ML17279A365
| ML17279A365 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1987 |
| From: | Cillis M, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A362 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-87-14, NUDOCS 8707060616 | |
| Download: ML17279A365 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1987014
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No. 50-397/87-14
Docket
No. 50-397
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.
0.
Box 968
Richland, Washington
99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2
Inspection at:
WNP-2, Benton County, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
May 13-22,
1987
Inspectors:
M.
Cs i, Sens o
a iati on Specs al s st
Da e
igned
Approved by:
G.
P.
Yu as, Chief, Facilities Radiological
Pro
e
ion Section
Da
e
igned
~Summar:
Ins ection
on
Ma
13-22
1987
Re ort No. 50-397/87-14)
inspector of occupational
exposures
during extended
outages,
ALARA program,
external
occupational
exposures,
control of radioactive material
and
contamination,
internal
exposure
control
and assessment,
environmental
monitoring, radiological controls during spent fuel movement,
followup items
and
a tour of the licensee's facility.
Inspection
modules
30703,
25022,
25023,
83724,
83725,
83726,
83728,
83729
and 92701 were performed.
Results:
Of the nine areas
inspected,
violations were identified in three
areas:
"Caution Signs,
Labels, Signals,
and Controls,"
posting
and control of radiation areas
(paragraph
5); Technical
Specifications,
Section
6. 12, posting
and control of high radiation areas
(paragraph
5); Technical Specifications, Section 6.8. 1, documentation of
personal
clothing contamination
occurrences
in accordance
with plant
procedures
(paragraph
2).
87O7060blb 850
7P>19
gDOcl
0
pDR
8
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
a.
WNP-2 Staff
C.
M. Powers,
Plant Manager
"J.
W. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
"R.
G. Graybeal,
Health Physics/Chemistry
Manager
- V. E. Shockley,
Health Physics/Radiochemistry
Support Supervisor
"M.
C. Bartlett, Plant
QA Supervisor
L. Bradford, Health Physics
Supervisor
J. Allen, Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
- J.
D. Mills, Senior Health Physicist
D. J.
Pisarci k, Senior Health Physicist
"D.
E.
Larson,
Manager of Radiological
Programs
and Instrument Control
D. Elbert, Senior Health Physics Technician
"D.
S.
feldman, Plant
QA/QC Manager
"J.
Landon, Plant Maintenance
Manager
"C.
Van Hoff, Senior State Liaison
~R.
L. Corcoran,
Operations
Manager
- G. Oldfield, Supervisor of Radiological
Assessment
Nuclear
Re ulator
Commission
R.
Dodds, Senior Resident
Inspector
"C. Bosted,
Resident
Inspector
C.
State of Washin ton
Office of Radiation Protection
J.
Erickson, Senior Health Physicist
R.
Andrew, Health Physicist
"Denotes those individuals present at the exit interview on May 22,
1987.
In addition,
the inspector
met with other members of the licensee's
and
contractor's staff.
2.
Occu ational
Ex osures
Duein
Extended
Outa
es
a.
General
The licensee's
planning, preparations
and scheduling for the
refueling outage
were examined.
The outage which started
on
April 13, 1987, is expected to complete in mid June
1987.
The examination
focused
on the licensee's
radiation protection
program that was implemented for refueling activities and other
major repair work such
as:
Repair of A8B recirculation
pumps
In-service inspection (ISI)
Snubber inspection
and repair
Valve refurbishment
Turbine and condenser
inspection
and repair activities
CRD removal
and replacement activities
Other miscellaneous
repair activities
The examination disclosed that the licensee's
radiation protection
organization
was
augmented with members
from the licensee's
chemistry organization
and contractor personnel.
The resumes
of the contractor personnel
were reviewed
and the
qualification of the chemistry staff assigned
to assist
the
radiation protection organization
were examined.
The review indicated that all individuals selected
met or exceeded
the qualifications for Health Physics Technicians
(HPTs)
as
recommended
by paragraph 4.5.2,
American National Standards
Institute
(ANSI/ANS) 3. 1, 1978, "Selection
and Training of Nuclear
Power Plant Personnel."
Discussions with the Health Physics
Supervisor
(HPS), Assistant
Health Physics Supervisor
(AHPS), Health Physics
Foreman,
and Senior
Health Physics
Technician
(SHPT) staff revealed that the licensee
was unable to augment the site staff with the numbers of contractor
personnel
desired.
The inspector
noted that
WNP-2 management
was
aware of the manning
problems
and controlled work activities accordingly during the
outage.
The inspector could not find any instance
in which the
radiological control program was compromised
because
of the manning
shor tage.
The inspector verified that authorizations for overtime
work were consistent with plant procedure
PPM 1.3.27,
"Overtime
Control," and Technical Specifications, Section 6.2.2(f).
The above observations
were brought to the licensee's
attention at
the exit interview.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Audits and Survei llances
The inspector
reviewed audits
and surveillances
of the radiation
protection program that were conducted
by the licensee
since the
last inspection.
The following survei llances that pertained to
activities examined
by the inspector during this inspection
were
reviewed
Surveillance
No.
Date
Area Examined
2-86-106
2-86-161
September
2,
1986
ALARA Program Control
December
16,
1986
Contamination Control
and Decontamination
2-87-033
2-87-031
January
14,
1987
Radiation
Exposure
Records
and Control
February 18,
1987
Personnel
Exposure
Monitoring/Dosimetry
2-87-032
2-87-123
2-87-104
March 13,
1987
April 2,
1987
April 21,
1987
Radiological
Surveys
Radiation Work Permit
Program
Personnel
Exposure
Monitoring/Dosimetry
The examination disclosed that the surveillance provided
an in-depth
review of the particular areas that were examined.
None of the
reports identified any violations of the regulatory requirements.
Some surveillances
identified several
weaknesses,
such
as failure to
follow station procedures.
An observation
by the inspector
disclosed that most of the surveillances
were conducted prior to
starting the outage.
This observation
was brought to the licensee's
attention at the exit interview.
The inspector
discussed
the
importance for scheduling audits
and surveillances
during both
normal plant and outage operations.
The licensee
agreed to evaluate
the inspector's
observation.
d.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Personnel
Ex osures
This is discussed
in paragraph
4 and
6 of this report.
e.
Outa
e Work,Practices
Work practices
associated
with the scheduled
work were observed
during the tours conducted
by the inspector
(see
paragraph
5).
Particular attention
was given to work performed associated
with the
drywell, turbine building, refueling and recirculation
pump repairs.
Work practices
appeared
to be improved from the practices
observed
during the previous
outage.
The inspector
noted that contamination
control practices for recirculation
pump work and refueling work
were
much improved.
The inspector
concluded that work practices
appeared
to be
consistent with the
ALARA concept
and Radiation Work Permits.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Personnel
Contamination
Occurrences
Skin
Personnel
skin contamination
records for 1986 and 1987 were
reviewed.
The review disclosed that
a total of 73 skin contaminations
were reported in 1986 and 42 were reported to date in 1987.
Dose assessments
were in the process
of being determined for
three skin contamination
and two clothing contamination
(see
paragraph 2.f.2 below) events that were reported in 1987.
The
maximum skin contamination identified to date
was reported
as
2E5 dpm/probe area.
Plant Procedure,
PPH 11.2. 13.3,
"Personnel
Contamination
Survey" requires that each skin contamination
be reported
and
evaluated
by the Health Physics
Supervisor
or his designated
alternate.
Additionally, in special
circumstances
the
procedure
requires that
a Radiological
Occurrence
Report
(ROR)
be prepared
pursuant to
PPH 11.2. 19. 1, "Investigation of
non-reportable
Radiological Occurrences."
The purpose for the
ROR is to evaluate
the event with the. involved individual and
their supervisor
so that appropriate
actions to prevent
a
recurrence
can
be implemented.
All skin contamination
events
are included in the individual's permanent
exposure
records
and
are also maintained in the licensee's
permanent plant record
files.
The inspector's
review of reported skin contamination
logs
revealed that the evaluations for at least five skin
contaminations
reported in 1986 were incomplete
and were not
included in the licensee's
permanent
record system.
A search
for the missing data
was conducted
by the licensee's
staff.
The data
was subsequently
found on May 22,
1987.
The
licensee's
staff plans to complete the evaluations
in
accordance
with station procedures.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
(2)
Clothin
Contaminations
The licensee
has not established
a procedure for evaluating
personnel
exposures
resulting from personal
clothing
contamination
occurrences.
However,
a procedure,
PPH
11.2. 15.4,
"Personal
Clothing Decontamination"
has
been
established 'for the purpose of providing instructions
on
actions to be taken for the decontamination
of personnel
clothing and shoes.
Additionally, paragraph
11.2. 15.4.6
states:
"Record all conditions of personnel
clothing
contamination
and decon or lack of decon in the Health Physics
Log Book for future use with Corporate Policy and Procedure
(CPP) 1.4.416,
"Loss of Personnel
Property."
An examination
was conducted for the purpose of. determining the
numbers of clothing contamination
occurrences
and the levels of
contamination
being reported.
The examination included
a
review of Health Physics
Log Books,
Volumes 9, 10,
11 and 12,
and completed
copies of attachment
6. 1 to
CPP 1.4.416.
Attachment 6. 1 is used to reimburse
personnel
for damage to
personal
property.
Starting
on or about April 15, 1987, the licensee's
radiation
protection staff changed
the format for documenting clothing
contamination
occurrence
in that
a log sheet
was generated
to
document the event.
Procedure
PPM 11.2. 15.4 was not revised to
reflect the change.
A clothing contamination
reported
on May 5, 1987,
was
documented
on the
new form that was established.
It identified
that an individual had received
up to 1.2E5 dpm/probe
area of
contamination
on the left knee area of his pants.
The
inspector
asked the licensee's
staff if a dose
assessment
for
the individual had
been initiated.
The inspector
was informed
that current procedures
do not provide instructions for
performing dose
assessments
for clothing contamination
occurrences.
The inspector
noted that another
entry made in the skin
contamination
log (see
paragraph 2.f. 1, above)
on May 14, 1987,
reported
a clothing contamination
occurrence
involving an
individual with contamination
on his personal
coveralls.
The
contamination levels reported
were
3E5 dpm/probe
area.
A dose
assessment
of this occurrence
was initiated.
The review of available records disclosed at least
two
instances
involving clothing contamination
occurrences
dated
May 9, 1987,
and
May 10, 1987, that were not documented
in the
Health Physics
Log book or
on the
new form that was initiated
on April 15.
The inspector
found two additional clothing
contamination
occurrences
dated
June 8, 1986,
and August 1,
1986, that had not been
documented
in the Health Physics
Log.
In many cases,
the information recorded in the Health Physics
Log book for remaining contamination
occurrences
failed to
provide the necessary
detail that may be required for
performing
a dose
assessment.
The above observations
were brought to the licensee's
attention
during the inspection.
The licensee's
staff attempted to
locate
any survey data or information related to the clothing
contamination
occurrences
identified by the inspector.
The
licensee's
staff was unable to locate
any information after an
approximate
day and
a half search.
The inspector
noted that one individual had been
reimbursed for
three pairs of contaminated
shoed
and
a contaminated shirt in a
period of less
than nine months.
This information was also
provided to the licensee's
staff.
The licensee's
Health Physics staff acknowledged that they were
not following their procedures
and that their program for
handling personal
clothing contamination
occurrences
was
deficient.
The inspector
noted that the licensee's
staff had
started to develop
a procedure for performing dose
assessments
involving personal
clothing contamination
occurrences.
They
expected to be similar to the procedure
used for handling skin
contamination
occurrences.
The inspector
informed the licensee that Technical Specifications, Section 6.8.1 requires certain procedures
identified in Appendix A of RG, 1.33 - 1978 shall
be
established,
implemented
and maintained.
Procedures
identified
in
RG 1.33 Appendix, Section 6,
as
a minimum, includes
procedures
for personnel
monitoring, surveys
and contamination
control.
The inspector
added that failure to comply with PPM
11.2.15.4
was
an apparent violation (87-14-01).
3.
The inspector verified through discussions
with the licensee's
staff,
record reviews
and from personnel
observations
that the licensee's
program was being effectively implemented.
Man-Rem goals for the refueling outage
and year were established
in
accordance
with the licensee's
ALARA implementing procedures.
The
man-rem estimates
were reviewed with the licensee's
staff.
The review
disclosed that man-rem estimates
for the following jobs were exceeded:
In-Service Inspection (ISI)
Inspection
Repair of A8B Recirculation
Pumps
The man-rem expenditures
for repair of the recirculation
pumps
was
expected to be more than double prior to completion of the work.
The
pumps'adiation
levels were at least two-and-one-half times higher than
previously experienced.
Unexpected
problems during the disassembly
were
also experienced.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's
action
taken for the repair of the pumps, ISI inspections
and snubber
work were
consistent with
RG 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring Occupational
Radiation
Exposures at...will be ALARA,"
The review disclosed that remaining work will be performed at man-rem
expenditures
well below the original estimates.
The examination of
records
disclosed that the experience
gained from this outage
was being
documented.
The licensee
plans to use the information to improve their
performance
during subsequent
outages.
The inspector
concluded that
ALARA awareness
and management
support of
the
ALARA program
was consistent with
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Internal
Ex osure Control
and Assessment
An examination
was conducted to determine
the adequacy of the licensee's
control of 'internal occupational
exposures
for consistency with 10 CFR Part 20. 103.
Additional information related to this subject is discussed
in other
portions of this report and in Region
V Inspection
Report 50-397/87-05.
The examination
included the review of applicable licensee
procedures,
personnel
exposure
records,
survey reports
and personal
observations
made
by the inspector.
The inspector
noted that better
use of engineering controls to limit
concentrations
of airborne
radioactive materials
was
made during this
outage
than what was previously observed.
The use of respiratory equipment
was found to be consistent with 10 CFR 20. 103 and
"Manual of Respiratory Protection...Materials."
Procedures
for assessing
individual intakes of radioactive materials
were
being implemented
and
no abnormal results related to internal
dose
assessment
were identified from the review of personnel
exposure
records.
Larger numbers of grab air samples
were collected than the previous
outage.
Discussions
with the Health Physics staff revealed that the
noted increase
of grab air samples
taken resulted
from an
INPO inspection
finding.
The inspector also noted that
some
samples
may not have
been
representative
of the work that was performed.
The inspector's
observation
was
based
on a comparison
made
between
the sample collection
time and the time and type of work activity that was performed.
It
appeared
that
some
samples
were diluted.
The observation
was discussed
with the
HPS who stated that the
HPTs will be provided with appropriate
guidelines for obtaining representative
air samples.
The inspector also identified an error in plant procedure
11.2. 13.8,
"Airborne Radioactivity Surveys,"
Revision 0, dated
May ll, 1987.
Paragraph
11.2. 13.8.6(A)(6) provided the following statement:
"NOTE:
For short jobs,
less
than about four hours,
Lo Vol samples
will not meet the required detection limit of 7.5 E-10 pCi/cc.
Hi
vol samples
must be used."
The record review disclosed that air samples
of less
than
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> were
still being collected with Lo Vol samplers.
The inspector discussed
his
observations
with the licensee's
staff.
The discussions
disclosed that
most the staff had not read the recent
change
and that they disagreed
with the statement.
Based
on the type of sampling equipment
used,
the
licensee's
staff and
NRC inspector calculated that the minimum sampling
time required to meet the detection limit of 7.5 E-10 pCi/cc was four
minutes.
The licensee's
staff determined that an error had been
made
and
then issued
a deviation to the procedure until such time that
a permanent
change
can
be made.
The inspector discussed
the above observations
at the exit interview.
The inspector
emphasized
the importance for providing proper instructions
in procedures
and for assuring that personnel
are
made
aware of these
instructions.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Daily tours of the Turbine,
Radwaste
and Reactor Buildings were conducted
during the inspection.
The licensee's
staff accompanied
the inspector
on
several
occasions.
Independent
radiation measurements
were performed by the inspector with
the following instruments:
Eberline,
Model
RO-2 ion chamber
survey meter, Serial
Number 2694
Due for calibration
on July 23,
1987.
Keithly, Model 36100
X-Ray/Gamma survey meter, Serial
Number 10444-
Due for calibration
on October 14, 1987.
The following observations
were
made:
a.
Observed
work practices
were consistent with instructions provided
on Radiation Work Permits
and the
ALARA concept
as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. 1(c).
b.
Portable
instruments
used for air sampling
and radiation detection
were in current calibration.
c.
A general
improvement in housekeeping
was noted in the areas
toured.
d.
No unmonitored personnel
were observed in the areas
toured.
e.
An excessive
amount of tools/equipment
were observed
in controlled
areas.
This was brought to the licensee's
attention.
The inspector
was informed that the licensee
plans to implement
a new tool control
program prior to the next outage.
The
new tool control program is
expected to minimize the amount of tools used in a controlled area.
Noted improvements
in contamination control work practices for
recirculation
pump repairs
and refueling work were observed.
g.
Posting of notices to workers were consistent with 10 CFR Part 19. 11
requirements.
Except for items (i) and (j) below, the licensee
s posting
and
labeling practices
were consistent with 10 CFR Part 20.203,
"Caution
Signs,
Labels,
Signals
and Controls."
On May 13, 1987, the
NRC inspector identified that the north
personnel
access
leading into the east valve gallery room on the
467'evel
of the
Radwaste
Building was not conspicuously
posted
even though whole body dose rates
up to 10 mrem/hr were measured
by
the licensee
and
NRC inspector.
The inspector
noted that
a
radiation area sign installed
on a swinging gate could not be seen.
The gate which had spanned partially across
the access
opening
had
been
moved aside
and was turned around 1804, facing directly up
against
an adjacent wall.
The inspector notified the
HPS of the observation.
Immediate action
was taken to conspicuously
post the area in accordance
with 10 CFR. Part 20.203(b),
"Caution Signs,
Labels,
Signals
and Controls."
The
swing gate
was subsequently
replaced with a permanent barrier.
The inspector
informed the licensee that failure to assure that the
- area
was conspicuously
posted
was
an apparent violation (87-14-02).
. The
NRC inspector also noted that
a swing gate
used in the west
valve gallery was defective.
The gate would not return to its
normal position after used for access.
The licensee
took immediate
action to repair the gate.
On May 13, 1987, the
NRC inspector
noted that the inner personnel
access
doorway leading into a vacant work tent used for repairing
the recirculation
pump, having whole body dose rates
up to 300
mrem/hr at 18", was not conspicuously
posted
as
a high radiation
area.
The outer doorway entrance
was appropriately posted
as
a
radiation area pursuant to 10 CFR 20.203.
Technical Specifications,
Section
6. 12 requires that each high radiation area shall
be
barricaded
and conspicuously
posted.
The inspector
noted that
a
sign was
on
a piece yellow and magenta
rope.
The sign which
identified that the area
was contaminated
and
did not span across
the access
opening.
It was dangling in a manner
such that it could not be seen
because it was
up against the tent
wal 1.
The inspector
informed the
HPS of the observation.
The licensee
took immediate action to conspicuously post the area.
On May 18, 1987,
NRC inspector
noted the
same condition existed.
The inspector
informed the licensee's
staff of the observation.
The
licensee
took immediate action to conspicuously
post the area.
The
inspector
informed the licensee of their responsibility for assuring
radiation,
and airborne radioactivity areas
are
maintained in accordance
with Technical Specifications,
Section
6. 12
and
10 CFR Part 20 '03.
The inspector discussed
the observation at the exit interview.
The
inspector
informed the licensee that failure to assure that the area
10
was barricaded
and conspicuously
posted
was
an apparent violation
(87-14-03).
On May 18,
1987, the
NRC inspector
and
a lead
HPT from the
licensee's
staff conducted
a tour of the drywell.
Both the
HPT and
NRC inspector
observed
an area
immediately adjacent to the "B"
recirculation
pump that was not conspicuously
posted
as
a high
radiation area.
Radiation levels at 18" from the
pump housing were
200 mrem/hr as determined
from radiation measurements
obtained
by
both the
NRC inspector
and licensee
representative.
A yellow and
magenta
rope spanning
a distance of approximately 15'-20'ontained
only one sign at the extreme left end of the bar rier.
The barrier
was at head height.
The sign blended in with some
equipment that
was installed in the area.
Entry to the location of the
pump is
normally made at the center point of the barrier.
In discussions
with the
HPT who installed the sign,
he stated
he
had installed the
sign in a manner
so that personnel
would not be hitting their heads
on it when they entered
the high radiation area.
The lead
HPT moved
the sign so that it would be readily seen
by personnel
entering the
area.
The lead
HPT agreed that the sign,
as originally installed,
was not conspicuous.
The above observation
was brought to the licensee's
attention at the
exit interview.
The inspector
emphasized
the importance for
following the instructions provided in plant procedures
11.2.7. 1, "Area Posting,"
and
PPM 11.2.24. 1, "Health Physics
Work
Routines."
PPM 11.2.7. 1 requires that radiation areas
and high
radiation areas
be conspicuously
posted with barriers
and signs
installed at approximately waist high.
PPM 11.2.24. 1 requires
radiation
and high radiation area barriers
be checked shiftly.
6.
External
Occu ational
Ex osure Control
and Personnel
Dosimetr
The licensee's
personnel
dosimetry
and control of external
occupational
exposure
was examined for the purpose of assuring
compliance with:
10 CFR Part 19. 13, "Notifications and Reports to Individuals"
10 CFR Part 20. 101, "Radiation Dose Standards
for Individuals in
Restricted
Areas"
10 CFR Part 20. 102, "Determination of Prior Dose"
10 CFR Part 20. 104,
"Exposure of Minors"
"Personnel
Monitoring"
"Records of Surveys,
Radiation Monitoring
and Disposal"
10 CFR Part 20'08,
"Reports of Personnel
Monitoring on Termination
of Employment or Work"
Licensee's
procedures
that were established
for assuring
compliance with
the above requirements
and selected
personnel
exposure
records
were
reviewed.
Periodic tours of the licensee's facilities verified personnel
were
equipped with appropriate
monitoring devices.
The examination disclosed that accreditation of the licensee's
personnel
dosimetry program was granted
on August 20,
1986,
under the National
Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) sponsored
by the
U.
S.
National
Bureau of Standards.
The examination did not reveal
any abnormal
exposure
levels.
The
inspector
observed
the use of alarming pocket dosimeters for work
performed in high radiation areas.
The inspector
also observed that the
licensee's
program includes provisions for the use of multi-whole body
dosimetry for working in nonuniform radiation fields.
The examination disclosed that the licensee's
administrative controls of
external
radiation exposure
were consistent with the'egulatory
requirements
referenced
above
and were commensurate
with the
concept that is defined in 10 CFR Part 20. 1(c).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Control of Radioactive Materials
and Contamination
Surve
s
and
~Noni tori n
An examination
was conducted to determine whether the licensee
effectively controls radioactive materials
and contamination,
and
performs
adequate
surveys
and monitoring.
The inspection
included
a review of applicable procedures,
surveillance
reports,
surveys
and direct observations
of contamination control
practices.
Inspector observations
related to this subject are also discussed
in
other portions of this report.
The licensee's
Health Physics staff are responsible
for monitoring all
materials
leaving controlled areas.
The monitoring practices for
materials
leaving the controlled areas
appeared
to be consistent with IE
Circular 81-07
and IE Notice 85-92.
Licensee
procedure
PPM 11.2.15.7,
"Release of Material from Radiologically Controlled Areas," provides the
instruction for assuring all materials
released
from controlled areas
are
surveyed in accordance
with the guidelines
recommended
in the Circular
and Notice.
A review of a routine survey performed of site buildings within the
protected
area,
but outside of the controlled area,
disclosed that survey
was performed with an Eberline
Model E-120 survey meter.
The inspector
asked the licensee's
staff why a more sensitive
instrument,
such
as
a
micro-R meter wasn't
used along with the Eberline
Model E-120 survey
meter.
The inspector
added that using the micro-R meter along with the
12
Model E-120 survey meter would provide better assurance
that
no
radioactive material
was inadvertently released
from controlled areas.
The licensee's
staff agreed to evaluate
the inspector's
observation.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8.
Collection of Collocated
TLD Measurements
The results of WNP-2 and State of Washington environmental
thermoluminescent
dosimeter
(TLD) measurements
made in 1985 and 1986 from
monitoring stations
collocated with NRC TLD monitoring stations
were
collected pursuant to the instructions provided in Temporary Instructions
(TI) 2500/22.
The data
was forwarded to the
NRC Radiation Dosimetry
Specialist,
Region 1, for evaluation.
This closes
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Radiolo ical Controls Durin
-S ent Fuel
Movement
An examination of the licensee's
radiological control program implemented
for access
to and for work performed in the drywell during spent fuel
movements
was conducted
in accordance
with the instructions provided in
IE Manual, TI 2500/23.
The examination disclosed that
a similar evaluation
was performed
by the
NRC resident
inspector staff.
The results of the
NRC resident inspector's
evaluation are
documented
in
Region
V Inspection
Report 50-397/87-09.
The information was reviewed
and discussions
were held with the
HPS.
Radiation measurements
made in
the drywell during fuel movement
and
a licensee instruction,
dated
April 18,
1987, established
for fuel movement were reviewed.
Personnel
dosimetry records
were also reviewed
and
a tour of the drywell was
conducted.
Exclusion area signs
and area radiation monitors installed in the drywell
for fuel movement were observed
during the tour.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee fully understood
the potential
hazards
from spent fuel movements
and
had taken appropriate
action to
protect the workers that are allowed access
to drywell during fuel
movements.
TI 2500/23 is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with the individuals denoted in paragraph
1 at the
conclusion of the inspection
on May 22,
1987.
The scope
and findings of
the inspection
were summarized.
The licensee
was informed of the
violations discussed
in paragraphs
2 and 5.
The licensee
acknowledge
the
violations stating that appropriate corrective actions would be taken to
resolve the items.
13
The inspector discussed
the significance for the violation discussed
in
paragraph
2.
The inspector
stressed
the importance for performing dose
assessments
for clothing contamination
events
as well as skin
contamination
events.