ML17285A172
| ML17285A172 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1988 |
| From: | Brown G, Fish R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A170 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-88-42, NUDOCS 8901180310 | |
| Download: ML17285A172 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1988042
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V .
Report
No.
License
No.
Licensee:
50-397/88-42
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.O.
Box 968
3000 George Mashington
May
Richland,
99352
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2 (WNP-2)
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington-
Inspection
conducted:
Inspector:
Approved by:
December 5-9,
1988
'o< G.
A. Brown,
Emergency 'Preparedness
Analyst
pii'.2 ~ ~
~~
R.
F. Fish, Chief
Emergency
Preparedness
Section
Date Signed
Date Signed
~Summau
This was
an unannounced
inspection in the areas
of followup on three
open
items
identified during previous inspections,
operational
status of the emergency
preparedness
program
(procedures, facilities, organization
and management
control,
and training),
and
an independent
inspection
review of the licensee's
response
to three recent events.
"Inspection procedures
92701,
82701 and 92700
were used.
Results
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified.
In general
the inspector
found strengths
in the positive attitude
and motivation of the
reorganized
emergency
preparedness
(EP) staff (see Section 3.a),
and Supply
System management's
capability to respond to internally-identified problems
(see Section 3.c)..'RC concerns
were in the quality assurance
oversight of
the
EP program (see Section 3.c), the
EP staff's capability for root cause
analysis,
and the reliability of the primary notification system
(see Section
3.d)
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
WNP"2 Personnel:
- G. Bouchey, Director Licensing and Assurance
"R. Chitwood,
Manager
Emergency Planning
Y. Derrer, Principal Training Specialist
L. Garvin, Manager,
Programs
and Audits
"J. Houchins,
Emergency
Planner
W. Jensen,
Corporate
Records
Manager
D. Kerlee, Principal
gA Engineer-
- A. Klaus, Senior
Emergency
Planner
J.
Landon, Consultant,
Scenario
Development,
WNP-2
"R. Mogle, Senior
Emergency
Planner
M. Monopoly, Manager Support Services
- R. Romanelli,
Senior
Information Officer
"V. Shockley,
Consultant,
Scenario
Development,
WNP-2
- G. Sorensen,
Manager Regulatory
Programs
-"C. Voss,
Manager Telecommunications
- D. Werlau, Technical Training
Others:
- P. Grady, Bonneville Power Association
"W. Kiel, Licensing, Washington State
Liaison
D.
Sommers,
Director Benton County Department of Emergency
Management
K. Vails, Physicians Assistant,
Hanford Environmental
Health
Foundation
M. Wiggins, Director. Franklin County Department of Emergency
Management
"Indicates
those in attendance
at the
December
9,
1988 exit
interview
Follow"u
on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
Module 92701
0 en
0 en Item 88-25-02:
Need to clarify phrase
"inadequate
control of
plant" found in, Attachment A.C.2.c(3) of EPIP 13. l. 1.
The licensee
has
proposed
a procedure revision that includes
a definition of "inadequate
control of plant" as follows: "any event compromising the functions of
safety systems
needed for the protection of the public". 'his proposed
revision is awaiting approval
by the Plant Operating
Committee
(POC)
~
Progress
on this concern is satisfactory;
however, this item will remain
open pending implementation of the revision.
0 en
0 en Item 88-25-03:
Licensee's
make
no distinction between
initial classification
and reclassification notifications.
The licensee
is proposing
a revision to EPIP 13.4.1 to include
a provision that for
events
which require the maintaining of continuous
open line
communications with the
NRC, follow-up. notifications will be
made
immediately to
NRC in accordance
with provisions of 10 CFR 50.72(c)(l).
Follow-up notifications for other events will be
made immediately after
notification of appropriate
State
and local agencies.
This proposed
revision will be submitted to the
POC at the next regularly scheduled
meeting.
Progress
on this concern is satisfactory;
ho'wever, this item
will remain
open pending implementation of the revision.
0 en
0 en Item 88-25-04:
Procedures
don't provide adequate
guidance
for declaration of an Alert for loss of most or all control
room
The licensee is proposing
a revision to EPIP 13. 1. 1 to
include the declaration of an Alert upon the failure
of control
room
panels
P601,
P602,
and
P603 (which includes
most of the critical
This proposed revision is awaiting approval
by the
POC.
Progress
on this concern is satisfactory;
however, this item will remain
open pending implementation of the revision.
3.
0 erational
Status of the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram
Module
82701
Chan
es to the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram
The inspector reviewed this program area to determine if any changes
to the emergency
preparedness
(EP) program
had decreased
the overall
state of emergency
preparedness.
Changes
to the organization
and
management
control of the
EP program were reviewed during this
inspection.
At the time of the inspection the licensee
was undergoing
a major
staff reorganization
which had not been
completed at the conclusion
of the inspection.
Actions that
had been completed;
however,
included:
1)
Detaching the Emergency
Preparedness
group from the
Environmental
Programs
group and. assigning
separate
managers
to
each.
This was
done in an attempt to allow the manager
more
time for EP-related
matters.
2)
Creation of an internal
EP exercise
scenario
development
group
with the sole responsibility of developing challenging
scenarios
for drills and exercises.
An experienced
licensed
operator,
a health physicist,
and senior emergency
planners
are
included in the staffing of this group.
3)
Creation of an offsite liaison section to deal with
offsite-related matters.
A full-time emergency
planner will
staff this section.
Support from other
EP groups will be
provided as necessary.
4)
Transfer of EP-related training responsibilities
from the
Supply System Training Department to the
EP Department.
A
principal training specialist with experience
in EP training
will staff this position.
The Supply System Training
Department will provide logistical support.
During interviews with EP staff members affected
by these
changes
the inspector
noted
a high degree of enthusiasm
and motivation.
They seemed
capable
and anxious to contribute to the challenges
of
the
new jobs.
EP management
appeared
supportive of their efforts.
While it is too soon to evaluate
the effect of these
changes
on the
EP program, it appears likely that they will enhance its
'ffectiveness.
~Trainin
The training program was reviewed to determine if the requirements
and
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Item IV.F were
being met.
Discussions
with the
EP training specialist
and
a review
of the training records
indicated that the training for Supply
System
emergency
response
personnel
was
100K current
and that the
training included the latest
changes
to the
EP program,
The training provided appears
effective with respect to meeting the
safety objectives of the program.
Inde endent
Reviews/Audits
This program area
was
examined to determine
compliance with NRC
requirements
for an annual
independent
review of the
EP program
and
whether licensee
commitments and'corrective
actions
were implemented
in a timely manner.
. The inspector interviewed the Director of Licensing and Assurance
and reviewed guality Assurance
(gA) Audit No.88-425 (a report of
the annual
gA audit of the emergency
program conducted July 18-22,
1988).
The inspector
noted that, while the audit team members
were
qualified principal
gA auditors,
none possessed
EP expertise.
In
addition, with one. exception the scope
and depth of the audit
appeared
cursory.
For instance
the scope
included organization,
training and drills, State
and local agency interface,
and control
of FSARs.
Little attention
was devoted to such areas
in the
program
as detection
and classification of emergency
events,
protec-
tive action decisionmaking,
dose calculations
and assessment,
public
information, communications,
and staffing augmentation capabilities.
Representative
findings included:
there
was
no established
procedures
to cover processing,
management,
and approval of Corrective Action Records
(CARs)
EP personnel
informally stored
documents
rather than utilized
central files.
there
was
no standard for EP in the Functional
Manual for
Nuclear Operations.
The main emphasis
of, the audit seemed
to be slanted
more toward
procedural
than programatic
and managerial
assessments.
The areas
of scope,
depth,
and audit team composition requires further review
and evaluation
and is considered
to be
an open item and will be
identifie'd as
Open Item 88-42-01.
Once
a deficiency is identifi,ed by its internal organizations,
the
Supply System
management
appears willing and capable of taking firm
and positive steps
to correct it.
For instance,
plant and corporate
gA surveillances
identified numerous
problems in the administrative
controls for amendments
to the Final Safety Analysis'eport
(FSAR).
The
FSAR is the base
document for 10 CFR 50.59 (changes,
tests
and
experiments)
evaluations,
and is
a required
document for the
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Technical
Support Center
(TSC),
and the Control
Room.
These suryeil,lances
and audits
identified a total of 43 discrepancies
in three sets of FSARs.
As a
result,
the Programs
and Audits Manager issued
a Request for
Management Action.
In response,
Supply System
management
required
immediate updating of the.FSAR,
conducting
a higher level independent
review (Licensing
Engineer) of the next
FSAR amendment,
increasing the frequency of FSAR surveillance,
establishing
a,program to review and verify specific
sections
by combination of plant walkdowns,
Lead Technical
Review meetings,
and interviews with those
using the system,
and
making appropriate staffing adjustments
to improve the
management
control of FSAR amendments.
The gA program is effective with respect
to meeting the safety
objectives of the program.
4.
Inde endent
Ins ection
Module 92700)
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
response
to three recent
Unusual
Event declarations.
The first event occurred
on May 12,
1988 (resin
spill in Radwaste Building), the second
on August 24; 1988 (unidentified
leak rate greater
than technical specification limits), and the third on
November 21,
1988 (reactor
shutdown required
by technical specifications).
During the review, Franklin and Benton County Department of Emergency
Management
representatives
were contacted,
Control
Room logs reviewed,
and records of monthly communication tests
examined.
It was noted that the licensee's
investigation of the August 24th event.
included
a statement
by the shift, manager that
he was unable to notify
the local offsite agencies within the required time because
he was
detained
by discussions
with the
NRC.
The shift manager also stated that
he was unable to use the
CRASH (primary notification) system
on this
occasion.
While the licensee's
investigation did identify the untimely notification
problem, it failed to address
either of the following issues:
Why did the shift manager notify the
NRC first instead of the local
agencies
as required?
Was it because
of procedure
inadequacy,
deliberate
ignoring of the procedure
requirements,
or a training
inadequacy?
What was the problem with the
CRASH notification system?
Was it
system failure, operator error, or a training deficiency?
This inability of the
EP Department to demonstrate
root cause analysis
capabilities
requires further review and evaluation
and is considered
to
be an open item.
This item will be tracked
as
Open Item 88-42-02.
A review of the records 'of the monthly communication tests
revealed
that the
CRASH system
had failed four monthly tests
during the previous
18-month period,
and, in addition,
was inoperable during two actual
emergency
events.
The licensee's
resolution of the reliability of this
primary communications
system requires further review and evaluation
and
is considered
to be
an open item.
This item will be tracked
as
Open Item
88-42-03.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was held on December
9, 1988 with licensee
repre'sentatives.
Attendees of this interview are identified in Section
1
of this report.
The licensee
was advised that
no violations or
deviations
were identified during this inspection,
but that three
concerns
were identified as
open items.
Also discussed
during this
interview were other items
and observations
described
in Section
3 of
this report.