ML17276A936

Forwards Response to Reactor Sys Branch 810608 Questions, Which Will Be Incorporated Into FSAR Amend 23.Response to Questions 211.148 & 211.209 Will Be Submitted by 820115

ML17276A936
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/06/1982
From:	Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GO2-82-05, GO2-82-5, NUDOCS 8201250301
Download: ML17276A936 (25)

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REGULA'iT, f' VFORMATION 0<IS TRI BUT IO'JRPVSTEt1< (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8201250301 DOCr O'ATEi: 82/01/06 VO,TiAR IZED',

NO'ACIILt:50 397. dPPSS Vucil ea'r: P'rorj ectr Uni t 2r rrlashington PVbl i c< Pose AUTH. VA,~El auTiOR, a~FrILlIA,TION BOUCHEYrG.D..

ala'.shington< PUb:lic Power Supply System:

REC<IP>>, VA<>>lE<

RKCIIP<IENiTI AFF ILKATIONr SCHrlE<VCERg A ~-

l.li censing Br anch 2

SUBJECiT'.

For Weir dS r eSOOnSe tOl R'ea'Ctpr Sya Bi a'nCh.". 8'19608 queati OnSr whi ch; wi lili be incor< oo'r a'ted into, FSAR Amend 23 ~ Response tol Questions 21,1.148' 211,209 wil;l; be subliiitted-by 820115.'ISTRIBUTION CDDEI; 8001S CDPIIKS RECEIVED'lTR KNCLl SIZEi6

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PDR Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000 January 6,

1982 G02-82-05 SS-L-02-CDT-82-003 Docket No. 50-397 Mr. A. Schwencer, Director Licensinq Branch No.

2 Division of Licensinq U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

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Reference:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.

2 RESPONSES TO REACTOR SYSTEMS BRANCH QUESTIONS Letter, R.L. Tedesco to R.L. Ferquson, "WNP-2 FSAR - Request for Additional Information", dated June 8, 1981 Enclosed are sixty (60) copies of responses to Reactor Systems Branch questions transmitted to the Supply System by the referenced letter.

These responses, will be incorporated into Amendment 23 of the WNP-2 FSAR.

guestions 211.148 and 211.209 are not included in this submittal.

The response to these questions wi 11 be transmitted to the NRC by January 15, 1982.

Very truly yours,

~QW~+

G.

D. Bouchey Deputy Director, Safety and Security CDT/jca Enclosures cc:

R Auluck -

NRC WS Chin BPA R

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NNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

11 September 1090 Q.

211. 054 (5

2 2)

The peak pressures occurring after closu;.'f the XG:.'

c'<u=-

'o scrams initiated by high flux and high pressure signals are

,not consistent between Figures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5 of the FSAR.

Further, Section 5.2.2.2.3.1 erroneously states that generator load rejection with bypass failure is shown on Figure 5.2-4.

Correct these inconsistencies.

R~es nse:

The inconsistencies stated are corrected in revised 5.2.2.2.3.1 and revised. Figures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5.

The curve for peak vessel bottom pressure from pressure scram in Figures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5 were mistakenly placed onto these figures and have been deleted

~The reference to generator load rejection wxt.

ypass ax ure in 5.2.2.2.3.1 was incorrect and has been deleted.

ll 211

~ 054-1

f v

f,t pt

Insert to Page 211.054-1 It should be noted that the design of safety/relief valves for General Electric reactors is based on the requirements of Section IIIr Nuclear Vessels of the AStiE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes which has also, been adopted by the NRC as part of the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulationsi 10CFR50.55a.

It is GE's interpretatio'n that this Code does not require the failure of qualified scram signals such.. as the direct safety grade position scram.

GEi thereforer considers the failure of the direct scram signal and, relies on flux scram to terminate the event to be an appropriate Licensing basis for reactor vessel overpressure protection compliance.

Analysis shows adequate margin does exist in the design of the safety/relief systems and that even if the flux scram signal failed and the event was terminated by pressure scr am (clearly an emergency event) i the peak vesseL pressure would stiLL be Less than the emergency and upset ASIDE Code Limits.

This position is expressed in a Letter from I.

F. Stuart 'to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regula't ion (attention V. Stelloi Jr.) i dated December 23'975.

r

WNP-2 Q;

211.146 (5.4.6)

In'he responses to Question stated that an automatic,saf condensate storage tank to a

(ice.i the suppression pooL) ience to the operator.

Prov natic switchover feature and conf irm that both electrical safety grade.

i s 211.046 and 031.015't is ety-grade switchover from the Seismic Category I supply has been provided as a

conven-,

ide a description of the auto-it s initiating signal and and mechanical features are

Response

The automatic switchover feature e for HPCS and RCIC consists of two Class 1E Level switches for each system which will be mounted on a standpipe in the pump suction Line.

This standpipe is located on the comnon condensate supply Line inside the reactor building at the reactor building/service bui Lding inter face.

The standpipe is open ended and is used to indicate either a

low water Level condition in the condensate storage tanks (CST) or a

Loss of suction supply from the CST.

The stand-pipe is designedi fabricatedr and installed to Seismic Category Ir Quality CLass 1r and ASNE Section III'lass 2

standards.

The piping from the reactor buiLding/service building inter-face to both the RCIC and HPCS systems have been upgraded to Seismic Category I; each circumferential buttweld has been radiographicaLLy examined per ASNE Section III'C-5230m and a

chemicaL analysis has been performed on all piping materials and as-deposited weld.materials.

The HPCS P&ID (Figure 6.3"1) and Functional Control Diagram FCD (Figure 738) and the RCIC PRID (Figure 549) and FCD (Figure 7.4-2) have been revised to indicate this design feature.*

• FSAR page changes attached.

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

8 February 1980

~A) 5/- IZS whats the shutdown coolant system can be placed C/1/Sf into operation.

Following a reactor

scram, steam generation will continue at a reduced rate due to the core fission product decay heat.

At this time,the turbine bypass system will divert the steam to the main condenser, and the feedwater system will supply the make-up water required to maintain reactor vessel inven-tory.

In the event the reactor vessel is isolated, and the feedwater supply is unav'ailable, relief valves are provided to automati-cally (or remote manually) maintain vessel pressure within desirable limits.

The water level in the reactor vessel will drop due to continued steam generation by decay heat.

Upon reaching a predetermine'd low level, the RCIC System is initiated automatically.

The turbine driven'ump will supply demineralized make-up water from the condensate storage tank to the reactor vessel.

The suction line from this source is provided with an in-line reserve ~ with appropriate safety-related level instrumentation.

In the event that the water supply from the condensate storage tank becomes exhausted, the level instrumentation in the in-line reserve ~ initiates an automatic switchover to the suppression.

poolms the water source for the RCIC pump.

The in-line reserve ~ has suf-ficient volume to maintain the minimum required RCZC pump NPSH plus a two foot margin while the switchover occurs, thus assuring a water supply for continuous operation of the RCZC system.

The turbine will be driven with a portion of the decay heat steam from the reactor

vessel, and will exhaust to the suppression pool.

During RCZC operation, the suppression pool shall act as the heat sink for steam generated by reactor decay heat.

This will result in a rise in pool water temperature.

Heat exchangers in the Residual Heat Removal System are used to maintain pool water temperature within acceptable limits by cooling the pool water directly or by condensing generated steam prior to entering the suppression

pool, When using the steam condensing

mode, the condensate discharge from the heat exchangers may be used as RCZC pump suction "supply.

5. 4. 6. 2. l. 2 Diagrams

.he following diagrams are included for the RCZC Systems.

a.

A schematic "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram" (Figure

5. 4<<9) shows all components,

piping, points where interface system and subsystems tie

5. 4-22

S F

I

WNP-2 AMENDMENT NO.

8 February 1980 g.

211. 012 (4 ~ 6)

(5.4. 6)

(5. 4 ~ 7)

Page 1 of 2

Describe the provisions incorporated into the WNP-2 facility to protect the RCIC and the RHR systems from cold weather and from dust storms and to assure satisfactory operational per-formance under any adverse meteorological conditions.

In this discussion, include consideration of the standby liquid con-txol system and the control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic system and any other sources of water for these systems (e.g.,

the condensate storage tank and the standby service water).

~Res nse:

The RCIC system takes suction from the condensate storage tanks during normal modes of operation.

The condensate storage tanks are provided with heaters to maintain water tem-'erature above 40'F at all times.

All above ground piping that contains water zs heat traced to prevent freezing.

Since the CST is a covered

tank, the water supply is not affected by dust storms.

To provide a Categorv I so f coolin water for the RCIC system,

-.the-supprusmnn "pool~Mwh"-isbn vide

"<he-reac'=-

tor building and protected from cold weather and dust storms.

The control rod drive hydraulic system normally takes suction from the main condensate

system, downstream of the condensate demineralizers.

All the piping is located within the Turbine" Building or Reactor Building.

The secondary source of water is the condensate storage tank if the main condensate system is not available.

Both sources of water are protected from cold weather and dust storms.

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dc cs7 r The standby liquid control system, which is filled with sodium pentaborate, is provided with tank heaters and heat tracing to prevent solidification.

The entire system is located within the Reactor Building, so it is unaffected by cold weather or dust storms.

The RHR system takes, suction from either the recirculation-piping or the suppression pool.

All the piping is within the Reactor Building.

The RHR heat exchangers dissipate their heat to the standby service water system.

All SW piping and components are either below the frost line, within the heated pumphouse, or, in the

'ase of the spray rings, kept drained by the return header drain valve when not in operation.

The SW pump suction is 26, 211. 012-1

P A

AMENDMENT NO.

11 September 1980 Q.

211. 099 (7.5)

Since systems such as the

HPCS, HPCI, and RCXC are initially aligned to draw coolant water from the CST and switch to the suppression pool following a signal indicating a low water level in the CST, it is our position that the CST water level should be included in Table 7.5-1 of the FSAR, entitled "Safety-Related Display Instrumentation."

Accordingly, add the signal indicating low water level in the CST in Table 7.5-1.

Alternatively, justify its omission.

Resaonse:

L vel in 'tion for the Cona sate Storage Tank (CST) is pro-vi in th Contr>~Room. " How er, it i~our position that the s

ety fu tion oi HPCS and R

C is determined by displaying to th reactoi.operator p dischar'ge pressure and flow to t~ reacto both of~which are

'ncluded irt Table 7.5-1.

Lose of leve indicati'an in the T when HPCS or RCIC operating ~l have effect. on the sa operation af the HP or RCIC systems beca e both systems sw ch their suc-tion from the CST to the s

ression. pool auto tically folio 'ng a signal indicating low water level x

the CST.

The ins umentation. efi~ting.-th switchover is-C3.'a.

-1'8-m8 an alarm provided in, the Contro Room to indicate en switchover s occurred.

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WNP-2 Q.

211.159 (15. 0).

GE calculations performed for decrease in reactor coolant temperature (Section 15.1) and for" reactor pressure increase (Section 15.2) events using the proposed ODYN Licensing basis model (NEDO-24154) have shown that in some cases a

more Limiting CPR is predicted than by the current REDY Licensing bases model (NEDO-10802).

Since Question 211.049 was sub-mittedi the ODYN modeL has been approved.

Based on a Letter to Glen G.

Sherwood dated 1123180 from Richard P.

Deniser the staff's ODYN Licensing position is that GE can proceed with ODYN analysis of certain events described in Section 15 of Licensing application Safety.Analysis Reports.

Provide the following additional information in conjunction with Question 211.049:

a)

An ODYN analysis of the applicable events (One-D)

Listed in Tables 2-1 and 2-2 of NEDE-25154-P.

b)

A List of aLL input parameters for each event.

c)

Justification that input parameters for each event are conservative.

Response-:

a)

The ODYN analysis of the applicable events has been completed and the appropriate changes to the FSAR have been made.

The foLLowing'NP"2 FSAR sections have been revised:

Table 4 4-1r Sections 5

2'r 15 Or 15 1 2r 15.2.2r and 15-2.3.

b)

The List of input.parameters for the ODYN analysis are Listed in Table 15.0-2 of the FSAR.

c)

The input parameters for the ODYN analysis are either the same or more conservative than those previously used in REDY or have been corrected to reflect the Latest plant design.

See revised Table 15.0-2 of the FSAR for addit iona l information.

WNP-2 Q.

211.197 (6.3)

Section 6.3.2.2.1 of the FSAR states that the HPCS system will automatically switch over from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the suppression pool if the CST water supply

~ becomes exhausted or is not available.

Review of Figure 7-3-10b indicates that automatic switch over wi Ll only occur if the CST water leveL drops to the minimum Level and activates any one of the four Level switches (two per tank).

Howevers in the event that CST water cannot be supplied to the pump while the CST water level is above the minimum water Levelr automatic switch over is precluded.

Resolve this apparent discrepancy between the PSIDs and Section 6.3.2.2.1.

Response

Figure 7.3-10bi High Pressure Core Sprays FCDi sheet 2r has been changed to Figure 7.3-8b in Amendment 10.

The Level indicators which provide the signal for automatic switch over of both HPCS and RCIC are mounted on a Seismic Category I stand pipe in the reactor building.

These Level indicators as instaLLed wiLL sense a

Loss o4 suction supply as weLL as Low Level in the condensate storage tanks for the non"Seismic Category I portion of the condensate system.

The piping cfoun-stream of. -the. stm md p i pe.h es"-be en "u pgr a d e d~-g e i smi cC'are go ry I and wiLL guarantee a suction supply during suction switch over to the suppression pool.

Figure 63-1r HPCS PAID has been revised to indicate these changes.

See also the'evised response to Question 211.146.

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