ML17286A241

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LTR-17-0387 Joseph Pollock, Vice President and Acting Chief Nuclear Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute, Memorandum SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations (Information Paper)
ML17286A241
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Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 10/11/2017
From: Joseph E Pollock
Nuclear Energy Institute
To: Kristine Svinicki
NRC/Chairman
Hayes B
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JOSEPH E. POLLOCK Vice President, and Acting Chief Nuclear Officer 1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 P: 202.739.8114 F. 202.533.0127 jep@nei.org October 11, 2017 The Honorable Kristine Svinicki Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations Project Number: 689

Dear Chairman Svinicki:

The Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. (NEI) 1 appreciates the Commissions consideration of our comments on SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations. In this SECY paper released in August, the NRC staff has informed the Commission of the staffs intent to continue use of Tier 2* designations in design certification information. The industry now has five years of experience in the application of Tier 2* at two plant sites, Vogtle 3/4 and Summer 2/3. Considering the additional burden and complexity associated with the use of Tier 2*, and the lack of commensurate safety benefit, the NRC staff has not adequately justified its conclusion to retain it. The staff conclusion stands in stark contrast to lead plant experience demonstrating that Tier 2* is problematic and unnecessary and should be eliminated.

The industrys 10 CFR Part 52 lessons learned activities reaffirm that Tier 2* is a source of undue regulatory burden for licensees during construction as well as a potential source of construction delay, a key concern for future applicants considering the use of Part 52. Four years after the NRC identified Tier 2* as a problem area in its July 2013 post-COL self-assessment of Part 52 implementation, the staffs July 24, 2017 SECY paper affirming its continued use in future design certifications leaves the industrys longstanding concerns unresolved. For the reasons discussed below, the industry supports NRC implementing Alternative 2 in SECY-17-0075, which is to discontinue use of Tier 2* for future design certifications.

1 NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEIs members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.

The Honorable Kristine Svinicki October 11, 2017 Page 2 Discussion Designation of Tier 2* information in a design certification requires prior NRC approval via license amendment for any changes made to that information, regardless of the safety significance of the change.

This is similar to the treatment of Tier 1 changes, which require an exemption via license amendment. It is distinctly different from treatment of Tier 2 information, which may be changed, provided several safety-focused criteria are met, without prior NRC approval using a process similar to 10 CFR 50.59.

Experience at Vogtle 3/4 and Summer 2/3 demonstrates that Tier 2* places additional burden and unwarranted additional costs on licensees constructing plants under 10 CFR Part 52, while providing no added safety benefit. Moreover, the need for prior NRC approval increases the potential that emergent Tier 2* issues could cause needless construction delays. Since NEI raised concerns regarding the use of the Tier 2* designation in a December 19, 2014 letter to the NRC, three years of additional experience with Tier 2*

has reinforced our conclusion that other less burdensome regulatory processes exist, including the Tier 2 50.59-like change process, to ensure prior NRC review and approval of safety-significant changes. NEIs December 2014 letter (copy attached) provides additional information on the history of Tier 2*, the industrys strong objections to it, and an analysis of AP1000 Tier 2* information that supports the industrys conclusion and recommendation that Tier 2* should be eliminated. An updated assessment of Tier 2*

experience has shown that approximately 30% of license amendment requests were required solely because of changes to Tier 2* information. Of those changes, approximately 90% would not have required an amendment if a 50.59-like change process could be applied. The remainder would have required a license amendment request under the 50.59-like process, i.e., the Tier 2* designation was duplicative and unnecessary.

In several public meetings held since 2014 and the recent SECY paper, the NRC staff has been unable to provide examples where Tier 2* provided safety or regulatory benefit that would potentially justify the added cost and burden of its continued use. Additionally, the SECY does not provide the staffs analysis of how the Tier 2 (50.59-like) change process is insufficient to assure prior NRC review and approval of safety-significant changes. Instead, the staff provides only a general statement that Tier 2* designations may be useful in some cases.

The added complexity and burden that Tier 2* has imposed on licensees has made the already challenging task of constructing a nuclear plant even more difficult, without a corresponding safety benefit. While the staff acknowledged that the scope of AP1000 Tier 2* is somewhat larger than necessary, the SECY does not contemplate or propose any immediate remedy for units under construction that continue to bear the additional burden of unnecessary Tier 2* designations on top of the many other challenges they face. This situation needs to be corrected.

Additional specific comments on SECY-17-0075 are provided in the attachment.

The Honorable Kristine Svinicki October 11, 2017 Page 3 Evolving NRC Staff Position While not clear from the staffs July 24 SECY paper, we understand that the staff is implementing a new position whereby NRC will no longer impose Tier 2* designations on future design certification applicants.

The new staff position was discussed during a public meeting with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power on August 16, 2017. According to the discussion, going forward, the staff will focus on establishing the proper scope of Tier 1 versus Tier 2 information, and then allow the applicant to identify specific Tier 1 information (if any) that it would prefer to designate as Tier 2*. While it would not eliminate Tier 2*, implementation of this new position would provide a path for design certification applicants to avoid Tier 2* designations altogether.

The new NRC staff position on Tier 2* appears to support the industry view that proper delineation of Tier 1 versus Tier 2 is key, and that Tier 2* is unnecessary. While the new position would be a welcome shift by the NRC staff, we are concerned that the new position on voluntary use of the Tier 2* is not clearly articulated in the SECY-17-0075 and is not documented in staff guidance. Moreover, while the change in NRC staff position toward Tier 2* is timely to benefit current design certification applicants, we are also concerned that the ongoing reviews make the need for guidance on establishing the proper scope of Tier 1 information more urgent than indicated by the SECY, which provides no plan or timetable to develop it. For example, guidance is needed without delay to support ongoing design certification reviews so that information previously designated Tier 2* is not unnecessarily relocated to Tier 1.

Summary and Requested Action By affirming continued use of Tier 2*, the staff has not addressed an important lesson learned from recent and ongoing Part 52 implementation. Designating a sub-category of Tier 2* information that cannot be changed without prior NRC approval has reduced both the flexibility intended by the Commission 2 and the safety focus provided by the 50.59-like change process, while unnecessarily increasing burden on both licensees and the NRC.

The staff has not adequately justified its conclusion to continue the use of Tier 2* (Alternative 1 in the SECY). We believe Alternative 2 in the SECY (discontinuing use of Tier 2*) is more consistent with the NRC staffs newly announced position on voluntary use of the Tier 2* designation and the NRCs Principles of Good Regulation, especially Clarity, Efficiency and Reliability. In the interest of clarity, the NRC staff should reconsider its conclusion in a revision or supplement to SECY-17-0075, or at a minimum, provide a supplement to SECY-17-0075 that makes the new staff position clear and establishes a schedule for developing guidance to ensure consistent implementation.

2 NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-90-377, February 15, 1991, page 4,Section VI, Flexibility.

The Honorable Kristine Svinicki October 11, 2017 Page 4 A full examination of Part 52 implementation experience is expected to identify the need for more fundamental reforms that should be considered as part of further lessons learned activities. However, elimination of Tier 2* is a step that can and should be taken today to immediately benefit design certification applicants and to demonstrate timely, effective response to regulatory lessons learned.

Although SECY-17-0075 is focused on future design certifications, the staffs conclusion that the scope of AP1000 Tier 2* designations is larger than necessary indicates that near-term relief for Vogtle 3/4 is appropriate. Given the immediate relief that may be afforded during ongoing construction, we urge the Commission to direct the staff to expeditiously work with Southern Company to identify the most timely and efficient course to relieve Vogtle 3/4 from the continued unnecessary burden of Tier 2*.

Our goal in this effort is to ensure that Part 52 remains a viable licensing option for current licensees and applicants, as well as future applicants. We look forward to working with the NRC staff and Commission to recognize and implement key lessons learned from Part 52 implementation to date. If you have any questions or require any additional information concerning this matter, please contact me or Michael Tschiltz (mdt@nei.org or 202-739-8083) at NEI.

Sincerely, Joseph E. Pollock Attachments c: The Honorable Jeff Baran, NRC The Honorable Stephen Burns, NRC Mr. Victor McCree, Executive Director for Operations, NRC Mr. Michael Johnson, NRC Ms. Vonna Ordaz, NRC Mr. Michael Mayfield, NRC Mr. Frank Akstulewicz, NRC

Attachment 1 Additional Specific Comments on SECY-17-0075

1. Flexibility: Repeated references in the SECY paper to the flexibility afforded by the Tier 2*

change process versus the Tier 1 change process are misleading, especially in the context of the significant policy decision at hand concerning continuation of Tier 2*. In reality, the experience of SNC and SCANA has shown that Tier 2* has provided no flexibility. Rather, any change to Tier 2*

information requires a license amendment request (LAR), regardless of the change is safety significant. There is essentially no difference in burden between changes to Tier 1, which require an exemption as part of an LAR , and changes to Tier 2* which require an LAR but no exemption. The additional Tier 1 exemption requirement means little in terms of additional burden, because the bulk of the burden is associated with the LAR. The additional criteria for changes that require an exemption, most notably, to consider the loss of standardization as a result of the change, have not been an obstacle. In any event, the risk that the additional criteria for exemptions could complicate future changes is fully borne by the licensees.

2. Need for Guidance: On the need for improved guidance for designating Tier 1 versus Tier 2 information, the NRC staff and industry agree. In a June 14, 2017 letter, NEI reiterated its May 2015 request for NRC review and discussion of First Principles for determining the scope of Tier 1 versus Tier 2. Establishing Tier 1 First Principles will facilitate determinations on whether certain information that has in the past been designated Tier 2* actually belongs in Tier 1, and will generally assist in ensuring the proper scope of Tier 1 overall. The industry is prepared to abide by the application of appropriate criteria based on Tier 1 First Principles for determining Tier 1 versus Tier 2 information, without the need for Tier 2*.
3. Use of the 50.59-like Process: The SECY states that the staff is not confident that all safety-significant changes to Tier 2* information would have been identified as needing prior NRC approval under the 50.59-like change process (i.e., without Tier 2* designation), but does not explain that assertion or provide any examples. Industrys experience is contrary to this statement in the SECY. It is instructive to look at two well-known examples of safety significant Tier 2* changes: Basemat Shear Reinforcement Design Details and Nuclear Island Walls Reinforcement Criteria. First, neither issue was identified by virtue of Tier 2* designation; rather, they were identified during target ITAAC inspections. Second, once identified, the need for an LAR was determined by applying the 50.59-like process; Tier 2* was not necessary. These examples illustrate the point that other mechanisms exist to ensure prior NRC approval of safety-significant changes.
4. LWRs versus Non-LWRs: The industry disagrees with the staff that Tier 2* may be useful to address technical challenges in advanced non-LWR reviews. Tier 2* is an overly burdensome and duplicative regulatory practice regardless of technology. Whether it is an LWR or non-LWR review, the staff should ensure that the information necessary to support required safety findings is contained in Tier 2 and that top-level information to be certified is contained in Tier 1. Tier 2* has no safety benefit and should not be used because it adds unnecessary costs/burden and constrains the flexibility intended by the Commission and necessary to construct the facility, LWRs and non-LWRs alike.

Attachment 2 RUSSELL J. BELL Senior Director, New Plant Licensing 1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 P: 202.739.8087 rjb@nei.org nei.org December 19, 2014 Mr. Michael E. Mayfield Director Division of Advanced Reactors and Rulemaking Office of New Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Tier 2* Follow-Up Project Number: 689

Dear Mr. Mayfield:

On behalf of the nuclear energy industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 1 participated in a series of public meetings on the appropriate scope of information to be designated as Tier 2* in future design certification applications under 10 CFR Part 52. The purpose of this letter is to follow-up and reinforce key points from those public meetings (May 8, October 6, and November 13, 2014) related to Tier 2* genesis and history, experience to date, and alternatives, as input to assist the NRC staff in its Part 52 post-combined license (COL) lessons learned activities.

As discussed in our public meetings, Tier 2* has a long history. Tier 2* was not envisioned when the Commission approved a two-tier change process in 1991 to provide the flexibility that licensees would need to procure equipment and construct the plant. Designating design information as Tier 2* is not required by, or even mentioned, in the main body of Part 52. However, in the course of delineating Tier 1 and Tier 2 for the first design certifications, the staff determined - over strong industry objections - that departures from certain Tier 2 information would require prior NRC approval. This sub-category of Tier 2 information was designated Tier 2*. At the time, NRC explained that the purpose of Tier 2* was to ensure that a licensee could not make changes in certain important design methodologies that pertained to areas where it is not practical to specify a high degree of design detail at the time of design certification or where it was believed desirable to allow the design to accommodate subsequent improvements in technology.

1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible for establishing unified industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations and entities involved in the nuclear energy industry.

Attachment 2 Mr. Michael E. Mayfield December 19, 2014 Page 2 This rationale for Tier 2* was largely rendered moot by the 2007 rule change to the 50.59-like process for departures from methods of evaluation. We continue to believe that creating a sub-category of Tier 2 information that requires prior NRC approval to change is unnecessary and complicates an already rigorous change process.

Indeed, Tier 2* experience to date on Vogtle 3/4 and Summer 2/3 has substantiated many of the concerns that were the bases for our original objections, including uncertainty in the current licensing basis due to lack of precision in designating Tier 2* information and the loss of safety focus in the change process. By requiring prior NRC approval for any change to information designated as Tier 2* instead of relying on the criteria in the 50.59-like change process in Section VIII.B.5.b and c of the design certification rules to identify when a specific change requires prior NRC approval, numerous changes that have no safety significance must be reviewed by the NRC. As of earlier this year, 13 out of 15 license amendment requests (LARs) necessitated by impacts on Tier 2* information were not safety significant and would not have required prior NRC approval under the 50.59-like (Tier 2) change process. Nonetheless, these changes required the licensee and the NRC to expend resources to develop, review, and approve LARs of no safety significance. The other two changes (involving changes to Codes for concrete and rebar design) met the 50.59-like criteria for requiring prior NRC approval such that the Tier 2* designation was unnecessary.

Based on experience to date, the NRC staff correctly identified Tier 2* implementation as a problem area in its July 2013 lessons learned report, Part 52 Implementation Self-Assessment Review: 1 Year Post-Combined License Issuance (ML13196A403). As previously mentioned, actions to address Tier 2* have been the subject of the three public meetings earlier this year. While the staffs initial focus has been on improving the clarity of Tier 2* designations, the industry believes that other tools and processes exist that obviate the need for Tier 2* in future design certifications.

Alternatives to Tier 2* for Future Design Certifications The NRC staff designated Tier 2* information in first-of-kind design certifications and has continued the practice in the more recent AP1000 and ESBWR rules. Although the Commission did approve design certifications containing Tier 2* information, there is no requirement to identify Tier 2* information in either the design certification application or the final Design Certification Rule. Industrys view is that Tier 2* is not necessary for future applicants starting from a clean sheet of paper based on the ability to apply experience to date, use of improved criteria and guidance (currently being developed) for delineating Tier 1 vs. Tier 2 information, and reliance on other existing tools and processes to control and monitor design implementation.

Tier 2 information needs to be sufficient for the NRC to make its safety finding, and SERs are expected to clearly document the basis for the staffs safety conclusions. The 50.59-like process controls subsequent departures from Tier 2 such that the validity of the staffs safety findings is maintained. It does this by requiring an LAR for changes that meet specified criteria, and the LAR must be reviewed and approved by the NRC before being implemented. A key reason that experience to date indicates that Tier 2* designation 2

Attachment 2 Mr. Michael E. Mayfield December 19, 2014 Page 3 is unnecessary is the revision to the 50.59-like process accomplished in the 2007 Part 52 rulemaking and applied to all design certifications. This revision included the addition of a criterion that requires prior NRC approval of changes to methods of evaluation used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Lack of a criterion on control of design methodologies was a significant driver behind the staffs original desire for Tier 2*, but that driver has now been largely removed. The 50.59-like process is proving to be effective in identifying changes that warrant prior NRC approval, just as 10 CFR 50.59 has been for the operating fleet since that rule was revised in 1999.

Significant overlap of Tier 2* information with Tier 1/ITAAC further diminishes any need for Tier 2*. Tier 1 change controls assure that top level design features and performance characteristics are not changed without prior NRC approval. Moreover, many Tier 2* areas correspond to design acceptance criteria (DAC) and/or Target ITAAC, thus assuring appropriate and timely focus on design implementation areas (including any changes) of particular interest to the staff. In addition, Quality Assurance Program inspections, vendor inspections, and other inspections provide ample opportunities for the NRC staff to monitor, and intervene if necessary, in licensee design implementation activities without the need for Tier 2* designations.

In our last public meeting with the NRC staff on November 13, we discussed the lack of need for Tier 2* in specific areas, and in some areas, the staff provided some reasoning for retaining Tier 2*. The reasoning provided by the staff was far from the original intent of Tier 2*, and in our view, generally not compelling to justify the continuation of Tier 2* in light of the other existing processes and tools available. In particular,

  • The staff suggested that Tier 2* is needed to control cumulative impacts of minor changes. Never a rationale for Tier 2*, cumulative impact of changes is not an issue unique to new plants or any particular design area, nor one that warrants use of Tier 2*. Rather, 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) to be kept up to date. Compliance with this rule requires licensees to assess each change against the current licensing basis of the plant. Configuration control processes ensure that licensees understand where each change places them within their design and licensing bases. The cumulative changes must be in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements and other acceptance criteria to which licensees are committed. The 50.59-like process assures that changes that require prior NRC approval are identified.
  • The staff suggested that Tier 2* is necessary for monitoring and controlling design areas where the staff is concerned about adequate design margin or areas where there is a lack of applicable codes or standards. This was likewise never a rationale for Tier 2*. These are technical review matters that should be described in Tier 2 in sufficient detail to support an NRC safety finding, and the SER should clearly document the basis for the staffs safety conclusions. Changes affecting the design are then controlled under the 50.59-like process, not Tier 2*.
  • The staff has said on more than one occasion that design information that is subject to change was designated Tier 2* as an alternative to inclusion in Tier 1. Separate efforts are underway by the NRC staff to clarify the criteria for including design information in Tier 1. The industry is prepared to 3

Attachment 2 Mr. Michael E. Mayfield December 19, 2014 Page 4 use the forthcoming guidance to assure proper delineation of Tier 1 and Tier 2 information in future design certifications and then to apply the Tier 1 and Tier 2 change processes, as appropriate.

The attached white paper includes an updated table indicating that other tools and processes exist and obviate the need for Tier 2* in specific areas. The Tier 2* scope for AP1000 was used as a basis for discussion with respect to future design certifications.

In summary, we believe that future design certifications can and should be completed without designating a sub-category of Tier 2 information that cannot be changed without prior NRC approval. Instead, future design certifications should include Tier 1 and Tier 2 only. Returning to the two-tier approach would be consistent with Commission policy and is appropriate based on 1) experience to date that indicates Tier 2*

is unnecessary, problematic, and results in the unnecessary commitment of limited NRC and licensee resources, 2) enhancements that have strengthened the 50.59-like (Tier 2) change process, and 3) the availability of other existing tools and processes for monitoring and controlling design implementation in areas of particular interest to the staff. We believe that Tier 1 and Tier 2 can be delineated in the future in a manner that obviates the need for Tier 2* and that this approach will improve the efficiency and safety focus of the Part 52 change process.

The industry takes to heart that experience to date has also demonstrated the need for greater licensee oversight of design implementation in certain areas. We expect that future applicants will apply this and other lessons learned from the lead Part 52 construction projects and that the NRC will provide oversight of licensees as appropriate.

We look forward to continuing the discussion with the NRC staff on alternatives to Tier 2* that serve the NRC in its role to oversee construction in a manner that assures the finished plant will operate safely and to perform that oversight function as efficiently as possible. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Kati Austgen (kra@nei.org; 202.739.8068) or me.

Sincerely, Russell J. Bell Attachment c: Mr. Frank M. Akstulewicz, Jr., NRO/DNRL, NRC Mr. Earl R. Libby, NRO/DARR/ARPB, NRC NRC Document Control Desk 4

Attachment 2 OTHER CHANGE CONTROL PROCESSES APPLICABLE TO TIER 2* INFORMATION Executive Summary The Tier 2* change control process in Section VIII.B.6 of the design certification rule for the AP1000 in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, requires every change to information designated as Tier 2* be subject to NRC approval. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether there currently exist other appropriate methods for controlling changes to Tier 2* information for the AP1000. This paper demonstrates, given the existence of other change controls, there is no need to apply the stringent Tier 2* change control process to ensure changes which adversely affect safety are subject to NRC review and approval. The Tier 2* scope for AP1000 has been used for discussion purposes with respect to future DCs.

Attachment 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................... 1 1.0 Purpose ............................................................................................................................................. 3 2.0 Regulatory and Procedural References ............................................................................................ 3 2.1 50.59-like Change Process for Tier 2 Information (10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII)............. 3 2.2 Tier 2* Change Control Process (10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII) ........................................ 4 2.3 Other Applicable Change Control Processes ................................................................................ 6 3.0 Screening Questions Based on NEI 96-07 for Tier 2 Departures .................................................. 6 4.0 Review of Tier 2* Matter .................................................................................................................. 8 5.0 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 23

Attachment 2 OTHER CHANGE CONTROL PROCESSES APPLICABLE TO TIER 2* INFORMATION 1.0 Purpose The Tier 2* change control process in Section VIII.B.6 requires every change to information designated as Tier 2* be subject to NRC approval through a license amendment. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether there currently exist other appropriate methods for controlling changes to Tier 2*

information for the AP1000 (for discussion purposes with respect to future DCs).

2.0 Regulatory and Procedural References Tier 2* information is a subset of Tier 2 of the Design Control Document (DCD) for a design certification.Section VIII.B.6.a of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, states [a]n applicant who references this appendix may not depart from Tier 2* information, which is designated with italicized text or brackets and an asterisk in the generic DCD, without NRC approval. There are separate change control processes for Tier 2 and Tier 2* information in the design certification rules, including Section VIII of the design certification rule for the AP1000 in Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52. The following sections identify the change control process for Tier 2 and Tier 2* information.

2.1 50.59-like Change Process for Tier 2 Information (10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII)

The change control process for Tier 2 information for the AP1000 is contained in Section VIII.B.5 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52. Because this process is similar to the change control process for final safety analysis reports in 10 CFR 50.59, the Tier 2 change control process is often called the 50.59-like change process.

Section VIII.B.5 contains the following provisions related to the Tier 2 change control process. If the requirement for prior NRC approval for departures to Tier 2* information were to be removed, the information which is currently subject to the Tier 2* change control process would be subject to the Tier 2 change control process.

VIII.B.5.a. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix may depart from Tier 2 information, without prior NRC approval, unless the proposed departure involves a change to or departure from Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the TS, or requires a license amendment under paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c of this section. When evaluating the proposed departure, an applicant or licensee shall consider all matters described in the plant-specific DCD.

VIII.B.5.b. A proposed departure from Tier 2, other than one affecting resolution of a severe accident issue identified in the plant-specific DCD or one affecting information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to address 10 CFR 50.150, requires a license amendment if it would:

(1) Result in more than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD;

Attachment 2 (2) Result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety and previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (3) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (4) Result in more than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of an SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the plant-specific DCD; (5) Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated previously in the plant-specific DCD; (6) Create a possibility for a malfunction of an SSC important to safety with a different result than any evaluated previously in the plant-specific DCD; (7) Result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the plant-specific DCD being exceeded or altered; or (8) Result in a departure from a method of evaluation described in the plant-specific DCD used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.

VIII.B.5.c. A proposed departure from Tier 2 affecting resolution of an ex-vessel severe accident design feature identified in the plant-specific DCD, requires a license amendment if:

(1) There is a substantial increase in the probability of an ex-vessel severe accident such that a particular ex-vessel severe accident previously reviewed and determined to be not credible could become credible; or (2) There is a substantial increase in the consequences to the public of a particular ex-vessel severe accident previously reviewed.

The term departure from a method of evaluation as used in Section VIII.B.5.b.8 above has a specific definition, as provided in Section II.G of the design certification rule. That definition is as follows:

10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section II.G. Departure from a method of evaluation described in the plant-specific DCD used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses means:

1. Changing any of the elements of the method described in the plant-specific DCD unless the results of the analysis are conservative or essentially the same; or
2. Changing from a method described in the plant-specific DCD to another method unless that method has been approved by the NRC for the intended application.

2.2 Tier 2* Change Control Process (10 CFR 52, Appendix D, Section VIII)

The change control process for Tier 2* information for the AP1000 is contained in Section VIII.B.6 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52.Section VIII.B.6 contains the following provisions related to the Tier 2*

change control process.

Attachment 2 VIII.B.6.b. A licensee who references this appendix may not depart from the following Tier 2*

matters without prior NRC approval. A request for a departure will be treated as a request for a license amendment under 10 CFR 50.90.

(1) Maximum fuel rod average burn-up.

(2) Fuel principal design requirements.

(3) Fuel criteria evaluation process.

(4) Fire areas.

(5) Reactor coolant pump type.

(6) Small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) analysis methodology.

(7) Screen design criteria.

(8) Heat sink data for containment pressure analysis.

VIII.B.6.c. A licensee who references this appendix may not, before the plant first achieves full power following the finding required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), depart from the following Tier 2*

matters except under paragraph B.6.b of this section. After the plant first achieves full power, the following Tier 2* matters revert to Tier 2 status and are subject to the departure provisions in paragraph B.5 of this section.

(1) Nuclear Island structural dimensions.

(2) American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) piping design and welding restrictions, and ASME Code Cases.

(3) Design Summary of Critical Sections.

(4) American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, ACI 349, American National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel Construction (ANSI/AISC)-690, and American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI), "Specification for the Design of Cold Formed Steel Structural Members, Part 1 and 2," 1996 Edition and 2000 Supplement.

(5) Definition of critical locations and thicknesses.

(6) Seismic qualification methods and standards.

(7) Nuclear design of fuel and reactivity control system, except burn-up limit.

(8) Motor-operated and power-operated valves.

(9) Instrumentation and control system design processes, methods, and standards.

(10) Passive residual heat removal (PRHR) natural circulation test (first plant only).

Attachment 2 (11) Automatic depressurization system (ADS) and core make-up tank (CMT) verification tests (first three plants only).

(12) Polar crane parked orientation.

(13) Piping design acceptance criteria.

(14) Containment vessel design parameters, including ASME Code,Section III, Subsection NE.

(15) Human factors engineering.

(16) Steel composite structural module details.

2.3 Other Applicable Change Control Processes In addition to the change control processes related to Tier 2 and Tier 2* information, there are other relevant change control processes. For example:

  • Section VIII.A of the design certification rules requires NRC approval for any changes related to Tier 1 information (which is derived from Tier 2 information).
  • 10 CFR 52.98, and 10 CFR 50.59 and 50.90, require a license amendment for any changes in the Technical Specifications attached to a license or the license conditions.

3.0 Screening Questions Based on NEI 96-07 for Tier 2 Departures NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, and NEI 96-07, Appendix C, Guideline for Implementation of Change Processes for New Nuclear Power Plants Licensed Under 10 CFR Part 52, provide guidance for implementing the 50.59-like change process. Pursuant to that guidance, a licensee should engage in a multi-step process to determine whether a departure from Tier 2 needs a license amendment. One of the first steps in the process is to conduct a simplified evaluation or screen to determine whether a full evaluation against the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b and c is warranted. Typical questions asked during the screening are as follows:

Attachment 2 Does the activity to which this screening applies represent:

1. Yes No A modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design function as described in the plant-specific DCD, or Updated FSAR is adversely affected?
2. Yes No A change to procedures or method of control that adversely affects the performance of a design function as described in the plant-specific DCD, or Updated FSAR?
3. Yes No An adverse change to a method of evaluation or use of an alternate method of evaluation from that described in the plant-specific DCD, or Updated FSAR that is used in establishing design bases or in the safety analysis?
4. Yes No A test or experiment not described in the plant-specific DCD, or Updated FSAR which is outside the reference bounds of the design basis as described in the licensing document or is inconsistent with the analyses or descriptions described in the licensing document?
5. Yes No A modification, addition to, or removal of a structure, system, or component (SSC) such that a design feature credited in the ex-vessel severe accident assessment in the plant-specific DCD, or Updated FSAR is adversely affected?

If all of these questions are answered No, the change may be screened and a full evaluation against the criteria in VIII.B.5.b and c does not need to be performed. If any question is answered Yes, a full evaluation is needed.

Attachment 2 4.0 Review of Tier 2* Matter The following table lists each Tier 2* item for the AP1000, and provides a discussion of regulatory provisions other than the Tier 2* change control process which provide sufficient controls to ensure any safety significant changes to the Tier 2* information would be subject to prior NRC approval.

The Tier 2 references in this table are based upon AP1000 DCD, Rev. 19, Table 1-1.

Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference b.1 Maximum fuel rod average 4.3.1.1.1 As provided in Section 4.3.7 of NEI 96-07, fuel burnup limits are one of burn-up. the design basis limits for the fuel cladding barrier. Any change in the limit would require a license amendment in accordance with Section VIII.B.5.b.7 of the design certification rule.

b.2 Fuel principal design 4.1.1 Many of the fuel principal design requirements are also design basis limits.

requirements. As provided in Section 4.3.7 of NEI 96-07, changes in the fuel design basis limits for the fuel cladding barrier would require a license amendment in accordance with Section VIII.B.5.b.7 of the design certification rule.

To the extent the fuel principal design requirements are not limits themselves, changes in the requirements would need to be evaluated to confirm they do not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered.

b.3 Fuel criteria evaluation Table 1.6-1 Some of the Tier 2* information pertains to the design basis limits for the process. 4.1.3 fuel. As provided in Section 4.3.7 of NEI 96-07, any change in the limits 4.2 would require a license amendment in accordance with Section 4.2.1 VIII.B.5.b.7 of the design certification rule. To the extent the fuel design 4.2.1.1.2 parameters are not limits themselves, changes in the parameters would 4.2.1.1.3 need to be evaluated to confirm they do not result in a design basis limit 4.2.1.5 being exceeded or altered.

4.2.1.6 4.2.3 Some of the Tier 2* information consists of methods of evaluation used in 4.2.6 establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Under Section

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference 4.3.1 VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in an element of 4.3.1.1.1 a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are 4.3.5 conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new 4.4.8 method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

b.4 Fire areas Figure 9A-1 Changes to fire areas would need to be evaluated to determine the impact Figure 9A-2 on accidents and malfunctions of SSCs. Depending upon the results of Figure 9A-3 such an evaluation, several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b of the Figure 9A-4 design certification rule could be affected.

Figure 9A-5 Additionally, Table 3.3-3 of Tier 1 identifies fire areas and their associated Class 1E divisions. To the extent a change in a fire area represents a departure from that Table, it would require prior NRC approval pursuant to Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

b.5 Reactor coolant pump type 5.4.1.2.1 Any change in the reactor coolant pump (RCP) information designated as Tier 2* would need to be evaluated to determine whether it would result in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of a malfunction of the pump.

If yes, the change would require prior NRC approval pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.2 of the design certification rule.

Additionally, Tier 1 Section 2.1.2 discusses some of the attributes of the RCPs. To the extent a change is a departure from those attributes, it would require prior NRC approval pursuant to Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

b.6 Small-break loss-of-coolant 15.6.5.4B.2.2 The Tier 2* information pertains to methods of evaluation used in accident (LOCA) analysis 15.6.5.4B.2.3 establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Under Section methodology VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

b.7 Screen design criteria 6.3.2.2.7.1 Some of this Tier 2* information pertains to methods of evaluation used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

Most of the Tier 2* information pertains to design criteria on insulation and loose material which could clog the sump screens. Any change to one of the criteria would need to be evaluated for impact on performance of the passive core cooling system. To the extent the function of the passive core cooling system is adversely affected by the change in the design criteria, it is likely the change would require a license amendment pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b of the design certification rule.

b.8 Heat sink data for containment Table 6.2.1.1- Any change to the heat sink data would need to be evaluated for impact on pressure analysis 10 the containment pressure. If the containment pressure limit is exceeded or altered as a result of the change, it would require a license amendment pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.7 of the design certification rule, as discussed in Section 4.3.7 of NEI 96-07.

c.1 Nuclear Island structural 3.7.1.4 Much of the Tier 2* information is also contained in Tier 1 Tables 3.3-1 dimensions Table 3.7.1-2 and 3.3-5. Any change in that Tier 1 information would require prior NRC Figure 3.7.1-14 approval pursuant to Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

3.7.2 Figure 3.7.2-12 With respect to the remaining information, minor departures in those dimensions which do not affect the design functions of the structures could be screened out under the 50.59-like change process. More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference of the structures would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

c.2 American Society of 3.8.2.2 In general, this Tier 2* information involves methods of evaluation used in Mechanical Engineers Boiler 3.8.2.5 establishing the design bases for piping systems. Under Section

& Pressure Vessel Code 3.9.1.1 VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in an element of (ASME Code) piping design 3.9.1.3 a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are and welding restrictions, and 3.9.3.1.2 conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new ASME Code Cases 3.9.3.1.3 method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been 3.9.3.1.4 previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

3.9.3.1.5 3.9.3.3 Additionally, any exceptions to the ASME Code would be subject to the 3.9.3.3.1 change control process in 10 CFR 50.55a.

3.9.3.3.3 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.4.2 3.9.3.4.3 3.9.3.5 3.9.8.2 5.2.1.1 Table 5.2-3 5.2.1.2 3.7.3.2 c.3 Design Summary of Critical 3.8.3.5.8.1 Some of the Tier 2* information pertains to methods of evaluation. Under Sections 3.8.3.5.8.2 Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in the 3.8.3.5.8.3 element of the method would require NRC approval unless the results of Table 3.8.3-3 the analysis are the same or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use Table 3.8.3-4 a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method Table 3.8.3-5 has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

Table 3.8.3-6 Table 3.8.3-7 Other Tier 2* information involves dimensions. Some of that information Figure 3.8.3-1 is also contained in Tier 1 Tables 3.3-1 and 3.3-5. Any change in that Tier Figure 3.8.3-2 1 information would require prior NRC approval pursuant to Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference Figure 3.8.3-8 Figure 3.8.3-14 Minor departures in those dimensions which are not in Tier 1 and which do Figure 3.8.3-15 not affect the design functions of the structures could be screened out Figure 3.8.3-17 under the 50.59-like change process. More significant changes resulting in Figure 3.8.3-18 more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the structures 3.8.4.1.1 would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in 3.8.4.5.4 Section VIII.B.5.b.

3.8.4.5.5 3.8.4.5.5.5 As discussed in c.4, the Tier 2* information includes ACI-318, ACI-349, 3.8.4.6.1.1 and other codes and standards applicable to the design and construction of 3.8.4.6.1.2 structures. Given that information (which is more safety significant than 3.8.4.6.1.3 the critical sections), it is not necessary to designate the critical sections as Figure 3.8.4-2 Tier 2*.

Figure 3.8.4-4 3.8.5.1 3.8.5.4 3.8.5.4.4 Table 3.8.5-3 App 3H.1 App 3H.2.1 App 3H.3 App 3H.3.1 App 3H.3.2 App 3H.3.3 App 3H.3.4 App 3H.4 App 3H.4.1 App 3H.5 App 3H.5.1 App 3H.5.1.1 App 3H.5.1.2 App 3H.5.1.3 App 3H.5.1.4

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference App 3H.5.2 App 3H.5.2.1 App 3H.5.2.2 App 3H.5.3 App 3H.5.3.1 App 3H.5.4 App 3H.5.5 App 3H.5.5.1 App 3H.5.6 App 3H.5.6.1 App 3H.5.6.2 App 3H.5.6.3 App 3H.5.7.1 App 3H.5.7.2 Table 3H.5-1 Table 3H.5-2 Table 3H.5-3 Table 3H.5-4 Table 3H.5-5 Table 3H.5-6 Table 3H.5-7 Table 3H.5-8 Table 3H.5-9 Table 3H.5-10 Table 3H.5-11 Table 3H.5-12 Table 3H.5-13 Table 3H.5-14 Figure 3H.2-1 Figure 3H.5-1 Figure 3H.5-2 Figure 3H.5-3 Figure 3H.5-4

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference Figure 3H.5-5 Figure 3H.5-6 Figure 3H.5-7 Figure 3H.5-8 Figure 3H.5-9 Figure 3H.5-10 Figure 3H.5-11 Figure 3H.5-12 Figure 3H.5-16 3.8.7 3H.5.8 c.4 American Concrete Institute 3.8.3.2 The Tier 2* information includes methods of evaluation used in (ACI) 318, ACI 349, 3.8.3.5 establishing the design bases. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design American National Standards 3.8.4.2 certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require Institute/American Institute of 3.8.4.4.1 NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or Steel Construction 3.8.4.5 essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require (ANSI/AISC)-690, and 3.8.4.5.1 prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved American Iron and Steel 3.8.4.5.2 by NRC for the intended application.

Institute (AISI), "Specification 3.8.5.5 for the Design of Cold Formed Table 3.8.4-1 The Tier 2* information also includes requirements related to design and Steel Structural Members, Part Table 3.8.4-2 fabrication of structures. Minor departures in those requirements (e.g.,

1 and 2," 1996 Edition and minor changes in dimensions) which do not affect the design functions of 2000 Supplement the structures could be screened out under the 50.59-like change process.

More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the structures would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

c.5 Definition of critical locations 3.8.3.1 The Tier 2* information involves dimensional requirements related to and thicknesses 3.8.3.1.3 structures. Minor departures in those requirements (e.g., minor changes in Table 3.8.3-3 dimensions) which do not affect the design functions of the structures could be screened out under the 50.59-like change process. More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the structures would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference As discussed in c.4, the Tier 2* information includes ACI-318, ACI-349, and other codes and standards applicable to the design and construction of structures. Given that information (which is more safety significant than the critical locations and thicknesses), it is not necessary to designate the critical locations and thicknesses as Tier 2*.

c.6 Seismic qualification methods 3.10.1.1 The Tier 2* information generally involves methods of evaluation used in and standards 3.7.2.3.3 establishing the design bases, and the results of these evaluations. Under 3.7.2.14 Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 1) any change in an 3.7.3.2 element of a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the 3.7.3.5 analysis are conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use 3.7.3.5.1 a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method 3.7.3.5.2 has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

3.7.3.6 3.7.3.7 Additionally, Targeted ITAAC #2 in Section 3.3 of Tier 1 addresses 3.7.3.7.1.1 seismic qualification. Target ITAAC inspections provide opportunity for 3.7.3.7.1.2 the NRC staff to raise questions about any changes affecting seismic 3.7.3.7.2 qualification. Any departure from Tier1/ITAAC would require prior NRC 3.7.3.8 approval in accordance with Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification 3.7.3.8.1 rule.

3.7.3.8.2.1 3.7.3.8.2.2 3.7.3.8.3 3.7.3.8.4 3.7.3.9 3.7.3.11 3.7.3.12 3.7.3.13 3.7.3.13.4 3.7.3.13.4.1 3.7.3.13.4.2 3.7.3.13.4.3

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference 3.7.3.15 3.7.3.17 Table 3.7.1-1 App 3G.4.3.3 Figure 3G.4-5X Figure 3G.4-5Y, Figure 3G.4-5Z Figure 3G.4-6X Figure 3G.4-6Y Figure 3G.4-6Z Figure 3G.4-7X Figure 3G.4-7Y Figure 3G.4-7Z Figure 3G.4-8X Figure 3G.4-8Y Figure 3G.4-8Z Figure 3G.4-9X Figure 3G.4-9Y Figure 3G.4-9Z Figure 3G.4-10X Figure 3G.4-10Y

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference Figure 3G.4-10Z c.7 Nuclear design of fuel and Table 4.3-1 As provided in Section 4.3.7 of NEI 96-07, in general the fuel principal reactivity control system, Table 4.3-2 design requirements are part of the design basis limits for the fuel cladding except burn-up limit Table 4.3-3 barrier. Any change in the limits would require a license amendment in accordance with Section VIII.B.5.b.7 of the design certification rule.

To the extent the fuel principal design requirements are not limits themselves, changes in the requirements would need to be evaluated to confirm they do not result in a design basis limit being exceeded or altered.

c.8 Motor-operated and power- 5.4.8.1.2 The Tier 2* information includes methods of evaluation used in operated valves 5.4.8.1.3 establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses, including evaluation 5.4.8.5.2 of test results. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design certification rule, 5.4.8.5.3 1) any change in an element of a method would require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

The Tier 2* information also includes various design and testing criteria.

Minor departures from those descriptions which do not affect the ability to confirm the valves can perform their design function could be screened out. Departures which would adversely impact the ability to confirm the valves can perform their design function would require a license amendment pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.1 and 2 of the design certification rule (and possibly other criteria).

Additionally, numerous ITAAC require valves be bounded by the tests or type tests, and the valves appropriately change position during testing.

Any departure from those ITAAC would require prior NRC approval in accordance with Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference c.9 Instrumentation and control Table 1.6-1 To the extent that the Tier 2* information includes methods of evaluation system design processes, 7.1.7 used in establishing the design bases, changes to those methods would be methods, and standards 7.1.2.14 subject to Section VIII.B.5.b.8. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design 7.1.2.14.1 certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require 7.1.2.14.2 NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or 7.7.1.11 essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved by NRC for the intended application.

The Tier 2* information also includes requirements related to design and fabrication of systems, including requirements for verification and validation. Minor departures in those requirements which do not affect the design functions of the systems could be screened out under the 50.59-like change process. More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the systems would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

Additionally, Targeted ITAAC #11, 12, and 13 in Section 2.5.2 of Tier 1 address the processes used to design instrumentation and control systems.

Target ITAAC inspections provide opportunity for the NRC staff to raise questions about any changes affecting I&C design implementation. Any departure from Tier1/ITAAC would require prior NRC approval in accordance with Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

c.10 Passive residual heat removal 14.2.5 This test is subject to a license condition. Any decision not to perform (PRHR) natural circulation test 14.2.10.3.7 such tests would require a license amendment.

(first plant only) 14.4.6 The Tier 2* information also includes some descriptions of the tests.

Minor departures from those descriptions which do not affect the ability to confirm the system can perform its design function could be screened out.

Departures which would adversely impact the ability to confirm the system can perform its design function would require a license amendment pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.1 and 2 of the design certification rule (and

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference possibly other criteria).

c.11 Automatic depressurization 14.2.5 This test is subject to a license condition. Any decision not to perform system (ADS) and core make- 14.2.9.1.3 such tests would require a license amendment.

up tank (CMT) verification 14.4.6 tests (first three plants only). The Tier 2* information also includes some descriptions of the tests.

Minor departures from those descriptions which do not affect the ability to confirm the system can perform its design function could be screened out.

Departures which would adversely impact the ability to confirm the system can perform its design function would require a license amendment pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.1 and 2 of the design certification rule (and possibly other criteria).

c.12 Polar crane parked orientation 3.7.2.3.2 Any departures to the orientation of the parked polar crane would need to be evaluated for its impact on the seismic analysis. Departures which could lead to a seismic failure would need to be approved by the NRC pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b of the design certification rule.

c.13 Piping design acceptance 3.6.2.1.1.1 The Tier 2* information involves methods of evaluation used in criteria 3.6.2.1.1.2 establishing the design bases. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design 3.6.2.1.1.3 certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require 3.9.1.2 NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or 3.6.2.2 essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require 3.6.3.3 prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved 3.9.3.1.2 by NRC for the intended application.

3.9.3.1.5 3.9.8.2 Additionally, piping design is the subject of a number of ITAAC for Table 3.9-5 various systems. Accordingly, the NRC will have an opportunity to Table 3.9-6 determine whether licensees have properly implemented the piping design Table 3.9-7 prior to operation of the plant. If the NRC determines the piping design Table 3.9-8 ITAAC have not been satisfied, the plant will not be permitted to operate Table 3.9-9 until appropriate corrective actions have been taken.

Table 3.9-10

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference Table 3.9-11 c.14 Containment vessel design 3.8.2.1.1 The ASME Code includes methods of evaluation used in establishing the parameters, including ASME 3.8.2.1.3 design bases or in the safety analyses. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the Code,Section III, Subsection 3.8.2.1.4 design certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would NE 3.8.2.1.5 require NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or 3.8.2.2 essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require 3.8.2.5 prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved 3.8.2.6 by NRC for the intended application. Additionally, any exceptions to the 3.8.3.6 ASME Code would be subject to the change control process in 10 CFR 50.55a.

The Tier 2* information also includes requirements related to design and fabrication of systems. Minor departures in those requirements (e.g.,

minor changes in dimensions) which do not affect the design functions of the containment could be screened out under the 50.59-like change process. More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the containment would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

c.15 Human factors engineering Table 1.6-1 Much of this Tier 2* information pertains to methods of evaluation used in (HFE) 18.1 establishing the design bases. Under Section VIII.B.5.b.8 of the design 18.1.1 certification rule, 1) any change in an element of a method would require 18.2.1.2 NRC approval unless the results of the analysis are conservative or 18.2.1.3 essentially the same; and 2) any change to use a new method would require 18.2.1.4 prior NRC approval unless the new method has been previously approved 18.2.1.5 by NRC for the intended application.

18.2.1.6 18.2.2.1 Some of the Tier 2* information consists of design criteria. Changes to 18.2.2.3 those criteria would need to be evaluated for impacts on design functions.

18.2.3.1 To the extent a design function is adversely affected, evaluations would 18.2.3.5 need to be performed to determine the impacts on the frequency of 18.2.4 occurrence and the consequences of an accident, with more than a minimal 18.2.5 increase requiring NRC approval pursuant to Section VIII.B.5.b.1 and 3 of 18.2.7

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference Figure 18.2-1 the design certification rule.

18.5 18.5.1 Finally, HFE is the subject of Tier 1 Section 3.2, including associated 18.5.2 Target ITAAC. Accordingly, the NRC will have an opportunity to 18.5.2.1 determine whether licensees have properly implemented HFE prior to 18.5.5 operation of the plant. If the NRC determines the HFE ITAAC have not 18.7 been satisfied, the plant will not be permitted to operate until appropriate 18.7.2 corrective actions have been taken.

18.8 18.8.1.2 The amount of material considered Tier 2* in the five HFE reports 18.8.1.4 referenced in Section 18.11 has been subsequently clarified via license 18.8.1.7 amendments.

18.8.1.8 18.8.1.9 18.8.2 18.8.2.1 18.8.2.2 18.8.2.5 18.8.2.6 18.8.3.2 18.8.3.4 18.8.3.5 18.8.6 Table 18.8-1 18.11.2 18.12.1 18.12.2 18.12.3 18.12.5 c.16 Steel composite structural 3.8.3.6 The Tier 2* information involves requirements for steel composite module details structural modules, including some requirements related to materials.

Minor departures in those requirements which do not affect the design functions of the structures could be screened out under the 50.59-like

Attachment 2 Number Tier 2 Tier 2* Matter Non Tier 2* Regulatory Control (VIII.B.6) Reference change process. More significant changes resulting in more than a minimal increase in likelihood of failure of the structures would require prior NRC approval pursuant to several of the criteria in Section VIII.B.5.b.

N/A Hard-wired manual actuation 7.7.1.11 Removal of this requirement would likely be viewed as involving more function than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a system, requiring prior NRC approval in accordance with Section VIII.B.5.b.2.

Additionally, the diverse actuation system is addressed in Section 2.5.1 of Tier 1 (including ITAAC #2.c). Any departure from this Tier 1 information would require prior NRC approval in accordance with Section VIII.A.4 of the design certification rule.

Attachment 2 5.0 Conclusions This paper demonstrates, given the existence of other change controls, there is no need to apply the stringent Tier 2* change control process to ensure changes which adversely affect safety are subject to NRC review and approval.

CHAIRMAN Resource From: POLLOCK, Joseph <jep@nei .org >

Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2017 10:55 AM To: CHAIRMAN Resource Cc: CMRBARAN Resource; Burns, Stephen; McCree, Victor; Johnson, Michael; Ordaz, Vanna; Mayfield, Michael; Akstulewicz, Frank; Lepre, Janet

Subject:

[External_Sender] SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations Attachments: 10-ll-17_NRC_NEI SECY-17-0075 letter and attachments.pdf THE ATTACHMENT CONTAINS THE COMPLETE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER October 11, 2017 The Honorable Kristine Svinicki Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

SECY-17-0075, Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations Project Number: 689

Dear Chairman Svinicki:

The Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. (NEI)l 1l appreciates the Commission's consideration of our comments on SECY-17-0075, "Planned Improvement in Design Certification Tiered Information Designations." In this SECY paper released in August, the NRC staff has informed the Commission of the staff's intent to continue use of Tier 2*

designations in design certification information. The industry now has five years of experience in the application of Tier 2* at two plant sites, Vogtle 3/4 and Summer 2/3. Considering the additional burden and complexity associated with the use of Tier 2*, and the lack of commensurate safety benefit, the NRC staff has not adequately justified its conclusion to retain it. The staff conclusion stands in stark contrast to lead plant experience demonstrating that Tier 2* is problematic and unnecessary and should be eliminated.

The industry's 10 CFR Part 52 lessons learned activities reaffirm that Tier 2* is a source of undue regulatory burden for licensees during construction as well as a potential source of construction delay, a key concern for future applicants considering the use of Part 52. Four years after the NRC identified Tier 2* as a problem area in its July 2013 post-COL self-assessment of Part 52 implementation, the staff's July 24, 2017 SECY paper affirming its continued use in future design certifications leaves the industry's longstanding concerns unresolved. For the reasons discussed below, the industry supports NRC implementing Alternative 2 in SECY-17-0075, which is to discontinue use of Tier 2* for future design certifications.

Our goal in this effort is to ensure that Part 52 remains a viable licensing option for current licensees and applicants, as well as future applicants. We look forward to working with the NRC staff and Commission to recognize and implement key lessons learned from Part 52 implementation to date. If you have any questions or require any 1

additional information concerning this matter, please contact me or Michael Tschiltz (mdt@nei.org or 202-739-8083) at NEI.

Sincerely, Joseph Pollock Vice President &

Acting Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute 1201 F Street N.W., Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20004 www.nei.org P: 202. 739.8114 M: 202.436.1556 E: jep@nei.org This elec1ro11ic message 1ra11smissio11 co111ai11s i11fo rma1io11 from 1he Nuclear Energy l11s1i1we. Inc. Th e i11fonna1io11 is i111e11ded solely for 1he use of 1he addressee a11d ifs use by any 01her person is 1101a111horized. If you are no11he i111e11ded recipie111, you have received !his communica1io11 in error, a11d any review, use, disclosure, copying or dis1rib111io11 of 1he co111e111s oflhis co111111u11ica1ion is s1ric1ly pro/1ibi1ed. If you have received 1his elec1ro11ic 1ra11smissio11 in error, please 1101ify !he sender immedialely by 1elepho11e or by elec1ro11ic mail a11d permanemly delele !he original message. IRS Circular 230 disclosure: To ensure compliance wi1h requireme/1/s imposed by 1he IRS a11d 01her faring awhorilies, ire inform you 1ha1 any lax advice comained in !his con1111unica1ion (including any a11achme111s) is 1101 i111e11ded or wri11e1110 be used, and ca111101 be used, f or 1he p111pose of(i) avoiding pe11a/1ies 1/101 may be imposed 011 a11y la>:payer or (ii) prom01ing, marke1i11g or recommending 10 ano/h er parry a11y 1ra11sac1io11 or ma/fer addressed herein.

Sent through www.intermedi a.com Cll NEI is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all utilities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, architect/engineering firms, fuel fabrication facilities, materials licensees, and other organizations and individuals involved in the nuclear energy industry.

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