ML17277B057

Forwards Revised Pages to FSAR Section 8.3 Re Undervoltage Protection,Per Telcon Request.Changes Will Be Reflected in FSAR Amend 34

ML17277B057
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	11/15/1983
From:	Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-83-1061, NUDOCS 8311220223
Download: ML17277B057 (15)

Text

(RIDS)

WO DOCKET lic Powe 05000397 NOTES:

REGULATORY IN ORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYST ACCESSION NBR:8311220223 DuC ~ DATE: 83/11/15 NOTARIZE FACIL:50-397 NPPSS Nuclear Projects Unit 2< Nashington Pub AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION S()RENSKNiG>C, Washington Public Power Supply System RECIP~NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SCHNENCERiA ~

Licensing Branch 2

SUBJECT:

Forwards revised pages to FSAR'ection 8,3 re under voltage protection~per telcon request, Changes will be reflected in FSAR Amend 3Q, DISTRIBUTION CODE!

8001S COPIES RECKIVEDoLTR J ENCL!

SIZE ~

TITLE: Licensing Submittali PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related Correspondence"'ECIPIENT ID CODE/NAMF NRA/DL/ADL NRA L82 LA INTERNAL: ELO/HDS2 IE/OEPKR/EPB 36 IE/DEQA/QAB 21 NRR/OE/CEB il NRR/DE/EQB 13 NRR/DE/MEB 18 NRA/DE/SAB 2Q NRA/OHFS/HFEBPO NRA/OHFS/PSRB hlRR/OS I/AKB 26 NRA/OSI/CPB 10 NRR/OS I/ICS8 16 NRR/DS I/PSB 19 NRR/DSI/RSB 23 RGN5 EXTERNAL: ACRS 41 OM6/DSS (AMDTS)

LPOR 03 BASIC 05 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

0 1

0 1

0 3

3 1

1 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

3 3

6 6

1 1

1 1

1 1

RECIPIENT IO'CODE/NAMK NRR LB2 BC AULUCKrR~

01 IE FILE IE/OKPER/IRB 35 NRR/DE/AEAB NRR/DE/EHKB NRR/OE/GB 28 NRR/DE/MTEB 17 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 NRR/DL/SSPB NRR/DSI/ASB NRR/DS I/CSB 09 NRR/OS I/METB 12 NR D

/RAB 22 FIL 04 RR D

/MIB BNL(AMOTS ONLY)

FEMA. RKP DIP 59 NRC PDR 02 NTIS COPIES LTTR ENCL 1

1 1

1 1

1 0

1 1

2 2

1 1

1 1

'i 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

0 1

1 1

1i 1

1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:

LTTR 53 ENCL 06

g ', <<r I

~

Nt 4

'e 0

I g

g ~,t pt l

4

'l l f 4

l 4

14>>

N e ~ l 4>

~

~

l 4 t I ~Nte l t't N '" ~

Nf Ik,it) f lru e rl)N;I N

f Ne'l I

1 0;,'

4 'I e>>

~ 4 k

I) 4 l

<<4>>ttlN 't

$ 4t,tq

~

4 I

'I N j 44,-4NA."'i N'34'N 4

> fe.l>>

4! ~N

~ le.i) l e

ll., I f,l

>>+

ttr 4

II4 l

5I II l

~ tt,q I l N

>>Nl f~

ht ii 1< 'll'NX kL 3-

=Ne) 4t I t'

)l

~ >>>1 N'NI I

~ A %l NN>>I tP Xie.. i(X

%1(4 JNI-r

) X R

Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000 November 15, 1983 G02-83-1061 Docket No. 50-397 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.

2 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Project No.

2 Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

'UCLEAR PROJECT NO.

2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SECTION 8.3, UPDATE As requested during a phone conversation between Messrs.

R. Auluck and S.

Rhow (NRC) and T.

Meade and P.

Powell (SS),

the attached FSAR page changes are provided.

The Final Safety Analysis Report will be revised in Amendment 34 to reflect these changes.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Mr. P. L. Powell,

Manager, WNP-2 Licensing.

Yery truly yours, G.

C. Sorensen, Acting Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs PLP/tmh Attachment cc:

R Auluck NRC WS Chin

- BPA S

Rhow NRC AD Toth NRC Site 83i12202 050OO3+7 2S 83iiis PDR ADQCK

@DR

~A

~ 1 r

r

~ r r

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

26 July 1982 The primary undervoltage sensing scheme for the 4.16 kV Class lE distribution system utilizes instantaneous undervoltaqe relavs to start the Division 1+ 2~~standby diesel qenerators immediately upon lo4s of voltaqe at their asso-ciated 4.16 kV Class 1E switchgear buses.

These relays also eneraize timers which allow the system to attempt to establish supnly from the startup source (if the plant is operating from the normal source at the time) or verify that voltaqe loss is maintained (it the plant is operating from the startup source initially).

r

~

r

~ r

~

r rr

~

In the event that voltaae loss is maintained for two seconds, the Division 1 and/or 2 timers trip the Class 1E bus normal/

startup source breakers, institute load sheddinq, and energize additional two-second and five-second timers.

The second two-second timer is utilized to attempt closinq of the backun source breakers:

backup transformer undervoltaqe relays will inhibit breaker closure in the event of backup source under-voltage.

The five-seconal timers are used to inhibit closure of the diesel generator breakers until the system has had time to attempt reestablishment of supply via the backup source.

Since-th is no provision for on 3 4.16 kV Class 1 E bus trans~er~t4e~ac)cup source, its diesel aenerator breaker clos~~ sianals r

e Division 3 three-

~secon 'r, vhic!! is enerqized by the bus un r

ay.

Refer to 8.3.1.1.8.1.7 and 8.3.1.1.8.2.7 for additional discussion of the standby diesel aenerator starting and loading systems.

A second level of undervoltage protection is provided to pro-tect against the effects of prolonqed dearaded voltaae which could adversely affect the operation of Class lE electric

. motors reauirinq at least 90% of the na!Ienlate voltage for continuous oner at ion.

(See Table 8. 3-13. )

For this reason, Class lE bus S<-4, SM-7, and SN-8 voltaaes are monitored bv an additional set of Class 1E undervoltage relays.

Three static type undervoltaae relays are provided for ~h-bus-and are I

connected to monitor all three line voltaaes (i.e.,

p ases AB, BC, and CA).

The arrangement utilizes a 2-out-of-3 logic to preclude the possibilitv of spurious voltage loss siqnal and facilitate testina.

r r

r r

6 -pa-! >aARY ul4bEzvovtA<C ~~ 6 Foa ME. -r>! J! 5>ohl 3 f)b K'!( CW 8

>K ~u4 uT>ups~

>NSrh>J+AhlEOug QL)+g~+Qq(P+

RE WY5 QH>C,>+ eke(z >~ Wb ~~k~ y(~g~~

GVEH7 7HAT QC!~(c ~ ~g

>c

/4+gA)~g!g ~

~>->ewe m>MEk5, ~I> ~E PRE.F'gR~~&

'KOu&cE

'ER64kER.q 4N~

Q,NE:Lc )7)VC AW~N > r7Okh,< ~QQ ~CQk~ i. QIWb~

! ~4.~C W~CL+i

~Trh~ae M<

J4~~

W a P>l

!! -" i

~

~

~

~

~< ~<<5~-(~~~<. W~~Y ~~K'ER l

cd>4 (- ~EP( Mc7.c A~BR. ~E >zF~g(

~a.~

p>=,"(Cy'% > >>

'JOt '74.Cps

~

~

Op

~.

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

27 vember 1982 THC D>Q I%10~ 8 5GCPH>

4cQEL UlV ~~~(~~a

~>7EC77OIV PT/~

g ~O eu oF o

W 0 ~~C~U~C ~+ ~SgIPg,i7, OF ~C'>DU% MI>'P~hlg.

In the event of sustaineR bus undervoltaae (R7.3% of nominal bus voltage lastinq more than 8 seconds),

the second level of undervoltaqe protection automatical.ly trips the feeder breaker cnnnectina the normal/startup snurces to their respective

4. 16 kV Class 1E buses.

For Divisions 1 and 2 this action results in loss of bus voltaae, thereby startinq the diesel qenera-toes, initiatina load sheddina and energizing the three bus transfer timers mentioned in the primary undervnltage scheme above.

Tn thi.s case,

however, the first two-second timer is bypassed.

We second two-second timer nermits closing of the backup snurce breaker and the five-second timer permits closing of the diesel qenerator breaker assuminq a failure of the hackuo source breaker to close.

Closure nE the backup snurce and diesel generator breakers is oermitted if the snurce voltage is at least q4% of normal.

Should the Rearaded voltaae condition exist nn the backup power source while the source is supplying the load, the second level undervoltaae relays would then isolate that

source, aaain initiatina the seauence of events described for the secondary undervoltaae sensina scheme above.

Rowever, closina of backup Feeder

breakers, as part of that seauence nf

events, is blocked.

For Division 3, the second level of undervoltaae protection trips the normal/startup source breaker, therebv causinq a

loss of bus voltaqe.

~this-po-int-en~he-pr&eeey-enRer-e s-over-a~he-ense f-even ts will be the same as i~ the-case'nF--th~

loss-of oFfsit~-cower 4iecassed-ateca.

Wl5 gal@

Zc~PsC~

WE 5C," o A> M0-

~Hb

~NEJZ.

VJHICtP RE5CCC75 Pv')IJQ+L. 5~q7 +~ +P5F )LA When the Class 1E buses SR-7 and SM-8 are being fed from the turbine gener ator, the possibility of sustained undervoltaae is not considered credible due to response characteristics of t'e voltaqe reaulatnr and protection equipment for the unit.

The scheme doscriherl assures a nower source within the accep-table voltaae limits fnr the Class 1E loads at all times.

Circuit Resign allows for testing nf the individual relays, one at a time, without disruntinq the protective function.

~ ~

~

~

~

~ '

8. 3-4a

WNP-2 AMENDNENT NO.

27 November 1982 B.s.1.1.3 120/240 Volt (Ron-Class 1>) Plant Uninterruptible Power Svstem

~

~

The non-Class 1F. plant uninterruptible power system supplies 120/240 V AC to station services where uninterruptible power is reauired, such as for plant, computer and plant instrumen-tation (e.a.,

DEH cabinet).

This source of power is necessary for plant operational

loads, but does not supply ESP loads.

Power is distributed via a sinole phase, three wire, crounded neutral system.

Pailure of the non-Class 1E uninterruptible power system has no adverse effect on station safety. since no FBP loads are supplied from this system.

'I r'w'ri The plant uninterruptible power system receives its power from a static inverter-static switch arranqement fed both from a 250 V DC station battery (float source) and from a 480 V AC Class 1E NCC (preferred source) as shown on Fiuure 8.3-2.

During faults on the uninterruptihle power system the static switch will automatically transfer loads to a regulated alter-nate source, which supplies sufficient fault current to blow the circuit fuse and clear the fault.

p manual bypass switch.~ also provided to bypass the entire plant uninterruptihle power,systems and transfer load to ap'egulated bypass source.

This will allow for maintenance and inspection of the svstem.

8. 3.1.1. 4 120/208 volt Non-Class 1F. Instrumentation Power Svstem Power is supplied to non-Class 1F. plant instrumentation at 120/208 V AC via a three

phase, four wire, qrounded neutral distribution system.

Wis distribution system supplies power to the 115 V AC transversinu incore probe (TIP) of the neutron monitorinc system and other non-Class 1E instrumentation 1nads.

Failure of the noncritical instrumentation power system has no adverse effect on station safety since no ESP loads are supplied from this system.

Alarm and tault detection equipment is provided to alert the ooerator of possible trouble.

All equipaent associated with the 120/208 V non-Class 1P. instrumentation po~er system is readily accessible for inspection and maintenance on a routine basis in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendation.

8. '1-6

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO. 23 February 1982 A Class 1E supervisory control system is provided between the main control room and the standby service water pumphouses to monitor aa4-e~~

operation of Class 1E standby service water equipment.

The system is divided into three separate and independent divisions (Division 1, 2, and 3) corresponding to the three service water system equip ent divisions.

Separate equipment is provided for tr 1

or connections between divisions.

Failure of equipment in one supervisory division does not affect supervisory equipment of other divisions.

Each supervisory control division is a two-way type, incor-porating 'multiplexing line sharing, continuous scanning modu-les (with solid state logic) and output relays.

8.3.1.1.8 Standby AC Power System The standby AC power source for the plant consists of three diesel generator

sets, each one serving ESF loads in its asso-ciated Division (1, 2, 3), their attendant air starting and fuel supply systems, and automatic control circuitry.

The diesel generator sets supply power to those electrical loads which are required to achieve safe cold shutdown of the plant and/or mitigate the consequences of a design basis event coin-cident with a loss of all offsite AC power.

Tables 8.3-1, 8.3-2, and 8.3-3 list the equipment and loads supplied by each generator for both cases.

The individual loads are determined on the basis of nameplate rating of the motors used.

Each diesel generator (with its auxiliaries) is housed in a separate room as shown in Figure 8.3-15.

The separating walls are designed as three-hour NFPA fire barriers and will provide missile protection in the event of explosion or failure of rotating equipment.

Each room is provided with its own ven-tilation and lighting systems.

Design provisions ensure that flooding in one diesel generator room does not )eopardize the operation of the other diesel generators.

The power, instru-mentation, and control cabling associated with the diesel generators is contained in cable trays and conduits which meet the separation criteria detailed in 8.3.1.4.

All equipment for these systems is identified as indicated in 8.3.1.3.

8'-9

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

23 February 1982 8.3.1.1.8.2.6 Fuel Oil System Figure 8.3-22 shows the fuel oil system.

The fuel oil system consists of two mutually redundant fuel oil systems external to the engine fuel manifolds, either of which is capable of supplying fuel oil to the engine.

Each system, from the day tank to the fuel manifolds, contains a fuel supply line, a

strainer, a fuel oil pump, a duplex filter, a pressure

gage, and relief and check valves.

One of the fuel pumps is mech-anically driven by the engine and the other by a 120 V DC motor.

The system has a common return to the day tank.

Refer to 9.5.4 for additional details of the fuel oil system.

8.3.1.1.8.2.7 Automatic Starting and Loading System In the event, of loss of offsite sources of power to the onsite power system, the HPCS diesel generator set is automatically started and loaded by controls and circuitry which are inde-I pendent of those used to start and load the Division 1 and Division 2 units.

Control power for the diesel generator unit is supplied from its own 125 V DC system which consists of a battery with its own battery charger (see 8.3.2.1.2).

The diesel qenerator starting logic and starting signals (shown on Figures 8.3-18a and 8.3-18b) are described as follows:

a.

The diesel generator starts immediately upon receipt of ~16-ku-4:lass 1B&ee~N +j-under LOCA signals (reactor low water level and/or high drywell pressure).

b.

Upon sustained loss of bus SM-4 voltage the bus is automatically isolated from the upstream non-Class 1E system. A<a

'ST4 w~~

c.

After the diesel generator has attained approxi-mately normal frequency and voltage, its breaker automatically closes (if unit start was initiated by bus SM-4 undervoltage),

picking up loads as indicated in Table 8.3-3.

LOCA signals do not initiate automatic breaker closure.

8.3-22

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

23 February 1982

'I

~

E 4

~

r

~a 4 ~ ~

=p

'reoperational testing will include demonstrating the required reliability of the WNP-2 standby diesels by means of a start/load test described in Regulatory Guide 1.108.

Since Divisions 1

and 2 diesel generators are similar, each will undergo a 35 start/load test.

Division 3 (HPCS) ~4-undergo a

6 9 start/load test.

~ (X~ ~

Description of Division 3 test:

To accomplish this test, supply of 4.16 kV Class 1E bus SN-4 vlh~ ~~~ transferred to the startup,spurce.

Under this con-dition, the diesel generator wiJ4Msynchronized to the 230 kV startup source and loaded via manual ad)ustment of the unit speed controls to at least 50% of continuous ratiqqpad q

operated at>,tpis level for at least one hour.

Sixty-four')6A) such tests 4k&~'ccomplishep.~~,,In addition, 5 tests ~1+.i<i~<~

involvegloading the diesel with'he'existing bus loads including the HPCS pump motor.

Significant parameters such as voltage, frequency, operating temperature, acceleration

times, and other pertinent functions

~C. wkkk-be monitored throughout the duration of the test and recorded.

~%R R Valid tests and failures ~~ based on the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Section 2.e.

~F1 es nsidered e

limited~to those causyd by malfunctiotf the esel >gene tor set gnIy.

Failures~aused b~~malfun ons ip the +st equip ment', exter'nal circuitry,~ loads~ re notmonsi~red tri u-table to the reliability of the~esel gpnerato+set.

provisions are'ade to dete~e the cause of~ny my fun ion or~excess wear and fo clas RTy it as~6 vali+ failur'e of the

.equipmenp"being tested o

an external non~malid failu Such determiaation.>>of caus d classpfication of failure will be fu11y'upported by 4cfcumentatioh.

8.3-48a

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

27 November 1982

~ P 3.

on a restart with an initial enqine tem-perature equal to the continuous ratinq, full loaR enqine temperature; c.

Carry the Resiqn loaR for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />; d.

Maintain voltaqe anR frequency within limits that will not deqrade the performance of any of the loads composinq the Resiqn loaR below their mini-mum reauirements, including the duration of tran-sients causeR by load application or loaR removal; e.

withstand anv anticipateR vibration and overspeed cnnRitions.

There is no flywheel coupled with the HPCS diesel qenerator.

The generator and exciter 'are designed to withstand 25% overspeed without damaqe.

The HPCS diesel generator has continuous and short-term ratinqs consistent with the requirements of Section 5.1 of the Standard.

PI ~

~

~

Mechanical anR electrical system interactions between the HPCS diesel generator unit and other units of the standby power

supply, the nuclear plant, the conventional

plant, and the Class 1E electrical systems are coordinateR so that the HPCS diesel qenerator units'esiqn function anR capability are realizeR for anv Resiqn basis event except failure of the HPCS diesel qenerator unit.

The oualification requirements of'EFE StanRard 323-1971 are met by test anR on operatinq experience on similar equipment in similar environment in other plants.

8. 3.1.2.2

~ests and inspection The auxiliary AC power system is desiqned to permit periodic testinq and inspection of the system as a whole and of the operability and functional performance of the components in accordance with General Desiqn Criterion 18.

Preoperational

testinq, as ~escribed in Chapter 14, will be performed to verify that all components, automatic and manual controls, and seguences of operation of the standby power system function as required.

Preoperatinnal testing of redundant portions of the onsite electrical power system to verify proper load qroup assiqnments is performed in accorRance with NRC Regulatory GuiRe 1.41, Revisio~p,<t Voltaqe values at Class 1E hiqh and low voltage buses ~X-be measured and compared to the Resign

values, to demonstrate correct transformer tap settings, durinq the preoperatinnal testinq phase of the plant.

8. 3-48

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO ~

26 July 1982 8.3.1.2.4.3.2 Secondary Undervoltaqe Sensing V'

~, t Static Class lE undervoltaae relays with definite time delay located in each of the redundant Division 1 and Division 2

4. 16 kV Class 1E switchqear units are utilized for detection of sustained deqraded voltaae in the offsite power system.

This protection scheme is desiqned to compliment the primary undervoltaae scheme described above.

~ ~ ~,

~

rr

~l

~

~ ~ +

~

The trip setpoint of each relay is 3631 volts, corresponding to 87.3 percent of nominal bus voltage and 90.8 percent of nominal motor voltaae.

Trip setpoint selection is based upon insurinq 90 percent of motor nominal voltaqe at the motor ter-

minals, includinq allowance for feeder voltaue drop.

The relay automatically resets when the bus voltage exceeds 89.9%

of nominal ratina.

Eiqht seconds of time delay is provided to permit override of motor startina dip.

The duration of motor starting voltage dip is very short lived - in the order of 2 to 5 seconds.

The second level of undervoltaae relays will not, therefore, ini-tiate actions for this condition.

g*

The relays operate to isolate the degraded source and initiate the sequence of events to select the next available source.

Circuit desiqn precludes spurious voltaqe loss siqnal and allo~s for testing of the individual relay, one at a time,

~without disruptinq the protective function.

Durinu loss-of-coolant accident, diesel qenerator power is available to the emerqency loads 13 seconds after the sustained degraded qriR voltage condition is sensed at the emergency bus.

This time delay is derived from the 8-second delav mrior to the offsite breaker trip plus a 5-second delay prior to the diesel generator breaker closure.

The above time delay is acceptable since during a concurrent loss-of-coolant

accident, the emergency core cooling system tECCS) coolant iniection time reauirements as specified in Table 6.3-1 are met.

See Fiqures 8.3-16c and 8.3-17c for the logic diagrams of Divisions 1

and 2 secondary undervoltage protection.

The same voltaqe trip and time delay setpoints are used for the Division 3 secondary undervoltage relays.

For Division 3g

however, the diesel generator power is available at the bus J t;.

seconds after a coincident occurrence of a loss-of-coolant accident and a deqraded grid condition.

This time delay is equal to the 8-second delay prior to the offsite breaker trip plus a 3-second delay prior to the diesel aenerator breaker closure'

~ E rr a

~ / r

, r. ~

0

'sr r-WNP-2 AMENDHENT NO.

23 February 1982 8.3.2.1.3.3 Charqers The chargers for each

+ 24 V DC load group (four chargers total) are supplied from 120 V AC vital power panels asso-ciated with each division.

Each charger is capable of carrying the largest combined demand of the various steady state DC loads while simultaneously restoring the battery from 1.75 volts per cell to its rated voltage in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The charger size and instrumentation conform to the requirements of IEEF, Standard 308-1974 and NRC Regulatory Guide 1.32, (Revision 2).

The + 24 V DC Division 1

(CO-1A, CO-1B) and Division 2 (C0-2A, CO-2B) chargers are rated 25 amperes DC output.

8.3.2.1.4 250 Volt DC (Division 1) System 8.3.2. 1.4.

1 General

~ r r

> 'rr,

'rr r

~

~

\\*

~

P

~

One Class 1E 250 V DC system is provided to supply 120/240 V

AC power on an uninterruptible basis to plant controls, instrumentation, computer and communication equipment via a solid state inverter.

It also supplies 250 V DC power directly to RCIC, selected RHR and RWCO system motor-operated valves and the turbine auxiliary oil pumps.

See Figures 8.3-2 and 8.3-19.

Pl t 120/24 V AC lo ds and turbine oil cia s ified a

nonessen ial (Division A).

thei importa ce to pl t operations and serv from t Class 1$ power source via inver er utili ing prime~,cables.

ump loads ar However,,

beca se of

uipment, the are e Division A

(

The cablinq to the main 250 V DC distribution panel, including the panel, battery,

charger, and incoming 480 V AC normal source are Class 1E (Division 1).

A spare, unconnected charger of the same rating is provided.

8.3.2.1.4.2 Battery In the event of a loss or interruption of charger 250 V DC output, the battery will maintain power to its DC system loads.

The ampere rating and short time rating of the battery is in accordance with IEEE Standard 308-1974.

The battery is capable of supplying, for a period of at least two hours, all DC power required to safely shut down the plant and/or to limit the consequences of a design basis accident.

8.3-66

WNP-2 AHENDNENT NO.

23 Pebruary 1982 TABLE 8.3-23 Transformer Ta Settin s

I A a xC

~"

Wl

~ l

~ W my ~ I ~ ~

~ ~

~-

~ \\

~

~

' r

' \\

Transformer TR-S TR-B TR-N 1 TR-N2 TR-1-1 1 TR-2-21 TR-3-31 TR-7-71 TR-8-73 TR-8-81 TR-8-83 TR-4-41

~Ta s

.8%'

~ ~ ~~

+2.5%

-2.5%

-2.5%

O~~

-5A% -L.~ )-.

-~ C) 7~

8.3-192

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

1 5"

I 1

~

~

I 1&