ML17284A420
| ML17284A420 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1988 |
| From: | Samworth R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8807120631 | |
| Download: ML17284A420 (30) | |
Text
June 28, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR'HRU:
Dennis Mi. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Gary M. Holahan, Assistant Director for Regions III &
V Reactors Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRI BUTI0 NRC
& LPDR PDV Reading DMCrutchfield GMHolahan RBSamworth OGC EJordan JPartlow ACRS (10)
FROM:
SUBJECT:
George
>l. Knighton, Director Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and.Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert B. Samworth,'enior Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DRAFT NRR SYSTEflATIC ASSESSt'1ENT OF LICENSEE PERFORllANCE (SALP)
FOR THE MASHINGTON PUBLIC POlfER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NUMIBER 2 FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1, 1987 THROUGH MAY 31, 1988.
Enclosed is the NRR SALP report for NNP-2 for the rating period ending May 31, 1988.
This report is based upon inputs provided by staff performing safety reviews during the rating period as well as upon our review of licensee event reports and discussions of events with other NRR staff.
Our review of inspection reports and impressions from our participation in inspections and site visits with regional staff are also reflected in the analysis of licensee performance.
Please review the draft evaluation and provide comments by July 5, 1988.
The SALP Board meeting is scheduled for July 12, 1988.
Enclosure:
As stated r
Contact:
Robert Samworth, PDV original signed by Harry Rood for Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RBSamworth:cw GMKnighton 06/P'88 6/RH/88 8807i2063i 880628 "7
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 June 28, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:
THRU:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Gary H. Holahan, Assistant Director for Regions III &
V Reactors Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office Of Nuclear Reactor Regulation George W. Knighton, Director Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DRAFT NRR SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
FOR THE WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NUMBER 2 FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1, 1987 THROUGH MAY 31, 1988.
Enclosed. is the NRR SALP report for WNP-2 for the rating period ending May 31, 1988.
This report is based upon inputs provided by staff performing safety reviews during the rating period as well as upon our review of licensee event reports and discussions of events with other NRR staff.
Our review of inspection reports and impressions from our participation in inspections and site visits with regional staff are also reflected in the analysis of licensee performance.
Please review the draft evaluation and provide comments by July 5, 1988.
The SALP Board meeting is scheduled for July 12, 1988.
4,~~
Robert B. Samworth, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated
Contact:
Robert Samworth, PDV X21364
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Docket No. 50-397 FACILITY:
LICENSEE:
WPPSS Nuclear Project No.
2 Washington Public Power Supply System PROJECT MANAGER:
Robert B.Samworth I.
INTRODUCTION This report contains NRR's input to the SALP for WNP-2 for the period June 1,
1987 through May 31, 1988.
The assessment of licensee performance was conducted in accordance with NRR Office Letter Number 44, Revision 1, dated December 22, 1986, which incorporates NRC Manual Chapter 0516, "Systematic Analysis of Licensee Performance."
However, in accordance with the request of the Regional Office (memo, Kirsch to SALP Board Members dated May 24, 1988), the Draft Revision to the Manual Chapter has been utilized.
II. CRITERIA The NRC Manual Chapter specifies functional areas for which performance is to be analysed.
The Manual Chapter also sets forth the evaluation criteria to be applied to each functional area.
This NRR input considers all criteria for all functional areas.
Where NRR involve-ment in activities during the rating period were not significant enough to allow the criteria to be applied, no rating is given.
III.
SUMMARY
OF RESULTS The table below gives NRR's overall rating for each functional area.
Also shown is NRC's overall rating for each area for the past two SALP rating periods.
Section IV includes a table giving the rating for each criterion for each functional area for the current rating period.
Functional Area SALP Rating for indicated period 6/1/87 to 6/1/86 to 6/1/85 to 5/31/88 5/31/87 5/31/86 A. Plant Operations B. Radiological Controls C. Maintenance/Surveillance D. Emergency Preparedness E. Security F. Engineering/Tech Support G. Safety Assessment/
equality Verification H. Others 1
2 2/2 1
2 2
2 2/2 2
2 2/2
4t li,
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS This performance analysis considers the inspection and LER data identified in the June I, 1988 memorandum from P.H. Johnson to the SALP Board members.
It also considers the license amendment applications filed by the licensee during the rating period, the SALP comments provided by the NRR staff on safety reviews performed during the rating period, licensee responses to NRC letters and bulletins, and licensee reports filed under 10 CFR 50.72.
SECTION IV of'his report lists pertinent items.
A.
Functional area:
PLANT OPERATIONS 1.
Analysis a.
Assurance of quality Although unit output increased from 1986 to 1987, assurance of quality of plant operations is still not considered strong.
The capacity factor for 1987 was greater than 1986.
During 1987 the unit achieved one uninterrupted run of 133 days, a significant record for the unit.
This improvement in power production is a reflection of management involvement and control.
During the rating period the number of significant events climbed well above the industry average.
Furthermore, the limited scopes of the root cause analyses of the five scrams at the end of the 1987 refueling outage demonstrate poor quality of operations probably due to inadequate management involvement and control over safety matters.
The management has been slow to develop and implement a thorough root-cause analysis program.
The procedural deficiencies identified in event reports make it questionable whether the licensee's review committees are functioning effectively.
The Region has noted from security records that corporate management presence on site and particularly in the control room has been rare.
It also appears that discipline or iginating with the onsite management could be stronger.
The management control breakdowns create high potential for deterioration in quality of plant operations.
b.
Approach to identification and resolution of problems As documented in event reports, the licensee identified a number of problems and acted to resolve them unilaterally.
Several events during the review period, though, indicate that the licensee failed to recognize and correct other problems.
It was known, for example, that the reactor building ventilation system controls were not functioning properly.
However the licensee apparently failed to recognize the potential for the system to cause damage to the secondary containment and therefore did not pursue the resolution of the problem.
Their failure to recognize the safety significance of this system is of as great concern as their failure to identify and correct the problem.
ll The licensee attempted to resolve the ventilation system problem as well as other problems with instructions to operators and ISC technicians rather than with hardware modifications.
A scram,occurred on low water level (LER 88-11) when a licensed operator opened an RHR valve prematurely.
This same event had occurred previously but with "resolution" limited to instructing operators about the possibility.
c.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives generally exceeds actions the licensee takes on its own initiative.
During the rating"period, the staff completed its'review of several licensee program documents, e.g.,
the
- SPDS, the DCRDR, and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
The staff generally found these to be of acceptable quality.
The licensee is picking up on the approach taken in the Region V SSFI inspection of August 1987.
Not only is this a demonstration of responsiveness but this potentially could enhance their ability to identify potential safety deficiencies and take corrective action before problems develop.
The licensee has also responded to the identified shortcomings in their root cause analysis.
Similarly, guality Assurance appears to be receiving attention in response to NRC initiatives.
There are contrary examples which detract from the performance rating ir, this category.
The licensee appeared to proceed with excessive deliberation in the resolution of the staff concern over the spurious opening of the RHR intake line valves in the event of a control room fire.
d.
Enforcement history There were few enforcement actions in the rating period.
None was above severity level 4.
None was directed toward operations.
e.
Operational events AEOD identified no significant operating events at WNP-2 during the rating period.
A number of "insignificant" events give us concern that more significant events may be coming.
The number of reportable events dropped from 44 in 1986 to 33 in 1987.
A similar drop had been experienced from 1985 to 1986.
This may reflect the maturing of the facility and the gradual elimination of mechanical and procedural problems.
AEOD noted that 17 of 29 LERs they evaluated were related to performance or procedural errors.
Several events were reported under 10 CFR 50.72 but were not subsequently reported under 50.73 (see the summary in Part IV).
These along with events described in inspection reports further our concern over human performance and the potential safety consequences of carelessness.
Although NRR attention is normally focused on events within the scope of our regulations, we are aware of other events, e.g., the fuel assembly drop (f11917) and the injury of an electrical worker (not reported) which indicate that inattention to detail, or carelessness, is not limited to matters regulated by NRC.
f.
Staffing The licensee continues to maintain a high level of operator training within the staff.
g.
Effectiveness of training and qualifications programs During the rating period, the Supply System received final INPO accreditation of their operator training program.
This evidences the effort which the licensee places on quality of training.
2.
Performance rating The overall rating is 2 for this functional area and appears to be declining.
The rating for each evaluation criterion is shown in the table in Section'V.
3.
Recommendations Enforcement effort in this area should not be reduced.
Attention is needed on quality assurance in human performance.
Additional action may be appropriate to address the licensee's practice-of-'temporarily" resolving equipment problems with tags and with procedural notes or comments.
B.
Functional area:
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS 1.
Ana lys is:
a.
Assurance of quality Control of occupational exposure at MNP-2 historically has been good.
However, occupational exposure has increased from 136 man rems in 1985 to 222 man rems in 1986, to 406 man rems in 1987.
For the 29 BWRs for which data are available for 1987, 15 have reported total exposures which exceed 406 man rems.
Thus, the licensee's performance is average.
jI II
In commenting on this record in their annual operating report for 1987, the licensee pointed out that INPO estab]ished 543 man rems as the value to be attained to be rated in the top 25K of all BllRs for 1987.
The licensee may be overestimating their ranking.
During the rating period the staff completed a review of the licensee's Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
This was found to be of acceptable quality, requiring no major revisions.
b.
Identification and resolution of issues c.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives d.
Enforcement history e.
Operational events No significant releases were reported during the rating period.
A resin spill did occur (event 0 12266).
Contamination was limited to a small area within the plant.
The licensee advised by telephone (November 17, 1987) that area radiation monitors were indicating the possibi lity of a leaking fuel pin.
This is being investigated during the refueling outage.
Thus, its significance is not yet known.
However,,
age may contribute to the decline in the licensee's record for radiation controls.
f.
Staffing g.
Effectiveness of training and qualifications programs 2.
Rating:
Overall rating 2
3.
Recommendations Because occupational exposure is increasing-and.-beeem"the":
potentially leaking fuel pins are a reminder that 'the licenshe'.s controls may not have been challenged yet, inspection effort in this area should not be reduced.
C.
Functional area:
MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE l.
Analysis:
a.
Assurance of quality The reportable events resulting from activities of.ISC technicians performing surveillances along with events attributable to performance of maintenance detract significantly from the rating in this functional area.
Furthermore, several inspections (notably, the SSFI and the residents inspection in February, 1988) indicate poor quality control over maintenance work.
A low number (3) of survei llances were missed during the rating period indicating that generally management attention to the scheduling of survei llances is good.
Furthermore, instances of inadequate surveillance procedures were minimal.
A number of events reported during the rating period, though, were due to personnel errors during surveillances.
These focus attention on the quality control exercised over maintenance and surveillance activities.
Inspections by the Region found extensive problems with the licensee's Jumper practices regarding t10VATS testing.
Findings are indicative of poor planning as well as poor quality assurance.
b.
Identification and resolution of issues c.
Responsiveness to NRC,initiatives d.
Enforcement history e.
Operational events As AEOD noted (memo, Rosenthal to Zimmerman dated June 10, 1988) human or procedural errors were responsible for most of the LERs this rating period.
Four events were reported under 10 CFR 50.72, although only one appeared as an LER, in which workers pulled the wrong fuse, tripped the wrong breaker, or jumpered the wrong terminals.
This type of human error could be reduced through labelling of such components.
f.
Staffing g.
Effectiveness of training and qualification programs 2.
Rating:
Overall rating 2
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3.
Recommendations:
Increased emphasis is appropriate for gA on maintenance and surveillance activities.
Practices for prioritizing and tracking repairs should be reviewed to ensure that necessary safety components are not being left out of service for extended periods.
Adequacy of labelling of fuses, breakers and jumpered terminals should be reviewed.
D.
Functional Area:
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS NRR has no comment.
E.
Functional area:
SECURITY 1.
Analysis a.
Assurance of quality NRC reviewed the licensee's updates to the Security Plan and issued a
license amendment and Safeguards Evaluation Report documenting the status of the licensee's plan.
Staff review found "consistent evidence of prior planning by utility (including corporate level) management.
Responses regarding safeguard matters were technically sound and consistent, demonstrating the existence of well developed policies and procedures for control of security related activities."
"Responses were generally timely, and the proposed resolutions were generally acceptable the first time.
There are a few longstanding issues to be resolved."
b.
Identification and resolution of issues.
c.
Responsivenss to NRC initiatives d.
Enforcement history e.
Operational events f.
Staffing g.
Effectiveness of training and qualification programs 2.
Ratings:
Overall rating is 1.
The ratings in the attached table are those provided by Safeguards in conjunction with their review of the security plan updates.
3.
Recommendations:
Attention should be directed to the "longstanding issues" referenced in the Safeguards comment.
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F.
Functional area:
ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL SUPPORT 1.
Ana lysi s:
a.
Assurance of quality There is need for improvement in assurance of quality of engineering and technical support.
This rating period included events which call into question the adequacy of engineering at WNP-2.
The SSFI found problems with the quality of workmanship and of engineering remaining from the time of station construction. It also found a backlog of modifications for which attention to documentation is necessary.
The roof rupture event also drove home the point that there are problems with the quality of initial workman-ship which have not yet been found and corrected and which have potentially severe consequences.
The resident's inspection of February, 1988 discovered, furthermore, that control of current design quality is very poor.
The design work on the installation of the Alternate Rod Insertion System had numerous deficiencies.
b.
Identification and resolution of issues The licensee has demonstrated considerable initiative and capability in looking ahead to improvements in operation.
The licensee has identified areas where changes can be made to improve plant operation and reduce costs.
During the rating period amendment applications have been filed to extend the fuel cycle by reducing feedwater temperature at the end of the cycle when no further control of reactivity is available through the withdrawal of control rods.
The licensee has also proposed to increase the limit of power operation with a single recirculation pump in service.
Through two years nf experience with single loop operation, the licensee may have expertise unique to the industry on this subject.
tI 1',
The licensee has also advised that future reload analyses will be done internally rather than by contractors.
The licensee's apparent weakness is in looking backward and identifying the significance of operational events relative to enhancing safety.
The SSFI found such a significant number of defects that the licensee's ability to identify and resolve issues must be declared weak.
c.
Responsiveness to NRC initiatives The licensee has generally been responsive to NRC initiatives.
The licensee is initiating an internal review patterned after the Region's SSFI to identify and resolve issues.
d.
Enforcement history The SSFI resulted in ten of the eighteen violations issued in the rating period.
e.
Operational events f.
Staffing Staff appears to be well qualified and knowledgeable.
Therefore, problem seems to be attributable to lack of management controls.
Hanagement is increasing size of staff, primarily to permit the internal safety system functional review.
g.
Effectiveness of training and qualifications programs 2.
Rating:
See table.
Overall 2
3.
Recommendations:
Emphasize QA on design.
Emphasize operability tests of all design modifications.
Expand required surveillance tests as appropriate to ascertain operability of systems under wider range of events.
G.
Functional area:
SAFETY ASSESSHENT/QUALITY VERIFICATION l.
Analysis:
a.
Assurance of quality The staff finds there is need for further improvement in assuring quality of safety assessments.
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The licensee filed thirteen license amendment applications during the rating period.
Four of these were granted on an emergency basis.
Although the staff concluded that the four emergency amendments could be made without compromising safety,-it is arguable that the need for two of the four should have been anticipated and avoided:
The licensee had experienced high steam line tunnel temperature in past years but had not taken adequate measures to increase cooling of the tunnel.
The licensee had also come close to the 90 hour0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> purge limit in the past and apparently had.not done anything to avoid coming up to the limit again.
On these two items at least, the staff has advised verbally that it will be difficult to demonstrate the existence of an "emergency" need for relief in the future.
The staff has also recommended, again verbally, that the licensee review records to identify other LCGs which are being approached with regularity.
Actions should be taken by the licensee as appropriate to avoid the need to operate outside of the bounds of the technical specifications, even on an emergency basis.
Four license amendments were claimed to be necessary because the existing technical specification had become unworkable or otherwise in need of revision.
One of these four (removal of surveillance of isolation level switch) should have been requested when the licensee proposed replacing the level switches.
Of the remainirg five, one was needed to allow resolution of a safety concern raised by the staff in conjunction with a fire protection issue; one afforded a cost savings to the licensee by revising surveillance to utilize a
new industry standard; two (still under review) extend design concepts to increase efficiency of power production, and; one reanalyzed safety limits applicable to the next refueling cycle.
Of the thirteen amendments actually issued during the rating period, five were based solely on the original amendment application.
The remainder required supplemental submittals.
The Project Director, the Project Manager, and the NRR Licensing Assistant travelled to the site in August 1987 to discuss licensing procedures with the station staff.
The turnaround time for license amendments could be signifi-cantly reduced by more thorough submittals.
gA practices should extend to licensing paperwork.
The amendment for the cycle four refueling included the wrong pages of the technical specifications.
II l
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Generally, responses to bulletins and notices regarding hardware'have been more thorough than responses regarding analytical or procedural items.
Although the number of LERs continues to decrease, the number of reportable events is above the industry average.
To some extent the continuation of a high number of reportable events is a reflection of the thoroughness of safety reviews.
The licensee should review reportable events to see where further improvements can be made.
b.
Identification of issues c.
Responsiveness to NRC issues d.
Enforcement history e.
Operational events f.
Staffing g.
Effectiveness of training and qualifications programs 2.
Rating Overall rating 2.
The detailed ratings in the table in Section IV reflect the inputs from the technical branches providing safety analyses during the rating period.
3.
Recommendations:
The licensee should strive to improve the quality of licensing submittals.
The major objective should be to strive for thoroughness.
IV. SUPPORTItlG DATA AND SUYitlARIES The following tables are included:
1.
SALP ratings for each functional area.
2.
Safety Evaluations received during the Salp period.
3.
License amendment applications received during the SALP period.
4.
Events reported to the Operations Center during the SALP period.
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h NCLOSURE Events reported during the SALP period June 1, 1987 through Nay 31, 1988 LER 4 50.72 4
Event Event Description Date 87-13 87-14 87-15 87-16 87-17 87-18 87-19 87-20 87-21 87-22 87-23 87"24 87-25 87-26 87-27 87-28 87-29 87-30 87-31 87-32 87-33 8878 9065 9075 9089 9125 9135 9141 9182 9201 9212 9373 9389 9604 10018 10801 419874 05/31 06/05 06/21 06/20 06/22 06/23 06/26 06/27 06/28 07/02 07/04 07/06 07/14 07/20 07/22 08/08 09/15 08/31 09/16 09/16 11/06 11/18 11/26 12/16 12/18 Inoperable RHR oiniauw flow valve, wislocated wire Half-scraw Cc NSSS isolation, 16C tech tripped wrong breaker Intentional scraw to tiae rod drives Operating aode change while aonitoring instruaentation unavailable Control rooa eaergency filtration systea actuation reactor water cleanup systew isolation due to valve leakage
- Scraw, RPS actuation due to turbine control valve fast closure Scraa (no LER)
- Scrae, concurrent failures of RPS aotor-generator and switch NSSS systea isolation during surveillance test Scrae on low water level caused by feedwater puep trip RPS surveillance procedures not in coapliance with tech specs Pulled wrong fuse-reactor bldg vent isolation occurred Liaitorque juapers wissing Half-scraw-EPA breakers tripped Docuaentation error - fuel table, inadequate fuel supply Hissed tech spec surveillence, APRN calibration ESF actuation - High RCIC roow teap Discovered fire floor penetration Discovered unqualified fire wall Tech spec violation - Battery voltage out of spec
~ Failed to take action.
ESF actuation, techs juapered wrong switch supp pool teap increased RCIC trip systea inop - setpoint error Tech spec surveillance wissed on PASS valve 88-01 88-02 88-03 88-04 88-05 88-06 88-07
'8-08 88-09 88-10 88-11 88-12 11258 11296 11410 11502 11508 11615 11841 11917 12162 12171 12266 12267 12269 12288 12309 12425 41988!
01/18 01/22 02/04 02/04 02/08 02/13 02/14 02/26 03/18 03/23 04/01 04/01 04/30 05/01 05/08 05/12 05/13 05/13 05/15 05/15 05/30 RPS Actuation - low water level Discovered RCIC puwp suction line not seiseic qual Scraa-16C tech did not reset breaker TS viol - SLCS puep inop
> 7 days control rooa fan bypass
> allowable Scraa due to procedural inadequacy Roof rupture event ESF act - lost DC power (M breaker surveillance)
Fire penetration seals iepaired Nill shut down to repair tube leak Dropped two fuel asseablies Hissed surveillance on standby gas treateent syst NSSS isolation on low pressure Scraa on low water level - RHR valve error Discovered potential rad release path through DS corrido Spilled radioactive resins ESF actuation - cause unk ESF out due to lightning ESF Act S/D cooling lost - switch error Scraa " spurious noise on APRH while down for refueling ESF actuation - pulled wrong fuse r exhaust fan NNP-2 events 24-Jun-88
ENCLOSURE License aaendaent applications filed during the SALP period Application Date TAC Subject 06/01/87 09/01/87 10/13/87 11/19/87 12/01/87 12/15/87 12/23/87 01/05/88 02/05/88 02/18/88 03I07/88 03/07/88 03/18/88 65568 Reeove isolation level switch surveillance 66074 Hain stean line tunnel trip setpoint 66378 Inoperable accoustic aonitor LCO 66809 Revise ainiouo operable trip channels for wain steaa line tunnel 66808 Snubber testing saepling plan 66885 End of Cycle feedwater tecperature reduction 66889 Defer installation of wide range neutron eonitor 66927 Transfer contorl of RHR-V-8, bypassing isolation interlocks 67082 Increase 90 hour0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> purge Iiwit 67181 Crane travel over fuel pool - roof event 67538 Single loop operation 67541 Cycle 4 reload 67620 Revise DC battery duty cycles 12/15/87 66886 Prior NRC approval for DG slow restart 24-Jun-88 page 1
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MHP'-2 SALP input log ENCLOSURE TAC 4 Date of Review SAI.P Date Action ANEHDNEHT Subject or coaaent SE Branch Rec'd Issued SALP Rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) tb) (7) 56181 11/06/86 ICSB Y
56535 09/03/87 LHFB Y
56947 04/22/85 DRP Y
59516 08/18/87 ICSB Y
59798 11/13/87 HF Y
60547 H
61014 04/30/86 CHNB Y
63528 09/15/87 SPLB Y
64670 05/10/87 SPLB Y
64697 07/02/87 RE65 Y
64838 PD5 N
64942 10/27/87 ICSB Y
65232 06/10/87 HF Y
65279 02/24/88 SAFE Y
65568 10/27/87 ICSB Y
66074 12/04/87 PD5 H
66378 10/16/87 PD5 N
66382 NEB H
66808 03/11/88 NEB Y
66885 RSB 66886 04/29/88 SELB Y
66889 05/19/88 8 ICB Y
66927 04/01/88 ICSB Y
66927 04/26/88 SPLB Y
67082 05/06/88 PD5 N
67181 02/23/88 SPLB Y
67538 04/25/88 RSB Y
67541 04/25/88 RSB Y
10/13/87 10/13/87 03/23/88 12/24/87 04/04/88 11/11/87 04/04/88 06/03/87 04/04/88 53 46 51 05/23/88 04/13/88 12/04/87 10/16/87 57 55 48 47 05/05/88 06/10/88 05/26/86 05/26/86 05/06/88 02/23/88 60 58 58 56 50 06/09/88 59 04/11/88 54 DCRDR - RAI SPDS - RAI-Nithdrawn by licensee Conforeance to RG 1.97 Training Coordinators (in '87 SALP)
Hithdrawn by licensee UHS Ridgely (in '87 SALP)
Review Fire Protectn Pln
-. Chandra Underground fire wain Raasey - sera@
accuas Defer flux wonitor - Narcus Fuel vault alara Rewove organization charts Security plan update isolation level switch surveillance Steaaline tunnel teap trip Accoustic aonitor inop Control rona habitability Snubber saepling Final feedwater teep reduction DB slow restart Flux aonitor deferral High/low presssure interface High/low presssure interface 90 hour0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> purge Iiwit Crane travel - roof event Single loop operation Cycle 4 reload 2
3 2
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21-Jun-88
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