ML17308A169
| ML17308A169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1985 |
| From: | Jape F, Mathis J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17308A167 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-29, NUDOCS 8512270441 | |
| Download: ML17308A169 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1985029
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report No.:
50-335/85-29
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket No.:
50-335
Facility Name:
St. Lucie
1
License No.:
Inspector:
J. L. Mathis
Approved by:
ape,
Sectio
ie
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Results:
One violation was identified - Inadequate
procedure
for removal of
upper guide structure.
I
Inspection
C
ducted:
November 4-8,
1985 and
November 12-15,
1985
c~- r 7,'~ SS
Date Signed
Accompanying Personnel:
W. S.
Kim, Korea Advanced
Energy Research
Institute
Y. H. Ryu, Korea Advanced
Energy Research
Institute
oP ~
ate
1gne
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection entailed
84 inspector-hours
at the
site in the areas
of preparation
for refueling, refueling activity, and spent
fuel pool activity.
8512270441
851219
ADOCK 05000335.
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REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- K. N. Harris, Site Vice President of St. Lucie
- T. Dillard, Maintenance
Superintendent
- C. A. Pell, Technical Staff
- R. Frechette,
Chemistry Superintendent
- C. L. Wilson, Mechanical
Maintenance
- J. Krumins,
Power Plant Engineer
- H. F. Buchanan,
Health Physics
Superinteqdent
N. Roos, guality Control
(gC) Supervisor
J. Walsh,
gC Inspector
M. H. Mosley, .Refueling Coordinator
E. Wunderlich, Reactor
Engineer Supervisor
P. Tusing, Reactor
Engineer
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
office personnel.
Other Organizations
construction
craftsmen,
security force members,
and
Jim Viebrock, Nuclear Assurance
Corporation
(NAC) Vice President
H. Cross,
Exxon Nuclear Service
NRC Resident
Inspectors
- R. Crlenjak, Senior
Resident
Inspector
- H. Bibb, Resident
Inspector
- S. Elrod, Section Chief
NRC
- Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on November 15,
1985, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The inspector
described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the
inspection
findings.
j;No
dissenting
comments
were received
from the licensee.
I,
Violation (50-335/85-29-01),
Inadequate
procedure for removal
of~'upper
guide structure internal,
paragraph
5.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspector during this inspection.
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Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
This subject
was not addressed
in the inspection.
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Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items were not identified during the inspection.
Preparation for Refueling (80705), Unit
1
II
The St.
Lucie, Unit 1 nuclear
plant entered
mode six for refueling
on
October 31,
1985.
During the
outage
the inspector verified that prepara-
tions and conditions for defueling were in accordance
with NRC requirements.
The inspector
reviewed the following procedures
and documents:
OP 1-1600023,
Refueling Sequencing
Guidelines
j
OP 1-1630024,
Refueling Machine Operation
OP 1-1630023,
Fuel Transfer
System Operation
OP 1-1630022,
Spent
Fuel Handling Machine
OP 1-1630025,
Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System-Periodic
Test
GMP 1-M-0015, Reactor
Vessel
Maintenance-Sequence
of Operations
j,
St. Lucie Unit 1, Cycle 7, Safety Analysis Report
The
above
procedures
were
analyzed
for embodiment of the
necessary
'test
prerequisites,
preparations,
instructions,
acceptance
criteria and te'chnical
content.
On the morning of November 6, 1985, while removing the St. Lucie Unit'
core
internals
upper guide structure
(UGS) in preparation for defueling,
one of
three lifting rig attachments
gave
way.
This placed
the
upper
guide
structure
(UGS) in
a tilted position with its full weight of approximately
45
tons
supported
by the
remaining
two attachment
points.
Refueling
operations
were
immediately
stopped
with the structure
suspended
in
an
apparently
stable position with its bottom at
a level approximately two feet
below the reactor vessel
Florida Power
and Light (FPSL) declared
an
unusual
event at
10:45 a.m.,
(EST) in accordance
with the plant emer'gency
plan.
Immediately after the incident occurred
the licensee
designed
and
fabricated
an auxiliary lifting rig to aid in the removal of the
upper',
guide
structure.
Power
and Light succeeded
in lifting the core internals
UGS free of the reactor vessel
on November
9 and the structure
was placed in
its planned location in the refueling cavity.
After the
UGS was placed in
the refueling cavity
a preliminary inspection
revealed
some minor damage to
the regular lifting rig, but no significant
damage
to either the
UGS or core
barrel.
The inspector
reviewed
General
Maintenance
Procedure
Number~ 1-M-
0015,
Rev.
12,
Reactor
Vessel
Maintenance-Sequence
of Operations
which was
used to remove
the
UGS.
Procedure
1-M-0015 contained
provisions to torque
the lifting bolts to 50 ft. lbs once the three lifting bolts were
engaged
into the
threaded
holes
of the
UGS.
However,
there
was
no provision
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to verify that
the lifting bolts
were fully engaged
as specified
in
Instruction Manual,
IP-19367-485-164-1,
Reactor
Internal Lift Rig Instruc-
tion Manual.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
as
implemented
by
FPSL
Topical Report
(FPLTgAR 1-76A), Section
T(R 5.0, Instructions,
Procedures
and
Drawings,
Rev.
5 requires that activities affecting quality shall beprescribed
by documented
instructions,
procedures,
or drawings, of a type appropriate
to
the circumstances
and shall
be accomplished
in accordance
with these,instruc-
tions, procedures,
or drawings.
Instructions,
procedures
or drawings shall
include
appropriate
quantitative
or qualitative
acceptance
criteria for
determining that important activities
have
been satisfactorily accomplished.
Contrary to the
above,
the
licensee
did not ensure
that the
procedure
1-M-0015, Reactor
Vessel
Maintenance-Sequence
of Operation for removal of
UGS included
an appropriate qualitative acceptance
criteria for determining
whether
the lifting bolts were fully engaged
in the
UGS flange.
This is a
violation against
10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion
V and is identified
as
violation 50-335/85-29-01.
6.
Refueling Activities (60710)
Defueling for Unit
1 started
November 10,
1985
and
ended
on
November
14,
1985.
The licensee
placed
217 fuel
assemblies
into the spent fuel 'pool.
The inspector witnessed
at least
two shifts of defueling activities from the
control
room, refueling floor, and
spent fuel
pool
area.
Defueling
was
performed
in
accordance
with the controlling procedure
for refueling,
OP-1-1600022,
Rev.
14, Unit 1 Refueling Operation.
The inspector
observed
defueling to verify the following:
a)
Direct communication
was
established
between
the control
roomj', and
reactor building.
b)
Staffing
requirements
were
in accordance
with Technical
Specifica-
tions.
c)
Control of personnel
access
to the spent fuel pool areas.
d)
Changes
to
procedures
were
made
in accordance
with administrative
procedures.
e)
Licensee maintained
good housekeeping
in the refueling area.
f)
Radiological
controls
were
maintained
in accordance
with approved
procedures.
g)
Appropriate steps
and
gC hold points were signed off.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
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Spent
Fuel
Pool Activity (86700)
On November
13 and 14,
1985, the inspector
observed
fuel handling operations
during fuel
movement
in the spent fuel
pool
area
and reviewed
procedures
related
to fuel handling to verify that the following were included in the
procedures:
a)
Provisions for verifying prior to fuel handling that the
spent ~fuel
pool ventilation
system
was operable.
b)
Provision for verifying that
minimum water level for the spent, fuel
pool
was monitored during fuel handling operations.
c)
Provision for verifying that the spent fuel pool storage
area radiation
and airborne radioactivity monitors were operable.
d)
Provision for verifying that the spent fuel pool cleaning
and cooling
systems
were operable.
e)
Provision for verifying prior to fuel handling that the spent fuel pool
area
crane
interlocks
or physical
stops
could prevent
the crane1lfrom
passing
over fuel storage
locations.
Fuel sipping
was
performed
by Nuclear
Assurance
Corporation
(NAC) in'he
spent fuel pool for reload
spent fuel in accordance
with the
NAC procedure
and
FPSL's Letter of Instruction
No. 1-0-19 (LOI-19).
After completion of
fuel sipping,
assemblies
identified as
suspect
leakers
were ultrasonically
tested
(UT) by Exxon Nuclear
Company
(ENC) to determine
which fuel piris were
leaking.
This effort was coordinated
by
FPKL with Combustion
Engineering
(CE)
and
NAC.
Out of the total
number of fuel assemblies
sipped
and UT'ed,
nine
(9)
were
confirmed leakers.
Exxon Nuclear
Company
provided
a fuel
assembly
reconstitution
procedure
to
be performed
on those
confirmed IExxon
fuel assembly
leakers
that will be reloaded for cycle 7,
and
CE supplied
a
fuel
assembly
reconstitution
procedure
to
be performed
on those
confirmed
CE fuel assembly
leakers that are intended to be reloaded for cycle
7i core.
The inspector
reviewed the
ENC evaluation of St. Lucie Unit
1 fuel recons-
titution, dated
November 5,
1985,
and the
CE evaluation for fuel reconsti-
tution, dated
October 28,
1985.
The results of the review confirmed~',that
there
were
no unreviewed
safety questions.
The following are
some of the
conditions that were used to assure criticality safety:
a)
Replacing
absorber
rods with fuel rods
b)
Placing fuel rods in guide tubes
c)
Placing four bundles together in a 2x2 array
Prior to final core verification,
CE and
ENC will provide documentation
to
FPSL that reconstituted
fuel assemblies
are certified mechanically safe for
continued
use in accordance
with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
Within the areas
inspected,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
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