ML17272A634
| ML17272A634 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Haist D, Narbut P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17272A633 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-79-12, NUDOCS 7909200194 | |
| Download: ML17272A634 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1979012
Text
U, S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report
No.
50 397/79
12
50-397
ense
No
CPPR-93
Washington Public Power Supply System
P. 0.
Box 968
Richland,. Washington
99352
Faci>ity Name
Was ning ton Hucl ear Project 'o.
2 (WHP-2)
Inspection at:
WHP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Approved
By:
Inspection conducted:
l'la
30-June
1,
1979
and June 26-29,
1979
Inspectors:
ta.l ~
P.
P.
Rarbu
Reactor
Inspector
,~< I
l.
D.
P. Haist~Reactor
Inspector
R.
T
odds
Chief, Reactor
Engineering
Support Section
cW~~2
R. T. Dodds, Chief, Reactor
Engineering
Support Section,
Reactor Construction" and Engineering
Support Branch
Safeguards
Group
zs]f)s
Date Signed
el~I/7
Date Signed'
7Q
Dat
Si. ned
Y 3~
ate
igned
SuIrmary: Ins ection
on
Ma
30 - June
1,
1979 and June 26-29,
1979
Re ort No.
50-397/79-12
~A<<d: i ii
.
ii i ii
iy
ii ii
d
inspector
of construction activities including:
review of the licensee's
planned
response
"Pipe Support,
Base Plate
Designs
Using Concrete
Expansion
Anchor Bolts," review of the licensee instigated
anchor bolt rework program in areas
other
than pipe supports
and ob-
servations
of work in the anchor bolt rework program.
This portion of
the inspection
involved 13 inspector-hours
onsite
by one
HRC inspector.
Additionally, an unannounced
investigation
by regional
based
inspectors
of allegations
concerning
the quality of work during fabrication of the
sacrificial shield assembly.
It was alleged that the quality of work on
the sacrificial shield assembly
did not meet construction specification
requirements
and that the licensee
was not being responsive
to the
problem.
This portion of the inspection
involved 63 inspector-hours
onsite
by three
NRC inspectors.
Results:
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified.
Rv Form 219 (2)
~ ~09200 lg
DETAILS
l.
Persons
Contacted
a ~
Washin ton Public Power
Su
1
S stem
b.
C.
d.
+A. D. Kohler,
WNP-2 Project Manager
+*M. E. Witherspoon,
Division Manager,
Q.A.
+*J.
C. Janus,
Construction
Manager,
WNP-2
+J.
D. Martin, Manager,
Startup
and Operations
+M.
W. Hultgren, Division Manager,
WNP-1/4
+L.
D. Noble, Mechanical
Engineer
+*A. M. Sastry,
Project Q.A. Manager
- J.
M. Steidl, 'Senior Q.A. Engineer
- A. N. Kugler, Design Supervisor
R. Spence,
Q.A. Engineer
Burns
and
Roe
Inc.
B
R
+*M. J. Parise,
Deputy Project Q.A. Manager
+G. T. Harper, Jr., Technical
Support Manager
J.
Lauck,
Lead Q.A. Engineer,
215 Field Activities
J. Brinkerhoff, Lead Field Engineer,
215
H. Tuthill, Senior Quality Assurance
Engineer
- R. C. Root, Deputy Project Manager
- M. A. Lacey, Resident Project Engineer
- J.
F.
Good, Assistant Resident Project Engineer
- L. F. Ackers, Senior Welding Engineer
M. Giannini,
Lead Civil Engineer
H. Lunt, Senior Metallurgical Engineer
R.
Dewey, Welding Engineer
P. Hickey, Project Engineer
WSH/Boecon
Bovee and Grail
GERI
Contract
215
A. Larson,
Q.A. Manager
T. Bennington,
Q. A. Supervisor
In addition, inter views regarding the sacrificial shield
quality of construction
were conducted with six quality
control,
two craft, three engineering
and two non-destructive
examination
personnel.
=
State of Washin ton
- G. Hanson,
Senior Project Engineer,
Energy Facility Site
Evaluation Council
+Denotes
attendance
at exit interview of June l. 1979
- Denotes attendance
at exit interview of June
29,
1979
2.
Construction Status
As of June
1979,
the licensee
considered
the construction of MNP-2
project to be
71'A complete.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
(Open) Unresolved
item 50-397/79-06/01:
Undersize fillet weld
designated
on pipe whip support
PHS-1-1.
The licensee
had issued
a project engineering dir ective
(PED 215-
CS-0885 of 6/13/79) to increase
the fillet weld size f'r pipe whip
.
support PMS-l-l to 1/2 inch to meet AISC standards.
The licensee
will perform further review to determine whether calculations
show
that the originally specified
1/4 inch fillet weld was technically
adequate
or perform
a review of other pipe whip support designated
weld sizes for conformance
to AISC design standards.
This item
will remain
open pending 'completion of this review by the licensee.
4.
Concrete
Anchor Bolt Rework
Back round
As a result of defective
anchor bolt installations
discovered
by the licensee
in February,
1978, the licensee
has undertaken
a program of 1005 reinspection of previously installed con-
crete expansion
anchor bolts for all contractors,
including
mechanical, electrical,
and heating
and ventilation for safety
and non-safety related
systems.
The inspector
examined
the licensee's
program for conformance
to the requirements
"Pipe Support
Base
Plate
Designs
Using Concrete
Expansion
Anchor Bolts."
The
licensee's
program basically consists of verifying the proper
installation of Phillips Red
Head shell
type anchor bolts by
measuring
the depth to which the wedge
had
been driven into
the shell.
The replacement
anchors
used, if required,
were
Hilti Drop-In anchor bolts.
The licensee
has
and is continuing
to perform extensive laboratory testing
to determine
such
items
as ultimate pull-out strengths,
load versus slippage
relationships
and torque versus
load relationships.
The
~ inspection
acceptance/
rejection criteria (regarding the depth
of the wedge in the shell)
has
been developed.
At the time of the inspection,
the licensee
had not received
the A/E (B/R) analysis for support plate flexibilityand
corresponding
anchor bolt loading.
The A/E's report to the
licensee
was scheduled
to be provided by June
15, 1979.
The
licensee
stated that
a response
to Bulletin 79-02 will be pro-
vided to
NRC within the 120-day repor ting date.
-3-
b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities
The inspector
examined
the Contract
215 inspection
and rework
of one and inspection of another non-safety related* hanger.
The work was being performed
by the
same
crew in accordance
with the
same procedures
as applied to safety-related
work.
Several
practices
were observed
that differ from Bulletin 79-
02 requirements.
The licensee
agreed in the management
interview to correct these
items
as follows:
(1)
Add a check that the sleeve
has not pulled
up against the
plate for all future anchor bolt reinspections
and
new
installations.
Also, recheck the anchor bolts already
reinspected
and/or reworked to verify the sleeves
have
not pulled
up against
the support plate
by performing
a
-sampling using
a recognized statistical
sampling plan.
(2)
Improve procedure
compliance
by changing
procedures
to
include desirable options, train personnel
and audit the
anchor bolt inspection
and rework areas for procedure
compliance.
Items (1) and (2) above will be reinspected
for safety-related
hangers
during
a future inspection.
(50-397/79-12/Ol)
5.
Sacrificial Shield
a
~
~Summar
On June
6, 1979,
the
HRC Region
Y office received eight allegations
concerning
the quality of'elding on the sacrificial shield.
It was alleged that the quality of welding did not meet construction
standards,
voids existed in the concrete within the shield,
the steel
plate
used to fabricate the shield was not certified
and that the licensee
would not provide direction for resolution
"
of these
problems to the contractor.
On June 8, 1979, the
NRC Region
Y office received
an allegation
that magnetic particle inspection
had
been
changed
from DC to
AC methods contrary to
AWS D.l.l.
The
NRC investigation of the allegations
included examination
of the sacrificial shield welds, interviews with quality
control, craft, engineering,
quality assurance
and management
personnel,
and
a partial review of procedures.
- Note:
Non-safety related
rework and inspec'tion of hangers
was
observed
since
no safety-related
work was in process
at
the time of the inspection.
0
0,
I
-4-
h.
~dh
d
The current construction organization
performing piping and
pipe support work is not the
same organization
as
was originally
involved.
The Leckenby Corporation acting
as
a subcontractor
to the original contractor
performed the shop prefabrication
and site fabrication of the sacrificial shield in the 1975 to
1977 time frame.
Leckenby
and former Leckenby personnel
were
not available
on the site.
The personnel
interviewed were
familiar with the quality of construction of the sacrificial
shield
by virtue of the fact that they are currently making
attachments
to it for structural
steel
and pipe whip supports.
C.
Investi ation Results
~ATT
1:
uyh
1d
1
h
1
pp
[2
2-1'T2
inches thick) were made in many instances
as partial
welds only 3/8-inch deep,
contrary to specifi-
cations
and drawings."
~indin<is:
The allegation
was not substantiated.
However
it was found that laminations
found in structural
steel
are only "chased" 3/8-inch.
This repair procedure
was
reportedly issued
as
a policy by memorandum
according to
the senior welding engineer.
The memorandum reportedly
states
that laminations in plate shall
be chased
(ground)
back into the plate 3/8-inch and then seal
welded
and
welded back out to the original dimension of the plate.
A copy of the memorandum
was not immediately available
for inspector
review but will be made available during
a
futur e inspection.
22)
~A)1
1:
"2
hd<<ld>>
pd
dhy
hp
particularly on the inside."
Findin s:
The allegation
was not substantiated.
The
cra ts, inspectors
and engineers
involved in making
new
attachments
to the sacrificial shield were interviewed
extensively.
The personnel
interviewed provided
a
con-.
sistent description of the types of defects
found in
inspecting
the sacrificial shield steel
in preparation
for attachments
and stated that to their knowledge all
defects
had
been repaired
and
no defects
had
been covered
over by wash passes.
(3)
Alle ation:
"Very few welds meet acceptance criteria by
visua
examination."
~Findin s:
The allegation
was substantiated
The a.pp'licable
visual acceptance
criteria are contained in AWS D.l.l.
The inspection
revealed that on the order of 10Ã to
40%
of the welds
do not meet
AWS 0;1.1 visual acceptance
criteria.
However,
the licensee
and the architect-
engineer
(B/R) were aware of this problem and were taking
action.
See
Paragraph
5.c.(8) of this report-
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
A~11
1:
"d
ld
b
1
d
d."
~Findin s:
The allegation
was substantiated.
The inspectors
observed
a sacrificial shield weld which was covered with
slag
and could not have
been visually inspected.
Additionally,
other welds were sighted with obvious visual defects
not
in accordance
with A/lS D.l.l but were listed on the
Leckenby inspection
records
(on as-built drawings)
as
"O.K."
Therefore,
the licensee
was asked to reconsider
the validity of the fabricator's inspection records
should these
records
be utilized in the final evaluation
of the shield wall.
~A11
1: "ltd
1
1
t
bhl dth
bftd.u
Findin<is:
The allegation
was substantiated.
However
this was
a
known problem and is discussed
in Inspection
Repor t 50-397/78-10.
The licensee
committed actions for
resolution were considered
satisfactory
and the item was
closed
as reported in Inspection Report 50-397/79-08.
A~11
1:
"yb1
(L t
byl
ld
b
certifications for shield material."
~Findin s:
This allegation
was not examined during this
inspection.
However, it was determined that Leckenby
'aterial
certification problems
were addressed
by the
current contractor correspondence
to the licensee
and
B/R
for evaluation.
This item will be examined during
a
future inspection.
~ttf
1:
"d
1
l
fbi
d lb
having receiving inspection."
~Ffndin s:
This allegation
was not examined during this
inspection,
but will be examined during
a future inspection.
A~11
1:
"L<<by th
to NPPSS asking
MPPSS for direction, however
MPPSS
has
not provided the contractor with a satisfactory reply.
They appear
to be taking
a "head-in-the-sand
attitude."
~Findin s:
The allegation
was not substantiated.
Although
the problem of construction quality of the sacrificial
shield
has not yet been resolved,
B/R has stated that the
.
problem has
been officially referred to the B/R home
office for technical
resolution.
The licensee
committed
to provide the date
by which the evaluation will be
completed
and necessary
corrective action identified.
~ttt:
"1
d
1
f
1
lb t
215 magnetic particle inspection
examiners
has
been
changed
from DC to AC which does not detect subsurface
discontinuities
and is contrary to
AMS D.l.l."
-6-
'
~Findin s:
The allegation
eas
riot resolved
on this in-
spection.
The outstanding
items discussed
in Paragraph
5.c above will be
examined during
a f'uture inspection.
(50-397/79-12/02)
7 ~
a7
'
d.
Additional Items
'During the personnel
interv'iews, it was determined that
on several
occasions
when grinding defects
on the sacrificial
shield wall, free water was encountered within the shield.,
Outstanding
nonconformance
reports
issued
on this item da
not address
the free water in the disposition..
The
licensee
has stated that the analysis will include the
corrective action necessary
or the possible deleterious
effects of free water during operations.
This item will
be examined in a future inspection.
(50-397/79-12/03)
(2)
During the inspection of the sacrificial shield, it was
noted that there are shims
between sections
3 and
4
resulting in a through-shield. gap of up to 1/2 inches in
some places.
The authorization
and installation instruc-
tions for the shims or an analysis of the possible
deleterious
effects of the gaps
were not readily available.
This item will be examined further on
a future inspection.
(50-397/79-12/04)
(3)
The use of addenda
to procedure
Ho.
MP-84 (Melding and
Repair Procedure
for Structural
Steel Mithin the Reactor
'
Containment Drywell) written and issued
by the field
welding engineer
was reviewed.
A sampling of addenda
was
reviewed
by the inspectors for improperly reviewed design
changes.
No'esign
changes
were readily apparent in the
addenda,
however,
one addenda
allowed visual
and magn7etic
particle hold points to be bypassed until dispositioned
by B/R civil engineering.
The inspector observed that the senior weld engineer
and
senior civil engineer
did not review the addenda
issued
by the field welding engineers
to ensure that improperly
reviewed design
changes
had not been authorized.
7
The inspector
reviewed Project Engineering Directive No.
215-M-0583,
Document Control Standard for the Meld Procedure
Addenda
System for Structural
Steel
Within the Drywell,
and
had the following comments:
(a)
The Document Control Standard
does not specify
review by B/R g.A, although the 'addenda
are reviewed
and signed
by B/R g.A.
7
~ 7
7
J
7 7
)
V
~
e
(b)
The Document Control Standard specifies signoff by
the general
foreman
and g.C. inspector prior to
release. for construction.
The B/R senior welding
engineer indicated that this may not always
be the
case.
(c)
The Document Control Standard
adds,
as
a note, that
should rework infringe upon structural integrity,
technical justification and or direction will be
given by B/R structural
engineer
to assure
no loss
of structural
capacity for design requirements.
It
appeared
to the inspector that this note may allow
the addenda
system to be used to effect design
changes,
including design
changes
affecting structural
integrity without design control measures
commensurate
with those applied to the original design.
However,
no instances
of design
changes
were identified
during the review of the addenda
packages.
This
item will be examined further during a subsequent
inspection.
(50-397/79-13/05)
6.
Exit Interviews
Exit interviews were conducted
on the dates
and attended.
by the
representatives
denoted in Paragraph l.
The activities performed
and the observations,
findings and licensee
commitments
discussed
in the paragraphs
above were discussed.
P"
, b
t
l
g't
,1