ML17284A610
| ML17284A610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1988 |
| From: | Cicotte G, North H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17284A608 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-88-36, NUDOCS 8811210195 | |
| Download: ML17284A610 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1988036
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report
No. 50-397/88-36
Docket No. 50-397
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power
Supply System
P.
0.
Box 968
Richland,
Washing
on
99352
Facility Name:
Nuclear Project
No.
2
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
October 10-14,
1988
Inspector
Approved by
G.
R. Cicott
, Radiation Specialist
H.
S. North, Acting Chief
Facilities Radiological Protection Section
/l 9
PP
Date Signed
ZP
Da e Signed
~Summa r:
Ins ection durin
eriod of October 10-14
1988
Re ort No. 50-397/88-36
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
inspection
by a regionally based
inspector of organization
and management
controls,
followup, facilities and
equipment,
and tours of the facility.
Inspection procedures
30703,
83722,
92701,
83727,
and 83726 were addressed.
Results:Of the four areas
addressed,
no violations were identified in three
areas.
In one area,
a violation of'0
CFR 20.203
was identified, involving a
radiation area which was not posted (report section 5).
An unresolved
item,
regarding documentation
and control of radioactive material
storage
areas,
was
. identified (report section 4).
The licensee's
program appeared
capable of
meeting its safety objectives.
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
"G.
C.
"J.
W.
R. J.
~T.
M.
A. I.
W.
S.
R.
G.
D.
A.
E
"R.
L.
"M.
R.
Sorensen,
Manager,
Regulatory
Programs.
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
Barbee,
Plant Engineering Supervisor
Bradford, Health Physics
Supervisor
Brun, Plant guality Assurance
Engineer
Davis, Senior Radiochemist
Davison,
Compliance
Engineer
Graybeal,
Health Physics/Chemistry
Manager
Larson, Radiological
Programs/Instrument
Calibration Manager
Pisarcik,
ALARA Supervisor
Shockley,
Health Physics
Support Supervisor
Wardlow, Health Physicist
Wuestefeld,
Assistant Plant Technical
Manager
In addition to the individuals identified above,
the inspector
met and
held discussions
with other members of the licensee's
staff and
personnel.
"Denotes
those present at the exit interview held on October 14,
1988.
2.
Or anization
and
Mana ement Controls
A.
~Staffin
The licensee
stated that two additional
Health Physics
(HP)/Chemistry personnel
were being hired to reduce
the backlog of
work requiring
HP coverage.
Additionally, the licensee
had two
contractor
HP Technicians
(HPTs)
on site.
Some licensee
HPTs stated
that many lower priority tasks
were being deferred
due to staffing
limitations.
Identification and Correction of Weaknesses
The licensee
had recently instituted several
changes
to their
problem identification process.
When
a problem with a high
radiation area enclosure
lock mechanism
was identified (see
paragraph
5, below), the licensee
immediately held a meeting to
investigate
the problem, which was quickly resolved.
Non-Conformance
Reports
(NCRs), Radiological
Occurrence
Reports
(RORs),
and Personnel
Contamination
Reports
(PCRs)
from June
15 to
October 10, 1988,
were reviewed to evaluate
the effectiveness
of the
licensee
s program.
Two incidents
reported in RORs, involving
multiple personnel
contaminations
and an administrative
would typically have resulted in initiation of NCRs,
under the discretionary authority of the
HP Supervisor.
In both
cases,
an investigation of sufficient depth to meet the intent of
the procedures
had been
conducted.
The
HP Supervisor stated that
NCRs would be completed in order to document the review that had
taken place.
Licensee
Procedure
PPM 11.2. 19. 1, Investi ations of Non-Re ortable
Radiolo ical Occurrences,
Revision 7, dated 09/07/88,
was reviewed.
The purpose of the procedure
was described
as the reporting of
'vents
not deemed to have resulted in non-compliance with regulatory
requirements.
Among the criteria listed for matters warranting
initiation of a Report of Radiological
Occurrence
(ROR) was
"suspected
radiation overexposure"
~
The licensee's
philosophy
concerning the use of RORs
and
NCRs was discussed
with the
Supervisor
and with the Health Physics/Chemistry
(HP/C) Manager.
Based
on the report reviews
and discussions,
the following
conclusions
were drawn:
The licensee's
emphasis
concerning investigation of
radiological
events
had shifted toward evaluation of incidents
whether
or not the incidents
were initially deemed reportable.
This change is in accordance
with commitments
discussed
with
NRC regional
management
(see
Inspection
Report 50-397/88-08).
.However,
the wording-of
PPM 11.2. 19. 1 indicated that the
procedure
was intended only for non-reportable
events.
In practice, virtually all radiological events
were being
reported
on
RORs,
except
as
noted above.
Those incidents with
some question
as to reportability had dual documentation,
in
that
NCRs were also initiated.
No documented
incidents for the period reviewed .were observed
to have received
an inadequate
level of review by the licensee.
See paragraph
3, below, item 50-397/88-36-01,
for further discussion
of problem identification and correction.
Audits and
A
raisal
The following selected
Quality Assurance
(QA) Audits and Quality
Control
(QC) surveillances
were reviewed:
Audit
(2-87-371)
Title
PPM 11.2. 10.5 Area Radiation Monitor
Calibration
Date
11/12/87
(2-88-042)
(2-88-183)
(2-88-213)
(2-88-440)
Use of Radwaste
Drums and Control
2/10/88
Area Radiation Monitor Calibration/Setpoints
9/22/88
Radiological
Occurrence
Reports - Corrective
(Open)
Action/Followup
1"
Radiological
Environmental
Monitoring Program 5/18/88
(REMP)
Personnel
performing the audits
had the qualifications
and independence
required
by the licensee's
program.
Response
to audit findings, for
those audits
reviewed,
was
more timely and self-critical than-had
been
previously observed.
In particular,
gA audit 088-440 findings were
closed
on schedule
(see Inspection
Report 50-397/88-28).
Other aspects
of the licensee's
program in this area
were discussed
in
Inspection
Report 50-397/88-33.
The licensee's
program appeared
capable
of meeting its safety objectives.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
~Fo1 1 owu
A.
Followu
on Items of t<oncom liance
and Deviations
50-397/88-22-04
Closed
This matter refens to the licensee's
corrective action related to unauthorized entry into high radiation
areas
and
an observed
lack of knowledge of access
controls
by plant
personnel.
The licensee
had produced
a videotape presentation
as
part of their corrective action.
The presentation
addressed,
but
did not stress,
the unacceptability
of disregarding
access
controls
for high radiation areas.
The access
controls
and other safety
aspects
of work in and around high radiation areas
were presented.
Based
on the licensee's
commitment to make the presentation
to all
personnel,
this matter is considered
closed
(50-397/88-22-04
closed).
B.
~Fol 1 owu
50-397/88-28-01
0 en
This refers to the licensee efforts to
improve continuous air monitor (CAN) availability.
Representative
maintenance
records
were reviewed.
The two primary means of failure
appeared
to be
a lack of reproducibility on weekly source
checks,
and repetitive or unrepaired
detector
fai lures.
In one case,
a
on the refueling floor of the Reactor
Building (RB), was recorded
as
having failed source
checks
from 8/1/88 to the time of the
inspection, without corrective maintenance
having been performed.
Another
CAM, in the
Radwaste
Building (RMB), had
a deficiency tag
which indicated it had
an inoperable detector.
Several
other
'ere
recorded
as having failed source
checks
on a regular basis.
All appeared
to have retained their sampling capability.
The matter
was discussed
with the licensee,
who stated that the weekly source
checks
were being evaluated
as to applicability and usefulness.
This matter will remain
open (50-397/88-28-01
Open).
50-397/88-36-01
0 en
This refers to the licensee identified
potential
degradation
of post-accident
monitoring capability.
The
licensee
determined that during operation of the Standby
Gas
Treatment
(SGT) system for ventilation of the secondary
containment,
as allowed in an accident condition, continued operability of the
Main Plant Vent (MPV) stack effluent monitor (REA-SR-37) was not
assured
for the low/intermediate
ranges.
The post-accident
particulate/iodine
sampling unit is started
by an alarm condition on
the intermediate
range
MPV noble
gas channel.
The possible
inoperability
was caused
by the automatic
sample flow control
system,
which maintains sample/effluent
flow ratio and isokinetic
sampling
by following effluent flow.
As effluent flow rate is
reduced
from approximately 98,000
cfm to the maximum
SGT flow rate
of 4000 cfm, the control signal for sample flow shuts the valve.
See Inspection
Report 50-397/88-33 for discussion of non-accident
operability.
On October ll, 1988, the licensee
requested
a teleconference
to
discuss
the issue.
The participants
were:
For
NRC
Re ion V
Senior Resident
Inspector
Radiation Specialist
Chief,
Emergency
Preparedness
and Radiological
Protection
Branch
(EP8RPB)
Reactor Projects
Inspector
(WNP-2)
For the Licensee
Assistant Plant Manager
Assistant Plant Technical
Manager
Plant Engineering Supervisor
Health Physics/Chem'istry
(HP/C) Manager
Compliance
Engineer
The licensee
discussed
reporting requirements,
the possibility that
the system
was not indeed inoperable,
and their plans for resolution
by testing the system.
The licensee
stated that although they had concluded
the matter
was
not specifically reportable, their commitment to plant improvement
made it desirable
to keep
Region
V staff apprised of such matters.
The basis for non-reportability was the licensee's
conclusion that
compensatory
information was available,
as required
by Regulatory
Guide
(RG) 1.97,
Revision 3,
May 1983, Instrumentation for Li ht-
Water-Cooled Nuclear
Power Plants to Assess
Plant
and Environs
Conditions Durin
and Followin
an Accident.
The
EP8RPB Chief
expressed
concern, that should the monitor be determined to have
been
since before the plant was licensed, it would result in
the conclusion that the licensee
had not met the plant description,
of having the
RG 1.97 systems
in place,
which would be reportable
as
required
by license condition 2. F.
The licensee
responded
to the concern with a proposal
to test the
system
immediately with a simulated
SGT - magnitude flow, and to
evaluate
by means of a test the actual
operating conditions
under
which ventilation system flows would allow operation of SGT in lieu
of normal
RB ventilation.
The licensee
conducted
the test
a short
time after the conclusion of the discussion.
The licensee
stated
that the test results indicated, that with an effluent flow signal
equivalent to
SGT flow, a sample flow rate of approximately
0. 18 cfm
was obtained.
With a sample line 60 feet in length and 1/2 inch
inner diameter,
the transit time would be approximately
30 seconds
for sampled air to reach the noble gas monitor.
The inspector
discussed
with the licensee
the uncertainty associated
with normal
effluent flow versus
SGT flow as
a motive force for the sample.
The
licensee
stated that at the next available
shutdown the system would
be tested
under actual
SGT flow conditions,
and the results
provided
to the inspector.
Although the sample test which was performed did
not quantify actual conditions,
and
no characterization
was
made
as
to sampling characteristics
for iodines
and particulates,
the
inspector
concluded that the noble
gas intermediate
range monitor
appeared
to be capable
of performing its safety function.
Pending
further testing,
committed to by the licensee,
this matter will
remain
open (50-397/88-36-01'pen).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Facilities
and
E ui ment
The licensee
had not made
any major equipment
changes
since the last
inspection of this area.
In reviewing
RORs (see
paragraph
2, above),
the
inspector
noted that the licensee
had increased
the storage facilities
for radioactive materials
outside the protected
area.
One
NCR,
02-88-044,
was related to workers not trained at WNP-2, apparently
knocking over and not restoring radiological postings for the storage
area in Warehouse
85 (Building 80).
The
ROR indicated that additional
material
was being stored in the warehouse,
outside the locked enclosure.
The enclosure
was originally constructed
to control access
to radioactive
sources,
used
by the licensee for calibration
and testing,
during
construction.
A review of the licensee's
Process
Control
Program,
discussions
with the licensee,
and tours of the storage
locations,
revealed
the following:
Licensee
Procedure
PPM 1. 1.3, Plant
Res onsibilities, Revision 10,
dated 03/23/88,
states
that the
HP/C Manager is responsible for,
"...plant receipt
and storage of radioactive materials...."
PPM 1. 11.3, Health
Ph sics
Pro ram, Revision 4, dated 04/04/88,
states
that the
HP/C Manager shall
be responsible
for:
".
~ . documentation of radioactive material receipts,
storage,
and
transfer."
PPM 11.2. 14.3, Stora
e of Radioactive Material, Revision 3, dated
06/30/87,
step 11.2. 14.3.4,
Precautions
and Limitations, states
in
par4:
"Non-licensed material or by-product materials
produced at
the facility are exempt from this procedure."
PPM 11.2. 14.9, Stora
e and Control of Site Generated
Radioactive Material,
was listed in the licensee's
table of contents
for the Health Physics series
of PPMs.
However,
no copy was
available,
and it was determined that the procedure title was
apparently installed in the licensee's
computerized tracking system
on November 12,
1985.
The licensee
was not able to provide
information regarding the original purpose for the procedure,
and
stated that the procedure
had not been written or reviewed
by the
Plant Operations
Committee
(POC).
PPM 11. 2. 23. 15,
Extended
Stor a
e of Radioactive Material, was,
as
stated
by the licensee,
in the process
of being written at the time
of the inspection.
The origination date
was 9/20/88.
The licensee
stated that the purpose
was to establish
an inventory control
method
for radioactive wastes
awaiting disposal.
The licensee further
stated that the procedure
did not specify storage
locations or
address
non-waste
contaminated
equipment.
PPM 1. 12. 1, Radioactive
Waste
Mana ement
Pro ram, Revision 3, dated
12/14/87,
under step
1. 12. 1.8.M, "Radioactive Waste Storage,
Handling,
and Shipping," states
in part:
"The on-site radioactive
waste storage
requirements
are outlined in
NRC Branch Technical,
Position
ETSB 11-3,
Rev.
2, July 1981."
ETSB 11-3, which is part of
section
11.4 of the Standard
Review Plan, states
in part:
"This
position paper sets forth minimum branch requirements...."
ETSB
11-3, Part III, "Waste Storage",
states
that storage of solidified
wastes
'should
be located indoors,
and that storage
areas for dry
wastes
and packaged
contaminated
equipment
should
be capable of
accommodating
one full offsite waste
shipment.
ETSB 11-3 does
not
address
non-waste
contaminated
equipment.
The licensee
had stored licensed
sources for WNP-2 in the locked
enclosure
in Warehouse
5.
The licensee
obtained permission
from NRC
to transfer WNP-l, 3,
and
5 licensed
sources
to WNP-2.
These
were
observed to be stored in the enclosure.
Contaminated
equipment
was
stored outside the locked enclosure
but within a posted
boundary.
All the equipment
appeared
to be appropriately labeled
and posted in
accordance
with 10 CFR 20 and/or
as applicable.
The licensee
had stored additional
contaminated
equipment in what
appeared
to be weather-tight containers
(designated
"C-Yans" by the
licensee)
near the Plant Support Facility (PSF)
and near Warehouse
5.
Additionally, the licensee
had stored plastic-wrapped
components
and equipment for the Moisture Separator
Reheaters
(MSR) heat
exchanger
tube bundles,
which had been replaced
and were awaiting
disposal,
in a quonset
hut near the property line since March, 1987.
These
locations also appeared
to be properly posted,
although the
MSR parts were subject to some weather effects
due to the plastic
packaging
and numerous
holes in the quonset
hut structure,
the
concrete
pad of which was not bermed.
The licensee later provided
information to the effect that the maximum contamination level
on
the
MSR parts
was 16,000 disintegrations
per minute
(dpm) per 100
cm~.
The licensee
stated that the total activity for the
bundles
had been calculated,
but that
no specific calculation
was
available for the C-vans or other such equipment.
PPM 11.2.24. 1, Health
Ph sics
Work Routines,
Revision 4, dated
01/23/87, lists the Warehouse
5 storage
area
as
an area
included in
the weekly survey schedule,
and lists the warehouse
complex as
a
semi-annual
survey location.
The
MSR tube bundle storage
area
and
C-vans were not listed in
PPM 11.2.24. 1.
The
HP Supervisor stated
that surveys of those
areas
were performed approximately quarterly
under step 11.2.24. 1.5.G,
"Semi-Annual Routines,"
which lists site
building surveys
and states
in part:
"Any other areas
assigned
by
the Health Physics
Supervisor or designee."
Anal sis
Re ort (FSAR), part 2. 1. 1.3,
(page
2. 1-2,
amendment
36) states
in part:
"An area
encompassing
approximately
one square mile has
been
established
as the limit of the restricted
area.
~ .shown in Figure
2. 1-3..."
Review of Figure 2. 1-3 indicated that all the radioactive
material
storage
areas
identified by the inspector
were within the area
delineated
thereon.
The
FSAR did not appear to address
non-waste
radioactive material outside the plant itself, and stated generally in
Chapter ll that sufficient storage of dry active waste
was available
within the
RWB.
The licensee
was informed that the lack of documentation
of storage
areas
by the
HP/C manager,
the lack of a procedure for handling and storage of
non-waste
site-generated
radioactive material,
and the unincorporated
nature of routine surveys,
were considered
to be an unresolved
item.
The
issue of the definition of the restricted
area
was resolved sufficiently
to determine that radioactive material
was being stored in accordance
with 10 CFR 20. 203(e)
and (f).
This matter will remain
open pending
further review of the licensee's
procedures,
applicable
requirements,
and
quantification of the activity stored in the outside
areas
(50-397/88-36-02
unresolved).
An unresolved
item is one about which more information is required in
order to determine if it is an acceptable
item,
a deviation, or a
violation.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Tours of the
RWB,
RB, and Turbine Building (TB) were conducted.
Independent
radiation surveys
were performed with an
NRC ion chamber
survey instrument
model
R0-2, Serial
0009154, calibrated 8-12-88 and
due
for calibration 11-12-88.
While touring the 467
elevation of the
RWB, the inspector
noted that the
gate for an area in the east valve gallery had
a hole in the anti-tamper
screening,
such that unauthorized individuals could reach through the
'ate
'to unlock it from the outside.
The licensee
had been maintaining
the area
locked due to fluctuation of dose rates in the
room of
approximately
1000 mr/hr.
At the time of the inspection,
no significant
change
appeared
to have occurred since the last inspection,
when dose
rates
were measured
at much less than
1000 mr/hr (see Inspection
Report
50-397/88-33,
paragraph
5).
When the inspector
informed the
Supervisor,
the area
was immediately locked with a chain
and padlock and
the licensee
convened
a meeting to investigate
how the anti-tamper device
came to be inoperable.
The licensee
concluded
from discussion with
personnel
who had performed maintenance
on the lock that the original
installation
had been with a lock mechanism
on the right side of the
scissor
gate,
which had been
moved to the left side,
leaving the hole
through which the mechanism
had previously protruded.
The inspector
concurred with the licensee's
observation that the
HP escort for the lock
mechanism
work erred in not recognizing the reduction in security which
resulted.
The described
condition had existed
from the .time of
installation until the inspection.
The licensee
documented
the
investigation in accordance
with their problem-reporting
procedures.
Radioactive
resin liner movement in preparation for transport for
disposal
was observed.
It was noted that the licensee
did not have the
capability to attach/detach
handling equipment for the type of liner
being used.
Personnel
performing the liner movement stated that lifting
slings for
a liner reading
70 R/hr were removed
by having an individual
climb on top of the liner to remove the shackles
and slings.
The
licensee
was minimizing dose primarily by using experienced
workers in
order to minimize the time on top of the liner.
At approximately 1:00 p.m.
on October 10, 1988,
on the 422'levation of
the
RB, frisker model
L-177, serial
¹F091,
was found to have
no
indication on the instrument tag of the daily (24 hr) source
check
performed for the day,
as required
by
PPM 11.2.9.2,
Ludlum Model 177,
Revision 2, dated 4/20/87.
The inspector
informed the lead
HPT.
A few
minutes later,
an
HPT was observed to be using the frisker for a survey
of the "B" RHR pump room, in preparation for release
of the contaminated
area.
Discussion with the
HPT revealed that
he was
unaware that
no daily
source
check was indicated.
PPM 11.2.9.2 step 11.2.9.20.5.B. l.e states
in part:
"Ensure that the instrument'as
been source
checked for the day that it
i s to be used. "
The HPT,
and several
persons
who had per formed whole body frisks after
exiting the "B" RHR room contaminated
area,
had not ensured that the
source
check
had been performed.
The matter
was brought to the attention
of the
HP Supervisor,
who stated that the daily source
check checklist
indicated that the instrument
had been
checked,
and that the secondary
documentation
on the instrument tag was what had been missed.
The tag
was subsequently
completed properly.
At approximately 8:00 a.m.
on October 13,
1988, at the entry to the
counting
room on the 487'levation of the
RWB, frisker model
L177,
serial ¹F144, it was found that notation of the daily source
check was
missing
on the instrument tag, although it was indicated
on the daily
checklist.
Chemistry personnel
who had performed whole body frisks were
observed
to not check the tag.
When self-frisking was discussed
with the
chemistry personnel,
the view expressed
was that the source
checks
were
the. responsibility of the
HP Department.
The inspector
reminded the
>>/>>/
"Instrument shall
have
been
source
checked within the past
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />..."
and that the source
check tag is the
means of verification for frisker
users.
The matter of personnel
not verifying instrument operability
prior to use
was discussed
with the
HP Supervisor,
who stated that
instrument verification would be stressed
to instrument
users
in the
plant.
At approximately 2:15
pm,
PDT,
on October 10,
1988, the radiation area
posting
and barricade for the Reactor
Core Isolation Cooling
Pump 81
(RCIC-P-1)
room was found to have
been
moved to one side
such that the
sign could not be read.
The sign and barricade for the other door to the
room was found to be in the
same condition.
Dose rates in the
room
measured
up to 10 mr/hr in accessible
areas,
and the licensee's
most
recent
survey identified the
room as
a radiation area.
"Personnel
monitoring." states,
in part:
"(2) "Radiation area"
means
any area,
accessible
to personnel,
in which
there exists radiation, ... at such levels that
a major portion of the
body could receive in any one hour
a dose in excess
of 5 millirem,...."
10 CFR 20. 203, "Caution signs,
labels,
signals
and controls." states,
in
part:
"(b) Radiation areas.
Each radiation area shall
be conspicuously
posted
with a sign or signs bearing the radiation caution
symbol
and the words:"
"Caution "
1
"Radiation Area"
" Or "Danger""
1
The inspector
informed the
HP Supervisor,
who dispatched
an
HP foreman to
the
room.
While the inspector
and the foreman were discussing
the
matter,
and b'efore the postings
were restored,
an individual entered
the
room without replacing the sign on the side of the
room through which he
had entered.
The
HP foreman
asked the individual if he had been in
RCIC-P-1 room earlier.
He stated that he had, but that the sign had
already
been
down when
he
came in.
He further stated that
he had not
been through the other door.
The
HP foreman counseled
the individual on
posting restoration.
The inspector
discussed
the issue of radiological postings with the
Supervisor
and the
HP/C Manager.
The matter
had been addressed
in a
number of previous inspections.
An apparent
reduction in such instances
had resulted in closing
an open item regarding the failure to restore
postings after entry (see Inspection
Report 50-397/88-33).
The inspector
expressed
concern that the above
was
a significant indication that the
problem was not yet resolved.
The failure to have the RCIC-P-1 room
posted
as
a radiation area is an apparent violation of 10 CFR 20.203
(50-397/88-36-03).
While touring the
RB on various elevations, it was observed that
equipment
was being left within the red/white tape boundaries
for several
safety-related
instrument racks.
The matter was later turned over to the
resident inspector for discussion with the licensee.
Near one area,
an
instrumentation
technician with whom the equipment
was discussed
stated
that it was not his, but that the red/white markers
were for very high
10
levels of radiation,
and that the inspector should discuss
the matter
with the
HP department.
Mhen the inspector
asked
about marking color,
t,ne sec.nnician,
after
some hesitation,
stated correctly that
yellow/magenta
were for radiation hazards,
and also correctly identified
the red/white markings with the red/white "Shift Supervisor's
approval
for entry" signs.
The technician stated
he had not yet viewed the video
tape presentation
discussed
in paragraph
3, above.
With regard to fire protection,
in room R415 of the
RB, by instrument
rack E-IR-H22/P027,
a rubber
hose
had been left coiled in the corner.
A
sign
on the door stated:
"Unattended
combustibles
not allowed in room
R415."
Door R512 on the 522'levation of the
RB, which was not
specif'ically posted
as
a fire door,
was found propped
open with a piece
of 2" pipe.
The pipe presented
an unrestrained tripping hazard
when the
door was
opened.
Both matters
were immediately corrected
when brought to
the attention of the licensee.
Housekeeping
had deteriorated slightly from the good conditions
noted
during the last inspection.
Several
areas
were noted to have small
amounts of used plastic
and protective clothing in corners
and at
step-off pads
from contaminated
areas.
Although some contaminated
areas
had
been
reduced
or eliminated
by the licensee,
the total area did not
appear
to have
changed significantly.
Although the matter of area postings
appeared
to be
a recurring problem,
the licensee's
program,
in general,
appeared
capable of meeting its
safety objectives.
Other than the item identified as 50-397/88-36-03,
no violations or
deviations
were identified.
6.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with those individuals denoted in paragraph
1 at the
conclusion of the inspection
on October 14,
1988.
The scope
and findings
of the inspection
were summarized.
The licensee
acknowledged
the
apparent violation discussed
in paragraph
5, above.
The licensee
provided additional information regarding the unresolved
item discussed
in paragraph
4, above,
and committed to providing the inspector with an
approximate quantification of the radioactive material contained in the
storage
areas
noted therein.
'