ML17292B351
| ML17292B351 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17292B350 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-98-02, 50-397-98-2, NUDOCS 9804280179 | |
| Download: ML17292B351 (14) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION IV Docket No.:
License No.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
Inspector:
Approved By:
Attachment:
50-397 NPF-21 50-397/98-02 Washington Public Power Supply System Washington Nuclear Project-2 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington April6-9, 1998 Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist Plant Support Branch Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division Reactor Safety Supplemental Information
'780428017'P 980424 PDR ADQCK OS0003'P7 6
PDR EXECUTIVE SU I@A Y Washington Nuclear Project-2 NRC Inspection Report 50-397/98-02 This routine, announced inspection focused upon specific areas of the licensee's physical security program.
These areas included review of alarm stations, communications, access control of personnel, packages and vehicles, assessment aids, compensatory measures, plans and procedures, security force training, management effectiveness, and staffing.
Plan u
Implementation of the security program continued to be highly effective. Management of
. the security program was excellent.
An effective program for searching personnel packages and vehicles was maintained.
Excellent assessment aids provided effective and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
Alarm stations were redundant and well protected.
Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained.
The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.
Changes to security programs and plans were reported to the NRC within the required time frame.
Overall, implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical security plan. An excellent training program that included conducting shift contingency drills had been implemented. The licensee's on-shift security staffing was properly maintained (Sections S1.1, S1.2, S1.3, S2.1, S2.2, S3.1, S6.1, S6.1 and S6.2).
A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to implement compensatory measures for an inoperative microwave security zone (Section S8.1).
A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to submit a security event report within the required 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time period (Section S8.'1).
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities a.
Ins ec ion co e 81700-0201 The alarm stations were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the requirements and capabilities of the alarm stations, redundancy and diversity of stations, protection of the alarm stations, and systems security.
bserv ions and Fi The inspector verified the redundancy and diversity of the alarm stations.
Action by one alarm station operator could not reduce the effectiveness of the security systems without the knowledge of the other alarm station operators.
The central alarm station and secondary alarm station were bullet resistant.
The inspector questioned the station operators and determined that they were properly trained and knowledgeable of their duties.
c.
~oclusions Alarm stations were redundant and well protected.
Alarm station operators were alert and effectively trained.
a.
Ins c ion Sco e 81700- 201 The communication capabilities were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan. The areas inspected included the operability of radio and telephone systems and the capability to.effectively communicate with the local law enforcement agencies through both of the systems.
Observa ions and F'ndin s
The inspector verified that the licensee had good radio and telephone systems capable of meeting all communication requirements of the security organization. The licensee had approximately 76 portable radios with two batteries assigned to each.
The licensee maintained an adequate number of portable radios for use by members of the security organization.
The licensee had a maintenance program to insure that the batteries for the portable radios remained at maximum operating power.
c.
(~ncl j~ion Good radio and telephone communication systems were maintained.
An adequate number of portable radios with batteries were available for members of the security organization.
S1.3 Pr ed Area Acc ss onrol f Personnel Pa k
s n
Vehic s
a.'on c
70 -0 01 The access control program for personnel packages and vehicles was inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.
b.
0 se ions n
Findi s
The inspector determined through observations at the primary access facility and at the vehicle sallyport that the licensee properly controlled personnel, packages, and vehicle access to the protected area.
The protected area access control equipment was inspected and found to be functional and well maintained.
The inspector also observed use of the X-ray machine and search of packages and material at the main access facility. The operators were efficient and well trained.
c.
~Gnarl.~ion s A strong program for searching personnel, packages, and vehicles was maintained.
S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S
a.
In i n Sco 81700-2 2
The inspector reviewed the assessment aids to determine compliance with the physical security plan. The areas inspected included the closed-circuit television monitors located in the alarm stations.
Observations an Findin s The inspector observed the assessment aids during the hours of daylight on April 8, 1998, and determined that the licensee's overall assessment aids system was excellent.
The inspector verified through observation that the fixed closed-circuit television cameras were positioned to ensure proper coverage of the perimeter security alarm zones.
The camera resolution was excellent.
The inspector determined through interviews that licensee technicians provided excellent maintenance support.
c.
~Cni~u~n Excellent assessment aids provided effective and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones.
S2.2 m
sa o M
sur The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine compliance with the requirements of the Industrial Security Plan. The areas inspected included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measures.
b.
erv ion n
F'ndi s
The inspector confirmed through a review of Security Plan Implementing Procedure-SEC-18, "Safeguards Compensatory Measures,
" that the licensee normally deployed compensatory measures in a manner consistent with the requirements in the physical
'ecurity plan. The inspector determined through interviews that the security personnel available for assignment to compensatory security posts were properly trained for those duties.
c.
g~~iu~~ins The compensatory measures program was effectively implemented.
The security procedure for compensatory measures met the requirements in the physical security plan. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements.
S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation S3.1 Securit Pro r P ans and Proce res a.
Ins c ion Sc 1 00- 20 The physical security plan and the implementing procedures were inspected to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and the physical security plan.
Observa ions and Findin s The inspector determined that previous plan changes were reported to the NRC within the required time frame, and changes submitted did not reduce the effectiveness of the plan. The inspector reviewed implementing procedures for adequacy, ensured that the licensee maintained an effective management system for the development and administration of procedures, and that changes to the procedures did not reduce the effectiveness of the licensee's security program.
c.
~ou~sio s
Changes to security programs and plans were reported to the NRC within the required time frame. Overall, implementing procedures met the performance requirements in the physical security plan.
S5 Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 e
ri T
inin n
lifi
'o The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the Security, Training, and Qualification Plan and the Contingency Plan.
an The inspector verified that the security organization conducted security training in accordance with its approved security, training, and contingency plans.
The inspector confirmed by a review of the security shift records that contingency drills were conducted periodically on shift. Documentation of the shift drills was maintained on file.
Additionally, the inspector observed security officers during the performance of their duties. "Allsecurity officers displayed excellent knowledge of the procedural requirements for the task they were performing.
c.
~nli~io An excellent training program that included conducting shift contingency drills had been implemented.
Documentation of training activities by the security shifts and training section was very good.
S6 Security Organization and Administration S6.1 Man m
n Eff iv a.
Ins ec ion co e 8170 The effectiveness and adequacy of the security management staff's administration of the security program were evaluated.
b.
Discu~s Management effectiveness of the security organization was excellent.
The security program was managed by a well trained and highly qualified security staff.
The inspector determined from interviews with security personnel that security officers have a clear understanding of their duties and responsibilities and the morale of the security officers was very good.
Qgnnli~<~
Management of the security program was excellent.
S6.2 in v
co The inspector verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed personnel immediately available at the facilityto fulfillresponse requirements met the number specified by the physical security plan.
b.
bserv i n n
Fi d'n The inspector determined from discussions with security supervisors arid reviewing the security shift personnel rosters that there were an adequate number of security officers and armed personnel available to meet the number specified in the physical security plan.
Conclusion The licensee's on-shift security staffing was properly maintained.
S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards Issues (Followup 92904)
S8.1 Closed Viola i n 97/97 7-1: In ua Vehicle a
e During a previous security inspection, it was noted that a gap in the vehicle barrier system that provided a path for a design basis vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas existed.
This was contrary to the licensee's physical security plan and 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7).
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee had installed double concrete Jersey barriers in the area of vulnerability to meet the vehicle barrier requirements.
The inspector also verified the licensee's barrier calculations for the double Jersey barriers confirming that they would effectively stop a design basis vehicle within the required safe standoff distance.
-s-S8.2 I
e Lic nseeEv n Re o
7-1-0 Fail r o a eCo sao Meas r
r In r
ive Mi v
ecuri o
The licensee reported that on July 18, 1997, an intrusion alarm was received in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) from a microwave unit monitoring a section of the isolation zone for the plant protected area.
Both the CAS and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS} acknowledged the alarm and surveyed the associated security zone using the closed-circuit television (CCTV) but did not immediately, recognize the need for a compensatory measure.
Approximately 30 minutes later, as the CAS operator was reviewing the alarm status summary display, he saw the affected microwave zone in constant alarm and realized it may indicate a safeguards system failure requiring a compensatory measure within 10 minutes.
He dispatched a security patrol officer to the zone to conduct an operability test of the affected microwave unit. The test revealed the microwave unit was inoperative.
The security patrol was then posted at the zone as temporary, compensatory measure.
Upon arrival of the permanent compensatory officer, the security patrol officer conducted a walk-down of the affected isolation zone.
No, signs of intrusion were noted.
Section 10.5.1 of the licensee's security plan requires. that outages of individual microwave zones be compensated by dedicated monitoring of CCTV covering each zone or the posting of security officers.
Security Plan Implementing Procedure SEC-18, "Safeguards Compensatory Measures," paragraph 2.1, requires compensatory measures whenever part of the security system becomes either partially or totally inoperative resulting in the lowering of security integrity of the plant. When this occurs, immediate compensatory measures shall be initiated so that an equivalent level of protection exists after the failure as existed before.
The licensee's investigation, root cause analysis, determined that the failure to post a compensatory officer within 10 minutes was personnel error by the CAS and SAS operators.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that proper corrective actions had been completed by the licensee.
The licensee's corrective actions included the following:
~
Security officers received training on self-checking techniques.
~
CAS and SAS operators were briefed on the incident and received refresher training on alarm station instructions, placing emphasis on alarm station operators ensuring intended actions and verifications are performed.
~
The CAS and SAS operators involved received individual remedial training on posting compensatory measures for failed microwave zones.
The officers involved in the event received appropriate disciplinary action.
The licensee's failure to implement appropriate compensatory measures for an inoperative microwave security zone is a violation of Section 10.5.1 of the physical security plan. This violation was licensee identified, the root cause was nonrepetitive, and it was corrected within a reasonable period of time.
Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-397/9802-01) b..
Appendix G to 10 CFR 73.71, paragraph l(c) requires that the licensee report within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery, any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, material access area, controlled access area, vital area, or transport for which compensatory measures have not been employed.
Due to a misinterpretation of the guidance in 10 CFR 73.71 by the security supervisor at the time of the event in "a" above, the event was classiTied as meeting the criteria of 10 CFR 73.71, Appendix G II, which requires the event to be recorded in the safeguards event log within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and requires no NRC notification.
When the security event was reviewed by the Security Programs Manager on July 23, 1997, he reclassified the event, and a telephone notification was made to the NRC Operations Center per 10 CFR 73.71.
Allsecurity force supervisors received refresher training on reporting of safeguards events The licensee's failure to submit a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71, Appendix G l(c), for the failure to post a compensatory measure is a violation of 10 CFR Part 73. This violation was licensee identified, the root cause was nonrepetitive, and it was corrected within a reasonable period of time.
Accordingly, the violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-397/9802-02)
V Mana emen Mee'1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April9, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIALLIST OF'PERSONS CONTACTED IJtMLKK R. Brownlee, Licensing Engineer A. Conner, Security Operations Lead F. Dehart, Supervisor, Safeguards and Investigations J. Fisher, Security Lieutenant R. Givin, Security Force Supervisor J. Gloyn, Security Supervisor, Training P. Inserra, Licensing Manager D. Martin, Manager, Security Programs G. Smith, Plant General Manager R. Webring, Vice President, Operations Support S
ECT ON OCEDURES USED IP 81700 IP 92704 ENED CLO ED AND D SC SSED Q~igff.
50-397/9802-01 50-397/9802-02 NCV Failure to Implement Compensatory Measures within 10 Minutes NCV Failure to Report Security Event within 1 Hour of Occurrence
<2zxd 50-397/97-07 VIO Inadequate Vehicle Barrier 50-397/9802-01 50-397/9802-02 NCV Failure to Implement Compensatory Measures within 10 Minutes NCV Failure to Report Security Event within 1 Hour of Occurrence.
LI OF CRON MS USED CAS CFR Central Alarm Station Code of Federal Regulations Noncited Violation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Secondary Alarm Station
0 0
LIST OF LICENSEE DOCU E
S REV WED Physical Security Plan including Revisions 36 and 37.
Security Training and Qualification Plan, Revision 11, January 26, 1994 Security Plan Implementing Procedure SEC-18, "Safeguards Compensatory Measures,"
Revision 0, February 19, 1998 Security Plan Implementing Procedure SEC-02, "Central and Secondary Alarm Stations,"
Revision 0, February 19, 1998 Security Force Compensatory Measures Guideline No 1, "Unplanned CPU, Power or MUX Failure," Revision 2, August 4, 1997 Security Force Compensatory Measures Guideline No 4, "Loss of CCTV Due to Adverse Environmental Factors," Revision 2, August 4, 1997 Local Law Enforcement Assistance Plan with the Benton County Sheriff Department, January 7, 1998 Vehicle Barrier Calculation 500158-C-002, December 9, 1997, Double Jersey Barrier Used on a Temporary Basis in Front of Protected Area Access Point Site Wide Procedure SEC-05, "Contingency Events, Response and Reporting," Revision 0, February 19, 1998
Response
Force Drillrecords from January 1 1997 to April 1, 1998