ML17279A376
| ML17279A376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1987 |
| From: | Fish R, Good G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A375 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-12, IEIN-85-044, IEIN-85-062, IEIN-85-077, IEIN-85-078, IEIN-85-080, IEIN-85-44, IEIN-85-62, IEIN-85-77, IEIN-85-78, IEIN-85-80, IEIN-86-010, IEIN-86-018, IEIN-86-097, IEIN-86-098, IEIN-86-10, IEIN-86-18, IEIN-86-97, IEIN-86-98, NUDOCS 8707110047 | |
| Download: ML17279A376 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1987012
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No. 50-397/87-12
Docket No.
50-397
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.
0.
Box 968
3000 George Washington
Way
Richland, Washington
99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2. (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
May 18-22,
1987
Inspector:
G.
M.
Go
- Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst
lv>
Date Signed
Approved by:
R.
F. Fish, Chief
Emergency
Preparedness
Section
Da e Signed
~Summar:
Ins ection
on
Ma
18-22
1987
Re ort No. 50-397/87-12
the areas
of changes
to the emergency
preparedness
program, notifications and
communications,
licensee,.audits,
follow-up on nine
NRC Information Notices
and follow-up on five open items identified during previous inspections.
The
licensee's
actions
as
a result of the March 22,
1987 loss of feedwater trip
were examined
from an emergency
preparedness
standpoint.
Inspection
procedures
82203,
82204,
82210,
82701
and 92701 were addressed.
Results:
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified.
All of the open
items identified during previous inspections
and all of the
Information Notices were closed.
Four open items were identified during
this inspection.
8707ii0047 870623
ADQCK 05000397
6
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
G.
Bouchey, Director, Support Services
R. Chitwood, Manager,
Emergency
Planning
and Environmental
Programs
(EPSEP)
D. Gano, Shift Technical Advisor
J.
Hogg, Supervisor,
Telecommunications
.F. Klauss,
Senior
Emergency
Planner
D. Mannion, Senior
Emergency
Planner.
R. Mogle, Senior
Emergency
Planner
G. Oldfield, Principal Health Physicist
C.
Powers,
Plant Manager
J. Wyrick, Manager,
WNP-2 Nuclear License Training
Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
(Closed
0 en Item
85-04-01:
Visual alarms
had not been installed in
high noise areas.
By letter dated August 26,
1986, the licensee notified
the
NRC that action on this issue
had been completed.
The inspector
verified that the evacuation
warning devices
were in place,
operational
and tested
on a regular basis.
The inspector also verified that these
devices
and information associated
with response
to their activation were
being addressed
in tr aining.
This information is also contained
on signs
which are posted
on each device.
Applicable Emergency
Plan Implementing
Procedures
(EPIPs)
have
been revised.
This item is considered
closed.
(Closed
0 en Item
85-10-09
Provide systematic verification and
documentation for the backup
emergency
dose projection system
(EDPS)
microcomputer
program.
This item remained
open pending completion of the
design
document.
Revision
0 of this document
was completed
as of
September
9,
1986.
The document
was revised
on October 15,
1986 to
correct the high range
Krypton 85 (Kr 85) response
factor in the source
code,
add plume travel time to the output and to add
a line print option.
The document
was revised again
as
a result of observations
made
by the
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency (FEMA) during the licensee's
1986
annual
emergency
exercise.
Revision
2 allows for direct input of plume
centerline radioactivity concentrations
or dose
~ates
as determined
by
environmental field teams.
Revision
2 was completed
on January
12,
1987.
This item is considered
closed.
Closed
0 en Item
85-13-01
':
Incorporate
change to Section 18.4 in the
next revision of the Emergency
Plan (EP).'his
change
was incorporated
into Revision
5 of the licensee's
EP.
Revision
5 was dated
February
1986.
This item is considered
closed.
Closed
0 en Item
85-33-10
Review areas with limited egress
under
certain operational difficulties.
As of April 23,
1986, this item
remained
open pending equipment installation scheduled
to be performed
during the next outage.
This equipment installation was completed in
April 1987.
This item is considered
closed.
Closed)
0 en Item
GT-04-03
During an annual
frequency test of the
Emergency
Broadcast
System
(EBS),
a number of alerting radios were
inadvertently activated.
The licensee
has purchased
and distributed
FM
radios to eliminate the spurious activation problem.
All but 100 radios
have
been replaced,
with the remaining radios to be distributed within
the next fiscal year.
In the interim, all of the remaining
AM radios
have
had adjustments
made to their test frequencies
to prevent spurious
activation.
During residence visits to replace the
AM radios,
some
locations
were found where
FM reception
was poor.
It will be necessary
for these
locations to keep the
AM radios.
This item is considered
closed.
Follow-u
on
NRC Information Notices
The Nuclear Safety Assurance
Group (NSAG),. part of Operational
Assurance
Programs,
has
a program for tracking licensee
review and appropriate
actions
on
NRC Bulletins and Information Notices,
INPO notices
and other
similar documents.
Copies of these
documents
are supplied to
NSAG who
establishes
a file for each
one.
A master
computer listing tracks the
files and provides
a connection
between
document
and file number s.
This
inspection
included
an examination of the files for the following NRC
Information Notices:
IN 85-62
IN 85-78
IN 86-10
IN 86-97
Each file had
a copy of the applicable Information Notice.
The results
of the reviews
made
and any actions
taken
have
been
documented
on
tracking forms and, if applicable,
in memorandums,
both of which were in
the files.
The examination of these files confirmed that the licensee
had received these
nine Information Notices
and when necessary
had taken
appropriate
action in response
to the information provided in the Notice.
All nine of these
Information Notices are considered
closed.
Notifications and Communications
This inspection
included
an examination of the licensee's
program for
testing the operability of the emergency
communications
systems.
These
systems
include the dedicated
phone
system (called
CRASH), that connects
the onsite
and offsite emergency centers,
the backup direct dial system,
the
(NRC) Emergency Notification System
(ENS) and the
NRC Health Physics
Network (HPN).
EPIP 13. 14.4,
"Emergency Equipment," identifies the communications
systems
to be tested
and the test frequency.
The above identified
systems= are required to be tested
every month.
Procedure
13. 14.4 also
identifies additional
communications
equipment
and their test frequency.
The
EP8EP organization
has established
a file to maintain the records
related to the testing of these
emergency
communications
systems.
The
test results
are recorded
on a form developed specifically for this
purpose.
The test date,
individual performing the test
and test findings
are recorded
on the form.
Corrective actions,
necessitated
by problems
identified during the test,
are recorded
on the lower portion of the
form.
The test records for the period March 1986 through
May 1987 were
examined.
All pertinent information was'recorded
on the forms.
The
forms showed that on about four occasions
there were malfunctions of the
equipment.
In all cases,
timely corrective actions
were taken
and
recorded
on the forms.
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified during
this part of the inspection.
Licensee. Audits
The inspector verified that an independent
audit of the emergency
preparedness
program
had been conducted
on an annual
basis in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.54(t)
and Section
18 of the licensee's
EP.
Corporate
Licensing and Assurance
Audit 87-384,
dated
February 17, 1987,
was
reviewed.
Fifteen Items of Concern (least significant) were issued
as
a
result of the audit.
Thirteen of the items were assigned
to the
EP&EP
Department
as the responsible
organization
and two were assigned
to the
plant.
The
EP8EP
response
to the audit report was submitted within the
prescribed
time period and the responses
appeared
to be adequate.
During this part of the inspection,
the inspector
reviewed the licensee's
system for tracking findings identified in NRC inspection/exercise
reports.
The inspector
examined the licensee's
log book used to track
these
items.
Based
on a review of the log book and conversations
with
EP8EP personnel,
the inspector concluded that only those
items identified
as "open" were being tracked.
EP8EP personnel
stated that this was
a
recent oversight since other findings had been tracked in the past.
Since
this situation could result in some
NRC concerns
being overlooked,
resolution of this matter will be tracked
by the Region
as
an open item
(87-12-01).
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified during
this part of the inspection.
Chan
es to the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram
To'etermine if any changes
to the emergency
preparedness
program
had
been
made which could affect the overall state of emergency
preparedness,
the inspector
addressed
the following areas:
(1) changes
to the
Emergency
Response Facilities
(ERFs) (i.e., Technical
Support Center
(TSC), Operations
Support Center
(OSC)
and Emergency Operations Facility
(EOF)), (2) changes
to the emergency
response
organization,
and (3)
changes
to the licensee's
emergency
planning group.
No notable
changes
have
been
made in these
areas.
The Region
V Emergency
Preparedness
Section performs
an annual
review of
the
By letter dated April 21, 1987, Revision
6 to the
licensee's
EP had been
reviewed.
The
EP,
as
changed,
continued to meet
the standards
and the requirements
Appendix E.
The review of the
was accomplished
in the Region
V
s
~sv' n: ~
v.e.
s.
~ .
S
w <<a,a
a
~
'office, prior to this inspection.
The following procedures
were
reviewed:
13. 1. 1, Revisions
3 and 4, "Classifying the Emergency"
13. 1.2,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Plant Emergency Director Duties"
13.2. 1, Revisions
3 and 4, "Fire/Explosions"
13.2.3,
Revision 3, "Toxic or Flammable
Gas
Releases
or Oxygen
Deficient Atmosphere"
13. 2. 4, Revision 3, "Missiles"
13.3.2,
Revision 3, "High Winds/Tornados"-
13.3.3,
Revision 3, "Floods"
13.3.4,
Revision 3,
"Ash Fallout"
13.4. 1, Revision 4, "Notifications"
13.5. 1, Revisions
3 and 4, "Controlled Evacuation of the Protected
Area"
13.5.2,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Immediate Evacuation of the Protected
Area"
13.5.3,
Revisions
4 and 5, "Evacuation of Exclusion Area and/or
Nearby Facilities"
13.5.4,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Columbia River Evacuation"
13.5.5,
Revision 3, "Personnel
Accountability"
13. 5. 6, Revision 3, "Personnel*Search
and Rescue"
13.6. 1, Revisions
3 and 4, "Security Procedures"
13.7. 1, Revision 3, "Personnel
Monitoring"
13.7.2,
Revision 3, "Contamination Control"
13.7.3,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Plant Personnel
Decontamination"
13.7.4,
Revision 3, "Personnel
Decontamination
Operations
at the
Emergency Operations Facility"
13.7.5,
Revisions
4 and 5, "Decontamination Operations at Remote
Decontamination
Locations"
13.7.6,
Revision 3, "Plant First Aid Facility"
13.7.7,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Emergency Operations Facility First Aid
Center Operations"
13.7.8,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Transportation of Injured or
Contaminated
Injured Personnel
to an Offsite Medical
Faci 1 ity"
13.7.9,
Revision 3, "Decontamination Within the Site Area Boundary"
13.7. 10, Revision 1, "Offsite Emergency
Response
Personnel
Dosimetry"
13.8. 1, Revision 3, "Computerized
Emergency
Dose Projection
System
Operations"
13.8.2,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Manual Offsite Dose Calculations"
13.8.3,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Ingestion Pathway
Dose Calculations"
13.9. 1, Revisions
3 and 4, "Environmental Field Team Operations"
13.9.2,
Revisions
3 and 4, "Field Exposure
Rate Surveys"
13.9.3,
Revision 3, "Portable Air Sampling"
13.9.4,
Revision 3,
"TLD and Fixed Air Sample Retrieval"
13.9.5,
Revision 3, "Environmental
Sample Collection"
13.9.6,
Revision 4, "Field Analyses of Environmental
Samples"
The questions/comments
which were generated
as
a result of the review of
these
procedures
were discussed
with the licensee
during this inspection.
With the exception of some
comments pertaining to EPIP 13. l. 1 (see
below), all of the questions
were either explained or notations
were
made
so that the procedures
could be corrected/clarified
in the next revision.
Only one question,
regarding step
8 of 13.7. 10,
needed attention
now,
rather than waiting for the next revision to be issued before the matter
was clarified.
With respect
to EPIP 13.1.1,
during the procedure
review, it became
evident that there were
a few emergency action levels
(EALS) that were
worded such that they appeared
to result in an emergency classification
that was not consistent with NUREG-0654.
The
EALs in question
were for
Technical Specification related
Unusual
Events
and for the fire related
EALs for the Unusual
Event, Alert and Site Area Emergency
classifications.
It should
be noted that the Technical Specification
Unusual
Event issue
had been identified during
a previous inspection
(see
Section
12 of Inspection
Report
No. 50-397/86-08).
Subsequent
to that
inspection,
a management
decision
was
made to not change that
EAL.
On May 19,
1987, during this inspection,
a meeting
was held with plant
management
to discuss this matter.
During this meeting,
the licensee
reaffirmed their position regarding the methodology they used in
developing
13. 1. 1.
The licensee
has
used
a combination of symptomatic
and situation
based
EALs.
Guidance
on this issue is being sought from
NRC Headquarters,
since this appears
to be a generic issue.
Pending
a
decision
on this matter,
the licensee
has
requested their Operational
Assurance
Department to perform a complete evaluation of 13. 1. 1. It
should also
be noted that the licensee
volunteered to provide their
assistance
in resolving this issue.
This matter will be tracked
as
an
open item (87-12-02) until final disposition.
During the review of the licensee's
classification procedure,
the
inspector
examined
two documents that pertained to this subject matter.
One was
a document
dated August 26,
1983 that summarized
an
NRC review of
the licensee's
emergency classification
system/EALs
and the second
was
the licensee's
response
to this document.
The licensee's
response
was
dated October
3, 1983.
One of the recommendations
made in the August
1983 letter was that the licensee list the loss of onsite
AC power
capability under the situation
based initiating conditions for an Unusual
Event.
The October
1983 response
indicated that
EPIP 13. l. 1 would be
revised to reflect this request.
To date, this condition has not been
incorporated into 13. 1. 1.
This matter
was brought to the licensee's
attention during the aforementioned
meeting
on May 19,
1987.
The Region
intends to follow-up on this matter, therefore, it will be tracked
as
open item 87-12-03.
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified during
this part of the inspection.
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Review of the March 22
1987
Loss of Feedwater
~Tr i
This inspection
included
a review of the events that occurred during the
March 22,
1987 loss of feedwater trip and
an evaluation
from an emergency
preparedness
standpoint.
Region
V Emergency
Preparedness
personnel
were
informed of this event during a March 25,
1987 telephone call from the
Resident
Inspector.
The conversation
included
a discussion
about whether
it would have
been appropriate
to declare
an Unusual
Event.
Based
on
a
comparison of the situation
as it existed during the loss of feedwater
trip on March 22,
1987 and the symptomatic initiating conditions for an
Unusual
Event contained within EPIP 13.1. 1, it was determi ned that
condition A.l. a. of Attachment
A had been
met (Lo Lo reactor vessel
water
level (-50 inches));
however, the condition only lasted for approximately
16 seconds
before water level
was recovered.
A description of this event
can
be found in Licensee
Event Report
(LER) No. 87-02.
This event
was discussed
during the
May 19,
1987 meeting referred to
above.
During the meeting,
the inspector
was informed that because all
required
Engineered
Safety Feature
(ESF) actuations
occurred
and water
level recovered
immediately,
an Unusual
Event was not declared
because
the situation did not pose
a threat to the safety of plant personnel
or
the public.
Further,
the licensee
was able to produce
a March 15,
1983
letter to the
NRC in which this
same situation
was described.
The
licensee
stated
in the letter that an Unusual
Event declaration for this
situation is unwarranted
because
the plant responded
as designed
and the
potential safety degradation
was only momentary.
Additionally, the
'
licensee
stated that declaring
an Unusual
Event for this situation
does
not satisfy the purpose of this classification.
During the meeting,
licensee
personnel
indicated that the'ituation
described
in the March 15,
1983 letter (loss of feedwater/reduction
in
water level without Unusual
Event declaration)
was addressed
during
training on EPIP 13. 1. 1.
This information was not confirmed during a
review of the lesson plan.
Based
on the results of the investigation into the March 22,
1987 loss of
feedwater trip, it appears
that
a declaration of an Unusual
Event,
based
on
Lo Lo reactor vessel
water level,
may not have
been appropriate.
However,
two suggestions
were
made.
A.
EPIP 13.1.1 could be improved if it were modified to include those
situations
where
an
EAL could be reached,
without event declaration.
B.
EPIP 13. 1. 1 could be improved if the sentence
preceding the
symptomatic initiating conditions for each of the four emergency
classifications
was modified to eliminate the word "consider".
The
sentence
(verbatim for each classification)
appears
to indicate that
event declaration
need only be considered,
rather than being
an
automatic result of meeting
a prescribed initiating condition.
The
purpose of establishing
a classification
and
EAL scheme
was to
develop 'trigger points for EP activation.
Since the Region intends to follow-up on the licensee's
handling of these
two suggestions,
this matter will be tracked
as
open item 87-12-04.
No deficiencies
or violations of NRC requirements
were identified during
this part of the inspection.
8.
Exit Interview
The inspector
held an exit interview with the licensee
on May 22,
1987 to
discuss
the preliminary findings of the inspection.
The attachment to
this report identifies the licensee
personnel
who were present at the
meeting.
Mr.
R.
F. Fish, Chief of Region V's Emergency
Preparedness
Section,
also attended
the meeting.
The inspector
summarized
the
findings described
in Sections
2-7 of this report.
During the meeting,
the change to EPIP 13. l. 1, mentioned in Section 7,
was not specifically
identified as
a follow-up/open item.
Regarding the findings described
as
open items 87-12-01,
87-12-03
and 84-12-04 (Sections
5-7, respectively),
the licensee
indicated that there did not appear to be any problems with
implementation of these
suggestions.
The inspector
informed the
licensee that they would be kept informed of the progress
associated
with
the open item described
as 87-12-02 (Section 6).
ATTACHMENT
EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES
G.
Bouchey, Director, Support Services
A. Hosier,
Manager,
Nuclear Safety Assurance
Group
J.
Houchins,
Emergency
Planner
F. Klauss,
Senior
Emergency
Planner
D. Mannion, Senior
Emergency
Planner
R. Mogle, Senior
Emergency
Planner
R. quay,
Manager,
General
and Technical
Support Training
C.
Van Hoff, Senior State
Liaison
S. Washington, Shift Technical Advisor
M. Muestefeld,
Supervisor,
Reactor
Engineering
'