ML17278B010
| ML17278B010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1986 |
| From: | Bradfute J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mcknight J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609230032 | |
| Download: ML17278B010 (6) | |
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 16, 1986 8609230032 860916 PDR ADOCK 05000397 F
PDR Docket No. 50-397 NOTE TO: <<Jjm McKnight, Document Control FROM:
John 0. Bradfute, Project Manager for WNP-2 BWR Project Directorate No.
3 Division of BWR Licensing
SUBJECT:
DRAFT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM ON WNP-2 The enclosed information was provided to WPPSS on September 12, 1986, to assist them in responding to NRC concerns regarding WNP-2.
By copy of this note the enclosed information should be placed in the PDR and the LPDR.
cc:
EDAdensa PDR LPDR John'.
Bradfute, Project Manager BWR Project Directorate No.
3 Division of BWR Licensing
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FIRE PROTECTION CONCERNS AT WNP-2 1.
Safe Shutdown Methodolo a.
The licensee method,to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions following a control room evacuation requires the use of the ADS and
'LPCI systems.
.Division II equipment is primarily protected for this
, purpose, however, the licensee's present procedure requires the use of three Division I ADS'alves. 'he licensee's procedure also requires that several current transformers be short-circuited by the installation of shorting screws on terminal strips internal to e1ectrical switchgears to ensure the associated equipment's operability
. i'n'the.event of a fire.
Safety questions for the licensee:
.1) 'Provide a plant specific analysis 'to confirm that the use of ADS/LPCI safely achieves and maintains hot shutdown conditions.
2)
Have the three Division I ADS valves been appropriately protected to ensure their'availability following a cable spreading room or control room fire?
3)
Justify the installation of shorting screws internal to switchgears
,to allow use of some of the Division II equipment required for hot shutdown when repairs are not allowed.
b.
.The.licensee has apparently not functionally tested the use of ADS/LPCI to achieve hot shutdown.
.Safety questions for the, licensee:
I 3)
Provide justification for not functionally testing ADS/LPCI to
, ensure hot shutdown can be achieve'd.
2.
Electrical Se aration and Cable Rou n
, The contro1 room controls for two RHR valves (53A and 123A) which are high/1'ow.pressure interface valves are apparently not adequately protected
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to.prevent spurious operation.
These control switches are 1ocated in c1ose proximity to each, other.
The li'censee has identified several loads whose spurious actuation could add to the tota1 load on the Division II EDG; however, the. licensee has apparently not vepified that the EDG would remain'.within"the EDG's rated load should this event occur.
The plant apparently. does not comply with Reg. Guide 1.75 in that cables of both
,Divisions I and II can be routed in common raceways'.
In this regard, the.licensee
'has, apparently not completely analyzed for the "common enclosure" 'concern.
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2.
(continued)
Safety questions for the licensee:
1)
How are RHR valves '53A and 123A protected from spurious actuation?
P 2)
.Can spurious actuations of loads result. in overloading of the Division II EDG?
3)
Was a "common enclosure" analysis performed for.raceways?
If not,.justify not performing this analysis.'.
Fire.Barrier Installations Apparently, not.all penetration seals have been installed in conformance with their tested configuration.
'. The licensee apparently was informed in 1983 by ANI and a penetration seal vendor that '200-'3'00 penetrations are in this category.
Safety question for the 1icensee:
Are all penetration seals installed in accordance.with tested 'configurations and if'not, justify their use in meeting fire protection requirements?.
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a 4..Fire.Main Routin
- The plant,fire.main which supplies fire suppression systems located in the
.cable spreading room', cable chase, diesel generator building, and portions of the reactor bui'lding, is routed beneath.the diesel gen'erator building.
'outing
.a fire main under a building appears to be in nonconformance with
..NFPA code requirements.
Additionally, the licensee has already experienced leakage problems.with this fire.main.'
,Safety questions for the.1icensee:
- 1)
For fire mains routed. beneath plant structures,
.discuss the safety
.significance of a 1eak in the, main as itrelates to possible degradation of the foundation of the struc'ture.
2)
. How would such a leak be detected?
3)
What actions, if'any,.are planned for this"concern?
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