ML17286A852
| ML17286A852 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1991 |
| From: | Chaney H, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A850 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-91-10, NUDOCS 9106040332 | |
| Download: ML17286A852 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1991010
Text
INSPECTION
REPORT
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Repor t No.
50-397/91-10.
License
No.
REGION V
Licensee:
Mashington Public Power Supply System
(Supply System)
P.
0.
Box 968
3000 George Mashington
May
Richland,
WA
99352
Facility Name:
Mashington Nuclear Project
No.
2 (MNP-2)
Approved by:
Inspection at:
MNP-2 site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
April 8-20,
1991
Inspected
by:
ney,
>or
a ia
on
pecia 1st
u as,
le
,
eac
o
a )o oglca
Protection
Branch
s!i>/ r
ate
i
ne
5/A
a
e
1gne
Summary:
Ins ection Durin
A ril 8-20
1991
(Re ort No. 50-397/91-10)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine
unannounced
inspection of the licensee's
radiation
pro ec
son
program including:
Occupational
radiation exposure controls,
activities associated
with .refueling outage
R-6,
and follow-up on previous
inspection findings.
Inspection procedures
83750,
83524,
83729,
and 92702
were used.
Results:
The licensee's
implementation of their radiation protection program
ss considered
adequate; still, inspection results indicate that more attention
to worker contamination control practices
and
a greater
degree of attention to
detail in conduct of radiation protection activities by the Health Physics
Group personnel
is necessary
for the licensee to meet their performance
goals.
The licensee's
reorganization
of the Radiological
Programs
and Instrument
Calibration Department within the Supply System Support Services
Group appears
to have decreased
the technical
expertise of management
in this area.
Two apparent violations of NRC requirements
involving the failure to post high
(see
paragraph 4.b.)
and issuance
of out-of-date
respiratory protection equipment
(see
paragraph 5.b.) were identified.
vh
0
1.
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
DETAILS
- A. Oxsen,
Deputy Managing Dir'ector
~J.
Baker, Plant Manager
"LE Harrold
Assistant Plant Manager
"R. Graybeat,
Health Physics/Chemistry
Manager
(HP/Chem)
"M. Monopoli, Manager'upport
Services
- D. Pisarci k, Assistant
HP/Chem Manager
- C. McGilton, Operational
Assurance
Manager
Others
-"C. Sorensen,
NRC, Senior Resident
Inspector
"G. Yuhas,
NRC Region V, Chief, Reactor Radiological Protection
Branch
"J. Irish, Bonneville
Power Administration
(") Denote personnel
that were in attendance
at the exit meeting held on
April 19,
1991.
Additional licensee
personnel
attended
the exit meeting
and other licensee
personnel
were contacted
during the inspection.
h
2.
~Follow-u
a.
Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
(92702)
(Closed) Notice of Violation 397/90-01-02:
"Failure to Obtain Beta
ose
a
e
urveys.
>s vlo a ion )nvo ved the licensee's
failure
to perform adequate
surveys for surface
contamination
(i.e.,'etermination
of beta activity) when workinq on highly contaminated
surfaces.
The licensee's
response
to the violation was previously
discussed-in
NRC Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/90-07.
The licensee's
corrective actions
concerning
improved performance
based
technician
(HPT) training and increase
overview of HPT work
performance
were verified during this inspection
and
a previous
NRC
inspection
documented
as Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/91-.07.
Training plans
examined
are discussed
in paragraph
5.b. of this
report.
The inspector
had
no further questions
regarding this
matter.
b.
NRC Ins ection
and Enforcement Information Notices (IEINs)
The inspector verified the licensee's
receipt of and examined the
licensee's
evaluation of the following IEINs:
IEIN No. 90-44,
"Dose-Rate
Instruments
Underresponding
to the True
d,"'hhd
ldldhd
I
I I'd dd
hh
IIPT
annual
refreshed training.
IEIN No. 90-48,
"Enforcement Policy for Hot Particle Exposures,"
1
1
1 ddt
th
dpi
1
1
h
trai ni ng.
IEIN No. 90-50, "Minimization of Methane
Gas in Plant Systems
and
PPI
d
1 t
1
," th
11
P
1
lip
1
t
d thl
IEIN in regards to the shipment of radwaste
and to a lesser extent
to plant systems.
3.
Occu ational
Ex osure
(83750)
a ~
~Chan
es
(1)
The licensee
had created
the position of Assistant Plant Health
Physics/Chemistry
Manager (Asst.
HP/Chem Manager)
and promoted
the Plant Health Physics Supervisor to the position.
The
licensee is currently searching for a person to fill the vacant
Plant Health Physics
Supervisor position, which continues to be
staffed by the Asst.
HP/Chem Manger.
This change
complies with
the requirements
of WNP-2 Technical Specification (TS) 6.3.1.
(2)
The licensee
had reorganized
the corporate (offsite)
Radiological
Programs
and Instrument Calibration Department
(RP&IC) effective April 15,
1991.
The previous
RP&IC
organization
was described
in
NRC Inspection
Report
50-397/90-29.
This reorganization
resulted in the
RP&IC
'Department
being eliminated
and the functional activities being
split between
two new organizations
and managers.
The previous
manager of the
RP&IC was reassigned
as
manager of the
Emergency
Planning Department.
Except for the activities involving the
environmental
monitoring all other plant affecting
activities/programs
(technical
support to the plant
HP group,
Supply System personal
dosimetry, respiratory protection
equipment procurement,
testing,
and maintenance
program,
offsite dose calculation
manual
(ODCM) maintenance,
portable
radiation protection instrument calibration
and testing,
protective clothing laundry, internal dosimetry program,
and
assessment
of plant radiation protection program
implementation)
are
now managed
by personnel
with little or no
professional
HP or operational
radiation protection
(RP)
technical
expertise.
The group overseeing
the
ODCM,
technical
assessment,
and plant
HP technical
support;
does not
currently have
a first line supervisor.
The inspector
discussed
with the Services
Support Manager the current job
descriptions
and qualifications of the personnel
occupying
new
manager positions
and the apparent limitations of the
new
managers
to make technical
decisions
regarding
RP or
HP issues
arising at the plant or in corporate
RP activities.
The
licensee will be relying on the technical
competence
of the
staff conducting the technical activities noted above.
The
licensee is committed to using the guidance in NRC Regulatory
Guide 1.8, Revision 1-1977,
"Personnel
Selection
and Training,"
and industry standard
ANSI 18. 1-1971, "Selection
and Training
.-
of Nuclear
Power Plant Personnel."
The licensee's
decision to
reorganize
the Radiological
Programs
and Instrument Calibration
Department
and
manage
the programs with managers
lacking the
appropriate
technical
expertise in the disciplines being
managed is not prohibited by the standards
noted above nor by
Sect>on
13. 1. 1.3, "qualifications," of the WP-2 Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR).
The licensee
stated that
revised position descriptions for the managers
and staff of the
new organizations
were being prepared.
The
NRC has previously brought to the attention of the licensee
apparent
performance
based deficiencies in the licensee's
internal dosimetry program (see
NRC Inspection
Report
No.
50-397/90-22,
paragraph 3.c.).
The inspector
noted to the licensee that the current plant
HP/Chemistry
and Support Services
organizations
and functional
position titles do not agree with the organization tables in Section
13 of the
4.
External
Occu ational
Ex osure Control
and Personal
Dosimetr
(83524)
The licensee's
program for controlling personnel
exposures
and access
to
were examined to determine
compliance with TS 6. 12,
and the requirements
20.202,
and 20.203.
The inspector
examined radiological surveys,
radiation
and high radiation
areas
controls
and posting, including locked high radiation areas.
The
use of multiple dosimeters
was also observed,
including: alarming
dosimeters
and self reading pocket dosimeters.
Independent
radiation
exposure
and dose rate surveys
were conducted
using an
NRC digital
qeiger-muller type survey instrument,
and
a licensee
used Eberline RO-2-
son chamber type survey instrument.
Findings agreed with documented
licensee
surveys.
Several
HP technicians
(HPTs) were observed obtaining
beta
dose rates
from highly contaminated
surfaces
using ion chamber type
instruments.
Dose rates
before
and after the installation of temporary
lead shielding were verified by the inspector.
An adequate
supply of
portable
dose rate instruments
was evident.
a.
Resin
S ill and Plant Administrative Ex osure Limit Overex osures
On April 13, 1991, the licensee
experienced
a spill of spent
condensate
cleanup
system resin
on the 437 foot elevation of the
Radwaste
Building.
This spill covered
most of the open floor space
and areas within the shielded cubicles containing the various spent
resin tanks.
The spill occurred during the routine evolution of
removing
a condensate
polisher system
from service.
The spill
involved the overflowing of the Condensate
Resin .Backwash
Tank and
backing
up of the 437 foot elevation floor drains.
The floor drains
overflowed due to the overfilling of local floor drain sumps.
The
spill was reported
by the Shift Manager via Problem Evaluation
Request
(PER) 291-245.
The
HP group immediately isolated the area
and
made
detailed
preparations
for the cleanup
and recovery of the area
(Radiation
Work Permit
No. 2-91-218).
Actions were taken
by plant. management
to have
a root cause
investigation performed to determine
the cause
of the spill.
The spill did not result in any unplanned
exposures
or personnel
contaminations.
The licensee's
root cause
analysis of
this event will be reviewed
as
a follow-up. item (397/91-10-01).
The above noted spill. is similar to but not as radiologically
significant as the
May 12
1988 spill of spent resin from the
Reactor Mater Cleanup
(RMfU) System.
See
Licensee
Event Report
No.
88-14.
On April 17th, during cleanup of the spill in resin collection tank
cubicles,
three decontamination
workers
exceeded their MNP-2
administrative
exposure limit of 300 millirem per day that is
prescribed
in Plant Procedures
Manual
(PPM) 11.2.5. 1, "Personnel
Exposure Limits and Guides".
Mhile sweeping
up resin in the
RMCU
Sludge Separator
Tank cubicle their alarming dosimeters
alerted
them
that they had exceeded their preset
dose limit (128 mrem).
Following their exit from the cubicles
and the shielded
passageway
it was determined
by the licensee
from self reading dosimeter
data
that each of their daily cumulative exposures
exceeded
the
administrative
dose limit.
No individual
s total
dose for the
calendar quarter
exceeded
600 millirem.
General
area
dose rates
within one cubicle were later measured
to range
from 600 mrem per
hour (mrem/hr) at the entry'door to 70 rem per hour adjacent to the
tanks.
The cognizant
HPT documented
a radiation survey of the
room
showing general
area levels ranging from 200 millirem per hour at
the entry door to 8 rem per hour adjacent to the tanks.
This
incident was reported
by the shift HP supervisor via
PER 291-267.
The Plant Hanager
suspended
all cleanup
work within the shielded
cubicles,
except for HP surveys
and equipment operator entries
(under
HP escort).
This event will be evaluated
by Operational
equality Assurance for root cause
determination.
Preliminary
information available to the inspector indicated that deficiencies
involving cognizant technician performance
and
a less than adequate
prewor k briefings were suspected
causative
factors.
As of April
24th, the
HP group
had reviewed implementing procedures
for
agreement with expected
HPT performance
and performed
an evaluation
of outstanding
Radiation Work Permits
(RWPs) involving possible
exposure
to high radiation levels.
Selected
RMPs were enhanced
in
the area of prework briefing instructions,
where
needed,
to prevent
a future occurrence
of the incident.
The official root cause
review
by plant equality Assurance
engineers
(gA) had not been
completed
as
of April 24,
1991.
The inspector
discussed
with HP group managers their views on the
reasons
for the incident and agreed that they were accurately
focusing in on the apparent
causes,
and that current actions
could
be expected to prevent
a future reoccurrences
of the incident.
This
problem and the official root cause
analysis will be considered
a
follow
dered satisfactory. The licensee's performance in this area is considered fully adequate. 6. ~tit II tt The inspector and the Chief, Reactor Radiological Protection Branch (G. Yuhas) met with licensee representatives identified in Section 1 of the report on April 19, 1991. They discussed the scope and findings of the inspection. Mr. Yuhas pointed out that, from a radiological point of view, the outage was not getting off to a good start and that an injection of management enthusiasm seemed appropriate to bring about improved performance. The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspectors'indings and stated that the Plant Manager was scheduled to provide a motivational presentation to all employees shortly after the exit meeting. During continued onsite inspection activities on April 20, 1991, the inspector noted that WNP-2 management had initiated a temporary action 12 (one week) to assure that staff managers performed additional surveillance/monitoring of in-plant activities during the outage. Based on evaluation of the effectiveness of this additional oversight the Plant Manger would determine its continued use.-