ML17284A650
| ML17284A650 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1998 |
| From: | Cowley R WASHINGTON, STATE OF |
| To: | Scarano R NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9806100250 | |
| Download: ML17284A650 (51) | |
Text
CATEGORY j.
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTIO SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9806100250 DOC.DATE: 98/06/02 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-397 WPPSS Nuclear Project, Unit 2, Washington Public Powe 05000397 AUTH. NAME 'AUTHOR AFFILIATION COWLEY,R; RECIP.NAME
'ashington, State of RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SCARANO,R. NRC - No Detailed Affiliation Given
SUBJECT:
Provides update on 971029 telcon received from Siemens Power Corp (SPC) re biennial exercise of HazMat drill scenario.
Copy of SPC ltr E draft rept of response SPC in Richland,WA,encl.
to 980415 fire at C DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE35D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: Emergency Preparedness-Appraisal/Confirmatory Action Ltr/Exercise Rep T E
NOTES:
G RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL 0 PD4-2 PD 1 1 POSLUSNY,C 1 1 INTERNAL 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PERB 1 1 OE DIR 1 1 RGN4 FILE 1 1 EXTERNAL: NOAC 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 D
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NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 8 ENCL 8
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STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION 7171 Cleanwater lane, Bldg. 5 ~ P.O. Box 47827 ~ Olympia, Washington 98504-7827 TDD Relay 1-800-833-6388 June 2, 1998
'O: Ross Scarano Nuclear Regulatory Commission FROM: Richard Cowley Nuclear Engineer Nuclear Safety Section SUMECT: Siemens'P Program To bring you up to date, on October 29, 1997, we got a (206)-NUCLEAR call from Siemens (SPC) because of their biennial exercise. The drill scenario was a HazMat event. I had never been called for one of their exercises before so I decided to look in their procedures for what they are supposed to do. When they called back to terminate the drill, I talked to the controller about the form and a few other things. This investigation prompted several questions. These questions were e-mailed to the Radiation Materials Section, who licenses certain aspects of Siemens Power Corporation's operation, and were then forwarded to Siemens.
I have included a copy of the letter from Siemens Power Corporation so you can see the questions and their responses. I will try to elaborate a bit on each of these so you may have a better understanding of the situation.
Pzgbl~ (these would not have been called "problems" ifI had been sending them to SPC myself but more likely "questions" or "concerns") - When I looked at the procedures, I saw that SPC was to call Washington Emergency Management Division (EMD) for all emergencies, radiological or HaaMat. They were only to call Radiation Protection for radiological emergencies. Since this was a HazMat scenario, I wondered why they had called us and if they had called EMD, so I called the EMD duty officer to see if they had been called. At that time, EMD could not verify that they had received a call from SPC on that day.
'P806100250 '780602 I PDR ADGCK 05000397 F PD~R
The comment in the SPC letter regarding EMD not being able to find the correct form could well be an indicator that all agencies need to be more proactive in training and coordinating. Neither we nor EMD could find their form without help. (This was evident again in the April 15th fire notification which EMD had to take on a WNP-2 notification form.)
Pmbhz~ - This was a comment regarding SPC not strictly following its procedures evidenced by its notifying Radiation Protection for a HazMat event (Radiation Protection is only supposed to be notified for radiological events) - I don't have a problem with this response, it is better to notify everybody than to accidentally forget to call someone who was supposed to be notified.
Pmhh~ - This regards the two different callout lists in the procedures. SPC's procedures and their response indicate that they consider immediate notification to be (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. RegGuide-3.67 wording considers prompt notification as "nojvnally ivithin l5 minutes of declaring an alert (or site area emergency)". This should probably be cleared up. We presently hold Allied Technical Group (ATG), another of our licensees who falls under RegGuide-3.67 to the 15 minute time limit. While the NRC has approved Siemens'lan with the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requirement, we would like to discuss that time limit criteria basis.
PmbhzLg4 - This item commented on the fact that Radiation Protection received redundant emergency notifications, one from EMD and another from SPC. There is nothing that we can do about this. If it means that we will get notification from EMD and from SPC, so be it. EMD does have a protocol for notifying the appropriate State agencies for response to classified radiological emergencies, such as Unusual Events, Alerts, Site Area Emergencies, and General Emergencies. This does not include notification for "regulatory" purposes, only for response to emergencies. We in Radiation Protection do not know how EMD handles hazardous material emergencies that are not classified in the above manner.
Pubs~ - This issue deals with coordinating exercises with the State and local agencies.
Siemens has in the past invited us to their annually required EP presentation, however, this was the first time Radiation Protection had even been notified of an exercise, much less involved in the planning or invited to participate. We have a problem with SPC's interpretation of RegGuide 3.67 in this area. We feel that the State must be considered as one of the offsite assistance organizations, whether for radiological or Hazardous Materials incidents. A letter from Washington Governor John Spellman, dated August 28, 1983, identifies DOH as the lead response agency to radiological accidents and directs DOH to "maintain a capability to assess any radiological hazards resulting from a Fixed Nuclear Facility emergency affecting the state of Washington. " Siemens'tatement that they are not notifying the State "because of their (the State') inability to respond in time to our plant site before the incident would typically be resolved" does not reflect DOH's current capabilities. Regardless of the time it takes us to respond, we have the legal responsibility to protect public health and we certainly cannot do that
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very well if they don't let us know as quickly as possible. Now that we have several Radiation Health Physicists as First Responders and field team members in the tri-cities area, we should have no more of a problem finding someone to respond to Siemens than we do to DOE-RL or WPPSS. Our responders do not need to respond to the SPC facility directly but more likely to the field to monitor any offsite releases and then communicate their findings back to SPC and the State and county EOCs.
Washington Emergency Management Division, as the lead State planning agency, is the appropriate agency for coordinating participation in SPC emergency drills and exercises.
However, EMD is not the only agency that needs to be involved in this planning. As the State' lead ~~
.'." Mr. Richard Cowley LB/TCP'1 60'97 November 21, 1997 Page 2 p Answer: You are correct; the SPC notification monitors inadvertently called all the agencies on the list and did not note the distinction that DRP should only be called during radiological events. Problem 43: "The table in EMF-32, Part II gives a different priority for notification than does Procedure 3.0 in EMF-32, Part I. The table also does not provide any indication of the required timeframe for notifying the various agencies." Answer: There was never any intent to list the agencies in EMF-32 Part I, Chapter 3 and EMF-32 Part II in any specific order or priority. We have multiple people calling the different agencies at the same time and we felt listing the agencies in the same order or in a special priority was not necessary. However, during the next Emergency Plan update this can be done. As for the required timeframe for notifying the various agencies, this table you refer to (EMF-32, Part II, Section 1.3.5) notes that these "notifications are to be immediate. (<1 hour)." Problem t4: "Notifying DRP via 206-NUCLEAR is redundant notification if WAEiVID 's notified is no required b y i ie as require p fo'cedures. EiMD should notify DRP if they are notified of a rad event at Siemens". Answer; Our last contact with the State on requirements for notifying the various State agencies as required in our Emergency Plan was about two years ago. At that time we were told to individually notify all agencies because the State did not have an internal call down system to notify all the State agencies from one,central number. Also we are still required to follow State Regulation WAC 246-221-250, which requires that "notwithstanding other requirements for notification, each licensee and/or registrant shall immediately (as soon as possible, but no later t an our hours after discovery of an incident) notify the State Department oi Health, Division of Radiation Protection by telephone (206/682-5327)" of specific radiological incidences as noted in the regulations. That phone number is the 206-NUCLEAR emergency number. Problem 05: "Reg. Guide 3.67 requires the facility to invite participation by State and focal agencies in the biennial exercises. To,the best of my recollection, this is the first time that we have been notified of a drill by Siemens." L k Mr. Richard Cowley LB/TCP:160:97 November 21, 1997 Page 3 Answer: Reg. Guide 3.67 requires in Section 7.3.1, Biennial Exercise, that we "ensure that an exercise will be held biennially and that offsite response organizations will be invited to participate in the biennial exercise in order to exercise coordination with offsite assistance organizations, including testing procedures and equipment for notifying and communicating with local and State agencies." We have interpreted this section to mean that the Richland Fire Department and the Benton County Emergency Management are our offsite response organizations who are invited to participate in the site exercise, while the State agencies (because of their inability to respond in time to our plant site before an incident would typically be resolved) are among their agencies we would be practicing the notification procedures with. However, since we send the USNRC a copy of the cenario 60 days before the exercise with an invitation to participate, we would also be happy to do the same with the WAEMD, if that is the correct lead agency to invite. Problem 46: "Reg. Guide 3.67 also requires the facility to perform quarterly communications drills. Again, I cannot recall any communications drills with us from Siemens. There may have been some instances where they have verified the 206-NUCLEAR number as being still correct, but no communications drills like the ones we hold WNP-2 to, where the State and locals are contacted and the information on a CNF is transmitted to the recipient to "verify understanding" as required in NUREG-0654." I Answer: NUREG-0654 stipulates the criteria used for the preparation and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans and preparedness in support of nuclear power plants. SPC is not a nuclear power plant and the criteria that the State holds WNP-2 to are not appropriate for us. Reg. Guide 3.67 requires in "Section 7.3.2, Quarterl Communication Checks, that we "ensure that checks are conducted with offsite response organizations each quarter to verify and update all necessary telephone numbers." This quarterly communication check is performed by our Security personnel. They call other nearby facilities (EMF-32, Part II, Section 1.3.2), offsite assistance (Section 1.3.4) and other contacts (Section 1.3.5). We are not required by Reg. Guide 3.67 to conduct quarterly communication drills; currently we conduct our communication drills as part of the biennial exercise. Even though we have written our Emergency Plan to comply with the majority of Reg. Guide 3.67, we have deviated in some minor aspects because of site-specific requirements. Regulatory guides are just that, guides and not regulations. The NRC has reviewed SPC's Emergency Plan extensively over the last several years and has found no deficiencies with our written program. 0 ~a/ L ~ Mr. Richard Cowley ~ LB/TCP:160:97 November 21, 1997 Page 4 'A I hope I have addressed your concerns about our emergency preparedness capabilities. If you have any additional comments, please contact me directly at (509) 375-8193. Very truly yours, T. C. Probasco, Manager Safety /mah cc: Mr. Leo Wainhouse Washington State Department of Health Division of Radiation Protection Airdustrial Park, Building 5, MS 7827 P. O. Box 47827 Olympia, WA 98504-7827 k I Report on fhe Response to the Fire on April 16, 1998 at the Siemens Power Corporation Richland, Washington Prepared By Washington Department of Health Division of Radiation, Protection DRAFT 41 May 29, 1998 ll ~ % ~ ~ ~ TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
II~ DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IV. SUPPORTING DATA 2'
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SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION Fire and ALERT Declaration April 15, 1998 I. EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Siemens Power Corporation Nuclear Division Engineering and Manufacturing Facility-is a nuclear fuel fabrication facility located on Horns Rapid Road in Richland, Washington. During testing of the fire alarm system on April 15, 1998 a Fire Protection Engineer noticed an alarm from the UO2 Facility. Upon investigation, at approximately 0806 it was verified that a fire had broken out in a 4-ft x 4-ft waste sorting basket filled with vinyl gloves and paper in the hot radioactive maintenance shop of the UO2 Facility.
Richland Fire Department (RFD) was notified and responded in 11 minutes. The fire was extinguished.
The UO2 Building houses the majority of the fuel fabrication activities. Enriched uranium is stored in a specially controlled area prior to being made into fuel pellets. If a moderator such as water surrounds the uranium, the quantity of thermal (slow) neutrons may increase, in turn, increasing the possibility of a criticality accident. To prevent this potential hazard, water was applied sparingly to the waste sorting basket before it was removed from the building. The low-level waste began to smolder and flare again. A tarp was put on the ground and the basket placed on top of it. RFD applied water,
'oaking the contents of the waste-sorting basket.
The event was classified as an ALERT at 0818. The Fire was extinguished by 0823 and the event was declassified at 0833. The ALERT classification and declassification notification were verbally given to Benton County at 0850. The Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) Duty Officer received notification from Siemens at 0859.
The Washington Department of Health's (DOH) Emergency Response Duty Officer (ERDO) received notification of the event from the EMD Duty Officer at approximately 0920. Information given to DOH indicated the event was "an Emergency ALERT DOE-RL in the UO2 Building."
DOH also received notification from the 206-NUCLEAR line via the answering service at the same time. Information from the answering service identified the location as the UO2 Building. There was no facility (i.e. Siemens Power Corporation or US Department of Energy -RL) identified, only an address. Susan May, Nuclear Safety Section Supervisor (NSS), Mike Robertson (NSS DOE Program Manager), John Erickson (Radiation Protection Division Director), and Al Conklin (Air Emissions Section Supervisor) were notified of "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO2 Building."
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There was.some additional confusion about both notifications when a copy of the notification form was received by fax. The EMD Duty Officer who took the notification from Siemens used a Supply System ClassiTication Notification Form (CNF) because no Siemens Incident Notification Form was available. He crossed out Supply System's name and wrote "Siemens" in red ink at the top of the page. It should be noted that the red ink was not picked up by the fax.
As the ERDO was informing John Erickson of the situation, Al Conklin came over with information that he had just received a call from the NRC Region IV office. The fire was at Siemens,.not the Supply System or DOE. Conklin had the details and updated Erickson and the ERDO.
Terry Frazee (Radioactive Materials Section Supervisor) was briefed of the incident, as Siemens is a Radioactive Materials licensee.
Three DOH Radiation Health Physicists stationed in Richland (Al Danielson, John Schmidt, and John Martell) were dispatched to Siemens to follow up on the event.
Siemens reported to DOH that no offsite release was believed to have occurred. Dan Noss of Siemens reported that they had monitoring teams taking samples, including air samples. The survey of Richland Fire Department personnel found one boot with 400 dpm alpha. No other contamination above background was found. A survey of the controlled area indicated ohe spot, 1200 dpm/100 cm . This area was decontaminated and the controlled area released. The area above the door and the roof were surveyed and were found less than'200 dpm/100 cm . Analysis of Siemens'ample results confirms no significant releases of radioactive contaminants. (Report not yet available).
II. DESCRIPTION OF RESPONSE ACTIVITIES TO SIEMENS ALERT ON APRIL 15, 1998 Time Event 0806 Fire Alarm sounds in UO2 Building at Siemens Power Corp. (Siemens) while fire alarms are being tested.
0806 Siemens calls Benton County 911 to request fire assistance 0818 Fire classified in accordance with Siemens procedures as ALERT 0823 Fire Out
-0830 Richland Fire Chief calls Terry Hobbs, Benton County Emergency Management to inform her of.a small fire at Siemens, in UO2 Building
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0833 ALERT is reclassified as "ALERT Over" on same INF as the ALERT notification.
0850 'iemens verbally notifies Benton County Emergency Management of the ALERT.
-0850 Siemens gives verbal notification to Allied Technical Group, Department of Energy's Occurrence Notification Center, and Czebotar Farms 0859 EMD Duty Officer receives verbal notification of ALERT from Siemens. No INF was sent or faxed.
0900 Siemens sends a fax of their INF to Benton County 0917 DOH ERDO paged by answering service 0920 206-NUCLEAR line rings while dialing answering service; EMD duty officer .
notifies Department of Health ERDO of "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO2 Building." The point of contact at Siemens was Christine Kragcik.
0924 ERDO called answering service received similar notification but the answering service did not identify the initiator of the ALERT.
0926 ERDO notifies Health Staff in accordance with Department of Health Response Procedures for Radiation Emergencies procedures: Susan May, Mike Robertson, John Erickson. Al Conklin 0926 Faxed Notification Form of ALERT (stamped 0826), received by DOH on Supply System Incident Notification Form.
0951 Benton County receives fax of the notiTication from EMD on Supply System Incident NotiTication Form.
-1000 AI Conklin receives notification from Linda McClean of the NRC Region IV
'ffice concerning the Siemens ALERT.
1004 Southeast Communications Center (Benton County Dispatch) receives fax from Siemens.
1010 Al Conklin advises John Erickson and Anine Grumbles that, according to the NRC, the ALERT is at Siemens, not at Supply System or DOE-RL.
-1020 Anine Grumbles (ERDO) briefs Terry Frazee of sequence of events.
1030 Al Conklin assigns Richland staff to investigate the incident on scene:
1030 The ERDO calls the EMD Duty Officer to'advise them of the information received from the NRC.
-1100 Debra McBaugh (Environmental Section Supervisor) calls Al Danielson to.join John Schmidt and John Martell to represent the environmental section on the incident follow-up at Siemens.
1215 DOH receives a copy of Siemens Incident Notification Form with the ALERT as well as a blank form.
-1300 The DOH Health Physicists from the Richland Office arrive at Siemens to follow-up on the incident.
III., CO.NCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Issue ¹1: Improper Notification Form sent to Department of Health and Benton County EMD Duty Officer used a Supply System CNF (Classification Notification Form) to notify DOH and Benton County. To indicate that it was not actually a Supply System event, Supply System was crossed out and Siemens written in red ink at the top of the page. The red ink was not picked up by the fax machine. Neither the EMD Duty Officer nor Benton County Dispatch was aware of a specific notification form for Siemens. Blank copies were not available for recording notification information.
Recommendation: There is no formal protocol in place between Siemens and Emergency Management or the Department of Health for receiving classified emergency notifications. The State and Benton County should work with Siemens to develop/improve procedures for notification of events at Siemens. Duty Officers should be trained concerning Siemens classifications and their Notification Forms.
I Copies of blank Incident Notification Forms should be readily available to State duty officers and county staff by Siemens Issue ¹2: Department of Health received inconsistent information during the verbal emergency notification.
There were two EMD Duty Officers at the time of the incident. The duty officer who initially notified the ERDO via phone announced that there was "an Emergency ALERT at DOE-RL in the UO2 Building." This information was apparently inconsistent with the information written down by the second duty officer who noted that this was a Siemens event. The supervisor of the EMD duty officers was also told it was a DOE event.
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Recommendation: Emergency Management should take actions to prevent future occurrences. EMD Duty Officers should receive training on the Siemens notification form, as well as for handling notification for classified emergencies from any other facilities within the State of Washington with a potential for reporting a radiological incident.
Issue P3: Timeliness and Sequence of Notification Benton County received verbal notification from Siemens 32 minutes after the classification of the ALERT. Siemens Power Corporation faxes notification form to Benton County 42 minutes after classification. (The Duty Officer did not request a hard co'y of the INF).
Washington Emergency Management (EMD) received verbal notification from Siemens 41 minutes after the classification of ALERT. The Duty Officer did not request a hard copy, of the Incident Notification Form.
EMD verbally notifies the Department of Health 66 minutes after the classification of the ALERT (21 minutes after they received notification). EMD faxes notification form to DOH (on WNP-2 form) 73 minutes after the ALERT classification (32 minutes after EMD is notified) ~
Discussion:
Siemens Power Corporation Emergency Plan, Part I, Section 3.0, Classification and Notification of Accidents provides no guidance as to time requirements for notifying offsite agencies. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) 1.1, Classifying an Emergency and 4.2, Incident Notification Worksheet - Offsite Agencies also do not indicate any time requirements. The only location where time requirements for notification can be found is in Part II, Quick Reference Guide. Section 1.3.5 of this guide indicates that Seimen Power Corporation's interpretation of "immediate notifications" is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
US NRC Regulatory Guide (RegGuide) 3;67, Standard Format and Content for Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle and Materials Facilities, Section C, items 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 recommend that notiTications be made "normally within 15 minutes of declaring an Alert/Site Area Emergency". The NRC has approved Siemens'lan and procedures with the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time requirement.
The county is responsible for the timely protection of residents and must therefore receive notiTication of any emergency in a timely manner so that appropriate protective measures may be evaluated and implemented. One concern is a daycare facility located approximately 1.25 miles from Siemens, who may not have the capability to evacuate.
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The State of Washington's Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection (DRP), the State's lead response agency for radiological emergencies, feels that the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> allowance for notification needs review because it may not provide adequate notification to permit necessary offsite protective actions to be implemented, especially in the event of a release of hazardous materials.
Recommendation: Siemens Power Corporation should meet with Benton County and State representatives to discuss notification time requirements and prioritize notifications. DOH will work with Siemens and the NRC to see if the time requirement for notification of offsites to that indicated in RegGuide 3.67 is adequate and if greater emphasis on notifying Benton County and Siemens site neighbors within that 15 minute time frame is necessary. The State and the NRC can be notified after the county and the site neighbors.
Issue W: The answering service for Nuclear Safety did not obtain clear information.
The answering service for Nuclear Safety (The Ca/l Center) did not obtain the name of the facility and Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify themselves to The Ca/l Center operator. Siemens Security staff may have assumed that they were talking to a Department of Health employee when delivering the information to the answering service. The Ca/l Center also did not fax information regarding the call the following day, as requested.
(Note: the point of contact listed by the answering service, Peggy Green, is a different person than the point of contact listed on the CNF sent by Emergency Management.)
Recommendation: Nuclear Safety should revise the answering service procedures to clarify the instructions and include'all requests in writing. The section should further train the Ca/I Center staf on the procedures and on obtaining essential information.
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Issue CG: Siemens Power Corporation did not clearly identify itself to DOH Siemens did not clearly identify themselves as Siemens Power Corporation when the ERDO called to verify information concerning the ALERT. "Security" was their only acknowledgment, upon answering the phone. This added to the mix-up about the location of the fire. The, ERDO had to request the identity of the facility responding as "Security."
Recommendation: Siemens staff performing notifications or taking incoming calls should clearly identify themselves.
Siemens and Department of Health should work together to coordinate our notification methods so that the communication process works efficiently and effectively. Participation in communication drills and other drills and exercises would improve effectiveness.
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Conclusion:
On April 20, 1998, at 13:51 Jack Horner of the Walnut Creek office of the NRC faxed a photo of the damaged exit sign to Department of Health staff in the Richland Office.
On April 22, 1998, at approximately 10:00 am, Rich Berklund (SPC) advised DOH that a tritium exit sign had melted during the fire. It was determined from procurerrient records that the sign was 15 years old and should have had a current activity of-5.16 Ci. The room volume was calculated to be 10,080 Cu.Ft. The concentration of the room was calculated to be 1.8 E-2 uCi/ml. Using a dilution factor from P-Screen of 1862 and assuming that it was all released at one time, the concentration at the fence was calculated to have been -1 E-5 uCi/ml.
Many of the issues arising from the April 15 ALERT occurred due to a of lack of understanding of each other's emergency response protocols and responsibilities.
In order to ensure adequate protection of the health and safety of the public, Washington Emergency Management, the State's lead planning agency for emergency preparedness, should coordinate a planning meeting with all affected agencies to gain a better understanding of each other's capabilities, responsibilities, and needs. The session should also identify areas where specific plans and procedures should be revised so that they can be integrated with each other.
Building trust will help all of us to better handle future emergencies. Smoothing out the communication and notification processes should be the first step.
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. RPR-15-1558 12 t 15 P. 81 Siemens Power orporation Fax To Anina Grumbles Date 04/15/98 Time in 'l1:41 AM Pages to follow 4 Company WDOH From D.L. Noss
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or Radiation Protection Telephone 509-375-8380 MB Q Original to be mailed g Via fax only Receiving fax 360-236-2255 Sending fax 509-375-8345 Telephone 360-236-3273 Fax verification Extra distribution to Massa e Ms. Gurmbles, As you requested, here is a copy of SPC's notification'form for todays incident. Also included is a blank copy of the form.
Should you .iave any questions, please feel free to give me a call.
This facsimik;ansmission is intended only for the indivkfualisi numed above. It may contin information which ir r. pally privileged, confidential, M'therwiss protected hom disclosure by Iaw. Any use of this transmission by indivkiuah other than i'vise named above is strictly prohibited. If you receive this trarLsmission in error, ploaso call the fax verification number above br tiediately, and mail the odainsl eansmission to us at ths address sst fonh below. Thank you.
Siemens Power Corporation Nuclear Division Headquarters Engineering 5. Manufacturing PO Box 130, 2101 Horn Rapids Road Operator Richland, il/A 993521 30 Log No Time Sent Tel: (509'I;l75-8100
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'I R-1S-1SS8 12: 16 P. 82 EMF-32, Part ill
'ieur NUMSER:
powER coapoRmoM, Huc zan Divisov, aAcaeexcY 4.$
pvw iM~MENTiraa mccEovaas Revision 2 REV: I sacnoN: mtmmvoN TlTLE: NCJDEHT No'nFlCATION FORII SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION INCIOENT NOTIFICATION FORMN, umber.
This is (name)~t , at phone O," ti~e Siemens Power Corp. facility in KchlancL Ne have an. event that ls an: a. Actual emergency, b. Exercise.
The date and,time of this cfassication status is:
Class'ion Status Date Time 24 hr
- a. ~initial classification b.
c.
~ Reclassification Termination d, PAR change only 5, Th~ emergency cTassificatlon is:
a g(Unusual Event - not used) e. None
- b. O'lert f. Not yet classled H~
c.
d.
Site Area Emergency ~PAR required (General Emergency - not used) g.
- h. tl~ I t IPP'I
- 6. The type of incident is:
a <
Fire/explosion e. System problems
- b. Radiological release/exposure f..Electrical
- c. Criticality (potential/actual) g. Secunty cL Hazardous materials. release/exposure h. Other De.:.ription of Incident: [include, as applicable, information on chemicals/
radionucfide(s) involved, physical form of released material(s), quantity/rate: f release, Emergency Action Levels (EALs) pertinent to event classrTication.],
ix,
'APR-15-1558 12: 17 p. 83 EMF-32, Part Ill rr s SiEMENS NUMBER SECTloN:
~ CORPORATiON NUCLBR DnnSlON, BAERGENCY puw lLu LEuEMrlNG PRocEDUREs 4.1 NOTiRCAWON REV: T Revision 2 TlTLE' 'NCiDEMTNOTlFlCATlON FORM
- 7. A rel e:
- a. Is not expected.
May startistarted at {time) .and may iast tor hours.
- c. Has been terminated.
- 8. The weather:
~ ~
7&a Wind speed approximately Precipitation: 'Yes, mph; direction from, to None.
9 (Ãsite assistance requested is:
a: None c. V Fire e. Other.
- b. Ambulance d. Law enforcement
'l O. Th'rognosis of the situati n is:
- a. Unknown b. Stable c. Escalating d. improving
'\
t~. The Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for offsite is:
- a. Shelter in the 1 Mi Zone (and):
b, cuate the 1 Mi Zone (and):
- c. Not applicable T2. The bye for this PAR is:
- a. '< Plant conditions d. Other .
- b. Radiological conditions e. Not applicable c, Hazardous chemicals
- 13. Protective Actions in effect onsite are:
a Partial shelter, areas:
- b. Pte-wide shelter c.. Ly Building evacuations, bulfdings-
- d. Site-wiefe evacuation gr tr e.', None Auth gy:
Plant Eme'ancy Direct Date -
Time
t DOH: John Schmidt 8h John Martell (AirEmissions) Allen Danielson (Environmental)
'Contacts at Siemens: Lorin Maus Edward Foster 509-375-8389 (Gave us the information)
~ Accident description During the testing of fire alarm system, a Fire Protection Engineer noticed alarm Rom UO2. Sent someone to investigate (5 min.). They noticed fire coming from the UOz Facility. Richland Fire
~
Department was notifie (11-min. response time).
Cause of smoke was a burning 4-ft X 4 ft waste sorting basket filled with vinyl gloves and paper. RFD setup fan to blow fresh air into the room. Most of the air was exhausted out the'stack A small amount escaped through the open door. Two gooseneck samplers werc setup and samples were collected. A control area was established.
Fire was extinguished and due to a moderator hazard near the room, the waste sorting basket was moved out of the building. At this point it was smoldering and began to flare. RFD applied water soaking the contents of thc waste-sorting basket.
Survey of RFD found one boot with 400 dpm alpha. No other contamination above background was found.
Survey of the control area indicated one spot, 1200 dpm/100 cm . This area was decontaminated and the control area released.
The area above the door and the roof were surveyed and werc found less than 200 dpm/100 cm .
Preliminary Sample Data Eflluent Data K-37 Stack 1 min. count (Stack concentration) 1.1'E-12 pCi/ml Estimated fence line concentration 1.3 E-15 pCi/ml Room air from fire Counted twice, no change 1.7 E-11 pQ/ml Two goose neck samples from outside room,7.1 E-12 pCi/ml A conference call was held between NRC and Siemens at 1200.
Chuck Hooker and Debra Seymour of NRC werc'at Siemens at the time of the occurrence doing and inspection. Talked with Chuck Hooker and offered DOH services, ifneeded.
Siemens willprovide DOH updated information/data within the next three days.
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To: "McBaugh, Debra" Cc: "Conklin,AI" From; Danielsqn, Al
Subject:
Siemens Fire Date: 4/16/98 Time: 8:20AM April 15th, 1998 Debra:
I accompanied Conklin's Richland staff to Siemens for a meeting with Jim Edgar, Loren Maes and Ed Foster concerning their recent fire.
It appears the facility damage is minimal and estimated release of radioactive material, based on routine and emergency air samples, is less than the DAC for Uranium. Initial Uranium air concentratrions were all less than 2 E-11 uCi/ml and the fenceline concentration is estimated to be 1E-15 uCi/mL All air samples were counted for 1 minute and would most likely contain activity from Radon since they were not decayed.
I Siemens staff indicate the Fire Department tried to use as little water as possibile because of criticality concerns.
They carried the smoldering debris from the building to the outside area where it was extinguished. There is a possibility some of the smoke contained Uranium particulate but any release would have been small. They were going to take smears of soot deposits inside the building to get an idea what may have been in the smoke.
Contamination levels were very low. One of the emergency workers boots had 400 dpm/100 cm2 from carrying the smoldering debris outside and a spot approximately 1200 dpm/100cm2 was found on the asphalt inside the emergency exclusion area. All other equipment and personnel were surveyed with no contamination detected.
Siemens staff indicate they are preparing an internal report which they will make available upon request.
Conklin's staff has requested the air data and some of the radiological surveys.
. At this point, I see no reason to initiate any special environmental followup. Any enviromental surveys taken in this area wouid most likely indicate residual Uranium contamination from natural sources as well as past Siemens and Hanford practices.
Please call if you have any questions.
Thanks Allan Daniefson Environmental Radiation Section Richland (509) 377-3870
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