ML17289A813
| ML17289A813 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1992 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9208260328 | |
| Download: ML17289A813 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION V 1450 MARIALANE WALNUTCREEK, CALIFORNIA94596-5368
.August 17; 1992 Docket No. 50-397 MEMORANDUM FOR:
L. F. Hiller, Jr.,
Team Leader WNP-2 Augmented Inspection Team FROM:
SUBJECT:
J.
B. Hartin, Regional Administrator AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER POWER OSCILLATIONS AT WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT 2 REVISION 1
Enclosed is a revision to your charter as the Team Leader for the Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) reviewing the August 15, 1992 power oscillation event at WNP-2.
The charter has been revised to s'upport AEOD studies of control room human factors and decision making processes during reactor events.
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Enclosure:
(1)
AIT Charter CC:
J. Taylor, EDO J.
- Sniezek, EDO W. Bateman, EDO T. Murley, NRR H. Virgilio, NRR B. Boger, NRR C. Rossi, NRR A. Chaffee, NRR T. quay, NRR F. Hiraglia, NRR W. Russell, NRR
>n Regional Admin' tor J. Richardson, NRR A. Thadani, NRR B. Grimes, NRR J.
- Roe, NRR E. Jordan, AEOD D. Ross, AEOD B. Faulkenberry, RV G. Cook, RV R. Scarano, RV K. Perkins, RV D. Kunihiro, RV P. Johnson, RV P~
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05000397 8 q20817 PDR ADOCH PDR
Rev. I AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAN CHARTER 08/17/92 WASHINGTON NUCLEAR PLANT 2 POWER OSCILLATIONS.ON AUGUST 15, 1992 The Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) is to perform an inspection to accomplish the following:
1.
Develop a complete sequence of events and description of the power oscill'ations which occurred on August 15, 1992.
In addition, develop a
sequence of events and description of the plant reactivity anomalies which occurred during the plant startup from the most recent refueling outage.
Include in the sequence of events operator actions, decision making and communication leading up to the decision to trip the reactor.'.
Identify those equipment failures, human performance errors, procedural deficiencies, and quality assurance deficiencies that contributed to these events.
In making this analysis, specifically include the following:
a.
Determine what procedures the licensee had implemented to avoid and mitigate power instability, and assess the adequacy of these procedures.
b.
Review the core fuel loading and rod patterns in effect during,the event.
Review the most recent core reload safety analysis to determine whether the predicated areas of flow instability were properly calculated.
Assess whether these areas were contributing causes for the events.
c.
Review the operating status of the recirculation flow control system.
Assess whether the operation of the components in this system were contributing causes for the events.
d.
Review the operating status of the turbine control system.
Assess whether the operation of the components in this system were contributing causes for the events.
e.
Assess the operating crew's performance during and subsequent to each event.
Ascertain the control room organization and staffing level during the event and the role of the STA before, during and after the event.
6.
Evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's investigation of these events.
7.
Determine the root causes of the power oscillation event, from equipment, personnel, and organizational perspectives.
8.
Assess the adequacy of the licensee's notification of other agencies of both of these eve'nts.
Inspection Procedure
- 93800, "Augmented Inspection Team Implementing Procedure" and Nanual Chapter
- 0325, "Augmented Inspection Team" provide additional administrative guidance which will be used by the AIT.
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KJ ston 8/i7/92 KPerkins 8/(
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MVirgilio, NRR JMar in 8/,
YES NO YES NO YES NO
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