ML17303A962

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 871102-06.Violation Noted: Limitorque Valve Operators Inside Containment Not Shown to Be Qualified Because of Deviations from Qualification Test Specimen Configurations
ML17303A962
Person / Time
Site: 05000290, Palo Verde
Issue date: 03/17/1988
From: Pate R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17303A961 List:
References
50-528-87-37, 50-529-87-36, 50-530-87-38, NUDOCS 8803290051
Download: ML17303A962 (3)


Text

APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.

0.

Box 52034

Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 Docket Nos.

50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos.

NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 As a result of the inspection conducted on November 2-6,

1987, and in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the following violations were identified:

Contrary to paragraph (f) of 10 CFR 50.49, at the time of the inspection Limitorque valve operators inside containment were not shown to be qualified because of deviations from qualification test specimen configurations.

Specifically, one operator had a grease fitting installed in a grease relief, and another operator did not have a T-drain at the low point of the motor.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

2.

Contrary to paragraph (f) of 10 CFR 50.49, at the time of the inspection the ANPP files did not adequately document qualification of in-containment transmitters because the installation configuration differed from the qualification test configuration.

Specifically, sheath cracks in vertical top entry conduit could permit standing water to collect against the transmitter's Conax. cable entrance

seal, possibly violating the seal qualification 'and thus failing to provide the integrity required for transmitter qualification.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

3.

Contrary to paragraph (f) of 10 CFR 50.49, at the time of the inspection the ANPP files did not adequately document qualification of dual-voltage Limitorque valve operators outside containment because internal crimped wire connectors were not shown to be like any crimped connectors that had been qualified.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

4, 5.

Contrary. to, paragraph (f) of 10 CFR 50.49, at the time of the inspection the ANPp:-:,fMes did not adequately document qualification of Skinner solenoid:;valves because design and material differences between the plant equipment and test specimens were not evaluated in detail.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

Contrary to paragraph (j) of 10 CFR 50.49, at the time of the inspection the ANPP files did not adequately document qualification of Masoneilan valve position transducers because the file did not contain a complete qualification test report or evidence that a complete test report had been reviewed; only a summary test report was included.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

S803290051 380317 PDR ADQCK 05000528 9

DCD

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Arizona Nuclear Power Project is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region V, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Mr. T. J. Polich, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitted with this Notice.

This reply should be clearly marked as a

"Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:

(1) the reason for the violation if admitted, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results

achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.

If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other actions as may be proper should not be taken.

Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.

Dated at Walnut Creek, California this I7 day of March 1988 FOR THE NUCLEAR R UL RY COMMISSION R bert J.

Pa e, C ief Reactor Safety Branch

I