ML17286A686
| ML17286A686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1991 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A684 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-91-04, 50-397-91-4, NUDOCS 9104080219 | |
| Download: ML17286A686 (21) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1991004
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report No:
Docket No:
Licensee:
50-397/91-04
50-397
Washington Public Power Supply System
P. 0.
Box 968
Richland,
WA 99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
'NP-2 site near Richland, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
January
14 - February
17,
1991
Inspectors:
R.
C. Sorensen,
Senior Resident
Inspector
D. L. Proulx, Project Inspector
Approved by:
P.
H. J hnson,
Chief
React
Projects
Section
3
Date
igned
Summary:
Ins ection
on Januar
14 - Februar
17
1991
50-397/91-04
Areas Ins ected:
Routine inspection
by the resident inspector
and
a region-
ase
inspector of control
room operations,
licensee
action
on previous
inspection findings, operational
safety verification, surveillance
program,
maintenance
program, licensee
event reports,
special
inspection topics,
procedural
adherence,
occupational
safety,
and review of periodic reports.
During this inspection,
Inspection
Procedures
61726,
62703,
71707,
71710,
90712, 90713,
92700,
92701,
92702,
93001
and 93702 were utilized.
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SINS
Items:
None.
Results:
General
Conclusions
and
S ecific Findin
s
Si nificant Safet
Matters:
None.
Summar
of Violations and Deviations:
One violation was identified,
invo ving fai ure to proper y test the standby
gas treatment
system in
accordance
with Technical Specification requirements.
0 en Items
Summar
Four followup items
and
one
LER were closed;
one
new item was
opene
.
~1040S02i9
9i03>9
PD4
ADOCK 05000 '97
9
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
J. Baker, Plant Manager
- L. Harrold, Assistant Plant Manager
C. Edwards, guality Control Manager
- R. Graybeal,
Health Physics
and Chemistry Manager
- J. Harmon, Maintenance
Manager
- H. McGilton, Operational
Assurance
Manager
"A. Hosier, Licensing Manager
S. Davison, guality Assurance
Nanager
- R. Koenigs, Generation
Engineering
Manager
- S. McKay, Operations
Manager
- J. Peters,
Administrative Manager
G. Gelhaus,
Assistant Technical
Manager
W. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations
Manager
- R. Webring, Plant Technical
Manager
The inspectors
also interviewed various control
room operators, shift
supervisors
and shift managers,
maintenance,
engineering, quality
assurance,
and management
personnel.
"Attended the Exit Meeting on February
19, 1991.
Plant Status
At the start of the inspection period, the plant was operating at
100%
power.
Power was reduced
on February
16 to approximately
70$ power due
to problems with the "A" reactor feedwater
(RFW) turbine governor.
The
"A" RFW pump was
removed from service
and the actuator for the turbine
governor
was replaced.
The "A" RFW pump was returned to service
on
February
17
and reactor
power was in the process
of being returned to
100% at the end of the inspection period.
Standb
Gas Treatment
S stem Surveillance Testin
Problems
61726)
On January
24, the licensee
performed
a surveillance test of the
upstream
charcoal
adsorber
bed
on the "A" train of SGT, in accordance
with Plant Procedures
Manual
(PPN) 7.4.6.5.3.6,
"SGT System Adsorber
Bypass
Leakage Test,-" Revision 5.
This test is conducted
by injecting
Freon at
a point upstream of the charcoal
bed
and measuring
the Freon
concentrations
both upstream
and
downstream of the charcoal
bed.
The
results
are acceptable if the downstream concentration is less
than'.05%
of the upstream concentration,
indicating no significant bypass
leakage.
Each train of SGT at WP-2 contains
two separate
charcoal
beds
in series,
and they had normally been tested
separately.
Unsatisfactory
results
were obtained for the upstream
bed
on January
24,
and the "A"
train of SGT was declared
A Problem Evaluation Request
'(PER)
was initiated and was addressed
by the Management
Review Committee
(MRC) on January
25.
MRC dispositioned
the
PER for Generation
Engineer-
ing review and evaluation.
Later
on January
25, Generation
Engineering
determined
the "A" train of SGT to be operable
and the Technical
, Specification
(TS) action statement
was exited.
On January
28 the
I
inspector
reviewed the
PER to determine
the rationale for returning the
"A" train to an operable status.
The inspector
noted that,
as
a result of the
PER, the licensee
revised
PPN 7.4.6.5.3.6
to test both charcoal
adsorber
beds concurrently, in
series..
The inspector also noted from review of the procedure that the
sample points both upstream
and downstream of the charcoal
beds
were
moved,
and the injection point was moved also.
The charcoal
beds in
both trains were then retested
concurrently
and their operability (when
treated
as
one integral adsorber unit in each train) was demonstrated.
The inspector
subsequently
verified that this test method, after the
procedure revision, satisfied
the
TS for testing of the charcoal
beds.
Each train of SGT at WNP-2 also contains
two separate
high efficiency
particulate air (HEPA) filter banks in series
(one upstream
and
one
downstream of the charcoal
adsorber
bed), with four HEPA filters in each
bank.
The
HEPA filters have
bypass
leakage testing requirements
similar
to t'>>ose for the charcoal
adsorber
beds,
except that particulate dioctyl
phthalate
(DOP) is used for the
HEPA filters in place of Freon.
The
TS
direct that bypass
leakage testing for*the HEPA filters and charcoal
beds
be conducted
per the guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.c,
and
C.5.d, respectively, of Regulatory
Guide 1.52.
These Regulatory
Positions of Regulatory Guide 1.52 direct this testing to be conducted
per Sections
10 and 12, respectively, of ANSI Standard
N510-1975.
Sections
10 and
12 of ANSI N510-1975 both state specifically that
Section
9 of ANSI N510-1975 is
a prerequisite.
Section
10 also states
that if the
HEPA filter system contains
more than
one
bank of filters in
series,
each
bank must be tested separately.
Section
9 of ANSI N510-1975,
"Air-Aerosol Mixing Uniformity Test,"
states
that it is to be performed once
upon completion of initial SGT
system installation,
and after modification or major repair.
It is not
required
each time an in-place test of the
HEPA filters or adsorbers
is
conducted.
The purpose of this test is to verify that tracer
(DOP
or'reon)
injection and sample points are located
so
as to provide .proper
mixing of the tracer in the air approaching
the
HEPA filter bank or
adsorber
stage.
The testing
done pursuant,to
Section
9 validates
the
injection and sample points which are to be used for all subsequent
bypass
leakage testing per Sections
10 and 12, so that the testing
performed pursuant to these
sections is meaningful
and representative.
The inspector
reviewed preoperational
test SLT-S39.0-5
and portions of
preoperational
test SLT-S39.0-4,
both conducted in 1983 (after initial
SGT system installation) to comply with Section
9 of ANSI N510-1975.
These preoperational
tests
did in fact'stablish
the injection and
sample points to be-used
in subsequent
bypass
leakage testing performed
per Sections
10 and
12 of ANSI N510-1975.
The inspector
noted that
an
injection manifold was used for injecting
DOP to challenge
the down-
stream
HEPA filter bank.
The 1983 preoperational
test confirmed that
..
this injection manifold ensured
a homogeneous
mixture of the
DOP and air
approaching
the
KEPA filters such that
a representative
upstream
sample
would be obtained.
In addition, the
1983 preoperational
testing of the
charcoal
beds validated tracer injection and sample locations for two
different test methods for testing the charcoal
units separately
or
0-
concurrently.
The validated
method for testing the charcoal
beds
sepa-
rately, which the licensee
had
done before the procedure
change dis-
cussed
above,
also required that manifolds
be used for tracer injection
and upstream
sampling
when testing the downstream
charcoal
bed.
Other-
wise, per SLT-S39.0-5,
the adsorber
beds
were to'be tested concurrently.
Licensee
personnel
responsible for testing
SGT were questioned
about the
use of the injection and sampling manifolds and, to their knowledge,
they had never
been
used.
Failure to use the injection manifolds for
testing the downstream
HEPA filter bank,
and the injection and sampling
manifolds for testing the downstream
charcoal
bed, is
a violation of TS Section 4.6.5.3.b.
1 (Violation 397/91-04-01).
The licensee
appears
to
have .corrected
the portion of this violation which pertains to the
charcoal
beds
by making the procedure
change
discussed
above.
However,
this change
appears
to have
been
made
because
acceptable
test results
could not be obtained
when the beds
were tested
separately,
not because
the licensee
was aware that the previous test method
was in violation of
the requirements.
The portion of this issue involving the charcoal
beds
is therefore not considered
to be
a licensee-identified violation.
On February
1 at 9:00 p.m., after the inspector
noted that the procedure
for testing the downstream
HEPA filter was incorrect, the licensee
entered
TS 4.0.3, which allows 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to successfully
complete
a sur-
veillance test that has not been
performed
as required.
The licensee
attempted
to validate the injection method that had been
used for test-
ing the downstream
HEPA filters by conducting
a test per Section
9 of
ANSI N510-1975.
The results failed the acceptance
criteria.
They were
finally able to successfully test the downstream
HEPA filter bank by
removing the upstream
HEPA filters and using its previously established
injection and sample points.
The upstr
am bank was then tested after
reinstallation.
was exited at about 12:00 p.m.
on February 2.
Additional concerns
expressed
to the licensee
included:
PPN 7.4.6.5.3.5,
"SGT System
and Visual Inspection,"
did not indicate, specifically where injection and sample ports were
located.
Sample
and injection ports
on the filtration units themselves
were
only identified by writing in black marker pen.
There was incon-
sistency in the labeling for injection and sample points between
the "A" and "B" trains, especially
where the downstream
filters were concerned.
Conversations
with licensee
personnel
responsible for SGT testing indicated that for the downstream
filters the intended injection point was in doubt.
Confusion existed
as to,whether the
1975 or 1980 version of ANSI
N510 applied for bypass
leakage testing of SGT or other safety
related filtration systems.
Some differences exist between
the two
which may be significant,
and Regulatory Positions
C.5.c
and C.5.d
of Regulatory Guide 1.52 specifically endorse
the
1975 version.
The licensee
has
committed to the
1980 version in the
FSAR.
This
issue
was resolved
in subsequent
discussions
with cognizant
licensee
personnel.
4
The licensee
issued
a
PER to document
and resolve the
SGT testing
deficiency.
A Level I root cause
evaluation
was initiated to determine
why the original preoperational
tests
had not been followed.
Licensee
Event Report
(LER)91-003,
issued after the
end of the inspection
period, also discussed
this issue.
One violation was identified,
as discussed
above.
4.
Previousl
Identified
NRC Ins ection Items
92701,
92702
The inspectors
reviewed records,
interviewed personnel,
and inspected
plant hardware relative to licensee
actions
on previously identified
inspection findings:
a.
Closed
Part
21
Re ort 90-03-P - Potential
Problem with Rockbestos
Ca
es w>t
KS-500 Insu at>on
Rockbestos,
a vendor of electrical
cable,
submitted
a Part
21
report to the
NRC concerning
a discrepancy
in Rockbestos
cable with
certain silicon rubber insulation.
This insulation
was designated
KS-500.
The discrepancy
involved the use of the wrong activation
energy in the calculation for its equipment qualification.
Use of
the wrong activation energy would adversely
impact the environ-
mental qualification of the cable.
A copy of the Part
21 report
was sent to each licensee to which this type of cable
had been
supplied, including the Supply System.
After a search of records,
the licensee
determined that the cable
originally bought under the purchase
order referenced
by Rockbestos
had been received at the WNP-3/5. projects.
No cable
had
been
transferred
from either
WNP-3 or WNP-5 to WNP-2.
In addition,
no
procurement history for this type of cable
was found for WNP-2,
indicating that that
no cable of this type had
been
purchased
from
Rockbestos for use at WNP-2.
Further, it was determined that the
cable received
by WNP-3 had
been sold to a contractor for
non-nuclear
use.
This item is closed.
b.
Closed
Followu
Item 397/90-28-02 - Drawin
Revision Not Issued
for Cross-connected
Contro
Room
nstrument
Power
Su
ses
A deficiency was discovered
by the licensee
in October
1990 involv-
ing 24
VDC power supplies for certain control
room instrumentation.
Class
lE power supplies
had effectively been cross-connected
with
non-Class
lE power supplies,
rendering safety related instruments
susceptible
to faults
on non-safety related
power supplies.
This
was the result of a design
change that had
been
implemented
in 1983
by a Burns
and
Roe engineer.
The applicable drawing had not been
updated to reflect the design
change that had implemented this
wiring error.
The inspector left this item open to determine if
this was
a generic
problem.
In response,
the licensee
reviewed several
design
changes
imple-
mented during the
1983 time frame.
All had correctly updated
design
documents with the exception of the one discussed
above.
Thus, it appeared that the problem was
an isolated
one,
and that
the design engineer at the time had neglected
to modify the panel
connection
diagram
as required to reflect the as-built
configuration.
This item is closed.
co
(Closed
Followu
Item 397/90-31-03 - Weaknesses
in Im lementation
of Co d Weather
Pre aratsons
Several
weaknesses
were identified with regard to implementation of
the cold weather preparation
program.
They were corrected
as
follows:
+
One circuit on the heat trace
panel in the Condensate
Storage
Tank
(CST) pit area
had
a low temperature
alarm,
even though
the ambient temperature
was
above the alarm point of 35
degrees
at the time.
Operations
submitted
an
MWR and the
problem was corrected.
The procedure for cold weather operations,
PPM 1.3.37, stated,
"Ensure there is no debris in the
CST pit area that could plug
the drain and flood."
However, several
inches of water were
observed in the
CST pit area, indicating that the drain was
indeed plugged,
and appeared
to hamper efforts to check the
panel in the area.
Per the Assistant Operations
Manager,
the normal drain system for the
CST pit has never
been
used
because
the radiation monitor originally installed
in the drain piping was-inadequate
for the application.
Therefore,
the
CST pit has
always
been
pumped to the turbine
building sump via a temporary
pumping arrangement,
making the
process
a difficult one."
The Assistant Operations
Manager
stated that the
CST pit will be
pumped out when the water gets
one inch deep or greater,
and
PPM 1.3.37 will be revised to
reflect this.
Various heat trace panels
were being checked
once
a day by
equipment operators
even though
PPM 1.3.37 stated that these
panels
should
be checked
by each shift when they are in
service during cold weather.
The Assistant Operations
Manager
stated that the equipment operator log sheets
would be changed
to require that heat trace
panels
be checked
each shift for
continuity and low temperatures.
This item is closed.
d.
Closed)
Followu
Item 397/BS-32-01 - Discre ancies/Concerns
e ar
sn
W
o
s
scat>ons
The inspector
had reviewed the licensee's
implementation of the
Anticipated Transient Without Scram
(ATWS) rule,
and
l
had determined that followup inspection
was necessary
to resolve
certain aspects
that were incomplete at the time of the inspection.
These aspects,
and their resolutions,
are itemized below:
Some operators
had not been
aware of the manual
reset charac-
teristic of the alternate
rod insertion
(ARI) system,
or of
the minimum required time to reset.
The inspector interviewed
a number of licensed
operators,
and found that they were fami-
liar with the manual reset function of ARI and were aware that
there
was
a minimum time to wait before attempting to reset.
In addition, this minimum time to reset
(45 seconds)
had
been
incorporated into the applicable
emergency
operating
procedure
that th'e control
room operators
follow when responding to an
ATWS event.
At the time of the previous inspection,
ARI modifications
had
not been
added to the simulator.
The inspector verified that
ARI modifications installed in the plant had
been
added to the
simulator.
The licensee's
ATWS Criteria Design Implementation
Review
document
had identified certain
commitments
associated
with
ATWS implementation that were not complete.
The inspector
verified by reviewing applicable
documentation that all
18
issues
remaining
open at the time of the inspection in the
Design Implementation
Review Document
had subsequently
been
completed.
The logic scheme
used for the
ATWS recirculation
pump trip
(RPT)
had been
a one out of two taken
once for each recircu-
lation pump. This logic was different from the one out of two
taken twice scheme that had
been found acceptable
by the
NRC.
The licensee
subsequently
modified the
RPT logic to
a one out
of two taken twice for each recirculation
pump.
This item is considered
closed.
5.
0 erational
Safet
Verification
71707
93001
a ~
Plant Tours
The following plant areas
were toured
by the inspectors
during the
course of the inspection:
Reactor Building
Control
Room
Diesel
Generator Building
Radwaste
Building
Technical
Support Center
Turbine Generator Building
Yard Area and Perimeter
b.
The followin
items were observed
durin
the tours:"
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(g)
0 eratin
Lo s
and Records.
Records
were reviewed against
ec naca
peer
icatson
an
administrative control procedure
requirements.
Nonitorin
Instrumentation.
Process
instruments
were observed
or corre at>on
etween
c annels
and for compliance with
Technical Specification requirements.
S~tif
N
i
.
C
1
d lif
i
9
b
d
for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical Specifica-
tions,
and administrative
procedures.
The attentiveness
of
the operators
was observed
in the execution of their duties.
and the control
room was observed
to be free of distractions
such
as
non-work related
radios
and reading materials.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valves
and electrical
breakers
were veri-
fie
to
e 1n t e position or condition required
by Technical
Specifications
and administrative
procedures
for the applic-
able plant mode..
This verification included routine control
board indication reviews
and conduct of partial
system
lineups.
Technical Specification limiting conditions for
operation
were verified by direct observation.
E ui ment Ta
in
.
Selected
equipment, for which tagging
requests
ha
been initiated, was observed
to verify that tags
were in place
and the equipment
was in the condition
specified.
General
Plant
E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment
was
o serve
for indicatsons
of system leakage,
improper lubrica-
tion, or other conditions that would prevent the system from
fulfillingits functional requirements.
Annunciators were
observed to ascertain their status
and operability.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment
and controls were
df
Ih dpi<on practices
to determine
whether the licensee's
program was being implemented in
conformance with facility policies
and procedures
and in
compliance with regulatory. requirements.
The inspectors
also
observed
compliance with Radiation
Work Permits,
proper
wearing of protective equipment
and personnel
monitoring
devices,
and personnel
frisking practices.
Radiation
monitoring equipment
was frequently monitored to verify
operability
and adherence
to calibration frequency.
4
II
(10) Plant Housekee
inc.
Plant conditions
and material/equipment
storage
were
o served to determine
the general
state of
cleanliness
and housekeeping.
Housekeeping
in the radio-
logically controlled area
was evaluated with respect to
controlling the spread
of surface
and airborne contamination.
(11) ~Securit
.
The inspectors
periodically observed
security
practices
to ascertain
that the licensee's
implementation of
the security plan was in accordance
with site procedures,
that
the search
equipment at the access
control points
was
operational,
that the vital area portals were kept locked
and
alarmed,
and that personnel
allowed'ccess
to the protected
area
were
badged
and monitored
and the monitoring equipment
was functional.
C.
( 12)
Occu ational Safet
.
Plant conditions which could result in
an occupationa
ris
, such
as exposure to toxic non-radio-
active materials,
were monitored
by the inspectors.
The
inspectors
periodically monitored for other such industrial
hazards
in the workplace.
Safet
S stem Malkdowns
Selected
engineered
safety features
(and systems
important to
safety)
were walked
down by the inspector to confirm that the
systems
were aligned in accordance
with plant procedures.
During
the walkdown of the systems,
items
such
as lub} ication of major
components
and cooling water/ventilation were inspected
to deter-
mine that they were operable
and in a condition to perform their
required functions.
The inspectors
also verified that system
valves were in the required position by both local
and remote
position indication,
as applicable.
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked down on
the indicated dates.
~Sstem
Dates
Scram Discharge
Volume System
125V
DC Electrical Distribution,
Divisions
1 and
2
February
4
January
30
250V
DC Electri ca 1 Distributi on
No violations or deviations
were identified.
January
30
6.
Survei 1 l ance
Tes tin
61726
a.
Surveillance tests
required to be performed
by the Technical
Specifications
(TS) were reviewed
on
a sampling basis to verify
that:
( 1)
a technically adequate
procedure
existed for performance
of the surveillance tests;
(2) the surveillance tests
had
been
performed at the frequency specified in the TS and in accordance
with the
TS surveillance
requirements;
and (3) test results
satisfied
acceptance
criteria or were properly dispositioned.
Portions of the following surveillance tests
were observed
by the
inspectors
on the dates
shown:
Procedure
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
7.4.8.1.1.2.1
Nonthly Operability of
(EDGs)
January
15
7.4.6.5.3.6
7.4.3.6.23
Standby
Gas
Treatment'ystem
Adsorber Bypass
Leakage Test
'ecirculationFlow Channel
"B" Upscale
or Inoperable
Control
Rod Block
February
1
February
5
10. 2. 77TP
Reactor
Closed Cooling
(RCC)
February
6
Heat Exchanger
"B" Flush
Chemical
C1eaninq
While observing the conduct of the
EDG surveillance test
on January
15, the inspector noted the following:
Step
18 on page
16 of PPH 7.4.8.1.1.2.1
is
a prerequisite
step in
which the operator verifies that Standby Service Water
(SSW) flow
is 1650-1750 gallons per minute (gpm).
However, according to the
local gauge,
the flow rate of SSW was actually 1810
gpm, outside:
the required
band.
The operator
noted this discrepancy
and
reported the out of specification flow rate to the control room.
The operators
in the control, room replied that since the logs for
an operating diesel
generator
allowed
a wider control
band
(1400-2200
gpm), the
SSW flow was satisfactory.
The local operator
then signed off the prerequisite
step,
and the surveillance
continued
through completion.
The inspector questioned
why a procedure
change
was not initiated
prior to continuing with the surveillance in order to clearly
document
and rectify the discrepancy.
This would also allow an
improvement of the procedure
to make it more feasible the next time
it was worked.
Finally, since this was
a Technical Specification
required
surveillance test,
the inspector questioned
why a sound
technical justification was not provided for deviating from certain
steps of it.
During discussions
with the Assistant Operations
Hanager,
he stated
'hat
this problem had minimal safety significance
because
the
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higher flow rate was anticipated
by operations
personnel
and did
not affect
EDG operability.
The
SSW system
was also being operated
in the "splash
mode" (which bypasses
the spray
pond spray nozzles
during cold weather), resulting in less
back-pressure
in the
system,
and therefore
a higher flow rate in the system.
However,
the Assistant Operations
Manager stated that the procedure
would be
revised to allow for higher flow rates
when the
SSW system is
operated
in the above-mentioned
cold weather lineup.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Evaluation of the Licensee's
Self Assessment
Ca abilit
40500)
The inspector
conducted
interviews with several
personnel
associated
with the licensee's
oversight groups,
and reviewed Plant Operations
Committee
(POC) minutes,
the Operational
Experience
Assessment
(OEA)
group's monthly summaries
and recommendations,
and inspection reports
ir~ued by Technical
Ass"-ss.-.=-:.=.~s
~ a;.sonnel.
During this inspection,
the
inspector ascertained
that the licensee
appeared
to be in compliance
with the Technical Specifications
(TS) and appeared
to have strong
programs for these oversight groups.
Some'xamples
of the particular
~ "".>ngths are listed below:
POC is required
by the
TS to meet monthly to discuss plant
operations
and approve
Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs), replies to
Notices of Violations
(NOYs), changes
to the TS,
and other items.
Pi7i actually meets at least weekly,
and sometimes
even more often,
which keeps
POC closely involved with plant operations.
OEA reviews events from other utilities,
INPO reports,
Generic
Letters
and other items in the nuclear industry to determine if
action needs to be taken at
WNP-2 to prevent similar occurrences
or
correct similar problems.
The inspector
noted several
examples of
significant recommendations
that kept the licensee
ahead of
potential
problems.
For example, at the Grand Gulf nuclear
power
plant, the licensee lost control of a fuel bundle during refueling
due to problems with certain refueling bridge equipment.
The
OEA
at WNP-2 recommended
that the refueling equipment at WNP-2 be
checked for similar problems prior to use.
Upon inspection,
some
of the problems
noted with the'rand
Gulf refueling equipment were
noted at WNP-2 also.
Thus, the licensee
took timely action to
correct these
problems before they became
more significant.
Technical
Assessments
performs inspections
similar to the
NRC and
INPO.
Technical
Assessments
has
some experienced
personnel
(including former operators)
who are highly knowledgeable
in the
areas
they inspect.
A Safety System Functional
Inspection
(SSFI)
of the
SSW system,
performed recently
by the group,
made approxi-
mately
70 observations
and was generally of high quality.
In
addition, Technical
Assessments
issued
an Outage Modification
Inspection'hat identified several significant issues.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
0
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I
Plant Maintenance
(62703
During the inspection period, the inspector
observed
and reviewed
documentation
associated
with maintenance
and problem investigation
activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements
and with
administrative
and maintenance
procedures,'equired
gA/l}C involvement,
proper use of clearance
tags,
proper equipment alignment
and use of
jumpers,
personnel
qualifications,
and proper retesting.
The inspector
verified that reportability for these activities was correct.
The inspector witnessed
portions of the following maintenance
activities:
~D
Investigation of oil leak from
Division I
Recalibrate
(Diesel Mixed Air)
DMA-TIS-ll/1 per
AR 2248
Replace
rubber rollers
on south fuel
preparation
machine per
AR 1413
Dates
Performed.
January
14
January
14
February
1
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Licensee
Event
Re ort (LER
Followu
90712
92700
The following LER associated
with an operating
event
was reviewed
by the
inspector.
Based
on the,information provided in the report it was
concluded that reporting requirements'had
been met, root causes
had
been
identified, and corrective actions
were appropriate.
The below LER is
considered
closed.
LER
NUMBER
91-01
DESCRIPTION
RCIC-V-8 ESF Actuation
Due to Failed Electronic
Component in Leakage Detection System
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Review of Periodic
and
S ecial
Re orts
90713
Periodic
and special
reports
submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to
Technical Specifications 6.9.1
and 6.9.2 were reviewed
by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained
the information required to be reported
by NRC requirements,
and the
reported
information appeared
valid.
Within the scope of the above,
the
following report was reviewed
by the inspector.
Monthly Operating
Report "for December,
1990.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
12
11.
Exit Meetin
30703
The inspector
met with licensee
management
representatives
periodically
during the report period to discuss
inspection status,
and
an exit meet-
ing was conducted with the indicated personnel
(refer to paragraph
1)
on
February
19,
1991.
The scope of the inspection
and the inspector's
findings,
as, noted in this report, were discussed
with and acknowledged
by the licensee
representatives.
I
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information
reviewed by or discussed
with the inspector during the inspection.
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