ML17264A430
| ML17264A430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1996 |
| From: | Shankman S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17264A431 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9604030265 | |
| Download: ML17264A430 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 ROCH S
ER GAS AND ELECT C CORPORATION DOCKET NO.
5 44 GINNA NUCLEA OWER PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 62 License No.
DPR-18 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (the licensee) dated February 9,
- 1996, as supplemented March 20,
- 1996, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comnission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; 2.
D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements h'ave been satisfied.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-18 is hereby amended to read as follows:
960403026 S '760401 P
PDR PDR ADOCK 05000244
~r
3.
(2)
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
62
, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
~Susan F.
- Shankman, Acting Direct r Project Directorate I-I Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
pp~~y l., y996
ATTACHMENT TO LIC NSE AMENDMENT NO. 62 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-18 DOCKET NO. 50-244 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove 3.9-4 3.9-5 B 3.9-10 B 3.9-11 B 3.9-12 B 3.9-13 Insert 3.9-4 3.9-5 B 3.9-10 B 3.9-11 B 3.9-12 B 3.9-13
ontainment Penetrations 3.9.3
- 3. 9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
a.
The e'quipment hatch shall be either:
I.
bolted in place with at least one access door
- closed, 2.
isolated by a closure plate that restricts air flow from containment, or 3.
isolated by a roll up door and enclosure building; b.
One door in the personnel air lock shall be closed; and C.
Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
1.
closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or 2.
capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Ventilation Isolation System.
APPLICABILITY:
During CORE ALTERATIONS, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
R.E. Ginna'uclear Power Plant 3.9-4 Amendment No. pg, 62
ntainment Penetrations 3.9,.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.
One or more containment penetrations not in required status.
A.l AND A.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.
Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
Immediately Immedi ately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3. 1 Verify each required containm'ent penetration is in the required status.
7 days SR 3.9.3.2 Verify each required containment purge and exhaust valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.
24 months R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.9-5 Amendment No. Pg, 62
Containment Penetrations B 3.9.3 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 8 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations BASES BACKGROUND During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, a release of fission product
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radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment when the LCO requirements are met.
In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining containment OPERABLE as described in LCO 3.6. 1, "Containment."
In MODE 5, there are no accidents of concern which require containment. 'n MODE 6, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not likely; therefore, requirements to isolate the containment from the outside atmosphere can be less stringent.
The LCO requirements are referred to as "containment closure" rather than "containment OPERABILITY."
Containment closure means that all potential escape paths are closed or capable of being closed.
Since there is no potential for containment pressurization, the Appendix J leakage criteria and tests are not required.
The containment serves to contain fission product radioactivity that may be released from the reactor core following an accident, such that offsite radiation exposures are maintained within the requirements of 10 CFR 100.
Additionally, the containment provides radiation shielding from the fission products that may be present in the containment atmosphere following accident conditions.
The containment equipment hatch, which is part of the containment pressure
- boundary, provides a means for moving large equipment and components into and out of containment.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the equipment hatch-must be bolted in place.
Good engineering practice dictates that a
minimum of 4 bolts be used to hold the equipment hatch in place and that the bolts be approximately equally spaced.
As an alternative,'he equipment hatch opening can be isolated by.a closure plate that restricts air flow from containment or by an installed roll up door and enclosure building.,
(continued)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.9-10 Revision 0,
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ontainment Penetrations 8 3.9.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
The containment equipment and personnel air locks,,which are also part of the containment pressure
- boundary, provide a
means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in accordance with LCO 3.6.2, "Containment Air Locks."
Each air lock has a door at both ends.
The doors are normally interlocked to prevent simultaneous opening when containment OPERABILITY is required.
During periods of plant shutdown when containment closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of an air lock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary.
During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement. of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, containment closure is required; therefore, the door interlock mechanism may remain disabled, but one air lock door must always remain closed in the personnel and equipment hatch (unless 'the equipment hatch is isolated by a closure plate or the roll up door and associated enclosure building).
The requirements for containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment.
The closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict fission product radioactivity release from containment due to a fuel handling accident during refueling.
The Containment Purge and Exhaust System includes two subsystems.
The Shutdown Purge System includes a 36 inch purge penetration and a 36 inch exhaust penetration.
The second subsystem, a Mini-Purge System, includes a
6 inch purge penetration and a 6 inch exhaust penetration.
During MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the shutdown purge and exhaust penetrations are isolated by a blind flange with two 0-rings that provide the necessary boundary.
The two air operated valves in each of the two mini-purge penetrations can be opened intermittently, but are closed automatically by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation System.
Neither of the subsystems is subject to a Specification in MODE 5.
(continued)
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.9-11 Revision 0,
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(.ontainment Penetrations B 3.9.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)
In MODE 6, large air exchangers are used to support refueling operations.
The normal 36 inch Shutdown Purge System is used for this purpose, and each air operated valve is closed by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation in accordance with LCO 3.3.5, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."
The Mini-Purge System also remains operational in MODE 6, and all four valves are also closed by the Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.
The other containment penetrations that provide direct access from containment atmosphere to outside atmosphere must be isolated on at least one side.
Isolation may be achieved by an OPERABLE automatic isolation valve, or by a manual isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.'quivalent isolation methods may include use of a material that can provide a temporary, atmospheric
- pressure, ventilation barrier for the other containment penetrations during fuel movements.
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident.
The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel (Ref. 1).
Fuel handling accidents, analyzed using the criteria of Reference 2, include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies.
The requirements of LCO 3.9.6, "Refueling Cavity Water Level,"
and the minimum decay time of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to CORE ALTERATIONS ensure that the release of fission product radioactivity, subsequent to a fuel handling accident, results in doses that are within the guideline values specified in 10 CFR 100.
Standard Review'Plan (SRP),
Sect'ion 15.7.4, Rev.
1 (Ref. 2), requires containment closure even though this is not an assumption of the accident analyses.
The acceptance limits for offsite radiation exposure is 96 rem (Ref. 3).
Containment penetrations satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement since these are assumed in the SRP.
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.9-12 (continued)
Revision 0,
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ontainment Penetrations 8 3.9.3 BASES (continued)
LCO This LCO limits the consequences of a fuel handling accident in containment by limiting the potential escape paths for fission product radioactivity released within containment.
The LCO requires any penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed except for the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations.
For the OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust penetrations, this LCO ensures that at least one valve in each of these penetrations is isolable by the Containment Ventilation Isolation System.
APPLICABILITY I
The containment penetration requirements are applicable during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment because this is when there is a potential for a fuel handling accident.
In NODES I, 2, 3, and 4, containment penetration requirements are addressed by LCO 3.6. 1.
In NODES 5 and 6, when CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment are not being conducted, the potential for a fuel handling accident does not exist.
Therefore, under these conditions, no requirements are placed on containment penetration status.
ACTIONS A.l and A.2 If the containment equipment hatch (or its closure plate or roll up door and associated enclosure building), air lock doors, or any containment penetration that provides direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere is not in the required status, including the Containment Ventilation Isolation System not capable of automatic actuation when the purge and exhaust valves are
- open, the plant must be placed in a condition where the isolation function is not needed.
This is accomplished by immediately suspending CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.
Performance of these actions shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.
R.E.
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 8 3.9-13 (continued)
Revision 0,