithtwoCStrainsinoperable,theNaOHSystemandoneorbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,three.ormoreCRFCunitsinoperable,oroneCSandtwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR-3.6.6.1TheapplicableSRdescriptionsfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRisrequiredsincetheOPERABILITYofvalves896Aand896BisalsorequiredfortheCSSystem.SR3.6.6.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheCSflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforCSSystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvesoutsidecontainment(therearenovalvesinsidecontainment)andcapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-57DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.3Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheNaOHSystemflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforNaOHSystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,'rotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewere'verifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvesoutsidecontainment(therearenovalvesinsidecontainment)andcapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.SR3.6.6.4OperatingeachCRFCunitfor>15minutesonceev'ery31daysensuresthatall.CRFCunitsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthefanunitsandcontrols,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationoftheCRFCunitsoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.6.6.5Verifyingcoolingwater(i.e.,SW)flowtoeachCRFCunitprovidesassurancethattheenergyremovalcapabilityoftheCRFCassumedintheaccidentanalyseswillbeachieved(Ref.ll).TheminimumandmaximumSWflowsarenotrequiredtobespecificallydeterminedbythisSRduetothepotentialfor'acontainmentairtemperaturetransient.Instead,thisSRverifiesthatSWflowisavailabletoeachCRFCunit.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityoftheSWSystem,thetwoCRFCtrainredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofasignificantdegradationofflowoccurringbetweensurveillances.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-58DraftB 0 CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6'BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS,(continued)SR3.6.6.6Operatingeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfor>15minutesonceevery31daysensuresthatalltrainsareOPERABLEandthatalldampersarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockagecanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationofthetrainoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.6.6.7VerifyingeachCSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedheadensuresthatspraypumpperformancehasnotdegradedduringthecycle.FlowanddifferentialpressurearenormaltestsofcentrifugalpumpperformancerequiredbySectionXIoftheASMECode(Ref.12).SincetheCSpumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughthesprayheaders,theyaretestedonrecirculationflow.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurveandisindicativeofoverallperformance.SuchinservicetestingconfirmscomponentOPERABILITY,trendsperformance,and'detectsincipientfailuresbyabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyoftheSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.VSR3.6.6.8Toprovideeffectiveiodineremoval,thecontainmentspraymustbeanalkalinesolution.SincetheRWSTcontentsarenormallyacidic,thesprayadditivetankmustprovideasufficientvolumeofsprayadditivetoadjustpHforallwaterthatisinjected.ThisSRisperformedtoverifytheavailabilityofsufficientNaOHsolutioninthesprayadditivetank.The184dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedonthelowprobabilityofanundetectedchangeintankvolumeoccurringduringtheSRintervalsincethetankisnormallyisolated.Tanklevelisalsoindicatedandalarmedinthecontrolroom,sothatthereishighconfidencethatasubstantialchangeinlevelwouldbedetected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-59DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.9ThisSRprovidesverificationoftheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankandissufficienttoensurethatthespraysolutionbeinginjectedintocontainmentisatthecorrectpHlevel.The184dayFrequencyissufficienttoensurethattheconcentrationlevelofNaOHinthesprayadditivetankremainswithintheestablishedlimits.Thisisbasedonthelowlikelihoodofanuncontrolledchangeinconcentrationsincethetankisnormallyisolatedandtheprobabilitythatanysubstantialvarianceintankvolumewillbedetected.SR3.6.6.10ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheVFTPincludestestingcharcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.Theminimumrequiredflowratethrougheachofthetwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltersis33,000cubicfeetperminuteataccidentconditions(or38,500cubicfeetperminuteatnormaloperatingconditions).Specific.testfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.However,themaximumsurveillanceintervalforrefuelingoutagetestsisbasedon24monthrefuelingcyclesandnot18monthcyclesasdefinedbyRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.13).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-60DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.11ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCRFCunittestingisperfo'rmedinaccordancewiththeVFTP.TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance.TheminimumrequiredflowratethrougheachofthefourCRFCunitsis33,000cubicfeetperminuteataccidentconditions(or38,500cubicfeetperminuteatnormaloperatingconditions)~SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.However,themaximumsurveillanceintervalforrefuelingoutagetestsisbasedon24monthrefuelingcyclesandnot18monthcyclesasdefinedbyRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.13).SR3.6.6.12andSR3.6.6.13TheseSRsrequireverificationthateachautomaticCSvalveintheflowpath(860A,860B,860C,and860D)actuatestoitscorrectpositionandthateachCSpumpstartsuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHighpressuresignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillanceswereperformedw'iththereactoratpower.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusually.passtheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.6.6.14ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachCRFCunitactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.12andSR3.6.6.13,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-61DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.15ThisSRrequiresverificationevery24monthsthateachtrainofpost-accidentcharcoalfiltersactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.12andSR3.6.6.13,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.16ThisSRprovidesverificationthateachautomaticvalveintheNaOHSystemflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition(836Aand836B)actuatestoitscorrectpositionuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.12andSR3.6.6.13,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.17ToensurethatthecorrectpHlevelisestablishedintheboratedwatersolutionprovidedbytheCSSystem,flowthroughtheeductorisverifiedonce'every5years.ThisSRinconjunctionwithSR3.6.6.16providesassurancethatNaOHwillbeaddedintotheflowpathuponCSinitiation.Aminimumflowof20gpmthroughtheeductormustbeestablishedasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.AflowpathmustalsobeverifiedfromtheNaOHtanktotheeductors.Duetothepassivenatureofthesprayadditiveflowcontrols,the5yearFrequencyissufficienttoidentifycomponentdegradationthatmayaffectflowinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-62DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.18WiththeCSinletvalvesclosedandthesprayheaderdrainedofanysolution,lowpressureairorsmokecanbeblownthroughtestconnections.ThisSRensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstructedandprovidesassurancethatspraycoverageofthecontainmentduringanaccidentisnotdegraded.Duetothepassivedesignofthenozzle,atestat10yearintervalsisconsideredadequatetodetectobstructionofthenozzles.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionMTEB6-1,"pHForEmergencyCoolantWaterForPWRs."3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFAutomaticSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.4.NUREG-0821.5.UFSAR,Section6.3.6.UFSAR,Section6.1.2.4.7.10CFR50,AppendixK.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.9.UFSAR,Section6.2.2.2.10.UFSAR,Section6.5.11.UFSAR,Section6.2.2.'1.12.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.13.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-63DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6CO<<<<44<<zAaaveOCSIS'4<<4<<COSI~+LCIlIZJOS~<<Z~IIIISlEnlP0-IFigureB3.6.6-1ContainmentSprayandNaOHSystemsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-64DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6rContaimncatRecirculatingFanCoolingUnitA~CP'ontainmentReciicuhtingFanCoolingUnitBrContainmentRecirculatingFanCoolingUnitC5873(FO)(FC)5875(FC)5876(FO)PostAcciCharcoal.FilterUnitA5 (FQ)r~QPContainmRecircuiat'ng(FO)FanCoolingUnitDVariousSupplyPoints5874(FO)PostAccidentCaoalritterUnitBI'orillustrationonlyNotes:1.Dampers5871and5872arcassociatedwithPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitA2.Damliers5874and5876areassociatedwithPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitB3.Damper5873isassoicatedwithbothCRFCUnitAandPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnitA4.Damper5876isassociatedwithbothCRFCUnitCandPostAccidentCharcoalFilterUnit13Figure2Figure83.6.6-2CRFCandContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-65Draft8

tB3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.7HydrogenRecombinersHydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESBACKGROUNDThefuncti'onofthehydrogenrecombinersistoeliminatethepotentialbreachofcontainmentduetoahydrogenoxygenreaction.Per10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlSystemsinLight-Water-CooledReactors"(Ref.1),hydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtoreducethehydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentfollowingalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)orsteamlinebreak(SLB).Therecombinersaccomplishthisbycollectingthehydrogenandoxygenatmosphericmixtureinsidecontainmentandoxidizingthehydrogeninacombustionchamber.Additionalhydrogenisaddedbytherecombinertoensurethatthenoncondensiblecombustionproductsthatcouldcauseaprogressiveriseincontainmentpressureareavoided.Oxygenisalsoaddedtopreventdepletionofoxygenbelowtheconcentrationrequiredforstableoperationofthecombuster.Theproductofcombustion,watervapor,iscooledandcondensedfromtheatmospherebytheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSystem.ThehydrogenrecombinersaremanuallyinitiatedsinceflammablelimitswouldnotbereacheduntilseveraldaysafteraDesignBasisAccident(DBA).PreventionofhydrogenaccumulationduringnormaloperationisaccomplishedbyuseoftheHini-PurgeSystem.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant83.6-66DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Two100%capacityindependenthydrogenrecombinersystemsareprovided.EachconsistsofcontrolslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,apowersupplyfromaseparateEngineeredSafetyFeaturesbus,andarecombiner.Therecombinersarecomprisedofablowerfantocirculatecontainmentairtothecombuster,acombusterchamberwithamainburner,twoigniters(includesaninstalledspare),apilotburner,andadilutionchamberdownstreamoftheflamezonewhereproductsofthecombustionaremixedwithcontainmentairtoreducethetemperatureofthegasleavingthesystem.Asinglerecombineris"capableofmaintainingthehydrogenconcentrationincontainmentatapproximately2.0volumepercent(v/o)whichisbelowthe4.1v/oflammabilitylimit.Tworecombinersareprovidedtomeettherequirementforredundancyandindependence.APPLICABLEThehydrogenrecombinersprovideforthecapabilityofSAFETYANALYSEScontrollingthebulkhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthanthelowerflammableconcentrationof4.1v/ofollowingaDBA.Thiscontrolpreventsacontainmentwidehydrogenburn,thusensuringthepressureandtemperatureinsidecontainmentasassumedintheanalysesarenotexceeded.ThelimitingDBArelativetohydrogengenerationisaLOCA.HydrogenmayaccumulateincontainmentfollowingaLOCAasaresultof:'a~b.C.d.Ametalsteamreactionbetweenthezirconiumfuelrodcladdingandthereactorcoolant;RadiolyticdecompositionofwaterintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)andthecontainmentsump;HydrogenintheRCSatthetimeoftheLOCA(i.e.,hydrogendissolvedinthereactorcoolantandhydrogengasinthepressurizervaporspace);orCorrosionofmetalsexposedtocontainmentsprayandEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsolutions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-67DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ToevaluatethepotentialforhydrogenaccumulationincontainmentfollowingaLOCA,thehydrogengenerationasafunctionoftimefollowingtheinitiationoftheaccidentiscalculated.ConservativeassumptionsrecommendedbyReference2areusedtomaximizetheamountofhydrogencalculated.Theminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitis4.1v/o,however,toavoidadynamicoverpressurizationofcontainment,allhydrogenmustbeignitedbeforeaconcentrationof6.0v/oisreached(Ref.3).Analternativetotheignitionofhydrogenatconcentrations~6.0v/oisventingofcontainmentusingtheHini-PurgeSystem.However,ventingwouldmostlikelyrequireevacuationsofthegeneralpublicwithinaradiusofseveralmilessurroundingtheplant.BasedontheconservativeassumptionsusedtocalculatethehydrogenconcentrationversustimeafteraLOCA,thehydrogenconcentrationintheprimarycontainmentwouldreach5.5v/oabout31daysaftertheLOCAifnorecombinerwasfunctioning(Ref.3).However,amorerealisticmodelpredictsthatahydrogenconcentrationof4.1v/o(thelowerflammabilitylimit)willbereachedin31days.Operationofthehydrogenrecombinersensuresthataconcentrationof6.0v/owouldnotbereachedinsidecontainmentwhichcouldresultinanoverpressurizationgivenanignitionsource.Thehydrogenrecombinersaredesignedsuchthat,withtheconservativelycalculatedhydrogengenerationratesdiscussedabove,asinglerecombineriscapableoflimitingthepeakhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthan4.1v/o(Ref.3).ThehydrogenrecombinerssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-68(continued)Draft8 HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7LCOTwohydrogenrecombinersmustbeOPERABLEandcapableofbeingplacedintooperationbeforetheminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitof4.,1v/oisreachedfollowingaDBA.ThisensuresoperationofatleastonehydrogenrecombinerintheeventofaworstcasesingleactiveFailure.ThenecessaryhydrogenoroxygenrequiredtooperatethehydrogenrecombinerdoesnothavetobeavailableonsiteforthehydrogenrecombinertobeconsideredOPERABLE.Operationwithatleastonehydrogenrecombinerensuresthatthepost-LOCAhydrogenconcentrationcanbepreventedfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimitorcausinganoverpressurizationofcontainmentgivenahydrogenignitionsource.APPLICABILITYInMODESIand2,twohydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtocontrolthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammabilitylimitof4.Iv/ofollowingaLOCA,assumingaworstcasesinglefailure.InMODES3and4,boththehydrogenproductionrateandthetotalhydrogenproducedafteraLOCAorSLBwouldbelessthanthatcalculatedfortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobabilityofanaccidentrequiringthehydrogenrecombinersislow.Therefore,thehydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredinMODE3or4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesofaDBAarelow,duetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,hydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredintheseHODES.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-69(continued)DraftB

HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7ACTIONSA.l'Withonecontainmenthydrogenrecombinerinoperable,theinoperablerec'ombinermustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.Inthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLEhydrogenrecombinerisadequatetoperformthehydrogencontrolfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLErecombinercouldresultinreducedhydrogencontrolcapability.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.RequiredActionA.Ihasbeenmodified,byaNotethatstatestheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenonerecombinerisinoperable.Thisallowanceisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccur'ring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-70DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7ACTIONS(continued)B.landB'.2Withtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperable,theabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionvia,alternatecapabilitiesmustbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithin1hour.ThealternatehydrogencontrolcapabilitiesareprovidedbytheHini-PurgeSystemwhichconsistsoftwoisolationvalvesperpenetrationflowpaththatarecapableofopeningandasupplyfancapableofperformingpurgingfunctions.The1hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetoverifythatalossofhydrogencontrolfunctiondoesnotexist.Inaddition,thealternatehydrogencontrolsystemcapabilitymustbeverifiedonceper12hoursthereaftertoensureitscontinuedavailability.Boththeinitialverificationandallsubsequentverificationsmaybeperformedasanadministrativecheckbyexamininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabilityofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperformanySurveillancesneededtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem(e.g.,openingofmini-purgevalves).Iftheabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained,continuedoperationispermittedwithtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperableforupto7days.SevendaysisareasonabletimetoallowtwohydrogenrecombinerstobeinoperablebecausethehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintainedandbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenintheamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.C.1Iftheinoperablehydrogenrecombiner(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hours.TheCompletion.Timeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-71(continued)DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3'.7SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.7.1ThisSRrequiresasystemfunctionalcheckofeachhydrogenrecombiner.Afunctionalcheckdoesnotrequireanactualtestofthehydrogenrecombinerduetothesystemdesignwhichrequiresoxygenandhydrogentobepumpedintocontainment.Instead,afunctionalcheckisaphysicalandvisualinspectionofthehydrogenrecombinerstoverifythatpipingisnotplugged,theignitorisOPERABLE,andtherecombinersarenotfouled;Theuseofatestgas(e.g.,nitrogen)isacceptable.Verificationthattherecombinersarenotfouledrequiresoperationoftheblowerfanandoperationofthesystemcontrolvalves.The24monthFrequencyforthissurveillancewasdevelopedconsideringtheincidenceofhydrogenrecombinersfailingtheSRinthepastislow.SR3.6.7.2ThisSRrequiresperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisrequiredtoensurethatthehydrogenrecombinerwillprovidethecorrecthydrogen/oxygenmixturetothecombustionchamber.The24monthFrequencyforthisSurveillancewasdevelopedconsideringtheincidenceofhydrogenrecombinersfaiTingtheSRinthepastislow.REFERENCESl.10CFR50.44.2.SafetyGuide1.7,Rev.0.3.UFSAR,Section6.2.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-72DraFt8 HSSVs3.7.13.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.1HainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)LCO3.7.1EightHSSVsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachMSSV.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreHSSVsinoperable.A.1RestoreinoperableMSSV(s)toOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-1DraftB HSSVs3.7.1SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.1.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedinNODES1and2.VerifyeachHSSVliftsetpointspecifiedbelowinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramVALVENUHBERSGASGB35093508351135103515351235133514LIFTSETTINGsi+1%-3%1140 1140 11401085R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-2DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.23.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesLCO3.7.2TwoHSIVsandtwonon-returncheckvalvesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODEI,NODE2and3exceptwhenallHSIVsareclosed'andde-activated.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromasteamgenerator(SG)inMODEl.A.lRestorevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE2.6hoursC.OneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromaSGinMODE2or3.C.IANDC.2CloseHSIV.VerifyHSIVisclosed.8hoursOnceper7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3'3DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.2tACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.IBeinMODE3.AND0.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursE.OneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromeachSG.E.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.2.IVerifyclosuretimeofeachHSIVis~5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.2Verifyeachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.3VerifyeachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-4Draft8 HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVs3.7.33.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.3MainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(MFRVs),AssociatedBypassValves,andHainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs)LCO3.7.3TwoHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andtwoMFPDVsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,and3exceptwhenbothsteamgeneratorsareisolatedfrombothmainfeedwaterpumps.ACTIONS------------------------NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable.A.ICloseHFPDV(s).ANDA.2VerifyHFPDV(s)isclosed.24hours.Onceper7daysB.OneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable'.ICloseorisolateHFRV(s).ANDB.2VerifyHFRV(s)isclosedorisolated.24hoursOnceper7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-5DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVs3.7.3tACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.OneormoreMFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable.C.lCloseorisolateHFRV,bypassvalve(s).ANDC.2VerifyHFRVbypassvalve(s)isclosedorisolated.24hoursOnceper7daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursD.2BeinMODE4.12hoursE.OneormoreMFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable.OROneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreMFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable.E.IEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-6Draft8 MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVs3.7.3SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.3.1VerifytheclosuretimeofeachMFPDViss80secondsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.3.2VerifytheclosuretimeofeachMFRVandassociatedbypassvalveiss10secondsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3177DraftB ARVs3.7.43.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)LCO3.7.4TwoARVlinesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,NODE3withReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T.,)a500F.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETION'IMEA.OneARVlineinoperable.A.1--------NOTE--------'-LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestoreARVlinetoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE3withT,,(500F.8hoursC.TwoARVlinesinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-8DraftB

ARVs3.7.4SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.4.1PerformacompletecycleofeachARV.24monthsSR3.7.4.2VerifyonecompletecycleofeachARVblockvalve.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-9DraftB AFWSystem3.7.53.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemLCO3.7.5TwomotordrivenAFW(HDAFW)trains,oneturbinedrivenAFW(TDAFW)train,andtwostandbyAFW(SAFW)trainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneTDAFWtrainflowpathinoperable.A.1RestoreTDAFWtrainflowpathtoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.OneHDAFWtraininoperable.B.1RestoreMDAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.TDAFWtraininoperable.ORTwoMDAFWtrainsinoperable.OROneTDAFWtrainflowpathandoneHDAFW.traininoperabletooppositesteam.generators(SGs).C.1RestoreoneHDAFWtrain.orTDAFWtrainflowpathtoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-10DraftB

tACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONAFWSystem3.7.5COMPLETIONTIMED.AllAFWtrainstooneormoreSGsinoperable.D.lRestoreoneAFWtrainorTDAFWflowpathtoeachaffectedSGtoOPERABLEstatus.4hoursE.OneSAFWtraininoperable.E.1RestoreSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.14daysF.BothSAFWtrainsinoperable.F.lRestoreoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA,B,C,D,E,orFnot.met.G.1BeinMODE3.ANDG.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursH.ThreeAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsinoperable.H.1---------NOTE--------LCO3.0.3andallotherLCORequiredActionsrequiringMODEchangesaresuspendeduntiloneMDAFW,TDAFW,orSAFWtrainis'estoredtoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontorestoreoneMDAFW,TDAFW,orSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-11DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.5.1VerifyeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveineachwaterflowpath,andinbothsteamsupplyflowpathstotheturbinedrivenpump,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.5.2NOTERequiredtobemetpriortoenteringMODE1fortheTDAFWpump.VerifythedevelopedheadofeachAFWpumpattheflowtestpoint'isgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.3VerifythedevelopedheadofeachSAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.4Perform,acompletecycleofeachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheServiceWaterSystem,eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedisolationvalve,andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7;5.5VerifyeachAFWautomaticvalvethatisnot~locked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,actuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-12DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.5.6NOTE-----RequiredtobemetpriortoenteringMODE1fortheTDAFWpump.VerifyeachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.7.5.7VerifyeachSAFWtraincanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-13DraftB

CSTs3.7.63.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)LCO3.7.6TheCSTsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CSTwatervolumenotwithinlimit.A.lVerifybyadministrativemeansOPERABILITYofbackupwatersupply.ANDA.2RestoreCSTwatervolumetowithinlimit.4hours7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hours8.2BeinMODE4.12hoursSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.6.1VerifytheCSTwatervolumeis~22,500gal.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-14DraftB CCWSystem3.7.73.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemLCO3.7.7TwoCCWtrains,twoCCWheatexchangers,andtheCCWloopheadershallbeOPERABIE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCCWtraininoperable.A.lRestoreCCWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.OneCCWheatexchangerinoperable.B.1RestoreCCWheatexchangertoOPERABLEstatus.31daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-15Draft8 CCWSystem3.7.7ACTIONScontinued.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.TwoCCWtrains,twoCCWheatexchangers,orloopheaderinoperable.LCO3.0.3andallotherLCORequiredActionsrequiringMODEchangesaresuspendeduntiloneCCWtrain,oneCCWheatexchanger,andtheloopheaderarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.D.1ANDInitiateActiontorestoreoneCCWtrain,oneheatexchanger,andloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyD.2BeinHODE3.AND0.3BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-16DraftB

CCWSystem3.7.7SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.7.1NOTEIsolationofCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheCCWloopheaderinoperable.VerifyeachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWtrainandheatexchangerflowpathandloopheaderthatisnot'ocked,sealed,orotherwisesecure'dinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.7.2Performacompletecycleofeachmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheresidualheatremovalheatexchangers.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-17DraftB SWSystem3.7.83.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemLCO3.7.8TwoSWtrainsandtheSWloopheadershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIMEA.OneSWtraininoperable.A.1RestoreSWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.ANDB.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursC.TwoSWtrainsorloopheaderinoperable.C.1--------NOTE----------EnterapplicableconditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem,"forthe'omponentcoolingwaterheatexchanger(s)madeinoperablebySW.EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-18DraftB SWSystem3.7.8SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.8.1Verifyscreenhousebaywaterlevelandtemperaturearewithinlimits.24hoursSR3.7.8.2NOTE-IsolationofSWflowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheSWloopheaderinoperable.Verify'eachSWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheSWtrainflowpathandloopheaderthatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.8.3VerifyallSWloopheadercross-tievalvesarelockedinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.8.4VerifyeachSWautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,actuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24,monthsSR3.7.8.5VerifyeachSWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-19DraftB

CREATS3.7.93.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)LCO3.7.9TheCREATSshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,4,5,and6,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CREATSfiltrationtraininoperable.A.1RestoreCREATSfiltrationtraintoOPERABLEstatus.OR48hoursA.2---------NOTE--------ThecontrolroommaybeunisolatedforsIhourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceisolationdampersinCREATSModeF.48hoursB--------NOTE---------SeparateConditionentryallowedforeachdamper.B.IRestoreisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneCREATSisolationdamperinoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-20DraftB CREATS3.7.9ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDIC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmetinHODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuel.D.lPlaceOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)inCREATSModeF.ORD.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyD.2.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyE.TwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperableinMODE1,2,3,or4.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-21DraftB CREATS3.7.9CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEF.TwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperablein,MODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.'.lANDInitiateactionsto,restoreoneisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyF.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDF.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-22DraftB CREATS3.7.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.9.1OperatetheCREATSfiltrationtraina15minutes.31daysSR3.7.9.2PerformrequiredCREATSfilter,testinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewithVFTPSR3.7.9.3VerifytheGREATSactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant3.7-23DraFtB ABVS3.7.103.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)LCO3.7.10TheABVSshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.ABVSinoperable.A.l-------NOTE--------LCO3.0'isnotapplicable.0SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.10.1VerifyABVSisinoperation.24hoursSR3.7.10.2VerifyABVSmaintainsanegativepressurewithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentattheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorlevel.24hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-24DraftB

tSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEABVS3.7.10FREQUENCYSR3.7.10.3PerformrequiredSpentFuelPoolCharcoalAdsorberSystemfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewiththeVFTPR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-25DraftB SFPWaterLevel3.7.113.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelLCO3'.11TheSFPwaterlevelshallbe~23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SFPwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.l--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.11.1VerifytheSFPwaterlevelis~23ftabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-26DraftB SFPBoronConcentration3.7.123.7.12SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationLCO3.7.12TheSFPboronconcentrationshallbe~300ppm.APPLICABILITY:WhenfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFPandaSFPverificationhasnotbeenperformedsincethelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SFPboronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.3'snotapplicable.A.1SuspendmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.ANDA.2.1InitiateactiontorestoreSFPboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ORA.2.2InitiateactiontoperformSFPverification.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-27DraftB SFPBoronConcentration3.7.12SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.12.1VerifytheSFPpoolboronconcentrationiswithinlimit.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-28DraftB SFPStorage3.7.133.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.13SpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageLCO3.7.13Fuelassemblystorageinthespentfuelpoolshallbemaintainedasfollows:a.FuelassembliesinRegion1shallhaveaK-infinityofs1.458;andb.FuelassembliesinRegion2shallhaveinitialenrichmentandburnupwithintheacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.APPLICABILITY:Wheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredinthespentfuelpool.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsoftheLCOnotmetforeitherregion.A.l--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.Initiateactiontomovethenoncomplyingfuelassemblyfromtheapplicableregion.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-29DraftB SFPStorage3.7.13tSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7;13.1-NOTE-NotrequiredtobeperformedwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegionl.VerifybyadministrativemeanstheK-infinityofthefuelassemblyis~1.458.PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion1SR3.7.13.2VerifybyadministrativemeanstheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1~PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-30Draft6 SFPStorage3.7.1340000ACCEPTABLE30000CLrDa)20000P6$DClEUNACCEPTABLE10000-OFAFuel&ExxonFuel----5'TDFuell.83.03.43.8NominalUEnrichment(w/o)4.26.0Figure3.7.13-1FuelAssemblyBurnupLimitsinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-31DraftB SecondarySpecificActivity3.7.143.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityLCO3.7.14Thespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantshallbe(0.10pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131.APPLICABILITY:NODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Specificactivitynotwithinlimit.A.lBeinNODE3.ANDA.2BeinNODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.14.1Verifythespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantis~0.10yCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.732Draft8 HSSVsB3.7.1B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.1MainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheHSSVsistoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysystem.TheHSSVsalsoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurizingthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)byprovidingaheatsinkfortheremovalofenergyfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)ifthepreferred(butnonsafetyrelated)heat.sink,providedbythecondenserandcirculatingwatersystem,is,notavailable.FourHSSVsarelocatedoneachmainsteamheader,outside.containmentintheIntermediateBuilding,upstreamofthemainsteamisolationvalves(Ref.1).HSSVs3509,3511,3513,and3515arelocatedonthesteamgenerator(SG)AmainsteamheaderwhileHSSVs3508,3510,3512and3514arelocatedontheSGBmainsteamheader.TheHSSVsaredesignedtolimitthesecondarysystemto~110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignflow.TheMSSVdesignincludesstaggeredsetpointssothatonlytheneededvalveswillactuate.Staggeredsetpointsreducethepotentialforvalvechatteringthatisduetosteampressureinsufficienttofullyopenallvalvesfollowingaturbine/reactortrip.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheHSSVsistolimitthesecondarysystempressureto~110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignsteamflow.Thisdesignbasisissufficienttocopewithanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)oraccidentconsideredintheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysis.TheeventsthatchallengetherelievingcapacityoftheHSSVs,andthusRCSpressure,arethosecharacterizedasdecreasedRCSheatremovalevents(Ref.2).Ofthese,thefullpowerlossofexternalloadeventisthelimitingAOO.ThiseventalsoresultsinthelossofnormalfeedwaterflowtotheSGs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-1DraftB HSSVsB3.7.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thetransientresponseforalossofexternalloadeventwithouta'irectreactortrip(i.e.,lossofloadwhen<50/RTP)presentsnohazardtotheintegrityoftheRCSortheHainSteamSystem.Fortransientsatpowerlevels>50/,theeffectonRCSsafetylimitsisevaluatedwithnocredittakenforthepressurerelievingcapabilityofpressurizerspray,thesteamdumpsystem,andtheSGatmosphericreliefvalves.Thereactoristrippedonhighpressurizerpr'essurewiththepressurizersafetyvalvesandHSSVsrequiredtobeopenedtomaintaintheRCSandMainSteamSystemwithin110/oftheirdesignvalues.TheMSSVsareassumedtohavetwoactiveandonepassivefailuremodes.Theactivefailuremodesarespuriousopening(asaninitiatingeventonly),andfailuretorecloseonceopened.Thepassivefailure.modeisfailuretoopenupondemandwhichisnotconsideredintheaccidentanalyses.TheHSSVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.~ceoTheaccidentanalysisrequiresfourHSSVspersteamgeneratortoprovideoverpressureprotectionfordesignbasistransientsoccurringat102/RTP.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdefinedastheabilityto"openwithinthesetpointtolerances,rel'ieveSGoverpressure,andreseatwhenpressurehasbeenreduced.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdeterminedbyperiodicsurveillancetestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Theliftsettings,accordingtoSR3.7.1.1intheaccompanyingLCO,correspondtoambientconditionsofthevalveatnominaloperatingtemperatureandpressure.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSSVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinachallengetotheRCPBorsecondarysystem.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-2(continued)DraftB HSSVsB3.7.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,arid3,fourHSSVsperSGarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheRCSremainswithinitspressuresafetylimitandthatthesecondarysystem,fromtheSGstothemainsteamisolationvalves,islimitedtos110%ofdesignpressureforallDBAs.CInNODES4and5,therearenocredibletransientsrequiringtheMSSVs.TheSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremovalinMODES5and6,andthuscannotbeoverpressurized;thereisnorequirementfortheHSSVstobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.A.1WithoneormoreMSSVsinoperable,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysisforlossofexternalloadmaynolongerbevalidandthesafetyvalve(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.ThisConditionspecificallyaddr'essestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventthatanon-significantdiscrepancyrelatedtotheMSSVsisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginMODES1,2,or3.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultinalossofHSSVcapabilitytorelievesteam.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorrectionofadministrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletiontimeisbasedonengineeringjudgement.ThisConditionisnotapplicabletoasituationinwhichtheabilityofaMSSVtoopenorrecloseisquestionable.Inthisevent,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandConditionBofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedduringHODES1,2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-3DraftB MSSVs83.7.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IftheHSSV(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsbytheverificationofeachHSSVliftsetpointinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.TheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.3),requiresthatsafetyandreliefvalvetestsbeperformedinaccordancewithANSI/ASMEON-1-1987(Ref.4).AccordingtoReference4,thefollowingtestsarerequired:a.Visualexamination;b.Seattightnessdetermination;c'.Setpointpressuredetermination(liftsetting);d.Compliancewithowner'sseattightnesscriteria;ande..Verificationofthebalancingdeviceintegrity'nbalancedvalves.'ITheANSI/ASHEStandardrequiresthatallvalvesbetestedevery5.years,andaminimumof20%ofthevalvesbetestedevery24months.TheASMECodespecifiestheactivitiesandfrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.ThisSRallowsa+1%and-3%setpointtoleranceforOPERABILITY;however,'thevalvesareresetto+1%duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.(contihued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-4DraftB HSSVsB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoandoperationinMODE3priortoperformingtheSR.TheHSSVsmaybeeitherbenchtestedortestedinsituathotconditionsusinganassistdevicetosimulateliftpressure.IftheHSSVsarenottestedathotconditions,theliftsettingpressureshallbecorrectedtoambientconditionsofthevalveatoperatingtemperatureandpressure.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.3.2.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.2.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.4.ANSI/ASHEOM-1-1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-5DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves83.7.2B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.2MainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesBASESBACKGROUNDTheHSIVs(3516'nd3517)isolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).HSIVclosureisnecessarytoisolateaSGaffectedbyasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventorasteamlinebreak(SLB)tostopthelossofSGinventoryandtoprotecttheintegrityoftheunaffectedSGfordecayheatremoval.TheHSIVsareairoperatedswingdiskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbyanairoperatoragainstspringpressure.TheHSIVsareinstalledtousesteamflowtoassistintheclosureofthevalve(Ref.I).AHSIVislocatedineachmainsteamlineheaderoutsidecontainmentintheIntermediateBuilding.TheHSIVsare,downstreamfromthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)andturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumpsteamsupply,toassuretheHSSVspreventoverpressureonthesecondarysideandassuresteamisavailabletotheAFWsystemfollowingHSIVclosure.ClosingtheMSIVsisolateseachSGfromtheother,andisolatestheturbine,steamdumpsystem,andotherauxiliarysteamsuppliesfromtheSGs.TheHSIVscloseonamainsteamisolationsignalgeneratedbyeitherhighcontainmentpressure,highsteamflowcoincidentwithlowT.andsafetyinjection(SI),orhigh-highsteamflowcoincidentwithSI.TheHSIVsaredesignedtoworkwithnon-returncheckvalves(3518and3519)locatedimmediatelydownstreamofeachMSIVtoprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowinga,SLB.TheHSIVsfailclosedonlossofcontroloractuationpowerandlossofinstrumentaironcetheairisbledofffromthesupplyline.TheHSIVsmayalsobe'actuatedmanually.EachHSIVhasanormallycl.osedmanualHSIVbypassvalve.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-6(continued)DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThe,designbasisoftheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesisestablishedbythelargeSLB(Ref.2).TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity.TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHSIVontheintactSGforthiscaseisassumedtoclosetopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.TheSLBforcontainmentintegrity'isevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolantmaximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Duetothenon-returncheckvalveonthefaultedSG,reverseflowfromthesteamheadersdownstreamoftheHSIVandfromtheintactSGispreventedfromcontributingtotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.Thischeckvalveisapassivedevicewhichisnotassumedtofail.SLBsoutsideofcontainmentcanoccurintheIntermediateBuildinganddownstreamoftheHSIVsintheTurbineBuilding.ASLBinpiping>6inchesdiameterintheIntermediateBuildingisnotrequiredtobeconsideredduetoanaugmentedpipinginspectionprogram(Ref.3).ForaSLBintheTurbinebuilding,theHSIVsonbothSGsmustclosetoisolatethebreakandterminatetheevent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-7DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheHSIVsarealsocreditedinaSGTRtomanuallyisolatetheSGwiththerupturedtube.Inadditiontominimizingtheradiologicalreleases,thisassiststheoperatorinisolatingtheRCSflowthroughtherupturedSGbypreventingtheSGfromcontinuingtodepressurizeandcreatingahigherpressuredifferencebetweenthesecondarysystemandtheprimarysystem.TheHSIVsarealsoconsideredinotherDBAssuchasthefeedwaterlinebreakinwhichclosureoftheHSIVontheintactSGmaximizestheeffectofthebreaksincetheenergyremovalcapabilityoftheintactSGwouldbereducedwithrespecttolongtermheatremoval.InadditiontoprovidingisolationofafaultedSGduringaSLB,feedwaterlinebreak,oraSGTR,theHSIVsalsoserveasacontainmentisolationboundary.TheHSIVsarethesecondcontainmentisolationboundaryforthemainsteamlinepenetrationswhichusethesteamlinesandSGsinsidecontainmentasthefirstboundary.TheHSIVsdonotreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignalsinceaspurioussignalcouldresultinasignificantplanttransient.TheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattwoHSIVsand'thenon-returncheckvalvesinthesteam.linesbeOPERABLE.TheHSIVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheirisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignal.AHSIVmustalsobecapableofisolatingaSGforcontainmentisolationpurposes.Thenon-returncheckvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofclosing.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalveswillperformtheirdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigate.theconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoffsiteexposurescomparabletothe10CFR100(Ref.4)limits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-8(continued)DraftB MSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheMSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenthereissignificantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGstochallengetheintegrityofcontainment,orallowatransienttoapproachDNBRlimits.WhentheMSIVsareclosedandde-activatedinMODES2and3,theyarealreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunctionandtheMSIVsandtheirassociatednon-returncheckvalvesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEperthisLCO.InMODE4,theMSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesarenormallyclosed,andtheRCSandSGenergyislow.InMODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;therefore,theMSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialmainsteampipebreaksintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.A.11WithoneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromaSGinMODEI,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.Somerepairstothesevalvescanbemadewiththeplantunderhotconditions.The8hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireaclosureoftheMSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesandtheabilitytoisolatetheaffectedSGbyturbinestopvalves.The8hourCompletionTimeisgreaterthanthatnormallyallowedforcontainmentisolationboundariesbecausetheMSIVsarevalvesthatisolateaclosedsystempenetratingcontainment.Thesevalvesdifferfrommostothercontainmentisolationboundariesinthattheclosedsystemprovidesanadditionalmeansforcontainmentisolation.FailureofthisclosedsystemcanonlyresultfromaSGTRwhichisnotpostulatedtooccurwithanyotherDBA(e.g.,LOCA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-9DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONS(continued)B.IIftheHSIVand/ornon-returncheckvalvefromaSGcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinNODE2within6hoursandConditionCwouldbeentered.TheCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE2inanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1andC.2SincetheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvearerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES2and3,theinoperablevalve(s)mayeitherberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheassociatedHSIVclosed.Whenclosed,theHSIVsarealreadyinthepositionrequiredbytheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisandthenon-returncheckvalveisnolongerrequired.The8hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththatallowedinConditionA.For'noperabl,evalvesthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,buttheassociatedHSIVisclosed,theHSIVmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasistobeclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofHSIVstatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareintheclosedposition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-10DraftB

HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheHSIVsand/ornon-returncheckvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheassociatedHSIVisnotclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedatleastinHODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromHODE2conditionsinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1IfoneormorevalvesintheflowpathfromeachSGareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesareinoperablesuchthatatleastonevalveisinoperableineachofthetwomainsteamflowpaths.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.7.2.1ThisSRverifiesthatHSIVclosuretimeis~5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.TheHSIVsareswing-diskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbytheirairoperatorsagainstspringpressure.OncetheHSIVsbegintocloseduringhotconditions,thesteamflowwillassistthevalveclosuresuchthattestingundernoflowandnoloadconditionsisconservative.The5secondclosuretimeisconsistentwiththeexpectedresponsetimeforinstrumentationassociatedwiththeHSIVandtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinNODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-11DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.2.2ThisSRverifiesthateachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.Asthenon-returncheckvalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.7.2.3ThisSRverifiesthateachMSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.TheHSIVsshouldnotbetestedatpower,sinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosureandplanttransientwhentheplantisaboveHODE4.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODES1,2and3.ThefrequencyofMSIVtestingisevery24months.The24monthFrequencyfortestingisbasedontherefuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section5.4.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.3.UFSAR,Section3.6.2.5.1.4.10CFR100.11.5.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-12DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.383.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.3HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs),AssociatedBypassValves,andMainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheMFRVs(4269and4270)andtheirassociatedbypassvalves(4271and4272),andHFPDVs(3977and3976)isolatemain~feedwater(HFW)flowtothesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThesafetyrelatedfunctionoftheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVsistoprovideforisolationofHFWflowtothesecondarysideoftheSGsterminatingtheDBAforlinebreaksoccurringdownstreamofthevalves.ClosureeffectivelyterminatestheadditionoffeedwatertoanaffectedSG,limitingthemassandenergyreleaseforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)orfeedwaterlinebreaks(FWLBs)insidecontainment,andreducingthecooldowneffectsforSLBs.TheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andMFPDVsinconjunctionwithcheckvalveslocateddownstreamoftheisolationvalvesalsoprovideapressureboundaryforthecontrolledadditionofauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)totheintactSG(seeFigureB3.7.3-1).OneHFPDV,islocatedintheTurbineBuildingonthedischargelineofeachHFWpump(Ref.1).OneHFRVandassociatedbypassvalveislocatedoneachMFWlinetoitsrespectiveSG,outsidecontainmentintheTurbineBuilding.TheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPVsarelocatedupstreamoftheAFWinjectionpointsothatAFWmaybesuppliedtotheSGsfollowingclosureoftheMFRVsandbypassvalves.ThepipingvolumefromthesevalvestotheSGsisaccountedforincalculatingmassandenergyreleases,andmustberefilledpriortoAFWreachingtheSGfollowingeitheranSLBorFWLB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-13DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheMFPDVclosesontheopeningoftheMFWpumpbreakerwhichoccursonreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignaloranyothersignalwhichtripsthepumpbreaker.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvescloseonreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,aSGhighlevelsignal,oronareactortripwithT,,<554'FwiththeassociatedHFRVinauto.Allvalvesmayalsobeactuatedmanually.InadditiontotheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalvesandHFPDVs,acheckvalvelocatedoutsidecontainmentforeachfeedwaterlineisavailable.Thecheckvalveisolatesthefeedwaterlinepenetratingcontainmentprovidingacontainmentisolationboundary.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVsisestablishedbytheanalysesfortheSLB.TheSLBisevaluated,fortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity(Ref.2).TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHFRVandbypassvalveontheintactSGforthiscaseareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.Thefailureofeitherofthese.valvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdown'ftheHFWpumps,whichhavetheirbreakersopenedbyaSIsignal,andtheHFPDVwhichcloseonopeningoftheHFWpumpbreakers.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.'7-14DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs83.7.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolant,maximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TheHFRVandbypassvalveonthefaultedSGareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventcontinuedcontributiontotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumpsandclosureoftheHFPDVs.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvesarealsocreditedforisolationinthefeedwatertransientanalyses(e.g.,increaseinfeedwaterflow).ThesevalvescloseoneitherasafetyinjectionorhighSGlevelsignaldependingonthescenario.ThevalvesalsomustcloseonaFWLBtolimittheamountofadditionalmassandenergydeliveredtotheSGsandcontainment.ThefailureoftheHFRVstocontrolflowisalsoconsideredasaninitiatingevent.ThisincludesconsiderationofavalvefailurecoincidentwithanatmosphericreliefvalvefailuresinceasinglecomponentintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)controlsbothcomponents(Ref.3).ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttoONBsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbytheSLBaccident.TheHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-15(continued)DraftB IBASES(continued)MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs83,7.3LCOThisLCOensuresthattheMFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVswillisolateNFWflowtotheSGs,followingaFWLBorSLB.ThisLCOrequiresthattwoMFPDVs,twoHFRVs,andtwoHFRVbypassvalvesbeOPERABLE.TheNFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andMFPDVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignal.FailuretomeettheLCOrequirementscanresultinadditionalmassandenergybeingreleasedtocontainmentfollowinganSLBorFWLBinsidecontainment.Itmayalsoresultintheintroductionofwaterintothemainsteamlinesforanexcessfeedwaterflowevent.APPLICABILITYTheHFRVs,associatedbypass,andHFPDVsvalvesmustbeOPERABLEwheneverthereissignificantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGs.Thisensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremaintained.InMODESI,2,and3,theHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtolimittheamountofavailablefluidthatcouldbeaddedtocontainmentinthecaseofasecondarysystempipebreakinsidecontainment.Whenthevalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalvesuchthatbothSGsareisolatedfrombothHFWpumps,theyarealreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunctionandnolongerrequiredtobeOPERABLE.InMODE4,theHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andMFPDVsarenormallyclosedsinceAFWisprovidingdecayheatremovalduetothelowSGenergylevel.InNODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;t'herefore,theHFRVs,associatedbypassvalves,andHFPDVsarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialpipebreaksintheseMODES.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-16(continued)DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionen'tryisallowedforeachvalve.A.landA.2WithoneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hou'rCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFPDVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The7dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailablein.thecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.B.landB.2WithoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,ortocloseorisolatetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,based.onoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosedorisolated.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The7dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-17DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2WithoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,ortocloseorisolatetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRYbypassvalvethatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosedorisolated.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.D.land0.2IftheMFRV,associatedbypassvalve,orMFPDVcannotbe.restoredtoOPERABLEstatusorclosedwithin24hoursorcannotbeverifiedclosedonceper31days,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-18DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)IfoneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreMFRV(s),oroneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)areinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHFRVs,associatedbypass,valves,orHFPDVsareinoperablesuchthataHFWpump,condensatepump,orcondensateboosterpumpcanprovideunisolableflowtooneorbothSGs(seeFigureB3.7.3-1).SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.3.1ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachMFPDViss80secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal(i.e.,fromopeningofHFWpumpbreakers).Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI,(Ref.4)requirementsduringoperationinMODESI,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-19DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVsB3.7.3(BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7;3.2ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachMFRVandassociatedbypassvalveisz10secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.4),requirementsduringoperationinMODES1,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.4.5.3.2.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.4.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-20DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3Ck$50nm~)ClK~I~QInIa8'8eoOeaje'HII~I4lOOOglJ8JIBeevcFigureB3.7.3-1HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValvesandHFPDVsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-21DraftB ARVsB3.7.4B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThereisanARV(3410and3411)locatedonthemainsteamheaderfromeachsteamgenerator(SG).TheARVsareprovidedwithupstreamblockvalvestopermittheirbeingtestedatpower,andtoprovideanalternatemeansofisolation.TheARVshavetwofunctions(Ref.1):a.providesecondarysystemoverpressureprotectionbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSVs);and.b.provideamethodforcoolingtheplantshouldthepreferredheatsinkviathesteamdumpsystemtothecondensernotbeavailable.TheaccidentanalysesdonotcrediteitherofthesefunctionssincetheARVsdonothaveasafety-relatedsourceofmotiveairandtheaccidentanalysesdonottypicallyrequirecooldowntotheresidualheatremovalentryconditionssincetheplantwasoriginallydesignedtomaintainHotShutdownconditionsindefinitely.Theonlyexceptioniswithrespecttosteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventswhichrequiretheuseofatleastoneARVtoprovideheatremovalfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)topreventsaturationconditionsfrom'eveloping.TheARVsareairoperatedvalveslocatedintheIntermediateBuildingwithareliefcapacityof329,000ibm/hreach(approximately5%ofRTP).TheARVsarenormallyclosed,failclosedvalveswhichreceivemotiveairfromtheinstrumentairsystem.Thevalvescanalsoreceivemotiveairfromanon-seismicbackupnitrogenbottlebanksystem.Thevalvesareequippedwithpneumaticcontrollerstopermitcontrolofthecooldownrate.TheARVsarenormallycontrolledbytheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)butcanalsoberemotemanuallyoperatedandopenedlocallybyuseofhandwheelslocatedonthevalves.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-22(continued)Draft8 ARVs83.7.4BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheARVsisestablishedbytheSGTRevent(Ref.2).Forthisaccidentscenario,theoperatorisrequiredtoperformalimitedcooldowntoestablishadequatesubcoolingasanecessarysteptoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowintotherupturedSG.FollowingaSGTR,theNSSVswillmaintainthesecondarysystempressureatapproximately1085psigwhichcouldresultinthelossofsubcoolingmarginsincetheRCSaveragetemperatureisattemptingtostabilizeatapproximately547'F.TheARVsareusedduringthefirst30to60minutesoftheSGTRtocontinuetheRCScooldowninanefforttoreduce,andeventuallyterminate,theprimarytosecondarysystemflowintherupturedSG.Theinabilitytocooldowncouldresultininadequatesubcoolingmarginwhichwoulddelaytheterminationoftheleakagethroughtherupturedtube.TheopeningoftheARVsisalsoconsideredcoincidentwithafailureofamainfeedwaterregulatingvalve(Ref.3)sinceasinglecomponentintheADFCScontrolsbothcomponents.ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttodeparturefromnucleateboilingsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbythesteamlinebreakaccident.TheARVsareequippedwithblockvalvesintheeventtheARVspuriouslyfails.toopenorfailstocloseduringuse.TheARVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement,LCOTwoARVsandtheirassociatedmanualblockvalvesarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.TheARVsarerequiredformanualoperationeitherlocally(usingthehandwheelorlocalpanel)orremotelytorelievemain'teampressure.TheARVblockvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtoisolateafailedopenARV.AclosedblockvalvedoesnotrenderitoritsARVlineinoperableifoperatoractiontimetoopentheblockvalvecanbeaccomplishedwithinthetimeframesspecifiedbelow.FailuretomeettheLCOcanresultintheinabilitytocooltheplantfollowingaSGTReventinwhichthecondenserisunavailableforuse'withthesteamdumpsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-23DraftB ARVs83.7.4BASESLCO(continued)AnARVlineisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitiscapableofbeingmanuallyopenedwithin20minutesofdeterminingtheneedtoutilizetheARVfollowingaSGTR.TheARVlinemustalsobecapableofclosingwithin15minutesintheeventtheARVspuriouslyopensontheSGwiththerupturedtube.Finally,theARVlinemustbecapableofclosingwithin5minutesintheeventthattheARVontheintactSGfailstoclosefollowinginitiationofacooldown.Fortheclosurerequirements,eithertheARVoritsassociatedblockvalvemaybecreditedforOPERABILITY.APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinNODE3withRCSaveragetemperatureo.500'F,theARVlinesarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.InMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500F,andinMODE4,theARVsarenotrequiredsincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftsettingsoftheMSSVs.InMODE5or6,anSGTRisnotacredibleeventsincethewaterintheSGsisbelowtheboilingpointandRCSpressureislow.ACTIONSA.lWithoneARVlineinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestorethevalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsfortheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheremainingOPERABLEARVlineandanonsafetygradebackupinthesteamdumpsystem.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.4doesnotapplysincethesteamdumpsystemwouldnormallybeinserviceduringlowerHODESofoperationandcanprovideanacceptablealternativetotheinoperableARVline.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-24DraftB ARVsB3'.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lIftheARVlinecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500Fwithin8hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothARVlinesareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalysesforaSGTRevent;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.4.1ToperformacooldownoftheRCS,theARVsmustbeabletobeopenedeitherremotelyorlocally.ThisSRensuresthattheARVsaretestedthroughafullcontrolcycleatleastonceperfuelcycle.PerformanceofinservicetestingoruseofanARVduringaplantcooldownmaysatisfythisrequirement.Operatingexperiencehasshown'thatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.TheFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.4.2ThefunctionoftheblockvalveistoisolateafailedopenARV.Cyclingtheblockvalvebothclosedandopendemonstratesitscapabilitytoperformthisfunction.Performanceofinservicetestingoruseoftheblockvalveduringplantcooldownmaysatisfythisrequirement.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponents'usuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.TheFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-25(continued)DraftB ARVsB3.7.4BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.3.2.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-26DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheAFWSystemsuppliesfeedwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)toremovedecayheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)uponthelossofnormalfeedwatersupply.TheSGsfunctionasaheatsinkforcoredecayheat.TheheatloadisdissipatedbyreleasingsteamtotheatmospherefromtheSGsviathemainsteamsafetyvalves'HSSVs)oratmosphericreliefvalves.Ifthemaincondenserisavailable,steammaybereleasedviathesteamdumpvalves.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwoseparatesystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFW)System(Ref.I).~AFWSstemThepreferredAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenAFW(HDAFW)pumpsandoneturbinedrivenAFW(TDAFW)pump.configuredintothreeseparatetrainswhicharealllocatedintheIntermediateBuilding(seeFigureB3.7.5-1).EachHDAFWtrainprovides100%ofAFWflowcapacity,andtheTDAFWpumpprovides200%oftherequiredcapacitytotheSGs,asassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thepumpsareequippedwithindependentrecirculationlinestothecondensatestoragetanks(CSTs).EachHDAFWtrainispoweredfromanindependentClassIEpowersupplyandfeedsoneSG,althougheachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGviacross-tielinescontainingnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4000Aand.4000B).ThetwoMDAFWtrainswillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalineitherSG,openingofthemainfeedwater(HFW)pumpbreakers,asafetyinjection(SI)signal,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(AHSAC).Thepumpscanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.(continued),R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-27DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheTDAFWpumpreceivessteamfromeachmainsteamlineupstreamofthetwomainsteamisolationvalves.Eitherofthesteamlineswillsupply100%oftherequirementsoftheTDAFWpump.TheTDAFWpumpsuppliesacommonheadercapableoffeedingbothSGsbyuseoffail-open,air-operatedcontrolvalves'(4297and4298).TheTDAFWpumpwillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalinbothSGs,lossofvoltageon4160VBusesllAand11B,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(AMSAC).Thepumpcanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.ThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemistheCSTswhicharelocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding.TheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8)canalsobeusedtosupplyasafety-relatedsourceofwater.throughnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4013,4027,and4028)whichsupplyeachAFWtrain.~PTheSAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenpumpsconfiguredintotwoseparatetrains(seeFigureB3.7.5-2).EachmotordrivenSAFWtrainprovides100%oftheAFWflowcapacityasassumedintheaccidentanalysesandsuppliesoneSGthroughtheuseofanormallyopenmotor-operatedstopcheckvalve.EachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGvianormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9703Aand9703B).EachpumpispoweredfromanindependentClassIEpowersupplyandcanbepoweredfromthedieselgeneratorsprovidedthatthebreakerfortheassociatedMDAFWpumpisopened.Thesafety-relatedsourceofwaterfortheSAFWSystemistheSWSystemthroughtwonormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9629Aand9629B).Condensatecanalsobesuppliedbya'10,000galloncondensatetesttankandtheyardfirehydrantyardloop.TheSAFWSystemismanuallyactuatedintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemhasfailedduetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding,aseismicorfire.event.TheSAFWtrainsarelocatedintheSAFWPumpBuildinglocatedadjacenttotheAuxiliaryBuilding.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-28DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheSAFWPumpBuildingenvironmentiscontrolledbyroomcoolerswhicharesuppliedbythesameSWheaderasthepumptrains.Thesecoolersarerequiredwhentheoutsideairtemperatureis~80'FtoensuretheSAFWPumpBuildingremainss120'Fduringaccidentconditions.The,AFWSystemisdesignedtosupplysufficientwatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatwithSGpressureatthelo'westHSSVsetpressureplus1%.Subsequently,theAFWSystemsuppliessufficientwatertocooltheplanttoRHRentryconditions,withsteamreleasedthroughtheARVs.APPLICABLEThedesignbasisoftheAFWSystemistosupplywatertotheSAFETYANALYSES.SG(s)toremovedecayheatandotherresidualheatbydeliveringatleasttheminimumrequiredflowratetotheSGsatpressurescorrespondingtothelowestHSSVsetpressureplus1%.TheAFWSystemmitigatestheconsequencesofanyeventwiththelossofnormalfeedwater.ThelimitingDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)andtransientsfortheAFWSystemareas,follows(Ref.2):FeedwaterLineBreak(FWLB);b.LossofHFW(withandwithoutoffsitepower);C.SteamLineBreak(SLB);d.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);e.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR);andExternalevents(tornadosandseismicevents).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-29DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheAFWSystemdesignissuchthatanyoftheaboveDBAscanbemitigatedusingthepreferredAFWSystemorSAFWSystem.FortheFWLB,SLB,andexternaleventsDBAs(itemsa,c,andf),theworstcasescenarioisthelossofallthreepreferredAFWtrainsduetoaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuilding,orafailureoftheIntermediateBuildingblockwalls.Forthesethreeevents,theuseoftheSAFWSystemwithin10minutesisassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.SinceasinglefailuremustalsobeassumedinadditiontotheHELBorexternalevent,thecapabilityoftheSAFWSystemtosupplyflowtoanintactSGcouldbecompromisediftheSAFWcross-tieisnotavailable.ForHELBswithincontainment,useofeithertheSAFWSystemortheAFWSystemtotheintactSGisassumedwithin10minutes.FortheSGTRevents(iteme),theaccidentanalysesassumethatoneAFWtrainisavailableuponaSIsignalorlow-lowSGlevelsignal.AdditionalinventoryisbeingaddedtotherupturedSGasaresultoftheSGTRsuchthatAFWflowisnotacriticalfeatureforthisDBA.ForthelossofHFWeventsandsmallbreakLOCA(itemsbandd),twotrainsofAFWareassumedavailable(i.e.,twoHDAFWtrainsortheTDAFWtrain)uponalow-lowSGlevelsignalandSIsignal,respectively.TwoAFWtrainsareassumedavailablesincenosinglefailurecanresultinthelossof"morethanoneAFWtrain.ThelossofHFWisaCondition2event(Ref.3)whichplaceslimitsontheresponseoftheRCSfromthetransient(e.g.,nochallengetothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisallowed).TwotrainsofAFWarerequiredtomaintaintheselimits.ThesmallbreakLOCAanalysisrequirestwotrainsofAFWtolowerRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-30DraftB AFWSystem83.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Inadditionto.itsaccidentmitigationfunction,theenergyandmassadditioncapabilityoftheAFWSystemisalsoconsideredwithrespecttoHELBswithincontainment.ForSLBsandFWLBswithincontainment,pumprunoutfromallthreeAFWpumpsisassumedfor10minutesuntiloperationscanisolatetheflowbytrippingtheAFWpumpsorbyclosingtherespectivepumpdischargeflowpath(s).Therefore,the.motoroperateddischargeisolationvalvesforthemotorHDAFWpumptrains(4007and4008)aredesignedtolimitflowto<230gpm.TheTDAFWtrainisassumedtobeatrunoutconditions(i.e.,600gpm).TheAFWSystemsatisfiestherequirementsofCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheAFWSystemwillperformitsdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorcontainment.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwosystemswhichareconfiguredintofivetrains.TheAFWSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhen.thecomponentsandflowpathsrequiredtoprovi'deredundantAFWflowtotheSGsareOPERABLE(seeFiguresB3.7.5-1and3.7.5-2).ThisrequiresthatthefollowingbeOPERABLE:a.b.TwoNDAFWtrainstakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andcapableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGwith~200gpmand~230gpmtotalflow;TheTDAFWtraintakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),providedsteamisavailablefrombothmainsteamlinesupstreamoftheHSIVs,andcapableofsupplyingbothSGswith~200gpmeach;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-31DraftB AFWSystem83.7.5BASESLCO(continued)C.TwomotordrivenSAFWtrainscapableofbeinginitiatedeitherlocallyorfromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes,takingsuctionfromtheSWSystem,andsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGandtheoppositeSGthroughtheSAFWcross-tielinewith~200gpm.Thepiping,,valves,instrumentation,andcontrolsintherequiredflowpathsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLE.TheTDAFWtrainiscomprisedofacommonpumpandtwoflowpaths.ATDAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.ThefailureofthepumporbothflowpathsrenderstheTDAFWtraininoperable.Thecross-tielineforthepreferredNDAFWpumpsisnotrequiredforthisLCO.TherecirculationlinesforthepreferredAFWsystemandSAFWsystempumpsarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysisandarealsonotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheNSSVsmaintaintheSGpressurebelowthepump'sshutoffhead.TheSAFWPumpBuildingroomcoolersarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwhentheoutsideairtemperatureis~80'F.Ifoneroomcoolerisinoperable,theassociatedSAFWtrainisinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheeventthatitiscalledupontofunctionwhentheNFWSystemislost.Inaddition,theAFWSystemisrequiredtosupplyenoughmakeupwatertoreplacethelost*SGsecondaryinventory'astheplantcoolstoNODE4conditions.InNODE4,5,or6,theSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremoval,andtheAFWSystemisnotrequired.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-32(continued)DraftB AFWSystem83.7.5BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lIfoneoftheTDAFMtrainflowpathsisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheflowpathtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonthefollowingreasons:a.'heredundantOPERABLEturbinedrivenAFWpumpflowpath;b.TheavailabilityofredundantOPERABLEMDAFWandSAFWpumpspandc.Thelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringthatrequiresthe,inoperableTDAFWpumpflowpath.ATDAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.B.lIfoneNDAFMtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonthefollowingreasons:a.TheredundantOPERABLEHDAFWtrain;b..TheavailabilityofredundantOPERABLETDAFWandSAFWpumps;andc.ThelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringthatrequirestheinoperableNDAFWtrain.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-33Draft8 AFWSystemB3,7.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1WiththeTDAFWtraininoperable,orbothHDAFWtrainsinoperable,or'neTDAFWtrainflowpathandoneHDAFWtraininoperabletooppositeSGs,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.IftheinoperableHDAFWtrainsuppliesthesameSGastheinoperableTDAFWflowpath,ConditionDmustbeentered.ThecombinationoffailureswhichrequiresentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossof'onetrain(oroneflowpath)ofpreferredAFWcoolingtoeachSGsuchthatredundancyislost.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.D.1WithallAFWtrainstooneorbothSGsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastonetrainorTDAFWflowpathtoeachaffectedSGtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.ThecombinationoffailureswhichrequireentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossofpreferredAFWcoolingtoatleastoneSG.IfaSGTRweretooccurinthiscondition,preferredAFWispotentiallyunavailabletotheunaffectedSG.IfAFWisunavailabletobothSGs,theaccidentanalysesforsmallbreakLOCAsandlossofHFWwouldnotbemet.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-34DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESACTIONSD.1(continued)ThetwoHDAFWtrainsofthepreferredAFWSystemarenormallyusedfordecayheatremovalduringlowpoweroperationssinceairoperatedbypasscontrolvalvesareinstalledineachtraintobettercontrolSGlevel(seeFigureB3.7.5-1).Sinceafeedwatertransientismorelikelyduringreducedpowerconditions,4hoursisprovidedtorestoreatleastonetrainofadditionalpreferredAFWbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.ThiswillalsoprovidetimetofindacondensatesourceotherthantheSWSystemfortheSAFWSystemifallthreeAFWtrainsareinoperable.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.E.1WithoneSAFWtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin14days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneofthetwoSAFWcross-tievalveswhich,requiresdeclaringtheassociatedSAFWtraininoperable(e.g.,failureof9703BwouldresultindeclaringSAFWtrainDinoperable).The14dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseofthe.SAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.F.lWithbothSAFWtrainsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftheSAFWcross-tie.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-35DraftB 00 AFWSystem83.7.5BASESACTIONS(continued)G.landG.2WhenRequiredActionA.I,B.I,C.I,D.I,E.I,orF.IcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.H.lIfallthreepreferredAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsareinoperabletheplantisinaseriouslydegradedconditionwithnosafetyrelatedmeansforconductingacooldown,andonlylimitedmeansforconductingacooldownwithnonsafetyrelatedequipment.Insuchacondition,theplantshouldnotbeperturbedbyanyaction,includingapowerchange,thatmightresultinatrip.Theseriousnessofthisconditionrequiresthatactionbestartedimmediatelyto.restoreoneMDAFW,TDAFW,orSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ForthepurposesofthisRequiredAction,onlyoneTDAFWtrainflowpathandthepumpmustberestoredtoexitthisCondition.RequiredActionH.IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatallrequiredMODEchangesorpowerreductionsaresuspendeduntiloneMDAFW,TDAFW,orSAFWtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Inthiscase,LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablebecauseitcouldforcetheplantintoalesssafecondition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-36(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.5.1Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheAFWandSAFWSystemwaterandsteamsupplyflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforAFWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,or-otherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3.7.5.2PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASME,SectionXI(Ref.4)detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASMEcode.SectionXIoftheASMEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredtobemetpriortoenteringMODE1fortheTDAFWpumpsincesuitabletestconditions'avenotbeenestablished.Thisdeferralisrequiredbecausethereisinsufficientsteampressuretoperformthetest.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-37DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.5.3PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachSAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASME,SectionXI(Ref.4)detects'trendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.BecauseitisundesirabletointroduceSWintotheSGswhiletheyareoperating,thistestingisperformedusingthetestcondensatetank.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASMEcode.SectionXIoftheASMEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.SR3.7.5.4ThisSRverifiesthateachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheSWSystem(4013,4027,4028,9629A,and9629B),eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedvalve'4007,4008,9704A,9704B,and9746),andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve(9703Aand9703B)canbeoperatedwhenrequired.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.4).SR3.7.5.5ThisSRverifiesthatAFWcanbedeliveredtotheappropriateSGintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignal,bydemonstratingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandthedesignreliabilityoftheequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-38DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.5.6ThisSRverifiesthattheAFWpumpswillstartintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignal'bydemonstratingthateachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonthepotentialneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredtobemetpriortoenteringHODE1fortheTDAFWpumpsincesuitabletestconditionsmayhavenotbeenestablished.Thisdeferralisrequiredbecausethereisinsufficientsteampressuretoperformthetest.SR3.7.5.7IThisSRverifiesthattheSAFWSystemcanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.TheSAFWSystemisassumedtobemanuallyinitiatedwithin10minutesintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedatpower.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.5.2.UFSARChapter15.'.4.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedMaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.hASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-39DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.54PgR8HRpOlh~I~JgaCOWbji0fCprsO.9a~gIpFigureB3.7.5-1PreferredAFWSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-40DraftB '~, AFWSystemB3.7.5POiOaO64lCI8Cha9gNRIV~CIFigureB3.7.5-2StandbyAFWSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.7-41Draft8 CSTs83.7.6B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheCSTsprovideasourceofwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)forremovingdecayandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).TheCSTprovidesapassiveflowofwater,bygravity,tothepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System(LCO3.7.5)(seeFigure83.7.5-1).TheresultingsteamproducedintheSGsisreleasedtotheatmospherebythemainsteamsafetyvalvesortheatmosphericreliefvalves.Whenthemainsteamisolationvalvesareopen,thepreferredmeansofheatremovalfromtheRCSistodischargesteamtothecondenserbythenonsafetygradepathofthesteamdumpvalves.ThecondensedsteamisthenreturnedtotheSGsbythemainfeedwatersystem.Thishastheadvantageofconservingcondensatewhileminimizingreleasestotheenvironment.ITherearetwo30,000gallonCSTslocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding(Ref.I).TheCSTsarenotconsideredsafetyrelatedcomponentssincethetanksarenotprotectedagainstearthquakesorothernaturalphenomena,includingmissiles.ThesafetyrelatedsourceofcondensatefortheAFWandStandbyAFWSystemsistheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8).TheCSTsareconnectedbyacommonheaderwhichleadstothesuctionofallthreeAFW'umps.AsingleleveltransmitterisprovidedforeachCST(LT-2022AandLT-2022B).TheCSTscanberefilledfromthecondenserhotwellortheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetank.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSTsprovidecoolingwatertoremovedecayheatandtocooldowntheplantfollowingalleventsintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2)whichassumesthatthepreferredAFWSystemisavailableimmediatelyfollowinganaccident.For.anyeventinwhichAFWis.notrequiredforatleast10minutesfollowingtheaccident,theSWSystemprovidesthesourceofcoolingwatertoremovedecayheat.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-42DraftB

CSTsB3.7.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forthecondensatevolumeisthelossofnormalfeedwatereventandsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)(Ref.2).Forthelossofnormalfeedwaterevent,flowfromatleasttwoAFWpumpsisrequireduponalowlevelsignalineitherSGtomeettheacceptancecriteriaforaCondition2event(Ref.3).ForthesmallbreakLOCA,twoAFWpumpsarerequiredtolowertheRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadofthesafetyinjectionpumps.AssumingthatallthreeAFWpumpsinitiateattheirmaximumflowrate,theCSTsprovidesufficientinventoryforatleast20minutes(atgreaterthanrequiredflowrates)beforeoperatoractiontorefilltheCSTsortransfersuctiontotheSWSystemisrequired.AnonlimitingeventconsideredinCSTinventory.determinationsisamainfeedwaterlinebreakinsidecontainment.Thisbreakhasthepotentialfordumpingcondensateuntilterminatedbyoperatoractionafter10minutessincethereisnoautomaticre-configurationoftheAFWSystem.FollowingterminationoftheAFWflowtotheaffectedSGbyclosingtheAFWtraindischargevalvesorstoppingapump,flowfromtheremainingAFWtrainortheSAFWSystemisdirectedtotheintactSGfordecayheatremoval.ThislossofcondensateispartiallycompensatedforbytheretentionofinventoryintheintactSG.ForcooldownsfollowinglossofallonsiteandoffsiteACelectricalpower,theCSTscontainsufficientinventorytoprovideaminimumof2hoursofdecay'heatremovalasrequiredbyNUREG-0737(Ref.4),itemII.E.l.l.ThisbeyondDBArequirementprovidesmorelimitingcriteriaforCSTinventory.TheCSTssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTosatisfyaccidentanalysisassumptions,theCSTmustcontainsufficientcoolingwatertoremovedecayheatforatleast10minutesfollowingalossofHFWeventfrom102%RTP.Afterthistimeperiod,theaccidentanalysesassumethatAFWpumpsuctioncanbetransferredtothesafetyrelatedsuctionsource(i.e.,theSWSystem).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-43DraftB CSTsB3.7.6BASESLCO(continued)TherequiredCSTwatervolumeis~22,500gallons,whichisbasedontheneedtoprovideatleast2hoursofdecayheatremovalfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower.TheCSTsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenatleast22,500gallonsofwaterisavailable.The22,500galminimumvolumeismetifoneCSTis>21.5ftorifbothCSTsare~12.5ft.SincetheCSTsare30,000gallontanks,onlyoneCSTisrequiredtomeettheminimumrequiredwatervolumeforthisLCO.TheOPERABILITYoftheCSTsisdeterminedbymaintainingthetanklevelatorabovetheminimumrequiredwatervolume.APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,and3,theCSTsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupporttheAFWSystemrequirements.InMODE4,5,or6,theCSTisnotrequiredbecausetheAFWSystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ACTIONSA.landA.2IftheCSTwatervolumeisnotwithinlimits,theOPERABILITYofthebackupsupplyshouldbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithin4hours.OPERABILITYofthebackupfeedwatersupplymustincludeverificationthattheflowpathsfromthebackupwatersupplytothepreferredAFWpumpsareOPERABLEandimmediatelyavailableuponAFWinitiation,andthatthebackupsupplyhastherequiredvolumeofwateravailable.Alternatesourcesofwaterinclude,butisnotlimitedto,theSWSystemandtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatetank.Inaddition,theCSTsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,becausethebackupsupplymaybeperformingthisfunctioninadditiontoitsnormalfunctions.Continuedverificationofthebackupsupplyisnotrequiredduetothelargevolumeofwatertypicallyavailablefromthesealternatesources.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonanOPERABLEbackupwatersupplybeingavailable,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodrequiringtheCSTs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-44DraftB CST'sB3.7.6BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IfthebackupsupplycannotbeverifiedortheCSTscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.6.1ThisSRverifiesthattheCSTscontaintherequiredvolumeofcoolingwater.The22,500galminimumvolumeismetifoneCSTisz21ftorifbothCSTsare~12.5ft.The12hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheneedforoperatorawarenessofplantevolutionsthatmayaffecttheCSTinventorybetweenchecks.Also,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperator.toabnormaldeviationsintheCSTlevel.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section10.7.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-45DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheCCWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theCCWSystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.TheCCWSystemservesasabarriertothereleaseofradioactivebyproductsbetweenpotentiallyradioactivesystemsandtheServiceWater(SW)System,andthustotheenvironment.ThesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheCCWsystemarecoveredbythisLCO.TheCCWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%capacity,safetyrelatedpumpandheatexchangertrains(Ref.1)(seeFigureB3.7.7-1).EachCCWtrainconsistsofamanualsuctionanddischargevalve,apump,andadischargecheckvalve.Thetrainsdischargetoacommonheaderwhichthensuppliestwoheatexchangers,eitherofwhichcansupplythesafetyrelatedandnon-safetyrelatedcomponentscooledbyCCW.TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeofthetwoparallelheatexchangers,andcontinuesuptothefirstisolationvalveforeachcomponentsuppliedbytheCCQSystem.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachsuppliedloadtothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.EachpumpispoweredfromaseparateClass1Eelectricalbus.AnopensurgetankinthesystemprovidesforthermalexpansionandcontractionoftheCCWsystemandensuresthatsufficientnetpositivesuctionheadisavailabletothepumps.TheCCWSystemisalsoprovidedwitharadiationdetector(R-17)toisolatethesurgetankfromtheAuxiliaryBuildingenvironmentandtoprovideindicationofaleakofradioactivewaterintotheCCWSystem.TheCCWSystemisnormallymaintainedbelow100'Fby"theuseofonepumptraininconjunctionwithoneheatexchanger.ThestandbyCCWpumpwillautomaticallystartifthesystempressurefallsto50psig.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-46DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionoftheCCWSystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheResidualHeatRemoval.(RHR)System.SincetheremovalofdecayheatviatheRHRSystemisonlyperformedduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident,theCCWpumpsdonotreceiveanautomaticstartsignal.Followingthegenerationofasafetyinjectionsignal,thenormallyoperatingCCWpumpwillremaininserviceunlessanundervoltagesignalispresentoneitherClass1EelectricalBus14orBus16atwhichtimethepumpisstrippedfromitsrespectivebus.ACCWpumpcanthenbemanuallyplacedintoservicepriortoswitchingtorecirculationoperationswhichwouldnotberequireduntilaminimumof46minutesfollowinganaccident.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtrainandoneCCWheatexchangertoremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase.TheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andcontainmentmodelsforaLOCAeachconsidertheminimumperformanceoftheCCWSystem.ThenormaltemperatureoftheCCWiss100F,and,duringLOCAconditions,amaximumtemperatureof120'Fisassumed.ThispreventstheCCWSystemfromexceedingitsdesigntemperaturelimitof20'0F,andprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofcontainmentsumpfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bytheECCSpumps.TheCCWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsite'ower.TheCCWtrains,heatexchangers,andloopheadersaremanuallyplacedintoservicepriortotherecirculationphaseofanaccident(i.e.,46minutesfollowingalargebreakLOCA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-47DraftB CCWSystem83.7.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheCCWSystemcanalsofunctiontocooltheplantfromRHRentryconditions(T.,<350'F),toMODE5(T,,<200'F),duringnormalcooldownoperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350Fto200FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRtrainsoperating.SinceCCWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsindrainingtheCCWSystemwithinashortperiodoftime.TheCCWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados'heplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofCCWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornatural'circulationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem)withacceptableresults(Ref.1).LeakswithintheCCWSystemduringpostaccidentconditionscanbemitigatedbytheavailablemakeupwatersources.TheCCWSystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.ceoIntheeventofaDBA,oneCCWtrain,oneheatexchanger,andtheloopheaderisrequiredtoprovidetheminimumheatremovalcapabilityassumedinthesafetyanalysisforthesystemstowhichitsuppliescoolingwater(seeFigureB3.7.7-1).Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofCCW,twoheatexchangers;andtheloopheadermustbeOPERABLE.AtleastoneCCWtrainwilloperateassumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ACCWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthepumpisOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheader.TheautomaticstartlogicassociatedwithlowCCWsystempressureisnotrequiredforthisLCO.Inaddition,ifaCCWpumpfailsanInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead)thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperabl'ewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-48DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESLCO(continued)TheCCWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,surgetank,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwatertothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.TwoRHRheatexchangers;b.TwoRHRpumpmechanicalsealcoolersandbearingwaterjackets;c.Threesafetyinjectionpumpmechanicalsealcoolers;andd.Twocontainmentspraypumpmechanicalsealcoolers.TheCCWloopheadertemperaturemustalsobes120'FpriortotheCCWcoolingwaterreachingthefirstisolationvalvesupplyingthesecomponents.TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWheatexchangersandcontinuesuptothefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthe.lastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachoftheabovecomponentstothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.TheportionofCCWpiping,valves,instrumentationandcontrolsbetweentheisolationvalvestocomponentsathroughdaboveisaddressedbythefollowingLCOs:a.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"b.LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"c.LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled,"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-49DraftB CCWSystem83.7.7BASESLCO(continued)d.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3,"e.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4,"f.LCO3.9.3,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23Ft,"andg.LCO3.9.4,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."TheCCWpipinginsidecontainmentforthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andthereactorsupportcoolersalsoserves,asacontainmentisolationboundary.ThisisaddressedbyLCO.3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries."TheCCWsystemradiationdetector(R-17)isnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheCCWsystemoutsidecontainmentis.notrequiredtobeaclosedsystem.TheisolationofCCWfromothercomponentsorsystemsnotrequiredforsafetymayrenderthosecomponentsorsystemsinoperablebutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheCCWSystem.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theCCWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystem,whichmustbecapabletoperformitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCA.InMODE5or6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheCOWSystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,andLCO3.9.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-50(continued)DraftB

CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1IfoneCCWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECCWtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLECCWtraincouldresultinlossofCCWfunction..The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.B.lIfoneCCWheatexchangerisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin31days.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEheatexchangerisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseapassivefailureintheOPERABLECCWheatexchangercouldresultinalossofCCWfunction.The31dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofapassivefailureoftheremainingheatexchanger.C.landC.2IftheCCWtrainorCCWheatexchangercannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-51DraftB

CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESACTIONS(continued)D.lD.2andD.3WithbothCCWtrains,bothCCWheatexchangers,ortheloopheaderinoperable,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestoreOPERABLEstatustooneCCWtrain,oneCCWheatexchanger,andtheloopheader.InthisCondition,thereisnoOPERABLECCWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisalossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofCCWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantisnotrequiredtoexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,enterNODE5)untilatleastoneCCWtrain,oneCCWheatexchanger,andtheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation.RequiredActionsD.I,0.2,andD.3aremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatallrequiredMODEchanges"orpowerreductionsrequiredbyotherLCOsaresuspendeduntiloneCCWtrain,oneCCWheatexchanger,andtheloopheaderarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Inthiscase,LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablebecauseitcouldforcetheplantintoalesssafecondition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-52(continued)Draft8 CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.7.1VerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanualandpoweroperatedvalvesintheCCWflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathsexistforCCWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesevalvesareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisal.igned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositioned"areinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbased.onengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrect'alvepositions'hisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperablebutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITY,oftheCCWloopheader.SR3.7.7.2ThisSRverifiesthatthetwomotoroperatedisolationvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers(738Aand738B)canbeoperatedwhenrequiredsincethevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.2.2,2.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-53DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7~ICOclch)CgCOD.CIcIfCOCOO.cc:DlfccClIo"0"IfS\COcvCDCfI~CO00OQccxIIxCf0CD~~i880.IIIIIjl~IIDIIIDII I IIICfIfOgpL--~-I++----iJ~CO~cCDCccCOMcc~JÃ~Ifc~DlaCl~IIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIdlclCOCDCOCDSD0ccIIIIII ICI~acII II I IIcIIIIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIcICOclCl'Cf,coFigureB3.7.7-1CCWSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-54DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheSWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theSWsystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.Thesafetyre]atedfunctionsoftheSWSystemarecoveredbythisLCO.TheSWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%capacity,safetyrelatedpumptrains(Ref.1)(seeFigureB3.7.8-1).ThephysicaldesignoftheSWSystemissuchthatone100%capacitypumpfromeachclass1Eelectricalbus(Buses17and18)isarrangedonacommonpipingheaderwhichthensuppliestheSWloopheader.ForthepurposesofthisLCO,aSWtrainisbasedonelectricalsourceonly.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateClasslEelectricalbusandconsistsoftwo100%capacitypumpsandassociateddischargecheckvalvesandmanualisolationvalves.TheSWloop'headerbeginsfromthedischargeofthetrainsandsuppliesthesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbySW.Thepumpsinthesystemarenormallymanuallyaligned.Onepumpineachtrainisselectedtoautomaticallystartuponreceiptofanundervoltagesignalonitsrespectivebus.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,eachSWpumpwillautomaticallystartinapredetermined'sequence.TheSWloopheadersuppliesthecoolingwatertoallsafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.Thenonsafetyrelatedandlong-termsafetyfunctions(e.g.,componentcoolingwaterheatexchangers)canbeisolatedfromtheloopheaderthroughuseofredundantmotoroperatedisolationvalves.ThesevalvesautomaticallycloseonacoincidentsafetyinjectionsignalandundervoltagesignalonBuses14and16.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-55DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)rThesuctionsourcefortheSWSystemisthescreenhousewhichisaseismicstructurelocatedonLakeOntario.ThedischargefromtheSWSystemsuppliedloadsreturnsbacktoLakeOntario.TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheSWsystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System,providecoolingwatertothedieselgenerators(DGs)andcontainmentrecirculationfancoolers(CRFCs)andtoprovideasafetyrelatedsourceofwatertotheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheSWSystemisforoneSWtraininconjunctionwitha100%capacitycontainmentcoolingsystem(i.e.,CRFC)toprovideforheatremovalfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB)insidecontainmenttoensurecontainmentintegrity.TheSWSystemisalsodesigned,in.conjunctionwiththeCCWSystemanda100%capacityEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemandcontainmentcoolingsystem,toremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase(Ref.2).ThispreventsthecontainmentsumpfluidfromincreasingintemperatureduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofthisfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystembytheECCSpumps.TheSWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.Followingthereceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,allfourSWpumpsaredesignedtostart(ifnotalreadyrunning)to.supplythesystemloads.Ifacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignaloccurs,theneachnonsafetyrelatedandnonessentialloadwithintheSWSystemisisolatedbyredundantmotoroperatedvalvesthatarepoweredbyseparateClasslEelectricaltrains.TheSWpumpsaresequencedtostartwithin17secondsfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheselectedSWpumpsaresequencedtostartaftera40secondtimedelayfollowingenergizationoftheelectricalbussupplyingtheselectedpump(i.e.,Bus17orBus18)afteranundervoltagesignal.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-56DraftB SWSystem83.7.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSWtrainsandloopheaderareassumedtosupplytofollowingcomponentsfollowinganaccident:a.TheCRFCs,DGsandsafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolersimmediatelyfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal(i.e.,aftertheloopheaderbecomesrefilled);b.ThepreferredAFWandSA'FWpumpswithin10minutesfollowingreceiptofalowSGlevelsignal;andc.TheCCWheatexchangerswithin46minutesfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheSWsystem,in'onjunctionwiththeCCWSystem,canalsocooltheplantfromresidualheatremoval(RHR)entryconditions(T.,<350'F)toNODE5(T.,<200F)duringnormaloperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350Fto200'FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRSystemtrainsthatareoperating.SinceSWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsinfailingtheSWSystemtopotentiallymultiplesafetyrelatedfunctions.'heSWsystemhasbeenevaluatedtodemonstratethecapabilitytomeetcoolingneedswithanassumed500galleak.TheSWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofSWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingthe'tmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAFWSystems)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).ThetemperatureofthefluidsuppliedbytheSWSystemisalsoaconsiderationintheaccidentanalyses.IfthecoolingwatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfancoolersandCCWheatexchangersistoowarm,theaccidentanalyseswithrespecttocontainmentpressureresponsefollowingaSLBandthecontainmentsumpfluidtemperaturefollowingaLOCAmaynolongerbebounding.Ifthecoolingwatersupplyistoocold,thecontainmentheatremovalsystemsmaybemoreefficientthanassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thiscausesthebackpressureincontainmenttobereducedwhichpotentiallyresultsinincreasedpeakcladtemperatures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-57Draft8 SWSystemB3.7.8BASESAPPLICABLETheSWsystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicySAFETYANALYSESStatement.(continued)LCOIntheeventofaDBA,oneSWtrainandtheloopheaderisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovidetheminimumheatremovalcapabilitytoensurethatthesystemfunctionstoremovepostaccidentheatloadsasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofSWandtheloopheadermustbeOPERABLE(seeFigureB3.7.8-l).AtleastoneSWtrainwilloperateassumingthattheworstcase'ingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwiththelossofoffsitepower.ASWtrainisdefinedbasedonelectricalpowersourcesuchthatSWPumpsAandCformonetrainandSWPumpsBandDformthesecondtrain.ASWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenonepumpinthetrainisOPERABLEandcapableoftakingsuctionfromthescreenhouseandprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheaderasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Thisincludesconsiderationofavailablenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)totheSWpumpsandthetemperatureofthesuctionsource.ThefollowingaretheminimumrequirementsofthescreenhousebaywithrespecttoOPERABILITYoftheSWpumps:a.Level~5feet;andb.Temperature>35'Fabove50%RTPand~80'F.Thelowerscreenhousebaytemperatureisonlyspecifiedabove50%RTPsincethisvalueisonlyaconsiderationwhenevaluatingLOCAatornearfullpowerconditions.Inaddition,ifaSWpumpfailsonInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead)',thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-58DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)AnOPERABLESWtrainalsorequiresthatallnonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedloadscanbeisolatedbythesixmotoroperatedisolationvalveswhicharepoweredfromthesameClass1Eelectricaltrainasthepumps.Therefore,motoroperatedvalves4609,4614,4615,4616,4663,and4670mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsAandCwhilevalves4613,4664,4733,4734,4735,and4780mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsBandD.TheSWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwaterfromeachOPERABLESWtraintothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.FourCRFCs;b.TwoCCWheatexchangers;c.TwoDGs;d.ThreepreferredAFWpumps;e.TwostandbyAFWpumps;andf.Threesafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolers.AnOPERABLESWloopheaderalsorequiresaflowpaththroughthedieselgenerator(4665,4760,4669,and4668B)andCRFC(4623,4640,4756and4639)cross-ties.TheSWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeofbothSWpumptrainsandendsatthefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.SincetheSWSystemdischargesbacktoLakeOntario,thecoolingwaterflowpaththroughtheabovecomponentsandsubsequentdischargeisaddressedundertheirrespectiveLCO.Thisincludes:a.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS'NODES1,2,and3;"b.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-NODE4;"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-59DraftB SWSystem83.7.8BASESLCO(continued)c.LCO3.6.6,"CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems;"d.LCO3.7.5,"AFWSystems;"e.LCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem;"f.LCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4;"andg.LCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."TheSWpipinginsidecontainmentfortheCRFCsandthereactorcompartmentcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationboundaries.ThisisaddressedunderLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries."APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theSWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystemwhichmustbecapableofperformingitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAorlossofcontainmentintegrityfollowingaSLB.InMODES5and6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheSWsystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.6.6,LCO3.7.7,andLCO3.8.2.ACTIONSA.lIfoneSWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLESWtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLESWtraincouldresultinlossofSWSystemfunction.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain-,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-60DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IftheSWtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastHODE3within6hoursandinHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1WithbothSWtrainsortheloopheaderinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.RequiredActionC.1ismodifiedbyaNoterequiringthattheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem,"beenteredforthecomponentcoolingwaterheatexchangermadeinoperablebySW~ThisnoteisprovidedsincetheinoperableSWsystemmaypreventtheplantfromreachingNODE5asrequiredbyLCO3.0.3ifbothCCWheatexchangersarerenderedinoperable.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.7.8.1ThisSRverifiesthatadequateNPSHisavailabletooperatetheSWpumpsandthattheSWsuctionsourcetemperatureiswithinthelimitsassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.The24hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheapplicableHODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-61DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.8.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheSWflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathsexistforSWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortobeinglocked,sealed,orsecured.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheSWflowtoindividualcomponentsorsystemsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperable,butdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheSWSystem.SR3.7.8.3ThisSRverifiesthatallSWloopheadercross-tievalvesarelockedinthecorrectposition.Thisincludesverificationthatmanualvalves4623,4639,4640,4665,4668B,4669,4756,and4760arelockedopenandthatmanualvalves4610,4611,4612,and4779arelockedclosed.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgement,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverninglockedvalves,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-62DraftB

SWSystemB3.7.8BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.8.4ThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSWmotoroperatedisolationvalvesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal(i.e.,coincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignal).SWisanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannot.befullyactuatedaspartofnormaltesting.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.8.5ThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSWpumpsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisincludestheactuationoftheSWpumpsfollowinganundervoltagesignalandfollowingacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignal.SWisanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedaspartofnormaltestingduringnormaloperation.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwith.thereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.2.1.2.UFSAR,Section6.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-63DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I IIIIIII I IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII II I I III,IIIII(5zIQIeikII IIaOCfgO$RIFigureB3.7.8-1SWSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-64DraftB CREATSB3.7.9B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC11(Ref.1),acontrolroomshallbeprovidedwhichpermitscontinuousoccupancyunderanycrediblepostaccidentconditionwithoutexcessiveradiationexposuresofpersonnel.ExposurelimitsareprovidedinGDC19of10CFR50,AppendixA(Ref.2)whichrequiresthatcontrolroompersonnelberestrictedto5remwholebody,oritsequivalency,forthedurationoftheaccident.TheCREATSprovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontroltheplantfollowinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivityfor30dayswithoutexceedingthis5remwholebodylimit.TheCREATSispartoftheControlBuildingventilationsystem.TheCREATSconsistsofahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filter,activatedcharcoaladsorbersforremovalofgaseousactivity(principallyiodines),andtwofans(controlroomreturnairfanandemergencyreturnairfan)(seeFigureB3.7.9-1).Ductwork,dampers,andinstrumentationalsoformpartofthesystemaswellasdemisterstoremovewaterdropletsfromtheairstream(Ref.3).TheCREATSisanemergencysystem,partsofwhichmayoperateduringnormalplantoperations.ActuationoftheCREATSplacesthesysteminoneoffiveseparatestatesoftheemergencymodeofoperation,dependingontheinitiationsignal.ThefollowingarethenormalandemergencymodesofoperationfortheCREATS:CREATSModeATheCREATSisinthestandbymodewiththeexceptionthatthecontrolroomreturnairfanisinoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-65DraftB CREATS83.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeBThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowinganaccidentwitharadiationreleaseasdetectedbyradiationmonitorR-l.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfm(approximatelyonefourthoftheControlBuildingVentilationSystemdesign)throughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.AlloutsideairthatenterstheCREATS,ascontrolledbyanairadjustswitch(S-81),isalsocirculatedthroughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.CREATSModeCThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeBwiththeexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.CREATSModeDThisisthe.CREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofsmokewithintheControlBuilding.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemcontinuestodrawoutsideair.However,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfmthroughtheCREATSandHEPAfilters.Thiseffectivelypurgesthecontrolroomairenvironment.CREATSModeEThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeDwithexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-66Draft8 CREATSB3.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeFThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofatoxicgasasindicatedbythechlorineorammoniadetectors,orhighradiationasdetectedbyR-36(gas),R-37(particulate),orR-38(iodine).Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemalignsitselfconsistentwithModeCexceptthattwodampersineachairsupplypathareisolated.Normallyopenairsupplyisolationdampersarearrangedinseriessothatthefailureofonedampertoclosewillnotresultinabreachofisolation.Theairenteringthecontrolroomiscontinuouslymonitored.byradiationandtoxicgasdetectors.Onedetectoroutputabovethesetpointwillcauseactuationoftheemergencyradiationstateortoxicgasisolationstate,asrequired.Theactionsofthetoxicgasandhighradiationstate(ModeF)aremorerestrictive,andwilloverridetheactionsoftheemergencyradiationstate(ModeBorC).OnlythehighradiationstateCREATSModeFisaddressedbythisLCO.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess,TheCREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinHODESI,2,3,and4,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.3).Thisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditforthe.CREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.InMODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-67DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESAPPLICABLETheCREATSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicySAFETYANALYSESStatement.(continued)LCOTheCREATSiscomprisedofafiltrationtrainandtwoindependentandredundantisolationdampertrainsallofwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLE.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultinexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorsintheeventofalargeradioactiverelease.TheGREATSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytopermitCREATSModeFoperationareOPERABLE(seeFigureB3.7.9-1).TheCREATSfiltrationtrainisOPERABLEwhentheassociated:a.ControlroomreturnairandemergencyreturnairfansareOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingforcedflow;b.HEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorbersfortheemergencyreturnairfanarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andarecapableofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andc.Ductwork,valves,anddampers(includingAKD06andAKD09)areOPERABLE,andaircirculationcanbemaintained.TheCREATSisolationdampersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthedamper(AKDOl,AKD04,AKD05,AKD08,andAKD10)cancloseonan.actuationsignaltoisolateoutsideairorisclosedwithmotiveforceremoved.Twodampersareprovidedforeachoutsideairpath.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-68DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESLCO(continued)Inaddition,thecontrolroomboundarymustbemaintained,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdoors.Openingoftheaccessdoorsforentryandexitdoesnotviolatethecontrolroomboundary.Anaccessdoormaybeopenedforextendedperiodsprovidedadedicatedindividualisstationedattheaccessdoortoensureclosure,ifrequired(i.e.,theindividualperformstheisolationfunction),thedoorisabletobeclosedwithin30secondsuponindicationoftheneedtoclosethedoor,andtheCREATSfiltrationtrainisOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYInNODESI,2,3,and4,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDBA.InNODE5or6,theCREATSisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSA.landA.2WiththeCREATSfiltrationtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisCondition,theisolationdampersareadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbutnomeansexisttofilterthereleaseofradioactivegaswithinthecontrolroom.The48hourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoisolatethecontrolroom.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor~Ihourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-69DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.IWithoneCREATSisolationdamperinoperableforoneormoreoutsideairflowpaths,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECREATSisolationdamperisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLECREATSisolationdampercouldresultinlossofCREATSfunction.The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod,andabilityoftheremainingisolationdampertoprovidetherequired'isolationcapability.C.landC.2InMODEI,2,3,or4,iftheRequiredActionsof.ConditionsAorBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.lD.2.1andD.2.2InHODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,iftheRequiredActionsofConditionsA'rBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,actionmustbetakentoimmediatelyplacetheOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)inCREATSModeF.Thisactionensuresthattheremainingdamper(s)areOPERABLE,thatnofailurespreventingautomaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailurewouldbereadilydetected.(conti'nued)R.E.'innaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-70DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESACTIONSD.10.2.1andD.2.2(continued)AnalternativetoRequiredActionD.1isimmediatelysuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ThisrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandthesuspension'ofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.E.1InMODE1,2,3,or4,ifbothCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsareinoperable,theCREATSmaynotbecapableofperformingtheintendedfunctionandtheplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Failureoftheintegrityofthecontrolroomboundary(i.e.,walls,floors,ceilings,ductworkoraccessdoors)alsoresultsinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.F.landF.2andF.3InMODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithtwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperable,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytorestoreoneisolationdamperineachaffectedairsupplypathtoOPERABLEstatus.Inaddition,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ThisrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandthesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.R.E.Ginna'uclearPowerPlantB3.7-71(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7;9.1Standbysystemsshouldbecheckedperiodicallytoensurethattheyfunctionproperly.Astheenvironmentandnormaloperatingconditionsonthissystemarenottoosevere,testingeachCREATSfiltrationtrainonceevery31daysfor~15minutesprovidesanadequatecheckofthissystem.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthereliabilityoftheequipment.SR3.7.9.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCREATStestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheCREATSfiltertestsareingeneralaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).TheVFTPincludestestingtheperformanceoftheHEPAfilter,charcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.TheminimumrequiredflowratethroughtheCREATSfiltrationtrainis2000cubicfeetperminute(+10%).SpecifictestFrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.However,themaximumsurveillanceintervalforrefuelingoutagetestsisbasedon24monthrefueling.cyclesandnot18monthcyclesasdefinedbyRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).SR3.7.9.3ThisSRverifiesthattheCREATSfiltrationtrainstartsandoperatesandeachCREATSisolationdamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-72(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC11,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC19.3.UFSAR,Section6.4.4.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-73DraftB CREATSB3.F9AKD10AKDOIIAKLOVSIIrrI.rI/IrrmrhlCNAKCOALIKILTER$gAKDOSIII,IIIIIIAKpnvENKRtnwajOLDKKIIiRNooarpFANRooat~AKD0$IIIr-------IAxrosRKIVKNFANITIAKD1)'KDI2'KDISIANDI~BlKlZQoLDKrrannrIIIIE---+IIcoNrnoLIROOKLegend:--<<-CREA'l3FiltrationfrainNotes:Forilhstrationonlyl.OutsideairflowpathisolationdampersincludesAKD01,AKD04,AKD05,AKD08,andAKD10.2.'nIcCREhTSfiltrationtraindoesnotincludethcairAIandlingunit(AKL03andAKH13).Figure83.7.9-1CREATSR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-74DraftB ABVSB3.7.10B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheABVSfiltersairborneradioactiveparticulatesfromtheareaofthespentfuelpool(SFP)followingafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVS,inconjunctionwithothernormallyoperatingsystems,alsoprovidesenvironmentalcontroloftemperatureandhumidityintheAuxiliaryBuildingincludingtheSFParea.TheABVSconsistsofanairhandlingunit,aseriesofexhaustfans,charcoalfilters,ductwork,anddampers(Ref.1).The'exhaustfansincludethefollowingfanswhichalldischargeintoacommonductwork'thatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansAandB(seeFigureB3.7.10-1):a.IntermediateBuildingexhaustfansAand8;b.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC;c.AuxiliaryBuildingcharcoalfilterfansAand8;d.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanG;ande.ControlaccessexhaustfansAandB.TheonlycomponentswhichfiltertheenvironmentassociatedwiththeSFParetheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC.Therefore,thesearetheonlyfansconsideredwithrespecttotheABVSinthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-75DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASESBACKGROUND(continued)AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtakessuctionfromtheSFPanddecontaminationpitareasontheoperatingleveloftheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheairisfirstdrawnthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemwhichconsistsofroughingfiltersandcharcoaladsorbers.Theroughingfiltersprotectthecharcoaladsorbersfrombeingfouledwithdirtparticleswhilethecharcoaladsorbersremovetheradioactiveiodinesfromtheatmosphere.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCthendischargesintothecommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans.Thiscommonductworkcontainsahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterwhichisnotcreditedinthedoseanalyses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansareeach100%capacityfanswhichcanmaintainanegativepressureontheoperatingflooroftheAuxiliaryBuildingthroughorientationofthesystemdampers.ThisnegativepressurecausesairflowontheoperatingfloortobetowardtheSFPwhichensuresthatairinthevicinityoftheSFPisfirstfilteredthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandexhaustfanCarepoweredfromnon-EngineeredSafeguardsFeaturesbuses.YTheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansdischargetotheplantventstack.Theplantventstackiscontinuouslymonitoredfornoblegases(R-14),particulates(R-13)andiodine(R-10B).Duringnormalpoweroperation,theABVSisplacedinthe"out"modebytheinterlockmodeswitchwhere"out"definesthestatusoftheSFPcharcoalfilters.ThiscausesallexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingtheAuxiliaryBuildingHainexhaustfans)andAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtotripuponasignalfromR-108,R-13orR-14tostopthereleaseofanyradioactivegases.DuringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theinterlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"modesuchthatonlyexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans)aretripped.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-76(continued)DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheABVSdesignbasisisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA),whichisafuelhandlingaccident.Theanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccident,giveninReference2,assumesthatallfuelrodsinanassemblyaredamaged.TheDBAanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem,andoneAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanareOPERABLE.Theaccidentanalysisaccountsforthereductioninairborneradioactivematerialprovidedbytheminimumfiltrationsystemcomponentswhichresultinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).Thefailureofanyorallofthesefiltrationsystemcomponentsresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.ThefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsandtheanalysisfollowtheguidanceprovidedinRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).TheremainderoftheABVSdescribedintheBackgroundisnotrequiredforanyDBAsinceitisnon-safetyrelatedandsuppliedonlyfromoffsitepowersources.TheABVSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatoffsitedosesarewellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)followingafuelhandlingaccidentinth'eAuxiliaryBuilding.ThefailureoftheABVScoincidentwithafuelhandlingaccidentresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.TheABVSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytocontrolexposureintheAuxiliaryBuildingfollowingafuelhandlingaccidentareOPERABLEandinoperation(seeFigureB3.7.10-1).TheABVSisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitsassociated:a.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCandeitherAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanAorBisOPERABLEandinoperation;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-77DraftB ABVS83.7.10BASESLCO(continued)b.AuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanHEPAfilterandSFPcharcoaladsorbersarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemi.scapableofperformingitsfiltrationfunction;C.d.Ductwork,valves,anddampersareOPERABLE,andaircirculationandnegativepressurecanbemaintainedontheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloor;andInterlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"mode.APPLICABILITYDuringmovementofirradiatedfuelintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoalleviatetheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVSisonlyrequiredwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.Anyfuelhandlingaccidentwhichoccursafter60daysresultsinoffsitedoseswhicharewellwithin10CFR100limits(Ref.3)duetothedecayrateofiodine.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,theABVSisnotMODEdependantandonlyrequiredwhenirradiatedfuelisbeingmoved.ACTIONSA.lWhentheABVSisinoperable,actionmustbetakentoplacetheplantinaconditioninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesin,theAuxiliaryBuilding.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffueltoasafeposition.RequiredActionA.IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichhavedecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-78(continued)DraftB

ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.7".10.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheABVS.Duringfuelmovementoperations,theABVSisdesignedtomaintainaslightnegativepressureintheAuxiliaryBuildingtopreventunfilteredLEAKAGE.ThisSRensuresthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,andeitherAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanAorBareinoperationandthattheABVSinterlockmodeswitchisinthecorrectposition.TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgementandshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.7.10.2ThisSRverifiestheintegrityoftheAuxiliaryBuildingenclosure.TheabilityoftheAuxiliaryBuildingtomaintainnegativepressurewithrespecttotheuncontaminatedoutsideenvironmentmustbeperiodicallyverifiedtoensureproperfunctioningoftheABVS.Duringfuelmovementoperations,theABVSisdesignedtomaintainaslightnegativepressureintheAuxiliaryBuildingtopreventunfilteredleakage.ThisSRensuresthatanegativepressureisbeingmaintainedintheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgementandshownto.beacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-79DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.10.3ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemtestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheSFPCharcoalAdsorber'SystemfiltertestsareingeneralaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.5).TheVFTPincludestestingcharcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).ThereisnominimumrequiredflowratethroughtheSFPcharcoaladsorberssinceSR3.7.10.2requiresverificationthatanegativepressureismaintainedduringfuelmovementintheAuxiliaryBuilding.AslongasthisminimumpressureismaintainedbydrawingairfromthesurfaceoftheSFP.throughtheSFPcharcoaladsorbers,theassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesaremet.SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.However,themaximumsurveillanceintervalforrefuelingoutagetestsisbasedon24monthrefuelingcyclesandnot18monthcyclesasdefinedbyRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.5).REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.4.2.2.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.2.3.10CFR100.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Rev.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-80DraftB PlSampleIlltBldgAreasIntBldgExhssutFansAandBOperatingHoorLevelAuxBldgSupplyAirHandlingUnitASpentPuclPoolSurfaceAuxBldgySupplyFanBDeeonpitSFPCharoalAdsorbcrSystemCHARHEAuxBldgPExhauetFanCR-10BR-13R-14AuxBMgMainExhustPeasA&9II~g7-GssDecayTankReleaseCihKPlahtVentAuxBldgVolumeControl'I'ankGheDecayTankAuxBldgCharcoalIll(<<rFansAS'eAuxBldgExhaustFanGControlAccessExhauetFansCHARIIEPAServiceBldg,HotShopA.ChemLabAreasCNMTDcprcssurizationkMIllplugeExhalLetAuxBldgMainHoorAreasDrummingStationLegend:~I'loevpathrequiredbyLCO(AuxBldgExhaustFanCHEPAfilternotrequiredfiorLCObutAuxBldgoperatingfloormustbeatanegativepressure)~~1of2QoeeliathsrequiredbyLCOQSFPRoughiugfiltersI'orilhstration SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)MaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDTheminimumwaterlevelinthespentfuelpool(SFP)meetstheassumptionsofiodinedecontaminationfactorsfollowingafuelhandlingaccident.Thespecifiedwaterlevelprovidesprotectionagainstexceedingtheoffsitedoselimits.TheSFPisaseismicallydesignedstructurelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuilding(Ref.1).Thepoolisinternallycladwithstainlesssteelthathasaleakchasesystemateachweldseam,tominimizeaccidentaldrainagethroughtheliner.TheSFPisalsoprovidedwithabarrierbetweenthespentfuelstorageracksandthefueltransfersystemwinch.Thisbarrier,uptotheheightofthespentfuelracks,preventsinadvertentdrainageoftheSFPviathefueltransfertube.TheSFPCoolingSystemisdesignedtomaintainthepools120'Fduringnormalconditionsandrefuelingoperations(Ref.2).Thecoolingsystemnormallytakessuctionnearthesurfaceof'heSFPsuchthatafailureofanypipeinthesystemwillnotdrainthepool..Thecoolingsystemreturnlinetothepoolalsocontainsa0.25inchventholelocatedneartheSFPsurfaceleveltopreventsiphoning.Finally,controlboardalarmsexistwithrespecttotheSFPlevelandtemperature.ThesefeaturesallhelptopreventinadvertentdrainingoftheSFP.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheminimumwaterlevelintheSFPisanassumptionofthefuelhandlingaccidentdescribedintheUFSAR(Ref.3)andRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).Theresultant2hourthyroiddoseperpersonattheexclusionareaboundaryasbasedonthisassumptionisasmallfractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.5).limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-82DraftB SFPWaterLevel83.7.11IBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)BasedontherequirementsofReference4,theremustbe23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthedamagedfuelbundleandthefuelpoolsurfaceduringafuelhandlingaccident.With23ftofwateravailable,theassumptionsofReference4canbeuseddirectly.Theseassumptionsincludetheuseofadecontaminationfactorof100intheanalysisforiodine.Adecontaminationfactorof100enablestheanalysistoassumethat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofalldroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytheSFPwater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory.Inpractice,thisLCOpreservesthisassumptionforthebulkofthefuelinthestorageracks.Inthecaseofasinglebundledroppedandlyinghorizontallyontopofthespentfuelstorageracks,however,theremaybe<23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthefuelbundleandthesurface,indicatedbythewidthofthebundleanddifferencebetweenthetopoftherackandactivefuel.Tooffsetthissmallnonconservatism,theanalysisassumesthatallfuelrodsfail,althoughanalysisshowsthatonlythefirstfewrowsfailfromahypotheticalmaximumdrop.The'SFPwater,levelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheSFPwaterlevelisrequiredtobea23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.Thespecifiedwaterlevelpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.3).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithintheSFP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-83(continued)DraftB SFPMaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOappliesduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthespentfuelpool,sincethepotentialforareleaseoffissionproductsexists.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurduringmovementoffuel,thisLCOisnotapplicableduringotherconditions.DuringrefuelingoperationsinNODE6,theSFPwaterlevel(andboronconcentration)areinequilibriumwiththerefuelingwatercavity.ThewaterlevelundertheseconditionsisthencontrolledbyLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel"whichrequirestherefuelingcavitywaterleveltobemaintained~23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Arefuelingcavitywaterlevelofa23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangewillresultin>23feetofwaterabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracksassumingthatatmosphericpressurewithincontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuildingareequivalent.ACTIONSA.IWhentheinitialconditionsassumedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiscannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoprecludetheaccidentfromoccurring.WhentheSFPwater.levelislowerthantherequiredlevel,themovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFPisimmediatelysuspended.Thisactioneffectivelyprecludesthe'occurrenceofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,'ovementtoanavailablerackposition).RequiredActionA.IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceifmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinNODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODESI,2,3,and4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-84(continu'ed)DraftB SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7:11.1ThisSRverifiessufficientSFPwaterisavailableintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thewaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolmustbecheckedperiodicallyduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliestoensurethefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsaremet.The7dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeinthepoolisnormallystableandtheSFPisdesignedtopreventdrainagebelow23ft.Waterlevelchangesarecontrolledbyplantproceduresandareacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.VerificationofSFPwaterlevelcanbeaccomplishedbyseveralmeans.ThetopoftheupperSFPpumpsuctionlineis23ftabovethefuelstoredinthepool.Ifthereis>23ftofwaterabovethereactorvesselflange(asrequiredbyLCO3.9.5),withequalpressureinthecontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuilding,thenatleast23ftofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracks.Inadditiontothephysicaldesignfeatures,therearetwoSFPlevelalarms(LAL634)whichareavailabletoalerttheoperatorsofchangingSFPlevel.AlowlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelfalls4inchesormorefromthenormallevelwhileahighlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelrises4inchesormorefromthenormallevel.Thesealarmsmustreceiveacalibrationconsistentwith'industrypracticesbeforetheyaretobeusedtomeetthisSR.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.UFSAR,Section9.1.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.10CFR100.11.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-85DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.12SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThewaterinthespentfuelpool(SFP)normallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,<<of0.95bemaintainedi'ntheabsenceofsolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothSFPregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN-16.1-1975(Ref.1)andReference2allowscreditforsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themostsevereaccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.EitherscenariocouldpotentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2.Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.Safeoperationofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontr'oilingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewithLCO3.7.13,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)Storage."Within7dayspriortomovementofanassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12;1.PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7;13.2asapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-86(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Ref.3and4).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegionItoRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconcentrationofdissolvedboronintheSFPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheSFPboronconcentrationisrequiredtobe~300ppm.ThespecifiedconcentrationofdissolvedboronintheSFPpreservestheassumptionsusedintheanalysesofthepotentialcriticalaccidentscenariosasdescribedinReferences3and4(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident).ThisconcentrationofdissolvedboronistheminimumrequiredconcentrationforfuelassemblystorageandmovementwithintheSFPuntilthefuelassemblieshavebeenverifiedtobestoredcorrectly.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-87(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOapplieswheneverfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFP,untilaSFPverificationhasbeenperformedfollowingthelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.TheSFPverificationisaccomplishedbyperformingSR3.7.13.1orSR3.7.13.2aftermovementoffuelassembliesdependingonwhichSFPregionwasaffectedbythefuelmovement.Iffuelwasmovedintobothregions,thenbothSR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2mustbeperformedafterthecompletionoffuelmovementbeforeexitingtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.ThisLCOdoesnotapplyfollowingtheverification,sincetheverificationwouldconfirmthattherearenomisloadedfuelassemblies.Withnofurtherfuelassemblymovementsinprogress,thereisnopotentialforamisloadedfuelassemblyoradroppedfuelassembly..ThisLCOdoesnotapplytofuelmovementwithinaSFPregionsincetheaccidentanalysesassumeeachregioniscompletelyfilledinaninfinitearray.ACTIONSA.lA.2.1andA.2.2WhentheconcentrationofboronintheSFPislessthanrequired,immediateactionmustbetakentoprecludetheoccurrenceofanaccidentortomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentinprogress.Thisismostefficientlyachieved'yimmediatelysuspendingthemovementoffuelassemblies.Theconcentrationofboronisrestoredsimultaneouslywithsuspendingmovementoffuelassemblies.AnacceptablealternativeistoimmediatelyinitiateactiontoperformaSFPverification(SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2).TheperformanceofthisverificationremovestheplantfromtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,movementtoanavailablerackposition).TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinMODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,3,or4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementoffuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-88(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.12.1ThisSRverifiesthattheconcentrationofboronintheSFPiswithinthelimit.AslongasthisSRismet,theanalyzedaccidentsarefullyaddressed.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeandboronconcentrationinthepoolisnormallystableandallwaterlevelchangesandboronconcentrationchangesarecontrolledbyplantprocedures.IThisSRisrequiredtobeperformedpriortofuelassemblymovementintoRegion1orRegion2andmustcontinuetobeperformeduntilthenecessarySFPverificationisaccomplished(i.e.,SR3.7.13.1and3.7.13.2).REFERENCES1.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactors."2.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.3.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.4.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-89DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.13SpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageBASESBACKGROUNDThespentfuelpool.(SFP)isdividedintotwoseparateanddistinctregions(seeFigureB3.7.13-1)which,forthepurposeofcriticalityconsiderations,areconsideredasseparatepools(Ref.1).Region1,with176storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodateneworspentfuelutilizingatwooffourcheckerboardarrangement.Afuelassemblywithanenrichmentof~4.05wt%canbestoredatanyavailablelocationinRegion1sincetheaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingthatRegion1wasfilledwithfuelassembliesofthisenrichment.Afuelassemblywithanenrichment>4.05wt%U-235canalsobestoredinRegion1providedthatintegralburnablepoisonsarepresentintheassembliessuchthatk-infinityiss1.458.TheexistingdesignusesIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbers(IFBAs)asthepoisonforfuelassemblieswithenrichments>4.05wt%.IFBAsconsistofneutronabsorbingmaterialwhichprovidesequivalencingreactivityholddown(i.e.,neutronpoison)thatallowsstorageofhigherenrichmentfuel,.Theneutronabsorbingmaterialisanon-removableorintegralpartofthefuelassemblyonceitisapplied.Theinfinitemultiplicationfactor,K-infinity,isareferencecriticalitypointofeachfuelassemblythatifmaintained~1.458,willresultinak,<<s0.95forRegion1.TheK-infinitylimitisderivedforconstantconditionsofnormalreactorcoreconfiguration(i.e.,typicalgeometryoffuelassembliesinverticalpositionarrangedinaninfinitearray)atcoldconditions(i.e.,68'Fand14.7psia).Region2,with840storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithintheacceptabledomainaccordingtoFigure3.7.13-1,intheaccompanyingLCO.ThestorageoffuelassemblieswhicharewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1inRegion2ensuresaK,<<s0.95inthisregion.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-90DraftB

SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscanalsobestoredineitherregionintheSFPprovidedthattheminimumburnupofFigure3.7.13-1ismet.Inaddition,allcanistersplacedintoserviceafter1994musthave<144rodsor~256rods(Ref.2).Thecanistersarestainlesssteelcontainerswhichcontainthefuelrodsofamaximumoftwofuelassemblies(i.e.,358rods).Allbowed,broken,orotherwisefailedfuelrodsarefirststoredinastainlesssteeltubeof0.75inchouterdiameterbeforebeingplacedinacanister.Eachcanisterwillaccommodate110failedfuelrodtubes.ThewaterintheSFPnormallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,<<of0.95bemaintainedintheabsenceofsolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN16.1-1975(Ref.3)andReference4allowscreditforsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themostsevereaccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.EitherscenariocouldpotentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2.Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.Safeoperati.onofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewiththisLCO.Within7dayspriortomovementofanassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12.1..PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7.13.2asapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-91(continued)DraftB SFPStorage83.7.13BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Refs.2and5).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityis'ltimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconfigurationoffuelassembliesinthespentfuelpoolsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTherestrictionsontheplacementoffuelassemblieswithintheSFPensurethek,<<oftheSFPwillalwaysremain<0.95,assumingthepooltobefloodedwith'unboratedwater(Specification4.3.1.1).ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion1,eachassemblymusthaveaK-infinityof~1.458.ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion2,initialenrichmentandburnupshallbewithintheacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.Thex-axisofFigure3.7.13-1isthenominalU-235enrichmentwt%whichdoesnotincludethe+0.05wt%tolerancethatisallowedforfuelmanufacturingandlistedinSpecification4.3.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-92(continued)Draft8 SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOapplieswheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredintheSFP.ACTIONSA.1WhentheconfigurationoffuelassembliesstoredineitherRegion1orRegion2oftheSFPisnotwithintheLCOlimits,theimmediateactionistoinitiateactiontomakethenecessaryfuelassemblymovement(s)tobringtheconfigurationintocompliancewithSpecification4.3.l.1.Thiscompliancecanbemadebyrelocatingthefuelassemblytoadifferentregion.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinMODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,3,or4,theactionisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytomovefuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.13.1ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheK-infinityofeachfuelassemblyiss1.458priortostorageinRegionl.Iftheinitialenrichmentofafuelassemblyis~4.05wt%,aK-infinityof~1.458isalwaysmaintained.Forfuelassemblieswithenrichment>4.05wt%,aminimumnumberofIFBAsmustbepresentineachfuelassemblysuchthatk-infinitys1.458priortostorageinRegion1.Thisverificationisonlyrequiredonceforeachfuelassemblysincetheburnablepoisons,ifrequired,areanintegralpartofthefuelassemblyandwillnotberemoved.Theinitialenrichmentofeachassemblywillalsonotchange(i.e.,increase)whilepartiallyburnedassembliesarelessreactivethanwhentheywerenew(i.e.,fresh).PerformanceofthisSRensurescompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-93DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.13.1(continued)ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion1toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12,"SFPBoronConcentration."ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisverificationisnotrequiredwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.TheverificationisnotrequiredsinceRegion2isthelimitingSFPregion,andassuch,thefuelhasalreadybeenverifiedtobeacceptableforstorageinRegion1.SR3.7.13.2ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1intheaccompanyingLCOpriortostorageinRegion2.OnceafuelassemblyhasbeenverifiedtobewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,furtherverificationsarenolongerrequiredsincetheinitialenrichmentorburnupwillnotadverselychange.ForfuelassembliesintheunacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,performanceofthisSRwillensurecompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion2toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.3.ANSIN16.1-1975,'AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactors."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-94DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESREFERENCES(continued)4.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.5.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-95DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13SpentFuelStorageRacksN8wA~HOXEB0sm)~amczmSKKORAOSCAFhCITY174~'KThlCAPACKYIN5FUELARKhSUESFigure83.7.13-1SpentFuelPoolR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-96DraftB SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.1483.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDActivityinthesecondarycoolantresultsfromsteamgenerator(SG)tubeoutleakagefromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Understeadystateconditions,theactivityisprimarilyiodineswithrelativelyshorthalflivesand,thus,indicatescurrentconditions.Duringtransients,I-131spikescanbeobservedaswellasincreasedreleasesofsomenoblegases.Otherfissionproductisotopes,aswellasactivatedcorrosionproductsinlesseramounts,mayalsobefoundinthesecondarycoolant.Alimitonsecondarycoolantspecificactivityduringpoweroperationminimizesreleasestotheenvironmentbecauseofnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andDesignBasisaccidents(DBAs).Thislimitisbasedonanactivityvaluethatmightbeexpectedfroma0.1gpmtubeleak(LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE")ofprimarycoolantat.thelimitof1.0.pCi/gm(LCO3.4.16,"RCSSpecificActivity").Asteamlin'ebreak(SLB)isassumedtoresultinthereleaseofthenoblegasandiodineactivitycontainedintheSGinventory,thefeedwater,'andthereactorcoolantLEAKAGE.Hostoftheiodineisotopeshaveshorthalflives(i.e.,<20hours).I-131,withahalflifeof8.04days,concentratesfasterthanitdecays,butdoesnotreachequilibriumbecauseofblowdownandotherlosses.Withthespecifiedactivitylimit,theresultant2hourthyroiddosetoapersonattheexclusionareaboundary(EAB)wouldbeapproximately10remifthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)wereleftopenfor2hoursfollowingatripfromfullpower.Operatingaplantattheallowablelimitscouldresultina2hourEABexposureofasmallfractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.1)limits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-97(continued)Draft8 SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccidentanalysisoftheSLB,(Ref.2)assumestheinitialsecondarycoolantspecificactivitytohavearadioactiveisotopeconcentrationof0.10,pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131.Thisassumptionisusedintheanalysisfordeterminingtheradiologicalconsequencesofthepostulatedaccident.Theaccidentanalysis,basedonthisandotherassumptions,showsthattheradiologicalconsequencesofanSLBdonotexceedasmallfractionoftheplantEAB1'imits(Ref.I)forwholebodyandthyroiddoserates.Withthelossofoffsitepower,theremainingSGisavailableforcoredecayheatdissipationbyventingsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheHSSVsandsteamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalve(ARV).TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemsuppliesthenecessarymakeuptotheSG.VentingcontinuesuntilthereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavedecreasedsufficientlyfortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemtocompletethecooldown.Intheevaluationoftheradiologicalconsequencesofthisaccident,theactivityreleasedfromtheSGconnectedtothefailedsteamlineisassumedtobereleaseddirectlytotheenvironmentwithin60seconds.TheunaffectedSGisassumedtodischargesteamandanyentrainedactivitythroughtheNSSVsandARVfortheinitialtwohoursoftheevent.Primarycoolantwasassumedtobe3.0pCi/gmforthisanalysisbasedonpreviouslyallowedlimitswhichisafactorofthreegreaterthancurrentlimitsspecifiedinLCO3.4.16.Sincenocreditistakenintheanalysisfor'ctivityplateoutorretention,theresultantradiologicalconsequencesrepresentaconservativeestimateofthepotentialintegrateddoseduetothepostulatedsteamline.failure.SecondaryspecificactivitylimitssatisfyCriterion2of,theNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantisrequiredtobe<0.10pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131tolimittheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBAtoasmallfractionoftherequiredlimit(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,B3.7-98DraftB SecondarySpecificActivity83.7.14BASESLCO(continued)Monitoringthespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantensuresthatwhensecondaryspecificactivitylimitsareexceeded,appropriateactionsaretakeninatimelymannertoplacetheplantinanoperationalMODEthatwould'minimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thelimitsonsecondaryspecificactivityapplyduetothepotentialforsecondarysteamreleasestotheatmospherefromaSLB.InMODES5and6,theSGsarenotbeingusedforheatremoval.BoththeRCSandSGsaredepressurized,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisminimal.Therefore,monitoringofsecondaryspecificactivityisnotrequired.ACTIONSA.1andA.2DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131exceedingtheallowablevalueinthesecondarycoolant,isanindication-ofaproblemintheRCSandcontributestoincreasedpostaccidentdoses.IfthesecondaryspecificactivityisnotwithinlimitstheplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-99(continued)DraftB SecondarySpecificActivity83.7.14BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.14.1ThisSRverifiesthatthesecondaryspecificactivityiswithinthelimitsoftheaccidentanalysis.Agammaisotopicanalysisofthesecondarycoolant,whichdeterminesDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,confirmsthevalidityofthesafetyanalysisassumptionsastothesourcetermsinpostaccidentreleases.ItalsoservestoidentifyandtrendanyunusualisotopicconcentrationsthatmightindicatechangesinreactorcoolantactivityorLEAKAGE.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthedetectionofincreasingtrendsofthelevelofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,andallowsforappropriateactiontobetakentomaintainlevelsbelowtheLCOlimit.REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11..2.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGRE,

Subject:

"SEPTopic,XV-2,SpectrumofSteamSystemPipingFailuresInsideandOutsideContainment;XV-12,SpectrumofRodEjectionAccidents;XV-16,RadiologicalConsequencesofFailureofSmallLinesCarryingPrimaryCoolantOutsideContainment;XV-17,SteamGeneratorTubeFailure;andXV-20,RadiologicalConsequencesofFuelDamagingAccidents-R.E.Ginna,"datedSeptember24,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-100DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.13.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.1ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.1ThefollowingACelectricalsourcesshallbe"OPERABLE:a.Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSubsystems-MODES1,2,3,and4";andb.Twoemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)capableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveonsite480VsafeguardsbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.9.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Offsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)inoperable.A.1ANDDeclarerequiredfeature(s)inoperablewhenitsredundantrequiredfeature(s)isinoperable.12hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionAconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequiredfeature(s)A.2RestoreoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-1DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.OneDGinoperable.B.lANDB.2PerformSR3.8.1.1fortheoffsitecircuit.Declarerequiredfeature(s)supportedbytheinoperableDGinoperablewhenits.requiredredundantfeature(s)isinoperable.1hourANDOnceper8hoursthereafter4hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionBconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequiredfeature(s)B.3.1DetermineOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure.ORB.3.2PerformSR3.8.1.2forOPERABLEDG.ANDB.4RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.24hours24hours7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-2DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONC.Offsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)inoperable.ANDOneDGinoperable.RE(UIREDACTION-----------NOTEEnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4,"whenConditionCisenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.COMPLETIONTIMEC.1ORC.2Restorerequired'offsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.12hours12hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.1ANDD.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.TwoDGsinoperable.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-3DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.1.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityfortheoffsitecircuittoeachofthe480Vsafeguardsbuses.7daysSR3.8.1.2NOTES1.PerformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSR.2.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.VerifyeachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.31daysSR3.8.1.3--NOTES1.DGloadingsmayincludegradualloadingasrecommendedbythemanufacturer.2.Homentarytransientsoutsidetheloadrangedonotinvalidatethistest.3.ThisSurveillanceshallbeconductedononlyoneDGatatime.4.ThisSRshallbeprecededbyandimmediatelyfollowwithoutshutdownasuccessfulperformanceofSR3.8.1.2orSR3.8.1.9.VerifyeachDGissynchronizedandloadedandoperatesfora60minutesand<120minutesataload>1950kWand<2250kW.31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-4DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.4Verifythefueloillevelineachdaytank.31daysSR3.8.1.5VerifytheDGfueloiltransfersystemoperatestotransferfueloilfromeachstoragetanktotheassociateddaytank.31daysSR3.8.1.6VerifytransferofACpowersourcesfromthe50/50modetothe100/0modeand0/100mode.24monthsSR3.8.1.7NOTES1.This'urveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.2.Creditmaybetakenforunplanned.eventsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyeachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof~295kW.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-5DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.1.8------NOTES-1.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.2.CreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyeachDGautomatictripsarebypassedonanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjection(SI)signalexcept:a.Engineoverspeed;b.Lowlubeoilpressure;andc.Startfailure(overcrank)relay.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-6Draft8 ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.9NOTES-1.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.3.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinHODE1,2,3,or4.CreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyonanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal:a.De-energizationof480Vsafeguardsbuses;b.Loadsheddingfrom480Vsafeguardsbuses;and24monthsC.DGauto-startsfromstandbyconditionand:1.energizespermanentlyconnectedloads,2.energizesauto-connectedemergencyloadsthroughtheloadsequencer,and3.suppliespermanentlyandauto-connectedemergencyloadsfor)5minutes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-7DraftB ACSources-MODES5and63.8.23.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.2ACSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.2ThefollowingACelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a0Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6";andb.Oneemergencydieselgenerator(DG)capableofsupplyingonetrainoftheonsite480Vsafeguardbus(es)requiredbyLCO3.8.10.APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Offsitepowertooneormorerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)inoperable.------------NOTE-------------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.10,withonerequiredtrainde-energizedasaresultofConditionA.A.lORDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCORE,ALTERATIONS.ANDA.2.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ANDImmediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-8DraftB ACSources-MODES5and63.8.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.(continued)A.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.2.4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredoffsitepowercircuittoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.DGtotherequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)'noperable.B.IANDB.2ANDB.3ANDB.4SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.InitiateactiontorestorerequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-9DraftB ACSources-MODES5and63.8.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.2.1ForACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRsareapplicable:SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.1.5InaccordancewithapplicableSRsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-10DraftB DieselFuelOil3.8.33.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.3DieselFuelOilLCO3.8.3Thestoreddieselfueloilshallbewithinlimitsforeachrequiredemergencydieselgenerator(DG).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSNOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachDG.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredDGswithonsitefueloilsupplynotwithinlimit.A.lRestorefueloilleveltowithinlimit.12hoursB.OneormorerequiredDGswithstoredfueloiltotalparticulatesnotwithinlimit.B.1Restorefueloiltotalparticulateswithinlimit.7daysC.OneormoreDGswithnewfueloilpropertiesnotwithinlimits.C.1Restorestoredfueloilpropertieswitinlimits.30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-11DraftB DieselFuelOil3.8.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.OROneormorerequiredDGsdieselfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanConditionA,B,orC.D.lDeclareassociatedDGinoperable.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.3.1Verifyeachfueloilstoragetankcontains~5000galofdieselfueloilforeachrequiredDG.31daysSR3.8.3.2Verifyfueloilpropertiesofnewandstoredfueloilaretestedinaccordancewith,andmaintainedwithinthelimitsof,theDieselFuelOilTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeDieselFuelOilTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-12DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.43.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.4DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.4TheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable.A.1RestoreDCelectricalpowersourcetoOPERABLEstatus.2hoursB.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMode5.6hours36hoursC.BothDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-13DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.4.1Verifybatteryterminalvoltageis~l29Vonfloatcharge.7daysSR3.8.4.2NOTES-1.SR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.Verifybatterycapacityisadequatetosupply,andmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-14DraftB DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4,3.8.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.4.3NOTEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4.Verifybatterycapacityis~80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.60monthsAND12monthswhenbatteryshowsdegradation,orhasreached85%ofexpectedlifewithcapacity<100%ofmanufacturer'sratingAND24monthswhenbatteryhasreached85%oftheexpectedlifewithcapacity~'00%ofmanufacturer'sratingR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-15DraftB DCSources-MODES5and63.8.53.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.5DCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredDCelectricalpower-source(s)inoperable.A.lDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ORA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyA.2.4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredDCelectricalpowersource(s)toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-16DraftB DCSources-MODES5and63.8.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.5.1For'CsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,SR3.8.4.1isapplicable.InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-17DraftB BatteryCellParameters3.8.63.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.6BatteryCellParametersLCO3.8.6BatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSOTE-----------------------------------NSeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinlimits.A.IDeclareassociatedbatteryinoperable.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-18DraftB

BatteryCellParameters3.8.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.6.1Verifyelectrolytelevelofeachconnectedbatterycellisabovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing.31daysSR3.8.6.2Verifythefloatvoltageofeachconnectedbatterycellis>2.07V.31daysSR3.8.6.3Verifyspecificgravityofthedesignatedpilotcellineachbatteryiszl.188forBatteryAand~1.192forBatteryB.31daysSR3.8.6.4Verifyaverageelectrolytetemperatureofthedesignatedpilotcellineachbatteryis~55'F.31daysSR3.8.6.5Verifyaverageelectrolytetemperature.ofeveryfifthcellofeachbatteryis~55'F.92days.SR3.8.6.6'erifyspecificgravityofeachconnectedbatterycellis:a.Notmorethan0.020belowaverageofallconnectedcells,andb.Averageofallconnectedcellsis~1.188forBatteryAand~1.192forBatteryB.92daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-19DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.73.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.7ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.7ThefollowingACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.InvertersforInstrumentBusesAandC;andb.Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)forInstrumentBusB.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneinverterinoperable.A.1PowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClasslEornon-Class1ECVT.ANDA.2PowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClass1ECVT.ANDA.3RestoreinvertertoOPERABLEstatus.2hours24hours72hoursB.ClasslECVTforACInstrumentBusBinoperable.B.1ANDB.2PowerACInstrumentBusBfromitsnon-Class1ECVT.RestoreClass.1ECVTforACInstrumentBusBtoOPERABLEstatus.2hours7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-20DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.7ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.Twoormorerequiredinstrumentbussourcesinoperable.0.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.7.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.7days~SR3.8.7.2VerifycorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-21DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and63.8.83.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHS3.8.8ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and6LCO3.8.8ACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheonsiteClass1EACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6."APPLICABILITY:HODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)inoperable.A.lORDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2.2Suspendmovementof'rradiatedfuelassemblies.ANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.2.4'nitiateactiontorestorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-22DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and63.8.8SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.8.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttorequiredACinstrumentbus(es).7daysSR3.8.8.2VerifycorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbus.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-23DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.93.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.9DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.9TrainAandTrainBofthefollowingelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE:a.ACpower;b.ACinstrumentbuspower;andc.DCpower.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.A.1RestoreACelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.OneACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.B.1RestoreACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hoursC.OneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.C.1RestoreDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-24DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.1ANDD.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.Twotrainswithinoperableelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsthatresultinalossofsafetyfunction.E.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.9.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredelectricalpowertrains.7daysR:E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-25DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and63.8.103.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6LCO3.8.10Thenecessarytrains(s)ofthefollowingelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLEtosupportequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE:a.ACpower;b.ACinstrumentbuspower;andc.DCpower.APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributiontrai,n(s)inoperable.A.lORDeclareassociatedsupportedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-26DraftB DistributionSystems-HODES5and63.8.10ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.(continued)A.2.4ANDA.2.5Initiateactionstorestorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributiontrain(s)toOPERABLEstatus.Declareassociatedrequiredresidualheatremovalloop(s)inoperableandnotinoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.10.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredelectricalpowerdistributiontrains.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-27DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.B3.8.1B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.1ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofACpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplythe480Vsafeguardsbusesandassociateddistri-butionsubsystemduringMODES1,2,3,andTheplantACsourcesconsistof'anindependentoffsitepowersourceandtheonsitestandbyemergencypowersource(Ref.1).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.2)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andprotectionsystems.TheoffsiteandonsiteACsourcescaneachsupplypowerto480.Vsafeguardsbusestoensurethatreliablepowerisavailableduringanynormaloremergencymodeofplantoperation.The480Vsafeguardsbusesaredividedintoredundanttrains'sothattheloss,ofanyonetraindoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionsfrombeingperformed.SafeguardsBuses14and18areassociatedwithTrainAandsafeguardsBuses16and17areassociatedwithTrainB.Sinceonlytheonsitestandbypowersourceisclassifiedas'ClasslE,theoffsitepowersourceisnotrequiredtobeseparatedintoredundanttrains.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-1DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theindependentoffsitepowersourceconsistsofbreakers,transformers,switches,interruptingdevices,cabling,andcontrolsrequiredtotransmitpowerfromtheoffsitetransmissionnetworktotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.Theindependentoffsitepowersourceessentiallybeginsfromtwostationauxiliarytransformers(SAT12Aand12B)eachsuppliedfromanindependenttransmissionlineemanatingfromseparateswitchyards(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).SAT12Aisconnectedtothe34.5kVtransmissionsystem(circuit751)andSAT12Bisconnectedtotheplant115kVswitchyard(circuit767).TheSATsmaybeconfiguredinthefollowingmodes:a.SAT12A(orSAT12B)suppliessafeguardsBuses16and17andSAT12B(orSAT12A)suppliessafeguardsBuses14and18(50/50mode).b.SAT12AsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(0/100mode);orc.SAT12BsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(100/0mode).Thepreferredconfigurationisthe50/50mode;however,allthreemodesofoperationmeetapplicabledesignrequirementsfornormaloperation(Ref.1).Offsitepowercanalsobeprovidedduringanemergencythroughtheplantauxiliarytransformer11bybackfeedingfromthe115kVtransmissionsystemandmaintransformer.SATs12Aand12Bareeachconnectedtotwonon-Class1E,4.16kVbuses(12Aand12B).The4.16kVBus12AfeedstheClasslEloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses14and18and4.16kVBus12BfeedstheClass1Eloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses16and17(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).Lossofpowertoanyofthesafeguardsbuses,asaresultofinoperableoffsitecircuitcomponent(s),isalossofoffsitepower.Theoffsitepowersourceendsafterthefeederbreakersupplyingeach480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-2DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theonsitestandbypowersourcesconsistoftwo1950kWcontinuousratingemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)connectedtothesafeguardsbusestosupplyemergencypowerintheeventoflossofallotherACpower.TheDGsarelocatedinseparateroomsinaSeismicCategoryIstructurelocatedadjacenttothenortheastwalloftheTurbineBuilding.EachDGroomhasitsownventilationsystem.TheventilationsystemisdesignedtomaintaintheDGroombetween60'Fand104'Fandtoremoveanyhydrocarbongasesintheroom(Ref.3).Eachventilationsystemconsistsoftwofansandassociatedductworkanddampersthatfailopenonlossofinstrumentairandcontrolpower.OnefanisdesignedtostartonDGactuationwithasecondfandesignedtostartwhentheroomtemperaturereaches90'F.Thesecondfan'sdischargeairflowisdirectedto.theDGcontrolpanelandhasadelayedstarttopreventpotentiallyfreezingthecoolingwaterjacketpipingduringcoldweatherconditions.TheDGsutilizeanairmotorforstarting.TheairmotorissuppliedbytworeceiverswhichprovidesufficientairforfiveDGstartsbeforerequiringarechargeofthereceivers.TheDGsaresuppliedbyseparatefueloildaytankswhichcanbecross-tiedifrequired.Additionalfueloilcanbetransferredfromredundantundergroundfueloilstoragetanks.Adedicatedfueloiltransferpumpisusedforthistransfer.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valve,ortank,toresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.DGAisdedicatedtosafeguards.Buses14and18andDGBisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses16and17.ADGstartsautomaticallyonasafetyinjection(SI)signaloronanundervoltagesignalonitscorresponding480Vbuses(refertoLCO3.3.4,"LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation").IntheeventofonlyanSI.signal,theDGsautomaticallystartandoperateinthestandbymodewithouttyingtothesafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-3DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Intheeventoflossofoffsitepower,orabnormaloffsitepowerwhereoffsitepoweristrippedasaconsequenceofbusundervoltageor.degradedvoltage,theDGsautomaticallystartandtietotheirrespectivebuses.Allbusloadsexceptfor'thecontainmentspray(CS)pump,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pumpandsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcentersaretrippeduponactuationoftheundervoltagerelays.ThisisindependentoforcoincidentwithanSIsignal.OncetheundervoltagerelayresetsindependentofaSIsignal,theoperatormaymanuallyconnectloadsontothebus(es).Duringacoi.ncidentSIsignal,theCCWpumpisalsotrippedandloadsaresequentiallyconnectedtotheirrespectivebusesbytheautomaticloadsequencer.Intheeventoflossofoffsitepowertoonlyonesafeguards.businatrain,theDGwillh'utomaticallystartandtieonlytotheaffectedbus.DuringacoincidentSIsignal,thenormalfeedbreakeronthesecondbusontheaffectedtrainwillbetrippedbytheundervoltagerelayonthefailedbuscausingtheDGtoautomaticallytietobothbuses.Thisconditionwillthenactuatetheautomaticloadsequencer.IntheeventofalossofoffsitepowerandacoincidentSIsignal,theelectricalloadsareautomaticallyconnectedtotheDGsinsufficienttimetoprovideforsafereactorshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).CertainrequiredplantloadsarereturnedtoserviceinapredeterminedsequencebytheautomaticloadsequencerinordertopreventoverloadingtheDGduringthestartprocess.Withinapproximately1minuteaftertheinitiatingsignalisreceived,allloadsneededtorecovertheplantormaintainitinasafeconditionarereturnedtoservice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-4(continued)DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLETheinitialconditionsofDBAandtransientanalysesSAFETYANALYSES(Refs.4and5)assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheACelectricalpowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisresultsinmaintainingatleastonetrainoftheonsitestandbypoweroroffsiteACsourcesOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofoffsiteoronsitestandbyACpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainof'onsitestandbypower).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-5DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneACpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.1).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.6)canbemetatalltimes.TheDGsaredesignedtooperatefollowingaDBAoranticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)untiloffsitepowercan'berestored.AnAOOisdefinedasaCondition2eventinReference7(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).TheDGsarerequiredtostartwithin10secondsandbeginloading.TheDGscanbeginreceivingupto30%ofdesignloadsafterthe10secondstarttimeandcanaccept100%ofdesignloadswithin30seconds.TheDGsaremanuallyloadedifonlyanundervoltagesignalispresentandloadsequencedifacoincidentundervoltageandSIsignalispresent.Theloadsaresequencedasfollows(assumeSIsignalat0seconds):(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-6DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDGLoad(continued)DGATimeDGBTime480VsafeguardsbusesandCSpumps10SIpumpAandB15SIpumpC20Residualheatremovalpump25Selectedservicewaterpump30Firstcontainmentrecirculationfancooler35Secondcontainmentrecirculationfancooler40Hotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump45101522 273237 4247SincetheDGsmuststartandbeginloadingwithin10seconds,onlyoneairstartmustbeavailableintheairreceiversasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThelongtermoperationoftheDGs(untiloffsitepowerisrestored)isdiscussedinLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil."TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3ofNRCPolicyStatement.ceoOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandseparateandindependentDGsforeachtrainensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.AnOPERABLEqualifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguards'busesrequiredbyLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSubsystems-HODES1,2,3,and4."Powerfromeitheroffsitepowercircuit751or767satisfiesthisrequirement.ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-7DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESLCO(continued)b.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,CCWpump,andCSpumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal);C.TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceinterval-sfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);d.TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfora1hourat110%designloads;e.ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andf.AventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.TheACsourcesinonetr'ainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,separationandindependencemustbecompleteassumingasingleactivefailure.Fortheindependentoffsitepowersource,separationandindependencearetotheextentpractical(i.e.,operationispreferredinthe50/50mode,butmayalsoexistinthe100/0or0/100mode).APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.Acceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultof'AOOsorabnormaltransients;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-8DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES5and6arecoveredinLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSA.1andA.2Withoffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardbus(es)inoperable,assurancemustbeprovidedthatacoincidentsinglefailurewillnotresultinacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.Iftheredundantsafetyfeaturetothecomponentortrainaffectedbythelossof,offsitepowerisalsounavailable,theassumptionthattwocompletesafetytrainsareOPERABLEmaynolongerexist.Asanexample,ifoffsitepowerwereunavailableto480VBus14,DGAcouldsupplythenecessarypowertothebus.Ifresidualheatremovalpump(RHR)B(suppliedpowerby.Bus16)wereinoperableatthesametime,oratanytimeafterthelossofoffsitepowertoBus14,alossofredundantrequiredsafetyfeaturesexistssinceafailureofDGAwouldresultinthelossofemergencycorecooling.Therefore.,RHRpumpAonBus14wouldhavetobedeclaredinoperablewithin12hoursafterRHRpumpBandoffsitepowertoBus14weredeclaredunavailable.TheCompletionTimeof12hoursasprovidedbyRequiredActionA.1todeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheoffsitepowercircuitandallsafetyfeaturesaffectedbythelossofthe480Vbus.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbythelossofoffsitepower(i.e.,usingthesameexampleasabove,the72hourCompletionTimeforrestoringRHRpumpBwasdevel'opedassumingthatRHRpumpAhadbothoffsiteandonsitestandbyemergencypoweravailable).Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow12hoursinthisconfiguration.'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-9DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredActiontheCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythat:b.Thereisnooffsitepoweravailabletooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus;andAredundantrequiredfeatureisinoperableonasecond480Vsafeguardsbus.IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofConditionA,aredundantrequiredfeaturebecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimebeginstobetracked.RequiredActionA.1canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.ThelevelofdegradationduringConditionAmeansthattheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffecta.safeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident;however,theonsitestandbyACsourceshavenotbeendeg}aded.Thislevelofdegradationgenerallycorrespondstoeither:a.LossofoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand/orSAT1,2B;b.FailureofSAT12Aor12Bor4.16kVBus12Aor12B;orc.Failureofastationservicetransformersupplyinga480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-10DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)WithatotallossoftheoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforeithertrain.Withlossof,offsitepowertoSAT12Aor12B,failureofSAT12Aor12B,orfailureofBus12Aor12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforasingleACelectricaltrain.Withafailureofastationservicetransformer,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentforone480VsafeguardsbusinoneACelectricaltrain.Inallcases,.sufficientonsiteACsourcesareavailabletomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdownconditionintheeventofaDBAortransient.Infact,asimultaneouslossofoffsiteACsources,aLOCA,andaworstcasesinglefailurewerepostulatedasapartofthedesignbasisinthesafetyanalysis.Thus,the72hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetoeffectrestorationoftheoffsitecircuitcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintaininganACelectricalpowersystemcapableofmeetingitsdesigncriteria.8.1WithoneDGinoperable,itisnecessarytoverifytheavailabilityoftheoffsitecircuittoeachoftheaffected480Vsafeguardsbusesonamorefrequentbasis.SincetheRequiredActiononlyspecifies"perform,"afailureofSR3.8.1.1acceptancecriteriadoesnotresultinaRequiredActionbeingnotmet(i.e.,ConditionDwouldnotapply).However,ifacircuitfailstopassSR3.8.1.1,itisinoperableandConditionCwouldbeentered.TheCompletionTimeof1hourtoperformSR3.8.1.1isbasedontheimportanceofthisverificationtoensurethatoffsitepowerisavailabletotheaffectedbus.TheFrequencyofonceper8hoursthereafterisbasedonthealarmsandindicationsofbreakerstatusthatareavailableinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclear'PowerPlantB3.8-11DraftB 0 ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.2RequiredActionB.2isintendedtoprovideassurancethatalossofoffsitepower,duringtheperiodthataDGisinoperable,doesnotresultinacompletelossofasafetyfeature.Thesefeaturesaredesignedwithredundantsafetyrelatedtrainswhicharesuppliedpowerfromseparateandindependentonsitepowersources.Ifoneonsitepowersourceisinoperable,itmustbeassuredthattheredundantsafetyrelatedtrainsuppliedbytheOPERABLEDGisavailabletoprovidethenecessarysafetyfunction.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursforRequiredActionB.2isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredAction,theCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythatboth:a.AninoperableDGexists;andb.Arequiredfeatureontheothertrain(TrainAorTrainB)isinoperable,IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofthisCondition(oneDGinoperable)arequiredfeaturesupportedbytheOPERABLEDGsubsequentlybecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimewouldbegintobetracked.DiscoveringonerequiredDGinoperablecoincidentwithoneormoreinoperablerequiredsupportorsupportedfeatures,orboth,thataresuppliedpowerbytheOPERABLEDG,resultsinstartingtheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.2.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEDGandtheoffsitecircuitareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-12DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeof4hourstodeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheDGandallsafetyfeaturessupportedbytheDG.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbytheinoperableDG.Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow4hoursinthisconfiguration.Additionally,the4hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.RequiredActionB.2canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.3.1andB.3.2RequiredActionB.3.1providesanallowancetoavoidunnecessarytestingoftheOPERABLEDG.Ifitcanbedeterminedwithin24hoursthatthecauseoftheinoperableDGdoesnotexistontheOPERABLEDG,SR3.8.1.2isnotrequiredtobeperformed.IfthecauseofinoperabilityisdeterminedtoexistontheotherDG,thesecondDGwouldbedeclaredinoperableupondiscoveryandConditionEwouldbeentered.Oncethefailureisrepaired,thecommoncausefailurenolongerexists,andRequiredActionB.3.1issatisfied.IfthecauseoftheinitialinoperableDGcannotbeconfirmednottoexistonthesecondDGwithin24hours,performanceofSR3.8.1.2sufficestoprovideassuranceofcontinuedOPERABILITYofthatDG.IntheeventtheinoperableDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspriortocompletingeitherB.3.1orB.3.2,activitiesmustcontinuetoevaluatethecommoncausepossibility.Thiscontinuedevaluation,however,isnolongerunderthe24hourconstraintimposedwhileinConditionBEThe24hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoconfirmthattheOPERABLEDGisnotaffectedbythesameproblemastheinoperableDG(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-13DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.4WithoneinoperableDG,theremainingOPERABLEDGandtheoffsitecircuitareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.The7dayCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1Withoffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)andoneDGinoperable,redundancyislostinboththeoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpowersystems.Sincepowersystemredundancyisprovidedbythesetwodiversesourcesofpower,theACpowersourcesareonlydegradedandnolossofsafetyfunctionhasoccurredsinceatleastoneDGandpotentiallyoneoffsiteACpowersourceareavailable.However,theplantisvulnerabletoasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovidedtoeitherrestoretheoffsitepowercircuitortheDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeislessthanthatforaninoperableoffsitepowersourceoraninoperableDGduetothesinglefailurevulnerabilityofthisconfiguration.AsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoeithertrainwereinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofthisConditionaremodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthat'theRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4"mustalsobeimmediatelyenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.ThisallowsConditionCtoproviderequirementsforthelossofanoffsitepowercircuitandoneDG,withoutregardtowhetheratrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.9providestheappropriaterestrictionsforade-energizedtrain.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-14DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheinoperableACelectricpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1IfbothDGsareinoperable,alossofsafetyfunctionwouldexistifoffsitepowerwereunavailable;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeentered.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSJTheACsourcesaredesignedtopermitinspectionandtestingofallimportantareasandfeatures,especiallythosethathaveastandbyfunction(Ref.2).Periodiccomponenttestsaresupplementedbyextensivefunctionaltestsduringrefuelingoutages(undersimulatedaccidentconditions).SR3.8.1.1ThisSRensurespropercircuitcontinuityfortheindependentoffsitepowersourcetoeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandavailabilityofoffsiteACelectricalpower.Checkingbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityverifiesthateachbreakerisinitscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloadsareconnectedtotheirqualifiedpowersource.TheFrequencyof7daysisadequatesincebreakerpositionisnotlikelytochangewithouttheoperatorsknowledgeandbecausealarmsandindicationsofbreakerstatusareavailableinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-15DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.2ThisSRverifiesthateachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.ThisensurestheavailabilityoftheDGtomitigateDBAsandtransientsandtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.TheDGvoltagecontrolmaybeeitherinmanualorautomaticduringtheperformanceofthisSR.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1indicatesthatperformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSRsinceSR3.8.1.9isacompletetestoftheDG.ThesecondNotestatesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.Thisminimizesthewearonmovingpartsthatdonotgetlubricatedwhentheengineisnotrunning.SR3.8.1.3ThisSRverifiesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloadsgreaterthanorequaltotheequivalentofthemaximumexpectedaccidentloads.Aminimumruntimeof60minutesisrequiredtostabilizeenginetemperatures.Amaximumruntimenottoexceed120minutesminimizesthetimethattheDGisconnectedtotheoffsitesource.AlthoughnopowerfactorrequirementsareestablishedbythisSR,theDGisnormallyoperatedatapowerfactorbetween0.85laggingand0.95lagging.Theupperloadbandlimitof2250kWisprovidedtoavoidroutineoverloadingoftheDGwhichmayresultinmorefrequentinspectionsinaccordancewithvendorrecommendationsinordertomaintainDGOPERABILITY.ThelowerloadbandlimitistheexpectedmaximumloadfollowingaDBA.InadditiontoverifyingtheDGcapabilityforsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloads,theDGventilationsystemshouldalsobeverifiedduringthissurveillance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-16DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.3TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismodifiedbyfourNotes.Note1indicatesthatdieselenginerunsforthisSurveillancemayincludegradualloading,asrecommendedbythemanufacturer,sothatmechanicalstressandwearonthedieselengineareminimized.Note2statesthatmomehtarytransientsoutsidetheloadband(e.g.,duetochangingbusloads),donotinvalidatethistest.Similarly,momentarypowerfactortransientsaboveorbelowtheadministrativelimitdonotinvalidatethetest.Note3indicatesthatthisSurveillanceshallbeconductedononlyoneDGatatimeinordertoavoidcommoncausefailuresthatmightresultfromoffsitecircuitorgridperturbations.Note4stipulatesaprerequisiterequirementforperformanceofthisSR.AsuccessfulperformanceofSR3.8.1.2orSR3.8.1.9mustprecedethissurveillancetopreventunnecessarystartsoftheDGs.'R3.8.1.4This,SRprovidesverificationthattheleveloffueloilineachdaytankisatorabovethelevelatwhichfueloilisautomaticallyaddedwhenthefueloiltransferpumpisinautoandtheDGisoperating.Thislevelensuresadequatefueloilforaminimumof1hourofDGoperationat110%offullload.Thisisequivalenttoadaytanklevelof8.25inchesabovethetanksuctionline.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoensurethatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sincelowlevelalarmsareprovidedandoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-17DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.5ThisSRdemonstratesthateachDGfueloiltransferpumpoperatesandtransfersfueloilfromitsassociatedstoragetanktoitsassociateddaytank.ThisisrequiredtosupportcontinuousoperationoftheDGs.ThisSurveillanceprovidesassurancethatthefueloiltransferpumpisOPERABLE,thefueloilpipingsystemisintact,thefueldeliverypipingisnotobstructed,andthecontrolsandcontrolsystemsforautomaticormanualfueltransfersystemsareOPERABLE.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,sincethedesignofthefueloiltransfersystemissuchthatpumpsoperateautomaticallyormustbestartedmanuallyinordertomaintainanadequatevolumeoffueloilinthedaytanksduringorfollowingDGoperation.SR3.8.1.6ThisSRinvolvesthetransferofthe480Vsafeguardsbuspowersupplyfromthe50/50modetothe100/0modeand0/100modewhichdemonstratestheOPERABILITYofthealternatecircuitdistributionnetworktopowertherequiredloads.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationtheplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.Operatingexperiencehas.shownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassth'eSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-18DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.7ThisSRverifiesthateachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof~295kM.EachDGisprovidedwithanengineoverspeedtriptopreventdamagetotheengine.Recoveryfromthetransientcausedbythelossofalargeloadcouldcausedieselengineoverspeed,which,ifexcessive,mightresultinatripoftheengine.Thi'sSRdemonstratestheDGloadresponsecharacteristicsandcapabilitytorejectthelargestsingleloadonthebusessuppliedbytheDG(i.,e.,asafetyinjectionpump).InordertoensurethattheDGistestedunderloadconditionsthatareasclosetodesignbasisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactor,s0.9lagging.ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresentativeoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthattheDGwouldexperience.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinHODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseHODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult,plantsafetysystems.ThesecondNoteacknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-19DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.8ThisSRdemonstratesthatDGnoncriticalprotectivefunctions(e.g.,overcurrent,reversepower,localstoppushbutton)arebypassedonanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal,andcriticalprotectivefunctions(engineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andstartfailure(overcrank)relay)triptheDGtoavertsubstantialdamagetotheDG.ThenoncriticaltripsarebypassedduringDBAsbutstillprovideanalarmonanabnormalenginecondition.Thisalarmprovidestheoperatorwithsufficienttimetoreactappropriately.TheDGavailabilitytomitigatetheDBAismorecriticalthanprotectingtheengineagainstminorproblemsthatarenotimmediatelydetrimentaltoemergencyoperationoftheDG.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsidetationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,'hisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremovearequiredDGfromservicewhichisundesirableintheseMODES.ThesecondNoteacknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.SR3.8.1.9IntheeventofaDBAcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower,theDGsarerequiredtosupplythenecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,RCS,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-20DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.8.1.9(continued)ThisSRdemonstratestheDGoperationduringanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationofconnectionandloadingofloads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbythreeNotes.Note1statesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodwhichisintendedtominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginelubeoilcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendationsfortheDGs.Note2states.thatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4sinceperformingtheSurveillanceduringtheseMODESwouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,causeperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystems,andchallengesafetysystems'ote3acknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-21(continued)DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter8.2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.3.UFSAR,Section9.4.9.5.4.UFSAR,Chapter6.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.7."AmericanNationalStandard,NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.8.GenericLetter84-15,"ProposedStaffActionstoImproveandMaintainDieselGeneratorReliability,"July2,1984.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-22DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1SWlTCHYARD115KVSTATJON15AJJAJHJOllR10JOJ/115KVSAT1~SAT1JS54$KVH100V10KVl1150VUQT1RIX~ISAY~)!SX~1ISYdlCIVQJS15S41OJVBUS11BOUlNYGKR4150VRJS11A5160VBUSJJJANO.15STASERVICC1NO.15SERVCSNO.1<4eVBUS15eeVBUS1e0+4MVBUS1~SUSldnapJOdSJNO.17)XFMANO.15~~VIN!ttl40VBLJSldOFFSJTEPOWERSOURCEt+JJUSTBEOPERWHENTangi2OPF~ON8JTE480YBUSflJ~ONSAESTANDBYEMEROENCYSOURCEFigureB3.8.1-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-23DraftB

ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.2ACSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletothesesBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6theminimumrequiredACsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACpowersources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandling.accidentareavailable;andb.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-24DraftB ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinNODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.IJDuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdown'odesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-25DraftB

ACSources-HODES5and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Haintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingHODEI,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinHODE5or6thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power..TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitsupplyingtheassociatedACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6,"ensuresthatallrequiredloadsarepoweredfromoffsitepower.AnOPERABLEDG,capableofsupportingthedistributionsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,ensuresadiversepowersourceisavailable'oprovideelectricalpowersupport,.assumingalossoftheindependentoffsitepowercircuit.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredoffsitecircuitandDGensurestheavailabilityofsufficientACsourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).AnOPERABLEqualifiedoffsitecircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguardsbus(es).Powerfromeitheroffsitepower'circuit751or767,orbybackfeedingthroughauxiliarytransformerllsatisfiesthisrequirement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-26DraftB ACSources-NODES5and6B3.8.2BASESLCO(continued)ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:'a~b.C.d.e.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pump,andcontainmentspray(CS)pumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentsafetyinjection(SI)andundervoltagesignal);TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsmanually.SincemostequipmentwhichreceivesaSIsignalareisolatedintheseNODESduetomaintenanceorlowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionconcerns,andtheDHAofconcern(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)wouldnotgenerateaSIsignal,manualloadingoftheDGswillmostlikelyberequired.TheseloadsmustbecapableofbeingaddedtotheOPERABLEDGwithin10minutes;TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfora1hourat110%designloads;ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andAventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-27(continued)DraftB ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheACsources.requiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedeventsandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.lAsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystem'sACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoitareinoperable,resultinginde-energization~Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethatwhenConditionAis'enteredwithnoonsiteoroffsiteACpowertoanyrequired480Vsafeguardsbus,theACTIONSforLCO3.8.10mustalsobeimmediatelyentered.ThisNoteallowsConditionAto'providerequirementsforthelossoftheoffsitepowercircuit,whetherornotatrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.10wouldprovidetheappropriaterestrictionsforthesituationinvolvingacompletelyde-energizedtrain.llWith'offsitepoweravailabletooneormorerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)inoperable,assurancemustbeprovidedthatthereisnotacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,onetrainwithoffsitepoweravailablemaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,oroperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablethatarenotpoweredfromoffsitepower,appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.Requiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaqualifiedoffsitepowercircuit,evenifthatcircuitisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-28DraftB

ACSources-NODES5and6B3.8.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4WiththeoffsitepowercircuitnotavailabletoallrequiredACelectricaltrains,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredoffsitepowerACsourcesandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequiredoffsitepowersourcesshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethe'imeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybe'ithoutsufficientpower.B.1B.2B.3andB.4WiththerequiredDGinoperable,theminimumrequireddiversityofACpowersourcesisnotavailable.Therefore,itisrequiredthatCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsbeimmediatelysuspended.PerformanceofRequiredActionB.I,B.2,andB.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeoftemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-29DraftB ~,0 ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESACTIONSB.1B.2B.3andB.4(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatusandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowerredundancytoplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmedtatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDGshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientredundantpower.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.2.1ThisSRrequirestheperFormanceofSRsfromLCO3.8.1thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheACsourcesinMODES5and6.ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDG(s)frombeingparalleledwiththeoffsitepowernetworkorotherwiserenderedinoperableduringperformanceofSRs,precludesde-energizingarequired480Vsafeguardsbus,andprecludesunnecessarytransfersoftheoffsitepowersourceconfigurations.WithlimitedACsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromiseboththerequiredcircuitandtheDG.Therefore,therequirementtoperformSR3.8.1.3,andSR3.8.1.6through3.8.1.9issuspended.'tistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.1foradiscussionofeachSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-30DraftB DieselFuelOilB3.8.3B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.3DieselFuelOilBASESBACKGROUNDFueloilisprovidedtoeachemergencydieselgenerator(DG)byadedicated350galdaytanklocatedneartheDG.Eachdaytankissuppliedfromanassociated6000galundergroundfueloilstoragetank.Eachstoragetankprovidesaminimumfueloilcapacityof5000gal.ThetwostoragetanksaresufficienttooperatebothDGsatdesignratingsfor24hours.ThetotalminimumfueloilcapacityalsoensuresthatbothDGscanoperateforaperiodof40hourswhileprovidingforamaximumpostlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)loaddemand.ThemaximumloaddemandiscalculatedusingtheassumptionthatbothDGsareavailableandislessthantheDGdesignrating.TheminimumonsitefuelcapacityissufficienttooperatetheDGsforlongerthan8hourswhichisthetimerequiredtoreplenishtheonsitesupplyfromoutsidesources(Ref.I).Fueloilistransferredfromeachstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankbyadedicatedfueloiltransferpump.Each.fueloiltransferpumpispoweredbya480Vsafeguardsbus'thatisbackedbytheassociatedDG.OnefueloiltransferpumphasthecapabilitytosupplybothDGsoperatingwith110%oftheirdesignloads.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valveortanktoresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.Alloutsidetanks,pumps,andpipingarelocatedundergroundtoprotectthemfrompotentialmissiles.HeattracingisprovidedintheexposedsuctionpipingtothefueloilpumpsintheeventthatheatingislostintheDGrooms.Theheattracingisthermostaticallycontrolledtomaintainthefueloilinthepipe)40'Fwhichisabovethecloudpointtemperatureofthefueloil(O').R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-31(continued)DraftB DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASES(continued)transientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemsareOPERABLE.TheDGsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainment.designlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."SAFETYANALYSESSincedieselfueloilsupportstheoperationofthestandbyACpowersources,itsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.APPLICABLETheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andLCOStoredonsitedieselfueloilisrequiredtohave,sufficientsupplyfor40hoursofmaximumpost-LOCAloaddemand.Itisalsorequiredtomeetspecificstandardsforquality.Thisrequirement,inconjunctionwithanabilitytoobtainreplacementfueloilsupplieswithin8hours,supportstheavailabilityofDGsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandtomaintainitinasafeconditionforananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(A00)orapostulatedDBAwithlossofoffsitepower.DGdaytankfuelrequirements,aswellastransfercapabilityfromthestoragetanktothedaytank,areaddressedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-HODES5and6."APPLICABILITYTheACsources(LCO3.8;1andLCO3.8.2)arerequiredtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranA00orapostulatedDBA.SincestoreddieselfueloilsupportsLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2,storeddieselfueloilisrequiredtobewithinlimitsinHODES1,2,3and4,andwhentheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-32(continued)DraftB DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lWithoneormorerequiredDGswithanonsitesupplyof<5000galoffueloil,theassumed40hourfueloilsupplyforaDGisnotavailable.Thiscircumstancemaybecausedbyevents,suchasfullloadoperationafteraninadvertentstartwithaninitialminimumrequiredfueloillevel,orfeedandbleedoperations,whichmaybenecessitatedbyincreasingfueloilparticulatelevelsoranynumberofotheroilqualitydegradations.RequiredActionA.Iallowssufficienttimeforobtainingtherequisitereplacementvolumeandperformingtheanalysesrequiredpriortoadditionoffueloiltothetank.TheCompletionTimeof12hoursisconsideredsufficienttocompleterestorationoftherequiredlevelpriortodeclaringtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisacceptablebasedontheremainingcapacity,thefactthatactionswillbeinitiatedtoobtainreplenishment,andthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiod.B.lIfoneormoreDGshasstoredfueloilwithtotalparticulatesnotwithinlimitsforreasonsnotrelatedtonewfueloil,thefueloilmustberestoredwithinlimitswithin7days.ThefueloilparticulatepropertiesareverifiedbySR3.8.3.2.Trendingofparticulatelevelsnormallyallowssufficienttimetocorrecthighparticulatelevelspriortoreachingthelimitofacceptability.Poorsamplepractices(bottomsampling),contaminatedsamplingequipment,orerrorsinlaboratoryanalysiscanproducefailuresthatdonotfollowatrend.Sincethepresenceofparticulatesdoesnotmeanfailureofthefueloiltoburnproperlyinthedieselengine,andparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,andproperengineperformancehasbeenrecentlydemonstrated(within31days),itisprudenttoallowabriefperiodpriortodeclaringtheassociatedDGinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsforfurtherevaluation,resamplingandre-analysisoftheDGfueloil.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-33DraftB

DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1WiththenewfueloilpropertiesdefinedinSR3.8.3.2notwithinrequiredlimits,aperiodof30daysisallowedforrestoringthestoredfueloilproperties.Thisperiodprovidessufficienttimetotestthestoredfueloiltodeterminethatthenewfueloil,whenmixedwithpreviouslystoredfueloil,remainsacceptable,ortorestorethestoredfueloilproperties.Thisrestorationmayinvolvefeedandbleedprocedures,filtering,orcombinationsoftheseprocedures.EvenifaDGstartandloadwasrequiredduringthistimeintervalandthefueloilpropertieswereoutsidelimits,thereisahighlikelihoodthattheDGwouldstillbecapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.D.1WithaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet,oroneormoreDG'sfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanaddressedbyConditionsA,B,orC~(e.g.,cloudpointtemperaturereached),theassociatedDGmaybeincapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperable.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.3.1ThisSRverifiesanonsitesupplyof~5000galoffuel'ilisavailableforeachrequiredDG.ThisensuresthatthereisanadequateinventoryoffueloilinthestoragetankstosupporteachDG'soperationfor40hourswhileprovidingmaximumpost-LOCAloads.The40hourperiodissufficienttimetoplacetheplantinasafeshutdownconditionandtobringinreplenishmentfuelfromanoffsitelocation.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoensurethatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sinceindicationsareavailabletoensurethatoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-34DraftB DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.3.2\ThisSRprovidesameansofdeterminingwhethernewandstoredfueloilhasbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatwouldhaveanimmediate,detrimentalimpactondieselenginecombustion.ThisensurestheavailabilityofhighqualityfueloilfortheDGs.Fueloildegradationduringlongtermstorageisindicatedbyanincreaseinparticulate,duemostlytooxidation.Thepresenceofparticulatedoesnotmeanthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyinadieselengine.Theparticulatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueloilinjectionequipment,however,whichcouldeventuallycauseenginefailure.AfueloilsampleisanalyzedtoestablishthatpropertiesspecifiedinTableIofASTHD975-78(Ref.4)forviscosity,water,andsedimentaremetforthestoredfueloil.TheFrequencyofthisSRtakesintoconsiderationfueloildegradationtrendsthatindicatethatparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenFrequencyintervals.TheFrequency,asspecifiedintheDieselFuelOilTestingProgram,is92days,REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.5.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.ASTHStandards,D975-78,Tablel.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-35DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.4DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents'wosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).SeparatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforthesetwoelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandwhethertheyareClassIE(i.e.,supplysafetyrelatedorengineeredsafeguardsfunctions)ornonessential.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofDCpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplytheDC.busesandtheirassociateddistributionsystemduringMODES1,2,3,and4.ThestationDCelectricalpowersubsystemprovidestheACemergencypowersystemwithcontrolpower.ItalsoprovidesbothmotiveandcontrolpowertoselectedsafetyrelatedequipmentandpreferredACinstrumentbuspower(viainverters).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.1)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheengineeredsafetyfeaturesandprotectionsystems.The125VDCelectricalpowersystemconsistsoftwoindependentandredundantsafetyrelatedClasslEDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrain(TrainAandTrainB).Eachsubsystemconsistsofone125VDCbattery,twobatterychargerssuppliedfromthe480Vsystem,distributionpanelsandbuses,andalltheassociatedcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThebatteriesandbatterychargersareaddressedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-36DraftB DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)EachbatteryprovidesaseparatesourceofDCpowerindependentofACpower.EachofthetwobatteriesiscapableofcarryingitsexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.HajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.2).Therearefourbatterychargersavailabletothebatteries.Chargers1Aand1Bareratedat150ampsandchargerslA1and1Blareratedat200amps.Batterychargers1AandlAlarenormallyalignedtobatteryA,andbatterychargers1Band1BlarenormallyalignedtobatteryB.Achargingcapacityofatleast150ampsisnormallyrequiredtosupplythenecessaryDCloadsoneachtrainandtoprovideafullbatterychargeto'ensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheDCpowerdistributionsystemisdescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-HODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6."TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsoprovideDCelectricalpowertotheinverters,whichinturnpowertheACinstrumentbuses.TheinvertersaredescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.8,"ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and6."TrainAEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)equipmentissuppliedfrombatteryA,whileTrainBESFequipmentissuppliedfrombatteryB.Additionally,the480VESFswitchgearanddieselgenerator(DG)controlpanelsaresuppliedfromeitherbatterybymeansofanautomatictransfercircuitintheswitchgear'andcontrolpanels.ThenormalsupplyfromTrainA(Buses14and18andDGA)isfromDCdistributionpanelsA.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencyDCsupplyforTrainB.Similarly,thenormalsupplyfromTrainB(Buses16and17andDGB)isfromDCdistributionpanelsB.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencydcsupplyforTrainA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-37DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Each.125VDCbatteryandassociatedbatterychargersareseparatelyhousedinaventilatedroomwithitsassociateddistributioncenter.Eachsubsystemislocatedinanareaseparatedphysicallyandelectricallyfromtheothersubsystemtoensurethatasinglefailureinonesubsystemdoesnotcauseafailureinaredundantsubsystem.ThetwobatteryroomsaresuppliedwithventilationbyacommonACpoweredairconditioningandheatingunitwhichalsoprovidessufficientairchangestopreventhydrogenbuildup.AredundantDCpoweredfanisalsoavailableintheeventthatallACpowerislost.ThefailureofboththeACpoweredandDCpoweredunitsdoesnotresultinunacceptableroomserviceconditionsuntilafter5hoursofcontinuousbatteryoperationduringaDBA(Ref.2).ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemaresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesandthe100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.Theminimumvoltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltageoutputof128Vperbattery.EachbatterychargerfortheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemhasamplepoweroutputcapacityforthesteadystateoperationofconnectedloadsrequiredduringnormaloperation,whileatthesametimemaintainingitsbatterybankfullycharged.Eachbatterychargeralsohassufficientcapacitytorestorethebatteryfromthedesignminimumchargetoitsfullychargedstatewithin24hourswhilesupplyingnormalsteadystateloadsdiscussedintheUFSAR,Chapter8(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofaDBAandtransientanalyses(Refs.3,4,and5),assumethatESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerfortheDGs,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallMODESofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-38DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheOPERABILITYoftheDCsourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingatleastonetrainofDCsourceOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworst,casesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCelectricalpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofone,DCelectricalpowersource).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamline-breakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofDCpowerensuresthatatleastoneDCpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,a'edundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxi'liarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.6).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.7)canbemetatalltimes.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-39(continued)DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)LCOTheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersources,eachconsistingofonebattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.LossofanyonetrainDCelectricalpowersourcedoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionfrombeingperformed;AnOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcerequiresthebatteryandatleastonebatterychargerwithacapacity~150ampstobeoperatingandconnectedtotheassociatedDCbus.TheACpoweredandDCpoweredfanunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmayberequiredforSR3.8.6.4andSR3.8.6.5.APPLICABILITYTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensuresafeplantoperationandtoensurethat:a~b.Acceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolant'pressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasa,resultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andAdequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-40(continued)DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lWithoneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable,OPERABILITYmustberestoredwithin2hours.InthisCondition,redundancyislostandonlyonetrainiscapabletocompletelyrespondtoanevent.IfoneoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesisinoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowersourcehasthecapacitytosupportasafeshutdownandtomitigateanaccidentcondition.Asubsequentworstcasesinglefailurewould,however,resultinthecompletelossoftheremaining125VDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemwithattendantlossofESFfunctions.The2hourCompletionTimereflectsareasonable'imetoassessplantstatusasafunctionoftheinoperableDCelectricalpowersubsystemand,iftheDCelectricalpowersourceisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,topreparetoeffectanorderlyandsafeplantshutdown.B.landB.2IftheinoperableDCelectricalpowersourcecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothDCelectricalpowersourcesareinoperable,alossofmultiplesafetyfunctionsexists;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-41~(continued)DraftB DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.4.1Verifyingbatteryterminalvoltagewhileonfloatchargeforthebatterieshelpstoensuretheeffectivenessofthechargingsystemandtheabilityofthebatteriestoperformtheirintendedfunction.Floatchargeistheconditioninwhichthechargerissupplyingthecontinuouschargerequiredtoovercometheinternallossesofabattery(orbatterycell)andmaintainthebattery(orabatterycell)inafullychargedstate.Thevoltagerequirementsarebasedonthenominaldesignvoltageofthebatteryandareconsistentwiththeinitialvoltagesassumedinthebatterysizingcalculations.The7dayFrequencyisconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendationsandIEEE-450(Ref.8).SR3.8.4.2ThisSRverifiesthatthecapacityofeachbatteryisadequatetosupplyandmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.Abatteryservicetestisaspecialtestofbatterycapability,asfound,tosatisfythedesignrequirements(batterydutycycle)oftheDCelectricalpowersystem.ThedischargerateandtestlengthcorrespondstothedesigndutycyclerequirementsspecifiedinReference2.TheSurveillanceFrequencyof24monthsisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.32(Ref.9)andRegulatoryGuide1.129(Ref.10),whichstatethatthebatteryservicetestshouldbeperformedduringrefuelingoperationsoratsomeotheroutage,withintervalsbetweentestsnottoexceed24months.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1statesthatSR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2..=ThissubstitutionisacceptablebecauseSR3.8.4.3representsamoreseveretestofbatterycapacitythandoesSR3.8.4.2.Note2statesthatthissurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4'becauseperformingtheSurveillancewouldperturbtheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-42DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.4.3ThisSurveillanceverifiesthateachbatterycapacityis~80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.Abatteryperformancetestisatestofconstantcurrentcapacityofabattery,normallydoneinthe'sfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacityasdeterminedbyspecifiedacceptancecriteria.Thetestisintendedtodetermineoverallbatterydegradationduetoageandusage.Abatteryshouldbereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80%ofthemanufacturerrating.Acapacityof80%showsthatthebatteryrateofdeteriorationisincreasing,evenifthereisamplecapacitytomeettheloadrequirements.TheFrequencyforthisSRis60monthswhenthebatteryis<85%ofitsexpectedlifewithnodegradationand12monthsifthebatteryshowsdegradationorhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithacapacity<100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.Whenthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithcapacitya100%ofthemanufacturer'srating,theFrequencybecomes24months.Batterydegradationisindicatedwhenthebatterycapacitydropsbymorethan10%relativetoitscapacityonthepreviousperformancetestorwhenitis~10%belowthemanufacturerrating.TheseFrequenciesareconsideredacceptablebasedonthetestingbeingperformedinaconservativemannerrelativetothebatterylifeanddegradation.Thisensuresthatbatterycapacityisadequatelymonitoredandthatthebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNote,statingthatthisSRshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseMODES;performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-43(continued)DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.3.UFSAR,Section9.4.9,3.4.UFSAR,Chapter6.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.8.IEEE-450-1980.9.RegulatoryGuide1.32,February1977.10.RegulatoryGuide1.129,December1974.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-44DraftB m41$0VSUSIt8elA>>>>TRANSIQRMKRNO.N)9T.'LC,VITALSATTERYSTAllONSERVICETTIAICÃQIWERNO.14TALLSATTERVDOCOeCCTnTlICICDIDErJ~CDCOIGJUlCOIISATTERYCNIAOERIIAIIPANELAIVlQDCTRllNAAUIOSThllOTRAN5FKR125VASATT.ShlTERVSATTKRVbgCHASSERSWlfCH1AJTA.C.+VITKSATT.,'ANUKTNIIOWOVERISWIICHTANVAIIOVOLT]CONST.VOLTAOETRVIKVQIWKRA~)0)IttIVSATTKRV8SATTKRVcwea18IIMNKfER~)0)ISAlTKRYCNNeERII101IMCCAKMELINSTILLFQRMKRTAKVA120%QLT76KVAIIOWXTCONST.VOLTAOETIIANSFOAMEh8CAOIAICOC7tllINSTILSOS40NOXMAILVCPKNWHENTIIg>>t00F8DCSmJRCEfOCONT.SVNELI5':OCELEC.POWERSOURCES~LJSIST.SUSPOWERSOURCESL>>lDICOCL DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODESI,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredDCelectricalsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES:Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheDCelectricalsources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredDCelectricalsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumDCelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Requiredfeaturesneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;b.Requiredfeaturesnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andc~"Instrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringand'aintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-46DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODES1,2,3,and4haveno'specificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceof,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequ'ired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODE1,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesign=requirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-47DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportthedistributionsubsystemsrequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."IfonlyoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,theminimumsourceconsistsofabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithintherequiredtrain.IfbothDCelectricalpowertrainsare,required,oneDCsourcemustcontainabattery,acharging.capacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainsystem.ThesecondDCsourcemayconsistofonlyabatterychargerwithacapacityof,atleast150amps,orabattery,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling.Thetwomustbesufficientlyindependentthatalossofalloffsitepowersources,alossofonsitestandbypower,oraworstcase'singlefailuredoesnotaffectmorethan'nerequiredDCelectricalpowertrain.ThisensurestheavailabilityofsufficientDCelectricalpowersourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequen'cesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).TheACpoweredandDCpoweredfanventilationunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmaybe'requiredtomeetSR3.8.6.4andSR3.8.6.5.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-48DraftB

DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASES(continued).APPLICABILITYTheDCelectricalpowersourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheaffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.lAlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6,".theremainingDCelectricaltrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientsystemstoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,andoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperableassociatedwiththerequiredinoperableDCpowersource(s),appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.RequiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaDCelectricalsource,evenifthatsourceisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-49DraftB 0 DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4WithoneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDCelectricalpowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryDCelectricalpowertotheplantsafetysystems.ATheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththe.requiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.8.5.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofSRsfromLCO3.8.4thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersubsysteminMODES5and6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-50DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.5.1(continued)ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcefrombeingremovedfromservicetoperformabatteryservicetestoraperformancedischargetest.WithlimitedDCsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromisemultiplerequiredsafetyfeatures.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDCelectricalpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.4foradiscussionofthespecifiedSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-51DraftB

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.6BatteryCellParametersBASESBACKGROUNDEachDCelectricalpowertraincontainsa125VDCbatterywhichiscapableofcarryingtheexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.1).ThebatteriesarenormallyinstandbysincetheassociatedbatterychargersprovidefortherequiredDCsystemloads.ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpoweraresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesand100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.ThisLCOdelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytetemperature,level,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityfortheDCpowersourcebatteriestoensurethatthebatteriesarecapableofperformingtheirsafetyfunctionasrequiredbyLCO3.8.4,"DC'Sources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-52(continued)DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysesassumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE(Refs.2and3).TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerforthedieselgenerators,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallNODESofoperation.TheDCsourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."BatterycellparameterssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthatbatterycellparametersforTrainAandBbatteriesbewithinlimitstoensureavailabilityoftherequiredDCpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperational.occurrenceorapostulatedDBA.Batterycellparam'etersaredefinedforelectrolytelevel,temperature,floatvoltage,andspecificgravity.Thelimitsforelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityareconservativelyestablishedforbothdesignatedpilotcellsandconne'ctedcellswithinplantprocedures.FailuretomeettheseestablishedlimitsmayallowcontinuedDCelectricalsystemfunctionprovidedthatthelimitspecifiedintheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementforeachconnectedcellisnotexceeded.Theterm"connectedcell"excludesanybatterycellthatmaybejumperedout.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPl'antB3.8-53(continued)DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES"(continued)APPLICABILITYThebatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesarerequiredsolelyforthesupportoftheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystem.Therefore,thebatterycellparameterlimitsarerequiredtobemetwhentheDCpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.SincetheTrainAandTrainBbatteriessupportLCO3.8.4andLCO3.8.5,thebatterycellparametersarerequiredtobemetinMODESI,2,3,and4,andwhentheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyaNotetoprovideclarificationthatseparateconditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.SeparateConditionentryisacceptablesincethebatterycellparametersareprovidedonabatterybasis.A.lWithoneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersoutsidethelimitsforanyconnectedcell,sufficientcapacitytosupplythemaximumexpectedloadrequirementisnotassuredandthecorrespondingDCelectricalpowertrainmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperableandactions'takenperLCO3.8.4orLCO3.8.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-54(continued)DraftB

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.6.1ThisSRverifiesthattheelectrolytelevelofeachconnectedbatterycellisabovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing.ThisisconsistentwithIEEE'-'450(Ref.4)andensuresthattheplatessuffernophysicaldamageandmaintainadequateelectrontransfercapability.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450.SR3.8.6.2ThisSRverifiesthatthefloatvoltageofeachconnectedbatterycellis>2.07V.ThislimitisbasedonIEEE-450(Ref.4)whichstatesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelow,underfloatconditionsandnotcausedbyelevatedtemperatureofthecell,indicatesinternalcellproblemsandmayrequirecellreplacement.Thefrequencyof31daysisalsoconsistentwithIEEE-450.SR3.8.6.3ThisSRverifiesthespecificgravityof,thedesignatedpilotcellineachbatteryis>1.188forBatteryAand~l.192forBatteryB.Thesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendations.AccordingtoIEEE-450(Ref.4),thespecificgravityreadingsarebasedonatemperatureof77F(25'C).Thespecificgravityreadingsarecorrectedforactualelectrolytetemperature.Foreach3'F(1.67C)'bove77F(25C),1point(0.001)isaddedtothereading;1pointissubtractedforeach3'Fbelow77'F.Thespecificgravityoftheelectrolyteinacellincreaseswithalossofwaterduetoelectrolysisorevaporation.Becauseofspecificgravitygradientsthatareproducedduringtherechargingprocess,delaysofseveraldaysmayoccurwhilewaitingforthespecificgravitytostabilize.Astabilizedchargercurrentisanacceptablealternativetospecificgravitymeasurementfordeterminingthestateofcharge.ThisphenomenonisfurtherdiscussedinIEEE-450.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-55DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3'.6.4ThisSRverifiestheaverageelectrolytetemperatureofthedesignatedpilotcellineachbatteryis~55'F.Thistemperaturelimitisaninitialassumption'ofthebatterycapacitycalculations.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.4).SR3.8.6.5ThisSRverifiesthattheaveragetemperatureofeveryfifthcellofeachbatteryis~55'F.ThisisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofIEEE-450(Ref.4).Lowerthannormal'emperaturesacttoinhibitorreducebatterycapacity.ThisSRensuresthattheoperatingtemperaturesremainwithinanacceptableoperatingrange.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450.SR3.8.6.6ThisSRverifiesthespecificgravityofeachconnectedcellisnotmore.than0.020belowaverageofallconnectedcellsandthattheaverageofallconnectedcellsis>1.188forBatteryAanda1.192forBatteryB.ThesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendationsandIEEE-450(Ref.4)whichensuresthattheeffectofahighlychargedornewcelldoesnotmaskoveralldegradationofthebattery.ThetemperaturecorrectionforspecificgravityreadingsisthesameasthatdiscussedforSR3.8.6.3.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section3.8.2.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.'EEE-450-1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-56DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.7ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)isnormallysuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanon-Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigure3.8.4-1).Thesethree120VACinstrumentbuses(A,B,andC)supplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuatetheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andothercomponents(Ref.1).ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentHonitoringInstrumentation."InstrumentBusesAandCcanbesuppliedpowereitherfrominverterswhicharepoweredfromseparateandredundantDCpowersources,anon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower,oraClass1ECVT(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).TheinvertersarethepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusAandCbecauseofthestabilityandreliabilitytheyachieve.InstrumentBusBcanbesuppliedpowerfromeitheraClass1ECVToranon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower.TheClass1ECVT,suppliedbymotorcontrolcenterC(HCCCissuppliedby480VsafeguardsBus14),isthepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusBbecauseofthepotentialtohaveapowerinterruptionifoffsitepowerwereunavailable,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-57DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Themajorityofinstrumentationandcontrolssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesarefailsafedevicessuchthattheygototheirpostaccidentpositionuponlossofpower.However,anotableexceptiontothisistheactuationlogicforContainmentSpray(CS)Systemwhichrequires120VACand125VDCpowerinordertofunction.ThispreventsaspuriousCSactuationfromoccurringifcontrolpowerwerelost.TheactuationlogicforCSispoweredfromallthreeinstrumentbusesandfrombothDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrains.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidetherequiredcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertotheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbasedonmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingrequiredACinstrumentbusesOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACelectricalpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofACinstrumentbusesareavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneACinstrumentbuspowersource).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-58DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofACinstrumentbuspoweralsoensuresthatatleastonetrainofACinstrumentbusesisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.4).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.5)canbemetatalltimes.TheACinstrumentbussourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPoli,cyStatement.LCOTheACinstrumentbussourcesensuretheavailabilityof120VACelectricalpowerfortheinstrumentationforsystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.MaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClass1E480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-59DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESLCO(continued)ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").ForaClass1ECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").APPLICABILITYTheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintained.intheeventofapostulatedDBA.ACinstrument.buspowerrequirementsforMODES5and6arecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.8,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3Withaninverterinoperable,itsassociatedACinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromeitheritsClasslEornon-ClasslECVT.RequiredActionA.1allowstheinstrumentbustobepoweredfromeitheritsassociatedClass1ECVTorfromanon-ClasslECVT.ForInstrumentBusesAandC,thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanon-safetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursisconsistentwithLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4".(contihued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-60DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESACTIONSA.1A.2andA'.3(continued)RequiredActionA.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethattheinstrumentbuscanbeconnectedtoanon-Class1Epowersupply.The24hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClass1ECVTortheinverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheconnectiontoanon-Class1Epowersupply.RequiredActionA.3allows72hourstofixtheinoperableinverterandrestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.The72hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairaninverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheinverterinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhentheACinstrumentbusispoweredfromitsCVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleACelectricalpowersources(offsiteandonsite).Theuninterruptible,batterybackedinvertersourcetotheACinstrumentbusesisthepreferredsourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.B.landB.2WiththeClass1ECVTforInstrumentBusBinoperable,theinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromitsnon-ClasslECVT.RequiredActionB.1requiresInstrumentBusBtobepoweredfromitsnon-Class1ECVTwithin2hours.Thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanonsafetyrelated480Vmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-61DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESACTIONSB.1and'.2(continued)RequiredActionB.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethatInstrumentBusBcanbeconnectedtoanon-ClassIEpowersupply.The7daylimitisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetime'equiredtorepairtheClassIECVTandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheClassIECVTinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhenInstrumentBusBispoweredfromitsnon-ClassIECVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleoffsiteACelectricalpowersources.TheClassIE,dieselgeneratorbacked,CVTtoInstrumentBusBisthepreferredpowersourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.C.landC.2IftheinoperabledevicesorcomponentscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorotherRequiredActionsarenotcompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionAorB,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.'.lIftwoormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenbothinverters,oroneormoreinvertersandtheClasslECVTtoInstrumentBusBarediscoveredtobeinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-62(continued)DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.7.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.ThisverifiesthattheinvertersarefunctioningproperlyandACInstrumentBusAandCareenergizedfromtheirrespectiveinverter.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinvertersandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.SR3.8.7.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClasslECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.ThisverifiesthattheClasslECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatorto,theClasslECVTmalfunctions.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter8.3.2.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.5.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-63DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.8ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredACinstrumentbusesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACinstrumentbus.sources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalsubsystemisbasesontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABLETheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACinstrumentbuspower.SAFETYANALYSESsourcestoeachrequiredACinstrumentbusduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a~,b.C.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andInstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-64DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLEIngeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSAFETYANALYSESSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthe(continued),capabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheACinstrumentbusesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODES1,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions'hisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMO'DES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODE1,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-65DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroraloss'fallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClasslE480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-66DraftB e ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESLCO(continued)ForaClasslECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4).PowersourcesensuretheavailabilityofsufficientpowertotherequiredACinstrumentbusestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesof.postulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).APPLICABILITYTheinvertersrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.ACInstrumentBuspowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.7.ACTIONSA.1AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-NODES5and6,"theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablewiththeassociatedACinstrumentbuspowersourceinoperable,appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.ThisconditionmustbeenteredwhentheinvertersforInstrumentBusAorCareinoperable,ortheClass1ECVTforInstrumentBusBisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-67DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and6B3.8.8BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4WithoneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmay-involveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredACinstrumentbuspower.sourceshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpowerorpoweredfromanalternatepowersource.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTShSR3.8.8.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbuses.ThisSRverifiesthattheinverterisfunctioningproperlyandtheACinstrumentbusisenergizedfromtheinverter.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinverterandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-68DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.8.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClass1ECVTalignmentwhenInstrumentBusBisrequired.ThisverifiesthattheClass1ECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.3TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClass1ECVTmalfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-69DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.9"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactioncomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswhicharerequiredtosupplysafetyrelatedandEngineered.SafetyFeature(ESF)SystemsinMODES1,2,3,and4.TheonsiteClass1EAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsareeachdivided,intotworedundantandindependentdistributiontrains.Eachoftheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andtheirtrains,arediscussedindetailbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-70DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ACElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClasslEACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).Eachtrainconsistsoftwo480Vsafeguardsbuses,distributionpanels,motorcontrolcentersandloadcenters(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).The480Vsafeguardsbusesforeach.trainarecapableofbeingsuppliedfromtwosourcesofoffsitepoweraswellasadedicatedonsiteemergencydieselgenerator(DG)source.Thesepowersourcesarediscussedinmore.detailintheBasesforLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."The480Vsafeguardsbusesinturnsupplymotorcontrolcenters,distributionpanelsandloadcenterswhichsupplymotivepowertorequiredmotoroperatedvalves,pumps,dampers,oranyothercomponent.whichrequiresACpowertoperformitssafetyrelatedfunction.TheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliesoneofthethreerequiredACinstrumentbusesthroughaconstantvoltagetransformerandprovidesabackupsourcefortheothertwoinstrumentbuses.ThelistofallrequiredAC480VsafeguardsbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.DCElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClasslEDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainA'ndTrainB).EachtrainconsistsofaClasslEbatteryandtwobatterychargers(withacharging'apacityofatleast150amps)whichsupplyamain125VDCdistributionpanel(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."EachmaindistributionpanelsuppliessecondarydistributionpanelswhichprovidecontrolpowertoACpoweredcomponentsandcontrolpowerforotherdevicessuchassolenoidoperatedvalvesandairoperatedvalves.TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliestwoofthefourACinstrumentbusesthroughinverters.ThelistofallrequiredDCdistributionpanelsisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-71DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ACInstrumentBusElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)issuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanonClass1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).Thesethreebusesareorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).ThesetrainssupplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuateESFandothercomponents.TrainAconsistsoftwobuseswithonebus(InstrumentBusA)normallypoweredfromaninverterandtheother(InstrumentBusB)normallypoweredfromaClass1ECVT.TrainBconsistsofonebus(InstrumentBusC)normallypoweredfromaninverter.Thelong-termalternatepowersuppliesforInstrumentBusAandCaretwoClasslECVTs,eachpoweredfromthesametrainastheassociatedbatterychargers,andtheiruseisgovernedbyLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES1,2,3,and4."Thelistofrequired120VACinstrumentbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.ThelossofInstrumentBus0isaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentNonitoring(PAN)Instrumentation."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-72(continued)DraftB

DistributionSystems-NODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.Iand2)assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.Thisincludesmaintainingpower,distributionsubsystemsOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.Intheevent.ofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainofeachdistributionsubsystemisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofoffsitestandbyACpower).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-73DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)1Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneAC,DC,andACinstrumentbustrainisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwatertrainduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.3).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.4)canbemetatalltimes.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTrainAandTrainBoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.ThepowerdistributionsubsystemsandtheirtrainslistedinTableB3.8.9-1ensuretheavailabilityof'C,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerforthesystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-74DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESLCO(continued)OPERABLEAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelstobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.MaintainingtheTrainAandTrainBAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFisnotcompromised.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithintheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswillnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.TiebreakersbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionsubsystems,iftheyexist,mustbeopen.Thispreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowerdistributionsubsystemfrompropagatingtotheredundantsubsystem,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsystemandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanyofthefollowinglistedtiebreakersareclosed,theaffectedredundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisconsideredinoperable.Thisdoesnot,however,precludeACbusesfrombeingpoweredfromthesameoffsitecircuit.a.ACpower480Vsafeguardsbustiebreakers(Ref.5)Bus-Tie14-16Bus-Tie16-14"'us-Tie17-18Bus-Tie16-15Bus-Tie14-13b.DCcontrolpowerautomaticthrowoverswitches(innormalposition)(Ref.6)DGControlPanelADGControlPanelBBus14ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus16ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus17ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus18ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetP(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-75DraftB

DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESLCO(continued)c.TechnicalSupportCenterbatteryconnectionstoDCpowerBatteryAandB(Ref.6)TSC/BatteryAFusedDisconnectSwitchTSC/BatteryBFusedDisconnectSwitchThetraiisasspecifiedinTableB3.8.9-1onlyidentifythemajorAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcomponents.Atrainisdefinedtobeginfromtheboundaryofthepowersourcefortherespectivesubsystem(asdefinedin'thepowersourceLCOs),andcontinuesuptotheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponent(e.g.,safetyinjectionpump).TheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponentisonlyconsideredpartofthetrainwhenthedeviceisnot,capableofopeningtoisolatethefailedcomponentfromthetrain(e.g.,breakerunabletoopenanovercurrent).Otherwise,thefailureoftheisolationdevicetoclosetoprovidepowertothecomponentisaddressedbytherespectivecomponent'sLCO.Theisolationdevicefornonsafetyrelatedcomponentsareconsideredpartofthetrainsincethesedevicesmustbeavailabletoprotectthesafetyrelatedfunctions.Therefore,thetrainboundaryessentiallyendsatthemotorcontrolcenterorbuswhichsuppliesmultiplecomponents.Theinoperabilityofanycomponentwithintheabovedefinedtrainboundariesrendersthetraininoperable.APPLICABILITYTheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.Acceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolant.pressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandother.vitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-76DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABILITYElectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequirementsfor(continued)MODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."ACTIONSA.lWithoneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingACelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcompriseatrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hour'.TheworstcaseConditionAscenarioisonetrainwithoutACpower(i.e.,nooffsitepowertothetrainandtheassociatedDGinoperable)~InthisCondition,theplantismorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower.TheCompletionTimeforrestoringtheinoperabletrainbeforerequiringaplantshutdownislimitedto8hoursbecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyif'theplantoperator'sattentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessarytorestorepowertotheaffectedtrain;andb.Thepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwith.asinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithACpowerwhichresultsinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-77DraftB DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lWithoneACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdowntheplantandmaintainitinthesafeshutdowncondition.Overallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACinstrumentbustraincouldresultintheminimumESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,theACinstrumentbustrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionBrepresentsoneACinstrumentbustrainwithoutpowerwhichincludesthepotentiallossofboththeDC,sourceandtheassociatedACsourcestotheinstrumentbus.Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallnoninterruptiblepower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursduetothepotentialvulnerabilities.TakingexceptiontoLCO3:0.2forcomponentswithoutadequate120VACpower,thatwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hoursifdeclaredinoperable,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousApplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutadequate120VACpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;andc.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrain.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-78DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.l(continued)The2hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheimportancetosafetyofrestoringtheACinstrumentbustraintoOPERABLEstatus,theredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheotherOPERABLEinstrumentbustrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1WithoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredDCdistributionpanelsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionCrepresentsonetrainwithoutadequateDCpower(e.g.,thebatteryandrequiredbatterychargerareinoperable).Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallDCpower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursdueto"thispotentialvulnerability.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequateDCpower,whichwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hours,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutDCpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-79DraftB

DistributionSystems-HODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)c.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithDCpower.D.1andD.2IftheinoperabledistributionsubsystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.lWithtwotrainswithinoperableelectricalpower.distributionsubsystems,thepotentialforalossofsafetyfunctionisgreater.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionexists,noadditionaltimeisjustified,forcontinuedoperationandLCO3.0.3mustbeentered.ThisConditionmaybeenteredwiththelossoftwotrainsofthesameelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,orwithlossofTrainAofoneelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcoincidentwiththelossofTrainBofasecondelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsuchthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-80(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.9.1ThisSRverifiesthattheelectricalpowertrainsarefunctioningproperly,withallrequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,tie-breakersopen,andthebusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemis~420VAC;fortheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,~108.6VDC;andforACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,between113VAC.and123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Chapter6.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.4.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.5.UFSAR,Figure8.3-1.6.UFSAR,Figure8.3-6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-81DraftB

DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9TableB3.8.9-1(page1of1)ACandDCElectricalPowerDistributionSystemsDISTRIBUTIONSUBSYSTEMVOLTAGETRAINATRAIN8ACPower480VBus14Bus18Bus16Bus17DCPower125VHainOCFuseCabinetA(DCPDPC802A)HainOCDistributionPanelA(OCPDPCB03A)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPABOIA)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanelAI(DCPDPAB02A)OGAOCDistributionPanelA(DCPOPOGOIA)ScreenhouseDCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPSHOIA)HCBDCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPDC804A)MainOCFuseCabinet8(DCPDPC8028)HainOCDistributionPanel8(OCPDPC8038)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanel8(DCPDPABOIB)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelBl(DCPDPAB028)OG8OCDistributionPanel8(OCPDPOG018)ScreenhouseOCDistributionPanel8(DCPOPSH018)HCBDCDistributionPanel8(OCPDPCB048)TurbineBldgDCDistributionPanel,(DCPOPTBOIB)ACInstrumentBus120VBusABus8BusCR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-82DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODES5or6,thenumberofrequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,orthenumberofrequiredtrainswithintheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,mustbe'emovedfromservice.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITY-oftheminimumAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Systemsneededtomitigatea'fuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;b.C.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andInstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionandrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-83DraftB

DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYofthe.AC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.Dur'ingMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-84DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6thisLCOensures.thecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-85DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)LCOVariouscombinationsofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,trainswithinthesesubsystems,.andequipmentandcomponentswithinthesetrainsarerequiredOPERABLEbyotherLCOs,dependingonthespecificplantcondition.ImplicitinthoserequirementsistherequiredOPERABILITYofnecessarysupportfeatures.ThisLCOexplicitlyrequiresenergizationoftheportionsoftheelectricaldistributionsystemnecessarytosupportOPERABILITYofrequiredsystems,equipment,andcomponents-allspecificallyaddressedineachLCOandimplicitlyrequiredviathedefinitionofOPERABILITY.TheLCOswhichapplywhentheReactorCoolantSystemiss200'Fandwhichmayrequireasourceofelectricalpowerare:LCO3.1.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.12LCO3.7.9LCO3.9.2LCO3.9.4LCO3.9.5SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(GREATS)ActuationRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)NuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)'nd"CoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolant.Circulation-WaterLevel<23FtMaintainingthenecessarytrainsoftheAC,DC,and.ACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsenergizedensurestheavailabilityofsufficientpowertooperatetheplantinasafemannertomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-86DraftB

DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedeventandmaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheAC,DC,'ndACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.1.AlthoughredundantrequiredfeaturesmayrequireredundanttrainsofelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeOPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemtrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesassociatedwithaninoperabledistributionsubsystemortraininoperable,appropriaterestrictionsareimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5Withoneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsortrainsinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionofnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-87DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.'nadditiontoperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,A.2.3,andA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5requiresdeclaringRHRinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHRactions.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-88(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.10.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheelectricalpowerdistributiontrainsarefunctioningproperly,withalltherequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,requiredtie-breakersopen,andtherequiredbusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisz420VAC,fortheDCpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystem~108.6VDC,andforACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisbetween113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccountthecapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-89DraftB BoronConcentration3.9.13.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.1BoronConcentrationLCO3.9.1BoronconcentrationsoftheReactorCoolantSystem,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Boronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.A.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyA.3Initiateactiontorestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.1.1Verifyboron'concentrationiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.72hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-1DraftB NuclearInstrumentation3.9.23.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationLCO3.9.2Twosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsshall'beOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorinoperable.A.1ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyA.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyB.Twosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsinoperable.B.1ANDInitiateactionto'estoreonesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.2PerformSR3.9.1.1.4hoursANDOnceper12hoursthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-2DraftB NuclearInstrumentation3.9.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Noaudiblecountrate.C.1ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyC.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyC.3PerformSR3.9.1.14hoursANDOnceper12hoursthereafterSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.9.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.9.2.2.NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-3Draft8

ContainmentPenetrations3.9.33.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsLCO3.9.3Thecontainmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowingstatus:a.Theequipmenthatchshallbeeither:1.boltedinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,or2.isolatedbya.closureplatethatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment;b.Onedoorinthepersonnelairlockshallbeclosed;andC.Eachpenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereshallbeeither:I.closedbyamanualorautomaticisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent,or2.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITY:DuringCOREALTERATIONS,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelass'emblieswithincontainment.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentpenetrationsnotinrequiredstatus.A.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyA.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-4Draft8 ContainmentPenetrations3.9.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.3.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpenetrationisintherequiredstatus.7daysSR3.9.3.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft3.9.43.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.4ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23FtLCO3.9.4OneRHRloopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.NOTE-TherequiredRHRloopmayberemovedfromoperationfor~Ihourper8hourperiod,providednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)boronconcentration.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevel~23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RHRlooprequirementsnotmet.A.1SuspendoperationsinvolvingareductioninRCSboronconcentration.ANDImmediatelyA.2ANDSuspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.ImmediatelyA.3InitiateactiontosatisfyRHRlooprequirements.ANDImmediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-6DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft3.9.4ACTIONSCONDITION.REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.4Closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere.4hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.4.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-7DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft3.9.53.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.5ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtLCO3.9.5TwoRHRloopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LessthantherequirednumberofRHRloopsOPERABLE.A.lORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreRHRloop(s)toOPERABLEstatus.Initiateactiontoestablisha23ftofwaterabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ImmediatelyImmediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-8DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft3.9.5ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.NoRHRloopinoperation.B.lANDSuspendoperationsinvolvingareductioninReactorCoolantSystemboronconcentration.ImmediatelyB.2InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptooperation.ANDImmediatelyB.3Closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentto'outsideatmosphere.4hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.5.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.12hoursSR3.9.5.2VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-9DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevel3.9.63.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.6RefuelingCavityWaterLevelLCO3.9.6Refuelingcavitywaterlevelshallbemaintained~23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.APPLICABILITY:Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,DuringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Refuelingcavitywaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyA.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.withincontainment.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.6.1Verifyrefuelingcavitywaterlevelis~23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-10DraftB

BoronConcentrationB3.9.1B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.1BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThelimitontheboronconcentrationensuresthereactorremainssubcriticalduringNODE6.RefuelingboronconcentrationisthesolubleboronconcentrationinthefilledportionsoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcoreduringrefueling.Thesolubleboronconcentrationoffsetsthecorereactivityandismeasuredbychemicalanal'ysisofarepresentativesampleofthecoolant.Therefuelingboronconcentration.limitisspecifiedintheCoreOperationLimitsReport(COLR).Plantrefuelingproceduresensurethespecifiedboronconcentrationinordertomaintainanoverallcorereactivityofk,<<s0.95duringfuelhandling,withcontrolrodsandfuelassembliesassumedtobeinthemostadverseconfiguration(leastnegativereactivity)allowedbyplantrefuelingprocedures.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27requiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemspreferablyofdifferentdesignprinciplesbeprovided(Ref.I).Inadditiontothereactivitycontrolachievedbythecontrolrods,reactivitycontrolisprovidedbythechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)whichregulatestheconcentrationofboricacidsolution(neutronabsorber)intheRCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtoprevent,underanticipatedsystemmalfunction,uncontrolledorinadvertentreactivitychangeswhichmaystressordamagethefuelbeyondallowablelimits.Thereactorisbroughttoshutdownconditions(i.e.,MODE5)beforebeginningoperationstoopenthereactorvesselforrefueling.AftertheRCSiscooledanddepressurizedthevesselheadisunboltedandremoved.TherefuelingcanalandtherefuelingcavityarethenfloodedwithboratedwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetankthroughtheopenreactorvesselbygravityfeedingorbyuseoftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systempumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-1Draft8 0 BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThepumpingactionoftheRHRSystemintotheRCS,andthenaturalcirculationduetothermaldrivingheadsinthereactorvesselandrefuelingcavityprovidemixingfortheboratedcoolantintherefuelingcanal.TheRHRSystemisinoperationduringrefueling(seeLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft,"andLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft")toprovideforcedcirculationintheRCSandassistinmaintainingtheboronconcentrationintheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityabovetheCOLRlimit.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringrefuelingoperations,twotypesofaccidentscanoccurwithincontainmentthataffectthefuelandrequirecontrolofreactivity.Thesetwoaccidenttypesareafuelhandlingaccidentandaborondilutionevent.Bothaccidentsassumethatinitialcorereactivityisatitshighest(i.e.,atthebeginningofthefuelcycleortheendofrefueling).Afuelhandlingaccidentcanoccurduringfuelmovementinthereactorvessel,therefuelingcanal,ortherefuelingcavityandincludesadroppedfuelassemblyandanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly.Themostlimitingfuelhandlingaccidentisadroppedfuelassemblywhichisdroppedadjacenttootherfuelassembliessuchthatitresultsinthelargestexposureoffuelinthedroppedassembly.Thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivityforbothtypesofaccidents.Hence,theboronconcentrationensuresthatk,<<~0.95(i.e.,5%ak/kSHUTDOWNMARGIN)duringtherefuelingoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-2DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThesecondtypeofaccidentisaborondilutioneventwhichresultsfrominadvertentadditionofunboratedwatertotheRCS,refuelingcavity,andrefuelingcanal.Theassumptionsusedintheborondilutionevent(Ref.2)provideforamaximumdilutionflowof120gpmthroughtwochargingpumps(i.e.,60gpmperpump)usingunboratedwaterassuppliedbythetworeactormakeupwaterpumps(60gpmperpump).TheRCSisalsoassumedtobeatlowwaterlevels,uniformlymixedbytheRHRSystem,withtheminimumboronconcentrationasspecifiedintheCOLR.Theoperatorhaspromptanddefiniteindicationofsignificantborondilutionfromanaudiblecountratefunctionprovidedbythesourcerangeneutronfluxinstrumentation(seeLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation").Theincreasedcountrateisafunctionoftheeffectivesubcriticalmultiplicationfactor.Theresultsofthisanalysisconcludethatanoperatorhasatleast48.8minutesbeforeSHUTDOWNMARGINislostandthereactorgoescriticalwhichissufficienttimeforoperatorstomitigatethisevent.Thistimeisalsogreaterthanthe30minutesrequiredbyReference3fordilutioneventsduringrefueling.Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesand/orstoppingthereactormakeupwaterpumps.TheRCSboronconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthataminimumboronconcentrationbemaintainedintherefuelingcanal,therefuelingcavityandtheportionsoftheRCSthatarehydraulicallycoupledwiththereactor'corewhileinMODE6.TheboronconcentrationlimitspecifiedintheCOLRensuresthatacorek,<<ofz'0.95ismaintainedduringfuelhandlingoperationsandthatacorek,<<of(1.0ismaintainedduringaborondilutionevent.ViolationoftheLCOcouldleadtoaninadvertentcriticalityduringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-3(continued)DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE6toensurethatthefuelinthereactorvesselwillremainsubcritical.Therequiredboronconcentrationensuresak,<<s0.95duringfuelhandlingoperations.InMODES1and2withk,<<a1.0,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimit,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits"ensureanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactor.InMODES2withk,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5,LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"ensuresanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletomaintainthereactorsubcritical.ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3IftheboronconcentrationofthefilledportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityhydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcore,islessthanitslimit,aninadvertentcriticalitymayoccurduetoaborondilutioneventorincorrectfuelloading.Tominimizethepotentialofaninadvertentcriticalityresultingfromafuelloadingerrororanoperationthatcouldcauseareductioninboronconcentration,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditions(i.e.,otherthannormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures)shallnotprecludemovingacomponenttoasafeposition.InadditiontoimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivityadditions,borationtorestoretheconcentrationmustbeinitiatedimmediately.Therearenosafetyanalysisassumptionsofborationflowrateandconcentrationthatmustbesatisfied.Theonlyrequirementistorestoretheboronconcentrationtoitsrequiredvalueassoonaspossible.Inordertoraisetheboronconcentrationassoonaspossible,theoperatorshouldbe'ginborationwiththebestsourceavailableforplantconditions.(contihued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-4DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)Onceactionhasbeeninitiated,itmustbecontinueduntiltheboronconcentrationisrestored.Therestorationtimedependsontheamountofboronthatmustbeinjectedtoreachtherequiredconcentration.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.1.1ThisSRensuresthecoolantboronconcentrationoftherefuelingcanal,therefuelingcavity,andtheportionsoftheRCSthatarehydraulicallycoupled,iswithintheCOLRlimits.Theboronconcentrationofthecoolantisdeterminedbychemicalanalysis.ThesampleshouldberepresentativeoftheportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledwiththereactorcore.AFrequencyofonceevery72hoursisareasonableamountoftimetoverifytheboronconcentrationofrepresentativesamples.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperience,whichhasshown72hourstobeadequate.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.3.NUREG-0800,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-5Draft8 NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDThesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsareusedduringrefuelingoperationstomonitorthecorereactivitycondition.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxmonitors(N-31andN-32)arepartoftheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS).Thesedetectorsarelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselanddetectneutronsleakingfromthecore.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxdetectorsareproportionalcountersthatarefilledwithborontriflouride(BF,)gas(Ref.I).Thedetectorsmonitortheneutronfluxincountspersecondandprovidecontinuousvisualindicationinthecontrolroom.Audiblecountrateisalsoavailableinthecontrolroomfromeitherofthesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorstoalertoperatorstoapossibleborondilutionevent.TheNISisdesignedinaccordancewiththecriteriapresentedinReference2.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTwoOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsarerequiredtoprovideredundantindicationtoalertoperatorsofunexpectedchangesincorereactivity.Anincreaseintheaudiblecount'ratealertstheoperatorsthataborondilutioneventisinprogress.SufficienttimeisavailablefortheoperatortorecognizetheincreaseinaudiblecountrateandtoterminatetheeventpriortoalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN(seeBasesforLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration").Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesandstoppingreactormakeupwaterpumps.The.sourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-6(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentation83.9.2BASES(continued).LCOThisLCOrequirestwosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsbeOPERABLEtoensureredundantmonitoringcapabilityisavailabletodetectchangesincorereactivity.TobeOPERABLE,eachmonitormustprovidevisualindicationandatleastoneofthetwomonitorsmustprovideanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroom.APPLICABILITYInMODE6,thesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsmustbeOPERABLEtodeterminechangesincorereactivity.TherearenootherdirectmeansavailabletocheckcorereactivityconditionsinthisMODE.InMODES2,3,4,and5,thesesameinstalledsourcerangedetectorsandcircuitryarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.3.I,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACTIONSA.landA.2WithonlyonesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorOPERABLE,redundancyhasbeenlost.Sincetheseinstrumentsaretheonlydirectmeansofmonitoringcorereactivityconditions,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition(i.e.,otherthannormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurp'oseofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithinestablishedprocedures).B.landB.2WithnosourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorOPERABLEtherearenodirectmeansofdetectingchangesincorereactivity.Therefore,actionstorestoreamonitortoOPERABLEstatusshallbeinitiatedimmediatelyandcontinueuntilasourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-7DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASESACTIONSB.1andB.2(continued)SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemadeperRequiredActionsA.1andA.2,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntilthesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsareOPERABLE.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensuretherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentration.TheFrequencyofonceper12hoursensuresunplannedchangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.The12hourFrequencyisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.C.lC.2andC.3Withnoaudiblecountrateavailable,onlyvisualindicationisavailableandpromptanddefiniteindicationofaborondilutioneventhasbeenlost.Therefore,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsC.1andC.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionorthatisanormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrolwithin'stablishedprocedures.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntiltheaudiblecountratecapabilityisrestored.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensurethattherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TheCompletiontimeof4hoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentration.TheFrequencyofonceper12hoursensuresunplannedchangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.The12hourFrequencyisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-8(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.2.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECK,whichisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononemonitortoasimilarparameteronanothermonitor.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatthetwoindicationchannelsshouldbeconsistentwithcoreconditions.Changesinfuelloadingandcoregeometrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesbetweensourcerangemonitors,buteachmonitorshouldbeconsistentwithitslocalconditions.TheFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeCHANNELCHECKFrequencyspecifiedsimilarlyforthesameinstrumentsinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."SR3.9.2.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeneutronfluxmonitorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedata.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section7.7.3.2.2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC13and19,IssuedforCommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-9DraftB ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.3ContainmentPenetrationsBASESBACKGROUNDDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,areleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironmentwhentheLCOrequirementsaremet.InNODES1,2,3,and4,thisisaccomplishedbymaintainingcontainmentOPERABLEasdescribedinLCO3.6.1,"Containment."InNODE5,therearenoaccidentsofconcernwhichrequirecontainment.InNODE6,thepotentialforcontainmentpressurizationasaresultofanaccidentisnotlikely;therefore,requirementstoisolatethecontainmentfromtheoutsideatmospherecanbelessstringent.TheLCOrequirementsarereferredtoas"containmentclosure"ratherthan"containmentOPERABILITY."Containmentclosuremeansthatallpotentialescapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.Sincethereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenotrequired.Thecontainmentservestocontainfissionproductradioactivity,thatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowinganaccident,suchthatoffsiteradiationexposuresaremaintainedwithintherequirementsof10CFR100.Additionally,thecontainmentprovidesradiationshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentequipmenthatch,whichispartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,providesameansformovinglargeequipmentandcomponentsintoandoutofcontainment.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,theequipmenthatchmustbeboltedinplace.Goodengineeringpracticedictatesthataminimumof4boltsbeusedtoholdtheequipmenthatchinplaceandthattheboltsbeapproximatelyequallyspaced.Asanalternative,theequipmenthatchcanbeisolatedbyaclosureplatethatrestrictsairflowfromcontainment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-10Draft8 ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES'BACKGROUND(continued)Thecontainmentequipmentandpersonnelairlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,provideameansforpersonnelaccessduringNODESI,2,3,and4inaccordancewithLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.ThedoorsarenormallyinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopeningwhencontainmentOPERABILITY,isrequired.Duringperiodsofplantshutdownwhencontainmentclosureisnotrequired,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,containmentclosureisrequired;therefore,thedoorinterlockmechanismmayremaindisabled,butoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosedinthepersonnelandequipmenthatch(unlesstheequipmenthatchisisolatedbyaclosureplate).Therequirementsforcontainmentpenetrationclosureensurethatareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironment.Theclosurerestrictionsaresufficienttorestrictfissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefueling.TheContainmentPurgeandExhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.TheShutdownPurgeSystemincludesa36inchpurgepenetrationanda36inchexhaustpenetration.Thesecondsubsystem,aHini-PurgeSystem,includesa6inchpurgepenetrationanda6inchexhaustpenetration.DuringNODESI,2,3,and4,theshutdownpurgeandexhaus'tpenetrationsareisolat'edbyablindflangewithtwo0-ringsthatprovidethenecessaryboundary.Thetwoairoperatedvalvesineachofthetwomini-purgepenetrationscanbeopened.intermittently,butareclosedautomaticallybytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationSystem.NeitherofthesubsystemsissubjecttoaSpecificationinNODE5.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11DraftB ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)InNODE6,largeairexchangersareusedtosupportrefuelingoperations.Thenormal36inchShutdownPurgeSystemisusedforthispurpose,andeachairoperatedvalveisclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationinaccordancewithLCO3.3.5,"ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation."TheHini-PurgeSystemalsoremainsoperationalinNODE6,andallfourvalvesarealsoclosedbytheContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation.Theothercontainmentpenetrationsthatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmospheremustbeisolatedonatleastoneside.IsolationmaybeachievedbyanOPERABLEautomaticisolationvalve,orbyamanualisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalent.Equivalentisolationmethodsmayincludeuseofamaterialthatcanprovideatemporary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrierfortheothercontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelmovements.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,themostsevereradiologicalconsequencesresultfromafuelhandlingaccident.Thefuelhandlingaccidentisap'ostulatedeventthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiatedfuel(Ref.1).Fuelhandlingaccidents,analyzedusingthecriteriaofReference2,includedroppingasingleirradiatedfuelassemblyandhandlingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiatedfuelassemblies.TherequirementsofLCO3.9.6,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortoCOREALTERATIONSensurethatthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,subsequenttoafuelhandlingaccident,resultsindosesthatarewithintheguidelinevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100.StandardReviewPlan(SRP),Section15.7.4,Rev.1(Ref.2),requirescontainmentclosureeventhoughthisisnotanassumptionoftheaccidentanalyses.Theacceptancelimitsforoffsiteradiationexposureis96rem(Ref.3).ContainmentpenetrationssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatementsincetheseareassumedintheSRP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-12(continued)DraftB

ContainmentPenetrations83.9.3BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOlimitstheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainmentbylimitingthepotentialescapepathsforfissionproductradioactivityreleasedwithincontainment.TheLCOrequiresanypenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheretobeclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations.FortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandexhaustpenetrations,thisLCOensuresthatatleastonevalveineachofthesepenetrationsisisolablebytheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystem.APPLICABILITYThecontainmentpenetrationrequirementsareapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentbecausethisiswhenthereisapotentialforafuelhandlingaccident.InNODES1,2,3,and4,containmentpenetrationrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1.InMODES5and6,whenCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentarenotbeingconducted,thepotentialforafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexist.Therefore,undertheseconditions,norequirementsareplacedon'ontainmentpenetrationstatus.ACTIONSA.1andA.2Ifthecontainmentequipmenthatch(oritsclosureplate),airlockdoors,oranycontainmentpenetrationthatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereisnotintherequiredstatus,includingtheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystemnotcapableofautomaticactuationwhenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theplantmustbeplacedinaconditionwheretheisolationfunctionisnotneeded.ThisisaccomplishedbyimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Performanceoftheseactionsshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-13(continued)DraftB ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.9.3.1ThisSRdemonstratesthateachofthecontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.TheSurveillanceontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstratethatthevalvesarenotblockedorotherwisepreventedfromclosing(e.g.,solenoidunabletovent).TheSurveillanceisperformedevery7daysduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.TheSurveillanceintervalisselectedtobecommensuratewiththenormaldurationoftimetocompletefuelhandlingoperations.Assuch,thisSurveillanceensuresthatapostulatedfuelhandling.accidentthatreleasesfissionproductradioactivitywithinthecontainmentwillnotresultinareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytotheenvironment.SR3.9.3.2ThisSRdemonstratesthateachcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestoitsisolationpositiononmanualinitiationoronanactualorsimulatedhighradiationsignal.The24monthFrequencymaintainsconsistencywithothersimilarinstrumentationandvalvetestingrequirements.InLCO3.3.5,theContainmentVentilationIsolationinstrumentationrequiresaCHANNELCHECKevery12hoursandaCOTevery92daystoensurethechannelOPERABILITYduringrefuelingoperations.Every24monthsanACTUATIONLOGICTESTandCHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformed.TheseSurveillanceswillensurethatthevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-14(continued)DraftB ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section15.7.2.NUREG-800,Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,"dated'October7,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-15DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23FtB3.9.4B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.4ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23FtBASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminMODE6istoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratification(Ref.1).HeatisremovedfromtheRCSbycirculatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)andbypassline(s).MixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.Inordertoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,oneloopoftheRHRSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,andinoperationwhileinMODE6,withwaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-16DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23FtB3.9.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Whilethereis.noexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.DuetothewatervolumeavailableintheRCSwithawaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,asignificantamountoftimeexistsbeforeboilingofthecoolantwouldoccurfollowingalossoftherequiredRHRpump.Sincethelossofthe'requiredRHRpumpresultsintherequirementtosuspendoperationsinvolvingareductioninreactorcoolantboronconcentration,aborondilutioneventisveryunlikely.Therefore,thisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailabletooperatorstorespondtoalossoftheoperatingRHRpump.TheLCOpermitsde-energizingtherequiredRHRpumpforshortdurationsprovidednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionintheRCSboronconcentration.Thisconditionalde-energizingoftherequiredRHRpumpdoesnotresultinachallengetothefissionproductbarrierorresultincoolantstratification.RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ftsatisfiescriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnlyoneRHRloopisrequiredfordecayheatremovalinMODE6,withthewaterlevel~23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,becausethevolumeofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesbackupdecayheatremovalcapability.OneRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationtoprovidemixingofboratedcoolanttominimizethepossibilityofcriticality.AnOPERABLERHRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-17DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23FtB3.9.4BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOis-modifiedbyaNotethatallowstherequiredoperatingRHRlooptoberemovedfromserviceforupto1hourper8hourperiodprovidednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration.Boronreductionisprohibitedbecauseuniformconcentrationdistributioncannotbeensuredwithoutforcedcirculation.Thisallowstheoperatortoviewthecoreandpermitsoperationssuchascoremappingoralterationsinthevicinityofthereactorvesselhotlegnozzles.ThisalsopermitsoperationssuchasRCStoRHRisolationvalvetesting.Duringthis1hourperiod,decayheatisremovedbynaturalconvectiontothelargemassofwaterintherefuelingcavity.ShouldbothRHRloopsbecomeinoperableatanytimeduringoperationinaccordancewiththisNote,theRequiredActionsofthisLCOshouldbeimmediatelytaken.APPLICABILITYOneRHRloopmustbeOPERABLEandinoperationinMODE6,withthewaterlevel~23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremovalandmixingoftheboratedcoolant.The23ftwaterlevelwasselectedbecauseitcorrespondstothe23ftrequirementestablishedforfuelmovementinLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel."RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminMODES1,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODE.1>8.5%RTP;"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNot.Filled."TheRHRlooprequirementsinMODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9.5,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-18(continued)DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel)23FtB3.9.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3IfRHRlooprequirementsarenotmet,therewillbenoforcedcirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformboronconcentrations.ReducedboronconcentrationscanoccurbytheadditionofwaterwithalowerboronconcentrationthanthatcontainedintheRCS.Therefore,actionsthatcouldresultinareductioninthecoolantboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedimmediately.Withnoforcedcirculationcooling,decayheatremovalfromthecoreoccursbynaturalconvectiontotheheatsinkprovidedbythewaterabovethecore.Aminimumrefuelingwaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesanadequateavailableheatsink.Suspendinganyoperationthatwouldincreasedecayheatload,suchasloadingafuelassembly,isaprudentactionunderthiscondition.Therefore,actionsshallbetakenimmediatelytosuspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.WiththeplantinNODE6andtherefuelingwaterlevel)23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,removalofdecayheatisbyambientlossesonly.Therefore,correctiveactionsshallbeinitiatedimmediatelyandshallcontinueuntilRHRlooprequirementsaresatisfied.,A.4IfRHRlooprequirementsarenotmet,allcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheremustbeclosedwithin4hours.WiththeRHRlooprequirementsnotmet,thepotentialexistsforthecoolanttoboilandreleaseradioactivegastothecontainmentatmosphere.Closingcontainmentpenetrationsthatareopentotheoutsideatmosphereensuresdoselimitsarenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonthelowprobabilityofthecoolantboilinginthattime.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-19(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23FtB3.9.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.9.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingdecayheatremovalcapabilityandmixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratificationinthecore.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section5.4.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-20DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.583.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.5'esidual<23FtHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminMODE6istoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratification(Ref.I).HeatisremovedfromtheRCSbycirculatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)andbypassline(s).MixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem;Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.WhilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminMODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.Thiscouldleadtoalossofcoolantinthereactorvessel.Inaddition,boilingofthecoolantcouldleadtoareductioninboronconcentrationinthecoolantduetoboronplatingoutoncomponentsneartheareasoftheboilingactivity.Thelossofcoolantandthereductionofboronconcentrationinthereactorcoolantcouldeventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-21DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Inordertopreventachallengetofuelcladdingandtoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,twoloopsoftheRHRSystemarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,andoneloopinoperationwhileinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ftsatisfiescriterion4oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOBothRHRloopsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Inaddition,oneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinorder.toremovedecayheatandprovidemixingofboratedcoolantto.minimizethepossibilityofcriticality.AnOPERABLERHRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instrumentsandcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.APPLICABILITYTwoRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ft'bovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremovalandmixingoftheboratedcoolant.RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminMODES1,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP;"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."TheRHRlooprequirementsinMODE6withthewaterlevel>23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-22(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.landA.2IflessthantherequirednumberofRHRloopsareOPERABLE,actionshallbeimmediatelyinitiatedandcontinueduntiltheRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperationoruntil~23ftofwaterlevelisestablishedabovethereactorvesselflange.Whenthewaterlevelis~23ftabovethereactorvesselflange,theApplicabilitychangestothatofLCO3.9.4,andonlyoneRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperation.AnimmediateCompletionTimeisnecessaryforanoperatortoinitiatecorrectiveactions.B.landB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,'therewillbenoforcedcirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformboronconcentrations.ThepotentialforreducedboronconcentrationsbytheadditionofwaterwithalowerboronconcentrationthanthatcontainedintheRCSmustbereducedtopreventacriticalityevent.Therefore,operationsinvolvingareductioninRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedimmediately.Actionsshallalsobeinitiatedimmediately,andcontinued,torestoreoneRHRlooptooperation.SincetheplantisinConditionsAandBconcurrently,therestorationoftwoOPERABLERHRloopsandoneoperatingRHRloopshouldbeaccomplishedexpeditiously;B.3IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,allcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheremustbeclosedwithin4hours.WiththeRHRlooprequirementsnotmet,thepotentialexistsforthecoolanttoboilandreleaseradioactivegastothecontainmentatmosphere.Closingcontainmentpenetrationsthatareopentotheoutsideatmosphereensuresthatdoselimitsarenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonthelowprobabilityofthecoolantboilinginthattime.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-23(continued)DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.5.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingdecayheatremovalcapabilityandmixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratificationinthecore.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.9.5.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience:REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section5.4.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-24DraftB

RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.6B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.6RefuelingCavityWaterLevel~BASESBACKGROUNDThemovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentorperformanceofCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts,requiresaminimumwaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Thisrequirementensuresasufficientlevelofwaterismaintainedintherefuelingcavityorportionshydraulicallyconnected(e.g.,refuelingcanal)toretainiodinefissionproductactivityresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.1).Theretentionofiodineactivitybythewaterlimitstheoffsitedosefromtheaccidentwellwithinthevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,thewaterlevelintherefuelingcavityisaninitialconditiondesignparameterintheanalysisofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.1).Aminimumwaterlevelof23ftallowsadecontaminationfactorof100tobeusedintheaccidentanalysisforiodine(Ref.3).Thisrelatestotheassumptionthat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofallthedroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytherefuelingcavitywater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory(Ref.3).Withaminimumwaterlevelof23ftandaminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortofuelhandling,theanalysisandtestprogramsdemonstratethattheiodinereleaseduetoapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentisadequatelycapturedbythewaterandoffsitedosesaremaintainedwithinallowablelimits(Ref.2).RefuelingcavitywaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-25(continued)DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.6BASES(continued)LCOAminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeisrequiredtoensuretheradiologicalconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentarewithinacceptablelimitsandpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.I).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredlevelduringmovementoffuelassemblieswithincontainment.Maintainingthisminimumwaterlevelintherefuelingcavityalsoensuresthat>23ftofwaterisavai'lableinthespentfuelpoolduringfuelmovementassumingthatcontainmentandAuxiliaryBuildingatmosphericpressuresareequal.APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicablewhenmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ThisLCOisalsoapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.TheLCOensuresasufficientlevelofwaterispresentintherefuelingcavity'tominimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment.RequirementsforfuelhandlingaccidentsinthespentfuelpoolarecoveredbyLCO3.7.11,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevel."ACTIONSA.landA.2Whentheinitialconditionassumedinthefuelhandlingacc'identcannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoprecludetheaccidentfromoccurring.Withawaterlevelof<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,alloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinthecontainmentshallbesuspendedimmediatelytoensure,thatafuelhandlingaccidentcannotoccur.ThesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandfuelmovementshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-26(continued)DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.6BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.9.6.1Verificationofaminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangeensuresthatthedesignbasisfortheanalysisofthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingoperationsismet.Waterattherequiredlevelabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangelimitstheconsequencesofdamagedfuelrodsthatarepostulatedtoresultfromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment(Ref.1).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelargevolumeofwaterandthenormalproceduralcontrolsofvalvepositions,whichmakesignificantunplannedlevelchangesunlikely.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.3.2.10CFR100.3.RegulatoryGuide1.25.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-27DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.1SiteLocationThesitefortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantislocatedonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork.Theexclusionareaboundarydistancesfromtheplantshallbeasfollows:DirectionDistancemN(includingoffshore)NNENEENE EESESE SSESSSWSWWSW WWNWNW NNW80008000 8000 8000747 640503450 450450503915 945701800080004.2ReactorCore4.2.1FuelAssembliesThereactorshallcontain121fuelassemblies.Eachassemblyshallconsistofamatrixofzircalloycladfuelrodswithaninitialcompositionofnaturalorslightlyenricheduraniumdioxide(UO,)asfuelmaterial.Limitedsubstitutionsofzirconiumalloyorstainlesssteelfillerrodsforfuelrods,inaccordancewithapprovedapplicationsoffuelrodconfigurations,maybeused.FuelassembliesshallbelimitedtothosefueldesignsthathavebeenanalyzedwithapplicableNRCstaffapprovedcodesandmethodsandshownbytestsoranalysestocomplywithallfuelsafetydesignbases.Alimitednumberofleadtestassembliesthathavenotcompletedrepresentativetestingmaybeplacedinnonlimitingcoreregions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-1DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.2ReactorCore(continued)4.2.2ControlRodAssembliesThereactorcoreshallcontain29controlrodassemblies.Thecontrolmaterialshallbesilverindiumcadmium.4.3FuelStorage4..IC~i4.3.1.1Thespentfuelstorageracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:a.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;.b.k,<<s0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedinSection9.1oftheUFSAR;C.ConsolidatedrodstoragecanistersmaybestoredinthespentfuelstorageracksprovidedthatthefuelassembliesfromwhichtherodswereremovedmeetalltherequirementsofLCO.3.7.13fortheregioninwhichthecanisteristobestored.However,theconsolidatedrodstoragecanisterlocatedinRegionRGAF2mayexceedtheserequirements.Theaveragedecayheatofthefuelassemblyfromwhichtherodswereremovedforallconsolidatedfuelassembliesmustalsobes2150BTU/hr.4.3.1.2Thenewfuelstoragedryracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:a0b.C.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;k,<<~0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedinSection9.1oftheUFSAR;k,<<~0.98ifmoderatedbyaqueousfoam,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedinSection9.1oftheUFSAR;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-2DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES(continued)4.3FuelStorage(continued)4.3.2~DrainaeThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedtopreventinadvertentdrainingofthepoolbelowelevation257'0"(meansealevel).4.3.3~CaacitThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedwithastoragecapacitylimitedtonomorethan1016fuelassemblies.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-3DraftB Responsibility5.15.0ADHINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.1Responsibility5.1.1Theplantmanagershallberesponsibleforoverallplantoperationandshalldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence.Theplantmanager,orhisdesignee,shallapprovepriortoimplementation,eachproposedtest,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.5.1.2TheShiftSupervisor(SS)shallberesponsibleforthecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinHODE1,2,3,or4,anindividualwithanactiveSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)licenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinHODE5or6,anindividualwithanactiveSROlicenseorReactorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-1DraftB Organization5.25.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.2Organization5.2.1OnsiteandOffsiteOranizationsOnsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallbeestablishedforplantoperationandcorporatemanagement,respectively.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.a~Linesofauthority,responsibility,andcommunicationshallbedefinedandestablishedthroughouthighestmanagementlevels,intermediatelevels,andalloperatingorganizationpositions.Theserelationshipsshallbedocumentedandupdated,asappropriate,inorganizationcharts,functionaldescriptionsofdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandrelationships,andjobdescriptionsforkeypersonnelpositions,orinequivalentformsofdocumentation.Theserequirements,includingtheplantspecifictitlesofthosepersonnelfulfillingtheresponsibilitiesofthepositionsdelineatedintheseTechnicalSpecifications,shallbedocumentedintheUFSAR;b.Theplantmanagershallreporttothecorporatevicepresidentspecifiedin5.2.l.c,shallberesponsibleforoveralls'afeoperationoftheplant,andshallhavecontroloverthoseonsiteactivitiesnecessaryforsafeoperationandmaintenanceoftheplant;andC.Acorporatevicepresidentshallhavecorporateresponsibilityforoverallplantnuclearsafetyandshalltakeanymeasuresneededtoensureacceptableperformanceofthestaffinoperating,maintaining,andprovidingtechnicalsupporttotheplanttoensurenuclearsafety.d.Theindividualswhotraintheoperatingstaff,carryouthealthphysics,orperformqualityassurancefunctionsmayreporttotheappropriateonsitemanager;however,theseindividualsshallhavesufficientorganizationalfreedomtoensuretheirindependencefromoperatingpressures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-2DraftB Organization5.25.2Organization(continued)5.2.2PlantStaffTheplantstafforganizationshallincludethefollowing:'a~Anauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwithfuelinthereactor.AnadditionalauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinMODE1,2,3or4.b.Shiftcrewcompositionmaybeonelessthantheminimumrequirementof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)andSpecifications5.2.2.aand5.2.2.eforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoretheshiftcrewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirements.C.d.e.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresshallbeonsitewhenfuelisinthereactor.Thepositionmaybevacantfornotmorethan2hours,inordertoprovideforunexpectedabsence,providedimmediateactionistakentofilltherequiredposition.TheamountofovertimeworkedbyplantstaffmembersperformingsafetyrelatedfunctionsshallbelimitedandcontrolledinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogramspecifiedinplantprocedureschangestotheguidelinesintheseproceduresshallbesubmittedtotheNRCforreview.Theoperationsmanageroroperationsmiddle'managershallholdaSROlicense.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermalhydraulics,reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationoftheplant.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinMODE1,2,3or4andshallmeetthequalificationscontainedintheSTAtrainingprogramspecifiedinUFSARSection'13:2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-3DraftB PlantStaffqualifications5.35.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.3PlantStaffqualifications5.3.1EachmemberoftheplantstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,Revision1,September1975,forcomparablepositions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-4DraftB Procedures5.45.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.4Procedures5.4.1Writtenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefollowingactivities:a.TheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978;b.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresrequiredtoimplementtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1,asstatedinGenericLetter82-33;c.Effluentandenvironmentalmonitoring;d.FireProtectionProgramimplementation;ande.AllprogramsspecifiedinSpecification5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-5DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS'.5ProgramsandManualsThefollowingprogramsandmanualsshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintained.5.5.1OffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCMa~b.TheODCHshallcontainthemethodologyandparametersusedin-thecalculationofoffsitedosesresultingfromradioactivegaseousandliquideffluents,inthecalculationofgaseousandliquideffluentmonitoringalarmandtripsetpoints,andintheconductoftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogram;andTheODCHshallalsocontaintheradioactiveeffluentcontrolsandradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesanddescriptionsoftheinformationthatshouldbeincludedintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingandRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReports.LicenseeinitiatedchangestotheODCH:a0Shallbedocumentedandrecordsofreviewsperformedshallberetained.Thisdocumentationshallcontain:b.1.sufficientinformationtosupportthechange(s),togetherwiththeappropriateanalysesorevaluationsjustifyingthechange(s),2.adeterminationthatthechange(s)maintainthelevelsofradioactiveeffluentcontrolrequiredby10CFR20.1302,40CFR190,10CFR50.36a,and10CFR50,AppendixI,anddoesnotadverselyimpacttheaccuracyorreliabilityofeffluent,dose,orsetpointcalculations;Shallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptancebytheonsitereviewfunctionandtheapprovaloftheplantmanager;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-6DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.1ODCM(continued)C.ShallbesubmittedtotheNRCintheformofacomplete,legiblecopyoftheentireODCMasapartoforconcurrentwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodofthereportinwhichanychangeintheODCMwasmade.Eachchangeshallbeidentifiedbymarkingsinthemarginoftheaffectedpages,clearlyindicatingtheareaofthepagethatwaschanged,andshallindicatethedate(i.e.,monthandyear)thechangewasimplemented.5.5.2PrimarCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProram5.5.3Thisprogramprovidescontrolstominimizeleakagefromthoseportionsofsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccident.ThesystemsincludeContainmentSpray,SafetyInjection,andResidualHeatRemovalintherecirculationconfiguration.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Preventivemaintenanceandperiodicvisualinspectionrequirements;andb.Integratedleaktestrequirementsforeachsystematrefuelingcycleintervalsorless.PostAccidentSamlinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsthatensurethecapabilitytoobtainandanalyzereactorcoolant,radioactivegases,andparticulatesinplantgaseouseffluentsandcontainmentatmospheresamplesunderaccidentconditions.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a~b.C.Trainingofpersonnel;Proceduresforsamplingandanalysis;andProvisionsformaintenanceofsamplingandanalysisequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-7DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProram,Thisprogramconformsto10CFR50.36aforthecontrolofradioactiveeffluentsandformaintainingthedosestomembersofthepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonablyachievable.Theprogramshallbecontainedinthe,ODCH,shallbeimplementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsareexceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a~b.LimitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCM;Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingtotentimestheconcentrationvaluesin10CFR20,Appendix8,Table2,Column2;c.Monitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactive'liquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.1302andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCH;d.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttounrestrictedareas,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixIand40CFR141;e.Determinationofcumulativeandprojecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersin'theODCHatleastevery31days;f.Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiodof31dayswouldexceed2%oftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-8DraftB

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.45.5.5~~RadioactiveEffluentControlsProram(continued)g.Limitationsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentstoareasbeyondthesiteboundaryconformingtothedoseassociatedwith10CFR20,AppendixB,Table2,Column1;h.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesresultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;andj.Limitationsontheannualdoseordosecommitmenttoanymemberofthepublicduetoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190.ComonentCclicorTransientLimitProram5.5.6ThisprogramprovidescontrolstotrackthereactorcoolantsystemcyclicandtransientoccurrencesspecifiedinUFSARTable5.1-4toensurethatcomponentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.Pre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringanytendondegradationinpre-stressedconcretecontainments,includingeffectivenessofitscorrosionprotectionmedium,toensurecontainmentstructuralintegrity.TheTendonSurveillanceProgram,inspectionfrequencies,andacceptancecriteriashallbeinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.35,Revision2.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheTendonSurveillancePrograminspectionfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-9DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.7InserviceTestinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforinservicetestingofASHECodeClassI,2,and3componentsincludingapplicablesupports.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.TestingfrequenciesspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaasfollows:ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaterminologyforinservicetestingactivitiesRequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestinactivitiesMeeklyMonthlyquarterlyorevery3monthsSemiannuallyorevery6monthsEvery9monthsYearlyorannuallyBienniallyorevery2yearsAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper92'daysAtleastonceper184days.Atleastonceper276daysAtleastonceper366daysAtleastonceper731daysb.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2areapplicabletotheaboverequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestingactivities;c.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.3areapplicabletoinservicetestingactivities;andd.NothingintheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeshallbeconstruedtosupersedetherequirementsofanyTechnicalSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-10DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.8SteamGeneratorSGTubeSurveillanceProramEachSGshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyperformanceofaninserviceinspectionprograminaccordancewiththeNuclearPolicyManual.ThisinspectionprogramshalldefinethespecificrequirementsoftheeditionandAddendaoftheASMEBoilerandPressureCode,SectionXI,asrequiredby10CFR50.55a(g).Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.TheinspectionintervalsforSGtubesshallbespecifiedintheInserviceInspectionProgram.b.c~SGtubesthathaveimperfections>40%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.SGsleevesthathaveimperfections>30%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.5.5.9SecondarWaterChemistrProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringsecondarywaterchemistrytoinhibitSGtubedegradation.Thisprogramshallinclude:a.Identificationofasamplingscheduleforthecriticalvariablesandcontrolpointsforthesevariables;b.C.d.e.Identificationoftheproceduresusedtomeasurethevaluesofthecriticalvariables;Identificationofprocesssamplingpoints;Proceduresfortherecordingandmanagementofdata;Proceduresdefiningcorrectiveactionsforalloffcontrolpointchemistryconditions;andAprocedureidentifyingtheauthorityresponsiblefortheinterpretationofthedataandthesequenceandtimingofadministrativeevents,whichisrequiredtoinitiatecorrectiveaction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.10VentilationFilterTestinProramVFTPAprogramshallbeestablishedtoimplementthefollowingrequiredtestingofEngineeredSafetyFeaturefilterventilationsystemsandtheSpentFuelPool(SFP)CharcoalAdsorberSystem.ThetestfrequenciesandmethodswillbeinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2,exceptthatinlieuof18monthtestintervals,a24monthintervalwillbeimplemented.a.ContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSysteml.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoaladsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofz90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.b.C.ContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSystem1.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthehighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).2.'emonstratethatanin-placedioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)1.DemonstratethepressuredropacrosstheHEPAfilterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placeDOPtestoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-12DraftB

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.10VFTP(continued)3.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).4.5.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoaladsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofz90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.d.SFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem1.Demonstratethatthetotalairflowratefromthecharcoaladsorbersshowsatleast75%ofthat.measuredwithacompletesetofnewadsorbers.2.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoaladsorbersbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.'emonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofo90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheVFTPfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-13DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)5.5.11ExlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivitMonitorinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforpotentiallyexplosivegasmixturescontainedinthewastegasdecaytanksandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinwastegasdecaytanks.ThegaseousradioactivityquantitiesshallbedeterminedfollowingthemethodologyinNUREG-0133.'Theprogramshallinclude:a.Thelimitsforconcentrationsofhydrogenandoxygeninthewastegasdecaytanksandasurveillanceprogramtoensurethelimitsaremaintained.Suchlimitsshallbeappropriatetothesystem'sdesigncriteria(i.e.,whetherornotthesystemisdesignedtowithstandahydrogenexplosion);andb.Asurveillanceprogramtoensurethatthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankislessthantheamountthatwouldresultinawholebodyexposureof~0.5remtoanyindividualinanunrestrictedarea,intheeventofanuncontrolledreleaseofthetanks'ontents.5.5.12TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabl'etotheExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramsurveillancefrequencies.DieselFuelOilTestinProramAdieselfueloiltestingprogramtoimplementrequiredtestingofbothnewfueloilandstoredfueloilshallbeestablished.Theprogramshallincludesamplingandtestingrequirements,andacceptancecriteria,allinaccordancewith'applicableASTHStandards.Thepurposeoftheprogramistoestablishthefollowing:a~Acceptabilityofnewfueloilforusepriortoadditiontostoragetanksbydeterminingthatthefueloilhas:1.anAPIgravityoranabsolutespecificgravitywithinlimits,:2.aflashpointandkinematicviscositywithinlimitsforASTH2Dfueloil,and(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant5.0-14DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.12DieselFuelOilTestinProram(continued)3.aclearandbrightappearancewithpropercolor;andb.Within31daysfollowingadditionofthenewfueltothestoragetanks,verifythatthepropertiesofthenewfueloil,otherthanthoseaddressedina.above,arewithinlimitsforASTN2Dfueloil.5.5.13TechnicalSecificationsTSBasesControlProramThisprogramprovidesameansforprocessingchangestotheBasesoftheseTechnicalSpecifications.a.ChangestotheBasesoftheTSshallbemadeunderappropriateadministrativecontrolsandreviews.b.LicenseesmaymakechangestoBaseswithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangesdonotinvolveeitherofthefollowing:l.AchangeintheTSincorporatedinthelicense;orC.2.AchangetotheUFSARorBasesthatinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.TheBasesControlProgramshallcontainprovisionstoensurethattheBasesaremaintainedconsistentwiththeUFSAR.d.ProposedchangesthatmeetthecriteriaofSpecification5.5.13.b.1orSpecification5.5.13.b.2shallbereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.ChangestotheBasesimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalshallbeprovidedtotheNRConafrequencyconsistentwith10CFR50.Tie.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-15DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.14SafetFunctionDeterminationProramSFDPThisprogramensureslossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionstaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6,anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherappropriateactionsmaybetakenasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionandRequiredActions.ThisprogramimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.TheSFDPshallcontainthefollowing:a.Provisionsforcrosstraincheckstoensurealossofthecapabilitytoperformthesafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysisdoesnotgoundetected;b.Provisionsforensuringtheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionifalossoffunctionconditionexists;c.Provisionstoensurethataninoperablesupportedsystem'sCompletionTimeisnotinappropriatelyextendedasaresultofmultiplesupportsysteminoperabilities;andd.Otherappropriatelimitationsandremedialorcompensatoryactions.Alossofsafetyfunctionexistswhen,assumingnoconcurrentsinglefailure,asafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysiscannotbeperformeU.Forthepurposeofthisprogram,alossofsafetyfunctionmayexistwhenasupportsystemisinoperable,and:a~b.C.Arequiredsystemredundanttothesupportedsystem(s)isalsoinoperable;orArequiredsystemredundanttothesystem(s)inturnsupportedbytheinoperablesupportedsystemisalsoinoperable;orArequiredsystemredundanttotheinoperablesupportsystem(s)forthesupportedsystems(a)and(b)aboveisalsoinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-16DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.14SFDP(continued)TheSFDPidentifieswherealossofsafetyfunctionexists.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.5.5.15ContainmentLeakaeRateTestinProramAprogramshallbeestablishedtoimplementtheleakageratetestingofthecontainmentasrequiredby10CFR50.54(o)and10CFR50,AppendixJ,OptionB,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.ThisprogramshallbeinaccordancewiththeguidelinescontainedinRegulatoryGuide1.163,"Performance-BasedContainmentLeak-TestProgram,"datedSeptember1995.Thepeakcalculatedcontainmentinternalpressureforthedesignbasislossofcoolantaccident,Pis60psig.Themaximumallowableprimarycontainmentleakagerate,L.,atP.,shallbe0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday.LeakageRateacceptancecriteriaare:a.Containmentleakagerateacceptancecriterionis~1.0L..Duringthefirstplantstartupfollowingtestinginaccordancewiththisprogram,theleakagerateacceptancecriteriaare~0.60L,fortheTypeBandTypeCtestsand~0.75L,forTypeAtests;b.Airlocktestingaccept'ancecriteriaare:1)Foreachairlock,overallleakagerateis~0.05L,whentestedat.>Pand2)Foreachdoor,leakagerateiss0.01L,whentestedat)p,.c.Mini-purgevalveacceptancecriteriaiss0..05L.whentestedateP..TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2donot.applytothetestfrequenciesspecifiedintheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.3donotapplytothetestfrequenciesspecifiedintheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-17DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.6ReportingRequirementsThefollowingreportsshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.4.5.6.1OccuationalRadiationExosureReort5.6.2Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utility,andotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposures100mrem/yrandtheirassociatedmanremexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions(e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,inserviceinspection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance,wasteprocessing,andrefueling).Thistabulationsupplementstherequirementsof10CFR20.2206.Thedoseassignmentstovariousdutyfunctionsmaybeestimatedbasedonpocketdosimeter,.-thermoluminescentdosimeter(TLD),orfilmbadgemeasurements.Smallexposurestotalling<20%oftheindividualtotaldoseneednotbeaccountedfor.Intheaggregate,atleast80%ofthetotalwholebodydose'receivedfromexternalsourcesshouldbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.ThereportshallbesubmittedonorbeforeApril30ofeachyear.AnnualRadioloicalEnvironmental0eratinReortTheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantduringthepreviouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedbyMay15ofeachyear.Thereportshallincludesummaries,interpretations,andanalysesoftrendsoftheresults.oftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesforthereportingperiod.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM),andinIO.CFR50,AppendixI,SectionsIV.B.2,IV.B.3,andIV.C.TheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportshallincludetheresultsofanalysesofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplesandofallenvironmentalradiationmeasurementstakenduringtheperiodpursuanttothelocationsspecifiedinthetableandfiguresintheODCM,aswellassummarizedandtabulatedresultsoftheseanalysesandmeasurementsintheformatofthetableintheRadiologicalAssessmentBranchTechnicalPosition,RevisionI,November1979.Intheeventthatsomeindividualresultsarenotavailableforinclusionwiththereport,thereportshallbesubmitted'notingandexplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedinasupplementaryreportassoonaspossible.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-18DraftB

ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements(continued)5.6.35.6.45.6.5RadioactiveEffluentReleaseReortTheRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.36a.Thereportshallincludeasummaryofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsandsolidwastereleasedfromtheplant.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheODCMandinconformancewith10CFR50.36aand10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionIV.B.1.Monthl0eratinReortsRoutinereportsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperience,includingdocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorpressurizersafetyvalves,shallbesubmittedonamonthlybasisnolaterthanthe15thofeachmonthfollowingthecalendarmonthcoveredbythereport.COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORTCOLRCoreoperatinglimitsshallbeestablishedpriortoeachreloadcycle,orpriortoanyremainingportionofareloadcycle,andshallbedocumentedintheCOLR,forthefollowing:LCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,LCO3.4.1)LCO3.9.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)";"MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(MTC)"'ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";"ControlBankInsertionLimits";"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))";"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"~)";"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";and"BoronConcentration."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-19DraftB 80 ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements5.6.5COLR(continued)b.TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminethecoreoperatinglimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:WCAP-9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodology,"July1985.(MethodologyforLCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,andLCO3.9.1.)2.3.4.5. 6.7.8.WCAP-9220-P-A,"WestinghouseECCSEvaluationModel-1981Version,"Revision1,February1982.(HethodologyforLCO3.2.1.)WCAP-8385,"PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures-TopicalReport,"September1974.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.3.)WCAP-8567-P-A,"ImprovedThermalDesignProcedure,"February1989.(MethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingITDP.)WCAP11397-P-A,"RevisedThermalDesignProcedure,"April1989.(HethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingRTDP.)WCAP-10054-P-AandWCAP-10081,"WestinghouseSmallBreakECCSEvaluationModelUsingtheNOTRUHPCode,"August1985.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1)WCAP-10924-P-A,Volume1,Rev.1,andAddenda1,2,3,"WestinghouseLarge-BreakLOCABest-EstimateMethodology,Volume1:ModelDescriptionandValidation,"December1988.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1)WCAP-10924-P-A,Volume2,Rev.2,andAddenda,"WestinghouseLarge-BreakLOCABest-EstimateMethodology,Volume2:ApplicationtoTwo-LoopPWRsEquippedwithUpperPlenumInjection,"December1988.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-20DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements5.6.5COLR(continued)c~9.WCAP-10924-P-A,Rev.2andWCAP-12071,"WestinghouseLarge-BreakLOCABestEstimateMethodology,Volume2:ApplicationtoTwo-LoopPWRsEquippedWithUpperPlenumInjection,Addendum1:ResponsestoNRCguestions,"December1988.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1)10.WCAP-10924-P,Volume1,Rev.1,Addendum4,"WestinghouseLBLOCABestEstimateMethodology;ModelDescriptionandValidation;ModelRevisions,"August1990.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1)IIThecoreoperatinglimitsshallbedeterminedsuchthatallapplicablelimits(e.g.,fuelthermalmechanicallimits,corethermalhydrauliclimits,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)limits,nuclearlimitssuchasSDM,transientanalysislimits,andaccidentanalysislimits)ofthesafetyanalysisaremet.5.6.6d.TheCOLR,includinganymidcyclerevisionsorsupplements,shallbeprovideduponissuanceforeachreloadcycletotheNRC.ReactorCoolantSstemRCS'PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORTPTLR'a~RCS'pressureandtemperaturelimitsforheatup,cooldown,criticality,andhydrostatictestingaswellasheatupandcooldownratesshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits"b.ThepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsrequiredtosupporttheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,andtheLTOPenabletemperatureshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves";andLCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-21DraftB

ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements5.6.6PTLR(continued)C.TheRCSpressureandtemperatureandLTOPlimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCinAmendmentNo.48.Theacceptabilityofthe,P/TandLTOPlimitsaredocumentedinNRCletter,"R.E.Ginna-AcceptanceforReferencingofPressureLimitsReport,"December26,1995.Specifically,thelimitsandmethodologyaredescribedinthefollowingdocuments:1.AmendmentNo.48toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,March6,1992.2.LetterfromC.I.Grimes,NRC,toR.A..Newton,WestinghouseElectricCorporation,"AcceptanceforReferencingTopicalReportWCAP-14040,Revision1,'MethodologyusedtoDevelopColdOverpressureHitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves',"October16,1995.3.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E),toDocumentControlDesk,NRC,AttentionA.R.Johnson,"TechnicalSpecificationsImprovementProgram,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureandTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR),"December8,1995.d.ThePTLRshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponissuanceforeachreactorvesselfluencyperiodandforrevisionsorsupplementthereto.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-22Draft8 ta'k'~t'I HighRadiationArea5.75.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.7HighRadiationArea5.7.1Pursuantto10CFR20,paragraph20.1601(a),inlieuoftherequirementsof10CFR20.1601(c),eachhighradiationarea,asdefinedin10CFR20,inwhichtheintensityofradiationis>100mrem/hrbuts1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,shallbebarricadedandconspicuouslypostedasahighradiationareaandentrancetheretoshallbecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).Individualsqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedures(e.g.,radiationprotectiontechnicians)orpersonnelcontinuouslyescortedbysuchindividualsmaybeexemptfromtheRWPissuancerequirementduringtheperformanceoftheirassigneddutiesinhighradiationareaswithexposurerates~1000mrem/hr,providedtheyareotherwisefollowingplantradiationprotectionproceduresforentryintosuchhighradiationareas.Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentersuchareasshallbeprovidedwithoraccompaniedbyoneormoreofthefollowing:a.Aradiationmonitoringdevicethatcontinuouslyindicatestheradiationdoserateinthearea.b.Aradiationmonitoringdevicethatcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived.Entryintosuchareaswiththismonitoringdevicemaybemadeafterthedoseratelevelsintheareahavebeenestablishedandpersonnelareawareofthem.IC.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedureswitharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevice,,whoisresponsibleforprovidingpositivecontrolovertheactivitieswithintheareaandshallperfo'rmperiodicradiationsurveillanceatthefrequencyspecifiedbytheradiationprotectiontechnicianintheRWP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-23DraftB 'yI,~L'I41lCj)P~I4JtSIC,7l)<C(rc:.1 HighRadiationArea5.75.7HighRadiationArea(continued)5.7.25.7.3InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.1,areaswithradiationlevels>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cmshallbeprovidedwithlockedorcontinuouslyguardeddoorstopreventunauthorizedentryandthekeysshallbemaintainedundertheadministrativecontroloftheShiftSupervisorondutyorradiationprotectionsupervision.DoorsshallremainlockedexceptduringperiodsofaccessbypersonnelunderanapprovedRWPthatshallspecifythedoseratelevelsintheimmediateworkareasandthemaximumallowablestaytimesforindividualsinthoseareas.InlieuofthestaytimespecificationoftheRWP,directorremote(suchasclosedcircuitTVcameras)continuoussurveillancemaybemadebypersonnelqualifiedinradiationprotection,procedurestoprovidepositiveexposurecontrolovertheactivitiesbeingperformedwithinthearea.InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.1,forindividualhighradiationareaswithradiationlevelsof>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,accessibletopersonnel,thatarelocatedwithinlargeareassuchasreactorcontainment,wherenoenclosureexistsforpurposesoflocking,orthatcannotbecontinuouslyguarded,andwherenoenclosurecanbereasonablyconstructedaroundtheindividualarea,thatindividualareashallbebarricadedandconspicuouslyposted,andaflashinglightshallbeactivatedasawarningdevice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-24DraftB Iie~'UV/g'lgkJE6~HJ ANDRochesterGas5ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember1995SubmittalAttachmentCChapters1.0-3.4VolumeII ATTACHMENTCProposedRevisedR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsRevisethepagesasfollows:RemoveLicenseTableofContentsEntireSection1.0EntireSection2.0EntireSection3.0EntireSection4.0EntireSection5.0EntireSection6.0InsertGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationITSLicenseITSTableofContentsITSSection1.0ITSSection2.0ITSSection3.0ITSSection4.0ITSSection5.0December1995 ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDOCKETNO.50-244R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSELicenseNo.DPR-18TheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(theCommission)hasfoundthat:A.B.C.D.TheapplicationcomplieswiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended(theAct),andtheregulationsoftheCommissionsetforthin10CFRChapterIandallrequirednotificationstootheragenciesorbodieshavebeendulymade;ConstructionoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(thefacility)hasbeensubstantiallycompletedtoconformitywithConstructionPermitNo.CPPR-19,asamended,andtheapplication,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCommission;Thefacilitywilloperateinconformitywiththeapplication,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesand.regulationsoftheCommission(exceptasexemptedfromcomplianceinSection2.Dbelow);Thereisreasonableassurance(i)thatthefacilitycanbeoperatedatpowerlevelsupto1520megawatts(thermal)withoutendangeringthehealthandsafetyofthepublic;and(ii)thatsuchactivitieswillbe'onductedincompliancewiththeregulationsoftheCommission(exceptasexemptedfromcomplianceinSection2.Dbelow);E.TheapplicantistechnicallyandfinanciallyqualifiedtoengageintheactivitiesauthorizedbythisoperatinglicenseinaccordancewiththerulesandregulationsoftheCommission;F.Theapplicanthasfurnishedproofoffinancialprotectionthatsatisfiestherequirementsof10CFRPart140;andG.Theissuanceofthislicensewillnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TheProvisionalOperatingLicensedatedSeptember19,1969,issupersededbyFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18herebyissuedtoRochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoreadasfollows: ThislicenseappliestotheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,aclosedcycle,pressurized,light-water-moderatedandcooledreactor,'ndelectricgeneratingequipment(hereinreferredtoas"thefacility")whichisownedbytheRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(hereinafter"thelicensee"or"RGEE").Thefacilityislocatedonthelicensee'ssiteonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,WayneCounty,NewYork,about16mileseastoftheCityofRochesterandisdescribedinlicenseapplicationAmendmentNo.6,"FinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport,"andsubsequentamendmentsthereto,andintheapplicationforpowerincreasenotarizedFebruary2,1971,andAmendmentNos.1through4thereto(hereincollectivelyreferredtoas"theapplication").Subjecttotheconditionsandrequirementsincorporatedherein,theCommissionherebylicensesRG&E:(1)PursuanttoSection104boftheActand10CFRPart50,"DomesticLicensingofProductionandUtilizationFacilities,"topossess,use,andoperatethefacilityatthedesignatedlocationtoWayneCounty,NewYork,inaccordancewiththeproceduresandlimitationssetforthinthislicense;(2)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceive,possess,anduseatanytimespecialnuclearmaterialorreactorfuel,inaccordancewiththelimitationsforstorageandamountsrequiredforreactoroperationasdescribedintheFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,asamended,andCommissionSafetyEvaluationsdatedNovember15,1976,October5,1984,November14,1984,andAugust30,1995.(a)(b)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceiveandstorefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20,1979);PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,topossessandusefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20.1979)assupplementedFebruary20,1980andHarch5,1980;(3)(4)PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30,40,and70toreceive,possess,anduseatanytimeanybyproduct,source,andspecialnuclearmaterialassealedneutronsourcesforreactorstartup,sealedsourcesforreactorinstrumentationandradiationmonitoringequipmentcalibration,andasfissiondetectorsinamountasrequired;PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30,40,and70,toreceive,possess,anduseinamountsasrequired'nybyproduct,source,orspecialnuclearmaterialwithoutrestrictiontochemicalorphysicalform,forsampleanalysis orinstrumentcalibrationorassociatedwithradioactiveapparatusorcomponents;and(5)PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30and70,topossess,butnotseparate,suchbyproductandspecialnuclearmaterialsasmaybeproducedbytheoperationofthefacility.ThislicenseshallbedeemedtocontainandissubjecttotheconditionsspecifiedinthefollowingCommissionregulationsin10CFRPart20,Section30.34ofPart30,Section40.41ofPart40,'ections50.54and50.59ofPart50,andSection70.32ofPart70;andissubjecttoallapplicableprovisionsoftheActandrules,regulationsandordersoftheCommissionnoworhereafterineffect;andissubjecttotheadditionalconditionsspecifiedbelow:(1)MaximumPowerLevelRG&Eisauthorizedtooperatedthefacilityatsteady-statepowerlevelsuptoamaximumof1520megawatts(thermal).(2)TechnicalSecificationsTheTechnicalSpecificationscontainedinAppendixA,areherebyincorporatedinthelicense.ThelicenseeshalloperatethefacilityinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.(3)FireProtection(a)Thelicenseeshallimplementandmaintainineffect'allfireprotectionfeaturesdescribedinthelicensee'ssubmittalsreferencedinandasapprovedormodifiedbytheNRC'sFireProtectionSafetyEvaluation(SE)datedFebruary14,1979andSEsupplementsdatedDecember17,1980,Febr'uary6,1981,June22,1981,February27,1985andHarch21,1985orconfigurationssubsequentlyapprovedbytheNRC,subjecttoprovision(b)below.(b).ThelicenseemaymakechangestotheapprovedfireprotectionprogramwithoutpriorapprovaloftheCommissiononlyifthosechangeswouldnotadverselyaffecttheabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire. 4D.Notused.E.F.PhysicalProtection-ThelicenseeshallmaintainineffectandfullyimplementallprovisionsofthefollowingCommission-approveddocuments,includingamendmentsandchangesmadepursuanttotheauthorityof10CFR50.54(p),whicharebeingwithheldfrompublicdisclosurepursuantto10CFR73.21:ThelicenseeshallfullyimplementandmaintainineffectallprovisionsoftheCommission-approvedphysicalsecurity,guardtrainingandqualification,andsafeguardscontingencyplansincludingamendmentsmadepursuanttoprovisionsoftheMiscellaneousAmendmentsandSearchRequirementsrevisionsto10CFR73.55(51FR27827and27822)andtotheauthorityof10CFR50.90and10CFR50.54(p).Theplans,whichcontainSafeguards.Informationprotectedunder10CFR73.21,areentitled:"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantPhysicalSecurityPlan,"withrevisionssubmittedthroughAugust18,1987;"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantGuardTrainingandgualificationPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughJuly30,1981;and"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantSafeguardsContingencyPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughApril14,1981.Changesmadeinaccordancewith10CFR73.55shallbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeschedulesetforththerein.Thislicenseiseffectiveasofthedateofissuanceandshallexpireatmidnight,September18,2009.FROMTHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION

Attachment:

AppendixA-TechnicalSpecificationsDateofIssuance: TABLEOFCONTENTS1.01.11.2 1.31.42.02.12.23.03.0USEANDAPPLICATIONDefinitionsLogical=ConnectorsCompletionTimes.FrequencySAFETYLIMITS(SLs)SLS~~~~~~~~SLViolationsLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITY1.1-1*1.1-11.2-11.3-11.4-12.0-12.0-12.0-13.0-13.0-43.1 3.1.13.1.23.1.3 3.1.43.1.53.1.63.1.73.1.8REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS.SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)CoreReactivityModeratorTemperatureCoefficientRodGroupAlignmentLimits.ShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsRodPositionIndicationPHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2.(HTC)3.1-13.1-13.1-23.1-43.1-73.1-11 3.1-133.1-153.1-183.23.2.1.3.2.23.2.33.2.43.33.3.13.3.23.3.33.3.43.3.5POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"m)AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)INSTRUMENTATIONReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFASInstrumentationPostAccidentMonitoring(PAH)Instrumentation.LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)InstrumentationActuation~~)3.2-13.2-13.2-43.2-63.2-113.3-13.3-13.3-203.3-283.3-343.3-36(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB TABLEOFCONTENTS3.43.4.13.4.23.4.3 3.4.43.4.5 3.4.6 3.4.73.4.8 3.4.93.4.103.4.113.4.123.4.133.4.14 3.4.15 3.4.163.53.5.13.5.23.5.33.5.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefrom'NucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsRCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityRCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP.RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3RCSLoops-MODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledPressurizerPressurizerSafetyValvesPressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)..LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemRCSOperationalLEAKAGERCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage.RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationRCSSpecificActivityEMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)Accumulators.ECCS-NODES1,2,and3ECCS-MODE4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)3.4-13.4-13.4-33.4-4 3.4-63.4-73.4-103.4-133.4-163.4-183.4-203.4-223.4-263.4-323.4-343.4-383.4-423.5-13.5-1 3.5-33.5-63.5-83.63.6.13.6.2 3.6.33.6.43.6.5 3.6.63.6.7CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSContainmentContainmentAirLocksContainmentIsolationBoundaries.ContainmentPressureContainmentAirTemperatureContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculFanCooler(CRFC),NaOH,andContainmentCharcoalSystemsHydrogenRecombiners~~ationPost-Acci3.6-13.6-13.6-33.6-83.6-15 3.6-16dent3.6-173.6-233.73.7.13.7.23.7.33.7.43.7.53.7.63.7.73.7.8PLANTSYSTEMSMainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs)HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesMain.FeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVsMainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(MFRVs)andAssociatedBypassValvesAtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System.ServiceWater(SW)System~~)3.7-1 3.7-13~733.7-53.7-83.7-10'.7-143.7-15 3.7-17(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB TABLEOFCONTENTS3.73.7.93.7.103.7.11 3.7.123.7.133.7.143.83.8.13.8.23.8.33.8.4 3.8.5 3.8.63.8.73.8.83.8.93.8.10ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS.ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.ACSources-NODES5and6DieselFuelOilDCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.DCSources-MODES5and6BatteryCellParametersACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6.DistributionSystems-HODES1,2,3,and4DistributionSystems-MODES5and6~~~~and4PLANTSYSTEHS(continued)ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatment.System(CREATS)AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS).SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelSpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationSpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageSecondarySpecificActivity3.7-193.7-233.7-25 3.7-26 3.7-283.7-313.8-13.8-1 3.8-83.8-113.8-133.8-16 3.8-18 3.8-20 3.8-223.8-243.8-263.93.9.1 3.9.2 3.9.33.9.43.9.53.9.64.04.14.2 4.3REFUELINGOPERATIONS.BoronConcentrationNuclearInstrumentationContainmentPenetrations.ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation.-MaterLevel~23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtRefuelingCavityWaterLevelDESIGNFEATURESSiteLocationReactorCore.FuelStorage.~~~~~~3.9-1 3.9-1 3.9-2 3.9-43.9-63.9-8 3.9-104.0-14.0-14.0-14.0-25.05.1 5.2 5.35.45.55.65.7ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSResponsibility.Organization.PlantStaffqualificationsProcedures.ProgramsandManuals...ReportingRequirements.HighRadiationArea~~~5.0-15.0-15.0-25'-45.0-55.0-65.0-18 5.0-23R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant~111DraftB

TABLEOFCONTENTS2.02.1.12.1.2B3.0B3.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)ReactorCoreSLs.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSL.LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITY~~~~~~~~~~2.0-12.0-12.0-83.0-1 3.0-12B3.1B3..1.1B3.1.2B3.1.3B3.1.4B3.1.5B3.1.6B3.1.7B3.1.8REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS.SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)CoreReactivityModeratorTemperatureCoefficientRodGroupAlignmentLimits;.ShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsRodPositionIndicationPHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2.(HTC)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3.1-1 3.1-1 3.1-83.1-153.1-223.1-343.1-413.1-493.1-573.23.2.13.2.23.2.33.2.43.3 3.3.1 3.3.23.3.3 3.3.43.3.5POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)INSTRUMENTATIONReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationPostAccident'Monitoring(PAH)InstrumentatiLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation.ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationon~~B3.2-13.2-13.2-83.2-173.2-293.3-13.3-1 3.3-633.3-1073.3-1293.3-137B3.4B3.4.1)B3.4.2B3.4.3B3.4.4B3.4.5B3.4.6B3.4.7B3.4;8B3.4.9B3.4.10B3.4.11REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsRCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityRCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-NODE1)8.5%RTP.RCSLoops-NODES1~8.5%RTP,2,and3RCSLoops-MODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCS'oops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledPressurizerPressurizerSafetyValvesPressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs).......~.3.4-1B3.4-1B3.4-8B3.4-12B3.4-20B3.4-24B3.4-31B3.4-37B'.4-43B3.4-47B3.4-533.4-58(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantivDraftB

TABLEOFCONTENTS.3.4B3.4.12B3.4.13B3.4.14B3.4.15B3.4.16B3.5B3.5.1B3.5.2B3.5.3B3.5.4B3.6B3.6.1B3.6.2B3.6.3B3.6.4B3.6.5B3.6.6REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)(continued)LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemRCSOperationalLEAKAGERCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage.RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationRCSSpecificActivityEMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)Accumulators.ECCS-MODES1,2,and3ECCS-MODE4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSContainmentContainmentAirLocksContainmentIsolationBoundaries.ContainmentPressureContainmentAirTemperatureContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationB3.4-68B3.4-85B3.4-92B3.4-100B3.4-1083.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-10 3.5-25 3.5-293.6-13.6-13.6-8 3.6-183.6-37 3.6-413.6.7FanCooler(CFRC),NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems...............B3.6-45HydrogenRecombiners..............B3.6-663.73.7.1 3.7.2~3.7.3B3.7.4B3.7.5B3.7.6B3.7.7B3.7.8B3.7.9B3.7.10B3.7.11B3.7.12B3'.13B3.7.14PLANTSYSTEMSHainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)MainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValves.HainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs),HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs)andAssociatedBypassValvesAtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System.ServiceWater(SW)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS).AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelSpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationSpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageSecondarySpecificActivityB,B3.7-1 3.7-13.7-63.7-133.7-223.7-273.7-423.7-463.7-553.7-65 3.7-753.7-823.7-863.7-'903.7-97(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB Lf TABLEOFCONTENTSB3.8B3.8.1B3.8.2B3.8.3B3.8.4B3.8.5B3.8.6B3.8.7B3.8.8B3.8.9B3.8.10B3.9B3.9.1B3.9.2B3.9.3B3.9.4B3.9.5B3.9.6ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS.ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.ACSources-MODES5and6DieselFuelOilDCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.DCSources-MODES5and6BatteryCellParametersACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,andDistributionSystems-MODES5and6REFUELINGOPERATIONS.BoronConcentrationNuclearInstrumentationContainmentPenetrationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtRefuelingCavityWaterLevel~~,andB3.8-1B3.8-1B3.8-24B3.8-31B3.8-36B3.8-46B3.8-52B3.8-57B3.8-64B3.8-70B3.8-83B3.9-1B3.9-1B3.9-6B3.9-10B3.9-16B3.9-21B3.9-25R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantvlDraftB Definitions1.11.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.1DefinitionsNOTEThedefinedtermsof.thissectionappearincapitalizedtypeandareapplicablethroughouttheseTechnicalSpecificationsandBases.TermACTIONSDefinitionACTIONSshallbethatpartofaSpecificationthatprescribesRequiredActionstobe.takenunderdesignatedConditionswithinspecifiedCompletionTimes.ACTUATIONLOGICTESTAnACTUATIONLOGICTESTshallbetheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.TheACTUATIONLOGICTEST,asaminimum,shallincludeacontinuitycheckofoutputdevices.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)AFDshallbethedifferenceinnormalizedflux,signalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetector.'HANNELCALIBRATIONACHANNELCALIBRATIONshallbetheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechannelsothatitrespondswithintherequi'redrangearidaccuracytoknowninput.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONshallencompasstheentirechannel,includingtherequiredsensor,alarm,interlock,display,andtripfunctions.Calibrationofinstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetector(RTD)orthermocouplesensorsmayconsistofaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorandnormalcalibrationoftheremainingadjustabledevicesinthechannel.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONmaybeperformedbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlappingcalibrations*ortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)CHANNELCHECKCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)COREALTERATIONCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131ACHANNELCHECKshallbethequalitativeassessment,byobservation,ofchannelbehaviorduringoperation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.ACOTshallbetheinjectionofasimulatedoractualsignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifytheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,display,andtripfunctions.TheCOTshallincludeadjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy.COREALTERATIONshallbethemovementofanyfuel,sources,orreactivitycontrolcomponents,withinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadremovedandfuelinthevessel.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.TheCOLRistheplantspecificdocumentthatprovidescyclespecificparameterlimitsforthecurrentreloadcycle.ThesecyclespecificparameterlimitsshallbedeterminedforeachreloadcycleinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.5.PlantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualSpecifications.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131(microcuries/gram)thatalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,I-134,andI-135actuallypresent.ThethyroiddoseconversionfactorsusedforthiscalculationshallbethoselistedinTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109,Revision1,1977.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(continued)Draft8

Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)E-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYEshallbetheaverage(weightedinproportiontotheconcentrationofeachradionuclideinthereactorcoolantatthetimeofsampling)ofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergies(inHeV)perdisintegrationfornon-iodineisotopes,withhalflives>15minutes,makingupatleast95%ofthetotalnon-iodineactivityinthecoolant.LEAKAGELEAKAGEfromtheRCSshallbe:a.IdentifiedLEAKAGE1.LEAKAGE,suchasthatfrompumpsealsorvalvepacking(exceptreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealwaterinjectionorreturn),thatiscapturedandconductedtocollectionsystemsorasumporcollectingtank;2.LEAKAGEintothecontainmentatmospherefromsourcesthatarebothspecificallylocatedandknowneithernottointerferewiththeoperationofleakagedetectionsystemsornottobepressureboundaryLEAKAGE;or3.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)LEAKAGEthroughasteamgenerator(SG)totheSecondarySystem;b.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEAllLEAKAGE(exceptRCPsealwaterinjectionorreturn)thatisnotidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.PressureBoundarLEAKAGELEAKAGE(exceptSGLEAKAGE)throughanonisolablefaultinanRCScomponentbody,pipewall,orvesselwall.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-3(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)NODEANODEshallcorrespondtoanyoneinclusivecombinationofcorereactivitycondition,powerlevel,averagereactorcoolanttemperature,andreactorvesselheadclosurebolttensioningspecifiedinTable1.1-1withfuelinthereactorvessel.OPERABLE-OPERABILITYPHYSICSTESTSAsystem,subsystem,train,component,ordeviceshallbeOPERABLEorhaveOPERABILITYwhenitiscapableofperformingitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)andwhenallnecessaryattendantinstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpower,coolingandsealwater,lubrication,andotherauxiliaryequipmentthatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,component,ordevicetoperformitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).PHYSICSTESTSshallbethosetestsperformedtomeasurethefundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthereactorcoreandrelatedinstrumentation.Thesetestsare:a.DescribedinChapter14,InitialTestProgramoftheUFSAR;b.Authorizedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59;orc.OtherwiseapprovedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-4(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)RATEDTHERMALPOWER(RTP)SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)ThePTLRistheplantspecificdocumentthatprovidesthereactorvesselpressureandtemperaturelimits,includingheatupandcooldownrates,andthepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsandenabletemperatureassociatedwiththeLowTemperatureOverpressurizationProtectionSystemforthecurrentreactorvesselfluenceperiod.ThesepressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbedeterminedforeachfluenceperiodinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.6.Plantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualspecifications.QPTRshallbetheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.RTPshallbea.totalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolantof1520HWt.SDMshallbetheinstantaneousamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcriticalorwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassuming:a.Allrodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)arefullyinsertedexceptforthesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworth,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn.WithanyRCCAsnotcapableofbeingfullyinserted,thereactivityworthoftheRCCAsmustbeaccountedforinthedeterminationofSDM;andb.InMODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant1.1-5(continued)DraftB

~~1.1Definitions(continued)Definitions1.1STAGGEREDTESTBASISTHERMALPOWERASTAGGEREDTESTBASISshallconsistofthetestingofoneofthesystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsduringtheintervalspecifiedbytheSurveillanceFrequency,sothatallsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsaretestedduringnSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,wherenisthetotalnumberofsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsintheassociatedfunction.THERMALPOWERshallbethetotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolant.TRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)ATADOTshallconsistofoperatingthetripactuatingdeviceandverifyingtheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,display,andtripfunctions.TheTADOTshallincludeadjustment,asnecessary,ofthetripactuatingdevicesothatitactuatesattherequiredsetpointwithintherequiredaccuracy.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB Definitions1.1Table1.1-1(page1of1)NODESMODETITLEREACTIVITYCONDITION(k,)%RATEDPOWERaAVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTTEMPERATURE(F)PowerOperationStartupHotShutdownHotStandby()ColdShutdown()Refueling()>0.99>0.99<0.99<0.99<0.99>5<5NANA>350350>T,>200<200NA(a)Excludingdecayheat.(b)Allreactorvesselheadclosureboltsfullytensioned.(c)Oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensioned.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-7DraftB LogicalConnectors1.21.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.2LogicalConnectorsPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoexplainthemeaningoflogicalconnectors.LogicalconnectorsareusedinTechnicalSpecifications(TS)todiscriminatebetween,andyetconnect,discreteConditions,RequiredActions,CompletionTimes,andFrequencies.TheonlylogicalconnectorsthatappearinTSareANDandOR.Thephysicalarrangementoftheseconnectorsconstituteslogicalconventionswithspecificmeanings.BACKGROUNDSeverallevelsoflogicmaybeusedtostateRequired,Actions.Theselevelsareidentifiedbytheplacement(ornesting)ofthelogicalconnectorsandbythenumberassignedtoeachRequiredAction.ThefirstleveloflogicisidentifiedbythefirstdigitofthenumberassignedtoaRequiredActionandtheplacementofthelogicalconnectorinthefirstlevelofnesting(i.e.,leftjustifiedwiththenumberoftheRequiredAction).Thesuccessivelevelsof.logicareidentifiedbyadditionaldigitsoftheRequiredActionnumberandbysuccessiveindentationsofthelogicalconnectors.WhenlogicalconnectorsareusedtostateaCondition,CompletionTimeorFrequency,onlythefirstleveloflogicisused,andthelogicalconnectorisleftjustifiedwiththestatementoftheCondition,CompletionTime,orFrequency.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseoflogicalconnectors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-1LOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.lVerify.ANDA.2Restore.InthisexamplethelogicalconnectorANDisusedtoindicatethatwheninConditionA,bothRequiredActionsA.1andA.2mustbecompleted.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-2DraftB LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-2MULTIPLELOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.lORTrip.A.2.1Verify.ANDA.2.2.1Reduce.ORA.2.2.2Perform.ORA.3Align.Thisexamplerepresentsamorecomplicateduseoflogicalconnectors.RequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andA.3arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformedasindicatedbytheuseofthelogicalconnectorORandtheleftjustifiedplacement.AnyoneofthesethreeActionsmaybechosen.IfA.2ischosen,thenbothA.2.1andA.2.2mustbeperformedasindicatedbythelogicalconnectorAND.RequiredActionA.2.2ismetbyperformingA.2.2.1orA.2.2.2.TheindentedpositionofthelogicalconnectorORindicatesthatA.2.2.1andA.2.2.2arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-3DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.3CompletionTimesPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoestablishtheCompletionTimeconventionandtoprovideguidanceforitsuse.BACKGROUNDLimitingConditionsforOperation(LCOs)specifyminimumrequirementsforensuringsafeoperationoftheplant.TheACTIONSassociatedwithan.LCOstateConditionsthattypicallydescribethewaysinwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOcanfailtobemet.SpecifiedwitheachstatedConditionareRequiredAction(s)andCompletionTime(s).DESCRIPTIONTheCompletionTimeistheamountoftimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredAction.Itisreferencedtothetimeofdiscoveryofasituation(e.g.,inoperableequipmentorvariablenotwithinlimits)thatrequiresenteringanACTIONSConditionunlessotherwisespecified,providingtheplantisinaNODEorspecifiedconditionstatedintheApplicabilityoftheLCO.RequiredActionsmustbecompletedpriortotheexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime.AnACTIONSConditionremainsineffectandtheRequiredActionsapplyuntiltheConditionnolongerexistsortheplantisnotwithintheLCOApplicability.IfsituationsarediscoveredthatrequireentryintomorethanoneConditionatatimewithinasingleLCO(multipleConditions),theRequiredActionsforeachConditionmustbeperformedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime.WheninmultipleConditions,separate'CompletionTimesaretrackedforeachConditionstartingfromthetimeofdiscoveryofthesituationthatrequiredentryintotheCondition.OnceaConditionhasbeenentered,subsequenttrains,subsystems,components,orvariablesexpressedintheCondition,discoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,willnotresultinseparateentryintotheCondition,unlessspecificallystated.TheRequiredActionsoftheConditioncontinuetoapplytoeachadditionalfailure,withCompletionTimesbasedoninitialentryintotheCondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-1DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)However,whena~subseuenttrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheConditionisdiscoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,theCompletionTime(s)maybeextended.TheCompletiontimeextensioncannotbeusedtoextendthestatedCompletionTimeforthefirstinoperabletrain,subsystem,component,orvariable.ToapplythisCompletionTimeextension,twocriteriamustfirstbemet.Thesubsequentinoperability:a.Mustexistconcurrentwiththefirstinoperability;andb.Hustremaininoperableornotwithinlimitsafterthefirstinoperabilityisresolved.ThetotalCompletionTimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredActiontoaddressthesubsequentinoperabilityshallbelimitedtothemorerestrictiveoFeither:a.ThestatedCompletionTime,asmeasuredfromtheinitialentryintotheCondition,plusanadditional24hours;orb.ThestatedCompletionTimeasmeasuredfromdiscoveryofthesubsequentinoperability.TheaboveCompletionjTimeextensionsdonotapplytothoseSpecificationsthathaveexceptionsthatallowcompletelyseparatere-entryintotheCondition(foreachtrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheCondition)andseparatetrackingofCompletionTimesbasedonthisre-entry.TheseexceptionsarestatedinindividualSpecifications.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-2DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)TheaboveCompletionTimeextensiondoesnotapplytoaCompletionTimewithamodified"timezero."Thismodified"timezero"maybeexpressedasarepetitivetime(i.e.,"onceper8hours,"wheretheCompletionTimeisreferencedfromapreviouscompletionoftheRequiredActionversusthetimeofConditionentry).Anexampleofamodified"timezero"withtheCompletionTimeexpressedas"onceper8hours"isillustratedinExample1.3-6,ConditionA.Inthisexample,theCompletionTimemaynotbeextended.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseofCompletionTimeswithdifferenttypesofConditionsandchangingConditions.EXAMPLE1.3-1COMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.IBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours\ConditionBhastwoRequiredActions.EachRequiredActionhasitsownseparateCompletionTime.EachCompletionTimeisreferencedtothetimethatConditionBisentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-3DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-2DEFAULTCONDITIONSLCO3.0.3ENTRYCOMPLETIONTIMESTheRequiredActionsofCondition8aretobeinMODE3within6hoursANDinMODE5within36hours.Atotalof6hoursisallowedforreachingMODE3andatotalof36hours(not42hours)isallowedforreachingMODE5fromthetimethatConditionBwasentered.IfMODE3isreachedwithin3hours,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext33hoursbecausethetotaltimeallowedforreachingMODE5is36hours.IfConditionBisenteredwhileinMODE3,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext36hours.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.A.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursWhenatrainisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisentered.IfthetrainisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,ConditionBisalsoenteredandtheCompletionTimeclocksfor'equiredActionsB.1andB.2start.IftheinoperabletrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusafterConditionBisentered,ConditionAandBareexited,andtherefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionBmaybeterminated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-4Draft8 CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-2(continued)Whenasecondtrainisdeclaredinoperablewhilethefirsttrainisstillinoperable,ConditionAisnotre-enteredforthesecondtrain.LCO3.0.3isentered,sincetheACTIONSdonotincludeaConditionformorethanoneinoperabletrain.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterLCO3.0.3isentered,butcontinuestobe'trackedfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.WhileinLCO3.0.3,ifoneoftheinoperabletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasnotexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionA.WhileinLCO3.0.3,ifoneoftheinoperabletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionB.TheCompletionTimeforConditionBistrackedfromthetimetheConditionACompletionTimeexpired.UponrestoringoneofthetrainstoOPERABLEstatus,the.ConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetimethefirsttrainwasdeclaredinoperable.ThisCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthetrainrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperabletrain.A24hourextensiontothestated7daysisallowed,providedthisdoesnotresultinthesecondtrainbeinginoperablefor>7days.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-5DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-3MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.A.1RestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.OneFunctionYtraininoperable.B.lRestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursC.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.ANDOneFunctionYtraininoperable.C.lRestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ORC.2RestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-6DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-3(continued)WhenoneFunctionXtrainandoneFunctionYtrainareinoperable,ConditionAandCondition8areconcurrentlyapplicable.TheCompletionTimesforConditionAandCondition8aretrackedseparatelyforeachtrainstartingfromthetimeeachtrainwasdeclaredinoperableandtheConditionwasentered.AseparateCompletionTimeisestablishedforConditionCandtrackedfromthetimethesecondtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,thetimethesituationdescribedinConditionCwasdiscovered).IfRequiredActionC.2iscompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,Conditions8andCareexited.IftheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1hasnotexpired,operationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA.TheremainingCompletionTimeinConditionAismeasuredfromthetimetheaffectedtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,initialentryintoConditionA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-7Draft8

CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-4MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.1Restorevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinNODE4.6hours12hoursAsingleCompletionTimeisusedforanynumberofvalvesinoperableatthesametime.TheCompletionTimeassociatedwithConditionAisbasedontheinitialentryintoConditionAandisnottrackedonapervalvebasis.Declaringsubsequentvalvesinoperable,whileConditionAisstillineffect,doesnottriggerthetrackingofseparateCompletionTimes.OnceoneofthevalveshasbeenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,'heConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetimethefirstvalvewasdeclaredinoperable.TheCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthevalverestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperablevalve.TheConditionACompletionTimemaybeextendedforupto4hoursprovidedthisdoesnotresultinanysubsequentvalvebeinginoperablefor>4hours.IftheCompletionTimeof4hours(plustheextension)expireswhileoneormorevalvesarestillinoperable,ConditionBis'entered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-5SEPARATEENTRYCONDITION(continued)ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperablevalve.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.lRestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.AND8.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursTheNoteabovetheACTIONStableisamethodofmodifying,howtheCompletionTimeistracked.IfthismethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistrackedwasapplicableonlytoaspecificcondition,theNotewouldappearinthatCondition,ratherthanatthetopoftheACTIONStable.TheNoteallowsConditionAtobeenteredseparatelyforeachinoperablevalve,andCompletionTimestrackedonapervalvebasis.Whenavalveisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredanditsCompletionTimestarts.Ifsubsequentvalvesaredeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-9DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-5(continued)IftheCompletionTimeassociatedwithavalveinConditionAexpires,ConditionBisenteredforthatvalve.IftheCompletionTimesassociatedwithsubsequentvalvesinConditionAexpire,ConditionBisenteredseparatelyforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.IfavalvethatcausedentryintoConditionBisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,ConditionBisexitedforthatvalve.SincetheNoteinthisexampleallowsmultipleConditionentryandtrackingofseparateCompletionTimes,CompletionTimeextensionsdonotapply.EXAMPLE1.3-6MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onechannelinoperable.A.lPerformSR3.x.x.x.ORA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto50%RTPOnceper8hours8hoursB."RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-10,DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-6(continued)EntryintoConditionAoffersachoicebetweenRequiredActionA.1orA.2.RequiredActionA.1hasa"onceper"CompletionTime,whichqualifiesforthe25%extension,perSR3.0.2,toeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.Theinitial8hourintervalofRequiredActionA.1beginswhenConditionAisentered,andtheinitialperformanceofRequiredActionA.1mustbecompletedwithinthefirst8hourinterval.IfRequiredActionA.1isfollowed,andtheRequiredActionisnotmetwithintheCompletionTime(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.IfRequiredActionA.2isfollowedandtheCompletionTimeof8hoursisnotmet,ConditionBisentered.IfafterentryintoConditionB,RequiredActionA.1orA.2ismet,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaythencontinueinConditionA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-11DraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-7MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesubsysteminoperable.A.1Verifyaffectedsubsystem~isolated.ANDA.2RestoresubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.1hourANDOnceper8hoursthereafter72hours.B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursRequiredActionA.1hastwoCompletionTimes.The1hourCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheConditionisenteredandeach"Onceper8hoursthereafter"intervalbeginsuponperformanceofRequiredActionA.l.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-7(continued)IfafterConditionAisentered,RequiredActionA.1isnotmetwithineithertheinitial1houroranysubsequent8hourintervalfromthepreviousperformance(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterConditionBisentered,butcontinuesfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.IfRequiredActionA.1ismetafterConditionBisentered,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA,providedtheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.2hasnotexpired.IMMEDIATEWhen"Immediately"isusedasaCompletionTime,theCOMPLETIONTIMERequiredActionshouldbepursuedwithoutdelayandinacontrolledmanner.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-13Draft8 Frequency1.41.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.4FrequencyPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistodefinetheproperuseandapplicationofFrequencyrequirements.DESCRIPTIONEachSurveillanceRequirement(SR)hasaspecifiedFrequencyinwhichtheSurveillancemustbemetinordertomeettheassociatedLCO.AnunderstandingofthecorrectapplicationofthespecifiedFrequencyisnecessaryforcompliancewiththeSR.The"specifiedFrequency"isreferredtothroughoutthissectionandeachoftheSpecificationsofSection3.0,SurveillanceRequirement(SR)Applicability.The"specifiedFrequency"consistsoftherequirementsoftheFrequencycolumnofeachSRaswellascertainNotesintheSurveillancecolumnthatmodifyperformancerequirements.4SituationswhereaSurveillancecouldberequired(i.e.,itsFrequencycouldexpire),butwhereitisnotpossibleornotdesiredthatitbeperformeduntilsometimeaftertheassociatedLCOiswithinitsApplicability,representpotentialSR3.0.4conflicts.Toavoidtheseconflicts,theSR(i.e.,theSurveillanceortheFrequency)isstatedsuchthatitisonly"required"whenitcanbeandshouldbeperformed.WithanSRsatisfied,SR3.0.4imposesnorestriction.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratethevariouswaysthatFrequenciesarespecified.Intheseexamples,theApplicabilityoftheLCO(LCOnotshown)isMODES1,2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-1DraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-1SINGLEFREUENCYSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYPerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursExample1.4-1containsthetypeofSRmostoftenencounteredintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).TheFrequencyspecifiesaninterval(12hours)duringwhichtheassociatedSurveillancemustbeperformedatleastonetime.PerformanceoftheSurveillanceinitiatesthesubsequentinterval.AlthoughtheFrequencyisstatedas12hours,anextensionofthetimeintervalto1.25timesthestatedFrequencyisallowedbySR3.0.2foroperationalflexibility.Themeasurementofthisintervalcontinuesatalltimes,evenwhentheSRisnotrequiredtobemetperSR3.0.1(suchaswhentheequipmentisinoperable,avariableisoutsidespecifiedlimits,ortheplantisoutsidetheApplicabilityoftheLCO).IftheintervalspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheplantisinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCO,andtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceisnototherwisemodified(refertoExample1.4-3),thenSR3.0.3becomesapplicable.IftheintervalasspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheplantisnotinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCOforwhichperformanceoftheSRisrequired,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithintheFrequencyrequirementsofSR3.0.2priortoentryintotheMODEorotherspecifiedcondition.FailuretodosowouldresultinaviolationofSR3.0.4.(cont'inued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-2DraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-2MULTIPLEFREUENCIESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYVerifyflowiswithin1imits.Oncewithin12hoursafter25%RTP24hoursthereafterExample1.4-2hastwoFrequencies.ThefirstisaonetimeperformanceFrequency,andthesecondisofthetypeshowninExample1.4-1.Thelogicalconnector"AND"indicatesthatbothFrequencyrequirementsmustbemet.Eachtimereactorpowerisincreasedfromapowerlevel<25%RTPtoa25%RTP,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithin12hours.Theuseof"once"indicatesasingleperformancewillsatisfythespecifiedFrequency(assumingnootherFrequenciesareconnectedby"AND").ThistypeofFrequencydoesnotqualifyforthe1.25timesthestatedFrequency'xtensionallowedbySR3.0.2."Thereafter"indicatesfutureperformancesmustbeestablishedperSR3.0.2,butonlyafteraspecifiedconditionisfirstmet(i.e.,the"once"performanceinthisexample).Ifreactorpowerdecreasesto<25%RTP,themeasurementofbothintervalsstops.Newintervalsstartuponreactorpowerreaching25%RTP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-3DraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-3FREUENCYBASEDONSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY-----------------NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterz25%RTP.Performchanneladjustment.7daysTheintervalcontinues,whetherornottheplantoperationis<25%RTPbetweenperformances.dthNdtff<<hdfdffhSurveillance,itisconstruedtobepartofthe"specifiedFrequency."Shouldthe7dayintervalbeexceededwhileoperationis<25%RTP,thisNoteallows12hoursafterpowerreachesz25%RTPtoperformtheSurveillance.TheSurveillanceisstillconsideredtobeperformedwithinthe"specifiedFrequency."Therefore,iftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthe7day(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2)interval,butoperationwas<25%RTP,itwouldnotconstituteafailureoftheSRorfailuretomeettheLCO.Also,noviolationofSR3.0.4occurswhenchangingMODES,evenwiththe7dayFrequencynotmet,providedoperationdoesnotexceed12hourswithpower>25%RTP.f'tOncetheplantreaches25%RTP,12hourswouldbeallowedfor,completingtheSurveillance.IftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthis12hourinterval,therewouldthenbeafailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyandtheprovisionsofSR3.0.3wouldapply.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-4DraftB

SLs2.02.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)2.1SLs2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsInMODES1and2,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWER,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)averagetemperature,andpressurizerpressureshallnotexceedtheSLsspecifiedinFigure2.1.1-1.2.1.2RCSPressureSLInMODES1,2,3,4,and5,theRCSpressureshallbemaintaineds2735psig.2.2SLViolations2.2.1IfSL2.1.1isviolated,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2IfSL2.1.2isviolated:2.2.2.1InMODE1or2,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2.2InMODE3,4,or5,restorecompliancewithin5minutes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2.0-1DraftB

SLs2.06702400pie6406306620~6<02OOOps(a1T/5pal5905805700.00.10,20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.00.15.2POWER(FractionofNorninat)Figure2.l.l-lReactorSafetyLimitsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2.0-2DraftB ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)B2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6(Ref.I)requiresthatthereactorcoreshallbedesignedtofunctionthroughoutitsdesignlifetimewithoutexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimitswhichhavebeenstipulatedandjustified.Thisintegrityisrequiredduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).Thisisaccomplishedbyhavingadeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designbasis,whichcorrespondstoa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatDNBwillnotoccuronthelimitingfuelrodsandbyrequiringthatfuelcenterlinetemperaturestaysbelowthemeltingtemperature(Ref.2).TherestrictionsofthisSLpreventoverheatingofthefuelandcladding,.aswellaspossiblecladdingperforation,thatwouldresultinthereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Overheatingofthefuelispreventedbymaintainingthesteadystatepeaklinearheatrate(LHR)belowthelevelatwhichfuelcenterlinemeltingoccurs.Overheatingofthefuelcladdingispreventedbyrestrictingfueloperationtowithinthenucleateboilingregime,wheretheheattransfercoefficientislargeandthecladdingsurfacetemperatureisslightlyabovethecoolantsaturationtemperature.FuelcenterlinemeltingoccurswhenthelocalLHR,orpowerpeaking,inaregionofthefuelishighenoughtocausethefuelcenterlinetemperaturetoreachthemeltingpointofthefuel.Expansionofthepelletuponcenterlinemeltingmaycausethepellettostressthecladdingtothepointoffailure,allowinganuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-1DraftB ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)IOperationabovetheboundaryofthenucleateboilingregimecouldresultinexcessivecladdingtemperaturebecauseoftheonsetofDNBandtheresultantsharpreductioninheattransfercoefficient.Insidethesteamfilm,highcladdingtemperaturesarereached,andacladdingwater(zirconium-water)reactionmaytakeplace.Thischemicalreactionresultsinoxidationofthefuelcladdingtoastructurallyweakerform.Thisweakerformmayloseitsintegrity,resultinginanuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.TheproperfunctioningoftheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andmainsteamsafetyvalvespreventsviolationofthereactorcoreSLs.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThefuelcladdingmustnotsustaindamageasaresultofnormaloperationandAOOs.ThereactorcoreSLsareestablishedtoprecludeviolationofthefollowingfueldesigncriteria(Ref.3):a.Thehotfuelpelletinthecoremustnotexperiencecenterlinefuelmelting;andb.Theremustbeatleast95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehotfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant82.0-2DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)InmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,nuclearandthermalparameters,fuelfabricationparametersandcomputercodesmustbeconsidered.Theeffectsoftheseuncertaintieshavebeenstatisticallycombinedwiththecorrelationuncertaintytodeterminedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesthatsatisfytheDNBdesigncriterion.Theobservableparameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavebeenrelatedtoDNBthroughtheW-3and/orWRB-1DNBcorrelation.TheseDNBcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheDNBfluxandthelocationofDNBforauxiliaryuniformandnon-uniformheatfluxdistributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxratio,definedastheratiooftheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtothelocalheatflux,isindicativeofthemargintoDNB.AminimumvalueoftheDNBratioisspecifiedsothatduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransients,thereisa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevelthatDNBwillnotoccur.ThecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1representthelociofpointsofthermalpower,coolantsystempressureandaveragetemperatureforwhichthisminimumDNBvalueissatisfied.Theareaofsafeoperationisatorbelowtheselines.SafeoperationrelativetoFigure2.1.1-1referstotransientoraccidentconditions.NormalsteadystateoperationisgovernedbyLCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits."AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoahigherDNBRlimit.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNHRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility(Ref.4).TheReactorTripSystemsetpointsspecifiedinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation",incombinationwithalltheLCOs,aredesignedtopreventanyanticipatedcombinationoftransientconditionsforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)temperature,pressurizerpressure,andTHERMALPOWERlevelthatwouldresultinaDNBR.oflessthantheDNBRlimitandprecludetheexistenceofflowinstabilities.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-3DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)AutomaticenforcementofthesereactorcoreSLsisprovidedbythefollowingfunctions(Ref.5):a.Highpressurizerpressuretrip;b.Lowpressurizerpressuretrip;c.OvertemperaturesTtrip;d.OverpoweraTtrip;e.PowerRangeNeutronFluxtrip;andf.Steamgeneratorsafetyvalves.Additionalanticipatorytripfunctionsarealsoprovidedforspecificabnormalconditions.TheSLsrepresentadesignrequirementforestablishingtheRPStripsetpointsidentifiedpreviously.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits,"ortheassumedinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalyses(Ref.6)providemorerestrictivelimitstoensurethattheSLsarenotexceeded.SAFETYLIMITSFigureB2.1.1-1showsanexampleofthereactorcoresafetylimitsofTHERMALPOWER,RCSpressure,andaveragetemperatureforwhichtheminimumDNBRisgreaterthanorequaltothesafetyanalyseslimit,thatfuelcenterlinetemperatureremainsbelowmelting,thattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquid,orthatthecoreexitqualityiswithinthelimitsdefinedbytheDNBRcorrelation.Fromthistypeoffigure,thecurvesonFigure2.l.1-1oftheaccompanyingspecificationcanbegenerated.EachofthecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1hasthreedistinctslopes.Workingfromlefttoright,thefirstslopeensuresthattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthan,orequaltotheenthalpyof.saturatedliquidsuchthatovertemperatureaTindicationremainsvalid.Thesecondslopeensuresthatthehotlegsteamqualityremains<15%asrequiredbyW-3correlation.ThefinalslopeensuresthatDNBRisalways>1.3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant82.0-4DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESSAFETYLIMITS(continued)TheSLishigherthanthelimitcalculatedwhentheAxialFluxDifference(AFD)iswithinthelimitsoftheF(aI)functionoftheovertemperatureaTreactortrip.WhentheAFDisnotwithinthetolerance,theAFDeffectontheovertemperatureaTreactortripswillreducethesetpointstoprovideprotectionconsistentwiththereactorcoreSLs.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.1onlyappliesinMODES1and2becausethesearetheonlyNODESinwhichthereactoriscritical.AutomaticprotectionfunctionsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEduringNODES1and2toensureoperationwithinthereactorcoreSLs.ThesteamgeneratorsafetyvalvesandautomaticprotectionactionsservetopreventRCS.heatuptothereactorcoreSLconditionsortoinitiateareactortripfunction,whichforcestheplantintoNODE3.SetpointsforthereactortripfunctionsarespecifiedinLCO3.3.1.InNODES3,4,5,and6,ApplicabilityisnotrequiredsincethereactorisnotgeneratingsignificantTHERMALPOWER.SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.1isviolated,therequirementtorestorecomplianceandgotoNODE3placestheplantinasafeconditionandinaNODEinwhichthisSLisnotapplicable.TheallowedCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofbringingtheplanttoaNODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable,andreducestheprobabilityoffueldamage.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionsshallcontinueinordertobringtheplanttoaNODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-5(continued)DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESREFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGSE,

Subject:

"DeletionofInformationPertainingtoDefinitionofHotChannelFactors,"datedHay30,1985.'.UFSAR,Section4.2.1.3.3.4.UFSAR,Section4..4.3.5.WCAP-8745,"DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpowerDeltaTandThermalOvertemperatureDeltaTTripFunctions,"Harch1977.6.UFSAR,Section7.2.1.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-6DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.17570OPZT656055I-Lll~60Cl2000psia~\\1775psia2400psiaLocusofpointsWhamStcamQcnctatorSafetyValvesOpen---OT~TForCoteLimitatEachPseamo35CoioLimits30565570575580585590595600605610615620625630T-AVG('F)FigureB2.1.1-1ReactorCoreSafetyLimitsvs.BoundaryofProtectionR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-7DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2B2.0SAFETYLIHITS(SLs)B2.1.2ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSLBASESBACKGROUNDTheSLonRCSpressureprotectstheintegrityoftheRCSagainstoverpressurization.Intheeventoffuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductsarereleasedintothereactorcoolant.TheRCSthenservesastheprimarybarrierinpreventingthereleaseoffissionproductsintotheatmosphere.ByestablishinganupperlimitonRCSpressure,thecontinuedintegrityoftheRCSisensured.AccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary,"GDC33,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryCapability,"andGDC34,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryRapidPropagationFailurePrevention"(Ref.1),thereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)designconditionsarenottobeexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).ThedesignpressureoftheRCSis2485psig(Ref.2).DuringnormaloperationandAOOs,RCSpressureislimitedfromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,inacco'rdancewithSectionIIIoftheASHECode(Ref.3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure(Refs.4,5,and6).Toensuresystemintegrity,allRCScomponentsarehydrostaticallytestedat125%ofdesignpressure,accordingtotheASHECoderequirementspriortoinitialoperationwhenthereisnofuelinthecore.Followinginceptionofplantoperation,RCScomponentsarepressuretested,inaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheapprovedGinnaISI/ISTProgramwhichisbasedonASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.7).OverpressurizationoftheRCScouldresultinabreachoftheRCPBreducingthenumberofprotectivebarriersdesignedtopreventradioactivereleasesfromexceedingthelimitsspecifiedin10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria"(Ref.8).Ifsuchabreachoccursinconjunctionwithafuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductscouldenterthecontainmentatmosphere.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-8(continued)DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheRCSpressurizersafetyvalves,themainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSVs),andthereactorhighpressuretriphavesettingsestablishedtoensurethattheRCSpressureSLwillnotbeexceeded.TheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesaresizedtopreventsystempressurefromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,asspecifiedinSectionIIIoftheASNECodeforNuclearPowerPlantComponents(Ref.3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.Thetransientthatestablishestherequiredreliefcapacity,andhencevalvesizerequirementsandliftsettings,isacompletelossofexternalloadwithoutadirectreactortrip.Duringthetransient,nocontrolactionsareassumed,exceptthatthesafetyvalvesonthesecondaryplantareassumedtoopenwhenthesteampressurereachesthesecondaryplantsafetyvalvesettings.TheReactorTripSystemsetpoints(Ref.9),togetherwiththesettingsoftheHSSVs,providepressureprotectionfornormaloperationandAOOs.Thereactorhighpressuretripsetpointisspecificallysettoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurization.ThesafetyanalyseswhichcrediteitherthehighpressuretriportheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesareperformedusingconservativeassumptionsrelativetotheotherpressurecontroldevices.Norespecifically,nocreditistakenforoperationofthefollowing:a.Pressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves;'.Steamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalves;c~SteamDumpSystem;d.ReactorControlSystem;e.PressurizerLevelControlSystem;orf.Pressurizersprayvalves.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-9(continued)DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITSThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpressurevesselundertheASMECode,SectionIII,is110%ofdesignpressureexceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.ThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpiping,valves,andfittingsundertheoriginaldesignrequirementsofUSASB31.1(Ref.5)is120%ofdesignpressure.Themostlimitingofthesetwoallowancesisthe110%ofdesignpressure;therefore,theSLonmaximumallowableRCSpressureis2735psig.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.2appliesinMODES1,2,3,4,and5becausethisSLcouldbeapproachedorexceededintheseMODESduetooverpressurizationevents.TheSLisnotapplicableinMODE6becausethereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarenotfullytightened,makingitunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurized.SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.2isviolatedwhenthereactorisinMODE1or2,therequirementistorestorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.ExceedingtheRCSpress'ureSLmaycauseimmediateRCSfailureandcreateapotentialforradioactivereleasesinexcessof10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).TheallowableCompletionTimeof1importanceofreducingpowerlevelwherethepotentialforchallengesminimized.IftheCompletionTimeshallcontinueinordertorestoreandbringtheplanttoMODE3.hourrecognizesthetoaMODEofoperationtosafetysystemsisisexceeded,actionscompliancewiththeSL(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-10DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS(Continued)IfSL2.1.2isexceededinMODE3,4,or5,RCSpressuremustberestoredtowithintheSLvaluewithin5minutes.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLinMODE3,4,or5ismoreseverethanexceedingthisSLinNODE1or2,sincethereactorvesseltemperaturemaybelowerandthevesselmaterial,consequently,lessductile.Assuch,pressuremustbereducedtolessthantheSLwithin5minutes.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionshallcontinueinordertoreducepressuretolessthantheSL.TheactiondoesnotrequirereducingNODES,sincethiswouldrequirereducingtemperature,whichwouldcompoundtheproblembyaddingthermalgradientstressestotheexistingpressurestress.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,33,and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section5.1.4.3.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,ArticleNB-7000.4.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ~E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-1,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XV-15,andXV-17,DesignBasisEvents,AccidentsandTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.5.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,1967edition.6..UFSAR,Section15.3.2.7.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.8.10CFR100.9.UFSAR,Section7.2.2.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-11DraftB LCOApplicability3.03.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYLCO3.0.1LCOsshallbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.2and3.0.7.LCO3.0.2UpondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theRequiredActionsoftheassociatedConditionsshallbemet,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.5andLCO3.0.6.IftheLCOismetorisnolongerapplicablepriortoexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime(s),completionoftheRequiredAction(s)isnotrequiredunlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.3WhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)theassociatedACTIONSarenotmet,(2)anassociatedACTIONisnotprovided,or(3)ifdirectedbytheassociatedACTIONS,theplantshallbeplaced.inaMODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichtheLCOisnotapplicable.Actionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheplant,asapplicable,in:a.MODE3within6hours;b.MODE4within12hours;andc.MODE5within36hours.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.WherecorrectivemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationinaccordancewiththeLCOorACTIONS,completionoftheactionsrequiredbyLCO3.0.3isnotrequired.LCO3.0.3isonlyapplicableinMODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-1(continued)Draft8 LCOApplicabi1ity3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.4WhenanLCOisnotmet,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallnotbemadeexceptwhentheassociatedACTIONStobeenteredpermitcontinuedoperationintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityforanunlimitedperiodoftime.ThisSpecificationshallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.LCO3.0.5EquipmentremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONSmaybereturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontrolsolelytoperformtestingrequiredtodemonstrateitsOPERABILITYortheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesystemreturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontroltoperformthetestingrequiredtodetermineOPERABILITY.LCO3.0.6WhenasupportedsystemLCOisnotmetsolelyduetoa.supportsystemLCOnotbeingmet,theConditionsandRequiredActionsassociatedwiththissupportedsystemarenotrequiredtobeentered.OnlythesupportsystemLCOACTIONSarerequiredtobeentered.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesupportedsystem.Inthisevent,additionalevaluationsandlimitationsmayberequiredinaccordancewithSpecification5.5.14,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP)."Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.Whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-2(continued)DraftB LCOApplicability3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.7TestException,LCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTExceptions-NODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformanceofspecialtestsandoperations.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisdesiredtobemetbutisnotmet,theACTIONSoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbemet.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisnotdesiredtobemet,entryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallbemadeinaccordancewiththeotherapplicableSpecifications.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-3DraftB SRApplicability3.03.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYSR3.0.1SRsshallbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforindividualLCOs,unlessotherwisestatedintheSR.FailuretomeetaSR,whethersuchfailureisexperiencedduringtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceorbetweenperformancesoftheSurveillance,shallbefailuretomeettheLCO.FailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyshallbefailuretomeettheLCOexceptasprovidedinSR3.0.3.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentorvariablesoutsidespecifiedlimits.SR3.0.2ThespecifiedFrequencyforeachSRismetiftheSurveillanceisperformedwithin1.25timestheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency,asmeasuredfromthepreviousperformanceorasmeasuredfromthetimeaspecifiedconditionoftheFrequencyismet.ForFrequenciesspecifiedas"once,"theaboveintervalextensiondoesnotapply.IfaCompletionTimerequiresperiodicperformanceona"onceper..."basis,theaboveFrequencyextensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.SR3.0.3IfitisdiscoveredthataSurveillancewasnotperformedwithinitsspecifiedFrequency,thencompliancewiththerequirementtodeclaretheLCOnotmetmaybedelayed,fromthetimeofdiscovery,upto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless.ThisdelayperiodispermittedtoallowperformanceoftheSurveillance.IftheSurveillanceisnotperformedwithinthedelayperiod,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-4DraftB

SRApplicability3.03.0SRAPPLICABILITYSR3.0.3(continued)WhentheSurveillanceisperformedwithinthedelayperiodandtheSurveillanceisnotmet,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.SR3.0.4EntryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOshallnotbemadeunlesstheLCO'sSurveillanceshavebeenmetwithintheirspecifiedFrequency.ThisprovisionshallnotprevententryintoMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-5DraftB LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0B3.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYBASESLCOsLCO3.0.1throughLCO3.0.7establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.1LCO3.0.1establishestheApplicabilitystatementwithineachindividualSpecificationastherequirementforwhentheLCOisrequiredtobemet(i.e.,whentheplantisintheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability'tatementofeachSpecification).LCO3.0.2LCO3.0.2establishesthatupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theassociatedACTIONSshallbemet.TheCompletionTimeofeachRequiredActionforanACTIONSConditionisapplicablefromthepointintimethatanACTIONSConditionisentered.TheRequiredActionsestablishthoseremedialmeasuresthatmustbetakenwithinspecifiedCompletionTimeswhentherequirementsofanLCOarenotmet.ThisSpecificationestablishesthat:'a~b.CompletionoftheRequiredActionswithinthespecifiedCompletionTimesconstitutescompliancewithaSpecification;andCompletionoftheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,unlessotherwisespecified.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-1DraftB

ILCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)TherearetwobasictypesofRequiredActions.ThefirsttypeofRequiredActionspecifiesatimelimitinwhichtheLCOmustbemet.ThistimelimitistheCompletionTimetorestoreaninoperablesystemorcomponenttoOPERABLEstatusortorestorevariablestowithinspecifiedlimits.IfthistypeofRequiredActionisnotcompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,ashutdownmayberequiredtoplacetheplantinaMODEorconditioninwhichtheSpecificationisnotapplicable.(WhetherstatedasaRequiredActionornot,correctionoftheenteredConditionisanactionthatmayalwaysbeconsidereduponenteringACTIONS.)ThesecondtypeofRequiredActionspecifiestheremedialmeasuresthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantthatisnotfurtherrestrictedbytheCompletionTime.Inthiscase,compliancewiththeRequiredActionsprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.CompletingtheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetorisnolongerapplicable,unlessotherwisestatedintheindividualSpecifications.ThenatureofsomeRequiredActionsofsomeConditionsnecessitatesthat,oncetheConditionisentered,theRequiredActionsmustbecompletedeventhoughtheassociatedConditionnolongerexists.Inthisinstance,theindividualLCO'sACTIONSspecifytheRequiredActions.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-2DraftB LCOApplicability83.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)TheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsarealsoapplicablewhenasystemorcomponentisremovedfromserviceintentionally.ThereasonsforintentionallyrelyingontheACTIONSinclude,butarenotlimitedto,performanceofSurveillances,preventivemaintenance,correctivemaintenance,orinvestigationofoperationalproblemsasrequiredbytheLCO.EnteringACTIONSforthese'easonsmustbedoneinamannerthatdoesnotcompromisesafety.IntentionalentryintoACTIONSshouldnotbemadeforoperationalconvenience.Alternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantequipmentbeinginoperableshouldbeusedinstead.Doingsolimitsthetimebothsubsystems/trainsofasafetyfunctionareinoperableandlimitsthetimeotherconditionsexistwhichmayresultinLCO3.0.3beingentered.IndividualSpecificationsmayspecifyatimelimitforperforminganSRwhenequipmentisremovedfromserviceorbypassedfortesting.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsareapplicablewhenthistimelimitexpires,iftheequipmentremainsremovedfromserviceorbypassed.WhenachangeinMODEorotherspecifiedconditionisrequiredtocomplywithRequiredActions,theplantmayenteraMODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichanotherSpecificationbecomesapplicableandthenewLCOisnotmet.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesofthenewRequiredActionswouldapplyfromthepointintimethatthenewSpecificationbecomesapplicable,andtheACTIONSCondition(s)areentered.'CO3.0.3-LCO3.0.3establishestheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand:a.AnassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-3DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)b.TheconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThismeansthatnocombinationofConditionsstatedintheACTIONScanbemadethatexactlycorrespondstotheactualconditionoftheplant.Sometimes,possiblecombinationsofConditionsaresuchthatenteringLCO3.0.3iswarranted;insuchcases,theACTIONSspecificallystateaConditioncorrespondingtosuchcombinationsandalsothatLCO3.0.3beenteredimmediately.ThisSpecificationdelineatesthetimelimitsforplacingtheplantinasafeMODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhenoperationcannotbemaintainedwithinthelimitsforsafeoperationasdefinedbytheLCOanditsACTIONS.Itisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencethatpermitsroutinevoluntaryremovalofredundantsystemsorcomponentsfromserviceinlieuofotheralternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantsystemsorcomponentsbeinginoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-4DraftB LCOApplicability83.0LCO3.0.3(continued)UponenteringLCO3.0.3,theShiftSupervisorshallevaluatetheconditionoftheplantanddetermineactionstobetaken,consideringplantsafetyfirst,thatwillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown.Theseactionsshallincludepreparationforasafeandcontrolledshutdown,aswellasactionstocorrecttheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3.IfitisdeterminedthattheconditionthatcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3canbecorrectedwithina,reasonableperiodoftimeandstillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown,apowerreductiondoesnothavetobeinitiated.Thisincludescoordinatingthereductioninelectricalgenerationwithenergyoperationstoensurethestabilityandavailabilityoftheelectricalgrid.TheshutdownshallbeinitiatedsothatthetimelimitsspecifiedtoreachlowerNODESofoperationpermittheshutdowntoproceedinacontrolledandorderlymannerthatiswellwithinthespecifiedmaximumcooldownrateandwithinthecapabilitiesoftheplant,assumingthatonlytheminimumrequiredequipmentisOPERABLE.ThisreducesthermalstressesoncomponentsoftheReactorCoolantSystemandthepotentialforaplantupsetthatcouldchallengesafetysystemsunderconditionstowhichthisSpecificationapplies.TheuseandinterpretationofspecifiedtimestocompletetheactionsofLCO'.0.3are,consistentwiththediscussionofSection1.3,CompletionTimes.AplantshutdownrequiredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.3maybeterminatedandLCO3.0.3exitedifanyofthefollowingoccurs:a0TheLCOisnowmet.b.C.AConditionexistsforwhichtheRequiredActionshavenowbeenperformed.ACTIONSexistthatdonothaveexpiredCompletionTimes.TheseCompletionTimesareapplicablefromthepointintimethattheConditionisinitiallyenteredandnotfromthetimeLCO3.0.3isexited.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-5DraftB

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)ThetimelimitsofLCO3.0.3allow36hoursfortheplanttobeinMODE5whenashutdownisrequiredduringMODE1operation.IftheplantisinalowerMODEofoperationwhenashutdownisrequired,thetimelimitforreachingthenextlowerNODEapplies.IfalowerNODEisreachedinlesstimethanallowed,however,thetotalallowabletimetoreachMODE5.,orotherapplicableNODE,isnotreduced.Forexample,ifNODE3isreachedin2hours,thenthetimeallowedforreachingNODE4isthenext10hours,becausethetotaltimeforreachingNODE4isnotreducedfromtheallowablelimitof12hours.Therefore,ifremedialmeasuresarecompletedthatwouldpermitareturntoMODE1,apenaltyisnotincurredbyhavingtoreachalowerMODEofoperationinlessthanthetotaltimeallowed.InMODES1,2,3,and4,LCO3.0.3providesactionsforConditionsnotcoveredinotherSpecifications.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinNODES5.and6becausetheplantisalreadyinthemostrestrictiveConditionrequiredbyLCO3.0.3.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability(unlessinNODE1,2,3,or4)becausetheACTIONSofindividualSpecificationssufficientlydefinetheremedialmeasurestobetaken.ExceptionstoLCO3.0.3areprovidedininstanceswhererequiringaplantshutdown,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.3,wouldnotprovideappropriateremedialmeasuresfortheassociatedconditionoftheplant.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.7.11,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)MaterLevel."LCO3.7.11hasanApplicabilityof"DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP."Therefore,thisLCOcanbe'pplicableinanyorallMODES.IftheLCOandtheRequiredActionsofLCO3.7.11arenotmetwhileinNODE1,2,3,or4,thereisnosafetybenefittobegainedbyplacingtheplantinashutdowncondition.TheRequiredActionofLCO3.7.11of"SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP"istheappropriateRequiredActiontocompleteinlieuoftheactionsofLCO3.0.3.TheseexceptionsareaddressedintheindividualSpecifications.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-6(continued)DraftB LCOApplicability83.0BASES(continued)LCO3.0.4LCO3.0.4establisheslimitationsonchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmet.ItprecludesplacingtheplantinadifferentMODEorotherspecifiedconditionstatedintheApplicabilitywhenthefollowingexist:a.PlantconditionsaresuchthattherequirementsofanLCOwouldnotbemetintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeentered;andb.TheplantwouldberequiredtoexittheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeenteredinordertocomplywiththeRequiredActionsoftheaffectedLCO.CompliancewithRequiredActionsthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantforanunlimitedperiodoftimeinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.ThisiswithoutregardtothestatusoftheplantbeforeoraftertheMODEchange.Therefore,insuchcases,entryintoaHODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitymaybemadeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheRequiredActions.TheprovisionsofthisSpecification'houldnotbe,interpretedasendorsingthefailuretoexercisethegoodpracticeofrestoringsystemsorcomponentstoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringanassociatedMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.TheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesin'ODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.Inaddition,theprovisionsofLCO3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatresultfromashutdownperformedinresponsetotheexpectedfailuretocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstoLCO3.0.4arestatedintheindividualSpecifications.TheexceptionsallowentryintoNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability,whentheassociatedACTIONStobeentereddonotprovideforcontinuedoperationforanunlimitedperiodoftime.ExceptionsmayapplytoalltheACTIONSortoaspecificRequiredActionofaSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-7Draft8

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.4(continued)LCO3.0;4isapplicablewhenenteringallMODES,whetherincreasinginMODES(e.g.,MODE5toMODE4)ordecreasinginMODES(e.g.,MODE4toMODE5).ThisrequirementprecludingentryintoanotherMODEwhentheassociatedACTIONSdonotprovideforcontinuedoperationforanunlimitedperiodoftimeensuresthattheplantmaintainssufficientequipmentOPERABILITYandredundancyasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedontheassociatedinoperableequipment(oronvariablesoutsidethespecifiedlimits),aspermittedbySR3.0.1.Therefore,changingMODESorotherspecifiedconditionswhileinanACTIONSCondition,incompliancewithLCO3.0.4orwhereanexceptiontoLCO3.0.4isstated,isnotaviolationofSR3.0.1orSR3.0.4forthoseSurveillancesthatdonothavetobeperformedduetotheassociatedinoperableequipment.However,SRsmustbemettoensureOPERABILITYpriortodeclaringtheassociatedequipmentOPERABLE(orvariablewithinlimits)andrestoringcompliancewiththeaffectedLCO.LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.5establishestheallowanceforrestoringequipmenttoserviceunderadministrativecontrolswhenithasbeenremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONS.ThesolepurposeofthisLCOistoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2(e.g.,tonotcomplywiththeapplicableRequiredAction(s))toallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstrate:a.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice;orb..TheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.TheadministrativecontrolsensurethetimetheequipmentisreturnedtoserviceinconflictwiththerequirementsoftheACTIONSislimitedtothetimeabsolutelynecessarytoperformtheallowedSRs.ThisSpecificationdoesnotprovidetimetoperformanyotherpreventiveorcorrectivemaintenance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-8DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.5(continued)AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoserviceisreopeningacontainmentisolationvalvethathasbeenclosedtocomplywithRequiredActionsandmustbereopenedtoperformtheSRs.AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopreventthetripfunctionfromoccurringduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelintheothertripsystem.AsimilarexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopermitthelogictofunctionandindicatetheappropriateresponseduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelinthesametripsystem.LCO3.0.6LCO3.0.6establishesanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forsupportsystemsthathaveanLCOspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).ThisexceptionisprovidedbecauseLCO3.0.2wouldrequirethattheConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheassociatedinoperablesupportedsystemLCObeenteredsolelyduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem.Thisexceptionisjustifiedbecausetheactionsthatarerequiredtoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionarespecifiedinthesupportsystems'CO'sRequiredActions.TheseRequi'redActionsmayincludeenteringthesupportedsystem'sConditionsandRequiredActionsormayspecifyotherRequiredActions..WhenasupportsystemisinoperableandthereisanLCOspecifiedforitintheTS,thesupportedsystem(s)arerequiredtobedeclaredinoperableifdeterminedtobeinoperableasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability.However,itisnotnecessarytoenterintothesupportedsystems'onditionsandRequiredActionsunlessdirectedtodosobythesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.Thepotentialconfusionandinconsistencyofrequirementsrelatedtotheentryintomultiplesupportandsupportedsystems'CO'sConditionsandRequiredActionsareeliminatedbyprovidingalltheactionsthatarenecessarytoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditioninthesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-9DraftB LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.6(continued)However,thereareinstanceswhereasupportsystem'sRequiredActionmayeitherdirectasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforthesupportedsystem.ThismayoccurimmediatelyoraftersomespecifieddelaytoperformsomeotherRequiredAction.Regardlessofwhetheritisimmediateoraftersomedelay,whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.Specification5.5.14,"SafetyFu'nctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP),"ensureslossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionsaretaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6,anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherlimitations,remedialactions,orcompensatoryactionsmaybeidentifiedasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionsandRequiredActions.TheSFDPimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.Crosstraincheckstoidentifyalossofsafetyfunctionforthosesupportsystemsthatsupportmultipleandredundantsafetysystemsarerequired.ThecrosstraincheckverifiesthatthesupportedsystemsoftheredundantOPERABLEsupportsystemareOPERABLE,therebyensuring'safetyfunctionisretained.Ifthisevaluationdeterminesthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-10(continued)Draft8 LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASES(continued)LCO3.0.7Therearecertainspecialtestsandoperationsrequiredtobeperformedatvarioustimesoverthelifeoftheplant.Thesespecialtestsandoperationsarenecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,toperformspecialmaintenanceactivities,andtoperformspecialevolutions.TestExceptionLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTExceptions-NODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformancesofspecialtestsandoperations,whichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedifrequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsoftheseTS.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.ThiswillensureallappropriaterequirementsoftheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionnotdirectlyassociatedwithorrequiredtobechangedtoperformthespecialtestoroperationwillremainineffect.TheApplicabi1ityofaTestExceptionLCOrepresentsaconditionnotnecessarilyincompliancewiththenormalrequirementsoftheTS.AspecialoperationmaybeperformedeitherundertheprovisionsoftheappropriateTestExceptionLCOorundertheotherapplicableTSrequirements.IfitisdesiredtoperformthespecialoperationundertheprovisionsoftheTestExceptionLCO,therequirementsoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbefollowed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-llDraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASESSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3.0.4establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.SR3.0.1SR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespecifiedintheindividualSRs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutesafailuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecification,however,istobeconstruedasimplyingthatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknownnottobemetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformances.SurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheplantisinaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithatestexceptionareonlyapplicablewhentheTestExceptionLCOisusedasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.Surveillances,includingSurveillancesinvokedbyRequiredActions,donothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentbecausetheACTIONSdefinetheremedialmeasuresthatapply.SurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-12DraftB SRApplicability83.0BASESSR3.0.1(continued)Uponcompletionofmaintenance,appropriatepostmaintenancetestingisrequiredtodeclareequipmentOPERABLE.ThisincludesensuringapplicableSurveillancesarenotfailedandtheirmostrecentperformanceisinaccordancewithSR3.0.2.PostmaintenancetestingmaynotbepossibleinthecurrentMODEorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityduetothenecessaryplantparametersnothavingbeenestablished.Inthesesituations,theequipmentmaybeconsideredOPERABLEprovidedtestinghasbeensatisfactorilycompletedtotheextentpossibleandtheequipmentisnototherwisebelievedtobeincapableofperformingitsfunction.ThiswillallowoperationtoproceedtoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhereothernecessarypostmaintenancetestscanbecompleted.SR3.0.2SR3.0.2establishestherequirementsformeetingthespecifiedFrequencyforSurveillancesandanyRequiredActionwithaCompletionTimethatrequirestheperiodicperformanceoftheRequiredActionona"onceper.interval.SR3.0.2permitsa25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency.ThisextensionfacilitatesSurveillanceschedulingandconsidersplantoperatingconditionsthatmaynotbesuitableforconductingtheSurveillance(e.g.,transientconditionsorotherongoingSurveillanceormaintenanceactivities).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-13DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.2(continued)The25%extensiondoesnotsignificantlydegradethereliabilitythatresultsfromperformingtheSurveillanceatitsspecifiedFrequency.ThisisbasedontherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththeSRs.TheexceptionstoSR3.0.2arethoseSurveillancesforwhichthe25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequencydoesnotapply.TheseexceptionsarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.TherequirementsofregulationstakeprecedenceovertheTS.Therefore,whenatestintervalisspecifiedintheregulations,thetestintervalcannotbeexceededbyTS,andtheSRincludesaNoteintheFrequencystating,"SR3.0.2isnotapplicable."Anexampleofanexceptionwhenthetestintervalisnotspecifiedinthe'regulationsistheNoteintheContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgram,"SR3.0.2isnotapplicable."Thisexceptionisprovidedbecausetheprogramalreadyincludesextensionoftestintervals.AsstatedinSR3.0.2,the25%extensionalsodoesnotapplytotheinitialportionofaperiodicCompletionTimethatrequiresperformanceona"onceper..."basis.The25%extensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.TheinitialperformanceoftheRequiredAction,whetheritisaparticularSurveillanceor.someotherremedialaction,isconsideredasingleactionwithasingleCompletionTime.'nereasonfornotallowingthe25%extensiontothisCompletionTimeisthatsuchanactionusuallyverifiesthatnolossoffunctionhasoccurredbyche'ckingthestatusofredundantordiversecomponentsoraccomplishesthefunctionoftheinoperableequipmentinanalternativemanner.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2arenotintendedtobeusedrepeatedlymerelyasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals(otherthanthoseconsistentwithRefuelingintervals)orperiodicCompletionTimeintervalsbeyondthosespecified.R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant83.0-14(continued)DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.3SR3.0.3establishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.Adelayperiodofupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless,appliesfromthepointintimethatitisdiscoveredthattheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,andnotatthetimethatthespecifiedFrequencywasnotmet.Thisdelayperiodprovidesadequate'imetocompleteSurveillancesthathavebeenmissed.ThisdelayperiodpermitsthecompletionofaSurveillancebeforecomplyingwithRequiredActionsorotherremedialmeasuresthatmightprecludecompletionoftheSurveillance.Thebasisforthisdelayperiodincludesconsiderationofplantconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,thesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtherequiredSurveillance,andtherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththerequirements.WhenaSurveillancewithaFrequencybasednotontimeintervals,butuponspecifiedplantconditionsoroperationalsituations,isdiscoverednottohavebeenperformedwhenspecified,SR3.0.3allowsthefulldelayperiodof24hourstoperformtheSurveillance.SR3.0.3alsoprovidesatimelimitforcompletionofSurveillancesthatbecomeapplicableasaconsequenceofNODEchangesimposedbyRequiredActions.FailuretocomplywithspecifiedFrequenciesforSRsisexpectedtobeaninfrequentoccurrence.UseofthedelayperiodestablishedbySR3.0.3isaflexibilitywhichisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveiencetoextendSurveillanceintervals.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-15DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.3(continued)IfaSurveillanceisnotcompletedwithinthealloweddelayperiod,thentheequipmentisconsideredinoperableorthevariableisconsideredoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponexpirationofthedelayperiod.IfaSurveillanceisfailedwithinthedelayperiod,thentheequipmentisinoperable,orthevariableisoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponthefailureoftheSurveillance.CompletionoftheSurveillancewithinthedel'ayperiodallowedbythisSpecification,orwithintheCompletionTimeoftheACTIONS,restorescompliancewithSR3.0.1.SR3.0.4SR3.0.4establishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.ThisSpecificationensuresthatsystemandcomponentOPERABILITYrequirementsandvariablelimitsaremetbeforeentryintoMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichthesesystemsandcomponentsensuresafeoperationoftheplant.ThisSpecificationappliestochangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityassociatedwithplantshutdownaswellasstartup.TheprovisionsofthisspecificationshouldnotbeinterpretedasendorsingthefailuretoexercisethegoodpracticeofrestoringsystemsorcomponentstoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringanassociatedMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.Inaddition,theprovisions'fSR3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatresult.fromashutdownperformedinresponsetotheexpectedfailuretocomplywithACTIONS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-16DraftB

SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.4(continued)However,incertaincircumstances,failingtomeetanSRwillnotresultinSR3.0.4restrictingaMODEchangeorotherspecifiedconditionchange.Whenasystem,subsystem,train,component,device,orvariableisinoperableoroutsideitsspecifiedlimits,theassociatedSR(s)arenotrequiredtobeperformed,perSR3.0.1,whichstatesthatsurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipment.Whenequipmentisinoperable,SR3.0.4doesnotapplytotheassociatedSR(s)sincetherequirementfortheSR(s)tobeperformedisremoved.Therefore,failingtoperformtheSurveillance(s)withinthespecifiedFrequency,onequipmentthatisinoperable,doesnotresultinanSR3.0.4restrictiontochangingMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability'.However,sincetheLCOisnotmetinthisinstance,LCO3.0.4willgovernanyrestrictionsthatmay(ormaynot)applytoMODEorotherspecifiedconditionchanges.ThepreciserequirementsforperformanceofSRsarespecifiedsuchthatexceptionstoSR3.0.4arenotnecessary.ThespecifictimeframesandconditionsnecessaryformeetingtheSRsarespecifiedintheFrequency,intheSurveillance,orboth.ThisallowsperformanceofSurveillanceswhentheprerequisitecondition(s)specifiedinaSurveillanceprocedurerequireentryintotheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheassociatedLCOpriortotheperformanceorcompletionofaSurveillance.ASurveillancethatcouldnotbeperformeduntilafterentering'heLCOApplicability,wouldhaveitsFrequencyspecifiedsuchthatitisnot"due"untilthespecificconditionsneededaremet.Alternately,theSurveillancemaybestatedintheformofaNoteasnotrequired(tobemetorperformed)untilaparticularevent,condition,ortimehasbeenreached.FurtherdiscussionofthespecificformatsofSRs'nnotationisfoundinSection1.4,Frequency.SR3.0.4isapplicablewhenenteringallMODES,whetherincreasinginMODES(e.g.,MODE5toMODE4)ordecreasinginMODES(e.g.,MODE4toMODE5).Thisrequirementprecludingentryinto-anotherMODEwhentheassociatedACTIONSdonotprovideforcontinuedoperationforanunlimitedperiodoftimeensuresthattheplantmaintainssufficientequipmentOPERABILITYandredundancyasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-17DraftB 0, SDM3.1.13.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)LCO3.1.1SDHshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE2withk,<1.0,NODES3,4,and5.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDHnotwithinlimit.A.lInitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.1.1VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,3.1-1DraftB CoreReactivity3.1.23.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.2CoreReactivityLCO3.1.2Themeasuredcorereactivityshallbewithin+1%ak/kofpredictedvalues.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withKgff~1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Measuredcorereactivitynotwithinlimit.A.lANDRe-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.72hoursA:2EstablishappropriateoperatingrestrictionsandSRs.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,ff<,.1.0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-2DraftB CoreReactivity3.1.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.2.1-NOTE-------------------RequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringMODE1.Verifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin+1/sk/kofpredictedvalues.OnceaftereachrefuelingSR3.1.2.2-NOTES---------------1.Onlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).2.Thepredictedreactivityvaluesmustbeadjusted(normalized)tocorrespondtothemeasuredcorereactivitypriortoexceedingafuelburnupof60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.Verifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin+1%ak/kofpredictedvalues.31EFPDR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-3DraftB HTC3.1.33.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.3ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)LCO3.1.3TheMTCshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Themaximumupperlimitshallbelessthanorequalto5pcm/Fforpowerlevelsbelow70%RTPandlessthanorequalto0pcm/Fatorabove70%RTP.APPLICABILITY:MODE1andNODE2withk,<<~1.0fortheupperMTClimit,MODES1,2,and3forthelowerMTClimit.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.HTCnotwithinupperlimit.A.lEstablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbankstomaintainHTCwithinlimit.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withk,<1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-4DraftB MTC3.1.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDI'TIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC---------NOTE---------RequiredActionC.lmustbecompletedwheneverConditionCisentered.Projectedendofcyclelife(EOL)HTCnotwithinlowerlimit.C.1Re-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.-------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.OncepriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmD.RequiredActionand'associatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE4.12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.3.1VerifyMTCiswithinupperlimit.OncepriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingSR3.1.3.2ConfirmthatHTCwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP.OncepriortoenteringMODE1'ftereachrefueling(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-5DraftB HTC3.1.3SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.3.3ConfirmthatHTCwillbewithinlimitsatEOL.OncepriortoenteringHODE1aftereachrefueling.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-6DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.43.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEHS3.1.4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsLCO3.1.4AllshutdownandcontrolrodsshallbeOPERABLE,withallindividualindicatedrodpositionswithin12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandposition.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK,ffa1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorerod(s)untrippable.A.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthe1imitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.ANDA.2BeinMODE2withK,ff<1.0.1hour1hour6hoursB.Onerodnotwithinalignmentlimits.B.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORB.l.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-7DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)B.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos75%RTP.2hoursANDB.3VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ANDOnceper12hoursB.4ANDB.5ANDB.6PerformSR3.2.1.1.PerformSR3.2.2.1.Re-evaluatesafetyanalysesandconfirm.resultsremainvalidfordurationofoperationundertheseconditions.72hours72hours5daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE2withK,ff(1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-8DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimits3'.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME.D.Hovethanonerodnotwithinalignmentlimit.D.1.1VerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORD.1.2InitiateborationtorestorerequiredSDHtowithinlimit.ANDD.2BeinMODE2withK,),<1.0.1hour1hour6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.4.1Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.12hoursSR3.1.4.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-9DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.4.3Verifyrodfreedomofmovement(trippability)bymovingeachrodnotfullyinsertedinthecoretoaMRPItransitionineitherdirection.92daysSR3.1.4.4'erifyroddroptimeofeachrod,fromthefullywithdrawnposition,isz1.8secondsfromthebeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentry,with:a.T,,>500'F;andb.Bothreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.OncepriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-10DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.53.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitLCO3.1.5TheshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.NOTE-TheshutdownbankmaybeoutsidethelimitwhenrequiredforperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withKgff>1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Shutdownbanknotwithinlimit.A.1.1VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hourA.2Restoreshutdownbanktowithin'limit.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,<l.'0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-11DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.5.1VerifytheshutdownbankinsertioniswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-12Draft8 ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.63.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEHS3.1.6ControlBankInsertionLimitsLCO3.1.6Controlbanksshallbewithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.NOTEThecontrolbankbeingtestedmaybeoutsidethelimitswhenrequiredfortheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk,>1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Controlbanklimitsnotmet.A.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hourA.2Restorecontrolbank(s)towithinlimits.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2withK,(1.0..6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-13DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.6.1VerifyestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Within4hourspriortoachievingcriticalitySR3.1.6.2VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.1.6.3-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafterSR3.1.6.4VerifyeachcontrolbanknotfullywithdrawnfromthecoreiswithinthesequenceandoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-14DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.73.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.7RodPositionIndicationLCO3.1.7TheMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)SystemandtheDemandPositionIndicationSystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK,ffa1.0.ACTIONS-NOTE.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperableHRPIpergroupandeachdemandpositionindicatorperbank.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.A.lORA.2Verifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTP.Once'per8hours8hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-15DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.7ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorerodswithinoperablepositionindicatorshavebeenmoved>24stepsin,onedirectionsincethelastdetermination-oftherod'sposition.B.lORVerifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.4hoursB.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos50%RTP.8hoursC.Onedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.C.1.1ANDC.1.2ORVerifybyadministrativemeansallMRPIsfortheaffectedbanksareOPERABLE.Verifythemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodoftheaffectedbanksare~12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorfor,thatbank.Onceper8hoursOnceper8hoursC.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos50%RTP.8hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,ConditionBorConditionCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE2withKff(1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-16DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.MorethanoneMRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.ORMorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.7.1VerifyeachMRPIagreeswithin12stepsofthegroupdemandpositionforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravel.Priortoreactorcriticality aftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-17Draft8

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2LCO3.1.8DuringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTS,therequirementsofLCO3.1.3,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality"maybesuspended,provided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintained~5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureis>530F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:DuringPHYSICSTESTS.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.lInitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.15minutesANDA.2SuspendPHYSICSTESTSexceptions.1hourB.THERMALPOWERnotwithinlimit.B.1Openreactortripbreakers.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-18DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.8ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturenotwithinlimit.C.1RestoreRCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturetowithinlimit.15minutesD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE3.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.8.1PerformaCOTonpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelsperSR3.3.1.7andSR3.3.1.8.Oncewithin7dayspriortocriticalitySR3.1.8.2VerifytheRCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureis~530'F.30minutesSR3.1.8.3VerifyTHERMALPOWERis~5%RTP.30minutesSR3.1.8.4VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-19DraftB SDHB3.1.1B3.1REACTIYITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28(Ref.1),twoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsmustbeavailableandcapableofholdingthereactorcoresubcriticalfromanyhotstandbyorhotoperatingcondition.MaintenanceoftheSDHensuresthatpostulatedreactivityeventswillnotdamagethefuel.SDHrequirementsprovidesufficientreactivitymargintoensurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitswillnotbeexceededfornormalshutdownandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)whicharedefinedasCondition2eventsinReference2(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).Assuch,theSDHdefinesthedegreeofsubcriticalitythatwouldbeobtainedimmediatelyfollowingtheinsertionorscramofallshutdownandcontrolrods,assumingthatthesinglerodclusterassemblyofhighestreactivityworthisfullywithdrawnandthefuelandmoderatortemperaturearechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Thesystemdesignrequiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsbeprovided,andthatoneofthesesystemsbecapableofmaintainingthecoresubcriticalundercoldconditions.Theserequirementsareprovidedbytheuseofmovablerodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)andsolubleboricacidintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)whicheachprovideaneutronabsorbingmechanism.TheControlRodSystemcancompensateforthereactivityeffectsofthefuelandwatertemperaturechangesaccompanyingpowerlevelchangesovertherangefromfullloadtonoload.Inaddition,theControlRodSystem,togetherwiththeborationsystem,providestheSDHduringpoweroperationandiscapableofmakingthecoresubcriticalrapidlyenoughtopreventexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimits,assumingthattherodofhighestreactivityworthremainsfullywithdrawn.Thechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemcancontrolthesolubleboronconcentrationtocompensateforfueldepletionduringoperationandallxenonburnoutreactivitychangesandmaintainthereactorsubcriticalundercoldconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-1DraftB BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Duringpoweroperation,SDMcontrolisensuredbyoperatingwiththeshutdownbankfullywithdrawnandthecontrolbankswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankfullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Whentheplantisintheshutdownandrefuelingmodes,theSDMrequirementsaremetbymeansofadjustmentstotheRCSboronconcentration.APPLICABLETheminimumrequiredSDMisassumedasaninitialconditionSAFETYANALYSESinthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalysis(Ref.3)establishesaSDMthatensuresspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededfornormaloperationandAOOs,withtheassumptionofthehighestworthrodstuckoutfollowingascram.TheacceptancecriteriafortheSDMrequirementsarethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Thisisdonebyensuringthat:a.Thereactorcanbemadesubcriticalfromalloperatingconditions,transients,andDesignBasisAccidents;b.Thereactivitytransientsassociatedwithpostulatedaccidentconditionsarecontrollablewithinacceptablelimits(departurefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR),-~fuelcenterlinetemperaturelimitsforAOOs,ands200cal/gmenergydepositionfortherodejectionaccident);andc.Thereactorwillbemaintainedsufficientlysubcriticaltoprecludeinadvertentcriticalityintheshutdowncondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-2DraftB SDH83.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemostlimitingaccidentfortheSDHrequirementsisbasedonasteamlinebreak(SLB),asdescribedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.3).Theincreasedsteamflowresultingfromapipebreakinthemainsteamsystemcausesanincreasedenergyremovalfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator(SG),andconsequentlytheRCS.Thisresultsinareductionofthereactorcoolanttemperature.Theresultantcoolantshrinkagecausesareductioninpressure.Inthepresenceofanegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficient,thiscooldowncausesanincreaseincorereactivity.ThemostlimitingSLBforbothoneloopandtwoloopoperation,withrespecttopotentialfueldamagebeforeareactortripoccurs,isaguillotinebreakofamainsteamlineinsidecontainmentinitiatedattheendofcorelife.ThepositivereactivityadditionfromthemoderatortemperaturedecreasewillterminatewhentheaffectedSGboilsdry,thusterminatingRCSheatremovalandcooldown.FollowingtheSLB,aposttripreturntopowermayoccur;however,nofueldamageoccursasaresultoftheposttripreturntopower,andTHERHALPOWERdoesnotviolatetheSafetyLimit(SL)requirementofSL2.1.1.InadditiontothelimitingSLBtransient,theSDHrequirementmustalsoprotectagainst:a.'Inadvertentborondilution;b.Anuncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromsubcriticalorlowpowercondition;c.Startupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP);andd.Rodejection.Eachoftheseeventsisdiscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-3DraftB SDHB3.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Intheborondilutionanalysis(Ref.4),therequiredSDMdefinesthereactivitydifferencebetweenaninitialsubcriticalboronconcentrationandthecorrespondingcriticalboronconcentration.Thesevalues,inconjunctionwiththeconfigurationoftheRCSandtheassumeddilutionflowrate,directlyaffecttheresultsoftheanalysis(i.e.,thetimeavailabletooperatorstostopthedilutionevent).Thiseventisanalyzedforrefueling,shutdown(HODE5)andpoweroperationconditionsandismostlimitingatthebeginningofcorelife,whencriticalboronconcentrationsarehighest.Dependingonthesysteminitialconditionsandreactivityinsertionrate,theuncontrolledrodwithdrawaltransientisterminatedbyeitherahighpowerleveltriporahighpressurizerpressuretrip(Ref.5).Inallcases,powerlevel,RCSpressure,linearheatrate,andtheDNBRdonotexceedallowablelimitsifSDHhasbeenmaintained.ThestartupofaninactiveRCPwillnotresultina"coldwater"criticality,evenifthemaximumdifferenceintemperatureexistsbetweentheSGandthecore(Ref.6).ThemaximumpositivereactivityadditionthatcanoccurduetoaninadvertentRCPstartislessseverethantheeffectsofasmallsteamlinebreakwithoneloopoperation.StartupofanidleRCPcannot,therefore,produceareturntopowerfromthehotstandbyconditionifSDHhasbeenmaintained.TheejectionofacontrolrodconstitutesabreakintheRCSwhichrapidlyaddsreactivitytothereactorcore,causingboththecorepowerlevelandheatfluxtoincreasewithcorrespondingincreases'nreactorcoolanttemperaturesandpressure(Ref.7).Theejectionofarodalsoproducesatimedependentredistributionofcorepowerwhichresultsinahighneutronfluxtrip.FuelandcladdinglimitsarenotexceededifSDHhasbeenmaintained.SDHsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedfromthecontrolroom,SDHisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseitisperiodicallymonitoredtoensurethattheplantisoperatingwithintheboundsofaccidentanalysisassumptions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-4(continued)DraftB SDHB3.1.1BASES(continued)LCOSDMisacoredesignconditionthatcanbeensuredduringoperationthroughcontrolrodpositioning(controlandshutdownbanks)andthroughthesolubleboronconcentrationintheRCS.TheCOLRprovidestheshutdownmarginrequirementwithrespecttoRCSboronconcentration.TheSLB(Ref.3)andtheborondilution(Ref.4)accidentsarethemostlimitinganalysesthatestablishtheSDHcurveintheCOLR.ThemaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatendofcyclelifeandisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisfortheSLB.Earlyincyclelife,lessSDMisrequiredandisboundedbytherequirementsprovidedintheCOLR.Allotheraccidentsanalysesarebasedon1%reactivityshutdownmargin.ForSLBaccidents,iftheLCOisviolated,thereisapotentialtoexceedtheDNBRlimitandtoexceed10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).Fortheborondilutionaccident,iftheLCOisviolated,theminimumrequiredtimeassumedforoperatoractiontoterminatedilutionmaynolongerbeapplicable.APPLICABILITYInNODE2withk,<<<1.0andinNODES3,4and5,theSDHrequirementsareapplicabletoprovidesufficientnegativereactivitytomeettheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesdiscussedabove.InNODE6,theshutdownreactivityrequirementsaregiveninLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration."InNODE1andMODE2withK,<<i1.0,SDMisensuredbycomplyingwithLCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-5(continued)DraftB SDMB3.1.1BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lIftheSDMrequirementsarenotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.ItisassumedthatborationwillbecontinueduntiltheSDMrequirementsaremet.Inthedeterminationoftherequiredcombinationofborationflowrateandboronconcentration,thereisnouniquerequirementthatmustbesatisfied.SinceitisimperativetoraisetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSassoonaspossible,theflowpathofchoicewouldutilizeahighlyconcentratedsolution,suchasthatnormallyfoundintheboricacidstoragetank,ortherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Theoperatorshouldboratewiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.Indeterminingtheborationflowrate,thetimeincorelifemustbeconsidered.Forinstance,themostdifficulttimeincorelifetoincreasetheRCSboronconcentrationisatthebeginningofcyclewhentheboronconcentrationmayapproachorexceed2000ppm.Assumingthatavalueof1%ak/kmustberecoveredandaborationflowrateof10gpmusing13,,000ppmboricacidsolution,itispossibletoincreasetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSby100ppminapproximately35minutes.Ifaboronworthof10pcm/ppmisassumed,thiscombinationofparameterswill,increasetheSDMby1%ak/k.Theseborationparametersof10gpmand13,000ppmrepresenttypicalvaluesandareprovidedforthepurposeofofferingaspecificexample.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-6(continued)DraftB BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.1.1.1InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5,theSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.Thisallowstimefortheoperatortocollecttherequireddata,whichincludesperformingaboronconcentrationanalysis,andcompletethecalculation.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2."AmericanNationalStandardNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.4.UPSAR,Section15.4.4.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.3.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.8.10CFR100.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-7DraftB Pl CoreReactivityB3.1.2B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.2CoreReactivityBASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30(Ref.1),reactivityshallbecontrollable,suchthatsubcriticalityismaintainedundercoldconditions,andacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.Therefore,reactivitybalanceisusedasameasureofthepredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityduringpoweroperation.TheperiodicconfirmationofcorereactivityisnecessarytoensurethatDesign'BasisAccident(DBA)andtransientsafetyanalysesremainvalid.Alargereactivitydifferencecouldbetheresultofunanticipatedchangesinfuel,controlrodworth,oroperationatconditionsnotconsistentwiththoseassumedinthepredictionsofcorereactivity,andcouldpotentiallyresultinalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)orviolationofacceptablefueldesignlimits..ComparingpredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityvalidatesthenuclearmethodsusedinthesafetyanalysisandsupportstheSDMdemonstrations(LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM))"inensuringthereactorcanbebroughtsafelytocold,subcriticalconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-8DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Whenthereactorcoreiscriticalorinnormalpoweroperation,areactivitybalanceexistsandthenetreactivityiszero.Acomparisonofpredictedandmeasuredreactivityisconvenientundersuchabalance,sinceparametersarebeingmaintainedrelativelystableundersteadystatepowerconditions.Thepositivereactivityinherentinthecoredesignisbalancedbythenegativereactivityofthecontrolcomponents,thermalfeedback,neutronleakage,andmaterialsinthecorethatabsorbneutrons,suchasburnableabsorbersproducingzeronetreactivity.Excessreactivitycanbeinferredfromtheboronletdowncurve(orcriticalboroncurve)inthecoredesignreport,whichprovidesanindicationofthesolubleboronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)versuscycleburnup.PeriodicmeasurementoftheRCSboronconcentrationforcomparisonwiththepredictedvaluewithothervariablesfixedorstable(suchasrodheight,temperature,pressure,andpower),providesaconvenientmethodofensuringthatcorereactivityiswithindesignexpectationsandthatthecalculationalmodelsusedtogeneratethesafetyanalysisareadequate.Inordertoachievetherequiredfuelcycleenergyoutput,theuraniumenrichment,inthenewfuelloadingandinthefuelremainingfromthepreviouscycle,providesexcesspositivereactivitybeyondthatrequiredtosustainsteadystateoperationthroughoutthecycle.Whenthereactoris"criticalatRTPandnormaloperatingtemperature,theexcesspositivereactivityiscompensatedbyburnableabsorbers(ifany),controlrods,whateverneutronpoisons(mainlyxenonandsamarium)arepresentinthefuel,andtheRCSboronconcentration.WhenthecoreisproducingTHERMALPOWER,thefuelisbeingdepletedandexcessreactivityisdecreasing.Asthefueldepletes,theRCSboronconcentrationisreducedtodecreasenegativereactivityandmaintainconstantmoderatortemperature.TheboronletdowncurveisbasedonsteadystateoperationatRTP.Therefore,deviationsfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvemayindicatedeficienciesinthedesignanalysis,deficienciesinthecalculationalmodels,orabnormalcoreconditions,andmustbeevaluated.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-9(continued)DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforcorereactivityarethatthereactivitybalancelimitensuresplantoperationismaintainedwithintheassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses.Accuratepredictionofcorereactivityiseitheranexplicitorimplicitassumptionintheaccidentanalysisevaluations.Everyaccidentevaluation(Ref.2)is,therefore,dependentuponaccurateevaluationofcorereactivity.Inparticular,SDNandreactivitytransients,suchascontrolrodwithdrawalaccidentsorrodejectionaccidents,areverysensitivetoaccuratepredictionofcorereactivity.Theseaccidentanalysisevaluationsrelyoncomputercodesthathavebeenqualifiedagainstavailabletestdata,operatingplantdata,andanalyticalbenchmarks.HonitoringreactivitybalanceadditionallyensuresthattheNuclearDesignMethodologyprovidesanaccuraterepresentationofthecorereactivity.DesigncalculationsandsafetyanalysesareperformedforeachfuelcycleforthepurposeofpredeterminingreactivitybehaviorandtheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsforreactivitycontrolduringfueldepletion.The'comparisonbetweenmeasuredandpredictedinitialcorereactivityprovidesanormalizationforthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictcorereactivity.IfthemeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrationsforidenticalcoreconditionsatbeginningofcyclelife(BOL)donotagree,thentheassumptionsusedinthereloadcycledesignanalysisorthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictsolubleboronrequirementsmaynotbeaccurate.IfreasonableagreementbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivityexistsatBOL,thenthepredictionmaybenormalizedtothemeasuredboronconcentration.Thereafter,anysignificantdeviationsinthemeasuredboronconcentrationfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvethatdevelopduringfueldepletionmaybeanindicationthatthecalculationalmodelisnotadequateforcoreburnupsbeyondBOL,orthatanunexpectedchangeincoreconditionshasoccurred.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-10DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThenormalizationofpredictedRCSboronconcentrationtothemeasuredvalueistypicallyperformedafterreachingRTPfollowingstartupfromarefuelingoutage,withthecontrolrodsintheirnormalpositionsforpoweroperation.ThenormalizationisperformedatBOLconditions,sothatcorereactivityrelativetopredictedvaluescanbecontinuallymonitoredandevaluatedascoreconditionschangeduringthecycle.CorereactivitysatisfiesGriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOLongtermcorereactivitybehaviorisaresultofthecorephysicsdesignandcannotbeeasilycontrolledoncethecoredesignisfixed.Duringoperation,therefore,theLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurementandtracking,.andappropriateactionstakenasnecessary.LargedifferencesbetweenactualandpredictedcorereactivitymayindicatethattheassumptionsoftheDBAandtransientanalysesarenolongervalid,orthattheuncertaintiesintheNuclearDesignMethodologyarelargerthanexpected.Alimitonthereactivitybalanceof+1%ak/khasbeenestablishedbasedonengineeringjudgment.A1%deviationinreactivityfromthatpredictedislargerthanexpectedfornormaloperationandshouldthereforebeevaluated.Whenmeasuredcorereactivityiswithin1%zk/kofthepredictedvalueatsteadystatethermalconditions,thecoreisconsideredtobeoperatingwithinacceptabledesignlimits.SincedeviationsfromthelimitarenormallydetectedbycomparingpredictedandmeasuredsteadystateRCScriticalboronconcentrations,thedifferencebetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalueswouldbeapproximately100ppm(dependingontheboronworth)beforethelimitisreached.Thesevaluesarewellwithintheuncertaintylimitsforanalysisofboronconcentrationsamples,sothatspuriousviolationsofthelimitduetouncertaintyinmeasuringtheRCSboronconcentrationareunlikely.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-11(continued)DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThelimitsoncorereactivitymustbemaintainedduringMODE1andNODE2withK,<<~1.0becauseareactivitybalancemustexistwhenthereactoriscriticalorproducingTHERMALPOWER.Asthefueldepletes,coreconditionsarechanging,andconfirmationofthereactivitybalanceensuresthecoreisoperatingasdesigned.ThisSpecificationdoesnotapplyinMODE2withK,<<<1.0orMODES3,4,and5becausethereactorisshutdownandthereactivitybalanceisonlychangingbecauseofxenon.InMODE6,fuelloadingresultsinacontinuallychangingcorereactivity.Boronconcentrationrequirements(LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration")ensurethatfuelmovementsareperformedwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis.AnSDHdemonstrationisrequiredduringthefirststartupfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(SR3.1.2.1).ACTIONSA.1andA.2Shouldananomalydevelopbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivity,anevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysismustbeperformed.Coreconditionsareevaluatedtodeterminetheirconsistencywithinputtodesigncalculations.Measured'coreandprocessparametersareevaluatedtodeterminethattheyarewithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis,andsafetyanalysiscalculationalmodelsarereviewedtoverifythattheyareadequateforrepresentationofthecoreconditions.TherequiredCompletionTime'f72hoursisbasedanthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod,andallowssufficienttimetoassessthephysicalconditionofthereactorandcompletetheevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-12DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)Followingevaluationsofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,thecauseofthereactivityanomalymayberesolved.IfthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisamismatchincoreconditionsatthetimeofRCSboronconcentrationsampling,thenarecalculationoftheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsmaybeperformedtodemonstratethatcorereactivityisbehavingasexpected.Ifanunexpectedphysicalchangeintheconditionofthecorehasoccurred,itmustbeevaluatedandcorrected,ifpossible.Ifthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisinthecalculationtechnique,thenthecalculationalmodelsmustberevisedtoprovidemoreaccuratepredictions.Ifanyoftheseresultsaredemonstrated,anditisconcludedthatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheboronletdowncurvemayberenormalizedandpoweroperationmaycontinue.IfoperationalrestrictionoradditionalSRsarenecessarytoensurethereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheymustbedefined.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisadequateforpreparingwhateveroperatingrestrictionsorSurveillancesthatmayberequiredtoallowcontinuedreactoroperation.B.lIfthecorereactivitycannotberestoredtowithinthe1%ak/klimit,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.IftheSDMforMODE2withK,<<<1.0isnotmet,thentheborationrequiredbySR3.1.1.1wouldoccur.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-13(continued)DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.2.1Corereactivitymustbeverifiedfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(e.g.,fuelmovement,controlrodreplacement,controlrodshuffling).ThecomparisonmustbemadepriortoenteringMODE1whenthecoreconditionssuchascontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,andsamariumconcentrationarefixedorstable.Sincethereactormustbecriticaltoverifycorereactivity,itisacceptabletoenterMODE2withKeff~1.0toperformthisSR.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotetoclarifythattheSRdoesnotneedtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringMODEl.SR3.1.2.2CorereactivityisverifiedbyperiodiccomparisonsofmeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrations.Thecomparisonismade,consideringthatothercoreconditionsarefixedorstable,includingcontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,fueltemperature,fueldepletion,xenonconcentration,andsamariumconcentration.TheFrequencyof31EFPD,isacceptable,basedontheslowrateofcorechangesduetofueldepletionandthepresenceofotherindicators(QPTR,AFD,etc.)forpromptindicationofananomaly.TheSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthattheSRisonlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).ThesecondNoteindicatesthatthe.normalizationofpredictedcorereactivitytothemeasuredvaluemusttakeplacewithinthefirst60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.Thisallowssufficienttimeforcoreconditionstoreachsteadystate,butpreventsoperationforalargefractionofthefuelcyclewithoutestablishingabenchmarkforthedesigncalculations.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-14.DraftB HTCB3.1.3B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.3ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8(Ref.1),thereactorcoreanditsinteractionwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)mustbedesignedforinherently'stablepoweroperation,eveninthepossibleeventofanaccident.Inparticular,thenetreactivityfeedbackinthesystemmustcompensateforanyunintendedreactivityincreases.TheHTCrelatesachangeincorereactivitytoachangeinreactorcoolanttemperature(apositiveHTCmeansthatreactivityincreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature;conversely,anegativeHTCmeansthatreactivitydecreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature).HTCisdefinedasthechangeinreactivityperdegreechangeinmoderatortemperaturesincetemperatureisdirectlyproportionaltocoolantdensity.ThereactorisdesignedtooperatewithanegativeHTCoverthelargestpossiblerangeoffuelcycleoperation.Therefore,acoolanttemperatureincreasewillcauseareactivitydecrease,sothatthecoolanttemperaturetendstoreturntowarditsinitialvalue.Reactivityincreasesthatcauseacoolanttemperatureincreasewillthusbeselflimiting,andstablepoweroperationwillresult.HTCvaluesarepredictedatselectedburnupsduringthesafetyev'aluationanalysisandareconfirmedtobeacceptablebymeasurements.Bothinitialandreloadcoresaredesignedsothatthebeginningofcyclelife(BOL)HTCislessthanzerowhenTHERMALPOWERisatRTP.TheactualvalueoftheHTCisdependentoncorecharacteristics,suchasfuelloadingandreactorcoolantsolubleboronconcentration.ThecoredesignmayrequireadditionalfixeddistributedpoisonstoyieldanHTCatBOLwithintherangeanalyzedintheplantaccidentanalysis.Theendofcyclelife(EOL)HTCisalsolimitedbytherequirementsoftheaccidentanalysis.FuelcyclesthataredesignedtoachievehighburnupsorthathavechangestoothercharacteristicsareevaluatedtoensurethattheHTCdoesnotexceedtheEOLlimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-15DraftB HTC83.1.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThelimitationsonHTCareprovidedtoensurethatthevalueofthiscoefficientremainswithinthelimitingconditionsassumedintheUFSARaccidentandtransientanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforthespecifiedHTCare:a.TheHTCvaluesmustremainwithintheboundsofthoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2);andb.TheHTCmustbesuchthatinherentlystablepoweroperationsresultduringnormaloperationandaccidents,suchasoverheatingandovercoolingevents.TheUFSAR,Chapter15(Ref.2),containsanalysesofaccidentsthatresultinbothoverheatingandovercoolingofthereactorcore.HTCisoneofthecontrollingparametersforcorereactivityintheseaccidents.BoththemostpositivevalueandmostnegativevalueoftheHTCareimportanttosafety,andbothvaluesmustbebounded.Valuesusedintheanalysesconsiderworstcaseconditionstoensurethattheaccidentresultsarebounding(Ref.3).TheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreoverheatingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCispositive(i.e.,upperlimit).SuchaccidentsincludetherodwithdrawaltransientfromeitherzeroorRTP,lossofmainfeedwaterflow,andlossofforcedreactorcoolantflow.TheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreovercoolingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCisnegative(i.e.,lowerlimit).Suchaccidentsincludesuddenfeedwaterflowincreaseandsuddendecreaseinfeedwatertemperature.Inordertoensureaboundingaccidentanalysis,theHTCisassumedtobeitsmostlimitingvaluefortheanalysisconditionsappropriatetoeachaccident.Theboundingvalueisdeterminedbyconsideringroddedandunroddedconditions,whetherthereactorisatfullorzeropower,andwhetheritisatBOLorEOL.Themostconservativecombinationappropriatetotheaccidentisthenusedfortheanalysis(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-16DraftB

MTCB3.1.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)HTCsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom,HTCisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseofitsdependenceonboronconcentration.LCOLCO3.1.3requirestheHTCtobewithinthespecifiedlimitsoftheCOLRtoensurethatthecoreoperateswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.Duringthereloadcoresafetyevaluation,theHTCisanalyzedtodeterminethatitsvaluesremainwithintheboundsoftheoriginalaccidentanalysisduringoperation.AssumptionsmadeinsafetyanalysesrequirethattheHTCbelesspositivethanagivenupperboundandmorepositivethanagivenlowerbound.TheHTCismostpositiveatBOL;thisupperboundmustnotbeexceeded.ThismaximumupperlimitoccursatBOL,allrodsout(ARO),hotzeropower(HZP)conditions.AtEOLtheHTCtakesonitsmostnegativevalue,whenthelowerboundbecomesimportant.ThisLCOexiststoensurethatboththeupperandlowerboundsarenotexceeded.Duringoperation,therefore,theconditionsoftheLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurement.TheSurveillancecheckatBOLonHTCprovidesconfirmationthattheHTCisbehavingasanticipatedandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpower,andEOLsothattheacceptancecriteriaaremet.TheLCOestablishesamaximumpositivevaluethatcannotbeexceeded.TheBOLpositivelimitandtheEOLnegativelimitareestablishedintheCOLRtoallowspecifyinglimitsforeachparticularcycle.Thispermitstheplanttotakeadvantageofimprovedfuelmanagementandchangesinplantoperatingschedule.IftheLCOlimitsarenotmet,theplantresponseduringtransientsmaynotbeaspredicted.Thecorecouldviolatecriteriathatprohibitareturntocriticality,orthedeparturefromnucleateboilingratiocriteriaoftheapprovedcorrelationmaybeviolated,whichcouldleadtoalossofthefuelcladdingintegrity.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-17(continued)DraftB

HTCB3.1.3BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODE1,theupperandlowerlimitsonHTCmustbemaintainedtoensurethatanyaccidentinitiatedfromTHERMALPOWERoperationwillnotviolatethedesignassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.InNODE2withthereactorcritical,theupperlimitmustalsobemaintainedtoensurethatstartupandsubcriticalaccidents(suchastheuncontrolledCONTROLRODassemblyorgroupwithdrawal)willnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.ThelowerNTClimitmustbemaintainedinMODES2and3,inadditiontoMODE1,toensurethatcooldownaccidentswillnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysissinceHTCbecomesmorenegativeasthecycleburnupincreasesbecausetheRCSboronconcentrationisreduced.InNODES4,5,and6,thisLCOisnotapplicable,sincenoDesignBasisAccidentsusingtheNTCasananalysisassumptionareinitiatedfromtheseMODES.ACTIONSA.1HTCmustbekeptwithintheupperlimitspecifiedinLCO3.1.3toensurethatassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.TheupperlimitofConditionAistheupperlimitspecifiedintheCOLRsincethisvaluewillalwaysbelessthanorequaltothemaximumupperlimitspecifiedintheLCO.IftheupperNTClimitisviolatedatBOL,administrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanksmustbeestablishedtomaintaintheNTCwithinitslimitsinthefuture.ACompletionTimeof24hoursprovidesenoughtimeforevaluatingtheHTCmeasurementandcomputingtherequiredbankwithdrawallimits.Ascycleburnupisincreased,theRCSboronconcentrationwillbereduced.ThereducedboronconcentrationcausestheHTCtobecomemorenegative.Usingphysicscalculations,thetimeincyclelifeatwhichthecalculatedNTCwillmeettheLCOrequirementcanbedetermined.AtthispointincorelifeConditionAnolongerexists.TheplantisnolongerintheRequiredAction,sotheadministrative'ithdrawallimitsarenolongerineffect.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-18DraftB HTCB3.1.3BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1IftherequiredadministrativewithdrawallimitsatBOLarenotestablishedwithin24hours,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ToachievethisstatustheplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withk,<<<1.0.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1ExceedingtheEOLHTClowerlimitmeansthatthesafetyanalysisassumptionsoftheEOLaccidentsthatuseaboundingnegativeMTCvaluemaybeinvalid.IfitisdeterminedduringphysicstestingthattheEOLMTCvaluewillexceedthemostnegativeHTClimitspecifiedintheCOLR,thesafetyanalysisandcoredesignmustbere-evaluatedpriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmtoensurethatoperationneartheEOLremainsacceptable.The300ppmlimitissufficienttopreventEOLoperationatorbelowtheaccidentanalysisHTCassumptions.ConditionChasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresthatRequiredActionC.1mustbecompletedwheneverthisCon'ditionisentered.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateatconditionswheretheMTCwouldbebelowthemostnegativelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.RequiredActionC.1ismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatLCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.ThisNoteisprovidedsincetherequirementtore-evaluatethecoredesignandsafetyanalysispriortoreachinganequivalentRTPAROboronconcentrationof300ppmisadequateactionwithoutrestrictingentryintoMODE1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-19DraftB MTC83.1.3BASESACTIONS(continued)0.1Ifthere-evaluationoftheaccidentanalysiscannotsupportthepredictedEOLHTClowerlimit,oriftheRequiredActionsofConditionCarenotcompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimetheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfull'owerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.3.1ThisSRrequiresmeasurementoftheMTCatBOLpriortoenteringMODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostpositiveHTCLCO.MeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.TheBOLMTCvalueforAROwillbeinferredfromisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC)measurementsobtainedduringthephysi,cstestsafterrefueling.TheAROvaluecanbedirectlycomparedtotheBOLHTClimitoftheLCO.Ifrequired,measurementresultsandpredicteddesignvaluescanbeusedtoestablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanks.ThemeasurementoftheMTCatthebeginningofthefuelcycleisadequatetoconfirmthattheHTCremainswithinitsupperlimitsandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpowerandatEOL,sincethiscoefficientchangesslowly,dueprincipallytothereductioninRCSboronconcentrationassociatedwithfuelburnup.ThismeasurementisconsistentwiththerecommendationsdetailedinReference4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-20DraftB HTCB3.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.3.2ThisSRrequiresmeasurementofHTCatBOLpriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelinginordertodemonstrate'ompliancewiththe70%RTPHTClimit.TheFrequencyof"oncepriortoenteringHODE1aftereachrefueling"ensuresthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.3.3ThisSRrequiresmeasurementofHTCatBOLpriortoenteringNODE1aftereachrefuelinginordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostnegativeHTCLCO.MeetingthislimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetatEOL.TheHTCvalueforEOLisalsoinferredfromtheITCmeasurements.TheEOLvalueiscalculatedusingthepredictedEOLHTCfromthecoredesign.reportandthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandpredictedITC.TheEOLvalueisdirectlycomparedtothemostnegativeEOLvalueestablishedintheCOLR.toensurethatthepredictedEOLnegativeHTCvalueiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.WCAP9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodology,"July1985.4.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06",datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-21DraftB

HTCB3.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.3.2ThisSRrequiresmeasurementofHTCatBOLpriortoenteringHODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththe70%RTPClimit.TheFrequencyof"oncepriortoNODE1aftereachrefueling"ensuresthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.3.3ThisSRequiresmeasurementofHTCatBOLpriortoenteringHODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostnegativeHTCLCO.HeetingthislimitpriortoenteringNODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetatEOL.TheMTCvalueforEOLisalsoinferredfromtheITCmeasurements.TheEOLvalueiscalculatedusingthepredictedEOLHTCfromthecoredesignreportandthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandpredictedITC.TheEOLvalueisdirectlycomparedtothemostnegativeEOLvalueestablishedintheCOLRtoensurethatthepredictedEOLnegativeHTCvalueiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum('AIF)GDC8,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.4.WCAP9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationHethodology,"July1985.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06",datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-21DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(e.g.,trippability)oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.Maximum'odmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM).TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27and28(Ref;1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Hechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerod,worthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDM.LimitsoncontrolrodalignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore(uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCROMmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximatelyVeinch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-22DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.A.bankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.Theshutdownbankismaintainedeitherinthefullyinsertedorfullywithdrawnposition.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbankBbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankAstopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbank8continuestomoveout.WhencontrolbankBreachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.Thissequencecontinuesuntil.controlbanksA,B,andCareatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbank0isnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bankDisinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andtheMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-23DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtherodcontrolsystemthatmovestherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+1stepor"+V8inch),butifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.TheHRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactualcontrolrodposition,butatalowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofonedigitaldetectorassemblyperrod.AllthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputtotworedundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheHRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsduetothe12-stepintervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Withanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.ThesafetyconcernsassociatedwiththeHRPIsystemareassociatedwithgenerationofaroddrop/rodstopsignalwhichblocksautorodwithdrawalandtheabilitytocomplywiththerodmisalignmentrequirement.Arodbottomsignalfrombothsignalprocessorsisrequiredtogeneratearoddrop/rodstopsignal.Thetwo-out-of-twocoincidentsignalrequirementreducesinadvertentroddrop/rodstopbutdoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysisassumptions.ThebankdemandpositionandtheHRPIrodpositionsignalsaremonitoredbyaroddeviationmonitoringsystemthatprovidesanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.TheroddeviationalarmwillbegeneratedbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-24(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASES(continued)APPLICABLEControlrodmisalignmentaccidentsareanalyzedintheSAFETYANALYSESsafetyanalysis(Ref.3).Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingcontrolrodinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryintegrity;and(b.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Twotypesofmisalignmentaredistinguished.Duringmovementofacontrolrodgroup,onerodmaystopmoving,whiletheotherrodsinthegroupcontinue(i.e.,staticrodmisalignment).Thisconditionmaycauseexcessivepowerpeaking.Thesecondtypeofmisalignmentoccursifonerodfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionrequiresanevaluationtodeterminethatsufficientreactivityworthisheldintheremainingcontrolrodstomeettheSDHrequirement,with.themaximumworthrodstuckfullywithdrawn.Threetypesofanalysisareperformedinregardt'ostaticrodmisalignment(Ref.4).Thefirsttypeofanalysisconsidersthecasewhereanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedintothecorewithallotherrodscompletelywithdrawn.Withcontrolbanksattheirinsertionlimits,thesecondtypeofanalysisconsidersthecasewhenanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedint'othecore.Thethirdtypeofanalysisconsidersthecaseofacompletelywithdrawnsinglerodfromabankinsertedtoitsinsertionlimit.Satisfyinglimitsondeparturefromnucleateboilingratioinallthreeofthesecasesboundsthesituationwhenarodismisalignedfromitsgroupby12steps.ThesecondtypeofmisalignmentoccursifoneRCCAfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionisassumedintheevaluationtodeterminethattherequiredSDHismetwiththemaximumworthRCCAfullywithdrawnfollowingamainsteamlinebreak(Ref.5).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-25DraftB 0 RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheRequiredActionsinthisLCOensurethateitherdeviationsfromthealignmentlimitswillbecorrectedorthatTHERMALPOWERwillbeadjustedsothatexcessivelocallinearheatrates(LHRs)willnotoccur,andthattherequirementsonSDMandejectedrodwortharepreserved.Continuedoperationofthereactorwithamisalignedcontrolrodisallowediftheheatfluxhotchannelfactor(Fo(Z))andthenuclearenthalpyhotchannelfactor(F~)areverifiedtobewithintheirlimitsintheCOLRandthesafetyanalysisisverifiedtoremainvalid.Whenacontrolrodismisaligned,theassumptionsthatareusedtodeterminetherodinsertionlimits,AFDlimits,andquadrantpowertiltlimitsarenotpreserved.Therefore,thelimitsmaynotpreservethedesignpeakingfactors,andF<(Z)andF~mustbeverifieddirectlybyincoremapping.BasesSection3.2(PowerDistributionLimits)containsmorecompletediscussionsofthe.relationofFo(Z)andF~totheoperatinglimits.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYandalignmentaredirectlyrelatedtopowerdistributionsandSDM,whichareinitialconditionsassumedinsafetyanalyses.'hereforetheysatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOAllshutdownandcontrolrodsmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidethenegativereactivitynecessarytoprovideadequateshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditions..ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYisdefinedasbeingtrippablesuchthatthenecessarynegativereactivityassumedintheaccidentanalysisisavailable.Ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovablebutremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrodisconsideredtobeOPERABLE.Thelimitsonshutdownorcontrolrodalignmentsensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysiswillremainvalid.TherequirementsonOPERABILITYensurethatuponreactortrip,theassumedreactivitywillbeavailableandwillbeinserted.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsalsoensurethat'theRCCAsandbanksmaintainthecorrectpowerdistributionandrodalignment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-26DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESLCO(continued)TherequirementtomaintaintherodalignmentofeachindividualrodpositionasindicatedbyHRPItowithinplusorminus12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandpositionisconservative.TheminimummisalignmentassumedinsafetyanalysiswithrespecttopowerdistributionandSDMis25steps,whileatotalmisalignmentfromfullywithdrawntofullyinsertedisassumedforthecontrolrodmisalignmentaccident.Therodpositiondeviationmonitorisusedtoverifyrodalignmentonacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.Verificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthealignmentlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.4.1).Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinlimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.4.2).FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceunacceptablepowerpeakingfactorsandLHRs,orunacceptableSDHs,allofwhichmayconstituteinitialconditions.inconsistentwiththesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYTherequirementsonRCCAOPERABILITYandalignmentareapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<~1.0becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichneutron(orfission)powerisgenerated,andtheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability)andalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,5,and6,thealignmentlimitsdonotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.IntheshutdownMODES,theOPERABILITYoftheshutdownandcontrolrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDH,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),"forSDHinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirements.duringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-27(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.l.landA.l.2Whenoneormorerodsareuntrippable,thereisapossibilitythattherequiredSDMmaybeadverselyaffected.Undertheseconditions,itisimportanttodeterminetheSDM,andifitislessthantherequiredvalue,initiateborationuntiltherequiredSDMisrecovered.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisadequatefordeterminingSDMand,ifnecessary,forinitiatingemergencyborationtorestoreSDM.BorationisassumedtocontinueuntiltherequiredSDHisrestored.Inthissituation,SDMverificationmustincludetheworthoftheuntrippablerod,aswellasaremainingrodofmaximumworth.A.2Iftheuntrippablerod(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,ForreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems./B.l.landB.1.2Whenarodismisaligned,itcanusuallybemovedandisstilltrippable.Iftherodcannotberealignedwithin1hour,thenSDMmustbeverifiedtobewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLRorborationmustbeinitiatedtorestoretheSDM.TheCompletionTimeof1hourgivestheoperatorsufficienttimetoperformeitheractioninanorderlymanner.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-28DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.2B.38.4B.5andB.6Forcontinuedoperationwithamisalignedrod,reactorpowermustbereduced,SDHmustperiodicallybeverifiedwithinlimits,hotchannelfactors(F<(Z)andF>)mustbeverifiedwithinlimits,andthesafetyanalysesmustbere-evaluatedtoconfirmcontinuedoperationispermissible.Reductionofpowerto~75%RTPensuresthatlocalLHRincreasesduetoamisalignedRCCAwillnotcausethecoredesigncriteriatobe.exceeded(Ref.6).TheCompletionTimeof2hoursgivestheoperatorsufficienttimetoaccomplishanorderlypowerreductionwithoutchallengingtheReactorProtectionSystem.Whenarodisknowntobemisaligned,thereisapotentialtoimpacttheSDH.Sincethecoreconditionscanchangewithtime,periodicverificationofSDHisrequired.AFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensurethisrequirementcontinuestobemet.VerifyingthatF<(Z)andF~arewithintherequiredlimits(i.e.,SR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1)ensuresthatcurrentoperationat~75%RTPwitharodmisalignedisnotresultinginpowerdistributionsthatmayinvalidatesafetyanalysisassumptionsatfullpower.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursallowssufficienttimetoobtainfluxmapsofthecorepowerdistributionusin~theincorefluxmappingsystemandtocalculateFo(Z)andF>.Oncecurrentconditionshavebeenverifiedacceptable,timeisavailabletoperformevaluationsofaccidentanalysistodeterminethatcorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccidentforthedurationofoperationundertheseconditions.ACompletionTimeof5daysissufficienttimetoobtaintherequiredinputdataandtoperformtheanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-29DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1WhenRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintheirCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours,whichobviatesconcernsaboutthedevelopmentofundesirablexenonorpowerdistributions.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.l.landD.l.2Morethanonecontrolrodbecomingmisalignedfromitsgrouppositionisnotexpected,andhasthepotentialtoreduceSDH.Therefore,SDHmustbeevaluated.OnehourallowstheoperatoradequatetimetodetermineSDH.RestorationoftherequiredSDM,ifnecessary,requiresincreasingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoprovidenegativereactivity,asdescribedintheBasesofLCO3.1.1.TherequiredCompletionTimeof1hourforinitiatingborationisreasonable,basedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenonredistribution,thelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurring,andthestepsrequiredtocompletetheaction.Thisallowstheoperatorsufficienttimetoaligntherequiredvalvesandstarttheboricacidpumps.BorationisassumedtocontinueuntiltherequiredSDHisrestored.D.2Ifmorethanonerodisfoundtobemisalignedorbecomesmisalignedbecauseofbankmovement,theplantconditionsfalloutsideoftheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Sinceautomaticbanksequencingwouldcontinuetocausemisalignment,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-30DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONS0.2(continued)TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingNODE2withK,ff<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.4.1VerificationthatindividualrodpositionsarewithinalignmentlimitsusingMRPIorthePPCSataFrequencyof12hoursprovidesahistorythatallowstheoperatortodetectarodthatisbeginningtodeviatefromitsexpectedposition.ThisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.SR3.1.4.2Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)isinoperable,nocontrolroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourFrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofarodmisalignment.AreductionoftheFrequencyto4hoursprovidessufficientmonitoringoftherodpositionswhenthemonitorisinoperable.ThisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatperformanceofthisSRisonlynecessarywhentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-31DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.1.4.3VerifyingeachcontrolrodisOPERABLEwouldrequirethateachrodbetripped.However,inMODES1and2withK,~1.0,trippingeachcontrolrodwouldresultinradialoraxialpowertilts,oroscillations.Exercisingeachindividualcontrolrodevery92daysprovidesincreasedconfidencethatallrodscontinuetobeOPERABLEwithoutexceedingthealignmentlimit,eveniftheyarenotregularlytripped.MovingeachcontrolrodtoaMRPItransitionwillnotcauseradialoraxialpowertilts,oroscillations,tooccur.The92dayFrequencytakesintoconsiderationotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandSR3.1.4.1,whichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofOPERABILITYoftherods.DuringorbetweenrequiredperformancesofSR3.1.4.3(determinationofcontrolrodOPERABILITYbymovement),ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovable,butremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrod(s)isconsideredtobeOPERABLE.Atanytime,ifacontrolrod(s)isimmovable,adeterminationofthetrippability(OPERABILITY)ofthecontrolrod(s)mustbemade,andappropriateactiontaken.SR3.1.4.4Verificationofroddroptimesallowstheoperatortodeterminethatthemaximumroddroptimepermittedisconsistentwiththeassumedroddroptimeusedinthesafetyanalysis.Measuringroddroptimespriortoreactorcriticality,afterreactorvesselheadremoval,ensuresthatthereactorinternalsandroddrivemechanismwillnotinterferewithrodmotionorroddroptime,andthatnodegradationinthesesystemshasoccurredthatwouldadverselyaffectcontrolrodmotionordroptime.ThistestingisperformedwithbothRCPsoperatingandtheaveragemoderatortemperature~500Ftosimulateareactortripunderactualconditions.ThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutage,duetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandthepotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-32(continued)DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27,and28,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.5.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-33DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitBASESBACKGROUNDTheinsertionlimitsoftheshutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.Theinsertionlimitsdirectlyaffectcorepowerandfuelburnupdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableejectedrodworth,SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDMlimitsarepreserved.Therodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andLCO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.Theshutdownbankisrequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-34DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforprecisereactivitycontrolofthereactor.ThepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormallyautomaticallycontrolledbytheRodControlSystem,buttheycanalsobemanuallycontrolled.Theyarecapableofaddingnegativereactivityveryquickly(comparedtoboratingordiluting).Thecontrolbanksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormal,fullpoweroperations.Hence,theyarenotcapableofaddingalargeamountofpositivereactivity.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangeassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.Thedesigncalculationsareperformedwiththeassumptionthattheshutdownbankiswithdrawnfirst.Theshutdownbankcanbefullywithdrawnwithoutthecoregoingcritical.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thisprovidesavailablenegativereactivityintheeventofborationerrors.Theshutdownbankiscontrolledmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator.Theshutdownbankiseitherfullywithdrawnorfullyinserted.Theshutdownbankmustbecompletelywithdrawnfromthecore,priortowithdrawinganycontrolbanksduringanapproachtocriticality.Theshutdownbankisthenleftinthispositionuntilthereactorisshutdown.Theshutdownbankaffectscorepowerandburnupdistribution,andaddsnegativereactivitytoshutdownthereactoruponreceiptofareactortripsignal.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimited,.sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained;Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-35DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally,theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsrestrictthereactivitythatcouldbeaddedintheeventofarodejectionaccident,andensuretherequiredSDMismaintained.OperationwithinthesubjectLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),loss.offlow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfunction.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOnareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolbanks),exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumamountofnegativereactivityonareactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDM'(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthemostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDMatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitalsolimitsthereactivityworthofanejectedshutdownrod.Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentisthat:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-36DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.RCSpressureboundaryintegrity;andb,Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,theshutdownbankinsertionlimitaffectssafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandSDH(Ref.3).TheSDHrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedgPTRpresent.OperationattheinsertionlimitmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvalueinfuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.~IThecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits,togetherwithAFD,gPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDH,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitpreservesaninitialconditionassumedinthesafetyanalysesand,assuch,satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheshutdownbankmustbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitanytimethereactoriscriticalandpriortowithdrawalofanycontrolrod.ThisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDHfollowingareactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-37Draft8 ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicating'theLCOrequirementissuspendedduringSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequirestheshutdownbanktomovebelowtheLCOlimits,whichwouldnormallyviolatetheLCO.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITYTheshutdownbankmustbewithintheinsertionlimit,withthereactorinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<>1.0.ThisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDMfollowingareactortrip.InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODE3,4,5,or6,theshutdownbankinsertionlimitdoesnotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.InshutdownMODEStheOPERABILITYoftheshutdownrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDH,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.RefertoLCO3.l.1forSDMrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5.LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"ensures'dequat'eSDMinMODE6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.l.2andA.2Whentheshutdownbankisnotwithininsertionlimit,verificationofSDMorinitiationofborationtoregainSDMwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDMinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<~1.0isensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)").Iftheshutdownbankisnotwithintheinsertionlimit,thenSDMwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-38DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESACTIONSA.l.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinordertotakeconservativeactionbecausethesimultaneousoccurrenceofeitheraLOCA,lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistributionorreactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability..Twohoursisallowedtorestoretheshutdownbanktowithintheinsertionlimit.ThistimelimitisnecessarybecausetheavailableSDMmaybesignificantlyreduced,withtheshutdownbanknotwithintheinsertionlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblemswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.B.lIfRequiredActionsA.1andA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwheretheLCOisnotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE2withk,ff<1.0.withinaCompletionTimeof6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.5.1Sincetheshutdownbankispositionedmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator,averificationofshutdownbankpositionataFrequencyofevery12hoursisadequatetoensurethatthebankis,withintheinsertionlimit.Also,the12hourFrequencytakesintoaccountotherinformationavailableinthecontrolroomforthepurposeofmonitoringthestatusofshutdownrods.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-39(continued)DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASES(continued)REFERENCES'.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.\R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-40DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.6ControlBankInsertionLimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheinsertionlimitsoftheshutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.Theinsertionlimitsdirectlyaffectcorepowerandfuelburnupdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableejectedrodworth,SHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH),andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialforum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Therodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andLCO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.ThecontrolbankinsertionlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksarerequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.TheinsertionlimitsfigureintheCOLRalsoindicateshowthecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern.Overlapisthedistancetravelledtogetherbytwocontrolbanks.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-41DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits83.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforprecisereactivitycontrolofthereactor.ThepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormallycontrolledautomaticallybytheRodControlSystem,butcanalsobemanuallycontrolled.Theyarecapableofaddingnegativereactivityveryquickly(comparedtoboratingordiluting).Thecontrolbanksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormalfullpoweroperations.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangesassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.Therodinsertionlimitmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasisand.willprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificatio'nthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbankBbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankAstopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankBcontinuestomoveout.WhencontrolbankBreachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,B,andCareatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankDisnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bankDisinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-42DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimited,sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.Theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally,theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsrestrictthereactivitythatcouldbeaddedintheeventofarodejectionaccident,andensuretherequiredSDMismaintained.OperationwithintheAFD,gPTR,shutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),lossofflow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-43(continued)DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASES(continued)APPLICABLE.Onareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolSAFETYANALYSESbanks),exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumam'ountofnegativereactivityonareactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDH(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthemostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDHatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsalsolimitthereactivityworthofanejectedcontrolbankrod.Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystempressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsaffectsafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandpowerdistributions(Refs.4,5,6,and7).TheSDHrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-44DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits83.1.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedgPTRpresent.OperationattheinsertionlimitmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvalueinfuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.Thecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits,togetherwithAFD,gPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDH,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Thecontrolbankinsertion,sequenceandoverlaplimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement,inthattheyareinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.LCOThelimitson.controlbankssequence,overlap,andinsertion,asdefinedintheCOLR,mustbemaintainedbecausetheyservethefunctionofpreservingpowerdistribution,ensuringthattheSDHismaintained,ensuringthat'jectedrodworthislimited,andensuringadequatenegativereactivityinsertionisavailableontrip.Theoverlapbetweencontrolbanksprovidesmoreuniformratesofreactivityinsertionandwithdrawalandisimposedtomaintainacceptablepowerpeakingduringcontrolbankmotion.TherodinsertionlimitmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificationthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingtheLCOrequirementsaresuspendedduringtheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequiresthecontrolbanktomovebelowtheLCOlimits,whichwouldviolatetheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-45(continued)DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsshallbemaintainedwiththereactorinMODE1andMODE2withk,<<a1.0.Theselimitsmustbemaintained,sincetheypreservetheassumedpowerdistribution,ejectedrodworth,SDH,andreactivityrateinsertionassumptions.ApplicabilityinMODE2withk.<<<1.0andMODES3,4,5,and6isnotrequired,sinceneitherthepowerdistributionnorejectedrodworthassumptionswouldbeexceededintheseMODES.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2Whenthecontrolbanksareoutsidetheacceptableinsertionlimits,outofsequence,orinthewrongoverlapconfiguration,theymustberestoredtowithinthoselimits.Thisrestorationcanoccurintwoways:a.Reducingpowertobeconsistentwithrodposition;orb.Movingrodstobeconsistentwithpower.Also,verificationofSDHorinitiationofborationtoregainSDMwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDHinMODES1and2isnormallyensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdown'ankinsertionlimits(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)").Ifcontrolbanksarenotwithintheirlimits,thenSDMwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-46DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESACTIONSA.l.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinordertotakeconservativeactionbecausetheoccurrenceofeitheraLOCA,lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistributionorreactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability.Thus,theallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursforrestoringthebankstowithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblems.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.1andA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE2withK,<<<1.0,wheretheLCOisnotapplicable.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredNODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.1.6.1ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtoensurethatthereactordoesnotachievecriticalitywiththecontrolbanksbelowtheirinsertionlimits.TheFrequencyofwithin4hourspriortoachievingcriticalityensuresthattheestimatedcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLRshortlybeforecriticalityisreached.SR3.1.6.2WithanOPERABLEbankinsertionlimitmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS),verificationofthecontrolbankinsertionlimitsataFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensure.OPERABILITYofthebankinsertionlimitmonitorandtodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimitssince,normally,verylittlerodmotionoccursin12hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-47DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1;6.3Whentheinsertionlimitmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)becomesinoperable,nocontrolroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourfrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofacontrolbanknotwithintheinsertionlimits.AreductionoftheFrequencytoevery4hoursprovidessufficientmonitoringofcontrolrodinsertionwhenthemonitorisinoperable.VerificationofthecontrolbankpositionataFrequency'of4hoursissufficienttodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimits.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatperformanceofthisSRinonlynecessarywhentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.SR3.1.6.4WhencontrolbanksaremaintainedwithintheirinsertionlimitsasrequiredbySR3.1.6.2andSR3.1.6.3above,itisunlikelythattheirsequenceandoverlapwillnotbeininaccordancewithrequirementsprovidedintheCOLR.AFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeinsertionlimitcheckaboveinSR3.1.6.2.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR'0.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4..UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2..7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-48DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMB3.1.7RodPositionIndicationBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability),includingpositionindication,oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.MaximumrodmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH).RodpositionindicationisrequiredtoassessOPERABILITYandmisalignment.AccordingtotheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13(Ref.1),instrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystemsovertheiroperatingrangesduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andaccidentconditionsmustbeOPERABLE.LCO3.1.7isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITYofthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstodeterminecontrolrodpositionsandtherebyensurecompliancewiththecontrolrodalignmentandinsertionlimits.Mechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignm'entandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDM.LimitsoncontrolrodalignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDMlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore('uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCROMmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximately5/8inch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-49DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintogroupstoprovide"forprecisereactivitycontrol.A.groupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashionbutalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andtheHicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtheRodControlSystemthatmovetherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+1stepor+%inch),butifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-50DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheMRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactualcontrolrodposition,butatalowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofonedigitaldetectorassemblyperrod.AllthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputtotworedundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheHRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsduetothe12-stepintervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Withanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESControlandshutdownrodpositionaccuracyisessentialduringpoweroperation.Powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,orSDHlimitsmaybeviolatedintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(Ref.2),withcontrolorshutdownrodsoperatingoutsidetheirlimitsundetected.Therefore,theacceptancecriteriaforrodpositionindicationisthatrodpositions"mustbeknownwithsufficientaccuracyinordertoverifythecoreisoperatingwithinthegroupsequence,overlap,designpeakinglimits,ejectedrodworthlimits,andwithminimumSDM(LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits").Therodpositionsmustalsobeknowninordertoverifythealignmentlimitsarepreserved(LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits").Controlrodpositionsarecontinuouslymonitoredtoprovideoperatorswithinformationthatensurestheplantisoperatingwithintheboundsoftheaccidentanalysisassumptions.ThecontrolrodpositionindicatorchannelssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Thecontrolrodposition.indicatorsmonitorcontrolrodposition,whichisaninitialcondition"oftheaccident.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-51(continued)DraftB RodPositionIndication83.1.7BASES(continued)LCOLCO3.1.7specifiesthattheMRPISystemandtheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystembeOPERABLE.ForthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstobeOPERABLErequiresthefollowing:a.FortheMRPISystemtherearenofailedcoilsandrodpositionindicationisavailableontheMRPIscreen(ineitherthecontrolroomorrelayroom)ortheplantprocesscomputersystem;andb.TheBankDemandIndicationSystemhasbeencalibratedeitherinthefullyinsertedpositionortotheMRPISystem.The12stepagreementlimitbetweentheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemandtheMRPISystemasrequiredbySR3.1.7.1indicatesthattheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisadequatelycalibrated,andcanbeusedforindicationofcontrolrodbankposition.Adeviationoflessthantheallowable12stepagreementlimit,inpositionindicationforasinglecontrolrod,ensureshighconfidencethatthepositionuncertaintyofthecorrespondingcontrolrodgroupiswithintheassumedvaluesusedinthe'nalysis.TheMRPIsystemisdesignedwitherrordetectionsuchthatwhenafaultoccursinthebinarydatareceivedfromthecoilstacksorprocessingunitanalarmisannunciatedattheMRPIdisplay.Whenthefaultclears,thesystemprovidesselfvalidationofdataintegrityandreturnstoitsnormaldisplaymode.Becauseofthedigitalnatureofthesystemanditsinherentdiagnosticfeatures,intermittentdataalarmscanmaskpositionindicationandgeneratetheperceptionthatasinglerodpositionisunmonitored.Forasinglerodpositionindicationfailure,MRPIisconsideredOPERABLEifafaultoccursandclearswithinfiveminutesandtheindicatedpositioniswithinexpectedvalues.TheserequirementsensurethatcontrolrodpositionindicationduringpoweroperationandPHYSICSTESTSisaccurate,andthatdesignassumptionsarenotchallenged.OPERABILITYofthepositionindicatorchannelsensuresthatinoperable,misaligned,ormispositionedcontrolrodscanbedetected.Therefore,powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,andSDMcanbecontrolledwithinacceptablelimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-52(continued)DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYITherequirementsontheHRPIandstepcountersareonlyapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<z1.0(consistentwithLCO3.1.4andLCO3.1.5,andLCO3.1.6),becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical,andtheOPERABILITYandalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.IntheshutdownMODES,theOPERABILITY.oftheshutdownandcontrolbankshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDM,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),"forSDMrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirementsduringMODE6.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthataseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperableMRPIpergroupandeachdemandpositionindicatorperbank.ThisisacceptablebecausetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablepositionindicator.A.lWhenoneMRPIpergroupfails,thepositionoftherodcanstillbedeterminedbyuseofthemovableincoredetectors.Basedonexperience,normalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofbanks.Ifabankhasbeensignificantlymoved,theRequiredActionofB.1or8.2belowisrequired.Therefore,verificationofRCCAposit'ionwithintheCompletionTimeof8hoursisadequateforallowingcontinuedfullpoweroperation,sincetheprobabilityofsimultaneouslyhavingarodsignificantlyoutofpositionandaneventsensitivetothatrodpositionissmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-53DraftB RodPositionIndication83.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2ReductionofTHERHALPOWERto<50%RTPputsthecoreintoaconditionwhererodpositionisnotsignificantlyaffectingcorepeakingfactors.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreducingpowertoz50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.1above.8.1andB.2Whenoneormorerodswithinoperablepositionindicators(i.e.,HRPI)havebeenmoved>24stepsinonedirectionsincethepositionwaslastdetermined,theRequiredActionsofA.1andA.2arestillappropriatebutmustbeinitiatedpromptlyunderRequiredActionB.1tobeginverifyingthattheserodsarestillproperlypositioned,relativetotheirgrouppositions.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositions.Acceptableverificationofrodpositionwithin4hoursre-initiatestheclockforRequiredActionA.l.If,within4hours,therodpositionshavenotbeendetermined,THERHALPOWERmustbereducedtos50%RTPwithin8hourstoavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat>50%RTP,ifoneormorerodsare'isalignedbymorethan24steps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-54Draft8 RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)C.l.landC.l.2Withonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperable,therodpositionscanbedeterminedbytheMRPISystem.Sincenormalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofrods,verificationbyadministrativemeansthattherodpositionindicatorsareOPERABLEandthemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodares12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorforthatbankwithintheallowedCompletionTimeofonceevery8hoursisadequate.Thisensuresthatmostwithdrawnandleastwithdrawnrodarenomorethan24stepsapartwhichislessthantheaccidentanalysisassumptionof25steps.Thisverificationcanbeanexaminationoflogs,administrativecontrols,orotherinformationthatshowsthatallMRPIsintheaffectedbankareOPERABLE.C.2ReductionofTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTPputsthecore.intoaconditionwhererodpositionwillnotcausecorepeakingtoapproachthecorepeakingfactorlimits.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,based'noperatingexperience,forreducingpowerto~50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.1above.D.lIftheRequiredActionscannotbecomple'tedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-55DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1WithmorethanoneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks,animmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.1.7.1VerificationthattheHRPIagreeswiththegroupdemandpositionwithin12stepsforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravelensuresthattheHRPIisoperatingcorrectly.SincetheHRPIdoesnotdisplaytheactualshutdownrodpositionsbetween0and230steps,onlypointswithintheindicatedrangesarerequiredincomparison.ThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadduetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandthepotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-56DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8B'3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheMODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsistopermitrelaxationsofexistingLCOstoallowcertainPHYSICSTESTStobeperformed.SectionXIof10CFR50,AppendixB(Ref.1),requiresthatatestprogrambeestablishedtoensurethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinservice.Allfunctionsnecessarytoensurethatthespecifieddesignconditionsare'notexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesmustbetested.Thistestingisanintegralpartofthedesign,construction,andoperationoftheplant.RequirementsfornotificationoftheNRC,forthepurposeofconductingtestsandexperiments,arespecifiedin10CFR50.59(Ref.2).Thekeyobjectivesofatestprogramareto:a.Ensurethatthefacilityhasbeenadequatelydesigned;b.Validatetheanalyticalmodelsusedinthedesignandanalysis;c.Verifytheassumptionsusedtopredictplantresponse;d.Ensurethatinstallationofequipmentinthefacilityhasbeenaccomplishedinaccordancewiththedesign;ande.Verifythattheoperatingandemergencyproceduresareadequate.Toaccomplishtheseobjectives,testingisperformedpriortoinitialcriticality;duringstartup,lowpower,powerascension,andatpoweroperation;andaftereachrefueling.ThePHYSICSTESTSrequirementsforreloadfuelcyclesensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwiththedesignpredictionsandthatthecorecanbeoperatedasdesigned.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-57DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-NODE2B3.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)PHYSICSTESTSproceduresarewrittenandapprovedinaccordancewithestablishedformats.Theproceduresincludeallinformationnecessarytopermitadetailedexecutionofthetestingrequiredtoensurethatthedesignintentismet.PHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewiththeseprocedures,andtestresultsareapprovedpriortocontinuedpowerescalationandlongtermpoweroperation.ThePHYSICSTESTSperformedatGinnaStationforreloadfuelcyclesinNODE2include:a.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawn;b.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInserted;c.ControlRodWorth;andd.IsothermalTemperatureCoefficient(ITC).Theseandothersupplementarytestsmayberequiredtocalibratethenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems.ThesetestsmaycausetheoperatingcontrolsandprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOrequirementsduringtheirperformanceasdescribedbelow.'a~TheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawnTestmeasuresthecriticalboronconcentrationathotzeropower(HZP).Withallrodsout,bankDisatornearitsfullywithdrawnposition.HZPiswherethecoreiscritical(k,<<=1.0),andtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)isatdesigntemperatureandpressureforzeropower.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.3,"NoderatorTemperatureCoefficient(NTC)."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-58DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)b.C.TheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInsertedTestmeasuresthecriticalboronconcentrationatHZP,withabankhavingaworthofatleast1%zk/kfullyinsertedintothecore.Thistestisusedtomeasurethedifferentialboronworth.WiththecoreatHZPandallbanksfullywithdrawn,theboronconcentrationofthereactorcoolantisgraduallyloweredinacontinuousmanner.Theselectedbankistheninsertedtomakeupforthedecreasingboronconcentrationuntiltheselectedbankhasbeenmovedoveritsentirerangeoftravel.Thereactivityresultingfromeachincrementalbankmovementismeasuredwithareactivitycomputer.Thedifferencebetweenthemeasuredcriticalboronconcentrationwithallrodsfullywithdrawnandwiththebankinsertedisdetermined.Thedifferentialboronworthisdeterminedbydividingthemeasuredbankworthbythemeasuredboronconcentrationdifference.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits;"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit;"orLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheControlRodWorthTestisusedtomeasurethe',reactivityworthofselectedcontrolbanks.ThistestisperformedatHZPandhastwoalternativemethodsofperformance.Thefirstmethod,theBoronExchangeMethod,variesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationandmovestheselectedcontrolbankinresponsetothechangingboronconcentration.Thereactivitychangesaremeasuredwithareactivitycomputer.Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.Thesecondmethod,theBoronEndpointMethod,movestheselectedcontrolbankoveritsentirelengthoftravelandthenvariesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationtoachieveHZPcriticalityagain.Thedifferenceinboronconcentrationistheworthoftheselectedcontrolbank.Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,orLCO3.1.6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-59DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE283.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)d.TheITCTestmeasurestheITCofthereactor.ThistestisperformedatHZPusingtheSlopeMethod.TheSlopeMethodvariesRCStemperatureinaslowand,continuousmanner.Thereactivitychangeismeasuredwithareactivitycomputerasafunctionofthetemperaturechange.TheITCistheslopeofthereactivityversusthetemperatureplot.Thetestisrepeatedbyreversingthedirectionofthetemperaturechange,andthefinalITCistheaverageofthetwocalculatedITCs.TheModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)atBOL,70%RTPandatEOLisdeterminedfromthemeasuredITC.ThistestsatisfiestherequirementsofSR3.1.3.1andSR3.1.3.2.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThefuelisprotectedbymultipleLCOsthatpreservetheinitialconditionsofthecoreassumedduringthesafetyanalyses.ThemethodsfordevelopmentoftheseLCOs,thatareexceptedbythisLCO,aredescribedintheWestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport(Ref.3).TheabovementionedPHYSICSTESTS,andotherteststhatmayberequiredtocalibratenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems,mayrequiretheoperatingcontrolorprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOlimit'ations.TheUFSARdefinesrequirementsforinitialtestingofthefacility,includingPHYSICSTESTS.Reference4summarizestheinitialzero,lowpower,andpowertests.ReloadfuelcyclePHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification'equirements,fuelvendorguidelinesandestablishedindustrypracticeswhichareconsistentwiththePHYSICSTESTSdescribedinReferences5and6.AlthoughthesePHYSICSTESTSaregenerallyaccomplishedwithinthelimitsofallLCOs,conditionsmayoccurwhenoneormoreLCOsmustbesuspendedtomakecompletionofPHYSICSTESTSpossibleorpractical.Thisisacceptableaslongasthefueldesigncriteriaarenotviolated.TherequirementsspecifiedinthefollowingLCOsmaybesuspendedforPHYSICSTESTING:(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-60DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.4.2,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";"ControlBankInsertionLimits";and"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality".WhentheseLCOsaresuspendedforPHYSICSTESTS,thefueldesigncriteriaarepreservedaslongasthepowerlevelislimitedtos5%RTP,thereactorcoolanttemperatureiskept~530F,andSDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThePHYSICSTESTSincludemeasurementofcorenuclearparametersortheexerciseofcontrolcomponentsthataffectprocessvariables.AmongtheprocessvariablesinvolvedareAFDandgPTR,whichrepresentinitialconditionsoftheplantsafetyanalyses.Alsoinvolvedarethemovablecontrolcomponents(controlandshutdownrods),whicharerequiredtoshutdownthereactor.ThelimitsforthesevariablesarespecifiedforeachfuelcycleintheCOLR.PHYSICSTESTSmeetthecriteriaforinclusionintheTechnicalSpecifications,sincethecomponentsandprocessvariableLCOssuspendedduringPHYSICSTESTSmeetCriteria1,2,and3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOallowsthereactorparametersofMTCandminimumtemperatureforcriticalitytobeoutsidetheirspecifiedlimitstoconductPHYSICSTESTSinMODE2,toverifycertaincorephysicsparameters.Inaddition,itallowsselectedcontrolandshutdownrodstobepositionedoutsideoftheirspecifiedalignmentandinsertionlimits.OperationbeyondspecifiedlimitsispermittedforthepurposeofperformingPHYSICSTESTSandposesnothreattofuelintegrity,providedtheSRsaremet.TherequirementsofLCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,andLCO3.4.2maybesuspendedduringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTSprovided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintainedz5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisz530'F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-61(continued)DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicablewhenperforminglowpowerPHYSICSTESTS.TheapplicablePHYSICSTESTSareperformedinMODE2atHZP.ACTIONSA.1andA.2IftheSDMrequirementisnotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.Theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.BorationwillbecontinueduntilSDMiswithinlimit.SuspensionofPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsrequiresrestorationofeachoftheapplicableLCOstowithinspecificationwithin1hour.B.1WhenTHERMALPOWERis>5%RTP,theonlyacceptableactionistoopenthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)topreventoperationofthereactorbeyonditsdesignlimitssinceaMODEchangehasoccurred.ImmediatelyopeningtheRTBswillshutdownthereactorandpreventoperationofthereactoroutsideofitsdesignlimits.C.1WhentheRCSloopwiththelowestT,,is'530F,theappropriateactionistorestoreT,,towithinitsspecifiedlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidestimeforrestoringT,,towithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.Operationwiththereactorcriticalandwithtemperaturebelow530'Fcouldviolatetheassumptionsforaccidentsanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-62DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1IfRequiredActionC.1cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within.anadditional15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15additionalminutesisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE3fromMODE2inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.1.8.1ThepowerrangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEinMODE2byLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACHANNELOPERATIONALTESTisperformedoneachpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelwithin7dayspriortocriticality.ThiswillensurethattheRTSisproperlyalignedtoprovidetherequireddegreeofcoreprotectionduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTS.The7daytimelimitissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingPHYSICSTESTS.SR3.1.8.2VerificationthattheRCSlowestloopT.,is~530Fwillensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginaconditionthatcouldinvalidatethesafetyanalyses.VerificationoftheRCStemperatureataFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-63DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.1.8.3VerificationthatTHERMALPOWERis<5%RTPusingtheNISdetectorswillensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginaconditionthatcouldinvalidatethesafetyanalyses.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERataFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.SR3.1.8.4TheSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandonthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixB,SectionXI.2.10CFR50.59.3.WCAP-9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport,"July1985.4.UFSAR,Section14.6.5.LetterfromR.W.Kober(RGE)toT.E.Murley(NRC),

Subject:

"StartupReports,"datedJuly9,1984.6.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A,.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06,"datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-64DraftB Fo(Z)3.2.13.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))LCO3.2.1Fo(Z)shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F<(Z)notwithinlimit.A.lReduceTHERMALPOWER~1%RTPforeach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.AND15minutesA.2ANDA.3ANDA.4ANDReduceAFDacceptableoperationlimitsa1%foreach1%Fa(Z)exceedslimit.ReducePowerRangeNeutron.Flux-Hightripsetpoints~1%foreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.ReduceOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointsz1%foreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.8hours72hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-1DraftB ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.5PerformSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.1.2.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.lB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.1VerifymeasuredvaluesofF0(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPAND31EFPDthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-2DraftB

SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.2.1.2-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER~75%RTP.VerifymeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-3Draft8 3.2.23.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>>)LCO3.2.2F>>shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F>>notwithinlimit.A.1ReduceTHERMALPOWER~1%RTPforeach1%F>>exceedslimit.AND15minutesA.2ANDA.3ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints~1%foreach1%F>>exceedslimit.ReduceOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpoints>1%foreach1%F>>exceedslimit.72hours72hoursANDA.4PerformSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.1(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-4DraftB FN3.2.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.2.1VerifyF~iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPAND31EFPDthereafterSR3.2.2.2NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER>75%RTP.VerifyF~iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-5Draft8 AFD3.2.33.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)LCO3.2.3TheAFDmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandAFD:'a~b.c~ShallbemaintainedwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifferencewithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP.ThetargetbandisspecifiedintheCOLR.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbut~50%RTP,providedAFDiswithintheacceptableoperati.onlimitsandcumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiss1hourduringtheprevious24hours.TheacceptableoperationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<50%RTP.2.3.NOTES-TheAFDshallbeconsideredoutsidethetargetbandwhentheaverageoffourOPERABLEexcorechannelsindicateAFDtobeoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa1minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWER~50%RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa0.5minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWER>15%RTPand<50%RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Atotalof16hoursofoperationmaybeaccumulatedwithAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithoutpenaltydeviationtimeduringsurveillanceofpowerrangechannelsinaccordancewithSR3.3.1.6.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-6DraftB AFD3.2.3ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.THERMALPOWER290%RTP.ANDAFDnot,withinthetargetband.A.1RestoreAFDtowithintargetband.15minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTP.15minutesC.THERMALPOWER<90%RTPand~50%RTPwithcumulativepenaltydeviationtime>1hourduringtheprevious24hours.ORTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPand~50%RTPwithAFDnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits.C.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.30minutes(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-7DraftB AFD3.2.3ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.THERMALPOWER90%RTPANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.D.1PerformSR3.2.3.1.Onceevery15minutesE.THERMALPOWER(90%RTP.ANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.E.1PerformSR3.2.3.2.Onceevery1hourR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-8DraftB AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.1VerifyAFDmonitorisOPERABLE.12hoursSR'.2.3.2NOTES-------------------1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWERa90%RTP.2.AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexistduringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin1'5minutesandevery15minutesthereafterSR3.2.3.3NOTES-1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWER(90%RTP.2..AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexistduringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.Verify'FDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin1hourandevery1hourthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNucleaI'owerPlant3.2-9DraftB AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.4Updatetargetfluxdifference.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND31EFPDthereafterSR3.2.3.5-NOTETheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefuelingmaybedeterminedfromdesignpredictions.Determine,bymeasurement,thetargetfluxdifference.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND92EFPDthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-10DraftB QPTR3.2.43.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)LCO3.2.4TheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbe<1.02.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.QPTRnotwithinlimit.A.lANDA.2ANDLimitTHERMALPOWERtoz3%belowRTPforeach1%ofQPTR>1.00.PerformSR3.2.4.1andlimitTHERMALPOWERtoa3%belowRTPforeach1%ofQPTR>1.00.2hoursOnceper12hoursA.3PerformSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.24hoursANDOnceper7daysthereafterAND(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-11DraftB OPTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.4ANDA.5Reevaluatesafetyanalysesandconfirmresultsremainvalidforthedurationofoperationunderthiscondition.--------NOTE---------PerformRequiredActionA.5onlyafterRequiredActionA.4.iscompleted.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.l.ANDNormalizeexcoredetectorinstrumentationtoeliminatetilt.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.landA.2J(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantI3.2-12DraftB QPTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.6--------NOTES--------1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifthecauseoftheQPTRalarmisnotassociatedwithinoperableQPTRinstrumentation.2.RequiredActionA.6mustbecompletedwhenRequiredActionA.5iscompletedandNote1,above,doesnot3.OnlyoneoftheCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.PerformSR3.2.1.1andSR'3.2.2.1.Within24hoursafterreachingRTPORWithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERincreasedabovethelimitsofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-13DraftB QPTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTP.4hoursC.QPTRmonitoralarminoperable.C.1ORPerformSR3.2.4.2Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterC.2PerformSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-14DraftB QPTR3.2.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.4.1VerifyQPTRmonitor'alarmisOPERABLE.12hoursSR3.2.4.2NOTES1.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER<75%RTP,theremainingthreepowerrangechannelscanbeusedforcalculatingQPTR.2.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER~75%RTP,performSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.VerifyQPTRiswithinlimitbycalculation.7daysSR3.2.4.3l.2.3.-NOTESOnlyrequiredtobeperformediftheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER<75%RTP,theremainingthreepowerrangechannelscanbeusedforcalculatingQPTR.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER~75%RTP,performSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.VerifyQPTRiswithinlimitbycalculation.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-15DraftB Fo(Z)B3.2.1B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthelimitsonthevaluesofFQ(Z)istolimitthelocal(i.e.,pellet)peakpowerdensity.ThevalueofFo(Z)variesalongtheaxialheightofthecore(Z).Fo(Z)isdefinedasthemaximumlocalfuelrodlinearpowerdensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinearpowerdensity,assumingnominalfuelpelletandfuelroddimensionsadjustedforuncertainty.Therefore,F<(Z)isameasureofthepeakpelletpowerwithinthereactorcore.Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,these'LCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.Fo(Z)issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,fuelburnup,andchangesinaxialpowerdistribution.FQ(Z)ismeasuredperiodicallyusingtheincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreatornearsteadystateconditions.Withthemeasuredthreedimensionalpowerdistributions,itispossibletodetermineameasuredvalueforF<(Z).However,becausethisvaluerepresentsasteadystatecondition,itdoesnotincludevariationsinthevalueofF<(Z),whicharepresentduringanonequilibriumsituationsuchasloadfollowingwhentheplantchangespowerleveltomatchgriddemandpeaksandvalleys.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(i.e.,ConditionIeventsasdescribedinReferenceI)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,gPTR,andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-1(continued)DraftB Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLELimitsonFo(Z)precludecorepowerdistributionsthatSAFETYANALYSESviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:a~b.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.2);c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuel'willbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.3);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDN)withthehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.4).LimitsonFo(Z)ensurethatthevalueofthetotalpeakingfactorassumedasaninitialconditionintheaccidentanalysesremainsvalid.Othercriteriamustalsobemet(e.g.,maximumcladdingoxidation,maximumhydrogengeneration,eoolablegeometry,andlongtermcooling).However,thepeakcladdingtemperatureistypicallymostlimiting.kTheF<(Z)limitsprovidedintheCOLRarebasedonthelimitsusedintheLOCAanalysis.F<(Z)limitsassumedintheLOCAanalysisaretypicallylimit'ingrelativeto(i.e.,lowerthan)theF<(Z)assumedinsafetyanalysesforotheraccidentsbecauseoftherequirementssetforthin10CFR50.46(Ref.2)andECCSmodeldevelopmentinaccordancewiththerequiredfeaturesoftheECCSevaluationmodelsprovidedin'20CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.5).Therefore,thisLCOprovidesconservativelimitsforotheraccidents.F<(Z)satis'fiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-2(continued)DraftB Fo(Z)83.2.1BASES(continued)LCOTheFo(Z)shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipsprovidedintheCOLR.TheFo(Z)limitsdefinelimitingvaluesforcorepowerpeakingthatprecludespeakcladdingtemperaturesabove2200'FduringeitheralargeorsmallbreakLOCA(Refs.6and7).ThisLCOrequiresoperationwithintheboundsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Calculationsareperformedinthecoredesignprocesstoconfirmthatthec'orecanbecontrolledinsuchamannerduringoperationthatitcanstaywithintheLOCAF<(Z)limits.IfFo(Z)cannotbemaintainedwithintheLCOlimits,reductionofthecorepowerisrequired.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsforF<(Z)mayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifadesignbasiseventoccurswhileF<(Z)isoutsideitsspecifiedlimits.APPLICABILITYTheF<(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedwhileinNODE1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinotherNODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.ACTIONSA.1ReducingTHERMALPOWERby~1%foreach1%bywhichFQ(Z)exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableabsolutepowerdensity.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-3DraftB

Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2WhencorepeakingfactorsaresufficientlyhighthatLCO3.2.1doesnotpermitoperationatRTP,theacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDarereduced.Theacceptableoperationlimitsarereduced1%foreach1%bywhichFo(Z)exceedsitslimit.Forexample,ifthemeasuredFo(Z)exceedsthelimitby3%andtheacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDare+11%at90%RTPand+31%at50%RTP,thentherevisedAFDAcceptableOperationLimitswouldbe+8%at90%RTPand+28%at50%RTP.Thisensuresanearconstantmaximumlinearheatrateinunitsofkilowattsperfootattheacceptableoperationlimits.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforthechangeinsetpointsissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisrelativelyshorttimeperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.A.3AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpointsby.>1%foreach1%bywhichF<(Z)exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethistripsetpointhelpsprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,givenanFo(Z)limitof2.32,ameasuredFo(Z)of2.4,aridaPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointof108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3.4%to104.6%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERin'ccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-4DraftB FQ(Z)B3.2.1BASESACTIONS(continued)A.4ReductionintheOverpoweraTandOvertemperaturezTtripsetpointsby~1%foreach1%bywhichFo(Z)exceedsitslimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethesetripsetpointshelpprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.A.5VerificationthatF<(Z)hasbeenrestoredtowithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.1.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.1ensuresthatcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.lIftheRequiredActionsofA.1throughA.5cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.ThisallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-5(continued)DraftB Fo(Z)83.2.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.1.1VerificationthatF<(Z)iswithinitslimitinvolvesincreasingthemeasuredvaluesofF<(Z)toallowformanufacturingtoleranceandmeasurementuncertaintiesandthenmakingacomparisonwiththelimits.TheselimitsareprovidedintheCOLR.Specifically,themeasuredvalueoftheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo)isincreasedby3%toaccountforfuelmanufacturingtolerancesandby5%forfluxmapmeasurementuncertaintyforafullcorefluxmapusingthemovableincoredetectorfluxmappingsystem.ThisprocedureisequivalenttoincreasingthedirectlymeasuredvaluesofF<(Z)by1.0815%beforecomparingwithLCOlimits.PerformingtheSurveillanceinMODE1priortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPaftereachrefuelingensuresthatFo(Z)iswithinlimitwhenRTPisachievedandprovidesconfirmationofthenucleardesignandthefuelloadingpattern.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisadequateformonitoringthechangeofpowerdistributionwithcoreburnupbecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyforthisamountoffuelburnup.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheFo(Z)limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodoftime.SR3.2.1.2Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3;2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-6DraftB F,(Z)B3.2.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.2.1.2(continued)WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,gPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.1.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatForemainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTP.REFERENCESl.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.2.'0CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.1.4.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.6.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.1.7.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-7DraftB 0 83.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthepowerdensityatanypointinthecoresothatthefueldesigncriteriaarenotexceededandtheaccidentanalysisassumptionsremainvalid.Thedesignlimitsonlocal(pellet)andintegratedfuelrodpeakpowerdensityareexpressedintermsofhotchannelfactors.Controlofthecorepowerdistributionwithrespecttothesefactorsensuresthatlocalconditionsinthefuelrodsandcoolantchannelsdonotchallengecoreintegrityatanylocationinthecoreduringeithernormaloperationorapostulatedaccidentanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses..F~isdefinedastheratiooftheintegralofthelinearpoweralongthefuelrodwiththehighestintegratedpowertotheaverageintegratedfuelrodpower.Therefore,F~isameasureofthemaximumtotalpowerproducedinafuelrod.TheF~limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.Thischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityfordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).F~issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,andfuelburnup.F~typicallyincreaseswithcontrolbankinsertionandtypicallydecreaseswithfuelburnup.F~isnotdirectlymeasurablebutisinferredfromapower'istributionmapobtainedwiththemovableincoredetectorsystem.Specifically,theresultsofthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionmapareanalyzedbyacomputertodetermineF~.Thisfactoriscalculatedatleastevery31EFPD.However,duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.F~andthegPTRLCOlimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-8Draft8 FgB3.2.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheCOLRprovidespeakingfactorlimitsthatensurethatthedesignbasisvaluefordeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientconditionarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency.TheDNBdesignbasisprecludesDNBandismetbylimitingtheminimumlocalDNBheatfluxratio.AllDNBlimitedtransienteventsareassumedtobeginwithanF~valuethatsatisfiestheLCOrequirements.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.DNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.Thismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysis.limitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-9DraftB FNB3.2.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-1andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationappliesintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressures'ntherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimit's1.30.OperationoutsidetheLCOlimitsmayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.TheDNBdesignbasisensuresthatthereisnooverheatingofthefuelthatresultsinpossiblecladdingperforationwiththereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.APPLICABLELimitsonF~precludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedSAFETYANALYSESthefollowingfueldesignlimits:'a~Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.1);c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDHwiththehighestworthcontrol'rodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-10DraftB BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)FortransientsthatmaybeDNBlimited,theReactorCoolantSystemflowand'F~arethecoreparametersofmostimportance.ThelimitsonF~ensurethattheDNBdesign'asisismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientsarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency(i.e.,Condition1eventsasdescribedinReference4).TheDNBdesignbasisismetbylimitingtheminimumDNBRtothe95/95DNBcriterion.TheallowableF~limitincreaseswithdecreasingpowerlevel.ThisfunctionalityinF~isincludedintheanalysesthatprovidetheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)ofSL2.1.1.Therefore,anyDNBeventsinwhichthecalculationofthecorelimitsismodeledimplicitlyusethisvariablevalueofF~intheanalyses.Likewise,alltransientsthatmaybeDNBlimitedareassumedtobeginwithaninitialF~asafunctionofpowerleveldefinedbytheCOLRlimitequation.TheLOCAsafetyanalysisindirectlymodelsF>asaninputparameter.TheNuclearHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))andtheaxialpeakingfactorsareinserteddirectlyintotheLOCAsafetyanalysesthatverifytheacceptabilityoftheresultingpeakcladdingtemperature(Ref.1).ThefuelisprotectedinpartbyTechnicalSpecifications,whichensurethattheinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyandaccidentanalysesremainvalid.ThefollowingLCOsensurethis:LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.2,"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>),"andLCO3.2.1,"Heat.FluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))."F>ismeasuredperiodicallyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreat,ornear,steadystateconditions.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(Condition1events)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,gPTR;andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.F~satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-11(continued)DraftB BASES(continued)LCOF~shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipprovidedintheCOLR.TheF~limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.ThischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityforDNB.ThelimitingvalueofF~,describedbytheequationcontainedintheCOLR,isthedesignradialpeakingfactorusedintheplantsafetyanalyses.Apowermultiplicationfactorinthisequationincludesanadditionalmarginforhigherradialpeakingfromreducedthermalfeedbackandgreatercontrolrodinsertionatlowpowerlevels.ThelimitingvalueofF~isallowedtoincrease0.3%forevery1%RTPreductioninTHERMALPOWER.APPLICABILITYTheF~limitsmustbemaintainedinMODEItopreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthefueldesignlimitsforDNBRandPCT.Applicabilityinothermodesisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.S~ecifically,thedesignbaseseventsthataresensitivetoF~inMODES2,3,4,and5havesignificantmargintoDNB,andtherefore,thereisnoneedtorestrictFN~lnthesemodes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-12(continued)DraftB BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lReducingTHERMALPOWERbya1%foreach1%bywhichF~~exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableDNBRmargin.WhentheF~limitisexceeded,theDNBRlimitisnotlikelyviolatedinsteadystateoperation,becauseeventsthatcouldsignificantlyperturbtheF>value(e.g.,staticcontrolrodmisalignment)areconsideredinthesafetyanalyses.However,theDNBRljmitmaybeviolatedifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.ReducingTHERMALPOWERincreasestheDNBmargin.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.A.2AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpointsby~1%foreach1%bywhichF~exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionsandensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,giventhattheF~limitisexceededby3%andthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointis108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3%to105%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithrequiredactionA.1.A.3ReductionintheOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointsby~1%foreach1%bywhichF~exceedsitslimit,ensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofa.severetransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-13DraftB

BASESACTIONS(continued)A.4VerificationthatF~hasbeenrestoredwithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.1ensuresthatthecausethatledtotheF~exceedingitslimitiscorrected,andcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.1IftheRequiredActionsofA.1throughA.4cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.2.1ThevalueofF~isdeterminedbyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystemtoobtainafluxdistributionmap.AdatareductioncomputerprogramthencalculatesthemaximumvalueofF~fromthemeasuredfluxdistributions.ThemeasuredvalueofF~mustbemultipliedby1.04toaccountformeasurementuncertaintybeforemakingcomparisonstotheF~limit.Aftereachrefueling,F~mustbedeterminedinMODE1priortoexceeding75%RTP.ThisrequirementensuresthatF~limitsaremetatthebeginningofeachfuelcycle.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-14DraftB FN83.2.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSrSR3.2.2.1(continued)TheFrequencyof31EFPDisacceptablebecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyoverthisamountoffuelburnu~.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheF~limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofoperation.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.2.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.2.2doesnotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.2.2meetstherequirementsofSR3.2.2.1.SR3.2.2.2Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,gPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsome.quadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.2.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF~remainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERis~75%RTP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-15(continued)Draft8

BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.1.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly101967.4..AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-16DraftB AFDB3.2.383.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthevaluesoftheAFDinordertolimittheaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoeitherthetoporbottomofthecore.Bylimitingtheamountofpowerdistributionskewing,corepeakingfactorsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.Limitingpowerdistributionskewingovertimealsominimizesthexenondistributionskewing,whichisasignificantfactorinaxialpowerdistributioncontrol.Theoperatingschemeusedtocontroltheaxialpowerdistribution,ConstantAxialOffsetControl(CAOC),involvesmaintainingtheAFDwithinatolerancebandaroundaburnupdependenttarget,knownasthetargetfluxdifference,tominimizethevariationoftheaxialpeakingfactorandaxialxenondistributionduringplantmaneuvers.Thetargetfluxdifferenceisdeterminedatequilibriumxenonconditions.ThecontrolbanksmustbepositionedwithinthecoreinaccordancewiththeirinsertionlimitsandControlBankDshouldbeinsertednearitsnormalposition(i.e.,a210stepswithdrawn)forsteadystateoperationathighpowerlevels.ThepowerlevelshouldbeasnearRTPaspractical.ThevalueofthetargetfluxdifferenceobtainedundertheseconditionsdividedbythefractionofRTPisthetargetfluxdifferenceatRTPfortheassociatedcoreburnupconditions.TargetfluxdifferencesforotherTHERMALPOWERlevelsareobtainedbymultiplyingtheRTPvaluebytheappropriatefractionalTHERMALPOWERlevel.Periodicupdatingofthetargetfluxdifferencevalueisnecessarytofollowthechangeofthefluxdifferenceatsteadystateconditionswithburnup.TheNuclearEnthalpyRiseHot'hannelFactor(F~)andQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)LCOslimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-17(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheAFDisameasureofaxialpowerdistributionskewingtothetoporbottomhalfofthecore.TheAFDissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankpositions,corepowerlevel,axialburnup,axialxenondistributionand,toalesserextent,reactorcoolanttemperatureandboronconcentrations.TheallowedrangeoftheAFDisusedinthenucleardesignprocesstoconfirmthatoperationwithintheselimitsproducescorepeakingfactorsandaxialpowerdistributionsthatmeetsafetyanalysisrequirements.TheCAOCmethodology(Ref.I)entails:a.Establishinganenvelopeofallowedpowershapesandpowerdensities;b.Devisinganoperatingstrategyforthecyclethatmaximizesplantflexibility(maneuvering)andminimizesaxialpowershapechanges;c.Demonstratingthatthisstrategydoesnotresultincoreconditionsthatviolatetheenvelopeofpermissiblecorepowercharacteristics;andd.Demonstratingthatthispowerdistributioncontrolschemecanbeeffectivelysupervisedwithexcoredetectors.ThelimitsontheAFDensurethattheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z))isnotexceededduringeithernormaloperationorintheeventofxenonredistributionfollowingpowerchanges.ThelimitsontheAFDalsolimittherangeofpowerdistributionsthatareassumedasinitialconditionsinanalyzingCondition2,3,and4events(Ref.2).Thisensuresthatfuelcladdingintegrityismaintainedforthesepostulatedaccidents.ThemostimportantCondition4eventisthelossofcoolantaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition3eventisthelossofflowaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition2eventsareuncontrolledbankwithdrawalandborationordilutionaccidents.Condition2accidents,assumedtobeginfromwithintheAFDlimits;areusedtoconfirmtheadequacyofOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpoints.ThelimitsontheAFDsatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-18(continued)Draft8 AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)LCOTheshapeofthepowerprofileintheaxial(i.e.,thevertical)directionislargelyunderthecontroloftheoperator,througheitherthemanualoperationofthecontrolbanks,orautomaticmotionofcontrolbanksrespondingtotemperaturedeviationsresultingfromeithermanualoperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemtochangeboronconcentration,orfrompowerlevelchanges.SignalsareavailabletotheoperatortohelpdefinethepowerprofilefromtheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excoreneutrondetectors(Ref.3).Separatesignalsaretakenfromthetopandbottomexcoreneutrondetectors.TheAFDisdefinedasthedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetectorineachdetectorwell.Forconvenience,thisfluxdifferenceisconvertedtoprovidefluxdifferenceunitsexpressedasapercentageandlabe]edas%sfluxor%aI.WithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP(i.e.,PartAofthisLCO),theAFDmustbekeptwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.ThetargetbandisprovidedintheCOLR.WiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWERa90%RTP,theassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolated.WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTP,theAFDmaybeoutsidethetargetbandprovidedthatthedeviationtimeisrestricted.ItisintendedthattheplantisoperatedwiththeAFDwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.However,,duringrapidTHERMALPOWERreductions,controlbankmotionmaycausetheAFDtodeviateoutsideofthetargetbandatreducedTHERMALPOWERlevels.ThisdeviationdoesnotaffectthexenondistributionsufficientlytochangetheenvelopeofpeakingfactorsthatmaybereachedonasubsequentreturntoRTPwiththeAFDwithinthetargetband,providedthetimedurationofthedeviationislimited.Accordingly,whileTHERMALPOWERis~50%RTPand<90%RTP(i.e.,PartBofthisLCO),aIhourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimelimit,cumulativeduringthepreceding24hourswhen>15%RTP,isallowedduringwhichtheplantmaybeoperatedoutsideofthetargetbandbutwithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesascalculatedbyNotes2and3ofthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-19Draft8 AFD83.2.3BASESLCO(continued)forTHERMALPOWERlevels>15%RTPand<50%RTP(i.e.,PartCofthisLCO),deviationsoftheAFDoutsideofthetargetbandarelesssignificant.Thereducedpenaltydeviationtimeaccumulationratereflectsthisreducedsignificance.WithTHERMALPOWER<15%RTP,AFDisnotasignificantparameterintheassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisand,therefore,requiresnolimits.BecausethexenondistributionproducedatTHERMALPOWERlevelslessthanRTPdoesaffectthepowerdistributionaspowerisincreased,unanalyzedxenonandpowerdistributionispreventedbylimitingtheaccumulatedpenaltydeviationtime.ThefrequencyofmonitoringtheAFDbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)isnominallyonceperminuteprovidinganessentiallycontinuousaccumulationofpenaltydeviationtimethatallowstheoperatortoaccuratelyassessthestatusofthepenaltydeviationtime.TheinoperabilityofthismonitorrequiresindependentverificationthatAFDremainswithinlimitandthatthepeakingfactorsassumedintheaccidentanalysesremainvalid.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-20DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESLCO(continued)ThisLCOismodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstNotestatestheconditionsnecessaryfordeclaringtheAFDoutsideofthetargetband.Therequiredtargetbandvarieswithaxialburnupdistribution,whichinturnvarieswiththecoreaverageaccumulatedburnup.ThetargetbanddefinedintheCOLRmayprovideonetargetbandfortheentirecycleormorethanoneband,eachtobefollowedforaspecificrangeofcycleburnup.TheaverageofthefourOPERABLEexcoredetectorsisusedtodeterminewhenAFDisoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsareusedtoderivetheaverageAFD.ThesecondandthirdNotesdescribehowthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiscalculated.ThesecondNotestatesthatwithTHERHALPOWER>50%RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof1minuteforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband.ThethirdNotestatesthatwithTHERHALPOWER>15%RTPand<50/RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof0.5minutesforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesfromNotes2and3ofthisLCO.ThefourthNoteaddressesAFDoutsideofthetargetbandduringsurveillances.For,surveillanceofthepowerrangechannelsperformedaccordingtoSR3.3.1.6,devi'ationoutsidethetargetbandispermittedfor16hoursandnopenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulated.SomedeviationintheAFDisrequiredfordoingtheNIScalibrationwiththeincoredetectorsystem.,Thiscalibrationisperformedevery92days.ViolatingtheLCOontheAFDcouldproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaCondition2,3,or4eventoccurswhiletheAFDisoutsideitslimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-21(continued)Draft8 AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYAFDrequirementsareapplicableinMODE1above15%RTP.Above50%RTP,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWERandcorepeakingfactorsarethecoreparametersofprimaryimportanceinsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).Above15%RTP,thisLCOisapplicabletoensurethatthedistributionsofxenonareconsistentwithsafetyanalysisassumptions.Atorbelow15%RTPandforloweroperatingMODES,thestoredenergyinthefuelandtheenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolantarelow.Also,lowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.ThevalueoftheAFDintheseconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.ACTIONSA.lWiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandandTHERMALPOWER>90%RTP,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolatedwithrespecttothemaximumheatgeneration.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof15minutesisallowedtorestoretheAFDtowithinthetargetbandbecausexenondistributionschangelittleinthisrelativelyshorttime.B.lIfRequiredActionA.1isnotcompletedwiththerequiredCompletionTimeof15minutes,theaxialxenondistributionstartstobecomeskewed.ReducingTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPplacesthecoreinaconditionthathasbeenanalyzedandfoundtobeacceptable,providedthattheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.TheallowedCompletionTimeof15minutestoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPallowsforacontrolledreductioninpowerwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-22DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1ThisRequiredActionmustbeimplementedwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbuta50%RTPifeitherthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis>1hourduringtheprevious24hours,ortheAFDisnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits.WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbut~50%RTP,operationwiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandisallowedforupto1houriftheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.WiththeAFDwithintheselimits,theresultingaxialpowerdistributionisacceptableasaninitialconditionforaccidentanalysesassumingthethenexistingxenondistributions.The1hourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimerestrictstheextentofxenonredistribution.Withoutthislimitation,unanalyzedxenonaxialdistributionsmayresultfromadifferentpatternofxenonbuildupanddecay.ReducingTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTPwillputthereactorataTHERMALPOWERlevelatwhichtheAFDisnotasignificantaccidentanalysisparameter.IftheindicatedAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandoutsidetheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR,thepeakingfactorsassumedinaccidentanalysismaybeexceededwiththe,existingxenoncondition.AnyAFDwithinthetargetbandisacceptableregardlessofitsrelationshiptotheacceptableoperationlimits.TheCompletionTimeof30minutesallowsforaprompt,yetorderly,reductioninpower.D.1WhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERisz90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofevery15minutestoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequatetoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevelsand.isconsistentwiththeCompletionTimeforrestoringAFDtowithinlimits(ConditionA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-23DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1WhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis<90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofeveryhourtoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof1hourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforupto1hourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.1ThisSRistheverificationthattheAFDmonitorisOPERABLE.ThisisnormallyaccomplishedbyintroducingasignalintotheplantprocesscomputertoverifycontrolroomannunciationofAFDnotwithinthetargetband.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensureOPERABILITYoftheAFDmonitorsinceundernormalplantoperation,theAFDisnotexpectedtosignificantlychange.SR3.2.3.2TheAFDismonitoredonacontinuousbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasan'AFDmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesthe1minuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolboardannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.Thecomputeralsosendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeisz1hourwithintheprevious24hours.Thisalarmmessagedoesnotclearuntilthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis<1hourwithintheprevious24hours;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-24DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.2(continued)WiththeAFDmonitoralarminoperable,theAFDmeasurement,determinedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtime.Duringoperationat~90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof15minutestoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevels.TheAFDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyduringperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDismorelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.SR3.2.3.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthissurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP.ThesecondNotestatesthatmonitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderfortheoperatortocomputethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.SR3.2.3.3TheAFDismonitoredonacontinuousbasisusingthePPCSthathasanAFDmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesthe1minuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolboardannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.Thecomputeralsosendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis~1hourwithintheprevious24hours.Thisalarmmessagedoesnotclearuntilthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis<1hourwithintheprevious24hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-25DraftB

AFDB3.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.3(continued)WiththeAFDmonitoralarminoperable,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtime.Duringoperationat<90%RTP,but>15%RTP,theAFDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof1hourtoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyof1hourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforupto1hourusingthemethodologyofNotes'and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.TheAFDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyinperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDismorelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.SR3.2.3.3ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthissurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTP.ThesecondNotestatesthatmonitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderfortheoperatortocomputethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeif.AFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.SR3.2.3.4ThisSurveillancerequiresthatthetargetfluxdifferencebeupdatedataFrequencyof31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)toaccountforsmallchangesthatmayoccurinthetargetfluxdifferencesinthatperiodduetoburnup.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-26DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.4(continued)Therearetwomethodsbywhichthisupdatecanbecompleted.ThefirstmethodrequiresmeasuringthetargetfluxdifferenceinaccordancewithSR3.2.3.5.Thismeasurementmaybeobtainedusingincoreorexcoreinstrumentation.Thesecondmethodinvolvesinterpolationbetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalues.Thenucleardesignreportprovidespredictedvaluesfortargetfluxdifferenceatvariouscycleburnups.'hedifferencebetweenthelastmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueatthesameburnupisappliedtothepredictedvalueattheburnupwherethetargetfluxdifferenceupdateisrequired.Thisrevisedpredictedvaluecanthenbeusedtodeterminetheupdatedvalueofthetargetfluxdifference.SR3.2.3.5measurementofthetargetfluxdifferenceisaccomplishedbytakingafluxmapwhenthecoreisatequilibriumxenonconditions,preferablyathighpowerlevelswiththecontrolbanksnearlywithdrawn.Thisfluxmapprovidestheequilibriumxenonaxialpowerdistributionfromwhichthetargetvaluecanbedetermined.Thetargetfluxdifferencevariesslowlywithcoreburnup.AFrequencyof31EFPDaftereachrefuelingand92EFPDthereafterforremeasuringthetargetfluxdifferencesadjuststhetargetfluxdifferencetothevaluemeasuredat,steadystateconditions.This.isthebasisfortheCAOC.'RemeasurementatthisSurveillanceintervalalsoestablishestheAFDtargetfluxdifferencevaluesthataccountforchangesinincore-excorecalibrationsthatmayhaveoccurredintheinterim.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsthepredictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-27(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.WCAP-8403(nonproprietary),"PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures,"WestinghouseElectricCorporation,September1974.2.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section7.7.2.6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-28DraftB QPTR83.2.4B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)BASESBACKGROUNDTheQPTRlimitensuresthatthegrossradialpowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththedesignvaluesusedinthesafetyanalyses.Preciseradialpowerdistributionmeasurementsaremadeduring.startuptesting,afterrefueling,andperiodicallyduringpoweroperation.QuadrantPowerTiltisacoretiltthatismeasuredwiththeuseoftheexcorepowerrangefluxdetectors.Acoretiltisdefinedastheratioofmaximumtoaveragequadrantpower.TheQPTRisdefinedastheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.LimitingtheQPTRpreventsradialxenonoscillationsandwillindicateanycoreasymmetries.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimitedsothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"providelimitsonprocessvariablesthatcharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Controlofthesevariablesensuresthatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteriaandthatthepowerdistributionremainswithintheboundsusedinthesafetyanalyses.APPLICABLELimitsonQPTRprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatSAFETYANALYSESviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:b.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),thepeakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200F(Ref.I);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-29DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDMwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).TheLCOlimitsontheAFD,theQPTR,theHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z)),theNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~),andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimitsareestablishedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthesafetyanalyseslimits.TheQPTRlimitsensurethatF<andFo(Z)remainbelowtheirlimitingvaluesbypreventinganundetectedchangein'hegrossradialpowerdistribution.InNODEI,theF~andF<(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingdesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheQPTRsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbemaintainedatorbelowthelimitof1.02.QPTRismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasaQPTRmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesfromtheexcoredetectoroutputstheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinany'uadranttotheaverageofnuclearpower.inthefourquadrantsandprovid'esanalarmmessageiftheQPTRisabovethe1.02limit.TheQPTRlimitof1.02,atwhichcorrectiveactionisrequired,providesamarginofprotectionforboththeDNBratioandlinearheatgenerationratecontributingtoexcessivepowerpeaksresultingfromX-Yplanepowertilts.AlimitingQPTRof1.025canbetoleratedbeforethemarginforuncertaintyin'F<(Z)andF>ispossiblychalle'nged.However,theadditionalQPTRof0.005isprovidedformarginintheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-30(continued)DraftB QPTR83.2.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheQPTRlimitmustbemaintainedinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTPtopreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthedesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinMODE1s50%RTPandinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofaQPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.TheQPTRlimitintheseconditionsis,therefore,notimportant.NotethattheF~andF<(Z)LCOsstillapplybelow50%RTP,butallowprogressivelyhigherpeakingfactorsasTHERMALPOWERdecreasesbelow50%RTP.ACTIONSA.lWiththeQPTRexceedingitslimit,limitingTHERMALPOWERto~3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichtheQPTRexceeds1.00isaconservativetradeoffoftotalcorepowerwithpeaklinearpower.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursallowssufficienttimetoidentifythecauseandcorrectthetilt.Notethatthepowerreductionitselfmaycauseachangeinthetiltedcondition.AfurtherincreaseintheQPTRrequiresalowerlimittoTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2.AftercompletionofRequiredActionA.1,theQPTRalarmmaystillbeinitsalarmedstate.Assuch,anyadditionalchangesintheQPTRaredetectedbyrequiringacheckoftheQPTRinaccordancewithSR3.2.4.1onceper12hours.thereafter.IftheQPTRcontinuestoincrease,THERMALPOWERmustbelimitedaccordingly.A12hourCompletionTimeissufficientbecauseanyadditionalchangeinQPTRwouldberelativelyslow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-31DraftB OPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)A.3ThepeakingfactorsF~andFo(Z)areofprimaryimportanceinensuringthatthepowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.PerformingSrsonF>andFo(Z)withintheCompletionTimeof24hoursensuresthattheseprimaryindicatorsofpowerdistributionarewithintheirrespectivelimits.ACompletionTimeof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.Ifthesepeakingfactorsarenotwithintheirlimits,theRequiredActionsoftheseSurveillancesprovideanappropriateresponsefortheabnormalcondition.IfthegPTRremainsaboveitsspecifiedlimit,thepeakingfactorsurveillancesarerequiredeach7daysthereaftertoevaluateF~andF<(Z)withchangesinpowerdistribution.RelativelysmallchangesareexpectedduetoeitherburnupandxenonredistributionorcorrectionofthecauseforexceedingthegPTRlimit.A.4 AlthoughF~andFQ(Z)areofprimaryimportanceasinitialconditionsinthesafetyanalyses,otherchangesinthepowerdistributionmayoccurasthegPTRlimitisexceededandmayhaveanimpacton.thevalidityofthesafetyanalysis.Achangeinthepowerdistributioncanaffectsuchreactorparametersasbankworthsandpeakingfactorsforrodmalfunctionaccidents.WhenthegPTRexceedsitslimit,itdoesnotnecessarilymeanasafetyconcernexists.Itdoesmeanthatthereisanindicationofachangeinthegrossradialpowerdistributionthatrequiresaninvestigationandevaluationthatisaccomplishedbyexaminingtheincorepowerdistribution.Specifically,thecorepeakingfactorsandthequadranttiltmustbeevaluatedbecausetheyarethefactorsthatbestcharacterizethecorepowerdistribution.Thisre-evaluationisrequiredtoensurethat,beforeincreasingTHERHALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.1,thereactorcoreconditionsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthesafetyanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-32DraftB QPTR83.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)A.SIftheQPTRhasexceededthe1.02limitandtheverificationofF~andFo(Z)showsthatsafetyrequirementsaremet,theexcoredetectorsarenormalizedtoeliminatetheindicatedtiltpriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.IandA.2.ThisisdonetodetectanysubsequentsignificantchangesinQPTRandtoprovideameaningfulQPTRalarm.RequiredActionA.SismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthattheindicatedtiltisnoteliminateduntilafterthere-evaluationofthesafetyanalysishasdeterminedthatcoreconditionsatRTParewithinthesafetyanalysisassumptions(i.e.,RequiredActionA.4).Itisnecessarytoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacc'eptablepriortoadjustingtheexcoredetectorstoeliminatetheindicatedtiltandincreasingpowertoensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginanunanalyzedcondition.ThisNoteisintendedtopreventanyambiguityabouttherequiredsequenceofactions.A.6Afterthefluxtiltisnormalizedtoeliminatetheindicatedtilt(i.e.,RequiredActionA.5isperformed),itisacceptabletoreturntofullpoweroperation.However,asanaddedcheckthatthecorepowerdistributionatRTPisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisassumptions,RequiredActionA.6requiresverificationthatF<(Z)andF~arewithintheirspecifiedlimitswithin24hoursafterreachingRTP.Asanaddedprecaution,ifthecorepowerdoesnotreachRTPwithin24hours,butitincreasesslowly,thenthepeakingfactorsurveillancesmustbeperformedwithin24hoursofthetimewhentheascenttopowerwasbegun.TheseCompletionTimesareintendedtoallowadequatetimetoincreaseTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.IandA.2,whilenotpermittingthecoretoremainwithunconfirmedpowerdistributionsforextendedperiodsoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-33DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONSA.6(continued)RequiredActionA.5ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatitisnotnecessarytoperformRequiredActionA.5ifthecauseoftheQPTRalarmisassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythatthecorepowerdistributiondoesnothavetobere-verifiediftheQPTRalarmisonlyduetotheinstrumentation(i.e.,theexcoredetectors)beingoutofadjustmentandnotduetoananomalywithinthecore.ThesecondNotestatesthatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesarenotrequireduntilaftertheexcoredetectorshavebeennormalizedtoeliminatetheindicatedtilt(i.e.,RequiredActionA.S).TheintentofthisNoteistohavethepeakingfactorsurveillancesperformedatoperatingpowerlevels,whichcanonlybeaccomplishedaftertheexcoredetectorsareadjustedtoeliminatetheindicatedtiltandthecorereturnedtopower.ThethirdNotestatesthatonlyoneofthefollowingCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.TheintentofthisNoteistoclearlyindicatethatthefirstCompletionTimetobecomeapplicableistheCompletionTimewhichmustbemettosatisfyRequiredActionA.6.8.1IfRequiredActionsA.IthroughA.6arenotcompletedwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEor'onditioninwhichtherequirementsdonotapply.Toachievethisstatus,THERHALPOWERmustbereducedtos50%RTPwithin4hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimerequiredtoreachthereducedpowerlevelwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-34DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2WhentheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperabletheQPTRmustbeverifiedwithinlimitsatafrequencyofevery24hourstoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.WhenTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable,QPTRcannotbeadequatelymeasuredusingtheexcoredetectors.Inthissituationafluxmapmustbe'completedtoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.ACompletionTimeof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesinQPTR,becauseforthosecausesofQPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertiltandprovidessufficienttimetostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmapwhennecessary.TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisalsoconsistentwiththeFrequencyofSR3.2.4.3withoneinoperablepowerrangechannelsincethesechannelsprovideinputintotheQPTRmonitor.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.4.1ThisSRistheverificationthattheQPTRmonitorisOPERABLE.ThisisnormallyaccomplishedbyintroducingasignalintothePPCStoverifycontrolroomannunciationofQPTRnotwithinlimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensureOPERABILITYoftheQPTRmonitorsinceundernormalplantoperation,QPTRisnotexpectedtosignificantlychange.SR3.2.4.2ThisSurveillanceverifiesthat,theQPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyof7dayswhentheQPTRalarmisOPERABLEisacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilitythatthisalarmcanremaininoperablewithoutdetection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-35DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.4.2(continued)SR3.2.4.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstallowsQPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERHALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERis>75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythat.whenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis~75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifyQPTR.Atorabove75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatFo(Z)andF~remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.SR3.2.4.3ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheQPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumenta'tionSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimitswhentheQPTRalarmisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesinQPTR,becauseforthosecausesofQPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythat'romptaverificationofcorepowertilt.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-36Draft8

QPTRB3.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.4.3(continued)SR3.2.4.3ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthesurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformediftheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.ThissurveillancerequiresamorefrequentverificationthattheQPTRiswithinlimitsincethemonitoralarmisinoperable.ThesecondNoteallowsQPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThethirdNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shoul'dbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERis~75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis~75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifyQPTR.Atorabove75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatFo(Z)andF>remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-37DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.13.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.1TheRTSinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.1-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.1-1.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.OneormoreFunctionswithonechannelinoperable.ORTwosourcerangechannelsinoperable.A.lEntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.1-1forthechannel(s).ImmediatelyB.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.B.lRestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus'8hours'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-1DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDC.2Initiateactiontofullyinsertallrods.ANDC.3PlaceControlRodDriveSysteminaconditionincapableofrodwithdrawal.6hours6hours7hoursD.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.D.l--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-2DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.E.lORE.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<5E-11amps.---------NOTE--------RequiredActionE.2isnotapplicablewhen:a.Twochannelsareinoperable,orb.THERMALPOWERis<5E-11amps.2hoursIncreaseTHERMALPOWERto~8%RTP.2hoursF.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA'.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.F;1OpenRTBsandRTBBsupon'discoveryoftwoinoperablechannels.ANDImmediatelyupondiscoveryoftwoinoperablechannelsF.2ANDSuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyF.3RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCondition0,E,orFisnotmet.G.1BeinMODE3.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~33DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEH.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.H.1RestoreatleastonechanneltoOPERABLEstatusupondiscoveryoftwoinoperablechannels.1hourfromdiscoveryoftwoinoperablechannelsANDH.2ANDSuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyH.3RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursI.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionHnotmet.ANDI.2Initiateactiontofullyinsertallrods.PlacetheControlRodDriveSysteminaconditionincapableofrodwithdrawal.Immediately1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-4DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEJ.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.J.ISuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyJ.2PerformSR3.1.1.1.12hoursANDOnceper12hoursthereafterK.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.K.1--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hoursL.RequiredActionand-associatedCompletionTimeofConditionKnotmet.L.lReduceTHERMALPOWERto<8.5%RTP.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-5DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEM.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.M.l--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hoursN.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.N.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.6hours0.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionMorNnotmet.0.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto(50%RTP.6hoursP.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.P.1--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-6DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEQ.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionPnotmet.Q.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.AND6hoursQ.2.1Q.2.2VerifySteamDumpSystemisOPERABLE.ORReduceTHERMALPOWERto<8%RTP.7hours7hoursR.Asrequiredby'equiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.R.1--------NOTE---------Theinoperabletrainmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingoftheothertrain.RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursS.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.S.1ORS.2Verifyinterlockisinrequiredstateforexistingplantconditions.DeclareassociatedRTSFunctionchannel(s)inoperable.1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~37DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMET.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.------------NOTES------------l.Onetrainmaybebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.2.OneRTBmaybebypassedforup.to6hoursformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.1hourU.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.U.1RestoreatleastonetripmechanismtoOPERABLEstatusupondiscoveryoftwoRTBswithinoperabletripmechanisms.1hourfromdiscoveryoftwoinoperabletripmechanismsANDU.2RestoretripmechanismtoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursV.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionR,S,T,orUnotmet.V.lBeinMODE3.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-8DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEW.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.1-1.W.1ANDRestoreatleastonetripmechanismtoOPERABLEstatusupondiscoveryoftwoRTBswithinoperabletripmechanisms.1hourfromdiscoveryoftwoinoperabletripmechanismsW.2RestoretripmechanismortraintoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursX.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionWnotmet.X.1Initiateactiontofullyinsertallrods.ANDX.2PlacetheControlRodDriveSysteminaConditionincapableofrodwithdrawal.Immediately1hourR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-9DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTERefertoTable3.3.1-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachRTSFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3'.1.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.1.2NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterTHERMALPOWERis>50%RTP.CompareresultsofcalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtoNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)channeloutputandadjustifcalorimetricpoweris>2%higherthanindicatedNISpower.24hoursSR3.3.1.3NOTES1.Requiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERis~50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandiftheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31EFPD.2.PerformanceofSR3.3.1.6satisfiesthisSR.CompareresultsoftheincoredetectormeasurementstoNISAFDandadjustifabsolutedifferenceis~3%.31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-10DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.4PerformTADOT.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.5Perform'ACTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.6-NOTENotrequiredtobeperformeduntil7daysafterTHERHALPOWERis~50%RTP,butpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefueling'alibrateexcorechannelstoagreewithincoredetectormeasurements.92EFPDSR3.3.1.7NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedforsourcerangeinstrumentationpriortoenteringHODE3fromHODE2until4hoursafterenteringHODE3.PerformCOT.92days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-11DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.8NOTE1.Notrequiredforpowerrangeandintermediaterangeinstrumentationuntil4hoursafterreducingpower<6%RTP.2.Notrequiredforsourcerangeinstrumentationuntil4hoursafterreducingpower<5E-11amps.PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.1.9-------------------NOTESetpointverificationisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.92daysSR3.3.1.10NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcluded.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsSR3.3.1.11PerformTADOT.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-12Draft8 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.1.12---------NOTESetpointverificationisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.Priortoreactorstartupifnotperformedwithinprevious31daysSR3.3.1.13PerformCOT.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-13DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3~1-1(page1of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrwentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCECOHDITIONSREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1~ManualReactorTrip123(a)4('a)5(a)B,CSR3.3.1.112~PowerRangeNeutronFluxa~Highb.Low1,2,(b>2D,GD,GSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1'SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1~10SR3.3.1'SR3.3:1.8SR3.3.1~10s109KRTPs25KRTP3.IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux1(b)E,GSR3.3.1'SR3.3~1.8SR3.3.1.10(d)4.SourceRangeNeutronFlux2(c)3(a)4(a)5(a)3(e)4(e)5(e)F,GH,ISR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3~1~10SR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.10(d)(d)NA(continued)(a)WithControlRodDrive(CRD)Systemcapableofrodwithdrawal,orallrodsnotfullyinserted.(b)THERMALPOWER<6XRTP.(c)BothIntermediateRangechannels<5E-11amps.(d)UFSARTable7.2-3.(e)WithCRDSystemincapableofwithdrawalandallrodsfullyinserted.Inthiscondition,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxfunctiondoesnotprovideareactortrip,onlyindication.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-14DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page2of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDSURVEILLANCECHANNELSCONDITIONSREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT5.OvertemperaturehT1~2D,GSR3.3.1.1SR3.3'.3SR3.3~1.6SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1~10RefertoNote1(page3.3-18)6.OverpowerhT1,24>D,GSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10RefertoNote2(page3.3-19)7.PressurizerPressurea.LowK,LSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10z:1865psigb.High1,2D,GSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10s2385psig8.PressurizerIJaterLevel-High1,2D,GSR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1~10s88/.9.ReactorCoolantFlow-Lowa.SingleLoopb.TwoLoops1(g)1(h)3perloop3perloopH,OK,LSR3;3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1'0SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10a90K>90K(continued)(f)THERHALPOMERh8.5XRTP~(g)THERHALPOWER250XRTP.(h)THERNALPOMERa8.5XRTPandReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunction'blocked.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-15DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page3of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDREQUIREDSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSCHANNELSCONDITIONSREOUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT10.ReactorCoolantPmp(RCP)BreakerPositiona.SingleLoop1(g)1perRCPN,OSR3.3~1.11NAb.TwoLoops1perRCPK,LSR3.3'.11NA11~Undervoltage-Bus11Aand11B12.UnderfrequencyBus11Aand11B2perbus2perbusK,LK,LSR3.3.1.9SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.9SR3.3.1.10(d)257.5HZ13.SteamGenerator(SG)WaterLevel-LowLow1,23perSGD,GSR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3~1.10216K14.TurbineTrip~~a.LowAutostopOilPressure1(I)(k)P,OSR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.12(d)b.TurbineStopValveClosure1(j)(k)P,QSR3.3.1.12NA15.SafetyInjection(SI)InputfromEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)1,2R,VSR3.3.1.11(continued)(d)UFSARTable7.2-3.(f)THERMALPOWER2BiSXRTP.(g)THERMAL(i)THERMALPOWER250KRTP.POWER28.5XRTPandRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionblocked.(j)THERMALpDWER>8XRTp,andeithernocirculatingwaterpumpbreakersclosed,orcondenservacuuns20".(k)THERMALPOWER250KRTP,1of2circulatingwaterpumpbreakersclosed,andcondenservacua>204.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-16DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page4of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUHCTIOHAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCOHDITIOHSREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT16.ReactorTripSystemInterlocks/a.IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,P-6b.LowPowerReactorTripsBlock,P-7c.PowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-8d.PowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-9e.PowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-1017.ReactorftjpBreakers18.ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms2(c)1(b)21,23(a)~4(a)5(a)\1.23(a)4(a)5(a)4(powerrangeonly)2trains2trains1eachperRTB1eachperRTBS,VS,VS,VS,VS,VS,VT,VW,XU,VW,XSR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3.1:4SR3.3.1.4SR3.3.1.4SR3.3.1.4>5E-11aap<8.5XRTP<50XRTP<SDXRTPsBXRTP26XRTPNANANA19.AutomaticTripLogic1,23(a)4(a)5(a)2trains2trainsR,VM,XSR3.3.1.5SR3.3.1~5NAHA(a)llithCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted.(b)THERMALPOMER<6XRTP.(c)BothIntermediateRangechannels<SE-11amps.(f)THERMALPDMER28.5XRTP.(g)THERMALPONER2SO%RTP.(j)THERMALPNIER>8XRTP,andeithernocirculatingwaterpunpbreakersclosed,orcondenservacuums20".(k)THERMALPOMER2SOXRTP,1of2circulatingwaterpumpbreakersclosed,andcondenservacuua>20".(l)IncludinganyreactortripbypassbreakersthatarerackedinandclosedforbypassinganRTB.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-17Oraft8 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page5of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationANote1:OvertemeratureaTTheOvertemperaturezTFunctionTripSetpointisdefinedby:1+r,sOvertemperaturehT5hTeK,+K~(P-P')-K(T-T')'f(hI)1+r~sWhere:aTismeasuredRCSsT,'F.aToistheindicatedaTatRTP,'F.sistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'.TisthemeasuredRCSaveragetemperature,'F.TisthenominalT,,atRTP,'F.Pisthemeasuredpressurizerpressure,psig.PisthenominalRCSoperatingpressure,psig.K,istheOvertemperatureaTreactortripsetpoint,1.20.K2istheOvertemperatureaTreactortripdepressurizationsetpointpenaltycoefficient,0.000900.K3istheOvertemperatureaTreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficient,0.0209.r,isthemeasuredlead/lagtimeconstant,25seconds.~2isthemeasuredl,ead/lagtimeconstant,5seconds.f(aI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetopandbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelswhereq,andq,arethepercentpowerinthetopandbottomhalvesofthecore,respectively,andq,+gbisthetotalTHERMALPOWERinpercentRTP.f(zI)=0f(aI)=1.3I(q,-q,)-13Iwhenq,-qbis>+13%RTPwhenq,-q,is>+13%RTPR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-18DraftB RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page6of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationNote2:OveroweraTTheOverpowerzTFunctionTripSetpointisdefinedby:r>sTOverpowerhT8hTK-K(T-T')-K~-f(aI)OiS6+1r~SWhere:aTismeasuredRCSsT,'F.aToistheindicatedaTatRTP,'F.sistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'TisthemeasuredRCSaveragetemperature,'F.TisthenominalT.,atRTP,F.K4istheOverpoweraTreactortripsetpoint,1.077.K,istheOverpoweraTreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientwhichis:0.0forT<Tand;0.0011forTzT.K,istheOverpowerzTreactortripthermaltimedelaysetpointpenaltywhichis:0.0262forincreasingTand;0.00fordecreasingT.r3isthemeasuredlead/lagtimeconstant,10seconds.f(sI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetopandbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelswhereq,andq,arethepercentpowerinthetopandbottomhalvesofthecore,respectively,andq,+q,isthetotalTHERMALPOWERinpercentRTP.f(zI)=0f(aI)=1.3I(q,-q,)-13)whenq,-q,is>+13%RTPwhenq,-q,is>+13%RTPR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-19DraftB ESFASInstrumentation3.3.23.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.2TheESFASinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.2-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.2-1.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithonechannelortraininoperable.A.1EntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.2-1forthechannelortrain.ImmediatelyB.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.B.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hours(continuedR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-20DraftB

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.D.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursE.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.E.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursF.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.F.l-------NOTE--------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hoursG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeof,Condition0,E,orFnotmet.G.1ANDG.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursH.AsrequiredbyRequiredAction'.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.H.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-21DraftB ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEI.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.1andreferencedby'able3.3.2-1.I.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursJ.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedfor,upto4hoursforsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hoursK.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionH,I,orJnotmet.K.1ANDK.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursL.AsrequiredbyRequiredAction-A.1andreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.L.l--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~322DraftB

ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONH.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionLnotmet.H.lANDH.2N.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionA.landreferencedbyTable3.3.2-1.N.1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantRE(VIREOACTIONBeinMODE3.Reducepressurizerpressureto<2000pslg.DeclareassociatedAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpinoperableandenterapplicablecondition(s)ofLCO3;7.5,"AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System."3~323ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2COMPLETIONTIME6hours12hoursImmediatelyDraftB

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTES-1.RefertoTable3.3.2-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachESFASFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.2.2PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.2.3NOTEVerificationofrelaysetpointsnotrequired.PerformTADOT.92daysSR3.3.2.4NOTEVerificationofrelaysetpointsnotrequired.PerformTADOT.24monthsSR3.3.2.5PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsSR3.3.2.6VerifythePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000psig.24monthsSR3.3.2.7PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-24DraftB ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page1of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrumentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEkODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREMEHTSALLOMABLEVALUETRIPSETPOINT1.SafetyInjectiona.ManualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysc.ContairrnentPressure-High1,2,31,2,3,41,2,3,42trainsD,GI,KJ,KSR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.7SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3'.5NA<6.0psigNANAs4.0psigd.PressurizerPressure-LowL,kSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.6a1715psig>1750psige.SteamLinePressure-Low2.Contain>>ntSpraya.ManualInitiationLeftpushbuttonRightpushbuttonb.Automatic ActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,3('>1,2,3,41,2,3,4 1,2,3,43pcl'teamline12trainsL,kH,K H,KI,KSR3.3.2~1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2'SR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.7>358psi'gNA NAz,514psigNA NA NAc.ContainmentPressure-HighHigh1,2,3,43persetJ,KSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5s32.5psigs28psig3~ContaireentIsolationa.ManualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,3,421,2,3,42trainsH,KI,KSR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.7NANAHAc.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.(a)PressurizerPressurea2000psig.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-25Draft8 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page2of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstruaentationFUNCTIOHAPPLICAGLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEALLONABLECONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSVALUETRIPSETPOINT4.SteamLineIsolationa.HanualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysc.Contairaent Pressure-HighHigh(b)3(b)12(b)3(b)12(b)3(b)1perloop2trainsD,GSR3.3.2.4E,GSR3.3.2.7F,GSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5NANAs20psigHAs18psigd.HighSteamFlou12(b)3(b)2perIsteamlineF,GSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5s0.55E6ibm/hr9755psis0.4E6ibm/hr8755psigCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfmctionsandrequirements.CoincidentMithT,-Log1,2()3()2perloopF,GSR3.3.2.1z543FSR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5a545Fe.High-HighSteamFloM1,2(),3(b)2persteamlineF,GSR3.3.2'SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5S3.7E6ibm/hrg755psigs3.6E6ibm/hrg755psigCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.(b)ExceptshenbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant3.3-26DraftB ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page3of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREMENTSALLOMABLEVALUETRIPSETPOIHT5.FeedwaterIsolationa.Automatic ActuationLogicandActuationRelaysb.SGHaterLevel-High1,2(),3()2trainsE,GSR3.3.2.71~2(c)3(c)3perSGF,GSR3321SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5NANAs67Kc.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)a.ManualInitiationAFWStandbyAFll1,2,31,2,31per@flip1perfXlllpSR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.4HANAHAb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,32trainsE,GSR3.3.2.7NAHAc.SGHaterLevel-LowLow1,2,33perSGD,GSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5~a16Ka17Kd.SafetyInjection(MotordrivenFxmpsonly)RefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.e.Undervoltage-Bus11Aand11B(Turbinedrivenpumponly)1,2,32perbusD,GSR3.3.2.322450V22579Vwiths3.6withS3.6sectimesectimedelaydelayf.TripofBothMainFeedwaterPumps(Motordrivenpcsonly)1,22pclMFIJpunpB,CSR3.3.2.4HAHA(c)ExceptwhenallMainFeedwaterRegulatingandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-27DraftB PAMInstrumentation3.3.33.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.3'PostAccidentMonitoring(PAM)InstrumentationLCO3.3.3ThePAMinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.3-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONS-NOTES-1.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE--------NotapplicabletoFunctions3and4.A.lRestorerequiredchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.30daysOneormoreFunctionswithonerequiredchannelinoperable..B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1Initiateactiontoprepareandsubmitaspecialreport.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-28DraftB PAMInstrumentation3.3.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC---------NOTE--------OnTyapplicabletoFunctions3and4.C.1RestorerequiredchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneormoreFunctionswithrequiredchannelinoperable.D---------NOTE-----'---NotapplicabletoFuncti'on11.D.1RestoreonechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneormoreFunctionswithtworequiredchannelsinoperable.E.Twohydrogenmonitorchannelsinoperable.E.1RestoreonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursF.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionC,D,orEnotmet.F.1EntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3;3-1forthechannel.ImmediatelyG.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionF.1andreferencedinTable3.3.3-1.G.1BeinMODE3.ANDG.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-29DraftB PAMInstrumentation3.3.3ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEH.AsrequiredbyRequiredActionF.1andreferencedinTable3.3.3-1.H.1Initiateactiontoprepareandsubmitaspecialreport.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-30Draft8 PANInstrumentation3.3.3SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS-NOTE-------------------------------------SR3.3.3.1andSR3.3.3.2apply,toeachPANinstrumentationFunctioninTable3.3.3-1.SURVEILLANCE.FREQUENCYSR3.3.3.1PerformCHANNELCHECKforeachrequiredinstrumentationchannelthatisnormallyenergized.31daysSR3.3.3.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-31Draft8 PAMInstrumentation3.3.3Table3.3.3-1(page1of2)PostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationFUNCTIONRE(UIREDCHANNELSCONDITION1.PressurizerPressure2.PressurizerLevel3.5.6.7.8.9.10.12. 13.14.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)HotLegTemperatureRCSColdLegTemperatureRCSPressure(WideRange)RCSSubcoolingMonitorReactorVesselWaterLevelContainmentSumpBWaterLevelContainmentPressure(WideRange)ContainmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)HydrogenMonitorsCondensateStorageTankLevelRefuelingWaterStorageTankLevelResidualHeatRemovalFlow15.CoreExitTemperature-quadrant116.CoreExitTemperature-quadrant217.CoreExitTemperature-quadrant318.CoreExitTemperature-quadrant419.AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)FlowtoSteamGenerator(SG)A20.AFWFlowtoSGB21.SGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)toSGA22..SGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)toSGB1perloop1perloop22222222222(a)2(a)2(a)2(a)2G(continued)(a)Achannelconsistsoftwocoreexitthermocouples(CETs).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~332DraftB PANInstrumentation3.3.3Table3.3.3-1(page2of2)PostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHANNELSCONDITION23.SGWaterLevel(WideRange)toSGA24.SGMaterLevel(WideRange)toSGB25.SGPressuretoSGA26.SGPressuretoSGBR.E.GinriaNuclearPowerPlant3'33DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.43.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationLCO3.3.4Each480VsafeguardsbusshallhavetwoOPERABLEchannelsofLOPDGStartInstrumentation.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONS-NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormore480Vbus(es)withonechannelinoperable.A.1Placechannel(s)intrip.6hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.OROneormore480Vbus(es)withtwochannelsinoperable.B.1EnterapplicableCondition(s)andRequiredAction(s)fortheassociatedDGmadeinoperablebyLOPDGstartinstrumentation.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-34DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.4SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS---------NOTEWhenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyfortheperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintotheassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto4hoursprovidedthesecondchannelmaintainsLOPDG.startcapability.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.4.1PerformTADOT.31daysSR3.3.4.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONwithTripSetpointandAllowableValueforeach480Vbusasfollows:24monthsa0Lossofvoltage:AllowableValueBusvoltage>368VTimedelays2.75secTrip~Setoint>372.8V2'+0.12secb.Degradedvoltage:AllowableValueTrip~SetointBusvoltage>414Va419.2VTimedelay~1520sec<1520secR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-35DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.53.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.5ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationLCO3.3.5TheContainmentVentilationIsolationinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.5-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4,DuringCOREALTERATIONS,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneradiationmonitoringchannelinoperable.A.lRestoretheaffectedchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.4hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-36DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIMEB---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicableinHODEI,2,3,or4.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormoremanualorautomaticactuationtrainsinoperable.OR'othradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable.ORB.lEnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries,"forcontainmentmini-purgeisolationvalvesmadeinoperablebyisolationinstrumentation.ImmediatelyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant30337DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.C.IORPlaceandmaintaincontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesinclosedposition.ImmediatelyOneormoreFunctionswithoneormoremanualorautomaticactuationtrainsinoperable.ORBothradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable.ORC.2EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.9.3>"ContainmentPenetrations,"forcontainmentpurgeandexhaustisolationvalvesmadeinoperablebyisolationinstrumentation.ImmediatelyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAnotmet.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-38DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS-NOTERefertoTable3.3.5-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachContainmentVentilationIsolationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.5.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.24hoursSR3.3.5.2PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.5.3PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.24monthsSR3.3.5.4PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-39DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5Table3.3.5-1(page1of1)ContainnentVentilationIsolationInstrunentationFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOIHT1.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays2trainsSR3.3.5.3NA2.ContaitmentRadiationa.GaseousSR3.3.5.1SR3.3.5'SR3.3.5.4(a)b.Particulate~1SR3.3.5.1SR3.3.5.2SR3.3'.4(a)3~ContaireentIsolationRefertoLCO3.3.2,"ESFASInstrunentation,aFunction3,forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.4.ContairmentSpray-ManualIsolationRefertoLCO3.3.2,"ESFASInstrwentation,"Function2.a,forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.Hotes:(a)PerRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-40DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.63.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.6ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationLCO3.3.6TheCREATSactuationinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.6-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,4,5,and6,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithonechannelinoperable.A.l--------NOTE--------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedfor~1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceCREATSinModeF.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-41DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinMODE5or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.C.IANDInitiateactiontorestorechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatus.C.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDC.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-42DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS---------------NOTERefertoTable3.3.6-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachCREATSActuationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.6.1PerformCOT.92daysNOTESR3.3.6.2Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.24monthsSR3.3.6.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsSR3.3.6.4PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-43Draft8 CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6Table3.3.6-'I(page1of1)CREATSActuationInstrunentationFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1.ManualInitiation1trainSR3.3.6.2NA2.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1trainSR3.3.6.4NA3.ControlRoomRadiationIntakeMonitora.IodineSR3.3.6.1SR3.3.6.359x10pCi/ccb.NobleGasSR3.3.6.1SR3.3.6.351x'IOpCi/ccc.ParticulateSR3.3.6.1SR3.3.6.3s1x10pCi/ccR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-44DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1B3.3INSTRUMENTATION83.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14(Ref.1)requiresthatthecoreprotectionsystems,togetherwithassociatedengineeredsafetyfeaturesequipment,bedesignedtopreventorsuppressconditionsthatcouldresultinexceedingacceptablefueldesignlimits.TheRTSinitiatesaplantshutdown,basedonthevaluesofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingthecorefueldesignlimitsandReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryduringanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)andtoassisttheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)Systemsinmitigatingaccidents.Theinstalledprotectionandmonitoringsystemshavebeendesignedtoassuresafeoperationofthereactoratalltimes.Thisisachievedbyspecifyinglimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)intermsofparametersdirectlymonitoredbytheRTS,aswellasspecifyingLCOswithrespecttotheseparametersandotherreactorsystemparametersandequipment.TheLSSS,definedinthisspecificationastheTripSetpoints,inconjunctionwiththeassociatedLCOs,establishthethresholdforprotectivesystemactiontopreventexceedingacceptablelimitsduringDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs).Theseacceptablelimitsare:a.TheSafetyLimit(SL)valuesshallbemaintainedtopreventdeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB);b.Fuelcenterlinemeltshallnotoccur;andc.TheRCSpressureSLof2735psigshallnotbeexceeded.OperationwithintheSLsofSpecification2.0,"SafetyLimits(SLs),"maintainstheabovevaluesandassuresthatoffsitedosewill'bewithin10CFR100l,imits(Ref.2)duringAOOs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-1DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)DBAsareeventsthatareanalyzedeventhoughtheyarenotexpectedtooccurduringtheplantlife.TheDBAacceptancelimitisthatoffsitedosesshallbemaintainedwithinanacceptablefractionof10CFR100limits(Ref.2).Therearefivedifferentaccidentcategorieswhichareorganizedbasedontheprobabilityofoccurrence(Ref.3).Eachaccidentcategoryisallowedadifferentfractionofthe10CFR100limits,inverselyproportionedtotheprobabilityofoccurrence.Meetingtheacceptabledoselimitforanaccidentcategoryisconsideredashavingacceptableconsequencesforthatevent.TheRTSinstrumentationissegmentedintothreedistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4):a.Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;b.Signalprocesscontrolandprotectionequipment;andc,Reactortripswitchgear.ThesemodulesareshowninFigureB3.3.1-1anddiscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Toaccountforthecalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensorasprovidedinestablishedplantprocedures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-2DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessControlandProtectionEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4),Chapter6(Ref.5),andChapter15(Ref.6).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefieldtransmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Ifaparameterhasnomeasurablesetpointandisonlyusedasaninputtotheprotectioncircuits(e.g.,manualtripfunctions)twochannelswithaone-out-of-twologicaresufficient.Athirdchannelisnotrequiredsincenosur'veillancetestingisrequiredduringthetimeperiodinwhichtheparameterisrequired.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,four.channelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.7).(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant83.3-3DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUNDSinalProcessControlandProtectionEuiment(continued)Thetwo,three,andfourprocesscontrolchannelsdiscussedaboveallfeedtwologictrains.Figure83.3.1-1showsatwo-out-of-fourlogicfunctionwhichprovidesinputintotwologictrains(TrainAandB).TwologictrainsarerequiredtoensurethatnosinglefailureofonelogictrainwilldisabletheRTS."Provisionstoallowremovinglogictrainsfromserviceduringmaintenanceareunnecessarybecauseofthelogicsystem'sdesignedreliability.Duringnormaloperation,thetwologictrainsrema'inenergized.ReactorTriSwitchearThereactortripswitchgearincludesthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)andbypassbreakersasshownonFigureB3.3.1-1.TheRTBsareintheelectricalpowersupplylinefromthecontrolroddrivemotorgeneratorsetpowersupplytothecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDNs).OpeningoftheRTBsinterruptspowertotheCRDHs,whichallowstheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecorebygravityandshutdownthereactor.EachRTBmaybebypassedwithabypassbreakertoallowtestingoftheRTBwhiletheplantisatpower.Duringnormaloperation,theoutputfromtheprotectionsystemisavoltagesignalthatenergizestheundervoltagecoilsintheRTBsandbypassbreakers,ifinuse.Whentherequiredlogicmatrixcombinationiscompleted,theprotectionsystemoutputvoltagesignalisremoved,theundervoltagecoilsarede-energized,thebreakertripleverisactuatedbythede-energizedundervoltagecoil,andtheRTBsandbypassbreakersaretrippedopenallowingtheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecore.Therefore,alossofpowertotheprotectionsystemorRTBswillcauseareactortrip..Inadditiontothede-energizationoftheundervoltagecoils,eachbreakerisalsoequippedwithashunttripdevicethatisenergizedtotripthebreakeropenuponreceiptofareactortripsignalfromtheprotectionsystem(exceptforthezirconiumguidetubetripwhichonlyutilizestheundervoltagecoils).EithertheundervoltagecoilortheshunttripmechanismissufficientbyitselftoopentheRTBs,thusprovidingdiversetripmechanisms.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-4(continued)DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYTheRTSfunctionstomaintaintheSLsduringallAOOsandmitigatestheconsequencesofDBAswhichinitiateinanyMODEinwhichtheRTBsareclosed.EachoftheanalyzedaccidentsandtransientscanbedetectedbyoneormoreRTSFunctions.TheaccidentanalysisdescribedinReference6takescreditformostRTStripFunctions.RTStripFunctionsnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisarequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseRTStripFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheymayalsoserveasanticipatorytripstoRTStripFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentanalysis.TheLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganRTSFunction,listedinTable3.3.1-1intheaccompanyingLCO,tobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeorfourchannelsineachinstrumentationFunction,twochannelsofManualReactorTripineachlogicFunction,andtwotrainsineachAutomaticTripLogicFunction.FourOPERABLEinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationarerequiredwhenoneRTSchannelisalsousedasacontrolsysteminput.ThisconfigurationaccountsforthepossibilityofthesharedchannelfailinginsuchamannerthatitcreatesatransientthatrequiresRTSaction.Inthiscase,theRTSwillstillprovideprotection,evenwithrandomfailureofoneoftheotherthreeprotectionchannels.Threeoperableinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-threeconfigurationaregenerallyrequiredwhenthereisnopotentialforcontrolsystemandprotectionsysteminteractionthatcouldsimultaneouslycreateaneedforaRTStripanddisableoneRTSchannel.Thetwo-out-of-threeandtwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedorbypassedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausingareactortrip.Specificexceptions.totheabovegeneralphilosophyexistandarediscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-5DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCOandAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachRTSFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.1-1.IncludedonTable3.3.1-1areTripSetpointsforallapplicableRTSFunctions.TripSetpointsforRTSFunctionsnotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisarebasedonestablishedlimitsprovidedintheUFSAR(Reference4).NotethatintheaccompanyingLCO3.3.1,theTripSetpointsofTable3.3.1-1aretheLSSS.TheTripSetpointsarethelimitingvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracyasspecifiedwithinplantprocedures.Thechannelcontainingthebistableisconsideredinoperablewhenthe"asfound"value.exceedstheTripSetpointspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1.TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences4,5,and6.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,andinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimitsusedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference8.TheRTSutilizesvariouspermissivesignalstoensurereactortripFunctionsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.ThesepermissivesbackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionisavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-6DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)ThesafetyanalysesandOPERABILITYrequirementsapplicabletoeachRTSFunctionandpermissiveprovidedinTable3.3.1-1arediscussedbelow:1.ManualReactorTriTheManualReactorTripFunctionensuresthatthecontrolro'omoperatorcaninitiateareactortripatanytimebyusingeitheroftworeactortrippushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.AManualReactorTripenergizestheshunttripdeviceandde-energizestheundervoltagecoilsfortheRTBsandbypassbreakers.ItisusedatthediscretionofthecontrolroomoperatorstoshutdownthereactorwheneveranyparameterisrapidlytrendingtowarditsTripSetpointorduringotherdegradingplantconditions.TheLCOrequibeOPERABLE.reactortriptripbreakerarerequiredwilldisablefunctionhasassociateanprovided.restwoManualReactorTripchannelstoEachchanneliscontrolledbyamanualpushbuttonwhichactuatesthereactorinbothtrains.TwoindependentchannelstobeOPERABLEsothatnosinglefailuretheManualReactorTripFunction.ThisnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoLSSS,thereforenosetpointsare(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-7DraftB

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLCO,andAPPLICABILITY1.ManualReactorTri(continued)InNODE1or2,manualinitiationcapabilityofareactortripmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheMODESinwhichtheshutdownrodsand/orcontrolrodsarepartiallyorfullywithdrawnfromthecore.InNODE3,4,or5,themanualinitiationFunctionmustalsobeOPERABLEiftheRTBsareclosedandtheControlRodDrive(CRD)Systemiscapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorthecontrolrods.Inthiscondition,inadvertentcontrolrodwithdrawalispossible.InMODE3,4,or5,manualinitiationofareactortripisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEiftheCRDSystemisnotcapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorcontrolrods,orifoneormoreRTBsareopen.Iftherodscannotbewithdrawnfromthecore,thereisnoneedtobeabletotripthereactorbecausealloftherodsareinserted.InNODE6,neithertheshutdownrodsnorthecontrolrodsarepermittedtobewithdrawnandtheCRDNsaredisconnectedfromthecontrolrodsandshutdownrods.Therefore,themanualinitiationFunctionisnotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-8DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)2.PowerRaneNeutronFluxThePowerRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.TheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)powerrangedetectors(N-41,,N-42,N-43,andN-44)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISpowerrangedetectorsprovideinputtotheCRDSystemfordeterminationofautomaticrodspeedanddirection.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.a~PowerRaneNeutronFlux-HihThePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovided,fromallpowerlevels,againstapositivereactivityexcursionleadingtoDNBduringpoweroperations.ThesereactivityexcursionscanbecausedbyrodwithdrawalorreductionsinRCStemperature.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionchannelstobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-9DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Hih(continued)InMODE1or2,whenapositivereactivityexcursioncouldoccur,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionwillterminatethereactivityexcursionandshutdownthereactorpriortoreachingapowerlevelthatcoulddamagethefuel.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.IntheseMODES,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandreactivityexcursionsintothepowerrangeareextremelyunlikely.OtherRTSFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionswheninMODE3,4,5,or6.b.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-LowTheLCOrequirementforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedag'ainstapositivereactivityexcursionfromlowpowerorsubcriticalconditions.TheLCOrequir'esallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionchannels(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)tobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-10DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Low(continued)InMODE1,below6%RTP,andinNODE2,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorwhentwo-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsaregreaterthanapproximately8%RTP(P-10setpoint).ThisFunctionisautomaticallyunblockedwhenthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsarebelowtheP-10setpoint.AbovetheP-10setpoint,positivereactivityadditionsaremitigatedbythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunction.InNODE3,4,5,or6,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandtheNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstpositivereactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinNODE3,4,5,or6.3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFluxThe.IntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalcondition.ThistripFuncti,onprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionandisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.TheNISintermediaterangedetectors(N-35andN-36)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISintermediaterangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputtocontrolsystems.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-11DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFlux(continued)TheLCOrequirestwochannelsoftheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.BecausethistripFunctionisimportantonlyduringlowpowerconditions,thereisgenerallynoneedtodisablechannelsfortestingwhiletheFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Therefore,athirdchannelisunnecessary.InMODE1below6%RTP,andinMODE2,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEsincethereisapotential.foranuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.Above8%RTP(P-10setpoint),thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripprovidescoreprotectionforarodwithdrawalaccident.InMODE3,4,or5,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheNISintermediaterangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinMODE3,4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-12DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)4.SourceRaneNeutronFluxTheLCOrequirementfortheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalconditionandprovidesprotectionagainstborondilutionandrodejectionevents.ThistripFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsinMODE2andisnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisattheseconditions.TheNISsourcerangedetectors(N-31andN-32)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISsourcerangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputstocontrolsystems.ThesourcerangetripistheonlyRTSautomaticprotectionfunctionrequiredinNODES3,4,and5.Therefore,thefunctionalcapabilityatthespecifiedTripSetpointisassumedtobeavailable.TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.TheLCOalsorequiresonechanneloftheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLEinMODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemnotcapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsfullyinserted.'nthiscase,thesourcerangeFunctionistoprovidecontrolroomindication.TheoutputsoftheFunctiontoRTSlogicarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEwhentheCRDsystemisnotcapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsfullyinserted.TheSourceRangeNeutronFluxTripFunctionprovidesprotectionforcontrolrodwithdrawalfromsubcritical,borondilutionandcontrolrodejectionevents.TheFunctionalsoprovidesvisualneutronfluxindicationinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-13Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY4.SourceRaneNeutronFlux(continued)InMODE2whenbothintermediaterangechannelsare<5E-llamps(belowtheP-6setpoint),theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Lowtripwillprovidecoreprotectionforreactivityaccidents.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theNISsourcerangedetectorsaremanuallyde-energizedbytheoperatorandareinoperable.InMODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsarenotfullyinserted,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidecoreprotectionagainstarodwithdrawalaccident.IftheCRDSystemisnotcapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsarefullyinserted,thesourcerangedetectorsarenotrequiredtotripthereactor.However,theirmonitoringFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtomonitorcoreneutronlevelsandprovideindicationofreactivitychangesthatmayoccurasaresultofeventslikeaborondilution.TherequirementsfortheNISsourcerangedetectorsinMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-14Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.OvertemeratureaTTheOvertemperaturenTtripFunctionisprovidedtoensurethatthedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismet.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherangeoverwhichtheOverpowerzTtripFunctionmustprovideprotection.TheinputstotheOvertemperaturezTtripincludepressure,T.axialpowerdistribution,andreactorpowerasindicatedbyloopaTassumingfullreactorcoolantflow.ProtectionfromviolatingtheDNBRlimitisassuredforthosetransientsthatareslowwithrespecttodelaysfromthecoretothemeasurementsystem.TheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctionmonitorsbothvariationinpowerandflowsinceadecreaseinflowhasthesameeffectonaTasapowerincrease.TheOvertemperaturenTtripFunctionusestheaTofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerandiscomparedwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;1~pressurizerpressure-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesinsystempressure;and~axialpowerdistributionf(zI)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.Dynamiccompensationisincludedforsystempipingdelaysfromthecoretothetemperaturemeasurementsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-15DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY5.OvertemeratureaT(continued)TheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOvertemperatureaTTripSetpointisreachedintwo-out-of;fourchannels.Sincethepressureandtemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOvertemperatureaTconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresallfourchannelsoftheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOvertemperaturezTFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.FailuresthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InNODE1or2,theOvertemperatureaTtripmustbeOPERABLEtopreventDNB.InNODE3,4,5,or'6,this.tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-16DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheOverpoweraTtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedtoensuretheintegrityofthefuel(i.e.,nofuelpelletmeltingandlessthan1%claddingfailure)underallpossibleoverpowerconditions.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherequiredrangeoftheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctionandprovidesabackuptothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighSetpointtrip.TheOverpoweraTtripFunctionensuresthattheallowableheatgenerationrate(kW/ft)ofthefuelisnotexceeded.ItusesthezTofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;rateofchangeofreactorcoolantaveragetemperature-includingdynamiccompensationforthedelaysbetweenthecoreandthetemperaturemeasurementsystem;andaxialpowerdistributionf(aI)-theTripSetpointisv'ariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote2ofTable3.3.1-1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-17DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.IBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYTheOverpoweraTtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote2ofTable3.3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOverpoweraTtripsetpointisreachedintwo-out-of-fourchannels.Sincethetemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuationandasinglefailure'intheremainingchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Sectioh7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOverpoweraTconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsoftheOverpoweraTtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOverpoweraTtripFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.FailuresthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InMODEIor2,theOverpoweraTtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheonlyMODESwhereenoughheatisgeneratedinthefueltobeconcernedabouttheheatgenerationratesandoverheatingofthefuel.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutfueloverheatingandfueldamage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-18DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)7.PressurizerPressureThesamesensors(PT-429,PT-430,andPT-431)provideinputtothePressurizerPressure-Highand-LowtripsandtheOvertemperatureaTtripwiththeexceptionthatthePressurizerPressure-LowandOvertemperatureaTtripsalsoreceiveinputfromPT-449.SincethePressurizerPressurechannelsarealsousedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.a~PressurizerPressure-LowThePressurizer,Pressure-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowpressure.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofthePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Includedwithinthefourchannelsareleadtimeandlead/lagconstraints.InNODE1,whenDNBisamajorconcern,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripfunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThistripFunctionisautomaticallyenabledonincreasingpowerbytheP-7interlock(8.5%RTP).Ondecreasingpower,thistripFunctionisautomaticallyblockedbelowP-7.BelowtheP-7setpoint,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausenoconceivablepowerdistributionscanoccurthatwouldcauseDNBconcerns.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-19DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.PressurizerPressure-HihThePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstoverpressurizingtheRCS.ThistripFunctionoperatesinconjunctionwiththepressurizerreliefandsafetyvalvestopreventRCSoverpressureconditions.TheLCOrequires'threechannelsofthePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.InMODEIor2,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtohelppreventRCSoverpressurizationandminimizechallengestothereliefandsafetyvalves.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldcauseanoverpressureconditionwillbeslowtooccur.Therefore,theoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtakecorrectiveactions.Additionally,lowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionsystemsprovideoverpressureprotectionwheninorbelowMODE4.8.PressurizerWaterLevel-HihThePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionprovidesabackupsignalforthePressurizerPressure-Hightripandalsoprovidesprotectionagainstwaterreliefthroughthepressurizersafetyvalves.Thesevalvesaredesignedtopasssteaminordertoachievetheirdesignenergyremovalrate.Areactortripisactuatedpriortothepressurizerbecomingwatersolid.ThistripFunctionisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-20DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY8.PressurizerWaterLevel-~Hih(continued)TheLCOrequiresthreechannelsofthePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Thepressurizerlevelchannels(LT-426,LT-427,andLT-428)arealsousedforothercontrolfunctions.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.Thelevelchannelsdonotactuatethesafetyvalves,andthehighpressurereactortripissetbelowthesafetyvalvesetting.Therefore,withtheslowrateofchargingavailable,pressureovershootduetolevelchannelfailurecannotcausethesafetyvalvetoliftbeforethereactorhighpressuretrip.InNODE1or2,whenthereisapotentialforoverfillingthepressurizer,thePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InNODES3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldraisethepressurizerwaterlevelwillbeslowandtheoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtakecorrectiveactions.9.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)and(TwoLoops)tripFunctionsutilizethreecommonflowtransmittersperRCSlooptogenerateareactortripabove.8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint).FlowtransmittersFT-411,FT-412,andFT-413areusedforRCSLoopAandFT-414,FT-415,andFT-416areusedforRCSLoopB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-21DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.IBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)aob.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowSinleLooTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowintheRCSloop,whileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.AbovetheP-8setpoint,(50%RTP),alossofflowineitherRCSloopwillactuateareactortrip.EachRCSloophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorflow.Theflowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionchannelsperRCSlooptobeOPERABLEinMODEI>50%RTP(aboveP-8setpoint).EachloopisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.InMODEIabovetheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinoneRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore.InMODEIbelowtheP-8setpointtheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoosTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowinbothRCSloopswhileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionchannelsperlooptobeOPERABLEinMODEIabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisOPERABLE(belowtheP-8'setpoint).EachloopisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant*B3.3-22DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoos(continued)AbovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinbothloopswillinitiateareactortrip.Eachloophasthreeflowdetector'stomonitorflow.Theflowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.BelowtheP-7setpoint,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlowflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlowflowinbothRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpoint,theReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauselossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.10.RCPBreakerPositionBothRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctions(SingleLoopandTwoLoops)utilizeacommonauxiliarycontactlocatedoneachRCP.TheseFunctionsanticipatetheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripstoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuatesbutarenotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysis.'.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionSinleF00TheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinoneRCSloop.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfoneRCPbreakerisopenabove50%RTP,areactortripisinitiated'.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-23Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa~RCPBreakerPositionSinleLoo(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinMODE1a50%RTP(abovetheP-8setpoint).EachRCPisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.OneOPERABLEchannelissufficientforthistripFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofapump.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwith'hichtoassociateanLSSS.b.InMODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,whenalossofflowinanyRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InMODE1belowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobe'PERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).RCPBreakerPositionTwoLoosTheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloops.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfbothRCPbreakersareopenabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisOPERABLE(belowtheP-8setpoint),areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunction,willgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.Ginna'uclearPowerPlantB3.3-24DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3,3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionTwoLoos(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinMODE1abovetheP-7andbelowtheP-8setpoints.EachRCPisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.OneOPERABLEchannelissufficientforthisFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-Lowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotection'ofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofanRCP.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.InNODE1abovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allreactortripsonlossofflow(includingRCPbreakerposition)areautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponloss*offlowinbothRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-25DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)ll.Undervoltae-BusllAandllBTheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BreactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloopsfromamajornetworkvoltagedisturbance.ThevoltagetoeachRCPismonitored.Above8.5%RTP(theP-7setpoint),anundervoltageconditiondetectedonbothBuses11Aand11Bwillinitiateareactortrip.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.TimedelaysareincorporatedintotheUndervoltageBusllAand11Bchannelstopreventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowertransients.TheLCOrequirestwoUndervoltage-BusllAandllBtripFunctio'nchannelsperbustobeOPERABLEinNODE1abovetheP-7setpoint.EachbusisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.BelowtheP-7setpoint,theUndervoltage-BusllAandllBtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscould.occurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponUndervoltage-BusllAand11Bisautomaticallyenabled.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-26DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES>LCOandAPPLICABILITY(continued)12.Underfreuenc-Bus11Aand11B"TheUnderfrequency-Bus11Aand11BreactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCPloopsfromamajornetworkfrequencydisturbance.Anunderfrequencyconditionwillslowdownthepumps,therebyreducingtheircoastdowntimefollowing'apumptrip.Thepropercoastdowntimeisrequiredsothatreactorheatcanberemovedimmediatelyafterreactortrip.ThefrequencyofeachRCPbusismonitored.Above8.5LRTP(theP-7setpoint),alossoffrequencydetectedonbothRCPbuseswillinitiateareactortrip.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.TimedelaysareincorporatedintotheUnderfrequencyRCPschannelstopreventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowertransients.TheLCOrequirestwoUnderfrequency-Bus11Aand118channelsperbustobeOPERABLEinNode1abovetheP-7setpoint.EachbusisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.'bovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponUnderfrequency-BusllAand11Bisautomaticallyenabled.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-27DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)13.SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowTheSteamGenerator(SG)WaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstalossofheatsinkandactuatestheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystempriortouncoveringtheSGtubes.TheSGsaretheheatsinkforthereactor.Inordertoactasaheatsink,theSGsmustcontainaminimumamountofwater.AnarrowrangelowlowlevelinanySGisindicativeofalossofheatsinkforthereactor.ThreeleveltransmittersperSG(LT-461,LT-462,andLT-463forSGAand,LT-471,LT-472,andLT-473forSGB)provideinputtotheSGLevelControlSystem.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.ThisFunctionalsoperformstheEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)functionofstartingtheAFWpumpsonlowlowSGlevel.TheAFWSystemisthesafetyrelatedbackupsourceofwatertoensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofSGWaterLevel-LowLowperSGtobeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.EachSGisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.InMODE1or2,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethataheatsinkisavailabletothereactor.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperating.DecayheatremovalisaccomplishedbytheAFWSysteminMODE3andbytheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SysteminMODE4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-28Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)14.~TbiTiCreditforthesetripFunctionsisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.TurbineTri-LowAutostoOilPressureTheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingaturbinetripfromapowerlevelabovetheP-9setpoint.BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipates.thelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.Threepressureswi.tchesmonitorthecontroloilpressureintheAutostopOilSystem.Alowpressureconditionsensedbytwo-out-of-threepressureswitcheswillactuateareactortrip.These-pressureswitchesdonotprovideanyinputtothecontrolsystem.The.plantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionandRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretobeOPERABLEinNODEIaboveP-9.BelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseloadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InNODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,therefore,thereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-29DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveClosureTheTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingaturbinetripfromapowerlevelabovetheP-9setpoint.BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.ThistripFunctionwillnotandisnotrequiredtooperateinthepresenceofasinglechannelfailure.TheplantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunction,andRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.ThistripFunctionisdiversetotheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunction.EachturbinestopvalveisequippedwithonelimitswitchthatinputstotheRTS.Ifbothlimitswitchesindicatethatthestopvalvesareclosed,areactortr'ipisinitiated.ThisFunctiononlymeasuresthediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheturbinestopvalves.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustable'tripsetpointwith'whichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwoTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionchannels,onepervalve,tobeOPERABLEinNODEIaboveP-9.Bothchannelsmusttriptocausereactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-30DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveClosure(continued)BelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealoadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,thereforethereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.15.SafetIn'ectionInutfromEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemTheSafetyInjection(SI)InputfromESFASensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.Thistripisassumedinthesafetyanalysesforthelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).However,othertransientsandaccidentstakecreditforvaryinglevelsofESFperformanceandrelyuponrodinsertion,exceptforthemostreactiverodthatisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,toensurereactorshutdown.Therefore,areactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.'ripSetpointsarenotapplicabletothisFunction.TheSIInputisprovidedbyrelaysintheESFAS.Therefore,thereisnomeasurementsignalwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwotripFunctionchannelsofSIInputfromESFAStobeOPERABLEinMODEIor2.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.Therefore,thistripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODEIor2,whenthereactoriscritical,andmustbeshutdownintheeventofanaccident.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thereactorisnotcritical,andthistripFunctiondoesnotneedtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-31DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)16.ReactorTriSstemInterlocksReactorprotectioninterlocks(i.e.,permissives)areprovidedtoensurereactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.TheybackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionsarenotbypassed.Therefore,theinterlockFunctionsdonotneedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedreactortripfunctionsareoutsidethe'applicableMODES.Theseare:a.IntermediateRaneNeutronFluxP-6PermissiveTheIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,P-6permissiveisactuatedwhenanyNISintermediaterangechannelgoesapproximatelyonedecade(1E-10amps)abovetheminimumchannelreading.Ifbothchannelsdropbelowthesetpoint,thepermissivewillautomaticallybedefeated.'TheLCOrequirementfortheP-6permissiveensuresthatthefollowingFunctionsareperformed:onincreasingpower,theP-6interlockallowsthemanualblockoftheNISSourceRange,NeutronFluxreactortripbyuseoftwodefeatpushbuttons.ThispreventsaprematureblockofthesourcerangetripandallowstheoperatortoensurethattheintermediaterangeisOPERABLEpriortoleavingthesourcerange.Whenthesourcerangetripisblocked,thehighvoltagetothedetectorsisalsoremoved;andondecreasingpower,theP-6interlockautomaticallyenergizestheNISsourcerangedetectorsandenablestheSourceRangeNeutronFluxreactortripat5E-11amps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-32DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE,SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.IntermediateRaneNeutronFluxP-6Permissive(continued)TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,P-6permissivetobeOPERABLEinMODE2whenbelowtheP-6permissivesetpoint.AbovetheP-6permissivesetpoint,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxreactortripwillbeblocked,andthisFunctionisnolongerrequired.InMODE3,4,5,or6theP-6permissivedoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausetheSourceRangeisprovidingtherequiredcoreprotection.b.LowPowerReactorTrisBlockP-7PermissiveTheLowPowerReactorTripsBlock,P-7interlockisactuatedbyinputfromeitherthePowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-10,orfromfirststageturbinepressure.TheLCOrequirementfortheP-7permissiveallowsthebypassofthefollowingFunctions:PressurizerPressure-Low;ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops);Undervoltage-Bus11Aand118;and~Underfrequency-BusllAand118.ThesereactortripfunctionsarenotrequiredbelowtheP-7setpointsincetheRCSiscapableofprovidingsufficientnaturalcirculationwithoutanyRCPrunning.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofLowPowerReactorTripsBlock,P-7permissivetobeOPERABLEinMODE1~8.5%RTP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-33DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.c~LowPowerReactorTrisBlockP-7Permissive(continued)InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausethepermissiveperformsitsFunctionwhenpowerleveldropsbelow8.5%power,whichisinMODE1.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-8PermissiveThePowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-8;permissiveisactuatedatapproximately49%powerasdeterminedbytwo-out-of-fourNISpowerrangedetectors.TheP-8interlockallowstheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)reactortripsonlowflowinoneormoreRCSloopstobeblockedsothatalossofasingleloopwillnotcauseareactortrip.TheLCOrequirementforthistripFunctionsensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstalossofflowinanyRCSloopthatcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecorewhen~50%power.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofPowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-8interlocktobeOPERABLEinMODE1>50%RTP.InMODE1,alossofflowinoneRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditions,sothePowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-8permissivemustbeOPERABLE.InMODE1<50%RTP,thisfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloopwillnotresultinDNB.InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausethecoreisnotproducingsufficientpowertobeconcernedaboutDNBconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-34DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABL'ESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)d.e.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-9PermissiveThePowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-9permissiveisactuatedatapproximately50%powerasdeterminedbytwo-out-of-fourNISpowerrangedetectorsiftheSteamDumpSystemisavailableandat8%iftheSteamDumpSystemisunavailable.TheLCOrequirementforthisFunctionensuresthattheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressureandTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosurereactortripsareenabledabovetheP-9setpoint.AbovetheP-9setpoint,aturbinetripwillcausealoadrejectionbeyondthecapacityoftheSteamDumpSystemandRCS.AreactortripisautomaticallyinitiatedonaturbinetripwhenitisabovetheP-9setpoint,tominimizethetransientonthereactor.TheLCOrequirefourchannelsofPowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-9permissivetobeOPERABLEinMODE1abovethepermissivesetpoint.InNODE1abovethepermissivesetpoint,aturbinetripcouldcausealoadrejectionbeyondthecapacityoftheSteamDumpSystemandRCS,sothePowerRangeNeutronFluxinterlockmustbeOPERABLE.InNODE1belowthepermissivesetpointandNODE2,3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotatapowerlevelsufficienttohavealoadrejectionbeyondthecapacityoftheSteamDumpSystem.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-10PermissiveThePowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-10permissiveisactuatedatapproximately8%power,asdeterminedbytwo-out-of-fourNISpowerrangedetectors.Ifpowerlevelfallsbelow8%RTPon3of4channels,thenuclearinstrumenttripswillbeautomaticallyunblocked.TheLCOrequirementfor~theP-10permissiveensuresthatthefollowingFunctionsareperformed:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-35DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-10Permissive(continued)~onincreasingpower,theP-10permissiveallowstheoperatortomanuallyblocktheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxandPowerRangeNeutronFlux-lowreactortrips;onincreasingpower,theP-10permissiveautomaticallyprovidesabackupsignaltotheP-6permissivetoblocktheSourceRangeNeutronFluxreactortrip,andalsotode-energizetheNISsourcerangedetector;theP-10interlockprovidesoneofthetwoinputstotheP-7interlock;andondecreasingpower,theP-10interlockautomaticallyenablesthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowreactortripandtheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxreactortrip(androdstop).The,LCOrequiresfourchannelsofPowerRangeNeutronFlux,P-10interlocktobeOPERABLEinMODE1<6%RTPandMODE2.OPERABILITYinMODE1<6%RTPensurestheFunctionisavailabletoperformitsdecreasingpowerFunctionsintheeventofareactorshutdown.ThisFunctionmustalsobeOPERABLEinMODE2toensurethatcoreprotectionisprovidingduringastartuporshutdownbythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxreactortrips.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotatpowerandtheSourceRangeNeutronFluxreactortripprovidescoreprotection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-36DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)17.ReactorTriBreakers'histripFunctionappliestotheRTBsexclusiveofindividualtripmechanisms.TheOPERABILITYrequirementfortheindividualtripmechanismsisprovidedinFunction18below.TheLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEtrainsoftripbreakers.AtripbreakertrainconsistsofalltripbreakersassociatedwithasingleRTSlogictrainthatarerackedin,closed,andcapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem.Thus,thetrainmayconsistofthemainbreaker,bypassbreaker,ormainbreakerandbypassbreaker,dependinguponthesystemconfiguration.TwoOPERABLEtrainsensurenosinglefailurecandisabletheRTStripcapability.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsarenotfullyinserted.18.ReactorTriBreakerUndervoltaeandShuntTriMechanismsTheLCOrequiresboththeUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanismstobeOPERABLEforeachRTBthatisinservice.ThetripmechanismsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEfortripbreakersthatareopen,rackedout,incapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem,ordeclaredinoperableunderFunction17above.OPERABILITYofbothtripmechanismsoneachbreakerensuresthatnosingletripmechanismfailurewillpreventopeninganybreakeronavalidsignal.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsarenotfullyinserted.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-37DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)19.AutomaticTriLoicTheLCOrequirementfortheRTBs(Functions17'and18)andAutomaticTripLogic(Function19)ensuresthatmeansareprovidedtointerruptthepowertoallowtherodstofallintothereactorcore.EachRTBisequippedwithanundervoltagecoilandashunttripcoiltotripthebreakeropenwhenneeded.EachRTBisalsoequippedwitharedundantbypassbreakertoallowtestingofthetripbreakerwhiletheplantisatpower.ThereactortripsignalsgeneratedbytheRTSAutomaticTripLogiccausetheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakerstoopenandshutdownthereactor.TheLCOrequirestwotrainsofRTSAutomaticTripLogictobeOPERABLE.HavingtwoOPERABLEtrainsensuresthatfailureofasinglelogictrainwillnotpreventreactortrip.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinNODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InNODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsarenotfullyinserted.PTheRTSinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.ACTIONSANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.'heConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.1-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttoanalyticalvaluesspecifiedinplantprocedures,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoper'able,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-38DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)AsshownonFigureB3.3.1-1,theRTSiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticTripLogic(Function19inTable3.3.1-1).Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrumentorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothRTStrainsthatiscomprisedoftheRTBsandAutomaticTripLogicFunction.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualReactorTripandSIInputfromESFAStripFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis(i.e.,failureoftheseFunctionsmayonlyaffectoneRTStrain).A.lConditionAappliestoallRTSprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorerequiredchannelsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperableorifbothsourcerangechannelsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistorefertoTable3.3.1-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.Whenthe.numberofinoperablechannelsinatripFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithatripFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyenteredifthetripFunctionisapplicableinthecurrentMODEofoperation.ThisessentiallyappliestothelossofmorethanonechannelofanyRTSFunctionexceptwithrespecttoConditionsGandH.B.l.ConditionBappliestotheManualReactorTripFunctioninMODE1or2andinMODES3,4,and5withtheCRDsystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABL'Estatuswithin48hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformtherequiredsafetyfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-39DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSB.1(continued)TheCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanothermanualinitiationchannelOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.C.IC.2andC.3IftheManualReactorTripFunctioncannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallowed48hourCompletionTimeofConditionB,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours,actionmustbeinitiatedwithin6hourstoensurethatallrodsarefullyinserted,andtheControlRodDriveSystemmustbeplacedinaconditionincapableofrodwithdrawalwithin7hours.TheCompletionTimesprovideadequatetimetoexittheMODEofApplicabilityfromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystemsbasedonoperatingexperience.0.1ConditionDappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;OvertemperaturezT;OverpoweraT;PressurizerPressure-High;PressurizerWaterLevel-High;andSGWaterLevel-LowLow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-40DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSD.1(continued)Withonechannelinoperable,thechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripcondition.ForthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-High,PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low,OvertemperatureaT,andOverpoweraTfunctions,this'resultsinaone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.ForthePressurizerPressure-HighandPressurizerWaterLevel-HighFunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-oftwologicforactuation.FortheSGWaterLevel-LowLowFunction,thisresultsinaone-out-of-twologicpereachaffectedSGforactuation.The6hoursallowed'toplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassconditionforupto4hourswhileperformingsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThisincludesplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassconditiontoallowsetpointadjustmentsofotherchannelswhenrequiredtoreducethesetpointinaccordancewithotherTechnicalSpecifications.This4hoursisappliedtoeachoftheremainingOPERABLEchannels.The4hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-41DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1andE.2ConditionEappliestotheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-6setpoint(5E-llampasderivedfromabistablecircuitoftheintermediaterangechannels)andbelowtheP-10setpoint(6%RTPasderivedfromabistablecircuitofthePowerRangechannels)andonechannelisinoperable.AbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperformsamonitoringandprotectionfunction.WithoneNISintermediaterangechannelinoperable,2hoursisallowedtoeitherreduceTHERMALPOWERbelowtheP-6setpointorincreaseTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-10setpoint.IfTHERMALPOWERisgreaterthantheP-10setpoint,theNISpowerrangedetectorsperformthemonitoringandprotectionfunctionsandtheintermediaterangeisnotrequired.TheCompletionTimesallowforaslowandcontrolledpoweradjustmentaboveP-10orbelowP-6andtakeintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheredundantOPERABLEchannel,andthelowprobabilityofitsfailureduringthisperiod.ThisactiondoesnotrequiretheinoperablechanneltobetrippedbecausetheFunctionusesone-out-of-twologic.Trippingonechannelwouldtripthereactor.Thus,theRequiredActionsspecifiedinthisCondition.areonlyapplicablewhenchannelinoperabilitydoesnotresultinreactortrip.RequiredActionE.2ismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheoptiontoincreaseTHERMALPOWERisnotallowedifbothintermediaterangechannelsareinoperableorifTHERMALPOWERis<5E-11amps.ThispreventstheplantfromincreasingTHERMALPOWERwhenthetripcapabilityoftheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotavailableoriftheplanthasnotyetenteredthistripFunction'sMODEofApplicability.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-42Draft8 RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)F.lF.2andF.3ConditionFappliestotheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtrip'FunctionwheninMODE2,belowtheP-6setpoint.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withtwochannelsinoperable,theRTBsandRTBBsmustbeopenedimmediately.WiththeRTBsandRTBBsopened,thecoreisinamorestablecondition.Withonechannelinoperable,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.ThiswillprecludeanypowerescalationsincewithonlyonesourcerangechannelOPERABLE,coreprotectionisseverelyreduced.Theinoperablechannelmustalsoberestoredwithin48hours.G.lIftheRequiredActionsofConditionD,E,orFcannotbemetwithinthespecifiedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE3withinthenext6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.H.lH.2andH.3ConditionHappliestoaninoperablesourcerangechannelinMODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withtwochannelsinoperable,atleastonechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinIhour.TheCompletionTimeofIhourisreasonableconsideringthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-43DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)H.lH.2andH.3Withoneofthesourcerangechannelsinoperable,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediatelyand48hoursisallowedtorestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.Thesuspensionofpositivereactivityadditionswillprecludeanypowerescalation.I.landI.2IftheSourceRangetripFunctioncannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionH,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtofullyinsertallrods.Additionally,theCRDSystemmustbeplacedinaconditionincapableofrodwithdrawalwithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeof1hourissufficienttoaccomplishtheRequiredAction,andtakesintoaccount.thelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.ConditionJapplieswhentherequiredSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelisinoperableinNODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemnotcapableofrodwithdrawalandallrodsarefullyinserted.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringfunction.WithnosourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.Thiswillpreclude'nypowerescalation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-44DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSJ.1(continued)Also,theSDHmustbeverifiedoncewithin12hoursandevery12hoursthereafterasperSR3.1.1.1,SDHverification.WithnosourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,coreprotectionisseverelyreduced.VerifyingtheSDHonceper12hoursallowssufficienttimetoperformthecalculationsanddeterminethattheSDHrequirementsaremetandtoensurethatthecorereactivityhasnotchanged.RequiredActionJ.Iprecludesanypositivereactivityadditions;therefore,corereactivityshouldnotbeincreasing,anda12hourFrequencyisadequate.TheCompletionTimeofonceper12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperienceinperformingtheRequiredActionsandtheknowledgethatplantconditionswillchangeslowly.K.lConditionKappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:~PressurizerPressure-Low;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops);~Undervoltage-Bus11Aand118;and~Underfrequency-BusllAandllB.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactortrip.The6hoursallowedtoplacethechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9iftheinoperablechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.f(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-45DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSK.1(continued)AllowanceofthistimeintervaltakesintoconsiderationtheredundantcapabilityprovidedbytheremainingredundantOPERABLEchannel(s),andthelowprobabilityofoccurrenceofaneventduringthisperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionaffordedbytheFunctionsassociatedwithConditionK.FortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)Function,ConditionKappliesonaperloopbasis.FortheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)Function,ConditionKappliesonaperRCPbasis.ForUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11Bandunderfrequency-Bus11Aand11B,ConditionKappliesonaperbusbasis.Thisallowsoneinoperablechannelfromeachloop,RCP,orbustobeconsideredonaseparateconditionentrybasis.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto4hourswhileperformingsurveill.ancetestingoftheotherchannels.The4hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.The4hoursis'ppliedtoeachoftheremainingOPERABLEchannels.L.1IftheRequiredActionandCompletionTimeofConditionKisnotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE1<8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)atwhichpointtheFunctionisnolongerrequired.AnalternativeisnotprovidedforincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-8setpointfortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)andRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionssincethisplacestheplantinConditionM.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE1<8.5%RTPfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-46DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)'M.1ConditionMappliestotheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)reactortripFunction.Withonechannelperloopinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours.The6hoursallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusorplaceintripisconsistentwithReference9.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto4hourswhileperformingsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The4hoursisappliedtoeachofthetwoOPERABLEchannels.The.4hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.N.lConditionNappliestotheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunction.ThereisonebreakerpositiondeviceperRCPbreaker.WithonechannelperRCPinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin6hours.The6hoursallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusisconsistentwithReference9.O.IIftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionHorNisnotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEwheretheFunctionsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Toachievethisstatus,THERHALPOWERmustbereducedto<50%RTP(P-8setpoint)withinthenext6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-47DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS.(continued)P.IConditionPappliestoTurbineTriponLowAutostopOilPressureoronTurbineStopValveClosureinMODEIabovetheP-9setpoint.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours.IfplacedinthetrippedCondition,thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyoneadditionalchannelto'initiateareactortrip.The6hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto4hourswhileperformingsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The4hoursisappliedtoeachremainingOPERABLEchannel.The4hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9..I.2.1and.2.21IftheRequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionParenotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEwheretheTurbineTripFunctionsarenolongerrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Toachievethisstatus,THERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<50%RTP(P-9setpoint)withinthenext6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisconsistentwithReference9.TheSteamDumpsystemmustalsobeverifiedOPERABLEwithin7hoursorTHERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<8%RTP.ThisensuresthateitherthesecondarysystemorRCSiscapableofhandlingtheheatrejectionfollowingareactortrip.TheCompletionTimesarereasonableconsideringtheneedtoperformtheactionsinanorderlymannerandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringinthistime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-48DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)R.lConditionRappliestotheSIInputfromESFASreactortripandtheRTSAutomaticTripLogicinMODES1and2.Withonetraininoperable,6hoursisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeof6hourstorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatusisreasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.TheRequiredActionhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsbypassingonetrainupto4hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.S.landS.2ConditionSappliestotheP-6,P-7,P-8,P-9,andP-10permissives.Withonechannelinoperable,theassociatedinterlockmustbeverifiedtobeinitsrequiredstatefortheexistingplantconditionwithin1hourortheassociatedRTSchannel(s)mustbedeclaredinoperable.Theseactionsareconservativeforthecasewherepowerlevelisbeingraised.Verifyingtheinterlockstatusmanuallyaccomplishestheinterlock'sFunction.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheminimum"amountoftimeallowedformanualoperatoractions.T.lConditionTappliestotheRTBsinMODES1and2.Withonetraininoperable,1hourisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.The1hourCompletionTimeisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheminimumamountoftimeallowedformanualoperatoractions.TheRequiredActionhasbeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1allowsonetraintobebypassedforup-to2hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.Note2allowsoneRTBtobebypassedforupto6hoursformaintenance.onundervoltageorshunttripmechanismsifthe.otherRTBtrainisOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-49DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)U.landU.2ConditionUappliestotheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanisms(i.e.,diversetripfeatures)inHODES1and2.Withtwodiversetripfeaturesinoperable,atleastonediversetripfeaturemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeinterval.WithonetripmechanismforoneRTBinoperable,itmustberestoredtoanOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.TheaffectedRTBshallnotbebypassedwhileoneofthediversetripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredtoperformmaintenancetooneofthediversetripfeatures.Theallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthediversetripfeaturesis6hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditionT.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredActionU.2isreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditionthereisoneremainingdiversetripfeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLERTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.V.lIftheRequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionR,S,T,orUisnotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEwheretheFunctionsarenolongerrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinHODE3withinthenext6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachNODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-50DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)W.landW.2ConditionWappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctionsinMODE3,4,or5withtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted:~RTBs;,~RTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms;and~AutomaticTripLogic.Withtwotripmechanismsinoperable,atleastonetripmechanismmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeinterval.Withonetripmechanismortraininoperable,theinoperabletripmechanismortrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.TheCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequateto'erformthesafetyfunction,andgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.X.1andX.2IftheRequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionWisnotmet,thepl'antmustbeplacedin'MODE.wheretheFunctionsarenolongerrequired.Toachievethisstatus,actionbemustinitiatedimmediatelytofullyinsertallrodsandtheCRDSystemmustbeincapableofrodwithdrawalwithin1hour.TheseCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperiencetoexittheMODEofApplicabilityinanorderlymanner.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-51(continued)DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheSRsforeachRTSFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.1-1forthatFunction.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTablestatingthatTable3.3.1-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichRTSFunctions.NotethateachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheRTS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracie's(Ref.8).SR3.3.1.1ACHANNELCHECKisrequiredforthefollowingRTStripfunctions:~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;~IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;~'ourceRangeNeutronFlux;~OvertemperatureaT;~OverpoweraT;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-52DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.1(continued)~SGWaterLevel-LowLowPerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatgrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Sign'ificantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationthattheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Channelcheckacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaffbasedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,i'tmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.2ThisSRcomparesthecalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtotheNISPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highchanneloutputevery24hours.IfthecalorimetricexceedstheNISchanneloutputby>2%RTP,theNISisstillOPERABLEbutmustbeadjusted.IftheNISchanneloutputcannotbeproperlyadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-53Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.2(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisSurveillanceisrequiredonlyifreactorpoweris~50%RTPandthat12hoursisallowedforperformingthefirstSurveillanceafterreaching50%RTP.Atlowerpowerlevels,calorimetricdataareinaccurate.TheFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.TogetherthesefactorsdemonstratethechangeintheabsolutedifferencebetweenNISandheatbalancecalculatedpowersrarelyexceeds2%inany24hourperiod.Inaddition,controlroomoperatorsperiodicallymonitorredundantindicationsandalarmstodetectdeviationsinchanneloutputs.SR3.3.1.3ThisSRcomparestheincoresystemtotheNISchanneloutputevery31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).Iftheabsolutedifferenceis>3%,theNISchannelisstillOPERABLE,butmustbereadjusted.IftheNISchannelcannotbeproperlyreadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoverifythef(zI)inputtotheOvertemperatureaTFunction.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1clarifiesthattheSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERisz50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31EFPD.Note2statesthatperformanceofSR3.3.1.6satisfiesthisSRsinceitisamorecomprehensivetest.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-54DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.3.1.3(continued)TheFrequencyofevery31EFPDisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.Also,theslowchangesinneutronfluxduringthefuelcyclecanbedetectedduringthisinterval.SR3.3.1.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISoftheRTB,andtheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.Thetestshallincludeseparateverificationoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsexceptforthebypassbreakerswhichdonotrequireseparateverificationsincenocapabilityisprovidedforperformingsuchatestatpower.TheindependenttestforbypassbreakersisincludedinSR3.3.1.11.However,thebypassbreakertestshallincludealocalshunttrip.ThistestmustbeperformedonthebypassbreakerpriortoplacingitinservicetotaketheplaceofaRTP.TheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.1.5ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTESTontheRTSAutomaticTripLogicevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.Thetrainbeingtestedisplacedinthebypasscondition,thuspreventinginadvertentactuation.Allpossiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.TheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,con'sideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-55DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.6ThisSRisacalibrationoftheexcorechannelstotheincorechannelsevery92EFPD.Ifthemeasurementsdonotagree,theexcorechannelsarestillOPERABLEbutmustbecalibratedtoagreewiththeincoredetectormeasurements.Iftheexcorechannelscannotbeadjusted,thechannelsarethendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoverifythef(aI)inputtotheOvertemperaturesTFunction.ThisSRhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERis>50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92EFPD.TheFrequencyof92EFPDisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience;consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.SR3.3.1.7ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTevery92daysforthefollowingRTSfunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;SourceRangeNeutronFlux(inMODE3,4,or5withCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted);OvertemperaturenT;OverpoweraT;PressurizerPressure-Low;PressurizerPressurizer-High;PressurizerWaterLevel-High;ReadtorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-56DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.7(continued)~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);and~SGWaterLevel-LowLowACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.SetpointsmustbewithintheTripSetpointofTable3.3.1-1.The"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatprovidesa4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillanceforsourcerangeinstrumentationwhenenteringMODE3fromMODE2.ThisNoteallowsanormalshutdowntoproceedwithoutadelayfortestinginMODE2andforashorttimeinMODE3untiltheRTBsareopenandSR3.3.1.7isnolongerrequiredtobeperformed.IftheplantisinMODE3withtheRTBsclosedforgreaterthan4hours,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin4hoursafterentryintoMODE3.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwith'eference9.SR'.3.1.8ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTasdescribedinSR3.3.1.7forthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low,IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,andSourceRangeNeutronFlux(MODE2),exceptthatthistestalsoincludesverificationthattheP-6andP-10interlocksareintheirrequiredstatefortheexistingplantcondition.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotesthat'providea4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillance.TheseNotesallowanormalshutdowntobecompletedandtheplantremovedfromtheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillancewithoutadelaytoperformthetestingrequiredbythissurveillance.TheFrequencyofevery92daysappliesiftheplantremainsintheMODEofApplicabilityaftertheinitialperformancesofpriortoreactorstartupand4hoursafterreducingpowerbelowP-10orP-6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-57DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.1.8(continued)TheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillanceis<P-10forthepowerrangelowandintermediaterangechannelsand<P-6fortheSourcerangechannels.OncetheplantisinMODE3,thissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.Ifpoweristobemaintained<P-10or<P-6formorethan4hours,thenthetestingrequiredbythissurveillancemustbeperformedpriortotheexpirationofthe4hourlimit.FourhoursisareasonabletimetocompletetherequiredtestingorplacetheplantinaMODEwherethissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.ThistestensuresthattheNISsource,intermediate,andpowerrangelowchannelsareOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalandafterreducingpowerintotheapplicableMODE(<P-10or<P-6)forperiods>4hours.SR3.3.1.9ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTfortheUndervoltage-BusllAand11BandUnderfrequency-Bus11Aand118tripFunctions.TheFrequencyofevery92daysisconsistentwithReference9.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOT.SincethisSRappliestoBus11Aand11Bundervoltageandunderfrequencyrelays,setpointverificationrequireselaboratebenchcalibrationandisaccomplishedduringtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequiredbySR3.3.1.10.,SR3.3.1.10ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthefollowingRTSFunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;SourceRangeNeutronFlux;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-58DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.10(continued)~OvertemperatureaT;~OverpoweraT;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~Undervoltage-Bus11Aand11B;~Underfrequency-Bus11AandllB;~SGWaterLevel-LowLow;~TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure;and~ReactorTripSystemInterlocks.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONi'sperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.CHANNELCALIBRAfIONSmustbeperformedconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheplantspecificsetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionof24monthcalibrationintervalsinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-59Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.10(continued)Wheneverasensingelementisreplaced,thenextrequiredCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftheresistancetemperaturedetectors(RTD)sensorsshallincludeaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorandnormalcalibrationoftheremainingadjustabledevicesinthechannel.Thisisaccomplishedbyaninplacecrosscalibrationthatcomparestheothersensingelementswiththerecentlyinstalledsensingelement.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthepowerrangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofanormalizationofthedetectorsbasedonapowercalorimetricandfluxmapperformedabove50%RTP.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestothemanufacturer'sdata.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredfortheNISpowerrangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2or1,andisnotrequiredfortheNISintermediaterangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2,becausetheplantmustbeinatleastMODE2toperformthetestfortheintermediaterangedetectorsandMODE1forthepowerrangedetectors.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedonthe24monthFrequency.SR3.3.1.11ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheManualReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,andtheSIInputfromESFAStripFunctions.ThisTADOTisperformedevery24months.ThistestindependentlyverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsfortheManualReactorTripFunctionfortheReactorTripBreakersandReactorTripBypassBreakers'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-60DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.11(continued)TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOTbecausetheFunctionsaffectedhavenosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3.3.1.12ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTforTurbineTripFunctionswhichisperformedpriortoreactorstartupifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31days.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatverificationoftheTripSetpointdoesnothavetobeperformedforthisSurveillance.PerformanceofthistestwillensurethattheturbinetripFunctionisOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalbecausethistestcannotbeperformedwiththereactoratpower.SR3.3.1.13ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOToftheRTSinterlocksevery24months.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheinterlocksandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-61(continued)DraftB ~, RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR100.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.UFSAR,Chapter7.5.UFSAR,Chapter6.6.UFSAR,Chapter15.7.IEEE-279-1971.8.RG&EEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)5126,"GuidelinesforInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.9.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-62DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1gFieldInstrument~4s~~Channel:~ZII~I$cL%zQsFieldInstrunrcntSignalPwcaControlk,ProtectionGpipnrcntIIIRISSignalProcessPunctronsControlJtProtectionI1/nI~entManualRTSPunctionBypmRlBAUVKIBBUVRIBAUVMechanismI..~L.ITripTripMechanismMechanism'lISignalProcessControl4ProtectionEquiprncntReactorTripSwitchgearBypassRTBBUVandShunt'1'ripMechmhrn~IBeRIBA'TBBlrorillustrationon/I-TrainAgBistabieC120VACPowerSornce--TrainB'AutomaticTripLottic12$VDCPowerSourceR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFigureB3.3.l-lB3.3-63DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC15(Ref.1)requiresthatprotectionsystemsbeprovidedforsensingaccidentsituationsandinitiatingtheoperationofnecessaryengineeredsafetyfeatures.TheESFASinitiatesnecessarysafetysystems,basedonthevaluesofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingcoredesignlimitsandtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundary,andtomitigateaccidents.TheESFASinstrumentationissegmentedintotwodistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.2):~Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;and~Signalprocessingequipment.Thesemodulesarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Inmanycases,fieldtransmittersorsensorsthatinputtotheESFASaresharedwiththeReactorTripSystem(RTS).Toaccountforcalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-64Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessinEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter6(Ref.3),Chapter7(Ref.2),andChapter15(Ref.4).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefieldtransmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreli,abilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectio'nfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.5).TheactuationofESFcomponentsisaccomplishedthroughmasterandslaverelays.Theprotectionsystemenergizesthemasterrelaysappropriatefortheconditionoftheplant.Eachmasterrelaythenenergizesoneormoreslaverelays,whichthencauseactuationoftheenddevice's.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-65(continued)DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLCO,ANDAPPLICABILITYEachoftheanalyzedaccidentscanbedetectedbyoneormoreESFASFunctions.OneoftheESFASFunctionsistheprimaryactuationsignalforthataccident.AnESFASFunctionmaybetheprimaryactuationsignalformorethanonetypeofaccident.AnESFASFunctionmayalsobeasecondary,orbackup,actuationsignalforoneormoreotheraccidents.Forexample,SI-PressurizerPressure-Lowisaprimaryactuationsignalforsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents(LOCAs)andabackupactuationsignalforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)outsidecontainment.Functionssuchasmanualinitiation,notspecificallycreditedintheaccidentsafetyanalysis,arequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheseFunctionsmayalsoserveasanticipatoryactionstoFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.4).ThisLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganESFASFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeor,four-channelsineachinstrumentationfunctionandtwochannelsineachlogicandmanualinitiationfunction.Thetwo-out-of-threeandthetwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedduringmaintenanceortes'tingwithoutcausinganESFASinitiation.TwologicormanualinitiationchannelsarerequiredtoensurenosinglefailuredisablestheESFAS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-66DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachESFASFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.2-1.IncludedonTable3'.2-1areAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforallapplicableESFASFunctions.SetpointsinaccordancewiththeAllowableValueensurethattheconsequencesofDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)willbeacceptable,providingtheplantisoperatedwithintheLCOs,includinganyRequiredActionsthatareineffectattheonsetoftheDBAandtheequipmentfunctionsas'designed.TheTripSetpointsarethelimiting'valuesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracy.TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences2,3,and4.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,andinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.2-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimits(i.e.,AllowableValues)usedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference6.IfthemeasuredsetpointexceedstheTripSetpoint.Value,thebistableisconsideredOPERABLEunlesstheAllowableValueasspecifiedinplantproceduresisexceeded.TheAllowableValuespecifiedintheplantproceduresboundsthatprovidedinTable3.3.2-1sincethevaluesinthetablearetypicallythoseusedintheaccidentanalysis.TheTripSetpointsandAllowableValueslistedinTable3.3.2-1havebeenconfirmedbasedonthemethodologydescribedinReference6,whichincorporatesalloftheknownuncertaintiesapplicableforeachchannel.Themagnitudesoftheseuncertaintiesarefactoredintothe~determinationofeachTripSetpoint.Allfieldsensorsandsignalprocessingdquipmentforthesechannelsareassumedtooperatewithintheallowancesoftheseuncertaintymagnitudes.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-67DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TherequiredchannelsofESFASinstrumentationprovideplantprotectionintheeventofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents.ESFASprotectionfunctionsprovidedinTable3.3.2-1areasfollows:1.SafetIn'ectionSafetyInjection(SI)providestwoprimaryfunctions:1.Primarysidewateradditiontoensuremaintenanceorrecoveryofreactorvesselwaterlevel(coverageoftheactivefuelforheatremoval,cladintegrity,andforlimitingpeakcladtemperatureto<2200'F);and2.BorationtoensurerecoveryandmaintenanceofSDM(k,ff<1.0).Thesefunctionsarenecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofhighenergylinebreaks(HELBs)bothinsideandoutsideofcontainment.TheSIsignalisalsousedtoinitiateotherFunctionssuchas:ContainmentIsolation;ContainmentVentilationIsolation;ReactorTrip;FeedwaterIsolation;andStartofmotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-68DraftB "ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY1.SafetIn'ection(continued)Theseotherfunctionsensure:~Isolation'fnonessentialsystemsthroughcontainmentpenetrations;~Tripofthereactortolimitpowergeneration;~.Isolationofmainfeedwater(MFW)tolimitsecondarysidemasslosses;andStartofAFWtoensuresecondarysidecoolingcapability.a~SafetIn'ection-ManualInitiationThisLCOrequiresonechannelpertraintobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.IntheseMODES,thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems.TheoperatorcaninitiateSIatanytimebyusingeitheroftwopushbuttonson.themaincontrolboard.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentswiththeexceptionofContainmentIsolationandContainmentVentilationIsolation.TheLCOfortheManualInitiationFunctionensurestheproperamountofredundancyismaintainedinthemanualESFASactuationcircuitrytoensuretheoperatorhasmanualESFASinitiationcapability.Eachchannelconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogiccabinet.Eachpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.Thisconfigurationdoesnotallowtestingatpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-69DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYSafetIn'ection-ManualInitiation(continued)ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.Also,thisFunctionisnotrequiredinMODE4sinceitdoesnotactuateContainmentIsolationorContainmentVentilationIsolation:b.SafetIn'ection-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasThisLCOrequirestwotrainstobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4.IntheseMODES,thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-70Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)c.SafetIn'ection-ContainmentPressure-HihThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:SLBinsidecontainment;LOCA;and~Feedlinebreakinsidecontainment.ContainmentPressure-Highprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogic.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthroughcontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,thehighpressureFunctionwillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipebreak.InMODES5and6,ContainmentPressure-HighisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainment.d.SafetIn'ection-PressurizerPressure-LowThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:Inadvertentopeningofasteamgenerator(SG)atmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve;SLB;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-71Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SafetIn'ection-PressurizerPressure-Low(continued)~Rodclustercontrolassemblyejectionaccidents(rodejection);~,Inadvertentopeningofapressurizerrelieforsafetyvalve;~LOCAs;and.~SGTubeRupture.Sincetherearededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.Thetransmittersarelocatedinsidecontainment,withthetapsinthevaporspaceregionofthepressurizer,andthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(LOCA,SLBinsidecontainment,rodejection).Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrument.uncertainties.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)tomitigatetheconsequencesofanHELBinsidecontainment.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint.AutomaticSIactuationbelowthisinterlocksetpointisperformedbytheContainmentPressure-Highsignal.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE3belowthePressurizerPressureinterlocksetpoint.OtherESFfunctionsareusedtodetectaccidentconditionsandactuatetheESFsystemsinthisMODE.InMODES4,5,and6,thisFunctionisnotneededforaccidentdetectionandmitigation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-72DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO;andAPPLICABILITY(continued)e.SafetIn'ection-SteamLinePressure-LowSteamLinePressure-Lowprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLB;~Feedlinebreak;andInadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforanSGsafetyvalve.Steamlinepressuretransmittersprovidecontrolinput,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateevents'thattheFunctionactstomitigate.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsoneachsteamlinearesufficienttosatisfytheprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogiconeachsteamline.EachsteamlineisconsideredaseparatefunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.WiththetransmitterslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,itispossibleforthemto'experienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringasecondarysidebreak.Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-73DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.SafetIn'ection-SteamLinePressure-Low(continued)SteamLinePressure-LowmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvecouldresultintherapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint,Belowtheinterlocksetpoint,a'feedlinebreakisnotaconcern.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE4,5,or6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttocauseanaccident.2.ContainmentSraCSCSprovidesthreeprimaryfunctions:l.LowerscontainmentpressureandtemperatureafteranHELBincontainment;2.Reducestheamountofradioactiveiodineinthecontainmentatmosphere;and3.AdjuststhepHofthewaterincontainmentsumpBaftera'largebreakLOCA.Thesefunctionsarenecessaryto:Ensurethepressureboundaryintegrityofthecontainmentstructure;Limitthereleaseofradioactiveiodinetotheenvironmentintheeventofafailureofthecontainmentstructure;andNinimizecorrosionofthecomponentsandsystemsinsidecontainmentfollowingaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-74DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE2.CS(continued)SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andCSisactuatedmanuallyorbyContainmentAPPLICABILITYPressure-HighHigh.TheCSactuationsignalstartstheCSpumpsandal'ignsthedischargeofthepumpstotheCSnozzleheadersintheupperlevelsofcontainment.WaterisinitiallydrawnfromtheRWSTbytheCSpumpsandmixedwithasodiumhydroxidesolutionfromthesprayadditivetank.Duringtherecirculationphaseofaccidentrecovery,thespraypumpsuctionsaremanuallyshiftedtocontainmentsumpBifcontinuedCSisrequired.a~CS-ManualInitiationTheoperatorcaninitiateCSatanytimefromthecontrolroombysimultaneouslydepressingtwoCSactuationpushbuttons.BecauseaninadvertentactuationofCScouldhaveseriousconsequences,twopushbuttonsmustbesimultaneouslydepressedtoinitiatebothtrainsofCS.Therefore,theinoperabilityofeitherpushbuttonfailsbothtrainsofmanualinitiation.ManualinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiring,theoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanually'startingindividualcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-75DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.C.CS-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuation~RelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanually.startingindividualcomponents.CS-ContainmentPressure-~HihHihThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainment.Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthroughcontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainment.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ThisistheonlyESFASFunctionthatrequiresthebistableoutputtoenergizetoperformitsrequiredaction.ItisnotdesirabletohavealossofpoweractuateCS,sincetheconsequencesofaninadvertentactuationofCScouldbeserious.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-76DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc.CS-ContainmentPressure-~HihHih(continued)TheContainmentPressure-HighHighinstrumentfunctionconsistsoftwosetswiththreechannelsineachset.Eachsetisatwo-out-of-threelogicwheretheoutputsarecombinedsothatbothsetstrippedinitiatesCS.EachsetisconsideredaseparatefunctionforthepurposesofthisLCO.Sincecontainmentpressureisnotusedforcontrol,thisarrangementexceedstheminimumredundancyrequirements.AdditionalredundancyiswarrantedbecausethisFunctionisenergizetotrip.ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.3."ContainmentIsolationContainmentIsolationprovidesisolationofthecontainmentatmosphere,andselectedprocesssystemsthatpenetratecontainment,fromtheenvironment.ThisFunctionisnecessarytopreventorlimitthereleaseofradioactivitytotheenvironmentintheeventofaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-77Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.ContainmentIsolation(continued)ContainmentIsolationsignalsisolateallautomaticallyisolatableprocesslines,exceptfeedwaterlines,mainsteamlines,andcomponentcoolingwater.(CCW).Themainfeedwaterandsteamlinesareisolatedbyotherfunctionssinceforcedcirculationcoolingusingthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andSGsisthepreferred(butnotrequired)methodofdecayheatremoval.SinceCCWisrequiredtosupportRCPoperation,notisolatingCCWenhancesplantsafetybyallowingoperatorstouseforcedRCScirculationtocooltheplant.IsolatingCCWmayrequiretheuseoffeedandbleedcooling,whichcouldprovemoredifficulttocontrol.a0ContainmentIsolation-ManualInitiationManualContainmentIsolationisactuatedbyeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.Eitherpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationalsoactuatesContainmentVentilationIsolation.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-78DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.ContainmentIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuation1ogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoeval.uateplantconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.c.ContainmentIsolation-SafetIn'ectionContainmentIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatautomaticallyinitiateSI.The.ContainmentIsolationrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingFunctionsandrequirements.4.SteamLineIsolationIsolationofthemainsteamlinesprovidesprotectionintheeventofanSLBinsideoroutsidecontainment.Closureofthemainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVs)andtheirassociatednon-returncheckvalveslimitstheaccidenttotheblowdownfromonlytheaffectedSG.ForaSLBdownstreamoftheMSIVs,closureoftheMSIVstermina'testheaccidentassoonasthesteamlinesdepressurize.SteamLineIsolationalsomitigatestheeffectsofafeedlinebreakandensuresasourceofsteamfortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpduringafeedlinebreak.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-79Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)a.SteamLineIsolation-ManualInitiationManualinitiationofSteamLineIsolationcanbeaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.Therearetwoactuationdevices(onepushbuttonandoneswitch)onthemaincontrolboardforeachHSIV.EachdevicecaninitiateactiontoimmediatelycloseitsrespectiveHSIV.TheLCOrequiresonechannel(device)perlooptobeOPERABLE.Eachloopisnotconsideredaseparatefunctionsincethereisonlyonerequiredperloop.ManualinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofsignificantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.b.SteamLineIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant83.3-80DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.c~SteamLineIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoic'ndActuationRelas(continued)AutomaticinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofsignificantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisreq'uiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InNODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-Hih~HihThisFunctionactuatesclosureofbothMSIVsintheeventofaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainmenttomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsidecontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthroughcontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditions,andtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighHighprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-81DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc~d.SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HihHih(continued)ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,and3,becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidetopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipebreak.Thiswouldcauseasignificantincreaseinthecontainmentpressure,thusallowingdetectionandclosureoftheHSIVs.ThesteamlineisolationFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InNODES4,5,and6the'teamlineisolationFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisnotenoughenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidestopressurizethecontainmenttotheContainmentPressure-HighHighsetpoint.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithT-LowThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheHSIVsduringanSLBorinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvetomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehighsteamflowinonesteamline.EachsteamlineisconsideredaseparatefunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthatthefunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additional'channelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotection'interactionissues.Theone-out-of-twoconfigurationallowsonlinetestingbecausetripofonehighsteamflowchannelisnotsufficienttocauseinitiation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-82DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetInectionandCoincidentWithT-Low(continued)Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainment,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointsreflectbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThemainsteamlineisolatesonlyifthehighsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIandlowRCSaveragetemperature.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1,Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.TwochannelsofT.,perlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.EachloopisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.TheT,,channelsarecombinedinalogicsuchthatanytwoofthefourT.,channelstrippedinconjunctionwithSIandoneofthetwohighsteamline.flowchannelstrippedcausesisolationofthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamlineflowchannels.TheaccidentsthatthisFunctionprotectsagainstcausereductionofT,,intheentireprimarysystem.Therefore,theprovisionoftwoOPERABLEchannelsperloopinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationensuresnosinglefailuredisablestheT.,-LowFunction.TheT.,channelsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-83DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithT-Low(continued)ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.e.SteamLineIsolation-'HihHihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheMSIVsduringasteamlinebreak(orinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve)tomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.These"arecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehigh-highsteamflowinonesteamline.EachsteamlineisconsideredaseparatefunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-84DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.SteamLineIsolation-HihHihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ection(continued)Themainsteamlinesisolateonlyifthehigh-highsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIsignal.Steamlineisolationoccursonlyforthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamflowchannels.TheMainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIV'sareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-85Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.FeedwaterIsolationTheprimaryfunctionoftheFeedwaterIsolationsignalsistopreventandmitigatetheeffectsofhighwaterlevelintheSGswhichcouldcausecarryoverofwaterintothesteamlinesandresultinexcessivecooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSGhighwaterlevelisduetoexcessivefeedwaterflows.ThisFunctionisactuatedbyeitheraSGWaterLevel-HighoranSIsignal.TheFunctionprovidesfeedwaterisolationbyclosingtheHainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs)andtheassociatedbypassvalves.Inaddition,onanSIsignal,theAFWSystemisautomaticallystarted,andtheMFWpumpbreakersareopenedwhichclosestheHFWpumpdischargevalves.TheSIsignalwasdiscussedpreviously.a~FeedwaterIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES2and3unlessallHFRVsandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InHODES4,5,and6,theMFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPow'erPlantB3.3-86DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.FeedwaterIsolation-SteamGeneratorWater11-lll1TheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-HighFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallMFRVsandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theMFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstexcessivefeedwaterflow.TheESFASSGwaterlevelinstrumentshavededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements'achSGisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-Highisapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.C.FeedwaterIsolation-SafetIn'ectionTheSafetyInjectionFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHFRVsandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.In'MODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E'.GinhaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-87DraftB ~i ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc.FeedwaterIsolation-SafetIn'ection(continued)FeedwaterIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatinitiateSI.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.InsteadFunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliarFeedwaterTheAFWSystemisdesignedtoprovideasecondarysideheatsinkforthereactorintheeventthattheHFWSystemisnotavailable.Thepreferredsystemhastwomotordrivenpumpsandaturbinedrivenpump,makingitavailableduringnormalplantoperation,duringalossofACpower,alossofHFW,andduringaFeedwaterSystempipebreak(dependingonbreaklocation).AStandbyAFW(SAFW)isalsoavailableintheeventthepreferredsystemisunavailable.ThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemisthecondensatestoragetank(CST)whichisnotsafetyrelated.UponalowlevelintheCSTtheoperatorscanmanuallyrealignthepumpsuctionstotheServiceWater(SW)Systemwhichisthesafetyrelatedwatersource.TheSWSystemalsoisthesafetyrelatedwatersourcefortheSAFWSystem.TheAFWSystemisalignedsothatuponapumpstart,flowisinitiatedtotherespectiveSGsimmediatelywhiletheSAFWSystemisonlymanuallyinitiatedandaligned.aoAuxiliarFeedwater-HanualInitiationTheoperatorcaninitiateAFWorSAFWatanytimebyusingcontrolswitchesontheHainControlboard(oneswitchforeachpumpineachsystem).Thisactionwill.causeactuationoftheirrespectivepump.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-88DraftB ~i'0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.AuxiliarFeedwater-ManualInitiation(continued)TheLCOfortheManualInitiationFunctionensurestheproperamountofredundancyismaintainedtoensuretheoperatorhasmanualAFWandSAFWinitiationcapability.TheLCOrequiresonechannelperpumpineachsystemtobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.b.AuxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-89DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.AuxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelas(continued)AutomaticinitiationofAuxiliaryFeedwatermustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanually.placeeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.C.AuxiliarFeedwater-SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowSGWaterLevel-LowLowmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toprovideprotectionagainstalossofheatsink.Afeedlinebreak,insideoroutsideofcontainment,oralossofMFW,wouldresultinalossofSGwaterlevel.SGWaterLevel-LowLowineitherSGwillcausebothmotordrivenAFWpumpstostart.Thesystemisalignedsothatuponastartofthepump,waterimmediatelybeginstoflowtotheSGs.SGWaterLevel-LowLow'inbothSGswillcausetheturbinedrivenpumptostart.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-90DraftB 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYC.AuxiliarFeedwater-SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLow(continued)EachSGisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-LowLowisapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.OnetrainofSGWaterLevel-LowLowchannelsarepoweredfromInstrumentBusD.Therefore,ifInstrumentBus0isinoperable,onetrainofAutomaticActuationLogicandRelaysshouldbedeclaredinoperable.Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainmentandthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(feedlinebreak),theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.d.AuxiliarFeedwater-SafetIn'ectionTheSIfunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnot"requiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.AnSIsignalstartsthemotordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWpumps.TheAFWinitiationfunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-91DraftB 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)e.AuxiliarFeedwater-Undervoltae-Bus11AandllBTheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.Alossofpowerto4160VBus11Aand11BwillbeaccompaniedbyalossofpowertobothHFWpumpsandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatremoval.Thelossofoffsitepowerisdetectedbyavoltagedroponeachbus.LossofpowertobothbuseswillstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumptoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainsenoughwatertoserveastheheatsinkforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremovalfollowingthereactortrip.EachbusisconsideredaseparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.AuxiliarFeedwater-TriOfBothHainFeedwater~PumsATripofbothMFWpumpsisanindicationofalossofHFWandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatandsensibleheatremoval.TheHFWpumpsareequippedwithabreakerpositionsensingdevice.Anopensupplybreakerindicatesthatthepumpisnotrunning.TwoOPERABLEchannelsperHFWpumpsatisfyredundancyrequirementswithtwo-out-of-twologic.EachHFWpumpisconsideredaSeparateFunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.AtripofbothHFWpumpsstartsbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstoensurethatatleastoneSGisavailablewithwatertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-92DraftB 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYf.AuxiliarFeedwater-TriOfBothMainFeedwater~Pums(continued)ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.ThisensuresthatatleastoneSGisprovidedwithwatertoserveastheheatsinktoremovereactordecayheatandsensibleheatintheeventofanaccident.InMODES3,4,5,and6theMFWpumpsarenotinoperation,andthuspumptripisnotindicativeofaconditionrequiringautomaticAFWinitiation.ACTIONSANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.2-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.AsshownonFigureB3.3.2-1,theESFASiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticActuationLogic.Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrument,lossof120VACinstrumentbuspowerorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothESFAStrains.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualESFASandAutomaticActuationLogicFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis.TheAutomaticActuationLogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystem,includingthemasterrelays,slaverelays,andinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactivatingtheESFequipment.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-93DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.1ConditionAappliestoallESFASprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereonechannelortrainforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistorefertoTable3.3.2-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsFortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefr'omthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinanESFASFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithanESFASFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3shouldbeimmediatelyenterediftheESFASfunctionisapplicableinthecurrentHODEofoperation.B.lConditionBappliestotheAFW-TripofBothHFWPumpsESFASFunction.Ifachannelisinoperable,48hours'sallowedtoreturnittoOPERABLEstatus.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthenatureofthisFunction,theavailableredundancy,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.C.1IftheRequiredActionandCompletion'TimeofConditionBisnotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-94DraftB J ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1ConditionDappliestothefollowingESFASFunctions:~ManualInitiationofSI;~ManualInitiationofSteamLineIsolation;~AFW-SGWaterLevel-LowLow;and~AFW-Undervoltage-BusIIAand'llB.Ifachannelisinoperable,48hoursisallowedtorestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanothermanualinitiationchannelOPERABLEforeachmanualinitiation,FunctionadditionalAFWactuationchannelsavailablebesidestheSGWaterLevel-LowLowandUndervoltage-BusllAandllBAFWInitiationFunctions,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.E.1ConditionEappliestotheautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforthefollowingESFASFunctions:~SteamLineIsolation;~FeedwaterIsolation;and~AFW.ConditionEaddressesthetrainorientationoftheprotectionsystemandthemasterandslaverelays.Ifonetrainisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof6hoursisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatthereisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelow-probabilityofaneventoccurring.duringthistimeinterval.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisconsistentwithReference7.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-95DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)F.IConditionFappliestothefollowingFunctions:~SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~SteamLineIsolation-HighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjectionandCoincidentWithT.,-Low;~SteamLineIsolation-High-HighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjection;and~FeedwaterIsolation-SGWaterLevel-High.ConditionFappliestoFunctionsthattypicallyoperateontwo-out-of-threelogic.Therefore,failureofonechannelplacestheFunctioninatwo-out-of-twoconfiguration.OnechannelmustbetrippedtoplacetheFunctioninaone-out-of-twoconfigurationthatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements.Ifonechannelisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof6hoursisallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusortoplaceitinthetrippedcondition.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperability,restorescapabilitytoaccommodateasinglefailure,andallowsoperationtocontinue.TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNotethatallowstheinoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto'4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.This4hoursappliestoeachoftheremainingOPERABLEchannels.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursallowedto.restorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedcondition,andthe4hoursallowedfortesting,arejustifiedinReference7.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-96DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)G.lIftheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesofConditionsD,E,orFarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.H.lConditionHappliestothefollowingESFASfunctions:~ManualInitiationofCS;and~ManualInitiationofContainmentIsolation.Ifachannelisinoperable,48hoursisallowedtorestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanothermanualinitiationchannelOPERABLEforeachFunction(exceptforCS)andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.ConditionIappliestotheautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforthefollowingFunctions:~SI;~CS;and~ContainmentIsolation'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-97DraftB tt1!00 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSI.1(continued)ConditionIaddressesthetrainorientationoftheprotectionsystemandthemasterandslaverelays.Ifonetrainisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof6hoursisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatthereisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisconsistentwithReference7.ConditionJappliestothefollowingFunctions:~SI-ContainmentPressure-High;and~CS-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh.ConditionJappliestoFunctionsthatoperateonatwo-out-of-threelogic(forCS-ContainmentPressure-HighHightherearetwosetsofthislogic).Therefore,failureofonechannelplacestheFunctioninatwo-out-of-twoconfiguration.OnechannelmustbetrippedtoplacetheFunctioninaone-out-of-twoconfigurationthatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements.Ifonechannelisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof6hoursisallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusorplaceitinthetrippedcondition.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperability,restorescapabilitytoaccommodateasinglefailure,andallowsoperationtocontinue.TheRequiredActionismodifiedbyaNotethatallowstheinoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.The4hoursappliestoeachoftheremainingOPERABLEchannels.TheCompletionTimeof6hourstorestoretheinoperablechannelorplaceitintrip,andthe4hoursallowedforsurveillancetestingisjustifiedinReference7.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3:3-98DraftB ~,00 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)K.lIftheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesofConditionsH,I,orJarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.L.1ConditionLappliestothefollowingFunctions:~SI-PressurizerPressure-Low;and~SI-SteamLinePressure-Low.ConditionLappliestoFunctionsthatoperateonatwo-out-of-threelogic.Therefore,failureofonechannelplacestheFunctioninatwo-out-of-twoconfiguration.Onechannelmust.betrippedtoplacetheFUnctioninaone-out-of-twoconfiguration,thatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements.Ifonechannelisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof6hoursisallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusorplaceitinthetrippedcondition.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperability,restorescapabilitytoaccommodateasinglefailure,andallowsoperationtocontinue.TheRequiredActionismodifiedbyaNotethatallowstheinoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.The4hoursappliestoeachoftheremainingOPERABLEchannels.TheCompletionTimeof6hourstorestoretheinoperablechannelorplaceitintrip,andthe4hoursallowedforsurveillancetestingisjustifiedinReference7.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-99DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)M.lIftheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesofConditionLarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<2000psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.N.1ConditionNappliesifaAFWManualInitiationchannelisinoperable.Ifamanualinitiation.switchisinoperable,theassociatedAFWorSAFWpumpmustbedeclared.inoperableandtheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.7.5,"AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System"mustbeenteredimmediately.EachAFWmanualinitiationswitchcontrolsoneAFWorSAFWpump.DeclaringtheassociatedpumpinoperableensuresthatappropriateactionistakeninLCO3.7.5basedonthenumberandtypeofpumpsinvolved.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSTheSRsforeachESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.2-1.EachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheESFAS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2;Channel3,andChannel'4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.Note1hasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.2-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichESFASFunctions.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-100DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREVENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKforthefollowingESFASFunctions:~SI-ContainmentPressure-High;~SI-PressurizerPressure-Low;~SI-SteamLinePressure-Low;~CS-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~SteamLineIsolation-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSIandT.,-Low;~SteamLineIsolation-High-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSI;~FeedwaterIsolation-SGWaterLevel-High;and~AFW-SGWaterLevel-LowLow.PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatagrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronothercha'nnels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-101DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.2.1(continued)CHANNELCHECKacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.2.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTevery92daysforthefollowingESFASfunctions:SI-ContainmentPressure-High;SI-PressurizerPressure-Low;SI-.SteamLinePressure-Low;CS-'ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;SteamLineIsolation-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSIandT,,-Low;SteamLineIsolation-High-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSI;FeedwaterIsolation-SGWaterLevel-High;andAFW-SGWaterLevel-LowLow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-102Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2"SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.2.2(continued)ACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.SetpointsmustbefoundtobewithintheAllowableValuesspecifiedinTable3.3.2-1andestablishedplantprocedures.The"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithinReference7.TheFrequencyisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.2.3ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery92days.ThistestisacheckoftheAFW-Undervoltage-BusllAandllBFunction.Thetestincludestripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectlytotheprotectionsystem.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsforrelays.RelaysetpointsrequireelaboratebenchcalibrationandareverifiedduringCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheFrequencyof92daysisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.2.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery24months.ThistestisacheckoftheSI,CS,ContainmentIsolation,SteamLineIsolation,andAFWManualInitiations,andtheAFW-TripofBothMFWPumpsFunctions.EachFunctionistestedupto,andincluding,themastertransferrelaycoils.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalrefuelingcycle.The'SRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludes.verificationofsetpointsduringtheTADOT.TheManualInitiations,andAFW-TripofBothMFWPumpsFunctionshavenoassociatedsetpoints.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-103DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.5ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24monthsofthefollowingESFASFunctions:~SI-ContainmentPressure-High;~SI-PressurizerPressure-Low;~SI-SteamLinePressure-Low;~CS-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~SteamLineIsolation-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSIandT,,-Low;~SteamLineIsolation-High-HighSteamFlowCoincidentwithSI;~FeedwaterIsolation-SGWaterLevel-High;~AFW-SGWaterLevel-LowLow;and~AFW-Undervoltage-Bus11Aand11B.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.CHANNELCALIBRATIONSmustbeperformedconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheplantspecificsetpointmethodology.The"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-104DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.6ThisSRensurestheSI-PressurizerPressure-LowandSI-SteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000psigwhileinMODESI,2,and3.Periodictestingofthepressurizerpressurechannelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.6).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.rIfthepressurizerpressureinterlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,thepressurizerpressureinterlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypassed).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.SR3.3.2.7ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTESTonallESFASAutomaticActuation.LogicandActuationRelaysFunctionsevery24months.Thistestincludestheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlockstateandverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.Relayandcontactoperationisverifiedbyacontinuancecheckoractuationoftheenddevice.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheneedtoperformthistestingduringaplantshutdowntopreventareactortripfromoccurring.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-105(continued)DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC15,IssuedforCommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter7.3.UFSAR,Chapter6.4.UFSAR,Chapter15.5.IEEE-279-1971.6.EWR-5126,"GuidelinesForInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.7.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-106Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2~fiuidtus~cicsalprocaasRqailaIsot@la<<~is1dioatcusaotChaaoalCuaaaaldicoaivcocaasXVgscictIIII1III~~II1~I~IIIsotooatic~Wasiui~ooaIIr~~I~JIoI~I2ICtRascal22725tuuctiasICTlCC71ICTClasssalayaJodiridsalcospoooatsMaisKXtaiaSgCistablaQl20VAC~oootco~~hutcsatkchotuatioalooicQ12icXCtasseScucaa~01'~uiuaionOigjFigureB33.2-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-107DraftB PAMInstrumentation83.3.3B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.3PostAccidentMonitoring(PAM)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeofthePAMinstrumentationistodisplayplantvariablesthatprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorsduringaccidentconditions.Thisinstrumentationprovidesthenecessarysupportfortheoperatortotakerequiredmanualactions,verifythatautomaticandrequiredmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeencompleted,andtodetermineiffissionproductbarriershavebeenbreachedfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheOPERABILITYoftheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationensuresthatthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassessplantstatusandbehaviorduringanaccident.Theavailabilityofaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationisimportantsothatresponsestocorrectiveactionscanbeobservedandtheneedfor,andmagnitudeof,furtheractionscanbedetermined.TheseessentialinstrumentsareidentifiedinReference1addressingtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.97(Ref.2)asrequiredbySupplement1toNUREG-0737(Ref.3).TheinstrumentchannelsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCOprovideinformationforkeyparametersidentifiedduringimplementationofRegulatoryGuide1.97asCategoryIvariables.CategoryIvariablesareorganizedintofourtypesandarethekeyvariablesdeeme'drisksignificantbecausetheyareneededto:'a~b.Providetheprimaryinformation'requiredforthecontrolroomoperatortotakespecificmanuallycontrolledactionsforwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunctionsforDBAs(TypeA).Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortoverifythatrequiredautomaticandmanuallycontrolledfunctionshavebeenaccomplished(TypeB);(continued)R.E.GinriaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-108DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)C.Provideinformationtothecontrolroomoperatorsthatwillenablethemtodeterminethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease(TypeC);andd.Provideinformationregardingthereleaseofradioactivematerialstoallowforearlyindicationoftheneedtoinitiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublic,andtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat(TypeE).AllTypeAandkeyTypeB,C,andEparametershavebeenidentifiedasCategoryIvariablesinReference1whichalso'rovidesjustificationfordeviatingfromtheNRCproposedlistofCategoryIvariables.ThespecificinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1arediscussedintheLCOsection.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThePANinstrumentationensurestheavailabilityofRegulatoryGuide1.97CategoryIvariablessothatthecontrolroomoperatingstaffcan:PerformthediagnosisspecifiedintheemergencyoperatingproceduresfortheprimarysuccesspathofDBAs(e.g.,lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA));Takethespecified,pre-planned,manuallycontrolledactions,forwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunction;Determinewhetherrequiredautomaticandmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeenaccomplished;Determinethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease;Determineifagrossbreachofabarrierhasoccurred;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-109DraftB

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~Initiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublicandtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat.PAMinstrumentationthatmeetsthedefinitionofTypeAinRegulatoryGuide1.97satisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.CategoryI,non-TypeA,instrumentationmustberetainedinTSbecauseitisintendedtoassistoperatorsinminimizingtheconsequencesofaccidents.Therefore,CategoryI,non-TypeA,variablesareimportantforreducingpublicriskandsatisfyCriterion4.LCOThePAMinstrumentationLCOprovidesOPERABILITYrequirementsforRegulatoryGuide1.97.TypeAmonitors,whichprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorstoperformcertainmanualactionsspecifiedintheplantEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Thesemanualactionsensurethatasystemcanaccomplishitssafetyfunction,andarecreditedinthesafetyanalyses.Additionally,thisLCOaddressesRegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentsthathavebeendesignatedCategoryI,non-TypeA.TheOPERABILITYofthePAMinstrumentationensuresthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassessplantstatusfollowinganaccident.ThisLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEchannelsformostFunctions..TwoOPERABLEchannelsensurenosinglefailure.preventsoperatorsfromobtainingtheinformationnecessarytodeterminethesafetystatusoftheplant,andtobringtheplanttoandmaintainitinasafeconditionfollowinganaccident.Furthermore,OPERABILITYoftwochannelsallowsaCHANNELCHECKduringthepostaccidentphasetoconfirmthevalidityofdisplayedinformation.Morethantwochannelsmayberequirediffailureofoneaccidentmonitoringchannelresultsininformationambiguity(thatis,theredundantdisplaysdisagree)th'atcouldleadoperatorstodefeatorfailtoaccomplisharequiredsafetyfunction.Table3.3.3-1listsallCategoryIvariablesidenti,fiedbyReferencel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-110DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)CategoryIvariablesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofprovidingimmediatelyaccessibledisplayandcontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroom.TheHydrogenMonitorsareconsideredOPERABLEwhencontinuousreadoutisavailableintheControlRoomorintherelayroom.Eachchannelmustalsobesuppliedbyseparateelectricaltrainsexceptasnotedbelow.In,addition,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.6,itisnotrequiredtodeclareasupportedsysteminoperableduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem(e.g.,electricpower).SincetheinoperabilityofInstrumentBusDdoesnothaveanyassociatedRequiredActions,thelossofthispowersourcemayaffecttheOPERABILITYofthePressurizerPressureandSGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)Functions.ListedbelowarediscussionsofthespecifiedinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1.1.PressurizerPressure,PressurizerPressureisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.PressurizerpressureisalsousedtoverifytheplantconditionsnecessarytoestablishnaturalcirculationintheRCSandtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~PT-429andPT-431;~PT-430andPT-431;~PT-429andPT-449;~PT-430andPT-449;or~PT-431andPT-449ThelossofInstrumentBusDrequiresdeclaringPT-449inoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-111DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)2.PressurizerLevelPressurizerLevelisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.Pressurizerwaterlevelisalsousedtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~LT-426andLT-428;or~LT-427andLT-428.3,4.ReactorCoolantSstemRCSHotandColdLeRCSHotandColdLegTemperaturesareCategoryIvariables(RCSColdLegTemperatureisalsoaTypeAvariable)providedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCShotandcoldlegtemperaturesareusedtodetermineRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSsubcoolingmarginwillallowterminationofSI,ifstillinprogress,orreinitiationofSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.Inaddition,RCScoldlegtemperatureisusedinconjunctionwithRCShotlegtemperaturetoverifynaturalcirculationintheRCS.Temperatureinputsareprovidedbytwoindependenttemperaturesensorresistanceelementsandassociatedtransmittersineachloop.TemperatureelementsTE-409B-1andTE-410B-1providetherequiredRCScoldlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.TemperatureelementsTE-409A-1andTE-410A-1providetherequiredRCShotlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-112DraftB PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESLCO(continued)5.RCSPressureWideRaneRCSwiderangepressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandthelongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCSpressureisusedtoverifydeliveryofSIflowtotheRCSfromatleastonetrainwhentheRCSpressureisbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.RCSpressureisalsousedtoverifyclosureofmanuallyclosedpressurizerspraylinevalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andfordeterminingRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSpressurecanalsobeused:~todeterminewhethertoterminateactuatedSIortoreinitiatestoppedSI;~todeterminewhentoresetSIandstoptheresidualheatremovalpumps(RHR);~tomanuallyrestarttheRHRpumps-,'s.reactorcoolantpump(RCP)tripcriteria;~tomakeadeterminationonthenatureoftheaccidentinprogressandwheretogonextintheemergencyoperatingprocedure;and~todeterminewhethertooperatethepressurizerheaters.RCS'-pressureisalsorelatedtothreedecisionsaboutdepressurization.Theyare:todeterminewhethertoproceedwithprimarysystemdepressurization;toverifyterminationofdepressurization;andtodeterminewhethertocloseaccumulatorisolationvalvesduringacontrolledcooldown/depressurization.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-113DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO5.RCSPressureWideRane(continued)RCSpressureisaTypeAvariablebecausetheoperatorusesthisindicationtomonitorthecooldownoftheRCSfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)orsmallbreakLOCA.Operatoractionstomaintainacontrolledcooldown,suchasadjustingsteamgenerator(SG)pressureorlevel,wouldusethisindication.RCSpressuretransmittersPT-420andPT-420Aprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.6.RCSSubcoolinMonitorRCSSubcoolingMonitorisaTypeAvariableprovidedforveriFicationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.TheRCSSubcoolingMonitorisusedtoprovideinformationtotheoperator,derivedfromRCShotlegtemperatureandRCSpressure,onsubcooling.RCSsubcoolingmarginisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresdetermineRCSsubcoolingmarginbasedonthecoreexitthermocouples(CETs)andRCSpressure.Therefore,anyofthefollowingcombinationofparameterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisFunction:TI-409AandTI-4IOAorOnepressurizerpressuretransmitterandtwoCETsineachofthefourquadrantssuppliedbyelectricaltrainAandtrainB(i.e.,totaloftwopressurizerpressuretransmittersand16*CETs).(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-114DraftB PAN'InstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)7.ReactorVesselWaterLevelReactorVesselWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.Itisalsousedforaccidentdiagnosisandtodeterminereactorcoolantinventoryadequacy.WhenbothRCPsarestopped,theReactorVesselWaterLevelIndicationSystem(RVLIS)providesadirectmeasurementofthecollapsedliquidlevelabovethefuelalignmentplate.Thecollapsedlevelrepresentstheamountofliquidmassthatisinthereactorvesselabovethecore.WhentheRCPsareoperating,RVLISindicatesthefluidfractionoftheRCS.Measurementofthecollapsedwaterlevelorfluidfractionisselectedbecauseitisadirectindicationofthewaterinventory.LeveltransmittersLT-490AandLT-4908providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.8.ContainmentSum8MaterLevelContainmentSumpBWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.'ontainmentSumpBWaterLevelisusedtodetermine:~containmentsumplevelforaccidentdiagnosis;~whentobegintherecirculationprocedure;and~whethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress.LeveltransmittersLT-942andLT-943,eachwithfivediscretelevelswitches,providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-115DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)9.ContainmentPressureWideRaneContainmentPressure(WideRange)isaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofRCSandcontainmentOPERABILITY.ContainmentPressure(WideRange)isusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogressandwhen,andif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~PT-946andPT-948;or~PT-950andPT-948.10.ContainmentAreaRadiationHihRaneContainmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)isaTypeECategoryIvariableprovidedtomonitorforthepotentialofsignificantradiationreleasesintocontainmentandtoprovidereleaseassessmentforusebyoperatorsindeterminingtheneedtoinvokesiteemergencyplans.Containmentradiationlevelisusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogress(e.g.,LOCA),andwhen,orif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.RadiationmonitorsR-29andR-30areusedtoprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.11.HdroenMonitorsHydrogenConcentrationisaTypeCCategoryIvariableprovidedtodetecthighhydrogenconcentrationconditionsthatrepresentapotentialforcontainmentbreachfroma'ydrogenexplosion.Thisvariableisalsoimportantinverifyingtheadequacyofmitigatingactions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-116DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCOll.HdroenHonitors(continued)HydrogenmonitorsHHSLCPAandHHSLCPBprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Inaddition,thePostAccidentSamplingSystemmaytaketheplaceofoneofthesemonitors.ThePASSsystemHydrogenFunctionisnotrequiredtoprovidecontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroomorrelayroomforOPERABILITY.12.CondensateStoraeTankCSTLevelCSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtoensureawatersupplyisavailableforthepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.TheCSTconsistsoftwoidenticaltanksconnectedbyacommonoutletheader.CSTlevelisusedtodetermine:~ifsufficientCSTinventoryisavailableimmediatelyfollowingalossofnormalfeedwaterorsmallbreakLOCA;and~whentomanuallyreplenishtheCSToralignthesafetyrelatedsourceofwater(servicewater)tothepreferredAFWsystem.LeveltransmittersLT-2022AandLT-2022BprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunctionsHowever,onlytheleveltransmitterassociatedwiththeCST(s)requiredbyLCO3.7:6,"CondensateStorageTank(s)"arerequiredforthisLCO.13.RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevelRWSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyingawatersourcetotheSI,RHR,andContainmentSpray(CS)Systems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-117DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO13.RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevel(continued)TheRWSTlevelaccuracyisestablishedtoallowanadequatesupplyofwatertotheSI,RHR,andCSpumpsduringtheswitchovertotherecirculationphaseofanaccident.Ahighdegreeofaccuracyisrequiredtomaximizethetimeavailabletotheoperatortocompletetheswitchovertothesumprecirculationphaseandensuresufficientwaterisavailabletomaintainadequatenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)tooperatingpumps..LeveltransmittersLT-920andLT-921providethetwo.requiredchannelsforthis'functions14.RHRFlowRHRFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyinglowpressuresafetyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtotheCSandSIpumps.RHRflowisusedtodeterminewhentostoptheRHRpumpsandifsufficientflowisavailabletotheCS.andSIpumpsduringrecirculation.SincedifferentflowtransmittersareusedtoverifyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtoverifyflowtotheCSandSIpumps,FT-626andFT-931Acompriseonerequiredchanneland'T-689andFT-931Bcompriseasecondrequiredchannel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-118DraftB

PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESLCO15,16,17,18.(continued)CoreExitTemeratureCoreExitTemperatureisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.AnevaluationwasmadeoftheminimumnumberofvalidCETsnecessaryformeasuringcorecooling.TheevaluationdeterminedthenecessarycomplementofCETsrequiredtodetectinitialcorerecoveryandtrendtheensuingcoreheatup.Theevaluationaccountedforcorenonuniformities,includingincoreeffectsoftheradialdecaypowerdistribution,excoreeffectsofrefluxinthehotlegs,andnonuniforminlettemperatures.Basedontheseevaluations,adequatecorecoolingisensuredwithtwovalidCoreExitTemperaturechannelsperquadrantwithtwoCETsperrequiredchannel.CoreExitTemperatureisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.CoreExitTemperatureisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.TwoOPERABLEchannelsofCoreExitTemperaturearerequiredineachquadranttoprovideindicationofradialdistributionofthecoolanttemperatureriseacrossrepresentativeregionsofthecore.Becauseofthesmallcoresize,tworandomlyselected.thermocouplesaresufficienttomeetthetwothermocouplesperchannelrequirementinanyquadrant.However,aCETwhichliesdirectlyonthedividinglinebetweentwoquadrantscanonlybeusedtosatisfytheminimumrequiredchannelsforonequadrant.ACETisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitiswithin+35FoftheaverageCETreadingexceptfortheCETsassociatedwithperipheralassemblies.TheseCETs(A7,B5,C3,C.ll,02,D12,H13,I2,K3,Kll,L10,andH6).areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarewithin+43FoftheaverageCETreading.AtleasttwoCETsfromeachofthefollowingtrainsmustbeOPERABLEineachofthefourquadrants:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-l19DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO15,16,17,18.CoreExitTemerature(continued)TrainACETLocationTrainBCETLocationT2M6T5J3T6I2T7J6T8L10T9J8T12H6T15H9T18F8T21C11T22H11T23H13T26*I10T28D5T33D2T34C3T36B7,T38B5T39.D7TlT3T4T10T13T14T16T17T19T20T24T25T27T29T30*T31T32*T35T37I4L7K3J9K11D12H10E10G7 C8F12G12E6 E4G4 G2GlA7C6*-ThesethermocouplesareinthereactorvesselheadandcannotbecreditedwithrespecttothisLCO.19,20.AFWFlowAFWFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofthepreferredAFWsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-120DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO19120.AFWFlow(continued)TheAFWSystemprovidesdecayheatremovalviatheSGsandiscomprisedofthepreferredAFWSystemandtheStandbyAFW(SAFW)System.TheuseofthepreferredAFWorSAFWSystemtoprovidethisdecayheatremovalfunctionisdependentuponthetypeofaccident.AFWflowindicationisrequiredfromthethreepumptrainswhichcomprisethepreferredAFWSystemsince,thesepumpsautomaticallystartonvariousactuationsignals.ThefailureofthepreferredAFWSystem(e.g.,duetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding)isdetectedbyAFWflowindication.Atthispoint,theSAFWSystemismanuallyalignedtoprovidethedecayheatremovalfunction.SAFWflowcanalsobeusedtoverifythatAFWflowisbeingdeliveredtotheSGs.However,theprimaryindicationofthisisprovidedbySGwaterlevel.Therefore,flowindicationfromtheSAFWpumpsisnotrequired.EachofthethreepreferredAFWpumptrainshastworedundanttransmitters;however,onlytheflowtransmittersuppliedpowerfromthesameelectricaltrainastheAFWpumpisrequiredforthisLCO.Therefore,flowtransmittersFT-2001(MCBindicatorFI-2021A)andFT-2007(MCBindicatorFI-2024A)comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandFT-2002(MCBindicatorFI-2022A)andFT-2006(MCBindicatorFI-2023A)comprisethetworequiredchannels'orSGB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-121DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO21,22,23,24.(continued)SGWaterLevelNarrowandWideRaneSGWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Forthenarrowrangelevel,thesignalsfromthetransmittersareindependentlyindicatedonthemaincontrolboardas0%to100%.Thiscorrespondstoapproximatelyabovethe'opofthetubebundlestothetopoftheswirlvaneseparators(spanof143inches).Forthewiderangelevel,signalsfromthetransmittersareindicatedas0to520inches(0%to100%)onthemaincontrolboard.SGWaterLevel(NarrowandWideRange)isusedto:~identifythefaultedSGfollowingatuberupture;~verifythattheintactSGsareanadequateheatsinkforthereactor;~determinethenatureoftheaccidentinprogress(e.g.,verifyanSGTR);and~verifyplantconditionsforterminationof,SIduringsecondaryplantHELBsoutsidecontainment.RedundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbytwotrainsofinstrumentationperSG.SGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)requires2channelsofindicationperSG~Thiscanbe'metusinganyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmittersforSGA:~LT-461andLT-462;~LT-462andLT-463;or~LT-461andLT-463;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-122DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO21,22,23,24.SGWaterLevel'arrowandWideRane(continued)ForSGB,anyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitterscanbeused:~LT-471andLT-473;~LT-471andLT-472;or~LT-472andLT-473.ThelossofInstrumentBusDrequiresdeclaringLT-463andLT-471inoperable.SGWaterLevel(WideRange)requires2channelsofindicationperSG.TwochannelsperSGarerequiredsincethelossofonechannelwithnobackupavailablemayresultinthecompletelossofinformation'equiredbytheoperatorstoaccomplishnecessarysafetyfunctions.LeveltransmittersLT-504andLT-505comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandLT-506andLT-507comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.25,26.SGPressureSGPressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviathe.SGs.Thesignalsfromthetransmittersarecalibratedforarangeof0psigto1400psig.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbythreeavailabletrainsofinstrumentation.AnyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGA:~PT-468andPT-482;or~PT-469andPT-482.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-123DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO25and26.SGPressure(continued)AnyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB:~'T-479andPT-478;or~PT-478andPT-483.APPLICABILITYThePAHinstrumentationLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.Thesevariablesarerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinMODES1,2,and3.InMODES4,5,and6,thePAHinstrumentationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseplantconditionsaresuchthatthelikelihoodofaneventthatwouldrequirePAHinstrumentationislow.ACTIONSTheACTIONS.aremodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1hasbeenaddedtoexcludetheMODEchangerestrictionofLCO3.0.4.ThisexceptionallowsentryintotheapplicableMODEwhilerelyingontheACTIONSeventhoughtheACTIONSmayeventuallyrequireplantshutdown.Thisexceptionisacceptableduetothepa'ssivefunctionoftheinstruments,theoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentusingalternateinstrumentsandmethods,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringtheseinstruments.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.3-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatel'yforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-124DraftB PAMInstrumentation83.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)A.1ConditionAapplieswhenoneormoreFunctionshaveonerequiredchannelthatisinoperable.RequiredActionA.1requiresrestoringtheinoperablechanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEchannel,thepassivenatureoftheinstrument(nocriticalautomaticactionisassumedtooccurfromtheseinstruments),andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANInstrumentationduringthisinterval.ConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheConditionisnotapplicabletoTable3.3.3-1Functions3and4.TheseFunctionsareaddressedbyConditionCwhichprovidesthenecessaryrequiredactionsforthesesinglechannelFunctions.8.1Condition8applieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAisnotmet.ThisConditionrequirestheimmediateinitiationofactionstoprepareandsubmitaspecialreporttotheNRC.Thisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheConditionisentered.Thisreportshalldiscusstheresultsoftherootcauseevaluation'oftheinoperabilityandidentifyproposedrestorativeactionsoralternatemeansofprovidingtherequiredfunction.Thisactionisappropriateinlieuofashutdownrequirementsincealternativeactionsareidentifiedbeforelossoffunctionalcapability,andgiventhelikelihoodofplantconditionsthatwouldrequireinformationprovidedbythisinstrumentation.Ifalternatemeansaretobeused,theymustbedevelopedandtestedpriortosubmittalofthespecialreport.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-125DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.IConditionCapplieswhenaFunctionhasoneinoperablerequiredchannelandnodiversechannelOPERABLE(i.e.,lossofRCSHotLegTemperatureorRCSColdLegTemperatureFunctions).ThisConditionrequiresrestoringtheinoperablechannelintheaffectedFunctiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCompletionTimeof7daysisbasedontherelativelylowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAMinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuousoperationwithacompletelossoffunctionisnotacceptablebecausethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallperformancequalificationrequirementsappliedtothePAMinstrumentation.Therefore,requiringrestorationoftheinoperablechannellimitstheriskthatthePAMFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisConditionisonlyapplicabletoTable3.3.3-1Functions3and4.AllremainingFunctionsareaddressedbyConditionAwithonechannelinoperable.D.lConditionDapplieswhenoneormoreFunctionshavetwoinoperablerequiredchannels(i.e.,twochannelsinoperableinthesameFunction),RequiredActionD.1requiresrestoringonechannelintheFunction(s)toOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCompletionTimeof7daysisbasedontherelativelylowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAMinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofailternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuousoperationwithtworequiredchannelsinoperableinaFunctionisnotacceptablebecausethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallperformancequalificationrequirementsappliedtothePAMinstrumentation.Therefore,requiringrestorationofoneinoperablechanneloftheFunctionlimitstheriskthatthePAMFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur.Condition0ismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesFunctionllsincetheinoperabilityoftwohydrogenmonitorchannelsisaddressedbyConditionE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-126DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1ConditionEapplieswhentwohydrogenmonitorchannelsareinoperable.ThisConditionrequiresrestoringonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonthebackupcapabilityofthePostAccidentSamplingSystemtomonitorthehydrogenconcentrationforevaluationofcoredamageandtoprovideinformationforoperatordecisions.Also,itisunlikelythataLOCAwhichwouldpotentiallyrequireuseofthehydrogenrecombinerswouldoccur,duringthistime.F.1ConditionFapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionC,D,orEarenotmet.RequiredActionF.1requiresenteringtheappropriateConditionreferencedinTable3.3.3-1forthechannelimmediately.TheapplicableConditionreferencedintheTableisFunctiondependent.EachtimeaninoperablechannelhasnotmetanyRequiredActionofConditionC,0,orE,andtheassociatedCompletionTimehasexpired,ConditionFisenteredforthatchannelandprovidesfortransfertotheappropriatesubsequentCondition.G.landG.2IfonechannelforFunction3and4cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeforConditionC,ifonechannelforFunction1,2,3,4,5,6,8912~131415)16171819202122232425,or26cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionD,orifonechannelforFunctionllcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionE,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-127DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)H.1IfonechannelforFunction7or10cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionD,theplantmusttakeimmediateactiontoprepareandsubmitaspecialreporttotheNRC.Thisreportshal,lbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheactionisrequired.ThisreportdiscussesthealternatemeansofmonitoringReactorVesselWaterLevelandContainmentAreaRadiation,thedegreetowhichthealternatemeansareequivalenttotheinstalledPAMchannels,theareasinwhichtheyarenotequivalent,andascheduleforrestoringthenormalPAMchannels.ThesealternatemeansmusthavebeendevelopedandtestedandmaybetemporarilyinstalledifthenormalPAMchannel(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallottedtime.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatSR3.3.3.1andSR3.3.3.2applytoeachPAMinstrumentationFunctioninTable3.3.3-1.SR3.3.3.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery31daysensuresthatagrossinstrumentationfailurehasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteron'otherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Thehighradiationinstrumentationshouldbecomparedtosimilarplant'nstrumentslocatedthroughouttheplant.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-128DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.3.3.1(continued)Channelcheckacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingisolation,indication,andreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.AsspecifiedintheSR,aCHANNELCHECKisonlyrequiredforthosechannelsthatarenormallyenergized.TheFrequencyof31daysisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstratesthatchannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.3.2ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstothemeasuredparameterwiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.Wheneverasensingelementisreplaced,thenextrequiredCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftheCoreExitthermocouplesensorsshallincludeaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorandnormalcalibrationoftheremainingadjustabledevicesinthechannel.Thisisaccomplishedbyaninplacecrosscalibrationthatcomparestheothersensingelementswiththerecentlyinstalledsensingelement.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section7.5.2.2.RegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev.3.3.NUREG-0737,Supplement1,"TMIActionItems."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-129DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheDGsprovideasourceofemergencypowerwhenoffsitepoweriseitherunavailableorisinsufficientlystabletoallowsafeplantoperation.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationconsistsoftwochannelsoneachofsafeguardsBuses14,16,17,and18(Ref.1).Eachchannelcontainsonelossofvoltagerelayandonedegradedvoltagerelay(seeFigureB3.3.4-1).Aone-out-of-twologicinbothchannelswillcausethefollowingactionsontheassociatedsafeguardsbus:a.tripofthenormalfeedbreakerfromoffsitepower;b.tripofthebus-tiebreakertotheoppositeelectricaltrain(ifclosed);C.shedofallbusloadsexcepttheCSpump,componentcoolingwaterpump(ifnosafetyinjectionsignalispresent),andsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters;andd.startoftheassociatedDG.Thedegradedvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoprotectEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)componentsfromexposuretolongperiodsofreducedvoltageconditionswhichcanresultindegradedperformanceandtoensurethatrequiredmotorscanstart.Thelossofvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoensuretheDGisstartedwithinthetimelimitsassumedintheaccidentanalysistoprovidetherequiredelectricalpowerifoffsitepowerislost.Thedegradedvoltagerelayshavetimedelayswhichhaveinverseoperatingcharacteristicssuchthatthelowerthebusvoltage,thefasterthe".operatingtime.Thelossofvoltagerelayshavedefinitetimedelayswhicharenotrelatedtotherate'ofthelossofbusvoltage.Thesetimedelaysaresettopermitvoltagetransientsduringworstcasemotorstartingconditions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-130(continued)DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLOPDGstartinstrumentationisrequiredfortheESFSystemstofunctioninanyaccidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ItsdesignbasisisthatoftheESFActuationSystem(ESFAS).UndervoltageconditionswhichoccurindependentofanyaccidentconditionsresultinthestartandbusconnectionoftheassociatedDG,butnoautomaticloadingoccurs.AccidentanalysescredittheloadingoftheDGbasedonthelossofoffsitepowerduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThemostlimitingDBAofconcernisthelargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)whichrequiresESFSystemsinordertomaintaincontainmentintegrityandprotectfuelcontainedwithinthereactorvessel(Ref.2).Thedetectionandprocessingofanundervoltagecondition,andsubsequentDGloading,hasbeenincludedinthedelaytimeassumedforeachESFcomponentrequiringDGsuppliedpowerfollowingaDBAandlossofoffsitepower.ThelossofoffsitepowerhasbeenassumedtooccureithercoincidentwiththeDBAoratalaterperiod(40to90secondsfollowingthereactortrip)duetoagriddisturbancecausedbytheturbinegeneratortrip.Ifthelossofoffsitepoweroccursatthesametimeasthesafetyinjection(SI)signalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheSIsignalwillactuatetheDGwithin2secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursbeforetheSIsignalparametersarereached,theaccident'analysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillactuatetheDGwithin2.75secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12.75secondstotaltime).Iftheloss.ofoffsitepoweroccursaftertheSIsignalparametersarereached(griddisturbance),theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillopenthefeederbreakertotheaffectedbuswithin2.75secondsandtheDGwillconnecttothebuswithinanadditional1.5seconds(DGwasactuatedbySIsignal).'Thegriddisturbancehasbeenevaluatedbasedona140'FpeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduringaLOCAanddemonstratedtoresultinacceptableconsequences.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-131DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentation83.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThedegradedvoltageandundervoltagesetpointsarebasedontheminimumvoltagerequiredforcontinuedoperationofESFSystemsassumingworstcaseloadingconditions(i.e.,maximumloadinguponDGsequencing).TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltagerelays,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:a0ActuatetheassociatedDGwithin2.75secondsasassumedintheaccidentanalysis;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailableandduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestassumedvoltagedropbelowthevoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheTripSetpointforthedegradedvoltagechannels,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations;a.Preventmotorssuppliedbythe480Vbusfromoperatingatreducedvoltageconditionsforlongperiodsoftime;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailable,andduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestvoltagedropbelowthemaximumvoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-132(continued)DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOrequiresthateach480VsafeguardsbushavetwoOPERABLEchannelsoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentationinNODES1,2,3,and4whentheassociatedDGsupportssafetysystemsassociatedwiththeESFAS.InNODES5and6,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsforeach480VsafeguardsbusmustbeOPERABLEwhenevertheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheautomaticstartoftheDGisavailablewhenneeded.LossoftheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctioncouldresultinthedelayofsafetysystemsinitiationwhenrequired.Thiscouldleadtounacceptableconsequencesduringaccidents.TheLOPstartinstrumentationisconsideredOPERABLEwhentwochannels,eachcomprisedofonedegradedvoltageandonelossofvoltagerelaysareavailableforeach480Vsafeguardsbus(i.e.,Bus14,16,17,and18).EachoftheLOPchannelsmustbecapableofdetectingundervoltageconditionswithinthevoltagelimitsandtimedelaysassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforthedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltageFunctionsarespecifiedinSR3.3.4.2.TheAllowableValuesspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethosesetpointswhichensurethattheassociatedDGwillactuatewithin2.75secondsonundervoltageconditions,andthattheDGwillnotactuateonmomentaryvoltagedropswhichcouldaffectESFactuationtimesasassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethenominalsetpointsselectedtoensurethatthesetpointmeasuredbytheSurveillancedoesnotexceedtheAllowableValueaccountingformaximuminstrumentuncertaintiesbetweenscheduledsurveillances.Therefore,LOPstartinstrumentationchannelsareOPERABLEwhentheCHANNELCALIBRATION"asleft"valueiswithintheTripSetpointlimitsandtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandTADOT"asfound"valueiswithintheAllowedValuesetpoints.ThebasisforallsetpointsiscontainedinReference3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-133(continued)DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctionsarerequiredinMODES1,2,3,and4becauseESFFunctionsaredesignedtoprovideprotectionintheseMODES.ActuationinMODE5or6isrequiredwhenevertherequi}edDGmustbeOPERABLEsothatitcanperformitsfunctiononanLOPordegradedpowertothe480Vsafeguardsbuses.ACTIONS'ntheeventarelay'sTripSetpointisfoundtobenonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthechannelisfoundtobeinoperable,thenthechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOConditionenteredasapplicable.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.ThisNotestatesthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.A.1I'IWith.oneormore480Vbus(es)withonechannelinoperable,RequiredActionA.1requirestheinoperablechannel(s)tobeplacedintripwithin6hours.Withanundervoltagechannelinthetrippedcondition,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsareconfiguredtoprovideaone-out-of-onelogictoinitiateatripoftheincomingoffsitepowerfortherespectivebus.TheremainingOPERABLEchanneliscomprisedofone-out-of-twologicfromthedegradedandlossofvoltagerelays.AnyadditionalfailureofeitherofthesetwoOPERABLErelaysrequiresentryintoConditionB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-134DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1ConditionBappliestotheLOPDGstartFunctionwhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAarenotmetorwithoneormore480Vbus(es)withtwochannelsofLOPstartinstrumentationinoperable.ConditionBrequiresimmediateentryintotheApplicableConditionsspecifiedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"orLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6,"fortheDGmadeinoperablebyfailureoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentation.TheactionsofthoseLCOsprovideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheSurveillancesaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethat,whenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto4hours,providedthesecondchannelmaintainstripcapability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe4hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedontheassumptionthat4hoursistheaveragetimerequiredtoperformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,the4hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.SR3.3.4.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31days.Thistestcheckstripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectly.Forthesetests,therelayTripSetpointsareverifiedandadjustedasnecessarytoensureAllowableValuescanstillbemet.The31dayFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftherelaysandcontrolsandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-135DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.4.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefuelingoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentationforeach480Vbus.Thevoltagesetpointverification,aswellasthetimeresponsetoalossofvoltageandadegradedvoltagetest,shallincludeasinglepoint'verificationthatthetripoccurswithintherequired.timedelay.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycleandisjustifiedbytheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.'.RGEEDesignAnalysisDA-EE-93-006-08,"480VoltUndervoltageRelaySettingsandTestAcceptanceCriteria."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-136DraftB LOPOGStartInstrumentation83.3.4Qayadad1VillageForillustrationonlyUVStgnatancgygusFigure83.3.4-1OGLOPInstrumentationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-137Draft8 ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.5ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDContainmentventilationisolationinstrumentationclosesthecontainmentisolationvalvesintheMini-PurgeSystemandtheShutdownPurgeSystem.Thisactionisolatesthecontainmentatmospherefromtheenvironmenttominimizereleasesofradioactivityintheeventofanaccident.TheMini-PurgeSystemmaybeusedinallMODESwhiletheShutdownPurgeSystemmayonlybeusedwiththereactorshutdown.Containmentventilationisolationinitiatesonacontainmentisolationsignal,containmentradiationsignal,orbymanualactuationofcontainmentspray(CS).TheBasesforLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"discussthecontainmentisolationandmanualcontainmentspraymodesofinitiation.Twocontainmentradiationmonitoringchannelsareprovidedasinputtothecontainmentventilationisolation.Thetworadiationdetectorsareofdifferenttypes:gaseous(R-12),andparticulate(R-II).Bothdetectorswillrespondtomosteventsthatreleaseradiationtocontainment.However,analyseshavenotbeenconductedtodemonstratethatallcredibleeventswillbedetectedbymorethanonemonitor.Therefore,forthepurposesofthisLCOthetwochannelsare.notconsideredredundant.Instead,theyaretreatedastwoone-out-of-oneFunctions.Sincetheradiationmonitorsconstituteasamplingsystem,variouscomponentssuchassamplelinevalves,samplelineheaters,samplepumps,andfiltermotorsarerequiredtosupportmonitorOPERABILITY.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-138DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheMini-PurgeSystemhasinnerandoutercontainmentisolationvalvesinitssupplyandexhaustductswhiletheShutdownPurgeSystemonlyhasonevalvelocatedoutsidecontainmentsincetheinsidevalvewasreplacedbyablindflangethatisusedduringMODES1,2,3,and4.Ahighradiationsignalfromanyoneofthetwochannelsinitiatescontainment'entilationisolation,whichclosesallisolationvalvesintheMini-PurgeSystemandtheShutdownPurgeSystem.ThesesystemsaredescribedintheBasesforLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysesassumethatthecontainmentremainsintactwithpenetrationsunnecessaryforaccidentmitigationfunctionsisolatedearlyintheevent,withinapproximately60seconds.Theisolationofthepurgevalveshasnotbeenanalyzedmechanisticallyinthedosecalculations,althoughitsrapidisolationisassumed.Thecontainmentventilationisolationradiationmonitorsactasbackuptothecontainmentisolationsignaltoensureclosingoftheventilationvalves.Theyarealsotheprimarymeansforautomaticallyisolatingcontainmentintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentduringshutdowneventhoughcontainmentisolationisnotspecificallycreditedforthisevent.Containmentisolationinturnensuresmeetingthecontainmentleakagerateassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses,andensuresthatthecalculatedaccidentoffsiteradiologicaldosesarebelow10CFR100(Ref.1)limits.ThecontainmentventilationisolationinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequirementsensurethattheinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiateContainmentVentilationIsolation,listedinTable3.3.5-1,isOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-139DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation83.3.5BASESLCOAutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelas2.TheLCOrequirestwotrainsofAutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysOPERABLEtoensurethatnosinglerandomfailurecanpreventautomaticactuation.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysconsistofthesamefeaturesandoperateinthesamemannerasdescribedforESFASFunction2.b,ContainmentSpray-ManualInitiation,andESFASFunction3,ContainmentIsolation.TheapplicableMODESandspecifiedconditionsforthecontainmentventilationisolationportionoftheseFunctionsaredifferentandlessrestrictivethanthosefortheirrespectiveCSandESFASroles.IfoneormoreoftheCSorcontainmentisolationFunctionsbecomesinoperableinsuchamannerthatonlytheContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionisaffected,theConditionsapplicabletotheirrespectiveisolationFunctionsinLCO3.3.2neednotbeentered.ThelessrestrictiveActionsspecifiedforinoperabilityoftheContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionsspecifysufficientcompensatorymeasuresforthiscase.ContainmentRadiationTheLCOspecifiestworequiredchannelsofradiationmonitors(R-llandR-12)toensurethattheradiationmonitoringinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiateContainmentVentilationIsolationremainsOPERABLE.Forsamplingsystems,channelOPERABILITYinvolvesmorethanOPERABILITYofthechannelelectronics.OPERABILITYmayalsorequirecorrectvalvelineups,samplepumpoperation,andfiltermotoroperation,aswellasdetectorOPERABILITY,ifthesesupportingfeaturesarenecessaryfortriptooccur.3.ContainmentIsolationRefertoLCO3.3.2,Function3,forallinitiatingFunctionsandre'quirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-140DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESLCO(continued)4.ContainmentSra-ManualInitiationRefertoLCO3.3.2,Function2.a,forallinitiatingFunctionsandrequirements.ThisFunctionprovidesthemanualinitiationcapabilityforcontainmentventilationisolation.APPLICABILITYTheAutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays,ContainmentIsolation,ContainmentSpray-ManualInitiation,andContainmentRadiationFunctionsarerequiredOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4,andduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Undertheseconditions,thepotentialexistsforanaccidentthatcouldreleasefissionproductradioactivityintocontainment.Therefore,thecontainmentventilationisolationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEintheseMODES.WhileinMODES5and6withoutfuelhandlinginprogress,thecontainmentventilationisolationinstrumentationneednotbeOPERABLEsincethepotentialforradioactivereleasesisminimizedandoperatoractionissufficienttoensurepost'ccidentoffsitedosesaremaintainedwithinthelimitsofReference1.lACTIONSThemostcommoncauseofchannelinoperabilityisoutrightfailureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesufficienttoexceedthetoleranceallowedbyplantspecificcalibrationprocedures.Typically,thedriftisfoundtobesmallandresultsinadelayofactuationratherthanatotallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymadeduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whentheprocessinstrumentationissetupforadjustmenttobringitwithinspecification.IftheTripSetpointislessconservativethanthetolerancespecifiedbythecalibrationprocedure,thechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableimmediatelyandtheappropriateConditionentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-141DraftB ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESACTIONS(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.5-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.A.lConditionAappliestothefailureofonecontainmentventilationisolationradiationmonitorchannel.Since'hetwocontainmentradiationmonitorsmeasuredifferentparameters,failureofasinglechannelmayresultinlossoftheradiationmonitoringFunctionforcertainevents.Consequently,thefailedchannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.The4hourallowedtorestoretheaffectedchannelisjustifiedbythelowlikelihoodofeventsoccurringduringthisinterval,andrecognitionthatoneormoreoftheremainingchannelswillrespondtomostevents.B.lConditionBappliestoallContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionsand'ddressesthetrainorientationofthesystemandthemasterandslaverelaysfortheseFunctions.Italsoaddressesthefailureofmultipleradiationmonitoringchannels,ortheinabilitytorestoreasinglefailedchanneltoOPERABLEstatusinthetimeallowedforRequiredActionA.l.Ifatrainisinoperable,multiplechannelsareinoperable,ortheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,operationmaycontinueaslongastheRequiredActionfortheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.6.3ismetforeachvalvemadeinoperablebyfailureofisolationinstrumentation.ANoteisaddedstatingthatConditionBisonlyapplicableinNODEI,2,3,or4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-142DraftB ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.IandC.2ConditionCappliestoallContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionsandaddressesthetrainorientationofthesystemandthemasterandslaverelaysfortheseFunctions.Italsoaddressesthefailureofmultipleradiationmonitoringchannels,ortheinabilitytorestoreasinglefailedchanneltoOPERABLEstatusinthetimeallowedforRequiredActionA.l.Ifatrainisinoperable,multiplechannelsareinoperable,ortheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,operationmaycontinueaslongastheRequiredActiontoplaceeachvalveinitsclosedpositionortheapplicableConditionsofLCO3.9.4,"ContainmentPenetrations,"aremetforeachvalvemadeinoperablebyfailureofisolationinstrumentation.TheCompletionTimefortheseRequiredActionsisImmediately.ANotestatesthatConditionCisapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSandduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.5-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctions.SR3.3.5.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery24hoursensuresthatagrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthe'twoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofsomethingevenmoreserious.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-143DraftB ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentation83.3.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.5.1(continued)Agreementcriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.5.2ACOTisperformedevery92daysoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.TheFrequencyisbasedonthestaffrecommendationforincreasingtheavailabilityofradiationmonitorsaccordingtoNUREG-1366(Ref.2).Thistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidethecontainmentventilationsystemisolation.Thesetpointshallbe.leftconsistentwiththecurrentplantspecificcalibrationproceduretolerance.SR3.3.5.3ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTEST.Allpossiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.Inaddition,themasterrelayistestedforcontinuity.ThisverifiesthatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEandthereisanintactvoltagesignalpathtothemasterrelaycoils.Thistestisperformedevery24months.TheSurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedoninstrumentreliabilityandindustryoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-144DraftB ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.5.4ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.NUREG-1366.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-145DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.6B3.3INSTRUHENTATION83.3.6ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheCREATSprovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontroltheplantfollowinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivity.ThissystemisdescribedintheBasesforLCO3.7.9,"ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(GREATS)."ThisLCOonlyaddressestheactuationinstrumentationforthehighradiationstateCREATSHodeF.ThehighradiationstateCREATSHodeFactuationinstrumentationconsistsofnoblegas(R-36),particulate(R-37),andiodine(R-38)radiationmonitors.ThesedetectorsarelocatedontheoperatinglevelontheTurbineBuildingandutilizeacommonairsupplypump.AhighradiationsignalfromanyofthesedetectorswillinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolateeachairsupplypathwithtwodampers.ThecontrolroomoperatorcanalsoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolatetheairsupplypathsbyusingamanualpushbuttoninthecontrolroom.APPLICABLEThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinSAFETYANALYSESthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.TheCREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinHODES1,2,3,and4,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.1).ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-146DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)InHODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.TheCREATSActuationInstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequirementsensurethatinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheGREATSisOPERABLE.1.HanualInitiationTheLCOrequiresonetraintobeOPERABLE.Thetrainconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogic.TheoperatorcaninitiatetheCREATSFiltrationtrainatanytimebyusingapushbuttoninthecontrolroom.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentsinthesamemannerasanyoftheautomaticactuationsignalsrequiredbythisLCO.2.AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasTheLCOrequiresonetrainofActuationLogicandActuationRelaystobeOPERABLE.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsystem,includingtheinitiationrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheCREATS.3.ControlRoomRadiationIntakeHonitorTheLCOspecifiessinglechannelsofiodine(R-38),noblegas(R-36),andparticulate(R-37)oftheControlRoomIntakeHonitorstoensurethattheradiationmonitoringinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolationdampersremainsOPERABLE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-147(continued)DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation83.3.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDesignBasisAccident.InMODE5or6,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSThemostcommoncauseofchannelinoperabilityisfailureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesufficienttoexceedthetoleranceallowedbytheplantspecificcalibrationprocedures;Typically,thedriftisfoundtobesmallandresultsinadelayofactuationratherthanatotallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymadeduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whentheprocessinstrumentationissetupforadjustmenttobringitwithinspecification.The"asleft"TripSetpointmustbewithinthetolerancespecifiedbythecalibrationprocedure.Ifthe"asfound"TripSetpoint.exceedsthelimitsspecifiedinTable3.3.5-1,thechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableimmediatelyandtheappropriateConditionentered.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONSindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.5-1intheaccompanyingLCO.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel/trainofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-148DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation83.3.6BASESACTIONS(continued)A.lConditionAappliestooneormoreFunctionswithonechanneloftheCREATSactuationinstrumentationinoperable.Ifoneormoreradiationmonitorchannels,themanualinitiationtrain,ortheautomaticactuation.logictrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithinIhourorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisConditionforthemanualinitiationtraininoperableoraradiationmonitorchannelinoperable,theremainingCREATSactuationinstrumentationisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbuttheactuationtimeorresponsivenessoftheCREATSmaybeaffected.InthisConditionfortheautomaticactuationlogictraininoperableorallradiationmonitorchannelsinoperable,theCREATSisnotcapableofperformingitsintendedautomaticfunction.Thisisconsideredalossofsafetyfunction.TheCREATS,however,maystillbecapableofbeingplacedinCREATSNodeFbymanualoperatoractions.TheIhourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaOBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoautomaticallyisolatethecontrolroomorbemanuallyisolatedbytheoperator.TheRequiredActionforConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-I49DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESACTIONS(continued)B.land8.2ConditionBapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetandtheplantisinMODEI,2,3,or4.TheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.lC.2andC.3ConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetinMODE5,or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoretheinoperablechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatustoensureadequateisolationcapabilityintheeventofawastegasdecaytankrupture.MovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesandCOREALTERATIONSmustalsobesuspendedimmediately'toreducetheriskofaccidentsthatwouldrequireCREATSactuation.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.6-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichCREATSActuationFunctions.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-150DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.6.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTonceevery92daysoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.ThistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidetheautomaticCREATSactuation.Thesetpointsshallbeleftconsistentwiththeplantspecificcalibrationproceduretolerance.TheFrequencyof92daysisbasedontheknownreliabilityofthemonitoringequipmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.6.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheManualActuationFunctionsevery24months.TheManualActuationFunctionistestedupto,andincluding,themasterrelaycoils.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionandtheredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsbecausetheManualInitiationFunctionhasnosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3.3.6.3ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifigsthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththe.typicalindustryrefuelingcycle.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-151DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation83.3.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.6.4ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTEST.AllpossiblelogiccombinationsaretestedfortheCREATSactuationinstrumentation.Inaddition,themasterrelayistestedforcontinuity.ThisverifiesthatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEandthereisanintactvoltagesignalpathtothemasterrelaycoils.Thistestisacceptablebasedoninstrumentreliabilityandoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-152Draft8

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.13.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsLCO3.4.1RCSDNBparametersforpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrateshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.-----NOTEPressurizerpressurelimitdoesnotapplyduringpressuretransientsdueto:a.THERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminute;orb.THERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreRCSDNBparametersnotwithinlimits.A.IRestoreRCSDNBparameter(s)towithinlimit.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.1BeinMODE2.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-1DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.1.1VerifypressurizerpressureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.4.1.2VerifyRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.'k12hoursSR3.4.1.3---NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafter~95%RTP.VerifyRCStotalflowrateiswithinthelimitspecified.intheCOLR.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-2DraftB RCSHinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.23.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityLCO3.4.2EachRCSloopaveragetemperature(T.,)shallbe~540F.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk,<<z1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.T.,inoneorbothRCSloopsnotwithinlimit.A.1BeinMODE2withK,ff<1.0.30minutesSURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEIL'LANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.2.1VerifyRCST,,ineachloop~540F.Within30minutespriortoachievingcriticality.SR3.4.2.2NOTEOnlyrequiredifanyRCSloopT,,<547FandthelowT.,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.VerifyRCST.,ineachloop~540'F.Oncewithin30minutesandevery30minutesthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-3DraftB RCSP/TLimits3.4.33.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsLCO3.4.3RCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:Atalltimes.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE---------RequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.A.1Restoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.AND30minutesRequirementsofLCOnotmetinMODEI,2,3,or4.A.2DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.72hoursB.Required,ActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.IANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE5withRCSpressure<500psig.36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-4DraftB RCSP/TLimits3.4.3ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME---------NOTE---------CRequiredActionC.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetanytimeinotherthanMODE1,2,3,or4.C.1ANDC.2Initiateactiontorestoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.ImmediatelyPriortoenteringMODE4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.3.1--NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperationsandRCSinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.VerifyRCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesarewithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.30minutesR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-5DraftB RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP3.4.43.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.4RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPLCO3.4.4TwoRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:NODE1>8.5%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsofLCOnotmet.A.lBeinMODE18.5%RTP.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.4.1.VerifyeachRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-6DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.53.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.5RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3LCO3.4.5TwoRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneloopshallbeinoperation.NOTEBothreactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedinMODE3for~1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.APPLICABILITY:MODES1~85%RTPMODES2and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRCSloopinoperable.K-------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1VerifySDMiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ANDA.2RestoreinoperableRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper12hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-7DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5ACTIONS'continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE4.12hoursC.BothRCSloopsinoperable.ORC.lDe-energizeallCRDMs.ANDImmediatelyNoRCSloopinoperation.C.2ANDSuspendall,operationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.ImmediatelyC.3InitiateactiontorestoreoneRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.5.1VerifyrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4:5.2Verifysteamgeneratorsecondarysidewaterlevelsare>16%fortwoRCSloops.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-8DraftB RCSLoops-MODESI~8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREauENCVSR3.4.5.3VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredRCPthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-9DraftB RCSLoops-MODE43.4.63.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4LCO3.4.6TwoloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSloopsandresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTESl.Allreactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfor~Ihourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.NoRCPshallbestartedwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a.Thesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachsteamgenerator(SG)is~50'faboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;orb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).APPLICABILITY:MODE4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-10DraftB RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRCSloopinoperable.ANDTwoRHRloopsinoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately'IB.OneRHRloopinoperable.AND Two.RCSloopsinoperable.-------------NOTE------------RequiredActionB.1isnotapplicableifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperableandConditionCisentered.B.lBeinMODE5.24hoursC.AllRCSandRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRCSorRHRloopinoperation.C.1ANDC.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreonelooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E:Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant3.4-11DraftB

RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.6.1VerifyoneRHRorRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.6.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelis~16%foreachrequiredRCSloop.12hoursSR3.4.6.3Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-12Draft8 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.73.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledELCO3.4.7Oneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation,andeither:a.OneadditionalRHRloopshallbeOPERABLE;orb.Thesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastonesteamgenerator(SG)shallbea16%.NOTES1.TheRHRpumpoftheloopinoperationmaybede-energizedfor<1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.OnerequiredRHRloopmaybeinoperablefor~2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.3.NoreactorcoolantpumpshallbestartedwithoneormoreRCScoldlegtemperatureslessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a.ThesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGis~50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;orb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).4.AllRHRloopsmayberemovedfromoperationduringplannedheatuptoMODE4whenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsfilled.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-13DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDBothSGssecondarysidewaterlevelsnotwithinlimits.A.lORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontorestorerequiredSGsecondarysidewaterlevelstowithinlimits.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.BothRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.lAND8:2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.7.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation..12hoursSR3.4.7.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelisz16%intherequiredSG.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-14DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continuedSURVEILLANCE~FRE(UENCYSR3.4.7.3VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-15DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.83.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLCO3.4.8Tworesidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTES1.AllRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfors15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanotherprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature;andc.NodrainingoperationstofurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumearepermitted.2.OneRHRloopmaybeinoperablefors2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsnotfilled.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.A.1Initiateactiontorestore,RHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-16DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.8ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.BothRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.1SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration.ANDB.2InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.8.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.8.2VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotheRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-17DraftB Pressurizer3.4.93.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.9PressurizerLCO3.4.9ThepressurizershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONS'ONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Pressurizerwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.l'einMODE3withreactortripbreakersopen.ANDA.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursB.Pressurizerheaterscapacitynotwithinlimits.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours'2hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-18DraftB Pressurizer3.4.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.9.1'erifypressurizerwaterleveliss87%.12hoursSR3.4.9.2Verifytotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis>100Kw.92daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-19DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.103.4REACTORCOOLANT'YSTEM(RCS)3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesLCO3.4.10TwopressurizersafetyvalvesshallbeOPERABLEwithliftsettings)2410psigand(2544psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3,MODE4withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable.A.1RestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.15minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.ORBothpressurizersafetyvalvesinoperable.B.1AND8.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4withanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-20DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.10SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.10.1NOTE-Requiredtobeperformedwithin36hoursofenteringHODE4fromHODE5withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemper'aturespecifiedinthePTLRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditionsonlyprovidedapreliminarycoldsettingwasmadepriortoheatup.VerifyeachpressurizersafetyvalveisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-21DraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.113.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)LCO3.4.11EachPORVandassociatedblockvalveshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES1.SeparateentryintoConditionAisallowedforeachPORV.2.SeparateentryintoConditionCisallowedforeachblockvalve.3.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneorbothPORVsOPERABLEandnotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled.A.1Closeandmaintainpowertoassociatedblockvalve.ORA.2PlaceassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-22Draft8 PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEB.OnePORVinoperable.B.lCloseassociatedblockvalve.1hourAND8.2Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve.1hourANDB.3RestorePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursC.Oneblockvalveinoperable.C.'1ANDPlaceassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.1hourC;2RestoreblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.7daysD.Bothblockvalvesinoperable.D.1PlaceassociatedPORVsinmanualcontrol.1hourANDD.2RestoreatleastoneblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-23DraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orDnotmet.E.lANDE.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursF.TwoPORVsinoperable.F.1ANDInitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyF.2Closeassociatedblockvalves.AND1hourF.3ANDRemovepowerfromassociatedblockvalves.1hourF.4BeinMODE3withT.,(5QQ'F8hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-24DraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.11SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.11.1NOTE-NotrequiredtobeperformedwithblockvalveclosedperLCO3.4.13.'erformacompletecycleofeachblockvalve.92daysSR3.4.11.2PerformacompletecycleofeachPORV.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-25DraftB LTOPSystem3.4.123.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEN(RCS)3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemLCO3.4.12AnLTOPSystemshallbeOPERABLEwiththeEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)accumulatorsisolatedandeitheraorbbelow.a.Twopoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)withliftsettingswithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLRandnosafetyinjection(SI)pumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.b.TheRCSdepressurizedandanRCSventof>1.1squareinchesandamaximumofoneSIpumpcapableofinjecting'ntotheRCS.----NOTES-1.ThePORVsandanRCSvent~1.1squareinchesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictests.However,noSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.2.ECCSaccumulatorisolationisonlyrequiredwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorwhentheRHRsystemisintheRHRmodeofoperation,MODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,MODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayand.pressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-26DraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA--------NOTE----------OnlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a.OneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.A.1InitiateactiontoverifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ImmediatelyB----------NOTE--------OnlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a.B.1RestorerequiredPORVtoOPERABLEstatus.'daysOnerequiredPORVinoperableinMODE4.C----------NOTE--------OnlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a.C;1RestorerequiredPORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursOnerequiredPORVinoperableinMODE5orMODE6.D----------NOTE--------OnlyapplicabletoLCO3.4;12.b.TwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.D.lInitiateactiontoverifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-27Draft8 LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.AnECCSaccumulatornotisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.E,lIsolateaffectedECCSaccumulator.1hourF.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionEnotmet.F.1,IncreaseRCScoldlegtemperaturetogreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.12hoursORF.2DepressurizeaffectedaccumulatortolessthanthemaximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-28DraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEG.TworequiredPORVsinoperableforLCO3.4.12.a.ORG.lANDVerifyatleastonechargingpumpisinthepull-stopposition.1hourRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orFnotmet.ORLTOPSysteminoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,B,C,orE.G.2DepressurizeRCSandestablishRCSventofa1.1squareinches.8hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.1-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.a.VerifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-29DraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.12.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hoursSR3.4.12.3NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenECCSaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.VerifyeachECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.Oncewithin12hoursandevery12hoursthereafterSR3.4.12.4NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyRCSventa1.1squareinchesopen.12hoursforunlockedopenventvalve(s)AND31daysforlockedopenventvalve(s)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-30DraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.5VerifyPORVblockvalveisopenforeachrequiredPORV.72hoursSR3.4.12.6NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.PerformaCOToneachrequiredPORV,excludingactuation.31daysSR3.4.12.7-NOTE-------------OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenECCSaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.VerifypowerisremovedfromeachECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperator.Oncewithin12hoursandevery31daysthereafterSR3.4.12.8PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachrequiredPORVactuationchannel.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-31DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.133.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGELCO3.4.13RCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE;b.1gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.10gpmidentifiedLEAKAGE;andd.0.1gpmtotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEthrougheachsteamgenerator(SG)whenav'eragedover24hours.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.RCSLEAKAGEnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.A.lReduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimits.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.ORRCSpressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists.B.lANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlant3.4-32DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.13.1-NOTE--------------------Onlyrequiredtobeperformedduringsteadystateoperation.PerformRCSwaterinventorybalance.Onceduringinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationAND72hoursthereafterSR3.4.13.2VerifysteamgeneratortubeintegrityisinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-33DraftB 3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageRCSPIVLeakage3.4.14LCO3.4.14LeakagefromeachRCSPIVshallbewithinlimit.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONS-NOTES1.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachflowpath.2.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyaninoperablePIV.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreflowpathswithleakagefromoneormoreRCSPIVsnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------EachvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionA.2musthavebeenverifiedtomeetSR3.4.14.1orSR3.4.14.2andbeinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-34DraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.l4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.lIsolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofoneclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.4hoursANDA.2Isolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofasecondclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.IANDBeinMODE3.6hours8.2BeinMODE5.36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-35DraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.1-NOTES1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringMODE2fromMODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIcoldleginjectionlineandeachRHRRCSPIVisequivalentto~0.5gpm'ernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressurez2215psigands2255psig.24monthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalve(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-36DraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.14.2-NOTES-1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringHODE2fromHODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuateddur'ingtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIhotleginjectionlineRCSPIVisequivalenttos0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure~2215psigands2255psig.40monthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flow.throughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalveR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-37DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.153.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationLCO3.4.15ThefollowingRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationshallbeOPERABLE:a.OnecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuation);and'.Onecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(gaseousorparticulate).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.l.1PerformSR3.4.13.1.ORA.1.2Verifycontainmentaircooler-condensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLE.ANDA.2RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper24hours24hours30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-38DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Requiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.-----------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.B.l.1Analyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.OROnceper24hoursB.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1.Onceper24hoursAND8.2RestorerequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-39DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.ANDParticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.C.1.1Analyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.ORC.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1Onceper24hoursOnceper24hoursANDC.2.1RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysORC.2.2RestoreparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.lANDD.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.Allrequiredmonitorsinoperable.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-40DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYkSR3.4.15.1PerformCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.12hoursSR3.4.15.2PerformCOToftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.92daysSR3.4.15.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitor.24monthsSR3.4.15.4PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-41DraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.163.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityLCO3.4.16Thespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:HODES1and2,NODE3withRCSaveragetemperature(T,,)>500F.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivitynotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.lANDVerifyDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131withintheacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.Onceper8hoursA.2RestoreDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131towithinlimit.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.ORDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivityintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.B.lBeinHODE3withT,,(500'F.8hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-42DraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Grossspecificactivitynotwithinlimit.C.lBeinMODE3withT,<500F.8hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.16.1Verifyreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivity~100/EpCi/gm;7daysSR3.4.16.2NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1.VerifyreactorcoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivity~1.0pCi/gm.14daysANDBetween2and10hoursafteraTHERMALPOWERchangeof>15%RTPwithina1hourperiod(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-43DraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEfREQUENCYSR3.4.16.3NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1.DetermineEfromareactorcoolantsample.Oncewithin31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofMODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalfor>48hours.ANDEvery184daysthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-44DraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16300O8250200tlMM1508100ACCCFXhBLÃOPXRLTIORmumcruxaszxOPZRLTLOW006uIM2030405060708090100PXRCEÃTOl'OTEDTHECALPCNERFigure3.4.16-1ReactorCoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131SpecificActivityLimitVersusPercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-45DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEN(RCS)B3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheseBasesaddressrequirementsformaintainingRCSpressure,temperature,andflowratewithinlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalyses(Ref.1)ofnormaloperatingconditionsandanticipatedoperat'ionaloccurrencesassumeinitialconditionswithinthenormalsteadystateenvelope.ThelimitsplacedonRCSpressure,temperature,andflowrateensurethatthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designcriterionwillbemetforeachofthetransients'nalyzed.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswith"theWRB-2correlation.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigher'thanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-1DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-1andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationisappliedintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30.TheRCSpressurelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithoperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Pressurizerpressureindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerpressurewillcausethereactorcoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithfullpoweroperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Indicationsoftemperatureareaveragedtodetermineavalueforcomparisontothelimit.A.higheraveragetemperaturewillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCSflowrateasspecifiedintheCOLR,normallyremainsconstantduringanoperationalfuelcyclewithbothpumpsrunning.TheminimumRCSflowlimitcorrespondstothatassumedforDNBanalyses.Flowrateindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerRCSFlowwillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.OperationforsignificantperiodsoftimeoutsidetheseDNBlimitsincreasesthelikelihoodofafuelcladdingfailureinaDNBlimitedevent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-2(continued)DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherequirementsofthisLCOrepresenttheinitialconditionsforDNBlimitedtransientsanalyzedintheplantsafetyanalyses(Ref.I).ThesafetyanalyseshaveshownthattransientsinitiatedfromthelimitsofthisLCOwillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion.ThisistheacceptancelimitfortheRCSDNBparameters.ChangestotheplantthatcouldimpacttheseparametersmustbeassessedfortheirimpactontheDNBdesigncriterion.Thetransientsanalyzedincludelossofcoolantfloweventsanddroppedorstuckrodevents.AkeyassumptionfortheanalysisoftheseeventsisthatthecorepowerdistributioniswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)."Thelimitforpressurizerpressureisbasedona+30psiginstrumentuncertainty.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatnominalpressureismaintainedat2235psig.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedpressureis2235psig.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitisbasedona+O'Finstrumentuncertaintywhichincludesa+1.5'Fdeadband.It,isassumedthatnominalT,,ismaintainedwithin+1.5'Fof573.5'F.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedtemperatureiswithin1.5'Fof.nominal.ThelimitforRCSflowrateisbasedonthenominalT,,andSGpluggingcriterialimit.Additionalmarginofapproximately3%isthenaddedforconservatism.TheRCSDNBparameterssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOspecifieslimitsonthemonitoredprocessvariables-pressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrate-toensurethecoreoperateswithinthelimitsassumedin'thesafetyanalyses.Operatingwithin'he'selimitswillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion'ntheeventofaDNBlimitedtransient.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-3Draft8

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3;4.1BASESLCO(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethelimitonpressurizerpressureisnotapplicableduringshorttermoperationaltransientssuchasaTHERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminuteoraTHERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.Theseconditionsrepresentshorttermperturbationswhereactionstocontrolpressurevariationsmightbecounterproductive.Also,sincetheyrepresenttransientsinitiatedfrompowerlevels<100%RTP,anincreasedDNBRmarginexiststooffsetthetemporarypressurevariations.AnothersetoflimitsonDNBrelatedparametersisprovidedinSL2.1.1,"ReactorCoreSLs."ThoselimitsarelessrestrictivethanthelimitsofthisLCO,butviolationofaSafetyLimit(SL)meritsastricter,moresevereRequiredAction.ShouldaviolationofthisLCOoccur,theoperatormustcheck.whetherornotanSLmayhavebeenexceeded.APPLICABILITYInMODE1,thelimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCScoolantaveragetemperature,andRCSflowratemustbemaintainedduringsteadystateoperationinordertoensureDNBdesigncriteriawillbemetintheeventofanunplannedlossof.forcedcoolantfloworotherDNBlimitedtransient.InMODE2,anincreasedDNBRmarginexists.InallotherMODES,thepowerlevelislowenoughthatDNBisnotaconcern.ACTIONSA.lRCSpressureandRCSaveragetemperaturearecontrollableandmeasurableparameters.WithoneorbothoftheseparametersnotwithinLCOlimits,action'mustbetakentorestoreparameter(s).RCStotalflowrateisnotacontrollableparameterandisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperation.IftheindicatedRCStotalflowrateisbelowtheLCOlimit,powermustbereduced,asrequiredbyRequiredActionB.1,torestoreDNBmarginandeliminatethepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-4DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)The2hourCompletionTimeforrestorationoftheparametersprovidessufficienttimetodeterminethecausefortheoffnormalcondition,toadjustplantparameters,andtorestorethereadingswithinlimits,andisbasedonplantoperatingexperience.B.lIfRequiredActionA.1isnotmetwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2within6hours.InMODE2,thereducedpowerconditioneliminatesthepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonabletoreachtherequiredplantconditionsinanorderlymanner.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.1.1SinceRequiredActionA.lallowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforpressurizerpressure"issufficienttoensurethepressurecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-5DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.1.2SinceRequiredActionA.1allowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforRCSaveragetemperatureissufficienttoensurethetemperaturecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.SR3.4.1.3MeasurementofRCStotalflowrateonceevery24monthsverifiestheactualRCSflowrateisgreaterthanorequaltotheminimumrequiredRCSflowrate.Thisverificationmaybeperformedviaaprecisioncalorimetricheatbalanceorotheracceptedmeans.TheFrequencyof24monthsreflectstheimportanceofveri'fyingflowafterarefuelingoutagewhenthecorehasbeenaltered,whichmayhavecausedanalterationofflowresistance.VerificationofRCSflowrateonashorterintervalisnotrequiredsincethisparameterisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperationastherearenoRCSloopisolationvalvesorotherinstalleddeviceswhichcouldsignificantlyalterflow.Reducedperformanceofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)wouldbeobservableduetobusvoltageandfrequencychanges,andinstalledalarmsthatwouldresultinoperatorinvestigation.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoMODE1,withouthavingperformedtheSR,andplacementoftheplantinthebestconditionforperformingtheSR.TheNotestatesthattheSRshallbeperformedwithin7daysafterreaching95%RTP.Thisexceptionisappropriatesincetheheatbalancerequirestheplanttobeataminimumof95%RTPtoobtainthestatedRCSflowaccuracies.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-6(continued)DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits83.4.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NRCMemorandumfromE.L.Jordan,AssistantDirectorforTechnicalPrograms,DivisionofReactorOperationsInspectiontoDistribution;

Subject:

"DiscussionofLicensedPowerLevel(AITSF14580H2),"datedAugust22,1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-7Draft8 RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEN(RCS)B3.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisbaseduponmeetingseveralmajorconsiderationsbeforethereactorcanbemadecriticalandwhilethereactoriscritical.Thefirstconsiderationismoderatortemperaturecoefficient(HTC),LCO3.1.3,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)."Inthetransientandaccidentanalyses,theHTCisassumedtobeinarangefromslightlypositivetonegativeandtheoperatingtemperatureisassumedtobewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopewhilethereactoriscritical.TheLCOonminimumtemperatureforcriticalityhelpsensuretheplantisoperatedconsistentwiththeseassumptions.Thesecondconsiderationistheprotectiveinstrumentation.Becausecertainprotectiveinstrumentation(e.g.,excoreneutrondetectors)canbeaffectedbymoderatortemperature,'temperaturevaluewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosentoensureproperindicationandresponse'hilethereactoriscritical.Thethirdconsiderationisthepressurizeroperatingcharacteristics.Thetransientandaccidentanalysesassumethatthepressurizeriswithinitsnormalstartupandoperatingrange(i.e.,saturatedconditionsandsteambubblepre'sent).ItisalsoassumedthattheRCStemperatureiswithinitsnormalexpectedrangeforstartupandpoweroperation.SincethedensityoftheRCSwater,andhencetheresponseof'thepressurizertotransients,dependsupontheinitialtemperatureofthemoderator,aminimumvalueformoderatortemperaturewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosen.Thefourthconsiderationisthatthereactorvesselisaboveitsminimumnilductilityreferencetemperaturewhenthereactoriscritical.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-8(continued)DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAlthoughtheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotitselfaninitialconditionassumedinDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs),thecloselyalignedtemperatureforhotzeropower(HZP)isaprocessvariablethatisaninitialconditionofDBAs,suchastherodclustercontrolassembly(RCCA)withdrawal,RCCAejection,andmainsteamlinebreakaccidentsperformedatzeropowerthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.AlllowpowersafetyanalysesassumeinitialRCSlooptemperaturesgreaterthanorequaltotheHZPtemperatureof547F.Theminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimitationprovidesasmallband,7'F,forcriticaloperationbelowHZP.ThisbandallowscriticaloperationbelowHZPduringplantstartupanddoesnotadverselyaffectanysafetyanalysessincetheMTCisnotsignificantlyaffectedbythesmalltemperaturedifferencebetweenHZPandtheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitysatisfies.Criterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOCompliancewiththeLCOensuresthatthereactorwillnotbemadeormaintainedcritical(k,<<z1.0)atatemperaturelessthanasmallbandbelowtheHZPtemperature,whichisassumedinthesafetyanalysis.FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYInMODEI,andMODE2withk,<<~1.0,LCO3.4.2isapplicablesincethereactorcanonlybecritical(k,<<~1.0)intheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-9DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ThespecialtestexceptionofLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2,"permitsPHYSICSTESTStobeperformedats5%RTPwithRCSloopaveragetemperaturesslightlylowerthannormallyallowedsothatfundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthecorecanbeverified.Inorderfornuclearcharacteristicstobeaccuratelymeasured,itmaybenecessarytooperateoutsidethenormalrestrictionsofthisLCO.Forexample,tomeasuretheMTCatbeginningofcycle,itisnecessarytoallowRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowT.~,whichmaycauseRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowthetemperaturelimitofthisLCO.TheneedtoperformthePHYSICSTESTStoensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwithdesignpredictionsprovides'ufficientjustificationtoallowatemporarydecreaseintheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimit.ACTIONSA.lIftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitcannotberestored,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnot.apply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withK,<<<1.0within30minutes.Rapidreactorshutdowncanbereadilyandpracticallyachievedwithina30minuteperiodduetotheproximitytoMODE2conditions.Theallowedtimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE2withK,<<<1.0inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplan'tsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS.SR3.4.2.1ThisSRverifiesthatRCST,,ineachloopis~540Fwithin30minutespriortoachievingcriticality.Thisensuresthattheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisbeingmaintainedjustbeforecriticalityisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-10DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.2.2(continued)RCSloopaveragetemperatureisrequiredtobeverifiedatorabove540'Fevery30minutesinMODE1,andinMODE2withk,<<~1.0.The30minutetimeperiodislongenoughtoallowtheoperatortoadjusttemperaturesordelaycriticalitysotheLCOwillnotbeviolated,therebyprovidingassurancethatthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequirestheSRtobeperformedifanyRCSloopT.,is<547FandthelowT,,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.TheT.,alarmprovidesoperatorindicationoflowRCStemperaturewithoutrequiringindependentverificationwhileaT.,>547'FinbothRCSloopsiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.IftheT.,alarmistobeusedforthisSR,itshouldbecalibratedconsistentwithindustrystandards.ThissurveillanceisreplacedbySR3.1.8.2duringPHYSICSTESTING.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-11DraftB RCSP/TLimits83.4.3B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDAllcomponentsoftheRCSaredesignedtowithstandeffectsofcyclicloadsduetosystempressureandtemperaturechanges.Theseloadsareintroducedbystartup(heatup)andshutdown(cooldown)operations,powertransients,andreactortrips.ThisLCOlimitsthepressureandtemperaturechangesduringRCSheatupandcooldown,withinthedesignassumptionsandthestresslimitsforcyclicoperation.ThePTLRcontainsP/Tlimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,inserviceleakandhydrostatic(ISLH)testing,anddataforthemaximumrateofchangeofreactorcoolanttemperature(Ref.I).EachP/Tlimitcurvedefinesanacceptableregionfornormaloperation.Theusualuseofthecurvesisoperationalguidanceduringheatuporcooldownmaneuvering,whenpressureandtemperatureindicationsaremonitoredandcomparedtotheapplicablecurvetodeterminethatoperationiswithintheallowableregion.TheLCOestablishesoperatinglimitsthatprovideamargintobrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandpipingofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).Thevesselisthecomponentmostsubjecttobrittlefailure,andtheLCOlimitsapplymainlytothevessel.Thelimitsdo.notapplytothepressurizer,whichhasdifferentdesigncharacteristicsandoperatingfunctions.10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2),requirestheestablishmentofP/TlimitsforspecificmaterialfracturetoughnessrequirementsoftheRCPBmaterials.Reference2requiresanadequatemargintobrittlefailureduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andsystemhydrostatictests.ItmandatestheuseoftheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)Code,SectionIII,AppendixG(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-12DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theneutronembrittlementeffectonthematerialtoughnessisreflectedbyincreasingthenilductilityreferencetemperature(RT>>)asexposuretoneutronfluenceincreases.TheactualshiftintheRT>>~ofthevesselmaterialhasbeenestablishedbyperiodicallyremovingandevaluatingtheirradiatedreactorvesselmaterialspecimens,inaccordancewithASTHE185(Ref.4)andAppendixHof10CfR50(Ref.5).TheoperatingP/TlimitcurveshavebeenadjustedbasedontheevaluationfindingsandtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.99(Ref.6).TheP/Tlimitcurvesarecompositecurvesestablishedbysuperimposinglimitsderivedfromstressanalysesofthoseportionsofthereactorvesselandheadthatarethemostrestrictive.Atanyspecificpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchange,onelocationwithinthereactorvesselwilldictatethemostrestrictivelimit.AcrossthespanoftheP/Tlimitcurves,differentlocationsaremorerestrictive,and,thus,thecurvesarecompositesofthemostrestrictiveregions.The,heatupcurverepresentsadifferentsetofrestrictionsthanthecooldowncurvebecausethedirectionsofthethermalgradientsthroughthevesselwallarereversed.Thethermalgradientreversalaltersthelocationofthetensilestressbetweentheouterandinnerwalls.ThecriticalitylimitcurveincludestheReference2requirementthatitbez40'Fabovetheheatupcurveorthecooldowncurve,andnotlessthantheminimumpermissibletemperatureforISLHtesting.However,thecriticalitycurveisnotoperationallylimiting;amorerestrictivelimitexistsinLCO3.4.2,"RCSHinimumTemperatureforCriticality."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-13DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheconsequenceofviolatingtheLCOlimitsisthattheRCShasbeenoperatedunderconditionsthatcanresultinbrittlefailureoftheRCPB,possiblyleadingtoanonisolableleakorlossofcoolantaccident.Intheeventtheselimitsareexceeded,anevaluationmustbeperformedtodeterminetheeffectonthestructuralintegrityoftheRCPBcomponents.TheASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),providesarecommendedmethodologyforevaluatinganoperatingeventthatcausesanexcursionoutsidethelimits.APPLICABLETheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromDesignBasisAccidentSAFETYANALYSES(DBA)analyses.Theyareprescribedduringnormaloperationtoavoidencounteringpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchangeconditionsthatmightcauseundetectedflawstopropagateandresultinnonductilefailureoftheRCPBwhichisanunanalyzedcondition.ReferenceIestablishesthemethodologyfordeterminingtheP/Tlimits.AlthoughtheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromanyDBA,theP/Tlimitsareacceptancelimitssincetheyprecludeoperation,inanunanalyzedcondition.RCSP/TlimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThetwoelementsofthisLCOare:a.Thelimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting;andb.Limitsontherateofchangeoftemperature.TheLCOlimitsapplytoallcomponentsoftheRCS,exceptthepressurizer.Theselimitsdefineallowableoperatingregionsandpermitalargenumberofoperatingcycleswhileprovidingawidemargintononductilefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB'3.4-14Draft8 RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESLCO(continued)Thelimitsfortherateofchangeoftemperaturecontrolthethermalgradientthroughthevesselwallandareusedasinputsforcalculatingtheheatup,cooldown,andISLHtestingP/Tlimitcurves.Thus,theLCOfortherateofchangeoftemperaturerestrictsstressescausedbythermalgradientsandalsoensuresthevalidityoftheP/Tlimitcurves.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsplacesthereactorvesseloutsideoftheboundsofthestressanalysesandcanincreasestressesinotherRCPBcomponents.Theconsequencesdependonseveralfactors,asfollow:a0b.C.TheseverityofthedeparturefromtheallowableoperatingP/Tregimeortheseverityoftherateofchangeoftemperature;Thelengthoftimethelimitswereviolated(longerviolationsallowthetemperaturegradientinthethickvesselwallstobecomemorepronounced);andTheexistences,sizes,andorientationsofflawsinthevesselmaterial.APPLICABILITYTheRCSP/TlimitsLCOprovidesadefinitionofacceptableoperationforpreventionofnonductilefailureinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2).AlthoughtheP/Tlimitsweredevelopedtoprovideguidanceforoperationduringheatuporcooldown(MODES3,4,and5)orISLHtesting,theirApplicabilityisatalltimesinkeepingwiththeconcernfornonductilefailure.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-15Draft8 RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)DuringMODES1and2,otherTechnicalSpecificationsprovidelimitsforoperationthatcanbemorerestrictivethanorcansupplementtheseP/Tlimits.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality";andSafetyLimit2.1,"SafetyLimits,"alsoprovideoperationalrestrictionsforpressureandtemperature.Furthermore,MODES1and2areabovethetemperaturerangeofconcernfornonductilefailure,andstressanalyseshavebeenperformedfornormalmaneuveringprofiles,suchaspowerascensionordescent.ACTIONSA.1andA.2OperationoutsidetheP/TlimitsduringMODE1,2,3,or4mustbecorrectedsothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedby.stressanalyses.The30minuteCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyof.restoringtheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Mostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedinthistimeinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifytheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingoperation.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,newanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoaccomplishtheevaluation.Theevaluationforamildviolationispossiblewithinthistime,butmoresevereviolationsmayrequirespecial,eventspecificstressanalysesorinspections.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingtooperate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-16DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)ConditionAismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatRequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionA.lisinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.B.landB.2IfaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,theplantmust.beplacedinalowerMODEbecauseeithertheRCSremainedinanunacceptableP/Tregionforanextendedperiodofincreasedstressorasufficientlysevereeventcausedentryintoanunacceptableregion.EitherpossibilityindicatesaneedformorecarefulexaminationoftheeventwhichisbestaccomplishedwiththeRCSatreducedpressureandtemperature.Inreducedpressureandtemperatureconditions,thepossibilityofpropagationwithundetectedflawsisdecreased.Iftherequiredrestorationactivitycannotbeaccomplishedwithin30minutes,RequiredActionB.1andRequiredActionB.2mustbeimplementedtoreducepressureandtemperature.Iftherequiredevaluationforcontinuedoperationcannotbeaccomplishedwithin72hoursortheresultsareindeterminateorunfavorable,actionmustproceedtoreducepressureandtemperatureasspecifiedinRequiredActionB.1andRequiredActionB.2.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedanddocumentedbeforereturningtooperatingpressureandtemperatureconditions.PressureandtemperaturearereducedbybringingtheplanttoMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5withRCSpressure<500psigwithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-17DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2ActionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytocorrectoperationoutsideoftheP/TlimitsattimesotherthanwheninMODEl,2,3,or4,sothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalysis.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyof'nitiatingactiontorestoretheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Mostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedquicklyinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifythattheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedpriortoentryintoMODE4.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASMECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoterequiringRequiredActionC.2tobecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionC.1isinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.3.1VerificationthatoperationiswithinthePTLRlimitsis.requiredevery30minuteswhenRCSpressureandtemperatureconditionsareundergoingplannedchanges.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofthecontrolroomindicationavailabletomonitorRCSstatus.'lso,sincetemperaturerateofchangelimitsarespecifiedinhourlyincrements,30minutespermitsassessmentandcorrectionforminordeviationswithinareasonabletime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-18DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.3.1(continued)Surveillanceforheatup,cooldown,orISLHtestingmaybediscontinuedwhenthedefinitiongivenintherelevantplantprocedureforendingtheactivityissatisfied.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequiresthisSRtobeperformedduringsystemheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting.NoSRisgivenforcriticalityoperationsbecauseLCO3.4.2containsamorerestrictiverequirement.REFERENCES1,MCAP-14040,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"Revision1,December1994.2.10CFR50,AppendixG.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,AppendixG.4.ASTME185-82,July1982.5.10CFR50,AppendixH.6.RegulatoryGuide1.99,Revision2,May1988.7.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,AppendixE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-19DraftB RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPB3.4.4B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.4RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimaryfunctionoftheRCSisremovaloftheheatgeneratedinthefuelduetothefissionprocess,andtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerators(SGs),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission;b.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector;c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.Thereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,.areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforbothcontrolandprotection.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsinktotheisolatedsecondarycoolant.TheRCPscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.Thisforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolantensuresmixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrol.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalysescontain-variousassumptionsforthedesignbasesaccidentinitialconditionsincludingRCSpressure,RCStemperature,reactorpowerlevel,coreparameters,andsafetysystemsetpoints.TheimportantaspectforthisLCOisthereactorcoolantforcedflowrate,whichisrepresentedbythenumberofRCSloopsinservice.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-20DraftB RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Bothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThetransientandaccidentanalysesfortheplanthavebeenperformedassumingbothRCSloopsareinoperation.Themajorityoftheplantsafetyanalysesarebasedoninitialconditionsathighcorepowerorzeropower.TheaccidentanalysesthataremostimportanttoRCPoperationarethetwopumpcoastdown,singlepumplockedrotor,singlepump(brokenshaftorcoastdown),androdwithdrawalevents(Ref.1);SteadystateDNBanalysishasbeenperformedforthetwoRCSloopoperation.FortwoRCSloopoperation,thesteadystateDNBanalysis,whichgeneratesthepressureandtemperatureSafetyLimit(SL)(i.e.,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)limit)assumesamaximumpowerlevelof109%RTP.ThisisthedesignoverpowerconditionfortwoRCSloopoperation.Thevaluefortheaccidentanalysissetpointofthenuclearoverpower(highflux)tripis118%andisbasedonananalysisassumptionthatboundsallpossibleinstrumentationerrors(Ref.2).TheDNBRlimitdefinesalocusofpressureandtemperaturepointsthatresultinaminimumDNBRgreaterthanorequaltothecriticalheatfluxcorrelationlimit.TheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothRCSloopsinoperationtomaintainDNBRabovetheSL,duringa'llnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.Byensuringheattransferinthenucleateboilingregion,adequateheattransferisprovidedbetweenthefuelcladdingandthereactorcoolant.Adequateheattransferbetweenthereactorcoolantandthesecondarysideisensuredbymaintaining>16%SGlevelinaccordancewithLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation,"whichprovidessufficientwaterinventorytocovertheSGtubes.RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-21(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequireanadequateforcedflowrateforcoreheatremoval.FlowisrepresentedbythenumberofRCPsinoperationforremovalofheatbytheSGs.TomeetsafetyanalysisacceptancecriteriaforDNB,twopumpsarerequiredtobeinoperationatratedpower.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPinoperationprovidingforcedflowforheattransportandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.APPLICABILITYInMODEI>8.5%RTP,thereactoriscriticalandthushasthepotentialto'producemaximumTHERMALPOWER.Thus,toensurethattheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesremainvalid,bothRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationinthisMODEtopreventDNBandcoredamage.Thedecayheatproductionrateismuchlowerthanthefullpowerheatrate.Assuch,theforcedcirculationflowandheatsinkrequirementsarereducedforlowerMODESasindicatedbytheLCOsforMODESI~8.5%RTP,2,3,4,and5.OperationLCO3.4',LCO3.4.6,LCO"3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.4,LCO3.9.5)inotherMODESiscoveredby:"RCSLoops-MODESI~8.5%RTPp2pAND3"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval,(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.lIftherequirementsoftheLCOarenotmet,the.Required'ctionistoreducepowerandbringtheplanttoMODEI<8.5%RTP.ThislowerspowerlevelandthusreducesthecoreheatremovalneedsandminimizesthepossibilityofviolatingDNBlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-22DraftB RCSLoops-HODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE1<8.5%RTPfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingsafetysystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremovalwhilemaintainingthemargintoDNB.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.UFSAR,Section15.0.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-23DraftB RCSLoops-MODESI~8.5%RTP,2,and3B3.4.5B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.5RCSLoops-MODESIs8.5%RTP,2,AND3BASESBACKGROUNDInMODEI~8.5%RTP,andinMODE2and3,theprimaryfunctionoftheRCSistheremovalofdecayheatandtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerator(SG),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission(MODEI~8.5%RTPandHODE2only);b.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector(MODEI~8.5%RTPandMODE2only);c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloops,connectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPscirculatethewaterthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.InMODEI~8.5%RTPandMODE2,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoensuremixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrolandtoremovethelimitedamountofreactorheat.InMODE3,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationforheatremovalduringheatupandcooldown.TheMODEI~8.5%RTP,2,and3reactoranddecayheatremovalrequirementsarelowenoughthatasingleRCSloopwithone,RCPrunningissufficienttoremovecoredecayheat.However,twoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensureredundantcapabilityfordecayheatremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-24(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESBothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).InMODE1~8.5%RTP,andinMODES2and3,theseanalysesincludeevaluationofmainsteamlinebreaksanduncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromasubcriticalcondition.Themostlimitingaccidentwithrespectto'DNBlimitsforMODES1~8.5%RTP,2,and3isamainsteamlinebreak.Thisisduetothepotential'Forrecriticalityandbecauseofthehighhotchannelfactorsthatmayexistifthemostreactivecontrolrodisstuckinitsfullywithdrawnposition.AmainsteamlinebreakhasbeenanalyzedforboththecasewithoneandtwoRCSloopsinoperationathotzeropower(HZP)conditionswithacceptableresults(Ref.1).However,withonlyoneRCSloopinoperationandoffsitepoweravailable,additionalshutdownmarginisrequiredsincethereducedflowproducesanadverseeffectonDNBlimits.Thestartupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP)upto8.5%RTPhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtoresultinonlylimitedpowerandtemperatureexcursionsthatareboundedbyamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSLoopinoperati.on(Refs.2and3).Analyseshavealsobeenperformedwhichdemonstratethatreactorheatgreaterthan5%RTPcanberemovedbynaturalcirculationalone(Ref.4).Failuretoprovidedecayheatremovalmayresultinchallengestoafissionproductbarrier.TheRCSloopsarepartoftheprimarysuccesspaththatfunctionsoractuatestopreventormitigateaDesignBasisAccidentortransientthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.RCSLoops-MODES1z8.5%RTP,2,and3satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-25(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODESI~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatbothRCSloopsbeOPERABLE.OnlyoneRCSloopinoperationisnecessarytoensureremovalofdecayheatfromthecoreandhomogenousboronconcentrationthroughouttheRCSupto8.5%RTP.AnadditionalRCSloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsafetyanalyseslimitsaremet.RequiringoneRCSloopinoperationensuresthattheSafetyLimitcriteriawillbemetforallofthepostulatedaccidents.\TheNotepermitsallRCPstobede-energizedforsIhourper8hourperiodinMODE3.ThepurposeoftheNoteistoperformteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.'neofthesetestsisvalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurveusedasinputtoanumberofaccidentanalysesincludingalossofflowaccident.Thistestwassatisfactorilyperformedduringtheinitialstartuptestingprogram(Ref.5).If,however,changesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesofthecoastdowncurvemustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.Aswiththevalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurve,thistestshouldbeperformedonlyonceunlesstheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCSarechanged.TheIhourtimeperiodspecifiedisadequatetoperformthedesiredtests,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationoftheNoteispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a~NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,therebymaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-26DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESLCO(continued)b.Coreoutl,ettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.5.2.AnRCPisOPERABLEifitiscapableofbeingpoweredandabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovereactoranddecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO'.4.8,LCO3.9.4,LCO3.9.5,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRCSloopisinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.TheRequiredActionsaretoverifythattheSDMiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThisactionisrequiredtoensurethatadequateSDMexistsintheeventofamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation.The12hourFrequencyconsidersthetimerequiredtoobtainRCSboronconcentrationsamplesandthelowprobabilityofamainsteamlinebreakduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-27DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESACTIONSA.landA.2(continued)TheinoperableRCSloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof72hours.Thistimeallowanceisajustifiedperiodtobewithouttheredundant,nonoperatingloopbecauseasingleloopinoperationhasaheattransfercapabilitygreaterthanthatneededtoremovethereactoranddecayheatproducedinthereactorcoreandbecauseofthelowprobabilityofafailureintheremainingloopoccurringduringthisperiod.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenoneRCSloopisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseasingleRCSloopcanprovidetherequiredcoolingtoremovereactoranddecayheatconsistentwithsafetyanalysisassumptions.B.1Ifrestorationoftheinoperableloopisnotpossiblewithin72hours,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4.InMODE4,theplantmaybeplacedontheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.TheadditionalCompletionTimeof12hoursiscompatiblewithrequiredoperationstoachievecooldownanddepressurizationfromtheexistingplantconditionsinanorderlymanner.andwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-28DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.lC.2andC.3IftwoRCSloopsareinoperable,ornoRCSloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbytheNoteintheLCOsection,allCRDMsmustbede-energizedbyopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsets.AlloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspended,andactiontorestoreoneoftheRCSloopstoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsetsremovesthepossibilityofaninadvertentrodwithdrawal.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.5.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofthecontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification'.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloo'pperformance.SR3.4.5.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis~16%fortwoRCSloops'.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinkforremovalofreactorordecayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoalossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.Ginn'aNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-29DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.5.3VerificationthattherequiredRCPisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCPcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSARSection15.1.5.2.UFSARSection15.4.3.3.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG8E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXY-9,StartupofanInactiveLoop,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.4.UFSARSections14.6.1.5.6and15.2.5.2.5.UFSARSection14.6.1.5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-30DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4BASESBACKGROUNDInMODE4,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattoeitherthesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR).heatexchangers.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladdedfuel.TheSGsortheRHRheatexchangersprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPsandtheRHRpumpscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandtopreventboricacidstratification.InMODE4,eitherRCSorRHRloopscanbeusedtoprovideforcedcirculation.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastone.RCSoroneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRCSlooporoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequire'that.twopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyfordecayheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE4,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRCSandRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSLoops-'ODE4havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-31(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLEinMODE4andthatoneoftheseloopsbeinoperation.TheLCOallowsthetwoloopsthatarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoconsistofanycombinationofRCSloopsandRHRloops.Anyoneloopinoperationprovidesenoughflowtoremovethedecayheatfromthecorewithforcedcirculation.AnadditionalloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.Note1permitsallRCPsandRHRpumpstobede-energizedfors1hourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermitteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1).IfchangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNote1ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremetalongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a0NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-32Draft8 RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESLCO(continued)Note2requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbex50FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofanRCPwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenable~temperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.Thewater.volumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturepreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterentersthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.AnOPERABLERCSloopcomprisesanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.6.2.RCPsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.SimilarlyfortheRHRSystem,anOPERABLERHRloopcomprisesanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.AnOPERABLERHRloopmaybeisolatedfromtheRCSprovidedthattheloopcanbeplacedintoservicefromthecontrolroom.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODE4,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OneloopofeitherRCSorRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,twoloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSandRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)REE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-33DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.41LCO3.9.5,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.1IfoneRCSloopisinoperableandtwoRHRloopsareinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.IfnoRHRisavailable,theplantcannotenterareducedMODEsincenolongtermmeansofdecayheatremovalwouldbeavailable.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.B.1IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothRCSloopsareinoperable,aninoperableRCSorRHRloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatustoprovidearedundantmeansfordecayheatremoval.Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitscannotberestored,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE5within24hours.BringingtheplanttoMODE5isaconservativeactionwithregardtodecayheatremoval.WithonlyoneRHRloopOPERABLE,redundancyfordecayheatremovalislostand,intheeventofalossoftheremainingRHRloop,itwouldbesafertoinitiatethatlossfromMODE5(~200'F)ratherthanMODE4(200to350'F).TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5fromMODE4inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-34DraftB RCSLoops-NODE4B3.4.6BASESACTIONSB.1(continued)RequiredActionB.IismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatonlytheRequiredActionsofConditionCareenteredifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperable.WithallRCSandRHRloopsinoperable,NODE5cannotbeenteredandRequiredActionsC.1andC.2aretheappropriateremedialactions.C.landC.2IfnoloopisOPERABLEorinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNoteIintheLCOsection,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andthemargintocriticalitymustnotbereducedinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationfordecayheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ISURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.6.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRCSorRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSandRHRloopperformance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-35DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.4.6.2RE(UIREMENTS(continued)ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis~16%.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinknecessaryforremovalofdecayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel.SR3.4.6.3VerificationthattherequiredpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCSorRHRpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2'.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-36DraftB

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInMODE5withtheRCSloopsfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheateithertothesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.WhiletheprincipalmeansfordecayheatremovalisviatheRHRSystem,theSGsarespecifiedasabackupmeansforredundancy.EventhoughtheSGscannotproducesteaminthisMODE,theyarecapableofbeingaheatsinkduetotheirlargecontainedvolumeofsecondarywater.AslongastheSGsecondarysidewaterisatalowertemperaturethanthereactorcoolant,heattransferwilloccur.Therateofheattransferisdirectlyproportionaltothetemperaturedifference.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thereactorcoolantisnormallycirculatedbymeansoftwoRHRloopsconnectedtotheRCS,eachloopcontaininganRHRheatexchanger,anRHRpump,andappropriateflowandtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.OneRHRpumpcirculatesthewaterthroughtheRCSatasufficientratetopreventboricacidstratification.Thenumberofloopsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds'heintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCO.istorequirethatasecondpathbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.TheLCOprovidesforredundantpathsofdecayheatremovalcapability.ThefirstpathcanbeanRHRloopthatmustbeOPERABLEandinoperation.ThesecondpathcanbeanotherOPERABLERHRloopormaintainingoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevelatorabove16%toprovideanalternatemethodfordecayheatremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-37(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSLoops-NODE5(LoopsFilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRC'olicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleastoneoftheRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandinoperationwithanadditionalRHRloopOPERABLEoroneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel>16%.OneRHRloopprovidessufficientforcedcirculationtoperformthesafetyfunction'softhereactorcoolantundertheseconditions.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.However,ifthestandbyRHRloopisnotOPERABLE,anacceptablealternatemethodisoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevela16%.ShouldtheoperatingRHRloopfail,theSGcouldbeusedtoremovethedecayheat.Note1permitsallRHRpumpstobede-energizedz1hourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermittestsdesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1).Ifchangesaremadeto.theRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinNODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsde-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotlikelyduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNoteI.ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-38DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESLCO(continued)a~NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodz2hours,providedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhensuchtestingissafeandpossible.Note3requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe~50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)withanRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturearetopreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterente'rsthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedCondition.Note4providesforanorderlytransitionfromMODE5toMODE4duringaplannedheatupbypermittingremovalofRHRloopsfromoperationwhenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.ThisNoteprovidesforthetransitiontoMODE4whereanRCSloopispermittedtobeinoperationandreplacestheRCScirculationfunctionprovidedbytheRHRloops.AplannedheatupisascheduledtransitiontoMODE4withinadefinedtimeperiod.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.ASGcanperformasaheatsinkwhenitisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,withtheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.7.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-39(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued).APPLICABILITYInMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thisLCOrequiresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.TheRCSloopsareconsideredfilleduntiltheisolationvalvesareopenedtofacilitatedrainingoftheRCS.TheloopsarealsoconsideredfilledfollowingthecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.OneloopofRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,oneadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,orthesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastoneSGisrequiredtobea16%.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.4,LCO3.9.5,"RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODESIs8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-.MODE4";'RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothSGshavesecondarysidewaterlevels<16%,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusortorestoreatleastoneSGsecondarysidewaterlevel.EitherRequiredActionA.1orRequiredActionA.2willrestoreredundantheatremovalpaths.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilanRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorSGsecondarysidewaterlevelisrestored.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-40DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1andB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedby.Notes1and4,orifnoloopisOPERABLE,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.7.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparameters,isan.acceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.7.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.VerifyingthatatleastoneSGisOPERABLEbyensuringitssecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelisz16%ensuresanalternatedecayheatremovalmethodintheeventthatthesecondRHRloopisnotOPERABLE.IfbothRHRloopsareOPERABLE,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-41Draft8 RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled83.4.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.7.3VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbyRHRpump.Ifsecondarysidewaterlevelis~16%inatleastoneSG,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandha'sbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.6R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.4-42DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInMODE5withtheRCSloopsnotfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattothecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval'RHR)heatexchangers.Thesteamgenerators(SGs)arenotavailableasaheatsinkwhentheloopsarenotfilled.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withlo'opsnotfilled,onlyRHRpumpscanbeusedforcoolantcirculation.Thenumberofpumpsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRpumpfordecayheatremovalandtransportandtorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequateforheatremovalandforboronmixing.RCSloopsinMODE5(loopsnotfilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandoneoftheseloopsbeinoperationtotransferheatfromthereactor.coolantatacontrolledrate.HeatcannotberemovedviatheRHRSystemunlessforcedflowisused.A'inimumofoneoperatingRHRpumpmeetstheLCOrequirementforoneloopinoperation.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-43DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESLCO(continued)NoteIpermitsallRHRpumpstobede-energizedfors15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanother.ThecircumstancesforstoppingbothRHRpumpsaretobelimitedtosituationswhentheoutagetimeisshortandrequiresthatthefollowingconditionsbemet:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction;andc.NodrainingoperationsarepermittedthatwouldfurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumeandpossiblycauseamorerapidheatupoftheremainingRCSinventory.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodof~2hours,providedthattheotherloopisOPERABLE"andinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhenthesetestsaresafeandpossible.AnOPERABLERHRloopiscomprisedofanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInNODE5withloopsnotfilled,thisLCOrequirescoreheatremovalandcoolantcirculationbytheRHRSystem.TheRCSloopsareconsiderednotfilledfromthetimeperiodbeginningwiththeopeningofisolationvalvesanddrainingoftheRCSandendingwiththecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.\(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-44DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.9'.4,LCO3.9.5)"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.1IfonlyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilthesecondRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.landB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNote1,orifnoloopisOPERABLEalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSbor'onconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemarginto,criticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-45(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.8.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.8.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-46DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.9PressurizerBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerprovidesapointintheRCSwhereliquidandvaporaremaintainedinequilibriumundersaturatedconditionsforpressurecontrolpurposestopreventbulkboilingintheremainderoftheRCS.Keyfunctionsincludemaintainingrequiredprimarysystempressureduringsteadystateoperation,andlimitingthepressurechangescausedbyreactorcoolantthermalexpansionandcontractionduringnormalloadtransients.ThepressurecontrolcomponentsaddressedbythisLCOincludethepressurizerwaterlevelandtherequiredheatercapacity.PressurizersafetyvalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"andLCO3.4.11,"PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs),"respectively.TheintentofthisLCOistoensurethatasteambubbleexistsinthepressurizerpriorto,andduring,poweroperationtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Thepresenceofasteambubbleisconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.RelativelysmallamountsofnoncondensiblegasesaretypicallypresentintheRCSandcaninhibitthecondensationheattransferbetweenthepressurizersprayandthesteam,anddiminishthesprayeffectivenessforpressurecontrol.Thesenoncondensiblegasescanbeignoredifthesteambubbleispresent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-47DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOalsoensuresthatadequateheatercapacityisavailableinthepressurizertosupportnaturalcirculationfollowinganextendedlossofoffsitepower.Electricalimmersionheaters,locatedinthelowersectionofthepressurizervessel,keepthewaterinthepressurizeratsaturationtemperatureandmaintainaconstantoperatingpressure.Theseheatersaredividedintotwogroups,acontrol/variablegroupandabackupgroup.Thecontrol/variablegroupisnormallyusedduringpoweroperationsincetheseheatershaveinverseproportionalcontrolwithrespecttothepressurizerpressure.Thebackupgroupiseitherfullyonoroffwithsetpointsthatarebelowthoseforthecontrol/variablegroup.BothgroupsofheatersreceivepowerfromtheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)480Vbuses,however,theheatersareshedfollowingalossofoffsitepowerorsafetyinjectionsignal.Theheaterscanbemanuallyloadedontothedieselgeneratorsifrequired.AminimumrequiredavailablecapacityofpressurizerheatersensuresthattheRCSpressurecanbemaintainedduringnaturalcirculation.Thecapabilitytomaintainandcontrolsystempressureisimportantformaintaining'ubcooledconditionsintheRCSandensuringthecapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.Unlessadequateheatercapacityisavail'able,therequiredsubcoolingmarginintheprimarysystemcannotbemaintained.Inabilitytocontrolthesystempressureandmaintainsubcoolingunderconditionsofnaturalcirculationflowintheprimarysystemcouldleadtoalossofsinglephasenaturalcirculationanddecreasedcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.MaintainingnecessarysubcooledmarginduringnormalpoweroperationiscontrolledbymeetingtherequirementsforpressurizerlevelandLCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDepartureFromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-48(continued)DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODESI,2,and3,theLCOrequirementforasteambubbleisreflectedimplicitlyintheaccidentanalyses.SafetyanalysesperformedforlowerMODESarenotlimitingwithrespecttopressurizerparameters.Allanalysesperformedfromacriticalreactorconditionassumetheexistenceofasteambubbleandsaturatedconditionsinthepressurizer.Inmakingthisassumption,theanalysesneglectthesmallfractionofnoncondensiblegasesnormallypresent.ThemaximumpressurizerwaterlevellimitensuresthatasteambubbleexistsandsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.SafetyanalysespresentedintheUFSAR(Ref.I)donottakecreditforpressurizerheateroperation,however,theneedtomaintainsubcoolinginthelongtermduringlossofoffsitepower,asindicatedinNUREG-0737(Ref.2),isthereasonforprovidinganLCO.Thepressurizerheatersareassumedtobeavailablewithinonehourfollowingthelossofoffsitepower.andinitiationofnaturalcirculation(Ref.3).LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethatasteambubbleexistswithinthepressurizerandthatsufficientheatercapacityisavailabletosupportanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.ForthepressurizertobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestablishedintheSRsforwaterlevelandheatercapacitymustbemetandtheheatersmustbecapableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersourcewithinonehour.kAPPLICABILITYTheneedforpressurecontrolismostpertinentwhencoreheatcancausethegreatesteffectonRCStemperature,resultinginthegreatesteffectonpressurizerlevelandRCSpressurecontrol.Thus,applicabilityhasbeendesignatedforMODESIand2.TheapplicabilityisalsoprovidedforMODE3topreventsolidwaterRCSoperationduringheatupandcooldowntoavoidrapidpressurerisescausedbynormaloperationalperturbation,suchasreactorcoolantpumpstartup.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-49DraftB

Pressurizer83.4.9BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)InMODESI,2,and3,thereisneedtomaintaintheavailabilityofpressurizerheaters,capableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersupply(Ref.4).Intheeventofalossofoffsitepower,theinitialconditionsoftheseMODESgivethegreatestdemandformaintainingtheRCSinahotpressurizedconditionwithloopsubcoolingforanextendedperiod.ForMODE4,5,or6,itisnotnecessarytocontrolpressure(byheaters)toensureloopsubcoolingforheattransferwhentheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systemisinservice,andtherefore,theLCOisnotapplicable.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelis>650cubicfeet,whichisequivalentto87%,theabilitytomaintainasteambubblemaynolongerexist.Thesteambubbleisnecessarytoensurethecapabilitytoestablishandmaintainpressurecontrolforsteadystateoperationandtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Requiringthepresenceofasteambubbleisalsoconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.Pressurizerwaterlevelcontrolmalfunctionsorotherplantevolutionsmayresultinapressurizerwaterlevelabovethenominalupperlimit,evenwiththeplantatsteadystateconditions.NormallytheplantwilltripinthiseventsincetheupperlimitisthesameasthePressurizerHighLevelTrip.Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelisnotwithinthelimit,actionmustbetakentorestoretheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafety.analyses.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3,withthe'eactortripbreakersopen,within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.ThistakestheplantoutoftheapplicableMODESandrestorestheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-50Draft8 PressurizerB3.4.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.land8.2Ifthepressurizerheaterscapacityis<100KW,theabilitytomaintainRCSpressuretosupportnaturalcirculationmaynolongerexist.BymaintainingRCSpressurecontrol,amargintosubcoolingisprovided.Thevalueof100KWisbasedontheamountneededtosupportnaturalcirculationafteraccountingforheatlossesthroughthepressurizerinsulationduringanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.Ifthecapacityofthepressurizerh'eatersisnotwithinthelimit,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimes'rereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.9.1ThisSRrequiresthatduringsteadystateoperation,pressurizerlevelismaintainedbelowthenominalupperlimittoprovideaminimumspaceforasteambubble.TheSurveillanceisperformedbyobservingtheindicatedlevel.TheFrequencyof12hourshasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassesslevelforanydeviationandverifythatoperationiswithinsafetyanalysesassumptions.Alarmsarealsoavailableforearlydetectionofabnormallevelindications.SR3.4.9.2ThisSRissatisfiedwhenthe'powersuppliesaredemonstratedtobecapableofproducingtheminimumpowerrequired.ThismaybedonebytestingthepowersupplyoutputbyverifyingtheelectricalloadonBuses14and16withtherespectiveheatergroupsonandoff.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsideredadequatetodetectheaterdegradationandhasbeenshownbyoperatingexperiencetobeacceptable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-51(continued)Draft8 PressurizerB3.4.9BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.3.LetterfromB.L.King,WestinghouseElectricCorporation,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"AbilitytoMaintainSubcooledConditionsDuringanExtendedLossofOffsitePower,"datedSeptember26,1979.4.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,'oL.D.White,Jr.RGRE,

Subject:

"LessonsLearnedCategory'A'valuation,"datedJuly7,1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-52DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovide,inconjunctionwiththeReactorProtectionSystem,overpressureprotectionfortheRCS.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedpoptype,springloaded,selfactuatedvalveswithbackpressurecompensation.ThesafetyvalvesaredesignedtopreventthesystempressurefromexceedingthesystemSafetyLimit(SL),2735psig,whichis110%ofthedesignpressure.Becausethesafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedandselfactuating,theyareconsideredindependentcomponents.Thereliefcapacityforeachvalve,288,000ibm/hr,isbasedonpostulatedoverpressuretransientconditionsresultingfromacompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine.Thiseventresultsinthemaximumsurgerateintothepressurizer,whichspecifiestheminimumreliefcapacityforthesafetyvalves.Thedischargeflowfromthepressurizersafetyvalvesisdirectedtothepressurizerrelieftank.This.dischargeflowisindicatedbyanincreaseintemperaturedownstreamofthepressurizersafetyvalvesorincreaseinthepressurizerrelieftanktemperatureorlevel.OverpressureprotectionisrequiredinMODES1,2,3,4,and5andinMODE6withreactorvesselheadon;however,inMODE4,witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,andMODE5andMODE6withthereactorvesselheadonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbyoperatingproceduresandbymeetingtherequirementsofLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."Theupperandlowerpressurelimitsarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirement(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheliftsettingisfortheambientconditionsassociatedwithMODES1,2,and3.Thisrequireseitherthatthevalvesbesethotorthatacorrelationbetweenhotandcoldsettingsbeestablished.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-53DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepressurizersafetyvalvesarepartoftheprimarysuccesspathandmitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedaccidents.OPERABILITYofthesafetyvalvesensuresthattheRCSpressurewillbelimitedto110%ofdesignpressureforallanticipatedtransientsexceptforthelockedrotoraccidentwhichremainsbelow120%ofthedesignpressureconsistentwiththeoriginalmaximumtransientpressurelimitfortheRCS(Refs.2,3and4).TheconsequencesofexceedingtheAmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers(ASHE)andUSASSectionB31.1pressurelimits(Refs.1and4)couldincludedamagetoRCScomponents,increasedleakage,orarequirementtoperformadditionalstressanalysespriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAllaccidentandsafetyanalysesintheUFSAR(Ref.5)thatrequiresafetyvalveactuationassumeoperationofbothpressurizersafetyvalvestolimitincreasesinRCSpressure.Theoverpressureprotectionanalysis(Ref.6)isalsobasedonoperationofbothsafetyvalves.Accidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationifnotproperlyterminatedinclude:a.Uncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromfullpower;b.Lossofreactorcoolantflow;"c.Lossofexternalelectricalload(includingthecompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine);d.Lossofnormalfeedwater;e.LossofallACpowertostationauxiliaries;andf.Lockedrotor.DetailedanalysesoftheabovetransientsarecontainedinReference5.Safetyvalveactuationisrequiredineventsc,d,e,andf(above)tolimitthepressureincrease.CompliancewiththisLCOisconsistentwiththedesignbasesandaccidentanalysesassumptions.PressurizersafetyvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-54(continued)DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves83.4.10BASES(continued)LCOThetwopressurizersafetyvalvesaresettoopenattheRCSdesignpressure(2500psia),andwithintheASHEspecifiedtolerance,toavoidexceedingthemaximumdesignpressureSL,tomaintainaccidentanalysesassumptions,andtocomplywithASHErequirements.Theupperandlowerpressuretolerance'imitsfollowingtestingarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirements(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheOPERABILITYlimitsof+2.4%,-3%arebasedontheanalyzedevents.ThelimitprotectedbythisSpecificationisthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)SLof110%ofdesignpressureforall,transientsexceptlockedrotoraccidentswhichhasanallowedlimitof120%ofdesignpressure.InoperabilityofoneormorevalvescouldresultinexceedingtheSLifatransientweretooccur.TheconsequencesofexceedingtheASNEpressurelimitcouldincludedamagetooneormoreRCScomponents,increasedleakage,oradditionalstressanalysisbeingrequiredpriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,andportionsofNODE4abovetheLTOParmingtemperature,OPERABILITYoftwovalvesis'requiredbecausethecombinedcapacityisrequiredtokeepreactorcoolantpressurebelow110%ofitsdesignvalueduringcertainaccidents.NODE3andportionsofNODE4areconservativelyincluded,althoughthelistedaccidentsmaynotrequirethesafetyvalvesforprotection.TheLCOisnotapplicableinNODE4wheneitherRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorinNODE5becauseLTOPisprovided.OverpressureprotectionisnotrequiredinMODE6withthereactorvesselheaddetensionedortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorthepressurizermanwayopen.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-55(continued)DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves83.4.10BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lWithonepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable,restorationmusttakeplacewithin15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesreflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheRCSOverpressureProtectionSystem.AninoperablesafetyvalvecoincidentwithanRCSoverpressureeventcouldchallengetheintegrityofthepressureboundary.B.landB.2IftheRequiredActionofA.1cannotbemetwithintherequiredCompletionTimeorifbothpressurizersafetyvalvesareinoperable,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoHODE4witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WithanyRCScoldlegtemperatureatorbelowtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbytheLTOPSystem.ThechangefromNODE1,2,or3toHODE'4reducestheRCSenergy(corepowerandpressure),lowersthepotentialforlargepressurizerinsurges,andtherebyremovestheneedforoverpressureprotectionbybothpressurizersafetyvalves.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.10.1SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram.PressurizersafetyvalvesaretobetestedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref.7),whichprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytheSRs.Noadditionalrequirementsarespecified.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointis+2.4%,-3%forOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto+1%duringthesurveillancetoallowfordrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-56DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.10.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoMODES3and4withouthavingperformedtheSRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditions.Thispermitstestingandexaminationofthesafetyvalvesathighpressureand'temperatureneartheirnormaloperatingrange,butonlyafterthevalveshavehadapreliminarycoldsetting.ThecoldsettinggivesassurancethatthevalvesareOPERABLEneartheirdesignconditionuntilcompletionofthesurveillance.REFERENCES1.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII.2.UFSAR,Section15.3.2.3.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGLE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-1,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XV-15,andXV-17,DesignBasisEvents,Accidents,andTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,1967edition.5."UFSAR,Chapter15.6.WCAP-7769,"TopicalReport,OverpressureProtection'orWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactors,"Rev.1,June1972.7.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-57-DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerisequippedwithtwotypesofdevicesforpressurerelief:pressurizersafetyvalvesandPORVs.ThePORVs(430and431C)areairoperatedvalvesthatarecontrolledtoopenataspecificsetpressurewhenthepressurizerpressureincreasesandclosewhenthepressurizerpressuredecreases.ThePORVsmayalsobemanuallyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Motoroperatedblockvalves(515and516),whicharenormallyopen,arelocatedbetweenthepressurizerandthePORVs.TheblockvalvesareusedtoisolatethePORVsincaseofexcessiveleakageorastuckopenPORV.Blockvalveclosureisaccomplishedmanuallyusingcontrolsinthecontrolroom.AstuckopenPORVis,ineffect,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Assuch,blockvalveclosureterminate'stheRCSdepressurizationandcoolantinventoryloss.ThePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesmaybeusedbyplantoperatorstodepressurizetheRCStorecoverfromcertaintransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.Additionally,theseriesarrangementofthePORVsandtheirblockvalvespermitperformanceofsurveillancesonthevalvesduringpoweroperation.ThePORVsmayalsobeusedforfeedandbleedcorecoolinginthecaseofmultipleequipmentfailureeventsthatarenotwithinthedesignbasis,suchasatotallossoffeedwaterandauxiliaryfeedwater.ThePORVsarealsousedtomitigatetheeffectsofan.anticipatedtransientwithoutscram(ATWS)eventwhichisalsonotwithinthedesignbasis.ThePORVs,theirblockvalves,andtheircontrolsarepoweredfromthevitalbusesthatnormallyreceivepowerfromoffsitepowersources,butarealsocapableofbeingpoweredfromemergencypowersourcesintheeventofalossofoffsitepower.ThetwoPORVs(inmanualoperationonly)andtheirassociatedblockvalvesarepoweredfromtwoseparatesafetytrains.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-58DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheplanthastwoPORVs,eachhavingareliefcapacityof179,000lb/hrat2335psig.ThePORVsarenormallyopenedbyusinginstrumentairwhichissuppliedthroughseparatesolenoidoperatedvalves(8620Aand8620B).ThesafetyrelatedsourceofmotiveairisfromtwoseparatenitrogenaccumulatorsthatarenormallyisolatedfromthePORVsbysolenoidoperatedvalves8619Aand8619B;however,solenoidoperatedvalves8620Aand8620BmustbeintheventpositiontoclosethePORVsregardlessofwhichmotiveairsourceisused.ThefunctionaldesignofthePORVsisbasedonmaintainingpressurebelowthepressurizerhighpressurereactortripsetpointfollowingastepreductionof50%offullloadwithsteamdump.Inaddition,thePORVsminimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalvesandalsomaybeusedfor.lowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP).SeeLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESPlantoperatorsemploythePORVstodepressurizetheRCSinresponsetocertainplanttransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.FortheSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)event,thesafetyanalysisassumesthatmanualoperatoractionsarerequiredtomitigatetheevent.Alossofoffsitepowerisassumedtoaccompanytheevent,andthus,normalpressurizersprayisunavailabletoreduceRCSpressure.ThePORVsareassumedtobeusedforRCSdepressurization,whichisoneofthestepsperformedtoequalizetheprimaryandsecondarypressuresinordertoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowandtheradioactivereleasesfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator.ThePORVsarealsousedinsafetyanalysesforeventsthatresultinincreasingRCSpressureforwhichdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)criteriaarecritical.ByassumingPORVmanualactuation,theprimarypressureremainsbelowthepressurizerhighpressuretripandpressurizersafetyvalvesetpoints;thustheDNBRcalculationismoreconservativeassumingthesameinitialRCStemperaturesincethepressurizerpressureislimited.Eventsthatassumethisconditionincludealossofexternalelectricalloadandothertransientswhichresultinadecrease'inheatremovalbythesecondarysystem(Ref.1).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-59DraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)PressurizerPORVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvestobeOPERABLEformanualoperationbythenitrogenaccumulatorstomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.BymaintainingtwoPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesOPERABLE,thesinglefailurecriterionissatisfied.TheblockvalvesareavailabletoisolatetheflowpaththrougheitherafailedopenPORVoraPORVwithexcessiveleakage.SatisfyingtheLCOhelpsminimizechallengestofissionproductbarriers.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,thePORVisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTRanditsblockvalvemustbeOPERABLEtolimitthepotentialforasmall.breakLOCAthroughtheflowpath.ThemostlikelycauseforaPORVsmallbreakLOCAisaresultofapressureincreasetransientthatcausesthePORVtoautomaticallyopenwithasubsequentfailuretoclose.ImbalancesintheenergyoutputofthecoreandheatremovalbythesecondarysystemcancausetheRCSpressuretoincreasetothePORVopeningsetpoint.ThemostrapidincreaseswilloccuratthehigheroperatingpowerandpressureconditionsofMODES1and2.PressureincreasesarelessprominentinMODE3becausethecoreinputenergyisreduced,buttheRCSpressureishigh.ThePORVsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3tominimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalves.Therefore,theLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.TheLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4whenbothpressureandcoreenergyaredecreasedandthepressuresurgesbecomemuchlesssignificant.ThePORVsetpointisreducedforLTOPinMODES4,5,and6withthereactorvesselheadinplace.LCO3.4.12addressesthePORVrequirementsintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-60DraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASES(continued)ACTIONSNote1hasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothpressurizerPORVsaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes(i.e.,theCompletionTimeisonacomponentbasis)forConditionA.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothblockvalvesaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes,forConditionC.TheexceptionforLCO3.0.4,Note3,permitsentryintoMODES1,2,and3toperformcyclingofthePORVsorblockvalvestoverifytheirOPERABLEstatus.TestingisnotperformedinlowerMODESduetoLTOPconsiderations.A.landA.2WiththePORVsOPERABLEandnotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,eitherthePORVsmustberestoredortheflowpathisolatedwithin1hour.AlthoughaPORVmaynotbecapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,itmaybeabletobemanuallyopenedandclosed,andtherefore,abletoperformitsfunction.APORVisconsiderednotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolledforanyproblemwhichpreventsthePORVfromautomaticallyclosingonceithasautomaticallyopened.Thismaybeduetoinstrumentationproblems.NotcapableofautomaticcontroldoesnotincludeproblemswhichonlypreventthePORVfromautomaticallyopening(e.g.,lossofinstrumentairtothePORV).ItalsodoesnotincludeproblemswhichpreventthePORVfrombothautomaticallyopeningandautomaticallyclosing.Forthesereasons,theblockvalvemayeitherbeclosedtoisolatetheflowpathsorisolatedbyplacingthePORVcontrolswitchintheclosedposition.However,iftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolatetheflowpath,theActionrequirespowerbemaintainedtothevalve.ThisConditionisonly'intendedtopermitoperationoftheplantforalimitedperiodoftimenottoexceedthenextrefuelingoutage(MODE6)sothatmaintenancecanbeperformedonthePORVstoeliminatetheproblem.Normally,thePORVsshouldbeavailableforautomaticmitigationofoverpressureeventsandshouldbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoenteringstartup(MODE2).SeatleakageproblemsarecontrolledbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-61DraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)guickaccesstothePORVforpressurecontrolcanbemadewhenpowerremainsontheclosedblockvalve.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisbasedonplantoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatminorproblemscanbecorrectedorclosureaccomplishedinthistimeperiod.B.18.2andB.3IfonePORVisnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,itisinoperableandmustbeeitherrestoredorisolatedbyclosingtheassociatedblockvalveandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalve.PORVinoperabilityincludes(butisnotlimitedto)theinabilityofthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefromthenitrogenaccumulatortoopenorthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefrominstrumentairtovent.TheCompletionTimesof1hourarereasonable,basedonchallengestothePORVsduringthistimeperiod,andprovidetheoperatoradequatetimetocorrectthesituation.IftheinoperablevalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,itmustbeisol'atedwithinthespecifiedtime.BecausethereisasecondPORVthatisOPERABLE,anadditional72hoursisprovidedtorestoretheinoperablePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.IfthePORVcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-62DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2Ifoneblockvalveisinoperable,thenitisnecessarytoeitherrestoretheblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorplacetheassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.TheprimeimportanceforthecapabilitytoclosetheblockvalveistoisolateastuckopenPORV.Therefore,iftheblockvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour,theRequiredActionistoplacethePORVinmanualcontroltoprecludeitsautomaticopeningforanoverpressureeventandtoavoidthepotentialforastuckopenPORVatatimethattheblockvalveisinoperable.HanualcontrolisaccomplishedbyplacingthePORVcontrolboardswitchintheclosedposition.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeperiod,andprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.BecausethePORV,isnotcapableofautomatically,openingandthesmallpotentialforanSGTRorothereventrequiringHanualoperation,theoperatorispermittedaCompletionTimeof7daystorestoretheinoperableblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.Thetimeallowedtorestoretheblockvalveislimitedto7dayssincethePORVsarenotcapableofautomaticallymitigatinganoverpressureeventwhenplacedinmanualcontrol.IftheblockvalveisrestoredwithintheCompletionTimeof7days,thePORVwillagainbecapableofautomaticallyrespondingtoanoverpressureevent,andtheblockvalvescapableofisolatingastuckopenPORVwhichmayresultfromtheoverpressureevent.Ifitcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-63DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSD.landD.2(continued)Ifbothblockvalvesareinoperable,thenitisnecessarytoeitherrestoreatleastoneblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorplacethePORVsinmanualcontrol.TheprimeimportanceforthecapabilitytoclosetheblockvalveistoisolateastuckopenPORV.Therefore,iftheblockvalvescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour,theRequiredActionistoplacethePORVsinmanualcontroltoprecludeitsautomaticopeningforanoverpressureeventandtoavoidthepotentialforastuckopenPORVatatimethattheblockvalveisinoperable.ManualcontrolisaccomplishedbyplacingthePORVcontrolboardswitchintheclosedposition.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeperiod,andprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.BecausethePORVisnotcapableofautomaticallyopeningandthesmallpotentialforanSGTRorothereventrequiringManualoperation,theoperatorispermittedaCompletionTimeof72hourstorestoreatleastoneinoperableblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.Thetimeallowedtorestoreoneblockvalveislimitedto72hourssincethePORVsarenotcapableofautomaticallymitigatinganoverpressureeventwhenplacedinmanualcontrol.IfatleastoneblockvalveisrestoredwithintheCompletionTimeof72hours,atleastonePORVwillagainbecapableofautomaticallyrespondingtoanoverpressureevent,andtheassociatedblockvalvecapableofisolatingastuckopenPORVwhichmayresultfromtheoverpressureevent.Ifitcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,4-64DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3,4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)E.land'E.2IftheRequiredActionofConditionA,B,C,or0isnotmet,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InMODES4and5,maintainingPORVOPERABILITYmayberequired.SeeLCO3.4.12.F.lF.2F.3andF.4IfbothPORVsarenotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,theyareinoperableanditisnecessarytoinitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatusimmediatelysincenoreliefvalveisavailabletomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.Therefore,operatorsmusteitherrestoreatleastonevalvewithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorisolatetheflowpathbyclosingandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalves.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeandprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-65DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSF.IF.2F.3andF.4(continued)IfonePORVisrestoredandonePORVremainsinoperable,thentheplantwillbeinConditionBwiththetimeclockstartedattheoriginaldeclarationofhavingtwoPORVsinoperable.IfnoPORVsarerestoredwithintheCompletionTime,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwhichdoesnotrequiremanualPORVoperation.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3withT,,<500Fwithin8hours.InNODE3withtheRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,thesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.SincetheRWSTcontainsalargervolumeofwaterthanthesecondarysideofanSG,theleakthroughtherupturedtubewillstopaftertheSGisfilledtocapacity.Therefore,anSGTRcanbemitigatedundertheseconditionswithoutanyreleaseofradioactivefluidthroughthemainsteamsafetyvalves.EnteringalowerNODEisnotdesirablewithbothPORVsinoperableandnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycledsincethePORVsarealsorequiredforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-66(continued)DraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.11.1Blockvalvecyclingverifiesthatthevalve(s)canbeclosedifneeded.ThebasisfortheFrequencyof92daysistheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateaPORVthatisOPERABLEandisnotleakinginexcessofthelimitsofLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE,"thenopeningtheblockvalveisnecessarytoverifythatthePORVcanbeusedformanualcontrolofreactorpressure.IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateanotherwiseinoperablePORV,themaximumCompletionTimetorestorethePORVandopentheblockvalveis72hours,whichiswellwithintheallowablelimits(25%)toextendtheblockvalveFrequencyof92days.Furthermore,thesetestrequirementswouldbecompletedbythereopeningofarecentlyclosedblockvalveuponrestorationofthePORVtoOPERABLEstatus(i.e.,completionoftheRequiredActionsfulfillstheSR).TheNotemodifiesthisSRbystatingthatitisnotrequiredtobeperformedwiththeblockvalveclosedperLCO3.4.13.ThispreventstheneedtoopentheblockvalvewhentheassociatedPORVisleaking>10gpmcreatingthepotentialforaplanttransient.SR3.4.11.2ThisSRrequires.acompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogenaccumulators.OperatingaPORVthroughonecompletecycleensuresthatthePORVcanbemanuallyactuatedformitigationofanSGTR.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonatypicalrefuelingcycleandindustryacceptedpractice.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section15.2.2.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-67DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheLTOPSystemcontrolsRCSpressureatlowtemperaturessotheintegrityofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)isnotcompromisedbyviolatingthepressureandtemperature(P/T)limitsof10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.1).ThereactorvesselisthelimitingRCPBcomponentfordemonstratingsuchprotection.TheLTOPsystemalsoprotectstheRHRsystemfromoverpressurizationduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.ThePTLRprovidesthemaximumallowableactuationlogicsetpointsforthepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andthemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureduringcooldown,shutdown,andheatuptomeettheReference1requirementsduringtheLTOPMODES.Thereactorvesselmaterialislesstoughatlowtemperaturesthanatnormaloperatingtemperatures.Asthevesselneutronexposureaccumulates,thematerialtoughnessdecreasesandbecomeslessresistanttopressurestressatlowtemperatures(Ref.2).RCSpressure,therefore,ismaintainedlowatlowtemperaturesandisincreasedonlyastemperatureisincreased.ThepotentialforvesseloverpressurizationismostacutewhentheRCSiswatersolid,occurringonlywhileshutdown;apressurefluctuationcanoccurmorequicklythananoperatorcanreacttorelievethecondition.ExceedingtheRCSP/Tlimitsbyasignificantamountcouldcausebrittlecrackingofthereactorvessel.LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"requiresadministrativecontrolofRCSpressureandtemperatureduringheatupandcooldowntopreventexceedingthePTLRlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-68DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOprovi.desRCSoverpressureprotectionbyrestrictingcoolantinputcapabilityandhavingadequatepressurereliefcapacity.LimitingcoolantinputcapabilityrequiresisolatingtheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)accumulatorsandrenderingallsafetyinjection(SI)pumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingaminimumoftwoSIpumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSvent~l.Isquareinches.ThepressurereliefcapacityrequireseithertworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSandanRCSventofsufficientsize.OnePORVortheopenRCSventistheoverpressureprotectiondevicethatactstoterminateanincreasingpressureevent.Byrestrictingcoolantinputcapability,theabilitytoprovidecorecoolantadditionisminimized.TheLCOdoesnotrequirethemakeupcontrolsystemtobedeactivatedortheSIactuationcircuitsblocked.DuetothelowerpressuresintheLTOPMODESandtheexpectedcoredecayheatlevels,themakeupsystemcanprovideadequateflowviathemakeupcontrolvalve.IftheconditionsrequiretheuseofSIformakeupintheeventoflossofinventory,thenpumpscanbemadeavailablethroughmanualactions.The'woredundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSwithanopenRCSventisalsosufficienttoprotecttheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationforeventswhichcauseanincreaseinsystempressure.PORVReuirementsAsdesignedfortheLTOPSystem,eachPORVissignaledtoopeniftheRCSpressureexceedsthelimitselectedtopreventaconditionthatisnotwithintheacceptableregionprovidedinthePTLR.ThePORVsareopenedbycoincidentactuationoftwo-of-threeRCSpressurechannels.ThePTLRpresentsthePORVsetpointforLTOP.WhenaPORVisopenedinanincreasingpressuretransient,thereleaseofcoolantwillcausethepressureincreasetoslowandthenreverse.AsthePORVreleasescoolant,theRCSpressuredecreasesuntilaresetpressureisreachedandthevalveissignaledtoclose.Thepressurecontinuestodecreasebelowtheresetpressureasthevalvecloses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-69DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)RCSVentReuirementsOncetheRCSisdepressurized,av'entexposedtothecontainmentatmospherewillmaintaintheRCSatcontainmentambientpressureinanRCSoverpressuretransient,iftherelievingrequirementsofthetransientdonotexceedthecapabilitiesofthevent.Thus,theventpathmustbecapableofrelievingtheflowresultingfromthelimitingLTOPmassorheatinputtransient,andmaintainingpressurebelowtheP/Tlimits.Therequiredventcapacitymaybeprovidedbyoneormoreventpaths.ForanRCSventtomeettheflowcapacityrequirement,itrequiresremovingapressurizersafetyvalve,removingaPORV'sinternalsorblockingitopen,anddisablingitsblockvalveintheopenposition,orsimilarlyestablishingaventbyopeninganRCSventpath.Theventpath(s)mustbeabovethelevelofreactorcoolant,soasnot,todraintheRCSwhenopen.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalyses(Ref.3)demonstratethatthereactorvesselisadequatelyprotectedagainstexceedingtheReference1P/TlimitsforallDesignBasisAccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,andinMODE4withRCScoldlegtemperatureexceedingtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,thepressurizersafetyvalveswillpreventRCSpressurefromexceedingtheReference1limits.Atorbelowthe'LTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressurepreventionrequirestwoOPERABLEPORVsoradepressurizedRCSandasufficientlysizedRCSvent.Eachoftheseoverpressureprotectionsystemshasalimitedoverpressurereliefcapability.TheactualtemperatureatwhichthepressureintheP/Tlimitcurvefallsbelowthepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointincreasesasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesasaresultofneutronembrittlement.EachtimethePTLRcurvesarerevised,theLTOPSystemmustbere-evaluatedtoensureitsfunctionalrequirementscanstillbemetusingtheRCSreliefvalvemethodorthedepressurizedandventedRCScondition.(conti'nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-70DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThePTLRcontainstheacceptancelimitsthatdefinetheLTOPrequirements.AnychangetotheRCSmustbeevaluatedagainsttheReference3analysestodeterminetheimpactofthechangeontheLTOPacceptancelimits.TransientsthatarecapableofoverpressurizingtheRCSarecategorizedaseithermassorheatinputtransients,examplesof'hichfollow:MassInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentsafetyinjection(SI);orb.Charging/letdownflowmismatch.HeatInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentactuationofpressurizerheaters;b.LossofRHRcooling;orC.Reactorcoolantpump(RCP)startupwithtemperatureasymmetrywithintheRCSorbetweentheRCSandsteamgenerators.AnalyseshavedeterminedthatthemassinputtransientsaretheboundingcaseforoverpressurizationoftheRCS(Ref.3).ThetwocategoriesofmassinputtransientswereanalyzedwithrespecttoutilizingasinglePORVoranRCSvent~I.Isquareinches.asoverpressureprotection.TheinadvertentactuationofasingleSIpumpprovidesalargermassadditiontotheRCSthanisolationofletdownwithallthreechargingpumpsoperating.AsinglePORVwasdeterminedtobeincapableofmitigatingtheoverpressuretransientresultingfromactuationofaSIpump,butiscapableofmitigatingthecharging/letdownmismatchtransient.AnRCSvent~l.IsquareinchescanmitigateboththeinadvertentSIandcharging/letdownflowmismatchtransients.Therefore,thefollowingarerequiredduringtheLTOPMODEStoensurethatmassandheatinputtransientsdonotoccur,whicheitheroftheLTOPoverpressureprotectionmeanscannothandle:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-71DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.RenderingallSIpumpsincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingallbutoneSIpumpincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>I.1squareinches;b.DeactivatingtheECCSaccumulatordischargemotoroperatedisolationvalvesintheirclosedpositions;andC.DisallowingstartofanRCPif'secondarytemperatureismorethan50'Faboveprimarytemperatureinanyonelooporpressurizerlevel~38%.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"andLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"providethisprotection.TheReference3analysesdemonstratethateitheronePORVorthedepressurizedRCSandRCSventcanmaintainRCSpressurebelowlimitswiththemaximumallowedcoolantinputcapability.SinceneitheronePORVnortheRCSventcan'andlethepressuretransientproducedfromECCSaccumulatorinjectionwhenRCStemperatureislow,theLCOalsorequirestheECCSaccumulatorsisolatedwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.TheisolatedECCSaccumulatorsmusthavetheirdischargevalvesclosedandthevalvepowersupplyremoved.TheanalysesshowtheeffectofECCSaccumulatordischargeisoveranarrowerRCStemperaturerange(200'Fandbelow)thanthatoftheLCO.FracturemechanicsanalysesestablishedthetemperatureofLTOPApplicabilityattheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.Theconsequencesofasmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)inLTOPMODE4conformto10CFR50.46and10CFR50,AppendixK(Refs.4and5),requirementsbyhavingprocedurestomanuallyestablishmakeupcapability.TheeventswhichpotentiallyoverpressurizetheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationareincludedwithinthemassandheatinputtransientsanalyzedforLTOPconditions.Therefore,anOPERABLELTOPSystemensuresthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurizedduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-72DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)PORVPerformanceThefracturemechanicsanalysesshowthatthevesselisprotectedwhenthePORVsaresettoopenatorbelowthelimitshowninthePTLR.ThesetpointsarederivedbyanalysesthatmodeltheperformanceoftheLTOPSystem,assumingthelimitingLTOPtransientforthePORVsofacharging/letdownflowmismatch.TheseanalysesconsiderpressureovershootandundershootbeyondthePORVopeningandclosing,resultingfromsignalprocessingandvalvestroketimes.ThePORVsetpointsatorbelowthederivedlimitensurestheReferenceIP/TlimitswillbemetandthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurized.ThePORVsetpointsinthePTLRareupdatedwhentherevisedP/TlimitsconflictwiththeLTOPanalysislimits.TheP/Tlimitsareperiodicallymodifiedasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlementcausedbyneutronirradiation.Revisedlimitsaredeterminedusingneutronfluenceprojectionsandtheresultsofexaminationsofthereactorvesselmaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimens.TheBasesforLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"discusstheseexaminations,ThePORVsareconsideredactivecomponents.Thus,thefailureofonePORVisassumedtorepresenttheworstcase,Singleactivefailure.RCSVentPerformanceWiththeRCSdepressurized,analysesshowaventsizeof1.IsquareinchesiscapableofmitigatingtheallowedLTOPoverpressuretransient.ThecapacityofaventthissizeisgreaterthantheflowofthelimitingtransientfortheLTOP=configuration,whichmaintainsRCSpressurelessthanthemaximumpressureontheP/Tlimitcurve.ThelimitingtransientforthisLTOPconfigurationisanSIactuationwithoneSIpumpOPERABLE.AnRCSventa1.1squareincheswiththeRCSdepressurizedalsopreventsoverpressurizationoftheRHRsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-73DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLETheRCSventsizewillbere-evaluatedforcomplianceeachSAFETYANALYSIStimetheP/Tlimitcurvesarerevisedbasedontheresults(continued)ofthevesselmaterialsurveillance.TheRCSventispassiveandisnotsubjecttoactivefailure.TheLTOPSystemsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattheLTOPSystemisOPERABLE.TheLTOPSystemisOPERABLEwhentheminimumcoolantinputandpressurereliefcapabilitiesareOPERABLE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldleadtothelossoflowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationandviolationoftheReferenceIlimitsasaresultof'anoperationaltransient.Tolimitthecoolantinputcapability,theLCOrequirestheECCSaccumulatorstobeisolated.LCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"definesSIactuationOPERABILITYfortheLTOPNODE4smallbreakLOCA.TheelementsoftheLCOthatprovidelowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationare:a~b.TwoOPERABLEPORVsandnoSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.APORVisOPERABLEforLTOPwhenitsblockvalveisopen,itsliftsetpointissettothelimitrequiredbythePTLRandtestingprovesitsabilitytoopenatthissetpoint,andmotivepowerisavailabletothevalveanditscontrolcircuits.AdepressurizedRCSandanRCSventandamaximumofoneSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.AnRCSventisOPERABLEwhenopenwith'nareaof>I.lsquareinches.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-74DraftB LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESLCO(continued)Eachofthesemethodsofoverpressure'reventioniscapableofmitigatingthelimitingLTOPtransient.TheLCOismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictestswithoutthePORVsandRCSventOPERABLE;howevernoSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.Thisexclusionisnecessarysinceapressuredifferentialof~800psidismaintainedbetweentheprimaryandsecondarysidesduringthetest.ThisrestrictedpressuredifferentiallimitsthestressesplacedontheSGwhich.cancausecladdingintheprimarychanneltoseparatefromthebasemetalandresultintheneedfordifficultrepairsinahighradiationarea.TomaintainthispressuredifFerentiallimit,RCSpressuremustbeincreasedabovethePORVsetpointforLTOPconditions.ThetestcannotbeperformedabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturesincethesteamlinesmaynotbeabletoaccommodatetheassociatedthermalexpansioniftheyarehea'ted.Therefore,allthreeSIpumpsmustbeincapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthesesecondarysidehydrostatictests(Ref.6).ThesecondNoteonlyrequiresanECCSaccumulatortobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.AccumulatorpressurebelowthislimitwillnotoverpressurizetheRCSbeyondanalyzed"conditions.Theaccumulatorisisolatedwhenthedischargemotoroperatedvalveisclosedanditsassociatedpowersupplyisremoved.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-75(continued)DraftB LTOPSystem83.4.12BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRortheRHRsystemisintheRHRoperatingmode,inMODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,andinNODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.ThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovideoverpressureprotectionthatmeetstheReference1P/TlimitsabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.WhenthereactorvesselheadisoffortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorpressurizermanwayareopen,overpressurizationcannotoccur.LCO3.4.3providestheoperationalP/TlimitsforallMODES.LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"requirestheOPERABILITYofthepressurizersafetyvalvesthatprovideoverpressureprotectionduringMODES1,2,and3,andMODE4abovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.LowtemperatureoverpressurepreventionismostcriticalduringshutdownwhentheRCSiswatersolid,andamassorheatinputtransientcancauseaveryrapidincreaseinRCSpressurewhenlittleornotimeallowsoperatoractiontomiti'gatetheevent.ACTIONSA.lWithoneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyoftakingactiontoremovetheRCSfromthispotentialcondition.ConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisconditionisonlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a(i.e.,whenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-76DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSB.1(continued)InMODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,withonerequiredPORVinoperable,thePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTimeof7days.TwoPORVsarerequiredtoprovidelowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationwhilewithstandingasinglefailureofanactivecomponent.TheCompletionTimeconsidersthatonlyonePORVisrequiredtomitigateanoverpressuretransientandthatthelikelihoodofanactivefailureoftheremainingvalvepathduringthistimeperiodisverylow.ConditionBismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisconditionisonlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a(i.e.,whenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath).C.1TheconsequencesofoperationaleventsthatwilloverpressurizetheRCSaremoresevereatlowertemperature(Ref.7).Thus,withoneofthetwoPORVsinoperableinMODE5withtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,orinMODE6withtheheadonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,thePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusin72hours.RestoringthePORVtoOPERABLEstatusprovidesrequiredredundancy.TheCompletionTimeof72hourstorestorethePORVtoOPERABLEstatusrepresentsareasonabletimetoinvestigateandrepairseveraltypesofreliefvalvefailureswithoutexposuretoalengthyperiodwithonlyonePORVtoprotectagainstoverpressureevents.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisconditionisonlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.a(i.e.,whenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath).(contihued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.4-77DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONS(continued)D.lWithtwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandtheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof~1.1squareinches,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyoftakingactiontotheRCSfromthispotentialcondition.Condition0ismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisconditionisonlyapplicabletoLCO3.4.12.b(i.e.,whenthereisaRCSventpath~1.1squareinches.E.lF.landF.2AnunisolatedECCSaccumulatorrequiresisolationwithin1hour.ThisisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingtemperatureallowedbytheP/Tlimitcurves.Ifisolationisneededandcannotbeaccomplishedin1hour,RequiredActionF.1andRequiredActionF.2providetwooptions,eitherofwhichmustbeperformedinthenext12hours.ByincreasingtheRCStemperaturetogreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,amaximumaccumulatorpressureof800psig(reliefvalvesetpoint)cann'otexceedtheLTOPlimitsiftheaccumulatorsarefullyinj'ected.DepressurizingtheaccumulatorsbelowtheLTOPlimitfromthePTLRalsogivesthisprotection.TheCompletionTimesarebasedonoperatingexperiencethattheseactivitiescanbeaccomplishedinthesetimeperiodsandonengineeringevaluationsindicatingthataneventrequiringLTOPisnotlikelyintheallowedtimes.G.1andG.2Atleastonechargingpumpmustbeinthepull-stoppositionwithin1hourandtheRCSmustbedepressurizedandaventmustbeestablishedwithin8hourswhen:a.BothrequiredPORVsareinoperable;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-78DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSG.1andG.2(continued)b.ARequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orFisnotmet;orc.TheLTOPSystemisinoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,B,C,orE.TheCompletionTimeofonehourtorestrictthecoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSconsiderstherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodandprovidestheoperatortimetorenderachargingpumpincapableofinjectingbyplacingitinthepull-stopposition.Onlyonedisablingdeviceisrequiredsincethereisarelativelysmallprobabilityofaninadvertentchargingpumpactuationduringthe8hoursbeforeRCSdepressurizationisachievedandaventestablished.ThedisablingofachargingpumpisnecessarysinceRV203cannotmitigateacharging/letdownmismatcheventifRHRisprovidingdecayheatremovalaboveNODE5andthreechargingpumpsareoperating.Theventmustbesized~1.1squareinchestoensurethattheflowcapacityisgreaterthanthatrequiredfortheworstcasemassinputtransientreasonableduringtheapplicabl.eNODES,ThisactionisneededtoprotecttheRCPBfromalowtemperatureoverpressureeventandapossiblebrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandtoprotecttheRHRsystemfromoverpressurization.TheCompletionTimeof8hourstodepressurizetheRCSandestablishaventconsidersthetimerequiredtoplacetheplantinthisConditionandtherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodduetoincreasedoperatorawarenessofadministrativecontrolrequirements.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-79(continued)DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3Tominimizethepotentialforalowtemperatureoverpressureeventbylimitingthemassinputcapability,allSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhen,thePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath(LCO3.4.12.a)andaminimumoftwoSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedandanRCSventz1.1squareinchesisestablished(LCO3.4.12.b).TheSI.pumpsarerenderedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSthroughremovingthepowerfromthepumpsbyrackingthebreakers.outunderadministrativecontrol.AnalternatemethodofLTOPcontrolmaybeemployedusingatleasttwoindependentmeanstopreventapumpstartsuchthatasinglefailureorsingleactionwillnotresultinaninjectionintotheRCS.Thismaybeaccomplishedthroughthefollowing:a.placingthepumpcontrolswitchinthepull-stoppositionandclosingatleastonevalveinthedischargeflowpath;b.lockingclosedamanualisolationvalve'ntheinjectionpath;orc.closingamotoroperatedisolationvalveintheinjectionpathandremovingtheACpowersource.Theflowpathsthroughthetest'connectionsassociatedwiththeECCSaccumulatorcheckvalves(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves839A,839B,840A,and840B)andtheECCSaccumulatorfilllines(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves835Aand835B)donothavetobeisolatedforthisSRsincethepotentialmassadditionfromasingleSIpumpthroughthesesixlinesislimitedbytheinstalledorificestolessthanthatassumedforthecharging/letdownmismatchanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-80DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3(continued)TheECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvescanbeverifiedclosedbyuseofcontrolboardindicationforvalveposition.ThisverificationisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureislessthanthislimit,noverificationisrequiredsincetheaccumulatorcannotpressurizetheRCSto.orabovethePORVsetpoint.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficient,consideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,toverifytherequiredstatusoftheequipment.TheFrequencyofevery12hoursthereafterforSR3.4.12.3ensuresthattheECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesaremaintainedclosedanddonotresultinapotentialLTOPactuation.SR3.4.12.4TheRCSventof~1.1squareinchesisprovenOPERABLEbyverifyingitsopenconditioneither:a.Onceevery12hoursforavalvethatcannotbelocked.b.Onceevery31daysforavalvethatislocked,sealed,orsecuredinposition.Aremovedpressurizersafetyvalvefitsthiscategory.ThepassiveventarrangementmustonlybeopentobeOPERABLE.ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformediftheventisbeingusedtosatisfythepressurereliefrequirementsoftheLCO3.4.12.b.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-81DraftB LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.12.SThePORVblockvalvemustbeverifiedopenevery72hourstoprovidetheflowpathforeachrequiredPORVtoperformitsfunctionwhenactuated.Thevalvemayberemotelyverifiedopeninthemaincontrolroom.'ThisSurveillanceisperformedifthePORVsatisfiestheLCO.Theblockvalveisaremotelycontrolled,motoroperatedvalve.Thepowertothevalveoperatorisnotrequiredtoberemoved,andthemanualoperatorisnotrequiredtobelockedintheinactiveposition.Thus,theblockvalvecanbeclosedintheeventthePORVdevelopsexcessiveleakageordoesnotclose(sticksopen)afterrelievinganoverpressuresituationsThe72hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,suchasvalvepositionindication,thatverifythatthePORVblockvalveremainsopen.SR3.4.12.6PerformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)isrequiredevery31daysoneachrequiredPORVtoverifyand,asnecessary,adjust~itsliftsetpoint.TheCOTwillverifythesetpointiswithintheallowedmaximumlimitsinthePTLR.PORVactuationcoulddepressurizetheRCSandisthereforenotrequired.ANotehasbeenaddedindicatingthatthisSRisrequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious31days.Dependingonthecooldownrate,theCOTmaynothavebeenperformedbeforeentryintotheLTOPMODES.Thetestmustbeperformedwithin12hoursafterenteringtheLTOPMODES.The12hoursconsiderstheunlikelihoodofalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduringthistime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-82Draft8 LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.12.7Verificationoncewithin12hoursandevery31daysthereafterthatpowerisremovedfromeachECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveensuresthatatleasttwoindependentactionsmustoccurbeforetheaccumulatoriscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,theperformanceofthissurveillanceoncewithin12hoursandevery31daysthereafterwillprovideassurancethatpowerisremoved.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheSurveillanceisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureisbelowthislimit,theLTOPlimitcannotbeexceededandthesurveillanceisnotrequired.SR3.4.12.8PerformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONoneachrequiredPORVactuationchannelisrequiredevery24monthstoadjustthewholechannel,sothatitrespondsandthevalveopenswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixG.2.GenericLetter88-11,"NRCPositiononEmbrittlementofReactorVesselHaterialsanditsImpactonPlantOperations."3.UFSAR,Section5.2.2.4.10CFR50,Section50.46.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-83DraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESREFERENCES(continued)6.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RGEE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedJuly26,1979.7.GenericLetter90-06,"ResolutionofGenericIssue70,"Power-OperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability,"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLow-TemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLight-WaterReactors."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-84DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGEBASESBACKGROUNDComponentsthatcontainortransportthecoolanttoorfromthereactorcoremakeuptheRCS.Componentjointsaremadebywelding,bolting,rolling,orpressureloading,andvalvesisolateconnectingsystemsfromtheRCS.Duringplantlife,thejointandvalveinterfacescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantLEAKAGE,througheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.ThepurposeoftheRCSOperationalLEAKAGELCOistolimitLEAKAGEfromthesesourcestoamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThisLCOspecifiesthetypesandamountsofLEAKAGE.AtomicIndustryforum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.TheseleakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."ThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplantandthepublic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-85DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Alimitedamountofleakageinsidecontainmentisexpectedfromauxiliarysystems(e.g.componentcoolingwater)thatcannotbemade100%leaktight.Leakagefromthesesystemsshouldbedetected,located,andisolatedfromthecontainmentatmosphere,ifpossible,tonotinterferewithRCSleakagedetection.ThisLCOdealswithprotectionofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)fromdegradationandthecorefrominadequatecooling,inadditiontopreventingtheaccidentanalysesradiationreleaseassumptionsfrombeingexceeded.TheconsequencesofviolatingthisLCOincludethepossibilityofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESExceptforprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,thesafetyanalysesdonotaddressoperationalLEAKAGE.However,otheroperationalLEAKAGEisrelatedtothesafetyanalysesforLOCA;theamountofleakagecanaffecttheprobabilityofsuchanevent(Ref.2).PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisafactorinthedosereleasesoutsidecontainmentresultingfromasteamlinebreak(SLB)accident.Toalesserextent,otheraccidentsortransi.entsinvolvesecondarysteamreleasetotheatmosphere,suchasasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Thesafetyanalysisforaneventresultinginsteamdischargetotheatmosphereassumesa0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEastheinitialcondition.Theleakagecontaminatesthesecondaryfluid.TheUFSAR(Ref.3)analysisforSGTRassumesthecontaminatedsecondaryfluidisonlybrieflyreleasedviasafetyvalvesandthemajorityissteamedtothecondenser.The.assumed0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisrelativelyinconsequential.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-86DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALY(continuedTheRCSoperationalLEAKAGEsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.TheSLBoutsideofcontainmentismorelimitingforsiteSISradiationreleases.ThesafetyanalysisfortheSLB)accidentassumes0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinonegeneratorasaninitialcondition.ThedoseconsequencesresultingfromtheSLBaccidentoutsideofcontainmentarewellwithinthelimitsdefinedin10CFR100orthestaffapprovedlicensingbasis(i.e.,asmallfractionoftheselimits).However,alowerLEAKAGElimitisassumedforallSLBstopreventacoincidentSGTRduetothelargestressesplacedontheSGtubesasaresultoftherapidcooldownanddepressurization.Thesestresscalculationsconservativelyassumeatubewitha0.4inchlongthrough-wallcrackinalocationwith40%localwallthinning.Theanalysesdemonstratethattheintegrityoftheselectedtubeismaintainedwithsufficientmarginafter.theSLB.Theassumedthrough-wallcrackof0.4inchescorrespondsto0.Igpmleakageundernormaloperatingconditions(Ref.4).'herefore,theprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEislimitedtoO.lgpmperSG.LCORCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:'a~PressureBoundarLEAKAGENopressureboundaryLEAKAGEisallowed,beingindicativeofmaterialdeterioration.LEAKAGEofthistypeisunacceptableastheleakitselfcouldcausefurtherdeterioration,resultinginhigherLEAKAGE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB.LEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-87DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESLCO(continued)b.C.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEOnegallonperminute(gpm)ofunidentifiedLEAKAGEisallowedasareasonableminimumdetectableamountthatthecontainmentairmonitoringandcontainmentsumplevelmonitoringequipmentcandetectwithinareasonabletimeperiod.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB,iftheLEAKAGEisfromthepressureboundary.IdentifiedLEAKAGEd.Upto10gpmofidentifiedLEAKAGEisconsidered.allowablebecauseLEAKAGEisfromknownsourcesthat'onotinterferewithdetectionofidentifiedLEAKAGEandiswellwithinthecapabilityofachargingpumpoperatingatitslowspeedsetting.IdentifiedLEAKAGEincludesLEAKAGEtothecontainmentfromspecificallyknownandlocatedsources,LEAKAGEthroughtwoin-seriesPIVs,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,butdoesnotincludepressureboundaryLEAKAGEorcontrolledreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturn(anormalfunctionnotconsideredLEAKAGE).ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofacomponentorsystem.PrimartoSecondarLEAKAGEthrouhEachSteamGeneratorSGTotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEamountingto0.1gpmthrougheachSGproducesacceptableoffsitedosesandtubestressesintheSLBaccidentanalysis.ViolationofthisLCOcouldexceedtheoffsitedoselimitsforthisaccidentorresultinacoincidentSGTR.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEmustbeincludedinthetotalallowablelimitforidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheSGsshallalsobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-88(continued)DraftB RCSOperatio'nalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecausethepotentialforRCPBLEAKAGEisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.InMODES5or6,thetemperatureis<200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationismuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.LCO3.4.14,"RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage,"measuresleakagethrougheachindividualPIVandcanimpactthisLCO.Ofthein-seriesPIVsineachisolatedline,leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVdoesnotresultinRCSLEAKAGEwhentheotherisleaktight.IfbothvalvesleakandresultinalossofmassfromtheRCS,thelossmustbeincludedintheallowableidentifiedLEAKAGE.ACTIONSA.lUnidentifiedLEAKAGE,identifiedLEAKAGE,orprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinexcessoftheLCOlimitsmustbereducedtowithinlimitswithin4hours.ThisCompletionTimeallowstimetoverifyleakageratesandeitheridentifyunidentifiedLEAKAGEorreduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimitsbeforethereactormustbeshutdown.ThisactionisnecessarytopreventfurtherdeteriorationoftheRCPB.B.1andB.2IfanyRCSpressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists,oriftheRequiredActionofConditionAcannotbecompletedwithin4hours,thereactormustbebroughttolowerpressureconditionstoreducetheseverityoftheLEAKAGEanditspotentialconsequences.ThereactormustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE5within36hours.ThisactionreducestheLEAKAGEandalsoreducesthefactorsthattendtodegradethepressureboundary.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-89DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESACTIONSB.1and8.2(continued)TheallowedCompletionTimes'arereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InNODE5,thepressurestressesactingontheRCPBaremuchlower,andfurtherdeteriorationismuchlesslikely.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.13.1VerifyingRCSLEAKAGEtobewithintheLCOlimitsensurestheintegrityoftheRCPBismaintained.PressureboundaryLEAKAGEwhichisnotallowedbythisLCO,wouldatfirstappearasunidentifiedLEAKAGEandcanonlybepositivelyidentifiedbyinspection.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEandidentifiedLEAKAGEaredeterminedbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalance.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisalsomeasuredbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalanceinconjunctionwitheffluentmonitoringwithinthesecondarysteamandfeedwatersystems.The'RCSwater.inventorybalancemustbeperformedwiththeRCSatsteadystateoperatingconditions.Therefore,thisSRisrequiredtobeperformedonceduringtheinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationandevery72hoursthereafter.Steadystateoperationisrequiredtoperformaproperinventorybalance;calculationsduringmaneuveringarenotusefulandaNoterequirestheSurveillancetobemetwhensteadystateisestablished.ForRCSoperationalLEAKAGEdeterminationbywaterinventorybalance,steadystateisdefinedasstableRCSpressure,temperature,powerlevel,pressurizerandvolumecontroltanklevels,makeupandletdown,andRCPsealinjectionandreturnflows.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-90DraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.13.1(continued)AnearlywarningofpressureboundaryLEAKAGEorunidentifiedLEAKAGEisprovidedbytheautomaticsystemsthatmonitorthecontainmentatmosphereradioactivityandthecontainmentsumplevel.ItshouldbenotedthatLEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.LeakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."The72hourFrequencyisareasonableintervaltotrendLEAKAGEandrecognizestheimportanceofearlyleakagedetectioninthepreventionofaccidents.SR3.4.13.2ThisSRprovidesthemeansnecessarytodetermineSGOPERABILITYinanoperationalHODE.TherequirementtodemonstrateSGtubeintegrityinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramemphasizestheimportanceofSGtubeintegrity,eventhoughthisSurveillanc'ecannotbeperformedatnormaloperatingconditions.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationof~WestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingwithEliminationofPostulatedPipe'reaksinPWRPrimaryHainLoops."3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.LetterfromR.APurple,NRC,toL.D.White,RGLE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-91DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageBASESBACKGROUND10CFR50.2,10CFR50.55a(c),andAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53(Refs.1,2,and3),defineRCSPIVsasanytwonormallyclosedvalvesin-serieswithinthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB),whichseparatethehighpressureRCSfromanattachedlowpressuresystem.Duringtheirlives,thesevalvescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantleakagethrougheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.TheRCSPIVLeakageLCOallowsRCShighpressureoperationwhenleakagethroughthesevalvesexistsinamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThePIVleakagelimitappliestoeachindividualvalve.Leakagethroughbothin-seriesPIVsforagivenlinemustbeincludedaspartoftheidentifiedLEAKAGE,governedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."ThisistrueduringoperationonlywhenthelossofRCSmassthroughin-seriesvalvesisdeterminedbyawaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)orotherconfirmatorytests.AknowncomponentoftheidentifiedLEAKAGEbeforeoperationbeginsistheleastoftheindividualleakratesdeterminedforleakingseriesPIVsduringtherequiredsurveillancetesting;leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVinalineisnotRCSoperationalLEAKAGEiftheotherisleaktight.Priortotherequiredsurveillancetesting(SR3.4.14.1)andwaterinv'entorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)inMODES3and4,anyleakagethroughthePIVsisconsideredunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Althoughthisspecificationprovidesalimiton'allowablePIVleakagerate,itsmainpurposeistopreventoverpressurefailureofthelowpressureportionsofconnectingsystems.TheleakagelimitisanindicationthatthePIVsbetweentheRCSandtheconnectingsystemsaredegradedordegrading.PIVleakagecouldleadtooverpressureofthelowpressurepipingorcomponents.Failureconsequencescouldbealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)outsideofcontainment,(i.e.,intersystemLOCA),anunanalyzedaccident,thatcoulddegradetheabilityforlowpressureinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-92DraftB

RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThebasisforthisLCOisthe1975NRC"ReactorSafetyStudy"(Ref.4)thatidentifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcoredamage.Asubsequentstudy(Ref.5)evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurationstodeterminetheprobabilityofintersystemLOCAsandtoidentifywhichconfigurationsdominatetheriskprofileforintersystemLOCApotential.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformedtoidentifythemostrisksignificantconfigurations.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofaPIV,whichcouldleadtooverpressurizationofalowpressuresystemandthelossoftheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESReference4identifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcoredamage.ThedominantaccidentsequenceintheintersystemLOCAcategoryasidentifiedbyReference4wasthefailureofthelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemoutsideofcontainment.ThisaccidentistheresultofapostulatedfailureofthePIVs,whicharepartoftheRCPB,andthesubsequentpressurizationoftheRHRSystemdownstreamofthePIVsfromtheRCS.BecausethelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemisdesignedfor600psig,overpressurizationfailureoftheRHRlowpressurelinewouldresultinaLOCA.outsidecontainmentandsubsequentincreasedriskofcoredamage.Reference5evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurations,leakagetestingofthevalves,andoperationalchangestodeterminetheeffectontheprobabilityofintersystemLOCAs.ThisstudyconcludedthatperiodicleakagetestingofthePIVscansubstantiallyreducetheprobabilityofanintersystemLOCA.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformed.PIVsinthefollowingsystemsconnectedtotheRCSwereevaluated:a.residualheatremoval(RHR);b.saFetyinjection(SI);andc.chemicalandvolumecontrol.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-93DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheevaluationofintersystemLOCAsconcludedthatseveralconfigurationsidentifiedinReferences4and5existedintheRHRandSIsystems.ThePIVconfigurationsintheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwerenotidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantduetotheinstalledorificesintheletdownpipingandtheuseofpipingdesignedtoRCSpressureconditionsfromthedischargeofthepositivedisplacementpumpstocontainment(Ref.7).ThePIVsidentifiedintheSIandRHRSystemsarelistedbelow:853A853B 867A867B877A877B878A878C878F 878G878H878JRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorACheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorBCheckValvetoRCSColdLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegBSI.PumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegARCSPIVleakagesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSPIVleakageisidentifiedLEAKAGEintoclosedsystemsconnectedtotheRCS.Isolationvalveleakageisusuallyontheorderofdropsperminute.Leakagethatincreasessignificantlysuggeststhatsomethingisoperationallywrongandcorrectiveactionmustbetaken.ThisLCOonlyappliestothosePIVswhicharedeterminedtobeinthemostrisksignificantconfigurations(Ref.7)aslistedinApplicableSafetyAnalysis'heremainingPIVsaregovernedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE"andLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBoundaries."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-94DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOPIVleakagelimitis0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizewithamaximumlimitof5gpm.Aleakageratelimitbasedonvalvesizeisusedsincethisissuperiortoasingleallowablevalue(Ref.8).Reference9permitsleakagetestingatalowerpressuredifferentialthanbetweenthespecifiedmaximumRCSpressureandthenormalpressureoftheconnectedsystemduringRCSoperation(themaximumpressuredifferential)inthosetypesofvalvesinwhichthehigherservicepressurewilltendtodiminishtheoverallleakagechannelopening.Insuchcases,theobservedratemaybeadjustedtothemaximumpressuredifferentialbyassumingleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecausethePIVleakagepotentialisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.InMODES5or6,thetemperatureiss200Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandisolationfailuresaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheActionsaremodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1providesclarificationthateachflowpathallowsseparateentryintoaCondition.Thisisallowedbaseduponthefunctionalindependenceoftheflowpath.Note2requiresanevaluationofaffectedsystemsifaPIVisinoperable.Theleakagemayhaveaffectedsystemoperability,orisolationofaleakingflowpathwithanalternatevalvemayhavedegradedtheabilityoftheinterconnectedsystemtoperformitssafetyfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-95DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESACTIONS(continued)A.landA.2Aleakingflowpathmustbeisolatedbytwovalves.RequiredActionsA.1andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatthevalvesusedforisolationmustmeetthesameleakagerequirementsasthePIVsandmustbewithintheRCPBorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.RequiredActionA.Irequiresthatisolationoftheaffectedflowpathwithonevalvemustbeperformedwithin4hours.Fourhoursprovidestimetoreduceleakageinexcessoftheallowablelimitandtoisolatetheaffectedsystemifleakagecannotbereduced.The4hourCompletionTimeallowstheactionsandrestrictsoperationwithleakingisolationvalves.RequiredActionA.2specifiesthatthedoubleisolationbarrieroftwovalvesberestoredbyclosingsomeothervalvequal'ifiedforisolation.TheuseofavalveotherthanthepreviouslyleakingPIVmustincludeconsiderationthattheplantmaynolongerbeinananalyzedcondition.The72hourCompletionTimeafterexceedingthelimit'onsidersthetimerequiredtocompletetheActionandthelowprobabilityofasecondvalvefailingduringthistimeperiod.B.landB.2Ifleakagecannotbereduced,thesystemisolated,ortheotherRequiredActionsaccomplished,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandNODE5within36hours.ThisActionmayreducetheleakageduetoreducedRCSpressurewhilereducingthepotentialforaLOCAoutsidethecontainment.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonablebasedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-96(continued)DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2PerformanceofleakagetestingoneachRCSPIVorisolationvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.IandRequiredActionA.2isrequiredtoverifythatleakageisbelowthespecifiedlimitandtoidentifyeachleakingvalve.Theleakagelimitof0.5gpmperinchofnominalvalvediameterupto5gpmmaximumappliestoeachvalveandshouldbebasedonanRCSpressureof+20psigofnormalsystemoperatingpressure.Leakagetestingrequiresastablepressurecondition.Formultiplein-seriesPIVs,theleakagerequirementappliestoeachvalveindividuallyandnottothecombinedleakageacrossbothvalves.IfthePIVsarenotindividuallyleakagetested,onevalvemayhavefailedcompletelyandnotbedetectediftheotherin-seriesvalvemeetstheleakagerequirement.Inthissituation,theprotectionprovidedbyredundantvalveswouldbelost.Testingofthe'heckvalves(877A,877B,878F,and878H)andthemotoroperatedvalves(878Aand878C)identifiedasPIVsintheSIhotleginjectionlinesistobeperformedatleastonceevery40months.ThissurveillanceintervalisallOwedsince,thetwoSIhotleginjectionlinesaremaintainedclosedtoaddresspressurizedthermalshock(PTS)concerns.Eachinjectionlineisisolatedbytwocheckvalvesandonemotoroperatedvalvein-serieswhichmustallfailtocreatethepotentialforanintersystemLOCA.TestingoftheremainingRCSPIVsintheSIandRHRsystemsistobeperformedevery24months,atypicalrefuelingcycle.The24monthFrequencyisconsistentwith10CFR50.55a(g)(Ref.10)ascontainedintheInserviceTestingProgram,iswithinthefrequencyallowedbytheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)Code,SectionXI(Ref.9),andisbasedontheneedtoperformsuchsurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringanoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-97DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2(continued)Inadditiontotheperiodictestingrequirements,testingmustbeperformedonceafterthevalvehasbeenopenedbyflow,exercised,orhadmaintenanceperformedonittoensuretightreseating.Thismaintenancedoesnotincludeminoractivitiessuchaspackingadjustmentswhichdonotaffecttheleaktightnessofthevalve.PIVsdisturbedintheperformanceofthisSurveillanceshouldalsobetestedunlessdocumentationshowsthataninfinitetestingloopcannotpracticallybeavoided.Testingmustbeperformedwithin24hoursafterthevalvehasbeenreseated.Alimitof24hoursisareasonableandpracticaltimelimitforperformingthistestafteropeningorreseatingavalve.TheleakagelimitistobemetattheRCSpressureassociatedwithMODES1and2.ThispermitsleakagetestingathighdifferentialpressureswithstableconditionsnotpossibleintheMODESwithlowerpressures.EntryintoMODES3and4isallowedtoestablishthenecessarydifferentialpressuresandstableconditionstoallowforperformanceofthisSurveillance,REFERENCES1.10CFR50.2.2.10CFR50.55a(c).3.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.4.WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),"AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPowerPlants,"AppendixV,October1975.5.NUREG-0677,"TheProbabilityofIntersystemLOCA:ImpactDuetoLeakTestingandOperationalChanges,"May1980.6.GenericLetter,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedFebruary23,1980.(contihued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-98DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESREFERENCES,(continued)7.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"OrderforModificationofLicenseConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedApril20,1981.8.EGSGReport,EGG-NTAP-6175.9.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.10.10CFR50.55a(g).R.E.GinhaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-99DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34(Ref.1)alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.Industrypracticehasshownthatsmallwaterflowchangescanbereadilydetectedincontainedvolumesbymonitoringchangesinwaterlevelorintheoperatingfrequencyofapump.ThecontainmentsumpusedtocollectunidentifiedLEAKAGE(i.e.,containmentsumpA)ismonitoredforlevelandsumppumpactuationandcanmeasureapproximatelya2.0gpmleakinonehour.ThissensitivityisacceptablefordetectingincreasesinunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Thereactorcoolantcontainsradioactivitythat,whenreleasedtothecontainment,canbedetectedbyradiationmonitoringinstrumentation.Reactorcoolantradioactivitylevelswillbelowduringinitialreactorstartupandforafewweeksthereafter,untilactivatedcorrosionproductshavebeenformedandfissionproductsappearfromfuelelementcladdingcontaminationorcladdingdefects.Theparticulatemonitor(R-11)candetectaleakof0.013gpmwithin20minutesassumingthepresenceofcorrosionproducts.Thegaseousmonitor(R-12)candetectaleakof2.0.to10.0gpmwithin1hourandisconsideredabackuptotheparticulatemonitor.RadioactivitydetectionsystemsareincludedformonitoringbothparticulateandgaseousactivitiesbecauseoftheirsensitivitiesandrapidresponsestoRCSLEAKAGE.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-100DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation83.4.15BASESBACKGROUND(continued)AlternativemeansalsoexisttomonitorRCSLEAKAGEinsidecontainment.Theseincludehumiditydetectors,airtemperatureandpressuremonitoring,andcondensateflowratefromtheaircoolers.ThecapabilityofthesesystemstodetectRCSleakageisinfluencedbyseveralfactorsincludingcontainmentfreevolumeanddetectorlocation.ThesesystemsaremostusefulasalarmsorindirectindicatingdevicesavailabletotheoperatorsandarenotrequiredbythisLCO(Ref.2).TheleakagedetectionsystemsarealsousedtosupportidentificationofleakagefromopensystemsFoundincontainment.Thisincludesservicewaterandfireservicewatersystems.LeakagefromthesesystemsisrequiredtobemonitoredinresponsetoIEBulletinNo.80-24(Ref.3).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheasymmetricloadsproducedbythepostulatedbreaksaretheresultofanassumedpressureimbalance,bothinternalandexternaltotheRCS.Theinternalasymmetricloadsresultfromarapiddecompressionthatcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialsacrossthecorebarrelandfuelassemblies.Theexternalasymmetricloadsresultfromtherapiddepressurizationofannulusregions,suchastheannulusbetweenthereactorvesselandtheshieldwall,andcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialstoactonthevessel.TheseasymmetricloadscoulddamageRCSsupports,corecoolingequipmentorcoreinternals.Thisconcernwas.firstidentifiedasHultiplantAction(MPA)D-10andsubsequentlyasUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)2,"AsymmetricLOCALoads"(Ref.4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-101DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheresolutionofUSI-2forWestinghousePWRswasuseoffracturemechanicstechnologyforRCSpiping>10inchesdiameter(Ref.5).Thistechnologybecameknownasleak-before-break(LBB).IncludedwithintheLBBmethodologywastherequirementtohaveleakagedetectionsystemscapableofdetectinga1.0gpmleakwithinfourhours.Thisleakagerateisdesignedtoensurethatadequatemarginsexisttodetectleaksinatimelymannerduringnormaloperatingconditions.TheuseofLBBforGinnaStationisdocumentedinReference6.ThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplantandthepublic.RequiredcorrectiveactionsareprovidedinLCO3.4,13,RCSOperationalLEAKAGE.ThecapabilityoftheleakagedetectionsystemswasevaluatedbytheNRCinReference7.RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion1oftheNRCPolicyStatement.!LCOOnemethodofprotectingagainstlarg'eRCSLEAKAGEderivesfromtheabilityofinstrumentstorapidlydetectextremelysmallleaks.ThisLCOrequiresinstrumentsofdiversemonitoringprinciplestobeOPERABLEtoprovideahighdegreeofconfidencethatextremelysmallleaksaredetectedintimetoallowactionstoplacetheplantinasafecondition,whenRCSLEAKAGEindicatespossibleRCPBdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-1020}aftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation83.4.15BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOissatisfiedwhenmonitorsofdiversemeasurementmeansareavailable.Thus,thecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuationfromeithersumpApump),incombinationwithagaseous(R-12)orparticulate(R-ll)radioactivitymonitorprovidesanacceptableminimum.Alternatively,theplantventgaseous(R-14)orparticulate(R-13)monitorsmaybeusedinplaceofR-12andR-ll,respectively,providedthataflowpaththroughnormallyclosedvalve1590isavailableandR-14AisOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYBecauseofelevatedRCStemperatureandpressureinMODES1,2,3,and4,RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.IInNODE5or6,thetemperatureis<200Fandpressureismaintainedloworat.atmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforNODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinNODES5and6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2WiththerequiredcontainmentsumpAmonitorinoperable,nootherformofsamplingcanprovidetheequivalentinformation;however,thecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorwillprovideindicationsofchangesinleakage.InadditiontoanOPERABLEgaseousorparticulateatmospheremonitor,thecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEwithin24hours,ortheperiodicsurveillanceforRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedatanincreasedfrequencyof24hourstoprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.Theuseofthegaseousmonitor(R-12)isacceptableduetotheincreasedfrequencyofperformingSR3.4.13.1ortheuseofthecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-103DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSA.l.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLEiftheflowpathsfromallfourcontainmentaircoolerstotheirrespectivecollectiontanksareavailableandaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthemonitorhasbeenperformedwithinthelast24months.ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisprovidedasanoptionfordetectingRCSleakagesinceSR3.4.13.1isnotperformeduntilafter12hoursofsteadystateoperation.Therefore,thiscollectionsystemcanbeusedduringMODEchangesifthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.RestorationoftherequiredsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTime,of30daysisrequiredtoregainthefunctionafterthemonitor'sfailure.Thistimeisacceptable,consideringtheFrequencyandadequacyoftheRCSwaterinventorybalancerequiredbyRequired,ActionA.1.RequiredActionsA.1.1,A.1.2,andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.B.l.l8.1.2andB.2.1Withbothgaseous(R-12)andparticulate(R-11)containmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitoringinstrumentationchannelsinoperable(andtheiralternativesR-13andR-14),alternativeactionisrequired.Eithergrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmospheremustbetakenandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalances,inaccordancewithSR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedtoprovidealternateperiodicinformation.Withagrabsampleobtainedandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalanceperformedevery24hours,thereactormaybeoperatedforupto30daystoallowrestorationoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitors.The24hourintervalprovidesperiodicinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.The30dayCompletionTimerecognizesthatatleastoneotherformofleakagedetectionisavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-104DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSB.l.1B.1.2andB.2.1(continued)RequiredActionsB.1.1,B.1.2,andB.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthegaseousandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorforRCSLEAKAGE.C.l.lC.l.2C.2.1andC.2.2Withthe.requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorandtheparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-11)inoperable,theonlyinstalledmeansofdetectingleakageisthegaseouscontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-12).Thisconditiondoesnotprovide,adiversemeansofleakagedetection.Also,thegaseousmonitorcanonlymeasurebetweena2.0and10,0gpmleakwithin1hourwhichmaynotmeetthe1.0gpminlessthanfourhoursdetectionraterequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.5).TheRequiredActionsaretoanalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphereorperformRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,atafrequencyof24hours.ThecombinationofthegaseousmonitorandeithertheperiodicgrabsamplesorRCSinventorybalanceprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.RestorationofeitheroftheinoperablemonitorstoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysisrequiredtoregaintheintendedleakagedetectiondiversity.The30dayCompletionTimeensuresthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedinareducedconfigurationforalengthyperiodoftime.RequiredActionsC.1.1,C.1.2,C.2.1,andC.2.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicat'esthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-105Draft8 RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONS(continued)D.land0.2IfaRequiredActionofConditionA,B,orCcannotbemet,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.lWithallrequiredmonitorsinoperable,noautomaticmeansofmonitoringleakageareavailable,andimmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.15.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thecheckgivesreasonableconfidencethatthechannel,isoperatingproperly.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedoninstrumentreliability'andisreasonablefordetectingoffnormalconditions.SR3.4.15.2ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)ontherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thetestensuresthatthemonitor.canperformitsfunctioninthedesiredmanner.Thetestverifiesthealarmsetpointandrelativeaccuracyof.theinstrumentstring.TheFrequencyof92daysconsidersinstrumentreliability,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatitisproperfordetectingdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-106DraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESSURVEILLANCERENDUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.4.15.3andSR3.4.15.4TheseSRsrequiretheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachoftheRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationchannels.Thecalibrationverifiestheaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring,includingtheinstrumentslocatedinsidecontainment.TheFrequencyof24monthsconsiderschannelreliabilityandoperatingexperiencehasproventhatthisFrequencyisacceptable.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.RegulatoryGuide1.45.3.IEBulletinNo.80-24,"PreventionofDamageDuetoWaterLeakageInsideContainment."4.NUREG-0609,"AsymmetricBlowdownLoadsonPWRPrimarySystems,"1981.5.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingWithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryHainLoops."6.LetterfromD.C.DiIanni,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

"GenericLetter84-04,"dated,September9,1985.7.NUREG-0821,"IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,R.E.NuclearPowerPlant,"December1982.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-107DraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDThemaximumdosetothewholebodyandthethyroidthatanindividualatthesiteboundarycanreceivefor2hoursduringanaccidentisspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.1).Thelimitsonspecificactivityensurethatthedosesareheldtoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsduringanalyzedtransientsandaccidents.TheRCSspecificactivityLCOlimitstheallowableconcentrationlevelofradionuclidesinthereactorcoolant.TheLCOlimitsareestablishedtominimizetheoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesintheeventofasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)accident.ThespecificactivitylimitsforbothDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityareprovidedintheSRs.DOSEE(UIVALENTI-131iscalculatedusingTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuidel.109(Ref.2).Theallowablelevelsareintendedtolimitthe2hourdoseatthesiteboundarytoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.ThelimitsintheLCOarestandardized,basedonparametricevaluationsofoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesfortypicalsitelocations.TheparametricevaluationsshowedthepotentialoffsitedoselevelsforaSGTRaccidentwereanappropri'atelysmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.Eachevaluationassumesabroadrangeofsiteapplicableatmosphericdispersionfactorsinaparametricevaluation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLCOlimitsonthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantensuresthattheresulting2hourdosesatthesiteboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimitsfollowingaSGTRaccident.TheSGTRsafetyanalysis(Ref.'3)assumesthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantattheLCOlimitandanexistingreactorcoolantsteamgenerator(SG)tubeleakagerateof0.5gpm.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-108DraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheanalysisfortheSGTRaccidentestablishestheacceptancelimitsforRCSspecificactivity.ReferencetothisanalysisisusedtoassesschangestotheplantthatcouldaffectRCSspecificactivity,astheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.Theanalysisisfortwocasesofreactorcoolantspecificactivity(Ref.4).Onecaseassumesspecificactivityat1.0pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131withaconcurrentlargeiodinespikethatincreasestheI-131activityinthereactorcoolantbyafactorofabout500foradurationoffourhoursimmediatelyaftertheaccident.Thesecondcaseassumestheinitialreactorcoolantiodineactivityat60.0.pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131duetoapre-accidentiodinespikecausedbyanRCStransient.Inbothcases,thenoblegasactivityinthereactorcoolantassumes1%failedfuel,whichcloselyequalstheLCOlimitof100/EpCi/gmforgrossspecificactivity.TheSGTRcausesareductioninreactorcoolantinventory.ThereductioninitiatesareactortripfromalowpressurizerpressuresignaloranRCSovertemperatureaTsignal.TheanalysisalsoassumesalossofoffsitepoweratthesametimeasthereactortripfollowingtheSGTRevent.Thecoincidentlossofoffsitepowercausesthesteamdumpvalvestoclosetoprotectthecondenser.TheriseinpressureintherupturedSGdischarge'sradioactivelycontaminatedsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheSGatmosphericreliefvalvesandthemainsteamsafetyvalves.Thissteamreleasecontinuesforeighthoursuntiltheresidualheatremovalsystemisutilizedforcooldownpurposes.AllnoblegasactivityintheRCSwhichistransportedtothesecondarysystembythetuberuptureisassumedtobeimmediatelyreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheunaffectedSGremovescoredecayheatbyventingsteamtotheatmosphereuntiltheinitialcooldownendsandtheRCSsystempressurestabilizesbelowthereliefvalvesetpoint.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-109Draft8 RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)ThesafetyanalysisshowstheradiologicalconsequencesofanSGTRaccidentarewithinasmallfractionoftheReference1doseguidelinelimits.OperationwithiodinespecificactivitylevelsgreaterthantheLCOlimitispermissible,iftheactivitylevelsdonotexceedthelimitsshowninFigure3.4.16-1formorethan7days.TheincreasedpermissibleiodinelevelsshowninFigure3.4.16-1areacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilityofaSGTRaccidentoccurringduringtheestablished7daytimelimit.TheoccurrenceofanSGTRaccidentatthesepermissiblelevelscouldincreasethesiteboundarydoselevels,buttheywouldstillbewithin10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.RCSspecificactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificiodineactivityislimitedto1.0pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,andthegrossspecificactivityinthereactorcoolantislimitedto100/EpCi/gm(whereEistheaveragedisintegrationenergyofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesofthecoolantnuclides).ThelimitonDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131ensuresthe2hourthyroiddosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)willbeasmallfractionoftheallowedthyroiddose.Thelimitongrossspecificactivityensuresthe2hourwholebodydosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDBAwillbeasmallfractionoftheallowedwholebodydose.TheSGTRaccidentanalysis(Ref.3)showsthatthe2hoursiteboundarydoselevelsarewithinacceptablelimits.ViolationoftheLCOmayresultinreactorcoolantradioactivitylevelsthatcould,intheeventofanSGTR,leadtositeboundarydosesthatexceedthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-110(continued)DraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature~500'F,operationwithintheLCOlimitsforDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityarenecessarytocontainthepotentialconsequencesofanSGTRtowithintheacceptablesiteboundarydosevalues.ForoperationinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,andinMODES4and5,thereleaseofradioactivityintheeventofaSGTRisunlikelysincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftpressuresettingsofthemainsteamsafetyvalves'CTIONSA.landA.2WiththeDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131greaterthantheLCOlimit,samplesatintervalsof8hoursmustbetakentodemonstratethatthelimitsofFigure3.4.16-1arenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisrequiredtoobtainandanalyzeasample.Samplingisdonetocontinuetoprovideatrend.TheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131mustberestoredtowithinlimitswithin7daysifthelimitviolationresultedfromnormaliodinespiking.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhentheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131isgreaterthantheLCOlimitandwithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.4.16-1.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseofthesignificantconservatismincludedintheLCOlimit.Also,reducingtheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131towithinlimitsisaccomplishedthroughuseoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)demineralizers.ThiscleanupoperationparallelsplantrestartfollowingareactortripwhichfrequentlyresultsiniodinespikesduetothelargestepdecreaseinreactorpowerlevelandRCSpressureexcursion.ThecleanupoperationcannormallybeaccomplishedwithintheLCOCompletionTimeof7days.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-111DraftB 0'II'~VQlg/lIIp~)IlIJf RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1IfaRequiredActionandtheassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAisnotmetoriftheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131specificactivityisintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1,thereactormustbebroughttoMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500Fwithin8hours.Thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1Ifthegrossspecificactivityisnotwithinlimit,thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500'Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchall'engingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.16.1ThisSRrequiresperformingagammaisotopicanalysisasameasureofthegrossspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantatleastonceevery7days.Whilebasicallyaquantitativemeasureofradionuclideswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines,thismeasurementisthesumofthedegassedgammaactivitiesandthegaseousgammaactivitiesinthesampletaken.ThisSurveillanceprovidesanindicationofanyincreaseingrossspecificactivity.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-112DraftB ~,-J44Iv1I,nowIg.~iVf RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.4.16.1(continued)TrendingtheresultsofthisSurveillanceallowsproperremedialactiontobetakenbeforereachingtheLCOlimitundernormaloperatingconditions.TheSurveillanceisapplicableinHODES1and2,andinHODE3withT.,a500'F.The7dayFrequencyconsiderstheunlikelihoodofagrossfuelfailureduringthistime.SR3.4.16.2ThisSRisonlyperformedinHODE1toensureiodineremainswithinlimitsduringnormaloperationandfollowingfastpowerchangeswhenfuelfailureismorelikelytooccur.The14dayFrequencyisadequatetotrendchangesintheiodineactivitylevel,consideringgrossactivityismonitoredevery7days.TheFrequency,between2and10hoursafterapowerchange~15%RTPwithina1hourperiod,isestablishedbecausetheiodinelevelspeakduringthistimefollowingfuelfailure;samplesatothertimeswouldprovideinaccurateresults.SR3.4.16.3AradiochemicalanalysisforEdeterminationisrequiredwithin31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofHODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalforatleast48hoursandevery184days(6months)thereafter.ThisensuresthattheradioactivematerialsareatequilibriumsotheanalysisforEisrepresentativeandnotskewedbyacrudburstorothersimilarabnormalevent.TheEdeterminationdirectlyrelatestotheLCOandisrequiredtoverifyplantoperationwithinthespecifiedgrossactivityLCOlimit.Theanalysisfor.Eisameasurementoftheaverageenergiesperdisintegrationforisotopeswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines.TheFrequencyrecognizesEdoesnotchangerapidly.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatessamplingisonlyrequiredtobeperformedinHODE1suchthatequilibriumconditionsarepresentduringthesample.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-113DraftB

RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.RegulatoryGuide1.109,Revision1.3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.WCAP-11668,"LOFTTR2AnalysisofPotentialRadiologicalConsequencesFollowingaSGTRattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,"November1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-114DraftB 0J ANDRochesterGas5ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember1995SubmittalAttachmentsI,J,KVolumeIV ATTACHHENTI"Redlined".VersionofAttachmentA,SectionsD,E,F,andGasSubmittedonHay26,1995December1995 JUSTIFICATION(CURRENTGINNATS)ConvertingtotheITSformatwillprovideasignificanthumanfactorsimprovementbylocatingsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesectionandalsoprovide'a,standardstructure.Inaddition,theexpandedbasesinformationwillsupportpreparationofsafetyevaluationsandtrainingactivities.ThereareseveraltypesofchangesthatarebeingrequestedbythisLARinordertoperformtheconversion.ThesechangesarewithrespecttoboththeITSandthecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThetechnicalandsignificantadministrativechangesrelatedtothecurrentGinnaStationTSareorganizedintomultiplecategoriesassummarizedbelow.i.RelocationofRequirementsWithinTechnicalSpecificationsManycurrentspecificationsaremovedtosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesection.Sincetherequirementsareonlybeingrelocatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications,thereisnoreductioninsafety.Thiscategoryismainlyusedtoidentifymultiplerequirementsthatareconsolidatedintoasinglenewspecificationandnotforlistingrequirementswhichareonlyrenumbered.EliminationofDuplicatedRegulatoryRequirementsSeveralspecificationscurrentlyduplicateexistingregulatoryrequirements.Theremovalofthesespecificationseliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SincealllicenseesmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedex'emptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicatedrequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresandotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.iii.RelocationofCurrentRequirementsToOtherControlledDocumentsTherelocationofcertainrequirementstootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR,gAProgram,andplantprocedures)doesnoteliminatetherequirement.Instead,therequirementsarerelocatedtoother.moreappropriatedocumentsandprogramswhichhavesufficientcontrolsinplacetomanageimplementationandfuturechanges(e.g.,10CFR50.54(a)(3)and10CFR50.59).TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneed.torequesttechnical.specificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.December1995 iv.AdditionofNewITSRequirementsTherea'eseveralrequirementscontainedinNUREG-1431whicharenotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.TheseITSrequirements.-wereaddedinordertoprovideamorecompletespecification.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(iv.a)ora"lessrestrictivechange"(iv.b).v.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Technical)SeveralchangestoexistingrequirementsweremadetoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431.ExamplesincludemovingrequirementstoLCONotesandrevisingthecurrentspecifiedCompletionTime.Alsoincludedwithinthiscategoryaretherevisionoftheexistingbasestoreflectmorecurrentinformation.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(v.a),"lessrestrictivechange"(v.b),oran"administrativechange"(v.c).vi.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Administrative)Severalminorchangestothetechnicalspecificationswere.madethatareminorrevisionsonlyanddonotinvolveany'echnicalissues.ExamplesincludeupdatesofreferencestotheCodeofFederalRegulations.ThefollowingsectiondiscusseschangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhichwerenotaddressed.inSectionCofthisattachment.ThissectionisorganizedbasedontheexistingTSchapternumberstofacilitateeasierreview.Eachchangeisalsoidentifiedwithrespecttooneoftheabovecategories(e.g.,GinnaStationTSCategory(i)).AmarkedupcopyoftheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisprovidedinAttachmentBwhichidentifiesmajorchanges'only.Acrossreferenceisprovidedinthemarginofeachspecificationthathasbeenchangedbyuseofacirclecontainingsectionnumbersfrombelow.Forexample,"l.i"foundinthemarginofthemarkupwouldrefertosectionl.ibelow.AcrossreferencebetweentheITSandcurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisalsoprovidedinAttachmentE.1.TechnicalSpecification1.0TS1.2-ThedefinitionsofoperatingNODESwererevised,asfollows)theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):.a.Refueling-seeNotel.iibelow.b.ColdShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfroms-1hk/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.-161-December1995 HotShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfroms-1~k/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasalsorevisedfromz540'Fto~350'F.Thischangeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350'FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.TheexpansionofthistemperaturerangeisconservativesincethecurrentTSonlyusetheHotShutdownMODEintwoaspects.Thefirstmethodisrequiringashutdowntothismodeduetoplantconditions.SincetheuppertemperaturerangeforHotShutdownremainsthesame(ie.,theOperatingMODEtemperature),thereisnoimpact.ThesecondmethodistorequirecertainequipmenttobeOPERABLEinthismode.However,loweringthetemperaturelimitto350'FrequiresthattheequipmentwouldbeOPERABLEforalargertemperaturerange.Operating-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom>-1zk/k%toa0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureof-580'FwasnotaddedsincethisparameterisspecifiedinnewLCO3.4.1.Inaddition,theOperatingMODEwasseparatedintotwomodes:OperatingandStartup.TheonlydifferencebetweenthesetwomodesisthatStartupisdefinedwhenthereactoris~5%RatedThermalPower(RTP)whiletheOperatingMODEiswhenthereactoris>5%RTP.Anewoperatingmode(HotStandby)wasprovidedbetweenHotShutdownandColdShutdown.Thismodeisdefinedaswhenthereactivityconditionis<0.99k,<<andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis350'Fand>200'Fwhenthereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarefullytensioned.Thedefinitionofthisnewmodeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350'FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.-162-December1995 TS1.3-Thisdefinitionofrefuelingwasdeleted.ThecurrentTS1.2providesadefinitionofrefuelingasbeingthereactormodewhenreactivityis<-5~k/k%andthe.averagereactorcoolanttemperatureis<140'F.TS1.3statesthatrefuelingis"anyoperationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrods,whenthevesselheadisunbolted"whichisasubsetofthemodedefinedinTS1.2.ThenewTSTablel.1-1statesthatrefuelingisanyconditioninwhich"oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltislessthanfullytensioned"withfuelin-thereactor.Whileanaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureorreactivitylimitisnolongerprovidedfortherefuelingmodedefinition,thereactorvesselheadclosureboltscannotberemovedatelevatedreactorcoolanttemperaturesorwhentheRCSispressurizedduetotheirdesign.AreactivitylimitisalsonotrequiredwhentheRCSisdepressurized.Therefore,thenewdefinitionoftherefuelingmodeismore.conservativethancurrentTS1.3and.generallyconsistentwithTS1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS1.5-ThedefinitionforOperatingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedbythenewdefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITY.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS1.6-ThedefinitionforDegreeofRedundancy(InstrumentChannels)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedwithinnewTS3.3(Instrumentation).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.7.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecifythattheCHANNELCALIBRATIONincludestherequiredinterlockandtimeconstantfunctionsofthechannel.Inaddition,discussionofcalibratinginstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetectorswasaddedforclarification.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.2-Thelastsentenceofthisdefinitionwasrevisedasfollows:Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonof,thechannelindicationaad+v,::~:;i'tatus~~<t'a,otherindicationsaa~jy,estatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.Theseminorchangesprovidegreaterclarificationofthedefinedtermand'areGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.December1995 TS1.7.3-Thedefinitionsfortestingofanalogandbistablechannelswerecombinedintoonedescriptionwithanew'itle.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwodefinitionsisthattestingofbistablechannelsrequiredinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensorversus"asclosetothesensoraspossible"foranalogchannels.Sincethebistablemustbeactuatedtodetermineoperability,maintainingtheanalogchanneldescriptionforthecombineddefinitionisacceptable.Inaddition,thecombineddefinitionwasexpandedtorequire"adjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy."TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.4-ThedefinitionforSourceCheckwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheperformanceofaSourceCheckisnowaddressedwithinthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCHANNELOPERATINGTEST(COT).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.8-ThedefinitionforContainmentIntegritywasae4addeaze2~o'~ickytothehas'Piko&"newLiitjgo'ry~!i(~i'"Qi:;.:!elis'rigi'..TS1.10,-The.definitionforHotChannelFactorswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheHotChannelFactorlimitisonlydiscussedinoneLCOwiththelimitdefinedintheCOLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TSl.11-Thispreviouslydeleteddefinitionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS1.12-TheFrequencyforSurveillanceRequirementsisnowspecifiedinhours,daysor.monthsinthenew.specificationssuchthatthecurrentdefinitionofFrequencyNotationisnolongerrequired.Consequently,thisdefinitionwasreplacedwithageneraldescriptionofhowtouseandapplytheFrequencyrequirements.Inaddition,thedefinitionofrefuelingFrequencywasrevisedfrom18monthsto24monthsforallsystems.ThisisdiscussedinAttachmentHandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.1)change.TS1.13-ThedefinitionforOffsiteDoseCalculationHanual(ODCN)wasRe4-addedmo~gtotheDecember1995

afpji',eq'i'i~'i,"':g~ejts',ijt48iYtisa'irma"aegoryv.c'"ange".'""'"""""i"""""'"December1995 -166-December1995 xiv.TS1.14-ThedefinitionforProcessControlProgram(PCP)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThePCPwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRManddoesnotneedtobedescribedwithinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.XV'Y1.XV11.TS1.15-ThedefinitionforSolidificationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.SolidificationisdescribedwithinthePCPwhichwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRH.Therefore,thisdefinitiondoesnotneedtobeprovidedinnewTSl.l.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.16-ThedefinitionforPurge-Purgingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6;3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.17-ThedefinitionforVentingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.XV111.X1X.XX.TS1.19-ThedefinitionforReportableEventwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ReportableEventsaredescribedin10CFR50.72and50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS1.20-ThedefinitionforCanistersContainingConsolidatedFuelRodswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisprovidedinnewTS4.3whichistheonlysectionthataddressesconsolidatedfuelrods.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-167-December1995 TS1.21-ThedefinitionforShutdownMarginwasexpandedtorequireanotherassumptionthatinMODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Also,thedefinitionwasrevisedtorequireconsiderationofanyRCCAknowntobeincapableofbeingfullyinserted.ThisisinadditiontotheexistingassumptionsrelatedtoastuckfullywithdrawnsingleRCCAwiththehighestreactivityworth.Thedefinitiondescriptiondiscussing"nochangesinxenonorboronconcentration"wasdeletedsincethislevelofdetailisnotrequired.Theseclarifications,whichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431,areGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.4-ThedefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITYwasrevisedtoremove"supports."ThisphrasewasaddedtothecurrentdefinitionbyReference3butisnotconsistentwiththedefinitionasprovidedinNUREG-1431.Therefore,toprovidedconsistency,thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Thefollowingdefinitionswereaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheassociatedtermsareusedthroughoutthedocument(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):'a~b.C.d.e.f.g.h.1~J~k.ACTIONS ACTUATIONLOGICTESTAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE,COREALTERATIONCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)LEAKAGE PHYSICSTESTSPRESSURETEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)RATEDTHERMALPOWERSTAGGEREDTESTBASISTRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseofLogicalConnectorswithinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.A,newsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheCompletionTimeconventionwithinthenewTS.ThereareseveralchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSformatwhicharediscussedinthissection(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):-168-December1995 a~CompletionTimesinthenewTSarebasedontheformatthattheclockforallRequiredActionsbeginfromthetimethattheConditionisentered.TheCompletionTimesinthenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSaretypically.equal.Forexample,thenewspecificationsmayrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within36hoursforaspecifiedConditionwhilethecurrentGinnaStationTSrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4withinanadditional30hoursforthesameCondition.TheintentofboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSisthesame(i.e.beinMODE4within36hours).XXV1.b.ThenewspecificationsrestrictmultipleentriesintotheACTIONtableforseparateConditionsunlessitisspecificallystatedasacceptable.Forexample,ifoneSIpumpisinoperableandduringtheLCO,asecondSIpumpisdeclaredinoperable,theplantwouldenter3.0conditionsinboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTS.IfthefirstSIpumpwererestoredtoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringMODE3,theplantcouldresumeoperationinbothTS.However,inthecurrentTS,theCompletionTimeforrestoringthesecondSIpumptoOPERABLEstatuswouldbeginfromthetimethatitwasdeclaredinoperable.Inthenewspecifications,theCompletionTimewouldbeginfromthetimethefirstpumpwasdeclaredinoperablewithanadditional24hoursallowed.Thisisaconservativechange.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheFrequenciesspecifiedwithintheSRs'.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TechnicalSpecification2.17~E.TllTAApplyPllllyIPwhenthereactorisin"operation".":i-'EATAPATE':::.":E::d;ef'3n'I1Speee~yeneglTLer'!Cacti'o'n',;:9!'chadngM1f'."'nSp+d-'ThisisaginnaTsCategory(iv.a)'hange.-169-December1995 TechnicalTechnicalSpecification2.2TheApplicabilitywasrevisedto"NODES1,2,3,4,and5."TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequirethisSafetyLimit(SL)tobemetwhenfuelisinthevesselwithoneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensionedorwiththeheadremoved.Withthereactorheadboltslessthanfullytensioned,itishighlyunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurizedgreaterthantheSLpressureduetothelowtemperatureover-pressureprotectionrequirements.Withtheheadremoved,itisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.2)change.Specification2.3ThisentiresectionwasrelocatedtoITSChapter3.3,"Instrumentation."ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3-Variouslimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)areaddressedas"TripSetpoints,""AllowableValues,"or"ApplicableModes"(aspermissives)fortheirrespectiveReactorTripSystem(RTS)instrumentationFunctionsinnewLCO3.3.1.SpecificchangestotheLSSSarediscussedbelowforeachoftheassociatedFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.ill.iv.V.TS2.3.3.1,TS2.3.3.2,andFigure2.3-1-TheLSSSforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumTripSetpointvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.3.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.;.fheg~:;".~j'e'rtii'i:;:ss'77c:::i:rij:;.,..'e'a.:osiris""or"'"'*vWhvhV%~,wVN3%vwl4isis$Ginnades+gN3;:;,-Ci~ej~~y,."':~(',v,:.8'.:;,,c'Bn'ge,.-170-December1995 December1995 5.TechnicalSpecification3.0AnewsectionLCO3.0.1wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheApplicabilitystatementinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.1.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwith.theuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.23L1V.AnewsectionLCO3.0.2wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheassociatedACTIONSupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCOinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.2.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.0.1'-ThiswasrevisedtoclarifytheuseoftheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)anassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandno'therConditionappli.es,or(2)theconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThecurrentrequirementthattheLCOtimelimitsapplyif,theyaremorelimitingthatthoserequiredbyLCO3.0.3isdeletedandanexpandeddiscussionisprovidedintheBasistoclarifytheapplicabilityofthisrequirement.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirementsa'exc~iVlas!dj'scsu's'se'dh'iiiiiitsm>5.ush'i~>:bnwo'wlThec1arificationsandexamplesare'basedontheusethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionLCO3.0.4wasaddedwhichexplainsthelimitationsonchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmetinthenewTS.ThissectionprovidesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-172-December1995 AnewsectionLCO3.0.5wasaddedtoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2for.instanceswhererestorationofinoperableequipmenttoanOPERABLEstatuscouldnotbeperformedwhilecontinuing.tocomplywithRequiredActions.ManyTechnicalSpecificationACTIONSrequireaninoperablecomponenttoberemovedfromservice,suchas:maintaininganisolationvalveclosedortrippinganinoperableinstrumentchannel.ToallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice,ortodemonstratetheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentwhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedwithoutreturningtheequipmenttoservice,anexceptiontotheseRequiredActionsisnecessary.LCO3.0.5isnecessarytoestablishanallowancethat,althoughinformallyutilizedinrestorationofinoperableequipment,isnotformallyrecognizedinthepresentSpecifications.WithoutthisallowancecertaincomponentscouldnotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandaplantshutdownwouldensue.Clearly,itisnottheintentordesirethattheTechnicalSpecificationstoprecludethereturntoserviceofasuspectedOPERABLEcomponenttoconfirmitsOPERABILITY.Thisallowanceisdeemedtorepresentamorestable,safeoperationthanrequiringaplantshutdowntocompletetherestoration.andconfirmatorytesting.Sincethisrequirementisinformallyutilizedandhasnolicensingbasis,thissectionisconsideredtoprovidenewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.0.2-ThiswasdeletedandreplacedbyLCO3.0.6whichprovidesguidanceregardingtheappropriateACTIONStobetakenwhenasingleinoperability(e.g.,asupportsystem)alsoresultsintheinoperabilityofoneormorerelatedsystems(e.g.,supportedsystem(s)).Sinceitsfunctionistoclarifyexistingambiguitiesandtomaintainactions.withintherealmofpreviousindustryinterpretationsandNRCpositions,thisnewprovisiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheinformationcontainedinTS3.0.2wasrelocatedtoLCO3.8.1whichallowsonepowersourcetoasafeguardsbusandaredundantsafetyfeaturesonasecondbus'tobeinoperablefor12hoursversus1hour.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTS'ategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-173-December1995 V11~AnewsectionLCO3.0.7wasaddedtoprovideguidanceregardingTestExceptionsforLCO3.1.8.ThisLCOallowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecificationrequirementstobechanged(i.e.,madeapplicableinpartorwhole,orsuspended)topermittheperformanceofspecialtestsoroperationswhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformed.IfthisTestExceptionLCOdidnotexist,manyofthespecialtestsandoperationsnecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,specialmaintenanceactivitiesandspecialevolutionscouldnotbeperformed.ThisSpecificationeliminatestheconfusionwhichwouldotherwiseexistastowhichLCOsapplyduringtheperformanceofaspecial.testoroperation.Withoutthisspecificallowancetochangethe,requirementsofanotherLCO,aconflictofrequirementscouldbeincorrectlyinterpretedtoexist.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.Thisisa'innaTSCategory(v.c)change.RgR)"'OQ>,:~4~>-'."(::43::sgghs'~,'.rkFt,:::8'NET::~CO'jY.'klBG~~Q~~.'h'e;":."::."I.:~~:;0'",'o~p'::~'ui'.,",'..."',:co~'8te-".:.,'.""inc'e~~t".,4.';-~'1.;'ag!',"!1,:0~Ã8$':,fAQd&'j;.",$0.,:;,.'.l:6$$-'.":jsNQUoi."'.ji'ofp+4)j'di~'tified'~MS~;,"a;;.8$aYF~~"':Tl'::C'i~ei'j~i'.j';:$y,".e)":;:-"g'bang~)TechnicalSpecification3.1.1TS3.l.l.l.b-ThisrequirementwaschangedtorequireentryintoMODE1s8.5%RTPwithin4eeriixhoursversusanimmediatepowerreductionunderadminisRrativecontrol.Thischangedefinesaspecificnumberofhourstoreachthisconditionwhichprovidesgreaterclaritytothe.operators.TheremainingactionsasspecifiedbyTS3.1.l.l.bwererelocatedtoLCO3.4.5andarediscussedin6.iibelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-174-December1995 f1 TS3.l.1.l.b,3.l.l.l.c,and3.1.l.l.d-TheserequirementswererevisedpernewLCO3.4.5torequirebothreactorcoolantloopsOPERABLEwithoneloopinoperationduringMODES1s8.5%RTP,andMODES2and3,versusoneinoperationandtheotherOPERABLEfornaturalcirculationbetween350'Fand8.5%RTP.However,oneRCSloopisnowallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursprovidedthattheshutdownmarginasprovidedintheCOLRismaintainedandthenon-operatingRCSloopisOPERABLE(i.e.,availablefornaturalrecirculation).Theseareallconservativechanges(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes)since:a.TwoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.b.AdefinedperiodoftimeisnowspecifiedforoneRCSloopoperationwhichaddressestheconcernraisedbyReference12.Inaddition,CompletionTimesarenow.specifiedforverifyingshutdownmarginandnaturalcirculationcapability.December1995 iii.TS3.l.l.l.f-TheexceptionfornotrequiringtheRCSorRHRloopsduringsteamgeneratorcrevicecleaningoperationswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceRG&EnolongerperformsthisactivityandthenewSGsscheduledto-beinstalledin1996donothavecrevicessubjectedto'leaningasdescribedinthis'specification.Thisisaconservativedeletionandis'aGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.iv.TS3.1.1.l.g-TheactiontobeinColdShutdown(i.e.,<200'F)within24hourswasnotaddedfortheConditionwithbothRHRloopsinoperableandonlyoneRCSloopinoperableconsistentwithConditionBofLCO3.4.6.SinceRHRistheonlysystemwhichprovideslong-termdecayheatremovalbelow200'F,itisnotprudentto.bringtheplanttoalowerNODEuntilRHRisrecovered.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.V.TS3.l.l.l.k-ThisrequirementwaschangedintoaNoteforLCO3.4.6and3.4.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995 TS3.l.1.l.f-ThisrequirementwasrevisedtorequireoneRHRlooptobeoperatingwheninMODE5consistentwithLCO3.4.7and3.4.8.ARHRpumpisrequiredtobeoperatingsinceaRCPcannotberoutinelyoperatedundertheselowtemperatureandpressureconditions.However,aSGwithminimumwaterlevelof16%canprovideanalternatemeansofdecayheatremovaltotheoperatingRHRloopinMODE5withtheloopsfilled.Inaddition,alimitof15minutes(versus1hour)wasplacedonremovingbothRHRloopsfromserviceinNODE5withtheloopsnotfilledduetothereducedRCSinventory.TheseareconservativechangestothecurrentrequirementsandareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.l.1.l.e-ThenoteassociatedwiththepowersourcesfortheRHRloopshasbeenrelocatedtothespecificationsforelectricalrequirementsduringNODES5and6(i.e.,LCOs3.8.2,3.8.5,3.8.8,and'.8.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.l.l.iand3.1.l.l.j-TheserequirementswerenotaddedduetotheexpandedspecificationsprovidedinnewTS3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.ThenewspecificationsensurethattheappropriateRCSorRHRloopisavailabletoprovideforcedflowfordecayheatremovalandboronmixing.Therefore,theserequirementsarenolongernecessary.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-177-December1995 TS3.1.1.5.a-Thelowerlimitforpressurizerwaterlevel(12%)wasnotadded.ThislowerlimitwasrelatedtothepreviousSafetyInjectionactuationlogicwhichrequiredacoincidentlowpressurizerlevelandlowpressurizerpressuretrip.ThislogicwasmodifiedasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45)toeliminatethecoincidentlowpressurizerleveltrip(Ref.46)suchthatthesetpointisnolongerusedinanUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.Therefore,thelowpressurizerwaterlevelsetpointisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.3)change.X.TS3.1.1.5.b-ThecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringthepressurizerheatersandwaterlevelsetpointsduringtheRCShydrotestwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowMODE3conditions(i.e.,<350'F).SincethenewspecificationonlyrequiresthepressurizertobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.December1995 TS3.1.1.6-TherequirementforthereactorvesselheadventswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseventsdonotmeetthecriteriaspecifiedintheNRCPolicyStatement.ThisisduetothefactthattheventsareusedtoexhaustnoncondensiblegasesandsteamfromtheRCSwhichcoul'dinhibitnaturalcirculationfollowinganaccidentwithanextendedlossofoffsitepower.However,theseventsarenottheprimarysuccesspathandareonlyusedbyoperatorsifbothpressurizerPORVsareunavailable.Theseventsarenotusedinthesafetyanalysesnorwereidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantin,theGinnaStationLevel2PRA(Ref.47).ThisrequirementwillberelocatedfromTStotheTRM.TheremainingrequirementscontainedwithinthisspecificationrelatetothepressurizerPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalveswhichareaddressedinTS3.1.1.4.TheserequirementswererevisedasdiscussedinSectionD,items6.xiiiand6.xivbelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.1.1.3.aand3.1.1.3.b-Theserequirementswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotprovideoverpressur1zationprotectionduringColdShutdownandRefuelingconditions.Thisisprovidedbythelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)requirementasspecifiedincurrentTS3.15andnewLCO3.4.12.Sincethepressurizer.safetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionduringtheselowMODESofoperation,theserequirementswerenotretained.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.4)change.-179-December1995 xiii.TS3.1.1.4.a.iand3.1.1.6-ThesewererevisedtoprovideseparateRequiredActionsforthePORVsbasedonthereasonfortheirinoperability.APORVwhichisinoperableforautomaticfunctionsbutcapableofmanualactuationmustbeisolatedbyitsblockvalveconsistent'iththecurrentrequirement.However,aPORVwhichisincapableofmanualcyclingisrequiredtobeisolatedbyitsblockvalvewithin1hourandrepairedwithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.Inaddition,withbothPORVsinoperable,acontrolledshutdowntoMODE3conditionswithRCS<500Fmustbeaccomplishedwithin8hours.ThislimitonoperationwithaninoperablePORVisprovidedsinceaSGTReventcannotbemitigatedunderthiscondition.The72hoursforoneinoperablePORVisallowedsincethesecondPORVisavailable.Thesechanges"alsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.Thisisaconser'vativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-180-December1995 X1V.XV.XV1.TS3.1.1.4.a.iiand3.l.1.6-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatoneer-beth-inoperableblock~mv'alvinmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursj~4j'bot5','~678ck~ve',VV'"';,bti:,4%n:'"I,".',,::;dangortheplantmustinitiateacontrol'ledshutd'own.'hislimitonoperationwithaninoperableblockvalveisprovidedsinceastuckopenPORVcannotbeisolatedinthiscondition.t1NP~>'t~O<'P87formYQostt)VQP8$Ysg~8t:,";,~Power(("'0,:':iAce('"th'8!v'8:.i'<(~((".'c(<::';<:;i'<<,".:.,'(;:4(@(<,'((<5+'8+'ice.<')'<'.p~<+wv~v<"'<<<<<Nial'we+A4xj':8':+xxB4gg+qg~+@($:;:;06htedI!As$6~8'.;:~c'OAK'8fnfgeQ$1n.ch8<gPvess1tf."4x&r~,::lh':*:,';::;t,<.,l:;-:,I::::;.;,-'j-;--':,.*-'-<:::,":.<l~-.-,,-,,::,:;-<<i...<i*-.t0~$0%Yent"'jMQUi:-i,'8%iptS-;~:,:::.phd"'""8:;-'".'Gjhna~;...7S:;:.;:C'lCochange.TS3.1.1.2.-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.TS3.1.1.3.d-ANotewasaddedwhichallowsthepressurizersafetyvalvestoberemovedfromserviceabove350'Fforthepurposeofsettingthevalvesunderhot(i.e.,ambient)conditionsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-181-December1995 xvii.TS3.1.1.3.c-Thiswasrevisedtochangethepressurizersafetyvalveliftsettingsfrom2485psig+1%to2485psig+2.4%,-3%.Thevalve~liftsettingsarerequiredtobesettowithin+1%followingtesting;howevertheOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenrevised.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenevaluatedinthemostlimitingpressuretransientsforGinnaStation(i.e.,lossofexternalloadandlockedrotorevents)andfoundtoresultinacceptableresultswithrespecttothesafetylimitvalues.Thischangeisaresultofaneventinwhichthepressurizersafetyvalveswerefoundtohavedriftedoutsidetheexisting+1%tolerancebandfollowingtesting(Ref.58).7.TechnicalSpecification3.1.2TS3.1.2.l.a,Figure3.1-1,andFigure3.1-2-TheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswererelocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLRwhichisaddressedunderAdministrativeControls.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.December1995 v~TS3.1.2.l.b-TherequirementforperiodicallyrecalculatingtheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswas'll1IIl,f;I;Aperiodicreviewisalreadyrequiredby10CFR50,'ppendixHwhichdoesnotneedtoberestatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory~~'(~5).:change.TS3.1.2.l.c.1-ThetimeallowedtoperformanengineeringanalysistodeterminethattheRCSisacceptabletocontinueoperationafterapressureand/ortemperaturelimitisexceededwasincreasedfrom6hoursto72hours.Adurationof6hoursisnotsufficienttimetoac'complishtherequiredengineeringanalysis,especiallyiftheeventweretooccurduringeveningorearlymorninghourswithlimitedstaffsupportimmediatelyavailable.SinceNRCacceptedguidanceforperformingthenecessarycalculationsexists,allowing72hourstocompletetheanalysesisappropriate,especiallysincethedurationofeventisverylimited(i.e.,controlledbyLCO3.4.3).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.6)change.TS3.1.2.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.TS3.1.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethepressurizerheatupandcooldownratestothePTLR.Themaximumtemperaturedifferencebetweenthepressurizerandsprayfluidwasnotaddedsincethislimitiscontrolledbythecooldowncurves.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changesrespectively.TechnicalSpecification3.1.3TS3.1.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoraisethe.minimumtemperatureforcriticalityfrom500'Fto540'F.Thischangewasmadetocorrectadiscrepancybetweenthedefinitionofreactoroperatingmodesandthisrequirement.Currently,GinnaStationTS1.2definesHotShutdownas,Reactivity~-1~k/k%andT.~540'F.Inordertoachievecriticalityat500'F,theHotShutdownconditionwouldhave,~tobedirectlybypassed.Avalueof540'Fwasselectedforthenewminimumtemperatureforcriticalitybasedonpreviousoperatingexperienceduringstartupconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-183-December1995 TS3.1.3.2-ThiswasnotaddedsinceLCO3.4.2specifiestheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheminimumtemperaturewithrespecttothereactorvesseliscontainedinthePTLRandisbelowthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.4.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.3.3-TheexistingactionstatementwasrevisedtorequirethattheplantbeinMODE2withk,<<<1.0within30minutesifT.,foroneorbothRCSloopswas<540'Fversussubcriticalbyanamountequaltoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityduetodepressurization.ThenewrequirementprovidesclearandpreciseinstructionstooperationsandensuresthattheplantisquicklybroughttoaconditioninwhichtheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.3.1-TheMTCrequirementsaremovedfromtheRCSchapterintheGinnaStation'StotheReactivityControlSystemsChapter.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoreferencecyclespecificMTCrequirementsintheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheMTCmaximumupperlimitdescribedinTS3.1.3.1remainsthesameinITSLCO3.1.4.'ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-184-December1995 9.'echnicalSpecification3.1.4TS3.1.4.4-ThisspecificationwasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoHODE3withT,,<500Fwithin8hoursversusColdShutdownwithin40hoursconsistentwiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.4.l.c-ThelimitonsecondarycoolantactivityisnowrequiredtobemetinHODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustwhenthereactoriscriticalorRCStemperatureis>500'F.Thesecondarycoolantactivitylimitisbasedonasteamlinebreakandtheresultingdoseconsequences.ARCStemperatureof>500'F,isbasedonpreventingtheHSSVsfromliftingfollowingaSGTR(i.e.,aRCStemperatureof500'Fisonlyapplicabletoprimarysystemactivitylimitsnotsecondarylimits).Inaddition,ifthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitsarenotmet,TS3.1.4.4requiresenteringcoldshutdown(i.e.,HODE5)within40hours.RequiringthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitstobemetforallofHODE4(i.e.,RCSis>200'F)providesconsistencywithNUREG-1431andthecurrentRequiredActionsifthelimitisexceeded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 (QsGiii'Fi~~!TSiitii)oij,,':,'f~iij+eliirije10.TechnicalSpecification3.1.5TS3.1.5.1.1-Addedanewrequirementforthecontainmentsump"A"levelorpumpactuationperLCO3.4.15.Thisleakagedetectionsystemreplacesthecontainmenthumiditydetectorsandtheaircoolercondensateflowmonitor.Thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsdonotmeettherequiredleakageratedetectioncapabilityof1.0gpmwithin4hoursasrequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.19).Inaddition,thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsarerecommendedbyRG1.45(Ref.17)toonlybeusedasanalarmorindirectindicationofleakagetocontainmentandnotasaseparatemethodofdetectingleakage.TheremainingleakagedetectionsystemsprovideadequatemonitoringasdiscussedinthenewbasesandSectionC,item46.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.1.5.1.1and3.1.5.1.2-TheRCSleakagedetectionsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandRCSLEAKAGEwithinlimitsaboveNODE4(200'F)andnot350'FperLCO3.4.15and3.4.13.TheincreasedLCOApplicabilitywilladdressallNODESinwhichtheRCSisatanincreasedtemperatureandpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-186-December1995 iii.TS3.1.5.1-AddedanotewhichallowsachangeinNODEifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitorsareinoperableperLCO3.4.15.ThisnoteisappropriateconsideringtheotherinstrumentationthatisavailabletomonitorRCS'eakage.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.7)change.11.TechnicalSpecification3.1.6TS3.1.6-ThisentiresectionwasnotaddedsinceRCSChemistrydoesnotmeettheNRCPolicyStatement.RCSChemistryiscontrolledbyplantproceduresand'isnot.requiredtobeaddressedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.ThisrequirementisbeingrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-187-December1995 12.TechnicalSpecification3.2TS3.2.5-Therequirementwasrevisedtorequireplacingachargingpumpinpull-stopwithin1hourregardlessofthestatusoftheRHRpumpsortheMODE.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesdirectoperatorguidancetoperformanactionwithinadefinedtimeperiod.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.Theverificationofthechargingpumpstatusevery12hourswasalsonotaddedsincetheplantisrequiredtobeinadepressurizedandventedconditionwithin8hourswhichremovestheneedtoisolateachargingpump(i.e.,al.1squareinchventcanmitigateacharging/letdownmismatchevent).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a),(i),and(v.c)changes,respectively.TS3.2.1andTS3.2.1.1-TherequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsduringcoldshutdownandrefuelingwhichspecifiesthenumberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLEwerenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.2.2andTS3.2.4-TherequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsabovecoldshutdownwhichspecifiesthenumberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLE,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaand.arerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-188-December1995 TS3.2.3andTable3.2-1-TherequirementsfortheBoric*AcidStorageTank(s)whichspecifiestheboronconcentrations,minimumvolumeandsolutiontemperature,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthissystemdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-189-December1995 13.TechnicalSpecification3.3TS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3-LCO3.5.1ConditionAwasadded.whichallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesincethevolumeofwaterintheaccumulatorsisthecriticalfeature.Attemptingtocorrectboronconcentrationwithinthecurrent1hourlimitwouldcreateasignificantburdenontheoperationsstaff.Therefore,thecurrent1hourLCOwasonlymaintainedforaccumulatorpressureandvolume.Inaddition,theaccumulatorboronconcentration:l;:sfN1tfag's.";usaf<forkgxgg~im'QngbÃrBfue~g~lngg~cfches':.9TS3.3.1.l.aand3.3.1.2-LCO3.5.4.Awasaddedwhichallows8hourstorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesinceitrequiresalongerperiodoftimetoperformthistypeofadjustmentduetothelargevolumeofwatercontainedwithintheRWST.InddiI,,ttTIITT,I...t,tiIiiiiiY=":.jjfjw0'6jjo,-:"pjjjjt;:;ignis:;-::ifssj-:"ajtdpd&T'ai':Sji~igjjjtdii'Sillt'~i!'i!d!i"'i'ijtit',t""ijdiit:,':.-190-December1995 TS3.3.l.l.c-TwonotesassociatedwithLCO3.5.2wereadded.ThefirstnoteallowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting.TheITSbasesstatethatthisisacceptablesincetheisolationvalvescanbeopenedfromthecontrolroom.Thesecondnoteallowsupto4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375'F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations.ThisnotewasaddedsincetheLTOPsetpointof330'FisveryclosetotheMode3definitionof~350'F.AsdescribedintheITSbases,thisnoteprovidesoperatorflexibilitytorestoretheinoperablepumptoOPERABLEstatus.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.11)changes.TS3.3.1.5.d-ThiswasrevisedandusedasanoteforLCO3.5.2.Thespecificationnowonlyallows878A-,878B-,878G-,and878D,tohavepowerinstalledduringMODE3forthespecificpurposeofperformingpressureisolationvalvetesting.Isolationvalves878A:"";::.:;-:878C-,':'~896A,896Band856mustnowhaveDCpowerremovedPaboveNODE3orbothtrainsofECCSwillbedeclaredinoperable.Thischangewasmadesincethereisnoregularlyscheduledtestingof878A"".8786-,;-':896A,896B,and856above350'F.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-191-December1995 LCO3.5.3wasaddedwhichrequiresonetrainofSIandRHRduringNODE4.Thisnewrequirementisbeingaddedtoaddresslowprobabilityaccidentswhichmayoccurduringthismodeofoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.vi~TS3.3.1.l.b-Thecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringtheaccumulatorsduringhydrotestswasnotaddedtothenewtechnicalspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowNODE3conditions(i.e.,350'F).SincethenewspecificationonlyrequirestheaccumulatorswhenRCSpressureis>1600psigduringMODE3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.3.l.l.b-ThebasesforTS3.3wererevisedtoupdatethespecifiedwatervolumecontainedintheaccumulatorwithrespecttothe50%and82%levels.TherequiredlevelsspecifiedinTS3.3.1.1.bhavenotbeenchanged,onlythecorrespondingwatervolumesprovidedinthebases.Thenewvaluesareconsistentwiththoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(seeCOLR,Table1).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-192-December1995 TS3.3.l.l.g-Hotoroperatedisolationvalves851Aand851BwereaddedtonewSR3.5.2.1sincethesevalvesmustremainopenwithACpowerremovedtoensuretheavailabilityofContainmentSumpBtotheRHRsystemfollowingaLOCA.Theadditionofthesevalvesisaconservativ'echange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.1.l.h-Checkvalves877A,877B,878F,878H,andmotoroperatedisolationvalves878Aand878CwereaddedtothisrequirementsincethevalvesarerequiredtobetestedasPIVsbycurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.3.3.ThisprovidesamorecompletespecificationandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.gj!TheÃjl)~fiji'g:;'of'l:"'vQa:...vj$"';Ma's':,.O'Iso;:::;i;.',:eYpiaisa-;,bises~Thii~iii~iiji'i!styli'n'i'~~TS'i'C)'t'e'g'ii'iy'>(4'1~1i)'i,.'c.TS3.3.1.1.hand3.3.1.5-TheserequirementswererevisedtorequirePIVstobeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustabove350'F(i.e.,inHODE3andabove).Therefore,theplantmustnowenterHODE5within36hoursiftheRequiredActionscannotbeaccomplished.ThisisaconservativerevisionwhichexpandstheLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995

TS3.3.1.5.e-Thecurrentrequirementallows12hourstorepairaleakingcheckvalveifthein-seriesmotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.ThiswasrevisedtospecifythataleakingPIV(checkvalveormotoroperated)mustbeisolatedwithin4hourswithaleaktestedvalve,and'hatasecondleaktestedvalvemustbeclosedwithin72hours.Thisisgenerallyaconservativechangesinceatimelimitisnowspecifiedforisolatingtheleakingvalveandthesecondisolationvalvemustnowbeleaktested.Theonlyexceptionisthat72hoursisnowprovidedtoperformrepairsversus12hours.Theexistingallowedrepairtimeisinsufficienttoperformmostleakagerepairsandwouldmostlikelyrequireareactorshutdown.Sincetherearethreeisolationvalvesforseveralflowpaths,andtheLCO'applicabilityhasbeenexpandedtoincludeMODE4,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8-TheexceptionforallowingtheSIpumpstobeOPERABLEduringDGloadandsafeguardsequencetestingwasnotaddedsincethenewbasesallowthepumpstobeOPERABLEifadischargeisolationvalveislockedclosed.Therefore,thisexceptionisnotrequired.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.December1995 TS3.3.1.7.1and3.3.1.8.1-ThesespecificationswereconvertedintoSurveillanceRequirementsconsistentwiththeITSformatandrelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.3.1.8.2-ThisrequirementwasnotaddedsincethenewbaseslistthecriteriaforensuringthataSIpumpisincapableofinjectingintotheRCS.LimitingtheoperationtooneSIpumpwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathisnotnecessaryiftheisolationdevicerequirestwoseparateactionsbeforeprovidinganinjectionpathtotheRCS.Therefore,operatingmultipleSIpumpswillnotposeanythreattooverpressurizingtheRCSwiththisisolation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995 xv.TS3.3.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallowbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(includingtheCRFCunitswhichsupplythem)tobeinoperableforupto72hoursifbothcontainmentspray(CS)trainsareOPERABLE.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeaccident.analyseswhichdemonstratethateithertwoCS-trains,oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsareadequatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaDBA(i.e.,eachCStrainandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainprovides50%oftherequirediodineremovalrequirements).However,twoCStrainscannotbeinoperablesinceatleastonetrainmustoperateforcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Inaddition,twoCRFCunitscannowberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayssincetheaccidentanalysesonlycredittwoofthefourcoolingunitsasbeingOPERABLEwithrespecttocontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Finally,withoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperableandnotrestoredwithin7.days,theplanthasonly36hourstoreachNODE5versus84hoursduetotheimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.12)changes.TS3.3.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecifythattheCCWlooPheadermustalsobeOPERABLE,Pi,,he;:1OO'::P,":headsePs~$s:Bafbe":edi'as!iCh'e0'eoti'oiis'o7$i'pie:thee"::;.BETa't::":,"much'aepe'rr~Si'tegfbse~ptfrest;eS'S'Oltea'e!Sholustae.'.:."dpiOea':.Lhsiimpp'lk'ed.;.>ooiiip'o'm'esiitoompoeeet~to)the'i':.suit1o'iso'P:,:;:ffigpu'mpsih'-.".iiThih'."$s',;;:a!6ETTeAT;Ce't'eporp",,:.s::(ss')'.-",.-:ohaop!e-196-December1995 exchangersare100%redundantandareseparatedfromtheCCWpumptrainsbyasectionofcommonpiping.&e-CQPDecember1995 TS3.3.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(versus24hours)torestoreaninoperableCCWpumpbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.However,theplantisnolongerallowedtoremainatHotShutdownfor48hoursbeforerequiringadditionalcooldowntoColdShutdownconditions.Assuch,thetotaltimeinwhichaCCWpumpcanremaininoperableremainsthesame(i.e.,72hours)buttheplantisnotrequiredtobegincooldownactivitiesafter24hours.TheonlysafetyrelatedfunctionssupportedbytheCCWSystemarewithrespecttotheRHR,SI,andCSSystems,whichallallow72hourstorestoreaninoperabletrain.Therefore,thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethatthesixsetsofmotoroperatedisolationvalvesusedintheSWSystemtobeOPERABLEfortheSWSystemtobeconsideredOPERABLE.CreditistakenforthesevalvestoisolatethenonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentswithintheSWSystemfollowingacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignal.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesaclarificationtolicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-198-December1995 TS3.3.4.2-ThiswasrevisedtoallowoneSWtraincomprisedoftwopumpsandsixmotoroperatedvalvessuppliedbythesameelectricaltraintobeinoperablefor72hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.SincetheSWtrainsare100%redundant,removingoneoftwotrainsonlyaffectsredundancyanddoesnotplacetheplantoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Sincemostothersafetyfunctionsallow72hoursforonetraintobeinoperable(e.g.,ECCStrains),thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.Inaddition,thisspecificationwasrevisedtoaddressthescenarioifallSWpumpsortheSWloopheaderareinoperable.Inthiscondition,immediateactionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreoneSWpumportheloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus;however,it+ski'y>nothgprudenttoexittheMODEofApplicabilitysincetheSWS'stemisrequiredinMODE5fordecayheatremoval.Instead,RequiredActionshavebeenprovidedtorequireacooldowntoMODE45<0@4ssgt'h'&~CCQpgsk~&N~j::s+ificQp867g~ofj".:suj~ai;,'t;:i'removal.If,AFWwerelost,.additionaltimeisrequiredbeforeRHR(andconsequentlySW)wouldberequired.T4+s~~i!,,!GF','"!8C@g.+47'$changes.-199-December1995 TS3.3.5.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem(CREATS)tobeOPERABLEinMODES1through6andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinsteadofonlywhenRCSis~350'F.CurrentGinnaStationTS3.5.6requiresthatthecontrolroomHVACdetectionsystem(i.e.,chlorine,ammonia,andradioactivitymonitors)beOPERABLEatalltimes.However,thefiltrationsystemisonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEabove350'F.ThefiltrationsystemisdesignedtoensurethatdoseratestooperatorsarewithintheguidelinesofGDC19intheeventofanaccident.WhiledoseratestooperatorsisexpectedtobelowerwhentheRCSis<350'F.,nocurrentanalysesexistundertheseconditions.Inaddition,failuresofthewastegasdecaytankscanstilloccurbelow350'Fwhichalsorequirecontrolroomisolation.Therefore,theMODEofApplicabilitywasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithinthespecificationsandtheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-200-December1995 TS3.3.5.2-Thiswasrevisedtoproviderequirementsforaninoperablefiltrationtrainandinoperabledampers.TheCREATSdampersisolatethecontrolroomintheeventofaradiol,ogicaleventwhilethefiltrationtrainfiltersthe'ontrolroomatmospherefollowingisolation.Thenewspecificationcontinuestoallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperablefor48hoursbeforerequiringashutdownorplacingthecontrolroomintheemergencyradiationmode(i.e.,CREATSHode6).Ifoneofthetworedundantdampersineachoutsideairflowpathisinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow7daystorestorethedampertoOPERABLEstatussimilartorestoringonetrainofredundant.CREFSinNUREG-1431.Ifbothdampersareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3..0.3sincethecontrolroomcannolongerbeisolated.IfbothdampersarelostinHODES5or6,orduringfuelmovement,thenfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONSmustbesuspendedimmediately.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.14.TechnicalSpecification3.4TS3.4.1-Thiswasrevisedtospecificallyr'equirethatallHSSVsbe,testedpriortoenteringHODE2versusthecurrentwordingwhichallowstheHSSVstoberemovedfortestingatanytime.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentoperatingpracticesandensuresthattheHSSVsareOPERABLEbeforethereactorgoescriticalbutallows.theHSSVstobetestedunderhotconditions(i.e.,z350F).Inaddition,theHSSVsetpointswereaddedtothenewspecificationsincetheseareassumptions'withintheaccidentanalyses.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-201-December1995 TS3.4.2.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptionsasdiscussedinthenewbases.Essentially,theaccidentanalysestreatthepreferredAFWSystemasfourtrains(i.e.,twomotordriventrainsandtwoturbinedriventrains)suchthateachSGreceivesflowfromtwoAFWtrains.Therefore,thefailureofbothmotordriventrainsortheturbinedriventrain(orbothflowpaths)hasthesameconsequence(i.e.,lossofonetraintoeachSG).Sincetheturbinedriventrainisallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursperTS3.4.2.2.a(andNUREG-1431),thisspecificationwasrevisedtoallowbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstobeinoperableforupto72hours.Inaddition,ifbothAFWtrainstoacommonSGareinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow4hourstorestoreatleastonetrainbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.AtimelimitforbeinginthisconfigurationisnecessarysincenoAFWwouldbeavailableintheeventofaHELBwhichaffectstheonlySGabletoreceiveAFW.RequiringanimmediatecooldowninthisconfigurationisnotconsideredprudentsinceAFWprovidesfordecayheatremovalinlowerMODES.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.14)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.4.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheSAFWcross-tiebeavailablewhentheSAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thischangeisrequiredsincetheaccidentanalysescredittheuseofthecross-tiefor.HELBswithafailureofoneSAFWpump.Eachcross-tiemotoroperatedvalveisconsideredpartoftheSAFWtrainwhichsharesthesameelectricalpowersource.ThisisaGinnaStationTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.4.3-TherequirementforSWsuctionfortheAFWandSAFWpumpswererelocatedtotheLCOforthesepumps.TheCSTsprovidethepreferredsourceofcondensatetothepreferredAFWpumpswhiletheSWSystemisthesafetyrelatedsourceforboththepreferredandstandbyAFWsystems.TherelocationoftheneedforaSWsupplytotheAFWpumpswithintechnicalspecificationsdoesnotreducetherequirement.Instead,thechangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecification'sandiseasierforlicensedpersonneltounderstand.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-202-December1995 V.TS3.4.3-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatabackupsourceofcondensatebeverifiedwithin4hourswhentheCSTsareinoperableversusdemonstratingtheoperabilityoftheSWSystem.Specifyingatimelimitforverifyingthebackupcondensatesourceisaconservativechangewhichnowprovidesaclearandconciserequirementforplantoperators.RevisingtheActionstoallowanyalternatesourcetobeusedasabackupsourceprovidesadditionaloperationalflexibilitysinceothercondensatesourcesthantheSWSystemcanbeusedifnecessary.ThesesourcesaredescribedinthebasesfornewLCO3.7.6.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.15.TechnicalSpecification3.5ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.1orTable3.5-1:'a~Table3.5-1,Columns1,2,and3-Thecolumnsforthe"TotalNumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."Systemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelated.totheOPERABILITYoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesorareadequatelydescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.b.Table3.5-1,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"channeloperableabove"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheNodetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.ChangestotheApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.C.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit5'15'ThetripFunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.RemovalofthistripfunctionisjustifiedinReference44whichshowsthatbasedontheoffsite.powersystemconfiguration,thistripFunctionisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.Therefore,thistripFunctionwasrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.'I-203-December1995 d.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement81forFunctionalUnit81-ThisactionwasrevisedtoaddrequirementsforoperabilityoftheManualReactorTripfunctioninModes3,4;and5whenthero'dRareeke'.Mnot'~f'u$::;f)';.";.'.::":j,nsertedandtherodcontrolsystemiscapable"ofrodwithdrawal(LCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Theseactionsensurestheplantisplacedinaconditioninwhichthetripfunctionisnolongerrequiredfortheassociatedmodesofoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.e.Table3.5-1,Functional77On:,~:,;C%K'~.-:.".:,".,-',::,b1'iY';:ii'j$)",iivC:::sQto":OrPTur,'b3'~~pf74~p.::.on,'-."Turbi~ne@SMj":.;-':Val';v'e:Cfos'u'r'e".,",.ii,.nc%,::Ao'0i'5)Vj$,ahA'g;::;areN4Akth'i"~jim4a3<:,'t,bltgfai'P.,",:;Gee<::Tij-f%6J'e~s3~5-:k~'"Actjpp;.:,.:;8't4t'0'mat;:A)2@'or.;:,',""Fuji@:cpa)':pe'It'S,0?",5"ii,"'!AiAeSte1."A'ij~i::',h'Ad'.*:!!li'1gA!SSOO't'!'rie!!).:;"A85.,:~$6':AesÃliovjilsedi'iqAoli",e'1Now'ji'SA'i,'ll'Ao'p!OMAN!:8:',~AA'AAAO!IXsto'ikiiLA59...:::;:.'IAtsar,:':,Is'!O'."".'GIA'A'e,.':TS':::;Citejiij(g~v./AS'},lange.-TiblYP',,3,",,":",5",'-:,';1I~!~";(A"'::t,';:on,."..~St4fsme'rent":.'..:i/2'fbi'~~,;':~F+un%'joii'al'.":;~j$ViA,:tsg2,:;..g@:(~.":);op~',set'4)nj~4ii'id'::.::-',.'fbi'jacet'tb'hglgj'.~"45,:."-:$6;.:",:I.SSSOSXS~ho4'i",s$>';(fatlher;;,,'.,Chan';:.~~2,".,h'oui$,'";.,':;dpi)'ng$UIjv'eiw'1'eeoe~ltes'Ss'AII.Tll1sA4+Ago+vlsge'sg'fbiid."::@A'i::IIefet,','eAA'o',.":.:::.SQ.L!@hi~i'j:,::i'g-204-December1995 Tab;,I~ath'ejfiji'j1':i'cabiT'Tt::.seif',~'i'I!TS'g+Tab'Te'::.".",iLi'3,":".I'T"-.",Ljinni-'::FV!'j!816'jpThedeta~Isofthepersii~ssisble"bypasscon%it>onsfortnhneassociatedFunctionsarediscussedintheUFSARandITSBases.ChangestotheApplicabilityofaFunctionalUnitdifferentfromthosediscussedinColumn4arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-205-December1995 i.Table3.5-1,ab'ovule'o':j7e'aforFunctionalhij,ng'.""::,Oj'iji":ib'3$.0~.1"'4and...K$.,'1.'8,:.',':88i~t:.,;;,x:s.e.odpj,l!1iab31:ty,::i':,t,o.":g~~44ssaeTheiBorei'ritrh'iV:-'i8ianhg'ehprproui'des*:eioo'nsistgenojNTfCinna",,';TS;~eategoorpg(u.~ehasgep.no'ri;,e'sspe'nid'.".":te':,':.th','-."s'p$'r'ihip'ojp'erm's'ssi:u'e's'.TheNI'S"intermediaterangeno%aronT'luxchannelsmustbeOPERA'BLEwheiithepowerlevelisabovethecapabilityofthesourcerangeandbelowthecapabilityofthepowerrange.TheassociatedRequiredActionsensuretheplantisnolongerintheapplicableconditionthroughcontrolledpoweradjustmentsandtakingintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventduringtheperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionoftheNIStrip.ThischangesupersedesthatproposedinReference61.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.k.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹4forFunctionalUnit¹4-ThisactionwasrevisedtoclarifytheApplicabilityandaddassociatedRequiredActionsforinoperableSRHs.ForMode2belowthepermissiveand-206-December1995

Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹lland¹13-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin'dd:hIththI~~77~~ihfh1Idt*d.djustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory.(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement4686forFunctionalUI,,fdic!ii!IS!Q!:-.fitI"I,,11ITeolsgg,d4diIlliandddigd'lp-Thisactionnasrevisedgo$thejge~t~ehanqel.'unctjOOalKteshkof::::an'h""OPERNfLBpei~fn'i!'a'iiIarv!'v:'::Iancte',ehlss'tntvjhio'f;:::;:.oth,Ygov'/de'fig@';ay,':,50%'eject'0'~.0$'pas'8~liYg'8)e4gpiop'el,'.,:a5)'&g~scnan'O'O':,.I"i',icosiedh!'sntrsvegITTen'c'e'!toasts'nII'i!i'n!I!a~s'sici!send,i'or'diertl~IIReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l5)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),end-¹14ipd>~41'5m-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow4'ninoerablechannelto,;:,,bQ'Iaced,:;::.j'r'j!~tSFy~tri-jii~d'..-;io'i8$t'$:.oi';%iiÃt@jQShours-44HtRR~(ira%88Y!":j&iR'AA:".'3,'-.::~".'P70ur):..Fggj.:.'::j';h;i.:Si:'jNAIAge"".p'i::sChscussedg"..'and.':,Agentj'fi'ed8iiV:,:,"Riferekjee';:".:30:.'.">'.:;:...:;is:~8ka-208-December1995 siberia:::!@:.::,catajafi'N(v!:b.;.15)~;.'-cR'aug'e",of"a~nj0PKRABL'K@ch%iiii%f)-::40-:%f'l'okktbi~"'bj'pa'ssXii'g'%f'""::i8ji!i't!0re'::',:sufi'eB:!iiir'8;.":::t'ei't1'ii'j!%7!'o'thji~cbiiiiii'l'iQThechannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganoteto-bypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.-209-December1995 Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹16-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethegPTRMonitorOPERABILITYrequirementstoChapter3.2.Inaddition,requirementswereaddedtoverifywithacalculationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandtoverifywithafullcorefluxmapthatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERisa75%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹17-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationWaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.TheCirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstrumentsonlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedinthe~GinnaStationsafetyanalysis.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-TheFunctionalUnitapplicabilitywasrevisedtorequiretheinstrumentstobeapplicableinallmodesassociatedwithDGoperability.ThisensuresthattheDGcanperformitsfunctiononalossofvoltageordegradedvoltagetothe480Vbuses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-Thisactionwastevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThisCompletionTimeissufficienttoallowrestorationofthechannelandtakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannels,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringaLOPstartoccurringduring.thisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.16)change.-210-December1995

Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthe,bypassingofaninoperablechannel(consistentwithLCO3.0.5)inordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Thecurrentrequirement,limitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswiththeassociatedlogic.=Bypassingtheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.Additionally,anotewasaddedclarifyingthatentryintotheassociateConditionsandRequiredActionscanbedelayedforupto4hoursforperformanceofrequiredsurveillance.EnteringDGactionsduringtestingisnotnecessarysincetheCompletionTimesforaninoperableDGismuchgreaterthanthetimetoperformtheSR(72hoursvs6hours).TheSRNotetimeof6'4hourstakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannelsandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringaLOPstartoccurringduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.17)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-ThisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentshutdownactionswitharequirementtorestorechannelstoanOPERABLEstatusortoentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.TheactionsofnewLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2provideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.Thelossoftheminimumrequiredlossofvoltageordegradedvoltagechannels(onebus)shouldresultinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.l)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹18and¹19-Thenumberofchannelswasreformattedtorequireonlytwoundervoltagechannelsperbusversustwochannelsofthelossofvoltagefunctionandtwodegradedvoltagefunctionperbus.Thebusundervoltagedesignisaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogicsuchthatonedegradedvoltagechannelandonelossofvoltagechannelcompriseeachofthetwoundervoltagechannels.However,duetothesystemdesign,ifeitherofthedegradedvoltageorlossofvoltagefunctionsisinoperable,theentireundervoltagechannelmustbetripped(i.e.,boththedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagefunctionsaretripped).Thischangeprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperatorswithoutanyreductioninthesystemrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.18)change.-211-December1995 w.X.aa~LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.ThisfunctionanticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.Thefunctionensuresthatprotection'isprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.Thisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeen'eneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.'hisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹20andassociatedActionStatement¹14-ThisrequirementwasreformattedtoseparatelydenotetheReactorTripBreakers,theReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms,andtheAutomaticTripLogicfunctions(LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Functions¹15,¹16,and¹17).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow6hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiating.aplantshutdowntoMode3(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionQgf,:.Therestorationtimeof6hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTS'Category(v.b.18)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoMode3(newLCO3.3.1,Conditionkgjf:.Therestorationtimeof1hourisreasonablecons'ideringthattheremainingOPERABLERTBisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.19)change.-212-December1995 bb.CC.dd.ee.Table3.5-1,Action'Statement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionG@)I.Therestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethebreakertoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionTherestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEbreakerisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoonlyallow1hourtoopentheRTBsfollowingtheactiontorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionGPJ.:.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSallows6hoursto.performthisactionbuttakesintoaccountashutdownfromModes1and2.The1hourprovidessufficientamountoftimetoaccomplishtheactioninModes3,4,and5inanorderlymanner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtospecifyalimitof2hourstobypasstheRTBforsurveillancetestingand85hourstobypasstheRTB.formaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR7),Notes1and2).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSforbypassingduringmaintenancedoesnotspecifyatimelimit.TheITSwouldsetalimitonthistime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.2,Table3.5-2,orTable3.5-4:b.c~TS3.5.2.2,3.5.2.3andTable3.5-2,Columns1,2,and3-ThedetailsdescribingtheoperabilityacceptancecriteriaforTripSetpointsincludingthecolumnsforthe"TotalNumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctional.units.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperabilityoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"ChannelOperableAbove"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.ChangestotheApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Ne4-4:e,N-:::3:"5'-2"'-:F:t'3-5PV-fW'1b~g-":'N6%op4ppg'ii6,'FUijitjo'ng,~kli~iieIiiyi@RG'0'0,::;:psj!.~~jT'4'i'i:~~'ski~"::iQ)ii~a'ijTS,:.,::iC@tied.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnits81.cand0'1.d-ThenotesorremarkswhichdescribeoperationaldetailsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock,werereformattedasModeApplicabilitiesanddefaultconditionsinthenewspecifications.AnewSR3.3.2.6,wasaddedtospecificallydenotetheoperabilityrequirementsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.December1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹l.b,¹1.c,¹l.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltest'fanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannel,forupto48~4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Thecurrentrequirementlimitstheabi=litytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.December1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.c,¹1.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.c,and¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin~hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.g.LCO3.3.2,FunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹2.b,¹3.b,¹4.b,¹5.a,and¹6.a,"AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays,"wereaddedfortheESFASInstrumentation.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment..ThisismerelyapresentationchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsasthislogiccircuitryisassumedwithintheoperabilityofthe,specificFunctions.Additionally,theautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforvariousFunctionsarerequiredOPERABLEinNode4tosupportsystemlevelmanualinitiation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change..h.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnit¹3.c-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin48hours(ratherthan1hour).TlihgididdifidiReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.-216-December1995 Table3.5-2,Act'fon.:"::,Statement-:":Ai:;:fag]FunctionalUnit'Fo'B:.,:,'ie'n:=,OpKRABl,'KI(h'anniif!).:"::::to:."attie'e9the::;:lbj'Ras's'It'ni.",*.'of::"eBII~ee4.447wth~&9:~llcNNNZej'et'f~8PInWneioe'Illl1,".an'oe1titesitln'B~ot",:,'oth'e9@ghann'e'1s'.The+aFurgeiitj~rejii:rjmjt-::,<l,":fe;fts;the~ys+sibj.':;fi,:$0',;,-::p8p;mortem';~channel;;,:;fUnc'xpbijik.-'.;:;::;:48sfpoIt:,;:QPERABf,,:E:,'chaIIne1's'!":f,ozl!Fun'i%::lail'a11it:Un,'1tsii1::th';.:.:,tleo)cccc($cw9cc&gocc9ePFQY05'ln3~/@A~9:;..:,'0:::.",4pp4'$$Ã~kV@~4gaipddkpfi"-.Ihjrind'3)jpgov)d@p'It'OOOO'eegg~i,.'iij~thel.~.'eeqiiji'ed~s5mi':Hj3;:in'ce~jgii4nYj..':jia,'safeandZtcc'9I9'cc9ttgeZc.r?cesetsc:tccs9%4cccsce:0%$Ic9IZCr,,eiiy,:;:,:,:eanlnoeq.B'n'Iltlhei~ii'it1@!/1IPe@!C'allo'Iitl!On!CII'I'th'In'j!B!1'henIw!SiP(!pat'll&f'Cath'a'n'e:2'.:;Nisi',:s'),t;:;,:'hTh'i;s)',chan'g'e~i,~~'..:".d'6'w",sse'dpjnd~giist)'.Ie,,",.'",.;ll'~i'-.",tttt'iiisI!'!i:;i!!ii'-,',-.'::",::.si','i:"ttc':."':t-'""tC!'!y~ia::-i.':.t,,ittl:'thantBj>>'::.':T$bla'c'4)'ons~.,gesior,'.;:wgI;,opeerq6,:i,1;;:i,ty,,'":.':".~$g>;48<ghoor,,'s>::::t'0':,,","degl;,ac~,:ay<"Xh'e:Qraij'jjte9.-fQer18>M4+~nO'$'<$/1;.:$C4":,fOf,;..>C9mpglet&phC49'cLtjVOAggfgTLh'I.":s';:.~$'s'ji'!BI'nn'a.".:IIT.Bc!Ceto'B'ozy;,LCI'ehc-',B'1fe:.".'."o::hazn'q~fi~""Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3;b.ii,¹3.c,¹S.a,and5.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERAHLEchannel)to-217-December'1995 allowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto424hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Thecurrentrequirementlimitstheability.toperformchannelfunctionaltestson'PERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.-218-December1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,¹5.a,and5.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin~hours(ratherthanIhour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnit¹3.e-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoamorerestrictiverestorationtimeof48hoursforaninoperablechannelratherthanplacingthechannelinthetrippedconditionwithinonehour.Theallowanceof48hourstoreturnthetraintoanOPERABLEstatusisjustifiedinReference4830:.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-219-December1995 NOt+jQ888.'p..-iTibie'~~8:,8:"-".R~,":&inafibPi'lqU:iii&84~0,':"'-:'erequirementsA%-pepsi;;a'r...,~fhe~Ci'nt,ij::;ijm'ent~0ep4;43~5Ãiip0:so]';at)pF,:,:(CV.':l.):'Nan6a':I.',.""."IMk't'ji't'4i',;-":.F4iiiti'i'q~NR48&cUWF&'nt'..:,75%4)P'imi;s'1,'i.'.iChfiggip~th~t~4bere%i:",:oo,"manua'I'V'l,.",$i7Ai'aBYiigfunction700efLL~iiit'cad;:::;;:::cvI!:i::s-'..:~avu'ally,':>>:.;xiiit'ai%'8;::,::bPthegj~ch"iije.fagandTN4oj'e~~tdr's.ThisisapinnaTSCategory,iV:,~~-220-Decemberl995 q.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹l.b,¹1.d,and¹2.b-TheseFunctionalUnitAllowableValueswererevisedtoreflecttheactualvaluesusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.L-221-December1995 Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹7.aand¹7.b-TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesfornewLCO3.3.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.s.Table3.5-4,Notes1and2forFunctionalUnits¹6.aand¹6.c-ThenoteswhichdescribedesigndetailsfortheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowFunctionandLossof4kVFunctionwerenotadded.ThesedetailsarerelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-222-Oecember1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.3orTable3.5-3:a~b.c~TS3.5.3.2,TS3.5.3.3,andTable3.5-3,Columns1and2-Thecolumnsforthe"Tot'alRequiredNumberofChannels,"andthe"MinimumChannelsOperable,"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperabilityoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.5.3.2-Therestorationtimerequirementof7daysforoneinoperablechannel(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedto30days.The30dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremaining.OPERABLEchannel,thepassivenatureoftheinstrument,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAMinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.TS3.5.3.2-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan7days(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrum'entsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.Thisis,aGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.-223-December1995 d.TS3.5.3.3-Therestorationtimerequirementof48hoursfortwoinoperablechannelswasrevisedto7days.The7dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformationandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.e.Table3.5-3-ThePostAccidentHonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRG1.97,TypeAandCategoryIvariables.ThesefunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.59).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.5.4andTable3.5-6-Therequirementsforradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentation,providedtomonitorradiationlevelsinselectedplantlocationsfollowinganaccident,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,priortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRHGDCH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.5.6.1-Therequirementsforthechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.3.5,ConditionsBandC,wereaddedfortheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)actuationinstrumentation.ThesenewrequirementsspecifyRequiredActionsforvariousmodesofoperationwhentheCREATSisolation-damperscannotbeplacedintheemergencyradiationprotectionmode.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-224-December4995 16.TechnicalTS3.5.6.2-Therequirementforonedetectionsysteminoperablehasbeenrevisedtoallowmorethanonechannelinoperablewithanactiontoisolatethecontrolroominonehour.EvenwithalossofFunctionoftheautomatic'ctuationlogic,theCREATSmaystillbecapableofbeingmanuallyisolatedwithin1hourandperformingitssafetyfunction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.5.5andTable3.5-5-TherequirementsforradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationwhichensuresthatthelimitsofTS3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceededwerenotadded~>-.';;:(egFej4:,:,fej;;.'-;:!R'-;,",4::gtheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofa08Aortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableor,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoa08A.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.'~The,'skimj'8~6'~,"n'ii'a,;,!TS)Ca.'Ke'j'city~;":,(i'-,".i);:,;0'.4arig8"'.'.Specification3.6TS3.6.1-ThetextallowingclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolswasrelocatedtoaLCONoteconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.6.2-TheApplicabilityformaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitswasrevisedfromreactorcriticalitytoNODE4.Thischangeisnecessarytoprovideconsistencywiththerequirementsforcontainmentintegrity(i.e.,LCO3.6.1)sinceexceedingthesepressurelimitscouldresultinaoverpressureofcontainmentifanaccidentweretooccur.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-225-December1995 -226-December1995 'jf~S):6s)3wtu&%j'h%&r:we%pN~~SM'Ãew&p<pMNW~a~ddse&g@Sgj<~q,~g.sianaececontainmentintegrityispotentiallyviolated.Assuch,verificationofcontinuedacceptablecontainmentleakagemustbeinitiatedimmediatelyifbothbarriersaredeclaredinoperable.Inaddition,newrequirementswithrespecttoaninoperableairlock(includingtheuseofanairlockwithaninoperabledoororinterlockmechanism)andcontainmentmini-purgepenetrationswithisolationvalvesthatexceedtheirleakagerateacceptancecriteriawereadded.Thenewrequirementfortheairlocksspecifiesthataninoperableairlockdoor(includinganinoperableinterlockmechanism)mustbeisolatedwithin1hourandlockedclosedwithin24hours.However,adedicatedindividualcanbeusedinthecaseofaninoperableinterlockmechanismtoallowentryandexitthroughtheairlock.ThenewspecificationprovidesspecificRequiredActionsintheeventthatcurrentGinnaStationTS4-.4-.2-.44':.,4.2;.9.cisexceeded.Thenewrequirementforthemini-purgepenetrationsspecifiesthattheaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolatedwithin24hoursifanisolationvalveexceedsitsleakagelimit.Thesenewrequirementsprovideaddedassurancethatpenetrationswhichcanprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironmentareaddressedquicklywhentheirisolationbarriersbecomeinoperable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.3-Theuseofaclosedsystemtoisolateaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierfbi'<>ujl'tl":".727bgui'.,awasaddedtothisspecification.Consequenoy,acosedsystemwhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeetthisspecificationcanbeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrier~fov,';;~'iL4ti7N'~d~+~'j~eP),'od:,:ip;f':'.::'.'t':ice.Also,isolationdevices1ocatedouts'idecon~ainmenf.tl'iatwereusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationvalvearerequiredtobeverifiedclosedonceevery31days'orisolationdevices,insidecontainment,theymustbeverifiedcloseduponentryintoMODE4fromNODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92days.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.22)changes.lou'ialesb'av.oi'!F00,::;"~6:iweere1ocateeftothe'basesi'oi'"TT'S3.6.3sinceQ~leesth'e'ee.:::;;."::,';donotmeetanyof.thefourcriteriaanddeesd'oriotspecifyanyRequiredActions.OperationoftheNini-PurgeSystemisperformedunderproceduressuchthatitsuseisstrictlycontrolled.Placingthisinformationinthebasesalsoprovidessimilarcontrolunder10CFR50.59(i.e.,theBasesControlProgram).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-227-December1995 TS3.6-Anewrequirement,wasaddedwhichspecifiesthattheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureshallbe(120'FaboveHODE5.ThistemperaturelimitisnecessarytoensurethattheresultingcontainmenttemperaturefollowingaDBAiswithintheassumptionsusedforenvironmentalqualificationofcomponentswithincontainment.Iftheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureis)120'F,itmustberestoredwithin24hours.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhichrequiresthehydrogenrecombinerstobeOPERABLEinHODES1and2.Thehydrogenrecombinersareassumedintheaccidentanalysestobeusedtopreventahydrogenexplosionwithincontainmentthatcouldoverpressurizethecontainmentstructure.ThenewLCOallows30daystorestoreaninoperablerecombinerand7daystorestoretwoinoperablerecombinersiftheHini-PurgeSystemisOPERABLE.Inaddition,theplantcanenterHODES1and2withaninoperablehydrogenrecombiner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4.1andTS3.6.4.3-TheApplicabilityforthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedtoincludeHode3requirements.Thesevariablesarerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinHodes1,2,and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4.2-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan30dayswasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrumentsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.b~jsci~Ven~ng"::::ci",i:::e'wjiQip'p,.$d'or,."'."Xiii:s,j:i":e;u,:1>eiieni:",::s'inc'ethebent,'Oq%,'c'6n'cent1:a.:!>ini::iiait,::.".::is';<<;::::oiilj'.~i,etriaer!easiest.:;::feei...::die>$haiidi::i'iigI.::aooideotseereN4'f::herfeoi!~:~.;th~:e:,:::rceja'i'.ey'egts'j5>'@citiedforeeeket4ee-228-December1995 sir88'@jig:.::.Cw~jx&i':s;i~aria;.,'hive,:5ee~fi,":QeJ.,Qadi':Q.5.0)':.change.-229-December1995 17.TechnicalSpecification3.7TS3.7.l.l.b,3.7.1.l.d,and3.7.l.l.e-Thecoldshutdownorrefuelingrequirements(HODES5and6)forthe480Vsafeguardsbuses,batteriesandDCtrains,and120VACinstrumentbuseswererevisedfromrequiringonlyonetraintobeOPERABLEtorequirethenecessarytrain(s)tosupportallotherLCOrequirements.Consequently,oneorbothtrainsofthesesystemsmayberequireddependingonothersystemrequirements(e.g.,RHR).InMODES5and6,sufficientelectricalpowerredundancymustbeavailabletomitigate,aneventcoincidentwitheitheralossofoffsitepower,lossofallonsitestandbyemergencypower,oraworsecasesinglefailure.ThischangeensuresthatallnecessaryelectricalsupportsystemsareOPERABLEtorespondtoaDBAoratransient.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.lv.TS3.7.1.2-Coldorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)fortheDGfueloilsupplyandthebatteryparametershavebeenaddedtoproviderestorationtimesforspecifiedconditionsconsistentwiththeITS.Thesetimesaresufficienttocompleterestorationofthedegradedparameterpriortodeclaringthecomponentinoperableandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiodandthefactthatthecomponentremainscapableofperformingmostrequiredfunctions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.7.2.l.b.2,3.7.2.2.a,and3.7.2.2.b-Therequirementsfortwooffsitesourceswerenot'dded.Thecurrentactionsallowtheplanttooperateindefinitelywithoneoffsitesourceinoperable.ThenewITSformatcriteriawouldnotspecifytheserequirementsintheTS(i.e.,requireacomponentforaMODEchangebutallowthecomponenttoremaininoperableindefini'telyoncetheMODEchangeiscomplete).Therefore,theserequirementsaredeteaedre'Tucated!:,to':.":tfi~i~TRN.Theoffsitepowersourcesarefurtherd'iscussedinRei'erence32.ThisisaGinnaTScmmwr.',:::ij.",:iii'e:-,':w"..-~TS3.7.2.2.b.1-TheactionsforaninoperableDGhavebeenrevised:(1)toeliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure,and(2)torequireverificationoftheoffsitepowercircuittotheaffectedACdistributiontrain.Inaddition,theOPERABLEDGmustonlybetestedonceduringthe7dayallowedoutagefortheinoperableDG.TherevisedactionfortheOPERABLEDGeliminatesunnecessarytestingduringaperiodinwhichtheplantreliesononlyoneDG.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.2)and(v.a)changes.-230-December1995 V.vl.18.TechnicalTS3.7.2.2.c-TheCompletionTimefortheactiontore-energizethe480Vsafeguardsbushasbeenrevisedfrom1hourto8hours.ThetimeisconsistentwiththeITSwhichassumesnotonlyrestorationofthebusbutalsotheassociatedloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcomprisetheACelectricaltrain.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.24)change.TS3.7.2.2.d-ThiswasrevisedtoaddressthescenariowithbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,nolossofsafetyfunctionexistssincetheremainingDGisavailabletoprovidepowertooneESFtrain.However,thetimeinthisConditionshouldbelimitedduetothepotentialtolosemultiplesafetyfunctionsiftheremainingDGwerelost.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovided.However,ifbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperabletothesameACelectricaltrain,thenthetimewouldberestrictedto8hoursasdiscussedinSectionD,item17.vabove.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.~-change8.5'4)~jch'anginaSpecification3.8TS3-.4~3,.8:;;";-;.:P.',h'e'.;:;':ippgg~c)bj~)":i:~~gsa.'$.jDecember1995

TS3.8.l.b-TherefuelingorMODE6requirementforthecontainmentradiationmonitorswhichprovidemonitoringforpersonnelsafetywasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableof'heLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDHAortransientanalysis.Further,thecontainmentradiationmonitorsareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-232-December1995 TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityoftheSRHswasrevised.The'hrase"whenevergeometryisbeingchanged"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofHODE6.TherequirementthatoneSRHbeOPERABLEwhencoregeometry"isnotbeingchanged"iscoveredbytheRequiredActionforonein'operableSRH.ThiswouldrestrictCOREALTERATIONandpositivereactivityadditionswhencoregeometryisnotbeingchanged.RequiredActionswerealsoprovidedwhentwoSRHsbecomeinoperableorwhentheaudibleindicationislost.Thesenewactionsrequireverificationofboronconcentrationevery12hoursandensuresthestabilizedconditionofthereactorcore.TheseareaconservativerevisionsandGinnaTSCategory(v.a)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.TS3.8.l.e-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityandfrequencyoftheboronconcentrationsamplingwasrevised.Thephrase"immediatelybeforereactorvesselheadremovalandwhileloadingandunloadingfuelfromthereactor"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofHODE6.ThiswouldadditionallyrequireboronconcentrationsamplingthroughoutHODE6.Thesamplingfrequency,however,wasalsorevisedtorequiresamplingevery72hours.Theserevisionsconsiderthelargevolumeoftherefuelingcanal,RCS,andrefuelingcavityandareadequatetoidentifyslowchangesinboronconcentration.Rapidchangesinboronconcentration,describedinUFSAR15.4.4.2,aredetectedbytheSRHinstrumentationrequiredbynewTS3.9.2.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.8.l.f-Therequirementforcommunicationwith'thecontrolroomduringCOREALTERATIONSisnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecommunicationsisnotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.8.l.d(footnote*)andTS3.8.l.g(footnote*)-Therequirementthateitherthepreferredortheemergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachresidualheatremovalloopisnotadded.ThisdetailisencompassedinthedefinitionofoperabilitydescribedinnewTSl.1andtheelectricpowerrequirements'containedinChapter3.8.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-233-December1995 TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementtoprovideSRHaudibleindicationinthecontainmentwasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincethemonitoredparameter(audibleindicationincontainment)isnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.ThesafetyanalysisassumesaudibleindicationinthecontrolroomwhichisdenotedbynewLCO3.9.2.Theaudibleindicationisforpersonnelsafetyonly.Further,theaudibleindicationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-234-December1995 19.TechnicalSpecification3.9TS3.9.1.1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,Appendix8;TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-235-December1995 ii.TS3.9.1.2andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseordosecommitmenttoindividualswhichresultsfromcumulativeliquideffluent'ischargesduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodsandisintendedtoassurecompliancewiththedoseobjectivesof10CFRPart50,AppendixI,46@FRX4f!~%~hiid~>"40~GFR,:~jf'9~0%;$i$'tjgwerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotreIae'toproVecti'onofhepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,radioactiveliquideffluentdoseprojectedvalueisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.1.3-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,Appendix',Append+>-Iez'@~not<>adde3Nolossofprimarycoolanisinvolve8,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantri'skcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-236-December1995 TS3.9.2.1-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-237-December1995 TS3.9.2.2.a,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamage'frequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications.5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.vi.TS3.9.2.2.b,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetoradioiodine,radioactivematerialsinparticulateform,andradionuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhalf-livesgreaterthan8daysreleasedwithgaseouseffluentswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thesegaseouseffluentsdosesareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-238-December1995 1X.TS3.9.2.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.Theventi.lationexhaustsystemisnotassumedin'heanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.5andTS3.9.2.6-Thespecificrequirementsforwhichlimitconcentrationofoxygeninagasdecaytankandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.11andamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.7-Therequirementsforthesolidradwastesystemwhichprocesseswetradioactivewasteandoperatesinaccordancewith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,foreffluentcontrolwerenotadded.TheoperabilityofthesystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,radioactivewasteisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthis'functiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocated'totheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,~respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.20.TechnicalSpecification3.10TS3.10.1-ThiswasrevisedtoincludespecificactionsandCompletionTimesforcaseswhentheshutdownbankinsertionlimitsandthecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsarenotwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Theseactionsrequireverificationwithin1hourthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinlimitsandrestoringtheassociatedvaluetowithinlimitswithin2hours.orbeinMODE3within6additionalhours.Theseadditionsweremadetoensurethatthecontrolbanksandtheshutdownbankareavailableasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-239-December1995 TS3.10.1.1-Thiswasrevisedtoincludeaspecificactiontoinitiateborationwithin15minuteswhentheSHUTDOWNMARGINisnotwithinlimits.Theadditionofthisactionensuresthat'HUTDOWNMARGINismonitoredandquicklyrestoredwithinlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.10.1.1andFigure3.10-2-ThesewererevisedtorelocatetheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementsandFigure3.10-2totheCOLR.SHUTDOWNMARGINcanbeusedinfuelmanagementandasavariabletosolveplantspecificproblems.SHUTDOWNMARGINimpactsanumberofanalyses(i.e.,uncontrolledborondilutionandsteamlinebreak)andissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankposition,corepowerlevel,coolanttemperatureandcyclespecificparameterssuchasfuelburnup,xenonconcentrationandboronconcentration.TheinclusionofSHUTDOWNMARGINintheCOLRprovidesmoreflexibilityinplantoperation,inperformingthedesign,andinobtaininggoodfueleconomicsparticularlyforextendedcycleoperation.WiththeSHUTDOWNMARGINincludedintheCOLR,thecoredesigncanbefinalizedaftershutdownsothattheactualendofcycleburnupisknownwhichisparticularlyhelpfulwhentheactualburnupdiffersfromtheprojectedvalue.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ITS3.10.1.2andTS3.10.1.3-ThesewererevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsfortheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimits.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheinsertionlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3'0.1.3andFigure3.10-1-Thesewererevisedtorelocatethecontrolrodinsertionlimitsandthesequenceandoverlap1'imitstotheCOLR.,ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.1.5-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoneofthePHYSICSTESTScurrentlyperformedatGinnaStationcurrentlyrequirearelaxationoftheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirements.ThereforenoneoftheseSHUTDOWNMARGINPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsorRequiredActionsarenecessary;ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethelowpowerPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsincenewLCO3.2.1andLCO3.2.2whichcontainthepeakingfactorrequirementsareonlyapplicableinMODE1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-240-December1995 TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforthegPTR.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthegPTRlimitandtheITSLCO3.2.4whichcontainsgPTRisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER~50%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.8,TS3.10.2.9andTS3.10.2.10-ThesewererevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforAFD.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheAFDlimitsandtheITSLCO3.2.3whichcontainsAFDisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWERa15%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.hTS3.10.3.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtoreducetheminimumT,,fortheroddroptestfrom540'Fto500'F.The500'Ftemperatureisconservativesincethewaterwillbeslightlydenseratthelowertemperaturewhichhasthepotentialtoslowdownthedroppedrods.ThischangewouldenabletheplanttocompletetheroddroptestatanearliertimeduringplantstartupandisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-241-December1995 ~~~~~~~~xi.TS3.10.4.1-Thiswasrevisedto.indicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsforcontrolbankalignment.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinNODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthealignmentlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.X11.X1V.TS3.10.4.2andTS3.10.4.3-Thesewererevisedtoremoveconditionsofrodinoperabilityduetobeingimmovable.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.Referencetofulllengthrodswasalsoremovedsincetherearenopartlengthrodsinthereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.4.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtodeclareamisalignedrodinoperablewhentherodcannotberestoredtowithinthealignmentlimitsin1hour.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.~)~change.TS3.10.4.3.2.a-ThisoptionforrestoringarodtowithinalignmentwasremovedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtotheBasesforITS3.1.4whichiscontrolledundertheBasesControlProgram.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.xv.TS3.10.4:3.2.b.iiiandTable3.10-1-ThesewererevisedtoremoveTable3.10-1fromthespecifications.TheITSrequiresevaluationsofaccidentanalysistobeperformedtodeterminethatthecorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccident.AnevaluationofeachoftheanalysesonTable3.10-1maynotberequiredtodeterminethatthecorelimitswill'notbeexceed.ThistablewasrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.bandTS3.10.4.3.2.c-Thesewererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoreducethehighneutronfluxtripsetpointto~85%RTPwhenthepowerlevelisreducedto~75%RTP.Thisrequiredactionisdeletedbasedonagreementsbetween.theNRCandtheownersgroupsandisconsistentwithWCAP-13029(Ref.50)whichstatesthatthe'afetyanalysesresultswouldnotbesignificantlyaffectedbychangestotheirinitialassumptionsasaresultofincreasedpeakingfactorscausedbyrodmisalignment.Additionally,thepeakingfactorlimitverificationwithin72hoursandthere-evaluationofthesafetyanalysiswithin5daysthatarerequiredbythisspecificationprovidefurtherassurancethattheassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisarepreserved.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.e)-ehaage8.-242-December1995 -243-December1995 TS3.10.4.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoverifySHUTDOWNMARGINorinitiateborationwithin1hourwhenmorethanone.rodisoutofalignment.TheITSBasesstatethat1hourisareasonabletimebasedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenondistributionandthelowprobabilityofaaccident.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.1-ThiswasrevisedtoaddanactionstatementtoclarifythatifmorethanoneHRPIisinoperablepergroupforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankisinoperableforoneormorebanksthentheplantmustenter3.0.3immediately.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.2.a-Thiswasrevisedtoallow4hours(insteadofimmediately)toverifyrodposition.Therodpositioncannotbedeterminedimmediately.Ittakestimetoacquirethedataandobtaintheresults."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontime.TheITSBasesstatethat4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositionswhileareductionto~50%RTPwillavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat>50%RTPwith2ormorerodsmisaligned.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-244-December1995 XX.XX1~XX11.XX111.XX1V.TS3.10.2.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequiremeasurementofthepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortooperationoftheplantatorabove75%RTPinsteadofpriorto50%RTPconsistentwithITS.ThisrequirementensuresthatthedesignlimitsarenotexceededwhenRTPisachieved,sincepeakingfactorsareusuallydecreasedaspowerincreases.Requiringthissurveillanceat75%versus50%stillprovidesthenecessary,margintoensurethatdesignsafetylimitsarenotexceededandprovidestheoperatorwithmoreflexibilityduringpowerascensionfollowingarefueling.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.25)change.TS3.10.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtodeletetherequirementtoverifygPTRusingmovableincoredetectorsorcoreexitthermocoupleswithonepowerrangedetectorinoperableatTHERMALPOWER~75%RTPandreplacedwitharequirementtoperformafluxmaptoverifythathotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitsconsistentwithITS.TheincoredetectorsarenotusedtoverifygPTRbutrathertoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.GinnaStationdoesnothave8pairs.ofsymmetricthimbleplugswhicharenecessarytoperformapartialfluxmapandthuswouldhavetocompleteafullcorefluxmaptoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentinterpretationsatGinnaStationandispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethehotchannelfactorsbewithinlimitonlyinNODE1.TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequiretheFoorF>>limitstobemetinNODES2-5orduringrefueling.AsdescribedintheITSBases,FoandF>>mustbewithinlimitsduringNODE1;however,suchlimitsarenotnecessaryinMODE2becausethereisinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorbeingtransferredtothecoolanttorequiretheselimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.26)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethelimitsforFo(Z)andF>>andtheFigure3.10-3totheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanadministrativeActiontoreducetheAFDacceptableoperationallimitsspecifiedintheCOLRbythepercentagethatFoexceedsthelimit.ThisisnecessarysinceachangeinFocanadverselyimpactAFDlimits.ACompletionTimeof8hoursisallowedtoperformthisaction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-245-December1995 xxv.TS3.10.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(insteadof24hours)toreducetheOverpoweraTandtheOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsconsi,stentwithNUREG-1431.Thissectionwas'lsorevisedtoincludeaCompletionTimeof72toreducethePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripsetpoints.Theseactionsprovidefurtherprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributions.The72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.27)change.xxvi.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoaddaRequiredActionto,beinMODE2within6hoursiftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesfortheConditionwhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsisnotmet.ThisactionplacestheplantinaconditionoutsideoftheApplicabilityrequirementsfortheHotChannelFactorrequirements.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursissufficienttoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-246-December1995 t' TS3.10.2.3and3.10.2.4-ThesewererevisedtospecificallydefinetheApplicabilityrequirementsforgPTRasMODE1withTHERMALPOWER50%RTP.ThisApplicabilityisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforGinnaStationsincecontinuedoperationisallowedforanunlimitedperiodoftimewhenTHERMALPOWERis<50%RTP.TheITSBasesstatethatbelow50%RTPthereiseitherinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorinsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofagPTRlimit,onthedistributionofcorepower.Inaddition,theLCOlimitof1.12wasremovedsincetheprimarylimitof1.02willbereachedinitiallyandactionswillalreadybeinprogresstoaddressthetilt.THERMALPOWERwillcontinuetobereducedifthetiltratiocontinuestoincrease.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-247-December1995 TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERrelativetothepercentageofquadrantpowertilt,(i.e.,limitpowerto3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichthegPTRexceeds1.00)insteadofrequiringanimmediateactiontogobelow75%RTP.Thereductionto75%RTPessentiallyemploysa2%RTPreductionforeach1%thegPTRwasabove1.00upuntilgPTRequalled1.12whereareductionto50%RTPwasrequired.Theproposedchangewouldprovideflexibilitywiththeinitialreduction,butwouldrequireatleasta3%RTPreductionfor.each1%gPTRexceeded1.00.Thus,theproposedchangewhilerequiringasmallerreductionforsmalltiltsismoreconservativeforlargertilts'whichwouldsuggestamoreseriousproblem.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TherequirementtomeasurethehotchannelfactorswhenthegPTRexceeds1.02ischangedfromwithin2hourstowithin24hourssincetheTHERMALPOWERisappropriatelylimitedwithin2hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.2.4-Thiswasrevisedtodeletetherequirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorlimitpowerto<50%RTP.Identificationofthecauseofthetiltisnotalwayspossibleandotheractionsalreadyunderwayareadequatetoassuresafeoperationoftheplant(e.g.,surveillances).ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-12159(Ref53).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.28)change.-248-December1995 xxx.ThefollowingRequiredActionswereaddedfortheConditionwhengPTRisnotwithinthelimit:TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.a0Arequirementtoverifybycalculation.thatthegPTRiswithinlimitsandlimitpoweraccordinglyevery12hours.b.ArequirementtorecalibratetheexcoredetectorspriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitspriortorecalibrationoftheexcoredetectors.-249-December1995 c~d.ArequirementtoverifyFQandF~withinlimitseitherwithin24hoursafterreachingRTPorwithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyseveralNotes.ThefirstNoteclarifiesthatwhenthegPTRalarmisduetoinstrumentationalignmentthisactiondoesnotneedtobecompleted.Thesecondnoteallowsthisactiontobecompletedonlyaftertheexcoreshavebeenrecalibrated.ThethirdnoteclarifiesthattheCompletionTimeapplicablefirstistheonethatmustbemet.Arequirementtoreducepowerto<50%RTPwithin4hoursiftheinitialRequiredActionsarenotmetwithintheassociatedcompletiontime.ThistakestheplantoutoftheApplicabilitywhen.,theactionsarenotmetandprovidesanadditionalactionbeforeplantshutdownisrequired.xxxi..xxxi1.TS3.10.2.5-Thiswasdeletedsincethe1.12gPTR'limitnolongerappliesandtheApplicabilityrequirementforgPTRhasbeenrevisedto>50%RTP.Actionsalreadyinprogress(i.e.,limitingpowerby3%belowRTPforeach1%gPTRexceeds1.00)aresufficienttoaddressthetilt.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.7-Thiswas.revisedtorequireameasurement,ofthetargetfluxdifferencewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelinginsteadofwithin92EFPD.ThisrequirementisalsomodifiedwithanotethatallowsthepredictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobe'sedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.Thechangetow'ithin31EFPDismoreconservativethanwithin92EFPDandisnecessarytoperformtheinitialmonthlytargetfluxdifferenceupdatealsorequiredbyTS3.10.2.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.xxxiii.TS3.10.2.8-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandtotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthelowamountsofstoredortransferredenergyinthelowerMODES.TheAFDattheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changes,respectively.-250-December1995 TS3.10.2.9-Thiswasrevisedtospecify15minutes(insteadofimmediately)torestoreAFDtowithinthetargetbandandthenimmediatelyinitiateactionstoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPiftheAFDisnotrestoredwithintheinitial15minutes.ThisisconsistentwiththeintentofthecurrentGinnaStationtechnicalspecifications."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontimeand15minutesisconsideredasufficientamountoftimetorestoreAFDwithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftimepriortoareductioninpower.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.10a-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandandtheacceptableoperationlimitstotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthe1'owamountsofstoredortransferredenergyinthelowerMODES.TheAFDattheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v-;c)changesrespectively.TS3.10.2.12-ThiswasrevisedtorequireaverificationthattheAFDiswithinlimitsandtologtheAFDevery15minuteswithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTPandonceeveryhourwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableinsteadofeveryhourforthefirst24hoursand'veryhalfhourthereafter.Thismodificationreflectstheimportanceofstayingwithinthetargetbandatabove90%RTPandisconsistentwiththeRequiredActioniftheAFDisoutsidethetargetband.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-251-December1995 21.TechnicalSpecification3.11TS3.11.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)beOPERABLEwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed(60dayssincebeingirradiated.ThespecificcomponentswhicharerequiredfortheABVStobeconsideredOPERABLEwererelocatedtothebasessimilarwiththestructureofNUREG-1431andtheITSWriter'sGuide.ThebasesforLCO3.7.10nowrequirethatoneofthetwo100%capacityAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans,exhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystem,andallassociatedductwork,valvesanddampersbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,TS3.11.l.cwasrevisedtorequireanegativepressurewithintheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorwithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentinsteadofrequiringalldoors,windows,andotherdirectopeningsbetweentheoperatingfloorareaandtheoutsidetobeclosed.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentasdescribedinthebases.Thischangealsoprovidesamuchclearerspecificationwhichiseasierforlicensedpersonneltoreadandunderstandwithoutanyreductioninactualrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.11.2-TherequirementtocontinuouslymonitorradiationlevelsintheSFPareawasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialcondition.ofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,theSFPradiationlevelsonlyprovideabackupsourcetoaSFPproblem.OtherLCOsprovideadequateverificationofSFPprimaryindications(i.e.,levelandboronconcentration)whichensurethatallaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremet.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,personnelwouldbestationedwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingandimmediatelyawareofaproblem.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.11.3and3.11.5-Theheavyloadrestrictionformovementof,loadsovertheSFPwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheheavyloadlimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-252-December1995 1V.22.Technical23.TechnicalTS3.11.4-TheSFPwatertemperaturelimitwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheSFPwatertemperaturelimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransient'nalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.12TS3.12.1-TherequirementforthenumberofthimblesperquadrantrequiredtoOPERABLEduringrecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystemwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TherequirementsforthissurveillancearenotaninitialassumptionofanyDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,thisspecificationdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.13TS3.13-Therequirementsforsnubbersoperabilitywerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoheInaerviceTeet4~IisjegtgoePrograpmvMed.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.24.TechnicalSpecification3.14None.25.TechnicalSpecification3.15i.TS3.15.1-TheLTOPexceptionduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestingwasrelocatedasaNOTEtonewLCO3.4;12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.15.1-ThePORVsetpointduringLTOPconditionswasrelocatedtothePTLRconsistentwithLCO3.4.12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.15.1-Theaccumulatorsarenowrequiredtobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreater"thanthemaximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperaturesasspecifiedinthePTLRconsistentwithConditionCofLCO3.4.12.ThisnewrequirementpreventsanaccumulatorfromoverpressurizingtheRCSandcausinganactuationofthe'TOPSystem.Theoperatorisinstructedtoisolateordepressurizetheaffectedaccumulatorunder'theseconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-253-December1995 iv.V.vi~26.TechnicalTS3.15.1.1-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhenaPORVisinoperableduringMODES5and6duetotheincreasedconsequencesfromanoverpressurizationeventundertheseconditions.ThisnewrequirementspecifiesthatthePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.Thelimitof72hourswithonePORVinoperableisconsistentwiththeallowedoutagetimeforonetrainofECCSequipmentduringMODES1,2and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.15.1.3-Thereportingrequirementforthelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)systemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementtoincludedocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisdetailedinproposedTS5.6.4,"MonthlyOperatingReports"andisgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.15-TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtospecifythatLTOPisonlyrequiredinMODES5and6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.Thischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforiso1atingtheSIpumpsforLTOPconditions(33.1.7and3.3.1.8)andtheITSfsuuihhthatlychefhrh'ie".'nss;:,oerI',".a",hcgaenianth~N098'>'f"AWL'TS"1'Irdt"Th'O'TSCt'v.c)change.Speci'fication3.16TS3.16.1andTable3.16-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposuiepathwaysandforspecifiedradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-254-December1995 .27.TechnicalTS3.16.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.16.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.'pecification4.0AnewsectionSR3.0.1wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementsandlimitationsthattheSRsmustmeetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithSR3.0.1.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-255-December1995 TS4.0-Thiswasrevisedtoclarifythebasicapplicationofthe25%extensiontoroutinesurveillancesconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.Theintervalextensionconceptisbasedonschedulingflexibilityforrepetitiveperformances.ThereareclarificationsprovidedinSR3.0.2forSurveillanceswhicharenotrepetitiveinnatureandessentiallyhavenointervalasmeasuredfromthepreviousperformance.Thisprecludestheabilitytoextendtheseperformances.TheexistingSpecification4.0canbeinterpretedtoallowtheextensiontoapplytoallSurveillances.Anadditionalclarificationprovidesthebasisforconsistencyinschedulingflexibilityforallperformancesofperiodicrequirements,whethertheyareSurveillancesorRequiredActions.Theintentremainstoperformtheactivity,ontheaverage,onceduringeachspecifiedinterval.ThissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirementsbutprovidesclarificationandadescriptionofSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionSR3.0.3wasaddedwhichestablishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecified.Frequency.TheSRpermitsthedeclarationoftheLCO-not-mettobedelayedforupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency(whicheverisless),andeliminatesconfusioninapplyingthecorrectACTIONtimelimi'tsattheendofthis24hourperiod.Thevastmajorityofsurveillancesperformeddemonstratethatsystemsorcomponents,infact,areOPERABLE.WhenaSurveillanceismissed,i'tisprimarilyaquestionofOPERABILITYthathasnotbeenverifiedbytheperformanceoftherequiredsurveillance.Basedonconsiderationofpla'ntconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillanceandthesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtheSurveillance,theNRChasconcludedthat24hoursisanacceptabletimelimitforcompletingamissedSurveillancewhentheallowableoutagetimesoftheACTIONSarelessthanthe24hourlimitorashutdownisrequiredtocomplywithACTIONS(Ref.53).Thissection,inpart,providesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatofthe.ITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-256-December1995 iv.AnewsectionSR3.0.4wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretation-ofexistingSpecificationsisconsistent'ithSR3.0.4.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.28.TechnicalSpecification4.1ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.1orTable4.1-1:a0b.Table4.1-1,Columns2(Calibrate)and3(Test)Variouscalibrationand'testingintervalrequirementsforRTSandESFASFun'ctionswererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ChangestothetestingintervalrequirementsdifferentfromthoseidentifiedanddiscussedinNUREG-1431arediscussedwiththe'specificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-1(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):1.SR3-.4-.4:43::4:;:;Z.::.g.:-requiresverificatonevery30minutesthatT.,foreachRCSloopis>540'FwhenanyRCSloopT.,isknowntobe<547'F:ThissurveillanceisintendedtoensurethattheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotexceededwhentheRCSisatlessthanHotZeroPowerconditions(ice.,547'F).ThesurveillanceisnotrequiredtobeperformedifthelowT,,alarmineachloopisresetwithasetpoint>540'F.2.SR3.4.3.1-requiresverificationevery30minutesthat"RCSpressure,temperature,heatupandcooldownratesarewithinlimits.ThissurveillanceisonlyrequiredduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperations,andinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.The30minuteFrequencyisbasedonthefactthatheatupandcooldownratesarespecifiedinhourlyincrementswhichprovidesadequatemargintocorrectminordeviations.-257-December1995 SR3.4.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hours.thatpressurizerpressureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinnaTSTable4.1-1,87whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.2-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinnaTSTable4.1-1,833whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.3-requiresperformanceofaprecisionheatbalancetoverifythatRCSflowiswithinlimitsevery24months.Thissurveillanceis"requiredtobeperformedwithin7daysofenteringMODE1andreaching,95%RTP.SR3.1.6.1-Requiresverificationwithin4hourspriortocriticalitythatthecriticalcontrol.bankpositioniswithinlimitsintheCOLR.SR3.1.6.4-Requiresverificationevery12hourswhencriticalthatthesequenceandoverlaplimitsforthecontrolbanksnotfullywithdrawnarewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.SR3.-A-Ak43,,".,3;:":853-Requiresverificationevery30minutescfurfngMODE2PHYSICSTESTSthatTHERMALPOWERz5%RTP.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERlevelwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalyses.arenotviolated.SR3.2.4.1-Verificationwithacalculationusingthepowerrangechannelsevery7daysthatthegPTRiswithinlimits.~50'.8R","'"-""34:21:-::'-"'"::jr'uMS~'.n'tBAde'd,'~<'~St0gPens0Ã'e,':':Ahlt~4flem)."n.:i"m'umph~'~;:Ce'mji'ei.':itii're';,",l>>",',:,!ufo'i)pf)$4Tcal'ljj'y<LACsPinot'kk&gcgg([Cd-258-December1995 c.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1,¹2,¹3,¹8,¹17,¹23,¹25,¹38a,¹38b,¹39,¹40,¹41a,and¹4lb-Thenotesorremarkswhichdescribeanoperationaldetail,werenotadded.ThesedetailswererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-259-December1995 LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.ThisfunctionanticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.Thefunctionensuresthat'rotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.e.g,LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.ThisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.SR3.3.1.14,SR3.3.1.15,SR3.3.1.16,SR3.3.1.17,SR3.3.1.18wereaddedfortheReactorTripSystemInterlocks(P-6throughP-10).Thesesurveillancesareprovidedtoensurereactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.TheyareprovidedtobackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionsarenotbypassed.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,Functions¹34and¹35-Therequirementsforthechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfor'heserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor;norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-260-December1995 Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1and2wererevisedtorequireaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)onthepowerrangeandtheintermediaterangechannelswithin7dayspriortoreactorcriticality.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe7daytimelimitsissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingthePHYSICSTESTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹4wasrevisedtoincludeanoterequiringachannelcheckevery30minuteswhileimplementingHODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptions.VerificationoftheRCStemperaturewillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹18,¹28,and¹29-TheSurveillancerequirementsforradiationmonitorsR-1throughR-9andR-17,emergencyplanradiationinstruments,andenvironmentalmonitors,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹3-ThiswasrevisedtoaddarequirementwhichestablishesasurveillanceforaSRHCHANNELCALIBRATIONinHODE6.Thiscalibrationconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedataandisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationprocedures.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹14,¹16,and¹19wererelocatedtotheTRHforthesamereasonsasdescribedinSectionD,items12.ithrough12.iv.December1995 TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes.-262-Oecember1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-2:a~b.C.d.e.Table4.1-2,¹6awasrevisedtoextendthesurveillanceFrequencyofthecontrolrodexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe92dayFrequencytakesintoconsiderationtheotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandthechannelcheckwhichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofrodoperability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.29)change.Table4.1-2,¹5and¹6bwererevisedtoremovereferencetoonceevery18monthsoreachrefuelingshutdownfromtheFrequency.Thesesurveillancesareonlyperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorhead.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹7wasrevisedtorelocatethesurveillanceFrequencyof'hepressurizersafetyvalvestotheISTProgramconsistentwithSR3.4.10.1.TheFrequencycontinuestoremaininaprogramrequiringNRCapproval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹10wasnotaddedtothenew'specifications.Therequirementforverifyingtherefuelingsysteminterlocksisnot.aninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.This-requirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹13wasrevisedperSR3.6.6.8torequireverificationofthespray,additivetankNaOHconcentrationonceevery184daysinsteadofmonthly.ThischangeisacceptablesincethesprayadditivetankisnormallymaintainedisolatedatpowersuchthatchangestotheNaOHconcentrationorlevelarenotexpected.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.30)change.-263-December1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15wasrevisedtorequireRCSwaterinventorybalancesevery72hoursduringsteadystateoperationversusdailyconsistentwithSR3.4.13.1.ThisincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptablebasedontheleakagedetectionsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.4.15andthevariousindicationsavailabletooperators(e.g.,volumecontroltanklevelandradiationalarms).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.31)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹17wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofSFPboronconcentrationonceevery31dayswhenfuelisstoredintheSFPandthepositionoffuelassemblieswhichweremovedintheSFPhavenotbeenverified.Thecurrentmonthlyrequirement(regardlessofthestatusoftheSFPverification)isnotreflectedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichdoesnotcredittheavailabilityofsolubleboron.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.32)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹19-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationWaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.The'CirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstrumentsonlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedin,theGinnaStationsafetyanalysis.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressure'oundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-2(GinnaTSCategory(iv,a)changes):1.SR3.1.1.1-Requiresverificationevery4824hoursthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithint4elimits.TheITSBasesstatethataFrequencyofevery4824hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDH.-264-December1995

SR3.1.3.1-RequiresverificationpriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingthatMTCiswithintheupperlimit.TheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.3.2-Requires'erificationpriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingthatMTCwillbewithinthe70%RTPMTCupperlimit-andTheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.8.3-Requireverificationevery24hourswhileimplementingtheMODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinthelimits.TheITSBasesstatethataFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.SR3.5.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthateachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveisfullyopenabove1600psig.SR3.5.1.3-requires.verificationevery12hoursofanupperlimitforthenitrogenpressureblanketintheaccumulatorstopreventliftingofthereliefvalveandoverpressurizationofthetank.Avalueof790psigwasselectedsinceitisabovetheaccumulatorpressureupperalarmsetpointof760psigandbelowthereliefvalvesetpointof800psig.SR3.5.1.4-requiresverificationevery31daysonanSTAGGEREDTESTBASISofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheaccumulatorsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselectedsincethiswould.notcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainment(andaccumulator)temperatureof60'F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalculationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.-265-December1995 SR3.5.1.5-requiresverificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromtheaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorabove1600psig.ThissurveillanceisconsistentwithcurrentTS3.3.l.l.i.Avalueof1600psigwasselected(i.e.,thesamevalueasthatforaccumulatoroperability)sincetheRCSpressureinterlock(i.e.,P-11)asdiscussedinNUREG-1431doesnotexistatGinnaStation.Therefore,thereisnointerlocksignaltoopentheisolationvalvesintheeventthattheyareclosed.SR3.5.4.2-requiresverificationevery7daysofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheRWSTsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselectedsincethiswouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuilding(andRWST)temperatureof50'F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalculationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.SR3.6.5.1-requiresverificationevery24fghoursthatcontainmentaverage,airtemperatureis(120'F.SR3-.6A-.78~6':;!'6668-requiresverificationevery184daysthatthesprayadditivetankvolumeis~4500gallons.SR3.7.11.1-requiresverificationeverySQdaysthata23feetofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracksduringfuelmovementinthe=SFP.Thisverificationisrequiredsincethefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatatleast23feetofwaterisavailablewithrespecttoiodinereleases.SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2-verificationpriortofuelmovementintheSFPthattheassociatedfuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirementsforstorageintheintendedregion(e.g,enrichmentlimit,burnablepoisonspresent).ThisverificationisrequiredtolimittheamountoftimethatafuelassemblycouldbemisloadedintheSFP.-266-December1995 SR3.7.6.1-requires'erificationevery12hoursthattheCSTvolumeis~22,500gallons.ThisensuresthattheminimumvolumeofcondensateisavailableforthepreferredAFWSystemfollowinganaccident.SR3.7.7.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCCWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.SR3.7.7.2-requiresperformanceofacompletecycleofeachCCWmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheRHRheatexchangersinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.ThisensuresthatthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvesarecapableofbeingopenedfollowingaDBA.SR.3-.7-.4-.+3:.:.:~F5'4-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachSWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheSWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheSWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.m~~verff')cat'foAis-267-December1995 thatp~co'nrta1neenntr'is!!'j'nbtbe11coi'.;Aac'~t:;s~tateiiji+~io+'to':".:.'ahn'ddii'i'3'n'p'":!fi'ie'1riiooan'ent,",8,::;:-,3".:6,':.::;.Bp:.::-'.:~gerinrrges,:::,:i'elffri'catdo'n'l'ei'ranp::$1~dagoihe$<i::!'tb'e;Ape;;.",,fg)~PS,:.'.;:PBi4sl,.k):;cP,'.-::,:PYov1cfBXR;,;6M'.Bc':;PRIE;fromnnnsiii)iite'itti<itag)the'riOiiteid'e":::ieiiVrrnnnijieiit!".:.!tat~e':,:iiiig:3SR~@.:3~7,;'Sgg::@~=,:,":.;:,"-.'.,,'Rqagi~e'ij:.ViŽrl:f;:;i,ikeir.s,';::,thi4)hatratbsjiiltP'iiia't'e.;-,h'eath's!leak,;:.=-'so'nncejisb'iritb!'i'ith'erassenptr'ons:,.~opi'th'i*.':...acdj'dent~'analp~sesj,'j~j'ii'e'sj;":;i'i.;e",.0e'itoheri~j'Ipe'ce'seatdr!'."teiirsUpp~o)'t~l'%lie!,'.'An'ch'dent,".'!annal@sos:,.$RTjj3";e'5,,;;,g<,7(w)'p@j(4.,"rieqQ)$Kssvj>R~FjN<V($;sp83@(~)(jv&Fjk;:;:fj3~CR'l$'oRe'Vp)p)~24j~fNiitQ"S~j(44)'K~~fhd",'.':,,RHkk::;cent;;.ii;:rimes'r'!ctjion",;.t4&~pjSCr845~k";8fioHSjj~h04iV~dnkrRF%::;~$1';:4i4l.'UCgU+h'j;:4zhit;..;,th).;~AHR'.'.:8'ys'.t::;em~'AHg';,:ii'ot;~',:bicd'tiik$;'-ji'expct'adfdabi!11s'jiiibi'csh'::,:,i'iiijr:.".:exit!,:.'1'nrr'c'ont'a1"niiie'iitn'o'st"-"fQCA1ki'A.:.l":,:'::be'i'ii:.tliijj"::8acsses,kt'ite':::;-i:%liat>(iireet!nrp~ithe",::eljeateij:,:~g~~HOGF.".;',j:::iri~iij,','ei'>t',"h'0't'~khkjl;~iYiit,';:~i4)bt",$'4nsnnes'4'thetaithP~AFrParsstorirt'or"r;:::il'sr)8va'1'1ab'1esbto.date'ct:!.;.";ch'an@i)br)i'rid>JAFQ'ii::,::..:'a~add>jp!r:."""nn.oonoodnii'<:;"',:,.:"Leer'esii'rgLed!cation!'t'obepei'.;a'toiis':.SR":::3"2"":+rk"":,n-":":reqii%re~-"-'Ven:fan%'a41an"'::"'eiFV~'Rhtletdck~cbi'AjO'Nz":-.'~i'",:gPTP>,;~iiid@jiidv)d4'5:Khatgcoe~f'i~~gg~A'.88~4'Br.,';:,i0'~f1iviigg~thYiojh':,'&8'd~h:.'CR-268-December1995 13~ii'151)%jii's:':4"i'3'iiiiiiN!'iIi'ttil;4ccfdiiiTt~!4~'alj',s~~g!:2~8'.$R::3,";::,5;-'.2!',3~Jyj'pic;res:;.ver$,:;f3",eipii'jli",-Qcti~e4,':::fk09iJi!'ei'::::!i'lllg,"':Fi'i)~~bit'h'jjC4CS~I%1fi:S".,-269-December1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnitsII1andII2-ThesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationsforthereasonsdiscussedinSectionD,itemll.i.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4;1-2,FunctionalUnitII16-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofDGfueloilinventoryonceevery31daysinsteadofdaily.Sincethestoragetanksareofpassivedesignandareprovidedwithvariouslevelalarms,verificationevery31daysis,consideredadequate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.33)change.-270-December1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹4-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRMforthesamereasonsasdescribedinSection0,item12.iv.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.m.n.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit812-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRN18Tra!Pro'gr'emsinceitdoesnotmeetanyoftherequirementsforinclusionintheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹8$48-TheFrequencyfordetermininggrossspecificactivityofthesecondarysystemwasrevisedfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery31days.Inaddition,thedeterminationofI-131wasalsochangedtoonceevery31daysindependentofthelastactivitylevelsincethecurrentGinnaTSallowupto6monthsbetweentests.ThesechangesareallconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.e+-changes.5'1<),::c,aiiji.:;ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.3orTable4.1-3:a~Table4.1-3-ThePostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRegulatoryGuide1.97,TypeAandCategory1variables.TheseFunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.35).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-271-December1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-4:a.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit81wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.1toonlyrequireverificationofreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityonceevery7dayswhenT,,~500'Fversusonceevery72hoursaboveColdShutdown(i.e.,T.,~200'F).Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedonthesmallprobabilityofagrossfuelfailureduringtheadditional4days.Fuelfailuresaremorelikelytooccurduringstartuporfastpowerchangesandnotduringsteadystatepoweroperationduringwhichthemajorityofsamplingisperformed.GrossfuelfailureswillalsoresultinLetdownradiationalarmsandpossiblycontainmentradiationalarmsprovidingadditionaloperatorindication.OnlyrequiringthissurveillancewhenT.,~500'FprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.34)change.'I-272-December1995 Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹2wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.2torequireverificationofDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131whenT.,~500Finsteadofabove5%reactorpower.ThisconservativechangeprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.C.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹3wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.3todelaydeterminationofEuntil31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofNODE1operationfollowingthereactorbeingsubcriticalfor~48hours.The31dayswasaddedtoensurethatradioactivematerialsareatequilibriumjnordertoprovideatruerepresentativesampleforEdeterminationandeliminatepossiblefalsesamples.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.~ange8.$3j~cbgg'0':,V.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.4orTable4.1-5:Table4.1-5,FunctionalUnit¹3bwasrevisedtorequireachannelcheckofparticulatesamplerR-11every12hoursversusweekly.ThisisrequiredsinceR-llisbeingusedtomonitorRCSleakageandmaybetheonlyinstalledsystemOPERABLEtoperformthistaskforupto30dayspernewLCO3.4.15.-273-December1995 b.TS4.1.4andTable4.1-5-TheRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseprocessvariablesarenot'ninitialconditionoraDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,.therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandwererelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.g~I3)4':":1'-",:.:5>"'Fiiiotionggbnitt837'nannd43b,,fie:,i',:e'ii'ensigns'e'd~to~CtssLoTLsd,::!iTbe:-:;CBpNtfEL!CHsECK~ofoii~p)~wasttfeoit's'edi'.Fionline'eesTes".:too'nge">>~'e":.,::,IITaaneaes:Nota..;;:,S~bttiasjde'I'ete'd;:.Pinon'.:'::::::neijniijiij".::th~gostbaCHAnNNsEL~qCIiLTBRATOHgi';!.be<iti'a'c'dl"::,bn8k',;Eton%'H'a@Nations,'I';29.TechnicalSpecification4.2TS4.2.1-ThespecificrequirementsfortheInserviceInspectionProgram,whichincludegualityGroupsA,B,andCcomponents,highenergypipingoutsideofcontainment,snubbersandsteamgeneratortubes,werenotadded.Thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(GinnaStationgAManual,AppendixB)andamore'enericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-274-December1995 ll~L"whig-',;':";i's'j'~';:,6i'in~"'-:T):;.::':::;C'a~pi'j~ij":i'(it'i'!j'~gcliaiij~ii'j!<30.TechnicalSpecification4.3TS4.3.5.6-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedforthereasonsdiscussedunderSectionC,item6.xi.ThisSurveillancehasbeenrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.3.5.3.b-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedsinceperformanceofpumptestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingprogramshouldnotberequiredfor,anoperatingRHRpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredbynewSR3.4.6.3whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailableto.thepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestingismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringshutdownconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureoperabilityduringNODE4operations.However,thisSurveillanceisrequiredforECCSduringNODE4(seenewSR3.5.3.1)ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3-Thefollowingnewrequirementswereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):SR3.4.6.3,3'.4.7.3and3.4.8.2-Requirestheverificationofcorrectbreakeralignmentfor'thenon-operating,butrequired,RHRpumpinNODES4and5.b.C.SR3.4.9.2-Requiresverificationthatthetotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis~100KWonceevery92days.SR3.4.11.2-RequiresacompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogensystemonceevery24months.-275-December1995 TS4.3.3.1,4.3.3.2,and4.3.3.3-Therequirementthattheleakagetestsbeperformedwithaminimumtestdifferentialpressure'f150psidwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThebasesfornewLCO3.4.14referenceASNE,SectionXI(Ref.53)whichprovidesacceptableguidanceforperformingtheseleakagetests.Thisincludesadjustingtheobservedleakageratesforteststhatarenotconductedatthemaximumdifferentialpressurebyassumingthatleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.ThisisaconservativechangeinmostcasessinceitrequiresthatthePIVsbetestedunderthemaximumdifferentialpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-276-December1995 TS4.3.3.4-TheallowedleakageratesforPIVswasadjustedfromasinglevalueforallvalvestoavaluebasedonvalvesizeconsistentwithSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2.Thischangeprovidesgreaterinformationofvalvedegradationandremovesanunjustifiedpenaltyonlargervalves(Ref.54).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.V1.V11.TS4.3.5.5-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedduringNODE1operationsincethereisareactortripfunctionwhichprotectstheSGlevel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.3.1.1-Thisrequirementwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitonlystatesthatthereactorvesselmustbetestedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixH.SincethisrequirementisalreadyspecifiedintheCFR,itdoesnothavetoberetainedwiththeTSandwasdeleted.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS4.3.3.1-ThiswasmodifiedtoremovetherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdown.AtGinnaStation,theseflowpathsareonlyusedforemergencyinjection(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringcoldshutdownconditions).Sincethevalvesaremaintainedclosedatalltimes,requiringaleaktestwithin24hoursofbeingopenedorhavingmaintenanceperformed,andonceevery24monthsprovidesadequateProtection.'ii:,;::,::,;,feeP'cagf!PgP'sttteyeerey...:a2g:.',,:cont'hs~:;,;tii."i~:".asocosnsist~tit!:.:eith'1ÃltC',,:.%pp~roaedaOHa':,,-;:,1988'.:ll:;,)Thisisa'innaTS'Categoryv'"."h".3'g"change.31.TechnicalSpecification4.4TS4.4.4-Therequirementsforthetendonstresssurveillanceswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendon.SurveillanceProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.6andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.This~isaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.4.3-TherequirementsforthetestingoftheportionoftheRHRsystemintherecirculationconfigurationwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.2andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-277-December1995 -278-December1995 iii.TS4.4.1(exceptdefinitionforL.),4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2,and4.4.2.4-Thesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisinformationiscontainedin10CFR50,AppendixJanddoesnotneedtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecifications.SRs3.6.1.1and3.6.1.2provideforthenecessaryrelationfromtechnicalspecificationstoAppendixJ~,,(VeV%!$5tete'wneej6$$.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(ii)changes.iv.V.TS4.4.2.3.aand4.4.2.3.b-Thesewererevisedtorequirethatiftheallowed10CFR50,AppendixJleakagelimitsareexceeded,theymustberestoredwithin1hourversus48hoursconsistentwithLCO3.6.1.However,theleakagelimitof<0.6L.wasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththenewAppendixJruleandimplementationguidance(i.e.,theleakagelimitis<0.6L,onamaximumpathwayleakageratebasispriortoenteringNODE4forthefirsttimefollowingeachrefuelingoutageand<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakageratebasis.forallothertimeperiods)~p<(i@@'Q)",e~Ref'ereoc~ej6ff:.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS4.4.2.4.c-Aspecified'airlockleakageacceptancecriteriaof(0.05L.whentestedat)P.wasaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisacceptancecriteriaisrequiredtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecificationsby10CFR50,AppendixJ,SectionIII.D.2(iv)andisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrenttestingrequirements.Inaddition,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifythatonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatimeonceevery24months.ThistestisnecessarytoensurethattheOPERABILITYoftheairlocks,asdefinedinthenewbasesforLCO3.6.2ismaintained.TheseareGinnaCategory(iv.a)changes.-279-December1995 TS4.4.2.3.c-Therequirementtoperformanengineeringevaluationifthemini-purgesupplyandexhaustlinesisolationvalveleakageexceeds0.05L,wasrevisedtorequireisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationwithin24hours.Inaddition,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31daysifitisoutsidecontainment,oronceevery92daysifitisinsidecontainment.ThesechangesprovidedirectguidancetooperatorswhichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.4.5.1-Twonewsurveillances(SR3-.6-.3-.48,:::!GY3'.2andSR3-.6.'~~3'"'";6:":,,'3')>>wereaddedwhichrequireverificationofthecorrectpositionofcontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedoutsidecontainmentonceevery484@daysandinsidecontainmentpriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious4849$days.ThesesurveillancesensurethatthecontainmentisolationbarriersremainOPERABLEaboveMODE5.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.6.2-TheSurveillanceFrequencyforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveshasbeenrevisedfrom18to24months(seeSectionD,item1.xii).TheresponsetimesforCIVsisdiscussedinthebasesfornewLCO3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.1)change.TS4.4-TwonewSurveillanceswereaddedwithrespecttothehydrogenrecombiners(SR3.6.7.1andSR3.6.7.2).Thedh.ThdN111NIthtNIIANNELNALININITIANhperformedonthehydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelsonceevery24months.The,performanceoftheseSRsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareOPERABLEandcapableofperformingtheirpost-accidentfunction.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.7-TheFrequencyforperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKofthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedfromdailytomonthly.Inaddition,theFrequencyforCHANNELCALIBRATIONSwasrevisedfromquarterlytoevery24months.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andarejustifiedbyindustryexperience.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)changes.-280-December1995 32.TechnicalSpecification4.5TS4.5.1.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtodeletethestatementthattheSIand.RHRpumpsarepreventedfromstarting'uringthistest.'incethesecomponentshaverecirculationlinesavailable,thisstatementisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.5.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtorelocateallSI,RHR,andCSpumptestingfrequenciesanddischargepressurerequirementstotheInserviceTestingprogramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8consistentwiththeITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.2.c-ThetestrelatedtoaccumulatorcheckvalvetestingforoperabilityeveryrefuelingshutdownwasrelocatedtotheGinnaStationInserviceTestingprogram.Thevalvesarecurrentlypartiallystroketestedquarterlyandrefurbishedeverysixyears.LeakageassociatedwiththesecheckvalvesisaddressedbySR3.5.1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.iv.ThefollowingnewITStestingrequirements'wereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):-281-December1995 SR3.5.2.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatECCSrelatedisolationvalvesareintheirrequiredposition.ThesevalvesarecurrentlyspecifiedinTS3.3.l.l.g,3.3.1.l.i,and3.3.l.l.j.b.SR3.5.2.2-requiresverificationevery31daysthatECCSrelatedvalveswhicharenotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionareintheircorrectposition.V.vi.TS4.5.2.3-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThislevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVentilationFilterTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.Inaddition,theremainingrequirementswereallrelocatedtotheAdministrativeControlssection.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.3.6.a-Thesetestrequirementswererevisedtoclarifythattwoseparatetestsareperformed.AHEPAfiltertestandacharcoaladsorberbanktestareseparatelyperformedwitheachrequiringalimitoflessthan3inchesofwater.Thisisessentiallyequivalenttoacombinedtestoflessthan6inchesofwaterandisconsistentwithspecifiedtestingstandards.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.-282-December1995 TR4.2.1.2-AT,':.~22,:lit!!:::-:.-:24thecorrectposYtionof"eachmanual",""poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheHaOA~iodCSflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheN'BOA.,ih'd,>CSSys4e~Sys'tern'sare.OPERABLEinaccordancewiththeL'CO.~~Th'ejegi;eGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)ehaagechYn'gj'g.TS4.5.1.2.b-TheFrequencyofperformingthespraynozzlegastestwasrevisedfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10yearsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.14.Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptableduetothepassivenatureofthespraynozzlesandpreviousacceptableresults.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.36)change.TS4.5.2.3.5-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireactuationofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfromanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonceevery24monthstoensurethatthesystemalignsitselfcorrectly(SR3-.RAi-.M+9:;";:.'6~6.'$5/~;.Thepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersmuststillbeopenedatleastonceper31daystoallowthesystemtooperatefora15minutes.Consequently,onlythefrequencyoftheautomaticalignmentofthedampersisbeingrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithotherspecifications..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.37)change.TS4.5.2.2.a-ThiswasrevisedtoadjustthetestingFrequencyofthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlytoonceevery24monthsconsistentwithSR3-346A35,.",.':6,':.",656.Thisincreasedtestingintervalisacceptablesincet'esystemonlyneedstobeverifiedthatitcanactuateonanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonarefuelingbasissimilartothe,SIandRHRsystems.AnyadditionalvalvetestingisaddressedbytheISTprogram.Inaddition,anewSurveillance(SR-:~~3Y6;."6:.:.;"12)",:wasaddedtoverifythattheCSmotoroperatedisolationvalvesactuatetotheircorrectpositiononceevery24months'ollowinganactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Finally,anewSurveillance(SR3.:',:.6:::.:67f7):wasaddedtoverifythatthesprayadditiveflowrateiswithinlimitsonceevery5years.ThesechangesensurethattheCSandsprayadditivetankLCOscontinuetobemet.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.38)changes.TS4.5.2.3.3and4.5.2.3.4-ThesewererevisedtorequirethateachCRFCunitbeoperatedfor~15minutesonceevery31days(SR3-.6-.~8:::!6,:.";,"",6.'..:OJ":.This,testwillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPEfNBLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.Inaddition,anewSurveillanceisalsorequiredonceevery24monthstoensurethattheCRFCunitsstartonanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.ThesetestswillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-283-December1995 -284-December1995 X11TS4.5.2.3.9-ThiswasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityoftheGREATSonceevery24months.Thisverificationisnecessarytoensurethatthecontrolroomenvironmentcanbeisolatedintheeventofaradiologicalrelease.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.33.TechnicalSpecification4.6TS4.6.l.a-Thecoldorrefuelingrequirements(NODES5and6)fordemonstratingDGoperabilityhavebeenrevisedtoinclude(1)verificationofDGdaytankfueloillevel,(2)verificationoftheonsitesupplyoffueloil,and(3)operationofthefueloiltransfersystem.Theseareconsistentwith.therequiredsurveillancesforDGoperabilityinNODES1,2,3,and4andprovideassurancethattheDGisOPERABLE.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.6.l.b.6-TherequirementtoverifythattheDGisalignedtoprovidestandbypowertotheassociatedemergencybuseswasnotadded.ThisrequirementiswithinthedefinitionofanOPERABLEDGandisdenotedinthebasesofnewTS3.8.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-285-December1995 iii.TS4.6.l.c-TherequirementtoperformthetestsinSpecification4.6.l.bpriortoexceedingcoldshutdownwasnotadded.Thisrequirementwasreplacedwithageneralprovision(newSR3.0.4)thatrestrictsentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOunlesstheLCO'ssurveillanceshavebeenmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.6.l.d-Thedieselfueloiltestrequirements.wererelocatedtonewTS5.5.12andareproposedtobeidentifiedasa"program"consistentwiththeformatofa'nd::.;Cfe;',f%ti'-:::.;,:tie'e:::924d~j:,:~t'esFjjgii,':.'fupt~oj3~eijwjjjpibj%'est'edfbeFsre~b~iFy~it'iced:!i,::n~tbapsfjwxg~;-uI,';:'.:.:6~j:;.,"..:W,,i84i':s~-286-December1995 TS4.6.l.e.1-TherequirementtoinspecttheDGinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationswasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsinceDGinspectionsarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicy'StatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.l.e.3(b).-TherequirementforDGtestingsimulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontestsignalwasrevised.Detailsofthetestacceptancecriteriawererelocatedto@he-~NPiPSj'~0'ate'isincethislevelofdetailisnottypicallyspecifiedintheSR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.2.aand4.6.2.b-Thestationbatterytestingrequirementswererevisedtoaddacceptancecriteria,parameters,andassociatedactionsforbatteryoperabilitysupportingDCelectricalpowersubsystems.TheserequirementsareprovidedinthebaemKRSandenhancethecurrentcriteriaspecifiedintheTSandisaconservativechangeregardingthedefinitionofbatteryOPERABILITY.Inaddition,theelectrolytetemperatureisonlytobemeasuredevery92daysversusmonthlyconsistentwithIEEE-450requirements.TheseareGinnaTS.Category(iv.a)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS4.6.2.f-Thedetailsdenotingbatterydegradationweremovedtothebasesandwererevisedtoincludeexpectedlifeparametersofthebatterywhencomparedtoacapacitycriteriaof100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.ThiscriteriaisusedinconjunctionwithidentifyingwhenthesurveillanceFrequencymustbeincreasedandisconsistentwithITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.a)changes,respect1vely.-287-December1995 TS4.6.2-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.8.4.1andSR3.8.5.1)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationevery347>daysthatthebatterychargingeepeha'Wi4yterninai~iiol'tajeisa4gg-elapeg~R9~>V:.",yF!lf~'PP'itjgiftag'eduringoperatingaidshutdownconditions.Thissurveillanceensures"thatthe'equiredbatterychargerremainscapableofmaintainingDCsystemloadsandafloatchargeonthebattery.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.X.TS4.6.2.c-TherequirementfortrendingbatterytestdatawasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisistrendingmustbeperformedtomeettheFrequencyrequirementsforSR3.8.6.2andSR3.8.4.3.~~TheM'Foe@'3bvawowo.cy...av:A-288-December1995 (5!!!!46'i'i!!E4!ygli:,-,:-'!~i!,;;,,i:-,-chitii(Ji)'!At:,,ittati:"';,":,","i'*.Tile':,:i!i"'hi!i-'i!ai'~i-'::!!tSW5!4-'iviiii,"::.'giii'--::::i.""i'i""i!-'f5'~4:6':4~5~4~4'8::"X~e::"'2"l':aii'd"'4""'6""'1":""i"3:"':-"'Chi'seÃweNVeVisag4854.IAggÃequ:.fFQlleAtS'P@T4'k8:,:,,81:SO;;:pF&V8flt$gUAAeCBMRV+~4t8stS,,6'iFV~i,;"@8;.,6';atejiiy+4~%)j"chang34.TechnicalSpecification4.735.TechnicalTS4.7wasrevisedtoincludeasurveillancetoensurethateachMSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalevery24monthsconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrentGinnaStationTSTable3.5-,2whichrequirethattheisolationsignalstotheMSIVsbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,RequiredActionswereprovidedintheeventthattheMSIVscannotcloseasrequiredbythisSurveillance.Theseactionsrequirerestorationof,orclosureofaninoperableMSIV,within24hours.IntheeventthatbothMSIVsareinoperable,the,plantmustenterLCO3.0.3.Final'ly,requirementsforthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalveswereadded.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.Specification4.8TS4.8.1and4.8.2-TheFrequencyoftheAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASME,SectionXIrequirements.Theacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedto,InserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObases,consistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.-289-December1995 TS4.8.3-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheAFWsuctionanddischargevalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,thecross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalveswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethesevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses(seebasesfornewLCO3.7.5).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.b.39)changes,respectively.-290-December1995

iii.TS4.8.4-TheFrequencyoftheSAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASHE,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.iv~v.Vi.Vii~TS4.8.5-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheSAFWsuction,discharge,andcross-overvalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivitiesconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.8.6-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheacceptancecriteriafortheAFWandSAFWteststotheactualproceduresperformingthesetests.ThenewbasesidentifywhatisrequiredforOPERABILITYoftheAFWandSAFWSystemssuchthatspecifyingthisacceptancecriteriaisunnecessary.Inaddition,boththebasesandtestproceduresarecontrolledunder10CFR50.59.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.8-AnewSurveillancewasaddedrequiringverificationevery31daysofthecorrectpositionofeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperatedandautomaticvalveintheflow'aththatisnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisverificationisrequiredtoensurethattheAFWandSAFWSystemsareOPERABLEwhennotinservice.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.8.10-Therequirementtomeasuretheresponsetimeofthe'AFWpumpsandvalvestobe(10minutesonceevery18monthswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThetimerequirementsfortheAFWSystemaredescribedinthenewbases.WhilesomeaccidentsdonotrequireAFWfor10minutes,thesmallbreakLOCAandlossoffeedwatertransientsrequireAFMwithinmuchshortertimeframes.Therefore,thisSurveillanceisnotaccurateandisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.40)change.-291-December1995 -292-December1995 36.TechnicalSpecification4.9TS4.9-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanLCOrequirementthatthemeasuredcorereactivitybewithin1%ak/kofthepredictedvaluesandtoaddaspecificsurveillanceFrequencyofevery31EFPDaftertheinitialnormalization.TheSurveillanceRequirementwasdividedintotwosurveillancestoclarifythedifferencebetweentheinitialnormalizationandthemonthlyverification.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.37.TechnicalSpecification4.10TS4.10.1andTable4.10-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.10.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaand.arerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-293-December1995 38.TechnicalTS4.10.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.11TS4.11.1-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheSFPfiltrationsystemtestswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.ll.l.l.a,4.1l.l.l.b,and4.ll.l.l.c-ThesecharcoaladsorbersystemtestingrequirementswererelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedintheAdministrativeControls(TS5.5.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.11.l.l.d-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisverificationisnotrequiredtoensurethatinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesarestillmet.TheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemdoesnotutilizeheaters.ThebasesforSR3.7.13.1statethatoperatingtheventilationsystemfor~15minutesevery31daysforsystemswithoutheatersistoensuresystemoperation.InaccordancewithnewLCO3.7.10(NUREG-1431LCO3.7.13),theABVSisrequiredtobeinoperationduringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Assuch,theABVSisnotastandbysystematGinnaStation(i.e.,thesystemmustbebothOPERABLEandinoperationduringitsMODEofApplicability).Therefore,amonthlyverificationprovidesnoverificationofanyaccidentanalysis,dti,,ttd,~S'vip':.f,'-,'f',ai'cps'<j~iow'e'r~e;added"which~eQ-enid'j6$.,','reverificationevery24hoursthattheAuxiliaryBuil'lingoperatingfloorlevelisatanegativepressurewithre~secttotheoutsideenvironment+a'nd:,'4h'~4th'e'~eo~t;.0'aigensy,.s,:eiPj::s:,"':,":,,:n$::,Opei":a...'ii.va"i~1':fgeW'4j%i~is'-',ii'e,consistentwithplantpracticesandensuresthat~initial~umpMeaiss'u'mph'osofthefuelhandlingaccident+sK)',hbeingmainYained~hechangeisalsoconsistentwithReference55.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-294-December1995

-295-December1995 TS4.11.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYonceevery12hoursversus4hoursconsistentwithSR3.9.3.1.AFrequencyof12hoursisadequateduetothealarmsandindicationsavailabletotheoperatorswithrespecttoRHRpumpandloopperformance.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.41)change.V.vl.TS4.11.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementforanInserviceTestoftheRHRpumps.AnInserviceTestshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredbynewSR3.9.4.2whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringnormalconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureOPERABILITYduringMODE6operations.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.42)change.TS4.11.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofthewaterlevelinthereactorcavitywithin24hoursoffuelmovementversus2hours.ThenewTSusagerulesstatethataSRistobecontinuouslyperformedatitsrequiredFrequency.However,theSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenintheMODEofApplicability,Therefore,aSRwithaFrequencyof24hoursmusthavebeenperformedwithin24hoursbeforeenteringtheMODEofApplicability.AFrequencyof24hoursisacceptableduetothelargevolumeofwateravailableandtheproceduralcontrolsinplace.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.39.TechnicalSpecification4.12TS4.12.1.1andTable4.12-1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin'0CFRPart20,Appendix8,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactive'EffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-296-December1995 TS4.12.1.2-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedor.implied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.1andTable4.12-2-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.2-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantrisk'contributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.This,isaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-297-December1995 V.40.Technical41.TechnicalTS4.12.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.13TS4.13-Therequirementsforperiodictestingofleakageforradioactivesourceswerenotadded.ThesourceleaktestarenotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,theleakagefromradioactivesourcesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheT4Ã50CH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.14TS4.14-Therequirementsforthetestingofsnubberswerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification52485~5P~7:andmore.genericprogramdescriptionisproVided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.42.TechnicalNone.Specification4.1543.TechnicalSpecification4.16TS4.16-AnewsurveillancewasaddedwhichrequiresverificationonFeTN:".::,viit6ii':Qf2pijtjo'urs~jand~pevery12hours'theFe'ifteigjthatanaccumuTator'ssmotoroperatedisolation.v~aveisclosedwhenitspressureisgreaterthanorequal.tothepressureallowedbytheP/Tlimitcu'rvesprovidedinthePTLRconsistentwithSR3.4.12.3.Inaddition,averificationone'e'j'5iitlh'i~ntt'!lion're".~an3'/every31days)herefusee~*:thatpaverisremovedtotheseisolationvalvesisalsoadded.TheseverificationsareneededtoensurethattheaccumulatordoesnotdischargeintotheRCSandcauseanoverpressureeventwhichchallengestheLTOPSystem.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-298-December1995 44.TechnicalTS4.16.l.a-ThissurveillancewasrevisedtodelayperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriortoenteringtheLTOPSystemApplicability.ThischangeeliminatestheperformanceofthefunctionaltestwhenRCSisbetween330'F(theLTOPenabletemperature)and350'F(MODE3lowerlimit)duringforcedshutdowns.Instead,thetestcanbeperformedwithin12hoursofenteringthespecifiedconditionandreducestheimmediateoperatorburden.-ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.43)change.Specification5.1TS5.1.1,TS5.1.2,andFigure5.1-1-ThedescriptionandfigureofthesiteareaboundarybeunM~wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithTravellerGEOG-03,C.1'.SincethedescriptionofhhtP~dg~.h:,"t:--::d~ttheen+Rgcrieria'.for.;,:,:::Deil'jn'.;!F'eatuiisN&esey,-lbF4+i@0O'FR'50,;.'."36,thisdescriptionisreldocatedMolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR<Section2.1.2).&+s-~Ape,',W~ijere8'0fjjff&scE~l:pt;.",oA':pf~gp68~M~c::Us49f7$4L'&a'hbouA680iygfita's:;~ia.'Ig'6ft'i!i'iiitgh::.':""ll..':.~II!ii""'-i!'TEi'lc't!id',."tiled'ld'th'i!hi:'.h':iii~45.TechnicalSpecification5.2TS5.2-Thedescriptionofthecontainmentdesignfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificcontainmentfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).46.Technicalfhi.'iifoi%,hisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSections3.8.1and6.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification5.3TS5.3.l.aandTS5.3.1.c-ThedescriptionofthereactorcoredesignfeatureswasrevisedconsistentwiththestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431.Thesectionnowincludestheamount,kind,andsourceofnuclearmaterialrelatedtothereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS5.3.l.b-The'escriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturewithrespecttothemaximumenrichmentweightpercentwasrevisedandrelocatedtonewSpecification4.3.1.Thechangesareinaccordancewiththechanges-299-December1995 discussedinitem47.ii,below.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-300-December1995 TS5.3.2-Thedescriptionofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)designfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificRCSfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).er-i4ev4+74Fiifere,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSection3.7.1andChapter5)..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.3.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtoincreasethefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent.Thischangehasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptablewithrespecttopostulatedfuelhandlingaccidents(Ref.29).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.46)change.47.TechnicalSpecification5.4TS5.4.1,5.4.2,5.4.6,andFigures5.4-1and5.4-2-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturesdenotingspentfuelstorageregionsandboratedwaterconcentrationswaeH'icerelocatedtoChapters3.7and3.9.Thesefeaturesarediscussedin~COs3.7.11,AGO-3.7.12,CC4-3.7.13,and440-3.9.1asappropriate.Inaddition,appropriateRequiredActionswereaddedintheeventthatSFPwaterlevel,boronconcentration,orSFPregionstoragerequirementsarenotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS5.4.2-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeatureswasrevised.Therevisiontothesefeaturesarebasedonarevisedcriticalityanalysissupportingtheproposed18monthfuelcycle(Reference29).ThedescriptionofthesefeaturesfollowthestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431whichwouldincludetheamount,kind,andsourceofspecialnuclearmaterialwiththeexceptionthatnominalcentertocenterspacingbetweenthefuelassemblieswasnotadded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995 1V.TS5.4.3-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturedenotingthe60-daylimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2wasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplies.forthetimelimitonstorageof'ischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2.Thecurrent60-daylimitwasestablishedtoprovidesufficientmargininspentfuelpooltemperaturecalculationsasaresultofdecayheatloadsinRegion2fromdischargedfuelassemblies(Reference39).Althoughthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemand,thus,theassociatedrestrictiononheatloadpreventstructuralintegritydamagetothespentfuelpool,theyar'enotassumedtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccident(DBA).Therestrictiononheatloadisnotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therestrictiononheatloadisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamaefreuencyandoffsitedoses.Since%lions~:.doe%,;,;a'ogspecif'i'ca'tionscreeningcriteriaapply,thisrequirementisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.4.4and5.4.5-ThesewererevisedconsistentwithReferences29and39toprovidetheamount,kind,andsourceot'ateriaiwhichisstoredinthecanisters.ITh'i:."eiip~ia'jGiaiij>TsAir-.4'ftate'a9iyi~(:uV.TS5.4-Thiswasrevisedtoincludedescriptions'oftheSFPdrainagesystemandcapacity.Thisinformationiscurrentlycontainedinthebasesforthissection.Since.NUREG-1431,Chapter4doesnotcontainanybases,thisinformationhasbeenrelocatedtothespecification.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.48.TechnicalSpecification5.5TS5.5-Thedescriptionofthewastetreatmentsystemsdesignfeatureswasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthedescriptionofthesefeatures.SpecificwastetreatmentsystemsfeaturesareeithercoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sorhavebeenrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocumentsand,therefore,donotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatement'echnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARChapterll).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-302-December1995 -303-December1995 49.TechnicalSpecification6.1TS6.1.1-Therequirementwasrevisedtoincludeatth1~ji!i,'"'t':',t",,1h11PPeachproposedtest,experime~nit"ormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS6.1-Anewrequirement(Specification5.1.2)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforShiftSupervisorresponsibility.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Th~e,';,.p:,,",i'i'1:,',:;;tli!i.jj'i!t:",1h'hi's",.;~iiiitie':,::Sfiinti::,!Tgt;:galti'egiob;:(~he:";c'h'a.nqe:,,*50.TechnicalSpecification6.2CrossreferencestoexistingregulatoryrequirementsareredundantandgenerallynotincorporatedintoNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.PlantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsarereplacedwithgenerictitlescaffs$%teh5;;ehhgRe(eren~ce.':62.Personnelwhofulfil,lthesepositionsarerequiredtomeetspecificqualificationsasdetailedinproposedTS5.3,andcompliancedetailsrelatingtotheplantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesareidentifiedinthepOFSAR.Thetwomajorspecificreplacementsarethegeneric-'TLaa4Hanager-"Pjg>'atig~%iAPge'i>jforthemanagerlevelindividualresponsibleee'ortheoverallsafeoperationoftheplantandthegenericdescriptiveuseof-'4he~acorporateee~h+veijmydyp+muctjruesid~ent-:,'nplaceoftheip'eel)'ic:;:.,:,:,VicePresidentposition.Theplantspecifictitl'esfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,11t*hd,d,tddpdtdiil,::iiiFTSI:::,hdm(1'i=:P'P'1yrequirementsforclianges~.PregraR+Thischangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.ill.TS6.2.l.d-Therequirementdescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagement4e~ggddt:drfo>!hy;.'::cont"s!'stenni>ii:thaNURE$-;;:ljq81",".".jhesech'atrnsge~thei,;en'teiitg::;,:;."or,."."-'requi!rtemejjts'":o'faggot-304-December1995 -305-December1995 iv~V.Vi.M351.Technical52.Technical53.TechnicalNone.TS6.2.2.b-Therequirementsdescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswerenotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(l),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and5.2.2.e.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.2.2.d-Therequirementwasrevisedtoclarifythattheindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresisallowedtobeabsentfornotmorethantwohours.Thisisconsistentwiththerequirementsforshiftcrewcomposition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS6.2.2.e-TherequirementdescribingtheovertimerequirementforplantstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionswasrevisedtoreferenceaNRCapprovedprogramforcontrollingovertime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.A".:!,'.Aw,::.:7,8$0$'::Isis'A't::~itii:.:"iiiiiii!iiiiiii!4!:"",'":ill::.ci"ill:ii~:::,-.-t!ll'll':)liiii'iiiiii.'.~Specification6.3TS6.3.1-ThereferencetotheRG&EletterdatedDecember30,'980,wasreplacedwithwordingconsideredmoreappropriate.ThecurrentSTAprogramatGinnaStationisdiscussedinReferences40and42andwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.'herevisedwordingeliminatestheneedtorevisetheTechnicalSpecificationsiftheSTAprogramislaterrevised,butstillrequiresNRCapprovalofthesechanges.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Specification6.4TS6.4-TherequirementsforaTrainingProgramwerenotadded.TherequirementsareeitheradequatelyaddressedbyotherSection5.0administrativecontrolsorareaddressedby10CFR55requirements.~Yh'ei;::ifoivl:>gggse~Žeql!~fjme~is,:;,:areal:e1;o~~Ppchikot'e;:::,;:VF'SAR.:::,.'-::,ll'ii%'.'"5'=,:4:.':6'liight",!TSACatej'ti:i('!1'!15')'.::~ch%iij~ii,"Specification6.554.TechnicalNone.Specification6.6-306-December1995 55.TechnicalSpecification6.7TS6.7.l.a-TheinitialoperatoractionsforSafetyLimit(SL)violationswererevisedasfollows:-307-December1995

ForviolationoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2,therequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)wasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinMODE3.Immediatelyshuttingdownthereactorcouldinferactiontoimmediatelytripthereactor.'herevisionprovidesthenecessarytimetoshutdowntheunitinamorecontrolledandorderlymannerthanimmediatelytrippingthereactorwhichcouldresultinaplanttransient.TheproposedtimecontinuestominimizethetimeallowedtooperateinMODE1or2withaSLnotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.44)change.b.ForviolationoftheRCSPressureSLinMODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasaddedwhichrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeSLwithin5minutes.Specifyingatimelimitforoperatorstorestorecomplianceprovidesgreaterguidancetoplantstaff.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS6.7.l.b-TherequirementfornotificationtomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NotificationrequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TherequirementfornotificationtotheNRCofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisrequirementisdenotedin10CFR50.36'and10CFR50.72.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.7.l.c-TherequirementthataSafetyLimitViolationReportbepreparedwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementfortheonsitereviewcommitteetoreviewtheSafetyLimitViolationReportwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheresponsibilitiesoftheonsitereviewcommitteearerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SLviolationsarereportedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof10CFR50.73.ThedetailsdescribingtherequirementsforcontentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportis,therefore,controlledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.73anddoesnotneedtobespecifiedinTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.-308-December1995 iv.TS6.7.l.d-TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttotheNRCwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR.50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thedistributionofreportssubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73arerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.56.TechnicalSpecification6.8TS6.8.l.d-TheOffsiteDoseCalculationManualimplementationiscoveredbyamoregenericitemwhichisspecifiedinSection5.5.Itisnotnecessarytospecificallyidentifyeachprogramunderprocedures(seeSectionD,item56.iv).Sincetherequirementsremain,thisisconsideredtobeachangeinthemethodofpresentationonly.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS6.8.1.e-ThePCPdescriptionwasnotaddedsincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10'FR20,10CFR61,and.10CFR71anddoesnotimposeanynewregulations.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPis1tdd111111ddThisisaGinnaTSCategory~~$3jj';"')';change.TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.b)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenemergencyoperatingproceduresimplementingtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-309-December1995 TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.e)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenproceduresforprogramsandmanualsdenotedinnewSpecification5.5.TheseProgramsinclude:ITSCurrentTS~Proram5.5.15.5.25.5.35.5.4 5.5.55.5.65.5.7 5.5.85.5.105.5.115.5.125.5.135.5.145."':::;SFg'.81.13&6.14.4.3New3.9&3.16New4.4.44.24.24.5:2.3&4.11.13.9.2.5&3.9.2.64.6.1.d NewNewHew50ffsiteDoseCalculationHanualPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentPostAccidentSamplingProgramRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramComponentCyclicorTransientLimitPre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramInserviceTestingProgramSteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgramVentilationFilterTestingProgramExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactiveNonitoringProgramDieselFuelOilTestingProgramTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram'c~~%'1n~e~5&"':4ikag~e)~i"~'R5fe',~>$'fbi't$i%'gThetechnicalcontentofseveralrequirementsarebeingmovedfromotherchaptersofthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsand'areproposedtobeidentifiedasProgramsinaccordancewiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Otherprogramswere'added,exceptasdiscussedbelow,toensureconsistencyintheimplementationofrequiredprogramswithinthecurrentlicensingbasis.TheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramwasaddedd'uetotherelocation'ftheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwithGenericLetter89-01andthechangesto10CFR20.TheBasesControlprogramwasaddedtospecificallydelineatetheappropriatemethodsandreviewsnecessaryforachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBases.TheSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramwasaddedtosupportimplementationofthesupportsystemoperabilitycharacteristicsoftheTechnicalSpecifications(newLCO3.0.6).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.-310-December1995 December1995 57.TechnicalSpecification6.9TS6.9-Thereferencetoreportingrequirementswererevisedconsistentwith10CFR50.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.JTS6.9.1.1-TherequirementtosubmitaStartupReportwasnotadded.TheStartupReportismoreappropriatelyaddressedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportauthorizinganOperatingLicense,increasedpowerlevel,installationofanewnuclearfueldesignormanufacturer,ormodificationswhichsignificantlyalterthenuclear,thermal,orhydraulicperformancesoftheplant.TheStartupReportisrequiredtobesubmittedwithin90daysfollowingcompletionoftheaboveactivitiesanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,inclusionoftherequirementforthisreportinTechnicalSpecificationsisnotnecessarytoassuresafeplantoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.9.1.2-'herequirementsdescribingthedetailsofthemonthlyreportwerenotadded.Thesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.1V~V.Vl.Vl1~TS6.9.1.3,TS6.9.1.4,Table6.9-1andTable6.9-2-Thedetailsandmethodsimplementingthesespecificationswerenotadded.ThesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThesubmittaldatewasalsochangedtoHay15thtoallowthesubmittaloftheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReporttocorrespondwiththeHonthlyOperatingReportsubmittaldate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS6.9.1.4-Thespecificdatereferencedfortheannualsubmittalwasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR50.36a.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.9.1.5-TherequirementforthereportingofchallengestopressurizerPORVsorsafetyvalveswas,revisedfromanannualtoamonthlyreportandrelocatedtotheHonthlyOperatingReport(newSpecification5.6.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS6.9.2.1-The'eportingrequirementrelatedtosealedsourceswasnotaddedsincethisisspecifiedin10CFR30,50,,',The!deheil'addescj';:.'>jt0nnn.'.";:ef~t'ees,rapen:.eeg!inejui'eiseats::-'ee(ic,enssee.:.',:,'eject'r.,".n'll'ed"~-"dnjiii4eiii~ee!Iilifi:c..,:eenge'312-December1995

-313-December1995 V111~1X.X.TS6.9.2.4-Thereportingrequirementforreactoroverpressureprotectionsystemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementisdetailedinproposedSpecification5.6.4,andisgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.Sincethecriteriaidentifiedin10CFR50.73includestheareaofdegradedboundariesthatnecessitatesreporting,anyminordifferencesarenegligiblewithregardtosafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory+'$1~fi)~ichihge.c+-dmage-.AnewrequirementTS5.6.5wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheCOLR.TheCOLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationcoreoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.AnewrequirementTS5.6.6wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheRCSPTLR.ThePTLRisrequired-dueto.theremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationpressureandtemperatureoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.58.TechnicalSpecification6.10None.59.TechnicalSpecification6.11INone.60.TechnicalSpecification6.12None.61.TechnicalSpecification6.13TS6.13.1-PlantspecificpositiontitlesinthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerereplacedwithgenerictitles~(l.-The0Iidi~t!'II-;:::,j'r,aiejfiOAPtighji'e'!:i)(~:;.;"::.:.Q'l',:h.~;.;.:,1:aat~fjaifjiaj,"'ijui'iiayj~k';r',evqjeQ'jt;,equ~,'.r'emeiiisi',,:io~r'~-.c)'ie~.7niscnangeresponsibilitiesorrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.62.TechnicalSpecification6.14-314-December1995 None.-315-December1995 63.+P64.65.Technical1~TechnicalTechnicalSpecification6.15TS6.15.l.b-TheapprovalprocessforODCHchangeswasrevisedtoclarifythattheeffectivechangesbeapproved'ythe'laiitjnanag~eyinsteadoftheonsitereviewfunction.SincetheonsitereviewfunctionreportstothePlantHanager,thisisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.eP)::change.Specification6.16TS6.16-TheprocessforchangestothePCPwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFRPart20,10CFRPart61,and10CFRPart71anddoesnotimposeanynewrequirements.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisdlddllltltddThisisaGinnaTSCategory~~(,i<PS)'hange.Specification6.17TS6.17-Therequirementsformajorchangesto"radioactivewastetreatmentsystemswasnotadded.Changestothesesystemsarecontrolledby10CFR50.59.NRCnotificationofsignificantchangestothesesystemsisaddressedby10CFR50.59(b)(2).Therefore,thisspecificationisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.66.NewRequirements(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)Changes)LCO3.4.1andtheassociatedsurveillancerequirementswereaddedforDNBlimits.Thisnewrequirementplaceslimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCS.totalflowratetoensurethattheminimumDNBRwillbemetforallanalyzedtransients.LCO3.7.3andtheassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedfortheHFWpumpdischargevalves(HFPDVs),HFWregulatingvalv'es,andtheassociatedbypassvalves.Thisnewrequirementspecifiesanisolationtimeof80secondsfortheHFPDVsand10secondsfortheremainingvalvesandrequiresthemtobeOPERABLEaboveNODE4toprovideisolationcapabilityasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.LCO3.7.4andtheassociatedsurveillancewereaddedfortheatmosphericreliefvalves(ARVs).TheLCOrequiresthattheARVsbeOPERABLEwhenRCSaveragetemperatureis>500'FinHODE3toprovideqooldowncapabilityfollowing'SGTReventasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ASurveillancetoverifythateachARViscapableofopeningandclosingonceevery24monthswasalsoadded.-316-December1995 iv.ACOLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedwithreactorphysicparametersthatmaychangewitheachrefueling.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,GenericLetter88-16(Ref.56)allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationCOLRisprovidedinAttachmentF.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtotheCOLR:a0b.c~d.e.f.g.h.J~k.l.m.SHUTDOWNMARGINMODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsHeatFluxHotChannelFactorNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactorAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCENi.,"Q~S'8RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits',N7i~t~ufe'do'fi-';use'd"","",RefuelingBoronConcentrationV.ARCSPTLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedRCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsandLTOP.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,NUREG-1431allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationPTLRisprovidedinAttachmentG.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtothePTLR:67.License'a~b.C.RCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemEnableTemperatureLTOPSetpointThelicensewasrevisedtorelocaterequirementsassociatedwithSecondaryWaterChemistryMonitoringProgram,SystemsIntegrity,andIodineMonitoringtoAppendixAof.thelicense(.i.e.,TS).ChangestoboththelicenseandTSrequireNRCapprovalsuchthatthereisnoreductionincommitmentwithrespecttothischange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Minoreditorialchangesweremadetoprovideconsistencywithinthelicense.Theseareadministrativechangesonlywhichdonotchangetheintentofthelicense.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(vi)changes.-317-December1995 iv.Theexemptionto10CFR50.48(c)(4)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionexpiredin1986andisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Theexemptionto10CFR50.46(a)(1)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionisnolongerrequiredsincetheECCSmodelsforGinnaStationhave'sincebeenrevised.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.E.SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDareorganizedinto6categoriesandsubcategoriesasnecessary.Thesecategoriesofchangesareevaluatedwithrespectto10CFR50.92(c)andshowntonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdescribedbelow.E.1SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-ADMINISTRATIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(i),(ii),(v.c),or(vi)changesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor.consequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolveeither(1)therelocationofrequirementswithintheTechnicalSpecificationstosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirements,(2)thereformatting,renumberingorrewordingoftheexistingTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431,(3)thedeletionofduplicateregulatoryrequirements,or(4)minorchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationssuch'thatthechangesdonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.Assuch,thischangeisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotimpactinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsorassumedmitigationofaccidentortransientevents.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimposeanynewordifferentrequirements.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-318-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamargin'ofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactanysafetyanalysisassumptions.Thesechangesareadministrativeinnature.Assuch,noquestionofsafetyisinvolved,andthechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.2SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-RELOCATEDSPECIFICATIONSTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iii)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesrelocatesrequirementsandsurveillancesforstructures,systems,componentsorvariableswhichdidnotmeetthecriteriaforinclusioninTechnicalSpecifications.Theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesarenotassumedtobeinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsandarenotassumedtomitigateaccidentortransientevents.Therequirementsandsurveillancesfortheseaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariableswillberelocatedfromtheTechnical.Specificationstoanappropriateadministrativelycontrolleddocument(e.g.,TechnicalRequirementsManualorUFSAR)whichwillcontinuetobemaintainedpursuantto10CFR50.59.Inaddition,theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesareaddressedinexistingsurveillanceprocedureswhicharealsocontrolledby10CFR50.59andsubjecttothechangecontrolprovisionsintheAdministrativeControlsSectionoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnot.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindof.accidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimposeoreliminateanyrequirementsandadequatecontrolofexistingrequirementswillbemaintained.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-319-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactanysafetyanalysisassumptions.Inaddition,therelocatedrequirementsandsurveillancesfortheaffectedstructure,system,componentorvariableremainthesameastheexistingTechnicalSpecifications.Sinceanyfuturechangestotheserequirementsorthesurveillanceprocedureswillbeevaluatedpertherequirementsof10CFR50.59,noreduction(significantorinsignificant)inamarginofsafetywillbeallowed.TheexistingrequirementforNRCreviewandapprovalofrevisions,inaccordancewith10CFR50.92,tothesedetailsproposedforrelocation,doesnothaveaspecificmarginofsafetyuponwhichtoevaluate.However,themajorityofchangesareconsistentwiththeWestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecification,NUREG-1431,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Therefore,revisingtheTechnicalSpecifications.toreflecttheapprovedlevelofdetailensuresnosignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.ForthoserequirementsproposedtoberelocatedwhichareretainedwithinNUREG-1431,therelocateditemsaresimilarinnaturetootherrelocatedrequirementsorarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysesforGinnaStation.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.3SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-MORERESTRICTIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.a)and(v.a)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesprovidemor'estringentrequirementsforoperationofthefacility.Thesemorestringentrequirementsdonotresultinoperationthatwillincreasetheprobabilityofinitiatingananalyzedeventanddonotalterassumptionsrelativetomitigationofanaccidentortransientevent.Themorerestrictiverequirementscontinuetoensureprocessvariables,structures,systemsandcomponentsaremaintainedconsistentwiththesafetyanalysesandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-320-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangesdoimposedifferentrequirements.However,thesechangesareconsistentwithassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theimpositionofmorerestrictiverequirementseitherhasnoimpactonorincreasesthemarginofplantsafety.AsprovidedinthediscussionofthechangeinSectionD,eachchangeinthiscategoryisbydefinitionprovidingadditionalrestrictionstoenhanceplantsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent.kindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.4SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGESLESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.l)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.1)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordance'iththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRequiredActionsoftheDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)startinstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19)fromanactiontoshutdowntoanactiontorestorethechanneltoanOPERABLEstatusorentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.Thestartinstrumentationfunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabili'tyofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEstartinstrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-321-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverni'ngnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStati.oninaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.2)TheproposedchangestotheGinna.StationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheactionsforaninoperableDGto:(I)eliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetoacommoncausefailure,and(2)eliminatetherequirementtotesttheOPERABLEDGonceevery24hoursuntilthesecondDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus(TS3.7.2.2.b.I).ThetestingrequirementsforanOPERABLEDGarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsincesomeDGfailurescanbeconclusivelydeterminednottoapplytoasecondDGwithoutrequiringexcessivetesting.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethe'onsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-322-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatpreventunnecessaryDGstartswhichcanpotentiallyadverselyaffectDGreliability.ThechangemaintainsDGOPERABILITYrequirementswithinthesafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibility.ofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.l)The.proposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.l)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRefuelingFrequencywhichisusedtodefineCHANNELCALIBRATIONandothertestingintervals,from18monthsto24months(TS1.12and4.4.6.2).TheFrequencybetweenCHANNELCALIBRATIONSisnot.consideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TSrequiredequipmentiscurrentmaintainedunderaReliabilityCenteredHaintenanceprogramsuchthattheirfailuresaretrackedandtrended.Inaddition,instrumentationsetpointsandequipmenthistoryhavebeenverifiedtobeacceptablewithrespecttothischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-323-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated'perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theequipmenttestingintervalsareincreased,buttheystillmustbemaintainedOPERABLEconsistentwiththeirTSrequirements.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.2)~TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincrease"intheprobabilityorconsequencesofan'accidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisestheapplicabilityassociated'withtheRCSSafetyLimits(SL)inMODE6(currentTS2.2).AdequatemarginexistssuchthatitisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinNODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedcondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.-324-December1995

-325-Decembe}1995 Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-326-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchange~~~~~.~e-~doesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceitisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinMODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.3)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.3)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeremovestherequirementforthepressurizerwaterlevellowerlimitof12%(currentTS3.1.1.5.a).ThisrequirementrelatestoareactortripfunctionthatwasremovedatGinnaStationasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45).Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentnorsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplantsincethetripfunctionhasalreadybeenremoved.Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethepressurizerlowleveltripfunctionisnolongercredited.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-327-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.~k~i,4)QoTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.4)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheapplicabilityanddeletesrequirementsassociatedwiththeoverpressurizationprotectionfunctionofthepressurizersafetyvalvesinNODES5and6(currentTS3.1.1.3.aandTS3.1.1.3.b).Thepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.Po83OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesn'otcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsoverningnormalplantoperation.iT4U'sP>,::;.~thg!s.:',':>ih'8'riji~dms',etx",'c,reatei";,,ctheiePtns'sil'f)j1'gy',:.":.",n!fY!unnewiar,:i'dilrffere'ntri't'njdnf'itoia,cidanhti~i!,"ii"ii::::i-:"-iidel!i'i'i'-,:::",--"'::!lilies,,'ei"','-'lla,changeniaintainsreqitireiiientswitlTfncurrentsafetyanalysessincethesevalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctioninNODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-328-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.5)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.5)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedeletestherequirementsassociatedwithSGtemperatureandpressurevariables(currentTS3.1.1.2andTS3.1.2.2).ThetemperatureandpressurevariablesarenotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisexceptthroughthevariablesofRCSpressure,temperature,andflowwhichareaddressedintheheatupandcooldownratesinthePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theseSGvariablesarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident..2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceallnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesareaddressedbythePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-329-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,.itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.6)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.6)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisestheperiodoftime(from6hoursto72hours)continuedoperationisallowedpriortoconfirmingthroughtheperformanceofanengineeringevaluation,thestructuralintegrityoftheRCSafterexceedingpressureortemperaturelimits(currentTS3.1.2.l.c.1).Therequirementisassociatedwithafunctionthatisnotanassumedinitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyevaluatedsincetheexceededlimitsaresubsequentlyrestored.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thisfunctionisnotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Operationof'GinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethetimethatout-of-conditionlimitsarerestoreisnotchanged.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-330-December1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthatthe'proposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.7)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.7)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesaNoteallowingtheplanttochangeNODESifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable(currentTS3.1.5.1).TheRCSLEAKAGEdetectionsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincesomeformofLEAKAGEdetectionmustalwaysremainOPERABLEunderthesecircumstancesoraplantshutdowncommenced.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.fromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnohewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-331-December1995 ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincesomeformofRCSLEAKAGEdetectionmustremainOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-332-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges'totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.8)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.8)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowsanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgrambeforecommencingareactorshutdown(currentTS3.1.5.2.2).AdministrativediscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgramarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheSGtubestoperformtheirintendedfunctionsincethelimitonSGtubeleakageremains.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident;2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreduction.inamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatallowrestorationofminoradministrativediscrepancieswithoutaffectinganysafetyanalysisassumptionswithrespecttoSGtubeleakage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.',ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-333-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itis.concludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.9)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.9)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviously'valuated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversus1hour(currentTS3.3.l.l.band3.3.1.3).Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheaccumulatortoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyev'aluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.accumufatorboron'conceritrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotheraccumulatorparameters(e.g.,watervolume)s'uchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-334-December1995 1Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.10)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.10)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversus1hour(currentTS3.3.1.l.aand3.3.1.2).TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRWSTtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Ho2.Operationof.GinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotherRWSTparameters(e.g.,watervolume)suchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-335-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.11)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.11)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechange:(1)allowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting,and(2)allowsupto4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375'F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations(curr'entTS3.3.1.l.c).TheECCSSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCSandreducesthepotentialforatransienttochallengetheLTOPSystem.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCS,reducesthepotentialforatransienttochallengetheLTOPSystems,andareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-336-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.12)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.12)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesanAOTof72hoursfortwoinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(currentTS3.3.2.2).Thesystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.ThiswillallowanadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2..OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalteration,oftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethods.governingnormalplantoperation.3-.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent'indofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheCRFCunitswhichsupplythepost-accidentcharcoal,filtertrainsmayberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Inaddition,the100%redundantCStrainsmustremainOPERABLEinthiscondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-337-December1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.13)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.13)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangei**thCCII'hhgqi,,~,*~K!Ii!I"',"',1heatexchangertobej7iojii,.ibj'oi;fo<iup',,:kol!33,.'.:.';:dag<s~v&ilil'Rg@4baNwe(currentTS3.3.3.1).eCCWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCCWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheheatexchangerisapassivedevicesimilartotheCCWpiping.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposed'changedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithin.currentsafetyanalysessincetheCCWpipingisalsoapassivedevice,whichifitweretofail,wouldresultinthelossoftheentireCCWSystemwhichhasbeenanalyzedwithacceptableresults.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-338-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolve.asignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.14)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.14)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor.consequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTfortwomotordrivenAFWpumps,from24hoursto72hours,tobeconsistentwiththatfortheturbinedrivenAFWpump(currentTS3.4.2.l.b).TheAFWsystemisnotconsideredasan'nitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantly.increasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheturbinedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingbothSGs.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.jfhus;.",'-'";:.'.;this";:,,'"."chao'ge'",::,8oesPtii'0'g!Wffhsiiji',ll&i!'i!i[yii'fbi,-",,:,,-;:-::,,chfit:~i,::tile"Il~l'I!ii""::i'd--"0i~fPQ,!Rg:,:::8'cc'M8flt4'F&v!I0Q59:::i'8vR'I'U8t%d"changemaintainsrequirements'wi'thincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheturbinedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingboth.SGs.Inaddition,foraccidentconditionsinwhichAFWisnotimmediatelyrequired(i.e.,notrequiredfor10minutes),theSAFWSystemisavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-339-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.15)RPcC~A4;ESS+AE87Rf::CT4VK<C'HAG'::,CAVE63RY'Qv,.m.<c;~mcxwqxcmxcera"~~,0T,',":;:UX8Qpi:::8'8&+!K8f@l":,:8tlc8~ot~.:;:i~is'(i@e~Refereiic@876),:.-K8TRYcfEYEycHAWGK":,,cAVKGQRYi::KSg~~-340-December1995 erea4ed-.-341-December1995 7~~~~~~~~~~~~-342-December,1995 ~0~~~~-343-December1995 LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.l8)The.proposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.18)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestherequiredchannelsforDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)startinstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19)fromindividuallyspecifyingthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagechannelstorequiringtwochannelsofundervoltage'per480Vsafeguardsbus.'Thestartinstrumentationfunction'isnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGLOPinstrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-344-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-345-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeonlyclarifiestheactualdesignoftheDGLOPinstrumentationwithoutaffectingthesafetyfunctionofthespecifiedchannels.TherequirementforalossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionisspecifiedinthesurveillancerequirementforthisLCO.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.19)-346-Oecember1995 iff~v'0N":.~4A+44ccScf8'fi4~jpx','8v4ov's:fy~(8v8'jM84ed';.8;:'1Opejatahoa'Skr4aIAGW~ZFBqU)MC~~ji%0'WpV'OV'l'68.IRUXONRTIC;:;~NBSpOASet.'.%0$8AQACBMQAb:ISED.':s:,'"';:4a':iiaascifa>a',ts'a,kt'g4'~t.:':c's'":::e;aada:(ls'~is!iso'i!sea'sts,'e'a't'c!c'cc::,:;PER37REARICT!1'VE:":CNNGE~CC@'LOORY~(~:,b",.'2R'j;::a-.ht,,hg-,,-'d...,,:h-:,,ddg,,",:,,:,:hi',::,:::t'l!l:::,tts,sa'cia'afh.isagith:;;biii'iChfhe'oa's's'da5~@OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangevev+.~ffa~9theicseaiceca~g4,:knife'aii:,:.'o'sad,".":,:systteea't'oleohas'adtop'aaattatso~n~i'cctig".:,a',":fadt'e'dkca~Vainnia~t::":;:is~ia'tcoii.::::ytai~pj'.,oc'.::eOafpi"aaerit~j@i.',go.:j~iiii'i~jii,."tes.g'S:,,:.Cgcatcconsideredhs:.,..aninitiatorforS~n'~accidiii4's'~previouslyanalyzedchangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofaddd.Th~,','*','idhhgddhdegrade,hhh'ttddthI:"''i!i,",",jill'i'hi:i:"""'ll!hh"":".'ilia'ig',::ghi,.ddedreqirfre'0functiown':iinde'r;.";:,th'i,:.4'i'i';'cCacccgddhgh)hccccccc@ca(St,:~)%~Kh4e'4AS~ctcccsehaahh)';"dachacga~'Ngtgshacaa@c"(cd%)cat~eaeaiaae~t@@HOcha~~gccccccagca~hdchhcidghcccc:,vSiem...,>X@~-:"o8ssl:ve'.,.:aevt~ce):HA~~A::,:::>s;;ni~ii~::;le-':~roiectfei.InereTorethischangedoesnotsignificaritlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-347-December1995 -348-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)Tfl8.:';pYjop0$8dnewiijo3e'@f~i:::4>>t!::oilerieti'oniior,cog'65.,+1;.A,'4~t~azl~t<e~ss.cesewtrrzeeei:eel,.~en"~n"etew'~elmsn:",'.".o:::;::ieec~~C1.en,'"!.::ro~eT':.'.'CBQC'ecch:Inst-:.',*prone'!oes';hT!'le've::ee,;8~~:-e+eQpe)za::4:.jp:,j5%7'::"N'nn%"+tetiionIth.8.S':3;.:if@f:hsv.<<.s:nsrtg(g:%)+ph$+fxtws'g(~sgeeehTherefore,Fhls-349-Oecember1995 changedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.kij'iiif,~::~~iih~ied:The)('e'ford,1tco'oi8u8edthattheproposedchanges"4eii'iet,"the~a4ed-,Wequam:.;:resent;:::s.::.:~~~qfg'20w'SF'::,50>,9~'Pge~anddeesdonotinvolveaI!f1!ll!!T!Rt'Y!ii!E!!4'll'll!E!:!.*;.f!A!f7'i!!T'ii!!.b.2f).:,',"-:ll:,,'ll-"i':;!'!!i!i!ii'::"'1!1!!:*,"'!ll"","*',i'5,'".',-:,','id~c6ii'iij'iie'iici'i~Ãbf,$4a4+e966&F4-350-December1995 pFep9&eh@aged~~+REAP+c~+fK+BBHpvebab66&&~e4'-aa~Mep~~t~~ eva4ea4edj~f;.The'ehaRge~-theAequi+A@4-i+a'~%BOER>V,:'C'0fjS;;.3'd,i4@~i>i"forAtAeae'351-December1995 -352-December1995 4At1ep~'tea'~e-44~as+e-R-4-sw-i-44~BC4-4eeptH4&&pere&4-e.~T-4-e~etcbre4<e66R644&AH-+&epe~p-.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificant1-353-Oecember1995 increasetheprobabi1ityofaprevious1yanalyzedaccidentThePfop9$.changedoesnotfurtherdegrade7AHA~e-,thecapabi1ityoftheAtkema-354-December1995 function:st5,&c!,T4erefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlincreasetheconsequencesofaprevious1yanalyzedaccident.-355-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)@fan'06ilCtrie4hidg.-.,"'.:;9ill'i'.'.:N".n9'...ii'Or'm-changedoesnot"createthepossfb~ilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.,g3;5k%.Ag8~4ftlorP4ftimetorestore4hegginoperable~ph~80p!Vpafegij&p;:Pcjgda'ej)notjadveggelPYaf~kic'tgt4'e$~4414k@~>'RnctgpsBs.;:;,'..~8~Ace);"'a>,':FedUAdaAt'~CtrscL'1Ag<)s'>~'RVchedoes"neoinvolveasigni"fTcanYreductioninamarginof'afety.,VRE6;.;;7433~-chhasbeenNRL8~tastj.-t~~~7~0-356-December1995 -357-December1995 ggeggy~gg(Pygy~egP)age~g~(je+Pcj~gwgggc>?+$vyP??<(wj~jjg@?>y:~egg'g@yyt<)gIwc50'.:cm%d'::v0:;)".,'sb~i~lkfjici~t'~hhxkr,,8,.';;conti:esca,':,~'iii',%IC@RS/RES,fRICTIVg:,"",,CAANCEYCATECORY.:.:.::,,:(P'b$25')::Tie:":pi??.pops'?:"i".":?h'aiig?~'s-ill4'iii?ii":::StVt~?a?i?i:-"'Taihiii'~jt'Spe'e'"f?VXtiF7qs:--iisi?iifj'fbi:,bric':li@inli~c'oii'si'ilii?ilia!%!!QP:.',,:,0"::::,,::,*:!9!!?i,:iff'?:',:,-,,!(,::i'::--::rrr-':-:-:l-,-,.lhi1ii'ji,--p--"dii4"-'-fxN~4v'~~,.g'q@~qgQ~gQ~f?&.?y~gy)gzo'x??'g~y?,'y,'??('j~~.'..o<p<'e~'jjjef@era+?<pi?Qy<v"?'4<~4??h?'A:zc':+g,.,fw?~<~q'?+K???..,x~>>.OeS.:::;.".~~;AO';,.?),'.AVO,,;.V8'~~S~~~~S<3gA::,j,.-:.'CSAjg~";""Ap~&8$8~3A,"',j~,Bt",'p'FO,'8,;::;:'..,L???'?4~ii'i~!ithi."::ciiii'i'i'."q'iiiiii'ei'-.;:!c'lf',:.":;:kkpik-358-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.The8,'dl,p'itch!i1,i(1iJ"'~('"t'i,,iiiiilki'll.:*.lib!!!dN:,ii:...:,:dKhhigl!!!p:::,.pi.,",,'dnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.82+~~-359-December1995

.j:$'O'0834'~'%fan~~eCti5rj~gin::.':&ho:e.'$joe."i6!ger.'y'.":V5'.-::'i~':.0~'rib'4rivo'::,VN::0"'i""'if'i""""'"'"'<<"h""""'"svf-""-""""d"'t'i'""e'di""""'i'""':'hayyt<<sphthohusatvt<<h<<a<<t'nese<<cicirhsait'ancehi~s<<t':::"iherei'ore",'iiis"ciiang'e'iioes"nots'i'gniricant'iyincreasetheconsequ~encesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-360-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStation,inaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheThi,je,;.:,.'pjiiki;~d);:s't'i'.,'ib~t!PnFj35$B@<j%1'nBas'ed7iqp'ari=.tVe:-.ihjugal:"':,~thattheproposedchangesmeet"therequii"'ementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.~~~~~,~~)~~~~)-361December1995 P;7.,:$~g~iiP!::'I~i!"";-",,'"i::'Cia)iiiiiiii,":,,i:iI;'*:,:it'tK:::,:GT"i!'i'St't'!,"i'iifih!ii'!I)!Ijigii1<fA'iieet'If'Ži~i,:gg'ioiis!Cii@t4ri~kii't'set'i~9'i5,'.,heia'vi;4'8'88'8p~'p'QPCFidj75%F~fPQp~1'OA~j'3',,'7Np@R;,:0:;jYQQ'GJ$~8'q'0ff'e,',:;8%pNNV4~ÃedUC47OA",;08,ip~iijQiii'i%~s;jiff,':!a":,:::.'.,"j'i.i'vhoii'sit'yi";:ii'iiai!!jib'4~4'icia'i'tl'!;.-362-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.~~)Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonot.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.~-363-December1995

-364-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.The.proposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationofthepl'ant(i.e.,no'ewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-365-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.AHe~ylies!eejrd'l';:dth~&.req'glraa'!ee+qflj~jd'e'eteflf!tll+'a'edaseef"'it/!a'.,tlJ!!teer'diredtlC&;::e:,eer5'483)<~)KAP~1'8489'j('R~kf;:'.-',.:.5))~(Therefore,thischangeGoesnoinveotvasignificantreductioninamarginof.safety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.~~~~~dF!!1!::,-1'W!K--:1-'--iiiddf!4&d'dl':-'ddide!::l!Te1!i1i!read::,,".:"1I1!i'di!i:.'--:.":i!i'd,Ltljsiiflfaet~li'ai'ii'ds;-;",':caeee$'de'rit1'ede'ia'+~aOperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor*11fd111d.00,.Jli'e;:;chaiigeeeree1~l,!ss!e~tlbea,rppj,eeeye,.signif'icantlyincr'easetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystem-366-December1995 toperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethisSurveillanceonlyconfirmsnormaloperationalindicationsofcontrolrodOPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-367-December1995 -368-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethods.governingnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-369-December1995 3.'perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnothdigff0-370-December1995 7~~~~~~~~-371-December1995 ~~~~-372-December1995 ControlRodOPERABILITYisnormallyverified'ynormaloperationalpracticessuchthatincreasingtheallowedSurveillanceintervaldoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,does.notcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.30)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsas-373-December1995 discussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.30)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:1.Operationof6innaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingtheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankfrommonthlytoonceevery184days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit813).Thesprayadditivetankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeinconcentration.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-374-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-375-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.The.changeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivetankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor'differentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazards.consideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.31)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.31)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperforminganRCSwaterinventorybalancefromdailytoonceevery72hours(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15).VerifyingRCSwaterinventoryisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegrade'hecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindications,includingletdown,areavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesof.apreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-376-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-377-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.32)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.32)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor'onsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingverificati.on.oftheSFPboronconcentrationfromonceevery31daystoonceevery31daysifaverificationoffuelstoragehasnotbeencomplete(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit817).VerifyingSFPboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceboronconcentrationisonlycreditedduringafuelhandlingaccidentpriortothetimewhichthefuelhasbeenverifiedtobecorrectlystored.Therefore,thischange.doesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-378-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,no8ffttypfqp1lbit11dj.~-379-December1995 usedforafuelhandlingaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thischange(withtheexceptionofthe31dayFrequency)isalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,'nddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.33)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.33)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobability'rconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingtheDGfueloilinventoryfromdailytoonceevery31days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit816).TheDGfueloiltankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethe'apabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeininventory.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-380-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.~F0cv&4iwA44&Hvkvwv$4%Nv'c4'LAXAwicN@4c44KMw,.P@4@srNoorvo~&wQcYD~PfQ~jggc)~MEgcc~~~tx,g~~~~~~gcgQMc~~cDPc~f~tgP'/~~pc+~~~:4>YrPY~Q~~+d+'+coYgcg(cQ~~-381-Oecember1995 ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheDGfueloiltankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsinceotherindicatorsareavailabletooperators.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.L!f$$~,:.RKsTRKcT!TvE~.".cHANBE!$:cATt'GORY~!i~WfbTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.34)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery7days(currentTable4.1-4,FunctionalUnit5'1).VerifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfur'therdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyfuelfailuressinceotherindications,includingradiationalarms,areavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-382-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e-.,-Re-383-December1995 .ec'ci'd'en't~froiiiji'iy','a'c'cLde~nt::,":"provin'a~sly';.,eue1'iijte'd,c'hange"inSurveiilancerequencydoesnto"dgerIaiethecapasi"i'ityofoperationstoidentifygrossfuelfailuresinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesme'ettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.35)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.35)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdowngreaterthan7days(currentTS4.3.3.1).Thesevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringpoweroperationorcoldshutdownconditions).Performingtestingonth'esePIVsshouldonlyberequiredonceevery24monthsorwithin24hoursoftheirbeingopenedsincemorefrequenttestingwouldnotlikelyprovideanyadditionalinformation.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthePIVstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethevalvesaremaintainedclosed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequen'cesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-384-December1995

OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-385-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRCSPIVSfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheywillbetestedaminimumofonceevery24months.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.36)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.36)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeprop'osedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthespraynozzlegastestfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10years(currentTS4.5.1.2.b).Thesprayringnozzlesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorfor.anyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCSSystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethenozzlesarepassiveandlocatedinagenerallyunaccessiblearea.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-386-December1995 OperationofGinna'tation,inaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nodiff<<iiiiixiiibi11dj.-387-Oecember1995 The~aci!'deit~ihi'ai'ii':-o'iij'h'ij~i:c"hiil~w"'"i'!Ii'ii'oui)'.5~%"'-:'."'OpQPAV3'9A"~F'::Cfn93%4%54365@79.~'4CGGWV8nCe"'%4'":'tf~l&"FOosed~CNledo'e~s"'hangesnSurveil'lane'eFrequencydoesnotpreve%n+heCSSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.37)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.37)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingactuationtestingofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfrommonthlytoonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.3.5).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethedampershavedemonstratedahighdegreeofreliabilityandtheCSSystemprovidesa100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincrease,theconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-388-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-389-December1995 cKangeinSurveill'anceFrequencydoesnotpreventt'hepostaccidentfiltersfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.'asedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.38)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.38)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlyonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.2.a).Thesprayadditivevalvesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunctionsincehavedemonstratedahighdegreeofreliabilityandthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersprovide100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-390-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.39)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.39)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheAFWmotordrivenpumpcross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalves(currentTS4.8.3).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemsincethecross-overisolationvalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-392-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,no'ewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-393-December1995 ijg~'~ijcinij,':,i';:iiue'thoi':;:jj'A;<cross-overisolationvalvestestingrequi'rementsdoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreate-thepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.40)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.40)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeeliminatestheneedtoperformaverificationthattheAFWpumpscanstartwithin10minutesonceevery18months(currentTS4.8.10).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforany'accidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.'TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunctionsincethisverificationisnotconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysistimes.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-394-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-395-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThedeletionofthisSurveillancedoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethe10minuteverificationisnotconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.41)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.41)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolve.asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingaRHRpumpisprovidingforcedflowinMODE6fromonceevery4hourstoonceevery12hours(currentTS4.11.2.1).VerificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYisnotconsideredasani'nitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremovalsincetherearenumerousindicationsavailabletoplantoperatorsofalossofanRHRpump.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsig'nificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-396-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindof*accidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromany'accidentpreviouslyevaluated.-397-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRHRSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRC,Staff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreasein'theprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.42)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.42)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtoperformInserviceTestingsurveillancesoftheRHRpumpsduringNODES5and6(currentTS4.11.2.2).AtleastoneRHRpumpisoperatingandthebreakersofthesecondpumpareverifiedduringtheseconditionssuchthatperformanceofthistestisonlyaduplicationofexistingsurveillances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremovalsincetherearealternateSurveillancesverifyingpumpOPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-398-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,noNifpfiipiiiiiiid).-399-December1995 a'cch'd'ii'i'it:,.:;.'h'iiiii~anji":'eccvdveant:".":pii~~~ii~ijisTjgeveT'mated,::;R(i'!i'i!Js'I'ie'vii!!miriam',',:I!St'tii'!ilia'!.""":",s',',-:!oh'-'hi'll',:::mll'4::":'i'ei*doesjnst'~1'nvoT've,:.a!s~i'n'1'fa'ca~mt'<'redii5t!1oitÃ1'nva'!'marglnilgfs'a'asfs.et+~ThedeTetlonoFthisSurv'eiltancedoesnotpreventthe11HRSysteiiifromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheInserviceTestingSurveillanceismainlyperformedtoverifypumpoperationathighpressureswhichdonotexistinMODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b-.b~43)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.43)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposed'hangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedelaysperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriortoenteringthiscondition(currentTS4.16.l.a).ThePORVsareonlyconsideredasaninitiatorforapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentwithrespecttospuriouslyopening.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetoverifythatthePORVisOPERABLEforitsLTOPfunctionssincethePORVprovidesalternatefunctions,withdifferentsetpoints,inhigherMODES.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-400-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheshortperiodprovidedtoperformthePORVtestingensuresthatthePORVremainscapableofperformingitsmultiplefunctionsthroughallrequiredNODES.ThisperiodoftimeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.44)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.44)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows1hourtorestorecomplianceforviolationsoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2insteadofrequiringanimmediateshutdownoftheplant(currentTS6.7.l.a).SincethischangeaffectstheRequiredActionsfollowingaviolationofSLs,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetorestorecompliancebeforeperformingashutdownoftheplantinordertolimitthepotentialforadditionaldamage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-402-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchange'oesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).!Tbye'isp'ropes'e'd~fvos~89/il~ikcc4cfen4'~tpg8vgous:,fg';Bv8lU8ted."shortperiodprovided"torestoremcom~ip"ianceprovidesoperatorswithtimetostabilizetheplantbeforerequiringashutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.45)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.45)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationin.accordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotirivolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeincreasestheOPERABILITYtoleranceforthepressurizersafetiesfrom+1%to+2.4%,-3%(currentTS3.1.1.3.c.).Sincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointremainsabovethenormal,operatingpressureandthePORVsetpoint,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttothemostlimitingpressuretransientsandshowntobeacceptable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-403-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationin'ccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperationsincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointsfollowingtestingremain+1%.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-404-December1995

OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceallowsforsetpointdriftwhichhasbeendemonstratedtoexistatGinnaStation.Theincreasedtoleranceshavebeenanalyzedforthemostlimitingpressuretransientswithsafetylimitsstillbeingmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.46)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.46)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeincreasesthefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent(currentTS5.3.I.b).Thefuelenrichmentlimitisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethepr'obabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttofuelhandlingaccidentsandshowntobeacceptablewithrespecttooffsitedosesand10CFR100.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-405-December1995 OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Ilh~ijpro'po'sed,:4"'"ji,,"ji,',.-','.~',~u...:,f;;:,::;:,i::',:,r;,'.,",,:;::,'.h0'ajj8jsniwdtjces::,-',,~fryoN~"'WV~sNCCfQBn'4V.DF8Vf08'S::f'V@8V8':lM87'8Yf'~~~-406-December1995 increasedfuelenrichmentlimitallowsforGinnaStationtoconvertto18monthcycles.Thechangehasbeenanalyzedandshownthatall'afetylimitsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.Oecember1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasinnificantreductioninamarginofsafety.NBOOh':.:,iOOO~J'OO,;4~'$5if~'ifi'OO%:ihOSOydS;:COneiChii'Sti'OO,.I'!KSS,,:-:RfggRI@t~IVE,:-::,CHA~Alfk~CATENRP!;::(~O:";8;;.-"49),:'l~!O!,O,-,,i'i':l-0-"*,:ii;-!OPS'i":,-,,tSil:.::""-,,-...S,',,:1-,:,i",:,',:ll'Si:SHOOi'.:,.158ll:.:,>>O'XSfy:.S!CO'CO,,'S1'QVOl'OOO,.":.""OS',::"'::OOlla'S'O'l;SO!v,O'9,.BoosS!os':.",',:,.silgoiijficRAtviiyi.:.Sod~!osSo,~!!Svh&""':::,coosoqooocosiiiofsi":.pi~+'A'8~:::VX'6','Ice:i'q:-.,'lvllivtvvlvOSvi2QOj'e'gatqeri'h'ifÃ'Gj~OOO,,'::5'tapis'~jiysjagtgiiii;:,'.-":iiiy',;.i'h'i4!'d'oviiti-'ij'i,~i'i'jo'sos)'y'vi',.;."ooo':.i'Coat'ed'."'::-409-December1995 ~1!i-"':*':::'"-'i'::',':i""'"ll!ti"."':-'":"i'l""*'-'"-'i'1":-:ii":-'-"::-!8""':-'-'-"tl:'."-"-"!:,c@saREsTR)c74v'E-:-',:cQN6E'gxffllo'RYj(j~i,bNbf:s'ijiiifigg~K',,'-,liii4ijlg~ioii's'~SiriTiioii'!4$!i'dist'ii'ss'e'd;:!b'illaiIIIIII:,":ii,,'i,:::,i!ki",',":;::SE)!~i".",i!,::,',':",:-,,',,:,ll'1'",lb-,,:!:,--,-:i::,-,ill":,',,ll,",'I'j,':::"."'4"'",':*':..".'i-:i'4:-""-'i,"iii":!lily:-i.'"!i!"Ch:::--"'i'-!i'""5+g0~;,(!ii,-:,,'ifoal,:;,":,S!t!i!:,'l('i!i!""id'-',::,::,'T!kg!-,.'.!::!-'--d-,:::;.--IWW8684@~fr'oui'::,i'ri'y'~la't."cd'di.*n'tljiNi'ii!oiiil'yjwil':ii5'te'df'8't"":.:.j'iiV'@Pe'~cps'~jr'",.';f'jcaatgh4ia&s:,":m'AYj'd'e'jat'j'~n~'.-410-December1995 ~~SSSA'EitiYrC~'i'ii'~.",:C'i¹3E':."::CifEK~ON%R::v';-'O;5'ij,':'S~l:A'pifg'CR'At:":ARRRQS)!:;COOS!IdRI:Iti0~A;:,:-.",:RS"'dLSCOS'SRd~OR~IOM>Or'~~$AFW::lAAAP"'";1'Ait)Rt1'O>>~CSROROSI:i>~Yfftb'i'AR!$48R'4OAi"ShtO'."di!C1ai%6h'RROSORORSRRSfSSRSgled!ONE~'-.RccM8A6"..pF&v.'4'0Q89+~8v4'3',08486~P+IIP,.!PP!.:i!RP!'RP."-':-.":.!P~ti',i-:':ll!P'-':,,:::,,P...,,:i!i,RPAP,',,:,!P;;,:,.P:,-@P!P!',.l%$AOT!iiAVOiV8!R!SSQO:":i.WICRAK!!OBZ!RPQSj!COASiQR1.:::RT!OA:!.-411-December1995 December1995 -413-December1995 ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATION,RG&Ehasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.Thechangesdono'tinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionDabove;-414-December1995 2.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsitesinceallspecificationsrelatedtooffsitereleasesareretained,addressedbyexistingregulations,orrelocatedtoalicenseecontrolledprogramsubjecttothecurrentregulations;andThechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincenonewordifferenttypeofequipmentarerequiredtobeinstalledasaresultofthisLAR,andthefrequencyofrequiredtestingwhichmayresultinradiationexposureistobeoptimizedconsistentwithindustrypractices.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.December1995 REFERENCESNUREG-1431,StandardTechnicalSpecifications,klestinghousePlants,September1993.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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SEPTopicsV-lO.B,V-1I.B,andVII-3,datedSeptember29,1981.-416-December1995 -417-December1995 16,17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.54toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.877849),datedAugust30,1993.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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ContainmentIsolationBoundaries(TACN77849),datedDecember21,1994.LetterfromG.E.Lear,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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ContainmentPurgeTechnicalSpecifications,IssuanceofAmendmentNo.13toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedFebruary15,1986.NRCTemporaryInspection2515/126,EvaluationofOn-LineHaintenance.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

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TNIActionPlanTechnicalSpecifications,datedApri120,1981.Westinghouse,CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,datedJune,1994.Lettei',Prbni~R.-418-December1995 December1995 IttfA.R,Jh,,NRC,,tR.C.N,EN,,RNEE,NtEh-'l'att':!!iil::'lli--':Ii!!id'E-'-':id,-:::---:i"'ll'lI'--*.::'Rill:--420-December1995 32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43. 44.45.46.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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DieselGeneratorSurveillanceandTesting,datedApril23,1981.NUREG-0944,SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheFull-TermOperatingLicenseforR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedOctober1983.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVIII-Z,datedJune24,1981.LetterA.R.Johnson(NRC),toR.C.Hecredy(RG&E),

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EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3,datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromH.B.Fairtile,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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TechnicalSpecificationsonBatteryDischargeTesting,datedHay8,1986.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVIII-3A,datedJuly31,1981.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.51toOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedApril13,1993.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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IncreaseoftheSpentFuelPoolStorageCapacity,datedNovember14,1984.LetterfromW.A.Paulson,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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PlantStaffirkingHoursandReportingRequirementsforSafetyValveandReliefValveFailuresandChallenges,datedJanuary31,1984.LetterfromR.W.Kober,RG&E,toM.Fairtile,NRC,

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PolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift(GenericLetter86-04),datedMay14,1986.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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NUREG-0737,Item1'.A.l.l,ShiftTechnicalAdvisor,datedOctober12,1989.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.E.White,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.33toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedJune13,1980.LetterD.H.Crutchfield(NRC)toJ.E.Maier(RG&E),SafetyEvaluationforGinna:SEPTopicVII-6,datedJune24,1981.IEBulletin79-06A,ReviewofOperationalErrorsandSystemNisalignmentsIdentifiedDuringTNIIncident.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

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I'ssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-I8,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedJune15,1979.-421-December1995 47.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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GenericLetter88-20,datedMarch15,1994.48.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.l,June1990.49.50.51.52.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield(NRC)toJ.Haier(RG&E),

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FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,datedOctober7,1981.WCAP-13029,HERITSProgram,PhaseIII,CommentsonDraftNVREG-1431,StandardTechnicalSpecificationswestinghousePlants,July1991.WCAP-12159,NERITSProgram,PhaseII,TechnicalSpecificationsandBases,March1989.WCAP-11618,NERITSProgram,PhaseII,Task5,CriteriaApplication,November1987.53.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.54.55.57.58.59.60.61.EG&EReport,EGG-NTAP-6175,In-ServiceLeakTestingofPrimaryPressureIsolationValves,February1983.LetterfromV.L.Rooney',NRC,toJ.F.Opeka,NortheastNuclearEnergyCompany,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.105(TACNo.889518),datedFebruary22,1995.GenericLetter88-16,'RemovalofCycle-SpecificParameterLimitsfromTechnicalSpecifications,datedOctober4,1988.LetterfromA.G.Hansen,NRC,toR.'E.Link,

Subject:

AmendmentNos.157and161toFacilityOperatingLicenseNos.DPR-24andDPR-27(TACS885689and885690),datedDecember8,1994.GinnaStationLER95-001,

Subject:

PressurizerSafetyValveLiftSettingsFoundAboveTechnicalSpecificationToleranceDuringPost-ServiceTestDuetoSetpointShifts,ResultsinIndependentTrainBeingConsideredInoperable,datedMarch6,1995.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

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EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3(TACNo.N80439),datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

GenericLetter90-06,ResolutionofGenericIssue70,"PowerOperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLightPlaterReactors,"datedSeptember15,1992.LetterfromR.E.Smith,RG&E,toC.Stahle,NRC,

Subject:

ChangeP-10Permissive,datedDecember22,1988.PeB@~r:.~~!filo-422-December1995

-423-December1995 -424-December1995 AttachmentHLocationofRelocatedCurrentTechnicalSpecificationRequirementsDecember1995 ATTACHMENTJDocumentationofChangestoHay26,1995Submitta1December1995 ITSRELATEDPROBLEMSPOST5/26/95SUBMITTAL20-Dec-95ITEM¹:CHAPTER/LCO:3.5.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MustaddanLCO3.0.6exemptionsincetheSFDPwouldimplythattheECCSwouldhavetobedeclaredinoperable,thusenteringLCO3.0.3,iftheRWSTwereinoperable.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:6/30/9512/2/95COMMENTS:See¹129.ITEM¹:2CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MustaddanLCO3.0.6exemptionsincetheSFDPwouldimplythattheCSSystemwouldhavetobedeclaredinoperable,thusenteringLCO3.0.3,ifthesprayadditivetankswereinoperable.DATEIDENTIFIED:6/30/95DATECLOSED:'l/30/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:See¹129. 20-Dec-95ITEM//:3CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MustaddanLCO3.0.6exemptionsincetheSFDPwouldimplythattheAFWSystemwouldhavetobedeclaredinoperable,thusenteringLCO3.0.3,iftheCSTswereinoperable.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:6/30/9512/1/95COMMENTS:See//129.ITEM//;4CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RG&EattemptedtorelocatethebatteryparametertablefromtheLCOsincewecurrentlydonothavethisrequirement.However,theLCOdirectlyreferencesthistablesuchthatNRCapprovalwouldberequiredpriortomakechangestotheseparameters.ReviseLCOtocorrectthisproblem.DATEIDENTIFIED:6/30/95DATECLOSED:12/4/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:DeletedtableinitsentiretyandrevisedLCObasedon11/15/95meeting. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:CHAPTER/LCO:3.9.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MustaddanotetotheLCOtoallowtestingofsingledroplinevalvesforupto12hourssinceanyMOVworkwhileinMODE6wouldrequiredeclaringbothRHRpumpsinoperable.SincethesearePIVs,thistestingcanonlybedone<200FwhichincludesMODE6.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST~'o6/30/9511/28/95TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:LCOalreadyallows1hourforthisscenario.SubmitLARatfuturedateifneeded.ITEM¹:6CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ThebasesforLCO3.7.6statethatonly1of2CSTsisrequiredtomeetthisLCO.ThereisonlyonetrainoflevelindicationperCST.However,LCO3.3.3requirestwotrainsofCSTtobeavailable.ReviseLCO3.3.3toaddaNotetocia'rifythisrequirement.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:6/30/9512/9/95COMMENTS:Vogtlecurrentlyhassimilarnote.

20-Dec-95ITEM//:CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.3.4.2torelocatetheundervoltageanddegradedvoltageDGLOPInstrumentationsetpoints.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:6/30/9512/8/95COMMENTS:Travellernevergeneratedtosupportthischange.ITEM//:8CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.2.dDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Removetheovertimerestrictionsforlicensedpersonnel.DATEIDENTIFIED:6/30/95DATECLOSED:10/31/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Nobasisforchangeexists.Therefore,leAITSasis. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:9CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE;DATEIDENTIFIED:AddaNotetoConditionC,similartothenoteforConditionGofLCO3.7.5,topreventtheSFDPfromrequiringentryintoLCO3.0.3withthelossofCCW.6/30/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/23/95COMMENTS:Trackedby¹100ITEM¹:10CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddaNotetoConditionC,similartothenoteforConditionGofLCO3.7.5,topreventtheSFDPfromrequiringentryintoLCO3.0.3uponlossofSW.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:6/30/9510/23/95COMMENTS:Trackedby¹102 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:11CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:PeachBottomwasrequiredtosubmitaletteracknowledgingthatseveralcommitmentsandSERswerebasedonthcfactthatitemswereintheTSwhicharenowbeingrelocated.Theletterstatesthattheseitemsarenowadequatelycontrolledby50.59and50.54.6/30/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Requiredpriortoimplementation.ITEM¹:12CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:SR3.8.6.3requiresverificationvery92daysthattheaverageelectrolytetemperatureofrepresentativebatterycellsis>=65F.TlrisisanewSRforGinnaStation.ElectricalEngineeringhassinceconcludedthat>=55Fisacceptable.Thistemperatureisin[]swithintheNUREG.DATEIDENTIFIED:6/30/95DATECLOSED:12/4/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS: 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:13CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Thereareseveralformatandtechnical"brokes"withinthisLCO.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/13/9512/8/95COMMENTS:Closedby¹222.ITEM¹14CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Thereareseveralformatandtechnical"brokes"withinthisLCO.Thesewereattemptedtobefixedinthe5/26/95submittal.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/13/9512/8/95'COMMENTS:Closedby¹218. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:15CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ThecurrentLCOhasanexceptiontoLCO3.0.3andismissingoneforLCO3.0.4.DATEIDENTIFIED'ATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/13/9510/13/95COMMENTS:Addressedby¹148.ITEM¹:16CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.7.12ThecurrentLCOhasanexceptiontoLCO3.0.3andismissingoneforLCO3.0.4.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/13/9510/13/95COMMENTS:Addressedby¹148. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:17CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.13DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ThecurrentLCOhasanexceptiontoLCO3.0.3andismissingoneforLCO3.0.4.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/13/9510/13/95COMMENTS:Addressedby¹148.ITEM¹:18CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentEofsubmittal.Thisclosescomments:3.3Q3,3.3Q10,3.3Q11,3.3Q12,3.3Q13,3.3Q15,3.3Q32,3.3Q36,3.3Q40,3.3Q43,3.3Q45,3.3Q47,and3.3Q487/27/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/8/95COMMENTS:CorrectionsweremadetoAttachmentAasnecessarysuchthatnofurtherchangestoAttachmentEarerequired. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:19CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemoveallchangesjustifiedbyWCAP-14333andimplementTOPS(WCAP-10271).Thisclosescomments3.3Q7,3.3Q16,3.3Q17,3.3Q19,3.3Q20,3.3Q21,3.3Q22,3.3Q27,3.3Q34,3.3Q23,3.3Q41,3.3Q42,alld3.3Q49.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:7/27/9512/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Closedby¹222.ITEM¹:20CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentBofsubmittal.Thisclosescomments:3.3Q12,3.3Q14,3.3Q21,3.3Q25,3.3Q26,3.3Q31,3.3Q40,3.3Q45,3.3Q46,3.3Q47,Gild3.3Q50;DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:7/27/9512/11/95

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:21CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemoveallchangesjustifiedbyWCAP-14333andimplementTOPS(WCAP-10271).Thisclosescomments:3.3Q33,3.3Q35,3.3Q37,3.3Q41,3.3Q42,3.3Q52,and3.3Q53.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:TRAVELLERNAME:7/27/9512/8/95NoCOMMENTS:Closedper¹218.ITEM¹:22CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisethedescriptionoftheAFWFunctions(¹6)toclarifywhichpumps.areactuatedbyeachsignal.Thisclosescomment3.3Q28.DATEIDENTIFIED:7/27/95DATECLOSED:12/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Closedby¹218. 20-Dec-95ITEMPi23CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisethebasesjustificationforthe48hourCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.lwithrespecttotheTripoftheMFWPumpsforactuatingthemotor-drivenAFWpumps.Thisclosescomment3.3Q29.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:7/27/9512/11/95ITEM//:24CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentCofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomments:3.3Q30and3.3Q56.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:7/27/9512/8/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:25CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisetheRequiredChannelcolumnofTable3.3.3-1fortheSGWaterLevelNarrowRangefunctiontoread"2perSG."ThisprovidesconsistencywiththewordingfortheSGWideRangerequirement.Thisclosescomment3.3Q54.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:7/27/95I12/8/95ITEM¹:26CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.4IDATEIDENTIFIED:7/27/95DATECLOSED:12/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST~:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddadrawingoftheLOPDGStartInstrumentationtothebasestoprovideadditionalclarificationofwhatismeantbychannels.Thisclosescomment3.3Q55. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:27CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentAofsubmittal.Thisclosescomment3.3Q56.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/27/9512/8/95COMMENTS:ThischangewasnotmadesinceallnecessarychangestoAttachmentBweremade.ITEM¹:28CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RequestthatWestinghouseprovideajustificationastowhyuseofonlyaTripSetpointcolumnisacceptableversusthetableReviewer'sNote.Thisclosescomment3.3Q2.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/27/9512/8/95COMMENTS:Onholdpendingnumerousinstrumentationissues. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:29CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisedSetpointAnalysisDA-EE-92487-21touseanAllowableValueof1715psigvs.1711psigforSafetyInjection-PressurizerPressure-Lowfunction.Thisclosescomment3.3Q38.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:7/27/9512/8/95COMMENTS:Revision1issuedon11/22/95.ITEM¹:30CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseRequiredActionA.1toonlyallow12(or8hours)torestoretheonsiteDGfueloilsupplyversusthecurrent48hours.Thisclosescomment3,8Q13.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/11/9512/4/95 20-Dec-95ITEMI/:31CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisethebasesforAFWactuationonlowSGleveltoincludediscussionoftheeffectofthelossofInstrumentBusD.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/11/9512/11/95ITEMP:32CHAPTER/LCO:3.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentCofthesubmittal.ThisincludesConditonCofLCO3.8.1(CTcolumn).DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/12/9512/11/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:33CHAPTER/LCO:3.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentAofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomment3.8Q22.DATEIDENTIFIED:8/24/95DATECLOSED:12/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AllnecessarychangestoAttachmentBweremadesuchthatnofurtherchangestoAttachmentAwererequired.ITEM¹:34CHAPTER/LCO:3.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:EithertheNRCortheWOGmustissueatravellerpackageforrelocatingnotesfromtheFrequencycolumntotheSurveillancecolumn.TheNRChasagreedthatthisisa"goodpractice"perteleconon8/23/95.Thisclosescomments3.6Q1and3.6Q15.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:8/30/9510/10/95COMMENTS:WOGrejectedtravellerasbeingbelowthreshold.NRClikesideabutalsonotwillingtogenerateatraveller.NofurtheractionrequiredbyRGB'. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:35CHAPTER/LCO:3.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:RevisetheContainmentSectionLCOsandBasesinsupportofthenewAppendixJrulebasedchanges.MakesureallprogrammaticchangesthatarerequiredaresubmittedandthatPaiscorrect(thisaffects3.6QIOand3.6Q20).Thisclosescomments3.6Q4and3.6Q6.8/30/95DATECLOSED:11/30/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:'ITEM¹:36CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemovethetextaddedtoRequiredActionNote2for'LCO3.6.2,ConditionsAandB(changeC.58.ii).Thisclosescomment3.6Q14.DATEIDENTIFIED:'/30/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:37CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddbackintothebasesforConditionsC.1,C.2,andC.3thephrase"(e.g.,onlyonesealperdoorfailed)"whichwasremovedbychangeC.58.v.b.Thisclosescomment3.6Q27.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:'OMMENTS:8/31/9510/30/95ITEM¹i38CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddthelastsentencebacktothefirstparagraphofthebasesforSR3.6.2.1whichwasdeletedbychangeC.58.v.b.Thisclosescomment3.6Q29.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:8/31/9511/30/95COMMENTS:Amodifiedsentencewasa'ddedasaresultofincorporativeof¹35./9 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:39CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemovechangeC.58.xtoConditionsC.2andC.3(madetextplural).Thisclosescomment3.6Q31.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/30/95ITEM¹:40CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseActionsNote¹1toincludethephrase"exceptforShutdownPurgeSystemvalveflowpaths..."Thisclosescomment3.6Q35.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/27/9520 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:41CHAPTER/LCO:3.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinthebasesforAttachmentDthatarecorrectlyshowninAttachmentC.Thisclosescomments3.6Q74,3.6Q77,and3.6Q82.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:8/31/9511/30/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarycorrectionstoAttachmentCweremadesuchthatnochnagestoAttachmentDwererequired.ITEM¹:42CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RelocateActionTableNotetoConditionFwithnecessaryRequiredActionsandCompletionTimes.Thisclosescomment3.6Q78.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/31/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:43CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MustaddanewSurveillancesimilartoNUREG-1431SR3.6.7.1.Thisclosescomment3.6Q85.DATEIDENTIFIED:8/31/95DATECLOSED:10/31/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:44CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.6.6.13toincludethephrase"thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition."Thisclosescomment3.6Q86.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/31/9522 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:45CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisethehydrogenrecombinertestingtoincludeaphysicalandvisualinspectionoftheunitsandverificationthatpipingisnotplugged,thattheignitorisOPERABLE,andtheunitsarenotfouledevery24months.Thiswillbea"functionalcheck"versusa"functionaltest."Thisclosescomments3.6Q98and3.6Q99.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/31/95ITEM¹:46CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.6.7ClarifytheBackgroundbasesforLCO3.6.7withrespecttooperationofthehydrogenrecombiners.Thisclosescomment3.6Q103.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9510/31/9523 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:47CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentAofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomments3.6Q122and3.6Q140.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/31/9511/30/95ITEM¹:48CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ExpandsubmittaldiscussiontoprovideadditionaldetailsonwhyLCQsandimportantbasesdiscussionswerenotadded.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/5/9512/20/95COMMENTS:NRCagreedtowithdrawrequeston12/14/95.24 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:49CHAPTER/LCO:3.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorsandperformminoreditorialchangesandclarificationswithinAttachmentAofsubmittal.Thisclosescomments3.4Q1,3.4Q4,3.4Q5,and3.4Q11.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/9/95DATECLOSED:12/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:50CHAPTER/LCO:3.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorsandperformminoreditorialchangesandclarificationstoAttachmentAofsubmittal.Thisclosescomments3.1Q3,3.1Q7,and3.1Q8.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/9/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/8/95 20-Dec-9$ITEM//:51CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseAttachmentA,SectionD,item20.~vitobea"lessrestrictivechange"withtheassociatednosignificanthazardsevaluation.Thisclosescomment3.1Q4.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:'OMMENTS:9/9/9512/8/95ITEM//i52CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.16DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseAttachmentA,SectionD,item28.iv.ctobea"lessrestrictivechange"withtheassociatednosignificanthazardsevaluation.Thisclosescomment3.7Q16.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/9/9512/12/9526 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:53CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TrackWOGTravellerconcerningincreasedCompletionTimeforrevisingthePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripfunctioninbothLCO3.2.1and3.2.2.Thisclosescomment3.2Q2.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:9/10/9512/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:WOG-22COMMENTS:Travellerunderindustryreview.ITEM¹:54CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ExpandbasesforASAinblockedtextonpage83.1-3tostate"shutdown(MODE5)."AlsoadddiscussionfromCTS3.10-11concerningCTSFigure3.10-2toInsert3.1.1.A.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/19/9512/8/9527 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:55CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:SeparateSR3.1.3.2into2differentSRssinceyoucanfaildifferentportionsofthecurrentSRandbeindifferentconditions.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED'RAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/19/9512/6/95ITEM¹:56CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:EvaluateneedforNotetoConditionAanddeleteifnolongerrequired.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/19/9512/6/95'OMMENTS:Deletednotesincedeterminednottoberequired.28 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:57CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanexceptiontoConditionCforLCO3.0.4sinceitshouldallowaMODEtransfer.,DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:,TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/19/9512/6/95ITEM¹:58CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOfirstsentencetoreadasintheNUREG.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/19/95DATECLOSED:12/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:29 20-Dec-95ITEM¹i59CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCObasestoaddaAerfirstsentence"andpriortowithdrawalofanycontrolrod."ThisalsoimpactspropsedWOGtraveller.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS;9/19/9512/6/95ITEM¹:60CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Verifyaccidentanalysisassumptionsformaximumdifferencebetweenmostwithdrawnandleastwithdrawnrodis24steps.ThisimpactsConditionC.1.2andSR3.1.7.1.Revisebasesaccordingly.ThisaQectschange15.iii.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/6/95COMMENTS:ThcLCObasesforLCO3.1.4statethatamisalignmentof25stepsisassumed.30 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:61CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseACTIONSNotetobeconsistentwithNUREGnotesinceyouwillbeinConditionAandEwithmorethan1MRPIpergroupinoperable;thereforeneedseparateConditionentry.ThisaQectschange15.ix.Replace"rodpositionindicator"inNotewith"MRPI".DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/20/9512/6/95ITEM¹:62CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddastatementtotheLCOBasesthat"TheCOLRcontainsthefigureshowingthetargetbandandAFDacceptableoperationlimits."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/6/95COMMENTS:OnlyaddedastatementforthetargetbandsincebasesalreadydiscussedtheCOLRandAFDacceptableoperationlimits. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:63CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRtoverifythatAFDmonitoralarmisoperableevery12hours.Addbasesexplanationconcerninghowcurrentpracticeofusingcomputertogenerateacontrolbandalarmsatisfiesthistest.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/6/95COMMENTS:BasedonconversationwithControlRoom.ITEM¹:64CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.1.1.1tobeonafrequencyofevery24hrs.insteadofproposed48hours.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/20/95DATECLOSED:12/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:CurrentGinnapracticeis24hours.AgreedtobyD.Filion.32 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:65CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseRAB.1anditsassociatedCompletionTimetobeconsistentwithNUREG,Rev.1.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/6/95COMMENTS:IfB.1isnotcompletedintime,LCO3.0.3becomesApplicableandshutdowninitiateduntiltheLCOisagainmet.ITEM¹:66CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseRAC.1anditsassociatedCompletionTimetobeconsistentwithNUREG,Rev.1.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/6/95~COMMENTS:IfB.1isnotcompletedintime,LCO3.0.3becomesApplicableandshutdowninitiateduntiltheLCOisagainmet. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:67CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRtoverifythattheQPTRmonitoralarmisoperableevery12hours.Addbasese>ylanationconcerningcurrentpractice.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/20/95DATECLOSED:12/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Seecomment¹63ITEM¹:CHAPTER/LCO:683.2.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TracknewTravellerforLCO3.2.4andprovidemarkupsandjustificationforimplementation.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:9/20/9512/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:TSTF-25COMMENTS:34 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:69CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ExpandbasesforRAC.1,C.2,andSR3.2.4.2toshowthat24hoursisconsistentwiththe24hourstodoafluxmapwithaninoperablepowerrangechannelgreaterthanorequalto75%RTP.SincepowerrangechannelsfeedtheQPTRmonitor,theCompletionTimesandFrequenciesshouldallbeconsistent.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/20/9512/6/95ITEM¹:70CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:ReviseSR3.1.6.1tohavethesameFrequencyastheNUREG.Thisimpacts3.1Q7.9/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/6/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyP.Bamford.35 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:71CHAPTER/LCO:3.5.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:InitiateatravellertorelocateaccumulatorboronconcentrationstotheCOLR.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/20/9512/2/95COMMENTS:ThistravellerwasrejectedbytheReactorSystemsbranch.Seecomment¹220.ITEM¹:72CHAPTER/LCO:3.5.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideadditionaljustificationwhySR3.5.2.8shouldnotberequired.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME;9/20/P512/2/95COMMENTS:ThisSRwasaddedtotheITSsuchthatnofurtherjustificationisrequired.36 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:73CHAPTER/LCO:3.5.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DeterminehowSFDPappliestoaninoperableRWST.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST~NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/23/95COMMENTS:Trackedby¹1.ITEM¹:74CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddreferencetoperformanceofSR3.4.4.1inSectionCchange32.iv.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST~'oTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/11/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarychangestoSectionDweremadesuchthatnofurtherchangestoSectionCwererequired.ITEM¹:75CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:InitiatetravellerforchangestoNUREGSR3.4.1.4.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:9/21/9512/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:WOG-37COMMENTS:Stillundergoingindustryreview.37 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:76CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRtoverifyTavgineachloopgreaterthanorequalto540Fwithin30minutespriortocriticality.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/12/95COMMENTS:PerM.RubyandP.Bamford30minutesshouldbeacceptableandP.Bamford.ITEM¹:77CHAPTER/LCO:3.5.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Reviseinsert3.5.14toonlyapplytovalves878Band878Dsince878Aand878Carenevertouched.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/2/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyG.Joss. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:78CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrectAttachmentDApplicablilitytoshow"MODEI,)8.5%RTP."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/12/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarycorrectionstoAttachmentBweremadesuchthatnofurtherchangestoAttachmentDarerequired.ITEM¹:79CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Reviseinsert3.4.11toadd"consistentwiththesafetyanalysisassumptions."DATEIDENTIFIED:9/21/95DATECLOSED:.12/12/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:80CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.7'DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ChangeConditionBtoread"BothRHRloops..."ThischangeisalsorequiredforConditionBofLCO3.4.8.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/21/9512/12/95ITEM¹:81CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseInsert3.4.47tosay"Tomaintainthispressuredifferentiallimit..."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/21/9512/12/95ITEM¹:82CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Add"ECCS"totheentiresectionwhendiscussing"accumulators".DATEIDENTIFIED:9/21/95DATECLOSED:12/12/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:40 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:CHAPTER/LCO:833.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Change"verify"to"ensure"inRequiredActionA.1andB.l.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/21/9512/12/95ITEM¹:84CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReorderLCOconditionsbasedonwhichoptionofLCO3.4.12istaken.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/21/9512/12/95ITEM¹:85CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.14DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProposetravellerforSR3.4.14.1,Note1consistentwithchange45.v.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/12/95COMMENTS:Closedby¹170.4/ 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:86CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.14DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideajustificationrelatedtoOMa-1988onhowafrequencyof24monthsisacceptableforSR3.4.14.1.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/12/95ITEM¹:87CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.15DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AdddiscussiontoSectioCchange46.vithatyoucanonlyusethecontainmentaircoolercollectionsystemiftheradiationmonitorsareOPERABLE.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/12/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarychangeswercmadetoSectionDsuchthatnofurtherchangestoSectionDarerequired.42 20-Dec-95ITEM//r88CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.15DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AdddiscussiontoSectionCchange46.iiitoaddressthefactthatwiththerequiredradiationmonitorinoperable,wenothavetheoptiontoperformaninventorybalanceevery24hrs.inlieuofdoinggrabsamples.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/21/95DATECLOSED:12/12/95rkTRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AllnecessarychangesweremadetoSectionDsuchthatnofurtherchangestoSectionDarerequired.ITEM//t89CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.15DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DeleteSR3.4.15.5andadddiscussiontoInsert3.4.65statingthat"andaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthemonitorhasbeenperformedwithinthelast24months."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/20/9512/12/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:90CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.16DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseNotetoSR3.4.16.3todelete"only"fromnote.Mustcheckallusesof"only"intheSRs.Thisclosescomment3.7Q3.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/21/9512/12/95COMMENTS:Closedby¹170.ITEM¹:91CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Expandchange25.vi(CTS)todiscusshowLTOPrequirementsareinCTS3.15and3.3andhowwehavemaintainedtheMODEofApplicabilityforCTS3.3.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/22/9512/12/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:92CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorsandprovideminorclarificationstoAttachmentAofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomments:3.7Q2,3.7Q38,3.7Q66,3.7Q114and3.7Q126.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/25/9510/28/95ITEM¹:93CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:Performminorbasesclarificationstoaddresstypographicalerrors,minorclarifications,andeditorialpreference.Thisclosescomments:3.7Q5,3.7Q52,3.7Q56,3.7Q57,3.7Q58,3.7Q59,3.7Q73,3.7Q86,3.7Q144,,3.7Q164,3.7Q170,and3.7Q185.9/25/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/13/9545 20-Dec-95ITEM0:94CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrectminortypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentDofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomments:3.7Q26,3.7Q32,3.7Q147,3.7Q162,3.7Q175,and3.7Q197.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:No9/25/9512/1/95TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AllnecessarycorrectionstoAttachmentCweremadesuchthatnochangestoAttachmentDwererequired.ITEM//:95CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisetitletoread"MFRVandAssociatedBypassValvesandMFPDVs."Thisclosescomment3.7Q39and3.7Q45.DATEIDENTIFIED:'/26/95DATECLOSED:10/27/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:46 20-Dec-95ITEM//t96CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddNUREGSR3.7.4.2backintotheITSsincetheblockvalveiscreditedintheaccidentanalysis.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/26/9510/28/95ITEM//:97CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseAttachmentA,SectionC,change79.iiitodiscussrevisionoftheCompletionTimeforITSRequiredActionB.l.Thisclosescomment3.7Q61.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/26/9510/29/9547 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:98CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideajustificationinAttachmentA,SectionC,item80fortheFrequencyofAFWandSAFWpumptesting.AlsotrackWOGtravelleronthisissue.Thisclosescomments3.7Q67and3.7Q68.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATE'CLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:9/26/9510/28/95COMMENTS:Travellerapprovalbeingtrackedby¹99.ITEM¹:99CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TrackTravellerxvithrespecttoeliminationofMODE4requirementsforAFW.Thisclosescomments3.7Q65,3.7Q70,3.7Q79,3.7Q80,and3.7Q87.DATEIDENTIFIED'ATECLOSED:9/26/9512/1/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:TSIF-29'OMMENTS:SubmittedtoNRCon11/13/95.48 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:100CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanotetoRequiredActionC.lsimilartothenoteforLCO3.7.5,RequiredActionD.1,whichsuspendsimplementationofLCO3.0.3andallMODEreductions.Thisclosescomment3.7Q95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/26/9510/28/95ITEM¹:101CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideadrawinginthebaseswhichshowsthebreakdownoftheCCWpumptrainsandloopheader.Thisclosescomment3.7Q99,3.7Q102and3.7Q108.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/27/9510/28/9549 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:102CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:AddanotetoRequiredActionC.1similartothenoteforLCO3.7.5,RequiredActionD.1,whichsuspendsimplementationofLCO3.0.3andallMODEreductions.Thisclosescomments3.7Q113,3.7Q116,3.7Q117,3.7Q118,and3.7Q1249/27/95DATECLOSED:10/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Thischangewasrejectedinmeetingon10/12/95(¹135).Therefore,changewasclosed.ITEM¹:103CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideadrawinginthebaseswhichshowsthebreakdownoftheSWpumptrainsandloopheader.Thisclosescomment3.7Q123.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/27/9510/28/9550 20-Dec-95ITEM//:104CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.9DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideadrawingtothebaseswhichshowsthebreakdownoftheCREATSfiltrationtrainsanddampers.Thisclosescomment3.7Q134.DATEIDENTIFIED:~DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/27/9510/28/95ITEM//:105CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.7.9ChangethelogicalconnectorbetweenconditionD.1andD.2toanORandrevisethebasesaccordingly.Thisclosescomment3.7Q138.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/27/9510/28/95 C20-Dec-95ITEM¹:106CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.10DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideadrawingtothebaseswhichshowswhatportionoftheABVsisaddressedbythisLCO.Thisclosescomments3.7Q155and3.7Q163.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:9/27/9510/27/95ITEM¹:107CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RequestTravellertorelocateSFPboronconcentrationtotheCOLR.Thisclosescomment3.7Q182.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:9/28/9512/1/95COMMENTS:ReactorSystemsBranchrejectedchange.ModifiedLCOtoaddconcentrationbackin.Seealso¹220and¹207.52 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:108CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TracktravellerforCompletionTimeforRequircdActionC.2.Thisclosescomment3.7Q18.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:TRAVELLERNAME:9/28/9510/27/95NoCOMMENTS:Thiscommentclosedbyincorpationof¹134.Thistravellerwillnotbeimplemented.ITEM¹:109CHAPTER/LCO:3.9DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE;CorrectreferenceinAttachmentB,CTS3.5.5.1tobe"15.ix"insteadof"15.viii"andprovidenewchangejustification15.ixtoAttachmentA.Thisclosescomment3.9Q4.DATEIDENTIFIED:'0/2/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:TRAVELLERNAME:11/29/95NoCOMMENTS:Thiscommentwassupercededby¹221.53 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:110CHAPTER/LCO:3.9DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProvideminorclarificationstotheLCOandbasis.Thisclosescomments3.9Q19and3.9Q27.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/3/95DATECLOSED:11/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:111CHAPTER/LCO:3.9.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseInsert3.9.7.btobemorespecificwithrespecttoCHANNELCHECKS.Also,checktoseeiftherevisedInsert3.9.7.bshouldbcaddedtoSR3.3.1.1andSR3.4.15.1.Thisclosescomment3.9Q25.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/3/9511/28/95COMMENTS:Thiscommentwasrevisedpcr¹195todeletetheassociatedte>c.54 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:112CHAPTER/LCO:3.9.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.9.3.1and3.9.4.1tobeconsistentwithWOGTraveller.Also,trackstatusofthistraveller.Thisclosescomments3.9Q32and3.9Q34.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/3/95DATECLOSED:11/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:113CHAPTER/LCO:3.9.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorsandotherminorcorrectionstoAttachmentA.Thisclosescomment3.7Q32and3.9Q34.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:No10/3/9511/29/95TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AllnecessarycorrectionstoAttachmentArelatedtoCTSmarkupweremadesuchthatnochangestotheITSmarkuparerequired.55 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:114CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentB.Thisclosescomment3.7Q211.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/4/9510/28/95ITEM¹:115CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Correctchangecategoryfor13.xixto"v.b"andprovidenosignificant'azardsevaluation.Thisclosescomment3.7Q220.DATEIDENTIFIED:.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:No9/27/9510/28/9556 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:116CHAPTER/LCO:3.1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:InitiateatravellertoreviseEOLMTCverificationconsistentwithwhatGinnasubmitted.DATEIDENTIFIED:9/21/95DATECLOSED:12/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:WithdrewsinceWOGprogramforasimilarchangeiscurrentlyundergoingWOGreview.ITEM¹:117CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseconditionsforPORVblockvalvestoallow72hourswith2inoperablevalvesand7daysforonevalve.Citedi6icultyinrepairs,probabilityoftuberupture,etc.Referencejustificationin9/15/92.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/9557 ZO-Dec-95ITEM¹:11SCHAPTER/LCO:3.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Editorialcommentsinbases:pagesB3.6S,B3.6-7,B3.6-22,B3.6-39,B3.6-40,Insert3.6.1.4,B3.6-44,Insert3.6.6.7,Insert3.6.7.3,B3.643,andB3.647.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/95ITEM¹:119CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TrackTravellerassociatedwithchangestoSR3.6.2.2..DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:10/31/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:TSTF-17?COMMENTS:58

20-Dec-95ITEM//i120CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Developwhitepaperoncreditingclosedsystems.Discuss:(1)PRA,(2)Outsidevalvesnotleaktestedwhereasclosedsystemshaveleakageverification,(3)Notsubjecttoanactivefailure,(4)Proposereasonabletime7/14day.Providecopiesofexamples.ReviseLCOper11/16/95appealmeeting.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/30/95ITEM//:121CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DevelopewhitepaperforLCOnoteexcludingMSIVs/MSSVs/ARVsfromLCO3.6.3.Cite:(1)Hardship,(2)InconsistencyinNUREG.ReviseLCOper11/16/95appealmeeting.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/30/9559 20-Dec-95ITEM//:122CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Replaceuseof"barrier"with"boundary"consistentwithCTSlanguage.RemarkupthisLCOandbasesusingRev.1ofNUREG.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/95ITEM//t123CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ClarifySR3.6.3.1andSR3.6.3.2.Also,reviseFrequenciestobe92daysforSR3.6.3.1and"PriortoenteringMode4...92days"forSR3.6.3.2.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:10/30/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:60 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:124CHAPTER/LCO:3.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MakeminoreditorialchangestoLCOs.Thisaffectspages:3.6-8,3.6-9,3.6-11,Insert3.6.3.2.Insert3.6.3.18,Insert3.6.3.15,and3.6-'24.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/95ITEM¹:125CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseActionsNote4basestoclarifythattheevaluationofLCO3.6.1leakgelimitsappliestoanyboundarythatisdeclaredinoperable(bothoneandtwoinoperableboundaries).Carlmustaddressthetimelineofthisaction.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/10/9511/30/95COMMENTS:Closedby¹192. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:126CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddNUREGSR3.6.3.2backintoTSwithreferenceto"admincontrols"versusspecificreasonsforopening.ThesespecificreasonsshouldbeintheSRbases.Also,controlboardverificationisacceptableforthisSR.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/95ITEM¹:127CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisecompletiontimeforA.1to8hours.Thisclosescomment3.6Q61.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/9562 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:128CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ChangeFrequencyforSR3.6.5.1tobe12hours.Thisclosescomment3.6Q71.Also,reviseresponseto3.6Q70todiscusstotaldurationofLCOnotbeingmetis(12+12hrs)vs.theNUREG(8+24hrs)oronlya4hrdifference.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/95ITEM¹:129CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:PrepareawhitepaperdiscussinghowtohandlesingletrainsystemsandSFDP(RWST,CST,CREATS).Dueby11/1.10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:No11/28/95TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:CancelledperphonecallwithC.Grimeson10/11/95.NRCstatedtoaddressgenerically.IfresolutionnotreachedpriortoSER,clarifybasesforLCO3.0.6tostatethatSFDPdoesnotapplytoRWST&CSR.NRCwouldnotfightthisinterp. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:130CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise"sprayadditivetank"tobe"NaOHSystem"throughoutLCOandbases.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/30/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyOperations.ITEM¹:131CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRsimilartoSR3.6.6A.3to"verifyservicewaterflowthrougheachCRFCunit"every31days.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/$5DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/9564 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:132CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RenumberSRssothattheVFTPrequirementscamerightbeforethosewith24monthsurveillancetestintervals.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/95ITEM¹:133CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Add"line"backintotheLCOforARVs.Thisclosescomment3.6Q52.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/28/9565 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:134CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise3.7.2tobeconsistentwithNUREGanddecisionsmadeduringRG&E/NRCmeeting.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/27/95ITEM¹:135CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MakeminoreditorialchangestoLCOs.Thisafectspages:3.7-7,3.7-8,3.7-20,Insert3.7.8.1,3.7-18,3.7-24,3.7-23,3.7-31,3.7-35,and3.740.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/28/9566 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:136CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AdddrawingofMFWisolationvalvestobases.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/11/95DATECLOSED:10/27/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:137CHAPTER/LCO:3.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Makeminoreditorialchangestobases.Thisaffectspages:Insert3.7.5.10,B3.7-26,B3.7-28,Insert3.7.8.9,and3.7-52DATEIDENTIFIED:10/12/95DATECLOSED:10/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:67 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:138CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Provideadditionaljustificationtoresponseto3.7Q261using:(1)SI/RHR/CStestfrequencies,(2)pumpsusedmoreoftenduringlowpower,(3)5pumpstotal,(4)relabilitydata(2).Alsogenerateatraveller.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/12/9510/28/95"COMMENTS:Addressedby¹98.ITEM¹:139CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE;ReviseLCObasedonissuesdiscussedduringRG&E/NRCmeeting.DATEIDENTIFIED:.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/12/9510/28/9568 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:140CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE;DoasearchforallpluralwordsintheconditionsandhowitmatchestoRequiredActions.UseWriter'sGuideexampletostandardize.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/12/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/95ITEM¹t141CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRfor"verifyallSWloopheadercross-tievalvesarelockedandinthecorrectposition"every31days.Mustverify4665,.4760,4669,4668B,4623,4756,4639,and4640tobelockedopen.Alsoverify4612,4611,4610,and4779tobelockedclosed.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/12/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/28/9569 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:142CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Add1newSRasfollows:"Verifyscreenhousebaywaterlevelandtemperaturearewithinlimits"every24hours.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/12/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/28/95ITEM¹:143CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.10DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ExpandASAbasestodiscusswhytheremainderoftheABVSisnotrequiredforthisLCO.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/27/9570 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:144CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.10'ESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRto"verifytheABVSmaintainsanegativepressurewithrespecttoatmospherefortheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfioorlevel"every24hours.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/27/95ITEM¹:145CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:GeneratetravellertorelocateSFPboronconcentrationstoCOLR.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/13/95COMMENTS:Addressedby¹107.7/ 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:146CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Expandresponseto3.7Q191todiscuss:(1)needtodrop2000-300ppm(time),(2)boraflexissues,(3)levelbeingverifiedevery7days.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/28/95ITEM¹:147CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.13DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Generatetravellertorelocatespecification4.3.1.1operationaldetails(eandf)toLCO3.7.17.Also,reviseLCO,itema,todeleteallwordingafler"1.458"asthisisbasesinformation.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/1/95COMMENTS:TravellerduefromWOGinDec.72

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:148CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ProposeanewtravellertoaddaLCO3.0.4exclusiontoLCO3.7.11,3.7.12,and3.7.13similartotheLCO3.0.3exclusion.AddthistotheITS.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/1/95COMMENTS:RejectedbyWOGon11/8/95sinceactionsare"immediate".Therefore,thiswasnotadded.ITEM¹:149CHAPTER/LCO:,5.5.10DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddthefollowingtothelastsentenceofthebasesforSR3.6.6.5,SR3.6.6.6,SR3.7.9.2,andSR3.7.10.2,"However,themaximumsurvcillanccinternalforrefuelingoutagetests'isbasedon24monthrefuelingcyclesandnot18monthcyclesdefinedbyRegulatoryGuide1.52."Thisclosescommitmentin10/18/95lettertoNRC.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/18/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/9573 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:150CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.10DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AdddiscussiononminimumrequiredflowratestothebasesforSR3.6.6.5,SR3.6.6.6,SR3.7.9.2,andSR3.7.10.2.Thisclosescommitmentin10/18/95lettertoNRC.DATEIDENTIFIED:~10/18/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/31/95.ITEM¹:151CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:5.5.8Removechange120.xviiandtheadditionofhighenergypipingandthesteamgeneratortubesfromtheITSProgram.Thisclosescomment6.0Q6.DATEIDENTIFIED:"10/18/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/11/9574

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:152CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE;Replaceallusesof"absorber"with"adsorber."Thisclosescomment6.0Q12.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/18/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/95ITEM¹:153CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddNUREGSection5.2.1.dbackintothesubmittalandrevisechange.50.iii.Thisclosescomment6.0Q27.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/19/95BATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/11/9575 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:154CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOF,ISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorswithinAttachmentDofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomment6.0Q33.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/19/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/11/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarycorrectionstoAttachmentCweremadesuchthatnochangestoAttachmentDwererequired.ITEM¹:155CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisedieselfueloiltestingproramtoonlyrequiretestingofviscosity,,water,andsediment.Thisclosescomment6.0Q36.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/19/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/11/95COMMENTS:Commentwasreplacedby¹196.76 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:156CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:PerformminoreditorialchangestoITS5.5.5and5.5.10.Thisclosescomment6.0Q37.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/19/95DATECLOSED:11/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:157CHAPTER/LCO:1.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:CorrecttypographicalerrorsandeditorialchangestoAttachmentAofthesubmittal.Thisclosescomments1.0Q2and1.0Q13.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/20/95.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/9577 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:158CHAPTER/LCO11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Initiateandtrackatravellertoadd"timeconstant"todefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATION.Thisclosescomment1.0Q8.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:10/20/9512/1/95COMMENTS:RG&Ewithdrewuseoftimecontstantsindefinition.ITEM¹:159CHAPTER/LCO:1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisechange3.viitoremoveuseof"either"andreplacewithNUREGuseof"one"andtodeleteaddedtexttopage1.3-11.Thisclosescomment1.0Q27.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/9578

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:160CHAPTER/LCO:1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseITSdescriptiontodeletechange3.ix.Thisclosescomment1.0Q25.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/95ITEM¹:161CHAPTER/LCO:1.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviselocationofInsert1.3.1toberightaAerfirstsentenceattopofpage1.3-2.Thisclosescomment1.0Q26.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/9579

20-Dec-95ITEM//i162CHAPTER/LCO:3.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemovetextproposedattheendofthebasesforSR3.0.1aschange7.xiii.Thisclosescomment3.0Q2.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/23/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/11/95ITEM//:163CHAPTER/LCO:3.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:Generateandtrackatravellertodeletetextclarifying"exceptionstothespecificationareprovidedintheindividualspecifications"forLCO3.0.4.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithLCO3.0.3andclosescomment3.0Q7.10/23/9511/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:YesTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:TravelleracceptedbyWOGon11/8/95.Basestextrevisedconsistentwithproposedtraveller.J80 20-Dec-95ITEM¹'64CHAPTER/LCO:3.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:TrackfinalWOGdispositionofTravellerBWR-26,C.l.Thisclosescomment3.0Q7.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/23/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/1/95COMMENTS:NRCacceptedproposedwordingweekof11/20/95.ITEM¹:165CHAPTER/LCO:3.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseITSandNUREGmarkuptoretaindeletedte~tinthesecondparagraphonpageB3.04.Thisclosescomment3.0Q7..DATEIDENTIFIED:,10/23/95DATECLOSED:'l/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:8/ 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:166CHAPTER/LCO:4.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseA-25.6toincludediscussionofCTS5.3.1.areportingrequirementsforreconstitutedfuel.Thisclosescomment4.0QS.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/27/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Implemenationissueonly.ITEM¹:167CHAPTER/LCO:4.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddCTS5.4.4.5intoITS4.3.1.1andcorrectreferenceinITS4.3.1.1.ctobeSpecification3.7.13,not3.7.17.Thisclosescomment4.0Q11.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/27/95.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/9582 20-Dec-95ITEM//t168CHAPTER/LCO:4.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:GenerateandtrackatravellertorelocatedNUREG14314.3.1.1.eand4.3.1.1.ftoLCO3.7.17.Thisclosescomment4.0Q16.DATEIDENTIFIED:10/27/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/1/95COMMENTS:TravellerdueinDecember.ITEM//:169CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Editorialcommentswithinre-typedversion(proofreadingissues).DATEIDENTIFIED:10/28/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/95ITEMP:170CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Updateuseof"only"withinSRNotestobeconsistentwithinNUREG.DATEIDENTIFKD:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:10/30/9512/11/95 20-Dec-95ITEM//t171CHAPTER/LCO:3.2.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:SplitSR3.2.1.1(andSR3.2.2.1)into2separateSRsconsistentwithrestofNUREG.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/1/95DATECLOSED:12/6/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ThiswasnotincorporatedsinceLCO3.2.4andSR3.2.4.2andSR3.2.4.3directlyreferencetheseSRs.ITEM//:172CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseFrequencyofSR3.4.12.3tobe"oncewithin12hoursandevery12hoursthereafter."AlsoreviseFrequencytobe"oncewithin12hoursandevery31daysthereafter."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/12/9584 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:173CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.13DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.4.13.1tobeconsistentwithTSTFtravellerDATEIDENTIFIED:11/1/95DATECLOSED:12/12/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:TravellerwasneversubmittedbytheWOGsuchthatchangewasleftasls.ITEM¹:174CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.16DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.4.16.3torelocatealltextafterNotetext"onlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1"totheFrequencycolumn.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/12/9585

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:175CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.7.1.1Notetoread"onlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODES1and2."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/1/95ITEM¹:176CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisenotesforSR3.7.5.2andSR3.7.5.6toread"Requiredtobemetpriorto..."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/1/9586 20-Dec-95ITEM//:177CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.5.3Revisebasestostate:1.TherearenoASAforthisLCO,2.TheSIsystemmustbeisolatedbyLTOPby2independentmeans,3.LCObeingprovidedfor"goodoperationalpractice.",4.10minuteactuationprovidedforLTOPprotectionandconsistentwithlicensedbasesforacutation.,5.LCOmeetscriterion4,deletereferencetoWCAP.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED;TRAVELLEREXIST?:.NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/1/9512/2/95COMMENTS:SeeB3.3-36ofMWR/4ITEMI/t178CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddanewSRto3.6.6whichstates"PerformSR3.5.2.1andSR3.5.2.3forvalves896Aand896B"inaccordancewith'applicableSRs.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/95~11/30/9587 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:179CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Adddiscussionof40CFR141and40CFR190fromCTS3.9.1.2.b(iii)tochangejustification19.ii.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/1/95DATECLOSED:11/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:180CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise5.5.10to:(1)DeletereferencetoESF;(2)revisetitleof5.5.10atoadd"containment";(3)add"atadesign"priortoflowrateunder5.5.10.6.3,and(4)discuss24monthfrequencyversus18monthtestfrequency.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/1/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/11/9588 20-Dec-95ITEM//:181CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddaCTSchangejustificationtoshowwhereCTS6.8.l.cwentto.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/1/95DATECLOSED:11/10/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEMP:182CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ChangethefollowingCTSjustificationsto(iii):56.ii,57.vii,64.i.ChangethefollowingCTSjustificationsto(ii):57.vii.ChangethefollowingCTSjustificationto(v.a):63.i.Thisclosesmeetingcommentsfromweekof11/1/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9511/10/9589 ZO-Dec-95ITEM//t183CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Generateamatixwhichshows:(1)allchangecategory(ii)andwhatregulationduplicatesit.(2)allchangecategory(iii)andwhatregulationcoverschangestoit.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9512/20/95ITEM//i184CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:Revise5.2.1.atoaddressuseoflowercaselettertitlesconsistentwith11/10/94NRCletter.Change5.2.l.btoread"Theplantmanagershallreporttothecorporatevicepresidentspecifiedin5.2.1.c,and..".Also,revise5.2.1.ctoread"Acorporatevicepresident..."11/1/95DATECLOSED:11/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:90 0 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:185CHAPTER/LCO:5.7.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Place"RadiationProtectionTechnician"inlowercaseletters.Also,addto5.7.1.casfollows:"...atafrquencyspecifiedbytheradiationprotectiontechnicianintheRWP."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/1/9511/11/95NoITEM¹:186CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RenumberSecondaryChemistryProgramITS5.5.15)tocomerightaAerSGTubeSurveillanceProgramperNUREG.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/2/9511/11/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:187CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.14DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Removechangesjustifiedby121.iiifromAttachmentCofthesubmittal.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/2/9511/11/95COMMENTS:NRCagreeswithinterpretationprovidedbythechangebutduetoitsgenericimplications,agreedtowithdrawit.ITEM¹:188CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Replaceuseof"SpecialReport"with"rcport"intheACTIONSandbases.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/2/9512/8/95COMMENTS:Usedlowercase"specialreport"peragreemcntsduringmeetinsweekof11/13/95.92 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:189CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:ReviseLCOtorequirebothCCWHXstobeOPERABLEandremovefromloopdefinition.AllowoneHxtobcinoperablefor31days.AlsorequireoneHxtobeinoperationandbothOPERABLE.ACCWHxwhichisisolated,butcapableofbeingopenedwithinaccidentanalysistimelimitsisOPERABLE.11/2/9511/30/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AgreedtobyJ.Cook(RGB)andBillLeFave(NRC).Carlmustreviewandapprovealso.ITEM¹:190CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Addanewrequirementthatthe"OperationsManageroratleastoncoperationsmiddlemanagershallholdanSRO"similartoNUREGand11/10/94NRCletter.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/2/9511/11/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyWidayandMarchionda 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:191CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.9.4AddaCTSdiscussiontoAttachmentArelatedtotheadditionofnewSR3.9.4.2.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVEL'LEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/2/9511/29/95ITEM¹:192CHAPTER/LCO:3.6.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:RevisebasesforNote3(andNote4forLCO3.6.3)tostatethatactionshouldbeinitiatedimmediatelytoverifyCNMTisstillOPERABLEupondeclaringaboundaryorairlockinoperable.11/2/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/30/9594 0 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:193CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.10DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Delete"wherepractical"inlastsentenceofspecification.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/3/9511/11/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyJoss.ITEM¹:194CHAPTER/LCO:3.9DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Makebaseschanges.Thisaffectspages:B3.9-1,Insert3.9.2,Insert3.9.3,B3.9-3,B3.9-2,B3.94,B3.9-17,Insert3.9.7b,Insert3.9.6a,B3.9-9,Insert3.9.7a,Insert3.9.8,B3.9-18,B3.9-20,andB3.9-22.Tlusclosescommentsgeneratedduringmeetingsweekof11/20/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/3/95DATECLOSED:11/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Insert3.9.7band3.9.6.aarecorrectbutNRCprefersbeaddedaftertheirSERvia50.59.95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:195CHAPTER/LCO:3.9DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:MakeLCOchanges.Thisaffectspages:3.9.1,3.9.4,Insert3.9.1.a,3.9-5,3.9-9,3.9-10,3.9-8,and3.8-11.Thisclosescommentsgeneratedduringmeetingsweekof11/20/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:.11/2/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:'OMMENTS:11/28/95ITEM¹:196CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise5.5.12toincludetheNUREGitemsa(1-3)andthereviseditembonly.ThiseffectivelydeletestheCTSfueloiltestingrequirementsfortestingevery92days.Initiatetravellerfornewb.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:No11/3/9511/11/95TRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:AgreedtobyJossandEdTomlinson.96 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:197CHAPTER/LCO:2.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseCTSjustification2.itoremovediscussionof"subcriticalinMODE2."Thisclosescomment2.0Q1.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/3/9511/11/95ITEM¹:198CHAPTER/LCO:2.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisethefollowingbasespages:B2.0-9andB2.0-10.Thisclosesmeetingcommentsfromweekof11/1/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/3/9511/11/9597 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:199CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.0Revisethefollowingbasespage:B3.04.Thisclosesmeetingcommentsfromweekof11/1/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST~:NoTRAVELLERNAME;COMMENTS:11/3/9511/11/95ITEM¹:200CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.5DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisetexttoreferencespecificallyVFSARTable5.1-4.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/10/9511/11/95"COMMENTS:NRCagreedthateventhoughthistableisspecificallyreferencedintheAdminControlTS,thetablecanstillberevisedunder50.59.98

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:CHAPTER/LCO:2015.5.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RelocateSpecification5.5.7,RCPFl~vheelInspectiontoISIProgramsincethisprogramisnotintheCTSandisexpectedtoberelocated/deletedinearly1996viaarecentlysubmittedWCAP.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/11/95ITEM¹t202CHAPTER/LCO:3.0.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisebasesforLCO3.0.4toaddindiscussionconcerningivhy3.0.4appliesinMODES5and6.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/11/95COMMENTS:Thisisbeingtrackedby¹164.99 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:203CHAPTER/LCO:5.7.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise5.7.1.ctospeciTicallystatethattheradiatorprotectiontechniciansignstheRWPsimiliartoNUREG-1431.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/11/95COMMENTS:Closedby¹185.ITEM¹:204CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:Add"ForIllustationOnly"toalldrawingsbeingaddedtothebases.11/10/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/95/00 20-Dec-95ITEM//:205CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:5.6ReviseCOLRandPTLRreferencestobeconsistentwithfinalapprovedsollfces.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/11/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/19/95ITEM//:206CHAPTER/LCOallDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Provideadditionaljustificationfor62.viiiand80.ixwhichrelatesthat96%ofthetimethesesystemswerefullyinserviceandthat4%ofthetime,onetrainofa4trainsystemwasOOS.ProvideaseparatelettercommittingtoimplementMaint.RuletrackingonaLCObasisbyJune1,1996implementationdate.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/13/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/12/95COMMENTS:AllnecessarychangestoAttachmentBweremadesuchthatnofurther'hangestoSectionCofAttachmentAarerequired. 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:207CHAPTER/LCO:3.7.12DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RelocateSFPboronconcentrationbackintoLCO(vs.COLR).DATEIDENTIFIED:11/13/95DATECLOSED:.12/1/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:208CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RelocateRTSOPDTandOTDTparametersbackintoLCOTable(vs.COLR)DATEIDENTIFIED:11/13/95DATECLOSED:12/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Closedper¹220.ITEM¹:209CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:WithdrawRG&EresubmittalofPORVTSamendment.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/13/9512/20/95COMMENTS:Addressinfinalsubmittalcoverletter./02

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:210CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOpermeetingdiscussionsweekof11/1/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:11/13/9512/12/95COMMENTS:NRCacceptedLCoasiswithonlychangesclosedby¹209&237.ITEM¹:211CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisechange17.iiitorelocatesecondoffsitepowerlinerequirementstoTRM.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/14/9512/8/95/03 20-Dec-95ITEM0:212CHAPTER/LCO:3.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOpages:3.8-2,3.8-7,3.8-8,3.8-15,3.8-16,3.8-1,3.8-18,3.8-19,3.84,3.8-21,3.8-22,3.8-23,3.8-28,3.8-36,3.8-38,3.8<0,3.841,3.8-30,3.8-31,3.8-32,and3.8-33.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/4/95ITEM0:213CHAPTER/LCO:3.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisebasespages:B3.8-3,B3.8-7,Insert3.8.9.4DATEIDENTIFIED:11/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/4/95/04 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:214CHAPTER/LCO:3.8DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisechange17.vitobea"v.b"change.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/14/95DATECLOSED:12/11/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:215CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:EnsurelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinSFDP.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:Implementationissueonly.ITEM¹:216CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOpages:3.3-44,3.3-45,3.346,3.3-52,3.3-54permeetingagreementsweekof11/13/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/15/95DATECLOSED:12/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:105 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:217CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseBasespages:B3.3-64DATEIDENTIFIED:11/15/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/95ITEM¹:218CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCO3.3.2permeetingagreementsweekof11/13/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/16/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/8/95ITEM¹:219CHAPTER/LCO:2.1.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisebasesforASAtoretainhighpressurizerpressuretripandlowpressurizerpressuretrip.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/18/9511/28/95106

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:220CHAPTER/LCO:5.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseCOLRAdminControlsandallaffectedLCOstoplacebackwithinTSthefollowingparameters:(1)RTSinstrumentation,(2)accumulatorboronconcentration,(3)RWSTboronconcentration,and(4)SFPboronconcentration.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/18/95.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/95ITEM¹:221CHAPTER/LCODESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.9AddbackintoTStheLCOsforcontainmentisolationandassociatedinstrumentperresultsof11/16/95appeal.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/18/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/28/95/07 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:222CHAPTER/LCO:3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCO3.3.1permeetingagreementsweekof11/13/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:12/8/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:ITEM¹:223CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:AddAFWmanualinitiationbackintoTSpermeetingagreementsweekof11/13/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/20/9512/8/95ITEM¹:224CHAPTER/LCO:3.9.2'ESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Removechange106.iiitoConditionB.DATEIDENTIFIED:.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/20/9511/28/95108 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:225CHAPTER/LCO:4.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisespecificationtoincludeUFSARTable2.3-26fordescriptionofEAB..DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:11/28/95ITEM¹:226CHAPTER/LCO:4.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Makechangestospecifications4.2.1,4.3.1.1.b,4.3.1.2.b,Insert4.3.1.c,4.3.1.2.c,4.3.1.1.c,and4.3.3,4.2.2,and4.3.2.Thisclosescommentsfommeetingsweekof11/20/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:11/28/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:/09 20-Dec-9$ITEM¹:227CHAPTER/LCO:1.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisedefinitionsfor:CHANNELCAL,COT,andTADOTtoadd"display"backin.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/95ITEM¹:228CHAPTER/LCO:1.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Makevariouschangestospecificationspages1.2-1,1.4-2DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/95j/0 20-Dec-95ITEM¹t229CHAPTER/LCO:1.0DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisemarkupfor1.8toshowthatitisgoingtobasesforLCO3.6.1and3.6.2.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXISTPNoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/95ITEM¹:230CHAPTER/LCO:AllDESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviewallinstrumentationlogictestingrequirementstoaddACTUATIONLOGICTESTSasneeded.DATEIDENTIFIED:11/20/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/11/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:231CHAPTER/LCO:3.0.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOtoremove1hourpreparationtimeandrcmoveallrestrictionsonwhenshutdownmustbegin.Complete-12/1/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/1/9512/1/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyWhiteandMarchionda.ITEM¹:232CHAPTER/LCO:3.0.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemoveTSTF48changewithrespecttoSR3.0.1.Thisalsoimpacts'hapter3.8.Complete12/8/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:.DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/1/95P2/1/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:233CHAPTER/LCO:1.1DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemoveTSTF43changewithrespecttoDOSEEQUIVALENT1-131doseconversionfactors.AddreferencetoRG1.109.Complete12/1/95DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/I/9512/1/95ITEM¹:234CHAPTER/LCO:3.8.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseSR3.8.4-1tobeconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisnecessarysincerecentmodshaveremovedlargeloadsfromthebatteriessuchthattheproposedtestwouldbeextremelyddIicult.Complete12/8/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/8/9512/8/95

20-Dec-95ITEM¹:235CHAPTER/LCO:3.3.3DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReviseLCOpermeetingsagreementsweekof11/13/95.Complete12/8/95DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/8/9512/8/95ITEM¹:236CHAPTER/LCO:DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:3.3ReviseLCO3.3.2,3.3.4,and3.3.5toincludeallnecessaryACTUATIONLOGICTESTS.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:12/8/9512/8/95COMMENTS:AgreedtobyG.Joss.//4 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:237CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.11DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisednotefor3.'4.11.1consistentwithdiscussionswithPlantSystem'sBranch.DATEIDENTIFIED:12/12/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/95ITEM¹:238CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.16DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:ReplaceFigure3.4.16-1withthenewFigurebasedonNRCconferencecallof11/27/95.DATEIDENTIFIED:12/12/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/95 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:239CHAPTER/LCO:3.4.13DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RemoveproposedConditionBsincetheWOGhasdecidednottopursuethisissue.RevertbacktotheNUREG,Rev.l.DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/12/9512/12/95ITEM¹:240CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revisetoread"containedintheSTAtrainingprogramspecifiedinUFSARSection13.2."DATEIDENTIFIED:.12/14/95DATECLOSED:12/19/95TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS: 20-Dec-95ITEM¹:241CHAPTER/LCO:5.2.2DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise5.2.2.dtoread"inaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogramspecifiedinplantprocedures.ChangestotheguidelinesintheseproceduresshallbesubmittedtotheNRCforreview."DATEIDENTIFIED:12/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:'COMMENTS:12/19/95ITEM¹:242CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.4DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:Revise5.5.4.dtoadd"and40CFR141SafeDrinkingWaterAct"toendofsentence.DATEIDENTIFIED:12/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/19/95 20-Dec-95ITEM//:243CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.6DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:RevisetheTendonSurveillanceProgramtostate"inaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.35,Revision2."DATEIDENTIFIED:DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/14/9512/19/95ITEM//i244CHAPTER/LCO:5.5.7DESCRIPTIONOFISSUE:DATEIDENTIFIED:Revisethefirstparagraphtoread"inaccordancewiththeNuclearPolicyManual.ThisinspectionprogramshalldefinethespecificrequirementsoftheeditionandAddendaoftheASMEBoilerandPressureCode,SectionXI,asrequiredby10CFR50.55a(g)."12/14/95DATECLOSED:TRAVELLEREXIST?:NoTRAVELLERNAME:COMMENTS:12/19/95 AttachmentKResponsetoNRCquestionsContainedinLetterDatedDecember1,1995December1995 1.TechnicalSpecification1.0i.TS1.2-ThedefinitionsofoperatingNODESwererevisedasfollows(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):a.Refueling-seeNotel.iibelow.b.ColdShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom<-1zk/k/to<0.99k.<<whichareequivalentlimits.1.0Q1Response:DocumenttheconclusionthattheITSreactivitylimitisequivalenttotheCTSrequirements.Notethatadministrativechangesaredescribedasfollows:Non-technical,administrativechangesareintendedto*incorporatehuman-factorsprinciplesintotheformandstructureoftheimprovedplantTSsothattheywouldbeeasiertouseforplantoperationspersonnel.Thesechangesareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingtechnicalcontentoroperationalrequirements.Definingreactivitylimitsinformofk.<<intheITSisactuallymoreconservativethan~k/k%asisdoneintheCTS.Reactivityisdefinedas(k,<<-1)/k.<<(iee.,ak/k).Placingak,<<valueof0.99inthisequationyieldsavalueof-0.010101zk/kor-1.0101~k/k%whichismoreconservativethantheCTSvalueof-1~k/k%.Forrefueling,ak.<<valueof0.95yieldsareactivityof-0.05263zk/kor-5.26~k/k%.Thisisagainmoreconservative.Therefore,thelargertheshutdownmarginrequiredinITS,themoreconservativetheuseofk,<<indefiningreactivitybecomes.However,thisisstillconsideredanadminstrativechangesincetheITSspecifiesthe~inutintothereactivityequationwhileCTSspecifiesthe~oututC.HotShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom<-1~k/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasalsorevisedfroma540'Fto~350'F.Thischangeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350'FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.1.0Q2Doesthestatement,"Thischangeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2."meanthatthe350degreenumberwasusedtoestablishamodeintheITSthatisequivalenttotheCTSmodelimits?Explain.TheexpansionofthistemperaturerangeisconservativesincethecurrentTSonlyusetheHot'ShutdownNODEintwoaspects.Thefirstmethodisrequiringashutdowntothismodeduetoplantconditions.SincetheuppertemperaturerangeforHotShutdownremainsthesame(i.e.,theOperatingNODEtemperature),thereisnoimpact.Response:TheCTSuseatemperatureof350Ftoestablishaspecifiedconditionormodeinmultiplespecifications.However,thisDecember1995 temperatureisnotspecificallydenotedintheCTSNodedefinitions(i.e.,thistemperaturelimitwas"backfitted"intotheCTSfollowingTNIwithoutrevisingCTS1.2).ThisspecifiedconditionisequivalenttotheITSoperationalNODEseparationbetweenHotShutdownandHotStandbyinTable1.1-1.AnydifferencesintheutilizationofthedefinedmodeintheITSfromanyCTSrequirementisannotatedasatechnicalchangeanddiscussedandjustifiedintheirapplicablesections.Therefore,thischangetoCTS1.2ismerelyanadministrativepresentationpreference.FortheCTSwhichdonotincludeaspecifiedconditionof350'F(e.g.,requireasystemtobeOPERABLEwhenRCS)200'F),theCTShavebeenrevisedtoclarifythataNODEchangeoccursat350F.Fortheseconditions,theITSrequirementwouldbemorerestrictivethanthecorrespondingCTSrequirementduetoLCO3.'0.4issues..Theintentoftheabovechangesistoprovideclarityandcompletenessinavoidinganymisinterpretation,andcouldbeconsideredadministrative.However,sincethischangealsoeliminatesthepotentialtointerpretcertainplantconditionssuchthatnomode,orlessrestrictivemodewouldexist,thischangeshouldbemodifiedtoreflectthatitisactuallyamorerestrictivechange.Comment¹157hasbeenopenedtoaddamorerestrictivenotationtothisitem.1.0Q3Response:1.0Q4Clarifythestatement"SincetheuppertemperaturerangeforHotShutdownremainsthesame(i.e.,theOperatingNODEtemperature),thereisnoimpact."Istherezeroimpactoristheimpactinconsequential?Explain.ThesecondmethodistorequirecertainequipmenttobeOPERABLEinthismode.However,loweringthetemperaturelimitto350FrequiresthattheequipmentwouldbeOPERABLEforalargertemperaturerange.ThereisnoimpactofmaintainingtheuppertemperaturerangethesameinITSandCTSeventhoughthe~uerrangeisonlyspecifiedinITSLCO3.4.1andnotinCTS.Seealsoresponseto1.0/2.d.Operating-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom>-1~k/k%to~0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureof-580FwasnotaddedsincethisparameterisspecifiedinnewLCO3.4.1.LCO3.4.1establishesDNBRlimits.ClarifyhowthetemperaturelimitforexistingTSreactivitylimitsareprovidedforintheITS.Inaddition,theOperatingNODEwasseparatedintotwomodes:OperatingandStartup.TheonlydifferencebetweenthesetwomodesisthatStartupisdefined'whenthereactoriss5%RatedThermalPower(RTP)whiletheOperatingNODEiswhenthereactoris>5%RTP.Response:TheCTSNodedefinition"Operating"specifiesanaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureof"approximately580'F."TheITSNodedefinitionTable1.1-1doesnotspecifyatemper'ature.TheITSfor-2-December1995 1.0Q5Response:NodesIand2isdesignatedas"NA"onthebasisthattemperatureforthesemodesisdictatedbyLCO3.4.1andLCO3.4.2(minimumtemperatureforcriticality).ThesignificanceoflimitingtheRCStemperatureistoensurethattheDNBdesigncriterionismetforeachofthetransientsanalyzed.TheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureasspecifiedinLCO3.4.1isconsistentwithoperationwithinthenominaloperationenvelopeasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.SincetheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureislimitedattheupperendbyLCO3.4.1andthelowertemperatureforthesemodesaredictatedbyLCO3.4.2,thischangeismerelyanadministrativepresentationpreference.Thestatementaboutthedifferencebetweentheoperatingandstartupmodesisfactual.ExplainwhythisisorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.Thischangeismerelyanadministrativepresentationpreferencesimilartochangesdiscussedintheresponseto1.0q2.However,itcouldalsobeconsideredamorerestrictivechangetotheCTSsinceaNODEchangenowoccursat5ÃRTPwherenonepreviouslyoccurred(i.e.,LCO3.0.4issues).e.Anewoperatingmode(HotStandby)wasprovidedbetweenHot.ShutdownandColdShutdown.Thismodeisdefinedaswhenthereactivityconditionis<0.99k,<<andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis<350Fand>200'.Fwhenthereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarefullytensioned.Thedefinitionofthisnewmodeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350'FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.1.0Q6ExplainwhythisisorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.Response:Seeresponseto1.0q2.TS1.3-Thisdefinitionofrefuelingwasdeleted.ThecurrentTS1.2providesadefinitionofrefuelingasbeingthereactormodewhenreactivityis<-5~k/k%andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis~140'F.TS1.3statesthatrefuelingis"anyoperationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrodswhenthevesselheadisunbolted"whichisasubsetofthemodedefinedinTS1.2.ThenewTSTable1.1-1statesthatrefuelingisanyconditioninwhich"oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltislessthanfullytensioned"withfuelinthereactor.Whileanaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureorreactivitylimitisnolongerprovidedfortherefuelingmodedefinition,thereactorvesselheadclosureboltscannotberemovedatelevatedreactorcoolanttemperaturesorwhentheRCSispressurizedduetotheirdesign.AreactivitylimitisalsonotrequiredwhentheRCSisdepressurized.Therefore,thenewdefinitionoftherefuelingmodeismoreconservativethancurrentTS1.3andgenerallyconsistent-3December1995 1.0Q7Response:,1V.v~withTS1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.ThecurrentTSactivityandtemperaturelimitshavebeendeletedintheITS.WhydotheITSoperationallimitsthatresultfromthe'hangestotherefueldefinitionsresultinmorerestrictiveoperationalrequirementsfortheGinnaStation?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.Whatistheminimumtemperatureandpressureatwhichthereactorpressurevesselheadboltscanbedetensionedasallowedbyplantprocedures?ComparethistemperatureandpressuretotheITSdefinitionofrefuelingandexplainwhythereisorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourres'ponse.CTS1.2and1.3wererevisedtoclarifytheheadclosurestatusandassociatedcoolanttemperaturesforplantconditionsnotpreviouslysatisfyingadefinedNODEorsatisfyingmorethanoneNODE.Thisincludedaddingthephrase"a77reactorvesselheadclosurebolts,fu77ytensioned"asafootnotetorefueling.ThefootnotewouldalsoapplytotheHotStandbyandCo7dShutdowndefinedmodes(i.e.,anypointatwhichareactorheadclosureboltwasnotfullytensioned).Clarifyingtheshutdownmodeswiththenewfootnoteeliminatestheoverlapindefinedmodeswhenthetemperatureisabove140'Fandthevesselheadisunbolted.ItisnottheintentoftheITStoallowanoptionofwhethertoapply"Refueling"applicableLCOsortoapply"Shutdown"applicableLCOs.Additionally,theaveragecoolanttemperatureandassociatedreactivityconditionfortherefuelingmodearereplacedwiththenotation"NA"consistentwithNUREG-1431.ThereactivityconditionforthismodewillbeassuredbytheprovisionsofITS'LCO3.9.1.Theintentofthesechangesistoprovideclarityandcompletenessinavoidinganymisinterpretation,andassuchcouldbeconsideredadministrative.However,sincethischangeeliminatesthepotentialtointerpretcertainplantconditionssuchthatnoNODE,oralessrestrictiveNODEwouldexistwhenabove140'F,thischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedasamorerestrictivechange.Withrespecttominimumboltuptemperatures,thisiscurrentlynotinTS;however,thisvalue(60'F)willnowbeinthePTLR.TS1.5-The'definitionforOperatingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedbythenewdefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITY.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS1.6-ThedefinitionforDegreeofRedundancy(InstrumentChannels)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedwithinnewTS3.3(Instrumentation).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.7.1-Thiswasrevisedtospecifythat,theCHANNELCALIBRATIONincludestherequiredinterlockandtimeconstantfunctionsofthechannel.1.0QBApprovalofthe.useoftimeconstantfunctionsinthedefinitionof4December1995 Response:vi.channelcalibrationrequiresaWOGtravelerforreviewandapprovalbythestaff.Inaddition,discussionofcalibratinginstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetectorswasaddedforclarification.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.RGEEagreestogenerateatravellerforthischange.Comment¹158hasbeenopenedtoinitiateandtrackthistraveller.(Changelaterwithdrawnbycomment¹158JTS1.7.2-Thelastsentenceofthisdefinitionwasrevisedasfollows:v)i.Response:Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.Theseminorchangesprovidegreaterclarificationofthedefined~termandareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.TS1.7.3-Thedefinitionsfortestingofanalogandbistablechannelswerecombinedintoonedescriptionwithanewtitle.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwodefinitionsisthattestingofbistablechannelsrequiredinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensorversus"asclosetothesensoraspossible"foranalogchannels.Anotherdifferenceistheuseofan"actual"signalintheITSvice"sourcesignal"intheCTS.ExplainwhythisisorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?"Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.Sincethebistablemustbeactuatedtodetermineoperability,maintainingtheanalogchanneldescriptionforthecombineddefinitionisacceptable.Inaddition,thecombineddefinitionwasexpandedtorequire"adjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy."TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.RGBEagreesthattheCTSdefinitionshavealsobeenrevisedtoaddthephrase"oractual"inreferencetotheinjectedsignalasaclarificationconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thereisnoreasonwhyanactualsignalwouldprecludesatisfactoryverificationorperformanceofanactuationlogictestorchanneloperationaltest.Useofanactualsignalinsteadofasimulatedsignalwillnotaffecttheperformanceoftheassociatedcomponents.Operabilitycanbeadequatelydemonstratedineithercasesincetheassociatedcomponentscannotdiscriminatebetweenactualorsimul'atedsignals.ThisisperceivedastheintentoftheCTSwording,andtherefore,therevisedwordingmoreaccuratelyreflectsthisintentandisconsideredtobeadministrative.viii.TS1.7.4-ThedefinitionforSourceCheckwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheperformanceofaSourceCheckisnowaddressedwithinthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCHANNELOPERATINGTEST(COT).-5-December1995 1.0Q10Response:Thisisaconclusionwithoutanevaluationtosupporttheconclusion.ExplainwhythisisorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TheSourceCheckdefinitionhasbeendeletedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisdefinitionisdeletedsincethespecificCTSreferencingthedefinitionisnotretainedintheITS.DiscussionofthetechnicalaspectsofthischangeisaddressedintheTechnicalSpecificationwherethedefinitionisused.Theremovalofthedefinitionisconsideredadministrative,withnoimpactofitsown.1.0Qllix.TS1.8-ThedefinitionforContainmentIntegritywasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ContainmentIntegrityisaddressedbynewTS3.6whichessentiallyrequirescompliancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ.ExplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Response:X.1.0Q12TheCTSContainmentIntegritydefinitionhasbeendeletedtoeliminatetheconfusionassociatedwiththisdefinitioncomparedtoitsuseinapplicableLCOs.ThespecificrequirementsdenotedinthedefinitionareaddressedinITSLCO3.6.1withrespecttocontainmentOPERABILITY(versuscontainmentintegrity).ThedeletionofthisdefinitionmaintainstheconsistencywithNUREG-1431and.ismerelyanadministrativepresentationpreference.TS1.10-ThedefinitionforHotChannelFactorswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheHotChannelFactorlimitisonlydiscussedinoneLCOwiththelimitdefinedintheCOLR.ExplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Response:ITheCTSHotChannelFactorsdefinitionhasbeendeletedtoeliminatetheconfusionassociatedwiththisdefinitioncomparedtoitsuseinapplicableLCOs.ThespecificrequirementsdenotedinthedefinitionareaddressedinITSChapter3.2.Discussionofthetechnicalaspectsofthedeletionorrevisionoftheapplicable.TSrequirementswillbeaddressedintheTSswherethedefinitionisused(ITSLCO3.2).TheITSBasesforthisLCOalsocontainsadescriptionofwhatconstituteshotchannelfactors.ThedeletionofthisdefinitionmaintainstheconsistencywithNUREG-1431andis-6-December1995 Xi~Xi1.merelyanadministrativepresentationpreference.TSl.11-Thispreviouslydeleteddefinitionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS1.12-TheFrequencyforSurveillanceRequirementsisnowspecifiedinhours,daysormonthsinthenewspecificationssuchthatthecurrentdefinitionofFrequencyNotationisnolongerrequired.Consequently,thisdefinitionwasreplacedwithageneraldescriptionofhowtouseandapplytheFrequencyrequirements.Inaddition,thedefinitionofrefuelingFrequencywasrevisedfrom18monthsto24monthsforallsystems.ThisisdiscussedinAttachmentHandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.1)change.xiii.TS1.13-ThedefinitionforOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)wasResponse:Xiv.xv.Xvi~Arethefollowingredline/strikeouttextchangesappropriate?Ifsomodifythejustification,ifnotprovidetheappropriatechangestoexplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?"movedtotheODCMprogramdescriptioninITSspecification5.5.1.ThechangetotheCTSiseditorialbecausetheprogramdescriptioninvolvesthereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingtechnicalcontent"RGBEagreestorev'isethechangejustification.CommentII157hasbeenopenedtorevisethedescriptionofchange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.14-ThedefinitionforProcessControlProgram(PCP)wasnotaddedtothe'newspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThePCPwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRManddoesnotneedtobedescribedwithinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.15-ThedefinitionforSolidificationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.SolidificationisdescribedwithinthePCPwhichwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRM.Therefore,thisdefinitiondoesnotneedtobeprovidedinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.'S1.16-ThedefinitionforPurge-Purgingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ExplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisaGinnaDecember1995 Response:TSCategory(v.c)change.ThePurge-PurgingdefinitionhasbeendeletedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisdefinitionisdeletedsincethespecificCTSreferencingthedefinitionisnotretainedintheITS.DiscussionofthetechnicalaspectsofthischangeisaddressedintheTechnicalSpecificationwherethedefinitionisused.Theremovalofthedefinitionisconsideredadministrative,withnoimpactofitsown.xvii.TS1.17-ThedefinitionforVentingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.Thisdefinition'onlypertainstothe'ontainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.1.0Q15Response:ExplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TheVentilationdefinitionhasbeendeletedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisdefinitionisdeletedsincethespecificCTSreferencingthedefinitionisnotretainedintheITS.DiscussionofthetechnicalaspectsofthischangeisaddressedintheTechnicalSpecificationwherethedefinitionisused.Theremovalofthedefinitionisconsideredadministrative,withnoimpact.ofitsown.TS1.18-Thereferencetothe"doseconversionFactorsforadultthyroiddoseviainhalation"wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications'inceaspecificreferencetoTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109wasadded.Thistableonlycontainsdoseconversionfactorsforadultsviainhalation.1.0Q16Response:X1X~ProvideaCTSmarkupofthischange.ExplainhowtheITSlimitsareeditorialinnatureorinvolvethereorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingchangestotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna?Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.Therefore,theexistingreferenceisnolongernecessary.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.ThedefinitionofDOSEEPUIVALENTI-131wasrevisedtorelocatethedetailsdenotingthethyroiddoseconversionfactorstothebasesforITSLCO3.4.16andLCO3.7.10.ThischangewillmakethecontentofthedefinitionconsistentwithotherdefinitionsandpermitfutureupdatesofthecalculationalmethodstoberevisedinaccordancewiththeTSBasesControlProgram.ThischangeisconsistentwithindustryproposedTravellerTSTF-03.TherequestedrevisedmarkupofCTSpage'I-8isattached.TS1.19-ThedefinitionforReportableEventwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ReportableEventsaredescribedin10CFR50.72and50.73.ThisisaGinnaTS-8-December1995 XX.XX1.XX11.Category(ii)change.TS1.20-ThedefinitionforCanistersContainingConsolidatedFuelRodswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionismovedtonewTS4.3whichistheonlysectionthataddressesconsolidatedfuelrods.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.21-ThedefinitionforShutdownMarginwasexpandedtorequireanotherassumptionthatinNODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.,Also,thedefinitionwasrevisedtorequireconsiderationofanyRCCAknowntobeincapableofbeingfullyinserted.ThisisinadditiontotheexistingassumptionsrelatedtoastuckfullywithdrawnsingleRCCAwiththehighestreactivityworth.Thedefinitiondescriptiondiscussing"nochangesinxenonorboronconcentration"wasdeletedsincethislevelofdetailisnotrequired.Theseclarifications,whichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431,areGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.4-ThedefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITYwasrevisedtoremove"supports."ThisphrasewasaddedtothecurrentdefinitionbyReference3butisnotconsistentwiththedefinitionasprovidedinNUREG-1431.Therefore,toprovidedconsistency,thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.xxiii.Thefollowingdefinitionswereaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheassociatedtermsareusedthroughoutthedocument(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):a.ACTIONSb.ACTUATIONLOGICTESTc.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEd.COREALTERATIONe.COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)f.LEAKAGEg.PHYSICSTESTSh.PRESSURETEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)i.RATEDTHERMALPOWERj..STAGGEREDTESTBASISk.TRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)XX1V.XXV.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseofLogicalConnectorswithinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat;ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheCompletionTimeconventionwithinthenewTS.ThereareseveralchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSformatwhicharediscussedinthissection(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):-9-December1995 0 a~b.CompletionTimesinthenewTSarebasedontheformatthattheclockforallRequiredActionsbeginfromthetimethattheConditionisentered.TheCompletionTimesinthenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSaretypicallyequal.Forexample,thenewspecificationsmayrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within36hoursforaspecifiedConditionwhilethecurrentGinnaStationTSrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4withinanadditional30hoursforthesameCondition.TheintentofboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSisthesame(i.e.beinMODE4within36hours).ThenewspecificationsrestrictmultipleentriesintotheACTIONtableforseparateConditionsunlessitisspecificallystatedasacceptable.Forexample,ifoneSIpumpisinoperableandduringtheLCO,asecondSIpumpisdeclaredinoperable,theplantwouldenter3.0conditionsinboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTS.IfthefirstSIpumpwererestoredtoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringMODE3,theplantcouldresumeoperationinbothTS.However,inthecurrentTS,theCompletionTimeforrestoringthesecondSIpumptoOPERABLEstatuswouldbeginfromthetimethatitwasdeclaredinoperable.Inthenewspecifications,theCompletionTimewouldbeginfromthetimethefirstpumpwasdeclaredinoperablewithanadditional24hoursallowed.Thisisaconservativechange.xxvi.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheFrequenciesspecifiedwithintheSRs.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Section1.0ImrovedTS1.ITS1.'1IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-Ol,C.1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.1.Thistravellerwasalsorevisedtoreplacetheseconduseof"crosscalibration"intheCHANNELCALIBRATIONdefinitionwith"qualitativeassessmentofsensorbehavior."1.001'7Confirmtherevisedtravelerchanges,andifnecessarycorrectthemarkupoftheChannelCalibrationdefinitiontomatchtheapprovedtraveler.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthedefinition-10-December1995 Response:iv.V.1.0Q18andisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONwasrevisedbeyondthechangesidentifiedinBh/R-05;C.1toreplace"crosscalibration"with"qualitativeassessmentofsensorbehavior."ThechangeissimilartothechangeapprovedinBh'R-05,C.l.Theterm"crosscalibration"impliesactivitieswhicharenotpossibleonRTDsorthermocouples."Calibrations"typicallyrequireadjustmentsofdevicestocausethemtoconformtoadesiredoutput.Inthissense,RTDsandthermocouplescannotbecalibrated.TheappropriateactivitytorequireonanRTDorthermocoupleistocrosscompareRTDorthermocoupleoutputindicationsfromsensorsmeasuringthesametemperature.Therefore,thisproposedchangeisintendedtoprovideamoreappropriatepresentationoftheintendedrequirement.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.3,andapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.3..MinorchangesweremadetotheDefinitionsandtheCompletionTimeandFrequencydiscussionstoprovideconsistencywithinthenewspecificationsandbases.Examplesincludetheuseof"plant"versus"unit"sincethereisonlyonenuclearunitatGinnaStation,Replacing"unit"with."plant"isacceptableResponse:Noresponserequired.1.0Q19Response:SpecifyingthattheLEAKAGEdefinitionisrelatedtotheRCSisnotacceptablebecausenotalltermsusedinthedefinitionrefertoRCSleakage.SpecifyingthattheLEAKAGEdefinitionisrelatedtotheRCSAllusesofLEAKAGEintheITSandinthisdefinitionrefertoRCSleakage..TheadditionofthistextwasrequestedbyGinnaoperationssinceCTS3.1.5.Z.Ispecificallyuses"RCSleakage"forthisdefinition.PhileitcouldbearguedthatunidentifiedLEAKAGEcould,beinterpretedasfromunknownsourcesotherthanRCS,theadditionof"RCS"isprovidedtoclarifythismisinterpretationsincethisis'meanttobeunidentifiedleakagefromtheRCSthathasnotbeenplacedintheidentifiedLEAKAGEbinordeterminedtobefromaRCSpressureboundary.ThisinterpretationisalsoconsistentwiththebasesforITSLCO3.4.13whichusesthisdefinition.Therefore,RGBEbelievesthechangeisnecessaryandcorrect.1.0Q20andeditingtheAVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYdefinitionforbetterreadabilityStettheproposeddeletionof"(inMeV)".Thisistheenergyassociatedwithbetaandgammareleasesonaperdisintegrationbasis.OtherwiseprovideanNEItravelerforthischange.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.-11-December1995 Response:V1~Thewords"(inNeV)"wereproposedtobemoved,notdeleted,toeditoriallyenhancethedefinitionofEbarattherequestofGinnaradiationprotectionpersonnel.Thephraseisproposedtoberevisedto"...betaandgammaenergies(inP1eV)perdisintegration..."ThischangewasreectedasatechnicalchangebytheHOG,thereforenotravellerhasbeengenerated.ThedefinitionsforENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATURE(ESF)RESPONSETIME,REACTORTRIPSYSTEM(RTS)RESPONSETIME,MASTERRELAYTEST,andSLAVERELAYTEST,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotrequireESForRTSresponsetimetesting,normasterandslaverelaytesting.TheserequirementsarenotbeingaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithReference2.Therefore,thesedefinitionsarenotapplicable.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.vii.Notused.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.26.1X.X.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.4.ThedefinitionofQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)wasreplacedwiththedefinitionprovidedincurrentGinnaStationTS1.9.TheuseoftheITS,definitionforQPTRwouldrequiremodificationstotheGinnaStationprocesscomputer,procedures,andoperatortraining.ThecurrentQPTRdefinitionwasaddedtotheGinnaStationTSbyReferences4and5.I.OQ21Response:X1.ExplainwhytheproposedITSdefinition,withoutthelastsentenceoftheCTSdefinition,isorisnotachangetotheexistingoperationalrequirementsforGinna.Providesupportingjustificationforyourresponse.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThelastsentenceofCTS1.9hasbeenrelocatedtoNotes2and3forITSSR3.2.4.2.These'otesstatethatif(75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,thenusetheremainingthreechannelstoverifyqPTR.If~75%RTPandmorethanonepowerrangechannelinoperable,ITSSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2mustbeperformed.ThesetwoSRsrequireacorefluxmaptoconfirmthatqPTRiswithinlimitswhichgoesbeyondCTSrequirements.Consequently,theITSrequirementsareactuallymoreconservativethanCTS.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.2.xii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.4.1.0Q22Response:Justifythechangestothe[]statementintheISTSdefinitionofshutdownmarginThe1'TSbracketedphrase"nominalzeropowerdesignlevel"wasrevisedto"nominalhotzeropowertemperature"tomoreaccuratelyreflectplantspecificrequirements.Thischangeisconsideredaneditorialenhancementconsistentwithplantnomenclatureanddesign-12-December1995 1.0Q23Response:X1V.xv.1.0Q24andtheuseof"hotzeropower"throughouttheITSandNUREG(e.g.,seebasesforLCO3.4.2).ThetitlesforNODES3and4wereswitched.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththecurrentGinnaStationTS,andthenomenclatureusedinprocedures,theUFSARandotherdocuments.Therevisionofallofthesedocumentsandoperatortrainingmaterialswouldrequiresignificantresourceswithoutanybenefit.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Providedocumentationthatthe[]averagecoolanttemperaturesforthespecifiedmodesisconsistentwithGinnaCTSprocedures.Copiesofstartupprocedureshavebeenprovided(attached).Seealsoresponseto1.0q2.ThedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATION,COTandTADOTwasrevisedtodeletethedisplayrequirementonthebasisthatitwillcreateconfusionwithrespecttoestablishingtheOPERABILITYofachannel.ThesechangesareconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThedefinitionofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131wasrevisedtodeleteandrelocatetotheBasesforLCO3.4.16andLCO3.7.10thedetailsdenotingthethyroiddoseconversionfactors.Thisallows.futureupdatesofthecalculationalmethodstoberevisedwithouthavingtochangetheTechnicalSpecifications.Asaresultoftheproposedrelocationofinformation,theapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.2,wasnotincorporated.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ThesegenericchangesrequiresubmittalofanNEItraveler.Response:ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-03.(ThischangewaslaterwithdrawnbasedonNRCrejectionoftraveller.Seecomment0'233.JThedefinitionofPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)wasrevisedbydeletingthereferencestotheLCO'stobeconsistentwiththe.definitionoftheCOLRandtoprovideacompletedescriptionofitscontent.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.3.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.1.0Q25Response:ThesegenericchangesrequiresubmittalofanNEItraveler.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-04.xvii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-35,C.l.xviii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-14,C.l.X1X.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONdefinitionwasrevisedtoinclude"timeconstants".ThischangeenablesNotesassociatedwithtimeconstantstoberemovedfromChapter3.3.ThisisanITSCategory-13-December1995 (i)change.2.ITS1.21.0Q26IncorporationofapprovedTravel.lerBWOG-01,C.5.Theterm"surveillances"isdeletedsincelogicalconnectorsarenotusedwithrespecttosurveillancesinNUREG-1431.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Appropriatetitleswereappliedtoeachexample.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Editorialcomment.Recommendedmarkupforpage1.3-3;1.3-4ofthemarkupResponse:Thisissuewillbediscussedduringthemeeting.3.ITS1.3IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.7.iii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.7.lv.v.Vl~IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.8.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.3(Rev.1).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-32,C.1.vii.HinorchangestoExample1.3-2andExample1.3-6weremadetoprovideadditionalclarification.Thesechangesdonotaltertheintentoftheexamples.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.1.0Q27Response:Editorialcomment:o.k.,exceptforthefollowing:Changing"one"to"either."thechoiceofwordingintheISTSisconsistentwiththediscussinthesecondparagraphonpage1.3-4ofthemarkup;andadding"untiltheLCOismet"wordingtothelastparagraphoftheISTSonpage1.3-11ofthemarkupRGEEagreestoreviseasrequested.Comment¹159hasbeenopenedtoaddress'heseitems.1.0Q281X.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.9.TheCompletionTimedescriptionwasrevisedtoeliminateconfusionregardingtheapplicabilityoftheRequiredActionsgivenadditionalfailuresintheabsenceofprovisionsforseparateconditionentry.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ThesegenericchangesrequiresubmittalofanNEItraveler.-14-December1995 Response:X.1.0Q29Response:xi.X11.Thischangewasproposedforclarityonlyandisconsideredaneditorialenhancement.Forthisreason,therevisionwasrejectedasatechnicalchangebythehfOGandnotravellerhasbeengenerated.Comment5'160hasbeenopenedtoremovethisclarificationsinceRG&Enolongerviewsitas"critical"forunderstandingtheaffectedsection.Anadditionalstatementwasaddedtoreinforcethat,intheapplicationofCompletionTimeextensions,nosinglecomponent,subsystem,orvariable,etc.,canbeallowedtoremaininoperableforlongerthanthestatedCompletionTime.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Editorialcomment.Insertthecompletiontimediscussionafterthefirstsentenceatthetopofpage1.3-2ofthemarkupRG&EagreestorevisetheITSasrequested.Commentil161hasbeenopenedtorevisethisclarification.This.sectionreferstoCompletionTimesona"onceper"basis,butnoexampleisreferenced.Anappropriateexamplewasadded.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheCompletionTimelogicalconnectorforExample1.3-3wasdeletedsincethisconnectorisnotusedasdiscussedinthechangesforapplicableLCOs.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.4.ITS1.41.0Q30Response:IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.14.MinorchangesweremadetoExample1.4-1toeliminateredundanttest.Thesechangesdonotaltertheintentoftheexample.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Editorialcomment.Let'sdiscussthechangesproposedtopage1.4-2ofthemarkup,somevaluablediscussionusefultounderstandinghowtoapplySR3.0.1havebeendeleted.RG&Eagreestodiscussthisduringtheupcomingmeetings.Essentially,thetextwasproposedtobedeletedsinceitreiteratedthelastparagraphonthesamepage.(Changewaslaterwithdrawnbasedonmeetingweekof11/20/95.SeecommentJ228.)5.ITS2.1.1SL2.1.1wasrevisedtodeletethereferencetothehighestloopaverage.ThisisbaseonGinnaStationdesignedwithtwoloops.TheRCSaveragetemperaturetripsthereactoroncoincidencetwo-out-of-foursignals,withtwochannelsperloop.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ITSFigure2.1.1-1wasreplacedwiththeexistingTechnicalSpecificationFigure2.1-1.TheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)figurereflectstheacceptableoperatingregionsoftheplantandis-15-December1995 consistentwiththecurrentsafetyanalysis.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.iii.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITS.Category(iv)changes):'a~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.C.ThediscussionofDNBcriteriawasrevisedandexpandedtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.d.ThelistingoftheautomaticfunctionsrelatingtotheenforcementofthereactorcoreSLswasrevisedconsistentwiththechangesproposedinITSChapter3.3.e.GinnaStationwasanalyzedforthelockedrotoreventtoshowthatthepeakreactorcoolantsystempressureremainsbelow120%ofdesign.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.f.Theadditionalwordstothereferenceallowforapprovedexceptions.g.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.iv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-Ol,C.1.v.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-11,C.10(Rev.1).ITS2'SL2.2.3-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l)and10CFR50.72.Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SL2.2.4-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thisrequirementforthenotificationofmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommitteesissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothe'ectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0-"Administrative-16-December1995 iv.V.Controls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.Thischangeisconsi'stentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AsaresultofthisTSchange,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.1andC.2werenotincorporated.SL2.2.5-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesection,inpart,duplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l)and10CFR50.73.Thedeletionofthisrequirementeliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thesectionalsorequiresdistributionofthesafetyviolationreporttocertainmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommittees.ThisrequirementissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothersectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0"AdministrativeControls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffect'publicsafety.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.Asaresultofthischange,approvedTravellersWOG-21,C.1andC.2,andBWR-02,C.8andC.Sawerenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SL2.2.6-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesarequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l).Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhenthere.arerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ITS3.0ForcompletenessLCO3.0.7shouldalsobereferencedinLCO3.0.1.AsdiscussedinapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5,LCO3.0.7addressesasituationwhenanLCOrequirementisallowednottobemet.ThisissimilartoLCO3.0.2whichaddressestherequirementofmeeting-17-December1995 theassociatedACTIONSwhennotmeetingaLimitingConditionforOperation.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.10.iii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.11.1V.v.V1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.26(Rev1).In'corporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5(Rev1).MinorchangesaremadetoreflecttheactualproposednewTS.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.10.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-25,C.3.1X.X.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.10(Rev2).Severalwordingchangesweremadetoincreaseunderstanding.ThesechangesdonotaltertheindentoftheTraveller.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.12'i.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.15andWOG-Ol,C,2.X11.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.13(Rev2).xiii.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.xiv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-01,C.11.xv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-07,C.1(Rev1).LCO3.0.3andthebaseswererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoinitiateactiontoshutdowntheplantwithin1hour.Instead,thebasesrequire'heShiftSupervisortoevaluatetheplantconditionstodetermineifaplantshutdownshouldbeinitiatedimmediately,ordeferrediftheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3isexpectedtoberestoredwithinareasonableperiodoftime.However,thetimerestrictionsinLCO3.0.3forHODfchangesmustalwaysbemet.ThischangeprovidestheplantmanagementandoperatingstaffwiththeflexibilitytodeterminethebestcourseofactionshouldLCO3.0.3beentered.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThebasesforSR3.0.1wererevisedtoclarifythatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfytheperformanceofa'nSR.ThischangeallowsthedeletionofmultipleNoteswithintheSRsinChapter3whichstatethesamething.ThechangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.3.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-18-December1995 xviii.LCO3.0.4andthebaseswererevisedtoprovidegreaterclarityandconsistencywithactualGinnaStationpractices.First,thedetailsofwhyexceptionsareallowedtoLCO3.0.4wasdeletedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtothebases.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithLCO3.0.3andSR3.0.2.Second,thebaseswererevisedtoprovideeasierreadability.Inaddition,currentGinnaStationoperatingpracticespreventanyMODEchange,upordown,withinoperableequipmentrequiredfortheMODEdesiredtobeentered.Therefore,thediscussionthatLCO3.0.4doesnotpreventMODEchangesduringa"normalshutdown"conflictswiththesepracticesandwasdeleted.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.Section2.083.0CurrentTS2.TechnicalSpecification2.1TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtonotonlyincludewhenthereactorisin"operation"or.critical,butalsowheninMODE2andsubcritical.ThisensuresthattheReactorCoreSafetyLimitsarealsometduringreactorstartupsincethereisapotentialforaninadvertentcriticalitywiththereactornearnormaloperating,temperatureandpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change..Response:TheexistingTS2.1reactorcoresafetylimitapplicabilitywasstatedtoberevisedinimprovedTS2.1.1tonotonlyincludewhenthereactorisin"operation"orcritical,butalsowheninMODE2andsubcritical.ITSMode2iscriticaloperation.Clarifyjustification2.i.RG&EagreestorevisetheCTSmarkupandthischangejustificationasfollows:2.0(2Response:TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtodefinewhenthe.reactorisin"operation"asPIODES1and2.Thisisaneditorialchangeonlysince"oper'ation"hasbeenredefinedasPtODES1and2perchangeD.l.i.d.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Thesafetylimitspecificationreferencesonpage2.1-3listtheFSARandaNRRstaffsafetyevaluationforthe95/95fuelcladdingdamagemargin.Thesereferencesaredeleted.Justifythechange.WhydidreferenceschangetoUFSARfromFSAR?ThesereferencesareintheBasessectionoftheCTSandarenotspecificallyrequiredtobejustifiedsincetheCTSbasesarebeingreplacedintheirentirety.ThecorrespondingITSBasesadequatelydescribesthislevelofdetail.TheITSBasesreflectsreferencesfromthe"UFSAR"ratherthanthe"FSAR"sincetheFSARwassupersededbytheUFSARin1984.TheCTSbaseswerenotrevisedatthattimetoreflecttheuseoftheUFSARsinceitwasassumedtorequireaTSamendment.Instead,across-matrixwasgeneratedinternallytoaddressthisissue.ItshouldalsobenotedthatWestinghousehasreviewedandapprovedthebasesproposedintheITSChapter2.0attherequestoftheGinnaStationPORC.-19-December1995 3.TechnicalSpecification2.2TheApplicabilitywasrevisedto"NODES1,2,3,4,and5."TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequirethisSafetyLimit(SL)tobemetwhenfuelisinthevesselwithoneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensionedorwiththeheadremoved.Withthereactorheadboltslessthanfullytensioned,itishighlyunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurizedgreaterthantheSLpressureduetothelowtemperatureover-pressureprotectionrequirements.Withtheheadremoved,itisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.2)change.2.003Thesafetylimitspecificationreferencesonpage2.2-2listtheFSARfortheRCS110%limitof2735psig.Thesereferencesaredeleted.Justifythechange.WhydidreferenceschangetoUFSARfromFSAR?Response:Seeresponseto2.0q2.4.TechnicalSpecification2.3ThisentiresectionwasrelocatedtoITSChapter'.3,"Instrumentation."ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3-Variouslimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)areaddressedas"TripSetpoints,""AllowableValues,"or"ApplicableNodes"(aspermissives)fortheirrespectiveReactorTripSystem(RTS)instrumentationFunctionsinnewLCO3.3.1.SpecificchangestotheLSSSarediscussedbelowforeachoftheassociatedFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3.1.2.dandTS2.3.1.2.e-Variousparametersusedinthe-methodologyfordeterminingtheOvertemperature~TandtheOverpowerzTFunctionswerenotaddedtothespecifications.TheseparametersareassociatedwithvariableswhichmaychangeasaresultofareloadanalysisandarerelocatedtotheCOLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.iv.V.TS2.3.3.1,TS'2.3.3.2,andFigure2.3-1-TheLSSSforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumTripSetpointvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.3.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS2.3.1.2.g-TheLSSSfortheRCPunderfrequencyFunctionswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisjustifiedinReference44TRN.ThisisaGinna55.TechnicalSpecification6.7whichshowsthatthistripfunction,thoughinstalledatGinnaStation,isnotrequiredorapplicablebasedontheoffsite'owersourcedesign.Thissetpointandrequirementarerelocatedto.theTSCategory(iii)change.-20-December1995 TS6.7.l.a-TheinitialoperatoractionsforSafetyLimit(SL)violationswererevisedasfollows:a.ForviolationoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2,'herequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)wasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinMODE3.Immediatelyshuttingdownthereactorcouldinferactiontoimmediatelytripthereactor.Therevisionprovidesthenecessarytimetoshutdowntheunitinamorecontrolledandorderlymannerthanimmediatelytrippingthereactorwhichcouldresultinaplanttransient.TheproposedtimecontinuestominimizethetimeallowedtooperateinMODE1or2withaSLnotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.44)change.b.ForviolationoftheRCSPressureSLinMODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasaddedwhichrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeSLwithin5minutes.Specifyingatimelimitforoperatorstorestorecomplianceprovidesgreaterguidancetoplantstaff.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.2.0Q4Response:TS6.7.l.b-TherequirementfornotificationtomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NotificationrequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TherequirementfornotificationtotheNRCofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisrequirementisdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.72.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.2.0Q5Response:TS6.7.l.c-TherequirementthataSafetyLimitViolationReportbepreparedwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR.50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementfortheonsitereviewcommitteetoreviewtheSafetyLimitViolationReportwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheresponsibilitiesoftheonsitereviewcommitteearerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SLviolationsarereportedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof10CFR50.73.ThedetailsdescribingtherequirementsforcontentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportis,therefore,controlledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.73anddoesnotneedtobespecifiedinTS..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.TS6.7.1.d-TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttotheNRCwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.-21-December1995 2.0Q6Response:Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thedistributionofreportssubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73arerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.5.TechnicalSpecification3.0AnewsectionLCO3.0.1wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheApplicabilitystatementinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PrevioutguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.1.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionLCO3.0.2wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheassociatedACTIONSupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCOinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.2.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.0.1-Thiswasrevisedtoclarifytheuseoftheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenan.LCOisnotmetand(1)anassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies,or(2)theconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThecurrentrequirementthattheLCOtimelimitsapplyiftheyaremorelimitingthatthoserequiredbyLCO3.0.3isdeletedandanexpandeddiscussionisprovidedintheBasistoclarifytheapplicabilityofthisrequirement.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheclarificationsandexamplesarebasedontheusethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.iv.V.AnewsectionLCO3.0.4wasaddedwhichexplainsthelimitationsonchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmetinthenewTS.ThissectionprovidesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)'hange.AnewsectionLCO3.0.5wasaddedtoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forinstanceswhererestorationofinoperableequipmenttoanOPERABLEstatuscouldnotbeperformedwhilecontinuingtocomply-22-December1995 withRequiredActions.ManyTechnicalSpecificationACTIONSrequireaninoperablecomponenttoberemovedfromservice,suchas:maintaininganisolationvalveclosedortrippinganinoperableinstrumentchannel.ToallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice,ortodemonstratetheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentwhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedwithoutreturningtheequipmenttoservice,anexceptiontotheseRequiredActionsisnecessary.LCO3.0.5isnecessarytoestablishanallowancethat,althoughinformallyutilizedinrestorationofinoperableequipment,isnotformallyrecognizedinthepresentSpecifications.WithoutthisallowancecertaincomponentscouldnotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandaplantshutdownwouldensue.Clearly,itisnottheintentordesirethattheTechnicalSpecificationstoprecludethereturntoserviceofasuspectedOPERABLEcomponenttoconfirmitsOPERABILITY.Thisallowanceisdeemedtorepresentamorestable,safeoperationthanrequiringaplantshutdowntocompletetherestorationandconfirmatorytesting.Sincethisrequirementisinformallyutilizedandhasnolicensingbasis,thissectionisconsideredtoprovidenewrequirementsconsistentwith'theuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.0.2-ThiswasdeletedandreplacedbyLCO3.0.6whichprovidesguidanceregardingtheappropriateACTIONStobetakenwhenasingleinoperability(e.g.,asupportsystem)alsoresultsintheinoperabilityofoneormorerelatedsystems(e.g.,supportedsystem(s)).SinceitsfunctionistoclarifyexistingambiguitiesandtomaintainactionswithintherealmofpreviousindustryinterpretationsandNRCpositions,thisnewprovisiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheinformationcontainedinTS3.0.2wasrelocatedtoLCO3.8.1whichallowsonepowersourcetoasafeguardsbusandaredundantsafetyfeaturesonasecondbustobeinoperablefor12hoursversus1hour.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.AnewsectionLCO3.0.7wasaddedtoprovideguidanceregardingTestExceptionsforLCO3.1.8.ThisLCOallowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecificationrequirementstobechanged(i.e.,madeapplicableinpartorwhole,orsuspended)topermittheperformanceofspecialtestsoroperationswhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformed.IfthisTestExceptionLCOdidnotexist,manyofthespecialtestsandoperationsnecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,specialmaintenanceactivitiesandspecialevolutionscouldnotbeperformed.ThisSpecificationeliminatestheconfusionwhichwouldotherwiseexistastowhichLCOsapplyduringtheperformanceofa'specialtestoroperation.WithoutthisspecificallowancetochangetherequirementsofanotherLCO,aconflictofrequirementscouldbeincorrectlyinterpretedtoexist.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-23-December1995 27.TechnicalSpecification4.0AnewsectionSR3.0.1wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementsandlimitationsthattheSRsmustmeetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply.TS4.0wasrevisedtoclarifythebasicapplicationofthe25%extensiontoroutinesurveillancesconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.1V.AnewsectionSR3.0.3wasaddedwhichestablishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhena'SurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.AnewsectionSR3.0.4wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.Section2.0ImrovedTS5.ITS2.1.1SL2.1.1wasrevisedtodeletethereferencetothehighestloopave'rage.ThisisbaseonGinnaStationdesignedwithtwoloops.TheRCSaveragetemperaturetripsthereactor.oncoincidencetwo-out-of-foursignals,withtwochannelsperloop.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ITSFigure2.l.1-1wasreplacedwiththeexistingTechnicalSpecificationFigure2.1-1.TheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)figurereflectstheacceptableoperatingregionsoftheplantandisconsistent'withthecurrentsafetyanalysis.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.iii.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.ThediscussionofDNBcriteriawasrevisedandexpandedtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.c.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.2.097Basesinsert2.1.3forpageB2.0-3isincomplete;provideadiscussionofthesecondslopeoffigure2.l.1-1andcorrecttheawkwardwordingofthelastsentence,"suchthatovertemperaturethe-24-December1995 hotlegsteamquality....".Response:2.0Q8Insert2.1.3hasbeenrevisedconsistentwiththewordingprovidedinAttachmentCtothesubmittal(attached).Thiswordingwas'evisedatthelastsecondbyPORCwithoutacorrespondingrewordingoftheinsertintheNUREGmarkup.Status:rejectBasesB2.0-8proposeddeletionofsafetylimitUSARreference.Response:2.0Q9Response:AllreferencesonNUREGB2.0-Shasonlybeenupdated(i.e.,itisthesamereference.source,onlythereferencenumberhasbeenchangedduetotheorderinwhichthereferenceiscalleduponbythebases).Theonlyexception.isthedeleted"(Ref.4)"inthefirstlineofthesecondparagraph.ThisdeletionwasmadesinceReference4,or10CFRPart100,isnotthebasesforReactorTripSystemsetpoints..d.ThelistingoftheautomaticfunctionsrelatingtotheenforcementofthereactorcoreSLswasrevisedconsistentwiththechangesproposedinITSChapter3.3.Explainwhythepressurizertriponhighandlowpr'essurearedeletedandnototherwisediscussedintheBases.TheNUREGmarkupincludesthesetripsasfunction7.Alsojustifydeletingtheenthalpydiscussion.Thesefunctionsweredeletedbecausetheyfallintothecategory.oftripfunctionswhichareprovidedtobackuptheprimaryFunctions(e.g.,thoseidentifiedinthelist)forspecificabnormalconditions.Thisbackupcategoryhasbeenincludedasastatementfollowingthelistoffunctions.Pleasenote,thatthesebaseschangesandclarificationswereprovidedbywestinghouseduringthepreparationofthissection.Essentially,thefouritemslistedintbApplilifAty**b**hIi*~ficredited.intheaccidentanalysesforkfestinghouseplants:eolithrespecttotheenthalpydiscussion,thishasbeenrelocatedtotheSafetyLimitssection(i.e.,Insert2.1.3)whereitismorerelevantandeasiertounderstand.(Thisresponsewasrevisedasaresultofmeetingstheweekof11/1/95.Seecomment8219.3e.GinnaStationwasanalyzedforthelockedrotoreventtoshowthatthepeakreactorcoolantsystempressureremainsbelow120%ofdesign.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.f.Theadditionalwordstothereferenceallowforapprovedexceptions.g.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ivIncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-Ol,C.l.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-ll,C.10(Rev.I).-25-December1995 6.ITS2.22.0Q10Response:SL2.2.3-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l)and10CFR50.72.Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThechangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.2.0Q11Response:SL2.2.4-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.ThisrequirementforthenotificationofmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommitteesissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothersectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0-"AdministrativeControls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexisting.regulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AsaresultofthisTSchange,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.1andC.2werenotincorporated.Thischangehasbeen'submittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.SL2.2.5-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesection,inpart,duplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l)and10CFR50.73.Thedeletionofthisrequirementeliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thesectionalsorequiresdistributionofthesafetyviolationreporttocertainmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommittees.ThisrequirementissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothersectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0"AdministrativeControls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.The-26-December1995 2.0gl2Response:relocationoftheseitemswillenableRGIlEtomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.1V.2.0013Response:ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.Asaresultofthischange,approvedTravellersWOG-21,C.1andC.2,andBWR-02,C.8andC.8awerenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SL2.2.6-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesarequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l).~Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRGREmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorother'controlledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-05.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.v.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Section3.0ImrovedTS7.ITS3.03.0(i1Response:ForcompletenessLCO3.0.7shouldalsobereferencedinLCO3.0.1.AsdiscussedinapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5,LCO3.0.7addressesasituation.whenanLCOrequirementisallowednottobemet.ThisissimilartoLCO3.0.2whichaddressestherequirementofmeetingtheassociatedACTIONSwhennotmeetingaLimitingConditionforOperation.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveller.Thi'schangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-06.-27-December1995 ii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.10.iii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.11.iv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.7.v.V1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.26(Rev1).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5(Rev1).MinorchangesaremadetoreflecttheactualproposednewTS.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.10.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-25,C.3.1X.X.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.10(Rev2).Severalwordingchangesweremadetoincreaseunderstanding.ThesechangesdonotaltertheindentoftheTraveller.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.12.xi.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.15andWOG-Ol,C.2.X11~X111.3.0Q2Response:3.0Q3Response:IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.13(Rev2).Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)'change.TheseproposedchangetoBasespageB3.0-10isgenericandrequiresastiffapprovedNEItraveller.Thiswasprovidedforclarityandisconsidered'neditorialenhancement.'orthisreason,therevisionwasrejectedasatechnicalchangebytheHOGandnotravellerhasbeengenerated.CommentiI162hasbeengeneratedtodeletethisinsertedtext.TheproposedchangetoLCO3.0.3Basesonpage83.0-4isgenericandrequiresastaffapprovedNEItraveller.Theproposedchange(otherthanreplacing"unit"with"plant"andmodifyingLCOnumbersandtitles)modifiesthefirsttwosentencesofthesecondparagraphandisconsideredaneditorialenhancement.Forthi'sreason,therevisionwasrejectedas'atechnicalchangebythehlOGandnotravellerhasbeenissued.ThesetwosentencesintheNUREGimplythattherearedifferenttimelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.0.3dependingonwhichNODEtheplantisoriginallyin.Thisisnotthecaseasprovidedinthediscussionandexampleswhichfollowthistext.X1v. XV.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.ll.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-07,C.1(Rev1).-28-December1995 3.0Q4Response:3.0Q5Response:xvi1.3.0Q6Response:xviii~3.0Q7Response:LCO3.0.3andthebaseswererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoinitiateactiontoshutdowntheplantwithin1hour.Instead,thebasesrequiretheShiftSupervisortoevaluatetheplantconditionstodetermineifaplantshutdownshouldbeinitiatedimmediately,ordeferrediftheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3isexpectedtoberestoredwithinareasonableperiodoftime.However,thetimerestrictionsinLCO3.0.3forMODEchangesmustalwaysbemet.ThischangeprovidestheplantmanagementandoperatingstaffwiththeflexibilitytodeterminethebestcourseofactionshouldLCO3.0.3beentered.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheproposedchangetoLCO3.0.3onpage3.0-1isagenericISTSchangeandrequiresastaffapprovedNEItraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-07.(Seealsocomment¹231JTheproposedchangetoLCO3.0.3BasesonpageB3.0-3isagenericISTSchangethatrequiresastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-07.(Seealsocomment¹231)ThebasesforSR3.0.1wererevisedtoclarifythatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfytheperformanceofanSR.ThischangeallowsthedeletionofmultipleNoteswithintheSRsinChapter3whichstatethesamething.ThechangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.3:ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheproposedchangetoSR3.0.1onpage3.0-9isagenericchangetotheISTSthatrequiresastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangehasbeensubmittedasanindustryproposedtravellerTSTF-08.(ThistravellerwasrejectedbytheNRCon12/1/95.Comment¹232wasopenedtoremoveallproposedchanges.JLCO3.0.4andthebaseswererevisedtoprovidegreaterclarityandconsistencywithactualGinnaStationpractices.First,thedetailsofwhyexceptionsareallowedtoLCO3.0.4wasdeletedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtothebases.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithLCO3.0.3andSR3.0.2.Second,thebaseswererevisedtoprovideeasierreadability.Inaddition,currentGinnaStationoperatingpracticespreventanyMODEchange,upordown,withinoperableequipmentrequiredfortheMODEdesiredtobeentered.Therefore,thediscussionthatLCO3.0.4doesnotpreventMODEchangesduringa"normalshutdown"conflictswiththesepracticesandwasdeleted.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.TheproposedchangetoLCO3.0.4onpage3.0-2andBasespageB3.0-5,B3.0-6,B3.0-10aregenericchangestotheISTSthatrequiresastaffapprovedtraveller.ThischangewasmadeattherequestoftheGinnaStationPORCtoprovideadditionalclarityandconsistencywiththerestoftheLCO-29-December1995 section.Thedeletion(orrelocation)ofthelastsentencetoLCO3.0.4(page3.0-2)wasmadetoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.0.3.Thatis,onlythestatementthatexceptionstotheSpecificationareprovidedintheindividualSpecifications"isleftintheLCOwhileadditionaldiscussionandclarificationisprovidedinthebases.AswrittenintheNUREG,thephrase"NODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability"isusedtwiceinthesentenceproposedtobedeletedwhichmakesitverydifficulttofollow.Comment¹163hasbeenopenedtogenerateatravellerforthischange.PithrespecttoBasespageB3.0-5,B3.0-6,andB3.0-10,thefollowingisprovided:a~DeletionoflastsentenceofB3.0-5andfirstsentenceofB3.0-6-GinnaStationimplementsLCO3.0.4atalltimes.Consequently,LCO3.0.4applieswhencomingdownforanormalshutdown(e.g.,theplantisnotallowedtoenterLTOPconditionswithoneorbothPORVsinoperable).ThisisaconservativechangefromtheNUREGthatshouldbeaddressedinthefinalresolutionofTravellerBWR-26,C.1.Comment¹164hasbeenopenedtotrackthisresolutionofthisissuefromtheVOGstandpoint.b.AdditionoftexttofirstparagraphofpageB3.0-6-ThisistherelocationofthetextfromtheLCOsectionasdiscussedabove.c.DeletionoftextinthesecondparagraphofpageB3.0-6-Thisisanerror.Comment¹165hasbeenopenedtoaddthisdeletedtextback.intotheITS.d.AdditionoftexttoB3.0-10-Seeresponseto3.0(2.Sections3.13.23.4and3.5TS6.TechnicalSpecification3.1.13.4(iTS3.l.1.l.b-ThisrequirementwaschangedtorequireentryintoMODE1s8.5%RTPwithinfourhoursversusanimmediatepowerreductionunderadministrativecontrol.Thischangedefinesaspecificnumberofhourstoreachthisconditionwhichprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperators.TheremainingactionsasspecifiedbyTS3.l.1.l.bwererelocatedtoLCO3.4.5andarediscussedin6.iibelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TheCompletiontimeof4hoursdiscussedabovedoesnotagreewithNUREG-1431Rev1orGinnaITSwhichspecifiessixhours.Explainthisdifference.Response:The"fourhours"isatypographicalerrorthatshouldbe"sixhours"whichisconsistentwithITSLCO3.4.4andNUREG-1431.ThiserrorwasintroducedduringtheinitialdraftITSLCO3.4.4thatwaspreparedforplantstaffreviewwhichused"fourhours."However,basedonplantstaffcommentsrelatedtotheabilitytogetbelow-30-December1995 3.4Q21X.8.5ÃRTPwithinfourhours,thiswaschangedtosixhoursintheITSwithoutthecorrespondingchangetothistext.Comment849hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserror.TS3.1.1.5.a-Thelowerlimitforpressurizerwaterlevel(12%)wasnotadded.ThislowerlimitwasrelatedtothepreviousSafetyInjectionactuationlogicwhichrequiredacoincidentlowpressurizerlevelandlowpressurizerpressuretrip.ThislogicwasmodifiedasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45)toeliminatethecoincidentlowpressurizerleveltrip(Ref.46)suchthatthesetpointisnolongerusedinanUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.Therefore,thelowpressurizerwaterlevelsetpointisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.3)change.Thischange'isidentifiedasalessrestrictivechange,anditdoesdeletearequirement.(Shouldthischangehavebeenmadewhenthephysicalchangetothetriplogicwasmade?)Prov'ideanexplanationastowhythischangeisalessrestrictive.Response:Bydefinition,anyCTSrequirementwhichhasbeendeletedorotherwiserelocatedoutsideTSisa"lessrestrictive"changesincethereisnolongeranyTSrequirement.h'ithrespecttothephysicalchangetothetriplogic,thisCTSrequirementshouldhavealsobeeneliminatedatthetimeofthemodification.However,plantproceduresstillrequireoperatorstoverifythatthepressurizerlevelis>12$above350'Fsuchthattheactualrequirementisstillbeingmeteventhoughitisnotnecessaryto.supportanysafetyfunction.3.4Q3X11~TS3.1.1.3.aand3.1.1.3.b-TheserequirementswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotprovideoverpressurizationprotectionduringColdShutdownandRefuelingconditions.Thisisprovidedbythelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)requirement,asspecifiedincurrentTS3.15andnewLCO3.4.12.SincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionduringtheselowMODESofoperation,theserequirementswerenotretained.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.4)change.Provideanexplanationforthisbeingalessrestrictivechange.YoustatethatthepressurizersafetyvalvesneverperformedthesafetyfunctionforprotectingtheRCSfromlowtemperatureoverpressurization,yetthevalveswerethere(operable)inthelowerNODES,whythencouldthesevalvesnotprotecttheRCSfromhighpressureatlowtemperature?WhatistheimportanceofusingReference60inthediscussionofchangejustification?Response:SincetherequirementforthepressurizersafetyvalvesinColdShutdownandRefuelingisbeingremovedfromtheCTS,thisisa"lessrestrictive"changewithrespecttocurrentrequirements.TheLTOPSystemisdesignedtoactuateat424psigtomaintaintheRCSlessthanllOP.'ftheRHRSystemdesignpressureof600psig(see1TSLCO3.4.12).Consequently,theRCSwillneverreachthepressurizersafetyvalveliftsetpointof2485psig21%asrequired-31-December1995 3.4Q4xvi1.byCTS3.1.1.3.a.ItshouldbenotedthattheLTOPSystemwasaddedafterinitialstartupforGinnaStationsuchthatthepressurizersafetieswereoriginallyrelieduponforpressurereductionduringlowerNODES.ArithrespecttoReference60,RG&Ehadoriginally'roposedchangestotheCTSrequirementsforthepressurizersafetyvalvesandPORVsinresponsetoGenericLetter90-06.ThechangesproposedintheNayZ6,1995submittalwereidentifiedassupersedingthoseTSchanges.TS3.1.1.3.c-Thiswasrevisedtochangethepressurizersafetyvalveliftsettingsfrom2485psig+1%to2485psig+2.4%,-3%.Thevalveliftsettingsarerequiredtobesettowithin+1%followingtesting;howevertheOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenrevised.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenevaluatedinthemostlimitingpressuretransientsforGinnaStation(i.e.,lossofexternalloadandlockedrotorevents)andfoundtoresultinacceptableresultswithrespecttothesafetylimitvalues.Thischangeisaresultofaneventinwhichthepressurizersafety.valveswerefoundtohavedriftedoutsidetheexisting+1%tolerancebandfollowingtesting(Ref.58).RevisingtheOPERABILITYtoleranceswillreducethepotentialforfutureLERsforanissuewhichhasbeendemonstratedtoremainwithintheaccidentanalysisrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.'45)change.ThisjustificationshouldbeseparatedfromreducingtheFrequencyofLERs.Thisisnotasafetyanalysisbasisforchangingthetolerances.Theargumentonthetransientanalysisresultshasmeritandshouldbeexpandedtoindicatehowthesevaluesmeetcodesetpointrequirements.ProvidethedetailsoftheanalysisandanyexplanationofwhythischangeisconsideredwithinthescopeofconversiontotheISTS.Response:3.4Q5Thesafetyanalysisbasisforrevisingthepressurizer'safetyvalve'stolerancebandissummarizedintheletterfromwestinghousetoRGBEdatedSeptember8,1995(attached).TheASNEcodetolerancerequirementsforreliefvalvessetabove1000psigare21Ãfollowingtestingand23%forOPERABILITY(seeNUREG-1431,basesforSR3.4.10.1).TheproposedchangesarewithintheseASNElimits.ThischangeisbeingperformedinconjunctionwiththeISTSsubmittalandwasidentifiedbyRGBEasbeinganissuewhenwecommittedtoperformthisconversiontoISTSduetoarecentLERonthisissue.RGBEalsoagreestodeletethesecondtolastsentenceofthechangejustificationrelatedtoLERs.Comment0'49hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.TS3.1.2.1.b-TherequirementforperiodicallyrecalculatingtheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswasrelocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLR.Aperiodicreviewisalreadyrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixHwhichdoesnotneedtoberestatedwithinthetechnical'pecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ThePTLRitselfdoesnotspecificallyaddresstherequirementtoperiodicallyrecalculatetheheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimits.IdentifythelocationofthisrequirementintheimprovedTSeven-32-December1995 Response:thoughthisrequirementmaybecontainedinsomeofthereferencedmaterial.(Asstatedabove,aperiodicsurveillanceprogramisrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixHwhichspecifiesrequirementsforspecimenwithdrawalsandfordeterminingifTSneedtobechanged,butAppendixHisnon-specificonthatpoint.)CTS3.1.2.1.brequiresthatthe"limitlinesshowninFigures3.1-1and3.1-2shallberecalculatedperiodicallyusingthemethodsdiscussedintheBasisSection."Thesetwofiguresaredevelopedbasedonreactorvesselcapsulesurveillancesandotherfactors(e.g.,weldchemistry)suchthatfiguresarevalidforaspecifiedeffectivefullpoweryears(EFPYs).Unlessanyofthefactorswhich-areusedtogeneratethefigureshavechanged,orthefiguresarenearingtheendoftheirspecifiedapplicability,thereisnoneedtorecalculatethem.10CFR50,AppendixHrequiresascheduleforwithdrawingsurveillancecapsules,andsubsequenttotheirwithdrawal,requiresadeterminationifthetwosubjectfiguresneedtoberevised.Alloftheremainingfactorsusedtocalculatethesetwofiguresarenotexpectedtochange.Consequently,RG&EhasinterpretedCTS3.1.2.1.btorequirerecalculationbasedonthesurveillancerequirementsofAppendixH.R6&EagreesthatthechangejustificationisincorrectinstatingthatthisperiodicrecalculationisbeingrelocatedtothePTLRsinceitis,infact,beingdeletedasitisduplicatingexistingregulations.Comment¹49hasbeenopenedtoremovethestatement"relocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLR"andreplaceitwith"deletedfromtechnicalspecifications."3.4Q6iv~TS3.1.2.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTL'RwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.Thischangeisnotadequatelyjustified;i.e.,"notrequiredforsafeoperation"isnotadequate.Providejustificationfordeletionofthisrequirement.Response:8.i.ThebasesforCTS3.1.2.2statethat"thetemperaturerequirementsforthesteamgeneratorcorrespondswiththemeasuredNDTfortheshellofthesteamgenerator."RG&Eisreplacingsteamgeneratorsinthespringof1996withnewS6sthatdonothavethisconcern.Inaddition,theCTSonlyappliesduringNODE5or6sincethisistheonlytimein-whichasteamgeneratorcanbe(70'FatGinnaStationastherearenoRCSisolationvalves.Thatis,thesteamgeneratorvesselcannotbemaintained(70Fand<200psigwiththeRCSgreaterthan200FunlessthesteamgeneratorwasphysicallyisolatedfromtheRCSheatsource.Therefore,withtheRCSatreducedtemperatureandpressure,theconsequencesoffaultingthesteamgeneratorundertheseconditionsissignificantlyreduced.TS3.1.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoraisetheminimumtemperatureforcr'iticalityfrom500'Fto540'F.Thischangewasmadetocorrectadiscrepancybetweenthedefinitionofreactoroperatingmodesandthisrequirement.Currently,GinnaStationTS1.2definesHot-33-December1995 3.4Q7Response:ShutdownasReactivitys-1zk/k%andT,~540'F.Inordertoachievecriticalityat500F,theHotShutJownconditionwouldhavetobedirectlybypassed.Avalueof540'Fwasselectedforthenewminimumtemperatureforcriticalitybasedonpreviousoperatingexperienceduringstartupconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Provideadditionaljustificationtoexplainhow"basedonpreviousoperatingexperience"relatestothenewminimumtemperatureforcriticalityandrelateittooperatingtemperature,ifappropriate.Revisingtheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityfrom500Fto540'FinCTS3.1.3.1isaconservativechangesinceitrequiresadditionalRCSheatupbeforeobtainingcriticality.CTS1.2doesnotspecifyatwhichpointthereactorgoescritical,onlythatOperatingtemperatureis"-580F"andthatHotShutdownis"~540F."NormaloperatingtemperatureforGinnaStationisactually573.5'F.Thetemperatureatwhichcriticalityistypicallyreachedisapproximately545'F;however,allowingforinstrumentuncertainty,thiscouldactuallybeaslowas540F.HotZeroPower(HZP)atGinnaStationrs547'Fatwhichtemperatureseveralsafetyanalysesareperformed.Theproposed7FtolerancedoesnotadverselyaffectanyofthesesafetyanalysessincetheMTCisnotsignificantlyaffectedbythissmalltemperaturedifferenceasdiscussedinthebasesforITSLCO3.4.2.3.4QSResponse:V.TS3.1.3.3-TheexistingactionstatementwasrevisedtorequirethattheplantbeinNODE2withk,<<<1.0within30minutesifT.,foroneorbothRCSloopswas<540'Fversussubcriticalbyanamountequaltoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityduetodepressurization.ThenewrequirementprovidesclearandpreciseinstructionstooperationsandensuresthattheplantisquicklybroughttoaconditioninwhichtheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Provideanexplanationforwhyitisacceptabletodeletetherequirementtoinsertsufficientnegativereactivitytooffsettheeffectsofdepressurizationsincethisissignificantlymorereactivitythanrequiredtosimplyinsertenoughreactivitytobecomejustsubcritical..ITSLCO3.4.2RequiredActionA.lspecifiesthatifTfallsbelow540F,thereactormustbebroughttoasubcriticalconditionwithin'0minutes.Oncesubcriticalconditionsarereached(i.e.,MODE2withkgy(1;0),ITS3.1.1requiresthatShutdownMargin(SDM)limitsshallbemet.ThisLCOensuresthatsufficientreactivityisavailabletooffsettheeffectsofdepressurizationasrequiredinCTS.Therefore,theCTSareITSareessentiallyequivalent.TS3.1.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoreferencecyclespecificNTCrequirementsintheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheNTCmaximumupper1'imitdescribedinTS3.1.3.1remainsthesameinITSLCO3.1.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-34-December1995

3.4QlExplainwhatelementsarerelocatedtotheCOLRprogramandwhatelementsarerelocatedoutsidetheTStoownercontrolleddocuments.Response:CTS3.1.3.1containsrequirementsfor:(1)minimumtemperatureforcriticality;(2)NTCupperlimitwhenatHZPandbelow70%RTP;and(3)NTCupperlimitwhenatHZPandabove70%RTP.TheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityiscontainedinITSLCO3.4.2asdiscussedaboveinresponseto3.4(7.ThetwoNTCupperlimitsatHZParebothspecifiedinITSLCO3.1.4.TheNTCbeginningofcyclelife(BOL)andendofcyclelife(EOL)lowerlimits,whicharenotinCTS,arespecifiedintheCOLR(seeAttachmentFtothe5/26/95submittal).ThereisnoNTClimitrelocatedfromCTStoanownercontrolleddocument.9.i.3.4Q9TS3.1.4.4-ThisspecificationwasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoNODE3withT.,<500Fwithin8hoursversusColdShutdownwithin40hoursconsistentwiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Provideanexplanationdiscussinghowthisisa(v.c)changesincetherevisedLCOdoesnotrequiregoingtocoldshutdownandexistingTSdo.Response:10.3.4Q10Response:OncetheplanthasreachedT,,(500F,theI-131equivalentactivitylimitofCTS3.1.4.1nolongerapplies.Therefore,theplanthasexitedtheNodeofApplicabilityforthisrequirementandfurthershutdowntoColdShutdownasspecifiedinCTS3.1.4.4isnotrequired.SincethereisnotechnicalchangeintheresponsetoexceedingI-131equivalentactivitylimitsintheconversionfromCTStoITS,thiswasidentifiedasan"administrativechange."TS3.1.5.1.1-Addedanewrequirementforthecontainmentsump"A"levelorpumpactuationperLCO3.4.15.Thisleakagedetectionsystemreplacesthecontainmenthumiditydetectorsandtheaircoolercondensateflowmonitor.Thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsdonotmeettherequiredleakageratedetectioncapabilityof1'gpmwithin4hoursasrequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.19).Inaddition,thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsarerecommendedbyRG1.45(Ref.17)toonlybeusedasanalarmorindirectindicationofleakagetocontainmentandnotasaseparatemethodofdetectingleakage.TheremainingleakagedetectionsystemsprovideadequatemonitoringasdiscussedinthenewbasesandSectionC,item46.TheseareGinnaTSCategory.(v.a)changes.Provideabriefexplanationofthesumppumpmonitoralarms..Discusswhetherthealarmsactuateonpumpactuationfrequency,.totalpumpingtime,andsumplevel,anddiscusshowleakageisquantified.Thesumppumpmonitoralarmsactuateonclosingofthesumppumpbreakerandcontrolroomannunciatorsremainlituntilthepumpstopsandthebreakeropens.Theoperationofthepumpisloggedbycontrolroomoperatorssuchthatasumppumpactuationintervalandassociatedleakagerateisdeterminedeveryshift.Copiesofthe-35-December1995 3.4glliv.twoprocedureswhichrequireloggingofthesumppumpactuation(AR-C-18)andthedeterminationofsumppumpintervalandleakagerate(S-12.4)areattached.TS3.1.5.2.2.c-TherequirementtocommenceareactorshutdownwithexcessiveSGtubeleakagewasrevisedtoallowanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramconsistentwithLCO3.4.13.B.RequiringareactorshutdownformostadministrativeerrorsisnotprudentbasedontheincreasedriskforatransientwhilechangingMODES.However,iftheintegrityofthetubeisdeterminedtobeinadequate,areactorshutdownwillcontinuetobeimmediatelyinitiated.Also,therequirementtoperformaSGinspectionwithexcessiveleakageifaninspectionhasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast.6monthswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.AnySGinspectionswillbedeterminedaspartofthecorrectiveactionsnecessarytorepairtheleakingtubeandinaccordancewiththeSteamGenerator'ubeSurveillanceProgram.SinceLCO3.0.4appliestothisLCO,theplantcannotgoaboveMODE5withoutverifyingthattheSGtubeintegrityisacceptable.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.8)changes.ThereasonforaddingConditionBaccordingtotheBasesis,"toallowanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram...".ThereasonforConditionBisnotclear.ItshouldnotbeassociatedwithSGleakageasisdoneinthisjustification.Thelead-insentencetothisitemstatesthat"therequirementtocommenceareactorshutdownwithexcessiveleakagewasrevisedtoallowanadditional4hours"isnotassociatedwithsteamgeneratorleakage.ExplainhowtheproposedactiontodeclaretheSGinoperableifthereisaprogramdeviationisrelevanttoLCO3.4.13requirements?ProvideabetterexplanationandsafetybasisjustificationontheneedforConditionB.Response:3.4gl2ConditionBwasaddedasaresultofapprovedTravellerWOG-15,C.1,RevisionI(attached).ThejustificationforthistravellerwasbasedonthedesiretoaddresssteamgeneratorprogramdeficienciesfoundwhileinNODES1,2,3,or4toallowlicenseestimetoeithercorrecttheproblemsorcontacttheNRC.TheintentionoftheRG&EjustificationwastostatethatCTS3.1.5.2.2.cwasbeingrevisedtoalsoaddresssteamgeneratorprogramdeficiencies.Forcaseswheredeficienciesintheprogramexist,butwhereprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisstillwithinallowedlimits,4hoursisprovidedtocorrecttheadministrativeproblem.Comment¹49hasbeenopenedtoclarifythisRG&Echangejustification.(Thisresponsewasrevisedpercomment¹239JJustifychangingtheexistingTSrequirementfrom"beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCS'temperaturelessthan350Fwithinthefollowing6hours"to"BeinMODE3"in6hoursand"BeMODE5in36hours."Response:TheRCSLEAKAGElimitMODEofApplicabilityhavebeenexpandedfromabove350'F(orNODE3)toabove200F(orNODE4)whichisa-36-December1995 conservativechangeconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Consequently,ifRCSLEAKAGElimitsarenotmet,theplantmustenterMODE5toexittheMODEofApplicabilityforITSLCO3.4.13.Currently,theplantmustonlygotoMODE4toexittheMODEofApplicabilityandhasIZhourstoperformthisaction.Allowinganadditional24hourstoreachMODE5isconsideredacceptableduetothetimerequiredtoreachtheseconditions.ThetimetoreachMODE5isalsoconsistentwithLCO3.0.3.3.4Q13Response:12.i.~~3.4Q14Response:JustifywhyandhowtheSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureProgramreplacestherequirementtoperformaSGinspectionifonehasnotbeenperformedinlast6months.CTS3.1.5.2.2.crequiresthatwithexcessivesteamgeneratorleakage,theplantmustshutdownand"Ifmorethansixmonthshaveelapsedsince.thelaststeamgeneratorinspection,performaninspectioninaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification4.2."CTS4.2.1.4onlystatesthatinspectionintervalsforsteamgeneratortubesshallbespecifiedintheISTProgramandprovideseddycurrentdetectedtubeimperfectionacceptancelimits.Consequently,theISTProgramreallycontainstheinspectionintervalsforbothnormaltestingrequirementsandfollowingdetectionofexcessiveleakage.RemovingthisstatementfromCTS3.1.5.2.2.cisacceptablesinceCTS4.Zdoesnothaveanyactualtestingrequirements..TS3.2.5-Therequi,rementwasrevisedtorequireplacingachargingpumpinpull-stopwithin1hourregardlessofthestatusoftheRHRpumpsortheMODE.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesdirectoperatorguidancetoperformanactionwithinadefinedtimeperiod:Also,these.requirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.Theverificationofthechargingpumpstatusevery12hourswasalsonotaddedsincethe"plantisrequiredtobeinadepressurizedandventedconditionwithin8hourswhichremovestheneedtoisolateachargingpump(i.e.,a1.1squareinchventcanmitigateacharging/letdownmismatchevent).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a),(i),and(v.c)changes,respectively.Provideappropriatedesignbasisand'afetyanalysisbasisjustificationwhyGinnaneedsonlytoprotectagainstasinglechargingpumpstartingforventedRCSconditionswhenthereare3operablechargingpumps.TherequirementtoonlyisolateonechargingpumpforRCSventedconditionsinITSLCO3.4.12isconsistentwithCTS3.2.5.TheNRCSERwhichimplementedCTS3.4.12isattached.AlthoughthisSERdoesnotspecificallyaddressthechargingpumpissue,itreferencesanRGBEletterdatedFebruary24,1977(asdothebasesforCTS3.2.5).Thisletter(attached)providestheresultsofananalysisdemonstratingthatreliefvalveZ03intheRHRSystemcanmitigate2of3chargingpumpsfollowingcompleteisolationofletdown.Theinternalflowpathdiameterofreliefvalve203is0.5squareincheswhichislessthantheCTSandITSrequiredI.Isquareinchventpath.-37-December1995 13.i.3.5QIResponse:3.5Q2TS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3-LCO3.5.1ConditionAwasaddedwhichallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesincethevolumeofwaterintheaccumulatorsisthecriticalfeature.Attemptingtocorrectboronconcentrationwithinthecurrent1hourlimitwouldcreateasignificantburdenontheoperationsstaff.Therefore,thecurrent1hourLCOwasonlymaintainedforaccumulatorpressureandvolume.Inaddition,theaccumulatorboronconcentrationlimitswererelocatedtotheCOLRsincethesevaluescanchangeduetorefuelingcyclechanges.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.9)and(iii)changes,respectively.Provideadditionaljustificationforthechangefroma1hourto72hoursTSlimittoadjustaccumulatorboronconcentrationbydocumentingtheoperationalhardshipwiththetypicaltimeneededtocompleteaboronadjustmentandtoachieveanacceptableconcentration.Also,includeanysafetyanalysisbasisthatsupportstheproposedchange.Onceitisdeterminedthattheaccumulatorboronconcentrationneedstobechanged,operations"andchemistrymustfirstcalculatetherequiredborontobeadded.TheaccumulatoristhendrainedtojustabovetheTSminimumrequiredlevelandtheboratedwateraddedfromtheRUST.Dependingontheinitialaccumulatorboronconcentration,thetankmayneedtobedrainedandfilledseveraltimestoreachtherequiredlimitsincetheRk/STismaintainedatonly2000ppmandthereisonly25cubicfeetofwatervolumeintheaccumulatortoworkwith.Sincetheseactionscantakelongerthan'onehourtocomplete,RGEEattemptstomaintainaccumulatorboronconcentrationsufficientlyabovetheTSlimitsuchthatactionsareinitiatedbeforeTSlimitsarereached.Thisisperformedinpartbychecksofaccumulatorleveleveryshift.PithrespecttotheaccidentanalysisforGinnaStation,thewaterinventoryintheaccumulatorsisthemostsignificantfeatureduetotheboronconcentrationavailablefromtheRh(ST.Thecriticalaccidentscenariowithrespecttoboronconcentrationisasteamlinebreakforwhichtheaccumulatorsdonotdump.TS3.3.1.l.b-ThebasesforTS3.3wererevisedtoupdatethespecifiedwatervolumecontainedintheaccumulatorwithrespecttothe50%and82%levels.TherequiredlevelsspecifiedinTS3.3.l.l.bhavenotbeenchanged,onlythecorrespondingwatervolumesprovidedinthebases.Thenewvaluesareconsistentwiththoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(seeCOLR,Table1).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TheBasesfor"ITSLCO3.5.1,Accumulators,donotprovidetheaccumulatorvolumeassumedintheaccidentanalysisasstated.Also,couldnotfindthisvalueinexistingTS3.3Basesasindicated.Provideanexplanationthatdescribeshowoperatorswillhaveaccesstothesevolumes.Response:CTSbasespage3.3-13containstheaccumulatorwatervolumes.Thisstatesthattheaccumulator50%indicatedlevelisequivalentto-38-December1995 20.3.1Q2Response:1108cubicfeetofwaterwhilethe82%indicatedlevelisequivalentto1134cubicfeetofwater.ITSSR3.5.1.2statesthat50%equatesto1126cubicfeetwhile82%equatesto1154cubicfeet.Thesechangesarebasedonmorerecentcalculationsoftheactual'ccumulatordesignandareconservativechangeswithrespecttotheaccidentanalyses(i.e.,theanalyseswereperformedassumingonly1108cubicfeetand1134cubicfeetwereavailable).SincethesevolumesareactuallyspecifiedintheSR,theyarenotreiteratedinthebasesforITSLCO3.5.1.klithrespecttooperatorsaccesstothesevolumes,aslongastheaccumulatorsaremaintainedwithintherequiredindicatedlevelsofITSSR3.5.1.2,thiswillensurethatthenecessaryvo'lumeasassumedintheaccidentanalysisisavailable.tTS3.10.4.2andTS3.10.4.3-Thesewererevisedtoremoveconditionsofrodinoperabilityduetobeingimmovable.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.Referencetofulllengthrods,wasalsoremovedsincetherearenopartlengthrodsinthereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ProvideansafetybasisexplanationdescribinghowthechangetoredefinerodOPERABILITYisanadministrativechange,'especiallysincetheexistingTSwouldrequireanimmovablerodtobedeclaredinoperableandputtheplantonashutdowntrack.CTS3.10.4.2requiresacontrolrodtobedeclaredinoperabledueto"beingimmovableasaresultofexcessivefrictionormechanicalinterferenceorknowntobeuntrippable."CTS3.10.4.3providesrequirementsforacontrolrod"inoperableforcausesotherthanaddressedby3.10.4.2,above,ormisalignedfromits'groupstepcounterdemandpositionbymorethan212steps."R68EhasalwaysinterpretedCTS3.10.4.2toaddressproblemsinwhichthec'ontrolrodwasunabletoinsertintothecorewithinaccidentassumedtimelimits(i.e.,thattherodwas"untrippable").Neanwhile,CTS3.10.4.3.addressesproblemssuchasacontrolrodw'hichisunabletofullywithdraw.Inthiscase;CTSrequirealigningallrodsintheaffectedcontrolrodgrouporreducingpowerto~75%RTPwithin1hour.x111.RG&Ehaspro'posedtoremove"beingimmoveableasaresultofexcessivefrictionormechanicalinterference"fromCTS3.10.4.2and"inoperableforcausesotherthanaddressedby3.10.4.2,above"fromCTS3.10.4.3.ThebasesforITSLCO3.1.4statethat"ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovablebutremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrodisconsideredOPERABLE."ThisbasesdiscussionisconsistentwithRG8E'sinterpretationoftheseCTSrequirementssuchthatthedeletedCTStextisonlyconsideredanadministrativechangesincethesamerequirementsarebeingimplemented.TS3.10.4.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoremovetherequiremen'ttodeclareamisalignedrodinoperablewhentherodcannotberestoredtowithinthealignmentlimitsin1hour.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableevenif-39-December1995 -3.1(3theyareimmovable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.ProvideansafetybasisexplanationdescribinghowthechangetodefineamisalignedrodtobeOPERABLE,evenifunabletorestorealignmentwithinonehour,isamorerestrictivechange.ExistingTSwouldrequireamisalignedrodtoputtheplantonapowerreductiontrackunlessrestoredtowithinlimitsinonehour.Response:CTS3.10.4.3addressesmisalignedcontrolrodsandrequiresthatitberestoredto.OPERABLEstatusortheroddeclaredinoperableandshutdownmargin(SDN)verifiedwithin1hour.Inaddition,ifthecontrolrodisdeclaredinoperable,theremainingrodsintheaffectedcontrolgroupmustbeeitheralignedwiththeinoperablecontrolrodorpowerreducedto~752,'TPwithin1hour.RG8EhasproposedtodeletetherequirementtodeclaretherodinoperableifitisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hoursinceiftheoptiontoalignallrodsintheaffectedcontrolgroupischosen,therodisnolongerinoperablebecauseitiswithinalignmentlimitsinbothCTSandITS.Iftheoptiontoreducepowerto~75%RTPischosen,severaladditionalactionsarerequiredincludingaverificationthattheaccidentanalysesremainvalidwiththemisalignedrod.Oncethisaccidentanalysisverificationhasbeencompleted,operationmaycontinuebuttherodremainsinoperable.Therefore,inthefirstofthesetwooptions,theaffectedcontrolrodisnotinoperableanddeletingthistextisactuallyan"administrativechange"insteadofa"morerestrictivechange."Comment¹50hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserrorinAttachmentAofthesubmittal.3.1(4Response:TS3.10.4.3.2.bandTS3.10.4.3.2.c-Thesewererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoreducethe'ighneutronfluxtripsetpointto~85%RTPwhenthepowerlevelisreducedtos75%RTP.ThisrequiredactionisdeletedbasedonagreementsbetweentheNRCandtheownersgroupsandisconsistentwithWCAP-13029(Ref.50)whichstatesthatthesafetyanalysesresultswouldnotbesignificantlyaffectedbychangestotheirinitialassumptionsasaresultofincreasedpeakingfactorscausedbyrodmisalignment.Additionally,thepeakingfactorlimitverificationwithin72hoursandthere-evaluationofthesafetyanalysiswithin5daysthatarerequiredbythisspecificationprovidefurtherassurancethattheassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisarepreserved.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Provideansafetybasisexplanationastowhythischangeisanadministrativechangesincethetripsetpointsarenolongerrequiredtoberesetdownward.Resettingdownwardwillprovideanearliertripwhichisintheconservativedirection.RGBEagreesthatthisisnotanadministrativechangeandisactuallya"lessrestrictivechange."Comment¹51hasbeenopenedtoaddressthisissue,includingtheneedforanosignificanthazardsevaluation.xvii.TS3.10.4.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoverifySHUTDOWNMARGINorinitiateborationwithin1hourwhenmorethan-40-December1995 3.1Q5onerodisoutofalignment.TheITSBasesstatethat1hourisareasonabletimebasedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenondistributionandthelowprobabilityofaaccident.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Providearationaleforthemorerestrictivechange,(v.a)categoryappliedtothisitem.ItappearstobelessrestrictivesincethenewrequirementallowsanhourtodetermineSDNortoborateandrestorethemarginifneedbe,butstillrequirestheplanttobeinhotshutdownin6hours.Response:ThisisalessrestrictivechangesinceeventhoughCTSandITSrequiretheplanttobeinNODE2withk<<(1.0(orHotShutdown)within6hoursinthiscondition,theITSalsorequireverificationofSDMwithinthefirsthour.Consequently,withtheadditionalSDMverificationrequiredinITS,thisisa"morerestrictive"changewithrespecttoCTSrequirements.3.1Q6xviii.TS3.10.5.1-ThiswasrevisedtoaddanactionstatementtoclarifythatifmorethanoneHRPIisinoperablepergroupforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankisinoperableforoneormorebanksthentheplantmustenter3.0.3immediately.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.NUREG-1431doesnothaveaspecificConditionforentryintoLCO3.0.3asITSLCO3.1.7,RodPositionIndicationdoes,butitisimplicitfromthegenericLCO3.0.3discussionofrequirementsthatLCO3.0.3wouldapplyiftheconditionexistsandthespecificLCOdoesnotsostateit.ExplainthereasonforinclusionofstatementtoenterintoLCO3.0'.Response:XX.AttherequestoftheGinnaStationOperationsdepartment,almosteveryLCOhasaConditionwhichaddressesentryintoLCO3.0.3.ThiswasdonetoassistintheoperationaltransitionfromcustomTStoITSandasahumanfactorsconsideration.Thatis,severalLCOsmusthaveaConditionwhichaddressesentryintoLCO3.0.3duetodesignconsiderations(e.g.,forasystemwithfourdifferenttrains,thelossofmorethantwotrainsmay'bealossofsafetyfunctionasshowninNUREG-1431,LCO3.5.1)).SpecifyingthisLCO3.0.3entryinalmosteveryLCOinsteadofonlyalimitednumberprovidesoperatorswithveryclearandconcise.directions.In,addition,withrespectITSLCO3.1.7,therodpositionindicationsystemusedatGinnaStationisdifferentfromthatprovidedinNUREG-1431.TheCTSarealsoveryclearinthatnomorethan:oneNRPIpergroupmaybeinoperableandnomorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankmaybeinoperableatanyonetime.TS3.10.2.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequiremeasurementofthepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortooperationoftheplantatorabove75%RTPinsteadofpriorto50%RTPconsistentwithITS.ThisrequirementensuresthatthedesignlimitsarenotexceededwhenRTPisachieved,sincepeakingfactorsareusuallydecreasedaspowerincreases.Requiringthissurveillanceat75%versus50%stillprovidesthenecessarymargintoensurethatdesign-41-December1995 3.2(isafetylimitsarenotexceededandprovidestheoperatorwithmoreflexibilityduringpowerascensionfollowingarefueling.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.25)change.Providedocumentationoftheconclusionsforwhythisless'restrictivechangeisacceptable.Whatisthesafetybasisexplanationfortheproposaltoascendto75%RTPwithoutconfirmingthatfueldesignsafetylimitsarenotexceeded?Explainthestatement,"sincepeakingfactorsareusuallydecreasedaspowerisincreases"andwhatmakesthisafactualstatement.Response:XXV'heoriginalrsquirementtomeasurethepowerdistributionpriorto50%RTPduringplantstartupwasbasedonengineeringjudgementandthedesiretoverify,priortoreachingRTP,thatthedesignlimitswillnotbeachieved.Currentindustrypracticeassociatedwiththistechnicalspecificationrequirementhassincebeenrevisedtoallowplantstomeasurethepowerdistributionpriorto75%RTPduringplantstartupinordertoprovideoperatorflexibilityassociatedwiththexenonoscillationsprevalenttothelowerpowerlevelswhichmayaffectthepowerdistributionmeasurements.Performingtheverificationofpowerdistributionlimitspriorto75%RTPversus50%RTPisconsistentwithNVREG-1431SR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.RG&Erequestedthathlestinghouseconfirmthattheincreaseto75%RTPwasacceptableforGinnaStation.westinghouseconfirmedthatthisincreasewasacceptableandprovidedtheabovechangejustification.ThereareseveralrequirementsoutsideoftechnicalspecificationswhichinvolvetheperformanceoffluxmapsandpowerdistributionmeasurementsatlowerpowerlevelsduringstartuptosatisfyPhysicsTestingrequirements.Thesemeasurementsarecurrentlyperformedat30%and60%.atGinnaStation.Assuch,whilemultiplefluxmapswillbeperformedatvariouspowerlevelsduringstartup,verifyingpeakingfactorsarewithintechnicalspecificationrequirementsat75%RTPwil7allowtheplanttoachieveaxenonequilibriumconditionwhichwillprovideamoreaccurateindicationoftheactualpowerdistribution.Thepeakingfactorsareafunctionofthepowerlevelandatreducedpowerlevels,thepeakingfactorlimitsareincreasedbasedontheassociatedpowermultiplicationfactor.Therefore,theclosertheplantistoRTPconditionsduringtheperformanceofthepowerdistributionmeasurements,thenthemoremeaningfulthemeasurementwillbewithrespecttoactualRTPconditions.TS3.10';2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(insteadof24hours)toreducetheOverpoweraTandtheOvertemperatureaTtrip.setpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimi,tsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThissectionwasalsorevisedtoincludeaCompletionTimeof72toreducethePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripsetpoints.Theseactionsprovidefurtherprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributions.The72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.27)change.-42-December1995 3.2Q2Provideansafetybasisexplanationtofurtherjustifythechangefrom24hoursto72hourstoadjustthesesetpointswhenthehotchannelfactorlimitsareexceeded.Response:28.i.bThe72hourstoreducetheOverpowerGTandOvertemperatureDTtripsetpointsisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Providinganadditional48hourstoreducethesetripsetpointsisacceptablesincethepromptreductioninTHERP1ALPOVERwithin15minutesprovidesthenecessarycompensatoryactionswhenhotchannelfactorlimitsareexceeded.Revisingthetripsetpointsisaconservativeactionbeyondthisinitialaction.Theadditional48hoursalsoprovidesgreatertimetoplanandpreparethetripsetpointreductiontoreducethelikelihoodofareactortripduringthisactivity.RevisingthePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripfunctionisalsoconsistentwiththeabovediscussionbutisbeingaddressedunderanindustrytraveller.Comment¹53hasbeenopenedtotrackthistraveller.6.SR3.1.6.1-Requiresverificat'ionwithin4hourspriortocriticalitythatthecriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithin.limitsintheCOLR.3.1Q7Response:3.1Q8Provideanexplanationwhythe"within4hours"isnotincludedintheSurveillanceRequirementstatementortheFrequency.The"within4hours"isatypographicalerrorandshouldberemovedfromthechangejustification.Thereasonforremovingthe"within4hours"fromNUREG-1431SR3.1.7.1isprovidedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item14.xii.,Comment¹50hasbeenopenedtocorrecttheAttachmentAtypographicalerror.(Thisresponsewasrevisedbasedonmeetingweekof9/18/95.Seecomment¹70.J8.SR3.1.8.4-Requiresverificationevery30minutesduringMODE2PHYSICSTESTSthatTHERMALPOWERs5%RTP.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERlevelwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.TheSRnumberintheITSisSR3.1.8.3insteadofSR3.1.8.4asstatedabove.Provideaconfirmationofthecorrectnumber.Response:28.iv.a.ThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentAwhichshouldstateSR3.1.8.3.Comment¹50hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserror.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹1wasrevisedasindicatedinITSSR3.4.16.1toonlyrequireverificationofreactorcoolantgrossspeci,ficactivityonceevery7dayswhenT.,~500'Fversusonceevery72hoursaboveColdShutdown(i.e.,T,,>200'F).Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedonthesmallprobabilityofagrossfuelfailureduringtheadditional4days.Fuelfailuresaremorelikelytooccurduringstartuporfastpowerchangesandnotduringsteadystatepoweroperationduringwhichthemajorityofsamplingisperformed.GrossfuelfailureswillalsoresultinLetdownradiationalarmsandpossiblycontainmentradiationalarmsprovidingadditionaloperatorindication.OnlyrequiringthissurveillancewhenT.,>500'Fprovidesconsistency-43-December1995

3.4Q15withtheLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.34)change.Thedecreaseintheactivitydeterminationintervalneedssupportingjustification.Providedocumentationconcerninghowthealarmswillprotecttheactivitylimitduringthisincreasedsurveillanceinterval.Response:28.iv.c3.4Q16Response:TheLetdownSystemcontainsaradiationalarm(R-9)whichisanionchamberdetectorwitharangeof0.1mr/hrto10,000r/hrspecificallyinstalledtodetectpossiblefuelfailures.BothindicationandalarmforR-9areavailableinthecontrolroom.Thismonitor,hasinfact,detectedfuelproblemsinthepastandischeckedeveryshiftbycontrolroomoperators.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUoitP3wasrevisedperITSSR3.4.16.3todelaydeterminationofEuntil31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofMODE1operationfollowingthereactorbeingsubcriticalfor~48hours.The31dayswasaddedtoensurethatradioactivematerialsareatequilibriuminordertoprovideatruerepresentativesampleforEdeterminationandeliminatepossiblefalsesamples.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Explainwhythisisanadministrativechange,sinceitchangesthesamplingandanalysistechnicalrequirements.RGBEagreesthatthisisnotanadministrativechangeandisactuallya"lessrestrictivechange."Comment852hasbeenopenedtoaddressthisissue,includingtheneedforanosignificanthazardsevaluation.30.iv.3.4Q17Response:TS4.3.3.1,4.3.3.2,and4.3'.3-Therequirementthattheleakagetestsbeperformedwithaminimumtestdifferentialpressureof150psidwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheBasesfornewLCO3.4.14referenceASME,SectionXI(Ref.53)whichprovidesacceptableguidanceforperformingtheseleakagetests.Thisincludesadjustingtheobservedleakageratesforteststhatarenotconductedatthemaximumdifferential.pressurebyassumingthatleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepr'essuredifferentialtotheone-halfpower.ThisisaconservativechangeinmostcasessinceitrequiresthatthePIVsbetestedunderthemaximumdifferentialpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ProvideasafetybasisexplanationsupportingthestatementthattheproposedchangeisconservativeinmostcasessincePIVswillbetestedundermaximumdifferentialpressureconditionsbyadjustingobservedleakageratesfortestsnotconductedatthemaximumdifferentialpressure.Identifythosecaseswheretheresultswouldnotbeconservativewhentheyareconductedatlessthanthemaximumpressuredifferential.TheCTSrequirethatleakage'estingbeperformedatgreaterthan150psidforallPIVs.TheASNEtestingrequirementsascontainedinNRCapprovedstandardONa-1988(attached),requirePIYleakage-44-December1995 V.3.4Q18Response:32.iii.~~testingtobeperformedwiththe"fullmaximumfunctionpressuredifferential."Leakagetestsperformedatlowerpressures"arepermittedinthosetypesofvalvesinwhichservicepressurewilltendtodiminishtheoverallchannelopening,asbypressingthediskintoorontotheseatwithgreaterforce."Therefore,thePIVsaretobetestedusingtheassumedworstcasepressuredifferentialunlessthiscausesthevalvetoseattighterinwhichcasealowerpressuredifferentialisallowedwithacorrespondingleakagelimitreduction.Assuch,thereisnoreductioninsafetysincethecurrent150psidrequired.minimummayinfactbeassistingthevalveinclosing,andmeetingitsleakageacceptancelimits.TS4.3.3.4SpecifiesrequirementsforallowableleakageratelimitsforPIVs.TheallowedleakageratesforPIVswasadjustedfromasinglevalue"forallvalvestoavaluebasedonvalve,sizeconsistentwithSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2.Thischangeprovidesgreaterinformationofvalvedegradationandremovesanunjustifiedpenaltyonlargervalves(Ref.54).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Provideansafetybasisexplanationforwhyitisacceptabletochangetheallowableleakagelimittoonebasedonvalvesize,andexplainhowthiscompareswiththeleakagelimitinexistingTS.ThebasisforusingleakagelimitsbasedonsizeiscontainedinNRCapprovedstandardONa-1988(attached)whichisconsistentwiththeEGSGReportreferencedinthechangejustificationabove.TheCTSspecifyleakagerateslessthan1.0gpmbutallowleakageratesupto5gpmprovidedthatthefollowingismet:currenttestleakaerate.-revioustestleakaerate0.5(5.0gpm)-(currenttestleakagerate)Specifyingleakageratesbasedonsize(0.5gpmpervalvediameter)resultsinthefollowingnew'cceptancecriteria:a.CheckValves878Gand878'CTS4.3.3.2)and877A,877B,878F,and878H(CTS4.3.3.3)are2inchvalvessuchthattheirnewleakagecriteriawillbe1gpm.Therefore,thisisalessrestrictivechangesinceleakageratesupto5gpmareallowedforthesevalves.b.Notoroperatedvalves878Aand878C(CTS4.3.3.3)are2inchvalvessuchthattheirnewleakagecriteriawillbe1gpm.Therefore,thisisalessrestrictivechangesinceleakageratesupto5gpmareallowedforthesevalves.c.Checkvalves853Aand853B(CTS4.3.3,1)are5inchvalvessuchthattheirnewleakagecriteriawillbe2.5gpm.Checkvalves867Aand867B(CTS4.3.3.1)are10inchvalvessuchthattheirnewleakagecriteriawillbe5.0gpm.BothoftheseleakageratesarewithintheCTSlimit.Inaddition,thesevalvesonlyprovidethefirstisolationbarriertotheRCSsincethereisatleastoneothervalveinserieswitheachofthesevalveswhichmustfailtoallowRCSpressurizedfluidintotheRHRandSISystems.TS4.5.2.2.c-ThetestrelatedtoaccumulatorcheckvalvetestingforoperabilityeveryrefuelingshutdownwasrelocatedtotheGinna-45-December'1995 '3.5Q3Response:StationInserviceTestingprogram.Thevalvesarecurrentlypartiallystroketestedquarterlyandrefurbishedeverysixyears.LeakageassociatedwiththesecheckvalvesisaddressedbySR3.5.1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ProvideanexplanationofhowtheleakagepastthesevalvesisaddressedbyITSSR3.5.1.2.ITSSR3.5.1.2requiresverificationofaccumulatorvolumeevery12hours.TheSIpumpsaretestedmonthlybyuseofatestlinetotheEST(seeattachedUFSARdrawing6.3-1,Sheet2).SincetheSIpumpsareonlydesignedwithashutoffheadofapproximately1400ps'ig,thein'ctionlinesarenotisolatedfromtheRCSotherthanbythenormallyclosedcheck,valves.Theaccumulatorsaremaintainedbetween700psigand790psig.Therefore,ifaccumulatorcheckvalves842Aand842Bwereleakingby,SIwouldforcewaterintotheaccumulatorsduringthemonthlytests.ThislevelchangewouldthenbedetectedduringperformanceofSR3.5.1.2.Inaddition,NRCapprovedstandardONa-1988requiresleaktestingofthesecheckvalvesatleastonceevery2yearsasdoestheGinnaStationISTprogram.Section3.3TS3.3Q1-Response:3.3Q2-AttachmentB,CTS2.3.1.2.g,lowreactorcoolantpumpfrequency~57.5Hz,ismarkedeliminated,citing4.v.Thereisnojustification4.v.Providejustificationforrelocatingthelowreactorcoolantpumpfrequency~57.5HzreactortriptotheTechnicalRequirementsManual.(J)Justification4.visprovidedonpage168ofAttachmentA.(Thisresponsewasrevisedbasedonmeetingsweekof11/13/95.Seecomment8222.JTable3.3.1-1inNUREG-1431hasacolumnlabeledTripSetpointandacolumnlabeledAllowableValue.Note'a'othattablenotes"UnitspecificimplementationmaycontainonlyAllowableValuesdependingonSetpointStudymethodologyusedbytheunit."TheGinnaITSusestheTripSetpointcolumn,referencingdiscussion23.vii,.whichstatestheTripSetpointcolumnisusedinaccordancewiththesetpointmethodologytoreflectthelicensee'snomenclature.ItisnotedthatthesubmittalmarkupofNUREG-1431includesbothcolumns.NUREG-1431allowstheuseoftheAllowableValuecolumnonly,butnottheTripSetpointcolumnbyitself.ProvideadditionalbasesforusingonlytheTripSetpointcolumnorreviseITSTable3.3.1-1toincludetheAllowableValues."Response:TheCTSonlyhaveTripSetpointsspecified(seeCTS2.3.1).TheAllowableValuesarenotspecifiedwithintheCTSandareinsteadspecifiedwithintheaccidentanalysesandtheSetpointStudyprogram.ThestationcalibrationproceduresrequirethatthereactortripfunctionsbesetwithintheTripSetpointsspecifiedbytheTSfor"asleft"values(i.e.,valuesfollowingcalibrationtesting).The"asfound"values(e.g.,tripsetpointsdiscovered-46-December1995 duringcalibrationtesting),aretypicallyallowedtobe1-2%beyondtheTripSetpointtoallowforinstrumentdriftandtestingequipmentinaccuracies.Anyvaluesbeyondthisvalueresultinthechannelbeingdeclaredinoperable.TheseallowancesarespecifiedinthecalibrationproceduresandarecontrolledbytheSetpointStudyprogramtoensurethattheAllowableValuesusedintheaccidentanalysisarealwaysmaintained.Itshouldbenotedthatthe1-2%"asfound"allowanceisnotthesameastheAllowableValueusedintheaccidentanalyses.TheA77owableValueuse'dintheaccidentanalysisincludesmultipleissuesthatgobeyonddriftconsiderations(e.g.,physicsissues).Consequently,therearereallythreetypesofsetpointswithrespecttothereactortripsystem:(1)TripSetpointsorthe."asleft"valueswhichifusedensuretheaccidentanalysissetpointassumptionstobemetatalltimes;(2)AllowableValueswhicharetheactualaccidentanalysissetpointsthathavenorealmeaningtostationpersonnelinthefield,and(3)A1-2%va7uebywhichtheTripSetpointcanbeexceededbeforetheaccidentanalysissetpointassumptionisinvalidated(i.e.,theallowable"asfound"value).SincetheCTSonlyhaveaTripSetpoint,andtheinstrumentdriftallowancesarecontrolledbycalibrationproceduresandtheSetpointStudyprogram,RG8EconsidersthatonlyhavingaTripSetpointcolumntobeacceptable.Inaddition,8'estinghousewasapproachedduringthepreparationoftheHay26thsubmittalpackageconcerningthisissueandverbalacceptancewasobtained.westinghousehasbeenrequestedtoprovideadditionalinformationwhichisbeingtrackedbyComment0'28.3.3Q3-Response:3.3Q4-AttachmentE,Page4of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"CTS2.3.2.2/ITSTable3.3.1-1,15.d".ITSTable3.3.1-1doesnothaveafunction15.d.Explaintheentryandjustifythechange.ThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentEexplainedasfollows.FortheinitialinternalreviewofLCO3.3.1,Tab7e3.3.1-1containedthereactortripsysteminterlocks.Forthatreview,Functioni715.dwasthePowerRangeNeutronFluxpermissiveP-9.ThispermissiveistiedintotheReactorCoolantFlow-Low,SingleLooptripasdiscussedinCTS2.3.2.2sinceitenablesthetripfunctionwhen~50%RTP.Therefore,whenthereactortripsysteminterlockswereremovedfromTable3.3.1-1followingthisinitialreview,thedatabasewhichwasusedtogenerateAttachmentEwasnotupdatedtoremove"ITSTable3.3.1-1,15d"andreplaceitwith"SR3.3.1.16."ThisSRverifiesthattheReactorCoolantFlow-Low,SingleLooptripisnotblocked~50%RTP.Commenti718hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis;CTS2.3.3.2definestheLossofPoweranddegradedvoltagesettings(inconjunctionwiththelimitsshowninFigure2.3-1),"measured"values,and"acceptable"valuesrespectively.ITSSR3.3.4.2appearstousedefinedsetpointsandtimedelays.TheBasesstatesthedegradedvoltagerelayshaveinversetimedelaycharacteristics.ProvidejustificationanddocumentationfortheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsofITSSR3.3.4.2,showingthespecifiedAllowable-47-December1995 Response:3.3Q5-ValuesandTripSetpointsareadequatefortheconversiontotheITS.Specificallyaddresstheacceptabilityofspecifyingthetripcurveofthedegradedvoltagerelayswithasinglepoint.Theevaluationwhichwasperformedtoconvertthedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltage"measured"and"acceptable"valuesfromCTSFigure2.3-1todefinedsetpointsandtimedelaysisdocumentedinRG&EDesignAnalysis,DA-EE-93-006-08,"480VoltUndervoltageRelaySettingsandTestAcceptanceCriteria."Acopyofthisanalysisisattached.SincethisanalysiswasusedtodeterminetheactualfieldsetpointsandtestingsetpointstoensurethatCTSFigure2.3-1isalwaysmet,RG&EdecidedtoputtheseactualvaluesintheITStoprovideconsistency.CTS3.12.2limitsthereactorpowerto90%ofratedpoweriftheexcoredetectorshavenothadcurrentsurveillance(calibration).CorrespondingITSSR3.3.1.6requirescalibrationbeforereaching90%RTPfollowingrefuelingifthesurveillancewasnotcompletedwithin92EFPD,butimposesnocorrespondinglimitsonreactorpower.Discussthisconversionandprovidejustificationforthelackoftherequirementtolimitreactorpowerifthecalibrationoftheexcoredetectorsisnotcurrent.Response:3.3Q6-Response:SR3.0.4preventsentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityifaSRisnotcurrent.Therefore,during.initialstartup,SR3.0.4wouldrestricttheplantfromexceeded90%RTPunlessSR3.3.1.6iscurrentsincethisSurveillanceisrequiredfortheOvertemperature~Ttripfunction.However,ifSR3.3.1.6isfoundtobenotcurrentwhen>90%RTP,SR3.0.3wouldprovideupto24hourstoperformthenecessarysurveillance.IfSR3.3.1.6werenotperformedwithinthe24hourlimit,theOvertemperaturezTtripfunctionwouldbedeclaredinoperableandLCO3.0.3wouldbeenteredrequiringaforcedshutdowntoNODE3.Assuch,thereisamaximum24hourwindowinw'hichtheplantcouldbe>90%RTPwithSR3.3.1.6notcurrent.ItisnotedthatCTS3.12.2restrictstheplantto~90%RTPundertheseconditionsbutthereisnoCompletionTimeforachievingthispowerlevel.GiventheshorttimeframetocompleteSR3.3.1.6beforerequiringaplantshutdow'n,itisconsideredacceptablenottorequireapowerreductionduringthissametimeperiod.CTS4.4.7.2,amonthlycalibrationoftheH,monitorsischangedtoa24-monthintervalcalibrationinITSSR3.3.3.2,citingindustryexperience.Show,byhistoricalcalibrationdata,thatthedriftoftheGinnaH2monitorssupportsa24-monthintervalcalibrationcycle.Providejustificationforthedailychannelcheck(CTS4.4.7.1)beingchangedto31-days(ITSSR3.3.3.1).ThisresponseisdividedintotwopartsrelatedtothecalibrationandchannelcheckoftheH~monitors.Currently,RG&EperformstwotypesofcalibrationontheH~monitors.Thefirsttypeofcalibrationisperformedmonthlyandcon'sistsofturningthemonitorsonsincetheyarenormallyinstandby,andensuringthatthemonitorsarezeroedcorrectlyandmeasuringH~betweenaspanof-48-December1995 3.3Q7-Response:0%to10%concentration.Themonitorsareadjustedasnecessarytoensurethesetwoparametersareacceptable.ThenthemonitorsaresuppliedwithtwoknownconcentrationsofH~samplegas(5%and9%)andalllocationswhichindicateH~concentrationsarethenviewedtoensurethattheindicatedconcentrationiswithinacceptabletolerancelimits.Thesecondcalibrationisperformedannuallyandconsistsofthissametestexceptthatallinstrumentstringsarealsocalibratedagainstacceptabletolerancelimits(i.e.,"asfound"valuesaredeterminedduringtesting).ThefactthattheH~monitorsarepotentiallyadjustedwithrespecttotheirzeroedsetpointandspanreadingisacceptablesincethisishowthemonitorswouldbeusedfollowinganaccident.Thatis,perstationprocedureCH-EPIP-CVH2,themonitorswouldbestartedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentandthenadjustedwithrespecttotheirzeroedsetpointandspanreading.TimeisallowedfortheseactionssinceasstatedinthebasesforLCO3.6.7,theminimumhydrogenflammabilityconcentrationwithincontainmentwouldnotbereacheduntil31daysfollowinganaccident.Assuch,RG&Ehasverifiedthattheinstrumentcalibrationscurrentlyperformedannuallywouldsupportasurveillanceintervalof24monthsasdiscussedinAttachmentHofthesubmittal.Areviewofthemonthlycalibrationsshowsthatbetween1990and1994therewereonlyfourinstanceswheretheH~monitorindicationateitherthemonitorpanel,remotepanel,orcontrolroommeterwasfoundoutoftolerancerequiringrepair.Inonlyoneinstancewereallthreemonitorsfoundoutoftolerance,however,thesecondH~monitorremainedOPERABLE.Thechangeinchannelcheckfromoncedailytoonceevery31daysisbasedonNUREG-1431whichjustifiestheFrequencyonthebasisthatchannelfailuresarerare.Inaddition,thehydrogenmonitorsareonlyusedpostaccidenttodetecthighhydrogenconcentrationlevelswhichcouldpotentiallyleadtoabreachofcontainment.ThebasesforLCO3.6.7statethattheminimumhydrogenflammabilityconcentrationwouldnotbereacheduntil31daysfollowinganaccident.Thisprovidessufficienttimetooperatorstodetectanyfailureofahydrogenmonitorwhichwouldbereadilyobservedduetothehydrogenconcentrationchangesfollowingtheaccident,andtheninitiatenecessaryrepairs.Also,GinnaStationcanaccessthePostAccidentSamplingSystem(PASS)ifrequiredforhydrogenmonitoringpurposes.WCAP-14333,May1995,iscitedasjustificationforplacinganinoperablechannelinbypassforupto12hourswhileperformingroutine.surveillancetestingofotherchannels.Similarly,thesamedocumentiscitedasjustificationforallowing72hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusand6additionalhourstoreduce"thermalpower.Describethisbasis,asthisHay1995documentsurelyhasnotreceivedNRCapproval.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinkfCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment¹19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,thefollowingwillbethe-49-December1995 3.3QB-changestotheCTSasaddressedbyComment019:a.changetheCTSlimitof2hoursforbypassinganinoperablechannelto4hours(versustheproposed12hours);andb.changetheCTSlimitof1hourtoplaceaninoperablechannelintripto6hours(versustheproposed72hours)beforerequiringaplantshutdown.TheCTS3.6.4.2requirementtogotohotshutdownifaninoperablehydrogenmonitoringchannelisnotrestoredtooperablestatusischangedtoITSLCO3.3.3,RequiredActionC.1,toinitiatepreparationandsubmittalofaSpecialReport.DescribetheintendedSpecialReport,andtherequiredtimetosubmitit.JustifywhythisSpecialReportisanadequateactiontotakeinlieuofhotshutdown.Response:.3.3Q9-ThebasesforRequiredActionC.1providethedetailsofwhatisrequiredtobecontainedwithintheSpecialReportandtheallowedCompletionTimeforsubmittal.PlacingthisinformationinthebasesisconsistentwithNUREG-1431,LCO3.3.3,ConditionG.Thebasesalsoprovidejustification,inconjunctionwithchange16.ixonpage203ofAttachmentA,astowhyaSpecialReportisadequateinlieuofhotshutdown.Also,asnotedintheresponseto3.3q6,thehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentisnotexpectedtoreachflammabilitylimitsuntil31daysfollowinganaccident.TheCTS3.5.3.2requirementtogotohotshutdownifaninoperablepost-accidentmonitoringchannelisnotrestoredtooperablestatusischangedtoITSLCO3.3.3,RequiredActionC.1,toinitiatepreparationandsubmittalofaSpecialReport.DescribetheintendedSpecialReport,andtherequiredtimetosubmitit.JustifywhythisSpecialReportisanadequateactiontotakeinlieuofhotshutdown.Response:3.3Q10-Response:3.3Qll-ThebasesforRequiredActionC.lprovidethedetailsofwhatis'requiredtobecontainedwithintheSpecialReportandtheallowedCompletionTimeforsubmittal.PlacingthisinformationinthebasesisconsistentwithNUREG-1431,LCO3.3.3,ConditionG.Thebasesalsoprovidejustification,inconjunctionwithchange15.iii.conpage199ofAttachmentA,astowhyaSpecialReportisadequateinlieuofhotshutdown.AttachmentE,Page5of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"New/ITSTable3.3.1-1,15/15.i.ff."AttachmentAdoesnotappeartohaveajustification15.i.ff.Explaintheentryandjustifythechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.Therefore,thisentry("New/ITSTable3.3.1-1,15/15.i.ff")shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentE.CommentII18hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.AttachmentE,Page5of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting-50-December1995 "New/ITSTable3.3.1-1,15/28.i.f."AttachmentA,28.i.f,appearstoaddresschanneloperationaltestsforthepower-andintermediate-rangechannels,butnotthereactortripbreakers.Explaintheentryandjustifythechange.Response:NewNewNewNewNewNewNewITSTable3.3.1-1,3ITSTable3.3.1-1,4ITSTable3.3.1-1,7ITSTable3.3.1-1,9ITSTable3.3.1-1,10ITSTable3.3.1-1,11ITSTable3.3.1-1,13Thisisatypographicalerror.Table3.3.1-1,15/28.i.f")shoulditsplace,newentriesasfollowsTherefore,thisentry("New/ITSbedeletedfromAttachmentE.Inshouldbemade:28.i.f"3.328.i.f3.328.i.f3.328.i.f3.328.i.f3.328.i.f3.328.i.f3.33.3Q12-Response:3.3Q13-Response:3.3Q14-Response:Comment,.818hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.AttachmentE,Page5ofCurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"New/ITSTable3.3.2-1,7/15.ii.d."TheGTSmarkupofTable3.5.2includes"AddFunction7,'ESFASPressurizerPressureInterlock'5.ii.d."Justification15.ii.daddressesfunctionalunits1.cand1.d.Further,neithertheNUREG-1431markupnortheGinnadraftITSincludeFunction7inTable3.3.2-1.ExplaintheentriesregardingFunction7andjustifythechange.ThisisatypographicalerrorinbothAttachmentBandE.TheinitialinternalreviewofLCO3.3.2includedthisfunctionbymistakesinceGinnaStationdoesnothavetheseESFASinterlocks.However,thisfunctionwasnotremovedfromAttachmentBandEasintended.Therefore,theentry"New/ITSTable3.3.2-1,7/15.ii.d"shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentEwhile"AddFunction7,'ESFASPressurizerPressureInterlock'5.ii.d"shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentB.Comments818and20havebeenopenedtocorrecttheseerrors,respectively.AttachmentE,Page5of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"Table3.5-1,AS1/ITSLCO3.3.1/15.i.d"thatislistedtwice.Explainthesignificanceofthisdoublelistingofanapparentlysingularitem.Thisisatypographicalerror.'herefore,thesecondentry("Table3.5-1,AS1/ITS.LCO3.3.1/15.i.d")shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentE.Comment818hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.ThecurrentTechnicalSpecificationforTable3.5-1,Note14,ismarked"LCO3.3.1,ConditionsC,S,andU."TheimprovedTechnicalSpecifications,LCO3.3.1hasnoConditionU.Explainthenotation,andanyassociatedchanges.ThisisatypographicalerrorwithrespecttoConditionU.Therefore,thenotationintheleftmarginforCTSTable3.5-1-51-December1995 3.3Q15-Response:3.3Q16-Response:3.3Q17-Response:3.3Q18-shouldread"LCO3.3.1,ConditionsCandS."CommentiIZOhasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.AttachmentE,Page6of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"Table3.5-1,AS14/ITSLCO3.3.1.v,"withnolistingintheNotescolumn.Explainthesignificanceofthislisting,thechangeinvolved,andthejustificationforthechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.Therefore,thisentry("Table3.5-1,AS14/ITSLCO3.3.1.v")shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentE.Comment818hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Justification15.i.fstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits2(highandlowsettings),5,6,and7tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto72hoursduringsurveillancetestinginstead'fthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG8EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RGEEwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment419hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripandtoallow4hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.Justification15.i.gstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits2(highandlowsettings),5,6,and7tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto12hoursduringsurveillancetestinginsteadofthecurrent2hours.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RGEEhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedin4'CAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RGEEwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).CommentiI19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow4hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.ITSTable3.3.1,Function4,SourceRangeNeutronFlux,callsoutConditionsIandJforMode2.NeitherRequiredActionrestorestheinoperablechannelsimilartowhatRequiredActionK.1does.NorisaModereductionrequiredtoimplementtheRequiredAction(Mode3).-52-December1995 ,Howistheinoperablechannelrestoredandwhataretheassociatedtimelimits?Response:ConditionIisenteredifoneSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelis'noperablewhileConditionJisenteredifbothchannelsareinoperable.RequiredActionJ.lrequiresthattheRTBsbeopened*immediatelywhichisequivalenttoimmediatelyenteringNODE3.TheplantwouldthenbeinConditionLwhichrequirestheimmediatesuspensionofpositivereactivityadditions.Ifonlyonechannelisoperable,RequiredActionI.1requirestheimmediatesuspensionofpositivereactivityadditions.Therefore,nopowerincreaseisallowed.Apower'eductionisnotrequiredsincethePowerRangeNu'etronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripfunctionscanprovidecoreprotection.InNODES3,4,and5,onlytheSourceRangeNeutronFluxprovidestherequiredcoreprotection,consequentlyapowerreductionisnecessaryiftheinoperablechannelisnotrestored.3.3019-,Justification15.i.lstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits8,9,10(lowflowinoneloop),ll,and13tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto72hoursduringsurveillancetestinginsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Nay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.Response:3.3020-Response:RG&Ehasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedin@CAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment¹19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripandtoallow4hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.Justification15.i.mstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits8,9,10(lowflowinoneloop),ll,and13tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto12hoursduringsurveillancetestinginsteadofthecurrent2'hours.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment¹19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwill'bechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripandtoallow4-53-December1995

3.3Q21-hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.CTSTable3.5-1,ActionStatement5,ismarkedConditionsE,N,H,8P.Justifications15.i.land15.i.mnoteFunctionalUnits8,9,10(lowflowinoneloop),11,and13.ThesebecomeFunctionalUnits7.b,8,9.a(lowflowinoneloop),13,and12intheITS,withConditionsE,E,N,P,andE,respectively.ITSTable3.3.1-1appliesConditionMtoFunctions7.a(PressurizerPressure-Low),9.b(ReactorCoolantFlow-Low,TwoLoops),10.b(RCPBreakerPosition),andll(Undervoltage,Bus11Aand11B).ProvidejustificationshowingtheacceptabilityofConditionHforthesefunctions.Response:Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,"ConditionM,"asplacedintheleftmarginforCTSTable3.5-1,ActionStatement5isatypographicalerror.Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Second,ITSTable3.3.1-1,Function¹10.b(RCPBreakerPosition)wasaddedtoCTSTable3.5-1aspartoftheconversioneffort(i.e.;thisfunctioniscurrentlynotatechnicalspecificationrequirementforGinnaStation).SinceConditionMappliestothisfunctioninNUREG-1431,RGEEbelievesittobeacceptable(seechange15.i.wonpage193ofAttachmentA).Third,ActionStatement2toCTSTable3.5-1isappliedtoFunction¹7(PressurizerPressure-Low)whileActionStatement6toCTSTable3.5-1isappliedtoFunction¹IO.b(ReactorCoolantFlow-Low,TwoLoops)and¹14(Undervoltage,Bus11Aand11B).ThesetwoActionStatementsdifferfromConditionMofITSinthatonly1hour(versus6hours)isallowedtorestoreaninoperablechannelwhileantheinoperablechannelisonlyallowedtobebypassedfor2hours(versus4hours)forsurveillancetestingofotherchannels(notethatRGEEisaddressingthe72hourCompletionTimeforrestoringaninoperablechanneland12hourbypasstimeseparatefrom'the.conversionasstatedabove).ThejustificationforincreasedCompletionTimesandbypasstimesbetweentheITSConditionMandCTSisprovidedinVCAP-10271-P-AwhichisaNRCreviewedandapproveddocument(i.e.,ReferenceSinBasesforLCO3.3.1asfoundinNUREG-1431).Comment¹19addressestheimplementationofthisWCAPforGinnaStation.3.3Q22-Response:Justification15.i.ostatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference'30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits10(lowflowinbothloops)and14tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto12hoursduringsurveillancetestinginsteadofbeingtiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanoperablechannel.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimes.andCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RGEEhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RGEEwillbereviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment¹19hasbeen-54-December1995

3.3Q23-Response:3.3Q24-Response:3.3Q25-openedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow4hourstobypassaninoperablechannelversusbeingtiedtothenextfunctionaltestofaninoperablechannel.Justification15.i.nstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsFunctionalUnits'0(lowflowinbothloops),14,and15tohaveaninoperablechannelbypassedforupto72hoursduringsurveillancetestinginsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG8EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinMCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG8EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment819hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentified'funct'ionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripandtoallow4hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.DiscussandjustifyrelocatingtheCTSTable3.5.1/15requirementsfor4-kVACbusunderfrequencytrips.Thisdiscussionandjustificationisprovidedinchange15.i.conpage187ofAttachmentA.Pleasenotifyifadditionaljustificationisrequired.(Thisresponsewasrevisedbasedonmeetingweekof11/12/95.Seecomment8222.JTheCTSmarkup,Table3.5-1,ActionStatement7,mentions15.i.u,ConditionB5C.ThereisnoConditionCinITSLCO3.3.4.ExplainthenotationintheCTSandthelackofConditionCinITSLCO3.3.4.Response:3.3Q26-The"ConditionC"inthemarginforCTSTable3.5-1,ActionStatement7isatypographicalerror.TheinitialLCO3.3.4whichwasdevelopedforinternalreviewcontainedConditionsA,B,andCasfoundinNUREG-1431.However,followingthisinternalreview,ConditionBwasdeletedandConditionCrenamedConditionBasdiscussedinchange27.ivonpage80ofAttachmentA.ThemarkuptoActionStatement7toCTSTable3.5-1wassubsequentlynotcorrectedfollowingincorporationofchange27.ivtotheITS.Comment820hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.TheCTSmarkup,Table3.5-1,Note5,appliestoITSFunctionalUnitsTable3.3.1-1,15,16,and17.ThemarkupatNote5referstoNote(j),FunctionalUnit17(ITS).ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit15(reactortripbreakers)referstoNote(k).FunctionalUnits.16and17donotrefertoafootnotesimilartoCTSNote5.Footnote(j)doesnotappeartoberelatedtoNote5.Explain,inacorrelatedstatement,1)theNote5applicabilitytoITSFunctional-55-December1995 Response:3.3Q27-Response:3.3Q28-Response:UnitsTable3.3.1-1,15,16,and17,and2)theannotatedfootnote(j)(CTSmarkup)andtheFunctionalUnit15useoffootnote(k)(ITS).Justification15.ii.hstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsTable3.3.2-1,tohaveaninoperablechannelplacedintripwithin72hoursinsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271).Comment¹19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintrip.The6hoursisconsistentwithNUREG-1431and.isjustifiedinVCAP-10271.CTSTable3.5.2,3.d,SafetyInjectionStartHotorDrivenPumps,istransferredtoITSTable3.3.2-1,6.c,AuxiliaryFeedwater-SafetyInjection.DescribewhichAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpsarestartedontheSafetyInjectionactuation.ThebasesforLCO3.7.5,AuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem(pages3.7-25and3.7-26),describewhichstartsignalsactuatewhichpumps.Thisinformationissummarizedbelow:StartStartNotor-DrivenTurbine-DrivenAFMStartSinalQuestion1:CTSTable3.5-1,Note5onlyappliestoITSTable3.3.1-1,Functions15,16,and17withrespecttothe"ApplicableNODESorotherSpecifiedConditions"columnandassociatedfootnote(a).ThereisnodifferencebetweenCTSNote5andtherequiredNODEofApplicabilityforITSTable3.3.1-1Functions15,16,and17.5*I:Uidill3..3I,I'-I5*1153FU5"I5,FU515,FU¹17,note(a)"inthelefthandmargininsteadof"FU¹17,note(j)"forthereasonsdiscussedinresponsetoquestion1.Inaddition,CTSTable3.3.1-1,Note4shouldhave"FU¹15,ConditionR,note(k)"insteadof"FU¹15,ConditionR,notei."ThereisnorelationshipbetweenCTSNote5and1'TSfootnote(k).Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Ia~b.C.d.e.AutologicSGLevelSafetyInjectionUVonBuses11Aand11BTripofbothPtFh'umpsYesYesin1/2SGsYesNoYesYes Yesin2/2SGsNoYesNoToclarifythisactuationlogic,RG&EwouldproposetoeitherrevisethebasesforITSTable3.3.2-1,Function¹6orrevisetheFunction-56-December1995 titleinthetableitself(e.g.,Function6.cwouldbecomeAuxiliaryFeedwater-SafetyInjection(RotorDrivenPumpsOnly)).Thesecondoptionispreferred.Comment¹2Zhasbeenopenedtoaddressthisissue.3.3Q29-Response:3.3Q30-Providejustificationforthe48-hourrestorationtimeinsteadofplacingtheinoperablechannelinTRIPwithinone-hourfortheauto-startofAuxiliaryFeedwateronthetripofbothmainfeedwaterpumps(CTSTable3.5-2,3.etoITSTable3.3'-1,6.e).The..."isjustifiedinReference48"isinadequatejustificationtoperformanevaluationoftheacceptablenessofthechange.ThebasesforNVREG-1431,ActionsJ.landJ.2statethat"theallowanceof48hourstoreturnthetraintoanOPERABLEstatusisjustifiedinReference8"whichisthesameasReference48inAttachmentA(i.e.,VCAP-10271).However,uponfurtherreview,ithasbeendeterminedthatk!CAP-l0271didnotprovidethisjustification,althoughitdidincludetheallowedinoperabilityof48hoursinitsevaluationofotherchangestoESFASsurveillancetestintervalsandCompletionTimes.The48hourCompletionTimetorestoretheautostartofthemotor-drivenAFhlpumpsontripofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsalsoexistedinpreviousversionsofSTS(seeNUREG-0452).Theallowanceof48hourscanbejustifiedbythemultipleactuationlogicwhichexistsforAFV.Thisincludestheautostartoftheturbine-drivenAFVpump,whichisredundanttobothmotor-drivenpumps,onlossofthe4kVbuseswhichsupplytheNFVpumps.Also,thetwomotor-drivenpumpsactuateonlowSGlevelwhichwouldoccurfollowinglossoftheNFLpumps.Assuch,thetripoftheNFMpumpsisnotaprimaryactuationfunctioncreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Comment¹23hasbeenopenedtoclarifythebasesjustificationforthe48hourCompletionTime.ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit4.e,appearstobeincorrectlytabulated,thatis,the'e.'snotinthesamehorizontalpositionasthe'a.','b.','c.',and'd.'boveit.LikewisetheentryHigh-HighSteamFlowislinedupasasubsetofHighSteamFlow.Correct.Response:3.3Q31-Response:Comment¹24hasbeenopenedtocorrectthistypographicalerror.TheCTSmarkupforTable3.5-2,6.b,isannotatedFunctionalUnit5.bandFootnoted.ITSTable3.3.2-1hasnofootnote(d).Explainthesignificanceoftheannotationandthereportedfootnote(d).Thisisatypographicalerror.Therefore,CTSTable3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹6.bshouldhave"FU¹5.b,Footnote(c)"insteadof"FU¹5.b,Footnote(d)"intheleftmargin.Inaddition,CTSTable3.5-2,Note**atthebottomofpage3.5-1Zshouldhave"Footnote(c)"insteadof"Note(d)"intheleftmargin.Finally,CTSTable3.5-2,FunctionalUnit5andNote~shouldhave"Footnote(b)"wherever"Note(c)"isused.Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.3.3Q32-AttachmentE,Page7of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferenceto-57-December1995 Response:3.3Q33-Response:3.3Q34-Response:3.3Q35-Response:ProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachment8,'asalisting"CTSTable3.5-2,ASll/ITSLCO3.3.2/15.ii.h."Justification15.ii.haddressesCTSActionStatement12,FunctionalUnit3.c,notActionStatementllaslisted.Explaintheentry,resolvethediscrepancy,andjustifythechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.Therefore,thisentry("Table3.5-2,AS11/ITSLCO3.3.2/15.ii.h")shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentE.Comment¹18hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Justification15.ii.iand15.ii.jstatethechangesarediscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit2.b,toplaceaninoperablechannelinbypassfor12hourswhileperformingsurveillancetestingonaredundantchannelandtohaveaninoperablechannelplacedintripwithin72hoursinsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&Ehasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedink!CAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,MCAP-10271).Comment¹21hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripandtoallow4hours,versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.Justification15.ii.hstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsTable3.3.2-1;FunctionalUnit3.c,tohaveaninoperablechannelplacedintripwithin72hoursinsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.Seeresponseto3.3q27(samequestion).Justification15.ii.mstatesthechangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnits3.b.ii,5.aand5.b,tohaveaninoperablechannelplacedintripwithin72hoursinsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementation-58-December1995 3.3Q36-Response:3.3Q37-Response:3.3Q38-ofTOPS(i.e.,4'CAP-10271).Comment¹21hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,'heCTSwillbechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintrip.The6hoursisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andisjustifiedinVCAP-10271.AttachmentE,Page7of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"CTSTable3.5-2,AS6/ITSLCO3.3.2/15.ii.o."Justification15.ii.oaddressesCTSActionStatement2,FunctionalUnit3.f,notActionStatement6aslisted.Explaintheentry,resolvethediscrepancy,andjustifythechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.Theentry'"Table3.5-2,AS6/ITSLCO3.3.2/15.ii'.o"wasmostlikelyintendedtobe"Table3.5-2,AS6/ITSLCO3.3.2/15.i.o"inAttachmentE.However,thisentrywouldalsobeincorrectsincethechangedocumentedin15.i.oisonlyapplicabletotheuseofCTSActionStatement6inITSTable3.3.1-1andnotITSTable3.3.2-1.Comment¹18hasbeenopenedtodeletethisentryinAttachment'.Justification15.ii.eand15.ii.fstatethechangesarediscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThischangeallowsTable3.5-2,FunctionalUnits1.c,l.e,1.d,6.b,4.cand5.b,toplaceaninoperablechannelinbypassfor12hourswhileperformingsurveillancetestingonaredundantchannelandtohaveaninoperablechannelplacedintripwithin72hoursinsteadofthecurrent1hour.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271)..Comment¹21hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,tosupportthisreview,theCTSwill,bechangedfortheidentifiedfunctionalunitstoallow6hours,versusthecurrent1hour,toplacetheinoperablechannelintripand'oallow4hours(or8hoursasallowedbytheVCAP),versusthecurrent2hours,tobypassaninoperablechannel.ThefollowingvaluesinITSTable3.3.2-1comefromCTSTable3.5-4,withchangesasnotedITSFunction1.c,AllowableValue1.d,Setpointl.e,AllowableValue2.c,AllowableValueCTSValue<5.0psigz1723psigz500psig<40psigITSValuez6.0psigz1750psig~358psig~32.5psigJustifi-cation15.ii.q15.ii.q15.ii.q-59-December1995 ITSFunction4.d,Setpoint4.d,AllowableValue4.e,'llowableValueCTSValues0.4E6ibm/hr8755psig,s545'Fs0.55E6ibm/hr8755psig,<545Fs3.7E6ibm/hr8755psigITSValuedpcorrespondingto~0.49x10~lbs/hrat755psig,T,,~545Fdpcorrespondingto~0.55x10'bs/hrat755psig,T.,@545Fdpcorres~ondingto~3.7x10lbs/hrat755psigJustifi-cationJustification15.ii.qstatestherevisionreflectstheaccidentanalysis.ProvidejustificationshowingthesetpointsandallowablevaluesareinaccordancewiththeGinnaSetpointAnalysis.-60-December1995 Response:Pleaseseetablebelow:ITSTable3.3.2-1SetpointAnalysisAesumptionsFuncnonFunctionDescriptionTripSetpointAllowableValueTripSetpointAllowableValueRGkECalculationIII.cSafetyInjection-ContainmentPressure-Highs40psigs6.0pslg4.0psigs5.0pstgDA-EE-92-041-21I.dSafetyInjection-PressurizerPressure-Low21750psig21715pstg1750psigh1711pslgDA-EE-92487-21l.eSafetyInjection-SteamLinePressure-Low~$14psig~23$8pstg514psig2500pstgDA-EE-92488-212.cContainmentSpray-ContainmentPressure-HighHighs28psigs32.$pstg28psigS30psigDA-EE-92441-2I4.dSteamLineIsolation-HighSteamFlows0.4E6Ibmlhr75$psigs0.$5E6IbmihrI'$$psig0.49E6IbmlhrI75$psigs0.5$E6IbmlhrI75$psigDA-EE-92-089-214.eSteamLineIsolation-HighHighSteamFlowWithSls3.6E6Ibmlhr9755psigs3.7E6IbmIhrO755psig3.6.E6IbmlhrO755psigs3.7E6IbmlhrO'75$psigDA-EE-92M9-21Ascanbeseenfromthistable,thetripsetpointsasusedintheSetpointAnalysisarethesameasthosecontainedinITSTable3.3.2-1(i.e.,thetripsetpointsintheSetpointAnalysisarethemaximumorminimumtripsetpointspecifiedintheITStable).TheonlyexceptionisFunction4.dwheretheSetpointAnalysisassumedahighertripsetpointthantheITS(i.e.,atripsetpointclosertotheAllowableValue).However,ahighertripsetpointisconservativeinthisinstancesincetheAllowableValueremainsthesameinboththeSetpointAnalysisandITSTable.Inaddition,theAllowableValueasassumedintheSetpointAnalysisiseitherequivalentormorelimitingthanthatspecifiedintheITStablesuchthattheSetpointAnalysisremainsbounding.TheonlyexceptioniswithrespecttoFunctionI.dinwhichtheAllowableValueinITSismorelimitingthanthatusedintheSetpointAnalysis.Therefore,RGBEwillreviseDA-EE-92-087-21toreflect-61-IIDecember1995 thischqpge.Comment¹29hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.3Q39-Response:3.3Q40-Response:TheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforSR3.3.4.2werederivedfromCTSFigure2.3-1,whichwasnotincludedinthe3.3or3.8tabsforreview.TheITSBasesB3.3.4,Reference3,mayclarifythetransition.VerifythattheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforSR3.3.4.2arecorrectlyincorporatedintotheITSfromCTSFigure2.3-1.Figure2.3-1isonpage2.3-10oftheCTSasincludedwithinthe3.3tabofAttachmentB.Pleaseseeresponsetoquestion3.3/4(samequestion).AttachmentE,Page7of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"CTSTable3.5-4,8.a/ITSTable3.3.2-1,7.,"ThereisnoFunctionalUnit7associatedwithITSTable3.3.2-1.Explaintheentry,resolvethediscrepancy,andjustifythechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.Theentry"CTSTable3.5-4,8a/ITSTable3.3.2-1,7"shouldbereplacedwith"CTSTable3.5-4,8a/ITSTable3.3.2-1,Footnote(a)"and"CTSTable3.5-4,8a/ITSSR3.3.2.6."Comment¹18hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Inaddition,theCTSmarkupforTable3.5-4,8ashouldberevisedtoreplace"FU¹7"with"Footnote(a)"and"SR3.3.2.6"intheleftmargin.ThebasisforthesechangesisdescribedinITSChange24.iionpage75ofAttachmentA.Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.3.3Q41-Response:3.3Q42-Justification28.i.astates'variouscalibrationandtestingintervalrequirementsforRTSandESFASFunctionswererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.'onsistencywiththeNUREGdoesnotmakethechangeofintervalacceptable,unlessfactorssuchasinstrumentstability,lackofinstrumentdrift,andsetpointcalculationsdocumenttheacceptabilityoftheextendedinterval.Whatarethebasesfortheacceptabilityofthecalibrationandtestingintervalextensions?ThesechangesincalibrationandtestingintervalsarebeingaddressedbyaseparatesubmittalrelatedtoincorporationofNRC,approvedVCAP-10271(i.e.,TOPS).Comments¹19and¹21havebeenopenedtotrackthisissue.Thechangeinthechanneloperationaltestfrommonthlytoquarterlyforthefollowinghavenot(apparently)beenjustified:a.steamgeneratorwaterlevel-high(CTSTable4.1-1,Function11/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit5.b,SR3.3.2.2)b.steamgeneratorwaterlevel-low-low(ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit6.b,SR3.3.2.2)c.steamgeneratorwaterlevel(narrowrange)(ITSTable3.3.3-1,FunctionalUnit20,noSurveillanceRequirement)d.reactorcontainmentpressure(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit17/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnits1.cand2.c,SR-62-December1995 e.g.h.k.m.n.0.p.q.3.3.2.2)~intermediaterangeneutronflux-high(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit2/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit3,SR3.3.1.8)steamgeneratorpressure-low(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit26/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnitl.e,SR3.3.2.2)steamflow-high(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit32/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit4.d,SR3.3.2.2)steamflow-high-high(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit32/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit4.e,SR3.3.2.2)T.,-low(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit33/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit4.d,SR3.3.2.2)controlroomairintakeradiationdetectors(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit36/ITSSR3.3.5.1)overtemperature~T(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit4/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit5,SR3.3.1.7)overpower~T(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit4/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit1,SR3.3.1.7)reactorcoolantflow(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit5/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit9,SR3.3.1.7)pressurizerwaterlevel-high(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit6/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit8,SR3.3.1.7)pressurizerpressure-low/high(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit7/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit7,SR3.3.1.7)pressurizerpressure-low(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit7/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit1.d,SR3.3.2.2)4-kVacundervoltage/underfrequency-Buses11Aand11B(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit8/ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit11,SR3.3.1.9)4-kVacundervoltage/underfrequency-Buses11Aand11B(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit8/ITSTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit6.e,SR3.3.2.3)Response:3.3(43-Response:Providethosejustifications.ThesechangesincalibrationandtestingintervalsarebeingaddressedbyaseparatesubmittalrelatedtoincorporationofNRCapprovedh!CAP-10271(i.e.,TOPS).Comments¹19and¹21havebeenopenedtotrackthisissue.AttachmentE,Page8of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"CTSTable4.1-1,21/ITSTable.3.3.1-1,4."Describehowthevalvetemperatureinterlocks(CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit21)relatetothesourcerangeneutronfluxinstrumentchannels(ITSTable,3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit4).Itappearstobeadiscrepancy.-Explaintheentry,resolvethediscrepancy,andjustifythechange.Thisisatypographicalerror.CTSTable4.1-1Function21(valve-temperatureinterlocks)referstoarefuelingbasistestofNSIVisolation(note-thisFunctionwasaddedaspartofpost-TP11technicalspecificationchangeswhichwererequiredtoensurethatallESFASwerebeingtested).Therefore,theentryinAttachmentEshouldbe"CTSTable4.1-1,21/SR3.3.2.4"whichisarefueling-63-December1995 basisTADOT.TheonlydifferencebetweenCTSandITSistherefuelingintervalwhichisdiscussedandjustifiedinAttachmentHoftheNay26thsubmittal.Change¹18hasbeenopenedtocorrectAttachmentE.3.3Q44-Response:3.3Q45-AttachmentE,Page8of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asthefollowinglistings:CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,1CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,2CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,3CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,4CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,5CTSTable4.1-1,22/ITSTable3.3.2-1,6.Whatistherelationbetweenthepump-valveinterlock(FunctionalUnit22ofCTSTable4.1-1)andthelistedESFASactuationsysteminstrumentationasnoted?Howistherefuelingintervalchannelcheck.ofthepump-valveinterlockimplementedintheITS?Explaintheentries,resolvethediscrepancies,andjustifythechanges.CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit22(Pump-ValveInterlock)requiresacheckeachrefuelingoutagethatallpumpsandvalveswhichreceiveanESFSignalactuateasrequired.Therefore,thisrequirementisrelatedtoallfunctionslistedinITSTable3.3.2-1(i.e.,Functions1-6)andisimplementedbytheTADOTspecifiedforeachAutomaticActuationLogicandAcutationRelayssubfunctionspecifiedinthetable(i.e.,SR3.3.2.4).TheseTADOTsarerequiredevery24monthswhichis-thenewrefuelinginterval.Therefore,exceptfortherefuelingintervalissuewhichis'ddressedinAttachmentHofthesubmittal,thereisnotechnicalchangeinconvertingthisCTSrequirement.AttachmentE,Page8of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'ists"CTS.Table4.1-1,23/ITSTable3.3.1-1,14(TurbineTripSetpoint-SafetyInjectioninputfromESFAS-Calibrationandtestinterval).WhatistherelationbetweentheturbinetripsetpointandtheBlockTrip?Howarethecalibrationandtest.intervalsimplementedin.theITS?Explaintheentries,resolveanydiscrepancies,andjustifythechanges.JustifyrelocationoftheblocktripnotetoUFSARandBases.Response:Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,theAttachmentElistingisatypographicalerror.Thisentryshouldread"CTSTable4.1-1,23/ITSTable3.3.1-1,13.a"(TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure).Comment¹18hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.1naddition,theAttachmentBmarkupofCTSTable4.1-1,Function23shouldberevisedtoreplace"FU¹14,(3.3.1)"intheleftmarginwith"FU¹13.a,(3.3.1)."Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Second,themonthly"BlockTrip"testidentifiedinCTSTable4.1-1,23iscurrentlyperformedbyclosingastopvalveandverifyingthatoneofthethreechannelstrips.The"BlockTrip"notereferstoperformingalogiccombinationtest.-64-December1995 3.3Q46-Response:3.3Q47-Response:Thiscannotbeperformedatpowersinceitwouldcauseareactortrip,hence,thetripisblockedbynotperformingthelogiccombinationtest.Instead,thisisperformedaspartoftherefuelingoutagebasiscalibration.Third,theconversionoftheseturbinetripfunctionrefuelingoutagecalibrationandmonthlytesttotheITSisasfollows.ThecalibrationofLowAutostopOilPressureTurbineTripSetpointwillbeperformedeachrefuelingoutageperSR3.3.1.10whichisconsistentwithCTSTable'4.1-1,23(note-therefuelingoutageintervalhasincreasedfrom18monthsto24monthsasdiscussedandjustifiedinAttachmentHtotheMay26thsubmittal).ThemonthlytestwillnowbereplacedwithaTADOT(SR3.3.1.12)performedonceeveryreactorstartupifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31days.ThischangeinsurveillanceintervalisjustifiedinAttachmentHtotheMay26thsubmittal.Fourth,therelocationofthe"BlockTrip"notefromCTSTable4.1-1isacceptablesincewiththeincorporationofSR3.3.1.12,thisnoteisnolongerrequired(i.e.,thetestwillnolongerbeperformedinaconditionwhichcouldpotentiallyresultinareactortrip).CTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit40,ManualTripBreaker,istestedonarefuelingbasis.The'R'scircledonthemarkup,witha'2'ttached.ITSTable3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit1,requiresaTripActuationDeviceOperationalTestevery24months.Resolvethediscrepancybetweenthenoted12monthsandthe24monthinterval,Justifythechangefromrefuelingto24months.The'12'rovidedinthemarkedupCTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnit40,referstoSR3.3.1.12.Thatis,the"Check","Calibrate",and"Test"columnsforCTSTable4.1-1areidentifiedbytheapplicableLCO¹andtheassociatedSR¹.Forexample,forFunctionalUnit40,themarkeduptextinthe"Test"columnshows"(3.3.1)-12."Thisactuallymeans,LCO3.3.1,SR3.3.1.12.However,thisisatypographicalerrorinthata'll'houldbeprovidedinthe"Test"columnsinceSR3.3.1.11istheactualsurveillance.Inaddition,the'12'nthe"Test"columnforFunctionalUnit41.bshouldalsobe"11."Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Thejustificationforthechangefromrefueling(or18months)to24monthsisprovidedinAttachmentHoftheMay26thsubmittal.Attachmentf,Page8of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'ists"CTSTable4.1-1,8/ITSTable3.3.1-1,11/28.i.c"(4-kVvoltageandfrequency).Whatisthedispositionoftheunderfrequencyrelaysandthe'ustificationforthataction?The4kVunderfrequencyreactortripfunctionhasbeenrelocatedtotheTRNasdiscussedinchange15.i.conpage187ofAttachmentA.Therefore,theCTSmarkupofTable4.1-1,Function8shouldberevisedfrom"FU¹11812(3.3.1)"to"FU¹11(3.3.1)".ThiserrorwascreatedduringtheinitialdraftofLCO3.3.1whichincludedthe4kVunderfrequencyreactortripfunction(i.e.,FU¹12)thatwassubsequentlyrelocated.Inaddition,"15.i.c"shouldbeaddedtotheleftmarginoftheCTSmarkup.Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Comment¹18hasalsobeenopenedtoadd"CTSTable4.1-1,8/I'TSTable3.3;I-l,11/15.i.c"toAttachmentE.-65-December1995

3.3Q48-Response:3.3Q49-Response:AttachmentE,Page8of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,Sor'tedPerAttachmentB,'ists"CTSTable4.1-1,8/ITSTable3.3.1-1,12/28.i.c"(4-kVvoltageandfrequencyintheCTSandSteamGenerator(SG)WaterLevelLow-LowintheITS).Whatistherelationofthetwo?Whatchangeistakingplacehere?Justifythatchange.Asdiscussedaboveintheresponseto3.3/47,thisentryisatypographicalerror.Therefore,theentry"CTSTable4.1-1,8/ITSTable3.3.1-1,12/28.i.c"shouldbedeletedfromAttachmentE.Comment¹18hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis'.TheITSrevisestheNUREG-1431completiontimetoplaceaninoperablechannelinTRIPfrom6hoursto72hours,andthetimelimitanInoperablechannelmaybebypassedforSurveillanceTestingfrom4hoursto12hours.JustificationC.23.istatesthisisjustifiedinReference30.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSections'pplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RGSEhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinklCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RGSEwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,VCAP-10271)whichiswhatthebypassandCompletionTimesofNUREG-1431arebasedupon.Comment¹19hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.3Q50-Response:3.3Q51-JustificationC.23.istatesthefrequenciesofSR3.3.1.3andSR3.3.1.6(fortheovertemperature~T)were"revisedconsistentwithGinnaStationpractices."WherearethesefrequencieslocatedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsorotherdocumentation?IfincludedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications,isthereachangeinthefrequencyand,ifso,whatisthebasisforthechangeinthefrequency?Note,theNUREGmarkupdoesnotincludeSR3.3.1.3forovertemperature~TwhiletheITScorrectlydoes.SR3.3.1.3isnotrequired'withintheCTSwhileSR3.3.1.6isonlypartiallyaddressedbyCTS3.12.1.However,noneofthechangesmadetoSR3.3.1.6impacttherequirementsofCTS3.12.1.GinnaStationcurrentlyperformsthesetwosurveillancesintheformdescribedbytherevisedsurveillancerequirementsandtheirassociatedbases.Thesesurveillancesareimplementedandcontrolledbystationprocedures.AnychangestotheseSRsasprovidedintheHay26thsubmittalcouldhaveasignificantimpactonstationoperationswithnocorrespondingbenefit.ThemissingSR3.3.1.3intheNUREGmarkupisatypographicalerror.Comment¹20hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.TheITSrevisestheNUREG-1431tripsetpointstoplantspecificvalues.JustificationC.23.xxviiistates"theTripSetpointsvaluesforvarioustripfunctionswasreplacedwithanotestatingthesevaluesare'basedonestablishedlimits'."Further,thesetrip-66-December1995 Response:3.3Q52-setpointsarecontrolledwithinplantproceduresandthesetpointmethodologyprogram.Thisappliestothesource-andintermediate-rangeneutronfluxinstrumentation,theBusesllAandllBundervoltageinstrumentation,andlowautostopoilpressureturbinetrip.Fortherecord,wherearethesesetpointslocatedandhowaretheycontrolled.Describetheacceptabilityofthissystemofsetpointcontrol.ThesetpointsfortheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripfunction,SourceRangeNeutrontripfunction,UndervoltageBus11Aand11Btripfunction,andTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripfunctionwerenotaddedtotheITSsincethesesetpointsarenotinourCTS.Inaddition,thesetripfunctionsarebackupfunctionsnotspecificallycreditedinthe.accidentanalysis(i.e.,thesefunctionsarecreditedasabackupforconservatismanduncertaintyconsiderationsbutarenotmodeledwithintheanalysesusinganactualtripsetpoint).ThesetpointsforthesetripfunctionsarecontainedwithinnumerousdocumentswithinRG&Eincludingstationprocedures(e.g.,calibrationprocedures,setpointprocedures),theUFSAR(Section7.2.2.2),andtheSetpoint.Studyprogram.TheaffectedproceduresandtheUFSARarecontrolledunder10CFR50.59whiletheSetpointStudyprogramwouldhavetobenotifiedofasetpointchange.RG8Econsidersthistoprovidesufficientcontrol.ExpandonjustificationC.24.xv.WhatinReference48supportstheextensionofthechanneloperationaltestfrommonthlytoquarterly?ThestatementismadethattheESFASdesigndoesnotallowtestingoftheActuationLogic,theHasterRelays,ortheSlaveRelaysmonthly.WhattestingassurestheirOperabilityandwherearetheserequirementslocated?JustifynothavingthoserequirementsintheITS.0Response:Rf4t'i.IIA-127lj~ill*pp"*thechanneloperationaltestfrommonthlytoquarterly(seeNRClettertoG.T.Goering,HOG,datedApril30,1990).Theplant-specificevaluationofthehistoricaltestdatanecessarytosupportthischangeintestingfrequencyistobeprovidedseparatelybyRGBEperComment821.TheESFASdesignwhichallowsmonthlytestingoftheactuationlogic,masterrelays,andslaverelaysincludestheuseof.installedbypasscapabilityandlowvoltagesignalswhichareinsufficienttopickuparelaybutcapableofverifyingcircuitcontinuit'y(seeNUREG-1431basesforSR3.3.2.2through3.3.2.4).Thisdesignisusedbysolidstateprotectionsystems(e.g.,EAGLE21),butnotbyrelaydrivensystemsasinstalledatGinnaStation.Theonlymethodofverifyingtheactuationlogic,masterrelays,andslaverelaysatGinnaStationistoactuallyinjectasignaltophysicallyactuatetheenddevicecomponents(i.e.performaTADOT).Thistestcanonlybeperformedwhileshutdownsinceareactortripwouldotherwiseoccur.PerformanceofarefuelinqoutageintervalTADOT(SR3.3.2.4)isconsistentwiththeCTSrequirements(Tab'le4.1-1,Functionil22).Therefore,currenttestingrequirementsareretainedwithinITS.Theotherklestinghouse2-LoopplantswhichareofsimilardesignhaveimplementedWCAP-10271withoutrevisingthistestingfrequency.-67-December1995 3.3Q53-Response:3.3Q54-Response:3.3Q55-.Response:3.'3Q56-Response:TheITSrevisestheNUREG-1431completiontimetoplaceaninoperablechannelinTRIPfrom6hoursto72hours,andthetimelimitanInoperablechannelmaybebypassedforSurveillanceTestingfrom4hoursto12hours.JustificationC.24.istatesthisisjustifiedinReference30.Reference30,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,Hay1995,hasnotbeenreviewedandapproved.Further,theSectionsapplicabletothepresentjustificationarenotavailabletothisreviewer.Providestand-alonejustificationforthischange.RG&EhasagreedtoaddresstheissuesjustifiedinVCAP-14333separatefromtheconversion.Therefore,RG&EwillreviseLCO3.3.1and3.3.2toremovealloftheseissuesandrequestimplementationofTOPS(i.e.,4'CAP-10271)whichiswhatthebypasstimesandCompletionTimesinNUREG-1431arebasedupon.Comment¹21hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.ITSTable3.3.3-1specifies'2'teamGeneratorWaterLevel(Narrow-range)channelsand'2perSG'teamGeneratorWaterLevel(Wide-range)channels.AsallthelistedinstrumentationiseitherTypeAvariablesorCategory1instrumentation,shouldn'tthenumberofrequiredchannelslistingforthenarrow-rangechannelsalsoread'2perSG'?Yes,Table3.3.3-1shouldberevisedfortheSteamGeneratorPlaterLevel(Narrow-range)toinclude'perSG'ntherequiredchannelcolumnconsistentwiththewiderangerequirement.Comment¹25hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.Describethelossofpower/degradedvoltagedetection,logic,andactuationfordieselgeneratorstarting.Adrawingwouldbehelpful.TheNUREGmarkupandtheITSstatethatthereneedtobetwoOPERABLEchannelsper480-Vacsafeguardsbus.JustificationC.27.ivstatesthelogicuses"one-out-of-twologictakentwice"andthat"bothchannelsmusttriptooperateaLOPDGstart."Clarifythesemeanings.Therequesteddrawingisattached.Ascanbeseenfromthisdrawing,eachrequiredchannelisactuallycomprisedoftworelays:adegradedvoltagerelayandalossofvoltagerelay.Onerelayfromeachchannelmustactuateinordertogenerateanundervoltagesignalonthebus.RG&EproposestoaddthisdrawingtothebasesforLCO3.3.4withadditionalsupportingbasestext.Comment¹26hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.JustificationC.29.iiistatestheCompletionTimeof48hoursforConditionAfortheCREATSisdiscussedinjustification(D.)15.vii.WhileD.15.viidiscussestheGREATS,itdoesnotdiscusstheCompletionTimeof48hoursforConditionA.AugmentjustificationC.29.iiitostandaloneandprovidethejustificationforthe48hourCompletionTime.ThediscussioninchangeC.29.iiiisatypographicalerrorthatwascreatedduringthedevelopmentoftheinitialLCO3.3.5forinternal-68-December1995 3.3Q57-review.The48hourCompletionTimediscussedinchangeC.29.iiionlypertainstoConditionAofLCO3.7.9whichisconsistentwithCTSrequirements.ConditionAofLCO3.3.5onlyallows1hourtorestoreaninoperablechannelconsistentwithCTS3.5.6.2.Comment¹27hasbeenopenedtodeletetheentiresentencecontainingthisdiscussioninchangeC.29.iii.Inaddition,RG8Enoticedthatthemarked-upNUREGdoesnotrevisetheCompletionTimeforLCO3.3.7,ConditionAfrom7daysto1hourasprovidedintheITS.Comment¹24hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.AttachmentE,Page5of'CurrentGinnaTSCrossReferencetoProposedTS-Table2,SortedPerAttachmentB,'asalisting"New/ITSTable3.3.1-1,14/15.i.x."AttachmentAdoesnotappeartohaveajustification15.i.x.Explaintheentryandjustifythechange.Response:Change15.i.xisprovidedonpage193ofAttachmentA.3.3Q38AResponse:3.3Q6ACurrentTechnicalSpecificationsTable3.5-4,FunctionalUnit2.b,CONTAINMENTSPRAY,High-HighContainmentPressure,ismovedtotheimprovedTechnicalSpecificationsTable3.3.2-1,FunctionalUnit2.c,ContainemntSpray,ContainmentPressure-High.Theallowablevaluewas~40psigandis~32.5psigintheimprovedTechnicalSpecifications.ThesetpointisthesameinbothversionsoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Theallowablevalueasrevised.inlessconservativethanthevalueintheaccidentanalyses,calculationDA-EE-92-041-21,s30'sig.Justifyusing<32.5psigastheallowable,valueintheimprivedTechnicalSpecifications.ThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentA,SectionC,item94.viinthatITSSR3.8.1.6shouldnothaveanoterestrictingperformanceofthisSRinNODES3and4.ThisSRistheverificationthatthealternatecircuitdistributionnetworktotheshutdownloadsisOPERABLE.TheNVREG-1431basesstatethatthisSRshouldnotbeperformedwiththereactorcriticalsinceperformanceoftheSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystems.Therefore,aNoteisappliedwhichrestrictsperformanceofthistestduringNODES1and2.RGBEhasproposedtoremovethisNoteforthefollowingreasons.TheoffsitecircuitryforGinnaStationisdesignedsuchthatthetwooffsitepowersourcescaneachsupplyitsrespectivesafeguardstrain(50/50mode)orthatoneofthetwooffsitepowersourcescansupplybothsafeguardstrains(100/0or0/100mode).Theplantisnormallyruninthe50/50modebutdoeschangetothe100/0or0/100modedependingonmaintenanceactivities.andweatherrelatedissues.Thatis,oneofthetwooffsitepowersourcesismorevulnerabletolighteningstrikesand,assuch,duringsevereweatherconditionsisremovedfromserviceandtheplantrealignedtothe100/0mode.RealigningtheoffsitepowersourcesaccomplishesITSSR3.8.1.6.Sincetheplantnormallyperformstheseactivitiesatpowerwithoutanyelectricaldistributionsystemperturbations,restrictingthisactivity.inNODES1,2,3,or4isunnecessaryandunwarranted.Comment¹33hasbeenopenedtoremovereferencetoITSSR3.8.1.6fromitem94.vi.Theresponseto3.3.Q6statesareviewofthemonthlycalibrations-69-December1995 Response:Section3.6fortheH2monitorshowsthat,between1990and1994,therewereonlyfourinstanceswheretheH~monitorindicationateitherthemonitorpanel,remotepanel,orcontrolroommeterwasfoundoutoftoleranceandrequiringrepair.Thisisafailurerateofapproximately3%(fourfailuresoutofappromiately150calibrations).Inonlyoneinstance,theresponsecontinues,wereallthreemonitorsoutoftolerance,however,thesecondH2monitorremainedOperable.Explainthelaterstatementanddescribetheacceptabilityofthefailurerate.TheeventinwhichthethreemonitorswereoutoftolerancebutthesecondmonitorremainedOPERABLErelatestothefactthatallthreemonitorsweredeclaredinoperableperthecalibrationprocedure.However,thesecondmonitorremainedOPERABLE,itjusthadtobeadjusted.Assuch,eveninthisinstance,therewasameansofdetermininghydrogenconcentrations.Thefailurerateisconsideredacceptablesinceinnocasedidthemonitoractuallyfail,itonlyprovidedreadingswhichwerenotwithinestablishedtolerances.Therefore,themonitorswouldstillprovidesomeformofindication.ImrovedTS57..ITS3.6.1TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLE[ITS57ii):3.6QlStatus:[)Response:TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnforSR3.6.1.1wasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnaspreferredby'licensedpersonnel.Inaddition,"containmentmini-purgevalve"wasadded'tothetextofSR3.6.1.1asanexemptionsincethemini-purgevalveleakageacceptancecriteriaisspecifiedinnewSR3.6.3.4.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.Also,approvedTravellerBWR-14,C.1wasonlypartiallyincorporatedduetotheproposednewAppendixJrulewhichwasrecentlypublishedforcomment(Ref.22).Thechangesprovideconsistencywiththeproposednewrule.The"Note"changeisrejectedasnotconformingtoITSformat.ThismaybeanITSgenericiteminallchaptersworthyofagenericsolution.RejectedBasedonatelephoneconversationwithCarlSchultenon8/23/95,theNRChasagreedthattherelocationofSurveillanceFrequencynotesisa"goodpractice"andthateithertheNRCortheindustrywillgenerateaTravellertoincorporate.Comment¹34hasbeenopenedtotrackthisresolution.Suggestchangestatusto"open"fortheinterim.3.6Q2HowarethesevalvesdifferentfromallotherCIVs?Ifso,shouldn'tweaddintheshutdownpurgevalvesandallotherCIVs-70-December1995 Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q3Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q4Status:[]Discussion:thathavedifferenttestingrequirements?AretheytestedduringIntegratedLeakRateTypeAtesting?AretheyTypeAtestedseparately?OpenThemini-purgevalvesaredifferentfromallothervalvesinthataspecificleakageacceptancelimitisspecifiedinITSSR3.6.3.4(~0.05L,).Otherthanairlocksandthemini-purgevalves,theITSdonothaveanyothercontainmentbarrierswith"special"leakagelimits.Currently,.NUREG-1431hasaexemptioninSR3.6.1.1withrespecttoairlocks.Thebasesstatethatthisexemptionisaddedsince"failuretomeetairlock(andpurgevalvewithresilientseal]leakagelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2(andLCO3.6.3jdoesnotinvalidatetheacceptabilityoftheseoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributiontoTypeA,B,andCleakagecausesthattoexceedtheselimits."RG8E.isproposingtoretainthebasestextin(Jsforthemini-purgevalvesandaddspecificreferencetothemini-purgevalvesinSR3.6.1.1similartotheairlocks.Withoutthistext.inSR3.6.1.1,thefailure'tomeetITSSR3.6.3.4wouldimplythatcontainmentisinoperablewhichisnotaccurate.InSR3.6.1.1,secondparagraphisrelocatedtodefinitionofL'.pertravelerbutisalsoreplacedbynewparagraphfromNUREG-1431Rev.1asfollows:Theleakagerateacceptancecriterionis~1.0L..However,duringthefirstunitstartupfollowingtestingperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions,theleakagerateacceptancecriteriaare<0.6L.fortheTypeB.andTypeCtests,and<0.75L.fortheTypeAtest.OpenThistexthasbeenrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.6.1.1sinceitisonlyanexpansionofcontainmentOPERABILITYasprovidedinAppendixJ.Also,thistextisremovedinsupportofthenewAppendixJrule(seeresponseto3.6q4).IncorporatingchangesbaseduponanticipatedrulechangejustnoticedintheFederalRegisterisoutsideconversiontotheSTS.WhatisinReference22?RejectedThenewAppendixJruletechnicalspecificationchangesarecurrentlybeingpreparedbytheindustryandNRCwithatravellerexpectedinmid-September(NoteletterfromC.GrimestoOwner'sGroupsdatedJuly28,1995).CommentiI35hasbeenopenedtotrackthisissue.Suggestchangestatusto"open"intheinterim.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedwithrespecttocontainment.b.'ariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadability.andunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.-71December1995 n [ITS57.iii.a3.6Q5Status:[]Discussion:andb]:TherearemanyBASESreferencestoexemptions,AIFGDCcriteriaandstaffevaluationsprovidedwhichcannotbeconfirmed.Also,shouldn'ttheoffsitedoselimitbeconsistentlydefinedas"wellwithin"or"afractionof"thelimitratherthanjust"within"thelimit?OpenTherearetwostatementswithrespectto10CFR100limitsintheLCO3.6.1bases.ThefirstbasesstatementiswithrespecttomaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLEsincethislimitsleakagetotheoutsideenvironmenttowithinthePart100limits.ThesecondstatementisthatanOPERABLEcontainment,incombinationwiththeminimumsafeguardsequipmentresultsindoseswellwithinthePart100limits.ThesearetwodifferentissuessincethefirststatementprovidesthereasonformaintaininganOPERABLEcontainment(i.e.,toensurethatoffsitedosesarewithinPart100limits)whilethesecondstatementimpliesisthatifcontainmentandtheassociatedsafeguardsequipmentareOPERABLE,thenthecalculatedoffsitedosesarewellwithinthesePart100limits.Therefore,RGEEdoesnotbelieveabaseschangeisnecessary.3.6Q6Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q7Status:[]Discussion:3.6QSStatus:[]Discussion:Inserts3.6.1.4and5donotmatchtheNUREG-1431Rev¹1.ExplainthisBASESchangeregardingminimumandmaximumpathwayleakagerates?OpenInserts3.6.1.4and3.6.1.5arebasedonthenewAppendixJruleandhowtoactuallyinterpretthe"missing"textdiscussedin3.6q3above.ThedefinitionoftheminimumandmaximumpathwayleakageisprovidedinANSIStd56.8andissummarizedbelow.Ninimumpathwayleakageistheleakagethatisassignedfromthesmallestleakageoftwoin-seriesvalves.Naximumpathwayleakageistheleakagethatisassignedfromthelargestleakageoftwoin-seriesvalves.Theadditionofthistextanduseofthesetermsisinfact,amorerestrictivechangesincetheTypeBandCleakagemustbe(0.6L,usingthemaximumpathwayleakageimmediatelyfollowingplantstartupand<'.6L,usingtheminimumpathwayleakageatallothertimes.Hence,marginisbuiltintotheTypeBandCleakageteststoallowincreasedleakagefollowingplantstartuptoensurethattheoverallleakagelimitof0.6L,isnotexceeded.SincethisisdirectlytiedtothenewAppendixJrule,comment¹35has'eenopenedtotrackthisissue.Theuseofisolationbarriershasbeenrequestedmanyplacesinlieuofcontainmentisolationvalves.ThisisdealtspecificallyinLCO3.6.3.Theproposedtextaddedhereisrejected.RejectedTobediscussedatthemeeting.ChangestoApplicabilitysuggestthereisnocontainmentoperabilityduringMODE6,Refuelingisimpliedasnotapplicable.OpenRGSEhasproposedtorelocatetheNODE6containmentrequirementstotheTRNasdiscussedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item107.i.(Thisresponsewasrevisedpercomment¹221J-72-December1995 3.6Q9Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q10iv.[ITS57.iv]:3.6Q11Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q12Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q13Status:[]Discussion:SeeITS57.ivbelow.OpenSeeresponsestoITS57.ivbelow(i.e.,3.6Qlland3.6Q12).Notused.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.8.NotcheckedProvidecopyofTraveler;thisisnotinBWR/6'sTSIPconversion.OpenTherequestedtravellerisprovided.Alsodeleted(c)shouldberevisedforthecontentsofexistingTS4.4.2.4.b.'penNoneofthecontainmentisolationbarriersspecifiedinTS4.4.2.4.butilizea"pressurizedsealingmechanism"asdescribedindeleteditem(c).Instead,thesebarriersusepassive0-ringsorothergasketdesignswhicharenormallymaintainedatatmosphericpressure.Thesebarriersaredesignedsuchthatifcontainmentatmosphericpressurewheretoincrease,thenthesealingpressureagainstthe0-ringsisalsoincreasedtoprovidegreaterleak-tightness.Sinceitem(a)alreadyrequiresthesebarrierstobeOPERABLE,item(c)isnotrequired.BackgroundItema.2-TheLCOnamechangeisacceptedbuttheprecedingtextchangeisrejectedasnotappropriatehereinthisLCO.RejectedThetextwhichisbeingdeletedandreplacedwith"OPERABLEcontainmentisolationbarriers"isbeingremovedforthefollowingreasons.First,thistextdoesnotspecifyclosedsystems,endcaps,andothertypesofcontainmentbarriers.Second,thebasesstatethatallpenetrationswhicharerequiredtoclosedduringaccidentconditionsmustbecapableofbeingisolatedbythecontainmentisolationsystemor"closedbymanualvalves,blindflangesorde-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedpositions"(textin""tobedeleted)~Thereareseveralpenetrationat6innaSystemwhicharenotisolatedonacontainmentisolationsignal,maintainedopenduringnormaloperation,andwhichusecheckvalvesincombinationwithaclosedsystemastheisolationbarrier.ThisincludesthemainfeedwaterlinesandcharginglinestotheRCSandRCPs.TheproposedtextclarifiesthatcontainmentintegrityisstillmetaslongasthecheckvalveandclosedsystemforthesepenetrationsisOPERABLE.58.ITS3.6.2TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLE-73-December1995 [ITS58ii]:'3.6Q14Status:[]Discussion:[ITS58iii]:3.6Q15Status:[]Discussion:Note2forConditionsAandBwasrevisedtoprovideadditionalclarificationandconsistencywiththeConditionstatement.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thesetextadditionsareredundant.CannotbeappliedwithoutRequiredActionnotesalreadyhavingthisequipmentinoperableasthesetextdescriptionsstatehasoccurred.TheplacetoaddadditionalclarificationisintheBASES.RejectedRG&EagreestowithdrawthischangetoRequiredActionNote2.However,theclarificationwillbemaintainedinthebasesassuggested.Comment¹36hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnforSR3.6.1.2wasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnaspreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(i'v)change.This"Note"changeisrejectedasnotconformingtoITSformat.ThismaybeanITSgenericiteminallchaptersworthyofagenericsolution.RejectedBasedonatelephoneconversationwithCarlSchultenon8/23/95,theNRChasagreedthattherelocationofSurveillanceFrequencynotesisa"goodpractice"andthateithertheNRCortheindustrywillgenerateaTravellertoincorporate.Comment¹34hasbeenopenedtotrackthisresolution.Suggestchangestatusto"open"for.theinterim.iv.[ITS58iv]:3.6Q16Status:[]TheFrequencyforSR3.6.2.2wasrevisedfrom184daysfollowingentryintocontainmenttoonceevery24months(i.e.,onceeveryrefuelingoutage).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainaSurveillancefortheairlockdoorinterlockmechanism;however,RGLEbelievesthatitisprudenttoaddaSRtoensurecompliancewiththespecification.AFrequencyofonceevery24monthsisconsideredappropriatesincetheinterlockispurelymechanicalandproceduresareinplacetocontrolpersonnelaccesstocontainmentduringMODES1through4.Also,thissurveillancecouldchallengecontainmentintegrityiftheinterlockweretofailandbothairlockdoorswereopenedsimultaneously.Finally,iftheinterlockisdefeatedduringanyshutdowncondition,itmustberetestedpriortodeclaringitOPERABLE.Duetothesechanges,approvedTravellerBMR-15,C.2wasonlyincorporatedinpart.ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.Alsosee[CTS¹31.v-Ll]IntheimprovedTSSR3.6.2.1,AppendixJrequiresTypeBtestsoftheairlockandthedoorsealsevery184days.TherearenospecificexistingTSrequirementsfortestingtheairlockinterlockmechanism;however,TS4.4.2.4.cimpliesopeningof.theairlockdoortodosealtestseverysixmonths.Also,theFrequencyof184daysforSR3.6.2.2wasselectedasconsistentwithAppendixJtestingintervalsforairlocksandforCIVswithresilientseals.Open-74-December1995 Discussion:3.6Q17Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q18Status:Discussion:GinnaStationpersonnelnormallyentercontainmentonamonthlybasistoperformTSrequiredsurveillances.Assuch,the184dayfrequencyinNUREG-1431doesnotcorrespondtotheuseoftheairlocksthemselvesorAppendixJtestingoftheairlocks(sincetheairlocksmustbeleaktestedfollowingentry).Also,seeresponseto3.6Q17below.Theexplanationthattestingtheinterlocksjeopardizescontainmentintegrityisnotaccepted;otherwisetheConditionB,Note82Relaxationofstationingadedicatedindividualtomaintainonedoorclosedmustbewithdrawn.VerifyingtheinterlockmechanismonlypriortocontainmententryisneededtolimitthisSR;sonotdeletingthenotehelpsreducesthe-frequencyofthistest.Withoutthisexception,theairlockdoorswouldberequiredtobeopenedsolelytoperformthisinterlocktest.Thisscenariowouldthenalsorequirethedoorsealtestbeperformedwithinthenext48hourscreatingunnecessarycontainmententriesandrequiringmanpowerfortesting.Intheeventtheplantisutilizingoneairlockforentriesandmaintainingoneairlockidle,thissurveillancewouldimposeanexcessivetestingrequirement.OpenThereasonthatcontainmentintegritycouldbechallengedduringthetestoftheinterlockmechanismisthattheonlymethodofperformingthistestatGinnaStationisopenonedoorandthenattempttoopentheseconddoor.Iftheseconddoordidopen,youwouldthenhaveadirectpathtotheoutsideenvironmentuntilatleastonedoorwasclosed.Note82toConditionB.allowstheuseofanindividualwhoineffectactsastheinterlockmechanism7'f.thismechanismisin'operable(i.e.,thisindividualpreventsopeningmorethanonedooratatime).Assuch,thereisnodirectrelationshipbetweenthejustificationandConditionBNote.RelaxingthesurveillancefrequencyofSR3.6.2.2to24months(i.e.,eachrefuelingoutage)negatestheneedfortheNotestatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredpriortocontainmententry.Ifthefrequencyweremaintainedat184days,thenthisNotewouldberequired.PleasenotethatthereisaV0Gtravellerinthesystemtomakethechangeproposedin58.iv.AlsoRGREhas48hourstotestpertheCTSandnowhas72hoursperITS.Thisisarelaxationwhichnotbeenjustified.[]OpenThe72hourstotestanairlockdoorwhichhasbeenopenedisbasedon10CFR50,AppendixJrequirements.Hence,theCTS4.4.2.4.crequirementofperformingthistestwithin48hoursismorerestrictivethanAppendixJ.SinceAppendixJhasbeenappliedtoallreactors,theallowanceof72hoursversus48hourshasbeenshowntobegenericallyacceptable.ThereasonthattheCTShaveamorerestrictiverequirementisrelatedtotheoriginalAppendixJrule.Forthisrule,aleakagetestwasrequiredaftereachopening.RGBErequested,andwasgranted,anexemptionbytheNRCtorevisethisrequirementtoonlyapplywithin48hoursafterthefirstinaseriesofopenings(seeletterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.white,RG&E,datedHarch28,1978).Therefore,RGBEproposestoeliminatethis48hourtestingrequirementandfollowthecurrentrequirementsofAppendixJ.(Thisresponsewasrevisedpercomment-75-December1995 V.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedwithrespecttothecontainmentairlocks.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.[ITS58.V]:3.6Q19Status:[]Discussion:Thedeletionofthelastsentenceofthebackgroundneedsexplanationfromtraveler.OpenTherequestedtravellerisprovided.3.6Q20Status:[]Discussion:P,is60psiginexistingTS,59.8psigin3.6.1and59.3psighere?OpenThedesignbasispressureofcontainmentis60psig(seeUFSAR6.2.6.I).Theresultingcontainmentpressurepost-LOCAis59.3psigwhilethecontainmentpressurefollowingamainsteamlinebreakis59.8psig.Therefore,usingthedefinitionofP,fromAppendixJof"thecalculatedpeakinternalcontainmentpressurerelated.tothedesignbasisaccident,"therealvalueofP,is59.8.However,allleakagetestingatGinnaStationhasconservativelyusedthedesignpressureasP,sincethefirstCTSdefineP,as"containmentvesseldesignpressure"(seeletterfromD.L.2iemann,NRC,toL.D.4'hite,RGZE,datedParch28,1978).TheP,valueintheApplicableSafetyAnalysisbasesis59.8psigthoughitcouldbereadas59.3psigduetothecopyquality(seeAttachmentCtothesubmittal).RGSEbelievesnochangeisrequired.(Thisresponsewasrevisedper"comment835J3.6Q21Status:[]Discussion:InLCO,recommendnotaddingtextafterOPERABLEorchangingto"suchthatbothdoorsareclosedwithleakagewithinacceptablelimits."OpenThereplacementtextbeingproposedimpliesthatifanairlockdoorisopen,thentheairlockmustbedeclaredinoperable.ThetextwhichwasaddedessentiallystatesthattheairlockisOPERABLEifbothdoorscanbeclosedwithleakagewithinacceptablelimits.ThereasonthistextwasaddedwastoclarifythatbothdoorsdidnothavetobeclosedfortheairlocktobeOPERABLE.RGBEsuggestsleavingtextasisorreplacewiththefollowing:suchthatbothdoorsareclosed(exceptasbeingusedfornormalentryandexitfromcontainment)withleakagewithinacceptablelimits.3.6Q22Status:[]Discussion:ExplainwhyairlocksnotapplicableinNODE6.OpenRGBEhasproposedtorelocatetheNODE6containmentrequirementstotheTRHasdiscussedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item107.i.(This-76-December1995 3.6Q23Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q24Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q25Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q26Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q27Status:[]responsewasrevisedpercomment¹221JSecondinserttofirstparagraphofA.I,A.2andA.3rejectedbecauseindicationlightsonlychecknotacceptedforaphysical"closeandlock"action.RejectedThefirstbasesparagraphofRequiredActionsA.l,A.Z,andA.3discussestheactiontoclosetheairlockonly.Theactuallockingoftheairlockisdiscussedinthefollowingparagraph.Therefore,theinsertinquestionstatesthattheverifyingthecontrolboardalarmsfortheairlockdoorsisadequatetoverifyingthatthedoorisclosedwithin1hour.Thedoormustthenbephysicallylockedwithin24hours.Thisisnodifferentthanclosinganinoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierfromthecontrolroomandverifyingfromindicatinglightsthatitisclosedwithin4hours.ThewordclarificationtoNote¹IofConditionAandBdoesnotclarify.RejectedThechangestoNote¹IinthebasesforConditionsAandBwasmadeattherequestofGinnaStationoperations.ThechangeinquestionrevisestheNotesothatitreiteratestheactualnoteintheRequiredActions.TheremainingtextthenclarifiestheNoteasrequired.'histechniqueofreiteratingtheLCOnoteinthebasesandthenexplainingasnecessaryisusedthroughouttheITS.ThereareonlytwoclarificationsmadetoNote¹1inthebases.ThefirstistoaddreferencetoRequiredActionC.3forcompletenesssinceC.landC.2arementioned.ThesecondistostatethateventhoughConditionCisenteredwithbothdoorsofanairlockinoperable,thetrackingoftheCompletionTimeinConditionAmuststillbeperformedintheeventthatonedoorisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.ThispreventsmisuseoftheLCOwhere'bythetimeclockforConditionAwouldnotstartuntilafteronedoorwasrestoredprovidinganextrahourtoisolatetheremainingfaileddoor.Thenewtextinsertfromtravelerfor58.viiineedsexplanation.OpenTherequestedtravellerisbeingprovided.ThirdparagraphofB.1,B.2,andB.3allowforprocedureonlyadministrativecontrolisrejected.Thismeanstheareaislockedandpersonnelarenotpermittedtoenter.RejectedThe"procedurecontrol"textwasaddedwithrespecttoadministrativecontrolssincethisisthedefinitionofadminstrativecontrolsatGinnaStation.Thatis,byuseofproceduralcontrolswhichrestrictactivitieswithrespecttotheinoperableairlock,itisensuredthatpersonneldonotuseit.ThephysicallayoutofGinnaStationdoesnotallowforlockingofan"area"relatedtoanairlock(thoughtheairlockdoorscanbephysicallylocked).InC.1,C.2,andC.3,retainthe"(eg.,onlyonesealperdoorhasfailed)"Open-77-December1995 Discussion:3.6Q28Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q29Status:[]Discussion:RGBEagreestoretainthetextinquestion.Comment537hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.Thereferences83cannotbecheckedthisshouldbereferredtoNRCPMtoverify.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.ThedeletionofthelastsentenceofSR3.6.2.1isnotjustified.OpenRGBEagresstoretainthetextinquestion.CommentII38hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.6Q30IssuesraisedinLCOreviewarealsoopenbutnotidentifiedhere.Status:[]OpenDiscussion:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.Vi.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.20.Notcheckedvii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-23,C.4.Notcheckedviii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.24.Notcheckedix.X.[ITS58.x]:3.6Q31Status:[]Discussion:Note3wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.6.3,Note4.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ACCEPTABLE,thereshouldbeaWSTStravelerpreparedforthischange!RequiredActionsC.2andC.3wererevisedtomakeairlockpluralsincemorethanoneairlockmaybeaffectedwheninConditionC.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwiththebasesforthisCondition.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thisconditionisgovernedbyseparateconditionentry.Soeachairlockisonaseparateclock.Withthechange,itcouldbemisinterpretedthatifbothairlockswerenotrestoredtooperablestatusatthesametimethenaplantshutdownisrequired.IfthepluralwordintheBASESismisleadingatyourplant,thenyoushouldproposeaclarificationintheBASES.RejectedRGBEagresstowithdrawchange58.x.CommentiI39hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.xi.[ITS58.xi]:3.6Q32Theairlockacceptancecriteriawasalsorevisedtobez0.05L.foreachairlockand~0.01L.foreachdoor.ThesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationtestingpracticessinceairlockacceptancecriteriaarenotspecifiedinTS.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Alsosee[CTS3l.v-Ll]ClarifythebasisforrevisingtheaboveleakageratecriteriawhentherearenoexistingTSrequirements.Howisthisdeterminedtobeacceptable?Additionally,theabovedoesnotdiscusstheotherSR3.6.2.2.a5.btestchangeswhicharenotjustified.Thesechanges-78-December1995 areidenticaltowhatwasalreadypertheNUREG-1431.Status:[]RejectedDiscussion:TheNUREG-1431SR3.6.2.2hasacceptancecriteriaforairlocksasfollows:a.Overallairlockleakagerateis~(0.05LJwhentestedat~P,.b.Foreachdoor,leakagerateis~(0.01LJ.whentestedat~(p>>91.Thechangeproposedby3.6Q32istoclarifythatitema.istheleakagelimitforeachairlock.Thatis,theGinnaStationPORCquestionedwhetheritema.wastheleakagerateforbothairlocksorwasittheleakagerateforeachairlock..GinnaStationcurrentlyappliesthisleakagerateforeachairlockinNUREG-1431.Hence,theonly"change"inquestionisiftheinterpretationismadethattheleakagelimitina.appliestobothairlocks.Thechangestoitemb.aretojustrewordthetextsothatitreadssimilartothereviseditema.(i.e.,beginswith"Leakagerate...")andtoreplacethetextin(Js.Sincethetextin(Jsmeansaplantspecificvalueistobeused,replacing"psig"with"P,"in(Jsisconsideredacceptablesinceitissimilartotheacceptancecriteriaofitema.59.ITS3.6.3\i.TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPMR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLE[ITS59.ii]:3.6(33Status:[][]Discussion:Thetitle,LCO,Conditions,Surveillances,andbaseswererevisedtoreplace"valves"with"barriers."Thischa'ngeisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.3andtheITSbaseswhichrequirevalves,blindflanges,andclosedsystemstobeOPERABLE.Sincevalvesareonlyasubsetofthedeviceswhichprovidecontainmentintegrity,"barriers"isconsideredamoreappropriateterm(seeRef.23).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.PAlsosee[CTS16.iii-Ll]ThisnamechangeisnotconsistentwiththeexistingTS3.6.'3whichwascontainmentisolationboundaries.TheexistingTSalsoincludedair-locksunderthisdefinition.AirLockshaveaseparateLCO3.6.2.Theuseofbarrierwouldincludeairlocksandthisisnotappropriate."Barrier"wouldalsoapplytothecontainmentstructureunderLCO3.6.1andthisisnotappropriate.LCO3.6.3ismeanttoapplytoonlycontainmentisolationvalvesandonlythosedeviceswhichblockthepenetrationflowpaths.Itisnotedthatthelicenseeisnotproposingtocallthemini-purgevalvesthe"mini-purgebarriers".Reference823hasnotbeenmadeavailableforreview.Rejected,7-14-95Open,7-27-95Thisitemwasoriginallyrejectedbutitwasreopenedfollowingateleconon7-27-95.Thenamechangefromcontainmentisolation"boundaries"to"barriers"isacceptedfort'etitleofLCO3.6.3;-79-December1995 [ITS59.iii]3.6Q34Status:f]Discussion:3.6Q35Status:[]Discussion:iv.however,internallywithintheLCOeachnamechangemustbediscussedonthefollowingguidelines:1.AcceptLCOtitlechangedinalllocations.2.AcceptLCOstatementchanged.3.Actionsnote¹3,onlytheword"valves"changedacceptedto"barriers".4.ActionsNote¹4,changeaccepted.5.ProposedwordchangesinallConditionsnotaccepted;however,newConditionscanbewrittenforthose"barriers"whichdonotmeetcurrentGDCrequirementsandhavesupportingdocumentationforNRCacceptance.ExampleseparatethosebarrierrequirementsnowlocatedinConditionAintotheirownseparateCondition.Don'tdeletetheConditionNotesbutreviseandmakeextensiveuseofnotestoeachConditiontodescribethedifferences.6.ChangestooldSR3.6.3.3and3.6.3.4notaccepted;however,newSRsmaybewrittentoaccompanynewConditionstomakeappropriateforcertaintypesofbarriers.Thisistobediscussedatthemeeting.Note3wasrevisedtoprovideclarityandconsistencywiththebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThetextclarificationaddedtoNote¹3arerejectedbecausetheLCOdoesnothavetoberedundanttotheBASEStext.TheBASESarethelocationwhereclarificationssuchastheseareplaced.ThejustificationforITSchangestobeconsistentwiththeBASESisbackwards,wrongandshouldberejected.Seeitem¹3ofITS59.ii.RejectedTobediscussedatthemeeting;TheNote¹Ineedsmorewording.Itisrecommendedthatthebracketedphrasebeeither[exceptfortheShutdownPurgeSystemvalveflowpaths...]or[exceptforthe36-inchshutdownpurgesystemvalveflowpaths...]OpenRGBEagreestorevisethe.textforNote¹1touse"exceptfortheShutdownPurgeSystemvalveflowpaths..."Comment¹40hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.ConditionsAandBwererevisedtobecomemoregenericandConditionCwasnotadded.TheITSbasesstatethatisolationdevicesareeitheractiveorpassiveandthatclosedsystemsprovideapassivebarrier.ThebasesalsostatethatclosedsystemsarerequiredtobeintactfornormallyclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeconsideredOPERABLE.However,theConditionsareorganizedbasedonpenetrationswhichhavecontainmentisolationvalvesandpenetrationswhichhaveclosedsystems.Toensureconsistencywiththebases,ConditionsAandBwerechangedtoapplytoallpenetrations.AnewRequiredActionA.2wasalsoaddedwhichallowsaclosedsystemtobeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrier.ThischangenowallowsanydevicewhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeettheLCOtobeusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationbarrier.ThischangeaddressestheissuesdiscussedinReference24.AnewRequiredActionB.2,similartoA.1.2,wasalsoaddedasaresultof-80-December1995 [ITS59.iv]:3.6Q36Status:[]Discussion:theabovechange.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.TheNUREG-1431LCOConditionAand8weretocoverall10CFR50,'ppendixA,GDC55andGDC56typeofpenetrations.ConditionCwastocoverGDC57typeofpenetrations.ItisacknowledgedthatGinnawasdesignedpriortothe10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC;however,theGinnadesignisnotclearlypresentedintheLCOs.DoesGinnahavelistsofthecontainmentpenetrationstoidentifyallthosepenetrationswhichmeettheGDCandthosewhichdon'.ThosepenetrationwhichmeetGDCshouldgointoConditionsA,8andC.ProposenewGinnaConditionsforthosewhichdon'tmeetGDCre'quirements.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.3.6Q37Status:[]Discussion:ConditionAand8weredevelopedtotietogether.Insert3.6.3.2isnotneededbecausewhentwovalvesareinoperableinCondition8and,oneisrestoredoperableyouarebackintoConditionA,RequiredActionA.2whichisthesameastheproposed8.3(exceptforthenewCompletionTime"devicesoutsideofcontainment"textthatisnotacceptable).ProposedRequiredAction8.2isrejectedforthesamereasonthatinsert3.6.3.10toBASESisacceptable.P'ertheGDC,youcannotisolateapenetrationopentocontainmentwithjustone(unreliable)device(eg.checkvalveoraclosedsystem)whichisaleakingbarrierneedingperiodicleakrateevaluation.ConditionCwasonlywrittenforoneinoperablecontainmentisolationvalveona"closedsysteminsideofcontainment"donotwritethisintoConditionA.HastheNRCstaffacceptedalternatepositionsfortheGinnadesignwhicharedifferentfromtheGDC?Ifso,keepConditionCseparateandrewritethesealternatesinnew'onditionsfortheGinnadesign.RejectedTobediscussedatthemeeting.3.6Q38Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q39Proposed,A.2(insert3.6.3.1)anditsassociatedchangesarerejectedbecauseclosedsystemoperabilityisdeterminedbyperformanceofTypeA,8,andCtestsandnotbyrelianceonwaterleakagedetectionsystems,operatorwalkdownsandothersur'veillancesystemsasdescribedintheBASES.Itisveryawkward(ifnotimpossible)torewriteConditionAand8todothesameasaseparateConditionC.IfConditionCisused,itpermitsonlytheoperabilityofthesameaffectedclosedsystempenetrationtoactasasecondbarrieroncethesoleinoperableisolationvalvein'theaffectedpenetrationisisolated.RejectedTobediscussedatthemeeting.ConditionAand8disagree.ConditionAexemptsthemini-purgevalveandCondition8exemptsallpurgevalves?Whatgoesonhere?'lsowhatconditionisenterediftheshutdownpurgevalveinoperable?Howisitdifferentfromthemini-purgev'alve?Providingpipingschematicswiththecontainmentboundaryindicatedwouldhelpthisevaluation.ThenotestoConditionsAand8couldbedeletediftheywerewrittenasdevelopedbutthenoteto-81-December1995 Status:[]Discussion:ConditionCshouldstaywhereeverConditionCendsupbeinglocated.AddmoreConditions,ifneeded.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.v.[ITS59.vii]3.6Q40Status:[]Discussion:IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.15.ACCEPTABLEConditionD,SR3.6.3.11,andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveashieldbuilding.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerBWR-14,C.3andC.4werenotincorporated.ACCEPTABLE,butcontentsoftravelerwasnotreviewed.SR3.6.3.1andtheassociated,baseswerenotaddedsincetheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedbyablindflange(seeRef..25).TheLCObaseswererevisedtoreflectthattheblindflangemustbeinstalledforthecontainmentisolationbarrierfortheShutdownPurgeSystemtobeconsideredOPERABLE.VerificationthatthisblindflangeisinplaceisaccomplishedbynewSR3.6.3.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AssuchapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.21wasnotincorporated.TheexistingTS4.4.2.4.brequirementstoassuretheshutdownpurgevalvesareoperableneedstobeincludedintheimprovedTS.The36-inchshutdownpurgevalvesareusedforventilationofcontainmentbelowMODE4andpriortopersonnelaccess.Thevalvesmustbeoperableatthesetimes,duringrefuelingandtheflowpathsunrestrictedbyblindflanges.Wherearethesurveillancerequirements(ifnotSR3.6.3.1)and/orleakageratetestsforthesevalves(ifnotSR3.6.3.7)to'determineoperability?Furthermore,whatConditionsareentereduntilthesevalvesarerestored"toservice?OpenLCO3.6.1coverscontainmentisolationrequirementsinNODES1,2,3,and4.Theshutdownpurgevalveflowpathsareisolatedwithflangescontainingdouble0-ringsduringtheseMODESandareonlyopenedwhenbelowNODE4.Assuch,theflangesprovidebothrequiredcontainmentbarriersaboveNODE5andthevalvesarenotrequired,norsubjectto,AppendixJleakagetesting(seeBackgroundbasesfor.ShutdownPurgeSystem).TheLCObasesstatethat"bothpenetrationsassociatedwiththeShutdownPurgeSystemmustbeisolatedbyablindflangecontainingredundantgaskets,orasinglegasketedblindflangewithade-activatedisolationvalve(i.e.,twopassivebarriers)."Therefore,iftheflangesarenotinplaceaboveNODE5,twobarriersfortheaffectedpenetrationaredeclaredinoperable.TheflangesareconsideredTypeBisolationbarriersandtestedinaccordancewithAppendixJ.TheonlyaccidentinwhichtheshutdownpurgevalvesarerequiredbelowNODE4isduringrefuelingoperations.ThisisaddressedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item107.i.SR3.6.3.2andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincethissurveillanceisnotinthecurrentGinnaStationTS.TheBackgroundbaseshavebeenrevisedtostatethat"emphasis.shallbe'placedon-82"-December1995 [ITS59.viii3.6(41Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q42Status:[]Discussion:ix.limitingpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasreasonablyachievable."AllusesoftheMini-PurgeSystemareunderproceduralcontrol.Inaddition,thestatusofthemini-purgeisolationvalvesiscontinuouslyavailableinthecontrolroomsuchthatoperatorswouldbequicklyawareofanyvalvethatisnotclosed.VerificationofthesestatuslightsisperformeddailybyoperatorssuchthataSurveillanceevery31daysisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerBWR-15,C-19,Revision1wasnotincorporated.]~kTheSR3.6.3.2seemstobeidenticaltoexistingTS3.6.5,ContainmentMini-Purge.ThisexistingTSrequirementisnowasurveillanceinsteadofanLCO.TheSRandBASESshouldnotbedeletedasproposed.Also,pleasenotethatthisSRisavisualverificationandnotjustsatisfiedbycheckingthestatusoftheindicationlights.RejectedCTS3.6.5statesasfollows:Mheneverthecontainmentintegrityisrequired,emphasiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasachievable.Themini-purgeisolationvalveswillremainclosedtothemaximumextentpracticablebutmaybeopenforpressurecontrol,forALARA,forrespirableairqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,forsurveillanceteststhatmayrequirethevalvetobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.Therearenosurveillancerequirementsevery31dayswithrespecttoverifyingthatthemini-purgevalvesareclosed.asrequiredbyNUREG-I431SR3.6.3.2.Theconditionsforwhichthemini-purgevalvescanbeopeneddonotmeetanyofthefourcriteriasincethevalvesreceivecontainmentisolationsignalsandaredesignedtoclosewithin2seconds.Theserestrictionsareinsteadgoodpractices.Inaddition,theproposedwordingofITS3.6.3.1andITS3.6.3.2providefornecessaryverificationofmini-purgevalvepositionwithouthavingaseparateSR.Therefore,RGBEdoesnotbelievethatSR3.6.3.2isrequired.(Thisresponsewaschangedduringmeetingsweekof10/9/95.Seecomment8126.JIsthetravelerapplicablenow?OpenTherequestedtravellerisbeingprovided.Thiswasapprovedon6/2/94.SR3.6.3.3andSR3.6.3.4havebeenrevisedtoclarifythat.thisverificationisperformedtoensurethatnonautomaticisolationbarrierswhicharerequiredtobeclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentareinfactclosed,versusensuringisolationbarriers"closedduringaccidentconditionsareclosed."Sinceseveralpenetrationsarenormallyopenbutareisolatedduringaccidentconditionsifthefirstpassivebarrierfails,theexistingSRwordingismisleading.Also,theSRFrequencywasrevisedfrom.31daysto184daysconsistentwithGinnaStationpractices.Inaddition,thisSRwasrevisedtonotrequireverificationofisolationbarrierswhicharelocked,sealedclosed,orotherwiseisolatedsimilartootherSurveillances.ThecurrentGinnaStation-83-December1995 [ITS59.ix]:3.6Q43Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q44Status:[]Discussion:X.TSdonotcontainthisrequirement.However,allcontainmentisolationbarriershaveaspecialfieldtagidentifyingthedeviceasanisolationbarrierandspecifiesthatOperationsmustbenotifiedbeforechangingthepositionofthedevice.ThistagprovidessufficientadministrativecontrolssuchthataFrequencyof184daysisconsideredadequate.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Thiswordclarificationdoesnothelp,asnotedinitem¹11ofITS59.ii.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.SincetheexistingTShasnoequivalenttoSR3.6.3.3and3.6.3.4,theFrequencyof31or92daysmaintainsaconsistencywiththeperiodiccheckrequiredwheninthevariousConditionsofthisLCOdependingwhetherthevalvesandblindflangesareinsideoroutsidecontainment.TheseintervalswerenotchangedfromthepreviousSTSandareconsistentforallfiveOwnerGroupimprovedSTSdeveloped.ItwasdeterminedduringthedevelopmentoftheimprovedSTSthatthisSRdidnotimposeanunnecessaryhardship.Itwasbelievedthatthemoreconsistentrequirementswereused,thelesschanceexistedformissinganimportantSR.ThetaggingsystemisgoodbutstrictlyindependentoftheFrequencyforthisSR.OpenTheRequiredActionswithinLCO3.6.3forinoperablecontainmentbarriersrequireisolationofthepenetrationwithin1-4hoursandverificationevery31daysthatthepenetrationremainsisolated.Thisverificationevery31daysisconsidereda"penalty"sincethecontainmentbarrieroriginallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisisinoperablesuchthatalternatemeasureshadtobetaken.ThisissimilartootherLCOswhichrequireincreasesurvei77anceswithinoperableequipment.Therefore,requiringverificationevery31daysthatOPERABLEcontainmentisolationbarriersareintheircorrectpositionisconsideredexcessive.Thesebarriersarestrictlycontrol7edatGinnaStationwithclearlyidentifiedtagslocatedonthemsuchthattheyrequireShiftSupervisorclearancetooperateandsubsequentindependentverification.TheonlytimeinwhichthesevalvesareopenedisduringISTrelatedtesting.Sincethistestingwil7nowbeonaquarterlybasis,RGBEiswillingtoagreetoquarterlyverificationofa7lvalvesoutsidecontainmenttomatchupwiththetesting..Forthosevalvesinsidecontainment,RG&Ewil7,agreetotheNUREG-1431frequencyduringstartupifnotwithinthelast92days.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingst'eweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹123.JSR3.6.3.5andthebaseswererevisedtoremoveverificationof"eachpoweroperated"containmentisolationvalve'sisolationtime.ThisSRisperformedtoensurethatthosecontainmentisolationvalveswhichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltoautomaticallyclosearetestedinaccordancewiththeISTprogram.AtGinnaStation,severalpoweroperatedcontainmentisolationvalvesdonotreceiveacontainmentisolationsignal.Therefore,theisolationtimeofthesevalvesisnotrelevanttothisLCO.Thechangealso-84-December1995 Xi~providesconsistencywithnewSR3.6.3.5.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ACCEPTABLESR3.6.3.6,SR3.6.3.9,andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincethesetestsareonlyrequiredforplantswithsubatmosphericcontainmentswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLESR3.6.3.7andthebaseswererevisedtoprovideconsistencywithSR3.6.2.1.TheSRtextwasalsochangedsinceitonlyappliestotheMini-PurgeSystemastheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedaboveMODE5perthenewLCObases.ThespecifiedFrequencywasrevisedsincetherequirementformorefrequenttestingofthemini-purgeisolationvalveswasremovedfromtheGinnaStationTSbyAmendmentNo.54(Ref.23).Thisis.anITSCategory(i)change.ApprovedTravellerBWR-14,C.3wasalsoincorporated.[ITS59.xii]:3.6Q45TheSRrequirementsforShutdownPurgeSystemvalvesatrefuelingshouldbelocatedhereorinITS3.9.4;butitisdeleted.Explain?Status:[]OpenDiscussion:RGEEhasproposedtorelocatetheNODE6containmentrequirementstotheTRPtasdiscussedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item107.i.(Thisresponsewasrevisedasaresultof11/16/95AppealNeeting.Seecomment¹221.)3.6Q46Status:[]Discussion:WhatisinAmendment54thatisapplicablehere?4.4.2.4.aisverygeneralanddoesnotapplyhere.OpenCTS4.4.2.4.ausedtohavearequirementtotestthemini-purgevalvesevery184days.However,thisrequirementwasremovedbyAmendment54(seeletterfrom'A.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Necredy,RGEE,datedAugust30,1993).Therefore,themorefrequentsurveillanceofthemini-purgevalvesdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.3.6Q47Status:[]Discussion:TheFrequencyColumnshouldhaveanintervalof184daysandwithin92daysafteropeningthevalve.OpenSeeresponseto3.6q46above.Nochangeisrequired.xiii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.9,Revisionl.ACCEPTABLExiV.xv.SR3.6.3.10andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedinMODES1,2,3,and4byablindflange.TheNUREG-1431basesstatethatthisSRonlyappliestoplantswhichcanhavetheshutdownpurgevalvesopenaboveMODE5.Therefore,thisSRisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-ll,C.1wasnotincorporated.ACCEPTABLEThebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):-85-December1995 a~b.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.[ITS59.xv]:3.6Q48Status:[]Discussion:Thereare28pagesofbaseswithchanges.Eachpagehaschangesamountingtooveronehundredchanges.IftheseConditionsarerewritten,asrequested,thentheBASESwillhavetobesignificantlychanged.TheBASESwillhavetobediscussedlaterseparatelyratherthannow.Also,providinganitemizedlistofcommentsnowwillresultinmostnotbeingapplicable.OnHoldTobediscussedatthemeeting.xvi.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.9.Notcheckedxvii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.22.Notcheckedxviii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.5.Notcheckedxix.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.2.NotcheckedXX.[ITS59.xx]:3.6Q49Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q50Status:[]Discussion:TheLCOwasrevisedtoaddaNotestatingthatthemainsteamisolationvalves,mainsteamsafetyvalves,andatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotincludedinthisLCOwhentheyarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinChapter3.7.ThevalvesallcredittheSGtubesasaboundarysuchthatadditionaltimeisallowedtorestoreOPERABILITY.ThischangeisconsistentwiththebasesforITSChapter3.7.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AtGinna,whereisthecontainmentintegrityboundarywithrespecttothesevalves?Pleaseprovideasketch.OpenThesteamgeneratorsactasthefirstboundaryforthesepenetrationswiththevalvesprovidingthesecondboundary.TheUFSARdrawingsfortheseaffectedpenetra'tionsareattached(UFSARFigures6.2-76,-77,and-78).ArethesevalvesTypeCtested?OpenNo,thesevalvesarenotTypeCtested.ThesevalvesareinthemainsteamandfeedwaterlineswhichonlyrequireAppendixJtestinginBk/Rs.Inaddition,themainsteamsafetyvalvesandatmosphericreliefvalvesarereliefvalveswhosesetpointisgreaterthan1.5timesthedesignpressureofcontainment.LeaktestingofthesevalveswasaddressedduringtheamendmentrequesttorelocatethelistingofCIVsfromtechnicalspecifications(seeletterfromR.C.Necredy,RGEE,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,datedNovember30,1992).3.6Q51Whydoesn'tActionsNote83applyinthesecases?Status:[]Open-86-December1995 Discussion:3.6(52Status:[]Discussion:xxi.ActionsNote0'3requiresentryintoanyapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsbytheinoperablecontainmentisolationbarrier.TheRequiredActionsrelatedtothemainsteamisolationvalvesmainsteamsafetyvalvesandatmosphericreliefvalvesarelessrestrictivethanLCO3.6.3.If8hoursoreven7dayshasbeenJustifiedforrestoringthesevalvestoOPERABLEstatusintheirrespectiveLCOs,whyshouldLCO3.6.3bemorerestrictive.Thisisespeciallytruesincetheonlyaccidentwhichcanchallengethefirstbarrierforthesepenetrationsisasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)atwhich-timecontainmentisbypassed.Thedoseanalyseshavebeenperformedwithastuckopensafetyreliefvalveinthisinstanceanddemonstratedacceptableresults.Alternately,whycan'ttheseexemptionsbeexplainedintheBASES,sothisnotecouldbeeliminatedfromtheLCOstatement?OpenThesevalvesareidentifiedascontainmentisolationbarriersintheUFSARandstationprocedures.Therefore,ifthesevalvesareinoperablefromacontainmentisolationstandpoint,LCO3.6.3mustbeenteredsincewecannotremovetheircontainmentisolationfunctionunder50.59.Placingthistypeofinformationinthebaseswouldleavethewindowopenforfuturequestionswhichisbestaddressednow.ThereisalsoaHOGtravellerinthesystemforthischange.ConditionEwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.6.2.Themini-purgevalvesatGinnaStationhavesimilar.leakageacceptancecriteriatothecontainmentairlockdoors.Assuch,failureofonemini-purgevalvedoesnotrequireevaluationwithrespecttooverallcontainmentleakage.However,failureofbothvalvesdoesrequireconsiderationofcontainmentleakagesincethepenetrationnolongermeetsitsleakagecriteriaasspecifiedinnewSR3.6.3.4.Therefore,ConditionEwasrevisedtoapplytoonemini-purgevalvenotwithinleakagelimitsandanewConditionwasaddedfortwovalvesnotwithinleakagelimits.InbothoftheseConditions,RequiredActionE.3wasnotaddedsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.Also,duetothedesignofthemini-purgepenetrations,itmaynotbepossibletotestamini-purgevalveifthesecondin-seriesvalveisexcessivelyleaking.TheseareITSCategory(iii)and(i)changes.[ITS59.xxi]:3.6(53WhycomparethistoLCO3.6.2?Status:[]OpenDiscussion:RequiredActionC.lofNUREG-1431LCO3.6.2requiresassessmentofcontainmentleakageperLCO3.6.1ifbothdoorsofanairlockareinoperable.TheproposedConditionDofITS3.6.3requiresthissameassessmentifbothmini-purgevalvesforapenetrationarenotwithintheirleakagelimits.3.6054Status:[]Discussion:WhereistheexistingTSacceptancecriteriaforairlocks?OpenAsdiscussedintheresponseto3.6/32,therearenotcurrentTSacceptancecriteriafortheairlocks.-87-December1995 3.6Q55Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q56.Status:[]Discussion:60.ITS3Dothemini-purgevalveshaveresilientsealsornot?OpenThemini-purgevalvesdouseresilientseals.However,asnotedintheresponseto3.6/46,morefrequenttestingofthesevalvesisnot'equired.Thenotedinabilitytothesevalvestoholdatestpressuregivesconcernfortheircapabilitytoisolateasadeactivatedautomaticvalve.Open The59.xxidiscussiondoesnotstatethatthemini-purgevalvescannotholdtestpressure.Theonlymethodtotestthefirstvalvelocatedinsidecontainmentistoperformareverseflowtest(i.e.,pressurizebetweenthetwomini-purgevalvesasshownonUFSARFigures6.2-41and-66).Therefore,ifthemini-purgevalvelocatedoutsidecontainmentisleaking,youcannottestthefirstvalveunlesstheleakingvalvewasfirstrepaired.Themini-purgevalveshavecontinuedtodemonstrateexcellentleaktightnesswhichisthebasisforremovingthemorefrequenttestingasdiscussedintheresponseto3.6/46..6.4[ITS60.ii]:3.6Q57Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q58Status:[]Discussion:TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.4B)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted,ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLETheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1wasrevisedfrom1hourto24hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.2.Allowing24hourstorestorepressuretowithinlimitsisacceptableduetothelargecontainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeof.thecontainmentMini-PurgeSystem.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AlsoSee[CTS16.ii-Ll]ExplainhowcontainmentpressureisaffectedbythelimitingsizeandfunctionofMini-PurgeSystem.OpenThetimetodepressurizecontainmentisdependantupontheinitialcontainmentpressureandthesizeoftheHini-PurgeSystemopeningtotheoutsideenvironment.Consequently,withalargerventpathfromcontainment,'hefasterthedepressurizationiftheNini-PurgeSystemisavailable.Howlongdoesittaketoopentheisolationvalvestoreturntoatmosphericpressure?OpenThetimetodepressurizecontainmentisdependantupontheinitialcontainmentpressure.GinnaStationnormallybeginstodepressuriz'eaftercontainmentreaches0.5psigsincetheupperlimitisonly1psig.Depressurizationtoatmosphericpressureundertheseconditionsnormallytakeslessthan30minutes.3.6Q59Isthispathwayfiltered?-88-December1995 Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q60Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q61Status:[]Discussion:OpenThepathwaythrought'emini-purgeexhaustexitsintotheAuxiliaryBuildingcharcoalfilterunits.However,thesecharcoalfiltersarenotESFcomponents,andassuch,arenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Instead,themini-purgevalvesaredesignedtoclosewithin2secondsfollowingreceiptofanisolationsignal.Howlongdoesittaketoexchangecontainmentairvolume?OpenThemini-purgesystemisdesignedtosupplyandexchangecontainmentairvolumeatarateof1200cfm(seeUFSAR,6.2.4.4.9).kfithacontainmentairvolumeof1,000,000ft,ittakesapproximately14hourstoachieveonecontainmentar'rvolumeexchange.Why24hoursandnotaCompletionTimeof1,2,4or8hours?Remembertheoriginalbasisfor1hourisconsistencywiththelossofthenewcontainmentoperabilityperITS3.6.I!OpenThe24hoursthatwasproposedisbasedonCTS3.6.2requirements.However,RG8EiswillingtoreducethisCompletionTimeto8hourssincethetimetoreducecontainmentpressureisminimalassumingtheNini-PurgeSystemisavailable.This8hoursisstillgreaterthanthe1hourforLCO3.6.1andisbasedonthefollowingconsiderations.ThepreferredmethodofreducingcontainmentpressureduringNODES1,2,3,and4isviauseofthemini-purgevalves.Ifanyofthesevalvesfailedtoopen,providing1hourtorepairthevalvesisaveryshortperiodoftime,especiallyonthebackshift.Thealternatemethodsrequireuseofsmallsamplelines,etc.RGBEalsoanticipatesafutureTSamendmenttoincreasetheinitialallowedcontainmentpressuresuchthatlongerdepressurizationtimescouldresult.Finally,theGinnaStationcontainmentstructurehasbeenpressuretestedto1.15%ofitsdesignratingwhichprovidesadditionalmarginintheunlikelyeventofaDBAduringthis8hourwindow.(Comment8127wasopenedtouse8bourse'hebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.[ITS60.iii.aandb]:3.6Q62ThereareseveralplaceswherereferencetoinadvertentcontainmentStatus:[]Discussion:3.6Q63sprayhasbeenremovedwithoutexplanation?Pleaseexplain.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.Therearechangesfortravelersin60.ivand60.vwhicharenotavailable.Pleaseexplain.-89-December1995 Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q64Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q65Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q66Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q67Status:[]Discussion:1V.V.OpenTherequestedtravellerisbeingprovided.PageB3.6-45isprintedofftothesideofthepagepleaseprovideanewpage.OpenTherequestedpageisbeingprovided.Intwoplaces,thelowerpressurelimitisbasedontherequirementsforthereactorcoolantpumpmotors.Couldyouelaborate?OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.Thechangesforthe24hourCompletionTimearestillunderreviewintheLCO.OpenPleaseseeresponseto3.6q61.IstheexactreferencetoPI-944inSR3.6.4.1necessary?Shouldn'thisinsteadbeaBASESreferencedocument?Lastly,doesn'tnewparagraphinser'tbelonginBasesforLCOinSection3.3andnothere?OpenSinceSR3.6.4.1isanewsurveillancerequirementforGinnaStation,referencetoPI-944isprovidedtoensurethecorrectpressureindicationisusedforthissurveillance.Thisistheonlycontainmentpressureindicatorwhichhasthenecessarytoleranceandcontrolroomindicatorrangetomeasurepressuresbetween-Z.Opsigand1.0psig.ThislevelofdetailinthebaseswasspecificallyrequestedbytheGinnaStationPORC.klithrespecttotheadditionaltextrelatedtothecalibrationrequirementsofPI-944,thispressureindicatorisnotusedforanyRTS,ESFAS,orPASSfunction.Consequently,Section3.3doesnotapplyforthisinstrument.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-11,C.3.NotcheckedIncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.l.Notchecked61.ITS3.6.5TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructure.typicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.5BandLCO3.6.5C)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLETheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1wasrevisedfrom8hoursto24hours.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonothavearequirementforaveragecontainmentairtemperature.SincetheFrequencyforverifyingthattheaveragetemperatureis~120'Fis24hours,RG8Ebelievesthat24hourstorestorethetemperaturetowithinlimitsisappropriate.ACompletionTimeof24hoursisalsoconsistentwithnewLCO3.'6.4(andcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.2).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-90-December1995 [ITS61.ii]:3.6Q68Status:f]Discussion:Seealso[CTS16.iv-MI]Explainthereferredmethodforreturningtheairtemperaturetowithinlimits?OpenTheonlymethodtorestorecontainmentairtemperaturetowithinlimitsistooperateadditionalcontainmentrecirculationfancooler(CRFC)unitsorincreaseServicekfaterflowtotheoperatingfancoolers.AllfourCRFCunitsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEperITSLCO3.6.6;however,oneortwofancoolerscanberemovedfromserviceforupto7days.Duringsummermonths,allCRFCunitsarenormallyrequiredtomaintaincontainmenttemperaturewithinacceptablelimits.Therefore,GinnaStationcouldbeinITSLCO3.6.6withoneormoreCRFCcoolersinoperableduringthesummermonths.3.6Q69Status:[]Discussion:Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q71Status:[]Discussion:Doesanylight,alarmetc.notifytheoperatorsthatthelimitsarebeingexceeded?OpenThereisnocontrolroomalarmorannunciatorthatglobalcontainmentairtemperaturelimitsarebeingexceeded.However,thereareindividualalarmswithrespecttoindividualfancoolersassociatedwithothercontainmentventilationsystems(e.g.,shroudfancoolers).Theplantcomputercontainstemperaturereadingswithincontainmentthatareverifiedbyoperatorseveryshift.Whatisthenormaloperatingrangeoftemperature?Ifrestorativeactionweretakensoonerbeforereachingthelimits,whycouldn'theCompletionTimebe8hours?OpenThenormaloperatingrangeduringthewinteris90'Fandduringthesummer,110'115'F.IfaCRFCwasoutofserviceduringthesummer,thecontainmentairtemperaturecouldpotentiallyexceedthe120'Flimitbyseveraldegrees.TherequiredcooldownbelowthislimitwouldtakeseveralhoursandisdependentupontheabilitytorestoretheinoperableCRFCandSVtemperatureandflow.WhatiftheSR3.6.5.1wasperformedevery12hours?OpenSR3.6.5.1iscurrentlyperformedeveryshiftviacheckoftheplantcomputer.RGSEiswillingtoreducethisSRfrequencyiftheRequiredActionCompletionTimewassubsequentlyincreased.(Comment8128wasopenedtorevisetheSRfrequencyto12hoursandleavetheCompletionTimeat24hoursJThebas'eswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv).changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.[ITS61.iii.aandb]:-91-December1995 ThesentenceattheendofthesecondparagraphofApplicableSafetyAnalysesismeanttobefilledinwithadescriptionoftheworstcasesingleactivefailureforGinna.Providetheworstcaseexample.Status:[]OpenDiscussion:TheworstcasesingleactivefailureforGinnaStationdependsontheaccidentscenarioandtheissuebeingconsidered(e.g.,doseconsequences,PCT,DNBR).Ingeneral,theworstcasesingleactivefailureisthelossofoneelectricaltrainfollowingalossofoffsitepower.However,forasteamlinebreak,theworstcasefailureisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpsinceoffsitepowerisassumedavailabletomaintaintheRCPsoperating,andgenerateamorerapidcooldown(i.e.,thereisnosinglefailurewhichcarirenderinoperableoneelectricaltrain).Therefore,thistextwasremovedfromthebasesratherthanattempttoaddresseverypossibleworstcasesinglefailure.3.6Q733.6Q72TheinsertintothefirstsentenceofApplicableSafetyAnalysesisnotunderstood.Status:[]OpenDiscussion:TheNUREG-1431ApplicableSafetyAnalysisbasesforLCO3.6.5statesthatthecontainmentaverageairtemperature"establishesthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforbothpressureandtemperature."However,environmentalqualification(Eq),byitself,isnotacomponentOPERABILITYissueperGenericLetter91-18.Itisaqualificationissuewhichmustbeevaluatedsimilartoseismicconsiderations.Assuch,theEqbasiswouldnotmeetanyofthefourcriteriaforinclusionwithinTS.TheinsertedtextclarifiesthatthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturelimitensuresthattheenergywithincontainmentfollowingaDBAiswithinthecapacityoftheCSandCRFCunitssuchthatcontainmentintegrityismaintained.ThetextalsostatesthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureisanimportantcontributorwithrespecttoEq.3.6Q74Status:[]'iscussion:Thephrase"exceedthecontainmentdesigntemperature"hasbeenremovedintwoplacesbutthesentencestructureislostandhastoberewrittentocompletethesentence.Alsotheendingsentenceofthisparagraphisnotjustifiedforthenewwording.Pleaseexplain.OpenThephase"exceedthecontainmentdesigntemperature"wasremovedinAttachmentDtothesubmittalbutreplacementwordscontainedinAttachmentCweremistakenlynotadded.Comment841hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.ThelastsentenceoftheaffectedparagraphisbasedonUFSARSection6.2.1.2asreferencedearlierintheApplicableSafetyAnalysesbases.ThisissueisalsodiscussedinUFSARSection3.11.3.3.6Q75~~Status:[]Discussion:3.6Q76PleaseexplainthedeletionoftheparagraphoninadvertentactuationoftheCSSystem'.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.PleaseexplainthereasonforaddingthelastphrasetoSR3.6.5.1.-92-December1995 Status:[]Response:Shouldn'tthisbeinanLCOinChapter3.3?Whyhere?OpenThesixtemperatureindicatorsidentifiedinthebasesarenotusedforanyRTS,ESFAS,orPASSfunction.(althoughtheyareRG1.97,TypeDinstruments).Consequently,Section3.3doesnotapplyfortheseinstrumentsandthebasestextwasadded.62.ITS3.6.6TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.6B,LCO3.6.6C,LCO3.6.6DandLCO3.6.6E)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.SincetheContainmentSpraySystematGinnaStationiscreditedforiodineremoval,LCO3.6.6Awaschosen.ThisisanITSCategory(iy)change.ACCEPTABLETheLCOtitle,Conditions,Surveillances,andbaseswererevisedtoreplace"CoolingSystem"with"RecirculationFanCoolingSystem"consistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.Also,thePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemwasaddedtothisLCOforreasonsdescribedbelow,ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLEConditionsCandEwererevised,Condition0wasdeleted,andthreenewConditionswereaddedwithrespecttoinoperablecontainmentrecirculationfancooling(CRFC)unitsandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains.Thesechangeswerenecessaryduetoplant-specificdesignfeaturesrelativetotheCRFCunitsthatdifferfromthemodelplantusedtoproduceNUREG-1431.At,GinnaStation,therearefourCRFCunitswhichareallsuppliedbyasingleServiceWater(SW)loopheader(i.e,theSWsystemisonlyorganizedintotrainsatthepumplevel,notatthelooplevel).Inaddition,twoofthefourCRFCunits(i.e.,unitsAandC)connecttothePostAccidentCharcoalSystemwhichdoesnothaveitsownseparatefansystem.Consequently,ifeitherCRFCunitAorCisinoperable,thentheassociatedpostaccidentcharcoalfiltertrainisinoperablesuchthatConditionDcannotapplytoGinnaStation(i.e.,onewouldhavetoenterLCO3.0.3).Inaddition,anyoneofthefollowingcombinationsissuccessfulforradioactiveiodineremovalpostaccident:a.Twocontainmentspray(CS)trains;b.OneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain;orc,Twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains.However,sinceatleastoneCStrainmustbeOPERABLEaboveNODE5forcontainmentpressureandtemperature.control,thelastcombinationisnotused.Assuch,organizingthisLCObytrainsfortheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolingSystemandseparatingoutthefunctionoftheSprayAdditiveandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsisnotpossible.Therefore,anewCondition(i.e.,B)wasaddedwhichallowsonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintobeinoperableforupto7dayssinceatleastoneredundantpost--93-December1995 [ITS62.iii3.6Q77Status:[Response:3.6Q78Status:[]Response:accidentcharcoalfilterandoneCStrainisavailable.AsecondnewCondition(i.e.,C)wasaddedforthecasewithtwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltersinoperablewhichrequiresthattheyberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursconsistentwithConditionAforlossofoneCStrain.AthirdCondition(i.e.,D)wasaddedwithrespecttoaninoperablesprayadditivetanksincethisrenderstheCSiodineremovalcapabilityinoperable.ACompletionTimeof72hoursisprovidedforthisConditionalso.Inaddition,existingConditionCwasrevisedtoaddressthecaseofoneortwoinoperableCRFCunitsandConditionEwasrevisedtoreflectallthepossiblecombinationswhichresultintheneedtoenterLCO3.0.3.ANotewasaddedtotheLCOtorequiredeclaringtheassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperablewhenCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.Also,thenecessarySurveillancesandbasesassociatedwiththePost-Accident.CharcoalSystemandthesprayadditivetankwereadded.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.4]-'heLCOstatementhasthewordcontainmentwhichisredundanttoCRFCandshouldbedeleted.]OpenTheLCOstatementinAttachmentDshouldhave"containment"removedpriortoCFRCunitsasshowninAttachmentC.Comment¹41hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.ThenewnoteunderapplicabilityisaConditionstatementandRequiredAction.Itisacknowledgedbutnotfullyunderstood.Pleaseprovideasketchofthecomponentsandtheirconnections.ThiswillenablenewConditionFtoberewrittenwiththisnoteinit(andRequiredActionsadded),anotherConditionmaybecreatedorsomeothersolutionimplemented.OpenAsimplifiedsketchoftherelationshipbetweentheCRFCsandthePostaccidentCharcoalfiltersisbeingprovided.RGBEproposestorelocatethisActionsNotetoITSConditionFasfollows.Comment¹42hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.ConditionReuiredActionComletionTimeImmediatelyANDF.OneortwoCRFCF.I-----'---NOTE----------unitsinoperable.RequiredActionF.IonlyrequiredifCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.Declareassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable.F.2RestoreCRFCunit(s)toOPERABLEstatus.7days3.6Q79Status:[]Response:ItisacceptabletodeleteConditionD.ClosedN/A-94-December1995 3.6080Status:[]Response:3.6081Status:[]Response:3.6082Status:[]Response:ConditionCneedsaqualifierstatement...thatbothCStrainsareOPERABLE.ThisisbecauseyoucouldbeinConditionAandCatthesametimeandnotbeabletomeetthedesignaccident.OpenConditionHspecificallyaddressesthecaseofbeinginbothConditionAandCatthesametimeandrequiresentryintoLCO3.0.3.ConditionCvasnotwrittentoonlyapplyifbothCStrainsvereOPERABLEsinceifaCStrainwereinoperable,thenLCO3.0.3isentered.IftheCStrainisthenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,thetimeclockforRequiredA'ctionC.lwouldnotbeginuntilaftertherepairiscompletedinsteadoffromthetimethatthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersweredeclaredinoperableasitiscurrentlywr'itten.Isn'tnewConditionDasubsetofConditionA?PleasecommentespeciallyregardinghowitaffectsbothCStrainsnotbeingfullyOPERABLE(noiodineremovalcapability).Thisassumesthereisonlyonesprayaddi$ivetank.Alsothisneedstosaythatbothpost-.accidentcharcoalfiltersmustbeOPERABLEperCTS3.3.2.2.e.TheCTSreferstothesprayadditivesystemandyouonlyspecthetank?OpenAsketchoftheinteractionoftheCStrainsandthesinglesprayadditivetankisprovidedwhichshowsthebreakdownofcomponentsasdescribedintheLCObases.Ascanbeseenfromthisdrawing,ConditionDisnotasubsetofConditionAsincetheinoperabilityofthesprayadditivetankdoesnotfailtheCSpressurereducingfunction(i.e.,itonlyimpactstheiodineremovalfunction).However,,ifbothCSspraytrainsareinoperable,thenConditionHrequiresimmediateentryintoLCO3.0.3regardlessofthestatusofthesprayadditivetank.ConditionHisalsoenteredifthesprayadditivetankandoneorbothpost-accidentcharcoal'filtersareinoperable.ConditionDwasnotwrittentoonlyapplyifbothpost-accidentcharcoalfilterswereOPERABLEsinceifapost-accidentfilterwereinoperable,thenLCO3.0.3isentered.Ifthepost-accidentfilteristhenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,thetimeclockforRequiredActionD.lwouldnotbeginuntilaftertherepairiscompletedinsteadoffromthetimethatthesprayadditivetankwasdeclaredinoperableasitiscurrentlywritten.Also,noteCommentiI2whichhasbeenopenedrelatedtoaLCO3.0.6exemptionforthesprayadditivetankaridCStrainsinteraction.NewConditionEstatementdoesnotincludeConditionDiftheCompletionTimeisnotmet.OpenTheConditionEstatementinAttachmentDshouldhaveincludeConditionDasshowninAttachmentC.Comment84lhasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.3.6083Status:[]Response:December1995InnewConditionHcouldn'tthelastthree.ORstatementsbeshortenedto"AnycombinationofthreeormoreinoperableCRFC'nits,sprayadditivetank,CStrainorpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains.OpenNo,theORstatementmustbeasstatedsincethereareseveralcombinationsoftheproposedtextwhichwouldnotbeoutsidethe 3.6Q84Status:[]Response:3.6Q85Status:[]Response:3.6Q86Status:[]Response:3.6Q87Status:[]Response:iv.[ITS62.iv]:3.6Q88Status:[]Response:V.accidentanalysisincluding:1.ThesprayadditivetankandoneCStrain.2.OneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfilter.Couldn'twegetridoftheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimeofConditionHandmovetheConditionHstatementstobelowtheConditionGstatementandthusgodirectlytotheConditionGRequiredActions?OpenThepurposeofConditionGistorequireaplantshutdownsinceeventhoughtheplantiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions,therequiredredundancyfortheCRFCunitsisunavailableandwasnotrestoredwithinspecifiedtimes.-ConditionHisprovidedinthecasewheretheplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalysisassumptionssincealossofsafetyfunctionhasoccurredandLCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.,Also,enteringLCO3.0.3providestheplantwith1hourtopreparefortheshutdownwhichConditionGdoesnot.SR3.6.6.1needstoalsoverifythesprayadditivevalves.OpenRG&EagreestoaddanewSRsimilartoNUREG-1431SR3.6.7.1.Comment0'43hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.NewSR3.6.6.13shouldincludethephrase"thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition"asjustifiedinITS862.v.OpenRG8EagreestoaddthiswordingtoSR3.6.6.13.Comment844hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.NewSRs3.6.6.5and3.6.6.6mayneedtobe.renumberedpertheWritersGuide.WhatistherealfrequencyoftheseSRs?OpenThe"real"frequencyoftheseSRsismonthlyformostcomponentsunlessmodificationsaremade,orifafire(i.e.,smoke)orpaintingoccursinthevicinity.ConditionFwasrelocatedaboveConditionGconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thisappearstobepurelyadministrativebutwhyisitcategorizedastechnical?OpenNUREG-1431LCO3.6.6AistechnicallybrokewithrespecttoConditionFregardlessofthechangesbeingproposed.ConditionFrequiresaplantshutdownifConditionCisnotmet.BasedontheITSVriter'sGuide,ConditionFshouldimmediatelyfollowConditionC.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.9,Revision1.Notchecked.vi~Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincluding-96-December1995 [ITS62.vi.a3.6Q89Status:[]Response:3.6Q90Status:[]Response:3.6Q91Status:[]Response:3.6Q92Status:[]Response:3.6Q93Status:[]Response:3.6Q94providingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Yariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsandb]:ThereisaninsertattheendofthesecondparagraphofBackgroundforCSSystemwhichisnotunderstoodfor"additionalheatremoval"?OpenDuringtherecirculationmodefollowinganaccident,theCSsystemisinpull-stopunlessCNNTpressurereaches37psigatwhichtimeCSisreinstated.ContainmentheatremovalduringrecirculationisnormallyprovidedbytheCRFCsandthecoolingviathesump(i.e.,throughtheRHRsystem).Itappearsthatthelastparagraphofinsert3.6.6.3shouldberelocatedtotheendoftheparagraphintowhichitisinserted?OpenAttachmentCofthesubmittalshowsthatthelastparagraphofInsert3.6.6.3isseparatefromthelastsentencecontainedintheinsertedparagraph.WhataretheotherGinnacontainmentventilationandairconditioningsystemsnotedonPageB3.6-65?OpenThereareessentiallyfivesystemswhichcanbeusedtoprovidecoolingtovariouspointswithincontainmentduringNODES1-4.ThesesystemsarelistedbelowanddiscussedinUFSARSection9.4.1:a.CRFCunits.b.ControlRodDriveNechanismCoolingSystemc.ReactorCompartmentCoolingSystemd.ContainmentNini-PurgeSysteme.PenetrationCoolingSystemIntheApplicableSafetyAnalyses,therearethreedeletedparagraphswhichshouldbespecificallyexplained.OpenThefirstparagraphofconcerndeletestextrelatedtoworstcasesingleactivefailureasdiscussedintheresponseto3.6q73.fphoneforinadvertentspray).Thethirdparagraphofconcernisdeletedinitsentirety.ThisparagraphspecifiesthatcontainmentcoolingtrainperformancesundervaryingaccidentconditionsisspecifiedintheUFSAR.ThislevelofdetailisnotinthecurrentGinnaStationUFSARandisinsteadretainedwithinvariousanalysesandotherdocumentswhicharenotgenerallyavailabletooutsideparties(e.g.,westinghouseproprietaryanalyses).Insert3.6.6.11ismissing.OpenTherequestedinsert3.6.6.11isbeingprovided.QuestionstotheLCOpartsof3.6.6haveaskedforsketchestoshowtherelationshipanddependenciesofthesethreesystems.TheimprovedTSLCObasisatthispointdoesnotappeartoagreewith-97-Oecember1995 Status:[]Response:3.6095Status:[]Response:V11.V111.theexistingTSasisexplainedandinterpretedbyCTS13.xv.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.'IThequestionstotheLCOpartof3.6.6needtobeaddressed,discussedandresolvedbeforeanycontinuingdetailedreviewoftheBASESLCO,ACTIONSandSRssectioncanoccur.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-23,C.6.NotcheckedTheCompletionTimelimitof"10daysfromthediscoveryoffailuretomeettheLCO"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.TheintentofaddingthislimittotheCompletionTimeistopreventaplantfromcontinuouslybeingintheLCOwithoutevermeetingthefullsystemrequirements.ThisabuseoftheLCOisbesthandledunderplantproceduressincetheadditionofthislimittotheCompletionTimecolumncreatesconfusionamonglicensedpersonnel.=-ProvidingthislimitcanstillresultinLCOabusesincethesystemscanallbedeclaredOPERABLEforonlyafewminutesandthentheLCOimmediatelyenteredagain.SufficientNRCguidancealreadyexistswithrespecttoextensiveuseofLCOtime(e.g.,Ref.26).Inaddition,theMaintenanceRule(10CFR50.65)requiresmonitoringofequipmentperformance.finally,areviewofGinnaStationplantrecordsindicatesthatthesystemscoveredbythisLCOwereoutofserviceatotalof1017hoursfromJune1990toJuly1994(or<4%ofthetimeinwhichtheplantwasaboveColdShutdown)whichdemonst'ratesthatthislimitisunnecessary.[ITS62.viii3.6096Status:[]Response:]~Itisacceptabletonotaddthisbutthejustificationraisesafewquestions.First,bydeletingthiswedonotwanttopushthe"abuse"ofth'issituationfurtherundergroundintoplantprocedures.TheNUREG-1431attemptedtodealhead-onwiththis"abuse"formerlycalledthe"flip-flop"betweenConditions.HaveallplacesintheimprovedTSwherethisisused,beendeleted?HasCompletionTimes1.3bechanged?The'searegenericquestionsoutside.ofthisspecificdeletioninthissection.Also,the1017hoursoutofserviceseemshighforthesesystemsalone.OpenAllusesofthisCompletion,TimelimithavebeenremovedfromthespecificationsincludingtheCompletionTime1.3examples.ThereisalsoawestinghouseproposedTravellerinthesystemwithrespecttothis.The1017hoursisthetotaltimeinwhichanyoneofthefour.CRFCunits,eitherCStrain,orthesprayadditivetankwasinoperableovera4yearwindow.Sincemostofthesecomponentsareallowedtobeinoperableforupto7days(or168hours),thistotalisnotconsideredexcessive.1X.SR3.6.6.A.3wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisSRrequiresverificationofaminimumSWflowratethroughthefancoolers.ThisprocessvariableisnotusedorcreditedintheDBAortransientanalyses.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontain-98-December1995 [ITS62.ix]:3.6Q97Status:[]Response:thissurveillance.Inaddition,noothercomponentsuppliedcoolingwaterbySW(e.g.,DGs,CCW)hasanyflowrateverificationsurveillance.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThecorrectSWflowrateisimportanttokeeptheCRFCunitsOPERABLEsincetwounitsarealwaysrunningduringnormaloperationstomaintainthecontainmentairtemperaturewithinthenewLCO3.6.5limits.TheselimitswerenotpreviouslyintheexistingTS.ThisverificationisimportantbecausetheSWflowisapparentlyorganizedatthepumplevelandnottheloopleveltotheseunits.PleaseaddthisSR.RejectedTheCRFCunitsuseSVtoremovecontainmentheatduringbothnormaloperationandaccidentconditions.ThisheatremovalcapabilityisbasedonbothSVflowandtemperature.Thatis,withhigherSkitemperatures,yourequirehigherflowratestomaintainheatremovalrequirements.Theaccidentanalyses'havebeenperformedassumingthehighestSMtemperaturestocreateworstcaseconditions.Therefore,requiringtheseSVflowratesduringwintermonthsisexcessivelyconservativeduetothelowwatertemperatureswhichexist.Inaddition,duringwintermonthsallfourCRFCunitshaveflowthroughthemwithacommondischargeAOVthrottlingflow.Inordertoperformthistest,thecommonAOVwouldhavetobeopenedcausingatemperaturetransientwithincontainment.SimilartestsofSh!supplytotheCCMheatexchangersandthedieselgeneratorsarenotrequiredbyNUREG-1431.Anindustrytravelleriscurrentlyinthesystemtodeletethisrequirement.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹131J63.ITS3.6.7ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheywererelocatedtoLCO3.6.6asdiscussedabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ACCEPTABLE64.ITS3.6.8TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedsinceLCO3.6.7wasrelocatedtoLCO3.6.6.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ACCEPTABLEIncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.5.ACCEPTABLEiii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.5.Notchecked1V.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.l.NotcheckedSR3.6.8.1,SR3.6.8.2,andSR3.6.8.3werenotaddedsincethecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainarequirementforthehydrogenrecombinersorthesesurveillances.Asdescribedinthenewbasesforthissection,thehydrogenrecombinersinstalledat-99-December1995 []e:Status:Respons[ITS64.v]:3.6Q98GinnaStationareinsidecontainmentandaredesignedaroundtheuseofacombustionchambertocontrolhydrogengeneration.Performingafunctionaltestwouldmostlikelyrequireanevacuationofcontainmentforsafetyreasonswithlittlebenefit.Instead,RGSEproposestoperformaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelevery24monthstoensurethateachhydrogenrecombinerwillprovidethecorrecthydrogenandoxygenmixtureinthecombustionchamber.Inaddition,theblowerfanforeachhydrogenrecombinerwillbeoperatedfor~5minutesevery24months.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Operatingthefanisagoodstartbutthereshouldalsobeaminimumamountoftestingthatispossibletoverifythat1)supplyhydrogenandoxygengetstotheunittopermitcombustion;2)thepowersupplyisindependentlyredundant;3)theunitcanflashorsparkwithouthydrogen/oxygenpresent;4)thatmoistureorotherby-productsdonotfouloperationoftheunit;andetc.Theinsert3.6.7.5impliesonlythefanisneededtooxidizethehydrogenwithincontainment.Thisdoesnotappeartobecorrect.RevisedthisnewSR3.6.7.1OpenEachoftheaboveissuesisaddressedseparatelybelow(note,asketchoftherecombineranditscontrollogicareattached):1.Atestgas(e.g.,nitrogen)willbesuppliedtotherecombinerevery24monthstoverifythatnopluggingoftheselineshasoccurred.2.Verificationthatthepowersupplyisindependentlyredundantisnotrequiredsinceeachhydrogenrecombinerispermanentlypoweredfromoppositeelectricaltrains.3.Asightglassexistsontheunitssuchthattheignitorcanbeactuatedandaverificationmadethatsparksweregenerated.Thisverificationwillbeperformedevery24months.4.Thefoulingoftheunitwillbeaddressedbyoperatingtheblowerfan,strokingallofthecontrolvalvesinthecontrollogic,andperformingcalibrationsofthiscontrollogicevery4months.Essentially,allcomponentsofthehydrogenrecombinerwillbetestedseparatelytoensurethatcollectively,therecombinerwillremainOPERABLE.Therecombinerwaslastfunctionallytestedin1979-whichresultedin300'Fairbeingdischargedintoamostlyevacuatedcontainment.CommentiI45hasbeenopenedtoaddressthesetestingrequirements.3.6Q99MhatiswrongordifficultwithperformingaphysicalandvisualinspectionoftherecombinerasisrequiredinSR3.6.8.2?Status:[]OpenResponse:RGBEagreestoaddNUREG-1431SR3.6.8.2toperformaphysicalandvisualinspectionoftherecombinerevery24months.Comment845hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.6Q100Sincethesearetheonlyhydrogencontrolunitsattheplantwhyisn'tthereaverificationofoperationevery184days?Suchasoperatingtheblowerfanorperformingachannelcheckorcalibration.December1995 Status:[]Response:vi.OpenAsdiscussedintheresponseto3.6q101,theNRChasapprovedtheuseofahydrogenpurgesystem.Therefore,RGEEdoesnotbelievethatadditionaltestingisrequired.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingdiscussionconcerningthedesignofthehydrogenrecombiners.b.GinnaStationhasanalternatehydrogenpurgesystemasdescribedinUFSARSection6.2.5.2.2andacceptedbytheNRCinReference27.[ITS64.vi.a3.6Q101Status:[]Response:3.6Q102Status:[]Response:3.6Q103StatOs:[]Response:andb]:Thereissomeconfusiononsystemnames.DoesthismeanGinnahasahydrogenpurgesystemordoesthismeanGinnahasanalternatehydrogencontrolsystem.The,textatthebottomofpageB3.6-115hasdeletedreferencetothehydrogenpurgesystem.InordertohaveaConditionBtothisLCO,analternatehydrogencontrolsystemmustbeacceptabletotheNRCstaff.PageB3.6-117,impliesthisistheMini-PurgeSystem.Isthiscorrect?OpenGinnaStationutilizesthePfini-Purgesystemasanalternatehydrogenpurgesystem(seeVFSARSection6.2.5.2).ThistechniquewasacceptedbytheNRCasabackuphydrogenpurgesystemperletterfromD.N.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.I/hite,RG&E,datedJuly7,1980(attached).TheactualhydrogenpurgesystemacceptedbytheNRCwastheshutdownpurgesystemsincetheHini-PurgeSystemwasnotinstalleduntilthemid-1980s.However,themini-PurgeSystemisnowthepreferredpath.ThebackgroundtotheBASESinthesecondparagraphisrevisedtoimplyhydrogenwillbedischargedtotheenvironmentduringnormaloperationbyuseofthemini-purgesystemandduringaccidentconditionsasthealternatetotherecombiners.SeeBASESinsert3.6.7.3whichproposesevacuationsofthegeneralpublic?BasedonthisinformationthereisnoreasontohaveaConditionBforGinna.OpenSeeresponseto3.6q100.TheuseofConditionBduetothepurgingcapabilityoftheHini-PurgeSystemisconsideredacceptablesincetheNUREG-1431basesreferencetheuseofaHydrogenPurgeSystem.TheBASESinsert3.6.7.4ismisleading.Itisstatedthatrecombinersmustbeplacedintooperationbeforethe4.1v/olimitisreached.WhyimplythatthelimitcouldbeexceededsoonerandnotreducedtheCompletionTimestomatchthisanalyzedstate?Alsoimplyingoperationoftherecombinersatornearthe6v/olimitdoesnotseemprudent.Thereisanimplieddependenceonventingexcesshydrogenwhichsuggeststherecombinersdonothave100%redundantcapability.OpenAsdiscussedinUFSARSection6.2.5.2,twoanalyseswereperformedwithrespecttohydrogengenerationwithincontainment.Both-101-December1995 analysesdemonstratethatthehydrogenflammabilitylimitof6.0v/oisnotreacheduntilatleast31daysfollowinganaccident.Thereisnodependenceofventingexcesshydrogenatanytimebelowthis6.0v/olimitsincehydrogenisphysicallypipedintocontainmentduringuseoftherecombinerstoensurethatitisappropriatelyburnedinthecombustionchamber.Therateatwhichhydrogenisaddedisdependantuponthecontainmenthydrogenconcentration.RGBEproposestorevisethelastsentenceofInsert3.6.7.4toread"Operationofthehydrogenrecombinersensuresthataconcentrationof6.0v/owouldnotbereachedinsidecontainmentwhichcouldresultinanoverpressurizationgivenanignitionsource."Comment¹46hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.65.ITS3.6.9[ITS65.i]:3.6Q104Status:[]Response:3.6Q105Status:[]Response: 3.6Q106Status:[]Response:Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheHydrogenMixingSystemasdefinedinthebasesisusedtoensurethatcontainmentatmosphereis'uniformlymixed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaHydrogenMixingSystemandinsteadusestheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolingSystemforthisfunction(LCO3.6.6).Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.WhyistheCRFCsystemnotusedasanalternatehydrogencontrolsystem?OpenTheCRFCsystembyitselfcannotremoveorpurgehydrogenfromcontainmentsinceitonlycoolsandrecirculatesairwithinthecontainment.TheHini-PurgeSystemmustalsobeinservicetoactasahydrogenpurgesystem.SincetheCRFCsystem'isalreadyrequiredbyLCO3.6.6,RGBEdoesnotbelievethatthisLCOisrequired.Has=theNRCstaffprovidedanevaluation/acceptanceofthehydrogencontrolmethodsandalternativesatGinna?OpenSeeresponseto3.6/101.Wouldn'ttheuseofaircirculationwithincontainmentprecludetheformationofhydrogenpocketswithpotentialconcentrationsabovethe6v/olimit?OpenTheuseofaircirculationwouldassistinthereducingtheformationofairpocketsbutnoanalyseshavebeenperformedtojustifythisconclusion.66.ITS3.6.10Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheHydrogen'gnitionSystemasdefinedinthebasesisusedtocontrolhydrogenlevelswithincontainmentpostaccident.GinnaStationdoesnot"haveaHydrogenIgnitionSystemandinsteadusestheHydrogenRecombinerSystemforthisfunction(LCO3.6.7).Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITS-102-December1995

  • [ITS66.i]:3.6QI07Status:[]Response:Category(i)change.ItisacceptablenottoaddthisLCOduetotheTSIPconversionguidelinesprohibitingplantmodificationstoimplementtheNUREG-1431.ClosedN/A67.ITS3.6.11i.ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheywererelocatedtoLCO3.6.6asdiscussedabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.68.ITS3.6.12ITS68.i:~~3.6Q108Status:[]Response:Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thefunctionofthecontainmentvacuumreliefvalvesasdefinedinthebasesistoensurethatcontainmentisprotectedagainstnegativepressure.GinnaStationdoesnothavecontainmentvacuumreliefvalves.ProtectionagainstnegativepressureisprovidedbyLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Pleaseexplain'howGinnadoesnotneedtohaveaContainmentVacuumReliefSystem.Theexistenceofapressurelimitationdoesnotprecludetheneedtoanalyzeforapotentialsituationsuchasaninadvertentactuationofthe"containmentspraysystem.Hasthisanalysisbeenperformed?Istheresufficientmarginbetween'thenegativepressurecreatedandthestructurallimitofthecontainmentliner.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.69.ITS3.6.13i.Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheShieldBuildingAirCleanupSystem(SBACS)asdefinedinthebasesisusedtoensurethatradioactivematerialswhichleakfromcontainmentfollowingaDBAisadequatelyfilteredandabsorbed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaSBACSsincetheleakagethroughthecontainmentlineriscontrolledbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.70.ITS3.6.14Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheAirReturnSystemasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinna-103-December1995 71.ITSStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.3.6.1572.ITSThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.AnicebedasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.3.6.1673.ITSThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.IcecondenserdoorsasdefinedinthebasesareonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.3.6.17Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Adivi'derbarrierasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.74.ITS3.6.1875.Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.ContainmentrecirculationdrainsasdefinedinthebasesareonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ITS3.6.19Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.AShieldBuildingasdefinedinthebasesisusedtoensurethatradioactivematerialswhichleakfromcontainmentfollowingaDBAareadequatelyfilteredandabsorbed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaShieldBuildingsincetheleakagethroughthecontainmentlineriscontrolledbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Section3.7CurrentTS13.TechnicalSpecification3.3TS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3-LCO3.5.1ConditionAwasaddedwhichallo......xv.TS3.3.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallowbothpost-accidentcharcoal104-December1995 filtertrains(includingtheCRFCunitswhichsupplythem)tobeinoperableforupto72hoursifbothcontainmentspray(CS)trainsareOPERABLE.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyseswhichdemonstratethateithertwoCStrains,oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsareadequatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaDBA(i.e.,eachCStrainandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainprovides50%oftherequirediodineremovalrequirements).However,twoCStrainscannotbeinoperablesinceatleastonetrainmustoperateforcontainmentpressur'eandtemperaturecontrol.Inaddition,twoCRFCunitscannowberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayssincetheaccidentanalysesonlycredittwoofthefourcooling.unitsasbeingOPERABLEwithrespecttocontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Finally,withoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperableandnotrestoredwithin7days,theplanthasonly36hourstoreachMODE5versus84hoursduetotheimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.12)changes.[CTS13.xv-L1]:3.6Q109TheexistingTS3.3.2.2.fismissingfromtheCTS.Isthisatypooranerror?Status:[]OpenResponse:ThereisnoTS3.3.2.2.fintheCTS,noranydiscussedinCTSchange13.xv.3.6Q110Status:[]Response:3.6Q111Status:[]Response:3.6Q112Status:[]Response:IsthisanewDBAanalysiswhichhasbeenperformedsincetheseCTSwereissuedasAmendment24?OpenNo,thesameDBAanalysiswhichwasperformedinsupportofAmendmentII24isusedasthebasisforthischange.Asamatter-of-fact,theCTSbasesonpage3.3-12(identifiedasthe"unidentifiedpage"below')containmuchoftheinformationusedtojustifythisproposedchange.TheCTSarealso"broke"inthatitdoesnotallowmorethanon'eCRFCtobeinoperableatatime.However,therearetwoCRFCsperelectricaltrain(actuallythesame48OYbus),whichCTS3.7.2.2.callowstoberemovedfromserviceforupto1hour.TheunidentifiedpagefollowingTS3.3.2.2.econtainsthreecombinationsofsystemstomeettheDBA.WhereisGinna'scommitmentmadetohenceforthnotrelyon"(2)twoCRFCunitsandtwopost-accidentcharcoalfilters"tosatisfytheDBAaccidentanalysis.OpenITSLCO3.6.6requiresall4CRFCunits,bothCStrains,andthesprayadditivetanktobeOPERABLE.Thevariouscombinationsof.equipmentwhichisallowedtoinoperableatanyonetimedoesnotallowtheuseofonlythe"twoCRFCunitsandtwopost-accidentcharcoalfilters"initem(2).PleaseshowtheconfigurationandnumberoffiltersinthesketchrequestedinITS62.iii,item82.Open Therequestedsketchesarebeingincluded.-105-December1995 16.TechnicalSpecification3.6TS3.6.1-The.textallowingclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeopenedonan:intermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolswasrelocatedtoaLCONoteconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Acceptedastechnicallyequivalentandisadministrativeinnature;therefore,noSEmentionneeded.TS3.6.2-TheApplicabilityformaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitswasrevisedfromreactorcriticalitytoNODE4.Thischangeisnecessarytoprovideconsistencywiththerequirementsforcontainmentintegrity(i.e.,LCO3.6.1)sinceexceedingthesepressurelimitscouldresultinaoverpressureofcontainmentifanaccidentweretooccur.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS16.ii-MI]:3.6Q113Thisisacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/AHowlongdoesittaketoopentheisolationvalvestoreturntoatmosphericpressure?OpenSeeresponseto3.6q58Status:[].Response:[CTS16.ii-Ll]:3.6Q114ExplainhowcontainmentpressureisaffectedbythelimitingsizeandfunctionofMini-PurgeSystem.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.6q573.6Q1153.6Q116Status:[7Response:3.6Q117 Status:[]Response:3.6Q118Status:[]Response:Isthispathwayfiltered?OpenSeeresponseto3.6q59Howlongdoesittaketoexchangecontainmentairvolume?OpenSeeresponseto3.6q60Why24hoursandnotaCompletionTimeof1,2,4or8hours?Remembertheoriginalbasisfor1hourisconsistency'with.the.lossofthenewcontainmentoperabilityperITS3.6.1!OpenSeeresponseto3.6q61TS3.6.3-ThetitleforthisLCOwasrevisedfromcontainmentisolation"boundary"to"barrier"whichprovidesgreaterconsistencywiththebasesforNUREG-1431.Inaddition,threenewrequirementswereadded.Thefirstrequiresthatapenetrationwithbothcontainmentbarriersinoperablebeisolatedwithin1hourversus4hours.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithTS3.6.1sincecontainmentintegrityispotentiallyviolated.Assuch,verificationofcontinuedacceptablecontainmentleakagemustbeinitiatedimmediatelyifbothbarriersaredeclaredinoperable.In106-December1995 addition,newrequirementswithrespecttoaninoperableairlock(includingtheuseofanairlockwithaninoperabledoororinterlockmechanism)andcontainmentmini-purgepenetrationswithisolationvalvesthatexceedtheirleakagerateacceptancecriteriawereadded.Thenewrequirementfortheairlocksspecifiesthataninoperableairlockdoor(includinganinoperableinterlockmechanism)mustbeisolatedwithin1hourandlockedclosedwithin24hours.however,adedicatedindividualcanbeusedinthecaseofaninoperableinterlockmechanismtoallowentryandexitthroughtheairlock.ThenewspecificationprovidesspecificRequiredActionsintheeventthatcurrentGinnaStationTS4.4.2.4.cisexceeded.Thenewrequirementforthemini-purgepenetrationsspecifiesthattheaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolatedwithin24hoursifanisolationvalveexceedsitsleakagelimit.Thesenewrequirementsprovideaddedassurancethatpenetrationswhichcanprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironmentareaddressedquicklywhentheirisolationbarriersbecomeinoperable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS16.iii-Ll]:Alsosee[ITS59.ii]3.6Q119Status:[][]Response:See3.6QRejected,7-14-95Open,7-29-95Thisitemwasoriginallyrejectedbutteleconon7-27-95.Thenamechange"boundaries"to"barriers"isacceptedhowever,internallywithintheLCOdiscussed.Tobediscussedatthemeeting.itwasreopenedfollowingafromcontainmentisolationforthetitleofLCO3.6.3;eachname'changemustbe[CTS16.iii-Ml]:3.6Q120Status:[]Response:3.6Q121Status:[]Response:3.6Q122Status:[]Response:3.6Q123Status:[]Response:Thechangetorestorecontainmentintegritywithinonehourratherthan4hoursperexistingTS3.6.3isacceptable.ClosedN/AWhatdoes4thsentenceof¹16.iiimean?OpenThissentencereferstonewRequiredActionB.2whichrequiresevaluationofcontainmentintegritywithin24hoursaftertwocontainmentisolationvalvesforthesamepenetrationaredeclaredinoperable.Whatdoes8thsentenceof¹16.iiimean?Therearenolimitsstated;sohowisthisTSexceeded?OpenThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentAtothesubmittalinthatitshouldreadCTS"4.4.2.3.c"andnot"4.4.2.4.c"attheendofthissentence.Comment¹47hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.SeeITS3.6.3¹59.ivforothercommentsonimprovedTS.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.[CTS16.iii-L2]:-107-December1995 3.6Q124Status:[]Response:TherelaxationsforLCO3.6.2ConditionsAandChavenotbeenjustified.OpenGinnaStationcurrentlytreatsairlockdoorsunderCTS3.6.3sincethereisnospecificairlockLCO.Sinceeachdoorinbothairlockscontainsredundanttestableseals,theOPERABI'LITYofeitherdooranditstwoassociatedsealsmeetstherequirementsofCTS3.6.3.Therefore,ifanairlockdoorisinoperable,CTS3.6.3hasnoRequiredActions(althoughtheGinnaStationoperatingpracticeswouldrequirerestoringthedoortoOPERABLEstatuswithinaprudenttimeframe).Ifbothdoorswereinoperable,thenCTS3.6.3requires4hourstoisolatetheairlockifcontainmentleakagelimitsaremetperCTS3.6.1;otherwiseonly1hourisallowed.Therefore,theITSLCO3.6.2ConditionsA(whichcorrespondstooneinoperableairlockdoor)andC'(whichcorrespondstotwoinoperableairlockdoors)aremorerestrictivethanCTSrequirements.[CTS16.iii-L3]:3.6Q125Status:[]Response:TherelaxationfornewLCO3.6.2,Condition8hasbeenaccepted.ClosedN/A[CTS16.iii-L4]:3.6Q126Status:[]Response:TherelaxationforITSLCO3.6.2ActionsNotePlhasnotbeenjustified.OpenAsdiscussedintheresponseto3.6/124,GinnaStationcurrentlyhasnoairlockrequirementsandconsidersairlockdoorsunderLCO3.6.3.Ifanairlockdoorwereinoperable,nofurtherrequiredactionisnecessaryintheCTS.IfaccessthroughtheOPERABLEdoorintheaffectedairlockwererequired,thenCTS3.6.1wouldapplywhichallows1hourtorestorecontainmentintegrity.However,theremainingairlockwouldbeusedtotheextentpracticalunderthiscircumstance.Therefore,theimplementationofthisActionNoteisconsistentwithcurrentpracticesandrequirements.[CTS16.iii3.6Q127Status:[]Response:-L57:Isthereaneedforanyroutineaccesstocontainment?Whatisit?OpenGinnaStationpersonnelnormallyentercontainmentatleastoncepermonthtoperformTSrequiredsurveillances.TheseincludeHEPAandcharcoalfiltertestingoftheCRFCunits(plusothernon-TSventilationsystems)andthe15minuterunofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.TheaccumulatorsarealsosampledmonthlywithASNEvalvetestsperformedquarterly.3.6Q128Status:[]Response:TherelaxationforConditionA,RequiredActions,Note82hasnotbeenjustified.OpenAsdiscussedintheresponseto3.6/124,GinnaStationcurrentlyhasnoairlockrequirementsandconsidersairlockdoorsunderLCO3.6.3.Ifbothairlockdoorswereinoperable,thenCTS3.6.1mustbemetwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity.Ifcontainmentintegrityismaintained,thentheairlockwouldessentiallybelockedclosedtopreventfurtheruse.Ifaccessthroughthe-108-December1995 affectedairlockwererequired,thenCTS3.6.1wouldapplywhichallows1hourtorestorecontainmentintegrity.However,theremainingairlockwouldbeusedtotheextentpracticalunderthiscircumstance.Therefore,.theimplementationofthisActionNoteisconsistentwithcurrentpracticesandrequirements.[CTS16.iii-L6]:3.6Q129Status:[]Response:TherelaxationforLCO3.6.3,ConditionAhasnotbeenjustified.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.[CTS16.iii-L7]:3.6Q130Status:[]Response:3.6Q131IStatus:[]Response:iv.TheimprovedTSLCO3.6.3ConditionE(newConditionC)isarelaxationwhichneedsjustificationforbothshutdownpurgeandmini-purgevalves.OpenITSLCO3.6.3ConditionCisamorerestrictivechangewithrespecttoCTSandthemini-purgevalves.CTS4.4.2.3.cspecifiesleakagelimitsforthemini-purgevalvesandthenstatesthatiftheselimitsarenotmet,"anengineeringevaluationshallbeperformedandplansforcorrectiveactiondeveloped."ITSLCO3.6.3ConditionCrequiresisolationofthepenetrationwithin24hoursandverificationthatitisclosedonceevery31days.SeeAttachmentA,sectionD,item3l.iv.ConditionCdoesnotapplytotheshutdownpurgesystem.TheoriginalintentofthisConditionwasforlargepurgevalveswhichareinherentlymoredifficulttorestoreoperable.Mhyshouldthemini-purgevalvesbegiventhislargeCompletionTimeandnotheldto4hours?OpenFirst,GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothaveanyisolationrequirementswithrespecttoexcessiveleakageasdiscussed'ntheresponseto3.6/130.Second,themini-purgesystemistheprimarysystemavailabletomaintaincontainmentpressurewithinlimitsofITSLC0,3.6.4.Requiringisolationofthispenetrationinashortperiodoftimewouldreducetheabilitytoreducecontainmentpressurewhenrequiredduetotheupperlimitof1.0psig.TS3.6.3-Theuseofaclosedsystemtoisolateaninoperablecontainment'isolationbarrierwasaddedtothisspecification.Consequently,aclosedsystemwhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeetthisspecificationcanbeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrier.Also,isolationdeviceslocatedoutsidecontainmentthatwereusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationvalvearerequiredtobeverifiedclosedonceevery31days.Forisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,theymustbeverifiedcloseduponentryintoMODE4fromMODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92days.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.22)changes.[CTS16.iv-Ll]:3.6Q132Theuseofaclosedsystemtoisolateaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierisnotacceptedasproposed.ThemergingofthisnewisolationmethodintoConditionAisconfusingandrequiresnewinformation.PleaserefertoITS59.ivformorequestions.-109-December1995 Status:[]OpenResponse:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.[CTS16.iv-Hl]:3.6Q133Itisacceptabletoreverifytheisolationofapenetrationatdifferentintervalsdependingwhethertheisolationdeviceislocatedinsideoroutsideofcontainment.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/AV.TS3.6.5-ThiswasrelocatedtothebasesforITS3.6.3sinceitdoesnotmeetanyofthefourcriteriaanddoesnotspecifyany'equiredActions.OperationoftheMini-PurgeSystemisperformedunderproceduressuchthatitsuseisstrictlycontrolled.Placingthisinformationinthebasesalsoprovidessimilarcontrolunder10CFR50.59(i.e.,theBasesControlProgram).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS16.v-RIl]:3.6Q134TS3.6.5seemstobethesameasSR3.6.3.2sothisshouldbeaCategory(i)change.ThetextneedstobeintheBASESbutshouldbeintheBASESfordescribingthepurposeofSR3.6.3.2.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.6q41.vi.TS3.6-Anewrequirementwasaddedwhichspecifiesthattheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureshallbe~120FaboveMODE5.Thistemperaturelimitisn'ecessarytoensurethattheresultingcontainmenttemperaturefollowingaDBAiswithintheassumptionsusedforenvironmentalqualificationofcomponentswithincontainment.Iftheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureis>120'F,itmustberestoredwithin24hours.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS16.vi-Hl]:3.6Q135TheadditionofthenewLCOisacceptable;however,the24hourstorestoreOPERABLEneedsreviewasisnotedinITS6l.ii.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.6q68through3.6q71.Vi1.TS3.6-Anewrequirementwasaddedwhichrequiresthehydrogen'ecombinerstobeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.Thehydrogenrecombinersareassumedintheaccidentanalysestobe.usedtopreventahydrogenexplosionwithincontainmentthatcouldoverpressurizethecontainmentstructure.ThenewLCOallows30daystorestoreaninoperablerecombinerand7daystorestoretwoinoperablerecombinersiftheMini-PurgeSystemisOPERABLE.Inaddition,theplantcanenterMODES1and2withaninoperablehydrogenrecombiner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS16.vii-Ml]:3.6Q136ItisacceptabletoaddthenewLCO3.6.7fortheHydrogenRecombiner.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/A-110-December1995 3.6Q137Status:[]Response:3.6Q138Status:[]Response:X.TheApplicabilityofthisLCOisMODE1and2butCTS16.viiistateapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccuralsoinMODE3.PleaseexplainwhyLCOisalsonotapplicableinMODE3.OpenThereasonthatthehydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredbelowMODE2isexplainedintheApplicabilitybasesofITSLCO3.6.7.Essentially,thehydrogenproductionratefollowingaDBAislowerinMODES3and4whiletheprobabilityofanaccidentrequiringtherecombinersisverylowinallMODESbelowMODE2.TheexistingTShadnomentionofrecombiners,buttheNUREG-1431guidanceassumesthereisatleastoneifnottwoalternatemethodsofhydrogencontrol.ThereappearstobenoneatGinnaexceptthereleaseofhydrogendirectlytotheatmosphereundernormalandaccidentconditions.Basedonthis,onlyConditionAisacceptableandConditionBcannotbeallowed.OpenPleaseseeresponseto3.6ql01TS3.6.l.bandTS3.6.l.c-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityforcontainmentintegritywasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecontainmentintegrityisnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.Thefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysis(UFSAR15.7.3.3)takesnocreditforisolationofthecontainment,containmentintegrity,noreffluentfiltrationpriortorelease.TherequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRM.BoronconcentrationchangesinMODE6andRequiredActionstosuspendpositivereactivityadditionsisprovidedinnewLCO3.9.l.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS16.x-RII?]:3.6Q139ThisisproposedtoberelocatedtorefuelingbutthequestionsonwhythereisnoContainmentIntegrityforMODE6stillremain.Status:[]OpenResponse:RGEEhasproposedtorelocatetheMODE6containmentrequirementstotheTRMasdiscussedinAttachmentA,Section'C,item107.i.IThisresponsewasrevisedasaresultof11/1&'95Appealmeeting.Seecomment¹221.J28.TechnicalSpecification4.1ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.1orTable4.1-1:k.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹25-Thecalibrationandtestingrequirementsforthecontainmentpressurenarrowrangetransmitterwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisinstrumentisnotusedorcreditedinanyDBAortransientanalysis.Thisinstrumentisonlyusedtoverifythatcontainmentpressureremainss1.0psigandz-2.0psigduringnormaloperation.TheseitemswererelocatedtotheRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS28.i.k-R01]:-111-December1995 3.6Q140Status:[]Response:Furtherexplainthisjustificationforrelocation.IsthistheinstrumentwhichisusedtoverifySR3.6.4.1?Ifitis,thenthisparameteristheassumedinitialambientpressurefordeterminingthepeakcontainmentpressureintheDBAanalysis.Likewise,peaknegativepressureforinadvertentcontainmentspraywouldalsobebasedonthisinstrument.OpenChangeD.28.i.kisatypographicalerrorandshouldbedeleted.The"Remarks"columnforthissurveillancespecificallystatesthatthe"narrowrangecontainmentpressure(-3.0,+3psig)excluded."Therefore,thisdiscussionisnotrelevanttotheactualsurveillancerequirementsforSR3.6.4.1.CommentlI47hasbeenopenedtodeletethisitem.ii.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTableF1-2:e.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit813wasrevisedperSR3.6.6.8torequireverificationofthesprayadditivetankNaOHconcentrationonceevery184daysinsteadofmonthly.ThischangeisacceptablesincethesprayadditivetankisnormallymaintainedisolatedatpowersuchthatchangestotheNaOHconcentrationorlevelarenotexpected.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.30)change.Status:[]Response:[CTS28.ii.e-Ll]:3.6Q141Pleasedescribewhatmakeupwatervolumepathwaystothesprayadditivetankexistandhowisitonlythroughwhichvalvesthatarelocked,isolatedorunderadministrativecontrol.Thisistosupportthebasisthatthetankisisolatedatpower.OpenTheonlymakeupwatervolumepathwaytothesprayadditivetankisfromthePrimaryMaterTreatmentSystem.Theuseofthispathwayrequiresopeningof5normallyclosed,in-seriesmanualvalves.Oneofthesevalvesismaintainedlockedclosed.Thetankdrainlinecontainsalockedclosedmanualvalve.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-2(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):10.SR3.6.5.1-requiresverificationevery24hoursthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureiss120'F.[CTS28.ii.i.10-Hl]:3.6Q142Thisisacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/ASR3.6.6.7-requiresverificationevery184daysthatthesprayadditivetankvolumeis>4500gallons.-112-December1995 3.6Q143Status:[]Response:Pleasedescribewhatmakeupwatervolumepathwaysfromthesprayadditivetankexistandhowitcouldonlybethroughwhichvalvesthatarelocked,isolatedorunderadministrativecontrolthatwatercouldbeinadvertentlyreleased.Thisistosupportthebasisforthe184daysintervalduringwhichthetankwillnotbeinadvertentlydrained.OpenPleaseseeresponseto3.6q141.31.TechnicalSpecification4.4TS4.4.4-Therequirementsforthetendonstresssurveillanceswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.6anda.moregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS31.i-R01]:3.6Q144Status:[]Response:ll~GinnahasmadechangestotheapplicableSection5.5.6whichneedresolutionpriortoapprovalofthisSE.OpenTobediscussedatthemeeting.TS4.4.3-The'equirementsforthetestingoftheportionoftheRHRsystemintherecirculationconfigurationwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.2andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.~[CTS31.ii-ROl]:3.6Q145GinnahasmadechangestotheapplicableSection5.5.2whichneedresolutionpriortoapprovalofthisSE.Status:[]OpenResponse:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.TS4.4.1(exceptdefinitionforL,),4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2,and4.4.2.4-Thesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisinformationiscontainedin10CFR50,AppendixJanddoesnotneedtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecifications.SRs3.6.1.1and*3.6.1.2provideforthenecessaryrelationfromtechnicalspecificationstoAppendixJ.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(ii)'hanges.[CTS31.iii-R01]:3.6Q146ThecontentsofexistingTS4.4.2.4.bneedstobeaddedtotheBackgroundBASESinitemcwhichisproposedtobedeleted.SeeITS57.iv.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.6P12iv.TS4.4.2.3.aand4.4.2.3.b-Thesewererevisedtorequirethatiftheallowed10CFR50,AppendixJleakagelimitsareexceeded,theymustberestoredwithin1hourversus48hoursconsistentwithLCO-113-December1995 3.6.1.However,theleakagelimitof<0.6L,wasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththenewAppendixJruleandimplementationguidance(i.e.,theleakagelimitis<0.6L.onamaximumpathwayleakageratebasispriortoenteringNODE4forthefirsttimefollowingeachrefuelingoutageand<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakageratebasisforallothertimeperiods).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.[CTS31.iv-L1]:Status:[]Response:V.3.6Q147Status:[]Response:TheexistingTSrequirementisforpenetrationsandleakagepathsunderTypeBandTypeCtesting.The"48hours"torestorehasbeenrelaxedto"indefinite"byLCOs3.6.2and3.6.3.OpenThe48hoursprovidedinCTS4.4.2.3.bistheCompletionTimeforCTS4.4.2.3.awhichrequiresrepairsifthe"totalleakagefromallpenetrationsandisolationboundariesexceeds0.6L.."10CFR50,AppendixJspecifiesthissame0.6L,acceptancecriteriaforTypeBandCpenetrations.Therefore,theCompletionTimeinCTS4.4.2.3.bisinexcessofthatforCTS3.6.1andITSLCO3.6.1whichrequiresrestorationwithin1hourorinitiationofshutdown.Assuch,this,is,notarelaxationbutachangewhichprovidesconsistencywithinboththeCTSandITS.1Wheredoesthis"minimum/maximumpathwayleakagerate"comefrom?Thissoundslikeanotherrelaxation?OpenSeeresponseto3.6P6.TS4.4.2.4.c-Aspecifiedairlockleakageacceptancecriteriaofs0.05L.whentestedat>P.wasaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisacceptancecriteriaisrequiredtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecificationsby10CFR50,AppendixJ,SectionIII.D.2(iv)andisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrenttestingrequirements.Inaddition,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifythatonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatimeonceevery24months.ThistestisnecessarytoensurethattheOPERABILITYoftheairlocks,asdefinedinthenewbasesforLCO3.6.2ismaintained.TheseareGinnaCategory(iv.a)changes.[CTS31.v-LI]:3.6Q149ExistingTS4.4.2.4.asayspenetrations,likeairlocks,aretestedperAppendixJ.AppendixJsaystheairlockshavetohavealeakageratedintheimprovedTS.ExistingTSaredeficient.ThisalsocontradictsITS58.xijustificationwhichsaysitwasrevised.~Thisseemsnotamorerestrictivebutisequivalentunlessthereisapreviousrequirement.Needsbetterjustification.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.6(32.3.6Q150Status:[]SeeITS58.iv-AsnotedabovethisSRisimportanttoensuringoperabilityoftheairlockssoitshouldhavethesameFrequencyof184daysasleakagetestingunlesstheairlockdoorisnotopened.Justifytestingintervalat24monthsratherthan184days.Open-114-December1995 Response:3.6Q151Status:[]Response:vi.Pleaseseeresponseto3.6P16and3.6(17.AppendixJislessrestrictivenowthanexistingTS4.4.2.4.cinthatonceanairlockdoorisopenedthenyouhave72hoursratherthan48hourstoretestthedoorseal.Providethislessrestrictivejustification.OpenSeeresponseto3.6/18.TS4.4.2.3.c-Therequirementtoperformanengineeringevaluationifthemini-purgesupplyandexhaustlinesisolationvalveleakageexceeds0.05L.wasrevisedtorequireisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationwithin24hours.Inaddition,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31daysifitisoutsidecontainment;oronceevery92daysifitisinsidecontainment.Thesechangesprovide.directguidancetooperatorswhichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Thisisacceptable.ThereisnoneedtoincludethisintheSEsincethistemporaryrequirementisnowmadeapermanentrequirement.TS4.4.5.1-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.6.3.1andSR3.6.3.2)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationofthecorrectpositionofcontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedoutsidecontainmentonceevery184daysandinsidecontainmentpriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious184days.ThesesurveillancesensurethatthecontainmentisolationbarriersremainOPERABLEaboveMODE5.TheseareGinn'aTSCategory(iv.a)changes.[CTS31.vii3'.6Q152Status:[]Response:3.6Q153Status:[]Response:-L1]Itisunclearhowthisisamorerestrictivechange.Ataggingsystemisnot100%reliablenorisvalvelock-out.ThisisthereasonforthisSR.OpenThisisamore.restrictivechangeinthattheCTSdonothaveany.requirementtoverifythecorrectposition/alignmentofcontainmentisolationbarriers.TS4.4.5.1onlyrequiresverificationthatcontainmentisolationvalvesareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.Thisprogramverifiesthatvalvesarecapableofclosing,withintheirrequiredtimelimits(e.g.,60seconds),notthatvalvesareinthecorrectposition.Thefactthat6innaStationcurrentlyperformspositionverificationevery6monthsandutilizesataggingandlockedvalveprogramoutsideofTSrequirementsisnotrelevanttowhetherthisisamoreorlessrestrictiveTSchange.ThisSRcontainsarelaxationforthoseisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationare'as.Justifythisrelaxation.OpenThisisamorerestrictivechangeinthattheCTSdonothaveanyrequirementtoverifythecorrect'osition/alignmentofcontainmentisolation,barriers.TS4.4.5.1onlyrequiresverificationthatcontainmentisolationvalvesareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.Thisprogramverifiesthatvalvesarecapableofclosing-115-December1995 3.6Q154Status:[]Response:withintheirrequiredtimelimits(e.g.,60seconds),notthatvalvesareinthecorrectposition.Thereshouldbemaintenance/surveillanceactivitieson-goinginthe'lantcontinuously.ItisforthesereasonsthatthefrequencyoftheSRswerekeptattheintervalscurrentlyusedinallactiveWestinghouseplantsandalltheotherownergroups.DuringthedevelopmentoftheNUREG-1431,alengtheningofthese31dayintervalscouldnotbejustified,exceptforthoselocatedwithincontainmenttobeat92days.The184daysproposedisunacceptable.Theperiodicwalkdownsareessentialtoverifyequipmentstatusandthisisjustanothercheckwhichshouldbemadein'aconsistentmannerasthemverificationsrequiredundertheRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.2andLCO3.6.3.AsnotedaboveinjustificationforCTS31.vi,thisprovidesdirectguidancetooperatorsinconformancewiththeNUREG-1431andallotherplants.OpenSeeresponseto3.6/44.viii.TS4.4.6.2-TheSurveillanceFrequencyforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveshasbeenrevisedfrom18to24months(seeSectionD,itemI.xii).TheresponsetimesforCIVsisdiscussedinthebasesfornewLCO3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l)change.[CTS31.viii-Ll]:3.6Q155Thisrelaxationfrom18to24monthsisbeingreviewbytheProjectManager.Thischangeisonholduntiladecisionisannounced..Status:[]OpenResponse:.NoresponserequiredbyRG&E.ix.TS4.4-TwonewSurveillanceswereaddedwithrespecttothehydrogenrecombiners(SR3.6.7.1andSR3.6.7.2).ThefirstnewSurveillancerequiresthattheblowerfanforthehydrogenrecombinersbeoperatedfor~5minutesonceevery24months.ThesecondnewSurveillancerequiresthataCHANNELCALIBRATIONbeperformedonthehydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelsonceevery24months.TheperformanceoftheseSRsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareOPERABLEandcapableofperformingtheirpost-accidentfunction.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.[CTS31.ix-Ml]:3.6Q156PleasenotethatthecommentsstateinITS64.vequallyapplyhere.UntilthereisagreementonthenumberandwhatarethecontentsofthenewSRsitisdifficulttojustifythem.Status:[]OpenResponse:Pleaseseeresponsesto3.6(98through3.6/100.32.TechnicalSpecification4.5TS4.5.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtorelocateallSI,RHR,andCSpumptestingfrequenciesanddischargepressurerequirementstotheInserviceTestingprogramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8consistentwiththeITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes,respectively.-116-December1995

[CTS32.ii-L3.60157Status:[]Response:V.lorR01].Thisisacceptablebutisn'tthisarelaxationfromoncepermonthtothelessfrequentISTinterval?OpenTheISTprogramcurrentlyrequiresquarterlytestsonthisequipmentsuchthatthisisactuallyalessrestrictivechangefollowingimplementation.ThejustificationforthischangeisthatASNEtestingrequirementsonlyspecifyquarterlytestsofpumpsandvalvesasbeingadequatetodemonstratecontinuedcomponentOPERABILITY.TheNRChasgenericallyapprovedthesetestingfrequenciesvia10CFR50.55aandapprovaloftheGinnaStationISTProgram.TS4.5.2'.3-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThislevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVentilationFilterTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.Inaddition,theremainingrequirementswereallrelocatedtotheAdministrativeControlssection,TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.[CTS32.v-ROl]:3.6(158Thisisacceptable.Status:[]OpenResponse:NIAV11.TS4.5.1.2-AnewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.1)wasaddedtoverifythecorrectpositionofeachmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheCSflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCSSystemisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS32.vii-HI]:3.6(159TheadditionofSR3.6.6.1isacceptable.Status:[]OpenResponse:N/Avi11.TS4.5.1.2'.b-TheFrequencyofperformingthespraynozzlegastestwasrevisedfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10yearsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.14.Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptableduetothepassivenatureofthespraynozzlesandpreviousacceptableresults.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.36)change.[CTS32.viii-L1]:3.6(160ThenewSR3.6.6.15isacceptable.Status:[]OpenResponse:ix.TS4.5.2.3.5-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireactuationofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfromanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonceevery24monthstoensurethatthesystemalignsitselfcorrectly(SR3.6.6.12).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersmuststillbeopenedatleast.onceper31daystoallowthesystem-'117-December1995 tooperatefor~15minutes.Consequently,onlythefrequencyoftheautomaticalignmentofthedampersisbeingrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithotherspecifications,ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.37)change.[CTS32.,ix-L1];3.6(161Status:[]Response:X.ThisappearsacceptablebutexplainifthereisanydifferencebetweentheCTSreferring,toisolationvalvesversusintheITSreferencetothedampers.SpecificallyintheGinnaterminology,arethesedamperssameastheisolationvalves?~OpenThephrase"post-accidentcharcoalfilterisolationvalves"inCTS4.5.2.3.5arethesamedevicesasthedampersreferencedintheITS.Asshownonthesketchprovidedinresponseto3.6(78,thedampersrequiredtobetestedbytheCTSandITSSR3.6.6.12are5671through5676.TS4.5.2.2.a-ThiswasrevisedtoadjustthetestingFrequencyofthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlytoonceevery24monthsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.13.ThisincreasedtestingintervalisacceptablesincethesystemonlyneedstobeverifiedthatitcanactuateonanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonarefuelingbasissimilartotheSIandRHRsystems.AnyadditionalvalvetestingisaddressedbytheISTprogram.Inaddition,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.9)wasaddedtoverifythattheCSmotoroperatedisolationvalvesactuatetotheircorrectpositiononceevery24monthsfollowinganactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Finally,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.14)wasaddedtoverifythatthesprayadditiveflowrateis'withinlimitsonceevery5years.ThesechangesensurethattheCSandsprayadditivetankLCOscontinuetobemet.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b,38)changes.[CTS32.x-L1]:3.6(}162NewSR3.6.6.13isacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/A[CTS32.x-HI]:3.69163AddinganewSR3.6.6.9isacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:NlA[CTS32.x-H2]:3.6(164Status:[]Response:xi.AddinganewSR3.6.6.14isacceptable.ClosedN/A4TS4.5.2.3.3and4.5.2.3.4-ThesewererevisedtorequirethateachCRFCunitbeoperatedfora15minutesonceevery31days(SR3.6.6.2).ThistestwillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLE.inaccordancewiththeLCO.Inaddition,anewSurveillanceisalsorequiredonceevery24monthstoensurethattheCRFCunitsstartonanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.ThesetestswillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.TheseareGinna118-Decembei1995 TSCategory(v.a)changes.[CTS32.xi-Hl]:3.6(165AddinganewSR3.6.6.2isacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/A[CTS32.xi-H2]:3.69166AddinganewSR3.6.6.11isacceptable.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/ASection3.7ImrovedTS76.ITS3.7.1[ITS76.1]:3.7(iStatus:[]Response:[ITS76.ii]:3.7(2Table3.7.1-1wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationaccidentanalysesassumethatalleightmainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)areavailableforpressurerelief.Noanalyseshavebeenperformedatlowerpowerlevelstosupporttheinoperabilityofoneormoresafetyvalves.Consequently,Table3.7.1-1andthesecondpartofConditionBdonotapplytoGinnaStation.RequiredActionA.1wasalsodeletedandreplacedwitharequirementtorestoreaninoperableHSSV(s)toOPERABLEstatuswithin4hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.1.Thebaseswererevisedtostatethatthe4hourCompletionTimeistoaddressinstanceswheretheHSSVsareadministrativelydeclaredinoperablesincehardwarerelatedrepairscannotbeperformedduringHODES1,2,or3,similartoapprovedTravellerWOG-15,C.1(Rev.1).TheseareITSGategory(i)changes.TheproposedchangestothisLCOareaccepted;however,theabovebasisforexplainingthechangestotheBASESisnotacceptedandrequiresdiscussion.First,TravelerWOG-15,C.1(rev.1)doesnotexistbuthasbeensupersededbyBWOG-09.Secondly,forSection3.7inNUREG-1431,.neitherofthesetravelersarespecificallyapplicablehere.ThisGinnabasisispresentedasinsert3.7.1.2intheproposedITSBASESforSR3.7.1.1.TheabovetextshouldbedeletedfromhereandthisissueresolvedunderITS76.iv.,OpenSeeresponseto3.7P8.Table3.7.1-2wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsincethistableonlyprovidestheliftsettingsoftheHSSVs.ThesevalueswererelocatedtoSR3.7.1.1toconsolidatethedefinitionofHSSV,OPERABILITY.Thatis,SR3.7'.1nowrequiresthattheHSSVshavean"asleft"liftsettingwithin+1%ofthespecifiedsetpointandan"asfound"liftsettingwithin+3%ofthespecifiedsetpoint.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thischangeisacceptable;however,thetolerancesabovedonotmatchthedescriptionprovidedintheaccompanyingBASES.The"asfound"liftsettingis+1%and-3%insteadof+3%.Thisisacceptablebutthereshouldbetextagreement.Also,whynotadd-119-December1995 Status:[]Response:the"asfound"and"asleft"terminologytotheBASEStohelpclarifyfortheGinnaplantpersonnel?OpenThechangejustificationisincorrectinthattheOPERABILITY,"asfound,"acceptancelimitisactually+1%and-3%asstatedinthebases.Commentk'92hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserrorinAttachmentA.Comment893hasalsobeenopenedtoclarifythebasesassuggested.TheNOTEforSR3.7.1.1wasrevisedtoprovideclarificationthatthisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoentryintoMODE2fromMODE3consistentwiththeNUREG-1431bases.This.isanITSCategory(iii)change.[ITS76.iii]:3.7(3Thisisacceptable;however;thischangemerelyrestateswhattheBASESalreadystateisthebasisforthisnote.WhymakeGinnadifferentfromthestandard?Status:[]OpenResponse:ThebasesintheNUREGprovideadifferentinterpretationofSR3.7.1.1thantheactualsurveil7ance.AswrittenintheNUREGSurveillance,theNotestatesthat"OnlyrequiredtobeperformedinNODES1and2."Neanwhile,thebasesstatethatthisNotewasaddedtoallow"entryintoandoperationinNODE3priortoperformingtheSR."TheNoteinthesurveillancecouldbeinterpretedasonly.beingapplicableinNODES1and2,andneverinNODES3.ThisisnottheintendedinterpretationsincetheSRisapplicableinNODE3whi7ede-powering.ThisissueisfoundthroughouttheNUREGandwasidentifiedbytheGinnaStationOperationsdepartment.Comment890wasopenedduringthereviewofChapter3.4toaddresstheuseof"onlyrequired"inaSRnote.Suggestthiscommentalsotrack'hisissue.fSeealsocomment8175Jiv.[ITS76.iv.a3.7(4Status:[]Response:Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.andb]:InBackground,thedeletionofthesecondsentenceinthesecondparagraphreferstothereliefcapacityoftheMSSVsandnotthedesignbasiswhichhasbeenreinserted.ThisisjustarepeatofthefirstsentenceinApplicableSafetyAnalyses.SuggestputtinginwhatweretherequirementsoftheapplicabledesigncodeusedatGinna.OpenThislevelofinformationisnotreadilyavai7able,butwillbecomeavailablelaternextyearuponcompleteoftheongoingdesignbasisdocumentation(DBD)effortatGinna.Assuch,RG8ErecommendsthattheBackgroundbasesremainasproposedforthetimebeing.-120-December1995 3.'7Q5Status:[]Response:3.7Q6Status:[]Response:3.7Q7Status:[]Response:3.7QSInApplicableSafetyAnalyses,secondparagraph-insertionofRCSdoesnotseemimportantandchangeofAOOtoDBAdoesnotappearcorrect?OpenThe"RCS"insertionprovidesclarificationasrequestedduringtheinitialinternalreviewofthesebases.TheuseofDBAinplaceofAOOisincorrectperthedefinitionofAOOin10CFR50,AppendixA.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtorevisethebasesconsistentwithNUREG-1431withrespecttothisissue.InLCO,deletioninthefirstparagraph,explainwhythesecondandthirdsentencesshouldnotberestoredexceptfor"five"shouldbechangedto"all"or"eight".Pleaseexplaininthiscasehowthephrase"openondemand"isdefinedatGinna.Isthisanexternalsignaltothevalvetoopen,apassivepressurebuildupthatdoesnotactivatethevalvelift,orsomethingelse?HowistheGinnaMSSVsdifferentfromtheWestinghousestandarddesign?DoesGinnahaveapoweroperatedreliefvalveoneachsteamheaderwiththeMSSVs?OpenTheGinnaNSSVsarethesameastheWestinghousestandarddesigninthataspringdesignisusedtoopenthereliefvalves.ThesecondparagraphoftheNUREGLCObasesstate"theOPERABILITYoftheNSSVsisdefinedastheabilitytoopenwithinthesetpointtolerances,relieveSGoverpressure,andreseatwhenpressurehasbeenreduced."Thedeletedtextstatesthat"anNSSVwillbeconsideredinoperableifitfailstoopenondemand"andthenproceedstodiscussreducedpowerrequirementswithoutthefullcomplementofNSSVs.The"failstoopenondemand"onlyduplicatestextwhilethereducedpowerreductionissuewasnotaddedtoLCO3.7.1asdiscussedabove.TheARYsarelocatedupstreamoftheNSSYsasshownonUFSARFigure6.2-76and6.2-77(thesewereprovidedintheChapter6rev'iew).InApplicability,insert3.7.1.1-explainwhythephrase"toensurethattheRCSremainswithinitspressuresafetylimit"shouldnotbedeletedorifabsolutelynecessary,relocatedattheendoftheinsertedtext.TheRCShasothermoredirectpressurecontrollingdesignfeaturesthanjusttheMSSVs.OpenTheinsertedtextatthetopofpageB'3.7-2fortheApplicableSafetyAnalysesstatesthatatpowerlevels>50%RTP,theNSSYsandpressurizersafetyvalvesarerequiredto"maintaintheRCSandHainSteamSystemwithin110%oftheirdesignvalues."TheApplicabilityreiteratesthisstatement.Essentially,followingalossofexternalloadevent,iftheNSSVswereunavailable,thereisnoplacefortheRCStodumpexcessheatexceptthroughthepressurizerPORVs(whicharenotcredited)andthesafeties.ThepressurizersafetiescannotremovethenecessaryheatsuchthattheNSSVsarecreditedwiththeirheatremovalviathesteamgenerators.InActions,insert3.7.1.2isnotacceptedbecauseitisimpliedthatMSSVsneverhaveinoperablehardware.Theyinsteadhavenon-significantdiscrepancies?orjusthavebadpaperwork?Thequestionsofitem¹3aboveleaddirectlyintothereviewofthecontentsofthisinsert.AlsothefourhourCompletionTimetoh-121-December1995 Status:[]Response:V.includetheNRCreviewisnotpracticalformereadministrativeproblems.Horeexplanationisrequired?OpenThe4hour'ompletionTimeis,consistentwithCTS3.4.1.TheCTSbasesdonotplaceanyrestrictionontheuseofthis4hours(i.e.,this4hoursmaybeusedforbothhardwarefailuresandnon-significantdiscrepancies).TheITSbasesstatethatthe4hoursmaybeusedfornon-significantdiscrepanciesonlyandthathardwarefailuresrequiresanimmediateshutdown.'hisisamorerestrictivechangewithrespecttoCTSrequirementswhileHOG-15,C.lwassubsequentlysupersededbyBVOG-O9,thistextisconsistentwiththeoriginalintentofthattravellerforasimilarissue.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2.VerifiedasconsistentwithNUREG-1431,Rev.¹IBASEStoITSmarkup.77.ITS3.7.2[ITS77.i]:3.7Q9Status:[]Response:3.7Q10Status:[Response:3.7QllTheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtorequiretheHSIVstobeOPERABLE.inMODES1,2,and3regardlessofthepositionofthevalve.ThebaseswerealsorevisedtostatethatanHSIVwhichisclosedandde-activatedisconsideredOPERABLEsincethevalveisinitsassumedpositionfortheaccidentanalysis.Assuch,ConditionsAandBarenolongerapplicableandweredeleted.ThischangeeliminatespotentialconfusionandclarifieswhatisdefinedasanOPERABLEHSIV.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThechangetoapplicableinHODES1,2,and3isacceptable.ClosedN/AThechangestatedinthesecondsentenceisnotacceptableherenorinITSLCO3.6.3.ThisnegatesthedefinitioninSection1.0.Thisismerelythetakingofalternateactiontomaintaintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyseswhenadisabledsystemcannotfunctiononitsown.OpenTheNUREGisveryconfusingwithrespecttotheNSIVNODEofApplicability.TheNUREGConditionDrequiresentryintoMODE4within12hours.ifthepreviousRequiredActionsarenotmet.However,theactualNODEofApplicabilityis"NODES1andNODES2and3exceptwhenallNSIVsareclosedand(deactivated)."IfinNODE2or3,theplantshouldbeprovidedwiththeoptiontocloseanddeactivatetheMSIVsimilartoeveryotherLCOwhentheRequiredActionsarenotmet.Inaddition,whileinMODES2and3withtheNS1'Vclosedanddeactivated,theNSIVsareinfactOPERABLEandperformingtheirsafetyfunction.PithaNODEofApplicabilitystatingthatifaNSIVisclosedanddeactivateditisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEismisleading.(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.)ItisacceptabletodeleteConditionB;however,ConditionAstays.ConditionAisrewrittentostate"OneHSIVand/oronenon-returncheckvalveinoperableonthesamesteamheaderinHODE1".The-122-December1995 Status:[]Response:[ITS77.ii]:3.7(12Status:[]Response:3.7(13Status:[]Response:RequiredActionis"Restorethevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus"withaCompletionTimeof8hours.ProposednewBisrejectedbecausemultipleconditionentrywouldallowproposedConditionAandBtobeenteredsimultaneously.toresultinConditionD.Therefore,'onditionDisnotneeded;sincebyomittingit,thisisanLCO3.0.3situation.PleasenotetheresolutionsproposedtorewrittenConditionCinITS77.ii.OpenTheITSVriter'sGuidedoesnotallowtheuseof"and/or"inaConditionorRequiredActionstatement.Therefore,theproposedresolutioncannotbeimplemented.Inaddition,ITSConditionsAandBonlyresultinConditionDiftheyoccuronoppositesteamlines.IfConditionsAandBexistonthesamesteamline,Condition0doesnotapplysincethereisnolossofsafetyfunctionastheremainingPlSIVcancloseandisolatethesteamgeneratorsfromeachother.TheuseofmultipleconditionentryinthisinstanceisnodifferentfromanyotherLCO.Forexample,foratwotrainsystem,thereistypicallyaconditionspecifiedifyouloseonetrain.However,ifyoulosebothtrains,youareinLCO3.0.3plustheconditionwhichappliestothelossofonetrain.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.1waschangedfrom8hoursto24hours.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyRequiredActionswithrespecttoaninoperableMSIV.ACompletionTimeof24hourswasselectedtoallowrestorationofaninoperableMSIVduetotheabilitytoisolateaSGbyothermeans(e.g.,turbinestopvalves).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ConditionCstatementiscounterproposedasConditionBtobe"OneormoreMSIVsand/ornon-returncheckvalvesinoperable'nMODES2or3"withtheRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesremainingthesametobeconsistentwithConditionA,OpenTheITSVriter'sGuidedoesnotallowtheuseof"and/or"inaConditionorRequiredActionstatement.Therefore,theproposedresolutioncannotbeimplemented.AtGinna,howisaSGisolatedbytheturbinestopvalveswithoutisolatingbothSGs?Open Theturbinestopvalvescanisolateasteamlinebreak(SLB)intheTurbineBuildinglocateddownstreamofthesevalvessuchthattheNISVsarenotrequired.Inaddition,ifaNSIVweretofail,itsassociatednon-returncheckvalvewouldpreventablowdownoftheunaffectedsteamgeneratorifaSLBweretooccur'nsidecontainment.TheNoteforConditionCwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceGinnaStationonlyhastwoinstalledMSIVs.Consequently,ifbothMSIVsareinoperable,theplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalysisintheeventofaSLB.Thisisalsotrueifboth'on-returncheckvalvesareinoperable,oroneormoreisolationvalvesfromeachSGareinoperable.ThedescriptionforConditionCwasalsorevisedtolimititsapplicationtoonlyoneinoperableMSIV.I-123-December1995 AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatoneormoreisolationvalvesfromeachSGaredeclaredinoperablerequiringentryintoLCO3.0.3.TheseareITSCategory(iv)and(iii)changesrespectively.[ITS77.iii]:3.7Q14Status:[]Response:ThisnotecannowbeaddedasoriginallyinNUREG-1431.OpenRGEEdisagrees.Asstatedinthechangejustification,ifbothNSIVsareinoperableinNODES1,2,or3,theplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalyseswithrespecttoaSLB.ThisNotewasaddedwithrespecttoplantswith4SGsand4NSIVs.Pithonly2SGsand2NSIVs,thisNoteisnotapplicable.(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.)3.7Q15Status:[]Response:SincethisrewriteofConditionCappliesinonlyMODES2or3,twoHSIVscanbeinoperableandclosedtomaintaintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/12..(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.$3.7Q16Status:[]Response:OneinoperableHSIVisnowunderConditionA.OpenOneNSIVinoperableisaddressedbothintheITSConditionAandthereviewerproposedConditionA.(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.j3.7Q17Status:[]Response:iv.[ITS77.iv]:3.7Q18Status:[]Response:V.AsnotedinITS77.ii,newConditionDisnotnecessary.OldConditionDbecomesCjustas'proposedinthissubmittal.OpenRGBEdisagrees.Pleaseseeresponseto3.7Pll.(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.)TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.2was,revisedfromonceevery7daystoonceev'ery31days.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.AFrequencyofonceevery31daysisconsistentwiththeRequiredActionsforLCO3.6.3whichisappropriatesincetheHSIVsalsoperformacontainmentisolationbarrierfunctionasdescribedinthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThisisrejectedbecausethelengthoftimetoreverifyisinsignificanttotherealeffortwhichshouldbetorestoretheHSIVsornon-returncheckvalvesOPERABLEandtoreturntoMODE1.RejectedThereisah!OGgeneratedtravelleronthisissuescheduledtogototheNRCbyNovember1st.Comment¹108hasbeenopenedtotrackthisissue.Suggestchangestatusto"Open"untilthistravellerisresolved.(Thisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.)SR3.7.2.1wasrevisedtorequirethateachHSIVbetestedunderno-124-December1995 [ITS77.v]:3.7Q19Status:[]Response:3.7Q20Status:[]Response:3.7Q21Status:[]Response:3.7Q22Status:[]Response:flowandnoloadconditionsconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.7.Thisisaconservativetestsincethevalveisassistedinclosingwhensteamflowisavailable.Assuch,thevalveclosuretimeunderhotconditionswouldbedependentuponavailablesteamflow.Inaddition,anewSurveillance(SR3.7.2.2)wasaddedwhichrequiresverificationonceevery24monthsthateachMSIVcancloseonanactuationsignal,independentofclosuretime,consistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptionsandcurrenttestingpractices.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.SR3.7.2.1isacceptable.ClosedN/ASR3.7.2.2isnotnewtoGinna.OpenCorrect,SR3.7.2.2.isnotnewtoGinnaStationbutisnewwith'especttotheNUREGwhichiswherethischangeisdiscussed.ThequestionstoITS77.viiineedanswerstoseparatethenon-return.checkvalvesfromtheMSIVfunction.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7.33through3.7.36.Sincethenon-returncheckvalvesarenotintheexistingTS,couldtestingundernoflowandnoloadforMSIVbemainlyforverifyingthenon-returncheckvalve?WhatarethetestconditionsfornewSR3.7.2.3?Isthisconservativeornon-conservative?OpenAcopyofthetestprocedureforITSSR3.7.2.3isattached(PT-2.10.15).Essentially,thisprocedureverifiesthatthenon-returncheckvalvesareclosediftheassociatedP1SIVhasclosed.Thistestisperformedduringanycondition,hotorcold,withtheassociatedP1SIVclosed.Testingundernoflowandno"loadconditionspreventsunnecessaryslammingoftheP1SIVandisconservativesinceflowinthemainsteamlinesassiststheP1SI'Vinclosingbydesign.Therefore,iftheHSIVisolationtimescanbemetundernoflowconditions,thetestisboundingwithrespecttoaccidentanalysisassumptions.Testingundernoflowandnoloadconditionsforthenon-returncheckvalvesisnotspecifiedalthoughitisallowedbythisnewSR.However,thisisalsoconservativesincesteamflowfromtheoppositesteamgeneratorwillassistinclosureofthecheckvalve.vl.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbasesandtheaccidentanalyses.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-24,C.3wasnotadded.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.-125-December1995 c.'iscussionwasaddedrelatedthefunctionoftheMSIVswithrespecttocontainmentisolation.[ITS77.vi.a,bandc]:3.7Q23Status:[]Response:MhatisinMOG-24,C.3thatisnotadded?OpenTravellerh!OG-24,C.3deletedselectivetextinitemd.oftheApplicableSafetyAnalysesbases.Sincetheentireitemd.isproposedtobedeleted,thisTravellerwasnotincorporatedatall.IThisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekof10/9/95.Seecomment¹134.$3.7Q24Status:[]Response:AsnotedinITS77.viii,thefunctionofthenon-returncheckvalveisnotadequatelydescribedtoincorporateintotheLCOasyet.Aschangesarepending,untilthisisresolved.InZYINDEX,anon-returncheckvalvedoesnotexistintheUFSAR?OpenAsseenintheprocedureprovidedinresponseto3.7q22,GinnaStationidentifiestheseasnon-returncheckvalves.Thesenon-returncheckvalvesarediscussedinthe'secondtolastparagraphofUFSARSection15.1.5.1.2.3.7Q25 Status:[]Response:3.7Q26Status:f]Response:PleaseverifytheMSIVbypassvalveisnotacheckanditismanuallyopened/closedonly.Isitacontainmentisolationvalve?DoestheHSIVbypassvalveloopincludetheHSIVandthenon-returncheckvalve?OpenTheHSI'Vbypassval.veisanormallyclosedmanualvalveasstatedinthelastsentencefor,theBackgroundbases.ThisvalveisidentifiedasacontainmentisolationvalveinUFSARTable6.2-14andasshownonUFSARFigures6.2-76and6.2-77(previouslyprovidedinresponsetoChapter3.6questions)."TheMSIVsmayalsobeactuatedmanually."isaddedtwice.Open"TheNSIVsmayalsobeactuatedmanually"shouldbedeletedfromtheballoonedtextontheleftofthepage.Comment¹94hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserror.3.7Q27Status:[]Response:Shouldinsert3.7.2.2bejustifiedas77.vi.a?OpenThejustification"77.iv.a"isatypographicalerrorasnoted.Comment¹94hasbeenopenedtochangethisjustificationto"77.vi.a..'.7Q28Status:[]Response:Shouldn'tinsert3.7.2.3read",highT.,coincidentwithsafetyinjectioncoincidentwithSI."perexistingTS5.aandb?Open1'nsert3.7.2.3isconsistentwithITSTherefore,nochangeisnecessary.steamflowand2outof4low(SI),orhigh-highsteamflowTable3.5-2,FunctionalUnitTable3.3.2-1,Function¹4.d.3.7Q29Insert3.7.2.4hasadifferentaccidentassumptionsthanthe-126-December1995 Status:[Response:3.7(30Status:[]Response:3.7(31 Status:[]Response:standardMSIVBASESinsecondparagraph.IntheSLBforcontainmentintegrityanalysis,offsitepowerisnotassumedtobeavailablebutitisavailableforGinna.InthethirdparagraphoftheSLBinsideoftheturbinebuilding,bothHSIVsareassumedtoisolatebutwhataboutasinglefailureofone?PleaseexplainthesedifferencesandhowitcouldaffecttheLCO?OpenFortheNUREGcontainmentanalysis,lossofoffsitepowerisassumedwithfailureoftheassociatedNSIYtoclosesuchthatreverseflowresultsfromthemainsteamheaderintocontainment.However,withuseofthenon-returncheckvalves,reverseflowisnotassumed.Consequently,blowdownfromonlytheaffectedsteamgeneratorispostulated.eolithoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpsassistinprovidingforcedRCSflowthroughtheaffectedsteamgenerator;hencemoresteamfromthesteamgeneratorandahighercontainmentpressure.ThelossofoffsitepowercausesthelossofforcedRCSflowandlesssteamgeneration.PithrespecttoaSLBintheturbinebuilding,ifeitherHSIVfailstoclose,theassociatedsteamgeneratorcontinuestofeedthebreakuntil.thefeedwatersourcetothesteamgeneratorisisolated.ThisisnodifferentfromaSLBupstreamoftheHSIVs.ThebasesstatementisintendedtoshowthattheP1SIVs,andnotthenon-returncheckvalves,arecreditedinthisinstance.InLCO,asnotedinITS77.i,inoperableHSIVsthatareclosedandde-activatedarenotconsiderOPERABLE.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/10.CommentstoBASESinActionsandSurveillanceRequirementsaredependentonresolutionsreachedintheLCO.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7/9through3.7/30.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-OI,C.2.[ITS77.vii]:3.7032 Status:[]Response:This77.viiwasnotmarkedinITS.DoesitapplytoReferenceP5ofBASES?OpenCorrect,"77.vii"appliestoBasesReference5.Comment894hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.TheLCOwasrevisedtoaddrequirementsandsurveillancesfornon-returncheckvalveswhicharein-serieswitheachHSIV.Thesenon-returncheckvalvesarecreditedintheaccidentanalysisarethereforeaddedtothenewspecifications.Thetitleandbaseswerealsoappropriatelyrevised.TheseareITSCategory(ii)changes.[ITS77.viii]:3.7(33FromtheBASESchanges,itappearsthatwithoutthenon-returncheckvalves,theHSIVscouldnotfunctionasmorerecentHSIVsdesignswhichcanisolatetopreventbackflowofsteaminthemainsteamheaderfromemptyingintocontainmentorisolatingtheunaffectedSG.Itappearsthenon-returncheckvalveispartoftheHSIV-127-December1995 Status:[]Response:3.7Q34Status:[]Response:3.7Q35Status:[]Response:3.7Q36Status:[]Response:functionandshouldtheybetreatedasone?OpenTheGinnaNSIVscanfunctionlikeallotherwestinghouseNSIVs.However,mostk(estinghouseplantsdonothaveaninstallednon-returncheckvalve.SinceGinnawasdesignedwiththischeckvalve,theaccidentanalyseshavecreditedtheirfunction.AsstatedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysesbases,thenon-returncheckvalvesareonlycreditedintheSLBwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity.Forallotheraccidentscenarios,theNSIVsarecreditedintheaccidentanalyses.SeeUFSARFigures6.2-76and6.2-77fortheconfigurationoftheNSIVsandnon-returncheckvalves.HowarethesevalvescurrentlytreatedatGinna?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/33.Inaddition,thenon-returncheckvalvesaretestedeachcoldshutdownpriortoplantstartupperprocedurePT-2.10.15(attached).AretheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesseparatelytestedortogether'?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/22.Isthenon-returncheckvalvedesignedtothesamerequirementsastheMSIV?Isitdesignatedasacontainmentisolationvalveforthispenetration?OpenSeeresponseto3.7(33.Sincethenon-returncheckvalvesarelocateddownstreamoftheNSIVs,they,arenotidentifiedascontainmentisolationvalves.ix.[ITS77.ix]:3.7Q37Status:[]Response:3.7Q38Status.:[]Response:VariouseditorialchangesweremadewhichprovideclaritybutdonotaltertheintentoftheLCO.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.ThiswasonlynotedonceforRequiredActionC.1whichwasrejectedinITS77.ii.OpenSeeresponseto3.7912.Pleaseprovidealistwheretheothervariouschangesweremadesotheycanbeevaluated.OpenChange77.ixwasonlyusedtoadd"inoperable"toNUREGRequiredActionC.l,Commentil92hasbeenopenedtorevisethischangejustificationtoread"RequiredActionC.lwasrevisedtoprovideclaritybutnotalterthe'ntentoftheLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change."78.ITS3.7.3ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichincludestheuseof"mainfeedwaterpumpdischargevalve(HFPDV)."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-128-December1995 [ITS78.i]:3.7Q39Status:[]Response:[ITS78.ii]:3.7Q40Status:[]Response:InHFPDV,theremovaloftheword"isolation"fromthisvalvenameisimportanttothepurposeforthisLCO.ThereappearstobenouniqueuseoftheproposednewvalvenameafterreviewingUFSAR10.4.5,FeedwaterSystem.NFIVfromtheNUREG-1431wouldclearlyapplytothemotor-operatedisolationvalveimmediatelydownstreamofthemainfeedwaterpump.Thecheckvalvebetweenthepumpandtheisolationvalvewouldbethe"mainfeedwaterpumpdischargevalve".Therearenopumpnumbersidentified.Also,thereappearstobenoassociatedbypassvalvewiththeisolationvalve.ThereappearstobeonlyonebypassvalveassociatedwitheachHFRV.ThisneedscorrectingintheLCOtitle,LCOandBASEStext.RejectedTheuseofNFPDVisconsistentwithGinnaOperationsprocedureswhorequestedtheuseofthistitle(seeattachedprocedure0-.1.2,pages62and66).SinceoperatorsaretheactualenduseroftheTS,RGEErequeststheuseofthistitle.Thecheckvalvebetweenthepumpandisolationvalveisthe"mainfeedwaterpumpdischargecheckvalve."Seealsotheattachedsketch.Pithrespecttopumpnumbers,theNUREGdoesnotidentifypumpnumbersintheLCOorbases;henceRGEEhasnotprovidedthisidentification.However,sincethereareonlytwoNFVpumpsatGinna,thisisnotaconcern.TherevieweriscorrectinthattherearenobypassvalvesassociatedwiththeNFPDY,onlywithrespecttotheNFRV;RGEEproposestorevisetitletoread"NFRVandAssociatedBypassValvesandNFPDVs."Comment¹95hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.ConditionDwasnotaddedsincethecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontaintheserequirements.Thefactthattwoparallelvalvesareinoperableshouldnotrequireashorterisolationtimesincecontainmentisolationpenetrationsdonothavesimilarrequirements.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ConditionDiswrittentooverridemultipleconditionentryintoConditionA,BandCatthesametimethatresultsinamainfeedwaterflowpathbeingunabletoisolate,ifneededtomeettheaccidentanalysesassumptions.Ifthisisdeletedthenextensiverewriteisrequired.Theshortertimeisjustifiedbecauseshouldthecontainmentbebreached,thereisnowaytoautomaticallyisolatethisflowpath.RejectedProposedConditionEpreventsbeingoutsidetheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Inaddition,TheNFPDVandNFRYarenotcontainmentisolationvalvesatGinnaStation.Instead,acheckvalvelocatedbetweentheNFRVandcontainmentisthecontainmentisolationvalveforthesepenetrations(seeattachedsketch).Inaddition,iftheNFPDVandNFRVfailedtoclose,theNFVpumpscanbemanuallytrippedtoprovidefeedwaterisolationincombinationwiththetwocontainmentisolationcheckvalves.TheCompletionTimefor'RequiredActionsA.2,B.2,andC.2wasrevisedfromonceevery7daystoonceevery31days.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.AFrequencyofonceevery31'aysisconsideredacceptableduetotheavailable129-December1995 [ITS78.iii3.7Q41Status:[]Response:3.7Q42Status:[]Response:3.7Q43Status:[]Response:indicationsofvalvepositionavailabletoplantoperators.ThisisanITS'ategory(i)change.]:Thoughnotmentionedabove,the24-hourCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1,B.1,andA.3isaccepted.ClosedN/AThoughnotmentionedabove,thetextchangestoRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,C.1,andC.2arerejectedbecause"close"isnotsameasisolated.OpenSeeresponsetocomment3.7q51.ThechangeinCompletionTimefrom7daysto31daysisnotacceptedbecausethisisthemainfeedwatersystemwhichismeanttobeOPERABLEandopenratherthanisolatedandrelyingonthesafetybackupauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfornormaloperation.Alsothe31dayfrequencyisavisualverificationasisdoneforLCO3.6.3.OpenThereisah!OGgeneratedtravelleronthisissuescheduledtogototheNRCbyNovember1st.Comment¹108hasbeenopenedtotrackthisissue.klithrespecttothecommentconcerninguseofNFVandnotrelyingonAFLAK,theNODEofApplicabilityforLCO3.7.3isNODES1,2,and3.NFVisactuallyonlyinserviceduringNODE1,abovee5RTP.Atalltimesbelowthispowerlevel,AFVisthenormalsourceoffeedwater.iv.~[ITS78.iv]:3.7Q44Status:[]Response:AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothMFWflowpathstotheSGshaveatleastoneinoperablevalve.Thenew'onditionrequiresentryintoLCO3.0.3sincetheplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Asaresultofthisaddition,Condition'wasrevisedtospecifythatitwouldonlybeenteredintheeventthattheRequiredActionsofConditionA,B,orCwerenotsatisfiedconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITS'Category(iii)change.NewproposedConditionEisnotunderstoodasjustifiedabove.Thefirstsentencesaysanewconditionwasaddedandthenthethirdsentencesaysitwassubsequentlyrevised?TheabovejustificationimpliesthatGinnamusthaveatleastoneoperableflowpathwithwaterflowingtothesteamgenerator.TheBASEStothisconditionreadthattheremustnotexistaflowpathwhichisunisolabletooneorbothSGs.ThedeletedConditionDwaswrittenforthislaterimpliedpurposefornewConditionE.????OpenDuetothepreviouschangestotheNUREG,ConditionEoftheNUREGwasrevisedtobeConditionD.Assuch,whenthenew'onditionwa's'dded,itbecamethenewConditionE.TheabovejustificationstatesthatifthetwoNFVpathstothesteamgenerators(i.e.,onepathpersteamgenerator)eachhaveoneormoreinoperablevalves,thenLCO3.0.3mustbeentered.ThisisdifferentfromConditionDwhichrequiresanearlyshutdownpathiftwovalvestothesame-130-December1995 V.[ITS78.v.a3.7Q45Status:[]Response:3.7Q46Status:[]Response:3.7Q47Status:[]Response:3.7Q48Status:[]Response:3.7Q49Status:[]Response:steamgeneratorareinoperable.AsketchoftheNFLisolationvalvesisattached.FromthisfigureitcanbeseenthattherearenotreallytwoisolationvalvespersteamgeneratorsuchthatConditionDisnotapplicabletoGinnaaswrittenintheNUREG.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases..ThisincludesthedeletionoftextthatisnotrelatedtothetechnicalspecificationfunctionperformedbytheNFRVsandbypasscontrolvalves.andb]:AsnotedinITS78.iabove,thenamechangesarenotsufficiently'ustified.Theterm"associated"apparentlyonlyappliestotheNFRVbuttheBASEStitleandtextimplyitalsoincludestheHFIV.Thisneedsmodificationthroughoutbackground.OpenSeeresponseto3.7P39.InLCO,thedeletionofthelastsentenceofthefirstparagraphshouldbeexplained.Isn'tthemainfeedwaterlinesafetyrelatedfromtheSGtotheHFRV?Whereistheboundary?OpenAtGinnaStation,checkvalves3992and3993providethesafetyclassboundarysincethesearethecontainmentisolationvalvesfortheNFh!penetrations(seeUFSARFigure6.4-78).InLCO,thetextadditionattheendofthesecondparagraphisrejectedbaseduponITS78.vibelow.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q51.InLCO,explaindeletioninthirdparagraph.OpenAsexplainedintheITSBackgroundbases,theNFPDVsonlycloseonopeningoftheNFVpumpbreakerswhichareopenedonaSIsignalorlowpumpsuctionpressure.Neanwhile,theNFRVscloseonaSIsignal,highsteamgeneratorlevel,oronreactortripwithT,,(554Fwiththevalveinauto.TheaccidentanalysesonlycredittheSIsignalwithrespecttoNFL'solationandnotthe,highsteamgeneratorlevelasstatedintheNUREGbases.Also,sincetheSIsignaldoesnotdirectlyclosethetwoNFPDVs",itwasdecidednottorevisethebasestexttoreplace"highsteamgeneratorlevel"with"SIsignal."Therefore,thetextwasdeleted.CommentstotheBASESActionsaredeferreduntilthecontentsoftheLCOConditionstatementsareresolved.OpenSeeresponseto3.7P39through3.7q48.-131-December1995 vi.[ITS78.vi]:3.7Q50Status:[]Response:TheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtorequiretheMFRVsandbypassvalvestobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3regardlessofthepositionofthevalves.Thebaseswererevisedtostatethatavalvewhichisclosedandde-activated,orisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve,isconsideredOPERABLEsincethevalveisinitsassumedpositionfortheaccidentanalysis.Thischangeeliminatespotentialconfusion.andclarifieswhatisdefinedasanOPERABLEMFRVandbypassvalve.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ItisacceptabletorequiretheseOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3.ClosedN/A3.7Q51Status:[Response:Thechangestatedinthesecondsentenceisnotacceptablehere,norinITSLCO3.6.3orITS77.iabove.ThisnegatesthedefinitioninSection1.0.Thisismerelythetakingofalternateactiontomaintaintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyseswhenadisabledsystemcannotfunctiononitsown.Thischangeaddsconfusionratherthanclarifies.TheBASESmustbereturnedtotheoriginaltext.]OpenTheNUREGisveryconfusingwithrespecttotheNFL'solationvalveNODEofApplicability.ConditionErequiresentryintoNODE4within12hoursiftheRequiredActionsarenotmet.However,theactualNODEofApplicabilityis"NODES1andNODES2and3exceptwhenNFIV,NFRVisclosedand(de-activated'(orisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve)."TheplantshouldbeprovidedwiththeoptiontocloseanddeactivatetheNSIVsimilartoeveryotherLCOinwhichthe"previousRequiredActionsarenotmet.Inaddition,withtheseisolationvalvesclosedanddeactiveated,thevalvesareinfactOPERABLEandperformingtheirsafetyfunction.ktithaNODEofApplicabilitystatingthatifanisolationvalveisclosedanddeactivateditisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEismisleading.'ii.SR3.7.3.1wasseparatedintotwosurveillancessincetheMFPDVshaveadifferentisolationtime(asassumedintheaccidentanalysis)thantheotherisolationvalves.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)'change.Acceptable,79.ITS3.7.4[ITS79.ii]:3.7Q52,ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichincludestheuseof"atmosphericreliefvalve(ARV)"versus"atmosphericdumpvalve(ADV)."Thisisan.ITSCategory(iv)change.AcceptableTheLCO,Conditions,RequiredActions,SurveillancesandbaseswererevisedsincetheARVsatGinnaStationdonothavearemoteoperatedblockvalve.ThespuriousopeningofanARVisconsideredwithintheaccidentanalysessuchthatablockvalveisnotrequired.Assuch,SR3.7.4.2wasnotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCOistoverifytheOPERABLEstatusoftheatmosphericrelief-132-December1995 Status:[]Response:valveflowpathunderbothcontainmentisolationconditionsandalternateuseasasteamdumppath.Therefore,allcomponentsinthisflowpathmustbeoperabletomeettheOPERABLEstatusforthisLCO.TheNUREG-1431doesnotrequiretheblockvalvetoberemotelyoperated.Amanualvalveisacceptable.Theassumedtimetoclosethisvalveisafactorintheaccidentanalysesassumptions.Therefore,pleaseaddinthe"line"toARVremovedfromthedescriptionsforthisLCO.OpenRG8Eagreestoadd"line"backintotheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheARVsincethemanualvalveisrequiredtoisolateafailedARVwhenitisbeingusedduringaSGTR.CommentiI93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.7Q53Status:[]Response:SR3.7.4.2shouldbeperformedasrequired.OpenRGBEagreestoaddthisSRtotheITS.CommentiI96hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.TheApplicabilityandRequiredActionsC.landC.2wererevisedtoonlyrequiretheARVsinMODES1and2andwhentheRCSaveragetemperatureis>500'FinMODE3.AtGinnaStation,theARVsareonlycreditedintheaccidentanalyseswithrespecttoprovidingcooldowncapabilityfollowingaSGTRinordertomaintainsubcoolingmar'gin.WiththeRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,th'saturationpressureoftheprimarysystemisbelowtheMSSVsetpointsandtheARVsarenotrequired.Seethenewbasesforadditionalinformation.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.[ITS79.111]:3.7Q54Thisappearsacceptable.PleaseverifythattheadditionalreasonthisisdifferentfromtheNUREG-1431isalsothattheARVsarenotusedforcooldowntotheRHRcrossovertemperatureat350'F.Status:[]OpenResponse:CooldowntotheRHRentrytemperaturedoesrequiresomeformofsteamrelieffromthesteamgenerators.ThiscanbeaccomplishedviatheARVsorthesteamdumpsystem.However,thiscooldownisnotaddressedinanyaccidentanalysessinceGinnawasdesignedandanalyzedtoshowthathotshutdowncouldbeachievedandmaintained.AdditionalcooldowntoRHRentryconditionswas,andisnotrequired.1V.[ITS79.iv]:3.7Q55Status:[]ConditionBwasrevisedtorequireentryintoLCO3.0.3immediatelywhenboth.ARVsareinoperable.SinceGinnaStationonlyhastwoARVs,tlieinoperabilityofbothvalveswouldresultinthelossof,asafetyfunctionasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheRequiredActionofrewrittenConditionB(nowC)couldbe"BeinMODE3in6hours"andin"BeinMODE5in30hours".ThisthemoredirectwayofenteringanLCO3.0.3shutdown.ItistheOTSBgeneralpolicynottoprescribeenteringLCO3.0.3.Open-133-December1995 Response:V.[ITS79.v.a3.7Q56Status:[]Response:RequiringentryintoLCO3.0.3isusedelsewhereintheNUREG(seeLCOs3.3.1and3.5.1).Also,theadditionofthisLCO'3.0.3entrythroughouttheITSwasdiscussedduringthereviewofChapters3.1,3.2,3.4,and3.5andfoundtobeacceptabletotheNRC.RG&EoperatorspreferthedirectmentionofLCO3.0.3sinceitisclearthatthereisalossofsafetyfunction.Also,1hourisallowedinLCO3.0.3toprepareforaplantshutdownwhichwouldnotbethecaseintheproposedrewriteoftheRequiredActions.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesthedeletionoftextthatisnotrelatedtothetechnicalspecificationfunctionperformedbytheARVs.andb]:Ininsert3.7.4.I,theARVsarelocatedintheintermediatebuildingonatappedlineoffofthest'earnheaderdownstreamoftheMSSVsandarenot"oneachSG".OpenRG&EagreestorevisethefirstsentenceofInsert3.7.4.1toread"ThereisanARV(3410and3411)locatedonthemainsteamheaderfromeachsteamgenerator(SG)."Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.7Q57Status:[]Response:3.7Q58Status:[]Response:InBackground,thethirdparagraphdeletedshouldbeaddedafterthe'nsert3.7.4.1.OpenRG&EagreestoretrainthethirdBackgroundbasesparagraphfromtheNUREG.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.InApplicableSafetyAnalyses,explaindeletionofsecondparagraph.Addindeletedthirdparagraph.OpenCooldowntotheRHRentrytemperaturedoesrequiresomeformofsteamrelieffromthesteamgenerators.ThiscanbeaccomplishedviatheARVsorthesteamdumpsystem.However,thiscooldownisnotaddressedinanyaccidentanalysessinceGinnawasdesignedandanalyzedtoshowthathotshutdowncouldbeachievedandmaintained.AdditionalcooldowntoRHRentryconditionswas,andisnotrequired.Pithrespecttothedeletedthirdbasesparagraph,RG&Eagreestoaddthistextwiththeadditionof"followingaSGlRevent"attheendofthesentence.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.7Q59Status:[]Response:InLCO,firstparagraphthethirdandfourthsentencesdeletedareapplicablehere.Alsoexplaininsert3.7.4.5inlieuofdeletedtext.OpenRG&Eagreestoaddthedeletedthirdandfourthsentencesofthe-134-December1995 firstLCObasesparagraph.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.TheInsert3.7.4.5textistheactualtimeswithrespecttotheuseoftheARVsfollowingaSGTReventastakenfromoperatortrainingmaterial.ThistextstatesthattheARVsmustbecapableofbothopeningandclosingwithintheprescribedtimestobeconsideredOPERABLE.3.7060Status:[Response:3.7(61Status:[Response:vi~InActionsA.1,theaddedtextattheendseemsmisplacedandshouldbeattheendoftheprevioussentence.WhyareNSSVsdeletedhere?OpenTheaddedtextattheendofRequiredActionA.listoexplainwhytheNotewithrespecttoLCO3.0.4hasbeenadded.TheNUREGonlyprovidesastatementthattheNoteexists,notwhytheNotewasadded.ThechangewasrequestedbyGinnaoperators.ThereferencetoMSSYswas'deletedsincethesevalveshavesetpointsabovetheARYswhicharenotadjustableduringpoweroperationoraccidentconditionssuchthattheycannotbecreditedwithrespecttoaSGTRevent.ThefactthattheNSSVsareOPERABLEhasnoimpactwithrespecttotheARVOPERABILITYrequirements.Assuch,RGBEbelievestheproposedmarkupiscorrect.InCompletionTimefornewB.1from6hoursto8hourshasnotbeenseparatelyexplainedaswhylongertimeisappropriate.OpenThelongertimeisappropriateforITSRequiredActionB.lsincetherequiredP10DEtobeenteredis"NODE3withT,(500F"versusonly"NODE3."The8hourstoperformthisaction7sconsistentwithITSLCO3.4.16.Comment¹97hasbeenopenedtoreviseChange79.iiitostatethis.ThetextofSR3.7.4.1wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithothersimilartests(seeSR3.4.11.1)andthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Acceptable80.ITS3.7.5[ITS80.i]:~~3.7(62TheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystematGinnaStationiscomprisedoftwosystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFW)System.EachsystemprovidesaportionoftheoverallAFWSystemfunction.TheLCO,Conditions,RequiredActions,Surveillances;andbaseswereallrevisedtoreflectthefunctionsofthepreferredAFWandSAFWSystemsasdescribedinthenewbases.TheConditions,RequiredActions,andtheirCompletionTimeswerealsosignificantlyrevisedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.2.However,severalchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerealsomadetoprovideconsist'encywiththeaccidentanalysesandforhumanfactorreasons.Thesechangesare'iscussedindetailinSectionD,item14.ii.NewSurveillanceswerealsoaddedwithrespecttotheSAFW.SystemconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.8.Reference28providesadditionalinformation.TheseareCategory(i)and(ii)changes.NUREG-1431wasdevelopedwithmultipleconditionentry.The'I-135-December1995 Status:[]Response:3.7Q63Status:[]Response:3.7Q64Status:[]Response:[ITSSO.ii]:3.7Q65Status:[]Response:proposedITSdoesnotworkaswrittenbecausenewConditionsDandEarethesameasnewConditionGwithdifferentRequiredActions.Arewriteisrequiredtoeitherachievemultipleconditionentry,createsingleconditionentryconditionsormaketwoLCOs.ThebalanceofcommentsonthisLCOaredependentupontheformatselected.OpenRG&EagreesthattheproposedLCOisbroke.AsimplesolutionwouldbetoaddaNotetoConditionsDandEsayingtheyarenotapplicableifbothAFk(andSAFE'reinoperable.However,suggestthatthisLCObediscussedindetailduringtheplannedGinnasitevisit.(Resolvedpercomment¹139JPleaseconfirmthatGinnadoesnotwantaconditionforaninoperablesteamflowpathtotheTDAFWpumpperoldConditionA.OpenAninoperablesteamflowpathtotheTDAFVpumpiscontainedinITSConditionA.ThebasesforRequiredActionA.1statesthata"turbinedrivenAFVtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG"(Insert3.7.5.9).ThisbasesdefinitionwasaddedsinceGinnaStationhasoneTDAFA'umpwhichfeedsbothSGsandreceivessteamfrombothSGs.Assuch,theinoperabilityofasteamsupplyfromaSGisnodifferentfromtheinoperabilityoftheTDAFVsupplytothesameSG.ITSConditionAaddressesbothoftheseflowpaths.(Resolvedpercomment¹139)TheConditionsneedtobearrangedsotheCompletionTimesareindescendingorder.OpenTheConditionswereorderedmainlyontheNUREGorderwhichdoesnotsorttheConditionsbasedonCompletionTimes.SuggestdiscussingthisissueduringtheplannedGinnasitevisit.TheLCONoteandConditionEwerenotadded,andtheApplicabilityandassociatedbaseswererevisedtoonlyapplyinMODES1,2,and3consistentwithcurrent.GinnaStationTS3.4.2.TherequirementforAFWduringMODE4whentheSGsarebeingrelieduponforheatremovaliscontrolledbynewLCO3.4.6whichspecifiesrequiredSGlevelrequirements.DuetothewidevarietyofmeansofprovidingdecayheatremovalinMODE4(e.g.,AFW,SAFW,HFW,condensateboosterpumps),RG&EdoesnotbelievethatitisnecessarytospecifyAFWrequirements.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference26.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AssuchapprovedTravellerWOG-27,C.1wasonlypartiallyincorporated(seealsoSectionC,item80.ivbelow).UFSAR10.5.3.1.2clearlystatesthatAFWisusedtomaintainsteamgeneratorwaterlevelduring'MODE4operationsasthereactorisbeingshutdown.Therefore,thisAFWApplicabilityrequirementandtheotherLCOdeletedrequirementsmustberestoredand/orrewrittentoaddprovisionsforaSAFWtrain.OpenThereisaHOGTravelleronthisissuewhichisscheduledtobe-136-December1995 submittedtotheNRConNovember1st.Comment¹99hasbeenopenedtotrackthisTraveller.PhiletheAFh(SystemisthepreferredmeansofsupplyingfeedwatertothesteamgeneratorsasstatedintheUFSAR,therearenumerousothersourcesasdiscussedinthe'ustificationabove.TheproposedNODEofApplicabilityisalsoconsistentwithCTS.[ITS80.iii]3.7Q66Status:[]Response:3.7Q67Status:[],Response:TheNoteforSR3.7.5.2andSR3.7.5.3wasrevisedtorequiretheturbinedrivenAFWpumptobetestedpriortoenteringMODE1consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.8.6.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference28.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Therevisednoteperinsert3.7.5.2isacceptableforSR3.7.5.2andthenewSR3.7.5.6onlyandnotforproposedSR3.7.5.3.OpenThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentAtothesubmittalinthattheNoteforNUREGSR3.7.5.2andSR3.7.5.4wererevised,not.SR3.7.5.3.Comment¹92hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserror.TheexistingTSrelaxationtotheSR3.7.5.2intervalisnotjustifiedanditisrejected.RejectedThereisaHOGTravelleronthisissuewhichisscheduledtobesubmittedtotheNRConNovember1st.Comment¹98hasbeenopenedtoaddressthemissingjustificationinAttachmentAandtotrackthistraveller.3.7Q68Status:[]Response:iv.[ITS80.iv]:3.7Q69Status:[]Response:3.7Q70ThenewproposedSRs3.7.5.3and3.7.5.4areacceptableexcepttheintervalshallbesameasSR3.7.5.2.OpenThereisaVOGTravelleronthisissuewhichisscheduledtobesubmittedtotheNRConNovember1st.Comment¹98hasbeen'openedtoaddressthemissingjustificationinAttachmentAandtotrackthistraveller.SR3.7.5.3andSR3.7.5.4wererevisedtodelete"wheninMODE1,2,or3"fromtheendoftheSurveillancedescriptionconsistentwithapprovedTravellerWOG-27,C.1.ThebasesstatethattheseSurveillancesshouldonlybeperformedduringshutdownconditionstopreventthepossibilityofcreatingaplanttransient.ThedeletedtextimpliesthatthistestshouldbeonlyperformedinMODE1,2,or3.TheintentionofthetwoSRsistoensurethatAFWwillcorrectlyactuatewhenitisinitsMODE1,2,or3configuration.SpecifyingthisintheSurveillanceisinconsistentwithallotherSRs(e.g.,ECCS)andisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Itisacceptabletoremovethetextimplyingthistestisonlyi'MODES1,2or3perthetraveler.ClosedNAAnewnoteshallbeaddedtonewSRs3.7.5.5and3.7.5.6becauseAFW-137-December1995 Status:[]Response:3.7Q71Status:[]Response:V.vi.[ITSSO.vi.a3.7Q72Status:[]Response:3.7Q73isusedduringNODE4.Thenoteis"ThisSRisnotapplicableinNODE4whensteamgeneratorisrelieduponforheatremoval."ThisisfromNUREG-1431Rev.l.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q65.DoesthisjustificationsuggestthereareothernewSR3.7.5.5textchangessimilartonewSR3.7.5.6whichareneededandarenotmarkedintheBASES?ThetextassumedanESFASsignalwouldinitiatethistestratherthanasimulatedactuationsignal.HowdoesGinnaplantoconductthistest?OpenTheAFL'umpsatGinnaareactuatedfromanESFASsignal,lowsteamgeneratorlevel,undervoltageconditionsontheRCPbuses,andopeningoftheNFL'umpbreakers(seeITSTable3.3.2-1).Currently,allofthesetestsignalsareverifiedonceeachrefuelingoutage(seeattachedprocedureRSSP-3.0).Thedeletedbasestextrelatedto"ESFASsignal"forITSSR3.7.5.6ensuresthatthereisnomisinterpretationwithrespecttowhatsignalsaretobeverified(i.e.,alloftheapplicablestartsignalsarenowrequiredtobeverified).TheonlyAFMautomaticvalvesaretheAFVpumpdischargevalves(NOVs4007and4008forthemotordrivenpumpsandAOVs4297and4298fortheTDAFklpump).ThesevalvesdonotreceiveanopensignalfromESFAS,lowsteamgeneratorlevel,etc.Instead,thesevalvesopenuponclosingoftheAFhlpumpbreakers.Therefore,theSR3.7.5.5basestextrelatedto"ESFASsignal"isnotapplicable.SR3.7.5.5wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.TheverificationofthecorrectlineupoftheAFWandSAFWSystemsisperformedbySR3.7.5.1.Inaddition,theAFWSystemtakessuctionfromtheCSTsduringnormalstartupandshutdownconditions.ThebasesforSR3.7.5.5statesthatthisSRisnotrequiredforplantswhichusetheCSTundertheseconditions.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.AcceptableThebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.andb]:AsnotedinITSSO.itheLCOstatement,ApplicabilityandConditionsareinneedofrewrite,sonocommentwillbemadeuntiltheformattingissuesarefinalized.OpenSeeresponseto3.7P62.TheBASESforSR3.7.5.2perchangeITSSO.iii,lastparagraph,doesnotneedtodeletelastsentence.Alsothe"maynothavebeen"is-13S-December1995 Status:[]Response:notrequiredandthe"are"shouldberetained.OpenRG8EagreestoretainthelastsentenceoftheNUREGbasesforSR3.7.5.2.However,theuseof"are"fortheprecedingsentenceisnotgrammaticallycorrect.Instead,RG8Eproposestoreplace"maynothavebeen"with"havebeen."Comment593hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-01,C.2Acceptableviii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-13,C.1.[ITS80.vii3.7(74Status:[]Response:ix.TheincorporationofthistravellerdoesnotmatchtheNUREG-1431Revision1textintheBASESforSR3.7.5.2.Pleaseexplaindifference?OpenRevision1oftheNUREGrevisedthebasestextforSR3.7.5.2beyondthatdocumentedinTravellerNRC-13,C.1(seeattachedtraveller).ThedifferenceintextbetweenthatintheTravellerandRevision1isminor(i.e.,nodifferenceinintent)suchthatRGEEdoesnotbelievethatadditionalbaseschangesarenecessary.TheCompletionTimelimitof"10daysfromthediscoverytofailuretomeettheLCO"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.TheintentofaddingthislimittotheCompletionTimeistopreventaplantfromcontinuouslybeingintheLCOwithoutevermeetingthefullAFWSystemrequirements.ThisabuseoftheLCOisbestaddressedunderplantproceduressincetheadditionofthislimittotheCompletionTimecreatesconfusionamonglicensedpersonnel.ProvidingthislimitcanstillresultinLCOabusesincetheAFWSystemcanbedeclaredOPERABLEforonlyaseveralminutesandthentheLCOimmediatelyenteredforextendedperiods.SufficientNRCguidancealreadyexistswithrespecttoextensiveuseofLCOtime(e.g.,Ref.26).Inaddition,theMaintenanceRule(10CFR50.65)requiresmonitoringofequipmentperformance.Finally,areviewofGinnaStationplantrecordsindicatesthattheAFWSystemwasoutaserviceatotalof2600hoursfromJune1990andJuly1994(or9%ofthetimeinwhichtheplantwasinMODE1,2,and3.betweenLCOconditionswithoutrestoringequipmentfullyoperable.SincetheseconditionsaretoberewrittenperITS80.i,thisissueisdeferredbecauseitmaynotbeneeded.OpenStatus:[][ITS80.ix]:3.7(75.ThisCompletiontimerequirementistoguardagainst"flip-flop"Response:Seeresponseto3.7q62.81.ITS3.7.6Thetitle,LCO,SurveillancesandbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationhastwocondensatestoragetanks(CSTs)insteadofoneasreferencedinNUREG-1431.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Acceptable139-December1995 [ITS80.ix]3.7076Status:[]Response:3.7(77Status:[]Response:3.7978Status:[]Response:TheLCOwasrevisedtorequirethattheCSTsbeOPERABLEwi'ththespecificOPERABILITYrequirementsspecifiedintheSurveillanceRequirement.Inaddition,ConditionA,RequiredActionA.2,andSR3.7.6.1wererevisedtoreplacethereferencetoCST"level"withCST"watervolume"whichistheactualparameterusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywithLCO3.5.4.'heseareITSCategory(iii)changes.Itappearsacceptabletochangeto"watervolume"limitsfrom"waterlevel"limits.However,itisnotclearthatthisLCOcouldonlybeinsupportofAFWandnotalsoSAFW.WhatpreventstheCondensateTestTankbeingusedforthesourceofwaterforSAFWiftheServiceWaterSystemwereunavailable?OpenTheITSApplicableSafetyAnalysesbasesstatethattheCSTiscreditedinthesafetyanalysisforallevents"whichassumesthatthepreferredAFVSystemisavailableimmediatelyfollowinganaccident.ForanyeventinwhichAFh!isnotrequiredforatleast10minutesfollowingtheaccident,theSkiSystemprovidesthesourceofcoolingwatertoremovedecayheat"(seeInsert3.7.6.2).Sincet'eSAFESystemismanuallyactuatedbyoperators,thissystemisnotavailablefor10minutesfollowinganaccidentsuchthatthenon-seismic,non-safetyrelated,CSTisnotrequiredforthissystem.Inaddition,theonlysourceofwatertotheSAFARICondensateTestTankisaI/2inchlinefromthemaincondenser(i.e.,thereisnopipingconnectedtheCSTtotheSAFARISystem).SincetheSAFE!injectionpathsare4inchlines,thissupplypathisnotacceptableto'supportdecayheatremoval.WhatotherwatertanksareavailablewhichcouldbeusedbyoperatorstomeettheoperabilityrequirementsofwatervolumeforthisLCO?Suchastheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetankandothers?OpenThealternatecondensatesourceforthepreferredAFVandSAFEpumpsisdocumentedinprocedureER-AFkl.I(attached).HowdoesrefillingoftheCSTsfigureintothedeterminationoftheOPERABILITY?Fromthefirewatersystemsorthecondenserhotwell?Open.TheCSTsmustcontainaminimumof22,500gallonsofwater.Aslongasthiswaterisavailable,theLCOismet,regardlessofwhethertheCSTwasfilledbythefirewatersystemorcondenserhotwell.Dueto'operationandchemistryconcerns,the"CSTisonlyfilledviathecondenserhotwellorotheracceptablecondensatestoragetanks.,However,theuseoffirewatersystemsisanacceptablemeansformeetingtheLCOrequirementssincefirewateristhesameasservicewaterwhichiscreditedintheaccidentanalysisforlongtermdecayheatremoval.TheApplicabilityandRequiredActionB.2wererevisedtoonlyrequiretheCSTstobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.3.TherequirementfortheCSTsduringNODE4whentheSGsarebeingrelieduponforheatremovalis-140-December1995 controlledbynewLCO3.4.6whichspecifiesrequiredSGlevelrequirements.DuetothewidevarietyofmeansofprovidingdecayheatremovalinMODE4(e.g.,AFW,SAFW,MFW,condensateboosterpumps),RG&EdoesnotbelievethatitisnecessarytospecifyCSTrequirements.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference28.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.[ITS81.iii]:3.7Q79UFSAR10.5.3.1.'2clearlystatesthatAFWisusedtomaintainsteamgeneratorwaterlevelduringMODE4operationsasthereactorisbeingshutdown.Therefore,sinceCSTisthesourceforAFWthisApplicabilityrequirementandtheotherLCOdeletedrequirementsmustberestoredand/orrewrittentoaddprovisionsforaSAFWtrain.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7q65.3.7Q80Status:[]Response:iv~[ITS81.iv]:3.7Q81Status:[]Response:V.AlsoadheringtotheimprovedTSformatrequiresagreementbetweenLCOsforApplicability,regardlessofthepossiblein-depthcapabilitiesofvarioussupportingsystems.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q65.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1wasrevisedtoremovethecontinuedverificationevery12hoursof'thebackupwatersupplytotheCSTs.ThecurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.3doesnotcontainthisrequirement.Inaddition,thesourcesofwaterwhichwouldnormallybeusedincludetheSWSystem(whichhasLakeOntarioasawatersupply)andtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetankwhichhasanormalstoredvolumeof100,000gallons(UFSARSection10.7.4).EitherofthesesourcesprovidemuchmorewaterthanisrequiredforAFWduringaDBAornormalcooldown.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.WhatisthehardshipcreatedbythisverificationoftheavailabilityanddeterminationoftheOPERABILITYofalternatesourcesofwater?TheamountofwateravailableisnotasimportantastherebeinganOPERABLEpathwaytodeliverthewater.-OpenPhilethehardshiprequiredbythisverificationislimited,GinnaStationhasanemergencyprocedureoutliningthespecificactionstobetakentouseanalternatesuctionsourcefortheAFVpumps(attached).Thesourcesofwaterincludethecondensatehotwellwhichmusthaveatleast22,500gallonsofwatertosupportnormaloperationrequirementssuchthataverificationisunnecessary.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesign'onsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandbasesfortheCSTwatervolumerequirement.b.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityDecember1995 [ITS81.v.a3.7Q82Status:[]Response:andunderstandingofthebases.andb]:Backgroundfirstparagraph,lastsentenceisdeleted;however,UFSAR10.5.3.1.1statesallpumpshaverecirculationlinesbacktotheCST?OpenPhileallthreepreferredAFhfpumpshaverecirculationlinesbacktotheCST,theserecirculationlinesarenotproviding"continuousrecirculation"astheNUREGBackgroundbasesstate.Inaddition,thisrecirculationpathisnotanaccidentanalysisassumptionsincetheHSSVspreventdeadheadingoftheAFVpumps.Consequently,thisbasestextwasdeleted.3.7Q83Status:f]Response:3.7Q84Status:[]Response:3.7Q85Status:[]Response:3,7Q86Status:[]Response:3.7Q87Status:[]Response:Insert3.7.6.1firstsentencereferstoanon-seismicgradeServicebuilding.Insert"grade"?OpenNo,RGBEnomenclaturedoesnotuse"grade"withrespecttoseismicdesign,onlywithrespectto"safety."Insert3.7.6.2,itispresumedthatSWwateristhepreferred(only?)sourceofwaterforSAFWregardlessoftheeventortimeintoevent.OpenSh!isthesourceofwatercreditedintheaccidentanalysesfortheSAFh!SystemasstatedinInsert3.7.5.6forthebasesforLCO3.7.5.Othersourcesofwaterareavailable(seeprocedureER-AFV.1)butarenotcredited.Thelastsentenceofinsert3.7.6.5isnotunderstood.OpenThewaterinventoryrequirementfortheCSTisbasedonastationblackout(SBO)whichisabeyondDBAevent(i.e.,aSBOrequiresacompletelossofoffsitepowerandfailureofbothdieselgenerators).TheTNIcommitmentsrelatedtoSBOrequire2hoursofdecayheatremov'alwhiletheaccidentanalysesonlyrequire10minutesuntiltheSVSystemcanbeused.SincetheLCOcontinuestorequirethe2hoursofdecayheatremoval,thewaterinventoryrequirementisbasedonabeyondDBAevent.The-lossof"allAC"electricalpowermeans"onsiteandoffsite?"Pleasechangetoclarify.OpenCorrect,lossof"allACelectricalpower"referstobothonsiteandoffsite(seeresponseto3.7q85).RG8Eagreestoclarifythisstatement.Comment493hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.InApplicability,NODE4isapplicable.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q65.~82.ITS3.7.7~~~i.TheLCO,Conditions,andbaseswererevisedtoreflecttheactualdesignofthecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)systematGinnaStation.-142-December1995 [ITS82.i]:3.7Q88Status:[]~Response:3.7Q89Status:[]Response:3.7Q90Status:[]Response:TheCCWSystemiscomprisedoftwo100%capacitypumpswhichfeedacommonloopheader.Thiscommonloopheaderthensplitsintoparallelflowpathsfortwo100%capacityheatexchangers.Theoutletof,theheatexchangersthenmeettore-formthecommonloopheaderwhichprovidescoolingwatertothesafetyandnonsafetyrelatedsystemloads.'hedischargeflowthroughthesesystemloadsthencombinetore-formthecommonheaderwhichprovidessuctiontothetwoCCWpumps.Assuch,theLCOwasrevisedtorequirethetwoCCWpumptrainsandtheCCWloopheadertobeOPERABLE.TheNoteforRequiredActionA.IwasalsonotaddedsincetheinoperabilityofasingleCCWtraindoesnotaffecttheabilityofCCWtoprovidecoolingtoeitherRHRheatexchanger.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ItisacceptabletoreformattheLCOandtonotincludethenoteforRequiredActionA.Ibecauseonecommonheadersuppliestheheatloads.ClosedN/ATheexistingTSrequirebothCCWheatexchangers(HX)OPERABLE.Isn'tthisarelaxationtotreatoneasastandby?Providejustificationassuch.OpenThischangeisdiscussedinAttachmentA,SectionD,item13.xvi.CanoneCCWHXhandlealltheheatloadfromallthesafety-relatedandnon-safety-relatedcomponentscooledbyCCW?OpenOneCCh'eatexchangerisnormallyinserviceduringpoweroperationwiththesecondheatexchangeressentiallyvalvedoutofservice(i.e.,theCCVflowpathisopenbutSkfcoolingsupplyisleftonlyslightlyopentoassistinopeningthevalvesduringaccidentconditions).However,onlyoneheatexchangerisrequiredforaccidentconditions.3.7Q91Status:[]Response:3.7Q92Status:[]Response:Howoftenarethestandbycomponentsputintoserviceandoperation?Arethepreviouscomponentsinserviceputintostandby?OpenThetwoCCVpumpsarerotatedonamonthlybasis(onlyonepumpisrequiredfornormaloperation).TheCCVheatexchangersaretypicallynotswappeduntilthenextrefuelingoutage.WhynotcontinuewithbothHXinserviceandhavetheextracapacity?Withthepassivecomponent,thereshouldbelittlemaintenancerequired.OpenRG8Eisnotproposingtoeliminatetheredundantheatexchangerfromthesystem,onlyrevisetheLCOrequirements.Thepurposeofthetechnicalspecificationsistomaintainallaccidentanalysisassumptions.Sincetheaccidentanalysesdonotrequirethesecondheatexchanger,andtheCCA'ystemisbasedontheuseofasingleloopheader,theLCOshouldnotrequiretwoheatexchangers.IThisresponsewasrevisedduringmeetingstheweekofll/1/95.SeeDecember1995 [ITS82.ii]:3.7Q93Status:[]Response:3.7Q94Status:[]Response:3.7Q95Status:[]Response:commentbl89.JAnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothCCWtrainsortheCCWloopheaderwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,CCWcannot'upporttheOPERABILITYoftheECCSandCSpumpsandalossofmultiplesafetyfunctionsexist.However,itisnotprudenttoenterLCO3.0.3inthisconditionsinceitwouldrequireentryintoMODE5whereCCWmustbeavailabletosupporttheRHRheatexchangers.Instead,thenewConditionrequiresimmediateactiontorestoreoneCCWtrainortheloopheaderandtoplacetheplantinMODE4within12hours.RestrictingthecooldowntoMODE4placestheplantinaconditioninwhichtheRCPsandAFWcanbeusedtoprovidedecayheatremovalwhileattemptstorestoreCCWcontinue.IntheeventthattheRCPsorAFWisalsolost,thetimerequiredbeforeRHRmustbeavailablefordecayheatremovalisincreasedin.thislowerMODE.Thechangeisalsoconsistentwi,ththeRequiredActionsforalossofRHRandcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.WhyisthisnotanOwnersGroupTravelerforthisrequestedchange?OpenTheHOGrejec'tedaTravelleronthisissuesincenootherplantscurrentlyhavethistypeofCTSrequirement.Instead,licenseesclaimedtheywouldrequestenforcementdiscretionifallCCVwerelost.RGBEcouldnotjustifyeliminationofthisshutdownrestrictionand'thereforemaintainedtheCTSrequirement.Shouldn'tthisConditionalsohavethenotedeletedfromRequiredActionA.1?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/95.ExplainhowGinnawillhandlethisnewproposedConditionCwiththeexistenceofNUREG-1431LCO3.0.6andAdministrativeControlsof5.5.15,SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramandConditionCofLCO3.7.8?OpenRG&EproposestoaddaNotesimilartothatforRequiredActionD.lofNUREGLCO3.7.5.ThisNotewouldsuspendimplementationofLCO3.0.3andallNODEreductionsuntiloneCCVpumpandtheloopheaderarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.CommentF100hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.TheCCWSystemisonlyrequiredbytheaccidentanalysesduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandismanuallyinitiated.Therefore,theCCWSystemdoesnotreceiveanyactuationsignalsuchthatSR3.7.7.2andSR3.7.7.3arenotapplicabletoGinnaStation.However,anewSurveillancewasaddedtorequireacompletecycleofthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers.AllotherCCWflowpathstocomponentsrequiredfollowingaDBAarenormallyopenanddonotrequiretesting.'hisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2wasnotincorporated.-144-December1995 [ITS82.iii]:3.7096Status:[]Response:PleaseclarifytheactualintendeduseforCCWwhichtheBASESstateisfornormalandaccidentconditionsversusherewhereCCWisonlyrequiredbyaccidentanalyses(aboveITS82.iiimplyCCWisessentialtotheRHRHXinHOOE5).OpenCCA'sessentialtotheRHRheatexchangersinNODE5and6;howevertheNODEofApplicabilityforthisLCOisNODES1,2,3,and4.Consequently,thebasesandchangejustificationsonlyrelatetothefunctionservedbyCCVaboveNODE5.3.7(97Status:[]Response:3.7098Status:[]Response:iv.RegardingnotaddingSRs3.7.7.2and3,doesn'tthestandbyCCWpumpgetastartsignalwhensystempressuredropsbelow50psig.Whyisthisnotverifiedatrefueling?Doesn'tcertainvalveshavetoautomaticallyopentoalignthispumptotheloopheader?OpenThe,standby-CCVdoesreceiveastartsignalwhensystempressuredropsbelow50psig.However,thisstartsignalisnotcreditednorrequiredintheaccidentanalyses."This50psigstartsignalisfornormaloperationalconcernsonly.TheCCA'ystemisonlyrequiredpostaccidentduring.therecirculationphaseatGinna(i.e.,followinganSlandUVsignalonthe480VbusessupplyingtheCCWpumps,theCCh!pumpsarestrippedandmustbemanuallystartedpriortoimplementingrecirculation).The50psigstartsignal,iscurrentlytestedevery18months.NovalvesintheCCVSystemmustopenorclosewhenthesecondCCVpumpstarts(i.e.,thispumpisalwaysalignedasifinserviceunlessitisinmaintenanceandtheLCOisentered).TravelerNRC-01,C.2dependsonaboveresponses.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q97.Thebases'ererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheCCWSystem.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.8.[ITS82.iv.a,bandc]:3.7(99Status:[]Response:Provideasketchoftheloopheaderfromthefirstandlastisolationvalvesforeachsafety-relatedload.Whattypeofvalvesarethese?WhichSR'sapplytothem?Areallnon-essentialloadsmanuallyorautomaticallyisolated?OpenAsketchoftheCCVSystemhasbeenprovidedasrequestedshowingthebreakdownoftheloopheaderboundaries.Allnon-essentialCCVloadsremainsuppliedbyCCVfollowinganaccident(i.e.,thereis-145-December1995

3.7Q100Status:[]Response:3.7Q101Status:[]Response:3.7Q102Status:[]Response:.3.7Q103Status:[]Response:'.7Q104Status:[]Response:nomanualorautomaticisolationoftheseloads)exceptforthelinetothereactorsupportcoolerswhichisisolatedbyacontainmentisolationsignal.TheseautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesaretestedbyI'TSSR3.6.3.3.AllloadsrequiredfollowinganaccidentrelatetocoolingfortheSI,CS,andRHRpumpsandtheRHRheatexchangers.CCh'lowiscontinuouslymaintainedthroughthepumploadswhiletheRHRheatexchangersareisolatedbytwomotoroperatedisolationvalves.ThetwoRHRheatexchangerNOVsaretestedbyITSSR3.7.7.2.AllvalvesrelatedtotheSI,CS,andRHRpumpsareeithermotor-operatedvalvesormanualvalveswhicharealllockedopenedsuchthatasurveillanceisnotrequired.WhatarethenormalCCWwatertemperaturesduringplantshutdown?OpenCCh!istypicallymaintainedapproximately85'Fduringshutdownconditions.However,theNODEofApplicabilityfortheLCOisonlyNODESI,2,3,and4.Whydeletelastsentenceofbackgroundafterinsert3.7.7.3?OpenTheNODEofApplicabilityofthisLCOisNODESI,2,3,and4.TheuseofCCVtosupportRHRduringnormalcooldownandshutdownisoutsidethisApplicability.TheuseofCCMtosupportRHRduringpostaccidentcooldownandshutdownisdescribedinInsert3.7.7.3.TheLCOoperabilityrequirementsareverycomplexasdescribed.ItappearsthatsomeinformationmayberelocatedtotheBackgroundorelsewhere.Perhapsuseofatablewouldhelpclarifypresentation.OpenTheOperationsdepartmentdoesnotlikeLCOOPERABILITYrequirementslocatedintheBackgroundoranyotherbasessectionotherthantheLCO.RG8Eisplanningonprovidingadrawinginthebaseswhichshows'hebreakdownoftheCCVpumptrainsandloopheaderforgreaterclarity.Comment8101hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.Thelastsentenceofinsert3.7.7.5needsamoreexplanation.OpenTheradiationdetectorintheCCh'ystemis'notrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsinceitisnotcreditedinanyaccidentanalysis..ThepurposeofthisdetectoristosupportdetectionofanyleaksbetweenCCh'ndasystemcontainingradioactivefluidduringnormaloperation.However,iftheCCVSystemwerecreditedasaclosedsystemoutsidecontainmentwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity,thisradiationdetectorwouldberequiredtobeOPERABLEtoautomaticallyisolatethesurgetankintheeventofanaccident.SincetheCCVlinesinsidecontainmentareaclosedsystem,thisradiationdetectorisnotrequired.InApplicability,theLCOssupportedbyCCWneedsidentificationbynameratherthanjustnumber.OpenConsistentwithotherNUREGbases,ifanLCOisdiscussedmultipletimesinthebases,thefirstmentionmustincludetheLCOtit'le.However,allothermentionsoftheLCOdonotrequiretheirtitle.ThetitlesoftheLCOsdiscussedintheApplicabilitybasesare-146-December1995 3.7Q105Status:[]Response:3.7Q106Status:[]Response:presentedintheLCObases(seeInsert3.7.7.5).ChangesmadetoConditionsandSRsnotedaboveneedmodificationsinBASESmarkup.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/88through3.7PIO4.Whatconditionisenteredifthesurgetankisinoperable?OpenThefirstsentenceofInsert3.7.'7.5states"theCCk!loopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,oneoftwoCCVheatexchangers,surgetank..."Therefore,ConditionCisentered.3.7Q107 Status:[]Response:V.[ITS82.v]:3.7Q108Status:[]Response:vi.WhyrelocatethenotetoSR3.7.7.1totheend?OpenThroughouttheNUREGbases,anyNotestotheLCO,Actions,orSurveillancesarediscussedinthelastparagraphofthatsection.RelocatingthisNotediscussiontotheendofSR3.7.7.1providesconsistencywiththerestoftheITSbases.SR3.7.7.1wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofmanualandpoweroperatedvalvesintheCCWtrainorloopheaderflowpaththatservicepost-accidentrelatedequipmentwhichisamoreaccuratedescriptionoftheactualSR.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ThesamesketchasnotedinITS82.iv,item¹1aboveandtheresponsesareneededtoevaluatethisproposedchange.TheadditionofSR3.7.7.2seemstocounterthisjustification.Thenamechangefromsafety-relatedtopost-accidentwasnotexplainedorjustified.OpenTherequestedsketchhasbeenprovided.SR3.7.7.2istheverificationthatthetwoCCMmotoroperatedvalvestotheRHRheatexchangersarestrokedopenandclosedinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.ThesetwovalvesarenormallymaintainedclosedandopenedbyoperatorspriortoimplementingtherecirculationphaseasstatedinthebasesforSR3.7.7.2.Therefore,SR3.7.7.2ensuresthatthesevalvescanbeopenedwhenrequired.Allothervalveswhichservepost-accidentcomponentsarelockedinpositionorhaveCCVflowthroughthemduringpoweroperationandmustbeverifiedbySR3.7.7.1.Thechangefrom"safetyrelated"to"postaccident"wasmadesinceallheatexchangerssuppliedbyColareidentifiedassafetycl.ass3sincenothingontheCCVSystemisisolatedfollowinganaccident.Therefore,thischangeprovidesgreateroperatorclarity.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.3.Notchecked83.ITS3.7.8ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichdoesnotabbreviatetheterm"system"withrespecttotheServiceWater(SW)System.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Acceptable-147-December1995 [ITS83.ii]:3.7Q109Status:[]Response:3.7Q110 Status:[]Response:TheLCO,Conditions,andbaseswererevisedtoreflecttheactualdesignoftheSWsystematGinnaStation.TheSWSystemiscomprisedoftworedundanttrains.Eachtrainincludestwo100%capacitypumpswhichfeedacommonloopheader.Thiscommonloopheaderprovidescoolingwatertothesafetyandnonsafetyrelatedsystemloads.Assuch,theLCOwasrevisedtorequirethetwoSWpumptrainsandtheSWloopheadertobeOPERABLE.TheNotesforRequiredActionA.1werealsonotaddedsincetheinoperabilityofasingleSWtraindoesnotaffecttheabilityofSWtoprovidecoolingtoeitherRHRheatexchangerorthedieselgenerators.Inaddition,theLCObaseswererevisedtostatethattheSWloopheaderendsatthefirstisolationvalveforanysuppliedcomponent.Ifcoolingwaterthroughorfromanycomponentrequiredbytheaccidentanalysisisunavail.able,thentheapplicableLCOshouldbeentered.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Asuch,approvedTravellerWOG-12,Cllwasnotincorporated.ItisacceptabletoreflecttheGinnaSWsystemdesign.AlsoexplainwhatisthenormalandstandbydischargeheadernotedinUFSAR9.2.1.1?OpenAllSh/isdischargedintoacommoncanalwhereitisdirectedtoLakeOntario.However,thedischargecanalcanalsobedirectedtowardstheScreenhousewaterbaywhichprovidesthesuctionsourcefortheSkl,firewaterpumps,andcirculatingwaterpumps.Thispathcanbeutilizedduringwintermonthstopreventtheformationofice;however,itisnormallymaintainedclosedbyuseofamotoroperatedvalve.Itisacceptabletodeletenotes1and2toRequiredActionA.1providedassuranceisestablishedthatthecrossconnectvalveswillneverbeclosed.Howwillthisbechecked,ifnotbyanuniqueSR?OpenTheverificationofthecrossconnectvalvesisrequiredbySR3.7.8.1(seeballoonedtextatbottomofAttachmentDpageB3.7-43.3.7QlllTheBASESneedhelpandrewritingasnotedinITS83.iv.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.7/119through3.7P125.3.7Q112Status:[]Response:Theseventhsentenceaboveisacceptable.IsthisfirstisolationvalveoftheSWheaderthesameisolationvalveofLCO3.6.3?PleasestatehowthisLCOwouldworkwiththeLCONoteP3toLCO3.6.3?Shouldasimilarnotebeplacedhere?OpenTheuseofthe"Sh!header"intheLCOisintendedtorequirethatthecommonheaderwhichsuppliesallofthesystemcomponentsisOPERABLE.IfthereisafailurewhichaffectsonlyoneortwoloadssuppliedbySV,anddoesnotaffectanyothersuppliedloads,thentheSVSystemshouldnothavetobedeclaredinoperableandimmediatelyinitiateashutdown.Instead,theaffectedloadsaredeclaredinoperableandtheirassociatedLCOentered.Inmanyinstances,thecontainmentisolationvalveaddressedinLCO3.6.3is-148-December1995 3.7Q113Status:[]Response:3.7gll4Status:[]Response:theboundarywithrespecttotheShfheader.Ifthiscontainmentisolationvalvewasrequiredtobeclosed,itdoesnotaffecttheSVheader.Instead,theloadsuppliedbySklandtheclosedvalves(e.g.,CNNTfancooler)isdeclaredinoperableandthatLCOisentered.PhilethereissomemerittoaddinganotesimilartoNote¹3ofLCO3.6.3,thismaycauseconfusionsincetheintentofthebasesisthatthesesuppliedloadsarenotaddressedinLCO3.7.8,onlyintheirapplicableLCOs.HaybetheotherSVsuppliedLCObasesneedclarificationwithrespecttothis.SuggestthisbediscussedduringtheGinnasitevisit.TheeighthsentenceiscorrectandthedeletedNotes1and2ofRequiredActionA.1permitacascadeofthesecriticalsafetysystemswhencoolingwaterwasunavailable.InthenewproposedConditionC,shouldn'tthosedeletednotesshouldbeaddedhere?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/118.Insentenceten,thetravelerasnotedhasnocommentnumberasidentifiedasbeingapplicableforthisLCO.,Pleaseexplain.OpenThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentA.TheTravellerinquestionisactually"klOG-I2,C.l."Comment¹92hasbeenopenedtocorrectthis.[ITS83.iii3.7gll5Status:[]Response:3.70116Status:[]Response:AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothSWtrainsortheSWloopheaderwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,SWcannotsupporttheOPERABILITYoftheSIpumps,CRFCs,CCWheatexchangers,dieselgenerators,orAFWpumpsandalossofmultiple'safetyfunctionsexist.However,itisnotprudenttoenterLCO3.0.3inthisconditionsinceitwouldrequireentryintoHODE5whereSWmustbeavailabletosupporttheRHRheatexchangers.Instead,thenewConditionrequiresimmediateactiontorestoreoneSWtrainortheloopheaderandtoplacetheplantinHODE4within12hours.RestrictingthecooldowntoHODE4placestheplantinaconditioninwhichtheRCPsandAFWcanbeusedtoprovidedecayheatremovalwhileattemptstorestoreSWcontinue.IntheeventthattheRCPsorAFWisalsolost,thetimerequiredbeforeRHRmustbeavailablefordecayheatremovalisincreasedinthislowerHODE.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.]~WhyisthisnotanOwnersGroupTravelerforthisrequestedchange?OpenTheh!OGrejectedaTravelleronthisissuesincenootherplantscurrentlyhave.thistypeofCTSrequirement.Instead,licenseesclaimedthey.wouldrequest'nforcementdiscretionifallSVwerelost.RGBEcouldnotjustifyeliminationofthisshutdownrestrictionforCChf.SincethelossofallSkiwouldalsoresultinthelossofCCV,RG&EmaintainedtheCTSrequirement.TheacceptanceofthisConditionisdependentuponresponsetoitem¹5oftheabove[ITS83.ii].OpenSeeresponseto3.7/118.-149-December1995 3.7Q117Status:[]Response:3.7Q118Status:[]Response:GiventhestatedimportanceoftheSWsupportedsystems,shouldn'allthesupportedsystemsofSWsystembecascadedinthisLCO?OpenSeeresponseto3.7qll8.Also,theSFDPrequiresatypeofcascadingifLCO3.7.8isentered.ExplainhowGinnawillhandlethisnewproposedConditionCwiththeexistenceofNUREG-1431LCO3.0.6andAdministrativeControlsof5.5.15,SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram?OpenRGEEproposestoaddaNotesimilartothatforRequiredActionD.lofNUREGLCO3.7.5.ThisNotewouldsuspendimplementationofLCO3.0.3andallNODEreductionsuntiloneSkipumpandtheloopheaderarerestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.CommentiI102hasbeenopenedtoaddressthi's.iv.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderations'wereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheSWSystem.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.7.[ITS83.iv.a,3.7Q119Status:[]Response:bandc]Asnotedabove,itisacceptabletostatetheGinnadesignbutthisbackgroundmarkupforparagraphs2and3isillegible.Whathappenedtoinsert3.7.8.1?OpenAnewcopyofthefirstpageofthebasesforLCO3.7.8isbeingprovided.Insert3.7.8.1isusedintheLCOtoaddnewConditionC.3.7Q120Status:[]Response:Withtheadditionofinsert3.7.8.4,thereisredundantwordinginthemarkup.OpenThefirsttwosentencesoftheITShazesforApplicableSafetyAnalysis(whereInsert3.7.8.4wasplaced)nowread:"ThedesignbasisoftheSVSystemisforoneSkftraininconjunctionwitha100%capacitycontainmentcoolingsystem(i.e.,'containmentrecirculationfancoolers)toprovideforheatremovalfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB)insidecontainmenttoensurecontainmentintegrity.TheSVSystemisalsodesigned,inconjunctionwiththeCCkfSystemanda100%capacityEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemandcontainmentcoolingsystem,toremovethelossofcoolant(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase."ThereisnoredundantwordinginthesesentencessincethefirstsentencerelatestoSVsupportofcontainmentintegritywhilethesecondsentencerelatestoSMsupportofcontainmentcoolingduringrecirculation.-150-December1995

3.7Q121Ininsert3.7.8.2.a,theacceptableandunacceptableelectricaltrainpairsshouldbestated.Theelectrical/mechanicaldivision'eedbetterdescriptions.Status:[]OpenResponse:TheacceptableandunacceptableelectricaltrainpairsisdiscussedintheLCObases(seeinsertedtextintosecondparagraphofLCO.basesonAttachmentDpageB3.7-42).3.7Q122Status:[]Response:3.7Q123Status:[]Response:3.7Q124Status:[]Response:3.7Q125Status:[]Response:V.IntheSeptember5thtelecon,itwasdiscussedthattheadditionoftheUltimateHeatSinkshouldbeplacedinitsownLCOaspertheguidanceofNUREG-1431.Therefore,thecontentsoftheLCOoperabilityBASEScouldbesignificantlyreducedinsizetomakeamoreconcisestatement.Variouspartsarebackgroundandcouldberelocatedasappropriate.Suggestuseofatabletoclarifyoperabilityrequirements.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/129.Inaddition,theUHSrelatedissuesdiscussedintheLCObasesonlycomprise3sentencesofa3page-discussionwhichisnotsignificant.Also,theOperationsdepartmentdoesnotlikeLCOOPERABILITYrequirementslocatedintheBackgroundoranyotherbasessectionotherthantheLCO.RGBEisplanningonprovidingadrawinginthebaseswhichshowsthebreakdownoftheSN'umptrainsandloopheaderforgreaterclarity.Comment¹103hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.(Seealsocomment¹142JInApplicability,theLCOsupportedshouldbeidentifiedbynameratherthannumbersduetorenumberingpossibilities.OpenConsistentwithotherNUREGbases,ifanLCOisdiscussedmultipletimesinthebases;thefirstmentionmustincludetheLCOtitle.However,allothermentionsoftheLCOdonotrequiretheirtitle.ThetitlesoftheLCOsdiscussedintheApplicabilitybas'esarepresentedintheLCObases(seeInsert3.7.8.9).Insert3;7.8.11maychangebaseduponcommentstoITS83iii.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/118.WhymovethenotedescriptiontoSR3.7.8.1?Thesix-setsofisolationvalvesneedidentification.Also,howarethecrossconnectvalvesdefinedareseparatefromothersandwhyshouldn'theybeverifiedasopenintheirownSR?Open ThroughouttheNUREGbases,anyNotestotheLCO,Actions,orSurveillancesarediscussedinthelastparagraphofthatsection.RelocatingthisNotediscussiontotheendofSR3.7.8.1providesconsistencywiththerestoftheITSbasesThesixsetsofisolationvalvesandcross-connectsareidentifiedintheLCObases(seeInsert3.7.8.9).HavingaseparateSRfordifferentvalveswhenitistheexactsamesurveillancerequirementforallvalvesonlycreatesconfusionandisprobablynotnecessary.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.3.-151-December1995 [ITS83.v]:3.7Q126Status:[]Response:vi.ExplainwhereandwhythiswasincorporatedintothisLCO.TheExcellistingshowsthistravelerwaslimitedtoLCO3.7.7!OpenThisisatypographicalerrorinAttachmentAandshouldbedeleted.Comment092hasbeenopenedtoreplaceChange83.vwith"Notused."IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-01,C.2.Acceptable84.ITS3.7.9[ITS84.i]:~~3.7Q127Status:[.]Response:3.7Q128Status:[]Response:3.7Q129,Status:[]Response:ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinna.StationTSdonotcontainany.requirementsfortheUltimateHeatSink(UHS).Inaddition,theUHSforGinnaStationisLakeOntario(therearenoinstalledcoolingtowers)andtheonlysafetyrelatedfunctionwhichrequirestheUHSistheSWSystem.Assuch,thebasesforLCO3.7.8wererevisedtospecifythattheSWtrainsareconsideredOPERABLEwhensufficientNPSHisavailableandthetemperatureoftheSW'uctionsourcewaswithinacceptablelimits.TheselimitsarethencontrolledbytheBasesControlProgram.ItshouldbenotedthattheNPSHrequirementfortheSWpumpsisfarlessthanotherequipment(i.e.,CirculatingMaterPumpsandFireWaterPumps)suchthatsufficientalarmsandindicationswouldbeavailabletoplantoperators.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.HowisGinnadifferentfromotherWestinghousestandarddesignsorotherplantswhichtaketheirwaterfromlakesorcoolingponds?OpenTheGinnadesignwithrespecttouseoflakewaterissimilartootherwestinghousestandarddesigns.Doesn'ttheUHSstillsatisfytheCriterion83oftheNRCPolicystatement?OpenYes,theUHSdoessatisfyCriterion83butisnotcontainedintheCTS,norintheTSofotherolderplantswhichuselakewater(e.g.,FitzpatrickandZionStationwhichisnotproposingtoaddthisLCO).RGBEhadproposedtorelocatethisinformationtothebasesforSVOPERABILITYsuchthattheBasesControlProgramwouldcontroltheselimits.TheUHStemperatureandlevellimitsarecontrolledbyprocedure(seeattached0-6.6).(Seealsocomment8142)TheUHSisthesourcefortheSWSystemsoretainthisLCOwithonlyConditionBasthe"UHSisinoperable."withSRs3.7.9.1and3.7.9.2.Theproposedinserts3.7.8.6and3.7.8.9toLCO3.7.8areclearlythebasisforneedingaseparateLCO.RejectedRGBEwouldbewillingtoaddthisLCO~onlifthespecifictemperaturelimitsofSR3.7.9.2couldberetainedoutsideoftheLCO.AsdiscussedinInsert3.7.8.9forLCO3.7.8,theminimumSh!temperaturechangeswithrespecttopowerlevelatGinna.ThisisduetothefactthattheminimumSVtemperatureisonlyimportantwithrespecttothedesignbasisLOCAat100%RTP.Inaddition,-152-December1995 3.7Q130Status:[]Response:3.7Q131Status:[]Response:RGBEiscurrentlyintheprocessofrevisingtheupperSVtemperaturelimitbasedonthispastsummer'sextremelyhotconditions.Asasidenote,whycan'tNVREGSR3.7.9.1(withoutthespecifictemperaturelimit)andSR3.7.9.2justberelocatedtotheShlLCO.RememberthatnewLCO3.7.8ConditionCwouldpreventapowerreductionbelowP10DE4withtheSkiloopheaderinoperable.BasedontheSFDP,withtheUHSinoperable,theSVloopheaderandColwouldalsobeinoperable.SuggestthisbediscussedduringtheGinnasitevisit.(Seealsocomment¹142JRenumberingofLCOs,SRsandBASESarerequired.RejectedSeeresponseto3.7q129.HodificationofBASESfor3.7.8isexpected.RejectedSeeresponseto3.7q129.85.ITS3.7.10[ITS85.i]:3.7Q132Status:[]Response:.3.7Q133Status:[]Response:TheLCOtitlewasrenamedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofLCO3.7.9(UHS).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv)changes.ItisacceptabletorenamethetitleofthisLCO.ClosedN/ATherenumberingisnotrequiredbecausetherewillbenodeletionofLCOforUHS.Thiswillonlybenotedonceinspiteofother.-renumbering.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q129.TheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)consistsofonefiltrationtrainandredundantdampers(seebasesandcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.5).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperableupto48hourssincethe,successfuloperationofthecontrolroomisolationdamperswillresultinacceptabledoseswithinthecontrolroom.However,ifanyradioactivegaswerereleasedandenteredthecont'rolroomenvironment,thereisnomeanstoremovethegas.Therefore,48hourswasdeterminedtobeacceptableCompletionTimeforrestoringthesystemtoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheCREATSinthetoxicgasmode.Inaddition,sincethereareredundantdampers,inoperabilityofthedampersweretreatedsimilartotheCREFtrainsinNUREG-1431(i.e.,aCompletionTimeof7daysisallowedtorestoreoneinoperabledamperandarequirementtoenterLCO3.0.3withtwoinoperabledampersforagivenoutsideairflowpath).ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandwithNUREG-1431tothegreatestdegreepossible.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Assuch,approvedTravellersWOG-24,C.5and-153-December1995 [ITS85.ii]:3.7Q134Status:[]Response:NRC-Ol,C.2werenotincorporated.Withthefiltrationtraininoperable,CREATSisinoperableasacleanupsystem.'ConditionAshouldjuststate"CREATSisinoperable".ThisisthewayexistingTS3.3.5.2isstated.Theinsert3.7.9.2isacceptableifthelogicalconnectorwereANDthereforenogasradioactiveortoxiccouldenterthecontrolroomasjustifiedabove.ThenotetonewA.2defeatsthisrequiredaction.Thetimeshouldbelimitedto5minutesorlessforoneroomairexchangewiththeoperatorsonScottAirpacks.OpenThereasonthatConditionAstates"CREATSfiltrationtrain"isthatConditionsB,E,andFaddressthefailureofCREATSdampers.Together,thefiltrationtrainanddamperscomprisetheCREATSsuch'hatConditionAshouldremainasproposed(seeattachedsketchwhichisbeingproposedtobeaddedtothebases).CTS3.3.5.2doesnotaddresstheCREATSdamperswhichisa"hole"thatisbeingproposedtobefixedduringtheconversion(seeChangeD.13.xxi).TheNotetonewRequiredActionA.2isconsistentwithCTS3.5.6.2whichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor1hourevery24hourswiththeCREATSactuationinstrumentationinoperable.RG8EisnotwillingtorevisethisCTSallowancenorrequireoperatorstowearScottAirpacksduringthistimeframesincetheCREATSiscomprisedofonlyasingletrain.RGSEalsodoesnotbelievethattheproposedlogicalconnectertoInsert3.7.9.2isrequired.ThetoxicgasmonitorsdonotmeetanyofthefourcriteriaforinclusionwithintechnicalspecificationsandhavebeenrelocatedtotheTRN.IncludingthelogicalconnectorwillonlycreateconfusionforoperatorssincethetoxicgasmonitorsarenotintheITSandallotherCREATSinstrumentationisaddressedinITSLCO3.3.5.Comment¹104hasbeenaddedtoaddedthesketchtothebases.3.7Q135Status:[]Response:NewConditionBisacceptableifwordedthisway:"OneCREATSredundantisolationdamperopenandinoperableinoneormoreoutsideflowpaths".TowhichredundantdampersordamperpairsdoesthisConditionBapply?Withanydamperclosedandinoperable(exampleAKD07orAKD09),fulloperationoftheCREATSisnotpossible.ThisisalsothesameasnewConditionsEand,FforanunisolableflowpathtotheoutsidewhicharesubsetsofCREATSbeinginoperableorbeinginConditionA.Pleaseexplainorcorrectifthisisnotthecase.AlsoacopyofUFSARFigure6.4-1shouldbeprovided.OpenAlloftheCREATSisolationdamperstotheoutsideareredundant.suchthattheuseof"redundant"intheConditionstatementis,unnecessary.Also,aCREATSdampercouldbeclosedbutleakingbysuchthatitdoesnotmeettheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Thisissimilartocontainmentisolationvalveswhichdouse"containmentisolationvalveopenandinoperable"intheirconditionstatements.TheisolationdamperswhichrequireentryintoConditionBareAKD10,AKD01,AKD08,AKD05,andAKD04asshownontheattachedsketch.PithAKD07orAKD09inoperable,theCREATSfiltrationtrainisdeclaredinoperable.Aco'yofUFSARFigure6.4-1isbeingprovidedasrequested.-154-December1995 3.7Q136Status:[]Response:ConditionAandBshouldbereversedfordescendingCompletionTimes.OpenThe1TSisorganizedthesameastheNUREGwhichdoesnothavedescendingCompletionTimesforthisLCO.Therefore,nochangeisproposed.ConditionCwasrevisedtorequireplacingtheOPERABLECREATSisolationdampersintheemergencyradiationprotectionmodewhenevertheRequiredActionsofConditionsofAor(new)BareriotmetinNODE5or6,orduringfuelmovement.Theemergencyradiationprotectionmodeisamoreconservativeconfigurationsincenooutsideairisallowedintothecontrolroom.Sincethedoseratestotheoperatorshasbeendeterminedtobeacceptablewiththecontrolroomisolated,thisi.spreferredtheconfiguration.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.[ITS85.iii]:3.7Q137NewConditionD(revisedConditionC)shouldkeep"orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies".Status:[]'OpenResponse:ITSConditionDappliesduringmovementofirradiatedfuelmovement,notConditionC.Therefore,ITSConditionCdoesnotneedtokeep"orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies."3.7Q138Status:[]Response:TheLogicalConnectorbetween0~1andD.2shouldbeOR.OpenThisisatypographicalerrorintheRequiredActionsandbases.Comment8105hasbeenopenedtochangethislogicalconnectortoanOR.3.7Q139Status:[]Response:iv.Themarkupstates"PlaceinNodeF".Isthisthesameasthe"emergencyradiationprotectionmode"notedabove?TheBASESdonothavenamesassociatedwiththeNodesAthruF.Open ThedefinitionofCREATSModesAthroughFiscontainedintheBackgroundbases(seeInsert3.7.9.4).The"emergencyradiationprotectionmode"isthesameasModeF.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheGREATS.[ITS85.iv.a3.7Q140Status:[]Response:b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.andb]:Whathappenedtoinserts3.7.9.1and3.7.9.2?OpenInserts3.7.9.1and3.7.9.2areintheLCOsectionandaddnewRequiredActionA.2andConditionB,respectively.-155-December1995

3.7Q141Status:[]Response:InthefirstparagraphofBackground,chemicalortoxicgasneednotbedeleted.OpenThereferencetochemicalandtoxicgaswasdeleted.sincethisLCOdoesaddressthetoxicgasrequirementsofCREATS.TheserequirementsareaddressedintheTRN.GinnaoperatorshaverequestedthattheBackgroundbasesrefrainfromdiscussingitemsnotrelatedtotheLCOOPERABI'LITYrequirements.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththeITSVriter'sGuide.3.7Q142Status:[]Response:InthesecondparagraphofBackground,CREATSshouldbestatedasonetrainonly.Redundantdamperpairsarenotmentioned.Alsothe'irconditioningunitanditsACfanarenotmentioned.OpenRG&Eproposestoaddafiguretothebases(seeresponseto3.7q134)toprovideadditionalclaritysuchthatthesuggestedtextchangesarenotrequired.TheairconditioningunitanditsassociatedACfanarenotrequiredforsuccessfuloperationoftheCREATSsystemandarethereforenotdiscussedinthesebases.3.7Q143Status:[]Response:Ininsert3.7.9.4,thenamesassociatedwiththeModesAthruFarenotidentifiedasusedinrevisedConditionCorthefollowingparagraphoftheBackground.OpenTheonlydifferencebetweenthenamesprovidedintheBackgroundbasesandITSConditionCisthatthebasesstate"CREATSNodeF"whileConditionCuses"NodeF."Thisisaninsignificantdifference.3.7Q144Status:[]Response:Thedeletionofparagraph7and9shouldberetainedandmodifiedfortheGinnadesignparameter.OpenRG8EagreestoretainNUREGBackgroundbasesparagraph9.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.However,paragraph7isnotapplicabletotheGinnadesignsinceCREATSdoesnotcreateapositivecontrolroompressure.Instead,CREATSisintendedtoisolatethecontrolroomwithanequivalentpressurebothinsideandout.3.7Q145Status:[]Response:3.7Q146Status:[]Response:ThethirddeletedparagraphofApplicable'SafetyAnalysesshouldberelocatedtoLCOtostatethatanyactivefailureofacomponentwillimpairtheCREATSoperation.OpenTheLCObasesalreadystatethatthetotal'systemfailurecouldresultinexcessiveoperatordosesandthattheCREATSiscomprisedof"afiltrationtrain."Therefore,RGSEdoesnotbelievethedeletedthirdparagraphis'necessary.IntheLCO,theredundantdamperpairsshouldbeidentifiedseparatefromthoseininsert3.7.9.7.Also,thelastballooninserttothissectionisnotexplained,justifiedorunderstood.OpenTheredundantoutsidedamperpairsarethoselistedinInsert3.7.9.7(seeattachedsketch).TheballooninsertrelatestothefactthattheGinnacontrolroomhasasingleaccessdoor(i.e.,-156-December1995 3.7Q147Status:(]Response:3.7Q148Status:[]Response:V.[ITS85.v]:3.7Q149Status:[]Response:3.7Q150Status:[]Response:vi.thereisnottwodoorsin-series).TheinsertedtextclarifiesthatthisdoorcanbeopenedandnotviolatetheLCO.Thedoorcanalsobeopenedforanextendedperiod(e.g.,tobringequipmentin)aslongasthereisadedicatedindividualtoisolateandclosethedoorifrequired.InApplicability,whyarethewastegasdecaytankslocatedoffsiteandthen,ifso,whywouldtheyaffectthecontrolroom.Whatis[82.vi]justifyinghere?OpenTheballoonedtext"locatedeitheroffsiteoronsite"isatypographicalerrorthatisnotshowninAttachmentC.Comment893hasbeenopenedtoremovethistextfromAttachmentD.SpecificquestionsontheActionsandSRswillbegivenlaterafterresponsestotheaboveLCOquestionsarereceived.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7P132through3.7q147.SR3.7.10.4wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationtechnicalspecificationsdonotcontainthisrequirement.ThecontrolroomenvironmentalcontrolsystemswereassessedaspartofTHIActionPlanrequirements(i.e.,NUREG-0737,Supplement1,itemIII.D.3.4)andfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.28).Therefore,RG&Edoesnotbelievethatthissurveillanceisrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Reference28isnotavailablebutthecontrolsystemisacceptableassumingthesystemcanmaintainitsfunction.ThisSRmerelyteststoverifythatthecontrolroomcanbepressurizedatthedesignedflowratetominimizetheairinfiltration.Withoutthistest,howisCREATSoperationdeterminedtobeOPERABLE.OpenThecontrolroomdoseassessmentsdonotassumethatthecontrolroomispressurized.Consequently,NUREGSR3.7.10.4isnot.applicabletotheGinnadesign.Also,StandardReviewPlan6.4(attached)doesnotrequiretheuseofpressurized,controlroomvolume.Itonlyrequiresverificationofinleakagetothecontrolroomiftheanalysesassumeagrossleakagerateof(0.06volumechangesperhouror"ifapressurizedsystemisusedthathaspressurizationrates(0.25volumechangesperhour.UFSARTable6.2.4showsanunfilteredleakageof0.06changesperhoursuchthatthisverificationisnotrequired.AsnotedinITS85.iabove,SR3.7.11.1isneededhere.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q152.ApprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.2wasnotaddedsincetheCREATSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODE6whichincludesallCOREALTERATIONSbydefinition.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.[ITS85.vi]:3.7Q151Thisappearsacceptable.Whatdoesthetravelerstateasthe-157-December1995

Status:[]Response:justificationorreasonforaddingthistothisLCO?OpenThejustificationforTravellerHOG-12,C.2isattached.Essentially,thisTravellercorrectedadiscrepancybetweenthe'nstrumentationandhardwareCREATSrequirements.86.ITS3.7.11[ITS86.i]:3.7(152Status:[]Response:ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanytemperaturecontrolrequirementsforthecontrolroomenvironment.TheexistingsystemwasevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableaspartoftheTHIActionPlanRequirements(i.e.,NUREG-0737,Supplement1,itemIII.D.3.4).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellersWOG-12,C.2andWOG-24,C.1werenotincorporated.NUREG-1431LCO3.7.11,CREATCSisnowapartoftheGinnaproposedLCO3.7.9.PerUFSARSection6.4,theAirConditioningUnitisanintegralin-lineseriescomponentofCREATSoperatingflowpath.Ifthisunitisinoperable,CREATSisinoperable.TheairconditioningunitisjustanothercomponentindeterminingtheoperabilityofCREATS,soonlytheSR3.7.11.1needstobeaddedtotheGinnaproposedLCOforCREATS.OpenAlthoughthecontrolroomairhandlingroomisinthepathoftheCREATSsystem,itisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportCREATSope'ration(i.e.,thedoseanalysesdonotcredittheuseofthisairhandlingunit).Consequently,SR3.7.11.1isnotrequired.87.ITS3.7.12[ITS87.i]:3.7(153ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyrequirementsforaECCSpumproomexhaustaircleanupsystem(PREACS).Thebasesforthis'COstatethatthePREACSisusedforfilteringairfromtheareaofactiveECCScomponentsduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccidentandtoprovideenvironmentalcontrol(e.g.,temperatureandhumidity).StandardReviewPlan15.6.5statesthatforplantswhichdonotprovideanESFatmospherefiltrationsystem,50gpmleakagefromagrossfailureofapassivecomponentshouldbeassumed24hoursafteranaccident.ThisisassumedforGinnaStationwithrespecttotheRHRpumps(UFSAR,Section5.4.5.3.5).Inaddition,UFSARSection9.4.2statesthatthecoolingsystemsrelatedtoECCSequipmentarenotrequiredevenwithbothtrainsofECCSinoperation.Therefore,thisLCOdoesnotapplytoGinnaStationandwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ItshouldbenotedthattheLCOprovidesrequirementsforbothroomtemperaturecontrolandaircleanupsystems.TheUFSARreferenceisassumedtobespecifically9.4.2.4.1,EffectofLossofCoolingonPumpsandValves.Thisdoesstatethatallpumpsinthisroomcan-158-December1995

Status:[]Response:3.7(154Status:[]Response:operatewithoutcoolingsystems.TheUFSARreferencetoSection5.4.5.3.5couldnotbeaccessedduetoanincompatiblefileerror.PleaseprovidethisreferencetoshowthatthisLCOisnotrequiredforthispumproom.OpenTherequestedUFSARsectionisattached.Inaddition,itshouldbenotedthattheECCSroomcoolersdonothaveanyfiltrationcomponentsassociatedwiththem,onlyfancoolers.UFSAR9.4.9,EngineeredSafetyFeaturesVentilationSystemsstateotherroomsandareasoftheplantwheresystemsareinstallrequirecooling.PleaseevaluatetheseareaspertheLCOcriterionofthepolicystatement.ExampletheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystempumproomappearstobeonlyanadditionandmaynotbeapartoftheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem.OpenTheonlyaircleanupsystemscreditedintheGinnaaccidentanalysesareforthecontrolroom(ITSLCO3.7.9),theContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalFilters(ITSLCO3.6.6)andtheSpentFuelPoolportionoftheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ITSLCO3.7.10).TheonlyroomtemperaturecontrolsystemsrequiredtoensurethatTSsystemsareOPERABLEareforthedieselgenerators(seeInsert3.8.1.3toLCObasesforITSLCO3.8.1)andtheSAFE/pumps(seeinsertedtextinballoonforLCObasesonAttachmentDpageB3.7-46forITSLCO3.7.5).~~~~88.ITS3.7.13i.TheLCOtitlewasrenamedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturesincethereisnoseparatefuelbuilding.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofprevioussections.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv)changes.AcceptableTheLCO,Applicability,Conditions,Surveillances,andthebaseswereallrevisedtobeconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.11.1.ThisrequirestheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)associatedwiththeSFPtobeOPERABLEwhenfuelisbeinghandledorstoredinSFPwhichhasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.TheABVSisdefinedasoneAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfan,theAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfan1C,SFPcharcoalabsorbers,androughingfilters.TheABVSonlyensuresthatoffsitedosesarewellwithin10CFR100limitsintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.IftheABVSwereunavailable,offsitedoseswouldincrease,butremainbelow10CFR100limits.Therefore,singlefailuresoralossofoffsitepowerisnotaconsiderationforthisLCO.IftheminimumABVSisinoperable,thenewConditionrequiressuspensionofmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingimmediatelywhichpreventsafuelhandlingaccidentfromoccurringthatrequirestheABVS.SincetheABVSisanon-EngineeredSafetyFeaturessystem,andisonlyrequiredfollowingafuelhandlingaccident,themajorityofsurveillancerequirementsdonotapplytoGinnaStation.TheonlySRswhicharenecessaryarethoserelatedtotheVFTPandtoensurethatthesystemisinoperationduringfuelmovementorCOREALTERATIONS(newSR3.7.10.1).AllotherSRswhichrequireoperationofsystemheaters(SR3.7.13.1),verifyactuationofthe-159-December1995 [ITS88.ii]:3.7Q155Status:[]Response:3.7Q156Status:[]Response:3.7Q157Status:[]Response:ABVSonasafetyinjectionsignal(SR3.7.13.3),verifytheabilitytomaintainanegativepressureinthefuelhandlingbuilding(SR3.7.13.4)orverifythatthebypassdampercanbeclosed(SR3.7.13.5)donotapplytoGinnaStationandwerenotadded.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-24,C.6wasnotincorporated.ItisacceptabletoadapttheFBACSLCOtotheGinnaABVSdesignandtoplacethecomponentsrequiredOPERABLEintheBASES.Themarkupassuppliedprovidesinformationwhichconfusestheidentityoftherespectiveventilationfans,filtersandductworkintheoperatingtrain(s?).PleaseprovidetheUFSARFigures9.4-4through9.4-8toclarifytheintentofinsert3.7.10.1.OpenTherequestedUFSARfigureshavebeenprovided.However,toassistinyourreview,asketchoftheABVSisalsoprovidedtoshowwhat'ortionofthatsystemisrequiredforthisLCO.RGSEproposestoaddthissketchtothebasestoprovidedclarity.Comment8106hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.ThisLCOshouldalsoappliesotheraccidentsbesidesjustafuelhandlingaccident.AsnotedinthejustificationfordeletionofNUREG-1431LCO3.7.12,thereisnoroomcleanupsystem,soradioactiveparticulatesmustbefilteredbytherespectivebuildingventilationsystems.ThereisnomentionoftheportionsoftheintermediatebuildingandotherauxiliarybuildingareaswhicharealsoventilatedbyABVS.AlsosincetheHighEnergyLineBreakAnalysiswasperformedaftertheplantwasdesigned,whateffectwouldthesteamisolationdampersnotclosinghaveupontheoperationofABVS.Pleaseexplain.OpenThisLCOisonlyapplicableforfuelhandlingaccidents.TheABVSdoesprovideaircleanupduringnormalpoweroperation,butisunavailablefollowingalossofoffsitepowerandisnotconsideredsafetyrelated(seeUFSARSection3.11.3.2.1).Therefore,forallradiologicalaccidentsotherthanfuelhandlingaccidents,theABVSisnotcreditedasallowedbyStandardReviewPlan15.6.5,AttachmentB.PithrespecttoHELBs,therearenosteamisolationdampersatGinnaStation.TheHELBofconcernintheAuxiliaryBuildingisanon-safetygradeheatingsteamlinewhichwasaddressedduringtheSystematicEvaluationProgram(seeUFSARSection3.11.3.2.1).ABVSappearstobecontinuouslyinoperationforreasonsotherthanajustFHA.Whyshouldn'ttheApplicabilitybe"atalltimes."AllOwnersGroupshaveacceptedanyirradiatedfuelmovementasappropriateapplicabilityratherthana<60daylimitation.Whycan'tGinna?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/156withrespecttoApplicability.Also,.theNRChasrecentlyissuedSERsallowinglicenseestochangetheirApplicabilitytobeconsistentwithGinna's(seeAmendmentNo.105toNillstone3licensedatedFebruary22,1995).Assuch,.RGBEisnotwillingtochangetheApplicability.-160-December1995 3.7Q158Status:[]Response:3.7Q159Status:[]Response:3.7Q160Status:[]Response:SincetheABVS'isinoperation,itisacceptabletoreplacewithnewSR3.7.10.1.ClosedNIAItisacceptable(asnotedinCTS21.ii)thatanegativepressureisnowthebasisforacceptableoperationinlieuofexistingTS3.11.l.c;so,theretentionofoldSR3.7.13.4isappropriate.ClosedN/ATheABVStrainrealignsitselfuponahighradiationsignalasnotedinUFSAR9.4.2.2.1andinsert3.7.10.1.ThereforeoldSRs3.7.13.3and3.7.13.5shouldberetained.OpenAsdiscussedintheresponseto3.7P156,theABVSisnon-safetyrelatedandisunavailablefollowingalossofoffsitepower.Assuch,eventhoughtheABVSwillattempttorealignitselfuponahighradiationsignal,thisrealignmentcannotbeassumedorcredited.TheABVSrelatedtothespentfuelpooldoesnotrealignfollowingahighradiationsignalalthoughitwillalsobeunavailablefollowingalossofoffsitepowerasdiscussedintheLCObases.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant.-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingusingGinnaStationnomenclatureandprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheABVS.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.[ITS88.iii.aandb]:3.7Q161Status:[]Response:3.7Q162Status:[]Response:3.7Q163Status:[]Response:ThereisnomentionofthenewfuelareawhichisservedbytheairhandlingunitofABVS.OpenUnlessthenewfuelisirradiated,thenthisLCOdoesnotapply.Onlyafuelhandlingaccidentwithirradiatedfuelhasthepotentialtocausesignificantoffsitedoses.InthefirstparagraphofBackground,lastsentence,lastballooninsertismislocated.OpenThisisatypographicalerrorasthislastballooninsertshouldbe.after"humidityinthe"portionofthislastsentence.Comment¹94hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserror.Asnotedabove,insert3.7.10.1willneedstreamlining.OpenRG&Ehasproposedtoaddafiguretothebases(seeresponse3.7P155).AnychangestothebasestosupportthisareaddressedinComment¹106.-161-December1995

3.7Q164Status:[]Response:3.7Q165Status:[]Response:3.7Q166Status:[]Response:3.7Q167Status:[]Response:lv.[ITS88.iv]:3.7Q168Status:[]Response:3.7Q169Status:[]Response:3.7Q170Status:[]Response:InApplicableSafetyAnalyses,thirddeletedsentenceshouldstay.Intheballooninserttothefourthsentence,whyarethelistedcomponents"functional"andnot"operable."Lastly,theinsertedwordjustpriortoinsert3.7.10.2isnotlegible.OpenThethirdsentenceintheApplicableSafetyAnalysesisnotapplicabletoGinnaasnotedintheresponsesto3.7q154and3.7q156andshouldthereforeremaindeleted.RGEEagreestoreplace"functional"with"OPERABLE"intheballooninserttothefourthsentence.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.Theillegibleinsertedwordis"minimum."Insert3.7.10.3isacceptablebutappearstobebestrelocatedtothebackground.OpenRG&EbelievesInsert3.7.10.3iscorrectwhereitissinceitonlyreplacesthetextcontairiedinthefirstparagraphoftheNUREGLCObaseswhichprovidesasimilardiscussion.InLCO,thecomponentsoperablewillbedeterminedafterreceiptoftheFiguresaccompanyingthisdesign,notedabove.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q155.SpecificcommentsonApplicability,ActionsandSRswillcomelater.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q153through3.7P166.ThetextofSR3.7.10.2wasrevisedtoreflectthatonlytheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemisrequiredtobeverifiedsincetheABVShasseveralcharcoalfiltercomponents.ThisisanTSCategory(iv)'hange.TheUFSARhasnomentionoftheSFPCharcoalAbsorber(orAdsorber)SystemanywherewhencheckedbyZYINDEX.Whatandwhereisthissystem?OpenThissystemisdiscussedinUFSARSections3.11.3.2.1and9.4.4.ThetitleofthisSystemisconsistentwithGinnaprocedures.Itisappropriatethatthe"?"systemhavefiltertestingperVFTPandanSRisrequired.ArethereotherfilteringsystemswhichalsoshouldbetestedasapartofthewholeABVS?OpenAsnotedintheresponseto3.7ql54and3.7q156,nootherportionoftheABVSisrequiredtobetestedpertheVFTP.ThevariousBASESreferencesdonotagreeonwhetherthisisan"absorber"filteroran"adsorber"filter.ThelateristhemorelikelycandidateandmatchesexistingTS4.11.1.OpenTheuseof"adsorber"iscorrect.Comment¹93hasbeenopenedtoensurethatallbasesreferencesuse"adsorber."-162-December1995 3;7Q171Status:[]Response:3.7Q172Status:[]Response:ExistingTS4.11.I.dismissingforthissystemandshouldbeaddedasanewSR.SeeCTS38.iii.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/278.AsnotedaboveandinChange38.iii,sincetheABVSisrequiredtobeinoperationandOPERABLEduringallmovementoffuelwhichhasbeenirradiatedwithinthelast60days,butisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEatanyothertimetomeettheaccidentanalyses,performingCTS4.ll.l.donamonthlybasisisnotnecessary.Instead,verificationthatthesystemisinoperationwhenbeingusedisallthatisrequiredasITS3.7.10.1proposes.WhyaretheAuxiliaryBuildingCharcoalFiltersnottestedalso?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/154and3.7/156.ItshouldbenotedthatthesefiltersarenormallytestedatGinna,butdonotrequiretestinginaccordancewithtechnicalspecifications.89.ITS3.7.14[ITS89.1]:3.7Q173Status:[]Response:ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveapenetrationroomexhaustaircleanupsystem(PREACS).ThebasesdescribethePREACSasasystemwhichfiltersairfromthepenetrationareabetweencontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuilding.AtGinnaStation,thecontainmentanAuxiliaryBuildingarejoinedsuchthatthereisnospace(i.e.,penetrationarea)betweenthesebuildings'herefore,thisLCOisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Itis'acknowledgedthattheremaynotbeanareaoftheplantlocatedasdescribedintheBASESorknownas"thepenetrationarea";however,theLCOisreservedforfiltrationand/orventilationsystemswhichperformessentiallythesamefunction.EvenifthereisnothingintheexistingTS,GinnaisrequestedtodeterminewhetherasimilarfunctionexistsforthistypeofLCO.AnexampleistheUFSARSection9.4.1.2.10referstoaPenetrationCoolingSystem.Isthisareaalsofiltered?OpenThePenetrationCoolingSystemisusedtocooltheconcretearoundcertaincontainmentpenetrationsandprovidesnofiltrationpurpose.ThissystemwasreviewedduringtheSystematicEvaluationProgramandconcludedthatitwasnotrequiredtomeetanyaccidentanalyses.Instead,thisisanoperationalissueonly(i.e.,a"goodpractice").Seeresponseto3.7/156withrespecttoallotherventilationandfiltrationsystemsatGinna.90.ITS3.7.15ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclatureincludingtheuseofabbreviation"SFP"for"spentfuelpool."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.AcceptableThebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):-163-December1995 a.Plant-specific.backgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignofthespentfuelpool(SFP)andtheSFPCoolingSystemwasadded.b.Discussionsofnon-TSrelatedfunctionsofmaintaininglevelintheSFPweredeleted.ThistypeofinformationiscontainedintheUFSAR,procedures,andothermoreappropriatedocuments.c.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.[ITS90.ii.a,d.ThebaseswereexpandedtodiscusswhytheLCOwasnotapplicableforotherplantconditions.b,c,andd]:3.7Q174Status:[]Response:3.7Q175Status:[]Response:3.7Q176Status:[]Response:3.7Q177Status:[]Response:ThedeletedportionofthefirstparagraphofBackgroundaretrue.,statements.Whyremovedthem?Attheendoftheballooninsert,begin"Italsoshields....etc".OpenThedeletedportionofthefirstparagraphof8ackgroundaretruestatementsbut-unrelatedtotheLCOrequirements.Thatis,thesesentencesrefertoauxiliaryfunctionsofSFPlevelwhicharenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses.GinnaoperatorshaverequestedthatthislevelofinformationberemovedfromthebasestoreducepotentialconfusionastowhytheLCOem'sts.Thislevelofinformationisbestaddressedintraining.InthefirstlineofApplicableSafetyAnalyses,poolshouldbedeleted.OpenThisisatypographicalerror.Commentf92hasbeenopenedtoremove"pool"fromthisfirstsentence.Ininsert3.7.1.5.2,the"decontaminationfactor"isnotunderstood.Pleaseexplain.OpenThetextforInsert3.7.1.5.2comesfromUFSARSection15.7.3.3andRegulatoryGuide1.25(attached).Essentially,a"decontaminationfactorof100"meansthat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedbydamagedrodsisretainedbythepoolwater.Inseveralplaces,th'euseofthewordphrase"activefuel"isnotclear.Isthisoffloadedfuelawaitingreloading?Explainorusedifferentterm.Open"Activefuel"istheportionofthefuelassemblywhichcontainsthefuelrods.Thefuelassemblynaturallyextendsbeyondthis"activefuel."SpecifyingtheLCOlimitwithrespecttoabovethe"activefuel"ensuresthatthereisatleast23feetofwateravailableforiodineremoval.3.7Q178Status:[]InLCO,whatistheleveloftheSFPrequiredwhennofuelmovementisoccurringandfuelisjustbeingstored?Open164-December1995 Response:TheSFPlevelisnormallymaintainedataconstantlevel>23feetabovethefuelwhetherfuelmovementistakingplaceornot.However,whennofuelmovementisoccurring,afuelhandlingaccidentcannotoccur.NotethattheITSLCOApplicabilityisthe'ameastheNUREGforarequirementthatGinnacurrentlydoesnothave.3.7Q179Status:[]Response:3.7Q180Status:[]Response:TheadditionoftheballooninsertafterperiodicallyintheSR3.7.15.1isdependentupontheanswertoitem5above.Also,the31dayfrequencyisonhold.OpenSeeresponseto3.7P178.Thelastparagraphofinsert3.7.15.4ischallengedasnotanacceptablemannertoverifySFPwaterlevel.OpenUseofthealarmsistheonlycontrolroomindicationthatoperatorshavetoensurethat~23feetofwaterisavailable.Thesealarms,arebothsetabovethe23ftLCOlimit.NotethatGinnacurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.Unlessthereviewercanproposeanotheroptionwhichdoesnotrequireaplantmodification,oracceptstheproposedmethodofperformingthisSR,RGBEwillwithdrawthisSR.TheFrequencyforSR3.7.15.1wasrevisedfrom7daysto31days.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisSurveillanceRequirement.However,consistentwiththecurrentsurveillanceforSFPboronconcentration(GinnaStationTSTable4.1-2,817),amonthlysurveillanceofSFPwaterlevelisconsideredadequateduetothedesignoftheSFPasdiscussedinthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.[ITS90.iii]:3.7Q181ThecurrentTS,surveillanceintervalforboronconcentrationappearstobemonthlyduringalloperationalmodes.TheproposedITSintervalofsevendaysismoreconsistentwiththeanticipatedactivityaroundtheSFPsince'itisconcurrentduringthemovementofirradiatedfuel.This7-dayintervalwasselectedasconsistentStatus:[]Response:withsafeconductofoperationsaroundafuelstoragepool.MostplantshaveadoptedtheserecommendationsalongwiththeimprovedTSformat.Whycan'tGinna?OpenTheSFPboronconcentrationcanonlychangeifwaterfromanunboratedwatersourceisadded.WCAP-14181wasrecentlysubmittedtotheNRCwithrespecttocreditingtheuseofboronintheSFPatalltimestoaddressboraflexissues.Thisdocumentcalculatesafrequencyof(1.OE-O6/reactoryearforthisevent.Assuch,RG&Ebelievesthatthefrequencyof31daysisadequate.91.ITS3.7.16ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclatureincludingtheuseof"SFP"for"spentfuelpool."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Acceptable-165-December1995 [ITS91.ii]:3.7Q182Status:[]Response:TheLCOandassociatedbaseswererevisedtorelocatetheactualboronconcentrationlimittotheCOLR.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithothersimilarrequirements(e.g.,ITS3.9.1).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.PleaseseequestionsonCTS28.ii.g!WhyisthisnotaWOGproposedtravelertotheSTS?Open/NRCHOLDThisLCOhasnotbeenaddressedbytheHOG.Comment4107hasbeenopenedtorequestaHOGtravelleratthenextmeetinginmid-November.3.7Q183Status:[]Response:3.7Q184Status:[]Response:Whenwasthelasttimetheboron.concentrationhadtochangetowarrantitbeingplacedintheCOLR?Open/NRCMOLDTheboronconcentrationjustchangedfollowingNRCapprovalofthenewfueldesignforGinna(seeattachedSER).ThoughtheSFPisnormallymaintainedat2000ppm,therecentlyapprovedSFPanalysisshowsthatonly300ppmisrequiredtomeetaccidentanalysisassumptions.Thischangeisonholdbecauseitisdependentupontheco-reviewwiththeReviewersforChapters3.9,4.0,COLRandpossibly3.4.Open/NRCHOLDTobediscussedatmeeting.iii.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory'(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignoftheSFPwas'addedincludingdiscussionconcerningIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbersasusedinRegionl.b.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtouseGinnaStationnomenclature.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.17.(Note-thisisanITSCategory(iii)change.)[ITS91.iii]:3.7Q185Forconsistencywiththemarkup'forLCO3.7.17,add"intoaregion"after"assembly'"inthelast*sentenceofBackground.Status:[]OpenResponse:3.7Q186Status:[]Response:3.7Q187Status:[]Response:RG&Eagreestoadd"intoaregion"inthelastsentenceofBackground.CommentiI93hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.PageB3.7-82ismissingfromthemarkupinthisSubmittal.OpenThemissingbasespagehasbeenprovided.Insert3.7.16.4isnotunderstoodforwhichanalysis?OpenTheSFPFHAanalysisassumesthateachregionoftheSFPisfilled-166-December1995 3.7Q188Status:[]Response:3.7QI89Status:[]Response:iv~[ITS91.iv]:3.7QI90Status:[]Response:withfuelassembliesinaninfinitearraytoconservativelycalculatethepotentialforrecriticalityanddosereleases.Insert3.7.16.5isacceptableexceptforthelastsentence.ThisimpliestheLCOnolongerappliesandGinnacancontinuefuelmovementwiththeboronconcentrationoutoflimit.Asdeletedintheparagraph,thisisnotallowedasintendedundertheguidanceofNUREG-1431.OpenTheNODEofApplicabilityforthisLCOstates(inboththeITSandNUREG:'%'henfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFPandaSFPverificationhasnotbeenperformedsincethelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP."OncethisverificationhasbeenperformedbyITSSR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2,thisLCOnolongerappliesasInsert3.7.16.5states.However,Insert3.7.16.6statesthattheverificationofSFPboron'oncentrationis"requiredtobeperformedpriortofuelassemblymovementintoRegion1orRegion2andmustcontinuetobeperformeduntilthenecessarySFPverificationisaccomplished."Pleaseexplaininsert3.7.16.6,asstatingSR"mustcontinuetobeperformed"whenSRintervalisproposedtobelengthenedto31days.Alsotheballooninsertinlieuofthedeletedtextasreliantuponplantprocedureisnotadequatejustification.SeeITS91.v.below.OpenFuelmovementoccursthroughoutarefuelingoutagewhichtypicallylast45days.Therefore,ITSSR3.7.12.1willmostlikelyberequiredatleasttwiceduringrefuelingoutages.TheballoonedtextisbasedontheNUREGbasesforSR3.7.15.1(seetopofpageB3.7-80).RequiredActionA.2.2wasrevisedtorequireperformanceofaSFPverificationinsteadofverifyingthataSFPverificationhadalreadybeenperformed.IfaSFPverificationhadbeenperformed,thenthisLCOwouldnotbeineffectpertheApplicability.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeintendedoptiontoimmediatelyperformtheverificationwhentheSFPboronconcentrationisnotwithinlimits.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thisisacceptabletoactuallyperformthe"SFPverification"insteadofverifyingwhetherithadbeenperformed.Thedefinitionofwhatconstitutesan"SFPverification"isnotdefinedasyetotherthanaparentheticalreference.ShouldtheLCOortheBASESclarifythisdefinition?OpenRGEEbelievestheparentheticalreferencetothetwoSRswhichactuallyperformthisverificationisadequatesincethisLCOonlyrelatestoSFPboronconcentrationwhileITSLCO3.7.13addressesSFPverification.V.TheFrequencyforSR3.7.16.1wasrevisedfrom7daysto31daysconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTSTable4.1-2,817..Sincetheboronconcentrationisnotexpectedtochangerapidlyduetothe-167-December1995 [ITS91.v]:3.7Q191Status:[]Response:largevolumeofwaterwhichisavailable,amonthlyverificationisconsideredacceptable.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThecurrentTSsurveillanceintervalforboronconcentrationappearstobemonthlyduringalloperationalmodes.TheproposedITSintervalofsevendaysismoreconsistentwiththeanticipatedactivityaroundtheSFPsinceitiscurrentlybaseduponthelastmovementofirradiatedfuel.This7-day'intervalwasselectedasconsistentwithsafeconductofoperationsaroundafuelstoragepool.HostplantshaveadoptedtheserecommendationsalongwiththeimprovedTSformat.Whycan'tGinna?OpenTheSFPboronconcentrationcanonlychangeifwaterfromanunboratedwatersourceisadded.I/CAP-14181wasrecentlysubmittedtotheNRCwithrespecttocreditingtheuseofboronintheSFPatalltimestoaddressboraflexissues.Thisdocumentcalculatesafrequencyof(1.0E-06/reactoryearforthisevent.Inaddition,thepoolboronconcentrationwouldhavetochangefrom2000ppmto300ppmwithoutbeingnoticed(levelischeckedevery7days).Assuch,RGBEbelievesthatthefrequencyof31daysisadequate.92.ITS3.7.17[ITS92.ii]:3.7Q192Status:[]Response:3.7Q193Status:[]Response:ThetitlewasrevisedtobemoreconsistentwiththeactualLCOsincenewfuelcanbestoredintheSFPifthefuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirements.Also,theabbreviation"SFP"for"spentfuelpool"wasusedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.AcceptableTheLCOandApplicabilitywererevisedtoproviderequirementsforbothregionsof.theSFP.ThischangewasrequiredsincebothRegion1andRegion2havelimitswithrespecttothefueltobestoredinadditiontotheupperU-235enrichmentlimitof5.05weightpercent.Assuch,RequiredActionswerenecessaryiftheselimitsareexceeded.Inaddition,separateSurveillanceswereaddedforeachRegiontoensurethatthelimitsaremet.TheselimitsareconsistentwithReference29.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.PleaseprovidetherelevantpartsofReference¹29toverifythesenewLCOlimits.OpenAcopyoftheNRCSERwhichapprovedthisnewlimitshasbeenprovide'd.AddanewitemcdtotheLCOstatementasfollows:"FuelassembliesnotmeetingaorbaboveshallbestoredinaccordancewithSpecification4.3.1.1."OpenRGEEdoesnotbelievethattheproposednewitemc.isnecessary.ITSLCO3.7.13addressallfuelstoredintheSFPandplaceslimitsonfuelinbothRegion1and2whileSpecification4.3.1.1identifiesthegenerallimitsoffuelstoredintheSFP.IfafuelassemblydoesnotmeettherequirementsforRegions1and2,it-168-December1995 3.7Q194Status:[]Response:3.7Q195Status:[]Response:cannotbestoredintheSFPbyITSLCO3.7.13andSpecification4.3.1.1hasnoadditionalbearing.NotethattheNUREGcontainsthisstatementsincethespecificlimitsonRegion1arenotinthisLCObutareinSpecification4.3.1.1.GinnahasproposedtolocatealloftheserequirementsinthisLCO.Addanewitemd.totheLCOstatementasfollows:"TheSFPtemperatureshallbelessthan120'Fduringnormaloperationsandlessthan150'Fduringfullcoredischargesituations."ThecapacityoftheSFPislimitedbytheheatremovalcapabilityoftheSFPpoolingsystemasisnotedinfirstparagraphofUFSARSection9.1.2.AsnotedinUFSARSection9.1.3.1,thislimitisneededtomaintainthestructuralintegrityoftheSFP.OpenRGEEdoesnotbelievethatproposednewitemd.isnecessary.TheUFSARstatementisbasedonsupersededconcretecodeswhichrequiredtheSFPtobemaintainedlessthan150'Fduringaccidentconditions.Thiscodenowstatesthattheconcretesurfacetemperatureshallnotexceed350'FduringaccidentconditionswhichisfarabovetheboilingtemperatureoftheSFP(attached).TheSFPcoolingrequirementswerejustifiedto.berelocatedduringthedevelopmentoft'eimprovedstandardtechnicalspecifications.ThedeletedtextofSR3.7.17.1shallberetainedandsimilarlyaddedtonewProposed3.7.13.1.OpenAttachmentDdoesnotshowanytextbeingdeletedfromNUREG,SR3.7.17.1,onlyachangetothenumbersandaddedtext.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignoftheSFPwasaddedincludingdiscussionconcerningIntegralBurnableAbsorbersasusedinRegion1.b.YariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtouseGinnaStationnomenclature.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.16.(Note-thisisanITSCategory(iii)change.)[ITS92.iii.a,bandc]:3.7Q196Status:[]Response:InBackground,thelastsentenceofthefirstparagraphshallberetained.AlsoretainthisdeletedsentenceinLCO.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q193.3.7Q197Status:[]Response:InBackground,secondparagraphsecondsentenceshouldbe"specifythatalimitingk,<<..."toagreewithmarkuptoLCO3.7.16.OpenRGEEagreestorevisetheBackgroundbasesasproposed.Comment894-169-December1995 3.7Q198Status:[]Response:3.7Q199Status:[]Response:hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.NewBASESFigureB3.7.16-1ismissingandisneededforfurtherreview.OpenThemissingbasesfigurehasbeenprovided.OthercommentsonLCOStatement,Conditions,ActionsmaycomedependingupontheresolutionofITS92.ii..OpenSeeresponsesto3.7P192through3.79198.93.ITS3.7.18[ITS93.ii]:3.7Q200Status:[]Response:ThisLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofpreviousLCOsections.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.AcceptableTheCompletionTimesforRequiredActionsA.1andA.2wererevisedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.4.4whichallow8hourstoreachMODE3and40hourstoreachMODE5.ThissmallincreaseintimeisconsideredminorandacceptablesincetheaccidentanalyseshavebeenperformedusingveryconservativevaluesforprimarysystemI-131andnocreditistakenforactivityplateoutorretention.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.WillthisbetheonlyplaceintheimprovedGinnaTSwherethetimesforanorderlyshutdownwillbedifferentforallothers?Ifso,whynotstandardizeacrossalltheimprovedTechSpecsforwhathasbeenstatedasaminorincrease.Asmalldifferencelikethiscreatesmoreconfusion.inprocedurewriting'hanwillbegainedbytheextratwohoursateachMODElevel.OpenNo,ITSLCO3.4.16,RequiredActionC.1alsohasdifferentshutdownCompletionTimesthantheNUREG.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCduringthereviewofthischapter.Assuch,RGBEwouldliketoretaintheCompletionTimeasproposed.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingusingGinnaStationnomenclatureandprovidingconsistencywiththedoseanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.[ITS93.iii.aandb]:3.7Q201Status:[]Response:Whatarethespecific10CFR100limitsasestablishedbytheNRCstaffforGinnaperthelicensingdocuments?OpenThe10CFR100limitsforGinnaarethesameasforeveryotherplant(i.e.,Ginnahasnoexemptionwithrespectto10CFR100).Theonlydifferenceiswithrespecttothedefinitionof"wellwithin-170-December1995 3.7Q202Status:[]Response:iv~Section3.710CFR100limits"whichhasbeenacceptedforGinnaforFHAas96remorapproximately33%oftheallowablelimit.TheCompletionTimesforActionA.1andA.2areunderdiscussion.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/200.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-24,C.5Acceptable,ifthisisjustremovingthebracketsfrom"31".CurrentTS9.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4TS3.1.4.4-'hisspecificationwasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoNODE3withT.,<500Fwithin8hoursversusColdShutdownwithin40hoursconsistentwiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.[CTS9.i-?1]3.7Q203Status:[]Response:3.7Q204Status:[]Response:3.7Q205Status:[]Response:3.7Q206Status:[]Response:WhereisthisitemintheCTSmarkup?OpenItem"9.i"relatestoITSLCO3.4.16andnotChapter3.7(seeAttachmentB,section3.4).CTS3.1.4.4isnotbeingchangedwithrespecttoChapter3.7requirements.Ifthisisav.cchange(technicalequivalence)thenwhatisrevised?OpenSeeresponseto3.7/203.TheMODEnamesforGinnaareproposedtoonlybechangedandnottheNODEnumbering;so,theshutdowntoMODE3inITSLCO3.7.14isthesameasexistingTS3.1.4.4.OpenSeeresponseto3.7P203.Theissues/changestotheexistingTSpertainingtoCompletionTimesandApplicabilityarecoveredinCTS9.iibelow.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/207through3.7/209.TS3.1.4.I.c-ThelimitonsecondarycoolantactivityisnowrequiredtobemetinNODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustwhenthereactoriscriticalorRCStemperatureis>500'F.Thesecondarycoolantactivitylimitisbasedonasteamlinebreakandtheresultingdoseconsequences.ARCStemperatureof>500FisbasedonpreventingtheNSSVsfromliftingfollowingaSGTR(i.e.,aRCStemperatureof>500'Fisonlyapplicabletoprimarysystemactivitylimitsnotsecondarylimits).Inaddition,ifthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitsarenotmet,TS3.1.4.4requiresenteringcoldshutdown(i.e.,MODE5)within40hours.RequiringthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitstobemetforallofNODE4(i.e.,RCSis>200'F)providesconsistencywithNUREG-1431andthecurrent,Required-171-December1995 Actionsifthelimitisexceeded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS9.ii-Nl]:3.7Q207ItisacceptabletomakeApplicabilityNODES1,2,3and4.'Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/ACTS9.ii-H2]:3.7Q208AsnotedinCTS9.iabove,thechangestotheexistingTSarenotclear.ThereisassumedtobeonlyonechangewhichisalongerApplicability.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7q203.3.7Q209'tatus:[]ItisrecommendedthatGinnastandardizeitsorderlyshutdowntimesforallLCOsasexplainedinITS93.iiitoLCO3.7.17.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q200.Response:13.TechnicalSpecification3.3TS3.3.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireoneofthetwoCCWheatexchangerstobeOPERABLEandtospecifythattheCCWloopheadermustalsobeOPERABLE.AsdiscussedinSectionC,item82'above,theCCWheatexchangersare100%redundantandareseparatedfromtheCCWpumptrainsbyasectionofcommonpiping.TheCCWheatexchangersarepassivedevicessuchthatanyfailureofaheatexchangerisboundedbyafailureoftheCCWpipingintheloopheader.Theloopheaderisdefinedasthesectionofpipingfromthedischargeofthepumpstothefirstisolationvalveofeachsuppliedcomponent.Theloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofthesuppliedcomponent'tothesuctionofthepumps.Sincethereisnosingleactivefailurewhichmustbeconsideredfortheheatexchangers,theyareconsideredpartoftheCCWloopheaderandonlyoneheatexchangermustbeOPERABLE.RequiringtheCCWloopheadertobeOPERABLEprovidesaclearandconciseLCOrequirementforoperators.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l3)and(y.a)changes.[CTS13.xvii-L1]:3.7Q210ThischangeisonholdpendingresolutionoftheissuesraisedinStatus:[]Response:3.7Q211Status:[]Response:ITS82.iiandITS82.iv.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q93through3.7q95and3.7q99through3.7q107.ThedeletionofexistingTS3.3.3.2.bisnotspecificallyaddressedintheCTSmarkuporjustification.Pleaseprovide.OpenThedeletionofCTS3.3.3.2.bisdiscussedinchange13.xviabove.'ommentiI114hasbeenopenedtoaddareferenceto"13.xvi"intheleftmarginforCTS3.3.3.2.b.[CTS13.xvii-Ml]:Thev.achangepartofthisjustificationisnotclear.,Isitthe172-December19953.7Q212 Status:[]Response:3.7Q213Status:[]Response:xv11;[CTS13.xvii3.7Q214Status:[]Response:definitionofthecommonloopheader?OpenCorrect,the"v.a"changerelatestotheCCVloopheaderwhilethe"v.b.l3"changerelatesthechangeinrequirementfortheCCVheatexchangers.Ifso,whathaschangedotherthanreflectingthecurrentGinnahardwaredesignintheITSforanequivalentreformatting?Ifnot,pleaseexplain?OpenCTS3.3.3.1onlyaddresstheCCVpumps,heatexchangers,and"allvalves,interlocks,andpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions."Since"theabovecomponents"onlyrelatesfotheCCMpumpsand"heatexchangers,requiringtheCollooptobeOPERABLE(whichincludesadditionalpipingandvalvesunrelatedtothesecomponents)isamorerestrictiverequirement.TS3.3.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(versus24hours)torestoreaninoperableCCWpumpbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.However,theplantisnolongerallowedtoremainatHotShutdownfor48hoursbeforerequiringadditionalcooldowntoColdShutdownconditions.Assuch,thetotaltimeinwhichaCCWpumpcanremaininoperableremainsthesame(i.e.,72hours)buttheplantisnotrequiredtobegincooldownactivitiesafter24hours.Theonlysafetyrelatedfunctionssupportedbythe.CCWSystemarewithrespecttotheRHR,SI,andCSSystems,whichallallow72hourstorestoreaninoperabletrain.Therefore,thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-LorM?]:Itisnotclearwhetherthisislessrestrictive,morerestrictiveorjustequivalent.ItissocloselycoupledtonewConditionCthatitwillhavetobediscussedasanapparentrelaxation.ThisappearsacceptablependingresolutionoftheissuesraisedinITS82.ii.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7/93through3.7P95.xviii.TS3.3.4.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatthesixsetsofmotoroperatedisolationvalves'usedintheSWSystemtobeOPERABLEfortheSWSystemtobeconsideredOPERABLE'reditistakenforthesevalvestoisolatethenonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentswithintheSWSystemfollowingacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignal.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesaclarificationtolicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.[CTS13.xviii-Ml]:3.7Q215ThesixsetsofinsolationvalvesarenotreadilyidentifiablefromthelinedrawingoftheSWSystemdated12-6-91.Onlyfoursetsarefoundherefornon-safetyrelatedcomponentsandtwosetsareforsafety-relatedcomponents.Explainfurther.Status:[]Open-173-December1995 Response:3.7(216Status:[]Response:3.70217Status:[]Response:3.7(218Status:[]Response:Theattachedsketchhasthesixsetsofisolationvalvescircled.Thesesetsincludebothvalvesfornon-safetyrelatedandsafetyrelatedloads.Thetwosetsofisolationvalvesforthesafetyrelatedcomponents(i.e.,CCVheatexchangersandSAFE)arealsorequiredtoisolateonacoincidentSIandUVsignalsincethesecomponentsarenotrequireduntilatleast10minutesfollowinganaccident.SeeInsert3.7.8.9toITSLCO3.7.8basesforadditionalinformation(lastparagraphonfirstpageofInsertbeginningwith"TheSVtrainsandloopheader...")..AretheseautomaticvalveswhichisolateontheSIorundervoltagesignal?OpenAllsixsetsofisolationvalvesisolateonacoincidentSIandUVsignal.SeeInsert3.7.8.3toITSLCO3.7.8bases.WhichSRcoversthesevalvesandwhynothavetheirownseparateSR?OpenITSSR3.7.8.2addressestheseisolationvalvessincethesearetheonlyautomaticvalvesintheSh'lowpaths.Needterminologyprotocoltoclarifythesevalvesseparatefromthecross-connectvalvesofothersystems.OpenTheterminologyusedwithrespecttotheSVvalvesisconsistentwithGinnanomenclature.Thecross-connectvalvesaremanualvalvesasshownonthesketch.3.79219Status:[]Response:AsnotedinITS83.iv.a,thebackgroundtextisillegibleandneedsrewriting.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/119.x1x.TS3.3.4.2-ThiswasrevisedtoallowoneSWtraincomprisedoftwopumpsandsixmotoroperatedvalvessuppliedbythesameelectricaltraintobeinoperablefor72hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.SincetheSWtrainsare100%redundant,removingoneoftwotrainsonlyaffectsredundancyanddoesnotplacetheplantoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.,Sincemostothersafetyfunctionsallow72hoursforonetraintobeinoperable(e.g.,ECCStrains),thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.Inaddition,thisspecificationwasrevisedtoaddressthescenarioifallSWpumpsortheSWloopheaderareinoperable.In,thiscondition,immediateactionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreoneSWpumportheloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus;however,itisnotprudenttoexittheNODEofApplicabilitysincetheSWSystemisrequiredinNODE5fordecayheatremoval.'Instead,RequiredActionshavebeenprovidedtorequireacooldowntoMODE4.InthislowerMODE,AFWisprovidingfordecayheatremoval.IfAFWwerelost,additionaltimeisrequiredbefore'RHR(andconsequentlySW)wouldberequired.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwiththeRequiredActionsforloss.ofCCW.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.[CTS13.xix-Ll]:3.7(220Thisisnotatechnicallyequivalentv.cchangebutarelaxationfor-174-December1995 Status:[]Response:3.7Q221Status:[]Response:3.7Q222Status:[]Response:theLCO3.7.8ConditionAwhichhasnotbeenjustifiedasalessrestrictivev.bchange.Pleasedprovideassuch.OpenRGEEagreesthatthisisalessrestrictive"v.b"change.Comment¹115hasbeenopenedtoreviseAttachmentAtochangetheGinnaTSCategoryto(v.b)..Thejustificationprovidedin"xix"abovewillnotchangeexceptforthelastsentence.Thisappearsacceptablepending,theresolutionoftheissuesinITS83.ii.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q109through3.7q114.Also,theCTSmarkupappearstobemissingthenewproposedConditionC.OpenThemarkupdoesnotspecificallyshownewproposedConditionCbutchange13.xixisprovidedintheleftmarginwhichspecificallydiscussesthisissue.XX.TS3.3.5.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem(CREATS)tobeOPERABLEinMODES1through6andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinsteadofonlywhenRCSis~350'F.CurrentGinnaStationTS3.5.6requiresthatthecontrolroomHVACdetectionsystem(i.e.,chlorine,ammonia,andradioactivitymonitors)beOPERABLEatalltimes.However,thefiltrationsystemisonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEabove350'F.ThefiltrationsystemisdesignedtoensurethatdoseratestooperatorsarewithintheguidelinesofGDC19intheeventofanaccident.Whiledoseratestooperatorsisexpected,tobelowerwhentheRCSis<.350'F,nocurrentanalysesexistundertheseconditions.Inaddition,failuresofthewastegasdecaytankscanstilloccurbelow350'Fwhichalsorequirecontrolroomisolation.Therefore,theMODEofApplicabilitywasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithinthespecificationsandtheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS13.xx-M1]:3.7Q223Status:[]Response:3.7Q224Status:[]Response:ItisacceptabletochangetheApplicability.WiththeremovalofthebracketstoMODES5and6intheproposedITS,thisisnow"Atalltimes."Whynotusethisphraseforclarity?Open"Atalltimes"isnotused,anywhereintheITSorNUREGsinceitimpliesApplicabilitywhentheplantisnolongerinanyNODE.Therefore,RGEErequestsuseofNODES1-6forthisLCO.WhyisTS3.5.6notprovidedinthisChapter3.7submittal?OpenCTS3.5.6relatestotheactuationoftheCREATSonlyandisaddressedinITSLCO3.3.5.TS3.3.5.2-Thiswasrevisedtoproviderequirementsforaninoperablefiltrationtrainandinoperabledampers.TheCREATSdampersisolatethecontrolroomintheeventofaradiologicaleventwhilethefiltrationtrainfiltersthecontrolroomatmosphere175-December1995 followingisolation.Thenewspecificationcontinuestoallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperablefor48hoursbeforerequiringashutdownorplacingthecontrolroomintheemergencyradiationmode(i.e.,CREATSHode6).Ifoneofthetworedundantdampersineachoutsideairflowpathisinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow7daystorestorethedampertoOPERABLEstatussimilartorestoringonetrainofredundantCREFSinNUREG-1431.Ifbothdampersareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3sincethecontrolroomcannolongerbeisolated.IfbothdampersarelostinHODES5or6,orduringfuelmovement,thenfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONSmustbesuspendedimmediately.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.ThesketchofCREATSrequestedearlierisneededtocompletethisevaluation.OpenSeeresponseto3.7/134.3.70226Status:[]Response:14.TechnicalSpecification3.4TS3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecificallyrequirethatallHSSVsbetestedpriortoenteringMODE2versusthecurrentwordingwhichallowstheHSSVstoberemovedfortestingatany.time.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentoperatingpracticesandensuresthattheHSSVsareOPERABLEbeforethereactorgoescriticalbutallowstheHSSVstobetestedunderhotconditions(i.e.,~350'F).Inaddition,theHSSVsetpointswereaddedtothenewspecificationsincetheseareassumptionswithintheaccidentanalyses.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.[CTS14.i-Ll]:[CTS13.xxi-LlorL2]:3.7(225TheproposedLCOforCREATSseparatestheportionofthefiltrationtrainfromtheCREATSystem.ThisisnotintheexistingTS,sopleaseexplain.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7/134.3.7(227Status:[]Response:Thecategoryv.ashouldbefurtherexplainedbecausetheexistingTSistooambiguousandtheexistingTSdoesnothavetheexactwordingasisimpliedintheabovejustification.ItisclearthattheexistingTSexemptsMSSVsfrombeingavailableduringtesting.Itcouldbeinterpretedthatthetestisperformedonlywhenaparameterismetandthatis"withtheRCStemperatureatorabove350'F".ThemostlogicalinterpretationisthattheavailabilityofalleightHSSVsonlyapplies"with'theRCStemperatureatorabove350'F".Baseduponthislastinterpretation,thechangerequestedislessrestrictivebecauseRCStemperatureisnolongeratornear350'Fbutcanbeashighas540'FjustpriortoentryintoMODE2.OpenRGBEhasalwaysinterpretedCTS3.4.1torequirealleightHSSVstobeOPERABLE"withtheRCStemperatureatorabove350'F."However,theNSSVsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringtestingoftheDecember1995 NSSVs.ITSLCO3.7.1requiresalleightNSSVstobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4,butthesevalvesarenotrequiredtobetesteduntilpriortoenteringNODE2.EventhoughtheNSSVsarenotrequiredtobetesteduntilpriortoNODE2,theNSSVsmuststillbeOPERABLEtotheextentpracticalbeforethetestisperformedaboveNODE5.ThisisconsistentwithSR3.0.1withrespecttopostmaintenancetestingforcomponentswhichcannotbetesteduntilaftertheLCONODEofApplicabilityhasbeenentered.ThisisalsoconsistentwiththeinterpretationofCTS3.4.1;otherwise,whywouldtestingbeallowedabove350FwhentheLCOisrequiredtobemetasofthat.time.3.70228Status:[]Response:InexistingTS3.4.1,explainthemodifyingphrase"turbinecyclecodeapprovedsteamrelievingcapability"addedtothe"eightHSSVsbeingavailable".Doesthishaveanytechnicalsignificance?Isitinlieuofjustsayingan"ASHEcodesafetyvalve"?OpenThe"turbinecyclecode"referencewascontainedintheoriginal1969TSsince"ASNEcodesafetyvalve"wasnotinuseatthattimeand10CFR55adidnotexist.However,theyareintendedtomeanthesamething.TS3.4.2.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptionsasdiscussedinthenewbases.Essentially,theaccidentanalysestreatthepreferredAFWSystemasfourtrains(i.e.,twomotordriventrainsandtwoturbinedriventrains)suchthateachSGreceivesflowfromtwoAFWtrains.Therefore,thefailureofbothmotordriventrainsortheturbinedriventrain(orbothflowpaths)hasthesameconsequence(i.e.,lossofonetrain'toeachSG).Sincetheturbinedriventrainisallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursperTS3.4.2'.2.a(andNUREG-1431),thisspecificationwasrevisedtoallowbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstobeinoperableforupto72hours.Inaddition,ifbothAFWtrainstoacommonSGareinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow4hourstorestoreatleastonetrainbeforerequiringacontrol,ledcooldown.AtimelimitforbeinginthisconfigurationisnecessarysincenoAFWwouldbeavailableintheeventofaHELBwhichaffectstheonlySGabletoreceiveAFW.RequiringanimmediatecooldowninthisconfigurationisnotconsideredprudentsinceAFWprovidesfordecayheatremovalinlowerHODES.The'seareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.14)and(v.a')changes,respectively.[CTS14.ii-LI]:3.7(229ThisappearsacceptablefortwoHDAFWpumpstobeinoperablefor72hours;however,thisispendingthefinalresolutionoftheagreeduponformatfor.theLCO(s)forAFWandSAFW.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7/62.[CTS14.ii-L2]:3.7(230ThisisforthenewproposedConditionEwhichisonholdpendingthefinalresolutionoftheagreeduponformatfortheLCO(s)forAFWandSAFW.Thisisarelaxation,notamorerestrictivechange;so,providejustificationaccordingly.Status:[]Open177-December1995 Response:ConditionEisnotarelaxationsinceCTS3.4.2.1.ballows:(1)bothHDAFVandoneTDAFVflowpathinoperablefor24hours;and(2)oneHDAFVandoneorbothTDAFklflowpathsinoperablefor24hours.Ineithercase,flowfromthepreferredAFhlSystemisunavailabletoonesteamgenerator.ConditionElimitsthisconditionforonly4hours.3.7Q231Status:[]Response:InordertoenterthisnewConditionE,shouldn'ttherebeaverificationthatbothtrainsofSAFWareOPERABLE?OpenThisverificationisnotrequiredbyCTS3.4.2.1.b.Inaddition,theonlymethodofperformingaverificationistoperformanactualpumptestwhichisprobablynotpossiblewithina4hourperiod.TS3.4.2.3'-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheSAFWcross-tiebeavailablewhentheSAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.'Thischangeisrequiredsincetheaccidentanalysescredittheuseofthecross-tieforHELBswithafailureofoneSAFWpump.Eachcross-tiemotoroperatedvalveisconsideredpartoftheSAFWtrainwhichsharesthesameelectricalpowersource.ThisisaGinnaStationTSCategory(v.a)change.[CTS14.iii-Ll]:3.7Q232Status:[]Response:Thisappearstobealessrestrictivechange.Providetheidentificationofthesetofcross-tievalvestowhichthischangeapplies.OpenBydefinition,expandingacurrentTStoincludeadditionalequipment(i.e.,valves)isalessrestrictivechange.Thesecross-tievalvesarecreditedintheaccidentanalysesandarerequiredtobetestedinCTS4.8.5.Theattachedsketchshowstheirlocations.3.7Q233Status:[]Response: 3.7Q234 Status:[]Response:3.7Q235Status:[]Response:iv.AuniqueSRwillberequiredtoverifyperiodicallythesespecificvalvesareassuredtobeopened.OpenITSSR3.7.5.4specificallyaddressesthesecross-tievalves.Arethereanypressureisolationconcernsifthese.valvesremainopenintheSAFWduringallexpectedoperationmodes?OpenThesecross-tievalvesarenormallyclosedtomaintaintrainindependence.TheyarealsomaintainedclosedtopreventapassivefailureineitherSAFE'rainfromfailingbothtrains.AretheelectricalandmechanicaltraindivisionsuniformwithoutanyoftheSWSystempumpscombinationstobeconcernedabout.OpenTheSAFE!Systemwasdesignedandinstalledinaccordancewithmid-1970requirementsforseparation,etc.EachSAFEpumptrainisfullyredundantanddoesnotrelyontheotherpumptrainforanyaccidentanalysisassumption.TS3.4.3-TherequirementforSWsuctionfortheAFWandSAFWpumpswererelocatedtotheLCOforthesepumps.TheCSTsprovidethe'preferredsourceofcondensatetothepreferredAFWpumpswhilethe-178-December1995 SWSystemisthesafetyrelatedsourceforboththepreferredandstandbyAFWsystems.TherelocationoftheneedforaSWsupplytotheAFWpumpswithintechnicalspecificationsdoesnotreducetherequirement.Instead,thechangeprovidesconsistencywithinthe'ewspecificationsandiseasierforlicensedpersonneltounderstand.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.[CTS14.iv-RI1]:3.7Q236Clarifywhatwasrelocatedtowhere?ForSAFW,isthisActionbofTS3'.3beingtransferredtowhereinLCO3.7.5?ItisnotclearwhatisstatedabovefortherelocationforAFW.Pleaseexplain.Status:[]OpenResponse:CTS3.4.3.alrequirest'eCSTstobeOPERABLE.However,theCSTsdonot,andcannot,supplytheSAFESystemasdiscussedintheresponseto3.7P76.Therefore,theCSTsonlysupplythepreferredAFA'ystemandthisrequirementhasbeenrelocatedtoITSLCO3.7.6.CTS3.,4.3.a2requiresSkffortheSAFESystem.ThisrequirementhasbeenrelocatedtotheLCObasesforITSLCO3.7.5.PleasenotethatSkiisalsorequiredforthepreferredAFh'ystemasitssafetyrelatedsourceandthisisnowarequirementforthissystem'soperabilityperthebasesforITSLCO3.7.5.V.TS3.4.3-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatabackupsourceofcondensatebeverifiedwithin4hourswhentheCSTsareinoperableversusdemonstratingtheoperabilityoftheSWSystem.Specifyingatimelimitforverifying"thebackupcondensatesourceisaconservativechangewhichnowprovidesaclearandconciserequirementforplantoperators.RevisingtheActionstoallowanyalternatesourcetobeusedasabackupsourceprovidesadditionaloperationalflexibilitysinceothercondensatesourcesthantheSWSystemcanbeusedifnecessary.Thesesourcesaredescr'ibedinthebasesfornewLCO3.7.6.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.[CTS14.v-Ll]:3.7Q237Status:[]Response:3.7Q238 Status:[]Response:ThequestionsonITSSl.iineedaddressingandITSSl.ivneedsthereverificationproposedtobedeletedandnotjustifiedabove..OpenSeeresponseto3.7/76through3.7/78and3.7/81.179-December1995Thisisarelaxationtoprovideanalternatecourseofactionbeforedeclaringacomponentinoperable.Providejustificationassuch.OpenCTS3.4.3requiresdemonstrationoftheOPERABILITYoftheSVsupplytothe.preferredAFklSystemwithin7daysiftheCSTsareunavailable.ITSLCO3.7.6requiresverificationofabackupwatersupplywithin4hourswhichisashorterCompletionTimebutmoreflexiblewithrespecttosources.However,thebasesforITSLCO3.7.5requirethatthepreferredAFk!pumpsbecapableoftaking.suctionfromSVwithin10minutes(seeInsert3.7.5.8)forOPERABILITY.Therefore,iftheSMSupplywereunavailabletothepreferredAFMpumps,theywouldbedeclaredinoperableregardlessofthestatusoftheCSTs.ITSLCO3.'7.6RequiredActionA.lcanthusbemetbyusinganadditionalsourceofwaterbeyondtheOPERABLESVsupplyorbyopeningtheShlsupply'itself. 21.TechnicalSpecification3.11TS3.11.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSy'tem(ABVS)beOPERABLEwhenoneormorefuelassembliesin.theAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed(60dayssincebeingirradiated.ThespecificcomponentswhicharerequiredfortheABVStobeconsideredOPERABLEwererelocatedtothebasessimilarwiththestructureofNUREG-1431andtheITSWriter'sGuide.ThebasesforLCO3.7.10nowrequirethatoneofthetwo100%capacityAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans,exhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystem,andallassociatedductwork,valvesanddampersbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,TS3.11.l.cwasrevisedtorequireanegativepressurewithintheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorwithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentinsteadofrequiringalldoors,windows,andotherdirectopeningsbetweentheoperatin9floorareaandtheoutsidetobeclosed.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentasdescribedinthebases:Thischangealsoprovidesamuchclearerspecificationwhichiseasierforlicensedpersonneltoreadandunderstandwithoutanyreductioninactualrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(v.a)changes,respectively.[CTS21.i-RII]:3.7Q239Status:[]Response:Itappearsthatafterirradiatedfuelhasdecayedmorethan60days,ABVSandallcomponentsareturnedoff.ThiswasnottheassumptionoftheimprovedTSperNUREG-1431.Ifirradiatedfuelishandledafter60daysandaFHAoccurs,explaintheneedfortheLCO.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7/156,3.7P157,and3.7160.IwouldalsosuggestthereviewerlookatInserts3.7.10.3and3.7.10.4andwithdrawhislaststatement.3.7Q240Status:[]Response:ItisacceptabletorelocateOPERABILITYrequirementstotheBASES.ClosedN/A3.7Q241TheoperabilityrequirementsofexistingTS3.11.l.athruewillbeverifiedafterthesketchesofthesystemarereceivedasrequestedinITS88.ii,Iteml.Status:[]OpenResponse:Sketchhasbeenprovidedinresponseto3.7/155.[CTS21.i-Hl]:3.7Q242Status:[]Response:Itisacceptabletorequireanegativepressureverificationinlieuofverifyingdoors,dampers,andetc,areclosed.WhereisthisplacedintheLCO?AsnotedearlierinITS88,aSurveillanceRequirement(s)isneeded.OpenThenegativepressurerequirementislocatedinitemcoftheLCObasesforITSLCO3.7.10.Thisisverified,byITSSR3.7.10.1(seebasesandattachedprocedureRF-8.4,step3.10).TS3.11.2-TherequirementtocontinuouslymonitorradiationlevelsintheSFPareawasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.No-180'-December1995 screeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,theSFPradiationlevelsonlyprovideabackupsourcetoaSFPproblem.OtherLCOsprovideadequateverification-ofSFPprimaryindications(i.e.,levelandboronconcentration)whichensurethatallaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremet.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,personnelwouldbestationedwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingandimmediatelyawareofaproblem.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS21.ii-R01]:3.7(243Whichradiationmonitorsareinvolvedhere?Aretheyareontheplantvent,mainauxiliarybuildingexhaustfansorlocalarea.monitors?Status:[]OpenResponse:Themonitorisaconstantairmonitorforparticulate,gasandiodine(seeattachedprocedureRF-8.4,step3.14).Thisisaportablemonitoronly.TS3.11.3and3.11.5-TheheavyloadrestrictionformovementofloadsovertheSFPwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheheavyloadlimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS21.iii-R02]:3.7(244Thisappearsacceptable;but,whatisthetopicoftheWCAP-11618andtheconsistencynotedhere.Status:[]OpenResponse:I/CAP-11618istheapplicationofthecriteria'tothewestinghouseStandardTS(i.e.,NUREG-0452,Revision4).ThiskfCAPwasusedbytheindustryandNRCtocreateNUREG-1431,Revision0.iv.TS3.11.4-TheSFPwatertemperaturelimitwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheSFPwatertemperaturelimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS21.iv-ROl]:3.7(245PleaseprovideacopyofGinna'sscreeningcriteriaforthisexistingTSrequirement.Status:[]OpenResponse:TheSFPwatertemperaturelimitisnotinstalledinstrumentationthatisusedwithrespecttodegradationofthereactorcoolant-181-December1995 pressureboundary.ThislimitisalsonotaninitialconditionofaDBAorpartoftheprimarysuccesspathtomitigateaDBA.TheonlyDBAconsideredwithrespecttotheSFPisafuelhandlingaccident.Thefuelhandlingaccidentonlyconsiderstemperaturewithrespecttomoderatordensitysuchthatlowtemperaturesareconservativelyusedintheanalysis.IfboilingoftheSFPweretooccur,criticalityispreventedbythestoragearrayinplaceandthedesignofthefuel.TheSFPtemperaturealsohasnotbeenshownbyoperatingexperienceorprobabilisticsafetyassessmenttobesignificanttopublichealthandsafety.Therefore,theSFPwatertemperaturelimitdoesnotmeettheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.3.7(246Status:[]Response:ITS92.ii,item3,isrelatedtothisexistingTSrequirement.ThereappearstobeananalysiswhichassumestheinitialSFPtemperaturetobefirst120'Fandthen150'Fbecauseat180'FthestructuralintegrityofthefuelpoolisnotmaintainedasnotedinUFSARSection9.1.3.1.OpenSeeresponseto3.7(194.28.TechnicalSpecification4.1ii.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-2:a.Table4.1-2,86awasrevisedtoextendtheg.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnitiI17wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofSFPboronconcentrationonceevery31dayswhenfuelisstoredintheSFPandthepositionoffuelassemblieswhichweremovedintheSFPhave.notbeenverified.Thecurrentmonthlyrequirement(regardlessofthestatusoftheSFPverification)isnotreflectedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichdoesnotcredittheavailabilityofsolubleboron.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.32)change.[CTS28.ii.g-L1]:3.7(247ThereappearstobeconfusionoverwhatistheboronconcentrationlimitfortheSFP.UFSARSection9.1.2.2.1statesSFPismaintainedatleastata2000ppmconcentration.AppendixFintheproposedCOLRsaysequaltoorgreaterthan300ppm.TheabovejustificationassumesnosolubleboronasdoesexistingTS5.4.2.ExistingTS5.4.6saysSFPconcentrationmatchesthatinthereactorcavity..Withsomanydisagreements,howcanthisbeplacedintheCOLR?Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.79183withrespecttodifferencebetweentheUFSARandAppendixFofthesubmittal.TheSFPconcentrationisonlyrequiredtomatchthereactorcavityboronconcentrationwhenthereactorvesselheadisremovedandfuelmovementisbeingperformedbetweentheSFPandthereactorvessel.Otherwise,theSFPisisolatedfromthereactorcavitybyuseofablindflange.andgatevalve.December1995 ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-2(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):12.SR3.7.11.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthat>23feetofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracksduringfuelmovementintheSFP.Thisverificationisrequiredsincethefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatatleast23feetofwaterisavailablewithrespecttoiodinereleases.[CTS28.ii.i.17-Ml]:3.7(248ItisacceptabletoaddthisSRpendingresolutionofissuesidentifiedinITS90.iii.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7Q181.13.SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2-verificationpriortofuelmovementintheSFPthattheassociatedfuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirementsforstorageintheintendedregion(e.g,enrichmentlimit,burnablepoisonspresent).ThisveriFicationisrequiredtolimittheamountoftimethatafuelassemblycouldbemisloadedintheSFP..[CTS28.ii.i.13-Ml]:3.7(249ItisacceptabletoaddtheseSRspendingresolutionofissuesidentifiedinITS92.ii.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.7Q192through3.7Q195.14.SR3.7.6.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthattheCSTvolumeisz22,500gallons.ThisensuresthattheminimumvolumeofcondensateisavailableforthepreferredAFWSystemfollowinganaccident.[CTS28.ii.i.14-Ml]:3.7(250ItisacceptabletoaddthisSRpendingresolutionoFissuesidentifiedinITS81.ii.Status:[]OpenResponse:See'responsesto3.7Q76through3.7Q78.15.[CTS28.ii.i.15-Ml]:SR3.7.7.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachCCWmanualandpoweroperated'alveintheCCWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCCWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.-183-December1995 3;7(251ItisacceptabletoaddthisSRpendingresolutionofissuesidentifiedinITS82.iii.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.7Q96through3.7Q98.16.SR3.7.7.2-requiresperformanceofacompletecycleofeachCCWmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheRHRheatexchangersinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.ThisensuresthatthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvesarecapableofbeingopenedfollowingaDBA.[CTS28.ii.i.16-Hl]:3.7(252ItisacceptabletoaddthisSRpendingresolutionofissuesidentifiedinITS82.iii.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.7Q96through3.7Q98.17.SR3.7.8.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachSWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveinthe'Wpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.,ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheSWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.[CTS28.ii.i.17-Nl]:3.7(253ItisacceptabletoaddthisSRpendingresolutionofissuesidentifiedinITS83.v.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7Q119through3.7Q125.28.ii.j.m.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnitII12-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRHsinceitdoesnotmeetanyoftherequirementsforinclusionintheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS28.ii.m-ROI]:3.7(254ItisagreedthisfunctionalunitdoesnotmeetTechSpeccriteriaforinclusion;however,hasGinnacompliedwiththerequirementsofGenericLetter86-10?HastheFireProtectionprogrambeenreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCstaff?AfteracceptancethentheelementsofthefireProtectionProgramcanberelocated.Status:[]OpenResponse:ThefireprotectionrequirementshaveallbeenrelocatedfromtheTSbyAmendmentNo.49(seeGinnalicensepage3).n.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit88-TheFrequencyfordetermininggross.specificactivityofthesecondarysystemwasrevisedfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery31days.Inaddition,thedeterminationofI-131wasalsochangedtoonceevery31-184-December1995 daysindependentofthelastactivitylevelsincethecurrentGinnaTSallowupto6monthsbetweentests.ThesechangesareallconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c}change.[CTS28.ii.n-L1]:3.7Q255TheproposedSRforaspecificisotopicanalysisevery31daysisacceptableandthisisatechnicallyequivalenttothenote(3)ofthetable.Status:[]'ClosedResponse:N/A3.7Q256Status:[]Response:TheSRfordetermininggrossspecificactivityisnotinProposedITSLCO3.7.14.Theeliminationofthemorefrequentgrossactivitytestevery72hourshasnotbeenjustifiedasalessrestrictivechangetotheexistingTS.Pleaseprovidethisjustification.OpenRGEEproposestoreviseitemnaboveasfollows:Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit018-ThedeterminationofI-131waschangedtoonceevery31daysindependentofthelastactivitylevelsincethecurrentGinnaTSallowupto6monthsbetweentests.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changeconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thissurveillancewasalsorevisedtorelocatetherequirementtoperformgrossactivitytestsofthesecondarycoolantonceevery72hourstoGinnaprocedureCH-PRI-SCHED(attached).ThissurveillanceismainlyintheCTStoprovideearlyindicationofchangestoI-131equivalentactivitywhichiswhatisevaluatedintheaccidentanalyses.I-131equivalentactivityisdeterminedevery6monthsintheCTSunlessthegrossactivitytestindicatesthatI-131equivalent-activityis>10'fitsallowable"limitatwhichtimethesurveillancechangestomonthly.SinceI-131equivalentactivityisnowtobetestedmonthlyregardlessofitspercentagewithrespecttoallowablelimits,thisearlyindicationofchangesasprovidedbythegrossactivitytestisnolongerrequired..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.32.TechnicalSpecification4.5X11.TS4.5.2.3.9-ThiswasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityoftheCREATSonceevery24months.Thisverificationisnecessarytoensurethatthecontrolroomenvironmentcanbeisolatedintheeventofaradiologicalrelease.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS32.xii-Hl]3.7Q257Status:[]Response:PleaseverifythattheexistingTS4.5.2.3.9wasretainedasisandthisshouldstatethat"AnewSRwasaddedtotesttheautomaticactuationcapabilityofCREATSatrefueling."OpenRGBEproposestoreviseitemxiiaboveasfollows:TS4.5.2.3.9-ThiswasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityofCREATSonceevery24monthsinsteadofmonthly.VerificationofthisinstrumentationonarefuelingoutagebasisinsteadofmonthlyisevaluatedinAttachmentH.Thisisa-185-December1995 GinnaTSCategory(v.b)change.Therequiremerittooperatethesystematleast15monthseverymonthhasbeenretained(ITSSR3.7.9.1).34.TechnicalSpecification4.7TS4.7wasrevisedtoincludeasurveillancetoensurethateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalevery24monthsconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrentGinnaStationTSTable3.5-2whichrequirethattheisolationsignalstotheHSIVsbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,RequiredActionswereprovidedintheeventthattheHSIVscannotcloseasrequiredbythisSurveillance.Theseactionsrequirerestorationof,orclosureofaninoperableHSIV,within24hours.IntheeventthatbothHSIVsareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3.Finally,requirementsforthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalveswereadded.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.ThetesttoensurethateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignaleveryrefuelingoutageisjudgedastechnicallyequivalentandnotmorerestrictive.[CTS34.i-Hl]:3.70258Status:[]Response:TheexistingTS4.7appearstohavebeenclarifiedratherthanrevisedinamorerestrictivemanner.SincenoLCOexisted,Applicabilitywasadded.ProposedSR3.7.2.3isthesameas"TheMSIVsshallbetestedatleasteachrefuelingoutage".OpenProvidingApplicabilitywherenonepreviouslyexistedisamorerestrictivechange.Inaddition,theCTSbasesstatethat.theclosuretimeforthissurveillanceis"consistentwithexpectedresponsetimeforinstrumentation"anddoesnotrequirethistesttobeconductedbyuseofanisolationsignal.Duetothedesignofthesevalves,thistestcouldbedonebyremovingDCcontrolpowertotheirrespectivesolenoidvalvesandensuringthatthe'alvecloseswithin5secondsandstillmeetthissurveillance.However,currentGinnapracticeistoperformthetestbyuseofthemanualcontrolsinthecontrolroom.[CTS34.i-Ll]:3.70259'tatus:[]Response:TheexistingTS4.7,MainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)coversonlytestingrequirementsanddoesnothaveacorrespondingLimitingConditionofOperationforHSIVs.Table3.5-2requiredHSIVoperability"asopenabove350'FT,,".TheimprovedTS3.7.2wasaddedtolimittheoperabilityoftheHSIVstojustMODES1,2,and3.NewConditionswithlessrestrictiveRequiredActionswereaddedtoprecludeanimmediateshutdownifaMSIVbecameinoperable.Providejustificationsfortheserelaxations.OpenCTSTable3.5-2relatestotheinstrumentationtotheP1SIVsonly,nottotheactualvalves(i.e.,theinstrumentationtothevalvecouldbeOPERABLEwhilethevalvecou.ldnotbeabletophysically'lose).Therefore,theCTSdonotcurrentlyhaveanyNSIVrequirementsexceptforinstrumentationandthesurveillancediscussedabove.-186-December1995 [CTS34.i-L2]:3.7Q260Status:[]Response:SeequestionsconcerningtheadditionofthesenewvalvesinITS77.viii.TheexistingTS4.7waschangedtoaddnewLimitingConditionsofOperationforthe"Non-ReturnCheckValves".TheimprovedTS3.7.2wasfurthermodifiedtoaddnewConditionswithlessrestrictiverequiredactionstoprecludeanimmediateshutdownifthemainsteamheaderisnonisolablewiththeNon-ReturnCheckValvesbecominginoperable.Providejustificationsfortheserelaxations.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q33through3.7q36.Also,sincetheCTShavenorequirementsforOPERABILITYofthesenon-returncheckvalves,thereisnorelaxationwithrespecttotheCTS.35.TechnicalSpecification4.8TS4.8.1and4.8.2-TheFrequencyoftheAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASHE,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.[CTS35.i-Ll3.7Q261Status:[]Response:3.7Q262Status:[]Response:3.7Q263Status:[]Response:andL2]:Thisjustificationonlydealswiththerelocationoftestrequirements.TherelaxationforthetestintervalsinTS4.8.1and4.8.2haveneverbeenjustified.OpenTheISTprogramcurrentlyrequiresquarterlytestsontheAFV'andSAFEpumpsandvalvessuchthatthisisactuallyalessrestrictivechangefollowingimplementation.ThejustificationforthischangeisthatASNEtestingrequirementsonlyspecifyquarterlytestsofpumpsandvalvesasbeingadequateto'emonstratecontinuedcomponentOPERABILITY;TheNRChasgenericallyapprovedthesetestingfrequenciesvia10CFR50.55aandapprovaloftheGinnaStationISTProgram.SeealsochangeD.80.x.Thisisviewedasamajorrelaxationtothetestfrequencyofthemotor-drivenandturbine-drivenAFWpumps.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q261.TheissuesofrelocationwillnotbedealtwithuntilthisrelaxationiffirstacceptablebytheNRCtechnicalstaff.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q261.TS4.8.3-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheAFWsuctionanddischargevalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,thecross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalveswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethesevalves187-December1995 arenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses(seebasesfornewLCO3.7.5).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.b.39)changes,respectively.[CTS35.ii-L1]:3.7Q264Status:[]Response:3.7Q265Status:[]Response:3.7Q266Status:[]Response:ThereisnojustificationforchangingthetestintervalsfrommonthlyperTS4.8.3toinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.Pleaseprovide.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.I'nITS80.iandITS80.iii,issuespertainingtothischangeneedtoberesolvedconcurrently.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7Q62through3.7Q64and3.7Q66through3.7Q68.Theissuesofrelocationwillnotbedealtwithuntilthisrelaxationiffirstaccepted.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.TS4.8.4-TheFrequencyoftheSAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASHE,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwith.NUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinna.TSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.[CTS35.iii-Ll]:3.7Q267Thisjustificationonlydealswiththerelocationoftestrequirements.TherelaxationforthetestintervalinTS4.8:4hasneverbeenjustified.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponseto3.7Q261.3.7Q268Status:[]Response:3.7Q269Status:[]Response:iv.ThisisviewedasamajorrelaxationtothetestfrequencyoftheSAFWpumps.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.TheissuesofrelocationwillnotbedealtwithuntilthisrelaxationiffirstacceptablebytheNRCtechnicalstaff.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.TS4.8.5-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheSAFWsuction,discharge,andcross-overvalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivitiesconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS35.iv-Ll]:-188-December1995 3.7Q270Status:[]Response:3.7Q271Status:[]Response: 3.7(272 Status:[]Response:V.ThereisnojustificationforchangingthetestintervalsfrommonthlyperTS4.8.5toinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.Pleaseprovide.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.InITS80.iandITS80.iii,issuespertainingtothischangeneedtoberesolvedconcurrently.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7Q62through3.7Q64and3.7Q66through3.7Q68.Theissuesofrelocationwillnotbedealtwithuntilthisrelaxationiffirstaccepted.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.TS4.8.6-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheacceptancecriteriafortheAFWandSAFWteststotheactualproceduresperformingthesetests.ThenewbasesidentifywhatisrequiredforOPERABILITYoftheAFWandSAFWSystemssuchthatspecifyingthisacceptancecriteriaisunnecessary.Inaddition,boththebasesandtestproceduresarecontrolledunder10CFR50.59.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.[CTS35.v-RIl]:3.7(273Status:[]Response:3.7(274Status:[']Response:vl.ItisacceptabletorelocatethedetailsofthesetestingprocedurestotheBASES.Pleaseidentifywherethisislocated.OpenTheacceptancecriteriaforthesetestshavebeenrelocatedtothefollowingprocedures:PT-16Q-A,PT-16Q-B,PT-16Q-T,PT-36Q-C,andPT-36Q-D.Theapplicablepagesoftheseproceduresareattached.Thedeletedtextinthelastsentence.isnotacceptablewiththisjustification.ThisonholdpendingtheresolutionoftheissuesinCTS35.iandCTS35.iii.OpenSeeresponseto3.7Q261.TS4.8-AnewSurveillancewasaddedrequiringverificationevery31daysofthecorrectpositionofeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperatedandautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredinposition.Thisverificationisrequiredtoensurethatthe,AFWandSAFWSystemsareOPERABLEwhennotinservice.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.[CTS35.vi-Hl]:3.7(275ItisacceptabletoaddthisnewSR3.7.5.1.Status:[]ClosedResponse:N/A38.TechnicalSpecification4.11TS4.11.l.l.d-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisverificationisnotrequiredtoensurethatinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesarestillmet.TheSFPCharcoalAbsorber-189-December1995 Systemdoesnotutilizeheaters.ThebasesforSR3.7.13.1statethatoperatingtheventilationsystemfor~15minutesevery31daysforsystemswithoutheatersistoensuresystem,operation.InaccordancewithnewLCO3.7.10(NUREG-1431LCO3.7.13),theABVSisrequiredtobeinoperationduringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Assuch,theABVSisnotastandbysystematGinnaStation(i.e.,thesystemmustbebothOPERABLEandinoperationduringitsMODEofApplicability).Therefore,amonthlyverificationprovidesnoverificationofanyaccidentanalysisassumption.Instead,anewSurveillancewasaddedwhichrequiresverificationevery24hoursthattheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorlevelisatanegativepressurewithrespecttotheoutsideenvironment.Thisverificationisconsistentwithplantpracticesandensuresthataninitialassumptionofthefuelhandlingaccidentisbeingmaintained.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithReference55.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.[CTS38.iii-Ll]:3.70276Status:[]Response:3.7(277,Status:[]Response:Explainthefilterbankjustification.Performingtheverificationprovidesassurancethefilterbankisoperationalifcalledupontooperate.WhiletheABVSisbeingoperated,thisSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemappearscapableofbeingputintoabypassorstandbyandnevercheckedifitwerenotforexistingTS4.ll.l.d.OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q154and3.7q156.WhyaretheAuxiliaryBuildingCharcoalFiltersnottestedalso?OpenSeeresponsesto3.7q154and3.7q156.66.NewRequirements(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)Changes)LCO3.7.3andtheassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedfortheHFWpumpdischargevalves(MFPDVs),MFWregulatingvalves,andtheassociatedbypassvalves.Thisnewrequirementspecifiesanisolationtimeof80secondsfortheMFPDVsand10secondsfortheremainingvalvesandrequiresthemtobeOPERABLEaboveMODE4toprovideisolationcapabilityasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.[CTS66.ii-Hl]:3.7(278ItisacceptabletoaddthisLCOpendingresolutionoftheissuesraisedinITS78.Status:[]OpenResponse:Seeresponsesto3.7q39through3.7q51.LCO3.7.4andtheassociatedsurveillancewereaddedfortheatmosphericreliefvalves(ARVs).TheLCOrequiresthattheARVsbeOPERABLEwhenRCSaveragetemperatureis>500'FinMODE3toprovidecooldowncapabilityfollowingaSGTReventasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ASurveillancetoverifythateachARViscapableofopeningandclosingonceevery24monthswasalsoadded.[CTS66.iii-Ml]:~~3.7(279ItisacceptabletoaddthisLCOpendingresolutionoftheissuesraisedinITS79.-190-December1995 Status:[]Response:iv.OpenSeeresponses3.7q52through3.7P61.ACOLRwasdevelopedwhichcontains'heactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedwithreactorphysicparametersthatmaychangewitheachrefueling.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,GenericLetter88-16(Ref.56)allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationCOLRisprovidedinAttachmentF.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtotheCOLR:a~b.C.d.e.f.g.h.1~j~k.l.m.SHUTDOWNMARGINMODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsHeatFluxHotChannelFactorNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactorAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEOvertemperatureaTandOverpoweraTTripSetpointsRCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsAccumulatorBoronConcentrationRWSTBoronConcentrationSpentFuelPoolBoronConcentrationRefuelingBoronConcentration[CTS66.iv.l3.7Q280Status:[]Response:3.7Q281Status':[]Response:Section3.83.8Q1-Response:-Ll]:ThisisarelaxationforSpentFuelPoolboronconcentrationwhichhasnotbeenjustifiedassuchhere.OpenTheSFPboronconcentrationlimitisnotintheCTSsuchthatthereisnorelaxationwithrespecttotheCTS.Also,thevaluetobeintheCOLRisindispute.PleaseseeCTS28.ii.gandITS91.ii.OpenSeeresponseto3.7q183and3.7q247.TSTheCTS3.0.2exclusionfortheOPERABILITYofasystem,subsystem,train,component,ordevicewhenoneofitspowersourcesisinoperableiscarriedovertoITSLCO3.8.1.Thejustificationforchangingtheallowableoutagetimefromthecurrent1hourtotheproposed12hoursisitsconsistencywithNUREG-1431.Thisisnotenoughjustificationfor'thislessrestrictivechange.Providejustificationforthischangebasedonplant-specificdesigncapabilities.CTS3.0.2providesanexclusionfordeclaringacomponentinoperableifitsoffsitepowersourceordieselgenerator(DG)sourceisinoperableprovidedthattwoconditionsaremet.Theseconditionsarethat:(1)eitherthecorrespondingoffsitesourceorDGremainsOPERABLE,and(2)theredundantcomponentremainsOPERABLEwith-191-December1995 eitheritsassociatedoffsitepowerorDGsourceOPERABLE.Ifeitheroftheseconditionsarenotmetforgreaterthan1hour,thentheplantmustinitiateshutdownactions.ThisrequirementwasrelocatedtoITSLCO3.8.1.ConditionAofLCO3.8.1appliesifanoffsitepowersourceisunavailabletooneormore480Vsafeguardsbuses.RequiredActionA.lstatesthatifanyfeaturesonanunaffectedbusaredeclaredinoperableatthetimeof,orfollowing,thelossofoffsitepower,thentheredundantcomponentonthe480Vbuswhichhaslostoffsitepowermustbedeclaredinoperablewithin12hours.TheNUREG-1431basesstateaCompletionTimeof12hoursisacceptablesinceitallowstheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.RGEEagreeswiththisbasis.Inordertoloseasafetyfunctioninthisinstance,eithertheDGtothe480Vbuswhichhaslostoffsitepowermustalsobeinoperableortheredundantcomponentontheaffectedbusmustfail.Theprobabilityofeithereventoccurringin12hoursisverylow,especiallycoincidentwithanaccident.However,iftheDGortheredundantcomponentweredeclaredinoperable,thenthesafetyfunctiondeterminationprogramwouldrequireimmediateentryintoLCO3.0.3.ItshouldbenotedthattheDGistheassumedsourceofpowerintheaccidentanalysesandnotoffsitepower(exceptforcaseswheretheavailabilityofoffsitepoweristheworstcase).Therefore,inConditionA,eventhough12hoursisallowedbeforedeclaringacomponentinoperableduestrictlytoitsoffsitepowersourcebeinglost,thesafetyrelatedsourceofpowertothatcomponentremainsavailable.'onditionBofLCO3.8.1appliesifaDGisunavailable.RequiredActionB.2statesthatifanyfeaturesonanunaffectedbusaredeclaredinoperableatthetimeof,orfollowing,thelossoftheDG,thentheredundantcomponentonthe480VbuswhichhaslosttheDGmustbedeclaredinoperablewithin4hours.TheNUREG-1431basesstateaCompletionTimeof4hoursisacceptablesinceitallowstheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.RGEEagreeswiththisbasis.Inordertolose'safetyfunctioninthisinstance,eithertheoffsitepowersourcetothe.480VbuswithaninoperableDGmustfailortheredundantcomponentontheaffectedbusmustfail.Theprobabilityofeithereventoccurringin4hoursis'verylow,especiallycoincidentwithanaccident.However,ifoffsitepowerwerelostortheredundantcomponentdeclaredinoperable,thenthesafetyfunctiondeterminationprogramwouldrequireimmediateentryintoLCO3.0.3.ItshouldbenotedthatGinnaStationhastwoavailablesourcesofoffsitepower,includingbackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerwhichdecreasesthepotentialforthisscenario.ConditionCofLCO3.8.1appliesifnooffsitepowerisavailabletooneormore480VsafeguardsbusesandoneDGisdeclaredinoperable.IfoffsitepowerandaDGwerelosttothesamebus,theassociatedcomponentswouldallbedeclaredinoperable.Ifseparatebuseswereaffected,bothConditionsAandBwouldbeenteredwhichessentiallyallowseither4or12hoursinthisconfigurationwithaninoperablecomponent.Theuseof4or12December1995 3.8Q2-Response:3.8Q3-Response:hoursversus1hourisconsideredacceptableduetothelowprobabilityoftheeventoccurringasdiscussedabove.TheCTS3.7.2.2.ctimeto.reenergizesafety-related480-Vacbuses'4,16,17,or18is1hour.TheITSLCO3.8.9,ConditionA,completiontimeis8hourstorestoretheACelectricalpowerdistributionsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.Thejustificationgiven,D.17.v,statesthat8hoursisconsistentwiththeITS.ItisnotclearhowconsistencywiththeITSmakesthisITScompletiontimeacceptable.Justifytheproposedcompletiontimebasedonplant-specificdesigncapabilities.Th'eNUREG-1431basesforLCO3.8.9,RequiredActionA.lstatethatan8hourCompletionTimetorestoretheACelectricalpowerdistributionsystemtraintoOPERABLEstatusisacceptablebecause:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyiftheplantoperator',sattentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessarytorestorepowertotheaffectedtrain;andb.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentinthetrainwithACpower.RGEEagreeswiththisbasissincetheoperatorsshouldbeprovidedwitheveryopportunitytorestoretheinoperableACelectricaltrainbeforerequiringaplantshutdownwithonlyonetrainavailable.Also,duringthe8hourCompletionTime,theredundantelectricaltrainremainscapableofperformingitssafetyrelatedfunction.Theprobabilityofanaccidentwithinthis8hoursisverylow.Inaddition,itshouldbenotedthatCTS3.7.2.2.conlyappliestothe480Vsafeguardsbusesandnottothemotorcontrolcen'ters(NCCs)anddistributionpanelssuppliedbythesebuses(i.e.,thereisnoCTSrequirementforanACelectricaldistributiontrain).Consequently,ifaMCC(assuppliedbyanyofthefour480Vsafeguardsbuses)weredeclaredinoperable,GinnaStationcouldcurrentlyentertheLCOsofthecomponentssuppliedbytheNCCwhichgenerallyhaveCompletionTimesof72hoursorgreater.Therefore,applyingI'TSLCO3.8.9withrespecttotheNCCsisamorerestrictivechange.TheCTS3.7.2.2.dtimetoachievecoldshutdownis36hourswithbothoffsstesourcesinoperable.TheITSLCO3.8.1,ConditionD,CompletionTimetoattainMode5(coldshutdown)is36hoursfromenteringConditionD,thatis,theRequiredActionandCompletionTimeofConditionA,nooffsitepowertooneormore480-Vacsafeguardsbuses,isnotmet.ConditionA,withtwocompletiontimes(12hours[ifconcurrentwithinoperableredundantrequiredsafetyfeatures]and72hourstorestoretheoffsitecircuittoOperablestatus)resultsinatotaltimetoachieveMode5of48hoursor82hours.Thisincreaseintheallowedtimetoreachcold'hutdownwasnotjustified.Discussthischangeandprovidejustificationappropriatetothechange.CTS3.7.2.2.dappliesifbothoffsitepowersourcesareinoperableabovecoldshutdown.Thisspecificationstatesthatoneoffsite-193-December1995

powersourcemustberestoredwithin72hours.Ifthisisnotachieved,thentheplantmustbebroughttoatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdown(i.e.,NODE5)withinthefollowing30hours.Therefore,thetimetoachieveNODE5isatmost108hoursfromthetimeinwhichbothoffsitepowersourceswerediscoveredinoperable(i.e.,72hours+6hours+30hours).ThisisthesametimeasproposedinITS.Thatis,ConditionArequiresrestorationoftheoffsitepowersourcewithin72hours.Ifthisisnotachieved,thenConditionDrequiresthattheplantbeinNODE3within6hoursandNODE5within36hours.ThetimetoachieveNODE5istherefore72hours+36hoursor108hours.Consequently,thereisnodifferencebetweentheCTSandITS.3.8Q4-Response:Itappearsthatthe"or"inCTS3.7.2.2.dappearstobethesourceofconfusion.This"or"beginsattheendofthe72hourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneoffsitepowersourceandnotfromthetimeatwhichtheConditionisentered(i.e.,bothoffsitepowersourcesarediscovered.inoperable).ItisrecognizedthattheITSwouldconsiderthis"or"tobeineffectatthetimeofenteringtheConditionwhichisnothowtheCTSareimplementedorused.TheCTS3.7.2.2.ftimetoachievecoldshutdownis36hourswithaninoperableinverter.TheITSLCO3.8.1,ConditionC,CompletionTimetoattainMode5(coldshutdown)is36hoursfromthetimeConditionCisentered,thatis,theRequiredActionandCompletionTimeofConditionA,oneinverterinoperable,isnotmet.ConditionA,withthreecompletiontimes(2hours,24hours,and72hourstorestoretheinverter)resultsinatotaltimetoachieveMode5of38hours,60hours,or108hours,respectively.Thisincreaseintheallowedtimetoreachcoldshutdownwasnotjustified.Discussthischange,theequivalencyofthe'ITSConditionCActionsandCompletionTimestotheCTS3.7.2.2.f("OTHERWISE"impliesachoicetoimmediatelypursuecoldshutdown)andprovidejustificationappropriatetothechange.CTS3.7.2.2.fstates'thatwitheitherInstrumentBusAorCnotenergizedfromitsassociatedinverter,theplantmustre-energizethebuswithin2hoursandre-energizetheinstrumentbusfromasafety-relatedsupplywithin24hoursandre-energizethebusfromitsassociatedinverterwithin72hours.The"otherwise"statementwhichfollowstheserequiredactionsmeansthatifanyoftheserequiredactionsarenotmet,thentheplantmustbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.The"otherwise"statementdoesnotmeantoimmediatelypursuecoldshutdownuponenteringtheCondition.Thisisalwaysanoptionavailableforplantoperatorsbutifthe"otherwise"statementwereinterpretedto~reuirethisshutdownpath,whatwouldbetherequiredactionifCTS3.7.2.2.f.l,3.7.2.2.f.2or3.7.2.2.f.3werenotmet?ITSLCO3.8.7ConditionAprovidesthesameRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesasCTS3.7.2.2.f.l,3.7.2.2.f.2or3.7.2.2.f.3whileConditionCprovidesthesameRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesasCTS3.8.2.2.f.4.Therefore,thereisnodifferencebetween-194-December1995

theCTSandITS.3.895-Response:TheCTS3.7.2.2.gtimetoachievecoldshutdownis36hourswiththeconstantvoltagetransformerinoperable.TheITSLCO3.8.1,ConditionB,CompletionTimetoattainMode5(coldshutdown)is36hoursfromthetimeConditionBisentered,thatis,theRequiredActionandCompletionTimeofConditionA,theconstantvoltagetransformerbecomesinoperable,isnotmet.ConditionA,withtwocompletiontimes(2hoursand7daystorestorethetransformer)resultsinatotaltimetoachieveMode5of38hoursor8-jdays,respectively.Thisincreaseintheallowedtimetoreachcoldshutdownwasnotjustified.Discussthischange,theequivalencyoftheITSConditionBActionsandCompletionTimestotheCTS3.7.2.2.g("OTHERWISE"impliesachoicetoimmediatelypursuecoldshutdown)andprovidejustificationappropriatetothechange.CTS3.7.2.2.gstatesthatwithInstrumentBusBnotenergizedfrom'tsassociatedinverter,theplantmustre-energizethebuswithin2hoursandre-energizetheinstrumentbusfromitsassociatedinverterwithin7days.The"otherwise"statementwhichfollowstheserequiredactionsmeansthat'ifanyoftheserequiredactionsarenotmet,thentheplantmust'beinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.The"otherwise"statementdoesnotmeantoimmediatelypursuecoldshutdownuponenteringtheCondition.Thisisalwaysan.optionavailableforplantoperatorsbutifthe"otherwise"statementwereinterpretedto~reuirethisshutdownpath,whatwouldbetherequiredactionifCTS3.7.2.2.g.lor3.7.2.2.g.2werenotmet?ITSLCO3.8.7.ConditionBprovidesthesameRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesasCTS3.7.2.2.g.land3.7.2.2.g.2whileConditionCprovidesthesameRequiredActionsandCompletionTimesasCTS3.8.2.2.g.3.Therefore,thereisnodifferencebetweentheCTSandITS.3.806-Response:TheITSchangestheCTS18-monthintervalfordieselgeneratorinspection(4.6.l.e.1),dieselgeneratorloadrejectiontesting(4.6.l.e.2),anddieselgeneratorsimulated'lossofpowerwithconcurrentsafetyinjectiontesting(4.6.I.e.3)toafrequencyof24-months.intheITS.Givejustificationthatshowstheincreaseinthisintervalwillnotlowerdieselgeneratorperformanceandits,abilitytomeetdesignrequirements.Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,theDGinspectionasrequiredbyCTS4.6.1.e.lisbeingrelocatedtotheTRH(seechangeC.33.iv'npage240ofAttachmentA).*RGBEisparticipatinginaprogramtodevelopperformancebaseddieselgeneratorinspectioncriteriainsteadofthecurrenttimedirectedinspection.ThisprogramisbeingdevelopedwiththefullsupportoftheDGvendor(Coltec-FairbanksHorse/ALCO)andsixotherparticipatingutilities.Assuch,RG8Ebelievesthatthe.DGinspectionfrequencyisbestcontrolledoutsideofthetechnicalspecificationsrelativetotheactualperformanceoftheDG.IftheDGperformancewouldrequiremorefrequentinspectionsthanonceevery24months,RG8Ewouldpursuethenecessaryactionsrequiredby-195-December1995 thisperformancebasedprogramtorestoreDGperformance.Second,therecordsrelatedtoperformanceofthedieselgeneratorloadrejectiontesting(CTS4.6.1.e.2)havebeenreviewedwithnofailuresobservedsincethistestwasfirstperformedin1969.Philethistesthashistoricallybeenperformedonanannualbasisdueto12monthrefuelingcycles,RGBEhasnotfoundanyhistoricalinformationwhichwouldrefuteanincreasedsurveillanceintervalof24months.IfDGloadrejectionperformanceweretodeclinefollowingthechangeto24months,thenecessaryactionswouldbeimplementedviatheprogramdiscussedinthefirstsectionaboveorviaimplementationoftheMaintenanceRulewhichisrequiredbyJune1996.Third,therecordsforthedieselgeneratorlossofpowerwithconcurrentSItest(CTS4.6.1.e.3)havebeenreviewedforthepastllyears(i.e.,1985-1995).Thesetestsarecurrentlyconductedannuallywithonlytworelayfailuresobservedduringthistimeframeasdiscussedbelow:3.8Q7-Response:a.In1994,thebreakerforthenon-essentialboricacidevaporatorfailedtocompletelytripduringthetestandwasdamaged.TheassociatedDGsuccessfullystartedandtheloadwassubsequentlyrelocatedtoanon-DGsuppliedbus.b.In1995,theMCCCloadshedrelayinitiallyshedallnon-essentialloadsbutthenbeganto"chatter"suchthatcertainloadscouldhavebecomereconnected.Engineeringanalysesdemonstratedthatevenassumingworstcaseconditions,theloadshedrelayfailurewouldnothavepreventedtheassociatedDGfromperformingitssafetyrelatedfunction.Therefore,allthefailuresobservedduringthis11yearperiodwouldnothavepreventedtheDGfromperformingitsrequiredfunction.RG&Ehasalsoimplementedareliabilitycenteredmaintenanceprogramwhichincludestrendingandrootcauseevaluationofequipmentfailures.ThenewMaintenanceRulerequiressimilarprogramstoensurethecontinuedreliabilityofthedieselgenerators.Theseprogramswil'lensurecontinuedDGreliability.CTS4.6.l.e.3(b)requiresthedieselgeneratortooperate"loadedwithemergencyloads"for~5minutes.ITSSR3.8.1.9requiresthedieselgeneratortooperate.for~5minutes,withnospecificationonloadinglevels.DiscusstheomissionofspecifyingtheloadingofthedieselgeneratorinthisITSSurveillance.Documentthemechanismthatcontrolsthedieselgeneratorloadingforthistest.ThefirstpartofCTS4.6.l.e.3(b)statesthattheDGmustautostartandenergize"theautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloads."ThisisfollowedlaterbyarequirementtooperatetheDG"loadedwithemergencyloads"foro.5minutes.TheITSSR3.8.1.9requiresthatDGautostartandenergize"automaticallyconnectedemergencyloadsandoperatefor~5minutes."TheonlydifferencebetweenthetwopartsofCTS4.6.1.e.3(b)(andtheCTSandITS)isthatthefirstpartrequires"automaticallyconnectedemergencyloads"whiletheDecember1995 3.898-secondpartonlyspecifies"emergencyloads."RG&Edoesnotbelievetheretobeadifferencebetweenthesestatements;however,evenifitwereassumedtobeadifference,thentheuseof"automaticallyconnectedemergencyloads"isconservative.UFSARTable8.3-2listsallemergencyloadssuppliedbytheDG.Thistableisorganizedintothreecategories:(1)loadsduringtheinjectionphase,(2)loadsduringthehigh-headrecirculationphase,and(3)loadsduringthelow-headrecirculationphase.Theloadsspecifiedduringtheinjectionphaseareautomaticallyloadedwhiletheloadsduringthetworecirculationphasesmaybeeitherautomaticallyormanuallyloaded.Ascanbeseenfromthistable,thereisneveraninstanceinwhichallpossibleemergencyloadsarebeingsuppliedbytheDGs.However,theloadsduringtherecirculationphasesaresignificantlylessthanthoseduringtheinjectionphasewheretheequipmentisautomaticallyloaded.Consequently,RGEEconsidersthewordingofSR3.8.1.9tobeappropriate.IThisresponsewaslaterrevisedbasedonmeetingstheweekof11/13/95.Seecommentii212.)h'ithrespecttocontrollingDGloading,procedureRSSP2.2,DieselGeneratorLoadandSafeguardSequenceTest,generatesalossofoffsitepowerandSIsignalforeachDGandverifiesthattheDGstartswithin10secondsandthatallautomaticloadsaresequencedwithinacceptabletimelimits.ThisissupplementedbySR3.8.1.3whichrequiresamonthlydieselgeneratorloadtestatmaximumexpectedloads.CTS4.6.l.e.4,"Thistestmayalsoservetoconcurrentlymet.therequirementsof4.6.l.aandb"(coldshutdownandrefueling,andexceptforcoldshutdownandrefueling,respectively)isrelocatedtoNote1ofITSSR3.8.1.2,"PerformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSR."Discusshowthisappliesduringcoldshutdownandrefueling,includingITSSR3.8.2.1,"forACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE."Showtheequivalenceduringcoldshutdownandrefueling.Discussandjustifyanydifferences.Response:ITSSR3.8.2.1statesthefollowing:ForACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRsareappl'icable:SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.1.5ForaDGwhichisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6(i.e.,CTScoldshutdownandrefueling),ITSSR3.8.1:2musthavebeenperformedwithinthelast31days.However,ITSSR3.8.1.2hasaNotewhichstatesthat"PerformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSR."Consequently,ifITSSR3.8.1.9hasbeenperformedwithinthelast31days,thenITSSR3.8.1.2isconsideredmetandITSSR3.8.2.1isalsoconsideredmetwithrespecttothissurveillance.RGEEdoesnotbelievethisisanydifferentthanCTS4.6.l.e.4whichessentiallystatesthattherefuelingoutagebasedDGtestmeetstherequirementsofthemonthlyDGtestduringcoldshutdownandrefueling(CTS4.6.1.a)andthemonthlyDGtestabovecoldshutdownandrefueling(CTS4.6.1.b).-197-December1995 3.8Q9-Response:TheCTS4.6.2.crequirementtotrendbatterytestdataisdeleted.JustificationD.33.xstatesthetrendingis"performedtomeetthefrequencyrequirementsofSR3.8.6.2andSR3.8.4.3."Explainhowthetrendingappliestothesesurveillances.Describethetrendingprogramanditsassociatedcontrols.Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,SR3.8.6.2requiresverificationthatbatterycellparametersaremetevery92days.Thesebatterycellparametersprovideactualacceptancecriteria.forbatteryOPERABILITYwhichifnotmet,havespecificRequiredActionstobeperformed.However,thebatterycellparameterlimitsalsoprovidemargintotheabsoluteOPERABILITYlimitsperIEEEStd450-1987whichstatesthatthelimitsandcorrectiveactionsaremeanttoprovide"optimumlifeofthebattery."Forexample,abattery'selectrolytelevelisnotacriticalissueunlesstheplatesareindangerofbeingexposed.Requiringtheelectrolyteleveltobegreaterthantheminimumwaterlevelindicationmarkonthebatterycellprovidesmargintoexposingtheplates.'herefore,itcanbeinferredthatthesebatteryparametersperformthesamefunctionastrendinginthatitensuresthatbatteriesremainattheiroptimumperformance.meanwhile,SR3.8.4.3requiresverificationofbatterycapacityevery60monthsoratanincreasedfrequencyduetodegradation.Inordertomeasuredegradation,trendingmustbeperformed.Consequently,SR3.8.6.2andSR3.8.4.3provideequivalentcontroltoCTS4.6.2.c.3.8Q10-Response:Second,thetrendingprogramconsistsofthefollowing.AfterthemonthlyandquarterlybatterychecksasrequiredbyCTS4.6.2.aand4.6.2.b,theElectricalPNAnalystisrequiredtoreviewthedatabyhissignatureinprocedurePT-11,60CellBatteryBanks"A"8"B"andSpareCells(attached).TheElectricalPP1Analystalsoaddsthetestresultstoadatabaseatwhichpointadatatrendcanbemade.ProcedurePT-11whichrequirestheElectricalPHAnalyst'ssignature,musthaveanevaluationperformedper10CFR50.59foranychange.CTS4.6.2.drequiresabatteryload(performance)testevery12monthswithapossibleextensionof3additionalmonths.ITSSR3.8.4.2requiresabatteryservicetest'every24months.Explainthe-'load'estandthe'service'est.Describeandjustifyanydifferences.Justifytheextendedintervalbetweentests.Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,theonlydifferencebetweena"load"testand"service"testisthename.Otherwise,the,testingrequirementremainsthesame.Asamatter-of-fact,theprocedureswhichimplementCTS4.6.2.daretitled"StationBattery1AServiceTest"(ProcedurePT-10.3)and"StationBattery1BServiceTest"(ProcedurePT-10.2).Thepurposeoftheseproceduresistodemonstratethatabatterywillcarrytheexpectedemergencyloadprofilefor4hourswithoutthebatteryterminal.voltagefallingbelowaspecifiedvalue.Second,thejustificationfortheincreaseinsurveillanceintervalfrom12monthsto24monthsisasfollows.IEEEStandard450-1987,-198-December1995 Section5.3statesthatthebatteryservicetestisrequiredfornuclearapplications;however,notestingintervalisspecified.TheEPRIguidanceforbatteries(NuclearHaintenanceApplicationsCenter,StationaryBatteryHaintenanceGuide,TR-100248,datedDecember1992)specifiesaservicetestfrequencyof"annuallyoreachrefuelingoutage."Areviewofplantrecordssincethecurrentbatterieswereinstalledin1986and1990showsthatneitherbatteryhasfailedthisservicetest.Consequently,RGBEbelievesthissurveillanceintervaltobeacceptable,especiallywiththemonthlyandquarterlyverificationsrequiredbyITSSR3.8.6.1andSR3.8.6.2.3.8QII-Response:CTS4.6.3.a.1confirmsnominalvoltageonthehighsideoftransformers12Aand12BwhereasITSSR3.8.1.1confirms"indicatedpoweravailabilityfortheoffsitecircuittoeachofthe480Vsafeguardsbuses."Explainhowthesesurveillancerequirementsaccomplishthesameobjective.Presentjustificationforanydifferences.Thenominalvoltageonthehighsideoftransformers12Aand12Bisnotanassumptionofanyaccidentanalysis.Inaddition,thepowersuppliedfromthesetransformersis4160VACwhichmustbetransformeddownto480Vbeforeitreachesthefoursafeguardsbuses.Ifsufficientvoltageisnotavailableontransformers12Aand12B,thenthe480VsafeguardsbuseswouldautomaticallytripandrequiretheassociatedDGtostartandsupplythenecessaryloads.Verifyingthatindicatedpowerisavailabletoeach480VsafeguardsbusperSR3.8.1.1ensuresthatanoffsitepowersourceisavailableandcapableofsupplyingaccidentloads.Inaddition,ITSSR3.8;9.1requiresverificationofacceptablevoltageonthe480Vsafeguardsbuses.Verifyingbreakeralignmentsand480Vbusvoltageensuresthattheaccidentassumptionsaremet.Requiringverificationatthehighsideoftransformers12Aand12Bdoesnotensurethatpowerisavailabletothe480Vsafeguardsbusessincebreakers,transformers,andbusesbetweentransformers12Aand12Bandthe480Vbusescouldfail.3.8Q12-Response:CTS4.6.3.a.2verifies4160-Vaccircuitbreakerposition.Either12AXor12BXAND12AYor12BYmustbeopen.ThereferencedITSSR3.8.1.1states"verifycorrectbreakeralignment."Describeandjustifythisrelocationofrequirements(thedetailsofthebreakeralignment).Whatarethecontrolsontherelocatedrequirements?Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,theCTS4.6.3.a.2verificationensuresthatbothoffsitesourcesarenotsupplyingthesame4160Vbus.Ifthisweretohappen,afaultcouldfailbothoffsitepowersources.However,thisscenarioisboundedbyoperationinthe100/0mode(i.e.,oneoffsitepowersourcesupplyingbothbuses)inwhichtheplantcanbackfeedthroughthemaintransformer'sasecondarypowersupply.Second,'heconfigurationofthesebreakersiscontrolledbyprocedure0-6.13,DailySurveillanceLog,AttachmentI,page3of5(attached)whichrequiresverificationofbreakerpositionsonceaday.Thisprocedurerequiresanevaluationper10CFR50.59foranychanges.199-December1995 3.8Q13-Response:CTS4.6.3.a.3verifiesthattiebreakers52/BT16-14and52/BT17-18areopenwhentheRCStemperature>200F.ThereferencedITSSR3.8.9.1confirms"correctbreakeralignment."Describeandjustify'hisrelocationofrequirements(thedetailsofthebreakeralignmentandRCStemperaturelimit).Whatarethecontrolsontherelocatedrequirements?ThetiebreakerpositionisspecifiedintheLCObasessectionforLCO3.8.9whichrequiresthesetwobreakers,and3otherACbreakers,tobeopenedaspartoftheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheassociatedelectricaldistributionsystem(seepageB3.8-81ofAttachmentC).ITSSR3.8.9.1thenverifiesthesecorrectbreakeralignmentsevery7days.Assuch,CTS4.6.3.a.3isnotchangedintheITS,onlythespecificlistingofthetiebreakersisrelocatedtotheBasesundertheBasesControlProgram.RelocationofthislevelofdetailtothebasesisconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichpreventstheneedforTSchangeswhenequipmentidentification,numberschange.Theadditionof3newACbreakersensuresthatindependenceismaintainedbetweenthetwoelectricaldistributiontrains.3.8Q14-Response:ThecompletiontimeforLCO3.8.3,ActionA.1is48hoursinboththeITSandNUREG-1431..Thebasisisa40-hoursupplyofdieselfuelanda7-daysupplyofdieselfuel,respectively.ItisnotapparentthatthetimeisderivedfromthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Justifythe48-hourcompletiontimetorestorea40-hoursupplyofdieselfuel.Note:TheCTSBasisfor3.7.1and3.7.2,page3.7-5,states"deliverieswithin8hours."Thus,itappearsthecompletiontimeforActionA,1,torestorethefueloilleveltowithinlimits,shouldbeabout8hours.TheNVREG-1431CompletionTimeof48hoursforLCO3.8.3,Re'quiredActionA.lwasbasedonacompromisebetweentheindustryandNRCduringthedevelopmentoftheNUREG.Asnotedbythereviewer,NUREG-1431includesarequirementfora7daysupplyofdieselfuelforeachDGwhileCTS4.6.1.b".3(andITSSR3.8.3.1)onlyrequiresa40hoursupply.TheCTSbasesalsostatethat"commercial,oilsuppliesandtruckingfacilitiesexisttoassuredeliverieswithin8hours."Phile8hoursmaybeamoreprudentCompletionTime,RGSEproposesaCompletionTimeof12hourstoensurethatfueloilcanbedelivered.Aratioof12hourstorestorea40hoursupplyisessentiallyequivalenttotheNUREG-1431ratioof48hourstorestorea7daysupply.Comment830hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.3.8Q15-TheBackgroundBasisforITS3.8.4statesthatDCdistributionpanelsAarethenormaldcsupplyforTrainA(Buses14and18anddieselgeneratorA)andtheemergencydcsupplyforTrainB(Buses16and17anddieselgeneratorB)andthatDCdistributionpanels8'rethenormaldcsupplyforTrainB(Buses16and17anddieselgeneratorB)andtheemergencydcsupplyforTrainA(Buses14and18anddieselgeneratorA).Discusshowdivisionalindependenceismaintainedandthesurveillancethatassuresit.-200-December1995 Response:3.8Q16-Response:Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,theissueofdivisionalindependencewasevaluatedbytheNRCduringtheSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)withasafetyevaluationissuedonFebruary21,1981(attached).ThisevaluationacknowledgedthattheDCdistributionsystemdidnotmeetthecurrent-criteriaforindependenceofonsitepow'ersystems.However,intheintegratedsafetyassessmentofallissueswhichdidnotmeetcurrentcriteria,theNRConlyrequiredadministrativecontrolofbreakerandfusestatusasafinalresolution(seeNUREG-0821,section4.2.4).Second,theLCObasesforLCO3.8.9requirethetiebreakerstobeopenedwheninNODES1,2,3,and4(seepageB3.8-81ofAttachmentC).ITSSR3.8.9.1thenverifiesthesecorrectbreakeralignmentsevery7days.ITSSR3.8.4.3,batterycapacity(performancedischarge)test,hasafrequencyof60months(12monthsor24monthsforcertainconditions).ThereisalsoanoteprohibitingthissurveillanceinModes1,2,3,and4.Itisnotedthata24-monthrefuelingintervalisproposed.Whena12monthfrequencyisre'quired(degradedbatteryorthebatteryhasreached85%ofexpectedlifeand<100%ratedcapacity)andtheplantisinMode1,describetheactionsthatresultinthetimelycompletionofthissurveillance.Justifyanydeviationsfromthe12-monthrequirement.Inasimilarmanner,discussthe'0-monthintervalimposedonthe24-monthrefuelingcycle,thatis,theoutagestoperformthetestoccurat24months,48months,and72months,anddonotcorrespondtothe60-monthintervalspecified.WhatistheRGKEmethod,means,androutinetocompletethissurveillancepriorto60months?Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,ifa12monthsurveillanceisrequiredwhichcannotbeperformedinNODES1,2,3,and4,theplantmusteither:(1)shutdowntoperformthetest,'(2)requestenforcementdiscretion,or(3)obtainatechnicalspecificationchange.TheplantcannotcontinuetooperatesinceifITSSR3.8.4.3isnotvalid,thenSR3.0.1requiresdeclaringtheaffectbatteryinoperable.Therefore,therecannotbeanydeviationsfromtheI2monthrequirement.However,itshouldbenotedthatGinnaStationinstallednewbatteriesin1986and1990suchthatthisdegradationimposedsurveillancefrequencyisnotexpectedtobereached.Second,the60monthsurveillanceintervalofITSSR3.8.4.3isbasedon12monthcycles(i.e.,onetestevery5refuelingoutages).Implementationof24monthcycleswouldrequirethissurveillanceonceeveryotherrefuelingoutage(i.e.,at48months).Implementationof18monthcycleswouldrequirethissurveillanceonceeverythirdrefuelingoutage(i.e.,at54months).However,ITSSR3.8.4.3onlyrequiresthatthesurveillancebeperformedatintervalsnottoexceed60months.Itdoesnotrequirethesurveillancetobeperformedatexactly60monthintervals.Inaddition,the60monthFrequencyisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,RG&Edoesnotconsiderthistobeanissue.3.8Q17-DescribewhytheT.S.C.vitalbattery(showninFigureB3.8.4-1)December1995 Response:doesnotneedinclusioninLCO3.8.4,Conditions,Actions,orSurveillance.Otherwise,whyisitincludedintheFigure?TheTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC)vitalbatteryisincludedonthefigure"forinformationonly"toprovideareferenceastohowthisbatterysourcecanbeutilizedifrequired(e.g.,abeyonddesignbasisstationblackoutevent).PlantoperatorsrequestedtheTSCbatterytobeincludedonthefigureforcompletenesssinceitisincludedintheirtrainingmaterial.TheTSCbatteryisnotcreditedinanyaccidentanalysis,andassuch,doesnotrequireanyConditions,Actions,orSurveillances.3.8Q18-FigureB3.8.4-1shows5circuitbreakersthatare"normallyopenwhenT,,>200F."Whereistheassociatedsurveillancethatverifiesthebreakeralignment?IfnotlocatedinLCO3.8.4,DCSources,whynot?IfcontrolledbyLCO3.8.9and3.8.10,describewhythosecontrolsaresuitableinmaintainingtheindependenceofthesources.Response:3.8Q19-Response:Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,thetiebreakersfortheACandDCpowersystemswhichmustbeopenedwheninNODES1,2,3,and4arespecifiedintheLCObasessectionforLCO3.8.9(seepageB3.8-81ofAttachmentC).'TSSR3.8.9.1verifiesthesecorrectbreakeralignmentsevery7days.Second,ofthefivetiebreakersshowninFigureB3.8.4-1whichmustbeopened,onlythetwotiebreakersbetween480VACBuses14and16areidentifiedinthebasesforLCO3.8.9.ThethreetiebreakersrelatedtotheTSCbatteryarenotlistedsincetheTSCbatterycannotbecreditedasabatterysourcewheninNODES1,2,3,and4.Third,theacceptabilityofthecontrolsfortheACandDCdistributionsystemisprovidedinaNRCsafetyevaluationdatedFebruary21,1981(attached).TheACdistributionsystemwasfoundtomeetcurrentrequirementswhiletheDCdistributionsystemisdiscussedintheresponseto3.8q15.DescribewhytheSpecificGravitylimitsofITSFigureB3.8.6-1aredifferentforBatteryAandBatteryB.DescribethevalidityofthelimitspresentedinITSFigureB3.8.6-1.Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,thespecificgravitylimitsforthebatteriesarebasedontheinitialspecific.gravitylimitsfollowinginstallation.ThisisinaccordancewithIEEEStd450-1987whichrequiresanequalizingchargeiftheaveragespecificgravityofa77cellsdropsmorethan10pointsfromthe"averageinstallationvalue"(seeSection4.4.2).Thesubjectbatterieswereinstalledin1986and1990withslightlydifferentoriginallymeasuredspecificgravityva7ues.Consequently,thespecificgravitylimitsaredifferentforthetwobatteries.ItisforthisreasonthatRGBEhasproposedtorelocateNUREG-1431Table3.8.6-1fromtheLCOsinceitcouldpotentiallyrequireatechnicalspecificationchangetoreplaceabatterywiththeexactsamedesign.However,theRGEEproposedfixdoesnotcompletelysolvethisissuesinceITSLCO3.8.6directlyreferencesbasesTableB3.8.6-1.Commenti'asbeenopenedtoaddressthis.-202-December1995 Second,thebasisfortheremainingvaluesofITSFigureB3.8.6-1isasfollows:3.8Q20-Response:a.ElectrolyteLevel-TheproposedwordingisconsistentwithNUREG-1431Table3.8.6-1.IEEEStd450-1987onlyspecifiesaddingwaterifthelowlevellineisreached.Therefore,thiswordingisconsideredacceptable.b.FloatVoltage-Theproposedvalue(2.13V)isconsistentwithNUREG-1431Table3.8.6-1.IEEEStd450-1987requiresanequalizingchargeifanycellisbelow2.13V'(seeSection4.4.3).Therefore,thisvalueisconsideredacceptable.ITSB3.8.7statesthatthelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2andLCO3.3.3.ThebasisforLCO3.3.3tellsoftheaffectedinstrumentationandtheneedtodeclaretheminoperable.However,neitherLCO3.3.2norLCO3.3.3directactionsonthelossofInstrumentBusD.NeitherdoesLCO3.8.7.Describewhythisomissionisacceptable.ClarifywhethertheITSisintendedtocoverthreeorfour120-VacInstrumentBuses.B3.8.9,Background,statesthe"ACInstrumentBuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses."Thus,LCO3.8.9,ConditionB,i'ncludesInstrumentBusD.However,itisnotclearwhetherLCO3.8.7,ConditionD,includesHCCB,thepowersourceforInstrumentBusD.TheITSappearsinconsistentontheapplicationanduseof120-VacInstrumentBusD.ThescopeoftheInstrumentBusrequirementsshouldbeconsistent,thatis,eitherinclude120-VacInstrumentBusDthroughoutordon'tincludeit.Thisconcernmayrequireatelephoneconferencetoclarifyandresolve.Thisresponseisorganizedintoseveralparts.First,InstrumentBusDasshowninITSFigureB3.3.2-1,issuppliedbyanon-dieselgeneratorbackedbus(NCCB).Therefore,uponlossofoffsitepower,thisInstrumentBusisunavailableandisnotincludedinLCOs3.8.7,3.8.9or3.8.10.ThebasesforthesethreeLCOsstatethattheneedforInstrumentBusDisinsteadaddressedinLCOs3.3.2and3.3.3.Inaddition,Table3.8.9.1doesnotlistInstrumentBusDasbeingincludedintheACandDCElectricalPowerDistributionSystems.RGBEbelievesthisprovidessufficientinformationofwhichLCOstoconsiderifInstrumentBusDisunavailable.Second,thereisoneESFASfunction(LCO3.3.2)andtwoPANSfunctions(LCO3.3.3)whicharepartiallysuppliedpowervialInstrumentBusD.Consequently,theavailabilityofInstrumentBusDdirectlyaffectsthesefunction'sOPERABILITY.Ifthisinstrumentbusisinoperable,'thentheaffected.instrumentationmustbedeclaredinoperable.ThisisdiscussedonITSbasespagesB3.3-109(firstparagraph),B3.3-109(lastsentence)andB3.3-120(firstsentence)withrespecttoPANS.SimilarwordingonbasespageB3.3-120shouldalsobeprovidedwithrespecttotheAFVinitiationonlowSGlevel(i.e.,thesameSGleveltransmittersaffectedbythelossofInstrumentBusDinPANSarealsoaffectedinESFAS).-203-December1995 3.8Q21-Response:3.8QISAResponse:Comment031hasbeenopenedtoaddresstheESFASomis'sion.Third,theCTShavenoOPERABILITYrequirementsforInstrumentBusDwhichRGSEbelievesisacceptablesinceitissuppliedbyanon-safetyrelatedpowersource.GinnaStationoperatorsbelievethatthereferencetoLCOs3.3.2and3.3.3inLCOs3.8.7,3.8.9,and3.8.10providesthenecessaryinformationtoensureappropriateactionsaretakenifInstrumentBusDisunavailable.ProvidingrequiredactionswhenonlythreeITSfunctionsareaffectedisunnecessary.Also,surveillancesofInstrumentBusDarenotrequiredsincetheaffectedinstrumentationalreadyhaveappropriatesurveillances.Inaddition,ifInstrumentBusDwerelost,areactortripcouldpotentiallyoccurduetoaffectedcomponents(e.g.,pressurizercontrol).TheITSBasisforSR3.8.9.1andSR3.8.10.1listtherequirementsfortheACInstrumentBuspowerdistributionsubsystemas"between113VACand123VAC."The"requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4.VAC,"andismorerestrictivethanthelimitsontheinstrumentbusvoltage.Describetheuseofthetwincopanelsandjustifywhythetechnicalspecificationsshouldlimitthevoltagemaintainedtheretoavaluemorerestrictivethanthevoltagelimitsonthepowersourcetothepanels.Theinstrumentbusessupplypowertothetwincopanelswhichinturnsupplythesafety-relatedinstrumentloops.Boththetwincopanelsandinstrumentbuseswerepurchasedandinstalledwithanallowedtoleranceof22%voltage.Analyseshavebeenperformedwhichdemonstratethatloadsdirectlysuppliedbytheinstrumentbusescanwithstandtolerancesgreaterthans2%.However,duetoinstrumentsensitivityconcernsrelatedtotheloadssuppliedbythetwincopanels,thesepanelsarelimitedto+2%of118VAC.ThetiebreakersfortheacanddcpowersystemsthatmustbeopeninModes1,2,3,and4arespecificizedintheBasesforLCO3.8.9.ImprovedTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceRequirement3.8.9.1.verifiesthesecorrectbreakeralignmentsevery7days.OfthefivetiebreakersshowninFigureB3.8.4-1thatmustbeopen,onlythetwotiebreakersbetween480-VacBuses14and16areidentifiedinthebasesforLCO3.8.9.ThethreetiebreakersrelatedtotheTechnicalSupportCentervitalbatteryarenotlistedsincetheTechnicalSupportCentervitalbatterycannotbecreditedasabatterysourcewheninMODES1,2,3,and4.DetailwhythesetiebreakersshouldnotbeverifiedopenbytechnicalspecificationinsupportoftheindependencerequiredbyRegulatoryGuide1.75?VerificationoftheTSCvitalbatterytiebreakershasbeenaddedtothebasesofLCO3.8.9.3.8Q21ATheITSBasisforSR3.8.9'.1andSR3.8.10.1listtherequirementsfortheACInstrumentBuspowerdistributionsubsystemas"between113VACand123VAC."The"requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC,"andismorerestrictivethanthelimitsonthe-204-December1995 Response:3.8QA2instrumentbusvoltage.TheinstrumentbusessupplypowertotheTwincopanelswhichinturnsupplythesafety-relatedinstrumentloops.BoththeTwincopanelsandinstrumentbuseswerepurchasedandinstalledwithanallowedtoleranceof+2%voltage.DuetoinstrumentsensitivityconcernsrelatedtotheloadssuppliedbytheTwincopanels,thesepanelsarelimitedto+2%of118-Vac.Byuseofthe+2%limitontheTwincopanels,thatsamelimitiseffectivelyontheacinstrumentbusesalso.Shouldn'ttheBasesbechangedtotheTwinco+2%limit(oranoffset+2%'toaccountforvoltagedropinthedistributionsystem)?Tobediscussedatthemeeting.Supplythenumberof'pilot'ellsfortheCategoryAmeasurementsofSR3.8.6.1.Supplythenumberof'representative'ellsforSR3.8.6.3.Whatisthedifferencebetween'pilot'ellsandthe'representative'ellsaredetermined,assignedandwhethertheyremainassuchthroughoutthelifeofthebattery.Response:Tobediscussedatthemeet'ing.3.8QA1AttachmentA,SectionC,ConversionofNUREG-1431-1431toITS,Item94.vi,onITS3.8.1notesthatNUREG-1431SR3.8.1.8(ITSSR3.8.1.6),SR3.8.1.10(ITS3.8.1.7),andSR3.8.1.13(ITSSR3.8.1.8)wererevisedtorestrictperformanceoftheseSRsinModes3and4.ThedraftITSSR3.8.1.6doesnothavethatrestrictiononperformingtheseSRswhichwouldreducethenumberofavailableacsourcesandcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.CorrectITSSR3'.1.6toincludethisrestriction.Response:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.Section3.9CurrentTS15.viii3.9Q1[CTS15.V111-RI]TS3.5.5andTable3.5-5-TherequirementsforradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationwhichensuresthatthelimitsofTS3.9.1.1and3.9'.1arenotexceededwerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssine'ethemonitoredparametersarenotpartof,theprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableor,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ExplainhowtheITSconformtotheguidanceofgenericletter89-01toincorporateprogrammaticcontrolsforradioactiveeffluentsandradiologicalandenvironmentalmonitoringconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFRPart20,40CFRPart190,and10CFRPart50AppendixI,-205-December1995 Response:3.9(2Response:TheapplicationoftheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaallowsfortherelocationoftheRadiologicalEffluentTechnicalSpecificationsfromtheCTS.ThesechangesareconsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedinGL89-01.TherelocationofrequirementsandsubsequentincorporationofassociatedprogrammaticcontrolsintheITSconformstotheregulatoryrequirementsof10CFRPart20,40CFRPart190,and10CFRPart50,Appendix1'.TheITSChapter5.0,"AdministrativeControls"providestheprogrammaticcontrolsnecessarytoensurethattheprogramsareestablished,implemented,andmaintainedtoprovideconformancewiththeregulatoryrequirements.SubmitanyadditionalinformationrequiredtomeettheguidanceofGL89-01.ProvideamarkupoftheCTSspecifyingwhichdetailsoftheCTSare"toberelocatedtotheODCM,effluentcontrolsprogram,ITSspecification5.5.1orITSspecification5.5.4.TheGL89-01requeststhatthreeitemsbesubmittedinthelicenseamendmentrequest:First,GL89-01requiredthatthe"model"TSbeincluded.TheseTSwerebasedontheStandardTSwhichformedthebasisfortheImprovedStandardTS.AnytechnicalchangefromtheITSisprovidedwithaspecificjustificationintheNaysubmittal;therefore,nofurtherinformationisrequired.Second,GL89-01"requiredthatifchanges(otherthaneditorialchanges)weremadetotheproceduraldetailsrelocatedfromtheCTStotheODCNorEffluentControlsProgram,thenthesechangesweretobeidentifiedinthelicenseamendmentrequest.Therearenochangestotherelocatedproceduraldetails;therefore,nofurtherinformationisrequired.Third,GL89-01requiredconfirmationinthelicenseamendmentrequestthattheODCNwasrevisedandreflectedtherelocatedrequirements.Thiswastoensurethattherelocatedrequirements-couldbeimplementedimmediatelyuponissuanceofthelicenseamendmentrequest.TheGL89-01requiredthata,completeandlegiblecopyoftherevisedODCNbeforwardedwitht'elicenseamendmentrequest.TheGLstatedthattheODCNwasbeingsubmittedforreferencepurposesonlyandthattheNRCStaffwouldnotconcurinorapprovetherevisedODCNdocument.RGSEbelievesthatsubmittaloftheODCNwiththeITSconversionpackageisnotnecessarysincerelocationoftheRadiol'ogicalEffluentTechnicalSpecificationsfromtheCTSwerebasedonutilizingtheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteria.Thereforetherelocationoftheserequirements,aswellasallotherrelocatedrequirementsbeyondthescopeofGL89-01,onlyrequireddenotingtheappropriatelicensingdocumentlocation(suchastheTRN,ODCN,UFSAR,orITSBases).Noreover,theimplementationoftheITSrequiresthatallrelocatedrequirementsbeeffectivelyincorporatedintheirassociatedplantprogramoroperatingproceduresuponissuanceoftheITS.TheCTSweremarkedaddressingRadiologicalEffluentTechnical-206-December1995 3.9Q3Response:SpecificationsaspartofchangesaddressedinChapter5.0.Therefore,nofurtherinformationisrequired.WhatisthemethodofcontrolforapprovingchangestotheeffluentcontrolsprogramafterimplementingITS?ThemethodofcontrolforapprovingchangestotheeffluentcontrolsprogramafterimplementingITSisdescribedinSpecification5.5.1oftheITS.3.9Q4Response:16.xClarifythemeaningofthemarginnotation"shutdownpurgeandminipurgeinNode6,othersareaddressedw/Chapter5.0"ofpage3;5-2asitrelatedtodiscussion15.viii]Theright-handmarginnotationwasintendedtostatethatonlytheshutdownpurgeandmini-purgeinstrumentationwastobeaddressedwithrespectto1'TSChapter3.9whiletheremaininginstrumentationisaddressedinChapter5.0.However,theleft-handmarginshouldnotreferencechange15.viii.Instead,itshouldreferenceanewchange15.ixwhichstates:Therequirementsfortheshutdownpurgeandmini-purgeinstrumentationwere'notaddedtothenewspecific'ationssincethesefunctionsarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses.InMODES1,2,3,and4,onlycontainmentisolationiscreditedwithrespecttoisolatingcontainment.InMODE6,containmentisolationisnotcreditedatall.AttachmentA,SectionD,items15.ii.pand18.iprovideadditionalinformation.Therefore,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Comment¹109hasbeenopenedtocorrecttheAttachmentBmarkupandtoaddtheabovechangetoAttachmentA.I'Thisresponsewas'changedasaresultofthell/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecomment¹221.J[CTS16.x-Al/Ll]TS3.6.l.bandTS3.6.l.c-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityforcontainmentintegritywasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecontainmentintegrityisnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.Thefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysis(UFSAR15.7.3.3)takesnocreditforisolationofthecontainment,containmentintegrity,noreffluentfiltrationpriortorelease.TherequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.BoronconcentrationchangesinNODE6andRequiredActionstosuspendpositivereactivityadditionsisprovidedinnewLCO3.9.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Assumptionsoftheevaluationofthe.fuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment(AttachmentA,Reference49p~3,para.2)statethatTSrequirethatpersonnelandequipmentdoorsareclosed.Furthe'r,theNUREG-1431refuelingoperationscontainmentpenetrationsLCO3.9.4satisfiescriterion3of10CFR50.36.-207-December1995 3.9Q5Response:CurrentTS3.6.I.brequirescontainmentintegritywiththevesselheadremovedunlessboronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm.DiscusshowTS3.6.l.brequirementsareprovidedinrefuelingITSLCO3.9.1.WhatpartofTS3.6.I.bisproposedtoberelocated?ITSLCO3.9.1requiresthattheboronconcentrationoftheRCSshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR(2000ppm)duringNODE6whichisdefinedinITSTable1.1-1asanytime"oneormorereactor,vesselheadclosurebolts(arejlessthanfullytensioned."Therefore,theNODEofApplicabilityforITSLCO3.9.1bounds"whenthereactorheadisremoved"asspecifiedinCTS3.6.l.b.Inaddition,theRequiredActionsintheeventthatboronconcentrationlimitsarenotmetintheITSaretosuspendCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsconsistentwithCTS3.6.1.c.TheseactionseffectivelypreventthetwoaccidentsofconcerninNODE6(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccidentandborondilutionevent).Thecontainmentisolationissueisaddressedintheresponseto3.9q7below.Therefore,theCTS3.6.1.brequirementforboronconcentrationlimitsbeing>200ppmwhenthereactorheadis,removedhasbeenrelocatedtoITSLCO3.9.1.3.9Q6Response:CurrentTS3.6.l.crequirescontainmentintegrityandprohibitsreactivitychangesunlessboronconcentrationlimitsaremet.DiscusshowTS3.6.l.crequirementsareprovidedinITSLCO3.9.1.WhatpartofTS3.6.l.cisproposedtoberelocated?DiscusshowcontainmentintegrityrequirementsofTS3.6.l.ccanbeaddedtotheLCO3.9.4ortoasection3.6TSapplicabilitysinceTS3.6.I.cestablisheslimitsrelatedcontainmentclosurepriortoborationto2000ppm.Seeresponseto3.9P5.Essentially,theRequiredActionsforITSLCO3.9.1requiresuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandposi'tivereactivityadditionswhenevertheboronconcentrationlimitisnotmetinNODE6regardlessofthecontainmentstatus.Therefore,CTS3.6.1.cisbeingrelocatedinitsentiretytoITSLCO3.9.1.I18.TechnicalSpecification3.8[18.i-XX]TS3.8.l.aand3.8.3-Therequirementstoclosecontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelhandlinginthecontainmentwerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincetheseconditionsarenotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.Thefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysis(UFSAR15.7.3.3)takesnocreditforisolationofthecontainmentnoreffluentfiltrationpriortoreleasefromthecontainmentbuilding.Therefore,closureofcontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelhandlinginsidecontainmentisnotrequired.Theclosureofthecontainmentpenetrationswereestablishedtoprovideadditionalmarginforthefuelhandlinganalysisandtoprovideprotectionagainstthepotentialconsequencesofseismiceventsduringrefueling.Thedoseconsequences,however,ofthefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysisisestimatedatapproximately30%of10CFR100limits.Thiswasfoundtobe"wellwithin"limitsasdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedOctober7,1981(Ref.-208-December1995 3.9Q7Response:3.9Q8Response:49).TherequirementsspecifiedfortheseconditionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Intheevaluationoftheconsequencesfueldamagingaccidentsinsidecontainment(SEPtopicXV-20)datedOctober7,1981thestaffassumedthattheplantTSrequirethatpersonnelandequipmentdoorsbeclosedandradiationlevelsbecontinuouslymonitored(page3,paragraph2).Theassumptionsofthis,evaluationcontinuetobevalid.ProvideamarkupofNUREGLCOs3.9.4,3.9.5and3.9.6andassociatedBasespageswithappropriatejustificationsshowingincorporationofexistingTS3.8.l.aand3.8.3.TheOctober7,1981SERcalculatedadoseof96remattheEABassumingthatthepersonnelandequipmentdoorswereclosedandthatradiationlevelswerecontinuouslymonitored.Thisdosewasstatedtobe"wellwithintheguidelinevalueof10CFRPart100."RGEEsubsequentlyrequestedthattheNRCcalculationdetailsbeprovided(seeattachedletterdatedNovember4,1981).TheNRCrepliedthatthesedetailswereunnecessarysincethe"methodsemployedarecontainedintheStandardReviewPlans"andthatallinputandassumptionswereincludedinthesafetyevaluations(seeattachedletterdatedParch3,1992).Assuch,RGEEperformeditsownanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccidentascontainedinUFSARSection15.7.3.3(attached).ThisUFSARanalysisassumesthatnocontainmentisolationisprovided,includingthepersonnelandequipmentdoors,andcalculatesadoseof103remattheEAB.Basedonconversationswithwestinghouse,theseassumptionsareconsistentwitholder,smallerplantdesignssuchasGinna.ThisUFSARanalysisprovidesthebasesusedinthedevelopmentoftheGinnaITS.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofthe11/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecomment8221.J[18.ii-RI]TS3.8.l.b-TherefuelingorNODE6requirementforthecontainmentradiationmonitorswhichprovidemonitoringforpersonnelsafetywasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thecontainmentradiationmonitorsareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedForthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Providejustificationthatthecontainmentradiationmonitorsarenotrequiredtopreventthepossibilityofanabnormalsituationoreventgivingrisetoanimmediatethreatofthepublichealthandsafety.TheCTS3.8.1.brequiresthecontinuousmonitoringofradiationlevels.Themonitoringrequirementisnotassociatedwithanyrequiredautomaticisolationfunctionandisprovidedforpersonnel-209-December1995

3.9(9Response:lv.fsafetyonly.Theaccidentanalysesalsodonotcreditmanualoperatoractionthroughuseofthesemonitorssincethereisnodesignbasiseventthatcreditsthisfunction.Therefore,thereisnoabnormalsituationoreventgivingrisetoanimmediatethreatofthepublichealthandsafety.[18.iii-Al/Hl]TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityoftheSRHswasrevised.Thephrase"whenevergeometryisbeingchanged"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofMODE6.(AJTherequirementthatoneSRHbeOPERABLEwhencoregeometry"isnotbeingchanged"iscoveredbytheRequiredAction(3.9.3RAA.landA.2$foroneinoperableSRH.(AJThiswouldrestrictCOREALTERATIONandpositivereactivityadditionswhencoregeometryisnotbeingchanged.RequiredActions3.9.3ConditionsBandCJwerealsoprovidedwhentwoSRHsbecomeinoperableorwhentheaudibleindicationislost.(NgThesenewactionsrequireverificationofboronconcentrationevery12hoursandensuresthestabilizedconditionofthereactorcore.TheseareaconservativerevisionsandGinnaTSCategory(v.a)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.Provideanexplanationjustifyingtheconclusionin18.iiithattheproposedITSaremorerestrictive"technical"andmorerestrictive"additions"totherequirementsinTS3.8.I.c.SpecificallyidentifytheseGinnaTSCategoriesforeachproposedchange.Justifyeachconclusion.TheCTS3.8.1.crequiresoneoperableSRNduringNODE6whencoregeometryisnotbeingchangedandtwooperableSRNsduringrefuelingwhenthecoregeometryisbeingchanged.TheITS'LCO3.9.2requirestwoSRNsoperableatalltimesduringNODE6.TheITSLCOrepresentsthelowestfunctionalcapabilityorperformancelevelsofequipmentrequiredforsafeoperationofthefacility.Therefore,theITShasbeendevelopedrequiringtwoSRNsoperable.4'ithonlyoneSRNoperable,theRequiredActionsA.landA.2arenomorelimitingthanwhatisspecifiedbytheCTSLCOrequirement(i.e.,nofuelmovementisallowed).ThechangeisconsideredmorerestrictiveonlybecausetheITSplacestheplantinaspecificConditionwhereastheCTSLCOwouldcontinuetobemet..Assuch,thisisa"v.a"change.TheCTSalsorequiresthesuspensionofoperationswhichmayincreasecorereactivity..TheCTShasbeenrevisedtoaddtherequirementsdenotedbyLCO3.9.2RequiredActionsBl,B4,andC.3whent'woSRNsbecomeinoperableorwhentheaudibleindicationislost.ThesenewactionsrequiretheimmediateinitiationofactiontorestoreoneSRNtooperablestatusandverificationofboronconcentrationevery12hours.TheseRequiredActionsensurethestabilizedconditionofthereactorcore.BecausetheseRequiredActionsarenewrequirements,thischangeisconsideredmorerestrictivewithrespecttoCTS(i.e.,a"iv.a"categorychange).[18.iv-Al/Hl/L1)TS3.8.1.e-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicability-210-December1995 3.9(10andfrequencyoftheboronconcentrationsamplingwasrevised.Thephrase"immediatelybeforereactorvesselheadremovalandwhileloadingandunloadingfuelfromthereactor"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofNODE6.(AI)ThiswouldadditionallyrequireboronconcentrationsamplingthroughoutNODE6.(Nl)Thesamplingfrequency,however,wasalsorevised(fromrequiringboronsamplingtwiceeachshift]torequiresamplingevery72hours.(L1JTheserevisionsconsiderthelargevolumeoftherefuelingcanal,RCS,andrefuelingcavityandareadequatetoidentifyslowchangesinboronconcentration.Rapidchangesinboronconcentration,describedinUFSAR15.4.4.2,aredetectedbytheSRNinstrumentationrequiredbynewTS3.9.2.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Provideanexplanationjustifyingtheconclusionin18'vthattheproposedITSaremorerestrictivethantherequirementsinTS3.8.l.e.JustifythattheproposedchangesareenhancementstotheexistingTS.Anotherproposedchangeaddressestheapplicabilityandfrequencyofboronsampling.StatewhythereisnotasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplantbychangingthefrequencyofexistingTS3.8.l.eto72hoursfromtwiceeachshift.Response:TheCTS3.8.1.erequiresthatpriortoreactorheadremovalandwhileloadingandunloadingfuelfromthereactor,theminimumboronconcentrationismaintained.TheITSLCO3.9.1requiresthattheminimumboronconcentrationbemaintainedduringNODE6.The,ITSdefinesNODE6as"whenoneormorereactorvesselheadclosurebolts(are/lessthanfullytensioned."TheITSalsorequirestheSRtobemetpriortoenteringNODE6perLCO3.0.4.Therefore,theCTSrequirementtoensurethattheminimumboronconcentrationismaintained"priortoreactorheadremoval"isequivalenttotheITSrequirements.However,theCTSonlyrequirestheminimumboronconcentrationrequirementwhenloadingandunloadingfuel.TheITSrequirescontinuationoftheminimumboronconcentrationrequirementthroughoutNODE6.TheliteralreadingoftheCTScouldbeinferredtoexclude,asaTSrequirement,therequirementtomaintaintheminimumboronconcentrationwhenfuelisnotintheprocessofbeingloadedorunloaded.Sincethisrequirement.couldbeinferredtobecontrolledadministratively,the1'TSrequirementisconsideredmorerestrictivethanthatoftheCTS.TheCTS3.8.1.erequirestheboronconcentrationlimitbeverifiedtwiceeachshift.TheITSSR3.9.1.1requirestheboronconcentrationlimitbeverifiedevery72hours:Thereisnotasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplantbychangingthefrequencyfromtwiceeachshiftto72hours.TheboronconcentrationlimitensuresthatthereactorremainssubcriticalduringNODE6.Theboronconcentrationlimitisbasedinpartontheassumptionsthat:(1)controlrodsandfuelassembliesareinthemostadverseconfiguration(leastnegativereactivity)allowedbyplantprocedures,and(2)corereactivityisatthebeginningofeachfuelcycle.Theseconservatisms,alongwiththefactthattheoperatorhaspromptanddefiniteindicationinthecontrolroomof-211-December1995 3.9QllV.asignificantborondilutionevent,provideassurancethattheproposedchangeinthesurveillancefrequencydoesnotprovideasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplant.The72hourfrequencyisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andisbasedonindustryoperatingexperiencewhichhasshownthat72hourstobeadequate.[18.v-R1]TS3.8.l.f-TherequirementforcommunicationwiththecontrolroomduringCOREALTERATIONSisnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecommunicationsisnotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thisis'GinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SpecifythedocumenttowhichtheTS3.8.l.frequirementswillberelocatedandthecontrolmechanismthatwillbeusedformakingfuturechangestotherequirements.Response:TherequirementisproposedtoberelocatedtoGinnaStationprocedure0-15.1(attached).AnysubsequentchangestothisrequirementisprovidedinaccordancewiththeGinnaprocedurechangeprocesswhichrequires,asminimum,ascreeningwithrespectto10CFR50.59.3.9Q12vi.vi1~[18.vi-Al]TS3.8.l.d(footnote*)andTS3.8.l.g(footnote*)-Therequirementthateitherthepreferredortheemergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachresidualheat.removalloopisnotadded.ThisdetailisencompassedinthedefinitionofoperabilitydescribedinnewTS1.1andtheelectricpowerrequirementscontainedinChapter3.8.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.[18.vii-Ll]TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementtoprovideSRHaudibleindicationinthecontainmentwasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincethemonitoredparameter(audibleindicationincontainment)isnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.ThesafetyanalysisassumesaudibleindicationinthecontrolroomwhichisdenotedbynewLCO3.9.2.Theaudibleindicationisforpersonnelsafetyonly.Further,theaudibleindicationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ProvideasafetyjustificationforwhyaudibleindicationofneutronfluxinthecontainmentisnotpartofchanneloperabilityforthemonitorsrequiredtobeoperablebyITS3.9.2.Response:Theaudiblecountratefunctionforthecontainmentisprovidedby-212-December1995 aaudiblemonitororspeakerthatreceivesthesameoutputsignalastheaudiblemonitorinthecontrolroom.TheITSonlyrequirescontinuousaudiblemonitoringinthecontrolroom.Theaudiblemonitoringinthecontainmentisforpersonnelsafetyonly.NocreditistakenforthisfunctionintheGinnasafetyanalysisforthemitigationofanyaccident.Also,theaudiblemonitorinthecontainmentdoesnotimpactthechannelOPERABILITY,asdefinedintheBasesforLCO3.9.2,forthemonitorlocatedinthecontrolroom.3.9Q13ProvideasafetyjustificationforwhycontinuousvisualindicationofneutronfluxinthecontrolroomisnotincludedaspartofchanneloperabilityforthemonitorsrequiredtobeoperablebyITS3.9.2.Response:TheLCObasesforLCO3.9.2denotesthatchanneloperabilityincludesvisualindicationinthecontrolroomforeachofthechannelsandanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroomforoneofthetwochannels.RelocationofthislevelofdetailtothebasesisconsistentwiththerestoftheITSandNUREG-1431.38.iv.3.9Q14[38.iv-L1]TS4.11.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYonceevery12hoursversus4hoursconsistentwithSR3.9.3.1.AFrequencyof12hoursisadequateduetothealarmsandindicationsavailabletotheoperatorswithrespecttoRHRpumpandloopperformance.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.41)change.ThisLCOverifiesloopoperabilityandpumpoperation.Statewhythereisnotasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplantinchangingfrom4hoursto12hoursbecauseoftheinstalledcontrolroomalarmsandindications.Response:V.TheCTS4.11.2.1requirestheverificationonceper4hoursthattheRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingwater.TheITSSR3.9.3.1andSR3.9.4.1requiresthisverificationevery12hours.Thechangeinthefrequencyfrom4hoursto12hoursisbasedontheconsiderationthatflow,temperature,pumpcontrol,andalarmindicationsareavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomformonitoringtheRHRSystem.ThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminNODE6istoremovedecayheatfromtheRCSandtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratification.TheSRonlyrequirestheverification,throughindicationinthecontrolroom,thattheRHRloopisinoperation.ThisSRisredundanttomanyotherindicationswhichwouldalerttheoperatorsshouldaninadvertentlossof.RHRloopoccur.ThechangeinfrequencyisnotasignificantsafetyissuesincetheindicationavailableandtheoperatorsresponsetoalossofRHRloophasnotchanged.Noreover,LCO3.9.3allowstheRHRlooptoberemovedfromoperationduringshortdurations.Theseshortdurationswillnotresultinchallengestothefissionproductbarrierorincoolantstratificationsincedecayheatisremovedbynaturalconvectiontothelargemassofwaterintherefuelingcavity.f38.v-L2,Hl]December1995 3.9Q15Response:vi.3.9Q16TS4.11.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementforanInserviceTestoftheRHRpumps.AnInserviceTestshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingpump.(L)Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredby.newSR3.9.4.2whichrequiresthe'erificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.(AJTheInserviceTestingprogramtestismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringnormalconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureOPERABILITYduringMODE6operations.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.42)change.ThisLCOverifiespumpoperability.Statewhythereisnotasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplantindeletingthepumpsurveillancespecifiedin10CFR50.55a.ProvideanadministrativechangediscussionforaddingSR3.9.4.2.JustifythattheproposedchangesareenhancementstotheexistingTS.TheCTS4.11.2.2requiresoperabilityoftheRHRpumpsbytheperformanceofapumpsurveillancespecifiedin10CFR50.55a.TheITSSR3.9.4.2requiresonlyverificationofcorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailableforthenon-operatingpump.Thespecifictestingrequirementisactuallybeingrelocated,andnotdeletedfromtheTS,andwillberetainedintheISTprogram.TherelocationofthisrequirementisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andisadministrativelycontrolledwithintherequirementsspecifiedinITSChapter5.0,"AdministrativeControls"fortheISTprogram.Thereisnosignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplant,withtherelocationofthisrequirement,sincethe.ITSprovidesadequateverificationthatasecondRHRpumpcanbeplacedinoperationtomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Additionally,inP10DE6,theRHRsystemisnotrequiredtomitigateanyeventsoraccidentsevaluatedinthesafetyanalysis.Itisonlyrequiredtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttohelppreventborondilutionevents.AsignificantamountoftimeexistsbeforeboilingofthecoolantcouldresultfromalossoftheRHRpumps.[38.vi-L3]TS4.11.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofthewaterlevelinthereactorcavitywithin24hoursoffuelmovementversus2hours.ThenewTSusagerulesstatethataSRistobecontinuouslyperformedatitsrequiredFrequency.However,theSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenintheMODEofApplicability.Therefore,aSRwithaFrequencyof24hoursmusthavebeenperformedwithin24hoursbeforeenteringtheMODEofApplicability.AFrequencyof24hoursisacceptableduetothelargevolumeofwateravailableandtheproceduralcontrolsinplace.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ThisLCOverifieswaterlevelinthe.reactorcavity.Statewhy*thereisnotasignificantsafetyquestionintheoperationoftheplantbychangingthefrequencyofexistingTS4.11.3.1to24hoursfrom2hoursinproposedSR3.9.5.1.-214-December1995 Response:TheCTS4.11.3.1requiresverificationofwaterlevel:(1)within2hourspriortothestartofthemovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodsincontainment,and(2)onceper24hoursthereafter.TheITSSR3.9.5.1requiresverificationofwaterlevel:(1)within24hourspriortothestartofthemovementoffuelassembliesincontainment(inaccordancewithSR3.0.4),and(2)onceper24hoursthereafter.TheonlydifferencebetweenthetworequirementsisthetimeperiodoftheinitialperformanceoftheSRthatensuresthattheSRismetpriortoentryintoaspecifiedconditionasdefinedbytheApplicability.TheITSSR3.0.4ensuresthatsystemandcomponentoperabilityrequirementsandvariablelimitsaremetbeforeentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedcondition(i.e.,suchasduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentasdenotedintheApplicabilityforLCO3.9.5)forwhichtheserequirementsensuresafeoperationoftheplant.Thechangehasnosafetyimpactontheoperationoftheplantsinceinbothcases,thewaterlevelmeetstherequirementsoftheLCOpriortothemodechange.Thiswaterlevelisnotexpectedtochangebetweentheadditional22hourswhichwouldnowbeallowedduetoadministrativecontrolsovervalvepositions,controlroomalarmsandindications,andoperatorsandotherplantpersonneltypicallybeinginsidecontainmentduringthistimeperiodwhocouldobserveasignificantchangeinwaterlevel.104.ITS3.9.13.9Q17RefertoBasesmarkupforidentificationofeditorialcommentsResponse:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-05,C.1.Thistravellerwasmodified'oprovidevariouswordingchangestoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCOwasrevisedconsistentwithsimilarLCOs.ThedetailsassociatedwiththeLCOwererelocatedtothebases.IncludingthesedetailsintheBaseseliminatesambiguities(e.g.,whentheplantinitiallyentersNODE6andwhenRCSloopsareisolated).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.3.9Q18Response:Explainthebasis'orconcludingthatthedetailsofthesystemsinLCO3.9.1arenotnecessarytoestablishsafetybasisforsystemsrequiringCOLRboronconcentrationlimits.Also,discusswhatisbiiiih'l'ii.<<hhardshipassociatedwiththe~ambiuit?TheITSLCOaspresentedintheNUREGwouldrequiretheverificationofboronconcentrationlimitsfortheRCS,refuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitywheninNODE6.ThisisconfusingsincetheLCOshouldonlyapplytothefilledportionsoftheseareasthatarehydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcoreduringrefueling.Forexample,UFSARFigure9.1-1(attached)showsasketchofthereactor-215-December1995

iv.3.9(19Response:3.9Q20Response:vessel,reactorcavityandrefuelingcanal.TherefuelingcanalcanbeisolatedfromthereactorvesselandreactorcavityduringNODE6byuseofablindflangeandgatevalve.However,thisLCOwouldstillrequiretherefuelingcanalboronconcentrationtobethesameasthatwithincontainment.Instead,therefuelingcanalboronconcentrationisaddressedbyITSLCO3.7.12inthisinstance.ThisissuewasbroughtupbyGinnaoperationsduringtheirreviewofthisLCO.ThisdetailisclarifiedintheBasesbutcouldcausefuturemis-interpretationstothisLCOorrequiretheneedforafuturelicenseamendmentrequesttothisLCO.Inordertoeliminatethispotentialconfusion,itwasproposedtorelocatethedetailsintheLCOtotheBases.ThisisconsistentwiththedetailsofotherTSbeingrelocatedtotheBases.Eliminatingambiguitysignificantlyreducesoperationalhardshipsduetopotentialoperatorerrorsandreducestrainingexpenseswhichresultfromtheneedforadditionalclarification.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofthell/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecomment¹195.)Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.Backgrounddiscussion,pageB3.9-1ProvidereplacementdiscussionapplicabletoGinna.AllchangestotheNUREGBackgroundBasesarereplacedwithequivalenttext.andinformation.Theonlyexceptioniswithrespecttotheendofthethirdparagraph.RG&Eagreestoaddthepreviouslydeletedtextbeginningwith"fromtherefuelingwater..."Comment¹IIOhasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.'IActionsdiscussionintroduction,pageB3.9-3.STETtheproposeddeletionofthefirstsentenceintheparagraph.Thisdiscussionwasreplacedtomoreaccu'ratelyreflectthediscussionsprovidedinthe"ApplicableSafetyAnalysis"sectionofthisBases.ThechangealsoprovidesconsistencywiththerestoftheITSandNUREGbasesforRequiredActionswhichhaveaformatasfollows:"If(aspecificconditionsexists,theplantisoutside.theaccidentanalysisassumptionsandmustrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin(completiontimej."TheNUREGbasesforthissectionstatethatCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionscanonlybemadeiftheLCOismetandthatiftheLCOisnotmet,theseactivitiesmuststop.Therefore,theproposedchangeprovidesconsistencywiththerestoftheITSwithoutrevisinganyspecificrequirements.b.Theplant-specificdescriptionoftheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingwasadded.-216-December1995 3.9Q21Response:c.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.IBasesInsert3.9.2.Thisdiscussionprovideshighleveldesignrequirementinformation.Providebackgrounddiscussionaboutsystemcapability,i.e.,thesamelevelofdetailyouproposetodelete.TheInsert3.9.2appearstobeofequivalentlevelofdiscussionforthereplacedNUREGBackgroundinformation.NUREG-1431discussestheCVCSbeingcapableofmaintainingthereactor"subcritical"whereastheproposedBasesdiscussestheCVCSbeingcapableofproviding"reactivitycontrol."Additionally,forGinna,theNUREG-1431referencetoCVCSprovidingsubcriticalcapabilityundercoldconditionsisnotappropriatewithrespecttoAIFGDC27asreferencedinthisparagraph.ThisAIFGDCdoesnotmentioncoldshutdownrequirementsatall.However,AIFGDC29Criterionstates"oneofthereactivitycontrolsystemsprovidedshallbecapableofmakingthecoresubcriticalunderanyanticipatedoperatingcondition(includinganticipatedoperationaltransients)sufficientlyfasttopreventexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimits.Shutdownmarginshouldassuresubcriticalitywiththemostreactivecontrolrodfullywithdrawn."ThisAIFGDConlyrelatesto"operatingconditions"andnot"coldconditions"suchthatthisdeletedtextisnotapplicabletotheGinnadesignbasis.d.Thetextwasrevisedtoclarifythatnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposesoftemperaturecontrolisnotconsideredasanadditionofpo'sitivereacti,vity.e.Thetextwasrevisedto.clarifythatthesampletakenisrepresentativeoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavity.OnlyonesampleisrequiredsinceoperationoftheRHRassumesuniformmixing.105.ITS3.9.2LCO3.9.2,"UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValves"andassociated,Bases,aspresentedinNUREG-1431,werenotaddedandsubsequentLCOsandBaseshavebeenrenumberedinconsecutiveorder.GinnaStationhasaplantspecificsafetyanalysis(UFSARSection15.4.4.2)foranuncontrolledborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumingtheworstcasescenariowiththemaximumnumberofpumpsandflowpathsavailable.Theconclusionoftheanalysisestablishesthatoperatorshavesufficienttime(i.e.,greaterthan30minutesrequiredbySection15.4.6ofReference3.9.1)tomitigatetheeffectsofaborondilutioneventinMODE6priortoalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN.Therefore,theLCOforisolatingunboratedwatersourcesinMODE6isnotrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.106.ITS3.9.3-217-December1995 3.9Q22ReviewoftheActionsBasesispendingresponsetoLCOQ's.Response:Seeresponsesto3.9Q24,3.9Q25,3.9Q26,3.9Q27,and3.9Q293.9Q23RefertoBasesmarkupforidentificationofeditorialcommentsResponse:Tobediscussedatthenextmeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerCEOG-02,C.3.Thistravellerwasrevisedtodeletetheword"required"sincethereareonlytwoindependentsourcerangechannels.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.2wasrevisedtodeletethe4hourverificationoftheboronconcentrationlimitsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.Thisrequirementisperformedwhentwosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsbecomeinoperable.Atthepointintimewhentwosourcerangechannelsbecomeinoperable,therefuelingboronconcentrationisassumedtobewithinlimit.VerificationthattheboronconcentrationiswithinlimithadbeenpreviouslydemonstratedbytheperiodicperformanceofSR3.9.1.1.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandtheadditionofpositivereactivityhavebeensuspended(asaresultofoneinoperablesourcerangechannel),corereactivityconditionswillremainstable.Therefore,theneedtoperformanadditionalverificationwithin4hoursisnotnecessary.Confirmationthatcorereactivityremainsstablewillcontinuetobeperformedevery12hours.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.3.9Q24Theintentofthe4hourcompletiontimetoperformSR3.9.1.1istoconfirmtheassumptionthattheboronconcentrationiswithinrequiredlimits.WOGtravelersareneededtostartthegeneric.changeprocess.Isthereanoperationalhardshipassociatedwith'hisSR?Response:1V~Theinitial4hourperformanceofSR3.9.1.1isbeingchangedbyaHOGtravellerscheduledtogototheNRCbyNovember1.TherearenosignificantoperationalhardshipsassociatedwiththisSR.However,asdiscussedabove,theproposedchangeisnotexplicitlyrequiredbytheCTS.Consideringthewatervolumeinvolved,andassumingboronconcentrationtobewithinthelimitwhenthetwosourcerangechannelsbecomeinoperable(ascanbedemonstratedbythepreviousperformanceofSR3.9.1.1)andsuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditions(asrequiredbyActionsA.landA.2)thecorereactivitywillbestableandanychangesinboronconcentrationwilloccurveryslowly.Therefore,theneedtoverifyboronconcentrationwithin4hoursisunnecessary.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofthell/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecommentb'195.)TheActionswererevisedtoaddaconditiontoaddressthelossoftheaudiblecountratefunction.Theaudiblecountratefunctionisaninitialassumptionoftheborondilutionduringrefuelingevent-218-December1995 V.3.9(25Response:atGinnaStation.AudiblecountrateisprovidedbyoneofthetworequiredOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxchannels.TheadditionoftheActionsisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.8.l.c.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.'hebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethe.readabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesprovidingconsistencywiththeLCOandotherbasessections.Insert3.9.7.b,pageB3.9-10TheproposedadditiontotheSR3.9.2.1appearstobeanoperatornoteforapplicationofSR3.0.1andtheuseandapplicationsectionof.theTS.ExplainhowtheaddedtextelucidatesthebasisfortherequiredTSsurveillance.SR3.0.1statesthatallSRsmustbemetfortheLCOtobeconsideredmet.However,SRsarenotrequiredtobeperformedonequipmentwhichhasbeendeclaredinoperable.InP1ODE6,aCHANNELCHECKisrequiredevery12hours.Ifonesourcerangeisdeclaredinoperable,aCHANNELCHECKisnotrequiredforthissourcerange.However,aCHANNELCHECKisstillrequiredforthesecondsourcerangeoritwouldthenhavetobedeclaredinoperableperSR3.0.1.Sincethereisnootherneutrondetectoravailableinthisinstance,theCHANNELCHECKrequirementsmustbecapableofbeingmetbyothermeans.ThedefinitionofCHANNELCHECKinITSSection1.1statesthatCHANNELCHECKS"shallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter."However,thereisnofurtherexplanationofwhattodowhenthisisnotpossible.Thus,Insert3.9.7.bwasadded.RG8EagreesthatInsert3.9.7.bissomewhatmisleadingandproposestorevisethisasfollows:"Ifonechannelisinoperable,aCHANNELCHECKoftheoperablechannelcanconsistofensuringconsistencywithknowncoreconditionssincetheRequiredActionsfortheinoperablechannelrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSand-positivereactivityaddition."Comment¹lllhasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.Areviewofallo'therITSrequiredCHANNELCHECKSindicatesthatanimmediateshutdownmustbeenteredifthenumberofchannelsfallsbelowtwo(i.e.,thereisatleast2channelswhichcanbecomparedatalltimes)exceptasfollows:(1)intermediaterangechannels;(2)sourcerangechannels;and.(3)radiationmonitorsusedforleakagedetection.Fortheintermediaterangechannels,withonechannelinoperable,theredundantchannelcanbecomparedtothesourcerangechannelssuchthataCHANNELCHECKcanstillbemade.ForthesourcerangechannelsbelowPfODE2,thereisnootherchannelwhichcouldbecheckedsuchthatbasesclarificationsarerequiredtoSR3.3.1.1.Fortheradiationmonitors,ITSSR3.4.15.1doesnotprovidesufficientinformationsincethereisonlyonechannelrequiredto-219-December1995 beOPERABLEbyITSLCO3.4.15.ThesewillalsobeaddressedbyComment¹111.(This.responsewaschangedasaresultofthe11/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecomment¹195.Jb.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeLCOaddressingtheaudiblecountratefunctionsuppliedfromeitheroftheOPERABLEsourcerangechannels.c.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.vi.3.9Q26Response:d.Thetextwasrevisedtoclarifythatnormalcool-downofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposesoftemperaturecontrolisnotconsideredasanadditionofpositivereactivity.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature(e.g.,replace"monitors"with"channels").ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ProvideadesignbasisreasonforreplacingCTSrequirementsformonitoroperabilitywithITSrequirementsforchanneloperability.Thewordingchangewasmadetobeconsistentwithplant-specificnomenclature.TheLCObasesstatethat"tobeOPERABLE,eachchannelmustprovidevisualindicationandatleastoneofthetwochannelsmustprovideanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroom."RelocationofthislevelofdetailtothebasesisconsistentwiththerestoftheITSandNUREG-1431.3.9Q27,DeletetheproposedreferencetosourcerangeinstrumentationinSR3.9.2.2.ThischangeisunnecessarytoestablishappropriateLCOSRs.RefertoSection3.3formatandSR3.0.1.Response:3.9Q28RG8EagreestodeletethisreferenceintheSR.Comment¹110hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.Acceptanceofthe24monthchannelcalibrationfrequencyispendingstaffreview.Response:Noresponserequiredatthistime.TwoRequiredActions,similartothoseforConditionAwithoneinoperablesourcerangefluxchannel,wereaddedtoConditionBtorequireimmediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditions.ThesechangesprovideahumanfactorsimprovementsinceRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andB.1allhaveimmediateCompletionTimes.LocatingalltheserequirementsintoConditionBiseasierforoperationspersonneltoimplement.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.3.9Q29WOGtravelersareneededtostartthegenericchangeprocess.-220-December1995 Response:Theh!OGrejectedthischangesinceitisnotatechnicalissue.SuggestthisbediscussedduringGinnasitevisit.107.ITS3.9.43.9Q30ProvideplantspecificLCOandBasesmarkupconsistentwithcurrentTSrequirements.DoseconsequencecalculationsassumeTSexistforpersonnelandequipmentdoors.Response:Seeresponsetoquestion3.9(7.LCO3.9.4,"ContainmentPenetrations"andassociatedBases,aspresentedinNUREG-1431,,werenotaddedandsubsequentLCOsandBaseshavebeenrenumberedinconsecutiveorder.GinnaStationhasaplantspecificsafetyanalysis(UFSARSection15.7.3.3)forafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentwhichassumesnoisolationofthecontainmentandnofiltrationfollowingtheaccident.TheNRChasconcludedthatthisanalysisis"wellwithin"10CFR100limits(Ref.3.9.2).SinceLCO3.9.4requirementsonlyensurefissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingare"wellwithin"10CFR100limits(seeBases),theserequirementswerenotadded.ThischangeisdiscussedindetailinsectionC.2ofthisAttachment(item18.i).AsaresultofthedeletionofITS3.9.4,approvedTravellersBWOG-03,C.3,BWOG-03,C.6,WOG-05,C.2,andWOG-05,C.3,werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.108.ITS3.9.53.9Q31RefertoBasesmarkupforidentificationofeditorialcommentsResponse:Tobediscussedat'hemeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.2.SR3.9.5.1wasrevisedtoremovetheflowratefortheRHRloopinoperation.ForGinnaStation,theborondilutioneventistheonlyeventpostulatedtooccurinNODE6whichassumestheRHRsysteminoperation.TheGinnaStationsafetyanalysisforborondilutioninMODE6(UFSARSection15.4.4.2)assumesuniformmixingoftheboratedcoolantasaresultofaRHRpumpbeinginoperationanddoesnotspecifyagivenflowrate.Therefore,thereisnoanalyticalbasisfortheinclusionofaflowrateintheSR.Thewords"andcirculatingreactorcoolant"werealsodeletedandrelocatedtothebases.Thisisanimpliedfunctionforan'RHRloopinoperationandisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisandSR3.4.8.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.3.9Q32TheSR3.9'.1BasesdonotconfirmthejustificationthatRHRpump'lowrateandreactorcoolantcirculationarenotrequiredtoverifyLCOcompliance.Discussthisdiscrepancy,includediscussionofthecriteriaforestablishingpumpoperability.GenericchangestotheNUREGrequireWOGtravelerstostartthechangeprocess.-221-December1995 Response:AklOGTravellerhasbeeninitiatedtochangeSR3.9.5.1tostate"verifyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation."TheJustificationforthistravelleristhatplantswhichdonotcreditisolationoftheRCStopreventborondilutioneventsonlycredittheuseofRHRtoensuremixingoftheboratedcoolantinP10OE6.Nospecificflowrateisspecifiedintheaccidentanalysisforthis.Comment8112hasbeenopenedtorevisetheproposedSR3.9.5.1toreflectthistravellerandtotrackitsstatus.Pithrespecttorelocationof"andcirculatingreactorcoolant"tothebases,thiswasnotdoneasstatedinChange108.ii.Comment8113hasbeenopenedtodeletetheassociatedtwosentencessincethisrelocationisnotrequiredbasedonthewordingoftheproposedSRbases.1V.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-05,C.4.RequiredActionA.4andassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationTScurrentlydonotcontainthisrequirement.TheITSRequiredActionto"closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere"isbasedonthescenariothattherearenoRHRloopsinoperation.Thiscouldleadoveraperiodoftimetoboilingofthecoolantand,shouldwaterlevelnotbemaintained,eventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.Theclosureof"allcontainmentpenetrations"isonlyprovidedtolimitthereleaseofradioactivegasestotheatmosphere.PlantproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereestablishedatGinnaStationinresponsetoGenericLetter88-017(Ref.3.9.3).Theseproceduresandadministrativecontrolsinclude(1)providingatleasttwoadequatemeansofaddinginventorytotheRCSand(2)closingcontainmentpenetrationsduringreducedRCSinventoryoperation.TheseproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereverifiedbytheNRCtobeadequatelyimplemented(Ref.3.9.4).Sincepreviouslyapprovedcontrolsarein-placetoensureradioactivityreleasesfromchallengestotheintegrityofthefuelcladding,addingadditionalrestrictionsatahigherwaterlevelarenotnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasestThisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.ThebaseswasrevisedsincethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionsforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6.Thereis,however,anassumptionintheborondilutioneventthatoneRHRpumpisinoperation.c.Thebaseswasrevisedtoclarifythatwhileultimatelyitmaybepossibletoachievecriticalitywithoutthepresenceofmixing(e.g.,thermalorboronstratification),theborondilutionanalysisassumesthecoolantremainsahomogeneousmixture.Additionally,thebaseswasrevisedtoeliminatethe-222-December1995

V1~temperatureindicatingdevicesincethedefinitionofoperabilityfortheRHRloopwouldencompassthisdevice.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheRequiredActionconsistentwithLCO3.4.8.vii.ThetitleforLCO3.9.5wasrevisedtobe"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23ft"whichisconsistentwiththeApplicability,GinnaStationprocedures,andallactivitieswhichrelatetoshutdownoperations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.109.ITS3.9.63.9(33Response:RefertoBasesmarkupforidentificationofeditorialcommentsTobediscussedatthenextmeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.2.Thistravellerwasmodifiedtoprovidevariouswordingchangestoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.iii.RequiredActionB.3andassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationTScurrentlydonotcontainthisrequirement.TheITSRequiredActionto"closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere"isbasedonthescenariothattherearenoRHRloopsinoperation.Thiscouldleadoveraperiodoftimetoboilingofthecoolantand,shouldwaterlevelnotbemaintained,eventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.Theclosureof"allcontainmentpenetrations"isonlyprovidedtolimitthereleaseofradioactivegasestotheatmosphere.'lantproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereestablishedatGinnaStationinresponsetoGenericLetter88-017(Ref.3.9.3).Theseproceduresandadministrativecontrolsinclude(1)providingatleasttwoadequatemeansofaddinginventorytotheRCSand(2)closingcontainmentpenetrationsduringreducedRCSinventoryoperation.TheseproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereverifiedbytheNRCtobeadequatelyimplemented(Ref.3.9.4).Sincepreviouslyapprovedcontrolsarein-placetoensureradioactivityreleasesfromchallengestotheintegrityofthefuelcladding,addingadditionalrestrictionsatahigherwaterlevelarenotnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)'change.1V~SR3.9.6.1wasrevisedtoremovetheflowratefor'theRHRloopin'operation.ForGinnaStation,theborondilutioneventistheonlyeventpostulatedtooccurinNODE6whichassumestheRHRsysteminoperation.The'innaStationsafetyanalysisforborondilutioninNODE6(UFSARSection'5.4.4.2)assumesuniformmixingof.theboratedcoolantasaresultofaRHRpumpbeinginoperationanddoesnotspecifyagivenflowrate.Therefore,thereisnoanalyticalbasisfortheinclusionofaflowrateintheSR.Thewords"andcirculatingreactorcoolant"werealsodeletedand-223-December1995 3.9(34relocatedtothebases.ThisisanimpliedfunctionforanRHRloopinoperationandisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisandSR3.4.8.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheSR3.9.6.1BasesdonotconfirmthejustificationthatRHRpumpflowrateandreactorcoolantcirculationarenotrequiredtoverifyLCOcompliance.Discussthisdiscrepancy,includediscussionofthecriteriaforestablishingpumpoperability.GenericchangestotheNUREGrequireWOGtravelerstostartthechangeprocess.Response:Theresponsetothisquestionisaddressedintheresponsetoquestion3.9P32.V.,,vi.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.ThebaseswasrevisedsincethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionsforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminMODE6.Thereis,however,anassumptionintheborondilutioneventthatoneRHRpumpisinoperation.c.Thebaseswasrevisedtoclarifythatwhileultimatelyitmaybepossibletoachievecriticalitywithoutthepresenceofmixing(e.g.,thermalorboronstratification),theborondilutionanalysisassumesthecoolantremainsahomogeneousmixture.Additionally,thebaseswasrevisedtoeliminatethe-temperatureindicatingdevicesincethedefinitionofoperabilityfortheRHRloopwouldencompassthisdevice.Variouswording.changesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheConditionsandRequiredActionsconsistentwithLCO3.4.8.3.9(35Response:WhencurrentrefuelingTS3.8.l.d,3.8.l.garenotmetTSaction3.8.2requiresrefuelingworktocease,repairstobeinitiated,andprohibitsanyoperationsthatmayincreasethereactivityofthecore.TS3.8.3furtherrequiresthat'fnoloopisinoperationtheninadditiontoTS3.8.2theshutdownpurgeandminipurgepenetrationsaretobeisolatedwithin4hours.JustifyanylessrestrictivechangestotheseTSrequirementsthatareproposedbytheHaysubmittalNUREGmarkup.CTS3.8.2isaddressedbyITSLCOs3.9.1through3.9.5.TheRequiredActionsfortheseLCOsareequivalenttoormorerestrictivetoCTS3.8.2(otherthanthoseproposedtoberelocated).Thatis:a.TheCTS3.8.2requirementthat"refuelingofthereactorshallcease"isequivalentto"suspendingCOREALTERATIONS"forITSLCOs3.9.1,3.9.2,and3.9.5sinceCOREALTERATIONSisdefined-224-December1995 as"movementofanyfuel...withinthereactorvessel."Thisrequirementisalsoequivalentto"suspendloadingofirradiatefuelassembliesinthecore"forITSLCOs3.9.3.ITSLCO3.9.4doesnothavethisrequirement;however,LCO3.9.5preventsfuelmovementwithlessthan23ftofwaterabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangesuchthatthisdoesnothavetobespecifiedinLCO3.9.4whichonlyapplieswithlessthan23ftofwater.b.TheCTS3,8.2requirementthat"workshallbeinitiatedtocorrecttheviolatedconditionssothatthespecifiedlimitsaremet"isnotrequiredtobestatedinthenewRequiredActionssincethisisalwaysanoptionforexitingtheLCOintheITS.c.TheCTS3.8.2requirementthat"nooperationsmayincreasethereactivityofthecoreshallbemade"isequivalentto""suspendpositivereactivityadditions"forLCOs3.9.1,3.9.2,and3.9.5..Thisrequirementisalsoequivalentto"suspendalloperations'nvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration"forLCOs3.9.3and3.9.4sinceotherthanreducingboronconcentration,theonlyothermethodtoincreasereactivityisatemperaturechangewhichisdirectlyaffectedbythelossoftheRHRpumps(i.e.,atemperatureincreasecanoccuriftherequirednumberofpumpsisreduced).CTS3.8.3onlyappliesifCTS3.8.1.disnotmet.Inthisinstance,itrequiresisolationoftheshutdownpurgeandmini-purgevalves.ThelossofallRHRwhenwateris~23ftabovethereactorvesselflangewillnotresultinboilinguntilhours,ifnotdays,later.Infact,theproposedshutdownruledoesnotevenaddressthisissueduetothetimeavailabletoplantoperatorsbeforeboilingisreached,letaloneuncoveryofthecorewithsubsequentfueldamage.Therefore,thisrequirementshouldnotberetainedintheITS.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofthe11/16/95Appealmeeting.Seecommentk'221.Jvii.ThetitleforLCO3.9.5wasrevisedtobe"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23ft"whichisconsistentwiththeApplicability,GinnaStationprocedures,andallactivitieswhichrelatetoshutdownoperations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.110.ITS3.9.73.9Q36RefertoBasesmarkupforidentificationofeditorialcommentsandrequestsfortechnicalclarificationsResponse:Tobediscussedatthenextmeeting.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadability-225-December1995 3.9Q37andunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywith.otherbasessections.Whereisthe100hourfueldecayprior'tofuelhandlinglimitintheITS?Response:Section4.0The100hourfueldecaylimitisnotintheITSLCOs.TherelocationofthisrequirementtotheBasesisconsistentwiththeNRCStaffpositiontorelocate(inaccordancewiththeCriteria)theStandardTechnicalSpecificationfor"DecayTime."b.Thebases'asrevisedtoclarifythatthefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentis"wellwithin"theexposureguidelinesof10CFR100.ThisfractionalreleaselimithasbeenpreviouslyapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.3.9.2).TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtorelocatethe"duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment"priorto"duringCOREALTERATIONS."TheexistingApplicabilityisveryconfusingwiththe'xceptiontoCOREALTERATIONSprovided.Thishumanfactorsimproveme'ntispreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.CurrentTS44.TechnicalSpecification5.1TS5.l.1,TS5.1.2,andFigure5.1-1ThedescriptionandfigureofthesiteareaboundaryandexclusionareaboundarywasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithTravellerCEOG-03,C.1.SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR,Section2.1.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.4.0Q1Response:4.0Q2Response:ImprovedTSjustification111.istatesthattravelerCEOG-03,C.1wasnotincorporated.Explaintheapparentconflictbetweenjustifications44.iandill.i.The-ITSjustificationIll.ishouldhavestatedthatTravellerCEOG-03,C.lwasincorporatedandwasrevisedtoreflecttheGinnaCTSdescription.ThisisconsistentwiththeincorporationofthistravellerintoNUREG-1431,Revision1whichdenotes,inbrackets,thetextdescriptionofthesitelocation.ThenecessarychangetoITSjustification111'isprovidedundertheITSreviewsection.ProvideadiscussionofchangetojustifydeletingthesiteownershipstatementinexistingTS5.1andrelocatingthestatementthat[theaccidentanalysis]assumptionsarethattheunrestrictedareaboundarycoincideswiththeexclusionareaboundaryforevaluatingradiologicalTS.TheapplicableregulationfordesignfeaturesTSis10CFR50.36(c)(4).ThesiteownershipdescriptionintheCTS5.1isnotbeingdeleted-226-December1995 4.0Q3butrelocatedfromtheTS.ThedescriptionofthesiteownershipandtherequirementsofTS5.1.1and5.1.2arerelocatedtotheUFSARSection2.1.2andFigure2.1-2.Notechnicalchangetotheserequirementshavebeenmade.Thechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangesisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.ThestaffmustbeabletoconcludethattheimprovedTSsupport"adequateprotectionofthepublichealthandsafety"forevaluatingradiologicalconsequencesrelatedto10CFRPart100limits.ToachievethischangeintheITS,retaintheexistingdescriptionofthesiteexclusionareabyaddingaonesentencedescriptionofthesiteexclusionareaboundarytotheITS.Thestaffaccepted:"Theexclusionareaboundaryshallhavearadiusoffromthecenterlineofthereactor"forrecentlyissuedBWR/6plantsconversion'TS.Response:Tobediscussedatthemeeting.45.TechnicalSpecification5.2TS5.2-Thedescriptionofthecontainmentdesignfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificcontainmentfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).Sincethedescriptionofthese.designfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSections3.8.1and6.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.4.0Q4Specifythedocumenteachrelocateditemwillbemovedtoandstatethechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestothatdocument.Response:ThecontainmentdesignfeaturesasdescribedinTS5.2arerelocatedtotheUFSAR.Thisisconsistentwiththeinformationrequiredby10CER50.36ascontainedinNURE6-1431.ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.46.4.0Q5TechnicalSpecification5.3i.TS5.3.l.aandTS5.3.I.c-ThedescriptionofthereactorcoredesignfeatureswasrevisedconsistentwiththestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431.Thesectionnowincludestheamount,kind,andsourceofnuclearmaterialrelatedtothereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Provideadiscussionofchangetojustifydeleting:(1)theapproximatetotalmassofuraniumdioxidepellets,(2)theuseofZircaloy-4,(3)thedescriptionsofthefuelrodpositionsinafuelassembly,(4)reportingrequirementsregardingfuelassemblyrodreplacementlimitsperrefueling,(5)fuelassemblydesignfeaturesregardingguidetubes,instrumentthimbles,andarray,and(6)RCCdesignparametersincludingcontrolcladdingconsistingofsilver--227-December1995 Response:indium-cadmiuminthedesignfeaturesTSsection.(1)TheapproximatetotalmassoftheuraniumdioxidepelletshasbeenrelocatedtoUFSARTable4.2-1.(2)TheuseofZircaloy-4havebeenretainedinITS4.2.1.ThisinformationisalsoprovidedinUFSARSections4.2.3.1,4.2.3.1.6,and4'.3.(3)ThedescriptionsofthefuelrodpositionshasbeenrelocatedtoUFSAR4.2.3.1.(4)ThereportingrequirementsforfuelrodreplacementwillberelocatedtoGinnaStationprocedureA-25.6(attached).Comment¹166hasbeenopenedtoaddressthisissue.(5)ThefuelassemblydesignfeatureshavebeenrelocatedtoUFSARSection4'.3.1andTable4.2-2.4.0(6(6)TheRCCdesignparametershavebeenrelocatedtoUFSAR4.1.1,4.2.3.1,4.2.3.2,and4.2.2.ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARandprocedureA-25.6isinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.TheserelocateditemsdonotmeetthecriteriaforinclusionintheDesignFeaturesoftechnicalspecificationsper10CFR50.36.TS5.3.l.b-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturewithrespecttothemaximumenrichmentweightpercentwasrevisedandrelocatedtonewSpecification4.3.1.Thechangesareinaccordancewiththechangesdiscussedinitem47.ii,below.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.ProvideadiscussionofchangetojustifydeletingtheenrichmentreloaddiscussioninexistingTS5.3.l.b.Further,explainhowtheexistingTS5.3.l.breloadfuelenrichmentdiscussionisrelatedtoITS4.3.1.2.adiscussionondesignfeaturesfornewfuelstorageracks.Response:TheCTS5.3.1.bdenotestherequirementsfornewfuelsimilartotherequirementsdenotedinITS4.3.1.2.a.TheonlydifferencebetweentheCTSandTTSisthattheITSisrelatedto~senoraeofnewfuelwhiletheCTScanbeinterpretedtorelatetoaccetanceofreloadfuel.Afuelhandlingaccidentofthereloadfuelpriortoplacementinthestorageracksisnotofconcernwithrespecttooffsitedosessincethefuelhasnotbeenirradiatedwithsourcetermsbeinggenerated.Therefore,relatingCTS5.3.1.brequirementstostorageofthenewfuelperITS4.3.1.2.aisacceptable.ThediscussionofthefueldeliveredpriortoandafterJanuary1,'984canbedeletedsincethisinformationisencompassedintheITSrequirementofa"maximum"enrichmentandisthereforenolongerapplicable.Thatis,thefuelhandlingaccidentsforthenewfuelpool(withrespecttocriticalityconcerns)havebeenperformedassumingthatthefuelpoolisarrangedwithfuelofthemaximum-228-December1995 enrichmentlimit.Also,theinformationprovidedisconsistentwiththatcontainedinNUREG-1431.4.0Q7lv.TS5.3.2-Thedescriptionofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)designfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificRCSfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSection3.7.1andChapter5).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.3.I.b-Thiswasrevisedtoincreasethefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent.Thischangehasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptablewithrespecttopostulatedfuelhandlingaccidents(Ref.29).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.46)change.ImplementationofthisproposedchangerequiresastaffSERfortheWestinghousecriticalityanalysis(Ref.29)~ProvideareferencetothestaffSE.Response:TheNRCstaffapprovedthischangevialetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.P1ecredy,RGBE,

Subject:

"SafetyEvaluationofRochesterGasandElectric'sProposedCriticalityAnalysisoftheGin'naNewandSpentFuelRacks/ConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters(TACNo.892188),"datedAugust30,1995.47.TechnicalSpecification5.4TS5.4.1,5.4.2,5.4.6,andFigures5.4-1and5.4-2-'ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturesdenotingspentfuelstorageregionsandboratedwaterconcentrationswasrelocatedtoChapters3.7and3.9.ThesefeaturesarediscussedinLCO,3.7.11,LCO3.7.12,LCO3.7.13,andLCO3.9.1asappropriate.Inaddition,appropriateRequiredActionswereaddedintheeventthatSFPwaterlevel,boronconcentration,orSFPregionstoragerequirementsarenotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS5.4.2-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeatureswasrevised.Therevisiontothesefeaturesarebasedonarevisedcriticalityanalysissupportingtheproposed18monthfuelcycle(Reference29).ThedescriptionofthesefeaturesfollowthestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431whichwouldincludetheamount,kind,andsourceofspecialnuclearmaterialwiththeexceptionthatnominalcentertocenterspacingbetweenthefuelassemblieswasnotadded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.4.0Q8Provideadiscussionofchangetojustifydeleting(1)thatfuelisstoredvertically,(2)fuelenrichmentsforunirradiatedfuelassembliesdeliveredpriortoJanuary1,1984,and(3)referencestounirradiatedfuelassembliesdeliveredafterJanuary1,1984.Response:(1)Thefactthatfuelistobestoredverticallyisprovidedin-229-December1995 UFSARSection9.1.2.2.2.ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.(2)Seeresponseto4.0q6.Also,thefuelstoragelimitationsarenowcontrolledbyITSLCO3.7.13.(3)Seeresponseto4.0q6.Also,thefuelstoragelimitationsare,nowcontrolledbyITSLCO3.7.13.4.0Q9Implementationofproposedchangestofuelenrichmentsrequiresa'staffSERfortheMestinghousecriticalityanalysis(Ref.29).ProvideareferencetothestaffSE.Response:4.0Q10Response:Seeresponseto4.0q7.TS5.4.3-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturedenotingthe60-daylimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassemblies'nRegion2wasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaappliesforthetimelimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2.Thecurrent60-daylimitwasestablishedtoprovidesufficientmargininspentfuelpooltemperaturecalculationsasaresultofdecayheatloadsinRegion2fromdischargedfuelassemblies(Reference39).Althoughthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemand,thus,theassociatedrestrictiononheatloadpreventstructuralintegritydamagetothespentfuelpool,theyarenotassumedtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccident(DBA).Therestrictiononheatloadisnotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therestrictiononheatloadisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitedoses.SincenoNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaapply,thisrequirement.isrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.AllproposedTS5.4.3changeswerenotdiscussedinjustification47.iii.Provideamarkupofallproposedchangeswithappropriatejustification.(1)ThediscussionrelatedtostorageinaclosepackedarrayutilizingfixedneutronpoisonsineachlocationhasbeenrelocatedtoVFSARSections9.1.2.1.12and9.1.2.2.2.ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.(2)The60daydecaytimeisdiscussedinjustification47.iiiabove.iv.(3)Theaverageburnupandenrichmentlimitsensuringthatk,<<~0.95discussionhasbeenrelocatedtoITS3.7.13andassociatedFigure3.7.13-1.TS5.4.4and5.4.5-ThesewererevisedconsistentwithReferences29and39toprovidetheamount,kind,andsourceofmaterialwhichisstoredinthecanisters.TS5.4.4.band5.4.5werenotaddedthe-230-December1995 4.0QllResponse:newspecificationsforthereasonsdiscussedinitem47.iiiabove.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(iii),respectively.ShowhoweachcommitmentinTS5.4.5andTS5.4.4.bwillbemaintainedintheimprovedTS4.3.1.1.Explainwhyproposedchangesdiscussedinthisjustificationareadministrativechanges.(1)TherequirementsofCTS5.4.4.ahaveeitherbeenretainedinITS4.3.1.1.c(lastsentence)orrelocatedtotheUFSARasdiscussedintheresponsesto4.0q8and4.0q10.(2)TherequirementsofCTS5.4.4.bonlyrelatetothedecayheatremovalrequirementswhichhavenotbeenretainedasdiscussedinthejustification47.iii.ThisdecayheatremovalrequirementisrelocatedtoUFSARSection9.1.3(Section9.1.3,4.1.6fortheconsolidatedfuelcanisters).ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.V.4.0Q12(3)TherequirementsofCTS5.4.4.5allowthecanisterstoredinRegionRGAF2toexceedtherequirementsofCTS5.4.2and5.4.3.ThisallowanceshouldhavebeenretainedsincethiscanisterwillnotmeettherequirementsofITSLCO3.7.13asrequiredbyITS4.3.1.1.c.CommentiI167hasbeenopenedtoaddthisCTSexceptionbackintotheITSandtocorrectthereferenceinITS4.3.1.1.ctoSpecification3.7.13versus3.7.17.TS5.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludedescriptionsoftheSFPdrainagesystemandcapacity.Thisinformationiscurrentlycontainedinthebasesforthissection.SinceNUREG-1431,Chapter4doesnotcontainanybases,thisinformationhasbeenrelocatedtothespecification.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Theproposedrevisionsarenotclearlymarked.ProvidelegiblecopiesofcurrentTSpages5.4-2,5.4-3and5.4-4andidentifyandjustifyallproposedchanges.Response:ThesepagesareBasespagesandarenotrequiredtobemarkedandjustifiedsincetheDesignFeaturessectionnolongerhasbasespagesandisnotrequiredtoby10CFR50.36=.TheinformationprovidedbythesebasesiscontainedinUFSARSection9.1.ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.Therefore,therequestedpageshavebeenprovidedeventhough,theinformationcontainedonthesepagesisbein'grelocated.48.TechnicalSpecification5.5TS5.5-Thedescriptionofthe'astetreatmentsystemsdesignfeatureswasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthedescriptionofthesefeatures.SpecificwastetreatmentsystemsfeaturesareeithercoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sorhavebeenrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocumentsand,therefore,donotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesDecember1995 Current4.0doesnotsatisfytheNRCfinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisr'elocatedtolicensee'controlleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARChapter11).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS111.ITS4.1IncorporationofapprovedTravellerCEOG-03,C.1(Rev.1).AdditionalchangeswerealsomadetoreflectGinnaStationdesignissues.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.112.ITS4.24.0Q13Response:4.0Q14Response:ApprovedTravellerNRC-01,C.lwasnotincorporatedsincethisdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.ExplainwhythetravelerdoesnotapplytoGinna.TheTravellerproposedtorevisethephrase"zirconiumalloy"with"ZircalloyorZIRLO."ThisTravellerchangeismisleadingandinconsistentwiththenomenclatureusedatGinnaindescribingthisfeature.Thephrase"zirconiumclad"moreaccuratelyrepresentsthedescriptionofthisfeature(seeUFSARTable4.2-3whichshowsthatthecurrentfuel(lastcolumn)iscladbybothzircaloyandinconel).[Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekofll/20/95.Seecomment8226.)ThecontrolrodassemblymaterialdescriptionwasnotaddedtothespecificationssincethespecificationalreadyrequiresNRCapprovalofthismaterial.Therefore,anychangeinmaterialwouldrequirebothaTSchangeandNRCapproval.ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.Thesegenericchangesrequireastaffapprovedtraveler.ThephraseasdenotedontheNUREGismisleadinginthatitcreatestwocomplianceissues.Thefirstcomplianceisthespecificcontrolmaterialthatisidentified.Thesecondcomplianceisthephrase"asapprovedbytheNRC."Additionally,thestructureofthebracketedphraseisconfusinginthatitprovides,withthelogicalconnector"or,"acasewhereallofthecontrolmaterialscanbelistedandonlythose"approvedbytheNRC"arerequiredtobemet.Letsdiscussnextweek.113.ITS4.3ITS.4.3.l.l.cand4.3.1.l.dwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseitemsarenotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThespacingoffuelassembliesintheSFPisultimatelycontrolledbyITS4.3.1.l.aand4.3.1.I.bwhichstate-232-December1995 4.0Q15Response:thatthespentfuelstorageracksaredesignedtolimitk,ffs0.95assumingthepoolcontainsfuelassemblieswith5.05weightpercentU-235enrichmentandisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ExplainthedesignorregulatoryburdenbasisfornotwantingtoupgradeITStothesedesignparameters?Theadditionofthisinformationisnotnecessarytomeetcompliancewith10CFR50:36andisnotinthecurrentTS.klhilethespacingofthefuelassembliesinthespentfuelpoolisanassumptionofthespentfuelpoolcriticalityanalysis,ITS4.3.1.1.brequiresthatthepoolbemaintainedwithak.<<~0.95assumingthatitisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.Consequently,theultimatecritieriaforthedesignandstorageoffuelinthespentfuelpoolistomaintaink,<<withinlimits.Thisisbeingretained.ThespacingofthefuelassembliesisdiscussedintheUFSAR(Table9.1-1).ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.4.0Q16Response:ITS4.3.1.1.eand4.3.l.l.fwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseitemsarecontrolledbynewITS3.7.17.TherevisedITS3.7.17provideslimitsonthestorageoffuelinthetwoSFPregionswithappropriateactionstatementssuchthatTS4.3.l.eand4.3.l.farenolongerrequired.Consequently,approvedTravellerNRC-06,C.1(Rev.1)wasalsonotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.GivethedesignorregulatoryburdenbasisfornotwantingtoupgradeITSto'thesedesignparameters?SincetheserequirementsarecontrolledbynewITS3.7.17,theadditionofthisinformationtoSection4.0wouldleadtothepotentialforconflictinginformationorformis-interpretationofrequirements.TheITSattemptstoeliminateduplicaterequirementsforthisreasonbyrelocatingtheseoperationaldetailstotheITSChapter3.7.Comment¹168hasbeengeneratedtocreateandtrackatravelleronthisissue.[CTS113.iii-M]TheuseofconsolidatedrodstoragecanisterswasaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS5.4.4andReferences29and39.4.0Q17Response:4.0Q18ManyofthedetailsfromTS5.4.4werenotincorporatedintoinsert4.3.l.c.OtherTSrequirementsnotinTS5.4.4wereincludedininsert4.3.I.c.ProvideamoredetailedmarkupofTS5.4.4showinghowthecurrentlicenserequirementsareproposedtobechangeduponimplementationofimprovedTSandexplainthebasisforeachchange.Seeresponseto4.0ql1.ThenecessaryremarkupofthisCTSisattached.Givethebasisforincludingcanisteroperabilityrequirements-233-December1995 (i.e.,insert4.3.l.creferencetospecification3.7.17)indesignfeaturesTS.Response:Thisisconsistentwiththelevelofdetailrequiredfor4.3.1.1by10CFR50.36.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekof11/20/95,Seecomment0226.)4.0Q19Response:Reference39increasesspentfuelstoragecapacityto1016assembliesfrom595.Howisthisrelatedtothejustificationforcanisteroperabilitylimits?ThereferencetoReference39isanerror.Instead,thefollowingdocumentshouldhavebeenreferenced(attached):LetterfromG.E.Lear,NRC,toR.kl.Kober,RGBE,

Subject:

"StorageofConsolidatedFuel,"datedDecember16,1985.4.0Q20iv.ITS4.3.1.2.dwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisisnotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThespacingoffuelassembliesinthenewfuelpoolisultimatelycontrolledbyITS4.3.1.2.aand4.3.1.2.bwhichstatethatthenewfuelstorageracksaredesignedtolimitk.<<~0.95assumingthepoolcontainsfuelassemblieswith5.05weightpercentU-235enrichmentandisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.GivethedesignorregulatoryburdenbasisfornotwantingtoupgradeITStothesedesignparameters?Response:Theadditionofthisinformationisnotnecessarytomeetcompliancewith10CFR50.36andisnotinthecurrentTS.4'bilethespacingofthefuelassembliesinthenewfuelstorageracksisanassumptionofthenewfuelcriticalityanalyses,ITS4.3.1.2.brequiresthatthepoolbemaintainedwithak<<~0.95assumingthatitisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.Consequently,theultimatecritieriafordesignandstorageoffuelinthenewfuelstorageracksistomaintaink.<<withinlimits.Thisisbeingretained.ThespacingofthefuelassembliesisdiscussedintheUFSAR(Table9.1-1).ThechangecontrolprocessgoverningfuturechangestotheUFSARisinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.4.0Q21V..Thedescriptionofthenewfuelstoragerackswasclarifiedtostatethatthedescriptionappliedtothe"dry"racksconsistentwithReference'29.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Themarkupprovidestheterminology"newfuelstoragedryracks."Isthiscorrect?Response:Thephrase"dryracks"moreaccuratelyrepresentsthedescriptionofthisfeature.Thisisaplantspecificnomenclatureandwasaddedtopreventmis-interpretationoftherequirements.AtGinnaStation,thefuelisreceivedandstoredin"dryracks"locatedintheAuxBuildingnearthespentfuelpool.Tobetransferredto-234-December1995 containment,thefuelismovedtothespentfuelpoolandthentransferredbythegatetransfersystem.vi.4.0(22Response:4.0023Response:.ITS4.3.2wasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclatureandtoprovideclarification.TheseareITSCategory.(iv)changes.Howis"<23feetabovethetopofthefuelassemblies"verifiedbyplantprocedurestobemet?ThisisanewTSrequirementforGinnaStation.TheverificationduringrefuelingactivitiesisaddressedbyITSSR3.7.11.1.VerificationatothertimesisnotrequiredbyCTS,norbytheITS.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekofll/20/95.Seecomment0226.JITS4.3.3wasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisaITSCategory(iv)change.ItisnotedthatthevaluespecifiedfortheSFPcapacityisatheoreticalvaluebasedontheexclusiveuseofconsolidatedfuelcanisters(i.e.,nofuelassemblies).ThecurrentSFPislimitedto1016fuelassembliesduetolimitationsoftheSFPCoolingSystem(seethebasesforcurrentGinnaStationTS5.4).SincetheheatremovalcapabilityoftheSFPCoolingSystemdoesnotmeetthecriteriaoftheNRCPolicyStatement,thenewspecificationwasbasedonthetheoreticalvalue.InthecurrentTSthespentfuelcapacitiesareidentifiedspecificallyforregionIandregionII.Provideabasisforchangingthisdesignation.TheCTSspentfuelcapabilitiesareprovidedinFigure5.4-1.ThisfigurehasbeenrelocatedtoITSBasesFigureB3.7.13-1whichisundertheBasesControlProgram.Thecapacitylimitsfoundonthisfigurerelateonlytospentfuelpoolcoolingrequirementswhichhavenotbeenaddedasdiscussedaboveinjustification47.iii.Therefore,theITS4.3.3descriptionwasmarkedtobethetheoreticalcapacityofthepoolconsistentwiththebasesfoundon.CTSpage5.4-4.Section6.0CurrentTS1.xiii.15.viii.,TS1.13-ThedefinitionforOffsiteDoseCalculationHanual(ODCH)wasnotaddedtothe'newspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.(LJTheODCHisdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.I3.5.5RadioactiveEffluentNonitoringInstrumentation(RETSJExistingTS3.5.5,andTable3.5-5proceduralrequirementsaddressinglimitingconditionsforoperation,theirapplicability,remedialactions,andreportingrequirementsforestablishi'ng'adioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationoperabilitytoensurethatthelimitsofexistingTS3.9.1.1-liquideffluentconcentrationsinthecirculatingwaterdischargeandexistingTS3.9.2.1-gaseouswastesinstantaneousdoseratesascalculatedin-235-December1995 6.0Q1Response:19.6.0Q2theODCHarenotexceededarenotassumedintheaccidentanalysisandarerelocatedtoODCNandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinimprovedTSs5.5.1and5.5.4.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ForcurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsandproceduraldetailsofTS3.5.5andTable3.5-5areincludedintheproposedODCHProgram(specification5.5.1)andRadioactiveEffluentsControlsProgramTS(specification5.5.4)andwhichoftheseTSwill.bemaintainedoutsidetheTS.ConfirmthatallNRCguidanceinGenericLetter89-01forremoval'oftheseTStoadministrativecontrolTSprogramshasbeenmet.CTS3.5.5,3.9,and3.16containdetailsrelatedtoimplementationoftheODCMandRETSprograms.AlldetailscontainedintheseCTSsectionsareproposedtoberelocatedtostationprocedures"asis"(i.e.,nochangeswillbemadeotherthanminoreditorialchangesforadditionalclarity).OnlythegeneralrequirementswhichimplementthedetailsoftheseCTSrequirementswillberetainedintheITSODCMandRadioactiveEffluentsControlsProgramspecifications.TheconformancewithrespecttoGL89-01isaddressedintheresponseto3.9/2.TechnicalSpecification3.9-PlantEffluents(RETSJForcurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsandproceduraldetailsofTS3.9areincludedintheproposedODCNprogramandRadioactiveEffluentsControlsProgramTSandwhichofthesedetailswillbe'maintainedoutsidetheTS.(R,TJResponse:Seeresponsesto3.9/2andG.OQ1.ExistingTS3.9.1.1requirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentsofthecirculatingwaterdischargetounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,AppendixB,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-236-December1995 ExistingTS3.9.1.2andexistingTS3.9.2.4requirementsfordoseordosecommitmenttoindividualswhichresultsfromcumulativeliquideffluentdischargesduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodsandisintendedtoassurecompliancewiththedoseobjectivesof10CFRPart50,AppendixI,werenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,radioactiveliquideffluentdoseprojectedvalueisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.1.3requirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,T]respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9..2.1requirementswhi,chassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.2.2.a,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4requirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechni.calspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.Thisisa-237-December1995 vi.V11.ix.GinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.2.2.b,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4requirementsfordoseduetoradioiodine,radioactivematerialsinparticulateform,andradionuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhalf-livesgreaterthan8daysreleasedwithgaseouseffluentswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thesegaseouseffluentsdosesareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.2.3requirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaand'rerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.2.5andTS3.9.2.6specificrequirementsforwhichlimitconcentrationofoxygeninagasdecaytankandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityHonitoringProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.11(R,TJandamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.9.2.7requirementsforthesolidradwastesystemwhichprocesseswetradioactivewasteandoperatesinaccordancewith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,foreffluentcontrolwerenotadded.TheoperabilityofthesystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,radioactivewasteisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgram(R,TJdescribedinnew.Specifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.23.TechnicalSpecification3.13-SnubbersTS3.13-Therequirementsforsnubbersoperabilitywerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheInserviceTesting-238-December1995 6.0Q3ProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8(R,TJandmoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ForcurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsofTS3.13areincludedintheinserviceinspectionandinservicetestprogramTSandshowwhichproceduraldetailsofTS3.13areproposedtobemaintainedintheimprovedTS,e.g.,relocatedtolicensee-controlleddocuments?Response:TheissueofsnubberOPERABILITYascontainedinCTS3.13isaddressedbythedefinitionofOPERABLE-OPERABILITYintheITSsuchthattheassociatedsystem'sLCOwouldbeenteredasapplicableforaninoperablesnubber.Thisisconsistentwithoption2ofCTS3.13.2;Pithrespecttosnubbersurveillancerequirements(CTS4.14),thecurrentISIProgramforsnubbersandtheengineeringdocumentationspecificallyreferencedinthisprogram(attached)containtheCTSrequirementswiththe'xceptionofcertaintextinCTS4.14.l.dandTable4.14-1(e.g.,theengineeringdocumentationreferencesTable4.14-1withoutduplicatingit).ThisCTStextandtablewillbeduplicatedintheengineeringdocumentationpriortoITSimplementationsuchthatCTS4.14willberelocatedinitsentiretytotheISIProgram.25.v.26.Tech6.0Q4LTOPSpecialReportExistingTS3.15.1.3containsarequirementtoreportuseoftheoverpressureprotectionsystemtomitigateanRCSorRHRpressuretransientinaccordancewithspecification6.9.2.TheSpecialReportisrequiredtoincludedocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorRCSvent(s)andadescriptionofthecircumstancesinitiatingthetransient,theeffectofthePORVsorvent(s)onthetransientandanyothercorrectiveaction.TheserequirementsisdetailedinimprovedTS5.6.4,"MonthlyOperatingReports"(TJandisgenerallyincludedintlieLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Spec3.16-RadiologicalEnvironmentalHonitoring(RETSJForcurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsofTS3.16areincludedintheODCNandRadioactiveEffluentsControlsProgramTSandwhichdetailswillbemaintainedoutsideTS.Response:Seeresponsesto3.992and6.0/1.ExistingTS3.16.1andTable3.16-1fortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramrequiresmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinexposurepathwaysandmeasurementofspecifiedradionuclides"whichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublic.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantrisk-239-December1995 0 contributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ExistingTS3.16.2requirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,T)respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.16.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedfor'hisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,T)respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.RadioactiveEffluentP1onitoringSurveillances(RETSJExistingTS4.1.4andTable4.1-5radioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentfunctionsrequiredbythisspe'cificationwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionoraDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandwererelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedin.newSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,(R,TJrespectively.ThisisaGi'nnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits818,828,and0'29-TheSurveillancerequirementsforradiationmonitorsR-1throughR-9andR-17,emergencyplanradiationinstruments,andenvironmentalmonitors,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonot-240-December1995 6.0(5satisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.fRJThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ForcurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsofTS4.1.1andTable4.1-1areincludedintheODCHProgramandRadioactiveEffluentsControlsProgramTSandwhichdetailswillbemaintainedoutsideTS.Response:AllrequirementsofCTSTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹18,¹28,and¹29areproposedtoberelocatedtoplantprocedureswhichimplementintheITSODCNandRadioactiveEffluentsControlsPrograms.Essentially,theCTSrequirementsarebeingrelocatedasistothenewITSprogramswithonlyminoreditorialchanges.29.TechnicalSpecification4.2Inservice1'nspectionExistingTS4.2.1requirementsfortheInserviceInspectionProgram,whichincludeequalityGroupsA,B,andCcomponents,highenergypipingoutsideofcontainment,'snubbersandsteamgeneratortubes,werenotadded.Thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(GinnaStationgAManual,AppendixB)(RJandamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.6.006Response:~ISIfTS42)fIl1yGpAB,dCp*,hghenergypipingoutsidecontainment,snubbersandSteamGeneratortubeqi<<>>dbd<<h(idTS5.5.8)andSGtubesurveillanceprogram(improvedTS5.5.9).Also,inservicepumpandvalvetestingcontainedinexistingTS4.2arenotdiscussedbychangejustification29.i.ForthecurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticandproceduraldetailsoftheISIprogramandtheinservicepumpandvalvetestingcontainedinexistingTS4.2aretobemaintainedinimprovedTS.DiscussanyproposedchangestothegAManualAppendixCfortheinservicepumpandvalvetesting.Uponfurtherreview,RG8EhasconcludedthattheproposedtextaddedtoNUREG5.5.8aschange120.xviishouldbedeleted.TheproposedtextrelatestoISIprogramwhichisdifferentfromtheISTdiscussedinthisspecification(see10CFR50.55a(g)and(f),respectively).Therefore,theCTS,4'.1(i.e.,4.2.1.1,4.2.1.2,4.2.1.3,and4.2.1.5)requirementsforequalityGroupsA,B,andCcomponentsandhighenergypipingisproposedtoberelocatedtotheISIprogramoutsideofTS(seeattached-1-NotethatA,B,andCareequivalentto1,2,3intheISIprogram).TheCTS4.2.1.4accetancecriteriaforSGtubeinspectionsareretainedinITS5.5.9.However,theSGtubeinspectionintervalspecifiedbyCTS4.2.1arebeingrelocatedtotheISIprogramoutsideTS(seeattached-2).Pithrespecttosnubbers,thesearenotreallyinthe1'STProgrameventhoughNUREG-1431,Rev.1statesthattheyare.Instead,theseareintheISIProgram(seeresponseto6.0/5and10CFR50.55a(f)whichonlydiscussespumpsandvalveswithrespectto-241-December1995

theISTProgram).However,RG&EiswillingtoleavetheminITS5.5.8providedthattheirbeinglocatedintheISIprogramisacceptable.Finally,theISTrequirementsofCTS4.2.1and4.2.1.6arebeingrelocatedoutsideTStotheISTProgramsincethislevel'finformationisnotinNUREG-1431,Revision1.However,nochangestothecurrentISTProgramarerequired(seeattached-3).Comment8151hasbeenopenedtocorrecttheNUREGmarkuptoremovethereferencetohighenergypipingandSGtubesintheISTprogram.31.TechnicalSpecification4.4.3RHRSystemsSurveillancesTS4.4.4-Therequirementsforthetendonstress'urveillanceswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.6andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.(T,R)ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.6.0(7Response:Requirementsproposedtoberelocatedneedanevaluationcomparingtheproposedchangetothecriteriaof10CFR50:36andidentifyingthelocationoftherelocatedrequirementandtheproposedcontrolmechanismforfuturechangestotherelocatedrequirement.ProvideanevaluationofcurrentTSrequirementsandshowwhichprogrammaticandproceduraldetailsinTS4.4.4willbemaintainedinproposedTS5.5.6.ExistingTS4.4.3requirementsfortestingoftheRHRsystemintherecirculationconfigurationwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.2andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.(T,RJThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ThedetailsforthetendonstresssurveillancesinCTS4.4.4arebeingrelocatedtothePre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram(ITS5.5.6).CTS4.4.4specifiestheminimumtendonsamplepopulation,testingfrequency,andacceptancecreature.ITS5.5.6requiresthatthe"TendonSurveillanceProgram,inspectionfrequencies,andacceptancecritierashallbeinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram."NUREG-1431referencesRG1.35isSpecification5.5.6whichspecifiestheminimumsamplepopulation,testingfrequency,andacceptancecriteria.Therefore,iftheITS5.5.6specificallyreferencedRG1.35,therewouldbenotechnicalchangesincethespecificationwouldreferenceaNRCapprovedmethodologyforsamplepopulation,testingfrequency,andacceptancecriteriainsteadofreiteratingtheminTS.However,theRG&EprogramdifferswithrespecttoRG1.35withrespecttoseveralfactors.Essentially,theRG&Eprogramrequiressurveillancesofalargersamplepopulationandhasmorestringentacceptancecriteria.Therefore,justreferencingRG1.35wouldbeareductionincommitment.Instead,RG&Eproposedtorequire"inaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram."Thecurrentprogramwas'pprovedbytheNRCinaSERdatedAugust19,1985andNUREG-0821(attached).Assuch,theprogramwouldcontainallthespe'cificdetailscurrentlyinTS,butwouldrequireNRCapprovalforchangestothisprogram,similartoatechnicalspecificationchange.-242-December1995 6.008Therefore,thereisnoreductionincommitmentandthecriteriaforinclusionwithinTSarenotaffected.However,RG&EwouldconsiderputtingtheNUREGwordsreferencingRG1.35backintoITS5.5.6andcontrollingtheadditionalrequirementsinprocedurePT-27(attached).(En'orthecurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticandproceduraldetailsinTS4.4.3willbemaintainedinimprovedTS5.5.2.Response:32.V.6.0(9CTS4.4.3containsspecificcritierafortestingpressure,acceptancecriteria,correctionactions,andtestfrequenciesforsystemsthatcancontaincontainmentsumpfluidduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident.ThisisbeingrelocatedtoPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgram(ITS5.5.2),whichspecifiesthesystemssubjecttothistestingandrequires"preventativemaintenanceandperiodicvisualinspections"andleaktests"atrefuelingcycleintervalsorless."Therefore,thespecifictestingpressure,acceptancecriteria,andcorrectiveactionsarebeingrelocatedtoplantprocedureswhichimplementITS5.5.2.Theseproceduresareunderthecontrolofprocedure.changeprocessatGinnaStationwhichrequires,asaminimum,a10CFR50.59screening.Thetestingfrequencyisalsobeingchangedfromevery12monthsto"refuelingcycleintervalsorless"inITS5.5.2.TheITSessentiallydefinerefuelingcycleintervalas24months(Note-thisisnotanITSdefinitionanywhere,shouldITS5.5.2bechangedtospecify24months?).Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalfrom12monthsto24monthsisacceptablesincetheaffectedsystemsarenormallyfilledwithwater.LeakagethroughthesesystemswouldbedetectedbyoperatorwalkdownsandduringISTrelatedpumptestswhichareperformedquarterly.Therefore,thisincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptable.AirFiltrationSystemSurveillancesTS4.5.2.3-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThislevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVentilationFilterTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.Inaddition,theremainingrequirementswereallrelocatedtotheAdministrativeControlssection.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.(T,RJWhatlicensee-controlleddocumentwillcontainthefrequency'andconditionrequirementsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestsproposedtoberelocated?Whatmechanismwillbeusedtocontrolfuturechangestotheserequirements?Proposedspecification5.5.10statesthatthetestfrequenciesandmethodswillbeperformed,wherepractical,inaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52.Fromthisstatementitisnotpossibletoidentifywhatchanges,ifanyarebeingproposedfortheexistingTSprogrammaticandproceduraldetails.ForthecurrentTSrequirementsshowwhichprogrammaticandproceduraldetailsinTS4.4.3willbemaintainedinimprovedTS.-243-December1995 Response:vi.6.0(10Response:33.iv.TheVFTPspecificallyreferencesRG1.52,Revision2.ThisregulatoryguidecontainsthesametestingfrequenciesasspecifiedinCTS4.5.2.3.1,4.5.2.3.2,4.5.2.3.3,4.5.2.3.4,4.5.2.3.6,4.5.2.3.7,and4.5.2.3.8(seesections5.band5.cofRG1.52).Therefore,thesesevenCTSsectionsarebeingrelocatedtoITS5.5.10.Themethyliodidetestrequirements(CTS4.5.2.3.1.cand4.5.2.3.6.d)willberelocatedtothestationprocedures.TheseprocedureswillbeunderthecontrolofprocedurechangeprocessatGinnaStationwhichrequires,asaminimum,a10CFR50.59screening.TS4.5.2.3.6.a-Thesetestrequirementswererevisedtoclarifythattwoseparatetestsareperformed.AHEPAfiltertestandacharcoaladsorberbanktestare-separatelyperformedwitheachrequiringalimitoflessthan3inchesofwater.Thisisessentiallyequivalenttoacombinedtestoflessthan6inchesofwaterandisconsistentwithspecifiedtestingstandards.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Explainwhatismeantbyessentiallyequivalent?Explaintheextenttowhichcurrentprocedureswillneedtochangetoaccommodatetheproposedchange.CTS4.5.2.3.6.arequiresthatthepressuredropacrossthecombinedHEPAfiltersandcharcoalfiltersbelessthan6inchesof.water.ITS5.5.10.c.land5.5.10.c.3limitthepressuredroptolessthan3inchesfortheHEPAandcharcoalfilters,respectively.Therefore,thetotalpressuredropremainslessthan6inchesbutthelocationofthepressuredropislimited(i.e.,theHEPAfiltercannothaveapressuredropof4inchesandthecharcoalfilter1inchandcontinuetomeettheITSlimits).ThecurrenttestingprocedurestestthepressuredropacrosstheHEPAandcharcoalfiltersseparately(seeattachedprocedurePT-47.3,steps6.5.3and6.6.4)suchthatonlytheiracceptancecriterianeedstobechanged.DieselFuelOilSurveillancesTS4.6.I.d-ThedieselfueloiltestrequirementswererelocatedtonewTS5.5.12andareproposedtobeidentifiedasa"program"consistentwiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.37.TechSpecs4.10RadiologicalEnvironmentalmonitoring(RETS)6.0011TheTSpolicycriteriacannotbeusetorelocateprogrammaticdetailsorrequirementsfromthedesignfeatureandadministrativecontrolsTS.ProvidejustificationforchangestoexistingTS4.10,4.10.1,4.10.2,and4.10.3RadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringTSconsistentwiththecontentofTSfoundin10CFR50.36.Inaddition,Table3.16-1referencedinexistingTS4.10.1isnotdiscussedintheexistingTSmarkupjustifications.ProvideamarkupoftheTableandthenecessarydiscussionsforanychanges.totheexistingTS.TheRETSaddressedbythischangearecontainedinthesurveillance-244-December1995 sectionoftheCTS(Section4.0).Consequently,theTSpolicycritieriaarebeingappliedtosurveillancerequirementsassociatedwithCTSrequirementsthathavebeensimilarlyrelocated(seeresponseto6.0(2and6.0(4).TherelocationofTable3.16-1isaddressedinchange26.iabove(seeresponseto6.0(4)andmarkedupinAttachmentB,Section5.0.NochangestotheRETSsurveillancerequirementswillbemadeintheirrelocation.TS4.10.1andTable4.10-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.10.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.10.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecification,screeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactive.EffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.38.TechSpecs4.11RefuelingSurvei1lances6.0gl2Whatlicensee-controlleddocumentwillitemsofthespentfuelpoolcharcoaladsorberstestsproposedtoberelocated?Whatmechanismwillbeusedtocontrolfuturechangestotheserequirements?-245-December1995 Provideajustificationforadding"penetrationandsystembypass"tothecharcoalabsorberin-placefreontestinproposedspecification5.5.10.d.2.Provideajustificationforusing"absorber"interchangeablywith"adsorber"inproposedTS5.5.10.d.Explaintheuseofboth"adsorber"and"absorber"inexistingTS4.ll.l.l.a.Response:ThedeletedtextinCTS4.11.1.1andCTS4.11.1.2markedwitha"38.i"intheleftmarginonlyreiteratetherequirementscontainedinRG1.52,Revision2whichisspecificallyreferencedtheVFTP.Thedeletedtestingrequirementsof"whentestedatleast150F..."willberelocatedtostationproceduresundercontroloftheGinnaprocedurechangeprocess.AlldifferencesbetweentheproposedVFTPandtheNUREG-1431versionarebeingaddressedbyPlantSystemsintheirreviewof24monthcycles(seeRG&EletterdatedOctober18,1995).Allusesof"absorber"shouldbereplacedwith"adsorber"assuggestedbytheITSVriter'sGuide.TheinterchangeableuseofthisintheCTSisatypographicalinconsistency.Comment¹152hasbeenopenedtoaddressthisintheITS.TS4.11.1-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheSFPfiltrationsystemtestswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.t'RJThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.11.1.l.a,4.11.l.l.b,and4.11.1.I.c-ThesecharcoaladsorbersystemtestingrequirementswererelocatedtotheVFTPdescribed,intheAdministrativeControls(TS5.5.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.39.TechSpecs4.12EffluentSurveillances(RETSJ6.0Q13Response:TheTSpolicycriteriacannotbeuseto'elocateprogrammaticdetailsorrequirementsfromthedesignfeatureandadministrativecontrolsTS.ProvidejustificationtorelocateexistingTS4.12.1,"LiquidEffluents","4.12.2"GaseousWastes",and4.12.3,"WasteGasDecayTanks"requirementsconsistentwiththecontentofTSfoundin10CFR50.36.Inaddition,Table3.16-1referencedinexistingTS4.10.1isnotdiscussedintheexistingTSmarkupjustifications.ProvideamarkupoftheTableandthenecessarydiscussionsforanychangestotheexistingTS.TheRETSaddressedbythischangearecontainedinthesurveillancesectionoftheCTS(Section4.0).Consequently,theTSpolicycriteriaarebeingappliedtosurveillancerequirementsassociatedwithCTSrequirementsthathavebeensimilarlyrelocated(seeresponsesto6.0Q1,6.0QZ,and6.0Q4).TherelocationofTable3.16-1isaddressedinchange26.iabove(seeresponseto6.0Q4)andmarkedupinAttachmentB,Section5.0.NochangestotheRETSsurveillancerequirementswillbemadeintheirrelocation.TS4.12.1.1andTable4.12-1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,-246-December1995 Appendix8,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.1.2-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.1andTable4.12-2-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotan.initialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5'.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.2'-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)values,isanon-significa'ntriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocated,totheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.Theventilationexhaustsystemis'-247-December1995 40.Tech6.0Q14Response:notassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Spec4.13-RadioactiveNaterialSourceLeakageTestsTheTSpolicycriteriacannotbeusetorelocateprogrammaticdetailsor,requirementsfromthedesignfeatureandadministrativecontrolsTS.ProvidejustificationtorelocateexistingTS4.13,"RadioactiveHaterialSourceLeakageTestsrequirementsconsistentwiththecontentofTSfoundin10CFR50.36.ProvideamarkupoftheTableandthenecessarydiscussionsforanychangestotheexistingTS.TherequirementsaddressedbythischangearecontainedinthesurveillancesectionoftheCTS(Section4.0).TheTSpolicycriteriaarebeingappliedtosurveillancerequirementswhicharenotassociatedwithanydesignfeatureoradministrativecontrolsintheCTSorrequiredtobeinthesesectionsby10CFR50.36(seealsoresponseto6.0(22).Therefore,theTSpolicystatementcanbeusedasproposed.TS4.13-Therequirementsforperiodictestingofleakageforradioactivesourceswerenotadded.ThesourceleaktestarenotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,theleakagefromradioactivesourcesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.41.TechSpec4.14-SnubberSurveillanceRequirements6.0Q15Response:ShowwhichprogrammaticcontrolsandproceduraldetailsofTS4.14areincludedintheproposedinserviceinspectionandinservicetestprogramTSandidentifycurrentTSrequirementsthatwillbecontrolledoutsideTS.(R,TJSeeresponseto6.0(3.tCategory(iAdministrativeControlsTS4.14-Therequirementsforthetestingofsnubbersadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8genericprogramdescriptionisprovided.Thisisa'ii)change.werenotInserviceInserviceandmoreGinnaTS-248-December1995 49.TechSpec6.1-ResponsibilitiesTS6.1.1-TherequirementwasrevisedtoincludeastatementthatthePlantHanagershallapproveeachproposedtest,experimentor'odificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.(HJTS6.1-Anewrequirement(Specification5.1.2)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforShiftSupervisorresponsibility.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.50.TechnicalSpecification6.2-OrganizationCrossreferencestoexistingregulatoryrequirementsareredundantandgenerallynotincorporatedintoNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory.(ii)change.(LJPlantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsarereplacedwithgenerictitles.(L)PersonnelwhofulfillthesepositionsarerequiredtomeetspecificqualificationsasdetailedinproposedTS5.3,andcompliancedetailsrelatingtotheplantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesareidentifiedinlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thetwomajorspecificreplacementsarethegeneric"PlantHanager"forthemanagerlevelindividualresponsiblefortheoverallsafeoperationofthe,plantandthegenericdescriptiveuseof"thecorporateexecutiveresponsibleForoverallplantnuclearsafety"inplaceoftheVicePresidentposition.Theplantspecifictitlesfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedinaplantcontrolleddocumentwithspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges(e.g.,asthe'UFSARorgAProgram).Thischangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilities'orrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.(GetHumanFactorsAssessmentBranchapproval)4TS6.2.1.d-Therequirementdescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementtosupportmitigationoftheirconcernswasnotadded.ProposedTS5.2.l.arequiresthat"linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationshallbeestablishedanddefinedthroughoutthehighestmanagementlevels."TheorganizationalstructureisspecifiedintheGinnaStationgAProgram.SincechangestothegAProgramarecontrolledby10CFR50.54(a)(3),equivalentcontrolisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJiv.V.TS6.2.2.b-Therequirementsdescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswerenotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(1),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and'.2.2.e.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJTS6.2.2.d-Therequirementwasrevisedtoclarifythat.theindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresisallowed-249-December1995 vi~6.0Q16Response:tobeabsentfornotmorethantwohours.Thisisconsistentwiththerequirementsforshiftcrewcomposition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.(PIJTS6.2.2.e-TherequirementdescribingtheovertimerequirementforplantstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionswasrevisedtoreferenceaNRCapprovedprogramforcontrollingovertime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Provideadiscussionshowingthattheproposedchangesresultinthesamelimitsasthecurrentrequirements,orrepresentanenhancedpresentationoftheexistingTSintent.CTS6.2.2.estatesthat"shiftcoverageshallbemaintainedwithoutroutineheavyuseofovertime."TheCTSthenspecifythatthisovertimerestrictionprogramshouldapplytopersonnelperformingsafetyrelatedfunctionswithexamplesprovided.1TS5.2.2.estatesthat"theamountofovertimeworkedbyplantstaffmembersperformingsafetyrelatedfunctionsshallbelimitedandcontrolledinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram."TheonlyrealdifferencebetweentheCTSandITSisthat:(1)examplesofpositionsaffectedbytheovertimeprogramarenotprovidedintheITS,and(2)theITSrequiresNRCapprovaloftheprogrambeingimplemented.ThefirstdifferenceisminorandpreventstheneedforTSchangeswhengobtitleschangeconsistentwithotherchangestotheCTS.TheseconddifferenceisanenhancementsincetheSERforthecurrentovertimeprogramspecificallystatesthatNRCapprovalofchangesisrequired(attached).TheITSclarifythisrequirement.51.TechnicalSpecification6.3-StationStaffqualificationsTS6.3.1--ThereferencetotheRG&EletterdatedDecember30,1980,wasreplacedwithwordingconsideredmoreappropriate.ThecurrentSTAprogramatGinnaStationisdiscussedinReferences40and42andwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.'herevisedwordingeliminatestheneedtorevisetheTechnicalSpecificationsiftheSTAprogramislaterrevised,butstillrequiresNRCapprovalofthesechanges.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.6.0Q17Response:Providediscussionshowingthattheproposedchangesresultinthesamelimitsasthecurrentrequirements,orrepresentanenhancedpresentation,oftheexistingTSintent.CTS6.3.1statestheSTAprogrammustbeinaccordancewitha1980RGBEletter.ITS5.2.2.especifiesthefunctionsprovidedbytheSTA,whatPIODEStheSTAistobeassignedtotheshiftcrew,andthattheSTAmustmeetthequalificationsspecifiedwithinaNRCapprovedSTAprogram.Thereferenced1980letterinCTS(attached)doesnotcontainthesedetails,onlythetrainingrequirementsoftheSTA.Inaddition,thisreferencedletterisfromRGBE,butshouldactuallybeaNRCSERorothercorrespondencewhichspecificallyapprovestheSTAprogram.TheNRCapprovaloftheSTAprogramiscontainedinaJanuary12,1982letter(attached).RG&E-250-December1995 providedaddit'ionalinformationtotheNRCinthreelettersdatedFebruary1,1982,Nay14,1986,andOctober1Z,1989.TheRGEEprogramdoesdifferfromtheNRCPolicyStatementofEngineeringExpertiseonShiftasdocumentedinthesethreeletters;hencethereferencetoa"NRCapprovedSTAprogram"intheITS.52.TechnicalSpecification6.4.-TrainingTS6.4-TherequirementsforaTrainingProgramwerenotadded.Therequirementsareeitheradequatelyaddressedbyothe'ection5.0administrativecontrolsorareaddressedby10CFR55requirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJ53.TechnicalSpecification6.5None.54.TechnicalSpecification6.6None.55.TechSpec6.7SafetyLimitViolation6.0(18Response:ForeachoftheCategory(ii)changesidentifytheplantdocumentthatincludestheduplicateTSrequirement.Forasafetylimitviolationtooccur,aplanttransientoraccidentmustfirstoccurwithsubsequentfailureofmultiplesafeguardsequipment(i.e.,asafetylimitviolationwillnotoccurduringnormalpoweroperation).Therefore,thenotificationofmanagementandNRCpartieswillbeperformedduringtheimplementationoftheemergencyresponseproceduresforan"Alert"orhigher.ForCTS6.7.1.b,procedureEPIP1-5(attached)currentlyrequiresnotificationofNRCwithin1hourper10CFR50.72(Step4.2)andimmediatenotificationoftheSeniorVP,CustomerRelations(Attachment2,Step4,a).Plembersoftheoffsitereviewboard(i.e.,NSARB)arelistedinAttachment5ofthisprocedure,butarenotspecificallyidentifiedasbeingrequiredtobenotified.However,.sincetheSeniorVPisalsochairmanoftheNSARB,thisrequirementcanbeconsideredmet.Therefore,CTS6.7.l.bhasbeenrelocatedtoprocedureEPIP1-5.CTS6.7.l.cand6.7.l.drelatetodevelopmentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportandthetimerequirementsforsubmittaltotheNRC,offsitereviewboard,andSeniorVicePresident,CustomerRelations.The14daylimitforsubmittalofthisreporttotheNRC(CTS6.7.l.d)iscontainedinprocedureA-Z5.6,Step3.5.Thecontentofthisreport(CTS6.7.1.c)wouldbetreatedsimilartoanLERwhichisdiscussedinStep3.10ofthisprocedure.TS6.7.l.a-TheinitialoperatoractionsforSafetyLimit(SL)violationswererevisedasfollows:-251-December1995 lv.a.ForviolationoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2,therequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)wasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinNODE3.Immediatelyshuttingdownthereactorcouldinfe}actiontoimmediatelytripthereactor.Therevisionprovidesthenecessarytimetoshutdowntheunitinamorecontrolledandorderlymannerthanimmediatelytrippingthereactorwhichcouldresultinaplanttransient.TheproposedtimecontinuestominimizethetimeallowedtooperateinMODE1or2withaSLnotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.44)change.(LJb.ForviolationoftheRCSPressureSLinMODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasaddedwhichrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeSLwithin5minutes.Specifyingatimelimitforoperatorstorestorecomplianceprovidesgreaterguidancetoplantstaff.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.(NjTS6.7.l.b-TherequirementfornotificationtomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NotificationrequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)(RJchange.TherequirementfornotificationtotheNRCofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisrequirementisdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.72.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJTS6.7.l.c-,TherequirementthataSafetyLimitViolationReportbepreparedwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementfortheonsitereviewcommitteetoreviewtheSafetyLimitViolationReportwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheresponsibilitiesoftheonsitereviewcommitteearerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SLviolationsarereportedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof10CFR50.73.ThedetailsdescribingtherequirementsforcontentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportis,therefore,controlledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.73anddoesnotneedtobespecifiedinTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJTS6.7.I.d-TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttotheNRCwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisa.duplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50./3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(R)The.requirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thedistributionofreportssubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73arerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.(RJTechnicalSpecification6.8Procedures56.6.0019ForeachoftheCategory(ii)changesdiscussidentifytheplant-252-December1995 Response:iv.documentthatincludestheduplicateTSrequirement.ThePCP(CTS6.8.1)iscontainedinprocedureRPA-RV-PCP(attached).NootheritemsareCategory(ii)changes.TS6.8.l.d-TheOffsiteDoseCalculationManualimplementationiscoveredbyamoregenericitemwhichisspecifiedinSection5.5.Itisnotnecessarytospecificallyidentifyeachprogramunderprocedures(seeSectionD,item56.iv).Sincetherequirementsremain,thisisconsideredtobeachangeinthemethodofpresentationonly.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.(AJTS6.8.l.e-ThePCPdescriptionwasnotaddedsincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFR20,10CFR61,and10CFR71anddoesnotimpose.anynewregulations.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocumentswiththerequirementforthePCPrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJTS6,.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.I.b)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenemergencyoperatingproceduresimplementingtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv,a)change.(AJTS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.e)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenproceduresforprogramsandmanualsdenotedinnewSpecification5.5.TheseProgramsinclude:ITSCurrentTS~Proram5.5.15.5.25.5.35.5.45.5.5 5.5.61.13&6.15OffsiteDoseCalculationManual4.4.3PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentNewPostAccidentSamplingProgram3.9&3.16RadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramNewComponentCyclicorTransientLimit4.4.4Pre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram5.5.7NewReactorCoolantPumpFlywheelInspectionProgram5.5.84.2InserviceTestingProgram5.5.94.2SteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgram5.5.104.5.2.3&VentilationFilterTestingProgram4.11.15.5.113.9.2.5&ExplosiveGasandStorageTank3.9.2.6RadioactiveMonitoringProgram5.5.124.6.l.dDieselFuelOilTestingProgram5.5.13NewTechnicalSpecificationBasesControl5.5.14NewSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramThetechnicalcontentofseveralrequirementsarebeingmovedfromotherchaptersofthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsandareproposedtobeidentifiedasProgramsinaccordancewiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Otherprogramswereadded,exceptasdiscussedbelow,toensure-253-December1995 consistencyintheimplementationofrequiredprogramswithinthecurrentlicensingbasis.TheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramwasaddedduetotherelocationoftheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwithGenericLetter89-01andthechangesto10CFR20.TheBasesControlprogramwasaddedtospecificallydelineatetheappropriatemethodsandreviewsnecessaryforachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBases.TheSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramwasaddedtosupportimplementationofthesupportsystemoperabilitycharacteristicsoftheTechnicalSpecifications(newLCO3.0.6).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.(A)57.TechnicalSpecification6.9-ReportingRequirements6.0Q20Response:ForeachoftheCategory(ii)changesidentifytheplantdocumentthatincludestheduplicateTSrequirement.CTS6.9.1.1relatestotherequirementforaStartupReportfollowing(1)receiptofanoperatinglicense,(2)increasedpower7evel,(3)changeinnuclearfue7design,and(4)significantplantmodifications.Ginnahasalreadyreceiveditsoperatinglicensesuchthatitem(1)nolongerapplies.Anincreaseinpowerlevelwou7drequireachangetotheTSandoperatinglicensetoimplementwhilechangesinnuc7earfueldesignandsignificantplantmodificationscouldpossiblyrequireaTSchange.IfaTSchangeisrequiredforitems(2),(3),and(4),thenNRCapprovalmustbeobtainedpriortoimplementationsuchthatthereportprovideslittlebenefit.IfaTSchangeisnotrequiredforitems(3)-and(4),thendocumentationofthesechangeswouldbeperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50.71(i:e.,UFSARupdates).TheimplementationofUFSARupdatesisperformedbyprocedureEP-2-P-112(Step5.3.3.eforNRCcopies).NootherCategory(ii)changesexistinthissection.TS6.9-Thereferencetoreportingrequirementswererevisedconsistentwith10CFR50.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.(AJTS6.9.1.1-TherequirementtosubmitaStartupReportwasnotadded.TheStartupReportismoreappropriatelyaddressedintheNRC-SafetyEvaluationReportauthorizinganOperatingLicense,increasedpowerlevel,installationofanewnuclearfueldesignormanufacturer,ormodificationswhichsignificantlyalterthenuclear,thermal,orhydraulicperformancesoftheplant.TheStartupReportisrequiredtobesubmittedwithin90daysfollowingcompletionof,theaboveactivitiesanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,inclusionoftherequirementforthisreportinTechnicalSpecificationsisnotnecessarytoassuresafeplantoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJTS6.9.1.2-Therequirementsdescribingthedetailsofthemonthlyreportwerenotadded.Thesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.(RJ-254-December1995

6.0Q21ProvidediscussionforthechangesshownasamarkupofexistingTS6.9.1.2.Response:Thechangestothethird,fourth,andfifthlinesofCTS6.9.1.2are"penandink"changesthatwereperformedbasedonverbaldiscussionswiththeGinnaprojectmanagerfollowingchangesto10CFR50.4(i.e.,allofficialcopiesoftheCTScontainthesewrittenchanges).Therefore,thesechangesarenotdiscussedintheconversiontoITS.1V.v.V1.V11.6.0Q22Response:6.0Q23TS6.9.1.3,TS6.9.1.4,Table6.9-1andTable6.9-2-Thedetailsandmethodsimplementingthesespecificationswerenotadded.ThesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectivel'y.ThesubmittaldatewasalsochangedtoMay15thtoallowthesubmittaloftheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReporttocorrespondwiththeMonthlyOperatingReportsubmittaldate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.(RJTS6.9.1.4-Thespecificdatereferencedfortheannualsubmittalwasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR50.36a.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.(AJTS6.9.1.5-TherequirementforthereportingofchallengestopressurizerPORVsorsafetyvalveswasrevisedfromanannualtoamonthlyreportandrelocatedtotheMonthlyOperatingReport(newSpecification5.6.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.(A)TS6.9.2.1-Thereportingrequirementrelatedtosealedsourceswasnotaddedsincethisisspecifiedin10CFR30.50.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(RJFortheCategory(ii)changeidentifytheplantdocumentthatincludestheduplicateTSrequirement.CTS6.9.2.1specifiesreportingrequirementsifleaktesting,ofsealedsourcesindicatesleakage)0.005microcuriesorremovablecontaminatio'n.ProcedureHP-8.2containstheleaktestingrequirementsforsealedsources.TherequirementforNRCnotificationiscontainedinprocedureCHA-RETS-REP-ANNUAL(step9.1andAttachmentI,ll)(attached).TS6.9.2.4-Thereportingrequirementforreactoroverpressureprotectionsystemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementisdetailedinproposedSpecification5.6.4,and'sgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.Sincethecriteriaidentifiedin10CFR50.73includestheareaofdegradedboundariesthatnecessitatesreporting,anyminordifferencesarenegligiblewithregardtosafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.(RJProvidediscussionshowingthattheproposedchangesresultinthe-255-December1995 Response:1X.X.samelimitsasthecurrentrequirements,orrepresentanenhancedpresentationoftheexistingTSintent.CTS6.9.2.4requiresaspecialreporttobesubmittedin30daysiritheeventtheLTOPsystemisactuatedtomitigateaRCSpressuretransient.TheCTSalsorequiresthatthereportdocument:(1)thecircumstancesinitiatingtheevent,(2)theeffectoftheLTOPsystem,and(3)anycorrectiveactionstaken.ITS5.6.4requiresamonthlyreportbythe15thofeachmonththatincludesdocumentationofallchallengestothePORYsorpressurizersafetyvalves.Therefore,thereportsubmittaltimerequirementsremainthesame.ThemonthlyoperatingreportrequiredbyITS5.6.4doesnothavethesamelevelofdetailasCTS6.9.2.4;however,thisreportwoulddocumentitems(1)and(2)abovebasedonCTS6.9.1.2andNRCguidance.Inaddition,10CFR50.73addressesallthreeCTSdocumentationrequirementswithin30daysoftheevent.Therefore,thereisequivalentrequirementsintheCTSandtheITSandexistingregulations.AnewrequirementTS5.6.5wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheCOLR.TheCOLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationcoreoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.(8)AnewrequirementTS5.6.6wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheRCSPTLR.ThePTLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationpressureandtemperatureoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.(NJ58.TechnicalSpecification6.10None.59.TechnicalSpecification6.11None.60.TechnicalSpecification6.12None.61.TechnicalSpecification6.13TS6.13.1-PlantspecificpositiontitlesinthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerereplacedwithgenerictitles.Theplantspecifictitlesfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedinaplantcontrolleddocumentwithspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges(e.g.,the.UFSARorgAProgram).Th'is'hangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.Thisisa.GinnaTSCategory(vi)change.(LJ-256-December1995 6.0(24Response:Providediscussionshowingthattheproposedchangesresultinthesamelimitsasthecurrentrequirements,orrepresentanenhancedpresentationoftheexistingTSintent.CTS6.13.1containsanotewhichstatesthatalternatetitlesmaybespecifiedforapositionaslongasallTSrequirementscontinuetoapplytothealternatetitleandthatthealternatetitlesarespecifiedintheUFSAR.Consequently,theCTSessentiallyusegenerictitlesnowsinceeventhoughaspecifictitleisprovided,anoteallowsthistitletochange.TherequirementtospecifytitlesintheUFSARisaddressedbyITS5.2.1.a.62.TechnicalSpecification6.14None.63.TechnicalSpecification6.15TS6.15.l.b-TheapprovalprocessforODCHchangeswasrevisedtoclarifythattheeffectivechangesbeapprovedbythePlantHanagerinsteadoftheonsitereviewfunction.SincetheonsitereviewfunctionreportstothePlantHanager,thisisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.(AJ64.TechnicalSpecification6.16TS6.16-TheprocessforchangestothePCPwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFRPart20,10CFRPart61,and10CFRPart71anddoesnotimposeanynewrequirements.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedin1'icenseecontrolleddocumentsandtherequirementfortheprogramisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.(R)6.0025Response:FortheCa'tegory(ii)changediscussidentifytheplantdocumentthatincludetheduplicaterequirement.Seeresponseto6.0(19.65.TechnicalSpecification6.176.0(26Response:TS6.17-Therequirementsformajorchangestoradioactivewastetreatmentsystemswasnotadded.Changestothesesystemsarecontrolledby10CFR50.59.NRCnotificationofsignificantchangestothesesystemsisaddressedby10CFR50.59(b)(2).Therefore,.thisspecificationisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.(RJFortheCategory(iii)changeidentifytheplantdocumentthatincludestheduplicaterequirement.Thereviewofallplantchangesunder10CFR50.59iscontainedinproceduresIP-SEV-1andIP-SEV-2whichhavebeenpreviouslyprovidedwithrespecttoprocedurecontrols.Inaddition,procedureCHA--257-December1995 Section6.0RETS-REP-ANNUAL(step9.1andAttachmentI,14.0)containstherequirementtodocumentmajorchangestotheradioactivewastetreatmentsystemintheannualRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReport(ITS5.6.3).ImrovedTS114.ITS5.1IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.1.Incorporationofapproved.TravellerNRC-02,C.21.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.2.115.ITS5.26.0Q27TS5.2.1.c-Thissectiondescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementtosupportmitigationoftheirconcernswasnotadded.TS5.2.l.arequiresthat"linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationshallbeestablishedanddefinedthroughoutthehighestmanagementlevels."TheorganizationalstructureisspecifiedintheGinnaStationQAProgram.SincechangestotheQAProgramarecontrolledby10CFR50.54(a)(3),equivalentcontrolisprovided.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ProvideasubmittaltocorrectthereferencedTStoTS5.2.I.d.ThisproposedchangeisagenericrelaxationthatrequiresanapprovedNEItraveler.ProvidetheRGEpolicythatimplementsthisadministrativecontrol.Response:RGBEagreestowithdrawthischange.Comment¹153hasbeen'openedtoaddthisspecificationbackintotheITS.ii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.3.TS5.2.2.b-Thissectiondescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswasnotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(l),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and5.2.2.e.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.6.0Q28ProvidediscussionexplaininginmoredetailtheequivalenceofthereferencedproposedTSandtheregulationstotheNUREG.Response:NUREGSpecification5.2.2.bstatesthat:AtleastonelicensedReactorOperator(RO)shallbepresentinthecontrolroomwhenfuelisinthereactor.Inaddition,whiletheunitisinPfODE1,2,3,or4,atleastonelicensedSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)shallbepresentinthecontrolroom.Thefirstsentenceof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(iii)statesthat."whenanuclearpowerunitisinanoperationalmodeotherthancold-258-Oecember1995 6.0Q291Vv.V1~shutdownorrefueling,asdefinedbytheunit'stechnicalspecifications,eachlicenseeshallhaveapersonholdingasenioroperatorlicenseforthenuclearpowerunitinthecontrolroomatalltimes."ThisisequivalenttothelastsentenceofSpecification5.2.2.b.Thesecondsentenceof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(iii)statesthat"inadditiontothissenioroperator,foreachfuelednuclearpowerunit,alicensedoperatororsenioroperatorshallbepresentatthecontrolsatalltimes."ThisisequivalenttothefirstsentenceofSpecification5.2.2.b.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.4.TS5.2.2.e-ThissectiondescribingtheovertimerequirementforunitstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionstorequirecontrolinaccordancewithanNRCapprovedprogramwasrevised.RGKEcurrentlyutilizesastaffworkinghourcontrolprogramwhichslightlydiffersfromheNRCPolicyStatementonWorkingHours(GenericLetter88-12).ThisprogramwaspreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.40).TheproposedwordingisconsideredmoreappropriateandconsistentwiththecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.(AJTS5.2.2.f-ThissectiondescribingtherequirementsfortheOperationsManagertoholdanSROlicensewasnotadded.ThequalificationsofthispositionareaddressedinANSIStandardN18.1-1971referencedinTS5.3.ThisisanITSCategory(.i)change.TS5.2.2.g-ThissectiondescribingtherequirementsoftheShiftTechnicalAdvisors(STAs)wasrevised.TherequirementsspecifiedinTS5.3.1aremovedtoTS5.2.2.ginaccordancewithapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.6.ThewordingofTravellerBWOG-09,C.6wasrevisedtoreflectmoreappropriateandconsistentwordingtoGinna-Stationcommitments.TheSTAprogramdoesnotmeetallherequirementsdenotedintheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift(GenericLetter86-04).ThecurrentSTAprogramisdiscussedinReferences41and42andwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ReviseproposedTS5.2.2.gtoincorporatethespecificinformationinRefs.41and42inplaceoftheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift.Response:GinnahasseveraldifferencesfromtheCommissionPolicyStatementincluding:a.RG&EcontinuestouseadedicatedSTAseparatefromtheshiftsupervisorasproposedinthepolicystatement.b.TheRG&EeducationalrequirementsfortheSTAarelessstringentthanrequiredbythepolicystatement.ThesedifferenceshavebeenreviewedbytheNRCandfoundto"meettheintent"oftheSTArequirements(seeattachedletters).This-259-'Oecember1995 levelofdetailisnotinthecurrentTSandRG8EdoesnotbelieveitsnecessarytospecifythisintheAdministrativeControls.Instead,requiringtheprogramtobeonethatisNRCapprovedallowsfuturechangestotheprogramwithoutrequiringunnecessaryTSchanges.116.ITS5.36.0030TS5.3.1-TherequirementforqualificationsofstaffnotcoveredbyRegulatoryGuide1.8wasnotadded.Thisrequirementwasnotconsiderednecessarysinceallactivitieswhichaffectnuclearsafetyarecontrolledbyothertechnicalspecificationrequirements,existingregulations,andthegAProgram.Also,Revision1ofRegulatoryGuide1.8wasnotrevisedtoRevision2inordertomaintainconsistencywith,thecurrentgAProgramandexistingprocedures.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Forthecategory(i)changeexplainallchangestothecurrentTSrequirementsshowinghowtheproposedTSlimitsarethesameasthecurrentlimits.Response:CTS6.3.1statesthat"eachmemberofthefacilityshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,"SelectionandTrainingofNuclearPowerPlantPersonnel,"assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,September1975,forcomparablepositions,exceptfortheShiftTechnicalAdvisor.'"ITS5.3.1statesthat"eachmemberoftheplantstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,September1975,forcomparablepositions."Ascanbeseen,theonlydifferencebetweenthetworequirementsisthediscussionoftheSTAintheCTS.Thissingulardifferenceisdiscussedintheresponseto6.0q17.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.6.117.ITS5.4IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.7.118.ITS5.5IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.8.119.ITS5.6IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.9.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.1,wasmodifiedduetotheformatchangesprovidedbyTravellerBWOG-09,C.9.120.ITS5.7-ProgramandNanualsIncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.10.-260-December1995 ii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.11,supersedeschangesproposedbyapprovedTravellers'OG-06,C:2,andWOG-06,C.3.6.0Q311V.v.Vl~Vl1~IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.12.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.13.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.13,supersedeschangesproposedbyapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.3.Additionalcrossreferences,similartothosedeletedbyTravellerBWOG-09,C13,'erenotadded.Ingeneral,theformatoftheNUREG-1431doesnotincludetheuseofcrossreferences.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thesechangesareprovidedforconsistencywiththenew10CFR20references.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConfirmthattheNRCstaffacceptsthenew10CFRPart20Ginnalicensingbasis.Response:V111.lx.X.Xl~Xl1~6.0Q32'henew10CFRPartZOwasrequiredtobeimplementedbyalllicenseesbyJanuary1,1994.TheNRCdoesnothavetoapprovethisprogramforeachlicensee.Instead,theNRCinspectsandauditscompliancewiththenew10CFRPartZO.RecentinspectionsforGinnainclude94-08and95-05(attached).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.14.'IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.15.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.16.Incorporationof[approved]TravellerBWOG-09,C.17.TS5.7.2.13-TherequirementsfortheSteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgramwererevisedtoreflectcurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.18,providedareviewersnotethatthelicenseescurrentlicensingbasisprogramdescriptionbeprovided.TheproposedTS5.5.9providesthisprogramdescription.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ProvideasourcedocumentreferencefortheSGTubeSurveillanceProgramdescriptionusedinproposedTS5.5.9.PResponse:ThesourcedocumentforITS5.5.9'isCTS4.2.1.4.xiii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.4.Xlv.TS5.7.2.15-TherequirementsfortheVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)wererevisedtoreflectcurrentGinnaStationtestfrequenciesandmethods.Theseareperformed,wherepractical,in-261-December1995 6.0Q33accordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52andANSIN510-1975.DuetotherevisionofTS5.7.2.15,theapprovedtravellerWOG-06,C.5,wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ProvidedocumentationthatproposedTS5.5.10changesresultinthesamelimitsasthecurrentTSlimits.Also,includedocumentationoftheproposedchangestotheNUREGthatdeletetheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3Response:ITS5.5.10isthesameasCTS4.5.2.3exceptasdiscussedintheresponsesto3.6Q9and3.6QIO.ThedeletionoftheSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3statementsinAttachmentDisatypographicalerrorsincethisstatementisincludedinAttachmentC.CommentiI154hasbeenopenedtocorrectthiserrorinAttachmentD.6.0Q34XV.xvi.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.13.TS5.7.2.16-TherequirementforcontrolofthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinoutdoorliquidradwastetankswasnotaddedsincetherearenooutdoorliquidradwastetanksatGinnaStation.Thedescriptionofthemethodologyusedindeterminingradioactivityquantitiesinthewastegasdecaytankswasrevisedtoreflectcurrent'icensingbasis.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ProvidedocumentationthattheproposedTS5.5.11,ExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivitymonitoringprogram.resultsinthesamelimitsascurrentTS.Response:ThedifferencesbetweenITS5.5.11andCTS3.9.2.5arediscussedinchange19.viii.However,toexpandthisdiscussion,thefollowingisalsoprovided.TherequirementtolimittheoxygenconcentrationlimitsinthewastegasdecaytanksisrelocatedtoITS5.5.11buttheactuallimitsaretobecontrolledbyprocedureCH-SANP-PISAoutsideTS(attached).TherequirementforasurveillanceprogramtoverifytheselimitsaremetisanewTSrequirementforGinna.However,thissurveillanceprogramisalsoaddressedbyprocedureCH-SAPIP-PISA.xvi1.6.0Q35Response:TS5.7.2.12-Theinservicetestingprogramdescriptionwasrevisedtoincludehighenergypipingoutsidecontainmentandsteamgeneratortubes.ThisisconsistentwiththeGinnaStationcurrent'icensingbasisandapprovedISTprogram.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.ProvidedocumentationthattheproposedTS5.5.4.b,limitationsonliquideffluentreleasestounrestrictedareasandproposedTS5.5.8,ITSProgramresultsinthesamelimitsascurrentTS.ThedifferencesbetweenITS5.5.4.b(RETS)andCTSisaddressedintheresponseto6.0Q1;6.0Q2,6.0Q4,6.0Q5,and6.0Q11.ThedifferencesbetweenITS5.5.8andCTSisaddressedintheresponseto6.0Q6.xviii.TS5.7.2.17-Therequirementdenotingthepurposeofthediesel-262-December1995 '6.0Q36Response:fueloiltestingprogramwasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationcurrentlicensingbasis.ApprovedTravellerWOG-06,C6,wasnotincorporatedduetotheproposedrevisionstotheserequirements.ThisisanITSCategory(i.)change.ProvidedocumentationthattheproposedTS5.5.12,dieselfueloiltestingprogramresultsinthesamelimitsascurrentTS.CTS4.6.1.drequiresverificationevery92daysthat"asampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetanksiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTHD975-78whencheckedforviscosity,waterandsediment."ITS5.5.1Zrequiresaprogramwithsampling,testing,andacceptancecriteriaofTable1ofASTP1D975.Thedifferences.betweentheCTSandITSinclude:(1)therelocationofthefrequencyofthisfueloilsampletoprocedureCH-S-FOoutsideTS(attached),and(2)theyearoftheASTNstandardisnotprovidedintheITS.TheyearwasomittedtoallowachangetoamorerecentASTNstandardwithoutrequiringaTSchange.Itshould.benotedthattheCTSonlyrequirechecksforviscosity,waterandsedimentwhiletheITSrequirementismore"openended."However,Table1ofASTHD975includeschecksofflashpoints,ash,sulfur,copper,etc.whichRGEEisnotagreeingtoperform.Therefore,RGBEproposestoreviseITS5.5.12toonlyrequirechecksof'iscosity,waterandsediment.ThisisconsistentwiththeCTSandthebasesforITSSR3.8.3.2.CommentiI155hasbeenopenedtoaddressthis.(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekofll/1/95.SeecommentiI196.Jxix.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.19.XX.6.0Q37Response:TS5.7.2.14-The-secondarywaterchemistryprogramwasrevisedconsistentwiththecurrentprogramspecifiedintheGinnaStationlicense.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Providethecorrectreferenceinplaceofreference120.xxonpage5.0-21,-5.0-25intheNUREGmarkupasnecessary.ProvidedocumentationthatproposedTS5.5.2,andproposedTS5.5.5[needtheFSARreference]resultinthesamelimitsasthecurrentTS.IncludeanexplanationofwhytheproposeddeletionoftheALARAprogramobjectivedoesnotapplytoGinna.Provideasourcedocumentref'erencefortheSecondaryWaterChemistryProgramdescriptionusedinproposedTS5.5.15.Change"120.xxi"shouldbeprovidedinplaceofchange"1ZO.xx"onthefollowingpages:5.0-20,5.0-21,5.0-23,and5.0-25(attached).Thisnewchangegustificationisprovidedbelow:120.xxiVariouseditorialchangesweremadewithintheAdministrativeControlsProgramsandNanualsection.Theseincludeadding"program"after.thetitletoPrimaryCoolant'ourcesOutsideContainment,PostAccidentSampling,andComponentCyclicorTransientLimittobeconsistentwiththerestofthesection.Also,theComponentCyclicorTransientLimitProgramwasrevisedtoonlygenericallyreferencetheUFSARwithoutidentifyingaspecificsection-263-December1995 topreventaTSchangeiftheUFSARsectionisrenumbered.(Note-theUFSARiscurrentlyundergoingamajorrewriteasresultofthenewSGs,ITS,and18monthcycles.)Finally,theuseof"TS"inSpecification5.5.8.dwasreplacedw'ith"TechnicalSpecification"sincethisabbreviationisnotpreviouslydefinedinthissection.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.Also,thefollowingnewchangejustificationshouldbeaddedforpage5.0-20.120.xxiiTheALARArequirementsofthePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentprogramwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThedoseanalysisforGinnausesatotalleakagefromallaffectedsystemsof2gallonsperhour(CTS4.4.3.2)sincenocreditistakenfortheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystemfollowinganLOCA.ThisvalueisproposedtobecontrolledbystationproceduresfollowingrelocationfromtheCTS.Therefore,specifyingALARAisunnecessaryandinsomeinstances,couldexceedtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.WithrespecttothecomparisonofITS5.5.2andCTS4.4.3,seetheresponseto6.0q8.ThesourcedocumentfortheSecondaryWaterChemistryProgramistheGinnalicense,page4.Finally,asaresultoftheprevious"missing"changejustificationsidentifiedabove,acomparisonoftheNUREGNarkup(AttachmentD)andtheretypedversion(AttachmentC)wasperformed.ThisreviewidentifiedtwoitemsontheretypethatwerenotintheNUREGmarkup.ThesechangestotheNUREGmarkupareprovidedusingye'liowhighlightstoshowthechanges.The'irstitemrelatestoInsert5.0.5anddoesnotrequireadditionaljustification.TheseconditemrelatestheSFDPwhichdoesrequireajustificationasprovidedbelow(Thisresponsewaschangedasaresultofmeetingstheweekofll/I/95.Seecomment0'187.J:121.iiiEditorialchangesweremadetotheSFDPtoprovideadditionalclarity.Thesechangeswererequestedbyoperationalpersonneltobetterunderstandtheintentofthisprogram.Themostsignificantchangeistoclarifythatalossofsafetyfunctioncanexistatatrainlevelandnotjustdueto~ssteminoperabilityastheNUREGstates.Forexample,CCWPumpA(assuppliedbydieselgeneratorA)couldbe'noperableinaccordancewithLCO3.7.7buttheCCWsystemitselfremainsOPERABLE(i.e.,you'einarequiredactionwith72hourstocomplete).IfdieselgeneratorBweresubsequentlydeclaredinoperable,alossofsafetyfunctionexistsuponalossofoffsitepower.Thislossoffunctionisduetothelossoftwotrainsoftwosystems.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-264-December1995

Also,additionalchangesthatshouldhavebeenmadetotheboththemarkupandtheretypewereidentifiedonpages5.0-23andInsert5.0.5(attachedandhighlighted).NofurtherjustificationsarerequiredforthesechangesbutCommentII156hasbeenopenedtotracktheirincorporation.[En'21.ITS5.81~11.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.20.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-25,C.3.122.ITS5.9i.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.21.6.0Q38TheincorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.21,wasrevised.toreflectasubmittaldateconsistentwiththereportingrequirementsof10CFR20.2206(c).ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.JProvidedocumentationthattheproposedTS5.6.1resultsinthesamelimitsascurrentTS.Response:TheonlydifferencebetweenCTS6.9.2.2andITS5.6.1isthat:(1)theITSreferencethenewpart20section(20.2206(c)versus20.407),and(2)theparenthetical"(describemaintenance)"wasremovedintheITS.Thisparentheticalisnotnecessarytodescribethetypeofjobfunctionsrequiredtobeaddressedintheannualreport."IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.22.1V.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.23.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.7.Vl.6.0Q39TS5.9.2.b-Therequirementforaspecialreportfollowingfourormorevalidfailuresofanindividualemergencydieselgeneratorinthelast25demandswasnotaddedsincetherequirementisnotspecifiedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Anyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ProvidediscussionexplainingatechnicalorhardshipbasisfornotchoosingtoadopttheNUREGTS.Response:RGEEdoesnothaveanyrequirementsforacceleratedtestingofthedieselgeneratorsandisnotwillingtoaddthisrequirementnor'pecialreport.ThisisdescribedinAttachmentA,SectionC,item94.viii.Acceleratedtestinghasbeendemonstratedtocauseadditionaldieselgeneratorwearandtearandsubsequentreductioninsystemreliability.Inaddition,theNRChasallowedthistestingandspecialreporttobeeliminateduponimplementationof-265-December1995 1l~)(I0<<(,).lh-'P~-.),,-QAC~I"<<IJ)J'-C'1I~)Ii'f3c.'iJJ)Jlg)~*$ty()~'IJPJI)'.~I')J)o),tlJII~J theNaintenanceRule.RG&EplanstoimplementtheHaintenanceRulebyJune1,1996whichisonly5monthsafterimplementationofthe1'TS.Thissmalltimedifferenceisconsideredminor.6.0Q40V11.TS5.9.2.d-TherequirementforaspecialreportfollowingdegradationofthecontainmentstructuredetectedduringtestrequiredbythePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramwasnotaddedsincetherequirementisnotspecifiedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications'nyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ProvidediscussionexplainingatechnicalorhardshipbasisfornotchoosingtoadopttheNUREGTS.Response:6.0Q41Response:1X~6.0Q42Thisspecialreportisonlyrequ'iredbytheITSintheeventof"anyabnormaldegradationofthecontainmentstructure."However,"abnormaldegradation"isnotdefinedleavingthisopentointerpretationbytheNRCandRG&E.Also,thereisnotimelimitonsubmittingthisspecialreport.Also,ifRG&EcommitstoRG1.35(seeresponseto6.0q7),section8ofthisdocumentreiteratesthisspecialreportrequirement.ThisspecialreportisalsonotcontainedintheCTS.10CFR50.73(v)requiresreportingof"anyeventofconditionthatalonecouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofthesafetyfunctionofstructuresorsystemsthatareneededto:(e)controlthereleaseofradioactivematerial."Therefore,ifthetendonsurveillanceprogramidentifiedsufficientdegradationtoaffectcontainmentOPERABILITY,aLERisrequired.RG&Econsidersthissufficientreportingrequirementswithoutrequiringaspecialreport.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.18.ThisTravellerwasrevisedtoreflectthattherequirementforaspecialreportforsteamgeneratortubeinspectionswasnotaddedsincetherequirementisnotspecifiedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Anyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ProvidediscussionexplainingatechnicalorhardshipbasisfornotchoosingtoadopttheNUREGTS.TherequirementforthespecialreportisintheISIProgram(attached)andnotintheCTS.RequiringthistobespecifiedintheITSisonlyredundantandunnecessary.TheISIProgramrequiresNRCreviewandapprovalforchanges.TS5.9.2.c-TherequirementforaSpecialReportfollowingextendedPostAccidentMonitoringinstrumentationinoperabilityandtheassociateddetailsofthereportandwhenitshouldbesubmittedwerenotadded.Thedetailscanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicensee'sadministrativecontrols.ThisinformationwasaddedtothebasesfortheLCORequiredActionswhichrequiredtheSpecialReporttobewritten.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThisreportisnecessarytotheproperapplicationofthePAN-266-December1995 ~~I~I instrumentationTS.ProvidearedraftofthePANTSandtheassociatedBasesthatmovesthereporttoanLCOActionconditionforfailuretomeetchanneloperabilityrequirementsforradiationmonitorslocatedinsidecontainment.Otherwisethealternativeistoinitiateaplantshutdown.Response:ThePANSITSincludesthisspecialreport(seeRequiredActionsC.landF.lofITSLCO3.3.3).Suggestthisissuebe'addressedduringreviewofthisLCO.6.0043Comment122.xisusedintheNUREGmarkup.Providethediscussion.Response:Changejustification122.xisprovidedbelow:122.xThereferencetotheProcessControlProgramwasnotaddedtotheRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReport.ThisprogramisnolongerdefinedintheNUREGas'twasremovedvia8h'OG-09,C.13.maintainingreferencetothisprogramcreatesthe.potentialforconfusionwithoutanyadditionalbenefit.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.123.ITS5.10.124.ITSIncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.24,supersedestheincorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.8.5.116.0044Response:Thesechangesareprovidedforconsistencywiththenew10CFR20references.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.DocumentthattheNRCstaffacceptsthenew10CFRPart20Ginnalicensingbasis.Thenew10CFRPart20wasrequiredtobeimplementedbyalllicenseesbyJanuary1,1994.TheNRCdoesnothavetoapprovethisprogramforeachlicensee.Instead,theNRCinspectsandauditscompliancewiththenew10CFRPart20.RecentinspectionsforGinnainclude94-08and95-05(attached).-267-December1995 /-tC<(tt1 ANDRochesterGashElectricCorporationR.E.GirlnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember'I995SubmittalAttachmentLChapters1.0-3.4VolumeV AttachmentL"Redlined"VersionofAttachmentCasSubmittedonHay26,1995December1995

Definitions1.11.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.1DefinitionsOTE-----------------------------------NThedefinedtermsofthissectionappearincapitalizedtypeandareapplicablethroughouttheseTechnicalSpecificationsandBases.TermACTIONSDefinitionACTIONSshallbethatpartofaSpecificationthatprescribesRequiredActionstobetakenunderdesignatedConditionswithinspecifiedCompletionTimes.ACTUATIONLOGICTESTAnACTUATIONLOGICTESTshallbetheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.TheACTUATIONLOGICTEST,asaminimum,shallincludeacontinuitycheckofoutputdevices.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)CHANNELCALIBRATIONAFDshallbethedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetector.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONshallbetheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechannelsothatitrespondswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONshallencompasstheentirechannel,includingtherequiredsensor,alarm,interlock,44ae-cene4an4sd,i'~sp'fay.,andtripfunctions.Calibrationofinstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetector(RTD)orthermocouplesensorsmayconsistofaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorandnormalcalibrationoftheremainingadjustabledevicesinthechannel.Wheneverasens>'ngeement'isgreplaced,thegiextrequiredCHANNELCALIBRAT/ONshallinclu)4aninplacequalit'tiveassessqlntofsensorf4haviorthatcomparetheother~sensingelement~swiththerecentlynstalledsensingelement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-1(continued)DraftB Definitions1.1l.1Definitions(continued)CHANNELCALIBRATION(continued)TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONmaybeperformedbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlappingcalibrationsortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.CHANNELCHECKCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)22'7COREALTERATIONIl'tCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131ACHANNELCHECKshallbethequalitativeassessment,byobservation,ofchannelbehaviorduringoperation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.ACOTshallbetheinjectionofasimulatedoractualsignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifytheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,ding'p'l!aj',,:!"',:.andtripfunctions.TheCOTshallinclude'djustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy.COREALTERATIONshallbethemovementofanyfuel,sources,or~reactivitycontrolcomponents,withinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadremovedandfuelinthevessel.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.TheCOLRistheplantspecificdocumentthatprovidescyclespecificparameterlimitsforthecurrentreloadcycle.ThesecyclespecificparameterlimitsshallbedeterminedforeachreloadcycleinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.5.PlantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualSpecifications.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131(microcuries/gram)thatalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,1-134,andI-135actuallypresent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-2(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-3(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)E-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYEshallbetheaverage(weightedinproportiontotheconcentrationofeachradionuclideinthereactorcoolantatthetimeofsampling)ofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergi~es(inHeV)perdisintegrationfornon-iodineisotopes,withhalflives>15minutes,makingupatleast95%ofthetotalnon-iodineactivityinthecoolant.LEAKAGELEAKAGEfromtheRCSshallbe:a.IdentifiedLEAKAGE1.LEAKAGE,suchasthatfrompumpsealsor,valvepacking(exceptreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealwaterinjectionorreturn),thatiscapturedandconductedtocollectionsystemsorasumporcollectingtank;2.LEAKAGEintothecontainmentatmospherefromsourcesthatarebothspecificallylocatedandknowneithernottointerferewiththeoperationofleakagedetectionsystemsornottobepressureboundaryLEAKAGE;or3.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)LEAKAGEthroughasteamgenerator(SG)totheSecondarySystem;b.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEAllLEAKAGE(exceptRCPsealwaterinjectionorreturn)thatisnotidentifiedLEAKAGE;R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-4(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)c.PressureBoundarLEAKAGELEAKAGE(exceptSGLEAKAGE)throughanonisolablefaultinanRCScomponentbody,pipewall,orvesselwall.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-5(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)NODE'NODEshallcorrespondtoanyoneinclusivecombinationofcorereactivitycondition,powerlevel,averagereactorcoolanttemperature,andreactorvesselheadclosurebolttensioningspecifiedinTable1.1-1withfuelinthereactorvessel.OPERABLE-OPERABILITYPHYSICSTESTSAsystem,subsystem,train,component,ordeviceshallbeOPERABLEorhaveOPERABILITYwhenitiscapableofperformingitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)andwhenallnecessaryattendant'nstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpower,coolingandsealwater,lubrication,andotherauxiliaryequipmentthatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,component,ordevicetoperformitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).PHYSICSTESTSshallbethosetestsperformedtomeasurethefundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthereactorcoreandrelatedinstrumentation.Thesetestsare:a.DescribedinChapter14,InitialTestProgramoftheUFSAR;b.Authorizedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59;orc.OtherwiseapprovedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-6(continued)Draft8 Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)RATEDTHERMALPOWER(RTP)SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)ThePTLRistheplantspecificdocumentthatprovidesthereactorvesselpressureandtemperaturelimits,includingheatupandcooldownrates,andthepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsandenabletemperatureassociatedwiththeLowTemperatureOverpressurizationProtectionSystemforthecurrentreactorvesselfluenceperiod.ThesepressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbedeterminedforeachfluenceperiodinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.6.Plantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualspecifications.QPTRshallbetheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.RTPshallbeatotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolantof1520MWt.SDMshallbetheinstantaneousamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcriticalorwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassuming:a.Allrodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)arefullyinsertedexceptforthesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworth,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn.WithanyRCCAsnotcapableofbeingfullyinserted,thereactivityworthoftheRCCAsmustbeaccountedforinthedeterminationofSDM;andb.InMODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-7(continued)DraftB Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-8(continued)Draft8 Definitions1.1l.1Definitions(continued)STAGGEREDTESTBASISTHERMALPOWERASTAGGEREDTESTBASISshallconsistofthetestingofoneofthesystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsduringtheintervalspecifiedbytheSurveillanceFrequency,sothatallsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsaretestedduringnSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,wherenisthetotalnumberofsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsintheassociatedfunction.THERMALPOWERshallbethetotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolant.TRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)(~~rATADOTshallconsistofoperatingthetripactuatingdeviceandver'ifyingtheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,8]',"s'p;fiat~:andtripfunctions.TheTADOTshallincIudeadjustment,asnecessary,ofthetripactuatingdevicesothatitactuatesattherequiredsetpointwithintherequiredaccuracy.R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-9DraftB Definitions1.1Table1.1-1(page1of1)MODESMODETITLEREACTIVITYCONDITION(k,)RATEDPOWERaAVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTTEMPERATURE('F)PowerOperationStartupHotShutdownHotStandby()ColdShutdown(b)Refueling()a0.99a0,99<0.99<0,99<0.99>5(5NANA'350350>T,>200z200(a)Excludingdecayheat.(b)Allreactorvesselheadclosureboltsfullytensioned.(c)Oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensioned.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-10DraftB LogicalConnectors1.21.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.2LogicalConnectorsPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoexplainthemeaningoflogicalconnectors.LogicalconnectorsareusedinTechnicalSpecifications(TS)todiscriminatebetween,andyetconnect,discreteConditions,RequiredActions,CompletionTimes,andFrequencies.TheonlylogicalconnectorsthatappearinTSareANDiiid,:":;:,OR.Thephysicalarrangementoftheseconnectoisconstituteslogicalconventionswithspecificmeanings.BACKGROUNDSeverallevelsoflogicmaybeusedtostateRequiredActions.Theselevelsareidentifiedbytheplacement(ornesting)ofthelogicalconnectorsandbythenumberassignedtoeachRequiredAction.ThefirstleveloflogicisidentifiedbythefirstdigitofthenumberassignedtoaRequiredActionandtheplacementofthelogicalconnectorinthefirstlevelofnesting(i.e.,leftjustifiedwiththenumberoftheRequiredAction).ThesuccessivelevelsoflogicareidentifiedbyadditionaldigitsoftheRequiredActionnumberandbysuccessiveindentationsofthelogicalconnectors.WhenlogicalconnectorsareusedtostateaCondition@CompletionTimeorFrequency,onlythefirstlevelof'ogicisused,andthelogicalconnectorisleftjustifiedwiththestatementoftheCondition~>)CompletionTime,orFrequency.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseoflogicalconnectors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-iDraftB LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-1LOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.1Verify.ANDA.2Restore.InthisexamplethelogicalconnectorANDisusedtoindicatethatwheninConditionA,bothRequiredActionsA.1andA.2mustbecompleted.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-iiDraftB

LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-2MULTIPLELOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.1TripORA.2.1Verify..ANDA.2,2,1Reduce.ORA.2.2.2Perform.ORA.3Align.Thisexamplerepresentsamorecomplicateduseoflogicalconnectors.RequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andA.3arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformedasindicatedbytheuseofthelogicalconnectorORandtheleftjustifiedplacement.AnyoneofthesethreeActionsmaybechosen.IfA.2ischosen,thenbothA.2.1andA.2.2mustbeperformedasindicatedbythelogicalconnectorAND.RequiredActionA.2.2ismetbyperformingA.2.2.1orA.2.2.2.TheindentedpositionofthelogicalconnectorORindicatesthatA.2.2.1andA.2.2.2arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-iiiDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.3CompletionTimesPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionisto.establishtheCompletionTimeconventionandtoprovideguidanceforitsuse.BACKGROUNDLimitingConditionsforOperation(LCOs)specifyminimumrequirementsforensuringsafeoperationoftheplant.TheACTIONSassociatedwithanLCOstateConditionsthattypicallydescribethewaysinwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOcanfailtobemet.SpecifiedwitheachstatedConditionareRequiredAction(s)andCompletionTime(s).DESCRIPTIONL4OTheCompletionTimeistheamountoftimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredAction.Itisreferencedtothetimeofdiscoveryofasituation(e.g.,inoperableequipmentorvariablenotwithinlimits)thatrequiresenteringanACTIONSConditionunlessotherwisespecified,providingtheplantisinaMODEorspecifiedconditionstatedintheApplicabilityoftheLCO.RequiredActionsmustbecompletedpriortotheexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime.AnACTIONSConditionremainsineffectandtheRequiredActionsapplyuntiltheConditionnolongerexistsortheplantisnotwithintheLCOApplicability.IfsituationsarediscoveredthatrequireentryintomorethanoneConditionatatimewithinasingleLCO(multipleConditions),theRequiredActionsforeachConditionmustbeperformedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime.WheninmultipleConditions,separateCompletionTimesaretrackedforeachConditionstartingfromthetimeofdiscoveryofthesituationthatrequiredentryintotheCondition.OnceaConditionhasbeenentered,subsequenttrains,subsystems,components,orvariablesexpressedintheCondition,discoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,willnotresultinseparateentryintotheCondition,unlessspecificallystated.TheRequiredActionsoftheConditioncontinuetoapplyV5';ia'ch:,.;:.a'ddi~tjo'jill:";;'.fii:1F7re>gwithCompletionTimesbased"oninitialentryintotheCondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-iDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)However,whenasubsequenttrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheConditionisdiscoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimitstheCompletionTime(s)maybeextended.jThi','"':,':,tomjl,et'i'j~!:;::mme,"exten's'j'on."',:::,."::.;.canrjot;:::,;.:b'e~u's'e'dfirstbemet.Thesubsequentinoperability:a.Mustexistconcurrentwiththefirstinoperability;andb.Hustremaininoperableornotwithinlimitsafterthefirstinoperabilityisresolved.ThetotalCompletionTimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredActiontoaddressthesubsequentinoperabilityshallbelimitedtothemorerestrictiveofeither:a~b.ThestatedCompletionTime,asmeasuredfromtheinitialentryintotheCondition,plusanadditional24hours;orThestatedCompletionTimeasmeasuredfromdiscoveryofthesubsequentinoperability.TheaboveCompletionTimeextensionsdonotapplytothoseSpecificationsthathaveexceptionsthatallowcompletelyseparatere-entryintotheCondition(foreachtrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheCondition)andseparatetrackingofCompletionTimesbasedonthisre-entry.TheseexceptionsarestatedinindividualSpecifications.(continued)R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-iiDraft8

CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)TheaboveCompletionTimeextensiondoesnotapplytoaCompletionTimewithamodified"timezero."Thismodified"timezero"maybeexpressedasarepetitivetime(i.e.,"onceper8hours,"wheretheCompletionTimeisreferencedfromapreviouscompletionoftheRequiredActionversusthetimeofConditionentry).Anexampleofamodified"timezero"withtheCompletionTimeexpressedas"onceper8hours"isillustratedinExample1.3-6,ConditionA.InthisexamPMe'xamp.l,i,theCompletionTimemaynotbeextended.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseofCompletion.TimeswithdifferenttypesofConditionsandchangingConditions.EXAMPLE1.3-1COMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursConditionBhastwoRequiredActions.EachRequiredActionhasitsownseparateCompletionTime.EachCompletionTimeisreferencedtothetimethatConditionBisentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-iiiDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-2DEFAULTCONDITIONSLCO3.0.3ENTRYCOMPLETION(continued)TIMESTheRequiredActionsofCondition8aretobeinMODE3within6hoursANDinMODE5within36hours.Atotalof6hoursisallowedforreachingMODE3andatotalof36hours(not42hours)isallowedforreachingMODE5fromthetimethatConditionBwasentered.IfMODE3isreachedwithin3hours,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext33hoursbecausethetotaltimeallowedforreachingMODE5is36hours.IfConditionBisenteredwhileinMODE3,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext36hours.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.A.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.7days8,.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursWhenatrainisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisentered.IfthetrainisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,ConditionBisalsoenteredandtheCompletionTimeclocksforRequiredActionsB.1andB.2start.IftheinoperabletrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusafterConditionBisentered,ConditionAandBareexited,andtherefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionBmaybeterminated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-ivDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-2(continued)Whenasecondtrainisdeclaredinoperablewhilethefirsttrainisstillinoperable,ConditionAisnotre-enteredforthesecondtrain.LCO3.0.3isentered,sincetheACTIONSdonotincludeaConditionformorethanoneinoperabletrain.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterLCO3.0.3isentered,butcontinuestobetrackedfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.WhileinLCO3,0.3,ifm4her'o'neoftheinoperaletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimefor'onditionAhasnotexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionA.WhileinLCO3.0.3,ifei4hero'n'eoftheinoperabletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasexpired,LCO3.0,3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionB.TheCompletionTimeforConditionBistrackedfromthetimetheConditionACompletionTimeexpired.UponrestoringÃ4heroneof'hetrainstoOPERABLEstatus,the,ConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetimethefirsttrainwasdeclaredinoperable.ThisCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthetrainrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperabletrain.A24hourextensiontothestated7daysisallowed,providedthisdoesnotresultinthesecondtrainbeinginoperablefor7days.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-vDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-3MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.A.1RestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.OneFunctionYtraininoperable.B.lRestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursC.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.ANDOneFunctionYtraininoperable.C.lRestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ORC.2RestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-viDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-3(continued)WhenoneFunctionXtrainandoneFunctionYtrainareinoperable,ConditionAandCondition8areconcurrentlyapplicable.TheCompletionTimesforConditionAandCondition8aretrackedseparatelyforeachtrainstartingfromthetimeeachtrainwasdeclaredinoperableandtheConditionwasentered.AseparateCompletionTimeisestablishedforConditionCandtrackedfromthetimethesecondtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,thetimethesituationdescribedinConditionCwasdiscovered).IfRequiredActionC.2iscompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,Conditions8andCareexited.IftheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1hasnotexpired,operationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA.TheremainingCompletionTimeinConditionAismeasuredfromthetimetheaffectedtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,initialentryintoConditionA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-viiDraft8 CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES,(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-4MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.1Restorevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.'4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursAsingleCompletionTimeisusedforanynumberofvalvesinoperableatthesametime.TheCompletionTimeassociatedwithConditionAisbasedontheinitialentryintoConditionAandisnottrackedonapervalvebasis,Declaringsubsequentvalvesinoperable,whileConditionAisstillineffect,doesnottriggerthetrackingofseparateCompletionTimes.OnceoneofthevalveshasbeenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetimethefirstvalvewasdeclaredinoperable.TheCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthevalverestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperablevalve.TheConditionACompletionTimemaybeextendedforupto4hoursprovidedthisdoesnotresultinanysubsequentvalvebeinginoperablefor>4hours.IftheCompletionTimeof4hours(plustheextension)expireswhileoneormorevalvesarestillinoperable,Condition8isentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-viiiDraftB

CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-5SEPARATEENTRYCONDITIONACTIONS-NOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperablevalve.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.lRestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursTheNoteabovetheACTIONStableisamethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistracked.IfthismethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistrackedwasapplicableonlytoaspecificcondition,theNotewouldappearinthatCondition,ratherthanatthetopoftheACTIONStable.TheNoteallowsConditionAtobeenteredseparatelyforeachinoperablevalve,andCompletionTimestrackedonapervalvebasis.Whenavalve.isdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredanditsCompletionTimestarts.Ifsubsequentvalvesaredeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-ixDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-5(continued)IftheCompletionTimeassociatedwithavalveinConditionAexpires,ConditionBisenteredforthatvalve.IftheCompletionTimesassociatedwithsubsequentvalvesinConditionAexpire,ConditionBisenteredseparatelyforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.IfavalvethatcausedentryintoConditionBisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,ConditionBisexitedforthatvalve,SincetheNoteinthisexampleallowsmultipleConditionentryandtrackingofseparateCompletionTimes,CompletionTimeextensionsdonotapply.EXAMPLE1.3-6=MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onechannelinoperable.A.1PerformSR3.x.x.x.ORA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.Onceper8hours8hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B,lBeinMODE3.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-xDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-6(continued)EntryintoConditionAoffersachoicebetweenRequiredActionA.1orA.2.RequiredActionA.1.hasa"onceper"CompletionTime',whichqualifiesforthe25%extension,perSR3.0.2,toeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.Theinitial8hourintervalofRequiredActionA.1beginswhenConditionAisentered,andtheinitialperformanceofRequiredActionA.1mustbecompletedwithinthefirst8hourinterval.IfRequiredActionA.1isfollowed,andtheRequiredActionisnotmetwithintheCompletionTime(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.IfRequiredActionA.2isfollowedandtheCompletionTimeof8hoursisnotmet,ConditionBisentered.IfafterentryintoConditionB,RequiredActionA.1orA.2ismet,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaythentiidiiAMA-44~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-xiDraftB

CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-7MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesubsysteminoperable.A.1Verifyaffectedsubsystemisolated.ANDA.2RestoresubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.1hourOnceper8hoursthereafter72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursRequiredActionA.1hastwoCompletionTimes.The1hourCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheConditionisenteredandeach"Onceper8hoursthereafter"intervalbegins-uponperformanceofRequiredActionA.l.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-xiiDraftB CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAHPLESEXAHPLE1.3-7(continued)IfafterConditionAisentered,RequiredActionA.1isnotmetwithineithertheinitial1houroranysubsequent8hourintervalfromthepreviousperformance(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),Condition8isentered.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterCondition8isentered,butcontinuesfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.IfRequiredActionA.1ismetafterCondition8isentered,Condition8isexitedandoperationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA,providedtheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.2hasnotexpired.IHHEDIATEWhen"Immediately"isusedasaCompletionTime,theCOHPLETIONTIHERequiredActionshouldbepursuedwithoutdelayandinacontrolledmanner.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-xiiiDraft8 Frequency1.41.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.4FrequencyPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistodefinetheproperuseandapplicationofFrequencyrequirements.DESCRIPTIONEachSurveillanceRequirement(SR)hasaspecifiedFrequencyinwhichtheSurveillancemustbemetinordertomeettheassociatedLCO.AnunderstandingofthecorrectapplicationofthespecifiedFrequencyisnecessaryforcompliancewiththeSR.The"specifiedFrequency"isreferredtothroughoutthissectionandeachoftheSpecificationsofSection3.0,SurveillanceRequirement(SR)Applicability.The"specifiedFrequency"consistsoftherequirementsoftheFrequencycolumnofeachSRaswellascertainNotesintheSurveillancecolumnthatmodifyperformancerequirements.SituationswhereaSurveillancecouldberequired(i.e.,itsFrequencycouldexpire),butwhereitisnotpossibleornotdesiredthatitbeperformeduntilsometimeaftertheassociatedLCOiswithinitsApplicability,representpotentialSR3.0.4conflicts.Toavoidtheseconflicts,theSR(i.e.,theSurveillanceortheFrequency)isstatedsuchthatitisonly"required"whenitcanbeandshouldbeperformed.WithanSRsatisfied,-SR3.0.4imposesnorestriction.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustrat'ethevariouswaysthatFrequenciesarespecified.Intheseexamples,theApplicabilityoftheLCO(LCOnotshown)isNODES1,.2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-iDraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-1SINGLEFREUENCYSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYPerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursExample1.4-1containsthetypeofSRmostoftenencounteredintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).TheFrequencyspecifiesaninterval(12hours)duringwhichtheassociatedSurveillancemustbeperformedatleastonetime.PerformanceoftheSurveillanceinitiatesthesubsequentinterval.AlthoughtheFrequencyisstatedas12hours,anextensionofthetimeintervalto1.25timesthestatedFreuencyisallowedbSR3.0.2foroerationalflexibility.ITh'emae'surement3fiolthtppijinterua'.'I<,::oontbn'uils$atspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCO,andtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceisnototherwisemodified(refertoExample1.4-3),thenSR3,0.3becomesapplicable.IftheintervalasspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheplantisnotinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCOforwhichperformanceoftheSRisrequired,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithintheFrequencyrequirementsofSR3'.2priortoentryintotheMODEor,otherspecifiedcondition.FailuretodosowouldresultinaviolationofSR3.0.4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-iiDraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-2MULTIPLEFREUENCIESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYVerifyflowiswithinlimits.Oncewithin12hoursafter25%RTPAND24hoursthereafterExample1.4-2hastwoFrequencies.ThefirstisaonetimeperformanceFrequency,andthesecondisofthetypeshowninExample1.4-1.Thelogicalconnector"AND"indicatesthatbothFrequencyrequirementsmustbemet.Eachtimereactorpowerisincreasedfromapowerlevel<25%RTPto~25%RTP,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithin12hours.Theuseof"once"indicatesasingleperformancewillsatisfythespecifiedFrequency(assumingnootherFrequenciesareconnectedby"AND").ThistypeofFrequencydoesnotqualifyforthe1.25timesthestatedFrequencyextensionallowedbySR3.0.2."Thereafter"indicatesfutureperformancesmustbeestablishedperSR3.0.2,butonlyafteraspecifiedconditionisfirstmet(i.e.,the"once"performanceinthisexample).Ifreactorpowerdecreasesto<25%RTP,themeasurementofbothintervalsstops.Newintervalsstartuponreactorpowerreaching25%RTP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-iiiDraftB Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-3FREUENCYBASEDONSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY-NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafter>25%RTP.Performchannel'djustment.7daysTheintervalcontinues,whetherornottheplantoperationis<25%RTPbetweenperformances.AhNdhfhhhhdNffhSurveillance,itisconstruedtobepartofthe"specifiedFrequency."Shouldthe7dayintervalbeexceededwhileoperationis<25%RTP,thisNoteallows12hoursafterpowerreachesz25%RTPtoperformtheSurveillance.TheSurveillanceisstillconsideredtobeperformedwithinthe"specifiedFrequency."Therefore,iftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthe7day(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2)interval,butoperationwas<25%RTP,itwouldnotconstituteafailureoftheSRorfailuretomeettheLCO.Also,noviolationofSR3.0.4occurswhenchangingMODES,evenwiththe7dayFrequencynotmet,providedoperationdoesnotexceed12hourswithpowera25%RTP.Oncetheplantreaches25%RTP,12hourswouldbeallowedforcompletingtheSurveillance.IftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthis12hourinterval,therewouldthenbeafailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyandtheprovisionsofSR3.0.3wouldapply.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-ivDraftB SLs'.02.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)2.1SLs2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsNInMODES1and2,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWER,Reactor,CoolantSystem(RCS)averagetemperature,andpressurizerpressureshallnotexceedtheSLsspecifiedinFigure2.1.1-1.2.1.2RCSPressureSL.InMODES1,2,3,4,and5,theRCSpressureshallbemaintained(2735psig.2.2SLViolations2.2.1IfSL2.1.1isviolated,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2IfSL2.1.2isviolated:2.2.2.1InMODE1or2,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2.2InMODE3,4,or5,restorecompliancewithin5minutes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2;0-1DraftB SLs2.06706606502400pehUNACCP~ABLEOPZRAHON630G620O~6102000ps41TJSpQ~600590580AOQ?FZABIZOPERATION570000.102030405060.70.8091.01.11.2POWER(FractionofNominal)Figure2.1.1-1ReactorSafetyLimitsR.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2.0-2DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)82.1.1ReactorCoreSLsBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6(Ref.1)requiresthatthereactorcoreshallbedesignedtofunctionthroughoutitsdesignlifetimewithoutexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimitswhichhavebeenstipulatedandjustified.Thisintegrityisrequiredduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).Thisisaccomplishedbyhavingadeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designbasis,whichcorrespondstoa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatDNBwillnotoccuronthelimitingfuelrodsandbyrequiringthatfuelcenterlinetemperaturestaysbelowthemeltingtemperature(Ref.2).TherestrictionsofthisSLpreventoverheatingofthefuelandcladding,aswellaspossiblecladdingperforation,thatwouldresultinthereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Overheatingofthefuelispreventedbymaintainingthesteadystatepeaklinearheatrate(LHR)belowthelevelatwhichfuelcenterlinemeltingoccurs.Overheatingofthefuelcladdingispreventedbyrestrictingfueloperationtowithinthenucleateboilingregime,wheretheheattransfercoefficientislargeandthecladdingsurfacetemperatureisslightlyabovethecoolantsaturationtemperature.FuelcenterlinemeltingoccurswhenthelocalLHR,orpowerpeaking,inaregionofthefuelishighenoughtocausethefuelcenterlinetemperaturetoreachthemeltingpointofthefuel.Expansionofthepelletuponcenterlinemeltingmaycausethepellettostressthecladdingtothepointoffailure,allowinganuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-1DraftB ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)OperationabovetheboundaryofthenucleateboilingregimecouldresultinexcessivecladdingtemperaturebecauseoftheonsetofDNBandtheresultantsharpreductioninheattransfercoefficient.Insidethesteamfilm,highcladdingtemperaturesarereached,andacladdingwater(zirconium-water)reactionmaytakeplace.Thischemicalreactionresultsinoxidationofthefuelcladdingtoastructurallyweakerform.Thisweakerformmayloseitsintegrity,resultinginanuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.TheproperfunctioningoftheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andmainsteamsafetyvalvespreventsviolationofthe'eactorcoreSLs.APPLICABLEThefuelcladdingmustnotsustaindamageasaresultofSAFETYANALYSESnormaloperationandAOOs.ThereactorcoreSLsareestablishedtoprecludeviolationofthefollowingfueldesigncriteria(Ref.3):~a.Thehotfuelpelletinthecoremustnotexperiencecenterlinefuelmelting;andb.Theremustbeatleast95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehotfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-2Draft8 ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)InmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,nuclearandthermalparameters,fuelfabricationparametersandcomputercodesmustbeconsidered.Theeffectsoftheseuncertaintieshavebeenstatisticallycombinedwiththecorrelationuncertaintytodeterminedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesthatsatisfytheDNBdesigncriterion.Theobservableparameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavebeenrelatedtoDNBthroughtheW-3and/orWRB-1DNBcorrelation.TheseDNBcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheDNBfluxandthelocationofDNBforauxiliaryuniformandnon-uniformheatfluxdistributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxratio,definedastheratiooftheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtothelocalheatflux,isindicativeofthemargintoDNB.AminimumvalueoftheDNBratioisspecifiedsothatduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransients,thereisa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevelthatDNBwillnotoccur.ThecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1representthelociofpointsofthermalpower,coolantsystempressureandaveragetemperatureforwhichthisminimumDNBvalueissatisfied.Theareaofsafeoperationisatorbelowtheselines.-AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoahigherDNBRlimit.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility(Ref.4).TheReactorTripSystemsetpointsspecifiedinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation",incombinationwithalltheLCOs,aredesignedtopreventanyanticipatedcombinationoftransientconditionsforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)temperature,pressurizerpressure,andTHERMALPOWERlevelthatwouldresultinaDNBRoflessthantheDNBRlimitandprecludetheexistenceofflowinstabilities.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-3DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-4DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)a.Over-ternb.c~;i/hi::prgssur~iierpressu~v$i:;:trip;L"--'i:p,,:,',:*,,-,,:,:.;'~!,::...,--'-,-,;::-$ip;fl,'i,::,',,','ji"'!8!0!!",i','!Ti;0-44V'ss.""'""AutomaticenforcementofthesereactorcoreSLsisprovidedbythefollowingfunctions(Ref.5):f.:.)Steamgeneratorsafetyvalves.Additionalaitje'jjjtoeygtripfunctionsareh~l':s'o'<)provided4eforspecificabnormalconditions.TheSLsrepresentadesignrequirementforestablishingtheRPStripsetpointsidentifiedpreviously.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits,"ortheassumedinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalyses(Ref.6)providemorerestrictivelimitstoensurethattheSLsarenotexceeded.SAFETYLIMITSFigureB2.1.1-1showsanexampleofthereactorcoresafetylimitsofTHERMALPOWER,RCSpressure,andaveragetemperatureforwhichtheminimumDNBRisgreaterthanorequaltothesafetyanalyseslimit,thatfuelcenterlinetemperatureremainsbelowmelting,thattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquid,orthatthecoreexitqualityiswithinthelimitsdefinedbytheDNBRcorrelation.Fromthistypeoffigure,thecurvesonFigure2.1.1-1oftheaccompanyingspecificationcanbegenerated.EachofthecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1hasthreedistinctslopes.Workingfromlefttoright,thefirstslopeensuresthattheaverageenthalpyin.thehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquidsuchthatovertemperatureaTindicationremainsvalid.Thesecondslopeensuresthatthehotlegsteamqualityremains(15%asrequiredbyW-3correlation.ThefinalslopeensuresthatDNBRisalwaysz1.3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-5Draft8

ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESSAFETYLIMITS(continued)-TheSLishigherthanthelimitcalculatedwhentheAxialFluxDifference(AFD)iswithinthelimitsoftheF(sI)functionoftheovertemperatureaTreactortrip.WhentheAFDisnotwithinthetolerance,theAFDeffectontheovertemperatureaTreactortripswillreducethesetpointstoprovideprotectionconsistentwiththereactorcoreSLs.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.1onlyappliesinMODES1and2becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical.AutomaticprotectionfunctionsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEduringMODES1and2toensureoperationwithinthereactorcoreSLs.ThesteamgeneratorsafetyvalvesandautomaticprotectionactionsservetopreventRCSheatuptothereactorcoreSLconditionsortoinitiateareactortripfunction,whichforcestheplantintoNODE3.SetpointsforthereactortripfunctionsarespecifiedinLCO3.3.1.InMODES3,4,5,and6,ApplicabilityisnotrequiredsincethereactorisnotgeneratingsignificantTHERMALPOWER.SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.1isviolated,therequirementtorestorecomplianceandgotoMODE3placestheplantinasafeconditionandinaMODEinwhichthisSLisnotapplicable.TheallowedCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofbringingtheplanttoaMODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable,andreducestheprobabilityoffueldamage.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionsshallcontinueinordertobringtheplanttoaMODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-6(continued)DraftB ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESREFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGKE,

Subject:

"DeletionofInformationPertainingtoDefinitionofHotChannelFactors,"datedMay30,1985.3.UFSAR,Section4.2.1.3.3.4.UFSAR,Section4.4.3.5.6.WCAP-8745,"DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpowerDeltaTandThermalOvertemperatureDeltaTTripFunctions,"March1977.UFSAR,Section7.2.1.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-7DraftB 0 ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.175702250psiaOPAT602000psi2400psiaLocusofPointsWhereStcamGeneratorSafetyValvesOpen1775psia40---OT~TForCore~LimitatEachPreslrreCoreLimits305655705755805855905956006056106'15620625630T-AVG('F}FigureB2.1.1-1Reactor.CoreSafetyLimitsvs.BoundaryofProtectionR.f.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-8Draft'B RCSPressureSLB2.1.2B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)B2.1.2ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSLBASESBACKGROUNDTheSLonRCSpressureprotectstheintegrityoftheRCSagainstoverpressurization.Intheeventoffuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductsarereleasedintothereactorcoolant.TheRCSthenservesastheprimarybarrierinpreventingthereleaseoffissionproductsintotheatmosphere.ByestablishinganupperlimitonRCSpressure,thecontinuedintegrityoftheRCSisensured.AccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary,"GDC33,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryCapability,"andGDC34,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryRapidPropagationFailurePrevention"(Ref.1),thereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)designconditionsarenottobeexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).ThedesignpressureoftheRCSis2485psig(Ref.2).DuringnormaloperationandAOOs,RCSpressureislimitedfromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,inaccordancewithSectionIIIoftheASMECode(Ref..3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure(Refs.4,5,and6).Toensuresystemintegrity,allRCScomponentsarehydrostaticallytestedat125%ofdesignpressure,accordingtotheASMECoderequirementspriortoinitialoperationwhenthereisnofuelinthecore.Followinginceptionofplantoperation,RCScomponentsarepressuretested,inaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheapprovedGinnaISI/ISTProgramwhichisbasedonASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.7).OverpressurizationoftheRCScouldresultinabreachoftheRCPBreducingthenumberofprotectivebarriersdesignedtopreventradioactivereleasesfromexceedingthelimitsspecifiedin10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria"(Ref.8).Ifsuchabreachoccursinconjunctionwithafuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductscouldenterthecontainmentatmosphere.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-9(continued)DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheRCSpressurizersafetyvalves,themainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs),andthereactorhighpressuretriphavesettingsestablishedtoensurethattheRCSpressureSLwillnotbeexceeded.TheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesaresizedtopreventsystempressurefromexceedingthe'esignpressurebymorethan10%,asspecifiedinSectionIIIoftheASHECodeforNuclearPowerPlantComponents(Ref.3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.Thetransientthatestablishestherequired'reliefcapacity,andhencevalvesizerequirementsandliftsettings,isacompletelossofexternalloadwithoutadirectreactortrip.Duringthetransient,nocontrolactionsareassumed,exceptthatthesafetyvalvesonthesecondaryplantareassumedtoopenwhenthesteampressurereachesthesecondaryplantsafetyvalvesettings.TheReactorTripSystemsetpoints-,4ege4h~rV-eperat~n-and-AOO~'('R'ej,'.eett1'ngSiaf:':thin'HSSWeee~prOVidep'rteeeen're!'ppr'Ofteotiaii"eneeeetsetortheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesareperformedusingconservativeassumptionsrelativetotheotherpressurecontroldevices.Horespecifically,nocreditistakenforoperationofthefollowing:a~Pressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves;b.Steamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalves;C.SteamDumpSystem;d.ReactorControlSystem;e.PressurizerLevelControlSystem;orPressurizersprayvalves.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-10(continued)DraftB RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITSThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpressurevesselundertheASHECode,SectionIII,is110%ofdesignpressureexceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.ThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpiping,valves,andfittingsundertheoriginaldesignrequirements4er-4nna$4a&eo'of'<VSA8~%83)i';;.1':(Ref.5)is120%ofdesignpressure.Themostlimitingofthesetwoallowancesisthe110%ofdesignpressure;therefor'e,theSLonmaximumallowableRCSpressureis2735psig.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.2appliesinMODES1,2,3,4,and5becausethisSLcouldbeapproachedorexceededintheseMODESduetooverpressurizationevents,TheSLisnotapplicableinMODE6becausethereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarenotfullytightened,makingitunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurized.SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.2isviolatedwhenthereactorisinMODE1or2,therequirementistorestorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLmaycauseimmediateRCSfailureandcreateapotentialforradioactivereleasesinexcessof10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).'ITheallowableCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofreducingpower-leveltoaNODEofoperationwherethepotentialforchallengestosafetysystemsisminimized.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionsshallcontinueinordertorestorecompliancewiththeSLandbringtheplanttoNODE3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-11DraftB

RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS(Continued)IfSL2.1.2isexceededinMODE3,4,or5,RCSpressuremustberestoredtowithintheSLvaluewithin5minutes.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLinMODE3,4,or5ismoreseverethanexceedingthisSLinMODE1or2,sincethe'reactorvesseltemperaturemaybelowerandthevesselmaterial,consequently,lessductile.Assuch,pressuremustbereducedtolessthantheSLwithin5minutes.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionshallcontinueinordertoreducepressuretolessthantheSL.TheactiondoesnotrequirereducingMODES,sincethiswouldrequirereducingtemperature,whichwouldcompoundtheproblembyaddingthermalgradientstressestotheexistingpressurestr'ess.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,33,and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section5.1.4.3.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,ArticleNB-7000.4.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-1,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XV-15,andXV-17,DesignBasisEvents,AccidentsandTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.5.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,1967edition.6.UFSAR,Section15.3.2.7.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.8.10CFR100.9.UFSAR,Section7.2.2.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-12DraftB LCOApplicability3.03.0LIHITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYLCO3.0.1LCOsshallbemetduringtheHODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.2and3.0.7.LCO3.0.2UpondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theRequiredActionsoftheassociatedConditionsshallbemet,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.5andLCO3.0.6.IftheLCOismetorisnolongerapplicablepriortoexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime(s),completionoftheRequiredAction(s)isnotrequiredunlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.3WhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)theassociatedACTIONSarenotmet,(2)anassociatedACTIONisnotprovided,or(3)ifdirectedbytheassociatedACTIONS,theplantshallbeplacedinaHODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichtheLCOisnotapplicable.Actionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheplant,asapplicable,in:a.NODE3within%hours;b.NODE4within48'lZhours;andc.HODE5within%36hours.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.Wherecorrectivem'easuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationinaccordancewiththeLCOorACTIONS,completionoftheactionsrequiredbyLCO3.0.3isnotrequired,LCO3.0.3isonlyapplicableinHODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-1(continued)DraftB

LCOApplicabi1ity3.03,0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.4WhenanLCOisnotmet,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallnotbemadeexceptwhentheassociatedACTIONStobeenteredpermitcontinuedoperationintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityforanunlimitedperiodoftime.ThisSpecificationshallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.LCO3.0.5EquipmentremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONSmaybereturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontrolsolelytoperformtestingrequiredtodemonstrateitsOPERABILITYortheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesystemreturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontroltoperformthetestingrequiredtodetermineOPERABILITY.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-2(continued)DraftB LCOApplicability3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.6WhenasupportedsystemLCOisnotmetsolelyduetoasupportsystemLCOnotbeingmet,theConditionsandRequiredActionsassociatedwiththissupportedsystemarenotrequiredtobeentered.OnlythesupportsystemLCOACTIONSarerequiredtobeentered.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesupportedsystem.Inthisevent,additionalevaluationsandlimitationsmayberequiredinaccordancewithSpecification5.5.14,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP)."Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.Whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-3DraftB LCOApplicability3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.7TestExceptionLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTKxcep4+enEx'c'ep8jorps:-NODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification"tTS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformanceofspecialtestsandoperations.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisdesiredtobemetbutisnotmet,theACTIONSoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbemet.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisnotdesiredtobemet,entryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallbemadeinaccordancewiththeotherapplicableSpecifications.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-4Draft8 SRApplicability3.03.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYSR3.0.1SRsshallbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforindividualLCOs,unlessotherwisestatedintheSR.FailuretomeetaSR,whethersuchfailureisexperiencedduringtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceorbetweenperformancesoftheSurveillance,shallbefailuretomeettheLCO.FailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyshallbefailuretomeettheLCOexceptasprovidedinSR3.0.3.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentorvariablesoutsidespecifiedlimits.SR3.0.2ThespecifiedFrequencyforeachSRismetiftheSurveillanceisperformedwithin1.25timestheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency,asmeasuredfromthepreviousperformanceorasmeasuredfromthetimeaspecifiedconditionoftheFrequencyismet.ForFrequenciesspecifiedas"once,"theaboveintervalextensiondoesnotapply.IfaCompletionTimerequiresperiodicperformanceona"onceper..."basis,theaboveFrequencyextensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.SR3.0.3IfitisdiscoveredthataSurveillancewasnotperformedwithinitsspecifiedFrequency,thencompliancewiththerequirementtodeclaretheLCOnotmetmaybedelayed,fromthetimeofdiscovery,upto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless.ThisdelayperiodispermittedtoallowperformanceoftheSurveillance.IftheSurveillanceisnotperformedwithinthedelayperiod,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-5DraftB SRApplicability3.03.0SRAPPLICABILITYSR3.0.3(continued)MhentheSurveillanceisperformedwithinthedelayperiodandtheSurveillanceisnotmet,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.SR3.0.4EntryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOshallnotbemadeunlesstheLCO'sSurveillanceshavebeenmetwithintheirspecifiedFrequency.ThisprovisionshallnotprevententryintoNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-6Draft8 LCOApplicabilityB3.0B3.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITY,BASESLCOsLCO3.0.1throughLCO3.0.7establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.1LCO3,0.1establishestheApplicabilitystatementwithineachindividualSpecificationastherequirementforwhentheLCOisrequiredtobemet(i.e.,'hentheplantisintheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicabilitystatementofeachSpecification).LCO3.0.2LCO3.0.2establishesthatupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theassociatedACTIONSshallbemet.TheCompletionTimeofeachRequiredAction'foranACTIONSConditionisapplicablefromthepointintimethatanACTIONSConditionisentered.TheRequiredActionsestablishthoseremedialmeasuresthatmustbetakenwithinspecifiedCompletionTimeswhentherequirementsofanLCOarenotmet.ThisSpecificationestablishesthat:a.CompletionoftheRequiredActionswithinthespecifiedCompletionTimesconstitutescompliancewithaSpecification;andb.CompletionoftheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,unlessotherwisespecified.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-1DraftB 0 LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)TherearetwobasictypesofRequiredActions.ThefirsttypeofRequiredActionspecifiesatimelimitinwhichtheLCOmustbemet.ThistimelimitistheCompletionTimetorestoreaninoperablesystemorcomponenttoOPERABLEstatusortorestorevariablestowithinspecifiedlimits.IfthistypeofRequiredActionisnotcompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,ashutdownmayberequiredtoplacetheplantinaNODEorconditioninwhichtheSpecificationisnotapplicable.(WhetherstatedasaRequiredActionornot,correctionoftheenteredConditionisanactionthatmayalwaysbeconsidereduponenteringACTIONS.)ThesecondtypeofRequiredActionspecifiestheremedialmeasuresthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantthatisnotfurtherrestrictedbytheCompletionTime.Inthiscase,compliancewiththeRequiredActionsprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.CompletingtheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetorisnolongerapplicable,unlessotherwisestatedintheindividualSpecifications.ThenatureofsomeRequiredActionsofsomeConditionsnecessitatesthat,oncetheConditionisentered,theRequiredActionsmustbecompletedeventhoughtheassociatedConditionnolongerexists.Inthisinstance,theindividualLCO'sACTIONSspecifytheRequiredActions.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-2DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)TheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsarealsoapplicablewhenasystemorcomponentisremovedfromserviceintentionally.ThereasonsforintentionallyrelyingontheACTIONSinclude,butarenotlimitedto,performanceofSurveillances,preventivemaintenance,correctivemaintenance,orinvestigationofoperationalproblemsasrequiredbytheLCO.EnteringACTIONSforthesereasonsmustbedoneinamannerthatdoesnotcompromisesafety.IntentionalentryintoACTIONSshouldnotbemadeforoperationalconvenience.Alternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantequipmentbeinginoperableshouldbeusedinstead.Doingsolimitsthetimebothsubsystems/trainsofasafetyfunctionareinoperableandlimitsthetimeotherconditionsexistwhichmayresultinLCO3.0.3beingentered.IndividualSpecificationsmayspecifyatimelimitforperforminganSRwhenequipmentisremovedfromserviceorbypassedfortesting.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsareapplicablewhenthistimelimitexpires,iftheequipmentremainsremovedfromserviceorbypassed.WhenachangeinNODEorotherspecifiedconditionisrequiredtocomplywithRequiredActions,theplantmayenteraNODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichanotherSpecification.becomesapplicableandthenewLCOisnotmet.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesofthenewRequiredActionswouldapplyfromthepointintimethatthenewSpecificationbecomesapplicable,andtheACTIONSCondition(s)areentered.LCO3.0.3LCO3.0.3establishestheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand:a.AnassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-3DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)b.TheconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThismeansthatnocombinationofConditionsstatedintheACTIONScanbemadethatexactlycorrespondstotheactualconditionoftheplant.Sometimes,possiblecombinationsofConditionsaresuchthatenteringLCO3.0.3iswarranted;insuchcases,theACTIONSspecificallystateaConditioncorrespondingtosuchcombinationsandalsothatLCO3.0.3beenteredimmediately.ThisSpecificationdelineatesthetimelimitsforplacingtheplantinasafeNODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhenoperationcannotbemaintainedwithinthelimitsforsafeoperationasdefinedbytheLCOanditsACTIONS.Itisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencethatpermitsroutinevoluntaryremovalofredundantsystemsorcomponentsfromserviceinlieuofotheralternativesthatwouldnot.resultinredundantsystemsorcomponentsbeinginoperable.(continued)R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-4DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)UponenteringLCO3.0.3,theShiftSupervisorshallevaluatetheconditionoftheplantanddetermineactionstobetaken,consideringplantsafetyfirst,thatwillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown.Theseactionsshallincludepreparationforasafeandcontrolledshutdown,aswellasactionstocorrecttheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3.IfitisdeterminedthattheconditionthatcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3canbecorrectedwithinareasonableperiodoftimeandstillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown,apowerreductiondoesnothavetobeinitiated.Thisincludescoordinatingthereductioninelectricalgenerationwithenergyoperationstoensurethestabilityandavailabilityoftheelectricalgrid.TheshutdownshallbeinitiatedsothatthetimelimitsspecifiedtoreachlowerNODESofoperationpermittheshutdowntoproceedinacontrolledandorderlymannerthatiswellwithinthespecifiedmaximumcooldownrateandwithinthecapabilitiesoftheplant,assumingthatonlytheminimumrequiredequipmentisOPERABLE.ThisreducesthermalstressesoncomponentsoftheReactorCoolantSystemandthepotentialforaplantupsetthatcouldchallengesafetysystemsunderconditionstowhichthisSpecificationapplies.TheuseandinterpretationofspecifiedtimestocompletetheactionsofLCO3.0.3areconsistentwiththediscussionofSection1.3,CompletionTimes.AplantshutdownrequiredinaccordancewithLCO3,0.3maybeterminatedandLCO3.0.3exitedifanyofthefollowingoccurs:TheLCOisnowmet.b.cAConditionexistsforwhichtheRequiredActionshavenowbeenperformed.ACTIONSexistthatdonothaveexpiredCompletionTimes.TheseCompletionTimesareapplicablefromthepointintimethattheConditionisinitiallyenteredandnotfromthetimeLCO3.0.3isexited.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,B3.0-5DraftB LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASES23ILCO3.0.3(continued)ThetimelimitsofLCO3.0.3allow%36hoursfortheplanttobeinMODE5whenashutdownisrequiredL':,:;dujgoj:-:,::::,HODR),<l~mme"thanal'1'owed",'owever,thetotalallo'wabletimetoreachNODE5,orotherapplicableMODE,isnotreduced.Forexample,ifMODE3isreachedin2hours,thenthetimeallowedforreachingMODE4isthenext4'10:hours,becausethetotaltimeforreachingMODE4isnotr'educedfromtheallowablelimitof43'12hours.Therefore,ifremedialmeasuresarecompletedthatwouldpermitareturntoMODE1,apenaltyisnotincurredbyhavingtoreachalowerMODEofoperationinlessthanthetotaltimeallowed.InMODES1,2,3,and4,LCO3.0.3providesactionsforConditionsnotcoveredinotherSpecifications.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinMODES5and6becausetheplantisalreadyinthemostrestrictiveConditionrequiredbyLCO3.0.3.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinotherspecifiedconditionsofthe.Applicability(unlessinMODE1,2,3,or4)becausetheACTIONSofindividualSpecificationssufficientlydefinetheremedialmeasurestobetaken.<<oqExceptionstoLCO3.0.3areprovidedininstanceswhererequiringaplantshutdown,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.3,wouldnotprovideappropriateremedialmeasuresfortheassociatedconditionoftheplant.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.7.11,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevel."LCO3.7.11hasanApplicabilityof"DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP."Therefore,thisLCOcanbeapplicableinanyorallMODES.IftheLCOandtheRequiredActionsofLCO3.7.11arenotmetwhileinMODE1,2,er-3,br<4~~thereisnosafetybenefittobegainedbyplacingtheplantinashutdowncondition.TheRequiredActionofLCO3.7.11of"SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP"istheappropriateRequiredActiontocompleteinlieuoftheactionsofLCO3.0.3.TheseexceptionsareaddressedintheindividualSpecifications.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-6DraftB LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.4LCO3,0.4establisheslimitationsonchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmet.ItprecludesplacingtheplantinadifferentHODEorotherspecifiedconditionstatedin4ha4PieApplicabilitywhenthefollowingexist:a.PlantconditionsaresuchthattherequirementsofanLCOwouldnotbemetintheHODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeentered;andb.TheplantwouldberequiredtoexittheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeenteredinordertocomplywiththeRequiredActionsoftheaffectedLCO.CompliancewithRequiredActionsthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantforanunlimitedperiodoftimeinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.ThisiswithoutregardtothestatusoftheplantbeforeoraftertheMODEchange.Therefore,insuchcases,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitymaybemadeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheRequiredActions.TheprovisionsofthisSpecificationshouldnotbeinterpretedasendorsingthefailuretoexercisethegoodpracticeofrestoringsystemsorcomponentstoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringanassociatedMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.TheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.,.:,.~ii.'!al!'i!ii-,::-.tal'if'ilies:::",;::::iiiiii:.'eely'iiii-allowExceptionstoLCO3.0.4arestatedintheindividualSpecifications.TheexceptionsBa,"'ji:1'll'j'-,:!tlti'O'F5hspecifieder-i-ed-ef'conditLons'-',:i',ri.',:',:th-Apjh!.tab'Fifty,'-.;fihea!it~aaaoŽciliated:;:::.ACTiIOiis'!4o!:::bi',i::-;eiitive(K'do(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-7DraftB

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESspeci"f'i'cRequiredActionofaSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-8DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.44deaa&LGO@<i;'aidyiaa'appI::.:icab1ejjphea!beati!i;:;.is'pt'alii'i:8'oDEs,aeie("'"'d)"""'~""'i"""i"""i'oijiS:j'"'~O.P,:.EAA9I;L':I.TY,;:'a'nd::Sii'ae',:'v,'Sa':e.i':.."4'av'e',.:",:t"o';!!h'e'ijpe'i;-;f'e>iiie'dl'djIe":"::"-::,t'al"::ah'e'!-",a'ai'aci'at'ad'>i'cope,prio'rtodeclaringtheassociatedequipmentOPERABLE(orvariablewithinlimits)andrestoringcompliancewiththeaffectedLCO.LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.5establishestheallowanceforrestoringequipmenttoserviceunderadministrativecontrolswhenithasbeenremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONS.ThesolepurposeofthisLCOistoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2(e.g.,tonotcomplywiththeapplicableRequiredAction(s))toallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstrate:a.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice;orb.TheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-9DraftB LCOApplicability83.0BASESTheadministrativecontrolsensurethetimetheequipmentisreturnedtoserviceinconflictwiththerequirementsoftheACTIONSislimitedtothetimeabsolutelynecessarytoperformtheallowedSRs.ThisSpecificationdoesnotprovidetimetoperformanyotherpreventiveorcorrectivemaintenance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-10DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASES)~CO"3:::.':075AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofbeingreturnedtoserviceisreopeningacontainmentisolationvalvethathasbeenclosedtocomplywithRequiredActionsandmustbereopenedtoperformtheSRs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-11DraftB

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESAnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopreventthetripfunctionfromoccurringduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelintheothertripsystem.AsimilarexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopermitthelogictofunctionandindicatetheappropriateresponseduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelinthesametripsystem.LCO3.0.6LCO3.0.6establishesanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forsupportsystemsthathaveanLCOspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).ThisexceptionisprovidedbecauseLCO3.0.2wouldrequirethattheConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheassociatedinoperablesupportedsystemLCObeenteredsolelyduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem.Thisexceptionisjustifiedbecausetheactionsthatarerequiredtoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionarespecifiedinthesupportsystems'CO'sRequiredActions.TheseRequiredActionsmayincludeenteringthesupportedsystem'sConditionsandRequiredActionsormayspecifyotherRequiredActions.WhenasupportsystemisinoperableandthereisanLCOspecifiedforitintheTS,thesupportedsystem(s)arerequiredtobedeclaredinoperableifdeterminedtobeinoperableasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability.However,itisnotnecessarytoenterintothesupportedsystems'onditionsandRequiredActionsunlessdirectedtodosobythesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.Thepotentialconfusionandinconsistencyofrequirementsrelatedtotheentryintomultiplesupportandsupportedsystems'CO'sConditionsandRequiredActionsareeliminatedbyprovidingalltheactionsthatarenecessarytoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditioninthesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-12DraftB LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-13(continued)DraftB 'II LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.6(continued)However,thereareinstanceswhereasupportsystem'sRequiredActionmayeitherdirectasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforthesupportedsystem.Thismayoccur'mmediatelyoraftersomespecifieddelaytoperformsomeotherRequiredAction.Regardlessofwhetheritisimmediate.oraftersomedelay,whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.Specification5.5.14,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP),"ensureslossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionsaretaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6,anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherlimitations,remedialactions,orcompensatoryactionsmaybeidentifiedasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionsandRequiredActions.TheSFDPimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.CrosstraincheckstoidentifyalossofsafetyfunctionForthosesupportsystemsthatsupportmultipleandredundantsafetysystemsarerequired.ThecrosstraincheckverifiesthatthesupportedsystemsoftheredundantOPERABLEsupportsystemareOPERABLE,therebyensuringsafetyfunctionisretained.Ifthisevaluationdeterminesthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-14(continued)Draft8 LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.7Therearecertainspecialtestsandoperationsrequiredtobeperformedatvarioustimesoverthelifeoftheplant.Thesespecialtestsandoperationsarenecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,toperformspecialmaintenanceactivities,andtoperformspecialevolutions.TestExceptionLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTKxcepNenExcejti,ons:-NODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformancesofspecialtestsandoperations,whichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedifrequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsoftheseTS.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.ThiswillensureallappropriaterequirementsoftheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionnotdirectlyassociatedwithorrequiredtobechangedtoperformthespecialtestoroperationwillremainineffect.TheApplicabilityofaTestExceptionLCOrepresentsaconditionnotnecessarilyincompliancewiththenormalrequirementsoftheTS.AspecialoperationmaybeperformedeitherundertheprovisionsoftheappropriateTestExceptionLCOorundertheotherapplicableTSrequirements.IfitisdesiredtoperformthespecialoperationundertheprovisionsoftheTestExceptionLCO,therequirementsoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbefollowed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-15DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASESSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3.0.4establishthe-generalrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.SR3.0.1SR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespecifiedintheindividualSRs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutesafailuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecification,however,istobeconstruedasimplying'hatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknownnottobemetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformances.SurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheplantisinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithatestexceptionareonlyapplicablewhentheTestExceptionLCOisusedasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-16DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-17DraftB SRApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESSurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-18Draft8 SRApplicabil'ityB3.0BASESSR",::.':,:3+0'Pl::Uponcompletionofmaintenance,appropriatepostmaintenance-testingisrequiredtodeclareequipmentOPERABLE.ThisincludesensuringapplicableSurveillancesarenotfailedandtheirmostrecentperformanceisinaccordancewithSR3.0.2.PostmaintenancetestingmaynotbepossibleinthecurrentNODEorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityduetothenecessaryplantparametersnothavingbeenestablished.Inthesesituations,theequipmentmaybeconsideredOPERABLEprovidedtestinghasbeensatisfactorilycompletedtotheextentpossibleandtheequipmentisnototherwisebelievedtobeincapableofperformingitsfunction.ThiswillallowoperationtoproceedtoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhereothernecessarypostmaintenancetestscanbecompleted.SR3.0.2SR3.0.2establishestherequirementsformeetingthespecifiedFrequencyforSurveillancesandanyRequiredActionwithaCompletionTimethatrequirestheperiodicperformanceoftheRequiredActionona"onceper.interval.SR3.0.2permitsa25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency.ThisextensionfacilitatesSurveillanceschedulingandconsidersplantoperatingconditionsthatmaynotbesuitableforconductingtheSurveillance(e.g.,transientconditionsorotherongoingSurveillanceormaintenanceactivities).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-19DraftB 0 SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.2(continued)The25%extensiondoesnotsignificantlydegradethereliabilitythatresultsfromperformingtheSurveillanceatitsspecifiedFrequency.ThisisbasedontherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththeSRs.TheexceptionstoSR3.0.2arethoseSurveillancesforwhichthe25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequencydoesnotapply.TheseexceptionsarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.TherequirementsofregulationstakeprecedenceovertheTS.hV+Vh'ggP+)RjVRgVhNVpp+V+4PhhP++@gh+%)ghV+V~specifiedintheregulat~orisj";.":,:the'.::;.;:::.,:t)'i5loiter'y'ib8'eius'e,:.",:the%projra'mal:readj".:.,":;:::i@'cl:ud'ej',:5k'..4'plcjgxjyxd$>N(44AN4'~Z'w'NNcRSvxvhm%Aw4Mc4vmvN44Ãc3cAiwhiixvSWv%4%ichwv>MvN444AsstatedinSR3.0.2,the25%extensionalsodoesnotapplytotheinitialportionofaperiodicCompletionTimethat.requiresperformanceona"onceper..."basis.The25%extensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.TheinitialperformanceoftheRequiredAction,whetheritisaparticularSurveillanceorsomeotherremedialaction,isconsideredasingleactionwithasingleCompletionTime.Onereasonfornotallowingthe25%extensiontothisCompletionTimeisthatsuchanactionusuallyverifiesthatnolossoffunctionhasoccurredbycheckingthestatusofredundantordiversecomponentsoraccomplishesthefunctionoftheinoperableequipmentinanalternativemanner.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2arenotintendedtobeusedrepeatedlymerelyasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals(otherthanthoseconsistentwithRefuelingintervals)orperiodicCompletionTimeintervalsbeyondthosespecified.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-20DraftB SRApplicabi1ityB3.0BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-21Draft8 SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.3SR3.0.3establishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaring,affectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.Adelayperiodofupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless,appliesfromthepointintimethatitisdiscoveredthattheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,andnotatthetimethatthespecifiedFrequencywasnotmet.ThisdelayperiodprovidesadequatetimetocompleteSurveillancesthathavebeenmissed.ThisdelayperiodpermitsthecompletionofaSurveillancebeforecomplyingwithRequiredActionsorotherremedialmeasuresthatmightprecludecompletionoftheSurveillance.Thebasisforthisdelayperiodincludesconsiderationofplantconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,thesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtherequiredSurveillance,andtherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththerequirements.WhenaSurveillancewithaFrequencybasednotontimeintervals,butuponspecifiedplantconditionsoroperationalsituations,isdiscoverednottohavebeenperformedwhenspecified,SR3.0.3allowsthefulldelayperiodof24hourstoperformtheSurveillance.SR3.0'alsoprovidesatimelimitforcompletionof.SurveillancesthatbecomeapplicableasaconsequenceofMODEchangesimposedbyRequiredActions.FailuretocomplywithspecifiedFrequenciesforSRsisexpectedtobeaninfrequentoccurrence.UseofthedelayperiodestablishedbySR3.0.3isaflexibilitywhichisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-22DraftB SRApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESSR3.0.3(continued)IfaSurveillanceisnotcompletedwithinthealloweddelayperiod,thentheequipmentisconsideredinoperableorthevariableisconsideredoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponexpirationofthedelayperiod.IfaSurveillanceisfailedwithinthedelayperiod,thentheequipmentisinoperable,orthevariableisoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponthefailureoftheSurveillance.CompletionoftheSurveillancewithinthedelayperiodallowedbythisSpecification,orwithintheCompletionTimeoftheACTIONS,restorescompliancewithSR3.0.l.SR3.0.4SR3.0.4establishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.ThisSpecificationensuresthatsystemandcomponentOPERABILITYrequirementsandvariablelimitsaremetbeforeentryintoNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichthesesystemsandcomponentsensuresafeoperationoftheplant.ThisSpecificationappliestochangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityassociatedwithplantshutdownaswellasstartup.)hmoaoo~?eu~j,Aoa&$w'oyeoppg&pi~NmemSguqaeiaj);cewettme":"...ohtmammjtgjp>~:t+$'bq4$co'ndi:.M'jii'~".";:,i'ii<-:",thkij'A',-l,1'iamb;%3~4t;'QTheprovisionsofSR3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS)~@iii':,.'.addhtd'oco;:;:::::."'::::theproIIi'j'i*",ooSg~'fi'SR!';3:Oii4V'aha:!IjI'otj,"fi':orna"':::,::a",:.!!ata'll,'ur'e'ite',.:::!co'm'ply~with'."::ACTjIONwS,::;:j(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-23DraftB SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.4(continued)However,incertaincircumstancesfailingtomeetanSRwillnotresultinSR3.0.4restrictingaNODEchangeorotherspecifiedconditionchange.Whenasystem,subsystem,train,component,device,orvariableisinoperableoroutsideitsspecifiedlimits,theassociatedSR(s)arenotrequiredtobeperformed,perSR3.0.1,whichstatesthatsurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipment.Whenequipmentisinoperable,SR3.0.4doesnotapplytotheassociatedSR(s)sincetherequirementfortheSR(s)tobeperformedisremoved.Therefore,failingtoperformtheSurveillance(s)withinthespecifiedFrequency,onequipmentthatisinoperable,doesnotresultinanSR3.0.4restrictiontochangingNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability.However,sincetheLCOisnotmetinthisinstance,LCO3.0.4willgovernanyrestrictionsthatmay(ormaynot)applytoNODEorotherspecifiedconditionchanges.ThepreciserequirementsforperformanceofSRsarespecifiedsuchthatexceptionstoSR3.0.4arenotnecessary.ThespecifictimeframesandconditionsnecessaryformeetingtheSRsarespecifiedintheFrequency,intheSurveillance,orboth.ThisallowsperformanceofSurveillanceswhentheprerequisitecondition(s)specifiedinaSurveillanceprocedurerequireentryintotheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheassociatedLCOpriortotheperformanceorcompletionofaSurveillance.ASurveillancethatcouldnotbeperformeduntilafterenteringtheLCOApplicability,wouldhaveitsFrequencyspecifiedsuchthatitisnot"due"untilthespecificconditionsneededaremet.Alternately,theSurveillancemaybestatedintheformofaNoteasnotrequired(tobemetorperformed)untilaparticularevent,condition,ortimehasbeenreached,FurtherdiscussionofthespecificformatsofSRs'nnotationisfoundinSection1.4,Frequency.ii'i~NODES!:,"(iiiig'!~PiR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-24DraftB SDM3.1.13.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)LCO3.1.1SDMshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE2withk,ff<1.0,MODES3,4,and5.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDHnotwithinlimit.A.1InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.15minutesSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREaUENCYSR3.1.1.1VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.4825.:hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-1DraftB CoreReactivity3.1.23.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.2CoreReactivityLCO3.1.2Themeasuredcorereactivityshallbewithin+1%ak/kofpredictedvalues.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK.na1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Measuredcorereactivitynotwithinlimit.A.1ANDRe-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.72hoursA.2EstablishappropriateoperatingrestrictionsandSRs.72hoursB.Requir'edActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,ff(1.0,6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-2Draft8 CoreReactivity,3.1.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR,3.1.2.1to-NOTE-~R,g:,.ii:;,::,,:::deery-i~ent'er+i.:rigNODEl.performedpriorVerifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin+1%ak/kofpredictedvalues.OnceaftereachrefuelingSR3.1.2.21.2.-NOTES--Onlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).Thepredictedreactivityvaluesaeym'u's't'eadjusted(normalized)tocorres'p'ondtothemeasuredcorereactivitypriortoexceedingafuelburnupof60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.31EFPDVerifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin+1%ak/kofpredictedvalues.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-3DraftB HTC3.1.33.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEHS3.1.3HoderatorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)LCO3.1.3~s'~hhilliidillhd-the-en:j:re',.KjspecifiedintheCOLR.Themaximumupperlimitshallhelessthanorequalto,5pcm/'Fforpowerlevelsbelow70%RTPandlessthanorequalto0pcm/Fatorabove70%RTP.APPLICABILITY:HODE1andHODE2withk,<<>1.0fortheupperHTClimit,NODES'1,2,and3forthelowerHTClimit.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.MTCnotwithinupperlimit.A.1EstablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbankstomaintainHTCwithinlimit.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinHODE2withk,(1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-4DraftB HTC3.1.3CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.---------NOTE---------RequiredActionC.1mustbecompletedwheneverConditionCisentered.C.1Re-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.OncepriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet,0.1BeinMODE4,12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.3.1VerifyHTCiswithinupperlimit.OncepriortoenteringNODE1aftereachrefuelingSR3.1.3.2ConfirmthatHTCwillbewithinlimitsat~55TNRTP~.OncepriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefueling:(:iy'ii't'li"n'iie'~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-5DraftB HTC3.1.3SURVEILLANCERE(}UIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREaUENCVR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-6DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.43.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1,4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsLCO3.1.4AllshutdownandcontrolrodsshallbeOPERABLE,withallindividualindicatedrodpositionswithin12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandposition.APPLICABILITY:.MODE1,NODE2withK.ffa1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA-.A.'Apl.1ORVerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.1hourOneormorerod(s)untrippable.A.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.ANDA.2BeinMODE2withK,(1.0.1hour6hoursB.Onerodnotwithinalignmentlimits.B.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORB.1.2-InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-7DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)B.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto(75%RTP.ANDB.3VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.AND2hoursOnceper12hours8.4ANDB.5ANDB.6PerformSR3.2.1.1.PerformSR3.2.2.1.Re-evaluatesafetyanalysesandconfirmresultsremainvalidfordurationofoperationundertheseconditions.72hours72hours5daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE2withK,<1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-8DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Morethanonerodnotwithinalignmentlimit.D.l.lVerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORD:1.2InitiateborationtorestorerequiredSDMtowithinlimit.ANDD.2BeinMODE2withK.ff<1.0.1hour1hour6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.4.1Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.12hoursSR3.1.4.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-9DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinued)SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.4.3Verifyrodfreedomofmovement(trippability)bymovingeachrodnotfullyinsertedinthecoretoaHRPItransitionineitherdirection.92daysSR3.1.4.4Verifyroddroptimeofeachrod,fromthefullywithdrawnposition,is<1.8secondsfromthebeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentry,with:a.T.,~500F;andb.Bothreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.OncepriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-10DraftB 0 ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.53,1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitLCO3.1.5Theshutdownbankshallbeatoraboveth'+insertionlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.NOTE-TheshutdownbankmaybeoutsidethelimitwhenrequiredforperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withKff>1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME'.Shutdownbanknotwithinlimit.A.1.1VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.ANDA.2Restoreshutdownbanktowithinlimit.1hour1hour2hours8:~1BeinMODE2withK,(1.0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-11DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.5.1VerifytheshutdownbankinsertioniswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-12DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.63.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.6ControlBankInsertionLimitsLCO3.1.6Controlbanksshallbewithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.-NOTEThecontrolbankbeingtestedmaybeoutsidethelimitswhenrequiredfortheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODEI)HODE2withk,>1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Controlbanklimitsnotmet.A.1.1VerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hourA.2Restorecontrolbank(s)towithinlimits.2hoursBeinMODE2withK,<1.0,6hours~irije>,':iso,,':.met':;:')R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-13DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.6ACTIONS(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.6.1VerifyestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.0~M'~gh~,n;:,'4'j~s::priortoach'ievingcriticalitySR3.1.6.2VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.1.6.3-------"------------NOTE-------------------Onlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafterSR3.1.6.4VerifyeachcontrolbanknotfullywithdrawnfromthecoreiswithinthesequenceandoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-15DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.73.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3,1.7RodPositionIndicationLCO3.1.7TheMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(MRPI)SystemandtheDemandPositionIndicationSystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,=MODE2withK,<<~1.0.ACTIONS-NOTE---------------------------------SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachgveu,'i;nope.r,.',ab'l,e)":llRPI!,:p'ejgroupand4er-each'peraNeea'ch'emandposi'tion'indicator~-pep'eijbank.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.A.lVerifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.Onceper8hoursORA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto(50%RTP.8hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-16DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.7CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorerodswithinoperablepositionindicatorshavebeenmoved>24stepsinonedirectionsincethelastdeterminationoftherod'sposition.B.1ORB.2VeriFythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.4hours8hoursC.Onedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.C.1.1ANDC.1.2ORC.2VerifybyadministrativemeansallMRPIsfortheaffectedbanksareOPERABLE.Verifythemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodoftheaffectedbanksare<12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorforthatbank.ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos50%RTP.Onceper8hoursOnceper8hours8hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,ConditionBorConditionCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE2withK0<1.0~6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-17DraftB RodPositionIndication3.1.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.MorethanoneMRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.ORMorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.7.1VerifyeachHRPIagreeswithin12stepsofthegroupdemandpositionforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravel.PriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3:1-18DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2LCO3.1.8DuringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTS,therequirementsofLCO3.1.3,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";LCO3.1,5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality"maybesuspended,provided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintained~5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureis~530'F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Ii'lAPPLICABILITY:MODE-2-dur4ngDur~g'n'gPHYSICSTESTS.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.1InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.AND15minutesA.2SuspendPHYSICSTESTSexceptions.1hourB.THERMALPOWERnotwithinlimit.B.1Openreactortripbreakers.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-19DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.8ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturenotwithinlimit.C.1RestoreRCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturetowithinlimit.15minutesD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE3.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1,8.1PerformaCOTonpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelsperSR3.3.1.7andSR3.3.1.8.Oncewithin7dayspriortocriticalitySR3.1.8.2VerifytheRCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisz530F.30minutesSR3.1.8.3VerifyTHERMALPOWERis(5%RTP.30minutesSR3.1.8.4VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-20DraftB SDHB3.1.1B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28(Ref.1),twoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsmustbeavailableandcapableofholdingthereactorcoresubcriticalfromanyhotstandbyorhotoperatingcondition.MaintenanceoftheSDHensuresthatpostulatedreactivityeventswillnotdamagethefuel.SDHrequirementsprovidesufficientreactivitymargintoensurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitswillnotbeexceededfornormalshutdownandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)whicharedeFinedasCondition2eventsinReference2(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).Assuch,theSDHdefinesthedegreeoFsubcriticalitythatwouldbeobtainedimmediatelyfollowingtheinsertionorscramofallshutdownandcontrolrods,assumingthatthesinglerodclusterassemblyofhighestreactivityworthisfullywithdrawnandthefuelandmoderatortemperaturearechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Thesystemdesignrequiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsbeprovided,andthatoneofthesesystemsbecapableofmaintainingthecoresubcriticalundercoldconditions.Theserequirementsareprovidedbytheuseofmovablerodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)andsolubleboricacidintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)whicheachprovideaneutronabsorbingmechanism.TheControlRodSystemcancompensateforthereactivityeffectsofthefuelandwatertemperaturechangesaccompanyingpowerlevelchangesovertherangefromfullloadtonoload.Inaddition,theControlRodSystem,togetherwiththeborationsystem,providestheSDHduringpoweroperationandiscapableofmakingthecoresubcriticalrapidlyenoughtopreventexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimits,assumingthattherodofhighestreactivityworthremainsfullywithdrawn.Thechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemcancontrolthesolubleboronconcentrationtocompensateforfueldepletionduringoperationandallxenonburnoutreactivitychangesandmaintainthereactorsubcriticalundercoldconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-1DraftB SDM83.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Duringpoweroperation,SDMcontrolisensuredbyoperatingwiththeshutdownbankfullywithdrawnandthecontrolbankswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankfullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Whentheplantisintheshutdownandrefuelingmodes,theSDMrequirementsaremetbymeansofadjustmentstotheRCSboronconcentration.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheminimumrequiredSDMisassumedasaninitialconditioninthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalysis(Ref.3)establishesaSDMthatensuresspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededfornormaloperationandAOOs,withtheassumptionofthehighestworthrodstuckoutfollowingascram.TheacceptancecriteriafortheSDMrequirementsarethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Thisisdonebyensuringthat:a.Thereactorcanbemadesubcriticalfromalloperatingconditions,transients,andDesignBasisAccidents;b.Thereactivitytransientsassociatedwithpostulatedaccidentconditionsarecontrollablewithinacceptablelimits(departurefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR),fuelcenterlinetemperaturelimitsforAOOs,ands200cal/gmenergydepositionfortherodejectionaccident);and.c.Thereactorwillbemaintainedsufficientlysubcriticaltoprecludeinadvertentcriticalityintheshutdowncondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-2DraftB SDM83.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemostlimitingaccidentfortheSDMrequirementsisbasedonasteamlinebreak(SLB),asdescribedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.3).Theincreasedsteamflowresultingfromapipebreakinthemainsteamsystemcausesanincreasedenergyremovalfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator(SG),andconsequentlytheRCS.Thisresultsinareductionofthereactorcoolanttemperature.Theresultantcoolantshrinkagecausesareductioninpressure.Inthepresenceofanegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficient,thiscooldowncausesanincreaseincorereactivity.ThemostlimitingSLBforbothoneloopandtwoloopoperation,withrespecttopotentialfueldamagebeforeareactortripoccurs,isaguillotinebreakofamainsteamlineinsidecontainmentinitiatedattheendofcorelife.ThepositivereactivityadditionfromthemoderatortemperaturedecreasewillterminatewhentheaffectedSGboilsdry,thusterminatingRCSheatremovalandcooldown.FollowingtheSLB,aposttripreturntopowermayoccur;however,nofueldamageoccursasaresultoftheposttripreturntopower,andTHERMALPOWERdoesnotviolatetheSafetyLimit(SL)requirementofSL2.1.1.InadditiontothelimitingSLBtransient,theSDMrequirementmustalsoprotectagainst:'a~b.C.d.Inadvertentborondilution;Anuncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromsubcriticalorlowpowercondition;Startupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP);andRodejection.Eachoftheseeventsisdiscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-3DraftB SDHB3.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Intheborondilutionanalysis(Ref.4),therequiredSDHdefinesthereactivitydifferencebetweenaninitialsubcriticalboronconcentrationandthecorrespondingcriticalboronconcentration.Thesevalues,inconjunctionwiththeconfigurationoftheRCSandtheassumeddilutionflowrate,directlyaffecttheresultsoftheanalysis(i.e.,thetimeavailabletooperatorstostopthedilutionevent).Thiseventisanalyzedforrefueling,~sfigt'da'8'";C"".Ze,"PX'hemWVWN???'9<9CaY4e'A'C",'S"0'??hag?P??%~i<'<."??'"?5%'c?.%CD)4+8?<~<.."?V?<a+'cz'4'~<<("0"W1?a4CN::(HODEi'5$:,andjp'o4'erlope'i;alaion;:::,":;::c?ojioj'.;?i:ons:;:,!variq't~i'tiii>be'gi'n'n);i.;,iiNc'o'r'e;:,:,',::(~ice~ukdewn-an8-'pew0-i-f~whencriticalboronconcentrationsarehighest.Dependingonthesysteminitialconditionsandreactivityinsertionrate,theuncontrolledrodwithdrawaltransientisterminatedbyeitherahighpowerleveltriporahighpressurizerpressuretrip(Ref.5).Inallcases,powerlevel,RCSpressure,linearheatrate,andtheDNBRdonotexceedallowablelimitsifSDHhasbeenmaintained.ThestartupofaninactiveRCPwillnotresultina"coldwater"criticality,evenifthemaximumdifferenceintemperatureexistsbetweentheSGandthecore(Ref.6).ThemaximumpositivereactivityadditionthatcanoccurduetoaninadvertentRCPstartislessseverethantheeffectsofasmallsteamlinebreakwithoneloopoperation.StartupofanidleRCPcannot,therefore,produceareturntopowerfromthehotstandbyconditionifSDHhasbeenmaintained.TheejectionofacontrolrodconstitutesabreakintheRCSwhichrapidlyaddsreactivitytothereactorcore,causingboththecorepowerlevelandheatfluxtoincreasewithcorrespondingincreasesinreactorcoolanttemperaturesandpressure(Ref.7).Theejectionofarodalsoproducesatimedependentredistributionofcorepowerwhichresultsinahighneutronfluxtrip.FuelandcladdinglimitsarenotexceededifSDMhasbeenmaintained.SDHsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedfromthecontrolroom,SDHisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseitisperiodicallymonitoredtoensurethattheplantisoperatingwithintheboundsofaccidentanalysisassumptions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-4(continued)Draft8

BASESLCOSDMisacoredesignconditionthatcanbeensuredduringoperationthroughcontrolrodpositioning(controlandshutdownbanks)andthroughthesolubleboronconcentrationintheRCS.TheCOLRprovidestheshutdownmarginrequirementwithrespecttoRCSboronconcentration.TheSLB(Ref.3)andtheborondilution(Ref.4)accidentsarethemostlimitinganalysesthatestablishtheSDHcurveintheCOLR.ThemaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatendofcyclelifeandisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisfortheSLB.Pga~n'aly.ies'jare:ib'oexceedtheDNBRlimitandtoexceed10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).Fortheborondilutionaccident,iftheLCOisviolated,theminimumrequiredtimeassumedforoperatoractiontoterminatedilutionmaynolongerbeapplicable.APPLICABILITYInMODE2withk,<<<1.0andinMODES3,4and5,theSDMrequirementsareapplicabletoprovidesufficientnegativereactivityto'eettheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesdiscussedabove.InMODE6,theshutdownreactivityrequirementsaregiveninLCO3.9,1,"BoronConcentration,"InMODE1andMODE2withK,<<)1.0,SDHisensuredbycomplyingwithLCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3,1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-5(continued)DraftB SDHB3.1.1BASESACTIONSA.1IftheSDHrequirementsarenotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.ItisassumedthatborationwillbecontinueduntiltheSDMrequirementsaremet.Inthedeterminationoftherequiredcombinationofborationflowrateandboronconcentration,thereisnouniquerequirementthatmustbesatisfied.SinceitisimperativetoraisetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSassoonaspossible,theflowpathofchoicewouldutilizeahighlyconcentratedsolution,suchasthatnormallyfoundintheboricacidstoragetank,ortherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Theoperatorshouldboratewiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.Indeterminingtheborationflowrate,thetimeincorelifemustbeconsidered.Forinstance,themostdifficulttimein"corelifetoincreasetheRCSboronconcentrationisatthebeginningofcyclewhentheboronconcentrationmayapproachorexceed2000ppm...':,';:,:.;:As'summing",:~KGB';:ga;~glib,,:,.",'osu's'i'rj'g",.:,'":,'.",000'~'p'p'm".,';,.,"osc).a$j':)gs'o':'u't'jon".'0-gpm-,itispossibletoincreasetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSby100ppminapproximately35minutes.Ifaboronworthof10pcm/ppmisassumed,thiscombinationofparameterswillincreasetheSDHby1%zk/k.Theseborationparametersof10gpmand13,000ppmrepresenttypicalvaluesandareprovidedforthepurposeofofferingaspecificexample.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-6(continued)DraftB

SDHB3.1.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.1.1.1InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5,theSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).'jrobab::,i'1!i'"'".wwÃc'.%A~ww,:404MAC'm+>~'Ac'aa~xpiam'aka&M+'m~5:4wm~aM~N'c~".sMh&4a@Av?ee-gen~-'fySDH-.Thisallowstimefortheoperatortocollecttherequireddata,whichincludesperformingaboronconcentrationanalysis,andcompletethecalculation.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2."AmericanNationalStandardNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.4.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.3.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.8.10CFR100.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-7DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMStB3.1.2CoreReactivityBASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30(Ref.1),reactivityshallbecontrollable,suchthatsubcriticalityismaintainedundercoldconditions,andacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.Therefore,'eactivitybalanceisusedasameasureofthepredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityduringpoweroperation.TheperiodicconfirmationofcorereactivityisnecessarytoensurethatDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientsafetyanalysesremainvalid.Alargereactivitydifferencecouldbetheresultofunanticipatedchangesinfuel,controlrodworth,oroperationatconditionsnotconsistentwiththoseassumedinthepredictionsofcorereactivity,andcouldpotentiallyresultinalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)orviolationofacceptablefueldesignlimits.ComparingpredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityvalidatesthenuclearmethodsusedinthesafetyanalysisandsupportstheSDMdemonstrations(LCO3.l.l,j-:',,::SJUTOOWNebe-bre77g,subcriticalconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-8DraftB CoreReactivity83.1.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Whenthereactorcoreiscriticalorinnormalpoweroperation,areactivitybalanceexistsandthenetreactivityiszero.Acomparisonofpredictedandmeasuredreactivityisconvenientundersuchabalance,sinceparametersarebeingmaintainedrelativelystableundersteadystatepowerconditions,Thepositivereactivityinherentinthecoredesignisbalancedbythenegativereactivityofthecontrolcomponents,thermalfeedback,neutronleakage,andmaterialsinthecorethatabsorbneutrons,suchasburnableabsorbersproducingzeronetreactivity.Excessreactivitycanbeinferredfromtheboronletdowncurve(orcriticalboroncurve)inthecoredesignreport,whichprovidesanindicationofthesolubleboronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)versuscycleburnup.PeriodicmeasurementoftheRCSboronconcentrationforcomparisonwiththepredictedvaluewithothervariablesfixedorstable(suchasrodheight,temperature,pressure,andpower),providesaconvenientmethodofensuringthatcorereactivityiswithindesignexpectationsandthatthecalculationalmodelsusedto"generatethesafetyanalysisareadequate.Inordertoachievetherequiredfuelcycleenergyoutput,theuraniumenrichment,inthenewfuelloadingandinthefuelremainingfromthepreviouscycle,providesexcesspositivereactivitybeyondthatrequiredtosustainsteadystateoperationthroughoutthecycle.WhenthereactoriscriticalatRTPandnormaloperatingtemperature,theexcesspositivereactivityiscompensatedbyburnableabsorbers(ifany),controlrods,whateverneutronpoisons(mainlyxenonandsamarium)arepresentinthefuel,andtheRCSboronconcentration.WhenthecoreisproducingTHERMALPOWER,thefuelisbeingdepletedandexcessreactivityisdecreasing.Asthefuelggcj>Y~>>>'rg~~~~~v~e~eo>>>>'~>>>'>>>>>>'>y<~+~~>-.,>age~>x;.>~>>yacc~+~>'>>>>>>>y'xmas~>~>'xgqdepletcs,/~i"'ey""CS:;:~b'oron;.';,'ejnceriti';:a'tjori'.::jis'~',.::re'au'cet'eiiii7$iitur,,e;*'*>"wvMVrNr>>>44>:4>>>>>>."vlAMPOQQt-TheboronletdowncurveisbasedonsteadystateoperationatRTP.Therefore,deviationsfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvemayindicatedeficienciesinthedesignanalysis,deficienciesinthecalculationalmodels,orabnormalcoreconditions,andmustbeevaluated.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-9(continued)DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforcorereactivityarethatthereactivitybalancelimitensuresplantoperation'ismaintainedwithintheassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses.Accuratepredictionofcorereactivityiseitheranexplicitorimplicitassumptionintheaccidentanalysisevaluations.Everyaccidentevaluation(Ref.2)is,therefore,dependentuponaccurateevaluationofcorereactivity.Inparticular,SDMandreactivitytransients,suchascontrolrodwithdrawalaccidentsorrodejectionaccidents,areverysensitivetoaccuratepredictionofcorereactivity.Theseaccidentanalysisevaluationsrelyoncomputercodesthathavebeenqualifiedagainstavailabletestdata,operatingplantdata,andanalyticalbenchmarks.MonitoringreactivitybalanceadditionallyensuresthattheNuclearDesignMethodologyprovidesanaccuraterepresentationofthecorereactivity.DesigncalculationsandsafetyanalysesareperformedforeachfuelcycleforthepurposeofpredeterminingreactivitybehaviorandtheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsforreactivitycontrolduringfueldepletion.Thecomparisonbetweenmeasuredandpredictedinitialcorereactivityprovidesanormalizationforthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictcorereactivity.IfthemeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrationsforidenticalcoreconditionsatbeginningofcyclelife(BOL)donotagree,thentheassumptionsusedinthereloadcycledesignanalysisorthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictsolubleboronrequirementsmaynotbeaccurate.IfreasonableagreementbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivityexistsatBOL,thenthepredictionmaybenormalizedtothemeasuredboronconcentration.Thereafter,anysignificantdeviationsinthemeasuredboronconcentrationfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvethatdevelopduringfueldepletionmaybeanindicationthatthecalculationalmodelisnotadequateforcoreburnupsbeyondBOL,orthatanunexpectedchangeincoreconditionshasoccurred.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-10DraftB

CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThenormalizationofpredictedRCSboronconcentrationtothemeasuredvalueistypicallyperformedafterreachingRTPfollowingstartupfromarefuelingoutage,withthecontrolrodsintheirnormalpositionsforpoweroperation.ThenormalizationisperformedatBOLconditions,sothatcorereactivityrelativetopredictedvaluescanbecontinuallymonitoredandevaluatedascoreconditionschangeduringthecycle.CorereactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOLongtermcorereactivitybehavior.isaresultofthecorephysicsdesignandcannotbeeasilycontrolledoncethecoredesignisfixed.Duringoperation,therefore,theLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurementandtracking,andappropriateactionstakenasnecessary.LargedifferencesbetweenactualandpredictedcorereactivitymayindicatethattheassumptionsoftheDBAandtransientanalysesarenolongervalid,orthattheuncertaintiesintheNuclearDesignHethodologyarelargerthanexpected.Alimitonthereactivitybalanceof+1%ak/khasbeenestablishedbasedonengineeringjudgment.A1%deviationinreactivityfromthatpredictedislargerthanexpectedfornormaloperationandshouldthereforebeevaluated.Whenmeasuredcorereactivityiswithin1%ak/kofthepredictedvalueatsteadystatethermalconditions,thecoreisconsideredtobeoperatingwithinacceptabledesignlimits.SincedeviationsfromthelimitarenormallydetectedbycomparingpredictedandmeasuredsteadystateRCScriticalboronconcentrations,thedifferencebetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalueswouldbeapproximately100ppm(dependingontheboronworth)beforethelimitisreached.Thesevaluesarewellwithintheuncertaintylimitsforanalysisofboronconcentrationsamples,sothatspuriousviolationsofthelimitduetouncertaintyinmeasuringtheRCSboronconcentrationareunlikely.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-11(continued)DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESAPPLICABILITYThelimitsoncorereactivitymustbemaintainedduringMODE1andMODE2withK,<<~1.0becauseareactivitybalancemustexistwhenthereactoriscriticalorproducingTHERMALPOWER.Asthefueldepletes,coreconditionsarechanging,andconfirmationofthereactivitybalanceensuresthecoreisoperatingasdesigned.ThisSpecificationdoesnotapplyinMODE2withK,<<<1.0orMODES3,4,and5becausethereactorisshutdownandthereactivitybalanceisonlychangingbecauseofxenon.InMODE6,fuelloadingresultsinacontinuallychangingcorereactivity.Boronconcentrationrequirements(LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration")ensurethatfuelmovementsareperformedwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis.AnSDHdemonstrationisrequiredduringthefirststartupfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(SR3.1~2.1).ACTIONSA.landA.2Shouldananomalydevelopbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivity,anevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysismustbeperformed.Coreconditionsareevaluatedtodeterminetheirconsistencywithinputtodesigncalculations.Measured,coreandprocessparametersareevaluatedtodeterminethattheyarewithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis,andsafetyanalysiscalculationalmodelsarereviewedtoverifythattheyareadequateforrepresentationofthecoreconditions.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod,andallowssufficienttimetoassessthephysicalconditionofthereactorandcompletetheevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-12DraftB CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)Followingevaluationsofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,thecauseofthereactivityanomalymayberesolved.IfthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisamismatchincoreconditionsatthetimeofRCSboronconcentrationsampling,thenarecalculationoftheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsmaybeperformedtodemonstratethatcorereactivityisbehavingasexpected.Ifanunexpectedphysicalchangeintheconditionofthecorehasoccurred,itmustbeevaluatedandcorrected,ifpossible.Ifthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisinthecalculationtechnique,thenthecalculationalmodelsmustberevisedtoprovidemoreaccuratepredictions.Ifanyoftheseresultsaredemonstrated,anditisconcludedthatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheboronletdowncurvemayberenormalizedandpoweroperationmaycontinue.IfoperationalrestrictionoradditionalSRsarenecessarytoensurethereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheymustbedefined.TherequiredCompletionTime.of72hoursisadequateforpreparingwhateveroperatingrestrictionsorSurveillancesthatmayberequiredtoallowcontinuedreactoroperation.B.1Ifthecorereactivitycannotberestoredtowithinthe1%ak/klimit,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.IftheSDMforMODE2withK,<<<1.0isnotmet,thentheborationrequiredbySR3.1.1.1wouldoccur,TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-13(continued)Draft8 CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.2.1Corereactivitymustbeverifiedfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(e.g.,fuelmovement,controlrodreplacement,controlrodshuffling).ThecomparisonmustbemadepriortoenteringMODE1whenthecoreconditionssuchascontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,andsamariumconcentrationarefixedorstable.Sincethereactormustbecriticaltoverifycorereactivity,itisacceptabletoenterMODE2withKeffz1.0toperformthisSR.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotetoclarifythattheSRdoesnotneedtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringMODE1.SR3.1.2.2CorereactivityisverifiedbyperiodiccomparisonsofmeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrations.Thecomparisonismade,consideringthatothercoreconditionsarefixedorstable,includingcontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,fueltemperature,fueldepletion,xenonconcentration,andsamariumconcentration.TheFrequencyof31EFPD,isacceptable,basedontheslowrateofcorec'hangesduetofueldepletionandthepresenceofotherindicators(QPTR,AFD,etc.)forpromptindicationofananomaly.TheSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthattheSRisonlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).ThesecondNoteindicatesthatthenormalizationofpredictedcorereactivitytothemeasuredvaluemusttakeplacewithinthefirst60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.Thisallowssufficienttimeforcoreconditionstoreachsteadystate,butpreventsoperationforalargefractionofthefuelcyclewithoutestablishingabenchmarkforthedesigncalculations.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-14DraftB 0 HTCB3.1.3B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.3ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8(Ref.1),thereactorcoreanditsinteractionwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)mustbedesignedforinherentlystablepoweroperation,eveninthepossibleeventofanaccident.Inparticular,thenetreactivityfeedbackinthesystemmustcompensateforanyunintendedreactivityincreases.TheHTCrelatesachangeincorereactivitytoachangeinreactorcoolanttemperature(apositiveHTCmeansthatreactivityincreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature;conversely,anegativeHTCmeansthatreactivitydecreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature).HTCisdefinedasthechangeinreactivityperdegreechangeinmoderatortemperaturesincetemperatureisdirectlyproportionaltocoolantdensity.ThereactorisdesignedtooperatewithanegativeHTCoverthelargestpossiblerangeoffuelcycleoperation.Therefore,acoolanttemperatureincreasewillcauseareactivitydecrease,sothatthecoolanttemperaturetendstoreturntowarditsinitialvalue.Reactivityincreasesthatcauseacoolanttemperatureincreasewillthusbeselflimiting,andstablepoweroperationwillresult.HTCvaluesarepredictedatselectedburnupsduringthesafetyevaluationanalysisandareconfirmedtobeacceptablebymeasurements.Bothinitialandreloadcoresaredesignedsothatthebeginningofcyclelife(BOL)HTCislessthanzerowhenTHERMALPOWERisatRTP.TheactualvalueoftheHTCisdependentoncorecharacteristics,suchasfuelloadingandreactorcoolantsolubleboronconcentration.ThecoredesignmayrequireadditionalfixeddistributedpoisonstoyieldanHTCatBOLwithintherangeanalyzedintheplantaccidentanalysis.Theendofcyclelife(EOL)HTCisalsolimitedbytherequirementsoftheaccidentanalysis.FuelcyclesthataredesignedtoachievehighburnupsorthathavechangestoothercharacteristicsareevaluatedtoensurethattheHTCdoesnotexceedtheEOLlimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-15Draft8 HTCB3.1.3BASESBACKGROUNDThelimitationsonHTCareprovidedtoensurethatthevalue(continued)ofthiscoefficientremainswithinthelimitingconditionsassumedintheUFSARaccidentandtransientanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforthespecifiedMTCare:a.TheHTCvaluesmustremainwithintheboundsofthoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2);andb.TheHTCmustbesuchthatinherentlystablepoweroperationsresultduringnormaloperationandaccidents,suchasoverheatingandovercoolingevents.TheUFSAR,Chapter15(Ref.2),containsanalysesofaccidentsthatresultinbothoverheatingandovercoolingofthereactorcore.HTCisoneofthecontrollingparametersforcorereactivityintheseaccidents.BoththemostpositivevalueandmostnegativevalueoftheHTCareimportanttosafety,andbothvaluesmustbebounded.Valuesusedintheanalysesconsiderworstcaseconditionstoensurethattheaccidentresultsarebounding(Ref.3).TheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreoverheatingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCispositive(i.e.,upperlimit).SuchaccidentsincludetherodwithdrawaltransientfromeitherzeroorRTP,lossofmainfeedwaterflow,andlossofforcedreactorcoolantflow.TheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreovercoolingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCisnegative(i.e.,lowerlimit).Suchaccidentsincludesuddenfeedwaterflowincreaseandsuddendecreaseinfeedwatertemperature.Inordertoensureaboundingaccidentanalysis,theHTCisassumedtobeitsmostlimitingvaluefortheanalysisconditionsappropriatetoeachaccident.Theboundingvalueisdeterminedbyconsideringroddedandunroddedconditions,whetherthereactorisatfullorzeropower,andwhetheritisatBOLorEOL.Themostconservativecombinationappropriatetotheaccidentisthenusedfortheanalysis(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-16DraftB HTC83.1.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)HTCsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom,HTCisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseofitsdependenceonboronconcentration.LCOLCO3.1.3requirestheHTCtobewithinthespecifiedlimitsoftheCOLRtoensurethatthecoreoperateswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.Duringthereloadcoresafetyevaluation,theHTCisanalyzedtodeterminethatitsvaluesremainwithintheboundsoftheoriginalaccidentanalysisduringoperation.AssumptionsmadeinsafetyanalysesrequirethattheHTCbelesspositivethanagivenupperboundandmorepositivethanagivenlowerbound.TheHTCismostpositiveatBOL;thisupperboundmustnotbeexceeded.ThismaximumupperlimitoccursatBOL,allrodsout(ARO),hotzeropower(HZP)conditions.AtEOLtheHTCtakesonitsmostnegativevalue,whenthelowerboundbecomesimportant.ThisLCOexiststoensurethatboththeupperandlowerboundsarenotexceeded.Duringoperation,therefore,theconditionsoftheLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurement.TheSurveillancecheckatBOLonHTCprovidesconfirmationthattheHTCisbehavingasanticipatedandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpower,andEOLsothattheacceptancecriteriaaremet.TheLCOestablishesamaximumpositivevaluethatcannotbeexceeded.TheBOLpositivelimitandtheEOLnegativelimitareestablishedintheCOLRtoallowspecifyinglimitsforeachparticularcycle.Thispermitstheplanttotakeadvantageofimprovedfuelmanagementandchangesinplantoperatingschedule.IftheLCOlimitsarenotmet,theplantresponseduringtransientsmaynotbeaspredicted.Thecorecouldviolatecriteriathatprohibitareturntocriticality,orthedeparturefromnucleateboilingratiocriteriaoftheapprovedcorrelationmaybeviolated,whichcouldleadtoalossofthefuelcladdingintegrity.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,1-17(continued)Draft8

MTCB3.1.3BASESAPPLICABILITYInMODE1,theupperandlowerlimitsonHTCmustbemaintainedtoensurethatanyaccidentinitiatedfromTHERMALPOWERoperationwillnotviolatethedesignassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.InMODE2withthereactorcritical,theupperlimitmustalsobemaintainedtoensurethatstartupandsubcriticalaccidents(suchastheuncontrolledCONTROLRODassemblyorgroupwithdrawal)willnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.ThelowerHTClimitmustbemaintainedinMODES2and3,inadditiontoMODEl,ptj:":,,:ejisure":::.",that'-::;j'o'o'ldo)iii';',$cb'e-HTG-becemcycl~bur-nureduced-.InMODES4,5,and6,thisLCOisnotapplicable,sincenoDesignBasisAccidentsusingtheMTCasananalysisassumptionareinitiatedfromtheseMODES.ACTIONSA.lHTCmustbekeptwithintheupperlimitspecifiedinLCO3.1.3toensurethatassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.TheupperlimitofConditionAistheupperlimitspecifiedintheCOLRsincethisvaluewillalwaysbelessthanorequaltothemaximumupperlimitspecifiedintheLCO.IftheupperMTClimitisviolatedatBOL,administrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanksmustbeestablishedtomaintaintheHTCwithinitslimitsinthefuture.ACompletionTimeof24hoursprovidesenoughtimeforevaluatingtheMTCmeasurementandcomputingtherequiredbankwithdrawallimits.Ascycleburnupisincreased,theRCSboronconcentrationwillbereduced.ThereducedboronconcentrationcausestheMTCtobecomemorenegative.Usingphysicscalculations,thetimeincyclelifeatwhichthecalculatedHTCwillmeettheLCOrequirementcanbedetermined.AtthispointincorelifeConditionAnolongerexists,Theplantisno(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-18Draft8 HTCB3.1.3BASESlongerintheRequiredAction,sotheadministrativewithdrawallimitsarenolongerineffect.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-19DraftB HTCB3.1.3BASESACTIPNS:,'.-':.(,',::.',.'.;~~@,::;~:.';;.:j.KB-"1'j:,"',::;(.c'oni."inued)'.:eu44-be-abIftherequiredadministrativewithdrawallimitsatBOLarenotestablishedwithin24hours,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ToachievethisstatustheplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withk,<<<1.0.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1Exceeding,.theEOLHTClowerlimitmeansthatthesafetyanalysisassumptionsoftheEOLaccidentsthatuseaboundingnegativeHTCvaluemaybeinvalid.IfitisdeterminedduringphysicstestingthattheEOLHTCvaluewillexceedthemostnegativeHTClimitspecifiedintheCOLR,thesafetyanalysisandcoredesignmustbere-evaluatedpriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmtoensurethatoperationneartheEOLremainsacceptable.The300ppmlimitissufficienttopreventEOLoperationatorbelowtheaccidentanalysisHTCassumptions.ConditionChasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresthatRequiredActionC.1mustbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateatconditionswheretheHTCwoul'dbebelowthemostnegativelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-20DraftB

HTCB3.1.3BASESP"""'-"1::"Act'""':::C.".1"",":"'odi'i"'"b"-N't'h,States"':thatrest'r'i,:c:.~ng,','en,:rj.::::.;in,,0,'.:":;"0NyvrN44cSRcMcvM"..AvxÃcM)i".wN(cM%5'N44kkyM54N49(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-21DraftB 'H HTCB3.1.3BASESACTIONS(continued)D.lIfthere-evaluationoftheaccidentanalysiscannotsupportthepredictedEOLHTClowerlimit,oriftheRequiredActionsofConditionCarenotcompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimetheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.3.1ThisSRrequiresmeasurementoftheHTCatBOLpriortoenteringMODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostpositiveHTCLCO.MeetingthelimitpriortoenteringNODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.TheBOLHTCvalueforAROwillbeinferredfromisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC)measurementsobtainedduringthephysicstestsafterrefueling.TheAROvaluecanbedirectlycomparedtotheBOLHTClimitoftheLCO.Ifrequired,measurementresultsandpredicteddesignvaluescanbeusedtoestablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanks.ThemeasurementoftheMTCatthebeginningofthefuelcycle,isadequatetoconfirmthattheHTCremainswithinitsupperlimitsandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpowerandatEOL,sincethiscoefficientchangesslowly,dueprincipallytothereductioninRCSboronconcentrationassociatedwithfuelburnup.ThismeasurementisconsistentwiththerecommendationsdetailedinReference4.'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-22DraftB

MTCB3.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.1.3.2REQUIREMENTS445xs~k)544$(4@9h(PAwvgvwN4&osiwNA&4<<QMcvAYNA4%YhN%5444N%4%4(~'IYh%%%4'6'gkhbcww$P,.",:i:!,."i.-";SR':".3;::1"3'!!3TheMTCvalueforEOLisalsoinferredfromtheITCmeasurements.TheEOLvalueiscalculatedusingthepredictedEOLMTCfromthecoredesignreportandthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandpredictedITC.TheEOLvalueisdirectlycomparedtothemostnegativeEOLvalueestablishedintheCOLRtoensurethatthepredictedEOLnegativeMTCvalueiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.WCAP9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodology,"July1985.4.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06",datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-23DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(e.g.,trippability)oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.MaximumrodmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM).TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27and28(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Mechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofa'inimumSDH.LimitsoncontrolrodalignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore(uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCRDHmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximatelyVeinch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-24DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.Theshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworth'ofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.Theshutdownbankismaintainedeitherinthefullyinsertedorfullywithdrawnposition.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbank8beginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankA.stopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankBcontinuestomoveout.WhencontrolbankBreachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,8,andCareatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbank0isnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bankDisinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theHankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andtheNicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-25DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtherodcontrolsystemthatmovestherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterfor,thatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+1stepor+'Isinch),butifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.TheHRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactualcontrolrodposition,butatalowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofonedigitaldetectorassemblyperrod.Allthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputto'woredundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheHRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsduetothe12-stepintervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Withanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.ThesafetyconcernsassociatedwiththeHRPIsystemareassociatedwithgenerationofaroddrop/rodstopsignalwhichblocksautorodwithdrawalandtheabilitytocomplywiththerodmisalignmentrequirement.Arodbottomsignalfrombothsignalprocessorsisrequiredtogeneratearoddrop/rodstopsignal.Thetwo-out-,of-twocoincidentsignalrequirementreducesinadvertentroddrop/rodstopbutdoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysisassumptions.ThebankdemandpositionandtheHRPIrodpositionsignalsaremonitoredbyaroddeviationmonitoringsystemthatprovidesanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.TheroddeviationalarmwillbegeneratedbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-26(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESControlrodmisalignmentaccidentsareanalyzedinthesafetyanalysis(Ref.3).Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingcontrolrodinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).pressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Twotypesofmisalignmentaredistinguished.Duringmovementofacontrolrodgroup,onerodmaystopmoving,whiletheotherrodsinthegroupcontinue(i.e.,staticrodmisalignment).Thisconditionmaycauseexcessivepowerpeaking.Thesecondtypeofmisalignmentoccursifonerodfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionrequiresanevaluationtodeterminethatsufficientreactivityworthisheldintheremainingcontrolrodstomeettheSDHrequirement,withthemaximumworthrodstuckfullywithdrawn.Threetypesofanalysisareperformedinregardtostaticrodmisalignment(Ref.4).Thefirsttypeofanalysisconsidersthecasewhereanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedintothecorewithallotherrodscompletelywithdrawn.Withcontrolbanksattheirinsertionlimits,thesecondtypeofanalysisconsidersthecasewhenanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedintothecore.Thethirdtypeofanalysisconsidersthecaseofacompletelywithdrawnsinglerodfromabankinsertedtoitsinsertionlimit.Satisfyinglimitsondeparturefromnucleateboilingratioinallthreeofthesecasesboundsthesituationwhenarodismisalignedfromitsgroupby12steps.ThesecondtypeofmisalignmentoccursifoneRCCAfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionisassumedintheevaluationtodeterminethattherequiredSONismetwiththemaximumworthRCCAfullywithdrawnfollowingamainsteamlinebreak(Ref.5).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-27(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheRequiredActionsinthisLCOensurethateitherdeviationsfromthealignmentlimitswillbecorrectedorthatTHERMALPOWERwillbeadjustedsothatexcessivelocallinearheatrates(LHRs)willnotoccur,andthattherequirementsonSDMandejectedrodwortharepreserved.Continuedoperationofthereactorwithamisalignedcontrolrodisallowediftheheatfluxhotchannelfactor(F<(Z))andthenuclearenthalpyhotchannelfactor(F~)areverifiedtobewithintheirlimitsintheCOLRandthesafetyanalysisisverifiedtoremainvalid.Whenacontrolrodismisaligned,theassumptionsthatareusedtodeterminetherodinsertionlimits,AFDlimits,andquadrantpowertiltlimitsarenotpreserved.Therefore,thelimitsmaynotpreservethedesignpeakingfactors,andFo(Z)andF~mustbeverifieddirectlybyincoremapping.BasesSection3.2(PowerDistributionLimits)containsmorecompletediscussionsoftherelationofF<(Z)andF>totheoperatinglimits.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYandalignmentaredirectlyrelatedtopowerdistributionsandSDM,whichareinitialconditionsassumedinsafetyanalyses.ThereforetheysatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOAllshutdownandcontrolrodsmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidethenegativereactivitynecessarytoprovideadequateshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditions.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYisdefinedasbeingtrippablesuchthatthenecessarynegativereactivityassumedintheaccidentanalysisisavailable.Ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovablebutremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrodisconsideredtobeOPERABLE.Thelimitsonshutdownorcontrolrodalignmentsensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysiswillremainvalid.TherequirementsonOPERABILITYensurethatuponreactortrip,theassumedreactivitywillbeavailableandwillbeinserted.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsalsoensurethattheRCCAsandbanksmaintainthecorrectpowerdistributionandrodalignment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-28(continued)Draft8 RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESLCO(continued)TherequirementtomaintaintherodalignmentofeachindividualrodpositionasindicatedbyHRPItowithinplusorminus12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandpositionisconservative.TheminimummisalignmentassumedinsafetyanalysiswithrespecttopowerdistributionandSDHis25steps,whileatotalmisalignmentfromfullywithdrawntofullyinsertedisassumedforthecontrolrodmisalignmentaccident.Therodpositiondeviationmonitorisusedtoverifyrodalignmentonacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.Verificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthealignmentlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1,4.1).Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinlimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.4.2).FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceunacceptablepowerpeakingfactorsandLHRs,orunacceptableSDHs,allofwhichmayconstituteinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYTherequirementsonRCCAOPERABILITYandalignmentareapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<~1.0becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichneutron(orfission)powerisgenerated,andtheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability)andalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.InMODE2withK.<<<1.0andMODES3,4,5,and6,thealignmentlimitsdonotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.IntheshutdownMODES,theOPERABILITYoftheshutdownandcontrolrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDH,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),"forSDHinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirementsduringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-29(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONSA.1.1andA.1.2Whenoneormorerodsareuntrippable,thereisapossibilitythattherequiredSDHmaybeadverselyaffected.Undertheseconditions,itisimportanttodeterminetheSDH,andifitislessthantherequiredvalue,initiateboration,untiltherequiredSDHisrecovered.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisadequatefordeterminingSDHand,ifnecessary,forinitiatingemergencyborationtorestoreSDH.BorationisassumedtocontinueuntiltherequiredSDHisrestored.Inthissituation,SDHverificationmustinc1udetheworthoftheuntrippablerod,aswellasaremainingrodofmaximumworth.A.2Iftheuntrippablerod(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.B.II:::;"..I:."~in'd':.O'..:I.":::,":2':."C@'~MYC~.~40.~'+Peen;i:::::a::.',:rad.<,"'.,::i.:'s':,mii:a'.:i';i:gne.i"...,'j:,iS'deci.':fi;.ed.':.,'3'n'@tli'e':.:'..'COf.'R!'.",,oi";,'.","::bo'r'a':.:+'$+"ccs>I'(.'eggx'YQP'Y4$"4v"4$N"k4(NM"xN"iwiw%sd'N'"4YN(wscN4cA444c"w@wc)4~jar'1j:.,m'anne'r':;:.,,...d-8-.6(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-30DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONS8.2B.3B.4B.5and8.6'orcontinuedoperationwithamisalignedrod,reactorpowermustbereduced,SDHmustperiodicallybeverifiedwithinlimits,hotchannelfactors(FQ(Z)andF>)mustbeverifiedwithinlimits,andthesafetyanalysesmustbere-evaluated.toconfirmcontinuedoperationispermissible.6).TheCompletionTimeof2hoursgivestheoperatorsufficienttimetoaccomplishanorderlypowerreductionwithoutchallengingtheReactorProtectionSystem,oWhenarodisknowntobemisaligned,thereisapotentialtoimpacttheSDH.Sincethecoreconditionscanchangewithtime,periodicverificationofSDHisrequired.AFrequency'of12hoursissufficienttoensurethisrequirementcontinuestobemet.VerifyingthatF<(Z)andF~arewithintherequiredlimitsepTheCompletionTimeof72hoursallowssufficienttimetoobtainfluxmapsofthecorepowerdistributionusingtheincorefluxmappingsystemandtocalculateF<(Z)andF~.Oncecurrentconditionshavebeenverifiedacceptable,timeisavailabletoperformevaluationsofaccidentanalysistodeterminethatcorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccidentforthedurationofoperationundertheseconditions.ACompletionTimeof5daysissufficient(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.1-31DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASEStimetoobtaintherequiredinputdataandtoperformtheanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-32DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESToachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK.<<<1.0within6hours.pQ~+$g4wp(RQ(%$.Np'>>'+4NQN~('>Q~N>>ggg~Ppg+p>4%%>gvr(rqx%apNsvpgvNywr.>>>,w~v,v(aw~,,...<~wvyp>~ra>>>wvv<;,$p>:..',);.,:,:.$qq',c>4vQk>NN4rcv44cw@NM44si>'CN'WvAwwvlv>:v~'Si4@Ns'Akv>>4>S&isvkMiAA44viQMkkcs>>'.s>N:w>v"vv:>'v@we>>>>kikwvkR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-34DraftB

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONSTheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,ff(1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.Si"C44"A~~4%iW%4o"So4%N4R@xcVA484%NiYiÃx4N~44NNA%0%@4@@'4~4'cPcÃ4kAVA'ee'<4%SNoNVN40%44.~So'a~iÃ@YACSR44MR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-35DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.4.1VerificationthatindividualrodpositionsarewithinalignmentlimitsusingHRPIorthePPCSataFrequencyof12hoursprovidesahistorythatallowstheoperatortodetectarodthatisbeginningtodeviatefromitsexpectedposition.ThisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.SR3.1.4.2Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)isinoperable,nocontrolroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourFrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofarodmisalignment,AreductionoftheFrequencyto4hoursprovidessufficientmonitoringoftherodpositionswhenthemonitorisinoperable'hisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatperformanceofthisSRisonlynecessarywhentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-36Draft8 RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.4.3VerifyingeachcontrolrodisOPERABLEwouldrequirethateachrodbetripped.However,inHODES1and2withK,<<a1.0,trippingeachcontrolrodwouldresultinradialoraxialpowertilts,oroscillations.Exercisingeachindividualcontrolrodevery92daysprovidesincreasedconfidencethatallrodscontinuetobeOPERABLEwithoutexceedingthealignmentlimit,eveniftheyarenotregularlytripped.HovingeachcontrolrodtoaHRPItransitionwillnotcauseradialoraxialpowertilts,oroscillations,tooccur.The92dayFrequencytakesintoconsiderationotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandSR3.1.4.1,whichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofOPERABILITYoftherods.DuringorbetweenrequiredperformancesofSR3,1.4,3(determinationofcontrolrodOPERABILITYbymovement),ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovable,butremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrod(s)isconsidered.tobeOPERABLE.Atanytime,ifacontrolrod(s)isimmovable,adeterminationofthetrippability(OPERABILITY)ofthecontrolrod(s)mustbemade,andappropriateactiontaken.SR3.1.4.4Verificationofroddroptimesallowstheoperatortodeterminethatthemaximumroddroptimepermittedisconsistent'withtheassumedroddroptimeusedinthesafetyanalysis.Heasuringroddroptimespriortoreactorcriticality,afterreactorvesselheadremoval,ensuresthatthereactorinternalsandroddrivemechanismwillnotinterferewithrodmotionorroddroptime,andthatnodegradationinthesesystemshasoccurredthatwouldadverselyaffectcontrolrodmotionordroptime.K,",Th'i':s:.'%as;5i'jap:s,;,:~peThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutage,duetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandtheR.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-37(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESpotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-38(continued)DraftB RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESREFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27,and28,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.4.6,5.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-39DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.583.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitBASESBACKGROUNDTheinsertionlimitsoftheshutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.The'insertionlimitsdirectlyaffectcorepowerandfuelburnupdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableejectedrodworth,SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.Theapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirements,areAtomicIndustrialforum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositions,aremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDMlimitsarepreserved.Therodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAs'consistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andLCO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.Theshutdownbankisrequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-40DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforprecisereactivitycontrolofthereactor.ThepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormallyautomaticallycontrolledbytheRodControlSystem,buttheycanalsobemanuallycontrolled.F,':;:","'They.",":are.:",,",,,c'a'pabTiCP"~oPsa+c<~A+4',.??g?y%~Q.?v,.9?g<<gkSgCC?,.?4a?)S+?g<4)"gj,.9':~j??':...'.'.,'?';x..jojj.j'.:.;4%vs(C4i'.,:.".:adriiri'g!!negiti.:ve:'::r'cacti,.yi'iyFjverygqul'.',cki'j~".';:,j'corn'pai'::;ed'.,'-:'::i'o'"horatinjj',.;:ii:.~,di,IOtjn'g~);,banksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormalfullpoweroperations.Hence,theyarenotcapableofaddingalargeamountofpositivereactivity.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangeassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.Thedesigncalculationsareperformedwiththeassumptionthattheshutdownbankiswithdrawnfirst.Theshutdownbankcanbefullywithdrawnwithoutthecoregoingcritical.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thisprovidesavailablenegativereactivityintheeventofborationerrors.Theshutdownbankiscontrolledmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator.Theshutdownbankiseitherfullywithdrawnorfullyinserted.Theshutdownbankmustbecompletelywithdrawnfromthecore,priortowithdrawinganycontrolbanksduringanapproachtocriticality.Theshutdownbankisthenleftinthispositionuntilthereactorisshutdown.Theshutdownbankaffectscorepowerandburnupdistribution,andaddsnegativereactivitytoshutdownthereactoruponreceiptofareactortripsignal.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimited,sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1,5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-41Draft8 ShutdownBankInsertionLimit83.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally~[ithe~h<,<,<@dms<<<<<<<xy~gy<<y..>c~xq<~lgrab<<~,yymi~yg<<~<tgi~~~l<<~ix<tt~xy~tP<~i<P,.'~/<8~maint'aii)ed'.":.OperationwithinthesubjectLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),lossofflow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfunction.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,Onareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolbanks),exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumamountofnegativereactivityonareactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDH(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthemostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDHatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitalsolimitsthereactivityworthofanejectedshutdownrod.Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentisthat:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-42Draft8 ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.RCSpressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,theshutdownbank,insertionlimitaffectssafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandSDH(Ref.3).TheSDNrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedOPTRpresent.OperationattheinsertionlimitmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvaluein.fuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.Thecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits,togetherwithAFD,gPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDH,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitpreservesaninitialconditionassumedinthesafetyanalysesand,assuch,satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Thisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegative(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-43DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESreactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSONfollowingareactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-44DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingtheLCOrequirementissuspendedduringSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequirestheshutdownbanktomovebelowtheLCOlimits,whichwouldnormallyviolatetheLCO.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITYTheshutdownbankmustbewithintheinsertionlimit,withthereactorinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<a1.0.ThisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDHfollowingareactortrip.InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODE3,4,5,or6,theshutdownbankinsertionlimitdoesnotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.InshutdownMODEStheOPERABILITYoftheshutdownrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDM,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.ReFertoLCO3.1.1forSDMrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5.LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"ensuresadequateSDMinMODE6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2Whentheshutdownbankisnotwithininsertionlimit,verificationofSDMorinitiationofborationtoregainSDMwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDHinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<~1.0isensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"),Iftheshutdownbankisnotwithintheinsertionlimit,thenSDMwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-45DraftB ShutdownBankInsertionLimit83.1.5BASESACTIONSA.1.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinorder.totakeconservativeactionbecausethesimultaneousoccurrenceofeitheraLOCA,lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistributionorreactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability.Twohoursisallowedtorestoretheshutdownbanktowithintheinsertionlimit.ThistimelimitisnecessarybecausetheavailableSDMmaybesignificantlyreduced,withtheshutdownbanknotwithintheinsertionlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblemswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.1andA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwheretheLCOisnotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE2withk,ff<1.0withinaCompletionTimeof6hours,TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.5.1Sincetheshutdownbankispositionedmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator,),:',,aj~ier'):::fi,c'6":,:i:onto'f;:;::FshutdoPii;:':,,erike'n's'ure;~:th'at;:;:She)';b'ank:RMw>~+'4Am"~NdNMQm'%A4:%AaÃc'v<kvAAA)4kNN:;+%j4N4A"xa$Ãvi'5"Ammva4io4WANueR~&f.'-ii~4-.Also,the12hourFrequencytakesintoaccountotherinformationavailableinthecontrolroomforthepurposeofmonitoringthestatusofshutdownrods.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-46(continued)Draf.tB ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESREFERENCES1.AtomicIssuedIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,forcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-47DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1'ControlBankInsertionLimitsBASESBACKGROUND/4%Theinsertionlimitsoftheshutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.j9g(h~P)%ww~'vP+'vj~~vMpp+)Vg@~,(~pgpgp~v~v~p)vl+V+VpgQVA'V~,~,'lp~~~('pg~A~)The.",'Xs'n8crt'a'b'n)jl'jmsts'~ds'r'e'c'6y;:..:,;affeet,.::cafe~.",,powej~janajjfu'eli';:,'odo'ith'.-;",:",:-SHUTDOWN..":.":MARGIN'":"';(SDM),'.,"-:Th""""""'"'wer-'""""'i'""'"urnup-'+u'm~d-wer-t-h-4HUTRQN-HARGNQQ4+andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDMlimitsarepreserved.Therodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andLCO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.ThecontrolbankinsertionlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksarerequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.TheinsertionlimitsfigureintheCOLRalsoindicateshowthecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern.Overlapisthedistancetravelledtogetherbytwocontrolbanks..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-48DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits83.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforprecisereactivitycontrolofthereactor.ThepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormallycontrolledautomaticallybytheRodControlSystem,butcanalsobemanuallycontrolled.Theyarecapableofaddingnegativereactivityveryquickly(comparedtoboratingordiluting).Thecontrolbanksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormalfullpoweroperations.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangesassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.TherodinsertionlimitmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificationthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbank8beginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankAstopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbank8continuestomoveout.WhencontrolbankBreachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,B,andCareat'thefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankDisnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bankDisinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-49DraftB

ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimited,sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.Theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally,gth8e:m'a',j'rj4i.'ri'e,'d"...:-t4e-ceEf+R56446OperationwithintheAFD,gPTR,shutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),lossofflow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-50(continued)DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOnareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolbanks),exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumamountofnegativereactivityonareactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDM(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthemostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDMatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsalsolimitthereactivityworthofanejectedcontrolbankrod,Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystempressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsaffectsafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandpowerdistributions(Refs.4,5,6,and7).TheSDMrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-51DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedgPTRpresent.OperationattheinsertionlimitmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvalueinfuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.Thecontrolandshutdownbankinsertion.limits,togetherwithAFD,gPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDH,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Thecontrolbankinsertion,sequenceandoverlaplimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement,inthattheyareinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.LCOThelimitsoncontrolbankssequence,overlap,andinsertion,asdefinedintheCOLR,mustbemaintainedbecausetheyservethefunctionofpreservingpowerdistribution,ensuringthattheSDHismaintained,ensuringthatejectedrodworthislimited,andensuringadequatenegativereactivityinsertionisavailableontrip,Theoverlapbetweencontrolbanksprovidesmoreuniformratesofreactivityinsertionandwithdrawalandisimposedtomaintainacceptablepowerpeakingduringcontrolbankmotion.Therodinsertionlimitmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasis-andwillprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificationthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingtheLCOrequirementsaresuspendedduringtheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequiresthecontrolbanktomovebelowtheLCOlimits,whichwouldviolatetheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-52(continued)DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESAPPLICABILITYThecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsshallbemaintainedwiththereactorinNODE1andNODE2withk,<<z1.0.Theselimitsmustbemaintained,sincetheypreservetheassumedpowerdistribution,ejectedrodworth,SDN,andreactivityrateinsertionassumptions.ApplicabilityinMODE2withk,<<(1.0andNODES3,4,5,and6isnotrequired,sinceneitherthepowerdistributionnorejectedrodworthassumptionswouldbeexceededintheseNODES.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2Whenthecontrolbanksareoutsidetheacceptableinsertionlimits,outofsequence,orinthewrongoverlapconfiguration,theymustberestoredtowithinthoselimits.Thisrestorationcanoccurintwoways:a.Reducingpowertobeconsistentwithrodposition;orb.Movingrodstobeconsistentwithpower.Also,verificationofSDMorinitiationofborationtoregainSDNwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDNinMODES1and2isnormallyensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdownbank,insertionlimits(seeLCO3.l.1,',-';:,-:,':,:,SPU~TDOANO'ARGINi;,"('SDN)""':')~-"SHNMWN-HA"'.I'controlbanksarenotwithintheirlimits,thenSDHwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-53DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimits83.1.6BASESACTIONSA.1.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinordertotakeconservativeactionbecausetheoccurrenceofeitheraLOCA,lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistributionorreactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability.Thus,theallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursforrestoringthebanks'owithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblems.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.landA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withK,<<<1.0,wheretheLCOisnotapplicable.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems,SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR-3.1.6.1ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtoensurethatthereactordoesnotachievecriticalitywiththecontrolbanksbelowtheirinsertionlimits.pjTh'e":;.'.'::.:Freq'urn'cjoyo'lipid'hini'4,:::,;:;hou'r's,SRi':,".':4%1::.-'6'.".2':(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-54DraftB ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASES,verificationofthecontrolbankinsertionlimitsataFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensureOPERABILITYofthebankinsertionlimitmonitorandtodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimitssince,normally,verylittlerodmotionoccursin12hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-55Draft8 ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.1.6.3Whentheinsertionlimitmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)becomesinoperable,nocontrolroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourfrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofacontrolbanknot'withintheinsertionlimits,AreductionoftheFrequencytoevery4hoursprovidessufficientmonitoringofcontrolrodinsertionwhenthemonitorisinopetable.VerificationofthecontrolbankpositionataFrequencyof4hoursissufficienttodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimits.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesth'atperformanceofthisSRinonlynecessarywhentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.SR3.1.6.4WhencontrolbanksaremaintainedwithintheirinsertionlimitsasrequiredbySR3.1.6.2andSR3.1.6.3above,itisunlikelythattheirsequenceandoverlapwillnotbeinaccordancewithrequirementsprovidedintheCOLR.AFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeinsertionlimitcheckaboveinSR3.1.6.2.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-56DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEHB3.1.7RodPositionIndicationBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability),includingpositionindication,oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.HaximumrodmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH).RodpositionindicationisrequiredtoassessOPERABILITYandmisalignment.AccordingtotheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13(Ref.1),instrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystemsovertheiroperatingrangesduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andaccidentconditionsmustbeOPERABLE.LCO3.1.7isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITYofthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstodeterminecontrolrodpositionsandtherebyensurecompliancewiththecontrolrodalignmentandinsertionlimits.Hechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDH.LimitsoncontrolrodalignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore(uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDHs).EachCRDHmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximately5/8inch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-57DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashionbutalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation,Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andtheHicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtheRodControlSystemthatmovetherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupall'receivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+1stepor+'/sinch),but'ifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-58DraftB

RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheHRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactualcontrolrodposition,butatalowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofone'igitaldetectorassemblyperrod.AllthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputtotworedundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheMRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsduetothe12-stepintervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Wi.thanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESControlandshutdownrodpositionaccuracyisessentialduringpoweroperation.Powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,orSDHlimitsmaybeviolatedintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(Ref.2),withcontrolorshutdownrodsoperatingoutsidetheirlimitsundetected.Therefore,theacceptancecriteriaforrodpositionindicationisthatrodpositionsmustbeknownwithsufficientaccuracyinordertoverifythecoreisoperatingwithinthegroupsequence,overlap,designpeakinglimits,ejectedrodworthlimits,andwithminimumSDM(LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits").Therodpositionsmustalsobeknowninordertoverifythealignmentlimitsarepreserved(LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits").Controlrodpositionsarecontinuouslymonitoredtoprovideoperatorswithinformationthatensures-theplantisoperatingwithintheboundsoftheaccident'nalysisassumptions.ThecontrolrodpositionindicatorchannelssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Thecontrolrodpositionindicatorsmonitorcontrolrodposition,whichisaninitialconditionoftheaccident.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-59(continued)~DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESLCOLCO3.1.7specifiesthattheHRPISystemandtheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystembeOPERABLE.ForthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstobeOPERABLErequiresthefollowing:'a~FortheHRPISystemtherearenofailedcoilsandrodpositionindicationisavailableontheHRPIscreen(ineitherthecontrolroomorrelayroom)ortheplantprocesscomputersystem;andb.TheBankDemandIndicationSystemhasbeencalibratedeitherinthefullyinsertedpositionortotheHRPISystem.The12stepagreementlimitbetweentheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemandtheHRPISystemasrequiredbySR3.1,7.1indicatesthattheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisadequatelycalibrated,andcanbeusedforindicationofcontrolrodbankposition.Adeviationoflessthantheallowable12stepagreementlimit,inpositionindicationforasinglecontrolrod,ensureshighconfidencethatthepositionuncertaintyofthecorrespondingcontrolrodgroupiswithintheassumedvaluesusedintheanalysis.TheHRPIsystemisdesignedwith.errordetectionsuchthatwhenafaultoccursinthebinarydatareceivedfromthecoilstacksorprocessingunitanalarmisannunciatedattheHRPIdisplay.Whenthefaultclears,thesystemprovidesselfvalidationofdataintegrityandreturnstoitsnormaldisplaymode.Becauseofthedigitalnatureofthesystemanditsinherentdiagnosticfeatures,intermittentdataalarmscanmaskpositionindicationandgeneratetheperceptionthatasinglerodpositionisunmonitored.Forasinglerodpositionindicationfailure,HRPIisconsideredOPERABLEifafaultoccursandclearswithinfiveminutesandtheindicatedpositioniswithinexpectedvalues.TheserequirementsensurethatcontrolrodpositionindicationduringpoweroperationandPHYSICSTESTSisaccurate,andthatdesignassumptionsarenotchallenged.OPERABILITYofthepositionindicatorchannelsensuresthatinoperable,misaligned,ormispositionedcontrolrodscanbedetected.Therefore,powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,andSDHcanbecontrolledwithinacceptablelimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-60(continued)DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESAPPLICABILITYTherequirementsontheHRPIandstepcountersareonlyapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<)1.0(consistentwithLCO3.1.4andLCO3.1.5,andLCO3.1.6),becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical,andtheOPERABILITYandalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.Intheshutdown'ODES,theOPERABILITYoftheshutdownandcontrolbankshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDM,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH),"forSDMrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<(1.0andNODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.I,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirementsduringMODE6.C3ThisisacceptablebecausetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablepositionindicator.ges-i44+o-4@&'~4er-pj'er",:i'j'r'o'u'p,':."..':aija~~.eacii,.:..'.oema'ri'a'.,";,:posi'..t~o,',ji'nd'i.c'atot;-':lper'.,"bank-;,:Cb~hi'%vispi"'"<'4'~':v'%49~%A<'i~4i44cY@.,i%4'cvNi@'4w4%4cMYAvC.4'(4etc'"+n44ea~euA.lWhenoneHRPIpergroupfails,thepositionoftherodcanstillbedeterminedbyuseofthemovableincoredetectors.Basedon'experience,normalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofbanks.Ifabankhas.beensignificantlymoved,theRequiredActionofB.1orB.2belowisrequired.Therefore,verificationofRCCApositionwithintheCompletionTimeof8hoursisadequateforallowingcontinuedfullpoweroperation,sincetheprobabilityofsimultaneouslyhavingarodsignificantlyoutofpositionandaneventsensitivetothatrodpositionissmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-61DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-62Oraft8 RodPositionIndication83.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2ReductionofTHERMALPOWERto(50%RTPputsthecoreintoaconditionwhererodpositionisnotsignificantlyaffectingcorepeakingfactors.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreducingpowerto(50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.1above.B.1andB.2sijjce!'fie'~pa'sgiy'<iiiiii'ji'<i;:its't*tieilia'i'iij'jii'ej'f'='=)41wicNNNowr@ÃvS.N~vAm4""'i%orc@&A"%AM@'(NvM'4"vN4wxv'nese-Req~n&A:-determ4~d-,theRequiredActionsofA.1andA.2arestillappropriatebutmustbeinitiatedpromptlyunderRequiredActionB.1tobeginverifyingthattheserodsarestillproperlypositioned,relativetotheirgrouppositions.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositions.Acceptableverificationofrodpositionwithin4hoursre-initiatestheclockforRequiredActionA.1.If,within4hours,therodpositionshavenotbeendetermined,THERMALPOWERmustbereducedto~50%'RTPwithin8hourstoavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat)50%RTP,ifoneormorerodsaremisalignedbymorethan24steps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-63DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)C.I.IandC.l.2Withonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperable,therodpositionscanbedeterminedbytheMRPISystem.Sincenormalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofrods,verificationbyadministrativemeansthattherodpositionindicatorsareOPERABLEandthemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodare~12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorforthatbankwithintheallowedCompletionTimeofonceeveryShoursisadequate.~'.',"::::::Th):.;shb:oklg818.'-.;:.:BssUNpt/00,;::.o';..:,'25,",,step'sgTnisverificai3oncanbeanexami'naYionof"logs"",admi'n'istrativecontrols,orotherinformationthatshowsthatallHRPIsintheaffectedbankareOPERABLE.C.2ReductionofTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTPputsthecoreintoaconditionwhererodpositionwillnotcausecorepeakingtoapproachthecorepeakingfactorlimits.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreducingpowertos50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.1above.D.IIftheRequiredActionscannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-64DraftB

RodPositionIndicationB3,1.7BASESACT!IGNS.":::."::;:.'::,',-.:~:"";::,"::~i'j'";::.:.:,.:.'!E:';:Gik.;.':(::c.'o'nt';i'n'u"ed:);:'4A'vAvAWAN'bBXYNNAYS'.AWithmorethanoneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks,animmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired.(SAN~,.';)4;:C5@+%...,ÃiS)'.)P+Qpihb'+N<$%@/$%'$0%%%%A%@R'Pj'O'SY'.."ICE)+Qv+4((4WN+x+<(c.,v'4)v+QDXP)R~$4))P.+%@CO(Q)~+(~<(PR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-65DraftB RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.7.1VerificationthattheMRPIagreeswiththegroupdemandpositionwithin12stepsforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravelensuresthattheMRPIisoperatingcorrectly.SincetheMRPIdoesnotdisplaytheactualshutdownrodpositionsbetween0and230steps,onlypointswithintheindicatedrangesarerequiredincomparison.ThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadduetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandthepotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-66DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3,1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheMODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsistopermitrelaxationsofexistingLCOstoallowcertainPHYSICSTESTStobeperformed.SectionXIof10CFR50,AppendixB(Ref.1),requiresthatatestprogrambeestablishedtoensurethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinservice.Allfunctionsnecessarytoensurethatthespecifieddesignconditionsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesmustbetested.Thistestingisanintegralpartofthedesign,construction,andoperationoftheplant.RequirementsfornotificationoftheNRC,forthepurposeofconductingtestsandexperiments,arespecifiedin10CFR50.59(Ref.2).Thekeyobjectivesofatestprogramareto:a.,Ensurethatthefacilityhasbeenadequatelydesigned;b.Validatetheanalyticalmodelsusedinthedesignandanalysis;c.Verifytheassumptionsusedtopredictplantresponse;d.Ensurethatinstallationofequipmentinthefacilityhasbeenaccomplishedinaccordancewiththedesign;ande.Verifythattheoperatingandemergencyproceduresareadequate.Toaccomplishtheseobjectives,testingisperformedpriortoinitialcriticality;duringstartup,lowpower,powerascension,andatpoweroperation;andaftereachrefueling.ThePHYSICSTESTSrequirementsforreloadfuelcyclesensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwiththedesignpredictionsandthatthecorecanbeoperatedasdesigned'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-67DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptio'ns-NODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)PHYSICSTESTSproceduresarewrittenandapprovedinaccordancewithestablishedformats.Theproceduresincludeallinformationnecessarytopermitadetailedexecutionofthetestingrequiredtoensurethatthedesignintentismet.PHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewiththeseprocedures,andtestresultsareapprovedpriortocontinuedpowerescalationandlongtermpoweroperation.ThePHYSICSTESTSperformedatGinnaStationforreloadfuelcyclesinNODE2include:a.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawn;b.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInserted;c.ControlRodWorth;andd.IsothermalTemperatureCoefficient(ITC).Theseandothersupplementarytestsmayberequiredtocalibratethenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems.ThesetestsmaycausetheoperatingcontrolsandprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOrequirementsduringtheirperformanceasdescribedbelow.a~TheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawnTestmeasuresthecriticalboronconcentrationathotzeropower(H7P).Withallrodsout,bankDisatornearitsfullywithdrawnposition.HZPiswherethecoreiscritical(k,u=1.0),andtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)isatdesigntemperatureandpressureforzeropower.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.3,"NoderatorTemperatureCoefficient(NTC)."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-68DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-NODE283.1.8BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)b.TheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInsertedTestmeasuresthecriticalboronconcentrationatHlP,withabankhavingaworthofatleast1%nk/kfullyinsertedintothecore.ThistestisusedtomeasurethediFferentialboronworth.WiththecoreatHZPandallbanksfully,withdrawn,theboronconcentrationofthereactorcoolantisgraduallyloweredinacontinuousmanner.Theselectedbankistheninsertedtomakeupforthedecreasingboronconcentrationuntiltheselectedbankhasbeenmovedoveritsentirerangeoftravel.'j":.';;..'Th'~<i",'"etc't'A@1.:.tj,,:--:.j;:,e'so;:.I7$',0j)",::fi",,"otiijeYch".'.ij'cr'e'riiejifa1,'",,-'ba'nk:,,;:mo've'm'ij~i't.'",'",ji,.linea's'iijr'e'd.:.:-','ii",'th<':'ac~~PGB!-.Thdeafl'etweenthemeasuredcriticalboronconcentrationwithallrodsfullywithdrawnandwiththebankinsertedisdetermined,Thedifferentialboronworthisdeterminedbydividingthemeasuredbankworthbythemeasuredboronconcentrationdifference.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits;"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit;"orLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheControlRodWorthTestisusedtomeasurethereactivityworthofselectedcontrolbanks.ThistestisperformedatH2Pandhastwoalternativemethodsofperformance.Thefirstmethod,theBoronExchangeHethod,variesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationandmovestheselectedcontrolbankinresponsetothechangingboronconcentration.'5;:The,;:,'lreactNity.;:.':,ch'ange'sggC.+.r,C,VC,~u(uP"NC,CPrSV&C"CCCr+%VNNQP4g:X~4b+C.,N,'.gRy...Y;',',AP"?+%M'i'4~AN~'AW'WS:are'@me'asui'";ed..-:::witlj':','a",:g;,each;i'::vjity".'c'o'm'pu'r'e'r':--'~e94NC.C~."C4'vs"i'%4:vW"CNA4mAkCAO~SCRVS:X'iVNv.'Pv'4dThissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.Thesecondmethod,theBoronEndpointMethod,movestheselectedcontrolbankoveritsentirelengthoftravelandthenvariesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationtoachieveHZPcriticalityagain.Thedifferenceinboronconcentrationistheworthoftheselectedcontrolbank.Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,orLCO3.1.6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-69DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)d.TheITCTestmeasurestheITCofthereactor,ThistestisperformedatHZPusingtheSlopeMethod.TheSlopeMethodvariesRCStemperatureinaslowandcontinuousmanner.'j~F'The7i'.e'acti;.v'ityichaii'gejj~g::;::~meas'ur8'dp1:th":,",a'.;::::i.;eact'1':,vJty,',co'p'te',";:.::as'j':.:'a';:-:,::,;func't:t'em"er'.,'a0'r.",e'.::,.":',.c"'"a'nge'",."""'&IStThITCi<<hslopeofthereactivityversusthetemperatureplot.Thetestisrepeatedbyreversingthedirectionofthetemperaturechange,andthefinalITCistheaverageofthetwocalculatedITCs.TheModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)atBOL,70%RTPandatEOLis-determinedfromthemeasuredITC.ThistestsatisfiestherequirementsofSR3.1.3.1andSR3.1.3.2.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality."APPLICABLE.ThefuelisprotectedbymultipleLCOsthatpreservetheSAFETYANALYSESinitialconditionsofthecoreassumedduringthesafetyanalyses.ThemethodsfordevelopmentoftheseLCOs,thatareexceptedbythisLCO,aredescribedintheWestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport(Ref.3).TheabovementionedPHYSICSTESTS,andotherteststhatmayberequiredtocalibratenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems;mayrequiretheoperatingcontrolorprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOlimitations.TheUFSARdefinesrequirementsforinitialtestingofthefacility,includingPHYSICSTESTS.Reference4summarizestheinitialzero,lowpower,andpowertests.ReloadfuelcyclePHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirements,fuelvendorguidelinesandestablishedindustrypracticeswhichareconsistentwiththePHYSICSTESTSdescribedinReferences5and6.AlthoughthesePHYSICSTESTSaregenerallyaccomplishedwithinthelimitsofallLCOs,.conditionsmayoccurwhenoneor'moreLCOsmustbesuspendedtomakecompletionofPHYSICSTESTSpossibleorpractical.Thisisacceptableaslongasthefueldesigncriteriaarenotviolated.TherequirementsspecifiedinthefollowingLCOsmaybesuspendedforPHYSICSTESTING:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-70DraftB

PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE283.1.8BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)LCO3.1,3,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";andLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality".WhentheseLCOsaresuspendedforPHYSICSTESTS,thefueldesigncriteriaarepreservedaslongasthepowerlevelislimitedtos5%RTP,thereactorcoolanttemperatureiskept~530'F,andSDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThePHYSICSTESTSincludemeasurementofcorenuclearparametersortheexerciseofcontrolcomponentsthataffectprocessvariables.AmongtheprocessvariablesinvolvedareAFDandgPTR,whichrepresentinitialconditionsoftheplantsafetyanalyses.Alsoinvolvedarethemovablecontrolcomponents(controlandshutdownrods),whicharerequiredtoshutdownthereactor.ThelimitsforthesevariablesarespecifiedforeachfuelcycleintheCOLR.PHYSICSTESTSmeetthecriteriaforinclusionintheTechnicalSpecifications,sincethecomponentsandprocessvariableLCOssuspendedduringPHYSICSTESTSmeetCriteria1,2,and3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOallowsthereactorparametersofMTCandminimumtemperatureforcriticalitytobeoutsidetheirspecifiedlimitstoconductPHYSICSTESTSinMODE2,toverifycertaincorephysicsparameters.Inaddition,itallowsselectedcontrolandshutdownrodstobepositionedoutsideoftheirspecifiedalignmentandinsertionlimits.OperationbeyondspecifiedlimitsispermittedforthepurposeofperformingPHYSICSTESTSandposesnothreattofuelintegrity,providedtheSRsaremet.TherequirementsofLCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,andLCO3.4.2maybesuspendedduringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTSprovided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintained~5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisz530'F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-71(continued)DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE283.1.8BASES(continued)ThppliblIUPHYSICSTESTSareperformedinMODE2atHZP.ACTIONSA.landA.2IftheSDMrequirementisnotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.Theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.BorationwillbecontinueduntilSDMiswithinlimit.SuspensionofPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsrequiresrestorationofeachoftheapplicableLCOstowithinspecificationwithin1hour.B.1WhenTHERMALPOWERis>5%RTP,theonlyacceptableactionistoopenthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)topreventoperationofthereactorbeyonditsdesignlimitssinceaMODEchangehasoccurred.ImmediatelyopeningtheRTBswillshutdownthereactorandpreventoperationofthereactoroutsideof,itsdesignlimits.C.1,WhentheRCSloopwiththelowestT.,is<530'F,theappropriateactionistorestoreT.,towithinitsspecifiedlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidestimeforrestoringT.,towithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.Operationwiththereactorcriticalandwithtemperaturebelow530'Fcouldviolatetheassumptionsforaccidentsanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses.j.CCQOy+$,.~~.<<k?.$4'j.$:.(cone;i,'naca):p~r+p~g~~~~>c~)yQQPA4Q~).'Pp.,wbh)v+Qw/PA)vgg+vq~q++w~qwp+Pupev~z~+)zpv}~qpe++gi+i~ipp~"pp<p)4~:'.:,.;:.;.,':,:;p;.,j4%v41w'N%+'%vQv414iv4iVN@84iswSQC%4S(vYRvv,.ss@4)%v."A'sV4%4ÃCSXNNwNCMNwNCCCvRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-72DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-NODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-73DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-NODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)ACTIONS(continued)D.lIfRequiredActionC.1cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3withinanadditional15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15additionalminutesisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingNODE3FromNODE2inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.1.8.1ThepowerrangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEintlODE2byLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACHANNELOPERATIONALTESTisperformedoneachpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelwithin7dayspriortocriticality.ThiswillensurethattheRTSisproperlyalignedtoprovidetherequireddegreeofcoreprotectionduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTS.The7daytimelimitissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingPHYSICSTESTS.SR3.1.8.2VerificationthattheRCSlowestloopT.,isz530Fwillensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginaconditionthatcouldinvalidatethesafetyanalyses.VerificationoftheRCStemperatureataFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-74DraftB PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCESR3.1.8.3REUIREMENTSEIl'IfRTHERMALPEHEIItFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotvi.olated.SR3.1.8'TheSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandonthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixB,SectionXI.2.10CFR50.59.3.WCAP-9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport,"July1985.4.UFSAR,Section14'.5.LetterfromR.W.Kober(RGE)toT.E.Hurley(NRC),

Subject:

"StartupReports,"datedJuly9,1984.6.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06,"datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-75DraftB Fo(Z)3.2.13.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))ILCO3.2.1Fo(Z)shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F<(Z)notwithinlimit.A.1ReduceTHERMALPOWER)1%RTPforeach1%F<(Z)exceedslimit.AND15minutesA.2ANDA.3AND A.4ANDReduceAFDacceptableoperationlimits~1%'oreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints>1%foreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.ReduceOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointsz1%foreach1%FQ(Z)exceedslimit.8hours72hours72=hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-1DraftB Fo(Z)3.2.1CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.5PerformSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.1.2.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.lB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2,6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.1VerifymeasuredvaluesofF<(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPAND31EFPDthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-2Draft8 ACTIONSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.2-NOTE-----OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERHALPOWERh75%RTP~VerifymeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~23DraftB

N3.2.23,2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS'3.2,2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>>)LCO3.2.2F>>shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F>>notwithinlimit.A.1ReduceTHERMALPOWER)1%RTPforeach1%F>>exceedslimit.AND15minutesA.2ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints~1%foreach1%F>>exceedslimit.72hoursA.3ANDReduceOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpoints)1%foreach1%F>>exceedslimit.72hoursA.4PerformSR3.2,2.1orSR3.2.2.2.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.1(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-4DraftB CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.2.1VerifyF>iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPAND31EFPDthereafterSR3.2.2.2-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWERh75%RTP~VerifyFziswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-5DraftB AFD3.2.33.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)LCO3.2.3TheAFDmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandAFD:a~b.C.ShallbemaintainedwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifferencewithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP.ThetargetbandisspecifiedintheCOLR.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbuta50%RTP,providedAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsandcumulativepenaltydeviationtimeisz1hourduringtheprevious24hours.TheacceptableoperationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<50%RTP.2.3.NOTES-TheAFDshallbeconsideredoutsidethetargetbandwhentheaverageoffourOPERABLEexcorechannelsindicateAFDtobeoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa1minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWER~50%RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa0.5minutepenaltydeviationForeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWER>15%RTPand<50%RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Atotalof16hoursofoperationmaybeaccumulatedwithAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithoutpenaltydeviationtimeduringsurveillanceofpowerrangechannelsinaccordancewithSR3.3.1.6.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-6DraftB AFD3.2.3ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.THERMALPOWER90%RTP.ANDAFDnotwithinthetargetband.A.1RestoreAFDtowithintargetband.15minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1redueeRe'du'ceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTP.fg<<<<r~~g.<<r<<~gb<<RNC.THERMALPOWER<90%RTPanda50%RTPwithcumulativepenaltydeviationtime>1hourduringtheprevious24hours.ORTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPand>50%RTPwithAFDnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits.C.1reduceR'ediicjTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.3't1CO><<RC<<<<<<~4~R~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3027Draft8 AFD3.2.3CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.THERMALPOWER90%RTP~ANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.D.1PerformSR3.2.3.1.Onceevery15minutesE.THERMALPOWER<90%RTP.ANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.E.1PerformSR3.2.3.2.Onceevery1hourR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-8DraftB AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.=2.3.1iver!ify.'.::!'AFD:.':Tlo'igtor<q.'is,,!0PERA8LiE.monitoralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWER>90%RTP.2.AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexistduringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin15minutesandevery15minutesthereafterSR8~3-.23'::;:P.::';3!i',32.-NOTES--------------OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWER<90%RTP.AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexistduringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin1hourandevery1hourthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-9DraftB AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3-.8-;3-.83,<';;283,'.~4Updatetargetfluxdifference.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND31EFPDthereafter-NOTE--------------Determine,bymeasurement,thetargetfluxdifference.SR3.'~3.'.:".:,2:":3,"5Theinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefuelingmaybedeterminedfromdesignpredictions.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND92EFPDthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-10DraftB QPTR3.2.43.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)LCO3.2.4TheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbes1.02.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.QPTRnotwithinlimit.A.1ANDA.2ANDLimitTHERMALPOWERto)3%belowRTPforeach1%ofQPTR>1.00.PerformSR3.2.4.1andlimitTHERMALPOWERto~3%belowRTPforeach1%ofQPTR>1.00.2hoursOnceper12hours~~M~03~~~S~go.~~~4"~o~t~~0~noir'~W~vXQ~Pc'g'ivVthti~t~ac'~w~eo,H~~+>@~maun~me..i4g~~A.3ANDWithin24hoursaft@'chiev"ing-eyi1ibrium~gonditionE~withTHERMAL/OMERlimited'yRequiredActionsA.lyd~APno~~tW~.nh.jt~~Ki"448t-+bwt.Rc4aee~(<vent~t~g&avoSA.~A~wnA.tANDOnceper7daysthereafter(continued)PerformSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-11DraftB gPTR3.2.4CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)5Ag--------NOTE---------Perform@quiredActionA.gonlyafterRequiredActionA..3"~<-4a~eri-fied-that-the-hot-eh-annel-f.acto.rsare-within-1-imits-.%SCa44br-a4ego,r,m'aljze;excoredete'cto'r"""instrumentationtoeliminate4he4ndim4ed-tilt.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2AND(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-12DraftB PPTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)Ag--------NOTES--------1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifthecauseofthegPTRalarmisnotassociatedwith~instrumentationaViqnmerk~2.Perform-RequiredActionA".8-e~c'omoI':i't'e'dtYAhen'equired~'ctionA.A'scemP~ed',if':lmeit'.1xhgqt):)~~~ngtw~Q.4~KPerformSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.Within24hoursafterveaeh+agRIPe4'-t~+RCPBB&4~a'C4>1.8V,'1:ng-:5<ixi<t<~>><A'<Vasss:Sos!<Yc',ie'qll'l-.':,l)1,".Dry:,UlflCon,n,):,1'tt<3,'o'A8'.;.w;i<thTHERHALP'5WERthe"4~+4~1'im"j't:.sofRequiredActions-<~~A.1andA.2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-13DraftB 0PTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos50%RTP.4hours(continued)C.gPTRmonitoralarminoperable.C.1ORPerformSR3.2.4.2Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterC.2PerformSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterSURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.2.4.14VeVjŽfP:"",,'.gP<TR~j~an~ft'oi'::,";;al,armgji(s:.~'::,0~PER'A8L~E.~Sf>'h'our::sR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-14DraftB

FQ(Z)B3.2.1B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthelimitsonthevaluesofFQ(Z)istolimitthelocal(i.e.,pellet)peakpowerdensity.ThevalueofFo(Z),variesalongtheaxialheightofthecore(Z).FQ(Z)isdefinedasthemaximum1ocalfuelrod1inearpowerdensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinearpowerdensity,assumingnominalfuelpelletandfuelroddimensionsadjustedforuncertainty,Therefore,FQ(Z)isameasureofthepeakpelletpowerwithinthereactorcore.Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.FQ(Z)issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,fuelburnup,andchangesinaxialpowerdistribution.FQ(Z)ismeasuredperiodicallyusingtheincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreatornearsteadystateconditions.Withthemeasuredthreedimensionalpowerdistributions,itispossibletodetermineameasuredvalueforFo(Z).However,becausethisvaluerepresentsasteadystatecondition,itdoesnotincludevariationsinthevalueofFo(Z),whicharepresentduringanonequilibriumsituationsuchasloadfollowingwhentheplantchangespowerleveltomatchgriddemandpeaksandvalleys.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(i.e.,Condition1eventsasdescribedinReference1)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,gPTR,andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-1DraftB BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLimitsonFQ(Z)precludecorepowerdistributionsthatviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:a.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.2);c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.3);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)withthehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.4).LimitsonF<(Z)ensurethatthevalueofthetotalpeakingfactorassumedasaninitialconditionintheaccidentanalysesremainsvalid.Othercriteriamustalsobemet(e.g.,maximumcladdingoxidation,maximumhydrogengeneration,eoolablegeometry,andlongtermcooling).However,thepeakcladdingtemperatureistypicallymostlimiting.TheFQ(Z)limitsprovidedintheCOLRarebasedonthelimitsusedintheLOCAanalysis.F<(Z)limitsassumedintheLOCAanalysisaretypicallylimitingrelativeto(i.e.,lowerthan)theF<(Z)assumedinsafetyanalysesforotheraccidentsbecauseoftherequirementssetforthin10CFR50.46(Ref.2)andECCSmodeldevelopmentinaccordancewiththerequiredfeaturesoftheECCSevaluationmodelsprovidedin20CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.5).Therefore,thisLCOprovidesconservativelimitsforotheraccidents.Fo(Z)satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-2DraftB Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASESLCOTheF<(Z)shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipsprovidedintheCOLR.TheFo(Z)limitsdefinelimitingvaluesforcorepowerpeakingthatprecludespeakcladdingtemperaturesabove2200FduringeitheralargeorsmallbreakLOCA(Refs.6and7).ThisLCOrequiresoperationwithintheboundsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.CalculationsareperformedinthecoredesignprocesstoconfirmthatthecorecanbecontrolledinsuchamannerduringoperationthatitcanstaywithintheLOCAFo(Z)limits.IfFo(Z)cannotbemaintainedwithintheLCOlimits,reductionofthecorepowerisrequired.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsforFo(Z)mayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifadesignbasiseventoccurswhileF<(Z)isoutsideitsspecifiedlimits.APPLICABILITYTheF<(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedwhileinMODE=1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.ACTIONSA.1ReducingTHERMALPOWERbyz1%foreach1%bywhichFQ(Z)exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableabsolutepowerdensity.-The-8-minute-Gompletion-Time-begins-the-tim~4d~-8p->>i+ihi'texceeded-and-the-sh+ft-supervisorhawbeen-noti-f4ed~-TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-3DraftB Fa(Z)B3.2.1BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2WhencorepeakingfactorsaresufficientlyhighthatLCO3.2.1doesnotpermitoperationatRTP,theacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDarereduced,Theacceptableoperationlimitsarereduced1%foreach1%bywhichFQ(Z)exceedsitslimit.Forexample,ifthemeasuredFo(Z)exceedsthelimitby3%andtheacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDare+11%at90%RTPand+31%at50%RTP,thentherevisedAFDAcceptableOperationLimitswouldbe+8%at90%RTPand+28%at50%RTP.Thisensuresanearconstantmaximumlinearheatrateinunitsofkilowattsperfootattheacceptableoperationlimits.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforthechangeinsetpointsissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisrelativelyshorttimeperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.A.3AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpointsby>1%foreach1%bywhichF<(Z)exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethistripsetpointhelpsprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,givenanFo(Z)limitof2,32,ameasuredFQ(Z)of2.4,andaPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointof108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3.4%to104.6%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-4DraftB BASESACTIONS(continued)A.4ReductionintheOverpoweraTandOvertemperaturezTtripsetpointsbya1%foreach1%bywhichF<(Z)exceedsitslimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethesetripsetpointshelpprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.A.5VerificationthatFo(Z)hasbeenrestoredtowithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.1.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.1ensuresthatcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.1IftheRequiredActionsofA.1throughA.5cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.ThisallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-5(continued)Draft8

Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.2.1.1VerificationthatF<(Z)iswithinitslimitinvolvesincreasingthemeasuredvaluesofF<(Z)toallowformanufacturingtoleranceandmeasurementuncertaintiesandthenmakingacomparisonwiththelimits.TheselimitsareprovidedintheCOLR.Specifically,themeasuredvalueoftheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<)isincreasedby3%toaccountforfuelmanufacturingtolerancesandby5%forfluxmapmeasurementuncertaintyforafullcorefluxmapusingthemovableincoredetectorfluxmappingsystem.ThisprocedureisequivalenttoincreasingthedirectlymeasuredvaluesofF<(Z)by1.0815%beforecomparingwithLCOlimits.PerformingtheSurveillanceinMODE1priortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPaftereachrefuelingensuresthatFQ(Z)iswithinlimitwhenRTPisachievedandprovidesconfirmationofthenucleardesignandthefuelloadingpattern.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisadequateformonitoringthechangeofpowerdistributionwithcoreburnupbecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyforthisamountoffuelburnup.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheFo(Z)limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofduration-.When-the-plant-i~lready-performi-ng-th~R-...dnot-need-4o-be-suspended-in-orde~o-perform-SR-3-.2-.1;-I-since-the-performecaM-S~2-.1-.2-meets-the-requirements--ofAR-3-.2-.1-.+:SR3.2.1.2Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-6DraftB BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.1.2(continued)WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.1.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatForemainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTP,REFERENCES1.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Section15,4,5.1.4.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.6.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.1.7.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.2.R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-7DraftB FgNB3.2.2B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthepowerdensityatanypointinthecoresothatthefueldesigncriteriaarenotexceededandtheaccidentanalysisassumptionsremainvalid.Thedesignlimitsonlocal(pellet)andintegratedfuelrodpeakpowerdensityareexpressedintermsofhotchannelfactors.Controlofthecorepowerdistributionwithrespecttothesefactorsensuresthatlocalconditionsinthefuelrodsandcoolantchannelsdonotchallengecoreintegrityatanylocationinthecoreduringeithernormaloperationorapostulatedaccidentanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses.F>isdefinedastheratiooftheintegralofthelinearpoweralongthefuelrodwiththehighestintegratedpowertotheaverageintegratedfuelrodpower.Therefore,F<<is.ameasureofthemaximumtotalpowerproducedinafuelrod.TheF<<limit,identifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.Thischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityfordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).F<<issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,andfuelburnup.F<<typicallyincreaseswithcontrolbankinsertionandtypicallydecreaseswithfuelburnup.F>>isnotdirectlymeasurablebutisinferredfromapowerdistributionmapobtainedwiththemovableincoredetectorsystem.Specifically,theresultsofthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionmapareanalyzedbyacomputertodetermineF~<<.Thisfactoriscalculatedatleastevery31EFPD.However,duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.F<<andthegPTRLCOlimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-8DraftB BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheCOLRprovidespeakingfactorlimitsthatensurethatthedesignbasisvaluefordeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientconditionarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency.TheDNBdesignbasisprecludesDNBandismetbylimitingtheminimumlocalDNBheatfluxratio.AllDNBlimitedtransienteventsareassumedtobeginwithanF>valuethatsatisfiestheLCOrequirements.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors,BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.DNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-9DraftB BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-1andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationappliesintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30,OperationoutsidetheLCOlimitsmayproduceunacceptable'onsequencesifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.TheDNBdesignbasisensuresthatthereisnooverheatingofthefuelthatresultsinpossiblecladdingperforationwiththereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLimitsonF>precludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthefollowingfueldesignlimits:a.Duringalossofforcedreactor'cool.a'nt:,::".":,:"flowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200F(Ref.1);c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDMwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-10DraftB F>>NB3.2.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)FortransientsthatmaybeDNBlimited,theReactorCoolantSystemflowandF>>arethecoreparametersofmostimportance.ThelimitsonF>ensurethattheDNBdesignbasisismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientsarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency(i.e.,Condition1eventsasdescribedinReference4).TheDNBdesignbasisismetbylimitingtheminimumDNBRtothe95/95DNBcriterion.TheallowableF~limitincreaseswithdecreasingpowerlevel.ThisfunctionalityinF>>isincludedintheanalysesthatprovidetheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)ofSL2.1,1.Therefore,anyDNBeventsinwhichthecalculationofthecorelimitsismodeledimplicitlyusethisvariablevalueofF>intheanalyses,Likewise,alltransientsthatmaybeDNBlimitedareassumedtobeginwithaninitialF~<<asafunctionofpowerleveldefinedbytheCOLRlimitequation.TheLOCAsafetyanalysisindirectlymodelsF>>asaninputparameter.TheNuclearHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))andtheaxialpeakingfactorsareinserteddirectlyintotheLOCAsafetyanalysesthatverifytheacceptabilityoftheresultingpeakcladdingtemperature(Ref.1).ThefuelisprotectedinpartbyTechnicalSpecifications,whichensurethattheinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyandaccidentanalysesremainvalid.ThefollowingLCOsensurethis:LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO.(gPTR),"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.2,"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>>),"andLCO3.2.1,"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z))."F>>ismeasuredperiodicallyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreat,ornear,steadystateconditions.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(Condition1events)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,gPTR,andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.F>>satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-11Draft8 CHB3.2.2BASESLCOF~>shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipprovidedintheCOLR.TheF~limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.ThischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityforDNB.ThelimitingvalueofF~,describedbytheequationcontainedintheCOLR,isthedesignradialpeakingfactorusedintheplantsafetyanalyses.Apowermultiplicationfactorinthisequationincludesanadditionalmarginforhigherradialpeakingfromreducedthermalfeedbackandgreatercontrolrodinsertionatlowpowerlevels.ThelimitingvalueofF~isallowedtoincrease0.3%forevery1%RTPreductioninTHERMALPOWER.APPLICABILITYTheF>limitsmustbemaintainedinMODE1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthefueldesignlimitsforDNBRandPCT.Applicabilityinothermodesisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.S~ecifically,thedesignbaseseventsthataresensitivetoF>inMODES2,3,4,and5havesignificantmargintoDNB,andtherefore,thereisnoneedtorestrictF>inthesemodes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-12(continued)DraftB

B3.2.2BASESACTIONSA.1ReducingTHERMALPOWERby>1%foreach1%bywhichF>>exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableDNBRmargin.WhentheF~>limitisexceeded,theDNBRlimitisnotlikelyviolatedinsteadystateoperation,becauseeventsthatcouldsignificantlyperturbtheF>value(e.g.,staticcontrolrodmisalignment)areconsideredinthesafetyanalyses.However,theDNBRlimitmaybeviolatedifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.ReducingTHERMALPOWERincreasestheDNBmargin.and-does-not-l+ke+y-cause-the-BNBR-l-imi-t-to-be-~-violated-i.n-steadymtate-opemNvn-.The-15-minut~Completion-Time-begins-at-.th~me-the-analgs-i~o~n~ncore~flux-map-veH+i-es-%he-1-immit~-exceeded-and"the"ski.ft~-.superv~-hambeen-noti-fi-ed-.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.A.2AreductionofthePowerRangeNeeh-enR+mw~hNeufFb'jF'!'up:-.",:,;'liiightripsetpointsby>>1%foreach1%byreh'i'chFanexceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionsandensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,giventhattheF>limitisexceededby3%andthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointis108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3%to105%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithrequiredactionA.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-13DraftB BASESACTIONS(continued)A.3ReductionintheOverpoweraTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointsbyz1%foreach1%bywhichF<<exceedsitslimit,ensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.I.A.4VerificationthatF~hasbeenrestoredwithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.2.IorSR3.2.2.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.IensuresthatthecausethatledtotheF<<exceedingitslimitiscorrected,andcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.IIftheRequiredActionsofA.IthroughA.4cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-14Draft8 FgN83.2.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.2.1ThevalueofF~isdeterminedbyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystemtoobtainafluxdistributionmap.AdatareductioncomputerprogramthencalculatesthemaximumvalueofF>fromthemeasuredfluxdistributions.ThemeasuredvalueofF>mustbemultipliedby1.04toaccountformeasurementuncertaintybeforemakingcomparisonstotheF~limit.Aftereachrefueling,F>mustbedeterminedinMODE1priortoexceeding75%RTP.ThisrequirementensuresthatF>limitsaremetatthebeginningofeachfuelcycle.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisacceptablebecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyoverthisamountoffuelburnu~.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheF>>limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofoperation,WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.2.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.2.2doesnotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.2.2meetstherequirementsofSR3.2.2.1.SN::.::",'.3l::.2'::2Y2..:Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.2.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF>remainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-15DraftB CH83.2.2BASES~Ic1'ccxcxxcxyxyycccx~xcx'Ac'E'qONKHEgj'.s'ORV.E::ILLANLESR8~:2'.':":2.';2~('.";(cont',infra"id),'.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERis>75%RTP.gxc.xxxxvwvcxccc,xcycxc,.wycxxycxxc'xxycycpv'ccpA'cccyrppcxYpyccMxcccxcxxyxcQgycgxy(cy~ccCc.cxpxphvpg'ch)pgyccCKsycc,cxcx'~ccCA<<g+cg(cxxcx~x+y4+:y~~.c,~Y:xgRWk~x"""~xxcxcyxkWM~&N4xMWAWW%axxcccc4c&a+YNxc@%N4NMxyp%WN4iStyx>'ycC"'32c@N'yxc'x'yk'cV'8y~~NCCN~M3ecc'XRx'ckCxNxc5cNCcN~~c'cxcxc'3N%cREFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.1.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly101967.4,AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-16DraftB AFDB3.2.3B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthevaluesoftheAFDinordertolimittheaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoeitherthetoporbottomofthecore.Bylimitingtheamountofpowerdistributionskewing,corepeakingfactorsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.Limitingpowerdistributionskewingovertimealsominimizesthexenondistributionskewing,whichisasignificantfactorinaxialpowerdistributioncontrol.Theoperatingschemeusedtocontroltheaxialpowerdistribution,ConstantAxialOffsetControl(CAOC),involvesmaintainingtheAFDwithinatolerancebandaroundaburnupdependenttarget,knownasthetargetfluxdifference,tominimizethevariationoftheaxialpeakingfactorandaxialxenondistributionduringplantmaneuvers.Thetargetfluxdifferenceisdeterminedatequilibriumxenonconditions.Thecontrolbanksmustbepositionedwithinthecoreinaccordancewiththeirinsertionli'mitsandControlBankDshouldbeinsertednearitsnormalposition(i.e.,~210stepswithdrawn)forsteadystateoperationathighpowerlevels.ThepowerlevelshouldbeasnearRTPaspractical.ThevalueofthetargetfluxdifferenceobtainedundertheseconditionsdividedbythefractionofRTPisthetargetfluxdifferenceatRTPFortheassociatedcoreburnupconditions.TargetfluxdifferencesforotherTHERMALPOWERlevelsareobtainedbymultiplyingtheRTPvaluebytheappropriatefractionalTHERMALPOWERlevel.Periodicupdatingofthetargetfluxdifferencevalueisnecessarytofollowthechangeofthefluxdifferenceatsteadystateconditionswithburnup.TheNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>)andQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)LCOslimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-17(continued)Draft8 AFDB3.2.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheAFDisameasureofaxialpowerdistributionskewingtothetoporbottomhalfofthecore.TheAFDissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankpositions,corepowerlevel,'axialburnup,axialxenondistributionand,toalesserextent,reactorcoolanttemperatureandboronconcentrations.TheallowedrangeoftheAFDisusedinthenucleardesignprocesstoconfirmthatoperationwithintheselimitsproducescorepeakingfactorsandaxialpowerdistributionsthatmeetsafetyanalysisrequirements.TheCAOCmethodology(Ref.I)entails:a.Establishinganenvelopeofallowedpowershapesandpowerdensities;b.Devisinganoperatingstrategyforthecyclethatmaximizesplantflexibility(maneuvering)andminimizesaxialpowershapechanges;c.Demonstratingthatthisstrategydoesnotresultincoreconditionsthatviolatetheenvelopeofpermissiblecorepowercharacteristics;andd.Demonstratingthatthispowerdistributioncontrolschemecanbeeffectivelysupervisedwithexcoredetectors.ThelimitsontheAFDensurethattheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z))isnotexceededduringeithernormaloperationorintheeventofxenonredistributionfollowingpowerchanges.ThelimitsontheAFDalsolimittherangeofpowerdistributionsthatareassumedasinitialconditionsinanalyzingCondition2,3,and4events(Ref.2).Thisensuresthatfuelcladdingintegrityismaintainedforthesepostulatedaccidents.ThemostimportantCondition4eventisthelossofcoolantaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition3eventisthelossofflowaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition2eventsareuncontrolledbankwithdrawalandborationordilutionaccidents.Condition2accidents,assumedtobeginfromwithintheAFDlimits,areusedtoconfirmtheadequacyofOverpowerzTandOvertemperatureaTtripsetpoints.ThelimitsontheAFDsatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-18(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESLCOTheshapeofthepowerprofileintheaxial(i.e.,thevertical)directionislargelyunderthecontroloftheoperator,througheitherthemanualoperationofthecontrolbanks,orautomaticmotionofcontrolbanksrespondingtotemperaturedeviationsresultingfromeithermanualoperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemtochangeboronconcentration,orfrompowerlevelchanges.SignalsareavailabletotheoperatortohelpdefinethepowerprofilefromtheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excoreneutrondetectors(Ref.3).Separatesignalsaretakenfromthetopandbottomexcoreneutrondetectors,TheAFDisdefinedasthedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetectorineachdetectorwell.Forconvenience,thisfluxdifferenceisconvertedtoprovidefluxdifferenceunitsexpressedasapercentageandlabeledas%nfluxor%aI.WithTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP(i.e,,PartAofthisLCO),theAFDmustbekeptwithinthetargetbandaboutthe'targetfluxdifference.jThe,:::.:,t'i'i"',ge~t""ban'0,"::::::i:,:-:;,'p'royide'd',"'qi'n':,"',".,,the,",':,:COLA':,;:.;zWiththeAFDoutsidethe't~argetbandw'i'th"THERMALPOWERz90%RTP,theassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolated.WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTP,theAFDmaybeoutsidethetargetbandprovidedthatthedeviationtimeisrestricted.ItisintendedthattheplantisoperatedwiththeAFDwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.However,duringrapidTHERMALPOWERreductions,controlbankmotionmaycausetheAFDtodeviateoutsideofthetargetbandatreducedTHERMALPOWERlevels,ThisdeviationdoesnotaffectthexenondistributionsufficientlytochangetheenvelopeofpeakingfactorsthatmaybereachedonasubsequentreturntoRTPwiththeAFDwithinthetargetband,providedthetimedurationofthedeviationislimited.Accordingly,whileTHERMALPOWERis~50%RTPand<90%RTP(i.e.,PartBofthisLCO),a1hourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimelimit,cumulativeduringthepreceding24hourswhen>15%RTP,isallowedduringwhichtheplantmaybeoperatedoutsideofthetargetbandbutwithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesascalculatedbyNotes2and3ofthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant~B3.2-19DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESLCO(continued)ForTHERMALPOWERlevels)15%RTPand<50%RTP(i.e.,PartCofthisLCO),deviationsoftheAFDoutsideofthetargetbandarelesssignificant.Thereducedpenaltydeviationtimeaccumulationratereflectsthisreducedsignificance.WithTHERMALPOWER<15%RTP,AFDisnotasignificantparameterintheassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisand,therefore,requiresnolimits.'ecausethexenondistributionproducedatTHERMALPOWERlevelslessthanRTPdoesaffectthepowerdistributionaspowerisincreased,unanalyzedxenonandpowerdistributionispreventedbylimitingtheaccumulatedpenaltydeviationtime.ThefrequencyofmonitoringtheAFDbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)isnominallyonceperminuteprovidinganessentiallycontinuousaccumulationofpenaltydeviationtimethatallowstheoperatortoaccuratelyassessthestatusofthepenaltydeviationtime.TheinoperabilityofthismonitorrequiresindependentverificationthatAFDremainswithinlimitandthatthepeakingfactorsassumedintheaccidentanalysesremainvalid.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-20Draft8 AFDB3.2.3BASESLCO(continued)ThisLCOismodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstNotestatestheconditionsnecessaryfordeclaringtheAFDoutsideofthetargetband.Therequiredtargetbandvarieswithaxialburnupdistribution,whichinturnvarieswiththecoreaverageaccumulatedburnup.ThetargetbanddefinedintheCOLRmayprovideonetargetbandfortheentirecycleormorethanoneband,eachtobefollowedforaspecificrangeofcycleburnup.TheaverageofthefourOPERABLEexcoredetectorsisusedtodeterminewhenAFDisoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsareusedtoderivetheaverageAFD.ThesecondandthirdNotesdescribehowthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiscalculated.ThesecondNotestatesthatwithTHERMALPOWERa50%RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof1minuteforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband.ThethirdNotestatesthatwithTHERHALPOWER>15%RTPand<50%RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof0.5minutesforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesfromNotes2and3ofthisLCO.ThefourthNoteaddressesAFDoutsideofthetargetbandduringsurveillances.ForsurveillanceofthepowerrangechannelsperformedaccordingtoSR3.3.1.6,deviationoutsidethetargetbandispermittedfor16hoursandnopenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulated.SomedeviationintheAFDisrequiredfordoingtheNIScalibrationwiththeincoredetectorsystem.Thiscalibrationisperformedevery92days.ViolatingtheLCOontheAFDcouldproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaCondition2,3,or4eventoccurswhiletheAFDisoutsideitslimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-21(continued)DraftB

AFDB3.2.3BASESAPPLICABILITYAFDrequirementsareapplicableinMODE1above15%RTP.Above50%RTP,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWERandcorepeakingfactorsarethecoreparametersofprimaryimportanceinsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).Above15%RTP,thisLCOisapplicabletoensurethatthedistributionsofxenonareconsistentwithsafetyanalysisassumptions.Atorbelow15%RTPandforloweroperatingNODES,thestoredenergyinthefuelandtheenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolantarelow.Also,lowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.ThevalueoftheAFDintheseconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.ACTIONSA.1WiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandandTHERMALPOWERz90%RTP,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolatedwithrespecttothemaximumheatgeneration.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof15minutesisallowedtorestoretheAFDtowithinthetargetbandbecausexenondistributionschangelittleinthisrelativelyshorttime.B.1IfRequiredActionA.1isnotcompletedwiththerequiredCompletionTimeof15minutes,theaxialxenondistributionstartstobecomeskewed.redueegi'd9'cj'ti'gTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPplacesthecoreinacondiet'ioneteViathasbeenanalyzedandfoundtobeacceptable,providedthattheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ct4e~the~galIl,oweeaE'o'eIP'1eti'o'ii~T'ines'Lo'f,';:~15':.,"e3-ot'eg<%j"'a~i:e'dooe'THERHXHLPO'HERto<'9eO'i"'RTPallowsforacontroi'ied'eductioninpowerwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-22(continued)DraftB

AFDB3.2.3BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,2-23(continued)Draft8

AFDB3.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1ThisRequiredActionmustbeimplementedwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbuta50%RTPifeitherthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis>1hourduringtheprevious24hours,ortheAFDisnotwithinthe.targetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits.WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbuta50%RTP,operationwiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandisallowedforupto1houriftheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.WiththeAFDwithintheselimits,theresultingaxialpowerdistributionisacceptableasaninitialconditionforaccidentanalysesassumingthethenexistingxenondistributions.,The1hourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimerestrictstheextentofxenonredistribution.Withoutthislimitation,unanalyzedxenonaxialdistributionsmayresultfromadifferentpatternofxenonbuildupanddecay,red~kenReducj'n'g;:."::::::.:THERMAL."'::EMPOWERtoa-pewer-l~e4-<50%RTPwillputthe""reac'tor""ata"THERMALPOWERlevelatwhichtheAFDisnotasignificantaccident'analysisparameter.IftheindicatedAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandoutsidetheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR,thepeakingfactorsassumedinaccidentanalysismaybeexceededwiththeexistingxenoncondition.AnyAFDwithinthetargetbandisacceptableregardlessofitsrelationsh~itotheacceptableoperationlimits.j.:;',!Thj<~Comj)pic.on",::.':.T'1jie';'l'()f830:re.iitftess.',a~l'l,':owsgfo'r~a:-::,p'r'omitD.lWhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis~90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofevery15minutestoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequatetoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevelsandisconsistentwiththeCompletionTimeforrestoringAFDtowithinlimits(ConditionA).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-24(continued)Draft8 AFDB3.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)WhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERHALPOWERis<90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofeveryhourtoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof1hourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforupto1hourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.2.3.1The-AFDTh'isFSRis%Vie'"'~vei'Fficat%onthatha~ntheAFDmonitor~'ig:;:~,::OP,ERABL'::P.T4*C-N~~!Tl!(-:i','v@'R...,::,i,:!::Ii:.vq,w~yryz~v~y<@~,q.yq.g.grrpy+syyv*ye,,yvesryg.y.+~@yyqyr~~yrpgvry~wpr~vayu'o~.h(5j'vxy.>~w~uy~w~y~ace'omp':l.a.sheaj,:Dyp)iiteoaucj,ng.;;:;;a';:',:::o."'.~i:;i'gn:::"."ca~n.'.":'y'""'c'aii'RS535$P3Y!2[i!i!i!~~PTh-'PC...~'g64l,the5PERABl,"Egencore)Ydete'ctor":,o'ut$iit's,::.',"a'n8)..:o'covin'e's'i'ari<:.',i>).'::at';i'~<M5>>~m~~'k&4&~~Wikim4RSm~mKvAC~N4.~eNP~C~'A'~4~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-25(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASES,,XWg.$++r'~X.OXON~Wg~gr.W+'PC~C<.@XIX~'Q.~M4~+%'SQVCPYAM($NW?W'g~~,ZNCgCOXy,PjPP,mess'age',.,and.':;:,.':,'a~main':::,',.coiitroi':,'.::board,':::annunc'i:.amor.',"::;,'immeai':aiefy,.':::<4f~the~.,av'erase,",":.:.'AFD,;!;'~:s,',::out'side',,the,:.'.3'targetbandana4e-cence.theta'en~',,re';.',a1,::;:a'r'm's.";:w}ii:"ii'>'",th'e~;c'uiiiul~atiyepenaltydeviationtimepli&V'!O'US'424l!;.Ollli8.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,2-26(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASES'SlfRV.FIi>LANCE~~:SR.!3:-'.':2"'!:::3."'.::2~~j'(c.0i;$.r'iued)':RE(UIAEHENTS'th'~e':"j'iiial'tj;.",::::;devi,a'tj:o'n.",.';.':ti'~e",.::';.'::::.':)During"operationat~90'il'TP,theA'FDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof15minutestoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevels.TheAFDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyduringperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDismorelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.e-Net~SR3.2.3.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthissurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWERa90%RTP.ThesecondNotestatesthat"monitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderfortheoperatortocomputethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.SR3-.2-4-.43i."2!.'3'-.:3TheAFDismonitoredonacontinuousbasisusingthePPCSthathasanAFDmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesthe1minuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolb'6a'i"::dannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.The-cempmu&4-i+e-pR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-27(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESSij:::":k:::,,':1'::lb'au~i"::::xi,':t)'iiil~th'ii':.:lpile'v'io~%j~)!24~Ii'o%'i",'siR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-28(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASES'SURVE'll.LANCE':::.,":>>;::,:::::,':,::':-':SR:"3:;:2';:":33~:"';;-.'.l-o-t,i,uxed)'EqiiIR>EVENTSC'w'xcccc>>>>xw'>>>NwikxMQc.,cc.cc>c~;xcx>aye"wxxc>x;.c>,".,c;,cwexcx.:c~c>xmas.y:;c>xx.c,xxx:ccx>c>>'cy6yw>,.@xccp>>xcc'~"ycC.p.cxca;...C.,:pCC..cx~kith'ji'iie:,':.-'jt:,u.,':,mo'o~,::tor,.-,.:-::i'::iform,t5'e'.-,":;:;p'e'nally'y.'",,devia't).'0'n",:,":tjr7fe':I.::."::,:::,;":.:.;During"operationat<901"RTP,but>"15i."RT'P,'theO'FDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof1hourtoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyof1hourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforupto1hourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOto'calculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.TheA'FDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyinperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDism'orelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.SR>..3,".",:.2:,',,":38":Qiggoxd'iLfj,:e'dtbj',:-':,trio'";.',Not'e$-:,'C$.':PhefirstNotestatestheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERHALPOWER<90%RTP.ThesecondNotestatesthatmonitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderFortheoperatortocomputethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.CDSR3-.RA-.:43::"-::2-:"'.3!F4ThisSurveillancerequiresthatthetargetfluxdifferencebeupdatedataFrequencyof31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)toaccountforsmallchangesthatmayoccurinthetargetfluxdifferencesinthatperiodduetoburnup.R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-29(continued)DraftB AFD83.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3-.2-.3W3::234.(continued)Therearetwomethodsbywhichthisupdatecanbecompleted.ThefirstmethodrequiresmeasuringthetargetfluxdifferenceinaccordancewithSR3-.2-.3&3.","::2:,',~3.:';:>5:'.Thismeasurementmaybeobtainedusingincoreorexcoreinstrumentation.Thesecondmethodinvolvesinterpolationbetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalues.Thenucleardesignreportprovidespredictedvaluesfortargetfluxdifferenceatvariouscycleburnups.Thedifferencebetweenthelastmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueatthesameburnupisappliedtothepredictedvalueattheburnupwherethetargetfluxdifferenceupdateisrequired.Thisrevisedpredictedvaluecanthenbeusedtodeterminetheupdatedvalueofthetargetfluxdifference.SR3-.3-:3-.43:;::2."';"'3.'"':6Measurementofthetargetfluxdifferenceisaccomplishedbytakingafluxmapwhenthecoreisatequilibriumxenonconditions,preferablyathighpowerlevelswiththecontrolbanksnearlywithdrawn.Thisfluxmapprovidestheequilibriumxenonaxialpowerdistributionfromwhichthetargetvaluecanbedetermined.Thetargetfluxdifferencevariesslowlywithcoreburnup.AFrequencyof31EFPDaftereachrefuelingand92EFPDthereafterforremeasuringthetargetfluxdifferencesadjuststhetargetfluxdifferencetothevaluemeasuredatsteadystateconditions.ThisisthebasisfortheCAOC.RemeasurementatthisSurveillanceintervalalsoestablishestheAFDtargetfluxdifferencevaluesthataccountforchangesinincore-excorecalibrationsthatmayhaveoccurredintheinterim.jTh':,:i::,i:.,:)SR3-.2-.3-.4-ismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsthepred'ictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-30(continued)DraftB AFDB3.2.3BASESREFERENCES1.WCAP-8403(nonproprietary),"PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures,"WestinghouseElectricCorporation,September1974.2.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section7.7.2.6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-31DraftB QPTRB3.2.4B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)BASESBACKGROUNDTheQPTRlimitensuresthatthegrossradialpowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththedesignvaluesusedinthesafetyanalyses.Preciseradialpowerdistributionmeasurementsaremadeduringstartuptesting,afterrefueling,andperiodicallyduringpoweroperation.QuadrantPowerTiltisacoretiltthatismeasuredwiththeuseoftheexcorepowerrangefluxdetectors.Acoretiltisdefinedastheratioofmaximumtoaveragequadrantpower.TheQPTRisdefinedastheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.LimitingtheQPTRpreventsradialxenonoscillationsandwillindicateanycoreasymmetries,Thepowerdensityatanypointinthe'oremustbelimitedsothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO,.:'.-;~(QPTR'),':,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"providelimitsonprocessvariablesthatcharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Controlofthesevariablesensuresthatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteriaandthatthepowerdistributionremainswithintheboundsusedinthesafetyanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLimitsonQPTRprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:'a~b.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),thepeakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.1);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,2-32DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDHwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).TheLCOlimitsontheAFD,theQPTR,theHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z)),theNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>>),andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimitsareestablishedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthesafetyanalyseslimits.TheQPTRlimitsensurethatF~andFo(Z)remainbelowtheirlimitingvaluesbypreventinganundetectedchangeinthegrossradialpowerdistribution.InNODE1,theF>andF<(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingdesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheQPTRsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbemaintainedatorbelowthelimitof1.02.QPTRismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasaQPTRmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesfromtheexcoredetectoroutputstheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaverageofnuclearpowerinthefourquadrantsandprovidesanalarmmessageiftheQPTRisabovethe1.02limit.TheQPTRlimitof1.02,atwhichcorrectiveactionisrequired,providesamarginofprotectionforboththeDNBratioandlinearheatgenerationratecontributingtoexcessivepowerpeaksresultingfromX-Yplanepowertilts.AlimitingQPTRof1.025canbetoleratedbeforethemarginforuncertaintyinFo(Z)andF~ispossiblychallenged.However,theadditionalQPTRof0.005isprovidedformarginintheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-33(continued)DraftB gPTRB3.2.4BASESAPPLICABILITYTheRPTRlimitmustbemaintainedinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTPtopreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthedesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinMODE1s50%RTPandinotherMODESisnotrequired,becausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofagPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.TheOPTRlimitintheseconditionsis,therefore,notimportant.NotethattheF>>andF<(Z)LCOsstillapplybelow50%RTP,butallowprogressivelyhigherpeakingfactorsasTHERMALPOWERdecreasesbelow50%RTP.ACTIONSA.1WiththegPTRexceedingitslimit,limitingTHERMALPOWERtoa3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichthegPTRexceeds1.00isaconservativetradeoffoftotalcorepowerwithpeaklinearpower.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursallowssufficienttimetoidentifythecauseandcorrectthetilt.Notethatthepowerreductionitselfmaycauseachangeinthetiltedcondition.AfurtherincreaseinthegPTRmould-require~alowerlimittoTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2.A.2AftercompletionofRequiredActionA.1,thegPTRalarmmaystillbeinitsalarmedstate.Assuch,anyadditionalchangesinthegPTRaredetectedbyrequiringacheckofthegPTRinaccordancewithSR3.2.4.1onceper12hoursthereafter.IfthegPTRcontinuestoincrease,THERMALPOWERmustbelimitedaccordingly.A12hourCompletionTimeissufficientbecauseanyadditionalchangeingPTRwouldberelativelyslow.(continued)R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-34DraftB gPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)J~C~~Plp~m.Qcl~i~A.3ThepeakingfactorsF>>andF<(Z)areofprimaryimportanceinensuringthatthepowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.PerformingSRsonF>>andF<(Z)withintheCompletionTimeof24hoursensuresthattheseprimaryindicatorsofpowerdistributionarewithintheirrespectivelimits.ACompletionTimeof<+i-MAP24hoursalber-aeh~gequi-l~bvi-um-condi-t4ons-wi-th-THERHAL-POWER-1-imited-b~Requ-ised-Acti-ops-A-.+-aad-A-.2takesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.Ifthesepeakingfactorsarenotwithintheirlimits,theRequiredActionsoftheseSurveillancesprovideanappropriateresponsefortheabnormalcondition.IfthegPTRremainsaboveitsspecifiedlimit,thepeakingfactorsurveillancesarerequiredeach7daysthereaftertoevaluateF>>andF<(Z)withchangesinpowerdistribution.Relativelysmallchangesareexpectedduetoeitherburnupandxenonredistributionororzectionofthecausefor,......exceedi~thegPT~jigLtQTheperforma'nce""o'f"'SR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1isnolongerrequiredonceConditionAisexited.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.1.2orSR3.2.2'tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.1.2orSR3.2.2.2donotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2meettherequirementsofSR3'.1.1andSR3.2.2.1,respectively.+.~AIfthegPTRhasexceededthe1.02limitandtheverificationofF>>andF<(Z)showsthatsafetyrequirementsaremet,hd<<~'...,,,l;:.I,',:'!itheindicatedtiltpriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2.ThisisdlWN~11dbsignificantchangesingPTRandtoprovideameaningfulgPTRalarm.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-35DraftB

A.4NAlthoughF><andFq(Z)areofprimaryimportanceasinitialconditionsinthesafetyanalyses,otherchangesinthepowerdistributionmayoccurasthegPTRlimitisexceededandmayhaveanimpactonthevalidityofthesafetyanalysis.Achangeinthepowerdistributioncanaffectsuchreactorparametersasbankworthsandpeakingfactorsforrodmalfunctionaccidents.WhenthegPTRexceedsitslimit,itdoesnotnecessarilymeanasafetyconcernexists.Itdoesmeanthatthereisanindicationofachangeinthegrossradialpowerdistributionthatrequiresaninvestigationandevaluationthatisaccomplishedbyexaminingtheincorepowerdistribution.Specifically,thecorepeakingfactorsandthequadranttiltmustbeevaluatedbecausetheyarethefactorsthatbestcharacterizethecorepowerdistribution.Thisre-evaluationisrequiredtoensurethat,beforeincreasingTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.l,thereactorcoreconditionsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthesafetyanalyses.

BASESmrna'aVCca>e~8'zw+s~QO'AMtviAajMXr<fa'i'olr~<l4aa4(Al'hLss4,'sevresf'J.'Pga(aa.l%>wv.Vn45C.awe>>(>ti-.<vrvvPPTRB3.2.4ACTIONSSA.4"(continued)RequiredActionA.AismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatthe'et-beosex.~so~vessey,,~srretawtwsvseasewv.~aaa.ax>~~we,.untilafter+hereperfeeaedfnd>>cwated,,t~>~l,t,,~is~not)~elhaminatedis-veri.fieati'on-that-t'e-hot-channel"-"faci:ors-are-within-1-imps-(i.e.,RequiredActionA.g.It.isnecessarytoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptablepriortoadjustingtheexcoredetectorstochew-zevee'ljkmiin'at'e':,",'the.j'riCh,'cd'e'dtiltandincreasingpowertoensurethat"tYeplantisnotoperatinginanunanalyzedcondition.,wa,.tru~,ayQ~PM~,>.".5O.>>0-~N<abwaXut~irlvuXc~'t~al,<>>~~ct"%aNQ~A.5Afterthefluxtiltisagreed-eutnorjal":.izedjto,:::..:":el'jiiijn'a'4'e;'!ah'i>sacceptabletoreturntofullpoweroperation.However,asanaddedcheckthatthecorepowerdistributionatRTPisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisassumptions,RequiredActionA.5requiresverificationthatFo(Z)andF>arewithintheirspecifiedlimitswithin24hoursef'after,'g,,eiiil".:-'-'i'll--'lI:-taws!ir'-"i-hi'iiotas'llldf1i!stlMEII~i~~as'ed~,',:"ab'o"",:.'tth'e'@1,'i'mite~:,":,ao".',.eqiij'.red!FA'et"ibhi':.::.'":::A.-Ã~Rva"w'avaN%)md%."'~vu'spc+ARANa&N<4a~viwvaruefvsaw~ewer-de:,btThese%.hi.':i~sCompletionT-imes-am,':.0,:;im'e.)h'.iintended"toall'owadequa'tetimetoincreaseT8ERHALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2,whilenotpermittingthecoretoremainwithunconfirmedpowerdistributionsforextendedperiodsoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-36DraftB

QPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONSA.5(continued)I".ŽRequiredActionA.5ismodifiedby4hvee@ioNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatitisnotnecessarytoperformRequiredActionA.5ifthecauseoftheQPTRalarmisassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythatthecorepowerdistributiondoesnothavetobere-verifiediftheQPTRalarmisonlyduetotheinstrumentation(i.e.,theexcoredetectors)Eeingout~ofa33j~Wandnotduetoananomalywithinthecore.ThesecondNotestatesthatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesarenotrequireduntilaftertheexcoreCOdetectorshavebeenca&4r-attn'or':m)1,4'i'dtoeked~e3i'xiii'n'a%;;.';the)."'iijd'ic'a'tedti1t('i.e.,RequiredActionA."4)."'Theinten'tofthisNoteistohavethepeakingfactorsurveillancesperformedatoperatingpowerlevels,whichcanonlybeaccomplishedaftertheexcoredetectorsareadjustedto+he~cree'1,':im'in'a't'e',::'."';tke~','.j'n'dilated'iltandB.1IfRequiredActionsA.IthroughAParenotcompletedwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEorconditioninwhichtherequirementsdonotapply.Toachievethisstatus,THERMALPOWERmustbereducedto~50%RTPwithin4hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimerequiredtoreachthereducedpowerlevelwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-37DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-38DraftB

QPTRB3.2.4BASES'f',:'.,;:,'...e:,".1',I,,:'.~.:,,;,;i,,,;.,',h':;,,T:n',;"QP.::i:,'.,,",'.:,".:'ami.-mia'..:.':v",,:the.'",>Niicl.'ea'i.,'i.:'I'it'ii'umetri'0'atj'onalarmisOPERABCEisacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilitythatthisalarmcanremaininoperablewithoutdetection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-40Draft8

QPTRB3.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3-.2-A-.43:.2'.'i'4'..".2:-(continued)SR3-.8-A-.43."'-.'.2:':4';:,""?ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstallowsQPTRtobecalc'ulatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteistop!:clarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifyQPTR.AbeveAt':.".,'o'i~!'ab'ov'e75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.Performingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthat$<f<(2<)';andF~remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.SR3~4-.N"..::2::::;:::.4;:8.ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheQPTR,,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimitswhentheQPTRalarmisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesinQPTR,becauseforthosecausesofQPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertilt,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-41DraftB QPTRB3.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3~4-.83::::2:!:4Y'3(continued)SR3~4-.23;:,"::P..;";:,4(3ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestates'haithesurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformediftheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.ThissurveillancerequiresamorefrequentverificationthattheQPTRiswithinlimitsincethemonitoralarmisinoperable.ThesecondNoteallowsQPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThethirdNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERis)75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERisz75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifyQPTR.AbeveAt'i.:,."',:i/6'ave75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,'QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF~Fz'(Z)';:andF>>remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.'.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-42DraftB p:~'3:!'3,,":::,::,':;:,'::::::1NSTNUNENTl'AT1ONTRTSInstrumentation3.3.1Wg'CayVgSSW~Vh>yv>NCh".)VG>VWY.:"V>NN>))vq:TSVyNVSV>)Na>VY:"~"""A)>Ye>WY..P)>)N)>).Y:.Nh>>>NVCY>V)>>Y)3,'-.::3~4:-'::::;:::ge'a'ctoe!"';::::)i.:r'ip',::.:.system:'::;,(tiiSI:';::::in's'truvmentatp'on~$'>yh>)))>>GASMvWNARMvhhw>Q7hC)Yh>Y)hN)hv>v..CCNkyAGYvh>AW,%4Mv5Y)AXN)rhehCCYhvvvyC'>Y>AAP>PL'ICABTLTTg.:'.pj',:i'Acc(it'din';>be!!>Table:;::3::."':3"::::.::;:1,::;::1'::'C'1<TONSO'."Sj>veha."::!i):;:!N+NYvcYPS<N'4)YSYM~@>"A'NANT!.:.,Wg<M~YYFi>Y>~iNN'acCC@QQ@4%WN;::CAvvC'vc">)'g(<'NecY('1"cn"1s:inn)an:('OONOjTfONACNU.IRED,'.'"O,'l'ON)rvhWw~m~~hM4W))N>>COHPL'.ETYMON;":T.::.lHE?yyhNSNcNv."G>cc'syae>hhclcelllN>ei':-:.::.:::Une-::,:.:::;or,,',.m'o":i"le:,i",~jinni',:jobs',=.1.n.'op.pra~bl.le.".>A","::;I.:;:-;<I!":-:;::.':Ki:':.::tneter,,'!ttie',:;:.ioyn0:it'i'honeSCavhCYSCCC)hvar)ea'>1'l)v":..C~h>)yh"".'.'$N)y)AYSCCY)S)Nrefer'ence'.';:..:,::,inIT::a'bl.e',:i::3.'3.'~1)(1~,ufo'.r,.:,i:.,thec'Aanii"e'.','slI';"""""""4%>%>S>>M'>S)Yyvcay,'sy.::I'minie'd;i"a'tel'y,>)Nc>e~hwyevYAYhcwhxv>TLAG'ksGll1',Cat!i:,RSNG'Ghaniiel,i~i'iian'i.r'abele,::,OP,,ERABLE::,',:st'at"us'.'l*'48,-;:ho'ur,.'s:.T~abl:,"e~i3':3'i:;1;-.',~1$R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-1DraftB

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1'ACT!lONS,'.:,::,:;;.,:cont'inu'ed'.".,RE(0.I:REOV,ACTTOH@NCv>.>>5:>>MCNAB>M"4wr'.4QCOMPLYECTION!::..'.,::TINECY1:"';:.::,::;.,"..:,".,:::-:,",'.Begin";;:tlODE",:<3"..'ln.k"::::'.'.Ne'...i..:"""81'CY'M>>>>>>'>>AND>:>PI"~APP%Vl>>>>>~>/Pj>>>g>AA><.>>Q~QV>>>>>>J>>'+QUA>Q>>>,v>.>>>,vM>:6):,:;:hour'i'hob;f.":;::;'r,"o"d:":.w,i;:t.hdr,,a%a;l.:::.~4v>>4>~>.>:A>>>>ONES>>>>>>>>~>>;~w4v3'>$p>/>>'>>g>>'JlnounsFP~;>)PAL(P~'"gfggR~>g~Pz~&P$';.<~<'45"gO'T"f~>y:~"r."::;",".~>><<A'~>>>'>i%4"::~>""'"i""'"~i;.;,:>::l:%ÃPy~';:;,<<z";~<;>gri,'h'Q~PNN>>>ZZ.";>jT,h'e)'ji;nop>e'rab'f.,:e".ch'a'nne'1,"i!'ij'iaji,:gabebp'as'se'deafor',:.,':.up%to>'a~4hv>wYWw!Cl,y>'>h4NAcv>>>>>@>%gyNv>>6~.;houFs+:A'm>.>>>&>>>>4>;-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-2DraftB 0 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4 LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.43.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationLCO3.3.4Each480VsafeguardsbusshallhavetwoOPERABLEchannelsofLOPDGStartInstrumentation.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONS-NOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneoikm'jye$48O..."."-.'V;:biis::(!es')'ij'wi':,tiki,:<irie"channeli"noperable.A.IPlaceehannWchanne:lg"i:)>intrip.6hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.ORb~wH{%;,.gj<..".,4:,~,noh4';(.i;;y~cv.'0kaA~ja'tl%m24~4~%~P~c'annespinoperable.B,1EnterapplicableCondition(s)andRequiredAction(s)fortheassociatedDGmadeinoperablebyLOPDGstartinstrumentation.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-1DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.4SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSNOTEWhenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyfortheperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintotheassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto4hoursprovidedthesecondchannelmaintainsLOPDGstartcapability.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.4,1PerformTADOT.31daysSR3.3.4.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONwithTripSetpointandAllowableValue:forI,:;.".ei'eh:,-;<480'pV.-<<<<RcvMv~~ww'<<t<<n<<wed24monthsa.Lossofvoltage:AllowableValueBusvoltage>368VTimedelays2.75secb.Degradedvoltage:AllowableValueBusvoltage~414VTimedelayz1520secTllp~Setoint2372.8V2.4+0.12secTrlp~Setoint2419.2V~1520secR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-2DraftB

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ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5ioNiiii:reREgUIRED~ACT:::IOACAMikt7MC&%CY%'NVAIAiYQWNfONP.L'FT310N',<T~IH.EAvXi'AX&%CC~iv:w'Wviw&0htNODE'i:,:1'i.:;'.'j~',":i9::::i'~'::."o,'r..'::"::4;:~"C!C+CQ>MMV~~XMXOX~~'YQY~WORRMgUne,.',,:::..,.br',!mpt..',,..e.'.';:.I;:;,Un'etc.'onS:w.,it'ii.',":on;;.';:;o',::'ii'r',,,e;a'ct'uit,:iori::,"'Xi",'ii:iii;~~~op-er;abl.e-~6%80th,"~Vktl1.:8t'1,'o'jii~iii.':i'or,'ng~'~iianne::.iPcP-..-i,.nbphr,'a':.'i,':.=:'cek~ri:vwiwradmwvAORNF'jm'epo,,~'<.on"i:':;i~b~ng'>'eq0;1;..r.e.d".i."Act.,:1:0A's<;-,ops'l'C'0:3a@3'::)=i'ontKj,rjm)nt'~mi,ni'.::~'j'urge",:i,':s'o'1,'at::j",o'ijv'".a';,':iie's'::,':.':'m'a"'e':""n's't'r,.'u'iiie"n,t,'i't'i:on'.,::ImYnedl.a't;elv;:(..iout.::i"'nuked'}'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-4DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5ACTIONScontinuedCONOI~VIO,kv&4MimRKqUIR'ED":::::.:AC'TI'OA4:cRc4v>.ccSN~w"4CQNPL'ETJOg::,::"-,TjI'gECOAEI";,'AI'.:TERATO)S.":'dr~One.::.".'o'."':;;:more'.".'::.";F'u~'et~;:ans:8,:,:.,;.:',.-.'~.on',"":,.o1':,::;:;.,:,,0Ãepian'i':II:;:,.or,,'-;:.hiiT,dmhtj,'c:a'ctuat-:~'in,",:;tr'a.:,i.rii'If8'I%YN(%%id~inoperabl'e~Sw'w'.>r'.Zw"vNv.'~MCC4OCORITim'ekfor;.";."'Cd'n"di::tea'n:"":.'A'Iot-;':,.met)~cccA>ANN'cc44"8~C:.l~':,"..:"-',::-,';,:",'),::',-::"::i:":P3':ace.':"'a'nd,;::pa'j"'.n't'ajn""o'nba';:ir'Iiiien't~:::;:'p',u'r",ge'>'andxhau's't',:::i:::",'~al';~e"s",:",",::.:~,ii'"'"c):ose'd@'p'os'::i't-;i'in'.:,;'w4:aver@XMCAC.~%'Av&Wi+:w4~C$c'on't'i.'.:i,riiii'en'O'I,::::."p'u'rge:.,:';a'nd.exh'au's'tj;.:.-:;i!'so7,'"a%i'.or'i'""i'a:::.,v,"es.":,',:,'m'a"'e"j',.'n'o'p.'e'r'ab7,'."e".,'-:;b'jB'o,l,:a't:i,'oii"'"'inStl;um'e'iitat'idn~I.<<axayadvi~+~~~g;~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-5DraftB

ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.5SUAVE'I6i.'iNCE:.":."'::RiqOIgENENTi'e'ntii:a::i.'on';"::-:."sb'.,:a,::q.d~n"'-.';.',;6nctj':b'n;,LAfqOEiC7,R~y,:j'5'S~i':-;~:,-'::::":,,Pe.',.:,for'i":~;CliNNEi::.:':$HECK-'".SR,:,.':.:::::;3:'-~3:"'.5;::2~:;:;,::..:":.;::.-:,::Pefoyrii;'.:COTP.,2S~Rh4P~'58k3364N0TE~"""":jii'..;::jti'c'a't',iiii.';:!o'i')':::i'et'poinfl),':;s',:.:.n'o't".:.:.:'re'qu'jr'ei:.jFPer..fogy~~.-TADOT~4~P4!':Ill0II'tIl8.:SR";.'::-.;:::.8::.:3'.':6:,':&.':.,':'$:,Per:fo,:AC'HANNEl;..'::.:::,,:.cAL"liAA'T:ION:..:~2,4'-:':::,moiithgR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-6DraftB ContainmentVentilationIsolationInstrumentation3.3.57%'to::,3~3".'$;"-'1:::,:::,('pise';:,1,:of,",:.:>'Ont~inm'Cop';:YOAFithii'itimari.:kOl'ot3sfinÃlF3StFe'entaeiOnShvhvrrtwhh'hwAYAO~YAAYAOACYAtAvhsAOSwhvhCYhvwhvhOhh5iTCi'logPhwhOhwrwKgOIi%5PgNi'lliii@ioW4hVhYhas%'1sCYCWWheSWRll;l;ANCC4ia'iiAhKiiisM~lP,:SC/PO'(HI:Q~5nUal:"in('%fanongAYCYACOACCCCCCCC5a:j3$3';SUCii'it'i'lmont(4cfi'ationR~<~X~~~~'s5h:.j,'33~$.otfts'ilt3'33';3~E':."r'Phr8'cQ'5~teSIig3";3";:8".".:i9~Co'ntif%imt':liialaYion'lvcrsekovwowwwroCvsvchgsvevhwvsvchwvs+svosvAuvchvvov(wp3zovswh,wcsrpshpgvYhvchvvYRofij~(t'o",':,Lcvo'p."~;'a:,.;:,:?!F8FAsg<nstreie'nvtvntion,'!':;:.Fuietion@',~for'>eitfntftvfet3tofienfshootone'iide:iiqi:f'resLton"3Aliirf'er;::;:,ts;:,tt'f'tv33s3.'3",":f'e'3S'33's!tf'fniitr,tefnntoft~One;c,,ntfossetOn,'Rvsgigs3!:::St(3'5):;::6!petis3itfol'o'fr'esl'llffluent'<<'soiilrot@p~roqrdle-:R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3o37DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.63-i"::-:.,=-,;:ASTRUHENTi7~1'ON<'.:.:',:,:':::;:~::::~~I'intr'ii7iiiiitai0'nAPPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,4,5,and6,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONS-NOTE------------------SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONT4HECOHPL'E'T!IONL%A-.'O'JOneormoreFunctionswithone~xarmchannelinoperable.A.l--------NOTE--------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedfor(1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceCREATSinModeF.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.B.1AND8.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-8DraftB CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCONPKMGNT-NECgHPL'6'TALIONC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinMODE5or,6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.C.IANDInitiateactiontorestorechannel(s)er-4rai~toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyC.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDC.3Suspend'ovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-9DraftB

CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSNOTERefertoTable3-.3-.S-M:,':,3:,::,'::6:.'-.1'.todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachCREATSActuationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3-.3-.5-.43::.":5,::.:6"."::f::PerformCOT.92days-NOTE-SR3~-.83;."'.3;.:'.";;.6.:;gVerificationofsetpointisnotrequire.PerformTADOT,24monthsSR3-.3-.6W3,,P;:::6';8PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24-~~monthsSk!,:::::::.:':,3':3::::6:-.',4:,'::::;":.fl?eifoif'ACTPA-.:T!IQN"::LOGIC!'!TEST'i]R.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-10DraftB

CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.6CR5iTSActy'ation',"'I'ns~t'riiientatjogFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHAHHELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1.ManualInitiation1trainHA2.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1trainSRNA3.ControlRoomRadiationIntakeMonitora.IodineSR~3":,5~6"':f;SR~~';."'3,'6g59x10'/'.b.NobleGasSR~~3"',3;6,",:3.-SR~3'"'3'.:6~:5s1x10'~i/ccc.ParticulateSR~~573'".Ni"='R~3"';:$Y6":;:5t~~1x10+1/ccR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-11DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1B3.3INSTRUMENTATION83.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDCl4(Ref.I)requiresthatthecore'rotectionsystems,togetherwithassociatedengineeredsafetyfeaturesequipment,bedesignedtopreventorsuppressconditionsthatcouldresultinexceedingacceptablefueldesignlimits.TheRTSinitiatesaplantshutdown,basedonthevaluesofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingthecorefueldesignlimitsandReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryduringanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)andtoassisttheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)Systemsinmitigatingaccidents.Theinstalledprotectionandmonitoringsystemshavebeendesignedtoassuresafeoperationofthereactoratalltimes.Thisisachievedbyspecifyinglimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)intermsofparametersdirectlymonitoredbytheRTS,aswellasspecifyingLCOswithrespecttotheseparametersandotherreactorsystemparametersandequipment.TheLSSS,definedinthisspecificationastheTripSetpoints,inconjunctionwiththeassociatedLCOs,establishthethresholdforprotectivesystemactiontopreventexceedingacceptablelimitsduringDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs).Theseacceptablelimitsare:a.TheSafetyLimit(SL)valuesshallbemaintainedtopreventdeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB);b.Fuelcenterlinemeltshallnotoccur;andc.TheRCSpressureSLof2735psigshallnotbeexceeded.OperationwithintheSLsofSpecification2.0,"SafetyLimits(SLs),"maintainstheabovevaluesandassuresthatoffsitedosewillbewithinIOCFR100limits(Ref.2)duringAOOs.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-1DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)DBAsareeventsthatareanalyzedeventhoughtheyarenotexpectedtooccurduringtheplantlife.TheDBAacceptancelimitisthatoffsitedosesshallbemaintainedwithinanacceptablefractionof10CFR100limits(Ref.2).Therearefivedifferentaccidentcategorieswhichareorganizedbasedontheprobabilityofoccurrence(Ref.3).Eachaccidentcategoryisallowedadifferentfractionofthe10CFR100limits,inverselyproportionedtotheprobabilityofoccurrence.Heetingtheacceptabledoselimitforanaccidentcategoryisconsideredashavingacceptableconsequencesforthatevent.TheRTSinstrumentationissegmentedintothreedistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4):a.Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;b.Signalprocesscontrolandprotectionequipment;andc.Reactortripswitchgear.ThesemodulesareshowninFigureB3.3.1-1anddiscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Toaccountforthecalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor~gai)Sp'i'.;:o'ii:di'dj':ii'"',e'ifeb'l)!shed',."'p'1::aihproceUtes:.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-2DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessControlandProtectionEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.Thesesetpointsaredefinedin,UFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4),Chapter6(Ref.5),andChapter15(Ref.6).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefieldtransmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Ifaparameterhasnomeasurablesetpointandisonlyusedasaninputtotheprotectioncircuits(e.g.,manualtripfunctions)twochannelswithaone-out-of-twologicaresufficient.Athirdchannelisnotrequiredsincenosurveillancetestingisrequiredduringthetimeperiodinwhichtheparameterisrequired.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.7),(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-3DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUNDSinalProcessControlandProtectionEuiment(continued)Thetwo,three,andfourprocesscontrolchannelsdiscussedaboveallfeedtwologictrains.FigureB3.3.1-1showsatwo-out-of-fourlogicfunction'hichprovidesinputintotwologictrains(TrainAandB).Twologictrains'arerequiredtoensurethatnosinglefailureofonelogictrainwilldisabletheRTS.Provisionstoallowremovinglogictrainsfromserviceduringmaintenanceareunnecessarybecauseofthelogicsystem'sdesignedreliability,Duringnormaloperation,thetwologictrainsremainenergized.ReactorTriSwitchearThereactortripswitchgearincludesthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)andbypassbreakersasshownonFigure83.3.1-1.TheRTBsareintheelectricalpowersupplylinefromthecontrolroddrivemotorgeneratorsetpowersupplytothecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).OpeningoftheRTBsinterruptspowertotheCRDMs,whichallowstheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsto,fallintothecorebygravityandshutdownthereactor.EachRTBmaybebypassedwithabypassbreakertoallowtestingoftheRTBwhiletheplantisatpower.Duringnormaloperation,theoutputfromtheprotectionsystemisavoltagesignalthatenergizestheundervoltagecoilsintheRTBsandbypassbreakers,ifinuse.Whentherequiredlogicmatrixcombinationiscompleted,theprotectionsystemoutputvoltagesignalisremoved,theundervoltagecoilsarede-energized,thebreakertripleverisactuatedbythede-energizedundervoltagecoil,andtheRTBsandbypassbreakersaretrippedopenallowingtheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecore.Therefore,alossofpowertotheprotectionsystemorRTBswillcauseareactortrip.Inadditiontothede-energizationoftheundervoltagecoils,eachbreakerisalsoequippedwithashunttripdevicethatisenergizedtotripthebreakeropenuponreceiptofareactortripsignalfromtheprotectionsystem(exceptforthezirconiumguidetubetripwhichonlyutilizestheundervoltagecoils).EithertheundervoltagecoilortheshunttripmechanismissufficientbyitselftoopentheRTBs,thusprovidingdiversetripmechanisms.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-4Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES)LCO,andAPPLICABILITYTheRTSfunctionstomaintaintheSLsduringallAOOsandmitigatestheconsequencesofDBAswhichinitiateinanyNODEinwhichtheRTBsareclosed,EachoftheanalyzedaccidentsandtransientscanbedetectedbyoneormoreRTSFunctions.TheaccidentanalysisdescribedinReference6takescreditformostRTStripFunctions.RTStripFunctionsnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisarequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseRTStripFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.Theymayalsoserveasbackups%'iit,.j,c'ip'ato'ry':'::::;:Ctj'p'etoRTStripFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccid'entanalysis.TheLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganRTSFunction,listedinTable3.3.1-1intheaccompanyingLCO,tobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeorfourchannelsineachinstrumentationFunction,twochannelsofManualReactorTripineachlogicFunction,andtwotrainsineachAutomaticTripLogicFunction.FourOPERABLEinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationarerequiredwhenoneRTSchannelisalsousedasacontrolsysteminput.ThisconfigurationaccountsforthepossibilityofthesharedchannelfailinginsuchamannerthatitcreatesatransientthatrequiresRTSaction.Inthiscase,theRTSwillstillprovideprotection,evenwithrandomfailureofoneoftheotherthreeprotectionchannels.Threeoperableinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-threeconfigurationaregenerallyrequiredwhenthereisnopotentialforcontrolsystemandprotectionsysteminteractionthatcouldsimultaneouslycreateaneedforaRTStripanddisableoneRTSchannel.Thetwo-out-of-threeandtwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedorbypassedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausingareactortrip.Specificexceptionstotheabovegeneralphilosophyexistandarediscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-5Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCOandAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachRTSFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.1-1.IncludedonTable3.3.1-1areTripSetpointsforallapplicableRTSFunctions.TripSetpointsforRTSFunctionsnotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisarebasedonestablishedlimitsprovidedinpken4preeedureskpih,',;,UgSAR!":(Refe're'ince":;,:4')':.NotethatintheaccompanyingLCO3.3.1,theTripSetpointsofTable3.3.1-1aretheLSSS.TheTripSetpointsarethenemw+Qji;m',i',b;ngvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracya~:ipse'i~-ffe8,,Qi,Kh)~n~-,p'l'int<:pi',aeed0'r'es.gThvAc~h~KN.l~~w~t~i<gi%ygt~h<q~ib5~c,ct~:gbjj.s~j':f'.yc>.,sv<0,i.d:;;".$4~dFjcÃiy:s+444+~canc]Ãwn'O'O':".::The)4'bs!':",T0QA'0;;;4,v8!l,:Ue;:':exceeGR:::".":;.the.:~cl+Ydgi)iTI'1,pSet'poi.'n't"'~'"".Khbih.,scw$Mc4~$C'oqTheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences4,5,and6.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,andinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimitsusedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference8.TheRTSutilizesvariouspermissivesignalstoensurereactortripFunctionsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.ThesepermissivesbackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionisavailable.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-6DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES~T'PPLtttflfif,',".,:,,:!!ififtiii-:,'lf,:-.I'-:ilia'"-,"'!!it!"",,'..,,"'-"'I:::*,tl'll'll'I'1'!lf'Tl'I::,::I-',i,,",'-,-fitdT.,&Verw,1"'A.TP,PP:""g'QXg+P,:Ph".;PC%"""Q"gt+~'.".LV'YCgyM>%<.;PTTNWWWNS"W".$$%&ÃPPP'LL..P1'I!':,,I'l'PL!Ifft'tltltf,:::tt'-,"-*:,,IITTP!P,:',,!if",,-!',,",:'I'l'."L!":I!,'::,:::1,.'P'-IT11'APP,L<I:BABA)::TpY,:$':,:{"'eb'nt::~"n'used)'::I::..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,3-7Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-8DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESATP-.4-.HanualReactorTriTheHanualReactorTripfunctionensuresthatthecontrolroomoperatorcaninitiateareactortripatanytimebyusingeitheroftworeactortrippushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.AHanualReactorTripenergizestheshunttripdeviceandde-energizestheundervoltagecoilsfortheRTBsandbypassbreakers.ItisusedatthediscretionofthecontrolroomoperatorstoshutdownthereactorwheneveranyparameterisrapidlytrendingtowarditsTripSetpointorduringotherdegradingplantconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-9DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES5P,:ERABLiE.reactortriptripbreakerarerequiredwilldisablefunctionhasassociateanprovided.Eachchanneliscontrolledbyamanualpushbuttonwhichactuatesthereactorinbothtrains.TwoindependentchannelstobeOPERABLEsothatnosinglefailuretheHanualReactorTripFunction.ThisnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoLSSS,thereforenosetpointsare(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-10DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESa-HOOC-'iPPLQjABiE~tt'""Hiiiilt"-'t:":!7!i!i(::::-'.:::i----'d'j!SAFETYjANALlSES;:::::::!,",,::::;;P~""""""""partiallyorfullywithdrawnfromthecore.InHODE3,4,or5,themanualinitiationFunctionmustalsobeOPERABLEiftheRTBsareclosedandtheControlRodDrive(CRD)Systemiscapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorthecontrolrods.Inthiscondition,inadvertentcontrolrodwithdrawalispossible.InHODE3,4,or5,manualinitiationofareactortripisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEiftheCRDSystemisnotcapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorcontrolrods,orifoneormoreRTBsareopen.Iftherodscannotbewithdrawnfromthecore,thereisnoneedtobeabletotripthereactorbecausealloftherodsareinserted.InHODE6,neithertheshutdownrodsnorthecontrolrodsarepermittedtobewithdrawnandtheCRDHsaredisconnectedfromthecontrolrodsa'ndshutdownrods.Therefore,themanualinitiationFunctionisnotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-11Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)2.PowerRaneNeutronFluxThePowerRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.TheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)powerrangedetectors(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISpowerrangedetectorsprovideinputtotheCRDSystemfordeterminationofautomaticrodspeedanddirection.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.'a~PowerRaneNeutronThePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovided,fromallpowerlevels,againstapositivereactivityexcursionleadingtoDNBduringpoweroperations,ThesereactivityexcursionscanbecausedbyrodwithdrawalorreductionsinRCStemperature.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionchannelstobeOPERABLE.(continued)-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-12Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-13Draft8

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLEa.PowerRaneNeutron(continued)~F,:I:*:,-',-!W1SAFETYANALYSES)LCO,andAPPLICABILITYInMODE1or2,whenapositivereactivityexcursioncouldoccur,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionwillterminatethereactivityexcursionandshutdownthereactorpriortoreachingapowerlevelthatcoulddamagethefuel.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.IntheseMODES,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandreactivityexcursionsintothepowerrangeareextremelyunlikely.OtherRTSFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionswheninMODE3,4,5,or6.b.PowerRaneNeutronA~-4ewF'16K'::-'.:.:LoPwTheLCOrequirementforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstapositivereactivityexcursionfromlowpowerorsubcriticalconditions.TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionchannels(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)tobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-14Draft8

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.PowerRaneNeutronA~&ewKTux-.-"'LowA(continued)InMODE1,below6%RTP,andinMODE2,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorwhentwo-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsaregreaterthanapproximately8%RTP(P-10setpoint).ThisFunctionisautomaticallyunblockedwhenthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsarebelowtheP-10setpoint.AbovetheP-10setpoint,positivereactivityadditionsaremitigatedbythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunction.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobe'OPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandtheNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstpositivereactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinMODE3,4,5,or6.3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFluxTheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalcondition.ThistripFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionandisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.TheNISintermediaterangedetectors(N-35andN-36)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISintermediaterangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputtocontrolsystems.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-15DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFlux(continued)TheLCOrequirestwochannelsoftheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.BecausethistripFunctionisimportantonlyduringlowpowerconditions,thereisgenerallynoneedtodisablechannelsfortestingwhiletheFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Therefore,athirdchannelisunnecessary.InHODE1below6%RTP,andinHODE2,theIntermediateRangeNeutronfluxtripfubctdongustbeOPERABLEsincethereisapotentialforanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.Above8%RTP(P-10setpoint),thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripprovidescoreprotectionforarodwithdrawalaccident.InHODE3,4,or5,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheNISintermediaterangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinHODE3,4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-16Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)SourceRaneNeutronFluxTheLCOrequirementfortheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalconditionandprovidesprotectionagainstborondilutionandrodejection."ev'ant'i.ThistripFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsin~tlt'EEdt<<dEyeliddltd1theaccidentanalysisattheseconditions.TheNISsourcerangedetectors(N-31andN-32)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISsourcerangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputstocontrolsystems.ThesourcerangetripistheonlyRTSautomaticprotectionfunctionrequiredinNODES3,4,and5.Therefore,thefunctionalcapabilityatthespecifiedTripSetpointisassumedtobeavailable,TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.TheLCOalsorequiresonechanneloftheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtdP1OOPERABLE1MOE,E,I1ththOROE<<,,OlI'~Ihdlot,',diiIOI!IIItlEiiiyitllei'll:"Ade.IthtthesourcerangeFunctionistoprou~viddecontrolroomindication.TheoutputsoftheFunctiontoRTSlogictE1dOPERALEhher-4he-CRDsystemisnotcapableofrodwithdrawal~i'nd'll!.;:-d;:igde'lyLd::-,:::.:::d.TheSourceRangeNeutronFluxTripFunctionprovidesprotectionforcontrolrodwithdrawalfromsubcritical,borondilutionandcontrolrodejectionevents.TheFunctionalsoprovidesvisualneutronfluxindicationinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-17DraftB e RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-18DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY4.SourceRaneNeutronFlux(continued)InNODE2whenbothintermediaterangechannelsare<5E-llamps(belowtheP-6setpoint),theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunct'i;oii7~mustbeOPERABLE.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Lowtripwillprovidecoreprotectionforreactivityaccidents.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theNISsourcerangedetectorsaremanuallyde-energizedbytheoperatorandareinoperable.InNODE3;4,'r5withtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal~l'o).'j,al.",l:::i,.".;.':,rod's),:.:aii.:,":iiof~fiif,:lj~fnii.:i~tid,theSourceRangeNeu'tronFlux"tr'ipFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidecoreprotectionagainstarodwithdrawalaccident.IftheATION-areCRDSystem.isnotcaableofrodwithdrawal+and":.:il,':1;:,:;i(idsjiv'~e,:,',",fu':.Ig'y,'::,",'fA'i'ii'":fed,thesourcerangedetectorsarenotrequired"totri'pthereactor.However,theirmonitoringFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtomonitorcoreneutronlevelsandprovideindicationofreactivitychangesthatmayoccurasaresultofeventslikeaborondilution.TherequirementsfortheNISsourcerangedetectorsinNODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-19DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.OvertemeratureaTTheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctionisprovidedtoensurethatthedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismet.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherangeoverwhichtheOverpoweraTtripFunctionmustprovideprotection.TheinputstotheOvertemperatureaTtripincludepressure,T,axialpowerdistribution,andreactorpowerasindicatedbyloopaTassumingfullreactorcoolantflow.ProtectionfromviolatingtheDNBRlimitisassuredforthosetransientsthatareslowwithrespecttodelaysfromthecoretothemeasurementsystem.The~t,,",it",g",,:,:":t'",:,",TtipFtimonitorsbothvari'ation'n'powerandflowsinceadecreaseinflowhasthesameeffectonaTasapowerincrease.TheOvertemperaturedTtripFunctionusestheaTofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerandiscomparedwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;~pressurizerpressure-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesinsystempressure;and~axialpowerdistributionf(aI)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperand.lowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.Dynamiccompensationisincludedforsystempipingdelaysfromthecoretothetemperaturemeasurementsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-20DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY5.OvertemeraturewT(continued)TheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote1ofTable3:3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOvertemperatureaTTripSetpointisreachedintwo-out-of-fourchannels.Sincethepressureandtemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOvertemperatureaTconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresallfourchannelsoftheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOvertemperatureaTFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.FailuresthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InNODE1or2,theOvertemperatureaTtripmustbeOPERABLEtopreventDNB.InNODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-21DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)6.OverowerzTTheOverpoweraTtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedtoensuretheintegrityofthefuel(i.e.,nofuelpelletmeltingandlessthan1%claddingfailure)underallpossibleoverpowerconditions.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherequiredrangeoftheOvertemperatureaTtripFunctionandprovidesabackuptothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighSetpointtrip.TheOverpoweraTtripFunctionensuresthattheallowableheatgenerationrate(kW/ft)ofthefuelisnotexceeded.ItusestheaTofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;rateofchangeofreactorcoolantaveragetemperature-includingdynamiccompensationforthedelaysbetweenthecoreandthetemperaturemeasurementsystem;andaxialpowerdistributionf(aI)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountForimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote2ofTable3.3.1-1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-22Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYTheOverpowersTtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote24eo~fTable3.3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOverpoweraTtripsetpointisreachedintwo-out-of-fourchannels.Sincethetemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuationandasinglefailureintheremainingchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section.7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOverpoweraTconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsoftheOverpoweraTtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOverpoweraTtripFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.FailuresthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicable'toallaffectedFunctions.InHODE1or2,theOverpoweraTtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheonlyHODESwhereenoughheatisgeneratedinthefueltobeconcernedabouttheheatgenerationratesandoverheatingofthefuel.InHODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereis.insufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutfueloverheatingandfueldamage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,3-23DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,3-24DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)7.P}essurizerPressureThesamesensors(PT-429,PT-430,andPT-431)provideinputtothePressurizerPressure-Highand-LowtripsandtheOvertemperatureaTtripwiththeexceptionthatthePressurizerPressure-LowandOvertemperatureaTtripsalsoreceiveinputfromPT-449.SincethePressurizerPressurechannelsarealsousedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunction.actuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.Pressurizer'".wOM:QC+$+QQMQ(XC.):.g9xQgi;."r'e's:sure::-.-..'.".:.i.:owThePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowpressure.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofthePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Includedwithinthefourchannelsareleadtimeandlead/lagconstraints.InMODE1,whenDNBisamajorconcern,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripfunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThistripFunctionisautomaticallyenabledonincreasingpowerbytheP-7interlock(8.5%RTP).Ondecreasingpower,thistripFunctionisautomaticallyblockedbelowP-7.BelowtheP-7setpoint,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausenoconceivablepowerdistributionscanoccurthatwouldcauseDNBconcerns.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-25DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-26Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.Pressurizer.p.,YQX...CCCOXC.W.QXQQW)~KgThePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstoverpressurizingtheRCS.ThistripFunctionoperatesinconjunctionwiththepressurizerreliefandsafetyvalvestopreventRCSoverpressureconditions.TheLCOrequiresthreechannelsofthePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.InMODE1or2,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtohelppreventRCSoverpressurizationandminimizechallengestothereliefandsafetyvalves,InMODE3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldcauseanoverpressureconditionwillbeslowtooccur.Therefore,theoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtakecorrectiveactions.Additionally,lowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionsystemsprovideoverpressureprotectionwheninorbelowMODE4.Pres'suez'eVNQat7r,'.'::Level~;,",;~AH.hha9i'iii'i'it,':::boitei)i,li'i'.:i'f.~tlirt'i'i.8'v,6$;.h~~uA(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-27Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESvalves-.Thesevalvesaredesignedtopasssteaminordertoachievetheirdesignenergyremovalrate.Areactortripisactuatedpriortothepressurizerbecomingwatersolid.ThistripFunctionisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-28DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES:,:.c0A,j1'n'ue',;:'Sh'F,'E':fr:,-::.:AN'iibjgS;.'(pressurizerlevelchannels('L'4'2'6,LT'-"'4s2'7;andLT-428)arealsousedforothercontrolfunctions.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.Thelevelchannelsdonotactuatethesafetyvalves,andthehighpressurereactortripissetbelowthesafetyvalvesetting.Therefore,withtheslowrateofchargingavailable,pressureovershootduetolevelchannelfailurecannotcausethesafetyvalvetoliftbeforethereactorhighpressuretrip.InMODE1or2,whenthereisapotentialforoverfillingthepressurizer,thePressurizerWater'evel-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InMODES3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldraisethepressurizerwaterlevelwillbeslowandtheoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtakecorrectiveactions.9.ReactorCoolantR-ew-LewFl'oM-:."Lo7wTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)and(TwoLoops)tripFunctionsutilizethreecommonflowtransmittersperRCSlooptogenerateareactortripabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint).FlowtransmittersFT-411,FT-412,andFT-413areusedforRCSLoopAandFT-414,FT-415,andFT-416areusedforRCSLoopB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-29DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)a~ReactorCoolantA-ew-4ewF,::.I~ow'.':.-.::.'L'owSinleLooTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowintheRCSloop,whileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.AbovetheP-8setpoint,(50%RTP),alossofflowineitherRCSloop.willactuateareactortrip.EachRCSloophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorflow.Theflowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionchannelsperRCSlooptobeOPERABLEinMODE1z50%RTPaboveP-8setpoint).~Ca(h~B:..l~OO'p,:;:,:,),',S:.,COijkdered:;:,::::a"';::.":.'Sepi'rateFun'cti'on'll'fOr,.',;.4thspur'po'se$oB'f;:,<th'iS~,'";'.:L'CO.:iInMODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinoneRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore.InMODE1belowtheP-8setpointtheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).b.ReactorCoolantR+~wF~lo'w'-.,':LAY)TwoLoosTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowinbothRCSloopswhileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionchannelsperlooptobeOPERABLEinMODE1above8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisOPERABLE(belowtheP-8setpoint).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-30DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESEach;:~foo'p:::-:,1aaico'na'<bedewed""::::,,:::,.a':-'iaepaiate~lFunctfoanWPio~s"'~theptat~ataaacso,Ul!n'o,se'i'"of!.,"";;fath,1:::e'll'i4c((conti,nued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-31DraftB 0

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESflowinoneRCSloop.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfoneRCPbreakerisopen45~50%RTP,areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-33Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa~RCPBreakerPositionSinleLoo(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinMODE1above50%RTP(abovetheP-8setpoint).g'ach~j,;:,.RCP.:,~p:;'coh's;ideJea';,::~a',:;sepai;a'tel~Functuin'::;~ed'i'/pri,";pal;:poshfort'histripFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofapump.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.b.InMODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,whenalossofflowinanyRCSloopcouldresultinDNB'onditionsinthecore,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InMODE1belowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).RCPBreakerPositionTwoLoosTheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloops.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfbothRCPbreakersareopenabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheRCPBreakerPosition~'{SiiggleLoop)tripFunctionisOPERABLE(belowtheP-8setpoint),areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-34DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES)LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionTwoLoos(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinNODE1abovetheP-7andbelowtheP-8setpoints.Fach'*wPggPA+NYeS'PnePA+'Pg'Seen.'4yBP'x+eene,ate'+9g+Snia",eeeeNgesg+oxc~aan~'yM44'GV::,.'.:j::,S,"',:,~COriS:i,'aeer'elt':-,:,a:.':,:'ESeP'ara,'ee;::.-;','FunCi'l,Ori;:-.:.rOil:~tniPunne'seInf;::,:,:.'this",;.',LOO'..":,":;:!'iOneOPERABLEcliannelissufficientfor"thisFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofanRCP.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.InNODE1abovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allreactortripsonlossofflow(includingRCPbreakerposition)areautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlossofflowinbothRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-35DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE11.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)Unde',volta'e."-.';;Bus:11Aand11BTheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BreactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloopsk1~I!!8:g'--;:i.ThevoltagetoeachRCPismonitored.Above8.5i'TP(theP-7setpoint),anundervoltageconditiondetectedonbothBuses11Aand11Bwillinitiateareactortrip.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.Timedelaysareincor'poratedintotheUndervoltageBus11Aand11Bchannelstopreventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowertransients.TheLCOrequirestwoUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BtripFunctionchannelsperbustobeOPERABLEinNODE1abovetheP-7setpointP':;,~',:.E'a'cd:,b.using>'..s:.:'ion,i;1,der;:ed.!'8."s'epar'a't'e'.,:.",':Fu~cfogonto'Pjth~e"'iirp'o's'e.'.,;:8f,';:';.:thai'sj~",LCQG.'elowtheP-7setpoint,theUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11Bisautomaticallyenabled.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-36DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO-,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)12.~XlsAKandl16:8Theunc"i'oiierisures'"'"'a'ro"ec"i'on""'i's'rovieagains-a[io'opsy.:::i'.,om!,'::a'..'.;,iiiaj'or!:n'eiw'o'r'k:::.;";:fsreqijeney.::iisiurbanee.[~Aii:S'e'tpa'i'ji't::,:.',:is,'.',::.'r'e'a'shed,':,."'.;-:j<",Tj'i'jie'.::,'del,a'y's:-,'::ari'",:,'~timor'po'i!a'%edj'.each'oi'.:,'::..:,t$:,:j'i'i's"..'-I'dii'e'::,':,to::-",'"mo'm'ent'ai',:.V,.",'.i'1':.e'ct~vqan8~$:9~0t~s;..;.p~g'ttzeegrsreinwxsro><ottpe~q+Oreda+wef'seesaw'ham>ves~@~Boee>se~<1s1<pmm~g~>oIII"Be'ooii'si.'de're'd!'::;."e',"::!serai'aret'ego'ii'ct'i'>wMYNcbjoe'rid'itisibiitio(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-37DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLQCABL'E::.'j"::::,"'::::::l'%~>-....<13'0Steam'generatoY4ater,':.".L>e~~.l:;-::~Low"':LowSAJ'FT'Y"':ANAL'YSES':;'"Pactasaheatsink,theSGsmustcontainaminimumamountofwater.AnarrowrangelowlowlevelinanySGisindicativeofalossofheatsinkforthe~reactor.ThreeleveltransmittersperSG(LT-461,LT-462,andLT-463forSGAand,LT-471,LT-472,andLT-473forSGB)provideinputtotheSGLevelControlSystem..Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.ThisFunctionalsoperformstheEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)functionofstartingtheAFWpumpsonlowlowSGlevel.TheAFWSystemisthesafetyrelatedbackupsourceofwatertoensurethattheSGsremain'theheatsinkforthereactor.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofSGWaterLevel-LowLowperSGtobeOPERABLEinMODES1InMODE1or2,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethataheatsinkisavailabletothereactor.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperating.Decayheatremoval'saccomplishedbytheAFWSysteminMODE3andbytheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SysteminMODE4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-38Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-39DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESPPPPLI::-::i--:.-i'4:-"'urbinea~PPPLif444PPPEl!i:':::::::,liiiiii!4PP!':::::i::::::."Pi~liISA'FETYANAL"YSE'S,LCO,andCreditforthesetripFunctionsisnotcreditedinAPPLICABILITY'heaccidentanalysis.(continued)TheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingaturbinetripfromapowerlevelaboveMY~ltTP+theP-9setpointP.BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.ThreepressureswitchesmonitorthecontroloilpressureintheAutostopOilSystem.Alowpressureconditionsensedbytwo-out-of-threepressureswitcheswillactuateareactortrip.Thesepressureswitchesdonotprovideanyinputtothecontrolsystem.TheplantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionandRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretobeOPERABLEinMODEIaboveP-9.BelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseloadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,therefore,thereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-40Draft8

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLEI~qSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)~a~TurbineClosureTheTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingatgrbinetripfromapowerlevelabove46M-RT~.(heP-9setpoinP).BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor,ThistripFunctionwillnotandisnotrequiredtooperateinthepresenceofasinglechannelfailure.TheplantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunction,andRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.ThistripFunctionisdiversetotheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunction.EachturbinestopvalveisequippedwithonelimitswitchthatinputstotheRTS.Ifbothlimitswitchesindicatethatthestopvalvesareclosed,areactortripisinitiated.ThisFunctiononlymeasuresthediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheturbinestopvalves.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwoTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionchannels,onepervalve,tobeOPERABLEinMODE1aboveP-9.Bothchannelsmusttriptocausereactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-41DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY441'5.b.TurbineClosure(continued)el'".i';~'Cur.b&eStoValveBelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealoadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,thereforethereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.SafetInectionInutfromEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemTheSafetyInjection(SI)InputfromESFASensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.Thistripisassumedinthesafetyanalysesforthelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).However,othertransientsandaccidentstakecreditforvaryinglevelsofESFperformanceandrelyuponrodinsertion,exceptforthemostreactiverodthatisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,toensurereactorshutdown.,Therefore,areactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.TripSetpointsarenotapplicabletothisFunction.TheSIInputisprovidedbyrelaysintheESFAS.Therefore,thereisnomeasurementsignalwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwotripFunctionchannelsofSIInputfromESFAStobeOPERABLEinMODE1or2.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.Therefore,thistripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2,whenthereactoriscritical,andmustbeshutdownintheeventofanaccident.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thereactorisnotcritical,andthistripFunctiondoesnotneedtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-42DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE4616,'.SAFjETrY.:;:",::,::;ANAL'Y,SESSFunctus',:oji'ii':~",m.969m$ii%~caounvxvnvNacN(tet>4wwvaeav+oaoa%vviwooatnorAN'Nxc&eaoxaaoRM@9NnavrocR)lAes&$~45e"gy~%~k~~8~4~9uo'Rereovea9MQNem989tÃee95euierF'1:%?Ru9pppor96Mp'Au999euipNer',oem'2.i;aii'g'jj))0,,;.altps)~,,above,:,,:,tahe;,Ii..nnsmurrp..;,.chm.anonel...:,.rteoadieng,,:,,:,~l,bbot,h):.:;.ch'an'ne,,l'::;s:-";::d;r.oep'erIIIj':.e,s:j'vga;::wi.:.1,':1,'::..'.'autttC'Oi<!r<eq'u'i':,'iriienteit'to'r'!::.,th@!"e,e'-,"."d':gc:hei,iii':ie'iei'e<eriie'";"e'e:Rh'ant~:::the';:":::,::9'o11!o'i'ii'n'g',:iFu'nc't'io'nsi":,::ai're;:."o'e'r'i'o'r'm'e'4"SN4%ncM~+~nad4AÃvÃv&:DYNE.~WvkvnCev:9A+uM,unt~mehP~toa~k%h~j<<.,:.:j:,:::glori.:",;:;,;sncreasjogjjdHe)<P:.,:,.':,i;,iid~gv,.-'.;,.'P,,:,',s,'jitepl;.oak,:Rarije:,,';::'::::;NHUt'ror':.';F'1;Ux:;i,,eacto'i,;,::.w,o,":.'di,.'fe'apr'km'a'tu're~,.:,',b'lo'ck@of~$'th'ego'Udcjj;I"',a'ng'e',:.".:ti,'.,jp'.and,',:;:;":,,"al,:1,'o'ws':,':,",'":.the':,",operato'rN'":,:,'to"':.'h'n~into'r'm'edia'te';:i'r'anngi:">ji'egggFRABLEAP'i'in,:,;.",te'"i,",a'ri'g'e'i!t%j'pii'j'j;.':'bl':,o'eke'd";:jtII'ej,,:::II'i'.ge'hpthe'9'de'te'ctorqa'iq~ii)'!i'18':.':::::rtemoy'ed'!:;in'd="i;.';:,'",:.::L$ii';::"'de'cia'iji'.i);:<powe'r.".,;,'j~thV,"'"'P@~6.::;:;:i,nteerl,:oakau't'omat'i'ca11:;y'.:::::en'ergbzi'i~.;.".the"'::-',HIS':."..:s'o'uirce3",'a'njiFditecto'r's:,:'a'n'dj,,e'riabl:ei'.;:.:,th'(~$'o'iii'":,ce:Rang'i"..:Niiiti,.on'9:Flux:-':,.":ri4'gati'i'~:;-;ti'i.'p',.j~t,:"';,,~S(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-43DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESKPP.LFI'C3AF,:,ETIt,CO"'gaII'all'!,>I!>i>i,,"'h"i'!bi!."-"ll'l!'!ll>'i>!L'ilia:::*"*'ilia:::::i'll::..'!h>'"::!I!.x>wpO+~61+~...+X,,x.Xg'g.Wluauwx$>...XIC>~+>Xp>QCh>>xtpwj+XfX>x>>p!CpXindI~thj.':S.';;Fuincti',On~)~,s,BnO:,:::,::,1;Onaepr:,.::::,:reFi9i,:j...;ed:::p>~"~dmng;=:.the'r!e9uzred>'co~prote~~~.on~p'res's'u'rle.;:::..::The.';PLCO:-:,:,r'e'qgu'1,re'm'en'tl.:for,",,'.)the'iP,:,::.;:7<PPermi;:;ssi',v'e'.,'...""alii'ops'<':thel,",::by@'a)'i':~Piin8t;i;one'.":'>>X>XXX'>wn>>XYyi>"Prisiur..;:Yer':.:'Pi".essurce';Ž,'.::.L'os:j~.'"..:;,::;:~RCPT.,B~iaiker;.":,':Point':i'.org('Tio';:::.':.f~oos':Qi;>':::::.,":::,":~iidurvoftugu,.':::Bii,:.'.::11A~nnd5!1!1'B.1>un'dgilia'iliii!Iindunfi:i,jun'll'GABu's.:..".1!1%'!andi>!1!lB::)'>>"'x':x@"':"'k$'<'>>>n'PP>n.~yt;n>Xw>xxxxe'~X.>:Pr>x>"u>unw>"xx>y<~xvunvnun>xx>w!>X@>xqx>Cx>auXX>ynuX>u>W!xqun:;hesjjpea'cia);::-:;:,';ii".:jp,".",:,i>iiijcijons:;:ar>pkyai..::,,:requdrejiGI>I'..;'::1IJ'G.,I?:;,;:/',";:;:ji',tp'Gnnlt'l!jj'ji'Gfj,pl'n'uii'dlug>:",'.ÃIf*,,:,Ic1nntx>illAtIlnnl!::::":GIIIcULG'tI0IIThPl~CG::;.:;;;;,,e';u:.::iiq'fourghaijyel~s;:jf:";law'.,l'PtijegReict'or'<Tr'j'ps":."Bl'o!ck:,'::;::..';::P",-',':7qpei';iii),OPKRABL~Egin"",-::MODE('1,'::"'i.::8,~:,SI~g'RTP.<*(continued)R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-44DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSAjF,T,:Y:!.::.'.O'NA.L"Y,RES,.'(~aaoaaaaao~Tiitib)1.:'o'a'd:::!r'j'a:otal'on'::beyon'd'.:;::tbo,,"::to'a'p'a'o'i,:.:ty.,:.:,'"',:o':,:,!%~ho!St'o'aniOiliii'p>,Spsteiii";:,an'ARCS~":;~.".;::."A";Fr'eoactol>)t)",ip":.,';,'isa'ut.oi02.22-i'ri'ni,".':en';::.:::::o,n':;:::.:~ne.'.)'reliar.'"::,~j',ri't'er'l:;ock~)m'6's't'.,a,:.b';;-',OPERAbe'e'aU'seethe%'regct'o'i!:.::.:';:i,."s@'n'otI':."at':::,"::,':"'a'-:i,".:'pow'e'r~Ca"a'c'itj~jotf>)th',:.",.":Ste)iq:I,:D'ump'!::aS+s't"em'.:"avqP~~xo~oR~x~Nm~~~;rFl~anorprwfp~ap~rrwcM+~r,,~r..,..p,ower,:th'",;:P.'-':10'Yp'e'rjji1Is$)v'e'::e'ris'uor'es:"::",Ch'i'tl.",th'ejif6'l'1o't'ai'rig*M~xMyxiy'Accc4i4~n'i~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-46DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE17.ReactorTriBreakersSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)46,'l5.ThistripFunctionappliestotheRTBsexclusiveofindividualtripmechanisms.TheOPERABILITYrequirementforthei,pdividualtripmechanismsisprovidedinFunction'elow.TheLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEtrainsoftripbreakers.AtripbreakertrainconsistsofalltripbreakersassociatedwithasingleRTSlogictrainthatarerackedin,closed,andcapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem.Thus,thetrainmayconsistofthemainbreaker,bypassbreaker,ormainbreakerandbypassbreaker,dependinguponthesystemconfiguration.TwoOPERABLEtrainsensurenosinglefailurecandisabletheRTStripcapability.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbe.OPERABLEwhentheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal+i:::;:and,:,'%1gj~i'ods:if,'8no,:;:.:,u:,~,:.v,::::::",.:;user,,e',ReactorTriBreakerUndervoltaeandShuntTriMechanismsTheLCOrequiresboththeUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanismstobeOPERABLEforeachRTBthatisinservice.ThetripmechanismsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEfortripbreakersthatareopen,rackedout,incapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem,ordeclaredinoperableunder'Function~ia~bo~nOPERABILITYofbothtripmechanismsoneachbreakerensuresthatnosingletripmechanismfailurewillpreventopeninganybreakeronavalidsignal.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhenthe(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-48Draft8

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASES4he-CRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalLaa'@alia,jg'r..."o"'s",:',".:".,:"a'r'8not~,;u:;.'..:;:.,",.:,i'n"'ser't:e'(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-49DraftB , RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPL'ICAB~LE:::,'i':;~::;:~j:::,:.',19.;:.'.SA'FETY'AAALYSE'S,'CO,andI4'{APPLICABILITY(continued)AutomaticTriLoicl'0TheLCOrequirementfortheRTBs(Functions-&and1&)andAutomaticTripLogic(Function17).ensuresthatmeansareprovidedtointerruptthepowertoallowtherodstofallintothereactorcore.EachRTBisequippedwithanundervoltagecoilandashunttripcoiltotrip-thebreakeropenwhenneeded.EachRTBisalsoequippedwitharedundantbypassbreakertoallowtestingofthetripbreakerwhiletheplantisatpower.ThereactortripsignalsgeneratedbytheRTSAutomaticTripLogiccausetheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakerstoopenandshutdownthereactor.TheLCOrequirestwotrainsofRTSAutomaticTripLogictobeOPERABLE.HavingtwoOPERABLEtrainsensuresthatfailureofasinglelogictrainwillnotpreventreactortrip.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhenthe4he-CRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal[(aridg~~ljl':TheRTSinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.ACTIONSr,u],ea.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.1-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttoanalyticalvaluesspecifiedinplantprocedures,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythat(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-50DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-51DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)AsshownonFigureB3.3.1-1,theRTSiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticTripLogic(Function17inTable3.3.1-1).Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrumentorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothRTStrainsthatiscomprisedoftheRTBsandAutomaticTripLogicFunction.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualReactorTripandSIInputfromESFAStripFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis(i.e.,failureoftheseFunctionsmayonlyaffectoneRTStrain).A.1ConditionAappliestoallRTSprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorerequiredchannelsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperableRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithatripFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyenteredifthetripFunctionisapplicableinthecurrentNODEofoperation.ThisessentiallyappliestothelossofmorethanonechannelofanyRTSFunctionexceptwithrespecttoConditionsG~andJH.8.1-,a~.~o~t+J~~g~i~Ma~Wa~~+~eggs~N+Lipoty,,r<X-'6Cen'OOK-4-er-R-.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformtherequiredsafetyfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-52Draft8 i RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-53DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSB.ll...":,",:4:::rshiit"',.I':~u~d)",:'O't'n"-;.",'eiieir't;:::,::ieoohri'j.':i'irI'Oe,",,"::dol'ri';:i'i'iiihth'ii";!iat'ii'ii'ia1!.2-.4-aRd-8'C.aonod<SO.3:~pf+ytvhrso~@~oee~olsngRcy>vapmqoaTors,ac@.,F",woywtw;~n,owwwtwe@w.,.t,,dr~weeTo,""'."acfi'i:ev'8,::l'th~',.sj'sta~Us:'~";~theplanteys4ees-+sWV4@hi~Co)ipletioriLTh'xiii;s":::p'iŽo%'iir:dpi",1Ty",::,::roan'i7yi!::r'cr'th'o'n't,!:oh'ai:,1'e'rijLrIyd"~ei'i'"'.i'n""c'".,".",e'hrcIrii~i'!is'n'oe-':i"-COn'drtdenb~iajYj71irieei::.;tee!therfTi'Ijlac'rdngri::.Peaot'Or,,:,:,itiiiip!Furis~ttqVg(continued)R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-54Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES:!j.ower,,':;Ranoeijieutrone!~:;:"i:u'Ã,'",;;,~LoF7:.'-vPKcRN~rMM8>M.4NA7MNv'kch'eve>rv.%~&4%4hei:.'t'i'mp'e'rit:u'i%-:;:;i.;Tj':'Prjs~5iA:ziti.!iP'i'ii'is'ir~ei"-'::0'1'ghiJPresser'i2;er.':."Miter.".',QL~e,,el<j:Augh";:;"'.,and-G:.:::.::;.l'3::,.g~$~6";,AateF."",:.:',Lese:l,-::-.'.'..:,LoggLow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-55DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAC'T~I:oNsIllh,h,l:'11,he~:-~ch'anj'e))mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusOr,.jl.aced,:'0:r'i,'.:';:-:;;th'.'.",'.lt'rj'jipe'd,;.,":i'cqij'di"tjj'on7>within486'ours.-I4'-the(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-56DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES~2'i66REH44+~U+F4R~~Ruv.~he(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-57DraftB

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESKM-and-E-.4Gend-i44.e(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-58DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESPlacingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripcondition.ForthePowerRangeNeutronFdlllx",:,:-,,;,;,'::Highs',,:.!Powerv!Rangei::::Ne'utronFlux-Low,OvertewpejatureaTV,andOverpoweraTfunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.Forthp!~pi,:il,"ii'r,"',,";ll!IjebtdpWaterLevel-HighFunctions,thi's"r'esultsinaone-out-oftwologicforactuation.FortheSGWaterLevel-LowLowFunction,thisresultsinaone-out-of-twologicpereachaffectedSGforactuation.The&6hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.p),acjipi93~(~tii'e:;rinvoper'aditi',:e,:::;,"C,'aiin'e;.""S.""""'"'""""""='-'",:;j.'SP':;:i"'n'C:.;'."u.;eS,",:""~dp.':,,:i'Cj'i'.headVeddxddxbhuwbVdbtVbth,',blah...,,,':!I,::I:,I,:-:::,,h"':,bj':':,::-'i:,::,',-.!ni'":hii'!i!i!ilia','.tdd'!t:"",'lt',tileit"..;,-!II',",,',:,,"'!i!i"."=:,iI!i-'"i",".i::iPi!i!i",',!i-,"id!",,:",:::i:bi""'illowvxbMNsdrpwdwwNbotghsbhdheÃbexpwaelbwbv"whbxvhavwphxYxhvv,8ppll6dd'Pdlll!PId:w)~th"..:"R~<ferenceg"',.'9.-Th44'ba'li""e'""l'""""g-"'t"'t(continued)REE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-59DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAGT!IQLis,,::;::g!~iL!.1.:;:';:andM:.-The"""""""'.R'iYiji:-:!i!h'aiiriiil)'!)(~i'midi:::'o'ii'i)'.:,'cliRiirii".1'yii:::.ii'oj'ei'::ibI'i.'"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-60Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperformsamonitoringandprotectionfunction.WithoneNISintermediaterangechannelinoperable,2hoursisallowedtoeitherreduceTHERMALPOWERbelowtheP-6setpointorincreaseTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-10setpoint.IfTHERMALPOWERisgreaterthantheP-10setpoint,the.NISpowerrangedetectorsperformthemonitoringandprotectionfunctionsandtheintermediaterangeisnotrequired.TheCompletionTimesallowforaslowandcontrolledpoweradjustmentaboveP-10orbelowP-6andtakeintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheredundantOPERABLEchannel,andthelowprobabilityofitsfailureduringthisperiod.Thisactiondoesnotrequiretheinoperablechanneltobetrippedbecausethefunctionusesone-out-of-twologic.Trippingonechannelwouldtripthereactor.Thus,theRequiredActionsspecifiedinthisConditionareonlyapplicablewhenchannelinoperabilitydoesnotresultinreactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-61DraftB i RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESxiii'jt'ipi::h',.';Mo0E;.:,:,:af:!Ap'pli'iab!1,',ity,'..-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-62DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESjic'i:<ops':,,",:::;-:,:"::;:,':.",.:;:;::,::~,:...:...,:,,,:~,...,,:,,;.,!!k,,.:.:,i::-':,.::.!::.:...':-.:..:,,:,:,.::::.::...:::"3'::..........:::.;,:.....:::::::::::..:...:.ch'817en'9i.hg.,:,:':,.'p;.I:8're,'~:cJst'kiri)'~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-63DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES-'Q~$~'d~;Q~ga.+~'gFu'n"ct':i,o'n5'.wh'er.'B'.N'fAQfjBhBYjRA4ABBABVVpVhAYVhNB(VWAV,WBVpppfWABBWhWABhpfhhYpffYVA%,4%;BWhpfhBVA'O'LYSSACondition,theNLSsourcerangepertoYrmsthemonitoringandpIII'.Illh~hinoperable,,,'hih','!Ill!I!ilia,',,BPB'fpBB'!ilia'Oi,I,,pMIBY5',,.Bimmediately.~'A:,."Mj.:"tb:-::,;:the::,";RTBS~;.',':.-an'd!';:.RTBBS':'."pa'e'ii'e'd:~the5':.COre"j~more'j':,st'aAb"i,e'::.,",.conan:;ti'on..".,::M'FA'V/MVfhApfAAABVAVfppA'BBW'p'A'WMBW'.SMNWWAQA'BWfsourcerangechannelOPERABLE,coreprotectionisseverelyreduced.~i~~~>m~>v,~<<u~.(~3.>~Mr~a~Q(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-64DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESand4enet4~+H.3:""iiitih)i::::"'"ll'll.-,",:,::ii!!I!i-'.,:,'id.:::,,::,::.ti'!if1!!pili!!'i:,*::,,:1!",,dP~es'o'urc'ej','.'ranged"','jer;:,orms.,':.'e,'.'::::;;riion;:o'r~ijg;";':.:::an,,pj";;o."':e'c,,::;;j,'onf0'net),.ons.w>thtwo~-,.;cQa'one;.I:::841.ndnerab:I:e,4he(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-65DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESpl.hpused-Scumee-Range-Neu4venc;.$~A+Q~.-7W-t-h+s~4neTFKsijg~i1:I:,i;"P%'c'l.udge:,::,.::a'ri'y:,:,,~aiei=~~<"S~v'-o~o~p~~cW.>'R<L+4wW(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPl'antB3.3-66DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACg!IQNSP~!'""T"')"4he-fQSs',:.':!an'd:::4.2i""'eYj':.'i'qi>'i>'iYeiiie'i'i"';.-":,:'i's'j':,:ii0ti':;:.'ji>p:,!y",':.:,'-i44-en-,t4ne4+enmTo;."achi.'ev,'eTh>'%>>>,C'..""...'>'\lQ'>x'$5+5<>cj>~><P'f$j'>>h>':,j>'%.'.>z>>x)>'>~4j'f'>'z'>>>~'N'>~j~t;>>>~>~>><~>>OPERABLE,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.Thiswillprecludeanypowerescalation.Also,theSDMmustbeverifiedonceeveryway:t'ai:n12hoursandevery12hoursthereafterasperSR3.1.1.1,SDHverification.WithnosourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,core(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-67DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESprotectionisseverelyreduced.VerifyingtheSDMonceper12hoursallowssufficienttimetoperformthecalculationsanddeterminethattheSDHrequirementsaremetandtoensurethatthecorereactivityhasnotchanged.RequiredAction43.Iprecludesanypositivereactivityadditions;therefore,corereactivityshouldnotbeincreasing,anda12hourFrequencyisadequate.TheCompletionTimeofonceper12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperienceinperformingtheRequiredActionsandtheknowledgethatplantconditionswillchangeslowly.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-68Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSHK.I-and-H:ib<g~~Pi;,ij:i,oi",,i:iii'--...,.",.Pres'sure:,."';-..!I'iP;:;.'i::::X!.,:.R5~P:.Br!elk'ii'",,":.::,"Pigiitlori::."gTio'!:L<iFji)',;.'N'4")P'Fvk'P~"cPr9v+wv49%+KN&~Mv9PM4~QMNkPPYAwk.",',,":.',",,'.':,',On8er".',re'qiii'i~cy:-:...:.Bus;::;::11'A'::,'.',and-:(118.~jn".:.",:toe:,,4ri'ppeu,;.:;;conaPjaos;;:,w~;tn'l.'ji,',';;6':.:':jiipUi",p.uA;-bepe@ceneurus-.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactortrip.The746;hoursallowedtoplacethechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9iftheinoperablechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.-g(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-69DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASES~>>.~y>.y~~og'apg>;~>~>>">>y8<.,t>>~>>>a~@~~~,z~>,>.~i'>>>>y~t>h~~or~~t>>>x>>>>>4%A>>>>44wx4>>vugh.>iv>>AN>>>>>>>>>>>>>wN>>w'iv'>>>'v4'>>>>>>>.>>>>>>>>>i>>>v'w~wNNww>>>>>>>>>>>>~%>>beeps)-andFo'ri;t}ieRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)4v4pPgrg,,,,:~88,$~44'BEfubric,.s.~4~~>5Il1B~Condition-H;:,:kuipj~1,es':.:on@'a>p'eg:::::::bus:~</.~MCUS~s~>>~Q>p,~~MQh%6*~gLlQ(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-70DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESThisallowsoneinoperablechannelfromeachloop,RCP,orbustobeconsideredonaseparateconditionentrybasis.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto484:hourswhileperformingmu4-i~surveillancetestingofthe.otherchannels.The48'4hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9IljThii4i'liour~s':::;is(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-71DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAACT10NSr'll~+':::;:,'",i:::::i'i:::::~i',:i:,::::::!Lii>1>f',::~'.:feiiit',i'nu'e'd:)':m'a'j"ni'r,.",'::i'n'd:..::W",j::.th',Osu't-:".,',::chÃ,:1e'n'j::i:hvhkw'Q4c4Nv)hRso4s4(kcv'(c4a4ouososou'IY4ivYANNN'uwPANMc4ouw%NvN!~%.>v8'oTsor'e'uus:::::9':-'::,:,."'ej~ao"hours::;:,:!I,::s:::::::upN.I-and-~~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-72Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES'meuMaeet~he-48-heur-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-73OraftB RTSInstrument'ationB3.3.1BASESz"3ThereisonebreakerpositiondeviceperRCPbreaker.WithonechannelperRCPinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7@hours.'to!",:.OPERA8L'E!::stjtus.,".N$,;::~ops>Yt'entwi'.:t'h,:Re'f'eFen'c'e::,.".9.-"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-74DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES'AV!!fggg.0.iI.4'o':;.',:,b'e~OP)RACBL."'8.,",,:,':ll!d!iigg'i'*;i!i!Cd'~iiiid,'fgii:tt,,t'diid'!gd:"::iii!i'(tff'.:."i!it:.":tf,;:i'!i;.i':,.CfC~:.ffI.':P.I-and-,!f::,!!!!v,tt'!,:,:::,,",",.i!i!i!",,Cd!.",::...'tt,:f!!tv:ii,-:g:-',.'!i!id',"":!i,tile:::;:::::'"tt,':,",fC.,',-,,'id'!"'tg:.i'C::..-.'t"6,,"ii'C,'Pjje'ddfegond~.tldg,,.M~thsvng,:,6,.hougrs.C'CXvXCC~vig'v'Cv'.%4XCXCCvgCNCCgXcCC'CvvddXCCvddXCV'CC!CY'+placedinthetrippedCo'ndj';tioi$$'::th'i~s<:re'siifti~i;ij:;."'::,a.':!",pj's'gi:a'I:ttd!!I,dt!~ig'll!:i!i-gillsitC!'-:::"'-'i""':id'di'gii-:'-"i!IOcvcledcCC'p'cxcccccXC'FdxcCcdc'~p+8?xvccvxdcc(xcvcC:(d,::;c;:cv'PcdxACv"xvdCggvv'cgvd'vkgvvfv0cxvxvcgvcvfxcxvCgv(>>ciiannei!::to,,-:.~jnj'tjgat'e;::",',a>>rea'ci:,or,;iI;r)'ii'.~u+v4ag-eA~ene-adTlie',::;:.6,.',hdttvs":.:;,"h1,1:@peptotdgpvpde6;::":COgn1~XiOn".-~::S".':CanSa:Scent-."';;H~':th;:,':,:,R6'AreriCe,',:9.+f-+he--a"j+md-..:,CF.-':eaitj',::-';emYm'~PERABL(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-75DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES,:.~eej~)j'ise9e>AWMxekj'.weeeewN'xpeeseA'>4sev4sjNj9seeRMxcec<~~~ww"J~c<vxNvcesvAMvAvwvseAvicNvi'vMs~~k4~AC9iicXpp~e+'9iO~M~~ie.e4P~(ZQQ(i=[.:)The<is;::::c~oiis$itet:,."::@itlj.:;::::::Re'ier~nce,:::;9.-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-76DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESFs::."..":2:Ri~;"'::::=:an"d~~NMANR$84cooioPi4iwc(~4QnvwAtvMr.@we't~~i%c~kiMwNczc4NM<wwi.s~sc~xiRiw>swc&ÃvYi:vox(NAY(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-77DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSGeRd+NeR-K:l".'-":<"':2';:::::2;:::,:;:.:,:::.;:(::;co'n'tjnued:)'.:ahensa'oondi'ip~'sSstamior!ACE;:,:;.::,1s,.::.:",nba'p>a'bi'e!to'p";'h'andliiijpthepace@~Tn,:.',p:i',t';;.,;:,,.......;;";....'...p,.i:..4,...,..'.'9;.,g"'xwpa>se~,.;>>>,.axeipr>::"'"'wit"'M5>:"."';"",>a'";::>~>e>+An>et~%>'>~+..'s>%%<@4,srse>'~seAc4~:.ne.ilCom'o';i'et':onITiiiie'.s'-.".'-;a';;."';r'e'a;s'oriana!:e',;coristider1.ngAj>>>no~'LMhswr>>>i>(w,(apse"@"vpxQ}$>e(n$-Q',,"'4eQ>n'~ee>>N"Cw'he'ance"d.:::to:;:,;ie'i':;fo)'mtheart)on's'>'"::,i'titian':,,:':o'rdpi,lP!Piannar,',aj>d>tt~ii'>oigjparaba'bi1lit~j,,:,':oY,::::.:'::a'n':::~aj>'e"4',::::;:.or'ob'ri,;iriij::;,;::in'b'th'assiti'iiie.'.~eR.lmnd-OPERABLC'::;-',i'tjt'4,:.N4wedThe';::q~Comp'1:et.(in,':.::P'ice;::o~f,:.:;::;.6';:hogistorestorethetraineppQtli'N~iConpdh't'4on!":ll'thii;:iiiii7iin'i,j.:i'g':idFERA'BLt:.";:::.tr>aj'n:.:":fs:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-78DraftB e RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASES2.2-2.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-79Orai'tB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESS.landS.2Condition-~SappliestotheP,,,;.6,'::;.:::.':.;:P.:,':.-..:...7,.@P,.";,,;8",;:-;.':::,':P,,-:.",'9..-.;::..d:..-,::P,,":.-,,i:."einc~cccgysj+'.,+)c(w~t...,.g~:c,tg~,x,~x1Q~P).gg~.'jK.,Y<...)c'~P~~&qd.cf.~"""'""""l'1'"~'""'1"-'h""fh""""""'""'k"""'"F"""t"'"M'i4PCheJoo'er>atoi;::;:::,::action's.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-80Draft8

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES'ACTION'SPj';.,;::::-'~i,,:::::::;:;:::8,,.::::::::~,':7;-;::1'::~i(e'o'iit'i'"ii'i'ed)f':fbi":::::miniii'::;.'.".:"o'j'i'i":~t~oi:'.".":act'4ii~".","':,,~A'the",':."."',RTB,':."jt'r'a)'ii:,'-':j,"s';:,".OPERABL'E':..,'":;;:0'i'ill:':andYUY!'2'ripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredtoperformmaintenancetooneofthediversetripfeatures.Theallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthediversetripfeaturesis86hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditionAT::.QTheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredActionSU.42::isreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditionthereisoneremainingdiversetripfeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLE'RTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduring-thisinterval.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-81DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-82DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES~~AGTIGHC5'U,',:'0,h:::.'eh6iiiojp;:,an:,';,:'jgsteths".K1.".':::::::a'nB;:M".:::Pj~i".:.;%",'~~~gRTBVNw".vNFKMviN.f444i:'.,:..::.':,"':,:j~.;".RTiB~Vri'derv'a':I't'a"7"-aRd~Shun't'""'6"7""N"'O'""'-'""9~!~~A~aoiiiat~i'c~jfi;ip~~L!O'Qi'i:.',jM:~,'th:,::,'.two~jtrg:pjn,".e'r,:,v',a',:"".'Sere.'~ySof:,.:ajV:.;::,:e'vshiit":;,;oie4ij:inq>'dij,'ri'iig;;:::,ihi's;:,:.::j'iit'ei'i'ihlF;::(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-83DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3,1BASESI!IT!II!!!'l!!!!;:,:!!!iii!i!X!'!T::-,",'TT!-:,"-T,'.":Pi2~'of+'Appl.j;:c'abi')le':tj,":l:.~n'i".".:aii'::::Gi'::derl:'y";",.."i'iiiji'iver.::."gQ,,gjIWWgPP~1P+A~VPPA+%V+g~.'AVPIV1IIPVV+PVAAVIVVVI,PAV,WIQVPPVIlPPAV+lulgbtP)'ASIANS~)VPNVAWPh'ÃMVNVVhWST5kNCN~S%CYMNChWM~N4WAC4%1%MW%NSiVINN'O'AVNN3VAAVIVX%IAAAIV%hMAWKVMWA4VA%%&'l3VPAIIISIVAQXW%M4ANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTablestatingthatTable3.3.1-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichRTSFunctions.NotethateachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheRTS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies(Ref.8).SR3.3.1.1ACHANNELCHECKisrequiredforthefollowingRTStripfunctions:Power'angeNeutronFlux-High;PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;SourceRangeNeutronFlux;IOvertemperatureaT;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-84DraftB ~,0 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-85DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.1.1(continued)Ove~ipoiYei',:':KT:;;.Pie,s,s'ur'iiiir~Pieisiir:,e;-,:L'wi:~Pr'esip~i"'::3'gii~Press'ure',':.-,',,";:::H,'gib.",'::Pre,s:s',un.ier.;",,Miti'ii;:;::L'evil::,::::-:;~ATjh,::;.Reactor'jCial.,ant~Flow"::-:,::.":LowF(Sin~::I,'e,'::L'Oop'L'."',.Reac't'o'r,.,:,~'ijgLant,':,:,:F.'l;ow,',"-.;,~~L'ow'::.'":(T~wo~:.:oops:),,i-',;and86'.':Mater,',.'.::;f.e)ie"I',:;-:,',:::,Liow-',."L!owPerformanceoftheCHANNEL'CHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatgrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationthattheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Channelcheckacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaffbasedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthe.displaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-86DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSUggfgpj>ggCBsR3.3.1.2BEAU.I::REHENTSThi"sS'RcomparesthecalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtotheNISPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highchanneloutputevery24hours.IfthecalorimetricexceedstheNISchanneloutputby>2%RTP,theNISisstillOPERABLEbutmustbeadjusted.IftheNISchanneloutputcannotbeproperlyadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-87Draf.tB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES~i-~SR8-.3-.~ismodifiedby4'-Ne4esa;:,NoteYwh)ch'Peti'tej.".':,.:,th'ib0dataareinaccurate.Atlowerpowerlevels,calorimetricTheFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.TogetherthesefactorsdemonstratethechangeintheabsolutedifferencebetweenNISandheatbalancecalculatedpowersrarelyexceeds2%inany24hourperiod.Inaddition,controlroomoperatorsperiodicallymonitorredundantindicationsandalarmstodetectdeviationsinchanneloutputs.SR3.3.1.3ThisSRcomparestheincoresystemtotheNISchanneloutputevery31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).Iftheabsolutedifferenceisz3%,theNISchannelisstillOPERABLE,butmustbereadjusted..IftheNISchannelcannotbeproperlyreadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoverifythef(aI)inputtotheever4eaperatureOvg'i,',;temp&i.'.;SttJgVaT$une4+enWdvF~'~~Y~~Q',.un.c.:,:i.oM~ew44rh~9(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-88DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.3(continued)ThisSRismodifiedby4hree'tw8Notes.Note1-ar-iNs,.a...i,i:,a+$pettnnmnnco"."',:."'of...":,.",:SR:."-'3~3,:,'ll:";::,i:,::iit$sfioi!'tlit,,sjSo,Rico'>neoi*'1,,s',<ln'3!m01,'"nprehend-i~4e&TheFrequencyofevery31EFPDisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.Also,theslowchangesinneutronfluxduringthefuelcyclecanbedetectedduringthisinterval.SR3.3.1.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISoftheRTB,andtheRTBUndervoltageandShunt'ripMechanisms.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.Thetestshallincludeseparateveri,ficationoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsexceptforthebypassbreakerswhichdonotrequireseparateverificationsincenocapabilityisprovidedforperformingsuchatestatpower.TheindependenttestforbypassbreakersisincludedinSR3-.3-.4448~!3'::.';l1::.However,thebypassbreakertestshallincludealocalshunttrip.'h'its:testmustbeperformedonthebypassbreakerpriortoplacingitinservicetotaketheplaceofaRTP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-89DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESTheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,considering,instrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-90DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.5'ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTESTontheRTSAutomaticTrip,Logicevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.Thetrainbeingtestedisplacedinthebypasscondition,thuspreventinginadvertentactuation.Allpossiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.TheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.1.6ThisSRisacalibrationoftheexcorechannelstotheincorechannelsevery92EFPD.Ifthemeasurementsdonotagree,theexcorechannelsare.stillOPERABLEbutmustbecalibratedtoagreewiththeincoredetectormeasurements.Iftheexcorechannelscannotbeadjusted,thechannelsarethendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoiiif(I)i<<iaTFunction.M%&iNNMMokiir>Nk'~BMSR~+-.6-hasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERisz50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92EFPD.TheFrequencyof92EFPDisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-91DraftB RTSInstrumentationB.3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.7I!i'!iiiiiiii!!!!I!!!'0!dforthefollowingRTSfunctions:oPowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;~SourceRangeNeutronFlux(inMODE3,4,or5with~OvertemperatureaT;~OverpowerpT;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressurizer-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);and~SGWaterLevel-LowLowACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.Setpointsmustbewithinthe~'7!!ii!,!!!",!,,t,,:,,::,~P!TW!~3:::"",3',:::!!'!!.!!usedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3:3-92DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.3.1.7(continued)REOUIREHENTS'l45."..SRB-.B-.IW"ismodifiedbyaNotethatprovidesa4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillanceforsourcerangeinstrumentationwhenenteringHODE3fromHODE2.ThisNoteallowsanormalshutdowntoproceedwithoutadelayfortestinginHODE2andforashorttimeinHODE,3untiltheRTBsareopenandSR3.3.1.7isnolongerrequiredtobeperformed.IftheplantisinHODE3withtheRTBsclosedforgreaterthan4hours,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin4hoursafterentryintoHODE3.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithReference499.SR3.3.1.8ThisSRisthe'performanceofaCOTasdescribedinSR3.3,1.7forthePowerRangeNeutron,Flux-Low,IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,andSourceRangeNeutronFlux@NODE~!gf,:,exceptthatthistestalsoincludesverif~i~cwaŽtionthattheP-6andP-10interlocksareinthrequiredstatefortheexistingplantcondition.ismodifiedbytwoNotesthatprovidea4hourdelay'intherequirementtoperformthissurveillance.TheseNotesallowanormalshutdowntobecompletedandtheplantremovedfromtheHODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillancewithoutadelaytoperformthetestingrequiredbythissurveillance.TheFrequencyofevery92daysd~eg5EsappliesiftheplantremainsintheNODEofApplicabilityaftertheinitialperformancesofpriortoreactorstartupand4hoursafterreducingpowerbelowP-10orP-6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-93Draft8 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.3.1.8(continued)TheHODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillanceis<P-10forthepowerrangelowandintermediaterangechannelsand<P-6fortheSourcerangechannels.OncetheplantisinNODE3,thissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.Ifpoweristobemaintained<P-10or<P-6formorethan4hours,thenthetestingrequiredbythissurveillancemustbeperformedpriortotheexpirationofthe4hourlimit.FourhoursisareasonabletimetocompletetherequiredtestingorplacetheplantinaHODEwherethissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.ThistestensuresthattheNISsource,intermediate,andpowerrangelowchannelsareOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalandafterreducingpowerintotheapplicableHODE(<P-10or<P-6)forperiods>4hours.SR3.3.1.9ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTfortheUnderyoltage-Bus11Aand11Ba'n'dgUn'de'r'free'Gin'cj,'.-:,:-,,Bu'i'll!1A'2daysisconsistentwiA7Reference409'.~'~SR~~~ismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTAOOT.SincethisSRappliestoBus11Aand11Bundervoltage:an'd:::::.",::un'de'rhfre'Auencytrelays,setpointverificationrequireselaborate'b'ench"cal"i'brationandisaccomplishedduringtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequiredbySR3.3.1.10.SR3.3.1.10ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthefollowingRTSFunctions:~-Hag~')PowerRangeNeutronFlux;PO~A+AM~4lst-+t~~~%~M'lc(O~hIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;~SourceRangeNeutronFlux;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-94DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-95DraftB RTSInstrumentation83'.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3:1.10(continued)~Oyerte~m.ei.stere!"oui:Ov'er'pos'erihT'~i~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~Ud'::%i'lit'iiiieilAd1lB;~'n~iiode'rare'jiieiicy;"::-,"".'iB'us:!11A,:..,.eod('::1)18,:;":SGWaterLevel-LowLow;and~TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure.::,;.::;:a~'dPw(CScv,e:wRestcorTrpb'::"S:.ysteiii:,::1st'e'rIocks;.CHANNELCALIBRATIONSmustbeperformedconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheplantspecificsetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionof24monthcalibrationintervalsinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.~K>>m~~~~~TiwetMK~~=X<~iO.c.x.k,~.t~+~+'stN<e;CCAsyP,pA-.rO~aC~t~.ttt~m~~P-~~~~+d-i~~~.t~b~<<0~S&:)39.tyt~p4~t~KO~stuti9w~w~<yR~SR'VV'~'Q0>~~COdd~bxwimctckgjut~~MtJtme<~~Mo.v,n&,,~iris.,t(G.~~bd~JJ~-i~i~'p(o~~~.<<~~Wk;,,~~~y~p~,~>~~q~~,~~(continued)s'tV>~VV-tMi'44Ceu.~A.Ssir.sR.E:GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-96DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-97DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESSR3.3.1.10(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS-.~;SR3-.3-.4-.10-ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthepowerrangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofanormalizationofthedetectorsbasedonapowercalorimetricandfluxmapperformedabove50%RTP.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestothemanufacturer'sdata.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredfortheNISpowerrangedetectorsforentryintoNODE2or1,andisnotrequiredfortheNISintermediaterangedetectorsforentryintoNODE2,becausetheplantmustbeinatleastNODE2toperformthetestfortheintermediaterangedetectorsandNODE1forthepowerrangedetectors.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringap]antoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedonthe24monthFrequency.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-98DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSR3.3.1.11AOCW~Ar~l~ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheHanualReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,andtheSIInputfromESFAStripFunctions~~'4-.'44~mWa4Kk-;::Furi@i.in's..ThisindependentlyverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsfortheHanualReactorTripFunctionfortheReactorTripBreakersandReactorTripBypassBreakers.The-ReactorTrip-Bypass-Breaker-test-shal-1-include-testing-of-the-undervoltageTheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliability,oftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOTbecausetheFunctionsaffectedhavenosetpointsassociatedwiththem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-99DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES+('e,'iijtj'nu;e,d:)";:vXCSNYACbsvhVMXYh'A%vNRVEIL'fANC8SR3.3.1.12REWiRkiiEN'TSThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTforTurbineTripFunctionswhichisperformedpriortoreactorstartupg1%P!ig()QTheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthathei;;to'wed;.::,fbY;,:.'~the,'0~)Silrv'eilail,:ance.PerformanceofthistestwillensurethattheturbinetripFunctionisOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalbecausethistestcannotbeperformedwiththereactoratpower.s(S,Z>,t3~0.ic+Nq.>-r'-grwgo,~<Q--Mc9-:,~'>.i~.gXh~~RA'..f44lh1~>%$OO~~r4g~~K~~'g~(~~g~>>J.1cs>8.5+4,w~%r~Agv,g~~H4)y,i()pp,rg~~'<.,~~44a.s,'v~.s>~w~~~~+~g~~~~~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83,3-100DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESREFEREE'ESe+n4-k~eeper-aN~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-101DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1IBASES6864R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-102DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-103DraftB RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-104DraftB

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR100.3..AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.UFSAR,Chapter7.5.UFSAR,Chapter6.6.UFSAR,Chapter15.7.IEEE-279-1971.8.RG&EEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)5126,"Guidelinesfor.InstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.9.40-.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990.gglgVP@)gwghVWhp)1'QVh++pQ~)lg.++A)~~lAVPgAIQ@IAWAQPggh'pPQQ~WJ'$R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-105DraftB RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1<pLa14InsttIIaaotSITnaIptocss~Coattol5pcotactlooSISIISoaonIIIIIII II II.8Iaotosatlc~---htn~I2/4ISignalpxocossControl5pcstoatlasETnllnasntSsactocTclpSsltchysacIlI/aIIIIIIIKanoatTanctloaI/aSltaohPsoosssControlattotactlonSaolysantSaactocTclpS&tchToaxhlpaoaLTSWahdshoatITICSachs'oatepp~StoatTripxastaalmsschanlsaSSpaaaSTSScaanshoatTclpSsohanlao1tahsIpaasnbaaIII-Teats<Q120VhCPosseSsatoa+antosatlcTslpLoTlcIQ125vnccoastSoaccsFigureB3.3.1-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-106DraftB B;:";3'::3;.::.!i:.;;:;INSISTRUNEAST!IDNHAS.ESii!'::i!::::!':::::i,::,:,::::;:,::::.,'-.:::::.:,-::.':we-mern:..::--;--:--'--:--":"':"eew:":"..';:.':.:,<<,.:,e::.:":.",-,:m:,::::.:::.".:::.;;w.:.-:::.:.::,eeeewwwwmeem4!'w-'"L-"i'i,","ww""""'""'-"';".""""""'ewe'"iw'"""'""'-""'-""""'-'-"""'""-"'"""'-""'"'%"""';4wwwwwt'8AC'I'GRiitLRD~~::::::::::;::,:::!:,;::,j::::,:::::lhtoiiii~c~fiidiimgr,;if'1&b~kum,':,'::(A'1F},,iC0C;::,;:!15'i::::(Rm'f.hoW~aa'..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-107DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-108DraftB e ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES.1)requiresthatprotectionsystemsbeprovidedforsensingaccidentsituationsandinitiatingtheoperationofnecessaryengineeredsafetyfeatures.TheESFASinitiatesnecessarysafetysystems,basedonthevaluesofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingcoredesignlimitsandtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundary,andtomitigateaccidents.TheESFASinstrumentationissegmentedintotwodistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.2):~Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;and~Signalprocessingequipment.Thesemodulesarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Inmanycases,fieldtransmittersorsensorsthatinputtotheESFASaresharedwiththeReactorTripSystem(RTS).Toaccountforcalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.These(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-109DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESstatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-110DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessinEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovides'ignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter6(Ref.3),Chapter7(Ref.2),andChapter15(Ref.4).Ifthemeasured,valueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefieldtransmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Ifonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresult.inapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecond'channelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-two.logic.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.5).TheactuationofESFcomponentsisaccomplishedthroughmasterandslaverelays.Theprotectionsystemenergizesthemasterrelaysappropriatefortheconditionoftheplant.Eachmasterrelaythenenergizesoneormoreslaverelays,whichthencauseactuationoftheenddevices.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-111Draft8

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALLCO,ANDAPPLICABILIEachoftheanalyzedaccidentscanbedetectedbyoneorYSES,moreESFASFunctions.OneoftheESFASFunctionsistheprimaryactuationsignalforthataccident.AnESFASTYFunctionmaybetheprimaryactuationsignalformorethanonetypeofaccident.AnESFASFunctionmayalsobeasecondary,orbackup,actuationsignalforoneormoreotherid.Fp1,l4't!,.-',f,,ii';""ll:*"':Pressure-Lowisaprimaryactuationsignal"'forsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents(LOCAs)andabackupactuationsignalforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)outsidecontainment.Functionssuchasmanualinitiation,notspecificallycreditedintheaccidentsafetyanalysis,arequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheseFunctionsmayalsoserveasbackepsi77tiFi:p'ator'j'i't)orgy:toFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentana'lysis(Ref.4).ThisLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganESFASFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeorfourchannelsineachinstrumentationfunctionandtwochannelsineachlogicandmanualinitiationfunction.Thetwo-out-of-threeandthetwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausinganESFASinitiation.TwologicormanualinitiationchannelsarerequiredtoensurenosinglefailuredisablestheESFAS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-ll2DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachESFASFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.2-1.IncludedonTable3.3.2-1areAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforallapplicableESFASFunctions.SetpointsinaccordancewiththeAllowableValueensurethattheconsequencesofDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)willbeacceptable,providingtheplantisoperatedwithintheLCOs,includinganyRequiredActionsthatareineffectattheonsetoftheDBAandtheequipmentfunctionsasdesigned.TheTripSetpointsarethenemmWl;:imNin'gvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracy.TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences2,3,and4.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,andinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.2-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimits(i.e.,AllowableValues)usedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference6.IfthemeasuredsetpointexceedstheTripSetpointValue,thebistableisconsideredOPERABLEunlesstheAllowableValueasspecifiedinplantproceduresisexceeded.Pi:.:Th','","Al~4%abje,.':.:::";9/1'u'e'j'sp)e)fjiii.'a:.':.'j",'s'."::s.'heTrip.SetpointsandAllowableValueslistedinTable3.3.2-1havebeenconfirmedbasedonthemethodologydescribedinReference6,whichincorporatesalloftheknownuncertaintiesapplicableforeachchannel.ThemagnitudesoftheseuncertaintiesarefactoredintothedeterminationofeachTripSetpoint.Allfieldsensorsandsignalprocessingequipmentforthesechannelsareassumedtooperatewithintheallowancesoftheseuncertaintymagnitudes.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-113DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TherequiredchannelsofESFASinstrumentationprovideplantprotectionintheeventofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents.ESFASprotectionfunctionsprovidedinTable3.3.2-1areasfollows:1.SafetIn'ectionSafetyInjection(SI)providestwoprimaryfunctions:1.Primarysidewateradditiontoensuremaintenanceorrecoveryofreactorvesselwaterlevel(coverageoftheactivefuelforheatremoval,cladintegrity,andforlimitingpeakcladtemperatureto<2200F);and2,BorationtoensurerecoveryandmaintenanceofSDH(k,<1.0).Thesefunctionsarenecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofhighenergylinebreaks(HELBs)bothinsideandoutsideofcontainment.TheSIsignalisalsousedtoinitiateotherFunctionssuchas:ContainmentIsolation;ContainmentVentilationIsolation;ReactorTrip;FeedwaterIsolation;andStartofmotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-114DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY1.SafetIn'ection(continued)Theseotherfunctionsensure:Isolationofnonessentialsystemsthroughcontainmentpenetrations;Tripofthereactortolimitpowergeneration;Isolationofmainfeedwater(NFW)tolimitsecondarysidemasslosses;andStartofAFWtoensuresecondarysidecoolingcapability.aeSafetInitiationThisLCOrequiresonechannelpertraintobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3.IntheseNODES,thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems,TheoperatorcaninitiateSIatanytimebyusingeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentswiththeexceptionofContainmentIsolationandContainmentVentilationIsolation,TheLCOfortheNanualInitiationFunctionensurestheproperamountofredundancyismaintainedinthemanualESFASactuationcircuitrytoensuretheoperatorhasmanualESFASinitiationcapability.Eachchannelconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogiccabinet.Eachpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.Thisconfigurationdoesnotallowtestingatpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-115DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE'SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY.'1.<<,":"<<<<'<<t<i<Q<<<<>+8>fjh</<$~'<<:j.Initiation(continued)"""""'""""""""""'""""""""ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES4,5,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.<Aul~~qhw<<y<wvF<~'<<~t<<<<~~+rPys'<<'<<yqyr<<<<<y~<<~g~+~~~wODE<'~~rc+m5r<wvrc~l-;,ofithwmept<';;;;-jeniila'jon!;-I'~so,-~'a".i'o44<vXvA'.v@Ãv>YN'~<4x4RcNMQ:NrNM>4K'<<<<<wv5%4<<vwNNA'c't<uati'o'n,.:"Rel:a":s'"""""""'""""""""""-'uff<ic'ientenergy'"i'n"theprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES4-,5-,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwise(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,3-116DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESpreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.l(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-.117,hDraft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABILITYc.Safet~y.)t>~,~C,q.,t>y~~'~y~yvt~Pr.vPc~xcq~v&Rc~offv~gSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLBinsidecontainment;~LOCA;and~Feedlinebreakinsidecontainment.ContainmentPressure-Highprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogic.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassing~thi!ough;containmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,thehighpressureFunctionwillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and-3~an'd>':,4becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipebreak.InMODES4-,5-,and6,ContainmentPressure-HighisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainment.d.Safet~..).:.A~.".~>y".~:AN?N<NNA'<46+%%%%.%~%%.NI'n':"ect'Won~-'..':!Pr'es's'Qrs:z'er'.:,':.':Pre'ssur'et='fYoThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~Inadvertentopeningofasteamgenerator(SG)atmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-118DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES~SLB)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-119DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLEt4QSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.Safet(continued)Iti"'e'cti'o'n.-'..!Pre'ss'ul'".:iz'e'r;;:!PKe'ss0r'e'::;.':,'.;to'w~Rodclustercontrolassemblyejectionaccidents(rodejection);Inadvertentopeningofapressurizerrelieforsafetyvalve;~LOCAs;and~SGTubeRupture.Sincetherearededicatedprotectionandcontrol,.channels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.Thetransmittersarelocatedinsidecontainment,withthetapsinthevaporspaceregionofthepressurizer,andthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(LOCA,SLBinsidecontainment,rodejection).Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)tomitigatetheconsequencesofanHELBinsidecontainment.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint.AutomaticSIactuationbelowthisinterlocksetpointisperformedbytheContainmentPressure-Highsignal.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE3belowthePressurizerPressureinterlocksetpoint.OtherESFfunctionsareusedtodetectaccidentconditionsandactuatetheESFsystemsinthisMODE.InMODES4,5,and6,thisFunctionisnotneededforaccidentdetectionandmitigation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-120DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLEe.SafetIn::ec:t':i"ont4S't'e'amLinewPiessure'.-".,LoMSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)SteamLinePressure-Lowprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:SLB;Feedlinebreak;andInadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforanSGsafetyvalve.Steamlinepressuretransmittersprovidecontrolinput,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsoneachsteamlinearesufficienttosatisfytheprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogiconeachsteamline.~tu'nest'1"a'n~foi"'.',:,'the"'pu'i:"jojei',,o'fl'",":i,"'h':i';'si~'L7C'05WiththetransmitterslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringasecondarysidebreak.Therefore,theTrip'etpointreflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-121DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-122DraftB , ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.~5ft*'"'*:':i'""ll::::,8":',::""""':.ll-:!!Li"'"""""""""""""""""(continued),SteamLinePressure-LowmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)whenasecon'darysidebreakorstuckopenSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvecouldresultintherapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint.Belowtheinterlocksetpoint,igfeedlinebreakisnotaconcern.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE4,5,or6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttocauseanaccident.2.ContainmentSraCSCSprovidesthreeprimaryfunctions:1.LowerscontainmentpressureandtemperatureafteranHELBincontainment;2.Reducestheamountofradioactiveiodineinthecontainmentatmosphere;and3.AdjuststhepHofthewaterincontainmentsumpBafteralargebreakLOCA.Thesefunctionsarenecessaryto:Ensurethepressureboundaryintegrityofthecontainmentstructure;Limitthereleaseofradioactiveiodinetotheenvironmentintheeventofafailureofthecontainmentstructure;andMinimizecorrosionofthecomponentsandsystemsinsidecontainmentfollowingaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-123DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE2.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYCS(continued)CSisactuatedmanuallyorbyContainmentPressure-HighHigh.TheCSactuationsignalstartstheCSpumpsandalignsthedischargeofthepumpstotheCSnozzleheadersintheupperlevelsofcontainment.WaterisinitiallydrawnfromtheRWSTbytheCSpumpsandmixedwithasodiumhydroxidesolutionfromthesprayadditivetank.Duringtherecirculationphaseofaccidentrecovery,thespraypumpsuctionsaremanuallyshiftedtocontainmentsumpBifcontinuedCSisrequired,a~CSWa~6S'::-'.".Han0al)InitiationTheoperatorcaninitiateCSatanytimefromthecontrolroombysimultaneouslydepressingtwoCSactuationpushbuttons.Becauseaninadvertent'ctuationofCScouldhaveseriousconsequences,twopushbuttonsmustbesimultaneouslydepressed'oinitiatebothtrainsofCS.i<'i':.,ls'Rkb'o'th'":t'ra'in".s'<<'o'f.;:'ma'nu'a'1;:"::::!5':r'i,i':,t'.:ia't'::i~ii'8"!"-""$"'"-"'I:ManualinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityand.consequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-124DraftB 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.C.CS'O'Autom'atioActuationLoicandAe4ua4eA'ct'u'ast':icons~RelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,3,and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InHODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseHODES.InHODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.Q&4eehelenen4CS-.'.,:::C'panta'i'nhTean73Pressure-Hi<iHhHihThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainment,Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassing4hrvVhroujhcontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainment.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsand'theTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.Thisistheonly~ESPA'Sii'Functionthatrequiresthebistableoutputtoenergizetoperformitsrequiredaction.ItisnotdesirabletohavealossofpoweractuateCS,sincetheconsequences(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-125DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESofaninadvertentactuationofCScouldbeserious.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-126DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES)LCO,andAPPLICABILITYC.(continued)sGSi:-:::GoWt'aW'iiienhPressure-Hi<iHhHihTheContainmentPressure-HighHighinstrumentfunctionconsistsoftwosetswiththreechannelsineachset.Eachsetisatwo-out-of-threelogicwheretheoutputsarecombinedsothatbothsetstriedinitiatesCS.'6)ch;:!~seC;':-.:iiconte'id'ercediia::::,::s'spar'at'e,';:funLti'on",.:":.:or'ith'el!purpose's:'oPeth'is:':;:;:LCQ:,i'~PS'incaconCainiiientpressureisnotusedforco~ntrol,thisarrangementexceedstheminimumredundancyrequirements.AdditionalredundancyiswarrantedbecausethisFunctionisenergizetotrip.ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.3.ContainmentIsolationContainmentIsolationprovidesisolationofthecontainmentatmosphere,andselectedprocesssystemsthatpenetratecontainment,fromtheenvironment.ThisFunctionisnecessarytopreventorlimitthereleaseofradioactivitytotheenvironmentintheeventofaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83,3-127DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.ContainmentIsolation(continued)ContainmentIsolationsignalsisolateallautomaticallyisolatableprocesslines,exceptfeedwaterlines,mainsteamlines,andcomponentcoolingwater(CCW).Themainfeedwaterandsteamlinesareisolatedbyotherfunctionssinceforcedcirculationcoolingusingthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andSGsisthepreferred(butnotrequired)methodofdecayheatremoval.SinceCCWisrequiredtosupportRCPoperation,notisolatingCCWenhancesplantsafetybyallowingoperatorstouseforcedRCScirculationtocooltheplant.IsolatingCCWmayleech'ij(is:i';6'heuseoffeedandbleedcooling,whichcouldprovemoredifficulttocontrol.a~Containment4ee&M+rNs'olat::.ion"':;-.';!Ha'n'u'a'll:::";'I'ni:6%t'i'oriHanualContainmentIsolationisactuatedbyeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.Eitherpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationalsoactuatesContainmentVentilationIsolation.HanualinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InHODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateuni-tel."ant!conditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-128DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.Containment'IYo'le'os:.'-'.":AYtomati8ActuationLoicandActuation"R'ela""s"""""""""""'"""""'ctuationlogi,cconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InHODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyin.theprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateea-i4PI'i're'onditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.c.Containment~In'ectionContainmentIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatautomaticallyinitiateSI.TheContainmentIsolationrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingFunctionsandrequirements.4.SteamLineIsolationIsolationofthemainsteamlinesprovidesprotectionintheeventofanSLBinsideoroutsidecontainment.Closureofthemainsteamisolationvalves(HSIVs)andthejr~assoc'>~ate'Pnon-returncheckvalves1imitstheaccid'enttotheblowdownfromonlytheaffectedSG.ForaReSLBdownstreamoftheHSIVs,closureoftheHSIVsterminatestheaccidentassoonasthesteamlinesdepressurize.SteamLineIsolationalsomitigatestheeffectsofafeedlinebreakandensures(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-129DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESasourceofsteamfortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpduringafeedlinebreak.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-130DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)GDa~b.SteamLine4+e&A+8-Maaua@so'ltati'oun!-."'.:;f4anON3InitiationManualinitiationofSteamLineIsolationcanbeaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.Therearetwoactuationdevices(onepushbuttonandoneswitch)onthemaincontrolboardforeachMSIV.EachdevicecaninitiateactiontoimmediatelycloseitsrespectiveHSIV.TheLCOrequiresonechannel(device)perlooptobeOPERABLE.@,,::Ea'ch:a'>uoa+uta.',:o>~a~.<.Au.'~Au'>ny:."<':>tuna'u>n>agaa<n>'aPua>nun>>no't<nu>ya'taun>t>>>x"w>':"0)"""sN"lm;"i'oop~:,i':',s'k't'ai."',~co'n's~'aer'ea";:,a:,',::Lsejiay';aiegfunctjiii':::,:::,silence:'h""":,',;,""';v,,'"'<~,,',,a.,'a:$""::..'l,'o,".;tere',:,:'::.'~$':,o':I:.V,:tonne<':..redUiJ;,ea,;:.,er:::;.:.::Idoo.'"..ManualinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofsignificantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.SteamLineLocpicandActuationAe'la"sActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-131DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.C.SteamLine~LoicandActuationRelas(continued)AutomaticinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseof-significantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.SteamLine'I's'o'l.':ahioon'-.".'.Co'tia'inm'eontMProe"s"sur'e"."-:.HV"8ThisFunctionactuatesclosureofbothMSIVsintheeventofaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainmenttomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsidecontainmentwiththesensinglinespassing@broth'vgiu'ghcontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditions,andtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighHighprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.3-132DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLEc.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYSteamLine4'Pi."e's's'Ore'."-'-.".':;Hi"'hw"H'i'h"""(coiitinued)ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3,becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidetopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipebreak.Thiswouldcauseasignificantincreaseinthecontainmentpressure,thusallowingdetectionandclosureoftheHSIVs.ThesteamlineisolationFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6thesteamlineisolationFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisnotenoughenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidestopressurizethecontainmenttotheContainmentPressure-HighHighsetpoint.d.SteamLine4'I'hsol'gati':aii'.-"..'Hi'SteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWith-LeWg.".ei'-':.::L'::OWaThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheHSIVsduringanSLBorinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvetomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Twosteam'lineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehighsteam,flowinonesteamline.::Earth:'ij!'l7,'":::;::!iliaii,:iceid~iii'-,,:,:,--p"--,:!!F:,-:-::::i:,":Lif,::::th,::,::p'ui;"p'ose",;.;:"of;.':::th)~s~lCO'.:,"::',':.,"",.'The-s'teamflow'transmitters"prov*idecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthatthefunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.Theone-out-of-twoconfigurationallowsonline(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-133DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASEStestingbecausetripofonehighsteamflowchannelisnotsufficienttocauseinitiation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-134DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SteamLine'disco:lent';:io~n':.::-.".ffi:SteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWith~T:"-.,-'..'.!doei(continued)Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainment,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointsreflectbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThemainsteamlineisolatesonlyifthehighsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIandlowRCSaveragetemperature.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.TwochannelsofT,,perlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Fachr'l:orlop;:,".-.A.::.,c'ojisi'di.iedei!seppY'eie'@Furicteon'.":;:.!foe':;jthe'ti'pui:po'iiiiioti4h"'4'LCO""""':"ThTco"h'"""bi=d'""'"logicsuchthatanytwoofthefourT,,channelstrippedinconjunctionwithSIandoneofthetwohighsteamlineflowchannelstrippedcausesisolationofthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamlineflowchannels.TheaccidentsthatthisFunctionprotectsagainstcausereductionofT,,intheentireprimarysystem.Therefore,theprovisionoftwoOPERABLEchannelsperloopinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationensuresnosinglefailuredisablestheT,,-LowFunction.TheT.,channelsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore;additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-135DraftB ESFASInstrumentation'3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE(i~',)SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.e.SteamLine4ee&&eIs'o1:i'ti'on:.-"'."Hi-'8SteamFlowCoincident-WithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithW~~T:--i:-".'."'oue.(continued)ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,and3whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activat'ed.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.SteamLine4eAeMe'I's'o'l."a'6~orV,-:.::..AT77HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionThisFunction,providesclosureoftheHSIVsduringasteamlinebreak(orinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve)tomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andto'limitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.(4$TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehigh-highsteamflowinonesteamline.Each'~steam",,-"1:.:ine;,::lac'o'ns.:::ideaed";',;a~';sdp'a'rate.;:.';;:Junc%i'ouicontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-136DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES)LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.SteamLine4ee&M~Is'ol::atio'n'.-',.".Ai,"h.HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ection(continued)Themainsteamlinesisolateonlyifthehigh-highsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIsignal.Steamlineisolationoccursonlyforthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamflowchannels.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines,TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIV'sareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-137DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)S.FeedwaterIsolationTheprimaryfunctionoftheFeedwaterIsolationsignalsistopreventandmitigatetheeffectsofhighwaterlevelintheSGswhichcouldcausecarryoverofwaterintothesteamlinesandresultinexcessivecooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSGhighwaterlevelisduetoexcessivefeedwaterflows.ThisFunctionisactuatedbyeitheraSGWaterLevel-Highorby-anSIsignal.TheFunctionprovidesfeedwaterisolationbyclosingtheHFRAPa)n";:iFeeChatekR'egiila6',ng,;:::Vil;ves'.",.",:;.':'(MFRAgandtheassociatedbyp'ass"isautomaticallystarted,andtheMFWpumpbreakersareopenedwhichclosestheMFWpumpdischargevalves.TheSIsignalwasdiscussedpreviously.dI::ll"ti':-:\l(i!K"'"tii*-'ctuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofall.circuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallNFRVsandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theMFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-138DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b..FeedwaterGeneratorWaterLTevel!':~Hi"'hTheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-HighFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallMa+aSFRVgandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstexcessivefeedwaterflow.TheESFASSGwaterlevelinstrumentshavededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.Watt'ernLevel-Big'h'isapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.c~FeedwaterWe&4-i-e~Inection'Ieet-'ej$eep~'oeeeeh~gN~jj+YtekTheSafetyInjectionFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2d3,111II'A~VakvmPF'AV,'s:.andassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-139Draft8

ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFELCO,c.FeedwaterIn'ection)'jTYANALYSES,~t'ai'Aii;,"',",!iii~!,";::;:;:;::,::::","i:,:',if!:!('u'eiiti'r'jued),:andAPPLICABILITY~~Y'<Functsthatsnit'iate"S'I""""Th"e"FeeedwmaterIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.InsteadFunction1,SI,isreferencedforallinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliarFeedwaterTheAFWSystemisdesignedtoprovideasecondarysideheatsinkforthereactorintheeventthattheHFWSystemisnotavailable.Thejr'e(ei'.;:i",;ed;,':~systemhastwomotordrivenpumpsandaturbined'riveenpump,makingitavailableduringnormalplantoperation,duringalossofACpower,alossofNFW,andduringaFeedwaterSystempipebreak(dependingonbreakth%:~eV'ent:-:.>f;h'e-"jiefemrr3di'SAcondensatestoragetank(CST)whichisnotsafetyrelated.UponalowlevelintheCSTtheoperatorscanmanuallyrealignthepumpsuctionstotheServiceWater(SW)SystemwhichisthesafetyrelatedwaterIhAtllm,'I,:,,iii:!4m'i'i!ii'fVivid::,,'1*::t"-!diiui',:,:ll':i!i:"*thiSFAIPSt~e.em'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-140DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESpl*ia.nmA~ev-,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-141DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES:gage,'gsegnse>.e~.:~x~vgsg+e>,axe,<.,gypsqse?.e.~~exe',y,,o>e.cw?~,,se'A'u'Xi'::i:abr'-,:!i"..':eedWsai'er-:..':.'.Aanu'a"i!;:,':::::in:(~i:ati'Onb'y'!'in'sl'n'j'>>j'i'i'~hbbbtesn's!",:."nl'n'..":.:!tlI'e.":,:,.:He'i'n!i'C'e'n't'i',n:::'ib'n'e'i'ct,orat.:i,ojof~Th'.i;:sjact'3'oj.::,"P3,'":f,'".I,::-".::::cjQjjxeS)pr...(%ATE'ne$Sebcxn,:(e,,npnes+YQ...?$?%pe)esbe+g'nSD?bees7!e'spect;:,i;Ye',':i":pOmlPK~M'6~+88..-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-142DraftB CREAKOPAD6uStaohInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESCURVE)3,:L~gCfkl....':::-':-KN~~';-"S=;'3';"j~"4REUIRENEN,::$.nstr'umeh't:-!r'e'1:i"abl!l"..:itj::".::,"'and.',.bop'e~r'at)'ng:::'-,e'x'per",',REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-clviDraftB

ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPP44QAB4CI~.'ii,ji'ch4ystem'.:to,";:bi~OPKReABLE.:::.,iVi4NDDESt'o'",;:,'mau'ua'II1'y.;pic'acct'e'itheir"'-.:;":a'y'at'e')i',.,ii'i-,;'op'ei!'etio'ii.';-"ifb'i'j:;;;,Fuutciou'!.i':atj'bio't",:,i':,.e"bb'e!iap',.."'::ill'e'i'ie'tiiaat'e'dimii':::ith'ii::,':;:::;i'.;ea'C't'Or'~<t'0'::;.'i',ii""tl'iiiebttlie",::";.iK'GSgender!A5tu'at%'ocn-":Ree'1a"s""""'"'"'"""-""'"""""""""""'-'"""""')'thin'l,':,th',,",ac'tuatl".o.,::",,.:j'ub'sj)t'em's";",,",in'cl'udNj'--.:::,;;thb'e"Iiil'i,tiat'ippalp;"1e'"a':"y.:'cotua'Cte'>i"."e'sp'I'i'ii$ji,'"bi'eI'::ti'i'ija'ctua'et>iIgi:,thb'~E$F:.",ejumpuT'cute(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-144DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESgy~xgcc@y~~Py,;P,P>c;~.1~~'yrr~gm'xt~ggre~g~ihfii,:;:;8G's",,'JjH,Q.OE.:OPERA'8f.":E,',,".",bi",iai)'i'i,',:ti'i),,:"xiii'ii'utilj:,';":pl,'a'ijTh'js:;;,F,,:o"nc'4':i';o'n',.':,",i".s>HODES,be'ii'j~,,:',"'ge'n'i'j:at'ed;:::;':i."'n:3Qg~jwf~gfo,~~t~~St~~~G~~~~~j~<.'cQ~c"x~~ileve'l~~:-':.;Low."l',oQou'tsideof'ontainment,oralossofHFW,wouldresultinalossofSGwaterlevel.SGWaterLevel-LowLowineitherSGwillcausebothmotordrivenAFWpumpstostart.Thesystemisalignedsothatuponastartofthepump,waterimmediatelybeginstoflowtotheSGs.SGWaterLevel-LowLowinbothSGswillcausetheturbinedrivenpump.tostart.InHODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-145DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPAL'ICABIJlj,'SA'F/'.:;":,:AQLYs'ES';:;:.".:,';::;,:':::,::;:.;::::.::,,;:;:;::.;:::.:,:::,:,:-.!L'iiviiV:=:::lLiYitWL+Ki:.:,;,gj'ol43WaterLevel-'LowLowisapercent'ofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainmentandthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(feedlinebreak),theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-146DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESd.Auxiliar~InectionhQ~adTheSIfunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGs'saheatsink.AnSIsignalstartsthemotordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWpumps.TheAFWinitiationfunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsand,requirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-147DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES:.'uxi'1'-:i:ar:,':,~Feedwakei".;:-".,::T."i"'::;Of'F~Bath::::::Ha'i'e'e'dw'atej"'atch'od:"-:::if~ide'c'shyeo'a~ti'%o'd..'-':;is'its'ih1!eiilhoe'e'tjramaoualfipositionsensingdevice.Anopensupplybreakerindicatesthatthepumpisnotrunning.TwoOPERABLEchannelsperAANNpumpsatisfyredundancyrequirementswitfitwo-out-of-two1opic,(jyKa'cht'I'eFII::.":;:pu'mp,,:;:."!ps,'c'o'u'san;Ie!ed~<a'.:::Separate'Fuse'tiouiif'or'liekji'ur'po's'e::::."of.:.:th'isjL'CO'iA"tripofhotchHF!Tpumpsstartrsbothm~otortri'venAFWpumpstoensurethatatleastoneSGisavailablewithwatertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-149DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSA'<>lY':"':,::::Alglli'fSisW~!i!'.-:,:iiiii~iii:,'-!ilia":*,i!p:-----"'::ll'<--,-'--->I:'-'"."'>>withwatertoserveastheheatsinktoremovereactordecayheatandsensibleheatintheeventofanaccident.InHODES3,4,5,and6theHFWpumpsarenotinoperation,andthuspumptripisnotindicativeofaconditionrequiringautomaticAFWinitiation.ACTIONSN>~><'"@%%%%4%m~~KRSNMTheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.2-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.AsshownonFigureB3.3.2-1,theESFASiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticActuationLogic.Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrument,lossof120VACinstrumentbuspowerorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothESFAStrains.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheHanualESFASandAutomaticActuationLogicFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis.TheAutomaticActuationLogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystem,includingthemasterrelays,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-150DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESslaverelays,andinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactivatingtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-151DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES~~.fC'NIGHTcoyd5it3on:!A~ip~1Fes.':-:.:0'o',:;:::ifl%EsFAs~i:pviteitfogkr~u'nit)'ijii:.:RequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-152DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESenterediftheESFASfunctionisapplicableinthecurrentMODEofoperation.B.lCondition-~VBappliestothe~ZfVE~~ZFdhSFu~~-'Fr4ivhF~W.,-,':!Tr>pofBothWFWputappLu'ups<.'::-:.:Ifachanneler-4r.~Risinoperable,48~~hoursisallowedo~~ERARLE~fhespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsidering~:!',:::thol!'avaiilafi'eire'du'ndawncy,andthelowproailityofanevehoccurringduringthis'interval.-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-153DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES6-74m%(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-154DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESToachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreach,'GD.E;:::3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-155DraftB ESfASInstrumentationB3.3<<2BASES',O'TALONS::,',jj:coni'sn<<u'ei:.:'N.NQ%VANvMSYtanM<<kD.lmnd-COnditli'O<<nDpa'pplee<<e'!tb.';!the'ifel::IOWin~jjgSFAS!NahntiOIie'i:manual.:.',:In'>VS'N~iSn.;Of."'.";.":SI~V!:,<<Iianhhi~!xiiiti'atIo>>iaaf!!St,earn!L!1)ii';:,i'Je'o'liat<<.one!Q4h)iienaa4.-":Ini4J+taon'-:,:elf-,::,'npg".~mt~-u<<Mc<<t'<<<<<<~Ku<<l<n~Ql'It.csh4,~<~Ar-~If,I-"t&~~a,c~pW,~4!1>ct>>~~n.'ec.c,<4(~SP~~~~~~nQ-~~[ab~pOS~$Dm~gifatmp~Qa)gg:;"vtlAat~4.4tf~At~i~A..C,S<WFu~C4aI~C~io~'andY;-'.,th'egj%(i'!':p'j',:ob'ab)l::i.".,:,'o'l.",",;",ahgeveF<<n<<Chica'tjgi":~ri'j...y@ng':>>.",:,'th,i';~:.i4".i'ter'i,.'i':l'.e-er-45.Conditionfbi(I)'~I!i,"!iliai'llt~iiii:,"':,,i::iiii!i,-Iaa,lopi'oI:.,"antd:,,.:',:;a'otoato'oi'i!5'el'a'fbiifori'O'I'ie'~foIIo'wi'ri'j'!!'SS'Fna'"'":"~4<~4~eail.Ci:ne"'!CD'8~1&a::.kiS)<<,,~!.,;,.::;.;"e:,e,,dviatei!:,:::iIeolatao'n.",".',:.":,::ae'nd':!~4,::;::;-:,::i:::::AFI'I.-heeweton'digjon',:.,::~!::a,dulia'eee,:",:::,fhea~@tyainjijjientet!Foon!of,.::,tiie'efiewedi'f<<on'eat'i!aiiiwie<jn<<<<olpe~iiibl,"i,':":;";:;.:'ompletion"f4mee-aweCC<<+$0~f<<F"~ya<<<<<<~bd'i'd'S';:,ji::~;,'::%janON88e.".,tbsp:')',:88+0/,';i:theLe~in':,;:,::to'::OPKRABTEg~~tiM.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-156DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-157DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB,3.3.2BASESAYjiONSl.a-e~%~l:-:::::chai:'::-!F!ii::::"'~i!ill:,iiii'::::.(ilWgaL-,:.!,-gi!F,,--:-::,i:-:Ii,'::,:ll'i,':::!its::":.-,i,:::,ii::i::-:-.if!:~i:4'ii:-::-i:--",-'~it!i!---.-:::::!!Ilijhiitl'gg"'datetji,";!I'iffact'd$'ii',,::iiida.!!CiY'$'nc'i:ad'a~iit:::M.iith>>T-;,;-,;:L'e%~~~>':::j'"',:.;:!:,Fi'edÃater;"",NIsolifgo7i'.:-':,.'.:".:SG';:,:!Mater,:;::::::Iice:l~;,':Hi'ghg~:.::.;:e:::;i';~iG;-,:Mallei,,,'-",:Bevil-;:,,:.Lii'wL7i%-,,::::.aii~"."..:':ARM'"Undigvo14aee~Bifi&1A:,'-,',:a'n<Lgd~CLha~~4jj'c':i':,"I,"::I;i;,,:ope,ra,'j",'-.;on;".~Xylo',-:,',.Out.":;,$f-;-::.',(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-158DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESie't:.:@fi'::e%'."r'ediiri'daii'cj,",.';:,::i"'eq'i,::vFii'i'e,"."nt'illI:fillfiii:.-;i'ii'if::":.:'.ij',,1~he"".,if)i'er:i'tiati'!to@cii'i~~t;:iiiitii",;~j'ip.l':,~e's'";.:.'",'.to'.:.ea'ch'::!4'f.';:":,:'"',th'"'"::-i!i~a"f'b.,::::.i':pJ,,t>.;--."-::::i!I!:--pJiliP,";:i',,::i:,::::::"I'!";",.:;:h~i!t'!i:.;--,,;-.(:,:;,:-'0::,:"'1'~'t""'O'PERABI.E'"""""'0"-""'""t"1""'tTi""'"'"'"'"bl4;o$$',:485'tj'fig,",'"::."ll"::::a'r,,'.,'el'.,':j'ifst'.i:f:.'edeŽq'"~gffe,.r:,&n'ie,'.7:"(cont'inued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-159DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESO'GTIONS7j,";:>~Pj'~.'('~j,;.$~~:,."".'.:'.:.8':iG"[.:,:;,'"(cb'rishi,iiued:;Con'd<%1~onii1~l'!app~lieetee!atoe!t~pi<fo,:,!1'ojiing':!ESFAS!'fnn'i::t'ioiia'p,~i::;::,",:!!bann':.141nit4'ati'on',,leo"faCS'.n'!ai'i8;i~~iHaFu~a:I:::,:-:::~I%8'ts'italo'n."'::,:,:of::.Grot'ii'mimi.'iit.".':::Ijo',I,':Kiari::.Condigfpg'$~app1)e~~!t'o~',the.:',ajitjmatPijj~~aetiat'ioneaggi>~iandii!i":i~:-:.g1a:.mk@5'~~"':.~p~fj...(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-160Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAliTIONSl".:-'."y~i::::!.'::,::-.)I~4:;:,:::.-:+KIi!1'::~:,:,:-':.:.('ront4riiied)'::enassosaeeaaosoa'o,:.',:.":e4aoie-,'.",':.:tlii:-:;tiai'ii~'tii";,:OPERABLEii'ti'Ci'i~s;:::TliisCompletionTiiiieisreasonableconsideringthatthereisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.~s~)~.IThPComPJet~iongTiiqe,:.:.".ofg6.;.::fi'd'Ug's,'.",s'8.:con's>siiiii':.:-,:~w'it~ii.;.;.8'ei:i,:r'ended:":."'i,,"':.9Yi)London%j:oui!g,;:ip'(1',i'i'iV4i:.;-'-,'::;fhe+ol,"fcig~,rig',":'F~ne::,:i@os.:eaSSCeesaoeeePE.edmnd"ance~~.:;:re~('ii'::i~riie'ri'i~s".-.;e.:.:-i.:yjipe.'.,':..'iion".i,,".'oi~'."iiesyea..yey"~!ootnpje"-',ae's'.oui~fa!!jnY!8J'!i'>sandJ1;alHo'!s0pPe8@:,'o!n'0~t,.":!,.oon~apUn;.e(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-161DraftB I ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESt'i'i,:,:i*."sihanoi'.-;;:::,tieiii'~i'iiijgiOLEEABL~E!'.c'hiiiji:lss:)Th~jj,:';C'omjileFjorj"::,;::gj'lag:;:'of:,,::":,.6:j~,hosv,sj:,;ta!::,tpsgj+ePhsj~h'i4'pe'i;,a61'es'iiii'isj1']hestiate'stLo'j~jgis'g'os'tiff'i'e'd,:iiiA::::.'lieEi'."ie'bio(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-162DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3a2BASES'AGT~IONS:-:;lj'"4'jl+~'~4!:"::::::~il~'arereasonab'le,baese3onoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-163DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3e2BASESi~eh!'lI-':!i!i.i!i!i'-':it-'-',:.tihiiimi:ii:!"::,:.i"-:i!i::":::i':!ilia'lsi~iiiiii:---ii:i--iii,:,,:-:---:--,ii!L:-::.%hap!Op&1@to.:;0.pa,::,baits':",';OVt",-,;:Of.:,:;,tabi,t,',en'Kil;0'g'i'0,<jii~~ITh01!'0'fOpai)+004'Oileghagp'e'1!mustbebneughttr~i'ppedtoa-H09&plaoe.';6jaCO~afigui,gatiOOn...~tLlati'Satiafieaiaedund'anujjfi::"iiiiam'0'0't'Sfs-..'a,.':.Comp,:.4't0inc'0an'hei',ia4jp'ifj.:;::;io'mpeji'sit'elforpthj':":iji'ojie'rk'bali'ij)":::4!'igtotes:Rap'ab'i,;>~j'I'y!':i.'o'!:,a'ce'0'mmod'are'.,",:;ai'si:ngi'e.::"fa'j;iurae,",'jaria0~em'aj::,i'O'W'Si:Op'0fai'ia'nilt'oi';:::oijn'tisane.Tb---i:::::4!ih"-,.":iii~h);mthAli$ehctAene.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-164DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.3-165Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES0Reel"ence@7"'w.4wiisvYXCCw'v~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-166DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESA~AC:;.::IONSTj".'-:,::::,'",;.':;:~.::.'";.."@0~!A'j~i!5":<1~~th'i",jL'CO~doe's$'not:::0p'jlj;";('""Toa'ch'i'eve'"thi'ss'tatus,thepI"antmustbebroughtto't"leastNODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<2000psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,.basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.~)~)~p~y~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-167DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheSRsforeachESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.2-1.EachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheESFAS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrain8mustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.Note1hasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.2-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichESFASFunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-168DraftB

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESIrevst!.L'Alssk!!'!F!ms~i::".:"':::I::":-3!i'llii'ai:i;m'l:."!Ql!",.'gE(U.:fREM,ENTS'."AA%NsEmLCAE'CKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparam'eterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoin'strumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.CHANNELCHECKacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmore-frequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3'.2.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTevery92daysLvftori~tlgefZil'1ovii'riqjiSplLS!fiin'cti~nns',PS',IPmf-o'~i'i,.hme.Qn~4'.::.~P.ei's'ioii;:i~g~gh3/~I'.-::,.;,pres'sai:,iteripre'usia~i!:~~aL","viS3;:::,-';,;!She'amaL!'n~a':ip~ressi~i'i'.e:;.'-,";,o,y,,',SCi.-ai"L~ine,'<<::.:Ls'o'Tats'on",:-:::;Contaiimetit'/pre~so'sire~":sj~h'.!i{ljj!ling(continued),R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-170DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES$llR~$~1:~L'ANCESR::::":::::8!'.:8'i':g~i2'!~!.:nant!Wl.a8gjsteat,mn,::,:LgAanii:.*:;Iso,lat~i,odni-,'l8Ãgh'usta'am::,::F1::o'n~ca1'ioldantiÃialthste'aim,";L17ie;-.',:,,IsetatIonŽ~Hagh,,"-:,.":g!'gh.','stea~Y!sgog;::;coins'icenihdFee'~Softies'::::::,:~~1at'1onn-'.:":::Sg:::,:gaftei,~Lape'le1PiFi,jh:,;,'.':~%~AFQ~86::-.';;gaNr,,'.,":.::;,':Levpel,";-,,~tow',,::::~ow,'~A+~-<gL.~uHrp.aa2-Ka~t0,Q~QKXQ.ACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.SetpointsmustbefoundtobewithintheAllowableValuesspecifiedinTable3-.3-4-48:,:.':3.,';P,-::.':,:I-."',:-:and7ps~ibllshed~$'l."antIpi,:..oc'e'dXrej.The"asleft"avaluesatmustbeconsistentwith'thedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof'92daysisconsistentwithinReference7.TheFrequencyisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.2.3(QTlfRRI<<A2I'TARTAdThistestisacheckofthe~'2'filliiii!2,",2'"',',:."ll,,',2"'i!i!lapIIAdIIBThetestincludestripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectlytotheprotectionsystem.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsforrelays.RelaysetpointsrequireelaboratebenchcalibrationandareverifiedduringCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheFrequencyof92daysisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-171DraftB ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-172.DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES$VRVEL4~WG8@Jcantgn<<ued),:SR3.3.2.4gkj9.ii&N':isThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery24months.ThistestisacheckoftheSIj'-::::;:;:::CS'.Sgg,.Barite~>omeit@i'soI',af:coif::steam4:-e$m".h!'.'!!!~h:-:h-:::'::::-P--.ht:$d,:j.ne':,~:,iiuj'na~";;',.:i'fIi'-',.':ma's~er.,'".:,:,transfer'r,,::,:,re;,';iysjomov',8C~91':I.'8.thPdPhdIthdindustryoperatingexpe'rienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalrefuelingcycle.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsduringtheTADOT.TheManual::rod6;a%i.cod,and~AFMP~Tr,",s.pofBothMFWPumpsFunctionshavenoassociatedsetpoiYnts.SR3.3.2.5ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24monthssijsV!'the,",i."::.Sajl:omfjjog!PPESPASP!nFund.'ua'nls:::mn~tijiddgdjnh'i,:::":.tl!p::.,'.;t::,,:,iwi'j!jljll::::,8'iN:-.:.':Pressiir>2;er,.',:;:Pres'suroe."..:;:...,,',no~@;;Sdiiiid~!"'i!Pii::thdd'dhlhhtlihi'tSteam:::,tInc:::.,::.,:Iso'1:estd!o~n:-.:!RSg&Stia~:::;:Fl,ajhj!:.::Ca)nojdent=:,,ijjithgSt~eon,:"LdneV~halatioh.":-.::.Hjgb~Hjigh!;::Steam,::;I':1aw<Going'i'deut!Lee'dH~t~jPt"~'olj.;j',o~n:,.-;,.;::,58":,'.:Wa.'ter~Lev.e~j,'j~Q','a,ii)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-173DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-174DraftB 'II,H ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAEjVfR,EHENTS-SO'RLE:IUiNC6(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-175Draft8 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(Y~gV,heo...,,~.t,,,t,,MKtNFC>:CACCBRAT45AS"""iii9VC.';;:.b~e".,:..";,".'i)',:fojje'dPejqsjete,,',f:;':,,':qq;th~4$gausedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.SRY33.3.2.6TliER,hP'R!I:::,'!!Pp",",","'"",ll"*"','-Land$4eam87,:;.;,:'Ste'amLinePressure"-"'ow"'Fuiic'tionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000psigwhileinMODES3.Periodictestingofthepressurizerpressurechannelsis'equiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.6).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.Ifthepressurizerpressureinterlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,thepressurizerpressureinterlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition~7',",,Pi'i",'i,,"'@:,tfp1dihbypdcondition,theSRismetandthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-176DraftB ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-177Draft8

'lllig ESFASInstrumentation83.3.21ial/IIaatcccaoat~Ltcctl,PtoooooIqotlaaatILsQcIctnauatII IIII III III1III IIIIIcc~IIaatosatlaNFAtIIccaotioaoJ1/aIIIIy2CcbatlI IItcaotiot1/a"llkttoa2coloIvlII III1jIa&vtcCoalCoccpcooattCraia4ghlctabloQ120KAC2oNsaSooxooVeda5r+2ttasatloJctaatioaLottoQ22ivxDoratcoacoeFigure83.3.2-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-179Draft8 ~~""'"-:.'co.i'j"p,"tj>mo'om,:,op'er'a'i:oj;:s)..agr'i'IIIePacci'iieet.:,.".iona'i;t'i"ons:.QoM~.oyC(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-180DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-181DraftB BASESIPAMInstrumentation83.3.3~o~~~~+~Thisinstrumentationprovidesthenecessarysupportfortheoperatortotakerequiredmanualactions,verifythatautomaticandrequiredmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeencompleted,andtodetermineiffissionproductbarriershavebeenbreachedfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheOPERABILITYoftheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationensuresthatthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassess,plantstatusandbehaviorduringanaccident.Theavailabilityofaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationisimportantsothatresponsestocorrectiveactionscanbe'bservedandtheneedfor,andmagnitudeof,furtheractionscanbedetermined.TheseessentialinstrumentsareidentifiedinReference1addressingtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.97(Ref.2)asrequiredbySupplement1toNUREG-0737(Ref.3).TheinstrumentchannelsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCOprovideinformationforkeyparametersidentifiedduringimplementationofRegulatoryGuide1.97asCategoryIvariables.CategoryIvariablesareorganizedintofourtypesandarethekeyvariablesdeemedrisksignificantbecausetheyareneededto:'Ia.Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolro'omoperatortotakespecificmanuallycontrolledactionsforwhichnoautomaticcontrolis(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-182DraftB

PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunctionsforDBAs(TypeA).b.Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortoverifythatrequiredautomaticandmanuallycontrolledfunctionshavebeenaccomplished(TypeB);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant8'3.3-183DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)C.Provideinformationtothecontrolroomoperatorsthatwillenablethemtodeterminethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease(TypeC);andd.Provideinformationregardingthereleaseofradioactivematerialstoallowforearlyindicationoftheneedtoinitiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublic,andtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat(TypeE).AllTypeAandkeyTypeB,C,andEparametershavebeenidentifiedasCategoryIvariablesinReference1whichalsoprovidesjustificationfordeviatingfromtheNRCproposedlistofCategoryIvariables.ThespecificinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1arediscussedintheLCOsection.APPLICABLEThePANinstrumentationensurestheavailabilityofSAFETYANALYSESRegulatoryGuide1.97CategoryIvariablessothatthecontrolroomoperatingstaffcan:PerformthediagnosisspecifiedintheemergencyoperatingproceduresfortheprimarysuccesspathofDBAs(e.g.,lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA));Takethespecified,pre-planned,manuallycontrolledactions,forwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunction;Determinewhetherrequiredautomaticandmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeenaccomplished;Determinethelikelihoodofagrossbreachof.thebarriersto,radioactivityrelease;Determineifagrossbreachofabarrierhasoccurred;and(continued).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-184DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~Initiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublicandtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat.PAMinstrumentationthatmeetsthedefinitionofTypeAinRegulatoryGuide1.97satisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.CategoryI,non-TypeA,instrumentationmustberetainedinTSbecauseitisintendedtoassistoperatorsinminimizingtheconsequencesofaccidents.Therefore,CategoryI,non-TypeA,variablesareimportantforreducingpublicriskandmeatjifjCriterion4.LCOThePAMinstrumentationLCOprovidesOPERABILITYrequirementsforRegulatoryGuide1.97TypeAmonitors,whichprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorstoperformcertainmanualactionsspecifiedintheplantEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Thesemanualactionsensurethatasystemcanaccomplishitssafetyfunction,andarecreditedinthesafetyanalyses.Additionally,thisLCOaddressesRegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentsthathavebeendesignatedCategoryI,non-TypeA.TheOPERABILITYofthePAMinstrumentationensures,thereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassessplantstatusfollowinganaccident.ThisLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEchannelsformostFunctions.TwoOPERABLEchannelsensurenosinglefailurepreventsoperatorsfromobtainingtheinformationnecessarytodeterminethesafetystatusoftheplant,andtobringtheplanttoandmaintainitinasafeconditionfollowinganaccident.Furthermore,OPERABILITYoftwochannelsallowsaCHANNELCHECKduringthepostaccidentphasetoconfirmthevalidityofdisplayedinformation.Morethantwochannelsmayberequirediffailureofoneaccidentmonitoringchannelresultsininformationambiguity(thatis,theredundantdisplaysdisagree)thatcouldleadoperatorstodefeatorfailtoaccomplisharequiredsafetyfunction.Table3.3.3-1listsallCategoryIvariablesidentifiedbyReference1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-185DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)CategoryIvariablesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofprovidingimmediatelyaccessibledisplayandcontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroom.TheHydrogenMonitorsareconsideredOPERABLEwhencontinuousreadoutisavailableintheControlRoomorintherelayroom.Eachchannelmustalsobesuppliedbyseparateelectricaltrainsexceptasnotedbelow.Inaddition,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.6,itisnotrequiredtodeclareasupportedsysteminoperableduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem(e.g.,electricpower).SincetheinoperabilityofInstrumentBusDdoesnothaveanyassociatedRequiredActions,thelossofthispowersourcemayaffecttheOPERABILITYofthePressurizerPressureandSGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)Functions.ListedbelowarediscussionsofthespecifiedinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1.1.PressurizerPressurePressurizerPressureisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.PressurizerpressureisalsousedtoverifytheplantconditionsnecessarytoestablishnaturalcirculationintheRCSandtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~PT-429andPT-431;~PT-430andPT-431;~PT-429andPT-449;~PT-430andPT-449;or~PT-431andPT-449ThelossofInstrumentBusDrequiresdeclaringPT-449inoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-186DraftB

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)2.PressurizerLevelPressurizerLevelisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.Pressurizerwaterlevelisalsousedtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~LT-426andLT-428;or~LT-427andLT-428.3,4;ReactorCoolantSstemRCSHotandColdLeRCSHotandColdLegTemperaturesareCategoryIvariables(RCSColdLegTemperatureisalsoaTypeAvariable)providedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCS.hotandcoldlegtemperaturesareusedtodetermineRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSsubcoolingmarginwillallowterminationofSI,ifstillinprogress,orreinitiationofSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.Inaddition,RCScoldlegtemperatureisusedinconjunctionwithRCShotlegtemperaturetoverifynaturalcirculationintheRCS.Temperatureinputsareprovidedbytwoindependenttemperaturesensorresistanceelementsandassociatedtransmittersineachloop.TemperatureelementsTE-409B-1andTE-410B-1providetherequiredRCScoldlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.TemperatureelementsTE-409A-1andTE-410A-1providetherequiredRCShotlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-187DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)5.RCSPressureWideRaneRCSwiderangepressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandthelongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCSpressureisusedtoverifydeliveryofSIflowtotheRCSfromatleastonetrainwhentheRCSpressureisbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.RCSpressureisalsousedtoverifyclosureofmanuallyclosedpressurizerspraylinevalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andfordeterminingRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSpressurecanalsobeused:~todeterminewhethertoterminateactuatedSIortoreinitiatestopped'SI;~todeterminewhentoresetSIandstopthe~residualheatremovalpumps(RHR);~tomanuallyrestarttheRHRpumps;~asreactorcoolantpump(RCP)tripcriteria;~tomakeadeterminationonthenatureoftheaccidentinprogressandwheretogonextintheemergencyoperatingprocedure;and~todeterminewhethertooperatethepressurizerheaters.RCSpressureisalsorelatedtothreedecisionsaboutdepressurization.Theyare:todeterminewhethertoproceedwithprimarysystemdepressurization;toverifyterminationofdepressurization;andtodeterminewhethertocloseaccumulatorisolationvalvesduringacontrolledcooldown/depressurization.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-188DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO5.RCSPressureWideRane(continued)RCSpressureisaTypeAvariablebecausetheoperatorusesthisindicationtomonitorthecooldownoftheRCSfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)orsmallbreakLOCA.Operatoractionstomaintainacontrolledcooldown,suchasadjustingsteamgenerator(SG)pressureorlevel,wouldusethisindication.RCSpressuretransmittersPT-420andPT-420Aprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.6.RCSSubcoolinMonitorRCSSubcoolingMonitorisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.TheRCSSubcoolingMonitorisusedtoprovideinformationtotheoperator,derivedfromRCShotlegtemperatureandRCSpressure,onsubcooling.RCSsubcoolingmarginisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalso,usedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresdetermineRCSsubcoolingmarginbasedonthecoreexitthermocouples(CETs)andRCSpressure.Therefore,anyofthefollowingcombinationofparameterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:TI-409AandTI-410A;orOnepressurizerpressuretransmitterandtwoCETsineachofthefourquadrantssuppliedbyelectricaltrainAandtrainB(i.e.,totaloftwopressurizerpressuretransmittersand16CETs).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-189DraftB

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-190Draft8 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)7.ReactorVesselWaterLevelReactorVesselMaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.Itisalsousedforaccidentdiagnosisandtodeterminereactorcoolantinventoryadequacy.WhenbothRCPsarestopped,theReactorVesselWaterLevelIndicationSystem(RVLIS)providesadirectmeasurementofthecollapsedliquidlevelabovethefuelalignmentplate.Thecollapsedlevelrepresentstheamountofliquidmassthatisinthereactorvesselabovethecore.WhentheRCPsare'operating,RVLISindicatesthefluidfractionoftheRCS.Measurementofthecollapsedwaterlevelorfluidfractionisselectedbecauseitisadirectindicationofthewaterinventory.LeveltransmittersLT-490AandLT-490Bprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.8.ContainmentSum5%WaterLevelContainmentSumpBWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.ContainmentSumpBWaterLevelisusedtodetermine:~containmentsumplevelforaccidentdiagnosis;~whentobegintherecirculationprocedure;and~whethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress.LeveltransmittersLT-942andLT-943,eachwithfivediscretelevelswitches,providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-191DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)9.ContainmentPressureWideRaneContainmentPressure(WideRange)isaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofRCSandcontainmentOPERABILITY.ContainmentPressure(WideRange)isusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogressandwhen,andif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~PT-946andPT-948;or~PT-950andPT-948.10.ContainmentAreaRadiationHihRaneContainmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)isaTypeECategoryIvariableprovidedtomonitorforthepotentialofsignificantradiationreleasesintocontainmentandtoprovidereleaseassessmentforusebyoperatorsindeterminingtheneedtoinvokesiteemergencyplans.Containmentradiationlevelisusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogress(e.g.,LOCA),andwhen,orif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.RadiationmonitorsR-29andR-30areusedtoprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.HdroenHonitorsHydrogenConcentrationisaTypeCCategoryIvariableprovidedtodetecthighhydrogenconcentrationconditionsthatrepresentapotentialforcontainmentbreachfroma'hydrogenexplosion.Thisvariableisalsoimportantinverifyingtheadequacyofmitigatingactions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-192DraftB

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO11.HdroenMonitors(continued)HydrogenmonitorsHMSLCPAandHMSLCPBprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Inaddition,thePostAccidentSamplingSystemmaytaketheplaceofoneofthesemonitors.ThePASSsystemHydrogenFunctionisnotrequiredtoprovidecontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroomorrelayroomforOPERABILITY.12.CondensateStoraeTankCSTLevelCSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtoensureawatersupplyisavailableforthe,preferedAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.TheCSTconsistsoftwoidenticaltanksconnectedbyacommonoutletheader.CSTlevelisusedtodetermine:~ifsufficientCSTinventoryisavailableimmediatelyfollowingalossofnormalfeedwaterorsmallbreakLOCA;and~whentomanuallyreplenishtheCSToralignthesafetyrelatedsourceofwater(servicewater)tothepreferredAFWsystem.LeveltransmittersLT-2022AandLT-2022Bprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.,";:,',:,:Aowe'vega13.RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevelRWSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyingawatersourcetotheSI,RHR,andGSCo'A4F'~'riPieat~5p'rag(CS)Systems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-193DraftB PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASES00~file!R9Sf(l,eye)'ccuracyisaeqw'r-sacs%Pi::.shedto'Al":::bP'gbgd'e'qi.'eei'.;of&a'c'c'uriae'c;tte)i'e'~ji%)i'1ah);esto,circe:."oycLeveltransmittersLT-920andLT-921providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.\LGO-14.RHRFlowRHRFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyinglowpressuresafetyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtotheCSandSIpumps.RHRflowisusedtodeterminewhentostoptheRHRpumpsandifsufficientflowisavailabletotheCSandSIpumpsduringrecirculation.SincedifferentflowtransmittersareusedtoverifyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtoverifyflowtotheCSandSIpumps,FT-626andFT-931AcompriseonerequiredchannelandFT-689andFT-9318compriseasecondrequiredchannel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-194Draft8 ,rJ PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASES&oc+a.espAnevaluationwasmadeoftheminimumnumberofvalidCETsnecessaryformeasuringcorecooling.TheevaluationdeterminedthenecessarycomplementofCETsrequiredtodetectinitialcorerecoveryandtrendtheensuingcoreheatup.Theevaluationaccountedforcorenonuniformities,includingincoreeffectsoftheradialdecaypowerdistribution,excoreeffectsofrefluxinthehotlegs,andnonuniforminlettemperatures.Basedontheseevaluations,adequatecorecoolingisensuredwithtwovalidCoreExitTemperaturechannelsperquadrantwithtwoCETsperrequiredchannel.CoreExitTemperatureisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.CoreExitTemperatureisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.eeA4pg-..LGQC5~',3:6;:':;;::47,;"::;:,:M~",.":,"':.,:::Chive%~'xi'::t':::Tom-'er.atur'eQ!.,'('coii'f,'::1'iiiied:"!:::,,::,::k!I';:::,f~!:::::!!:::".i'::::d,'::::::ll'.':",i1%"::::-':iii":"'i'i'i!!'i!'::-""""-:-"';:::::::::::'i'ilia","""~i".GVI'1'j1~ll,:;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-195DraftB

PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESPoDot.pi'jr'Oii1gi,;,egi'ei'efit'at'A~a','5.;egi'Odn'st'f&he~jCOi.:;,'i":SBecauseofthesmal"t"'two""r'andoaoinly-'"'1"e'tedthermocouplesaresufficienttomeetthetwothermocouplesperchannelrequirementinanyquadrant.However,aCETwhichliesdirectlyonthedividinglinebetweentwoquadrantscanonlybeusedtosatisfytheminimumrequiredchannelsforonequadrant.ACETisconsideredOPERABLfwhenitiswithin+.35'FoftheaverageCETreading.ijcehpt'.:;-',',':for'::.'the":::'.::;ClosRE'ROC;.":,:;ates:.'..Qj;tg.:",,::."'er4pher,:1:::ga'SSdembljeS:-.~eastuadr-aQ~TR;.':(A'/j::;::86~i~$C3.1i!ChamAC4&Wwerakienl1::.,:(63s,'"',,;.::,D12~H13:::":,:::.IRo'~K3'i::::;Kl>1::::::,::::7!,Ti,:D.'.':":::,'3~N6,:]a1a;;ooh'sh'dha'i'a'd,:i,.:OPERA8L~E'";:.:~hahIsthi!y'.;.",:'ai'ajii'Chaii:~~'!43!P'"oftiia"'"'alii'igaii!!Chili!'i'i'a'ijj.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-196DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES'laaispi-i~elfoiilouia'O'It'ra1'aa'!auat::::::,bj~OPERABf!E,",.i'nba'aohoftheEyAeafour:::;::.quidgaiif~i'i(continued)R.E.Ginna,NuclearPowerPlantB3.3-197DraftB

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(~pVd~o,::".!(taint'!'nuked)]IThj!~%N.','.;:;Systemi~projsdhs7sdcosy'~shreat':remriv'e'Ij~iiaj~Fhe:::",SGs;end'::::,:is:,;tom'opri's'e'de'tithe',:."!p'reStan'dhty':,:":rpsFM'::,':::(S'AF+h::.'i::::Sy'st'em';.Theuseofthepre'fetrredAFWeor"SAFWSystemtoprovidethisdecayheatremovalfunctionisdependentuponthetypeofaccident.AFWflowindicationisrequiredfromthethreepumptrainswhichcomprisethepreferredAFWSystemsincethesepumpsautomaticallystartonvariousactuationsignals.ThefailureofthepreferredAFWSystem(e.g.,duetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding)isdetectedbyAFWflowindication.Atthispoint,theSAFWSystemismanuallyalignedtoprovidethedecayheatremovalfunction.SAFWflowcanalsobeusedtoverifythatAFWflowisbeingdeliveredtotheSGs.However,theprimaryindicationofthisisprovidedbySGwaterlevel.Therefore,flowindicationfromtheSAFWpumpsisnotrequired.EachofthethreepreferredAFWpumptrainshastworedundanttransmitters;however,onlytheflowtransmittersuppliedpowerfromthesameelectricaltrainastheAfWpumpisrequiredforthisLCO.ThereforeflowtransmittersFeT-2001::(8CB,';,";-.'::>'n))Qt>Oi'>i,:.;>>.202'IAAF<)andFT-2007:."(HCB~<-:;;ii7dfiit'or~~FI,<<':;7024'A):fT-2002(NCB',qfAda.'atso~i",~Ff:;,<<"",,.2022A')bandFT-2006:(HCBjnd7cat'i@~".,'-","'""F'I'.:'.-',',20e23'A)';:::;,'."'compri~sehetworequire'channesforSG8.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-199DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)RO-,21';,'",',:2R:,",'.,.g3:::;:;;.',24.SGWaterLeve'lNarrowandWideRaneSGWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Forthenarrowrangelevel,thesignalsfromthetransmittersareindependentlyindicatedonthemaincontrolboardas0%to100%.Thiscorrespondstoapproximatelyabovethetopofthetubebundlestothetopoftheswirlvaneseparators(spanof143inches).Forthewiderangelevel,signalsfromthetransmittersareindicatedas0to520inches(0%to100%)onthemaincontrolboard.SGWaterLevel(NarrowandWideRange)isusedto:~identifythefaultedSGfollowingatuberupture;~verifythattheintactSGsareanadequateheatsinkforthereactor;~determinethenatureoftheaccidentinprogress(e.g.,verifyanSGTR);and~verifyplantconditions,forterminationofSIduringsecondaryplantHELBsoutsidecontainment.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbytwotrainsofinstrumentationgpe~~glSG.~BCWaterLevel(NarrowRange)requires2channelsofi'ndication~per(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-200DraftB PAMInstrumentation83.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-201DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-202DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCOaa-,2I;i;::;::3i+33,,;:::,SGWaterLevel"NarrowandWideRane(continued)'ro~STnst!j)ist'of,,',,.;'I,iiie1'i'ti;;non's'xiiitt'n'i,'s,",."ostn":ib's'.:;::;n'sod'".':F,:.;,,.',,:.::44%037,,:::a7nd:-:::,LT@783~Cf:"::47.1Y(arid:,::,;:P-,',.4:7?:.~~or~!::::6!i-:":'4ii~Xn3::..::,tT',::.Zfs.tjTh~.::::!loss,::,:'.;::osf",';.-:,'-,:In)finn7s'n'O':::::::ans%Dji:iqnir~e's':::i8i'iil%n1'n'giiLT:::-,'.:,.453Mos%v.'mtoncivYNNMQ~sAwNN~'"'SGWaterLevel(WideRange)requires2channelsofindicationperSG.TwochannelsperSGarerequiredsincethelossofonechannelwithnobackupavailablemayresultinthecompletelossofinformationrequiredbytheoperatorstoaccomplishnecessarysafetyfunctions.LeveltransmittersLT-504andLT-505comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandLT-506andLT-507comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.SGPressureSGPressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Thesignalsfromthetransmittersarecalibratedforarangeof0psigto1400psig.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbythreeavailabletrainsofinstrumentation.AnyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforEB'i!A':~PT-468andR-478~P(-;,::488;~Ko~roPT-469and~P&p(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-203DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-204DraftB

PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESandM~28:.LCO'v<...,.w~'en'oxgrg~~+~~~~+....~w>w.:>AV~O~>myy..~~~w~~>vngmoyp~gj'ngiy0f$g)&jan.,o'I(('d~Qjj9'jcdmbj,naf1ohj'o',:,,::.,'pr'essur8t'ai'os'i'rii~tt'ii;:"j'~qcaiiipi)"i'i,:::::th%jt'iiib'::;iYiji4N'i.:,:Pp~PQ:-::479.,:,'.'.":::and;,-:,:PT,':;47S:-::;,br.~i::',;::~::.:.;;;-':P';f.':,'-."."47,8".;:i."a'n'ds',::O'7,",-:.,483::-::.::~'"'SN~V~A~"%W~~>'e@kkmma"'~(4~vÃc&"'~S'@a"4&('N4~>3"'0'MAROON~~'4"~~~Apre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinHODES1,2,and3.InNODES4,5,and6,thePAHinstrumentationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseplantconditionsaresuchthatthelikelihoodofaneventthatwouldrequirePAHinstrumentationislow.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1hasbeenaddedtoexcludetheHODEchangerestrictionofLCO3.0.4.ThisexceptionallowsentryintotheapplicableHODEwhilerelyingontheACTIONSeventhoughtheACTIONSmayeventuallyrequireplantshutdown.Thisexceptionisacceptableduetothepassivefunctionoftheinstruments,theoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentusingalternateinstrumentsandmethods,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringtheseinstruments.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.3-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-205DraftB

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESAC::f:;:IONSA.1RoavM$riwoaoudConditionAappliesAeet+eaewhe';,:,":one,'.';.ew;.:~may,'e'~<,Fiiqjtj'ciii.'s.'-,:.:.;";'4.ag'e,::..~o$e~jjeji,"j;iedSc4~%'l~jth'atj~);;9~o'ji'i:,,aeb.'f:j;@en%4~RSqii33",e.-T4e'eh'a'nn'ee'.1'i:>",":,the",:ass'i/8)~h'a't'u'iaiittomaii;jci,::,'action',;.'i's"tass'u'Yrieo~to:!oc'ciir'romi';ii'e'se'jj'.nsti;.,gjjie'n'ts'j;,,j'lajjji":-jrheIloui;:jijb'ab11itji::,at!i!aiijeueant@reYji'iii!in'9:P'nl'1,",.lln'uter'u'xiii!'iitat1oiiurh'he!,.i,;!a;:a.":.I'.erva:'.~'rgchiir:::,-'--ill!i!-',::,,-:,::',;,e'I!ink:,*,:by!:,,",!Ill',,':,Rhea"-,:,:-:li',:":::,e'o',."i3","",3',:,'!3.:-.:::1-:;:,7F'u'n'ct'i':on's!'":,:3'.::,4'nd,:;;:"";:,'4':hi+4jTI!""',!p!"""r'i:";,'ll",",,',,i!ere!,',ei)rriedhoti~Qc!Iawh'ich:n'rior:",i'de'e,;::thhe'e'ii'ei,'"eah'a'rj!requireda'uti~one':,'!t'o;ao'""'~br::aeea~'Co'n'dj~ti'6A':~B;:,':hapl.'j.e'.'s".,","MMj-enthe'laequarlepe60'li:::!and:::iheeO'Gi'ate'd,,::;conanl~eYi'<igwTji'nj'8,':,'lifo~1.~cand~itLibn~~khdimdoaoOaradhao~naKj%V1'on%op'.:.,,anuatiiinh'to:-.:,'.,~er'ar""""'"trt'"nthh-"'llRG(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-206DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESThisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheConditionisentered.Thisreportshalldiscusstheresultsoftherootcauseevaluationoftheinoperabilityandidentifyproposedrestorativeactionsoralternatemeansofprovidingtherequiredfunction.Thisactionisappropriateinlieuofashutdownrequirementsincealternativeactionsareidentifiedbeforelossoffunctionalcapability,andgiventhelikelihoodofplantconditionsthatwouldrequireinformationprovidedbythisinstrumentation.Ifalternatemeansaretobeused,theymustbedevelopedaodtestedpriortosubmittaloftheP--:!:!I!',:.Ki.s(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-207DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES~~)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-208DraftB PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESKA;:1WS~:,'.;-:::,'-'":::Ij.'~e"'k"':::::,:~!joe::-';:Fit:doesn't.'n'0'ed):s'4'it'u'~s."$'i)thj'je'7.:"'"i'da'j~s'::"-."TheCompletionTt'i'iiieof7daysisbasedonthereativelylowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAHinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuousoperationwithF~ltIffttnotacceptablebecausethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallperformancequalificationrequirementsaPPliedtothePAFjinstrumentation~!jTheretf'o're;:,"'igequirjintag:,it!,,::!I!FF~!!ilia!it!i!'",'::,:'-,,li!!II!"-,F*,i'!i,"Ii~!it,,t:,:,,::::C;-::;,:,::;,;;.F,;-,';!!F.;,;'.'Fty;,;:::;:pl-,tt-,.-,::::,,'.t,:"n,,::,;:rt.atf'=,,-::::.,":,.:Is,i,:taatF!,:*,i""Fii!I'iiiiii'(Ili!I!i*',,"...-"'"'-ll!'ii!F!"-'!!ll'fti',ll,."ii~Di!yINt'liejim'di."c'etio'n's!Fm'a'j<i'no't'i':f:qu'alifi'ationntreqi3ueiiient'siahppj!ietidtio8tlig'i'p~tjj[nstr'umentatt'ion'll'"Therefore,""requirintgrestorationofoneilnoperabjteclianneloftheFunctionlimitstheriskthatthePAHFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-209DraftB

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83,3-210DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESCen~en-O'GT4.G.NS~fn'o'p'e~i".a6l'%~'Thi'sConditionrequiresrestoringonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonthebackupcapabilityofthePostAccidentSamplingSystemer-tthhetomonitorthehydrogenconcentrationforevaluationofcoredamageandtoprovideinformationforoperatordecisions.Also,itisunlikelythataLOCAwhichwouldpotentiallyrequireuseofthehydrogenrecombinerswouldoccurduringthistime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-211DraftB

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESii~i'i!i!ii)ilia:-':::::::C,dii--:i','"::,iil'i:,-,-:i-h-,,-:,',!tlat',(ll-g-,'ll,,-,;-,--0::,'.:A',,:0:.,:,-,iK5'c'u;siqii'en,...".",",.Coii.:::.',,'on".;:'*"'CM4w""~'wow~G.landG.2IfonechannelforFunctionp>i'rjd,"::4!,'e'8'r'i'hat"'b'e,,"',:,"',,ebs'."orle'd+tope2S:;:e':,'.d~f"',,:86cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequired"CompletionTimeofConditionDRorifonechannelforFunctionllcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionE,theplantmustbebrought.toaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesare(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-212Draft8

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-213Draft8 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-214DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESZ3teeetedsdhsestdsfel!1Owillg';.'.l4!idipsj>'te'eie.::,til'e.",",t'iillg(~th~e.',:::,'e'et%etclpge,'s.:IYiji!S'ee:;e'1'tel."iie,'e:,,:sleesee:,::::,Sixie,':;:.hee'e:,::ibeiese;:,"diiii$1sects'd,':,:::;:ppd:-:;,':,t'set'ed'elis'eee'e((is')':i:e'e'riiie'tish'el:;ice's'te'!l];et't.'ed,-"tLe'i'e'j>"SR3.3.3.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery31daysensuresthatagrossinstrumentationfailurehasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteron'otherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Thehighradiation(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-215DraftB PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESinstrumentationshouldbecomparedtosimilarplantinstrumentslocatedthroughouttheplant.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-216DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESChannelcheckacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingisolation,indication,andreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedouts'ideitslimit.AsspecifiedintheSR,aCHANNELCHECKisonlyrequiredforthosechannelsthatarenormallyenergized.TheFrequencyof31daysisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstratesthatchannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-217DraftB PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESSR3.3.3.2ACHANNELCALIBRATIONis'performedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondsto~tfiemeasuredparameterwiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwith'thetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle..REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section7.5.2.2.RegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev.3.3.NUREG-0737,Supplement1,"THIActionItems."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-218DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheDGsprovideasourceofemergencypowerwhenoffsitepoweriseitherunavailableorisinsufficientlystabletoallowsafeplantoperation.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationconsistsoftwochannelsoneachofsafeguardsBuses14,16,17,and18(Ref.1).Eachchannelcontainsonelossofvoltagerelayandonedegradedvoltagerelayt,:',Casse',:.F~jqure;.:;-,':B:::.,:,Bi3:.:;4J':.Aone-out-of-twologicinbothc'hannelsw'il'1causethefollowingactionsontheassociatedsafeguardsbus:a.tripofthenormalfeedbreakerfromoffsitepower;b.tripofthebus-tiebreakertotheoppositeelectricaltrain(ifclosed);c.shedofallbusloadsexcepttheCSpump,componentcoolingwaterpump(ifnosafetyinjectionsignalispresent),andsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters;andd.startoftheassociatedDG.Thedegradedvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoprotectEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)componentsfromexposuretolongperiodsofreducedvoltageconditionswhichcanresultindegradedperformanceandtoensurethatrequiredmotorscanstart.Thelossofvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoensuretheDGisstartedwithinthetimelimitsassumedintheaccidentanalysistoprovidetherequiredelectricalpower'ifoffsitepowerislost.Thedegradedvoltagerelayshave.timedelayswhichhaveinverseoperatingcharacteristicssuchthatthelowerthebusvoltage,thefastertheoperatingtime.Thelossofvoltagerelayshavedefinitetimedelayswhicharenotrelatedtotherateofthelossofbusvoltage.Thesetimedelaysaresettopermitvoltagetransientsduringworstcasemotorstartingconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-219DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLOPDGstartinstrumentationisrequiredfortheESFSystemstofunctioninanyaccidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ItsdesignbasisisthatoftheESF~ActuationSystem(ESFAS).UndervoltageconditionswhichoccurindependentofanyaccidentconditionsresultinthestartandbusconnectionoftheassociatedDG,butnoautomaticloadingoccurs.AccidentanalysescredittheloadingoftheDGbasedonthelossofoffsitepowerduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThemostlimitingDBAofconcernisthelargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)whichrequiresESFSystemsinordertomaintaincontainmentintegrityandprotectfuelcontainedwithinthereactorvessel(Ref.2).Thedetectionandprocessingofanundervoltagecondition,andsubsequentDGloading,hasbeenincludedinthedelaytimeassumedforeachESFcomponentrequiringDGsuppliedpowerfollowingaDBAandlossofoffsitepower.ThelossofoffsitepowerhasbeenassumedtooccureithercoincidentwiththeDBAoratalaterperiod(40to90secondsfollowingthereactortrip)duetoagriddisturbancecausedbytheturbinegeneratortrip.Ifthelossofoffsitepoweroccursatthesametimeasthesafetyinjection(SI)signalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheSIsignalwillactuatetheDGwithin2secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursbeforetheSIsignalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillactuatetheDGwithin2.75secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12.75secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursaftertheSIsignalparametersarereached(griddisturbance),theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillopenthefeederbreakertotheaffectedbuswithin2.75secondsandtheDGwillconnecttothebuswithinanadditional1.5seconds(DGwasactuatedbySIsignal).Thegriddisturbancehasbeenevaluatedbasedona140'FpeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduringaLOCAanddemonstratedtoresultinacceptableconsequences.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-220DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThedegradedvoltageandundervoltagesetpointsarebasedontheminimumvoltagerequiredforcontinuedoperationofESFSystemsassumingworstcaseloadingconditions(i.e.,maximumloadinguponDGsequencing).TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltagerelays,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:a.ActuatetheassociatedDGwithin2.75secondsasassumedintheaccidentanalysis;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailableandduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestassumedvoltagedropbelowthevoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheTripSetpointforthedegradedvoltagechannels,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations;a.Preventmotorssuppliedbythe480Vbusfromoperatingatreducedvoltageconditionsforlongperiodsoftime;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailable,andduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestvoltagedropbelowthemaximumvoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-221DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESLCOThisLCOrequiresthateach480VsafeguardsbushavetwoOPERABLEchannelsoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentationinMODES1,2,3,and4whentheassociatedDGsupportssafetysystemsassociatedwiththeESFAS.InMODES5and6,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsforeach480VsafeguardsbusmustbeOPERABLEwhenevertheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheautomaticstartoftheDGisavailablewhenneeded.LossoftheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctioncouldresultinthedelayofsafetysystemsinitiationwhenrequired.Thiscouldleadtounacceptableconsequencesduringaccidents.TheLOPstartinstrumentationisconsideredOPERABLEwhentwochannels,eachcomprisedofonedegradedvoltageandonelossofvoltagerelaysareavailableforeach480Vsafeguardsbus(i.e.,Bus14,16,.17,and18).EachoftheLOPchannelsmustbecapableofdetectingundervoltageconditionswithinthevoltagelimitsandtimedelaysassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforthedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltageFunctionsarespecifiedinSR3.3.4.2.TheAllowableValuesspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethosesetpointswhichensurethattheassociatedDGwillactuatewithin2.75secondsonundervoltageconditions,andthattheDGwillnotactuateonmomentaryvoltagedropswhichcouldaffectESFactuationtimesasassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethenominalsetpointsselectedtoensurethatthesetpointmeasuredbytheSurveillancedoesnotexceedtheAllowableValueaccountingformaximuminstrumentuncertaintiesbetweenscheduledsurveillances.Therefore,LOPstartinstrumentationchannelsareOPERABLEwhentheCHANNELCALIBRATION"asleft"valueiswithintheTripSetpointlimitsand.theCHANNELCALIBRATIONandTADOT"asfound"valueiswithintheAllowedValuesetpoints.ThebasisforallsetpointsiscontainedinReference3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-222DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABILITYTheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctionsarerequiredinMODES1,2,3,and4becauseESFFunctionsaredesignedtoprovideprotectionintheseMODES.ActuationinMODE5or6isrequiredwhenevertherequiredDGmustbeOPERABLEsothatitcanperformitsfunctiononanLOPordegradedpowertothe480Vsafeguardsbuses.ACTIONSIntheeventarelay'sTripSetpointisfoundtobenonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthechannelisfoundtobeinoperable,thenthechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOConditionenteredasapplicable.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.ThisNotestatesthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.A.1m'0r~e:':::480,':.,'::V,-;,bu's(y'i)";withonechannelper-bus-inoperabl-e4""ReQU):i,'e,':":c..).onA'.$:vSCv9rwiN;wMM~w',84WCS4,ill--::i!-,,-!':,,:,ll'!!i.,i0b!E!",-,,"-"::Ik,::!ii:;"-,-!b'i'i!i'-!:::-"i""-d:*'-'"-"i!i":ilia'll'i,-:::,:h:.'P--,.:(?"-:--::-.";:::,k:-:jii!'!i:.".ij'::::'",":::.*.i!::".i'!!ii!,:::-!!i,--:,::6!i,:,-,,::..0itanundervoltagechannelinthetrippedcondition,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsareconfiguredtoprovideaone-out-of-onelogictoinitiateatripoftheincomingoffsitepowerfortherespectivebus.TheremainingOPERABLEchanneliscomprisedofone-out-of-twologicfromthedegradedandlossofvoltagerelays.AnyadditionalfailureofeitherofthesetwoOPERABLErelaysrequiresentryintoConditionB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-223DraftB

LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1ConditionBappliestotheLOPDGstartFunctionwhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAarenotmetorwhew~i'th'"::."oni'::!sn~r'::-.more:::::~480,.',V:biif(es);.i":;:ii~glttwochannelsofLOPstartinstruiiientationper%~~inoperable.ConditionBrequiresimmediateentryintotheApplicableConditionsspecifiedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-HODESI,2,3,and4,"orLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-HODES5and6,"fortheDGma'deinoperablebyfailureoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentation.TheactionsofthoseLCOsprovideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSTheSurveillancesaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethat,whenachannelisplacedin.aninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto6'4hours,providedthesecondchannelmaintainstrip.capability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe4hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableCondit'ionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedonth~gassumptionthat4hoursistheaveragetimerequiredto'erformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,th~ej4hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.hSR3.3.4.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31days.Thistestcheckstripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectly.Forthesetests,therelayTripSetpointsareverifiedandadjustedasnecessarytoensureAllowableValues'canstillbemet.The31dayFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftherelaysandcontrolsandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-224DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.4.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling~o'fP!%Re~~!:-f."07':::,::DCThevoltagesetpointverification,aswellasthetimeresponsetoalossofvoltageandadegradedvoltagetest,shallincludeasinglepointverificationthatthetripoccurswithintherequiredtimedelay.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycleandisjustifiedbytheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.RG&EDesignAnalysisDA-EE-93-006-08,"480VoltUndervoltageRelaySettingsandTestAcceptanceCriteria."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-225DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4&puhdlIDeoradadForiuushnhon0pfyFigureB3.3.4-1DGLOPInstrumentationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-226DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4figureB3.3.4-1DGLOPInstrumentationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-227DraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentation83.3.4CoLta'inmerit':,~VentsWationi!Iso'IatIoanInstrumentatIonB3.3.5B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.5Lon'taifififi,re~,',YQAgi;:.I'.h'ted'ii',:"'Lsol;:at:;~'bqInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDCo'nta,"rijghrjt;;ifg::,~.:;Tit'.:,j.ip.:~~::.ipljt,.':j-,~qI:;Co!'3i3e3i!,:;::;',:':,Knjp'ije'eeI,',.e'd~@Sai',a'iid':,man'u'ai!',OO'et'ai'niiieiit!!Sjiainiiigde'S+;o'f(igjts'a't'o'o'n'!Inowtm.A~a.eitoooa3rtetoreemei'll!i'.::;ll'W:.'.~s.:::.ilia'lliiiii""iii"!'!lilith!i:;"",":min"!!t"'i'ePE'll!I'!Ll!!!Yi!:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-228DraftB ContainmentVenti1atibOPIM18taahInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESLi';,i'c'ciiRiribfd):,",':::::::i:';;ij,07i1;iffjri'ge".::;,';I'!!!ix'i!<'!!!<~!i'll'l<","i"'ll""i"'i<!i?i!i'i!"i<i!':"'lily<"""x"',".ll'"".llilia<!i%:::::?..4::::.'N'::.?<0::;.::;.0<.;:...::,.':xx<<<,q<.,:...::.k.:;x?:;~x;.".:;:i::4::::..:...;.5'h~'<<<xxM:'<.:M:.':?0?'I<>>'x4<<0<<<<:.:.".'%x::?<<d?'.::N<....',.'0?0?.;.':>.::<<?gd.?...,.<<<;.;x,:,I?<<,;:.';<:;.","?0?'0101o'00cil)i'd8ri.'i'i?i~0b~?e'Iji'x?I'0,:::":0FR!:";":100!pe.'::::xM'SaS.:;<<N<?<?X:;+?'<'M.g<x%'5<<..,<<X:;0?<<;:;;<;:<<<.0?,";0?....'...<<4<:,:0??I?0;;":".';.y'.0<<0+8k<:<x?000?':'.<<'.:0?0?'<?:'.N?<?YPerSNxSgNi'Mx<:.)gjg%%%>@@AM'<<!<x?Nx<'NxM4'x(<<?x<<m~?<<x'<<<<xVY<<xx%i0z'<<<<<gxNih~~x'<<<?xx<<xc<<<<<<0??<<<<<<<<<<<~xV%R?<?><?4%4<<?<<<x<<~~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-229DraftB ContainmentVentilatibOPIMlStaohInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESsos::;@conic.nu'eaj~stH&view~~~~1v.IW~~a'nuaf~C'n'f:tf'dt'>3'0'0i%Re'tO,',-'i;:.;neo~tea;,::,::;siss+oh'aiiielS::to:;.",be,:.:OPfRQAT~!;-'titsSpi,jest'o);;,:::;::c0'omo'Oneht%,'::::,iii';-';:::the':iaot'o~ati'og:::i1'jii'als;;"ato't'os'tie:,-:Io'1)',;oo'sirji,.,':0Eaoii::::::oehaiiiiP;;::;::jjiis'oats',:::,:ofFo'npi::;:jjiish,;ibitton'::,::"and+b'be,Ci"nit'eii'oso'nine'S't1,"n'g':!'i't'i!'1bn'g!t'o",::i!thne:"'a'otiiatisoneilo'j$ii'a'b%netqsmsetsetttssao::-;,101!;.;::-::,:;-;!~i':;:-.:--'i:,-,,-::-,:,:"w,'-As!',oi,',lees'sii:"',:.'s'~',rje'le,'.'..i;amndoii7~:,"".fii"l':i~utoma';~a!,,':A~cuats~oo;:,.L::o,'pij~riP<:;Auto'ski,8'p'itsj!,;,:.,Manoa3I'a/I'ii'i'ts'a'ti'o'n,'!-:aiid'i,'ECihkgj',rjmsssesssatsessssssashsi'o'miien's"at'oer'i~~:yi6'i"u're's~",,':for;.":,'",'t'h"i's.-:,:igiiS"'(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-230DraftB ContainmentVenti1atibOPIB618taohInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESji"n'M'ruiiie)iLeis'i':1i't'i;~jj'!'Iso'1,'atj'ori'~g'emaji'is":;.::OPERABL'0>',feat'iii~e'it'ai".';il.',:.'na"ec'ei'w'i:,y~fo'i'"::.4'imp'~'jt'ol(%iiiii.','..",'~ContNTiNen85Isol:aAMoii':'Rege~::;:.:Vp>.:.ECOh'3",,':3'::.'.<1";93ct'i::dn"':-p';:,;::,:'.;:::for'::;"',.j',lip;;,i'.shiit'ii'iic't't'n'na.",i'a'n'd:-','ra'q'ii'ii~'iii'ia'n't'a":i:""JJ""c!ilialaaiimanta!sKa;:-::HT.u-na'i%I:n%!':Faian)4jet'CD3"32-"'FU6b"2-~a~Yfbr'ING""'>nsks~twn9Fun'Ctli'OnS:;,.."a'n'd.;.::brae'..qM."rement'i:.:;.+i;<r~~".~i~p~~,m.~N'<cd":"c.ixx:cx:.?..:'paaca..Ma:>-.Ma~manMc'a:ca'a.,xxaxaaMcshcnaacpSc~~fx'c'pxcg~xSSSxaaNXWRmg'NN"~~WNVNgxixxg'm'cc~ZMaa"~~amaS~&aM~a~c@'auw~x"<<we~~~'Qxxi~i~iaxaA~a~'i'~~LPf,',LQ:CAB!'iiiaiii,"...!a'!ii'4!ii:,.'i!i:.:!'a'I::":a"c'"""a!i!wl'i!iiia!ac't'hi!'i:-,i),:,'-,",ill'otlcc-:-:::-,:5!ii-,"chc!:,,',!!I!i","t-:,,If!-im,-,-d1!:,!!an~!;..c:.-,,gp,,-W.ii:::.",:.::.;::!'i!':;.:*'-"i,';:,',";:ciii;--.:-:,.'lc!',:;-::.gaia,".,".',::-;-:::.,i',:;.,in'.:,,:,'c:*.",'i!i'::-,'::,'i.*.'..i':::.i.;,;!a!:::::.'::-ilia"-;"'i'ii::'-".eccl:::.':::t'i'::::::i'I!i'i'i':::*:i",:ii':".'ll',':.":::-;-'!i'i'i':::"'.mai::"::,i":::.:,:::,,:..::'i(ia:R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-231(continued)DraftB

IContainmentPurgeandExhauhoPIBGlltaohInstrumentation83.3.5BASES(continued)ACT:.:IONS"-:'-4".,'j~PZ'::.'te't'a1Je>le'e'eij'0f,.ifdee'et!'tell'y',:,:!';",::::Thhhti'det'ea&1ll8t10e:;:::;!hi:geaeY~a'1!pigO',:8etch~as!b~pjidadde:::tjfj::t,:.htefACl'.j0'HS@t~;il:a:,jifj,:::th,.the.":,C'eiidiIti:'id~i,:,::ije-,.":ee.,teiedi:,,f~e'i,'"ithatdF,e'acti"lee,c";400iNjat;I0'o'."""A~Ppp'1!'fes;.""".t'o".th6'~i@'1lmMl";6".";0f:.','>~00e"'.coAta'f'ANeAtC'e'e'eei'jeto,pm'o'i::'e,';.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-232(continued)DraftB

ContainmentPurgeandExhauhoPIB618taobInstrumentationB3.3.5BASES8R;-"..'.-:8';!3'".8'.."I1FeeFNOH'tiila'ede,'""-:eif::::-",Eben!CIiAjiNELbiCjECK'icode,';:leVej!jj@p',::heeli'e.:;;:Oeedj'eexiii~ti)me'r'itat'i'e,'ei'i",."oo'et'i'a'ues'jtoi':,::o'pxiii't'HANNE~L-"::::::CA~L,joBR'AT~ION;:Adi;ei,'mali',ei;i%i,i;i:y',:."~~~,'-:deatjvji'nedi;;br'Eh~e;:,,piiiaaet~emtefFji::beead'it!:.ig,:::iili:..i.,ei'!iliiiie8:--ch::,',jii~!m,p,,,:.atilt;i.I~I!!ii::::,,**;;.:pi:.:!,.,::TI!'ee'ehiii'a't'ed,';"jj'i'th%th'ii'l',L'CO~!'ie'jjiiied,:::,:ohaehei'j+e".:,RV.'.3l;:.:~3'FS.:~$djl'Fhii'i'tioh,::;:gjjh'e~I::F.cgi@rlt'j05'jpi'.o'cddltd&'::!',to%era'ice::R.E.GinnaNuc1earPowerPlantB3.3-234(continued)DraftB

d ~CSBASESContainmentPurgeandExhauh6PIM18taohInstrumentation83.3.5gfEftREWcEs.::,:!Pk~9!:::::-:,~Vl-QQ~GFR7:00::,":,kgAaQ'jsh<Fi36L;.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cxlvOraftB LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4~p,4NxSe&NM'8IICJSWIIQRII!!!!ii:-:::::.,'::::-:::)!ill,,i!CIINTS'i+:,,@~i:::::'::,:::-:,i,;::,:--3:-'eg,-,i!i:-,,--',"tW..-'tf'h,,,b,95'3;i'w$i~j5'f,':,:,:wi'dfoa'c'tie'jtj'-'~Thissyst'misdescribedintheBasesForLCO3.7.9,"C'ontrolRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)."ThisLCOonlyaddressestheactuationinstrumentationforthehighradiationstateCREATSModeF.ThehighradiationstateCREATSModeFactuationinstrumentationconsistsofnoblegas(R-36),particulate(R-37),andiodine(R-38)radiationmonitors.ThesedetectorsarelocatedontheoperatinglevelontheTurbineBuildingandutilizeacommonairsupplypump.AhighradiationsignalfromanyofthesedetectorswillinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolateeachairsupplypathwithtwodampers.ThecontrolroomoperatorcanalsoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolatetheairsupplypathsbyusingamanualpushbuttoninthecontrolroom.APPLICABLEThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinSAFETYANALYSESthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.TheCREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinMODESI,2,3,and4;asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.I).ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiator,andnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cxlviDraftB

CREAKBPADGuSta0hInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESInMODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuel-assemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityin-theeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.TheCREATSActuationInstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3goftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequirementsensurethatinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSisOPERABLE.1.ManualInitiationTheLCOrequiresonetraintobeOPERABLE.Thetrainconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogic.TheoperatorcaninitiatetheCREATSFiltrationtrainatanytimebyusingapushbuttoninthecontrolroom.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentsinthesamemannerasanyoftheautomaticactuationsignalsrequiredbythisLCO.2.AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasTheLCOrequiresonetrainofActuationLogicandActuationRelaystobeOPERABLE.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsystem,includingtheinitiationrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheCREATS.3.ControlRoomRadiationIntakeMonitorTheLCOspecifiessinglechannelsofiodine(R-38),noblegas(R-36),andparticulate(R-37)oftheControlRoomIntakeMonitorstoensurethattheradiationmonitoringinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolationdampersremainsOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cxlviiDraftB CREAKOPAD6uStaobInstrumentationB3.3'.6BASESAPPLICABILITYQo~W+~InMODES1,2,3,and4,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDesignBasisAccident.InMODE5or6,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSThemostcommoncauseofchannelinoperabilityisfailureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesufficienttoexceedthetoleranceallowedbytheplantspecificcalibrationprocedures.Typically,thedriftisfoundtobesmallandresultsinadelayofactuationratherthanatotallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymadeduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whentheprocessinstrumentationissetupforadjustmenttobringitwithinspecification.The"asleft"TripSetpointmustbewithinthetolerancespecifiedbythecalibrationprocedure.Ifthe"asfound"TripSetpointexceedsthelimitsspecifiedinTable3.3.5-1,thechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableimmediatelyandtheappropriateConditionentered.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONSindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.The,ConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.5-1intheaccompanyingLCO.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel/trainofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cxlviiiDraftB CREAKOPADGuStanhInstrumentationB3.3.6BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cxlixDraftB CREAHPADCuStaohInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESA.lConditionAappliestooneormoreFunctionswithone~channeloftheCREATSactuationinstrumentationinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-clDraftB CREAKSPAOGuStaahInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESInthisConditionforthemanualinitiationtraininoperableoraradiationmonitorchannelinoperable,theremainingCREATSactuationinstrumentationisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbuttheactuationtimeorresponsivenessoftheCREATSmaybeaffected.InthisConditionfortheautomaticactuationlogictraininoperableorallradiationmonitorchannelsinoperable,theCREATSisnotcapableofperformingitsintendedautomaticfunction.Thisisconsideredalossofsafetyfunction.TheCREATS,however,may'stillbecapable,ofbeingplacedinCREATSModeFbymanualoperatoractions.TheIhourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoautomaticallyisolatethecontrolroomorbemanuallyisolatedbytheoperator.TheRequiredActionforConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-cliDraftB CREAK8PADCuStavhInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESFACT'lQNSB.landB.2ConditionBapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetandtheplantisinMODEI,2,3,or4.TheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbe.broughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachthe.requiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-cliiDraftB

CREAHPADCuStaobInstrumentationB3.3.6BASES691C.2andC.3ConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetinHODE5,or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoretheinoperablechannel(s)er-4rai~toOPERABLEstatustoensureadequateisolationcapabilityintheeventofawastegasdecaytankrupture.HovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesandCOREALTERATIONSmustalsobesuspendedimmediatelytoreducetheriskofaccidentsthatwouldrequireCREATSactuation.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementoffuelorothercomponents.toasafeposition.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3-.3-;6-43"';':3Y6':-',~f:determineswhichSRsapplytowhichCREATSActuationFunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-cliiiDraftB CREAKOPAD6uStaahInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESiquuR(HS'TSThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTonceevery92daysoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.ThistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidetheautomaticCREATSactuation.Thesetpointsshallbeleftconsistentwiththeplantspecificcalibrationproceduretolerance.TheFrequencyof92daysisbasedontheknownreliabilityofthemonitoringequipmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience..:.3'::3!i!5!i::ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheHanualActuationFunctionsevery24months.TheManualActuation.Functionistestedupto,andincluding,themasterrelayC011S.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-clivDraftB CREAKSPADGuStaohInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESTheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionandtheredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsbecausetheManualInitiationFunctionhasnosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3-.MD-.NY3Y6"".3.ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-clvDraft8

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.13.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEN(RCS)3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsLCO3.4.1RCSDNBparametersforpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrateshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.-NOTEPressurizerpressurelimitdoesnotapplyduringpressuretransientsdueto:a.THERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminute;orb.THERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreRCSDNBparametersnotwithinlimits.A.1RestoreRCSDNBparameter(s)towithinlimit.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.1BeinMODE2.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-1Draft8 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.1.1VerifypressurizerpressureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.4.1.2VerifyRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.4.1.3-NOTE-------Requiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafter~95%RTP.VerifyRCStotalflowrateiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-2DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.23.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityLCO3.4.2EachRCSloopaveragetemperature(T.,)shallbez540F.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk))+1o0oACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.T.,inoneorbothRCSloopsnotwithinlimit.A.lBeinMODE2withK,<<<1.0.30minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSRVej;:,j"fj4"'c'~p";,'j"j~<',4P~~j'igg-)!T..",:ii':,"':,i":'"!hi(iiI:-',:-lE'46:-;,!F;;Q,:i',:t.h),"n':-:;.','30'c&it:I;o'Nl~i'tv/~4K%.A;4y;4%~%47.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-3DraftB RCSHinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.2VerifyRCST,,ineachloop~540F,Oncewithin30minutesandevery30minutesthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-4DraftB RCSP/TLimits3.4.33.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsLCO3.4.3RCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:Atalltimes.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE---------RequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.A.1ANDA.2Restoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.30minutes72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.8.1ANDB~2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5withRCSpressure<500psig.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-ivDraftB RCSP/TLimits3.4.3CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHE---------NOTE---------CRequiredActionC.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.IRequirementsofLCOnotmetanytimeinotherthanHODE1,2,3,or4.C.1ANDC.2Initiateactiontorestoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.ImmediatelyPriortoenteringHODE4SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.3.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperationsandRCSinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.VerifyRCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesarewithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.30minutesR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-vDraftB RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP3.4.43.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.4RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPLCO3.4.4TwoRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE1>8.5%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsofLCOnotmet.A.1BeinMODE18'%RTP~6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.4.1VerifyeachRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-viDraftB RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.53,4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.5RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3LCO3.4.5TwoRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTE-Bothreactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedinMODE3fors1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.APPLICABILITY:MODES1~8.5%RTP>MODES2and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRCSloopinoperable.-------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1VerifySDMiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ANDA.2RestoreinoperableRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper12hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-viiDraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE4.12hoursC.BothRCSloopsinoperable.ORNoRCSloopinoperation.C.1De-energizeallCRDHs.ANDC.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyC.3InitiateactiontorestoreoneRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationsImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3,4.5.1VerifyrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.5.2Verifysteamgeneratorsecondarysidewaterlevelsarea16%fortwoRCSloops.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-viiiDraft8 RCSLoops-MODESI~8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5ACTIONScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.5.3VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredRCPthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-ixDraftB RCSLoops-MODE43.4.63.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4LCO3'.6TwoloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSloopsandresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTESl.Allreactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedforsIhourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.NoRCPshallbestartedwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a.Thesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachsteamgenerator(SG)is~50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;orb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).APPLICABILITY:MODE4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xDraftB RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRCSloopinoperable.ANDTwoRHRloopsinoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDTwoRCSloopsinoperable.-------------NOTE------------RequiredActionB.1isnotapplicableifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperableandConditionCisentered.24hoursB.1BeinMODE5.C.AllRCSandRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRCSorRHRloopinoperation.C.1ANDC.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreonelooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xiDraftB RCSLoops-NODE43.4.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.6.1VerifyoneRHRorRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.6.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelis~16%foreachrequiredRCSloop.12hoursSR3.4.6.3Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xiiDraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.73.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledLCO3.4.7Oneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation,andeither:a.OneadditionalRHRloopshallbeOPERABLE;orb.Thesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastonesteamgenerator(SG)shallbe>16%.NOTES-1.TheRHRpumpoftheloopinoperationmaybede-energizedfor<1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.OnerequiredRHRloopmaybeinoperablefors2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.3.NoreactorcoolantpumpshallbestartedwithoneormoreRCScoldlegtemperatureslessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a.ThesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGiss50FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;Olb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).4.AllRHRloopsmayberemovedfromoperationduringplannedheatuptoMODE4whenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsfilled.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xiiiDraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDA.lInitiateactiontorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyBothSGssecondarysidewaterlevelsnotwithinlimits.ORA.2InitiateactiontorestorerequiredSGsecondarysidewaterlevelstowithinlimits.Immediately8;',">ISuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.ImmediatelyANDepee-aMea-.B.,Bo,,:h",:-';.RHR!.'=;1,:o,'os:n'.noper'ab'1,4:;iri'<<ci6+ce<6>4$w'o'Ca'4OR8.2InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyN':":RAR';:::)'o'oop;.:,":n'o'j'er','a.",'j:'o'ii"..'."-'iPNwhw44NvNcorsivSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.7.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3,4-xivDraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.7.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelis)16%intherequiredSG.12hours(continued)SR3.4.7.3VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xvDraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.83.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLCO3.4.8Tworesidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTES-1.AllRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfors15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanotherprovided:'a~NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature;andc,NodrainingoperationstofurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumearepermitted.2.OneRHRloopmaybeinoperablefor~2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsnotfilled.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestoreRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xviDraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.8CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSlSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.8.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.8.2VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotheRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xviiDraftB Pressurizer3.4.93.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.9PressurizerLCO3.4.9ThepressurizershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Pressurizerwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.lBeinMODE3withreactortripbreakersopen.ANDA.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursB.Pressurizerheaterscapacitynotwithinlimits.B.1BeinMODE3.AND8.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hours4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xviiiDraftB Pressurizer3.4.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.9.1Verifypressurizerwaterlevelis~87%.12hoursSR3.4.9.2Verifytotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis~100Kw.92daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xixDraft8 PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.103.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesLCO3.4.10TwopressurizersafetyvalvesshallbeOPERABLEwithliftsettings)2410psigande~54:psig.25MOAPPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3,MODE4withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA,Onepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable.A.IRestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus'5minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.ORBothpressurizersafetyvalvesinoperable.B.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4withanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxDraftB PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.10SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.10.1NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin36hoursofenteringMODE4fromMODE5withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditionsonlyprovidedapreliminarycoldsettingwasmadepriortoheatup.VerifyeachpressurizersafetyvalveisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxiDraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.113.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM'(RCS)3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)LCO3.4.11EachPORVandassociatedblockvalveshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES-1.SeparateentryintoConditionAisallowedforeachPORV.2.SeparateentryintoConditionCisallowedforeachblockvalve.3.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneorbothPORVsOPERABLEandnotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled.A.1Closeandmaintainpowertoassociatedblockvalve.ORA.2PlaceassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxiiDraft8 PressurizerPORVs3.4.11CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEB.OnePORVinoperable.B.1Closeassociatedblockvalve.1hourANDB.2Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve.1hourANDB.3RestorePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hours1hourC.cent%-Dne~gbl,'ockv-ajvej1'iiop'e'r,"abl~8.~ON-&7."'",d'hg'S'4-hear-sG,'-"jl~P~lac'e:':isjocj':a't'e'd:."',)PORVgi'iimaiiU'a.;;c'ontro;':~YMxM&SxiiPFSr44iM'.isa4>.'.Q:')INOPERABLE'~i'ta'aliisi~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxiiiDraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.8'ii"th~i:iioper~ablh,.h<&)..4.<V%<<4h<)k~5':,',/OursPf,.'i'i'ii';"is~0'<i,",iat'e~dkPORVs:,<<i',iiajiua:,:;:.",:contro,3)4h4-""hhwh.<<<M"AÃ94<<;h%'AND'yWS'<.~Wrh'hr;"'hS',hWh<,h;<h;,W<:<<'h<<<V'C:<W.h.<<<W%VN"'"""".b.:'liock',,.'i'a~1kve,'.;'t.'o"'"OPERABL."'E'~:,:s'ta.tus';;~72;:;:,::::hours(continued).4q'ua),';e',::,::,::get'q,'os:,;:,;:a'$;s's'o',c$::;a'ted;;.".'C'oljf'et'i~,'onK-'::1'.;::,.;:::,!g.,-,,:.::":.:::Be::.',::,.i:n":;:,'NODE::,','3.'A'N5h'<h<<wh6::',hour,sK:.'.::2:,:::<:;,:.:".".",",'."',::":,::.B;e'.:-:,i'",:...'NODE-.'::::;::;4';:::'.SN<w<<<VWYh'lYN<'O'IW'hh<hVR+$'N<')h<<khYhGk:12'::;:::hours:.<<h<&,<7.<$:gRC~4~li'.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxivDraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEFPTwoPORVsinoperable.K,F>.1InitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.ANDKF<.2Closeassociatedblockvalves.ANDK,.F>.3Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalves.ANDKF:..4BeinMODE3withT,,(500'FImmediately1hour1hour8hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxvDraftB PressurizerPORVs3.4.11SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.11.1NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedwithblockvalveclosedpeY:.::::L'CQ,:::;::.".3:;:::4!::1'8..Performacompletecycleofeachblockvalve.92daysSR3.4.11.2PerformacompletecycleofeachPORV.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxviDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.123.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemLCO3.4.12AnLTOPSystemshallbeOPERABLEwiththeEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem.(gC~CS:,:::::.:':accumulatorsisolatedandeiheraorbbelow.a.Twopoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)withliftsettingswithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLRandnosafetyinjection(SI)pumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.b,TheRCSdepressurizedandanRCSventof>1.1squareinchesandamaximumofoneSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.2.-NOTESThePORVsandanRCSvent>1.1squareinchesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictests.However,noSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.~E)C!S!i'i!iiiiiiiii'i'i!";i,:...'lliwhenaccumul"a'tor'ressure"'isgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorwhentheRHRsystemisintheRHRmodeofoperation,MODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,MODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxviiDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.FBOj'ly,'..":Fpp'1;::;:icab1~e~4o:,.'LCQ>>w>;gyve:.,<:.yap.qppygypOneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxviiiDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEKB.IRestorerequiredPORVtoOPERABLEstatus.7days42-he~e4$ee4edaccomu&4er-4e4-heur-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxixDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEK.IRestorerequiredPORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72-~,hoursOnerequiredPORVinoperableinMODE5orMODE6.xv,vSTgogjoi',-,::more,:;."S.'I";:.j'umpj-ea'p'able',:>a'f..:-;'>)i'i'joe'tj)ig:i.'nt':o',:.:::;.the..;:,-',,R~CS;:"~.,;~..~~~j'::-:.;a'.,::,iiiakimUj,,",'of;'o'.n'.e.",":~.::'::,:j'u"m'p.;',".',':.'s""'apjb'I:k(0tg))nyet)'.,n9'Imme'd4.:o'lar(IR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.".>'An:.::ECCS.":.,'ac'ciIAijl';atornot;,:",i,,:'sol"a't'eda."when,'",'."the:hdiumul,atda;-;:pfi'ess<UY<~Iii;:,",:;great'er,,:,:-'Itligii'.'",",'o'rI'equi'ia:.,'Ij,:;..;t)i";::--,th',.:,)$a'xj'mugRCS'.;::::pre's's'ur'eifor,,"'the't)iii'ji'ei'fgt'uri".'::'::'.'hlil'aw'i!Ch!1'<<~thii!~~PTI;S~!='<a'coumu'.,:,"a'.'oi:.,'""'"'""":<R<<N<<i%<<.'<'<l<:04:g':R&qul,:r8~(lg'ACt1.,0'A$kkndi~'P)<%<~yggc)fx<<&y<.<~<~<DAogjR>C>SP<<yhQlyd~l<.,-::.,t';,em<p,era'0'ii'r,'e'.;:,.."to:.'jre'at'er;:,::,,:tha'ri'::;:;;:the.':::L'TOP,'e'n',abl,e;:~jt'e'iij'p"ira't<u'r'.;.'.e"'"""s'p,'e,'c'i'.'f;:;i,ed~~i',,n:i",the'",PTL'R".';'1:2;.".':h.ou"r's,,";.2.,::.".',::",::::;:::,:~jj0epi.:.;ess'uri..:.z'e;::;:::;:aiiecte'iFi%:;<):<,;'j',,"~0.;'g,',ff,,'d'"')cciim'u:,,'a't'oi',,'::.;:to':.'~:,'e'ss'""'th'a'riIIIthe'I'm'a'p'mu'mI!RCI:Sp'r.',e's.'s,iire';,.';,:::,'fo',.;.';::::;eII,is',t)'ngcol,d",,:;;l,eg':'.."'teijip6rature:i:1"loied!<::3n~~.t)i'e::.',.PTL<'R",;<j<2~w'gv<<.y<x'<<:<<'~.;x:yx<tyx<,x~<<<dR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxiDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTINE3,:::,'4:'Q'2',,'a'i:;"ORG.1ANDVerifyatleastonechargingpumpisinthepull-stoppositions1hourie'0,:i,::repjPci:.i'on',::,::,'::ana;ii'iiii,ated~,,C~iii)l,it'$'o'n:G.2DepressurizeRCSandestablishRCSventof~1.1squareinches.8hours.:t'hiiiY::;C'o'n'di',:t"ion'".;,:,A.'":"::::::,::8.:,'"~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3'.12.a.VerifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hoursSR3.4.12.2NOTE---OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxiiDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY(continued)SR3.4.12.3-NOTE-Onlyrequiredtobeperformedwhen$CCSaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.VerifyeachECC8;.'.'~accumulatormotoroperatedisolationva'Iveisclosed.R-hear-@OS'ce-w",:i:th'in'.'",-.,'":,:1~2>:,':4'o'ur,:,.san'd,";eve',eryg'.:12.'oui':s:the'i":,:catt'ii',"SR3.4.12.4-NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyRCSvent~1.1squareinchesopen.12hoursforunlockedopenventvalve(s)AND31daysforlockedopenventvalve(s)SR3.4.12.5VerifyPORVblockvalveisopenforeachrequiredPORV.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxiiiDraftB LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.6-NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.PerformaCOToneachrequiredPORV,excludingactuation.31daysSR3.4.12.7-NOTE-Onlyrequiredtobeperformedwhen.ECCSaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthan'"orequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.VerifypowerisremovedfromeachECCSaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperator.Onc'::.:::wj'thj'n~l':8h'our".s'::::,a'n'd'v'e'r'y':"0'+>i)x4'.c4>k'~ur44';,c31daysth'e'r'4'af>t."e.r.:SR3.4.12.8PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachrequiredPORVactuationchannel.24monthsR.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxivDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.133.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGELCO3.4.13RCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE;b.1gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.10gpmidentifiedLEAKAGE;andd.0.1gpmtotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEthrougheachsteamgenerator(SG)whenaveragedover24hours.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RCSLEAKAGEnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.A,lReduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimits.4hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxvDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.13CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.PregraeReqji,i);:edl~Acti";on:anp".astro'c'j:a:.'eCoiiyi"'.l'eti,'.o~n'""Tk~iiiinot~et.CB,.IBeinMODE3.ANDG8.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursORRCSpressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxviDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.13.1-NOTE----------Onlyrequiredtobeperformedduringsteadystateoperation.PerformRCSwaterinventorybalance.Onceduringinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationAND72hoursthereafterSR3.4.13.2VerifysteamgeneratortubeintegrityisinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxviiDraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.143.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageLCO3.4.14LeakagefromeachRCSPIVshallbewithinlimit.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSNOTES-1.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachflowpath.2.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyaninoperablePIV.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreflowpathswithleakagefromoneormoreRCSPIVsnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------EachvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.landRequiredActionA.2musthavebeenverifiedtomeetSR3.4.14.1orSR3.4.14.2andbeinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxviiiII'raftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.1Isolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofoneclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.4hoursANDA.2IsolatethehighpressureportionoftheafFectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofasecondclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.AND6hoursB.2BeinMODE5.36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xxxixDraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.1NOTES-1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringNODE2fromNODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIcoldleginjectionlineandeachRHRRCSPIVisequivalentto~0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure>2215psigands2255psig.24monthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalve(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlDraftB RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.2-----NOTES-1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringMODE2fromMODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIhotleginjectionlineRCSPIVisequivalenttos0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure>2215psigand<2255psig.40monthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalveR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xliDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.153.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationLCO3.4.15ThefollowingRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationshallbeOPERABLE:a.OnecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuation);andb.Onecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(gaseousorparticulate).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.l.1PerformSR3.4.13.1.ORA.1.2VerifycontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLE.ANDOnceper24hours24hoursA.2RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlssDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Requiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.-----------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.B.1.1Analyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.OROnceper24hours8.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1.Onceper24hoursANDB.2Restorerequiredcontainmentatmosphere radioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlsslDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMECDRequiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.AND'articulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable,------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.C.1.1Analyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.ORC.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1Onceper24hoursOnceper24hoursANDC.2.1RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysORC.2.2RestoreparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE,Allrequiredmonitorsinoperable.EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlivDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.15.1PerformCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.12hoursSR3.4.15.2PerformCOToftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.92daysSR3.4.15.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitor.24monthsSR3.4.15.4PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlvDraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.163.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityLCO3.4.16Thespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withRCSaveragetemperature(T.,)>500F.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-,131specificactivitynotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1ANDA.2VerifyDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131withintheacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.RestoreDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131towithinlimit.Onceper8hours7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.ORDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivityintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.B.1BeinMODE3withT,,(500F.8hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlviDraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)HOVEC-.C,NOVC4Grossspecificactivitynotwithinlimit.BeinMODE3withT,,<500'F.8hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.16.1Verifyreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivity~100/EyCi/gm.7daysSR3.4.16.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1.VerifyreactorcoolantDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131specificactivity<1.0pCi/gm.14daysANDBetween2and10hoursafteraTHERMALPOWERchangeof15%RTPwithina1hourperiodR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlviiDraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY(continued)SR3.4.16.3-NOTE---------------OnlyrequiredtobeperformedinNODE1'e-e$'qQ~8-heur-s.g<DetermineEfromareactorcoolantsample.484-4aysOii'cev;<.P..<<.yywi;%jibn,:.:";:,3'1:;:;:,:dass:aft;ei::.;:a',:;min:im0$o,f.'.":::,:3':,:.effe'c6',v:.e;fj::l:1'::::;p'ow'ei",:::,dajj'a'nd;::::2O",..".:,day'.:s"-:'.:o'fjNO<DE<',.:.:1'..,,o"pe"r5',tj:,'oii:.,,'h:a',v'e'eja'j':s',ed,",:,",~".i;ii'c'.~"th',",...::re,'actoi;-:,':,::)its!<,'a','.ubcr,:;.1':1ca'lp':;fol(~48<jhOur8.",:ANDR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlviiiDraftB RCSSpecificActivity3.4.162CDC3I-0-)I-OOUUJQ.CAllJCILllllJCOOC5IOOOCLOOillCC30025020015010050THISFIGUREFORILLUSTRATIONONLY.DONOTUSEFOROPERATION.UNACCEPTABLEOPERATIONACCEPTABLEOPERATIONCDE302030405080708090100PERCENTOFRATEDTHERMALPOWERFigure3.4.16-1(page1of1)ReactorCoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131SpecificActivityLimitVersusPercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-xlixDraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheseBasesaddressrequirementsformaintainingRCSpressure,temperature,andflowratewithinlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalyses(Ref.1)ofnormaloperatingconditionsandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesassumeinitialconditionswithinthenormalsteadystateenvelope.ThelimitsplacedonRCSpressure,temperature,andflowrateensurethatthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designcriterionwillbemetforeachofthetransientsanalyzed.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1,52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-1DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-1andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationisappliedintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30.TheRCSpressurelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithoperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Pressurizerpressureindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerpressurewillcausethereactorcoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithfullpoweroperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Indicationsoftemperatureareaveragedtodetermineavalueforcomparisontothelimit,Ahigheraveragetemperaturewillcause,thecoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCSflowrateasspecifiedintheCOLR,normallyremainsconstantduringanoperationalfuelcyclewithbothpumpsrunning.TheminimumRCSflowlimitcorrespondstothatassumedforDNBanalyses.Flowrateindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerRCSflowwillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.OperationforsignificantperiodsoftimeoutsidetheseDNBlimitsincreasesthelikelihoodofafuelcladdingfailureinaDNBlimitedevent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-2(continued)DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherequirementsofthisLCOrepresenttheinitialconditionsforDNBlimitedtransientsanalyzedintheplantsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).ThesafetyanalyseshaveshownthattransientsinitiatedfromthelimitsofthisLCOwillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion.ThisistheacceptancelimitfortheRCSDNBparameters.ChangestotheplantthatcouldimpacttheseparametersmustbeassessedfortheirimpactontheDNBdesigncriterion.Thetransientsanalyzedincludelossofcoolantfloweventsanddroppedorstuckrodevents.AkeyassumptionfortheanalysisoftheseeventsisthatthecorepowerdistributioniswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";andLCO3.2.4)"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(OPTR)."Thelimitforpressurizerpressureisbasedona+30psiginstrumentuncertainty.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatnominalpressureismaintainedat2235psig.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedpressureis2235psig.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitisbasedona+4Finstrumentuncertaintywhichincludesa+1.5'Fdeadband.ItisassumedthatnominalT.,ismaintainedwithin+1.5'Fof573.5'F.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedtemperatureiswithin1.5'Fofnominal,ThelimitforRCSflowrateisbasedonthenominalT.,andSGpluggingcriterialimit.Additionalmarginofapproximately3%isthenaddedforconservatism.TheRCSDNBparameterssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOspecifieslimitsonthemonitoredprocessvariables-pressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrate-toensurethecoreoperateswithinthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.OperatingwithintheselimitswillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterionintheeventofaDNBlimitedtransient.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-3(continued)DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESLCO(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethelimitonpressurizerpressureisnotapplicableduringshorttermoperationaltransientssuchasaTHERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminuteoraTHERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.Theseconditionsrepresentshorttermperturbationswhereactionstocontrolpressurevariationsmightbecounterproductive.Also,sincetheyrepresenttransientsinitiatedfrompowerlevels<100%RTP,anincreasedDNBRmarginexiststooffsetthetemporarypressurevariations.AnothersetoflimitsonDNBrelatedparametersisprovidedinSL2.1.1,"ReactorCoreSLs."ThoselimitsarelessrestrictivethanthelimitsofthisLCO,butviolationofaSafetyLimit(SL)meritsastricter,moresevereRequiredAction.ShouldaviolationofthisLCOoccur,theoperatormustcheckwhetherornotanSLmayhavebeenexceeded.APPLICABILITYInMODE1,thelimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCScoolantaveragetemperature,andRCSflowratemustbemaintainedduringsteadystateoperationinordertoensureDNBdesigncriteriawillbemetintheeventofanunplannedlossofforcedcoolantfloworotherDNBlimitedtransient.InMODE2,anincreasedDNBRmarginexists.InallotherMODES,thepowerlevelislowenoughthatDNBisnotaconcern.ACTIONSA.1RCSpressureandRCSaveragetemperaturearecontrollableandmeasurableparameters.WithoneorbothoftheseparametersnotwithinLCOlimits,actionmustbetakentorestoreparameter(s).RCStotalflowrateisnotacontrollableparameterandisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperation.IftheindicatedRCStotalflowrateisbelowtheLCOlimit,powermustbereduced,asrequiredbyRequiredActionB.1,torestoreDNBmarginandeliminatethepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-4(continued)Draft8 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)The2hourCompletionTimeforrestorationoftheparametersprovidessufficienttimetodeterminethecausefortheoffnormalcondition,toadjustplantparameters,andtorestorethereadingswithinlimits,andisbasedonplantoperatingexperience.8.1IfRequiredActionA.1isnotmetwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE2within6hours,InNODE2,thereducedpowerconditioneliminatesthepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonabletoreachtherequiredplantconditionsinanorderlymanner.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.1.1SinceRequiredActionA.1allowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforpressurizerpressureissufficienttoensurethepressurecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationand'overifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-5DraftB RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.1.2SinceRequiredActionA.1allowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforRCSaveragetemperatureissufficienttoensurethetemperaturecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.SR3.4.1.3MeasurementofRCStotalflowrateonceevery24monthsverifiestheactualRCSflowrateisgreaterthanorequaltotheminimumrequiredRCSflowrate.Thisverificationmaybeperformedviaaprecisioncalorimetricheatbalanceorotheracceptedmeans,TheFrequencyof24monthsreflectstheimportanceofverifyingflowafterarefuelingoutagewhenthecorehasbeenaltered,whichmayhavecausedanalterationofflowresistance.VerificationofRCSflowrateonashorterintervalisnotrequiredsincethisparameterisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperationastherearenoRCSloopisolationvalvesorotherinstalleddeviceswhichcouldsignificantlyalterflow.Reducedperformanceofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)wouldbeobservableduetobusvoltageandfrequencychanges,andinstalledalarmsthatwouldresultinoperatorinvestigation.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoMODE1,withouthavingperformedtheSR,andplacementoftheplantinthebestconditionforperformingtheSR.TheNotestatesthattheSRshallbeperformedwithin7daysafterreaching95%RTP.Thisexceptionisappropriatesincetheheatbalancerequirestheplanttobeataminimumof95%RTPtoobtainthestatedRCSflowaccuracies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-6Draft8 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESREFERENCESl.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NRCMemorandumfromE.L.Jordan,AssistantDirectorforTechnicalPrograms,DivisionofReactorOperationsInspectiontoDistribution;

Subject:

"DiscussionofLicensedPowerLevel(AITSFI4580H2),"datedAugust22,1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-7DraftB RCSHinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)B3.4.2RCSHinimumTemperatureforCriticalityBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisbaseduponmeetingseveralmajorconsiderationsbeforethereactorcanbemadecriticalandwhilethereactoriscritical.Thefirstconsiderationismoderatortemperaturecoefficient(HTC),LCO3-.4-A3~1'!:.3,"HoderatorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)."Inthetransientandaccidentanalyses,theHTCisassumedtobeinarangefromslightlypositivetonegativeandtheoperatingtemperatureisassumedtobewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopewhilethereactoriscritical.TheLCOonminimumtemperatureforcriticalityhelpsensuretheplantisoperatedconsistentwiththeseassumptions.Thesecondconsiderationistheprotectiveinstrumentation.Becausecertainprotectiveinstrumentation(e.g.,excoreneutrondetectors)canbeaffectedbymoderatortemperature,atemperaturevaluewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosentoensureproperindicationandresponsewhilethereactorisc'ritical.Thethir'dconsiderationisthepressurizeroperatingcharacteristics.Thetransientandaccidentanalysesassumethatthepressurizeriswithinitsnormalstartupandoperatingrange(i.e.,saturatedconditionsandsteambubblepresent).ItisalsoassumedthattheRCStemperatureiswithinitsnormalexpectedrangeforstartupandpoweropetation.SincethedensityoftheRCSwater,andhencetheresponseofthepressurizertotransients,dependsupontheinitialtemperatureofthemoderato'r,aminimumvalueformoderatortemperaturewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosen.Thefourthconsiderationisthatthereactorvesselisaboveitsminimumnilductilityreferencetemperaturewhenthereactoriscritical.R.E,GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-8(continued)DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAlthoughtheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotitselfaninitialconditionassumedinDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs),thecloselyalignedtemperatureforhotzeropower(HZP)isaprocessvariablethatisaninitialconditionof.DBAs,suchastherodclustercontrolassembly(RCCA)withdrawal,RCCAejection,andmainsteamlinebreakaccidentsperformedatzeropowerthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.AlllowpowersafetyanalysesassumeinitialRCSlooptemperaturesgreaterthanorequaltotheHZPtemperatureof547F.Theminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimitationprovidesasmallband,7'F,forcriticaloperationbelowHZP.ThisbandallowscriticaloperationbelowHZPduringplantstartupanddoesnotadverselyaffectanysafetyanalysessincetheHTCisnotsignificantlyaffectedbythesmalltemperaturedifferencebetweenHZPandtheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOCompliancewiththeLCOensuresthatthereactorwillnotbemadeormaintainedcritical(k,<<a1.0)atatemperaturelessthanasmallbandbelowtheHZPtemperature,whichisassumedinthesafetyanalysis.FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYInNODE1,andNODE2withk,<<a1.0,LCO3.4.2isapplicablesincethereactorcanonlybecritical(k,<<a1.0)intheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-9DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality83.4.2BASESAPPLICABILITY6~~(continued)ThespecialtestexceptionofLCO8-.4-.Ã3,'.",":1:;:,':8.,O~B~PHYSICSTESTSKxeepÃ~asJx'cept1oos.':,:-,.',:.",I10DE4~2,"permitsPHYSICSTESTStobeperformedat~5i'TPwithRCSloopaveragetemperaturesslightlylowerthannormallyallowedsothatfundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthecorecanbeverified.Inorderfornuclearcharacteristicstobeaccuratelymeasured,itmaybenecessarytooperateoutsidethenormalrestrictionsofthisLCO.Forexample,tomeasuretheMTCatbeginningofcycle,itisnecessarytoallowRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowT...~,whichmaycauseRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowthetemperaturelimitofthisLCO.TheneedtoperFormthePHYSICSTESTStoensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwithdesignpredictionsprovidessufficientjustificationtoallowatemporarydecreaseintheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimit.ACTIONSA.1Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitcannotberestored,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withK.<<<1.0within30minutes.Rapidreactorshutdowncanbereadilyandpracticallyachievedwithina30minuteperiodduetotheproximitytoMODE2conditions.Theallowedtimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE2withK,<<<1.0inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS'SR3.4.2.1!7I!i-:i!8R-::,':--:,,:iiitii':---'-i:::::::li.,f,:.':::,:,Rc'be'1'".n'g',.:'.iiia'3'n'ta::iiiedjx~vea~.~awNMw'A'4N%NvvNcexvhYMY7YNhNsswoNhNcoN'AilxxeexYYewN'.'NNww'vx4wNAant(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-10DraftB RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESSUAVEILL'ANCE::,'":::;;":.:,:.,~::::,:.','-:.:';!SRi~"-::3.-":.4'.:.2'2'"~i~('c'on%";:iui'd)".:RE(U,:.IREN,ENTS,Qw~~mCitvN~wAK:4i'NdgvS';;joop.".lap'crageii':r,,:;:,',:;ib'aie::::,,5'4074allow'theoperatortoadjusttemperaturesordelaycriticalitysotheLCOwillnotbeviolated,therebyprovidingassurancethatthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequirestheSRtobeperformedifanyRCSloopT,,is<547'FandthelowT,,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.TheT.,alarmprovidesoperatorindicationoflowRCStemperaturewithoutrequiringindependentverificationwhileaT.,>547FinbothRCSloopsiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.IftheT,alarmistobeusedforthisSR,itshouldbecalibrate)consistentwithindustrystandards.ThissurveillanceisreplacedbySR3-.4-.N-.th))l,:8+>'duringPHYSICSTESTING.REfERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-11DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)83.4.'3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDAllcomponentsoftheRCSaredesignedtowithstandeffectsofcyclicloadsduetosystempressureandtemperaturechanges.Theseloadsareintroducedbystartup(heatup)andshutdown(cooldown)operations,powertransients,andreactortrips.ThisLCOlimitsthepressureandtemperaturechangesduringRCSheatupandcooldown,withinthedesignassumptionsandthestresslimitsforcyclicoperation.ThePTLRcontainsP/Tlimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,inserviceleakandhydrostatic(ISLH)testing,anddataforthemaximumrateofchangeofreactorcoolanttemperature(Ref.1).EachP/Tlimitcurvedefinesanacceptableregionfornormaloperation.Theusualuseofthecurvesisoperationalguidanceduringheatuporcooldownmaneuvering,whenpressureandtemperatureindicationsaremonitoredandcomparedtotheapplicablecurvetodeterminethatoperationiswithintheallowableregion.TheLCOestablishesoperatinglimitsthatprovideamargintobrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandpipingofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).Thevesselisthecomponentmostsubjecttobrittlefailure,andtheLCOlimitsapplymainlytothevessel.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer,whichhasdifferentdesigncharacteristicsandoperatingfunctions.10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2),requirestheestablishmentofP/TlimitsforspecificmaterialfracturetoughnessrequirementsoftheRCPBmaterials.Reference2requiresanadequatemargintobrittlefailureduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andsystemhydrostatictests.ItmandatestheuseoftheAmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers(ASHE)Code,SectionIII,AppendixG(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-12DraftB

RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theneutronembrittlementeffectonthematerialtoughnessisreflectedbyincreasingthenilductilityreferencetemperature(RT>>)asexposuretoneutronfluenceincreases.TheactualshiftintheRTgpyofthevesselmaterialhasbeenestablishedbyperiodicallyremovingandevaluatingtheirradiatedreactorvesselmaterialspecimens,inaccordancewithASTHE185(Ref.4)andAppendixHof10CFR50(Ref.5).TheoperatingP/TlimitcurveshavebeenadjustedbasedontheevaluationfindingsandtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.99(Ref.6).TheP/Tlimitcurvesarecompositecurvesestablishedbysuperimposinglimitsderivedfromstressanalysesofthoseportionsofthereactorvesselandheadthatarethemostrestrictive.Atanyspecificpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchange,onelocationwithinthereactorvesselwilldictatethemostrestrictivelimit.AcrossthespanoftheP/Tlimitcurves,differentlocationsaremorerestrictive,and,thus,thecurvesarecompositesofthemostrestrictiveregions.Theheatupcurverepresentsadifferentsetofrestrictionsthanthecooldowncurvebecausethedirectionsofthethermalgradientsthroughthevesselwallarereversed.Thethermalgradientreversalaltersthelocationofthetensilestressbetweentheouterandinnerwalls.ThecriticalitylimitcurveincludestheReference2requirementthatitbe~40Fabovetheheatupcurveorthecooldowncurve,andnotlessthantheminimumpermissibletemperatureforISLHtesting.However,thecriticalitycurveisnotoperationallylimiting;amorerestrictivelimitexistsinLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-13DraftB RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheconsequenceofviolatingtheLCOlimitsisthattheRCShasbeenoperatedunderconditionsthatcanresultinbrittlefailureoftheRCPB,possiblyleadingtoanonisolableleakorlossofcoolantaccident.Intheeventtheselimitsareexceeded,anevaluationmustbeperformedtodeterminetheeffectonthestructuralintegrityoftheRCPBcomponents.TheASMECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),providesarecommendedmethodologyforevaluatinganoperatingeventthatcausesanexcursionoutsidethelimits.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromDesignBa'sisAccident(DBA)analyses,Theyareprescribedduringnormaloperationtoavoidencounteringpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchangeconditionsthatmightcauseundetectedflawstopropagateandresultinnonductilefailureoftheRCPBwhichisanunanalyzedcondition.ReferenceIestablishesthemethodologyfordeterminingtheP/Tlimits.AlthoughtheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromanyDBA,theP/Tlimitsareacceptancelimitssincetheyprecludeoperationinanunanalyzedcondition.RCSP/TlimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThetwoelementsofthisLCOare:a,Thelimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting;andb.Limitsontherateofchangeoftemperature.TheLCOlimitsapplytoallcomponentsoftheRCS,exceptthepressurizer.Theselimitsdefineallowableoperatingregionsandpermitalargenumberofoperatingcycleswhileprovidingawidemargintononductilefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-14DraftB

RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESLCO(continued)Thelimitsfortherateofchangeoftemperaturecontrolthethermalgradientthroughthevesselwallandareusedasinputsforcalculatingtheheatup,cooldown,andISLHtestingP/Tlimitcurves.Thus,theLCOfortherateofchangeoftemperaturerestrictsstressescausedbythermalgradientsandalsoensuresthevalidityoftheP/Tlimitcurves.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsplacesthereactorvesseloutsideoftheboundsofthestressanalysesandcanincreasestressesin~otherRCPBcomponents.Theconsequencesdependonseveralfactors,asfollow:'a~b.C.TheseverityofthedeparturefromtheallowableoperatingP/Tregimeortheseverityoftherateofchangeoftemperature;Thelengthoftimethelimitswereviolated(longerviolationsallowthetemperaturegradientinthethickvesselwallstobecomemorepronounced);andTheexistences,sizes,andorientationsofflawsinthevesselmaterial.APPLICABILITYTheRCSP/TlimitsLCOprovidesadefinitionofacceptableoperationforpreventionofnonductilefailureinaccordancewith10CfR50,AppendixG(Ref.2).AlthoughtheP/Tlimitsweredevelopedtoprovideguidanceforoperationduringheatuporcooldown(MODES3,4,and5)orISLHtesting,theirApplicabilityisatalltimesinkeepingwiththeconcernfornonductilefailure.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-15(continued)Draft8 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)DuringMODES1and2,otherTechnicalSpecificationsprovidelimitsforoperationthatcanbemorerestrictivethanorcansupplementtheseP/Tlimits.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality";andSafetyLimit2.1,"SafetyLimits,"alsoprovideoperationalrestrictionsforpressureandtemperature.Furthermore,MODES1and2areabovethetemperaturerangeofconcernfornonductilefailure,andstressanalyseshavebeenperformedfornormalmaneuveringprofiles,suchaspowerascensionordescent.ACTIONSA.landA.2OperationoutsidetheP/TlimitsduringMODE1,2,3,or4mustbecorrectedsothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalyses.The30minuteCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofrestoringtheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange,Hostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedinthistimeinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifytheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingoperation.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,newanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoaccomplishtheevaluation.Theevaluationforamildviolationispossiblewithinthistime,butmoresevereviolationsmayrequirespecial,eventspecificstressanalysesorinspections.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingtooperate.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-16(continued)DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)ConditionAismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatRequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionA.IisinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.B.1andB.2IfaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinalowerMODEbecauseeithertheRCSremainedinanunacceptableP/Tregionforanextendedperiodofincreasedstressorasufficientlysevereeventcausedentryintoanunacceptableregion.EitherpossibilityindicatesaneedformorecarefulexaminationoftheeventwhichisbestaccomplishedwiththeRCSatreducedpressureandtemperature.Inreducedpressureandtemperatureconditions,thepossibilityofpropagationwithundetectedflawsisdecreased.Iftherequiredrestorationactivitycannotbeaccomplishedwithin30minutes,RequiredActionB.IandRequiredActionB.2mustbeimplementedtoreducepressureandtemperature.Iftherequiredevaluationforcontinuedoperationcannotbeaccomplishedwithin72hoursortheresultsareindeterminateorunfavorable,actionmustproceedtoreducepressureandtemperatureasspecifiedinRequiredActionB.IandRequiredActionB.2.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedanddocumentedbeforereturningtooperatingpressureandtemperatureconditions.PressureandtemperaturearereducedbybringingtheplanttoMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5withRCSpressure<500psigwithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-17(continued)DraftB RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2ActionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytocorrectoperationoutsideoftheP/TlimitsattimesotherthanwheninMODE1,2,3,or4,sothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalysis.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofinitiatingactiontorestoretheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Hostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedquicklyinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifythattheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedpriortoentryintoMODE4.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoterequiringRequiredActionC.2tobecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionC.1isinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.3.1VerificationthatoperationiswithinthePTLRlimitsisrequiredevery30minuteswhenRCSpressureandtemperatureconditionsareundergoingplannedchanges.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofthecontrolroomindicationavailabletomonitorRCSstatus.Also,sincetemperaturerateofchangelimitsarespecifiedinhourlyincrements,30minutespermitsassessmentandcorrectionforminordeviationswithinareasonabletime.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-18(continued)DraftB RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.3.1(continued)Surveillanceforheatup,cooldown,orISLHtestingmaybediscontinuedwhenthedefinitiongivenintherelevantplantprocedureforendingtheactivityissatisfied.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequiresthisSRtobeperformedduringsystemheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting.NoSRisgivenforcriticalityoperationsbecauseLCO3.4.2containsamorerestrictiverequirement.REFERENCES1.WCAP-14040,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"Revision1,December1994.2.10CFR50,AppendixG.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,AppendixG.4.ASTME185-82,July1982.5.10CFR50,AppendixH.6,RegulatoryGuide1.99,Revision2,May1988.7.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,AppendixE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-19DraftB RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPB3.4.4B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.4RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimaryfunctionoftheRCSisremovaloftheheatgeneratedinthefuelduetothefissionprocess,andtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerators(SGs),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission;b.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector;c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.Thereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,levelandtemperatureinstrumentationforbothcontrolandprotection.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsinktotheisolatedsecondarycoolant.TheRCPscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.Thisforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolantensuresmixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrol.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalysescontainvariousassumptionsforthedesignbasesaccidentinitialconditionsincludingRCSpressure,RCStemperature,reactorpowerlevel,coreparameters,andsafetysystemsetpoints.TheimportantaspectforthisLCOisthereactorcoolantforcedflowrate,whichisrepresentedbythenumberofRCSloopsinservice.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-20DraftB RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPB3'.4.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Bothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThetransientandaccidentanalysesfortheplanthavebeenperformedassumingbothRCSloopsareinoperation.Themajorityoftheplantsafetyanalysesarebasedoninitialconditionsathighcorepowerorzeropower.TheaccidentanalysesthataremostimportanttoRCPoperationarethetwopumpcoastdown,singlepumplockedrotor,singlepump(brokenshaftorcoastdown),androdwithdrawalevents(Ref.1).SteadystateDNBanalysishasbeenperformedforthetwoRCSloopoperation.FortwoRCSloopoperation,thesteadystateDNBanalysis,whichgeneratesthepressureandtemperatureSafetyLimit(SL)(i.e.,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)limit)assumesamaximumpowerlevelof109%RTP.ThisisthedesignoverpowerconditionfortwoRCSloopoperation.Thevaluefortheaccidentanalysissetpointofthenuclearoverpower(highflux)tripis118%andisbasedonananalysisassumptionthatboundsallpossibleinstrumentationerrors(Ref.2),TheDNBRlimitdefinesalocusofpressureandtemperaturepointsthatresultinaminimumDNBRgreaterthanorequaltothecriticalheatfluxcorrelationlimit.TheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothRCSloopsinoperationtomaintainDNBRabovetheSL,duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.Byensuringheattransferinthenucleateboilingregion,adequateheattransferisprovidedbetweenthefuelcladdingandthereactorcoolant.Adequateheattransferbetweenthereactorcoolantandthesecondarysideisensuredbymaintaininga16%SGlevelinaccordancewithLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation,"whichprovidessufficientwaterinventorytocovertheSGtubes.RCSLoops-NODE1>8.5%RTPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,4-21DraftB RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESLCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequireanadequateforcedflowrateforcoreheatremoval.FlowisrepresentedbythenumberofRCPsinoperationforremovalofheatbytheSGs.TomeetsafetyanalysisacceptancecriteriaforDNB,twopumpsarerequiredtobeinoperationatratedpower.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPinoperationprovidingforcedflowforheattransportandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.APPLICABILITYInHODEI>8.5%RTP,thereactoriscriticalandthushasthepotentialtoproducemaximumTHERMALPOWER.Thus,toensurethattheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesremainvalid,bothRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationinthisMODEtopreventDNBandcoredamage.Thedecayheatproductionrateismuchlowerthanthefullpowerheatrate.Assuch,theforcedcirculationflowandheatsinkrequirementsarereducedforlowerMODESasindicatedbytheLCOsforMODESIs8.5%RTP,2,3,4,and5.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODESIs8.5%RTP,2,AND3";LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCO~~~IllI.4~~dhG0-3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)ar'i'Ch:":,:Cool::i'hbg,:.,:$ir'c¹t,)'oii':.-",".Mater'-:lL'ev",':l!$$!;:23.'.,".,";.g<t.,.>{HODB6):,,)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-22DraftB RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESACTIONSA.IIftherequirementsoftheLCOarenotmet,theRequiredActionistoreducepowerandbringtheplanttoMODEI<8.5%RTP.ThislowerspowerlevelandthusreducesthecoreheatremovalneedsandminimizesthepossibilityofviolatingDNBlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-23DraftB RCSLoops-NODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremovalwhilemaintainingthemargintoDNB.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.UFSAR,Section15.0.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-24DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,and3B3.4.5B3,4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.5RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,AND3BASESBACKGROUNDInMODE1s8.5%RTP,andinNODE2and3,theprimaryfunctionoftheRCSistheremovalofdecayheatandtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerator(SG),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission(MODE1<R48'.',:5l'TPandMODE2only);%kNs>;Aob.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector(MODE1~SXB:,':!5%RTPandMODE2only);c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloops,connectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPscirculatethewaterthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.InMODE1z8,5%RTPandMODE2,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoensuremixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrolandtoremovethelimitedamountofreactorheat.InMODE3,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationforheatremovalduringheatupandcooldown.TheMODE1s8.5%RTP,2,and3reactoranddecayheatremovalrequirementsarelowenoughthatasingleRCSloopwithoneRCPrunningissufficienttoremovecoredecayheat.However,twoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensureredundantcapabilityFordecayheatremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-25(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP)2>AND3B3.4.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESBothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).InMODE1s8.5%RTP,andinMODES2and3,theseanalysesincludeevaluationofmainsteamlinebreaksanduncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromasubcriticalcondition.ThemostlimitingaccidentwithrespecttoDNBlimitsforMODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3isamainsteamlinebreak.Thisisduetothepotentialforrecriticalityandbecauseofthehighhotchannelfactorsthatmayexistifthemostreactivecontrolrodisstuckinitsfullywithdrawnposition.AmainsteamlinebreakhasbeenanalyzedforboththecasewithoneandtwoRCSloopsinoperationathotzeropower(HZP)conditionswithacceptableresults(Ref.1).However,withonlyoneRCSloopinoperationandoffsitepoweravailable,additionalshutdownmarginisrequiredsincethereducedflowproducesanadverseeffectonDNBlimits.Thestartupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP)upto8.5%RTPhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtoresultinonlylimitedpowerandtemperatureexcursionsthatareboundedbyamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSLoopinoperation(Refs.2and3).Analyseshavealsobeenperformedwhichdemonstratethatreactorheatgreaterthan5%RTPcanberemovedbynaturalcirculationalone(Ref.4).Failuretoprovidedecayheatremovalmayresultinchallengestoafissionproductbarrier.TheRCSloopsarepartoftheprimarysuccesspaththatfunctionsoractuatestopreventormitigateaDesignBasisAccidentortransientthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,and3satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-26(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESLCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethat,bothRCSloopsbeOPERABLE.OnlyoneRCSloopinoperationisnecessarytoensureremovalofdecayheatfromthecoreandhomogenousboronconcentrationthroughouttheRCSupto8.5%RTP.AnadditionalRCSloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsafetyanalyseslimitsaremet.RequiringoneRCSloopinoperationensuresthattheSafetyLimitcriteriawillbemetforallofthepostulatedaccidents.TheNotepermitsallRCPstobede-energizedfor<1hourper8hourperiodinMODE3.ThepurposeoftheNoteistoperformteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthesetestsisvalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurveusedasinputtoanumberofaccidentanalysesincludingalossofflowaccident.Thistestwassatisfactorilyperformedduringtheinitialstartuptestingprogram(Ref.5).If,however,changesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesofthecoastdowncurvemustberevalidatedbyconductingthe.testagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.Aswiththevalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurve,thistestshouldbeperformedonlyonceunlesstheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCSarechanged.The1hourtimeperiodspecifiedisadequatetoperformthedesiredtests,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationoftheNoteispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,therebymaintainingthemargintocriticality,BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-27DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESLCO(continued)b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.5.2.AnRCPisOPERABLEifitiscapableofbeingpoweredandabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODES1z8.5%RTP,2,and3,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovereactoranddecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7)LCO3.4.8,LCO~~"RCSLoops-MODE1)8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";II~RefhGQ-3.9,4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR}'a'n'd,.:l,Coo:::I":a'nt~-.'-.'Cjilliti'0j::;,.;,;Mali*,'iWLi.ice'I,:,::+'23;:,:,-:;,Ft-,,",;:;::,:(NODE6)i9ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRCSloopisinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.TheRequiredActionsaretoverifythattheSDMiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThisactionisrequiredtoensurethatadequateSDHexistsintheeventofamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation.The12hourFrequencyconsidersthetimerequiredtoobtain(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-28DraftB

RCSLoops-NODES1(8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESRCSboronconcentrationsamplesandthelowprobabilityofamainsteamlinebreakduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-29DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1(8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4,5BASESACTIONSA.landA.2(continued)TheinoperableRCSloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof72hours.Thistimeallowanceisajustifiedperiodtobewithouttheredundant,nonoperatingloopbecauseas'ingleloopinoperationhasaheattransfercapabilitygreaterthanthatneededtoremovethereactoranddecayheatproducedinthereactorcoreandbecauseofthelowprobabilityofafailureintheremainingloopoccurringduringthisperiod.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenoneRCSloopisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseasingleRCSloopcanprovidetherequiredcoolingtoremovereactorandB.1Ifrestorationoftheinoperableloopisnotpossiblewithin.72hours,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4.InMODE4,theplantmaybeplacedontheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.TheadditionalCompletionTimeof12hoursiscompatiblewithrequiredoperationstoachievecooldownanddepressurizationfromtheexistingplantconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-30DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1~8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.lC.2andC.3IftwoRCSloopsareinoperable,ornoRCSloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbytheNoteintheLCOsection,allCRDMsmustbede-energizedbyopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsets.AlloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspended,andactiontorestoreoneoftheRCSloopstoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsetsremovesthepossibilityofaninadvertentrodwithdrawal.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval,TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.5.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofthecontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.SR3.4.5.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelisz16%fortwoRCSloops.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinkforremovalofreactorordecayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoalossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-31DraftB RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.5.3VerificationthattherequiredRCPisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCPcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSARSection15.1.5.2.UFSARSection15.4.3.3.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-9,StartupofanInactiveLoop,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.4.UFSARSections14,6.1.5.6and15.2.5.2.5~UFSARSection14.6.1.5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-32DraftB RCS'oops-MODE4B3.4.6B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4BASESBACKGROUNDInMODE4,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattoeitherthesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladdedfuel.TheSGsortheRHRheatexchangersprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPsandtheRHRpumpscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandtopreventboricacidstratification.InMODE4,eitherRCSorRHRloopscanbeusedtoprovideforcedcirculation.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRCSoroneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRCSlooporoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyfordecayheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE4,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRCSandRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSLoops-MODE4havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-33DraFt8 RCSLoops-HODE4B3.4.6BASESLCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLEinHODE4andthatoneoftheseloopsbeinoperation.TheLCOallowsthetwoloopsthatarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoconsistofanycombinationofRCSloopsandRHRloops.Anyoneloopinoperationprovidesenoughflowtoremovethedecayheatfromthecorewithforcedcirculation.AnadditionalloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.Note1permitsallRCPsm'a'n'dRHRpumpstobede-energizedfors1hourper8hourpe'ri"od.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermitteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.OneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationoFroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1).IfchangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinHODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNote1ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremetalongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-34Draft8 RCSLoops-NODE4B3.4.6BASESLCO(continued)Note2requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe<50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofanRCPwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturepreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterentersthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.AnOPERABLERCSloopcomprisesanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3,4,6.2.RCPsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.SimilarlyfortheRHRSystem,anOPERABLERHRloopcomprisesanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.AnOPERABLERHRloopmaybeisolatedfromtheRCSprovidedthattheloopcanbeplacedintoservicefromthecontrolroom.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.kCMPWh(cllQCwv@gwYYh$$x4'l1'!NN'!'Il(QNkhPhKwsPYÃ%hs'lvwlw~wvx4NVMR%cc!'JNN'Av!!'NM%4(IYwAQvhWcwg444xc41+v%I$&vÃ4NMAPPLICABILITYInNODE4,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OneloopofeitherRCSorRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,twoloopsconsistingof.anycombinationofRCSandRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-35DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESOperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES1s8.5%RTP,2,AND3";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCOIIg~~-andLG0-3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WatelLevelKgg~3,,:FK+~::,:NODE6)~P...i%i:end.ACTIONSA.1IfoneRCSloopisinoperableandtwoRHRloopsareinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.IfnoRHRisavailable,theplantcannotenterareducedMODEsincenolongtermmeansofdecayheatremovalwouldbeavailable.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.8.1IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothRCSloopsareinoperable,aninoperableRCSorRHRloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatustoprovidearedundantmeansfordecayheatremoval.l4ttlNE.-'tti<itl!!ie!i.".;:,,iiitipi:,;the!ii,."...:,'i,,"...t(,.*,,-id,iaheeavii:'"lr84-heurs-.BringingtheplanttoMODE5isaconservativeactionwithregardtodecayheatremoval.WithonlyoneRHRloopOPERABLE,redundancyFordecayheatremovalislost(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-36DraftB RCSLoops-HODE4B3.4.6BASESand,intheeventofalossoftheremainingRHRloop,itwouldbesafertoinitiatethatlossfromNODE5(s200'F)ratherthanHODE4(200to350F).TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE5fromHODE4inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-37DraftB RCSLoops-MODE483.4.6BASESAoM~y.LENT'I'O'IIX.'!ll'll!I'1l:":Nl'equi>ed;:-:.'Alii'on,':::"::,.8/1ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatonlytheRequiredActionsofConditionCareenteredifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperable.WithallRCSandRHRloopsinoperable,MODE5cannotbeenteredandRequiredActionsC.1andC.2aretheappropriateremedialactions.C.landC.2IfnoloopisOPERABLEorinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNote1intheLCOsection,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andthemargintocriticalitymustnotbereducedinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationfordecayheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.P'g~+,+hw++wczwNrgP+>wgy<)~byywN@y+'ggM&rxr'ygg+Avg@e+PPrgyurgvP<w>v'Prg(g<rysy'o'w4svoYsaÃy(wy'ygPPv(vga)yw'(wPawwgSURVEILLANCESR3.4.6.1RE(UIREMENTSThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRCSorRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSandRHRloopperformance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-38DraftB RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4,6BASES'SugVEi'i."::ilANCE~W%ivWv~NvP~.QL>~c;qQy~w(ogx~trq~~yca~SR3.4.6.2RE(UIRENEN'fSThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis~16%.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinknecessaryforremovalofdecayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequatei'nviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel,SR3.4.6.3VerificationthattherequiredpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCSorRHRpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-39DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInMODE5withtheRCSloopsfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheateithertothesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.WhiletheprincipalmeansfordecayheatremovalisviatheRHRSystem,theSGsarespecifiedasabackupmeansforredundancy.EventhoughtheSGscannotproducesteaminthisMODE,theyarecapableofbeingaheatsinkduetotheirlargecontainedvolumeofsecondarywater.AslongastheSGsecondarysidewaterisatalowertemperaturethanthereactorcoolant,heattransferwilloccur.Therateofheattransferisdirectlyproportionaltothetemperaturedifference.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thereactorcoolantisnormallycirculatedbymeansoftwoRHRloopsconnectedtotheRCS,eachloopcontaininganRHRheatexchanger,anRHRpump,andappropriateflowandtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.OneRHRpumpcirculatesthewaterthroughtheRCSatasufficientratetopreventboricacidstratification.Thenumberofloopsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport,TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequirethatasecondpathbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.TheLCOprovidesforredundantpathsofdecayheatremovalcapability.ThefirstpathcanbeanRHRloopthatmustbeOPERABLEandinoperation.ThesecondpathcanbeanotherOPERABLERHRloopormaintainingoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel'i,;::,','o'rgabove16%toprovideanalternatemethodfordecayhea'tremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-40(continued)Draft8 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSLoops-MODE5(LoopsFilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleastoneoftheRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandinoperationwithanadditionalRHRloopOPERABLEoroneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel>16%.OneRHRloopprovidessufficientforcedcirculationtoperformthesafetyfunctionsofthereactorcoolantundertheseconditions.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.However,ifthestandbyRHRloopisnotOPERABLE,anacceptablealternatemethodisoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel~16%.ShouldtheoperatingRHRloopfail,theSGcouldbeusedtoremovethedecayheat.Note1permitsallRHRpumpstobede-energized~1hourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermittestsdesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1,).IfchangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsde-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotlikelyduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNote1ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:(continued)REE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-41DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESLCO(continued)a~NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodz2hours,providedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhensuchtestingissafeandpossible.Note3requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe<50FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofareactorcoolantpump(gCP)withanRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturearetopreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterentersthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedCondition.Note4providesforanorderlytransitionfromMODE5toMODE4duringaplannedheatupbypermittingremovalofRHRloopsfromoperationwhenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.ThisNoteprovidesforthetransitiontoMODE4whereanRCSloopispermittedtobeinoperationandreplacestheRCScirculationfunctionprovidedbytheRHRloops.AplannedheatupisascheduledtransitiontoMODE4withinadefinedtimeperiod.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.ASGcanperformasaheatsinkwhenitisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,withtheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.7.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-42(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESAPPLICABILITYInMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thisLCOrequiresforcedcirculat>onofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.TheRCSloopsareconsideredfilleduntiltheisolationvalvesareopenedtofacilitatedrainingoftheRCS.TheloopsarealsoconsideredfilledfollowingthecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.OneloopofRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,oneadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,orthesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastoneSGisrequiredtobe~16%.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.51LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.8,LCO"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1~8,5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";II-andhC0-3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)aiid,':...Cool;:,an'gC00+9)5$.,:.:',"';Res).'d0al<',".,He'a'ti:";;R'emo'V%1';-:~(RHR)ij,andCoolant"C'ircuTa'tion-'WaterLeveT<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.1andA.2IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothSGshavesecondarysidewaterlevels<16%,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusortorestoreatleastoneSGsecondarysidewaterlevel.EitherRequiredActionA.1orRequiredActionA.2willrestoreredundantheatremovalpaths.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilanRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorSGsecondarysidewaterlevelisrestored.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-43DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESACTIONS(continued)8.1andB.21IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNotesl~and4,orifnoloopisOPERABLE,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.7.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance,SR3.4.7.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.VerifyingthatatleastoneSGisOPERABLEbyensuringitssecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis~16%ensuresanalternatedecayheatremovalmethodintheeventthatthesecondRHRloopisnotOPERABLE.IfbothRHRloopsareOPERABLE,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,4-44DraftB RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4,7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.7.3VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayhe'atremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbyRHRpump.Ifsecondarysidewaterlevelis>16%inatleastoneSG,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.Thefrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.6R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-45Draft8 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInMODE5withtheRCSloopsnotfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattothecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesteamgenerators(SGs)arenotavailableasaheatsinkwhentheloopsarenotfilled.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withloopsnotfilled,onlyRHRpumpscanbeusedforcoolantcirculation.Thenumberofpumpsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRpumpfordecayheatremovalandtransportandtorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequateforheatremovalandforboronmixing.RCSloopsinMODE5(loopsnotfilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandoneoftheseloopsbeinoperationtotransferheatfromthereactorcoolantatacontrolledrate.HeatcannotberemovedviatheRHRSystemunlessforcedflowisused.AminimumofoneoperatingRHRpumpmeetstheLCOrequirementForoneloopinoperation.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-46DraftB

RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESLCO(continued)Note1permitsallRHRpumpstobede-energizedfors15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanother.ThecircumstancesforstoppingbothRHRpumpsaretobelimitedtosituationswhentheoutagetimeisshortandrequiresthatthefollowingconditionsbemet:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction;andc.NodrainingoperationsarepermittedthatwouldfurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumeandpossiblycauseamorerapidheatupoftheremainingRCSinventory.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodof~2hours,providedthattheotherloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhenthesetestsaresafeandpossible.AnOPERABLERHRloopiscomprisedofanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInNODE5withloopsnotfilled,thisLCOrequirescoreheatremovalandcoolantcirculationbytheRHRSystem.TheRCSloopsareconsiderednotfilledfromthetimeperiodbeginningwiththeopeningofisolationvalvesanddrainingoftheRCSandendingwiththecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-47DraftB

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO~~"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";II~RdAGO-3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)and'Cod'7,:~~8P'Cijcu':I,:at'1,"oo':,:-.;.:;Mat'eij(Led@',".::~~.:'",R3.'.'..'::-Fii-,,'.,"';,(MODE6)".,';""glL'CO~3:955'-,"'~~~Res'fdua'l"~He'a't~,':,Removal':,':!(RflRgandCoolantACTIONSA.1IfonlyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilthesecondRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.landB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNote1,orifnoloopisOPERABLEalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-48(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilled83.4.8BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-49(continued)DraftB RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.8.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.8.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-50DraftB PressurizerB3.4.983.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.9PressurizerBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerprovidesapointintheRCSwhereliquidandvaporaremaintainedinequilibriumundersaturatedconditionsforpressurecontrolpurposestopreventbulkboilingintheremainderoftheRCS.Keyfunctionsincludemaintainingrequiredprimarysystempressureduringsteadystateoperation,andlimitingthepressurechangescausedbyreactorcoolantthermalexpansionandcontractionduringnormalloadtransients.ThepressurecontrolcomponentsaddressedbythisLCOincludethepressurizerwaterlevelandtherequiredheatercapacity.PressurizersafetyvalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"andLCO3.4.11,"PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs),"respectively.TheintentofthisLCOistoensurethatasteambubbleexistsinthepressurizerpriorto,andduring,poweroperationtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Thepresenceofasteambubbleisconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.RelativelysmallamountsofnoncondensiblegasesaretypicallypresentintheRCSandcaninhibitthecondensationheattransferbetweenthepressurizersprayandthesteam,anddiminishthesprayeffectivenessforpressurecontrol.Thesenoncondensiblegasescanbeignoredifthesteambubbleispresent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-51DraftB

PressurizerB3.4.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOalsoensuresthatadequateheatercapacityisavailableinthepressurizertosupportnaturalcirculationfollowinganextendedlossof'offsitepower.Electricalimmersionheaters,locatedinthelowersectionofthepressurizervessel,keepthewaterinthepressurizeratsaturationtemperatureandmaintainaconstantoperatingpressure.Theseheatersaredividedintotwogroups,acontrol/variablegroupandabackupgroup.Thecontrol/variablegroupisnormallyusedduringpoweroperationsincetheseheatershaveinverseproportionalcontrolwithrespecttothepressurizerpressure.Thebackupgroupiseitherfullyonoroffwithsetpointsthat'rebelowthoseforthecontrol/variablegroup.BothgroupsofheatersreceivepowerfromtheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)480Vbuses,however,theheatersareshedfollowingalossofoffsitepowerorsafetyinjectionsignal.Theheaterscanbemanuallyloadedontothedieselgeneratorsifrequired.AminimumrequiredavailablecapacityofpressurizerheatersensuresthattheRCSpressurecanbemaintainedduringnaturalcirculation.ThecapabilitytomaintainandcontrolsystempressureisimportantformaintainingsubcooledconditionsintheRCSandensuringthecapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.Unlessadequateheatercapacityisavailable,therequiredsubcoolingmarginintheprimarysystemcannotbemaintained.Inabilitytocontrolthesystempressureandmaintainsubcoolingunderconditionsofnaturalcirculationflowintheprimarysystemcouldleadtoalossofsinglephasenaturalcirculationanddecreasedcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.MaintainingnecessarysubcooledmarginduringnormalpoweroperationiscontrolledbymeetingtherequirementsforpressurizerlevelandLCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDepartureFromNucleateBoiling(DNB)j<f."'fm'i;:ti."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-52Draft8 PressurizerB3.4.9BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODESI,2,and3,theLCOrequirementforasteambubbleisreflectedimplicitlyintheaccidentanalyses.SafetyanalysesperformedforlowerMODESarenotlimitingwithrespecttopressurizerparameters.Allanalysesperformedfromacriticalreactorconditionassumetheexistenceofasteambubbleandsaturatedconditionsinthepressurizer.Inmakingthisassumption,theanalysesneglectthesmallfractionofnoncondensiblegasesnormallypresent.ThemaximumpressurizerwaterlevellimitensuresthatasteambubbleexistsandsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.SafetyanalysespresentedintheUFSAR(Ref.I)donottakecreditforpressurizerheateroperation,however,theneedtomaintainsubcoolinginthelongtermduringlossofoffsitepower,asindicatedinNUREG-0737(Ref.2),isthereasonforprovidinganLCO.Thepressurizerheatersareassumedtobeavailablewithinonehourfollowingthelossofoffsitepowerandinitiationofnaturalcirculation(Ref.3).LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethatasteambubbleexistswithinthepressurizerandthatsufficientheatercapacityisavailabletosupportanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.ForthepressurizertobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestablishedintheSRsforwaterlevelandheatercapacitymustbemetandtheheatersmustbecapableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersourcewithinonehour.APPLICABILITYTheneedforpressurecontrolismostpertinentwhencoreheatcancausethegreatesteffectonRCStemperature,resultinginthegreatesteffectonpressurizerlevelandRCSpressurecontrol.Thus,applicabilityhasbeendesignatedforMODESIand2.TheapplicabilityisalsoprovidedforMODE3topreventsolidwaterRCSoperationduringheatupandcooldowntoavoidrapidpressurerisescausedbynormaloperationalperturbation,suchasreactorcoolantpumpstartup.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-53DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)InMODES1,2,and3,thereisneedtomaintaintheavailabilityofpressurizerheaters,capableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersupply(Ref.4).Intheeventofalossofoffsitepower,theinitialconditionsoftheseMODESgivethegreatestdemandformaintainingtheRCSinahotpressurizedconditionwithloopsubcoolingforanextendedperiod.ForMODE4,5,or6,itisnotnecessarytocontrolpressure(byheaters)toensureloopsubcoolingforheattransferwhentheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systemisinservice,andtherefore,theLCOisnotapplicable.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelis>650cubicfeet,whichisequivalentto87%,theabilitytomaintainasteambubblemaynolongerexist.Thesteambubbleisnecessarytoensurethecapabilitytoestablishandmaintainpressurecontrolforsteadystateoperationandtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Requiringthepresenceofasteambubbleisalsoconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.Pressurizerwaterlevelcontrolmalfunctionsorotherplantevolutionsmayresultinapressurizerwaterlevelabovethenominalupperlimit,evenwiththeplantatsteadystateconditions.NormallytheplantwilltripinthiseventsincetheupperlimitisthesameasthePressurizerHighLevelTrip.Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelisnotwithinthelimit,actionmustbetakentorestoretheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3,withthereactortripbreakersopen,within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.Thistakestheplantout'oftheapplicableMODESandrestorestheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-54DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1andB.2Ifthepressurizerheaterscapacityis<100KW,theabilitytomaintainRCSpressuretosupportnaturalcirculationmaynolongerexist,BymaintainingRCSpressurecontrol,amargintosubcoolingisprovided.Thevalueof100KWisbasedontheamountneededtosupportnaturalcirculationafteraccountingforheatlossesthroughthepressurizerinsulationduringanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.Ifthecapacityofthepressurizerheatersisnotwithinthelimit,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.9.1ThisSRrequiresthatduringsteadystateoperation,pressurizerlevelismaintainedbelowthenominalupperlimittoprovideaminimumspaceforasteambubble.TheSurveillanceisperformedbyobservingtheindicatedlevel.TheFrequencyof12hourshasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassesslevelforanydeviationandverifythatoperationiswithinsafetyanalysesassumptions,Alarmsarealsoavailableforearlydetectionofabnormallevelindications.SR'.4.9.2ThisSRissatisfiedwhenthepowersuppliesaredemonstratedtobecapableofproducingtheminimumpowerrequired.ThismaybedonebytestingthepowersupplyoutputbyverifyingtheelectricalloadonBuses14and16withtherespectiveheatergroupsonandoff.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsideredadequatetodetectheaterdegradationandhasbeenshownbyoperatingexperiencetobeacceptable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-55(continued)DraftB PressurizerB3.4.9BASESREFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTHIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.3.LetterfromB.L.King,WestinghouseElectricCorporation,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"AbilitytoHaintainSubcooledConditionsDuringanExtendedLossofOffsitePower,"datedSeptember26,1979.4.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,Jr.RGKE,

Subject:

"LessonsLearnedCategory'A'valuation',"datedJuly7,1980'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-56DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)B3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovide,inconjunctionwiththeReactorProtectionSystem,overpressureprotectionfortheRCS.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedpoptype,springloaded,selfactuatedvalveswithbackpressurecompensation.ThesafetyvalvesaredesignedtopreventthesystempressurefromexceedingthesystemSafetyLimit(SL),2735psig,whichis110%ofthedesignpressure.Becausethesafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedandselfactuating,theyareconsideredindependentcomponents.Thereliefcapacityforeachvalve,288,000ibm/hr,isbasedonpostulatedoverpressuretransientconditionsresultingfromacompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine.Thiseventresultsinthemaximumsurgerateintothepressurizer,whichspecifiestheminimumreliefcapacityforthesafetyvalves.Thedischargeflowfromthepressurizersafetyvalvesisdirectedtothepressurizerrelieftank.Thisdischargeflowisindicatedbyanincreaseintemperaturedownstreamofthepressurizersafetyvalvesorincreasein-thepressurizerrelieftanktemperatureorlevel.OverpressureprotectionisrequiredinHODES1,2,3,4,and5andinHODE6withreactorvesselheadon;however,inHODE4,witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,andHODE5andHODE6withthereactorvesselheadonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbyoperatingproceduresandbymeetingtherequirementsofLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."Theupperandlowerpressurelimitsarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirement(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheliftsettingisfortheambientconditionsassociatedwithHODES1,2,and3.Thisrequireseitherthatthevalvesbesethotorthatacorrelationbetweenhotandcoldsettingsbeestablished.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-57DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepressurizersafetyvalvesarepartoftheprimarysuccesspathandmitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedaccidents.OPERABILITYofthesafetyvalvesensuresthattheRCSpressurewillbelimitedto110%ofdesignpressureforallanticipatedtransientsexceptforthelockedrotoraccidentwhichremainsbelow120%ofthedesignpressureconsistentwiththeoriginalmaximumtransientpressurelimitfortheRCS(Refs.2,3and4).TheconsequencesofexceedingtheAmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers(ASHE)andUSASSectionB31.1pressurelimits(Refs.1and4)couldincludedamagetoRCScomponents,increasedleakage,orarequirementtoperformadditionalstressanalysespriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAllaccidentandsafetyanalysesintheUFSAR(Ref.5)thatrequiresafetyvalveactuationassumeoperationofbothpressurizersafetyvalvestolimitincreasesinRCSpressure.Theoverpressureprotectionanalysis(Ref.6)isalsobasedonoperationofbothsafetyvalves.Accidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationifnotproperlyterminatedinclude:a.Uncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromfullpower;b.Lossofreactorcoolantflow;c.Lossofexternalelectricalload(includingthecompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine);d.Lossofnormalfeedwater;e.LossofallACpowertostationauxiliaries;andf.Lockedrotor.DetailedanalysesoftheabovetransientsarecontainedinReference5.Safetyvalveactuationisrequiredineventsc,d,e,andf(above)tolimitthepressureincrease.CompliancewiththisLCOisconsistentwiththedesignbasesandaccidentanalysesassumptions.PressurizersafetyvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-58(continued)DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves83.4.10BASESLCOThetwopressurizersafetyvalvesaresettoopenattheRCSdesignpressure(2500psia),andwithintheASHEspecifiedtolerance,toavoidexceedingthemaximumdesignpressureSL,tomaintainaccidentanalysesassumptions,andtocomplywithASMErequirements.Theupperandlowerpressuretolerancelimitsfollowingtestingarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirements(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheOPERABILITYlimitsof+2.4%,-3%arebasedontheanalyzedevents.ThelimitprotectedbythisSpecificationisthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)SLof110%ofdesignpressureforalltransientsexceptlockedrotoraccidentswhichhasanallowedlimitof120%ofdesignpressure.InoperabilityofoneormorevalvescouldresultinexceedingtheSLifatransientweretooccur.TheconsequencesofexceedingtheASHEpressurelimitcouldincludedamagetooneormoreRCScomponents,increasedleakage,oradditionalstressanalysisbeingrequiredpriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,andportionsofMODE4abovetheLTOParmingtemperature,OPERABILITYoftwovalvesisrequiredbecausethecombinedcapacityisrequiredtokeepreactorcoolantpressurebelow110%ofitsdesignvalueduringcertainaccidents.MODE3andportionsofMODE4areconservativelyincluded,althoughthelistedaccidentsmaynotrequirethesafetyvalvesforprotection.TheLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4wheneitherRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorinMODE5becauseLTOPisprovided.OverpressureprotectionisnotrequiredinMODE6withthereactorvesselheaddetensionedortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorthepressurizermanwayopen.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-59(continued)DraftB PressurizerSafetyValves83.4.10BASESACTIONSA.1Withonepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable,restorationmusttakeplacewithin15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesreflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheRCSOverpressureProtectionSystem.AninoperablesafetyvalvecoincidentwithanRCSoverpressureeventcouldchallengetheintegrityofthepressureboundary.'.1andB.2IftheRequiredActionofA.1cannotbemetwithintherequiredCompletionTimeorifbothpressurizersafetyvalvesareinoperable,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE4witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WithanyRCScoldlegtemperatureatorbelowtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbytheLTOPSystem.ThechangefromHODE1,2,or3toNODE4reducestheRCSenergy(corepowerandpressure),lowersthepotentialforlargepressurizerinsurges,andtherebyremovestheneedforoverpressureprotectionbybothpressurizersafetyvalves.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.10.1SRsarespeci.fiedintheInserviceTestingProgram.PressurizersafetyvalvesaretobetestedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref.7),whichprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytheSRs.Noadditionalrequirementsarespecified.Thepressurizersafety~'ii):;v'esetpointis+2.4%,-3%forOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto+1%duringthesurveillancetoallowfordrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-60DraftB PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.10.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoMODES3and4withouthavingperformedtheSRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditions.Thispermitstestingandexaminationofthesafetyvalvesathighpressureandtemperatureneartheirnormaloperatingrange,butonlyafterthevalveshavehadapreliminarycoldsetting.ThecoldsettinggivesassurancethatthevalvesareOPERABLEneartheirdesignconditionuntilcompletionofthesurveillance.REFERENCESl.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII.2.UFSAR,Section15.3.2.3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGEE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-1,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XV-15,andXV-17,DesignBasisEvents,Accidents,andTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.4.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers,1967edition.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.WCAP-7769,"TopicalReport,OverpressureProtectionforWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactors,"Rev.1,June1972.7.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GirmaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-61DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerisequippedwithtwotypesofdevicesforpressurerelief:pressurizersafetyvalvesandPORVs.ThePORVs(430and431C)areairoperatedvalvesthatarecontrolledtoopenataspecificsetpressurewhenthepressurizerpressureincreasesandclosewhenthepressurizerpressuredecreases.ThePORVsmayalsobemanuallyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Motoroperatedblockvalves(515and516),whicharenormallyopen,arelocatedbetweenthepressurizerandthePORVs.TheblockvalvesareusedtoisolatethePORVsincaseofexcessiveleakageorastuckopenPORV.Blockvalveclosureisaccomplishedmanuallyusingcontrolsinthecontrolroom.AstuckopenPORVis,ineffect,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Assuch,blockvalveclosureterminatestheRCSdepressurizationandcoolantinventorylos's.ThePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesmaybeusedbyplantoperatorstodepressurizetheRCStorecoverfromcertaintransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.Additionally,theseriesarrangementofthePORVsandtheirblockvalvespermitperformanceofsurveillancesonthevalvesduringpoweroperation.ThePORVsmayalsobeusedforfeedandbleedcorecoolinginthecaseofmultipleequipmentfailureeventsthatarenotwithinthedesignbasis,suchasatotallossoffeedwaterandauxiliaryfeedwater.ThePORVsarealsousedtomitigatetheeffectsofananticipatedtransientwithoutscram(ATWS)eventwhichisalsonotwithinthedesignbasis.ThePORVs,theirblockvalves,andtheircontrolsarepoweredfromthevitalbusesthatnormallyreceivepowerfromoffsitepowersources,butarealsocapableofbeingpoweredfromemergencypowersourcesintheeventofalossofoffsitepower.ThetwoPORVs(inmanualoperationonly)andtheirassociatedblockvalvesarepoweredfromtwoseparatesafetytrains.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-62Draft8 PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheplanthastwoPORVs,eachhavingareliefcapacityof179,000lb/hrat2335psig.ThePORVsarenormallyopenedbyusinginstrumentairwhichissuppliedthroughseparatesolenoidoperatedvalves(8620Aand8620B).ThesafetyrelatedsourceofmotiveairisfromtwoseparatenitrogenaccumulatorsthatarenormallyisolatedfromthePORVsbysolenoidoperatedvalves8619Aand8619B;however,solenoidoperatedvalves8620Aand8620BmustbeintheventpositiontoclosethePORVsregardlessofwhichmotiveairsourceisused.ThefunctionaldesignofthePORVsisbasedonmaintainingpressurebelowthepressurizerhighpressurereactortripsetpointfollowingastepreductionof50%offullloadwithsteamdump.Inaddition,thePORVsminimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalvesandalsomaybeusedforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP).SeeLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."APPLICABLEPlantoperatorsemploythePORVstodepressurizetheRCSinSAFETYANALYSES=responsetocertainplanttransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.FortheSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)event,thesafetyanalysisassumesthatmanualoperatoractionsarerequiredtomitigatetheevent.Alossofoffsitepowerisassumedtoaccompanytheevent,andthus,normalpressurizersprayisunavailabletoreduceRCSpressure.ThePORVsareassumedtobeusedforRCSdepressurization,whichisoneofthestepsperformedtoequalizetheprimaryandsecondarypressuresinordertoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowandtheradioactivereleasesfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator.ThePORVsarealsousedinsafetyanalysesforeventsthatresultinincreasingRCSpressureforwhichdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)criteriaarecritical.ByassumingPORVmanualactuation,theprimarypressureremainsbelowthepressurizerhighpressuretripandpressurizersafetyvalvesetpoints;thustheDNBRcalculationismoreconservativeassumingthesameinitialRCStemperaturesincethepressurizerpressureislimited.Eventsthatassumethisconditionincludealossofexternalelectricalloadandothertransientswhichresultinadecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystem(Ref.1).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-63DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)PressurizerPORVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvestobeOPERABLEformanualoperationbythenitrogenaccumulatorstomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.BymaintainingtwoPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesOPERABLE,thesinglefailurecriterionissatisfied.TheblockvalvesareavailabletoisolatetheflowpaththrougheitherafailedopenPORVoraPORVwithexcessiveleakage.SatisfyingtheLCOhelpsminimizechallengestofissionproductbarriers.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,thePORVisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTRanditsblockvalvemustbeOPERABLEtolimitthepotentialforasmallbreakLOCAthroughtheflowpath.ThemostlikelycauseforaPORVsmallbreakLOCAisaresultofapressureincreasetransientthatcausesthePORVtoautomaticallyopenwithasubsequentfailuretoclose.ImbalancesintheenergyoutputofthecoreandheatremovalbythesecondarysystemcancausetheRCSpressuretoincreasetothePORVopeningsetpoint.ThemostrapidincreaseswilloccuratthehigheroperatingpowerandpressureconditionsofMODES1and2.PressureincreasesarelessprominentinMODE3becausethecoreinputenergyisreduced,buttheRCSpressureishigh.ThePORVsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3tominimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalves.Therefore,theLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.TheLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4whenbothpressureandcoreenergyaredecreasedandthepressuresurgesbecomemuchlesssignificant.ThePORVsetpointisreducedforLTOPinMODES.4,5,and6withthereactorvesselheadinplace.LCO3.4.12addressesthePORVrequirementsintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxDraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSNote1hasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothpressurizerPORVsaretreatedasseparateentities,each'withseparateCompletionTimes(i.e.,theCompletionTimeisonacomponentbasis)forConditionA.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothblockvalvesaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes,forConditionC.TheexceptionforLCO3.0.4,Note3,permitsentryintoMODES1,2,and3toperformcyclingofthePORVsorblockvalvestoverifytheirOPERABLEstatus.TestingisnotperformedinlowerMODESduetoLTOPconsiderations.A.landA.2WiththePORVsOPERABLEandnotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,eitherthePORVsmustberestoredortheflowpathisolatedwithin1hour,AlthoughaPORVmaynotbecapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,itmaybeabletobemanuallyopenedandclosed,andtherefore,abletoperformitsfunction.APORVisconsiderednotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolledforanyproblemwhichpreventsthePORVfromautomaticallyclosingonceithasautomaticallyopened.Thismaybeduetoinstrumentationproblems.~~doesnotincludeproblemswhichonlypreventthePORVfromautomaticalloenin{e.g.,losofinstrumentairtothePORV).whichpreventtePORfrombothautomaticallyopeningandautomati.ca'l~l'y,.;:-".,closing.Forthesereasons,theblockvalvemaye'i.'.the'r'."'-."beclosedtoisolatetheflowpathsbConditionisonlyintendedto""permitope'ra'ti'on'oftheplantforalimitedperiodoftimenottoexceedthenextrefuelingoutage(MODE6)sothatmaintenancecanbeperformedonthePORVstoeliminatetheproblem.Normally,thePORVsshouldbeavailableforautomaticmitigationofoverpressureeventsandshouldbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoenteringstartup(MODE2).SeatleakageproblemsarecontrolledbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxiDraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASES~oc.Mmi~ghen-pACTIONS"::.;;!-;,.",A'.:1::."an'd.:';:AY2~:::::','",:('coriiniTed))wh'en"::poli',:';;:":rema'in's."'on'it"e,':",c::o's'e',"'".,',.$c'i".:,va::iv'5:<he4WAMCÃpXjMV1WAVj%VhYh4V4lkONPNIYh'MShgkVWVpNYXWPhN'IAY4AYNkCSN'6CYN5Compl"etionTimeot"IhourisSasedonplantoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatminorproblemscanbecorrectedorclosureaccomplishedinthistimeperiod.ACTNNS-B.18.2andB.3IfonePORVisnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,itisinoperableandmustbeeitherrestoredorisolatedbyclosingtheassociatedblockvalveandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalve.PORVinoperabilityincludes(butisnotlimitedto)theinabilityofthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefromthenitrogenaccumulatortoopenorthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefrominstrumentairtovent.TheCompletionTimesof1hourarereasonable,basedonchallengestothePORVsduringthistimeperiod,andprovidetheoperatoradequatetimetocorrectthesituation.IftheinoperablevalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,itmustbeisolatedwithinthespecifiedtime.BecausethereisasecondPORVthatisOPERABLE,anadditional72hoursisprovidedtorestoretheinoperablePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.IfthePORVcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionW~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxiiDraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2Ifonebl'o'ck,".'vklv~e.':-48inoperablethenitisnecessarytoeitherrestoretheblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorplacetheassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.TheprimeimportanceforthecapabilitytoclosetheblockvalveistoisolateastuckopenPORV.Therefore,iftheblockvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour,theRequiredActionistoplacethePORVinmanualcontroltoprecludeitsautomaticopeningforanoverpressureeventandtoavoidthepotentialforastuckopenPORVatatimethattheblockvalveisinoperable.ManualcontrolisaccomplishedbyplacingthePORVcontrolboardswitchintheclosedposition.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeperiod,andprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.BecausethePORVisnotcapableofautomaticallyopeningandthesmallpotentialforanSGTRorothereventrequiringManualoperation,theoperatorispermittedaCompletionTimeof72-heursl.'.."':::':day'itorestoretheinoperableblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.Thetimeallowedtorestoretheblockvalveislimitedto74heurs7.':.".;,.d'ayi:.sincethePORVsarenotcapableofautomaticallymitigatinganoverpressureeventwhenplacedinmanualcontrol.IftheblockvalveisrestoredwithintheCompletionTimeof72-heurs7,'".days,thePORVwillagainecapableofautomaticallyrespon'dsngtoanoverpressureevent,andtheblockvalvescapableofisolatingastuckopenPORVwhichmayresultfromtheoverpressureevent.Ifitcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionDE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxiiiDraft8 PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1andD.2Ifii'-,5's':.:,':,:::;,races'sa'ay,.::-;ij'i:.;,e'itnbr;,,';;;res,"::oregano.:~j.:easimanua:i'.,~)+conti;.0;:t,j,.)::,Tii~,';pryrje(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,4-lxivDraftB PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASESAC::(IO)S~$p,:,'.:::;:.:":::,p;:',";,";::.':":,.:;.'-,:El';:ll':::'n8':.E::::2.~flIwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InNODES4and5,maintainingPORVOPERABILITYmayberequired.SeeLCO3.4.12..F.:;"':!IFO':FP'2<FF,.":3"':::.';in'd:"-::F8~4IfbothPORVsarenotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,theyareinoperableanditisnecessarytoinitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatusimmediatelysincenoreliefvalveisavailabletomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.Therefore,operatorsmusteitherrestoreatleastonevalvewithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorisolatetheflowpathbyclosingandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalves.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeandprovidestheoperator'imetocorrectthesituation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxvDraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSEF;.IKF.;..2KF;.3andKN.4(continued)IfonePORVisrestoredandonePORVremainsinoperable,thentheplantwillbeinConditionBwiththetimeclockstartedattheoriginaldeclarationofhavingtwoPORVsinoperable.IfnoPORVsarerestoredwithintheCompletionTime,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwhichdoesnotrequiremanualPORVoperation.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3withT,,<500'Fwithin8hours.InMODE3withtheRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,thesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.SincetheRWSTcontainsalargervolumeofwaterthanthesecondarysideofanSG,theleakthroughtherupturedtubewillstopaftertheSGisfilledtocapacity.Therefore,anSGTRcanbemitigatedundertheseconditionswithoutanyreleaseofradioactivefluidthroughthemainsteamsafetyvalves.EnteringalowerMODEisnotdesirablewithbothPORVsinoperableandnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycledsincethePORVsarealsorequiredforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxvi(continued)DraftB PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.11.1Blockvalvecyclingverifiesthatthevalve(s)canbeclosedifneeded.ThebasisfortheFrequencyof92daysistheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).Pfthe.blockvalveis'~nc~be6ameiopening.ttie..b~qjp,valveisnec~~~to~WthePORVMbeusedformanualconrolofreactorpressure,IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateanotherwiseinoperablePORV,themaximumCompletionTimetorestorethePORVandopentheblockvalveis72hours,whichiswellwithintheallowablelimits(25%)toextendtheblockvalveFrequencyof92days.Furthermore,thesetestrequirementswouldbecompletedbythereopeningofarecentlyclosedblockvalveuponrestorationofthePORVtoOPERABLEstatus(i.e.,completionoftheRequiredActionsfulfillstheSR).TheNotemodifiesthisSRbystatingthatitisnotrequiredtobeperformedwiththeblockvalveclosedjpP'r..".,:::LCO!>3.':;4/3..P40i:.::.;a",pliant.;;::,tiiiis5'erat::"'"'".'"'*SR3.4.11.2ThisSRrequiresacompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogenaccumulators.OperatingaPORVthroughonecompletecycleensuresthatthePORVcanbemanuallyactuatedformitigationofanSGTR.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonatypicalrefuelingcycleandindustryacceptedpractice.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section15.2.2.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-lxviiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheLTOPSystemcontrolsRCSpressureatlowtemperaturessotheintegrityofthereactorcool'antpressureboundary(RCPB)isnotcompromisedbyviolatingthepressureandtemperature(P/T)limitsof10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.1).ThereactorvesselisthelimitingRCPBcomponentfordemonstratingsuchprotection.TheLTOPsystemalsoprotectstheRHRsystemfromoverpressurizationduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.ThePTLRprovidesthemaximumallowableactuationlogicsetpointsforthepressurizer,poweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andthemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureduringcooldown,shutdown,andheatuptomeettheReference1requirementsduringtheLTOPMODES.Thereactorvesselmaterialislesstoughatlowtemperaturesthanatnormaloperatingtemperatures.Asthevesselneutronexposureaccumulates,thematerialtoughnessdecreasesandbecomeslessresistanttopressurestressatlowtemperatures(Ref.2).RCSpressure,therefore,ismaintainedlowatlowtemperaturesandisincreasedonlyastemperatureisincreased.ThepotentialforvesseloverpressurizationismostacutewhentheRCSiswatersolid,occurringonlywhileshutdown;apressurefluctuationcanoccurmorequicklythananoperatorcanreacttorelievethecondition.ExceedingtheRCSP/Tlimitsbyasignificantamountcouldcausebrittlecrackingofthereactorvessel.LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"requiresadministrativecontrolofRCSpressureandtemperatureduringheatupandcooldowntopreventexceedingthePTLRlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxviiiDraft8 LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOprovidesRCSoverpressureprotectionbyrestrictingcoolantinputcapabilityandhavingadequatepressurereliefcapacity.LimitingcoolantinputcapabilityrequiresisolatingtheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)accumulatorsandrenderingallsafetyinjection(SI)pumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingaminimumoftwoSIpumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSvent~1.1squareinches.ThepressurereliefcapacityrequireseithertworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSandanRCSventofsufficientsize.OnePORVortheopenRCSventistheoverpressureprotectiondevicethatactstoterminateanincreasingpressureevent,Byrestrictingcoolantinputcapability,theabilitytoprovidecorecoolantadditionisminimized.TheLCOdoesnotrequirethemakeupcontrolsystemtobedeactivatedortheSIactuationcircuitsblocked.DuetothelowerpressuresintheLTOPNODESandtheexpectedcoredecayheatlevels,themakeupsystemcanprovideadequateflowviathemakeupcontrolvalve.IftheconditionsrequiretheuseofSIformakeupintheeventoflossofinventory,thenpumpscanbemadeavailablethroughmanualactions.ThetworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSwithanopenRCSventisalsosufficienttoprotecttheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeoFoperationforeventswhichcauseanincreaseinsystempressure.PORVReuirementsAsdesignedfortheLTOPSystem,eachPORVissignaledtoopeniftheRCSpressureexceedsthelimitselectedtopreventaconditionthatisnotwithintheacceptableregionprovidedinthePTLR.ThePORVsareopenedbycoincidentactuationoftwo-of-threeRCSpressurechannels.ThePTLRpresentsthePORVsetpointforLTOP.WhenaPORVisopenedinanincreasingpressuretransient,thereleaseofcoolantwillcausethepressureincreasetoslowand'thenreverse.AsthePORVreleasescoolant,theRCSpressuredecreasesuntilaresetpressureisreachedandthevalveissignaledtoclose.Thepressurecontinuestodecreasebelowtheresetpressureasthevalvecloses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-lxixDraftB LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)RCSVentReuirementsOncetheRCSisdepressurized,aventexposedtothecontainmentatmospherewillmaintaintheRCSatcontainmentambientpressureinanRCSoverpressuretransient,iftherelievingrequirementsofthetransientdonotexceedthecapabilitiesofthevent.Thus,theventpathmustbecapableofrelievingtheflowresultingfromthelimitingLTOPmassorheatinputtransient,andmaintainingpressurebelowtheP/Tlimits.Therequiredventcapacitymaybeprovidedbyoneormoreventpaths.ForanRCSventtomeettheflowcapacityrequirement,itrequiresremovingapressurizersafetyvalve,removingaPORV'sinternalsorblockingitopen,anddisablingitsblockvalveintheopenposition,orsimilarlyestablishingaventbyopeninganRCSventpath.Theventpath(s)mustbeabovethelevelofreactorcoolant,soasnottodraintheRCSwhenopen.~lLh'heactualtemperatureatwhichthepressureintheP/TlimitcurvefallsbelowthepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointincreasesasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnesshT<<T.hhThTcurvesarerevised,theLTOPSystemmustbere-evaluatedtoensureitsfunctionalrequirementscanstillbemetusingtheRCSreliefvalvemethodorthedepressurizedandventedRCScondition.a~a~taAPPLICABLESafetyanalyses(Ref.3)demonstratethatthereactorvesselSAFETYANALYSESisadequatelyprotectedagainstexceedingtheReference1P/TlimitsforallDesignBasisAccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,andinMODE4withRCScoldlegtemperatureexceedingtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,thepressurizersafetyvalveswillpreventRCSpressurefromexceedingtheReference1limits.AtorbelowtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressurepreventlonufCI='~nltwoOPERABLEPORVsorOTPadepressurizedRCSandasufficientlysizedRCSvent.Eachofthese<mea~nhasalimitedoverpressurereliefcapability.<O<<P-,.A.-~Plrts+%4savaE'hsatteh'aa(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThePTLRcontainstheacceptancelimitsthatdefinetheLTOPrequirements.AnychangetotheRCSmustbeevaluatedagainsttheReference3analysestodeterminetheimpactofthechangeontheLTOPacceptancelimits.TransientsthatarecapableofoverpressurizingtheRCSarecategorizedaseithermassorheatinputtransients,examplesofwhichfollow:MassInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentsafetyinjection(SI);orb.Charging/letdownflowmismatch.HeatInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentactuationofpressurizerheaters;b.LossofRHRcooling;orc.Reactorcoolantpump(RCP)startupwithtemperatureasymmetrywithintheRCSorbetweentheRCSandsteamgenerators.AnalyseshavedeterminedthatthemassinputtransientsaretheboundingcaseforoverpressurizationoftheRCS(Ref.3).ThetwocategoriesofmassinputtransientswereanalyzedwithrespecttoutilizingasinglePORVoranRCSvent~1.1squareinchesasoverpressureprotection.TheinadvertentactuationofasingleSIpumpprovidesalargermassadditiontotheRCSthanisolationofletdownwithallthreechargingpumpsoperating.AsinglePORVwasdeterminedtobeincapableofmitigatingtheoverpressuretransientresultingfromactuationofaSIpump,butiscapableofmitigatingthecharging/letdownmismatchtransient.AnRCSvent~1.1squareinchescanmitigateboththeinadvertentSIandcharging/letdownflowmismatchtransients.Therefore,thefollowingarerequiredduringtheLTOPMODEStoensurethatmassandheatinputtransientsdonotoccur,whicheitheroftheLTOPoverpressureprotectionmeanscannothandle:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'a~b.c~RenderingallSIpumpsincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingallbutoneSIpumpincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>1.1squareinches;DeactivatingtheECCSgaccumulatordischargemotoroperatedisolationvalvesintheirclosedpositions;andDisallowingstartofanRCPifsecondarytemperatureismorethan50'Faboveprimarytemperatureinanyonelooporpressurizerlevel+g38%.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"andLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"providethisprotection.TheReference3analysesdemonstratethateitheronePORVorthedepressurizedRCSandRCSventcanmaintainRCSpressurebelowlimitswiththemaximumallowedcoolantinputcapability.SinceneitheronePORVnortheRCSventcanhandlethepressuretransientproducedfromECCS,:)accumulatorinjectionwhenRCStemperatureislow,theLCOalsorequirestheKCCSgaccumulatorsisolatedwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreasierthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Theisolated,EC'CS~gaccumulatorsmusthavetheirdischargevalvesclosedandthevalvepowersupplyremoved.TheanalysesshowtheeffectofECC'Sg~~accumulatordischargeisoveranarrowerRCStemperaturerange(200'Fandbelow)thanthatoftheLCO.FracturemechanicsanalysesestablishedthetemperatureofLTOPApplicabilityattheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.Theconsequencesofasmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)inLTOPMODE4conformto10CFR50.46and10CFR50,AppendixK(Refs.4and5),requirementsbyhavingprocedurestomanuallyestablishmakeupcapability.TheeventswhichpotentiallyoverpressurizetheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationareincludedwithinthemassandheatinputtransientsanalyzedforLTOPconditions.Therefore,anOPERABLELTOPSystemensuresthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurizedduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxiiDraft8 LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continu'ed)PORVPerFormanceThefracturemechanicsanalysesshowthatthevesselisprotectedwhenthePORVsaresettoopenatorbelowthelimitshowninthePTLR.ThesetpointsarederivedbyanalysesthatmodeltheperformanceoftheLTOPSystem,assumingthelimitingLTOPtransientforthePORVsofacharging/letdownflowmismatch.TheseanalysesconsiderpressureovershootandundershootbeyondthePORVopeningandclosing,resultingfromsignalprocessingandvalvestroketimes,ThePORVsetpointsatorbelowthederivedlimitensurestheReference1P/TlimitswillbemetandthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurized.ThePORVsetpointsinthePTLRareupdated-whentherevisedP/TlimitsconflictwiththeLTOPanalysislimits.TheP/Tlimitsareperiodicallymodifiedasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlementcausedbyneutronirradiation.Revisedlimitsaredeterminedusingneutronfluenceprojectionsandtheresultsofexaminationsofthereactorvesselmaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimens.TheBasesforLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"discusstheseexaminations.ThePORVsareconsideredactivecomponents.Thus,thefailureofonePORVisassumedtorepresenttheworstcase,singleactivefailure.RCSVentPerformanceWiththeRCSdepressurized,analysesshowaventsizeof1.1squareinchesiscapableofmitigatingtheallowedLTOPoverpressuretransient.ThecapacityofaventthissizeisgreaterthantheflowofthelimitingtransientfortheLTOPconfiguration,whichmaintainsRCSpressurelessthanthemaximumpressureontheP/Tlimitcurve.ThelimitingtransientforthisLTOPconfigurationisanSIactuationwithoneSIpumpOPERABLE.AnRCSventz1.1squareincheswiththeRCSdepressurizedalsopreventsoverpressurizationoftheRHRsystem.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxiiiDraftB LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheRCSventsizewillbere-evaluatedforcomplianceeachtimetheP/Tlimitcurvesarerevisedbasedontheresultsofthevesselmaterialsurveillance.TheRCSventispassiveandisnotsubjecttoactivefailure.TheLTOPSystemsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattheLTOPSystemisOPERABLE.TheLTOPSystemisOPERABLEwhentheminimumcoolantinputandpressurereliefcapabilitiesareOPERABLE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldleadtothelossoflowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationandviolationoftheReference1limitsasaresultofanoperationaltransient.Tolimitthecoolantinputcapability,theLCOrequirestheKCCSgaccumulatorstobeisolated.LCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"definesSIactuationOPERABILITYfortheLTOPMODE4smallbreakLOCA.TheelementsoftheLCOthatprovidelowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationare:a.TwoOPERABLEPORVsandnoSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.APORVisOPERABLEforLTOPwhenitsblockvalveisopen,itsliftsetpointissettothelimitrequiredbythePTLRandtestingprovesitsabilitytoopenatthissetpoint,andmotivepowerisavailabletothevalveanditscontrolcircuits.b.AdepressurizedRCSandanRCSventandamaximumofone'SIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.AnRCSventisOPERABLEwhenopenwithanareaof>1.1squareinches.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxivDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESLCO(continued)EachofthesemethodsofoverpressurepreventioniscapableofmitigatingthelimitingLTOPtransient.TheLCOismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictestswithoutthePORVsandRCSventOPERABLE;howevernoSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.Thisexclusionisnecessarysinceapressuredifferentialofs800psidismaintainedbetweentheprimaryandsecondarysidesduringthetest.ThisrestrictedpressuredifferentiallimitsthestressesplacedontheSGwhichcancausecladdingintheprimarychanneltoseparatefromthebasemetalandresultintheneedfordifficultrepairsinahighradiationarea.Tomaintainthispressuredifferential~T~fiiift,RCSpressuremustbeincreasedabovethePORVsetpointforLTOPconditions.ThetestcannotbeperformedabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturesincethesteamlinesmaynotbeabletoaccommodatetheassociatedthermalexpansioniftheyareheated.Therefore,allthreeSIpumpsmustbeincapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthesesecondarysidehydrostatictests(Ref.6).ThesecondNoteonlyrequiresanECCS".:::laccumulatortobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.AccumulatorpressurebelowthislimitwillnotoverpressurizetheRCSbeyondanalyzedconditions.Theaccumulatorisisolatedwhenthedischargemotoroperatedvalveisclosedanditsassociatedpowersupplyisremoved.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxvDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRortheRHRsystemisintheRHRoperatingmode,inMODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,andinMODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.ThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovideoverpressureprotectionthatmeetstheReference1P/TlimitsabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.WhenthereactorvesselheadisoffortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorpressurizermanwayareopen,overpressurizationcannotoccur,LCO3.4.3providestheoperationalP/TlimitsforallMODES.LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"requirestheOPERABILITYofthepressurizersafetyvalvesthatprovideoverpressureprotectionduringMODES1,2,and3,andMODE4abovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.LowtemperatureoverpressurepreventionismostcriticalduringshutdownwhentheRCSiswatersolid,andamassorheatinputtransientcancauseaveryrapidincreaseinRCSpressurewhenlittleornotimeallowsoperatoractiontomitigatetheevent.ACTIONSA.1WithoneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.@ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyoFremev+ng*theRCSfromthiscondition.~~do.cd%4a<amgq~c>~a~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxviDraft8 LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES'"dŽai"RCS"'"t""'"th'""='continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-lxxviiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSi;;:,::,':.::-';:,",::;'..':;:::;<~::;:..',:.,,-Bji';::c.':::c,',:jcqiigi50eg:wN%%Ytc44144Cvlw@Piccc;.......,..w.w..'.YscrsvwwNcvhcicN.AOY'""e>)Ne.AkLecw$.'c)+c<e,.cs'"eke?(c)cct>vrrc>AQ+opdse)BP)bless)c':csrcc+p+sAv+'<see~aA'~.",'.scree+(~:Iji);:'5E'"4';.:;:,ih6n'::anj,.::,i'c)'::,:":cro":t,a,",:,'::t,:.ej,:::::,.i'e'm'pera'i;:uri;:--;.;::i,'s.-,'1esceslpeA8lli':liduei":i'j('i',"!,":th"ii's','.j:-,t;:i"m'e't;ii.e'r'.,"..i'o'der~!s'".."'v'e'iy'",j"'o'H',"'-,'""'"""""'"""'"'*""'"'"'"""""'"rNCe)XC+RYwk444hh')iVAA48AS,,CrVNCCCcCYNXW%)SACPAt,'vwYNCPORVS::::",Oi'8V$16;;-;,,he,'-::.",.RGS;,;".:;ve'jest:",::,;::Dadh);,.,rdcw'erV~4$ca'c@xRk@crsi@dertscetceNMNNZcc:~c:~'B<<c:c.c:KcscP+s)RESC~:1".te'.",OPERcABLE':,Itstus:::::Preverde's'".';:::veRetci!i~!d:,.ri".;di'iii'diriej;.;tv..'a'i~i':~EOOB'~.::::"i!~'O'~a~i"4'BOOB::-':"O~V'i.'B~PORV$':-:;;:"prov'i,'.de;".".':the!".:RGS':-::veiit';'jith):..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxviiiDraftB BASESZWey'S<P-A~ac.iw~wd-vsse~~Q>i~.4(limni)VZ~wkPe>3~a-~xac~u~~LTOPSystemB3.4,12WithtwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandtheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>1.1squareinches,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyofremovi.ng-theRCSfromthiscondition.CkMPoM.~GE:.IDN.1andDF':.2Anunisolated.ECCS(<accumulatorrequiresisolationwithin1hour.Thisis""onlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingtemperatureallowedbytheP/Tlimitcurves.Ifisolationisneededandcannotbeaccomplishedin1hour,RequiredActionOF~,IandRequiredActionOg.2providetwooptions,eitherofwhichmustbeperformedinthenext12hours.ByincreasingtheRCStemperaturetogreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,amaximumaccumulatorpressureof800psig(reliefvalvesetpoint)cannotexceedtheLTOPlimitsiftheaccumulatorsarefullyinjected.DepressurizingtheaccumulatorsbelowtheLTOPlimitfromthePTLRalsogivesthisprotection.TheCompletionTimesarebasedonoperatingexperiencethattheseactivitiescanbeaccomplishedinthesetimeperiodsandonengineeringevaluationsindicatingthataneventrequiringLTOPisnotlikelyintheallowedtimes.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxixDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESG.1andG.2Atleastonechargingpumpmustbeinthepull-stoppositionwithin1hourandtheRCSmustbedepressurizedandaventmustbeestablishedwithin8hourswhen:a.BothrequiredPORVsareinoperable;orb.ARequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,08,KC,orFisnotmet;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESe~AGT.:;IO.HS~(;:.:6.'in'dpi6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES2"-"'"-"(""'"'i'$""d')"c.4-and-GThe;-'::;:'.LTOP:.,:,',Sy'tem,'.,;,':3,':s.::.',:::.j)ioperabl,:e"."-'(~i',,.';:ariy~i.iViiaTheCompletionTimeofonehourtorestrictthecoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSconsiderstherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodandprovidestheoperatortimetorenderachargingpumpincapableofinjectingbyplacingitinthepull-stopposition.Onlyonedisablingdeviceisrequiredsincethereisarelativelysmallprobabilityofaninadvertentchargingpumpactuationduringthe8hoursbeforeRCSdepressurizationisachievedandaventestablished.ThedisablingofachargingpumpisnecessarysinceRV203cannotmitigateacharging/letdownmismatcheventifRHRisprovidingdecayheatremovalaboveNODE5andthreechargingpumpsareoperating.Theventmustbesized~l.1squareinchestoensurethattheflowcapacityisgreaterthanthatrequiredfortheworstcasemassinputtransientreasonableduringtheapplicableNODES.ThisactionisneededtoprotecttheRCPBfromalowtemperatureoverpressureeventandapossiblebrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandtoprotecttheRHRsystemfromoverpressurization.TheCompletionTimeof8hourstodepressurizetheRCSandestablishaventconsidersthetimerequiredtoplacetheplantinthisConditionandtherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodduetoincreasedoperatorawarenessofadministrativecontrolrequirements.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxiiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSG.Iand.G.2(continued)LCO3.0.4onlyappliesforentryintoHODES1,2,3,and-4whichincludesbnlypartoftheApplicabilityforthisLC).SincetheLTOPSystemhelpsmaintaintheintegrityoftheRCPBduringlowtemperatureconditions,i~tisundesirabletoentertheLTOPSystemA'pplicabilitywithnomitigationcapability.Thisappliestobothj.ncreasingordecreasingHODES.EntryintotheLTOPSytemApplicabilitywithbothPORVsinoperableshouldno@bemadeunlessitisrequiredtoperformnecessaryrepa~i-softhePOQVs.ExamplesofthisincludeahardwareyelatedfailureofbothPORVswhichrequiresbreachy.ngtheirintegritytores/oreOPERABILITY.Itisundesg.rabletoperformthistypeofRajntenanceatelevate)ARCSpressureswithonlyoneisolationvalveavailable(i.e.,PORVblockvalve).Therefore,entryintotheLTOPSystemApplicabilitycanbeperformedinordertoreachaventedconditionoftheRCS.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3Tominimizethepotentialforalowtemperatureoverpressureeventbylimitingthemassinputcapability,allSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath(LCO3,4.12.a)andaminimumoftwoSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedandanRCSventa1.1squareinchesisestablished(LCO3.4.12.b).TheSIpumpsarerenderedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSthroughremovingthepowerfromthepumpsbyrackingthebreakersoutunderadministrativecontrol.AnalternatemethodofLTOPcontrolmaybeemployedusingatleasttwoindependentmeanstopreventapumpstartsuchthatasinglefailureorsingleactionwillnotresultinaninjectionintotheRCS.Thismaybeaccomplishedthroughthefollowing:a.placingthepumpcontrolswitchinthepull-stoppositionandclosingatleastonevalveinthedischargeflowpath;(continued)REE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxiiiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-lxxxivDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3(continued)b.lockingclosedamanualisolationvalveintheinjectionpath;orc.closingamotoroperatedisolationvalveintheinjectionpathandremovingtheACpowersource.TheflowpathsthroughthetestconnectionsassociatedwiththeECCS:",:)accumulatorcheckvalves(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves839A,839B,840A,and840B)andtheKC'6Saccumulatorfilllines(i.e.,linescontainingairopera'tedvalves835Aand835B)donothavetobeisolatedforthisSRsincethepotentialmassadditionfromasingleSIpumpthroughthesesixlinesislimitedbytheinstalledorificestolessthanthatassumedforthecharging/letdownmismatchanalysis.TheKCCS'.;Pjaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvescanbeverifi'edclosedbyuseofcontrolboardindicationforvalveposition.ThisverificationisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureislessthanthislimit,noverificationisrequiredsincetheaccumulatorcannotpressurizetheRCStoorabovethePORVsetpoint.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficient,consideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,toyeriftherequiredstatusoftheequipment.P-;:,";,::<The'.'.",:,;F're'qtie'n'cy'~~o'fg'.:ev'e'ry.','",.:'.:',1'2;,"'hou'rs:SR3.4.12.4TheRCSventof~1.1squareinchesisprovenOPERABLEbyverifyingitsopenconditioneither:a.Onceevery12hoursForavalvethatcannotbelocked.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearIPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxvDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSVRVEfCLAAGE.Wc3vr~b.Onceevery31daysforavalvethatislocked,sealed,orsecuredinposition.Aremovedpressurizersafetyvalvefitsthiscategory.ThepassiveventarrangementmustonlybeopentobeOPERABLE.ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformediftheventisbeingusedtosatisfythepressurereliefrequirementsoftheLCO3-AA443,.::.":.4:!f2.b':.".':44(4vNAcCQviv'.4SR3.4.12.5ThePORVblockvalvemustbeverifiedopenevery72hourstoprovidetheflowpathforeachrequiredPORVtoperformitsfunctionwhenactuated.Thevalvemayberemotelyverifiedopeninthemaincontrolroom.ThisSurveillanceisperformedifthePORVsatisfiestheLCO.Theblockvalveisaremotelycontrolled,motoroperatedvalve.Thepowertothevalveoperatorisnotrequiredtoberemoved,andthemanualoperatorisnotrequiredtobelockedintheinactiveposition.Thus,theblockvalvecanbeclosedintheeventthePORVdevelopsexcessiveleakageordoesnotclose(sticksopen)afterrelievinganoverpressuresituation.The72hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,suchasvalvepositionindication,thatverifythatthePORVblockvalveremainsopen,SR3.4.12.6PerformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)isrequiredevery31daysoneachrequiredPORVtoverifyand,asnecessary,adjustitsliftsetpoint.TheCOTwillverifythesetpointiswithintheallowedmaximumlimitsinthePTLR.PORVactuationcoulddepressurizetheRCSandisthereforenotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxviDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxviiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.12.6(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedindicatingthatthisSRisrequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious31days.Dependingonthecooldownrate,theCOTmaynothavebeenperformedbeforeentryintotheLTOPNODES.Thetestmustbeperformedwithin12hoursafterenteringtheLTOPNODES.The12hoursconsiderstheunlikelihoodofalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduringthistime.~s~~oSR3.4.12.7Verificationonce;":,.w'i;th'i:h;-'I'2,:;:,:;::.:haul:.:,:::ao8pevery31dayst'heejaft~ee::thatpowerisremovedfromeachLCCB',)accumulatormo'tor"operatedisolationvalveensuresthatatleasttwoindependentactionsmustoccurbeforetheaccumulatoriscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hoursthep'erfai",:mance,'."':,:a'f:,:.'.':;.',th5::s'.",:":.:;"@rve1jl<1:anc'i~:once.w)::.thai,'::;I'2".:.".hoi'iF's::q"ar7d:~e'ii.'rj~31day-"Freque'ncydaj',s.',:'.',:,',CIi'e'rea'f0wi'rovieassurance'atpowerisremoved'.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheSurveillanceisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureisbelowthislimit,theLTOPlimitcannotbeexceededandthesurveillanceisnotrequired.SR3.4.12.8PerformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONoneachrequiredPORVactuationchannelisrequiredevery24monthstoadjustthewholechannelsothatitrespondsandthevalveopenswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-lxxxviiiDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESREFERENCES1.10CFR50,AppendixG.2.GenericLetter88-11,"NRCPositiononEmbrittlementofReactorVesselMaterialsanditsImpactonPlantOperations."3.UFSAR,Section5.2.2.4.10CFR50,Section50.46.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.6.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RGKE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedJuly26,1979.7.GenericLetter90-06,"ResolutionofGenericIssue70,"Power-OperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability,"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLow-TemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLight-WaterReactors."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcDraftB LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-lxxxixDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGEBASESBACKGROUNDComponentsthatcontainortransportthecoolanttoorfromthereactorcoremakeuptheRCS.Componentjointsaremadebywelding,bolting,rolling,orpressureloading,andvalvesisolateconnectingsystemsfromtheRCS.Duringplantlife,thejointandvalveinterfacescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantLEAKAGE,througheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.ThepurposeoftheRCSOperationalLEAKAGELCOistolimitLEAKAGEfromthesesourcestoamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThisLCOspecifiesthetypesandamountsofLEAKAGE.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures,Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.TheseleakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."ThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplantandthepublic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-xciDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Alimitedamountofleakageinsidecontainmentisexpectedfromauxiliarysystems(e.g.componentcoolingwater)thatcannotbemade100%leaktight.Leakagefromthesesystemsshouldbedetected,located,andisolatedfromthecontainmentatmosphere,ifpossible,tonotinterferewithRCSleakagedetection.ThisLCOdealswithprotectionofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)fromdegradationandthecorefrominadequatecooling,inadditiontopreventingtheaccidentanalysesradiationreleaseassumptionsfrombeingexceeded.TheconsequencesofviolatingthisLCOincludethepossibilityofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESExceptforprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,thesafetyanalysesdonotaddressoperationalLEAKAGE.However,otheroperationalLEAKAGEisrelatedtothesafetyanalysesforLOCA;theamountofleakagecanaffecttheprobabilityofsuchanevent(Ref.2).PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisafactorinthedosereleasesoutsidecontainmentresultingfromasteamlinebreak(SLB)accident.Toalesserextent,otheraccidentsortransientsinvolvesecondarysteamreleasetotheatmosphere,suchasasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Thesafetyanalysisforanevent"resultinginsteamdischargetotheatmosphereassumesa0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEastheinitialcondition.Theleakage.contaminatesthesecondaryfluid.TheUFSAR(Ref.3)analysisforSGTRassumesthecontaminatedsecondaryfluidisonlybrieflyreleasedviasafetyvalvesandthemajorityissteamedtothecondenser.Theassumed0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisrelativelyinconsequential.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xciiDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheSLBoutsideofcontainmentismorelimitingForsiteradiationreleases.ThesafetyanalysisfortheSLBaccidentassumes0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinonegeneratorasaninitialcondition.ThedoseconsequencesresultingfromtheSLBaccidentoutsideofcontainmentarewellwithinthelimitsdefinedin10CFR100orthestaffapprovedlicensingbasis(i.e.,asmallfractionoftheselimits).However,alowerLEAKAGElimitisassumedforallSLBstopreventacoincidentSGTRduetothelargestressesplacedontheSGtubesasaresultoftherapidcooldownanddepressurization.Thesestresscalculationsconservativelyassumeatubewitha0.4inchlongthrough-wallcrackinalocationwith40%localwallthinning.TheanalysesdemonstratethattheintegrityoftheselectedtubeismaintainedwithsufficientmarginaftertheSLB.Theassumedthrough-wallcrackof0.4inchescorrespondsto0.1gpmleakageundernormaloperatingconditions(Ref.4).-Therefore,theprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEislimitedto0.1gpmperSG.TheRCSoperationalLEAKAGEsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:'a~PressureBoundarLEAKAGENopressureboundaryLEAKAGEisallowed,beingindicativeofmaterialdeterioration.LEAKAGEofthistypeisunacceptableastheleakitselfcouldcausefurtherdeterioration,resultinginhigherLEAKAGE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB.LEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xciiiDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESLCO(continued)b.C.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEOnegallonperminute(gpm)ofunidentifiedLEAKAGEisallowedasareasonableminimumdetectableamountthatthecontainmentairmonitoringandcontainmentsumplevelmonitoringequipmentcandetectwithinareasonabletimeperiod.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB,iftheLEAKAGEisfromthepressureboundary.IdentifiedLEAKAGEUpto10gpmofidentifiedLEAKAGEisconsideredallowablebecauseLEAKAGEisfromknownsourcesthatdonotinterferewithdetectionofidentifiedLEAKAGEandiswellwithinthecapabilityofachargingpumpoperatingatitslowspeedsetting.IdentifiedLEAKAGEincludesLEAKAGEtothecontainmentfromspecificallyknownandlocatedsources,LEAKAGEthroughtwoin-seriesPIVs,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,butdoesnotincludepressureboundaryLEAKAGEorcontrolledreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturn(anormalfunctionnotconsideredLEAKAGE).ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofacomponentorsystem.d.PrimartoSecondarLEAKAGEthrouhEachSteamGeneratorSGTotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEamountingto0.1gpmthrougheachSGproducesacceptableoffsitedosesandtubestressesintheSLBaccidentanalysis.ViolationofthisLCOcouldexceedtheoffsitedoselimitsforthisaccidentorresultinacoincidentSGTR.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEmustbeincludedinthetotalallowablelimitforidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheSGsshallalsobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcivDraft8 RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESAPPLICABILITYInHODES1,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecausethepotentialforRCPBLEAKAGEisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized,InHODES5or6,thetemperatureiss200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforHODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationismuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinHODES5and6.LCO3.4.14,"RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage,"measuresleakagethrougheachindividualPIVandcanimpactthisLCO.Ofthein-seriesPIVsineachisolatedline,leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVdoesnotresultinRCSLEAKAGEwhentheotherisleaktight.IfbothvalvesleakandresultinalossofmassfromtheRCS,thelossmustbeincludedintheallowableidentifiedLEAKAGE.ACTIONSA.1UnidentifiedLEAKAGE,identifiedLEAKAGE,orprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinexcessoftheLCOlimitsmustbereducedtowithinlimitswithin4hours.ThisCompletionTimeallowstimetoverifyleakageratesandeitheridentifyunidentifiedLEAKAGEorreduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimitsbeforethereactormustbeshutdown.ThisactionisnecessarytopreventfurtherdeteriorationoftheRCPB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcvDraft8 RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESB.1V.'a'ridNB.R8'qiiiii'd!:.Aint'ji'oii'eYiiggiti,",Ojii;:."itb~:i%'-d.ii'if'-:.",th)",~s'ev$i';:i':ty)!8'f;:::;:!L'hi."ii!LEAKAGE::iiiiid"::,':'j'o.,':e'n'."";.'4j:,c'o'n's.'e'qu'e'n'c'e,'s-".,Vy'N'MRNNW'hCw"vXvj4%%'.QN".iY'YA'wlv."euW:-empkeNenThereactormustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODESwithin36hours.This{continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-xcviDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESactionreducestheLEAKAGEandalsoreducesthefactorsthattendtodegradethepressureboundary.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcviiDraft8 RCSOperationalLEAKAGE83.4.13BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcviiiDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGE83.4.13BASESACTIONSUBG5.1andGB.2(continued)TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InNODE5,thepressurestressesactingontheRCPBaremuchlower,andfurtherdeteriorationismuchlesslikely.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.13.1VerifyingRCSLEAKAGEtobewithintheLCOlimitsensurestheintegrityoftheRCPBismaintained.PressureboundaryLEAKAGEwhichisnotallowedbythisLCO,wouldatfirstappearasunidentifiedLEAKAGEandcanonlybepositivelyidentifiedbyinspection.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEandidentifiedLEAKAGEaredeterminedbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalance.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisalsomeasuredbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalanceinconjunctionwitheffluentmonitoringwithinthesecondarysteamandfeedwatersystems.TheRCSwaterinventorybalancemustbeperformedwiththeRCSatsteadystateoperatingconditions.Therefore,thisSRisrequiredtobeperformedonceduringtheinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationandevery72hoursthereafter.Steadystateoperationisrequiredtoperformaproperinventorybalance;calculationsduringmaneuveringarenotusefulandaNoterequirestheSurveillancetobemetwhensteadystateisestablished.ForRCSoperationalLEAKAGEdeterminationbywaterinventorybalance,steadystateisdefinedasstableRCSpressure,temperature,powerlevel,pressurizerandvolumecontroltanklevels,makeupandletdown,andRCPsealinjectionandreturnflows,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-xcixDraftB RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.13.1(continued)AnearlywarningofpressureboundaryLEAKAGEorunidentifiedLEAKAGEisprovidedbytheautomaticsystemsthatmonitorthecontainmentatmosphereradioactivityandthecontainmentsumplevel.ItshouldbenotedthatLEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.LeakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."The72hourFrequencyisareasonableintervaltotrendLEAKAGEandrecognizestheimportanceofearlyleakagedetectioninthepreventionofaccidents.SR3.4.13.2ThisSRprovidesthemeansnecessarytodetermineSGOPERABILITYinanoperationalHODE.TherequirementtodemonstrateSGtubeintegrityinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramemphasizestheimportanceofSGtubeintegrity,eventhoughthisSurveillancecannotbeperformedatnormaloperatingconditions.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingwithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryHainLoops."3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.LetterfromR.APurple,NRC,toL.D,White,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cDraftB RCSPIVLeakage83.4.14B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageBASESBACKGROUND10CFR50.2,10CFR50.55a(c),andAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53(Refs.1,2,and3),defineRCSPIVsasanytwonormallyclosedvalvesin-serieswithinthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB),whichseparatethehighpressureRCSfromanattachedlowpressuresystem.Duringtheirlives,thesevalvescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantleakagethrougheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.TheRCSPIVLeakageLCOallowsRCShighpressureoperationwhenleakagethroughthesevalvesexistsinamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThePIVleakagelimitappliestoeachindividualvalve.Leakagethroughbothin-seriesPIVsforagivenlinemustbeincludedaspartoftheidentifiedLEAKAGE,governedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."ThisistrueduringoperationonlywhenthelossofRCSmassthroughin-seriesvalvesisdeterminedbyawaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)orotherconfirmatorytests.AknowncomponentoftheidentifiedLEAKAGEbeforeoperationbeginsistheleastoftheindividualleakratesdeterminedforleakingseriesPIVsduringtherequiredsurveillancetesting;leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVinalineisnotRCSoperationalLEAKAGEiftheotherisleaktight.Priortotherequiredsurveillancetesting(SR3.4.14.1)andwaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)inMODES3and4,"anyleakagethroughthePIVsisconsideredunidentifiedLEAKAGE.AlthoughthisspecificationprovidesalimitonallowablePIVleakagerate,itsmainpurposeistopreventoverpressurefailureofthelowpressureportionsofconnectingsystems.TheleakagelimitisanindicationthatthePIVsbetweentheRCSandtheconnectingsystemsaredegradedordegrading.PIVleakagecouldleadtooverpressureofthelowpressurepipingorcomponents.Failureconsequencescouldbealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)outsideofcontainment(i.e.,intersystemLOCA),anunanalyzedaccident,thatcoulddegradetheabilityforlowpressureinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-ciDraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThebasisforthisLCOisthe1975NRC"ReactorSafetyStudy"(Ref.4)thatidentifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcoredamage.Asubsequentstudy(Ref.5)evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurationstodeterminetheprobabilityoFintersystemLOCAsandtoidentifywhichconfigurationsdominatetheriskprofileforintersystemLOCApotential.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformedtoidentifythemostrisksignificantconfigurations.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofaPIV,whichcouldleadtooverpressurizationofalowpressuresystemandthelossoftheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESReference4identifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcoredamage.ThedominantaccidentsequenceintheintersystemLOCAcategoryasidentifiedbyReference4wasthefailureofthelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemoutsideofcontainment.ThisaccidentistheresultofapostulatedfailureofthePIVs,whicharepartoftheRCPB,andthesubsequentpressurizationoftheRHRSystemdownstreamofthePIVsfromtheRCS.BecausethelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemisdesignedfor600psig,overpressurizationfailureoftheRHRlowpressurelinewouldresultinaLOCAoutsidecontainmentandsubsequentincreasedriskofcoredamage.Reference5evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurations,leakagetestingofthevalves,andoperationalchangestodeterminetheeffectontheprobabilityofintersystemLOCAs.ThisstudyconcludedthatperiodicleakagetestingofthePIVscansubstantiallyreducetheprobabilityofanintersystemLOCA.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformed.PIVsinthefollowingsystemsconnectedtotheRCSwereevaluated:a.residualheatremoval(RHR);b.safetyinjection(SI);andc.chemicalandvolumecontrol.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-ciiDraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheevaluationofintersystemLOCAsconcludedthatseveralconfigurationsidentifiedinReferences4and5existedintheRHRandSIsystems.ThePIVconfigurationsintheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwerenotidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantduetotheinstalledorificesintheletdownpipingandtheuseofpipingdesignedtoRCSpressureconditionsfromthedischargeofthepositivedisplacementpumpstocontainment(Ref.7).ThePIVsidentifiedintheSIandRHRSystemsarelistedbelow:853A853B867A867B877A877B878A878C878F878G878H 878JRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorACheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorBCheckValvetoRCSColdLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegARCSPIVleakagesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSPIVleakageisidentifiedLEAKAGEintoclosedsystemsconnectedtotheRCS.Isolationvalveleakageisusuallyontheorderofdropsperminute.Leakagethatincreasessignificantlysuggeststhatsomethingisoperationallywrongandcorrectiveactionmustbetaken.ThisLCOonlyappliestothosePIVswhicharedeterminedtobeinthemostrisksignificantconfigurations(Ref.7)aslistedinApplicableSafetyAnalysis.TheremainingPIVsaregovernedbyLCO3'.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE"andLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationVakve+Bounidarjes',-.";ii~Axa~eecd)~4~~((continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-ciiiDraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOPIVleakagelimitis0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizewithamaximumlimitof5gpm.Aleakageratelimitbasedonvalvesizeisusedsincethisissuperiortoasingleallowablevalue(Ref.8).Reference9permitsleakagetestingatalowerpressuredifferentialthanbetweenthespecifiedmaximumRCSpressureandthenormalpressureoftheconnectedsystemduringRCSoperation(themaximumpressuredifferential)inthosetypesofvalvesinwhichthehigherservicepressurewilltendtodiminishtheoverallleakagechannelopening.Insuchcases,theobservedratemaybeadjustedtothemaximumpressuredifferentialbyassumingleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecausethePIVleakagepotentialisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.InMODES5or6,thetemperatureiss200Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODESI,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandisolationfailuresaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheActionsaremodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIprovidesclarificationthateachflowpathallowsseparateentryintoaCondition.Thisisallowedbaseduponthefunctionalindependenceoftheflowpath.Note2requiresanevaluationofaffectedsystemsifaPIVisinoperable.Theleakagemayhaveaffectedsystemoperability,orisolationofaleakingflowpathwithanalternatevalvemayhavedegradedtheabilityoftheinterconnectedsystemtoperformitssafetyfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-civDraftB

RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESACTIONS(continued)A.landA.2Aleakingflowpathmustbeisolatedbytwovalves.RequiredActionsA.1andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatthevalvesusedforisolationmustmeetthesameleakagerequirementsasthePIVsandmustbewithintheRCPBorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.RequiredActionA.Irequiresthatisolationoftheaffectedflowpathwithonevalvemustbeperformedwithin4hours.Fourhoursprovidestimetoreduceleakageinexcessoftheallowablelimitandtoisolatetheaffectedsystemifleakagecannotbereduced.The4hourCompletionTimeallowstheactionsandrestrictsoperationwithleakingisolationvalves.RequiredActionA.2specifiesthatthedoubleisolationbarrieroftwovalvesberestoredbyclosingsomeothervalvequalifiedforisolation.TheuseofavalveotherthanthepreviouslyleakingPIVmustincludeconsiderationthattheplantmaynolongerbeinananalyzedcondition.The72hourCompletionTimeafterexceedingthelimitconsidersthetimerequiredtocompletetheActionandthelowprobabilityofasecondvalvefailingduringthistimeperiod.B.landB.2Ifleakagecannotbereduced,thesystemisolated,ortheotherRequiredActionsaccomplished,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoHODE3within6hoursandHODE5within36hours.ThisActionmayreducetheleakageduetoreducedRCSpressurewhilereducingthepotentialforaLOCAoutsidethecontainment.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonablebasedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cv(continued)DraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2PerformanceofleakagetestingoneachRCSPIVorisolationvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionA.2isrequiredtoverifythatleakageisbelowthespecifiedlimitandtoidentifyeachleakingvalve.Theleakagelimitof0.5gpmperinchofnominalvalvediameterupto5gpmmaximumappliestoeachvalveandshouldbebasedonanRCSpressureof+20psigofnormalsystemoperatingpressure.Leakagetestingrequiresastablepressurecondition.Formultiplein-seriesPIVs,theleakagerequirementappliestoeachvalveindividuallyandnottothecombinedleakageacrossbothvalves.IfthePIVsarenotindividuallyleakagetested,onevalvemayhavefailedcompletelyandnotbedetectediftheotherin-seriesvalvemeetstheleakagerequirement.Inthissituation,theprotectionprovidedbyredundantvalveswouldbelost.Testingofthecheckvalves(877A,877B,878F,and878H)andthemotoroperatedvalves(878Aand878C)identifiedasPIVsintheSIhotleginjectionlinesistobeperformedatleastonceevery40months.This~~5dsurveillanceintervalisallowedsincethetwoSIhotleginjectionlinesaremaintainedclosedtoaddresspressurizedthermalshock(PTS)concerns.Eachinjectionlineisisolatedbytwocheckvalvesandonemotoroperatedvalvein-serieswhichmustallfailtocreatethepotentialforanintersystemLOCA.TestingoftheremainingRCSPIVsintheSIandRHRsystemsistobeperformedevery24months,atypicalrefuelingcycle.The24monthFrequencyisconsistentwith10CFR50.55a(g)(Ref.10)ascontainedintheInserviceTestingProgram,iswithinthefrequencyallowedbytheAmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers(ASHE)Code,SectionXI(Ref.9),andisbasedontheneedtoperformsuchsurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringanoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cviDraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2(continued)Inadditiontotheperiodictestingrequirements,testingmustbeperformedonceafterthevalvehasbeenopenedbyflow,exercised,orhadmaintenanceperformedonittoensuretightreseating.Thismaintenancedoesnotincludeminoractivitiessuchaspackingadjustmentswhichdonotaffecttheleaktightnessofthevalve.PIVsdisturbedintheperformanceofthisSurveillanceshouldalsobetestedunlessdocumentationshowsthataninfinitetestingloopcannotpracticallybeavoided.'estingmustbeperformedwithin24hoursafterthevalvehasbeenreseated.Alimitof24hoursisareasonableandpracticaltimelimitforperformingthistestafteropeningorreseatingavalve.TheleakagelimitistobemetattheRCSpressureassociatedwithMODES1and2.ThispermitsleakagetestingathighdifferentialpressureswithstableconditionsnotpossibleintheMODESwithlowerpressures.EntryintoMODES3and4isallowedtoestablishthenecessarydifferentialpressuresandstableconditionstoallowforperformanceofthisSurveillance.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.2.2.10CFR50.55a(c).3.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.4.WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),"AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPowerPlants,"AppendixV,October1975.5.NUREG-0677,"TheProbabilityofIntersystemLOCA:ImpactOuetoLeakTestingandOperationalChanges,"May1980.6.GenericLetter,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedFebruary23,1980.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cviiDraftB RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESREFERENCES(continued)7.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"OrderforModificationofLicenseConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedApril20,1981.8.EGEGReport,EGG-NTAP-6175.9.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.10.10CFR50.55a(g).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cviiiDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM{RCS)B3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum{AIF)GDC16{Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34(Ref.1)alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.Industrypracticehasshownthatsmallwaterflowchangescanbereadilydetectedincontainedvolumesbymonitoringchangesinwaterlevelorintheoperatingfrequencyofapump.ThecontainmentsumpusedtocollectunidentifiedLEAKAGE(i.e.,containmentsumpA)ismonitoredforlevelandsumppumpactuationandcanmeasureapproximatelya2.0gpmleakinonehour.ThissensitivityisacceptablefordetectingincreasesinunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Thereactorcoolantcontainsradioactivitythat,whenreleasedtothecontainment,canbedetectedbyradiationmonitoringinstrumentation.Reactorcoolantradioactivitylevelswillbelowduringinitialreactorstartupandforafewweeksthereafter,untilactivatedcorrosionproductshavebeenformedandfissionproductsappearfromfuelelementcladdingcontaminationorcladdingdefects.Theparticulatemonitor(R-11)candetectaleakof0.013gpmwithin20minutesassumingthepresenceofcorrosionproducts.Thegaseousmonitor(R-12)candetectaleakof2.0to10.0gpmwithin1hourandisconsideredabackuptotheparticulatemonitor.RadioactivitydetectionsystemsareincludedformonitoringbothparticulateandgaseousactivitiesbecauseoftheirsensitivitiesandrapidresponsestoRCSLEAKAGE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cixDraftB

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESBACKGROUND(continued)AlternativemeansalsoexisttomonitorRCSLEAKAGEinsidecontainment.Theseincludehumiditydetectors,airtemperatureandpressuremonitoring,andcondensateflowratefromtheaircoolers.ThecapabilityofthesesystemstodetectRCSleakageisinfluencedbyseveralfactorsincludingcontainmentfreevolumeanddetectorlocation.ThesesystemsaremostusefulasalarmsorindirectindicatingdevicesavailabletotheoperatorsandarenotrequiredbythisLCO(Ref.2).Theleakagedetectionsystemsarealsousedtosupportidentificationofleakagefromopensystemsfoundincontainment.Thisincludesservicewaterandfireservicewatersystems.LeakagefromthesesystemsisrequiredtobemonitoredinresponsetoIEBulletinNo,80-24(Ref.3).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringthe19?0's,theWRCbeganevaluatingasymmetricloads+thatresulrompostulateg~rapidopeningofdouble-endedrupturesof~RCSipingatcertainlocationsin,PWRss:'Theasymmer>cloadsproucedbythepostulatedbreaksaretheresultofanassumedpressureimbalance,bothinternalandexternaltotheRCS.TheinternalasymmetricloadsresultfromarapiddecompressionthatcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialsacrossthecorebarrelandFuelassemblies.Theexternalasymmetricloadsresultfromtherapiddepressurizationofannulusregions,suchastheannulusbetweenthereactorvesselandtheshieldwall,andcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialstoactonthevessel.TheseasymmetricloadscoulddamageRCSsupports,corecoolingequipmentorcoreinternals.ThisconcernwasfirstidentifiedasHultiplantAction(HPA)D-10andsubsequentlyasUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)2,"AsymmetricLOCALoads"(Ref.4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheresolutionofUSI-2forWestinghousePWRswasuseoffracturemechanicstechnologyforRCSpiping>10inchesdiameter(Ref.5).Thistechnologybecameknownasleak-before-break(LBB).IncludedwithintheLBBmethodologywastherequirementtohaveleakagedetectionsystemscapableofdetectinga1.0gpmleakwithinfourhours.Thisleakagerateisdesignedtoensurethatadequatemarginsexisttodetectleaksinatimelymannerduringnormaloperatingconditions.TheuseofLBBforGinnaStationisdocumentedinReference6.~ICo'iThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaO~kagel:capoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplant~and'hepublic.RequiredcorrectiveactionsareprovidedinLCO3.4.13,RCSOperationalLEAKAGE.ThecapabilityoftheleakagedetectionsystemswasevaluatedbytheNRCinReference7.RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion1oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnemethodofprotectingagainstlargeRCSLEAKAGEderivesfromtheabilityofinstrumentstorapidlydetectextremelysmallleaks.ThisLCOrequiresinstrumentsofdiversemonitoringprinciplestobeOPERABLEtoprovideahighdegreeofconfidencethatextremelysmallleaksaredetectedintimetoallowactionstoplacetheplantinasafecondition,whenRCSLEAKAGEindicatespossibleRCPBdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxiDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4,15BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOissatisfiedwhenmonitorsofdiversemeasurementmeansareavailable.Thus,thecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuationfromeithersumpApump),incombinationwithagaseous(R-12)orparticulate(R-11)radioactivitymonitorprovidesanacceptableminimum.Alternatively,theplantventgaseous(R-14)orparticulate(R-13)monitorsmaybeusedinplaceofR-12andR-ll,respectively,providedthataflowpaththroughnormallyclosedvalve1590isavailableandR-14AisOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYBecauseofelevatedRCStemperatureandpressureinMODES1,2,3,and4,RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.InMODE5or6,thetemperatureis~200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.l.2andA.2WiththerequiredcontainmentsumpAmonitorinoperable,nootherformofsamplingcanprovidetheequivalentinformation;however,thecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorwillprovideindicationsofchangesinleakage.InadditiontoanOPERABLEgaseousorparticulateatmospheremonitor,thecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEwithin24hours,ortheperiodicsurveillanceforRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedatanincreasedfrequencyof24hourstoprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.Theuseofthegaseousmonitor(R-12)isacceptableduetotheincreasedfrequencyofperformingSR3.4.13.1ortheuseofthecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxiiDraft8 RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSA.1.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLEiftheflowpathsfromallfourcontainmentaircoolerstotheirrespectivecollectiontanksareavailabled~;;i'CN!!NIIEiiiiC!A'L't'IIII'!1!0!N!i!V!ii,'I!'",ll:,"!'ill',",',,hbperformedwA'h':.)',ri'jthe'jul,':a'st,"',P'4,:".:;m'ont'hs;:.The'ontainmentaircoolercondensatecollection'systemisprovidedasanoptionfordetectingRCSleakagesinceSR3.4.13.1isnotperformeduntilafter12hoursofsteadystateoperation.ThereFore,thiscollectionsystemcanbeusedduringNODEchangesifthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable,RestorationoftherequiredsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTimeof30daysisrequiredtoregainthefunctionafterthemonitor'sfailure.Thistimeisacceptable,consideringtheFrequencyandadequacyoftheRCSwaterinventorybalancerequiredbyRequiredActionA.1.RequiredActionsA.1.1,A.1.2,andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.B.l.lB.1.2andB.2.1Withbothgaseous(R-12)andparticulate(R-11)containmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitoringinstrumentationchannelsinoperable(andtheiralternativesR-13andR-14),alternativeactionisrequired.Eithergrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmospheremustbetakenandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalances,inaccordancewithSR3,4.13.1,mustbeperformedtoprovidealternateperiodicinformation.Withagrabsampleobtainedandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalanceperformedevery24hours,thereactormaybeoperatedforupto30daystoallowrestorationoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitors.The24hourintervalprovidesperiodicinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.The30dayCompletionTimerecognizesthatatleastoneotherformofleakagedetectionisavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxiiiDraFtB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4~15BASESACTIONSB.1.1B.1.2and8.2.1(continued)RequiredActionsB.1.1,B.1.2,andB.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthegaseousandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorforRCSLEAKAGE.C.l.lC.l.2C.2.1andC.2.2Withtherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitorandtheparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor~-1-1+'(k)@i~li),::inoperable,theonlyinstalledmeansofdetectingleak'ageisthegaseouscontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-12),Thisconditiondoesnotprovideadiversemeansofleakagedetection.Also,thegaseousmonitorcanonlymeasurebetweena2.0and10.0gpmleakwithin1hourwhichmaynotmeetthe1.0gpminlessthanfourhoursdetectionraterequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.5).TheRequiredActionsaretoanalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphereorperformRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,atafrequencyof24hours.ThecombinationofthegaseousmonitorandeithertheperiodicgrabsamplesorRCSinventorybalanceprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage,RestorationofeitheroftheinoperablemonitorstoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysisrequiredtoregaintheintendedleakagedetectiondiversity.The30dayCompletionTimeensuresthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedinareducedconfigurationforalengthyperiodoftime.RequiredActionsC.1.1,C.1.2,and-C.2!;.1",,'"'.,':.:,a'n'd,::,;!C:,'.,2.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthat'the"provi'sionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxivDraftB RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONS(continued)D.land0.2IfaRequiredActionofConditionA,B,orCcannotbemet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1Withallrequiredmonitorsinoperable,noautomaticmeansofmonitoringleakageareavailable,andimmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.15.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thecheckgivesreasonableconfidencethat,thechannelisoperatingproperly.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedoninstrumentreliabilityandisreasonablefordetectingoffnormalconditions.SR3.4.15.2ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)ontherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thetestensuresthatthemonitorcanperformitsfunctioninthedesiredmanner.Thetestverifiesthealarmsetpointandrelativeaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring.TheFrequencyof92daysconsidersinstrumentreliability,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatitisproperfordetectingdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxvDraftB

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.15.3andSR-3-.4-3~%374"";1'SY4TheseSRsrequiretheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachoftheRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationchannels.Thecalibrationverifiestheaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring,includingtheinstrumentslocatedinsidecontainment.TheFrequencyof24monthsconsiderschannelreliabilityandoperatingexperiencehasproventhatthisFrequencyisacceptable.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.RegulatoryGuide1.45.3.IEBulletinNo.80-24,"PreventionofDamageDuetoWaterLeakageInsideContainment."4.NUREG-0609,"AsymmetricBlowdownLoadsonPWRPrimarySystems,"1981.5.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingWithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryMainLoops."6.LetterfromD.C.DiIanni,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGRE,

Subject:

"GenericLetter84-04,"datedSeptember9,1985.7.NUREG-0821,"IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,R.E.NuclearPowerPlant,"December1982.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxviDraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDThemaximumdosetothewholebodyandthethyroidthatanindividualatthesiteboundarycanreceivefor2hoursduringanaccidentisspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.1).Thelimitsonspecificactivityensurethatthedosesareheldtoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsduringanalyzedtransientsandaccidents.TheRCSspecificactivityLCOlimitstheallowableconcentrationlevelofradionuclidesinthereactorcoolant.TheLCOlimitsareestablishedtominimizetheoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesintheeventofasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)accident.ThespecificactivitylimitsforbothDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityareprovidedintheSRs.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131iscalculatedusingTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109(Ref.2).Theallowablelevelsareintendedtolimitthe2hourdoseatthesiteboundarytoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.ThelimitsintheLCOarestandardized,basedonparametricevaluationsofoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesfortypicalsitelocations.TheparametricevaluationsshowedthepotentialoffsitedoselevelsforaSGTRaccidentwereanappropriatelysmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.Eachevaluationassumesabroadrangeofsiteapplicableatmosphericdispersionfactorsinaparametricevaluation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLCOlimitsonthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantensuresthattheresulting2hourdosesatthesiteboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimitsfollowingaSGTRaccident.TheSGTRsafetyanalysis(Ref.3)assumesthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantattheLCOlimitandanexistingreactorcoolantsteamgenerator(SG)tubeleakagerateof0.5gpm.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxvii(continued)DraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheanalysisfortheSGTRaccidentestablishestheacceptancelimitsforRCSspecificactivity.ReferencetothisanalysisisusedtoassesschangestotheplantthatcouldaffectRCSspecificactivity,astheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.Theanalysisisfortwocasesofreactorcoolantspecificactivity(Ref.4).Onecaseassumesspecificactivityat1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(}UIVALENTI-131withaconcurrentlargeiodinespikethatincreasestheI-131activityinthereactorcoolantbyafactorofabout500foradurationoffourhoursimmediatelyaftertheaccident.Thesecondcaseassumestheinitialreactorcoolantiodineactivityat60.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131duetoapre-accidentiodinespikecausedbyanRCStransient.Inbothcases,thenoblegasactivityinthereactorcoolantassumes1%failedfuel,whichcloselyequalstheLCOlimitof100/EpCi/gmforgrossspecificactivity.TheSGTRcausesareductioninreactorcoolantinventory.ThereductioninitiatesareactortripfromalowpressurizerpressuresignaloranRCSovertemperaturesTsignal.TheanalysisalsoassumesalossofoffsitepoweratthesametimeasthereactortripfollowingtheSGTRevent.Thecoincidentlossofoffsitepowercausesthesteamdumpvalvestoclosetoprotectthecondenser.TheriseinpressureintherupturedSGdischargesradioactivelycontaminatedsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheSGatmosphericreliefvalvesandthemainsteamsafetyvalves.Thissteamreleasecontinuesforeighthoursuntiltheresidualheatremovalsystemisutilizedforcooldownpurposes.AllnoblegasactivityintheRCSwhichistransportedtothesecondarysystembythetuberuptureisassumedtobeimmediatelyreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheunaffectedSGremovescoredecayheatbyventingsteamtotheatmosphereuntiltheinitialcooldownendsandtheRCSsystempressurestabilizesbelowthereliefvalvesetpoint.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxviii(continued)Draft8 RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)ThesafetyanalysisshowstheradiologicalconsequencesofanSGTRaccidentarewithinasmallfractionoftheReference1doseguidelinelimits.OperationwithiodinespecificactivitylevelsgreaterthantheLCOlimitispermissible,iftheactivitylevelsdonotexceedthelimitsshowninFigure3.4.16-1formorethanone-week.TheincreasedpermissibleiodinelevelsshowninFigure3.4.16-1areacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilityofaSGTRaccidentoccurringduringtheestablishedoneweektimelimit.TheoccurrenceofanSGTRaccidentatthesepermissiblelevelscouldincreasethesiteboundarydoselevels,buttheywouldstillbewithin10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.RCSspecificactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificiodineactivityislimitedto1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131,andthegrossspecificactivityjnthereactorcoolantislimitedto100/EpCi/gm(whereEistheaveragedisintegrationenergyofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesofthecoolantnuclides),ThelimitonDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131ensuresthe2hourthyroiddosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)willbeasmallfractionoftheallowedthyroiddose.Thelimitongrossspecificactivityensuresthe2hourwholebodydosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDBAwillbeasmallfractionoftheallowedwholebodydose.TheSGTRaccidentanalysis(Ref.3)showsthatthe2hoursiteboundarydoselevelsarewithinacceptablelimits.ViolationoftheLCOmayresultinreactorcoolantradioactivitylevelsthatcould,intheeventofanSGTR,leadtositeboundarydosesthatexceedthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxixDraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperaturea500'F,operationwithintheLCOlimitsforDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityarenecessarytocontainthepotentialconsequencesofanSGTRtowithintheacceptablesiteboundarydosevalues.ForoperationinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature(500'F,andinMODES4and5,thereleaseofradioactivityintheeventofaSGTRisunlikelysincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftpressuresettingsofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.ACTIONSA.landA.2WiththeDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131greaterthantheLCOlimit,samplesatintervalsof8hoursmustbetakentodemonstratethatthelimitsofFigure3.4.16-1arenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisrequiredtoobtainandanalyzeasample.Samplingisdonetocontinuetoprovideatrend.TheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131mustberestoredtowithinlimitswithinoneweekifthelimitviolationresultedfromnormaliodinespiking.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhentheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131isgreaterthantheLCOlimitandwithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.4.16-1.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseofthesignificantconservatismincludedintheLCOlimit.Also,reducingtheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131towithinlimitsisaccomplishedthroughuseoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)demineralizers.Thiscleanupoperationparallelsplantrestart-followingareactortripwhichfrequentlyresultsiniodinespikesduetothelargestepdecreaseinreactorpowerlevelandRCSpressureexcursion.ThecleanupoperationcannormallybeaccomplishedwithintheLCOCompletionTimeofoneweek.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxxDraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)ACTIONS(continued)B.1IfaRequiredActionandtheassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAisnotmetoriftheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131specificactivityisintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1,thereactormustbebroughttoMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'Fwithin8hours,Thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500'FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1Ifthegrossspecificactivityisnotwithinlimit,thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500'FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500'Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.16.1ThisSRrequiresperformingagammaisotopicanalysisasameasureofthegrossspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantatleastonceevery7days.Whilebasicallyaquantitativemeasureofradionuclideswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines,thismeasurementisthesumofthedegassedgammaactivitiesandthegaseousgammaactivitiesinthesampletaken.ThisSurveillanceprovidesanindicationofanyincreaseingrossspecificactivity.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxxiDraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxxiiDraft8

,t,ey) RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)conoid'i',oiis,:a'e',:-.p)".,e's'enid;,ivI',j:nqthesampl;e.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-cxxivDraftB RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)REFERENCES1,10CFR100.11.2.RegulatoryGuide1.109,Revision1.3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.WCAP-11668,"LOFTTR2AnalysisofPotentialRadiologicalConsequencesFollowingaSGTRattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,"November1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-cxxvDraftB 5u ANDRoc;hesterGas5ElectricCorporationR,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember1995SubmittalAttachmentLChapters3.5-5.0andAttachmentMVolumeVl Accumulators3.5.13.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.1Accumulators.'woECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.ILCO3.5.1ACTIONSRE(UIREDACTIONCONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.Restoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursA.1tB.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.RestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.1hourB.1C.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.BeinMODE3.6hoursC.1AND12hoursReducepressurizerpressuretos1600psigC.2D.Twoaccumulatorsinoperable.Immediately0.1EnterLCO3.0.3.DraftBR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-1APPLICABILITY:NODES1and2,MODE3withpressurizerpressure>1600psig. Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hoursSR3.5.1.2Verifyboratedwatervolumeineachaccumulatorisz1126cubicfeet(50%)ands1154cubicfeet(82%).12hoursSR3.5.1.3Verifynitrogencoverpressureineachaccumulatorisz700psigands790psig.12hoursSR3.5.1.4Verifyboronconcentrationineachaccumulatoris4he-CGER--:,';gI00~'pm"';::;"'in'::,::.:j:,":.,'.":2600.pp~31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.5.1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperatorwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-2DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.23.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-MODES1,2,and3LCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.--------------------NOTES-1.InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedbyclosingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingpetSR3.4.14.1.Powermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878A-,878B-,874C-,and878Dforupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4.14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime.2.OperationinMODE3withECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureofbothRCScoldlegsexceeds375F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.ANDAtleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable.A.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-3DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.2CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursC.Twotrainsinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.2.1Verifythefollowingvalvesareinthelistedposition.NumberPositionFunction12hours825A825B 826A826B 826C826D851A851B 856878A 878B878C878DOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpen OpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpen896AOpen896BOpenRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSprayR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-4DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and33.5.2SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCY(continued)SR3.5.2.2VerifyeachECCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.3Verifyeachbreakerorkeyswitch,asapplicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.4VerifyeachECCSpump'sdevelopedheadatthetestflowpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.5.2.5VerifyeachECCSautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.5.2.6VerifyeachECCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.2,4">iiibng4,.8;24monthsresign:cted~5$~~~debg)s",~an'd:;,~thh:,'::,'cop%ai'bmji'jc'i'i'e'e'ii':::.:,:::,'shii)i',ii);'"::":,:e'iiidii'i'cj'".'-:,,d'i'd@",:es%'i;'::Qi:,:-;::,'ib'ii'i0iiiial:::::;;c'or/'ai'jo'ii.:*R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-5DraftB ECCS-MODE43.5.33.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.3ECCS-NODE4LCO3.5,3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.RequiredECCSSafetyInjection(SI)subsysteminoperable.8.1RestorerequiredECCSSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCondition8notmet.C.1BeinNODE5.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-6Draft8 ECCS-MODE43.5.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.3.INOTEAnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.3.s.a.<iRh~ol+ow.i'-SRisapplicableforallequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE~InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-7DraftB RWST3.5.43.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1RestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.RWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits.B.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.IBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-8DraftB RWST3.5.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYR.E.GonnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-9DraftB RWST3.5.4SR3.5.4.1VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeisz300,000gallons(88%).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-10DraftB RWST3.5.4R.E.GinnaNUclearPowerPlant3.5-11Draft8

AccumulatorsB3.5.1B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoftheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalargebreaklos'sofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereafter,andtoprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.Thereactorcoolantinventoryisvacatingthecoreduringthisphasethroughsteamflashingandejectionoutthroughthebreak.Theblowdownphaseofthetransi'entendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.IntherefillphaseofaLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,thecoreisessentiallyinadiabaticheatup.Thebalanceofaccumulatorinventoryisavailabletorefloodthecoreandhelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoastoestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomofthecore.Theaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwithboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-1DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegviaanaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinseries.Themotoroperatedisolationvalves(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref.1).ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3.Theaccumulatorsize,watervolume,andnitrogencoverpressureareselectedsothatoneofthetwoaccumulatorsissufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingaLOCA.TheneedtoensurethatoneaccumulatorisadequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.4).ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativeassumptionsaremadeconcerningtheavailabilityofECCSflow.IntheearlystagesofalargebreakLOCA,withorwithoutalossofoffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.TheassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulationsandconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgothroughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios,theentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-2DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeofthereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.Asaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.ThisdelayaccountsforSIsignalgeneration,thedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.Duringthistime,theaccumulatorsareanalyzedasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeofsmallbreaks,therateofblowdownissuchthattheincreaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcooling.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsandsafetyinjectionpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingtheriseincladtemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthesafetyinjectionpumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingthetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby10CFR50.46(Ref.5)willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureiss2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationisz0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionisz0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbegeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-3DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontainedwatervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulatorsareemptied,oncedischarged.Forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduetothereducedgasvolume.Apeakcladtemperaturepenaltyisanassumedincreaseinthecalculatedpeakcladtemperatureduetoachangeinaninputparameter.Forlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodingportionofthetransient.Theanalysisusesanominalaccumulatorvolumeandincludesthelinewatervolumefromtheaccumulatortothecheckvalveduetothesecompetingeffects.TheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisusedindeterminingthetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)System.ThemaximumvalueN:t'ai!26!99Kpp'dttthpotentialforboronprec'ipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainmenttemperatureof60'F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-4DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuationat800psig,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.8and9).TheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulatorsareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.Twoaccumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillreachthecoreduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecontentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.IflessthanoneaccumulatorisinjectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECCSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.5)couldbeviolated.ForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,themotor-operatedisolationvalvemustbefullyopen,powerremovedabove1600psig,andthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSpressure>1600psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsarebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-5DraftB Accumulators83.5.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>1600psig.Atpressuress1600psig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequateinjectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CfR50.46(Ref.5)limitof2200'F.InMODE3,withRCSpressures1600psig,andinNODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisallowsRCScooldownanddepressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA.lIftheboronconcentrationofoneaccumulatorisnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthelimitswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theabilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybereduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalityduringrefloodsincetheaccumulatorwatervolumeisverysmallwhencomparedtoRCSandRWST'nventory.BoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringrefloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsinthecore.Inaddition,current'nalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulatorsarenotexpectedtodischargefollowingalargesteamlinebreak.Eveniftheydodischarge,theirimpactisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-6DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1Ifoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsofoneaccumulatorcannotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAundertheseconditions.C.landC.2IftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto~1600psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.1Ifbothaccumulatorsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-7(continued)Draft8 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.1.1s4.~Eachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalve4@igbeverifiedtobefullyopenevery12hours.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3Theboratedwatervolumeandnitrogencoverpressure"shou44-/beverifiedevery12hoursforeachaccumulator.ThisFrequencyissufficienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignoftheaccumulator,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatortoidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.Haincontrolboardalarmsarealsoavailablefortheseaccumulatorparameters.OperatingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.SR3.5.1.4The'boronconcentration4ho@4beverifiedtobewithinrequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTFrequencysincethestaticdesignoftheaccumulatorslimitsthewaysinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31daySTAGGEREDTESTFrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-8DraftB

AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESR.E.GonnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-9DraftB AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.1.5Verificationevery31days'hatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureis>1600psigensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultintheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,noaccumulatorswouldbeavailableforinjectioniftheLOCAweretooccurinthecoldlegcontainingtheonlyOPERABLEaccumulator.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifi'edevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.REFERENCES1.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."2.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicsVI-7.F,VII-3,VII-6,andVIII-2,"datedJune24,1981.3.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.4.UFSAR,Section6.3.5.10CFR50.46.6.UFSAR,Section3.11.7.10CFR50.49.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.9.UFSAR,Section15.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-10DraftB ECCS-MODES1,,2,and3B3.5.2B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)83.5.2ECCS-MODES1,2,and3BASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefollowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andcoolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalchargingsystem;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledsteamreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theadditionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantpower.TherearetwophasesofECCSoperation:injectionandrecirculation.Intheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)andinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)throughthecoldlegsandreactorvesselupperplenum.WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalandthecontainmentsumphasenoughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedtoContainmentSump8forrecirculation.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousECCSinjectionisusedtoreducethepotentialforboilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresultingboronprecipitation.TheECCSconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWSTarealsopartoftheECCS,butarenotconsideredpartofanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-11DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSflowpathswhichcomprisetheredundanttrainsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheRHRpumps,heatexchangers,andtheSIpumps.TheRHRsubsystemconsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainsthatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.TheSIsubsystemconsistsofthreeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theseinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesignsprovidetheoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilizecomponentsfromoppositetrainstoachievetherequired100%flowtothecore.DuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,suctionheaderssupplywaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSpumps.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andcontainmentspray(CS)Systempumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-seriesmotor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations,TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.1).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B)whicharemaintainedopenbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-12DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5'BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.3).ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAandBeachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(871Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseachcontaininganormallyclosed,motoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum.ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepressurizetheRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,thesteamgeneratorsprovidecorecoolinguntiltheRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aand896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-13DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.6).TheRHRpumpscanalsoprovidesuctiontotheCSpumpsforcontainmentpressurecontrol.Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequatecoreandcontainmentcooling,theSIandCSpumpsremaininpull-stop.Duringrecirculation,flowisdischargedthroughthesamepathsastheinjectionphase.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumpsisusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHR'throughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.IIThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainmentSumpBtotheRHRpumpsalso.containamotoroperatedisolationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand851Barealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinanundesirableactuation(Ref.2).TheSIsubsystemoftheECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasasteamlinebreak(SLB).Thelimitingdesignconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,limitationsareplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-14DraftB

ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSIsignal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetimedelayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5.4,"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeetAIF-GDC44(Ref.8).APPLICABLETheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptanceSAFETYANALYSIScriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR50.46(Ref.9),willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Maximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureiss2200F;b.Maximumcladdingoxidationiss0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Maximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis~0.01timesthehypotheticalamount"generatedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.TheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialforaposttripreturntopowerfollowinganSLBeventandhelpsensurethatcontainmenttemperaturelimitsaremetpostaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPower"PlantB3.5-15DraftB ECCS-NODES1,2,and383.5,2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)BothECCSsubsystemsaretakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.6and10).ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasmallbreakLOCAevent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthepumps.TheSGTRandSLBeventsalsocredittheSIpumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:a~AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedbytheSIpumpsintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.TheRHRpumpsinjectdirectlyintothecorebarrelbyupperplenuminjection.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.10and11).TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwatertomatchboiloffratesquicklyenoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoveredfollowingalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,theSIpumpsdeliversufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-16DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESLCOInMODES1,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanSIsignalandtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpB.ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow,EINPositionSecuredinPositionB825A825B826A826B826C826D 851A851B856878A,878B878C878D 896A 896BOpenOpenClosed Closed ClosedClosedOpen OpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemoval RemovalRemovalRemoval Removal RemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchangertakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andcapableofinjectingthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headrecirculationtotheSIandCSpumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-17DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESLCO(continued)AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(viaRHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.TheflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensurethatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprovideforreducedcoolingrequirementsinthelowerMODES.TheSIpumpperformancerequirementsarebasedonasmallbreakLOCA.MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODE1analysis.InMODE4,the.ECCSrequirementsareasdescribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4."InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO8-.%4-,II3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)~~53';:~:::i,~k',Res'i'dual:'.';Hea't,':,",;Reioia'1,.;')(AHR);and'CooIantAsindicatedinNote1,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2.hoursinMODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Theflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrolroomorbyfieldtestpersonnel.ThenotealsoallowsanSIisolationHOVto(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-18DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESbepoweredforupto12hoursfortheperformanceofthistesting.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-19DraftB ECCS-MODES1,2,and383.5.2BASES.APPLICABILITY(continued)AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"maybenecessarysincetheLTOParmingtemperatureisneartheNODE3boundarytemperatureof350F.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.WhenthistemperatureisneartheHODE3boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestoretheinoperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.InNODES4,5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.Mode4corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-Mode4,"andLCO3.5',"ECCS-Shu4dewnNOOf!,,:4:.'orecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3,4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantACTIONSA.1Withonetraininoperableandatleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.12)andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.AnECCStrainisinoperableifitisnot,capableofdelivering100%designflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableofperformingtheirdesignfunctiono'rnecessarysupportingsystemsarenotavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-20Draft8 ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5,2BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)TheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofoneactivecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferenttrain,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthat100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponents,inoppositetrainsareinoperable.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.AneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.Areliabilityanalysis(Ref.2)hasshownthatthe,impactofhavingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.B.1andB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoHODE3within6hoursandHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-21DraftB ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCSpumpstotheRCSismaintained.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.HisalignmentofthesevalvescouldrenderbothECCStrainsinoperable.ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.Thesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionofthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.TheverificationofthevalvebreakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3.HispositioningofthesevalvescandisablethefunctionofbothECCStrainsandinvalidatetheaccidentanalyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedvalveisunlikely.(continued)R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-22DraftB ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation..ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionprior'olocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositioninmostcases,wouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorDCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.Ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-23(continued)DraftB ECCS-HODESI,2,and3B3.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)'SR3.5.2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomplishedbymeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadatasinglepointofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesboththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.SR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveactuatestotherequiredpositiononanactualorsimulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpumpstartsonreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsifthySurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,andequipmentperformanceismonitored.aspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-24(continued)Draft8

ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASES9.10CFR50.46.Pj:.'(:.:ciri('i'~uP)',:'1'0.UFSA'R,Section15.6.11.UFSAR,Section6.2.12.NRCMemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-26DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.3ECCS-MODE4BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE4,therequiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).TheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)Thhhhbtt1b1bl1takingsuctionfromcontainmentSumpBtoproviderecirculation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESqq!eTherataieiin'o.ApplicableSafetyAnalyseseeet4en-ep~ahh1::-':.hi::::-:-,',"1j!!1!it.":.'.!if1gtha~i,cci""e'n'.gak'Ther'eforge,theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereduceed~)htjdMOTDE':,',::;4::.Itisunderstoodinth,,1t.thtttt.t~Ilactuationsarenotavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeex+~1.:s~e'xpectedformanualactuationoftherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA'tern'nqyhITherefo're,';.".';;":.'ri'ilytonetrainofECCSisrequiredforBDDE4.Thisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresare(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-27DraftB ECCS-NODE4B3.5.3BASESnotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailableforoperatorstorespondtoanaccident.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion84:oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-28DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3BASESLCOInMODE4,oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowinga-DBAanInMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.ThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringMODE4consistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneoftwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandinjectingthroughoneoftwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredintheMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtotheRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.BasedontheRipe'ct'el<:.timeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduri'n'gMODE4,a'nd:."thk$con'fulgurhtiori'>0//the,:,,,:.AAQcapableof6eingreconfiguredtotheinjectionmode(remotelyorlocally)within10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes.LCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem"containsadditionalqitf'f'igifth~SI!8/8.:'.tYg.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5.2.InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350'F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-29DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3-.8-.3-,II3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolant'C)i;,:cia:,"it$'oii':.;,,::.."..':M~a,.';egACTIONSA.IWithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelytoinitiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysomealternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.ThealternatemeansofheatremovalmustcontinueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoMODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRHRsubsystem.Therefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-30DraftB ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lWithnoECCSSIsubsystemOPERABLE,duetotheinoperabilityoftheSIpumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotppdtp'dlit&ea4+Fnjgcc'~de'ntrequiringSI.The1hourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinMODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.1WhentheRequiredActionsofCondition8cannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.3..1TheapplicableSurveillancedescriptionfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeofoperationandnototherwiseinoperable.ThisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringMODE4,ifnecessary.REFERENCESMene-4-aR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-31DraftB

RWSTB3.5.4B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUNDTheRWSTsuppliesboratedwatertobothtrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)Systemduringtheinjectionphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)recovery.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andCSpumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandCSSystempriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.TherecirculationmodeisenteredwhenpumpsuctionistransferredtothecontainmentsumpbasedonRWSTlevel.UseofasingleRWSTtosupplybothtrainsoftheECCSandCSSystemisacceptablesincetheRWSTisapassivecomponent,andpassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50Fand104F(Ref.1).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.DuringnormaloperationinMODES1,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI),RHR,andCSpumpsarealignedtotakesuctionfromtheRWST.TheECCSandCSpumpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoperatingatornearshutoffheadconditions.TherecirculationlinesfortheRHRandCSpumpsaredirectedfromthedischargeofthepumpstothepumpsuction.TherecirculationlinesfortheSIpumpsaredirectedbacktotheRWST.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-32DraftB RWSTB3.5.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandCSpumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTandSIpumprecirculationflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstotheAuxiliaryBuildingandtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.ThisLCOensuresthat:'a~b.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSandCSsystemduringtheinjectionphase;SufficientwatervolumeexistsinthecontainmentsumptosupportcontinuedoperationoftheECCSandCSpumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andc.,ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultininadequateNPSHfortheRHRpumpswhenthetransfertotherecirculationmodeoccurs.ImproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDMorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswellasexcessivecausticstresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandCSpumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.3).ThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofLCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3";LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4";andLCO3.6.6,"ContainmentSprays';-'..;'(CS');~ContainmentRi!iF~C'::"il.,"::ii!f'I!Ft!ii'i(!!Il!!:.':dCQjt'i'i,'iiiiNPost-AccidentCharcoalSys'toms."TheseanalysesareusedtoassesschangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffectsinrelationtotheacceptancelimitsintheanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83,5-33DraftB RWSTB3.5.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheRWSTmustalsomeetvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincethevolumerequiredforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupisasmallfractionoftheavailableRCSvolume.ThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAandcontainmentanalyses.FortheRWST,thedeliverablevolumeisselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.Theminimumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptioninthesteamlinebreak(SLB)analysistoensuretherequiredshutdowncapability.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptionintheevaluationofchemicaleffectsresultingfromtheoperationoftheCSSystem.ForalargebreakLOCAanalysis,theminimumwatervolumelimitof300,000gallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimitareusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore'.TheupperlimitonboronconcentrationisusedtodeterminethetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheCSSystem.TEAvalue:,':.:'R699p'p'qwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitati~on'i'ntheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50'F(Ref.I).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.I).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-34(continued)DraftB

RWSTB3.5.4BASESLCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcr'iticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinthecontainmentsumptosupportECCSandCSpumpoperationintherecirculationmode.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewatervolumeandboronconcentrationlimitsestablishedintheSRs.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,RWSTOPERABILITYrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandCSSystemOPERABILITYrequirements.SinceboththeECCSandtheCSSystemmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLEtosupporttheiroperation.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-.MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9,4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantRm<<'~ACTIONSA.1WithRWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinlimitswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedconsideringthetimerequiredtochangetheboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankarestillavailableforinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-35DraftB RWSTB3.5.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1WiththeRWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits,itmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaHODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired.Theshorttimelimitof1hourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbasedonthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.1andC.2IftheRWSTcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSR3.5.4.1TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandCSSystempumpoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystableandtheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichprovidessufficientleakdetectioncapability,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-36DraftB RWSTB3.5.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.5.4.2TheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboronconcentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section3.11.2.10CFR50.49.3.UFSAR,Section6.3andChapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-37Draft8 Containment3.6.13.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1ContainmentLCO3.6.1ContainmentshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentinoperable.A.1RestorecontainmenttoOPERABLEstatus.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3..ikAND8.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-1DraftB

Containment3.6.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.1.1-NOTESR3.0.2isnotapplicable.Performrequiredvisualexaminationsandleakageratetestingexceptforcontainmentairlockandcontainmentmini-purgevalvetesting,inaccordancewith40-GFR-SO-,except-ieaslbe,:"Cojt'Miiiiiiiif,':::Le'aka~'e7Rate(~8s,'l,A9,"."~vjo'g,,amInaccordancewith40-4FMA-,SR3.6.1.2VerifycontainmentstructuralintegrityinaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-2DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.23.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.2ContainmentAirLocksLCO3.6.2TwocontainmentairlocksshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONS-NOTES-1.Entryandexitispermissibletoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponents.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.3.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithonecontainmentairlockdoorinoperable.--'----------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsA.l,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexit4hreugi~nispermissiblefor7daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothair.locksareinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-3DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.1VerifytheOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.AND1hourA.2ANDA.3LocktheOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.24hoursVerifytheOPERABLEdoorislockedclosed'ntheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-4DraftB

ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEB.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithcontainmentairlockinterlockmechanisminoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitofcontainment4hreugh-anispermissibleunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividual.B.1VerifyanOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.1hourANDB.2LockanOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.24hoursAND8.3--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifyanOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedair1ock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-5DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.OneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionAorB.C.1ANDC.2ANDC.3InitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.Verifyadoorisclosedintheaffectedairke4~35jk.Restoreair&4+~~7dggtoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately1hour24hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.D.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursD.2BeinMODE5.36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-6DraftB ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.2.1-NOTES-1.Aninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.2.Resultsshallbeevaluatedagainstacceptancecriteriaef~~g':.iea'ble',::,".":toSR3.6.1.1gPetr'i!ormmgreqqoiii'd""::::aii',,:;.:,;1'ok-:,lehkajp!ratetesti'og'.:.':.j'o",'la'coo'i>',aooe';;:m)',t:h,::he~aC'o"aigomeojLcakeego'R'a't".'e:~jTe'itiiig:,':;:.'Pr'ogoram.InaccordancewithkO-GER-SO-,epppevedT~t'e'stiiiq~P'ri'oigramSR3.6.2.2Verifyonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatime.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-7DraftB 0 ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.33.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBanrieneBouri,aji:e'sLCO3.6.3Eachcontainmentisolationbmr1mb'ounda'rg>shallbeOPERABLE.NOTESmainsteamsafetyvalvesinMODESI,2,and3."APPLII'CA'8'll.=:IjTgii::,,:gFHODES":::*:',.l~"::,";,3::.::::3,:;,,iÃd;.'".4is,ACTTON32.AGT40NSSeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-8DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.33.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperableby4Q4ed-containmentisolationboundi)",,:j:e's.S'il:<v&CRM~(4.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenisolationbarr4~5oundaiy"leakageresultsinexceedingatheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-9DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-10DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3A"'.UT$,i,'j,..;:;,~.;~~Oj]yp,'app,::,'.i,'cabl,:e',.'-:'t'o"'"pe'Ae'tratjoui'..';,'fl.:ow'I.'pathso)'tjirIpiiiii::::~i'spi'ati'xiiihoiiii'di'ry,':;ki,'n'ojie,'r".,'i'bl'e<'e'ic"ejit'::;.:':fi:i"Iij:;ii:i",'-,,:"ji"i'i'i"'.j'eji'"i"i1)'t'ifijikji)4'::iioii~w'0'tl'ii,ii::iiiii';:t"g>>ANDe,'fjja':;;=l.'i'i'i.t"'ne"~~i:l'o)ed,,,":;:m'a"n'IIa,'jij;:,v.alai'egb)i)",nd';;::;f'l,':,i-e"'":,:."or~th'r'oujh:,';::,~'th'i'j"val':vei'"'-A~ihdi'Iii'sa'i':eas>>'iii'a'j;:;b'e'-::,':"v4rj.':,fi":edCK$%:i:>X(%'W%'M'M74WCCviiM%iw&a:vW~1,';iU)ilk":,,'ii'0p'erIet'ra't."i,'i'ii:-",::."..f].".ow';.'::,'j'i'thiiilliiii'i::,!i':,'d~")0Fj)4oQt~lonboo,rid)t.3es;o,ut,s,.i;decdfitai,iim'ega)MXRVÃi%AvNviiiw'4(CANOente'H,.'ng',~NODE~4;:i,;:,r'Prii~'HODR;:'.:5):'jifn'o't~"pej',fo're'djr'ev:i;Otij';::":92::<',:d~a.',8f~oj,'K.":.j,'8'g;:albionbou'r'isa"ri.'.e'3"'co,nt:a,'4iii,'Qi".4heaA-'ec4epeRe4r-a%ehHewpa4h-byuse-e$a4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-11DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantI3.6-12DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)(iQVer4RateeppeetMNOTE!;,:::,.-:;,l:-::.;.:-!-.;,;$~Oil:'::,,':'.a"ppl)i"cabfe!topena"rai'ron+eOPC4AB4Cf1,:oe.':,',path/$41,cking,:60:."".:',004:,:,:.;",0's)))a"oii'iii':.y,'.4-hewersh.".:.i:",'~~i.'s~P'."",at.;;:.';<.he7~affee,"'<e:dp,e084Va~t'l.,:OA'.:..."fl'OP~i'p.lf)g(0.',i:.'b1'1$dÃfl,:i'ni'e4-vni'e,!i::Or::.':;;tnoare.jiif'{i::~t'wo):,;p'i'iiti):iim'i'ntirea0'hajji'ei':ab),i':,:,"Iex'c'ij'4"..':Loi",wi:::-:,:jitit,gk;.:,:;v.al;:,veti-::;:,,tile',";i:::-::-,'i'lalI!:.'ji-",:ifnii-leper-aA-ew+CMa44m4-.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-13DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)e4'-fee-tMNOT'E:<<%'~iOoky',.".:."",'ajjl.'ic'-.ab~i~topenetrationflowpathQp:a,th4-'.,ihVcguseeg"VAN'g~q;:ggjqm~j;y~etqxq.,Ptcg>~o>~sff~qtaxq8oj8l,:.,c],oshd"'-;Oh'd':;,'d):-.,:ac'iii~ajed.'...~j~'iomaii,';ci'.al':i~'",;"::'cl:,'os'jd!'jiajiiial::.'lI,',.::,'..'",,.;,,"",":-..c::,.:o.s.edjjyjtiij,';~'a'j,:;:(agojitainm'en%~,";:,:i':$'o1.'.Std'o,nui'iiiiaary,.-awQas"'018gibe""'icy"i'is'4idm'iii':j.':s."."rat:>ie'~3geao.s::":;j&9cQxK4:~icwk0%+iv9W+Mv&~x~84~7:2hours80njipr::jpp,:;:pi.netpat5o$:;f1'dglipfi,th'0'fjW)tih%bABiii'iti:~':i'iiii'i."ii'4";~i'~o",l':at.,48'jQxxxc'w.yd>&$&$)%'~QM<~ss~:+.j$~$45~jO'Ug'a-:yK,"7'nop'e.f~,8,;,.I:,e.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.~~~Onceper31daysPH+r-4e(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-14Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)Gf).Oneormoremini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithonevalvenotwithinleakagelimits.ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.24hours0..+~'~'<c~'"~"'ai'xj"4"<p<zBUTE~,.><~<i;"0,';,,,':ig,I':"s,ol,~'t':1'o'ii';.:-':.:.b'oun'dar'1;ii'j'ii':,'.:4jjh':::i..,"a'd'4't'i',o'0'O'F.,'98s,':Ql'aye@'Bj'~vsYillf4g',",:u'se,:o'.'='"'j:"e,'n"e't."r'at),".o'.n<'."."fl"o%>)'p".a't'4""s~.',:.'~is'o:::i',e'."..:=31'ay,s,,:,.:~f01.~j,:801;:at)$nb,i,i'i'n'di'i~Xi."'sio'iitiii'imeii5AND'HDE/n<ot):;"'p.8t,',:..foY,'ifi89i:,>,:t'li:i:i:,""';t.h'e9P,'ajs,'".::.fogb:o<u'n':Oarj.43~l.nS'1'co'n't'a$iment,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-15DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)YO:C+XOÃOWj:jCR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-16DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3ACTIONS(continued)neorm'remini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithtwovalvesnotwithinleakagelimits.ANDInitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.ImmediatelyD,E.2Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.1hourR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-17DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3,6.3ACTIONS(continued)f,""..I-::,::;:';::::::;-,'::::,;'::::.".";:."'..':8e'.:,::A.iigHOOE$3Y<A%9~biiig)'i'!ilia::-::8!ilia:-':::!SIIBEl5:::-:"~F!4-.36':";,hei',s:.R.f.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-18DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3,6.3KS-.USEILL'ANCE;::!O'E90fRENENT686-hee~sUKYEj,":LCAAc5~FRE)OEHGg&aRNtR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-19DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3E.lE.2FRYglTENGY:RtKgVKNCYSP,:":.;;:;3~,":;6',':;.:SPYadiiijiii>sCpktive:,,i:,onto'i's,:3g~q~yoal>.,+~sly>>~>:+>>~xqgvPPc~>mmexo>tc'j'so'l)ti4'ii';:".bo'undar'je's':,:.".'wh:,.ich!'.'i'e'ce,iye,':,.-';anom't6',c:;:iconta:i"nment",;;:(is':o':iS'ii)i".4~.'...'"'?.N4a@wMM'vswN4kNi"4>>:4'i4a>">:>>:v'>v'>N6i>>'.>>8'iQADI':.R-"':'4"%4'i"""':':"Mt":>'-"0'."":""'4M"""i"~4M"t'hi't'::.;:,:-:0h'-;:,':ll,'i'i'cgtiid:,,.',.".0'i'its1',de'>'iiir'ita)'>IIriiiitji'a'kaid>I'ri'ii'0j'acket'd",!!sihl~jd=,'>eii'i'iith'iiihis%!j'eju>iid!.'::in';,::thm'>s>4(>g>>"'jijSg>>(.,?>'4s"q>Ry)>C.'>'4+4+>)>i%>:x>%'>>g('Yvr)(':><MN44cc>>>>KQsc<<f'i'ii'c;t'i'On'::'".':"..'jxc"e'j't'":~;f'Drijii'j,,p.;:i'Am'en~i'-4,'so,"I':ata'~m'i~~'st'r'a~'~ve,":..".'c'oner'oj'sj--'~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-20DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3E.1E.2SM~r-sSURV,FIJI"NLE"~mR~UENC~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-21DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)E.IE.2~m~r'iVfiLLQACg58'E'qtfgitY:s:~vr4wN>~SR"::;.:::,..dg::.iisolsti'iii":,".bod'n'dpi':iis::::,"'i,,:h'i'jli'::i'is'diat!onsides'as's'iii'a'y'~b's"',".!ijsiiifiad~i".'bj~oos's~!'!o'psFdmjn~i,:stratjve4~iii4asn'sP4~~s'~m~MvN<<NAWQ!:9',;,sppj'cabli~tajcohtfinmsnti's'o1':,af1~jiP::b'oundiii'es:,.,,w'h)eh,":-.i,iced'ie~"'::::aniiitos'mabi'i~~c'ii'iit'L'i'hms'ptjii'so'.:'IatsonI"=S;.:"lid!,)"):ojk4d."",~:,".s'e'a)id.',i,..".op'q'u'1'::r'ed..<'jism:ti'i'ii,:.;;::!),:'s",'."per't".or'iii1,"ii'9.:c'omn'tai,.'nmentNi':s'os't')on':",,.',:::;ac'c'j'de'n'ts<friction","".:':,::excepi:',p'.i'.,::cosni'a~njienT,"::;:.'::,iso'l,:ai','o'ij~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-22DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)E.lE.286-hev~s0RvE13!LANc8FRE(}VENERY:S'Rii)l!'6':-3'illcont&rime'n't::.:.:,is'alit'j'oui.'6'ia'l.':,ve':,.~i"si;".,4i'.:,thi"ng~,el'.',.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-23DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)E.IE.236-her-sSYRU,E'g;LAN,CNahx~~~PRE"'UENGY:~A-.3A,resj3S'e'n.t,,':,se,'a':l:i',;'.,<>C'o'n'ta'j'"ji'iii'erat~':;:f'eaka'ai""'.:.::Rat'e',":T4'i'tjng's"".P'ro'9'j"":ag"'mvwMÃAK(@Yacc>xbcch~iyx@NNr~x@NsMMM4@cMv.434xM&wvgrxklvw4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-24DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3,6.3SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)E.IE.286-hes~SURVSILLAtTfE:FREtfU,E+O'Y:S.R~~.."3.,'.::::6'j3'.",6iw~~".o:ipmg:x+~g'>g'cq:>.<?~~gx~~~+mc;.sx~c~<<~q.p,xq~~ys.<Ymca~Veri':Pj's::e'ash,".::.".'i9'tjmat'i:c:.';:,,contj$;.riment':,',.:i,:s'o,!.:itjongth'ej,'i".$."se~!:recur'e,'.d.":::4,ii,"'::~th'e",:jii-,4'iiat~5:i.:<<,t'j,'";atty'i'1::::::,oink'1iiiiiitid,:;::".;hc't'i'iaaf'a~if'i~a'1.24months~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-25DraftB

ContainmentPressure3.6.43.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.4ContainmentPressureLCO3.6.4Containmentpressureshallbea-2.0psigand~1.0psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEoA.Containmentpressurenotwithinlimits.A.1Restorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.848:hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.4.1Verifycontainmentpressureiswithinlimits.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-26DraftB ContainmentAirTemperature3.6.53.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3,6.5ContainmentAirTemperatureLCO3.6.5Containmentaverageairtemperatureshallbes120F.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithinlimit.A.1Restorecontainmentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimit.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.5.1Verifycontainmentaverageairtemperature(XSiswithinlimit.242hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-27DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.63.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),-asd~h;;.:'.,i'!P!,:':,'::!i!g'aQ:;"',;:<'aii'dl'lC'ontasnmeri8Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemsLtqLCO3.6.6(isoTwoCStrains,fourCRFCunits,twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains>;,andthe'Na(N~bsj".:i$eiiiishallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEsA.OneCStraininoperable.A.1RestoreCStraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.Onepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable.B.lRestorepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.Twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.C.1Restoreonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-28DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.~haOHg>sjsiteI<<f~-.-...P..:.~~~iinoperable".D.IRestorecpm-ayii"-,DiH'gs,%~i,toOPER'A'BLEstatus.72hours(continued)E.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orDnotmet.E.IANDE.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours84hoursF.OneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable.F.l;1~;:>>;:,os:;fy,,".:.':::.i":,eq'u'7::re'dj$f~",:,,CReFC(un)':;0'OetJaPe~asssaj1ate8'j'e'sl'.":..~ieeiifi.'nt,ch'a'i";.'co'af,,:.f']'j':,t'ai":.'::."4~a5n.~isnoti$f,."a:~et'metemsmemee&vrivkkc44'ANDtte':!."OPERABL'E::t.seta'test:imm'e,d":i~ates:y7daysG..RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFnotmet.G.lANDBeinMODE3.6hoursG.2BeinMODE5.36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-29DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)H.TwoCStrainsinoperable.ORH.IEnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately~N,'0,'i!Ei"t,-,-doneor'bothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.ORCRFCunitsinoperable.ORdt",,:ip<<-idcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-30DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6.1SAi::,::,~3SS!8,.";::1:::;'ao~di:SA'-:!ill!'5YP<3::-:0:,o'g':,v,:a3'~i".si,';.',898ijsoa4s:o"~As'<<434-d,Itn:accoidanci,':.;:pj:,th.a'p'pl.-i.'~obli,:;.,:8.R~.SR3.6.6.2Gp~v::ria,"r-,~s,.:.;:::--",,o~>-,a",utomjtij-.":;,,::,ill",ii~:i".n'"::,LO!S'1~tjOniiia'l>iao'kthii',":':O'rratititLjSOSabiOii.'1daysSR3.6.6.3Op~Ye.i;:.ffyeach31daysae,SR3.6.6.4~+$y0j'ej<it'ieachu7ij,t'.::...:for,',':::ji'.;:::::::I:S.:>~ji~jo::e.s.K>>':~D8kk;"->~stS88r8oKIXQ~l+~<3j~da7gR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-31Draft8 CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY,:.0':es,":<:.'pQ;.'.f}.:.,~s,,:Q))'gr8'a,:,e$):-;;'/fan,';:,.or.:.;:e.qu'Qi;..,4the,';:::,:r&'iiuj7'.:ed>'d&ve'.:'otied';~he8dgInaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-32DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-33DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEfRE(UENCYSR3-.6-.6-.93:::."'.,6,'.~.6:,".;8Verify~aF6'1;OilsisNaOA~Sstim;;::::s.l,it,:4%770P4-meath@'18$>>',:";:4.5,O'0SR3-.6-.6-.K3.:':6~6Y9Verify24-een4h+18,4:;~l<<I~Lca'taqk",",;"N'aOH,:-".s'ol::d'tl';drij!d'or'i'c'ejiti$6"i'!(j.:s~iSR~~ca'raaccord<<'nca::.'!i'~<<h:tah"e.'.-'.'V@FT,:PgSRF,::-.6,.'-:,":,6.","',":1,l::84-meMhs),A'a'cc'o'pdan'c'em,',::Hs':tkh~<"i.'":Vf~T."PSR8-.6-.6-.&3,".';!6,':,,",;.6!.";kgVerifyeachautomatic'CSvalveintheflowpathtli'it'gs;::.p'ogpu::::ockid,;>>ji.'.i3id",::;,:oi"ofhim6'%::::."'".:sec'u'red;'::;.':)'.i,p'oint'i:aiiCOa~cuat<<estothecorrectposieaononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24-monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-34DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3-.6-.%443!..:6"':-,.6.'.g3;:Verify',.+NCMC'i.s4)~(4@+~gK""::.KP4%$%t4(;R'.i'C>~."i(rg)i$g+4$+aPQW%.)autpriijt'i'ia'":t~j'j~,on':,,:,.':a:.'.%et'ua'i,::,'or.':,"wmuiatea'acti;at'1'6'ni,sj'dnai).hiANwIhcAWMvi4%MM~iwAM~~iWN2~4+!:iiki'iit,s'y~i!""i!i'.'t'"'"alii":i'ii'i.i!i:::'0'!Chi:.".!t,tiiiil"'"'!!ill"'i!iWjI~~~~$g~M~~j1ffj+~gQ'vgvPg~f~~%~I'lf'l~'lg+PP$%~'I+~QggP~g+d+YAgg~~gg~g(~~%%lAg+fgoaljQgg+~s~inifl$'trodi!acti'ijt'i%'i';:."-s'i'jii'il::::24.."'.':,':r7io'n",4hg:(:.c:one,:i:np'dd::).goto'~t'he'-'.:".coi'.";,i,";e'ct!;.';'p'o's$'t'i",oii'jon!!%n',.!a'ctua~l~pj~i.'4~tnoith8:-)ANXCQÃciCvNki4vS5yearsSR3-.6-.6-.M3~6,":,',6'.leVerifyeachspraynozzleisunobstructed.10yearsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-35DraftB HydrogenRecombiners3.6.73.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.7HydrogenRecombinersLCO3.6.7TwohydrogenrecombinersshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onehydrogenrecombinerinoperable.A.1--------NOTE---------LCO.3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestorehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysB.Twohydrogenrecombinersinoperable.B.lANDVerifybyadministrativemeansthatthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained.1hourANDOnceper12hoursthereafter8.2RestoreonehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-36DraftB

HydrogenRecombiners3.6.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.7.1~Perf'@i'm:,.',:a(spat'iris'"':-'fvncb":onal~gh'eckfor~5-a@V4mi'ii'hjhj'd'fjj'e'n'll'r'i'%'n'ii~.'4monthsSR3.6.7.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-37DraftB Containment83.6.183.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.1ContainmentBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentconsistsoftheconcretecontainmentstructure,itssteelliner,andthepenetrationsthroughthisstructure.ThestructureisdesignedtocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)inaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC10and49(Ref.1).Additionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentisareinforcedconcretestructurewithacylindricalwall,aflatbasemat,andahemisphericaldomeroof.Theinsidesurfaceofthecontainmentislinedwithacarbonsteellinertoensureahighdegreeofleaktightnessduringoperatingandaccidentconditions.Eachweldseamontheinsideofthelinerhasaleaktestchannelweldedoverittoallowindependenttestingofthelinerwhenthecontainmentisopen.Thelinerisalsoinsulatedwithclosed-cellpolyvinylfoamcoveredwithmetalsheetinguptothecontainmentsprayringheaders.Thefunctionofthelinerinsulationistolimitthemeantemperatureriseofthelinertoonly10'FatthetimeassociatedwithmaximumpressurefollowingaDBA(Ref.2).ThecontainmenthemisphericaldomeisconstructedofreinforcedconcretedesignedforallDBArelatedmoments,axialloads,andshearforces.Thecylinderwallisprestressedverticallyandreinforcedcircumferentiallywithmildsteeldeformedbars.Thebasematisareinforcedconcreteslabthatisconnectedtothecylinderwallbyuseofahingedesignwhichpreventsthetransferofimposedshearfromthecylinderwalltothebasemat.Thishingeconsistsofelastomerbearingpadslocatedbetweenthebottomofthecylinderwallandthebasemat,andhighstrengthsteelbarswhichconnectthecylinderwallshorizontallytothebasemat(Ref.2).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-1(continued)DraftB

ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)Thecylinderwallisconnectedtosandstonerocklocatedbeneaththecontainmentbyuseof160post-tensionedrockanchorsthatarecoupledwithtendonslocatedinthecylinderwall.Thisdesignensuresthattherockactsasanintegralpartofthecontainmentstructure.TheconcretecontainmentstructureisrequiredforstructuralintegrityofthecontainmentunderDBAconditions.Thesteellineranditspenetrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryofthecontainment.MaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLElimitstheleakageoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmenttowithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).SR3.6.1.1leakageraterequirementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJP~!Optdo~btB(Ref.4),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthecontainmentboundaryareapartofthecontainmentleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarrier:aeAllpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:b.1.CapableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.ClosedbyOPERABLEcontainmentisolationbarr'~bouoki'i9~es,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationSernimneBonnojari'aS."EachairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."APPLICABLE'hesafetydesignbasisforthecontainmentisthattheSAFETYANALYSEScontainmentmustwithstandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitingDBAwithoutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-2(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Q(cTheDBAsthatresultinachallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromhighpressuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccident(REA)(Ref.5).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthatthecontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,releasetotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasoriginallystrengthtestedat69psig(115%ofdesign).Theacceptancecriteriaforthistestwas0.1%ofthecontainmentairweightperdayat60psigwhichwasbasedontheconstructiontechniquesthatwereused(Ref.5).Followingsuccessfulcompletionofthistest,theaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingaleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperday.Thisleakagerate,incombinationwiththeminimumcontainmentengineeredsafeguardsoperating(i.e.,either2post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandnocontainmentspray,1post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainand1containmentspraytrain,ornopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsand2containmentspraytrains)resultsinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)intheeventofaDBA.Theleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperdayisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ~F:.'";:-.OpBonyB(Ref.8@)';,asL.:themaximumallowabl'econtainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternal[P,)ltdgfth~8!iiiiii'9'iiih1i"*:~XA".TheallowableleakageraterepresentedbyL.formsKebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedonallcontainmentleakageratetesting.L.isassumedtobe0.2%perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP.=59-.860psig-ge$.~SatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-3(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)LCO(ContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitingleakagetoz1.0L.exceptpriortoenteringHODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofperiodictestingperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ~<,.:,":,;Op'ti:o'n,~B.Atthattime,thecombinedType8andCleakagemustbe<0.6L.onamaximumpathwayleakagerate(HXPLR)basis,andtheoverallTypeAleakagemustbe<0.75L..Atallothertimespriortoperformingasfoundtesting,theacceptancecriteriaforTypeBandCtestingis<0.6L.onaminimumphytkNTNNPjhtht.~ij!Tick'tt'it'",,"iWXlh'1vhervvyehyonhje~+%Yd~u~~n"bXCo'hRccep4aQ+~i'ejuiVe'8structuralintegrityfollowingaDBA.CompliancewiththisLCOwillensureacontainmentconfiguration,includingpersonnelandequipmenthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleakagetothoseleakageratesassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Individualleakageratesspecifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO3.6.2)andmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals(LCO3.6.3)andadministrativelimitsforindividualisolationbarr4+mboundarj,"esarenotspecificallypartoftheacceptancecriteriaof10CfR50,AppendixJ.Therefore,leakageratesexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultinthecontainmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinexceedingtheacceptance'criteriaofAppendixJAPPLICABILITYInHODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InHQDES(00(5+ad-6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsof~th!!t'ehhh:.Thy,tttrequiredtobeOPERABLEinWQB55)IOOf:5end-5-topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainment.4+'theBqovvuouoE65o,.,e,uy:,reehnTs'.f.:of4hcoiji'aj,riment~aoplli.-NUL}t:,::::,';6,.:;;ard:::;:.aocirkss64'q:.'BO'::PBi9~3:":;:!,::,C'on'te'5niiienrti!'Ite'n'e't'r'e'tio'no'nqR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-4(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1Intheeventcontainmentisinoperable,thecontainmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocorrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentduringMODES1,2,3,and4.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofanaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.B.landB.2IfcontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-5(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.6.1.1HaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualexaminationsandleakageratetestrequirementsof'h'i,:..,:Conti'i'aine'o$jld'8jka'g8.;;-,:,kit'6g.:,l8'lt::;jng)apr'ogl',4g.mini-purgevalvewithresilientsealleakagelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2andLCO3.6.3doesnotinvalidatetheacceptabilityoftheseoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributiontooverallTypeA,B,andCleakagecausestheselimitstobeexceeded.AsleftleakagepriortoenteringNODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofrequired10CFR50,AppendixJperiodictesting,isrequiredtobe<0.6L.forcombinedType8andCleakageonaHXPLRbasis,and<0.75L.foroverallTypeAleakage(Ref.8g)>.Atallothertimesbetweentherequiredleakagetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakagelimitofs1.0L..ThisismaintainedbylimitingcombinedTypeBandCleakageto<0.6L.onaHXPLRbasisuntilperformanceofasfoundtesting.Ats1.0Ltheoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysis.SRFrequenciesareasrequiredbyeseperiodictestingrequirementsverifythatthecontainmentleakageratedoesnotexceedtheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.2ThisSRensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwillbemaintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestingandFrequencyaregenerallyconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.+g":exceptthattendonmaterialtestsandinspectionsarenotrequired(Ref.40+/~.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-6(continued)DraftB ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum,GDC10and49,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section3.8.1.3.10CFR100.4.10CFR50,AppendixJ~~Opt'jo'@~I.5.UFSAR,Section6.2.6.~lit!!i;:::,'94:,,)!);,,':,:;:!i!:,,1,-,,:5;;,::,1,x3,",,1!!i",,",',ll!!i'.!7mji):'em'e'it1,ogi:;fie':fo'i,iiiae,,'-'Ba:.eed.b'pt1oooo'fi1),,":::::C9-.RegulatoryGuide1.35,Revision2.401.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

"SafetyEvaluation~)ContainmentVesselTendonSurveillanceProgram,"datedAugust19,1985.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-7DraftB~ ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.2ContainmentAirLocksBASESBACKGROUNDContainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundaryandprovideameansforpersonnelaccessduringallMODESofoperation.TherearetwocontainmentairlocksinstalledatGinnaStation,anequipmenthatchandapersonnelhatch.Bothairlocksarenominallyarightcircularcylinderwithadoorateachendtoallowpersonnelaccess.Thetwodoorsoneachairlockareinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopening.DuringperiodswhencontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.Eacha'irlockdoorhasbeendesignedandtestedtocertifyitsabilitytowithstandapressureinexcessofthemaximumexpectedpressurefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)incontainment.Assuch,closureofasingledoorsupportscontainmentOPERABILITY.Eachofthedoorscontainsadouble-tongue,singlegasketedsealandlocalleakageratetestingcapabilitytoensurepressureintegrity.Toeffectaleaktightseal,theairlockdesignusespressureseateddoors(i.e.,anincreaseincontainmentinternalpressureresultsinincreasedsealingforceoneachdoor).Eachpersonnelairlockisprovidedwithlimitswitchesonbothdoorsthatprovideacontrolboardalarmifanydoorisopened.Asinglecontrolboardalarmexistsforallfouraccessdoors.Additionally,acontrolboardalarmisprovidedifhighpressureexistsbetweenthetwodoorsforeitherairlock.Thecontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Assuch,aitlockintegrityandleaktightnessisessentialformaintainingthecontainmentleakageratewithinlimitintheeventofaDBA.Notmaintainingairlockintegrityorleaktightnessmayresultinaleakagerateinexcessofthatassumedintheplantsafetyanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-8DraftB Q ContainmentAirLocks83.6.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccidentandarodejectionaccident(Ref.I).Intheanalysisofeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasdesignedwithanallowableleakagerateof0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday(Ref.I).Thisleakagerateisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ."',,::::;~Optooi':8(Ref.2),asL.=0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday,themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressureP,=89-.860psigfollowinga-DBAthe~deji'jo'~jbas'~,",~'-"..:,LOCA:.ThisallowableleakagerateformsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedontheSRsassociatedwiththeairlocks.ThecontainmentairlockssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheequipmenthatchandpersonnelhatchcontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Aspartofcontainment,theairlocksafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofthecontainmentleakageratefollowingaDBA.Thus,eachairlock'sstructuralintegrityandleaktightnessareessentialtothesuccessfulmitigationofsuchanevent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-9DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESLGOEachairlockisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Fortheairlock-tobeconsideredOPERABLE,theairlockinterlockmechanismmustbeOPERABLE,theairlockmustbeincompliancewiththe10CFR50,Appendix3TypeBairlockleakagetest(i.e.,SR3.6.2.1),andbothairlockdoorsmustbeOPERABLEsuchthattheycan-res~'areclosedwithleakagewithinpbilii<<~.Thi1konlyonedoorofanairlocktobeopenedatatime.ThisprovisionensuresthatagrossbreachofcontainmentdoesnotexistwhencontainmentisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Closureofasingledoorineachairlockissufficienttoprovidealeaktightbarrierfollowingpostulatedevents.Nevertheless,bothdoorsarekeptclosedwhentheairlockisnotbeingusedfornormalentryintoandexitfromcontainment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-10DraftB 0 ContainmentAirLocksB3.6<2BASES;"0).'m'8'1)ge'i~i.j.,:y',.intoMndeggs:,:;~fr'oNcontainment%'::;doesjAot.:';::;r&Ad8'd:kibe;~81:hl',ockjtnop9~rkb',t8.-h~kP'~'<'a"%~X.'::'<(Me<a<."'85+SiF<a'".<i%NV%4i%%M:',".&8K'O'gAF?'<<P4"~i'%~<:..P'v~%'::kMFVM4"~S~KNNEK~<a':%~¹.'Marx<'~<N.".::"<ee"'<"aSNC<"~WM4%MNRMQNNSM:Masm'~*'"<see~"'"r'"""'.".".'."'18giC'jjjjItI~TY'nNODES~~F'"'-2""'3'""""d'4'DBA"'0'lV""-'"',j'~!i+I'ias'eYof:;:,"';raajjant~ivji'::jtjatir'ia'h:::;::jnta::'c'0'etiam'ii'm'iiii1i..'I~0;:f0985The/Pfiii!e::,":::,,::::,:.:tejjt::::;:!n'nTvjtain<mant::::,':::.'ijr,:::::::,:!I'avails;areme<jj44e<j(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-11DraftB

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-13DraftB

ContainmentAirLocks'B3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.lA.2andA.3Withoneairlockdoorinoneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperable,theOPERABLEdoormustbeverifiedclosed(RequiredActionA.1)ineachaffectedcontainmentairlock.Ifthebetweenairlockdoorvolumeexceedstheallowedleakagecriteria,andleakageisverifiedtobeintocontainment(e.g.,leakagethroughtheequalizingvalve),thentheinnerairlockdoorshallbedeclaredi~noerableandthisConditionentered.Ifleakageexists'fro~m'8rjtVj:iioierit:totheoutsideenvironment,thenConditionCisentered.Thisensuresthataleaktightcontainmentbarrierismain'tainedbytheuseofanOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisactionmustbecompletedwithin1hourandmayconsistofverifyingthecontrolboardalarmstatusfortheairlockdoors.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequirescontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.Inaddition,theaffectedairlockpenetrationmustbeisolatedbylockingclosedtheOPERABLEairlockdoorwithinthe24hourCompletionTime.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonableforlockingtheOPERABLEairlockdoor,consideringtheOPERABLEdooroftheaffectedairlockisbeingmaintainedclosed.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-14DraftB

ContainmentAirLocks83.6.2BASESReqiisie8kAcfjonl!Ai!3verifiesthatanairlockwithaninoperabledoorhasbeenisolatedbytheuseofalockedandclosedOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisensuresthatanacceptablecontainmentleakageboundaryismaintained.TheCompletionTimeofonceper31daysisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelowlikelihoodofalockeddoorbeingmispositionedandotheradministrativecontrols.RequiredActionA.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.~i)!liteir!IITA!tile'--;le'i'-,,::::-.1-:-,':':::;dail",ch!Iiliii:",:Note1specifiesthatRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedandRequiredActionsC.1,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.TheexceptionofNote1doesnotaffecttrackingtheCompletionTimefromtheinitialentryintoConditionA;onlytherequirementtocomplywiththeRequiredActions.Note2allowsuseoftheairlockforentryandexitfor7daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothairlockshaveaninoperabledoor.This7dayrestrictionbeginswhenthesecondairlockisdiscoveredtobeinoperable.ContainmententrymayberequiredonaperiodicbasistoperformTechnicalSpecifications(TS)SurveillancesandRequiredActions,aswellasotheractivitiesonequipmentinsidecontainmentthatarerequiredbyTSoractivitiesonequipmentthatsupportTS-requiredequipment.ThisNoteallowsperformingotheractivities(i.e.,nonTS-requiredactivities)ifthecontainmentisentered,usingtheinoperableairlock,toperforman(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-15DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESallowedactivitylistedabove.ThisallowanceisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimethattheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-16DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASES'ACTIONSB.1B.2andB.3Withanairlockinterlockmechanisminoperableinoneormoreairlocks,theRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesareconsistentwiththosespecifiedinConditionAwiththeexceptionthatbothairlockdoorsarestillOPERABLEandeitherdoorcanbeusedtoisolatetheairlockpenetration.AttuNR-STI5,,-',:::::-'ll,-gillie:---0!I","iii;:iiili';:::,"!ih":"'::-d'ilii:-,ETW!i8--Note1specifiesthatRequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedandRequiredActionsC.1,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.Note2allowsentryintoandexitfromcontainmentthroughanairlockwithaninoperableairlockinterlockmechanismunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividualstationedattheairlocktoensurethatonlyonedoorisopenedatatime(i.e.,theindividualperformsthefunctionoftheinterlock).RequiredActionB.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-17Draft8 ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)C.lC.2andC.3WithoneormoreairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanthosedescribedinConditionAorB(e.g.,bothdoorsofanairlockareinoperable),RequiredActionC.Irequiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentairlocktestresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothdoorsinanairlockhavefailedasealtestoriftheoverallairlockleakageisnotwithintheifit2RR3.3.2.2.222t3containmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweentheairlockleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.RequiredActionC.2requiresthatonedoorintheaffectedcontainmentair4edm4ckmustbeverifiedtobeclosedwithintheIhourCompletionTime.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinIhour.Additionally,theaffectedair4ec~l,oyckmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe24hourCompletionTime.ThespecifiedtimeperiodisconsideredreasonableforrestoringaninoperableairlocktoOPERABLEstatus,assumingthatatleastonedoorismaintainedclosedineachaffectedairlockandthecontainmentoverallleakagerateisacceptable.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-18DraftB

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheinoperablecontainmentairlockcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.2.1MaintainingcontainmentairlocksOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththeleakageratetestrequirementsofThisSRreflectstheleakageratetestingrequirementswithregardtoairlockleakage(TypeBleakagetests).Theacceptancecriteriawereestablishedbasedonindustryexperience.Theperiodictestingrequirementsverifythattheairlockleakagedoesnotexceedtheallowedfractionoftheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.TheF'j".,Squeak%j,':,'::i.'::si<'a'sYrie'jujr,':.edby4hreeNeteethi$Cea'tainment,';,i'L'e'akim'gaetR'a'te'i:."Tejt'1jg'!:::,p~i~ej'iXm.Lgi'i(SR.::,::;:.basing)gFn,:-.:--",.moŽdV~fgi'd'tbykfw'o.'...",'::;Notes",:)Note1statesthatsuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.ThisisconsideredreasonablesinceeitherairlockdooriscapableofprovidingafissionproductbarrierintheeventofaDBA.Note2requiresthattheresultsofthisSRbeevaluatedagainsttheacceptancecriteriaofSR-3-Ai-A-.LtdCi'ziti'4oieAf,:'Laikae:.:,":RXte';:::Ti.:s't~';rij)j4Frogr'i'j.Thisensuresthatair1'ockleakage"'"ismmprop~erlyaccounted""forindeterminingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-19DraftB ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESSURVELLL'ANCgSR537:6':'"':::2>::!2.'"'tic'onto'iieoj'.","':::.::i::,'@!Tie,".':;:aj;;i,:,:jrockj,:j:nTeri'jcv;,is~8sljned.',..Icp<N,:.eve'nt:,:,':iqgU:..t;:.taneolls,':::.:op'eginrig'::,:,:o,:."".bothy'.,aool':;s:~iii'::,::-,:a'.:s':.".nfi'eg'ai":r:.:;!'.f:o"c.k.~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-20DraftB

ONw.'CwvMKv,CwXQe0'ttgf'I'll'AsPT6!'b8!!'pI'QV>P'&Qggl'Ellis80!i!9!SDIRC16lli::::DOIIAohj'!IdS::.6'ej!'u'ii'i'j~(Pi'IF;,');.',.';,,CD':;.':53.'":::,'.id:!.'.,57!',.'"'.(,Aef.tip!!thi,::::::Caritafniiii@t!..Is'Oiitiia~~iijia"'s'i'e'tii:"'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-22DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESa4a+nTheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovideisolationcapabilityfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forallfluidlineswhichpenetratecontainment.Allmajornonessentiallines(i.e.,fluidsystemswhichdonotperformanimmediateaccidentmitigationfunction)whichpenetratecontainment,exceptforthemainfeedwaterlines,componentcoolingwatertothereactorcoolantpumps,andmainsteamlines,areeitherautomaticallyisolatedfollowinganaccidentorarenormallymaintainedclosedinNODESI,2,3,and4.Automaticcontainmentisolationvalvesaredesignedtocloseonacontainmentisolationsignalwhichisgeneratedbyeitheranautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)signalorbymanualactuation.TheContainmentIsolationSystemcanalsoisolateessentiallinesatthediscretionoftheoperatorsdependingontheaccidentprogressionandmitigation.Asaresult,thecontainmentisolation(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-23DraftB 0 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESbarr4ersbo'iield'ai,',:1,"ei-helpensurethatthecontainmentatmospherewi'f1*beisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytothecontainmentatmosphereasaresultofaDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-24DraftB ~r0 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforcontainmentisolationbarr-i-ersb'o'u'nd'ar'i'eshelpensurethatcontainmentisisolatedwithinthetimelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequirementsprovideassurancethatthecontainmentfunctionassumedinthesafetyanalyseswillbemaintained.Inadditiontothenormalfluidsystemswhichpenetratecontainment,therearetwosystemswhichcanprovidedirectaccessfrominsidecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.ShutdownPureSstem36inchurevalvesTheShutdownPurgeSystemoperatestosupplyoutsideairintothecontainmentforventilationandcoolingorheatingandmayalsobeusedtoreducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccessbelowHODE4.Thesupplyandexhaustlineseachcontainoneisolationvalveandonedoublegasketedblindflange.Becauseoftheirlargesize,theshutdownpurgevalvesarenotqualifiedforautomaticclosurefromtheiropenpositionunderDBAconditions.Also,duetothedesignoftheblindflangeassembly,theisolationvalveisnotrequiredtobecreditedasacontainmentisolationbarrier.Therefore,theblindflangesareinstalledinHODESI,2,3,and4toensurethatthecontainmentbarrierismaintained(Ref.2).Hini-PureSstem6inchurevalvesTheHini-PurgeSystemoperatesto:a.Reducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccess,andb.Equalizeinternalandexternalpressures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-25DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3BASESBACKGROUNDMini-PureSstem6inchurevalves(continued)p~~SheThesystemisdesignedwithsupplyand.exhaustlineswhich-eachcontaintwoairoperatedisolationvalves.SincethevalvesusedintheMini-PurgeSystemaredesignedtomeettherequirementsforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalves,thesevalvesmaybeopenedasneededinMODESI,2,3,and4;however,emphasisshallbeplacedonlimitingpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasreasonablyachievable.APPLICABLEThecontainmentisolationbarr4er8o'iiiidarjLCOwasderivedfromtheSAFETYANALYSESassumptionsrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierduringmajoraccidents.Aspartofthecontainmentbarrier,OPERABILITYofdeviceswhichactascontainmentisolationbarr4+rsboundarhi;es,supportsleaktightnessofthecontainment.Therefore,thesafetyanalysesofanyeventrequiringisolationofcontainmentisapplicabletothis)u'CO.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)'nda'rodejectionaccident(Ref.3).Other.'.':::DHAsR4'c'j'de.isys'tiki's@45i'rougli':.:e'o'nt'ai':nm5'r'i't';:-:','::,j::::s'ol':at'i';0'fi>b'otu'ride'w'j':esij'('j"nc."I'4d~iii"etnntal'riiiient!".::iii'!'n1i,-,':nesge~)ea'1i';e!ai'i;:::,:xiiii'1e1a'sad,The.safetyateventinitiation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-26DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESkoa~bsmCassume,g,'o.::-:,-;:e,...'~.""",'::"".!::.,.'th'.:"::i'ac'c'i.'d'eÃlVy%P%yRv,'i%.'."'%C4VNv'vow)>AMOCOv."""v..d&eVvMNWSWjYi:CCw'QRSQWN'ow'NjM"~~',j%W'%Ã+Q;inyjn~torj,:,:;d:fyeJipedjfromimax>'mmmm.::4;4ak'a'ji*,",",~'f'riiii'.':.L'o'.n't%'i:niiieiit:!j('.ReN.-~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-27DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES~'~>)X~P~g++~c~t~+xdgQl~~XX~)2+~+cg)<+fgy)'P$wtg';PP0)5+hfQxQgQxc+giQ(QQPyfphjwh1,,%PP(')h'hP{d,(gj(P)@Ave/RBA4'gSPY>P~x$%NMPK489'PcKNP~'w4'~895M%NN%reA~a>~MF494ks'4:%4$(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-28DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESiridFi'itijliLmt"en't'-.',,""drool's'tior'1'r"-:.oe'1oerstwoVeii'tier'mii'sir."""'='""""oonsoosSeooo6jij')'i'::CD'?is"'-*'i""-'"i'iiiiiiiiii-iiiiiii:,":,.1,."o:.-'-::!riling'ii;:.is'iecon'.'8fnm&n",.;F;so.:::a'1:on)IYa:t:.ver:.'.roe'-'h',.;Nes;:"..'AM%seo+MSwArses%W&NAe'"'~4"'Ax@v~'>rs':XoeleoNk+~Contejn'memnt~i'sorntron,':;.'is:,:-,:e1so;.:::,i,,eqolre~d;foilry:.e,iethnwhlch,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-29DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES$~1'iiiit'i.:'.;:;alii)'the",:,-'.ka'sty:..:i'gaia)y'i'ij~gTh'issy'salemwasoriginallynotcontainthespecificdesigncriteriaspecifiedin10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57(Ref.~5')'."(QIngeneral,theContainmentIsolationSystemmeetsthecurrentGDCrequirements;however,severalpenetrationsdifferfromtheGDCfromthestandpointofinstalledvalvetype(e.g.,checkvalveversusautomaticisolationvalve)orvalvelocation(e.g.<bothcontainmentisolationb~ersh'oiirida'rj.esarelocatedinsidecontainment).TheevaluationofthesepenetrationsisprovidedinReference3.Thecontainmentisolationva&es4o'pindar.'$e'ssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOContainmentisolationba~+mbouj~dapi."e'sformapartofthecontainmentpressurebarrier."Thecontainmentisolationbarriers-'b6updatj'eF>safetyfunctionisrelatedtominimizin'g'the'""lo'ss"ofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierleakageratesduringaDBA.ThebarH+rs8o'u'n'dariescoveredbythisLCOarelistedinReference58.Thesebarr4~4'oupdar$ei'.consistofisolationvalves(manualvalves,checkval"ves,'a'iroperatedvalves,andmotoroperatedvalves),pipeandendcaps,closedsystems,andblindflanges..Therearethreemajorcategoriesofcontainmentisolationbarr~rs4'iunda't.'.';iaiwhichareuseddependingonthetypeofpenetrationandthesafetyfunctionoftheassociatedpipingsystem:a.Automaticcontainmentisolationbmr4evsba'oJidlcjegwhichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignal"to"closefollowinganaccident;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-30DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3BASESLCO(continued)b.Normallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarr-H~bo'undar'~i"es-:whicharemaint'ained""closedinNODES1,2,3,and4sincetheydonotreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltocloseandthepenetrationisnotusedfornormalpoweroperation(butmaybeusedform8i~0,";ong'..;:fe);:gaccidentmitigationfunction);andc.Normallyopen,butnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarri~bo~undaij'eswhicharemaintainedopensincethe~'jki"'::-'":kk.:i.k!'-,:ji'-....'d.-d1---.Ipoweroperation.Penetrationswhichutilizethesetyeofisolationbarr4ersb'o'unnIariesalsocontainapassivedevice(ie."';<'.ji'ijlose'd<$y'st'xiii),':::,";":.:!su'ch>:th')tWh'eO'nip,.;:;"C~l,O.S'e'd'~%'ftde.ieth'e'~,;.,'.fan):gSt;:,":~naS'S',i':Veddnfl";...'6,,T'.~~,V',I,',,t$';I,'t,';t<,,jO.,..g,,;.'1,'4&>dkg4!4&g.4~&"".4'"P:~~8'44%'W"N4W044444NMQ44'.."4N4."4'444'"4'4$4~N.QM444dd4450~WX444g44gdN'4~I,.:;iie>,auiomarjc::.'con~ajnmen~.,",::,i,'so',"t,::aijon';:;,',ouna'apies,,":,'::."j;.~:::,e.,,".,'QUAacyl:.e'sag:e,.";4gkWYiWW~M'~4dgj4gkCv..MA~~j.g.I1IdconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofbeingclosed.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-31DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESInaddition,bothpenetrationsassociatedwiththeShutdownPurgeSystemmustbeisolatedbyablindflangecontainingredundantgaskets,orasinglegasketedblindflangewithade-activatedautomaticisolationvalve(i.e.,twopassivebarriers).Containmeritisolationbarri-erboun'dag,.'eakageper10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeBandCtesting,isonlyaddressedbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"andisnotaconsiderationindeterminationofcontainmentisolationbarr-i-erbo'undiig>OPERABILITY.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-32DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESLCO(continued)r's0ThisLCOyrovidesassurancethatthecontainmentisolationbewrierebbun'dit,:ieswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstocontrolleakagefromthecontainmentduringDBAs.TheLCOismodifiedby~@Ye/Notes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthe@pl::kagl~ejta,::::,qth~~3~:ni'a~npsteam-:::>>':::si'f$tjFiji,::ves):.,inMODESI,2,SafetyValves(HSSVs),","whichprevise'j'rovides.:appropriateRequiredAe44eRIIcti,,:ones:intheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.*ThesecondNotestatesthattheLCO+1s~g0-I:-jolt!app')icab.ei'tj~thetmasn!",::stoa'ijetsos"'n'0$'"3e'ac'k'>tveatme'cj.'ij",3T'Pose!~va'~,'v>8's,:RFQ."'::""'2~"Hai'nm""184'e'awem~~Igsofati'on')ViIVes""""(NS'IVs')~"andYNo'n'-"Re'turnGn8GK'iiva'tv&s<<~;.;iemowea'mwLrYi4&cewePiwch500~~F".JThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.4,"AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs),"whichprovidesappropriateRequiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.APPLICABILITYInHODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InNO!KSH0985and-6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsof~ssi:iiiillpall.Thf,obarr~ho'undai;:.'.ie'sarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHOK490,9,6S-and-6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-33DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued)4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-34DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES<~n't'er(i'i'::tie'n't:.fj;:,.::;::.:,unde'ndividualqualifiedinaccordancewithplantproceduresatthevalvecontrols,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforcontainmentisolationisindicated.Duetothesizeoftheshutdownpurgelinepenetrationandthefactthatthesepenetrationsexhaustdirectlyfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideenvironment,thepenetrationflowpathcontainingthesevalvesmaynotbeopenedunderadministrativecontrols.AGT40N-AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,fthiLCO,ptCdiiyi11dfhpenetrationflowpath.ThisisacceptablesincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablecontainmentisolationbarr1-erboQn8Ãr$.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation~andsubsequentinoperablecontainment.isolationbarr4+vsbiu'tidal'e'iaregovernedbysubsequentConditionentryand,appl"icationofassociatedRequiredActions.AthirdNotehasbeenaddedwhichensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystemsarerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablecontainmentisolationM~)o'xiii'darj,orastheresultofperformingtheRequiredActionsdescribedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-35DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESFinally,intheeventtheisolationbarr-i-erb$!un'dary,:leakageresults-inexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria,Note4directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-36Draft8

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES'd.'e."c;1'i'~r'i'Yj'a.':~i$~co'n't'i'i'"n'hj~s:is'aa(9wlha+o~g.e&rsauo,~,Ceja:gaea,,",,'s,:afacetaAso~w'aP9wv,p+vs39w99VF9apa%x9wtu9x9rov~.NN.vpvAMpwewouowoY+c~3woq%.~isMtpahwewowo+axwkxowtr[93Mwtdstdse~e:am~djj'.-".:s'epj,.es,,anajj.;eaiiiia'arjr~i::so.'j;atg'o)i'",::b'o'uijuary:.",:::nil'~":.:~fia7je"..;,".":;.'ak,"-':ll'-e'ft';;".""""1'::,eakaj'el,at~i'".'.,:a's's'oc'i.'at'ed;'%i::th';'-'::)'.':0gOXi::::anod3-","A'.8f3"""'th"-"'-'a~4~'t"'""1'""""""""dtt'f1'isoihated'"3"naccordancewit'hRequiredActionA.3-.1I",,thedev-i~bi'iiydYpgusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavai'fableonetocontainment.RequiredActionA.k-.41mustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTtimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringNODESI,2,3,and4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-37DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-38DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONSA.4-.R-:"l::andAeneas-A.4~-4H.'2JPer;affectedpenetrationflowpaths'th'atcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccidentandnolongercapableofbeingisolatedfollowingasinglefailurewillbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationoOondav'jets::(95capableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposi"tion.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationdev4+m6'o'un'd'ir'>'eioutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevi+mbo'uridar>jj's'::areoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandthepro6abilÃtyoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdev-i~ha'~n'dao'i,'eginsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevi~esbouogarJes:andotheradministrativecontrolsthatwi11ensurethatisolationdev-i+eK0n8iig~misalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionA.4-.2NismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdev-.i~F0'opd4e~ei:locatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedN+eesbo'uodarf'e's'obeverifiedclosedyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevieesboiioda~rfe9,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperpositron,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-39DraftB 0 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-40DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESs.~so~~>~~~a<<.~,so~seFii.;::,",.:"':thoj'i',':::jene4vatj;oui,";jhijh'.';"'::,.9o.useaclosedsystee~!':.':L')iid~t'i'tiiij'C,:;,jr'iivj'desi~ah'e'::.:::a'jpcs'o'c'is'te!e'ot'ioTis:.-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-41DraftB 0 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES'AC'Ti1ONSQkth.-',.:tNocontainmenter-!HagWW~4808.ci.,:,ig::::;::,!I,,!::."::.'W'fPw~g'::):::::,-::,::jjll,,containmen""""',,',i',:sf'::,latj,o"rjb'ounjavj:.The1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACTIONS'fLCO3.6.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-42DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-43DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESf'ajjaiifiij:,':,ii)jiiPl~Ptf'1';::;:jest,:::;:ReqP7,,ed;;,;"ACtion(8.18iiir,;:1PjiCatIPmu's"'t":::jbYnv'wN%v'84vk44.wvSAtwt'CAw.Cv.'Iv.4$Q%kvw'MB'O'C44vNv8%4'ASN44v&v'vv..N4vvAv~vSNCvtijvNNwNA'C'jj"'Ai"I'ijij'ii'i"j':!IFIi;.i':i'Oii'pv'xiii'a'tie~~~~~~~0~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-44DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-45DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESiddri-'i'se"","ehcopdj::t'io'.';,;f",;:";::.onecomit:-";,n'men't-';::::,,'.;'i"i'6'1.a,,o'rib'ounoa',"';,."i:noje'rao,":i:e";'.",."',.'5'thi.i.".:~ill:'':'..",,"'0'ene~i'"a'i'j,',:~~r";:,~:,.'ow,":,:'t'ai'n.+@~~~~PP4&0~~~~3~g~<w~&~~~QMU>m"'~~pg~pCh~~g,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-46DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES,GTIOllS)j7andP('c',ont:s~~up'd":i~Acgu.~Q<<~<(Mh,vth~>WVi~m~~%th~.~~Ift+'t~o~404v~cor~~~~u~a~a<~I~X~~Ktsuw4ane~M~Cad%~8O.~<n(~~c~r~2'-'tgp';,:,...";g'.~~.b<"espy+%)a't...y?:Qgdko,twN4ivNnesaos"v.ARhtc~'Mv&86'4..vsii'.,erat'e4!Iper'i'ezra't'i;:one.:.:fit,';oui98tt1<!NO'8'T<~Di&i,;,'0'8'O'I!O'Ce'6.~44Thepmethoifiof,:,:;::.;::walationjgust"::,:,::incijChtheese;:,',::ofipfiji'I~iito'iiei::ii'o3'at'ionka'rr~ieighth'a't'!ca'kir'o't'll'1'id)Pi~a'eILolaoff'ected""'bp~~i';.:-'ii,ngl,e,"';;,amtlsVe',',':;fai.';1:',Are.(::-j,::,.:Cc.."ec::,,'."~,a.:Tie:,.,::ifaei5rio.'Acids-BV$~fite%h~k~~a.:,feted';:.:;:pj~itr',"~t'jo$bifl,';og...,j'at.T4+s~~Requi::red>~Ac't;i'on".~g.~+aseal~!i!,:,,:Sa,.'-i:,-,ii!'.'0e:;:,::::,'!!ts!."'":,,::,,::hah-"'-,i:IL!!I:,:"'!.iiiip'-Vti',oii'.:,"::;T~fpi;e..>>"'::..4)><"'.,",.'",u'g;""~isa')ynesvo!!oeovovowovsrawvxaes~~me~~>"s"+xsneoeoeee~e.,ay'!asxeeeac4tfo>>aug~'xiii;.,:::.'.'.s'p~'cj';i-~:~a,;~i'ime~pevi:oa.:,i,".'e'$'it'jije':,'.,'!~'tibjij<j~ty'i':'.o'fj.::,'th.'el'.:os'e'dsystem"'w44dewn('fj'eii'cs'et,4ha4ReRi'~61',:jibe~)g':::tj),~4e-'ebb'os'iida'r"..",';:.;jij~d;"the)j're'l!at'ai'e'i'::i'mioi't'anfci:;'.;of.m'i1:iif,::,1:ipse::n9coritainment'*,nII'fgoII~'atg5ji's~::,gsofated';,;jii:,'inc'linda'n'ce:::::::::::::IIIth','-,Rkq~ii!';.r'ed:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-47DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESbe'Aj'so)'.a't%d~io'ia'pier'fSdic",,ib'a's'i~s,".P'>WQ$ThsyW'4~'AN~g+~VWMgP~CAP~jhow'i'ddi0+vej,;j;fg'48tj'oui':.i:s):;::ae'c'es'sh'rgtoFd~th~t-,.i-.'tijnp>iif-,.,.;-j~ejieti":it'i"':olil".Oi'j'"iigan"""'"'a'cia!'d'i!i't,'i'a'r:e::,'1'ilail':iteig.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-48DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-49DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS':.:'.'~';,::.:C.'::,.':,.:;;;:':;-;:.;'j.:::::,.:C::'1"alga':::CY~2(cont'nued)RequiredActionC.82ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeA~Pou'nba'ejes,:locatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthese@~~bo'u'n'di'i8'e's:tobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyver4A-eChejijfi:ed')::.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.-O.1Intheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontainonevalvenotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,mini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarr4mboo'nda'i.,:jthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.IsolationbarrH.rskp60'd'ari,'eithatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionCo.ImusthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3-.6-~8..:';.:;:6$37i5.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,coiisider'ingthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-50DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)G0.2InaccordancewithRequiredActionC0.2,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolation'oundaj;:,:je's,:andcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationdev4cesfo'u'noa'rsi~esoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsidering'thefactthatthedev-.i~b'o'ur'id',;'":,j'e's:areoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabil"ityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicessounda'pi.',ij':insidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas~'priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesbo'undarfe'siandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwilIensurethatisolationdevl~bji'unWigP>misalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.iljloaw'sheath'esei!vh'u'undejiefft'o",:,bheiaiv;:i't'i'ed'oclseldihj."adeiii'1:','tr'tiveiee'ani'j'(eig.,erisur'bingthat'al"Ivalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedev+embo'u'ndarjes'::,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposi"tion'",issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-51DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)9E.1Intheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontaintwovalvesnotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,RequiredAction96.Irequiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentmini-purgeresults.,AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothmini-purgevalveshavefailedaleakagetestorarenotwithinthelimitsofSR3-.6-.3-.43~76~3:."':":5;.Inmanyinstances,containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.1anditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationofthemini-purgepenetrationflowpathwithinthe1hourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.1beforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,evenwithbothvalvesfailingtheleakagetest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweenthemini-purgevalveleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.9E.2-and-9Pimr;e';,,c,ion'.,:.O'""At""-"83-thleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredAction95.2musthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3-.6-:3-.43~6"'3,;:;:5.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-52DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESIii'IIId'*":Chi,::'*"::Ii!Ill!I,::":if.::I::.didli'idi'iiid"""i'ifiIfd'!!ll"I-:"'Iii'd"'fhhd'dv)+'4'Ad'<<A'4NVAVhdhVVWddVNNhhVdddVIdVAAWAdVAVA4%XWWN&dddVWdddVAWAW4A%k(dCdWdIVAVddhWdV'hdhd~tiiiI:2.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-53DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES~'ACTIONS~~<~~F.:1'.":l'a'ndNF:.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-54Draft8 ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES(continued).2IftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR-'::!N3.6.3.IThisSRexje'4::,:ice'n;:::,g.i'brit;i'o'::;:".""e"'IXX.'f,fl,:1'ith."XO.jh:.:d,::,-il::::-::,,::::::.--t:hill!::::::::::::I,-:ii,'ti'i!:th',V'j,i.,.bnme,nht;:.,,'.;b:)..',ogff7g~~a,Th~e':-:va;:..v'ep;:::-ajbe~ope'njdel:;:rojr'-.',:pressudre;;,',:chdor'jT'ro':,i,,:.~i:;:,:.oi~ali'r":!'q'u'i'::.i',:i'On'Siaderhai;:j:OnS:.~i,br:',,,;IIehr'SjOXnan.,i~:,."entYjj:,:;:,:majnPQnanCde'.:I!,,'::Itl:"-':-:i!i'iiiiil!'.:!!I!'ll:"!!I!I!:""-""'"t'h"t"~,tI)h...,,',t!,:,:,YdXddtXdddXd!XhpgjXthXdjXQ'":::::,:h',-,,-I),.t,',"::I'i:"",',",","'!dillies;:'"'lth',','!::,,l,"""i""""'""*!It*Lii""'i:-"'h'ihtiit!,:-'I:,-iiti':,-,Chil-:::i""'*-:::lid-"'i'-ll".i""'i'did!i!i""'"'ll:-:,'"::,,-tihi"'i""thevalvesi!i""'tilth-.,:!ihhidlldddd(ii::,--,d!ii:,,:hiij'hi!ii"idj",e1."easppm~it",:,:,"be".',.mjo'n')'t'or'ed':+'jjAkjdh"XXh@jdj%(hddyd'XAjjj8'hdjdh+'j\jjdXdjXjdhjXd4ACw'hXjXjhtXC&iWddjddhdXjXXMl:,th1;n('/StanjiAIdtt).,l',/PI'IMP'I1,:,Cj:.Siddje-jdd(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-55DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES31::dayFrequency$s<,':.:,ba'i'ed:,':,oPi,:.,'".;:the+re'>gtj'ie~5'iiij'ii;::tance'b'iltiidP':'e'niti'rarimeiit$'nd,:!%lie.,",:.':::iviniii'isEiativs;::::,';c~g'tto'f$(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-56DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESThe-sURVEIL~L'AAcBsR~...i.'.6'."-O'.."...'QREgVfRENE~JS0?::i;.".4(?'?N'..qN:"::;:...:.:VCOO(C~RV}~~<MICOw&~~hg@NCNA'????kPXgP%y+?VAQ'0?PrXCCC+'YPgg~Q'0?:?P?XCgO'jR.gQ~<>..gy~AN~l:o'ck'ed','",;:::;-:;,8e'a1."e'd:...:'o'.'::,.".",.;.p,'th8"p'08!j'i'OA".;""<'Spit;fo~m'i'rig~i',tg,':;,co(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-57DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES<l.:Qikigebsf4j"adi;cactive'."f'lii(de.-:,'::b'r;,",::)is'containment~~b~i',:.f'ie.'r";:".,:."9'%"",w"f,':,f",:6"1'.r'i~<eLgn:::.:':,:::fit"',ts.TIE':s:SR!e-:::,i,ti,,:,:,i!!,,'!!eT!:!tI:I'!:::::ii::::,,:"'!i-':iii!s!ii'Uter,:..:.;Ito'sooLaas~iie'iiF1'cat:Ip~ii':,:,:",t'hrpjigh",:::,"::;a::;::;sjsteiii'ijiil'kdawii:::,.".,tg5thIthos'I*,,.iso,aIoo,Qcpa,%pRN'cp)@piss)~%%a)pa+fpf$gass.~pssgjjgAcpgpxc+QQ+xgppg+b!Y!!Qfppppspi;:sp'ds'i,':K~on'e.,;:;:::ar'6intheprepergbi;rect.position~~ma+l-.~~~Thist~~"ti'Ii:t'!!ll"::!S!!!i!"."-,::i"giles!i!~bill!-:::::f::i':"""t'!",'"'"":a'(ll!1'---'-!I!'-'ti!'":-"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-58DraftB

ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES,N>>P>%>>>%~y~>>>>yj9$&9>@XX>Q>4(C%>>'Og?'>>;.CO'WC4,.QN"'Q>+(+>'(?QP;)g>?>>'>Q>'>>~(>X9pjh+)~b:o,,u,no'ar;jj:s:,.Jw'ii~cn';-;:.:'::.r.',:ex~iAw~~<~iH~~;'r~:>ua,guet,M4~a~wW~-qsr-'+>~9Qp~~6,c4>(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-59DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundaries83.6.3BASES-'Sigh)Eii."LAN'CE,.":."::,",,~~'S~a>6':3':-a:8:,'E(U,fREMEND,.ofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentbarrieriswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolves~verification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationbar~tbo'unda)',.".~asinsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositioned"arei'nthecorrectposition.ThjY;:j~~cl:uuIHe-manualvalves,blindflanges,pipeandend'caps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationbarr4ersbo'u'oui'iie'jaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswi'Vlicontainmentisolationbarr4mb'ou'p8iig:tagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignriienti'slowandFrequencyof"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious48492:days"isappropriate.TheSRspecifiesthatisolationbaVv4evsbo'u'r'id'a'r'ie's,thatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequ'iredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheyareopen.The>>-)meanswo,",:!noe's:.2K~g~~d,,yyqgy~tygyggba~4~y+yfv~+~dy~~l~d~byrurry<r~'svyrrqfwy~d~'+~PP>Py't'".",',kg>i.its.,+,8~v~+~y..~.Fdiiijj'.js:tr!htivd'~aliiaiR:;:;.'$8."%f1'o'i'i1'iig~vev";Hi<r@'0jon:::,:Fy,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-60DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES>yyypcom~.np~>..y.,>>...:c>>>r;:q>>..:g>~>>>>qgy."~>.~iq>,<<~~~~p>c~g.l:,':j:pr'ocjaui";.'e'.:,:,conir'o;i,'j,~i.:s.':.'.;.co'risw'eredv.v>>&we>>>>>>>>v'.>SwRMNiv>(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-61DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES'SVR,V,EEL:"'AAGE',".:;":;;g',.i~~SR:4!::::3;'.6'4:"':4REljUjRENFNTS'hevalveweal'1'isoTateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheisolationtimeandFrequencyofthisSRareinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3-343-.43"-."."6'"':.:3."":."'5Forcontainmentmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals,additionalleakageratetestingbeyondthetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ,Gjt~j'opP8~$gisrequiredtoensureOPERABILITY.Operatingexperiencehasdemonstratedthatthistypeofsealhasthepotentialtodegradeinashortertimeperiodthandoothersealtypes.Basedonthisobservationandtheimportanceofmaintainingthispenetrationleaktight(duetothedirectpathbetweencontainmentandtheoutsideenvironment),aleakageacceptancecriteriaof(0.05L.whentestedataP.isspecifiedforeachmini-urgeisolationvalvewithresilientsealsP:,'ri~kthi,,.~Cori%'al,nment<>,:Leak'aj~e':;Rati;:.,'~Vest's:n'g',:;,:."Prjgr'am.Theiih-:6'o'n4~i:nment"."':"::Leakage"::Rate.:"::.Propria'm.-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-62DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASES6-aad~S0RVgIX."LANCE>.:':",'"::::SR"-';'"':3':.':6:::36::".'::::2REt}UlRENENTS'ad'i0itt1i~<'iiiai;ii1'i'l.':::t'ro~!'::i:smriti'I'iiiiiiiftA'fo1;IS.~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-63DraftB ContainmentIsolationBoundariesB3.6.3BASESThisSRensuresthateachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvewillactuatetoitsisolationpositiononacontainmentisolationsignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForumGDC53and57,issuedforcommentJulyIO,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-4,"ContainmentPurgingDuringNormalOperation."3.UFSAR,Section6.2.4andTable6.2-15.4Regal,at~ipVGijidei,,l::4:;-;::::R~vjii"o~n~g:::;+5~,'0CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57.56.GinnaStationProcedureA-3.3.N!IIIIt!0',:-(I'tidii'i!I'"@!',:,.:!Sig,:-"::li.~~IIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-64Draft8 ContainmentPressureB3.6.4B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.4ContainmentPressureBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentpressureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Theselimitsalsopreventthecontainmentpressurefromexceedingthecontainmentdesignnegativepressuredifferentialwithrespecttotheoutsideatmosphere.Containmentpressureisaprocessvariablethatismonitoredandcontrolled.Thecontainmentpressurelimitsarederivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalysis.ShouldoperationoccuroutsidetheselimitscoincidentwithaDBA,postaccidentcontainmentpressurescouldexceedcalculatedvalues.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmentpressureoutsidethelimitsoftheLCOviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLEContainmentinternalpressureisaninitialconditionusedSAFETYANALYSESintheDBAanalysesperformedtoestablishthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressure.ThelimitingDBAsconsidered,relativetocontainmentpressure,aretheLOCAandSLB,whichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.TheworstcaseSLBgenerateslargermassandenergyreleasesthantheworstcaseLOCA.Thus,theSLBeventboundstheLOCAeventfromthecontainmentpeakpressurestandpoint(Ref.I).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-65(continued)DraftB

ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Theinitialpressureconditionusedinthecontainmentanalysiswas15.7psia(1.0psig).ThemaximumcontainmentpressureresultingfromtheworstcaseSLB,59.8psig,doesnotexceedthecontainmentdesignpressure,60psig.Thecontainmentwasalsodesignedforan4AernA-.oXtei.:jag;:pressureloadequivalentto-2.5psig.However,in'ternalpressureislimitedto-2.0psigbasedonconcernsrelatedtoprovidingcontinuedcoolingforthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainment.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Therefore,fortherefloodphase,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).ServiceWaterSystem(LCO3.7.8)temperatureplaysanimportantroleinbothmaximizingandminimizingcontainmentpressurefollowingaDBAresponse.ContainmentpressuresatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintainingcontainmentpressureatlessthanorequaltotheLCOupperpressurelimitensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theresultantpeakcontainmentaccidentpressurewillremainbelowthecontainmentdesignpressure.MaintainingcontainmentpressureatgreaterthanorequaltotheLCOlowerpressurelimitensuresthatthecontainmentwillnotexceedthedesignnegativedifferentialpressure.However,thelowerpressurelimitspecifiedforthisLCOisset,atamorelimitingpressuretoensurecontinuedcoolingofthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainmentwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLEforalargeportionofMODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-66(continued)DraftB ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASESAPPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.Sincemaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitsisessentialtoensureinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesaremaintained,theLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,3and4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentpressurewithinthelimitsoftheLCOisnotrequiredinMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.lWhencontainmentpressureisnotwithinthelimitsoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithintheselimitswithin848hours.TheRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The848hourCompletionTimeisgreaterthantheACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.However,duetothelargecontainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeofthecontainmentMini-PurgeSystem,kghoursisallowedtorestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.ThisisjustifiedbythelowprobabilityofaDBAduringthistimeperiod.B.1and8.2IfcontainmentpressurecannotberestoredtowithinlimitswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-67(continued)DraftB 0 ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1Verifyingthatcontainmentpressureiswithinlimitsensuresthatplantoperationremainswithinthelimitsassumedinthecontainmentanalysis.ThisverificationshouldnormallybeperformedusingPI-944.The12hourFrequencyofthisSRwasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingofcontainmentpressurevariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmentpressurecondition.CalibrationofPI-944orothercontainmentpressuremonitoringdevicesshouldbeperformedinaccordancewithindustrystandards.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50,AppendixK.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-68DraftB ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.5ContainmentAirTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperaturelimitisderivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalyses.ThisLCOensuresthatinitialconditionsassumedintheanalysisofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotviolatedduringplantoperations.ThetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfromcontainmentbytheContainmentSpray(CS)andContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC)Systemsduringpostaccidentconditionsisdependentupontheenergyreleasedtothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellastheinitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighertheinitialtemperature,themoreenergythatmustberemoved,resultinginhigherpeakcontainmentpressureandtemperature.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Operationwithcontainment'emperatureinexcessoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentaverageairtemperatureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysestoensurethatthetotalamountofenergywithincontainmentiswithinthecapacityoftheCSandCRFCSystems.Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureisalsoanimportantconsiderationinestablishingthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforbothpressureandtemperature.ThelimitforcontainmentaverageairtemperatureensuresthatoperationismaintainedwithintheassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesforcontainment(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-69DraftB

ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmentOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtothecapability.oftheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemstomitigatetheaccident,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.Consequently,theESFsystemsmustcontinuetofunctionwithintheenvironmentresultingfromtheDBAwhichincludeshumidity,pressure,temperature,andradiationconsiderations.ThelimitingDBAforthemaximumpeakcontainmentairtemperatureisanSLB.Theinitialcontainmentaverageairtemperatureassumedinthedesignbasisanalyses(Ref.1)is120'F.Thisresultsinamaximumcontainmentairtemperatureof374'F.TheinitialtemperaturelimitspecifiedinthisLCOisalsousedtoestablishtheenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforcontainment;ThemaximumSLBpeakcontainmentairtemperaturewascalculatedtoexistforonlyafewsecondsduringthetransient.Thebasisofthecontainmentdesigntemperature,however,istoensuretheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinsidecontainment(Ref.2).Thermalanalysesshowthatthetimeintervalduringwhichthecontainmentairtemperaturepeakedwasshortenoughthattheequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelowtheirdesigntemperatures.Also,theequipmentandcablinginsidecontainmentareprotectedagainstthedirecteffectsofaSLBbyconcretefloorsandshields.Therefore,itwasconcludedthatthecalculatedtransientcontainmentairtemperaturefollowingaLOCA(286'F)becomeslimitingforenvironmentalqualificationreasons.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-70Draft8 ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thecontainmentpressuretransientissensitivetotheinitialairmassincontainmentand,therefore,totheinitialcontainmentairtemperature.ThelimitingDBAforestablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureisaSLB.Thetemperaturelimitisusedinthisanalysistoensurethatintheeventofanaccidentthemaximumallowablecontainmentinternalpressurewillnotbeexceeded.ContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaverageairtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperaturelimit,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthecontainmentdesigntemperature.Asaresult,theabilityofcontainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctionisensuredandtheOPERABILITYofequipmentwithincontainmentismaintained.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentaverageairtemperaturewithinthelimitisnotrequiredinNODE5or6.ACTIONSA.1WhencontainmentaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithinthelimitwithin24hours.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The24hourCompletionTimeisacceptableconsideringthesensitivityoftheanalysistovariationsinthisparameterandprovidessufficienttimetocorrectminorproblems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-71DraftB ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IfthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturecannotberestoredtowithinitslimitwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursand.toHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSR3.6.5.1VerifyingthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithintheLCOlimitensuresthatcontainmentoperationremainswithinthelimitassumedforthecontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethecontainmentaverageairtemperature,anarithmeticaverageiscalculatedusingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthecontainmentselectedtoprovidearepresentativesampleoftheoverallcontainmentatmosphere.Thereare6containmentairtemperatureindicators(TE-6031,TE-6035,TE-6036,TE-6037,TE-6038,andTE-6045)suchthataminimumofthreeshouldbeusedforcalculatingthearithmeticaverage.The241:,:2hourFrequencyofthisSRisconsideredacceptablebasedonobservedslowratesoftemperatureincreasewithincontainmentasaresultofenvironmentalheatsources(duetothelargevolumeofcontainment).Furthermore,the24/2:hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmenttemperaturecondition.Calibrationofthesetemperatureindicatorsshallbeperformedinaccordancewithindustrystandards.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50.49.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-72DraftB CS,CRFC,aedNamOH+~agd':,;":::.Cpbn'tripe'ijt;.Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemsw'erieeeN:'"'ae"'cue'c~orim~eemrixari~mB3.6.6B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSIaaQB3.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerCFRC),aekgi085'::;.:::i',::,':;::.C'onta$'niiient:Post-AccidentCharcoalSystems%Ãw.'v.wiavcvicv.vR4&r&vYNerivmcrrieeewvmBASESBACKGROUNDTheCSandCRFCsystemsprovidecontainmentatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandtemperatureincontainmenttolessthanthedesignvalues.ReductionofcontainmentpressureandtheiodineremovalcapabilityoftheCSaeXKri~ee@ReacerivNv'5%yaeAP4Ivs~aM4vQ~iriCegta'i,.hgPri't,Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemconnectedtotheCAFeCeaunitsreducesthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheenvironment,intheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),towithinlimits.TheCS,CRFC-andzjgNaOH~an'O';,.:,C'oiitVi'rima%Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemsaredesignedtomeettherequirementsofAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61(Ref.1).TheCS~ITTaQHjandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsalsoaredesignedtolimmitoffsitedosesfollowingaDBAwithin10CFR100guidelines.TheCRFCSystem,CSSystem,NaOH';.".:,Sy'ife'iii'Q!'andtheConN1':nLenpPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemareEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systems.Theyaredesignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapabilityrequiredduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeattainedandreducethepotentialreleaseofradioactivematerial,principallyiodine,fromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.TheCSSystem,CRFCSystem,sad-4heNaOH~Sjst~eg:ijd::;;,%heron'tai':ntiiintiPost-AccidentCharcoa'fSystemprovidere'dundamnt"metmhodstolimitandmaintainpostaccidentconditionstolessthanthecontainmentdesignvalues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-73DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6,6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ContainmentSraand:':NaO:::::S.ste%TheCSSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesapump,sprayheaders,spryeductors,nozzles,valves,andpiping(;:::.('s'e'ejFiguji::;-8,','.8,:,',;..~6",,Eachtrainispoweredfromasepar'ateESFbus.Therefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)suppliesboratedwatertotheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphaseofoperationthroughacommonsupplyheadersharedbythesafetyinjection(SI)system.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,CSpumpsuctioncanbetransferredfromtheRWSTtoContainmentSumpBviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)system.TheCSSystemprovidesasprayofcoldboratedwatermixedwithsodiumhydroxide(NaOH)fromthesprayadditivetankintotheupperregionsofcontainmenttoreducethecontainmentpressureandtemperatureandtoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphereduringaDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisanimportantfactorindeterminingtheheatremovalcapabilityoftheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphase.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,heatisremovedfromthecontainmentsumpwaterbytheresidualheatremovalcoolers.However,theCSSystemcanprovideadditionalcontainmentheatremovalcapabilityifrequired.EachtrainoftheCSSystemprovidesadequatespraycoveragetomeetthesystemdesignrequirementsforcontainmentheatremoval.TheNaOHmixtureisinjectedintotheCSflowpathviaaliquideductorduringtheinjectionphaseofanaccident.TheeductorsaredesignedtoensurethatthepHofthespraymixtureisbetween8.3and9.1.TheresultingalkalinepHofthesprayenhancestheabilityofthespraytoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheNaOHaddedinthesprayalsoensuresanalkalinepHforthesolutionrecirculatedinthecontainmentsump.ThealkalinepHofthecontainmentsumpwaterminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheoccurrenceofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentsexposedtothefluid(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-74DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUNDContainmentSraann5NaOH::::S"":stems(continued)TheCSSystemisactuatedeitherautomaticallybyacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignalormanually.DBAswhichcangenerateanautomaticactuationsignalincludethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).AnautomaticactuationopenstheCSpumpmotoroperateddischargevalves(860A,860B,860C,and860D),opensNaOHadditionvalves836Aand836B,startsthetwoCSpumps,andbeginstheinjectionphase.AmanualactuationoftheCSSystemrequirestheoperatortoactuatetwoseparatepushbuttonssimultaneouslyonthemaincontrolboardtobeginthesamesequence,TheinjectionphasecontinuesuntilanRWSTlowlevelalarmisreceivedsignalingthestartoftherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.3and4).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.5).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwith896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhighheadrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequateinjectionflowforcorecooling,theSIpumpsremaininpull-stop.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-75DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUNDContainmentSraanP~'::::NaOHMS-s'tern@(continued)TheCSSystemisonlyusedduringtherecirculationphaseifcontainmentpressureincreasesaboveapressureatwhichcontainmentintegrityispotentiallychallenged.Otherwise,thecontainmentheatremovalprovidedbytheCRFCunitsandContainmentSumpB(viatheRHRsystem)isadequatetosupportcontainmentheatremovalneedsandthelimitsonsumppH(Refs.2and6).OperationoftheCSSystemintherecirculationmodeiscontrolledbytheoperatorinaccordancewiththeemergencyoperatingprocedures.ContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstemTheCRFCSystemconsistsoffourfanunits(A,8,C,andD).Eachcoolingunitconsistsofamotor,fan,coolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,highefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters,ductdistributorsandnecessaryinstrumentationandcontrolst'('s'ee<,:F'i'g'0'i",;ej!8~5;:";:6>62'I';.Themoistureseparatorsfunctiontoreducethemoisturecontentoftheairstreamtosupporttheeffectivenessofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.CRFCunitsAandDaresuppliedbyoneESFbuswhileCRFCunitsBandCaresuppliedbyaredundantESFbus.AllfourCRFCunitsaresuppliedcoolingwaterbytheServiceWater(SW)Systemviaacommonloopheader.'Airisdrawnintothecoolersthroughthefananddischargedintothecontainmentatmosphereincludingthevariouscompartments(e.g,,steamgeneratorandpressurizercompartments).Duringnormaloperation,atleasttwofanunitsaretypicallyoperating.TheCRFCSystem,operatinginconjunctionwithothercontainmentventilationandairconditioningsystems,isdesignedtolimittheambientcontainmentairtemperatureduringnormalplantoperationtolessthanthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentAirTemperature."ThistemperaturelimitationensuresthatthecontainmenttemperaturedoesnotexceedtheinitialtemperatureconditionsassumedfortheDBAs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-76DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUNDContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstem(continued)InpostaccidentoperationfollowingaSIactuationsignal,theCRFCSystemfansaredesignedtostartautomaticallyifnotalreadyrunning.ThedischargeofCRFCunitsAandCthentransfertoforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.ThetemperatureofthecoolingwatersuppliedbySWSystem(LCO3.7.8)isanimportantfactorintheheatremovalcapabilityofthefanunits.Conka~%i%%tNPost-AccidentCharcoalSstemTheC~ri'tW'jhieA'tgPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesanairtightplenumcontainingtwobanksofcharcoalfiltercellsforremovalofradioiodinesj::,'(see'F64g'ure,';.":::>3',>6,':~6".,:<<','::?)<.Airflowenterstheplenumthroughtwo"holes'int'ebottom(oneateachend),passesthroughthecharcoalfilterbankstothecenter,andisexhaustedfromtheplenumthroughaholeinthetop.Twonormallyclosedairoperateddampersisolateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfromCRFCunitsAandC(dampers5871and5872forTrainAand5874and5876forTrainB).ASIsignalopensthesedampersandclosestwobypassdampersfromtheCRFCunits(dampers5873forCRFCunitAand5875forCRFCunitC)toforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSSystemandCRFCSystemlimitthetemperatureandpressurethatcouldbeexperiencedfollowingaDBA.ThelimitingDBAsconsideredaretheLOCAandtheSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandtemperaturetransients.NoFin'jDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtocontainmentESFsystems,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-77DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)Theanalysisandevaluationshowthatundertheworstcasescenario,thehighestpeakcontainmentpressureis59.8psigandthepeakcontainmenttemperatureis374F(bothexperiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeettheintentofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentTemperature,"foradetaileddiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsassumeaplantspecificpowerlevelof102%,oneCStrainandonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperating,andinitial(pre-accident)containmentconditionsof120Fand1.0psig.Theanalysesalsoassumearesponsetimedelayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculatedcontainmentpressureandtemperatureresponses.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,theeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.7).TheeffectofaninadvertentCSactuationisnotconsideredsincethereisnosinglefail,ure,includingthelossofoffsitepower,whichresultsinaspuriousCSactuation.ThemodeledCSSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysisisbasedonaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHi-HipressuresetpointtoachievingfullflowthroughtheCSnozzles.ToincreasetheresponseoftheCSSystem,theinjectionlinestothesprayheadersaremaintainedfilledwithwater.TheCSSystemtotalresponsetimeof37.5seconds(assumingthecontainmentHi-Hipressureisreachedattimezero)includesdieselgenerator(DG)startup(forlossofoffsitepower),openingofthemotoroperatedisolationvalves,containmentspraypumpstartup,andspraylinefilling(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-78DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemodeledCRFCSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysisisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingtheSIactuationlevelstoachievingfullCRFCSystemairandsafetygradecoolingwaterflow.TheCRFCSystemtotalresponsetimeof44seconds,includessignaldelay,DGstartup(forlossofoffsitepower),andservicewaterpumpandCRFCunitstartuptimes(Ref.9),DuringaSLBorLOCA,aminimumoftwoCRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintaincontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits.TheCS~i-NoaOHgandCoot'ai.limen%.".'.:-',Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemsoperateoreducethereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofaDBA.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactiveiodinewithincontainmentaretheLOCAorarodejectionaccident(REA).Intheanalysisforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatadequatecontainmentleaktightnessisintactateventinitiationtolimitpotentialleakagetotheenvironment.Additionally,itisassumedthattheamountofradioactiveiodinereleasedislimitedbyreducingtheiodineconcentrationpresentinthecontainmentatmosphere.TherequirediodineremovalcapabilityoftheCSNY(N)andCd~n.:ajqpehtgPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDBA,whichisaLOCA.Theaccidentanalyses(Ref.10)assumethateithertwotrainsofCS,'p'as':::;,:atccident'::,"ch'area'al":;:::f34't'eri".':,::."t'r~i!i"or't,wopost-accidentcharcoaltil~errainsoperatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheCSSystemNaQHj'Sjuste'ro~~CRFCSystem,NiOH::Sjjtemg~andtheCantoV'i'nijm~:e!)p'to-sccAidtenCharcoalSystem's'satisfyCriterion"3oheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-79DraftB / CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESLCODuringaDBA,aminimumof2CRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintainthecontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits(Ref.8).Additionally,twoCStrainsjjta'Rpjiijjisu'ethnic,"'-,fi'ohmh.",,th'eh',."LiagA+Sj'skip,twoCRFCunitswithpos't'accident"charcoal=fhil'ters(i.e.,unitsAandC),oroneCRFCunitwithpostaccidentcharcoalfiltersincombinationwithoneCStrainarealsorequiredtoremoveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphereandmaintainconcentrationsbelowthoseassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Toensurethattheserequirementsaremet,twoCStrains,fourCRFCunits,andtwoO-EOh1l'litlOh4aakNNaOON'SystemmustbeOPERABLE.Therefore,intheeventofanaccident,atleastoneCSandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,~alfie.'-:.AaQHi>Systeriij~'..'.andtwoCRFCunitsoperates,assumingtheworsVcase'singleactivefailureoccurs.EachCStrainincludesaspraypump,sprayheaders,nozzles,valves,sprayeductors,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRMSTuponanESFactuationsignalandiinua'I;.";,ljtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpBviatheRHRPUlllPS.Ph~ll'OW'EP:'t'",hOPERABLE,hvolumeandcon'centrationofsprayadditivesolutioninthetankmustbewithinlimitsandairoperatedvalves836Aand836BmustbeOPERABLE.EachCRFCunitincludesamotor,fancoolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,HEPAfilters,ductdistributors,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.ForCRFCunitsAandC,flowthrougheitherthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterorthebypassisrequiredfortheunitstobeconsideredOPERABLE.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludesaplenumcontainingcharcoalfilterbanksandisolationdamperstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.(continued)ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-80DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES'Rlidlfl!lfl!:.Rltd"'!d-':"."'Rile"--d!Ri;,-:i,':,:'-!",";ll:,'-'--,-!!Rid"%R'-'V7ARdddRCA4'k4VRRNXddfYXdh(OA'ÃIWRVAARAYRAVSVhWhWV!RYARMMRYhYh(ddt(RYdkh%N(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-81DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESConti'inwerifgPost-AccidentCharcoalSystem,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-83DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1Withonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable,theinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainiscapableofproviding50%oftheradioactiveiodineremovalrequirementsfollowingaDBA.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCalsoresultsinitsassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.The7dayCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.Itorestoretheinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,includingtheCRFCunit,isjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSys4em'and':::HaOH$'jest'eggs:-andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringt'histimeperiod.C.1Withbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,atleastonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimetorestoreoneinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.Theinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludes,.butisnotlimitedtoinoperableCRFCunitsAandC.D.lWiththe'NiQH'"'.:,Sysfenlinoperable,OPERABLEstatusmustberestoredwithin72'ours.The72hourCompletionTimetorestorethe'NiOHSystemisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbythe'Conterim'en%'4Post-AccidentCharcoalSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-84DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued)E.landE.2IftheinoperableCStrain,post-accidentcharcoalfilterti,th~ttat%go":;at1restoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequieredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within84hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheextendedintervaltoreachNODE5allowsadditionaltimeforattemptingrestorationoftheinoperablecomponent(s)andisreasonablewhenconsideringthedrivingforceforareleaseofradioactivematerialfromtheReactorCoolantSystemisreducedinHODE3.F.li'ri'iiÃ8.8(~b'::OPERABLE;',."':Stean'eiiiiaha'y%'7',:-."::d'ayre'...'"Th'e"i"'noaoerabl"'e,celeeee@'4j>dd~id'C'opemlAe.The7dayCompletionTimeisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantheatremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbycombinationsoftheCSSystemandCRFCSystemandthelowprobabilityofDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.IfbothCRFCunitsAandCareinoperable,thenConditionCmustalsobeentered.'PCu.e.>q(>o4~5$'t,hapeth'aroe:::'En~iiiP'.liialiiibly"T,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-85DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-86DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES~'f7!!'!SR'll'i"",,,'r',"ti(i:'r!!re!!i',"i:%!!Ii"",,'*!!Ie,,:,s',",",:.kehiiii::".::-i!,;"de:,::,ii'";,!,-,:-ll:,::::";::":--:-:die!'!,:"*-ioi:,:isi'n'c'e.",,"".."::th'te'se,':,:.",,:'ie'i'i!'>He'i',','if'ie'll:,,tii'":;ben'i'nthecoirect"positionIgji~Th:>..sgSR-3-34-6-.R>>jijui'r~e::,"e)ig;::,,gesfiii'g<'oradiislue,'.,"een'ipulet3'oii.fj'Ae't'h!otgOoeshsthseheec'o'n'ti'i.'ri'iiie'nst:)'",ij'ii'd':;)c'etp'ebg'e',"i(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-88DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES.,~YE:IF!L."';N-';'","::.-'"':.":~"'.:S.""".'::.."'""'RE(UIRENENTS""'""f"-'"'Vi""'"-"d:~Ye::::-'.:VeYiYyei'r7g":th"""':-"---:t"-"'l"""ncrit~for'"-"mainuaferiacosr'rue'ct:;:!p'o'sit!onV.ShY;-::3';."':6'...6:.";::4:Operat1'nng;:,:.'eaaClirgiiiamass'o'coa'te'd.":::."'co'ntr'o',s'!iar'eg~f'ukn'ctp'on,.'n'gmi'pr!op'e'rlj!":'lsoensuresfbatblockage,fanormotorfai'lure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthefanunitsandcontrols,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantde'gradationoftheCRFCunitsoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3-.6-;6-.33!:l'6':-".6'>i9>Ylii.":::'.g1!jd'aji'f'reijuencj:::::;!u'as'::,::::de'vbel'oLed::.;:::c'o'ns1d~i'T'f're':'jt'b(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-89DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES'dij'ra'die'i'oi!4'f'i!ffa'w',:lie'i!i]i!i!in'g;::i'b'et'wil'i'ii!ji'i',"iie'silata'ri'c'e8:::,(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-90DraftB

CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES'SUE)JfI."O'AAC.E:,::.',:.:~~;.:;:,':~;:.:SRj"3";-':6'";:6',,6RE)U'IRENENTS'P::4"':'.:""':'Q,,',,P..+,.'a...".~'..My,.'5P%'g@wm~',r?P..~,QNQ~tr.'h'.".,~,.]',mmf,le~.~,ae~f'g0PERABtE:.","!andh'th'at~aiL!.':::."d'amjii.i.s4ai,.'ei'::;fai"actaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationofthetrainoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(is>)SRm~3'."S'i".6>~4VerifyingeachCSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedheadensuresthatspraypumpperformancehasnotdegradedduringthecycle.FlowanddifferentialpressurearenormaltestsofcentrifugalpumpperformancerequiredbySectionXIoftheASNECode(Ref.44-gR').SincetheCSpumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughthesprayheaders,theyaretestedonrecirculationflow.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurveandisindicativeofoverallperformance.SuchinservicetestingconfirmscomponentOPERABILITY,trendsperformance,anddetectsincipientfailuresbyabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyoftheSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3-.6-3~356':.'!6;!8ATo,:.-:prpFide,::,:effantiie<jindjiie.:;:,:,iPmavil;-/th;nachti.:nament::;:~jii,jy(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-91DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-92DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSincetheRWSTcontentsarenormallyacidic,thesprayadditivetankmustprovideasufficientvolumeofsprayadditivetoadjustpHforallwaterthatisinjected.ThisSRisperformedtoverifytheavailabilityofsufficientNaOHsolutioninthesprayadditivetank,The184dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedonthelowprobabilityofanundetectedchangeintankvolumeoccurringduringtheSRintervalsincethetankisnormallyisolated.Tanklevelisalsoindicatedandalarmedinthecontrolroom,sothatthereishighconfidencethatasubstantialchangeinlevelwouldbedetected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-93DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES8URCETYL'ANGEii~igii:::SR";-'.l':3:;:6"NRThisSRprovidesverificationoftheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankandissufficienttoensurethatthespraysolutionbeinginjectedintocontainmentisatthecorrectpHlevel.The184dayFrequencyissufficienttoensurethattheconcentrationlevelofNaOHinthesprayadditivetankremainswithintheestablishedlimits.Thisisbasedonthelowlikelihoodofanuncontrolledchangeinconcentrationsincethetankisnormallyisolatedandtheprobabilitythatanysubstantialvarianceintankvolumewillbedetected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-94DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSRF43.6.6.10(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-95DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSR~l'!8~8'6'i'6"41"'2'."::lan'd.:.:.':SRi:::;.':'3"':"'.'6".!6:!'..'f3n'ii!Ia'rse's'su'r'eel'sij'n~a'ii!Thissurveillanceisnotrequiiedfor"valvest'liatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3-.6-.4KA4-3%6:".':6Y!1'.4ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachCRFCunitactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3-.6-.6-443:.:,"':,s6:::,":::6~I:;andSR3-.6-.6-.H-3,::::",:6!';6>l>13',above,forfurtherJiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-96DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3-.6-.6%43!:;6".6'".","'15ThisSRrequiresverificationevery24monthsthateachtrainofpost-accidentcharcoalfiltersactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3-.6-34-93!,6';::,6',';l2:andSR3-.6-.6-.Ng,>6:.".":6,.',.,::1'3::,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.ThisSRprovidesverificationthateachautomaticvalveinreceiptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3-.6-.6-.9L6<':6","':l'P;andSR3-.6-.6-.N3,:-'::6'",:,";6;:;-:QS,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe'24monthFrequency.SR3-346-.443.'-."676~.,:7-:.7;ToensurethatthecorrectpHlevelisestablishedintheboratedwatersolutionprovidedbytheCSSystem,flowthroughtheeductorisverifiedonceevery5years.ThisSRinconjunctionwithSR3-.6-.6-.433!6:,'!6..'"':9'$providesassurance'hatNaOHwillbeaddedintotheflowpathuponCSinitiation.Aminimumflowof20gpm~thj":o'umh',;:tpe',':,eduetaV~mustbeestablishedasassumedintheacciden'tanayse~s.,-::,:i!'A:e'diikt'o'r'i!'>Du'etothepassiven'ature"of'"t'hesprayadd>'tivet'lowcontrols,the5yearFrequencyissufficienttoidentifycomponentdegradationthatmayaffectflowinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-97DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83;6-98DraftB ICS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)i~)SR3-.6-.6-.483'::;'".":6':i:6'.::18WiththeCSinletvalvesclosedandthesprayheaderdrainedofanysolution,lowpressureairorsmokecanbeblownthroughtestconnections.ThisSRensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstructedandprovidesassurancethatspraycoverageofthecontainmentduringanaccidentisnotdegraded.Duetothepassivedesignofthenozzle,atestat10yearintervalsisconsideredadequatetodetectobstructionofthenozzles.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionHTEB6-1,"pHForEmergencyCoolantWaterForPWRs."3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGEE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFAutomaticSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationHode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.4.NUREG-0821.5.UFSAR,Section6.3.6.UFSAR,Section6.1.2.4.7.10CFR50,AppendixK.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.9.UFSAR,Section6.2.2.2.10.UFSAR,Section6.5.11.UFSA(;:j,"'::8e'etj~,i'A!6:,'2",":3;:;.'::9@ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-99DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASES~~veaeuen>j'.@ggYg@0,'~~~@Ag@D@~g...~OQ@X~g@.~g~AgCg@?~'g@RW~Y~CC@<g&OXgj@PVFCCCgg~g@@Pi&~g~'C'~IC4NMv@M4%CN%%'(SRIYNNNV4Y%XC4~)vANNA'QSCYPWh(ASQQ4vM(4'ITS'XvA'V@AN'NAAw444&'AMYNNIM~XCCwhCC~SAACN'4R.E.GinnaNuc1earPowerPlantB3.6-100Draft8 CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6FigureB3.6.6-1ContainmentSprayandNaOHSystemsR.E:GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-101DraftB CS,CRFC,NaOH,andContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6FigureB3.6.6-2CRFCandContainmentPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-102DraftB -'ootooOIo',L:i,oooiIo.:,::o'o'o":ojOiiiiii,o'",oota:o':.';io'I!4'let.:i'OII;.Per10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlSystemsinLight-Water-CooledReactors"(Ref.1),hydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtoreducethehydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentfollowingalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)orsteamlinebreak(SLB).Therecombinersaccomplishthisbycollectingthehydrogenandoxygenatmosphericmixtureinsidecontainmentandoxidizingthehydrogeninacombustionchamber.Additionalhydrogenisaddedbytherecombinertoensurethatthenoncondensiblecombustionproductsthatcouldcauseaprogressiveriseincontainmentpressureareavoided.Oxygenisalsoaddedtopreventdepletionofoxygenbelowtheconcentrationrequiredforstableoperationofthecombuster.Theproductofcombustion,watervapor,iscooledandcondensedfromtheatmospherebytheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSystem.ThehydrogenrecombinersaremanuallyinitiatedsinceflammablelimitswouldnotbereacheduntilseveraldaysafteraDesignBasisAccident(DBA).PreventionofhydrogenaccumulationduringnormaloperationisaccomplishedbyuseoftheHini-PurgeSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-103DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Two100%capacityindependenthydrogenrecombinersystemsareprovided.EachconsistsofcontrolslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,apowersupplyfromaseparateEngineeredSafetyFeaturesbus,andarecombiner.Therecombinersarecomprisedofablowerfantocirculatecontainmentairtothecombuster,acombusterchamberwithamainburner,twoignit'ers(includesaninstalledspare),apilotburner,andadilutionchamberdownstreamoftheflamezonewhereproductsofthecombustionaremixedwithcontainmentairtoreducethetemperatureofthegasleavingthesystem.Asinglerecombineriscapableofmaintainingthehydrogenconcentrationincontainmentatapproximately2.0volumepercent(v/o)whichisbelowthe4.1v/oflammabilitylimit.Tworecombinersareprovidedtomeettherequirementforredundancyandindependence.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThehydrogenrecombinersprovideforthecapabilityofcontrollingthebulkhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthanthelowerflammableconcentrationof4.1v/ofollowingaDBA.Thiscontrolpreventsacontainmentwidehydrogenburn,thusensuringthepressureandtemperatureinsidecontainmentasassumedintheanalysesarenotexceeded.ThelimitingDBArelativetohydrogengenerationisaLOCA.HydrogenmayaccumulateincontainmentfollowingaLOCAasaresultof:a.Ametalsteamreactionbetweenthezirconiumfuelrodcladdingandthereactorcoolant;b.RadiolyticdecompositionofwaterintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)'andthecontainmentsump;C.d.HydrogenintheRCSatthetimeoftheLOCA(i.e.,hydrogendissolvedinthereactorcoolantandhydrogengasinthepressurizervaporspace);orCorrosionofmetalsexposedtocontainmentsprayandEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsolutions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-104DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Toevaluatecontainmentfunctionofcalculated.Reference2calculated.thepotentialforhydrogenaccumulationinfollowingaLOCA,thehydrogengenerationasatimefollowingtheinitiationoftheaccidentisConservativeassumptionsrecommendedbyareusedtomaximizetheamountofhydrogenTheminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitis4.1v/o,however,t;i'..,,":yV'i'idadynamic.-:-:-,p;""-',:-1'i'tif!':"fh'j.',dro'geo:.',;:oiust.hydrogenatconcentrations~6.0v/oisventingofcontainmentusingtheMini-PurgeSystem.However,ventingwouldmostlikelyrequireevacuationsofthegeneralpublicwithinaradiusofseveralmilessurroundingtheplant.BasedontheconservativeassumptionsusedtocalculatethehydrogenconcentrationversustimeafteraLOCA,thehydrogenconcentrationintheprimarycontainmentwouldreach5.5v/oabout31daysaftertheLOCAifnorecombinerwasfunctioning(Ref.3).However,amorerealisticmodelpredictsthatahydrogenconcentrationof4.1v/o(thelowerflammabilitylimit)willbereachedin31days.Operationofthehydrogenrecombinersb@-ew-a-ee.',::-,::nh~',,".'.;:-,!,ln:.",,'."i!eonn:,.ii:,!d.t~in!'.;::.'.,!!:,::".!i!!'d'i!::,'-'oiii'-nh'i'nh'qadi:;:iiiildj!rian3't<'".:.,';injantoie'i',pi'~jsa'iji:iatatio'n'.givenanThehydrogenrecombinersaredesignedsuchthat,withtheconservativelycalculatedhydrogengenerationratesdiscussedabove,asinglerecombineriscapableoflimitingthepeakhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthan4.1v/o(Ref.3).ThehydrogenrecombinerssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-105Draft8 HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESLCOTwohydrogenrecombinersmustbeOPERABLEandcapableofbeingplacedintooperationbeforetheminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitof4.1v/oisreachedfollowingaDBA.Thisensuresoperationofatleastonehydrogenrecombinerintheeventofaworstcasesingleactivefailure.ThenecessaryhydrogenoroxygenrequiredtooperatethehydrogenrecombinerdoesnothavetobeavailableonsiteforthehydrogenrecombinertobeconsideredOPERABLE.Operationwithatleastonehydrogenrecombinerensuresthatthepost-LOCAhydrogenconcentrationcanbepreventedfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimitorcausinganoverpressurizationofcontainmentgivenahydrogenignitionsource.APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,twohydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtocontrolthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammabilitylimitof4.1v/ofollowingaLOCA,assumingaworstcasesinglefailure.InMODES3and4,boththehydrogenproductionrateandthetotalhydrogenproducedafteraLOCAorSLBwouldbelessthanthatcalculatedfortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobabilityofanaccidentrequiringthehydrogenrecombinersislow.Therefore,thehydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredinMODE3or4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesofaDBAarelow,duetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,hydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-106DraftB HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESACTIONSA.IWithonecontainmenthydrogenrecombinerinoperable,theinoperablerecombinermustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.Inthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLEhydrogenrecombinerisadequatetoperformthehydrogencontrolfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLErecombinercouldresultinreducedhydrogencontrolcapability.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.RequiredActionA.)hasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatstatestheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenonerecombinerisinoperable.Thisallowanceisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-107DraftB HydrogenRecombiners83.6.7BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2Withtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperable,theabilitytoperFormthehydrogencontrolfunctionviaalternatecapabilitiesmustbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithinIhour.ThealternatehydrogencontrolcapabilitiesareprovidedbytheMini-PurgeSystemwhichconsistsoftwoisolationvalvesperpenetrationflowpaththatarecapableofopeningandasupplyfancapableofperformingpurgingfunctions.TheIhourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetoverifythatalossofhydrogencontrolfunctiondoesnotexist.Inaddition,thealternatehydrogencontrolsystemcapabilitymustbeverifiedonceper12hoursthereaftertoensureitscontinuedavailability,Boththeinitialverificationandallsubsequentverificationsmaybeperformedasanadministrativecheckbyexamininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabilityof'thealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperformanySurveillancesneededtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem(e.g.,openingofmini-purgevalves).Iftheabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained,continuedoperationispermittedwithtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperableforupto7days.SevendaysisareasonabletimetoallowtwohydrogenrecombinerstobeinoperablebecausethehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintainedandbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenintheamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.C.1~Iftheinoperablehydrogenrecombiner(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachNODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-108DraftB

HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.7.1Igl:Ri':;$gpv,',eqUjfrhe$;aDBRsgsz8fbi'n6'f3oÃi't'>:::c'h74k:,,:,os,:each)byd'ii'i'giiiiii'"ec<iibiii'ejr'.P,'N,JY~~..Q~Whh.YC;NC?'~<N..NWYh.,~'jNVIYCjNPQ..++CC.)yI..."',,'i"",,,I'i!i",",:'lii::(I"i:"':,ll,'..iN*...':,:i:.',i*:,INii::,.:Ii'I'!:,::I,,-..:"::.6ii,,:ill"i'Nih::!N,".,I,,'ill:::I,:"II'i!i,,,".:'j:era"'".;."."0'n.'!o'";",""::""e'.,,"'s'ii',,"et'tj.",':::co'.'n.",ro',....",:',;::;vi,;v'e's'.i'COPYBOYWl~4h4CWVNQXV44Yl'XVVhvVNW<<AhYNN4ChWXN1YlWNNQN'Vkl3CVNWVilSR3.6.7.2ThisSRrequiresperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisrequiredtoensurethatthehydrogenrecombinerwillprovidethecorrecthydrogen/oxygenmixturetothecombustionchamber.The24monthFrequencyforthisSurveillancewasdevelopedconsideringtheincidenceofhydrogenrecombinersfailingtheSRinthepastislow.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.44.2.SafetyGuide1.7,Rev.0.3.UFSAR,Section6.2.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-109DraftB HSSVs3.7.13.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.1HainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs)LCO3.7.1EightHSSVsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONS-NOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreHSSVsinoperable.A.1RestoreinoperableHSSV(s)toOPERABLEstatus.4hours.B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE4.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-1DraftB

MSSVs3.7.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.1.1l-NOTE----Onlyrequ-H-gKep'unwedtobeperformed~'jjjBODES:I'~:::and.2-%mernVerifyeachMSSVliftsetpointspecifiedbelowinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+4'Ij~.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramVALVENUMBERSGASGBLIFTSETTINGsi+1%-3%350935113515 351335083510351235141140114011401085R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-2DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.23.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesLCO3.7.2TwoHSIVsandtwonon-returncheckvalvesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HOOKQiGDC1,ail;:k:vite.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTINEA.OneNS4VFr.;"!"more:<~i.f,,V,-es'"'om~~""::s+9~@"":9KKer><RB'M.oi)A.18PReqi',i'::red..'.,A~fy':i'":and-'.i".s'so"'e".i..a't'e'd"",'!C,o'iiip"',,j,t"',j'ig:'iKie';,.".'o'f$Co'midi.':,t'fon".~A~8~"',I:'.QÃB~e,'-,.:::,i::na:,,HODE~"'25R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3073DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.2CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEC.IANDC.2ps'.,8:.42-hear-s8ihb$ijyg::C.-(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-4DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.2CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.genera4e+gPjg$:t,.8d'Ac%))j>:aii'O'-','Ass,o,'c1ai'idComp.'l;8t;16pgf~l,hei9fgc'tilde::t1'xiii!)C~!::noR'::.liiiig.D.Ib~FEN'j~2.c)"4:<cQx~+Onp;;:;,:jw:.,:-;jorj;.',v'~);:ve's~1'isop"'ei',"abN'-:,','i~ii;::,:F1"oi'j.apt>F4'.CMgeKh~~;.S,JE~pfg';:!:::;j:.:::;:;.'.":Eri~eij':CO,.::,':::3::.',0,;"-',3;;,.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYISR3.7.2.1VerifyclosuretimeofeachMSIVis~5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.2Verifyeachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.3VerifyeachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-5DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs3.7.33.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.3HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(NFRVs),eed-AssociatedBypassValveseaLCO3.7.3T...,~FRYalidbyp1!;-::::,:::--ahullQFPDVgshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODESI,,2,and,Speci',~pt'-::.when:,::.:::beth.spjaiiijgeijaVftais;.",:::aneACTIONSNOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreMFPDV(s)inoperable.AaIClose1-nepmabkeHFPDV(s).ANDA.2VerifyHFPDV(s)isclosed.24hoursOnceper3gdaysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-6Draft8 HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs3.7.3CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB-.gOneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable.24hours,c-lssed-.8""1:':'::-"-"lCI'0tdioI';:s'd-1:,%.48NFR1f(s)f.Onceper3gdays8~2::j:;:::!::,:::::::.~VerVfjj.,MF.RV,:(':,s:)F4,::ic:,:ose~'ol;;,'.;>,:so:.:.,a:e.'.(continued)C.OneormoreMFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable.C.1ANDCloseop'.:j::cola'4~e":"'MFRVbypassvalve(s).24hoursC.2VerifyHFRVbypassvalve{s)isclosed~or.~i,:s0'I:,I,'t&d.Onceper%7.:daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.1ANDD.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3077DraftB 0 HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs3.7.3CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.OneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreMFRV(s)inoperable.ORa~OneorFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRYbypassvalve(s)inoperable.E.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.f.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-8DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVs3.7.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.3.1VerifytheclosuretimeofeachMFPDViss80secondsonanactualor.simulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.3.2VerifytheclosuretimeofeachMFRVand'1'sioci&a:egd:bypassvalveiss1secondsonanactua1orsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-9DraftB ARVs3.7.43.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)LCO3.7.4TwoARVsARV:":-,l~i:n'isshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T,,)a500'F.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneARVITS+'einoperable.A.1--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestoreARV'f..::Ine.,':."'.toOPERABLEsta6s.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE3withT,,(500'F.8hoursC.two..."::,."ARY::;;.,-l:,i,es:.tins'0'pir,'ib:16,$NNKsA~~A:wR5EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-10DraftB ARVs3.7.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.4.1PerformacomPletecycleofeachARV.24monthsR.E.GonnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftB AFWSystem3.7.5GONKTNN3.'::,7g~PPPL'AN~T4SYSTEAS3,:::.'::7,::::::5':,"~au%~::l(i,:ijy;,';,Fiidix.ei".,.:;:{AFQ):.;':5js'fey}CO!!!3!!!7Pel'!ii!'ll)'".!ll!8!,:,',i!i"',tli!id'}i',"ij!Ill}}i!}}}OI}}t}l!7:"APAPLilCABIL}IiTY'S,::::,":,::,::,'::NQDEF$1":;:;2:;::::::::-'"e>>%3'!IA-.ll'EIITiAIE}}>>}T't}}}}~A-.COAL'.L'ETI'OH;fjINE4te%4ereA'9On'e~":::TDAFM)t'rfB~4}'o}P}p>>Lh'!'i'>>'ope>>'eble':;:AA.:::.'-':.':.:';::::"::;::;::;Restoy,e'.:""'.TDAFQ"-",':.ty'a3:n:O'I,.'o4"i'L'h';ltojoPEIIASLG'e';t'8.':U'e'."W4M.4M>>SDXAX7daysR.E.GinnaNuc1earPowerP1ant3.7-12Draft8 AFWSystem3.7.5.Omiif'LOLAA-.jgqU"(ED'.ling'j'.i"O'fiA-.GGNP.LET."io.NT,"LNEAP~he@B.LtDA'F,'Qtraininoperable.gimel!:,::::;;:-.,';g4Resgj>re::",'DAFM,'.:'::::t'>>ji'eAN-tr-amer-4'-b+neC>iTDAF~M::;ti;;.a'$p~f"i"e'>>ab:,l'e:.'OR>>TiP855FMFti-'a'~"nsnoIIerab)ORG"::,'::3~::,.'"'.:5~i'.":jRjstj;i.>j,Io.ne~,',:NDAFM;:f1:o'w)ash'!'to,:;,'.GPERABC8~,ta'~u$g72hoursf~l',Ow'judith..";,':a"d':%jib.',PDAFg'e'iie>>'a't'r'ii~i'i"::;:{'see)QR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-13DraftB 00 AFWSystem3.7.5ACTIONScontinued4".II!II1I!II!EII!!CTi'I!IIII~~glPIYd!I((continued)'4,.:::,"liour,,'s':g8OneSAFWtraininoperable.Gg.1RestoreSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.14daysBothSAFWtrainsinoperable.D>F'.IRestoreoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-14DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5ACTIONScontinued)A-.llE'I]Il'!R'E'Hi'lA'C!f7UN'~Cgv5knd8AN-AFQ6hours8e,~>.o~A006"':3,~12hours4-hear-s2BeinNODE4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-15DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5ACTIONScontinuedcoN5Q)QAA-.RE(OIREO~>ACCT,:lOHA-.CONPLETCHT:.'J,NE4AN4eVe084A84C+44+~GH.ThreeAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsinoperable.~~A<~)IGH.1---------NOTE--------LCO3.0.3andallotherLCORequiredActionsrequiringMODEchangesaresuspendeduntilon@%&orSAFWtrainrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Initiateactiontorestoreone495orSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.'mmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-16DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.5.1VerifyeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveineachwaterflowpath,andinbothsteamsupplyflowpathstotheturbinedrivenpump,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.5.2NOTE.II:a::i':,:,@bpriortoentering'NODE1forthe4mb'aven-AFQTOAF'Wpump.VerifythedevelopedheadofeachAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.3VerifythedevelopedheadofeachSAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.4PerformacompletecycleofeachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheServiceWaterSystem,eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedisolationvalve,andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.5VerifyeachAFWautomaticvalvethatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,actuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-17DraftB AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY(continued)SR3.7.5.6-NOTEIl':0l.,:",0bpriortoenteringHQDEIforthe4'@~4~@-AFW~TD+AF,;,pump.VerifyeachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.7.5.7VerifyeachSAFWtraincanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-18DraftB CSTs3.7.63.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)LCO3.7.6TheCSTsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CSTwatervolumenotwithinlimit.A.1ANDVerifybyadministrativemeansOPERABILITYofbackupwatersupply.4hoursA.2RestoreCSTwatervolumetowithinlimit.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.6.1VerifytheCSTwatervolumeisz22,500gal.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-19DraftB CCWSystem3.7.73.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemLCO3.7.7TwoCCWtrains>~~tjo'$CW,:":,.'heat':::s'exchanqers;;~andtheCCWloopheadershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCCWtraininoperable.A.IRestoreCCWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursn~e40riipCCV)hi,,jCe~~b..anj'e'i.":j$n'op'e'rabl':e.B.I~'ll,',j:,,::-,C,Ck';:.6844'j.'"<<..e$$fla,ng'er."~<,OPERABL~E~S'tatii'i;R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-20Draft8 CCWSystem3.7.7CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEC.8ii!:::-::i!OOEiiii.Acta-4eR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-21DraftB CCWSystem3.7.7CONDITIONRf(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINE0.::.'(fgo;:;..':,CCH~Fti.;,aliis";'"jtiiiCCMjili)at::,'<i)'i<:h$~ri~i."i::k:,or,'.-",:,','I;.0.0p'<f),8'8~(l8.j:ii'oji'e'r'abl;6'..".<-'-'-l~""~j".'~My%,'.M~<A~@<$%,'.~~CCO73YOY3';":::pre'd<:",'i]<i,"',::,'othe'r,".~L'CO.Re,.qu,jred,":'i'.'ct,"'j;{jii~s::'QPfRASL'f::;:jt'ass:i>a<<w4ama<<<<<<iX><i<Pi<<'<<<v.'<<km~/~itim~WQQ~4+~~J,'IINIT84ll::8f&fY~egcfj'a'j"ger,",""':::;:~)a'jj'd)'..'I:;o'.ojh"nadir.'":;:;::,";t';il,:::,OPERABL'8i'Patiis',.<AN5'A'ND078':i':,.":::!i::,:::,'.:i-:::".<Hi'i!ri!'H00E:.::Q4::,6"'hbG&s12!<hagi',,sR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-22DraftB CCWSystem3.7.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.7.1NOTE----------IsolationofCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheCCWloopheaderinoperable.VerifyeachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWtrain:arid,',;:h~~t:";,:eiChinger1111d1ddd'thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.7.2Performacompletecycleofeachmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheresidua)heatremovalheatexchangers.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-23DraftB

SWSystem3.7.83.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemLCO3.7.8TwoSWtrainsandtheSWloopheadershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneSWtraininoperable.A.1RestoreSWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ANDBeinHODE3.6hoursB.2BeinHODE5.36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-24DraftB SWSystem3.7.8CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMETwoSWtrainsorloopheaderinoperable.C.I.'Ent'e.r'!kaj)p.,':A',.c.aSfi,e'at'~~jxih'hng&Y'(:8')'.made'.:n'oj'.i:rabble::::.':'bj,'WImmediately@En.teee~~LGO;"'::3~0,.','::3..8R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3,7-25Draft8 SWSystem3.7.8SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-26DraftB SWSystem3.7.8Sk:::,,:::j'8':~7:,:::.::;8::,!lr<!,,::,jjVsgj'tj'!i'mercenlrbaaaejlbaj,';::;iMva,~rl~l'eiiai:;.'.':andatiimpe'i!a'tiireiar.iiwj::'I",::,';iiii.."ai~~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-27DraftB SWSystem3.7.8'~:x'"'""'x'4"""".S'~~<LA"""><'>.xx'Nc'gQ'"'v"c"bshe(5'mp'o)'ii'i'i;,sgdoPp.;:-:;:,n'0'tiii%IIdi.'i(!".tkiiiiSMVloop'aef,',:,l-:,::jQ0ppra:,.'85'aUCjiiiii't'j'c<ialjie'jj".ijjhheIISM;!4jp$'ji:."',fl'jw~p'i'XIII:,ai'd';l'."o'oojNSthhgj%6~s'4'cUVe'de'ij",:;jo'8'jtibii',':',4s'"=",':i,:ii::,:alfiecqviiiNi:.'::.:,::;joiitioiii~~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-28DraftB SWSystem3.7.8A-mea4~SR:;,':'.'::;,"3:"',i7,.'.;:8.';3':Sic~'AAwvN~S",.'f'~]'cjM~~~g+j&Nc4~~gN~d~.,9z~Nc~ti9ww~wBf&a~0ar$:;:,-";.l,:ocked~!j.;n,",;:.:;.t'ai&,-:;i'or).":,ectjpiilitjcijjNR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-29DraftB SMSystem3.7.8otfje@je,::,"~s)'o'uj';;ed';,'i."p'o's'j';t'~;dn"'"';"'a'c'44/'te'i,':'to:t.h'e,";,:co'i..:ie.ill"~p'o'sj.t'1,"o'"',.-oui'.:;l'inwit:,'a"cF4~iiiojths::24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-30Draft8 CREATS3.7.93.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem{CREATS)LCO3.7.9TheCREATSshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,4,5,and6,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CREATSfiltrationtraininoperable.A.1RestoreCREATSfiltrationtraintoOPERABLEstatus.OR48hoursA.2---------NOTE--------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedfors1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceisolationdampersinCREATSModeF.48hoursB--------NOTE---------SeparateConditionentryallowedforeachdamper.B.lRestoreisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneCREATSisolationdamperinoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-31DraftB e CREATS3.7.9ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)C.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmetinHODE1,2,3,or4.C.lBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmetinHODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuel.D.1PlaceOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)inCREATSModeF.D.82:.;::;:,:llSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyD.SR':;::2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyE.TwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormore'iiuts'~~di::::air~uppg.A,'owpathsinoperableinMODE1,2,3,or4.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3,Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-32DraftB CREATS3.7.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEF.TwoCREATSisolationdampersForoneormoreouts'~88%aireuppg'.f1,'owpathsinoperageinMODE5or6-,iver;,duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieser-F.lANDInitiateactionstorestoreoneisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.F.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDF.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuc'learPowerPlant3'33DraftB CREATS3.7.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.9.1OperatetheCREATSfiltrationtraina15minutes.31daysSR3.7.9.2PerformrequiredCREATSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewithVFTPSR3.7.9.3VerifytheCREATSactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-34DraftB ABVS3.7.103.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)LCO3.7.10TheABVSshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.The-ABVS+sinoperable.A.lPPA$gS'<MK44'aDD'Ij'l~c:ab'l,8.cusp',n)jmovement~ofa"s.semb),':);:.i'i.:,';:!'ir'i:,"'.:,~t'h'eA'ui'~~jfar'0,'.,:-:.:,Biil:1:dine/)>3'c>'N44$@wa<4.4%rasaA45ci"64kxcImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.10.1VerifyABVSisinoperation.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-35DraftB A8VS3.7.10SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.10.2aece&sseegey~7fy,,::::;ABVSi'miinta1nf;,':;:gi'iejati~veUt,,'O'SStttl8W'I$?+Wg%%$?~~~':,.Ag>+~A'pjp,ectj::',t,'oj:;:::t'2~~/+ghIQQYAPgg~SR:':."::-::::'.:3;,ajcoi'".'.dance','!w'i'th'<th'e;,':V~i'~it'i:1%41'ir'i';,",::F'i8tYgpeAi%'9;.";Py~'y",'i'.':::";(VFTP,:JInaccordancewiththeVFTPR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-36Draft8 SFPWaterLevel3.7.113.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelLCO3.7.11TheSFPwaterlevelshallbea23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SFPwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.1--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.11.1VerifytheSFPwaterlevelisz23ftabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.3gdaysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~737DraftB SFPBoronConcentration3.7.123.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.12SpentFuelPool{SFP)BoronConcentrationLCO3.7.12TheSFPboronconcentrationshallbe:-90,0,~6<.APPLICABILITY:WhenfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFPandaSFPverificationhasnotbeenperformedsincethelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SFPboronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.A.lANDA.2.1ORSuspendmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.InitiateactiontorestoreSFPboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelyImmediatelyA.2.2InitiateactiontoperformSFPverification.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-38DraftB SFPBoronConcentration3.7.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEA(0SR3.7.12.1VerifytheSFPpoolboronconcentrationiswithin4he-limitFREQUENCY31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-39DraftB SFPStorage3.7.133.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.13SpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageLCO3.7.13Fuelassemblystorageinthespentfuelpoolshallbemaintainedasfollows:a.FuelassembliesinRegion1shallhaveaK-infinityof<1.458db.Fuel.assembliesinRegion2shallhaveinitialenrichmentandburnupwithintheacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.APPLICABILITY:Wheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredinthespentfuelpool.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCONPLETIONTINEA.RequirementsoftheLCOnotmetforeitherregion.A.1--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.Initiateactiontomovethenoncomplyingfuelassemblyfromtheapplicableregion.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-40DraftB SFPStorage3.7.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.13.1NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegionl.VerifybyadministrativemeanstheK-infinityofthefuelassemblyiss1.458PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion1SR3.7.13.2VerifybyadministrativemeanstheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1.PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-41Draft8 SFPStorage3.7.1340000ACCEPTABLE30000I20000P35E8UNACCEPTABLE10000-OFAFud8ExmnFuel---.SV)Fuel1.82.22.63.03.43.84.2NominalU~5Enrlchrnent(w/o)Figure3.7.13-1FuelAssemblyBurnupLimitsinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-42DraftB SecondarySpecificActivity3.7.143.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityLCO3.7.14Thespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantshallbes0.10yCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.Specificactivitynotwithinlimit.A.1BeinNODE3.ANDA.2BeinHODE5.86hours403.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.14.1Verifythespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantiss0.10pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-43DraftB MSSVs83.7.1B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.1MainSteamSafetyValves{HSSVs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheMSSVsistoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysystem.TheHSSVsalsoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurizingthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)byprovidingaheatsinkfortheremovalofenergyfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)ifthepreferred(butnonsafetyrelated)heatsink,providedbythecondenserandcirculatingwatersystem,isnotavailable.FourHSSVsarelocatedoneachmainsteamheader,outsidecontainmentintheIntermediateBuilding,upstreamofthemainsteamisolationvalves(Ref.1).HSSVs3509,3511,3513,and3515arelocatedonthesteamgenerator(SG)AmainsteamheaderwhileHSSVs3508,3510,3512and3514arelocatedontheSG8mainsteamheader.TheMSSVsaredesignedtolimitthesecondarysystemtoz110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignflow.TheHSSVdesignincludesstaggeredsetpointssothatonlytheneededvalveswillactuate.Staggeredsetpointsreducethepotentialforvalvechatteringthatisduetosteampressureinsufficienttofullyopenallvalvesfollowingaturbine/reactortrip.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheHSSVsistolimitthesecondarysystempressuretoc110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignsteamflow.Thisdesignbasisissufficienttocopewithanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrence:(~AOO')~~!.,oraccidentconsideredintheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysis.TheeventsthatchallengetherelievingcapacityoftheHSSVs,andthusRCSpressure,arethosecharacterizedasdecreasedRCSheatremovalevents(Ref.2).Ofthese,thefullpowerlossofexternalloadeventisthelimitingOBAAOO.ThiseventalsoresultsinthelossofnormalfeedwaterflowtotheSGs.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-1DraftB HSSVsB3.7.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thetransientresponseforalossofexternalloadeventwithoutadirectreactortrip(i.e.,lossofloadwhen<50%RTP)presentsnohazardtotheintegrityoftheRCSortheHainSteamSystem.Fortransientsatpowerlevels>50%,theeffectonRCSsafetylimitsisevaluatedwithnocredittakenforthepressurerelievingcapabilityofpressurizerspray,thesteamdumpsystem,andtheSGatmosphericreliefvalves.ThereactoristrippedonhighpressurizerpressurewiththepressurizersafetyvalvesandHSSVsrequiredtobeopenedtomaintaintheRCSandMainSteamSystemwithin110%oftheirdesignvalues.TheHSSVsareassumedtohavetwoactiveandonepassivefailuremodes.Theactivefailuremodesarespuriousopening(asaninitiatingeventonly),andfailuretorecloseonceopened.Thepassivefailuremodeisfailuretoopenupondemandwhichisnotconsideredintheaccidentanalyses.TheHSSVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheaccidentanalysisrequiresfourMSSVspersteamgeneratortoprovideoverpressureprotectionfordesignbasistransientsoccurringat102%RTP.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdefinedastheabilitytoopenwithinthesetpointtolerances,relieveSGoverpressure,andreseatwhenpressurehasbeenreduced.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdeterminedbyperiodicsurveillancetestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Theliftsettings,accordingtoSR3.7.1.1intheaccompanyingLCO,correspondtoambientconditionsofthevalveatnominaloperatingtemperatureandpressure.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSSVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinachallengetotheRCPBorsecondarysystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-2DraftB 0i HSSVsB3.7.1BASESAPPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,fourHSSVsperSGarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheRCSremainswithinitspressuresafetylimitandthatthesecondarysystem,fromtheSGstothemainsteamisolationvalves,islimitedtos110%ofdesignpressureforallDBAs.InMODES4and5,therearenocredibletransientsrequiringtheHSSVs.TheSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremovalinMODES5and6,andthuscannotbeoverpressurize'd;thereisnorequirementfortheHSSVstobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateCondition'entryisallowedforeachMSSV.A.1WithoneormoreHSSVsinoperable,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysisforlossofexternalloadmaynolongerbevalidandthesafetyvalve(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.ThisConditionspecificallyaddressestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventthatanon-significantdiscrepancyrelatedtotheHSSVsisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginMODES1,2,or3.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultinalossofHSSVcapabilitytorelievesteam.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorrection,ofadministrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletiontimeisbasedonengineeringjudgement.ThisConditionisnotapplicabletoasituationinwhichtheabilityofaHSSVtoopenorrecloseisquestionable.Inthisevent,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandConditionBofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedduringNODES1,2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-3Draft8 HSSVsB3.7.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IftheHSSV(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.1.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheMSSVsbytheverificationofeachHSSVliftsetpointinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.TheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.3),requiresthatsafetyandreliefvalvetestsbeperformedinaccordancewithANSI/ASHEOH-1-1987(Ref.4).AccordingtoReference4,thefollowingtestsarerequired:a.Visualexamination;b.Seattightnessdetermination;c.Setpointpressuredetermination(liftsetting);d.Compliancewithowner'sseattightnesscriteria;ande.Verificationofthebalancingdeviceintegrityonbalancedvalves.TheANSI/ASHEStandardrequiresthatallvalvesbetestedevery5years,andaminimumof20%ofthevalvesbetestedevery24months.TheASHECodespecifiestheactivitiesandfrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.ThisSRallowsa+1%and-3%setpointtoleranceforOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto+1%duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-4DraftB HSSVsB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoandoperationinMODE3priortoperformingtheSR.TheHSSVsmaybeeitherbenchtestedortestedinsituathotconditionsusinganassistdevicetosimulateliftpressure.IftheHSSVsarenottestedathotconditions,theliftsettingpressureshallbecorrectedtoambientconditionsofthevalveatoperatingtemperatureandpressure.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section10.3.2.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.2.3.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.4.ANSI/ASHEOH-1-1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-5DraftB

HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.283.7PLANTSYSTEHS83.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesBASESBACKGROUNDTheHSIVs(3516and3517)isolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).HSIVclosureisnecessarytoisolateaSGaffectedbyasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventorasteamlinebreak(SLB)tostopthelossofSGinventoryandtoprotecttheintegrityoftheunaffectedSGfordecayheatremoval.TheHSIVsareairoperatedswingdiskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbyanairoperatoragainstspringpressure.TheHSIVsareinstalledtousesteamflowtoassistintheclosureofthevalve(Ref.I).AHSIVislocatedineachmainsteamlineheaderoutsidecontainmentintheIntermediateBuilding.TheHSIVsaredownstreamfromthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)andturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumpsteamsupply,toassuretheHSSVspreventoverpressureonthesecondarysideandassuresteamisavailabletotheAFWsystemfollowingHSIVclosure.ClosingtheHSIVsisolateseachSGfromtheother,andisolatestheturbine,steamdumpsystem,andotherauxiliarysteamsuppliesfromtheSGs.TheHSIVscloseonamainsteamisolationsignalgeneratedbyeitherhighcontainmentpressure,highsteamflowcoincidentwithlowT,andsafetyinjection(SI),orhigh-hi'ghsteamflowcoinciJentwithSI.TheHSIVsaredesignedtoworkwithnon-returncheckvalves(3518and3519)locatedimmediately'ownstreamofeachHSIVtoprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowingaSLB.TheHSIVsfailclosedonlossofcontroloractuationpowerandlossofinstrumentaironcetheairisbledofffromthesupplyline.TheHSIVsmayalsobeactuatedmanually.EachHSIVhasanormallyclosedmanualHSIVbypassvalve.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-6DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesisestablishedbythelargeSLB(Ref.2).TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity.TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofbotoninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHSIVontheintactSGforthiscaseisassumedtoclosetopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.TheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolantmaximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Duetothenon-returncheckvalveonthefaultedSG,reverseflowfromthesteamheadersdownstreamoftheHSIVandfromtheintactSGispreventedfromcontributingtotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.Thischeckvalveisapassivedevicewhichisnotassumedtofail.SLBsoutsideofcontainmentcanoccurintheIntermediateBuildinganddownstreamoftheHSIVsintheTurbineBuilding.ASLBinpiping>6inchesdiameterintheIntermediateBuildingisnotrequiredtobeconsideredduetoanaugmentedpipinginspectionprogram(Ref.3).ForaSLBintheTurbinebuilding,theHSIVsonbothSGsmustclosetoisolatethebreakandterminatetheevent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-7DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheHSIVsarealsocreditedinaSGTRtomanuallyisolatetheSGwiththerupturedtube.Inadditiontominimizingtheradiologicalreleases,thisassiststheoperatorinisolatingtheRCSflowthroughtherupturedSGbypreventingtheSGfromcontinuingtodepressurizeandcreatingahigherpressuredifferencebetweenthesecondarysystemandtheprimarysystem.TheHSIVsarealsoconsideredinotherDBAssuchasthefeedwaterlinebreakinwhichclosureoftheHSIVontheintactSGmaximizestheeffectofthebreaksincetheenergyremovalcapabilityoftheintactSGwouldbereducedi'%~W~K"KOyX~~~C+...C'qX~N~+~A:.y~Og+%PP~~pP~~K;XNARCInadditiontoprovidingisolationofafaultedSGduringaSLB,feedwaterlinebreak,oraSGTR,theHSIVsalsoserveasacontainmentisolationkerr-i~ho'iindarj,'.TheHSIVsarethesecondcontainmentisolationbmw~b'o'u'ndary:forthemainsteam'linepenetrationswhichusethest'ea'mlinesandSGsinsidecontainmentasthefirstba~vb'ou'rj'dXr$.TheHSIVsdonotreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignalsinceaspurioussignalcouldresultinasignificantplanttransient.TheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattwoHSIVsandthenon-returncheckvalvesinthesteamlinesbeOPERABLE.TheHSIVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenwhen-theirisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignal.AHSIVmustalsobecapableofisolatingaSGforcontainmentisolationpurposes.Thenon-returncheckvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofclosing.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalveswillperformtheirdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoffsiteexposurescomparabletothe10CFR100(Ref.4)limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-8DraftB HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABILITYTheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenthereissignificantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGstochallengetheintegrityofcontainment,orallowatransienttoapproachDNBRlimits.llhthlittdIddd-,t!...td~FiA.':""..,,'80l)E8+2~l;:andd,!3,',theyarealreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunct~ion",':a'n8>4'heNSIVs~'A8Ehejr:!.':a!yssocjas'edliiai,"-'VeEdda::;::.'he'ckYiabiiesi!ahrelhtl'eelLe't'ji'ii::rle'dIire'!jOPERABL'E:.'i'!sr.':.tb1's::;:~LCQ.InMODE4,theHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesareIlyId,dhtth~iy,,"yddyy-,low.InMODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;therefore,theHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialmainsteampipebreaksintheseMODES.ACTIONS.TheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.A.1-and-Al~ifNODE(:,I'oty.ese,.".,va'1ves'4':.,":dan;.:;,::.,b'egmhhaae".',.-"',:ii::irj':,':Joe"!'!di!1'::..!!hi!i!!iiiii!I""ii'll!Iilith!":::idlyi,"'id'dt'ie'y1'~iih'i-,',"i!1!"'ra\resThe248hourCompletionTimeis(continued).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-9DraftB

HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASES~~~wg~'l~~~f~~~xeg~~yi~~~tgxyioPqxa'l',.mtcPq~'g,xcg~ygx~rioxg>>',eca088theNbIvs1y&t~>~<~pi,,:,~i~lipym~q~y","o~,fee:,",",wg<~>wowen'i.,tt,,":a::;~rigCoh,ai,nmen,.AQ.:Si:;ifh".1~'Ch'tPi,:,:::f,,'"IIW-(!%!4---'"t""'""'"t~'t1'd'""'i"-tht"th'"'d'cont'a$nment,:.:,.$.".sol;:ati,on.FailureofthisclosedsystemcanonlyresultfromaSGTRwhichisnotpostulatedtooccurwithanyotherDBA(e.g.,LOCA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-10DraftB NSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves83.7.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,7-11DraftB

HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESQ~t~b~~gpp*~j~pg~~@p>~~p...fCvXgrg~+bC~~i,~tQ~<g~>.,j~?Ag(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-13DraftB 4lt' HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASES!lht;s;::::ts,'ae'etessar7,te'eaaseij'~that:...'ithe":.;.":,"ass'emptjaiiij'ia,::::;,:tshhe',;:,,"safetycjiitr6:,'f;:.:.;:;;"j,":i,oPand~tao,';:,.":e'nsiige'l::;:-'that':;::ch88e,':,vM',\i'8'c$4ip;.,:~,53!ttinct',0&aPp08.1;tl.o)j.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-14Draft8 HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONS0.1."a'n'd%0.lf~::theMSIVsas4Man~nrnnn-returnchecke'Aces.kre[e'a'rh""i';f';.',:.:;.':th'~":,::,"'tw'o.'.;".'.":."m'a'1.'iijj'tSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.2.1ThisSRverifiesthatHSIVclosuretimeiss5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.TheHSIVsareswing-diskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbytheirairoperatorsagainstspringpressure.OncetheHSIVsbegintocloseduringhotconditions,thesteamflowwillassistthevalveclosuresuchthattestingundernoflowandnoloadconditionsisconservative.The5secondclosuretimeisconsistentwiththeexpectedresponsetimefor(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-15Oraft8 HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESinstrumentationassociatedwiththeHSIVandtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-16DraftB MSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESSURDI:LllQTC8SR3.7.2.2pE'@ijjffEmiThi'sS'Rverifiesthateachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.Asthenon-returncheckvalvesarenottestedatpower,theya}eexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-17DraftB

MSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2'BASESSR3.7.2.3ThisSRverifiesthateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.TheHSIVsshouldnotbetestedatpower,sinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosureandplanttransientwhentheplantisaboveMODE4.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfrom'heASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODES1,2and3.ThefrequencyofHSIVtestingisevery24months.The24monthFrequencyfortestingisbasedontherefuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24month,Frequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section5.4.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.3.UFSAR,Section3.6.2.5.1.4.10CFR100;11.5.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-18DraftB

NFPDVs-,HFRVs,HF'PSYCHF(B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSds'A~'Bpp,4ovpew$(Vvo'leasewev~e+stdwoV0,6B3.7.3B3.7.3HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs),As.:80c;:i'akY8BASESBACKGROUNDTheFRVs(4269and4270)andtheirassociatedbypassvalves(4271and4272),:;::!:.';:i'ri'1:'::f'IFP~IF@';(397jTKrd~3978)::isolatemainfeedwater(HFW)flowothesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThesafetyrelatedfunctionoftheNFWA-,NFRVs,aedaasooi'atedbypassvalves':!:a'hd;:-'::NFPVDVsistoprovideforisolationofNFWflowtothesecoodarysideoftheSGsterminatingtheDBAforlinebreaksoccurringdownstreamofthevalves.ClosureeffectivelyterminatestheadditionoffeedwatertoanaffectedSG,limitingthemassandenergyreleaseforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)orfeedwaterlinebreaks(FWLBs)insidecontainment,andreducingthecooldowneffectsforSLBs.TheNFPQlh~FRVs,eedassooheate'dbypassvalves,a'Rd'fNppDVss:inconjunctionwithcheckva'tveslocateddownstreamof'theisolationvalvesalsoprovideapressureboundaryforthecontrolledadditionofauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)totheOneHFPDVislocatedintheTurbineBuildingonthedischargelineofeachHFWpump(Ref.1).OneHFRVandassociatedbypassvalveislocatedoneachHFWlinetoitsrespectiveSGoutsidecontainmentintheTurbineBuilding.TheNFPO&HF:R$,:s:,,:a'ssbci'afed/byassoval'vesP~::.';i'nd)H~FPVsarelocatedupstreamoftheAFQinjecationpoinTsothatAFQmaybesuppliedtotheSGsfollowingclosureoftheHFRVsandbypassvalves,ThepipingvolumefromthesevalvestotheSGsisaccountedforincalculatingmassandenergyreleases,andmustberefilledpriortoAFWreachingtheSGfollowingeitheranSLBorFWLB.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-19(continued)DraftB NFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs83.7.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheNFPDVclosesontheopeningoftheHFWpumpbreakerwhichoccursonreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignalorain',.::othe,.""':,Y$:,"rit::,:.:."ihk,'ih.'..:t'.";i;.'3.:.~thepomI:;':b)'.i'ak~ep.TheHFRVsandbypassval'vescloseonreeeceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,aSGhighlevelsignal,oronareactortripwithT,,<554FwiththeassociatedHFRVinauto.Allvalvesmayalsobeactuatedmanually.InadditiontotheHAD~FRVs,aRdas'seri%tebypassvalvesQld,;".:8FLDPs:,acheckvalvelocatedoutsi8econtainmentforeachfeedwaterlineisavailable.Thecheckvalveisolatesthefeedwaterlinepenetratingcontainmentprovidingacontainmentisolationbarrel'oun'de'j.aaa;asm<<ceased4APPLICABLESAFETYAYSES9,$ThedesignbasisoftheHFPQ~HFRVs,@@dash'ae$%t'e'drbypassvalvesi-s:,~a'o',Lf~PDlfs".::::Ti'szestablishedbytheanalysesfortheSLB.TheSLBPsevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity(Ref.2).TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichh'avethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheNFRVandbypassvalveontheintactSGforthiscaseareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumps,whichhavetheirbreakersopenedbyaSIsignal,andtheHFPDVwhichcloseonopeningoftheHFWpumpbreakers.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-20(continued)DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVsB3.7.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolant,maximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TheHFRVandbypassvalveonthefaultedSGareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventcontinuedcontributiontotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheMFWpumpsandclosureoftheHFPDVs.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvesarealsocreditedforisolationinthefeedwatertransientanalyses(e.g.,increaseinfeedwaterflow).ThesevalvescloseoneitherasafetyinjectionorhighSGlevelsignaldependingonthescenariosThevalvesalsomustcloseonaFWLBtolimittheamountofadditionalmassandenergydeliveredtotheSGsandcontainment.ThefailureoftheHFRVstocontrolflowisalsoconsideredasaninitiatingevent.ThisincludesconsiderationofavalvefailurecoincidentwithanatmosphericreliefvalvefailuresinceasinglecomponentintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)controlsbothcomponents(Ref.3).ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttoDNBsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbytheSLBaccident.TheHFPOVs-,HFRVs,aedasiiifate'dbypassvalvesg~iand!!MFPD)s:satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-21(continued)Draft8 HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andMFPDVsB3.7.3BASESLCOThisLCOensuresthattheHAD%-,HFRVs,en4's's'oc$Vtedbypassvalvesmvand.":,::NFpDVewillisolateNFWflowEotheSgs,followingaF'Lb"orSLB.ThisLCOrequiresthattwoHFPDVs,twoHFRVs,andtwoHARV,:bypassvalvesbeOPERABLE.TheHFPD~FRVs,andes's~ciat'e'dbypassvalves,:.'.;8'odPHFPDVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignalFailuretomeettheLCOrequirementscanresultinadditionalmassandenergybeingreleasedtocontainmentfollowinganSLBorFWLBinsidecontainment.Itmayalsoresultintheintroductionofwaterintothemainsteamlinesforanexcessfeedwaterflowevent.APPLICABILITYTheNPDVs-,HFRVs,edda'SSO'cja4e'dbypass<":,..-.".'andt,":,I<FPtIIfgvalvesmustbeOPERABLEwheneverthereissignif'icantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGs.Thisensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremaintained.InMODESI,2,and3,theHFNDVs-,HFRVs,ead~eK~socjatpdbypassvalvess~A::,iao8HFPD6arerequiredtobeOPERieABl.Etomlimittheamountofavailablefluidthatcouldbeaddedtocontainmentinthecaseofasecondarysystempipebreakinsidecontainment.Whenthevalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve!siicfi'i:::t5it-.:performingt'heiisoftyfuncti'onfraindip!nogll'eager':,:;:requfrie8!tohe';Qgg&~SLg.InNODE4,theNFPD~FRVs,ends'sso'cist'esdbypassvalvesgandi:::NFPOVsiarenormallyclosedsince'AspWis'rovidingdecayheatremovalduetothelowSGenergylevel.InNODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;therefore,theNNDVs-,HFRVs,endisiociagedbypassvalvesz",.',andi::,'HFPDVKarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialpipebreaksintheseMODES.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-22(continued)DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.A.landA.2(WithoneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFPDVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The3gjdayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.B.landB.2WithoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,ortiglcloseor.'.".;:.'::;:',.,iNC'P>theinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationof4ehth'eHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed,::.6gj.':8'0,"I~ated.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The34~7:dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-23(continued)DraftB MFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2WithoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,ort'o~close@i~i:0.:i4fjte'.,"jtheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRVbypassvalvethatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed/>@i<jSi$lYC'~i8.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheassuiRptionsinthe"safetyanalysisremainvalid.The84)dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.D.Iand0.2IftheNAOV-,HFRV,mA'ss~'ci::qt'edbypassvalve:,:',::o'r~pFP~DV:cannotberestoredtoOPER'ABl.Estatusorclosedwithin24hoursorcannotbeverifiedclosedonceper31days,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-24(continued)Draft8 ,II HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVsB3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1IfoneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s),oroneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHRQVHIRV,:bypassvalve(s)areinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofiipppVs-,FiFRVs,end'as'soc'i;:atedmbypassvalvesIijoriifiFPD(~areinoperablesuchtha'ta"NFW'"pummp,condensatepump,orcondensateboosterpumpcanprovideunisolableflowtooneorbothSGsg(ice>,:Fjgul".:,,e'.:::,":BJ3~!':::7,::.~3~1:."),:.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.3.1ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachHFPDViss80secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal(i.e.,fromopeningofHFWpumpbreakers).Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI,(Ref.4)requirementsduringoperationinMODES1,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-25(continued)DraftB HFRVs,AssociatedBypassValves,andHFPDVs83.7.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.3.2ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachHFRVandass'a@i'a~phd.:',-.bypassvalveiss10secondsfromthefullopenpositi'ononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.4),requirementsduringoperationinMODES1,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.4.5.3.2.UFSAR,Section15.).5.,3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.4.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-26DraftB SQSVnrpaaaV4aaarrtOtD9C5TtO(CDtap5555KspermCasIC7cs'ionOOTlCDtr2QCCCPCDCCPCuCatCaseat~(~515CasItD VlLJpssssrsYotes:l.LCO373ConditionhcnwcdvrhenMFPiPV3976a~3977isinopcrabk.2.LCO373ConditionBcrtered<<itenMFRV4269andfcr4270isinopcrabk.3.LCO373ConditionCcateredashenMFRVB)7aassVelaT427londlor4272khaPaablc.4.LCO373Cocdhion8enteredtthcnanycontbinationol'valveboperabiliYiesresnltsincnnnlacl*ktlotapathdiernthccondensateboosterptenpstoon>>orsnoreSGs.5trttVSppaaaVataaCSPS~QIWIspprsssaillflII~NOSOSOOCDCLCDMCLCÃ5CasTl~QNO~(CasCh ARVsB3.7.4B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThereisanARV(3410and3411)locatedonth8jma),'j~gs4earjhe'a'der,,",','fj,.am(eachsteamgenerator(SG).(."..",".,"::!Thol:ARVi"::::;ii'ea.providesecondarysystemoverpressureprotectionbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs);andb.provideamethodforcoolingtheplantshouldthepreferredheatsinkviathesteamdumpsystemtothecondensernotbeavailable.TheaccidentanalysesdonotcrediteitherofthesefunctionssincetheARVsdonothaveasafety-relatedsourceofmotiveairandtheaccidentanalysesdonottypicallyrequirecooldowntotheresidualheatremovalentryconditionssincetheplantwasoriginallydesignedtomaintainHotShutdownconditionsindefinitely.Theonlyexceptioniswithrespecttosteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventswhichrequiretheuseofatleastoneARVtoprovideheatremovalfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)topreventsaturationconditionsfromdeveloping.TheARVsareairoperatedvalveslocatedintheIntermediateBuildingwithareliefcapacityof329,000ibm/hreach(approximately5%ofRIP-pewer)RTP<)';..TheARVsarenormallyclosed,failclosedvalveswhichreceivemotiveairfromtheinstrumentairsystem.Thevalvescanalsoreceivemotiveairfromanon-seismicbackupnitrogenbottlebanks'stem.:,'5'e,.:.,:.,':v,'-"-!l,",-!ii:Fi!ih-'-'i":;,:::::,':"i!id"-i"'-'i!ii'igloo::::;TRA'll!!'!control'lebytheAdvanced"DigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)butcanalsoberemotemanuallyoperatedandopenedlocallybyuseofhandwheelslocatedonthevalves.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-28DraftB ARVsB3.7.4BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-29DraftB ARVsB3.7.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheARVsisestablishedbytheSGTR,event(Ref.2).Forthisaccidentscenario,theoperatorisrequiredtoperformalimitedcooldowntoestablishadequatesubcoolingasanecessarysteptoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowintotherupturedSG.FollowingaSGTR,theHSSVswillmaintainthesecondarysystempressureatapproximately1085psigwhichcouldresultinthelossofsubcoolingmarginsincetheRCSaveragetemperatureisattemptingtostabilizeatapproximately547'F.TheARVsareusedduringthefirst30to60minutesoftheSGTRtocontinuetheRCScooldowninanefforttoreduce,andeventuallyterminate,theprimarytosecondarysystemflowintherupturedSG.Theinabilitytocooldowncouldresultininadequatesubcoolingmarginwhichwoulddelaytheterminationoftheleakagethroughtherupturedtube.TheopeningoftheARVsisalsoconsideredcoincidentwithafailureofamainfeedwaterregulatingvalve(Ref.3)sinceasinglecomponentintheADFCScontrolsbothcomponents.Thiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttodeparturefromnucl.cateboilingsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbythesteamlinebreakaccident.TheARVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTwoARVsa~eqmanual0ilhei::,'agj,.:::.i'Ii"uirid::::::ItOBb~PAOPKRA'BLF;;.Thi,:;"ARV~s-:',,j'i*"$!ii!4'EB""ARP~EB!i'."'Eii","ill',*i'...'"!!I!B"BPEIIABIEAto0.i;oTatia(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-30DraftB ARVsB3.7.4BASES'NNÃo~"4Cv@&wx~kKc>%Mcus(GO""can'::g5s,01$intheeh~>.nabs";;ftj,"'.;.:ti),".,;;;,:ecol,,"t'ai,:p,lintfollowing'aceevi~s)TR'.-':,i)le~'4~i'n~ili'i'i'"'!thp';::!g'a~deiii'i'.':i,;,"::ggpiggavgi'll'ible"os'.ii'ieP@!':"""'9,'i's"'eaB""xiii'pi"',"i'is'."'e'm".='C~rC6~v'ivAMC&XArDRCKhC4'~4M>Ki~YCW'~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-3lDraftB

ARVsB3.7.4BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-34Draft8

ARVsB3.7.4BASESREFERENCES.',.",:.:.!R!i~'!':::,'ig!lUFSAR,Section10.3.2.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.R.E.GinnaNuc1earPowerP1antB3.7-35DraftB

AFWSystem83.7.5B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheAFWSystemsuppliesfeedwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)toremovedecayheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)uponthelossofnormalfeedwatersupply.TheSGsfunctionasaheatsinkforcoredecayheat.TheheatloadisdissipatedbyreleasingsteamtotheatmospherefromtheSGsviathemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)oratmosphericreliefvalves.Ifthemaincondenserisavailable,steammaybereleasedviathesteamdumpvalves.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwoseparatesystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFW)System(Ref.I).~AFWSstemThepreferredAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenAFWPDAF~Qf,:"':jpumpsandoneturbinedriven'AFAR'{TDAF+Ue':".pumpconfiguredintothreeseparatetrainswhichare"alllocatedintheIntermediateBuilding/('s'ee.'.;;::,I-."igure~(BP3,".:,:775~'I~$.EachA'EAfeti,pE'dI'litt'IfAfflffpit,dtt~l'll'A'Pffpppid>>Il'requiredcapacitytotheSGms,asassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thepumpsareequippedwithindependentrecirculationlinestothecondensatestoragetanks(CSTs).EA'fillliilltiipdfindependentClassIEpowersupplyandfeedsoneSG,althougheachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGviacross-tielinescontainingnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4000Aand40008).Thetwo'DA~FQtrainswillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalineitherSG,openingofthemainfeedwater(HFW)pumpbreakers,asafetyinjection(SI)signal,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(AHSAC).Thepumpscanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-36(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)BACKGROUNDTDAFWpumpreceivessteamfromThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemistheCSTswhicharelocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding.TheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8)canalsobeusedtosupplyasafety-relatedsourceofwaterthroughnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4013,4027,and4028)whichsupplyeachAFWtrain.Theeach-.",;-mainsteam1ine-upstreamofthetwomainsteamisolationvalves.Eitherofthesteamlineswillsupply100%oftherequirementsoftheTDAFQpump.The'TQAFMpumpsuppliesacoiiimonheadercapableoffeedingbothSGsbyuseoffail-open,air-operatedcontrolvalves(4297and4298).The'XDAFQpumpwillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalinbothSGs,lossofvoltageon4160VBusesllAandllB,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(ANSAC).Thepumpcanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.SAFWSstem93TheSAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenpumpsconfiguredintotwoseparatetrainsQiQse'e;:,:;,:.Fj,::gui~ii::O':9,.::.-.:7~"::,S.",-';ggEachmotordrivenSAFWtrainprovides100%"oftheO'FWfl'owcapacityasassumedintheaccidentanalysesandsuppliesoneSGthroughtheuseofanormallyopenmotor-operatedstopcheckvalve.EachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGvianormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9703Aand9703B).EachpumpispoweredfromanindependentClassIEpowersupplyandcanbepoweredfromthedieselgeneratorsprovidedthatthebreakerfortheassociatedARlHDA(Apumpisopened.Thesafety-relatedsourceofwaterfortheSAFWSystemistheSWSystemthroughtwonormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9629Aand9629B).Condensatecanalsobesuppliedbya10,000galloncondensatetesttankandtheyardfirehydrantyardloop.TheSAFWSystemismanuallyactuatedintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemhasfailedduetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding,aseismicorfireevent.TheSAFWtrainsarelocatedintheSAFWPumpBuildinglocatedadjacenttotheAuxiliaryBuilding.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-37(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)The'SAFWPumpBuildingenvironmentiscontrolledbyroomcoolerswhicharesuppliedbythesameSWheaderasthepumptrains.Thesecoolersarerequiredwhentheoutsideairtemperatureisz80FtoensuretheSAFWPumpBuildingremainss120'Fduringaccidentconditions.TheAFWSystemisdesignedtosupplysufficientwatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatwithSGpressureatthelowestNEEVtppl1'/~.Sbqtly,thAFWSystemsuppliessufficientwatertocooltheplanttoRHRentryconditions,withsteamreleasedthroughtheARVs.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheAFWSystemistosupplywatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatandotherresidualheatbydeliveringatleasttheminimumrequiredflowratetotheSGsatpressurescorrespondingtothelowestHSSVsetpressureplus1%.TheAFWSystemmitigatestheconsequencesofanyeventwiththelossofnormalfeedwater.ThelimitingDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)andtransientsfortheAFWSystemareasfollows(Ref.2):a.FeedwaterLineBreak(FWLB);b.LossofHFW(withandwithoutoffsitepower);c.SteamLineBreak(SLB);d.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);e.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR);andf.Externalevents(tornadosandseismicevents).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-38(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheAFWSystemdesignissuchthatanyoftheaboveDBAscanbemitigatedusingthepreferredAFWSystemorSAFWSystem.FortheFWLB,SLB,andexternaleventsDBAs(itemsa,c,andf),theworstcasescenarioisthelossofallthreepreferredAFWtrainsduetoaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuilding,orafailureoftheIntermediateBuildingblockwalls.Forthesethreeevents,theuseoftheSAFWSystemwithin10minutesisassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.SinceasinglefailuremustalsobeassumedinadditiontotheHELBorexternalevent,thecapabilityoftheSAFWSystemtosupplyflowtoanintactSGcouldbecompromisediftheSAFWcross-tieisnotavailable.ForHELBswithincontainment,useofeithertheSAFWSystemortheAFWSystemtotheintactSGisassumedwithin10minutes.FortheSGTRevents(iteme),theaccidentanalysesassumethatoneAFWtrainisavailableuponaSIsignalorlow-lowSGlevelsignal.AdditionalinventoryisbeingaddedtotherupturedSGasaresultoftheSGTRsuchthatAFWflowisnotacriticalfeatureforthisDBA.ForthelossofNFWeventsandsmallbreakLOCA(itemsbandd),twotrainsofAFWareassumedavailable(i.e.,two~d~en-AF4NDAFQtrainsorthe'TOAF9train)uponalow-lowSGlevelsignalandSIsignal,respectively.TwoAFWtrainsareassumedavailablesincenosinglefailurecanresultinthelossofmorethanoneAFWtrain.ThelossofHFWisaCondition2event(Ref.3)whichplaceslimitsontheresponseoftheRCSfromthetransient(e.g.,nochallengetothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisallowed).TwotrainsofAFWarerequiredtomaintaintheselimits.ThesmallbreakLOCAanalysisrequirestwotrainsofAFWtolowerRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-39(continued)DraftB AFWSystem83.7.5BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Inadditiontoitsaccidentmitigationfunction,theenergyandmassadditioncapabilityoftheAFWSystemisalsoconsideredwithrespecttoHELBswithincontainment.ForSLBsandFWLBswithincontainment,pumprunoutfromallthreeAFWpumpsisassumedfor10minutesuntiloperationscanisolatetheflowbytrippingtheAFWpumpsorbpclosingthp'ppdihg~!fill,."'-!lipsth'ii:,'i.Therefore,themotoroperateddischargeisolationvalvesfor4t~llthfggpl*(4,T,44,8idesinedtolimitflowto<230m.pphe':,~75A,FM::.'.'.'.;t't..;.'.i~n.:",":.'i;9iisiiiiie'8!',:to'::,:benit::::i'u-n,'out:*:,co'o~dTt1liii7i(1>ii'ilia".6OO'::i9'jiiiL!4TheAFWSystemsatisfiestherequirementsofCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheAFWSystemwillperformitsdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorcontainment.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwosystemswhichareconfiguredintofivetrains.TheAFWSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthecomponentsandflowpathsrequiredtoprovideredundantAFWflowtotheSGsareOPERABLE)";,:::,(~heiF~jgures~83~7.:,',".-;5;.:-,:,,I~@an'd"':3;."'i?",':,:5>>,'.:;2)';.Thisrequiresthat"thefol'lowingbeOPERAB'LE:TwogDAFMtrainstakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyCCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andcapableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGwitha200gpmands230gpmtotalflow;b.Th~Tgh'fgItlgIIhCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),proveesteamfrombothmainsteamlinesupstreamoftheHSIVs,andcapableofsupplyingbothSGswitha200gpmeach;andR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-40(continued)Draft8 AFWSystem83.7.5BASES(continued)LCOc.TwomotordrivenSAFWtrainscapableofbeing-@it::c'~o'ijtinned;:pot!+~a(h8,:":initiatedeitherlocallyorfromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes,takingsuctionfromtheSWSystem,andsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGandtheoppositeSGthroughtheSAFWcross-tielinewith>200gpm.hC4-Thepiping,valves,instrumentation,andcontrolsintheEtEP1Ptt1EtEttOPERABLE.11,,':FOALswapo.~triijis',,',romi;,ise'ni::.;,nt'td-...:,,a:,::,::comtmon;".'E";um":'e'n'd:,:ltno',:-&lan,.'.:p'athd.a'A>'EAETDAFJtttra'pn'i;,f1o'ng'pa'tthhsis'eil."A"':ra'ntotitno"'hewraat'e':i"preferredO'FWsy'temandSAFWsystempumpsarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysisandarealsonotrequiredtobeOPERABLEForthisLCOsincetheNSSVsmaintaintheSGpressurebelowthepump'sshutoffhead.TheSAFWPumpBuildingroomcoolersarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwhentheoutsideairtemperatureis~80F.Ifoneroomcoolerisinoperable,theassociatedSAFWtrainisinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheeventthatitiscalledupontofunctionwhentheNFWSystemislost.Inaddition,theAFWSystemisrequiredtosupplyenoughmakeupwatertoreplacethe~SGsecondaryinventor~~~>astheplantcoolstoMODE4<<<~conditions.InNODE4,5,or6,theSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremoval,andtheAFWSystemisnotrequired.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-41(continued)DraftB AFWSystem83.7.5BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1Ifone,ofthe~TD~FM,"-,',"trygj~it1:o'ggaXhpisbbl,ttb,ttEhl,os'!j'at(}toOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayC'ompl'ety"i'onTimeisreasonable,basedonthefollowingreasons:a.TheredundantOPERABLEturbinedrivenAFWpumpAewpa44f]:ow,bpath;b.Eb,,tlbtlltyPEEOPERABLE~AN)DAFQandSAFWpumps;and-kshhS%4S,ElljRP,:,bb'lty'tPjj';:,,ll:,,l'l-,:,jt'r!Ehyii,,-,j'\,*;!Ah,~ii'ob'ji'ii':ab'3.'..i'.-'.P0AFH,::jium'j~.'::,foaloi:"',p'ith.ARI-pumpgiTD'Al.',0trainPf',,'l;:ox';j)'atj",$:s":,@defji',nR'uotSYmhdbtyWMWkvXAAvYNmv&'4@V:~hyhhhMyyp~CRBiv4S'~AEAMMMC4vXCM4A40MC~vM'Y4XA'AAAAAAAjbEO'LCMC~C5hejj~ffi1!'fo7ijigPTj',ea~'Ojjgs:I.OPERAS'CE:~Ht)AFQtrainL-"-~YES"-un<an-t'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-42(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)8.~~:aj;aA':,abj'.'l)Vy'ofGPERABf'E;.'.".:.:TDAFW.;-!hiig(!SAFE'juitis,::",.<$'i'4dANc4ccccvM'4(c4vicccv'c4vwwvN4w:NNcwvsRKcPiP~viMN4tpccgrj>agJ~thYt:,.",,'.;r,,'equi;its'i;t'h,",."1.ri'op'ei';:ab:l'g,'::.'::NBA'FM'rainR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-43(continued)Draft8

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)K:."".">f't'ai't'j,ri'iiYd)!'O'GT!IONS5.4CyeIiit1'~~'he':;;".:,:TopFbi.:;traij',::::iiioP'erabl'e:;."':uboui,:,,MPPPili'trainee,,tr'asn'isujip)'p'ets!,th"'hssa'mi.::,:SS'gwWeRcusmbeyiiegt~m??elumstmeppfee.,~.j'pN?Pe?'4'eever,'??g'femppe8+heueeC1ess':~>%."?smtkseme".;0."iuee'ttse~p~gi?et+eden'dan'ody',,":;.',i's!!ls'i'~t!The/FhourcompletionT'ime'isreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-44(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)>Tje,';two'"fiji!..:::i':iidiijidgrii<Ii'iPibiliiti'iigf~fPide:,b>z!:th'iiIsA'FMjsy's'0'ii'iiij'iiiiedi;;@'".'fbi;i,::ilia'ji',i,'ij"",'::;;:WithoneSAFWtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin14days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneofthetwoSAFWcross-tievalveswhichrequiresdeclaringtheassociatedSAFWtraininoperable(e.g.,failureof9703BwouldresultindeclaringSAFWtrainDinoperable).The14dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.WithbothSAFWtrainsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftheSAFWcross-tie.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-45(continued)DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)andR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-46(continued)DraftB

AFWSystem83.7.5BASES(continued)(continued).2WhenRequiredActionA.1,B.1,C.I,D.I,erE.~g,"::,"::::o'i,~Fje"IcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompleti'onTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hours,andinNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.IfallthreepreferredAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsareinoperabletheplantisinaseriouslydegradedconditionwithnosafetyrelatedmeansforconductingacooldown,andonlylimitedmeansforconductingacooldownwithnonsafetyrelatedequipment.Insuchacondition,theplantshouldnotbeperturbedbyanyaction,includingapowerchange,thatmightresultinatrip.Theseriousnessofthisconditionrequiresthatactionbestartedimmediatelytorest'oreoneakEWorSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus./<~F0~!'.':thepUr,'o'se's',.'::,"of%hj"',0;.::RequiredAction-0;,:::::::.:,:::@jig/'orjp':@ADA'F~ARj'qii>Q',;ed::.."-:Actj'iirigA)lismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthata't'1"re"u'dNODEchangesorpowerreductionsaresuspendeduntiloneorSAFWtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Inthiscase,LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablebecauseitcouldforcetheplantintoalesssafecondition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-47(continued)DraftB

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.5.1Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheAFWandSAFWSystemwaterandsteamsupplyflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforAFWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3.7.5.2PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASHE,SectionXI(Ref.4)detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.TheFrequency'ofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHEcode.SectionXIoftheASHEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredtobeperfermedmdtpriortoenteringHODE1forthe~TDAFMpumpsincesuitabletestconditionsmay-ac@-havenoO~Obeenestablished.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-48DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-49Draft8 AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.5.3PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachSAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASME,SectionXI(Ref.4)detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.BecauseitisundesirabletointroduceSWintotheSGswhiletheyareoperating,thistestingisperformedusingthetestcondensatetank.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASMEcode.SectionXIoftheASMEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.SR3.7.5.4ThisSRverifiesthateachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheSWSystem(4013,4027,4028,9629A,and9629B),eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedvalve(4007,4008,9704A,9704B,and9746),andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve(9703Aand9703B)canbeoperatedwhenrequired.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.4).SR3.7.5.5ThisSRverifiesthatAFWcanbedeliveredtotheappropriateSGintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignal,bydemonstratingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandthedesignreliabilityoftheequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-50DraftB AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.5a6ThisSRverifiesthattheAFWpumpswillstartintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignalbydemonstratingthateachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonthepotentialneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.0ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthat,theSRisonlyrequiredtobepenfermedmatpriortoenteringMODElfortheTOAFQpumpsincesuitabletestconditionsmaynet-havenij~t~beenestablished.tStbuoeSgSjg)N~ucefana~aleqomomraW&maueau.muevdd~~obW'~mave~YhauomeaouesSR3.7.5.7ThisSRverifiesthattheSAFWSystemcanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.TheSAFWSystemisassumedtobemanuallyinitiatedwithin10minutesintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedatpower.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.5.2.UFSARChapter15.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-51DraftB 444SlO5tDrD455C5NrDIDC2.CUrlC43C/l~C5llhIIDBIyyCan492549144....I~9154014Pyrlllmaam~ynly'6129519S42914351435$350$I3505ycTcVIIY3515gTa315n'514IIIIi--44I35oenssoca35re~Rote-FZ-2001y}Y-2002,17-2000andFf-2002aLcoaddreasedbyLCO3.3.3.40144344402110Syy45GccyycycI8-HoyopetitnotretpiredforLCO~-AddrecaedinLCO3.7$-----~mhPVQot43ltt2h~AIWTrain(Note-'llsAFV/traininchdcaboth5!earnandbothinjectionQoyapath3)rlCXIC/s~N~IDCslR 03329ASAFWPomph~JahpWRayRoomCoohogSA3WPmopRoomCooboatoitlBP03AIfBBBBIIIIII I III--v-03laIIIIIIIIII$0303BIII$%33B~f3333CoodauatoSAXWPompBS370IB408SF703BGcocccBOrBLegend:-----HotvpathnotrequircdforLCOSAPVTrainFOf1tlQstrhtlbhOhLYTl<<UC33l~VINet~coCJlG CSTsB3.7.6B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheCSTsprovideasourceofwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)forremovingdecayandsensibleheatfromtheReactor'oolantSystem(RCS).TheCSTprovidesapassiveflowofwater,bygravity,tothepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System(LCO3.7.5)g('she",:::;Fjgu'r'e"::::!Bl'3:,",7,,"::5~h)';:.TheresultingsteamproducedintheS'Gsisrel'ease'dtotheatmospherebythemainsteamsafetyvalvesortheatmosphericreliefvalves.Whenthemainsteamisolationvalvesareopen,thepreferredmeansofheatremovalfromtheRCSistodischargesteamtothecondenserbythenonsafetygradepathofthesteamdumpvalves.ThecondensedsteamisthenreturnedtotheSGsbythemainfeedwatersystem.Thishastheadvantageofconservingcondensatewhileminimizingreleasestotheenvironment.Therearetwo30,000gallonCSTslocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding(Ref.1)..TheCSTsarenotconsideredsafetyrelatedcomponentssincethetanksarenotprotectedagainstearthquakesorothernaturalphenomena,includingmissiles.ThesafetyrelatedsourceofcondensatefortheAFWandStandbyAFWSystemsistheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8).TheCSTsareconnectedbyacommonheaderwhichleadstothesuctionofallthreeAFWpumps.AsingleleveltransmitterisprovidedforeachCST(LT-2022AandLT-2022B).TheCSTscanberefilledfromthecondenserhotwellortheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetank.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSTsprovidecoolingwatertoremovedecayheatandtocooldowntheplantfollowingalleventsintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2)whichassumesthatthepreferredAFWSystemisavailableimmediatelyfollowinganaccident.ForanyeventinwhichAFWisnotrequiredforatleast10minutesfollowingtheaccident,theSWSystemprovidesthesourceofcoolingwatertoremovedecayheat.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-54DraftB CSTsB3.7.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forthecondensatevolumeisthelossofnormalfeedwatereventandsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)(Ref.2).Forthelossofnormalfeedwaterevent,flowfromatleasttwoAFWpumpsisrequireduponalowlevelsignalineitherSGtomeettheacceptancecriteriaforaCondition2event(Ref.3).ForthesmallbreakLOCA,twoAFWpumpsarerequiredtolowertheRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadofthesafetyinjectionpumps.AssumingthatallthreeAFWpumpsinitiateattheirmaximumflowrate,theCSTsprovidesuffi'cientinventoryforatleast20minutes(atgreaterthanrequiredflowrates)beforeoperatoractiontorefilltheCSTsortransfersuctiontotheSWSystemisrequired.AnonlimitingeventconsideredinCSTinventorydeterminationsisamainfeedwaterlinebreakinsidecontainment.Thisbreakhasthepotentialfordumpingcondensateuntilterminatedbyoperatoractionafter10minutessincethereisnoautomaticre-configurationoftheAFWSystem.FollowingterminationoftheAFWflowtotheaffectedSGbyclosingtheAFWtraindischargevalvesorstoppingapump,flowfromtheremainingAFWtrainortheSAFWSystemisdirectedtotheintactSGfordecayheatremoval.Thisloss-ofcondensateispartiallycompensatedforbytheretentionofinventoryintheintactSG.Forcooldownsfollowinglossofall9n's;.its,.ai'6,',,",::;~oJfs'He);:ACelectricalpower,theCSTscontainsufficientinventorytoprovideaminimumof2hoursofdecayheatremovalasrequiredbyNUREG-0737(Ref.4),itemII.E.l.l.ThisbeyondDBArequirementprovidesmorelimitingcriteriaforCSTinventory.TheCSTssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTosatisfyaccidentanalysisassumptions,theCSTmustcontain'sufficientcoolingwatertoremovedecayheatforatleast10minutesfollowingalossofHFWeventfrom102%RTP.Afterthistimeperiod,theaccidentanalysesassumethatAFWpumpsuctioncanbetransferredtothesafetyrelatedsuctionsource(i.e.,theSWSystem).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-55DraftB CSTsB3.7.6BASESLCO(continued)TherequiredCSTwatervolumeisz22,500gallons,whichisbasedontheneedtoprovideatleast2hoursofdecayheatremovalfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower.TheCSTsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenatleast22,500gallonsofwaterisavailable.The22,500galminimumvolumeismetifoneCSTisz21.5ftorifbothCSTsarea12.5ft.SincetheCSTsare30,000gallontanks,onlyoneCSTisrequiredtomeettheminimumrequiredwatervolumeforthisLCO.TheOPERABILITYoftheCSTsisdeterminedbymaintainingthetanklevelatorabovetheminimumrequiredwatervolume.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,and3,theCSTsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupporttheAFWSystemrequirements.InMODE4,5,or6,theCSTisnotrequiredbecausetheAFWSystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ACTIONSA.landA.2IftheCSTwatervolumeisnotwithinlimits,theOPERABILITYofthebackupsupplyshouldbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithin4hours.OPERABILITYofthebackupfeedwatersupplymustincludeverificationthattheflowpathsfromthebackupwatersupplytothepreferredAFWpumpsareOPERABLEandimmediatelyavailableuponAFWinitiation,andthatthebackupsupplyhastherequiredvolumeofwateravailable.Alternatesourcesofwaterinclude,butisnotlimitedto,theSWSystem*andtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatetank.Inaddition,theCSTsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,becausethebackupsupplymaybeperformingthisfunctioninadditiontoitsnormalfunctions.Continuedverificationofthebackupsupplyisnotrequiredduetothelargevolumeofwatertypicallyavailablefromthesealternatesources.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonanOPERABLEbackupwatersupplybeingavailable,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodrequiringtheCSTs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-56Draft8

CSTsB3.7.6BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IfthebackupsupplycannotbeverifiedortheCSTscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.6.1ThisSRverifiesthattheCSTscontaintherequiredvolumeofcoolingwater.The22,500galminimumvolumeismetifoneCSTis~21ftorifbothCSTsare~12.5ft.The12hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheneedforoperatorawarenessofplantevolutionsthatmayaffecttheCSTinventorybetweenchecks.Also,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoabnormaldeviationsintheCSTlevel.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section10.7.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-57DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.7ComponentCooling=Water(CCW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheCCWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theCCWSystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.TheCCWSystemservesasabarriertothereleaseofradioactivebyproductsbetweenpotentiallyradioactivesystemsandtheServiceWater(SW)System,andthustotheenvironment.ThesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheCCWsystemarecoveredbythisLCO.TheCCWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%capacity,safetyrelatedpumpRi'id:.':::;:he'i4exch~an'~ei"".,:.trains(Ref.1),";:,"(s'e~e'~F~i'gift!'e,.::::B."-:i3<X7,:;..",<?.':-:1)'.EachCCWMrainconsistsofamanual"'suctionanddischargevalve,ap1,ddhhgh11.Thy~,,W~Xag~;,.d~.dye.h;gg,d~~Pq:h,~iW~~qg,p,~yeq.ygqzddig~Z",~"@re+W",trains'jsch'ir'gi>,"';:iioq'a!,:,.comeo'iYjneader...:::iihieh~i"eo.supplythesafetyrelatedandnon-safetyrelatedcomponentscooldbyCCW.TheCCMploopheaderbe'g'i::0'j:::at::::;::;:,thp~c'omrijoqiii'iring'.;:"atgthÃdfic'ti'agj'e',,:bf~thei:".:tingj>aY'a'i!1%'l,l':heij'e%clij'ri'9'a~i%componentsuppliedbytheCCWSystem.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachsuppliedloadtothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.EachpumpispoweredfromaseparateClasslEelectricalbus.AnopensurgetankinthesystemprovidesforthermalexpansionandcontractionoftheCCWsystemandensuresthatsufficientnetpositivesuctionheadisavailabletothepumps.TheCCWSystemisalsoprovidedwitharadiationdetector(R-17)toisolatethesurgetankfromtheAuxiliaryBuildingenvironmentandtoprovideindicationofaleakofradioactivewaterintotheCCWSystem.TheCCWSystemisnormallymaintainedbelow100Fbytheuseofonepumptraininconjunctionwithoneheatexchanger.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-58(continued)DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESThestandbyCCWpumpwillautomaticallystartifthesystempressurefallsto50psig.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-59(continued)DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-60(continued)DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theprincipalsafety,relatedfunctionoftheCCWSystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)System.SincetheremovalofdecayheatviatheRHRSystemisonlyperformedduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident,theCCWpumpsdonotreceiveanautomaticstartsignal.Followingthegenerationofasafetyinjectionsignal,thenormallyoperatingCCWpumpwillremaininserviceunlessanundervoltagesignalispresentoneitherClassIEelectricalBus14orBus16atwhichtimethepumpisstrippedfromitsrespectivebus.ACCWpumpcanthenbemanuallyplacedintoservicepriortoswitchingtorecirculationoperationswhichwouldnotberequireduntilaminimumof46minutesfollowinganaccident.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtrainandoneCCWheatexchangertoremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase.TheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andcontainmentmodelsforaLOCAeachconsidertheminimumperformanceoftheCCWSystem.ThenormaltemperatureoftheCCWis~100F,and,duringLOCAconditions,amaximumtemperatureof120Fisassumed.ThispreventstheCCWSystemfromexceedingitsdesigntemperaturelimitof200F,andprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofcontainmentsumpfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bytheECCSpumps.TheCCWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.+brckw~~~~~0~~~~9KQop~~~~p>o~Q..~R'~~~~P<<<+<~~~o>R.~~~~-~+~~~+C,i~,~t~~~+uE~q44mi~gR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-61(continued)DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheCCWSystemcanalsofunctiontocooltheplantfromRHRentryconditions(T,,<350'F),toMODE5(T.,<200F),duringnormalcooldownoperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350'Fto200FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRtrainsoperating.SinceCCWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsindrainingtheCCWSystemwithinashortperiodoftime.TheCCWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofCCWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).LeakswithintheCCWSystemduringpostaccidentconditionscanbemitigatedbytheavailablemakeupwatersources.TheCCWSystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIntheeventofaDBAoneCCWtrain/:".one'"':fico%:-,..:ij'Ch'iijjePandtheloopheaderisrequiredtopro'vi8etheminimum"'heatremovalcapabilityassumedinthesafetyanalysisforthesystemstowhichitsuppliescoolingwater/(~'se~e:,:F'i'gure':.',",8Si:~7.>7M::::):..Toensurethisrequirementismet;"twotrainsofCCW~~:.:":tw'o);-,':h'e'at'j"e'xihingei;-j',andtheloopheadermustbeOPEAABL'E.AtleastoneCCWtrainwilloperateassumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ACCWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthepumpisOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheader.TheautomaticstartlogicassociatedwithlowCCWsystempressureisnotrequiredforthisLCO.Inaddition,ifaCCWpumpfailsanInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead)thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-62(continued)Draft8 CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-63(continued)Draft8 CCWSystem83.7.7BASESLCO(continued)TheCCWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,surgetank,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwatertothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.TwoRHRheatexchangers;b.TwoRHRpumpmechanicalsea1coolersandbearingwaterjackets;c.Threesafetyinjectionpumpmechanicalsealcoolers;.and)qC(d.Twocontainmentspraypumpmechanicalsealcoolers.TheCCWloopheadertemperaturemustalsobez120FpriortotheCCWcoolingwaterreachingthefirstisolationvalvesupplyingthesecomponents.~~eeM>>~~~~~~~The.CCWtrainsI,."'".'.;plat:;;!jichajge~pandlopheaderareconsideredOPABLE"whentheycanbacedintoservicewithinthemelimitsassumedheaccident@noses(i.e.,46inutes).TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWheatexchangers-,andc'orig'nV4i:,',uptothefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachoftheabovecomponentstothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.ThpifCCIIpipig,instrumentationandcontrolsbetweentheisolationvalvestocomponentsathroughdaboveisaddressedbythefollowingLCOs:a.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"b.LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"c.LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled,"R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-64(continued)Draft8 CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESLCO(continued)d.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3,"e.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4,"f.LCO3.9.3,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft,"andg.LCO3.9.4,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."TheCCWpipinginsidecontainmentforthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andthereactorsupportcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationbarrimbouri'd'~gj.:.,ThisisaddressedbyLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationSm>>r4evs8g'u'n'dar37is.:."TheCCWsystemradiationdetector(R-17)isnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheCCWsystemoutsidecontainmentisnotrequiredtobeaclosedsystem.TheisolationofCCWfromothercomponentsorsystemsnotrequiredforsafetymayrenderthosecomponentsorsystemsinoperablebutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheCCWSystem.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theCCWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystem,whichmustbecapabletoperformitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCA.InMODE5or6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheCCWSystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,andLCO3.9.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-65(continued)DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESACTIONSA.1IfoneCCWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECCWtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecause,asinglefailureintheOPERABLECCWtraincouldresultinlossofCCWfunction.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.B.l-and-8::ii>,.ai)e-.;;i;:i.'i-;:,':,ji'earn.,excn'aji'g4ahaeb~~tii!i@store',:::".OPEfNBL'BistKs;::reuuuea":bpecause;:::a'."pas:,i:)*,verja5i'ure.,in"Fe'.s~u:l%in"';":;;:,I:;o,i:,'"'):f~lCCWi'..::Fiiic;t$:i'ii:.TheNl~ed31ildag,Completionmaes-a@Time'::.',:j'isreasonable,basedoneannenthe.::jedund'an~t.u'apabYAti'e's,oaff,dnerd:-:,::e:bytli~'ej::tOPXRA'BE'rbaabaIi":~it~Vej::atpass,:isa,,::::,fa'i",::fu~iKe~af!::;!th'e,:;:.":remaifii1ifp'(li~ea"C.1~~.'5'dC.2bth'e'i>>::n'e,:";:,'impp':i..Li.,"TOijI~CS::8V&(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-66DraftB CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES*L!~4'"::1!li:,:,::',!'""'i'!'lid'4'i!th,.'*!i'::::,:!h(!!(ijti':-'jill',.'.::ji:,::::l!ilia"'ll::,,"-""(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-67DraftB 0 CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESKCTjIGNS':;::::':::"':::.:'::.""::l::.:':!'-.:;::~!>::.'::.',!;-::.0.-l':'!!O':'::P".-':-'::an'de'.."".3:reSt'016!-,:OPERABLE'.",.8tates:;."..tQeX'etjang'ey,-','.i~any!,'":i'joe'=:':,io'oj,".."."","e'agee'r!Iini;nisionciiiion,inereisiqQ,noOPERABLECCWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisalossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofCCWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantisnotrequiredtoexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,enterMODE5)untilatleastoneCCWtrain~:",~j!on'ewCCTil::lhea~t:;".,'8'xohahgejl~p'.;,::andtheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation.::::a't'seiidi'jfiediib~iy'j':,".;;."riot~~;.:mdiiiii'iiq;:.:"thjt~k))hiI!(pii'j'it~{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-68Draft8 CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)$1lllXE!!L'!!I!!'~i:;:;,,:i!:::;",iiiBEE!::;-::.:!!I!i:::.::::::!11RE(U'CEREMENTSWvWwwN~<<v.~v.vRi44'<<'<xesa.'<~<,~<<!><x<y<<<<'gy<<'c><,"'~wn'<'<q<,~~o<axp<q<'<<~<~rq~q<~<.z,<~>,.~Vi)jib'j.;ling,",,t'nesecuredinposition,sincethesevalvesareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperablebutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheCCWloopheader.SR3.7.7.2ThisSRverifiesthatthetwomotoroperatedisolationvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers(738Aand738B)canbeoperatedwhenrequiredsincethevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.2;2.2.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-69DraftB CCWSystemB3'.7AILI22OI80-II+-I8gLIIr-----++----gIJ~88ICIOIgo.I'III'IOIII~I IIII I I I IIIIIIIIIIIbILO~OIIOIOI~(OIOIIloOIIOC8Co2D0oIIQtoACg45r,8>'liJ5g4IIIIIIIIaIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII~I~IIIIIoVI~Oa',I IIeIO,oIgoIIIoILFigureB3.7.7-1CCWSystemR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-70DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheSWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theSWsystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.ThesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheSWSystemarecoveredbythisLCO.TheSWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%caacity,safetyrelatedpumptrains(Ref.1)~i~(See,',:,Fig'Ore~,',8~3,',-":,7j'.8;.,4)).:.ThephysicaldesignoftheSWSystemi'ssuchthat~oneOOIcapacitypumpfromeachclass1Eelectricalbus(Buses17and18)isarrangedonacommonpipingheaderwhichthensuppliestheSWloopheader.ForthepurposesofthisLCO,aSWtrainisbasedonelectricalsourceonly.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateClass1Eelectricalbusandconsistsoftwo100%capacitypumpsandassociateddischargecheckvalvesandmanualisolationvalves.TheSWloopheaderbeginsfromthedischargeofthetrainsandsuppliesthesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbySW.Thepumpsinthesystemarenormallymanuallyaligned.Onepumpineachtrainisselectedtoautomaticallystartuponreceiptofanundervoltagesignalonitsrespectivebus.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,eachSWpumpwillautomaticallystartinapredeterminedsequence.TheSWloopheadersuppliesthecoolingwatertoallsafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.Thenonsafetyrelateda'ndlong-termsafetyfunctions(e.g.,componentcoolingwaterheatexchangers)canbeisolatedfromtheloopheaderthroughuseofredundantmotoroperatedisolationvalves.ThesevalvesautomaticallycloseonacoincidentsafetyinjectionsignalandundervoltagesignalonBuses14and16.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-71DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThesuctionsourcefortheSWSystemisthescreenhousewhichisaseismicstructurelocatedonLakeOntario.ThedischargefromtheSWSystemsuppliedloadsreturnsbacktoLakeOntario.TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheSWsystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System,providecoolingwatertothedieselgenerators(DGs)andcontainmentrecirculationfancoolers(CRFCs)andtoprovideasafetyrelatedsourceofwatertotheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheSWSystemisforoneSWtraininconjunctionwitha100%capacitycontainmentcoolingsystem(i.e.,CRFC)toprovideforheatremovalfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB)insidecontainmenttoensurecontainmentintegrity.TheSWSystemisalsodesigned,inconjunctionwiththeCCWSystemanda100%capacityEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemandcontainmentcoolingsystem,toremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase(Ref.2).ThispreventsthecontainmentsumpfluidfromincreasingintemperatureduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofthisfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystembytheECCSpumps.TheSWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.Followingthereceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,allfourSWpumpsaredesignedtostart(ifnotalreadyrunning)tosupplythesystemloads.Ifacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignaloccurs,theneachnonsafetyrelatedandnonessentialloadwithintheSWSystemisisolatedbyredundantmotoroperatedvalvesthatarepoweredbyseparateClass1Eelectricaltrains.TheSWpumpsaresequencedtostartwithin17secondsfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheselectedSWpumpsaresequencedtostartaftera40secondtimedelayfollowingen'energ'iaatdon!oP.theelectricalbussupplyingtheselectedPumP(i.e.,Bus17orBus18)g~fteij:,'-;an'.":,ahnde'ruoftage~asi.O'I.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-72DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSWsystem,inconjunctionwiththeCCWSystem,canalsocooltheplantfromresidualheatremoval(RHR)entryconditions(T,,<350'F)toNODE5(T,,<200'F)duringnormaloperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350'Fto200'FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRSystemtrainsthatareoperating.SinceSWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsinfailingtheSWSystemtopotentiallymultiplesafetyrelatedfunctions.TheSWsystemhasbeenevaluatedtodemonstratethecapabilitytomeetcoolingneedswithanassumed500galleak.TheSWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofSWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAFWSystems)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).ThetemperatureofthefluidsuppliedbytheSWSystemisalsoaconsiderationintheaccidentanalyses.IfthecoolingwatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfancoolersandCCWheatexchangersistoowarm,theaccidentanalyseswithrespecttocontainmentpressureresponsefollowingaSLBandthecontainmentsumpfluidtemperaturefollowingaLOCAmaynolongerbebounding.Ifthecoolingwatersupplyistoocold,thecontainmentheatremovalsystemsmaybemoreefficientthanassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thiscausesthebackpressureincontainmenttobereducedwhichpotentiallyresultsinincreasedpeakcladtemperatures.TheSWsystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIntheeventofaDBA,oneSWtrainandtheloopheaderisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovidetheminimumheatremovalcapabilitytoensurethatthesystemfunctionstoremovepostaccidentheatloadsasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofSWandthe1oopheadermustbeOPERABLE'('s~e".:.'.Figure<<Bii3i.':,';7':;::8~p;:.AtleastoneSWtrainwilloperateassumingthatthe"worstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwiththelossofoffsitepower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-73DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)ASWtrainisdefinedbasedonelectricalpowersourcesuchthatSWPumpsAandCformonetrainandSWPumpsBandDformthesecondtrain.ASWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenonepumpinthetrainisOPERABLEandcapableoftakingsuctionfromthescreenhouseandprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheaderasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Thisincludesconsiderationofavailablenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)'totheSWpumpsandthetemperatureofthesuctionsource.ThefollowingaretheminimumrequirementsofthescreenhousebaywithrespecttoOPERABILITYoftheSWpumps:a.Levela5feet;andb.Tempe}aturea35'Fabove50%RTPand~80'F.Thelowerscreenhousebaytemperatureisonlyspecifiedabove50%RTPsincethisvalueisonlyaconsiderationwhenevaluatingLOCAatornearfullpowerconditions.Inaddition,ifaSWpumpfailsonInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead),thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses(Ref.1).AnOPERABLESWtrainalsorequiresthatallnonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedloadscanbeisolatedbythesixmotoroperatedisolationvalveswhicharepoweredfromthesameClass1Eelectricaltrainasthepumps.Therefore,motoroperatedvalves4609,4614,4615;4616,4663,and4670mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsAandCwhilevalves4613,4664,4733,4734,4735,and4780mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsBandD.TheSWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwaterfromeachOPERABLESWtraintothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.FourCRFCs;b.TwoCCWheatexchangers;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-74DraftB SWSystem83.7.8BASESLCO(continued)c.TwoDGs;d.ThreepreferredAFWpumps;e.TwostandbyAFWpumps;andf.Threesafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolers.AnOPERABLESWloopheaderalsorequiresa4-'I~p+4hf';:.fow";;:jptgthroughthedieselgenerator(4665,4760,4669,and466'BB)andCRFC~6('462$:,<<'4640~~7~475'6and4639)cross-ties.HVhtAV4PUW~,WTheSWtrainsandloopheaderareA-the~~ug~MSannaQ~>~@~'Wjitnsslsn~a~~o.~~'.TheCRFCs,DGsandsafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolersimmediatelyfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal(i.e-.eJ!,aftertheloopheaderbecomesrefilled);/b.ThepreferredAFWandSAFWpumpswithin10minutesfollowingreceiptofalowSGlevelsignal;andc.TheCCWheatexchangerswithin46minutesfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheSWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeofbothSWpumptrainsandendsatthefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.SincetheSWSystemdischargesbacktoLakeOntario,thecoolingwaterAewpa448:,oij'at'hthroughtheabovecomponentsandsubsequentdischargeisaddressedundertheirrespectiveLCO.Thisincludes:'a~LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3;"b.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4;"C.LCO3.6.6,"CS,CRFC,andPost-Ac'cidentCharcoalSystems;"d.LCO3.7.5,"AFWSystems;"e.LCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem;"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-75DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)f.LCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4;"andg.LCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."TheSWpipinginsidecontainmentfortheCRFCsandthereactorcompartmentcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationba~wboundaries.:.ThisisaddressedunderLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarv4eriB'odjdiejeg."APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theSWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystemwhichmustbecapableofperformingitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAorlossofcontainmentintegrityfollowingaSLB.InMODES5and6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheSWsystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.6.6,LCO3.7.7,andLCO3.8.2.ACTIONSA.1IfoneSWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLESWtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLESWtraincouldresultinlossofSWSystemfunction.The72hourCompletionTime.isbasedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-76DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-77Draft8 SWSystemB3.7.8BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IftheSWtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.I-,6Oii,',tb~ibuth':ssO!<tet'a>tut'"::,ui<<tl>e:::::::1;apisjlieadei:;.;:~~j,auli'ebable:C,tli'e",,,',j1'alittbi've~'fi'ij",e$::::LtO.:::3",-,'0',",,3!!msu'et:,::be"::l'autei',:.'ed2-,andRe~iii':ped~ACti:oiC.S...ed.Qmaaj..'9%%>>Nkcbc+j$A':jl~~'jSg~gp~(44MccneMc<vMvJym'T41,,:StnotB,"',<1:,s<l."pr5$>fGe6!"81,QC88'-""'"-'-f:CO<,',3:::,:,0,,"";::3<'~i(f'b'btli1~ii$'pe'ia",:.e.-'~<<,4iii':<<<bed;;;8N;Ka,.MWNÃRVASÃ%%%RRFe'~:.;:.:<ih,AMKS33:,:,NNPeNMNPnFS!ekPZaXk@N~>,t;.ie><<13":M'>%8M)M4%8~>~"m>m<ttl33>'<3<3>3s>s<%~>x~~'~at>i3>t>3!>e>>3<>us<My."m<'x:.s.:."...<mmmaax+>>m<:..':'ests>>iI<3>%>>>~<""i'SORPEILL~ANCE':~~~.',~~4,-":~,85~3%/."8';"."'I)REq'iiiREHEHii""8'i,':thj)j'~;4'.-',:,.:,",1,'.:ii'N'sj":.,aijupied!;,4j":,Xhme,aceident~'<<'y',:;ti>ems:.<<;::&.~'<<<<>>e<<>>~e'<>3(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-78DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-79Draft8 SWSystemB3.7.8BASESexpeeeeeeeSURllEgLjLAjNCE:;;:,:S:R!'E4';:.'j7!8~4RE<<llUIRENjELNTSi!i'iQiii..!i.":'d)iiiii(iiiiiiiiiil,iIil'lid!i<<iiititiie-,,:,,::,'ll'!!li'I'"'tiiid:iijij"'!JI,~~l'i":::"Iid-I:'-dt!ii!i:"-I,:,:,:,,-,",li'i:;,t!!tit",',!I!Ill!i!Il;,'::[Itiiti!Ii!i!i!IIi:.d,::::.di~>>."$N.Y:.;,.+Pc+>>P,g<<+Y~<<.,"~>>>>ed<<<<e<<g>>R>>>>>>;>>,<<<<<<,P)PPRzE:"'*"",-,:,--iiitiii'i!i!tt""::::;!i(ie!'tlirt.,':!jan'thi;:iiIi!":.i!i'ddt!L::::::::::I'i.":"'.-~~eper-aAen-.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-80DraftB

SWSystemB3.7.8BASESThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortobeinglocked,sealed,orsecured.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheSWflowtoindividualcomponentsorsystemsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperable,butdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheSWSystem.SR-:~A-.4ThisSRverifies'th'at~aflSW'l.o,,o~p,-.';::h"'ei'de':,cr,o.s's::,>>:t:;>:gvalvesenc'o.KN<.i'<'?:vK44.Aa4&aNeoNNÃckmvGNv'5awv5xv@vsN4c34w'cvM4wNNNoNcwwiww"v,~vs.M4ww~'a4~0s,:,itjoiis':l'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-81DraftB SWSystemB3.7.8BASESSUjgE'il,siA'C'E;~:-:,"';':.jR';."':3".7'.:.:i~::;;4:RE(U)RENENTS,L";;~<'ctn""'k'i'iuae',")':-.':.'::;..;.:;,.",~i',"s'.:;<<;:ver;"jes,;";:yr,opei;;..',,a>u>"'orna...~n:.:>~;;>:;.';.:;:;>.'~>,".',m...,'.',",'d<~~~?Tg~<<>.<<~SRq~>>a?a?iy~a?s?tg~?m?u?a?ae>>at<<n>?atm?asm?>mt>>itm<<,many><<e<<?>stxma?a<<tan?f',tmh~.~~~+:p~<con"i'nue)':-.::...,:;:..'.:;!;~,,'u,,<<;Ver,>>ess;:",;:yr,oper;.',;a>au>'orna,,c:..o"era,',~o<<n':;o.,::,;"'.ie,,';:Nmoopa'c'uii'dterb'ol:'tag'e~s'p'goal)':,',;.Si'iisanormallya~pere<<tingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedaspartofnormaltesting.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneed,toperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3-.7-AM3!.":l778Y5'hisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSWpumpsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.3.-.,:.;";,.Thi;:s':;::::;:in'":,u'desf4t>man>?ss>m><<efi'>>octan'.>><<fr???t>f>.o.aw@".Mxeu9eouezepf<.'ltmignaibario'proili'oua<<n!gacpo<<in,:',:ciu'ei'it'isai'oicksjItjiir'agonal'a'iiacannotbefully"actuatedaspartofnormaltestingduringnormaloperation.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.2.1.2.UFSAR,Section6.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-82DraftB mToratdsdsbdWaterPntpshndllavcdindSnecnsO(DfttTllCX)C/3+3(D~C/lvlh~Cs3CA3fD2.COISWPsrspBswanI46ct34607II IsIII946I24411k~48Ãl~4)psToSlPntcpt(LCD342)aadScfstyltststcdPompSoarCoolersII5-l~Ž~I(dtstiahlt{I~~IIAC)~OncrstorA4667(LCD3')III$468sToDicssfP~CnctscotB(LCDLLl)ToSAlWPcnspDaulSAFWBcetnCorderSP626SIII scsIsrn4613Q-P4334TToCCWHXS(LCO3B.T)~ndhpndPadPoolNXSs~re41POToElPampa~3S.S)andSafetyytdsrodPsanpToSAPWPompCToccwHXACoolerA(CCO3.1S)SpcacyttstpoolHXAAstg~473$ISCsthI IIIIII4616Is~fctyItI)I$461OIIIToTDhlwbanp(LCOMQIIIToCRFCUathgADLSh)r----f/+II I IIToChyo'LaitB(LCO26,5)LIIIIIIIIsToCSkCUnitC(LCO3')ToCRFClhdD(CCO38.6)IIIIIII c II I IIIIPozilfuslmtiononlyToMoronotircss(1/303.TS)rToNort4sfctyToNvodsfstyMatedloads(Oaltcrs)C/lCXtC/3Cs3M~t/tNc+~tDOOR CREATSB3..7.9B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC11(Ref.1),acontrolroomshallbeprovidedwhichpermitscontinuousoccupancyunderanycrediblepostaccidentconditionwithoutexcessiveradiationexposuresofpersonnel.ExposurelimitsareprovidedinGDC19of10CFR50,AppendixA(Ref.2)whichrequiresthatcontrolroompersonnelberestrictedto5remwholebody,oritsequivalency,forthedurationoftheaccident.TheCREATSprovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontroltheplantfollowinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivitJh!df,,or!30::;:.",dayj+Vifthotu:TheCREATSconsistsofahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filter,activatedcharcoalabserbersKdsorbe'riforremovalofgaseousactivity(principallyiodines),andtwofans(controlroomreturnairfanandemergencyreturnairfan).:,'(':ie"@F3ju'v~e:'8!',:,:3',".';7~<9~fJ.Ductwork,dampers,andinstrumentaYionalsoform'partofthesystemaswellasdemisterstoremovewaterdropletsfromtheairstream(Ref.3).TheCREATSisanemergencysystem,partsofwhichmayoperateduringnormalplantoperations.ActuationoftheCREATSplacesthesysteminoneoffiveseparatestatesoftheemergencymodeofoperation,dependingontheinitiationsignal.ThefollowingarethenormalandemergencymodesofoperationfortheCREATS:CREATSModeATheCREATSisinthestandbymodewiththeexceptionthatthecontrolroomreturnairfanisinoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-84(continued)DraftB

CREATSB3.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeBThisistheGREATSconfigurationfollowinganaccidentwitharadiationreleaseasdetectedbyradiationmonitorR-l.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfm(approximatelyonefourthoftheControlBuildingVentilationSystemdesign)throughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.AlloutsideairthatenterstheCREATS,ascontrolledbyanairadjustswitch(S-81),isalsocirculatedthroughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.CREATSModeCThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeBwiththeexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.CREATSModeDThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofsmokewithintheControlBuilding.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemcontinuestodrawoutsideair.However,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfmthroughtheCREATSandHEPAfilters.Thiseffectivelypurgesthecontrolroomairenvironment.CREATSModeEThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeDwithexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-85(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeFThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofatoxicgasasindicatedbythechlorineorammoniadetectors,orhighradiationasdetectedbyR-36(gas),R-37(particulate),orR-38(iodine).Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemalignsitselfconsistentwithModeCexceptthattwodampersineachairsupplypathareisolated.Normallyopenairsupplyisolationdampersarearrangedinseriessothatthefailureofonedampertoclosewillnotresultinabreachofisolation.Theairenteringthecontrolroomiscontinuouslymonitoredbyradiationandtoxicgasdetectors.Onedetectoroutputabovethesetpointwillcauseactuationoftheemergencyradiationstateortoxicgasisolationstate,asrequired.Theactionsofthetoxicgasandhighradiationstate(HodeF)aremorerestrictive,andwilloverridetheactionsoftheemergencyradiationstate(ModeBorC).OnlythehighradiationstateCREATSModeFisaddressedbythisLCO.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.TheGREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinMODESI,2,3,and4,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.3).ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoGREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.InMODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-86(continued)DraftB

CREATSB3.7.9BASESAPPLICABLETheCREATSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicySAFETYANALYSESStatement.(continued)LCOTheCREATSiscomprisedofafiltrationtrainandtwoindependentandredundantisolationdampertrainsallofwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLE.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultinexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorsintheeventofalargeradioactiverelease.TheGREATSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividual~~~~componentsnecessarytopermitCREATSNodeFoperationareOPERABLE>>(se'e:;;:gigot@%8~3:;:~7;;:;"::9~01)',:.TheCREATSfi1trationtrainisO'PERABCEwhentheassociated:a.ControlroomreturnairandemergencyreturnairfansareOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingforcedflow;b.HEPAfiltersandcharcoalabsM~mi'3s'orb'ers:fortheemergencyreturnairfanarenotexcessivel'yrestrictingflow,andarecapableofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andcc.Ductwork,valves,anddampers(including'AKD06~aii8AKD09)areOPERABLE,andaircirculation'caribemaintained.TheCREATSisolationdampersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthedamper(AKDOI,AKD04,AKD05,AKDOS,andAKDIO)cancloseonanactuationsignaltoisolateoutsideairorisclosedwithmotiveforceremoved'wodampersareprovidedforeachoutsideairpath.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-87(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESLCO(continued)Inaddition,thecontrolroomboundarymustbemaintaine'd,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdoors.Openingoftheaccessdoorsfor=entryandexitdoesnotviolatethecontrolroomboundary.Anaccessdoormaybeopenedforextendedperiodsprovidedadedicatedindividualisstationedattheaccessdoortoensureclosure,ifrequired(i.e.,theindividualperformstheisolationfunction),,thedooris,abletobeclosedAPPLICABILITYInNODESI,2,3,and4,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDBA.InNODE5or6,theCREATSisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSA.1andA.2WiththeCREATSfiltrationtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisCondition,theisolationdampersareadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbutnomeansexisttofilterthereleaseofradioactivegaswithinthecontrolroom.The48hourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoisolatethecontrolroom.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedforsIhourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-88(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lWithoneCREATSisolationdamperinoperableforoneormoreoutsideairA~paVvf)Yw;:,"."p'ass,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatus"within7days.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECREATSisolationdamperisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLECREATSisolationdampercouldresultinlossofCREATSfunction.The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod,andabilityoftheremainingisolationdampertoprovidetherequiredisolationcapability.C.landC.2InHODEI,2,3,or4,iftheRequiredActionsofConditionsAorBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hours,andinHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.ID.RRYf::andD.32::";'2InNODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,iftheRequiredActionsofConditionsAorBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,actionmustbetakentoimmediatelyplacetheOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)inCREATSHodeF.Thisactionensuresthattheremainingdamper(s)areOPERABLE,thatnofailurespreventingautomaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailurewouldbereadilydetected.R,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-89(continued)DraftB GREATSB3.7.9BASESACTION/0.5~0';:GYRE".~and,"::0:2'.'2,'::::,~LconLi",:ued)";suspensi"onof"'C'OaRE"ALTERATIONSandthesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.AQT40NS-E.IInMODEI,2~3,or4,ifbothCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreo0t's'.i;dge>::aircup~flowpathsareinoperable,theCREATSmaynont"becapableofperformingtheintendedfunctionandtheplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Failureoftheintegrityofthecontrolroomboundary(i.e.,walls,floors,ceilings,ductworkoraccessdoors)alsoresultsinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.-@~~::.herefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.F.IandF.2andF.3InMODE5or6-,~jd'tduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithtwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormore+i+-eupPyoutsj,de,:-,:;a~fgflowpathsinoperable,.actionmustbetakenimmediatelytorestoreoneisolationdamperineachaffectedairsupplypathtoOPERABLEstatus.Inaddition,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ThisrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandthesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-90(continued)DraftB 0 CREATSB3.7.9BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.7.9.1Standbysystems,shouldbecheckedperiodicallytoensurethattheyfunctionproperly.Astheenvironmentandnormaloperatingconditionsonthissystemarenottoosevere,testingeachCREATSfiltrationtrainonceevery31daysfora15minutesprovidesanadequatecheckofthissystem.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthereliabilityoftheequipment.SR3.7.9.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCREATStestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheCREATSfiltertestsareingeneralaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).TheVFTPincludestestingtheperformanceoftheHEPAfilter,charcoalabeerberads'oi','bŽe'qefficiency,minimumflowrate;andthephysicalouitrhrsth0ofhpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.F~NTh'e.,::m1:Ag,m,',~1h'~s",.g0'00::cub'ic::,'.."feet:-:."Ip'er~iii1'nuteti(k1'0'/')gi:;"'Spec'icfi'c'es't'reuenciesandaddi%i'ona'1""inforaiationarediscussedindetailintheVTFP.!riioureur~etlj!eeaxiiii'i'erve!'1'llrupee;:,';;::iiittepruucal':,;afeard.::refu'ecC>e.:.f%$)4s'gde'fijoe'd:";:~b,,'::.:'::Rle'R3.7.9.3ThisSRverifiesthattheCREATSfiltrationtrainstartsandoperatesandeachCREATSisolationdamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-91,(continued)DraftB CREATSB3.7.9BASESREFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDCll,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50,AppendixA,GOC19.3.UFSAR,Section6.4.4.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-92DraftB GREATS83.7.9FROMOVTslDBAIRAKD10TOCONIROLavlUIDIOAIRahNDUNOAIDIOIAKDOIAKLossIIrLrt/Iasrh/CIIARCOALIEILTlQt$gaxeARLOIAK303'1r7I/IrAKDll'KDI2IAKDIPAIa2lgII~mmuwuer0HZOZO'IIIITOLOKIICIINcoMpvIRRIIIIAKEOIG1ROILYIIxmasusafOUI~----1-RSIVSNIcoMEUIERIIFANROOMCONIROLQAKD06ROOLIIIII+JIIIAKFcsRIII/RNPANLcgcnd:---.CRPATSFiitrationTrainNctCKForiilustrationonlyi.OutsldoairtowpathisolationdatupcrsincludesAKD01,AKD04,AKDOS,AKDOS,andAKDi0.2.'iilcCRRAZSQitrationtraindocsnotinciudcthcairhandlingunit(AKL03andAKF03).Figure83.7.9-1GREATSR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-93Draft8

ABVSB3.7.10B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheABVSfiltersairborneradioactiveparticulatesfromtheareaofthespentfuelpool(SFP)followingafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVS,inconjunctionwithothernormallyoperatingsystems,alsoprovidesenvironmentalcontroloftemperatureandhumidityintheAuxiliaryBuildingincludingtheSFParea.TheABVSconsistsofanairhandlingunit,aseriesofexhaustfans,charcoalfilters,ductwork,anddampers(Ref.1).TheexhaustfansincludethefollowingfanswhichalldischargeintoacommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansAandB(seegF~1g~urgegB',!3'i7~J'0.=",::I!)]:a~IntermediateBuildingexhaustfansAand8;b.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC;c.AuxiliaryBuildingcharcoalfilterfansAandB;d.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanG;ande.ControlaccessexhaustfansAandB.TheonlycomponentswhichfiltertheenvironmentassociatedwiththeSFParetheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC.Therefore,thesearetheonlyfansconsideredwithrespecttotheABVSinthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-94DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtakessuctionfromtheSFPanddecontaminationpitareasontheoperatingleveloftheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheairisfirstdrawnthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemwhichconsistsofroughingfiltersandcharcoalabeerbersa'd3oi":b'ei",s,::.Theroughingfiltersprotectthecharcoalabserbem'ids'o~bŽejj:.frombeingfouledwithdirtparticleswhilethechare'oaleheerherejdsor'h'ersremovetheradioactiveiodinesfromtheatmosphere.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCthendischargesintothecommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans.Thiscommonductworkcontainsahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterwhichisnotcreditedinthedoseanalyses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansareeach100%capacityfanswhichcanmaintainanegativepressureontheoperatingflooroftheAuxiliaryBuildingthroughorientationofthesystemdampers.ThisnegativepressurecausesairflowontheoperatingfloortobetowardtheSFPwhichensuresthatairinthevicinityoftheSFPisfirstfilteredthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandexhaustfanCarepoweredfromnon-EngineeredSafeguardsFeaturesbuses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansdischargetotheplantventstack.Theplantventstackiscontinuouslymonitoredfornoblegases(R-14),particulates(R-13)andiodine(R-10B).Duringnormalpoweroperation,theABVSisplacedinthe"out"modebytheinterlockmodeswitchwhere"out"definesthestatusoftheSFPcharcoalfilters.ThiscausesallexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingtheAuxiliaryBuildingHainexhaustfans)andAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtotripuponasignalfromR-10B,R-13orR-14tostopthereleaseofanyradioactivegases.DuringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theinterlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"modesuchthatonlyexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans)aretripped.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-95(continued)DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheABVSdesignbasisisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA),whichisafuelhandlingaccident.Theanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccident,giveninReference2,assumesthatallfuelrodsinanassemblyaredamaged.TheDBAanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem>andoneAuxiliary8lid'ihtf~'i','!i!I!PZIIA!Bldg.Thaccidentanalysisaccountsforthereductioninairborneradioactivematerialprovidedbytheminimumfiltrationsystemcomponents,whichresultinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).Thefailureofanyorallofthesefiltrationsystemcomponentsresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.ThefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsandtheanalysisfollowtheguidanceprovidedinRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).SnptpTn'e~d"i'O'nlj:::'::,ipr'O'nir'O'El'Site'epc'Whe'r~i!SE'O'n'r'C'e'S3'"TheABVSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatoffsitedosesarewellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)followingafuelhandlingaccidentintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ThefailureoftheABVScoincidentwithafuelhandlingaccidentresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.TheABVSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytocontrolexposureintheAuxiliary.BuildingfollowingafuelhandlingaccidentareOPERABLEandinoperationE:('seej~F7gu~re::;B~j3~!T,.:".";!TO:=,:.1!),':.TheABYSisconsideredOPERABLEw'henitsassociated:aa.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCandeitherAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanAor8isOPERABLEandinoperation;R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-96(continued)DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)k'COb.AuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanHEPAfilterand-+i('ciiitinoed):;":!li.,"~hta'<!j!!~SFFcharcoaladsorbersarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemiscapableofperformingitsfiltrationfunction;c.Ductwork,valves,anddampersareOPERABLE,andaircirculationandnegativepressurecanbemaintainedontheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloor;andd.Interlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"mode.APPLICABILITYDuringmovementofirradiatedfuelintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoalleviatetheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVSisonlyrequiredwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.Anyfuelhandlingaccidentwhichoccursafter60daysresultsinoffsitedoseswhicharewellwithin10CFR100limits(Ref.3)duetothedecayrateofiodine.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,theABVSisnotMODEdependantandonlyrequiredwhenirradiatedfuelisbeingmoved.ACTIONSA.lWhentheABVSisinoperable,actionmustbetakentoplacetheplantinaconditioninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.ActionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffueltoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-97(continued)DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)gi'iji'i~~li"-gi'":,;::A'cfjo'iF""'"d"f'"'d*'4""'l<T'"""'d"'t'"~f4't<<j~s';;,",.ind'ipeSde'nilly'o'f'::,::";e'hecto'r',.',",.'~o".jr%'tj;a'reahiitdawn.-d~a4-4he~e'ai:;:,o'g(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-98DraftB I ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)~51IRER!IL3LE55'53333'33133355!i!i!5'3333315':"I:'E(UTRENENTSTh'1,i:,'::,':.':SR~zjeiVf4's',"G'~YOiEiVBik4iY:ofth~:,",::ABVS.~~,ujjn'g:;;file';.':(itive'mentE~opsat'jon's,',.theperfermedd88jgh'6d;.:::t'6:;:.Rfaj)5'i~~'4gslpjhe.".n'ejXtiYi.:@'pF'~sltjrNinSR:':.'::3'.:7"!::1'0~!2kpoHji;:::,',b-':e:,,geek~,a:,i,;:::~.;i.',8uri..';,:.'Opei'.,atiiig:;WMCVNW'A@kW9NA~M~~ONWYN4RNXQ'+atNRREELVA&V.~5'5nCRM%84~~5R&MRMS~RWk~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-99DraftB ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)SaaE!!!!slIE!!,:-',:::i,::,::,::,:-"ii'fUE!i:,':-3.:':-.!1::-::-:.:l:::::5'RE(U1RENENTSeavsuaaectaotegssocCcarcoale&eAmiCh'orb'er>efficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations}~'l'hindi!i~!::j~sKhr.add'i'tionali'n'formationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.I3Howev,e,r~gIiSji'ae'ntli:.,::::.'C'y'Cl!ie'S:,:.:a'S~di,'F1'need;:::,be;:";;:::liege'l,."adtaeryuGREFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.4.2.2.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.2.3.10CFR100.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Rev.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-100DraftB SamplelntBldgAreasIntBldgZxhasutPansAandBCanrÃ7CD~crsrss+CF)(h~OIOpcratirigHoorI~elSFPCharoalAdsorbcrSystemCHARAuxBldgSupplyAirIlandlingUnitASpentFuelPoolSurfaceAuxBldgSupplyPanBDcconPitAuxBldgExhaustFanCVoturncControlTankAuxBldgCharcoalFiltaFansAgc,BAuxBMgExhaustGasDecayTankAuxBldgCNM'Dcpmsuriiation4Mini-purgeExhaustHEPAGasDecayTankReleaseCHARHBPAAuxBldgMainHoorAreasDruauningStationR-IOBR13AuxBldg"--R-14MahtExhustFansAaa1iIPlantVentServiceBldg,HotShop8ChanLcbAreasLegend:~HcnvpathrcctuircdbyLCO(AuxBldgFxliaustFanCHRPAfilternotrecpircdfiorLCObutAtccBldgoperatiogfloormustbeatanegativepressure)~~Iof2flowpathsrcquircdbyLCOQSFPRoughhtgGItcraForillustrationonlv2~CQOÃ

SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDTheminimumwaterlevelinthespentfuelpool(SFP)meetstheassumptionsofiodinedecontaminationfactorsfollowingafuelhandlingaccident.Thespecifiedwaterlevelprovidesprotectionagainstexceedingtheoffsitedoselimits.TheSFPisaseismicallydesignedstructurelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuilding(Ref.1).Thepoolisinternallycladwithstainlesssteelthathasaleakchasesystemateachweldseamtominimizeaccidentaldrainagethroughtheliner.TheSFPisalsoprovidedwithabarrierbetweenthespentfuelstorageracksandthefueltransfersystemwinch.Thisbarrier,uptotheheightofthespentfuelracks,preventsinadvertentdrainageoftheSFPviathefueltransfertube.TheSFPCoolingSystemisdesignedtomaintainthepool~120'Fduringnormalconditionsandrefuelingoperations(Ref.2).ThecoolingsystemnormallytakessuctionnearthesurfaceoftheSFPsuchthatafailureofanypipeinthesystemwillnotdrainthepool.Thecoolingsystemreturnlinetothepoolalsocontainsa0.25inchventholelocatedneartheSFPsurfaceleveltopreventsiphoning.Finally,controlboardalarmsexistwithrespecttotheSFPlevelandtemperature.ThesefeaturesallhelptopreventinadvertentdrainingoftheSFP.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheminimumwaterlevelintheSFPisanassumptionofthefuelhandlingaccidentdescribedintheUFSAR(Ref,3)andRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).Theresultant2hourthyroiddoseperpersonattheexclusionareaboundaryasbasedonthisassumptionisasmallfractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.5)limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-102DraftB SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)BasedontherequirementsofReference4,theremustbe23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthedamagedfuelbundleandthefuelpoolsurfaceduringafuelhandlingaccident.With23ftofwateravailable,theassumptionsofReference4canbeuseddirectly.Theseassumptionsincludetheuseofadecontaminationfactorof100intheanalysisforiodine.Adecontaminationfactorof100enablestheanalysistoassumethat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofalldroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytheSFPwater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory.Inpractice,thisLCOpreservesthisassumptionforthebulkofthefuelinthestorageracks.Inthecaseofasinglebundledroppedandlyinghorizontallyontopofthespentfuelstorageracks,however,theremaybe<23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthefuelbundleandthesurface,indicatedbythewidthofthebundleanddifferencebetweenthetopoftherackandactivefuel.Tooffsetthissmallnonconservatism,theanalysisassumesthatallfuelrodsfail,althoughanalysisshowsthatonlythefirstfewrowsfailfromahypotheticalmaximumdrop.TheSFPwaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicy,Statement.LCOTheSFPwaterlevelisrequiredtobea23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.Thespecifiedwaterlevelpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.3).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithintheSFP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-103DraftB SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOappliesduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthespentfuelpool,sincethepotentialforareleaseoffissionproductsexists.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurduringmovementoffuel,,thisLCOisnotapplicableduringotherconditions.DuringrefuelingoperationsinHODE6,theSFPwaterlevel(andboronconcentration)areinequilibriumwiththerefuelingwatercavity.ThewaterlevelundertheseconditionsisthencontrolledbyLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel"whichrequirestherefuelingcavitywaterleveltobemaintaineda23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Arefuelingcavitywaterlevelofz23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangewillresultin>23feetofwaterabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracksassumingthatatmosphericpressurewithincontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuildingareequivalent.ACTIONSA.1Whentheinitialconditionsassumedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiscannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoprecludetheaccidentfromoccurring.WhentheSFPwaterlevelislowerthantherequiredlevel,themovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFPisimmediatelysuspended.Thisactioneffectivelyprecludestheoccurrenceofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,movementtoanavailablerackposition).,RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceifmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODES1,2,3,and4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-104Draft8 SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.11.1ThisSRverifiessufficientSFPwaterisavailableintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thewaterlevelinthespentfuelpool-mustbecheckedperiodicallyduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliestoensurethefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsaremet.The34J7dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeinthepoolisnormallystableandtheSFPisdesignedtopreventdrainagebelow23ft.Waterlevelchangesarecontrolledbyplantproceduresandareacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.VerificationofSFPwaterlevelcanbeaccomplishedbyseveralmeans.ThetopoftheupperSFPpumpsuctionlineis23ftabovethefuelstoredinthepool.Ifthereisz23ftofwaterabovethereactorvesselflange(asrequiredbyLCO3.9.5),withequalpressureinthecontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuilding,thenatleast23ftofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracks.Inadditiontothephysicaldesignfeatures,therearetwoSFPlevelalarms(LAL634)whichareavailabletoalerttheoperatorsofchangingSFPlevel.AlowlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelfalls4inchesormorefromthenormallevelwhileahighlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelrises4inchesormorefromthenormallevel.ThesealarmsmustreceiveacalibrationconsistentwithindustrypracticesbeforetheyaretobeusedtomeetthisSR.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.UFSAR,Section9.1.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.10CFR100.11.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-105DraftB ~)ln~~Rl!P:BCtB3.7.12B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.12SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThewaterinthespentfuelpool(SFP)normallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,<<of0.95bemaintainedintheabsenceofsolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothSFPregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN-16.1-1975(Ref.1)andReference2allowscreditforsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themostsevereaccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.EitherscenariocouldpotentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2.Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.SafeoperationofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewithLCO~~8.:.::,:7/i'3,"Spen~t'".'oui'lFP88)F<;;(SFP'),'::Storage."within7dayspriorto~movementof'an"=a'ss'emblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12.1.PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7.13.2asapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-106(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Ref.3and4).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconcentrationofdissolvedboronintheSFPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIa"igQO+a~)TheSFPboronconcentrationisrequiredtobew+tMn-ther'"':~'F3.0.0Y~p'pm.ThespecifiedconcentrationofdissolvedboronfntheSFPpreservestheassumptionsusedintheanalysesofthepotentialcriticalaccidentscenariosasdescribedinReferences3and4(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident).ThisconcentrationofdissolvedboronistheminimumrequiredconcentrationforfuelassemblystorageandmovementwithintheSFPuntilthefuelassemblieshavebeenverifiedtobestoredcorrectly.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-107(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentration83.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOapplieswheneverfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFP,untilaSFPverificationhasbeenperformedfollowingthe'lastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.TheSFPverification,isaccomplishedbyperformingSR3.7.13.1orSR3.7.13.2aftermovementoffuelassembliesdependingonwhichSFPregionwasaffectedbythefuelmovement.Iffuelwasmovedintobothregions,thenbothSR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2mustbeperformedafte}thecompletionoffuelmovementbeforeexitingtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.ThisLCOdoesnotapplyfollowingtheverification,sincetheverificationwouldconfirmthattherearenomisloadedfuelassemblies.Withnofurtherfuelassemblymovementsinprogress,thereisnopotentialforamisloadedfuelassemblyoradroppedfuelassembly.ThisLCOdoesnotapplytofuelmovementwithinaSFPregionsincetheaccidentanalysesassumeeachregioniscompletelyfilledinaninfinitearray.ACTIONSA.lA.2.1andA.2.2WhentheconcentrationofboronintheSFPislessthanrequired,immediateactionmustbetakentoprecludetheoccurrenceofanaccidentortomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentinprogress.Thisismostefficientlyachievedbyimmediatelysuspendingthemovementoffuelassemblies.Theconcentrationofboronisrestoredsimultaneouslywithsuspendingmovementoffuelassemblies.AnacceptablealternativeistoimmediatelyinitiateactiontoperformaSFPverification(SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2).TheperformanceofthisverificationremovestheplantfromtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,movementtoanavailablerackposition).TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinNODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinNODE1,2,3,or4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementoffuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-108(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-109(continued)DraftB SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSio'ISR3.7.12.1ThisSRverifiesthattheconcentrationofboronintheSFPiswithinthelimitAslongasthisSRismet,theanalyzedaccidentsarefullyaddressed.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeandboronconcentrationinthepoolisnormallystableandallwaterlevelchangesandboronconcentrationchangesarecontrolledbyplantprocedures.ThisSRisrequiredtobeperformedpriortofuelassemblymovementintoRegion1orRegion2andmustcontinuetobeperformeduntilthenecessarySFPverificationisaccomplished(i.e.,SR3.7.13.1and3.7.13.2).REFERENCES1.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableHaterialsOutsideReactors."2.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.3.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.4.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-110DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.13SpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageBASESBACKGROUNDThespentfuelpool(SFP)isdividedintotwoseparateanddistinctregions(seeFigureB3.7.13-1)which,forthepurposeofcriticalityconsiderations,areconsideredasseparatepools(Ref.1).Region1,with176storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodateneworspentfuelutilizingatwooffourcheckerboardarrangement.Afuelassemblywithanenrichmentofs4.05wt%canbestoredatanyavailablelocationinRegion1sincetheaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingthatRegion1wasfilledwithfuelassembliesofthisenrichment.Afuelassemblywithanenrichment>4.05wt%U-235canalsobestoredinRegion1providedthatintegralburnablepoisonsarepresentintheassembliessuchthatk-infinity's~1.458.TheexistingdesignusesIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbers(IFBAs)asthepoisonforfuelassemblieswithenrichments>4.05wt%.IFBAsconsistofneutronabsorbingmaterialwhichprovidesequivalencingreactivityholddown(i.e.,neutronpoison)thatallowsstorageofhigherenrichmentfuel.Theneutronabsorbingmaterialisanon-removableorintegralpartofthefuelassemblyonceitisapplied.Theinfinitemultiplicationfactor,K-infinity,isareferencecriticalitypointofeachfuelassemblythatifmaintaineds1.458,willresultinak,<<s0.95forRegion1.TheK-infinitylimitisderivedforconstantconditionsofnormalreactorcoreconfiguration(i.e.,typicalgeometryoffuelassembliesinverticalpositionarrangedinaninfinitearray)atcoldconditions(i.e.,68'Fand14.7psia).Region2,with840storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithintheacceptabledomainaccordingtoFigure3.7.13-1,intheaccompanyingLCO.ThestorageoffuelassemblieswhicharewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1inRegion2ensuresaK,<<s0.95inthisregion.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-111DraftB

SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)ConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscanalsobestoredineitherregionintheSFPprovidedthattheminimumburnupofFigure~FF-@f7!!!1'3;"-.,,::llismet.Inaddition,allcanistersplacedintoserviceafter1994musthaves144rodsorm256rods(Ref.2).Thecanistersarestainlesssteelcontainerswhichcontainthefuelrodsofamaximumoftwofuelassemblies(i.e.,358rods).Allbowed,broken,orotherwisefailedfuelrodsarefirststoredinastainlesssteeltubeof0.75inchouterdiameterbeforebeingplacedinacanister.Eachcanisterwillaccommodate110failedfuelrodtubes.ThewaterintheSFPnormallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticality,marginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,ffof0.95bemaintainedintheabsenceofsolubleboron.'ence,thedesignofbothregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN16.1-1975(Ref.3)andReference4allowscreditforsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneed.beconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themostsevereaccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.EitherscenariocouldpotentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2.Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.SafeoperationofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewiththisLCO.Within7dayspriortomovementofanassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12.1.PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7.13.2asapplicable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-112DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Refs.2and5).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisava'ilable(seeSpecification4,3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivity.effectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconfigurationoffuelassembliesinthespentfuelpoolsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTherestrictionsontheplacementoffuelassemblieswithintheSFPensurethek.<<oftheSFPwillalwaysremain<0.95,assumingthepooltobefloodedwithunboratedwater(Specification4.3.1.1).ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion1,eachassemblymusthaveaK-infinityof~1.458~efFo;',,fuelassemblies'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-113(continued)DraftB SFPStorage83.7.13BASES(continued)3-3'-.4~Thex-axisofFigure3.7.13-1isthenominalU-235enrichmentwt%whichdoesnotincludethe+0.05wt%tolerancethatisallowedforfuelmanufacturingandlistedinSpecification4.3.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-114(continued)DraftB SFP.StorageB3.'7.13BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOapplieswheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredintheSFP.ACTIONSA.1WhentheconfigurationoffuelassembliesstoredineitherRegion1orRegion2oftheSFPisnotwithintheLCOlimits,theimmediateactionistoinitiateactiontomakethenecessaryfuelassemblymovement(s)tobringtheconfigurationintocompliancewithSpecification4.3.l.1.Thiscompliancecanbemadebyrelocatingthefuelassemblytoadifferentregion.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinHODE5or6~LCO3.0.31dbppiibl.It'll)',"'d'dfuelassemblieswhileinHODE1,2,3,or4,the'actionisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytomovefuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.p~~~~~~w~~~~~~~q~~wpmp~~m~~p>>.s>~p.~egy+~~~gqppo~xq~~pmggge;i~movep~~>>..~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.7.13.1ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheK-infinityofeachfuelassemblyiss1.458'riortostorageinRegion1.Iftheinitialenrichmentofafuelassemblyis~4.05wt%,aK-infinityof~1.458isalways.maintained.Forfuelassemblieswithenrichment>4.05wt%,aminimumnumberofIFBAsmustbepresentineachfuelassemblysuchthatk-infinitys1.458'riortostorageinRegion1.Thisverificationisonlyrequiredonceforeachfuelassemblysincetheburnablepoisons,ifrequired,areanintegralpartofthefuelassemblyandwillnotberemoved.Theinitialenrichmentofeachassemblywillalsonotchange(i.e.,increase)whilepartiallyburnedassembliesarelessR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-115(continued)DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)reactivethanwhentheywerenew(i.e.,fresh).PerformanceofthisSRensurescompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-116(continued)DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)RETffBRENXNTs'.R.8.':7..".'.1.3.'."..1TH<'"nXLn<<dd;":ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion1toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12,"SFPBoronConcentration."ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisverificationisnotrequiredwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.TheverificationisnotrequiredsinceRegion2isthelimitingSFPregion,andassuch,thefuelhasalreadybeenverifiedtobeacceptableforstorageinRegionl.SR3.7.13.2ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1intheaccompanyingLCOpriortostorageinRegion2.OnceafuelassemblyhasbeenverifiedtobewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,furtherverificationsarenolongerrequiredsincetheinitialenrichmentorburnupwillnotadverselychange.ForfuelassembliesintheunacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,performanceofthisSRwillensurecompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion2toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.3.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactors."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-117(continued)DraftB SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)IIREF+AENCK$4.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactor-s'l'.',::gcoritjfiiojd)',.:;:~qi"-.',",':;;.;:;,::;:::+i~'/Licensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.5.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-118(continued)DraftB f SFPStorageB3.7.13R.E.GinnaNUclearPowerPlant83.7-119DraftB SFPStorage83.7.13SpentFuelStorageRacksN50XS1ORhOEChPACIiY174100XSIQRAMChPhCGYQO~E>TALCAPAC!TYfN6FUELASSEhSLlESFigure83.7.13-1SpentFuelPoolR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-120Draft8 hV R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-121(continued)DraftB 8-3.7.14B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDActivityinthesecondarycoolantresultsfromsteamgenerator(SG)tubeoutleakagefromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Understeadystateconditions,theactivityisprimarilyiodineswithrelativelyshorthalflivesand,thus,indicatescurrentconditions.Duringtransients,I-131spikescanbeobservedaswellasincreasedreleasesofsomenoblegases.Otherfissionproductisotopes,aswellasactivatedcorrosionproductsinlesseramounts,mayalsobefoundinthesecondarycoolant.Alimitonsecondarycoolantspecificactivityduringpoweroperationminimizesreleasestotheenvironmentbecauseofnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andDesignBasisaccidents(DBAs).Thislimitisbasedonanactivityvaluethatmightbeexpectedfroma0.1gpmtubeleak(LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE")ofprimarycoolantatthelimitof1.0pCi/gm(LCO3.4.16,"RCSSpecificActivity").Asteamlinebreak(SLB)isassumedtoresultinthereleaseofthenoblegasandiodine.activitycontainedintheSGinventory,thefeedwater,andthereactorcoolantLEAKAGE.Hostoftheiodineisotopeshaveshorthalflives(i.e.,<20hours).I-131,withahalflifeof8.04days,concentratesfasterthanitdecays,butdoesnotreachequilibriumbecauseofblowdownandotherlosses.Withthespecifiedactivitylimit,theresultant2hourthyroiddosetoapersonattheexclusionareaboundary(EAB)wouldbeapproximately10remifthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)were'eftopenfor2hoursfollowingatripfromfullpower.Operatingaplantattheallowablelimitscouldresultina2hourEABexposureofasmallfractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.1)limits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3;7-122(continued)DraftB 1g~ SecondarySpecificActivity83.7.14BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccidentanalysisoftheSLB,(Ref.2)assumestheinitialsecondarycoolantspecificactivitytohavearadioactiveisotopeconcentrationof0.10pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.Thisassumptionisusedintheanalysisfordeterminingtheradiologicalconsequencesofthepostulatedaccident.Theaccidentanalysis,basedonthisandotherassumptions,showsthattheradiologicalconsequencesofanSLBdonotexceedasmallfractionoftheplantEABlimits(Ref.1)forwholebodyandthyroiddoserates.Withthelossofoffsitepower,theremainingSGisavailableforcoredecayheatdissipationbyventingsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheHSSVsandsteamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalve(ARV).TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemsuppliesthenecessarymakeuptotheSG.VentingcontinuesuntilthereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavedecreasedsufficientlyfortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemtocompletethecooldown.Intheevaluationoftheradiologicalconsequencesofthisaccident,theactivityreleasedfromtheSGconnectedtothefailedsteamlineisassumedtobereleaseddirectlytotheenvironmentwithin60seconds.TheunaffectedSGisassumedtodischargesteamandanyentrainedactivitythroughtheHSSVsandARVfortheinitialtwohoursoftheevent.Primarycoolantwasassumedtobe3.0pCi/gmforthisanalysisbasedonpreviouslyallowedlimitswhichisafactorofthreegreaterthancurrentlimitsspecifiedinLCO3.4.16.Sincenocreditistakenintheanalysisforactivityplateoutorretention,theresultantradiologicalconsequencesrepresentaconservativeestimateofthepotentialintegrateddoseduetothepostulatedsteamlinefailure.SecondaryspecificactivitylimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantisrequiredtobes0.10pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131tolimittheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBAtoasmallfractionoftherequiredlimit(Ref.1).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-123(continued)Draft8

SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14BASESLCO(continued)Monitoringthespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantensuresthatwhensecondaryspecificactivitylimitsareexceeded,appropriateactionsaretakeninatimelymannertoplacetheplantinanoperationalMODEthatwouldminimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thelimitsonsecondaryspecificactivityapplyduetothepotentialforsecondarysteamreleasestotheatmospherefromaSLB.InMODES5and6,theSGsarenotbeingusedforheatremoval.BoththeRCSandSGsaredepressurized,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisminimal.Therefore,monitoringofsecondaryspecificactivityisnotrequired.ACTIONSA.landA.2DOSEE(UIVALENTI-131exceedingtheallowablevalueinthesecondarycoolant,isanindicationofaproblemintheRCSandcontributestoincreasedpostaccidentdoses.IfthesecondaryspecificactivityisnotwithinlimitstheplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within86hours,andinMODE5within4036hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-124(continued)DraftB SecondarySpecificActivity83.7.14BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.7.14.1ThisSRverifiesthatthesecondaryspecificactivityiswithinthelimitsoftheaccidentanalysis.Agammaisotopicanalysisofthesecondarycoolant,whichdeterminesDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,confirmsthevalidityofthesafetyanalysisassumptionsastothesourcetermsinpostaccidentreleases.ItalsoservestoidentifyandtrendanyunusualisotopicconcentrationsthatmightindicatechangesinreactorcoolantactivityorLEAKAGE.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthedetectionofincreasingtrendsofthelevelofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,andallowsforappropriateactiontobetakentomaintainlevelsbelowtheLCOlimit.REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGSE,

Subject:

"SEPTopic,XV-2,SpectrumofSteamSystemPipingFailuresInsideandOutsideContainment;XV-12,SpectrumofRodEjectionAccidents;XV-16,RadiologicalConsequencesofFailureofSmallLinesCarryingPrimaryCoolantOutsideContainment;XY-17,SteamGeneratorTubeFailure;andXV-20,RadiologicalConsequencesofFuelDamagingAccidents-R.E.Ginna,"datedSeptember24,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-125Draft8 ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.13.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.1ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.1ThefollowingACelectricalsourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a~Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepower~.-ce-circuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses'.,:,reqiijijjP!bjj',:LOl,"8:-:;O'N~jDibtib!'"e+Subs':"abcs,:,:,-,'f30'O'ES!'!'S'i<a!8.",::,8A'i!au'dg4'~'nalb.Twoemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)capableofsupplyingtheir+equ4+edFesp'eqtj;.:vmonsite480Vsafeguardsbusesre'g'~u1giidisby:::.";::LCO"'::8!8::::,'g.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Qt:powertoone"ormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)i:nopeiible.A.1ANDDeclarerequiredfeature(s)inoperablewhenitsredundantrequiredfeature(s)isinoperable.12hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionAconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequiredfeature(s)A.2RestoreoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-1DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.OneDGinoperable.B.1PerformSR3.8.1.1fortheoffsitecircuit.AND1hourANDOnceper488hoursthereafterB.2ANDB.3.1ORDeclarerequiredfeature(s)supportedbytheinoperableDGinoperablewhenitsrequiredredundantfeature(s)isinoperable.DetermineOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure.4hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionBconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequiredfeature(s)24hoursB.3.2PerformSR3.8.1.2forOPERABLEDG.ANDB.4RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.24hours7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-2DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONS(continuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Ne-O'-AA4eO;ffs.,i:::t:epowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)~1iiapi!Fib);e.ANDOneDGinoperable.-----------NOTE--------------EnterapplicableConditionsand'RequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4,"whenConditionCisenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.C.1RestorerequiredoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.ORC.2RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.12hours12hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,orCnotmet.0.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.TwoDGsinoperable.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-3DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityfortheoffsitecircuittoeachofthe480Vsafeguardsbuses.7daysSR3.8.1.2NOTES1.PerformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSR.2.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.VerifyeachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.31daysSR3.8.1.3NOTES-1.DGloadingsmayincludegradualloadingasrecommendedbythemanufacturer.2.Homentarytransientsoutsidetheloadrangedonotinvalidatethistest.3.ThisSurveillanceshall.beconductedononlyoneDGatatime.'jwiii.,'diate(l'pg'fj'll,'ow::;;w'/th'o'ut';".':;:;:.shu't8oinggs)i'c'cessf'ill:,',:.:j)rformanc'e:o'f<~SR:::~3,,"::,8;:!1<<',;2VerifyeachDGissynchronizedandloadedandoperatesfor)60minutesand<120minutesataloada1950kWand<2250kW.31days~(coj$i:need),'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-4DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.4Verifythefueloillevelineachdaytank.31days333.3.1.33fftt31'1tf3133systemoperatestotransferfueloilfromeachstoragetanktotheassociateddaytank.SR3.8.136VerifytransferofACpowersourcesfromtheaedegOj,',50~modetothe109+0modeand0/10024monthsSR3.8.1.7F~c4%=:-ypcPhg~jc(Ag~tpj"-~j"::-<~eh<":i"jSR~~MP9yMVerifyeachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionofa295kW.24months~~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-5Draft8 ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYkC%~'~~~'"~~'""'ARW4Nh@N~64YSNFvkNSY@P~w~PKCM<~N~ZPM%"'~NNVerifyeachDGQautomatictripsaref(~gagbypassedonanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjection(SI)signalexcept:a.Engineoverspeed;b.Lowlubeoilpressure;andc.Startfailure(overcrank)relay.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-6DraftB ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.9-NOTES-l.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinHODE1,2,3,or4.39cubi.ding'::::::~yP>,b~y,,::::,-:;:,':akeii':::*:foi.,:::,::::iinp."Ihnne8eveiit::i':,.'",th'at":y'ati".",:fy",::::th;:i,::s:..:"SR":Verifyonanactualorsimulated.lossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal:24monthsa~De-energizationof480Vsafeguardsbuses;b.C.Loadsheddingfrom480Vsafeguardsbuses;andDGauto-startsfromstandbyconditiond.::I.~yvAykvw&yyydw$y.~Nyw%ydyd'ywwc84&iwp94y5ywyww~'Myydydwd5&dyYNyYiNdydingywdyMygdvvyvy!d%%$yvvyvyyyd'ygyvyW'dyyWyvvw(dwyXw(yvyvyy!dvsenergid'e's::.,:fau'io,.:-",;c'onnectd,'ed)'emder'en'cyy",1."o'a'di';.,':th'r'o'."u'gyh.":i:'::the..:,""I,':oa'd,'::::::s'e'q'u"'en'i%i.:,","Snabdlydyy+535~iujj'lj4p5perma'nerifig,:"',.)'ri'dj"'.aVit'o';-,,Oriiiieted:-"iimiir'giiiCy,'ddtiad'y'~i::fiir'.,':<<g5jiii'riUtd'S'::-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-7Draft8 ACSources-MODES5and63.8.2SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.2ACSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.2ThefollowingACelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepowereeuree-circuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6";andb.Oneemergencydieselgenerator(DG)capableofsupplyingonetrainoftheonsite480>;:.':U)(safeguardbus(es)requiredbyLCO3.8.10.APPLICABILITY:NODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-8DraftB ACSources-MODES5and63.8.2A.'l!,ipowertooneor"morerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)jinngfgb::l,s.------------NOTE----'---------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.10,withonerequiredtrainde-energizedasaresultofConditionA.A.1Declareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)ImmediatelyORinoperable.A.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyAND'A'AO(continued)A.(continued)A.2-.2;2';::,';3;Ini"tiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.R-32-+4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredoffsitepowercircuittoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-9DraftB ACSources-NODES5and63.8'ACTIONSB.He-DGtotherequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)1',no'p'ejabl.e.B.1ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyB.2~~ImmediatelyANDPea@kv44jjad&4-ieeeSU~s;87tdmo'v'emijt',':of~~pi,.'jade::a4edgfliel;:;:ass"emb'l.A'.s'.:Iirimidisci:i,lP~~B.3InitiateactiontoImmediately40df41:OAS.9A9iPc'KPoNArix+:v('.t"o,"-.'P,ERASL'E.~l.st'a't'iis:,::8R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-10DraftB ACSources-MODES5and63.8.2SURVEILLANCEREaUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.2.1ForACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRsareapplicable:SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.1.5InaccordancewithapplicableSRsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-11DraftB DieselFuelOil3.8.33.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.3DieselFuelOilLCO3.8.3Thestoreddieselfueloilshallbewithinlimitsforeachrequiredemergencydieselgenerator(DG).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSNOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachDG.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredDGswithonsitefueloilsupplynotwithinlimit.A.1Restorefueloilleveltowithinlimit.48l~2:hoursB.OneormorerequiredDGswithstoredfueloiltotalparticulatesnotwithinlimit.B.1Restorefueloiltotalparticulateswithinlimit.7days36'-'d'R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-12DraftA DieselFuelOil3.8.3ACTIONScontinued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED,",:>RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.GD.IDeclareassociatedDGinoperable.ImmediatelyOneormorerequiredDGsdieselfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanConditionA-er-.4B<:,::6'r'.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYIfb'tSR3.8.3.1er~~~~4ohZQm@WngVerify~og~~supgy-~5000galofdieselfueloila~@thaforeachrequiredDG.31daysSR3.8.3.2Verifyfueloilpropertiesofn'w,.-:,.::.eggstoredfueloilaretestedinaccordancewith,andmaintainedwithinthelimitsof,theDieselFuelOilTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeDieselFuelOilTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-13DraftA

DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.43.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.4DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.4TheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable.A.1RestoreDCelectricalpowersourcetoOPERABLEstatus.2hoursB.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMode5.6hours36hoursC.BothDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0,3.ImmediatelyR,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-14DraftB DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and43.8.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY347,:daysSR3.8.4.2---------------NOTES------1.SR3,8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4.Verifybatterycapacityisadequatetosupply,andmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-15DraftB DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.4SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.4.3NOTEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.Verifybatterycapacityisz80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.60monthsAND12monthswhenbatteryshowsdegradation,orhasreached85%ofexpectedlifewithcapacity<100%ofmanufacturer'sratingAND24monthswhenbatteryhasreached85%oftheexpectedlifewithcapacity~100%ofmanufacturer'sratingR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-16DraftB DCSources-MODES5and63.8.53.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.5DCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-17DraftB

DCSources-MODES5and63.8.5A-.A;:<OneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersource(s)inoperable.A.1Declareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ORA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyImmediatelyANDA.Immediately44aQa2'.:i:2ouspe.na.:::.',moiemeo.iof4%v&%vkvk07MRR&iw'i$:.:fu'e'l:,::'"'isle'mbl'.:i'0'i.SwW'CYÃ5NkWXCQNMCv'vXMv'~w:WS.IMMY??d!'~%%44j~]~ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-18DraftB DCSources-MODES5and63.8.5ACTIONSR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-19Draft8 DCSources-NODES5and63.8.5ACTIONSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.5.1ForDCsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,theplib1S3.8.4.1InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-20DraftB BatteryCellParameters3.8.63.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.6BatteryCellParametersLCO3.8.6BatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and'4,WhenassociatedDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Immediately1Declareassociatedbatteryinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-21DraftB BatteryCellParameters3.8.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.6.1Verifyg1'ecg~ro'fyt'e'::::::,:,:IeiiePot>i".'@eh.'.."'.coooe'ctydVt-"".i'"'-'f':th--'~'l'rt""::-ni"r'"-"'"fl'"""""'1daysSR3.8.6.2batterycellK.83."j:daysSR3.8.6.3Verifyjii'ec'if:i:.c.:-.;.':,.'qra"vA%9of,th';::,des>ii'nated.',!oi;:1:af>eel.:'.,>gay.p..":;,::"e,;ajp>.b;at't>,'e'r'y'is~~'::::;:1~:;:;::l88'.',:.fojBathe'rj.,A'-;:;::::;i'n"d"::i:~3.';-"::;I:9.2:.":.;":A-.i.;:':!:.',B,at::t~v,';".8;I-3<fedaysal<dak,s>II'i!i!3ii>5'lie>i:;::::.iig,:iie>i',,-,:,,e,Yil:,"it-,::-!>>~ii-',,>--,:-':,;::i.::.:>ie>>evGFpg'!':.,::1,',et"ice;~,i:;:;:.o.:,"peag'~'at'ter/";ls&$j:...,-;:>>a4M4i>>>>>er>>>>MvNM>e>)v%<c4>>vek>V>>4>>'>iv444c4v>>A>aAkYk>e'>V>Me4CV>N+92"'>!0~~'sR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-22DraftB BatteryCellParameters3.8.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR~3:-'8"::6'::6':V"'Y"':'""':f"~""""'t"'"-f'~:h)'~""""""t""di'5Nat~mai"e~thari";",0~020:;,::.baal,,.oui..:'::iliaji:,:"::,"og8'~ttiiY!A)~8':::;::R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-23DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.73.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.7ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.7ThefollowingACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.InvertersforInstrumentBusesAandC;andb.Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)forInstrumentBusB.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneinverterinoperable.A.lANDA.2ANDA.3PowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClassIEornon-Class1ECVT.PowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClass1ECVT.RestoreinvertertoOPERABLEstatus.2hours24hours72hoursB.Class1ECVTforACInstrumentBusBinoperable.B.1ANDB.2PowerACInstrumentBusBfromitsnon-ClasslECVT.RestoreClass1ECVTforACInstrumentBusBtoOPERABLEstatus.2hours7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-24DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)C.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.Twoormorerequiredinstrumentbussourcesinoperable.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.7.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.7daysSR3.8.7.2VerifycorrectClasslECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-25DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and63.8.83.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8,8ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.8ACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheonsiteClassIEACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITY:HODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-26DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-NODfS5and63.8.8A.OneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyImmediatelyIa",e'o'apei,,abi,',e;."!.GRA'L<T,,;ERAT~10NSNii'.:j"':"2'egiSusppri8rimoTemeot!i'o'tzii',rr'a'djab'ed::"..".:,";puck,"::ars'semb1~i."es,"I4w'v&vSK>ae&riv.'~vANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediately':Imme:idate),:jImmediatelyA.2.4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)toOPfRABLEstatus.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-27DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and63.8.8ACTIONSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.8.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttorequiredACinstrumentbus(es).7daysSR3.8.8.2VerifycorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbus.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-xxiiiDraftB DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and43.8.93.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.9DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4LCO3.8.9TrainAandTrainBofthefollowingelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE:a.ACpower;b.ACinstrumentbuspower;andc.DCpower.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA-.g5>>OneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.A.lRestoreACelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.8hours~~n.B.Oneweqeh-ed-ACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.B.lRestoremqui+ed-ACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hoursC.OneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.C.IRestoreDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3,8-xxivDraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeoFConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE3.AND0.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.Twoer-serei;i.:thinoperablei.,1'ec'ti,::igj1':~aeidistr,';.i,b,un:Qnk'u'b'sy's't'e'iiiigthatresult\"'.w.'CYNiIAhfgYCM'unction.E.1EnterLCO3,0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREaUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.9.1VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredAG-,OC-,and-AGp7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-xxvDraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and63.8,103.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6LCO3.8.10Thenecessaryper-t4eetii:>',ns'.(::s)<ofbueth'e,"."fo'1!1'o'8'i'r'igelectrical*powerdistributionsubsystemsshal'1beOPERABL'EtosupportequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE@~pgi'i~'o-waij,AC~1'.,"IONGCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-xxviDraftB

DistributionSystems-NODES5and63.8.10A.OneormorerequiredmA;-r-umentbe+electricalpowerdistribution~~'ti,',a'i'o"'.(3)':inoperable.A.1ORDeclareassociatedsupportedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.A.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyImmediatelyANDImmediatelyS~>SNCN%<vÃvX40ANDg;.:':2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.AND(continued)A.(continued)A.2.4InitiateactionstorestorerequiredAG-,bus-electricalpowerdistributiontrain(s)toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyANDA.2.5Declareassociatedrequiredresidualheatremovalloop(s)inoperableandnotinoperation.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCE1nnaucearoweran-XXV11FRE(UENCYra ~, DistributionSystems-NODES5and63.8.10ACTIONSSR3.8.10.1VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredAG-,BC-,and-AG1pdistributioneubsye4emtj;~j:iis::.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-xxviiiDraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and433B3.8.1B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.1ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCO.isprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofACpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplythe480VsafeguardsbusesandassociateddistributionsubsystemduringMODES1,2,3,and4.TheplantACsourcesconsistofanindependentoffsitepowersourceandtheonsitestandbyemergencypowersource(Ref.1).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.2)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andprotectionsystems..TheoffsiteandonsiteACsourcescaneachsupplypowerto480Vsafeguardsbusestoensurethatreliablepowerisavailableduringanynormaloremergencymodeofplantoperation.The480Vsafeguardsbusesaredividedintoredundanttrainssothatthelossofanyonetraindoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionsfrombeingperformed.SafeguardsBuses14and18areassociatedwithTrainAandsafeguardsBuses16and17areassociatedwithTrainB.SinceonlytheonsitestandbypowersourceisclassifiedasClass1E,theoffsitepowersourceisnotrequiredtobeseparatedintoredundanttrains.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-1DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-2DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND-(continued)Theindependentoffsitepowersourceconsistsofbreakers,transformers,switches,interruptingdevices,cabling,andj$controlsrequiredtotransmitpowerfromtheoffsitetransmissionnetworktotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.Theindependentoffsitepowersourceessentiallybeginsfromtwostationauxiliarytransformers(SAT12Aand12B)eachsuppliedfromanindependenttransmissionlineemanatingfromseparateswitchyards(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).SAT12Aisconnectedtothe34.5kVtransmissionsystem(circuit751)andSAT12Bisconnectedtotheplant115kVswitchyard(circuit767).TheSATsmaybeconfiguredinthefollowingmodes:a.SAT12A(orSAT12B)suppliessafeguardsBuses16and17andSAT12B(orSAT12A)suppliessafeguardsBuses14and18(50/50mode);b.SAT12AsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(0/100mode);orc.SAT12BsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(100/0mode).Thepreferredconfigurationisthe50/50mode;however,allthreemodesofoperationmeetapplicabledesignrequirementsfornormaloperation(Ref.1).Offsitepowercanalsobeprovidedduringanemergencythroughtheplantauxiliarytransformer11bybackfeedingfromthe115kVtransmissionsystemandmaintransformer.SATs12Aand12Bareeachconnectedtotwonon-Class1E,4.16kVbuses(12Aand12B).The4.16kVBus12AfeedstheClass1Eloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses14and18and4.16kVBus12BfeedstheClasslEloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses16and17(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).Lossofpowertoanyofthesafeguardsbuses,asaresultofinoperableoffsitecircuitcomponent(s),isalossofoffsitepower.Theoffsitepowersourceendsafterthefeederbreakersupplyingeach480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-3DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-4DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theonsitestandbypowersourcesconsistoftwo1950kWcontinuousratingemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)connectedtothesafeguardsbusestosupplyemergencypowerintheeventoflossofallotherACpower.TheDGsarelocatedinseparateroomsinaSeismicCategoryIstructurelocatedadjacenttothenortheastwalloftheTurbineBuilding.EachDGroomhasitsownventilationsystem.TheventilationsystemisdesignedtomaintaintheDGroombetween60'Fand104'Fandtoremoveanyhydrocarbongasesintheroom(Ref.3).Eachventilationsystemconsistsoftwofansandassociatedductworkanddampersthatfailopenonlossofinstrumentairandcontrolpower.OnefanisdesignedtostartonDGactuationwithasecondfandesignedtostartwhentheroomtemperaturereaches90'F.Thesecondfan'sdischargeairflowisdirectedtotheDGcontrolpanelandhasadelayedstarttopreventpotentiallyfreezingthecoolingwaterjacketpipingduringcoldweatherconditions.TheDGsutilizeanairmotorforstarting.TheairmotorissuppliedbytworeceiverswhichprovidesufficientairforfiveDGstartsbeforerequiringarechargeofthereceivers.TheDGsaresuppliedbyseparatefueloildaytankswhichcanbecross-tiedifrequired.Additionalfueloilcanbetransferredfromredundantundergroundfueloilstoragetanks.Adedicatedfueloiltransferpumpisusedforthistransfer.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valve,ortank,toresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.DGAisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses14and18andDGBisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses16and17.ADGstartsautomaticallyonasafetyinjection(SI)signaloronanundervoltagesignalonitscorresponding480Vbuses(refertoLCO3-.3-.~~3:,"iX,.':4,"LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation").IntheeventofonlyanSIsignal,theDGsautomaticallystartandoperateinthestandbymodewithouttyingtothesafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-5DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-6DraftB

ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Intheeventoflossofoffsitepower,orabnormaloffsitepowerwhereoffsitepoweristrippedasaconsequenceofbusundervoltageordegradedvoltage,theDGsautomaticallystartandtietotheirrespectivebuses.Allbusloadsexceptforthecontainmentspray(CS)pump,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pumpandsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcentersaretrippeduponactuationoftheundervoltagerelays.ThisisindependentoforcoincidentwithanSIsignal.OncetheundervoltagerelayresetsindependentofaSIsignal,theoperatormaymanuallyconnectloadsontothebus(es).DuringacoincidentSIsignal,theCCWpumpisalsotrippedandloadsaresequentiallyconnectedtotheirrespectivebusesbytheautomaticloadsequencer.Intheeventoflossofoffsitepowertoonlyonesafeguardsbusinatrain,theDGwillautomaticallystartandtieonlytotheaffectedbus.DuringacoincidentSIsignal,thenormalfeedbreakeronthesecondbusontheaffectedtrainwillbetrippedbytheundervoltagerelayonthefailedbuscausingtheDGtoautomaticallytietobothbuses.Thisconditionwillthenactuatetheautomaticloadsequencer.IntheeventofalossofoffsitepowerandacoincidentSIsignal,theelectricalloadsareautomaticallyconnectedtotheDGsinsufficienttimetoprovideforsafereactorshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).CertainrequiredplantloadsarereturnedtoserviceinapredeterminedsequencebytheautomaticloadsequencerinordertopreventoverloadingtheDGduringthestartprocess.Withinapproximately1minuteaftertheinitiatingsignalisreceived,allloadsneededtorecovertheplantormaintainitinasafeconditionarereturnedtoservice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-7(continued)DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,8-8(continued)DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDBAandtransientanalyses(Refs.4and5)assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheACelectricalpowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisresultsinmaintainingatleastonetrainoftheonsitestandbypoweroroffsiteACsourcesOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofoffsiteoronsitestandbyACpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofonsitestandbypower).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-9DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-10DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneACpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.1).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.6)canbemetatalltimes.TheDGsaredesignedtooperatefollowingaDBAoranticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)untiloffsitepowercanberestored.AnAOOisdefinedasaCondition2eventinReference7(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).TheDGsarerequiredtostartwithin10secondsandbeginloading.TheDGscanbeginreceivingupto30%ofdesignloadsafterthe10secondstarttimeandcanaccept100%ofdesignloadswithin30seconds.TheDGsaremanuallyloadedifonlyanundervoltagesignalispresentandloadsequencedifacoincidentundervoltageandSIsignalispresent.Theloadsaresequencedasfollows(assumeSIsignalat0seconds):(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-11DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)DGLoadDGATime480VsafeguardsbusesandCSpumps10SIpumpAandB15SIpumpC20Residualheatremovalpump25Selectedservicewaterpump30Firstcontainmentrecirculationfancooler35Secondcontainmentrecirculationfancooler40Hotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump45DGBTime10152227323742 47SincetheDGsmuststartandbeginloadingwithin10seconds,onlyoneairstartmustbeavailableintheairreceiversasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThelongtermoperationoftheDGs(untiloffsitepowerisrestored)isdiscussedinLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil."TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3ofNRCPolicyStatement.LCO~i'nequalifiedindependentoffsitepower~o~circuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandseparateandindependentDGsforeachtrainensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.AnOPERABLEq'uhl:,'iedjindependentoffsitepower~ohcircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguardsbusesj(recipe'd!',';:by)f!C'0thisrequirement.ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a~TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-12DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESLCO(continued)b.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,CCWpump,andCSpumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal);c.TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervalsfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);d.TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfor)1hourat110%designloads;e.ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andf.AventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.TheACsourcesinonetrainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,separationandindependencemustbecompleteassumingasingleactivefailure.Fortheindependentoffsitepowersource,separationandindependencearetotheextentpractical(i.e.,operationispreferredinthe50/50mode,butmayalsoexistinthe100/0or0/100mode).APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.Acceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceeded,asaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-13DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheACpowerrequirementsforNODES5and6arecoveredinLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-NODES5and6."ACTIONSA.IandA.2Withae-offsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardbus(es)/nope'w(bie,assurancemustbeprovidedthatacoincidentsinglefailurewillnotresultinacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.Iftheredundantsafetyfeaturetothecomponentortrainaffectedbythelossofoffsitepowerisalsounavailable,theassumptionthattwocompletesafetytrainsareOPERABLEmaynolongerexist.Asanexample,ifoffsitepowerwereunavailableto480VBus14,DGAcouldsupplythenecessarypowertothebus.Ifresidualheatremovalpump(RHR)B(suppliedpowerbyBus16)wereinoperableatthesametime,oratanytimeafterthelossofoffsitepowertoBus14,alossofredundantrequiredsafetyfeaturesexistssinceafailureofDGAwouldresultinthelossofemergencycorecooling.Therefore,RHRpumpAonBus14wouldhavetobedeclaredinoperablewithin12hoursafterRHRpumpBandoffsitepowertoBus14weredeclaredunavailable.TheCompletionTimeof12hoursasprovidedbyRequiredActionA.1todeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheoffsitepowercircuitandallsafetyfeaturesaffectedbythelossofthe480Vbus.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbythelossofoffsitepower(i.e.,usingthesameexampleasabove,the72hourCompletionTimeforrestoringRHRpumpBwasdevelopedassumingthatRHRpumpAhadbothoffsiteandonsitestandbyemergencypoweravailable).Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow12hoursinthisconfiguration.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-14DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredActiontheCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythat:a.Thereisnooffsitepoweravailabletooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus;andb.Aredundantrequiredfeatureisinoperableonasecond480Vsafeguardsbus,IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofConditionA,aredundantrequiredfeaturebecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimebeginstobetracked.RequiredActionA.1canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.ThelevelofdegradationduringConditionAmeansthattheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident;however,theonsitestandbyACsourceshavenotbeendegraded.Thislevelofdegradationgenerallycorrespondstoeither:a.LossofoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand/orSAT12B;b.FailureofSAT12Aor12Bor4.16kVBus12Aor12B;orc.Failureofastationservicetransformersupplyinga480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-15DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)WithatotallossoftheoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforeithertrain.WithlossofoffsitepowertoSAT12Aor12B,failureofSAT12Aor12B,orfailureofBus12Aor12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforasingleACelectricaltrain.Withafailureofastationservicetransformer,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentforone480VsafeguardsbusinoneACelectricaltrain.Inallcases,sufficientonsiteACsourcesareavailabletomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdownconditionintheeventofaDBAortransient.Infact,asimultaneouslossofoffsiteACsources,aLOCA,andaworstcasesinglefailurewerepostulatedasapartofthedesignbasisinthesafetyanalysis.Thus,the72hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetoeffectrestorationoftheoffsitecircuitcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintaininganACelectricalpowersystemcapableofmeetingitsdesigncriteria.B.1WithoneDGinoperable,itisnecessarytoverifytheavailabilityoftheoffsitecircuittoeachoftheaffected480Vsafeguardsbusesonamorefrequentbasis.SincetheRequiredActiononlyspecifies"perform,"afailureofSR3.8.1.1acceptancecriteriadoesnotresultinaRequiredActionbeingnotmet(i.e.,ConditionDwouldnotapply).However,ifacircuitfailstopassSR3.8.1.1,itisinoperableandConditionCwouldbeentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-16DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES00'N'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-17DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.2RequiredActionB.2isintendedtoprovideassurancethatalossofoffsitepower,duringtheperiodthataDGisinoperable,doesnotresultinacompletelossofasafetyfeature.Thesefeaturesaredesignedwithredundantsafetyrelatedtrainswhicharesuppliedpowerfromseparateandindependentonsitepowersources.Ifoneonsitepowersourceisinoperable,itmustbeassuredthattheredundantsafetyrelatedtrainsuppliedbytheOPERABLEDGisavailabletoprovidethenecessarysafetyfunction.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursforRequiredActionB.2isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredAction,theCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythatboth:a.AninoperableDGexists;andb.Arequiredfeatureontheothertrain(TrainAorTrainB)isinoperable,IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofthisCondition(oneDGinoperable)arequiredfeaturesupportedbytheOPERABLEDGsubsequentlybecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimewouldbegintobetracked.Discovering'onerequiredDGinoperablecoincidentwithoneormoreinoperablerequiredsupportorsupportedfeatures,orboth,thataresuppliedpowerbytheOPERABLEDG,resultsinstartingtheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.2.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEDGandtheoffsitecircuitareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-18DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeof4hourstodeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheDGandallsafetyfeaturessupportedbytheDG.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbytheinoperableDG.Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow4hoursinthisconfiguration.Additionally,the4hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurring.duringthisperiod.RequiredActionB.2canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.3.1andB.3.2RequiredActionB.3.1providesanallowancetoavoidunnecessarytestingoftheOPERABLEDG.Ifitcanbedeterminedwithin24hoursthatthecauseoftheinoperableDGdoesnotexistontheOPERABLEDG,SR3.8.1.2isnotrequiredtobeperformed.Ifthecauseofinoperabilityisdeterminedtoexistontheother.DG,thesecondDGwouldbedeclaredinoperableupondiscoveryandConditionEwouldbeentered.Oncethefailureisrepaired,thecommoncausefailurenolongerexists,andRequiredActionB.3.1issatisfied.IfthecauseoftheinitialinoperableDGcannotbeconfirmednottoexistonthesecondDGwithin24hours,performanceofSR3.8.1.2sufficestoprovideassuranceofcontinuedOPERABILITYofthatDG.IntheeventtheinoperableDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspriortocompletingeitherB.3.1orB.3.2,activitiesmustcontinuetoevaluatethecommoncausepossibility.Thiscontinuedevaluation,however,isnolongerunderthe24hourconstraintimposedwhileinConditionB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-19DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESP~-en-T-ime-i.~~na@-e-4e-cen44+m-4ha4CT::1,0NS'F8~4th$";.;:,iiiS'Hi~4d80;':;V;,;::,i.afdegiia'i".ds';..Ibusi.,'s.TP1dp1TimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1Withne-offsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)andoneDGinoperable,redundancyislostinboththeoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpowersystems.Sincepowersystemredundancyisprovidedbythesetwodiversesourcesofpower,theACpowersourcesareonlydegradedandnolossofsafetyfunctionhasoccurredsinceatleastoneDGandpotentiallyoneoffsiteACpowersourceareavailable.However,theplantisvulnerabletoasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovidedtoeitherrestoretheoffsitepowercircuitortheDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeislessthanthatforaninoperableoffsitepowersourceoraninoperableDGduetothesinglefailurevulnerabilityofthisconfiguration.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-20DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESThI',hRdlddlTtliConditionaremodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4"mustalsobeimmediatelyenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.ThisallowsConditionCtoproviderequirementsforthelossofanoffsitepowercircuitandoneDG,withoutregardtowhetheratrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.9providestheappropriaterestrictionsforade-energizedtrain.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-21DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES@~~fcont1'niedg:ACQIONED.land0.2wA"'ftheinoperableACelectricpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1IfbothDGsareinoperable,alossofsafetyfunctionwouldexistifoffsitepowerwereunavailable;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeentered.??~~~~XCC???ÃC+X~Q~~~X2>'X9!C?+~CQ'QC.>>?OJjgy&~Yg~?j?0>%>.gMA++$QX+Q?YP$AA?Q~?><y$~~~~hp~~g+~XO~N,~CC'9~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheACsourcesaredesignedtopermitinspectionandtestingofallimportantareasandfeatures,especiallythosethathaveastandbyfunction(Ref.2).Periodiccomponenttestsaresupplementedbyextensivefunctionaltestsduringrefuelingoutages(undersimulatedaccidentconditions).SR3.8.1.1ThisSRensurespropercircuitcontinuityfortheindependentoffsitepowersourcetoeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandavailabilityofoffsiteACelectricalpower.Checkingbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityverifiesthateachbreakerisinitscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloadsareconnectedtotheirqualifiedpowersource.TheFrequencyof7daysisadequatesincebreakerpositionisnotlikelytochangewithouttheoperatorsknowledgeandbecausealarmsandindicationsofbreakerstatusareavailableinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-22DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-23DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESS0p~V:::ILLANCBSR3.8.1.2REgUTRENEN'fisThisSRver'ifiesthateachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.ThisensurestheavailabilityoftheDGtomitigateDBAsandtransientsandtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.TheDGvoltagecontrolmaybeeitherinmanualorautomaticduringtheperformanceofthisSR.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1indicatesthatperformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisFiesthisSRsinceSR3.8.1.9isacompletetestoftheDG.ThesecondNotestatesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.Thisminimizesthewearonmovingpartsthatdonotge't.lubricatedwhentheengineisnotrunning.[i',':i'"::,:)ii~i~i:,':,fi:.;-':.',".',",::'~ivji'j;:::::@~j~jkUAV!4L4ANGE-SR3.8.1.3ThisSRverifiesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloadsgreaterthanorequaltotheequivalentofthemaximumexpectedaccidentloads.Aminimumruntimeof60minutesisrequiredtostabilizeenginetemperatures.Amaximumruntimenottoexceed120minutesminimizesthetimethattheDGisconnectedtotheoffsitesource.AlthoughnopowerfactorrequirementsareestablishedbythisSR,theDGisnormallyoperatedatapowerfactorbetween0.85laggingand0.95lagging.Theupperloadbandlimitof2250kWisprovidedtoavoidroutineoverloadingoftheDGwhichmayresultinmorefrequentinspectionsinaccordancewithvendorrecommendationsinordertomaintainDGOPERABILITY.ThelowerloadbandlimitistheexpectedmaximumloadfollowingaDBA.InadditiontoverifyingtheDGcapabilityforsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloads,the(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-24DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESDGventilationsystemshouldalsobeverifiedduringthissurveillance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-25DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESRKgVLREHENTS;~.;;;;":,(:contq,need,)>TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.jfIii',:8:.,:":SR.."::,j.s",:aiodi~f'j'egby~fo'a~i,.';;.".Po't'es.;:',::::,:Note1indicatesthatdieselenginerunsforthisSurvei'llancemayincludegradualloading,asrecommendedbythemanufacturer,sothatmechanicalstressandwearonthedieselengineareminimized.Note2statesthatmomentarytransientsoutsidetheloadband(e.g.,duetochangingbusloads),donotinvalidatethistest.Similarly,momentarypowerfactortransientsaboveorbelowtheadministra'tivelimitdonotinvalidatethetest.Note3indicatesthatthisSurveillanceehe&dsh'a1,::,I;:beconductedononlyoneDGatatimeinordertoavoidcommoncausefailuresthatmightresultfromoffsitecircuitorgridperturbations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-26DraftB

ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESS0'ayfiTi~hNCE'.SR3.8.1.5.R(quTJE::M'ENDSThi'sSRd'emonstratesthateachDGfueloiltransferpumpoperatesandtransfersfueloilfromitsassociatedstoragetanktoitsassociateddaytank.ThisisrequiredtosupportcontinuousoperationoftheDGs.ThisSurveillanceprovidesassurancethatthefueloiltransferpumpisOPERABLE,thefueloilpipingsystemisintact,thefueldeliverypipingisnotobstructed,andthecontrolsandcontrolsystemsforautomaticormanualfueltransfersystemsareOPERABLE.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,sincethedesignofthefueloiltransfersystemissuchthatpumpsoperateautomaticallyormustbestartedmanuallyin'ordertomaintainanadequatevolumeoffueloilinthedaytanksduringorfollowingDGoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3,8-28DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSR3.8.1.6ThisSRinvolvesthetransferofthe480VsafeguardsbuspowersupplyfromtheB0766:"--"(Wg{>%Q@Secm<~8,,"!!tL!'lllBQdd0/I>>~l",1'lhdemonstratestheOPERABILITYofthealternatecircuitdistributionnetworktopowertherequiredloads.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationtheplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-29DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES$URVE!1LL'ANGESR3.8.1.7RkqO.'.i'REO(8i'SThisSRveiifiesthateachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionofz295kW.EachDGisprovidedwithanengineoverspeedtriptopreventdamagetotheengine.Recoveryfromthetransientcausedbythelossofalargeloadcouldcausedieselengineoverspeed,which,ifexcessive,mightresultinatripoftheengine.ThisSRdemonstratestheDGloadresponsecharacteristicsandcapabilitytorejectthelargestsingleloadonthebusessuppliedbytheDG(i.e.,asafetyinjectionpump).InordertoensurethattheDGistestedunderloadconditionsthatareasclosetodesignbasisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactor~0.9lagging.ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresentativeoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthattheDGwouldexperience.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.R44+ue+ThisSRismodifiedbya-Nerve-s4a&wcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult,plantsafetysystems.WC'.~a+.QAggg.g>.YA%AXQMgP.OXO?AY<(C'6'~$j4$%+PPcia>6WQNNNN'L'4%'QPN>WPN)~,,ice.,:.:,",recon),:!0oiegackriow:i,edes,':.:-:that,;,::.creaftma,:',::.:,:ue!~it!life',-ll""'i'll'i"""i'dj'i'lli,":":::!lithtile'"tlii'glib(iiI'lilia!S'll.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-30DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES;SURVffoal,ANCE;":,".;.'.:,jan)',';:;.':;:;:SR!43l'8w<5';:8Qf"::!(c'o':,il'acts'o'ns'::i:'e.";.g.,overcurren,reversepower,oca1stoppushbutton)arebypassedonanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal,andcriticalprotectivefunctions(engineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andstartfailure(overcrank)relay)triptheDGtoavertsubstantialdamagetotheDG.ThenoncriticaltripsarebypassedduringDBAsbutstillprovideanalarmonanabnormalenginecondition.Thisalarmprovidestheoperatorwithsufficienttimetoreactappropriately.TheDGavailabilitytomitigatetheDBAismorecriticalthanprotectingtheengineagainstminorproblemsthatarenotimmediatelydetrimentaltoemergencyoperationoftheDG.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThisSRismodifiedbya-Nthatperforming"theSeurveil'lancewouldremovearequiredDGfromservicewhichisundesirableintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-31DraftB ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESRURVE44LRRGE-fhe,,:,.".:."e'econ'd,:::Ro,te::::.accknai'iJgdges.:::.:::;tha't:;:!'@red'i.::t'lian!b~e'>takYiggoi'j~u""p'1'an'n'e6'.::i;:ev'e'rit',:-.':tha'0-':'.::sa't"::;i's'fbi,::::.:'",.:thj~s,:".'!'SR~~Q-@~SR@Pena't1hi9'hea't;:."th'eI.,:fii~g1,::":,",::!:RC~S:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-32DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSORV,E)%LARGE)~~""~:.',.'~~SR-':::.-"':::3'::8'~lj::9:RE(UIREMENTStestingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbythreeNotes.Note'1statesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodwhichisintendedtominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginelubeoilcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendationsfortheDGs.Note2statesthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4sinceperformingtheSurveillanceduringtheseMODESwouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,causeperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystems,andchallengesafetysystems.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-33DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES:th'ij;'!SR';:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-34DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESREFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter8.2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.3.UFSAR,Section9.4.9.5.,4.UFSAR,Chapter6,5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.10CFR50,'ppendixA,GDC17.7."AmericanNationalStandard,NuclearSafetyCriteria.fortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.8.GenericLetter84-15,"ProposedStaffActionstoImproveandMaintainDieselGeneratorReliability,"July2,1984.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-35DraftB ~I~,~~I~I~'tII~~I~~~~'I~6I~~t~CI~~N'~0~~II~'Jt~ ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.2ACSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletothesesBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6theminimumrequiredACsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACpowersources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;andb.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-37DraftB

ACSourNhs5oHGBH-lHOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-38DraftB ACSourNhsSoHGBH-IMOB)S3$and6B3.8.ZBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.These'mayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-39DraftB ACSourNe5oHBDH-lMOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-40DraftB ACSourACesSoHBDH-IMOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Haintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingHOOf1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinHODE5or6thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitsupplyingtheassociatedACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6,"ensuresthatallrequiredloadsarepoweredfromoffsitepower.AnOPERABLEDG,capableofsupportingthedistributionsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,ensuresadiversepowersourceisavailabletoprovideelectricalpowersupport,assumingalossoftheindependentoffsitepowercircuit.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredoffsitecircuitandDGensurestheavailabilityof.sufficientACsourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).AnOPERABLEqualifiedoffsitecircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguardsbus(es).Powerfromeitheroffsitepowercircuit751or767,orbybackfeedingthroughauxiliarytransformerllsatisfiesthisrequirement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-41DraftB ACSourNe5oHMH-DEMOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-42DraftB ACSourNe5oHGBES-IHOB(S3$and6B3.8.ZBASESLCO(continued)ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a~TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;b.C.d.e.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pump,andcontainmentspray(CS)pumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentsafetyinjection(SI)andundervoltagesignal);TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsmanually.SincemostequipmentwhichreceivesaSIsignalareisolatedintheseNODESduetomaintenanceorlowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionconcerns,andtheDBAofconcern(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)wouldnotgenerateaSIsignal,manualloadingoftheDGswillmostlikelyberequired.TheseloadsmustbecapableofbeingaddedtotheOPERABLEDGwithin10minutes;TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilforz1hourat110%designloads;ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andAventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkandd'ampersisOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-43DraftB ACSourNh5oHGDH-lHOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-44DraftB ACSourMh5oHGDES-IMOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABILITYTheACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedeventsandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.1AsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystem'sACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoitareinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethatwhenConditionAisenteredwithnoonsiteoroffsiteACpowertoanyrequired480Vsafeguardsbus,theACTIONSforLCO3.8.10mustalsobeimmediatelyentered.ThisNoteallowsConditionAtoproviderequirementsforthelossoftheoffsitepowercircuit,whetherornotatrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.10wouldprovidetheappropriaterestrictionsforthesituationinvolvingacompletelyde-energizedtrain.Withae-offsitepoweravailabletooneormorerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es)(~jnoper'abfe,assurancemustbeprovidedthatthereisnotacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,onetrainwithoffsitepoweravailablemaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,oroperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablethatarenotpoweredfromoffsitepower,appropriaterestrict'ionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.Requiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaqualifiedoffsitepowercircuit,evenifthatcircuitisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,B3.8-45DraftB ACSou4fesSoHBDES-1MOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASESACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2end-A.2.30r'e.'qii)Y'a'ndA.4-5':::4madel.~~rI4e.".:i"::-:::iiei:,i,~%~%0!ilia,:.Iie,-':::".e~rm+~yyec@~+~s,,"'yc,:,,j,.;;ee,.jue;&t,Pumiceee~r.ewgeep<,.<<atee~eey'Le~eee,.eeexeeergi~...()go@4eweeeeej'ocs'iX'i':v'e:'i"eea'ct-."i'.v'jtypNNPei,::.f'orman'ce""...":,'oef,,:::,Re7jiiLre3.:::"Acti.',on's.mp6-t4jii'i'ii'p'e'ee.:I:::,e',F.,:;;":eijSteil:,'".,:::te'e'e"er',,eet."'u'r,e':.",:::".::,cue'u't:r.'o']i'.:'r'eced'ue!e'e",:;:'.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredoffsitepowerACsourcesandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequiredoffsitepowersourcesshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.B.1B.2end-B.3(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-46DraftB ACSourACe5oHGBH-lMOB)S3$and6B3.8.2BASESndRBfU'el.-".:ij'siiiib1!i'i',*",i,"';,(j'ri'dj;::o'p'eii'awb'a'i't'-':i':i30j,'ja'dd::,i::0'li.'o'n'i'~~b'e.'.;::.:::imm'e'd3':atelfR'"dAt'l~~~~'~B2oequire'ionpen(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-47DraftB

ACSourNesSoHGDHRMOB)S3$and6B3.8.ZBASES::",,;,",,',,'i!i-i!,'"":-:i!!",':-'i,5:,::!ilia!'h:,::iii::,!'!i'-,:i',tl!!it-:"'!:.>>::,'t:,::,::,:,i'i:::..t,::Wii",,4ht:::.i!i:::.I!i!i)i!....:",.h"'!(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-48DraftB ACSourMe5oHGDH-IMOB(S3$andI83.8.2BASES4-,'ACT,",.I:ONSB.RXand-B.fg!;~an.P"::,",:lB.B::.:.."'a'n'd.::::::8'<4-:ill(co'n't'3':r'iNed)'heCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDGshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientredundantpower.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.8.2.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofSRs'fromLCO3.8.1thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheACsourcesinMODES5and6.ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDG(s)frombeing=paralleledwiththeoffsitepowernetworkorotherwiserenderedinoperableduringperformanceofSRs,precludesde-energizingarequired480Vsafeguardsbus,andprecludesunnecessarytransfersoftheoffsitepowersourceconfigurations.WithlimitedACsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromiseboththerequiredcircuitandtheDG.Therefore,therequirementtoperformSR3.8.1.3,andSR3.8.1.6through3.8.1.9issuspended.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.1foradiscussionofeachSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-49DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1DieselFuelOilB3.8.3B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.3DieselFuelOilBASESBACKGROUNDFueloilisprovidedtoeachemergencydieselgenerator(DG)byadedicated350galdaytanklocatedneartheDG.Eachdaytankissuppliedfromanassociated6000galundergroundfueloilstoragetank.Eachstoragetankprovidesaminimumfueloilcapacityof5000gal.ThetwostoragetanksaresufficienttooperatebothDGsDgsatdesignratingsfor24hours.Thetotalminimumfuel'oilcapacityalsoensuresthatbothDGscanoperateforaperiodof40hourswhileprovidingforamaximumpostlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)loaddemand.ThemaximumloaddemandiscalculatedusingtheassumptionthatbothDGsareavailableandislessthantheDGdesignrating.TheminimumonsitefuelcapacityissufficienttooperatetheDGsforlongerthan8hourswhichisthetimerequiredtoreplenishtheonsitesupplyfromoutsidesources(Ref.1).Fueloilistransferredfromeachstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankbyadedicatedfueloiltransferpump.Eachfueloiltransferpumpispoweredbya480VsafeguardsbusthatisbackedbytheassociatedDG.OnefueloiltransferpumphasthecapabilitytosupplybothDGsoperatingwith110%oftheirdesignloads.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valveortanktoresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG,Alloutsidetanks,pumps,andpipingarelocatedundergroundtoprotectthemfrompotentialmissiles.HeattracingisprovidedintheexposedsuctionpipingtothefueloilpumpsintheeventthatheatingislostintheDGrooms.Theheattracingisthermostaticallycontrolledtomaintainthefueloilinthepipe>40'Fwhichisabovethecloudpointtemperatureofthefueloil(O').R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-50(continued)DraftB ACSources-MODESDIysB]8gehnOi4B3.8.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemsareOPERABLE.TheDGsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."SincedieselfueloilsupportstheoperationofthestandbyACpowersources,itsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOStoredonsitedieselfueloilisrequiredtohavesufficientsupplyfor40hoursofmaximumpost-LOCAloaddemand.Itisalsorequiredtomeetspecificstandardsfor.quality.Thisrequirement,inconjunctionwithanabilitytoobtainreplacementfueloilsupplieswithin8hours,supportstheavailabilityofDGsrequiredtoshut.downthereactorandtomaintainitinasafeconditionforananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBAwithlossofoffsitepower.DGdaytankfuelrequirements,aswellastransfercapabilityfromthestoragetanktothedaytank,areaddressedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITYTheACsources(LCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2)arerequiredtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.SincestoreddieselfueloilsupportsLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2,storeddieselfueloilisrequiredtobewithinlimitsinMODES1,2,3and4,andwhentheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-51(continued)DraftB ACSources-HODESDIysB]HgeinOi4B3.8.3BASESACTIONSA.1WithoneormorerequiredDGswithanonsitesupplyof<5000galoffueloil,theassumed40hourfueloilsupplyforaDGisnotavailable.Thiscircumstancemaybecausedbyevents,suchasfullloadoperationafteraninadvertentstartwithaninitialminimumrequiredfueloillevel,orfeedandbleedoperations,whichmaybenecessitatedbyincreasingfueloilparticulatelevelsoranynumberofotheroilqualitydegradations.RequiredActionA.1allowssufficienttimeforobtainingtherequisitereplacementvolumeandperformingtheanalysesrequiredpriortoadditionoffueloiltothetank.TheCompletionTimeof4812hoursisconsideredsufficienttocompleterestorationoftherequiredlevelpriortodeclaringtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisacceptablebasedontheremainingcapacity,thefactthatactionswillbeinitiatedtoobtainreplenishment,andthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiod.B.lIfoneormoreDGshasstoredfueloilwithtotalparticulatesnotw'thinlimitsP~t'tjrgveas'ori'i:.,;;n'i't,::::l:i@4ted<towithin7days.Thefueloilparticulatepropertiese$areverifiedbySR3.8.3.2.Trendingofparticulatelevelsnormallyallowssufficienttimetocorrecthighparticulatelevelspriortoreachingthelimitofacceptability.Poorsamplepractices(bottomsampling),contaminatedsamplingequipment,orerrorsinlaboratoryanalysiscanproducefailuresthatdonotfollowatrend.Sincethepresenceofparticulatesdoesnotmeanfailureofthefueloiltoburnproperlyinthedieselengine,andparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,andproperengineperformancehasbeenrecentlydemonstrated(within31days),itisprudenttoallowabriefperiodpriortodeclaringtheassociatedDGinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsforfurtherevaluation,resamplingandre-analysisoftheDGfueloil.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-52DraftB ACSources-MODESDiysB]HgeinOi4B3.8.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1Illl~II':RheD'.":l'.clodint"temperatur'""""'hd')',"t'eassoc"iatedDG"'maybeincapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperable.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.3.1'.Ck~+&4.QOhCNAlL+~s~ThisSRverifies+e5000galoffueloilqidDG.lhi<<tttttisanadequateinventoryoffueloilinthestoragetankstosupporteachDG'soperationfor40hourswhileprovidingmaximumpost-LOCAloads.The40hourperiodissufficienttimetoplacetheplantinasafeshutdownconditionandtobringinreplenishmentfuelfromanoffsitelocation.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoensurethatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sinceindicationsareavailabletoensurethatoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-53DraftB ACSources-HODESDiysB'IHgehnOi4B3.8.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-54DraftB ACSources-HODESDiysB'IHgeknOi4B3.8.3BASESSR3.8.3.2RE(UIREHE¹ThisSRprovidesameansofdeterminingwhetherneM@ingstoredfueloilhasbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatwouldhaveanimmediate,detrimentalimpactondieselenginecombustion.ThisensurestheavailabilityofhighqualityfueloilfortheDGs.Fueloildegradationduringlongtermstorageisindicatedbyanincreaseinparticulate,duemostlytooxidation.Thepresenceofparticulatedoesnotmeanthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyinadieselengine.Theparticulatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueloilinjectionequipment,however,whichcouldeventuallycauseenginefailure.AfueloilsampleisanalyzedtoestablishthatpropertiesspecifiedinTable1ofASTH0975-78(Ref.4)forviscosity,water,andsedimentaremetforthestoredfueloil.TheFrequencyofthisSRtakesintoconsiderationfueloildegradationtrendsthatindicatethatparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenFrequencyintervals.TheFrequency,asspecifiedintheDieselFuelOilTestingProgram,is92days.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.5.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.ASTHStandards,D975-78,Table1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-55DraftB ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.4DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents,Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).SeparatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforthesetwoelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandwhethertheyareClassIE(i.e,,supplysafetyrelatedorengineeredsafeguardsfunctions)ornonessential.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofDCpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplytheDCbusesandtheirassociateddistributionsystemduringMODES1,2,3,and4.ThestationDCelectricalpowersubsystemprovidestheACemergencypowersystemwithcontrolpower.ItalsoprovidesbothmotiveandcontrolpowertoselectedsafetyrelatedequipmentandpreferredACinstrumentbuspower(viainverters).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.1)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheengineeredsafetyfeaturesandprotectionsystems.The125VDCelectricalpowersystemconsistsoftwoindependentandredundantsafetyrelatedClassIEDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrain(TrainAandTrainB).Eachsubsystemconsistsofone125VDCbattery,twobatterychargerssuppliedfromthe480Vsystem,distributionpanelsandbuses,andalltheassociatedcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThebatteriesandbatterychargersareaddressedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-56DraftB OKSmmaes-NODES1,2,3,and483.8.4BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83,8-57DraftB OKSmtnmes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)EachbatteryprovidesaseparatesourceofDCpowerindependentofACpower.EachofthetwobatteriesiscapableofcarryingitsexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.2).Therearefourbatterychargersavailabletothebatteries.Chargers1Aand1Bareratedat150ampsandchargers1A1and1B1areratedat200amps.Batterychargers1Aand1AlarenormallyalignedtobatteryA,andbatterychargers1Band1B1arenormallyalignedtobatteryB.Achargingcapacityofatleast150ampsisnormallyrequiredtosupplythenecessaryDCloadsoneachtrainandtoprovideafullbatterychargetoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheDCpowerdistributionsystemisdescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSys4eaMQDKSSystigs,:;",.,'NODf81,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MOOES5and6."TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsoprovideDCelectricalpowertotheinverters,whichinturnpowertheACinstrumentbuses.TheinvertersaredescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.8,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6."TrainAEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)equipmentissuppliedfrombatteryA,whileTrainBESFequipmentissuppliedfrombatteryB.Additionally,the480VESFswitchgearanddieselgenerator(DG)controlpanelsaresuppliedfromeitherbatterybymeansofanautomatictransfercircuitintheswitchgearandcontrolpanels.ThenormalsupplyfromTrainA(Buses14and18andDGA)isfromDCdistributionpanelsA.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencyDCsupplyforTrainB.Similarly,thenormalsupplyfromTrainB(Buses16and17andDGB)isfromDCdistributionpanelsB.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencydcsupplyforTrainA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-58DraftB OK5ummes-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Each125VDCbatteryandassociatedbatterychargersareseparatelyhousedinaventilatedroomwithitsassociateddistributioncenter.Eachsubsystemislocatedinanareaseparatedphysicallyandelectricallyfromtheothersubsystemtoensurethatasinglefailureinonesubsystemdoesnotcauseafailureinaredundantsubsystem.ThetwobatteryroomsaresuppliedwithventilationbyacommonACpoweredairconditioningandheatingunitwhichalsoprovidessufficientairchangestopreventhydrogenbuildup.AredundantDCpoweredfanisalsoavailableintheeventthatallACpowerislost.ThefailureofboththeACpoweredandDCpoweredunitsdoesnotresultinunacceptableroomserviceconditionsuntilafter5hoursofcontinuousbatteryoperationduringaDBA(Ref.2).ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemaresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingto.warrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesandthe100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.Theminimumvoltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltageoutputof128Vperbattery.EachbatterychargerfortheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemhasamplepoweroutputcapacityforthesteadystateoperationofconnectedloadsrequiredduringnormaloperation,whileatthesametimemaintainingitsbatterybankfullycharged.Eachbatterychargeralsohassufficientcapacitytorestorethebatteryfromthedesignminimumchargetoitsfullychargedstatewithin24hourswhilesupplyingnormalsteadystateloadsdiscussedintheUFSAR,Chapter8(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofaDBAandtransientanalyses(Refs.3f>~'4>jandQ5')::,assumethatESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerfortheDGs,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallNODESofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-59DraftB OK5nunaes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheOPERABILITYoftheDCsourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingatleastonetrainofDCsourceOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCelectricalpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneDCelectricalpowersource).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofDCpowerensuresthatatleastoneDCpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.6).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref,7)canbemetatalltimes.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-60(continued)DraftB

DKKa.mmes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)LCOTheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersources,eachconsistingofonebattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafteranA00orapostulatedDBA.LossofanyonetrainDCelectricalpowersourcedoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionfrombeingperformed.AnOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcerequiresthebatteryandatleastonebatterybat4ery-chargerwithacapacitya150ampstobeoperatingandconnectedtotheassociatedDCbus.TheACpoweredandDCpoweredfanunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmayberequiredforSR3.8.6~~APPLICABILITYTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4toensuresafeplantoperationandtoensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-61(continued)DraftB OK.'Brutes-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1WithoneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable,OPERABILITYmustberestoredwithin2hours.InthisCondition,redundancyislostandonlyonetrainiscapabletocompletelyrespondtoanevent.IfoneoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesisinoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowersourcehasthecapacitytosupportasafeshutdownandtomitigateanaccidentcondition.Asubsequentworstcasesinglefailurewould,however,resultinthecompletelossoftheremaining125VDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemwithattendantlossofESFfunctions.The2hourCompletionTime,reflectsareasonabletimetoassessplantstatusasafunctionoftheinoperableDCelectricalpowersubsystemand,iftheDCelectricalpowersourceisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,topreparetoeffectanorderlyandsafeplantshutdown.B.landB.2IftheinoperableDCelectricalpoweree~soOV~ecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfrom"fullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothDCelectricalpowersourcesareinoperable,alossofmultiplesafetyfunctionsexists;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-62(continued)DraftB OK5xumaes-MODES1,2,3,-and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.4.1go:1ejYsujigi,"e't>h'e)!effects'.Y,e're's's,'"::.:o'fk,:thei":Ohapagelp;::":isasupplyin'~7jhhe;:::::coridin'u'o'us,'oh'iaqi5>ie'quojfedFtq'"'""andaceey4ab@'iol:.tige>i',gqii1:remerit'-s':>ar,,'eobasedonepee'-i-ngmyer4-eReeth'e':,'n'6i'i;nal,:-.','.doe's'i"jII:.:::.v'o'1'.,'t'a'g'ek<of':',ghegjb'itfi'jpand>o>>o>>o)5cP9w'.vAwA>>oso9~cvi<v'vwcv'ivNo>os>o>>>oPv>s'vswMAMw&>>>oNkwvhi'>N><>%was>>>>o>s>>>>"<<"'.os~<M~os>e>sm>xo>>>>a>a>o>?<o>'wo>::.~os.hem>Nu>'>+%'w"',oN>o>'ai~x;.aap~~frequencys,';.:~j.::s,:.,c0nlj,si:ent:;.';:.Hlitij(.,manutaci:u~rel.o'eo'oI'mn'and'asi'onei>an'dlLi'EEE';::'4)'0'i(R'af~iy8);.,'.;,SR3.8.4.2ThisSRverifiesthatthecapacityofeachbatteryisadequatetosupplyandmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.Abatteryservicetestisaspecialtestofbatterycapability,asfound,tosatisfythedesignrequirements(batterydutycycle)oftheDCelectricalpowersystem.ThedischargerateandtestlengthcorrespondstothedesigndutycyclerequirementsspecifiedinReference2.TheSurveillanceFrequencyof24monthsisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.32(Ref.+9)andRegulatoryGuide1.129(Ref.6+~0::>,whichstatethatthebatteryservicetestshouldbeperformedduringrefuelingoperationsoratsomeotheroutage,withintervalsbetweentestsnottoexceed24months.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1statesthatSR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.ThissubstitutionisacceptablebecauseSR3.8.4.3representsa(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-63DraftB OKSRmnmes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)moreseveretestofbatterycapacitythandoesSR3.8.4.2.Note2statesthatthissurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4becauseperformingtheSurveillancewouldperturbtheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-64DraftB OK5xurnaes-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-65DraftB DKSixunmes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.4.3ThisSurveillanceverifiesthateachbatterycapacityisa80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.Abatteryperformancetestisatestofconstantcurrentcapacityofabattery,normallydonein,theasfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacityasdeterminedbyspecifiedacceptancecriteria.Thetestisintendedtodetermineoverallbatterydegradationduetoageandusage.Abatteryshouldbereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80%ofthemanufacturerrating.Acapacityof80%showsthatthebatteryrateofdeteriorationisincreasing,evenifthereisamplecapacitytomeettheloadrequirements.TheFrequencyforthisSRis60monthswhenthebatteryis<85%ofitsexpectedlifewithnodegradationand12monthsifthebatteryshowsdegradationorhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithacapacity<100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.Whenthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithcapacity~100%ofthemanufacturer'srating,theFrequencybecomes24months,Batterydegradationisindicatedwhenthebatterycapacitydropsbymorethan10%relativetoitscapacityonthepreviousperformancetestorwhenitisz10%belowthemanufacturerrating.TheseFrequenciesareconsideredacceptablebasedonthetestingbeingperformedinaconservativemannerrelativetothebatterylifeanddegradation.Thisensuresthatbatterycapacityisadequatelymonitoredandthatthebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSRshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,'or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseMODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-66(continued)DraftB OKSRmnmes-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967,2.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.3.UFSAR,Section9.4.9.3.4.UFSAR,Chapter6.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.8.:L'E5E-::."450;,-',"1,"980',;9.RegulatoryGuide1.32,February1977.~10:;RegulatoryGuide1.129,December1974.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-67DraftB mAIA0VNUNItAA100VEAIBINBTlllllafOIWSIg,BTATXWNERV!CBlTIAIOTORUERHO.1000f0NATLT~aEASELaslXMIECfIC!<XiTIOGJ~COCOCl~COCOI4TIERYCHARODI!IAI!BAY.ABATT.gBATTERY4TTERY0/CHARBERA~0IAJEANT.PAAELATS.C.VITAL4TT.IAAIIUALTIIROWOVERSWiiNIE0Y4TTERYtJLTTERYCIIARKR\BDIST.IALEL8BATTERY CIIARBERIBIIILVVERTANTATX'RUINIERI)>)+RORUAILYOPEIIWHO!T00iZ00FTSKVA110VOLT~CONNT.VOLTA'TRARBIuUAERAT'!NIILbDCBOIIROEfOCOer.eTNTELI41OCELEC.FOWERNOURCEB);).~IRBT.!RISFOWERBCURCCSEIIOLINSIILERTSIShI20VOLTTSXVh110VOLT~,VOLTAGETRAIINAOltMERbL/IOOIDICO C3mE/)COCL DCSources-NODES5and6B3.8.5B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InNODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredDCelectricalsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumbereeoc~requiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheDCelectricalsources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredDCelectricalsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumDCelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Requiredfeaturesneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;b.Requiredfeaturesnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andc.Instrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-69DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODES1,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performance-ofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODE1,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-70DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theability'operformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportthedistributionsubsystemsrequiredOPERABLEbyLca3.8.1,"oitibi~s'y"'4:'-ll!MOAB!!Eand/6."IfonlyoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,theminimumsourceconsistsofabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthe-correspondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithintherequiredtrain.IfbothDCelectricalpowertrainsarerequired,oneDCsourcemustcontainabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainsystem.ThesecondDCsourcemayconsistofonlyabatterychargerwithacapacityofatleast150amps,orabattery,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling.Thetwomustbesufficientlyindependentthatalossofalloffsitepowersources,alossofonsitestandbypower,oraworstcasesinglefailuredoesnotaffectmorethanonerequiredDCelectricalpowertrain.ThisensurestheavailabilityofsufficientDCelectricalpowersourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).TheACpoweredandDCpoweredfanventilationunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmayberequiredtomeetSR3.8.6".3P~~-Gsg.~,q,c..S(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-71DraftB DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABILITYTheDCelectricalpowersourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheaffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.1AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6,"theremainingDCelectricaltrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientsystemstoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,andoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperableassociatedwiththerequiredinoperableDCpowersource(s),appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.RequiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaDCelectricalsource,evenifthatsourceisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-72DraftB DCSources-NODES5and6B3.8.5BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4WithoneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,janvement::::ki::.';i%!i,a81atediaftue'll-."assembl'j'os@andoperationsinvolvingpoliti'vereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDCelectricalpowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryDCelectricalpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshould'becompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.'SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.8.5.1mi".:-isaihfff3.8.4thatagree"necessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersubsysteminNODES5and6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-73DraftB

DCSources-NODES5and6B3.8.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.8.5.I(continued)ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcefrombeingremovedfromservicetoperformabatteryservicetestoraperformancedischargetest.WithlimitedDCsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromisemultiplerequiredsafetyfeatures.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDCelectricalpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.4foradiscussionofthespecifiedSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-74DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.6BatteryCellParametersBASESBACKGROUNDEachDCelectricalpowertraincontainsa125VDCbatterywhichiscapableofcarryingtheexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelowl05V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.I).ThebatteriesarenormallyinstandbysincetheassociatedbatterychargersprovidefortherequiredDCsystemloads.ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpoweraresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesand100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.ThisLCOdelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytetemperature,level,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityfortheDCpowersourcebatteriestoensurethatthebatteriesarecapableofperformingtheirsafetyfunctionasrequiredbyLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODESI,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8,5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuc'learPowerPlantB3.8-75DraftB BatteryCellParameters83.8.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysesassumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE(Refs.2and3).TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerforthedieselgenerators,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallNODESofoperation.TheDCsourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofeee~yne'cessary:powertoEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemssothatfuel,Re'actorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."BatterycellparameterssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthatbatterycellparametersforTrainAandBbatteriesbewithinlimitstoensureavailabilityoftherequiredDCpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrenceorapostulatedDBA.Batterycellparametersaredefinedforelectrolytelevel,temperature,floatvoltage,andspecificgravity.Thelimitsforelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityareconservativelyestablishedforbothdesignatedpilotcellsandconnectedcells'>>M&>>.>>>>>>.'>>'>>>Qc:>MQwfC$l,'i,::.."p,':J';:an'fi,":pro'c'edur~ej.These-l4~-tsFaj,'I;:ure,(t'ai;..P'e'AKg'hate".:e's'tabl;;j'she'd~l:,:i'm'it'sjiiiay,allowcontinuedDCeIectricalsy's>em'nc"ion>~>8>>.,m~hpyB4,&pe@'c-ypkcs,:v&pANcMv)>r'.;:"yps~yiA79$pww4%p>9K,ivy>ww~yiAAT'h>>>~@~M>ii!'-i---,:,'.:di.:!i>!!jan-,"-i:,,>i!i!;--">ty(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.8-76DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-77DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES'(continued)erm4s-4ha&~-derog-eq(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-78DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)mper-ed-eu4-.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-79DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)cup(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-80DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThebatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesarerequiredsolelyforthesupportoftheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubs~sTherefore,thebatterycellparameterlimitsarerequiredtobemetwhentheDCpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.SincetheTrainAandTrainBbatteriessuortLCO3.8.4andLCO3,8.5,thebatterycellparametersarerequiredtobemetinMODES1,2,3,and4,andwhentheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyaNotetoprovideclarificationthatseparateconditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.SeparateConditionentryisacceptablesincethebatterycellparametersareprovidedonabatterybasis.A.1Wi;:thi<onggoi;::mor'e,".;jbatte'r'i',i'sj~hpequ~,:reme'i'.'.,:::.;~s!jioi::::,::as'surei::,,';:."ariu.',::-:;::t'e';::.."coi,res'fiona'ing:;,::ii&(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-81DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)2-SURYEILCANCE-',:~!:",.'SR>',:3::-.:8~6"~lIRE'(UIRENEHTSi!a'ri'je'i:te'0)b'iib;':!!oiiei':::.o'wiriy.:,ji:Thi,'.i':l'ig:::::..coiis1':itent.:withene-ev-'IEEj',,-,',4,50'(Re7:-d~'"-'-"-"'t'h-t'~eh"""'"'1~t'"'"-""'-ff""""-'"""""""'h"""""""""'I"t)~~,,44-f,,':::::::Fii--:-"-y':::,::-.!illi.:"1ii'i!:::*::4@4%'kit%NAMVÃkh4%CCÃh'lR'1QC4%%h\ICYih.v(C48445vesA4SRl':~3'i'856'!."':2:er-a4-ie.,",-"'ll'i!":::"'i":,tgb,".,""~gisj,',:>I'."'."j::.:;:,(i:>>':;:.~~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-82DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)~~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-83DraftB 0F BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-84OraftB

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)Thirst::,\'ph'""'i'i"i'"end+ndl.fur;:th'e'iX'd::is'ct'i'sse.d,"",:;li::n":."::!I:EEE;-::450.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-86DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)with,Jhi':i!Fi':.i"---"",""!V!l,:T!iW'!llii'd"i'i!ilia'iitt~fEEE!!45tl::"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-87DraftB BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)I>SURIIEILLIANCE':,::;.::::SR'~NISaR'i'4!."4'EIIVIRENJENTS;,...",:"',(contbbitte'rjkc'a'p'ac)'ty)'ca,I,".cul',ati'os',ns,"eTheFrequeiicyof"'3>'RIdaysisconsistent'with"IEEE-450(Ref.~)'.SR3-.S-A-.R3YB'.6."'5ThisSRverifiesthat'6"e[iiiii,,',aRe.-",:t'eiaf'eratIIrveeEf;.,::;everj$fifthcellRereeei~~epera4ur-e-e$ThisisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofIEEE-450(Ref.Q4$.Lowerthannormaltemperaturesacttoinhibitorreducebatterycapacity.ThisSRensuresthattheoperatingtemperaturesremainwithinanacceptableoperatingrange.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref-.->:txf,ay~~jj.::>Shta;g~~+g,':hv'f<<j>>,"'.'"<<f>tshe>,:."":..,S:;:..'.,;:>eshshee~'+~Sea>>tM:>fath>>>acr'ceie&vseRV>L'N>>NsatheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-88DraftB

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)'ihiKGR'OOADIThe,',Ac:::';>>>s'tialiment'::;:,bus:":,,e1ec'fi;,ic~al:-'::ipower,:,',::.'disti:,>'suui>BI><<~~oo;~r:.,':..:!1~36::.O'AC!:,',::i~st'iUrjgritgb'UsdaR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-90DraftB AG-4eWrumen4-Bus-Scumee-HO8-3-.8-.7-~07-V~443-V~43-'VH+Rgd~+-i-neh-abeve-aex4auRNAHCK4Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)isnormallysuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanon-Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(see(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-91DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)Figure3.8.4-1).Thesethree120VACinstrumentbuses(A,B,andC)supplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuatetheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andothercomponents(Ref.1).ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentMonitoringInstrumentation."InstrumentBusesAandCcanbesuppliedpowereitherfrominverterswhicharepoweredfromseparateandredundantDCpowersources,anon-ClassIECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower,oraClassIECVT(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).TheinvertersarethepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusAandCbecauseofthestabilityandreliabilitytheyachieve.InstrumentBusBcanbesuppliedpowerfromeitheraClass1ECVToranon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower.TheClasslECVT,suppliedbymotorcontrolcenterC(MCCCissuppliedby480VsafeguardsBus14),isthepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusBbecauseofthepotentialtohaveapowerinterruptionifoffsitepowerwereunavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-92DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)Themajorityofinstrumentationandcontrolssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesarefailsafedevicessuchthattheygototheirpostaccidentpositionuponlossofpower.However,anotableexceptiontothisistheactuationlogicforContainmentSpray(CS)Systemwhichrequires120VACand125VDCpowerinordertofunction.ThispreventsaspuriousCSactuationfromoccurringifcontrolpowerwerelost.TheactuationlogicforCSispoweredfromallthreeinstrumentbusesandfrombothDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrains.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidetherequiredcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertotheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbasedonmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingrequiredACinstrumentbusesOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACelectricalpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofACinstrumentbusesareavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneACinstrumentbuspowersource).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-93DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofACinstrumentbuspoweralsoensuresthatatleastonetrainofACinstrumentbusesisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.4).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.5)canbemetatalltimes.TheACinstrumentbussourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheACinstrumentbussourcesensuretheavailabilityof120VACelectricalpowerfortheinstrumentationforsystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.\NaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClassIE480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-94DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8,7BASES(continued)LCO(continued)ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").ForaClass1ECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480Vsafeguardsbusmustbepowered-fromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").APPLICABILITYTheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.ACinstrumentbuspowerrequirementsforMODES5and6arecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.8,"~F4'Glnscrement'~!BemsiSnnrces!;-:,',;!NOQES5and6."ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3Withaninverterinoperable,itsassociatedACinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromeitheritsClassIEornon-Class1ECVT.RequiredActionA.1allowstheinstrumentbustobepoweredfromeitheritsassociatedClass1ECVTorfromanon-Class1ECVT.ForInstrumentBusesAandC,thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanon-safetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursisconsistentwithLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4".(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-95DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)RequiredActionA.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethattheinstrumentbuscanbeconnectedtoanon-ClasslEpowersupply.The24hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClass1ECVTortheinverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheconnectiontoanon-Class1Epowersupply.RequiredActionA.3allows72hourstofixtheinoperableinverterandrestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.The72hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairaninverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheinverterinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhentheACinstrumentbusispoweredfromitsCVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleACelectricalpowersources(offsiteandonsite).Theuninterruptible,batterybackedinvertersourcetotheACinstrumentbusesisthepreferredsourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.B.landB.2WiththeClass1ECVTforInstrumentBusBinoperable,theinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromitsnon-Class1ECVT.RequiredActionB.1requiresInstrumentBusBtobepoweredfromitsnon-Class1ECVTwithin2hours.Thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanonsafetyrelated480Vmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-96DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and483.8.7BASES(continued)ACTIONSB.1andB.2(continued)RequiredActionB.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethatInstrumentBus8canbeconnectedtoanon-ClassIEpowersupply.The7daylimitisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClassIECVTandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheClass1ECVTinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhenInstrumentBusBispoweredfromitsnon-ClassIECVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleoffsiteACelectricalpowersources.TheClass1E,dieselgeneratorbacked,CVTtoInstrumentBusBisthepreferredpowersourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.C.landC.2IftheinoperabledevicesorcomponentscannotberestoredtoopERABLEstatusor:::,:other,,::::::.Re'qudredlpettoIIshtareiiii'o8orB,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.lIftwoormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenbothinverters,oroneormoreinvertersandtheClass1ECVTtoInstrumentBusBarediscoveredtobeinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-97(continued)DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTSSR3.8.7.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.ThisverifiesthattheinvertersarefunctioningpropetlyandACInstrumentBusAandCareenergizedfromtheirrespectiveinverter.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinvertersandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.SR3.8.7.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.ThisverifiesthattheClasslECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClass1ECVTmalfunctions.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter8.3.2.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4..UFSAR,Section8.3.1.5.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-98DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.8ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUND.TheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredACinstrumentbusesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACinstrumentbussources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalsubsystemisbasesontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABLETheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACinstrumentbuspowerSAFETYANALYSESsourcestoeachrequiredACinstrumentbusduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a~b.c~Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andInstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-99DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheACinstrumentbusesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,and.resultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded,DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-100DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,.relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingHODEanalyses,orboth.c~Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Haintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingNODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinHODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOHaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClassIE480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-101DraftB

ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and6B3.8.8BASESLCO(continued)ForaClass1ECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClass1E480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4).PowersourcesensuretheavailabilityofsufficientpowertotherequiredACinstrumentbusestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents),APPLICABILITYTheinvertersrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.ACInstrumentBuspowerrequirementsforNODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.7.ACTIONSA.lAlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-NODES5and6,"theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablewiththeassociatedACinstrumentbuspowersourceinoperable,appropriate.restrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.ThisconditionmustbeenteredwhentheinvertersforInstrumentBusAorCareinoperable,ortheClassIECVTforInstrumentBusBisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-102DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and6B3.8.8BASESACTIONSi.:';:jlgc'on"i'i':nuea:;:<<>>>><>>A<<@N<<<>>>ÃwhvAwNS'<<A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3:a'ndXA.2.4""<<'PÃ<"<<<<><~&~o9<WM&~:<>><'~>,<>>W<<<."<<>">:<>~"'~%".QWW<~"A>><>'<'NN~+,)M?PN~4AXP~9i,::.tn',.::.'one;,:,"oi'::,'.:,:,mor',':.;.'::i.';equ'>>red'-:ii<,:'::,.:i0strument:;::;:,bus~';:power,:::.."...sou>re'esinoperab,ii,~i;ije,::.:.,'optjo',:;:equi:sts':::.ji'o:.:,;:::aecfari':,..;a:"ilj~ijqt'ijr'eafe'a'iiui'.es':::.'::::i'.n'o0'er'a5i:e.:."<pei',:::::iReq'ulcce,'~A'n'i'oiiA.~RC~~~>>>>><<<<>><<<><<<<<<<PL@0>4>pA>><>>8<<y7X9><<<<4<<:<<~R<>,<><<<<W>>>>>>><+(k~<<<<<><>'<<<<<;'<;<%<;",'N>><>.'<0>...<<>><<><>>><'<<XM8>'<<>:<><>><YA>';.>N<>>"A<<>pp<<4<KV~":">:>:>'><~i:.(<$>'<.>'<'<.":><oj)iio<n>may~+i,neo,i,ve:.;:,':;.Uiiaesir'ed!;::::aamjp'1::strat'~ve'~<ef'iortee4~~Tji'ei;e'for,'e";~,ipe".jii,i::ie,.~A'ct~~".in:,',A.'Me'.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA,2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceandtocontinue'thisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpowerorpoweredfromanalternatepowersource.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.8.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbuses.ThisSRverifiesthattheinverterisfunctioningproperlyandtheACinstrumentbus%%~~energizedfromtheinverter.Theverificationensures(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-103DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESthattherequ>redpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinverterandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-104DraftB ACInstrumentBusSources-NODES5and6B3.8.8BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.8.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClass1ECVTalignmentwhenInstrumentBusBisrequired.ThisverifiesthattheClass1ECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.3TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClass1ECVTmalfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-105DraftB

DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.9DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactioncomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspower.electricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswhicharerequiredtosupplysafetyrelatedandEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)SystemsinMODES1,2,3,and4.TheonsiteClass1EAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsareeachdividedintotworedundantandindependentdistributiontrains.Eachoftheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andtheirtrains,arediscussedindetailbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-106DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)ACElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClasslEACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).Eachtrainconsistsoftwo480Vsafeguardsbuses,distributionpanels,motorcontrolcentersandloadcenters(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).The480Vsafeguardsbusesforeachtrainarecapableofbeingsuppliedfromtwosourcesofoffsitepoweraswellasadedicatedonsiteemergencydieselgenerator(DG)source.ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4,"The480Vsafeguardsbusesinturnsupplymotorcontrolcenters,distributionpanelsandloadcenterswhichsupplymotivepowertorequiredmotoroperatedvalves,pumps,dampers,oranyothercomponentwhichrequiresACpowertoperformitssafetyrelatedfunction.TheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliesoneofthethreerequiredACinstrumentbusesthroughaconstantvoltagetransformerandprovidesabackupsourcefortheothertwoinstrumentbuses.ThelistofallrequiredAC480YsafeguardsbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.BAQiCGAQUWD-OCElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClass1EDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).EachtrainconsistsofaClass1Ebatteryandtwobatterychargers(withachargingcapacityofatleast150amps)whichsupplyamain125VDCdistributionpanel(seefigureB3.8.4-1).ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4."EachmaindistributionpanelsuppliessecondarydistributionpanelswhichprovidecontrolpowertoACpoweredcomponentsandcontrolpowerforotherdevicessuchassolenoidoperatedvalvesandairoperatedvalves.TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliestwoofthefourACinstrumentbusesthroughinverters.ThelistofallrequiredDCdistributionpanelsisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-107DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-108DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)ACInstrumentBusElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)issuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanonClassIEconstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigureN-.8-.~53,","8,-'9,'.-",;3;,:)":.Thesethreebusesareorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).ThesetrainssupplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuateESFandothercomponents.TrainAconsistsoftwobuseswithonebus(InstrumentBusA)normallypoweredfromaninverterandtheother(InstrumentBusB)normallypoweredfromaClassIECVT.TrainBconsistsofonebus(InstrumentBusC)normallypoweredfromaninverter.Thelong-termalternatepowersuppliesforInstrumentBusAandCaretwoClass1ECVTs,eachpoweredfromthesametrainastheassociatedbatterychargers,andtheiruseisgovernedbyLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."Thelistofrequired120VACinstrumentbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureAcu4a&m'AZtu'a6'i'~System(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3',"Post-AccidentMonitoring(PAM)Instrumentation."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-109DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and483.8.9BASES{continued)APPLICABLETheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident{DBA)andSAFETYANALYSEStransientanalyses(Refs.1and2)assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainofeachdistributionsubsystemisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofoffsitestandbyACpower).{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-110Draft8

DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneAC,DC,andACinstrumentbustrainisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwatertrainduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.3).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.4)canbemetatalltimes.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTrainAandTrainBoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.ThepowerdistributionsubsystemsandtheirtrainslistedinTableB3.8.9-1ensuretheavailabilityofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerforthesystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-111DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)LCO(continued)OPERABLEAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelstobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.HaintainingtheTrainAandTrainBAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFisnotcompromised.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithinthe'electricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswillnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.TiebreakersbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionsubsystems,iftheyexist,mustbeopen.Thispreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowerdistributionsubsystemfrompropagatingtotheredundantsubsystem,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsystemandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanyofthefollowinglistedtiebreakersareclosed,theaffectedredundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisconsideredinoperable.Thisdoesnot,however,precludeACbusesfrombeingpoweredfromthesameoffsitecircuit.a.ACpower480Vsafeguardsbustiebreakers(Ref.5)Bus-Tie14-16Bus-Tie16-14Bus-Tie17-18Bus-Tie16-15Bus-Tie14-13b.DCcontrolpowerautomaticthrowoverswitches(innormalposition)(Ref.6)DGControlPanelADGControlPanelBBus14ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus16ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus17ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus18ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-112(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-113(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)LCOd-AC-im4v-upensee.jf)chn'j',c'al",~'-;S6p'p'oit",':~Ceii't'e'r'!>b%ttei,"-.ja)::,';,":."::,:,,',::;::lo,:;::vr:;r;v.;:e"'.u':~vr,',o':~'".'.":,(cond'1:nOedjzi:.;::"':::;,":::,",::;:::,::::.':,::"':,:;".::;,::::lo'ower!,:":.Bai'r'B'av!4'::"an~dgB~',.(Rei";-,".'"'.;6':,NAx~awQv.rARk4k4xRct~:YkN~44'M4cANcNAPyk9ANQyw'wv'A,,eweNNccNcN..4'1iTSCj8at4iy'."::.",A"'.;Fus'ed:::;,Dis'c'one'e'ct~"::,":Sw1."tc67SC',8'at'te'ry'~'::B.':.,:;,Fu's'ed!,Di::s'c'onnectgSwi';t'c$MMACwNr.A&iwN%kCvbiNvivivNvAM(vkwwsMv'cCvi%x)kvS((Ndi'stj<jb44~ii'7r:;.'::.;s'ub'sy's't'eiiigi'."ompoiieiits.':;>Atrainisdefinedtobegi'n"from'the'boundar'y'of'*the"pow'ersourcefortherespectivesubsystem(asdefinedinthepowersourceLCOs),andcontinuesuptotheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponent(e.g.,safetyinjectionpump).TheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponentisonlyconsideredpartofthetrainwhenthedeviceisnotcapableofopeningtoisolatethefailedcomponentfromthetrain(e,g.,breakerunabletoopenanovercurrent).Otherwise,thefailureoftheisolationdevicetoclosetoprovidepowertothecomponentisaddressedbytherespectivecomponent'sLCO.Theisolationdevicefornonsafetyrelatedcomponentsareconsideredpartofthetrainsincethesedevicesmustbeavailabletoprotectthesafetyrelatedfunctions,Therefore,thetrainboundaryessentiallyendsatthemotorcontrolcenterorbuswhichsuppliesmultiplecomponents.Theinoperabilityofanycomponentwithintheabovedefinedtrainboundariesrendersthetraininoperable.APPLICABILITYTheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-114(continued)DraftB c DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ElectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-NODES5and6."ACTIONSA.1WithoneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingACelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcompriseatrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.TheworstcaseConditionAscenarioisonetrainwithoutACpower(i.e.,nooffsitepowertothetrainandtheassociatedDGinoperable).InthisCondition,theplantismorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower.TheCompletionTimeforrestoringtheinoperabletrainbeforerequiringaplantshutdownislimitedto8hoursbecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyiftheplantoperator'sattentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessarytorestorepowertotheaffectedtrain;andb.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithACpowerwhichresultsinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-115(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1Withone~u-i+ed-ACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdowntheplantandmaintainitinthesafeshutdowncondition.Overallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACinstrumentbustraincouldresultintheminimumESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,thesquired-ACinstrumentbustrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionBrepresentsoneACinstrumentbustrainwithoutpowerwhichincludesthepotentiallossofboththeDCsourceandtheassociatedACsourcestotheinstrumentbus.Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallnoninterruptiblepower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursduetothepotentialvulnerabilities.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequate120YACpower,thatwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hoursifdeclaredinoperable,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsaFetyby,requiringentryintonumerousApplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutadequate120YACpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;andc.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrain.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-116(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-NODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1(continued)The2hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheimportancetosafetyofrestoringtheACinstrumentbustraintoOPERABLEstatus,theredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheotherOPERABLEinstrumentbustrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.IWithoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredDCdistributionpanelsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionCrepresentsonetrainwithoutadequateDCpower(e.g.,thebatteryandrequiredbatterychargerareinoperable).Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallDCpower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursduetothispotentialvulnerability.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequateDCpower,whichwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hours,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutDCpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;andR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-117(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)c.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithDCpower.0.1andD.2IftheinoperabledistributionsubsystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.l44'Hi7$two~vere-trainsarew'i:;thinoperableÃe~l';.ictr1:cjgl'owi'yjdis'tr'jbGtioogi'ups:..'it~iq's,Qiepotentialforalossofsafetyfunc'tioni'sgreater.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionexists,noadditionaltimeisjustifiedforcontinuedoperationandLCO3.0.3mustbeentered.ThisConditionmaybeenteredwiththelossoftwotrainsofthesameelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,orwithlossofTrainAofoneelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcoincidentwiththelossofTrainBofasecondelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsuchthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-118(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.9.1ThisSRverifiesthattheAC-,OC-,anelectricalpower'i...:ainsarefunctioningproperly,withallrequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,tie-breakersopen,andthebusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemis~420VAC;fortheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,~108.6VDC;andforACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,between113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter6.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.4.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.5.UFSAR,Figure8.3-1.6.UFSAR,Figure8.3-6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-119DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9TableB3.8.9-1(page1of1)ACandDCElectricalPowerDistributionSystemsDISTRIBUTIONSUBSYSTEHVOLTAGETRAINATRAIN8ACPower480VBus14Bus18Bus16Bus17OCPower125VHainOCFuseCabinetA(DCPOPCB02A)HainDCDistributionPanelA(DCPOPC803A)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPA801A)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanelAf(OCPOPAB02A)DGAOCDistributionPanelA(DCPOPDG01A)ScreenhouseOCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPSH01A)MCBDCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPDCB04A)HainOCFuseCabinet8(DCPOPC8028)HafnDCDistributionPanel8(DCPDPC8038)AuxBldgOCDistributionPane'I8(OCPDPAB018)AuxBldgOCOfstrfbutionPane'I81(OCPDPAB028)OG8OCDistributionPanel8(DCPOPOG018)ScreenhouseDCDfstributionPanel8(DCPDPSH018)HCBDCDistributionPanel8(OCPOPC8048)TurbineBldgOCDistributionPanel(DCPOPTB018)ACInstrumentBus120VBusABus8BusCR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-120DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODES5or6,thenumberofrequiredAC,DC,andAGinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,orthenumbereeocrequiredtrainswithintheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,mustberemovedfromservice.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a~b.c~Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andInstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionandrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-121DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinNODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-122DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-123DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10IBASES(continued)LCOVariouscombinationsofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,trainswithinthesesubsystems,andequipmentandcomponentswithinthesetrainsarerequiredOPERABLEbyotherLCOs,dependingonthespecificplantcondition.ImplicitinthoserequirementsistherequiredOPERABILITYofnecessarysupportfeatures.ThisLCOexplicitlyrequiresenergizationoftheportionsoftheelectricaldistributionsystemnecessarytosupportOPERABILITYofrequiredsystems,equipment,andcomponents-allspecificallyaddressedineachLCOandimplicitlyrequiredviathedefinitionofOPERABILITY.TheLCOswhichapplywhentheReactorCoolantSystemiss200'Fandwhichmayrequireasourceofelectricalpowerare:F~)4iLCO3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)LCO3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLCO3-.3-.63',:.:3~4,LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationLCO3-.3-.7353$4'ontrolRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationLCO3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledLCO3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLCO3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemLCO3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)LCO3.9,2NuclearInstrumentationLCO..'<eat-RemevA-gtH~d-Ce~hGQ-3.9.4LCO;:;::3'.,"'...995ResidualHeatRe'm'ov'al';::.:;".'(~R8R').,',::,';::gad:::":,'CiSl~a'riCMaintainingthe,"'jie'C'es'8'a'r'y>6th'i't'i8,':::,::,.'0fFth8AC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpower@he-distributionsubsystemsenergizedensurestheavailabilityofsufficientpowertooperatetheplantinasafemannertomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-124DraftB DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedeventandmaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.lAlthoughredundantrequiredfeaturesmayrequireredundanttrainsofelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeOPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemtrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesassociatedwithaninoperabledistributionsubsystemortraininoperable,appropriaterestrictionsareimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5Withoneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsortrainsinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREoperations'invo"v'i'ngosi'imv'e""reactivi"y'"ionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionofnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepuryoseofsystemtemperaturecontrol;i'ii'thi'ri,:i'estahIpsh'edFjLFso'cedures:.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-125DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredAC,DC,,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.InadditiontoperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,A.2.3,andA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5requiresdeclaringRHRinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHRactions.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-126(continued)DraftB DistributionSystems-NODES5and6B3.8,10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIRBlENTSSR3.8.10.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC-,OC-,and-AGpdi<<ibeubsys4emstraf'n'sarefunctioningproperly,withalltherequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,requiredtie-breakersopen,andtherequiredbusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisz420VAC,fortheDCpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystem~108.6VDC,andforACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisbetween113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccountthecapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.IREFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-127DraftB BoronConcentration3.9.13.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.1BoronConcentrationLCO3.9.1Boronconcentrationsof,::-:::.;,:thegReactov:::.':,Gool":,ant'lSgstee@~C6gwgfiie'fiijijfcaiialji:::.'indpf'h'ei.':,",i'~fiick)~i'i'",".'jayity'gsha11beAPPLICABILITY:HODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.Boronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyA.3Initiateactiontorestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.l.1VerifyboronconcentrationiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.72hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-1DraftB NuclearInstrumentation3.9.23.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationLCO3.9.2Twosourcerangeneutronfluxehanne-hnioAYtot'",:i:shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME~1QSA.Onesourcerangeneutronfluxehanneleon:itor4inoperable.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.TwosourcerangeneutronfluxehanR@-sm'onto'j'iinoperable.8.1ANDB.2Initiateactiontorestoreonesourcerangeneutronfluxd~nAeorift:o~rtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyOnceper12hoursthefi~ifker,,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-2DraftB J'k NuclearInstrumentation3.9.2CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINE(continued)C.Noaudiblecountrate.C.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDC.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDC.3PerformSR3.9.1.1ImmediatelyImmediately~4~)hadeaNiOnceper12hoursK~h'isaf<tP>SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.9.2.2NOTE-NeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.59S'<oPerformCHANNELCALIBRATION~ng&.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-3DraftB: ContainmentPenetrations3.9.33.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.3Lon%71:@mijn':,iPenet,i:a'Mpjs:LCO3.9.3~7h,;:.,ei:ii'"',,',,t!I'p",,'...e',",ti',,'*h11bWNINILEinepere4ienthempal!1aiii1'ngiisdtetnrsi!...eel@::::::,::Ip-mess:::-1-':1li~--::-:---:.!ah~LTRpW%'t'n'Sp'lade!'%th:;,'.is't.".,.':,T'steat!:.an(,'",:.a~ness::,':,do'ar'::':;.:.'aTasef:,;.ljtgReli'Sp;i!Sateeibji!e!!alee'nr'e!'PT'tre'::.:,:thateei7riiet'S'::::::;X'iy-:if1OgA4ehe7;%v.v44~neJNsmer~One,:,,:daari.".'Tn,,thee::,:::per'sa'nn'eT,,hei~i!;::;:::!!I::.aaK,::,:."a:ased."i:;:n3Eich.':..jienet'r'at'Ion,,;;:;ji;;o'y)d,:>.nadir~'ct.,:::",,:,acceiP;::.;:f,SNo<LL,~Llr~ilas'ed::bg!'e)msniielg~jaJ"::,:':e'llfoams."hc,.,:,:1sQTsT!i'an!,"iisl~v~e.:,:'.:...'n'%.;:a'n'mme'.:::::;,'ai".::,':,:)au,:,';i'i::enh'>":.::,:::OY;k5~%9AQAheAemvMvlic9Nibv:~&caJw~0wa.~%~M"APP(!1CABTtTTTF!!i::"j;:,':,Doi!i)g'::,::,CORt.":::;".:,AtTRRATIOilS,::~,tenesemsnsx~~MR4ensrredACl'ION8CONDI;T,fONREgUIRIDjYACQONp~llP!L%TTOll:,:,ilTNti'UOji;.::,:;ii;;:,.:...:..,Io.'r.,:e':eneti',at'i':ons)not"::::,::i'.8;,:e"u"::::r",e",:""::::i':%,";."s:,"::;AYl~f!,',;:::::;::::::".::::,':::SiispenditCOlJ8"""'ALTKRAB:ONS:,',A"'R~t~r:~'~'QSp8.A,CNOVgpient~s40'f:IAN1'B~d7RR,'BNP~~mmed:i:s'teP~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-4DraftB

ContainmentPenetrations3.9.3SUjfVE'fi,;LAKfCE':":RE(VI'9EH5TR'Vy8Ãyse~)pat'.:.~'a:.jj:pjc,'i'i",'e'~;:ii"j)j!.~(i::l's'o,'i""ib'ri"'"'o'sitj;o'ii.'-.':.',:;on'j:,'ar'j~actV'8;:::-:,',ol',',:..siiiiiil.it'egai:tiiat.i'0ii~iii)"~r'ii1'i',;=""K~fs~mon,,~sR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5Draft8

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft3.9.4L~CO;:.':;::3:,:9;::0::.::l~Ki~',:.;,:;:;.!",:,One!RHR~ifoop'::::,:;shell:-:::bT'!OPERRBLE::.':::ingiOn,:NOTETherequiredRHRloopmayberemovedfromoperationfors1hourper8hourperiod,providednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)boronconcentration.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevela23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RHRlooprequirementsnotmet.A.1ANDSuspendeAoperationsinvolvingigireductioninRCSboronconcentration.ImmediatelyA.2Suspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.ImmediatelyANDA.3InitiateactiontosatisfyRHRlooprequirements.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-6DraftB I RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft3.9.4CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEKg,ii.iield)";(hVWV&'1%&ARtKQvc4pAggg;c'o.n'.t"::,i:i'd'.),~~~~~prov3';disci'jg~di,~eg3'cC)s:s,:;:.;,-',l:r'o.i'COA)aAfAeAt:Mego'sphere:::::.:,:,.o:;:oUis'jd8i'tio~spoii:i':,'<~-9-ATee-RHRkeep.km&be-4ah~Fr3E9kVNlL'ANCE".':RYgUfRKHENTSSURGE!I:i~L>ANC8iRiijuEHN~I:@%jour.-,,'sAooxaxt&w~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-7DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23ft3.9.5APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME~8-ps~OPERABLE~.A.lORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreRHR~(lgop:($'g~toOPERA'BLE"status.Initiateactiontoestablisha23ftofwaterabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ImmediatelyImmediatelyCased(s4bt~ii'ie4:R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-8DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft3.9.5ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMES.:,~4.:4~8";~l'::,SUsp~ey,:;'..":%oipaefh'tl',on)~jiik4')~;:i,'iig'.".;."a':,:,':::.i',edu'c::t';f,i.n'c'one'antral'>on'."'iAo8!'R~v,:-8k~~~.;."Ti,,:,It!%!,,'.&to,".aot!'oj~,:,'t'6r'es't'ore'~,'one'::,','.:'RHR~i'::1'a'op4o!,;Cpepta,dh".)AN5b:,i3'~!ii!:.:,;:,:.-.,C~loseaa1!1.-:;santainiiii,,i-:e'net.i,a'poi)'si'bnt'4)nN)jt":;:.:'::tbb'i'it'sorLel::'a'te'o's'yiii~rii.,::Fliat5%$~LwpficSpv,'Nv'.M4w"e";:.hoiiFs:maqVma-40gVEI'AC'f::;-".Nf@TfiKNfNT~~~~~rgORVE1tL~PC':5epee-a4-i~a-.F.Rf+UEHGgjR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-9DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-MaterLevel<23Ft3.9.58~HR:,i"-umy~-':t,h'iAs'll;:no'0':.",'!i'i'j4'jii;:,ijinn'.::7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-10Draft8 RefuelingCavityWaterLevel3.9.63.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3-.9-.83.:':9996'efuelingCavityWaterLevelLCO~3-.S3<<9,'5Refuelingcavitywaterlevelshallbemaintaineda23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.APPLICABILITY:Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,DuringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Refuelingcavitywaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.1ANDA.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSRBA-.!i-.43!!9i!6:,::!1::.Verifyrefuelingcavitywaterlevelisa23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-11Draft8 BoronConcentrationB3.9.1B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.1BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThelimitontheboronconcentrationensuresthereactorremainssubcriticalduringMODE6.RefuelingboronconcentrationisthesolubleboronconcentrationinthefilledportionsoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcoreduringrefueling.Thesolubleboronconcentrationoffsetsthecorereactivityandismeasuredbychemicalanalysisofarepresentativesampleofthecoolant.TherefuelingboronconcentrationlimitisspecifiedintheCoreOperationLimitsReport(COLR).Plantrefuelingproceduresensurethespecifiedboronconcentrationinordertomaintainanoverallcorereactivityofk,<<z0.95duringfuelhandling,withcontrolrodsandfuelassembliesassumedtobeinthemostadverseconfiguration(leastnegativereactivity)al'lowedbyplantrefuelingprocedures.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27requiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemspreferablyofdifferentdesignprinciplesbeprovided(Ref.1).Inadditiontothereactivitycontrolachievedbythecontrolrods,reactivitycontrolisprovidedbythechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)whichregulatestheconcentrationofboricacidsolutionneutronabsorber'(jjp'utrpon;,".":ab's'o'rbe'r))>iintheRcs.Thecvcsisdesignedtoprevent,underanticipatedsystemmalfunction,uncontrolledorinadvertentreactivitychangeswhichmaystressordamagethefuelbeyondallowablelimits.Thereactorisbroughttoshutdownconditions(i.e.,MODE5)beforebeginningoperationstoopenthereactorvesselforrefueling.AftertheRCSiscooledanddepressurizedthevesselheadisunboltedandremoved.Therefuelingcanalandtherefuelingcavityarethenfloodedwithboratedwaterfjo~'!ah@~etc%,julenrng7'::::rooter'age.::tang,'"'::tbrougRbtbye";::;upi,erat;RevjjOv'a'1.:!..:{:I<H:)Sy'Steiiie'bpumyps"::.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-1DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESBACKGROUNDRHRThepumpingactionoftheSystem)intotheRCS,andthenaturalcirculationduetothermaldrivingheadsinthereactorvesselandrefuelingcavityprovidemixingfortheboratedcoolantintherefuelingcanal.TheRHRSystemisinoperationduringrefueling(seeLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Fn3Y~CjaiaiC,CirciiRitYan:,':,:;.".;:.'::Qatee+L'evel,j~~23Fg!:::.,:::.:!a'ifCh::,'L'CQ3,::;,3:.5~q4Resi'nna'1::I'iea't':iR'eiova1'.:.:,',(RHRQanifCoolantcirculationintheRCSandassistinmaintainingtheboronconcentrationintheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityabovetheCOLRlimit.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringrefuelingoperations,twotypesofaccidentscanoccurwithincontainmentthataffectthefuelandrequirecontrolofreactivity.Thesetwoaccidenttypesareafuelhandlingaccidentandaborondilutionevent.Bothaccidentsassumethatinitialcorereactivityisatitshighest(i.e.,atthebeginningofthefuelcycleortheendofrefueling).Afuelhandlingaccidenteeeerseir'i":;>6e'curduringfuelmovementinthereactorvessel,'therefuelingcanal,ortherefuelingcavityandincludesadroppedfuelassemblyandanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly.Themostlimitingfuelhandlingaccidentisadroppedfuelassemblywhichisdroppedadjacenttootherfuelassembliessuchthatitresultsinthelargestexposureoffuelinthedroppedassembly.Thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivityforbothtypesofaccidents.Hence,theboronconcentrationensuresthatk,<<s0.95(i.e.,5%ak/kSHUTDOWNMARGIN)duringtherefuelingoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-2DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThesecondtypeofaccidentisaborondilutioneventwhichresultsfrominadvertentadditionofunboratedwatertotheRCS,refuelingcavity,andrefuelingcanal.Theassumptionsusedintheborondilutionevent(Ref.2)provideforamaximumdilutionflowof120gpmthroughtwochargingpumps(i.e.,60gpmperpump)usingunboratedwaterassuppliedbythetworeactormakeupwaterpumps(60gpmperpump).TheRCSisalsoassumedtobeatlowwaterlevels,uniformlymixedbytheRHRSystem,withtheminimumboronconcentrationasspecifiedinthe'OLR.Theoperatorhaspromptanddefiniteindicationofsignificantborondilutionfromanaudiblecountratefunctionprovidedbythesourcerangeneutronfluxinstrumentation(seeLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation").Theincreasedcountrateisafunctionoftheeffectivesubcriticalmultiplicationfactor.Theresultsofthisanalysisconcludethatanoperatorhasatleast48.8minutesbeforeSHUTDOWNMARGINislostandthereactorgoescriticalwhichissufficienttimeforoperatorstomitigatethisevent.Thistimeisalsogreaterthanthe30minutesrequiredbyReference3fordilutioneventsduringrefueling.Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesand/orstoppingthereactormakeupwaterpumps.TheRCSboronconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthataminimumboronconcentrationbemaintainedinthe'efuelincanal,end-therefuelingcavityaridtwh'e'afjortioiig'iofrthe,;:!RCgijthatarehydraulicallycoupledwi'th""tahereactorcore"wh'i'leinMODE6.TheboronconcentrationlimitspecifiedintheCOLRensuresthatacorek,<<of~0.95ismaintainedduringfuelhandlingoperationsandthatacorek,<<of<1.0ismaintainedduringaborondilutionevent.ViolationoftheLCOcouldleadtoaninadvertentcriticalityduringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-3(continued)DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE6toensurethatgthefuelinthereactorvesselwillremainsubcritical.Therequiredboronconcentrationensuresak,<<(0.95duringfuelhandlingoperations.InMODES1and2withk,<<a1.0,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmenthka&ef.gmit,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLim4si))Aji',tj',"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits"'ensureanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactor.InMODES2withk,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5,LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)"ensuresanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletomaintainthereactorsubcritical.ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3IftheboronconcentrationofthefilledportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityhydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcore,islessthanitslimit,aninadvertentcriticalitymayoccurduetoaborondilutioneventorincorrectfuelloading.Tominimizethepotentialofaninadvertentcriticalityresultingfromafuelloadingerrororanoperationthatcouldcauseareductioninboronconcentration,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsInadditiontoimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivityadditions,borationtorestoretheconcentrationmustbeinitiatedimmediately.Therearenosafetyanalysisassumptionsofborationflowrateandconcentrationthatmustbesatisfied.Theonlyrequirementistorestoretheboronconcentrationtoitsrequiredvalueassoonaspossible.Inordertoraisetheboronconcentrationassoonaspossible,theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailableforplantconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-4DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASES(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-5DraftB BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)Onceactionhasbeeninitiated,itmustbecontinueduntiltheboronconcentrationisrestored.Therestorationtimedependsontheamountofboronthatmustbeinjectedtoreachtherequiredconcentration.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.9.1.1ThisSRensuresthecoolantboronconcentrationos)theI'imits.Tfieboron'"'conceritratiorioft'ecoolant.isdeterminedbychemicalanalysis.ThesampleshouldberepresentativeoftheportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,and.therefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledwiththereactorcore.AFrequencyofonceevery72hoursisareasonableamountoftimetoverifytheboronconcentrationofrepresentativesamples.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperience,whichhasshown72hourstobeadequate.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4'.3.NUREG-0800,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-6DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.283.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDThesourcerangeneutronfluxehann~oriifoO;.s:areusedduringrefuelingoperationstomonitorthecorereactivitycondition.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxeham~mo'nits'r's(N-31andN-32)arepartoftheNuclearInstrumentationSystem{NIS).Thesedetectorsarelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselanddetectneutronsleakingfromthecore.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxdetectorsareproportionalcountersthatarefilledwithborontriflouride(BF~)gas(Ref.I).Thedetectorsmonitortheneutronfluxincountspersecondandprovidecontinuousvisualindicationinthecontrolroom.Audiblecountrateisalsoavailableinthecontrolroomfromeitherofthesourcerangeneutronfluxchannel-upon'i::tors:toalertoperatorstoapossibleborondilutionevent.TheNISisdesignedinaccordancewiththecriteriapresentedinReference2.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTwoOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxchaan~m6nj:,toi;s:aredrequiretoprovideredundantindicationtoalertoperatorsofunexpectedchangesincorereactivity.Anincreaseintheaudiblecountratealertstheoperatorsthataborondilutioneventisinprogress.SufficienttimeisavailablefortheoperatortorecognizetheincreaseinaudiblecountrateandtoterminatetheeventpriortoalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN{seeBasesforLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration").Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesandstoppingreactormakeupwaterpumps.Thesourcerangeneutronfluxd~naA+Fo~ni,"'t0rs-satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-7(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOrequirestwosourcerangeneutronfluxehanne-'I~are'it~'i,':,ebeOPERABLEtoensureredundantmonitoringcapability'is"availabletodetectchangesincorereactivity.~dnaI~sTobeOPERABLE,each~hmustprovidevisualindicationandatleastoneofthetwoehannHE>mustprovideanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroom.APPLICABILITY~(Ss.InMODE6,thesourcerangeneutronfluxcohenneismustbeOPERABLEtodeterminechangesincorereactivity.TherearenootherdirectmeansavailabletocheckcorereactivityconditionsinthisNODE.InNODES2,3,4,and5,thesesameinstalledsourcerangedetectorsandcircuitryarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.3.I,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACTIONSAaIandA.2Withonlyonesourcerangeneutronfluxchann&monTt'oy,OPERABLE,redundancyhasbeenlost.Sincetheseins6umentsaretheonlydirectmeansofmonitoringcorereactivityconditions,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsAaIandA.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositioner-nermal-addmkaN-..Pgheri:.than:,:,!nom'al:;,:;,coo:Idemn",io'f;;:.::,:.ritevj';:,"."~.ii":';,ei"'"..'.:ii,:':"i".'e:;i'ro'ce"u're's"',,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-8(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES8".':,ll:."':and;"'::8:";"'2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-9(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASESACTIONSB.l-~<'aidB.23.;":,:::;::.';::(continiiid)::Withjyoyjhjjjej,,i":a,:npi~p'tio)i".;,~F!1%&i,bi)1Jjjj;,;::,OPgRABTC-BtliiigQH;Ij'jh~,Ktth,:'::ltli'-!i'".=!hill'ih"'iiiiit!i'iiiji":,,"fii!'p'iiiiillt-:i::::,'!P!'!t"'it!*-,',':-'-"",'jijti:--:-:it!":--:ii-,',",i't,,-i:,::':::-...!t'Pifttt1'.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.I.Itoensuretherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TttPl1Ttf~tt1fft1tobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentrationTtF'requericylofe-ehangeon'c'egjeqpl3P~10diC.lC.2andC.3Withnoaudiblecountrateavailable,onlyvisualindicationisavailableandpromptanddefiniteindicationofaborondilutioneventhasbeenlost.Therefore,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsC.IandC.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionorormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofystemtemperaturecontrol';;withen"..e~s.:ab:.i:st@Pjjtocedlit".,88.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-10(continued)DraftB ~nH SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntiltheaudiblecountratecapabilityisrestored.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensurethattherequiredboronconcentrationexists.Thp1iif~ghifl'iobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentrationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11(continued)DraftB ~~~'Pireqiiiii'cy,:;::,:;1::s~i;,eaponablm,t4'~~-:,l."bi~".jii-iba'b'i::1:::::i;4jofTjI4':i1:2$,4b~Ur.c!0A~s'1~d8f1.llg'.a')iCn'BTlg'8X':;1;:0R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-12(continued)DraftB NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)E>ill%>!1'ALL<Ill'E!i!i(ii!i'i!!l!~E1liiii!!!3'%!!f2iiiIRERUIRRNENTS;"ahashRxaehcxsxsoh5i'ii'il"a'i",j'Iparame'tei':;:::'::,.;i':':::,:,'i'ii'i%he'r.;."::-':;m'os'3'tfiP"tisbasecl"ontheassumpti'ontIiatthetwoindicationchannelsshouldbeconsistentwithcoreconditions.Changesinfuelloadingandcoregeometrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesbetweensourcerangedanh~ioiifto'r's,buteachehennWjoji'toPshouldbecons>stenCwIthitslocalconditions.TheFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeCHANNELCHECKFrequencyspecifiedsimilarlyforthesameinstrumentsinLCO3.3.1,",ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."~>9SSR3.9.2.2EE>AL><!>I'!!!E'AIIffEAIIEELCALIBRATIONevery24months.ThisSRis'odifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeneutronfluxehann~l'dij~jtiijPconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampd'iscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedata.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.N@.R@~k<l.~p"~~xW'<Q"."..'><<xx>t'<Rxxn>~xh.':t:x<ER<x<:;:':;:.::>..::.'R".~<'"."~x:+4>aY<ci""'ax<<<':N'.a~a.Sx.t."~>.<<<h,%'xax%~x:XSNk%%>Y'-:P."::RSxNIRE"""~'"'"""'"'XE""""""~'""""""'M"X'MNW'<~~%~~>ENeE'""""Mi'4W"""i""'.i"'i"""'"'"'-'-"'"-""""'-""~~""AREFRLRRNCES~!i:!'~i!~<i:.,":::lgtUFSAR,Section7.7.3.2.2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC13and19,IssuedforCommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-13DraftB 'C'ontaj"anaiiient,';Pen'etraatso'nss8,"'i::a!!9,:.:';::,88-3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.3BASES'Contafnment~P'enetr'at'1ons5'5~~~~~a~~~Wain~s~BACKGROUNDQGSg).ii.i;:),jg,,',.:Cssfm-".,jes":::is'!ii',',:s~nioj."aianmenn~~g~~~jj~f'g~a~s~A'ospsdA'I'vAwg~(~'so~~pgcpavaorottn~~.'oggphnsosatj"'ka'ge'i'o5'"r:teira,."a'nd!~t4'sos::,"'ar'te'::setoi!rien!o're!niotassasososroatsssasaoType<<>!et!sandlot!sseasasttaeasososweemtasogy!seasat!seasons><gris."es~~qeosse!it's'-""'i"':","~ii"'-"ii""".':i"'::":::,:::il"1j!,"i""i'-ii'!:"I"*:'::ai."ai,::::::"'d~lsi",-'i"':,::ti",i-:-'""""':"'i'~i'tl':."i'h!Ie'tih':"ll'@':'!ii~tiiiih':fib!i!i:'li'ii!:'continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-14DraftB E ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.3BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-15DraftB

C'oiit'a'1'oiiiie'jjt~Veo'0!1"ass'o'o.'::::-.,1:soaotlat'1oii::,:Systeiiifljt~Ka<)gS..Woke.;-,>',.v),',:;O,yawl.;;:O,:::Sf'Ne',m,..:.g;.,if':,."%4';.:.-.e~>NgNSS;;S',+siSt~~fst:.v::,...'S,ed'O,.f.%tN.Ne'.see.,'O,:S'S>>,Ni'4!gNN8fc;.;?:;d',e>S'Nt'eyb$<',:;',BN>SNt'"'""'"""""""""'"'-+""""""""""'"""NINN'NNN%%'".-'"'""""""~'-OSAPPAL.'..1:.CAB'oo'!'ii'eqiiaj'cafe'jjtd:s~ii'iT!p11Iado?ed!!O,:-'.,oo'o't'i'iii'iijiiiiC'ji'i'iie't'jiat'i%i'jP>>>:"~"Y~tdfa"~sP'""~',r%>~f-;:::%~d,':."~to:.:;.'<~>N4%W'Pbe"::";N!%VKs?!'FN~'MP"<Ã><5%~NNt<4MFoN'<%Mi'~e'%s?NNPcÃ$~PNSÃ~>NMReX>5t%"'ONfaN'Si"""NSI"'SS'IS'N""'"""""""""""'""""""Wi~""'"'%."'Mi""M"'"""'"""""""'"'""""""""""""""'"INNS'A'cTFI.Iti'!!lilies!ieiiiiiiiiiIejjii,','dI!!!!!!ttiifftt:!j:::-::-:::::-'ll:'iffy;,'ll'tjit"'i:-"ilia-'f,'"-ijii'*:::ll'I'i""pic!R.E.GonnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-18{continued)DraftB

REFERENCESii.":::!':,*i'>%i""':::8"ic238+!OF'sA,R",:'~8'eiFiij$15::,:piLRREt,";-889~,',:::;!9iieetjii;-,.,:,15-'::.7Tc4,-;;...R~ep;:,8p::0iil-;,:,.1~981~:.dihkd",..Oc'tobe",:::::7,.'.',':,:;:.-:,.1:983N:5.CRC~>iCMgr~'@:::,:8C1CCC':;<C."1ZC;;:,:C.'C.Zg~g@Z;.~~~a'gC,~~~<':.gCCq..pMCcMC;.,":+C...C....'C.:C;:CC~"::ccR,:";.c;:;;::C.;~~C'.'v...,:.c,";.";:;:..",:::::g~:8Ec:~~%ccccIQNERNw'$8%4cNw'NNQKwÃcSNc1%NRaCvxv'NNSKVNccRcccvC@wARw%4@N>i&w'45v3Ã~c:R4$4@cccv%4VNN88ccc:NUMR.E.GonnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-20DraftB A1.!hAS;E)N%4%%.M<X'earsSKP<~~a..:.:AnaekeÃx<.x<0'k.exNRN4%RX..;:xax."."...<t...,+SR<@.CNPN~x<;:'.~x;:.4'H<:;Ne<<xF4x<~gNNWM<x<<Sx<<44m~<<<<<<tow'.<Xa<a<XXt<"'"R<<<<axxi<'<i'<<<<4v<i<Xvxtai<Na<v'AXdX<<<<%~<<XM<~~~<~v',X<xd!Vi&Q!!<<allIIIII!I!'ll;i(i!i)iiiiiiiiii'Ih',,'!!!i"',,',!Pj",:'<i!ah,,':i!IIB7I,!i!y,,t,'4T!!","i!Ia!!a!!,::,'i!!,iiti...!,'.""'a':!ia""'!aaaaa't"a"i"a'a'"i'a:".'ii,it'*'a'-:a:a-ato'i'!-'::::::*aa::a'""::';:'"a'ataxpi.;aaa<ilt";,<tli'i,'i!iijil~ghi'jdgip<'ax';;::."a'ti',,atitja'axiiitheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingMaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)andbypassline(s).HixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.Inordertoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,oneloopoftheRHRSystem.isrequiredtobeOPERABLE,andino'perationwhileinMODE6,withwaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-21DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft83.9.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)WhilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.DuetothewatervolumeavailableintheRCSwithawaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,asignificantamountoftimeexistsbeforeboilingofthecoolantwouldoccurfollowingalossoftherequiredRHRpump.SincethelossoftherequiredRHRpumpresultsinthe'regauiifevaetnhk'to't:='.:'.suspendoperationsinvolvingareductioninreactorcoolantboronconcentration,aborondilutioneventisveryunlikely.Therefore,thisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailabletooperatorstorespondtoalossoftheoperatingRHRpump.TheLCOpermitsde-energizingtherequiredRHRpumpforshortdurations,'P,va,ro1FvveePnroPoertaionsbre':,::,;permittedthateheiiiuld":.:,:,c'ause!fj",:::re'dII'eti'o'o'!in'<(th';.":Rcs:boronconcentration'.iiiisconaitionalde-energizingoftherequiredRHRpumpdoesnotresultinachallengetothefissionproductbarrierorresultincoolantstratification.scriterion41RHRandCoolantQa4erC'3';rc'0'3at~i',on":;-::~Wat'er.Leveli.;:.',7~3::":::::j'psatisfieLCOOnlyoneRHRloopisrequiredfordecayheatremovalinNODE6,withthewaterlevelz23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,becausethevolumeofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesbackupdecayheatremovalcapability.OneRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationtoprovidemixingofboratedcoolant":t~o,::,':.:m'io$mi'ze'&'6;::"pdss'~b~41::,:j'My"';,orf,-;:..cl,:,jti,'q'a13tP>.AnOPERABLERKRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-22Draft8

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23FtB3.9.4BASESLCO{continued)TheLCOismodifiedbyaNotethatallowstherequiredoperatingRHRlooptoberemovedfromserviceforupto1hourper8hourperiodprovidednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration.Boronreductionisprohibitedbecauseuniformconcentrationdistributioncannotbeensuredwithoutforcedcirculation.Thisallowstheoperatortoviewthecoreandpermitsoperationssuchascoremappingoralterationsinthevicinityofthereactorvesselhotlegnozzles.Thisalsopermits.operationssuchasRCStoRHRisolationvalvetesting.Duringthis1hourperiod,decayheatisremovedbynaturalconvectiontothelargemassofwaterintherefuelingcavity.ShouldbothRHRloopsbecomeinoperableatanytimeduringoperationinaccordancewiththisNote,theRequiredActionsofthisLCOshouldbeimmediatelytaken.APPLICABILITYOneRHRloopmustbeOPERABLEandinoperationinNODE6,withthewaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremovalandmixingoftheboratedcoolant.The23ftwaterlevelwasselectedbecauseitcorrespondstothe23ftrequirementestablishedforfuelmovementinLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel."RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminNODES1,2,3~4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-NODElj)>.:;,".,".8.:Gf"-;!R.FP<',"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-NODES::l(4'g::,."8'."':;.5'l~>,:RTP,,:;",Q2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-NODE4"RHRlooprequirementsinMODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftarelocatedinLCO3-.9-.43,.:"',",,9<>$,"ResidualHeatRemoval{RHR)andCool,antCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-23{continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23FtB3.9.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3IfRHRlooprequirementsarenotmet,therewillbenoforcedcirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformboronconcentrations.ReducedboronconcentrationscanoccurbytheadditionofwaterwithalowerboronconcentrationthanthatcontainedintheRCS.Therefore,actionsthatcouldresultin,areductioninthecoolantboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedimmediately.Withnoforcedcirculationcooling,decayheatremovalfromthecoreoccursbynaturalconvectiontotheheatsinkprovidedbythewaterabovethecore.Aminimumrefuelingwaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesanadequateavailableheatsink.Suspendinganyoperationthatwouldincreasedecayheatload,suchasloadingafuelassembly,isaprudentactionunderthiscondition.Therefore,actionsshallbetakenimmediatelytosuspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-24(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23Ft83.9.4BASES(continued)WiththeplantinNODE6andtherefuelingwaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,removalofdecayheatisbyambientlossesonly.Therefore,correctiveactionsshallbeinitiatedimmediatelyandshallcontinueuntilRHRlooprequirementsaresatisfied.P!F@Rlpglyoj.':,":::t!squiyeier~i:s;,~iree'jjiit;ie.t..,::;-".:-,ill",:I..=.,:ro'ntjiijieriii'pe'ne:Fit'i'i'i'rovi"i'ng"the:;:::ii'u'tsar:d@,';a!'mosptfkiie~;jiiiisc~,'::.5ethy'exi:."srs;::;::for.',;:the'.:,choo',an~tgto.",,bo$~gand.:'.",re,::.'e'ase,,':,'",r~adi'oa'ctive':."':gasR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-25(continued)DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel~23FtB3.9.4BASES(continued)k-9-.4~~Theand~c;xovyx~t...,y~iw.x;>.,trhxoy+Pg+yg~t~gq>.qc,~~c;q~~q~tq~yyga~,Poimt~~~RgR~alg~~iqrfd1'.nIan'c8.vNi484&%MAC~[EFERENCtS~!,,::>F!;:,.;:,:~!,'jQUF@A'R'-;::!:.:S'ecti'iin,::.';:::,6)!4!.',56.Q2;,,PFS'AR,:.,':.":,:,";".S'ct:;."':o'ii'i;:,1"'5.':4'::.".",:4/+2:iR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-27DraftB 8,::,,:3:l9,~:;::AEFOELPlG!:,OPERATIONSl35,:,.)411!%8l::l.S'9.,$~j:8gg'iPolllÃt'B~',<'!@ctrl@.'...",,9::Stl.,:::,.(8::lhtheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger{s)andbypassline{s).Mixingofthereactorcoolant.ismaintainedbythiscontinuouscir'culationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.Whilethereisnoexplicit'analysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunction.oftheRHRSysteminNODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.Thiscouldleadtoalossofcoolantinthereactorvessel.Inaddition,boilingofthecoolantcouldleadtoareductioninboronconcentrationinthecoolantduetoboronplatingoutoncomponentsneartheareasoftheboilingactivity.Thelossofcoolantandthereductionofboronconcentrationinthereactorcoolantcouldeventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-28DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft83.9.5BASES(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-29DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Inordertopreventachallengetofuelcladdingandtoensureadequatemixing.oftheboratedcoolant,twoloopsoftheRHRSystemarerequiredto~biP~OPERABLE,andoneloopinoperationwhileinNODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.dllllddII~~'Cipeolat'i~5ij~QÃt)>reLevel<j'23ÃFgc'satisfiescriterion4oftheNRCPolicyS'tatement.LCOBothRHRloopsmustbeOPERABLEinNODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Inaddition,oneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinordertoremovedecayheatandproyi,demixingofberatedcoolantItoj'jji'.niiiijie".::.:itiej!'Po'a'ea'ibif'tj'3a'o'fcr'iItic'aliitj.AnOPERABLERHRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instrumentsandcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.APPLICABILITYTwoRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinNODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremova'landmixingoftheboratedcoolant.RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminNODES1,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-NODE1F,"~~8.$%%u-.:R'f~P';"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-NODES1jj~F>'8",',:Sf~':"':RIP',:.,-."::2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-NODE4'";"Id!de!"d'ai!!lid!illdd'd!!!!I'::"jdcii*:.ii-,::.!ddtdtd!!i!Lai:'L"':,:".*'!!!rill!I,'::~d'll',RHRlooprequirementsinNODE6withthewaterlevel~23ftarelocatedinLCO3-.9~.!9;':4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevela23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-30(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.landA.2~'--"':tel::"::i"::::-'ilia!'":-"!'i!ij'jhow'-It"';-;-'l!.il""--'1!aail:l'liat,-,!ie.;'",,:-chh!c;~Khgwaterlevel~i~sj:i.'::,,23-gftabovethe4ep-ef-reactor5,Y974~<a7id~oQhajj'.,.'oen'j'.-.,"',::RHg:jliiIo';,:op'er:,a'l'I.'.oa.+'neAAimmeaiateC'ompfetiioniime'jcessa7y",.fori'~tj"'iis.--'le@'rkFiB.4-ahd-82:'c,':i:'c'ii,l,Th~e~p~'..terbit.::i,',a9e+owj"..j.;ed~.~eg8"""'!-'--tr'8'-"-'bahWdd'0"fRN'""t'""""w"t'h""!e(eiei(:,-:::',',,",,"!"~l,'~i!"ijfTglcer'""?;:,.:1!ii:,,il'~a~jj,",',::j,',:::.::,,:':i'i'lii:::::o'!iv':'.:::::::,.'-:'-"'i':lii:-'-~'-'4e4+enThre',:,ore,'ar!i"'ilyl:.i"!I:rip!i'!i:."d.,'oi!.:"epera4~aRCS-:,;.,bbron...cdnc&ntratj;bid:,,:,.Nilft:;,;:be;""~~su8endF6)mmei;ae',-.'miiiil1iteljpyiiddcontiniiae'dLitoia'rie'attoie:,:::::iinijteB'HR-'.!1.'o'o'p-,::,:.ot'ott'pera'ionCod!Xiiiiig:-~-..:5"8.:-,8'o5cetir!entlPj'ieti!a~resx~5;ati~n-;:,.ogdenR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-31(continued)DraftB

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASES(continued)lo'o",':,ehooldi,",;e>accosi',::iehedh!e"ed:tio';i'jl~~~~LV.",':::,:re:,:::RHR'A.o.ojisin4heeereopei.':ati.'o~n,'l:;."".','a$'4e'oiitijoijjiig4r~V~w'iA~A)~t,h".:":.ieRHR1oops~w~4!~~<<rX~Ie.;w>>0+"i)i~"""",jjj~gt>>judice,Yee~e~tmge.<~~<~c+l~x~xgx~wqvo~co<w~ejequ.:,;:iem';;s;::.;.;no",:.'::,':III'e',".:-,4",:.":e,:,-::po,eri".;.'a:..'."-ex':.:s.'j:.'.-.';:,oj'o'o'n","ii'i'niiii'n'~::::,e"'e'oioe',i,'i':e.cvi&%64'c'asIwvnekYshvÃM&~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-32(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.5BASES(continued)Cljiiij:,.':conti~.nment:,":.::;p'enetiptjon)thatscend'tTi!i:.,*"!!l":jim'~"h5rg::eiiiuv'e'j',','that-.';:"do.:e::"'F)mit's"',Yar'e'."."o~t'""'"'d""dR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-33(continued)DraftB RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft83.9.5BASES(continued),S0RV,EI1,LAAGER,-;.'~j~".."g~;:SR':"::::3""'9"':.8~1'EQU,:CEREMENTS;,"'thtli,"!ilia'tl!hi":,"-'!it*'lli'":!~tiii)!IIHII!'ll'!pills""",:".F,,',,"""::-'llRR%%9~BWfg!::veliticat>onispertormeaoyverityingproperDreaKeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section5.4.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-34DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevel8~3~9,:6B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3-.9-.63,":..:9:.,6RefuelingCavityWaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDThemovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentorperformanceofCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts,requiresaminimumwaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Thisrequirementensuresasufficientlevelofwaterismaintainedintherefuelingcavityorportionshydraulicallyconnected(e.g.,refuelingcanal)toretainiodinefissionproductactivityresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.1).Theretentionofiodineactivitybythewaterlimitstheoffsitedosefromtheaccidentwellwithinthevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,thewaterlevelintherefuelingcavityisaninitialconditiondesignparameterintheanalysisofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.1).Aminimumwaterlevelof23ftallowsadecontaminationfactorof100tobeusedintheaccidentanalysisforiodine(Ref.3).Thisrelatestotheassumptionthat99%ofthetotal'iodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofallthedroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytherefuelingcavitywater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory(Ref.3).Withaminimumwaterlevelof23ftandaminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortofuelhandling,theanalysisandtestprogramsdemonstratethattheiodinereleaseduetoapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentisadequatelycapturedbythewaterandoffsitedosesaremaintainedwithinallowablelimits(Ref.2).RefuelingcavitywaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-35(continued)DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.6BASES(continued)LCOAminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeisrequiredtoensuretheradiologicalconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentarewithinacceptablelimitsandpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.I).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredlevelduringmovementoffuelassemblieswithincontainment.Maintainingthisminimumwaterlevelintherefuelingcavityalsoensuresthat~23ftofwaterisavailableinthespentfuelpoolduringfuelmovementassumingthatcontainmentandAuxiliaryBuildingatmosphericpressuresareequal.APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicablewhenmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ThisLCOisalsoapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.TheLCOensuresasufficientlevelofwaterispresentintherefuelingcavitytominimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment.Requirem'entsforfuelhandlingaccidentsinthespentfuelpoolarecoveredbyLCO3.7.Il,"SpentFuelPool$$FP)':,';WaterLevel."ACTIONSA.landA.2Whentheinitialconditionassumedinthefuelhandlingaccidentcannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoprecludetheaccidentfromoccurring'.Withawaterlevelof<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,alloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinthecontainmentshallbesuspendedimmediatelytoensurethatafuelhandlingaccidentcannotoccur.ThesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandfuelmovementshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-36(continued)DraftB RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.6BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3-24AMST9.:::.."",6YlVerificationofaminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangeensuresthatthedesignbasisfortheanalysisofthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingoperationsismet.Waterattherequiredlevelabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangelimitstheconsequencesofdamagedfuelrodsthatarepostulatedtoresultfromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment(Ref.1).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelargevolumeofwaterandthenormalproceduralcontrolsofvalvepositions,whichmakesignificantunplannedlevelchangesunlikely.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.3.2.10CFR100.3.RegulatoryGuide1.25.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-37DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.1SiteLocationThesiteFortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantislocatedonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork.~~Theeeeeaeeexcljs'ja'ij,:aP'eailgii'eiida!i)~dig,:b'e'i<'as';:,",fc'1:;1"'i'!'*:-:f!!"!'"'--:,!!:i!i'".!ilia."".ii:."i<<'!i(i!i!~!!iii!0~':!!::1A.',.:::('3,:n~c:;,::::,ud)j'j.,Iff~hoi;.,'i);.;P'.;,::;.';,::>-'~80h0s0<<NNE@:.>,~',@'<<>);s~)~>>~~meqx,.,:x~4@+<.'<s~sy~,.p<.<<ssscx,i<<.w~h800QNls<:):j:~axe;x$$<)x)~';j@jg);sj-,,jg<'<aa<<as,')jxh<;;@).;):ig%)gj'5)ga>8g)0,Q'%~'%.e"...<j~~'c%.<.s,<.'<+e%'ui';;;:"'"'::.;:.';":';".:.'.."":"..:;.;"'::.".":::;.",::"."'"",'.";:::,.'"':.,';;:.,'."','-,:,'.":>~4.'xah0':SQ%~+>'~$';<ee".:s:(%spree!~~44j+>>p"i(&~%<@,':>eh'xs$:4gj4><+l1NNN=8'0O)esg:;feei/,:;.:t.h,(?.'f.:"fiickshallFe(<(<<<<<<-.;.pe.'."es':Mp<@~VNpc;.(re:,,:;a.';i:,a:,,:5:~x,.,;..'.:a:;:<<<.<.<<,"...<<e;sea<',a:,::.iv.,:".<<.>.x;a,.::"!.a:ss;.ss'..;~WKFs.W<<,,":l,:::::::.:;:!e'~%%%'%'""""""+"'""'""'.""""+'""'".'"'"""""'A'4%e<%'"e<+'""'R"'-""<<e"""'<<<e<<a"""<~4::::2RYa'etoy~Co'r.e4'"'2"'lF'"l'A"'"9'--"jTb~i.,"',,";:...i!i!'<!i'i!i"",,t'ai-'ll!Yll'!l,'",!!i!:::,,',,;,",!i!!"'s!!!!!withaninitialcompositionofnaturalogtlyenricheduraniumdioxide{UO~)asfuelmaterial.Limitedsubstitutionsofzirconiumalloyorstainlesssteelfillerrodsforfuelrods,in(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-1DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURESaccordancewithapprovedapplicationsoffuelrodconfigurations,maybeused.FuelassembliesshallbelimitedtothosefueldesignsthathavebeenanalyzedwithapplicableNRCstaffapprovedcodesandmethodsandshownbytestsoranalysestocomplywithallfuelsafetydesignbases.Alimitednumberofleadtestassembliesthathavenotcompletedrepresentativetestingmaybeplacedinnonlimitingcoreregions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-2DraftB DesignFeatures4.04;0DESIGNFEATURES4~2::Reacts,r.::C:o:,r:!i~(cont,iPuP<Q4.2.2ControlRodAssemblies4.3FuelStorageThereactorcoreshallcontain29controlrodassemblies.Th,1i1h11bNAG~s'flvji',,':::.'fnd$~um,~ilium.'.3.1.1Thespentfuelstorageracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:a.Fuelassemblieshavingamaximum.U-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;b.k,<<<0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedinSec'ta'on!!9!1'to@theUFSAR;C.Consolidatedrodstoragecanisterstallies'ereuirementsCOiiSOii)eteChi'fueI~aea'emb'!S'se'SiijauSta1AS'::~bi:i'lZ16:0,'":::;;":BTU/~ho",."b-.'.3.1.2Thenewfuelstoragedryracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:a.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-3DraftB 4 DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES(continued)b.k,<<s0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedin.S'eel'ion~9:.':,:::::fi:",,'jfj%theUFSAR;C.k,<<~0.98ifmoderatedbyaqueousfoam,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedinSeet4Žn~i'":,9$47~~6f'heUFSAR;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-4DraftB DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES(continued)4.3.2~DrainaeThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedtopreventinadvertentdraining~8th~a::::::lie-'"limni!,'.::I',::-A2573:0',::;:,:;(me'-,::,saba:,':;:.:-.:'f.:eip:.:'1:)'.4.3.3~CaacitThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedwithastoragecapacitylimitedtonomorethanSSRT0$gfuelassemblies.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-5DraftB Responsibility5.15.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.1Responsibility5.1.1Th~jg,::,',,'g::::::;",'"',",h111p1111plantoperationandshafldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence.Th~jti,higgi'"'jj,,hhdTg,h11pppriortoimplementation,eac'h"proposedtest,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.5.1.2TheShiftSupervisor(SS)shallberesponsibleforthecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinMODE1,2,3,or4,anindividualwithanactiveSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)licenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinMODE5or6,anindividualwithanactiveSROlicenseorReactorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-1DraftB Organization5.25.0ADHINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.2Organization5.2.1OnsiteandOffsiteOranizationsOnsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallbeestablishedforplantoperationandcorporatemanagement,respectively.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.a~Linesofauthority,responsibility,andcommunicationshallbedefinedandestablishedthroughouthighestmanagementlevels,intermediatelevels,andalloperatingorganizationpositions.Theserelationshipsshallbedocumentedandupdated,asappropriate,inorganizationcharts,functionaldescriptionsofdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandrelationships,andjobdescriptionsforkeypersonnelpositions,orinequivalentformsofdocumentation.Theserequirements>~"'::inc),lld)ng~.,th'dKl~jneati'd:il'1""-:,th'i"se-','jTe'ch'n'ical)jS'p'e'cjIftj'c'a0'id(ic~uinented"'in-:tlite:UFSAR-.,-:-"-:-::::::----::---:b.!h~pili"'"'t:","i,',""'jj','..<<:iy>j~'ynyo.i&acer'epprt:;.",::te':::;:th'~e~nTrp'creteiije~e:;:r'e'eeideiiE~jpejif~i:d":,,in';:~5%2,-,:.1::.',::!ll(,,I","'!!ll'iiibi:,:;:::,'",",,',",ib!,',!'!!!.e'ev~!e!e!~"~gnymph;"pw~"r.evnmwyyv~!!y,~yeyy':,!ii-li':-:.:e!iii::,:I!i!!-,-.::;:.i!1!,'-!'!ilia,",'dpi,'*-Ij,!'!:*onpertai'.:i'On,:..".:a'ri'a~m'ain't'en'an'c'edot'ncLt'npe'er'tl'ko'::,:,";:thiiljident.i"te';::.,:ed,n",iiir'e'!!nl7nleer,,.:ieefetyJ!i(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-2DraftB

Organization5.25.2Organization(continued)0'iu'i~'i,:tli~'1Lii'!ri'dej'e'r'i'd'eii4ii::;~0'~i!a'i'ojij'i':,,'it'iii9.'".".'!j'i'i'!i(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-3DraftB Organization5.25.2Organization(continued)5.2.2PlantStaffTheplantstafforganizationshallincludethefollowing:a.Anauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwithfuelinthereactor.AnadditionalauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinNODE1,2,3or4.b.Shiftcrewcompositionmaybeonelessthantheminimumrequirementof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)andSpecifications5.2.2.aand5.2.2.eforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoretheshiftcrewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirements.C.d.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresshallbeonsitewhenfuelisinthereactor.Thepositionmaybevacantfornotmorethan2hours,inordertoprovideforunexpectedabsence,providedimmediateactionistakentofilltherequiredposition.TheamountofovertimeworkedbyplantstaffmembersperformingsafetyrelatedfunctionsshallbelimitedandcontrolledinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram.e.Ii'he:.";::ojeratioll'ei::;,iaTnraijer::or:,'okrhfionsqiniddlee!iaaiiagei<jslia~li."o',.',.'i)!l,l",'o'e'ne'e'i"TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermalhydraulics,reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationoftheplant.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinNODE1,2,3or4andshallmeetthequalificationsAll*ETAdR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantZ~(ye.g'nu9'tAPi>~,g5.0-4~~~aV(Q.~JamnPWCS.4)&.4~~Waste,con.OuitLa4m.s~i~QR)Cprk~QeeS%ca.5~ir+t.$/)+(i~>g~a'+l.A~DraftB PlantStaffqualifications5.35.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.3PlantStaffqualifications5.3.1EachmemberoftheplantstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,Revision1,September1975,forcomparablepositions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-5DraftB Procedures5.45.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.4Procedures5.4.1Writtenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintai'nedcoveringthefollowingactivities:a.TheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978;b.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresrequiredtoimplementtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1,asstatedinGenericLetter82-33;c.Effluentandenvironmentalmonitoring;d.FireProtectionProgramimplementation;ande.AllprogramsspecifiedinSpecification5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-6DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.0ADHINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.5ProgramsandManualsThefollowingprogramsandmanualsshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintained.5.5.1OffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCHTheODCHshallcontainthemethodologyandparametersusedinthecalculationofoffsitedosesresultingfromradioactivegaseousandliquideffluents,inthecalculationofgaseousandliquideffluentmonitoringalarmandtripsetpoints,andintheconductoftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogram;andb.TheODCMshallalsocontaintheradioactiveeffluentcontrolsandradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesanddescriptionsoftheinformationthatshouldbeincludedintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingandRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReports.LicenseeinitiatedchangestotheODCH:a.Shallbedocumentedandrecordsofreviewsperformedshallberetained.Thisdocumentationshallcontain:1.sufficientinformationtosupportthechange(s)togetherwiththeappropriateanalysesorevaluationsjustifyingthechange(s),2.adeterminationthatthechange(s)maintainthelevelsofradioactiveeffluentcontrolrequiredby10CFR20.1302,40CFR190,10CFR50.36a,and10CFR50,AppendixI,anddoesnotadverselyimpacttheaccuracyorreliabilityofeffluent,dose,orsetpointcalculations;b.Shallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptancebytheonsitereviewfunctionandtheapprovalofthe~Nasag~j'tait~i:,:.:"manaj~ei;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-7DraftB

ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals5.5.1ODCH(continued)C.ShallbesubmittedtotheNRCintheformofacomplete,legiblecopyoftheentireODCHasapartoforconcurrentwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodofthereportinwhichanychangeintheODCHwasmade.Eachchangeshallbeidentifiedbymarkingsinthemarginoftheaffectedpages,clearlyindicatingtheareaofthepagethatwaschanged,andshallindicatethedate(i.e.,monthandyear)thechangewasimplemented.5.5.2PrimarCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProram5.5.3Thisprogramprovidescontrolstominimizeleakagefromthoseportionsofsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccident.ThesystemsincludeContainmentSpray,SafetyInjection,andResidualHeatRemoval~~intherecirculationconfiguration.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Preventivemaintenanceandperiodicvisualinspectionrequirements;andb.Integratedleaktestrequirementsforeachsystematrefuelingcycleintervalsorless.PostAccidentSamlinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsthatensurethecapabilitytoobtainandanalyzereactorcoolant,radioactivegases,andparticulatesinplantgaseouseffluentsandcontainmentatmospheresamplesunderaccidentconditions.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a~b.C.Trainingofpersonnel;Proceduresforsamplingandanalysis;andProvisionsformaintenanceofsamplingandanalysisequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-8DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProramThisprogramconformsto10CFR50.36aforthecontrolofradioactiveeffluentsandformaintainingthedosestomembersofthepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonablyachievable.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheODCH,shallbeimplementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsareexceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a.LimitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCM;b.Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingtotentimestheconcentrationvaluesin10CFR20,AppendixB,Table2,Column2;C.d.e.Monitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.1302andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCM;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttounrestrictedareas,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;DeterminationofcumulativeandprojecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCHatleastevery31days;f.Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiodof31dayswouldexceed2%oftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-9DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)~is~5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProram(continued)g.Limitationsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentstoareasbeyondthesiteboundaryconformingtothedoseassociatedwith10CFR20,AppendixB,Table44g,Column1;h.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesresultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;andLimitationsontheannualdoseordosecommitmenttoanymemberofthepublicduetoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190.ComonentCclicorTransientLimitNPF6'r'RBThisprogramprovidescontrolstotrackthereactorcoolantsystemcyclicandtransientoccurrencesspecifiedin4he-UFSARjTa'b~l,'e~5,."'.f~<'4)<toensurethatcomponentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.5.5.6Pre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringanytendondegradationinpre-stressedconcretecontainments,includingeffectivenessofitscorrosionprotectionmedium,toensurecontainmentstructuralintegrity.TheTendonSurveillanceProgram,inspectionfreq.eciesandacceptancecriteriashallbeinaccordancewithNRCapprovedprop"a.t.~S,~<aionTheprovisionsofSR3.0.2and"SR3.0.3areapplicabletotheTendonSurveillancePrograminspectionfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-10DraftB

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.7RTtiset,'vi'c'e.,'-":Te's'lt'inProramlMpg,~ii",%'.:"e,-,-i:,',,'lt,,:,e.,:'*f44mopej'5s6t,.',v'l.;ce.".'-,.;:.,'es",'),5'go"I",'";a'nd>4.::.:comsponeehts)F~nc;:f:uajng:;";,:;aDoj,~ca6,l:e::,'.;',.supports.:.m-e4heprogramshallincllltieth>fol'imari'ng:a.TestingfrequenciesspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaasfollows:ASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddenda.terminologyforinservicetestingactivitiesRequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestinactivitiesWeeklyMonthlyQuarterlyorevery3monthsSemiannuallyorevery6monthsEvery9monthsYearlyorannuallyBienniallyorevery2yearsAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper184daysAtleastonceper276daysAtleastonceper366daysAtleastonceper731daysb.c~TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2areapplicabletotheaboverequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestingactivities;TheprovisionsofSR3.0.3areapplicabletoinservicetestingactivities;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-11DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)d.NothingintheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeshallbeconstruedtosupersedetherequirementsofanyTechnicalSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-12DraftB U~~c&OAnc~~~sf.;~Ski;t4u~~P~g<~ww~(:M"3r-<~pMovcv~<,M~>+Q~~~"4"MI'~QQ~<4J%we~~664M~wcgb0AE~~(c,<'L~<~4Puk'vmM~,~~4<~~~4~glaCX-l~4'04Wg,(,-g5.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)ProgramsandManuals5.5$-.6-.9&5",!.:8SteamGeneratorSGTubeSurveillanceProramEachSGshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyperformanceofan'inserviceinspectionprograTheprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Theinspection,intervalsforSGtubesshallbespecifiedin4VegInserviceInspectionProgram.b.SGtubesthathaveimperfections>40%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.c.SGsleevesthathaveimperfections>30%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.jfh)'::iprogram'i':,:6'ijde's'Fearing)!~els:;,:.:fbi.'.>'tii'os~"::topi@s'e'co'n"'arj;":.;:,::::wa..eri::..c'em':s:r::to'"4>cMQNv..w.'~M%0~~vi%4~ems~Vrjffjb'1t'"46~~tube',"'degridio'],'.oi.~~fT'h'1's',:::,.ii<igr:;am:,,sliÃfl!l!iTiYl',ide:::(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-13DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)var);:a,.:,ees;;;:,;:an',coA4:.'::::'omni:s,'::.:,':,:of;-::,:::.tet';::.:,v'a~di,h::,'4:;biiiii~iii!t'd,,:i)m:--:o."-,i-:--tifhi'-~:,:0:"-:,-:-ii:,:----%i!!:-:"---'----:::,::ifm::::::,::::,'-::I:::::::~c~~xdi.rifÃf'ical%'Qri'.::::--':pro'cess',"'.".s'a'mph",':i::.i'pot;nil:.':;"I8~~OPTO.edurei::!'t~:a:i7Ffhi.;:;ice,O~F'd)j'::aiid3!i$aeaqemeat!Otl!d'a'tao:i,ooi'Qtj)cem.strj',:-,':,.c,'o,n;:jib:ifnF;::;Na)i,amdi.ii'j."t'evtaj've'~jev'e~a'i!i'.ec::,v'eia'ci:::,o".ai"'=(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-14DraftB ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)i%3LSo5',",':;,'O'."'LT0,":;:;."::::.::::,"':::::,',",:::VeifIti"::.I':at':i'~ri'.,:":':.'I'te',":~fest'i'n"8,'ro"ram'.:,"IIF'TII;.~int'et'Ual8::'~,;:4,,:!24)~Noiitgj'.,l5o"ii<pi!:,,:Ca'jitasiimept,,:::P~gt.;.-'::A'ccrc..dest';;.,".:,Char,;.""oa."I::-:::,"::Sy~s:et~iii'.:::!!Daiaoa'otic'at~!Khd:ibas'su1!8!dDopiaaot'tos'satb&'ll'L'baI!cpk'lI,~a,.~-abiR.".'>:::,::t:::.:Dai'!ll.":,:ib~v'ifiaabita'st'ad,:u'adar!j4'mb1'auiittbs'a'ii'0'!itbiiii'sJ"""F,';.p::DaiaoaTtYi~7i~gfiji:.,:;ayoarib'ou,::;.sajij'1'a-::,'."ithapj'a::.";:;Iabpv,,'atoij.,'by':,:;.::g~Cobtjjnijiaat.'::,::Da'oi'ii'!o'u1,'a'taoii':"::F%$',::::::,C'o'<~i';:ai::,"":::Syst~igtg)t>Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthehighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).~~c~2.Demonstratethatanin-placedioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)1.DemonstratethepressuredropacrosstheHEPAfilterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placeF80testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationand'ystembypass<-1.0%.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-15DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)~[So5~5'.',:fOV'FTP.;:."':,"(:c'6'rj't'i;nued)'.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoal<~~'4~-abserbevbankis<3inchesofwater$~t'::",.:iVCesijii:]f1owrate(+10%).4.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoala6~~~4-"cabser4svbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.5.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofa90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.d.~SI!IiCh1Ah4'Ad",,'ilL'iSyDemonstratethatthetotalairflowratefromthecharcoalabee&ersL1sor6ersshowsatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithacomp'feCesetofnewabserbersdde'sor'b4'ri.2.,Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoalWser4ers-bankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyof~90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheVFTPfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-16DraftB

ProgramsandHanuals5.55,5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)5.5.11ExlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivitHonitorinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforpotentiallyexplosivegasmixturescontainedinthewastegasdecaytanksandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinwastegasdecaytanks.ThegaseousradioactivityquantitiesshallbedeterminedfollowingthemethodologyinNUREG-0133.Theprogramshallinclude:a.Thelimitsforconcentrationsofhydrogenandoxygeninthewastegasdecaytanksandasurveillanceprogramtoensurethelimitsaremaintained.Suchlimitsshallbeappropriatetothesystem'sdesigncriteria(i.e.,whetherornotthesystemisdesignedtowithstandahydrogenexplosion);andb.Asurveillanceprogramtoensurethatthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankislessthantheamountthatwouldresultinawholebodyexposureofz0.5remtoanyindividualinanunrestrictedarea,intheeventofanuncontrolledreleaseofthetanks'ontents.5.5.12TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityHonitoringProgramsurveillancefrequencies.DieselFuelOilTestinProramAdieselfueloiltestingprogramtoimplementrequiredtestingofbothnewfueloilandstoredfueloilshallbeestablished.Theprogramshallincludesamplingandtestingrequirements,and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-17DraftB

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-18Draft8 ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.133;:,iR'gleai;.:,:,":a'ad!lb'iight~".:::appeaijii'ci;:;igfh':::;:::poo7iei;":,ooi~fi",:;:::,::::a%oii,a~I!i'i":i'-':::i!F!i:::OSa!i!i!i!iii:'""!elise'::'"ll'!J!i'echnicalSecificationsTSBasesControlProramThisprogramprovidesameansforprocessingchangestotheBasesoftheseTechnicalSpecifications.a~b.C.ChangestotheBasesoftheTSshallbemadeunderappropriateadministrativecontrolsandreviews.LicenseesmaymakechangestoBaseswithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangesdonotinvolveeitherofthefollowing:1.AchangeintheTSincorporatedinthelicense;or2.AchangetotheUFSARorBasesthatinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.TheBasesControlProgramshallcontainprovisionstoensurethattheBasesaremaintainedconsistentwiththeUFSAR.d.ProposedchangesthatmeetthecriteriaofSpecification5.5.13.b.1orSpecification5.5.13.b.2shallbereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.ChangestotheBasesimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalshallbeprovidedtotheNRConafrequencyconsistentwith10CFR50.71e.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-19DraftB

ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.14SafetFunctionDeterminationProramSFDPThisprogramensures44'~lossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionstaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6$anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherappropriateactionsmaybetakenasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability(~i'nd<c'oui,',e'ijarldiri'gThisprogramimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.TheSFDPshallcontainthefollowing:a.Provisionsforcrosstraincheckstoensurealossofthecapabilitytoperformthesafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysisdoesnotgoundetected;b.Provisionsforensuringtheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionifalossoffunctionconditionexists;c.Provisionstoensurethataninoperablesupportedsystem'sCompletionTimeisnotinappropriatelyextendedasaresultofmultiplesupportsysteminoperabilities;andd.Otherappropriatelimitationsandremedialorcompensatoryactions.Alossofsafety.functionexistswhen,assumingnoconcurrentsinglefailure,asafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysiscannotbeperformed.Forthepurposeofthisprogram,alossofsafetyfunctionmayexistwhenasupportsystemer-4rH'n-isinoperable(4~!,:,.:an>(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-20DraftB ProgramsandManuals'5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-21DraftB ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued).Areuiredsstemev-@+~redundanttotheeem@ed-systemsaaaHef~n.';.tirnpcupported%~!t'ai'e,,:,snopexa>1'e",:sopLorte~deyifciaisalsoinopera'le;or'8.Arequiredsystemredundanttothejj~o,'eY~a&1."eFs'gp'ppHsystem(s)er-tra~7o~i':,::,tYesupportedovs(~$iwx>vi<ac'~vasot,;~oyanq~v)apynasgTg"et~bonoinoperable~(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-22DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandNanuals(continued)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-23DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManualsSSFOP::.".'::,:;('c'~ntfyiOi.@theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.~~~T~ei4;:::::;:P'io"r!'aarII;i!!:,::,!6ft'i~diL6e'Late'mb'ed~i'i'>995~a6oam9em6aarmaeTheeeak;;.cj:,,liii1~aed,:romoLiaar1riiiia'arrarr:,';iaaei;rial-:,ae',a'eore::.,:far,.:.".:the)::;di'ii,'ai4iS:a1".iOda9a:.":raO1O:aO'iit:::.,a'OC5derit:,'::::::P'-::!'1ra,",,:'60.::::p'i)i'>'a'Li,",',"k-rII"'tl'r::--'-."'p'm',",:-,.:--.:--,.a'.i!i-",!',,'i'mR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-24DraftB ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManualsi::,:,",:.:75:,,:Ld!ei",,:-,.',T,pec'::-:::O':,:::teests:",'b:."',;-'.::.",".";;:.'."-:A'if,:',.,:';,joe'k";""'te'8tj;rfg",-:4'c'cepfan~e.':"':@gite'rex::.::::at':6,:::"'Lf~!:::;,;:F,::.,ei>e'a'~ti;:;:"yji~leck,:;.":i'eveee~f1.':::::::I'jikVj'e,:~c.::::;-~N~i,etcire'gy~veleve!.",::ecce0tan'cd:cr1tejiee1's'g><0!!OBQL>i@h~eeitested"f;,';,,';-.:,;.;,;.~.".','..-,,:,-i;,-"::~SR"';"','.P,,;;-';a:;.',;;.,..',",'vi'".;,';.';,'.;'n',"',,',.':.'::,';.i,,'e~geerlwppwwyry~g~gpAys@weveyp~vAev~~rh~9@vAyeye'yyeeyevye~/egAYrj(e~geelyy~evvrqeee(pge~eyrygyp(l.;heppjove'sg'onsgog4hj'3",".0'";:>jfao"not)~ip'p'i'y-"::toast'iie';;;.t'e'stkireque'ncaaesR,E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-25DraftB

ReportingRequirements5.65.0ADHINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.6ReportingRequirementsThefollowingreportsshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.4.5.6.1OccuationalRadiationExosureReort5.6.2Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utility,andotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposures>100mrem/yrandtheirassociatedmanremexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions(e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,inserviceinspection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance,wasteprocessing,andrefueling).Thistabulationsupplementstherequirementsof10CFR20.2206.Thedoseassignmentstovariousdutyfunctionsmaybeestimatedbasedonpocketdosimeter,thermoluminescentdosimeter(TLD),orfilmbadgemeasurements.Smallexposurestotalling(20%oftheindividualtotaldoseneednotbeaccountedfor.Intheaggregate,atleast80%ofthetotalwholebodydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshouldbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.ThereportshallbesubmittedonorbeforeApril30ofeachyear.AnnualRadioloicalEnvironmental0eratinReortTheAnnualRadiological,EnvironmentalOperatingReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantduringthepreviouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedbyHay15ofeachyear.Thereportshallincludesummaries,interpretations,andanalysesoftrendsoftheresultsoftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesforthereportingperiod.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheOffsiteDoseCalculationHanual(ODCH),andin10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionsIV.B.2,IV.B.3,andIV.C.TheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportshallincludetheresultsofanalysesofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplesandofallenvironmentalradiationmeasurementstakenduringtheperiodpursuanttothelocationsspecifiedinthetableandfiguresintheODCH,aswellassummarizedandtabulatedresultsoftheseanalysesandmeasurementsintheformatofthetableintheRadiologicalAssessmentBranchTechnicalPosition,Revision1,November1979.Intheeventthatsomeindividualresultsarenotavailableforinclusionwiththereport,thereportshallbesubmittednotingandexplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedinasupplementaryreportassoonaspossible.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-26DraftB

ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements(continued)5.6.35.6.45.6.5RadioactiveEffluentReleaseReortTheRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.36a.Thereportshallincludeasummaryofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsandsolidwastereleasedfromtheplant.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheODCMandinconformancewith10CFR50.36aand10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionIV.B.1.Monthl0eratinReortsRoutinereportsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperience,includingdocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorpressurizersafetyvalves,shallbesubmittedonamonthlybasisnolaterthanthe15thofeachmonthfollowingthecalendarmonthcoveredbythereport.COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORTCOLR'a~Coreoperatinglimitsshallbeestablishedpriortoeachreloadcycle,orpriortoanyremainingportionofareloadcycle,andshallbedocumentedintheCOLRforthefollowing:LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)";LCO3.1.3)"MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(MTC)";LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.1,"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))";LCO3.2.2,"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"~)";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";LCO4460-3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";II~II~~~)1I~~LCO3.9.1,"Boron(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-27Draft8 ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements(continued)(continued)R.f.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-28DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements-5,":."'8675~<~.:';:":,.:P.,:::-:.,':,::::;K~CO'(jolt:,inuid.)'TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminethecoreoperatinglimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:WCAP-9212-P-A~"IW,',",slimly',"'i"",'I9SafetyEvaluationMethodology,"~u'y"1'98s5.(MethodologyforLCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,.LaCeeel!9!."':Lc~.2.1,L.2.1,LandLCO3.9.1.)~2~37I.IICAP-921-9-A~'i!i!II,",2'!i'"r'i,'CCCEvaluationModel-1981Version,"Revision1,February1982.(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1.)3.WCAP-8385,~wer-.":.:".PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures-TopicalReport,"September1974.(MethodologyforLCO3.2,3.)II9QCAP+8667~i?:-.:A~swalATmjircOV'e'djjTcliii'i'nial~[04S'ignVI?re'codjr'e,"(MethodologyforLCO63'!i)04.":.",":!7,',::::::;iihi.,'iii.:;::,'ils'i,:ti";:,.:,:fTD7.A8Agd:piggy,:;:P~sIts'""0""'d"Thl'"0-"g'""'"":IA"1~sr'8,(iietlido'o'l'o'jj','3Foi::!LCO!'8,,",,'429!:,"lIP'CehrswnuCIsin'ATP.")7I'00Y4;.;::.:-:;A'.:,':;~~8:.':.WCAP,,:=:ltI081:;.:',":-',:;':;.gejtjq~4iuse;::;,,':Sm~f::.:-:::Break(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-29Draft8

ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirementsECC'8,:'.::.:':E.'I",ua41jn'::.:,::Ho8e::::,::::;:Us:1,og",,"'."':,thi.":,":lNOTRUWP,."."::,Godi,"Apr44(MethodologyforLCO(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-30DraftB

ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirementsACA'P:,-.':1',0924~P,Iwi,{continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-31DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements2osc+Hethido,'::I:i-'$'faiVLCG'"'".3",:,Z,':.,:I);;Eiju)'ji'pid;:g'~.th~0j'pi'i'.'(Neth'odoj.o'av'::::for;:'-EGO!3"2::sl'.>:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-32DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirementsPYNP,:~!",::::,::,::::;:;:":,:,,::":'::,col>i::"::,('chn.t!YPued)n)e'ction+.":;:-:.'Addk~ijdUfjfj:;1::.';~:"-:,~Rekpoijsg's,"',to",:tfRGjgue'sfiVPnk~~kOecember,::,.9:988"~(Me,'th'o'do::l:."o8'j'-'fj'~,:;:fCO::3:":.0:;::'l~f:,~f0,:i>/CAP,',",.'":1.'O924,',-;,'P,,::';,3'olu-e,:.'i:.-":,::Rev,:,;ji,-';:;:j'd8e,n'dun;.y3';Pksc/1pf'1:',o')'..i'pd.iV'(MilthodTif'a'j'ufori'LC07872~!',:~3Thecoreoperatinglimitsshallbedeterminedsuchthatallapplicablelimits(e.g.,fuelthermalmechanicallimits,corethermalhydrauliclimits,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)limits,nuclearlimitssuchasSDH,transientanalysislimits,andaccidentanalysislimits)ofthesafetyanalysisaremet.d.TheCOLR,includinganymidcyclerevisionsorsupplements,shallbeprovideduponissuanceforeachreloadcycletotheNRC.5.6.6ReactorCoolantSstemRCSPRESSUREANDTEHPERATURELIHITSREPORTPTLRa.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsforheatup,cooldown,criticality,andhydrostatictestingaswellasheatupandcooldownratesshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits"b.ThepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsrequiredtosupporttheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,andtheLTOPenabletemperatureshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-HODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves";andLCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-33DraftB ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirementsTh~HddHi-,'I!",',,"""',i',b!PhRCEpressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCecifically4hese-~it~~~9describedinthefollowingdocuments:4994I:'jig'~~frG~YG.O~~~~Sat%+~$Lls~~ILMQ0haAPtQ~4JQ~~~34L<)~6~"p<.g,<<<A~~+cern~~r4uom,<E;,P4,~i>~P~~~~w1~t%9,<tZ'.l(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-34Draft8 ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements::jTAC,"'."iIM91/49);*':.",I:,'."dat'edi!Octoberjgl'5I'-;..:ll995"-I(Meth'o'dbl',oj'j';,'-:,:;fiiii'~LCG."::;9:,:."'4r',"',!SQ'EnILetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

"TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgram,oeaoSb,.CS'pbPreassurre';::!san'djITempe'ra'Eu're!L'Ims~si!Ri~orft':,::,"dated.e'cem,~er,5,ethodolggfor*'LCOs').46,3.4.7,3.$.10and3.4.12-LTOPEnleTemperatFeandLCO3.4gF-PressurizerPowerperatedRe'efValveLiftSdttinLimits.d.ThePTLRshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponissuangqforeachreactorvesselfluencyperiodandforQyrevisioh"-orsupplementthereto.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-35DraftB HighRadiationArea5.75.0ADNINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.7HighRadiationArea5,7.1Pursuantto10CFR20,paragraph20.1601(a),inlieuoftherequirementsof10CFR20.1601(c),eachhighradiationarea,asdefinedin10CFR20,inwhichtheintensityofradiationis>100mrem/hrbuts1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,shallbebarricadedandconspicuouslypostedasahighradiationareaandentrancetheretoshallbecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).Individualsqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedures(e.g.,.%!:'.:tl::::.!P.,:,,,ti...a!..i!it,':ill,::!!.":,o'continuouslyescortedbysuchindividualsmaybeexemptfromtheRWPissuancerequirementduringtheperformanceoftheirassigneddutiesinhighradiationareaswithexposureratess1000mrem/hr,providedtheyareotherwisefollowingplantradiationprotectionproceduresforentryintosuchhighradiationareas.Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentersuchareasshallbeprovidedwithoraccompaniedbyoneormoreofthefollowing:a.Aradiationmonitoringdevicethatcontinuouslyindicatestheradiationdoserateinthearea.b.Aradiationmonitoringdevi'cethatcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived.Entryintosuchareaswiththismonitoringdevicemaybemadeafterthedoseratelevelsintheareahavebeenestablishedandpersonnelareawareofthem.C.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedureswitharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevice,whoisresponsibleforprovidingpositivecontrolovertheactivitieswithintheareaandshallperformperiodicradiationsurveillanceatthefrequencyspecifiedbp+th'i.""nr!!!".iiP~1i.,l!:"".:me:.h,.!".--:i~!ihRIIP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-36DraftB HighRadiationArea5.75.7HighRadiationArea(continued)5.7.25.7.3InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.1,areaswithradiationlevels>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cmshallbeprovidedwithlockedorcontinuouslyguardeddoorstopreventunauthorizedentryandthekeysshallbemaintainedundertheadministrativecontroloftheShiftSupervisorondutyorradiationprotectionsupervision.DoorsshallremainlockedexceptduringperiodsofaccessbypersonnelunderanapprovedRWPthatshallspecify.thedoseratelevelsintheimmediateworkareasandthemaximumallowablestaytimesforindividualsinthoseareas.InlieuofthestaytimespecificationoftheRWP,directorremote(suchasclosedcircuitTVcameras)continuoussurveillancemaybemadebypersonnelqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedurestoprovidepositiveexposurecontrolovertheactivitiesbeingperformedwithinthearea.InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.1,forindividualhighradiationareaswithradiationlevelsof>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,accessibletopersonnel,thatarelocatedwithinlargeareassuchasreactorcontainment,wherenoenclosureexistsforpurposesoflocking,orthatcannotbecontinuouslyguarded,andwherenoenclosurecanbereasonablyconstructedaroundtheindividualarea,thatindividualareashallbebarricadedandconspicuouslyposted,andaflashinglightshallbeactivatedasawarningdevice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-37DraftB TABLE1RELOCATEDTOCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)(ChangescontrolledbySpecification5.6.5and10CFR50.59)ITEM¹tuCTS¹DESCRIPTION.20.iii20.v20.xxiii20.xxxv20.xxxiii3.10.1.1,Figure3.10-23.10.1.3,Figure3-10.13.10.2.23.10.2.10a3.10.2.8ShutdownMarginLimitsControlBankLimitsFz(Z)andF".LimitsAFDTargetBandAFDTargetBand(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionDDecember1995 TABLE2RELOCATEDTOUFSAR(Changescontrolledby:(1)10CFR50.54or(2)10CFR50.59)ITEM¹tn15.i.a15.ii.a15.ii.r15.ii.r15.iii.a44.i45'.i46.i46.iii47.iii48.i 50.ii52.157.iiCTS¹Table3.5-1Table3.5-2Table3.5-2,NotesTable3.5-2,Notes Table3.5-35.1 5.2 5.3.1.a&5.3.1.c5.3.25.4.35.56.1.1&6.2.16.4 6.9.1.1DESCRIPTIONVariousInstrumentationOperationalDetailsVariousInstrumentationOperationalDetailsESFASInstrumentationDesignESFASInstrumentationDesignVariousInstrumentationOperationalDetailsSiteContainmentDesignFeaturesMiscellaneousReactorCoreDesignFeatures RCSDesignFeaturesSFPRegionIDecayTimeLimitWasteTreatmentSystemsManagementTitlesTrainingStartupReportCHANGECONTROL(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)(2)-(2)(1)(2)(1)(2)(2)(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-2-December1995 TABLE3RELOCATEDTOISTPROGRAM(ChangescontrolledbySpecification5.5.8and10CFR50.55a(f))ITEM¹<n28.ii.c28.ii.m29.i32.1135.i35.ii35.iii 35.v38.vCTS¹Table4.1-2,¹7Table4.1-2,¹124.24.5.2.1,4.5.2.2.c4.8.1&4.8.24.8.34.8.44.8.64.11.2.2DESCRIPTIONPressurizerSafetyValveTestingFrequencyFireProtectionPumpInformationISI/ISTProgramInformationCS,SI&RHRPumpHeadLimitsAccumulatorCheckValveTestingAFWPumpTestsAFWValveTestsSAFWPumpTestsAFW&SAFWTestsRHRPumpTestinginMODE6(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-3-December1995 TABLE4RELOCATEDTOISIPROGRAM(Changescontrolledby10CFR50.55a(g))ITEM¹tn23.129.i41.iCTS¹3.134.2.14.14DESCRIPTIONSnubbers ISI/ISTProgramInformationSnubberSurveillanceProgram(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-4-December1995 TABLE5RELOCATEDTOODCM(ChangesControlledbySpecification5.5.1)ITEM¹<u15.iv15.viii19.i19.ii19.iii19.iv19.v19.vi19.vii19.ix26.i26.ii26.iii28.i.j28.v.b37.137.1139.i39.ii39.iiiCTS¹3.5.4&Table3.5-63.5.5&Table3.5-53.9.1.13.9.1.2&3.9.2.43.9.1.33.9.2.13.9.2.2.a,3.9.2.2.c,3.9.2.43.9.2.2.b,3.9.2.2.c,3.9.2.43.9.2.33.9.2.7 3.16.1&Table3.16-13.16.23.16.3Tbl.4.1-1,¹18,28,294.1.4&Table4.1-54.10.1&Table4.10-14.10.24.10.34.12.1.1&Table4.12-14.12.1.24.12.2.1&Table4.12-2DESCRIPTIONRadiationAccidentMonitoringRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentationLiquidEffluentsConcentrationLiquidEffluentsDose.LiquidWasteTreatmentGaseousWastesDoseRateGaseousWastesDose'aseousWasteDoseGaseousWasteTreatmentSolidRadioactiveWasteRadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringProgramLandUseCensusInterlaboratoryComparisonProgramRadiationMonitoringInstrumentationRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringSurveillanceRequirementsRadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringLandUseCensusInterlaboratoryComparisonProgramLiquidEffluentsConcentrationLiquidEffluentsDoseGaseousWastesReleaseRate-5-December1995 CTS¹DESCRIPTION39.iv39.v40.i57.1V4.12.2.24.12.34.136.9.1.3,6.9.1.4,Table6.9-1,&Table6.9-2GaseousWastesDoseWasteDecayTanks,RadioactiveMaterialSourceLeakageTestsAdministrativeControlReports(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-6-December1995'

TABLE6RELOCATEDTOPLANTPROCEDURES(Changescontrolledby10CFR50.59)ITEM¹<uCTS¹DESCRIPTION18.ii18.v18.vii28.ii.n28.v.e31.i31.ii32.U33.x38.i,38.ii46.i57.iii57.vi65.i57.vii3.8.1.b 3.8.1.f3.8.1.cTable4.1-2,¹18Table4.1.5,Note54.4.44.4.34.5.2.34.6.2.c4.11.1.15.3.1.a6.9.1.26.9.1.5 6.176.9.2.1RadiationLevelsinContainmentControlRoomandManipulatorCraneCommunicationsContainmentAudibleFluxMonitorSecondaryCoolantSamplesCHANNELCALIBRATIONandNationalBureauofStandardsContainmentTendonSurveillanceRecirculationHeatRemovalSystemsAirFiltrationSystemsBatteryTestTrendingSpentFuelPoolCharcoalAdsorberSystemReportingRequirementsforRodFillerMaterialMonthlyOperatingReportDatabasePORV/SafetyValveChallengesMajorchangestoRadioactiveWasteTreatmentSystemsSealedSourceReportingRequirements(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-7-December1995 TABLE7RELOCATEDTOPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)(ChangesControlledbySpecification5.6.6)mM¹u>CTS¹DESCRIPTION6.v7.17.v25.ii3.1.1.1.143.1.2.1.a,Figure3.1.1,EcFigure3.1-23.1.2.33.15.1LTOPEnableTemperatureRCSHeatupandCooldownCurvesPressurizerHeatupandCooldownRatesLTOPSetpoints(1)FromAttachmentA,SectionD-8-December1995 4ll'kQr:~pc TABLE8RELOCATEDTOTECHNICALREQUIREMENTSMANUAL(TRM)(ChangesControlledby10CFR50.59)ITEM¹tn6.xi12.ii12.iv15.i.q15.v17.iii20.xv21.ii2l.iii21.iv22.1 28.i.g28.i.m28.ii.d28.ii.h28.ii.l30.iCTS¹3.1.1.63.1.63.2.1&3.2.1.13.2.2&3.2.43.2.3&Table3.2-1Table3.5-1,¹173.5.6.13.7.2.1.b.2,3.7.2.2.a,&3.7.2.2.b3.10.4.3.2.b.iii&Table3.10-13.11.23.11.3,3.11.53.11.4'.12.1Table4.1-1,¹34&35Table4.1-1,¹14,16,&19Tbl.4.1-2,¹10Tbl.4.1-2,¹19Tbl.4.1-2,¹44.3.5.6DESCRIPTIONReactorVesselHeadVentsRCSChemistryCVCSinMODES5and6CVCSaboveMODE5CVCSBoronConcentrationCirculatingWaterFloodProtectionControlRoomToxicGasMonitorsSecondOffsitePowerSourceMisalignedRodAccidentAnalysisEvaluationFuelMovementRequirementsinAuxBldgFuelMovementRequirementsinAuxBldg FuelMovementRequirementsinAuxBldgMoveableIncoreInstrumentationControlRoomToxicGasMonitorsCVCSSurveillancesFuelMovementRequirementsinAuxBldg CirculatingWaterFloodProtectionCVCSSurveillancesReactorVesselHeadVent-9-December1995 >(jIII<4)f'4'I,~Jf nXM¹<'LCTS¹DESCRIPTION33.UL4.6.1.e.3(b)DGSequenceTimeLimits55.ii55.iii6.7.1.b6.7.1.c47.iii,5.4.3SFPTornadoRelatedRequirementsSafetyLimitViolationResponseSafetyLimitViolationResponse55.iv6.7.1.dSafetyLimitViolationResponse(1)FromAttachment-A,SectionD-10-December1995 IC"lI'II-~~,ti,"d<",CiI'.gApI{~i TABLE9RELOCATEDTOTECHNICALSPECIFICATIONBASES(ChangescontrolledbySpecification5.5.13)mnVr¹ruCTS¹DESCRIPTION13.ix13.xii13.xii16.v32.vill3.3.1.1.li3.3.1.73.3.1.83.6.54.6.2.fPIVListingSIPumpListingSIPumpListingMini-purgevalves'openingrestrictions'atterydegradationdefinition-11-December1995 VVv ANDRochesterGas5ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsDecember1996SubmittalCoverLetterandAttachmentsAandBVolumeI960i0300i095i228PDRADCICK05000244PPDR JUSTIFICATION(CURRENTGINNATS)ConvertingtotheITSformatwillprovideasignificanthumanfactorsimprovementbylocatingsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesectionandalsoprovideastandardstructure.Inaddition,theexpandedbasesinformationwillsupportpreparationofsafetyevaluationsandtrainingactivities.ThereareseveraltypesofchangesthatarebeingrequestedbythisLARinordertoperformtheconversion.ThesechangesarewithrespecttoboththeITSandthecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThetechnicalandsignificantadministrativechangesrelatedtothecurrentGinnaStationTSareorganizedintomultiplecategoriesassummarizedbelow.RelocationofRequirementsWithinTechnicalSpecificationsManycurrentspecificationsaremovedtosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesection.Sincetherequirementsareonlybeingrelocatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications,thereisnoreductioninsafety.Thiscategoryismainlyusedtoidentifymultiplerequirementsthatareconsolidatedintoasinglenewspecificationandnotforlistingrequirementswhichareonlyrenumbered.~ii.EliminationofDuplicatedRegulatoryRequirementsSeveralspecificationscurrentlyduplicateexistingregulatoryrequirements.Theremovalofthesespecificationseliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SincealllicenseesmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicatedrequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresandotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.iii.RelocationofCurrentRequirementsToOtherControlledDocumentslTherelocationofcertainrequirementstootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR,gAProgram,andplantprocedures)doesnoteliminatetherequirement.Instead,therequirementsarerelocatedtoothermoreappropriatedocumentsandprogramswhichhavesufficientcontrolsinplacetomanageimplementationandfuturechanges(e.g.,10CFR50.54(a)(3)and10CFR50.59).TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRGKEtomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.-160-December1995 iv.AdditionofNewITSRequirementsThereareseveralrequirementscontainedinNUREG-1431whicharenotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.TheseITSrequirementswereaddedinordertoprovideamorecompletespecification.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(iv.a)ora"lessrestrictivechange".(iv.b).v.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Technical)SeveralchangestoexistingrequirementsweremadetoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431.ExamplesincludemovingrequirementstoLCONotesandrevisingthecurrentspecifiedCompletionTime.Alsoincludedwithinthiscategoryaretherevisionoftheexistingbasestoreflectmorecurrentinformation.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(v.a),"lessrestrictivechange"(v.b),oran"administrativechange"(v.c).vi.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Administrative)Severalminorchangestothetechnicalspecificationsweremadethatareminorrevisionsonlyanddonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.ExamplesincludeupdatesofreferencestotheCodeofFederalRegulations.ThefollowingsectiondiscusseschangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications,whichwerenotaddressedinSectionCofthisattachment.ThissectionisorganizedbasedontheexistingTSchapternumberstofacilitateeasierreview.Eachchangeisalsoidentifiedwithrespecttooneoftheabovecategories(e.g.,GinnaStationTSCategory(i)).AmarkedupcopyoftheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisprovidedinAttachmentBwhichidentifiesmajorchangesonly.Acrossreferenceisprovidedinthemarginofeachspecificationthathasbeenchangedbyuseofacirclecontainingsectionnumbersfrombelow.Forexample,"l.i"foundinthemarginofthemarkupwouldrefertosectionl.ibelow.Acro'ssreferencebetweentheITSandcurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisalsoprovidedinAttachmentE.TechnicalSpecification1.0TS1.2-ThedefinitionsofoperatingNODESwererevisedasfollows(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):a.Refueling-seeNotel.iibelow.b.ColdShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfroms-1~k/k%to(0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.December1995 HotShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfromz-1~k/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasalsorevisedfroma540'Fto)350'F.Thischange'liminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.TheexpansionofthistemperaturerangeisconservativesincethecurrentTSonlyusetheHot.ShutdownMODEintwoaspects.Thefirstmethodisrequiringashutdowntothismodeduetoplantconditions.SincetheuppertemperaturerangeforHotShutdownremainsthesame(i.e.,theOperatingNODEtemperature),thereisnoimpact.ThesecondmethodistorequirecertainequipmenttobeOPERABLEinthismode.However,loweringthetemperaturelimitto350FrequiresthattheequipmentwouldbeOPERABLEforalargertemperaturerange.Operating-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom>-1>k/k%toa0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperature.of-580'Fwasnotaddedsincethisparameterisspecified.innewLCO3.4.1.Inaddition,theOperatingMODEwasseparatedintotwomodes:OperatingandStartup.TheonlydifferencebetweenthesetwomodesisthatStartupisdefinedwhenthereactoris(5%RatedThermalPower(RTP)whiletheOperatingMODEiswhenthereactoris>5%RTP.Anewoperatingmode(HotStandby)wasprovidedbetweenHotShutdownandColdShutdown.Thismodeisdefinedaswhenthereactivityconditionis<0.99k,<<andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis350'Fand>200'Fwhenthereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarefullytensioned.Thedefinitionofthisnewmodeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350'FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.-162-December1995 TS1.3-Thisdefinitionofrefuelingwasdeleted.ThecurrentTS1.2providesadefinitionofrefuelingasbeingthereactormodewhenreactivityis~-5zk/k%andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureiss140'F.TS1.3statesthatrefuelingis"anyoperationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrodswhenthevesselheadisunbolted"whichisasubsetofthemodedefinedinTS1.2.ThenewTSTablel.1-1statesthatrefuelingisanyconditioninwhich"oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltislessthanfullytensioned"withfuelinthereactor.Whileanaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureorreactivitylimitisnolongerprovidedfortherefuelingmodedefinition,thereactorvesselheadclosureboltscannotberemovedatelevatedreactorcoolanttemperaturesorwhentheRCSispressurizedduetotheirdesign.AreactivitylimitisalsonotrequiredwhentheRCSisdepressurized.Therefore,thenewdefinitionoftherefuelingmodeismoreconservativethancurrentTS1.3andgenerallyconsistentwithTS1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS1.5-ThedefinitionforOperatingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedbythenewdefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITY.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS1.6-.Thedefinition(InstrumentChannels)wasspecificationssinceitisdefinitionisaddressed(Instrumentation).'hisischange.forDegreeofRedundancynotaddedtothenewnolongerrequired.ThiswithinnewTS3.3aGinnaTSCategory(v.c)TS1.7.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecifythattheCHANNELCALIBRATIONincludestherequiredinterlockandt'imeconstantfunctionsofthechannel.'Inaddition,discussionofcalibratinginstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetectorswasaddedforclarification.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.2-Thelastsentenceofthisdefinitionwasrevisedasfollows:Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindication~nd+q~gyn'dstatus~~q;..:t$otherindicationsm44er~or.'tatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.TheseminorchangesprovidegreaterclarificationofthedefinedtermandareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.December1995 TS1.7.3-Thedefinitionsfortestingofanalogandbistablechannelswerecombinedintoonedescriptionwithanewtitle.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwodefinitionsisthattestingofbistablechannelsrequiredinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensorversus"asclosetothesensoraspossible"foranalogchannels.Sincethebistablemustbeactuatedtodetermineoperability,maintainingtheanalogchanneldescriptionforthecombineddefinitionisacceptable.Inaddition,thecombineddefinitionwasexpandedtorequire"adjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy."TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.4-ThedefinitionforSourceCheckwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.The'erformanceofaSourceCheckisnowaddressedwithinthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCHANNELOPERATINGTEST(COT).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.8-ThedefinitionforContainmentIntegritywasrelocatedtothebasesofnewTS3.6.1and3.6.2whichessentiallyrequirescompliancewith10CFR50,AppendixJandtheGDC.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS1.10-ThedefinitionforHotChannelFactorswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheHotChannelFactorlimitisonlydiscussedinoneLCOwiththelimitdefinedintheCOLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TSl.11-Thispreviouslydeleteddefinitionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS1.12-TheFrequencyforSurveillanceRequirementsisnowspecifiedinhours,daysormonthsinthenewspecificationssuchthatthecurrentdefinitionofFrequencyNotationisnolongerrequired.Consequently,thisdefinitionwasreplacedwithageneraldescriptionofhowtouseandapplytheFrequencyrequirements.Inaddition,thedefinitionofrefuelingFrequencywasrevisedfrom18monthsto24monthsforallsystems.ThisisdiscussedinAttachmentHandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l)change.'S1.13-ThedefinitionforOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)wasmovedtotheODCMprogramdescriptioninITSspecification5.5.1.ThechangetotheCTSiseditorialbecausetheprogramdescriptioninvolvesreorganizationorreformattingofrequirementswithoutaffectingtechnicalcontent.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995* X1V.XV.XV1.XV11.TS1.14-ThedefinitionforProcessControlProgram(PCP)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThePCPwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRHanddoesnotneedtobedescribedwithinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.15-ThedefinitionforSolidificationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.SolidificationisdescribedwithinthePCPwhichwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRH.Therefore,thisdefinitiondoesnotneedtobeprovidedinnewTSl.l.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.16-ThedefinitionforPurge-Purgingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.17-ThedefinitionforVentingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ThisisaGinna.TSCategory(v.c)change.xviii.Notused.X1X.XX.TS1.19-ThedefinitionforReportableEventwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ReportableEventsaredescribedin10CFR50.72and50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS1.20-ThedefinitionforCanistersContainingConsolidatedFuelRodswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisprovidedinnewTS4.3whichistheonlysectionthataddressesconsolidatedfuelrods.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995 TS1.21-ThedefinitionforShutdownMarginwasexpandedtorequireanotherassumptionthatinMODES1'nd2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Also,thedefinitionwasrevisedtorequireconsiderationofanyRCCAknowntobeincapableofbeingfullyinserted.ThisisinadditiontotheexistingassumptionsrelatedtoastuckfullywithdrawnsingleRCCAwiththehighestreactivityworth.Thedefinitiondescriptiondiscussing"nochangesinxenonorboronconcentration"wasdeletedsincethislevelofdetailisnotrequired.Theseclarifications,whichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431,areGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.4-ThedefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITYwasrevisedtoremove"supports."ThisphrasewasaddedtothecurrentdefinitionbyReference3butisnotconsistentwiththedefinitionasprovidedinNUREG-1431.Therefore,toprovidedconsistency,thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Thefollowingdefinitionswereaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheassociatedtermsareusedthroughoutthedocument(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):'a~b:C.d.e.f.g,h.1~J~k.ACTIONSACTUATIONLOGICTESTAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCECOREALTERATIONCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)LEAKAGEPHYSICSTESTSPRESSURETEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)RATEDTHERMALPOWERSTAGGEREDTESTBASISTRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseofLogicalConnectorswithinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheCompletionTimeconventionwithinthenewTS.ThereareseveralchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSformatwhicharediscussedinthissection(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):December1995 a~CompletionTimesinthenewTSarebasedontheformatthattheclockforallRequiredActionsbeginfromthetimethattheConditionisentered.TheCompletionTimesinthenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSaretypicallyequal.Forexample,thenewspecificationsmayrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within36hoursforaspecifiedConditionwhilethecurrentGinnaStationTSrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4withinanadditional30hoursforthesameCondition.TheintentofboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSisthesame(i.e.beinMODE4within36hours).xxvi.b.ThenewspecificationsrestrictmultipleentriesintotheACTIONtableforseparateConditionsunlessitisspecificallystatedasacceptable.Forexample,ifoneSIpumpisinoperableandduringtheLCO,asecondSIpumpisdeclaredinoperable,theplantwouldenter3.0conditionsinboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTS.IfthefirstSIpumpwererestoredtoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringMODE3,theplantcouldresumeoperationinbothTS.However,inthecurrentTS,theCompletionTimeforrestoringthesecondSIpumptoOPERABLEstatuswouldbeginfromthetimethatitwasdeclaredinoperable.Inthenewspecifications,theCompletionTimewouldbeginfromthetimethefirstpumpwasdeclaredinoperablewithanadditional24hoursallowed.Thisisaconservativechange.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheFrequenciesspecifiedwithintheSRs.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TechnicalSpecification2.1TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtodefinewhenthereactorisin"operation"asMODES1and2.Thisisaneditorialchangeonlysince"operation"hasbeenredefinedasMODES1and2perSectionDChangel.i.d..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 Technical1~TechnicalSpecification2.2TheApplicabilitywasrevisedto"MODES1,2,3,4,and5."TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequirethisSafetyLimit(SL)tobemetwhenfuelisinthevesselwithoneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensionedorwiththeheadremoved.Withthereactorheadboltslessthanfullytensioned,itishighlyunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurizedgreaterthantheSLpressureduetothelowtemperatureover-pressureprotectionrequirements.Withtheheadremoved,itisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.2)change.Specification2.3ThisentiresectionwasrelocatedtoITSChapter3.3,"Instrumentation'~"ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3-Variouslimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)areaddressedas"TripSetpoints,""AllowableValues,"or"ApplicableHodes"(aspermissives)fortheirrespectiveReactorTripSystem(RTS)instrumentationFunctionsinnewLCO3.3.1.SpecificchangestotheLSSSarediscussedbelowforeachoftheassociatedFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Notused.1V.V.TS2.3.3.1,TS2.3.3.2,andFigure2.3-1-TheLSSSforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumTripSetpointvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.3.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS2.3.2-ThelistingofpermissiveswasrevisedtoproviderequirementsandsetpointsforP-6,P-9,andP-10.ThesepermissivesalsoprovideenablingandblockingfeaturesforvariousRTSfunctions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(y.a)change.-168-December1995 TechnicalSpecification3.0AnewsectionLCO3.0.1wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheApplicabilitystatementinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynew'requirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.1.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityc'onsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.iv.AnewsectionLCO3.0.2wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheassociatedACTIONSupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCOinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.2.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.0.1-ThiswasrevisedtoclarifytheuseoftheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)anassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies,or(2)theconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedby.theassociatedACTIONS.ThecurrentrequirementthattheLCOtimelimitsapplyiftheyaremorelimitingthatthoserequiredbyLCO3.0.3isdeletedandanexpandeddiscussionisprovidedi'ntheBasistoclarifytheapplicabilityofthisrequirement.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirementsexceptasdiscussedinitem5.viiibelow.Theclarificationsandexamplesare.basedontheusethenew~ITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionLCO3.0.4wasaddedwhichexplainsthelimitationsonchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmetinthenewTS.ThissectionprovidesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-169-December'995 AnewsectionLCO3.0.5wasaddedtoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forinstanceswhererestorationofinoperableequipmenttoanOPERABLEstatuscouldnotbeperformedwhilecontinuingtocomplywithRequiredActions.HanyTechnicalSpecificationACTIONSrequireaninoperablecomponenttoberemovedfromservice,suchas:maintaininganisolationvalveclosedortrippinganinoperableinstrumentchannel.ToallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice,ortodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoFotherequipmentwhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedwithoutreturningtheequipmenttoservice,anexceptiontotheseRequiredActionsisnecessary.LCO3.0.5isnecessarytoestablishanallowancethat,althoughinformallyutilizedinrestorationofinoperableequipment,isnotformallyrecognizedinthepresentSpecifications.Withoutthisallowancecertaincomponentscouldnot-berestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandaplantshutdownwouldensue.Clearly,itisnottheintentordesirethattheTechnicalSpecificationstoprecludethereturntoserviceofasuspectedOPERABLEcomponenttoconfirmitsOPERABILITY.Thisallowanceisdeemedtorepresentamorestable,safeoperationthanrequiringaplantshutdowntocompletetherestorationandconfirmatorytesting.Sincethisrequirementisinformallyutilizedandhasnolicensing'basis,thissectionisconsideredtoprovidenewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.0.2-ThiswasdeletedandreplacedbyLCO3.0.6whichprovidesguidanceregardingtheappropriateACTIONStobetakenwhenasingleinoperability(e.g.,asupportsystem)alsoresultsintheinoperabilityofoneormorerelatedsystems(e.g.,supportedsystem(s)).SinceitsfunctionistoclarifyexistingambiguitiesandtomaintainactionswithintherealmofpreviousindustryinterpretationsandNRCpositions,thisnewprovisiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheinformationcontainedinTS3.0.2wasrelocatedtoLCO3.8.1whichallowsonepowersourcetoasafeguardsbusandaredundantsafetyfeaturesonasecondbustobeinoperablefor12hoursversus1hour.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-170-December1995 ~6.vi11.TechnicalAnewsectionLCO3.0.7wasaddedtoprovideguidanceregardingTestExceptionsforLCO3.1.8.ThisLCOallowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecificationrequirementstobechanged(i.e.,madeapplicableinpartorwhole,orsuspended)topermittheperformanceofspecialtestsoroperationswhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformed.IfthisTestExceptionLCOdidnotexist,manyofthespecialtestsandoperationsnecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,specialmaintenanceactivitiesandspecialevolutionscouldnotbeperformed.This'pecificationeliminatestheconfusionwhichwouldotherwiseexistastowhichLCOsapplyduringtheperformanceofaspecialtestoroperation.WithoutthisspecificallowancetochangetherequirementsofanotherLCO,aconflictofrequirementscouldbeincorrectlyinterpretedtoexist.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.0.1-Thiswasrevisedtoremovethe1hourallowancetoprepareforaplantshutdown.Instead,theplantmustnowbeinhotshutdown(i.e.,HODE3)within6hoursofenteringthisLCOandcoldshutdown(i.e.,HODE5).within36hours.Notimelimitsarenowplacedoninitiatingtheplantshutdown,onlyinthetimeframeinwhichtheshutdownmustbecompleted.Sincetheplantmustnowbeinalowermodeinlessamountoftime,thisisamorerestri.ctivechange.However,sincenorestrictionsaremadeastowhentheshutdownmustcommence,thisisidentifiedasaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification3.1.1TS3.1.l.I.b-ThisrequirementwaschangedtorequireentryintoHODE1~8.5%RTPwithinsixhoursversusanimmediatepowerreductionunderadministrativecontrol.Thischangedefinesaspecificnumberofhourstoreachthisconditionwhichprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperators.TheremainingactionsasspecifiedbyTS3.1.1.l.bwererelocatedtoLCO3.4.5andarediscussedin6.iibelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-171-December1995 TS3.l.l.l.b,3.l.l.l.c,and3.l.l.l.d-TheserequirementswererevisedpernewLCO3.4.5torequirebothreactorcoolantloopsOPERABLEwithoneloopinoperationduringNODES1s8.5%RTP,andNODES2and3,versusoneinoperationandtheotherOPERABLEfornaturalcirculationbetween350'Fand8.5%RTP.However,oneRCSloopisnowallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursprovidedthattheshutdownmarginasprovidedintheCOLRismaintainedandthenon-operatingRCSloopisOPERABLE(i.e.,availablefornaturalrecirculation).Theseareallconservativechanges(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes)since:a.TwoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.b.AdefinedperiodoftimeisnowspecifiedforoneRCSloopoperationwhichaddressestheconcernraisedbyReference12.Inaddition,CompletionTimesarenowspecifiedforverifyingshutdownmarginandnaturalcirculationcapability.TS3.l.l.l.f-TheexceptionfornotrequiringtheRCSorRHRloopsduringsteamgeneratorcrevicecleaningoperationswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceRG&EnolongerperformsthisactivityandthenewSGsscheduledtobeinstalledin1996donothavecrevicessubjectedtocleaningasdescribedinthisspecification.ThisisaconservativedeletionandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.l.l.g-TheactiontobeinColdShutdown(i.e.,<200'F)within24hourswasnotaddedfortheConditionwithbothRHRloopsinoperableandonlyoneRCSloopinoperableconsistentwithConditionBofLCO3.4.6.SinceRHRistheonlysystemwhichprovideslong-termdecayheatremovalbelow200'F,itisnotprudenttobringtheplanttoalowerNODEuntilRHRisrecovered.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.l.l.k-ThisrequirementwaschangedintoaNoteforLCO3.4.6and3.4.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ThevalueforLTOPenabletemperaturewithrespecttotheRCPswasalsorelocatedtothePTLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-172-December1995 TS3.1.1.l.f-ThisrequirementwasrevisedtorequireoneRHRlooptobeoperatingwheninMODE5consistentwithLCO3.4.7and3.4.8.ARHRpumpisrequiredtobeoperatingsinceaRCPcannotberoutinelyoperatedundertheselowtemperatureandpressureconditions.However,aSGwithminimumwaterlevelof16%canprovideanalternatemeansofdecayheatremovaltotheoperatingRHRloopinMODE5withtheloopsfilled.Inaddition,alimitof15minutes(versus1hour)wasplacedonremovingbothRHRloopsfromserviceinMODE5withtheloopsnotfilledduetothereduced.RCSinventory.TheseareconservativechangestothecurrentrequirementsandareGinnaTSCategor'y(v.a)changes.TS3.l.l.l.e-The.noteassociatedwiththepowersourcesfortheRHRloopshasbeenrelocatedtothespecificationsforelectricalrequirementsduringNODES5and6(i.e.,LCOs3.8.2,3.8.5,3.8.8,and3.8.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.l.l.iand3.1.1.l.j-TheserequirementswerenotaddedduetotheexpandedspecificationsprovidedinnewTS3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.ThenewspecificationsensurethattheappropriateRCSorRHRloopis.availabletoprovideforcedflowfordecayheatremovalandboronmixing.Therefore,theserequirementsarenolongernecessary.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v..c)change.TS3.1.1.5.a-Thelowerlimitforpressurizerwaterlevel(12%)wasnotadded.ThislowerlimitwasrelatedtothepreviousSafetyInjectionactuationlogicwhichrequiredacoincidentlowpressurizerlevelandlowpressurizerpressuretrip.ThislogicwasmodifiedasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45)toeliminatethecoincidentlowpressurizerleveltrip(Ref.46)suchthatthesetpointisnolongerusedinanUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.Therefore,thelowpressurizerwaterlevelsetpointisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.3)change.TS3.1.1.5.b-ThecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringthepressurizerheatersandwaterlevelsetpointsduringtheRCShydrotestwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowNODE3conditions(i.e.,<350'F).'incethenewspecificationonlyrequiresthepressurizertobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-173-December1995 TS3.1.1.6-TherequirementforthereactorvesselheadventswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseventsdonotmeetthecriteriaspecifiedintheNRCPolicyStatement.Thisisduetothefactthatthe'entsareusedtoexhaustnoncondensiblegasesandsteamfromtheRCSwhich:couldinhibitnaturalcirculationfollowinganaccidentwithanextendedlossofoffsitepower.However,theseventsarenottheprimarysuccesspathandareonlyusedbyoperatorsifbothpressurizerPORVsareunavailable.TheseventsarenotusedinthesafetyanalysesnorwereidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantintheGinnaStationLevel2PRA(Ref.47).ThisrequirementwillberelocatedfromTStotheTRM.TheremainingrequirementscontainedwithinthisspecificationrelatetothepressurizerPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalveswhichareaddressedinTS3.1.1.4.TheserequirementswererevisedasdiscussedinSectionD,items6.xiiiand6.xivbelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.1.1.3.aand3.1.1.3.b-'heserequirementswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotprovideoverpressurizationprotectionduringColdShutdownandRefuelingconditions.Thisisprovidedbythelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)requirementasspecifiedincurrentTS3.15andnewLCO3.4.12.SincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionduringtheselowMODESofoperation,theserequirementswerenotretained.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.4)change.TS3.1.1.4.a.iand3.1.1.6-ThesewererevisedtoprovideseparateRequiredActionsforthePORVsbasedonthereasonfortheirinoperability.APORVwhichisinoperableforautomaticfunctionsbutcapableofmanualactuationmustbeisolatedbyitsblockvalveconsistentwiththecurrentrequirement.However,aPORVwhichisincapableofmanualcyclingisrequiredtobeisolatedbyitsblockvalvewithin1hourandrepairedwithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.Inaddition,withbothPORVsinoperable,acontrolledshutdowntoMODE3conditionswithRCS<500Fmustbeaccomplishedwithin8hours.ThislimitonoperationwithaninoperablePORVisprovidedsinceaSGTReventcannotbemitigatedunderthiscondition.The72hoursforoneinoperablePORVisallowedsince-thesecondPORVisavailable.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 X1V.XV.XV1.XV11.TechnicalTS3.1.1.4.a.iiand3.1.1.6-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethatoneinoperableblockvalvemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours,bothblockvalveswithin7days,ortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.ThislimitonoperationwithaninoperableblockvalveisprovidedsinceastuckopenPORVcannotbeisolatedinthiscondition.Thetimelimitsprovideadequatetimetoperformmostrepairsatpowersincethevalvesarelocatedinsidecontainmentinthepressurizercubicle.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaconservativerevisionwithrespecttocurrentrequirementsandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.1.1.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.TS3.1.1.3.d-ANotewasaddedwhichallowsthepressurizersafetyvalvestoberemovedfromserviceabove350Fforthepurposeofsettingthevalvesunderhot(i.e.,ambient)conditionsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.1.3.c-Thiswasrevisedtochangethepressurizer,safetyvalveliftsettingsfrom2485psig+1%to2485psig+.2.4%,-3%.The'alveliftsettingsarerequiredtobesettowithin+1%followingtesting;howevertheOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenrevised.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenevaluatedinthemostlimitingpressuretransientsforGinnaStation(i.e.,lossofexternalloadandlockedrotorevents)andfoundtoresultinacceptableresultswithrespecttothesafetylimitvalues.Thischangeisaresultofaneventinwhichthepressurizer'safetyvalveswerefoundtohavedriftedoutsidetheexisting+1%tolerancebandfollowingtesting(Ref.58).TheproposedchangeiswithintheASHEtolerancesof+1%followingtestingand+3%forOPERABILITY.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.45)change.Specification3.1.2TS3.1.2.1.a,Figure3.1-1,andFigure3.1-2-TheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswererelocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLRwhichi'saddressedunderAdministrativeControls.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-175-December1995 iv.V.TechnicalTS3.1.2.l.b-The.requirementforperiodicallyrecalculatingtheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswasdeletedfromtechnicalspecifications.Aperiodicreviewisalreadyrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixHwhichdoesnotneedtoberestatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS3.1.2.l.c.1-ThetimeallowedtoperformanengineeringanalysistodeterminethattheRCSisacceptabletocontinueoperationafterapressureand/ortemperaturelimitisexceededwasincreasedfrom6hoursto72hours.Adurationof6hoursisnotsufficienttimetoaccomplishtherequiredengineeringanalysis,especiallyiftheeventweretooccurduringeveningorearlymorninghourswithlimitedstaffsupportimmediatelyavailable.SinceNRCacceptedguidanceforperformingthenecessarycalculationsexists,allowing'2hourstocompletetheanalysesisappropriate,especiallysincethedurationofeventisverylimited(i.e.,controlledbyLCO3.4.3).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.6)change.TS3.1.2.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.TS3.1.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethepressurizerheatupandcooldownratestothePTLR.Themaximumtemperaturedifferencebetweenthepressurizerandsprayfluidwasnotaddedsincethislimitiscontrolledbythecooldowncurves.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changesrespectively.Specification3.1.3TS3.1.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoraisetheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityfrom500'Fto540'F.Thischangewasmadetocorrectadiscrepancybetweenthedefinitionofreactoroperatingmodesandthisrequirement.Currently,GinnaStationTS1.2definesHotShutdownasReactivitys-1~k/k%andT,,~540'F.Inordertoachievecriticalityat500'F,theHotShutdownconditionwouldhavetobedirectlybypassed.Avalueof540'Fwasselectedforthenewminimumtemperatureforcriticalitybasedonpreviousoperatingexperienceduringstartupconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.December1995 iv~V.TS3.1.3.2-ThiswasnotaddedsinceLCO3.4.2specifiestheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheminimumtemperaturewithrespecttothereactorvesseliscontainedinthePTLRandisbelowthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.4.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.3.3-TheexistingactionstatementwasrevisedtorequirethattheplantbeinMODE2withk,<<<1.0within30minutesifT;,foroneorbothRCSloopswas<540'Fversussubcriticalbyanamountequaltoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityduetodepressurization.ThenewrequirementprovidesclearandpreciseinstructionstooperationsandensuresthattheplantisquicklybroughttoaconditioninwhichtheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.3.1-TheHTCrequirementsaremovedfromtheRCSchapterintheGinnaStationTStotheReactivityControlSystemsChapter.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoreferencecyclespecificMTCrequirementsintheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheHTCmaximumupperlimitdescribedinTS3.1.3.1remainsthesameinITSLCO3.1.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Technical'Specification3.1.4TS3.1.4.4-ThisspecificationwasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoMODE3withT.,<500'Fwithin8hoursversusColdShutdown-within40hoursconsistentwiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.4.l.c-Thelimitonsecondarycoolantactivityisnowrequired.tobemetinMODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustwhenthereactoriscriticalorRCStemperatureis>500'F.Thesecondarycoolantactivitylimitisbasedonasteamlinebreakandtheresultingdoseconsequences.ARCStemperatureof>500'FisbasedonpreventingtheMSSVsfromliftingfollowingaSGTR(i.e.,aRCStemperatureof500'Fisonlyapplicabletoprimarysystemactivitylimitsnotsecondarylimits).Inaddition,ifthesecondar'ycoolantactivitylimitsarenotmet,TS3.1.4.4requiresenteringcoldshutdown(i.e.,MODE.5)within40hours.'equiringthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitstobemetforallofMODE4(i.e.,RCSis>200'F)providesconsistencywithNUREG-1431andthecurrentRequiredActionsifthelimitisexceeded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 10.TechnicalThetimetoperformashutdownifsecondaryactivityisnotwithinlimitswaschangedfrom8hoursto6hourstoreachhotshutdownand32hoursto30hourstoreachcoldshutdown.ThesecompletiontimesareconservativeandprovideconsistencywiththerestoftheTS.ThisisaGinnaTScategory(v.a)change.Specification3.1.5TS3.1.5.1.1-Addedanewrequirementforthecontainmentsump"A"levelorpumpactuationperLCO3.4.15.Thisleakagedetectionsystemreplacesthecontainmenthumiditydetectorsandtheaircoolercondensateflowmonitor.Thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsdonotmeettherequiredleakageratedetectioncapabilityof1.0gpmwithin4hoursasrequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.19).Inaddition,thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsare'ecommendedbyRG1.45(Ref.17)toonlybeusedasanalarmorindirectindicationofleakageto,containmentandnotasaseparatemethodofdetectingleakage.TheremainingleakagedetectionsystemsprovideadequatemonitoringasdiscussedinthenewbasesandSectionC,item46.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.1.5.1.1and3.1.5.1.2-TheRCSleakagedetectionsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandRCSLEAKAGEwithinlimitsaboveMODE4(200F)andnot350'FperLCO3.4.15and3.4.13.TheincreasedLCOApplicabilitywilladdressallMODESinwhichtheRCSisatanincreasedtemperatureandpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.1.5.1'AddedanotewhichallowsachangeinMODEifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitorsareinoperableperLCO3.4.15.ThisnoteisappropriateconsideringtheotherinstrumentationthatisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.7)change.11.,Technical.Specification3.1.6TS3.1.6-ThisentiresectionwasnotaddedsinceRCSChemistrydoesnotmeettheNRCPolicyStatement.RCSChemistryiscontrolledbyplantproceduresandisnotrequiredtobeaddressedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.'hisrequirementisbeingrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-178-December1995 12.TechnicalSpecification3.2TS3.2.5-Therequirementwasrevisedtorequireplacingachargingpumpinpull-stopwithin1hourregardlessofthestatusoftheRHRpumpsortheHODE.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesdirectoperatorguidancetoperformanactionwithinadefinedtimeperiod.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.Theverificationofthechargingpumpstatusevery12hourswasalsonotaddedsincetheplantisrequiredtobeinadepressurizedandventedconditionwithin8hourswhichremovestheneedtoisolateachargingpump(i.e.,al.1squareinchventcanmitigateacharging/letdownmi.smatchevent).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a),(i),and(v.c)changes,respectively.TS3.2.1andTS3.2.1.1-TherequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsduringcoldshutdownandrefuelingwhichspecifiesthenumberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLEwerenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.2.2andTS3.2.4-TherequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsabovecoldshutdownwhichspecifiesthenumberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLE,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-179-December1995 iv13.TechnicalTS3.2.3andTable3.2-1-TherequirementsfortheBoricAcidStorageTank(s)whichspecific's'heboronconcentrations,minimumvolumeandsolutiontemperature,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirements,specifiedforthissystemdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPol.icyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.3TS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3-LCO3.5.1ConditionAwasaddedwhichallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesincethevolumeofwaterintheaccumulatorsisthecriticalfeature.Attemptingtocorrectboronconcentrationwithinthecurrent1hourlimitwouldcreateasignificantburdenontheoperationsstaff.Therefore,thecurrent1hourLCOwasonlymaintainedforaccumulatorpressureandvolume.Inaddition,theaccumulatorboronconcentrationlimitwasincreasedto2100ppmtosupportthevalueusedintheaccidentanalysis,forthe18monthrefuelingcycles.Anupperlimitof2600ppmwasalsoaddedtoaddresschemicalconsiderationsofthesumpfluidfollowinganaccident.Thisvalueisalsoconsistentwiththatusedfor18monthrefuelingcycles.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.9)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.3.1.l.aand3.3.1.2-LCO3.5.4.Awasaddedwhichallows8hourstorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesinceitrequiresalongerperiodoftimetoperformthistypeofadjustmentduetothelargevolumeofwatercontainedwithintheRWST.Inaddition,theRWSTboronconcentrationlimitwasincreasedto2300ppmtosupportthevalueusedintheaccidentanalysisforthe18monthrefuelingcycles.Anupperlimitof(2600ppmwasalsoaddedto'addresschemicalconsiderationsofthesumpfluidfollowinganaccident.Thisvalueisalsoconsistentwiththatusedfor18monthrefuelingcycles.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.10)and(v.a)changes,respectively.December1995 TS3.3.l.l.c-TwonotesassociatedwithLCO3.5.2wereadded.ThefirstnoteallowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting.TheITSbasesstatethatthisisacceptablesincetheisolationvalvescanbe~openedfromthecontrolroom.Thesecondnoteallowsupto4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375'F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations.ThisnotewasaddedsincetheLTOPsetpointof330'FisveryclosetotheMode3definitionof)350'F.AsdescribedintheITSbases,thisnoteprovidesoperatorflexibilitytorestoretheinoperablepumptoOPERABLEstatus.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.11)changes.TS3.3.1.5.d-ThiswasrevisedandusedasanoteforLCO3.5.2.Thespecificationnowonlyallows878Band878DtohavepowerinstalledduringMODE3forthespecificpurposeofperformingpressureisolationvalvetesting.Isolationvalves878A,878C,896A,896Band856mustnowhaveDCpowerremovedaboveMODE3orbothtrainsofECCSwillbedeclaredinoperable.Thischangewasmadesincethereisnoregularlyscheduledtestingof878A,878C,896A,896B,and856above350'F.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.LCO3.5.3wasaddedwhichrequiresonetrainofSIandRHRduringMODE4.Thisnewrequirementisbeingaddedtoaddresslowprobabilityaccidentswhichmayoccurduringthismodeofoperation.Thisisa.GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.3.1.l.b-Thecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringtheaccumulatorsduringhydrotestswasnotaddedtothenewtechnicalspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowMODE3conditions(i.e.,350'F).SincethenewspecificationonlyrequirestheaccumulatorswhenRCSpressureis>1600psigduringMODE3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.3.l.l.b-ThebasesforTS3.3wererevisedtoupdatethespecifiedwatervolumecontainedintheaccumulatorwithrespecttothe50%and82%levels.TherequiredlevelsspecifiedinTS3.3.1.l.bhavenotbeenchanged,onlythecorrespondingwatervolumesprovidedinthebases.Thenewvaluesareconsistentwiththoseusedintheaccidentanalysis'(seeCOLR,Table1).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-181-December1995 TS3.3.l.l.g-Motoroperatedisolationvalves851Aand851BwereaddedtonewSR3.5.2.1sincethesevalvesmustremainopenwithACpowerremovedtoensuretheavailabilityofContainmentSumpBtotheRHRsystemfollowingaLOCA.Theadditionofthesevalvesisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.l.l.h-Checkvalves877A,877B,878F,878H,andmotoroperatedisolationvalves878Aand878CwereaddedtothisrequirementsincethevalvesarerequiredtobetestedasPIVsbycurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.3.3.ThisprovidesamorecompletespecificationandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Thelistingofvalveswasalsorelocatedtothebases.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.3.l.l.hand3.3.1.5-TheserequirementswererevisedtorequirePIVstobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustabove350F(i.e.,inMODE3andabove).Therefore,theplantmustnowenterMODE5within36hoursiftheRequiredActionscannotbeaccomplished.ThisisaconservativerevisionwhichexpandstheLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.3.1.5.e-Thecurrentrequirementallows12hourstorepairaleakingcheckvalveifthein-seriesmotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.ThiswasrevisedtospecifythataleakingPIV(checkvalveormotoroperated)mustbeisolatedwithin4hourswithaleaktestedvalve,andthatasecondleaktestedvalvemustbeclosedwithin72hours.Thisisgenerallyaconservativechangesinceatimelimitisnowspecifiedforisolatingtheleakingvalveandthesecondisolationvalvemustnowbeleaktested.Theonlyexceptionisthat72hoursisnowprovidedtoperformrepairsversus12hours.Theexistingallowedrepairtimeisinsufficienttoperformmostleakagerepairsandwouldmostlikelyrequireareactorshutdown.Sincetherearethreeisolationvalvesforseveralflowpaths,andtheLCOapplicabilityhasbeenexpandedtoincludeMODE4,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8-TheexceptionforallowingtheSIpumpstobeOPERABLEduringDGloadandsafeguardsequencetestingwasnotaddedsincethenewbasesallowthepumpstobeOPERABLEifadischargeisolationvalveislockedclosed.Therefore,thisexceptionisnotrequired.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-182-December1995 xv.TS3.3.1.7.1and3.3.1.8.1-ThesespecificationswereconvertedintoSurveillanceRequirementsconsistentwiththeITSformatandrelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTS'ategory(i)change.TS3.3.1.8.2-ThisrequirementwasnotaddedsincethenewbaseslistthecriteriaforensuringthataSIpumpisincapableofinjectingintotheRCS.LimitingtheoperationtooneSIpumpwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathisnotnecessaryiftheisolationdevicerequirestwoseparateactionsbeforeprovidinganinjectionpathtotheRCS.Therefore,operatingmultipleSIpumpswillnotposeanythreattooverpressurizingtheRCSwiththisisolation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.3.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallowbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(includingtheCRFCunitswhichsupplythem)tobeinoperableforupto72hoursifbothcontainmentspray(CS)trainsareOPERABLE.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyseswhichdemonstratethateithertwoCStrains,oneCStrainandonepost-accident'harcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsareadequatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaDBA(i.e.,eachCStrainandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainprovides50%oftherequirediodineremovalrequirements).However,twoCStrainscannotbeinoperablesinceatleastonetrainmustoperateforcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Inaddition,twoCRFCunitscannowberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayssincetheaccidentanalysesonlycredittwoofthefouicoolingunitsasbeingOPERABLEwithrespecttocontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Finally,withoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperableandnotrestoredwithin7days,theplanthasonly36hourstoreachMODE5versus84hoursduetotheimportanceof'aintainingcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.12)changes.TS3.3.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecifythattheCCW.loopheadermustalsobeOPERABLE.Theloopheaderisdefinedasthesectionofpipingfromthedischargeoftheheatexchangerstothefirstisolationvalveofeachsuppliedcomponent.Theloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelast'solationvalveonthedischargeofthesuppliedcomponenttothesuctionofthepumps.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-183-December1995 TS3.3.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoallowoneCCWheatexchangertoberemovedfromserviceforupto31days.AsdiscussedinSectionC,item82.iabove,theCCWheatexchangersare100%redundantandareseparatedfromtheCCWpumptrainsbyasectionofcommonpiping.Sincethereisnosignalactivefailurewhichcouldfailtheredundantheatexchanger,31daysisconsideredacceptable.Also,thereisonlyoneloopheadersuchthatapassivefailureoftheloopheader,ortheremainingOPERABLEheatexchanger,hasthesameconsequences.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.13)change.TS3.3.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(versus24hours)torestoreaninoperableCCWpumpbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.However,theplantisnolongerallowedtoremainatHotShutdownfor48hoursbeforerequiringadditionalcooldowntoColdShutdownconditions.Assuch,thetotaltimeinwhichaCCWpumpcanremaininoperableremainsthesame(i.e.,72hours)buttheplantisnotrequiredtobegincooldownactivitiesafter24hours.TheonlysafetyrelatedfunctionssupportedbytheCCWSystemarewithrespecttotheRHR,SI,andCSSystems,whichallallow72hourstorestoreaninoperabletrain.Therefore,thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethatthesixsetsofmotoroperatedisolationvalvesusedintheSWSystemtobeOPERABLEfortheSWSystemtobeconsidered.OPERABLE.CreditistakenforthesevalvestoisolatethenonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentswithintheSWSystemfollowingacoincidentsafetyinjection'andundervoltagesignal.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesaclarificationtolicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.December1995 x)x~XX.TS3.3.4.2-ThiswasrevisedtoallowoneSWtraincomprisedoftwopumpsandsixmotoroperatedvalvessuppliedbythesameelectricaltraintobeinoperablefor72hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.SincetheSWtrainsare100%redundant,removingoneoftwotrainsonlyaffectsredundancyanddoesnotplacetheplantoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Sincemostothersafetyfunctionsallow72hoursforonetraintobeinoperable(e.g.,ECCStrains),thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.Inaddition,this'pecificationwasrevisedtoaddressthescenarioifallSWpumpsortheSWloopheaderareinoperable.Inthiscondition,immediateactionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreoneSWpumportheloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus;however,itmaynotbeprudenttoexittheMODEofApplicabilitysincetheSWSystemisrequiredinMODE5fordecayheatremoval.Instead,RequiredActionshavebeenprovidedtorequireacooldown'oMODE5unlesstheCCWsystemisincapableofsupportingRHR.InNODE4,AFWisprovidingfordecayheatremoval.IfAFWwerelost,additionaltimeisrequiredbeforeRHR(andconsequentlySW)wouldberequired.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.47)changes.TS3.3.5.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem(CREATS)tobeOPERABLEinMODES1through6andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinsteadofonlywhenRCSisz350'F.CurrentGinnaStationTS3.5.6requiresthatthecontrolroomHVACdetectionsystem(i.e.,chlorine,ammonia,andradioactivitymonitors)beOPERABLEatalltimes.However,thefiltrationsystemisonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEabove350'F.ThefiltrationsystemisdesignedtoensurethatdoseratestooperatorsarewithintheguidelinesofGDC19intheeventofanaccident.WhiledoseratestooperatorsisexpectedtobelowerwhentheRCSis<350'F,nocurrentanalysesexistundertheseconditions.Inaddition,failuresofthewastegasdecaytankscanstilloccurbelow350'Fwhichalsorequirecontrolroomisolation.Therefore,theMODEofApplicabilitywasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithinthespecificationsandtheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 TS3.3.5.2-Thiswasrevisedtoproviderequirementsforaninoperablefiltrationtrainandinoperabledampers.TheCREATSdampersisolatethecontrolroomintheeventofaradiologicaleventwhilethefiltrationtrainfiltersthecontrolroomatmospherefollowingisolation.Thenewspecificationcontinuestoallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperablefor48hoursbeforerequiringashutdownorplacingthecontrolroomintheemergencyradiationmode(i.e.,CREATSMode6).Ifoneofthetworedundantdampersineachoutsideairflowpathisinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow7daystorestorethedampertoOPERABLEstatussimilartorestoringonetrainofredundantCREFSinNUREG-1431.Ifbothdampersareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3sincethecontrolroomcannolongerbeisolated.IfbothdampersarelostinMODES5or6,orduringfuelmovement,thenfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONSmustbesuspendedimmediately.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.14.TechnicalSpecification3.4TS3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecificallyrequirethatallHSSVsbetestedpriortoenteringMODE2versusthecurrentwordingwhichallowstheHSSVstoberemovedfortestingatanytime.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentoperatingpracticesandensuresthattheHSSVsareOPERABLE.beforethereactorgoescriticalbutallowstheHSSVstobetestedunderhotconditions(i.e.,z350'F).Inaddition,theHSSVsetpointswereaddedtothenewspecificationsincetheseareassumptionswithintheaccidentanalyses.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-186-December1995 TS3.4.2.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptionsasdiscusse'd'inthenewbases.Essentially,theaccidentanalysestreatthepreferredAFWSystemasfourtrains(i.e.,twomotordriventrainsandtwoturbinedriventrains)suchthateachSGreceivesflowfromtwoAFWtrains.Therefore,thefailureofbothmotordriventrainsortheturbinedriventrain(orbothflowpaths)hasthesameconsequence(i.e.,lossofonetraintoeachSG).Sincetheturbinedriventrainisallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursperTS.3.4.2.2.a(andNUREG-1431),thisspecificationwasrevisedtoallowbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstobeinoperableforupto72hours.Inaddition,ifbothAFWtrainstoacommonSGareinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow4hourstorestoreatleastonetrainbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.AtimelimitforbeinginthisconfigurationisnecessarysincenoAFWwouldbeavailableintheeventofaHELBwhich'ffectstheonlySGabletoreceiveAFW.RequiringanimmediatecooldowninthisconfigurationisnotconsideredprudentsinceAFWprovidesfordecayheatremovalinlowerMODES.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.14)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.4.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheSAFWcross-tiebeavailablewhentheSAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thischangeisrequiredsincetheaccidentanalysescredittheuseofthecross-tieforHELBswithafailureofoneSAFWpump.Eachcross-tiemotoroperatedvalveisconsideredpartoftheSAFWtrainwhichsharesthesameelectricalpowersource.ThisisaGinnaStationTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.4.3-TherequirementforSWsuctionfortheAFWandSAFWpumpswere'elocatedtotheLCOforthesepumps.TheCSTsprovidethepreferredsourceofcondensatetothepreferredAFWpumpswhiletheSWSystemisthesafetyrelatedsourceforboththepreferredandstandbyAFWsystems.TherelocationoftheneedforaSWsupplytotheAFWpumpswithintechnicalspecificationsdoesnotreducetherequirement.Instead,thechangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecificationsandiseasierforlicensedpersonneltounderstand.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-187-December1995 V.TS3.4.3-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatabackupsourceofcondensatebeverifiedwithin4hourswhen.theCSTsareinoperableversusdemonstratingtheoperabilityoftheSWSystem.Specifyingatimelimitforverifyingthebackupcondensatesourceisaconservativechangewhichnowprovidesaclearandconciserequirementforplantoperators.RevisingtheActionstoallowanyalternatesourcetobeusedasabackupsourceprovidesadditionaloperationalflexibilitysinceothercondensatesourcesthantheSWSystemcanbeusedifnecessary.ThesesourcesaredescribedinthebasesfornewLCO3.7.6.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.15.TechnicalSpecification3.5ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.1orTable3.5-1:a0b.C.Table3.5-1,Columns1,2,and3-Thecolumnsforthe"TotalNumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheOPERABILITYoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesorareadequatelydescribedintheUFSAR.Thisisa.GinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"channeloperable.above"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.ChangestotheApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3;5-1,FunctionalUnit815-ThetripFunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.RemovalofthistripfunctionisjustifiedinReference44whichshowsthatbasedontheoffsitepowersystemconfiguration,thistripFunctionisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.Therefore,thistripFunctionwasrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.December1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹1forFunctionalUnit¹1-ThisactionwasrevisedtoaddrequirementsforoperabilityoftheManualReactorTripfunctioninNodes3,4,and5whentherodsarenotfullyinsertedandtherodcontrolsystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal(LCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Theseactionsensurestheplantisplacedinaconditioninwhichthetripfunctionisnolongerrequiredfortheassociatedmodesofoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹ll-ThiswasrevisedtoaddtherequirementsforTurbineTriponTurbineStopValveClosuresincethiswasnotintheCTS.TherequiredactionswithinoperablechannelsarethesameasthatfortheTurbineTriponLowAutostopOilPressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2for.FunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto4hours(ratherthan2hours)duringsurveillancetesting.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,Column4-Thisrequirementwasrevisedtoassociatethepermissive(orbypass)detailswiththespecificpermissive(orinterlock)numbersandtoclarifytheapplicabilityoftheFunctionwithanassociatedMode(seeITSTable3.3.1-1,FU¹16).ThedetailsofthepermissiblebypassconditionsfortheassociatedFunctionsarediscussed-intheUFSARandITSBases.ChangestotheApplicabilityofaFunctionalUnitdifferentfromthosediscussedinColumn4arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-189-December1995 Table3.5-1,ChannelOperableabovecolumnforFunctionalUnits7,10,14and15.ThiswasrevisedtochangetheMODEofApplicabilityto8.5%RTPversus5%RTP.ThepermissivewhichenablesthesefunctionstobeOPERABLEissetat8.5%RTPperCTS2.3.2.1.Therefore,thischangeprovidesconsistencywithintheCTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹3and¹4forFunctionalUnits¹2,¹3,and¹4-Theseactionswererevisedtoclarifytheapplicabilityoftheintermediaterangeneutronfluxandsourcerangeneutronfluxtocorrespondtothespecificpermissives.TheNISintermediaterangeneutronfluxchannelsmustbeOPERABLEwhenthepowerlevelisabovethecapabilityofthesourcerangeandbelowthecapabilityofthepowerrange.TheassociatedRequiredActionsensuretheplantisnolongerintheapplicableconditionthroughcontrolledpoweradjustmentsandtakingintoaccountthe'lowprobabilityofaneventduringtheperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionoftheNIStrip.ThischangesupersedesthatproposedinReference61.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹4forFunctionalUnit¹4-Thisactionwasrevisedtoclarify.theApplicabilityandaddassociatedRequiredActionsforinoperableSRHs.ForMode2belowthepermissiveandonlyoneSRMOPERABLE,positivereactivityadditionsmuststopimmediatelyandtheinoperablechannelrestoredin48hoursconsistentwithcurrentTS.However,withtwoSRMsinoperabletheplantwouldberequiredtoimmediatelyopentheRTBs.ForModes,3,4,and5,withtheCRDincapableofrodwithdrawalorallrodsnotfullyinserted,anadditionalactionwasaddedthatrequirestheperformanceofaSDMverification.Theseclarificationsandadditionalrestrictionensuretheplantisnolongerintheapplicableconditionorisinamorestablecondition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-190-December1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹11and¹13-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowariinoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹lland¹13-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),¹14and¹15-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),and¹14-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethe'currentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframeto.performtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.-191-December1995 Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹16-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethegPTRHonitorOPERABILITYrequirementstoChapter3.2.Inaddition,requirementswereaddedtoverifywithacalculationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltHonitorisinoperableandTHERHALPOWERis<75%RTPandtoverifywithafullcorefluxmapthatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltHonitorisinoperableandTHERHALPOWERis~75%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹17-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationMaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.TheCirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstrumentsonlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedinthe'innaStationsafetyanalysis.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-TheFunctionalUnitapplicabilitywasrevisedtorequiretheinstrumentstobeapplicableinallmodesassociatedwithDGoperability.ThisensuresthattheDGcanperformitsfunctiononalossofvoltageordegradedvoltagetothe480Vbuses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-Thisactionwas'revisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThisCompletionTimeissufficienttoallowrestorationofthechannelandtakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannels,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringa,LOPstartoccurringduring.thisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.16)change.-192-December1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannel(consistentwithLCO3.0.5)inordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswiththeassociatedlogic.Bypassingtheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.Additionally,anotewasaddedclarifyingthatentryintotheassociateConditionsandRequiredActionscanbedelayedforupto4hoursforperformanceofrequiredsurveillance.EnteringDGactionsduringtestingisnotnecessarysincetheCompletionTimesforaninoperableDGismuchgreaterthanthetimetoperformthe.SR(72hoursvs6hours).TheSRNotetimeof4hourstakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannelsandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringaLOPstartoccurringduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.17)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-ThisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentshutdownactionswitharequirementtorestorechannelstoanOPERABLEstatusortoentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.TheactionsofnewLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2provideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.Thelossoftheminimumrequiredlossofvoltageor.degradedvoltagechannels(onebus)'houldresultinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.1)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹18and¹19-Thenumberofchannelswasreformattedtorequireonlytwoundervoltagechannelsperbusversustwochannelsofthelossofvoltagefunctionandtwodegradedvoltagefunctionperbus.Thebusundervoltagedesignisaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogicsuchthatonedegradedvoltagechannelandonelossofvoltage.'hannelcompriseeachofthetwoundervoltagechannels.However,duetothesystemdesign,ifeitherofthedegradedvoltageorlossofvoltagefunctionsisinoperable,theentireundervoltagechannelmustbetripped(i.e.,boththedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagefunctionsaretripped).Thischangeprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperatorswithoutanyreductioninthesystemrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.18)change.December1995 w.X.aa~LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.Thisfuncti'on'anticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.ThefunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changersLCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.ThisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.'hisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹20andassociatedActionStatement¹14-ThisrequirementwasreformattedtoseparatelydenotetheReactorTripBreakers,theReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanisms,andtheAutomaticTripLogicfunctions(LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Functions¹15,¹16,and¹17).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow6hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinHodes1'nd2prior'oinitiatingaplantshutdowntoHode3(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR).Therestorationtimeof6hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.18)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(reactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinHodes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoHode3(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionT).Therestorationtimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLERTBisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.19)change.-194-December1995 bb.CC~dd.ee..Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisaction.wasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5prior'toinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionW).Therestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethebreakertoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionM).Therestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEbreakerisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoonlyallow1hourtoopentheRTBsfollowingtheactiontorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionX).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSallows6hoursto.performthisactionbuttakesintoaccountashutdownfromNodes1and2.The1hourprovidessufficientamountoftimetoaccomplishtheactioninModes,3,4,and5inanorderlymanner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtospecifyalimitof2hourstobypasstheRTBforsurveillancetestingand6hourstobypasstheRTBformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionT,Notes1and2).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSforbypassingduringmaintenancedoesnotspecifyatimelimit.TheITSwouldsetalimitonthistime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-195-December1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.2,Table3.5-2,orTable3.5-4:a~b.C.d.TS3.5.2.2,3.5.2.3andTable3.5-2,Columns1,2,and3-ThedetailsdescribingtheoperabilityacceptancecriteriaforTripSetpointsincludingthecolumnsforthe"TotalNumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperabilityoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"ChannelOperableAbove"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.ChangestotheApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹l.b-TheModeofApplicabilitywasrevisedtobeRCS>200F.TheSIHighContainmentPressureFunctionisusedtoactuatecontainmentisolationbelow350'FsuchthatthisFunctionmustbeoperable.TheManualSIFunctiondoesnotactuateContainmentIsolationwhiletheremainingfunctionsareblockedwhenRCSpressureis2000psig.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnits¹I.cand¹I.d-ThenotesorremarkswhichdescribeoperationaldetailsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock,werereformattedasModeApplicabilitiesanddefaultconditionsinthenewspecifications.AnewSR3.3.2.6,wasaddedtospecificallydenotetheoperabilityrequirementsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-196-December1995 rTable3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.c,¹1.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation.(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.c,¹1.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.LCO3.3.2,FunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹2.b,¹3.b,¹4.b,¹5.a,and¹6.a,"AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays,"wereaddedfortheESFASInstrumentation.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.ThisismerelyapresentationchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsasthislogiccircuitryisassumedwithintheoperabilityofthespecificFunctions.Additionally,theautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforvariousFunctionsarerequiredOPERABLEinMode4tosupportsystemlevelmanualinitiation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnit¹3.c-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin48hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory'(v.b.15)change.-197-December1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹11forFunctionalUnit¹2.b-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹11forFunctionalUnit¹2.b-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan2hours).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹3.aand¹3.f-TheactionsforaninoperableManualInitiationchannelfortheAFWandSAFWSystemswasrevisedfromrestoringoperabilityin48hourstodeclaringtheassociatedpumpinoperable.TheManual.Initiationchannelsforthesefunctionsactuallyconsistofswitchesinth'econtrolwhichonlyactuateonepumptrain.ThereisnoswitchforcompleteactuationofallAFWorSAFWpumps.Therefore,enteringthepumpinoperabilityrequirementsisconsistentwiththeactionsiftheAFWpumpweredeclaredinoperable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory'(v.b.51)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,¹3.c,¹5.a,and5.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto4hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Thecurrentrequi,rementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.December1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,¹5,a,andS.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnit¹3.e-Theaction'ssociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoamorerestrictiverestorationtimeof48hoursforaninoperablechannelratherthanplacingthechannelinthetrippedconditionwithinonehour.Theallowanceof48hourstoreturnthetraintoanOPERABLEstatusisjustifie'dinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Notused.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹4.2-TherequirementsfortheContainmentVentilationIsolation(CVI)ManualInitiationFunctionwerenotadded.ThecurrentTSaremisleadinginthatthereisnomanualCVIinitiationfunction.Instead,CVIismanuallyinitiatedbytheManualCSfunction.TheremovalofthisrequirementprovidesconsistencywithintheTSandgreaterclarifytotheoperators.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.d,and¹2.b-TheseFunctionalUnitAllowableValueswererevisedtoreflecttheactualvaluesusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹7.aand¹7.b-TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesfornewLCO3.3.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-4,Notes1and2forFunctionalUnits¹6.aand¹6.c-ThenoteswhichdescribedesigndetailsfortheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowFunctionandLossof4kVFunctionwerenotadded.ThesedetailsarerelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.December1995 Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit84.2bandAction8toTable3.5-5-TheactionsforaninoperableCVIradiationmonitorwererevisedtoallow4hourstoisolatetheaffectedpenetration.CurrentTSTable3.5-2doesnotprovideatimelimit,onlythatthevalvesaretobeclosedwhileTable3.5-5provides.1hourtoperformthisaction.ThetimelimitisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andtheCompletionTimesforaninoperablecontainmentisolationvalvewhichtheCVIsignalactuates.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.3orTable3.5-3:('a~b.c~TS3.5.3.2,TS3.5.3.3,andTable3.5-3,Columns1and2-Thecolumnsforthe"TotalRequiredNumberofChannels,"andthe"MinimumChannelsOperable,"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwitha.newcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."Systemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperability'oftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.5.3.2-Therestorationtimerequirementof7daysforoneinoperablechannel(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedto30days.The30dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEchannel,thepassivenatureoftheinstrument,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAMinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.2'1)change.TS3.5.3.2-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan7days(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrumentsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.-200-December1995 d.TS3.5.3.3-Therestorationtimerequirementof48hoursfortwoinoperablechannelswasrevisedto7days.The7dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformationandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAMinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.e.Table3.5-3-ThePostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredby'hisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRG1.97,TypeAandCategoryIvariables.ThesefunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.59).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.5.4andTable3.5-6-Therequirementsforradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentation,providedtomonitorradiationlevelsinselectedplantlocationsfollowinganaccident,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDHA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.5.6.1-Therequirementsfor'hechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDHAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.3.5,ConditionsBandC,wereaddedfortheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)actuationinstrumentation.ThesenewrequirementsspecifyRequiredActionsforvariousmodesofoperationwhentheCREATSisolationdamperscannotbeplacedintheemergencyradiationprotectionmode.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.\-201-December1995 vii.ix~16.TechnicalTS3.5.6.2-Therequirementforonedetectionsysteminoperablehasbeenrevisedtoallowmorethanonechannelinoperablewithanactiontoisolatethecontrolroominonehour.EvenwithalossofFunction.oftheautomaticactuationlogic,theCREATSmaystillbecapableofbeingmanuallyisolatedwithin1hourandperformingitssafetyfunction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.5.5andTable3.5-5-TherequirementsforradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationwhichensuresthatthelimitsofTS3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceededwerenotadded(exceptforR-llandR-12whichsupportContainmentVentilationIsolation).NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableor,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.Table3.5-5-TheModeofApplicabilityforR-llandR-12operabilitywasrevisedfrom"duringshutdownpurges"toMODES1,2,3,and4,andduringMODE6whenrequiredbyLCO3.9.3,"ContainmentPenetrations."ThisisaconservativechangewhichensuresthatthegaseousandparticulateradiationmonitorsareoperableinallModesinwhichthemini-purgeorshutdownpurgesystemscanbeused;.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Specification3.6TS.3.6.1-Thetext.allowingclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolswasrelocatedtoaLCONoteconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.6.2-TheApplicabilityformaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitswasrevisedfromreactorcriticalitytoMODE4.Thischangeisnecessarytoprovideconsistencywiththerequirementsforcontainmentintegrity(i.e.,LCO3.6.1)sinceexceedingthesepressurelimitscouldresultinaoverpressure'fcontainmentifanaccidentweretooccur.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Also,thetimeallowedtorestorecontainmentpressurewaschangedfrom24hoursto8hours.Thischangewasmadeduetotheshortperiodoftimeitnormallytakestorestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-202-December1995 TS3'.3-Threenewrequirementswereadded.Thefirstrequiresthatapenetrationwithbothcontainmentboundariesinoperablebeisolatedwithin1hourversus4hours.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithTS3.6.1sincecontainmentintegrityispotentiallyviolated.Assuch,verificationofcontinuedacceptablecontainmentleakagemustbeinitiatedimmediatelyifbothbarriersaredeclaredinoperable.Inaddition,newrequirementswithrespecttoaninoperableairlock(includingtheuseofanairlockwithaninoperabledoororinterlockmechanism)andcontainmentmini-purgepenetrationswithisolationvalvesthatexceedtheirleakagerateacceptancecriteriawereadded.Thenewrequirementfortheairlocksspecifiesthataninoperableairlockdoor(includinganinoperableinterlockmechanism)mustbeisolatedwithin1hourandlockedclosedwithin24hours.However,adedicatedindividualcanbeusedinthecaseofaninoperableinterlockmechanismtoallowentryandexitthroughtheairlock.ThenewspecificationprovidesspecificRequiredActionsintheeventthatcurrentGinnaStationTS4.4.2.3.cisexceeded.Thenewrequirementforthemini-purgepenetrationsspecifiesthattheaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolatedwithin24hoursifanisolationvalveexceedsitsleakagelimit.Thesenewrequirementsprovideaddedassurancethatpenetrationswhichcanprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironmentareaddressedquicklywhentheirisolationbarriersbecomeinoperable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.3-Theuseofaclosedsystemtoisolateaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierforupto72hourswasaddedtothisspecification.Consequently,aclosedsystemwhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeetthisspecificationcanbeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrierforalimitedperiodoftime.Also,isolationdeviceslocatedoutsidecontainmentthatwereusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationvalvearerequiredtobeverifiedclosedonceevery31days.Forisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,theymustbeverifiedcloseduponentryintoNODE4fromNODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92days.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.22)changes.TS3.6.5-Thereasonsforopeningthemini-purgevalvesabove200'FwererelocatedtothebasesforITS3.6.3sincethesedonotmeetanyofthefourcriteriaanddonotspecifyanyRequiredActions.OperationoftheMini-PurgeSystemisperformedunderproceduressuchthatitsuseisstrictlycontrolled.Placingthisinformationinthebasesalsoprovidessimilarcontrolunder10CFR50;59(i.e.,theBasesControlProgram).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-203-December1995 TS3.6-Anewrequirementwasaddedwhichspecifiesthattheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureshallbe~120'FaboveNODE5.ThistemperaturelimitisnecessarytoensurethattheresultingcontainmenttemperaturefollowingaDBAiswithintheassumptionsusedforenvironmentalqualificationofcomponentswithincontainment'ftheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureis>120'F,itmustberestoredwithin24hours.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhichrequiresthehydrogenrecombinerstobeOPERABLEinHODES1and2.Thehydrogenrecombinersareassumedintheaccidentanalysestobeusedtopreventahydrogenexplosionwithincontainmentthatcouldoverpressurizethecontainmentstructure.ThenewLCOallows30daystorestoreaninoperablerecombinerand7daystorestoretwoinoperablerecombinersiftheHini-PurgeSystemisOPERABLE.Inaddition,theplantcanenterHODES1and2withaninoperablehydrogenrecombiner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4.1andTS3.6.4.3-TheApplicabilityforthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedtoincludeHode3requirements.Thesevariablesarerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinHodes1,2,and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4'-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan30dayswasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrumentsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.TS'.6.l.b-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityforcontainmentintegrityiftheboronconcentrationislessthan2000ppmwasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincetheboronconcentrationlimitisonlyarequirementforfuelhandlingaccidents.SincetherequirementsofITSLCO3.6.1immediatelystopallfuelmovementinthiscondition,thereisnoforcontainmentintegrity.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandhavebeendeleted.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.50)change..-204-December1995 17.TechnicalSpecification3.7iv.TS3.7.l.l.b,3.7.1.l.d,and3.7.1.l.e-Thecoldshutdownorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)forthe480Vsafeguardsbuses,batteriesandDCtrains,and120VACinstrumentbuseswererevisedfromrequiringonlyonetraintobeOPERABLEtorequirethenecessarytrain(s)tosupportallotherLCOrequirements.Consequently,oneorbothtrainsofthesesystemsmayberequireddependingonothersystemrequirements(e.g.,RHR).InMODES5and6,sufficientelectricalpowerredundancymustbeavailabletomitigateaneventcoincidentwitheitheralossofoffsitepower,lossofallonsitestandbyemergencypower,oraworsecasesinglefailure.ThischangeensuresthatallnecessaryelectricalsupportsystemsareOPERABLEtorespondtoaDBAoratransient.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.7.1.2-Coldorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)fortheDGfueloilsupplyandthebatteryparametershavebeenaddedtoproviderestorationtimesforspecifiedconditionsconsistentwiththeITS.Thesetimesaresufficienttocompleterestorationofthedegradedparameterpriortodeclaringthecomponentinoperableandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiodandthefactthatthecomponentremainscapableofperformingmostrequiredfunctions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.7.2.l.b.2,3.72.2.a,and3.7.2.2.b-Therequirementsfortwooffsitesourceswerenotadded.Thecurrentactionsallowtheplanttooperateindefinitelywithoneoffsitesourceinoperable.ThenewITSformatcriteriawould'otspecifytheserequirementsintheTS(i.e.,requireacomponentforaMODEchangebutallowthecomponenttoremaininoperableindefinitelyoncetheMODEchangeisco'mplete).Therefore,theserequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRH.TheoffsitepowersourcesarefurtherdiscussedinReference32.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.7.2.2.b.1-TheactionsforaninoperableDGhavebeenrevised:(1)toeliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure,and(2)torequireverificationoftheoffsite,powercircuittotheaffectedACdistributiontrain.Inaddition,theOPERABLEDGmustonlybetestedonceduringthe7dayallowedoutagefortheinoperableDG.TherevisedactionfortheOPERABLEDGeliminatesunnecessarytestingduringaperiodinwhichtheplantreliesononlyoneDG.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.2)and(v.a)changes.-205-December1995 V.vl.18.TechnicalTS3.7.2.2.c-TheCompletionTimefortheactiontore-energizethe480Vsafeguardsbushasbeenrevisedfrom1hourto8hours.ThetimeisconsistentwiththeITSwhichassumesnotonlyrestorationofthebusbutalsotheassociatedloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcomprisetheACelectricaltrain.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.24)change.TS3.7.2.2.d-ThiswasrevisedtoaddressthescenariowithbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,nolossofsafetyfunctionexistssincetheremainingDGisavailabletoprovidepowertooneESFtrain.However,thetimeinthisConditionshouldbelimitedduetothepotentialtolosemultiplesafetyfunctionsiftheremainingDGwerelost.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovided.However,ifbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperabletothesameACelectricaltrain,thenthetimewouldberestrictedto8hoursasdiscussedinSectionD,item17.vabove.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.54)change.Specification3.8TS3.8-Theapplicabilitywasrevisedfrom"duringrefuelingoperations"to"COREALTERATIONSandirradiatedfuelassemblymovementwithincontainment."ThisisanequivalentchangesincerefuelingoperationscanonlyberelatedtoCOREALTERATIONSandirradiatedfuelassemblymovementwithincontainment.ThisisaGinnaTScategory(v.c).change.TS3.8.l.b-TherefuelingorMODE6requirementforthecontainmentradiationmonitorswhichprovidemonitoringforpersonnelsafetywasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thecontainmentradiationmonitorsareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-206-December1995 TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityoftheSRHswasrevised.Thephrase"whenevergeometryisbeingchanged"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofMODE6.TherequirementthatoneSRHbeOPERABLEwhencoregeometry"isnotbeingchanged"iscoveredbytheRequiredActionforoneinoperableSRM.ThiswouldrestrictCOREALTERATIONandpositivereactivityadditionswhencoregeometryisnotbeingchanged.RequiredActionswerealsoprovidedwhentwoSRHsbecomeinoperableorwhentheaudibleindicationislost.Thesenew=actionsrequireverificationofboronconcentrationevery12hoursandensuresthestabilizedconditionofthereactorcore.TheseareaconservativerevisionsandGinnaTSCategory(v.a)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.TS3.8.l.e-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityandfrequencyoftheboronconcentrationsamplingwasrevised.Thephrase"immediatelybeforereactorvesselheadremovalandwhile.loadingandunloadingfuelfromthereactor"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofMODE6.ThiswouldadditionallyrequireboronconcentrationsamplingthroughoutMODE6.Thesamplingfrequency,however,wasalsorevisedtorequiresamplingevery72hours.Theserevisionsconsiderthelargevolumeoftherefuelingcanal,RCS,andrefuelingcavityandareadequatetoidentifyslowchangesinboronconcentration.Rapidchangesinboronconcentration,describedinUFSAR15.4.4.2,aredetectedbytheSRHinstrumentationrequiredbynewTS3.9.2.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.8.l.f-TherequirementforcommunicationwiththecontrolroomduringCOREALTERATIONSisnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecommunicationsisnotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoprocedures,orotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.8.1.d(footnote*)andTS3.8.l.g(footnote*)-Therequirementthateitherthepreferredortheemergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachresidualheatremovalloopisnotadded.ThisdetailisencompassedinthedefinitionofoperabilitydescribedinnewTSl.1andtheelectricpowerrequirementscontainedinChapter3.8.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-207-December1995 TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementtoprovideSRNaudibleindicationinthecontainmentwasnotadded;Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincethemonitoredparameter(audibleindicationincontainment)isnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.ThesafetyanalysisassumesaudibleindicationinthecontrolroomwhichisdenotedbynewLCO3.9.2.Theaudibleindicationisforpersonnelsafetyonly.Further,theaudibleindicationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.8.l.iii.1-Theisolationdeviceswhichareallowedwasrevisedtoinclude"orequivalent."Theuseof"orequivalent"forisolationofacontainmentpenetrationisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andthebasesforCTS3.8whichallow'theuseofa"materialwhichcanprovideatemporaryventilationbarrier,atatmosphericpressure,forthecontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelmovement."Therefore,thisisaclarificationonlytotheLCO.ThisisaGinnaTS.Category(v.c)change.TS3.8.2-Therequirementtoinitiateaction"tocorrecttheviolatedconditions"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisisalwaysanoptiontoexittheCondition.Thatis,theConditionisnotexited,evenaftercompletionoftheRequiredActions,unlesseithertheLCOismet,ortheNODEofApplicabilityisexited.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)chang'e.TS3.8.2-Therequirementtocease"operationswhichmayincreasethereactivityofthecore"wasnotaddedtoLCO3.9.3(ContainmentPenetrations)sincethebasisforisolationofcontainmentiswithrespecttoafuelhandlingaccident.ThereactivityofthecoreiswithrespecttoaborondilutioneventwhichisadequatelyaddressedbyotherLCOs.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.48)change.-208-December1995 19.TechnicalSpecification3.9TS3.9.1.1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,Appendix8,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonot,satisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.1.2andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseordosecommitmenttoindividualswhichresults'romcumulativeliquideffluentdischargesduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodsandisintendedtoassurecompliancewiththedoseobjectivesof10CFRPart50,AppendixI,40CFR141,and40CFR190limitswerenotadded.Theselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepubl.icfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,radioactiveliquideffluentdoseprojectedvalueisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecification'creeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCH'andtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.1.3-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixI,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-209-December1995

TS3.9.2.1-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributorto.coredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyState'menttechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.l,and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.2.a,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.2.b,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetoradioiodine,radioactivematerialsinparticulateform,andradionuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhalf-livesgreaterthan8daysreleasedwithgaseouseffluentswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thesegaseouseffluentsdosesareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcrit'eriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-210-December1995 ix.TS3.9.2.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControls,ProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.5andTS3.9.2.6-Thespecificrequirementsforwhichlimitconcentrationofoxygeninagasdecaytankandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.11andamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.7-There'quirementsforthesolidradwastesystemwhichprocesseswetradioactivewasteandoperatesinaccordancewith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,foreffluentcontrolwerenotadded.TheoperabilityofthesystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,radioactivewasteisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore;therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)'hange.20.TechnicalSpecification3.10TS3.10.1-ThiswasrevisedtoincludespecificactionsandCompletionTimesforcaseswhentheshutdownbankinsertionlimitsandthecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsarenotwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Theseactionsrequireverificationwithin1hourthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinlimitsandrestoringtheassociatedvaluetowithinlimitswithin2hours'orbeinMODE3within6additionalhours.Theseadditionsweremadetoensurethatthecontrolbanksandtheshutdownbankareavailableasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-211-December1995 TS3.10.1.1-Thiswasrevisedtoincludeaspecificactiontoinitiateborationwithin15minuteswhentheSHUTDOWNMARGINisnotwithinlimits.TheadditionofthisactionensuresthatSHUTDOWNMARGINismonitoredandquicklyrestoredwithinlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.10.1.1andFigure3.10-2-ThesewererevisedtorelocatetheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementsandFigure3.10-2totheCOLR.SHUTDOWNMARGINcanbeusedinfuelmanagementandasavariabletosolveplantspecificproblems.SHUTDOWNMARGINimpactsanumberofanalyses(i.e.,uncontrolledborondilutionandsteamlinebreak)andissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankposition,corepowerlevel,coolanttemperatureandcyclespecificparameterssuchasfuelburnup,xenonconcentrationandboronconcentration.TheinclusionofSHUTDOWNMARGINintheCOLRprovidesmoreflexibilityinplantoperation,inperformingthedesign,andinobtaininggoodfueleconomicsparticularlyforextendedcycleoperation.WiththeSHUTDOWNMARGINincludedintheCOLR,thecoredesigncanbefinalizedaftershutdownsothattheactualendofcycleburnupisknownwhichisparticularlyhelpfulwhentheactualburnupdiffersfromtheprojectedvalue.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.1.2andTS3.10.1.3-ThesewererevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsfortheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimits.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheinsertionlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.1.3andFigure3.10-1-Thesewererevisedtorelocatethecontrolrodinsertion'limitsandthesequenceandoverlaplimitstotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.1.5-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoneofthePHYSICSTESTScurrentlyperformedatGinnaStationcurrentlyrequirearelaxationoftheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirements.ThereforenoneoftheseSHUTDOWNMARGINPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsorRequiredActionsarenecessary.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethelowpowerPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsincenewLCO3.2.1andLCO3.2.2whichcontainthepeakingfactorrequirementsareonlyapplicableinMODE1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-212-December1995 TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforthegPTR.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthegPTRlimitandtheITSLCO3.2.4whichcontainsgPTRisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWERz50%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.8,TS3.10.2.9andTS3.10.2.10-ThesewererevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforAFD.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheAFDlimitsandtheITSLCO3.2.3whichcontainsAFDisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWERz15%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.3.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtoreducetheminimumT,,fortheroddroptestfrom540Fto500'F.The500'Ftemperatureisconservativesincethewaterwillbeslightlydenseratthelowertemperaturewhichhasthepotentialtoslowdownthedroppedrods.ThischangewouldenabletheplanttocompletetheroddroptestatanearliertimeduringplantstartupandisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsforcontrolbankalignment.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthealignmentlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.4.2and.TS3.10.4;3-Thesewererevisedtoremoveconditionsofrodinoperabilityduetobeingimmovable.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.Referencetofulllengthrodswasalsoremovedsincetherearenopartlengthrodsinthereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.4.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtodeclareamisalignedrodinoperablewhentherodcannotberestoredtowithinthealignmentlimitsin1hour.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.a-'hisoptionforrestoringarodtowithinalignmentwasremovedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtotheBasesforITS3.1.4whichiscontrolledundertheBasesControlProgram.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-213-December1995 XV.XV1.XV11.XV111.X1X.TS3.10.4.3.2.b.iiiandTable3.10-1-ThesewererevisedtoremoveTable3.10-1fromthespecifications.TheITSrequiresevaluationsofaccidentanalysistobeperformedtodeterminethatthecorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccident.AnevaluationofeachoftheanalysesonTable3.10-1maynotberequiredtodeterminethatthecorelimitswillnotbeexceed.ThistablewasrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.bandTS3.10.4.3.2.c-Thesewererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoreducethehighneutronfluxtripsetpointtoz85%RTPwhenthepowerlevelisreducedtos75%RTP.ThisrequiredactionisdeletedbasedonagreementsbetweentheNRCandtheownersgroupsandisconsistentwithWCAP-13029(Ref.50)whichstatesthatthesafetyanalysesresultswouldnotbesignificantlyaffectedbychangestotheirinitialassumptionsasaresultofincreasedpeakingfactorscausedbyrodmisalignment.Additionally,thepeaking.factorlimitverificationwithin72hoursandthere-evaluationofthesafetyanalysiswithin5daysthatarerequiredbythisspecificationprovidefurtherassurancethattheassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisarepreserved.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.52)change.TS3.10.4.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoverifySHUTDOWNHARGINorinitiateborationwithin1hourwhenmorethanonerodisoutofalignment.TheITSBasesstatethat1hourisareasonabletimebasedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenondistributionandthelowprobabilityofaaccident.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.1-ThiswasrevisedtoaddanactionstatementtoclarifythatifmorethanoneHRPIisinoperablepergroupforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankisinoperableforoneormorebanksthentheplantmustenter3.0.3immediately.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.2.a-Thiswasrevisedtoallow4hours(insteadofimmediately)toverifyrodposition.Therodpositioncannot'bedeterminedimmediately.Ittakestimetoacquirethedataandobtaintheresults."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontime.TheITSBasesstatethat4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositionswhileareductionto~50%RTPwillavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat>50%RTPwith2ormorerodsmisaligned.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.December1995 XX.XX1.XX11~XX111.XX1V.TS3.10.2.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequiremeasurement'fthepower-distributionaftereachfuelreloadi'ngpriortooperationoftheplantatorabove75%RTPinsteadofpriorto50%RTPconsistentwithITS.ThisrequirementensuresthatthedesignlimitsarenotexceededwhenRTPisachieved,sincepeakingfactorsareusuallydecreasedaspowerincreases.Requiringthissurveillanceat75%versus50%stillprovidesthenecessarymargintoensurethatdesignsafetylimitsarenotexceededandprovidestheoperatorwithmoreflexibilityduringpowerascensionfollowingarefueling.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.25)change.TS3.10.2.1-Thiswas'evisedtodeletetherequirementtoverifygPTRusingmovableincoredetectorsorcoreexitthermocoupleswithonepowerrangedetectorinoperableatTHERMALPOWER~75%RTPandreplacedwitharequirementtoperformafluxmaptoverify'thathotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitsconsistentwithITS.TheincoredetectorsarenotusedtoverifygPTRbutrathertoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.GinnaStationdoesnothave8pairsofsymmetricthimbleplugswhicharenecessarytoperformapartialfluxmapandthuswouldhavetocompleteafullcorefluxmaptoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentinterpretationsatGinnaStationandispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.Thisisat'irmaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethehotchannelfactorsbewithinlimitonlyinMODE1.TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequiretheFQorF<<limitstobemetinMODES2-5orduringrefueling.AsdescribedintheITSBases,FoandF<<mustbewithinlimitsduringMODE1;however,suchlimitsarenotnecessaryinMODE2becausethereisinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorbeingtransferredtothecoolanttorequiretheselimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.26)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethelimitsforFo(Z)andF<<andtheFigure3.10-3totheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanadministrativeActiontoreducetheAFDacceptableoperationallimitsspecifiedintheCOLRbythepercentagethatFoexceedsthelimit.ThisisnecessarysinceachangeinFocanadverselyimpactAFDlimits.ACompletionTimeof8hoursisallowedtoperformthisaction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-215-December1995 ITS3.10.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(insteadof24hours)toreducetheOverpoweraTandtheOvertemperatureaTtripsetpointswhenFQorF~isnotwithinlimitsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThissectionwasalsorevisedtoincludeaCompletionTimeof72toreducethePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripsetpoints.Theseactionsprovidefurtherprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributions.The72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.27)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoaddaRequiredActiontobeinMODE2within6hoursiftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesfortheConditionwhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsisnotmet.ThisactionplacestheplantinaconditionoutsideoftheApplicabilityrequirementsfortheHotChannelFactorrequirements.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursi'ssufficienttoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplant'ystems.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.10.2.3and3.10.2.4-ThesewererevisedtospecificallydefinetheApplicabilityrequirementsforgPTRasMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ThisApplicabilityisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforGinnaStationsincecontinuedoperationisallowedforanunlimitedperiodoftimewhenTHERMALPOWERis<50%RTP.TheITSBasesstatethatbelow50%RTPthereiseitherinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorinsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofagPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.Inaddition,theLCOlimitof1.12wasremovedsincetheprimarylimitof1.02willbereachedinitiallyandactionswillalreadybeinprogresstoaddressthetilt.THERMALPOWERwillcontinuetobereducedifthetiltratiocontinuestoincrease.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.December1995 TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERrelativetothepercentageofquadrantpowertilt,(i.e.,limitpowerto3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichthegPTRexceeds1.00)insteadofrequiringanimmediateactiontogobelow75%RTP.Thereductionto75%RTPessentiallyemploysa2%RTPreductionforeach1%thegPTRwasabove1.00upuntilgPTRequalled1.12whereareductionto50%RTPwasrequired.Theproposedchangewouldprovideflexibilitywiththeinitialreduction,butwouldrequireatleasta3%RTPreductionforeach1%gPTRexceeded1.00.Thus,theproposedchangewhilerequiringasmallerreductionforsmalltiltsismoreconservativeforlargertiltswhichwouldsuggestamoreseriousproblem.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TherequirementtomeasurethehotchannelfactorswhenthegPTRexceeds1.02ischangedfromwithin2hourstowithin24hourssincetheTHERMALPOWERisappropriatelylimitedwithin2hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.2.4-Thiswasrevisedtodeletethe.requirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorlimitpowerto<50%RTP.Identificationofthecauseofthetiltisnotalwaysp'ossibleandotheractionsalreadyunderwayareadequatetoassuresafeoperationoftheplant(e.g.,surveillances).ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-12159(Ref53).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.28)change.ThefollowingRequiredActionswereaddedfortheConditionwhengPTRisnotwithinthelimit:TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.'a~ArequirementtoverifybycalculationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsandlimitpoweraccordinglyevery12hours.b.ArequirementtorecalibratetheexcoredetectorspriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitspriortorecalibrationoftheexcoredetectors.-217-Oecember1995 C.ArequirementtoverifyFoandF~withinlimitseitherwithin24hoursafterreachingRTPorwithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyseveralNotes.ThefirstNoteclarifiesthatwhenthegPTRalarmisduetoinstrumentationalignmentthisactiondoesnotneedtobecompleted.Thesecondnoteallowsthisactiontobecompletedonlyaftertheexcoreshavebeenrecalibrated.ThethirdnoteclarifiesthattheCompletionTimeapplicablefirstistheonethatmustbemet.d.Arequirementtoreducepowerto<50%RTPwithin4hoursiftheinitialRequiredActionsarenotmetwithintheassociatedcompletiontime.ThistakestheplantoutoftheApplicabilitywhentheactionsarenotmetandprovidesanadditionalactionbeforeplantshutdownisrequired.TS3.10.2.5-Thiswasdeletedsincethe1.12gPTRlimitnolongerappliesandtheApplicabilityrequirementforgPTRhasbeenrevisedto>50%RTP.Actionsalready.inprogress(i.e.,limitingpowerby3%belowRTPforeach1%gPTRexceeds1.00).aresufficienttoaddressthetilt.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.7-Thiswasrevisedtorequireameasurementofthetargetfluxdifferencewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelinginsteadofwithin92EFPD.ThisrequirementisalsomodifiedwithanotethatallowsthepredictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.Thechangetowithin31EFPDismoreconservativethanwithin92EFPDandisnecessarytoperformtheinitialmonthlytargetfluxdifferenceupdatealsorequiredbyTS3.10.2.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.2.8-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandtotheCOLR'.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthelowamountsofstoredortransferredenergyinthelowerMODES.TheAFDattheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changes,respectively'.'218-December1995 TS3.10.2.9-Thiswasrevisedtospecify15minutes(insteadofimmediately)torestoreAFDtowithinthetargetbandandthenimmediatelyinitiateactionstoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPiftheAFDisnotrestoredwithintheinitial15minutes.ThisisconsistentwiththeintentofthecurrentGinnaStationtechnical~specifications."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontimeand15minutesisconsideredasufficientamountoftimetorestoreAFDwithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftimepriortoareductioninpower.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.10a-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandandtheacceptableoperationlimitstotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyNODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthelowamountsofstoredortransferred.energyinthelowerMODES.TheAFDattheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changesrespkctively.TS3.10.2.12-ThiswasrevisedtorequireaverificationthattheAFDiswithinlimitsandtologtheAFDevery15minuteswithTHERMAL'OWERa90%RTPandonceeveryhourwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableinsteadofeveryhourforthefirst24hoursandeveryhalfhourthereafter.Thismodificationreflectstheimportanceofstayingwithinthetargetbandatabove90%RTPandisconsistentwiththeRequiredActioniftheAFDisoutsidethetargetband.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-219-December1995

21.TechnicalSpecification3.11TS3.11.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)beOPERABLEwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.ThespecificcomponentswhicharerequiredfortheABVStobeconsideredOPERABLEwererelocatedtothebasessimilarwiththestructureofNUREG-1431andtheITSWriter'sGuide.ThebasesforLCO3.7.10nowrequirethatoneofthetwo100%capacityAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans,exhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystem,andallassociatedductwork,valvesanddampersbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,TS3.11.1.cwasrevisedtorequireanegativepressurewithintheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorwithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentinsteadofrequiringalldoors,windows,andotherdirectopeningsbetweentheoperatingfloorareaandtheoutsidetobeclosed.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentasdescribedinthebases.Thischangealsoprovidesamuchclearerspecificationwhichiseasierforlicensedpersonneltoreadandunderstandwithoutanyreductioninactualrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.11.2-TherequirementtocontinuouslymonitorradiationlevelsintheSFPareawasnotaddedtothen'wspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,theSFPradiationlevelsonlyprovideabackupsourcetoaSFPproblem.OtherLCOsprovideadequateverificationofSFPprimaryindications(i.e.,levelandboronconcentration)whichensurethatallaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremet.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,personnelwouldbestationedwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingandimmediatelyawareofaproblem.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.11.3and3.11.5-.TheheavyloadrestrictionformovementofloadsovertheSFPwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.'oscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheheavyloadlimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-220-December1995 iv~22.Technical23.TechnicalTS3.11.4-TheSFPwatertemperaturelimitwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheSFPwatertemperaturelimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3~12TS3.12.1-Therequirementforthenumberofthimblesperquadrantrequiredto'PERABLEduringrecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystemwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TherequirementsforthissurveillancearenotaninitialassumptionofanyDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,thisspecificationdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.1324.TechnicalNone.TS3.13-Therequirementsforsnubbersoperabilitywerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheInserviceInspectionProgram.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.1425.TechnicalSpecification3.15TS3.15.1-TheLTOPexceptionduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestingwasrelocatedasaNOTEtonewLCO3.4.12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.15.1-ThePORVsetpointduringLTOPconditionswasrelocatedtothePTLRconsistentwithLCO3.4.12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.15.1-Theaccumulatorsarenowrequiredtobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanthe.maximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperaturesas~specifiedinthePTLRconsistentwithConditionCofLCO3.4.12.ThisnewrequirementpreventsanaccumulatorfromoverpressurizingtheRCSandcausinganactuationoftheLTOPSystem.Theoperatorisinstructedtoisolateordepressurizetheaffectedaccumulatorundertheseconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.December1995 iv~V.vi.26.TechnicalTS3.15.1.1-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhenaPORVisinoperableduringMODES5and6dueto'theincreasedconsequencesfromanoverpressurizationeventundertheseconditions.ThisnewrequirementspecifiesthatthePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.Thelimitof72hourswithonePORVinoperableisconsistentwiththeallowedoutagetimeforonetrainofECCSequipmentduringMODES1,2and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.15;1.3-The'reportingrequirementforthelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)systemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementtoincludedocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvaTvesisdetailedinproposedTS5.6.4,"MonthlyOperatingReports"andisgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.15-TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtospecifythatLTOPisonlyrequiredinMODES5and6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.ThischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforisolatingtheSIpumpsforLTOPconditions(3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8)andtheITSsuchthatthereisnorealchangeintheMODEofApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification3.16TS3.16.1andTable3.16-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforspecifiedradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further;thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-222-December1995 27.TechnicalTS3.16.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandof.radioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.16.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.0AnewsectionSR3.0.1wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementsandlimitationsthattheSRsmustmeetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithSR3.0.1.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-223-tDecember1995 TS4.0-Thiswasrevisedtoclarifythebasicapplicationofthe25%extensiontoroutinesurveillancesconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.Theintervalextensionconceptisbasedonschedulingflexibilityforrepetitiveperformances.ThereareclarificationsprovidedinSR3.0.2forSurveillanceswhicharenotrepetitiveinnatureandessentiallyhavenointervalasmeasuredfromthepreviousperformance.Thisprecludestheabilitytoextendtheseperformances.TheexistingSpecification4.0canbeinterpretedtoallowtheextensiontoapplytoallSurveillances.Anadditionalclarificationprovidesthebasisforconsistencyinschedulingflexibilityforallperformancesofperiodicrequirements,whethertheyareSurveillancesorRequiredActions.Theintentremainstoperformtheactivity,ontheaverage,onceduringeachspecifiedinterval.ThissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirementsbutprovidesclarificationandadescriptionofSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionSR3.0.3wasaddedwhichestablishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethe'specifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.TheSRpermitsthedeclarationoftheLCO-not-mettobedelayedforupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency(whicheverisless),andeliminatesconfusioninapplyingthecorrectACTIONtimelimitsattheendofthis24hourperiod.Thevastmajorityofsurveillancesperformeddemonstratethatsystemsorcomponents,infact,areOPERABLE.WhenaSurveillanceismissed,itisprimarilyaquestionofOPERABILITYthathasnotbeenverifiedbytheperformanceoftherequiredsurveillance.Basedonconsiderationofplantconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillanceandthesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtheSurveillance,theNRChasconcludedthat24hoursisanacceptabletimelimitforcompletingamissedSurveillancewhentheallowableoutagetimesoftheACTIONSarelessthanthe24hourlimitorashutdownisrequiredtocomplywithACTIONS(Ref.53).Thissection,inpart,providesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-224-December1995 lv.AnewsectionSR3.0.4wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynew'equirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithSR3.0.4.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.28.TechnicalSpecification4.1i.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.l.1orTable4.1-1:a0b.Table4.1-1,Columns2(Calibrate)and3(Test)VariouscalibrationandtestingintervalrequirementsforRTSandESFASFunctionswererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ChangestothetestingintervalrequirementsdifferentfromthoseidentifiedanddiscussedinNUREG-1431arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-1(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):1.SR3.4.2.2-requiresverificationevery30minutesthatT.,foreachRCSloopis>540FwhenanyRCSloopT.,isknowntobe<547'F.ThissurveillanceisintendedtoensurethattheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotexceededwhentheRCSisatlessthanHotZeroPowerconditions(i.e.,547'F).Thesurveillanceisnotrequiredtobeperformedi'thelowT,',alarmineachloopisresetwithasetpoint>540'F.2.SR3.4.3.1-requiresverificationevery30minutesthatRCSpressure,temperature,heatupandcooldownratesarewithinlimits.ThissOrveillanceisonlyrequiredduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperations,andinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.The30minuteFrequencyisbasedonthefactthatheatupandcooldownrates,arespecifiedinhourlyincrementswhichprovidesadequatemargintocorrectminordeviations.-225-December1995 SR3.4.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatpressurizerpressureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinnaTSTable4.1-1,P7whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.2-requiresverificationevery.12hoursthatRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinnaTSTable4.1-1,833whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.3-requiresperformanceofaprecisionheatbalancetoverifythatRCSflowiswithinlimitsevery24months.Thissurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysofenteringMODE1andreaching95%RTP.SR3.1.6.1-Requiresverificationwithin4hourspriortocriticalitythatthecriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinlimitsintheCOLR.SR3.1.6.4-Requiresverificationevery12hourswhencriticalthatthesequenceandoverlaplimitsforthecontrolbanksnotfullywithdrawnarewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.SR3.1.8.3-Requiresverificationevery30minutesduringMODE2PHYSICSTESTSthatTHERMALPOWER~5%RTP.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERlevelwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.SR3.2.4.1-Verificationwithacalculationusingthepowerrangechannelsevery7daysthatthegPTRiswithinlimits.SR3.4.2.1-requiresverificationwithin30minutespriortoachievingcriticalitythatT,,foreachRCSloopis>540F.'hissurveillanceisintendedtoensurethat,theminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotexceededjustpriortoachievingcriticality.-226-December1995 Table4.1-1,=FunctionalUnits¹1,¹2,¹3,¹8,¹17,¹23,¹25,¹38a,¹38b,¹39,¹40,¹41a,and¹41b-Thenotesorremarkswhichdescribeanoperationaldetail,werenotadded.ThesedetailswererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.ThisfunctionanticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.ThefunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.ThisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.SR33114~SR33115SR33116SR33117~SR3.3.1.18wereaddedfortheReactorTripSystemInterlocks(P-6throughP-10).Thesesurveillancesareprovidedtoensurereactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.TheyareprovidedtobackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionsarenotbypassed.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.'ITable4.1-1,Functions¹34and¹35-Therequirementsforthechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimary.successpathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapabl'eof,detectingasignificant.abnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-227-December1995 Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1and2wererevisedtorequireaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)onthepowerrangeandtheintermediaterangechannelswithin7dayspriortoreactorcriticality.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe7daytimelimitsissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingthePHYSICSTESTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹4wasrevisedtoincludeanoterequiringachannelcheckevery30minuteswhileimplementingMODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptions.VerificationoftheRCStemperaturewillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹18,¹28,and¹29-TheSurveillancerequirementsforradiationmonitorsR-1throughR-9andR-17,emergencyplanradiationinstruments,andenvironmentalmonitors,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Notused.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹3-ThiswasrevisedtoaddarequirementwhichestablishesasurveillanceforaSRMCHANNELCALIBRATIONinMODE6.Thiscalibrationconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvesto,baselinedataandisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationprocedures.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹14,¹16,and¹19wererelocatedtotheTRMforthesamereasonsas.describedinSection0,items12.ithrough12.iv.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes.'228-December1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-2:'a~b.c~d.e.Table4.1-2,86awasrevisedtoextendthesurveillanceFrequencyofthecontrolrodexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe92dayFrequencytakesintoconsiderationtheotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandthechannelcheckwhichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofrodoperability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.29)change.Table4.1-2,85and56bwererevisedtoremovereferencetoonceevery18monthsoreachrefuelingshutdownfrom.theFrequency.These.surveillancesareonlyperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorhead~ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit87wasrevisedtorelocatethesurveillanceFrequencyofthepressurizersafetyvalvestotheISTProgramconsistentwithSR3.4.10.1.TheFrequencycontinuestoremaininaprogramrequiringNRCapproval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit810wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TherequirementforverifyingtherefuelingsysteminterlocksisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.ThisrequirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit813wasrevisedperSR3.6.6.8torequireverificationofthesprayadditivetankNaOHconcentrationonceevery184daysinsteadofmonthly.ThischangeisacceptablesincethesprayadditivetankisnormallymaintainedisolatedatpowersuchthatchangestotheNaOHconcentrationorlevelarenotexpected.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.30)change.-229-December1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15wasrevisedtorequireRCSwaterinventorybalancesevery72hoursduringsteadystateoperationversusdailyconsistentwithSR3.4.13.1.ThisincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptablebasedontheleakagedetectionsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.4.15andthevariousindicationsavailabletooperators(e.g.,volumecontroltanklevelandradiationalarms).Thisisa'innaTSCategory(v.b.31)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹17wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofSFPboronconcentrationonceevery31dayswhenfuelisstoredintheSFPandthepositionoffuelassemblieswhichweremovedintheSFPhavenotbeenverified.Thecurrentmonthlyrequirement(regardlessofthestatusoftheSFPverification)isnotreflectedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichdoesnotcredittheavailabilityofsolubleboron.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.32)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹19-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationWaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.TheCirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstrumentsonlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedintheGinnaStationsafetyanalysis.Theseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhich,areinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressure.boundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-2(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):1.SR3.1.1.1-Requiresverificationevery24hoursthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinthelimits.TheITSBasesstatethataFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinboronconcentrationandthelowprobabil'ityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.-230-December1995 SR3.1.3.1-RequiresverificationpriortoenteringNODE1aftereachrefuelingthatHTCiswithintheupperlimit.TheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringHODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.3.2-RequiresverificationpriortoenteringHODE1aftereachrefuelingthatHTCwillbewithinthe70%RTPHTCupperlimit.TheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringHODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.8.3-Requireverificationevery24hourswhileimplementingtheHODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsthattheSHUTDOWNHARGINiswithinthelimits.TheITSBasesstatethataFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDH.SR3.5.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthateachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveisfullyopenabove1600psig.SR3.5.1.3-requiresverificationevery12hoursofanupperlimitforthenitrogenpressureblanketintheaccumulatorstopreventliftingofthereliefvalveandoverpressurizationofthetank.Avalueof790psigwasselectedsinceitisabovetheaccumulatorpressureupperalarmsetpointof760psigandbelowthereliefvalvesetpointof800pslg.SR3.5.1.4-requiresverificationevery31daysonanSTAGGEREDTESTBASISofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheaccumulatorsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselectedsincethiswouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainment(andaccumulator)temperatureof60'F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalculationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.-231-December1995 8.9.10.SR3.5.1.5-requiresverificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromtheaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorabove1600psig.ThissurveillanceisconsistentwithcurrentTS'.3.l.l.i.Avalueof1600psigwasselected(i.e.,thesamevalueasthatforaccumulatoroperability)sincetheRCSpressureinterlock(i.e.,P-11)asdiscussedinNUREG-1431doesnotexistatGinnaStation.Therefore,thereisnointerlocksignaltoopentheisolationvalvesintheeventthattheyareclosed.SR3.5.4.2-requiresverificationevery7daysofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheRWSTsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCALThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselectedsincethiswouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuilding(andRWST)temperatureof50'F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalcul.ationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.SR3.6.5.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureis<120'F.12.SR3.6.6.8-requiresverificationevery184daysthatthesprayadditivetankvolumeisz4500gallons.SR3.7.11.1-requiresverificationevery7daysthat~23feetofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracksduringfuelmovementintheSFP.Thisverificationisrequiredsincethefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatatleast23feetofwaterisavailablewithrespecttoiodinereleases.13.SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2-verificationpriortofuelmovementintheSFPthattheassociatedfuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirementsforstoppageintheintendedregion(e.g,enrichmentlimit,burnablepoisonspresent).ThisverificationisrequiredtolimittheamountoftimethatafuelassemblycouldbemisloadedintheSFP.-232-December1995 14.15.16.17.18.19.20.SR3.7.6.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthattheCSTvolumeis~22,500gallons.ThisensuresthattheminimumvolumeofcondensateisavailableforthepreferredAFWSystemfollowinganaccident.SR3.7.7.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked;sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCCWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.SR3.7.7.2-requiresperformanceofacompletecycleofeachCCWmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheRHRheatexchangersinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.ThisensuresthatthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvesarecapableofbeingopenedfollowingaDBA.SR3.7.8.2-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachSWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheSWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwi'sesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheSWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.SR3.9.4.1and3.9.5.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursinNODE6thatoneRHRloopisinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.ThisensuresthattheRCSisbeingmixedasassumedforborondilutioneventsandthatdecayheatremovalcontinuesduringshutdown.SR3.9.3.1-requiresverificationevery7daysthatallcontainmentpenetrationswhichcommunicatetotheoutsideenvironmentareintheirrequiredstateinNODE6.Thisensuresthatcontainmentisinthecorrectstatepriortoandduringfuelmovement.SR3.6.3.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthatthemini-purgevalvesareclosed,exceptwhenthepenetration,flowpathisbeingusedunderadministrativecontrol.Thisensuresthattheflowpathswhichprovideadirectpathfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmentareinthecorrectposition.-233-December1995 21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.SR.3.7.8.1-requiresverificationevery24hoursthatthescreenhousebaywaterlevelandtemperaturearewithinlimits.Thisensuresthattheultimateheatsinksourceiswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.SR3.7.8.3-requiresverificationevery31daysthatallSWloopheadercross-tievalvesareinthecorrectposition.Thisensuresthatthevalvesareeitherlockedopenedorclosedasnecessarytosupporttheaccidentanalyses.SR3.5.2.7-requiresavisualverificationevery24monthsthattheRHRcontainmentsumpsuctioninletlineis'notobstructedandthatthescreenshowsnoevidenceofstructuraldistressorabnormalcorrosion.Thisensures'hattheRHRsystemwillnotbecomepluggedbyexpecteddebriswhichmayexistincontainmentpost-LOCA.SR3.1.3.3-requiresverificationpriortoenteringHOOf1aftereachrefuelingthatHTCwillbewithintheEOLlowerMTClimit.TheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringHODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigher,powerlevels.SR3.2.3.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthattheAFDmonitorisOPERABLE.ThisensuresthattheAFDmonitorisavailabletodetectchangesinAFDandprovidenecessaryindicationtooperators.SR3.2.4.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatthegPTRmonitorisOPERABLE.ThisensuresthatthegPTRmonitorisavailabletodetectchangesingPTRandprovidenecessaryindicationtooperators.SR3.6.6.5-requiresverificationevery31daysthatcoolingwaterisflowingthrougheachCRFCunit.Thisensuresthattheheatremovalcapabilityof.theCRFCunitsisverifiedtobeavailableasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.SR3.5.2.3-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachbreakerorkeyswitchisinthecorrectpositionofvalvesrequiredtobe'depoweredorpowered.ThisensuresthatnosingleactivefailurewillfailbothECCStrains.-234-December1995 k.n.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnits81and82-ThesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationsforthereasonsdiscussedinSectionD,itemll.i.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit816-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofDGfueloilinventoryonceevery31daysinsteadofdaily.Sincethestoragetanksareofpassivedesignandareprovidedwithvariouslevelalarms,verification'very31daysisconsideredadequate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.33)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit84-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRHforthesamereasonsasdescribedinSectionD,item12.iv.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit812.-ThiswasrelocatedtotheISTProgramsinceitdoesnotmeetanyoftherequirementsforinclusionintheITS.Thisi'saGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit818-TheFrequencyfordetermininggrossspecificactivityofthesecondarysystemwasrevisedfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery31days.Inaddition,thedeterminationofI-131wasalsochangedtoonceevery31daysindependentofthelastactivitylevelsincethecurrentGinnaTSallowupto6monthsbetweentests.ThesechangesareallconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.51)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.3orTable4.1-3:'a~Table4.1-3-ThePostAccidentNonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRegulatoryGuide1.97,TypeAandCategory1variables..TheseFunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.35).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-235-December1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-4:Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit81wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.1toonlyrequireverificationofreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityonceevery7dayswhenT.,~500'Fversusonceevery72hoursaboveColdShutdown(i.e.,T.,)200'F).Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedonthesmallprobabilityof-agrossfuelfailureduringtheadditional4days.Fuelfailuresaremorelikelytooccurduringstartuporfastpowerchangesandnotduringsteadystatepoweroperationduringwhichthemajorityofsamplingisperformed.GrossfuelfailureswillalsoresultinLetdownradiationalarmsandpossiblycontainmentradiationalarmsprovidingadditionaloperatorindication.OnlyrequiringthissurveillancewhenT.,).500'FprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.34)change.b.C.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit82wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.2torequireverificationofDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131whenT.,~500'Finsteadofabove5%reactorpower.ThisconservativechangeprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit83wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.3todelaydeterminationofEuntil31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofNODE1operationfollowingthereactorbeingsubcriticalfor)48hours.The31dayswasaddedtoensurethatradioactivematerialsareatequilibriuminordertoprovideatruerepresentativesampleforEdeterminationandeliminatepossiblefalsesamples.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.53)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.4orTable4.1-5:a0Table4.1-5,FunctionalUnit83bwasrevisedtorequireachannelcheckofparticulatesamplerR-llevery12hoursversusweekly.ThisisrequiredsinceR-llisbeingusedtomonitorRCSleakageandmaybetheonlyinstalledsystemOPERABLEtoperformthistaskforupto'0dayspernewLCO3.4.15.-236-December1995 b.TS4.1.4andTable4.1-5-TheRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionoraDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandwererelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.c~TS4.1-5,FunctionalUnit83aand83bwererevisedtoonlyrequirethefunctionaltestofthevalvesactuatedbyR-11andR-12onceevery24monthsversusquarterly.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andisconsideredacceptablesincethesechannelsareredundanttothecontainmentisolationsignal.Assuch'heaccidentanalysisdonottakespecificcreditforR-11andR-12toisolatethecontainmentpurgevalves.Also,afunctionaltestofthechannels(minusactuationofthevalves)istobedonequarterly.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.49)change.d.TheCHANNELCHECKofR-llwasrevisedfromweeklytodailyinMODES1,2,3,and4,andduringMODE6whenrequiredbyLCO3.9.3.This.isaconservativechangewhichrequiresR-11andr-12tobecheckedatthesamefrequency.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.e.TableNote5wasdeletedsincerequiringthattheCHANNELCALIBRATIONbetracedbacktotheNationalBureauofStandardsisnotanecessarylevelofdetailtobecontainedinTS.NUREG-1431doesnotcontainthislevelofdetailsinceitdoesnotmeetanyofthefourcriteria.Therefore,thisNoteisrelocatedtoplantprocedures.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.29.TechnicalSpecification4.2TS4.2.1-ThespecificrequirementsfortheInserviceInspectionProgram,whichincludegualityGroupsA,8,andCcomponents,highenergypipingoutsideofcontainment,.snubbersandsteamgeneratortubes,werenotadded.Thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(GinnaStationgAManual,AppendixB)andamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-237-December1995 TS4.2.1-Thetitleofthe"GinnaStationgAManual"waschangedto"NuclearPolicyManual"sincethisisthelocationoftheISTProgramperReference64.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.30.TechnicalSpecification4.3TS4.3.5.6-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedforthereasonsdiscussedunderSectionC,item6.xi.ThisSurveillancehasbeenrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.3.5.3.b-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedsinceperformanceofpumptestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingprogramshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingRHRpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredbynewSR3.4.6.3whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestingismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringshutdownconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureoperabilityduringMODE4operations.However,thisSurveillanceisrequiredforECCSduringMODE4(seenewSR3.5.3.1)ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3-Thefollowingnewrequirementswereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):a~SR3.4.6.3,3.4.7.3and3.4.8.2-Requirestheverificationofcorrectbreakeralignmentforthenon-operating,butrequired,RHRpumpinMODES4and5.b.C.SR3.4.9.2-Requiresverificationthatthetotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis~100KWonceevery92days.SR3.4.11.2-RequiresacompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogensystemonceevery24months.-238-December1995 TS4.3.3.1,4.3.3.2,and4.3.3.3-Therequirementthattheleakagetestsbeperformedwithaminimumtestdifferentialpressureof150psidwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.-ThebasesfornewLCO3.4.14reference'SHE,SectionXI(Ref.53)whichprovidesacceptableguidanceforperformingtheseleakagetests.Thisincludesadjustingtheobservedleakageratesforteststhatarenotconductedatthemaximumdifferentialpressurebyassumingthatleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.ThisisaconservativechangeinmostcasessinceitrequiresthatthePIVsbetestedunderthemaximumdifferentialpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3.3.4-TheallowedleakageratesforPIVswasadjustedfromasinglevalueforallvalvestoavaluebasedonvalvesizeconsistentwithSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2.Thischangeprovidesgreaterinformationofvalvedegradationandremovesanunjustifiedpenaltyonlargervalves(Ref.54).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3.5.5-Thissurveillancewasnotaddedduring'MODE1operationsincethereisareactortripfunctionwhichprotectstheSGlevel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.3.1.1-Thisrequirementwasnotaddedtothe.newspecificationssinceitonlystatesthatthereactorvesselmustbetestedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixH.SincethisrequirementisalreadyspecifiedintheCFR,itdoesnothavetoberetainedwiththeTSandwasdeleted.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS4.3.3.1-ThiswasmodifiedtoremovetherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdown.AtGinnaStation,theseflowpathsareonlyusedforemergencyinjection(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringcoldshutdownconditions).Sincethevalvesaremaintainedclosedatalltimes,requiringaleaktestwithin24hoursofbeingopenedorhavingmaintenanceperformed,andonceevery24monthsprovides.adequateprotection.Aleakagetestevery24monthsisalsoconsistentwithNRCapprovedONa-1988.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.35)change.TS4.3.4.2-ThiswasrevisedtolimittheexclusionfortestingofthePORVblockvalvesfromwhen"thevalveisclosed,"to"whenthevalveisclosedduetoPORVleakage>10gpm."Thisensuresthattheblockvalveistestedunderallconditionsexceptthosethatcouldpotentiallyresultinaplanttransient.Thisisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-239-December1995 31.TechnicalSpecification4.4TS4.4.4-Therequirementsforthetendonstresssurveillanceswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.6andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.4.3-TherequirementsforthetestingoftheportionoftheRHRsystemintherecirculationconfigurationwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.2andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.lv~V.TS4.4.1(exceptdefinitionforL.),4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2,and4.4.2.4-Thesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisinformationiscontainedin10CFR50,AppendixJanddoesnotneedtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecifications.SRs3.6.1.1and3.6.1.2provideforthenecessaryrelationfromtec'hnicalspecificationstoAppendixJ(seealsoReference63).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(ii)changes.TS4.4.2.3.aand4.4.2.3.b-Thesewererevisedtorequirethatiftheallowed10CFR50,AppendixJleakagelimitsareexceeded,theymustberestoredwithin1hour,versus48hoursconsistentwithLCO3.6.1.However,theleakagelimitof<0.6L,was'evisedtobeconsistentwiththenewAppendixJruleandimplementationguidance(i.e.,theleakagelimitis<0.6L,onamaximumpathwayleakageratebasispriortoenteringNODE4forthefirsttimefollowingeachrefuelingoutageand<0.6L,onaminimumpathwayleakagerate.basisforallothertimeperiods)(seealsoReference63).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS4.4.2.4.c-Aspecifiedairlockleakageacceptancecriteriaof~0.05L.whentestedat~P.wasaddedtothe'newspecifications.Thisacceptancecriteriaisrequiredtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecificationsby10CFR50,AppendixJ,SectionIII.D.2(iv)andisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrenttestingrequirements.Inaddition,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifythatonlyonedoorineach'airl'ockcanbeopenedatatimeonceevery24months.ThistestisnecessarytoensurethattheOPERABILITYoftheairlocks,asdefinedinthenewbasesforLCO3.6.2ismaintained.TheseareGinnaCategory(iv.a)changes.-240-December1995 TS4.4.2.3.c-Therequirementtoperformanengineeringevaluationifthemini-purgesupplyandexhaustlinesisolationvalveleakageexceeds0.05L,wasrevisedtorequireisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationwithin24hours.Inaddition,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31daysifitisoutsidecontainment,oronceevery92daysifitisinsidecontainment.ThesechangesprovidedirectguidancetooperatorswhichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.4.5.1-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.6.3.2andSR3.6.3.3)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationofthecorrectpositionofcontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedoutsidecontainmentonceevery92daysandinsidecontainmentpriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious92days.These'urveillancesensurethatthecontainmentisolationbarriersremainOPERABLEaboveMODE5.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.6.2-TheSurveillanceFrequencyforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveshasbeenrevisedfrom18to24months(seeSectionD,item1.xii).TheresponsetimesforCIVsisdiscussedinthebasesfornewLCO3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.1)change.TS4.4-TwonewSurveillanceswereaddedwithrespecttothehydrogenrecombiners(SR3.6.7.1andSR3.6.7.2).Thefirst.newSurveillancerequiresafunctionalcheckofthehydrogenrecombinersonceevery24months.ThesecondnewSurveillancerequiresthataCHANNELCALIBRATIONbeperformedonthehydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelsonceevery24months.TheperformanceoftheseSRsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareOPERABLEandcapableofperformingtheirpost-accidentfunction.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.7-TheFrequencyforperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKofthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedfromdailytomonthly.'naddition,theFrequencyforCHANNELCALIBRATIONSwasrevisedfromquarterlytoevery24months.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andarejustifiedbyindustryexperience.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)changes.-241-December1995 32.TechnicalSpecification4.5TS4.5.l.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtodeletethestatementthattheSIandRHRpumpsarepreventedfromstartingduringthistest.Sincethesecomponentshaverecirculationlinesavailable,thisstatementisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.5.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtorelocateallSI,RHR,andCSpumptestingfrequenciesanddischargepressurerequirementstotheInserviceTestingprogramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8consistentwiththeITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.2.c-ThetestrelatedtoaccumulatorcheckvalvetestingforoperabilityeveryrefuelingshutdownwasrelocatedtotheGinnaStationInserviceTestingprogram.Thevalvesarecurrentlypartiallystroketestedquarterlyandrefurbishedeverysixyears.LeakageassociatedwiththesecheckvalvesisaddressedbySR3.5.1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.1V.ThefollowingnewITStestingrequirementswereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):a0SR3.5.2.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatECCSrelatedisolationvalvesareintheirrequiredposition.ThesevalvesarecurrentlyspecifiedinTS3.3.l.l.g,3.3.l.l.i,and3.3.l.I.j.V.Vl.b.SR3.5.2.2-requiresverificationevery31daysthatECCSrelatedvalveswhicharenotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionareintheircorrectposition.TS4.5.2.3-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestswerenotaddedto,thenewspecifications.ThislevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVentilationFilterTesting.ProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.Inaddition,theremainingrequirementswereallrelocatedtotheAdministrativeControlssection.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.3.6.a-Thesetestrequirementswererevisedtoclarifythattwoseparatetestsareperformed.AHEPA.filtertestandacharcoaladsorberbanktestareseparatelyperformedwitheachrequiringalimitoflessthan3inchesofwater.Thisisessentiallyequivalenttoacombinedtestoflessthan6inchesofwaterandisconsistentwithspecifiedtestingstandards.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.-242-December1995 TS4.5.1.2-TwonewSurveillances(SR3.6.6.1andSR3.6.6.2)wereaddedtoverifythecorrectpositionofeachmanual,poweroperated,andautomatic'valveintheNaOHandCSflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisSurveillanceensures'hattheNaOHandCSSystemsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.5;1.2.b-TheFrequencyofperformingthespraynozzlegastestwasrevisedfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10yearsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.14.Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptabledue'othepassivenatureofthespraynozzlesandpreviousacceptableresults.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.36)change.TS4.5.2.3.5-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireactuationofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfromanactualor.simulatedSIsignalonceevery24monthstoensurethatthesystemalignsitselfcorrectly(SR3.6.6.15).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersmuststillbeopenedatleastonceper31daystoallowthesystemtooperatefora15minutes.Consequently,onlythefrequencyoftheautomaticalignmentofthedampersisbeingrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithotherspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.37)change.TS4.5.2.2.a-ThiswasrevisedtoadjustthetestingFrequencyofthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlytoonceevery24monthsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.16.ThisincreasedtestingintervalisacceptablesincethesystemonlyneedstobeverifiedthatitcanactuateonanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonarefuelingbasissimilarto.theSIandRHRsystems.'nyadditi'onalvalvetestingisaddressedbytheISTprogram.Inaddition,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.12)wasaddedtoverifythattheCSmotoroperatedisolationvalvesactuatetotheircorrectpositiononceevery24monthsfollowinganactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Finally,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.17)wasaddedtoverifythatthesprayadditiveflowrateiswithinlimitsonceevery5years.ThesechangesensurethattheCSandsprayadditivetankLCOscontinuetobemet.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.38)changes.TS4.5.2.3.3and4.5.2.3.4-ThesewererevisedtorequirethateachCRFCunitbeoperatedfor~15minutesonceevery31days(SR3.6.6.4).ThistestwillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.Inaddition,anewSurveillanceisalsorequiredonceevery24monthstoensurethattheCRFCunitsstartonanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.ThesetestswillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-243-December1995 33.TechnicalTS4.5.2.3.9-ThiswasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityoftheCREATSonceevery24months.Thisverificationisnecessarytoensurethatthecontrolroomenvironmentcanbeisolatedintheeventofaradiologicalrelease.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Specification4.6TS4.6.l.a-Thecoldorrefuelingrequirements(NODES5and6)fordemonstratingDGoperabilityhavebeenrevisedtoinclude(1)verificationofDGdaytankfueloillevel,(2)verificationoftheonsitesupplyoffueloil,and(3)operationofthefueloiltransfersystem..TheseareconsistentwiththerequiredsurveillancesforDGoperabilityinMODES1,2,3,and4andprovideassurancethattheDGisOPERABLE.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.iv.TS4.6.l.b.6-TherequirementtoverifythattheDGisalignedtoprovidestandbypowertotheassociatedemergencybuseswasnotadded.ThisrequirementiswithinthedefinitionofanOPERABLEDGandisdenotedinthebasesofnewTS3.8.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.6.l.c-TherequirementtoperformthetestsinSpecification4.6.l.bprior'toexceedingcoldshutdownwasnotadded.Thisrequirementwas,replacedwithageneralprovision(newSR3.0.4)thatrestrictsentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOunlesstheLCO'ssurveillanceshavebeenmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.6.l.d-ThedieselfueloiltestrequirementswererelocatedtonewTS5.5.12andareproposedtobeidentifiedasa"program"consistentwiththeformatofNUREG-1431.Inaddition,thefueloiltestingprogramwasrevisedtoexpandthetestingrequirementsconsistentwithNUREG-1431anddeletethe92daytestofthestoredfueloil.Thefueloilmustnowbetestedbeforebeingplacedinthestoragetankssuchthattestingofviscosity,water,andsedimentafterbeingplacedinthestoragetanksinnolongerrequired.Thisisaconservativechangewhichreducesthepotentialtoharmthesafetyrelateddieselgeneratorsfrom"bad"fueloil.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-244-December1995 TS4.6.l.e.1-TherequirementtoinspecttheDGinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationswasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsinceDGinspectionsarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.l.e.3(b)-TherequirementforDGtestingsimulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontestsignalwasrevised.DetailsofthetestacceptancecriteriawererelocatedtoplantproceduressincethislevelofdetailisnottypicallyspecifiedintheSR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.2.aand4.6.2.b-Thestationbatterytestingrequirementswererevisedtoaddacceptancecriteria,parameters,andassociatedactionsforbatteryoperabilitysupportingDCelectricalpowersubsystems.TheserequirementsareprovidedintheSRsandenhancethecurrentcriteriaspecifiedintheTSandisaconservativechangeregardingthedefinitionofbatteryOPERABILITY.Inaddition,theelectrolytetemperatureisonlytobemeasuredevery92daysversusmonthlyconsistentwithIEEE-450requirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS4.6.2.f.-Thedetailsdenotingbatterydegradationweremovedtothebasesandwererevisedtoincludeexpectedlifeparametersofthebatterywhencomparedtoacapacitycriteriaof100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.ThiscriteriaisusedinconjunctionwithidentifyingwhenthesurveillanceFrequencymustbeincreasedandisconsistentwithITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS4.6.2-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.8.4.1andSR3.8.5.1)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationevery7daysthatthebatteryterminalvoltageis~129Voffloatvoltageduringoperatingandshutdownconditions.ThissurveillanceensuresthattherequiredbatterychargerremainscapableofmaintainingDCsystemloadsandafloatchargeonthebattery.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.6.2.c-TherequirementfortrendingbatterytestdatawasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisistrendingmustbeperformedtomeettheFrequencyrequirementsforSR3.8.6.2andSR3.8.4.3.Therefore,thisrequirementisrelocatedtoplantprocedures.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-245-December1995 Xi.34.Technical35.TechnicalTS4.6.l.b.4-thiswasrevisedtorequirethattheonehourmonthlyDGrunmustbeperformedaftersuccessfulperformanceofthemonthlyDGstart(i.e.,TS4.6.l.b.4)ortherefuelingoutagetest(i.e.,TS4.6.l.e.4).ThisensuresthattheDGisnotbeingunncessessarilystartedfortheperformanceoftheonehourrun.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrenttestingpracticesandNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.6.l.b.4,4.6.l.e.2,and4.6.l.e.3-ThesewererevisedtoaddanotetothesurveillancewhichspecificallystatesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfiestheseSRs.ThisisconsistentwithcurrentoperatingpracticeandNUREG-1431sinceifalossofoffsitepowerweretooccurrequiringaDGrun,itshouldbeabletosatisfythesurveillanceifitmeetsallofthetestingrequirements.ThisalsopreventsunnecessarytestsoftheDGswhichcanleadtopotentialdegradation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification4.7TS4.7wasrevisedtoincludeasurveillancetoensurethateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalevery24monthsconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrentGinnaStationTSTable3.5-2whichrequirethattheisolationsignalstotheHSIVsbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,RequiredActionswereprovidedintheeventthattheHSIVs,cannotcloseasrequiredbythisSurveillance.Theseactionsrequirerestorationof,orclosureofaninoperableHSIV,within24hours.IntheeventthatbothHSIVsareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3.Finally,requirementsforthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalveswereadded.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.Specification4.8TS4.8.1and4.8.2-TheFrequencyoftheAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASHE,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.-246-December1995 TS4.8.3-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheAFWsuctionanddischargevalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,thecross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalveswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethesevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses(seebasesfornewLCO3.7.5).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.b.39)changes,respectively.TS4.8.4-TheFrequencyoftheSAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASHE,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.8.5-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheSAFWsuction,discharge,andcross-overvalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivities,consistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.8.6-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheacceptancecriteriafortheAFWandSAFWteststotheactualproceduresperformingthesetests.ThenewbasesidentifywhatisrequiredforOPERABILITYoftheAFWandSAFWSystemssuchthatspecifyingthisacceptancecriteriaisunnecessary.Inaddition,boththebasesandtestproceduresarecontrolledunder10CFR50.59.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.8-AnewSurveillancewasaddedrequiringverificationevery31daysofthecorrectpositionofeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperatedandautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisverificationisrequiredtoensurethattheAFWandSAFWSystemsareOPERABLEwhennotinservice.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.8.10-TherequirementtomeasuretheresponsetiqeoftheAFWpumpsandvalvestobes10minutesonceevery18monthswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThetimerequirementsfortheAFWSystemaredescribedinthenewbases.WhilesomeaccidentsdonotrequireAFWfor10minutes,thesmallbreakLOCAandlossoffeedwatertransientsrequireAFWwithinmuchshortertimeframes.Therefore,thisSurveillanceisnotaccurateandisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.40)change.-247-December1995 36.Technical37.TechnicalSpecification4.9TS4.9-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanLCOrequirementthatthemeasuredcorereactivitybewithin1%zk/kofthepredictedvaluesandtoaddaspecificsurveillanceFrequencyofevery31EFPDaftertheinitialnormalization.TheSurveillanceRequirementwasdividedintotwosurveillancestoclarifythedifferencebetweentheinitialnormalizationandthemonthlyverificationsTheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.Specification4.10TS4.10.1andTable4.10-1-Therequirementsforthe.radiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclides.whichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.10.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwereriotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequir'ementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-248-December.1995 38.TechnicalTS4.10.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecific'ations5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.11TS4.11.1-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheSFPfiltrationsystemtestswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.ll.l.l.a,4.1l.l.l.b,and4.ll.l.l.c-ThesecharcoaladsorbersystemtestingrequirementswererelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedintheAdministrativeControls(TS5.5.10).Thisisa,GinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.11.l.l.d-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisverificationisnotrequiredtoensurethatinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesarestillmet.TheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemdoesnot.utilizeheaters.ThebasesforSR3.7.13.1state.thatoperatingtheventilationsystemfor~15minutesevery31daysforsystemswithoutheatersistoensuresystemoperation.InaccordancewithnewLCO3.7.10(NUREG-1431LCO3.7.13),theABVSisrequiredtobeinoperationduringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Assuch,theABVSisnotastandbysystematGinnaStation(i.e.,thesystemmustbebothOPERABLEandinoperationduringitsNODEofApplicability).Therefore,amonthlyverificationprovidesnoverificationofanyaccidentanalysisassumption.Instead,twonewSurveillanceswereaddedwhichrequireverificationevery24hoursthatthe..AuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorlevelisatanegative.pressurewithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentandthattheventilationsystemisinoperation.Theseverificationsareconsistentwithplantpracticesandensuresthatinitialassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentarebeingmaintained.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithReference55.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-249-December1995 iv.V.vi~39.TechnicalTS4.11.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofRHR'pumpOPERABILITYonceevery12hours'versus4hoursconsistentwithSR3.9.3.1.AFrequencyof12hoursisadequateduetothealarmsandindicationsavailabletotheoperatorswithrespecttoRHRpumpandloopperformance.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.41)change.TS4.11.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementforanInserviceTestoftheRHRpumps.AnInserviceTestshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredbynewSR3.9.4.2whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeral'ignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformance.during.accidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringnormalconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureOPERABILITYduringMODE6operations.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.42)change.TS4.11.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofthewaterlevelinthereactorcavitywithin24hoursoffuelmovementversus2hours.ThenewTSusagerulesstatethataSRistobecontinuouslyperformedatitsrequiredFrequency.However,theSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenintheMODEofApplicability.Therefore,aSRwithaFrequencyof24hoursmusthavebeenperformedwithin24hoursbeforeenteringtheMODEofApplicability.AFrequencyof24hoursisacceptableduetothelargevolumeofwateravailableandtheproceduralcontrolsinplace.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification4.12TS4.12.1.1andTable4.12-1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,AppendixB,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-250-December1995 TS4.12.1.2-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10.CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagef'requencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatement'technicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.1andTable4.12-2-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.2-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease:Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-251-December1995 V.TS4.12.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswaste'treatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCNandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.40.TechnicalSpecification4.13TS4.13-Therequirementsforperiodictestingofleakageforradioactivesourceswerenotadded.ThesourceleaktestarenotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,theleakagefromradioactivesourcesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.41.TechnicalSpecification4.14TS4.14-Therequirementsforthetestingofsnubberswerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.7andmoregenericprogramdescriptionis.provided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.42.TechnicalSpecification4.15None.43.TechnicalSpecification4.16TS4.16-Anewsurveillancewasaddedwhichrequiresverificationoncewithin12hoursandevery12hoursthereafterthatanaccumulator'smotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosedwhenitspressureisgreaterthanorequaltothepressureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLRconsistentwithSR3.4.12.3.Inaddition,averificationoncewithin12hoursandevery31daysthereafterthatpowerisremovedtotheseisolationvalvesisalsoadded.TheseverificationsareneededtoensurethattheaccumulatordoesnotdischargeintotheRCSandcauseanoverpressureeventwhichchallengestheLTOPSystem.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-252-December1995 44.TechnicalTS4.16.l.a-ThissurveillancewasrevisedtodelayperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriorto'nteringtheLTOPSystemApplicability.ThischangeeliminatestheperformanceofthefunctionaltestwhenRCSisbetween330'F(theLTOPenabletemperature)and350'F(NODE3lowerlimit)duringforcedshutdowns.Instead,thetestcanbeperformedwithin12hoursofenteringthespecifiedconditionandreducestheimmediateoperatorburden..ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.43)change.Specification5.1'ITS5.1.1,TS5.1.2,andFigure5.1-1-ThedescriptionandfigureofthesiteareaboundarywasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithTravellerCEOG-03,C.1.SincethedescriptionofthisdesignfeaturedoesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR,Section2.1.2).Thefigureanddescriptionoftheexclusionareaboundarywasalso.replacedwithatabledescribingthisfeatureconsistentwithTravellerGEOG-03,C.l.ThereareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes.45.TechnicalSpecification5.2TS5.2-Thedescriptionofthecontainmentdesignfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificcontainmentfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).Therefore,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSections3.8.1and6.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.46.TechnicalSpecification5.3TS5.3.l.aandTS5.3.I.c-Thedescriptionofthereactorcore'designfeatureswasrevisedconsistentwiththestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431.Thesectionnowincludestheamount,kind,andsourceofnuclearmaterialrelatedtothereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS5.3.l.b-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturewithrespecttothemaximumenrichmentweightpercentwasrevisedandrelocatedtonewSpecification4.3.1.Thechangesareinaccordancewiththechangesdiscussedinitem47.ii,below.TheseareGinnaTS'ategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-253-December1995 iv.47.TechnicalTS5.3.2-Thedescriptionofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)designfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificRCSfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).Therefore,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSection3.7.1andChapter5).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.3.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtoincreasethefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent.Thischangehasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptablewithrespect'opostulatedfuelhandlingaccidents(Ref.29).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.46)change.Specification5.4TS5.4.1,5.4:2,5.4.6,andFigures5.4-1and5.4-2-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturesdenotingspentfuelstorageregionsandboratedwaterconcentrationswererelocatedtoChapters3.7and3.9.ThesefeaturesarediscussedinLCOs3.7.11,3.7.12,3.7.13,and3.9.1asappropriate.Inaddition,appropriateRequiredActionswereaddedintheeventthatSFPwaterlevel,boronconcentration,orSFPregionstoragerequirementsarenotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS5.4.2-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeatureswasrevised.Therevisiontothesefeaturesarebasedonarevised'riticalityanalysissupportingtheproposed18monthfuelcycle(Reference29).ThedescriptionofthesefeaturesfollowthestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431whichwouldincludetheamount,kind,andsourceofspecialnuclearmaterialwiththeexceptionthatnominalcentertocenterspacingbetweenthefuelassembliesw'asnotadded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory,(v.c)change.-254-December1995 1V.V.48.TechnicalTS5.4.3-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturedenotingthe60-daylimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2wasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaappliesforthetimelimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2.Thecurrent60-daylimitwasestablishedtoprovidesufficientmargininspentfuelpooltemperaturecalculationsasaresultofdecayheatloadsinRegion2fromdischargedfuelassemblies(Reference39).Althoughthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemand,thus,theassociatedrestrictiononheatloadpreventstructuralintegritydamagetothespentfuelpool,theyarenotassumedtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccident(DBA).Therestrictiononheatloadisnotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therestrictiononheatloadisanon-significantriskcontributortocore'amagefrequencyandoffsitedoses.SincethisdoesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4)andnoNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaapply,thisrequirementisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.4.4and5.4.5-ThesewererevisedconsistentwithReferences29and39toprovidetheamount,kind,andsourceofmaterialwhichisstoredinthecanisters.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS5.4-Thiswasrevisedto'ncludedescriptionsoftheSFPdrainagesystemandcapacity.Thisinformationiscurrentlycontainedinthebasesforthissection.SinceNUREG-1431,Chapter4doesnotcontainanybases,thisinformationhasbeenrelocatedtothespecification.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Specification5.5TS5.5-Thedescriptionofthewastetreatmentsystemsdesignfeatureswasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthedescriptionofthesefeatures.SpecificwastetreatmentsystemsfeaturesareeithercoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sorhavebeenrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocumentsand,therefore,donotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARChapter11).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-255-December1995 49.Technical50.TechnicalSpecification6.1TS6.1.1-Therequirementwasrevisedtoincludeastatementthattheplantmanagershallapproveeachproposedtest,,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS6.1-Anewrequirement(Specification5.1.2)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforShiftSupervisorresponsibility.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TheplantmanagertitlewasrevisedtobemoregenericconsistentwithReference62.Seealsoitem50.iibelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Specification6.2CrossreferencestoexistingregulatoryrequirementsareredundantandgenerallynotincorporatedintoNURfG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.PlantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsarereplacedwithgenerictitlesconsistentwithReference62.PersonnelwhofulfillthesepositionsarerequiredtomeetspecificqualificationsasdetailedinproposedTS5.3,andcompliancedetailsrelatingtotheplantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesareidentifiedintheUFSAR.Thetwomajorspecificreplacementsarethegeneric"plantmanager"forthemanagerlevelindividualresponsiblefortheoverallsafeoperationoftheplantand"thegenericdescriptiveuseof"acorporatevicepresident"inplaceofthespecificVicePresidentposition.Theplantspecific.titlesfulfillingthe'utiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedintheUFSARwhichhasspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges.Thischangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirements,forthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.2.l.d-Therequirementdescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementwasmodifiedtobeconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thesemodificationsareeditorialchangesonlywhichdonotchangetheintentorrequirementsofthisspecification.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.-256-December1995 1V~v.V1~V11.51.Technical52.Technical53.TechnicalNone.TS6.2.2.b-Therequirementsdescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswerenotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(l),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and5.2.2.e.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.2.2.d-Therequirementwasrevisedtoclarifythattheindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresisallowedtobeabsentfornotmorethantwohours.Thisisconsistentwiththerequirementsforshiftcrewcomposition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS6.2.2.e-TherequirementdescribingtheovertimerequirementforplantstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionswasrevisedtoreferenceaNRC-approvedprogramforcontrollingovertime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.AnewrequirementwasaddedwhichspecifiesthattheOperationsManagerorOperationsmiddlemanagershallholdaSRO.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andensuresthatatleastoneoperationsmanagerholdsaSRO.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Specification6.3TS6.3.1-ThereferencetotheRGLEletterdatedDecember30,1980,wasreplacedwithwordingconsideredmoreappropriate.ThecurrentSTAprogramatGinnaStationisdiscussedinReferences40and42andwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.TherevisedwordingeliminatestheneedtorevisetheTechnicalSpecificationsiftheSTAprogramislaterrevised,butstillrequiresNRCapprovalofthesechanges.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Specification6.4TS6.4-TherequirementsforaTrainingProgramwerenotadded.TherequirementsareeitheradequatelyaddressedbyotherSection5.0administrativecontrolsorareaddressedby10CFR55requirements.Therefore,theserequirementsarerelocatedtotheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification6.554.TechnicalNone.Specification6.6-257-December1995 55.TechnicalSpecification6.7TS6.7.l.a-TheinitialoperatoractionsforSafetyLimit(SL)violationswererevisedasfollows:a~ForviolationoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinNODES1and2,therequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)wasrevised'toallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinNODE3.Immediatelyshuttingdownthereactorcouldinferactiontoimmediatelytripthereactor.Therevisionprovidesthenecessarytimetoshutdowntheunitinamorecontrolledandorderlymannerthanimmediatelytrippingthereactorwhichcouldresultinaplanttransient.TheproposedtimecontinuestominimizethetimeallowedtooperateinNODE1or2withaSLnotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.44)change.b.ForviolationoftheRCSPressureSLinNODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasa'ddedwhichrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeSLwithin5minutes.Specifyingatimelimitforoperatorstorestorecomplianceprovidesgreaterguidancetoplantstaff.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS6.7.1.b-TherequirementfornotificationtomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NotificationrequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TherequirementfornotificationtotheNRCofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisrequirementisdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.72.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.7.l.c-TherequirementthataSafetyLimitViolationReportbepreparedwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10'FR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementfortheonsitereviewcommitteetoreviewtheSafetyLimitViolationReportwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheresponsibilitiesoftheonsitereviewcommitteearerelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SLviolationsarereportedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof10CFR50.73.ThedetailsdescribingtherequirementsforcontentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportis,therefore,controlledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.73anddoesnotneedtobespecifiedinTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.-258-December1995 iv.TS6.7.l.d-TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttotheNRCwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thedistributionofreportssubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73arerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.56.TechnicalSpecification6.8TS6.8.l.d-TheOffsiteDoseCalculationManualimplementationiscoveredbyamoregenericitem.whichisspecifiedinSection5.5.Itisnotnecessarytospecificallyidentifyeachprogramunderprocedures(seeSectionD,item56.iv).Sincetherequirementsremain,thisisconsideredtobeachangeinthemethodofpresentationonly.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS6.8.1.e-ThePCPdescriptionwasnotaddedsincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFR20,10CFR61,and10CFR71anddoesnotimposeanynewregulations.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.b)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenemergencyoperatingproceduresimplementingtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-259-December1995 TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.e)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenproceduresforprogramsandmanualsdenotedinnewSpecification5.5.TheseProgramsinclude:ITS5.5.15.5.25.5.35.5.4 5.5.55.5.65.5.75.5.85.5.105.5.115.5.125.5.135.5.14 5.5.15CurrentTS~Prnram1.13&6.150ffsiteDoseCalculationHanual4.4.3PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentNewPostAccidentSamplingProgram3.9&3.16RadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramNewComponentCyclicorTransientLimit4.4.4Pre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram4.2InserviceTestingProgram4.2SteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgram4.5.2.3&VentilationFilterTestingProgram4.11.1 3.9.2.58ExplosiveGas.andStorageTank3.9.2.6RadioactiveHonitoringProgram4.6.l.dDieselFuelOilTestingProgramNewTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlNewSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramNewContainmentLeakageRateTestingProgramThetechnicalcontentofseveralrequirementsarebeingmovedfromotherchaptersofthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsandareproposedtobeidentifiedasProgramsinaccordancewiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Otherprogramswereadded,exceptasdiscussedbelow,toensureconsistencyintheimplementationofrequiredprogramswithinthecurrent.licensingbasis.TheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramwasaddedduetotherelocationoftheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwithGenericLetter89-01andthechangesto10CFR20.TheBasesControlprogramwasaddedtospecificallydelineatetheappropriatemethodsandreviewsnecessaryforachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBases.TheSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramwasaddedtosupportimplementationoft$esupportsystemoperabilitycharacteristicsoftheTechnicalSpecifications(newLCO3.0.6).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS6.8.l.c-Theradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogramiscoveredbyamoregenericitemwhichisspecifiedinspecification5.5.Itisnotnecessaryto'pecificallyidentifyeachprogramunderprocedures(seeSectionD,item56.iv).Sincetherequirementsremain,thisisconsideredtobeachangeinthemethodofpresentationonly.ThisisaGinnaTScategory(i)change.-260-December1995 57.TechnicalSpecification6.9TS6.9-Thereferencetoreportingrequirementswererevisedconsistentwith10CFR50.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.9.1.1-TherequirementtosubmitaStartupReportwasnotadded.TheStartup.ReportismoreappropriatelyaddressedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportauthorizinganOperatingLicense,increasedpower'level,installationofanewnuclearfueldesignormanufacturer,ormodificationswhichsignificantlyalterthenuclear,thermal,o}hydraulicperformancesoftheplant.TheStartupReportisrequiredtobesubmittedwithin90daysfollowingcompletionoftheaboveactivitiesanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,inclusionoftherequirementforthisreportinTechnicalSpecificationsisnotnecessarytoassuresafeplantoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.lv~v.Vl.Vl1.TS6.9.1.2-Therequirementsdescribingthedetailsofthemonthlyreportwerenotadded.Thesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS6.9.1.3,TS6.9.1.4,'able6.9-1andTable6.9-2-Thedetailsandmethodsimplementingthesespecificationswerenotadded.ThesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThesubmittaldatewasalsochangedtoMay15thtoallowthesubmittaloftheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReporttocorrespondwiththeMonthlyOperatingReportsubmittaldate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ili)change.TS6.9.1.4-Thespecificdatereferencedfortheannualsubmittalwasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR50.36a.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.'JTS6.9.1.5-TherequirementforthereportingofchallengestopressurizerPORVsorsafetyvalveswasrevisedfromanannualtoamonthly'reportandrelocatedtotheMonthlyOperatingReport(newSpecification5.6.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS6.9.2.1-Thereportingrequirementrelatedtosealedsourceswasnotaddedsincethisisspecifiedin10CFR30.50.Thedetaileddescriptionofthesereportingrequirementsareprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-261-December1995 1X~X.TS6.9.2.4-Thereportingrequirementforreactoroverpressureprotectionsystemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementisdetailedinproposedSpecification5.6.4,andisgenerallyincludedintheLfRrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.Sincethecriteriaidentifiedin10CFR50.73includestheareaofdegradedboundariesthatnecessitatesreporting,anyminordifferencesarenegligiblewithregardtosafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.AnewrequirementTS5.6.5wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheCOLR.TheCOLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationcoreoperatinglimits.Thisisa'innaTSCategory(iv.a)change.AnewrequirementTS5.6.6wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheRCSPTLR.ThePTLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationpressureandtemperatureoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.58.TechnicalSpecification6.10None.59.TechnicalSpecification6.11None.60.TechnicalSpecification6.12None.61.TechnicalSpecification6.13TS6.13.1-PlantspecificpositiontitlesinthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerereplacedwithgenerictitles(i.e.,radiationprotectiontechnician).Theplantspecifictitlesfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedintheUFSARwhichhasspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges.Thischangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.62.TechnicalSpecification6.14None.-262-December1995 63.TechnicalSpecification6.15TS6.15.l.b-TheapprovalprocessforODCHchangeswasrevisedtoclarifythattheeffectivechangesbeapprovedbytheplantmanagerinsteadoftheonsitereviewfunction.SincetheonsitereviewfunctionreportstothePlantHanager,thisisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.64.TechnicalSpecification6.16TS6.16-TheprocessforchangestothePCPwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFRPart20,10CFRPart61,and10CFRPart71anddoesnotimposeanynewrequirements.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.65.TechnicalSpecification6.17TS6.17-Therequirementsformajorchangestoradioactivewastetreatmentsystemswasnotadded.Changestothesesystemsarecontrolledby10CFR50.59.NRCnotificationofsignificantchangestothesesystemsisaddressedby10CFR50.59(b)(2).Therefore,thisspecificationisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.66.NewRequirements(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)Changes)LCO3.4.1andtheassociatedsurveillancerequirementswereaddedforDNBlimits.Thisnewrequirementplaceslimits.onpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowratetoensurethattheminimumDNBRwillbemetforallanalyzedtransients.LCO3.7.3andtheassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedfortheHFWpumpdischargevalves(HFPDVs),HFWregulatingvalves,andtheassociatedbypassvalves.Thisnewrequirementspecifiesanisolationtimeof80secondsfortheHFPDVsand10secondsfortheremainingvalvesandrequiresthemtobeOPERABLEaboveHODE4toprovideisolationcapabilityasassumedintheaccidentanalyses..LCO3.7.4andtheassociatedsurveillancewereaddedfortheatmosphericreliefvalves(ARVs).TheLCOrequiresthattheARVsbeOPERABLEwhenRCSaveragetemperatureis>500'FinHODE3toprovidecooldowncapabilityfollowingaSGTReventasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ASurveillancetoverifythateachARViscapableofopeningandclosingonceevery24monthswasalsoadded.-263-December1995 iv.V.ACOLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedwithreactorphysicparametersthatmaychangewitheachrefueling.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,GenericLetter88-16(Ref.56)allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationCOLRisprovidedinAttachmentF.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtotheCOLR:a.SHUTDOWNMARGINb.MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTc.ShutdownBankInsertionLimitd.ControlBankInsertionLimitse.HeatFluxHot.ChannelFactorf.NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor9.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEh.Notusedi.RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limitsj.Notusedk.Notused1.Notusedm.RefuelingBoronConcentrationARCSPTLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedRCSpressureandtemperaturelimits,andLTOP.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,NUREG-1431allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationPTLRisprovidedinAttachmentG.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtothePTLR:67.Licensea~b.C.RCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemEnableTemperatureLTOPSetpointThelicensewasrevisedtorelocaterequirementsassociatedwithSecondaryWaterChemistryMonitoringProgram,SystemsIntegrity,andIodineMonitoringtoAppendixAofthelicense(i.e.,TS);-ChangestoboththelicenseandTSrequireNRCapprovalsuchthatthereisnoreductionincommitmentwithrespecttothischange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Minoreditorialchangesweremadetoprovideconsistencywithinthelicense.Theseareadministrativechangesonlywhichdonotchangetheintentofthelicense.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(vi)changes.-264-December1995

iv.Theexemptionto10CFR50.48(c)(4)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionexpiredin1986andisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Theexemptionto10CFR50.46(a)(1)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionisnolongerrequiredsincetheECCSmodelsforGinnaStationhavesincebeenrevised.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.E.SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDareorganizedinto6categoriesandsubcategoriesasnecessary.Thesecategoriesofchangesareevaluatedwithrespectto10CFR50.92(c)andshowntonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdescribedbelow.E.lSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-ADMINISTRATIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDa'nddenotedbyCategory(i),(ii),(v.c),or(vi)changesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolveeither(1)therelocationof.requirementswithintheTechnicalSpecificationstosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirements,(2)thereformatting,renumberingorrewordingoftheexistingTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431,(3)thedeletionofduplicateregulatoryrequirements,or(4)minorchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationssuchthatthechangesdonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.Assuch,thischangeisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotimpactinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsorassumedmitigationofaccidentortransientevents.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimposeanynewordifferentrequirements.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-265-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactany'safetyanalysisassumptions.Thesechangesareadministrativeinnature.Assuch,noquestionofsafetyisinvolved,andthechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.2SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-RELOCATEDSPECIFICATIONSTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifichtionsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iii)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesrelocatesrequirementsandsurveillancesforstructures,systems,componentsorvariableswhichdidnotmeetthecriteriaforinclusion'nTechnicalSpecifications.Theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesarenotassumedtobeinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsandarenotassumedtomitigateaccidentortransientevents.Therequirementsandsurveillancesfortheseaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariables.willberelocatedfromtheTechnicalSpecificationstoanappropriateadministrativelycontrolleddocument(e.g.,TechnicalRequirementsManualorUFSAR)whichwillcontinuetobemaintainedpursuantto10CFR50.59.Inaddition,theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesareaddressedinexistingsurveillanceprocedureswhicharealsocontrolledby10CFR50.59andsubjecttothechangecontrolprovisionsintheAdministrativeControlsSectionoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonew.ordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimposeoreliminateanyrequirementsandadequatecontrolofexistingrequirementswillbemaintained.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-266-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactanysafetyanalysisassumptions.Inaddition,therelocatedrequirementsandsurveillancesfortheaffectedstructure,system,componentorvariableremainthesameastheexistingTechnicalSpecifications.Sinceanyfuturechangestotheserequirementsorthesurveillanceprocedureswillbeevaluatedpertherequirementsof10CFR50.59,noreduction(significantorinsignificant)inamarginofsafetywillbeallowed.TheexistingrequirementforNRCreviewandapprovalofrevisions,inaccordancewith10CFR50.92,tothesedetailsproposedforrelocation,doesnothaveaspecificmargin.ofsafetyuponwhichtoevaluate.However,themajorityofchangesareconsistentwiththeWestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecification,NUREG-1431,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Therefore,revisingtheTechnicalSpecificationstoreflecttheapprovedlevelofdetailensuresnosignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.ForthoserequirementsproposedtoberelocatedwhichareretainedwithinNUREG-1431,therelocateditemsaresimilarinnaturetootherrelocatedrequirementsorarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysesforGinnaStation.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGi'nnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.3SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-NORERESTRICTIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.a)and(v.a)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:1.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesprovidemorestringentrequirementsforoperationofthefacility.Thesemorestringentrequirementsdonotresultinoperationthatwillincreasetheprobabilityofinitiatingananalyzedeventanddonotalterassumptionsrelativetomitigationofanaccidentortransientevent.Themorerestrictiverequirementscontinuetoensureprocessvariables,structures,systemsandcomponentsaremaintainedconsistentwiththesafetyanalysesandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thischangedoesnot'nvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-267-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangesdoimposedifferentrequirements.However,thesechangesareconsistentwithassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.'perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theimpositionofmorerestrictiverequirementseitherhasnoimpactonorincreasesthemarginofplantsafety.AsprovidedinthediscussionofthechangeinSectionD,eachchangeinthiscategoryisbydefinitionprovidingadditionalrestrictionstoenhanceplantsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.4SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGESLESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.l)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.1)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRequiredActionsoftheDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)start'nstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits818andkl9)fromanactiontoshutdownto,anactiontorestorethechanneltoanOPERABLEstatusorentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.Thestartinstrumentationfunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEstartinstrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-268-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated..Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductionina'arginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c).anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.2)Theproposedchanges.totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesgotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheactionsforaninoperableDGto:(I)eliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetoacommoncausefailure,and(2)eliminatetherequirementtotesttheOPERABLEDGonceevery24hoursuntilthesecondDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus(TS3.7.2.2.b.1).ThetestingrequirementsforanOPERABLEDGarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsincesomeDGfailurescanbeconclusivelydeterminednottoapplytoasecondDGwithoutrequiringexcessivetesting.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-269-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverning'ormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatpreventunnecessaryDGstartswhichcanpotentiallyadverselyaffectDGreliability.ThechangemaintainsDGOPERABILITYrequirementswithinthesafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolvea'significanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.1)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.I)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewithth'eproposedchangedoesnotinvofveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRefuelingFrequencywhichisusedtodefineCHANNELCALIBRATIONandothertestingintervals,from18monthsto24months(TS1.12and4.4.6.2).TheFrequencybetweenCHANNELCALIBRATIONSisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TSrequiredequipmentiscurrentmaintainedunderaReliabilityCenteredHaintenanceprogramsuchthattheirfailuresaretrackedandtrended.Inaddition,instrumentationsetpointsandequipmenthistoryhavebeenverifiedtobeacceptablewithrespecttothischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-270-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordiff'erentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theequipmenttestingintervalsareincreased,buttheystillmustbemaintainedOPERABLEconsistent'iththeirTSrequirements.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreduction.inamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGE'CATEGORY(v.b.2)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincrease'intheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheapplicabilityassociatedwiththeRCSSafetyLimits(SL)inNODE6(currentTS2.2).AdequatemarginexistssuchthatitisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinMODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedFormitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedcondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.V-271-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceitisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinMODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.3)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStation'echnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.3)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeremovestherequirementforthepressurizerwaterlevellowerlimitof12%-(currentTS3.1.1.5.a).ThisrequirementrelatestoareactortripfunctionthatwasremovedatGinnaStationasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45).Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentnorsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3~~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplantsincethetripfunctionhasalreadybeenremoved.Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethepressurizerlowleveltripfunctionisnolongercredited.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-272-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnot.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.4)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.4)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheapplicabilityanddeletesrequirementsassociatedwiththeoverpressurizationprotectionfunctionofthepressurizersafetyvalvesinNODES5and6(currentTS3.1.1.3.aandTS3.1.1.3.b).Thepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident..OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityof.anewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethesevalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctioninNODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-273-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.5)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.5)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedeletestherequirementsassociatedwithSGtemperatureandpressurevariables(currentTS3.1.1.2andTS3.1.2.2).ThetemperatureandpressurevariablesarenotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisexceptthroughthevariablesofRCSpressure,temperature,andflowwhichareaddressedintheheatupandcooldownratesinthePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theseSGvariablesarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thisch'angedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceallnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesareaddressedbythePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-274-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.6)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.6)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisestheperiodof'time(from6hoursto72hours)continuedoperationisallowedpriortoconfirmingthroughtheperformanceofanengineeringevaluation,thestructuralintegrityoftheRCSafterexceedingpressureortemperaturelimits(currentTS3.1.2.1.c.l).Therequirementisassociatedwithafunctionthatisnotanassumedinitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyevaluatedsincetheexceededlimitsaresubsequentlyrestored.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thisfunctionisnotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationin'ccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnot'createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafety'systemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethetimethatout-of-conditionlimitsarerestoreisnotchanged.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.,-275-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.7)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.7)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchange.doesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesaNoteallowingtheplanttochangeNODESifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable(currentTS3.1.5.1).TheRCSLEAKAGEdetectionsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabi.lityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincesomeformofLEAKAGEdetectionmustalwaysremainOPERABLEunderthesecircumstancesoraplantshutdowncommenced.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3..OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincesomeformofRCSLEAKAGEdetectionmustremainOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-276-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.8)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.8)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowsanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgrambeforecommencingareactorshutdown(currentTS3.1.5.2.2).AdministrativediscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgramarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethe.probabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheSGtubestoperformtheirintendedfunctionsincethelimitonSGtubeleakageremains.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposed.changedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatallowrestorationofminoradministrativediscrepancieswithoutaffectinganysafetyanalysisassumptionswithrespecttoSGtubeleakage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety..ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-277-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdo'notinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.9)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnical'SpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.9)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversusIhour(currentTS3.3.l.l.band3.3.1.3).Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsign'ificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheaccumulatortoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstall.ed).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotheraccumulatorparameters(e.g.,watervolume)suchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-278-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.lO)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.10)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversusIhour(currentTS3.3.l.l.aand3.3.1.2).TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentsp}eviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRWSTtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkind.ofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotherRWSTparameters(e.g.,watervolume)suchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-279-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.11)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.11)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechange:(1)allowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting,and(2)allowsupto4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375'F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations(currentTS3.3.l.l.c).TheECCSSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCSandreducesthepotential"foratransienttochallengetheLTOPSystem.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCS,reducesthepotentialforatransienttochallengetheLTOPSystems,andareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenappr'ovedbytheNRCStaff.-280-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.12)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.12)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesanAOTof72hoursfortwoinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(currentTS3.3.2.2).Thesystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.ThiswillallowanadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2~3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwi.llbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheCRFCunitswhichsupplythepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsmayberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Inaddition,the100%redundantCStrainsmustremainOPERABLEinthiscondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkind'ofaccidentpr'eviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.13)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscu'ssedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.13)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:'perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheCCWheatexchangerrequirementstoallow1heatexchangertobeinoperableforupto31daysversus24hours(currentTS3.3.3.1).TheCCWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCCWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheheatexchangerisapassivedevicesimilartotheCCWpiping.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Thepropo'sedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheCCWpipingisalsoapassivedevice,whichifitweretofail,wouldresultinthelossoftheentireCCWSystemwhichhasbeenanalyzedwithacceptableresults.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-282-December1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.14)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.14)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor'onsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTfortwomotordrivenAFWpumps,from24hoursto72hours,tobeconsistentwiththatfortheturbinedrivenAFWpump(currentTS3.4.2.l.b).TheAFWsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheturbinedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingbothSGs.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheturbinedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingbothSGs.Inaddition;foraccidentconditionsinwhichAFWisnotimmediatelyrequired(i.e.,notrequiredfor10minutes),theSAFWSystemisavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-283-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.15)Notused(seeReference30).LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.16)Notused(seeReference3.0).LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.17)Notused(seeReference3.0).LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.18)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.18)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestherequiredchannelsforDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)startinstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnitsk18and819)fromindividuallyspecifyingthelossofvoltage.anddegradedvoltagechannelstorequiringtwochannelsofundervoltageper480Vsafeguardsbus.Thestartinstrumentationfunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGLOPinstrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindof.accidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposed.changedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-284-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeonlyclarifiestheactualdesignoftheDGLOPinstrumentationwithoutaffectingthesafetyfunctionofthespecifiedchannels.TherequirementforalossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionisspecifiedinthesurveillancerequirementforthisLCO.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamargin.ofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.19)Notused(seeReference30).LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.20)Notused(seeReference30).LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.21)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.21)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisesthecurrentAOTtorestoreinoperablePostAccidentMonitors(PAMs),revisestheactionsforinoperablePANsthatarenotrestoredtoservicewithintheAOT,andrevisesthePAMtestingfrequencies(currentTS3.5.3,3.6.4.2,and4.4.7).ThePAMsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethe'consequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-285-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Operationof'GinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThePAMsarenotrequiredtoprovideautomaticresponsetoanydesignbasisaccident.TheadditionaltimeandsurveillancefrequencieshasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedbytheNRCtonotsignificantlyaffectthecontributionofthemonitorstoriskreduction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff./Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirem6ntsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.22)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.22)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowstheuseofaclosedsystemtobeusedtoisolateapenetrationwithafailedcontainmentisolationvalveforupto72hours(currentTS3.6.3).Thecontainmentisolationsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthecontainmentisolationsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheclosedsystemisapassivedevicewhichismissileprotected.Therefore,thischange'oesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-286-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thecontainmentisolationsystemremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionsincetheclosedsystemismissileprotected,leaktested,andcapableofmaintainingcontainmentintegrityintheeventofanaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident'reviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVE;CHANGECATEGORY(v.b.23)Notused.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.24)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.24)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTforaninoperable480VsafeguardsbusfromIhourto8hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown(currentTS3.7.2'.c).The480Vsafeguardsbusesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthe480Vsafeguardsbusestoperformtheirrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincearedundanttrainisavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-287-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allowingadditionaltimetorestoreaninoperable480Vsafeguardsbusdoesnotadverselyaffecttheaccidentanalysessincearedundanttrainisavailable.TheincreasedtimeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.25)hTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.25)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscus'sedbelow:OperationofGinnaStation"inaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnot.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident'reviouslyevaluated.'hechangerevisestherequirementtoverifypowerdistributionaftereachrefuelingfrompriortoreaching50%RTPto<75%RTP(currentTS3.10.2.1).Peakingfactorsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-288-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety."Allowingpowerascensionto75%RTPbeforeverifyingpowerdistributionstillprovidesthenecessarymargintoensuredesignlimitsaremetsincepeakingfactorsaremostdecreasednear100%RTP.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.26)TheproposedchangestotheGinna'tationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.26)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedcha'ngedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestherequirementtomaintainFoandF,withinlimitsatalltimestoonlyinNODE1(currentTS3.10.2.2).Thesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-289-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccident,previouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotnecessarytobemetduringNODE2sincethereisinsufficientenergyinthefueltorequiretheselimits.InNODES3,4,5,and6,thereactorisnotcriticaland,assuch,theselimitsarenotrequired.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.27)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.27)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewith'theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheCompletionTime,from24hoursto72hours,toreducetheOverpower~T,Overtemperature~T,andPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripsetpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimits(currentTS.3.10.2.2).Thesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantly.increasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilitybfthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheRequiredActionsforthesepowerdistributionlimitsalreadyrequireapowerreductionindirectrelationshiptothepercentagethatthelimitwasexceeded.Thereductionoftripsetpointsonlyprovidesadditionalprotection.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-290-December1995 2.3.Operation'ofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)~Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allowingadditionaltimetoreducethesetpointsforassociatedreactortripfunctionsonlyprovidessecondaryprotectionwithrespecttopotentialunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincereactorpowerhasalreadybeenreduced.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeforOverpower~TisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.28)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.28)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedeletestherequirementtoidentifythecauseofgPTRexceeding1.02orlimitpowerto<50%RTP(currentTS3.10.2.4).ThegPTRisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.IfthegPTRisnotwithinlimits,thermalpowerisrequiredtobereducedproportionaltothepercentagethatgPTR'isoutsidethelimitstocompensatefor.thetiltandfluxmappingmustbeinitiated.Therefore,thischange'oesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-291-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Removingtherequirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorreducepowerto<50%RTPdoesnotadverselyaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceapowerreductionproportionaltothepercentagethatgPTRisoutsidethelimitisrequired.ItisnotalwayspossibletoidentifythecauseofthetiltandtheremainingRequiredActionsalreadyunderwayareadequatetoassuresafeoperationoftheplant.ThispowerchangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andWCAP-12159(Ref.51).Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant'reductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviously'valuated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanew.ordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.'29)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.29)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformanceofcontrolrodexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit86a).ControlRodsareonlyconsideredasaninitiatorforrodejectionaccidentswhicharenotrelatedtothisSurveillance.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethisSurveillanceonlyconfirmsnormaloperationalindicationsofcontrolrodOPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-292-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ControlRodOPERABILITYisnormallyverifiedbynormaloperationalpracticessuchthatincreasingtheallowedSurveillanceintervaldoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.30)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.30)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisesthe.FrequencyforverifyingtheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankfrommonthlytoonceevery184days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit513).Thesprayadditivetankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeinconcentration.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-293-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivetankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.31)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.31)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperforminganRCSwaterinventorybalancefromdailytoonceevery72hours(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15).VerifyingRCSwaterinventoryisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindications,includingletdown,areavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-294-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,no'ewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated',doesnotcreatethepossibilityof.anewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.32)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.32)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingverificationoftheSFPboronconcentrationfromonceevery31daystoonceevery31daysifaverificationoffuelstoragehasnotbeencomplete(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit817).VerifyingSFPboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceboronconcentrationisonlycreditedduringafuelhandlingaccidentpriortothetimewhichthefuelhasbeenverifiedtobecorrectlystored.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-295-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorcha'ngesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotaffecttheassumptionsusedforafuelhandlingaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thischange(withtheexceptionofthe31dayFrequency)isalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesno'tcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.33)1TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.33)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobability'orconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingtheDGfueloilinventoryfromdailytoonceevery31days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹16).TheDGfueloiltankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeininventory.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-296-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent-kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheDGfueloiltankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsinceotherindicatorsareavailabletooperators.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedby'heNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.34)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.34)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant,increaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery7days(currentTable4.1-4,Functional.Unit81).VerifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed..Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyfuelfailuressinceotherindications,includingradiationalarms,areavailable.Therefoxe,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-297-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifygrossfuelfailuresinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor~differentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.35)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.35)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdowngreaterthan7days(currentTS4..3.3.1).Thesevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringpoweroperationorcoldshutdownconditions).PerformingtestingonthesePIVsshouldonlyberequiredonceevery24monthsorwithin24hoursoftheirbeingopenedsincemorefrequenttestingwouldnotlikelyprovideanyadditionalinformation.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzed,accident;TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthePIVstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethevalvesaremaintainedclosed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-298-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplant.operationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRCSPIVSfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheywillbetestedaminimumofonceevery24months.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.36)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.36)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated'hechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthespraynozzlegastestfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10years(currentTS4.5.1.2.b).Thesprayringnozzlesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCSSystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethenozzlesarepassiveandlocatedinagenerallyunaccessiblearea.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviously-analyzedaccident.-299-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheCSSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.37)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.37)donotinvolvea.significanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechange.revisestheFrequencyforperformingactuationtestingofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfrommonthlytoonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.3.5).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethedampershavedemonstratedahighdegreeofreliabilityandtheCSSystemprovidesa100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-300-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthepost-accidentfiltersfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVE.CHANGECATEGORY(v.b.38)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.38)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlyonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.2.a).Thesprayadditivevalvesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunctionsincehavedemonstratedahighdegreeofreliabilityandthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersprovide100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinna,StationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationsLESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.39)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.39)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident'reviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheAFWmotordrivenpumpcross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalves(currentTS4.8.3).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemsincethecross-overisolationvalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-302-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchange'introducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus.,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Th'deletionoftheAFWcross-overisolationvalvestestingrequirementsdoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.40)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.40)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeeliminatestheneedtoperformaverificationthattheAFWpumpscanstartwithin10minutesonceevery18months(currentTS4.8.10).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunctionsincethisverificationisnotconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysistimes.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-303-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThedeletionofthisSurveillancedoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethe10minuteverificationisnotconsistentwith'heaccidentanalysisassumptions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c).anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.41)Theproposedchanges.totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.41)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordance.withtheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingaRHRpump,isprovidingforcedflowinNODE6fromonceevery4hourstoonceevery12hours(currentTS4.11.2.1).VerificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethe.probabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremovalsincethereare.numerousindicationsavailabletoplantoperatorsofalossofanRHRpump.Therefore,thischangedoesqptsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-304-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationofthe'lant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordiffer'entkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Operationof'GinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRHRSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendetermi.nedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor~differentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.42)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.42)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtoperformInserviceTestingsurveillancesoftheRHRpumpsduringNODES5and6(currentTS4.11.2.2).Atl,eastoneRHRpumpisoperatingandthebreakersofthesecondpumpareverifiedduringtheseconditionssuchthatperformanceofthistestisonlyaduplicationofexistingsurveillances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremoval'incetherearealternateSurveillancesverifyingpump.OPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincrease.theconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-305-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafet'y.ThedeletionofthisSurveillancedoesnotpreventtheRHRSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheInserviceTestingSurveillanceismainlyperformedtoverifypumpoperationathighpressureswhichdonotexistinMODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CfR50.92(c)and,donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.43)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedby'Category(v.'b.43)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedelaysperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriortoenteringthiscondition(currentTS4.16.l.a).ThePORVsareonlyconsideredasaninitiatorforapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentwithrespecttospuriouslyopening.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetoverifythatthePORVisOPERABLEforitsLTOPfunctionssincethePORVprovidesalternatefunctions,withdifferentsetpoints,inhigherNODES.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-306-December1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheshortperiodprovidedtoperformthePORVtestingensuresthatthePORVremainscapableofperformingitsmultiplefunctionsthroughallrequiredNODES.ThisperiodoftimeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,.itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.44)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.44)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows1hourtorestorecomplianceforviolationsoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinNODES1and2insteadofrequiringanimmediateshutdownoftheplant(currentTS6.7.l.a).SincethischangeaffectstheRequiredActionsfollowingaviolationofSLs,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetorestorecompliancebeforeperformingashutdownoftheplantinordertolimitthepotentialforadditionaldamage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviousl'yanalyzedaccident.-307-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibility,ofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttype,ofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theshortperiodprovidedtorestorecomplianceprovidesoperatorswithtimetostabilizetheplantbeforerequiringashutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVE.CMANGECATEGORY(v.b.45)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.45)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeincreasestheOPERABILITYtoleranceforthepressurizersafetiesfrom+1%to+2.4%,-3%(currentTS3.1.1.3.c.).SincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointremainsabovethenormaloperatingpressureandthePORVsetpoint,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttothemostlimitingpressuretransientsandshowntobeacceptable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-308-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperationsincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointsfollowingtestingremain+1%.Thus,thischangedoesnot'createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceallowsforsetpointdriftwhichhasbeendemonstratedtoexistat,GinnaStation.Theincreasedtoleranceshavebeenanalyzedforthemostlimitingpressuretransientswithsafetylimitsstillbeingmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.46)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.46)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeincreasesthefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent(currentTS5.3.l.b).Thefuelenrichmentlimitisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttofuelhandlingaccidentsandshowntobeacceptablewithrespecttooffsitedosesand10CFR100.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-309-December1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.The'ncreasedfuelenrichmentlimitallowsforGinnaStationtoconvertto18monthcycles.Thechangehasbeenanalyzedandshownthatallsafetylimitsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolWasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofa.newordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.47)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.47)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:Operation'ofGinna,Stationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeallowstwoSWpumpsfromthesameelectricalsource'tobeinoperableforupto72hours(currentTS3.3.4.2).TheinoperabilityofoneSWtrainisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.SystemssupportedbySWandusingthesameelectricaltrainasthetwoSWpumpsarecurrentlyallowed72hoursormoretorestoreoneinoperabletrain.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident...2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreasethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-310-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeonlyprovidesconsistencywithintheTSbetweentheSWsystemandsystemswhichitsupports.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewofdifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.48)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.48)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechange-removestherequirementto"ceaseoperationswhichmayincreasethereactivityofthecore"(currentTS3.8.2)ifthenecessarycontainmentpenetrationsarenotisolatedduringrefuelingactivities.Containmentisolationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TherequiredactionsfornotmeetingthecontainmentisolationprovisionsduringrefuelingistostopallCOREALTERATIONSandfuelmovement.Thisactionprecludesafuelhandlingaccidentforwhichcontainmentisolationprevents.anoffsiterelease.Requiringthatalloperationswhichmayincreasethereactivityofthecoreisnotnecessarysincecontainmentdoesnotprotectagainstthisaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e:,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonew'modeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-311-December1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Noaccidentanalysesareaffectedbytheremovalofthisrequirement.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.IBasedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.49)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.49)donotinvolveasignificanthazards'considerationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththe'roposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisesthetestingrequirementsofradiationmonitorsR-11andR-12toonlyrequireafunctionaltestofthepurgevalvesonarefuelingoutagebasis(every24months)versusquarterly(currentTSTable4.1-5,FunctionalUnits¹3aand¹3b).Theradiationmonitorsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheradiationmonitorsactuatetheContainmentVentilationIsolationSystemwhichisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysessinceitonlyservesto.backsupthecontainmentisolationsystem.Therefore;thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent,kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident.fromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.COperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theradiationmonitorsarenotcreditedinanyaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-312-December1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdo'otinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.50)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.50)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideratjonasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtoisolatecontainmentiftheRCSboronconcentrationisnotmaintainedabove2000ppmduringrefueling(currentTS3.6.l.b).Containmentisolationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TherequiredactionsfornotmeetingtheboronconcentrationlimitsistostopallCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuel.Thisactionprecludesafuelhandlingaccidentforwhichcontainmentisolationpreventsanoffsiterelease.Therefore,this'hangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Noaccidentanalysesareaffectedbytheremovalofthisrequirement.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.-313-December1995 LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.51)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.51)do'otinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisescurrentrequirementsfromrestoringaninoperablemanualAFWorSAFWpumpinitiationchannelwithin48hourstodeclaretheassociationpumptraininoperable(currentTSTable3.5-2,FunctionalUnit83.aand83.f).ThemanualactuationoftheAFWandSAFWpumpsisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.SincethemanualinitiationfunctionsonlyaffectoneAFWorSAFWpump,enteringtheLCOfortheaffectedpumpisconsistentwithallotherpumpoperabilityrequirements.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnot,involveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor'differentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeprovidesconsistencywithintheTSwithoutallowingapumptobeinoperableforaperiodgreaterthaniscurrentlyallowed.,Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthatthe.proposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazards'onsideration.-314-December1995 LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.52)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.52)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeremovestherequirementtoreducethehighneutronfluxtripsetpointtos85%RTPwhenpowerisreducedto~75%RTPwithamisalignedrod(currentTS3.10.4.3.2.band3.10.4.3.2.c).Theaccidentanalysesareperformedassumingthatonerodremainsfullywithdrawnfollowingoperationatfullpowerconditions.Sincereducingpowertos75%RTPandverifyingpeakinglimitsarestillmaintainedmustalsobe'performed,theaccidentanalysesremainvalid.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentanddoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allsafetylimitsandaccidentanalysesassumptionsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.-315-December1995 LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.53)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.53)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant'increaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedelaysthedeterminationofEuntil31daysafteraminimumof2EFPDsand20daysofMODEl,operationfollowingthereactorbeingsubcriticalfora48hours(currentTSTable4.1-4,FunctionalUnit83).ThedeterminationofEisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed..Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theallowanceofanadditional31daysensuresthatatruerepresentativesampleisobtainedsuchthatthepotentialforfalsereadingsisreduced.TheactualvalueofEisnotchanged.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allsafetylimitsandaccidentanalysisassumptionsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonot*involveasignificantincreaseintheprobability,orconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.December1995 LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.54)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.54)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowsonedieselgeneratortobeinoperablewithnooffsitepoweravailableforupto12hours(currentTS3.7.2.2.d).Sincethelossofalloffsitepowerandthefailureofadieselgeneratorare'ssumptionsofmostaccidentan'alysis,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theprobabilityofanaccidentpreviouslyanalyzedisnotincreasedsinceoffsitepowerandthedieselgeneratorsonlymitigateanaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeof.plantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofa'newordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allsafetylimitsandaccidentanalysisassumptionsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifica'tionsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATIONRG&Ehasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionDabove;-317-December1995 2.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsitesinceallspecificationsrelatedtooffsitereleasesareretained,addressedbyexistingregulations,orrelocatedtoalicenseecontrolledprogramsubjecttothecurrentregulations;andThechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincenonewordifferenttypeofequipmentarerequiredtobeinstalledasaresultofthisLAR,andthefrequencyofrequiredtestingwhichmayresultinradiationexposureistobeoptimizedconsistentwith.industrypractices.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposed'hangesisnotrequired.December1995 REFERENCESNUREG-1431,StandardTechnicalSpecifications,westinghousePlants,September1993.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.57toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedDecember7,1993.FederalRegister,Volume60,page9634,February21,1995.23..LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

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1ssuanceofAmendmentNo.54toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.877849),datedAugust30,1993.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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Containment1solationBoundaries(TACN77849),datedDecember21,1994.LetterfromG.E.Lear,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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ContainmentPurgeTechnicalSpecifications,IssuanceofAmendmentNo.13toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedFebruary15,1986.NRCTemporaryInspection2515/126,EvaluationofOn-LineHaintenance.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

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LessonsLearnedCategory"A"Evaluation,datedFebruary15,1986.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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TPIIActionPlanTechnicalSpecifications,datedApril20,1981.Westinghouse,CriticalityAnalysis'ftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,datedJune,1994.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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ChangetoTechnicalSpecificationInstrumentationRequirements.ConversiontoImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,datedAugust31,1995:-320-December1995 31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.40.41.42.43.44.45.~46.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

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ChangetoTechnicalSpecificationInstrumentationRequirements,ConversiontoImprovedTechnicalSpecifications,datedAugust31,1995.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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DieselGeneratorSurveillanceandTesting,datedApril23,1981.NUREG-0944,SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheFull-TermOperatingLicenseforR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedOctober1983.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

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SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVIII-2,datedJune24,1981.LetterA.R.Johnson(NRC),toR.C.Hecredy(RG&E),

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EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3,datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromH.B.Fairtile,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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TechnicalSpecificationsonBatteryDischargeTesting,datedHay8,1986.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

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SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVIII-3A,datedJuly31,1981.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,to,R.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.51toOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedApril13,1993.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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IncreaseoftheSpentFuelPoolStorageCapacity,datedNovember14,1984.LetterfromW.A.Paulson,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

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PlantStaffh'orkingHoursandReportingRequirementsforSafetyValveandReliefValveFailuresandChallenges,datedJanuary31,1984.LetterfromR.W.Kober,RG&E,toH.Fairtile,NRC,

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PolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift(GenericLetter86-04),datedHay14,1986.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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NUREG-0737,ItemI.A.1.1,ShiftTechnicalAdvisor,datedOctober12,1989.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.E.White,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.33toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedJune13,1980.LetterD.H.Crutchfield(NRC)toJ.E.Haier(RG&E),SafetyEvaluationforGinna:.SEPTopicVII-6,datedJune24,1981.IEBulletin79-06A,ReviewofOperationalErrorsandSystemHisalignmentsIdentifiedDuringTNIIncident.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedJune15,1979.-321-December1995 ~4~.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.57.58.59.60.61.62.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,datedOctober7,1981.WCAP-13029,MERITSProgram,PhaseIII,CommentsonDraftNUREG-1431,StandardTechnicalSpecificationswestinghousePlants,July1991.WCAP-12159,MERITSProgram,PhaseII,TechnicalSpecificationsandBases,Harch1989.WCAP-11618,MERITSProgram,PhaseII',Task5,CriteriaApplication,November1987.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.EG&EReport,EGG-NTAP-6175,In-ServiceLeakTestingofPrimaryPressureIsolationValves,February1983.LetterfromV.L.Rooney,NRC,toJ.F.Opeka,NortheastNuclearEnergyCompany,

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IssuanceofAmendmentNo.105(TACNo.M89518),datedFebruary22,1995.GenericLetter88-16,RemovalofCycle-SpecificParameter'LimitsfromTechnicalSpecifications,datedOctober4,1988.LetterfromA.G.'Hansen,NRC,toR.E.Link,

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AmendmentNos.157andl61toFacilityOperatingLicenseNos.DPR-24andDPR-27(TACSM85689andM85690),datedDecember8,1994.GinnaStationLER95-001,

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PressurizerSafetyValveLiftSettingsFoundAboveTechnicalSpecificationToleranceDuringPost-ServiceTestDuetoSetpointShifts,ResultsinIndependentTrainBeingConsideredInoperable,datedHarch6,1995.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

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EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3(TACNo.M80439),datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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GenericLetter90-06,ResolutionofGenericIssue70,"PowerOperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLightMaterReactors,"datedSeptember15,1992.LetterfromR.E.Smith,RG&E,toC.Stahle,NRC,

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ChangeP-10Permissive,datedDecember22,1988.LetterfromC.I.Grimes,NRC,toNSSSOwnersGroups,

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UseofGenericTitlesinSTS,"datedNovember10,1994.-322-December1995 t63.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

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ApplicationforAmendmenttoFacilityOperatingLicense,Implementationof10CFR50,APpendixJ,OptionB,datedNovember27,1995.64.LetterfromH.Hodes,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

10CFR50.54-qualityAssuranceProgramChangeReview,"datedHarch22,1995.-323-December1995 ATTACHMENTBMarkedUpCopyofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationsIncludedpages:AllpagesinFull-TermOperatingLicenseandAppendixAtothatlicenseupto,andincluding,AmendmentNo.59.TheseareorganizedwithrespecttotheproposednewITSprovidedinAttachmentC.ThefollowingpageshavebeenrevisedsincetheMay26,1995submittal:License:2,4,and5Chapter1.0:1.0-5,-8,-9,and-10Chapter2.0:NoneChapter3.0:3.0-1Chapter3.1:3.1-36Chapter3.2:3.2-1and3.2-17aChapter3.3:3.3-2,-3,-4,-13,-14,-15,-19through-29,-31,-33through.-37,-50,-52,-54,and-55Chapter3.4:3.4-4,-25,-45,-47,and-55Chapter3.5:3.5-1,and-9Chapter3.6:3.6-5,-6.-9,-10,-ll,-29,-30,and-31Chapter3.7:3.7-2,-4,-5,-18,-19,-28,-32through-36Chapter3.8:3.8-14,.-15,and-17Chapter3.9:3.9-1through-8,-10,-14a,and-14bChapter4.0:4.0-2,-2a,and-12Chapter5.0:5.0-7,-8,-40,-42,-43,-92,-93,-94,-95,-100December1995 UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISS1ONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDOCKETNO.50-244R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSELicenseNo.DPR-181.TheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(theCommission)hasfoundthat:A.The,applicationcomplieswiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended(theAct),andtheregulationsofthe.Commissionsetforthin10CFRChapterIandallreauirednotifica-tionstootheragenciesorbodieshavebeendulymade;B.ConstructionoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(thefacility)hasbeensubstantiallycompletedinconformitywithConstructionPermitNo.CPPR-19,asamended,aridt<<eapplication,i.hepruvi~uII>oftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCommission;C.Thefacilitywilloperateinconformitywiththeapplicat.on,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCollmlission~0+i.,ii.i~+>.~4.~~~~Xx~u,cswnRc.~Thereisreasonableassurance(i)thatthefacilitycaneoperatedatpowerlevelsupto1520megawatts(thermal)withoutendangeringthehealthandsafetyofthepublic;and(ii)thatsuchactivitieswillbeconductedincompliancewiththeregulationsoftheCommissionE.TheapplicantistechnicallyandfinanciallyqualifiedtoengageintheactivitiesauthorizedbythisoperatinglicenseinaccordancewiththerulesandregulationsoftheCommission;F.G.Theapplicanthasfurnishedproofoffinancialprotectionthatsatisfiestherequirementsof10CFRPart140;andTheissuanceofthislicensewillnotbeinimicaltotheeamondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.2.TheProvisionalOperatingLicensedatedSepteIIIber19,1969,issupersededbyFacilitvOperaingLicenseNc.DPR-18herebyissuedtoRochesterGasandElecricCorporaiontoreadasfol1ows:A.ThislicenseappliestotheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,aclOsedcycle,pressurized,light-water-IIoderatedandcooledreactor,andelectricgeneratingeauipment(hereinreferredtoas"the faciliy")whichisownedbytheRochesterGasandElectricCorpora-tion{hereinafter"thelicensee"nr"P68E").Thefacilityislocatednnthelicensee'ssiteonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,MavneCounty,NewYork,about16mileseastoftheCitvnfRochesterandisdescribedinlicenseapplicationAmendmentNn.6,"FinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport,"andsubsequentamendmentsthereto,andintheapplicationforpowerincreasenotarizedFebruary2,1971,andAmendmentNos.1through4thereto(hereincollectivelyreferredtoas"theapplication").8.Subjecttotheconditionsandrequirementsincorporatedherein,theCommissionhereby'licensesR68E:PursuanttoSection104boftheActand10CFRPart50,"DomesticLicensingofProductionandUtilizationFacilities,"topossess,use,andooerate.thefacilityatthedesignatedlocationinMayneCounty,llewYork,inaccordancewiththeproceduresandlimitationssetforthinthislicense;(2)rg<vi-x~iiii~(3)(4)PursuarttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceive,possess,anduseatanytimespecialnuclearmaterialnrreactorfuel,inaccordancewiththelimitationsfor'torageandamountsreauiredforreactoroperationasdescribedintheFinalSafetyAnalvsisReport,asamended,andCommissionSafetyEvalua+ionsdatedNovember15,1976,October5,1984,Novemho.r14,1984~QA~>ao,iass-(a)Pursuant+otheActand10CFRPart70,toreceiveandstorefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,.1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20,1979);(b)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,topossessand'sefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979transmittedbyletter'atedDecember20,1979},assupplementedFebruary20,1980andMarch5,1980;PursuanttotheAc+ar010CFP,Parts30,40,and70toreceive,possess,andusea+anvtimeanybyoroduct,source,andspecialnuclearmaterialassealedneutronsourcesfnrreactnrstartup,sealedsourcesforreac+orinstrumentationandradiationmonitoringecuipmentcalibration,andasfissiondetectorsinamountsasrequired;PursuanttotheActand10CFP.Parts.30,40,and70,t>receive,possess,anduseinamountsasreouiredarvbyproduct,source,orsnecialnuclearmaterialwithou+restrictiontochemicalorohvsicalfnrm,forsampleana>ysisorinstr@.ntcalibrationnrassociatedwi+hradioactiveapoaratusnrcomonnents:awid (5)PursuanttotheActand10.CFRParts30and70,topossess,butnotseparate,suchbyproductandspecialnuclearmaterialsasmaybeproducedbytheoperationofthefacility.C.ThislicenseshallbedeemedtocontainandissubjecttotheconditionsspecifiedinthefollowingCommissionregulationsin10CFRPart20,Section30.34ofPart30,Section40.41ofPart40,Sections50.54and50.59ofPart50,andSection70.32ofPart70;andissubjecttoallapplicableprovisionsoftheActandrules,regulationsand,ordersoftheCommissionnoworhereafterineffect;andissubjecttotheadditionalconditionsspecifiedbelow:(1)MaximumPowerLevelRGGEisauthorized,tooperatethefacilityatsteady-statepowerlevelsuptoamaximumof1520megawatts(thermal).(2)Technical'SecificationsTheTechnicalSpecificationscontained.inAppendixA,areherebyincorporatedinthelicense.ThelicenseeshalloperatethefacilityinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.(3)FireProtection(a)Thelicenseeshallimplementandmaintainin)effectallfireprotectionfeaturesdescribedinthelicensee'ssubmittalsreferencedinandasapprovedormodifiedbytheHRC'sFireProtectionSafetyEvaluation(SE)datedFebruary14,1979andSEsupplementsdatedDecember17,1980,February6,1981,June22,1981,February27,1985andMarch21,1985.orconfigurationssubsequentlyapproved,bytheHRC,subjecttoprovision(b)below.(b)ThelicenseemaymakechangestotheapprovedfireprotectionpxogramwithoutpriorapprovaloftheCommissiononlyifthosechangeswouldnotadverselyaffecttheabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.AmendmentNo.49 ,~(4)SecondarWaterChemistMonitorinproramThelicenseeshallimplementasecondaryterchemistrymonitoringprogramtoinhibitteamgeneratortubedegradation.Thisproamshallbedescribedintheplantproceduresashallinclud'e:t(a)Tdentificationofasamplgscheduleforthecriticalphrametersandontrolpointsforhtheseparameers;1(b)Xdentificationmeasurethevalueparameters;eproceduresusedtoofthecritical(c)(d)(e)Identificatnofprocssamplingpoints;Procedurfortherecordidata;andmanagementofProduresdefiningcorrectivegctionsforocontrolpointchemistrycond'ons;andAprocedureidentifying(i)theauth.ityresponsiblefortheinterpretationofedata,and(ii)thesequenceandtimingo.administrativeeventsrequiredtoinitiate",correctiveaction.Thelicensee'shallimplementaprogramtoreduceleakagefromsystemsoutsideontainmentthatwouldorcouldcontai~nkgXy-radioactivefluidsduringaseriousgmasientoraccidenttoaslowasreasonahlpmchievablelevels.Thispmgramshall~acludethefollowing:AmendmentHo.49 5.5.2Q,C"<<.Thisr.~ia)--Provisionsestah1ishingpreventtvemaintenauoe-andperiodic-.visualinspectionrequirements;and(hiLnaktestrequjresmntsfore.achsystematarrequen~cyriot-to-exceedrefuelingcycleinterva"ls-;=.,,'{6l-..IodineMonitorinThelicenseeshallimplementaprogramwhichwiY1ensurethecapabilitytoaccuratelvdeterminetheairborneiodineconcentra.ioninvTtalareasunderac'cidentconditions.programshallincludethe,follunng:(a)Trainingofpersuel;(b)Proceduxwsformonitoring;and(c)rovisionsformaintenanceofsamplinaandanalysis!equipment.4>.'1V(>.<<i0.TheUire'romcertainrequiremenisof~AendixJto.10CFRPart50.Thes,anexemptiorom50.46~a1),aoerfnrmanceecalculatediccordancewithancceptablecalculanalmodelwhiconformstntheprisionsinAendix';K(SdatedApril18978).TheexempnwillexpireiptandarnvalofrevisedECCSculations;(certainexemptionsfromApoendix3to10CFRPart50secsonII.A.4.(a)maximumallowableleakagerateforreducedpressuretests,sectionIII.R.1acceptabletechnique~orperforminglocal(Type8)leakageratetests,sectionIII.0.1schedulinqof,containmentintegratedleakageratetits,andsectionIII.D.2testinqintervalforcontainmentailocks(SERdatedMarch28,1978),ananexemption~tesche1TlParrequiremenorea1te~rivsshutdownsvstemsetforthgn10CFR50,<-c)(4)(HRCle~rdatedMayK,<1984.Theexempti'oniseffectjfeuoti1wtactup,.rom..thrgqgs,,rclingoutae6Theaforementionedexemptinrsareauthorizedbyawanwillnotendangerlifeorproperttyorthecommondefenseand.'ecurityandare,otherwiseinthepublicinterest.Therefore,theexemptionsareherebygrantedpursuanttn10CFR50.12.PhysicalProtection-TheicenseeshallmaintainineffectandfullyimplementallprovisionsothefollowingCommission-aporoveddocuments,includingamendmentsandchangesmadepursuant.otheauthorityof10CFR50.54{p),whicharebeingwithheldfrompublicdisclosurepursuanttn10CFR73.21: AttachmenttoAmendmenttoFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-I8E.ThelicenseeshallfullyimplementandmaintainineffectallprovisionsoftheCommission-approvedphysicalsecurity,,guardtrainingandqualification,andsafeguardscontingencyplansincludingamendmentsmadepursuanttoprovisionsoftheMiscellaneousAmendmentsandSearchRequirementsrevisionsto10CFR73.55(51FR27827and27822)andtotheauthorityof10CFR50.90and10CFR50.54(p).Theplans,whichcontainSafeguardsInformationprotectedunder10CFR73.21,areentitled:"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantPhysicalSecurityPlan,"withrevisionssubmittedthroughAugust18,1987;"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantGuardTrainingandgualificationPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughJuly30,1981;and"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantSafeguardsContingencyPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughApril14,1981.Changesmadeinaccordancewith10CFR73.55shallbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeschedulesetforththerein.F.Thislicenseiseffectiveasofthedateofissuanceandshallexpireatmidnight,September18,2009.FORTHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOriginalsignedbyDarrellG.Eisenhut,DirectorDivisionofLicensing

Attachment:

Appendix'-TechnicalSpecificationsDateofIssuance:December10,1984 TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSDEFINITIONSThefollowingtermsaredefinedforuniforminterpretationofthespecifications.ThermalPowerTheratethatthethermalenergygeneratedbythefuelisaccumulatedbythecoolantasitpassesthroughthereactorvessel.Reactor0eratinModesModeReactivityakk'oolantTemperatureoFRefuelingColdShutdownHotShutdownOperating~1'T-14'0T5200TR540T580Anyoperationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrodswhenthevesselheadisunbolted. erable-erabilitAsystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceshallbeoperableorhaveoperabilitywhenitiscapableofperformingitsspecifiedfunction(s).Implicitinthisdefinitionshall'Ibetheassumptionthatallnecessaryattendantinstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpowersources(subjecttoSection3.0.2),coolingorsealwater,lubrication,orotherauxiliaryeauipmentthatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,componentordevicetoperformitsfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).,jWi~~ tinPerormingallintene~zntheintendedDereeofRedundanc(instrumentChannels)Thediffezenweenthenumb'-.of'operablechannelsAandthenumber"-crf"channelswhich,ied,willcauseanautomaticsysemtrip.InstrumentSurveillanceChannelCalibrationTheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechanneloutputsothatitrespondswiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracytoknownvaluesoftheparameterwhichthechannelmonitors.TheChannelCalibrationshallencompasstheentirechannelincludingthesensorandalarmand/ortripfunctions,andshallincludetheChannelFunctionalTest.TheChannelCalibrationmaybeperformedbyanyseriesofsequential,overlappingortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.ChannelCheckThequalitativeassessmentofchannelbehaviorduringoperationbyobservation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,whereposs'ble,comparisonofthechannelindicationand/orstatuswithotherindicationsanc/orstatusder'vedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter. ChannelFunctionalTesta.Analogchannels-theinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifyoperabilityincludingalarmand/ortripfunctions.b.Bistablechannels-theinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensortoverifyoper-Theaualitaxabilityincludingalarmand/ortripfunction.SccrceCheckessmentofchann~es~nsewhenthechannelx.sexposedtoativeource.;i Conta-.nr.:".ntTntcqritvContainmentintegrityisdefinedtoexistwhe,.:a.Allnon-automaticcontairmentisolationvalveswhicharenotrequiredtobeopenduringaccidentconditionsareclosedandblindflangesareinstalledwlererequired.'.Theequipmendoorisproperlyclosedardsealed.c.Atleastonedoorineachpersonnelair'lockisproperlyclosedandsealed.d.Al1automaticcontainmentisolationvalvesareoperable,securedintheclosedpositionorvalvesorflangesaspermittedbyOperation.e.Thecontainmentleakagesatisfies4isolatedbyclosedmanualLimitingConditionsf"rTechnica1SpecificationuadrantPowerTiltTheratioofhighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.Ifone~excoredetectorisoutofservice,thethreeinserviceunitsareusedinccmputingtheaverage. HotChannelFactorsF<',HeatFluxHot.ChannelFactor,isdefinedasthemaximumlocalheatfluxinthesurfaceofafuelroddividedbythearagefuelrodheatfluxallowingformanufacturing."tolercesonfuelpelletsandrods.Fq,NuclearatFluxHotChannelFactor~,'sdefinedasthe/maximumlocalfuerodlinearpowerensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinepowerdensityassumingnominalfuelpelletandroddimensionFE<,EngineeringHeFluxHotChnelfactor,,isdefinedastheratiobweenF<andF"<anditheallowanceonheatfluxrendu'dformanufacturingtolerances,.F~,NuclearEnthalphyRiseHotChannelFactor,1definedastheratiooftheintegraloflinearpoweralongthrodonwhichminimumDNBRoccurstotheaveragerodpower.if FreauencNotationThefrequencynotationspecifiedfortheperformanceofsurveillancerequirementsshallcorrespondtotheintervalsdefinedbelow.NotationS,EachShiftD,DailyTwiceperweekW,MeeklyB/M,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/M,BimonthlyQ,QuarterlySA,SemiannuallyA,AnnuallyFreauencvAtleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastoncepez4daysandat'.leasttwiceper7daysAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper14daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastoncepez62daysAtleastoncper92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastoncepe12monthsAtleastoncepez18monthsN.A.PRPriortoeachstartupNotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin12hourspriortoeachreleaseTheODCN'aaOffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCY'.-ngthemethodologyandmeterstoheusedforcalcula'offsite 0 FreauencNotationThefrequencynotationspecifiedfortheperformanceofsurveillancerequirementsshallcorrespondtotheintervalsdefinedbelow.NotationFreauencS,FachShiftD,DailyTwiceperweekW,WeeklyB/W,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/M,BimonthlyQ,QuarterlySA,SemiannuallyA,AnnuallyS/UAtleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastonceper4daysandatleasttwiceper7daysA%leastonceper7daysAtleastonceper14daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper62daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastonceper12monthsAtleastonceper18monthsPriortoeachstartupN.A.NotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin12hourspriortoeachrleaseOfisiteDoseCalculationManualODOM'heODCMisamanualcontainingthemethodo'ogyandparameterstoheusedforcalculatingtheoffsite dosesdueMliquidandgaseousradiologicaleffluents,incalculationofliquidandgaseouseffluentmonitoring:instrumentationalarm/tripsetpoints,andintheconductoftheenvironmentaLradiologicalmonitoringprogramProcessControlProramPCPI.xiThePisamanualoutliningthemethodforprocessingwetsolidwases~andforsolidificationof-i~i6wastes.Itshallinclude~epr-ssparametersandevaluationmethodsusoassuremeetingtherequirementsof10CFRPart.71.priortoshipmentofcontainers--ofz.oactivewastefromthesite.1.15'icationI.x,vSolidificationshawastesfromliquidsystemsPurae-PurainoEradioactive'toahomogeneous.solid.orpurgingisthecontrolledprocessofdischargingairorgasrconfinedspaceto'aintemperature,pressure,humidity,coationorotheroperatingconditio'uchamannerthatrepMementairor~asisremiedtopurifytheconfinedspace.Vent'a,'g.xvingisthecontrolledprocessofdischarginga~Jinedspacetomaintaiaemperatura,pressure,humidity,conc~~tionorotheoperatingcondition,chamannerthatre"lacementairisprovidedorreauied. DoseEuivalentI-131ThedoseequivalentI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131whichalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,I-134andI-135actuallypresent.Thedoseconversionfactorsusedforthiscalculationshallbethosefortheadultthyroiddoseviainhalation,containedinNRCRegulatoryGuide1.109Rev.1October1977.>.xixrtableEvent~P-hase=conditionsspecifiedAReportableEventsx.on50.73Oo10CFRPara50.CanistersContaininConsolidatedFuelRodsCanistertainingconsolidatedfuelrodsarestain~s~steelcanisterscontaxn~~thefuelrods.of--nomorethantwofuelassemblieswhichhave-d~ayedatbreastfiveyearsandarecapableez.ngstoredinastoragecellofthesSS~fuelool.ShutdownMarinShutdownmarginshallbetheamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcritical,orwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassumingallrodclustercontrolassemblies(shutdownandcontrol)arefullyinsertedexceptforthesinglerodclustercontrolassemblyofhighestreactivityworthwhichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,andassumingnochangesinxenonorboronconcentration. 2ao2.1SAFETYLIMITSANDLIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGSSafetLimit-ReactorCore~ld1tAppliestothelimitingcombinationsofthermalpower,reactorcoolantsystempressureandcoolanttemperature'during~~KHZTomaintaintheintegrityofthefuelcladding.w.i.IThecombinationofthermalpowerlevel,coolantpressureandcoolanttemperatureshallnot.exceedthelimitsshowninFigure2.1-1.Thesafetylimitisexceededifthepointdefinedbythecombinationofreactorcoolantsystemaveragetemperatureandpowerlevelisatanytimeabovetheappropriatepressuieline.3.S"ITomainintheintegrityofthefuelcladdingandpreventfissionproductrelea,itisnecessarytopreventoverheatingthelcladdingunderallcratingconditions.Thisisccomplishedbyoperatingwithinthenucteboilingregiofheattransfer,'hereintheheattransfercoef'ensverylargeandthecladsurfacetemperatureisonlyadegesFahrenheitabovethecoolanttemperature.ThupperboundaryohenucleateboilingregimeistermeddarturefromnucleateboilingB)andatthispointreisasharpreductionoftheheattranscoeff'ntwhichwouldresultinhighcladtemperaturesandreossibilityofcladfailure.DNBisnot,however,anobservable arameterduringreactoroperation.Therefore,theobservabletIpaameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpreurehaveeenrelatedtoDNBthroughtheW-3and/orWRB-1DNBcorelation.TheseDcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheNBfluxandelocationofDNBforaxiallyuniformandno-uniformheatfluxditributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxrao,definedastheratiootheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtoelocalheatflux,isindicaveofthemargintoDNB.AminimumalueoftheDNBratio,MDR,isspecifiedsotthatduringsteadysteoperation,normalperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransien,thereisa9/probabilityata95%confidencelevelthatDNB'llnotoc.ThecurvesofFigure2.1-1representtheloiofointsofthermalpower,1'coolantsystempressureandaveetemperatureforwhichthisminimumDNBvalueissatisfiedeareaofsafeoperationisbelowtheselines.Sinceitispossibletohavesomewhatgreaterenthalpyrisehotchannelfactorsatpar/powerthanatfull,powerduetothedeeper$'ontrolbankinsertionwhichispermitteda%partpower,aconservativealloyancehasbeenmadeinobtai~gthecurvesinFigure2.1-1fanincreasein>withdecreasgpowerlevels.Rodwithdrawa1blockandloadrunbackoccursbefore~,reactortripsetpoints-arereached.r.'heReactorControlandProtectiveSystemisdesignedtopieventoany'nt'cipatedcombinationoftransientconditionsforreacr,coolantsystemtemperature,pressureandthermalpowerlevelthat confidenceleve(1)FSAR,Section(2)SafeauationforR.E.Transition14x14OptimizedFuelAssemblsWestinghouseElectricCorporation,NovVemv983.wouesultintherebeinglessthana95Kprobabilityata955-~'ONBwou'lNootoccur ~<.i.l-iFIGURE~~~COREDNBSAFETYLIMITS2LOOPOPERATION660650.2400PSZAUNACCEPTABLEOPERATZDN6402250PSZA6306202000PS1'A600477KPSZA590580ACCEPTABLEOPERATZON5700.;1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.91.1.11.2POMER(fractionofnomina1) 2.2SafeLimit-ReactorCoolantSstemPressureAppliestothelimitonReactorCoolantSystempressure.',.~Ob'ective:/Tomaintaintheintegrityofthe/ReactorCoolantSystem.TheReactorCoolantSystempressureshallnotexceed2733psigithfuelassembliesinstalledinthereactorvessel.asis:TheactorCoolantSystemservesasabarrierpreventingradio-"(1)nuclidescoainedinthereactorcoolantfromreachingtheatmophere.ntheeventofaelcladdingfailure,theReactorCoolantSystemis<<Cr<<theprimarybarrierainstthereleaseoffission'products.Byes-tablishingasystempressurelimit,theco/inuedintegrityofthe,<<<<reactorcoolantsystemandfuelcddingisassured.ThemaximumtransientpressureallowableiathereaorcoolantsystempressurevesselundertheASMEode,Section111,isThemaximumtransientpressureallowableinsystempiping,valvesandfittingsunderUSASrofdes'ignpressure.Thus,thesafetylimitof<<<<(2)designpressure)hasoeenestablished.O%%uoofdesignpressure.the'xuactorcoolantSectionB31.1is120%%uo2735psig(110%%uoof esettingsofthepower-operatedreliefvalves(2335psig),the/reactor'pressuretrip{2385psig),andthesafetyvalves~(2485psig)haveeenestablishedtoassureneverreingtheReactorCoolantSysteressuresafetylim'Theinitialhydro-statictestwasconductedat3Reactor-CoolantSystem.pstoassuretheintegrityofthe

References:

(I)FSAR,Section4(2)FSAR,Section4.3 6.76.7.1SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONThefollowingactionsshallbetakenintheeventaSafetyLimitisviolated:a.Theprovisionsof10CFR50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)shallbecompliedwithimmediately.TheSafetyLimitviolationshallbereportedSeniorVicePresident,CustomerOperations,tothetotheoffsitereviewimmediately.function,andtotheNRC55iCeoftheviolationuponfacilitycomponents,systems~<<r<<<<ASafetyLimitViolationReportshallbeprepared.*Thereportshallbereviewedbytheonsitereviewfunction.Thisreportshalldescribe(1)applicable/circumstancesprecedingtheviolation,(2)effects/,orstructures,and(3)correctiveactiontakento>vs'r,~,e~uw<<r4A~J<<vsr...v.v%55.'<vd..TheSafetyLimitViolationReportshallbesubmittedtotheNRC,theoffsitereviewfunction,andtheSeniorVicePresident,CustomerOperationswithintwoweeksoftheviolation.+5II5g.sV~Analterna'tiemaybedesignatedfo~'spositioninaccordancewith10CFE~~a)(3requirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecificationsptithepositionwiththealternatetitleasywiththespecifxeiA:-ie.AlternatetitlesshspecifiedintheUpdatedFinalSafe~alysisRer<<v.r.,~<<v~<<<<evrvv1g~ ~~J0LIMITINGONDITIGNFOROPERATIONAPPLICABILITY3.0.1In-theeventaLimitingConditionforOperationand/ozassociatedactionrequirementscannotbesatisfiedbecause5',viiiofcircumstancesinexcessofthoseaddressedinthe~lspecification,itch1ho+actions+llbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenexthoursi,atot~ofs~nhou,and'natleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours(i.e.,atotalofhours)unlesscorrect'vemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationunderthepermissibleactionstatementsforthespecifiedtimeintervalasmeasuredfrominitialdiscoveryoruntilthereactorisplacedinamodeinwhichthespecificationisnotapplicable.IftheactionstatementcorrespondingtotheLimitingConditionforOperationthatwasexceededcontainstimelimitstohotandcoldshutdownthatarelessthanthosespecifiedabove,thesemorelimitingtimelimitsshallbeapplied.Exceptionstotheserequirementsshallbestatedintheindividual3.0.2vMlV~~/'pecifications.Whenasystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelybecauseitsemergencypowersourceisinoperable,orsolelybecauseitspreferredpowersourceisinoperable,itmaybeconsideredoperableforthepurposeofsatisfyingtherequirementsofitsapplicableLimitingConditionforOperation,provided: cQv~J~VL'1)itscorresPondingPreferredoremergencypowersourceisoperable;andQ)allof'itsredundantsystem(s),subsystems(s),train(s),component(s)anddevice(s)areoperable,orlikewisesatisfytherequirementsofspecification.Unlessbothconditions(1)and(2)aresatisf'dwithin1hour,theunitshallbeplacedinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours,andinatleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Thisspecificationisnotapplicableincoldshutdownorrefuelingmodes.O.)Basis"+.Specification3.0.1delineatestheACTIONtobetakenfor'circumstancesnotdirectlyprovidedforintheACTIONstatementsand..Iwhoseoccurrencewouldviolatetheintentofthespecification.ForI:example,Specification3.3.2requirestwoContainment,sprayPumpstobeoperableandprovides'xplicitactionrequirementsifonespraypumpisinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpeciXication3.0.1,ifbothIoftherequiredContainm'entSprayPumpsareinoperable,theunitisrequiredtobeinat'easthotshutd~onwithinthefollowing6hoursandinatleastcoldshutdown~'henext30hours.Thesetime1limitsapplybecausethetime.imitsCoronespraypumpinoperable(6hourstohotshutdown,wait48hoursthen.,30hourstocoldshutdown)!iarelesslimiting.Asafurtherexampl'eSpecification3.3.1requireseachReaMorCoolantSystemaccumulator,tobeoperableandprovidesexpl/citactionrequirementsifone'~accumulatorisinoperableUnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifmorethanoneIaccumutorisinoperable,within1houractionshallbeinitj.atedtoLpletheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursandcoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Thetimelimit'of6hours+-.; tohotshutdownand30hourstocoldshutdowndonotapplybecausethetimelimitsforlaccumulatorinoperablearemorelimiting.Itisassumedthattheunitisbroughttotherequiredmodewj'thintherequiredtimesbypromptlyinitiatingandcarryingoutappropriateactionstatement.Specification3.0.2delineateswhatadditionalconditionsmustbesatisfiedtopermitoperationtocontinue,consistentwiththeactionstatementsforpowersources,whenapreferredoremergencypowersourceisnotoperable.ItallowsoperationtobegovernedbythetimelimitsoftheactionstatementapsocxatedwiththeLimiting/ConditionforOperation-forthepreferredoremergencypowersource,nottheindividualactionstatementsforeachsystem,subsystem,/train,componentordevicethatisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelybecauseoftheinoperability.ofitspreferredoremergencypowersourcelForexample,Specification3.7.2.l.arequiresinpartthattwoIemergencydieselgeneratorsbeoperable.Theactionstatement/providesforamaximum:out-of-servicetimewhenoneemergencydieselrgeneratorisnotoperable.IfthedefinitionofoperablewereappliedwithoutconsiderationofSpecification3.0.2,allsystems,subsystems,trai'ns,componentsanddevicessuppliedbytheinoperableIemergencypowersourcewouldalsobeinoperable.Thiswoulddictateainvokingtheapplicableactionstatementsforeachoftheapplicable//LimitingConditionsforOperation.However,theprovisionsofSpecification3.0.2permitthetimelimitsforcontinuedoperationtobeconsistentwiththeactionstatementfortheinoperableemergencySdiselgeneratorinstead,providedtheotherspecifiedconditionsarIatisfied.Znthiscase,thiswouldmeanthatthecorresponding ,gezerredpo~ersourcemustbeoperable,andallredundant'ubsystems,ins,components,anddevi'cesmm-heoperabl~-otherwisesatisfySpecii'on3.0.2'.e.,becapable.ofperformingtheirdesignfunctionand~aveat~stonepreferredoroneemergencYpowe~ourceoperable).Zftheyare-"-not'hwshutdownisreguiredinaccordancewiththisspecification.~-'.hmenaged&moMcspeedSWSefveayVAretaV7~~~aced+'W~~~vo~bT~~44WWwS~+~SSVWgM>>JWeludes'~MC4 P=!~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSpecified,intervalsmaybeadjustedplusorminus25%toaccommodatenormaltestschedules.OperationalSafetReviewApplicability:Appliestoitemsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-~b'ospecifytheminimumfrecpxencyandtypeofsurveillancetobeappliedtoplanteauipmentardconditions.Speciication:Calibration,testing,andcheckingofanalogcharnelandtestingoflogicchannelshallbeperformedasspecifiedinTable4.1-1.EauipmentandsamplingtestsshallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.Eachaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshall,bedemonstratedoperablebyperformanceofthechar>elcheckandchannelcalibrationoperationsatthefrere.cieseshowninTable4.1-3.Eachradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedopeablebyperormi.gthechanne3,check,sourcecheck,channelfunctionaltest,andchannelca3'brationatthefreauencyshcwn'nTable4.1-5. 3.1.33.1.3.1'lC.o~.l~5L.C.O3'L51~t>>1>>v~a>>3.1.3.3MinimumConditionsforCriticalitExceptduringlowpowerphysicstests,thereactoshallnotbcmadecriticalatatemperaturebelow500-'F,andifthemoderatetemperaturecoefficientismorepositivethana.5pcm/'F(below70percentofratedthermalpower)b.0pcm/F(atorabove70percentofratedthermalpower)<nnocaseshallthecactorbemadecriticalaboveandtotheleftofthecriticalitylimitlinesho~>onFigue3.1-1of.thesespecifications.Whenthcreactorcoolant,temperatureisbelowtheminimumtemperaturespecif'edabove,thereactorshallIbesubcriticalbyanamount.eaualtoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityinsertionduetodepressurizati"n.BasisPrevioussafe"yanalyseshaveassume'dthatforDesignBasis=-ven-s(DS'tiatcdfromthehotzerotowerorhig.."powe"condition,themoderatemperaturecocficieMTC)wase'therzeroornegative.Begirsx'nc14,thesa=etyanalyses(1)(2)'haveassumedthatamaximumof+5pc'Fcanexis-upto70%po~er.Analyses.hshownthat,thedesigncr'iacanbesatisfiedtheDBK.swiththisassumption.(3)70/powertheKZCmustbe.zeroornega-ive.Atgterthan3.1-19 TeNTCarewaivedforlowpowerph'ststoApermitmeasurementoftheMTCsicsdesignparametersofinterest.D'hesetestsspecialoperatingprewiltaken.'onsTherequirementthatthereactorisnottobemadecriticalaboveandtotheleftofthecriticalitylimitprovidesincreasedassurancethattheproperrelationshipbetweenreactorcoolantpressureandtemperaturewillbemaintainedduringsystemheatupandpressurization.Heatuptothistemperaturewillbeaccomplishedbyoperatingthereactorcoolantpumps.Ifthespecifiedshutdownmarginismaintained,thereisnopossibilityofanaccidentalcriticalityasaresultofanincreaseinmoderatortemperatureoradecreaseofcoolantpressure.Reference(1)'FSAR(2)FSARFigure3.2.1-8(3)SafetyEvaluationfor.GinnaTransitu'.o14x14Optimizedmber1983.ssemblies,WestinghouseElectricCorpo'on,3.1-20 chemicalandVolumeControlSstemA'cabAppliestotheoperatio~tatusofechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem.)2,i<43.2')LihB3.2.3l2.i4Tod'thoseconditionsofthechemicalandvolumontrolsystemnecessarytoassuresafereactoroperation.eclc0Duringcoldshutdownorrefuelingwithfuelinthereactorthereshallbeatleastoneflowpathtothecoreforboricacidinjection.Theminimumcapabilityforboricacidinjec-tionshallbeequivalenttothatsuppliedfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Withthisflowpathunavailable,immediatelysuspendalloperationsinvolvingcorealterationsorpositivereactivitychangesandreturnaflowpathtooperablestatusassoonaspossible.Whenthereactorisabovecoldshutdown,twoboroninjectionflowpathsshallbeoperablewithoneoperablechargingpumpforeachoperableflowpath,andoneoperableboricacidtransferpumpforeachoperableflowpathfromtheboricacidstoragetank(sZfrequiredbyspecification3.2.2above,theBoricAcidStorageTank(s)shallsatisfytheconcentration,minimumvolumeandsolutiontemperaturerequirementsofTable3.2-1.AmendmentNe.g3573'-1 3'.4WithonlyoneoftherequiredboroninjectionflowpathstheRCSoperable,restoreatleasttwoboroninjectionflowI'athstotheRCStooperablestatuswithin72hours,orwithinthenext6hoursbeinatleasthotshutdownandboratedtoashutdownmarginequivalenttoatleast2.454deltak/katcold,noxenonconditions.Tftherequirementsof3.2.2arenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional7days,thenbeincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.3.2.5WhenevertheRCStemperatureisgreaterthan200oFandisbeingcooledbytheRHRsystemandtheover-pressureprotec-tionsystemisnotoperable,atleastonechargingpumpshallbedemonstratedinoperableatleastonceper12hoursbyverifyingthatthecontrolswitchisinthepull-stopposi-tion.AmendmentNo.573~22 Table3.2-1BoricAcidStorageTank(s)Minimum-Volume-Temperature-Concentration+ConcentrationppmboronMinimumVolumegal.MznxmumSolutionTemperatureoF4700to5000to6000to7000to8000to9000to10000to11000to12000to13000to14000to15000to16000to17000to18000to19000to20000to21000to22000tolessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthanlessthan500060007000800090001000011000120001300014000150001600017000 180001900020000210002200023000840078006400540047004200 38003500 3200300027002500 2400 220021002000190018001800405262 7078859197103 108113118 123127131 137 140143145AmendmentNo.573'2a Thehemicalandvolumecontrolsystemprovidescontrolofsysteboroninventory.'"Thisisnormallyaccomplishedbyus'ngoneormorechgingpumpsinserieswithoneofthetwoboricaidtransferpumpsAbovecoldsutdownconditions,aminimumoftwooffouboroninjectionflowpathsareequiredtoinsuresinglefunctionalcapabilityintheeventthatanaumedsingle'ctivefailurerenrsoneoftheflowpathsinoperable.Theborationvolumeavailablthroughanyflowpathissufficienttoprodetherequiredshutdownarginatcoldconditionsfromanyexpectedopertingconditionandtocompensateforshrinkageoftheprimarycoolantfrthecooldownocess.Themaximumvolumerequirementisassociatedwithboratiofromjustcritical,hotzeropower,peakxenonwithconolrodsttheinsertionlimit,tocoldshutdownwithsinglereactorcoolt.loopoperation.Thisrequires26,000+gallonsof2000ppmbrtedwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetankortheconcentrt'nsandvolumesofboratedwaterspecifiedinTable3.2-1fromthebricacidstoragetanks.Twoboricacidstoiagetanksareavaiable.0ofthetwo.tanksmaybeoutofserviceprovidedtherequedvolumeoboricacidisavailabletotheoperableflowpaths.(3)Abovecoldshutdown,woofthefollowinfourflowpathsmustbeoperablewithoneoprablechargingpumpforachoperableflowpath,andoneoperablebricacidtransferpumpforchoperableflowpathfromtheboricadstoragetanks.(1)Boricacidstoragetanksvi'aoneboricidtransferpumpthrghthenormalmakeup(FCV110A)flowpattothesuctionothechargingpumps.(2)oricacidstoragetanksviaoneboricacidtrasferpumpthroughtheemergencyboration.flowpath(MOV350tothesuctionofthechargingpumps.RefuelingwaterstoragetankviagravityfeedthroughAOV12Btothesuctionofthechargingpumps.AmendmentNo.57.3.2-3 K~I~exuding~acerstoragetan@.vxagravityfeedthroughnualbypassvalve358tothesuctionofthechargingPumpsAva'lableflowPathsfromthechargingpumpstothexeactocoo]antsysteincludethefollowing:(1)chargingflovpaththroughAOV392AtotheRCSLopBhotleg.(2)ChargingflovpaththroughAOV294totheRCSoopBcoldleg.(3)alinjectionflovpathtothereactorcooantpumps.Therateoforicacidinjectionmustbesufficnttooffsetthemaximumadditiofpositivereactivityfromthecayofxenonafteratripfromfullper.Thiscanbeaccomplishedtroughtheoperationofonechargingpumpminimumspeedvithsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Alsohetimerequiredforbicacidinjectionallowsforthelocalalignmeofmanualvalvestprovidethenecessaryflowpaths.Thequantityofboricacispecifiedinable3.2-1foreachconcentra-tionissufficientatanytimeinrelifetoboratethe.reactorcoolanttotherequiredcoldhutdoconcentrationandprovidemakeuptomaintainRCSinventoryduritecooldown.ThetemperaturelimitsspecifiedonTable3.2-1arerequedtomaintainsolutionsolubilityattheupperconcentrationineachan.Thetemperatures'listedonTable3.2-.1aretakenfromReferenc(4).arbitrarySoFisaddedtotheReference(4)formargin.HettracingaybeusedtomaintainsolutiontemperatureatoraboveeTable3.21limits.Zfthesolutiontemperatureofeithertheflowpathortheoratedwatersourceisnotmaintainedatoraboveeminimumtemperatuspecified,theaffectedflowpathmustbedlaredinoperableandeappropriateactionsspecifiedin3.2.4floved.Placingachargingpinpull-stopwhenevertheretorcoolantsystemtemperature,isa2OoFandisbeingcooledbyRHR'thouttheover-pressureprotect'onsystemoperablevillpreventinadveentoverpres-surizationofeRHRsystemshouldletdownbeterminated.Reece'.ARSection9.3.4.2(1)(2)GREDesignAnalysisDA-NS-92-133-00"BASTBoronConcenttionReductionTechnicalSpecificationValues"datedDec.14,192(3)L.D.ophite,Zr.letterA.Schvencer,NRC,

Subject:

ReactorVesselOverpressurization,datedFebruary24,1977AmementNo.5732-4) (4)Kerr-McGeechemiccdes"dated5/84etin0151"BoricAcid-Techni-AmendmentNo.573'-5 3.ControlRodandPowerDistributionLimitslicabilitApplieotheoperationofthedistributionl'ts.olrodsandpowerToensure(1oresubcritica'tyafterareactortrip,limitedpotentialreactiveinsertionsfromypotheticalcontrolrodejection,andanacceptablecorepowerdistributionduringpowercration.Secification3.10.12oi3~1011fC.OSi5.5Q~ei~POih4QQ,>hControlRodInsertionLimitsWhenthereactorissubcriticalpriortostartup,thehotshutdownmarginshallbeatleastthatshowninTheshutdownmarginasusedhereisdefinedastheamountbywhichthereactorcorevouldbesubcriticalathotshutdownconditions(547'F)ifallcontrolrodsveretripped,assumingthatthehighest,worthcontrolrodremainedfullywithdrawn,andassumingnochangesinxenonorboron.QPECi+la444ColR.,30,.gi,24 QQ,1V)oudpaulcv3.10.1.2'n3.l,5Q~~Q3i\~g3.10.1.3Whenthereactoriscriticalexceptforhysicstestsandcontrolrodexercises,theshutdowncontrolrodsIshallbefullywithdrawn(indicatedposition).I~~po~<~Whenthereactoriscritical,exceptforphysicstestsn~~@w~I~pl.CO3.l,'K3.10.1.4QC.D'3a1a5geo3,I,bandcontrolrodexercises,eachgroupofcontrolroshallbeinsertednofurtherthanthelimitsshownbythelinesonFigure3.10-1andmovedsequentiallywita100(+5)step(demandposition)overlapbetweensuccessivebanks.~Kdceake4Mi<DuringcontrolrodexercisesindicatedinTable4.1-2,theinsertionlimitsneednotbeobservedbuttheFigure3.10-2mustbeobserved.)pc.cl4)~gE,,3.10.1.5gO,Viuringmeasurementofcontrolrodworthandshutdownmain,theshutdownmarginrequirement,Specificat'3.10.1.,neednotbeobservedprovidedtherctivityequivalenttoatleastthehighestestimadcontrolrodworthisavaiblefortripinsertionEachfulllengthcontrolrodnotflyinserted,ttis,"therods,availablefortripinstion,hallbedemonstratedcapableoffullinsertioentrippedfromatleastthe'0%withdrawnpositi(indicad)within24hourspriortoreducingtheutdownmargintosthanthelimitsofSpecificaon3.10.1.1.Thepositioneachfulllengthrnotfullyinserted,thatis,availaefortriinsertion,shallbedeterminedatleastoncehours.3.10-2 3.10.2PowerDistributionLimitsandMisaliedControlRod3.10.2.1Themovabledetectorsystemshallbeusedtomeasurepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortooperationoftheplantat50%ofratedpowertoensurethatdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Ifthecoreisoperatingabove75%powerwithoneexcorenuclearchanneloutofservice,thenthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratioshallbedeterminedonceadaybyatleastoneofthefollowingmeans:a.Movabledetectorsb.Core-exitthermocouples3.10.2.2Powerdistributionlimitsareexpressedashotchannelfactors.Atalltimes,ZO,Mtt+a.~thehotchannelfactorsmustmeetthefollowing.limits:F(Z)=(2.32/P)*K(Z)Fg(Z)=4.64*K(Z)FhH=166[1+.3(1P)]forP>.5forP<.5for0<P<1.00WherePisthefractionofratedpoweratwhichthecoreisoperating,K(Z)isthefunctiongivenbyFigure3.10-3,andZistheheightinthecore.ThemeasuredFshallbeincreasedbythreepercenttoyieldF.IfthemeasuredForFhexceedstheNlimitingvalue,withdueallowanceformeasurementerror,themaximumallowablereactorpowerlevelandtheNuclearOverpowe-.TripsetpointshallbereducedonepercentforeachpercentwithFhHorF~exceeds~Nthelimitingvalue,whicheverismorerestrictive.Ifthehotchannelfactorscannotbereducedbelowthe3.10<<3 zo.vii~3.10,.2.3cy%3.10.2.43.10.2.53.10.2.6limitingvalueswithinoneday,theOverpower~TtripsetpointandtheOvertemperatureLTsetpointshallbesimilarlreduced.thequadrant.;toaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12,thenwithintwohours:a.Correctthesituation,orb.Determinebymeasurementthehotchannelfactors,andapplySpecification3.10.2.2,orc.Limitpowerto75%ofratedpower.IIfthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12forasustainedperiodofmorethan24hourswithoutknowncause,orifsuchatiltrecursintermittentlywithoutknowncause,thereactorpowerlevelshallberestrictedsoasnottoexceed50\ofratedpower.Zfthecauseof.thetiltisdetermined,continuedoperationatapowerlevelconsistentwith3.10.2.2above,shall'epermitted.Exceptforphysicstest,ifthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratiois1.12orgreater,within2hourseither.reducethequadranttoaveragepowertiltratiotowithinitslimitorreducepowertolessthan50%ofratedpower.Mithinanadditional4hours,eitherreducetheratiotowithinits1imitorbeathotshutdown.Subsequentoperationforthepurposeofmeasuringandcorrectingthetiltispermitted.providedthepowerleveldoesnotexceed50%ofratedpowerandtheNuclearOverpowerTripsetpointisreducedby50%.Followinganyrefuelingandatleasteveryeffectivefullpowermonththereafter,fluxmaps,usingthemovabledetectorsystem,shallbemadetoconfirmthat310-4 3.10.2.7ge>5~thehotchannelfactorlimitsofSpecification3.10.2.2aremet.Thereferenceequilibriumindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceasafunctionofpowerlevel(calledthetargetfluxdifference)shallbemeasuredatleastonceperequivalentfullpowerquarter.Thetargetfluxdifferencemustbeupdatedatleasteachequivalentfullpowermonthusingameasuredvalueorbylinearinterpolationusingthemostrecentmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueattheendofthecyclelife.~~2bi]X3.10.2.8Exceptduringcontrolrodexercises,excoredetectorcalibration,andexceptasmodifiedby3.10.2.9through3.10.2.12,theindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceshallbemaintainedwithini5%ofthetargetfluxdifference(definesthetargetbandonaxial,fluxdifference).Axialfluxdifferenceforpower'distributioncontrolisdefinedastheaveragevalueforthefourexcoredetectors.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreeshall'eusedtoderivetheaverage.~~20.LQ3.10.2.9P"<"ll~controlrodexercises,org~q~3i~excorecalibration,atapowerlevelgreaterthan.90percentofratedpower,iftheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencedeviatesfromitstargetband.Thefluxdifferenceshallbereturnedtothetargetbandimme-diatelyorthereactorpowershallbereducedtoalevelnogreaterthan90percentofratedpower.3.10-5 gp.fX3.10.2.10Exceptduringcontrolrodexercisesorexcorecalibration,atapowerlevellessthanorequalto90percentofratedpower:a.Theindicatedaxialfluxdifferencemaydeviatefromits+5%targetbandforamaximumofonehour(cumulative)inany24hourperiod,however,thefluxdifferenceshallnotexceedanenvelopeboundedby-llpercentand+11percentat90%powerandincreasingby-1percentand+1percentforeach2percentofratedpowerbelow90%power.b.IfSpecification3.10.2.10aisviolated,thenthereactorpowershallbeimmediatelyreducedtono.greaterthan50%power.c.Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan90percentofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencebeingwithinitstargetband.3.10.2.11Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan50%ofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencenotbeingoutsideitstargetbandformorethantwohours(cumulative)outofthepreceding24hourperiod.Onehalfthetimetheindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceisoutofitstargetbandupto50%ofratedpoweristobecountedascontributingtotheonehourcumulativemaximumthefluxdifferencemaydeviatefromitstargetbandatapowe"levellessthanorequalto90percent.ofratedpower.3.10-6 3.10.2.12Whenthereactoriscriticalandthermalpowerislessthanorequalto90%ofratedpower,analarmiprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferencehasbeenoutsidethetargetbandformorethanonehour(cumulative)outof:any24hourperiod.Inaddition,whenthermalpowerisgreaterthan90%ofratedpower,analarmisprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferenceisoutsidethetargetband.Ifeitheralarmisoutofservice,thefluxdifferenc'eshallbeloggedhourlyforthefirst24hoursthealarmisoutofserviceandhalf-hourlythereafter.3.10.3ControlRodDroTime3'0.3.1'M3,>,Q4~go,xWhilecritical,theindividualfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)roddroptimefromthefullywithdrawnposition(indicated)shallbelessthanorequalto1.8secondsfrombeginningofdecayofstationary.grippercoilvoltagetodashpotentrywith:SOO'Fa.Tgreaterthanorequaltoandavgb.Allreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.3.10.3.2.WiththedroptimeofanyfulllengthroddeterminedSPSiA.QgD<l.3.104~~~3'0'.1LcQ3.1.9ICog.l.gtoexceedtheabovelimit,restoretheroddroptimetowithintheabovelimitpriortocriticality.ControlRodCrouHeiht[o~o~Whilecritical,andexceptforphysicstesting,allfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)rodsshallbeoperableandpositionedwithin+12steps(indicatedposition)oftheirgroupstepcounterdemandposition.3.10-7 3.10.4.2WithanyCC.O3.i0rodknowntobeuntripable,determinethattheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1issatisfiedwithin1hourandbeinhotshutdownwithin6hours.310.4.3L.t.'03,),4~20Xi<3.10.4~3~1L('.xiii310~4~3~2LXo3)~WithonerodTheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1issatisfied.Operationsmaythencontinueprovidedeither:a.Theremainderoftherodsinthegroupwiththemisalignedfromitsgroupstepcounterdemandpositionbymorethanf12steps(indicatedposition),operationmaycontinueprovidedthatwithinonehoureither:The*rodisrestoredtooperablestatuswithinthe.abovealignmentrequirements,orZO,XiVLCO9~."~~~c,sinoperablerodarealignedtothesameindicatedpositionastheinoperablerodwithinonehour,whilemaintaininpthe.limitofSpecification3.10.1.3-orb.Thepowerlevelisreducedtolessthanorequal(.geg.)Ato75%ofratedpowerwithinthenextonehour,2DiMVlfollowingevaluationsareperformed:(i)TheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1isdeterminedatleastonceper12hours.3.10-8 LCD~l4(ii)ApowerdistributionmapisobtainedfromthemovableincoredetectorsandF~(Z)andPHareverifiedtobewithintheirlimitswithin72hours.Lcc3,l,4(iii)Areevaluationofeachaccident,analysiso4-isperformedwithin5days;thisreevaluationshallconfirmthatthepreviouslyanalyzedresultsoftheseaccidentsremainvalidforthedurationofoperationundertheseconditions.3.10.4.4ZyggIlWithtwoormorefulllengthrodsinoperableormisalignedfromthegroupstepcounterdemandpositionbymorethani12steps(indicatedposition),beinhotshutdownwithin6hours.3.10'ontrolRodPositionIndicationSstems3-10.5.1Whilecritical,therodpositionindicationsystemandLho'3.i3thestepcountersshallbeoperableandcapableofdeterminingthecontrolrodpositionswithin212steps.3.10-9 3.10.5.2Lc.z,h,l2c,ktfWithamaximumofonerodpositionindicationperbankinoperableeither:a.Determinethepositionofthenon-indicatingrod(s)indirectlybythemovableincoredetectorsatleastonceper8hoursandimmediatelyafteranymotionofthenon-indicatingrodwhichexceeds24steps(demandposition)inonedirectionsincethelastdeterminationoftherod'sposition,orb.Reducethepowertolessthan50%ofratedpowerwithin8hours.3.10.5.3Withamaximumofonestepcounterperbankinoperableneither:a.Verifythatpositionindicationforeachrodoftheaffectedbankisoperableandthattherodsofthebankareatthesameindicatedpositionatleastonceper8hours,orb.Reducethepowertolessthan50%ofratedpowerwithin8hours.asisThertivitycontrolconceptisthatreartiv:ichangesaccomingchangesinreactorerarecompensatedbycontrodmotioReactivitychangesassociatedwithxenon,sfueldepletion,andlargechangesinreorcoolantternature(operatingtemperaturecoldshutdown)arecompensabychangesintholubleboronconcentration.Duringpoweeratiortheshutdowngroupsarefullywithdrawn dcontrolofreactorpowerisbythecontrolgroupAactortripoccurringduringpoweroperationwilputereactorintothehotshutdowncondition.Theconolrodinsertionlimitsprovideforievinghotshutdbyreactortripatanytime,asumingthehighestworcontrolrodremainsfullyw'rawnwithsufficientmarinstomeettheassumptisusedintheaccidentanalysi.Inaddition,yprovidealimitonthemaximinsertedrodwthintheunlikely'eventofahypotheti1rodeject',andprovideforacceptablenuclearpea'ngfacts.4ThelinesshownonFigure3.11meettheshutdownrequirement.Themaximumstdownmarginrequirementoccursatend-of-cyclelidisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisoftheypotheicalsteambreakaccident.Earlyinclelife,1ssshutdownmarginisrequired,andFigure3.10-2showseshutdownmarginequivalenttothathichisrequiredtend-of-lifewithrespecttouncontrolledcooldo.Allotheraccidentanalysarebasedon1%reactivtyshutdownmargin.Anupperbondenvelopeof2.32timesthenoalizedpeakingctoraxialdependenceofFigure3.10-hasbeenderminedfromextensiveanalysesconsiderigoperaingmaneuversconsistentwiththeTechnicalSpeificationsonpowerdistributioncontrolasgiveniSection3.10.Theresultsofthelossofcoolantaccidentanalysesbasedonthisupperboundenvelope emonstratecompliancewiththeFinalAcceptanceCr'terialimitforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystems.WheanF~measurementistaken,bothexperiment1error'manufacturingtolerancemustbeallodfor.Fivepeentistheappropriateallowancefoafullcoremapkenwiththemovableincoredetctorfluxmappingsystandthreepercentistheppropriateallowanceforufacturingtolerance.WhenameasurementofF>Histaken,xperimentalerrorustbeallowedforand4percentisthappropriatelowanceforafullcoremapwiththemovleincordetectorfluxmappingsystem.Measurementsofthehotcaspartofstartupphysicselfactoxsarerequiredsts,atleasteachfullpowermonthofoperationandenever.abnormalpowerdistributionconditionrequirereductionofcorepowertoalevelbasonmeasuredotchannelfactors.Theincoremaptakfollowinginiti1loadingprovidesconfirmationoftebasicnucleardesibasesincludingproperfuelloaingpattern.Theperio'cincoremappingproviesadditionalassurancethatthenucleardesignbaseremaininviolateandidentifiesoperationaanomalieswhichmight,otherwise,ffectthesebaes.Fornoaloperation,itisnotnecessarytomeasethesequantities.InsteadithasbeendeterminedthaI,providedcertainconditionsareobserved,thehochannelfactorlimitswill,bemet;theseI3.10-12 cditionsareasfollows:1.Controlrodsinasinglebankmovetogetherwinindividualrodinsertiondifferingbymorethan25sepsfromthebankdemandposition.2.ControrodbanksaresequencedwithoverappingbanksasescribedinSpecification3.3.Thefulllegthcontrolbankinsert'limitsarenotviolated.4.Axialpoverdisibutionlimitwhicharegivenintermsoffluxdifrencelimsandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsarobseed.Fluxdifferenceisq-qasdefinedincification2.3.1.2d.TBThepermittedrelaxation'Hwithreducedpowerallovsradialpowershaechaeswithrodinsertiontoheinsertionlimi.Ithasbeendeterminedthatprovidedtheaboveonditions1ough4areobserved,thesehotchannefactorslimitsareet.InSpecification3.10,F~isartrarilylimitedforP0.5{exceptforloverpoverysicstests).Thelimitsonaxialpowerdistributeredtoaboveardesignedtominimizetheeffectsoxenonredist'butionontheaxialpowerdistributionuringloadollowmaneuvers.Basically,controloffluxdierenceisrequiredtolimitthedifferencebetenecurrentvalueofFluxDifference(hI)andarefencealuevhichcorrespondstothefullpowerequilibrium3.10-13AmendmentNo.22 lueofAxialOffset(AxialOffset=DI/fractionalpor).Thereferencevalueoffluxdifferencevarie,withpowerlevelandburnupbutexpresseasaxiaoffsetitvariesprimarilywithburp.ThetechnalspecificationsonpowerdisibutionassurethattheF~upperboundenvelopeof2.32timesFigure.10-3isnotexceededdxenondistributionsanotdevelopedwh',atalatertime,couldcausereaterlocalwerpeakingeventhoughthefluxdiffenceisenwithinthelimits..Thetarget(orreferencealueoffluxdifferenceisdeterminedasfollow.tanytimethatequilibriumxenonconditionsha0eeeneslished,.theindicatedfluxd-'fferenceisotedwithptlengthrodswithdrawnfromcoreandwithntrolBankDmorethan190seps(indicatedposi'on)withdrawn.Thisvalue,videdbythefractionofullpoweratwhichthcorewasoperatingistheullpowervalueofetargtfluxdifference.Valuesorailothercorepowerlevelsare'ainedbymuiplyingthefullpowervaluebythefrtionalpow.Sincetheindicatedequilibriumvaluewned,noallowancesforexcoredetectorerrorarecessaryandindicateddeviationof25percenthIispermittedfromtheindicatedreferencevalue.Duringperiodswhereextensiveloadfollowingis3.10-14AmendmentNo.22 requireimossibestablishtherequired(coreconditionsfeasuringthetaluxdifferenceeverym.Forthisreason,twomethodsare ermissible-forupdatingthetargetfluxdifference.Sictcontrolofthefluxdifference(androdposition)isntasnecessaryduringpartpoweroperation.Thisisbecausexenondistributioncontrolatpartpowerisnotassiificantasthecontrolatfullpoweranallowancehbeenmadeinpredictingtheheatfpeakingfactoforlessstrictcontrolatpartpower.Strictcontrolthefluxdifferenceisnotossibleduringcertainphicstests,controlrodeercises,orduringtherequidperiodicexcorecaibrationwhichrequirelargeruxdifferencesanpermitted.Therefore,thespecificaionsonpowedistributionarenotapplicableduringysicssts,controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibra'on,thisisacceptableduetotheextremelylowproblityofasignificantaccidentoccurringduringtheoerations.Excorecalibrationincludesthateriodotimenecesarytoreturntoequilibriumopratingcondiions.Insom'einstancesofpidplantpowereductionautomaticrodmotiowillcausethefluxifferencetodeviatefromtheargetbandwhenthereducdpowerlevelisreach.Thisdoesnotnecessarilyffectthexenondiributionsufficientlytochangeeenvelopeopeakingfactorswhichcanbereachednasubsequetreturntofullpowerwithinthetargetband,owever,tosim.~lifythespecification,alim'tationofonehourinanyperiodof24hoursisacedonoperationoutsidetheband.Thisensures3.10-15 attheresultingxenondistributionsarenotsignificalydiferentfromthoseresultingfromoperationwithinthergetband.Theinstantaneousconsequenceofbeingotsidetheband,providedrodinsertionlimisareobsed,isnotworsethana10percentinc'rentinpeakingctorforfluxdifferenceintherae+14percentto-14ercent(+11percentto-11perentindicated)increaingby+1percentofeachpercentdecreaseinratedpwer.Therefore,whileedeviationexiststhepowerleveislimitedto90rcentorlowerdependingontheindicadfluxdifferce.If,foranyreason,flux'fference'otcontrolledwithinthei5percentbandrasngaperiodasonehour,thenxenondistributionmbesignificantlychangedandoperationat50pentisrequiredtoprotectagainstpotentiallyrevereconsequencesofsomeaccidents.Asdiscussedabove,thessenceofthlimitsistomaintainthexenondisibutionintheoreasclosetotheequilibriumllpowerconditionapossible.Thisisaccomplisd,withoutpartlengthrds,byusingthechemilvolumecontrolsystemtopsitionthefulllengcontrolrodstoproducethereiredindicationuxdifference.Theeffecofexceedingthefluxdifferencebandaorbelowlfpowerisapproximatlyhalfasgreatasiwoulbeat90%ofratedpower,wheretheeffectofdesationhasbeenevaluated. ereasonforrequiringhourlyloggingistoprovidconinuedsurveillanceofthefluxdifferenceifenormaalarmfunctionsareoutofservice.Itiintendethat'thissurveillancewouldbetempoaryuntilthelarmfunctionsarerestored.Thequadrantwetti)tratio1imitassuresthe%heradialpowerdtributionsatisfiesthedesignvaluesusedinthepowecapabilityanalysisRadialpowerdistributionmeasuentsaremadeuringstartuptestingandperiodicalyduringpweroperation.Thelimitof1.02atwh'chcorrctiveactionisrequiredprovidesDNBanlinarheatgenerationrateprotectionwithx-yplane.pwertilts.Alimitingtiltof1.025canbetolerateerethemarginforuncertaintyinFisdeleted.Therefore,thelimitingtilthasbeesetas1.0.Toavoid.unnecessarypowercanges,theopetorisallowedtwohoursinwhichtoerifythetiltreingand/ortodetermineandcrectthecauseoftheilt.Shouldthisactionvifyatiltinexcessof1.2whichremainsuncorected,themarginforuncertntyinP~andP>isreinstatedbyreducingthepowby.2%foreacpercentoftiltabove1.0,inaccordanewiththe2o1ratioabove,orasrequiredbytheresictiononpeakingfactors.Ttwohoursin3.10.2.3areacceptabl.sincecompleterodmisalignment(full-lengthcontrolrod123.10-17 eetoutofalignmentwithitsbank)doesnotreultin'xceedingcoresafetylimitsinsteadystatoperationatratedpowerandisshortwihrespectoprobabilityofanindependentacdent.Xfinsteaofdeterminingthehotchannelactors,theoperatodecidestoreducepower,especified75%powerma'ainsthedesignmargitocoresafetylimitsfupto1.12powerilt,usingthe2to1ratio.Recingtheoveowertripsetpointensuresthateproteconsystembasis..is'aintainedforsustaipltoperation.Atiltratioof1.12ormorei'icativeofaseriousperformanceanomalyandalantshutdownisprudent..Themaximumroddropimerstrictionisconsistentwiththeassumedrdroptimusedinthesafetyanalyses.MeasurmentwithTgreaterthanoravequalto540'Fndwithbothreacorcoolantpumps*operatingensresthatthemeasureddroptimeswe'llbe;.epesen'ati~eof:inset'o'.",'.:.esexperiencedduringaeactortripatoperatingcond'tions.Thevar'ouscontrolrodbanks(shutdownbnks,contrbanksA,B,C,andD)areeachtobeovedasbank;thatis,withallrodinthebanwihinonestep(5/8inch)ofthebankpositioositx~nindicationisprovidedbytwomethods:adigitalcountofactuationpulseswhichshowsthe3.10-18AmenamentNo.22 demandpositionofthebanksandamicroprocessorzdpositionindication(MRPI)systemwhichindatestheactualrodposition.Thedigitalcountersreknownasthestepcounters.Operabi'tyofthecontrolrodpositioniicationisrequirtodeterminecontrolrodpostionsandtherebyensecompliancewiththeconolrodalignmentand'nsertionlimits.The12steppermissiblederndtoindicatedmialignmentandthe0steprodtoodindicatedisalignmentensuresthatthe25tepmisal'gnmentassumedin-thesafetyanalysisimet.heMRPI'systemdisplaysthepositionoarodsonaCRT.AfailureoftheCRTwouldesultinlossofpositionindicationoftherodsevethoughtheMRPI'systemisstilloperable.ncethMRPIsystemalsotransmitsrodposioninforma'ontothePlanttionsfrothebasicrequirementsareacompaniedbyaddiionalrestrictionswhichensurethttheorigialdesigncriteriaaremet.MisalignmtofardrequiresmeasurementofpeakingfactorsoaProcessComputerystem(PPCS),ePPCScanbeusedforrodpoitionindicationtiltheCRTis)rmadeopere>le(Theactiontatementewhichpermiti.ia'tedvaria/1//3.10-19AmendmentNo.22 trictioninpower;eitheroftheserestric'onsprovidessuranceoffuelrodintegrityingcontinuedoration.Inaddition,tsesafetyanalysesaffectebyamisalignrodarereevaluatedtoconfirmthat,therultsemainvalidduringfutureoperation.

References:

(1)VpedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSAR)Section4.2.eneno. 0IIG(/RE3.I(}CONTROLRODIN)ERTIONLIIIITSVERSUSCOREPOWERIOA00LTI!ROIJGIIEOI.---DashedlineisapplicableonlyforCycle19withcycleburnupgreaterthan5250MHD/M'IUProvidingCycle18burnuPhasexceeded12150MWDPml.EelCDIPJCD10000IIItJI IIIC0ffl/l60400020.::I::.Iiitl:I:.jI!il~~'::I.o:I~~:I:j~~:::I':::I:I:I,I:I':II~i:I~I:j:ilol'I'I:ioliili'I~oi!.'I~~~Io:~~~o~~IIiol~::j::!I:joiLI::I!II.I.IjjIIitll~~~~~~:otl.I:iI.::jio:tsl:I:~j!.III::~I~!I!jijIt.ji.jl'IIIjIIjiJII~I}II;Ink~~II![jllilan!'I!II!l!i'll'~tIjl[iIII:ill:j!il~II~~'IiiIl~ll!Iiilo~'Iojl"::ii:.I:~ooojl:jIijiotljjl'jjlII!IlittIt'..'o.".:II!:C:i!iI~~.Ii:~~~Ilo~~~~~ijmrII::!II:liij:jtllIIjijIllj,!I!~I~~~W~~~~oI~Iioo~oI!IIIlj:LiiljiijIll!!jtii~I~~~~~~:I:Ii'to!:lotili:~~IlijII!iI,ololool:IV..jl;~~~ooolI~IilojoI~I:II:.'II~:I::oI:::o~~~~~~:il:~~~::ii~~~-~~~I82.25't)010.,203040.:50',60'.7,0.CorePow'er(Perce'ntof1520Ht!T)8090100 3.00I'ss.j.'I~II~~~I~I~I~II.II~.I:liII~o~-~~~~lsoIIll~II'IIiI'.I(IONELOOPOPERATION2.00%0LOOPOPERATION~i(1.000.01llo00IislIII;llII,(II~o.JI~~I~~~IsII100IIII~l~IIooioII~~.II~II(I~IT!PPCOOLANTOORONCONCENTRATION(PPH)REqUIREOSHUTOOMNMARGINFIGURE3.10-2 l.2$00HORNllZEOAXlhL'.OEPEHONCEFACTORFORFqVS.ELKVAT.lOHFI(iURE3,10-3l.00000.75000.5000~~0.2$00TOTAI.FO2.320COAEIIKlGIIT0.0006.000l0.800l2.000K(Z)I.000I;0000.9%00.Sll~~0.0C3ClC3AtE3ILO~..COAKIIElCIITIFTIE3CI 00g7IEDC7At Table3.l0-1CCIDENTANALYSISREUIRINGRE:"VALUATIOTEiEEV=VTOFANINOPERABLECONTROODRodInsertionCharacistics'IRodMisalignmentLossofReactorCoolantFromaRupturedPipesO"FromC=cksInLargepipesWhichActusThegencycoreCool'ngsystemRodWithdrawalAt.FuPowermajorReactorCantSystempipeRuptures(LossfCoolantAccident,)SteamLBreakRodjection3.10-23 zp.g),4..(TABLE4.1-1HININUNFREQUENCIESFORCHECKS'ALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELSChannelCheck45.ReactorCoolantSTemperatu~ese.a.s.@.e.~a'e'avae4<r.3.3Ql.NuclearPowerRangeSN*(3)3>.8.i~~"4~~Ms&RV.PbkgC4c,y(v~n~e~e2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)Range3.NuclearSourceRangeS(l)CalibrateD(1)Q*(3)N.A.RTest4)5)P(2)1)2)p(z)1)N(1)(2)M1)2)B/W(2)(4)1),P(2)(5)2)Remarksfleatbalancecalculation**SignaltoWT;bistableaction(permxssive>rodstop>traps)Upperandlowerchambe.sforaxialoffset**flighsetpoint(<109%ofratedpower)Lowsetpoint(<25%otratedpower)Once/shiftwheninserviceLoglevel;bistableaction(permissive>rodstopstrxp)Once/shiftwheninserviceBistableaction(alarm>trip))Overtemperature-Delta'lOverpower-DeltaTSce-~n.q~6.PressurizerHaterLevelR7.PressurizerPressureS8.4KvVoltage&N.A.FrequencyReactorProtectioncircuitsonly'l&4'~e9.RodPositionIndicationSP3.t.~l.4sr."...c"L.c.S(lg2)NBA.*Bymeansofthemovablein-coreuetectorsystem.**Notrequiredduringhot<cold~orrefuelingshutdown1)2)NithstepcountersLogrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofserviceQlIbutassoonaspossibleatterreturntopower. ChannelescitoTABLE4.1-1(Continued)~Cetic~Ca>~ateTestP~e~arcsSRRC4c)pl;a~3'.z\+plX.%A-1)IsolationValvesignal~M(1)spa.l.z.~10.RodPositionBankS(1,2)N~A.N.A.1)Withrodpositionindication~aa.<,~,zCounters2)Logrodpositionindication"each~L~el,ln,g4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservicell.SteamGeneratorLevelM"'12.ChexngFlowN.A~RN.'i~PiA,>"A13.ResidualHeatRemoval'.A.N.A.PumpFlowe,z+(~14.BoricAcidSto~ge.-Tank--Level,D.---.--.--"-"R"N.A.Hote45.RefuelingWaterH.A.RN.A.StorageTankLevel~~16.VolumeControl%'ank-"----.-...N..A..."-R."N.A.Level4~I17.ReactorContainmentDRPressure1&~RadiationMonitoringSstemBoricAcidControlN.A.~-R'-.-"--"""N.A-:":AreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR17)20'.A.RN.A.21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.N.A.22'3'ump-ValveInterlockTurbineTripSet>>PointRN.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1)BlockTrip24'ccumulatorLevelandPressureN.A.'+AmenameneNo.P4'-6 'SAG.h,E,lSg5,<,'3,E.<P~g,2,1.>~3TABLE4.1-2MININ<JY.F'RKUENCZSPPcEUIPjlkhT'EDSAMPLIHGTESTSh1.ReactorCoolantChemistrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronTestChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentrationPr~crpene.3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelo~250FWeekly3.RofuolingWaterStorageTankMaterSample4.BoricAcidtoraTankBoronConcentrationWeeklyTwice/Week's5.ControlRadsRZ-8.'ai,Q6a.FullLengthControlRodSA.3.l.M.QMS.li.o6bFullLengthControlRad5.R.'3.i.2.i2,8.'a'i.b7.PressurizerSafetylValves8.MainSteamSafetyValves9.ContainmontIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyradnotfullyinsertedasufficiontnumberofstopsinanyonedirectiontocausechangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughitsfulllengthtoverifythat,therodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointSetpointFunctioningFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefueling'perationsAmendmentNo.,574."1-8 4,gRtivitAnomaliesAlicabilxAppliestopotentialri'anomalies~Ott'sctivsTorequirevaluationofreactivityanomalieshintherwtor.FoOowinganormalizationofthecomputedboronconcentrationSP3,i,zjasafunctionofburnup,theactualboronconcentrationofthecoolantshallbeperiodicallycomparedwiththepredictedvalue.'BasisToeliinate'possibleerrorsinthecalculationsoftheinitialrea.ivityofthecoredthereactivitydepletionrate,thepredictedelationbe-tweenfuelburn-undtheboronconcentration,necsarytcmaintainadequatecontrolcharacistics,mustbeadjted(normalized)toaccuratelyreflectactualcorenditionWhenfullpowerisreachedinitially,andwiththecontrolrodsinthedesiredpositions,theboronconcentrationismeasedandthepr'ctedcurveisadjustedrtothispoint.Aspoweroperation.proceeds,themsuredboroncon-centrationiscoparedwiththepredictedc'oncentrationdtheslopeofthecrelatingburn-upandreactivityiscomparedwithtt ThisprocessofnormalizationshouldbecompletedafteraboutA%%uoofthetotalcoreburn-up.Thereafter,actualboroncon-EP3,>~.lcentrationcanbecomparedwithpredicted,andthereactivitystatusLgoS.i.Z.ofthecorecanbecontinuouslyevaluated.Anyreactivityanomalygreaterthan'%wouldbeunexpected,andconsideredanabnormalcondition;itsoccurrencewouldbethoroughlyinvestigatedandevaluated.Themethodsemployedincalculatingthereactivityofthecorevs.burn-(1)upandthereactivityworthofboronvs.burn-uparegivenintheFSAR.Thevalueof1/oisconsideredasafelimitsinceashutdownmarginLC0S,l,aof'tleast1%withthemostreactiverodinthefullywithdrawnposi-.tionisalwaysxnaintained.

Reference:

(1)FSAR-Section3.2.14.9-2 TABLE3.5-1CONTINUEDPROTECTIONSYSTEHINSTRUHENTATION/Pa~9,3HO.=FUHCTIOHALUNITTOTALHO.ofCHANNELSNO.ofClUNNELSTOTRIPHIN.OPERABLECHANNELSOPERATORACTIONPERHISSIBI.EIFCONDITIONSOFBYPASSC01.UHN1OR3CONDITIONSCANNOTBEHETCllANNELOPERABLElABOVE11.TurbineTrip12.Deleted50'ower13.LoLoSteamGeneratorWaterLevel3/loop2/loop2/loopHotShutdown14.Undervoltage4KV2/busBus15.Underfrequency4KV2/busBus1/bus(bothbusses)1/bus(bothbusses)2/bus(oneitherbus)2/bus(oneitherbus5%Po~er5'LPower16.Quadrantpowertilt1monitor(uppertlowerex-coreneutrondetectors)NAtc,oa.z0QR>,2.4.2.gP.3,2,t,zgg3g,zaZ.Spsg.C~Vq2.4houvS'Vtv'fltpTRlbga.scuba.90m4~ewe.<AtPO~G<7$'loovVolQov'a(logicvdlgwlblko~i~Lec,eq)o.4"qgQlIQDv'6Pl~lvla.PlC1HERMALpeg~>>S>joRT('ol.ShutdownLogindividualupperClowerionchambercurrentsonce/hrfafteraloadchangeof10%orafter48stepsofcontrolrodmotion 3.10.2PowerDistributionLimitsandMisaliedControlRodt3.10.2.1SR.~.z,i,'isas.<~ighX'XThemovabledetectorsystemshallbeusedtomeasurepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortoAS9'ooperationoftheplantat~ofratedpowertoensurethatdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Ifthecoreisoperatingabove75%powerwithoneexcorenuclearchanneloutofservice,theeant20XX<toragepowertiratioshallbeddaybyatoneofthefolingmeans:inedonaa.MovedetectbCore-exitthermocoupleR~grn4i~eLgl~v+0.phoConfirm~~5C.>~<n~dCa.GWQ,3.10.2.2LAPPTaP-gC.O3i2.iILC.O3a1eLPowerdistributionlimitsareexpressedashotchannel~Re,~x,~~eoo6\f.~pd'glpphyteststhehotchannelfactorsmustmeetthere.'ionia.MlimitsinWL,C.><~.2,0iW4iii20e~lVF(Z).=(2.32/P)*K(Z)QF(Z)'4.64*K(Z)QFhH=1-66.[1+.3(1-P)]forP>.5forP<.5for0<P<1.0020,v.xviWherePisthefractionofratedpoweratwhichthecoreisoperating,K(Z)isthefunctiongivenbyFigure3.10-3,andZistheheightinthecore.ThemeasuredFshallbeincreasedbythreepercenttoyieldF.IfthemeasuredForFDHexceedstheNlimitingvalue,withdueallowanceformeasurementerror,themaximumallowablereactorpowerlevelandtheNuclearOverpowe-.TripsetpointshallbereducedonepercentforeachpercentwithFaHorFexceedsthelimitingvalue,whicheverismorerestrictive.Ifthehotchannelfactorscannotbereducedbelowthe3.10-3 ~KccdPfpgl~~L3.10,.2.3gr~agq20,XXVi>2g,<XYLEM~3.10.2.4LCO9.2.,g2DiX.XVII2020.X.V.g3.10.2.5gO,XQX~3.10.2.6SR3.~iiS43.z,z..<a.Correctthesituation,orb.Determinebymeasurementthehotchannelfactors)>ToM~O~P-'TP~>>e,ach1'Joot.G,<<bbandapplySpecification3.10.2.2,orc.LimitpowertoIftheadranttoaveraewertiltratiqugpooexceeds1.02but,islessthan1.12forasustainedperiodof'orethan24hourswithoutknowncause,orifsuchatiltrecursintermittentlywithoutknowncause,thereactorpowerlevelshallberestrictedsoasnottoexceed50%ofratedpower.Ifthecauseofthetiltisdetermined,continuedoperationatapowerlevelconsistentwith3.10.2.2above,shallbepermitted.eptforphysicstest,ifthequadranttoaveragepowertiltiois1.12orgreater,within2hourseireducetheranttoaveragepowertiltratiotxthinitslimitorredpowertolessthanofratedpower.Mithinanadditi4houritherreducetheratiotowithinitslimiteathot,shutdown.Subsequentoperationthepurposemeasuringandcorrectingtheispermittedprovidedtheerleveldoesnoxceed50%ofratedpowerandtheNupowerTripsetpoint.isreducedby50%.Followinganyrefuelingandateasteveryeffectivefullp'owermonththereafter,fluxmaps,usingthemovabledetectorsystem,shallbemadetoconfirmthatlimitingvalueswithin~-6@*~theOverpowersTtripsetpointandtheOvertemperatureh.Tsetpointshallbesimilarlyreduced.Excetforhsicstests,ifthequadrant'toaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12,then'ithintwohours:AmendmentNo.563.10-4 thehotchannel'factorlimitsofSpecification3.10.2.2aremet.3.10.2.7Thereferenceequilibriumindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceas-afunctionofpowerlevel(calledthetargetfluxSB.3.z.3A2,0,%%$4$Q.32.3.3~BE,EHAPygg,g.i3.10.2.8difference)shallbemeasuredatleastonceperequivalentfullpowerquarter.Thetargetfluxdifferencemustbeupdatedatleasteachequivalentfullpowermonthusingameasuredvalueor.bylinearinterpolationusingthemostrecentmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueattheendofthecyclelife.Excetdurinhsicstests,controlrodexercises,LGO~.'2.3o.excoredetectorcalibration,andexceptasmodifiedby20ig'j(,)(litL,go3.z3ploce.13.10.2.9through3.10.2.12,theindicatedaxialfl~~)~~43differenceshallbemaintainedwithin%5/ofthetargetfluxdifference(definesthetargetbandonaxialfluxdifference).Axialfluxdifferenceforpowerdistributioncontrolisdefinedastheaveragevalueforthefourexcoredetectors.IfoneexcoreQHA0KP313.10.2.9detectorisoutof'ervice,theremainingthreeshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.Exceptduringphsicstests,controlrodexercises,orLC.o32.3'xcorecalibration,atapowerlevelgreaterthan.901percentofratedpower,iftheindicatedaxialfluxdifference'deviatesfromitstargetband.Thefluxdifferenceshallbereturnedtothetargetband4atate-go,v.wx>qeked-orthereactorpowershallbereducedtoalevelnogreaterthan90percentofratedpower.3.10-5 3.10.2.10((do~C.oMQQQ'3<2i3Exceptduringphysicstests,controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibration,atapowerlevellessthanorequalto90percentofratedpower:a;Theindicatedaxialfluxdifferencemaydeviatefromits+5%targetbandforamaximumofonehour(cumulative)inany24hourperiod,however,'hefluxdifferenceshallnot,exceedanenvelope~boundedby-11percentand+11percentat90%powerandincreasingby-1percentand+1percentforeach2percentofratedpowerbelow90%power.b.IfSpecification3.10.2.10aisviolated,thenthereactorpowershallbeimmediatelyreducedtonogreaterthan50%power.c.Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan90percentofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencebeingwithinitstargetband.3.10.2.11Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan50%ofratedL.QO32.inclcm)poweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencenotbeingoutsideitstargetbandformorethantwohours(cumulative)outofthepreceding24hour.period.Onehalfthetimetheindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceisoutofitstargetbandupto50%ofratedpoweristobecountedascontributingto.theonehourcumulativemaximumthe.fluxdifferencemaydeviatefromitstargetbandatapowe"level3essthanorequalto90percentofratedpower.3.10-6 3.10.2.12Whenthereactoriscriticalandthermalpowerisless5R.>.2,.3,lopp,z,3.'Lthanorequalto90%ofratedpower,ana)armiprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferencehasbeenoutsidethetargetbandformorethanonehour(cumulative)outofany24hourperiod.Inaddition,whenthermalpowerisgreaterthan90%,ofratedpower,analarmisprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferenceisoutsidethetargetband.Ifeitheralarmisoutofservice,thefluxdifferenc'eshallbeloggedhourlyforthefirst24hoursthealarmisoutofserviceandhalf-hourlythereafter.3.10.33.10.3.1S~~>eAP~<9,hControlRodDroTimeWhilecritical,theindividualfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)roddroptimefromthefullywithdrawnposition(indicated)shallbelessthanorequalto1.8secondsfrombeginning,ofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentrywith:a.Tgreaterthanorequalto540'F,andavgb.Allreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.3.10.3'Withthec"optimeo'~nyfulllengti;roddetermne..3~10.43.10.4.1toexceedtheabovelimit,restoretheroddroptimetowithintheabovelimitpriortocriticality.ControlRodCrout>HeihtWhilecritic'al,andexceptforphysicstesting,allfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)rodsshallbeoperableandpositionedwithin+12steps(indicatedposition)oftheirgrouptepcounterdemandposition.3.10-AmendmentNo.22 SeFpgAPfek3.Landcontrolofreactorpowerisbythecontrolgroups.Areactortripoccurringduringpoweroperationwillputthereactorintothehotshutdowncondition.Thecontrolrodinsertionlimitsprovideforachievinghotshutdownbyreactortripatanytime,assumingthehighestworthcontrolrodremainsfullywithdrawnwithsufficientmarginstomeettheassumptionsusedinthe!accidentanalysis.Inaddition,theyprovidealimitonthemaximuminsertedrodworthintheunlikelyeventofahypotheticalrodejection,andprovideforacceptablenuclearpeakingfactors.ThelinesshownonFigure3.10-1meettheshutdownrequirement.Themaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatend-of-cyclelifeandisbasedonthevalue'sedinanalysisofthehypotheticalsteambreakaccident.Earlyincyclelife,lessshutdownmarginisrequired,andFigure3.10-2showstheshutdownmarginequivalenttothatwhichisrequiredatend-of-lifewithrespecttoanuncontrolledcooldown.Allotheraccidentanalysesarebasedon1%reactivityshutdownmargin.upperboundenvelopeof2.32timesthenormalizedpeakinactoraxialdependenceofFigure3.10-3sbeendeterminemextensiveanalysessideringoperatingmaneuversconsistheTechnicalSpecificationsonpoistributionrolasgiveninSecti.0.Theresultsofthelossofcontaccidentanalysesbasedonthisuerboundenveloe donstratecompliancewiththeFinalAcceptanceCririalimitforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystems.'WhenaFmeasurementistaken,bothexperimental/erioranmanufacturingtolerancemustbeallo'dfor.Fivepercetistheappropriateallowancefoafullcoremaptaknwiththemovableincoredetctorfluxmappingsystemandthreepercentisthepropriateallowanceformaufacturingtolerance.WhenameasurementofFHistaken,erimentalerrormstbeallowedforand4percentisthappropriatealowanceforafullcoremapwiththemovleincoreetectorfluxmappingsystem.Measurementsofthehotannlfactorsarerequiredaspartofstartupphysicsests,atleasteachfullpowermonthofoperation,nwheneverabnormalpower'Idistributionconditionsequirareductionofcorepowertoalevelbaseonmeasudhotchannelfactors.Theincoremaptakenfollowinginiialloadingprovidesconfirmationofthbasicnucleardeignbasesincludingproperfuelload'ngpattern.Theperidicincoremappingprovidsadditionalassuranceththenucleardesignbasesemaininviolateand'identifiesoperationaanomalieswhichmight,otherwise,affectthesebas.Fornoaloperation,itisnotnecessarytomearethesquantities.Insteadithasbeendeterminedth,providedcertainconditionsareobserved,thehotchannelfactorlimitswillbemet;these3.10>>12 /conditionsareasfollows:1.Controlrodsinasinglebankmovetogetherwithoindividualrodinsertiondifferingbymorean25stepsfromthebankdemandposition.!2.Conolrodbanksaresequencedwithoverlappingi'.banksasdescribedinSpecification3.10.3.Thefullengthcontrolbankinsertionlimitsare/notvioled.'.Axialpowedistributionlimitswhiaregivenintermsoffldifferencelimitsacontrolbankinsertionlimisareobserved.luxdifferenceisq-q.asdefidinSpecifiation2.3.1.2d.ThepermittedrelaxatninFwithreducedpowerchgeswithrodinsertionThelimitsonaalpowerdistribute.=.iredtoabovearedes'gnedtominimizetheeffecsofxenonredistributonontheaxialpowerdistribu'onduring/load-folldwmaneuvers.Basically,controlofluxdiffereceisrequiredtolimitthedifferencetweenthecrrent.valueofFluxDifference(AI)andareerencevalsewhichcorrespondstothefullpowerequilibri3.10-13AmendmentNo.22!allowsradialpowershal1Itoheinsertionlimits.thasbeendeterminedthatprovidedtheabovecondiion1through4areobserved,rthesehotchannelfacrslimiaremet.InSpecificatioi3.10,FisarbitralylimitedrP<0.5(exceptforIlowerpowerphysitests). alueofAxialOffset(AxialOffset=LI/fractionalpoer).Thereferencevalueoffluxdifferencevariwithpowerlevelandburnupbut,expressedasaxiaoffset,itvariesprimarilywithburnup.Thetechnxalspecificationsonpowerdistributio/assurethateF~upperboundenvelopeof2.32'imesFigure310-3isnotexceededandxenondistributionsanotdevelopedwhich,ataatertime,couldcausereaterlocalpowerpeakingeventhoughthefluxdiferenceisthenwi~nthelimits.Ixenonconditionshavekeenfluxd-'fferenceisnotedwilished,theindicatedartlengthrodswithdrawnfromthecoreadwicontrolBankDmorethan190steps{iicatedpoition)withdrawn.Thisvalue,dividedthe'ractionoffullpoweratwhichthecoreasoperatingisfullpowervalueofthetartfluxdifference.=Thetarget{orreferenc)valueoffluxdifferenceisdeterminedasfollows.AtatimethatequilibriamValuesforailothercorepowerlevelsaeobtainedbymultiplyigthefullpowervaluebytheractionalpower.Sicetheindicatedequilibriumvaluwasnoted,nallowancesforexcoredetectorerrorre/necessryandindicateddeviationofi5percentb,Iipermittedfromtheindicatedreferencevalue'.'ungperiodswhereextensiveloadfollowingis3.10-14AmendmentNo.22 require,'eimpoeeibleablishtherequiredcoreconditionsleasuringtheChxdifferenceevmonth.Forthisreason,twomethodsare3.10-14aAmendmentNo.22 ermissiblefcrupdatingthetargetfluxdifference.,ISictcontrolofthefluxdifference(androdposition)i1isotasnecessaryduringpartpoweroperation.Thisisbeaexenondistributioncontrolatpartpoweris'notassignificantasthecontrolatfullpoweran/'llowanhasbeenmadeinpredictingtheheatfl'ux/peakingfctorsforlessstrictcontrolatpartfpower.Strictconolofthefluxdifferenceisnotossibleduringcerta'nphysicstests,controlrodercises,orduringtheequiredperiodicexcorecalirationwhichrequire1rgerfluxdifferencestha'npermitted.IIiTherefore,thespcificationsonpower;distributionIarenotapplicableuringphysicstess,controlrodexercises,orexcorealibrations;isisacceptable'uetotheextremelyloprobabil'tyofasignificantaccidentoccurringduringtheseoperations.Excorecalibrationincludesthatpr'odoftimenecesarytoreturntoequilibriumoperigconditions.Insomeinstancesofrap'lanpowerreductionautomaticrodmotionw'causefluxdifferencedeviatefromthetartbandwhenreducedpowerlevelisreached.hisdoesnotnecesarilyaffectthexenondistritionsufficientlytocangetheenvelopeofpekingfactorswhichcanberachedonsubsequentturritofullpowerwithinthetgetband,hower,tosimplifythespecification,alimitat'onofonehourinanyperiodof24hours'splaceonoperationoutsidetheband.ThisensuresItoIes thattheresultingxenondistributionsarenotsignificatlydxferentfromthoseresultingfromoperationwithintheargetband.Theinstantaneousconsequenceofbeingutsidetheband,providedrodinsertionlim'areobseed,isnotworsethana10percentinc'entinpeakinfactorforfluxdifferenceintherge+14percentto4percent(+11percentto-11pcentindicated)inreasingby+1percentofea2percentdecreaseinratdpower.Therefore,wh'thedeviationexiststhepowerevelislimitedto0percentorlowerdependingontheinicatedfluxdierence.Ef,foranyreason,uxdiffereceisnotcontrolledwithinthe25percentbdforaslongaperiodasonehour,thenxenondistribu'osmaybesignificantlychangedandoperationat5ercentisrequiredtoprotectagainstpotentiaymresevereconsequencesofsomeaccidents.Asdiscussedabove,eessenceothelimitsisto.maintainthexenonistributioninecoreasclosetotheequilibrifullpowerconditxnaspossible.Thisisaccomplihed,withoutpartlenthrods,byusingthechem'calvolumecontrolsystemtopositionthefulllenhcontrolrodstoproducethrequiredindicationluxdifference.Theeffecofexceedingthefluxdifferencebanatorbelowhfpowerisapproximat1yhalfasgreataitwouldeat90%ofratedpower,wheretheeffectofdeviionhasbeenevaluated. Tereasonforrequiringhourlyloggingistoprovidecon'nuedsurveillanceofthefluxdifferenceifthnormallarmfunctionsareoutofservice.ItisintendedatthissurveillancewouldbetemporaIuntilthearmfunctionsarerestored.'hequadrarit.portiltratiolimitassuiesthetheradialpowerdisibutionsatisfiesthedes'gnvaluesusedinthepowerpabilityanalysis.Rdialpowerdistributionmeasuremntsaremadedurigstartuptestingandperiodicallduringpowe'operation.!Thelimitof1.02atwhichcorrect'actionisIrequiredprovidesDNBandlieareatgenerationrateprotectionwithx-yplane.powtilts.Alimitingtilt!of1.025canbetoleratedborethemarginforjuncertaintyinFisdepled.Threfore,the;limitingtilthasbeentas1.02.Toavoid.Iunnecessarypowerches,theoperatisallowedtwohoursinwhichtovifythetilt.'eadigand/ortodetermineandcorrctthecauseofthetit.Should!thisactionveriyatiltinexcessof1.02whichremainsuncorrcted,themarginforuncertaininFandP>Hireinstatedbyreducingthepower.2%foreachpcentoftiltabove1.0,inaccordancewiththe2toratioabove,orasrequiredbytherestri~ciononpeakingfactors.Thetohoursin3.10.2.3areacceptab3.sincecorneterodmisalignment(full-lengthcontrolrod123.10-17 ~00~~~~~00~~~0~0~~0~~~~~~00~~000000'4~~~~~000I~0~~0~'~~~~~~~0~0~~~~~0~~0~~~~00~~~~~00~~~~~~~~~ l.F500HORHALllEOAX(AL.OEPNONCEFACTORFORFqVS.ELEVATlONFIGURE3.10-3I.00000.7SOO00.50000.2500TOTAI.FO2.320COOKIIEICIIT0.0006.000j0.800j2.000K(7)!.000I;0000~SIO0.641~~QA)D0.0C)CIC3~U~'.COBEllftCIITIFTICl0093I TABLE4.1-1HININUNFREQUENCIESFORCHECKS'ALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELShannelAw'w'.NuclearPowerRangeCheckSN+(3)CalxbrateD(l)O*(3)TestB/N(2)(4)P(2)(5)Remarks1)Heatbalancecalculation**2)SzgnaltoWT;bistableaction(permxssive,rodstop,traps)3)Upperandlowerchambersforaxialoffset**4)flighsetpoint(<109%ofratedpower')5)Lowsetpoint(<25%oh::atedpower)-2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)RangeN.ADP(2).1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction(permissive>rodstop>-trap)3.NuclearSourceRangeS(1)4.ReactorCoolantTemperatureNA~p(z)N(1)(2)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Bistableaction(alarmitrip)1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT5.ReactorCoolantFlowS6.PressurizerWaterSLevelI7.PressurizerPressureSe.9.4KvVoltageFrequencyRodPositionIndicationN.A.S(lg2)RNA.MReactorProtectioncir"uitsonly1)Withstepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservicel*Bymeansofthemovablein-coredetectorsystem.**sotrequiredduringhot,clodeorrfscullngshutdown~~eAww,.VIbutassoonaspossibleatterreturntopoweL.. ~Sa,0TABLE4.1-2MINIMUMFREUENCIESFOREUIPHENTANDSAMPLINGTESTSheMth<~AM@1.ReactorCooi.antChemiatrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronTeatChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentration~FreA~enc3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow250FWeekly3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSampleBoronConcentrationWeekly4.BoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankTwice/Week"',5.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRodRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindi.catedbytherodpositionindicationsystemAftervesselheadremovalandat,leastonceper18months(1)Monthly6b.fl7~hl8FullLengthControlRodPressurizerSafetyValveoMainSteamSafetyValves~MoveeachrodthroughitafulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointSetpointEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdown9.ContainmentIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksFunctioningFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperations'0AmendmentNo.p,574~1-8 'r2.3~LixxutinSafetySstemSettins,ProtectiveL.strumentation'Alieabili2.3.1asfollows:,~j,3,l,tel>le3.3.I'-(23.1.1StartuoProtectionr*s~r~Applies.totripsettingsforinstrumentsmonitoringreactorpower.,reactorcoolantpr'essure,temper-aature,andflow:an6gressurizerlevel.~OIToprovideforautomaticprote~ctiveactionintheeventthat!the,,p'rincipalprocessvariables'approachasafetylimit.~SProtectiveinstrumentationforreactortripsettings-.shallbe,-,'I~Fua2.IHighfluv,powerrange(lowsetpoint)-=25%ofratedpower.2.3.l.2CoreProtectiona.Highfluv,powerrangethighsetpoint)-<1095ofratedpower.PUN7.bFOR7-a-b.Highpressurizerpressure-<2385psig.c.Lowpressurizerpressure->1865psig. ~L,co3.3.)F/45aWf1'd.OvertemperaturehTwhere+tlS+K2(P-P)-KS(T-T)(1+t2S)]-f(61)i11.TTlindicated4Tatratedpower,'F1avex'agetemperature,'F573.5OFpressurizerpressure,psig.2235psig~:K1=1.20K2=.000900K=.0209t1=25secx2=5secandf(hl)isafunctionoftheindicateddifference)between+.opandbottomdetectorsofthepower-rangenuclearionchambers;withgainstobeselected2basedonmeasuredinstrumentresponseduringplantstaxtuptestswhereqandqarethepercentpowertbinthetopandbottomhalvesofthecorerespectively,tandqt+qbisthetotalcorepowerinpercentofratedpowersuchthat:(i)foxq-qblessthan+13percent,f(h,I)=0 Pr~-(ii)foreachpercentthat.themagnitudeoftbismorepositivethan+13percent,.trigsetPointshallbeautomaticallyreducedbyecPxivalentof1.3percentofratedgower.e.OverpowerhTx3ST$6Tot.K4-K>(TTK6S+1I-f(LI),1where4T=indicatedLTatrated.Power,FT=averagetemperature,FT=indicatedTavgatnominalconditionsat.ratedpower,FK61.0770.0forT<T0.0011forT>T0.0262forincreasingT0.0fordecreasingTx3-=10secf(hX)=asdefinedin2.3.1.2.d 'Lowreactorcoolantflow->90%ofnormalindicatedflow.lg.Lowreactorcoolantpumpfrequency->57.5Hz.2.3.1.3Otherreactortris0'g~B.Fu+62.3.22.3.2.1p~)~.b2.3.2.2a.Highpressurizerwaterlevel-<88%ofspan.b.Low-lowsteamgeneratorwaterlevel->>6%ofnarrowrangeinstrumentspanProtectiveinstrumentationsettingsforreactortripinterlocksshallbeasfollows:Removebypassof"atpower"reactortripsathighpower(lowpressurizerpressureandlowreactorcoolantflow)forbothloops:Powerrangenuclearflux-<8..5%ofratedpower(1)(Note:Duringcoldroddroptests,'hepressurizer.highleveltripmaybebypassed.)Removebypassofsinglelossofflowtripathighpower:Powerrangenuclearflux-<50%ratedpowerRelayoperatingwillbetestedtoinsurethattheyperformaccordingtotheirdesigncharacteristicswhich'ustfallinwithintherangesdefinedbelow:2.3.3.1Lossofvoltagerelayoperatingtime<8.5secondsfor480voltsafeguardsbusvoltages,<368volts.4.)v/Neasuredvalesshallfallpitleast5%below~thetheoreticalimit.Th's5;~margini/s'shownasthe5%~tcierancecurvein~Figure2.3-1.y ~~~2.3.3;2~33.48.'~t.(vAcceptabledegradedvoltagerelayoperatingtimesandsetpoints,for480voltsafeguardsbusvoltages<414voltsand>368voltsaredefinedythesafeguard'equipmentermalcapabilitycurveshowninFigure2.3-1.1asuredvaluesshallfallatleast5%belowthethereticallimit.Thi5/marginisshownasthe5;torancecurveinFigre2.3-1.@is:T'eh'fluxreactortrip(lowsetpoint)providesredundant,protectio~,inthepowerrangeforapowerexcursionbeginniegxnnxng~4c'romlouposerT.histripvaluevasusedinthesafetypaalysis.~i~Xnthepowerrangh-ofoperation,theoverpowernuclear+luxreactortripprotects;.thereactorcoreagainstreactivityexcursiwhicharetoorapidtob~rotectedbytemperatureandpressureprotectivecircuitry.Theoverpowerlimitriteriaisthatcorepowerbepreventedfromreachin~avalueatwhichfuelpelletcenterlinemeltingwouldoccur.Treactorispreventedfromreachingtheoverpowerlimitcoition"4yactionofthenuclearoverpowerandoverpowerATzps.Thehighandlowpres'urereactortripslimittheressur'erangeinwh-'reactoroperation'ispermitted.The'ghpressurizerpressurerectortripis'alsoabackuptotheressurizercodesafetyvalvesforoverpressureprotection,ndisthereforesetlowerthanthesetpresurefortheseves(2485psig).Thelowpressurizerpressurereactortrialsotripsthereactorintheunlikelyeventofalossooolantaccident. TheovertemperaturebTreactortripprovidescoreprotectionainstDNBforallcombinationsofpressure,power,coolant.temperature,andaxialpowerdistribution,providedonlythat:(1)thettransientisslowwithrespecttothethermalcapacityofthereact'orcoolantsystemtorespondtopowerincreasesand(2)presureiswithintherangebetweenthehighandlowpressurereacortrips.Withnormalaxialpowerdistribution,thereactortrilimit,withallowanceforerrors,'isalways(2)belowthecoresatylimitasshowninFigure2.1-1.Ifaxial/peaksaregreaterthorndesign,asindicate'dbydifferencebetween/~:topandbottompowerrgenucleardetectors,thereactortrip~(4:)limitisautomaticallyreuced.Theoverpower6Treactortrippreventspowerdensityanywrein/thecorefromexceedingavalueatwhichfuelpelletcenerlinemeltingwouldoccurasdescribedinSection7.2ofthe'AR.Thissetpointincludeshcorrectionsforaxialpower.'distrition,changeindensityandFheatcapacityofwaterwiMtemperatue,anddynamiccompensation/forpipingdelaysfrom'thecoretotheoptemperaturedetectors.Thespecifiedsetpo'intsmeetthisrequirementandincludeallow-(1)anceforinstrumenterrors.ThelowflowreactortripprotectsthecoreagainstDNBintheeventofasuddenlossofpowertooneorbothreactorcoolantpumps.Thesetpointsspecifiedareconsistentwiththevalueusedintheaccidentanalys's.'Theunderfzequencyreactortripprotectsagainstadecreaseinflow/caused,bylowelectricalfrequency.Thespecifiedsetpotassuresareactortripsignalbeforethelowflowtrippoint'~iseacheron. Thehighpressurizerwaterlevelreactortripprotectsthepressurizersafetyvalvesagainstwaterrelief.Approximately700ft.fwatercorrespondsto92/ofspan.Atrip,atthisset'spointcontainsmarginforbothnormalinstrumenterrorandtransientoversotoflevelbeyondthistripse'tting.Anpladditional4%insNt~umenterrorhasbeenassumedtoaccountforttheeffectsofelevatedtemperaturesonlevelmeasurementipaccordancewithIEBullein79-21.'hereforeatripsetpoint{12).(4of88%preventsthewatergevelfrom*reachingthesafetyvalves.Thelow-lowsteamgeneratorwater'levelreactortripprotects(againstlossoffeedwaterflowi~ccidents.Asetpointof5%is'kequivalenttoatleast40,000lbs.",ofwaterandassuresthatIP3therewillbesufficientwaterinventoryinthesteamgenerators"lb~atthetimeoftriptoallowforstarti'ngdelaysfortheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.Anadditional11%hgsbeenaddedtothesetipointtoaccount-forerrorwhichmaybeintroducedintothesteam1t,generatorlevelsystematacontainmenttempera~tureof286'Fasdeterminedby'valuationperformedfortemperature.,effectsonlevelmeasurementsrequiredbyIEBulletin79-21.ThespecifiedreactortripsareblockedatlowpowerwheretheyI/arenotrequiredforprotectionandwouldotherwiseinterfere3with'normalplantoperations.Theprescribedsetpointabove>.ijwlpchthesetripsareunblockedassurestheiravailabilityinth'/owerrangewhereneeded. ~Iofsafeguardsequipmentdurimgaostulateddesignbasiseventconcurrentwithadegradedbusvoltagecondition.Theundervoltagesetpointsaveeenselectedsothatsafeguardsmotorswillstartandaccleratethedrivenloads(pumps)withintherequiredtimeandllbeabletoperformforlongperiodsoftimeatdegradedcoitionsabovethetr~setpointswithout.significantlossdesignlife.Allcontr'qlcircuitryorsafetyrelatedcontrolcentersandloadcenters,exceptformotorcontrolcentersManL,ared.c.Therefore,degradedgridvoltagesdonotaffectthesecontrolcentersandloadcenters.~MotorcontrolandL,whichsupplytheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterSyste,arefullyprotectedby'theundervoltagesetpoints.Fuer,theStandbySystemisnormallynotinserviceand'isanuallyoperatedonlyintotallossoffeedwaterandauxiliary,feedwater.centersOperationwithonepumpwillnot.bepermittedabove130(8.5.Anorderlypowerreductiontolessthan130(8.5;willbeccomplishedifa'umpislostwhileoperat'ngbetween130MWT(8.5%)and50%.Automaticprotectionisrovidedsothaapower-to-flwratioismaintainedequaltoon'lessthanone,!whichinsuresthattheminimumDNBratioincreasesatlowerflowbecausethemaximenthalpyrisedoesnoincrease.For+isireasonthesingleplossofflowtricanbebypassedbelow50%power.//Thelossofvoltageanddraded,votagetripsensureoperability The,erancecurveinFigure2.3-1andtherequirementsofspecifications2.3.3-~and2.3.3.2include~S;-allowanceformeasurementerror.Thus,provzdinyWemeasurementerrorisless%than3%,measuredvaluesbedirectlycom'paredtothecurve.Xfmeasurementerr'orexceeds5%,appropriateallowance-shallbemade. pj's

References:

(1)UPWGt15.0';(2)UFSARZS.4(3)UFSAR15".%,.(4)UFSAR7.2(5)UFSAR15.2DeletedDeleted(6)(7)Deleted(8)~,(9)LetterfromL.D.White,Jr.toA.datedSeptember,3'0,1977.(10)LetterfromLD.White,Jr.toA.datedSeptember30,1977.(ll)Letter/romL.D.White,Jr.toD.date'dJuly24,1978.cj(12)getterfromL.D.White,Jr.toB.datedSeptember14,1979.Schwencer,NRC,Schwencer,NRC,Ziemann,NRC,Crier,USNRCjl'4~ ~rQCWL%174tatl~~y~~~gpg~~~~,WIIAWt)f600~~~.LOSSANDSECONDLEVEL(DEGRADED)VNDERVOLTAGERELAYOPERATINGRANGESFIG.2.3-1I1s)~~~s1400~~I,rlr'200.1C2N'oc0oClNfoM30O20O1008'8.00~~I~q~~~Ig~A6024052'L70LOSSOFVOLGEOPERATINGNGE'x.~8032070KI~III/.zlII:1000I~~~I900600Secondleveoperating~400Iegxon(uipment.thalcapaility!'"-"'000120480104%909236880%'IIcurve1I5%tolerance[curveI100f03.5110414 90%0OOCC"K0AMXCSAFEGVARDSBUSVOLTAGE2.3-10 3.5InstrumentationSystemsOb'ectiveLc035.'.3.5.1.1Todelineatetheconditionsoftheplantinstrumentationandsafetycircuits.SecificationProtectionSystemInstrumentationTheProtectionSystemInstrumentationshownonTable3.5-1shallbeoperablewhenevertheconditionsspecifiedinColumn6areexceeded.Lco3-3.fGAIA3.5.1.2umberofchannelsofInteeventthenaparxcuarsub-systemfallsbelowthelimitsiveninthecolumns1or3ofTable3.5-1,actionshallbetaen.accorgtothereauiremenssnownincolumn5ofTable3.5-'.3.5.23.5'.1~~EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationInstrumentationTheEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)instrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-2shallbeoperablewiththeirtripsetpointssetconsistentwiththevaluesshownintheTripSetpointcolumnofTable3.5-4,whenevertheconditionsspecifiedincolumn6ofTable3.5-2areexceeded.3.5.2.2IRU.a,Inteeventthenumberofchannesoaparticularsubsystemfallsbelowthelimitsgivenincolumns1or3ofTable3.5-2,actionshallbetakenaccordingtothereauirementsofcolumn5ofTable3.5-2.3.5.2.3l5'.ii.~)CQ33.33~5.33.5.3.1W1trumentationchanneltripset'ssconservativeevalueshowneAllowableValuescolumnofTable.-eclarethechannelinoperableandtakea'accord-totherequire-mentsofcolumofTable3.5-2untz-hechannelisrestoredoperablestatuswiththetrip~se~atad'dconsistentwiththeTripSetpointvalueAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationTheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-3shallbeoperablewheneverthereactorisatorabovehotshutdown..

J.{:0333{-aAC+ACWhenrequiredby3.5.3.1,iththenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsshowninTable3.5-3,QoAcLL'4C/+(&~pi)npmetho~QOoeC4onh<(i3.5.3.3,4{'o33.>m-=LQg.ccrcdgs6eitherrestorethe'inoperablechannel(s)tooperable015.i'.4statuswithinQ7'days,rexnateasthotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.ice,.cCa&CWhenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthangtheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirementsofTablonewoalac3.5-3eitherrestoreto7'.sI,u.i.operablestatuswithinoreinatleasth~shutdownwithinthenext12hours.t&~WE~Theradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentation~,WithoneormorechasshowninTable3.5-6shallbe-rable,wheneverthereactorisatoovehotshutdown.sation'monitoringchannelsinoper,taketheactionshownin~Zable3.5-6.tartupmaycommenceorcontinueconsistentw'i'he3.5.53.5.5.1RadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentationTheradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationshowninTable3.5-5shallbeoperableatalltimeswithalarmand/ortripsetpointssettoinsurethatthelimitsofSpecification3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceeded.Alarmand/ortripsetpointsshallbeestablishedinaccordancewithcalculationalmethodssetforthintheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual.For0->>o~,5'6o~(-~'ew%ATE%2.O g.-lX~PflynnQPw~S.G3.5.5nIfthesetpointforaradioactiveeffluentmonitoralarmand/ortripisfoundtobehigherthanrequired,oneofthefollowingthreemeasuresshallbetakenimmediately:thes'etpointshallbeinmediatelyoorraotadnwioutdeolarinc(the'ohannelsinoperable;or/mmediatelyspendtherleaseofeffentsmonitoredbtheeffectechannel;or(iii)declarethechannelinoperable:.3.5.5.3Ifthenumberofchannelswhichareoperableisfoundtobelessthanrequired,taketheactionshowninTableC~wQ3.5-5.Exertbeasteffortstoretutheinstruments.toOP%LEstatuswithin31days)and,if-unsuccessful,.~felaininhenext"d-'oactivEffluentRel~easeReport.ytheioperabiltywasnotcorrected)inatimelyarmer.ww~~wer~~r'.5.6ControlRoomHVACDetectionSystems3.5.6.1Duringallmodesofplantoperation,detectionsystemst~.vcontrolroomHVACintakeshallbeoperablewithsetpointstoisolateairintakeadjustedasfollows: 3.5.6.2LCos.3.6DAILf<.F.Ao+eCo~ACsl.srV4'Duriplantoperations,thecompleteinstrumentationsystemwillnormalbeoperable.ReactorsafetyisprovidedbytheReactorProtectiSystem,whichautomaticallyinitiatesappropriateactiontoeventexceedingestablishedlimits.Safety/snotcompromised,owever,bycontinuingoperationwithcep'aininstrumentatiochannelsinoperablesinceprovisions&eremadeforthisinthelantdesign.Thisspecificationo'utlineslimitingconditionsforopeationnecessarytopreservetheeffectivenessofthereactorcontelandprotectionsystemwPenanyoneormoreofthechannelsisinaperable..Almostallreactorprotectionchannelsaresuppliedwithsufficientredundancytoprovidethe'capabilityforchannelcalibrationandtestatpower.Exceptionsa'ebackup"'channelssuchasreactorcoolantpumpbreakers.Theremoval~ofonetripchannelisaccom-plishedbyplacingthatchannel'bistableinatrippedmode;e.g,atwo-out-of-threecircuitbecomes-,'aone-out-of-twocircuit.Testingdoesnottripthesystemunlessatripconditionexistsinaconcurrentchannel.IeTheoperabilityoftheaccidentmonitoriiiginstrumentationensuresthatsufficientinformyCionisavailableon,selectedplantparameterstomonitorandasses&thesevariablesduringsandfollowinganaccident.Thiscapilityisconsistentwith<therecommendations',ofNUREG-0578,"-2LessonsLearnedTaskForce,StatusReportandShort-TermBecommendations".*N.l',Theradioactiveliquideffluentinstrumentationisprovidedto.monitoran+/orcontrol,asapplicable,thereleasesogradioactiveImaterialsinliquideffluents.Thealarmand/ortripsetpointsfortheeinstrumentsarecalculatedinaccordancewiththeODCMtoenrethatalarmand/ortripwilloccurpriortoexceedingtheimitsof10CFRPart20.Theoperabilityanduseofthx~itrumentationisconsistentwiththerequirementsofGeneral'.esignCriteria60,63and64ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50.chlorine,'<'5ppm3m'~~e-Z3S-tmmahia<35mgm-8pCi/ccraxoactivity,particulate<1x10iodine<9x10-9pCi/ccnoblegas<1x10-5pCi/ccIK.V"iiithoneofthedetectionsstemsznoper,within1hourisolatethecontrolroomHVACaa.rintake.Maintaintheairintakeisolatedexceptforshortperiods,nottoexceed1houraday,whenfreshairmakeupisallowed.toimprovetheworkingenvironmentinthe'ontrol'oom.tSvc ~seesssesoesase~ve&r~Theradioactivegaseouseffluentinstrumentationisp(ovidedtomon'torndcontrol,asapplicable,therelsesofradioactivematerialsingaseouseffluents.FThearmand/ortripsetpointsfortheseinstrumentsIaarecalclatedinaccordancewiththeODCMtoensurethatalarmand/ortripwilloccurpriorto.exceedingthelimitso10CFRPart20.Thisinstrumentatiqnalsoincludesovisionsformonitoringtheconcentra-'tionsofpotentilyexplosivegasmixturesinthe'Iwastegasholdupstern.Theoper'abilityanduseofthisinstrumentationsconsistentwiththerequire-;fmentsofGeneralDesignCriterion64ofAppendixAto~c10CFRPart50.JControlRoomHVACdetectionystemsaredesignedtoIJpreventtheintakeofch'loringammoniaandradiationatconcentrationswhichmaypreventplantoperatorsss~~l~fromperformingtheirrequiredfunctions.Concentra-tionswhichinitiateisolationofthecontrolroomHVACsystemhave.beenestablishedusing,theguidance.ofseveralestlishedreferences(2-4).4/!Thechlorine/isolationsetpointisl/3ofthetoxicityIlimitofreference2butslightlygreaterthhntheshorttecumexposurelimitofreference4.The'~onia'etpointisestablishedatapproximately1/3ofthetoxiitylimitforanhydrousammoniainreference2;anequaltotheshorttermexposurelimitofreference4.~'Nhesetpointsforradioactivitycorrespondtothe a+~iaximumpermissibleconcentrationsofreference3fursCs-~3,37,I-131andKr-85.gThemani-purgesystemisconnectedtotheplantivent.Ji10CFRPkrt100typereleasesviamini-purge,:arelimitedbyanisolationsignalgeneratedfromSI.10CFRPart20reeasesfrommini-purgeare'onsideredtobesimilartoorplantventilation<releasesandareIJ\monitoredbyR-10B,W-13,andR-14"R-14Amaybea!substituteforR-10B.~Automaticisolationofmini-purgesfor10CFRPart20typeelena'esisconsideredunnecessarduetothelowflowassociatedwithmini-purgeand~continuousmonitoring..Howek~r,theautomaticisolationIprovisionsusingRllp'rR12provideadditionalmarginfor10CFRPart20tFpereleases.'herefore,R-11or,FR-12isrequired~'tosamplecontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation.To/ensurethecontainmentsamplemonitoredPbyR-11orPpl2isrepresentativeofthecontainmentatmosphere,atleastonerecirculationfanisrequiredItobejifoperationduringmini-purgeoperation,/ShoulldR-11and/orR-12becomeinoperable,a1hour,liitischosentobeconsistentwiththegenerallyiacceptedtimeforpromptaction. 4)ThresholdimitValuesforChemicalPhysicalAgentsintheWorkEnvironment,82.PishedbyAmericanConferenceofGovernmentIndustrialHygienists.'"ReferencesC1)Updated<FSAR-Section7.2.2)USNRCRegulatoryGuide1.78,J+ne1974,Assump-tionsforEvaluatingtheEdhitabilityofaNuclear:,PowerPlantControlRDuringaPostulatedHazardousChemicaLelease~3)10CFR20AppendixB,TableI.stancesand ]~,tI~J~~~III~~I~IIII~4$}~~I~es~)I~~'J~~~I~~I~I~~~~~~~~I~~~~~I~~ TABLE3.5-1CONTINUEDPROTECTIONSYSTEHINSTRUHENTATIONQreg~Mt).4)...Mcxv.q6-4I)),I,rNO.FUNCTIONALUNIT51.TurbineTrip(w~raMtc)QHO.ofCHANNELSTOTRIPTOTAL4HO.ofCHANNELSHIH.OPERABLECHANNELSPERHISSIBLEBYPASSCOHDITIOHSOPERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOLUHN1OR3CANNOTBEHETCHANNELOPERABLEABOVE504Power70+II14.Undervoltage4KVBusR1>1313.LoLoSteamGeneratorHaterLevel(3/loop2/bus2/loop1/bus(bothbusses)2/loop2/bus(oneitherbus)HotShutdownEcq~Power15.underfrequency4KV)2/buuBus1/bus(bothbusses)2/bus(oneitherbus)~<ara,s"'/a5'PPower6.guadrantpowerti1t"'monitor(upper&lowerex-coreneutrondetectors)NAv1A,hcfroscp~whyChalPIS3.LHOLShutdownLogindividualupper&lowerionchambercurrentsonce/hr&afteraloadchangeof10%orafter48stepsofcontrolrodmotion)v<e~P,@dQ~bo~+LO,IMPQrea.4rR>>h~IS.i.mgf5~eetww~ewlv))qpetwewppN TABLE3.5-1(Continued)PROTECTIONSYSTEMINSTRUMEHTATIOHNO.FUHCTIONALUNIT2'TOTALNO.ofMIN.NO.ofCIIAHNELSOPERABI.ECIIANNFI,STOTRIPCIIANNFI,S~u~.mme~t'~'R'\.aalli~~~PERMISSIBLEBYPASSCONDITIONS5OPFRATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOI.UMH1OR3CAHNOTBEMF.TCIIAHHEI,OPFRABLEABOVF.l5.t.gb.ScreenhouserP,rs'r'~Cb3..2of2inoneofthetwoset.s1.CirculatingWaterFdProtectiona.Coenser2sets2of3in2of3inof3eitherset.bothsets~~~C2sets2of3in..2of3inof3either..setbothsetsr,IrllotShutdownPoweroperat.ionmaybecontinued'~~fora'eriodofupto+dayswith1charm%1,(Isetofthree)inoperableorforaperiodof24hrs.withtwWw".channels(2setsoW,ofthree)inoperable."",,Otherwisebeinhotshutdowninanadditional6hours.Poweroperationilot.Shutdownmaybecontinuedforaperiodofr%pto7days~.r'f,h1channel.(1setofthroe')inoperable.erforaperiodof24hrs.withtwochannels(2setsofofthree)inoperable.Otherwisebeinhotshutdowninanadditional6hours.LossofVoltage480VSafeguardsBus2setsof2/buslof2 ineachsetinonehusov.gq~~~/rwwas~W~~~*~~~LS.ia~~op~~w-I~%'a~,..~c~.aRCS TABLE3.5-1ContinuedPROTECTIONSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONNOR(8)70.Fgtt18.aFu<Pl(5.a.vFUNCTIONALUNITDegradedVoltage480VSafcguardsBusAutomaticTripLogicIncludingReactorTripBreakersTOTALNO.ofCHANNELS2/bu'O.ofMIN.CHANNELSOPERABLETOTRIPCHANNELS2/bus1/buslkv~lg,(..o.5OPERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOLUMNlOR3CANNOTBEMETPERMISSIBLEBYPASSCONDITIONSCHANNELOPERABLEABOVES.i,.r7T..=350"FIAJP'IAl~l<<(IZI%4M\+~\ItINlw&Note414l(otc5NOZE1:pygmy.NOTE2:Pe,>(o>g(ebNOTE3:(:u44hid'(c(6Fuwl74:Coyly"eP+d(7,NOTE5:"~(s'(~)4l~gWhenblockconditionexists,maintainnormaloperation.Channelsshouldbeoperableatallmodesbelowthebypassconditionwiththereactortripsystembreakersintheclosedpositionandcontrolroddrivesystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.Channelsshallbeoperableatallmodesbelowthebypassconditionexceptduringrefuelingdefinedtobewhenfuelisinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensioni;0orwiththeheadremoved.Oncreactortripbreakermaybcbypassedforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheotherreactortripbreakerisoperable.Channelsshallbeoperableatallmodesaboverefuelingwhenthc'ontrolroddrivesystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalunlessbothactortripbreakersareopen.Fn.l-TABLE3.5-2ENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATUREACTUATIOHIHSTRlNENTATION5.ii.bQq~a&~(>r>>>>NO.FUNCTIONALUHIT1TOTAI.NO.ofCIIAHHF.I,SHO.ofCIIANNEI.STOTRIPIIIH.Ol'F.RABLECIIANHEI.SPERHISSIBI,EBYPASSCONDITIONS5OPFRATORACTIONIFCOHI)ITIOHSOFCOI.UIIH1OR3CANNOTBEIIETCIIANNE1.OPERABI.F.ABOVESAFETYINJECTIONa.Manualb.IlighContainment.I>ress>>rcc.StcamGc>>erat.orI.owStcamPrcssure/I.oopf94),Jd.PressurizerLowPressure2.CONTAINHENTSPRAYa.Hanua1b.Ili-lliContainmentPressure(Contain-mentSpray)2setsof32of3inbott>~(ts2persetineithersetPrimaryprcssurelessthan2000psigPrimarypress>>lclesst.han2000psig5R33.z4(S.iL.J9Lco33,ZF~tIonic.39101!ICS3"O'F~z.a(=RCS350I'RC(3)0FCoIdSl>utdownColdSh>>tdow>>~Nustactuate2switchessimultanco>>sly.'I~V-a.AJgP~g(+~(((,Q"Auxin,4iAc@+>>Ljic-ag(]Fur>c:hon4'.b"Au+(((c4'(-$4oi(unQeq((-onl~>>~>(I4c4a8on%hole<<(sA<<.<<-R.(*ps" TABI.E3.5-2(Continued)~~~ENCINEEREDShFFTYFEhTUREACTUATIONIHSTRUNENTATIOHI'5t,i.~15;t<,',I'<Pw.<ti'.<~0tv>NO.FUNCTIONALUNITTOTALNO.ofCIIAHHEI,SNO.ofHIN.CIIAHHEI.SOPERARLF.TOTRIPCIIANNFI.SPERHISSIIll.l'.IIYI'ASSCOHDITIOHS5OPERA'fORACTIONII'OHDI'I'IONSOFCOI.UHHIOR3CANHOTIIENETCIIANNEI.OPERAIILEAIIOVE3~4.o.AUXILIARYFEEDWATFRHotorandT<<rhineDrivenal.Ha<<<<<a>II/pumpI/p>impI/P<<lnP~9~ki>>>~>S'.V>ak~V.<>3.Sa5T..=350oFI>.!itm.G<n.WaltrI.<vrI-Iow-Inwi.!il'>rlIlott>rl)rivt:l>I'<<mps3/st.m.gt02/stm.gt.i>.2/stm.g<n.<'.itl>r.rg>><<.bollig<.'i>.>5i<,o'fR,,=350~Fii.StartTurbinel)rivenPump3/st.m.gcn2/slm.gci>.bothgt'<<.2/st.m.g>>i>.cilhrrg<>n.12TRCS=35\c.I.ossof4KVVolt.ageSt.art.TurbineDrivenPump2/busI/b<>s2/bitsl>ot.libus<>s)(cill><.'rbi>s)I'~i<,'n,RCSd.Safety1<<.jectio<>Start.MotorDrivenPumpss>>>>It.<lmI)Fil<4.<e.TripofbothFeed-wat.crPumpsst.art.sHolorI)rive<<I'i>mps2/p<<mpI/p<<mp2/pumphotlipumps,eit.lierpi>mpIS.<<.hI><awrl.'ilan<ll>yklvt.orl)rivci>0><<ii'iII/pi>mpI/piimpI/pi>mp~whM+aI>aV~~4k~<<,pea'a~a~>t-'t4>AN%f>yraaI'150I tS,wi,.o.TABLE3.5-2(Continued)FNGINFIREDSAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONINSTRUHFNTATlOHa.iI,.)HO.FUHCTIOHAI.UNIT4.Ct)H'ChIHHIN'I'SOI,ATIONTOTALHO.nfCIIAHHEIHO.ofCIIAHNEI.STO'I'RII"'lIH.Ol'I:RAIII.ELIIANHI.I,SVIRADIISSIIII.EIIYPASSCORI)1'I't)HS5OPFRATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOVCOI,INNIOR3ChNHO'fIllPIE'fCIIANNEI.t)VEIIAIII.EhllOVE4.1Cot>taIrm>entIsoIat,ionFU+$,c>..>.tI>>>>>>I(:oI>ISin>t<I<>wnFu<3;Ih.S'>fetylnjection(h<>tohctnalion)(SeeT>I>I(3.5>-2,IttmI)~4.2Xl,s-lContainmentVrntilat.ionIsolationIta.Ha>alb.IlighContainmentRadioactivityVc.Han>>alSprayd.SafetyInjectionI2(SeeTal>le3.5-2,It.em2a)(SeeTable3.5-2,It.emI)13L0IdSI>I>tlplQ>l4%0'%k~CoIilSh>>tilnw>>~w~~W~=..+'~~,Wc~~>A@4%~~4.~4Zb,"A4,~4'4Av4-~L~<<a.JAct,.l'...(e4qi 'fhBI.I'.3.5-2(Continnril)I'.HO)NI'.I'.IIEI)Shl'FTYFl'.h'I'URI'.AC'I'Uh'I'IOHIHS'I'IIUHI'.N'rh'rIONLS:u.n.LS.t>..4~'>>'()yr>~NO.FUHCTIOHAI.UNITTO'rhl.NO.ofCIIAHHF.I.SHO.ofCIIAHHEI.STO'I'ItII'IN.OPERAB),ECIIANHI'.I.S2345OPERATORACTIOHI>I'.I)HISSIDl.l'.IFCONI)I')OHSOFI)YI>ASSCOI.UHNIOlt3CONDI'I'IONSCANNOTBEHETEl)ANNEIOl'ERADI,EABOVE5.STFAHI.)HEISO),AT)OHa.I)i-i)iSteamFlow2I)i-i)iSFwitliSaIelyI)ijiictionwitbS.I.oreacliloopAVOS>fityliijtctlollwit,hS.l.fareicliloop,fg))g,~c.Containmentf~~f~(<)PrcssnrcF1ltt4$b.IliSt.camFlow;in>l2IliSFanil!sa2<>I4I.owTwith4).owTISl'it.llS.I.incacliI<>opIlliSl'n<i2InwTavgwilliS.I.fori'ac)iloop~,>>1212"'T=350Fw/IBVso)>nilT-3")Oo)./h(iv.',.T,=:350~))w/%IV'openfu)).4~i).Hanna1roawoI(c36.FEEI)WATFRI.IHF.ISOI,ATIONI/IoopI/loopI/Ioop-'I)50Iw/)5)VsopenPU<g,C.a.SafetyInjection(SccTal>lc3.5"2,It.cm))F/'gb.IliSteamGeneratorr+<~(d)3/loop2/loopincit.lierloop2/Ion)>iiil>nt.hloops"-"'I'=.')50I'/FY')soIv>>l)vesopcii~V>>~>>~>>&>>>>RCStemperatiircmayl>eabove350Fif'SIV's;>rcclosed.~a"<AS-')RCSterncraturemabcabove350FifI)WIso).valvesarec)ose<l.Dot)itrainsmiistbccapableofprovidiiiga,S.I.sigiialtoracliloop.>>>>>>>>>>'>>>>>>ll4+PJ>>h>>>>>>H>>>>l4~>>>><<W'PW~>>>>>>g>>>>>>>>>>~%>>>>q.y~>>vp!>>>>'~')-)!,'l4)~4>>Aduok>>'>>>i~aJ)),),+>>~g>>)i);)5;ii..~IS.).i.tj Lco"".5.IGs~d8(QQanclC-~S;i.lACTTONSTATEMENTSWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbe,inhotshutdownwithallRCCA'sfullyinsertedwithinthenext6hours.LCo8.3.<2-CordDQ~QgContiMI5.p.f3.gdm(p:leo33Ipond'Gt<tQ'5Sai..ICWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedtheinoperablechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionwiNinkhourandtherequirementsfortheminimumnumberofchannelsoperablearesatisfied.However,theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforuptogIhoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchanne's.IS,i,.WiththenumberofoperablechannelslessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,beat.aconditionwhereoperabilityisnotrequ'edaccordingtoColumn6~Table3.5-1within6hours.iHP'.I4,+Cpond~5C<<>i0.~<<ov-iuC-i~.o,~avi'i4'<<Thy~WiththenumberofoperablechannelsneMinimum0crabe.ChanzuJ.q.reirement.susndallope"iona.nvolvinpositivereactitycangesahaveallRA'fullysertedwithin6ours.Withthenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthanthe.MinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,suspendalloperationsinvolvingpositivereactivitychanges.Ifthechannelisnotrestoredtooperablestatuswithin48hourseg~e[CO33i5.C.A0&nJPCondQQdJ.Fypassofanzoperablechanneltavowedegenertlonofareactotripgnal,oerationmyproceuntilisChan)elFunctonalTet.Atetimeof/thisnetCharmFunctioPaIW.I,o.TestorxzatanytimethenumberofoperablecanneslessthantheMinimumOperableChannels,beatacondtionwherechanneloperabilityisnotrequiredaccordingtoColumn6ofTable3.5-1withinthenext6hours.AidNt<<~p;reactortrxpbreakerwzthxnthenexthourio~is.i5)withthnumbersfoperatechannelsoeessanthe/Total)'umberofchanpels,opesationmarocedunt'hendxtChars(elFunctionalTeedrovideteanparablecannezspacedxntetrippeconditionwithinhour.WiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsreiIS.i.vCeataconditionwerechanneloperaxstyxsnotrequireaccordingtoColumn6ofTable3.5-1withinthenext6A~oe,IS.i..nnmberofoperablechannelsC8lA0~~NumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedthej,noperablechannelislacedinthetrippedconditionwithin(iiRi.n+hour.shouldthenexchannenctaonaTestrez.rete,, Lco3.3.2.Qu~d0~1$i~.S~(03$.$7.WiththenumberofoperablechannelslesthantheTotalNumberof<AChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedteinoperablechannelislacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hour.Shouldthenext'annenctxonaTesrequiretheypssoansnopable'channeltoavoithegeneratior(ofatripsgnal,operationmayproceed~k~Funct'alTest,orxaanymmeenumberofoperablechannelsxsessaneMinimumOperableChannels,eitherQra%fwataafP(5j(~~')beaHotShutdownwithinthenext'hoursandanRCS:terneraturelessthan350oFwithin~thefollowing,6hours,ICn88i~orCon@C/b)eergizetheafectedbuswit!)adieselgenerator.a(<</WNM\4hgt'10((:>>',a,~WiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinHotShutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.lCo33Z.9.nJ.Lc.Q5:ii.410.Cu14~co73?-c,>X~edLWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsreuired,erai.onmayproceeduntilthenextC&annerovee,ea.noperaecannelzsplacedxnthetrxedpositionwithinPhour.tenexanneuncz.onao%8esoraanymmehenumerofoperablecannesxsessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,beatHotShutdownwithin.thenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours,,qz~+.~~;~c5WrP~~".~~-<<~$~S.'l'a,CWiththenumberofoperablechannelsoneethantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperable'tatuswithin48hoursorbeinHotShutdownwithinanadditional6hours,andatcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours..A+aq2l.ii.5.ti.j.WithenumberofoperablechannelslesshantheTotalNumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedteinoperablechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionwithinghours.ShouldthenextChannelFunctionalTestrequirethebypassofaninoperablechanneltoavoidthegenerationofanactuationsignal,operationmayproceeduntil,thisChannelFunctionalTest.Atthetime.ofthisChannelFunctionalTest,orifat.anytimethenumberofoperablechannelsislessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,beatHotShin6hoursandatCouownw1thxnefollowing30hours.'(UVAW44VA tLt'033-2>"~Q<JFlg,if.4WithtNumberinoperwqth~nIS:at.mnumberofoperablechannelslessthantheTotalChannels.,operationmayproceedprovidedthelechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionIhr.ShouldthenextChannelFunctionalTestMamg'<l.lCondKCO3.B.)l4.Co4<8VLCD,"'...3.fg~J.~C~~dist,.dd~g,go)e2.requirethebypassofaninoperablechanneltoavoidthegenerationofanactuationsinalperatzonmayproceeuntztxsannelFunctionalTest.AtthetimeofthisChannetionalTestorifatanytametenerc.operablechannelsislessthantheMinimumOperableChannels.required,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Fwithin6hours.WiththenumberofoperablechannelslessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,operationmaycontinueprovidedthecontureandaustvalvesare~n~neQclosed.IS.I..fa.0Ii,.cc.l5.'f..wi15.l..i4houldoneeactortribreakeorannaloftriplog~ic.,beinoperabletheplantmustnotbeintheoperatingmodefollowingasixhourtimeperiod,andthebreakermustbe!0enpen~rssa~wAAV'Ifoneofthediversereactortripbreakertripfeatures'.I(undervoltageorshunttripattachment).ononebreakeris.inoperable,restoreittooperablestatuswithin48hoursordeclarebreakerinoperable.Ifattheendofthe48.,'ourperiodonetripfeatureisinoperableitmustbelrepairedortheplantmustnotbeintheoperatingmode,',andthereactortripbreakermustbeoen,followingan'additionalsixhourtimeperiod.Thereershalnotebypassed.whxeoneoMMeiversetripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredforperformingmaintenancetorestorethebreakertooperablestatus.l5.f..ee geplaCdfar/LCD3~3,Tc4Ae3.3'.3'-IFunctions~le2215.~~~-~5telAccidentMonitorinInstrumentationTOTALREQUIREDNO.OFCHANNELS(7)MIMUMLSPERABLE(7)wl.PresrizerWaterLevel(1)"2.AuxiliaFeedwaterFlowRate(2)(3)~3.SteamGenetorWaterLevel-WideRange(3)4.ReactorCoolanSystemSubcooling-MarginMonitor.)5.PressurizerPORVPositionIndicator(5)6.PORVBlockValvePosionIndicator(1)I7.Pressurizer"SafetyValveositionIndicator(5)2/steamgenerato1/steamgenertor/Valve1/Valve2/Valve11/steamgenerator'/steamgenerator<i1/Valve0/Valve1/Valve~'8.ContainmentPressure(8)1(6)2/corequadran)t9.ContainmentWaterLevel(NarrowangeSumpA)1(6)10.ContainmentWaterI,evel(WideRang,SumpB)2fll.Core-ExitThermocouples4/corequadrant.12.ReactorVesselLevelIndicatinSystem'q,2(1)Emergencypowerforprsurizerequipment,NUREG-37,itemII.G.l.(2)Auxiliaryfeedwaterystemflowindication,NUREG-07,itemII.E.1.2.(3)Only2outoftheindications(twosteamgeneratorauxliaryfeedwaterflowandonewid-rangesteamgeneratorlevel)arerequiredtobeoperable,NURE0737,itemII.E.1.2.(4)Instrumentatonfordetectionofinadequatecorecooling,NUREG-0737itemII.F.2.1.'(5}Direct'icationofreliefandsafetyvalveposition,NUSEG-0737,gitemI.D.3.TwochannelsincludeaprimarydetectorandRTDasthebackudetector.(6)OpationmaycontinuewithlessthantheminimumchannelsoperableovidedthattherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.1aremet.(7}/SeeSpecification3.5.3forrequiredaction.8)Continmentressuremonitor,NUREG-0737itemII.F.1.4.

TABLE3.5"4FUNCTIONALUNITM>.~.2SAFErYIHJFCTIONANflFEEDMA'I'ERISOI,ATIONa.Ha>>>>allnit.iationRl.tlFOII'~Lb.IlighContainmentI'ress>>reFtlg),4r.I.nwPressurizerPressureTItlpSRTPOIN'fHotApplical>le<4.0psigI9g~>~IpsigI5.<.t,.ggLOWABI.P.VAl.llfifi'AIIIOthpp1icable<>.0l>sig>'1715psigPalf,e[Cb8.342.FtlSg,c).PO~2.e.LC,O33.?3.FtlH3,a.Fd~3.c.Il.I.owSt.r'>mI.inePr<ssur<.CONTAIHIIEHTSl'BAY-Ha>>ualInitiat.ionb.Iligh-llighContainm<:ntPressureCOHTAIHHEHTISOI.A'fIOHa.ContainmentIsolatio>>1.HanuaI2.romSafetylnj<.clio>>AutomaticAct.uat.ionI.ogic>514psigHnthpplical>l<28psigHotApplical>leHntApplicabl<:ASSl>sigNotAl>pli<;>l>lrIIotApplicableNothp))lie>>hieb.-L~zS<~l~<<~P.ContainmentVentilationHntApic>l>l<>Hnte3NolApj/)I'IllIblApplle;Ilv3.FromS;)frtyI>>jcctio>>"fj>>>>>j>ISprilyHot.ApplicableHot.Apl>IicableII<>tApl>I>t<>bI<'>>thpplir'>I>I<~

Thill,F.3.5-4(Cont.lnul<I)FHIiINFFItl'.D!Ihi'I".fYFEATUIIEACTtlh'fIONSYSTEHIHSTRUtlEN'fh'I'IOHTRIPSFTf'OINTSI'UNCTIONAI,UNIT'L~()~~Z4.STFAIII.INI:.ISOLATfONrRIISETIOIHTAfI.OWAIII.FVhItlfSFbd4.a.Fute4C,a.Ila>>>>aII>.IlighContainmentPrrssurcc.IlighStcamFlow,Coi>>ci<ll)nLwithI.owTandSli>VgHothppIical>1eI8psig<lprorrcspop

  • >gt.o0.4gx101hs/hr)t755pslg~I>545<)i;i)VgHotApplicable20l>sig<11)cofleal)oI)<llngt.o<0.55x10lhs/hral755psigT>5)43I',a"gfg8p.e.<I.Iligh-IlighStcamLlnllFlowCoinci<lcnt.withSI5..FFFDWATI'.RISOLATIOH/41Qa.IlighStcamGeneratorWaterLevel)C>3T~6.AUKILIARYFEEDWA'I'F.RIdk(<).ba.Low-LowSteamGenerat.orWaterI,evelFH+LC.b.FromSafetyI>>ject.ionc.I.ossof4kVVolt.agc(Start.TAFP)<I.F<<<lw:<trrI'>>mpflrcl)k<rsOp<~>>(>>Lartllhl'I')<II><'orr<,'spl)>><ling3.6xIOIbs/hrat.755psig67$of'arrowrangeinstrument.spaneachst.earngc>>craLor174ofnarrowrangeilisLrumentspaneachsteamgenerator62/of4160voltsNot.e2Hot.AppIiral>Ic<If)corri'spo>><1j>>gLn<3.7x1011ls/hrat755psig<68'/ofnarrowrangeIt>strumentspaneachstcamgcncraLor16/ofnarrowrangeInstrument.spaneachat.earngcnlraLor.SccHotel.Hntr2H>>LApp1lcahIr TABI.E3.5-4(Con>.inue<l)EHGIHEFRFDSAFETYFEA'fUREACTUATIONSYS'fEHINS'I'RUHEHTATIOHTRIPSETPOIH'fSFUNCTIONALUNITLC03.3.$7.LOSSOFVOLTAGETRIPSETPOIHTALLOWABI.F.VALUESSR3.).g,pa.480VSaf<'guardsB<<sUn<lcr-vo1>.agc(I.ossofVoltag<.)5+3.3.Q.2.b.480VSafcguardsBusUndcr-v<>1lani(DegradedVoll.ag<)sccFigurc2.3-1sccFigi>rc2.3-1I<~'>i.C.LCOZ.328.ENGINEERI:.nSAFFTYFFATURF.AuIIATIONSYSTFHINTERI.OCKSSR.'2.Z.2"Qa.PressurizerI'ressurc,(block,unblockSI)<2000psig<2000psigt5.ir'..S4[~4444<<0vers>>e4c4~Ivuvvuavr4Holi:I:Apos'tive11/errorhabeeniiiclu<lcilintliectpoinl.loaccoiintforerrorswhichmayhcinl.roduce<liiilothesteamgen<ratrI<;vclmr.asurimcnl,syternal;i<'r>ut;>inmrintpcmpcraturc'r>f286I's<I(tcrminc<lbyii<>valu'itionPcr>rmcilonlcmpcrritiirc<>I'utso<<l<>vclsyst<.npfasrciluiredbyIE8>lle>.iu79-21.~.lwv~vt'0vatvs4re4vvsvu4le~+4vVgasapovv'vav~v4rlNota2:ThissaLpo'oLvalueisi'roaicrsotiotecarvefor<rfrelay(4060883/)vithLapseLLi~8of82voilaandtimeialsel.l.iiigof1.r:I:iy;il02%voltage's3.6scconils.TIcallowablcvaliics.<;+5%of.t,liel.ripset,point.v4we4a~Hote3:vvIThetripsetpointsforcontainmentvcntilal,ionisolal.ionwl>ilcpurgingsl>a11bcestal>lish<>dlocorrespondtotheIimit.sol10CFRPart20forunrestri<:tv<iareas.'fhescl,point.sarc<Ict<rmiiicilprocedurallyinaccorrlanccwitl>Tcchi>icalSpecifioation3.9.2byralciilatingeffluent.rnoriilorr<>iintratelimits,whichtakeintoaccountapproprialefactorsforilelcctorcalibration,v<ntilalionflowrate,andaveragesil.cmcl.corology.AllowableValuesarcl.hoseval<icsass>imcilinaccidcnl.analysis. rPireJmir~gK'trIv,~wlrpmrwrr>>.,pie&e'>>~.OM~'"Table3.5-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinInstrumentationMinimumOperableGrossActivityMonitors(Liquid)a.LiquidRadwaste(R-18)b.SteamGeneratorBlowdown.(R-19)c.*TurbineBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)d.HighConductivityWaste(R-22)e.ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)fI.Actior<123~13f.SpentFuelPoolHeat,ExchangerALoopg.SpentFuelPoolHeat,ExchangerBLoop(R"20A)l+++(R-20B)1+++32~PlantVentilationa.WithoutMini-Purge2-3~NobleGasActivity(R-14)(ProvidingAlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)ParticulateSampler(R-13)IodineSampler(R>>10BorR-14A~*~)l'l5b.'A~cQ..'~~.O.~~<<ae~r~Au'm~"~~C'Laaw3-M~~WithMini-Purge1.2.3.NobleGasActivity(R-14)ParticulateSampler(R-13)IodineSamR-10BorR-14A***)NobleGasActivity(R-12)orParticulateSampler(R-11)3~ShutdownPurgea.NobleGasActivity(R-12)b.ParticulateSampler(R-11) <<acorn~c.IodineSampler(R-10AorR-12A**~)4.~'AirE)ectorMonitor(R-15orR-15A~*+)MinimumChannels~oerahleAetio5.WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorl&.igNotrequiredwhenSteamGeneratorBlowdownisbeingTecycled(i.e.notreleased).~4Cle~Requiredandreguiredtosamp~letheco't'a>amentstacRequiredtosamplecontainmentduring~JVNotreguiredduringColdorRefuelingmini-purgeoperation.Shutdown.AlsoseeTable3.5-6.ApplicablewhenHeatExchangerinservice.2'.Q' TABK.E3.5-5ContinuedTableNotationAction1IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequire-ment,effluentreleasesfromthetankmaycontinueforupto14days,providedthatpriortoinitiatingarelease:1.Atleasttwoindependentsamplesofthetank'scontentsareanalyzed,inaccordancewithSpecification4.12.l.l.a,andAJ4s<<JmidCh~S.o2.AtleasttwotechnicallyqualifiedmembersoftheFacilityStaffindependentlyverifythereleaseratecalculationsand.dischargelinevalving;Otherwise,suspendreleaseofradioactiveeffluentsviathispathway.Action2WhenSteamGeneratorBlowdownisbeingreleased(notrecycled)andthenumberofchannelsoperableislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirements,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinuepiovidedgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(betaorgamma)at,alimitofdetectionofatmost10-7uCi/gram:1.Atleastonceper8hourswhentheconcentrationofthesecondarycoolantis>0.01uCi/gramdoseequivalentI-131.2.Atleastonceper24hourswhentheconcentrationofthesecondarycoolantis50.01uCi/gramdoseequivalentI-131.Action3IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsoperablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedthatatleastonceper24hoursgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgzossradioactivity(betaorgamma)atalimitofdetectionofatmost10-7uCi/gm.Action4-IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenatleastonceper8hoursandthesesamplesareanalyzedforisotopicactivitywithin24hoursorR14Aisoperableandreadingsarereviewedatleastonceper8hours. TABK.E3.5-5Continued)TableNotationAction5IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequire-ments,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedsamplesarecontinuouslycollectedasrequiredbyTable4.12-2ItemEwithauxiliarysamplingequipment.Action6IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperableandth5SecondaryActivityis~1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesmaycontinueviathispathwayprovidedgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(betaorgamma)atleastonceper24hours.Ifthesecondaryactivityisgreaterthan1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueforupto31daysprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenevery8hoursandanalyzedwithin24hours.Action7-Ifthe.channelisinoperable,asampleofthegasfromtheinservicegasdecaytankshallbeanalyzedforoxygencontentatleastonceever4hours.Action8IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrecpiredbytheMinimChannelsOperabl,ora<eastonecontaanmentfancooerasnotoperating,withe.nourermxnatethepurge. 8AIIvTable3.5-6RadiationAccidentMonitorinInstrumentation'Instrument1.Co2.No2l.IIIMinimum.'hannel.'sO~erable,ActionntainmentArea(R-."9andR-30)."214fbleGasEffluentMonitorsPlantVent(R-14A)11AMainSteamLine(R-31+.11i.BMainSteamLine(R;32)11iv.ContainmentPurgei(R-12A)~.1*1v.AirEjector(R-.15A)11ActionStatementsAction1-Withthenumberofoperablechannel/leanthanrequiredbytp'eMinimumChannelsOperablerequirements,either.restoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin7daysoftheevent,orprepareandsubmita.SpecialReporttotheCommissionwithin30daysfollowing;:theeventoutliningtheactiontaken,the'causeoftheinoperabilityandtheplansandschedulefor.restoringthesystemtooperablestatus.*nlywhentheshutdownpurgeflangesareremoved. 3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3.1Add~sgd~/Cbcy+r3.4QOg,)P3.6.4T~Lic3.~.$-6l41Fu~tl)g.xiiib.CombustibleGasControlhenthereactoriscriticalatleasttwoindependentcaznmentyrogenmonzorsshallbeoperable.OneofthemonitorsmaybethePostAccidentSamplingSystem.Withacontainmentisolationboundaryinoleforoneormorecontainmentpenetr~ti.ons,eita.RestoreeachinoperablendarytoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours,orIsolateeaaffectedpenetrationwithin4hoursbyuseoatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesredintheisolationposition,oneclosedmanualvalve,orablindflange,orc.Beinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursfandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.3.6.4.2Withonlyonehydrogenmonitoroperable,restoreasecondcgAmonitortooerablestatuswithin30sreznQ48t4.~x-~ea3.6.4.3Withnohydrogenmonitorsoperable,restoreatleastonemonitortooerablestatuswithin72hoursorbeznateaotshutownwxznours3.6.5ContainmentMini-PureWheneverthecontainmentintegrityisrequired,asiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingatingtimestoaslowasachievable.Themini-eisolationvalveswillremainclosedtothemextentpracticablebutmaybeopenforessurecontrol,forAIdGQ.,forrespirableaiqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentrsurveillanceteststhatmayrequirethevalveobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.Addree~ed~i~wChapter3.b ~~3.12'MovableIn-CoreInstrumentationr~1AlieabilitAppliestotheoperabilityofthemovabledetectorinstru-mentationsystem.F~~Obective:~~Tospecifyfunctionalrequirementsontheuseofthein-coreinstrumentationsysteznsfortherecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystezn.Secificationz3.12.1Aminimumof2thimblesperquadrantandsufficientmov-Stz3.~.z.Q(,3.12.ablein-coredetectorsshallbeoperableduringrecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystem.2Powershallbeliznitedto90%ofratedpowerifthecalibra-5g,3ih,K~4tionrequirementsforexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystem,identifiedinTable4.'l-l,arenotmet.sis.(1)~TheMoveIn-CoreInstrumentationSystemhasfourdriv,fourdetectors,and36blesinthecore.Eachdetorcanberoutedtonineteenormorethimblegreatdealmorecapabilitythoftheexcoredetecs.Conseqy,thefullsystemhasawoulceededforthecalibrationTocalibretheexcoredetectorchannels,itisonlynesarythatthe3.12-1 Movableln-CoreSystembeusedtodeterminethegrosspowerdis-"ibutioninthecoreasindicatedbythepowerbalancebetweeetopdbottomhalvesofthecore.Aftertheexcoresystemiscalibratedinitially,recrationisneededonlyinfreguetlytocompensateforchangesinecore,dueforex-ampletofueldepation,andforchangesintedetectorsIftherecalihrationinotpe'rformed,emandatedpowerreductionassuressafeoperationoereaorsinceitwiDcompensateforanerrorof1Q%%uointheexcoretectionsystem.ExperienceatBeznau(Switzerland)andGinnasshothatdriftduetochangesinthecoreorinstrumentchaelsisveryslight.Thus,the10'eductionis'onsideredtoeveryconservative.

    Reference:

    ~~(1)FSAR-Section7.63.12-2 4.pSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS4.1Specifiedintervalsmaybeadjustedplusorminus25/toaccommodatenormaltestschedules.OperationalSafetyReviewAppliestoitemsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-Tospecifytheminimumfrecruencyandtyneofsurveillancetobeappliedtoplantecuipmentandcond'tions.Speciication:Lcm35.ILc3.E.K':;4-o3.V.R.Lgo3.354.1.24.1.3LCo3~3.3Cal'bzation,testing,andcheckingofanalogcharnelandtestingoflogicchannelshallbeperrormedasspec'f'edinTable4.1-1.EauipmentandsamplingtestsshallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.Eachaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstraedoperablebypezozmancofthechannelcheckandchannelcalibrationoperationsatthefreouenciessho>minTable4.1-3.Eachradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedopeableozmingthechannel,check,soueck,channelfunctionaltest-.annelca3'bzationatthefzecruencyshe~ainTable4.1-S.~dclccs$2Jax~~P~~WO4.1-1 Basis:checkbyalarmoraunciatoraction,andthistypeofbu'lt-'nsurveillance.Piluressuchasblowninstrumentfuses,defectiveindators,faultedamplifierswhichresultin"upscale"or"doscale"indicationcanbeeasilyrecognizedbysimpl~~observat'onofthefunctioningofaninstrument'orsystem.Fu~ermorsuchfailuresare,inmanycases,revealedacheck'upplementsBasedonexperienceinoperationofbothconventionalandnuclearplantsytems,whentheplantisinoperation,theminimumcheckingfqecnxencyofonce.pershiftisdeemedadecpxateforreactorandsteamsysteminstrcmenta"ion;ControlRoomprocedurese'reacheckoftheRadiationMonitoringSystem(BMS)'pane~1~metersandst"ipchartIrecordersforproperreadoutonceeachshift.Adaily'/surveillancelogisalsomaintainedintheControlRoomsformanualentryofRMSreadouts,agdisindependentlyI~reviewedbyHealthphysicssupervisionatleastweekly.!Aradiationmonitrdownscalefailurewi,llrsuitina/conspicuous.visualindicationontheRESpanel(noIaudiblealaxzn).Radiationmonitorcontrolwitchesarespring-returnedtothe"operate"rr-5eafterbeingturnedtoanyothe"testorcheckmode.Theefore,togetherwiththe+signfeaturesofthe2!S,plantsurveilla.".qeproceduresensurethecontinuedavailabil'tycfechadiationmonitortoperformitsintendedfunction.. al'rationCalib-tionsaŽeperfor...edtoofaccratinormation.IIhen'leailu:(linearlevel)ensuret.eprese..tationanc-acauisiticnchannelsarecalibrateddailyagai.sta1.atbalancestandardtoaccountforerr'}rsinducedbychangingrodpatternsandcorephysicsparameters./POtherchannelsaresubjectonlytot'ne'rift'rrorsinducedwithin*%theinstrumentationitselfand,oonseouently,cantoleratelongeintevalsbetv:eencalibration.Process'systeminstru..e..tationerro.sinducedovdr~tcanbeexpectedtoremainivitn-..acceptaoletolerances,'frecalibratonisperformedatintervalsof~acnrefuelags."'.utdov~.Substantialcalibrgt".'onshiftswikinachannel(esent'allyachannelf-lure)F11erevealedduringroutinecheeringandestingprocecues.CIhusr."ni~u=..calibrationfrequenciesoionce-per-dayiorthenuclearlj'lu-li..earlevel)channels,a..donceeachrefuelingshutdovw'forthe.'ocesssvstemchannelsisco..sideredacceptable. P.~Testineminimumtestingfrequency.forthoseinstrumentchannelsconnctedtothesafetysystemisbasedonanaverageunsafIlfailurrateof2.5x10failure/hr.perchannel.This8sbasedonoeIonopera'ngexperienceatconventionalandnuclearplan+>An.FP~"unsafefaire"isdefinedasonewhichnegateschanneloperabilityanwhich,duetoitsnature,isrevealedonlywhenfthechannelisttedorattemptstorespondtoabonafide'3.gnal./Forthespecifiedonemothtestinterval,theaverageunprotecteditimeis360hoursincasefafailureoccurrinsgbetweentet/sintervals.Thus,theprobabilityoffailure/ofonechanneltbetween.test,intervalsis3602.5x10or.9x10.Sincetwochannelsmustfailinordernegatthesafetyfunction,theprobabilityofsimultaneousfailureoftwo-out-fthj-oreechan-32annelsz.s3(.9x10)=2.4x10.Thisreprsentsthefractionoftimeinwhicheachthre-chnnelsystemwouldhaveoneoperableandtwoinoperablechannelsqndequals2.4x10x8760hoursperyear,or(approximately)1mipute/year.Becauseoftheirgreatep'degreeofredundancy,&he1/3and2/4logicarraysprovide~mnevengreatermeasureofprotectionandaretherebyacceptableforthesametestinginterval".t,Thoseitemsspecif'formonthlytestingareassociatedwithprocessIcomponenwhereotherrreansofverificationprovideaddiionalfC'assurncethatthechannelisoperable,therebyrequiringlsjsequenttesting. TABLE4.l-lHINIHUMFREQUENCIESFORCHECKS'AIIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELS~se.t.eChannelDes~crition1.NuclearPowerRangei'LIDg.(Z.y.t),)QP6&.).I)~OIiCe<.-~('S"C"~I2.NuclearIntermediate~3(3.t.l)Range3.NuclearSourceRange=0~3.).tgz~f.~ReactorCoolant~7)-.).))Qfg(33))Temeratu~er~s0~5.ReacoroolantFlow')(3.3.1)6.PressurizerWater"<8(330LevelCheck~l(3@i)(hh)~3(3,3.I))().3.1)SS.Oi(>.>.i)1(7.'),I)SCalxbrateL(3.3.>)6(3.3.I).io().'$.0~~r.R)O(S.3.i)R)ot3.>.t)lo().).))Test~(3.3.))cb4)p%9t5)S(3.>.i)eII.u)P7(PPh)OSS8%5)5<citooc~)P-I(>.3.i)1)(2)S(3.7.()~(3.).<)28,i,t)RemarksgHMt<<s<<&<<<<<<<<s<<t~<<=-%Kneeh-if-t~).n:ser-v-m2)ogle1;bitableetioermssiero).rL2$.i.<nf'ellKFriQpMcTp1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT~~tP.I.<<atbalancecalculation*2)SignaWT;b'~eaction(perm).ss'vIstop>traps)3)Uandlowercha~sforaxialoffset**~,c'flighsetpoint<69%ofratedpower)5)Lowsetpoint(<25%ofratedpower))(3.).>')S)(33.z)N.A7.PressurizerPressureFU~7(~.3.i)4:hkvVoltage&FgI.d(.~.)N.AItisiiiItiVII)FSLCt(>')9.RodPositionS(1,2)Indication"RCPe)Recst<esPo>t+o~'OOI-unt.bo~Wlg;SXZ'nqi,+Ro~'5Pgg~S..eMv().3.3)k(3.>.4)'i(3>~I')3(),3.a)28.i.c,nl/1)With.stepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorPddressedt~isoutofservice.<<t~Qae33.a.3,[*Notreureddrain~h~~oPor5R>.3.).xS4oaerefuelingsutownbutassoonavpossibleafterretu'rh'tog)i>wer. TABLE4.1-1(Continued)Channelescitio10.RodPositionBankCounters<<>"ip(:s:t~))l~SteamGeneratorLevelKsS.L-ZC.r.(zp.~.')12.ChargingFlow+O3pp13.ResidualHeatRemoval~t=.>>,<~PumpFlowCeckS(1,2)tCb.>.i')S<Cw.~)N.A.N.A.~Caibate~est'Io~eN.A.N.A.1)2)iOaa)N.A.28.ib~emarspion:meit"/ca~.a.l~mem'ithrodpositionindicationLogrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorsoutofserviceeev~e,.~14.BoricAcidStorageTankLevelDH.A.Hote415.RefuelingHaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlTankLevel17.ReactorContainmentPressure~v'l.eC3.3.2.)T=um.<.c.Cp.3,z,)18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControlH.A.N.A~N.A.B.A.N.A.<'~~)u.~.~)N.A.AJdrO5gQJtnaa~chapter3.403'5ainlet-eenVe-+reAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1720.ContainmentDrainSumpLevel21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.H.A.H.A.N.A.@<dress(tte3-4C+tat'r3.'f03.5p22'P'%aiQHik23~(S1.APump-ValveInterlockTurbineTripSet-.PointN.A.-N.A.RN.AD)ev24.AccumulatorLevelandPressure(AR@f~wN.A.'l~'dd~ssel~hcyear3.+i3,5'pssQJ ChannelTABLE4.1-1(CONTINUED)2l3.3"028.i,25.ContainmentPressure26.StcamGeneratorPressure>"ta(.~s.z)27.TurbineFirstStagePressure28.F~crgcncyPlanRadiationInstrumentsCheck(N.3,3,IQSl3.3.jjCalibrate(g(5.%.2$(y,~.2)Remarksarrow~3angeconta'entpr.sure.c"(-3.0C+3psig)eluded(g.a.z)2B.L,<<29.EnvironmentalMonitors30.31.TripofMainFeedwaterPumpsF046.4(3.3.I)32.SteamFlowF'ti<44.~4~f3.>>)FU~AV'(3.y'.~gChlorine5etector,ControlRoomAzr35.Ammoniaetar,ControlRoomntakeNAlCsSo>,A(>.3I)HAPgnVZMM~~~+~~337.ReactorVesselLevelIndicationSystem38a.TripBreaker)LogicChannelTesting38b.TripBreakerLogicChannelTestingF033[(3.s.l)NAA36.RadiationDetectors,ControlRoomHAAirIntakeNANA28>>R)QW(>'~M>Ai"I.MARg(32~)2M>>>>~CRR'gi.3>4g,('3341'~~8~~MAer~i(3.>.S)CRR.Q(220~.6(RJNAq(3.3.33NAM))(s.a.I)NAN~aa~MA~gg2and3~eZL.~ TABLE4.1-1(Continued)29.i.o.ChannelFM<IS39.ReactorTripFg~(IBreakers(3.3.))Q~ecN.AFgvf40.ManualTripReactor(w.))NBA.t:gt)lS41a.ReactorTripBypassBreakerN.A.(n.<3~caibate~estN.A.t)nN.A.N~A.QS.f..biiemarksnctzontest-Includesindependengteingofbothundervoltageandshfittripattachmentofreactorripbreaks.Eachofthetworactortripbakerswillbetep4edonalternatmonths./IncludesindgegndentPesstingofbothundervoltageahshunttripcirc-uits.Thetesthallalsoverifytheoperability.o'fgebypassbreak-er.Usingtest~switchesinedreactorprotectio6rackmanually+ripthereactor/tripbypassbreaker'yusingthes6nttripcoil.+ut(gI)4l.bReactorTripBypassBreakerN.A.N.A.Auomaticallytriptheundervoltaiattachment.c)R3.3.I.lq~n.o~~hSR3:3.IIC28.'c.gNOTE1:SR.Q,P.I.~OTENOTE3:NOTE4eLogictrainswilletestedonalternatemonthscorresondinto.thereactortbreakertestiMonthlylogiesngwaveifytheoperabiltyofallsetsofreactortripogicactuatingcntactsonthattrin(SeeNote3).Refuelingshutdowtestingwilverifytheoperailityofallsetofreactortripctuatingcontactsn~bothtrain.Intesting,opationofonesetfcontactswillsuitinareactoripbreakertip;theoperatioofallotherseofcontactswilbeverifiedbythuseofindicioncircuitry.~'tingshallbeperfomedmonthly,lesstherectortripbreersareoporshaerformedriortotartuiftehasnoteeperformedithinthelstandasIThesourerangetrilogicmaybexcluded'fromonthlytesngprovidedit'stesteB'~within0dayspritostartup.WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable. TABLE4.1-2MINIMUMFREUENCIESFOREUIPMENTANQSAMPLINGTESTSTest~Freu~enc1.ReactorCoolantChemistrySamplesChlorideandFluoride3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow250F2.ReactorCoolant,BoronBoronConcentrationWeekly3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSamleBoronConcentrationWeekly4Q~aeJa)illC4cpter84<<34.BoricTankageoroncontratxonee5.ControlRodsRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)6a.FullLengthControlRodMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficient,numberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherod~positionindicationsystemMonthly@he~e3~4~Q,ha)4Z.l6b.FullLengthControlRodMoveeachrodthrough'tsfulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurEachRefuelingShutdown7.PressurirerSafetySetpointValvesEachRefuelingShutdownAC8.MainSteamSafetySetpointValvesEachRefuelingshutdownN-."-.2.79.ContainmentIsolationTripFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdown10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksFunctioningPriortoRefuelingOperations 1.ServiceWaterSystem2.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupply13.SprayAdditiveTank14.Accumulator15.PrimarySystemLeakaeTestFunctioningFunctioningNaOHConcentBoronConcentrationEvaluateFreauencvEachRefuelingShutdownMonthlyMonthly~pb~D,4Bi-MonthlyDaily16.DieselFuelSupplyFuelInventoryDaily17.SpentFuelPitBoronConcentrationMonthly18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesGrossActivity72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingWat&CalibraFloPdProtectignEipmentEachRefuelingShutdown/45.ci.PNotes:Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontxolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan3.0%oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10%oftheallowablelimit.(4)HhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable. ssTABLE4.1-3AccidentMonitorinInstrumentationSurveillanceRuirementsInstrument1.PressurizWaterLevel(1)ez2AuxiliaryFeeaterFlowRate(4)3.ReactorCoolantstem'ubcoolingMarginonitor(2)p4.PressurizerPORVPosi'onIndicator(primarydetetor)(3)5.PressurizerPORVPosition~Indicator(RTD-backupdetetor)(3)6.PORVBlockValvePosition.indiostor(1)7.PressurizerSafety.ValvePositionIndicator(primarydetector)(3)8.PresurizerSafetyValvePositionIndicator(RTD-backupdetector))ChannelCheckChannelCalibrationseeTable4.1-1seeTable.1-1seeSection4.8.1RFMRChannel'iTestNARNAzNA9.ContainmentPressure':10.SteamGeneratorWaterLevelHideRange:11.(12.'3.14.CoreExitThermouplesContainmentHighRangeRadiation(R-29andR-0)(5)ContainmentWaterLevel(NarrowRangeISumpA)ContainmentWaterel(WideRange~SumpB)MNAtNA5NAtNANAM~(1)EmergePowerSupplyRequirementsforPressurizerLevelIndicators~NUREG0578Item.1.1(2)InsntationforDetectionofInadequateCoreCooling-NUREG0578Im2-1-1(3)D'ctIndicationofPowerOperatedReliefValveandSafetyValvePositio-NUREG78item2.1.3.a(4)AuxiliaryFeedwaterFlowIndicationtoSteamGeneratorNUREG0578item2.1-7.f(5AcceptablecriteriaforcalibrationareprovidedinTableII.F.1-3ofNUREG07 gj'rQh~TABLE4.1-4TYPEOFMEASUREMENTANDANALYSISREACTORCOOLANTSPECIFICACTIVITYSAMPLEANDANALYSISPROGRAMSAMPLEANDANALYSISiFRPQVENCYMODESNHICHSAMPLEANDALYSISREQUIRED2~Gros.ActivityDetermination(beta'-gamma)(1)IsotopicAnalysisforDoseEquivalentI-131Concentra-tionAtleastonce*per72hours1per14daysovecoldshutdownAbove5%reactorpowerAbove5%reactorpower4.IsotopicAhalysisforIodineIncludingI-131,I-133,andI-135*xceptatrefuelingshutdown,samplingshallbecontinueduntiltheactivityofthereactorcoolantsstemisresdtnitslimits3.RadiochemicalforE1per6months(3)Determination(2)ra)Onceper8'hrs,wheneverAsrequiredbySpecificationtheI-131uivalent3'1.4.3.c*activity,xceedsthelimitof3.+ld.l.bb)On@"samplebetween2and.10Hotshutdownoraboveh6ursfollowingareactorIr~~powerchangeexceeding15per-centwithine1-hourperiod(1)Agrossradibactivityapdlysisshallconsistofthequantitativemeasurementofthetotalradio-activityoftheprimarfcoolantinunits~Ci/gm.Thetotalprimarycoolantactivityshall'ethesumofthedpcfassedbeta-gammaactivityandthetotalofallidentifiedgaseousactivitiei15minutesafter@heprimarysystemissampled.(2)Aradiochemicalanalysisshallconsistofthequantitativemeasurementoftheactivityforeachradionqc1idewhichisidentifiedintheprimarycoolant15minutesaftertheprimarysystemissamplers,z'heactivitiesfortheindividualisotopesshallbeusedinthedeterminationofE.(3)Sampl,dtobetakenafteraminimumof2EFPDand20daysofpoweroperationhaveelapsedsincerealtorwaslastsubcriticalfor48hoursorlonger. g><esse~uMQ~+t.<B.QTable4.1-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinaSurveillanceReauirementsjInstrumentChannelCheckb.cSteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)rTurbineBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)D(7)GrossActivityMonitor(Liquid)a.LiquidRadWaste(R-18)D(7)SourceCheckM(4)M(4)M(4)FunctionalChannelTestCalibrationc'(1)pcR(5)Q(1')R(5)P(1)R(5)d.HighConductivityWaste(R"22)e.ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)f.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)D(7)D(7)D(7)M(4),:~Q(1)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)/R(5)R(5) R(5)M(4)Q(2)D(7;)/'ra.NobleGasActivity(R-14);"D(7)(Alarm'ndIsolationofGasDecayTanks)b.ParticulateSampler(R-"13)W(I)PCIodineSampler(R-10BandR-14A).:d.FlowRateDeterminationrContainmentPurgeg.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)tPlantVentilationN.A.W(7)N.A.N.A.N.A.!3Q(1)N.A.N.A.R(5)R(5)R(5)R(5)R(6)sg.SI34.la.NobleGasActivity(R-12)~g.vAb.ParticulateSampler(R-1O~N.A.Q(1)/(R(5)5'Cch,S~e3.-IPR<(5)"tainSteamLines(R-31andR-32}c.IodineSampler(R;10AandR-12A)'.ghlowRateDeterminationAirEjectorMonitor(4-15andR-15A)r/WasteGasSystemOxygen/'onitor-iW(7)N.A.D(7)DN.A.N.A.N.A.MM(2)N.A.N.A.N.A.R(5)R(6)R(5)Q(3) TABLE4.1-5(Continued)~'ITABLENOTATIONwe.~.c(1)TheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatautomaticisolationoMthispathwayandcontrolroomalarmoccurifanyofthefog~osCltTotRexist:l.Instrumentindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmand/ortripsetpoint.2.Power.failure..i(2)TheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatcontrolroomalaqnoccursifanyofthefollowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmsetpoint.2.Powerfailure.TheChannelCalibrationshallincludetheuseofstandardgassamplescontaininganominal:1.Zerovolumepercentoxygen:and2.Threevolumepercentoxygen.(4)(5)z,4.ir.e.Thischeckmayrequiretheuseofanexternalsourceduetohighbackgroundinthesamplechamber.1pgppg,~~SourceusefortheChannelibrationshallbetrbletotheNatioBureauoStandards(Norshallbeobtainedsuppliers(e.g.rsham)thatovidesourcesaceabletootheroffic'ly-designatedstanrdsageies.Flowrateformainplantventilationexhaustandcontainmentpurgeexhaustarecalculatedbytheflowcapacityofventilationexhaustfansinserviceandllbedeterminedatthefrequencyspecified.~7)Appliesonlyduringreleasesviathispathway.iQ 4.4.4.2thetendoncontaining6brokenwires)shallbeinspected.Theacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorethan4brokenwiresinanyoftheadditional4tendons.Ifthiscriterionisnotsatisfied,allofthetendonsshallbeinspectedandifmorethan5%ofthetotalwiresarebroken,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurized.Pre-StressConfirmationTesta4b.Lift-offtestsshallbeperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin4.4.4.1aabove',attheintervalsspecifiedin4.4.4.15;Iftheaveragestressinthe14tendonscheckedislessthan144,000psi(60%ofultimatestress),alltendonsshallbecheckedforstressandretensioned,ifnecessary,toastressof144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionalstress(6%')shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilityofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressappliedduringaccidentconditions.4.4.54.4.5.1ContainmentIsolationValvesEachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeGinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFRSo.SSa.4.4.64.4.6.1.;4.6.2ContainmentIsolationResonseEachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEby.theperformanceoftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,.andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludes.onlythevalvetraveltimeforthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal.AmendmentNo.9fZ1t544.4-11 t4.4.7ContainmentHdroenMonitors4.4.7.1Demonstratethattwohydrogenmonitorsareoperableatleast(~M+byverifyingthattheunitisonorinstandby.Ztt4.4.7.2Atleastonceper~iXKi.~'erformacanne1calibration~~usingtwosamplegasescontainingknownconcentrationsofhydrogen.Basis:Thecyy)aznlne~isdesignedforanaccidentpressureof60psig-WhiletctorisoperatingItheinternalnmentofthecontainmentwillbeatapproximateosphericpressure.Themaximumtemperatursteam-aitmixtureatthepeakaccidentpressureof6giscaedtobe286F.4-4-llaAmendmentNo.9 4.8.8Atleastonceperl8monthsduringshutdown:.a~Verifythateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathforeachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpactuatestoitscorrectpositionuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.b.Verifythateachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpstartsasdesignedautomaticallyuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.4.8e9EachinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedoperablebytheperformanceoftheChannelCheck,ChannelCalibration,andChannelFunctionalTestoperationsforthemodesandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.a4.8.10etimeofeachpumpandvalve.requiredoperationofeac'ofauxiaershallbe35;Va4demonstratedtobinutesatleastonce\S~Basish1Themonthlytestingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingfeedwatertothesteamgeneratorswillverifytheirabilitytomeetminimumrequiredflowrates.Thecapacityofanyoneofthethreeauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsissufficienttomeetdecayheatremovalrequirements.'"Properfunctioningofthesteamturbineadmission,valveandthe'eedwaterpumpsstartwilldemonstratetheintegrityofthesteamdrivenpump.'"tMonthlytestingofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingwaterfromacondensatesupplytanktothesteamgeneratorswillverifytheir'bilitytomeetminimumrequiredflowrates.Thestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswouldbeusedonlyifallthreeauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswereunavailable."'neofthetwostandbypumpswouldbesufficienttomeetdecayheatremovalrequirements.Properfunctioningofthesuctionvalvesfromtheservicewatersystem,thedischargevalves,andthecrossovervalveswilldemonstratetheiroperability.Theoperabilityofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathsbetweenthepumpsandthesteamgeneratorsisdemonstratedusingwaterfromthetesttank.Testingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsusingtheirprimarysourceofwatersupplywillverifytheloperabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowpath.Verificationofcorrectoperationwillbemadebothfrominstrumentationwithinthemaincontrolroomandbydirectvisual!observationofthepumps. ReactorCoolantSstemAoolzcabxlzt::Appl~estotheoperatingstatusoftheReactorCoolantSystemwhenfuel.isinthereactor.TospecifythoseconditionsoftheReactorCoolantSvstemwhichmus"bemettoassuresafereactoropera".'on.Specfcation3.1.13.1.1.1C'sera=o..a'omponentsReacto"CoolantLoopsa.@henthereactorpowerisabove130MMT(8.5%),bothreactorcoolantloopsandtheirassociated.steamgeneratorsandreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation.,b.Iftheconditionsof3.1.1.l.aarenotmet,then'mmediatepowerreductionshallbeinitiatedunderadministrativecontrol.IftheshutdownmarginImeetstheonelooprequirementsofFigure3.10-2,thenthepowershallbereducedtolessthan130NWT.IftheoneloopshutdownmarginofFigure3.10-2isnotmet,theplantshallbetakentothehotshutdownconditionandtheoneloopshutdownZ.A.5C.marginshallbemet.Exceptforspecialtests,whentheRCStemperatureisatorabove350'Fwiththereactorpowerlessthanorequalto130MWT(8.5%),atleastonereactorcoolantloopanditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpumpshallbein IIoperation.Theotherloopanditsassociatedsteamgeneratormustbeoperablesothatheatcouldberemovedvianaturalcirculation.However,bothreactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided(1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.d.Iftheconditionsof3.l..l.l.carenotmet,thenI~+PiLCCLC.Q<cae.(i)ifoneloopisinoperation,buttheotherloopisnotoperable,restorethe.inoperablelooptooperablestatuswithin72hoursortaketheplanttothehotshutdownconditionandreducetheRCStemperaturetolessthan350'Fwithinthenext12hours,or(ii)ifneitherloopisinoperationsuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturnacoolantlooptooperation.WhentheRCStemperatureislessthan350'F,at,leasttwoofthefollowingcoolantloopsshallbeoperable:(i)reactorcoolantloopAanditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump.(ii)reactorcoolantloopBanditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump. QC>L=~as<'3.~i,o(iii)residualheatremovalloop~.>>(iv)residualheat.removalloopa.<<~-~~~~-leahiat].eastoneofthecoolantloopslistedinparagraph3.1.1.1.eshallbeinoperationwhileRCS(,.ii<C,.YiL~c-'iPIQ$i/Q<Qh.temperatureislessthan350'F.However,bothreactorcoolantpumpsandresidualheatremcvalpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactarcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10Fbelowsaturationtemperature.Iftheconditionsof3.1.1.1.earenotmet,.timmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveaction.toreturntherequiredloopstooperablestatus,andifnotincoldshutdownalready,beincoldshutdownwithin,24hours.Iftheconditionsof3.1.1.1.farenotmet,thensuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrat-'.onaftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcaolantloaptoaperation.<<Thepreferredoremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperablewhileincaidshutdown. ~i.Atleastonereactorcoolantpumoortheres'lhearemovalsystemshallbeinoperatiwhena~3~'voreduction'adeintheboroncoentrationofthereactorcoont.Atleastonereactorcant.pumpshallbein.operationforaedtran'tionfromoneReactorOperatingMetoanotherinvolvin~nincreaseinthebonconcentrationofthereactorco~nt,.ceptforemergencyboration.AreactorcoolantpumpshallnotbestartedwithoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesLc,Q3.~.b330'Funless1)thepressurizerwatervolumeislessthan324cubicfeet(38%level)or2)thesecondarywatertemperatureofeachsteam'generatorislessthanSO'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures.~merator3.1..l.a.Thetemperatureshallnotexceed100'F.3.1.1.3SafetyValvesthetubesheet~~~C.w4,b.Duringcoldshutdownorrefuel.ingwhenthereactor~~he~sboltedonthevessel,atleastonepressurizercodesafety~lveshallbeoperable.Khaliftsettingof2485psig+l~.Iftheconditionso.1.1.3'.a.arenotmet,iraediatelysuspendallerationsinvolvingpositivereactivitycharrgsandplaceanoperableRHRloopintooperationintheshutdowncoolingmode.I Q.~V%>C.WheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,bothpressurizercodesafetyvalvesshallbeoperablewithaliftsettingof2485psig21/.d.g,Q'.tD,4.XViIfonepressurizercodesafetyvalveisnotoperablewhilethereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,theneitherrestoretheinoperablevalvetooperablestatuswithin15minutesorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof350'Fwithinanadditional6hours.4,~iv'eliefValvesa.Bothpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andtheirassociatedblockvalvesshallbeloperablewheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,or(i).withoneormorePORU(s)inoperable,within1houreitherrestorethePORV(s)tooperablestatusorclosetheassociatedblockvalve(s);otherwise,beinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof.350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours,or(ii)withoneormoreblockvalve(s)inoperable,within1houreitherrestoretheblockvalve(s)tooperablestatusorclosetheblockvalve(s)andremovepowerfromtheblockvalve(s);5-'; otherwise,beinat=leasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.3.1.1.5Pressurizera.WheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'Fthepressurizershallhave'tleast100kwofheatersoperableandawaterlevelmaintainedbetween12%%u'nd87$oflevelspan.Efthepressurizerisinoperableduetoheatersorwaterlevel,restorethepressurizertooperablestatuswithin6hrs.orhavethereactorbelowanRCStemperatureof350'FandtheRHRsysteminoperationwithin.anadditional6hrs.equirementshallnotapplyduringperformanceofRCShydrotesvidedthetestandthepressurizer=~operablepeted.1.1.5awithinours.ReactorCoolantSstemVentsa.Whenthereactorisathotshutdownorcritical,atleastonereactorcoolantsystemventpathconsistingoftwovalvesinseriesshallbeoperableandclosed*ateachofthefollowinglocations:2.Pressurizersteamspace*ThePORVblockvalveisnotrequiredtobeclosedbutmustbeoperableifthePORViscapableofbeingopened. b.Withoneormoreventsattheabovereactorcoolantsystemventpathlocationsinoperable,startupmaycommenceand/orpoweroperationmaycontinueprovidedatleastoneventpathisoperableandtheinoperableventpathsaremaintainedclosedwithmotivepo~erremovedfromthevalveactuatorofallthevalvesintheinoperableventpaths.Eftherequirementsof3.1.1.6aarenotmetwithin30days,beinhotshutdownwithin6hoursandC.below3SO'Fwithinthefollowing30hours.Withalloftheabovereactorcoolantsystemventpathsinoperable;maintaintheinoperableventpathsclosedwithpowerremovedfromthevalveactuatorsofallthevalvesintheinoperablevent.paths,andrestoreatleastoneoftheventpathstooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinhotshutdownwithin6hoursandbelow350'Fwithinthefollowing30hours.BasTheplantisdesignedotewithallreactorcoolaninoperationandmaintainthovetvalueduring operationsandanticipatedtransients.Heattransferanales1swthatreactorheat'quivalentto130MWT(8.5/}caneremoedbynaturalcirculationalone.Thereforeoperaionwithoneopatingreactorcoolantloopwhilebelow130adequatergin.providesThespecificionpermitsanorderlyreductionnpowerifareactorcoolantumpislostduringoperatiobetween130MWTand50/ofratedpowe0(2)Above50$power,aautomaticreactortripwilloccurifetherpumpislost.Thepower-to-flowratiowillbemaintained,equatoorlessthanonewhichensuzesthattheminimumDNBratioincasesatLowerflowsincethemaximumenthalpyrisedoesnotinczeqe.jWhenthereactorcoolantsysteyveragetemperatureisabove350P',asinglereactorcooltloapprovidessuficientheatO~removalcapabilityforremvingdecay,heat;however,singlefailureconsiderationsquireoneloopbeinoperationandthe.otherloopbecapablefremovingheatvia,naturalcirculation.Whenthereactorclantsystemaveragetemperatureisbetween200'Pand350'Pwhileincoldshutdown,asinglereactorXEcoolantloopoRHRloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforremovindecayheat;butsinglefailure.considerationsrequirethatat1sttwoloopsbeoperable.Thus,ifthereactorcoolantloopsaenotoperable,thisspecificationrequirestwoRHRiloopstob%pezable.Whentheboronconcentrationofthereactorcoolantsystemistobereducdtheprocssmustbeuniform.topreventsuddenreactivity.3r17 angesinthereactor.Nixingofthereactorcoolantwillbesuicienttopreventasuddenincreaseinreactivityifatle/astPoneractorcoolantpumporoneresidualheatremovalpump/isrunningwhilethechangeistakingplace.Theresidualheatremovalppwillcirculatetheprimarysystemvolume"napproximatelonehalfhour.Thepressurizerisof.noconcernbecauseofthelowpressurizervolumeandbecauseithepressurizerboronconcentratnwillbehigherthanthatof/therest.ofthereactorcoolant.entheboronconcentrationofthereactor//coolantsystemistoeincreased,theprocessmustbeuniformto/preventsuddenreactiviincreasesinthereactorduringsubsecpxentstartupofthereactorcooantpumps.ixingofthereactorcoolantwi11besuffic'enttmaintanauniformboronconcentration/"ifat-leaseonereactorcoolanpumpisrunningwhilethechange/istakingplace.Emergencybor'onwithoutareactor'coolantpumpinoperationisnotprohibitedbythisspecification.Prohibitingreac"orcoolant/pumpstartswithoutalargevoidinthepressurizeorwithotalimitedRCStemperaturedifferentialwillpreventRCSoverpxrhssurizationdueto'expansionofcoolerRCSwaterasit.entersawarmersteamgeneratar.A38%levelin/'hepressurizer'iX'1accommodatetheswellresul~tingfromareactorcoolantpumpstartwithaRCStemperatueof140'Pand/steamgenerator'econdarysidetemperatureof340'F,d'orthemaximumtemperaturewhichu"-allyexistspriortocoolingthereactorwiththeRHRsystem.IP emperaturerequirementsforthesteamgeneratorcorrespondwithmeasuredNDTfortheshellandallowablethermalstressesinthetube.sheet.Eachof'>thepressurizercodesafetyvalveszsdesignedtori@eve288>000lb's.perhr.ofsaturatedsteamatthevalveset/point.0Below350Fand350psiginthereactorcoolantsystemi'heIresidualheatremovalsystemcanremovedecayheata'ndtherebycontrolsystemteeratureandpressure.Ifnorsidualheatwererremovedbyanyoftmeansavailable<theamontofsteamwhichcouldbegeneratedatafetyvalvereliefpssurewouldbelessthanhalfthevalves'acity.Onevalv<therefore>providesadequatedefenseagainstovrpressurizion.Thepoweroperatedreliefvals(POVs)operatetorelieveRCSpressurebelowthesettingofthressurizercodesafetyvalves.These.reliefvalveshaveremoteycratedblockvalvestoprovide~apositiveshutoffcapability"shouldreliefvalvebecomeinoperable.Theelectricalpowerforbththereliefvalvesandtheblockvalvesiscapableofbeingsuppl'ed'romanemergencyE/powersourcetoensuretheabilitytosealtispossiblekCS/tleakagepath.The+/requirementthat100kwofpessurizerheatersandtheirassociatedcontrolsbecapableofbeingsuppliedelectricalpolerfromanemergencybusprovidesassrancethat/'heseheaterscanbeenergizedduringalossofoffsite.power'f/conditiontomaintainnaturalcirculationathotshutdow~anddurincooldown.3.1-9AmendmentNo.9 eactorCoolantSystemVentsRectorCoolantSystemVentsareprovidedtoexhaustnoncon-jdenselegasesand/orsteamfromtheprimarysystemthatcouldinhibitnaturalcirculationcorecooling.Theoperabilityofat/Sjleastoneeactorcoolantsystemventpathfromthereactorvesself/headandonefromthepressurizersteamspaceensuresthe/capabilityexisstoperformthisfunction.Thevalveredundacyofthereactorcoolantsystemventpathsi/~.servestominimizeeprobabilityofinadv'ertentorirreversibleactuationwhileensurithatasinglefailureofaventvalve>IpowersupplyorcontrolstemdoesntpreventisolationoftheIventpath.t~estingrequirementsofthereactorcoolantsystemventsypts,/requirementsofItemII.B.1<ofNUR/ActionPlanRequirements"pNovemberReferences(1)FSARSection14'1.6(2)FSARSection7,2.3(3}LetterfromIZD.Nhite<Jr.toOctober17i+979/areconsistentwiththe0737IClarificationofTNI180.D.L.Zieann>USNRC>dated3.l-9aAmendmentNo.9 HeatuaandCooldownLimitCurvesforNorm10orma0eration'hereactorcoolanttemperatureredprpressureandystem.heatupandcooldownrates(withtheexceptionofthepressurizer)shallbelimitedinaccordancewithFigures3.1-1and3.1-2forthefirst21'effectivefullpoweryears.Allowablecombinationsofpressureandtemperatureforspecifictemperaturechangeratesarebelowandtotherightofthelimitlinesshown.Theheatupandcooldownratesshallnotexceed60'F/hrand100'/hr,respectively.Limitlinesorcooldownratesbetweenthosepresentedmaybeobtainedbyinterpolation.Figures3.1-1and3.1-2definelimitstoassure"revent'onoEnon-ductilefailureonly.ThelimitnesshowninFigures3.1-1and3.1-2shallberecalculatedperiodicallyusingmethodsaiscussedintheBasisSection.C.ZfthelimitsonFigures3.1-1and3.1-2areexceeded,restorethetemperatureand/orpressuretowithinthelimitwithin30minutes;andeither1211withinhours,performanengineeringevaluationtodeterminetheeffectsofcheout-of-limitconditiononthestructuralintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystemanddeterminethattheReactorCoolantSystemremainsacceptableforcontinuedoperation,or ")within6hoursbeinatleastHOTSHUTDOWN,andwithinthenext30hoursreduceRCStemperatureandpressuretolessthan200'Fand500psig,3.1respectively.esecondarysideofthesteamgeneratorotbepressurizedabovethetemperatureofthe3~l.~c)exceedhrand200't~shallnotbeusedifisbelow70'F.andcooldownratesshaXlnotF/hr,respectively.Thesprayemperaturedifferencebetweenthepurizerandthesprayfluiater Bsis'ractureTouhnessPropertiesCapsuleT.Thefracturetoughnesspropertiesof'heferritic/materialsintheractorvesselaredeterminedinaccordancewiththeSummer1965Section!'IIIofthe~ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,,Reference(1),)/adASTNE185,Reference(2),andin'ccordancewithaddtionalreactorvesselrequ'irements.ThesepropertiesarethenevaluatedinaccordancewithAppendix/6ofthe1972SummerAddendatoSectionIIIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode.<Reference/(3)andthecgculstionmethodsdescrihedinReference/(4).Theresultsare'eportedinReference(5)for7'I'g1fIiITheheatupanc'oolaowncurvesare"basedonnominal/pressure-tern'perarureiq6ications.Sufficientconservator.smexistsinthe'.algorithmfromwhichthecurves,~werederivedtoaccountforinstiument/uncertainties.!TEXTDELETEDadmetNo.J5.483.1-11 /Theemperaturerequirementsforthesteamgeneratorcorres,ondswiththemeasuredNDTfrtheshellofthesteamgeerator.IIIAtemperatudifferenceof320'Fbetweenthepressur-'zeranreactorcoolantsystemmaintains'(2)(3)(4)(5)stresseswith'epessurizerspraynozzlebelowdesign'-mits.ASNEBoiler~ndPressureiVesselCodeSectionIII(Summer196MASTME185SurveillanceTestsonStructuralMaterialsinNuclerReactorsASMEoilerandPressureVessel'Code,SectionIII,Summ1972Addenda(noteCodeClass1514)RelatoryGuide1.99,Rev.2,May1988,"RadiationrittlementofReactorVesselMaterials."WestinghouseReport,"RochesterGasandElectricReactorVesselLifeAttainmentP3.an",datedMarch1990.'AmementNo.JS,483~112 RCS/'zsaaSSURE(PSIG)2250LITINGMATERIALCIRIALVBLDLIMIT1/4TRTndt210'FLIMIT3/4TRTndt178'FHYDROLIMIT20001750~)XI1500UNACCEPTLEOPERATIO~.125060F/HR750OFERATIONX329'F2500'050Figue3.1-1:200250300350RCSTEMPERATURE(DEGF)150<sozooGinnaReactorVessel.HeatupLimitationshpgl'icableforthefirst21EFPYusingRegGuide1.99,~kiev.2 RCPRESSURE(PSIG)2500I'isI/~//22502000\1750LITINGMATERIALCIRFERENTIALOLDLIMIT1/4TRTndt210FLIMITIN3/4TRTndt178'F~~i1500UNACCEPTOPERATION125010007505002500'P/HR20'F/HR',40'F/HR60'F/HR100'P/HRACCEPTABLEOPERATION'0'50100150200250300350400450500RCSTEMPERATURE(DEQF)Figure3.1-2:GinnaReactorVesselCooldovnLimitationsAyplcab?eforthefirst21EPPYusingRegGuide1.9%,Rev.2.J 3.1-33.1.3.1MinimumConditionsforCriticalitExcept'.duringlowpowerphysicstests,thereactoshallnotbemadecriticalatatemperaturebelow500'F,andifthemoderatetemperaturecoefficientismorepositivethana.5ycm/F(below70percentofratedthermalpower)Ib.0pcm/F(at,orabove70percentofratedthermalpower)~1~e~aeshallthereactorbemadecritiovedtotheleftoft'imitlinesho~won3.1-1ofthesespecifications.3.1.3.3Whenthereactorcoolanttemperatueisbe'owtheminimumtemperaturespecif'edabo've,threactorshallbesubcriticalbyanamounteoualtoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityinsertionduetodepressurizatin.BasPreviouss"yanalyseshaveassume'8thatforDesignBasis~Events(DBE)init~dfromthehotzeropowerorPrgherpowerJcondition,themoderatoreraturecoefident(MTC)wase'ther',zeroornegative..!1)(2)Begirsin'ycle14,thesa=etyanalyses':'haveassumedthatamaximumof+5pcs'Fcanexis"upto70%3power.Analyses.havown'thatthedesigncr'texiacanbe(3)satisfiedfoeD~E'swiththisassumption.A"greMmrthangI,70%potheMTCmustbezeroornega"ive. ThlimitationsonMTCarewaivedforlowpowerphysicsteststo'erm'easurementoftheMTCandotherphysicsdesignparameters/uringthesetestsspecialoperatingprecautions/lofinteest.D/'illbeten./Thereguirementhatthereactorisnottobemadecriticalaboveandtotheeftofthecriticalitylimit'ovidesincreased"assurancethatthepoperrelationshipbetweenreactorcoolantpressureandtemperatu'willbemaintaindduringsystemheatup~andpressurization.Heaptothisteeraturewillbeaccomplishedbyoperatingthereactorcoolantpus.0,Ifthespecifiedshutdownmargin%ismaintained,thereisnopossibilityofanaccidentalcriticalityasaresultofanincreaseinmoderatorternratureor'a,decreaseofcoolantpressure.Reference(1)FSARTable3.2.1-1(2)FSARFigure3.2.1-8(3)SafetyEvaluationforR.E.R~~~~OptimizedFuelAssemblies;November1983.GinnaTransitionto14x14WestinghouseElectricCorporation, 3.1.4MaximumCoolantActivit.3.1.41SecificationsHheneverthereactoriscriticalorthereactorcoolantasaveragetemperatureisgreaterthan500'F:Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshall~CQZ.Q,LV~mKi4owC.notexceed84/EpCi/gm,whereEistheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesperdisintegrationinMev;b..TheI-131equivalentoftheiodineactivityinthec03.A.lte~ACereactorcoolantshallnotexceed0.2pCi/gm.'httPAThei-131eguiva]entoftheiodineactivityon~thelsecondarysideofasteamgeneratorshallnotexceed0.1/pCi/gm.d.'1Ifthelimitof3.1.4.l.aisexceeded,thenbe~o3.~'subcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessC~4hv~cthan500'Fwithin.8hours.3~14~3L~Z.+,i4No~QasIftheI-131equivalentactivityinthereactorcoolantexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.bbutislessthantheallowablelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,operationmaycontinueforupto168hours.AmendmentNo.$7,583~121 Thereactormaybetakencriticalor.reactorcoolantaveragetemperaturemaybeincreasedabove0a500FwiththeI-131equivalentactivitygreaterthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.baslongastheprovisionsofthisparagrapharemet,.b.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.3..bformorethan168hoursduringonecontinuoustimeintervalorexceedsthelimitshownonF'igure3.1.4-1,besubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500Fwithin8hours.gQ0c.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.b,thenperformsamplingandanalysisasrequiredbyTable4.1-4,item4a,untiltheactivityisreducedtolessthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.b.3.1.4.4Lcd~'-">>Ifthelimitof3.1.4.1.cisexceeded,thenbeathotshutdownwithin8hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing32hours.temsThetotalactive.'tfortheprimarysystemespondstooperationwiththeplantdesi'%fueldefects.Radiationshielding'andtheradioactivewastedisposa ~--(eredesignedforoperationwith1$defects~Thelimitfor(2)secndaryiodineactivityisconservativelyestablishedwithIrespettothelimitsonprimarysystemiodineactivity'ndprimary-o-secondaryleakage(Specification3'.5-2)Iftheactivitysouldexceedthespecifiedlimitsfollowingapowertransientthmajorconcernwouldbewhetheradditionalfueldefectshaddevlopedbringingthetotalto'above1%defects.0'~.Appropriateactiontobetakentobringthe'activitywithinspecificationincludoneormoreofthefollowing:gradualIdecreaseinpowertoaowerbasepowers,'ncreaseinletdownjrBlowrate,andventingo&thevolume,icontroltan'kgasestothe/~gasdecaytanks.Thespecifiedactivitylimitsprovideprotectiontothepublicagainstthepotentialreleasefreactorcoolantactivityto/theatmosphere,asdemonstratedby'the:analysisofasteamgenerator(3)tuberuptureaccident.IThe500Ftemperatureithespecificationcorrespondsatsaturation.to681psia,whichisbelowthesetpointofthesecondarysidereliefvalves.Thefore,potentialprimarytosecondaryleakageatatemperature,below500Fcanbecontainedby,closing.thesteam/lineisolationvalves-

    References:

    /(1)FSAR.Table9'-5(2)FSRSection11.1.31,(3)etterdatedSeptember24,1981fromDennisM.Crutchfiegd,USHRC,toJohnE.Maier,RG&E. il50~l-<<-f'-J200I'<<IUiV.CC"-trn.sLr=OVL=RnT<OMOMO150lfp<<OOOOPQ10050+TtlfI':CCL<<'/l"l'.0LEO'PI:-F<<'iKYlOM-PllHfI<<l0~;~l~203040506070809000.12@i/gmZ-1~PerePERCENTOPRATEDTHE&$ALPOWERFigure3.1.4-'131EcuivalentReactorCoolan"SpecificActivityLi.-.,itVersus-.,entoRatedThermalPower RCSLeakageDetectionSystems3.1.5.1.1WithanRCStemperaturegreaterthan350'F,twoofthecc.o=.~.~Sfollowingleakdetectionsystems,includingonesystemsensitivetoradioactivity,shallbeinoperation.a.Thecontanmentairparticulatemonitorb.Thecontainmentradiogasmonitorc.Thecon"ainmentatmospherehumiditydetectord.Thecontainmentwater'nventorymonitoringsystem3.1.5.1.2Whenasystemsensitivetoradioactivityisnotoperable,'.1.5.2operationmaycontinueforupto30daysprovidedgrabsampleso=thecontainmentatmosphereareobtainedandanalyzedatleastonceevery24hours.Otherwisebeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandhavetheRCStempeiaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.RCSLeakageLimits3.1.5.2.1WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,RCSleakageshallbelimitedto:a.Voleakage,ifknowntobethroughanRCSpressureboundarysuchasapipe,vesselorvalvebody,b.10gpmfromaknownleakagesourceotherthantheabove,c.1gpmfrom,anunidentifiedleakagesource,d..1gpmtubeleakageinonesteamgeneratorwhenaveragedover24hours. 3.1.5.2.2Ifthelimitsspecifiedaboveareexceededthefollowingactionisrequired.a.WithanyRCSpressureboundaryleakage,asdefinedtCO3.R.<3in3.1.5.2.1.a,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Finthefollowing6hours.b.Withleakageinexcessof3.1.5.2.1borc,reduce.leakageratetowithinlimitswithin4hoursorbeinho"shutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'FwithinthefollowingC-<0$.t'..t3C.6hours.Withsteamgeneratortubeleakageinexcessof3.1.5.2.1d,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Fwithinthefollowing6hours.Ifmorethansixmonthshaveelapsedsincethelaststeamgeneratorinspection,performaninspectioninaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification4.2.israteisofsufficientWaterintorybalances,monitoringequipment,boricacidcrystalline.=.deposits,andsicalinspectionscandisclosereactorcoolan~\leaks.Anyleakofioactivefluid,whetherornot.'sfromthereactorcoolantsystempXssureboundary,beaseriousIlproblemwithrespecttoin-plantra'oivitycontaminationoritcoulddevelopintoastillreseriou~roblemiftheleakageIlgnitudetoeffectcoolinfthereactorfIcore;and,thore,firstindicationsofsuchleakageouldbeinves'tedassoonaspracticable.endmentHo.243.1-26 leakageistothecontainment,itspresencemaybeindicatedbyeormoreofthefollowingmethods:Thecontainmentairparticulatemonitorissensitive/tolowleakrates.Therateofleakagetowh'ich/ytheinstramerrtissensitiveis0.013gprrwithintwentyminutes,assumingthepresenceof'orrosionproductactivity.b.C.d.Thecontainmentradiogasmonitoris'esssensitive/butcanbeusedasabackuptotHeairparticulatemoni"or'.l,Thesensitivityrangeoftheinstrumentisapproximately2gpmtogreaterthan10gpm./Thehumicity'.detectorpre@idesabackuptoa.andb.l~mThesensitivity;rangefthisinstrumentisfrom.approximately2gpmPo10gpm./Aleakagedetectisystemwhichdeterminesleakagefromwaterandteamsy,stemswithinthecontainmentcollectsandeasuresmoisturecondensedfromthecontainmenatmospherebycoolingcoilsofthemainrecircultionunits.Thissystemprovidesadepenbleandaccuratemeansofideterminingtotalleaage,includingleaksfromthecoolingcoils.Tissystemcandetectleakagefromproximately.!1/2gpmto10gpm./'mendmentNo.243.1-27 Indicationofleakagefromtheabovesourcesshouldbecauseforahinvestigationandcouldrequireacontainmententryandlimitdinsctionatpowerofthereactorcoolantsystem.Visualinectionproceaures,i.e.,lookingforsteam,floorwetnessorboricac'd\crystalformations,exu1dbeused.specificat'on.IAmendmentHo.24Itshouldenotedthatdetectionsystemssensitivetoradioactivitywillhavean>indicationthatissensitivetothecoantactivityandthelocationoftheleakaswellastheleakrate.Alsosinceleakagedirectlyintothecontainmentcouldbefromaivarietyofsources'zsuchasthecomponentcoolingsystem,thel'li'E.servicewatersystem~.thesecondarysystem,thereactormake-upwatersystem,thechemi'calandvolumectrolsystem,theseal/injectionsystem,thesar'plingsystem>~aswellastheprimary/coolantsystem,anincrease',incontainmentairmoistureorsumpCactuationdoesnotnecessarilymeanaprimarysystemleak.WaterIiinventorybalances,liquidwaste.activitiesandtritiumcontenticanallbeusecindeterminingthe;natureofaleakinsidethecontainment.Ifleakageistoanothersystem,itwi11bedetectedbytheplantradiationmonitorsaAd/orwaterinventory,control.WhenthesourceoSleakagehasbeeninvestigated,thesituationcanbeevaluatetodetermineifoperationcabecontinuedsafely.Thievaluationwillbewithinthecri'teriaofthis(3.1-28 valvebodyinthecoolantsystempressurebodarycompromisestheintegrityofthatsyterndignificantlyalterstheprobabilityofalos-of-clantaccidentoccurring.Therefo,promptshudownofthereactororisolatioftheleakingcomponentisrequiredtoreduceAheconsequencesothi'ventorpreventitsccurrence.b.Theident'fiedleakagerateisrestrictedtolessthan25mohthecoolantake-upcapabilitywiththeminimum'hargingcpacitypoweredbyemergencypowe.Thisdbesaowforfurtherdegradationofthesystemdurintheevaluationandshutdownprocesswithasuyncethatadequatecoolingmake-upcapabilityexists.It'hemaximumallowablexcoolantaa4ivityexisted,the10gpmleakratewouldn6tresultindos'esinexcessoftheannual,averseallowedby10CFRPart20.Shouldapostulaedtransientoraccident'occur(suchasarodegectionorsteamlinebreakaccident),thehiftheprimaryto/secondarylakrateislimitedto0.1gpmpe'r<.steamgenerator,thesite)boundarydosewouldbemaintainedwell~.withintheguide-linesandallsteamgeneratortubeswouldmaintaintheirintegrity.Continuousoperabilityoftwosystemsofdiverseprinciplesisdesiredtoassuresomesurveillanceofcoolantleakage.howev<<II'/a3.1-29AmendmentNo.24 duetotheredundancyofsystemsdesignedtomonitordegradothereactorcoolantpressureboundary,provisionsforhorttedegradationofonesystemorlongtermsubstitutiofsystemdonotmaterially.alterthedegreeofsafety.

    Reference:

    "(1)FSARSe'on11.2.3,14.2.4//j/PendmentNo.24 3.1.6~~MaximumReactorCoolantOxven,Fluoride,andChlorieConce..t"ation3.1..1WithanRCStemperatureabove200'F,theRCSchistryshallbemaintainedwithinthefollowinglimis.Contaminant*ygenChio>deSteady'-StateLimit(m)O.100.15TnsientLiltm1.001.503.1.6.23.1.6'3.1.6.4F"uor=~e1.50Withan"neormoreofthechestryparametersinexcessc=~i+s,SteadyStatetiit,hutwithinitsTrans'entLimz,restoretparametertowithinits0.15tureo200':withihhefollowing30hours.Withanyoneormoreof'<hechemistryparametersinIexcesscitsTransientLirtjt,beinatleasthotshutdownwitin6hoursandbelowanRCStemperature/of200'F%thinthefollowing3hoursandperformanengzpeeringevaluationinaccoancewith3.1.6.5.!/WithheRCStemperatureatorbelo~00'F,theRCSchistryshallbemaintainedwithintMfollowingimits.SteacyStateLim'tvithi24hoursorbeinat.leasthotshutdownwithi6/oursandbelowanRCStempera-TransientLzitmSaturatedOxygenNormalLimitSaturatedLimitsforOxygennotapplicablebelow250'F.endmentHo.243.1-31 ChlorideFluoride0.150.151.501.503.1.6.5theconcentrationofchlorideorfluorideexceeds.ctheStdvStateLimitformorethan48hours,orexceedstheansient:LimiCaizrtaintheRCSpressurelessthan500psigperformanengineeringevaluationoftheeffectsdftheouoflimitconditionsonthestructu-integrityoftheRCThisevaluations1determinethatthe.RCSremainscceptableforBasas:continuedoperationpriortoandpressureabove200'FandincreasingRCS~temperature500psigrespectively.maintIinerintegrittimedependentnatureofanyaeeeffectsarisingf-omoxygen,chloride,andfluorideconcentration'xcessofthelimits,itrisunnecessarytoshu+downimmediatelysicetheconditioncanbecorrected.Ts,theperiodof24hoursfcorrectiveactiontorestore.ncentrationswithinthelimitshasbenestablished.Iftheorrectiveactionhasnotbeeneffectiveatthe~endoftheainingtheoxygen,chlorideandfluorideconcentrationseactorcoolantbelowthenormallimitsasspecified,the.oftheReactorCoolantSystemisassuredunderall.<operatingcoitions(1).Ifnormallimitsareexceeds,measurescanbetakentorrectthecondition,e.g~,replacementofionexchangeresin,theditionofhydrazinedurjPgsuhcriticaloperation,oradjustmentfthehydrogenoncentrationinthevolumecontroltank(2)duri'owerHoperation.BecauseoftheaAnendmenthalo.Rk3.1-32 4hourperiod,thentheRCSwillbebroug.tbelow200'Fandoftheprimycoolantsyrestorethec".tani.".antcintheeventsu1'ritsoncentrationstowithinecificationlimits.wereexceeded,mixingpftheprimarycoolantpumpsmayberequir.Thiswillresultwiththereactoroolancorectiveactionwillcontinue.Theeffectsofcontaminantsintheeactorcoolantaretemperaturedependent.Itisconsistetherere,topermitasteadystateconcentrationinexcessflimittexistforalongerperiodoftimeatthecolderStemperatusandstillprovidetheassurancethatthe'egritystemwillbemaintained.IordertoinasmallheatupoSshortdurationandwi1notincreasethe,

    Reference:

    (1)FSAR,Section4.2(2)FSAR,Section9.2/.~AmendmentWo.24 WithonlyoneoftherequiredboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCSoperable,restoreatleasttwoboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCStooperablestatuswithin72hours,orwithinthenext6hoursbeinatleasthotshutdownandboratedtoashutdownmarginequivalenttoatleast2.45%deltak/katcold,noxenonconditions.Eftherequirementsof3.2.2arenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional7days,thenbeincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.WhenevertheRCStemperatureisgreaterthan2004FandisbeingcooledbytheBHRsystemandtheover-pressureprotec-tionsystemisnotoperable,atleastonechargingpumpshallbedemonstratedinoperableatleastonceper12hoursbyverifyingthatthecontrolswitchisinthepull-stopposi- ~~~HevJe'<<aAlwwf4vg~~effp1$~I+cPog<lM)~(4)Refuelingwaterstoragetankviagravityfeedthroughmanualbypassvalve358tothesuctionofthechargingpumps.Availableflowpathsfromthechargingpumpstothereactorcoolantsystemincludethefollowing:(1)ChargingflowpaththroughAOV392AtotheRCSLoopBhotleg.(2)ChargingflowpaththroughAOV294totheRCSLoopBcoldleg.(3)Sealinjectionflowpathto0hereactorcoolantpumps.Therateofboricacidinjectionmustbesufficienttooffsetthemaximumadditionofpositivereactivityfromthedecayofxenonafteratripfromfullpower.Thiscanbeaccomplishedthroughtheoperationofonechargingpumpatminimumspeedwithsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Alsothetimerequiredforboricacidinjectionallowsforthelocalalignmentofmanualvalvestoprovide.thenecessaryflowpaths.ThequantityofboricacidspecifiedinTable3.2-1foreachconcentra-tionissufficientatanytimeincorelifetoboratethereactorcoolanttotherequiredcoldshutdownconcentrationandprovidemakeuptomaintainRCSinventoryduringthecooldown.ThetemperaturelimitsspecifiedonTable3.2-1arerequiredtomaintainsolutionsolubilityattheupperconcentrationineachrange.ThetemperatureslistedonTablet3.2-1aretakenfromReference(4).Anarbitrary5FisaddedtotheReference(4)formargin.HeattracingmaybeusedtomaintainsolutionttemperatureatorabovetheTable3.2-1limits.Ifthesolutiontemperatureofeithertheflowpathortheboratedwatersourceisnotmaintainedatorabovetheminimumtemperaturespecified,theaffectedIflowpathmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheappropriateactionsspecifiedin3.2.sfollowed.Placxaringpumpinpull-stopwheneverthereactsoolantsystemtemperatureis>200'sbeinbyRHRwithouttheover-pressureprotectionsoperablewxvent,inadvertentoverpres-IsurizatheRHRsystemshouldletdownbetermina

    References:

    (1)(2)(3)UFSARSection9.3.4.2RG&EDesignAnalysisDA-NS-92-133-00"BASTBoronConcentrationReductionTechnicalSpecificationValues"datedDec.14,1992Zr.letterA.Schwencer,NRC-'Reac-torVesselOverpressuatedFebruary24,1977endmentN3.2-4 l3,'pa;d.e.gh.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof3SO'F,tworesidual~heatremovalpumpsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCSt'emperatureof350'F,"'-c-es-ouai.heatremovalheatexchangersareoperable.Attheconditionsrequiredinathrougheabove,allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromthefollowingvalveswiththevalvesintheooenposition:safetyinjectioncoldleginjectionvalves878BandD.A.C.powershallberemovedfromsafetyinjectionhotleginjectionvalves878AandCwiththevalvesclosed.D.C.controlpowershallbe.removedfromrefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliveryvalves896A,896Band856withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,checkvalves853A,853B,867A,867B,878G,and878Jshallbeoperablewithlessthan5.0gpmleakageeach.TheleakagerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.2.1arestill-applicable.Aboveareactorcoolantsyst:empressureof1600psig,+.exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,A.C.power)shallberemovedfromaccumulatorisolationvalves8417aand865withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromSafetyInjectionsuctionvalves82'5AandBwiththevalvesintheopenposition,andfromvalves826A,B,C,Dwiththevalvesintheclosedposition. (3.3.1.233~13Iftheconditionsof3.3.l.laarenotmet,thensatisfytheconditionwithin1hourorbeathotshutdowninthenext6hoursandatleastcoldshutdownwithinandditiona30hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.lband3.3-1.1imaybemodifiedtoallowoneaccumulatortobeinoperableorisolatedforuptoonehour.Zftheaccumulatorisnotoperableorisstillisolatedafteronehour,thereactorshallbeplacedinhoticshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCSpressureof1600psigwithinanadditional6hours.'.3.1.4Therequirementsof3.3.1.1cmaybemodifiedtoallowonesafetyingectionpumptobeinoperableforupto72hours.Ifthepumpisnotoperableafter72hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCStemperaturelessthan3504Fwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.ldthroughh.maybemodifiedtoallowcorn'ponents.tobeinoperableatanyonetime.MorethanonecomponentmaybeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthatonetrainoftheECCSisoperable.Iftherequirementsof3.3.1.ldthroughh.arenotsatisfiedwithinthetimeperiodspecifiedbelow,thereactorshallbeplaced.inhotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan3504Finanadditional6hours.h)Aha~OneresidualheatremovalpumpmaybeoutofserviceIprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours. b.OneresidualheatremovalheatexchangermaybeoutofIcfserviceforaperiodofnomorethan72hours.Anyvalve,interlock,orpipingrequiredforthefunc-tioninqofonesafetyinjectiontrainand/oronelowheadd.safetyinjectiontrain(RHR)maybeinoperableprovidedCrepairsarecompletedwithin72hours(exceptasspeci-fiedine.below).Powermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferencedin3.3.1.1gforthepurposesofvalvetestingprovidednomorethane.13.w<onesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingiscompletedandpowerremovedwithin12hours.//Thosecheckvalvesspecifiedin3.3.1.1hmaybeinopera-ble(greaterthan5.0cpmleakage)providedtheinlineMOVsarede-energizedclosedandrepairsarecompletedwithin12hours.ed

    3~3~j~7~~IS,.x3.3.1.7.1l3.glb'xcept'uringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetestingorwhenthevesselheadisremoved,orthesteamgeneratorprimarysystemmanwayisopen,nomorethanonesafetyinjectionpumpshallbeoperablewhenevertheoverpressurizationprotectionisprovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.(3.15.1.b).Wheneveronlyonesafetyinjectionpumpmaybeoperableby3.3.1.7,atleasttwoofthethreesafetyinjectionpumpsshallbeverifiedinoperable,asdefinedintheBasisforthissection,aminimumof3.3.1.8Concepertwelvehours.Exceptduringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetestingorwhenthevesselheadisremoved,orthesteamgeneratorprimarysystemmanwayisopen,allthreesafetyinjectionpumpsshallbeinoperablewandsafetyinjectiondischargepathstotheRCS.3318isolatedwheneveroverpressureprotectionisprovidedbythepressurizerPORVs(3.15.1.a).Wheneversafetyinjectionpumpsarerequired'obeinoperableby3.3.1.8,thesafetyinjectionpumps\Q,~'i'i'hallbeverifiedinoperable,asdefinedintheBasisofthissection,aminimumofoncepertwelvehours.SimilarlysafetyinjectiondischargepathstotheRCSshallbeverifiedtobeisolatedaminimumofoncepertwelvehours.

    Therequirementsof3.3.1.8maybemodifiedtoallowoperationofoneSXpumpprovidedtheassociatedpathstotheRCS.areisolatedbyA.C.powerbeingremovedtothedischargeNOVsintheclosedposition,orthemanualisolationvalvesclosed.Isolationofthedischargepathsshallbeverifiedatleastonceper12hours. 3.3.53.3.5.13.3.5.2ControlRoomEmerencvAirTreatmentSstemTheRCStemperatureshallnotbeatorabove350opunlessthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemisoperable.Therecvirementsof3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallowthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemtobeinooerableforaperiodof48hours.Ifthesystemisnotmaceoperablewithinthose48hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotsnutdownwithinthenex6hoursandtheRCStemperaturelessthan350'Finanadditonal'hours. teactorcoolanttonearoperatingtemperaturebyrunningtheReactoCoantPumps.Thereactoristhenmadecriticalbywithdrawin(1)controrodsand/ordilutingboroninthecoolant.Withthisodeofstartutheenergystoredinthereactorcoolantduringeapproachtocriticaliissubstantiallyequaltothatduringpowerperationandthereforeallenineeredsafeguardsandauxiliarycoingsystems,withtheoneexception<onefancooler,asdiscussedelow,arerequiredtobefullyoperable.uringlowtemperatureysicstests,thereisanegligibleamountofstredenergyintheeactorcoolant,thereforeanaccidentcomparableinsveritytothDesignBasisAccidentisnotpossible,andtheengineeredseguassystemsarenotrequired.Theoperablestatusofthevarioussystemsandcomponentsistobedemonstratedbyperiodictestsnthepecifications.AlargefractionofthesetestswillbeperforedwhilethreactorisoperatingintheIpowerrange.Ifacompentisfoundtobe/inoperable,itwillbepos-sibleinmostcasestoeffectrepairsandrestorethesystemtofulll}~operabilitywithinrelativelyshorttime.Forainglecomponenttobeinoperableesnotnegatetheabilityofthesystetoperformitsfunction,b+itreducestheredundancyprovidedinthe'actordesignandtherylimitstheabilitytotolerateaddtionalequipmetfailures.Toprvidemaximumassurancethattheredundantcomponent)will,30 'I~operateifrequiredtodoso,theredundantcomponent(s)aretobe~'esdpriortoinitiatingrepairoftheinoperablecomponent.Ifdevelopsgiat(a)theinoperablecomponentisnotrepairedthinthespecifiedallobletimeperiodor(b)asecondcompoentinthesameorrelatedsystemifoundtobeinoperable,theeactorwill,initiallybeputinthehotshutdownconditiontopro'forreductionofthedecayheatfromthefuel,andnsentreductionofcoolingrequire-mentsafterapostulatedloss-ocoontaccident.Thiswillalsoper-mitimprovedaccessforpairsinsomeases.Afteralimitedtimeinhotshutdown,iftmalfunction(s)arenotcrected,thereactorwillbeplaced'hecoldshutdowncondition,utilizinnorm'L'htdownandcool@ownprocedures.Inthecoldshutdowncondition,ereisnopos'bilityofanaccidentthatwouldreleasefissionproductsoramagethefuelelements.Theplantoperatingprocedureswi11requireimmediateactiontoeffectrepairsofaninoperablecomponent,andthereforeinmostcasesrepairswillbecompletedinlessthanthespecifiedallowablerepairtimes.Furthermore,thespecifiedrepairtimesdonotapplytoregularlyscheduledmaintenanceoftheengineeredsafeguardssystems,whichisnormallytobeperform'edduringrefuelingshutdowns.Thelimitingtimestorepairarebasedon:r(1)Assuringwithhighreliabilitythatthesafeguardsystemwillfunctionproperlyifrequiredtodoso.3-3-10 3e13OverressureProtectionSstemAalicabilitl<Q3.<l.'i2-~5.VaApplieswheneverthetemperatureofoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsis<330F,ortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemisxnoperation.ObectiveTopreventoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantsystemandtheresidualheatremovalsystem.Secification3.15.1Lc,oExceptduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestsinwhichRCSpressureistoberaisedabovethePORVsetpoint,atleastoneofthefollowingover-pressureprotectionsystemsshallbeoperable:a.Twopressurizerpoveroperated,reliefvalves(PORVs)withaliftsettingof<424psig,orb.Areactorcoolantsystemventof>1.1=squareinches.'.15.'.1'5i.(3.'5.1.23.15.1.3WithonePORVinoperable,eitherrestoretheinoperablePORUtooperablestatuswithin7daysordepressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)withinthenext8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.WithbothPORVsinoperable,depressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)within8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.sureprotectionsystemt'~ete'nRCSorRHBSpressuretra'ereported.in-ccordancee~eAraRCSventopeningaterthan1.1square'nsuresthat)theRCSwillbeprotectedtransientswhichcouldexceedthelimitsoxGto10t50whenoneormoreoftheegsare<330F'>>'.Thisre~i~opacitywill (2)~*Ire'rethat:no-,roverpressurizationofthe.RHRsystemcouldoccur."'".'Th'.entopening.protectstheRCSand'RHRSfromoverpressurizationwhenetransientislimitedtoeither1)thestartofanidXeRCPwiththsecondarywatertemperatureofthesteamgenerator<504F.!abovetheCScoldlegtemperatureor2)thestartopasafetyinjectionppand.itsinject'onintoawatersolidRCS'~~'.wTheoperabilityftwopressurizerPORVsensures~attheRCSwillheprotectedfromressuretransientswhichcould~exceedth'elim.=ts~fAppendixGto1CFRPart,50whenoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsare<330F'.hisreliefcapacitywillalsoensurethat.nooverpressurizationofeRHRsystemcould~ccur.EitherPORVhasadequaterelievingcap'litytoprotect:theRCSandRHRSfromoverpressurizationwhenthtransientslimitedtoeither1)the!startofanidleRCPwiththseconrywatertemperatureof-thesteamgenerator<504FaboveeRCScoldlegtemperatureor2)charging/letdownmismatchwithreechargingpumpsinoperation.Refrences:(1)L.D.Whit,Jr.,lettertoASchwencer,NRC,datedJuly29,977.SERorSEPTopicsV-10.3,V-11M,VII-3,"SafeShdown,"datedsepteeher29,1981.+I(3)estinghouseReport,"R.E.GinnaLowtemperatureOverpressureProtectionSystem(LTOPS)Setp-ntPhaseIIEvaluationFinalReport,"datedFebrua1991~submittedbylettertoAllenR.Johnson,NRC,:gatedFebruary15,991.r Z-kh,l,hSA2.s.<.~5A..'3.~(TABLE4.1-1MININUNFREQUENCIESFORCHECKSgCALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELSChannelDee~crition1.NuclearPowerRangeCheckSm*(3)CalibrateD(1)O*(3)Test-B/W(2)(4)P(2)(5)3.SeRemarks1)fleatbalancecalculation**2)SignaltoWT;bistableaction(permtssxve,rodst.opltraps)3)UpperandlowerchambersEoraxialoftset**4)Hzghsetpotnt(<109%of.ratedpower);.5)Lowsetpoint(<25%ot<<atedpower)2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)Range3.NuclearSourceRangeS(l)N.ADN~A~P(2)p(z)1.)Once/shaftwhenxnservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction(permissive>rodstop<trxp)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Bistableaction(alarmItrxp)4.ReactorCoolantTemperatureRX(l)(2)1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT5.ReactorCoolantFlowS6.PressurizerWaterSLevel7.PressurizerPressureSB.4KvVoltage&N.A.Frequency'eactorProtectioncircuitsonly9.RodPositionIndicationS(lg2)N.A1)Withstepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofserviceBymeansofthemovablein-coredetectorsystem.Notrequiredduringhotscold~orrefuelingshut<jownbutassoonaspossibleatterreturnE'~topouer.~ Channelesctio10.RodPositionBankCountersTABLE4.1-1(Continued)i~acc~caibrate~eetS(1,2)N.A.N.A.~e~a~s1)Hithrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice11.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlowN.A.N.A.N~ADN.A.14.BoricAcidStorageTankLevelDN.A.Note415.RefuelingHaterStorageTankLevel16,VolumeControlTankLevel17.ReactorContainmentPressure18.RadiationMonitoringSystemN.A.N.A.DRN.A.N.A.M(1)M1)IsolationValvesignalAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1719.Zxx31x21.22'3~wg5Ã.c$.320.BoricAcidControl*ContainmentDrainSumpLevelValveTemperatureInterlocksPump-ValveInterlockTurbineTripSet-PointN.A.RN.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)N.A.RN.A.1)BlockTrip24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureN.A.AmendmentNc.P574~1-6av' TABLE4.1-2HINIMUMFREUENCIESFOREUIPMENTANDSAHPLINGTESTSIgKI'Ir$l.ReactolantChemistrySam2.ReactorCoolaBoronaBs'tChlorideandFluorideBoronConcentration~Freu~IencatleastWeekp3times/weevarddaytimes/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow250F3.RefuelingWaterStoragoTankWaterSampleBoronConcentrationWeekly4.BoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankTwice/Week"'.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRodI6b.FullLengthControlRodRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedaaufficientnumberofseepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthrough'tafulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurAftervesselheadremovalandat,leastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdown4~0ta~(~7IO.pzeeetrizezZafetyZetiyeetValves=EachRefueli.ngShutdown8.9.MainSteamSafetyValvescontainmentIsolationTripSetpointFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdown10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksFunctioningPriortoRefuelingOperations7 CD55'.011.ServiceHaterSystemEachRefuelingShutdownFunctioning~tectvuvl<<htvcv'he'nv~~"~~C"tecluene12.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupplyFunc"ioningMonthly13.SprayAdditiveTankAccumulatorNaOHConcentBoronConcentrationMonthly~a,'3,15.PrimarySystemEvaluateLeakage/16.DleealpuelSupplyyuelZnventutyDailyIEDaily17.SpentFuelPit18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationCrossActivityMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingHaterFloodProtectionEquipmentCalibrateEachRefuelingShutdown'otes:(L)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.(2)~Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.(3)AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity,determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10%oftheallowablelimit.(4)HhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.ttWvavv TABLE4~1-4REACTORCOOLANTSPECIFICACTIVITYSAMPLEANDANALYSISPROGRAMTYPEOPMEASUREMENTANDANALYSIS5C3A.<g.)wjv.~1.GroscvityDetermination(beta'-gamma)(1)SrCZ.<.lc,.gz..lv.g2.IsotoAnalysisforDoseEquivalentI-131Concentra-tionSC'.N.iv,3ZP.iv.c,3.RadiocmcalforEDetermination(2)Spg'l.<<.2,4.IsotopicAhalysi.sforIodineIncludingI-131,I-133,andI-135SAMPLEANDANALYSISIFRI',QUENCYAtleastonce'per72hours1per14days1per6months(3)a)Onceper8"hours,whenevertheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.l.bMODESINWHICHSAMPLEANDANALYSISREQUIREDAbove'coldshutdownAbove5'treactorpowerAbove5%reactorpowerAsrequiredbySpecificati'on3'1.4'.c*Lt'.0.g,q,(qb)Onesamplebetween2and.10hoursfollowingareactor.powerchangeexceeding15per-centwithin-a1-hourperiodHotshutdownorabove(1)Agrossradibactivityanalysisshallconsistofthequantitativemeasurementofthetotalradio-activityoftheprimarycoolantinunits~Ci/gm.Thetotalprimarycoolantactivityshallbethesumofthedegassedbeta-gammaactivityandthetotalofallidentifiedgaseousactivitiei15minutesaftertheprimarysystemissampled.(2)Aradiochemicalanalysisshallconsistofthequantitativemeasurementoftheactivityforeachradionuclidewhichisidentifiedintheprimarycoolant15minutesaftertheprimarysystemissamplorl.%ieactivitiesfortheindividualisotopesshallbeusedinthedeterminationofE.(3)Sample,.tobetakenafteraminimumof2EFPDanddaysofpoweroperationhavecloppedsin'cereactorwaslastsubcriticalfor48hoursorlonger.Except.atrefuelingshutdown,samplingshallbecontinueduntiltheactivityofthereactorcoolantsystemisrestoredtowithinitslimits.I Table4.1-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinaSurveillanceRequirementsInstrumentChannelSourceFunctionalChannelCheckCheckTestCalihraticcIllc.TurbineBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)D(7)d.HighConductivityWaste(R-22)D(7)GrossActivityMonitor(Liquid)a.LiquidRadWaste(R-18)D(7)b.SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)R(5)R(5)R(5)R(5)~'!e.ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)f.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)PlantVentilationa.NobleGasActivity(R-14)(AlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)D(7) D(7)D(7)D(7)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)Q(1)R(5)R(5)R(5)R(5)/!b.C.ParticulateSampler(R-13)IodineSampler(R-10BandR-14A)W(7)W(7)N.A. N.A.N.A.R(5)R(5)3~SP>.q.>g<.pS<S.o.iS.>.Z,yFlowRateDeterminationN.AN.A.ContainmentPurea.NobleGasActivity(R-12)D(7)PRKVob.ticulateSampler(R-11)W(7)N-A-Q(1)R(5)R(6)Q(1)R(5)c.IodineSampler(R-10AandR-12A)W(7)N.A-MR(5)d.FlowRateDeterminationN.A.N.A.N.A.R(6)AirEjectorMonitor(R-15andR-15A)D(7)MM(2)R(5)WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorDN.A.N.A.Q(3)MainSteamLines(R-31andR-32)N.A. wrm4.2.1.1TheinspectionintervalforQualityGroupAcomponentsshallbetenyearintervalsofservicecommencingonJanuary1,1970.4.2.1.2TheinspectionintervalsforQualityGroupBandCComponentsshallbetenyearintervalsofservicecommencingwithMay1,1973,January1,1980,1990and2000,respectively.4.2.1.3TheinspectionintervalsfortheHighEnergyPipingOutsideofContainmentshallbetenyearintervalsofservice*commencingMay1,1973,January1,1980,1990and2000,respectively.Theinspectionprogramduringeachthirdofthefirstinspectionintervalprovidesforexaminationofallweldsatdesignbasisbreaklocationsandone-thirdofallweldsatlocationswhereaweldfailurewouldresultinunacceptableconsequences.Duringeachsucceedinginspectioninterval,theprogramshallprovideforanexaminationofeachofthedesignbasisbreaklocationwelds,andeachoftheweldsatlocationswhereaweldfailurewouldresultinunaccetableconsequences.4.2.1.4TheinspectionintervalsforSteamGeneratorTubesshallbeSP9'".,'~.-specifiedinthe"InserviceInspectionProgram"fortheapplicablefortymonthperiodcommencingwithMay1,1973.4.2;1.4.aSteamgeneratortubesthathave7inperfectionsgreaterthan404throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.4.2.1.4.bSteamgeneratorsleevesthathaveimperfectionsgreaterthan30%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.,5/AmendmenCog37etterofJuly3,1994.2-2 4.3~pSp.AlicabilitSCX(cAppliestosurveillanceofthecomponents.I~~~RJreactorcoolantsystemandits~-~I~8.~4ReactorVesselMaterialSurveillanceTesting4.3.1.1ThereactoivmaterialsurveilleczmensshallbeToensureoperabilityofthereactorcoolantsystemanditscomponents.Secifications:QQ,vs%removedandexam'termxesintheirmaterial4.3.24.3.2.1cgZ.i.R.lerties,asrequiredbyAppendixHto10CFRParPressurizerThepressurizerwaterlevelshallbeverifiedtobewithinitslimitsatleastonceper12hoursduringpoweroperationandhotshutdown. 4.3.3CheckValves4.3.3.1Leakagetestinoofcheckvalves853A,8538,867A,86?B,878Gand878Jshallbeaccomplishedpriortocriticality,exceot~orlowpowerphysicstesting,fo11owing(1)refoe1ing,(I.end(3)maintenance,repairorreplacementworkontheva'.ves.Leakagemaybemeasuredindirect>yfromtheperformanceofpressureindicators,systemvolumemeasurementsorbydirect.measurement.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallbegreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4forallowableleakagerates.4.3.3e2Checkvalves878Gand8780willbetestedforleakagefollowingeachsafetyinjectionflowtest.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallbeoreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4forallowableleakagerates.4.3.3.3Motor-operatedvalves8?8Aand878Candcheckvalves87?A,8778,878F,and878Hshallbetestedat,thefirstrefuelinqoutaaefollowing'thedateofthisorder*toindividuallyassureintegrityofatleasttwoothethreepressureboundariesineachhotleghigh-headsafetyinjectionpath.Testingshallalsobeperformedafteranyopeningofeithermotor-operatedvalveandataminimum,onceevery40months.Openingofthemotor-operatedvalves,andtesting,aretobeperformedat.atestpressurelessthanthatofthe lowest.designpressureofanyportionofthehigh-headsafetyinjectionsystemwhichmaybepressurizedduringthetest.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallbegreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4forallowableleakagerates.Allowablecheckvalveleakageratesareasfollows:(a)Leakagerateslessthanorequalto1.0gpmareconsideredacceptable.(b)Leakageratesgreaterthan1.0gpmbutlessthanorecpxalto5.0gpmareconsideredacceptableifIthelatestmeasuredratehasnotexceededtheratedeterminedbytheprevioustestbyanamountthatreducesthemarginbetweenmeasuredleakagerateandthemaximumpermissiblerateof5.0gpmby50%orgreater.(c)Leakageratesgreaterthan1.0gpmbutlessthanorequalto5.0gpmareconsideredunacceptableifthelatestmeasuredrateexceededtheratedeterminedbythe,previoustestbyanamountthatreducesthemarginbetweenmeasuredleakagerateandthemaximumpermissiblerateof5.0gpmby50%orgreater.(d)'eakageratesgreaterthan5.0gpmareconsideredunacceptable.~' ReliefYalvesEachPORYshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonce.per18monthsbyperformanceofaCHAHHELCALIBRATIOH.ExceptduringcoldaHdrefuelingshutdowneachblockvalveshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper92daysbyoperatingthevalvethroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelunlessthevalveisalreadyclosed.VReactorCoolantLoops3o.'awIQop~Whenreactorpowerisabove130MHt(8.5%),thereactorcoolantpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.Whentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisabove350'Fbutthereactorisnotcritical,whenthereactorisathotshutdown,orwhenthereactoriscriticalbutreactorpowerislessthanoreaualto130MNt(8.5%):a)theoperatingreactorcoolantpump(s)shallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours,andb)ifareactorcoolantpumpisnotoperating,butmustbeoperable,itshallbedemonstratedoperableonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.Whenthereactorisatcoldshutdownorwhentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisbetween200'Fand350'F,andfuelisinthereactor,thefollowingshallbeperformedtoIdemonstratealoopisoperable.Testsneednotbeper-formedifaloopis.notreliedupontosatisfythere-quirementsofSpecification3.1.1.1.e. a)-.:todemonstrateareactorcoolantloopoperable,thereactorcoolantpump(s)<ifnotinoperation>shall~4~bedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsand30.siindicatedpoweravailability.'bdemonstratearesidualheatremovalpumpisoper~hie<theillances~e'-eintheInservicePum~ndValveTest-ampreparedarsuantto10CFR50.55ashallbeperformed.4.3.5.4Whenthereactorisatcoldshutdownorwhentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisbetween200Fand350FandfuelgntSPgP%.w.P.i4.3.5.5isinthereactor>atlea'stone.coolantloopshallbeverified'tobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.Inadditiontotheaboverequirements<inorderto"-.-i.).E~wa~2,Sgdemonstratethatareactorcoolantloopisoperableithesteamgeneratorwaterlevelshallbegreaterthanoropenposxowthroughthereactorcoolantvenequalto16%ofthenarrowrangeinstrumentspan.Eachreactorcoolantsystemventpathshallbedemonsdoperableatleastonceper18montbs-My:l.VerifyingallmaisolationvesineachventpatharelockedinII2.Verifyisystemventpathsusingeitherliquidorgas.Basis.Thismaterialsurveilfracturetoughnessproperrogrammonitorschgnrp~nthe~ferrxmaterialsinthereactorvessoneregionofthereactorresultingfromeureto neuirradiationandthethermal'nvironment.Thetestda-CarobtainedfromisprogramwillbeusedtodetermineeconditionsunderwhichereactorvesselcaAeoperatedwithadequatemarginsofsafetyagar.cturethroughoutitsserviceThesurveillancereqairementsonpressurizerequintwillassure'Iproperpermanceofthepressurizerfunctionandgiveeac"IIV'in'tionofmalfunctions. OveroressureProtectionSstem11Appliestothereactorcoolantsystemoverpressuzeprotectionsystem.Obective:Toverifythattheoverpressureprotectionsystemwillfunctionproperlyifneeded.Secification4.16'.1EachPORVshallbedemonstratedoperableby:a~PerformanceofachannelfunctionaltestonthePORVactuationchannel,butexcludingvalveopera-tion,within.31dayspriortoenteringaconditioninwhichthePORVisrequiredoperableandatleastonceper31daysthereafterwhenthePORVisrequiredoperable.4.16.2'.Performanceofachannelcalibrationonthe.PORVactuationchannelatleastonceper18months.c.VerifyingthePORVisolationvalveisopenat.leastoncepez72hourswhentheoverpressureprotectionsystemisrequiredtobeoperable..TheRCSvent(s)shallbeverifiedtobeopenatleastonceper12hourswhenthevent(s)isbeingusedforoverpressuzeprotectionexceptwhenthevent,pathwayisprovidedwithavalvewhichislocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintheopenposition.Thenverifythesevalvesopenatleastonceper31days. 3.EmerencCoreCoolinSstemAuxiliarCoolinSstemsAirRecirculationFanCoolersContainmentSraandarcoalHEPAFiltersOb'e'veoseconditionsforoperationthatareneces-sary:(1)toremoveecayheatfromthecoreinemergencyorTodefinenormalshutdownsituation~(2)toremoveheatfromcontain-mentinnormalcratingandemergencysituations,(3)toremoveaiorneiodinefromthecc'retainmentatmospherend(4)tosequenttc/follingapostulatedDesignBasisAcciden-a/!'inimizecontainmentleakagetotheenvironmentsubaDesignBasisAccident.ISecificationSafetInectionandResidualHeatRemovalSstemsthefollowingconditionsaremet:a~Abovecoldshutdown,therefuelingwaterstoragetankCQ3.SAS,PSR.'tco3.5~Lb.containsnotlessthan300,000gallonsofwater,withaOOboronconcentrationofatleastppm~Q.Aboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,eachaccumulatorispressurizedtoatleast700psigwithanc~indicatedlevelofatleast50%andmaximumof824withKin<aboronconcentrationofatleast($992ppm,.~~~~-~:>>pp,qAtoraboveareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureoflb~<CD350F,threesafetyinjectionpumpsareoperable. AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof3504F,tworesidualheatremovalpumpsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,tworesidualheatremovalheatexchangersareoperable.Attheconditionsrequiredinathrougheabove,allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromthefollowingvalveswiththevalvesintheopenposition:safetyinjectioncoldleginjectionvalves878BandD.A.C.powershallberemovedfromsafetyinjectionhotleginjectionvalves878AandCwiththevalvesclosed.D.C.controlpowershallberemovedfromrefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliveryvalves896A,896Band856withthevalvesopen.PH0gypl~14PWlVOIWtuAtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,checkvalves~.853A,853B,867A,867B,878G,and878Jshallbeoperablewithlessthan5.0gpmleakageeach.Theleakage/requiiementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.2.1are/stillapplicable.iAboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,A.C.power}shallberemovedfromaccumulatorisolationvalves841and865withthevalvesopen.At.oraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromSafetyInjectionsuctionvalves825AandBwiththevalvesin'theopenposition,andfromvalves826A,B,C,D'iththevalvesintheclosedposition.r~M. 3.3-1.23.3.1.3LC02.$.iQ33.3.1.4LcoZ.S.~Iftheconditionsof3.3.1.laarenotmet,thensatisfytheconditionwithin1hourorbeathotshutdowninthenext6hoursandatleastcoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1band3.3.l.limaybemodifiedtoallovoneaccumulatortobeinoperableorisolatedforuptoonehour.Iftheaccumulatorisnotoperable,orisstillisolatedafteronehour,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursand,belovaRCSpressureof1600psigwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1cmaybemodifiedtoallovonesafetyinjectionpumptobeinoperableforupto72hours.Ifthepumpisnotoperableafter72hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelovaRCStemperaturelessthan350OFwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.maybemodifiedtoallovcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.NorethanonecomponentmaybeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthatonetrainoftheECCSisoperable.Iftherequirementsof3.3.l.ldthroughh.arenotsatisfiedwithinthetimeperiodspecifiedbelow,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdown.within6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Finanadditional6hours.a.Oneresidualheatremovalpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.3 b.lmZ.,cc~QCQ~5.2Q4~~2(NA)13.wvOneresidualheatremovalheatexchangermaybeout,ofserviceforaperiodofnomorethan72hours.Anyvalve,interlock,orpipingrequiredforthefunc-tioningofonesafetyinjectiontrainand/oronelowheadsafetyinjectiontrain(RHR)maybeinoperableprovidedrepairsarecompletedwithin72hours(exceptasspeci-fiedine.below).powermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferencedin3.3.1.1gforthepurposesofvalvetestingprovidednomorethanonesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingiscompletedandpowerremovedwithin12hours.hosecheckvalvesspecifiedin3.3.1.1hmaybei~no~eble(greater.0gpmleaka~-providedtheinlineMOVsarede-enhin12hours.closedan'rsarecompleted/ eeeopateifrequiredtodoso,theredundantcomponent(s)aretobetestepriortoinitiatingrepairoftheinoperablecomponent.Ifitdevelopthat(a)theinoperablecoznponentisnotrepairedwithithefspecifiedaowabletizneperiodor(b)asecondcomponentinesazneorrelatedsyemisfoundtobeinoperable,thereactorllinitiallybeputinthehothutdownconditiontoprovideforreductionofthedecayheatfromthefuel,andconsequentreductionfcoolingrequire-mentsafterapostulatdloss-of-coolantacciden.Thiswillalsoper-mitimprovedaccessforepairsinsoznecass.Afteralimitedtimeinhotshutdown,if'themalfction(s)areotcorrected,thereactorptythefuelelements.{{)~Assur>afunction0sos./.willbeplacedinthecoldshutwncondition,utilizingnor~~~shutdownandcooldownprocedures.Intheodshutdowncondition,thereisnoos'sibiliofanaccidentthatwouldeleasefissionproductsordamage/Theplantoperatingprocedureswillrequieimmediateactiontoeffectrepairsdfaninoperabgl'omponent,andtheaforeinmostcasesrepairs5Iwillbecompletedinnessthanthespecifiedalloablerepairtimes.Furthermore,the'pecifiedrepairtimesdonotalytoregularlyscheduledmaintenanceoftheengineeredsafeguardsstems,which/isnormaltobeperformedduringrefuelingshutdownstThelimiting/timestarepairarebasedon:fgwithhighreliabilitythatthesafeguardsystemwill/sproperlyifrequiredtod33.3-13{ (2)Allowancesofsufficienttimetoeffectrepairsvsiagproperprocedures.Aszningthereactorhasbeenoperatingatfullratedpowerfatleast0days,themagnitudeofthedecayheatdecreasessfollowsafterintianghotshutdown.eAfterShutdownDecaHeat%%uofRatedPower1min.4.53min.2.01ho1..628hours0.9648hours0.62Thus,therequirementforcorecolingincaseofa.postulatedloss-of-coolantaccidentwhileintheotshutd'nconditionissignificantlyre-ducedbelowtherequireentsforapostqtedloss-of-coolantaccidentduringpoweroperati.Puttingthereactor'nthehotshutdowncon-dition,significantreducesthepotentialconsequencesofaloss-of-lcoolantaccide;andalsoallowsmorefreeaccesstosomeoXtheen-gxneeredseguardscomponentsxnordertoeffectrepas.Failureocompleterepairswithin48hoursofgoingtothehotshutdowntcondonisconsideredindicativeofarequirementformajormainten-aceandt'eeforeinsuchacasethereactoristobeputintothecold.1shutdowncondition.%'ithrespecttothec'3~te,issmefunnalre Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps.pnlyisneededduringtheinjectionphase,andtwoarere~<iredduringtherecirculationphaseofapostulatedloss-of-coolant.accident-'ThecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemisdesignedtofilterthecontrolroomatmosphereduringperiodswhenthecontrolroomisisolatedandtomaintainradiationlevelsinthecontrolroomatacceptablelevelsfollowingtheDesignBasisAccident.'Reactoroperationmaycontinueforalimitedtimewhilerepairsarebeingmadetotheairtreatmentsystemsinceitisunlikelythatthesystemwouldbeneeded.'technicalSpecification3.3.5appl-esonlytotheeauipmennecessarytofilterthecontrolroomatmosphere.Ecruipmentnecessarytoinitiateisolationof.thecontrolroomiscove/edbyanotherspecfication.helimitsortheaccumulatorpressureand,voleassutherequiredamountofwaterinjecti'uringanaccidenandarebasedonvaluessedfortheaccidentanalys.Theindicedlevelof50'orrespondsto1108icfeetofwaterintheaccumulatorandtheinateto1134cubicfeevelof82tcorrespondsThelimita'ofn'omorethan.onesa'njectionpumpbeoperablewhenoverpressureproteconisingprovided.byaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.insure3.3-13 Channelescitio4'~~IIr~hNhTABLE4.1-1(Continued)QCeckCalibrateTestIhemars010.RodPositionBankCounters11.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlowS(1,2)N.A.N.A.N.A.H.A.1)Withrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice13.ResidualHeatRemoval.PumpFlowH.A.N.A.14.BoricAcidStorageTankLeveg...QH.A.Note4~~reslZ3,s.tl.'I15,16.RefuelingWaterH.A.StorageTankLevelVolumeControlTankN.A.LevelH.A.Ih<<IVhrI>>>>hVh.~,RN.A.a~p~~3.317.ReactorContainmentPressure18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControl20.ContainmentDrainSumpLevelDDN.A.N.A.M(1)N.A.N.A.1)IsolationValvesignalAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1721.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A;H.A.hVWSp3.F,L+22~Sg'RI$.4~23'ump-ValveInterlockTurbineTripSet-PointN.A.NBA.RN.A.M(1)1)BlockTripsr.~.s.i.z.24.AccumulatorLevelands'na.s.i,'4pressure~NIV\VVV4.1SRN.A.Srai~M"xpM"0(IWf TABXE4-1-2hTZSr0lI'.ReactorcoolantChemistrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronChlorideandFluozideOxygenBoronConcentration~Preen'times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexcept.whenbelow2504FWeeklySg.2.5.<.K3~2+.Ii.i4RofuolingWaterBoronConcantrationStorageTankWaterSample4~BoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankWeeklyTwice/Week'"S.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRod6b.FullLength!ContxolRod)RoddxoptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodposit,ionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthx'oughitsfulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdown57~t89-10PressurixersafetyValvesMainSteamSafetyValvesContainmentIsolationTripRefuelingSystem,InterlocksSetpointSetpointFunctioningFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperations 3.5,3,~,Q,/~s',0P,g-1011.ServiceWaterSystem12.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupply13.SprayAdditiveTankSRa.5.4<14.Accumulator15.PrimarySystemLeakageTestFunctioningFunctioningNaOHConcent,BoronConcentrationEvaluateFr~cgx~encEachRefuelingShutdownMonthlyMonthly~CBi-MonthlyDailyI'16.DieselFuelSupplyFuelInventoryDaily17.SpentFuelPit18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationcrossActivityMonthly72hours(2)(3)~,g,g,s,a9.3~19.CirculatingWaterCalibrateFloodProtectionEquipmentEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:(>)(3)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentact:ivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow104oftheallowablelimit.I(4)NhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.AmendmentNo.g,5743.-9 "4.3.4ReliefValves4.3.4.24.3.54.3.5.14.3.5.2EachPORYshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonce.per18monthsbyperformanceofaCHANNELCAL)BRATION..ExceptduringcoldaHdrefuelingshutdowneachblockvalveshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper92daysbyoperatingthevalvethroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelunlessthevalveisalreadyclosed.ReactorCoolantLoopsWhenreactorpowerisabove130MNt(8.5%),thereactorcoolantpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.Whentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisabove350'Fbutthereactorisnotcritical,whenthereactorisathotshutdown,orwhenthereactoriscriticalbutreactorpowerislessthanoreaualto130MNt(8.5%):a)theoperatingreactorcoolantpump(s)shallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours,andb)ifareactorcoolantpumpisnotoperating,butmustbeoperable,itshallbedemonstratedoperableonceper4353Whenthe7daysbyverifyingcorrect.breakeralignments;indicatedpcwenavailability.averagecoolanttemperatureisbetween200'Fand350'F,andfuelisinthereactor,thefollowingshallbeperformedtodemonstratealoop"isoperable.Testsneednotbe.per-formedifaloopisnot.reliedupontosatisfythere-quirementsofSpecification3.1.1.1.e4.3-4 a)--.todemonstrateareactorcoolantloopoperable,thereactorcoolantpump(s)>ifnotinoperation,shall/bedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsand/indicatedpoweravailability.5r3.s.'S,~4.3.5.4b)todemonstratearesidualheatremovalpumpisoper~hie>thesurveillancespecifiedintheInservicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.55ashallbeperformed.Hhenthereactorisatcoldshutdownor'whenthe*average>coolanttemperatureisbetween200Fand350Fandfuel00C1~isinthereactor~atleastone.coolantloopshallbeverified'tobeinoperationandcirculatingreactor4.3.5.54.3.5.6coolantatleastonceper12hours.Inadditiontotheaboverequirementsiinordertodemonstratethatareactorcoolantloopisoperableithesteamgeneratorwaterlevelshallbegreaterthanorequalto16tofthenarrowrangeinstrumentspanEachreactorcoolantsystemventpathshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper18monthsby:l.Verifyingallmanualisolationvalvesineachventpatharelockedin,theopenposition.2.Verifyingflowthroughthereactorcoolantventsystemventpathsusingeitherliquidorgas.Thismaterialsurveillanceprogrammonitorschangesinthefracturetoughnesspropertiesofferriticmaterialsinthereactor~vesselbeltlineregionofthereactorresultingfromexposureto4~3-5AmendmentNo.91 4.5SafetIn'ection,ContainmentSnraandIodineRemovalsSstemsTestssApplies.totestingoftheSafetyInjectionSystem,theContain-mentSpraySystem,andtheAirZiltratiorSysteminsideCcn-~'V'~%jtainment.Ob'ective:Toverifythatthesubjectsystemswillrespondpromptlyandperformtheirintendedfunctions,ifrequired.~,'lI'~4,5.1.1Safetln'ectionSstema.Systemtestsshallbeperformedateachreactorrefuelinginterval.Thetestshallbeperformedinaccordancewiththefollowing:Withthereactorcoolantsystempressurelessthanorequal.to350psigandtemperaturelessthanorequalto350F,atestsafetyinjectionsignalwillfromstartingbeappliedtoinitiateoperationofthesystem.The+safetytujaudresidualheatrepumpmotorsareprthetest./ ThcsystemtestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifcontrolboardindicatinandvisualobservationsAZR3.~.z,5indicatethatallvalveshavereceivedtheS"fctyinjectionsignalandhavecompletedtheirtravel.Thcproperscnuenceandtimingofthcrotating~$~~~componentsaretobcverifiedinconjunctionwithSection'4.6.1b.~.MP4.5.1.2ContainmcntSnraS~stema.Systemtestsshallbcperformedat,eachrc"ctorre-~.fuelinginterval.ThetestshalLbeperformedwithtncisolationvalves,inthcspraysupplylines,atthccon-tainmcntblocl'edcLoscd.Operationofthesystemb.isinitiatedbytrippingthcnormalactuationinstrumcn-'ation.Thcspraynor-Lcsshallbccheckedforproperfunctioninj'>atleasteveryfiveyears.\c.Thctestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifvisualobscr-vationsindicateaLlcomponentshaveoperatedsatisfac->~~'jorilq~4.5.2ComoncntTets4.5.2.1Purnnsa~ExceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdoivsthhsafetyQP-'Z.~7>Sa3.s.~.Rinjectionpumps,residualheatremovalpu-..ps,andcontainmcntspraypumpsshallbescartedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.Thepumpsshallbetestedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceedslmonth.4.'5-2 ~~~~q,~.lS03.a."r..tsaQz.i.4Cb.Acceptablelevelsofperformanceforthepumpsshallbethatthepumpsstart,operate,and,developtheminimumdischargepressurefortheflowslistedinthetablebelow:PUMPSDISCHARGEPRESSURE'ontaintSprayPum35gpm.240psigNatesResidualHeatRemovalPumps[200gpm]450gpm[140ps'g]138sigSafetyInjectionPumps[5gpm]150m[1420psig]1356psigTable4.-1Nates(1)Itemsinarebracketsare.effectivuntiltheinstallonofthenewresidualhearemovalminimflowrecirculationsystem.(2)Imsinsquarebracketsareeffectivetilnstallationofthenewsafetyinjectionminimflowrecirculationsystem.4.5.2.2Valvesa.Exceptduringcoldor.refuelingshutdownsthesprayadditivevalvesshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.Withthepumpsshutdownand.thevalvesupstreamanddownstreamArendmmtNo.334.5-3 ofthesprayadditivevalvesclosed,eachvalvewillbeopenedandclosedbvoperatoract'on.Thistestshallbeperformedpriortostartupithetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemon"'x.heaccumulatorcheckvalvesshallbecheckedoropeabilityduringeachrefuelingshutdown.'IViAi=.'"rat'on'vsemAtleastonceevery18monhsoaterevery720hoursof+.charea'i3.trationsvstemoperat'onsincethelasttest.,orol'cwingpainting,'orchem'alreleaseinanyven-tat'onzonecommunicatingwiththesystemthe"ostacc'dentcharcoalsystemshallhavethefollowingcond'"'onsdemonstratedaeThepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankis.lessthan3inchesofwateratdes'gnflowrate(~108).b.C~XnplaceFreontest'ng,underambientcond'"'ons,shashow'tleast99%removal.Theiod'neremovaleffic'encvofatleastonecharcoalfi'ercellsha'1bemeasured.Thef"er.cel'obetestedsna'1beselectedrandomlyomthosecel'swiththelongestin-hankresidencetime.Theminimumacceptablevalue.forfilterefficiencyis90%for=-mova3.o"methyliod'dewhentestedatat'east286'Pand95~BHandat1.=to20mg/m3loadingw'"htaggedCS3Z. sd.e.DPZ.S,g.~>3VaThe"estsinSpeczfxcatxon4.6.1bwillbeperformedpriortoexceedingcoldshutdownifthetimesincethelasttestexceeds31days.Atleastoncepez92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTID97S-78whencheckedforviscosity,waterandsediment.Atleast'nceper18monthsduringshutdownby:1.Inspectingthedieselinaccordancewithmanufactuzer'recommendationsforthisclassofstandbyservice.2.Verifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytorejectaloadof29SKWwithouttripping.3.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectionteusignaland:(a)Verifyingde-enezgizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses.(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfzomnormalstandbyconditionontbsauto-startsignal,energizestheautomaticallyconnectedemezgencyloadswith.thefollowingmaximumbreakerclosuretimesaftertheinitialstartingsignalforTrainsAandBnotbeingexceededABDieselplusSafetyInjection20sec22secPumpplusRHRPump.AllBreakers40sec42sec'Iandoperatesfor>fiveminuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthata11dieselgeneratortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andovercrank,areautomaticallybypassed'uponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal.AmendmentND.474.6-2 3.3.2ContainmentCoolinandIodineRemoval3.3.2.1Thereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Thesprayadditivetankcontainsnotlessthan4500ga11onsofsolutionwithasodiumhydroxideconcentrationofnotlessthan304b}weight.b.Bothcontainmentspraypumpsareoperable.c.r"ourec'culationfancoolerunitsincludingtheassociatedHEPAfilterunitswithdemistersareoperable.o.Bothpostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.e.A?:va1vesandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecorn-onentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccicen-conditionsareoperable.3.3-2~2The'quirementsof3.3.2.1maybemodifiedtoallow.com=onentstobeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthat1)thetimelimitsandotherrequirementsspecifiedI3.yginathroughfbelowaresatisfied,and2)atleast1cortat..mentspraypump,PPI"fancoolerunits,gPHEPAf'lterunitswithdemisters,and1charcoalfilterunitandallrequiredvalvesandpipingassociatedwiththesecomponentsareoperable.Iftheserequire-mentsarenotsatisfied,thereactorshallbeinhotshutdownwithin6hours.Iftherequirementsarenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional48hours,beincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.~DC'a.OneHEPAfilterunitordemisterand/orassociatedrecirculationfancoolermaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan7days.rs b.Onecontainmentspraypumpmaybeinoperableprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.Ic.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionauringaccidentconditions,maybeinoperableprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.d.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritse.associatedfancoolermaybeinoperableprovided'Itheuni"isrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.~~,~~~~p~-,~~~avM~cc~~~~Thesprayaastavesystemmaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.E~VComponentCoolinSstemThereacorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownrunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Bothcomponentcoolingpumpsareoperable.b.Bothcomponentcoolingheatexchangersareoperable.c.Allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswh'charerequ'redtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.Therequirementsof3.3.3.lmaybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowingcomponentstobeinoperableat.anyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeettheconditionsof3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiod undancyforcertainrangesofbreaksizes.Thcontain..entcoolingandiodineremovalfunctionsaeproviedbvtoindependentsystems:(a)fan-coolerspluspostaccinttcharco"iitersann(h)containmentspraywithsos'umhyroripeaddition.Dur'ngnormalpoweroperation,onlytwooftefourfan-coolersarerecuiredtoremovehea"lostcmecpmentandpipingwithinontainment.XntheeventofaDsignBasis(3)Accident,anyonothefol'owingwillservetoreduceairborneiodineactivityanmaintaindoseswithinthealuescalculatedinthePSAR:(1)twcontainmentspraypumsandsodiumhycroxicefadd'tion,(2)two"an-olersandtwocosaccidentcharcoa'lters,or(3)oneconta'mentspraypandsod'hydroxidesaddi".'onplusonean-ecoleandonepostaccidentcharcca')ilter.Enaddition,thentnmentintegr'tyana'ys'sassumesthatonecontainmentspyoumpanctwo"an-coolersooer-atetoreducecontainmentpresureollowingaDes'gnBasis(~)Accident.Becauseotdi"icutyofaccesstomakerepa'rstoaan-coo'eandbecaseofthe'ow'orobabi3.it~o=aDesignBasisAcc'centduringhattime,anaddi"'onalsevencaysocea-t'onw'thaninoperlean-coolerispermited.Thecontainmentspraypumpsandsrayadditivesystemareloctedoutsidecon-tainmentanda",therfore,lessdiff'cultopa'r.There-ore,threearsw'thaninoperableconta'nmentspaypu.po'sprayadd'vesvstem'sdeemedacceptable...eCcmoonen"Cool'ngSystemisdi"=erent;rcmtheothersvs-r:.sd'scussecaboveinthattheccmponen"sareso'ocatecintheAuxiaryBuild'ngastobeo=-coolntacŽ'dent.Tn(5)acessibleforrpa'"a="era'oss-add't'on,i=dur'ngthepost-accident-hase"hecomponen=cco'ingwatersupply'sosiscceandcondom'mentcoo'rgcouldbemaintainecuntilrepairswereeffected. eferences()Deleted(2)UFSARSection6.3.3.1(3)UFSARSection6.2.2.1(4)FSARSection15.6.4.3(5)UARSection9.2.2.4(6)UFSSection9.2.2.4(7)Deleed(8)UFSARection9.2.1.2(9)UFSARSction6.2.1.1(ContainmtIntegrity)andUFSARSetion6.4(CREmergencyAirTreatment)(10)MestinghoseReport,"R.E.G'aBoricAcidStorageTankBoroConcentrationeductionStudy"datedNov.1992C.J.McHughdJ.J.SpryshakPnendnentNo.3.3.14a ContainmentSstemAlicabilitAppliestotheintegrityofreactorcontainment.3.6.13.6.2Todefinetheoperatingstatusofthereactorcontainmentfogplantoperation.Secification:ContainmentInteritiWi~a.Exceptasallowedby3.6.3,containmentintegrityIshallnotbeviolatedunlessthereactorisinthe~coldshutdowncondition.:Closed""valvesmaybeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrol.ill4i~'Cb.Thecontainmentintegrityshallnotbeviolatedwhenthereactorvesselheadxsremovedunlesstheboronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm.c.Positivereactivitychangesshallnotbemadebyroddrivemotionorborondilutionwheneverthecontainmentintegrityisnotintactunlessthe~boronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm.InternalPressureIftheinternalpressureexceeds1psigortheinternalvacuumexceeds2.0psig,theconditionshallbecorrectedwithin($t)hoursorthereactorrenderedsubcritical.8AmendmentNo.4S~543.6-1 3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBoundaries3.6.3.1Withacontainmentisolationboundaryinoperableforoneormorecontainmentpenetrations,either:<c,o3.~."a.RestoreeachinoperableboundarytoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours,orb.Isolateeachaffectedpenetrationwithin4hoursbyuseofatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecured'ntheisolationposition,oneclosedlIIs.himanualvalve,orablindflange,orlU~iVc.Beinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefol'lowing30hours.WLt3.6.4CombustibleGasControl3.6.4.1Whenthereactoriscritical,atleasttwoindependentcontainmenthydrogenmonitorsshallbeoperable.OneofthemonitorsmaybethePostAccidentSamplingSystem.I3.6.4.2Withonlyonehydrogenmonitoroperable,restoreasecondmonitortooperablestatuswithin30daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.Withnohydrogenmonitorsoperable,restoreatleastonemonitortooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.3.6e5ContainmentMini-Pure~II.VWheneverthecontainmentintegrityisrequired,emphasiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasachievable.Themini-purgeisolationvalveswillremainclosedtothemaximumextentracticablebutmabeoenforpressurecontrol,fororrespirableairqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,forsurveillanceteststhatmayrequirethevalvetobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.)4,V<f4.Vi4c~3AmendmentNo.9,183.6-2 iasis:Theeactorcoolantsystemconditionsofcoldshutdownassurethatnsteawillbeformedandhencetherewouldbenopressurebuildupthecotainment.ifthereactorcoolantsystemruptures.Theshutownmarginsareselectedbasedonthetypeofactitiesthataxeeingcarriedout.The(2000ppm)boronconcenationpxovidessutdownmarginwhichprecludescriticalityueranycircumstance.Whenthereactorheadisnottoberemove,acoldshutdownmarg'noflC~k/kprecludescriticalityinanyourrence.Regardingintealpressurelimitations,theconta'ntdesignpressureof60p'gwouldnotbeexceedediftheintmalpressurebeforeamajorstmbreakaccidentwereasmucha1psig."'heThe2.containmentisdesiedtowithstandaninternalvacumof250~pslgs.0ps'.gvacuumspecifiedasanoperatingimittoavoidany~difficultieswithmotcooling.Inordertominimizentainmentleakagedingadesignbasisaccidentinvolvingasignificant'iss'productrelease,penetxationsnotrequiredraccidentmitiationareprovidedwithisolationboundaries.ThesisolationbodariesconsistofeitherpassivedevicesoractiveatomaticvaesandarelistedinaprocedureunderthecontrolofheQualiAssuranceProgramClosedmanualvalves,deactivatedautomaticvvessecuredintheirclosedposition(includingcheckvalfsthflowthroughthevalvesecured),'lindflangesandclosystemsareconsideredpassivedevices.Automaticisolationvalvdesignedtoclosefollowingan:accidentwithout,operatoraction,econsideredactivedevices.TwoisoLationdevicesareprovidedfeacmechanica3.penetration,sch!thatnosinglecrediblefailurermalfctionofanactivecomponentI,cancausealossofisolatio,orres'inaleakageratethat';.exceedslimitsassumedinthsafetyanalses+.Intheeventthatoneisolionboundaryis'noperable,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolaedwithatleastoreboundarythatisnotaffectedbyasingleacfivefailure.Isolationboundariesthatmeet.thiscriterionareaclosedanddeactivatedatomaticcontainmentisolationvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,orablidflange.Theopeningofclosdcontainmentisolationvalvesoqanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingonsiderations:1)stationinganindividualqualifiedinaccordancewithstationpcedures,whoisinconstantcommunica'onwiththecontrolroom,tthevalvecontrols,(2)instructingthiindividualtoclosethevalvesinanaccidentsituation,and(3)asuringthatenvironment1conditionswill'ot,precludeaccesstoisolatetheboundaxyndthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioact'tyoutsidethecontainment.SendmentNo.P$,$$,583.6-3 ferences:(1WestinghouseAnalysis,"ReportfortheBASTConcentrationReductionforR.E.Ginna",August1985,submittedviApplicationforAmendmenttotheOperatingLicenseinletterfromR.W.Kober,RGGEtoH.A.Denton,NRC,dadctober16,1985(2)UAR-Section6.2.1.4(3)UFS-Section6.2.4IcAmendmentNo.543.6-4 CTSpage'4.1-7isnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.6. TABLE4.1-2MINIMUM2'REUENCIZS:OREUIPMENTANDSAMPLINGTESTS/1.ReactorCaalantChemistrySamples!tinstChlorideandFluorideOxygen~Frei~enc3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5twes/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow250F2.ReactorCoolantBoronBoronConcentrationWeekly3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSampleBoronConcentrationWeekly4eBoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankTwice/Week<"S.ControlRodsI6a.FullLengthControlRad3~6b.FullLengthControlRad.'7.PressurirerSafetyValves8.MainSteamSafetyValves'I9.ContainmentIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRaddrop<<,imesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyradnotfullyinsertedasufficient.numberofstepsinanyonedirectiontacauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughits'ful.llengthtoverifythattherodposit.ionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpaintSetpointFunct,ianingFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortaRefueling,OperationsAmendment:No.g,574.1-8r(/Vgr~ IServiceHaterSystem12.FireProtectionTest.FunctioningFunctioningR'7~FreireneEachRefuelingShutdownMonthlyPumpandPowerI.SonnlvyrJl3.SprayAdditive5P3.c,.<RTank'S.ii.NaOHConcentAW+eh~APh&%8~~gggpccumulatorBoronConcentration--~4,,~Bi-Monthly15.PrimarySystemLeakageEvaluateDaily16.DieselFuelSupplyFuelXnventoryDaily17.SpentFuelPitBoronConcentration18.SecondaryCoolantGrossActivitySamplesMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingWaterCalibrateFloodProtectionEquipmentEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow104oftheallowablelimit'.t(4)WhenBASTis.requiredtobeoperable.~'0t4g~*Aq,*3.N,Q.~~QAmendmentNo.g,5741-9 4e4ContainmentTestsAlicabiliteAppliestocontainmentleakageandstructuralintegrity.~0b'ectiveToverifythatpotentialleakagefromthecontainment'ndthepre-stressingtendonloadsaremaintainedthinspecifiedvalues.Secfication4.4.1~~~4.4.1.1InteoraedLeakaeRateTest'Definition%rPa(psig)isthecontainmentvesseldesignpressureof!60pszg.Pt(psig)istheontainmentvesselreducedtestpressureforperiodictestng.ILt(wei~ghtpercent/24hours)isthemaximumallowableleakageratesofthecoqtainmentvessel'estatmosphereatpressurePt.'1E4.4-1 La(weigntpercent/24hours)isthemaximumallowableleakagerateofthecontainmentvesseltestatnos-phereatpressurePa,'.2X/24hrs.LamndLtm(weightpercent/24hours}arethetal/measredcontainmentleakagera'tesofthec'ntain-mentsseltestatmosphereatpressuresaandPtrespectely.PretestReulvements~~~gll'sSja.Avisualeminationoftheaccssibleinteriorandexteriorurfacesoftheontainmentstructureshallbeperfodtouncovranyevidenceofstructuraldeterorationhichmayaffecteitherthecontainmentstructeintegrityorleak-tightness.Ifthereisevidenceofstructuraldeterioration,integraedleakratetestingshallnotbeperforme.untilapropriatecorrectiveactionhasbeentaken.Exceptforrepairstocorrectstructuraleterioration,hever,norepairsoradjustmensshallbesadedurgtheperiodbetweentheiniiationoftheinspectioandtheperformanceofthetest.b.Csureofcontainmentisolationvalesshallbeccomplishedbynormaloperationandthoutany/pre'liminaryexercisingoradjustments.4.4-2 44.1.3ConductofTestsa.AllintegratedleakratetestsshallbeconductedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofAmericanNationalStandardN45.4-1972,LeakageRateTestingofCon-tainmentStructuresforNuclearReactors,~~March16,1972.b.eaccuracyofeachintegratedleak'atetestshallbeerifiedbyasupplementaltestwhichconfirmstheaccucyofthetestinstrumentationandcalculational/methodsbydeterminingaleakratewhichiswithin/0.25Ltothetestresult.<Ifresultsarenotwithin/0.25Lttheasonshallgedetermined,corrective/actiontakenadasuccessfulsupplementaltestper-formed.c.IntegratedleakrattestsshallbeconductedatanE.initialpressure(beginningoftest)Pt>35psig.d.Ifduringthetest,inclingthesupplementaltest,./potentiallyexcessiveleakaepathsareidentifiedwhicwillinterferewithsatsfactorycompletionofthetest,orwhichresultin~~thetestnotmeetingheacceptancecriteria,thetesthallbeterminatedandtheleakagethroughsuchpathssha11bemeasuredusinglocalleakagetestingmethods.epairsand/oradjustmentstoequipmentshallbemadeadanintegratedleakratetestperformed.4.4-3 .4.4M4AccetanceCriteria~(g~s~<b.cTheleakagerateLtmshallbe<0.75LtatPt.iefinedasthecontainmentvesselredutestpresswhichisgreaterthanorequal35psig.LtmisdeedasthetotalmeascontainmentleakageratearessurePt.isdefinedasthemaximumallowableageeatpressurePt.<acVI*Ltshallbedete'das=La'laJwhichequals.1528percentight'erdaya~35psig.Paisdefinedaecalculatedpeakconta'ntinternalpressrelatedtodesignbasis'ccidenhichisaterthanorequalto60psig.LaisdefLasthemaximumallowableleakagerateatPawhLequals.2percentweightperday.TheleakagerateatPa(Lam)shallbe<0.75La.Lamisdefinedasthetotalmeasuredcontainmenteakagerateatpressur4..1.5TestPreuenca~Asetofthreeintegratedleakratetestsshbeperformedatapproximatelyequalintervalsduringeach10-yearserviceperiod.Thethirtestofeachsetshallbeconductedinthefiyearofthe10-yearserviceperiodoroneyebeforeoraft'erthefinalyearofthe10-yearerviceperiodovided:gP<<<<aa~LLL~theintervalbetweenatwoTypeAtestsdoesnotexceedfourars,folowingeachiserviceinspection,theconinmentaircks,thesteamgeneratorinspeion/maienancepenetration,andtheequipmethachareleaktestedpriortoreturnineplanttooperation,andanyrer,placement,ormodificationofacoainmentbarrierresultingfromtheinsiceinspeionsshallbefollowedbytappropriatelkagetest.'AmendmentNo.544.4-4 ltdIp.4~'b.Ifanytestfailstomeettheacceptancecriteriaof4.4.1.4.athetestscheduleforsubsequentregul'arlyscheduledinservicetestsshall.besub-IemittedtotheComissionforreviewand'approval.ac.I*twoconsecutivetestsfailtoettheacceptancecriteiaof4.4.1.4.a,aretesfshallbeperformedateachfuelingshutdown~rapproximatelyevery18months,wichevercomesfirrt,untiltwocon-secotivetestseticeacceptancecriteriaof4.4.1.4.a,after~hchtimetheretestscheduleof4.4.1.5;amayeresu4.4.1.6AdditionalRuirementsa.Asurytechnicalreportshallbesubmittedto~~t'Commissionaftertheconductoeachintegratedleakratetest.Informationonanyva.veclosuremalfunctionorvalveleakagethatrequirescor-rectiveactionbeforethetestshallbeincTdedinthereport.LocalLeakDetectionTests~.4.4.2.1Test5allbeperformedatLocalleageratetesintervaecifiin4.4.2.4belowandatapressureofnotlessthansig.4.4-5 b.~,~Thelocalleakagerateshallbemeasuredforechofthefollowingcomponents:i.Containmentpenetrationsthatemploy~esilientseals,gaskets,orsealantcompnds,pipingenetrationswithexpansiobellowsandeltricalpene'trationswthflexiblemetalsealsemblies'.ii.Airlockndequipmtdoorseals.iii.Fueltransfetuiv.Isolationvaleonthetestablefluidsystemslinespeneratingecontainment.v.Otherontainmentcoonents,whichrequire'earepairinordertoeettheacceptanceiterionforanyintegradleakagerate/mesa.4.4.2.2AccetanceCriterionontainmentisolationboundariesareinoperableomaleakagestandpointwhenthedemonstratedleakageofsingleboundaryorcumulativetotalleakageofallboundariesisgreaterthan0.60La.4.4.2e3CorrectiveAction4~O3.v.ia.Ifatanytimeitisdeterminedthatthetotalleakagefromallpenetrationsandisolation3l.ivboundariesexceeds0.60La,repairsinitiatedimmediately.shallbe')AmendmentNo.544.4-6 b.Ifrepairsarenotcompletedandconformancetotheacceptancecriterionof4.4.2.2isnotdemonstrated3L.avEC3.Q,+Q<LOcowithin48hours,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurizeduntilrepairsareeffectedandthelocalleakagemeetstheacceptancecriterion.Ifitisdeterminedthattheleakagethroughamini-purgesupplyandexhaustlineisgreaterthan0.05Laanengineeringevaluationshallbeperformedandplansforcorrectiveactiondeveloped.4'.2.4TestFreenca~ceptasspecifiedinb.andc.beloindividual~b.penetionsandcontainmentisolonvalvesshallbetestedinaordancewith0CFR50,AppendixZ,asmodifiedbyapprovxemptions.Thecontaitequipmenatch,fueltransfertube,steamneratorinspection/maintncepenetration,andutdownpurgesystemflangesshallbeestedateachSrefuelingshutdownoraftereachuse,ifthatsooner.l B~!tThecontainmentairlocksshallbetested.at/intervalsofnomorethansixmontbypressurizingthespacebetweentheparlockdors.Inaddition,followingopen/ngoftheJairockdoorduringtheintexval,atestshallbperformedbypressurim.ngbetweenthedualsealofeachdooroened,within48hoursoftheopening,unlessthereactorwasinthecoldphuowncditionatthetimeoftheopeningorhaensubsequentlybroughttothecoldshutdondition.Atestshallalsobeperformdbypressurizingbetweenthedual,sealsoeachdoorthin48hoursofleavingtcoldshutdowncdition,unlessthedoohavenotbeenopenscethelasttesterformedeitherbypressuizingthespebetween,theairlockdoors~>orbyessurizingbetweenthedualdoorseals.i54 c.Visualinspectionshallbemadeforexcessiveleakagefromcomponentsofthesystem.Anysignificantleakageshallbemeasuredbycollectionandweighingorbyanequivalentmethod.4.4.3.2AcceptanceCriterionThemaximumallowableleakagefromtherecirculationheatremovalsystemscomponents(whichincludesvalvestems,flangesandpumpseals)shallnotexceedtwogalLonsperhour.4.4.3.3CorrectionActiona.'epairsshallbe.madeasrequiredtomaintainleakagewithintheacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2.b.Urepairsarenotcompletedwithin24hours,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurizeduntilrepairsareeffectedandtheacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2issatisfied.4.4.3.4TestFreuencTestsoftherecirculationheatremovalsystemshallbecon-;ductedatintervalsnottoexceed12months.3.~.>~4.4.4TendonStressSurveillanceInsectionforBrokenWtzeurteenspecifictendons,equandthe =~conta'.nmentshallbeinspectedperiodicallyforthepresenceofbrokenwires.b.Theinspectionintervals,measuredfromthed'ateofteinitialstructuraLtest,shallbeasfollows:6mnths1year3years8yearsandyearsintervalsthereafter.F/c.Theacceptanccriteriafortheinspectionarethatno//morethanatotalf38wires(in14tendons)arebroken//andthatnotmorethn6/brokenwiresexistinanyone/'tendon.Ifmorethan/'rokenwiresarefound,all/tendonsshallbeinspected>IfinspectionrevealsmoreI/than5hoftheto'talwiresbrken,thereactorshallbeshutdownan/depressurized.Id.Ifmoretan20wires(in14tendon)havebeenbroken/sincethelast,inspection,alltendonshallbeinspected.Ifipectionrevealsmorethan5o/gofthtotalwiresb'ken,the.reactorshallbeshutdownand~epressurizede.Ifasmanyas6brokenwiresarefoundin~ngonetendon,fourimmediatelyadjacenttendons(twooneachideofI/P.4.4-10 thetendoncontaining6brokenwires)shallbeinspeted.heacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorehan4benwiresinanyoftheadditioral4tendo.Ifthiscritionisnotsatisfied,alloftheteonsshallbeinspectandifmorethan5%oftheotalwiresarebroken,threactorshallbeshutdoanddepressurized.4.4.4.2Pre-StressConationTest'a~.bLift-offtestseperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin..laabove,attheintervalsspecifiedin..4.1.'ftheaveragestressinthe14tendonheckedislthan144,000psi(60%ofultimastress),alltensshallbecheckedforstrsandretensioned,ifnessary,toastressof144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionastress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressapplieduringaccidentconditions.4.4.5ContainmentIsolationValves4.4.5.1Eachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedto~~beOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeGinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmittedinaccordance.with10CFRZl.v'ii50.55a.4.4.6ContainmentIsolationResonseM1~~h~N4.4.6.1EachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceoftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.4.4.6.2~g.Z.4.'3.50'll1Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludes,onlythevalvetraveltime.forthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal.IAmendmentNo.9,1X544.4-11 4~4~7ContainmentHdroenNonitors4.4.7.1Demonstrateleastdailystandby.p~thattwohydrogenmonitorsareoperableatbyverifyingthattheunitisonorin~4.4.7.2Atleastonceperquarterperformusingtwosamplegasescontaining--...,of,hydrogen,.....,...isaachannelcalibrationknownconcentrationsThecyy)ainmen'signedforanaccidentpressureof60psig-Whilethereaisoper'atingftheinenvironmentofthecontainmentwillbeairaelyatmosphericpressure.Themaximumuteoftearn-aitmixtogaatthapeakaccidesureof60psigiscalculatee286F.~~4-4-llaAmendmentNo9 riortoinitialoperation,thecontainznentwasstrengthtestedatpsandthenwasleaktested.Theacceptancecriterionforthpre-opera'onalleakageratetestwasestablishedas0.1%per2hoursat,60psig.Thisleakageratewasbelievedconsistentwithheconstruction(2)ofthecontaent,whichisequippedwithindepenntleak-testablepenetrationsacontainschannelsoverallcontaentlinerwelds,whichwereindepedentlyleaktestedduringcstruction.SafetyanaLyseshaveeenperforznedon,thbasisofaleakagerateof0.20%per24hoursat6psig.Withthleakagerateandwithminimumj/containmentengineeredsauardscrating(i.e.,either2filterunitsandnospray,or1filterunit1spray,ornofilterunitsand2sprays)t'epublicexposurewouldbeeLL4elow10CFR100valuesintheevent(3)ofthedesignbasisaccidePerformanceofthein@gratedleakagertetestprovidesanover-allassessmentofpotetialLeakagefromthectainrnentincaseofanaccidentthatwoldpressurizetheintexiorofecontainment.InordertoproideareaListicappraisal.oftheinteityofthe.contain-mentundraccidentconditions,thetestistobeperormedwithoutpreliinaryleakdetectionsurveysorleakrepairs,ancontain-mtisolationvalvesaretobeclosedinthenormalmann.Theestpxessureof35psigfortheintegratedLeakageratetestisuf-tIup1hepreoperationaLleakageratetestat35psig.1'.4.4-12ficientlyhightoprovideanaccuratemeasurementoftheLeakageirateanditd1catest ThSpecificationalsoallowsforpossibledeteriorationofthleakeratebetweentests,byrequiringthatthetotalmeasedleakageratebeonly75%ofthemaximumallowableleakagere.TheduratioandmethodsfortheintegratedleakageratetestestablishedbANSIN45.4-1972provideaminimumleveofaccuracyandallowfordlycyclicvariationintemperateandthermalradiation.Thefquencyoftheintegratedleageratetestiskeyedtotherefuelgschedule.fortheretor,becausethesetestscanbestbeperfoedduringrefuelinshutdowns.Refuelingshutdownsarescheduledagapproximatelyoneyearintervals.Thespecifiedfrequencyofintgratleakageratetestsisbasedonthreemajorconsiderations.irstisthelowprobabilityofleaksintheliner,becauseof)theuseofweldchannelstotest<theleaktightnessoftheweldsduringerection,(b)conformanceof6thecompletecontainmenttma0.1%per/dayleakrateat60psigFduringpreoperationaltesting,and(c)ah/enceofanysignificant1stressesintheliner.uringreactoroperati.'Secondisthemore,.frequenttesting,thefullaccidentpressurofthoseportionsofthecontainmetenvelopethataremostlikelytodevelopleaksduringreactooperation(penetrationsandisolatenvalves)andIthelowvalue(Oe60La)ofthetotalleakagethatispecifiedasacceptab.Thirdisthetendonstresssurveillanceproam,whichprovidesassurancethananimportantpartofthestcturalinterityofthecontainmentismaintained.AmendmentNo.544.4-13 hebasisforspecificationofatotalleakageof0.60Lafrompeetrationsandisolationboundariesisthatonlyaportionofthallobleintegratedleakage,rateshouldbefromthosesourcesin1orderprovideassurancethattheintegratedleakagerateouldremainwihinthespecifiedlimitsduringtheintervalsetweenintegratedeakageratetests.Becausemostleakageduringanintegratedlearatetestoccursthoughpenetrationsdisolationvalves,andbecaseformostpenetrationsandisotionvalvesa~ismallerleakagerafromalocaltest,adleakageratewithinthepecifiedlimitsisovided.ThelimitingleakageratesfromtheecirculationHatRemovalSystemsare>judgementvaluesbasedprilyonasuringthatthecomponentsi',couldoperatewithoutmechanicalfaireforaperiodontheorderiof200daysafteradesignbasiscidenteThetestAmendmentNo.544.4-14 ressure,350lbyhydroticpsig,achievedeitherbynormalsystemoperationotesting,givesanadequatemarginoverehighestpressurewithinthestemafteradesignba~accident.Similarly,thehydrostatictestpressurercontainmentsumpreturnlinesonnectionstotheresidualandthereactorcoolantaintankpipinheatremovastemof100psiggivesanadequaarginoverthe(4)histpressurewithinthelinesafteradesignbasisaccieArecirculationsystemleakageof2gal./hrwilllimitoffsiteexposureduetoleakagetoinsignificantlevelsrelativetothosecalculatedforleakagedirectlyfromthecontainmentinthedesignbasisaccident.Thedosecalculatedasaresultofthisleakageis7.7mrfora2-hr(5)exposureatthesiteboundary.Incaseoffailuretomeettheacceptancecriteriaforleakagefromtheresidualheatremovalsystemorthepenetrations,itmaybepossibletoeffectrepairswithinashorttime.Ifso,itisconsideredunnecessaryandunjustifiedtoshutdownthereactor.ThetimesallowedforrepairsareconsistentwiththetimesdevelopedinSpecification3.3.Thetendonsurveillanceprogramisbasedonassuringthat,ontheaverage,theload-carrvingcapabilityofthetendonsismaintainedatapproximately95'Podesign.4.4-15 ~hepre-stressconfirmationtest,providesadirectmeasureofthe/load-carryingcapabilityofthetendon./j:fthesurveillanceprogramindicatesbyextensivewirebreakageortendonstressrelationthatthepre-stressingtendonsarenotbehavingasexpected,thesituationwillbeevaluatedimmediately.JThespecifiedacceptancecriteriaaresuchastoalertattentiontothesituationwellbeforethetendonload-carryingcapabilitywoulddeterioratetoapointthatfailureduringadesignbasisaccidentmightbepossible.Thusthecauseoftheincipientdeteriorationcouldbeevaluatedandcorrectiveactionstudiedwithoutneedtoshutdown'hereactor.Thecontainmentisprovidedwithtworeadilyremovabletendonsthatmightbeusefultosuchastudy.Inaddition,thereare40tendons,eachcontainingaremovablewirewhichwillbeusedtomonitorforpossiblecorrosioneffects.Operabilityofthecontainmentisolationboundariesensuresthatecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenronmentintheeventofareleaseof'adioactivematerialtotheontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainmentPerfoanceofcyclingtestsandverificationofisolationtsassociadwithautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesiscovredbythePuandValveTestProgram.CompliancewithAppend'to10CFR50iaddressedunderlocalleaktestingrequiremes.

    References:

    (1)UFSARSectio3.1.2.2.7(2)UFSARSection6..6.1(3)UFSARSection15.6.3(4)UFSARSection6.3.3.8(5)UFSARTable15.6-9(6)FSARPage5.1.2-28(7)North-American-RockwellReport550-x-32,ReliabilityHandbook,ebruary1963.(8)FSARPage5.1.2-28Autonetics~:,)Amendment,No.544.4-17

    • b.Thcsystemtestwillbeconside.edsatisfactoryifcontroLboardindicatinandvisuaLobservationsindicatethatallvalveshavereceivedtheS"fctyInjectionsignalandhavecomplctcdtheirtravel.4Thcproperscnuenceandtiminr~ofthcrotating4.5.L.2componentsaretobcverifiedinconjunctionivith!Section4.6.1b./J~~ContainmcntSaraS'stema.Systemtestsshallbcperformedat.eachrc"ctorre-fuelinginterval.Thetestshallbepcriormcdwithtncting.z.~.(..z.~w,vi's~gg3t.t,.l>solaticnvalves,inthcspraysupplylines,atthccon-ta~nmcnt.bloclcdclosed.Operationofthcsystemtstnitia(cdbytrsppingthcnormalactuationinstrumen-tat,ion.b.Thcsprayno@alesshalLbcat!castevery~yearschcckcdforproperfunctioning=.v.4.18~~Viixsatisfactoryifvisualobscr-Centshaveoperatedsatisfac-c.Thetcstwillbcconsidcredvationsindicat.eaLLcompontorily.4.5.2ComoncntTc"ts4.5.2.1Ponmsa~Exceptduringcoldorrefueling~shutdoiiasthhsafetyinjectionpumps,residualheatrerrovalpcs,andcontainmcntspraypumpsshallbesiartcdatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.ThepumpsshallbetestedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceedsImonth.4.5-2 h+b.Acceptablelevelsofperformanceforthepumpsshallbethatthepumpsstart,operate,anddeveloteminimumdischargepressurefortheflowsliedintetablebelow:a<'cDISCHARContainmentSprayPumpsResidualHeatRemovalPumpsSafetyInjectionPumps-35.gpm[20gp450[gpm50gpm40psig[140psig]138psig[1420psigj+1356psigNotes(2)Te4.5-1I(1)Itemsisquarebracketsareeffectiveuntiltheinstaltionofthenewresidualheatremovalminingflowrecirculationsystem.~e(2)Itsinsquarebracketsareeffectiveuntilpnstallationofthenewsafetyinjectionminim<flowrecirculation.system.4.5.22p4,Q.14SR.sez.(,.,Va3.ves.a.Exceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdownsthesprayadditivevalvesshallbetestedatintervalsnottod-~'hhpphddhvalvesupstreamanddownstreamAaatxhantNo.334.5-3 ofthesprayadditivevalvesclosec,eachvalvewi13.beopenedandclosedbvoperatoract'on.Thistestsha3.1beperormedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemonh.Theaccumulatorcheckvalvessha13.becheckedoroperabilityduringeachrefuelingshutdown.AirPiltrat'on'SvsemAtleastonceevery18monthsozafteevery720hoursofcharcoaltrationsystemoperationsincethelasttest,orol3.cwingpainting,fireorchemical,releaseinanyven-t'lation"onecommunicatingwiththesystem,the"ostaccidentcharcoalsystemshallhavethefo3.lowingco'nd'ionsdemonstated.b.Theoressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankislessthan3inchesozwateratdes-'gnflowrate(+108).ZnplaceFreontesting,underambientconc'"'ons,shal'howatleast99%removal.C~Theiod'neremova3.effic'encvozatleastonecharcoa'i'erce13.sha'beneasuz'ed.Theftercel'obetestedshallbeselectedrandomlyromthosecel'swiththelongestin-bankresidencetime.Theminimumacceptablevalueforiltereficiencyis90%or==movalo"methy'odidewhentestedata'ast285'Pand95~RHandat1.5to2.0mg/m3load'..gwi"~tagced4.5-4 Aterachplacementofacharcoa'rawerorateanvstructuralmaintenanceonthehousingforthepostacicentcharcoalsystem,theconditionofSpecification4.5.2.3.L.bshallbedemonstratedfortheafectedport'onofthe'ystem.Atleas"every1Smonthsorfollowingpaint'ngcire,ochemicalre'easeinanyventilationzoneconmunicat'ngw'hthesvstem,thecontainmentec'rculationsystemshallhavethefollowingconditionsdemonstated.a.T..epssuredropacrosstheHZ'PAfiltebank'slessthan3inchesowateatdesignflowrate(-:19$).b.Znp'acethe~llygenerated".OPtesingoftheH"-PAiltesshallshowatleast99$emoval.AfteeachcompleteorpartialreplacementoftheHZpAbankoraftanystructualmaintenanconahousingfothecontainmentreciculationsvs=em,thecondit'ono=Spec'cation4.5.2.3.3.bshallbeQemonstated=ortheafected"..or'onofthesystem."=xceptdur.'ngco'dorrefuel'ngshutdownsthepos"accidentcharcoa"'solationvalvesshalloetestedatint<<va'notgeaterthanonemonthtove'=vope<<abi'itvand."-c-erorintationandlowshallbemaintained".rough'xes>semoratleas"15minutes.The"estshallbeper-c=-:ec:ortostart"pithe..timesincethe'as"testexceeds1mmema~4.5-5 4.5.2.3.9Except"u"ingcoldorrefuelingshutdownstheautomaticinit'at'onothecontrolroomemergencyairtreatment~iIsystemshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonthto.verifvoperabilitvandproperorientatonandflowshallbemaintainedtMoughthesystemforatleastl5minutes.ThetstshallbeperformedpriortostartupifthetimeP'4A@Vs's:atesnfstVTq'ericSVSc+andtheCosa4enScvaVaveommewn~~~~%~tA%Mls+4,1IComp'etesyste.-..s.stscanncbeperowedwhe..nereacorntaimentSoSyst~"stre-tas:~ento"erat'.-.gbecauseSa=etvZn'ectionsigncausescon-'so'at'onancguires"..osys"emtobetempolyc+elec.Thei--e.".c"ofassuringc=erab"vo=thesestems's"ere=oretoco.-..-'es.-st"ms"estsioeper=o~weddw'".ga.".aqualp'".shu--downs,w't".mor~=reuent-mponnttests,nicb.cnbe=e=osneacnt'greactoro-enation.Thean.".als,stts"sts8aaonstttep"cpeatcw-o=ooeat'ono-t.".aaetyZn,actonancContaantSI=agSystems.Nithepumpsblockedromsa'.".-.atests'gnalisappliedtoinitiateautomaticact'cn andverificaticnmadethattheccmgcnentereceivehaecsafetyinjectioninthepropersequence'.Thetestdemonstratestheoperationofthevalves,pump'circuiteakers,and.automaticcircuitry.'~'u'ngreactoroperation,theinstrumentatonwhichisdepededontoinitiate..-safety.injectionand/contaientsprayisgenerallychec~dulyand.theinitiatigcircuitsaretestedmonly.Inaddition,theactivcomponents(pumpsanvalves)aretobetestedmontlytocheckthe'perationofthestartingcircuitsandtoverifyatthepumpsareinsatisfactoryr'ngordeanddeveloptheminimumrecpxiredpressuretomeetaccidentconditions.'~'heminimumdischargeessevalueslistedinTable4.5-1arebasedonanasseddegradationofthepumphead.-capacity"(charactisic)curveadjustedtowatertemperatureof6Fasfllows:ContainmentSprayPumps5't>>ResiduaHeatRemovalPps5't*SafetynjectionPumps3%,**Perntageisbased.ontheheadatthebestefciencypointofflow.Thetestintervalofonemontisbasedonthejugementthat.morefrequenttstingwouldnotignificantlyincreasethereliabiity(i.e.,probabilitythatthecomponentwouloperaterequired)andwouldresultinincreasedlearoverperiodsoftime.the/wheniIlong~/hmmdnentNo.3345-8 Othersystemsthatarealsoimportanttotheemergency~colingfunctionaretheaccumulators,thecompontcooingsystem,theservicewatersysteman4the./conta'nmentfancoolers.Theaccumulatorsareapassivsafeguard.Tnaccordanceththespecificaions,thewater.volumeandpresurein:theaccumulatorarechecked'eriodica3.1y'.g-'heothersystemsmentonedoperatewhenthey'reactarisinoperationandbthesemeansarecontinuouslymonitoredforsatisfactoryperformance.ereactorcoolantdraintankpumpsorateintermtentlyduringreactoroperation,andthusaealsonitoredforsatisfactoryperformance.Theairfiltrationporonofthecontainmentairrecirculationsystemiaassivesafeguardwhichisisolatedfromtheoolingairflowduringnormalreactoroperation.Hencethecharcoalshouldhavealongusefullifeime.Thefilterramesthathousethecharcoalarestainlesssteelanshould.alsolastindefinitel.Thepressuredrop,lterefficiency,andvalveoperationtestfrequenciesll.assurethatthesyemcanoperatetomeetitsdeignfunction;underaccidentcond'tions.Astheadsorbicharcoalisormallyisolated,thetestschedule,rlatedtoursofoperationaswellaselapsedtime,wilassure.thatitdoesnotdegradebelowtherequiredadsoion:AmaxheotNo.334.5-9 adsozbingeredThetestconditionsfo~-eirarcoalsampleefficien-athosewhichmightbeunderanaccidentsituati~on.'hecontrol'roomairtreatmentsystemisdesignedtofilterthecontrolroomatmosphere(recirculationandintakeair)duringcontrol"roomisolation:conditions..HE?'Afiltersareinstalledbeforethecharcoalfilterstoremoveparticu<<atematterandpreventcloggingoftheiodineadsorbers.Thecharcoalfiltersreduce.theairborneradioiodineinthecontrolroom.Bypassleakagemustbeataminimuminorderforthesefilterstoperformtheirdesignedfunction.Zftheperformances.areasspecifiedthecalculateddoseswillbelessthanthoseanalyzed.'~'Retestingofthepostaccidentcharcoalsystemorthecontrolroomemer'gencyairtreatmentsystemiatheentofpainting,fire,orchemicaleleaseisrequironlyifthesystemiscratingandisprovidingiltrationforthareainwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbe,totheextentitcangiventhconfigurationofthesystems,inacconcewithANSIN511975,"TestingofNuclearCleaningSystems"AmendnentNo.334.5-10 References=(1)UPSARSection6.3.5.22)UFSARFigures15.6-12and15.6-13(3UFSARSection6.5.1.2.4(4)FSARSection..6.4D.lIIit3AmmdrrantNo.33E.

    3.1.4MaximumCoolantActivit3.1.F1SecificationsWheneverthereactoriscriticalorthereactorcoolanta~b..Coaveragetemperatureisgreaterthan500F:~v~swwwvThetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed84/EpCi/gm,whereEistheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesperdisintegrationinMev.!TheI-131equivalentoftheiodineactivityinthe/reactorcoolantshallnotexceed0.2pCi/gm.'FTheI-131equivalentof-theiodineactivityonthesecondarysideofasteamgeneratorshallnotexceed0.1pC1/gmo+~hlI.rvvW'I4'~~(~%43.1.4~2Ifthelimitof3.'1.4.1.aisexceeded,thenbesubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500'Fwithin.8hours.3.1.4.3a..IftheI-131equivalentactivityinthereactorcoolantexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.bbutislessthantheallowablelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,operationmaycontinueforupto168hours.AmendmentNo.$7,583.1-21 Thereactormaybetakencriticalorreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturemaybeincreasedabovea500FwiththeI-131equivalentactivitygreater0thanthelimitof3.1.4.1.baslongastheprovisionsofthisparagrapharemet.b.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.bformorethan168hoursduringonecontinuoustimeintervalorexceedsthelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,besubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500Fwithin8hours.c.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.b,thenperformsamplingandanalysisasrequiredbyTable4.1-4,item4a,untiltheactivityisreducedto.lessthanthelimitof3.1.4'.b.F1.4.4Ifthelimitof3.1.4.l.cisexceeded,thenbeathotshutdownwithinPhoursandincoldshutdownwithin30thefollowing~hours.Basxs:Thetotalactivitylimitfortheprimarysystemcorrespondstooperationwiththeplantdesignbasisof1%fueldefects.Radiationshieldingandtheradioactivewastedisposalsystems ~-Thefor<weredesignedforoperationwith1%defectssecondaryactivityisconservativestablishedwithrespecttothelimitson~riKarysys~Giveactivityandprimary-,ocondaryleakage(Specification3~1.5~2&Ifthe~P"activityshouldexceedthespecifiedlimitsfollowingapowertransientthemajorconcernwouldbewhetheradditionalfueldefectshaddevelopedbringingthetotalto'above1%defects.Appropriateactiontobetakento'specificationincludeoneormorebringtheactivitywithinofthefollowing:gradualdecrease-inpowertoalowerbasepower,increaseinletdownflowrate,andventingofthevolumecontroltankgasestotnegasdecaytanks.Thespecifiedactivitylimitsprovideprotectiontothepublicagainstthepotentialreleaseofreactorcoolantactivitytotheatmosphere,asdemonstratedbytheanalysisofasteamgenerator(3)tuberuptureaccident.The500oPtemperatureinthespecificationcorrespondsatsaturationto681psia,whichisbelowthesetpointofthesecondarysidereliefvalves.Therefore,potential.primarytosecondaryleakageatatemperaturebelow"500Pcanbecontainedbyclosingthesteamlineisolationvalves.

    References:

    (1)FSARTable9.2-5(2)FSARSection11.1.3(3)LetterdatedSeptember24,1981fromDennisM.Crutchfield,USHRC,toJohnE.Maier,RG&E. b.Onecontainmentspraypumpmaybeinoperableprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days."c.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions,maybeinoperableprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.d.Onepostaccidentcharcoal'filterunitand/oritsassociatedfancoolermaybeinoperable.providedtheunitisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.e.Thesprayadditivesystemmaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatboth3-3.33.3.3.1charcoalfilterunitsareoperable.ComnentCoolinSstemThereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdown3unlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Bothcomponentcoolingpumpsareoperable.b.Both.componentcoolingheatexchangersareoperable.c.Allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwith)3,Yvestheabovecomponentswh'ch,arerequ'edtofunctionC.;e.~(~p>~-~duringaccidentconditionsareoperable<Lcc3.3.3.2~XV>sTherequirementsof3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowingcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeet.theconditionsof3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiod \3.)C'ciXlspecified,thereactorshallbeinhot,shutdownwithin~an@thenext6hours.~I-f-'the--requirements-of-3-.-3-.-3-.-1--arer~reactorshallbeinthecoldshutdownconditionwithinthefollowing30hours.IfneithercomponentcoolingcatMloopv~@Al,aP"f~'acr~NQwaterloopisoperable,te"r'eactorsh'allb'"maintainedbelowareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureof350Finsteadofatcoldshutdownandcorrectiveactionshallbeinitiatedtorestoreacomponentcoolingwaterlooptooperablestatusassoonaspossible.a.Onecomponentcoolingpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatusr+gwith'~hours.b.Oneheatexchangerorotherpassivecomponentmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthesystemmaystilloperateat100%capacityandrepairsarecompleted3;within3.3.4ServiceWaterSystemThereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Atleasttwoservicewater~umpsoneonbus17Sx=cs':co7c-rm.-.andoneonbus18,andoneloopheaderareoperable.b.Allvalves,interlocks,andpipingassociatedwith'heoperationoftwopumpsareoperable.c'7Anytimethattheconditionsof3.3.4.1abovecannotbeoccxcNcoccc.mCcscccc&5ucc.scmgi"';cc;ccitCcrcuc'et,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithin6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hoursendment--N~ 3.3.53.3.5.1ThesWa+1-no-t-be-a-t-crControlRoomEmerencvAirTreatmentSstemt~E.a.i~~~K33.3.5e23,3.9l2.wx'>treatmentsystem~CO~operable;Mo><g<~~a;~~~'~;.~~c~-=.'v=~5rfo.king%~.QWWS"33-'~~hereguirementsof3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallX,'4""r>'ftthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemtobeinoperableforaperiodof48hours.Zfthesystemisnotmadeoperablewithinthose48hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotsnutdownwithinthenext6hoursano~866-.~mpersture-less-then-3~5&inanadditional~'hours.BassaThenormalprocedure~~tarte-ng--t-rs,~rrsttoheatthee>S.o~cgt~e~4~~arizNQu'~a~s(Lx~Kt~~~(+o~~4~3i0~Mp undancyforcertainrangesofbreaksizes.(2)'5(Thecontainmentcoolingandiodineremovalfunctionsaprovidedbvtwoindepencentsvstms:(a)fan-coolespluspostaccidentcharcoalfiltersand(b)containmentspraywithsodiumhydroxideaddition.Dur'ngnormalpoweropeation,onlytwoofthefourfan-coolersarereauiredtoremovehea"lostrcmequipmentandpipingwithincontainment.In"heeventofaDesignBasis(3)Accident,anyoneothefol'owingwillservetoreduceairborneiodineactivityandmaintaindoseswithinthevaluescalculatdintheFSAR:(l)twocontainmentspraypumpsandsodiumhycroxiceadd'tion,(2)wo"an-coolersandtwopostaccidentcharcoa'lters,or(3)onecontainmentspraypumpandsod'hydox-ceaddit'onplusonefan-coolerandonepostaccidentcharcca'<)filter.Inaddition,the,containmentintegr'tyana'ys'sassumesthatonecontainmentspravpumpanatwofan-coolersoper-atetoreducecontainmentpressureollowingaDes'gnBasis(>)Accident.Becauseothedif'cultyofaccesstomakerepa'rstoaan-coolerandbecauseofthe'owprobabilityo=aDesi'gnysrThecontainmen"rBasisAcc'dentduringthattime,anaddonalsevenPasocera-tt'onw'thaninoperablean-coolerispermitted.lr':spraypumpsandsprayadd'ivesystemarelocatedoutsidecon>>Itainmentandar,therfore,lessdiff'culttorepa'There-oresthreecaysw'aninoperableconta'nmentspraypvpospayaddit'vesystem'sdeemedacceptable.ThehhmccnenCool'ngSystemis8i"=anent.-rcmtheothersvd'scussecabovthattheccmponen"sAuxiliarrBuild.'ngastccŽessib3.~areso'ocinthrepaira="era'oss-o=-coolantacc'dent.(5)d'tio~n,~Pu'ngthepost-accidenphase..ecompo.ccoingcatesnpplr'si~os,wo"aandcon-men~olirgcouldbemai~tainecuntilrepairswereeffected. Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps.pnlyoneisneededduringtheinjectionphase,andtwoeregnidduringtherecirculationphaserapostulateloss-of-coolantaccident.'TcontrolroomemergenairtreatmentsystemisdesignedtoLfilterthecontrroomatmospheredungperiodswhenthecontrolroomisolatedandtmaintainradiationlevelsinthecontroroomatacceptablelevelsfollowingtheDesignHas'ccident.'Reactoroperationmaycontinue'orlimitedtimewhilerepairsarebeingdetothea~treatmentsystemsinceitisunlilythatthesystemouldbeneeded.equipmentnecessarytEechnicalSpc'ficat'on3.3.5appliesnlytothetofilterthecontmlroomaanosere.aux.pmentnecessarytoimitiateisotionof.thecontrolroomiscove/edbyanotherspecfication.Thelimitsortheaccumulatorpressureandvolumeassuretherequiredamountofwaterinjection'uringanaccident,andarebasedonvaluesused,fortheaccidentanalyses.Theindicated.levelof50:correspondsto1108cubicfeetofwaterintheaccumulatorandtheindicatedlevelof82tcorrespondsto1134cubicfeet.Thelimitationofnomorethan.onesafetyinjectionpumptobeoperablewhenoverpressureprotectionisbeingprovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.insures3.3-13 PaJeferences()Deleted(2)UFSARSeccion6.3.3.1(3)~UFSARSection6.2.2.1(4)6SARSection15.6.4.3(5)UFARSection9.2.2.4(6)UFSSection9.2.2.4(7)Deletd(8)UFSARS,ction9.2.1.2(9)UFSARSetion6.2.1.1(ContainmentIntegrity)andUFSARSecion6.4(CREmergencyAirTreatment)(10)Westinghous'qReport"R,g.GinnaBoricAcidStorageTankBoronConcentraonReductionStudy"datedNov.1992byC.J.McHghandZ.Z.Spryshak/a1gII'AmendmentNo.3.3.14a TURBINECYCLE~1ApplietheoperatingstatusofturbineOb'ectivee.3.4.1Todefineconditionstturbinecyclesteam-relievingcapacity,andtoinetheAuxMaryFeedwaterSystemand.supportingviceWaterSystemoperationasnecessarytoensureecapabilitytoremovecoredecayB~.TheStandbyiaryFeedwatersystemprovidesadditionalaaaanoeofcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheatshouldtneAux'yFeedwaterSystembeunavailable.MAINSTEAMSAFETYVALVESSecificationExceptduringtestingofthemainsteamsafetyvalves,withtheRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,aminimumturbinecyclecodeapprovedsteamrelievingcapabilityofeight(8)mainsteamsafetyvalvesshallbeavailable.Action3.4.2Withoneormoremainsteamcodesafetyvalvesinoperable,restoretheinoperablevalve(s)tooperablestatuswithin4hoursorbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.AUXILIARYFEEDWATER3.4.2.1MOTOR-DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSecificationWiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,bothmotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsmustbeoperable,eachwithanoperableflowpathfromthecondensatestoragetankstoitsrespectivesteamgenerator.Actiona.Withonemotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperableandatleastoneturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathoperable,restorethepumptooperablestatuswithin7daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours. 4th+44rc3i7-f/'lw'hhochmotor-driven~auxii'ary'eedwareprepsinoperable,and'turbine-drivenauxi:iaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathoperable(see3.4.2.2),orwithamotor-drivenandturbine-drivenpumpflowpat~inoperable,restoreapumptooperablestatuswithihoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.~~A~-~,o.=i="-=.~-'.-0/','lVac.Withallauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsinoperable(motor-driven,turbine-driven,andstandby),immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontorestoreanyofthesepumpstooperablestatusassoonaspossible.3.4.2.2TURBINE-DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSecification(.co",>~gg.3.a.s'.~-WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,theturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpassociatedflowpathsfromthecondensatestoragetankstothesteamgenerators,andflowpathsofsteamfromeachsteamgeneratortotheguamturbine,I.'~ustbeshowntobeoperablepriortoexceeding5%power.Action~.a.Withtheturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpand/orbothassociatedflowpathsinoperable,restorethepump(andatleastoneflowpath)tooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthenext6hours.b.Withoneassociatedflowpathoftheturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperable,restoretooperablestatuswithin7daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwxthxnthenext6hours.3.4.2.3STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSecificationQgQ37,$[cf.i:~WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,twostandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpseachwithanassociatedflowpathfromthe.servicewatersystemtosteamgenerator,shallbeoperable.~en%4Actiona.Withonestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperablerestorethepumptooperablestatuswithin14daysorbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan3504Fwithinthefollowing6hours. ~'fb.'i""..borhs-andbyauxiliaryfee"~a-ezpumpsinoperableestoreatleastonestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaternumptooperablestatuswithin7daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithin6noursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Finthefollowing6hours.3.4.3SOURCESOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSecificationLCQs~C.OGi).>.a~WiththeRCStemperatureat.orabove350'F,thefollowingsourcesofauxiliaryfeedwatershallbeoperable:WWl1)Oneormorecondensatestoragetanks.withaminim~umo22,500gallonsofwater,and~.2)Servicewaterastheprimarysupplytothestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps,Actiona.Withthecondensatestoragetanksinoperable,within4hourseither:I4-v1)restorethecondensatestoragetankstooperablestatus,orbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350oFwithinthefollowing6hours,OR.2)demonstratetheoperabilityoftheservicewatersystemas'awatersupplytothemotor-drivenandturbine-drivenvauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsandrestorethecondensatestoragetankstooperablestatuswithin7days,orheinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.~b.Withtheservicewatersystemtooneorbothstandbauxiliaryfeedwaterpump(s)inoperable,declarethestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpump(s)inoperableandcomplywi~thSpecification3.4.2.3.P*IBAreactorshutoompowerrequiresremovalofcoredecayheat.Immediatedecayheatremoequirementsarenormallysat'ythesteambypasstothecondenser.'Z~erefore,coreyheatcanbecontinuouslydissipatedviathestetothecondenserasfeedwaterinthesteamgenerator'onvetosteambyheatabsorption.Normally,theilitytoreturnfeedwflowtothesteamgeneratorsiovidednyoperationoftheturnsolejfeedwatersys DoeQ.7-"'9t'evento"a"eac"oradturbinetrip;"ogethewiha1ssofitepower,'mmediatedecayheatremovaliseffectedviathemainstesafetyvalves.hee'ghtmainsteamsafetyvalveshaveatotalcombiedratedcapabilityof6,580,000lbs/hr.Thiscapabilityexceedstheto1full.powersteamflowof6,577,279lbs/hr.Followinreactor/turbinetrip,themotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwate~systemisautomaticallyinitiatedonlow-lowlevelinoneste@generator,SafetyInjectionsignal,oratripofbothmainfeedwaterpumps.Theturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpisinitiateonlow-lowsteamgeneratorlevelinbothsteamgenerators,ora1cfssofpowertoelecicalbuses11Aand11B.Themotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwatersystehastwo100%capacitypumps,eachnormallyservingonesteamgenerator.ITheirsourcesofwterincludethenormally-alignedbut~non-safety-relatedandnonseiiccategorylcondensatestoragePanks,andthesafety-relatedserviwatersystem.Theturbine-ivenauxiliaryfeedwatexsystemconsitsofone200%capacitypump,itwosteamsupplyflowoaths(onefromeahsteamgenerator),anorm@1sourceofwaterfromthenon-safety-relaedcondensatestorageQanks,andabackupsourceofwaterfromthesafety-relatedserviceatersystem."'heGinnaStationaccidentalyses"'ssume294gpmisdeliveredtoanoperablesteamgenerator,inrdertoremovetherequireddecayheat.Thecombinationofmotor-driveandturbinerivenauxiliaryfeedwater-pumpsassuresoperabilityoftesystemomeettheserequirements,evenassumingasinglefailure.'ntheeventofahighenergylineeakoutsidecontainment,"'heoperabilityofthemotor-drivenandbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwater.systems:cannotbeensured.,sincethkystemsarenotqualifiedforthe4ensuingharshenvironment.Thetanyauxiliaryfeedwatersystem,whichconsistsoftworedundantumps,>qdischargeflowpathtoeach',steamgeneratorandsuctionomboth3.oopsofthesafety-relatedservicewatersystem,performthisfunction.OperatoractionfromthecontrolroomisrequiredtoffectoperationoftheSAFWsystem.The',worst-caseanalysis,afeeaterlinebreak,"q'asbeenperformed,and'heconsequenceswerefodtobe'acceptable.~Theminimumamountof~aterinthecondensate~storagetanksisthe.:amountneededtoremodecayheatfor2hoursafterreactortripfrom,'fullpower.'Anunlimitedsourceforauxiliaryfe$dwaterisavailableIusingthesafety-relatedservicewatersystem.

    References:

    ~~'.(1)UFSARSection10.5:,(2)UFSARStions15.2,15.3,15.63(3)"EfetsofHighEnergyPipeBreaksOutsidetheGontainmentBuiing"submittedbyletterdatedNovember1,1973rofn'K.N.Am'sh,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoA.Giembusso,DputyDirectorforReactorProjects.(4L.D.White,Jr.lettertoMr.D.LZiemann.,USMRCdatedMarch28,1980.'5)SEPToPicXV-6,FeedwaterSystemPipeBreaks,NRCSERdated9/4/844-4I'dmentNo.40 FuelHandlinintheAuxiliaBuildinAlicabilitOb'ectiveisdaesiSecificationApplieolimitationswhilemovingirradiatedfue~-zntheoperatingrareaoftheauxiliazy~uilding.Tolimitdosesieeventanirradiatedfuelassemblygnificantly.Duringhandlingoffuelassembliesintheauxiliarybuildingwheneitherthefuelbeinghandledorthefuelstoredinthespentfuelstoragepoolhasdecayedlessthan60dayssinceirradiation,thefollowingconditionsshallbesatisfied:a.Oneauxiliarybuildingmainexhaustfanshallbeb.Cod~operating.Theauxiliarybuildingexhaustfan1C,whichtakessuctionfromthespentfuelstoragepoolIarea,shallbeoperating.5K~W~C4'IAL~~W<+~All"-do'ors;-mdov~ndother~ectqggx~Jse~~~"-~~/heoperatingfloorareatheoutsideeclosedexceptthatthepersoM~eex-~ay~eforaccess~s-r-eqgired.~~Roughingfiltersshallbeinstalledattheinlet,to'the'adsorbers. e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuelstoragepoolareaandshallbeoperable.3..'onlevelsinthespentfuelstorcL~r~haalcontinuously./3..Aloadinexcessofonefuelassemblyandits..han~ngtoolshallnever--be~sat;ionedorpermittedtopaysovergerackscontainingspentfuel-.--.,3~11.fuelpooltemperatuxmited.tosH~1herestrictionof3.11.3aboveshallnotapplytothe-movemenWwfcannisterscontainingconsolidate'dfuelrodsifthespentrbeneaththetransported/cansercontainoilyspentfuelthathas"decayedjatleastbOdayssincereactorshutdown.Basis:r'14lsgs~arcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequent:e<ofareclingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofsingl*singeirradiatefuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorersshouldbeemployedwneverrecentlyirradiatedfueliinghandled.Thisrequiresthatheventilationsystemsuld.beoperatinganddrawingairthroughthadsorbers.Thenlyexceptionto.therequirementoccurswhenthfuel'nghandled,oranyfuelinthestoragepool,hasdecayedleast60dayssinceirradiationITheconsequencesofafueandlingaccidentinthiscase-w,itho'utoperationofthecharaladsorbersisass,gnificantlylessthantheguidelinesofpCpplpp.AmendmentNo.5,ES.E2l9~AmendmentNo...,..3.11-2 7-1'desiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromthoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towadthentfuelstoragepool,intotheareaexhaustducts,thoughtheadsrbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhasttothefacil'tyvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuildiexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilaonsystemexhaustduct'lgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedtothefacilityvent.perationoftheexhaustfanfor+hespent,fuelstoragepoolareaausesairmovementontheoperatingfloortobetowardthepool.Preroperationofthefansandsettingof3.11-3damperswouldresultianegativepressu-eontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcausealeakagetobintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflowsfromtlocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)totharea/ofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhausirflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoallifoebeingdischargedfromthe/facility.Theroughingfilperprot'tstheadsorberfrombecoming,Ffouledwithdirt;theads'rberremoveiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsignficance,resul.ingfranafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffectivenessofcharcoal-orremovingiodineisassuredbyhavinghighthroughputandahxhremovalefficiency.Thethroughput,isattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.ThehighremovalfficiencyisattainedbyminimizingtheamountofiodinethabypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighC'otentiforremovingtheiodinethatdoespassthrughthechareal.':jAmendmentNo.19

    hespentfuelpooltenperatureislimitedto150'Fbecauseithespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisnotatthattemperatue,suffienttime{approximately7hours)isavailabletoovidetCbackupcoling,assumingthemaximumanticipatedheatad(fullcoredischae6previouslystoredfuel),untilatperatureof180'Fisreacd,thetemperatureatwhichthestcturalintegritylofthepoolwasalyzedandfoundacceptable.Therequirementof115insuresthatshoulahandlingaccidentoccurduringthemovemtofaconsolidatfuelcannister(asdescribedin5.4.)thedoeattheexclionareaboundarywouldReferences(1)(2)FSAR-Section9.3-1AHS-5.1(N18.6),Octo(3)Letter,J.A.ZwolinskNovember14,1984.satisfytherequirementsof10CFR100.r1973{USNRC)toR.W."gKober,{RG6E),3.11-4AmendmentRQ.2y19j SR.'a.$RStZZASgC.pSR},'ll~4},'L+.l'3.}.i2,2.3.'7~<o.I7.}.l2e}~\Q.-}.iw.lj,8TNIMUMTABLE4.1-2FRFO1'p<N<>FS~~Kn'J~oYHNTANDSp=pLXNQ'ESTS.r3.}~,g3,>l.ReactorCoolantChemiatrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronTestChlorideandFluorideOxygenBor'onConcentrationFrecru~enc3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow250FWeekly3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSampleBoronConcentrationWeekly4.BoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankTwice/Week'o5.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRod6b.FullLengthControlRod7.PressurirerSafetyValvesRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedaaufficientnumberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedby'ther'odpoaitionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughitafulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownst.g,o,l,l8.MainSteamSafetyValves9.ContainmentIsolationTri'p-~0.RefuelingSystemInterlocksloGe~nint-EachRefuelingShutdownFunctioningEach.RefuelingShutdownpFunctioningpriortoRefuelingOperationsAmendment:No.,S74'-8 FePzotectxoumpandPowSupplyY~IgtAs'R.zw.p.9SP11.ServiceMaterSystem~izTestFunctioningFunctiong~FrecrueneEachRefuelingShutdownonthly~j'3.14.1516~>.4i~W3.'7.1L.ljg3,7'Ld.l+R.'Eha+19.SprayAdditiveTankAccumulatorPrimarySystemLeakageSpentFuelPi.tSecondaryCoolantSamples44*HCirculatingMaterFloodProtectionEquipmentNaOHConcentBoronConcentrationEvaluateBoronConcentrationGrossActivityCalibrateMonthlyBi-MonthlyOakly9ai.lyMonthlyV2-hou-r-s-~~~EachRefuelingShutcfowNotes:AlsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthoseNotrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.Anisotopicanalysisfor.I.-$31equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlwhenverthegrossac'vi.tydetermination;syndicesxo1nencentrationgreerthan104ofhealablelimittonlyoncepermonthswhenevertgrosstivity.deteinationindicatiodineconcentrationbelow'.104ofthelowablelimit..i""'*"'*""""--"-,(4)HhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.3-IAmendmentNo.g,5?I4'-9 4.5.2.3.6Atleastonceevery1Smonthsorafterevery720hoursocharcoalf'ltrationsystemopeationsincethe'ast'test,orfollowingpainting,f'reorchemicalreleaseinanyventilat.onzonecommunicatingwitht'.".esystemthecontolccmernege.cvairtrea"~entsysemshallnave"".eollowingconditionsdemonstrated,.a0T.epressuredropacross".ecomb'ned2=-PAiltrsandcharcoaladsorbebanksislessthan6"ofwateatde-s'g..flowrate(~10$).o.Inp'aceFreontesting,undeambientcond'icns,sha'Si0showatleast99%"moval.c.Inplacethe~llygeneratedDC?testingof"ae2=-?A="rsshallshowatleast99%removal.,Theresultsoflaboratoryaralysisonacarbor.sampleshashow90%o-czreaterrad'oac"'vemethyicd'de4.5.2.3.7=emovalwhentestedatat"east125':and958RHan"a".1.5to2.0mg/mloadingwi-staggedCH3~.Aftereachcomp<<leteorpartia'eplacementofAeH=-PA'terbankorateranyst=uctualma.'ntenanceonthe2=-?Ahous'ngzort..econtrolzoomemergencya'rtreatmentsystem,"Necon-or.ofSpeci"'cat'on4.5.2.3.6.cshal'edemons"=ated"otheafeczedport'onofthesystm.4.5.2.3.8Aftereachreplacemenozacharcoaldraweroraeranvstructuralmaintenanceonthecharcoa'ousing.thecŽntrolroomemergencyairtrawentsvstem,thecond'"ionf'ca-'on4.5.2.3.6.bshabede.mnstratedorNeo-=Spec"'-<a~IApor"o..othesvstem. 4~S.2.3.9Exceptdu"ingco3.dorrefuelingshudownstheautomaticinit'ationofthecontolroomemergencvairt=eatment5Z.x.4systemsha3.1betestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonthto.verifyoperabilitvandproperorientat'nandflowshall'bemaintainedtMoughthesystemforatleast15minutes.Thetstshallbeper=ormed.priortost""pi=thet'-.esincethelasttestexceedsonemonth.hBas's:9Sazetvn~ectionSyst~~andtheCon'i...e..'>>av<<1>>>+VA<<ylsaecuas:.a~arero...='<<eq>>q<<~>>~<<'>>~<<<<<<lc=c~~riveiaa.io>>iC"mpa.systemstestscannotbeperformedwhent'"ere-"c"o-.s40sc-eratng"ecauseSa=etvXn,"ectionsignacausescon-I'ai:zeisola'onancaCcntai."rtentSorayS"-t-"~sc'I\s4c;uirasthesystemto"etemporarilydisabled.hemehcozassuringc=erab"vofthesesvstems's"eeforatocorn-.'nesvstmsteststoaper=ormeddurirgannua3.aslantshuQownslw'.more='-ecuentc=mporenttests)wnichcnbepeformeddu-'greactoro"'ation.T..eamalsystemstestsdemonstratearche>>autcmatico"-eat'ono-theSaet'niectionandContainmentScravS'vstems'i"hthepumpsblockedfromsar'.-.-atests'gnalisappliedtoi.it'teautcmaticact'cn efficiency.adsorbings~HThetestconditionsforcharcoalsampleIefficiencyarethosewhichmightbeencounteredunderanaccidentsituation.'controlroomairtreatmentsystemisdesigned,tfiterthecontrolroomatmosphere(recirculationndintaeair)duringcontrol"roomisolation:condiions..HEPAfz.tersareinstalledbeforethecharcoafilterstoremovparticu'atematterand,preventoggingoftheiodinedsorbers.Thecharcoalfiltsreduce.theairborneradiiodineinthecontrolroom.Bypassleakagemustbeta.minimuminorderforthesefilterstoperformtheperformancesareasdesignedfction.Iftheecifiedtcalculateddoseswill)abeless'hanthoseanalzed.'>>Retestingofthepostac'ntcharcoalsystemorthesystem'soperatingandiscontrolroomemergencyaitreatmentsystemintheeventofSainting,Aire,chemicalreleaseisrequiredonlyifheprovidingfiltrionfortheaeainwhichthepainting,fireorchemicalreleaseocurs.Testi.ngofdeairfiltrationsystemsillhe,totl)eextentitcan,giventheconfigurationofthesystems,inaccdancewithANSIN510-1975,"TestingofNuclearAir-CeaningSystems."tNo.334.5-10 3(7

    References:

    1)UFSARSection6.3.5.2()UFSARFigures15.6-12and15.6-13(3)UFSARSection6.5.1.2.4(4)SARSection..6.4.3.3./,I4.5-11 hfainSteamIsolationValvesAolicabilitAppliestoperiodictestingofthemainsteamisolationvalves.~Ob'ectiveToverifytheabilityofthemainsteamisolat'ionvalvestocloseuonsignal.oneT,'t~~QQSecificationThemainsteamisolationvalvesshallbetestedateachrefuelinginterval.Closuretimeoffivesecondsorlessshallbeverified.Thevalvesaretestedundernoflowandatnov'"o~~~o~W:loadeondltlons.~oc-"~Xo+4~c'--"o!v6~l~*sisThema'teamisolationvalvesservetolimitanexcessivereaorcoolantsystemcooldnrateandresultantreactivityinsertionlowingamainsteambreakincidenlfiedateachscheduledTheirabilitytocloseuposignalshouldbever!-reflingshutdownAclosuretimeoffivesecondswasselectedasbeingtlnentationasdetailedconsistentexpectedresponsetimeforinstru-inthsteamlinereakincidentanalysis.Rvierencas:F'SA-Section10.4rSAR-Section14.?.5V4.7-1 AUXILEARYPEEDWATERSYSTEMSALicabilitAppliestoperiodictestingrequirementsoftheturbine-driven,motor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps,andofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.4.8e1Sa'2.>.>.K~33.l4.8'SR.35.sToverifytheoperabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemandthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwatersystemandtheirabilitytodrespondproperlywhenrequired..SecificationdExceptwhenbelow350'Feachmotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump,unlessitisdeclaredinoperablewithouttestinwillbestartedatintervalsnottoexceed(ib3fmontbpeExceptwhenbelow3SO'Fthesteamturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump,unlessitisdeclaredinoperabLewithouttestinwillbestartedatintervalsnottoexceedmonth@'fonedischargef'paeraexnaccorancewithSpec'.4.2.2,I'flowof2QOgpms.Oncetheinoperableldischargeflow'eurneestatus,aflowof,t4-sbeestablishedwithin72hourster4.8.335.i'iSaa.~.s,94.8.4Sa.3s.its4~8~5S,g..a.S'3S.is'4.S.S~ZS.vSR3.1.S.ZSt2.'l.5d&4.8.7Exceptwhenbelow...350'FtheauxjJ.iary.feedwaterpumpssuctiond'.4~,hllhexercisedatintervalsw&=6~tceeM~nehhu.T:.:~'4l%~OS~Exceptwhenbelow350'Feacstandbyaux'.iaryewaerpump,unlessitisdeclaredinoperablewithouttestinwillbestartedatintervalsnottoexceedmonthnd,-a-G~wtdli-Exceptwhenbelow3SOdFthendcross-overmotoroperatedvalvesforesanyauxxz.aryfeedwaterhhlidd"-hhe-RHhebeconsideredscontrolboardIindicationanervationoftheequipmentratethatallcomponentshaveoeraeresetestsshallbeperormeprior.to.exceeding.5%,SowerduringstartupAtleastonceper(Q&onths,controlofthestandbyauxiliaryfeed,systempumpsand.valvesfromthecontrolroomwillbedemonstrated.S'~ac@.i<.~Pro~Asessseet s<s.~.~v~4.8.9Atleastonceper('monthsdur'ngshutdown:a.Verifythateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathforeachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpactuatestoitscorrectpositionuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.b.Verifythat,eachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpstartsasdesignedautomaticallyuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.EachinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedoperablebytheperformanceoftheChannelCheck,ChannelCalibration,andChannelFunctionalTestoperationsforthemodesandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.;4.8.10Theresponsetimeofeachpumpandvalverequiredfortheoperationofeach"train"ofauxiliaryfeedwatershallbedemonstratedtobewithinthelimitof10minutesatleastonceper18months.asisThenthlytestingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysuppl~ngfeedwattothesteamgeneratorswillverifytheirabilitytemeetminimumriredflowrates.ThecapacityofanyoneofthethreeauxiliaryfwaterpumpsissufficienttomeetdecayMtremovalrequirements."Properfunctioningofthesteamturbineadmissionvalveandthe'eeaterpumpsstartwilldemonstrateeintegrityofthesteamdrivenpMonthlytestingofthesdbyauxiliaryfeeterpumpsbysupplyingwaterfromacondensatesupptanktothesamgeneratorswillverifytheir'bilitytomeetminimumiredwrates.Thestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpwouldbeusedonlyifallthree.auxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswereuvaile."'neofthetwostandbypumpswouldbesufficienttoeetdecaheatremovalrequirements.Properfunctioningofthesuionvalvesfrtheservicewatersystem,"thedischargevalves,ahecrossovervalvewilldemonstratetheiroperability.Theoperxlityofthestandbya'liaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathsbetweentpumpsandthesteamgeneratsisdemonstratedusingwaterfrometesttank.Testingofthealiaryfeedwaterpumpsusingrprimarysourceofwatersupplywiverifytheoperabilitytheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowpath.Verificaonofcorrectoperationwillbemadebothfrominstrentationwithinthemaincontrolroomandbydirectvialobrvationofthepumps. f~ences:(1)FSARon10.5(.(2)FSAR-Sections15.,5.3,.15.6l'3)"EffectsofHighFipreaksoutsidethecontainment~Building"sedbyletterdateovember1,l973fromAmish,esterGasandElectricCorpoontoA.Giambusso,yDirectorforReactorProjects,U.AtomicEnergy,>Commission. RefuelinA1icabilitAppliestorefuelingandtofuelhandlinginthespentfuelpool.4.11;1SpentFuelPitCharcoalAdSOZhezSystem4.11.1.1Within60dayspriortoanyoperationofthespentfuelpoolcharcoaladSOZhezsystemasrequiredbySection3.11,thefollowingconditionsshallbedemonstrated.Aftertheconditionshavebeendemonstrated,theoccurrenceofpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththespentfuelpoolcharcoall,g~ozggzsystemshallrequirethatthefollowingconditionsberedemonstrated,beforefuelhandlingmaycontinue,ifoperationofthespentfuelp001charcoa1adsorbersystemisrequiredpersection3.11a~Thetotalairflowratefromthecharcoal4dSOZhe~Sshallbeatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithab.Cocompletesetofnewabsorbers.In-placeFreontesting,underambient.conditions,shallshowatleast99%removal.Theresultsoflaboratoryanalysisonacarbonsampleshallshow90%orgreaterradioactivemethyliodideremovalwhentestedatleast150'Fand95%RHandat1.5to2.0mg/mloadingwithtaggedCHI. 7&I4.11.1.2bemaintainedthroughthesystem1owpathforatleast.'Id.FLoweitherthefilteror1'eseachmonth.'U~'IAftereachreplacementofacharcoalfilterdzawerorfortheaffectedportionofthesystem.afteranystructuralmaintenanceonthecharcoalhousingforthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersystem,theconditionofSpecification4.l~.l.l.bshallbedemonstrated4.11.2ResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculation4.11.2.1Whenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelisinthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper4hours.4.11.2.2Whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofreactorvesselflangeislessthan23feet,bothRHRpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeoperablebyperformingthesurveillancespecifiedintheInsezvicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.55a.4.11.3WaterLevel-ReactorVessel4.11.3.1Thewaterlevelinthereactorcavityshallbedeterminedtobeatleastitsminimumrecyireddepthwithin2hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterduring.movementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodsincontainment.IP'hemeasurementairflowassuresthatairisbeSna-wttÃ8'rawofromthespentfuelpitareaanughtheadsorbers.Theflowismeanortoemployingtheadsorbertstablishthat4.11-2 'khezeM~,pTheFreontestprovidesameasureo'ftheamountofleakagefromaroundthecharcoaladsorbent.Theabilityofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeteriorateasthecharcoalagesandweathers.Testingthecapacityofthecharcoaltoadsorbiodineassuresthatanacceptableremovalefficiencyundeoperatingconditionswouldbeobtained.Thediffeencebetweenthetestrequiementofaremovalefficiencyof90%formethyliodineandthepercentageassumedintheevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccidentprovidesadequatesafetymarginfordegrada-tionofthefilterafterthetests.Retestingofthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersystemintheeventofpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseisrequiredonlyifIthesystemisoperatingandisprovidingfiltrationfortheareainwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbetested,totheextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,inaccordancewithANSI'510-1975,".TestingofNuclear.Air-C'aningSystems"Theoperabilityrequirementsforresidualheatremovalloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelingmode.Therequire-mentfor23feetofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangewhilehandlingfuelandfuelcomponentsincontpinmentisconsistentwiththeassump-tionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.

    Reference:

    (1)LetterfromE.J.Nelson,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoDr.PeterA.Norris',U.S.AtomicEnergyCommission,datedFebruary3,19714.11-3 5.4~1Secification5.5.4.2<,3,t.,L,oM,E.i,L,'eR~~91.'~i.5.4.3Thenewandspentfuelpit,structuresaredesigned..to.'we~andtheanticipatedearthcgzakeloadingslassIstructures'.-.*-.Thespent,fuelpit,hasstainlessst:eellinertoensureagainst-osswater.Thenewandspentfstorageresaredesignedsothatit,isimpos'toinsert;fuelassemblie'therthanthescribedlocations.ThespentfuelstoragesaredividedintotworegionsasdepictedonFigure5.4-1.Thefuelisstoredverticallyinanarraywithsufficientcentetocenterdistancebetweenassembliestoassure'eff<0.95for(1)unirradiatedfuelassembliesdeliveredcu'i4kinitio,(mcic4ncn4"'"'."',priortoJanuary1,1984(Region1-15)go~P<<+<<4'han350avc<qhtpeI'cepsQand(2)unirradiated~'i8,'1n+la.lbl'l'ft*J~1,1984~~~~~t~qi~c~r~n4.Q5'ug4~4Q.7.$5Bothcasesassumunboratedwaterusedinthepool.InRegion2ofthespentfuelstorageracks,fuelisstoredinaclosepackedarrayutilizingfixedneutronpoisonsineachofthestoredlocations.FordischargedfuelassembliestobestoredinRegion2,(1)60aysrmusthaveeapsedsinethecorecachedhotstdownpriortoischarged2)thecombinationofassemblyaverageburnupandinitialU-235enrichmentmustbesuch'that.tbopoint'"'de"tineahy"theselw'oparametersonFi~re5.4-2isabovethelineapplicabletot:particularfuelassemblydesign,thereforeassuringthat,Keff<0

    5-.4.44,'3.l.4c5.4.55.4.6~"o.CannisterscontainingconsolidatedfuelxodsmaybestoredineitherRegion1or2providedthat.'iceaveragebuxnupand,ini+~alenrichmentoftheTuelassembliesfromwhichtherodsvereremovedIsatisfytherequirementsof5.4.2and5.4e3above,andb.~averagedcayheatthefue'ssemblyfmhichtheds~ereemovedisessthan20STU/hr.Therequirementsof5.4.4amayheexceptedforthoseconsolidatedfuelassembliesofRegionRQAF2.Thespentfuelstoragepitisfilledwithboratedwater.ataconcentrationtomatchthatusedinthereactor~~cavityandrefuelingcanalduringrefuelingoperations-whenever.thereisfuelinthepit.osis-,ThecentertocenterspacingofRegion1insuresKeff<0.95fortheenrichmentlimitations~ciQeckin5-4-2iandforapostulated'issileimpacttheresgCoseattheEABwou1dhewithinthegnidelineeof10CKKOD.InRegion2,Keff<0:5isixmuedbytheadditionofinixedneutronpoison(borex)ineachoftheRecp.on.2storage1ocations',andaminimumburnuprequirementafunctionof~initialenrichmentforeachfuelassemblydesign-'.%Le60day~~45~---e---~~ac-sQra+os&.atcIL.slss~~eimp~ettheresultingdoseattheEABwouldbewithinWees'of100. TheMocurvesofFigureS.4-2dividethefuelassemb1y>Resignsintotmgroups.Thefirstgroupisallfueldelivered..prior.toJanuazy1,1984.ThisincorporatesallRxxoxt.andWes~g-houseHIMRdesignsasedat'Ginna.Thesecondcarve~forthewestinghouseOptimizedFuelAssemblydesigndelivered.toGinna.beginninginzuaxy1S84.TheassemblyaveragehurnupiscalculatedusingZSCOREgeneratedposersharingdataandtheactualpantoperating~history.Thecalculatedassemblyaveragehupshouldhereducedc5yXOQtoaccountforuncertainties.~.uncezt'mayof4gisassociatedwiththemeasurementofpowersharing.Theadditional-6gprovidesadditionalmargintohoundthehuxatxp.uncezt'Lintyassociatedwiththetimehe~een~meamuementsandupdatesofcorehuziup."Thecuxvesoffigure5.4-incoxporatetheunceztaintiesofthecalculation-ofassembyreact@,ty.ThecalculationsoffuelassemblyhuznupSorcomparisonCo~ecurvesofFiguze.5.4-2todetermine~~acceptabilityforstorageinRegion2shallheindepexuKentlyehee3ced.%hexe~~o'fthesecalculationsshallhekeptforaslong>fuelassembliesremaininthepol.The.:fuelstoragecannistersaredesignedInormally,theycancontaintheecpxivalentwumberoffurodsfromtwofuelassembliesinaclosepackedaxray,andcan>estoredineitherRegion1orRegion2.racklocations.Weo<<Ilpacke6araywillinsurethe'Keoftherackconficjurationcongany'umberofcannistezsvi11helessthanthatforstoredfuelassembliesatthesamehurnupandinitialenrichment.Theexceptio mfparagraph5.4.5ispossiblebecausetheconsolidatedconfigura's~substantiallylessreactivethanthatofafuelayyembly;Thez8cayheatxecpirementvillinsurethat'local"filmsboilingvil1notoccurbetveentheclosepackedfuel~odsifthepooltemperatureismaintainedatorbelow150'F.ThedecayheatoftheassemblywillhedeterminedusingAms5P,8889-2orotheracceptablesubstitutestandards.Miththe'additionofthestorage'fconsolidatedfuelc:annisters,MetheoreticaIatoragecapacityofthedroolwouldheincreasedto2032fuelassemblies(2x1Q16).Bovever.duetolimitationontheheatremovalcapabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem,thestoraecapacityislimitedto1016.fuelIassemblies.4References1Letter,J-EsuertoB.R.Benton,January38,1984-"---2.Letter3RrR.aiertoE.R.Denton,Manuary~38,2984.3.CriticalityMalaysiacfRegion2oftheGinnaK)RSpentrFuelstorageRack,pickard,LoweandGarrack,Rarch8,2984.4.Letter,T.R.Robbins,Pickard,LoveandGarrick,~-to;J.D.Cook,RQ&EMarchLS,L984.S~Letter,D.M.CrutchfieldtoJ.Z.Naier,NovemberS,Xett1-(o4'~~)"'t >tgCEQ)<RC<QLRS%%%X%%%%%%X'5%RRRN%%%%%%8gggRiUW~.~Q>i5>~%%5%%%5%%%%%%%8%%%%%%%%%%%NRXS>~g).~5i.rWC(5%5%%%RXXSRSOW%%%%XSSXQXWRWSNRI5=W-.S:%=%5%%%WWW%%%%%%%%%%%%%5%%%5%%%~:Qe~<~ac~aaaaawewaaaeweaeaaweawaaeaaeaa%Cia)%Xi<5~385%WWNSWQSSNSWISNINQSSSSQIQQg>3QCigi.(gC(5%8%%%%RSRRRRRRWRRRRRWRRRWRNOgi<8~35i~%i"i%5%%%%5%%X%%%55%%XSNSW55%5NN%%i~NC~RC~WC(WW5%%%%5%5%WWRSX%%%%%%%5%%%5gSg5)3i'd%>35>3%5%WQSX5%%%NSW%%%SR%555%Q%5555~<<NC~g~".(QCigWRQWWRNRWWRRWNWRORCRRXRRNR%IN')"~Wi35i.<SCi%%5%WQWQSWM%%WQX5%%%%%%5%%555%e~ie<i~-.iii-.iiaearaaxaaaeeaaeaaaewaaeaaeaeea5).i5).iW).~%i~MSSXXSXSRSlISXRS%5%%%WRXSSQg555Ri(0~3i3@%i"~86<%><WC~WC<5i355555%%%%%5%WRRWRWWXRORW%5%5155~35i35i35v5i3%~356(5>"~Ni3WC~W>3WQSQQWSRSWSSWHWW55%%%55%%%asaa5)3%~3Wi35ii%~35i3535C~CCiWi3RWSRRRRRRXSORNRRRSRRSRWRRR5Rgg55)(Qi.(5[.<W)35iDWi3%i35t<5i3'ICSWWWSWQSQSSSWXWRSWQW%1%555Qgg1i~Xi35i~Wi3%i35i35i35i35C<5i35%1%%51%%WRRCRRRRRRWXRRRCRRRgg6lki3%i=i%>"<R>35>3W>35M>>5i=<5>~55555%55Nl5%55555%555%555%SIXESRCEX95>3&IMR>3W>385555><Xi355555%5RRRRR55%5%555%5%55555NWg><56<M>3W?3%6<Xi<Oili.(Xi<W>35>~%%%SOW%%%%W%%%55%55%%%X555%gggRC~W>EW)<8)<%)3%~353%i.{5>3WC(RWN55%%RRRNSRRRRRRRON%55%5ggggii-.<i-.ii"~ii:ii"waaassaaamaaaaaaaesawaasmaraaaC(gigi35.{Wi3%WW55%%%%%%RR%%%XRRRRWWWORX%%g5)35><Xi<5"l5~<M%5%%%%%%%%%8%%%%M5%8Qlil%85%%Wg)~g<5)<5>353%%NOXXSRXWXWONRRWWMÃX%%5%WRRR%%QVX)35>"'SMS~VSNWSSS%%%SOWMW%55%I%MSSW10% fI'E'ggXlsg70rffCINCll~IAfsefloelll~~E~isfggffig4IL'gLNCO.geestsa~saFIGURE5.4-2Fqpm~3'7-i30gg20~fe~~II~,'s110:IIssl~g~~!t,'l'ss~~0'.ll:"'I'ro~eg'('oo"I:I~'~soREGIONSOFACCHP~sFORSTORAGEsIIlIje~(o;lj~~ST'~~g~olis~~f~~I~o~jjl'I~j~If~g~ol~i.":I;.(~I,l~II'~:I'itoo~~I~o~os~'itsli!~~~~'~~oo~s'~o'seI'l'e1tgo~g~Il:I~~'i'oI.'I;ilj',l:,ill;lj:triliti(i;sll:ijl~~~~lPos,~o~'lilogr(g::j.:it~ooi~~ltto~'I~!I~l~~\~~~teasioTIle;II~~oI~~~o'ltlji'I,::(t;::I!'Ws~f~:II'oifetIsliolssI:I'~~~I~~tIFUEI(AFTERJALDELIVERED1~~~~oTTl(s',lo~'ll!:I~o~~~tieo~s~Itg~I~gglos~:!I.'~jIf((~NUAogl~jtlfT~.:~~RYll,I~sI~~'~i('ll.ot~~It~s~o~,r~I:jjo~I:I':g'o~osgI.~~I~~~gI,,o~lsI~~till,o~I~(tj!~~tl:e:ll~~~~tI(ee!i~~~I"Iso~~~~'i.~<<tito'.I'<<ls~li.~gI~oI'~~~~Ltro~t~~fi:I!I:LE.lI!~I~sI~~Is~~I~oo~!I:ill'2s~~~~~I,~I~~~os~~~~~~~~!oEPACCTABs.lgFORIo':I,II:I[:',jilRREGIOo~~~:Ii(;~~~'Il~~.'I:;I;~fjisel.TOIo'le:I;;:i(I-.:',(Io'f~~~l:(,'jill,o'Is~~~I~iI(~Il:t~~oI,:~kgIss~I~~i~oo~~s.I~Iggo~~~goIsIl'oil~oli~~Io~IjIo~~~~haftIotlt:II'iI';'(tI:i:~~4r(.I~(~~~~I~oo.I:,rI~i'Ig~I~~Ilite~is,f'~~o:l"~~'jls~~li~~jjiof~felgoI~~,l~~~o~~ooooIS~~~I~i~Itrr,iI'os~~(f~'I:olfesit:jpIj:Tr~~so:ls.Il.(I::jr:(It"o~~IjI(I!~~.I~~~~~~~o~'I!s~~i'~'isoII.I,:!ji's.s,s::il;:~~~~o'I~~ii~I(~~~o~sslI':IsIjos~,':(II"..Il;:(si'I".elI.'ote:If~lIg~osIe~o;Iego.fo'P~gi~i~iii.I'~.~I~"Io'lo~l:~l~I~~,f~~os'os'~~os!I~o!"'(toio',es.IfIll!Ill~~fel:Ioeltl:stoftIlife(!lseT~'l~~:I'~~r'(li.!!1~~(g'I'~tt~s~(.II':sj:I't~sr!I:i!Iill.:CCi~ioI~'osle~II.,~g~IIos;~Ij;i;Ill,o~(og~I~lego~~I!i(~~~oFUELDELIVEREDPRIO.JANUARY1,198t~~',~ij:.rrr'iIIII~~i~i,'.Iifltijljiist!ji(:,ost~~I:.',Ii:.Ii:ION~~~~~'t~I::'.~~Ii~lsj'iet~~oo'lo~I~:.I:'ji:~I,!Ii.~~I~.'IloAB(~li~el~~ol~oo~!i~"i~I~~~I'I~~\~o'-ll:I~~~~I~I(~:I~s~js;t~~~~~~~~IUNo~~oo~~o~t~l~EPTFOARREGI~lo~ts'(~I~~to,'Iiolt~~o~I~I~j~'eiri(~li"ot"'I',1:g~~~l'(IIl,~~osl'-II~I~IIgo~si(~tIoij.(tilr'I'(:off(jjliIii'!isI,l'o'j-'i~L~~~~'lllI.Iosl~ll-j<<'~t'l:;~~~~o~~~I~IiI(l~~i~IsI'o~so~ItIo~~~~~~'ooo~Ii~lso~~I~~~~lssIg~I;:lj..'il'~'it~~~i~o~I;og~IIIL,I:~~eglII~gl~Isg~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oI)eII'IIs.I~~IIt~'Iol~Ws~~ii'os~.I~~(lI~eo~~~~~,os~o~g~st~gLII;~IIo~~o1.50IF003.00INITIALRNAIC!HMRNToi4/0IF004'5TABILITYANDUNACCEPTABILITY.OFSPENTFUELINREGION2 3.0(C~~3.0.LIMITINGCONDITIONFOR'PERATIONAPPLICABILITYIntheeventaLimitingConditionforOperationand/orassociatedactionrequirementscannotbesatisfiedbecauseofcircumstancesinexcessofthoseaddressedinthespecification,within1houractionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours(i.e,atotalofsevenhours),andinatleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours(i'.e.,atotalof37I~1hours)unlesscorrectivemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationunderthepermissibleactionstatementsforthespecifiedtimeintervalasmeasuredfrominitialdiscoveryoruntilthereactorisplacedinamodeinwhichthespecificationisnotapplicable.IftheactionstatementcorrespondingtotheLimitingConditionforOperationthatwasexceededcontainstime,limitstohotandcoldshutdownthatarelessthanthosespecifiedabove,thesemorelimitingtimelimitsshallbeapplied.Exceptionstotheserequirementsshallcifications.bestatedintheindividual:/3.0.2Whenasystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelybecauseitsemergencypowersourceisinoperable,orsolelybecauseitspreferredpowersourceisinoperable,itmaybeconsideredoperableforthepurposeofsatisfyingtherequirementsofitsapplicableLimitingConditionforOperation,provided:Amendm~No."13.0-3. (1)itscorrespondingpreferredoremergencypowersourceisoperable;and(2)allof'itsredundantsystem(s),subsystems(s),train(s),component(s)anddevice(s)areoperable,orlikewisesatisfytherequirementsofthisspec'ication./blessbothconditions(1)and(2)aresatisf'dwithintheunxtshallbeplacedinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours,andinatleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Thisspecificationisnotapplicableincoldshutdownorrefuelingmodes.BasisaSpecification3.0.1delineatestheACTIONtobetakenforcircumstancesnotdirectlyprovidedforintheACTIONstatementsandwhoseoccurrence~ouldviolatetheintentofthespecification.Forexample,Specification3.3.2requirestwoContainmentSprayPumpstobeoperableandprovidesexplicitactionrequirementsifonespraypumpisinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifbothoftherequiredContainmentSprayPumpsareinoperable,theunitisrequiredtobeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandinatleastcoldshutdowninthenext30hours.Thesetimelimitsapplybecausethetimelimitsforonespraypumpinoperable(6hourstohotshutdown,wait48hoursthen30hourstocoldshutdown)arelesslimiting.Asafurtherexample,Specification3.3.1'LrequireseachReactorCoolantSystemaccumulatortobeoperableandprovidesexplicitactionrequirementsifoneaccumulator.isinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifmorethanoneaccumulatorisinoperable,within1houractionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursandcoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Thetimelimitof6hours/Amended'~No.23,473.0-2 ~e~~3.otohotshutdownhand30hourstocoldshutdowndonotapplythetimelimitsfor1accumulatorinoperablearemorelimiting.isassumedthattheunitisbroughttotherequiredmodewithintheLequiredtimesbypromptlyinitiatingandcarryingouttheappropriateactionstatement.:~-Ipecification3.0.2delineateswhatadditionalconditionsmustsasfiedtopermitoperationtocontinue,consistentwiththeaionstatentsforpowersources,whenapreferredoremergenpowersourceinotoperable.XtallowsoperationtobegoveredbythetimelimitsoftheactionstatementassociatedwithheLimitingConditionforerationforthepreferredoremergepowersource,nottheindividuactionstatementsforeachystem,subsystem,train,componentorvicethatisdeterminedheinoperablesolelybecauseoftheinoperlityofitsprefredoremergencypowersourcesForexample,Specification.7.2.1requiresinpartthattwoemergencydieselgeneratorsbeperable.Theactionstatementprovidesforamaximumout-of-~rvitimewhenoneemergencydieselgeneratorisnotoperable.IftheefinitionofoperablewereappliedwithoutconsiderionofSpecifition3.0.2,allsystems,subsystems,trains,coponentsanddevicessulied,hytheinoperableemergencypowersocewouldalsobeinoperable.ThiswoulddictateinvokingtheapicableactionstatementsforeachftheapplicableLimitingCoitionsforOperation.However,therovisionsofSpecificaon3.0.2permitthetimelimitsforcontinuederationtobeconstentwiththeactionstatementfortheinoperableergencydieselgeneratorinstead,providedtheotherspecifiedconditioaresatisfied.Inthiscase,thiswouldmeanthatthecorrespondingAmen~ntNo.N4.473.0-3 x~Ircemustbeoperableanda'lredundantsystems,referredpowersoutssystems,trains,Cemergencpowersourceoperable).Eftheyarenotsisfied,shutdownirequiredinaccordancewiththisspecificatin.components,anddevi'cesmustbeoperableothewisesatisfySpecification3.0.2(i.e.,becapableofperforingtheirdesignr.unctionandnaveatleastonepreferred~.I~jAmendrya&No.2A.<73.0-4I~ 3.7AUXILIARYELECTRICALSYSTEMSAlicabilitAppliestotheavailabilityofelectricalpowerfortheoperationofplantauxiliaries.Todefinethoseconditionsofelectricalpoweravailabilitynecessarytoprovideforthecontinuingavailabilityofengineeredsafeguards.3.7.1Secification3.7.1.1Whenincoldshutdownorrefueling,withfuelinthereactorvessel,thefollowingconditionsaretobemet:a.Oneindependentoffsitepowersourceoperable,orbackfeedv>v>b~throughunitauxiliarytransformer11;andOnetrainof480-voltbuses(14and18,or16and17)c'COZ~4Lco~V.to)cog.$.8~a.i3.7.1.2operable;andOnedieselgeneratoroperablewithonsitesupplyof5,000gallonsoffuelavailableandeitherbuses14and18,or16and17,capableofbeingsuppliedfromthatdieselgenerator.Onebatteryandonedcsystem,andatleast150ampsofbatterychargercapacitytothebatterymustbeoperable.Either120voltA.C.InstrumentBus1Aor1Cenergizedfromitsassociatedinverter.ActionsToBeTakenIfConditionsof3.7.1.1.AreNotMet:e~3S.ZConJA(8LCO3$.5lp.)[co3.s8'~*)G)qWithlessthantheaboveminimumrec{uiredpowersourceoperable,-V+,immediatelysuspendalloperationsinvolvingpositivereactivity,'changes,corealterations,movementofc~'3.g.~CogiA')Q3%71 requiredpowersourcestooperablestatus.TT~~r,w~>>~er<TTr,VTT>>kk"3.7.2SecificationsTirradiatedfuelandinitiatecorrectiveactiontorestorethe,>>T37.F1a~i.ca3.8~LCD>,$.QLCo"-.~lLco3.$.yThereactorcoolantsystemshallnotbetakenabovethemodeindicatedunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:Abovecoldshutdown;1.Oneindependentoffsitepowersourceoperable.2.the480-voltbuses14and18(TrainA)andbuses16and17(TrainB)areenergized.3.thetwodieselgeneratorsareoperablewith'onsitesupplyof5,000gallonsoffuelavailableforeachdieselgenerator.Lco3.~ALco3.'3.t,Lcog.'S.gc4(5.bothbatteriesandbothdcsystemsareoperable.atleast150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityforeachDCsystemthat.isinservice.LCQ3.4,"ItLCOQ.l.'.'Ib.6.120voltA.C.InstrumentBuseslAand1Careenergizedfromtheirassociatedinverters.7.120voltA.C.InstrumentBus1BisenergizedfromitsassociatedconstantvoltagetransformerfromMCC1C.Above350F;1.Allconditionsof3.7.2.1aabovearemet;and2.Twooffsitesourcesi(34.5kv-4160vdltstationserjvv.cehtraformers,12Aithdedicatedircuit751,a12Bwihdedicatedc'uit767)areperable.3.7'.2ActionsToBeTakenIfConditionsof3.7.2.1AreNotMet:t7.clia~rOperatonabove350'aycontinueithoneinopable,provid.allremainingconditionsoffsidesourceof.7.2.1areI7.aiameWithoneorbotindependentoffsitesourcesoperable,andonedieselgeneratorinoperableabovecoldshutdown,demonstratetheoperabilityoftheremainingdieselgeneratorby:3~72 Performing.thesurveillancerequirementsidentifiedinSpecifications4.6.1.b.4and4.6.1.b.6within1hourandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterandrestoretheinoperabledieselgeneratortooperablestatuswithin7daysiOTHERWISE:2.Reducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinica3".E.t~~~Jythenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.QHours~17.Withonesafetyrelated480VBus(i.e.,bus14or16or17orls)de-energized,reen-ergizethebuswithin~orreducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours,unlesscorrectiveactionsarecompletethatpermitcontinuedoperation(i.e.,thebusisreturnedtoservice).Withbothindependentoffsitesourcesinoperable,bothdiesel'eneratorsmustbeoperable.Inaddition,restoreoneindependentoffsitesourcewithin72hours,orreducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hourse.andbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Operationabovecoldshutdownmaycontinueiflessthan150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityisavailabletoonedcsystem,providedatleast150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityisavailabletoeachdcsystemwithin2hours.Ifnotavailable,reducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.3~73 f.WitheitherInstrumentBus1Aor1CnotenergizedfromLcG3'S.itsassociatedinverter:1.Re-energizethebuswithin2hours(backupormaintenancegAA.Esupply),AND2.Re-energizethebusfromasafetyrelatedsupply(backuporinverter)within24hours,AND3.Re-energizethebusfromitsassociatedinverterwithin72hours,OTHERWISE4.Reducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.g.WithInstrumentBus1Bnotenergizedfromitsassociatedgc.~q.gqconstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)fromMCC1C:Re-energizethebuswithin2hours(maintenancesupply),~l-P)AND2Re-energizethebusfromitsassociatedCVTfromMCC1CCc)~g3.within7days,OTHERWISEReducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.3~73a Basisfor3.7.1and3.7.2:Theelectrica'1systemsequipment'sa"rangedsothatnonosinglefailurecaninactivateenoughsafeguardsequipmenttojeopardizethePlantsafety.The480-voltsafeguardsequipmentisarrangedon4safeguardsbuses.The4160-voltequipment(noneofwhichissafetY-related),issuppliedfrom4buses.Twoseparateoffsitesourcessupplystationservicepowertoplant.fsitloads.sources.'heplantauxiliaryequipmentisarrangedelectricallysothatredundantsafeguardsloadsreceivepowerfromseparatesources.Zntheeventthat1offsitesourc'e,isnotavailable,theremainingof'sourceiscapableofsupplyingbothtrainsofsafeguardsSafeguardsloadssuchassafety>injectionpumps,containmentfans,residualheatremovalpumps,andmotorcontrolcenters1Cand1Daredividedbetweenthe480-voltbusesNo,14and16.RedundantloadsincludingservicewaterpumpsaresuppliedbybusesNo.18andA17.TogetherthesebusesformtheTrainAandB'redundantClass.1E,Cr'ACpowerfore"safeguardsequipmentoriginatesfrombothoffsiteandonsitesources.Theoperabilityofthesepowersourcesandassoai.ated.distributionsystemsensuresthatsufficientpowerwiM.beailabletosupplythesafety-relatedequipmentrequiredfor(1)the3.7-4 safeshutdownoftheplant,and(2)themitigationandcontrolof>acidentconditionswithintheplant.~.WhentheRCSisabovecoldshutdown,bothemergencydieselgeneratorsarerequiredtobeoperable.Thetwodieselgeneratorshavesufficientcapacitytostartandrunalltheengineeredsafeguardsequipmentat5(designloads.-.ThesafeguardsequipmentoperatedfromonedieselgeneratorcanadequatelycoolthecoreandmaintainthecontainmentpressurewithinthecXesignvalueforanylossofcoolantincident.Theminimumdieselfueloil~inventoryismaintainedtoassurethatbothdieselscanoperateattheirdesignratingsfor24hours.Thisassuresthatbothdieselscancarry'thedesignloadsofrequiredengineeredsafeguardsequipmentforanyloss,ofcoolantaccidentconditionsforatleast40hours,orforoneengin'eeredsafetyfeaturetrainfor80hours.<'>Commercialoilsuppliesandtruckingfacilities.existtoassuredeliverieswithin.8hours.Theoffsitepowersourceconsistsofseparate,dedicated34.5kv-4160r,voltstationservicetransformersservedbydedicated34.5kvlines(12A.:.'ransformerwithdedicatedcircuit751,or12Btransformerwithdedicatedcircuit767)inoperablestatus.Eitherof<sitesourceofi~powercansupplyallauxiliaryloadsandtransfercanbe-accomplishedwithinthetime.'constraintsofGDC17.Thus,GDC17isexplicitlymet.Withfuel'nthereactorvesselaminimumofoneoffsitesource~oneE.onsitesourceofACpowerandoneDCpowertrainarerequired.Te~~offsitepowersourcemaybeprovidedbyoneofthreeconfigurations:3.7-5 ~,.:z.3~~hkCM,8Vl'I'!llPC~~'-'~'W,wl~,~~Iransformer12Aservedbyadedicated34.5kvline(circuit751),orTransformer12Bservedbyadedicated34.5kvline(circuit,767),orBackfeedthroughunitauxiliarytransformer11.~'heoffsitepowersourceisthepreferredsourceofACpower.Operabilityofanoffsitesourcerequiresthatonestationservicetransformerservedbyadedicated34.5kvlineisoperatingandprovidingpowertotheunit.Theemergencydieselgeneratorprovidespoweruponlossof.,theoffsitesource.Oneemergencydieselgeneratorwith5,000gallons'affuelcanprovidepowertoaminimumlevelofengineeredsafeguardsec{uipmentfor40hours(therequiredsafeguardsloadsatcoldshutdown/refuelingaresignificantlylessthanduringpoweroperation).Oneoperabledieselfueloiltransferpumpisrequiredtosupplyfuelfromoneofthetwofuelstoragetankstothedaytankoftheoperabledieselgenerator.KithlessthanoneoffsiteACpowersource,andoneonsiteACowersource,oneDCpowertrain,andonebatterybackedinstrumentbusavailable,nooperationsinvolvingpositivereactivitychanges,corealterations,andmovementofirradiatedfuelshalloccur.Batterychargerswithatleast150ampscapacitshallbeinserviceforeachbatterysothatthebatterieswillalwaysbeatfull,charge.Thisensuresthatadec{uatedcpowerwillbeavailable.Theplantcanbesafelyshutdownwithouttheuse'ofoffsrtepowersince!allvitalloads(safetysystems,instruments,etc.)canbesuppliedfrom..itheemergency'dieselgenerators"andthestationbatteries.Instrument!I.".Buses1A,1B,and1Cprovidepowertovitalplantinstrumentatioh.All'tIl.,threebusesarebackedupbysafetyrelatedemergencysupplies;bus1Afrom'battery1A,bus1Cfrombattery.1B,andbus1Bfrom'ieselgenerator1A.3.7-6 m4Thediesel'enerators,eachcapableofsupplyinyi~n-.safeguadsloads,andthestagionauxiliarytransformersprovidefouourseparatesourcesofpowerimmediately-availablefor'operationoftheseloads..cThus,thepowersupplymeetsthe"s"ingle'"'failurecriteria.NrRaforoneas(1-UFSAR-Sect'on9.5.43%77 12.13.~~~~s3.1,3.H,~Q~.SServiceWaterSyst:emFireProtectionPumpandPowerSupplySprayAdditiveTankTestFunctioningFunctioningNaOHConcent,~Feeuencig>4V<EachRefuelingShutdown--~MonthlyMonthlyP>215.PrimarySystemLeakage14.AccumulatorBoronConcentrationEvaluateBi-MonthlyDailySa.~.~.i'(16.Sg.3.6.2.lDieselFuelSupplyFuelInventory~~1718.SpentFuelPitSecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationGrossActivityMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingWaterCalibrateFloodProtectionEquipmentEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:~(1)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.(3)Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-3.31equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentration.greaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentra'tionbelow104oftheallowablelimit.WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.~L~,.LLLLQ.L.SIAmeedmentNo.g,574.1-9 4.64.6.1Preferred.andEmerencvPower'SystemsPeriodicTests.AlicabilitAppliestoperiodictesting'andsurveillancerequirementsofthepreferredandemergencypowersystems.Toverifythatthepreferredandemergencypowersystemswillrespond,promptlyandproperlywhenrequired.SecificationThefollowingtestsandsurveillanceshallbeperformedasstated:DieselGenerators5R3.'3.3-ILco3.g.IAtleastonedieselgeneratorshallbedemonstratedoperable:yA)vhl5%'l)&YA)wIvw,()%4~-))J)))pp~pe)ea.Duringcoldorrefuelingshutdownatleastonceper31Sp$g,p,Idaysby:1.Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormalstagy3v.L3%.'onditions,andattainsratedvoltageandfreguenEachdieselgeneratorshallbedemonstratedoperable:b.Exceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdownatleastonce.per31daysby:1.Verifyingthefuel.levelinthedaytank.2.Verifyingaminimumoilstorageof,5,000galionsforeachgenerator.thatisOnsite.5e,a.s.l.s3.Verifyingthefueltransferpumpcanbestartedand,transferfuelfromthestoragesystemtothedaytank.4.Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormalstandbyconditions,andattainsratedvoltageandfrequency.BR3.Z.I.g5..Verifyingthegeneratorissynchronized,loadehto)3z.~,atleast1950kwbutlessthanthe2hourratingof2250kwand,operatesforatleast60minutes3,xmas~.(butlessthan120minutes.JI'.Verifyingthedieselgeneratori~alignedtoO33)I.lprovidestandbypowertotheassoci'atedemergencyjbuse's.46-1 5'.g.<4~~SR8.8.'t.'(3Q.M'l1~P~Y~~Naw~w~~'Q8.Y.i,R."-~+n'hetests'.".SPecification4.6.1bwillbep+rformedfPr~rtoexceed-'Ling.cold.shutdownifthetime,;"sincethe1/sttestexesMys...d.Atleastonceper92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTHD975-78whencheckedforviscositywaterandsediment.4wtt~e.Atleast'nceperthsduringshutdownby:V,'.znspetingthe,dieselinaccordancewiththe)'manacturercommendationsforthisp'classofsndhservie.I2.Verifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytoreject,al33xIloadof295KWwithouttripping.3.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectionteusignaland:(a)Verifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses.pMd4'cs~~(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormalstandbyconditionontheauto-startsignal,energizestheautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloadsith,thefollowingmaxian~"33.vi.eakerclosuretimesafterthe'tialstartinsignalforTrainsAapcWnotheingexceededABDieselplusSafetyInjection~'-20sec22secPumpplus~RHRPumpBreakers40sec42'"secSR3.Y.l.$'ndoperatesfor>fiveminuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthatalldieselgeneratortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andovercrank,areautomaticallybypasseduponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal.4.6-2 SR38.t.Z.4~Thistestmayalsoservetoconcurrentlymeettherequirementsof4.6.l.aandb.4'-2a StationBatteriesa.Everymonththevoltageofeachcell(tothenearest0.01volt),thespecificgravityandtemperatureofapilotcellineachbatteryshallbemeasuredandrecorded.b.Every3monthsthespecificgravityofeachcell,thetempera-turereadingofeveryfifthcell,theheightofelectrolyte,andtheamountof~ateraddedshallbemeasuredandrecorded.4.6-3 335P3.$.W.ZzR38~LE~"a'<<hLJS~Hc.Ateachtie.d.ataisrecorded,newdatashallcomparedz.thold.todetecsignsofdetiorationd.achbatterys11besubgectetoaloadtestatwelve-monkperiodfromthlastload.test;owever,ItopermiteloadtesttocoincidewithscheduledI~refuelangtheperiodmextendforaeaddrtronali>threenths.Thebatteryvoltageasafunctionoftimeshallhemonitoredtoestablishthatthebatteryperformsasexpectedduringheavydischargeandthatallelectricalconnectionsaretight.Eachbatteryshallbesubjecttoadischargetestatleastonceper60months.Thepurposeofthistestistoshowthatthebatterycapacityisatleast804ofdthisdischargetestmaysubstitutefortheloadtest.Thedischargetest,shallbeperformedannuallyforanybatterythatshowssignsofdegradation.DegradationisindicatedwhentheUattecaacitdrosmore.thSa.4.6.3pyp/t10'tof,ratedcapacityfromitsaverageonprevious3'3.~;c'/dischargetests,orp.sbelow90%opthemanufaturer'srating.Preferred(Offsite)PowerSuliesSC2.8,i,<Sa~A.z..iSR3.'l.l.(.Eachoffsitepowersourceshallhedemonstratedoperable:a.Atleastonceper7daysby:Verifyingnominalvoltageindicationsonthehigh-voltagesideoftransformers12Aand12B;andonthe4160voltbuses12Aand12B.2..Verifying4160voltcircuit.breakers12AXor12BX,AND12AYor12BYareopen.3.Verifyingtiebreakers52/BT16-14and52/BT17-18areopenwhenplmodeisabove200'P.2Vb.Atleastonceperthsbytransferringunitpowersupplyto4160voltbuses12Aand.12Bfromthenormalcircuit,i.e.,transformer12Aforbus12Aandtransformer12Bforbus12Btothealternate'circuit,i.e.,transformer12Bforbus12Aandtransformer12Aforhus12B.4.6-4 InstrumentBusesEachsafetyrelatedinstrumentbusrequiredtobeoperable,shallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper7daysby:VerifyingnominalvoltageindicationsontheIn-strumentBuses1A,1B,1C.VerifyingpropersupplybqeakeralignmentforInstrumentBuseslA,1B.,and1C.VerifyingproperstaticswitchalignmentforIn-strumentBuses1Aand1C.4.6-4a i~~seygaeeelssal~~wvom~eseceo~~.basis:Thtestsspecifiedaredesignedtodemonstratethatthedieelgenetorswill'providepowerforoperationofequipment.Theyalsoassuret(attheemergencygeneratorsystemcontrolsandthecontrol./',systemsfothesafeguardsequipmentwillfunctionautomaticallyinItheeventof'elossofallnormal480VACstationservice,power.+\Thetestingfreqncyspecifiedwillbeoftenenough'oidentifyandcorrectanymechanicalorelectricaldeficiencybeforeitcanKfresultinasystemfailure.Thefuelsupplyands'tartingcircuits/andcontrolsarecontmuouslymonitoredandanyfaultsareindicatedbyalarm.Anabner.malconditionin,'thesesystemscanbeIidentifiedwithouthavingto'egestthediese1generators.,j"Periodictestsarealsospecifictodemonstratethattheoffsitepowersourceswillprovidepowerfor,operationofequipment.ac'ffsitepowersourceoperabilityrquires.correctbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityfromthetwopreferredpower/circuits,767and751,totheA160voltbuses.Theserequirementsaremetbymonitoringnominalvoltageindicationsonthehigh-voltagesideoftranformers12Aand12B;andonthe4160voltbuses12Aand12B.Offsitepowersourceindependencerequiresseparate>4160volt,jcircuitssupplyin'owertothe4160voltbuses.Zqterlockspreventconcurretclosureof12AXand12BX,OR12AYand128Y;andsurveillanceispecifiedtoensureseparationismaintainecL.lnstrumenbuspowersourceoperabilityrequirescorrectbreakralignmentandindicatedpoweravailability.Theserequirements,are+imetbmonitoringnominalvoltageindicationsonthebusesand1proerbreakeralignment.4.6-5 acre<<4~>>.~.~o4MW4t~'wJI,~'4>ioe>N>uNppwll%u&krPurthe/rmore,toassureindependencebetweenredundantClass1E4ROvobuses14and18(TrainA)andbuses16and17(TrainB),iet,breakrs52/BT1$-14and52/BT17-18arerequiredtobeopenwhentheplantmoeisabove200F.Oncetiebreakersareopen,interlockspreventclasurewhenindependentandredundantbusesareenergized.Stationbatteriesmaydeterioratewithtime,but,precipitousfailurezsextremelyunlikely.Thesurveillancespec'ifiedisthatwhichhasbeendemonstratedovertheyearstoprovideanindicationofacellbecomingserviceablelongbefore.itfails,andtoensurethatthebatterymapacityisacceptable.iTheequalizingcharge,asremmendedbythemanufacturer,isvitaltomaintainingtheampere-houcapabilityofthebattery.Asaecheckupontheeffectivenessoftequalizingcharge,thebatteryshouldbeloadedratherheavilyandthevoltagemonitoredfunctionoftime.Ifacellhasdetserzqratedorifaconnectionisloose,thevoltageunderload>'wcilldrepexcessivelyindicatinglreplacementormaintenance.~~'heminimumpermissible;on-sitefuelinventory,10,000gallons,(5,000gallonsforeachgenerator),issufficientforoperatiounderloss-of-coolant,accidentconditionsoftwoenErineeredsafety.featurestrainsfor40hours,orforonetrainfor80hoursorfo.I;operationofbothdieselgeneratorsattheirdesignratingsfor24Ihours.(2))9References'(1)~UAR,Section8.3<(2~)UFSAR,Section9.5.41IIQpfOCN)j4.6-5a CTSpage3.5-2isnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. tCTSpage3.5-2aisnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. CTSpage3.5-4aisnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. tCTSpage3.5-20isnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. tCTSpage3.5-20aisnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. CTSpage3.5-22isnolongercontainedinAttachmentB,Section3.9.TherequirementsonthisCTSpageareprovidedinAttachmentB,Section3.3. 3.6ContainmentSstemAlicabilitAppliestotheintegrityofreactorcontainment.3.6.1Todefinetheoperatingstatusofthereactorcontainmentforplantoperation.Secification:Kwhr~>eliC,hcp+~a.4ContainmentInterita.Exceptasallowedby3.6.3,containmentintegrityshallnotbeviolatedunlessthereactorisinthecol'dshutdowncondition.Closedvalvesmaybeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecntrol.econtainmentintegritswhenedremovedunlessthel(o.xationxs000m.~~3.Q.LMIAQ~~OW+C~Positivereactivitychangesshallnotbemadebyroddrivemotionorb'orondilutionwhenever'hecontainmentintegrityisnotintactunlesstheboronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm.3.6.2InternalPressureIftheinternalpressureexceeds1psigortheinternalvacuumexceeds2.0psig,theconditionshallbecorrectedwithin24hoursorthereactorrenderedsubcritical.Add~es~e3Chap%~3.4

    ,03.83.8.1REFUELZNGAlicabilitAppliestooperatinglimitationsduringC.Q+~i&i~~lWt-~~t'bhJg,~Q.'ecte~~~~hi~46.a.~~Toesurethatnoinc'ntcouloccurdingrelang'perationsthatwoulaffectplicheathandsfety1SecificationDuringrefuelingoperationsthefollowingconditionsshallbesatisfied.a0CcQ3.R.Z~~8.va't'>~~Containmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowingstatus:i.Theequipmenthatchshallbeinplacewithatleastoneaccessdoorclosed,ortheclosureplatethatrestrictsairflowfromcontainmentshallbeinplace,Atleastoneaccessdoorinthepersonnelairlockshallbeclosed,andiii.Eachpenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereshallbee~~<@He1.Closedbyan~sonvalveblindflange,ormanualvalve~ar2.Becapableofbeingclosedbyan-OPERABLEyautomaticshutdownpurgeormini-pureb.x,ationvalve.~~mi~~++~;~+>.s~>>~~A<wihMoe,C'velsxne'ountainmen2shallbe38.Z~<8.V'l'iI<5.iiic~monitodcontinuouCoresubcriticalneutronfluxshallbecontinuouslymonitoredbyatleasttwosourcerangeneutronmonitors,eachwithcontinuousvisualindicationinthecontrolroomandonewithaudibleindicationinthetcontrolroomavailablwhenevrcoregmetryiseingchagedNhcoregeetry,istbeingangedat ~it.'did'1C.O)pf,g.'ea-toe'MXVlcAtleast~,~s""rcexfangeneutrooneresidualheatfluxmonitorshallbe~in)Jd'r~CdremovalloopshallbeinLC.o)e~dLcoBR.5L<o"-'"-+(0-e.geh.Dectommun'icatibetenefuengcavity.anipatorwhenerangesI.ncoegeomrcontrolroomanthe'aneshallbeavilabletryare/takingple.Znadditiontotherequirementsofparagraph3.8.1.d,whileintherefuelingmodewithlessthan23feetofwaterabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,tworesidualheatremovalloopsshallbeoperable.~Duringmovementoffuelorcontrolrodswithinthereactorressel'avity,atleast23feetofwatershallbemaintainedoverthetopofthereactorvessel.operation.~'Immediateybeforeactorveselheadrmovalandwhil'oadingandunldingfuelomtherector,v'theminimumaAboronconcentrationof2000ppmshallbemaintainedinthe1*11d,-~c.~fcP72,5o~5v.'e'Eitherthep=eferredortheemergencypowersourcemaybeVdddd1111'1 flange.Ifthisconditionisnotmet,all3.8.2C.~Zq~w.4,A)Q)r<~>~,a,c~a*l~3.9.SCa~a~~.<,S;Conaeh,A3.8.3u"n2R.<operationsinvolvingmovementoffuelorcontrolrodsinthereactorvesselshallbesuspended.Ifanyofthespecifiedlimitingconditionsforrefuelingisnotmet,refuelingofthereactorshallceaseyw~onk/Rzze~*'a'ttheecified'tsareet'ooperationswhich~'ayincreasethereactivityofthecoreshallbemade.~C~OMIftheconditionsof3.8.1.darenotmet,theninadditiontotherequirementsof3.8.2,isolatetheshutdownpurgeandmini-purgepenetrationswithin4hours.~,Basis:TheequipmentanctgeneralprocedurestobeutiduringrefuelingarediscussedintheUESAR.De~edinstructions,theabovespecifiedprecautions,anedessgnofthefuelhandlingequipmentincorporatiilt-ininterlocksandsMetvfeaturesfIprovideassurethatnoincidentcouldoccurduringthere~ljng'Ioperonsthatwouldresultinahazard3.8-3 ~Itopublichealthandsafety.WheneverchangesarenotbeinmaeincoregeometryonefluxmonitorissuX'ficient.Thispermsmaintenanceoftheinstrumentation.Continuousmni-toringQradiationlevelsandneutronfluxpzovidesiediateindication'efanunsafecondition.TheresidualhQtpumpisusedtomaintainauniformboronconcentration.p'heshutdovnmaiginasindicatedvillkeepthecozesubczitical,evenifallcontrolrodswere.withdrawnfrommthecore.Duringrefueling,thereactorrefuelingcavitisf'liedwitha~prcxi-ma-e'y230,000gallonsfboratedwaer.Tgeboronconcentrationofthswaterat2000ppmboronissufficienttomaintainthereacorsubcriticalbyatleasd5%lk/kinthecoldconditionwithallrodsinserted(bes*estimateof10/subcritical),andlalsomaintainthecuesubcriticalevenifnocontrolrodsr~wereinsertedintothereactor.Periodicchecksofrefueling~~~~waterboronconcentrationinsurethepr'opershutdownmargin.'Communicationrepuirementsallowthecontr@iroomoperatortoinownthemaxpulatoroperatorofanyimpen'dingunsafecond>tiontdetec-ecmthemaincon-rolboardindicators'uring.fuelImovemen'Cnadtiontotheabovesafeguards,interlocksareuutilizedduzngrefuelingtoinsuzesafehandlingAnex.cessveigggtterlock's3.S-4 providedontheliftinghoisttopreventmovementofmorethanoneoelassemblyatatime.Thespentfueltransfermechanismcanaccommodateonlyonefuelassemblyatatime.Inadditi~'nterloksontheauxiliarybuildingcranewillpreventthetroleyfrombeingmovedoverstoredrackscontainingspentfuel.P4Theoperability~requirementsforresidualheatremovaloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelinmode.Therequirementfor23capetofwaterabovethereacto.vesselflangerwhilehandlingfuelpandfuelcomponentsicontainment.isIconsistentwiththeassumptions.ofthefuckhandlingaccident,analysis.Theanalysis"'orafuelhancKingacidentinsidecontainmentestablishesacceptableoffsitelimitingdosesfollowingruptureof~~Pallrodsofanassemblyoperateda4peakpower.NocreditistakenforcontainmentisolationorefluentQ,ltrationpriortorelease.Requiringclosureofpenetrat<onswhichprovidedirectaccessfromj'Econtainmentatmospherettheoutsideosphereestablishesadditionalmarginforthfuelhandlingaccidentandestablishesaseismicenvelopetoprotectagainstthepotentialconsequencesofseismiceventsdur'r'efueling.Isolationofthepenetrationsmaybeachievedb.anOPERABLEshutdownpurgeor.minn-purgevalve.,blindflange,orisolationvalve.AnOPERABLEshutdopurgeormini-purgevvei;scapableofbeingautomaticallyisoladbyRllorR12..enetrationswhichdonotprovidedirectaccefromcontainmtatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheresuortcontaientintegritybyeitheraclosedsystem,necessaryisolionvalves,oramaterialwhichcanprovideatemporaveilationbarrier,atatmosphericpressure,forthecontainmentenetrationsduringfuelmovement.3.8-S Fef-essences(1)UFSARSections9.1.4.4and~...5'I(2)ReloadTrans'MafetyReport,Cycle14~C~,(3Section15.7.3.343.8-6 TABfE4.3.-1HININUNFREQUENCIESFORCHECKS/CALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELSgearsS<DJw)CMhew33ChannelDes~criticn1.NuclearPowerRangeCheckSN*(3)CalxbrateD(l)Q*(3)TestB/W(2)(4)P(2)(5)Remarks1)Heatbalancecalculation**2)SignaltoAT;bistableaction(permissive/rodstop/trx.ps)3)Upperandlowerchambersforaxialoffset*"4)llxghsetpoint(<109%ofratedpower):5)Lowsetpoint(<25%otratedpower)2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)Range'N.A.P(2)N.A.>y.;;P(2)NuclearSourceRangeS(l)<~~Z~.Z..l5f.6.5.'7~l81lI~9.S(1,2)~~~~~.:4.ReactorCoolantSR,N(1)Temperature(2)ReactorCoolantFlowSRMlPressurizeraterSRHLevel,IsfvPressurizerPressureSN4KvVol:tageN.ADRNFreque)5)Icoy/5RodPositionN~ANIndication/r/,*Bymeansofthemovablein-coreuetectorsystem..**Notrequiredduringhotsco(id~orrefuelingshutdo/wnbutas1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction(permissive/rodstop/trap)1)Once/shiftwheninsecv(ce2)Bistableaction(alarm/trxp)~vvrel)Ovectespecstuce-DeltaT/./2)Overpower-DeltaT&os.4l),EG/v1TSav)q~oTHkRNON5nneessko~j/HhtKl-33Q/essa)su/Chp43.)/////ReactorProtectioncircuztsonlyrr1)With.stepcounters2)Logrodposition/indicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice/soonaspossible/atterreturntopowt5r'vv~avvWvawver'rr+~vvv4tvavr.ervve(aevsavwrv,v~.r Table4.1-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinSurveillanceReirementsChannelSourceInstrumentCheckCheck,>>~>>>>>>>>VGrossActivityMonitor(Liquid)a.LiquidRadWaste(R-18)D(7)M(4)b.SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)M(4)>>>>Q(1)X(+~-.0R(5)Q(1)R(5)Functional.ChannelTestCalzbratzonc.TurbineBuildingFloorDrai9s(R-21)D(7)M(4)Q(1)R(5)d.HighConductivityWaste(R-22)e.ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)f.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)PlantVentilationD(7)D(7)D(7)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)R(5)R(5)R(5)R(5)a~b.NobleGasActivity(R-14)(AlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)ParticulateSampler(R-13)D(7)W(7)Q(1)N.A.N.A.R(5)R(5)c.IodineSampler(R-10B,andR-14A.)W(7)N.A.R(5)d.FlowRateDeterminationN.A.N.A.N.A.R(6)ContainmentPurgea.NobleGasActivity(R-12)Q>>b.ParticulateSampler(R-11)c.IodineSampler(R-10AandR-12A)D(7)W(7)W(7)28.v,cPRQ(1)g.(i~gN.A.Q(1)JACl$N.A.MR(5)~QA~~e,~MR(5)R(5)d.FlowRateDeterminationN.A.N.A.N.A.~~~~~~R(6)IAirEjectorMonitor(R-15andR-15A)D(7)MM(2)>>~wv>>>>>>>>ewe>>>>>>>>>>w>>>>,a>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>~rvwuai>>.~aW'(5)~.oIWasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorMainSteamLines(R-31andR-32)DN.A.N.A.N.A.Q(3)/R TABLE4.1-5(Continued)1TABLENOTATIONSsvTheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatcontrolroomalarmoccurifanyoftheexist:automaki~solatiofollowingconditions(2)l.Instrumentindicatesmeasured'levelsabovethealarmand/ortripsetpoint.2.PowerfailureTheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatcontrolrocmalarmoccursifanyofthefollowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmsetpoint.2.Powerfailure.(3)TheChannelCalibrationshallincludetheuseofstandardgassamplescontaininganominal:1.Zerovolumepercentoxygen;and2.Threevolumepercentoxygen.J(4).(5)(6).Thischeckmayrequiretheuseofanexternalsourceduetohighbackgroundinthesamplechamber.w~-IASourceusedfortheChannelCalibrationshallbetraceabletotheNationalBureauofStandards(NBS)orshallbeobtainedfromsuppliers(e.g.Amersham)thatprovidesourcestraceabletootherofficially-designatedstandardsagencies.Flowrateformainplantventilationexhaustandcontainmentpurgeexhaustare~calculatedbytheflowcapacityofventilationexhaustfansinserviceandshallbedeterminedatthefrequencyspecified.Appliesonlyduringreleasesviathispathway.QCi'4Jhow%~~++w,i~~+.~~~vM~4.1-13A'mendme~tNo'.9 d.Flowshallbemaintainedthroughthesystemusingeitherthefilterorbypassflowpathforatleast15minuteseachmonth.4.11.1.2Aftereachreplacementofacharcoalfilterdrawerorafteranystructuralmaintenanceonthecharcoalhousingforthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersystem,theconditionofSpecification4.11.1.1.bshallbedemonstrated'fortheaffectedportionofthesystem.4.11.24.11.2.139,lvResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculationWhenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelisinthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolant.atleastonceperphours.~'.11.2.2Whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofreactorvesselflangeislessthan23feet,bothRHRpumpsshallbeZR-~.R,R.L'Iverifiedto'beoperablebyperformingthesurveillancespecifiedintheInservicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.53a.4.11.3WaterLevel-ReactorVesselaa.S~<~'4.11.3.11hewaterlevelinthereactorcavityshallbedeterminedtobeatleastitsminimumrequireddepthwithin&hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hours>8.xithereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodsincontainment.Basfs~(Themeasurementoftheairflowassuresthat'airisbeingwithdrawnfromthespentfuelpitareaand'passedthroughtheadsorbers.Theflowismeasuredpriortoemployingtheadsorberstoestablishthat4.11-2'Z.1 ~-.Ilastused.TheFreontest.providesameasure,~M~a~y~therehasbeennogrosschangeinperformanceesincethesystemwas~,I.o'ftheamountofleakagefromaroundthecharcoaladsorbent,.Theabilityofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeteriorateasthecharcoalagesandweathers.Testingthecapacityofthecharcoaltoadsorbiodineassuresthat,anacceptableremovalefficiencyundeoperatingconditionswouldbeobtained.Thedifferencebetweenthetestrequirementofaremovalefficiencyof90%formethyliodineandthepercentageassumedintheevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccidentprovidesadequatesafetymarginfordegrada-'-.tionofthefilterafterthetests.Retestingofthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersysteminthefuelandfuelnsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.eventofpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseisrequiredonlyifthesystemisoperatingandisprovidingfiltrationfortheareainwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbetested,totheeextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,inI(accordancewithANSIN510-1975,"TestingofNuclearAir-C'eaningSystems"/TheoperrequirementsforresidualheatremovalloopswilT'nsureadequateheatremoileintherefuelingttxufe~erequire-/mentfor23feetofwaterabovetho~elflangewhilehandling/tincontpinmentisconsistentwithsump~.eference:(1)LetterfromE.J.Nelson,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoDr.PeterA.Morris',U.S.AtomicEneray~/Commission,datedFebruary3,1971 5e0DESIGNFEATURES'pSxte~clccl~\The~}c.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlanti"locatedfewfbi'-Q+onthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork.~5.I5.1.2,rForthepurposesofimplementingGinnaRadiologichnicalSpecifications,andforevaluatingradiologicalreleasestheUnrestrictedArea,the.UnrestrictedAreaBoundaryisassumedtocoincidewiththeExclusionAreaBoundary.Thesitema~shoesinFigure5.1-1depictsthetGinnaExclusionAreaBeCindary.,(alsocalledUnrestrictedAreaBoundary)location.rThesi4eboundaryshallbethatlinebeyondwhichthelandr~r.-fsneitherowned,norleased,norotherwisecontroedbyRochesterGas&ElectricCorporation. GlWhSITSnhP~>srnowayl(X]-.~./lif-'ICSP'!cs)+~4)i,.c')W+o~a&aeOO)~Q-VeSSAfWICIt~~~~msEAS~~$I)eO~lEhB<i&idetfluentsGaseouseffluents(ac%4(fbi1C~6<<suuuuuftluentsreleasepointsc1.Turbinebuildingroo!-assuwedatgradeg.Plantvent-42e.abovopri'de$.Containaenhvent-42n.+abovegrade4..Slowdowntanlrvent~~asswaedatgrade+5.hlro]aulorvent.-<<ssuroedatgradeliquidoffluniftsreleasepointl.DlschWrcjnrenal-atlakeleveli1i.Q..lEAB<<Exclus)onbreaBoundary)~\~e'Ie0) GINNA/UFSARTable2.3-26EXCLUSIONAREABOUNDARYDISTANCESaDirectionDistance(m)NNNENEESESESSESSWSWWSWNW8000800080008000747640503450450450503915 94570180008000aFromplanttowardexclusionareaboundary.bForcalculationalpurposes,exclusionareaboundarydistancesoffshorewereassumedtobe8000m.2.3-48 0:~ta'I'c~~rSst"iti~s~/llre..25.Z.~l5.Z.2ContainmentDesignFeaturesReac'torContainment./a.ThereactorcontaLnmentcompletelyenclosesthe~entirItt"reactorandreactorcoolantsystemandensuresthatanacceptableupperlimitforleakageofradioactivematerialpitotheenvironmentisnotexceededevifgrossfailure/ofthe'reactorcoolantsystemoccus.Thestructuretprovidesbiologicalshieldingfopbothnormalandacci-dentsituation.b.ThecontainmentstructueisdesignedforaninternalIpressureof60psig.,ustheloads.resultingfroman1Iearthquakeproduc'.ng.,08ginthevertical,andhorizontalplanessimultaneously.Thecontainmentisalsostructur-allydesignedtowithstandan.externalpressureZ.5psi())higherthantheinternalpressure.IPenetratiansa.Alkpenetrationsthroughthecontainmentreinforcedcon-scretepressurebarrierforpipe,electrical.conductors,(2):ductsandaccesshatchesareofthedouble"barziertype.b.Theautomaticallyactuatedcontainmentisolat'onvalvesaredesignedtocloseuponhighpressureinthecontain-ment(setpointnohigherthan6psig)orhighradiation r,~r,~inthecontainmentvessel.TheactuationsystemisdesignedsuchthatnosinglecotnponentfailurewilL~,preventcontainmentisolationifrequired.)'I~~'tI)I~nrl5.2.3ContainmentSstemsa.Thecontainmentvesselhasan'internalspraysystemwhichiscapableofprovidingadistributedboratedmatersprayofatleast1200gpm.Duringtheinitialperiodofsprayopera'tion,sodiumhydroxidewouldbeaddedtothespraywatertoincreasetheremovalof(3)iodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.b.Thecontainmentvesselhasaninternalairrecirculationr~'t)',~55,600Btu/secunderconditionsfollowingalossofcoolantaccident.Twoofthefancoolerunitsareequippedwithactivatedcharcoalfilter'storemove(4)volatileiodinefollowinganaccident.systemwhichconsistsoffourventilationfansandaircoolerscapableofatotalheatremovalcapabilityofReferen'ces:(1)FSAR<<Section5.1(2)FSAR-Section.".1,2.7(3)FSAR-Section6.4~(4)FSAR-Secti.6.3 5.35.3.1ReactorDesiPeatuzesReactorCorea.Thereactorcorecontainsapproximately45metrictonsofuraniumintheformofuraniumdioxidepellets...Thepelletsar"encapsulatedinZircaloy4tubingtoform:fuelrods.Thereactorcoreismadeupof121fuel!assemblies"'itheachfuelassemblycontaining179,fuelrodlocations.FuelrodlocationsatanytimeI;duringplantlife,mayconsistoffuelrodscladwithZircaloy-4orfillerrodsfabricatedfromZircaloy-4orstainlesssteelifjustifiedbycycle-specific;reloadanalysis.Shouldmorethan30rodsinthecore,or10rodsinanyassemblybereplacedperrefuelingareportdescribingthenumberofrodsreplacedandassociatedcycle-specificevaluationshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionpriortocriticality.Eachfuelassemblyalsocontains16guidetubesandoneinstrumentationthimbleallarrangedina14s14jarraytoformafuelassembly.~'6'I0k*Cb.4,Z.)Z.o~Q(,.u<<fr'heenrichmentofreloadfuelshallbenomorethanA3.5weightpercentU-235forregionsdeliveredpriorS.OStoJanuary1,1984(Regions1-15),~MweightpercentU-235forregionsdeliveredafterJanuary1,1984,orfthe'requivalentsintermsofreactivity.c~Thereare29full-lengthassembliesinthereactorcore.EachRCCassemblycontains16144inchlengthsofsilver-indium-cadmiumalloycladwithstainlesssteelwhichactasneutronabsorberswheninsertedintothecore.3.sTheDNBRsforthereconstituted.'ssembliesareconservativelydeterminedbyassumingthefillrodsareoperatingat<thehighestjoueiionere.constrtutedtguassembly. S~4figroundacceleration,0.08g,intainedwithincodeallowableThedes.,ignseism'Iwi"hstressesworkingstre'es.~~P~~5%.2ReactorCoolantSstema.Thede"ianof.thereactorcoolantsystemcakplies~~~withthecoderequirements.0b."~A11piping,componentsandsupportingstructuresof!thereactorcoolantsystemareesignedtoClassIreaui'rements,andhavebeenesignedtowithstand:Themamumpotentialseismicgroundaccelera-tio,0.2g,actingin~thehorizontalandrticaldirectionssimultaneously.withno'lossoffunction.CiThenominalliauidvolumeofthereactor,coolant/svstem,atratedoperatingconditions,is6236cubicfeet. .Reerences:(1)ZSA+-Sction3..2.3'((2)ZSAR-S'e<tionP:2.1I(3)CESAR-Secon3.2.1<(4)CESARSection3.2.3x(5)FSd(R-Section3.2.1and%2.3(6)FSAR-Table4.l.9 5.4~F1Secification5.~..ThenewandanentfuelpitstructuresaredesiqnedtoS'~wiMs4andtheanticipatedearthquakeloadingsasClassIstructures"."--.Thespentfuelpithasstainlesssteel'>>r.linertoensureagains't-lossefwater.5.4.2Thenewandspentfu.storageracksaredesignedsothatitisimpossBQ.etoinsertfuelassemblies-inotherthanthescribedlocations.ThespentfuelstorageracksaredividedintotworegionsasdepictedonFigure5.4-1.TheIyp~ell.cLt2D-:3fuelisstoredverticallyinanarraywithsufficientcentetocenterdistancebetweenassembliestoassureKeff<0.95for(1)unirradiatedfuelassembliesdeliveredtailsih<4a(enric4~491'y1.9989988'-l~)~c.e~+r44hn3,>Qsve<qhtperCe~t'3235{2)unirradiated,~rthV'lktR.l!1984BothcasesassumeifuelassembliesdeliveredafterJanuary1,CanC4rc.e~>>rgarear+gn405'e<jhkor~dSt4UZ35unboratedwaterusedinthepool.XnRegion2ofthespentfuelstorageracks,fuelisfuelassemblydesign,thereforeassuringthatKeff<0.95-storedinaclosepackedarrayutilizingfixedneutronpoisonsineachofthestoredlocations.FordischargedfuelassembliestobestoredinRegion2,{1)60ays~~~~~/musthaveeapsedsinethecorecachedhotstdownpriortoischarged(2)thecombinationofasseiihlyaverageburnupandinitialU-235enrichmentmustbe~ace8'thatt:b~pr.5.ot.id+i~-'eaoy"thesecurioparametersonFigure5.4-2isabovethelineapplicabletot:particularI 6.4.4i~~Cannisterscontainingconsolidatedfuelrodsnay~bestoredineitherRegion1or2providedthat.-'+eaverageburnupand~~~+~el-enrichmentoftheXuelassembliesfromwhichtherods.vereremovedsatisfytherequirementsof5.4.2and5.4e3above,andf1.1'+,b.averagedcayheatthefueassemblyfomhichthedswereemovedisessthan20BTU/hr5.4.5N.S.f,K.c.Therequirementsof5.4.4amayheexceptedforthoseconsolidatedfuelassembliesofRegionRGAF2.,rrArH445.4.6'Thespentfuelstoragepitisfilledwithhoratedwater.ataconcentrationtomatchthatusedinthereactor~~~cavityandrefuelingcanalduringrefuelingoperations~whenever.thereisfuelinthepit;'asis=.ThecentertoreenterspacingofRegionLinsuretKeff0.95fortheenrichmentlimitations~cia.in5-4-2+andforapostulatedmissileimpacttheresultdoseattheEABwouldbewithintheguidelxaesof10CKK'00.InRegion2,Keff<OA5isinsuredhytheadditionoff'ixedneutronpoison(borgvElex)ineach..oftheRccp.on.2storagelocations,'ndaminimumburnupzecpurementasafunctionof4initialenrichmentforeachfuelassemblydesign.'-,'The50day~r,*--~~~coolingt'~i=~~t~dies~i'-a'os&a~d,missilerimpacttheresultingdoseattheEABwouldbewithinMegui,Ck-rMinesof10CFR100. ThetoocurvesofFigure5.4-2dividethefuelassembly-designsintotmgroups.Thefirstgroupisallfueldelivered..priortoJanuary1,1984.ThisincorporatesallExxaxiandVestmg-houseRIPERdesignsusedatGinna.'hesecondcurvews%ortheWestinghouseOptimizedFuelAssemblydesigndelivered.toGinnabeginninginFebruary1984.TheassemblyaverageburnupiscalculatedusingINCOREgeneratedpoversharingdataandtheactualpLantoperating.history.Thecalculatedassemblyaveragehurnupshouldbereducedby10$toaccountforuncertainties.~uncertaintyof4gis4associatedwiththemeasurementof'oversharing.Theadditional;:.6gprovidesadditionalmargin'~bound,theburnup.uncertaintyCassociatedwiththetimebetween':~aeasurementsandupdatesofcoreburnup."Xhecurvesoffigure,5.4-2,incorporatetheuncertaintiesofthecalculation-'ofassemblyreactivity.ThecalculationsoffuelessemablyburnupSorcomparisonI,tothecurvesofFigure5.4-2todetexame;theacceptabilityfor~storageinRegion2shallbeindependentlycheecked.~recordofthesecalculationsshallhekeptforas1ong";asfuel.assembU.esremaininthepool.Me.fuelstorage.cannistersaredesignedso,thatsnormally,theycancontaintheequivalentplumberoffuelrodsr.fromCmfuelassembliesinaclosepackedarray,andcan'4e0:,storedineitherRegion1orRegion2.racklocations.Theclosepa"ke"ar"ayvillinsurethe'Kooftherackconfiguration'containing'-.!anynumberofcannistersvi11helessthanthatforstoredfuel',L';assembliesatthesamebutnupan6initialenzichment.Xbeexception,:.. i~vi~gq0\g'o*C<'-ofparagraph5.4.5ispossiblebecausetheconsolidatedconfigura'~a'ssubstantiallylessreactivethanthatofafuel~emblemTheS~'mdecayheatxequireme'ntvill~urethat;1ocalAn6fiXm'a.'oilingvillnotoccurbetweentheclosepackedfuel,xodsifthe'pooltemperatureisaaintainedatorbelow150'F.Thedecayheat;oftheassemblyvillbectetezminedusingASSS.i,ASS9-2orI,I.'theracceptablesubstitutestandards.1Iwiththe,alitionofthestorageof'consolidatelfuelcannisters,thetheoreticaLstoragecap'acityofthepoolmouldheincreasedto2032fuelassemblies-(2x1016).However,dueto:limitationontheheatremoValcapabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem,thestoiagecapacityislimitedto1016-fuelassemblies.a~'J'eferences/3..Letter,Z.E.MertoR.R.Benton,Nanuazy2.8,X984.-.---/2.LetterJ.E.yMaierMH.R.benton,january<48,%984..3.Criticali+analysisofRegion2oftheGinna,%DRSgent~)'eelStorageRack,Pickerel,IeeeancGarrick,lac/'arch8,X984./14.Letter,T.R.Robbins,Pickard,LoveandGarrick,Inc.toJ.D.Cook,RGGEMarchl.5,2984.S.Letter,D.M.CrutchfieldtoJ.E.Maier,November5,1981.~// a~a~:~ae~wc~aI"wxxrlaaeleraaeeaarmaxrawaNligg5>3'W).<5)<5><%15%%%%%%a%%Maaa%XS%%%%5%15'5)<w).(5)(w)3awaxxR'kxw%5%aNRxa%%axRaxSQxIIwx56~ii.~Wi3Wi~Wa%%%aa%%1%%Waxa%%%awaa%%55ciwci5i35i35xQQlcsaoaaRaiiaaxwaaawaaawa%aaii:i=~i=~i=~rIIaeelaaaasawaraeaaimiraaINaIi3W)VX'.(WC<5W%%%%%%8%%%%%%%W%%%%NWQRWQNRgitic~:~i=~i=~waaaeaaraaxaraawaaaareaseaesaaC~WC~SC~Wi35%5058%%XOWRRXW%%%%%%XRRRRagiaagc<gc<gc<5~3055%%ax8%a%axaRxwxaa%aaSQaNO%aC~QC(Wi35>35%555%%%%%aaRIRRaI5%%aRRNIWRN.W.W.5W%55%585%1%%%%5%%5%%5%%1%%%15I).~565)".iW).(ISSRW%1Ãa%1%%%WraraaaSRQRWRQN%5Weieiii-.~i=~wWaaalaaemaelaeaaaarwweaaasagRi.~Xi3%4>>C~Wi:iRVRi"iWCi56~5i55%XRWNNRIRXWRRIRRRSWCIIRWRRRNIIIIi"iri=~re~wue~:iii=~ec~acm>-~sex"~awwaaaaaeaaaasaaeaeaaeaewaeaawW>3%~3%>ENi('g>3gf('5>(NC<'C)35>X~XWRRRROSRRRSRQRRRSIRXORRRRNIgg55)35>3X).<gi:<g~:(Wi316~5Cii3WCWXRNRX%faWSX5%%%%%RQWSIR%%AQXRIl(OK<5)35iERi3I>%%i(513%>AWK(IWIIISIIIRIIICISIRIRIRRISWIIgIK<5><5><fl><5><5>3595>a5><5><555155%155X5%5555555%%5%%1%%555>-<X>"<~>"<tl><X><%>-<5<555>-<5>=<SRRX5555%5%5%555555%%XRRX%%%%%%e~aciwi=~a,kiwi=~x=~w=~i~"iw=iwe~weeaaxaxmaaawaaswaaraawwaawaaraawciwciw~=~,eMwc~ai"ia-.iii-.iii"iannawaawrraaaaaaeaaawaaeaxrxaaxarawi.(x.~Q<5>(5<waaxw5%%51waaaaaaaaailaaagglgic~ii"ixcii=isa"iawxxwaawaawaxxaaaaaeaerrreaxaaa':-ic~ii~xeiw=~a"rxawaaxaaraaxasaaseasaeararwra)"~g><gC<5>35>3aXSSMWXWWSIWSNSRWRRWIRNWRRRRIRIavaeiei=<xvaeiwrieraseaxaawwxwaaaeaaeaeaawaaa ,~II('E'd~tdXtt(TO1((C(NC(l~lAIVSteL'(St'0IN(USIA(dlb'ALttCO.sees~stvsaF~m3.S.)v-iFIGURE5.4-230g20o10:tl~'1'scrts10~~~0elIi.aIlsss1~~.1~s"i:ieI~EPTABILITYAllDUNACCEPTABILITYEOFSPENTFUELINREGION2REGIONSOFACCFORSTORAGsI~1l~1~1;IIst1~~~I~~1~1le'rt!is~~I;1000I'l~11le,s~~)~s(~t'~01lo~,i-I~Ias~'li,~I'.l1:.Ieil1~~1~~TIS~siil".e~soii:s,1:I;.ITtesIi~i~~~0I~~I~~~~~~~~~(.itij.:.1~tttsse,'-!l.'.I;-.1st~'}si~~~~sl'IIIN2~~~I;~lst)lae~tie1~l!e~sls~~~~'0~~11'I:"'IIll~Iis~1~0~~~II100;sI,'1,~I:10~~st~~~~l~:I.ZO:I:ilail~~0Ie/I!a~slsI~f::I~ILE~~~I0~1~EPTAB~~~I'1.I0.'~~I".FORREG~t(~ejt0},ST~.lt~I.:~(to.;I.~11~~1a~0~~~f~0~~~~ssACC~~Iftt'I',(0(o~~~il:~,iI~.I~\~~s!.t'~~~t~I~.III~I:0I~~~';Il~o(0~~(~~~~~tit~~tla:II-I!-Is0~IIT(I!I:Ijt!Rs1I~~4rl,l~l~0~~sIas~1s~Il~I(~(~~~Ijt!r',lit,~~0~best'Isl~soj(01st:t'i:-I,Ij:'-r~1'~tlierit-eI:l;'(;Il!:(iI~1~~le~elale.~tr0'.~e~I1~~1Ij;!:I::lail~s1~~~~~se.I0~l~s01:I'sl~~~~0~0~~~I:I0!I:si(0!TSIeIo~si~I:s(r'ITe11litt:liIso~~110I~i~;I~0~I~il'ss~~~~~TO~sFUELDELIVEREDPRIO.JANUARY1198!(~1~,s'~~i~soliiI'esl'}Ii},};:0IIIIIII~'1t!I;i)I~I.'ll:CCejlI(ijI~III(V.il::~~(II!(isIUeIi.':It=Il(e~1~S~~1IIj~s~~t~~I:tv'I~I<'II}IIljIIe;:}t~~~~NAIi'l}~I~IIII.j,'t~~~s}'I~s1~II}ljlii'I!sIIeIs}}!lI(~!III"I:~ill~0't1'1'I'j~~s~l~1I~e~s~t;I(~1tri'II}lj0f~~~~hei~'01Ill'II~ej'~~~~~~~s.ral!s~~ls~~1~i~s~I.'I1'.}(I!!IiIt'I',ll.'seisI;IIillI'.tIl..~~so~~t~jestl.I',t.Ii.~~:I',I1st~t~~'!I0~~~1Ii!101'I~0(s;,.'III:~]'Ij,.IIpABL(I0~s1..it~r;II~~II'.~1s~~~'I:t~s(0EPT~~li"site(st.'ll~ll!(:s0'l::~1'(~IjoitsI~(lI~~i~I1~to~(~~(~~~~IIIFuELi;te}~~1~0~~lo 0so~~'ei'i(!0(lt~~sI~I':~~IDELIVEREDlh~:slFTERJhNUA1t'i~!(I1:-,1:".:::r:i'!:I!se~~0~I.eit~~IIi~i~tI,*I~1~~e~s1'sItie~I~~!1.'tle~'ll~I~sIIiej!~~~~I"!!~ee~~!I'!I'(t;~~sI0~sS~to.:I~~'I~10~~t~0.I,:!I:.1I~ie.:I(~sseIl.'lots'1~I~:,li:I"~le~I"~~~~~~~0~~0~.0~I~RRFOEGION0~~I~2s0~(~1S~I!;tt'0~I'~,~I'Iss!'..'I~i:~tIs~~0est,",t~I::s~1~(:el:0~~0~0r~iI~:!IIit~islt,1'ttts~.I':(~I~sllts~~s~1'..Ier~1~~I1i~1RY1,19040soe'i'I1~10f~1.50~rra>>0~v~~~a~~Ii~~1~(~~~~'.00Ii~1~~II s,:ijjI}j0l}:.IiI-'IIt:!;II!~leI!It,liIli~sIjl;1~~'I,'"~~IlI~~~~~~0~"~t~~'l1-1~I0It1~1st~t:sa'Il~~I3.004.004.25INITIALRNRICH((HNTPtrrQ.0~el~~Cs'({A WasteTreatmentSystemsRadioactiveLicpxidVasteTree.'anent.ThelicpliQwastetreatmentsystemconsistsofaWaste'oldupTank,aVasteEvaporatorandamixedbeddemineralizePortionsofthesystemmayhebypassedandstillmeetthereleaselimits.~e4GaseousRadwasteTreatmentThegaseousradwastesystemisdesignedtocollectoff-gasfromtheprimarycoolantsystemandholdforradioactivedecaypriortoreleasetotheenvironment.IThegaseousradwastetreatment,systemconsistsoffour(4)GasDecayTanksandtwo(2)gascompressors.Only'necompressorandthreeGasDecayTanksarenecessarytothesystem.VentilationExhaustSystemTheventilationexhaustistreatedtoreducegaseous\radioiodineandmaterialinparticulateformbypassingthroughcharcoaladsorbersand/orHK?Afilters.Thissystemhasnoeffectonnoblegaseffluents.The'.componentsoftheventilationexhaust~,systemare:AuxiliaryBuildingHEPAfilters.AuxiliaryBuilding"G"Charcoal&~AfiltersAuxiliaryBuilding"A"CharcoalAdsorhersContainmentPurgeCharcoal.&3%PA.filtersSolidRadwasteSystemThesolidradwastesystemconsistsofpipingandvalvesintheDrummingStationwherebywasteevaporaorconcentrates ~sezzedintopzepclzeddzomsbyaLeemswasteevapozatoz~ee~Iadit'iedandpzepazed,iozshipmentbyactor.~~ 1.12FrecruencNotationThefrecpxencynotationspecifiedfortheperfozmanceofsurveillancerecpxirementsshallcorrespondtotheintervalsdefinedbelow.NotationS,EachShiftD,DailyTwiceperweekW,WeeklyB/W,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/M,BimonthlyQ,QuarterlySA,'SemiannuallyA,AnnuallyFreauencvAtleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastonceper4daysandatleasttwiceper7daysACleastoncepe7davsAtleastonceper14daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper62daysAtleastoncepe92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastoncepe12monthsAtleastonceper18monthsNd~ssed~~Q4pferI.ON.A.PriortoeachstartupNotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin12hourspriortoeachreleaset-VV.<31139;S:lOffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCY'heODCMsamanualcontainingthemethodologyand.parameterstobeusedforcalculatingtheoffsite dosesduetoliquidandgaseousradiologicaleffluents,incalculationofliquidandgaseouseffluentmonitoringinstrumentatiozalarm/tripsetpoints,andintheconductoftheenvironmentalradiologicalmonitoring.1.14programProcessControlProramPCPThePCPisamanualoutliningthemethodforprocessingwetsolidwastesandforsolidificationofliquidwastes.Itshallincludetheprocessparametersand1evaluationmethodsusedtoassuremeetingtherequirementsof10CFRPart71priortoshipmentofcontainersofradioactivewastefzomthesite.SolidificationSolidificationshallbetheconversionofradioactive1.16wastesfromliquidsystemstoahomogeneoussolid.Purge-Puraina1.17/AddrccseJo'.~pQh-g>erl0Purgeorpurgingisthecontrolledprocessofdischargingtairorgasfromaconfinedspacetomaintaintemperatue,~pressure,humidity,c'oncentrationoroMeroperatingcondition,insuchamannerthatreplacementairozgas.isrequiedtopurifytheconfinedspace.Vent'aVentingisthcontrolledprocessofdischargingairorgasfromaconfinedspacetomaintaintemperatur(,pressure,humidity,concentrationo"otheroperatingcondition,insuchamannertha"relacementairisnotprovidedorreauied. 3.5.3.2Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsshowninTable3.5-3,eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin7days,orbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.3.5.3.3Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirementsofTable3.5-3eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.3.5'TheradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-6shallbeoperable,wheneverthereactorisatorabovehotshutdown.Withoneormoreradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable,taketheactionshowninTable3.5-6.Startupmaycommenceorcontinueconsistentwiththe3.5.53.5.L$~<.YVESactionstatement.H*IRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentationTheradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumenz.onshoinTable3.5-5shallbeoperabltalltimes.withalarm,dqrtripsetpoisettoinsurethatthelimitsofSpecxwon3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceeded.armand/oripsetpointsshallbeestabledinaccordancewithcalctionalmethodsetforthintheOffsiteDoseCalculationMal.w~ !.5.5.2Zfthesetpointforaradioactiveeffluentmonitoralarmand/ortripisfoundtobehigherthanrequired,oWofefallo>ringthreemeasuresshallbetakenimmpdiately:(i)thesetpointshallbeimmediateycorrectedithoutdeclaringthe'channe.sinoperable;or(ii)immeatelysuspendthreleaseofeffluentsmonitoredtheefrectedchannel;or(iii)declarethecnelinoperable.3.5.5.3Zfthenumberofchelswhiareoperableisfoundtobelessthanruired,takethetionshowninTable3.5-5.Exebesteffortstoreturnthe.instrumentstoOPERABstatuswithin31daysand,ifuuccessful,.eaininthenext:RadioactiveEffluentReleaseReport'.whytheinoperabilitywasnot,correctedinatimeymanner.3.5'3.56.1ControlRoomHVACDetectionSystemsDuringallmodesofplantoperation,detectionsystemsforchlorinegas,ammoniagasandradioactivityinthecontrolroomHVACintaKeshallbeoperablewithsetpointstoisolateairintakeadjustedasfollows: 3.5.6.2chlorine,<5ppm3ammonia,<35mg/m-8pCi/ccradioactivity,particulate<1x10iodine<9x10-9pCi/ccnoblegas<1x10-5pCi/ccWithoneofthedetectionsystemsinoperable,within1hourisolatethecontrolroomHVACairintake.Maintaintheaxrintakeisolatedexceptforshortperiods,nottoexceed1houraday,whenfreshairmakeupis,allo~edtoimprovetheworkingenvironmentinthe"controlroom.BasisDuringplantoperations,thecompleteinstrumentationsystemwillnormallybeoperable.ReactorsafetyisprovidedbytheReactorProtectionSystem.whichautomaticallyinitiatesappropriateactiontopreventexceedingestablishedlimits.Safetyisnotcompromised,however,bycontinuingoperationwithcertaininstrumentatxonchannelsinoperablesinceprovisionsweremadeforthisintheplantdesign.Thisspecificationoutlineslimitingconditionsforoperationnecessarytopreservetheeffectivenessofthereactorcontrolandprotectionsystemwhenanyoneormoreofthechannelsisinoperable.Almostallreactorprotectionchannelsaresuppliedwithsufficientredundancytoprovidethecapabilityforchannelcalibrationandtestatpower.Exceptionsarebackupchannelssuchasreactorcoolantpumpbreakers.Theremovalofonetripchannelisaccom-plishedbyplacingthatchannelbistableinatrippedmode;e.g.,atwo-out-of-threecircuitbecomesaone-out-of-twocircuit.Testingdoesnottripthesystemunlessatripconditionexistsinaconcurrentchannel.ITheoperabilityofthe.accidentmonitoringinstrumentationensuresthatsufficientinformationisavailableonselectedplantparameters~tomonitorandassessthesevariablesduringandfollowinganIaccident.ThiscapabilityisconsistentwiththerecommendationsIofNUREG-0578,"TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportrandShort-TermRecommendations".*adioactiveliquideffluentinstrumentationisprovided-'bmonitorcontrol,asapplicable,thereleasradioactivematerialsinliqu'uents.ThealaortripsetpointsfortheseinstrumentsarexnaccordancewiththeODCMtoensurethatalarmarapwcurpriortoexceedingthelimitsofPart20.TheoperabiZiiduseofthisinstrwonisconsistentwiththerequirementsGeneral/rgnCriteria60,63and64ofAppendixAto10CPRPart~ eradioactivegaseouseffluentinstrumentationisproveedtomonitorandcontrol,asapplicable,thereleaseso-radioactivematerials,ingaseous.effluents.Thealarmandaq:tripsetpointsforthesinstrumentsarecalculatedi:ncordancewithODCMtoensurethatalarmand/ortrip'llocrpriortoexceedingthelimitsof10CFRPartThisinstrumentationIIalsoincludesprovis'formonitoringtheconcentra-tionsofpotentilyexplosivegasmzturesinthewastegashdupsystem.Theoperabilitynduseofthisitrumentationisconsistentwiththereire-mtsofGeneralDesignCriterion64ofAppendixAo10CFRPart50.ControlRoomHVACdetectionsystemsaredesignedtopreventtheintakeofchlorine,ammoniaandradiationatconcentrationswhichmaypreventplantoperatorsfromperformingtheirrequiredfunctions.Concentra-tionswhichinitiateisolationofthecontrolroomHVACsystemhavebeenestablishedusingtheguidanceofseveralestablishedreferences(2-4).!Thechlorineisolationsetpointis1/3efthetoxicityIlimitofreference2butslightlygreaterthanthe!shorttermexposurelimitofreference4.Theammonia','etpointisestablishedatapproximately1/3ofthe(:.toxicitylimitforanhydrousammoniainreference2Cj!andequaltotheshort,termexposurelimitofreferenceThesetpointsforradioactivitycorrespondtothe Table3.5-5RadioactiveEffluentMonxtorinInstrumentationMinimChanels0eableacticrGroActivityMonitors(Liquid)a~b.e.'quidRadwaste(R-1&)SteGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)TurbieBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)HighCouctivityWaste(R-22)ContainmeFanCoolers(R-16)SpentFuelPolHeatExchange.ALoop~]*(R-20A)1.+++geSpentFuelPooHeatExchanerBLoop(R-20B)1+++2.PlantVentxlationa.WithoutMini-Purge2Ihb.NobleGasAtity(R-14)(ProvidingAlaandIsolationofGasDeayT)2.ParticuteSampl(R-13)3.Iodineampler(R-1BorR-14A""~)/WithMini-e1.2.3~4.NoleGasActivity(R-1)PrticulateSampler(R-lodineSampler(R-10Bor14A**~)oeGascxvyorParticulateSampler(R-11)23~ShutdPurgea./NobleGasActivity(R-12)h.fParticulateSampler(R-1123.5-20AmendmtNo.gg,gp,43 4~l5.c.IodineSampler(R-10AorR-12A**+)AxE)ectorMonitor(R-15orR-15A~*>)WastGasSystemOxygenMonitorMinimumChannelsocradleaction$***NotrequirewhenSteamGeneratorSlowdowniheingTecycled(i.e.'equiredonlyuringshutdownpurge~s,anrequiredtosamplethe.containmentsta++Requiredtosamleontainmentdurinmini-purgeora~***~+++NotrequiredduringCldorRefuel'Shutdown.AlsoseeTable3.5-6.ApplicablewhenHeatExcherinservice.3.5-20aAmendment.gP,43I5.vip' ~5.Yx<~:~~VrTABI.E3.5-5ContinuedTableZotationActi1-IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislesthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablrequire-ment,effluentreleasesfromthetankmycontinueforupto14days,providedthatpriortoinitiatingarelease:Action2-1.Atleasttwoindependentsampleofthetank'scontentsareanalyzed,inaccordancewithSpecification4.12.1.1.a,and/2.tleasttwotechnicallylifiedmembersofFacilityStaffindepeentlyverifythereleaseratecalculationanddischargelinevalving;Otherwz.se,suspendreleasofradioactiveeffluentsviatNlspa@way.WhenSteamGenatorBowdownisbeingreleased(notrecyc'ed)andnerofchannelsoperableislessthanrequirebtheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirements,eff1ntreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactiv'(betaorgamma)at.alimitofdetectionofatostlŽ7uCi/gram:Action3-'ction4-1.Atleastcueper8urswhentheconcentrationofthesondarycoolantis>0.01uCi/gramdoseequivaltI-131..2.'tlestonceper24hourawhentheconcentrationofesecondarycoolantis+<<0.01uCi/gramdoseequ'valentI-131.IfthnumberofoperablechannelsgslessthanreredbytheMinimumChannelsopegablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymacontinueprovidedthat.atleastonceper24hougrabsamplesyeanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(baorgamma)gtalimitofdetectionofatmost10-7ui/gm.IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerejgirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinutprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenatleastoncep8hoursandthesesamplesareanalyzedforisotopiactivitywithin24hoursorR14Aisoperableandreadingsarereviewedatleastonceper8hours.,3.5-21endmentHo.gf,29 /6rActionAction6TABLE3.5-5ContinuedTableNotationIfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablereire-ments,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymcontinueprovidedsamplesarecontinuouslyollectedasrequiredbyTable4.12-2ItemEwithailiaryplingequipment.IfenumberofoperablechannelsisessthanrequedbytheMinimumChannelsOperleandtheSeconryActivityis~1x10uCigm,effluentreleasemaycontinueviathispathayprovidedgrabsampleseanalyzedforgrossrad'oactivity(betaorgamma)tleastonceper24hgrs.Efthesecondaryactivityigreaterthan1x10-uCi/gm,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycntinueforupto31daysprovidedrabsamplesaretakenevery8hoursandanalyzedwin24hours.Action7-Ifthechannelisinoperab,asampleofthegasfromtheinservicgasdaytankshallbeanalyzedforoxygencontentlegitonceevery4.hours.Action8-IfthenumberofoperechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimahannelsOperable,'oratleastonecontainmentfacoolerisnotoperating,within1hourtermigatethpurge.66!~rs3.5-22'knendmentsAo.g9',29 3.9PlantEffluentsau3.91111*b'lt.9Appliestothecontrolledreleaseofradioactive,/liquidsandgasesfromtheplant.'c~3'odedinetheconditionsforreleaseofradioactiveliquid~dgaseouswastes.SecificaMons49~3LiidEfflustsConcentrationgC3~9.11aThereleaseofradctiveliquideffluentsshallbesuchthatthecoentioninthecirculatingwaterdischargedoenotexceedthelimitsspecifiedinaccordanceithAppendixB,TMleIE,Column2andNotesthretoof10CFR20;Fordissolvedorentrainednoblgasesthetotalactivitydueodissolvedor.entrainednoblegasesshallnotexcee2x10uCi/ml.t~~-43.9.1.1.bZftheconcentrationofradioactivematerialinthecirculatingwaterdischargeexceedsthelimitsof'I~~3.9.1.1.a,measures'hallbeinitiatedtoresthre'theconcentrationtowithinthoselimitsassoonaspracticable.SM.1.2Dosei~~3.9.1.2.aThe-doseordosecommitmenttoanindiviBualascal->~~>uculatedintheODOM&rom"radioactivematerialsinliquid....eff1'uentsreleasedtounre~'dareasshall.belimited: '(i)Duringanycalendarquarterto<1.5modemtor,thetotalbodyandto<5mremtoanyorgan,and'It(ii)Duringanycalendaryearto<3mremtotheIIItotalbodyandto<10mremtoanyorgan.,3.9.1.2.bWhenever.thecalculateddoseresultingfromthereleaseofzadioact'ivematerialsinlipideifl.uentsexceedsthequarterlylimitsof3.9.Z'.2.a(i},aSpecialReport~'hallbesubmitted>tothe+Commissionwithinthirtydayswhichincludes~followinginformation:1Identificationof~.thecauseforexceedingthedose1't.(ii)Correc'veactionstakenand/ortobetakentoreducethereleasesofra'dioactivematerialinLicgxideffluentstoassureMatsubsequent.releaseswillremainwithinthe,abovelimits.(ii'i}Theresultsoftheradiological.Walysesofthenearestpublicdrinkingwatersource,andanevaluationoftheradiologicalimpact"'enduetolicenseereleasesonfinisheddrinkingwaterwithregardtotherequirementsof40CZR141Safe,DrinkingWaterAct.P~3..K.3LiquidWasteTreatmentI3.9.1.3.aThe--lioudwatertreatment.systemshaeusedtoreducetheradioactivemats".ziala'cuidwastespriortotheir':discharca~k~acessary,to"assurethatthecumulativearosecuetcliquideffluentreleaseswhena~redr~ !3.9.1.3.b!G3e,Qover31daysdoesnotexceed0.06mremtothetotalbodyor0.2mremtoanyorgan..Iftheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemisnotoperableformorethan31daysandifradioactiveliquidwasteisbeingdischargedwithouttreatment.resultingindosesinexcessofSpecification3.9.1.3.a,aSpecialReportshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwithin,Jl'hirtydayswhichinclud'esthefollowinginformation:(i)Identificationofequiymmentorsubsystemsnotoperableandthereasons."~(ii)..Action(s)takentorestorethe'-inoperableequipmenttooperablestatus./(iii)Summarydescriptionofaction(s)takentoreventarecurrence.3.9.GaseousWashes~~values:3.9.2.1oseRateI3.9.2.1.aThe'tantaneousdoserate,ascalculatedinthe~'>ODCN,dueoradioactivematerialseasedingaseous!effluentsfromthesite.shallblimitedtothefollowing(i)Thedoserateor'noblegasesshallbe<500mrem/yrtdthetotalhodyamad<3000mrem/yrtotha"dkia,and(ii)~<'Thedoseratef-allradioiodines,radioactive~N,materialsinparticulatefom,andracLonuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhal-livesgreaterthan8daysshallbe<1500mrem/yrtoanyorgan. ~3.9.2.1b..Forunplannedreleaseofgaseouswastes,compliancesr~~~with3.9.2.1.amaybedeterminedbyaveragingovera24-hourperiod.3.9.2.1.cIfthec'alculateddoserateofradioactivematerials3releasedingaseouseffluents'romthesiteexceedsthelimitsof3.9.2;1.p"'or3.9.2.1.b,measuresshallC'einitiatedtorestorereleases.towithinthoselimitsassoonaspracticable.pt':3.3.2:1.dCompliancewith3.9.2.1.aand3.9.2".Z.bshallbe-determinedbyconsideringtheapplicable~ventilationta.systemflowrates.Theseflowratesshallbe"-determinedatthefrecpxencyrecpxiredbyTable4.1-5.3."9;-2,2Dose(10CFRPart:50,AppendixI)3.9.2.2.'aaaheairdose,.ascalculatedintheODCM,,Auetonoblegasesteleasedingaseousoffluentsfromthesite~Ishallbelimited,,tothefollowing:(i)Duringany"calendarquarterto<5mradforr't.gam'maradiationand-.to<10mradforbetaradiation.(ii)Duringanycalendaryearto<1~adforgammaradiationandto<20mradforbetaradi~on.~r<<~~~waa3.9.2.edosetoanindividual,ascalculatedinthehalf-livesgreategaseoluentsfromthesiteshallbe'tedtofromradioiodine,radioactivematerial'articulateformandradionuclidesotherviablegaseswitheightreleasedwiththefollowing:

    g---,.(.i)Duringanycalendarcpxarterto<7M..mzem'toanyorgan..(ii)Duz'nycalendaryearto<15.mremtoany~Plv.ViMheneverthecalculateddosetoanindividualresulting,c',fromnoblegasesorfromzadionuclidesotherthan'oblegasesexceedsthecpxarterly,limitsof.3'.9.2.2.a(i)or3-9.2'.2.b(i)aSpecialReportshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwithinthirtydayswhichincludesthefollowinginformation
    (i}identificationofthecauseforexceedingthedosel~t.3.9.2-3.bf'rbetaradiationtothemaximallyexposedird-'vidual.Theappropriateportionsoftheventilationexhaust'systemshallbeusedtoreduceradioactivemateria's~iingaseouswastepriototheirdischarge,ifnecessary,(ii)Correctiveactionstakenand/ortobetakento'educereleasesofradioactivematerialingaseouseffluentstoassurethatsubseauentreleaseswillbewithintheabovelimits.vow>>iIAAFii'r't4i~&QlIAIJ'Pff>'iLi)~~.3.9.2.3GaseousWasteTreatmenti.3.9.2.3.aThegaseousradwastetreatmentsystemshallbeused,to!reduceradioactivematerialsingaseouswastepriortotheirdischarge,ifnecessary,to.,assurethatthecumulativeairdoseduetogaseouseffluent.releasestounrestrictedaeaswhenaveragedover31daysdoesnotexceed0.2.mzadforgammaradiationand0.4mradI7t1I 3.9.2.3.ctoassurethatthecumulativedoseduetogaseouseffluentreleasesfromthesitewnenaveragedov31daysdoesnotexceed0.30mremtoanyorgan.Iftheigaseousradwastetreatmentsystemorventilationexhaustsystemisinoperablefor'morethan31daysandifgaseouswaseisbeingdischargedwithouttreatmeaentresultingindoses'ne~essofSpecifications3.9.2.3.aA'r3.9.2.3.b,aSpecieReportshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwi4inthirt-dayswhichincludestheIfollowinginformation:*~~~(x,)Identificationofequipmentorsubsystemsnotr;"'"operableandthereasons.(ii)Action(s)takentorestoretheinoeable.equipmenttooperablestatus.(iii)Summarydescriptionofaction(s)takentpreventarecurrence.3.+2.4Dose(40CFRPast190)3.9.2.4.a.3.9.2.>>a>>Ifthecalculateddose'romthereleaseof.radioacivematerialsfromtheplant'inliquidorgaseous-'e<fluents.gCexceedstw~ethelimitsofSpecifications3.9.1.2.a,.r+3.9.2.2.a,or3.9;-?.2.b,aSpecialReportshallbe,er'ubmittedtotheCommissionwithinthirtydaysandsubsequentreleases'hallbel'imitedsothatthedoseordosecommitmnttoarealindividualislimitedto~r<,25"mremtothetota'odyoranvorgan(except..thyroid,whichislimitedto<75mrem)fortheca3.endarIyearthatincludestherelease(s)covredbyth'srepo"t..

    I"II'5.vH.v~I-.Thisreportshallincludeananalysiswhichdeme""stratesthatradiationexposurestoallreal"'ndividuals.'-fromtheplant..zzelessthanthe40.sCFRPart:190Climitsinaccordancemithmethodsset.forthinthe(ODCN.Otherwise,therepo'ztshallrequestavariancefromtheCommissiontopermitreleasestoexceed.40CFRP~190.Submittalofthereportisconsideredaelyrequest,andavarianceisgrantedunt~i9;staffactiononthereouestiscomplete.~a3.9.2.5ExplosiveGasMixture3.9.2.5.aTheconcentrationofoxygenineachgasdecaytank3.2.5.b!3.9.2.5.cshallbelimitedIftheconcentrationofoxygeninagasdecaytankis2%byvolumebut<4%byvolume,restoretheconcentrationI'foxygentowithinthelimitwithin<~outs.Iftheconcentz~onofox~x,nagasdecaytankis>4%byvolume,~~ateemovethattankfromexcuse'~ozn.service<<statusandcetheconcentxat='on~oxygento<2%within48hoursifsuchmeasdonotconflictwithotherradiologicallimitsorprocedu3.9.2.6HasteGasDecayTanks3.9.2.6.aThequantity.ofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegas55~iigasdectankexceedstheimitof3.9.2.6.a,mmediatelysuspedalladditionsofadioactivematerialtothe~~srv'decaytankshallbelimitedtolessthanorequalto"00,0004a//curiesofnlegas(considereasZe-133)atalltimes.3.9.2.6.bIfthequtityofradioacti-materialinanywie r,tankandreducethetankcontentswithin48hoursifsuchmeas'uresdonotconflictwithotherradiological';wI'limits"orprocedures.,'.;2.7SolidRadioactiveWasteh3.9.2.7.a~ThesolidradwastesystemshallbeusedasapplicablelinaccordancewiththeProcessControlProgramforthesolidificationand-packagingofradioactivewasteto~e~".ensuremeetingtherequirementsof10CPRPa~~71priorItoshipmentofradioactivewastes'omthesite.r,(3.9.2.7.bIfthepackagingrequirementsof10CFRPart71areInotsatisfied,suspendshipmentsofdeficiently..packagedsolidradioactivewastesfromthesiteuntilappropriate,'orrectivemeasureshavebeentaken.~I~/'asis'K,iquidwastesfromtheRadioactiveWasteDisposa'1SystemaredilutedintheCirculatingWater'Systemdischargepriortoreleasetothelake.-Withtwo~pumpsoperating,'hecapacityoftheCirculatingWaterSystemisapproximately400,000'gpm.Operat'onofasinglecirculatingwaterpumpreducesthenominalflowratebyabou't50%.1he'irculatingwaterflowunde~variousoperatingc'onditionshas.beercalculatedf"omtheheaddiferentialacrossthepumpsandth'emanu-Irfacturer's"head-capacitycurves.Becauseofthe.lowradioactivitylevelsinthecirculatingwate"discharge,th~concer.trationofliquid-rad'oactiveeffluentsatthispointisnotmeasureddirecty.Theconcntion1I inthecirculatingwaterdischargeiscalculatedfromthemeasuredconcentrationintheHasteCondensateTank,theflow'rateoftheHasteCondensatePumps,andtheflowintheCirculatingMaterSystem.Radioactiveeffluentsreleasedtounrestrictedareasonthebasisofgrossbeta-gammaanalysisarebasedontheassumptionthat,I-129andradiumarenotpresent.Accordingly,Appendix3,TableII,Column2of10CFR20willpermitaconcentrationupto1x10uCi/mlnthecirculating'aterdischarge.Otherwise,ifcontrolledonaradio-nuclidebasis,thepermitteddischargeconcentrationwillbeinaccordancewithNote1of10CPR20,Appendix3,TableII,Column2.I,ftheconcentrationofliquidwastesinthecirculatingwaterdischargeequalstheMaximumPermissibleConcentration(NPC)asspecified,theaverageconcentrationattheintakeofthenearestpublicwatersupplyat'Ontario,HewYork,'ouldbe(2)wellbelowMPC.Thus,theselimitationsprovidetadditionalassurancethattheconceritrationsofwater-4)borneradioactivitywillresultinonlyminimalpotential';publicexposureswithin(1)SectionII.AofAppendixI,.10CFRPart50,and(2)thelimitsoflOCFRPartt20.106(e).Thec~~rcentationlimitfornoblegasesisbasedupontheassumptionthatXe-135isthecontroll'ngradio-sisotopeanc'tsNPCina'rwasconvertedtoanecu'valent/\concentrationinwaterusingICRPPublication2methodology..j TheSpecificationswhichlimit'thedosetoanindividualfr'omradioactiveliquideffluentsazeprovidedto'IFimplementtherequirementsofSectionsII.A,IIX,.Aand/~IV.Aof.10CFRPart.50,AppendixI.TheLimitingCondition,forOperationimplementstheguide>set!forthinSe'crionIZ.Aof10CFRPart50,AppendixZ.!/TheSpecifica'tionsprovidetherequired.operating,/flexibilityand,,atthesametimeimplementtheguidessetforthinSectionIV.Aof10CFR,Part50,Appendix'.ThedosecalculationsintheODCM,implementtherequire-ICmentsinSectionIII'.Aof10CFR/Part50,AppendixI.I/thatconformancewith.theguidasofAppendixIistobeshownbycalculationalprceduresbasedonsuch.modelsand,datathattheactualexposureofareal./individualthroughapproriatepathwaysisunlikelytobesubstantiallyunderestimated.Also,thereis/reasonableassurance/thattheoperationoftheplant.!willnotresult.inwaterborneradi'onuclidedischarges:.rwhichcausetheotentialexposurefromthefinisheddrinkingwateingestiontoexceedthe'.requirementsof'I40CPR141.rTherequirementsthattheappropriateport'onsothe~liquidadwastetzeatmensystembeusedwhenspecifiedIVproviedassurancet,~tthereleasesofradioactiveo.matrialsinliquide.:fluentswillbekept"aslowasireaso..&lyachievai~e."Thisspec'cationimpl'-entstherequirementsof10CFRPart50.36a,General~ 'c,DesignCriterion60ofAppendixAto10CFR'artSOan@designobjectiveSectionII.DofAppendixI.The~+~limitsgoverningtheuseofappropriateportionsofI~N.theliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwezesp'ecifiedasasuitablefractionoftheguidesetforthinSectionIII.Aof10CFRPartSO,AppendixIforliquideffluents.iIThecumulative'aximumdosetoan-offsiteindividual!Ifromwaterborneradioactiveeffluentsisdeterminedinordertoverifythattheaveragedoseovera31-'dayperiodisreasonablysmall,eveniftheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemisnotoperated,duringthatperiod./However,acumulativedosewhichexceedsthestatedlimitdoesnotnecessazilyimplythatallportionsofthelicpxidradwastetreatmentsystembeused;certainsubsystemsmayhaveonlyminimaleffectsonreducingdoses.Thelimitfozdoserateisprovidedtoensurethatthedoserateatany'imeatthesiteboundaryfromgaseous/effluentswillbewithintheannualdoselimitsofI10CFRPart:,20forunrestrictedareas.Theannualjdoselimitsarethedosesassociatedwiththeconcentat'onsof10GERPart20,Appendix3,TableII.Theselimits/;'rovidereasonableassurancethatradioactivemateria'disc'argedingaseouseffluentswi~J.notresult~~inthetfeosureofanind-'vidualinanunrestrictedarea,'.,toualaverageconcentrations':ceedingthelimitsb' ~specifiedinAppendixB,TableZIof10CFRPart20QOCFRPart20e106(b}).Forindividualswhomayat\timesbewithinthesiteboundary,theseoccupancy'\IItimes~willbesuficientlysmalltocompensateforanyincreas'eintheatmosphericdiffusionfactorabove'Ithatforthesiteboundary.TheSpecificationswhichlimitthedosefromradioactivegaseouseffluentsareprovidedtoimplementthe1requirementsofSectionsIX.B,ZI.C,III.AandZV.Aof110CFRPart'.50,AppendixI.TheLimitingConditionforOperationimplementstheguidessetforthinSectionsIIeBandXI.C'of10CFRPart:50,AppendixZ.yPTheSpecificationsprovidethere~izedoperatingflexibilityandatthesametimeimplementtheguidesi~~~~j'etforthinSectionZV,Aof10CFRPart50,AppendixIITherequirementtha4theappropriateportionsofthe/gaseousradwastetreatmentsystemandtheventilation/exhausttreatmentsystembeusedwhenspecifiedprovidesrreasonableassurancethatthereleasesofradioactive/o/lmaterialsxmgaseouseffluentswillbekept"aslowasisreaso)fa))lyachievable."Thisspecificationimplements,'herequirementsof10CFRPazt50.36a,GeneralDesigni/Crite'rion60ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50,and)designobjectiveSectionII.DofAppenci'zI.The,/~~imitsgoverningtheuseofappropriateportionsor',) thesystemswerespecifiedasasuitablefractionoftheguidesetforthinSectionsll.BandEI.Cof3.0.CFRPart50,AppendixI,fozgaseouseffluents.Thecumulativemaximumdosetoanoffsiteindividualfromairborneradioactiveeffluentsisdeterminedinorder'overifythattheaveragedoseovera31-dayperiodCisreasonablysmall,eve'ninthe-unlikelyeventthat\thegaseousraGwastetreatmentorventilationexhaustsystemsarenotoperatedduringthatperiod.However,acumulat'ivedosewhichexceedsthestatedlimitdoesnotnecessarilyimply.thatallportionsofthegaseousand'ventilationexhausttreatmentsystemsbeused;certainsubsystemsmayhaveonlyminimaleffectonreducingdoses..TheSpecificationondose(40CFRPart190)isprovidedtomeetthereportingrequirementsof40CFRPart190.Sincetheplantiswellremovedfromotherfuelcyclefacilities,it,issufficienttoapplytheSpecificationonlytotheplantinaccordancewithmethodsprovidedintheODCM.TheSpecificationonexplosivegasmixtureisprovidedtoensurthattheconcentrationofpotentiallyexplosivetgasmixturescontainedinthegasdecaytanksaremaintainedbelowtheflammabilitylimitofoxygen.Naintainingtheconcentrationofoxygenbelowit~flammabilitylimitsprovides.assurancethatthereleasesI ofradioactive.materialswillbecontrolledinconfo~ce*.withtherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriterion60'ofAppendixAto10CFRPartSO.Thewastegasdecaytankcurielimitisprovidedinorder.,toassurethatintheunlikelyeventofanuncontro3,ledreleaseofagasdecaytank'scontents,Itheresultingtotalbodygammaexposuretoanindividualatthenearest'exclusionareaboundarywillnotexceed0.5rem.Therequirementpertainingtosolidradioactivewaste1~isprovidedtoassurethatthesolidradioactivewaste.systemwillbeusedasappropriatefortheprocessingpandpackaging,:ofsolidradioactivewastes.Thespecification'alsoestablishesthe'PxrocessControl-/Program,whichincludestheprocessparametersandevaluationmethodsusedtoensuremeetingthereauire-Imentsof10CFRPart71priortobeingshippedoffsite.PReferences(1)gFSAR,Section10.2(2g)FSAR,Section2,Appendix2A)r3)FSAR,Sections2.6and2.7 3.13SnubhersmitinCnditionfor0eration3.13'~3.13.2BasisWithRCSconditionsbovecoldutdown,allsafety-relatedxsspecificationdoesnpactionstatementforthatsystem.snubbersshallbeoperable.rapppytothosesnubbersinstalledonnonsafetyelatedsystemsa.thesnubberfailure,andaresult'failureofthesupportedsonsafety-relatedsysteowntobecausedbythatsnubberfailure,wouldha~enoadverseeffectonanysafety-relatedsystc+ActionWithoneormoreubbersinoprable,within72hoursreplaceorrest~etheinoperablesnubber(s)tooperable.statusanperformanengineeringevaluationper\Specifjdation4.14.1fonthesupportedcompon'etordeclarethsupportedsysteminoperableandfollowtheapopriate.Snubberrerequiredtobeoperabletoensurethatthestturalintegrityoftreactorcoolantsystemandallotherfety-relatedsystemsismaintaineuringandfollowingasmicorothereventnitiatingdynamicloads.nubbersmaybereplacedIrigidstcturalsupports(bumpers)rovidedananalysis~sperformedto'emonsttethatappropriatecceptancecrMriaaresatisfiedfordesignbasis'saicandpipereakeventsandprovidedthatthebumpersareinspectedpe'icallyamannerappropriateforrigidstructuralsupports. 0 3.15OverressureProtectionSstemAlicabilit~~Applieswhenever.thetemperatureofoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsis<330'F,ortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemisxnoperation.ObectiveTopreventoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantsystemandtheresidualheatremovalsystem.Secification3.15.1Exceptduringsecondary.sidehydrostatictestsinwhichRcSpressuieistoberaisedabovethePORvsetpoint,atleastoneofthefollowingover-pressureprotectionsystemsshallbeoperable:asb.Twopressurizerpoweroperatedre3.iefvalves(pORVs)withaliftsettingof6424psig,orAreactorcoolantsystemventof>1.1squareinches.3'5.1.13.'5.1.2BasisWithonePORVinoperable,eitherrestoretheinoperablePORVtooperablestatuswithin7daysordepressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)withinthenext8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.WithbothPORVsinoperable,depressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)within8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.UseoftheoverpressureprotectionsystemtomitigateanRCS~orRHRSpressuretransientshallbereportedinaccor8ancewith6.9'2./AnRCSventopeningofgreaterthan1.1squareinchesensuresthat)theRCSwillbeprotectedfrompressuretransientswhichcouldexceedthelimitsofAppendixGto10CFRPart50whenoneormoreoftheRCS"old,legsare<330'F'~'.Thisreliefcapacitywill iQ'3'.16RadioloicalEnvironmentalMonitorinAlicabilitAppetoroutinetestingoftheplantenvirons.Ob'ectiveToestablishaprogramwhichwillassurerecognitionofchangesinradioactivityorexposurepathwaysintheenvirons.Snacifi".ation'8;16,13.16.1;1MonitorinaPrramTheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogram=3.16.1.2shallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable3.16-1atthelocationsgivenintheODCM.IftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitaringprogramisnotconductedasspecifiedinTable3.16-1,prepareandsubmittotheCommission,intheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReport,adescriptionofthereasonsfornot.conductingtheprogramasrequiredandtheplansforpreventingarecurrence.(Deviationsarepermittedfromtherequiredsamplingscheduleispecimensareunobtainableduetohazardousconditions,/seaso'nalavailability,ortomalfuncti'onofautomatic/samplingequipment.Ifthelatter,efortsshalj.be/nadetocompletecorrectiveacionpriortotheendothenextsamplingperiod.)3..l.6~1-3Tftheloselofradioactivty'nanenvironme.".telsamplingmc.diumatoneormoreothelocationsspeci-fied'ntneODCMexceedstheeportinglevelsofTable'~ll4.;A'I~&~~t4CP\%1NPR~c ~<~i.9-2.whenaveragedoveranycalendarquarter,aSpecialReortshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwithinthirdayswhichincludesanevaluationofanyrelasecondit'ons,environmentalfactorsorotheraspectwhichcausedhereportinglevelsofTable6.9-tobeexceeded.Hhenmorethnoneoftheradionuclides'able6.9-2aredetectedithesamplingmedium,thireportshallbesubmittedif:concentration1limitlevel(1)concentration2+....>1.0limitleve(2)WhenradionuclidesoterthanoseinTable6.9<<2aredetectedandarethersuitofplanteffluents,this'eportshallbesubmittedzthepotentialannu'aldoetoanindividualisgreaterhathecalendaryearlimitofSpecifications3.9.1.2aor3..2.2.b.Thisreportisnotrequiredifthemearedleveloradioactivitywasnot.theresultofplaeffluents;however,insuchanevent,theconditionhallbereportedan8describedintheAnnualRadioogicalEnvironmentalOpertingReport.formorthanonesampleperiodfromoneomoreofthesample.nglocationsindicatedbytheODCM,adiscussionshlbeincludedintheRadioactiveEffluenReleaseeportwhichidentifiesthecauseoftheunavaililityofsamplesandidentifieslocationsfor3.16.1.4IfmilkorfreshleafyvegetablesamplesreunavailableAmdmentNo.583.16-2 ~26.i.(r.,obtainingreplacementsamples.Ifamilkorleafyvegetablesamplelocationbecomesunavailable,theIlocationsfromwhichsampleswereunavailablemaythenbedeletedfrom.theODCN,providedthatcomparabler'location'sareaddedtotheenvironmentalmonitoring.3.6.2program.LandUseCensuser%y4)rrt<<~v4c++e~g~a3.16.1AlandusecensusshallbeconductedandshallidentifyJthelocationofthenearestmilkanimalandthe.nearestridenceineachofthe16meteorologicalsectorswitheadistanceoffivemiles.:I3.16.2.2.3.16.2.3Anonsitgardenlocatedinthemeteorologicalsectorhavingthe'esthistoricalD/Q:maybeusedfor~rbroadleafvegetationsampling"inlieuofagardencensus;otherwiseeland.usecensusshallalsoidentifythelocationSfthenearestgardenofgreaterthan500scpxarefeetineach'fthe16meteorological*sectorswithinadistanceoffivemiles.D/Qshallbedeterminedin>accordancewithmethodsdeecn'bedintheODCN.Ifalaxidusecensusidentifiesalocation(s)whichryieldsacalculateddoseordosecommitmengreaterthanthatofthemaximallyexposedindividual'qurreni'"-beingcalculatedinSpecification..12.2.2,thenewidentifiedlocation(s)shallbereportedintheSem'-annualRadioactiveReleaseRe:--.t.20.~ 2.6.2.4lfalandusecensusidentifiesamilklocation(~swhichyieldsacalculateddoseordosecommitmenteaterWanthatatalocaionfrommchsamplesarecurretlybeingobtainedinaccordancewithSpecifi-cation3..1,thenewident'iedlocation(s)shallbe',reportedinthSemiaalRadioactiveReleaseReport.Thenewlocation'beaddedtotheradiologicalIenvironment.monitoringprogramwithinthirtydays,ifpossible.Themilklocation.havingthelowestca"culateddoseordosecommitment"maybedeletedfromlIr'thismonitoringprogramafterOctober31'-oXtheyeareinwhichthislandusecensuswasconducted.6.33.16.3.13.16.3e2InterlaboratorvComparisonProramlaboratorycoarisonpramwhichhasbeenapprovedamexists.byNRC,ifsuch~rIfanalysesare.notperformeasrequiredabov,rtthecorrectiveactionstakenopreventarecurrenceintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvx.entalOperat'ngReport,.1Analysesshallbeperformedonapplicabadioactive'.envirentalsamplessupplied~partofan'nter-Theradioicalmonitoringprogramr-quiredbythisspecificationproviepsarementsofradiationand..ofradioact'vem~rialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforoseradionucl'deswhicnleac.thenighestpotent'alradiationexposuresofindividualsresul fromthestationoperation.Thismonitoringprogramtherebysupplementstheradiologicaleffluentmonitorin>>g(~~progr'amhyvera,fyingthatthemeasurableconcentrations>>ofradioactivematerialsandlevelsofradiationarenothigherthanexpectedonthebasisoftheeffluentmeasurement'sandmodelingoftheenvironmentalexposure',pathways.Th'einitially'specifieBmonitoringpxogramwillbeeffectiveforatleastthreeyears.Following.:thisperiod,programchangesmaybe,'initiatedbased.onroperationalexperience.ThedetectioncapabilitieszequiredbyTable4.l0-1arestate-of-the-artfoxroutineenvironmentalmeasurea(entsinindustrialrlaboratozies.Lowerlimitsi'ofdetection(LLDs)areintendedasapriori(befo'rethle-fac-t)limits,andanalyseswillbeconductedinsuchamannerthatthestatedLLDswillbeachievedunderroutineconditions.II'aThelandusecensus'equirementi'sprovidedtoensurethatchangesintheuseofunrestriced.areasaxeidentifiedand<Matmodificationsto'themonitoringlprogramaremadeifrequiredbytheres'ultsofthisPcensus.A.@ardencensusisnotrequired'ifanons'tegardeniq"located'nthemetoologicalsectorhavingSthehighest,histoicalD/Qisusedforbroadl'eavegetationsampling.Th'scensussatisfiesthe,requirementsofSectionEV.B.3ofAppend'xIto0CFR:.~Part50. VTherequirementforparticipationinaninterlaboratory'.comparison,programisprovidedtoensurethat"independentchecksonthecisionandaccuracyof-themeasurements~CIofradioactivematerxulinenvir~oentalsamplematricesareperformedaspartofanalityassurancepro'gramforenvironmentalmonitoringinordertodemonstratethattheresultsarereasonablyvalid.Gnlysampleswithradioactivitylevelscomparabletolevels.ine~v'xronmentalsamplesneedbeanalyzed. YowH~vm~TABLE3;16-11.AIRBORNE~eNonuserofSamlesandSamleLocations2lldColleciionFreuencRADIOLOGICALENVIRONMENTALMONITORINGPROGRAM//eandFfeuencofAhalsosa..Radioiodineb.Particulates2.'DIRECTRADIATIONt2,indicator2control7indicator5control10indicator.10control11placedgreatertl>an5milesfromplant=siteContinuousoperationofsamplerwithsamplecollectionatleastonceper10days.Sameasabove.TLDsat:leastquarterly.Radioiodinecanister.Analyzewithin7daysofcol?ectionofI-131Particulatesampler.Analyzeforgrossgretaradioactivity>24hoursfollowingfilterchange.Performgammaisotopicanalysison'eachsampleforwhichgrossbetaactivityis10timesthemeanofoffsitesamples.performgammaisotopicanalysisoncomposite(by'locaation)sampleatleastonceper92days.Ganunadosequarterly.1gi ~IItTABLE3.16-1CONTINUEDRADIOLOGICALENVIRONMENTALMONITORINGPRORAM~ExosalrePatllwaandor'SamleNumberofSamlesandSamleLocationsSamlinandCollectionFreuencTeandFreuencofAnalsos3.WATERBORNEa.Surface~~1contxol(RussellStation).1indicator('CqndenserWaterDischarge)Composite*samplecol-lectedoveraperiodof<31days..GrossbetaandgammaisotopicanalysisofeachcompositesamplTritiumanalysisofonecompositesampleatleastonceper92days'.Drinking1indicator(OntarioWaterDistrictIntake)Sameasabove.Sameasabove.IWComposztesampletobecollectedbycollectinganaliquotatintervalsnotexceeding2hous. .'PWTABLE3.16-1(CONTINUED)RADIOI.OGICALENVIRONHENTALMONITORINGPROGRAHxosurePathwaandorSamleNumberofSamlesandSamleLocationsSamlinandCollectionFreuencandF~reuencyofAnalysisINGESTIONa.HilkAtleastonceper15ilayso1control3indicatorJunethrii+Octobereacliof3fhqmsIcontrol"iAtleas+tnceper311indicator<days.<Novembert.hruHayoneofthefarmsGammaiaqtopicand.1-131anitlysisofeachsample.Gammaisutopira'nilI-131anitlysisofeaclisample.b.Fishc.FoodProducts4control4indicator(OffshoreatGinna)"1contro'12ingfcator(Onsl.t'e)1control2indicator(Onsitegardenornearestoffsitegardenwithin5milesiiithehighestD/Qmeti.orologicalsect.or)Gammaistitopicanalysisonedibleportionsofeachsample.:..Attimeofharvest.Onesampleof:1.broadleafvegetation2.othervegetableTwceduringfishingseasoh<includingatleastforspecies.AnnualattimebgGammaisutopicliarvest.Sample4;qmanalysisonedibletwoofthefollowing~portionttfsample.l.apples2.clierries3.grapesGamma"~stitopicanalysi&onedibleportionsofeachsample.~~~o~P<<6 Specifiedintervalsmaybeadjustedplusorminus25/'.toaccommodatenormaltestschedules.OperaionalSafetyReviewApplicability:Appliesto'temsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-Objective:litTospeciytheminimumfreauencyandtyoeofsurve'llancetobeaooliedtoplanteauipmentandcond'tions.Speccation:Cal'"rat'on,testing,andcheckingofanalogchar>elandtes"ingoflogicchannelshallbeperformedasspec"f'edinTable4.1-1.Ecn.'ipmentandsamolingtestssha3.1beconductedasspeci='edinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.Eachaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchanne3.shallbedemonstraedoperablebyperformancofthechannelcheckandeh~elcalibrationoperationsatthefrequenciessho~winTable4.1-3.Eachradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationchan..hallbedemonstratedooeableeformingthe.channe3,check,-cc,channelfunctionaltest,andceca3'brationale4.1-5.frecuencyshcww'n Basis:CheckFailuressuchasblowninstrumentfuses,defectrveind'ca"ors,faultedamplifierswhichresultin"upscale"'1or"downscale"indicationcanbeeasilyrecognizedbysimpleobservationofthefunctioningofaninstrumentorsystem.Fu~".er.ore,suchfailuresareinmanycases,revealedbyalarmorannunciatoraction,andachecksupplemensthis"-,=eofbuilt-insurveillance.Basedonexperienceinoperationofbothconventionaland.".c'earslantsystems,whentheplantisinoperation~,IIthe.-..in'm'checkingfreauencyofoncepershiftisdee.ecadquateforreactorandsteamsysteminstrumentatxon.C."=o'oomproceduresrecuireacheckoftheRadiationMonitoringSystem(RNS)panelmetersandst'pchartI'ecordersforproperreadoutonceeachshift.Adailysurvei>>ancelogisalsomaintainedintheControlRoomformanualent~ofRMSreadouts,andisindependentlyreviewedbyHealthPhysicssupervisionatleastweekly.fi=JAradiat'onmonitordownscalefailurewillrsuitinaconicuous,visualindicationontheRMSpanel(nolaudiblea.}.,Radiationmonitorcontroltonesarespring-returnedte'(operate"rr-afterbeingturnedtoanyothe"testorthedesigneaturprocecureensuresationmonitorcheckm.Theefore,togetherwithoftheHIS,antsurve'llaŽcethecontinuedavailab'tycfeachtoperformitsintendedfunc TABLE4.1-1(Continued)Channellt10.RodPositionBankCountersll.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlow~CackS(1,2)N.A.N.A.~CaihrateTest~vv+N.A.N.A.1)2)N.A.N.A.~e~arcsWithrodpositionindicationLogrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice'l14.BoricAcidStorageTankLevelDN.A.Note415.RefuelingWaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlTankLevel17.ReactorContainmentPressure~~=,-ar~'.A.N.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1)IsolationValvesignaltvvwrvAreaMonitorsRltoR9,..,..SystemMonitorR17v.v>>~"vk+*"~N.A.18.RadiationMonSystem19.BoricAcidControlN.A.~gD.R-----"M"rvv&~20.ContainmentDrainSumpLevel21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksN.A.N.A:N.A.N.A.rS~~o,~E>A22.Pump-ValveInterlock23.TurbineTripSet-PointN.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1}BlockTrip24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureN.A.mendmentNc.g4.1-6,v~* TABLE.41-1tCONTINUED)Channel~<~f~\25.ContainmentPressureCheck>>ljCalibrateTestRHRemarksNarrowrangecontainmentpressure(-3.0,+3psig)excluded26.StcamGeneratorPressure27.28.29.30.TurbineFirstStagePressureSFgcncyPlanRnationHnstrumentsironmcntanitors~HLossofVoltage/Degraded*NA.Voltage4&0VoltSafeguardsBus-------MRNARH'1.TripofHainFeedwaterPumps32.SteamFlow~NASNA33.TAN<I34.ChlorineDetector,ControlBoomAirIntakeNA35.AmmoniaDetector,ControlRoomAirIntakeNA36'adiationDetectors,ControlRoomNAAirIntake37ReactorVesselLevelIndicationSystemNA38a.TripBreakerLogicChannelTesting3&b.TripBreakerLogicChannelTestingNANANANANotes1,2and3Note1 Table4.1-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinSurveillanceRequirementsInstrumentChannelCheckSourceFunctionalCharmCheckTestCal(brionGroActivityMonitor(Liquid)acD(7)LiquidRadHaste(R-18)SteamGeneratorSlowdown(R-19)D(7)TurbineBildingFloorDra(R-21)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)/M(4)Q(1'(5)R(5)R(5)d.HighConductiv'tyHaste(R-22)D(7)M(4)R(5)e.ContainmentFanCooers(R-16)D(7)M(4)Q(2)R(5)SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)PlantVentilationD(7)D(7)4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)R(5)R(5)3.aeb.C~d.NobleGasActivity(R-14)(AlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)ParticulateSampler(R-13)/IodineSampler(R-10BandR-14A}FlowRateDeterminatipnntainmentPurgeD(7)W(7)W(7)N.A.Q(l)NA.BBMN.A.N.N..N.A.R(5)R(5) R(5)R(6)a.NobleGasActivity(R-12)~~a~b.ParticulateSampler(R-ll)c.iodineSampler(R-10AandR-12A)D(7)W(7)H(7)PRN.A.N.A.Q(1)Q(1).R(5)R(5)R(5)d.FlowRateDeterminationN.A.N.A.N.A.R(6))I6.RirEjectorMonitor(R-15andR-l'5A)--WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorMainSteamLiws(R-31andR-32)N.A.N.A.D(7)MM(2)~e~N.)(.Q(3)*....,..41-...12.~endmno.g(,43' TABLE4.1-5(Continued)~\TABLENOTATION(1)ThehannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatautomaticisolatioofthisthwayandcontrolroomalarmoccurifanyofthefollowingconditinsexist:l.Insntindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmand/ortrisetpoint.2.Power,filure.(3)TheChannelCalibrationscontaininganominal:(2)TheChannelFunionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatcontrorocmalarmoccursifanyofefollowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentinditesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmsetpoint.2.Powerfailure.(1includethe'useofstadardgassamples1.Zerovolumepercentoxygeand/2.Threevolumepercentoxygen.(4)Thischeckmayrequiretheuseofanxte1sourceduetohighbackgroundinthesamplechamber.(5)SourceusedfortheChannelCalibratioy(sllbetraceabletotheNationalBureauofStandards(NBS)orshallbe-'obtainedfromsuppliers(e.g.Amersham)thatprovidesourcestraceabletooeroffi'ly-designatedstandardsagencies.(6)Flowrateformainplantventiltionexhaustandontainmentpurgeexhaustarecalculatedbytheflowcapaciofventilationexustfansinserviceandshallbedeterminedatthepfeqnencyspecified.(7)Appliesonlyduringreleas'esviathispathway./4.1-13l/pfA'mendmentNo.9 4.2InserviceInsctionAlicabilitOb'ectivesghecificationAppliesotheinserviceinspectionofQualityGroupsA~XandCCompone~,HighEnergyPipingOutsideofContainment,SnubbersandSteamGeneratortubes.ltal'soappliestoinservicepumpandvalve0esting.r'oprovideassurance~thecontinuingstructuralandoperationalinteg'ofthestructures,'-;componentsandsystemsinccordancewiththerequirements'>of10CPRso.ssa'u;4.2.1S.S.Ta-JTheinserviceinspectionprogramforQual~GrouA,B+an5~~~,~.C~Comp@'ne~sHighZhergyPigngOutsidof'onta'nt,Spdbbe~'s+adsteamGeneratortubesshalll>einaccordancewithencYiZSo&the,GinnastationQualityPssuranseMannaThisariseicepump'valvetestiprogr'ams~aX"eaccordcewithAendixCofteGinnaStatinQualith'\4rAssuanceManual.:TheseinserviceinspectionprogramsshallHdefinethespec'icrequirementsoft;heeditionandAddendaoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,whichareapplicableforthefortymonthperiodofthetenyearinspectioninterval.Theprograms'enyearinspectionintervalshallbebasedonthefollowingcommencingdates.~('~w~gvQ~$x~4yl.pa,'~~Amendment.No.S,374.2-1 .2.1.1TheinspectionintervalforQualityGroupAcomponentsshalbetenyearintervalsofservicecommencingonJanuary1,1970.4-2.1.4.2.1.34.2.1.44.2.1.4.aTheinspectionintervalsforQualityGroupB~andComponentsshallbetenyearintervalsofservicemmencingwa.hMay1,1973,January1,1980,1990and2000,respctively.TheinectionintervalsfortheHighEnergyFipingOutsideofContainmtshallbetenyearintervalsofserviceIIcommencingay1,1973,January1,1p'80,1990'nd2000,/respectively.Theinspectionprogramduringeachthirdofthefirstinspectiointervalprovidesforexaminationofallweldsatdesignbisbreaklocationsandone-thirdofallweldsatlocationshereageldfailurewouldresultinunacceptableconsequncesr.'uringeachinspectioninterval,tprogramshallprovideforanexaminationofeachof@hesignbasisbreaklocationwelds,randeachofthewelds'tlocatenswhereaweldfailurewouldresultinunacceptableconseuencs.TheinspectionintervalsforSteamGeneratorTubesshallbespecifiedinthe"InserviceInspectionProgram"ortheapplicablefortymonthperiodcommencingwithMay1,1973.'ecev'teamgeneratortubesthathaveimperfectionsgreaterthan40%throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.4.2.1.4.bSteamgeneratorsleevesthathaveimperfectionsgreaterthan304throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.:Amen@meŽi'-N.:*~'wa~~weIw~wZ~ 4.2-..1.54.2.1.64.2.1.7InserviceInspectionofASMECodeClass1,Class2andCss3-components(QualityGroupsA,B,andC)shallbepformed'naccordancewithSctionXIoftheASMEBoilerndPressuretVesselCodeand,applicableAddendaasre@edby10CFR50,)Section50.55a(g),"exceptwherespeci'ficwrittenreliefhas'.beengrantedbytheNRC~~uxaQantto10CFR50,Section50.55a(g)(6)(i).TheinspectioniervalfortheInservicePumpandValve<TestingProgramshallbetenyearinterval~commencingwith';Janu1,1981,1990and2000.heinspectioninter'valsforSnubbersshallbeasdefi~inSpecification4.14.manufacturedandconstructed.Thiscompliance'constituteanacceptablebas'isforsatisfyingtherequirementsofGeIH*iCriterion32,AppendixAof10CFRPart50andthereguir;Section50.55a,paragraphgof10CFRPart50.alDesignerneofTheinservice'spectionprogramprovidesassuranceforthe"Continuedstructuralintegrityofthestructures,componentsand."systemsofGinnaStation.TheprogramscomplywiththeASME-"BoilerandVesselCodejSectionZI"RulesforInserviceInspectionofNuclearPowerPlant',Components"aspracticable,withduensiderationtothedesignandphysicalaccessofthe"structures,cornentsandsystemsas fReference1:August1982.erepaircriteriaof4.2.1.4.aand4.2.1.4.barebasedontherrendu'mentsofUSNRCRegulatory.Guide1.121,"BasesforPlug@3.ngDegradeWRSteamGeneratorTubes"asimplementedbyRGGE(ReTerence1).ThisgqidedescribesamethodacceptabletotheNpCstaffforestablishingthe~limitingsafeconditionsoftubedegree'dationofsteamr>>generatortubing.herepaircriteriaisbasedonstructuralrallowances,anallowancforeddycurrent,measurementerrorandanallowancefordegradationQuringthe-~operatingperiod.These~C'llowancesareaddedtogethertodeterminetherepaircriteriawhichistypically404forsteamgenerator~tubM.Basedoncalculationstheappropriatesleeveplugginglim&isa42>"Wruwalldefect.Inordertoallowforconservatism,304plugginglimitforsleeveswillberutilized."SteamGeneratorRapidSleevingProgramQesignVerificationReport",R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPla 4.4.3RecirculationHeatRemovalSstems4.4.3.1Test5.S;Za~Theportionoftheresidualheatremovalsystemthatisoutsidethecontainmentshall<Re~betestedbyuseinnormaloperatio'norhydrostati-callytestedat350psigattheintervapecifiedin4.4.3.4.b.Sucpipingfromcoxnmentsump8tothereactorcooaintankpumpandthedischargepipingfthepumpotheresidualheatrvalsystemshallbehydroticallytestedatnolessthat100psigattheinte1specificin4.4.3.4. gQ1c.Visualinspectionshallbemadeforexcessiveleakag'e4.4.3.24.4.3.3fromcomponentsofthesystem.Anysignificantleakageshallbemeasuredbycollectionandweighingorbyanequvalentmethod.//Accetanceriterionr"ThemaximumaowableleakageHorntherecirculationheatremovalsystemscoonents'(whichincludesvalvestems,/flangesandpumpseals)allnotexceedtwogallonsperhour.CorrectionActionc'.eRepairsshalibe,madeasreuiredtomaintainleakage,withinteacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2.b,Ifrepairsarenotcompletedwithin4hours,thereactorsiiallbeshutdownanddepressurizedurjtitrepairsareseffectedandtheacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2issatisfied.4.4..4TestFreauencTestsoftherecirculationheatremovalsystemshallbeon-lductedatintervalsnottoexceed12months.4.4.4TendonStressSurveillance4.4.4.1InsctionforBrokenWirej/Fourteenspecifictndons,equallyspadaroundthe' containmentshallbeinspectedperiodicallyfortheb.presenceofbrokenwires.Theinspectionintervals,measuredfromthedateofeinitialstructuraltest,shallbeasfollows~6onths1yearc3years8yearsandyearsinter'valstheafter.Theacceptancecriteriafor'hinspectionarethatnomorethanatotal38wire(in14tendons)arebrokenandthatnotmoretha6rokenwiresexistinanyonetendon.Ifmorethanokenwiresarefound,alltendonsshallbeinsected.inspectionrevealsmorethan5%ofthetot1wiresbrokethereactorshallbeshutdownandepressurized.c/d.Ifmorethan20wires(in14tendons)haebeenbrokensincethelastinspection,alltendonsshall~beinsoected.Ifinsectionrevealsmorethan5%ofthetotabwiresbro'ken,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepre'qsurized.re.Ifasmanyas6brokenwiresarefoundin~nyonetendon,~fourimmediatelyadjacenttendons(twooneachsideof C3vthetendoncontaining6brokenwires)shallbeinspecd.iTheacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorean4~brokenwiresinanyoftheadditional4tendon.Ifthiscriterionisnotsatisfied,allofthetensshallbeectedandifmorethan5%ofthetalwiresarebro,thereactorshallbeshutdonddepressurized.~r4.4.4.2Pre-StresonfirmationTesta~Lift-offtesshabeperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin.4.4.1aabove,attheintervals~specifiedin.4...Iftheaveragestressinthe14tendoncheckedisssthan144,000psi(60%ofultimastress),alltensshallbecheckedfor.strandretensioned,ifessary,toastresso144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionatress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilitofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressappliedngaccidentconditions.4.4.54.4.5.14.4.64.4.6.1'4.4.6.2ContainmentIsolationValvesEachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeGinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.55a./ContainmentIsolationResonseEachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformanceoftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludes.onlythevalvetraveltimeforthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal. pressure,>00prig,achieved'eitherbynormalsystemoperation'rbydrostatictesting,givesanadequatemarginovertheh'estpressuwithinthesystemafteradesignbasisaccident.Similarly,thehydrosttictestpressureforthecontainmentsumpreturnlines,andthereactorcoolantdraintankpiningconnectiostotheresidualheatretnovalsystetnof100psiggivesanadegtemarginoverthe(g)highestpressurewithithelinesafterades'gnbasisaccident.Arecirculationsystemlhkageof2gal./rwilllimitoffsiteexposerduetol.eakagetoinsignificantlevelselativetothosecalculatedforleakagedirectlyfromthecontaintinthedesignbasisaccident.Thedosecalculatedasaresultof(5)exposureatthesiteboundar'.sleakageis7.7mrfora2-hrlIncaseoffailuretomeetheacceptance~criteriaforleakagefromstheresidualheatrevaisystemorthepenetrations,itmaybepossibleto'effectepairswithinashorttime."Uso,itisconsideredunnecessaryaunjustifiedtoshutdownthereactor.ThetimesallowedforepairsareconsistentwiththetimesdevelopedinSpecificion3.3.Thetndonsurveillanceprogramisbasedonassuringthat,ontheavrage,theload-carrvingcapabilityofthetendonsismaintaiedatlapproximately95%%uodesign. eThisisconsistentwiththedesigncriteriaforthetendons,whichallowforuniformcapacityreductionof0.95and'whichcontemplatethat,asmallfractionoftheindividualwires0.03--0.5%maybreakduiing"'.(6)tensioning.oPeriodicvisual>inspectionisthemethodtobeusedtodeterminelossiofload-carryingcapabilitybecauseofwirebreakage.<Sincethetendonisunderastressofapproximately144,000psi,shouldawirebreak,rthebuttonheadwillriseabovethetopanchorheadwhereitcanbereadilyobserved.Assumingthat38brokeniresareobservedin14tendons(90wirespertendon),whichcorespondstoameanbreakage-cf3'97fodesignload-carryingcapability),,itcanhestatedwith95</oconfidencethatthefractionofbroenwiresinthetotaLcontainmentsaoninmenisbetween2.1and4.0/o.Thisibasedonreliabilitytablesdeveloped7)byNorthAmericanAviatio,forstatisticalsituationsthatcanberepresentedbyaPoissndistribution.Acondition.forfittingaPoissondistributionisthattepossibilityofwirebreakageis%constantandsmaLL.Thespecficationrelatingtoasmanyas6brokenwiresinonetendon(6.6/o)providesthattheassumptionofaconstantprobabilityofiooccurrencisnotsignificantlyviolated.Thedesignloadcanbecarried(8)'venifreeadjacenttendonsfailc"mpletely.Thespecificationhastheurposeofalertingagainstpossibledeteriorationatanytimein'theantoperating1time. References.(1).UFSARSection3.1~2.2.7(2)UFSARSectionP.2.6.1(3)UFSARSectian15.6.4.3(4)UFSARSeotion6.3.3.8r'-Thepre-stressconfirmationtestprovidesadirectmeasureoftheIloa@carryingcapabilityofthetendon.IIfthes'urveillanceprogramindicatesbyextensivewirebreakgeortendonst'nessrelationthatthepre-stressingtendons/renotbehavingas"expected,thesituationwillbeevaluatediediately.Thespecified-.acceptancecriteriaaresuchastoalerttentiontothesituationMellbeforethetendonload-carryingcapilitywoulddeterioratetoappointthatfailureduringadesign/asisaccidentmightbepossibleThusthecauseoftheincipientdeteriorationcouldbeevaluatedgndcorrectiveactionstudiedwithoutneedtoshutdownthereactor.Thecontainmentis/providedwithtworeadilyremovabletensthat.mightbeusefgtosuchastudy.Inaddition,thereare40endons,eachcontainingaremovablewirewhichwillbeusedtomon'torforossibcorrosioneffects.Operabilityofthecontainmhntisolat/onboundariesensuresthatthecontainmentatmosphere'lbe/isolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment,intheeventofaleeofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpsurizationofthecontainment.Performanceofcyclingtestsanerificationofisolationtimesassociatedwithautomaticcontai'nmetisolationvalvesiscoveredbythePumpandValveTestProgram.ompliancewithAppendixJto10CFR50isaddressedunder'.ocalleatestingrequirements.t(5)(6)UFSAR,Table15.6-9FSARPage5.1.2-281forth-American-RockwellReport550-x-32,'ReliabilityHandbook,February1963.~~AutoeticsFSARPage5.1.2-28 othespray.additivevalvesclosec,eachvalve1willbeopenedandclosedbyoperatoract'on.Thistestshallbeper=ormedpriortostarupithetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemonth.'.CeTheaccumulatorcheckvalvesshallbecheckedoroperabilitydurineachefuelinshudown.4.5.2.34.5.2.3.1IImeAirPil"rat'n'Svsme.~~A'llAtleastoceeverv18mothsorateevry720hourso~Z.v-charcoait=ationsv~emoperat'onsiorocwingpaintin,f'reorchem'calJnzonecoicatirgwithesyscethelast"s/releaseinanven-tern,the"ostacc"'de..-charcoa'vstemshallhavetheollowingcondonsdemonstra"ed.'.Thepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankisb.lessthan3incheso"wateratdesignflowrate(~10>).Xnplace2'reontest'ng,undeambientconc'ons,sha'showatleast99%removal.CeTheiod'neremovaleff'c'encvofatleasJorecharcoalftrc1sha'1bemeasured.Theferc1'o.be/testedshallbeselectedrandomly=-othosecellswithelongest'n-'nkresidence'me.Themin'mumacceptablevaluefor=ilteref'c'enc~is90%forre-C39movalo=methyliod'ehentes"edand95,~RHandat1..5to2e0mg/m3CH3,.at.at'east285'=-Roadngwth/"agged .5.2.3.2l32.v~',.tgCk~~~8pAftereach'placementofachacoa'raweror.ateranv/J~Meq~srucalma'ntnanceon~thehousingo-the'postaci=ant'harcoalsystem,theconditionofSpecifiction4.5.2.3.'.b'hal'edemonstratedfortheafectedportiono."".e,fsstem4.5.2.3.3Atleastevery18monthsofollowincpa'n'.c,ire,o>>chem're'easeinany'nti'at'nzonec.unicatinc'ai""~Vthesstemthecontainmentrec'rcu'at'onsvstemshal1havetheollowingconditionscemonstated.a~Thepessuredropacrossthe.:=PAfiltehark's'essthan3inchesXnplace/owateatdesignflowrae(-:10$).OPtes"ngofhe.-.=PAiltesshallshowatleast99%emova'.4.5.2.3.4Afterehcompleteorartialreplace.ntoftheH"-PA/I)'~~/,VIbankoaanystrctualmaintentheontainmentrec'ulationsvs=econahous'.thecond~t'ctdpor"'oo=thesstem.Spc'cation4.5.3.3.bshallbdemons-atedoro.452~3~5~xcepturcoldorrefue'in@shut"ownsthepos"acci"en-charcoalilt'solationvalvesshallbetestedatintervals'~notgate+Manonemonthtove'=yopeabilityanc.p""-erorienatior.andlowshallbemaintained":".oucnhesysmoratleas15m'nutes.The"estshallbeec'eoitostarpithe..timesincethelasttestexceeds1mcn""..K~A%4ftk1+tPNg/4%1CLW't&4N~PLjvmel+/~~a.PM-,4 4.5.2.3.6At'eastoceeverycharcoal~f'ltration/5P-V~'ollowingsainting,18mon'thsorafterevery720houxsosystemoperationsincethelas'te"t,or~If'orchemical"eleaseinanyent'at'n/yzoneqcommunicatingwththesystem,thecontrolcornernegencyaixteatmentsvstemshallnavetheollowingconditions6'5.o.~demonstrated.~52.v'.epxessuredropacrossthecombinedH=-Hf'ltesandcharcoaladsorberbanksislessthan6"ofwatea"de-s'gnflowrate(~10$).b.Znp'aceFreontesing,underambientcondcns,shashowatleast998removal.3'2.v'.ZnplaceDCPtestingo=the.-.=PA-'"r"shallshowatleast99Kremoval.'IThe"suitsof'laboratorvanalvsisonacaborsamplshashow90$o-greateradioact'vemethy'od'de54.5.2.3.8rt~eolc=Spec'-l"coevalwhentesteidatatleast125':and955RHan"~i5J,y~Q>v~1.5o2.0mm2load='n5w'.uta55edCZ:.Jwrrrw2.3.7AfteeachcompleteorpartialreplacementofAe.=FA'fil"~~<tfankorateany,structu=1ma'ntenanceonthen"->3,'Housingforhetrolroomemergencyairtreatmen",;system,the"on-d't'onofSpec'"t'on4.5.2.3.6.cshe'1'edemonstr"d=ort.'iea=ectedportiono.sv~t:m.A=tereachreplacementa=acha"1drawe"oraanvstructuralmal~nanceonthecharcoa'2eroomemergencyairtreatmentsvsem,".econd'"=11~ca-=on4.5.2.3.6.bshabedemo..s"a"edorthe"dpor"ionothesystem.l~.~ease,werrectorr~~AV /4.5.2.3.96tgteaeQJCa&&&v'rv&;r&~4&v'~hv,g,'r-rh,=-xcept"uringcoleorrefuelingshutdownstheautomat'cinitiat'onothecontrolroomemergencya'rt=eatmentsystemshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth',to.verifvoperabilitvandproperorientat'onandlowshal'/bemaintainedthoughthesvstemforaleasl5m'nutas.&Thetstshallbeperormedpriortostartupi="aet'..esincethelasttestexceedsonemonth.&vLl&r~V~~~~~a&vsovsta..ahComplaSoavS.--t-"s"'.tat:me"tIouhasfsvs'-,ss="eefcratocc.-..-,rs-'-oaoer=orneddw=~r;annualol."."s..ut-=:-atentc"aoo.".a.ttests,enrichc".oareactoro=ration.stassdamonstrteprcpara'wSaet'n~actionandContainmentScrim'I&'.-s-.:r..s.lietii'&s'gnalisapp'edtoin'atautomat'act'cntaepL~ai>>sblockedfro..lsiat'~atastSptvlgacand~neCvras&a'h$4'grl>>P'&ssa=gu-=sthaŽarno=..sal'vi~-er"'-ar~hhhhrrha\r&70heW+h\IShyl4a&4h&eae,ct&Oe~rsvs"a..-=as-"an.".c-'e=et"owen&'a."..'".ea=-c"o=c'so=ert'ngbecause.Sk=evZnjec"onsignacauascon-y'so'a"ona..cCcnte'~mentsvsanto"atawwrar=ycasablec.Thene.hcd~oassuringc-rab'litho=theselIcowns,w't.".moro=e=orneccu~'ngro"ea"~ono"-the andverificationmadethatthecomponentsreceivet~safetyinjectioninthepropersequence.The.est,hatthepumpsareinanddeveloptheminimumrequiredpressure,tomeeaccidentconditions.'TheminimumdischargepresevalueslistedinTable4.5-1arebasedonanasseddegradationofthepumphead-capacity'charactistic)curbsadjustedtowatertemperatureof6Pasfollows:emonstratestheoperationofthevalves,pumpgircuit/brkers,and.automaticcircuitry.'*'Duringreactoroperation,theinstrumentat,onwhichisdepended'~.ontoinitiate..-safety,njectionandcontainmentsprayisgenera3:lychecddailyandtheinitiatingcircuitsaretestedmopishly.Inaddition,theactivecoonents(pumpsadvalves)aretobettestedmonthlyto~checktheoerationofthestartingcircuitsandtoverifysatisfactoryrunning'ordeContainmeSprayPumps5%*ResidualeatRemovalPumps5%>>SafetyejectionPumps3$*I*porctageishasedontheheadatthehesteffciencypointofflow.Theestintervalofonemonthisbased.onthejuementthatmorefrequenttestingwould.notgnificantlyincreasethereliability(i.e,heprobabilitythatthecomponentwouldoperatewQerequired)andwouldresultinincreasedwearover.longperiodsoftime. flkwPl~~~wk<<~C~Othersystemsthatarealsoimportanttotheemergencycoolingfunctionaretheaccumulators,thecomponezi'tcoolingsystem,theservicewatersyst:emand,<theaIcontainmentfancoolers.Theaccumulatorsarea-.passive'.,safeguard.lnaccordancewiththe!~.specifications,thewater-volumeandgressurein:the:,'ccumulatorsgarechecked'eriodica3.1y'.;"'TheotherlIsystemsmentionedoperatewhenthe.'reactorisin'joperationandbythesemeansarecontinuouslymonitoredf.forsatisfactory.performance.Thereactorcoolant"draintankpumpsoperateintermittentlyduringreactor;.operation,andthusarealsomonitoredforsatisfactory!performance.Theairfiltrationportionofthecontainmentair..crecirculationsystemis:apassivesafeguardwhichis~isolatedfromtheCoolingair%flowduringnormalreactoroperation.Hencethecharcoalshouldhavea;longusefullifetime.Thefilterfr"sthathousethe~Icharcoalarestainlesssteelandshouldalsolastjindefinitely.Thepressuredrop,filter.efficiencysandvalveoperationtestfrequencieswillassurethat~/18lthesyste'mcanoperatetomeetitsdesign=functioni!.undera'ccidentcond'tions.Astheadsorbingcharcoal/isnormallyisolated,thetestschedule,related..to!/hoursofoperationaswellaselapsedtime,willassure:ithatitdoesnotdegradebelowtherequiredadsorption~aT~VW~~PPP\~~ABI7ll%8%7 adsbingencounredfunction.IftoofifthesystemforpgyyajyA'ifevwpA4Xp&RAlwvpJ~p,JAI~vglverNLqfficiency.Thetestconditionsforcharcoalsampleaefficiencyarethosewhichmight,:be/IIunderanaccidentsituation.'~'hecontr1roomairtreatmentsystemisdesi~edto~filterthentrolroomatmosphere(recirculationandintakeair)du-ingcontrolroomisolation:conditions..HEPAfiltersare'installedbeforethe,charcoalfiltersltoremoveparticulaaCematterand.preventcloggingoftheiodineadsorbers.'~Thecharcoalfiltersreduce,theairborneradioiodineinthelcontrolroom.Bypass4tleakagemustbeataminimum..xnorderforthesefilters!performtheirdes'dtheperformancesareasspecaifiedthecalculateddoseswill<belessthanthoseanalyzed.'Retestingofthepostaccidentchcoalsystemorthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmnentsysteminthe!eventpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseis/requiredon3.'yisopexatingandis':jproviding+ffiltrationtheareaiqwhichthepainting~fire,or'chemicalreleaseoccurs.X~CTestingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbh,totheI.e'xtentitcan,giventheconfigurationofthesstems,/inaccordancewithANSIN510-1975,"TestingofNuclearAir-CleaningSystems."

    References:

    (1)UFSSection6.3.5.2(2)UFSARFigures.6-12and15.6-13(3)UFSARction6.5.1.222UFSARSect,ion..6.4-3.l hdk~lS5;l2c~d.ThetestsinSpecif'cation4.6.1bwillbeperforpdpriortoexceedingcoldshutdownifthetimesinlasttestexceeds31days.Atleastonceper92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTHD975-78whencheckedforviscosity,waterandsediment.e.Atleast'nceper18monthsduringshutdownby:1.Inspectingthedieselinaccordancewithmanufacturer'srecommendationsforthisclassofIIstandbyservice.!t2.Verifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytorejectafloadof29SKWwithouttripping.3.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunction'ithasafetyinjectionteasignaland:(a)Verifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency',buses.(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormal<standbyconditionontheauto-steatsignal,~(energizestheautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloadswith.thefollowingmaximumbreakerclosuretimesaftertheinitialstartingsignalforTrainsAandBnotbeingexceededQgq+s~<~+ABDieselplusSafetyInjection20sec22secPumpplusRHRPumpAllBreakers40sec42secandoperatesfor>fiveminutesawhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthatalldiesel,generatortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlube.oilpressure,and.overcrank,areautomaticallybypasseduponasafetyinjectionactuationsigna3.~ p~4.TO4AM'bvvAww@AshNv~'%~&sRadioloicalEnvironmentalNonitorinApplicability-Appliestoroutinetestingofplantenvirons.I.'l.hichwillassurerecognitionofchangesinradioactivityintheenvirons.'-$7itW4.10.1~10e2SpecificationrTheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringsamplesshallbecollectedpursuanttoTable3.16-1...Acceotab3.e~cationsareshownintheODCN.Samplesshallbeana3.yzedpuzsuanttotherequirementsofTables.16-1/and4.10-1./landusecesusshallbecoductedannually'betweenlrJune1andctober1).4.10.3A-summaroftheresultsobtained,aspartofizedInterlaborato'nProgramshallbeincludedineAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReport.Theenvironmentalsurveyhasbeendesignedtoutilizeltheknowledgeaboutdilutioninthe..atmospheeandin.rthelakewhichhasbeengainedduringthepre-operationalandoperationalpeiodof"study.!Theradiological..monitoringprogramprovidesmeasurements!oyraoiationandoradioactivenaterialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswh'ch~-leadtothehighes-.potentialraaiationexpose'resof~~individualsresultingfromthestationopera"ion.This ~~Amtorxngprogramtherebysupplementstheradiological/eff1entmonioringprogrambyverifyingthatthes'easurablwconcentrationsofradioactivemater'ialsandlevelsofradiationarenothigherthanexpectedontheIbasisofthee'luentmeasurementsandmodelingoftheenvironmentalexposurepathways.IThedetectioncapabil'itiesrecpxiredbyTable4.10-1arestate-of-the-artforroutineenv'ironmentalmeasurementsinindustrial3.aboratories.',,Thespecifiedlowerlimitsofdetectionforl-131inwater.,milk,andotheroodfJ'roductscorrespondtopppzoximat'elyone-cruarte"ofthe10CFRPart50Append'ixldesignobj'ectivedose-equivalen<'f15mrem/yearforatmosphericreleasesand10mrem/year.'Iforlicruidreleasestothemaximallyexpo'sedorganandzn&vzdual41ParticipationinanapprovedinterlaboratorycohparisonIIIprogr'amassuresthattheadequacyofenvionmentalilaboratorymeasurementsismainta'nedonacontinuingbasisthroughindependentcross-checking.j Anal~singrossbeta~1>~FishCikwetMateyfpCi~1I4b1x10iJpjJTABLE'.10-1IMAXINJMVALUESFORTHELOWERLIMITSOFDETECTION(LID)Tobeachievedon98%ofanalysessAirborneParticulateorGagNilkFoodProductsCim~CiaCikwetH2000(1000)Nn1513059F30.26058,6015130Zn30260Zr-Nb15s~.>131I7x1060;134,13C..15(10),181x'1013015P4'0~L15sr>>~I>>lAPk>>I~hhh>h>>hh>>>~15ha>>">>JIs'>ps~>.~h TABLE4e10-1(Continued)TABLENOTATIONTheLLDxsthesmallestconcentrationofradioactive,,material"".inasamplethatwillbedetectedwith95%probabilitywithOnly5%probabilityoffalselyconcludingitsprese'nce.aE'oraparticularmeasurementsystem(whichmayincluderadiochemicalseparation):LLD,,=4.66sE.V.2.22.Y.exp(-hat)whereLLDisthe~,lowerlimitofdetectionasdefinedabove(aspCiper~unitmassorvolume)/'l/S>isthestandard,deviationofthebackgroundcount'ng'teorofthecountingrateofablanksampleasappropriate(ascountsperminute).Eisthecountingefficiencygascountspertransormation)Visthesample'ize(i'nurztsofmassorvolume)~'l.~2.22isthenumberoftzari'sfozmationspezminuteperpicocuriejeYisthefractionalradiochemicalyield(whenapplicable)A,istheradioactivdecayconstantfortheparticularzadionuclidehtistheelaosdtimebetweensamole'ollectionandanalysisj~Thevalueofa~~deedinthecalculationoft'eLLDfotadetectionsystPnshallbebasedontheactualobservedvarianceofMebackgroundcountingrateorofthecountingrateoftheP'lanksamoles(asaopzopriate)rathez.++anonanunveriiedtheozticallypredictedvariance.Encalcu3.ating~theLLDforaradionuclidedeterminedbygamma-rayspec""ometry;thebacka"oundshallincludethetypicalcontributionsofvtherradionuclidesnormallypresenter.thesamoles(e.g.,potassium-40inmilk"samples).Typica'aluesofE,V,,Yand-tshouldbeusedinthecalculations.alysesshalbeperformed'nshamanne-thattheeestatedLLDswillbeachievedunderroutineconditions.Occasionallybackgroundfluctuations,unavoidablysmall)~aANPll4h>"'ve~ii.,wO~ai~~~~ra~~~ TABLE4.10-1(Continued)TABLENOTATIONsamplesizes,thepresenceofinterferringnuclides,orotheruncontrollable.circumstancesmayrendertheseLLDsunachievable.Insuch"cases,thecontributingfactorswillbeidentifiedanddescribe6intheP~ualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingRepo~TheLLDisdefinedasanaosiozi(beforethefact)limitzeosesenting.Afiecapahili-yofameasnsementsystemandnot,'Nthh*>l:-'f.'.measuremhnt.LLD'fordrinkingwater.Totalforparentanddaughter.~oNle~~.rp'~g4>> 4/.4Appliestorefuelingandtofuelhandlinginthespentfuelpool./38~/'I41.1SpentFuelPitcharcoalAdsorhecrsystemjF.11.1.1Within60dayspriortoanyperationofthee'spentfuelpoolcharcoaladSOIhersystemthefollowingconditionsshallbedemonstrated.I4Afterthecondionshavebeendemonstrated,theoccurrence4'Iofpainting,re,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilation4srzonecommun'tingwiththespetfuelpoolcharcoal!a~OIbgIystemshallrequire'hatthefollowingcoitionslberedeonstrated,before-fuelhandlingmaycontieifI/'perationofthespent,,fuelpb01charcoaladsorbe4sysisrequiredpersection3.11a.ThetotalairflowratefromthecharcoaladSOIht:5shallbeatleast75%,ofthatmeasuredwithab.completesetofnewabsorbers.Zn-placeFreontesting,underambientconditions,shallshowatleast99%removal.C~i~3'6:i~Theresultsoflaboratoryanalysisonacarbonsampleshallshow90%orgreaterradioactivemethyliodideremovalwhentestedatleast1504Fand95%RHandat1.5to2.0mg/mloadingwith3taggedCH3Z. 4.11.1.24.11.24.11.2.1'I..4.11.2.24.11.34.11.3.1Ajjress;~carpi~3.7Flowshallbemaintainedthroughthesystemusingeitherthefilterorbypassflowpathforatleast15'nutesAfterchreplacementofachacoalfiltezdraweorafeanystructuralmaintenaceonthecharcoalhous>ngfothespentfuelpitcharoaladsorbersystem,nditionofSpecificatio4.11.1.1.bshallbedemonstratedfortheaffectedsortieofthesystem./ResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculationWhenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelisinthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper4hours.Whenthewatelevelabovethetopofreactorvesselflangeislessthan23feet,bothRHRpumpsshallbever'iedtobeoperablebyperformingthesurveillancespecifiedintheInsezvictPumpand'ValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.55a.WaterKevel-ReactorVesselIThewaterlevelinthereactorcavityshallbedeterminedJItobeatleastitsminimumre~ireddepthwithin2hours!priortothestart.ofandatleastonceper24hours//thereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontol'rodsincontainment.Addr$52-QhcpMs3~tThemeasurentoftheairflowssuresthatairisbeigwithdrawnfromthepentuelpitareaadpassedthroughtheaorbers.Theflowimeasuredpriortoemoyingtheadsorberstestablishthat IohIthreSystems".A,Q~ek~j',TheoperabHityrequirementsforresidualheatremovalloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelingmode.Therequire-mentfor23feetofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangewhilehandlingfuelandfuelcomponentsincontainmentisconsistentwiththeassump-ah~As~LLVd,'+,A4A~sehasbeennogrosschangeinperformancesincethesystemwas.Y"laused.TheFreontestprovidesameasureo'ftheamountofleakafromaroundthecharcoaladsorbent.TheabilityofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeterioratesthecharcoalagXpandweathers.Testingthecapacityofecha"coaltoadsorbiodxeassuresthatanacceptableremoval/efficiencyaundeoperating'conditionswouldbeobtained.Thd'iffeencebetween,thetestrequirementofaremovaleffim~encyof90%forqVmethyliodineandthepercentageassumedin.theevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccident,providesadequatesafetymarginfordegrada-Ytionofthefilterafter,thetests.Retesingofthespentfuelpitchare'oaladsorbersystemintheeventofpainting,fire,orchemic1releaseisrequiredonlyifthesystemisoperatingandis'providingfiltrationfortheareain~Iwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbetested,totheYextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,inIaccordancewithANSIN510-1975,"Testing.ofNuclearAiz-C'eaning'ionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.ef'ereacet(1)LetterfromE.J.Nelson,,EochesrerGasandElect=iccorporationterDr.Pe"ter.A.Mor"is,U.s-AtomicEne"oyrM'~t;ommission,datedFebruary3,1971f h4.12EffluentSurveillance~1'1Appliestotheperiodictestandrecordequizementsoftheplanteffluents.~h'oascertainthatreleasesfromtheSpecifications4.12.1LiquidEffluentsConcentration4.12.1.1.aTheradioactivityradioactiveliquidandgaseousplantarewithinallowablelimis.fcontent'ofeachbatchofradioactive<>4.12.1.1.bliquidwastetobedischargedshallbedeterminedpriortoreleasebysamplingandanalysisinaccordancewithTable4.12-1.Theresultsofpre-releaseanalyses,shallbeusedwiththecalculationalmethodsinthe*ODCMtoassurethattheconcentrationatthepointofreleaseislimitedtothevaluesinSpecification3.9.1.1.a.Post-releaseanalysesofsamplescompositdfrombatchreleasesshallbeperformedinaccozdancŽwithTable4.12-1.Theresultsofthepost-eleaseanalysesshallbeusedwiththecalculationalmethodsintheODCNtoassurethatthedoescommitmentsfomliquidswerelimitedtothevaluesinspeeitioation3.9.1;2.k ~YIw1%l~~lAM4-..12.1.2.aCumulativedosecontributionsfromliquid--"e'fluentsIshallbedetermined."iri'-=.accordancewiththeODCMatleastonceper31days.'i'.12~~4.12.2.2.14.12.2.1.b4.12.2.24.12.2.2.a4.12.2.1.a~W'~4HWAll%~GaseousWastesReleaseRateTheeffluentcontinuousmonitorsaslistedinTable~as3..5-6havingprovisionsforthe.automaticterminationofgas'decaytank,shutdown,.purgeormini-purgereleases,shallbeused"tolimitreleaseswithintheavaluesestablishedinSpecification3.9.2.1whenmonitorsetpointvaluesareexceeded.Thedose,-rate'duetoradioactivematerials,otherthannoblegases,ingaseousefdluentsshallbe.determinedinaccordancewiththemethodsofthesODCMbyobtainingrepresentativesample<andperforminganalysesinaccordancewiththe'sampling:andanalysisprogram,specifiedinTable4.12+2.QDose(10CFRPart50,AppendixI);GaseousWasteTreatment.~aJCumulativedosecontributionsfromgaseouseffluentshall'bedeterminedinaccordancewiththeODCMat~nleastonceevery31days.4.12.3asteGasDecayTanksThequantityof>radioactivematericontainedineachwastegasdecaytankshalledeterminedto.beAmendmentNo.29 7pwithinthelimitspecifiedi3.9.2.6.aatleastonce/per24hoursifthetotalprimarycoolant.noblegasW.v5concentrationexceeds250>"pCi/gramandprim'azy.coolant'-""-gasiseingtzansfezzecYtothegaseousAawastetreatmentsystem.j)sosBe~P~~~Sufficienttestswillbemadeto'-becertainthat-:"radioactivematerialsarenotreleasedtotheenvizonment'.iinquantitiesgreaterthanallowable.1nstalled!Jradiationmon'toringequipmentintheplantwillbe)~~~~usedinconjunctionwithlaboratoryanalysestomaintainsurveillanceofnormaleffluents.Suficientrecords'willbemaintainedtodeterminerr\ltheconcentrationofradioactivematerialsinunrestricted.Iareas.isotopicanalysisofrepresentativesamplesIwillservetoverifytheacc'uzacyofroutinesamplesA,byidentificationofsignaficantenergypeaks.s1Thequantityof.radioactivityineachgasdecaytank~~~~isdeterminedwhenthenoblegasconcentrationinthef;primarycoolantsystemincreasessignificantlyenoughI'opotentially,contributeanappreciab1eauantityof)noblegasactivitytothegaseousradwastsystem.Therequiredsurveillancewillbeinitiatedata,primarynoblegasconcentrationlevelwhich,)if)I,attainedwillstillallowsufficientmarginbelowtheIspecifiedcuriel'm'tforasinglegasdeaytaM.;Determinationoftankcuriecontentmaybeperozmed,.;,bysamplingand/orcalculation. TABLE4.12-1RADIOACTIVELIUIDWASTESAMPLINGANDANALYSISPROGRAMPRPREachBatchEachBatch1x10Grossalpha1x10Pzinchiy$GammaEmittersardI<<131RetentionTanklxl06NorS**Grablx10TypeofActivity./LowerZimAnalysis//ofDet.ct(LLD)(nCi/ml)BatchWasteb1.Principal/<amma5x10ReleaseTanks~EmzttersyandI-1311x10/<<72.Grdssbet'a-5x10g/amma*/2@MissolvedandOneBMch/N,/EntrainedGases,(GammaEmitters)///H-3lx10PR-'~H/'achBatchCampositelxl0'R/QEachBatchCompositeSr-89,Sr-905x10Pe-55'/'ontinugusRelease//-7/ContinuousW..-SxloComposite,/ServiceWater./'ontinuousGross(CVFanCoolerandbeta-gammaSrPHXlinesIIfteSbetaisperformedforbatchreleases,thenaweeklycornsiteshaalsobeanalyzedforPr'ncipalGammaEmittersandI-131.I**ervicewatersamplesshallbetakenandanalyzedonceper12hoursialarmsetpointisreachedoncontinuousmonitor.~2m CBaTABLE4.12-1ContinuedTABLENOTATIONae'i,~TheLLDi~thesmallestconcentrationofradioactivemater'linasamplethatwillbedetected.with95%probabi.litywi25%probabilityoffalselyconcludingitspesence.Foraparticularmeasurementsystem(whichmayincluderadiochemicalseparation):c'LD=4.66s.jE.V.'.22x"10".Y.exp(~h.ht)whereiLLDisthelowerlimitofdetectionasdefinedabove(asuCiperunitmassorvolume)s~isthestandarddeviationofthebackgoundcountingrnteoroftheconn"ing"raPeofablanksampleasappropriate(ascountspe~minute).Eisthecountingefficiency,(ascountspertransformation)Visthesamplesize'..'(inunits:ofmassorvolume)I2.22x10isthenumberoftransformations'perminutpermicrocurieYisthefractionalradiochemicalyield(whenapplicable)A,istheradioactivedecayconstantrortheparticularradionuclideiiFhtisthe;~elapsedtimebetweenmidpointofsamplecollect-'onandtime;-'ofcounting(forplanteffluents,notenvircnmental.samples>)'.Thevalue:ofsusedinthecalculationoftheLLDforadetectioiisystemshallbebasedontheactualobservedvariance'fthebackgroundcountingr-teorofthecountingratepftheblanksamples(asappropriate)rathethanonanuaverifiedtheoreticallypredictedvariance.Tncalculating:the/KLDforaradionuclidedeterminedbygamma-rayspectrometry,thybackgroundshallincLudethetypicalcontributionsooglerradionuclidesnormallypresentinthesamples.ppicalvaluesofE,V,Yand6tshouldbeusedinthe<~calculition.i'Ieer i>'Ch\CThebackgroundcountrateiscalculatedfrom'thebackgroundicountsthataredeterminedtobewithin2onerNHMenergybandabouttheenergyofthegammaraypeakusedforthe,~antitativeanalysisforthisradionuclide.TheLLDis'efinedasana)cziozi(beforethefact)'li'mitzepresentingthecapabilityofameasurementsyst'mandnotasaposteriori(afterthefact)limitforapar'ticularmeasurement.'iC',b.c:d-e.AnalysesshallbeperformedinsuchamannerthatthestatedLLDswillbeachievedunderroutine'onditions.Occasionally.backgroundfluctuations;unavoidablysmallsamplesizes,thepresenceofinterferr'ng.nuclides,orotheruncont~ollablec'rcumstancesmayrendertheseLLDs.unachievable.WhencircumstancesresultinLLDshigherthanreauired,thezeasonsshallbedocumentedintheSemiannual'Radioact'veEffluentRepor".CA-batchreleaseisthedischargeofliauidwastesofadiscretevolume.Acomposiesampleisoneg'nwhichthequantityofliquidsampldisproportionaltothequantityofliquidwastedischargedandinwhich,-Memethodofsamplingemployedresultsinaspecimenwhichisrepresentativeoftheliquids'released.TheprincipalgammaemittersforwhichtheLLDspecificationwillapolyazeex'elusivelythefollowingradionuclides:Hn-54,Pe-59,Co-58,Co-60,Zn-65,Cs-134,Cs-137,andCe-141.This,listdoesnotmeanthatonlythesenuclidesaretobedetectedandreported.Otherpeakswhicharemeasurable,,andidentifiable,togetherwiththeabovenuclides,shallalso'eidentifiedandreported.Huclideswhicharebelowthe'LDfortheanalysesshouldbereportedaslessthantheLLDandshouldnotbereportedasbeingpresentattheLLrf)level.Thelessthanvaluesshouldnotbeusedintherequireddosecalculations.WhenunusualcircumstancsresultinLLDshigherthanrequired,thereasonsshallbedocumentedintheSemiannualRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReoort.If~Acontinuousreleaseisthed'schazgeofliauidwastesofanon-discretevolume;e.g.fromavolumeofsystemthathasaninputflowduringthecontinuousrele-se. ~vcaGaseousReleaseTeSamplingFreuencMinimumAnalysisFreuencTypeofActivitAnalsisTABLE4.12-2RADIOACTIVEGASEOUSWASTESAMPLINGANDANALYSISPROGRAMtVLover?imitofDetection(OLD).-'CimlA.GaaDace'.'anlIVB.C.AuxiliaryBuildingVenationD.AirEjectorE.AllReleaseTypesaslistedinBandCaboveF.AllReleaseTypesaslistedinB,CandDaboveVvItVVVVvV+V~ContinuousPREachTankGrabSampleContainmentPurge'-.PREach-purgeGrabSampleMGrabSampleMb,f,hGrabSampleContinuous..-Con,tenuous/ContinuousContinuous+IVIV4V8Vt.VV~Ve-V<I~'PREachTankPrincipalGammaEmitters-PREachPurgePrincipalGammaEmittersH-~3M~PrincipalGammaEmittersH-3M,=~PrincipalGammaEmitters,I-131+h'IINI-1CharcoalSampleI-133bWParticulatePrincipalGamma'.EmittersSample(I-131,Others)M':GrossalphaCompositeParticulate SampleQSr-09,Sr-90,CompositeParticulateSampleNobleGasBetaor.GammaMonitor1x101xlp1x101x101x101x101x101x10-12Ix101xlp-llx10-11I.IIxlp-111x10 50-1+TABLE4.12-2ContinuedTABLENOTATZONCea.Thelowerlimitofdetection(LLD)is'definedinableNotationa.ofTable4.12-1./b.Analysesshallalsobeperformedwhenthemonitoronthecontinuoussamplerreachesits.setpoint./Tritiumgrabsamplesshallbetakenatleastdu:eetimesperweekwhenthereactorcavityisflood'ed,./a.Theratioofthesampleflowratetothesampledstreamflowrateshallbeknownforthetime'eiodcoveredbyeachdoseordoserate>calculationmadeinaccordancewithspecifications3.9.2.1.4,3.9.2.2..aand3.9.2.2.b.e.TheprincipalgammaemittezforwhichtheLLDspecificationwillapplyareexclusivelySe'ollowingradionuclides:Kr-85m,Xe-133,Xe-133m,and/'Xw-135forgaseousemissionsandMn-54,Fe-59,Co-58,Co-60,+n-65,Mo-99,Cs-134,Cs-137,Ce-141andCe-1<4+forparticulateemissions.This,listdoesnot,meanthat~onlythese&uclidesaretobedetectedandreported,<OtherpeaksQhicharemeasurableandidentifiable,.togetherwiththeabovenuclides,shallalsobeidentifie&andreported.NucligeswhicharebelowtheLLDfortheanalysesshouldnotbereportedasbeingpresentatthe~oLDlevelforthatnuclide.~Whenunusualcircumstances+resultinLLDshigherthanrequired,thereasonsshat1bedocumentedintheSemiannual&ffluentReleaseReport.rAirefectorsamplesarenotreauiredduringcoldorrefuel'ngshutdowns.g.Pirejectortritiumsampleno)requirediftheseconda<'ctivityislessthan1x10pCi/gm.hZAirejectoriodinesamplesshallbetakenandanaly-edweeklyifthesecondarycoolantactivityexceeds1x10pci/gm. 4"IL4;.15RadioactivematerialSourceLeakaeTestlicabilit4.13.1Appliestotheperiodictestforleakageofradioactivematerisourcesperformedbythelicenseeorbyotherpersons.specificallyauthorizedbytheCommissionorthestate.O~h'eotivaToascertainth"taleakagefromradar,oactivcmateri1sourcesi"sufficicn"1zlour.SoeoificationSourcess;hichcontainquanii',ties'ofby-productmateria~thatexceedthequantitieslistedin10CFR30.71SchcduJ.cBandallothersources.'includingalaemitters)con-taininggreaterthan:0.1microcuriessh&llbeleaktesteda~asfollows:a.Exceptfor"ealedsourcesthat'aretoredandnotbeingused,andexceptforstartupsources<eachsealed;sourcecontainingradioctivematerial.,otherthan'Hydrogen3,withahalf-liegreats"tha~30daysandinanyfor':.otherthangasshallheztestedforleakageand/orcontamin-tionatinterval.snottoexceedsixmonths. c~~go"."use.~y'ealedsourcesthatarestored~dnotbeingusedysshallbetestedforleakagepriortouseox'ran'sfertoanotheruserunlesstheyhavebeentested>zithinsixmonthspriortothedateofuseortransfer.Seadsourcesreceivedfromatransferor:hall/stheabnceofacertificatefromthet'ransferorIin!Bicatinpthatatesthaehaenperg4nneds!ithin!saxmonthsprmrtothetransfer,~betestedpriorto,jStartupsourceshallb-leaktestedpriortoandXollo~ringanyrepairrma'ntenanceandbeforebeingsubjectedtocoralux./4.13.2Theleakagetest""hallbe.capableofdetctingthepxesenceo.0.005microcuriesofradioactivmaterialontheestsample.Xfthetestrevealsthepesenceof0.005microcuriesormoreofremovablecontamition,~~~~ltshallimmediatelybewithdrawnfromuse,dcontam".aed,andrepaired,orbedisposedofinaccordancewithCommissionregulatis.BasissIngestionorinhalationofsourcemate'rialmaygiverise"tototal~Pbodyororganirradiation.Thissecificationassuresthat.leakagefromrdioactivematerialsourcsdoesnotexceedallowablelimits./.Inheunlikelyeventthatose ~~g.p~~Iqu~$tiesofradioactiveby-productmaterialsofintar~,'<tothispecie'idionwhichareexemptromlea~kagetesting'rr.areingestedorinhaled,the~epresent.lesthanoneC1<<maximumpermissible,-bodyburdenfortotal.bodyirradiation.'.,rThelimit~orallothersources(includingalpha-..emitters)iebaedupon10CFR70.39(c)limitsforplutonium.~"~l~r'Q'g11<<rS)l&krP4WVJfVLP'4'4Qrrr+<<r<<1r<<r1g~~ir<<t<<lb<.WW/1VVAW<<1'~ SnubberSurveillanceReuirementsb.VisualInsectxnsEachsnubberrequiredbySpecification3.13tobeOPERASgshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbythe,performanceofthefolowinginserviceinspectionprograminadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification4.2.ra.XnsectionTesAsuseinthisspecification,"typegrsnubber"shallmeansnubersofthesamedesign~andmanufacturer,irrespectiveofcapacity.r'nubbersarecateiized~inaccessibleoraccessibleduringreactoroperaon.Eachofthesecategories(znaccessibleandiaccessible)maybeinspectedindependentlyacordingto-the.scheduledetermine.byTable4.14-1/Thevisualinspectionintervalforeachc'ypeofsbbershallbedeterminedbaseduponthecriteriprovidedinTable4.14-1.i,c.Visua.lnsectionAccetance-Criteria-Viualinspectionsshallverifythat'1)',thesnubberasnovisibleindicationsofdamageorimpairedOPERABXLZTY,(2)attachmentstothefoundationor .14.1.c.(continued)supportingstructurearefunctional,and(3)fastersfortheattachmentofthesnubbertothecompontandtothesnubberanchoragearefunctional.Snubberswhichappearinoperableasaresulofvisualinspectionsshallbeclassifiedasunacceptable,andma'ereclassifiedacceptablefrthepurposeofestablishingthenextvisualnspectioninterval,providedgthat:(1)thecauseoftherejectionisclearlyestlishedandrediedforthatparticularsnubberandfokotherubbers,irrespectiveof.typethatmaybegene'llysusceptible;and(2)theaffectedsnubberisfunctionallytestedintheas-foundcondit'onanddeterminedOPERABLEperSpecificatio4.14.1e.Alsnubbersfoundconnectedtoaniperablecommonhydraulicfluidreservor0ixh.shallbecountedasunacceptableordeterminingthenextinspectioninterval.Areview'~andevaluatiion~~~~sllbeperformedanddocumentedtojustlycontinued//operationwithanunacceptablesnubber.Ifcoptinudueoperat1oncannotbejustified,thesnubbershal~edeclaredinoperableandtheACTIONrequirementshall+.bemet. TABLE4.14-1SNUBBERVISUALINSPECTIONINTERVALNUMBEROFUNACCEPTABLESNUBBERSRefNote7PopulationorCategory'.\Notes1and2ColumnAExtendIntervalNotes3and6ColumnBRepeatIntervalNotes4and6ColumnCReduceIntervalNotes5.and6080100'y01503200133005254003650012;2475020781000orgreater56109Note1:Thenextvisualinspectionintervalforasnubberpopulation(orcateg'orysizeshallbedeterminedbasedupon,thepreviousinspe'ctionintervalandthenumberofunacceptablesnubbers~~foundduringthatinterval.Snubbersmaybecategorized,.basedupontheiraccessibilityduringpoweroperation,asaccessibleorinaccessible.Thesecategoriesmaybeexaminedseparately.orjointly.However,thisdecisionmustbe TABLE4.14-1(continued)documented-beforeanyinspectionandshallbeusedas+thebasisuponwhichtodeterminethenextinspectioninterÃalforthat.category.Interpolationbetweenpopulationorcategorysiz'esandthe/umberofunacceptablesnubbersispermissib.UsenextlerintegerforthevalueofthelimitforColumnsA,B,orsCithatintegerincludesafractionalvalueofunacceptablesnubbsasdeterminedbyinterpolation.<IfthemberofunacceptablesnubbersisequaltoorlessthanthenumberinColumnA,thenextinspectionintervalmay/betwicetheeviousintervalbutnqtgreaterthan48months.Zfthenumberunacceptablesate>barsisequaltoorlessthanthenumberinColumnBbut"greaterthanthenumberinColumnA,thenextinspectionintervalshallbethesameasthepreviousinterval.IfthenumberofunaccepWesnubbersisequaltoorgreaterthanthenumberinColn>>C,thenextinspection'ntervalshallbetwo-thirdsofPhepre@iousinterval.However,ifthenumberofunacceptab3.esnubbers,islessthan.thenumberinColumnCbutgreatrthanthenQberinColumnB,thenextintervalshallbreduced.proportinallybyinterpolation,thatis,thepviousintervalshalliereducedbyafactorthatisone-thirdoftheratioofthe'fferencebetweenthe/numberofunacceptablesnubbersfoundringthepreviousintervalandthenumberinColumnBtothe'differenceinthenumbersnColumnBandC.TheprvisionsofSpecificationSection4.0areapplicableforallnspectionintervalsuptoandincluding48months.Tdeterminethenextsurveillanceinterval,anunaeptablesnubbermaybereclassifiedasacceptableifitcanbedemonstratedthatthesnubberisoperableinitsas-faundconditionbyperformanceifafunctionaltestandifitvsatisfiestheacceptancecriteriaforfunctionaltesting. .14.1.dFunctionalTestsAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,representativesample(atleast10%ofthesnubbsrequiredbySpecification3e13)shallbefunctiollyestedeitherinplaceorinabenchtest.Foreachsnberthatdoesnotmeetthefunctionaltest,acceptancecriteiaofSpecification4.14.1e,anadditiydal104ofthesnuersshallbefunctionallytesteduntilnomorefailuresefoundoruntilallsnubershavebeenrfunctionallyested..Therepresentatienvironments,rangefsizesandapacitiesofsnubbers.sampleselected.forfunctionaltemptingshall,'s/faraspractical,/includetheriousconfigurations,operatingIInadditiontotheregulasapie,snubbersplacedinthesamelocationsassnubbewhichfailedtheprevious~functionaltestshallbedetesdatthetimeofthenextIfunctionaltest.Add'onally,afailedsnubberhas'eenrepairedandrnstalledinatherlocation,thatfailedsnubbershllalsobereteste.Thesesnubbersshallnotbeiludedintheregularsale.Ifduringefunctionaltesting,additionalamplingisrequireduetofailureofonlyonetypeofsnuber,thefuncionaltestingresultsshallbereviewedat.thttimeto'etermineifadditionalsamplesshouldbelimitdtothetypeofsnubberwhichhasfailedthefunctioltestin FunctionalTestAccetanceCriteriaesnubberfunctionaltestshallverifythat:1)Activation(restrainingaction)isachievedwiintespecifiedcompession;rangeinbothtensioni/andf,2)SnubberMeed,orreleaseratewherereired,ispresentinthtensionandcompression~withinthespecifiedrange3)Whererequired,teforcerequirtoinitiateormaintainmotionofthesnubberisithinthespecifiedrangeinbothdirectionofavel;and4)Forsnubbersspecificallequirednottodisplaceundercontinuousload,heab'lityofthesnubbertowithstandloadwithtdisplacentisverified.Testingmethodsmbeusedtomasureparametersindirectlyorpametersother.thanthospecifiedifthose.resultcanbecorrelatedtotspecifiedhroughestablishedmethods.parametersFunctionalTestFailureAnalsisAnanysisshallbemadeofeachfailuretomeethefctionaltestacceptancecriteriato.determineecauseofthefailure.Theresultsofthisanalysis 4.14.1.f.'ontinued)shallbeused,ifapplicable,inselectingsnubberstoetestedinanefforttodeterminetheoperabilityofoersnbbers,irrespectiveoftype,whichmay'besubjcttothearnefailuremode.Forthespecificcaeofasnubberselectedforfunctionaltestingwhcheitherfailstoctivateorfailstomove,i.eZfrozen-in-place,thecusewillbeevaluatedand,ifcausedbymanufacturerordesigndeficiency,agsnubbersofthesametypesubjettothesamedefectshallbefunctionallytested'evaluate@inamannertoensuretheiroperability.Anyestigperformedaspartofthisrequirementshallbeinendent.oftherequirementsstatedinSpecification4.14.forsnubbersnotmeetingthefunctionaltestcceptanceiteria.Foranysnubbdrsfoundinoperableanengineeringevaluationsallbeperformedonthecornonentstowhich)theinopablesnubbersareattached.Tpuxposeof,'ithisesneeringevaluationshallbetodate'neifthe'ornonentstowhichtheinoperablesnubbersarettached..ereadverselyaffectedbytheinopexabilityothe,'nubbersinordertoensurethatthecomponentremaxs.capableofmeetingthe.designedservice. -4.Z~+gTheSnubberSealServiceLifeMonitorinlservice'lifeofhydraulicsnubbersshallandsealsreplaced~requiredtoenhattheservicelifeisnotexceededbetwesur.anceinspectionsduringaperiodshe~esnubberisrequiredtobeerable.ThesealplacementsshallbedocumentedandthedocumentaonshallberetainedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification6.10.asisSnubrsareprovidedtoensurethatthestructuralintegrityofhereactorclantsystemandallothersafetyrelatedsystemsismaintainedduriandfollowinga-seismicor,otherevt.initiatingdynamicloads.Thevxalinspectionfrequency'iasedonthenumberofunacceptablesnubbersdduringtepreviousinspectioninproportion.tothesi2;esofthvgaa.oussnubberpopulationsor.categories.Asnubberisconsiedacceptableifit,failstheacceptancecriteriadelineatbySpecificati4.14.1.c.Thevisual'liinspectionintervalisseduponthepreviousinsptionintervalandmaybeaslongawofuelcycles,nottoexceed48months,dependingon.thenumofunacceptablesnubbersfoundduringthepreviovisualspection. siscontinuedUnaeptablesnubbersshallbeevaluatedtodetermineiftheyarelinoperable.Forinoperablesnubberstheapplicableactionrequiremenshallbet.Whenasnubberisfoundinoperable,anengineeingevaluationof'hesupportedcomponentisperformedinordertodeermineji7ifanysafety-reltedcomponentorsystemhasbeenadverselyafectedbytheinoperabilityothesnubber.Thisevaluationisinadtiontothedeterminationofthesnubber'modeoffailure.Teengineeringevaluationshalldeterm'inwhetherornot,thesnberfailurehasimpartedasignificanteffectnorcauseddegradaonofthesupportedcomponentorsystem,toensure0heyremainpableofmeetingthedesignedservice.Whenthecauseoftherejectionofasnerisclearlyestablishedandremediedforthat,snubberandforanyher.snubbersthatmaybegenericallysusceptible,'andveriedbyinsevicefunctionaltesting,thatsnubbermaybeexemptefrombeingcuntedasinoperable.Genericallysusceptiblesnubrsarethosewhichaofaspecificmakeormodelandhavethesedesignfeaturesdirectrelatedtothesnubberrejectedorarehosewhicharesimilarlylocatorexposedtothesameenvironmentlconditionssuchastemperature,riation,andvibration.Todetminethenextsurveillanceinterval,anuncceptablesnubbermayberclassifiedasacceptableifitcanbedemonstradthatthesnubbersoperableinitsas-.foundconditionbyperformancefafunctioltestandifitsatisfiestheacceptancecriteriarfuionaltesting. .Basiscontinuedgp.9bTorovideassurance,ofsnubberfunctionalreliability,areprestativesampioftheinstalledsnubberswillbefunctionallystedduringplantshutdownsatlessthanorequalto18monthinrvals.Observed,failuresofhesesamplesnubbersshallrequireunctionaltestingof.5)additionalunitiHydraulicsnubbersandchanicalubbersmayeachbetreatedasaTheservicelifeofasnubberisevaluateviaanufacturerinputandengineeringinformationthroughcon'deration.ofesnubberserviceconditionsandfunctionaldesignquirements.Theosnubbercomponentswithservicelivesnexpectedtoexceedplantliaresealsando-zingsfabricatedomcertainsealmaterials.Therefore,asealreplacementprogramsrequiredtomonitorsnubbersealando-ringrvicelifetoassesnubberoperabilityisnotdegradedduetoexceedingomponent,rvicelife. g.c-7/~HtWAW4 6.06.15.I,l'JaADNXNISTRATIVECONTROLSRESPONSIBILITY,Theantanager,GinnaStationshallberesponsibleforoverallon-siteGinnaStationoperatio~andshalldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence. 6.26.2.1ORGANIZATIONOnsiteandOffsiteOranizationonsiteandanoffsite"organizationshallbeestablishedforunitoperationandcorporatemanagement.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.5e'2,'i~+Lhguh<'Q+-("~"~.i~p;,-o<W~%~6~~pach.oe4.4<~aMQp,'.~~s.~W~~<%~Qo~a.Linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationshallbeestablishedanddefinedfromthehighestmanagementlevelsthroughintermediatelevelstoandincludingallPlantmanagementpositions.Thoserelationshipsshallbedocumented/andupdated,asappropriate,intheformof~~~~~~organizationcharts.Theseorganizationchartstwa.@bedocumentedintheUFSAR$,%.X,C5o,',',5AV<~(~~ab.ns*shallhavecorporateresponsibilityforover'allPlantnuclearsafety,andshalltakeanymeasuresneededtoassureacceptableperformanceofthestaffinoperating,maintaining,andprovidingtechnicalsupportinthePlantsothatcontinuednuclearsafetyisassured..go.'i'II:5'5-~ternatetitlemaybedesignatedfortositioninaccordanceCFR50.54(a)(3).equirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecificaz..othepositionwiththealternatetitleaswiththe'dtitle.AlternatetitlesshaspecifiedintheUpdatedFinanalysis8~1, c.ThePlantManager,GinnaStationshallhaveresponsibilityforoverallunitoperationandshall~havecontroloverthoseresourcesnecessaryforo~'+-.'.~,,~~~om+So.;ai6.22a.Anauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwithfuelinthereactor.AnadditionalauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewaboveColdShutdown.b-.-~tleastonelicensedoperatorshallbepresenthecontromwhenfuelisinteactor.EnsafeoperationandmaintenanceofthePlant,.The~ersnsreonsibforeketFaini~ng~healthocphysicsggqualityassurancefunctionsmayreportVL~Q.WC-,~to+appropriateanageronsite,dj@shallhave'"'watalevelwheractionapprpriatetothe//.mitationoftra'ng,healthysicsandquality.'~assuranceconcernscanbeaccomplished..~'cilitStaffTheFacilityorganizationshallincludethefollowing:5o.iwcoaddition,aboveColdown,atleastonelicensedSrReactorOperator(Sallbeesentinthecontrolroom.Shiftcrewcompositionmaybelessthantheminimumrequirementsof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)and=-Speci'fications6..2.2.aand6.2.2.fforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoreshift,crewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirement. d.e.gc.v'<*>>CtWAgVJA+H'>>I'~proceduresshallbedevelopedandimplementedtolimittheworkinghoursofunitstaffwhoperformsafety-relatedfunctionsincludingseniorreactoroperators,reactoroperators,healthphysicists,auxiliaryoperators,andkeymaintenancepersonnel.ChangestotheguidelinesfortheadministrativeproceduresshallbesubmittedtotheNRCforreview.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotection1proceduresshallbeonsitewhenfuelisinthe,'eactor.Adequate,shiftcoverageshallbemaintainedwitho~ut(routineheavyuseofovertime.Administrative5.x.~.Qf.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermal.hydraulics,reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothe'afeoperationoftheunit.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewaboveColdShutdown.,~Ke,<eQP~~Ag~~vQC~044~~~AS(S~~44.o-'f4NQ%%1I/r1~~>>-An-a14ernatetitlemaybedesignatedfortrequirements~MheseTechnicalS'ationspositionwiththealters'sapplywithSo,,~title.Alternat'sshallbespeFinalSatw~nalysisReport.sation.AllapplytothethespecifiedtheUpdated 6.3STATIONSTAFFUALIFICATIONS6.3.15;3.IEachmemberofthefacilityshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,"SelectionandTrainingofNuclearPowerPlantPersonnel",assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,September1975,forcomparablepositions,exceptfortheShift1a..'.--5'i.+TechnicalAdvisor.ReferenceslgA>(1(Ktr.J.Maier(RG&E)toD.Crutchfield(NRC),datedDecember30,1980.C,...,.,,z...~~~,C" 8-4TRAININGI4~4~I'=.AretrainingandreplaoementtrainingprogramIortne'-faci3.itystaffshallbemaintainedunderthedirect'ftheDivi'TrainingManagerandshallmeorexceedtherequirements.andrecommendationsSection5.5ofANSIN18.1-1971andAndixA10CFRPart55.6.4.2ThetrainingprogramshtorexceedNFPANo.27,1975Section40,eptthat(1}ainingforsalvageoperationsnnotbeprovidedand(2)tFireBrigadetrain'essionsshallbeheldatleastqux,llsareconsideredtobetrainingsessions.terly.I/aeAnalternatetitlemaybedesignatedforthisposition.AllrequirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecificationsapplytothepositionwiththealternatetitleasapplywiththespecifiedtitle.Alternatet'tiesshallbespecifiedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport. 6.5 6.6 0p~IP)6.86.8.1KW,>PROCEDURESwrittenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefollowingactivities:a.TheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978.b.FireProtectionProgramimplementation.~~~~~cg~.v~c.Theradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogr~am.S~.'icffsiteDoseCalculationManualimplementati~on.OIWL~W5~.':e.ProcessControlProgramimplementationM 6.9ReoortinRequirementsInadditiontotheapplicablereportingrequirements'f;Title10',."odcofFederalRegulations,thefollowing~~~d-ident'fiedreportsshallbesubmittedtotheRegionalAdministratoroftheUSNRC,Region1,unlessotherwise,noted..6.9.1'.9.1.1RoutineReportsar"uoResortAsummaryrepo'rtofplantstartupasdpoweescalationtestingshallbesubmittedfollows.n'g(1)reciptofanoperatinglicense,(2)amendmenttotheliceninvolvingaplannedincrease,inpowerlevel,(3)in,lallationoffuelthathasadifferent?designorhasbeenmanufacturedby~'adifferentfuel'upplier,and(4)modifications/thatmayhavesignificantlyalteredthenuclear,tZrexma1r,'rhydraulicperformanceoftheplant.Thereport'shalladdresseach'oftheItestsperformedandshallingeneralincludeadescriptionofthemeasured.va3A~esofthoperatingconditionsorcharacteristicsobtainedduringthet'estprogramandacomparisonof'thesevalueswithdesignp'redictionsandIspeccations.Anycorrectiveactionsthatwerereauired'toobtainsatisfactoryoperationshallalsobedescribed.Anyadditionalspeciicdetailsrequiredinlicenseconditionsbasedonothe-commitmentsshal&bePincludedinthisreport.6.9-l. 6.9.1e2tupreportsshallbesubmittedwithin(.1)QOdayfollowingmpletionofthestartuptestprogr,o(2)90daysfolLo'ngresumptionofcommewealpower;operation,whicheverisarliesi.~DtheStartupReportdoesnotcoverbothets(i.e.,completionofIII',startuptestprogram,dresumptioofcommercial1~.I,'oweroperation,supplementaryreportss11besubmittedt/:,atleast~verythreemonthsuntilbotheventsRavebeen.completed.MonthlyOneratincReport.Routinereportsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperienceshallbesubm'tted.~dpi'e.cc>~4./8So.Ybythefifteenthofeachmonthfollowingthecalendarmonthcoveredbythereport.'.hemonthlyreportshallincludeanarrati>summaryofopetingexperiencedescribingtheoperationofthefacility,incingmajorsafrelatedmainterance,Sforthemonthlyperiod.,exct~atsafetyrelatedif1.'w-('~maintenanceperformedangtheuelingoutagemay,bereportedin"monthlyrepotfo=monthfollowingtheendtheoutageratherthaneachmontiingtheaoage.'6.9.1e3AnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOoeratin"aportAradiologcalenvronmertaloperatingreportcover'ngHieoperationoftheunitduringtheprev'ouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedpriortcMayWofeachvear.j~ !,5,.v-!Theannualradiologicalenvironmentalreportsquallincludesummaries,interpretations,-and~.lysisoftrendsoftheresultsoftheradiologicalenvironmentalg()p~andIpreviousenvironmentalsurveillance-weportsandan*~assessmentoftheobservedimpactsoftheplantoperationontheenviroant.Thereportsshallalso"-includethe'll*thP=I',~l"d'-~acomparisonwithbackroundcontrolsamzesoflandusecensusesasrequired.TheannualradiologicalenvironmentaloperatingreportshallincludesummarizedandtabulatedresultsintheformatofTable6.9-ofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplestakenduringthereportperiod.IntheeventIthatsomeresultsarenotavailableforinclusionwiththereport,,thereport:shallbesubmittednotingandexplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedassoonaspossibleinasupplementaryreport..Inaddition,theannualreport.~Pshaincludeadiscussionwhichidentifiesthecmcum-'tanceswhireventanyrequireddetectionlimitsforenvironmentalsample-analysesfrombeingmet,anda.discussionofalldeviatioas~romthesampleschedu'e--~ofTable3.16-1.Thereportsha?3alsoincludethe,'ollowing:.a-summary'escriptionoftheradiologicalenvironmen"almonitoringprograminch.ud:.z:gamapofall'.samplinglocationskeyedtoatablegivingdistances IandaIfromthereactor,andthereanlt~~~drmnznterlaboratox~omparisonprogram.RadioactiveEffluent'ReleaseBeortRoutineradioactiveeffluentreleasereportscoveringtheoperationoftheunitduringtheprevioustwelvemonths,ofoperationshallbesubmittedbyThisreportshallincludeasummary,onaquarterlybasis,ofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsandsolidwastereleasedasoutlinedinRegulatoryGuide1.21,Revision1.ThisportshallincludeanassessmentofadiationdosesfrotheradioactiveliquidandgaseseffluentsreleasedfromheunitduringeachoftpreviousfourcalendarquartersoutlinedinReatoryGuide1.21,Revision1.Inadditn,thesiteoundarymaximumnoblea~gasgammaairandb'etaaidosshallbeevaluated.TheassessmentofradiationsshallbeperformedinaccordancewiththeODC.Thissereportshallinclu'deanannual'ummaryofdourlymeteorolo'caldatacollected'verthepreviocalendaryear.Altnatively,thelicenseehaseoptionofretainingthissuryonsiteinafileatshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponquest.Also,thereportshallincludeanynearbylocation(s)identifiedbythelandusecensuswhich yieldacalculateddoseordosecommitrentgreatertha~nthdseformingthebasisofSpecifications4.12.2.2or3.16.1.."'Thereportshallalsocontainadiscussionwhichidentifiesthecausesoftheunavailahi]ityofmilkor~eafyvegetablesamplesandidentifies1'ocationsforobtainingreplacementsamplesinaccordancewithSpecification3.16.1.4.TheradioactiveeffluentreleasereportshallincludeaPdiscussionwhichidentifies'the'circumstanceswhichprevent,,~'1anyrequireddetectionlimitsforeffluentsampleanalysesfrombeingmet.ITheradioactiveeffluentreleasereportsshallincludeanys'changesmadedug'ingthereportingperiodt'otheODCNasspecifiedin:~Section6.15,andtotheProceshsControlProgramasspecif>fedinSection6.16.TheradioactiveeffluentI.release'eportsshallalsoincludeadiscussionofanymajorchangestoradioactivewastetreatmentsystemsinacco'rdance~ithSpecification.6.17.2.1.6.9.1.5PressurizerReliefandSafetValveChallenesChallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorsafetyvalvesshallbereportednolessfrequentlythan~onanannualbasis. 6'.2.157.visrAnResultsofrequiredleaktestper'sourcesiftheeepresenceeormoreofremovablecon'ann~ion.-ed~on)of0.0056.9.2.2Annually:Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utilityandotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposuresgreaterthan100mrem/yrandtheirassociatedman-remexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions,e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,in-serviceinspection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance(describemaintenance),wasteprocessing,andrefueling.Thedoseassignmenttovariousdutyfunctionsmaybeestimatesbasedonpocketdosimeter,TLD,orfilmbadgemeasurements.Smallexposurestotallinglessthan204oftheindividualtotaldoseneednot.beaccountedfor.Intheaggregate,atleast804ofthetotalwholebodydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshallbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.(NOTE:ThistabulationsupplementstherequirementsofSection20.407of10CFRPart20)6.9.2.3 IctorOverpressureProtectionSystemOperationIntheeveitherthePORVsortheRCSv~ent~areusedtomitigateaRCSssuretransientSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmiotheCommissionwithinthirtydays.Thereporalldescribecircumstancesinitiatingthransient,theeffectoftheVsorJvent(snthetransientandanyothercorrectiveaction/ecessarytopreventrecurrence.:"""*" ,(c").ty)'pTABLE6.9-1ENVIRONMENTALRADIOLOGICALMONITORINGPROGRAMSUMMARYNameof.FacilityR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244LocationofFacilityWaeCountNewYorkReportingPeriodETyp'e-andMediumorPathway'otalNumberSampledofAnalyses(UnitofMeasurement)PerformedI,owerLimitofDetection(LLD)-AllIndicator$ocationsLocationswithHigh'estAnnualM~anControlLocgtionMean[1).Name.Mean($)Mean($)RangeDistanceand"DirectionRangeRangePaaNominallowerLin)itofDetection(LLD)asdefinedinTableNotationa.bfTable4.12-1.IbMean.andrangebasedupondetectablemeasurementsonly.FractionofdetectablemeasurementsatspecifiedlocationsJisindicatedinparentheses(1).(ViC5 Sn1 TABLE6.9-2REPORTINGLEVELSFORRADIOACTIVITYCONCENTRATIONSINENVIRONMENTALSAMPLES.ReportingLevelsAnalysisH-3AirborneParticu)ateFishWater(pCi/1)~orGases(pCi/m)(pCi/Kg,wet)2x10*Milk(pCi/1)BroadLeafVegetables(pCi/Kg,wet)Fe-59Co-58Co-60Zn-65Zr-Nb-95I-131Cs-134s-137a-La-1401000~~4001000:3003004003050200()0.910.203x101x103x101"x102x10.-1x102x10360703001x101<102x10(a)+otalforparentanddaughter

    ii)06.10 5o-Jli6.11 D-JigJ'k6.12 ~~/Q>6.136.13~1HIGHRADIATIONAREAZnlieuofthe"controldevice"or"alarmsignal"requiredbyparagraph20.203(c)(2)of10CFRPart20:5.v.La4EachHighRadiationAreainwhichtheintensityofradiationis1000mrem/hrorlessshallbebarri-cadedandconspicu'ouslypostedasahighradiationareaandentrancetheretoshallbecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentersuchareasshallbeprovidedwithoneormoreofthefollowing:(1)A.radiationmonitoringdevicewhichcon-.tinuouslyindicatestheradiationdoserateinthearea.(2)Aradiationmonitoringdevicewhichcontinuouslyintegratestheradiation"doserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived.Entryintosuchareaswiththismonitoringdevicemaybemadeafterthedoseratelevelsintheareahavebeenestablishedandpersonnelhavebeenmadeknowledgeableofthem.RadiationProtectionpersonnelshallbeexemptfromtheRWP.issuancerequirementduringtheperformanceoftheirassignedradiationprotectionduties,providingtheyarefollowingplantradiationprotectionproceduresforentryintohighradiationareas.W.~~~~"~<'tWS~~rWi*a.~."<<".r.I;c.,**atetitlemaybedesignatedforthispositi~.requirementsTechnicalSpecificapplytothe~~.positionwiththealternatealywiththespecified<title.'lternasshallbespec>.xeUpdatedZiyAnalysisReport. S.~.l(3)AQualifiedhealthphysicist(i.e.,qualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedures)witharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevicewhoisresponsibleforprovidingpositivecontrolovertheactivitieswithintheareaandwhowillperformperiodicradiationsurveillanceatthefrequencyspecifiedintheHPMP.Thesurveillancefrequencywillbeestablishedbyaplanthealthphysicist.b.EachHighRadiationAreainwhichtheintensityofradiationisgreaterthan1000mrem/hrshallbesubjecttotheprovisionsof6.13.1a.above,andinaddition,lockeddoorsshallbeprovidedtopreventunauthorizedentryinto,theseareasand'thekeystounlocktheselockeddoorsshallbemaintainedundertheadministrativecontroloftheShiftSupervisoronduty.<<~wv'~"*~alternatetitlemaybedesignatedfor'ition.Alrei-entsoftheseTechniecificationsapplytotheposalternatetitleasapplywiththespecile.etitlesshallbespeci'theUpdatedFinalSafetyReport. 6.148D-it'=KB~

    r~~"6.15OffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)AnychangestotheODCMshallbemadebytbefollowingmethod:6.15.1.aLicenseeinitiatedchangesshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodinwhichthechange(s)wasmadeandshallcontain:(i)sufficientlydetailedinformationtosupporttherationaleforthechange.(ii)adeterminationthatthechangewillnotreducetheaccuracyorreliabilityofdosecalculationsorsetpointdeterminations;and(iii)documentationofthefactthatthechangehasS.s.(615.1bbeenreviewedandfoundacceptablebytheonsitereviewfunction.Licenseeinitiatedchangesshallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptanceby.theonsitereviewfunctiononadatespecifiedbythelicensee. 1 6.3.6ProcessControlProram(PCP)/6e16.'1AnychangestothePCPshallbemadebythefollowing-.Method:6.16.1.aLicenseeinitiatedchangesshallbesubmittedtothCommisionwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleasReportforthepemodinwhichthechange(s)wasmeandshallcontain:g(i)sufficientllydetailedinforsa'ontosupporttherationaleforthchange;(ii)adetermination-thaechangewillnotreducetheoverallconfornceefthesolidifiedwasteproducttoex'ngcriteriforsolidwastes;and(iii)documationofthefactthatthe/angehasbereviewedandfoundacceptablebytheonsite~Creviewfunction.6.16.1blicenseeinitiatedchangesshallbecomeeffectiveafreviewandacceptancebytheonsitereviewfunctiononadatespecified'bythelicensee. W~'t'4s>~'gy~ACI~O~~/~4t\\tI~IAI'I'<<fy~ ~.17'oChanestoRadioactiveWasteTreatmentSstems(Liquid,GaseousandSolid)FUNCON6.17.1Theradioactivewastetreatmentsystems(1'id,seousandsolid)arethosesystemsdef'nedinTecnicalSpecification5.5.6.17.2Majorhangestotheradioactivewaesystems(liquidandgaseus)shallbereportedbyhefollowingmethod.Forthepuoseofthisspecifiation,"majorchanges"isdefinedinpecification&'e17.3below.6.17.2.1TheCommissionsallbeinormedofallmajorchangesbytheinclusionoas'tablediscussionorbyreferencetoasuitabdiscussionofeachchangeintheRadioactiveEffenReleaseReportfortheperiodinwhichthechaeswerede.Thediscussionofeachchangeshallctain:a)asummaPyoftheevaluatiothatledtothedeteinationthatthe.changecouldbemade(in1acordancewith10CFR50.59))'b)Pufficientdetailedinformationtosupportthe!~.reasonforthechange;d}adetaileddescriptionoftheequipment,componentsandprocessesinvolvedandthe/interfaceswithotherplantsystems; VC'.Il~aP'IJI'6'\gP:)s.vjf.4I'4-Ai(V~++r'>'agaw~~4T,~tCt~(+~s'4rV$,Cf541;gCA'hJ~PtP,'qAA4AO'fr~~g~4%J~',0CPj~p~&p~A\yhWv/<<~4'A ]iQd)anevaluationofthechangewhichshowsthepred"ctedreleasesofradioactivematerialsinliauidandcg,.eous-effluertsfromthosepeviouslypredicted;e)evaluationofthechangewhichshowstheexpectedmaximumexposuzestoindividualinAeunrestrictedeareaantothgenealpopulation.'fromthosepreviouslyestimated;f)documentatioofthefactthatthechangewasreviewedandfoundacceptablebythePOPC."MajorChanges"toradzaactivewastesystems(lie@id,gaseousandsolid)shallincludethefollowing:/a)Majorchangesinocess,ecptipment,components,andstzuotuzesronthoseinnuse(e.g.,deletionofevaporatorsandinstallati'onofdemine"aizers);b)Majorchan'gesinthedesignofr'adwastetreatmentsystems'li~id;gaseousandsolid)%&atcouldsignificantlyalterthechazactezistics.and/oz,sauantitiesofeffluentsreleased;c),'hangesinsystemdesignwhichmayinvalidate'helaccidentanalysis(e.g.,changesintankcapacitys.thatwouldalterthecuziesreleased). I}}

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