ML17263B068

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{{Adams | number = ML17263B068 | issue date = 05/31/1995 | title = Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TS Improvement Program Submittal, Vols I-VIII | author name = | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | addressee name = | addressee affiliation = | docket = 05000244 | license number = | contact person = | document report number = NUDOCS 9506080208 | package number = ML17263B066 | document type = GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS, TEXT-SAFETY REPORT | page count = 4169 }}

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{{#Wiki_filter:ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCororation.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalhCoverLetterIAttachmentAVolumeI 1~~gglJg.Il.f1 AttachmentAR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantLicenseAmendmentRequestConversiontoImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsThisattachmentprovidesadescriptionoftheamendmentrequestandnecessaryjustificationfortheproposedchanges.Theattachmentisdividedintosevensectionsasfollows.SectionAidentifies,allchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhileSectionBprovidesthebackgroundandhistoryassociatedwiththechangesbeingrequested.SectionCprovidesdetailedjustificationforproposedchangestoNUREG-1431(Ref.1)whileSectionDprovidesthejustificationsforproposedchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.AnosignificanthazardsconsiderationevaluationandenvironmentalconsiderationoftherequestedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsareprovidedinSectionsEandF,respectively.Section'listsallreferencesusedinthisattachment.A.DESCRIPTIONOFAMENDMENTRE(VESTThisLicenseAmendmentRequest(LAR)proposestorevisetheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications(TS)assummarizedb'elow.AttachmentBcontainsamarkedupcopyofthecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsshowingtherequestedchanges.TheTechnicalSpecificationsfollowingtheproposedchangesisprovidedinAttachmentC.Notethatformatissuesandminorwordingchangesareexcludedfromthediscussionbelow.ThejustificationforthesechangesareprovidedinAttachmentD.1.TechnicalSpecification1.0TS1.2wasrevisedandplacedintoatableformat.TheNODEdefinitionswerealsorevisedtoreplacethereactivitymeasurementof~k/k%withk,<<.Thereactivitylimit'andthedefinedaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasremovedfortheRefuelingMODE.AnewoperatingMODEofHotStandbywasinsertedbetweenHotShutdownandColdShutdown.ThedefinedHotShutdownaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasloweredto>350F.TheOperatingMODEwasseparatedintotwoMODES,Operating(>5%RatedThermalPower).,andStartup(<5%RatedThermalPower).TS1.3,1.5,1.6,1.7.4,1.8,1.10,1.13,1.14,1.15,1.16,1.17,1.19,and1.20werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS1.4wasrevisedtoremove"supports"fromthedefinitionofOPERABLE-OPERABILITY.9506080208950526PDRADOCK05000244PPDRHay1995 R TS1.7.1wasrevisedtoincludetheinterlockandtimeconstantfunctionsofthechannelintheCHANNELCALIBRATIONdefinition.Discussionofcalibrating'nstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetectors(RTDs)wasalsoadded.TS1.7.2wasrevisedtoreplacetheuseof"and/or"witheither"and"or"or"asapplicable..TS1.7.3.aand1.7.3.bwereconsolidatedintoonecommondefinitionforaChannelFunctionalTest.PreviouslydeletedTSl.ll,wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS1.12wasreplacedwithageneraldescriptionofhowtouseandapplytheFrequencyrequirementsspecifiedwithinthenewTS.Also,thedefinitionofrefuelingFrequencywaschangedfrom18monthsto24months.rTS1.18wasrevisedtoincludeaspecificreferencetoTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109.TS1.21wasrevisedtoincludetheassumptionthatinHODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Also,theShutdownHargindefinitionnowrequiresconsiderationofRCCAknowntobeincapableofbeingfullyinserted.Thestatement"...andassumingnochangesinxenonorboronconcentration"wasnotadded.Thefollowingtermswereaddedtothedefinitionsection:a.ACTIONSb.ACTUATIONLOGICTESTc.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEd.COREALTERATIONe.COREOPERATINGLIHITSREPORT(COLR)f.LEAKAGEg.PHYSICSTESTSh.PRESSURETEHPERATURELIHITSREPORT(PTLR)i.RATEDTHERHALPOWERj.STAGGEREDTESTBASISk.TRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)AnewsectionwasaddedwhichexplainstheuseofLogicalConnectors(e.g.,AND,OR)withinthenewspecifications.-2-Hay1995 xl11.AnewsectionwasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheCompletionTimeconventionwithinthenewTS.CompletionTimesarenowbasedontheformatthattheclockforallRequiredActionsbeginsfromthetimethattheConditionisenteredandnotfromthetimethatthepreviousRequired'ctionwascompleted.Also,thenewTSrestrictmultipleentriesintotheACTIONrequirementsforseparateConditionsunlessitisspecificallystatedasacceptable.2.TechnicalSpecification2.1TS2.1wasrevisedtorequireanadditionalApplicabilityrequirementthatincludesHODE2whensubcritical.3.TechnicalSpecification2.2i.TS2.2wasrevisedtoonlyrequireanApplicabilityinNODES1,2,3,4,and5.TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequiretheSafetyLimittobemetwhenfuelisinthevesselwithoneormorereactorvesselheadclosurebolts'lessthanfullytensionedorwiththeheadremoved.4.TechnicalSpecification2.3TS2.3wasrelocatedtotheInstrumentationchapter.TS2.3wasrevisedtoclarifyvariouslimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)as"TripSetpoints"fortheirrespectiveReactorTripSystem(RTS)instrumentationfunctions.TS2.3.1.2.d,2.3.1.2.eand2.3.1.2.gwererelocatedtotheCOLRorTechnicalRequirementsHanual(TRH).iv.TS2.3.3.1,2.3.3.2,andFigure2.3-1wererevisedtoprovideaminimumTripSetpointvalue.5.TechnicalSpecification3.0AnewsectionLCO3.0.1wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheApplicabilitystatementinthenewTS.AnewsectionLCO3.0.2wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheassociatedACTIONSupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCOinthenewTSandallows12hoursversus1hourforaninoperableDGandsafeguards'bus.TS3.0.1wasrevisedtoclarifytheuseoftheactionsthatmustbeimplemented,inthenewTS,whenanLCOisnotmetand(1)anassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies,or(2)theconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.-3-Hay1995 1V.AnewsectionLCO3.0.4wasaddedwhichexplainsthelimitationsonchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnot.metinthenewTS.v.Vl.V11.AnewsectionLCO3.0.5wasaddedtoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forinstanceswhererestorationofinoperableequipmenttoanOPERABLEstatuscannotbeperformedwhilecontinuingtocomplywithRequiredActions.TS3.0.2wasrelocatedtoLCO3.8.1andreplacedbyLCO3.0.6whichprovidesguidanceregardingtheappropriateACTIONStobetakenwhenasingleinoperability(e.g.,asupportsystem)alsoresultsintheinoperabilityofoneormorerelatedsystems(e.g.,supportedsystem(s)).AnewsectionLCO3.0.7wasadded,toprovideguidanceregardingTestExceptionLCOs.TechnicalSpecification3.1.1TS3.l.l.l.bwasrevisedtorequireentryintoMODE1<8.5%RTPwithinfourhourswithaninoperableRCSloopversusanimmediatepowerreductionunderadministrativecontrol.TS3.1.l.l.b,3.l.l.l.c,and3.l.l.l.dwererevisedtorequirebothRCSloopsOPERABLEandoneloopinoperationduringMODE1<8.5%RTPandMODES2and3.OneRCSloopisallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursprovidedthatthenecessaryshutdownmarginismaintainedandthe.,non-operatingRCSloopisavailablefornaturalcirculation.111.'V.v~V1~TS3.l.l.l.ewasrevisedtorelocatethepowersourceexceptionforRHRduringMODES5and6totheelectricalchapter.TS3.l.l.l.fwasrevisedtodeletetheexception'ornotrequiringtheRCSorRHRloops'duringSGcrevicecleaningoperations.Inaddition,oneRHRloopisnowrequiredtobeOPERABLEandoperatinginMODE5andalimitof15minutes(versus1hour)isnowplacedonremovingbothRHRpumpsfromservice.TS3.1.1.l.gwasrevisedtodeletetheActiontobeinColdShutdownwithin24hourswithoneRCSloopandbothRHRloopsinoperable.TS3.l.l.l.i;3.l.l.l.j,3.1.1.3.a,and3.1.1.3.bwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS3.1.1.2wasrelocatedtothePTLRandTS3.1.1.6(withrespecttothereactorheadventsonly)wasrelocatedtotheTRM.4May1995 V111X.X.TS3.l.l.l.kwasrelocatedtoaNoteforRCSrequirementsinHODES4and5.TS3.1.1.3.d-ANotewasaddedwhichallowsthepressurizersafetyvalvestoberemovedfromserviceforatotalof36hoursabove350'Fforthepurposeofsettingthevalvesunderhot(i.e.,ambient)conditions.TS3.1.1.4.a.land3.1.1.6wererevisedtoprovideseparateActionsforthePORVsbasedonthereasonfortheir.inoperability.APORVinoperableforautomaticfunctionsbutcapableofmanualactuationmustbeisolatedbyitsblockvalveconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementorplacedintomanual.APORVincapableofmanualcyclingmustbeisolatedbyitsblockvalvewithin1hourandrepairedwithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.WithbothPORVsincapableofmanualcycling,acontrolledshutdowntoHODE3withRCS<500Fmustbeaccomplishedwithin8hours.TS3.1.1.4.a.iiand3.1.1.6wererevisedtorequirethatoneortwoinoperablePORVblockvalvesmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.X1.TS3.1.1.5.awasrevisedtoremovethelowerlimitforpressurizerlevel.TS3.1.1.5.bwasrevisedtodeletetheexceptionfornotrequiringthepressurizerheatersandwaterlevelsetpoints=duringtheRCShydrotests.7.'echnicalSpecification3.1.2'S3.1.2.1.a,Figure3.1-1,andFigure3.1-2wererevisedtorelocatethetemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitstothePTLR.TS3.1.2.l.bwasrelocatedtothePTLR.TS3.1.2.l.c.lwasrevisedtoincreasethetimeallowedtoperformanengineeringanalysistodeterminethattheRCSisacceptabletocontinueoperationafterapressureand/or.temperaturelimitisexceededfrom6hoursto72hours.TS3.1.2.2wasrelocatedtothePTLR.v.TS3.1.2.3wasrevisedtorelocatetheheatupandcooldownratestothePTLR.Themaximumtemperaturedifferencebetweenthepressurizerandthesprayfluidwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Hay1995

8.TechnicalSpecification3.1.3TS3.1.3.1wasrevisedtoincreasetheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityfrom500Fto.540F.TS3.1.3.2wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS3.1.3.3wasrevisedtorequirethattheplantbeinMODE2withk,<<<1.0within30minutesifT.,foroneorbothloopsis<540Fversussubcriticalbyanamountequaltoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityduetodepressurization.9.iv~TechnicalTS3.1.3.1wasrevisedtoreferencecyclespecificHTCrequirementsintheCOLR.SpecificactionswerealsoaddedforwhenMTCisnotwithinlimitstoensurecontinuedoperationiswithinanalyzedconditions.ThespecificationwasalsorelocatedfromtheRCSchaptertotheReactivityControlSystemchapter.Specification3.1.4TS3.1.4.4wasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoMODE3withT,,<500'Fwithin8hoursvers'usColdShutdownwith40hours.10.TechnicalTS3.1.4.l.cwasrevisedtorequirethelimitonsecondarycoolantactivitytobemetinMODES1,2,',and4andnotjustinMODES1,2,and3withRCS>500F.Specification3.1.5TS3.1.5.1wasrevisedtoaddaNoteallowingachangeinMODEifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericr'adioactivitymonitorsareinoperable.TS3.1.5.1.1wasrevisedtoreplacethecontainmenthumiditydetectorsandaircoolercondensateflowmeterwithanewrequirementforthecontainmentsump"A"levelorpumpactuation.TS3.1.5.1.1and3.1.5.1.2wererevisedtorequiretheRCSleakagedetectionsystemstobeOPERABLEaboveMode4insteadof350'F.iv,TS3.1.5.2.2.cwasrevisedtoallowanadditional'hoursbeforecommencingareactorshutdowntocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.-6-Hay1995 ll.TechnicalSpecification3.1.6TS3.1.6wasrelocatedtotheTRH.12.TechnicalSpecification3.2TS3.2.5wasrevisedtorequiretwoindependentmeansofisolatingachargingpumpduringLTOPconditions.TS3.2.1,3.2.1.1,3.2.2,3.2.3,3.2.4andTable3.2-1wererelocatedtotheTRH.13.TechnicalSpecification3.3TS3.3.1.l.aand3.3.1.2wererevisedtoallow8hours(insteadof1)torestoreRWSTboronconcentrationwithinlimits.AnupperRWSTboronconcentrationlimitwasalsoaddedwiththeactualboronconcentrationlimitsrelocatedtotheCOLR.TS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3wererevisedtoallow72hours'insteadof1)torestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationwithinlimits.TheexemptionrelatedtoisolatingtheaccumulatorsduringRCShydrotestswasalsodeleted.AnupperaccumulatorboronconcentrationlimitwasalsoaddedwiththeactualboronconcentrationlimitsrelocatedtotheCOLR.Specificwaterlevelscorrespondingto50%and82%werealsoadded.1Vv.TS3.3.l.l.cwasrevisedtoallowbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting.Also,anadditional4hours(oruntilRCStemperatureexceeded375F)isnowallowedtoplaceintoserviceanSIpumpdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderationsuponenteringHODE3.TS3.3.l.l.gwasrevisedtorequirethatmotoroperatedisolationvalves851Aand851BbemaintainedopenwithACpowerremoved.TS3.3.1.5.dwasrevisedtoonlyallowisolationvalves878A,878B,878C,and878DtohavepowerinstalledduringpressureisolationvalvetestinginHODE3.Isolationvalves896A,896B,and856mustnowhavepowerremovedaboveHODE3.V1.TS3.3.l.l.hwasrevisedtoaddcheckvalves877A,877B,878F,and878Handmotoroperatedisolationvalves878Aand878CasrequiringtestingasaPIV.TS3.3.l.l.hand3.3.1.5wererevisedtorequirePIVs,tobeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,3,and4versusabove350'F.-7-Hay1995 V111.1X.X.X1~X1i~TS3.3.1.5.ewasrevisedtospecifythataleakingPIV(checkvalveormotoroperatedvalve)mustbeisolatedwithin4hoursusingaleaktestedvalve.Asecondleaktestedvalvemustalsobeclosedwithin72hoursinsteadofallowing12hourstorepair.aleakingcheckvalveifthein-seriesmotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.TS3.3.1-.7and3.3.1.8wererevisedtoremovetheexceptionwithrespecttotheSIpumpsduringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardssequencetesting.TS3.3.1.7.1and3.3.1.8.1wereconvertedintoSurveillanceRequirements.TS3.3.1.8.2wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS3.3.2.2wasrevisedtoallowbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(includingthecontainmentrecirculationfancooler(CRFC)unitswhichsupplythem)tobeinoperableforupto72hoursifbothtrainsofcontainmentspray(CS)areavailable.Also,twoCRFCunitscanberemovedfromservicefromupto7days(versusonly'oneCRFCunit);however,only36hours(versus84hours)isallowedtoreachNODE5iftheCRFCunitsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.X111.X1V,XV'V1~XV11.TS3.3.3.1wasrevisedtoonlyrequireoneofthetwoCCWheatexchangerstobeOPERABLEandtheCCWloopheadertobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4.TS3.3.3.2wasrevisedtoallow72hourstorestoreaninoperableCCMpumpbeforerequiringaplantshutdowninsteadofonlyallowing24hourswithanadditional48hoursathotshutdown.TS3.3.4.1wasrevisedtorequirethesixsetsofmotoroperatedisolationvalvesintheSMSystemtobeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,3,and4.TS3.3.4.2wasrevisedtoallowoneSWtraintobeinoperableforupto72hoursinsteadofrequiringanimmediateshutdown.Inaddition,actionswereprovidedifallSWisunavailable(i.e.,requiresashutdowntoNODE4).TS3.3.5.1wasrevisedtorequirethecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem(CREATS)tobeOPERABLEinNODES1through6andduringfuelmovementversuswhenRCSis>350F.-8-Nay1995 ,TS3.3.5.2wasrevisedtorequiretheCREATSfiltrationtrainandthesystemdamperstobeOPERABLEwithseparateactionsiftheyareinoperable.Inoperabilityofthefiltrationtrainrequiresrestorationwithin48hoursorplacementoftheGREATSinthetoxicgasmode.Inoperabilityofoneofthetworedundantoutsideairdampersrequiresrestorationofthedamperwithin7days.Ifbothredundantdampersareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3aboveMODE5orsuspendfuelmovementinHODES5and6orduringfuelmovement.14.TechnicalSpecification3.4TS3.4.1wasrevisedtorequirethatallmainsteamsafetyvalvesbetestedpriortoenteringHODE3fromHODE2onceeveryrefuelingcycle.TS3.4.2.l.bwasrevisedtoallowAFWinoperableasfollows:~ComonentOneturbinedrivenAFWpumpflowpathOnemotordrivenAFWpumptrain-Turbine'drivenAFWpumpTwomotordrivenAFWpumptrainsOnemotordrivenAFWpumptrainandoneturbinedrivenAFWpumpflowpathAllAFWtoonesteamgeneratorcomponentstobeOutageTime7days7days72hours72hours72hours4hourslv~TS3.4,2.3wasrevisedtorequiretheSAFWcross-tielinestobeOPERABLEinHODES1,2,and3.TS3.4.3wasrevisedtorelocatetheSWsuctionrequirementstotheAFWLCOandtoallowothersourcesthanSWtobeusedwhenthecondensatestoragetanks(CSTs)areinoperable.Thisbackupsourcemustbeverifiedtobeavailablewithin4hoursofdeclaringtheCSTsinoperable.15.TechnicalSpecification3.5ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.1orTable3.5-1:a.-Table3.5-1,Columns1,2,and3werereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels"andsystemdesignandoperationaldetailsrelocated.b.Table3.5-1,Column6wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheHodetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.-9-Hay1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹1forFunctionalUnit¹1wasrevisedtoaddrequirementsforoperabilityoftheHanualReactorTripfunctioninHodes3,4,and5whenthereactortripbreakersareclosedandthe,rodcontrolsystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal(LCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Table3.5-1,Note1forFunctionalUnits¹2,¹3,and¹4werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7wasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7wasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto12hours(ratherthan2hours)duringsurveillancetesting.'ITable3.5-1,Column4wasrevisedtoreplacethepermissiblebypassconditionsdetailswiththespecificpermissive(orinterlock)numbers.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnit¹2("highsetting")was'revisedtoaddarequirementtoeitherreduceThermalPowertolessthanorequalto75%RTPwithin12hoursortoprovideafluxmapevery24hours(consistentwithSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹3forFunctionalUnit¹3wasrevisedtoclarifytheapplicabilityoftheintermediaterangeneutronfluxtocorrespondtothespecificpermissiveswitheitheroneortwochannelsinoperable.kTable3.5-1,ActionStatement¹4forFunctionalUnit¹4wasrevisedtoclarifytheApplicabilityandaddassociatedRequiredActionsforinoperableSRHs.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹lland¹13wasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.(ratherthan1hour).-10-Hay1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹11and¹13wasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),¹14and¹15wasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),¹14and¹15wasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEcha'nnel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹16wasrevisedtorelocatethegPTRMonitorOPERABILITYrequirementstoChapter3.2.Inaddition,requirementswereaddedtoverifywithacalculationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis(75%RTPandtoverifywithafullcorefluxmapthatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis>75%RTP.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹17wasrelocatedtotheTRM.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19wererevisedtorequiretheinstrumentstobeapplicableinallmodesassociatedwithDGoperability.'able3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19wasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19wasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.-11-May1995 u.'V.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19wasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentshutdownactionswitharequirementtorestorechannelstoanOPERABLEstatusortoentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19werereformattedtorequireonlytwoundervoltagechannelsperbusofthelossofvoltagefunctionandtwodegradedvoltagechannelsperbusofthedegradedvoltagefunction.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.W.X.Z~'aa4bb.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹20andassociatedActionStatement¹14werereformatted.toseparatelydenotetheReactorTripBreakers,theReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms,andtheAutomaticTripLogicfunctions(LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Functions¹17,¹18,and¹19).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)wasrevisedtoallow6hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoMode3(newLCO3.3.1,Conditiong).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)wasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoMode3(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)wasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(Reactor'TripBreaker)wasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestore"thebreakertoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).-12-May1995 CC.dd.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)wasrevisedtoonlyallow1hourtoopentheRTBsfollowingtheactiontorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms)wasrevisedtospecifyalimitof2hourstobypasstheRTBformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR,Note1).ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.2,Table3.5-2,orTable3.5-4:a0TS3.5.2.2,3.5.2.3andTable3.5-2,Columns1,2,and3werereplacedwitha,,newcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels"andsystemdesignandoperationaldetailswererelocatedtotheUFSARorbases.b.Table3.5-2,Column6wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.C.d.e.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnits¹l.cand¹l.dwererevisedtoremoveoperationaldetails.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹l.b,¹1.c,¹l.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.awasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹I.c,¹1.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.bwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).LCO3.3.2,FunctionalUnits¹l.b,¹2.b,¹3.b,¹4.b,¹5.a,and¹6.b,"AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays"wereaddedfortheESFASInstrumentation.Ig.Table3.5-2,Column6andActionStatement¹llforFunctionalUnit¹2.bwasrevisedtodeletetheMode4operabilityrequirementoftheinstruments.-13-May1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹llforFunctionalUnit¹2.bwasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.,Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹llforFunctionalUnit¹2.bwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan2hours).Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,'¹3.c,¹5.a,and5.bwasrevisedtoreplaceth'elimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctional'nits¹3.b.ii,¹S.a,and5.bwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(versus1hour).ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnit¹3.cwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin48hours(versus1hour).Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnit¹3.ewasrevisedtoamorerestrictiverestorationtimeof48hoursforaninoperablechannelratherthanplacingthechannelinthetrippedconditionwithinonehour.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnits¹3.a,¹3.f,and¹4.2wererelocatedtotheTRH.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnit¹3.bwasrelocatedtotheTRM.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.d,and¹2.bwererevisedtoreflectvaluesusedinthecurrentanalyses.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹7.aand¹7.bwererevisedtoprovideaminimumvalueratherthanarangeofvalues.Table3.5-4,Notes1and2forFunctionalUnits¹6.aand¹6.cwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.-14-Hay1995

iii.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.3orTable3.5-3:a4TS3.5.3.2,TS3.5.3.3,andTable3.5-3,Columns1and2werereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels"andsystemdesignandoperationaldetailswererelocatedtotheUFSARorbases.b.Therestorationtimerequirementof7daysforoneinoperablechannel(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedto30days.C.Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan7days(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.lv.v.V1.d.Therestorationtimerequirementof48hoursfortwoinoperablechannelswasrevisedto7days.e.Table3.5-3wasrevisedtoonlycontainRegulatory.Guide1.97TypeAandCategoryIvariables.TS3.5.4andTable3.5-6requirementsforradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentation,providedtomonitorradiationlevelsinselectedplantlocationsfollowinganaccident,wererelocatedtotheTRM.TS3.5.5andTable3.5-5wererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.TS3.5.6.1requirementsfo}thechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywererelocatedtotheTRM.TS3.5.6.2wasrevisedtoapplytomorethanoneinoperablefunction.viii.AnewLCO3.3.5wasaddedfortheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)actuationinstrumentation.16.TechnicalSpecification3.61~TS3.6wasrevisedtoaddtwonewrequirements.First,theaveragecontainmentairtemperaturemustbe<120FinMODES1,2,3,and4.Inaddition,twohydrogenrecombinersmustalsobeOPERABLEinHODES1and2althoughtheplantmaychangeMODESwithoneinoperablerecombiner.TS3.6.1wasrevisedtorelocatethetextconcerningintermittentopeningofclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestoaLCOnote.TS3.6.l.band3.6.l.cwererelocatedtotheTRH.-15-Hay1995 1V.v.V1.TS3.6.2wasrevisedtoincreasetheApplicabilityformaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitsfromthereactorbeingcriticaltoMODES1,2,3,and4.TS3.6.3wasrevisedtoreplacecontainmentisolation"boundary"with"barrier."Apenetrationwithtwoinoperablecontainmentisolationbarriersmust.nowbeisolatedwithinonehourversusfourhoursandcohtinuedacceptablecontainmentleakageverified.Inaddition,newRequiredActionswereprovidedforinoperableairlocksandmini-purgeisolationvalves.Also,closed.systemsarenowanacceptableisolationdeviceforaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierprovidethattheycanbeverifiedtobeintactwithin4hours.Finally,anypenetrationwhichisisolatedduetoinoperablecontainmentisolationbarriersmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31daysiftheisolationdeviceisoutsidecontainmentandonceevery92daysifitisinsidecontainment.TS3.6.5wasrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.6.3.V11.V111TS3.6.4.1andTS3.6.4.3wererevisedtoincludeMode3requirements.TS3.6.4.2wasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.-17.TechnicalSpecification3.71V.TS3.7.l.l.b;3.7.l.l.dand3.7.l.l.ewererevisedtorequirethenumberofsafeguardsbuses,batteriesandDCtrains,and120VACinstrumentbusesrequiredtosupportTSrequiredcomponentsinMODES5and6(versusonlyonetrain).TS3.7.1.2wasrevisedtoincluderestorationtimesduringcoldorrefuelingconditions(MODES5and6)forDGfueloilsupplyandthebatteryparameterspriortodeclaringthecomponentinoperable.TS3.7.2.l.b.2,3.7.2.2.a,and3.7.2.2.bwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications:TS3.7.2.2.b.1wasrevisedtoeliminateunnecessarytestingoftheDGduringaperiodwhentheplantreliesononlyoneDG.v.Vl.TS3.7.2.2.cwasrevisedtoincreasetheCompletionTimefortheactiontore-energizethe480Vbusto8hours.TS3.7.2.2.dwasrevisedtoaddressthescenariowithbothoffsitepowerandoneDGinoperable.-16-Hay1995 18.TechnicalSpecification3.8TS3.8.l.a,3.8.l.b,3.8.l.f,and3.8.3wererelocatedtotheTRMorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TS3.8.l.cwasrevisedto(1)includerequirementsforallofMODE6,(2)toprovideRequiredActions(i.e.,verificationofboronconcentration)whenSRMsareinoperableandwhennoaudibleindicationisavailable,(3)relocatetherequirementforaudibleindicationincontainment.lv.Vl1~19.TechnicalTS3.8.1.d(footnote*)andTS3.8.l.g(footnote*)wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS3.8.l.ewasrevisedtoincluderequirementsforallofMODE6andtorevisetheboronconcentrationsamplingfrequencytoevery72hours.AnewTS3.9.2,RequiredActionB.2andRequiredActionC.3,wasaddedwhichestablishestheperformanceofSR3.9.1.1whentwoSRMbecomeinoperable.Specification3.9TS3.9wasrelocatedtoaAdministrativeControlsProgram.'0.TechnicalSpecification3.10TS3.10.1wasrevisedtoincludespecificactionsandcompletiontimesforcaseswhentheshutdownbankinsertionlimitsandthecontrolbankinsertion,sequenceandoverlaplimitsarenotwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Theseactionsrequireverificationwithin1hourthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinlimitsandrestoringthevaluetowithinlimitswithin2hoursorbeinMODE3within6additionalhours.TS3.10.1.1wasrevisedtoincludeaspecificactiontoinitiateborationwithin15minuteswhentheSHUTDOWNMARGINisnotwithinlimitsandtorelocateFigure3.10-2totheCOLR.TS3.10.1.2andTS3.10.1.3wererevisedtoindicateonlylowpower.PHYSICSTESTexceptionsfortheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimits.lv.TS3.10.1.3andFigure3.10-1wererevisedtorelocatethecontrolrodinsertionlimitsandthesequenceandoverlaplimitstotheCOLR.v.TS3.10.1.5wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.-17-May1995 VlVl1.V111.0X.X.Xl~Xl1~X111~Xlv.XV.TS3.10.2.2wasrevisedtoremovethelowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsforthepeakingfactors.TS3.10.2.3wasrevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTSexceptionforgPTR.TS3.10.2.8,TS3.10.2.9andTS3.10.2.10wererevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTSexceptionforAFD.TS3.10.3.l.awasrevisedtoreducetheT.,requiredfortheroddroptestfrom540Fto500F.TS3.10.4.1wasrevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsforcontrolbankalignment.TS3.10.4.2andTS3.10.4.3wererevisedtoremoveconditionsofrodinoperabilityduetobeingimmovable.Referencetofulllengthrodswasalsoremovedsincetherearenopartlengthrodsinthereactorcore.TS3.10.4.3.2wasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtodeclareamisalignedrod.inoperablewhentherodcannotberestoredtowithinthealignmentlimitsin1hour.TS3.10.4.3.2.awasremovedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtotheBasesasanoptionforrestoringarodtowithinalignment.TS3.10.4.3.2.b.iiiwasrevisedtoremoveTable3.10-1fromthespecifications.TS3.10.4.3.2.bandTS3.10.4.3.2.cwererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoreducethehighneutronfluxtripsetpointto<85%RTPwhenthepowerlevelisreducedto<75%RTP.Xvl.Xvl1.Xvli1.TS3.10.4.4wasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoverifySHUTDOWNMARGINorinitiateborationwithin1hourwhenmorethanonerodisoutofalignment.TS3.10.5.1wasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoenter3.0.3immediatelywhenmorethanoneHRPIpergroupordemandpositionindicatorperbankareinoperable.TS3.10.5.2.awasrevisedtoallow4hours(insteadofimmediately)toverifyrodposition.-18-May1995

X1X.TS3.10.2.1wasrevisedtorequiremeasurementofthepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortooperationoftheplant>75%RTPinsteadofpriorto50%RTP.TherequirementtoverifygPTRusingmovableincoredetectorsorcoreexitthermocoupleswhenonepowerrangedetectorinoperableatTHERHALPOWER>75%RTPwasdeletedandreplacedwitharequirementtoperformafluxmaptoverifyhotchannelfactorsarewithinlimits.XX.XX1.XX11TS3.10.2.2wasrevisedtorequirethehotchannelfactorsbewithinlimitsonlyinMODE1.ThelimitsforFo(Z)andF~andFigure3.10-3werealsorelocatedtotheCOLR.AnadministrativeActiontoreducetheAFDacceptableoperationallimitsspecifiedintheCOLRbythepercentagethatFoexceedsthelimitwasaddedand72hours(insteadof24hours)isallowedtoreducetheOverpowerdTandtheOvertemperaturedTtripsetpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimits.Finally,aRequiredActionwasaddedtobeinNODE2within6hoursiftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesfortheconditionwhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsisnotmet.TS3.10.2.3and3.10.2.4wererevisedtospecificallydefinetheApplicabilityrequirementsforgPTRasNODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.Inaddition,thegPTRLCOlimitof1.12wasremoved.TS3.10.2.3wasrevisedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERrelativetothepercentageofquadrantpowertilt,(i.e.,limitpowerto3%belowRTPfareach1%bywhichthegPTRexceeds1.00).TherequirementtomeasurethehotchannelfactorswhenthegPTRexceeds1.02isalsochangedfromwithin2hourstowithin24hours.XX111.TS3.10.2.4.,wasrevisedtodeletetherequirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorlimitpowerto<50%RTP.ThefollowingRequiredActionswerealsoaddedfortheConditionwhengPTRisnotwithinthelimit:a.ArequirementtoverifybycalculationthatgPTRiswithinlimitsandlimitpoweraccordinglyevery12hours.b.ArequirementtorecalibratetheexcoredetectorspriortoincreasingTHEfNALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.c~ArequirementtoverifyFoandF~withinlimitswithin24hoursafterreachingRTPorwithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.-19-Nay1995 XxlV.XXV.Xxvl.Xxvl1.d.Arequirementtoreducepowerto<50%RTPwithin4hoursiftheinitialRequiredActionsarenotmetwithintheassociatedcompletiontime.TS3.10.2.5wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS3.10.2.7wasrevisedtorequireameasurementofthetargetfluxdifferencewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelinginsteadofwithinthefirst92EFPD.ThissurveillanceisalsomodifiedwithanotethatallowsthepredictedendofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.TS3.10.2.8wasrevisedtorelocate-theAFDtargetbandtotheCOLR.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.TS3.10.2.9wasrevisedtoallow15minutes(insteadofimmediately)torestoreAFDt'owithinthetargetbandandthenimmediatelyinitiateactionstoreduceTHERMALPOWER'o<90%RTPiftheAFDisnotrestoredwithintheinitial15minutes.XXV111~TS3.10.2.10awasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandandtheacceptableoperationlimitstotheCOLR.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.XxlX.21.TechnicalTS3.10.2.12wasrevisedtorequiretheAFDmonitoralarmtobeOPERABLE.Also,averificationthattheAFDiswithinlimitsandtologtheAFDevery15minuteswithTHERMALPOWER>90%RTPandonceeveryhourwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPwasaddedwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableinsteadofeveryhourforthefirst24hoursandeveryhalfhourthereafter.Specification3.11TS3.11.1wasrevisedtorelocatethespecificcomponentsoftheAuxiliaryBuildingventilationsystem(ABVS)whicharerequiredtobeOPERABLEduringfuelmovementintheAuxiliaryBuilding.TS3.11.2wasrevisedtorelocatetherequirementtocontinuouslymonitorradiationlevelsintheSFPtotheTRM.TS3.11.3and3.11.5wererevisedtorelocatetheheavyloadrestrictionovertheSFPtotheTRM.lv.TS3.11.4wasrevisedtorelocatetheSFPwatertemperaturelimittotheTRM.-20-May1995 22.TechnicalSpecification3.12i.TS3.12wasrelocatedtotheTRH.23.TechnicalSpecification3.13i.TS3.13wasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.24.TechnicalSpecification3.14None.25.TechnicalSpecification3.15TS3.15wasrevisedtoonlyrequiretheLTOPSysteminHODES5and6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.TS3.15.1wasrevisedtorelocatetoaNOTEtheexception'oLTOPduringsecondary.sidehydrostatictesting.ThePORVsetpointduringLTOPconditionswasalsorelocatedtothePTLR.AnewrequirementtoisolatetheaccumulatorswhentheirpressureisgreaterthanthemaximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperaturesasspecifiedinthePTLRwasalsoadded.iii.TS3.15.1.1wasrevisedtorequireaPORVtoberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursduringHODES5and6versus7days.iv.TS3.15.1.3wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.26.TechnicalSpecification3.16TS3.16wasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.27.TechnicalSpecification4.0\i.AnewsectionSR3.0.1wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementsandlimitationsthattheSRsmustmeetduringtheHODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply.TS4.0wasrevisedtoclarifythebasicapplicationofthe25%extensiontoroutinesurveillancesconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.-21-Hay1995 iv~AnewsectionSR3.0.3wasaddedwhichestablishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.AnewsectionSR3.0.4wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.28.TechnicalSpecification4.1ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.1orTable4.1-1:a.Table4.1-1,Columns2(Calibrate)and3(Test)wererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431(Ref.1).b.TheNotesandremarksforTable4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1,¹2,¹3,¹8,¹14,¹16,¹17,¹19,¹23,¹25,¹38a,¹38b,¹39,¹40,¹4la,and¹4lbwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.C.NewLCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Functional¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPositiontoanticipatetheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.d.NewLCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹15wasaddedfortheSfInputfromESFAStoensurethatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuation,logicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.e.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹25,¹34,and¹35wererelocatedtotheTRM.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹18,¹28,and¹29wererelocatedtoanAdministrative.ControlsProgram.f.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1and2wererevisedtorequireaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)onthepowerrangeandtheintermediaterangechannelswithin7dayspriortoreactorcriticality.g.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹3wasrevisedtorequireaCHANNELCALIBRATIONinMODE6.h.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹4wasrevisedtoincludeanoterequiringachannelcheckevery30minuteswhileimplementingMODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptions.-22-May1995 J~NewsurveillanceswereaddedfortheReactorTripSystemInterlocks(P-6throughP-10)toensurereactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.AddedarequirementtoverifypriortocriticalitythatthecriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithintheinsertionlimitsintheCOLR.k.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursthatthesequenceandoverlaplimitsforthecontrolbanksnotfullywithdrawnarewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery30minuteswhileimplementingMODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptionsthattheTHERMALPOWERiswithinlimit.n.0.AddedarequirementtocalculatethegPTRonceevery7daysusingthepowerrangechannels.Addedarequirement.toverifyevery30minutesthatT.,foreachRCSloopis>540'FwhenanyRCSloopT,,isknowntobe<547'F.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery30minutesthatRCSpressure,temperature,heatupandcooldownratesarewithinlimitsevery30minutesduringheatupandcooldowns.P.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursthatT.,iswithinlimitsinMODE1.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursthatpressurizerpressureiswithinlimitsinMODEl.AddedarequirementtoverifyRCSflowonceevery24months.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedorexistingrequirementsrevisedforTS4.1.2andTable4.1-2:'a~b.C.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹5and6.bwererevisedtoremovereferencetoonceevery18monthsfromtheFrequency.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹6awasrevisedtoextendthesurveillanceFrequencyofthecontrolrodexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days.rTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit.¹7wasrevisedtorelocatethe'urveillanceFrequencyofthepressurizersafetyvalvestotheISTprogram.-23-May1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹1,¹2,¹4,¹10,¹12,and¹19wererelocatedtotheTRM.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹13wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofthesprayadditivetankNaOHconcentrationonceevery184daysversusmonthly.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15wasrevisedtorequireRCSwaterinventorybalancesevery72hoursduringsteadystateoperationratherthandaily.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹16wasrevisedtorequireverificationofDGfueloilinventoryonceevery31daysversusdaily.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹17wasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofSFPboronconcentrationwhenfuelisstoredintheSFPandthepositionoffuelassemblieswhichweremovedintheSFPhavenotbeenverified.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹18wasrevisedtorequireverificationofsecondarycoolantspecificactivityevery31days.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery48hoursthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinthelimitsbelowMODE2withK.<<<1.0andevery24hourswhileimplementingMODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptions.AddedarequirementtoverifypriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingthatMTCiswithintheupperlimitandwillbewithinthe70%RTPMTCupperlimitandtheEOLMTClimit.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursthatcontainmentpressureiswithinlimits(i.e.,p-2.0psigand<1.0psig).Addedarequirementtoverifyevery24hoursthatthecontainmentaverageairtemperatureis<120F.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery184daysthatthesprayadditivetankvolumeis>4500gallons.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery31daysthat>23feetofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracksduringfuelmovementintheSFP.-24-May1995 P-q.AddedarequirementtoverifypriortofuelmovementintheSFPthattheassociatedfuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirementsforstorageintheintendedregion.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursoftheupperlimitforthe'nitrogenpressureblanketintheaccumulators.s.u.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12.hoursthateachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisfullyopenwhenRCSpressureis>1600psig.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromtheaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveswhenRCSpressureis>1600psig.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursoftheupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheRWST.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursoftheupperlimitfor,boronconcentrationintheaccumulators.V.w.X.Z~Addedarequirementtoverifyevery12hoursthattheCSTvolumeis>22,500gallons.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery31daysthateachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery31daysthateachSWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheSWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.AddedarequirementtoperformacompletecycleofeachCCWmotoroperatedisolationvalvesupplyingtheRHRheatexchangersinaccordancewiththeISTprogram.Addedarequirementtoverifyevery31daysthatthespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantis~0.10yCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.3orTable4.1-3:'a~Table4.1-3wasrevisedtoincludeonlyRegulatoryGuide1.97,TypeAandCategory1variables.-25-Nay1995 iv.V.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedorexistingrequirementsrevisedforTS4.1.2andTableand4.1-4:aTable4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹Iwasrevisedtorequire.verificationofreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityonceevery7dayswhenT,,>500'Fratherthanonceevery72hoursaboveColdShutdown.b.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹2wasrevisedtorequireverificationofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131whenT.,>500'Finsteadofabove5%reactorpower.c.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹3wasrevisedtorequirethatadeterminationofEbedelayeduntil31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysinNODE1operationafterthereactorwassubcriticalfor>48hours.TS4.1.4andTable4.1-5wererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.However,sinceTable4.1-5containscomponentsnecessaryforretainedLCOs,thefollowingrequirementswererevised:a.Table4.1-5,FunctionalUnit¹3bwasrevisedtorequireaCHANNELCHECKofparticulatesamplerR-llevery12hoursratherthanweeklywhenR-llisusedforRCSLEAKAGEdetection.29.TechnicalSpecification4.2TS4.2.1implementingrequirementswererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.30.TechnicalSpecification4.3TS4.3.1.1,4.3.5.3.b,and4.3.5.5(duringNODE1only)werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS4.3.5.6wasrelocatedtotheTRH.TS4.3.3.1wasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachColdShutdowngreaterthan7days.TS4.3.3.1,4.3.3.2,4.3.3.3,and4.3.3.4wererevisedtoremovethe150psi'dtestrequirementandtobaseleakageratesforPIVsonvalvesizeversusasinglevalueforallvalves.iv.Thefollowingnewsurveillanceswereadded:a.Verificationofcorrectbreakeralignmentevery7daysforanon-operating,butrequired,RHRpumpinMODES4and5.-26-Hay1995 31.Technicalb.Verificationevery92daysthatthetotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis>100KW.c.PerformanceofacompletecycleofeachPORVevery24monthsusingthenitrogensystem.Specification4.4TS4.4.3and4.4.4implementingrequirementswererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.lv.v~Vl~TS4.4wasrevisedtoincludetwonewsurveillancesrelatedtothehydrogenrecombinersincludingoperatingeachrecombinerfan>5minutesevery24monthsandperformingaCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherecombineractuationandcontrolchannelsonceevery24months.TS4.4.1(exceptdefinitionforL.),4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2,and4.4.2.4werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS4.4.2.3.aand4.4.2.3.bwererevisedtorequirethat-containmentintegrityberestoredwithin1hour(versus48hours)ifAppendixJleakagelimitswereexceeded.TS4.4.2.3.cwasrevisedtorequirethatamini-purgepenetrationwithaleakingisolationvalvebeisolatedwithin24hoursversusperformanengineeringevaluation.Inaddition,thepenetrationmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31days.TS4.4.2.4.cwasrevisedtoaddleakageacceptancecriteriafortheairlocksandtheirassociateddoors.Also,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifyevery24monthsthatonlyonedoorineachairlockcanopenatatime.TS4.4.5.1wasrevisedtorequireverificationevery184daysthatnormallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarriersareclosediftheyarelocatedoutsidecontainment.Forvalvesinsidecontainment,verificationafterenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifthepreviousverificationwasnotperformedwithinthelast184days.TS4.4.6.2wasrevisedtochangetheFrequencyfortestingautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesfrom18monthsto24months.1X.TS4.4.3wasrevisedtochangetheFrequencyforCHANNEL-CHECKSforthehydrogenmonitorsfromdailytomonthly.-27-May1995 32.TechnicalSpecification4.5TS4.5.1.l.awasrevisedtodeletethestatementconcerningthatSIandRHRpumpsarenotbestartedduringtheirrefuelingoutagetests.TS4.5.1.2.bwasrevisedtoincreasethetestingintervalforperformingthespraynozzletestsfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10years.111'V.v.Vl.TS4.5.2.1and4.5.2.2.cwererevisedtorelocatedallSI,RHR,andCSpumptestingfrequenciesanddischargepressurerequirementsandaccumulatorcheckvalvetestingtotheISTprogram.TS4.5.2.2.awasrevisedtochangethetestingFrequencyofthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlytoevery24months.TS4.5.2.3requirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsofthefiltrationsystemtestswererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.TS4.5.2.3.5wasrevisedtoonlyrequireautomaticactuationofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersonceevery24monthsfrommonthly.TS4.5.2.3.6.awasrevisedtoclarifythattwoseparatetestsareperformed.TS4.5.2.3.9wasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityoftheCREATSonceevery24months.ThefollowingnewSurveillanceswereadded:a.b.C.d.Verificationevery12hoursthatECCSrelatedisolationvalvesareintheirrequiredposition.Verificationevery31daysthatECCSrelatedvalveswhicharenotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionareintheircorrectposition.Verificationevery31daysthatCSrelatedvalveswhicharenotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionareintheircorrectposition.VerificationthattheCSmotoroperatedisolationvalvesgototheircorrectpositiononceevery24months.e.Verifyonceevery5yearsthatthespray'dditiveflowrateiswithinlimits.OperateeachCRFCunitfor>15minutesevery31days.-28-Hay1995 33.Technicalg.VerifythateachCRFCunitactuatesonanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonceevery24months.Specification4.6TS4.6.1.awasrevisedtoadd:(1)verificationofDGdaytankfueloillevel,(2)verificationoftheonsitesupplyoffueloil,and(3)operationofthefueloiltransfersystem,duringcoldorrefuelingconditions(MODES5and6).TS4.6.l.b.6,andTS4.6.l.cwerenotaddedtothenewspecification.TS4.6.l.dwasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgramandTS4.6.l.e.lwasrelocatedtotheTRH.TS4.6.l.e.3(b)wasrevisedtorelocatedetailsofthetestcriteria.lv.v.Vl~TS4.6.2.aandTS4.6.2.bwererevisedtoaddacceptancecriteria,parameters,andassociatedactionsforbatteryoperabilitysupportingDCelectricalpowersubsystems.TS4.6.2.cwasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtotrendbatterytestdata.TS4.6.2.fwasrevisedtoadddetailsdenotingbatterydegradation.Twonewsurveillanceswereaddedwithrespecttobatterychargingcapacity.34.TechnicalSpecification4.7TS4.7wasrevisedtorequireaverificationevery24monthsthateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalandthatthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalvescanclose.Also,actionswereprovidedintheeventthatoneormoreHSIVsornon-returncheckvalvesareinoperable.35.TechnicalSpecification4.8Verificationevery31daysthateachAFWandSAFW-manualandpoweroperatedvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.TS4.8.1and4.8.2wererevisedtochangetherequiredFrequencyofAFWpumptestsfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheISTProgram.Thepumptestingacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoplantprocedures.-29-Hay1995 1V~v.V1.TS4.8.3and4.8.5wererevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedvalvestotheISTprogram.Also,themotordrivenAFWcross-tieMOVswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS4.8.4wasrevisedtochangetherequiredFrequencyofSAFWpumptestsfrommonthlytoas'efinedintheISTProgram.Thepumptestingacceptancecriteriawasalso-relocatedtoplantprocedures.TS4.8.6(systemacceptancecriteria)wasrelocatedtoplantprocedures.TS4.8.10wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.36.TechnicalSpecification4.9TS4.9wasrevisedtoincludeanLCOrequirementthatthemeasuredcorereactivitybewithin1%hk/kofthepredictedvaluesandtoaddaspecificsurveillanceFrequencyofevery31EFPDafterthe-initialnormalizationandtodividetheSurveillanceRequirementinto2surveillances.37.TechnicalSpecification4.10TS4.10wasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProg}am.38.TechnicalSpecification4.11i.TS4.11.1requirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsofthefiltrationsystemtestswererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.tTS4.11.l.l.dwasnotaddedtonewspecifications.TS4.11.2.1wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYonceevery12hoursversusonceevery4hours.1V.v.TS4.11.2.2wasrevisedtoremovetheISTrelatedSurveillanceoftheRHRpump.TS4.1'1.3.1wasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofwaterlevelinthereactorcavitywithin24hoursoffuelmovementversus2hours.39.TechnicalSpecification4.12Ii.TS4.12wasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.-30-May1995 40.TechnicalSpecification4.13i.TS4.13wasrelocatedtotheTRM.41.TechnicalSpecification4.14TS4.14wasrelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.42.TechnicalSpecification4.15None.43.TechnicalSpecification4.16TS4.16wasrevisedtorequireverificationevery12hoursthatanaccumulatorisisolatedwhenitspressureisgreaterthanorequaltothepressureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.TS4.16.l.awasrevised'todelayperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinPTLRratherthanwithin31dayspriortoenteringtheLTOPSystemApplicability.44.45.TechnicalSpecification5.1TS5.1.1,TS5.1.2,andFigure5.1-1wererelocatedtotheUFSAR.TechnicalSpecification5.2i.TS5.2wasrelocatedtotheUFSAR.46.TechnicalSpecification5.3TS5.3;l.aandTS5.3.1.cwererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431toincludetheamount,kind,andsourceofspecialnuclearmaterialrelatedtothereactorcore.TS5.3.l.bwasrevisedtoincreasethemaximumenrichmentweightpercentfornewfuelto,supporttheproposed18monthcycles.TS5.3.2wasrelocatedtotheUFSAR.-31-May1995 47.TechnicalSpecification5.4TS5.4.1,5.4.2,5.4.6,andFigures5.4-1and5.4-2wererevisedtorelocatedescriptionsofthespentfuelstorageregionsandboratedwaterconcentrationstothePlantSystemsandRefuelingOperationschapters.NecessaryRequiredActionswerealsoaddedwhenSFPwaterlevel,boronconcentration,orSFPregionstoragerequirementsarenotmet.Theallowedfuelenrichmentweightpercentwasalsorevisedtosupporttheproposed18monthcycles.ThesesectionswerethenrevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431(e.g.,adddescriptionsoftheSFPdrainagesystemandcapacity).TS5.4.3wasrevisedtorelocatethe60-daylimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2ofthespentfuelpool.TS5.4.4and5.4.5wererevisedtorelocatetheheatremovallimitsforconsolidatedfuelrodcanisters.48.TechnicalSpecification5.5TS5.5wasrelocatedtotheUFSAR.49.TechnicalSpecification6.1TS6.1.1wasrevisedtoincludeastatementthatthe,PlantManagershallapproveeachproposedtest,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.1TS6.1wasrevisedtoincluderequirementsfortheshift'upervisor.50.TechnicalSpecification6.21V.CrossreferencestoexistingregulatoryrequirementsareredundantandgenerallynotincorporatedintoNUREG-1431.PlantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsarereplacedwithgenerictitles.TS6.2.1.d,6.2.2.bwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TS6.2.2.dwasrevisedtoclarifythattheindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresisallowedtobeabsentfornotmorethantwohours.V.TS6.2.2.erequirementdescribingtheovertimerequirementforplantstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionswasrevisedtoreferenceaNRCapprovedprogramforcontrollingovertime.-32-Hay1995 51.TechnicalSpecification6.3TS6.3.1referencetotheRGKEletterdatedDecember30,1980,wasreplacedwithwordingconsideredmoreappropriate.52.TechnicalSpecification6.4i.TS6.4wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.53.TechnicalSpecification6.5None.54.TechnicalSpecification6.6None.55.TechnicalSpecification6.7TheinitialoperatoractionforSafetyLimit(SL)violationsdenotedinTS6.7.l.awasrevised.'a~ForMODES1and2,therequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)foraReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLviolationwasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinMODE3.b.ForMODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasaddedthatrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeRCSPressureSLwithin5minutes.ii.TS6.7.l.b,6.7.l.c,and6.7.l.dwererelocatedtotheTRM.56.TechnicalSpecification6.8TS6.8.l.dwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationswhileTS6.8.l.ewasrelocatedtotheTRH.AnewsectionTS5.4.l.bwasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenemergencyoperatingproceduresimplementingtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplementl.AnewsectionTS5.4.l.ewasaddedwhichestabli'shestherequirementforwrittenproceduresforprogramsandmanualsdenotedinTS5.5.Theseprogramsinclude:a~b.C.d.e.OffsiteDoseCalculationManualPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentPost,AccidentSamplingSystemRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramComponentCyclicorTransientProgram-33-May1995 l.m.n.Pre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramRCPFlywheelInspectionProgramInserviceTestingProgramSGTubeSurveillanceProgramVentilationFilterTestingProgramExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactiveMonitoringProgramDGFuelOilTestingProgramTSBasesControlProgramSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram57.TechnicalSpecification6.9TS6.9wasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR50.4..TS6.9.1.1and6.9.2.1werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.iii.TS6.9.1.2requirementsdescribingthedetailsofthemonthlyreportwerenotaddedtothenewspecificati'ons.iv.V.TS6.9.1.3,TS6.9.1.4,Table6;9-1andTable6.9-2requirementsdescribingdetailsandmethodsimplementingthesespecificationswererelocatedtoanAdministrativeControlsProgram.TS6.9.1.4wasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof-10'FR50.36a.vi.TS6.9.1.5wasrevisedfromanannualtoamonthlyFrequencyforthereportingofchallengestopressurizerPORVsorsafetyvalves.vii.TS6.9.2.4wasrevisedfroma30-dayspecialreporttoarequirementtodocumentallchallengestothePORVsorpressurizersafetyvalvesintheMonthlyOperatingReport.viii.AnewrequirementTS5.6;5wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheCOLR.ix.AnewrequirementTS5.6.6wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheRCSPTLR.58.TechnicalSpecification6.10None.59.TechnicalSpecification6.11None.-34-May1995 60.TechnicalSpecification6.12None.61.TechnicalSpecification6.13TS6.13.1wasrevisedtoreplaceplantspecificpositiontitleswithgenerictitles.62.TechnicalSpecification6.14None.63.TechnicalSpecification6.15TS6.15.l.bwasrevisedtoclarifythattheeffectiveOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCH)changesbeapprovedbythePlantManager.64.TechnicalSpecification6.16i..TS6.16wererelocatedtotheTRH.65.TechnicalSpecification6.17i.TS6.17wererelocatedtotheTRH.66.NewLOORequirementsAnewLCOwasaddedwithrespecttomaintainingRCSflow,pressurizerpressure,andT.,withinlimitsinMODEl.A,newLCOandassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedforthemainfeedwaterpumpdischargevalves,regulationvalves,andassociatedbypassvalves.ThesecomponentsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3.1V.AnewLCOandassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedfortheatmosphericreliefvalves.ThesevalvesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3whenRCSis>500F.ACOLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforthefollowingparameters:.a..SHUTDOWNMARGINb.MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTc.ShutdownBankInsertionLimitd.ControlBankInsertionLimitse.HeatFluxHotChannelFactorf.NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactorg.AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEh.OvertemperaturehTandOverpowerhTTripSetpointsi.RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefrom-35-May1995 k.1.m.NucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsAccumulatorBoronConcentrationRWSTBoronConcentrationSpentFuelPoolBoronConcentrationRefuelingBoronConcentrationV.67.LicenseARCSPTLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforthefollowingparameters:a.RCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsb.LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemEnableTemperaturec.LTOPSetpointThelicensewasrevisedtoremoverequirementswhichhavebeenrelocatedtoAppendixAofthelicense(i.e.,TS).Thel.icensewasrevisedtoremoveexemptionrequestswhicharenolongerapplicable.B.BACKGROUNDB.1HISTORYOnFebruary,6,1987,theNRCissuedaninterimPolicyStatementonTechnicalSpecificationImprovementsforNuclearPowerReactorswhichproposedcriteriafordefiningthescopeofwhatshouldbecontainedwithintechnicalspecifications.ThesecriteriaweredevelopedasaresultofeffortswithintheNRCandnuclearindustrytorelocatemanyexistingrequirementstoothermoreappropriateprogramsanddocumentsinordertostreamlinethetechnicalspecifications.Therelocatedrequirementswouldthenbecontrolledbyotherexistingregulations(e.g.,10CFR50.59).Thisrelocationwouldresultinmoreconcisetechnicalspecificationswhichfocusedonthemostimportantrequirementswithoutanyreductioninsafety.FollowingissuanceoftheinterimPolicyStatement,theNRCandnuclearindustrybegandevelopmentofnewstandard(orimproved)technicalspecificationswhichimplementedtheproposedcriteria,providedgreateremphasisonhumanfactorsprinciples,andcontaineddetailedbasesforeachretainedspecification.TheendproductofthiseffortwasthereleaseoffiveNUREGsinSeptember1992whichcontainedtheImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)foreachofthefourNSSSvendors(twoNUREGswereissuedforBWRs).TheseNUREGscontainedalloftheimprovementsdiscussedaboveandalsoso-called"line-item"improvementswhicharegenericrefinementstothetechnicalspecificationsthatwereidentifiedsubsequenttotheinterimPolicyStatement.TheNUREGswerethenfollowedbyaFinalPolicyStatementwhichbecameeffectiveonJuly22,1993,andencouragedlicenseestoimplementtheITS.-36-Hay1995

8.2InresponsetothereleaseoftheITSandthecontinuedpublicationofnew"line-item"improvements,RG&EbeganconsiderationofimplementingNUREG-1431(Ref.1)whichcontainedthenewtechnicalspecificationsforWestinghouseplants.FollowingdiscussionswiththeNRCstaff,RG&EdecidedtoinitiateaTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgram(TSIP)andimplementtheITSforGinnaStation(Ref.2).ThisprogramconsistedofrelocatingcurrentrequirementsinaccordancewiththeFinalPolicyStatementonTechnicalSpecificationsandreformattingtheremainingrequirementsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.AnynewrequirementsthatarecontainedwithinNUREG-1431whicharenotinthecurrentGinnaStation'Swereevaluatedonacasebycasebasis.ThenewTSproposedinthisLARprovidemuchgreaterconsistencywiththeDBAandtransientanalysisassumptions.HARDWAREMODIFICATIONSTherearenoplantmodificationswhicharerequiredtoimplementthechangesrequestedinthisLAR.ThemajorityofchangesrequestedbythisLARarerelatedtoconversiontotheITSformatandcontent.ThemajorityoftechnicalchangesincludedwithinthisLARrelatetorevisingtheMODEofapplicabilityforvariouscomponentsoraddingrequirementsforsystemsandcomponentswhichwerepreviouslyadministrativelycontrolled.Inaddition,theproposednewsurveillancesdonotrequireanyrequestsfordelayofimplementationfollowingNRCapproval.C.JUSTIFICATION(NUREG-1431)ConvertingtotheITS,formatwillprovideasignificanthumanfactorsimprovementbylocatingsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesectionandalsoprovideastandardstructure.Inaddition,theexpandedbasesinformationwillsupportpreparationofsafetyevaluationsandtrainingactivities.ThereareseveraltypesofchangesthatarebeingrequestedbythisLARinordertoperformtheconversion.ThesechangesarewithrespecttoboththeITSandthecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThetechnicalandsignificantadministrativechangesrelatedtoNUREG-1431(referredtoasITSinthissection)areorganizedintomultiplecategoriesassummarizedbelow.ITSRequirementsNotAddedOrSignificantlyChangedSeveralNUREG-1431requirementswerenotaddedtotheproposednewtechnicalspecificationsorweresignificantlyrevisedbasedonissuesspecifictoGinnaStation.TheseissuesincludebothdesignandcostconsiderationsandexistingTSrequirements.RetainedRequirementsNotInITSTheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationscontainseveralrequirementsnotspecifiedwithinNUREG-1431thatmeetthecriterionfoundintheNRCFinalPolicyStatementonTechnicalSpecificationsImprovementsforNuclearPowerReactors.TheserequirementstypicallypertaintosystemsordesignfeaturesuniquetoGinnaStation.-37-May1995 iii.OtherChangestoITS(Technical)SeveralchangesweremadetotheITSprovidedinNUREG-1431toprovideconsistencybetweenchaptersandsections.Thesechangesaretypicallyminorbutmayinvolvetheadditionofnewrequirements(e.g.,entryintoLCO3.0.3).iv.OtherChangestoITS(Administrative)SeveralminorchangestotheITSweremadeduetodesignconsiderations(e.g.,tworeactorcoolantloopsversusfour).Thesechangesweremainlyperformedtothebasesandareminorrevisionsonlyanddonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.ThespecificchangestotheITSarediscussedbelow.ThesectionisorganizedbasedontheITSchapternumberstofacilitateeasierreview.Eachchangeisalsoidentifiedwithrespecttooneoftheabovecategories(e.g.,ITSCategory(i)change).SincetheconversionisbasedontheITSforWestinghouseplants,amarkedupcopyofNUREG-1431isprovidedinAttachmentD.AcrossreferenceisprovidedinthemarginofeachITSspecificationthathasbeenchangedbyuseofacirclecontainingsectionnumbersfrombelow.Forexample,"l.i"foundinthemarginoftheITSmarkupwouldrefertosectionl.ibelow.Thiscrossreferenceisnotusedfortheplant-specifiovaluesprovidedinbrackets(t])intheITSsincethesevaluesweretypicallytakenfromtheexistingGinnaStation'echnicalSpecifications.ITS1;1iv~V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-01,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.l.Thistravellerwasalsorevisedtoreplacetheseconduse.of"crosscalibration"intheCHANNELCALIBRATIONdefinitionwith"qualitativeassessmentofsensorbehavior."ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthedefinitionandisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-OS,C.3,andapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.3.MinorchangesweremadetotheDefinitionsandtheCompletionTimeandFrequencydiscussionstoprovideconsistencywithinthenewspecificationsandbases.Examplesincludetheuseof"plant"versus"unit"sincethereisonlyonenuclearunitatGinnaStation,specifyingthattheLEAKAGEdefinitionisrelatedtotheRCSandeditingtheAVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYdefinitionforbetterreadability.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.-38-May1995 V1.ThedefinitionsforENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATURE(ESF)RESPONSETIME,REACTORTRIPSYSTEM(RTS)RESPONSETIME,MASTERRELAYTEST,andSLAVERELAYTEST,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotrequireESForRTSresponsetimetesting,normasterandslaverelaytesting.TheserequirementsarenotbeingaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithReference2.Therefore,thesedefinitionsarenotapplicable.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Notused.V111~1X~X.X1~XV.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.26.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.4.ThedefinitionofQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)wasreplacedwiththedefinitionprovidedincurrentGinnaStationTS1.9.TheuseoftheITSdefinitionforgPTRwouldrequiremodificationstotheGinnaStationprocesscomputer,procedures,andoperatortraining.ThecurrentgPTRdefinitionwasaddedtotheGinnaStationTSbyReferences4and5.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.4.ThetitlesforMODES3and4wereswitched.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththecurrentGinnaStationTS,andthenomenclatureusedinprocedures,theUFSARandotherdocuments.Therevisionofallofthesedocumentsandoperatortrainingmaterialswouldrequiresignificantresourceswithoutanybenefit.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATION,COTandTADOTwasrevisedtodeletethedisplayrequirementonthebasisthatitwillcreateconfusionwithrespecttoestablishingtheOPERABILITYofachannel.ThesechangesareconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-1,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ThedefinitionofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131wasrevisedtodeleteandrelocatetotheBasesforLCO3.4.16andLCO3.7.10thedetailsdenotingthethyroiddoseconversionfactors.ThisallowsfutureupdatesofthecalculationalmethodstoberevisedwithouthavingtochangetheTechnicalSpecifications.Asaresultoftheproposedrelocationofinformation,theapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.2,wasnotincorporated.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-39-May1995 XV1.XV11~XV111~X1X~ITS1.2ThedefinitionofPRESSUREANDTEHPERATURELIHITSREPORT(PTLR)wasrevisedbydeletingthereferencestotheLCO'stobeconsistentwiththedefinitionoftheCOLRandtoprovideacompletedescriptionofitscontent.Thischangeisconsistent,withTravellerWSTS-I,C..3.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-35,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-14,C.l.TheCHANNELCALIBRATION'definitionwasrevisedtoinclude"timeconstants".ThischangeenablesNotesassociatedwithtimeconstantstoberemovedfromChapter3.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.5.1Theterm"surveillances"isdeletedsincelogicalconnectorsarenotusedwithrespecttosurveillancesinNUREG-1431.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Appropriatetitleswereappliedtoeachexample.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.111.1V.v.V1V11~V111~1X.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWGG-Ol,C.7..IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.S.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.3(Rev.1).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-32,C.l.HinorchangestoExample1.3-2andExample1.3-6weremadetoprovideadditionalclarification.Thesechangesdonotaltertheintentoftheexamples.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.9.TheCompletionTimedescriptionwasrevisedtoeliminateconfusionregardingtheapplicabilityoftheRequiredActionsgivenadditionalfailuresintheabsenceofprovisionsforseparateconditionentry.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-40-Hay1995 X.Xl.4.ITS1.4Anadditionalstatementwasaddedtoreinforcethat,intheapplicationofCompletionTimeextensions,nosinglecomponent,subsystem,orvariable,etc.,canbeallowedtoremaininoperableforlongerthanthestatedCompletionTime.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ThissectionreferstoCompletionTimesona"onceper"basis,butnoexampleisreferenced.Anappropriateexamplewasadded.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheCompletionTimelogicalconnectorforExample1.3-3wasdeletedsincethisconnectorisnotusedasdiscussedinthechangesforapplicableLCOs.Thi'sisanITSCategory(iii)change.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.14.Minorchangesweremadeto'xample1.4-1toeliminate'edundanttest.Thesechangesdonotaltertheintentoftheexample.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ITS2.1.1SL2.1.1wasrevisedtodeletethereferencetothehighestloopaverage.ThisisbaseonGinnaStationdesignedwith,twoloops.TheRCSaveragetemperaturetripsthereactoroncoincidencetwo-out-of-foursignals,withtwochannelsperloop.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ITSFigure2.1.1-1wasreplacedwiththeexistingTechnicalSpecificationFigure2.1-1.TheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)figurereflectstheacceptableoperatingregionsoftheplantandisconsistentwiththecurrentsafetyanalysis.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.C.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.ThediscussionofDNBcriteriawasrevisedandexpandedtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.-41-May1995 d.ThelistingoftheautomaticfunctionsrelatingtotheenforcementofthereactorcoreSLswasrevisedconsistentwiththechangesproposedinITSChapter3.3.e.GinnaStationwasanalyzedforthelockedrotoreventtoshowthatthepeakreactorcoolantsystempressureremainsbelow120/ofdesign.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.f.Theadditionalwordstothereferenceallowforapprovedexceptions.g.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-01,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-ll,C.10(Rev.1)./SL2.2.3-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l)and10CFR50.72.Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRG&EmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorother.controlledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SL2.2.4-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.ThisrequirementforthenotificationofmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommitteesissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothersectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0-"AdministrativeControls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AsaresultofthisTSchange,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.landC.2werenotincorporated.-42-May1995 111.1V.v~SL2.2.5-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesection,inpart,duplicatesareportingrequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(1)and10CFR50.73.Thedeletionofthisrequirement.eliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRGSEmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thesectionalsorequiresdistributionofthesafetyviolationreporttocertainmanagementpersonnelandplantsafetyreviewcommittees.ThisrequirementissimilartotherequirementsremovedfromothersectionsoftheITS(i.e.,Chapter5.0-"AdministrativeControls"fortheOnsiteandOffsitereviewfunction)andrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRG&Etomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.Asaresultofthischange,approvedTravellersWOG-21,C.landC.2,andBWR-02,C.8andC.8awerenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory.(i)change.SL2.2.6-Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thesectionduplicatesarequirementdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(l).Thedeletionofthissectioneliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SinceRGEEmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicaterequirementsfromtechnicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresorothercontrolledlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-2,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-43-May1995 7.ITS3.0illo1V.v.V1~V11.V111.1XX.X1~X11~X111.xivXV.ForcompletenessLCO3.0.7shouldalsobereferencedinLCO3.0.1.AsdiscussedinapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5,LCO3.0.7addressesasituationwhenanLCOrequirementisallowednottobemet.ThisissimilartoLCO3.0.2whichaddressestherequirementofmeetingtheassociatedACTIONSwhennotmeetingaLimitingConditionforOperation.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-Ol,C.10.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.11.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.26(Rev1).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.5(Rev1).MinorchangesaremadetoreflecttheactualproposednewTS.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-02,C.10.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-25,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.10(Rev2).Severalwordingchangesweremadetoincreaseunderstanding.ThesechangesdonotaltertheindentoftheTraveller.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.12.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.15andWOG-Ol,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-05,C.13(Rev2).Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller'BWOG-01,C.ll.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-07,C.l(Rev1).44May1995 LCO3.0.3andthebaseswererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoinitiateactiontoshutdowntheplantwithinIhour.Instead,thebasesrequiretheShiftSupervisortoevaluatetheplant,conditionstodetermineifaplantshutdownshouldbeinitiatedimmediately,ordeferrediftheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3isexpectedtoberestoredwithinareasonableperiodoftime.However,thetimerestrictionsinLCO3.0.3forMODEchangesmustalwaysbemet.ThischangeprovidestheplantmanagementandoperatingstaffwiththeflexibilitytodeterminethebestcourseofactionshouldLCO3.0.3beentered.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThebasesforSR3.0.1wererevisedtoclarifythatcreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfytheperformanceofanSR.ThischangeallowsthedeletionofmultipleNoteswithintheSRsinChapter3whichstatethesamething.ThechangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-3,C.3.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.0.4andthebaseswererevisedtoprovidegreaterclarityandconsistencywithactualGinnaStationpractices.First,thedetailsofwhyexceptionsareallowedtoLCO3.0.4wasdeletedfromtheLCOandrelocatedtothebases.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithLCO3.0.3andSR3.0.2.Second,thebaseswererevisedtoprovideeasierreadability.Inaddition,currentGinnaStationoperatingpracticespreventanyMODEchange,upordown,withinoperableequipmentrequiredfortheMODEdesiredtobeentered.Therefore,thediscussionthatLCO3.0.4doesnotpreventMODEchangesduringa"normalshutdown"conflictswiththesepracticesandwasdeleted.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.-45-May1995 8.ITS3.1.1lv~LCO3.1.1andSR3.l.1.1wererevisedtospecifythevariableSHUTDOWNMARGINcurveintheCOLRinsteadofafixedvalue.GinnaStationcurrentlyhasaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforsubcriticalconditionswhichvariesoverthelifeofthefuelcyclewiththehighestSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementattheendofthecycle.SHUTDOWNMARGINcan'beusedinfuelmanagementandasavariabletosolveplantspecificproblems.SHUTDOWNMARGINimpactsanumberofanalyses(i.e.-,uncontrolledborondilutionandsteamlinebreak)andissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankposition,corepowerlevel,coolanttemperatureandcyclespecificparameterssuchasfuelburnup,xenonconcentrationandboronconcentration.TheinclusionofSHUTDOWNMARGINintheCOLRprovidesmoreflexibilityinplantoperation,inperformingthedesign,andinobtaininggoodfueleconomicsparticularlyforextendedcycleoperation.WiththeSHUTDOWNMARGINincludedintheCOLR,thecoredesigncanbefinalizedaftershutdownsothattheactualendofcycleburnupisknownwhichisparticularlyhelpfulwhentheactualburnupdiffersfromtheprojectedvalue.ChangestoreferencetheCOLRinsteadofafixedvaluearemadethroughoutthetechnicalspecifications.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.1.1.1wasrevisedtospecifyaFrequencyofevery48hourstoverifythattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinthelimitsinsteadofevery24hours.ThisSurveillanceRequirementiscurrentlynotinthelicensingbasisforGinnaStation.ThebaseswerealsorevisedtoindicatehowSHUTDOWNMARGINismeasuredevery48hoursintheshutdownMODES.ThisrevisionreflectsthecurrentoperationproceduresusedatGinnaStationwhileincoldandhotshutdowntodeterminewhetherSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinlimit.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.LCO3.1.1ApplicabilitywasrevisedtoincludeMODE5sincetheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirement'isafunctionofcyclelifeandnotMODE.specific.ThetitleforLCO3.1.1wasrevisedtoremovethereferencetemperaturesincebothgreaterthanandlessthan200Farecoveredbythisspecification.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.-46-May1995 b.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.c.Abrief,discussionofwherethefullywithdrawn,positionfortheshutdownbanksandthecontrolbanksisdefinedwasaddedtoavoidconfusionwithcurrentGinnaStationdocumentation.v.Vi.d.Thediscussionwithregardstothe-SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementswasrevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationhasaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementthatvariesoverthecyclelifeandnotfromMODEtoMODE.ThelargestSHUTDOWNMARGINisrequiredatendofcycle.e.ThediscussionofSR3.l.l.1wasrevisedtoremovethefirstparagraphwhichdiscussedareasoutsidetheApplicabilityforLCO3:1.1.f.Thediscussionofthemostl.imitingaccidentforSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementswasrevisedtoreferencethesteamlinebreakanalysisingeneral.g.AdditionalreferencestotheGinnaStationUFSARwereincludedtoprovidemoreinformationontheSHUTDOWN'ARGINrequirementsintheaccidentanalyses.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.ll.TheBaseswererevisedtoincorporatechangeswhichareconsistentwithapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.4thatrelatestoLCO3.1.2.ITS3IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.l..1.2LCO3.1.2andSR3.1.2.1werenotaddedsinceGinnaStationcurrentlyhasavariableSHUTDOWNMARGINcurvewhichvariesoverthefuelcyclelifeandnotfromMODEtoMODE.ThegreatestSHUTDOWNMARGINisrequiredatendofcyclelife(EOL)toprotectagainstamainsteamlinebreak.ThisEOLrequirementislargerthantheusualSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforaMODE5borondilutionaccidentwhichusuallydictatestheMODE5SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirement.TheMODE5SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementisincludedinLCO3.1.1andSR3.1.1.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-47-May1995 10.ITS3.1.3lvV.TheApplicabilityforLCO3.1.3andtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtolimittheApplicabilityinMODE2towheneverK,<<is>1.0.ThereactivitybalancemustexistwheneverthereactoriscriticalorproducingTHERMALPOWER;thereforethisrequirementisonlyapplicablewithK.>1.0.Similarly,RequiredActionB.1andtheBaseswererevisedtorequirea.reductiontoMODE2withK,<1.0tobringtheplanttoaConditionwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ANotewasaddedtoSR3.1.3.1thatstatesthisisonlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoentryintoMODE1.ThisremovesthediscussionfromtheFrequencycolumnandplacesitintheSu}veillancecolumnasisconsistentwiththeformatprovidedinNUMARC93-03(Ref.6).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.1.3.1andtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtodividetheSurveillanceRequirementintotwoSurveillances.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnwasmovetotheSurveillancecolumn.ThisclarifiesthepurposeofeachoftheNotesthatmodifytheSurveillanceRequirementinNUREG-1431andispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Variouswording,changesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheSurveillanceRequirementsandtheBasesandtoreflectplantspecificinformation.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a0GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDC-issuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.cThediscussionwithregardstothecorereactivityatthebeginningofcycle(BOC)wasrevisedtobeginningofcyclelife(BOL)tobeconsistentwithcurrentnomenclatureatGinnaStation.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.-48-May1995 ll.ITS3.1.4iv'CO3.1.4wasrevisedtoclearlyspecifywhichlimitsareprovidedintheCOLR.ThefigureforthemaximumupperlimitwasreplacedwithwordingsimilartothecurrentGinnaStationTS.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionAandtheassociatedBasesweremodifiedbyaNotethatrequirestheRequiredActionA.lbecompletedwheneverConditionAisentered.ThisensuresthatwheneverMTCisnotwithintheupperlimit,administrativewithdrawallimitsareestablishedandimplementedforaslongasnecessary.ThischangeisnecessarytobeconsistentwithsimilarNotesthatapplytoRequiredActionswhichmustbecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ConditionCandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtorequireare-evaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalyseswhenevertheprojectedendofcyclelife(EOL)HTCisnotwithinthelowerlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.Thisre-evaluationmustbecompletedpriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsoutboronconcentrationof300ppmortheplantmustbetakentoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThischangeisnecessarytobeconsistentwiththeactualSurveillanceRequirementsperformedatGinnaStationtoensurethattheEOLMTCwillbewithinthespecifiedlimit.AnewConditionDwasaddedtorequirethattheplanttobetakentoMODE4ifthere-evaluation'annotsupportcontinuedoperationoftheplant.TheseActionsareconsistentwithcurrentproceduresatGinnaStationforthecasewhentheEOLMTClimitwillnotbemet.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AnewSR3.1.4.2wasaddedtorequireconfirmationthattheHTCwillbewithintheappropriatelimitsat70%RTPandatEOL.Thisverificationat70%RTPisnecessarysincethisisatransitionzonefortheupperMTClimit.TheEOLHTCispredictedatthebeginningofthecyclelife(BOL)duringlowpowerphysicstestingbyusingpredictedandactualmeasured'beginningofcycleHTCvalues.This.valueiscomparedwiththeendofcyclemostnegativelimittoverifythattheEOLHTCwillbewithinthemostnegativeboundinglimit.ThisaddedSurveillanceRequirementisconsistentwithcurrentproceduresatGinnaStationtoverify"thattheselimitswillnotbeexceeded.TheBaseswerealsorevisedtosupportthischange.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-49-Hay1995 SR3.1.4.2andSR3.1.4.3werenotaddedsincetheserequirementsarenotcurrentlycontainedwithintheGinnaStationTS.Currently,theEOLHTCispredictedatthebeginningofthecyclelife(BOL)duringlowpowerphysicstestingbyusingpredictedandactualmeasuredbeginningofcycleHTCvalues.ThisvalueiscomparedwiththeendofcyclemostnegativelimittoverifythattheEOLHTCwillbewithinthemostnegativeboundinglimit.ThismethodisconsistentwiththemethoddescribedinWCAP-13749(Ref.7)at300ppmandwiththemethodemployedbyVEPCOasreferencedinGenericLetter93-05(Ref.8).VariousBaseschangeswerealsomadetoreflectthesechanges.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-03,C.1wasnotincorporated.The'aseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):ThebackgrounddiscussionwithregardstotheModeratorTemperatureCoefficientwasrevisedtoincludethedefinitionofModeratorTemperatureCoefficient.Thediscussionofthebeginningofcycle(BOC)andendofcycle(EOC)HTClimitswererevisedtobeginningofcyclelife(BOL)andendofcyclelife(EOL)MTClimitstobeconsistentwithcurrentnomenclatureatGinnaStation.C.PortionsoftheBackgroundsectionwhichdiscussLCOlimitsandSurveillanceRequirementswererelocatedtotheappropriatesectiontoimprovethereadabilityoftheBases.d.e.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThediscussioninRequiredActionA.lwithregardstoHTCupperlimitwasrevisedtoclarifythedifferencebetweenthemaximumupperlimitspecifiedintheLCOandtheupperlimitspecifiedin'heCOLR.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967were'tilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.-50-Hay1995 12.ITS3.1.5lv~v.Vl~ConditionsA,BandDwererevisedtospecifythevariableSHUTDOWNHARGINintheCOLRinsteadofafixedvalue'asdiscussedinSectionB.iabove.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Incorporation,ofapprovedTraveller,WOG-17,C.l.SR3.1.5.1andtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtodividetheSurveillanceRequirementintotwoSurveillances.ThediscussionintheFrequencycolumnaboutwhenthesurveillancemustbeperformedwasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnintheformofaNote.ThisclarifiesthepurposeofeachoftheNotesthatmodifytheSurveillanceRequirementinNUREG1431andispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.1.5.2wasrevisedtorequiremovementofeachrodnotfullyinsertedtoaHRPItransitioninsteadofz10stepsineitherdirection.HovementoftherodsisverifiedbyindicationthroughHRPIwhichisunabletoverifyrodmovementforeachstepbutratheratanintervalof12steps.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithina8stepsoftheindicatedposition.Hovement>10stepswhichcouldbeinexcessoftheHRPItransitionisunnecessaryandwouldnotbeindicatedthroughHRPI.ThischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentlicensingbasisforGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.6.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheLCO,theSurveillanceRequirementsandtheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(these'areITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~b.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.5wasnotincorporated.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.-51-Hay1995 c.Thediscussionoftheshutdownandcontrolbankswasrevisedtoincludeadescriptionoftheirdifferentfunctions.d.AbriefdiscussionofwherethefullywithdrawnpositionfortheshutdownbanksandthecontrolbanksisdefinedwasaddedtoavoidconfusionwithcurrentGinnaStationdocumentation.e.ThediscussionoftheshutdownbankswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhasoneshutdownbankinsteadofatleasttwoaslistedinITS.f.Thediscussionofthepositionindicationsystemswererevisedtoreflectactualsystemdesign.ThisincludesrevisingtheBasesandtheLCOtoreflectthatGinnaStationhasaMicroprocessorRodPosition~IndicationSystem(HRPI)insteadofaDigitalRodPositionIndicationSystemlistedinITS.g.ThediscussionoftheanalysisperformedinregardtostaticrodmisalignmentwasrevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationhasthreetypesofanalysisinsteadofjustthetwolistedinITS.h.ThediscussionoftheLCOwasrevisedtoincludeadiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenOPERABILITYandtrippabilityfortheshutdownandcontrolbanks.i.Adiscussionoftherodpositiondeviationmonitoroperabilityrequirementswasaddedtoclarifythatamorefrequentsurveillanceisnecessarywhenthemonitorisinoperable.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-03,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-03,C.S.TheApplicabilityandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtochangetheMODE2ApplicabilityrequirementtoMODE2withK,<<z1.0insteadofallofMODE2sincetheserequirementsarenotconcernsuntilthereactoriscritical.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYandalignmentaredirectlyrelatedtocorepowerdistributionsandSDHwhenthereactoriscriticalandduringsubsequentpoweroperation.RequiredActionsA.2,C.2andD.IwererevisedtorequireareductiontoMODE2withK.<<<1.0(insteadofMODE3)inordertotaketheplantoutofapplicabilityofthisLCO.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-"4,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-52-Hay1995 xl.13.ITS3.1.6RequiredActionB.lwasdeletedsincetheplantalwayshastheoptiontorestoretherodtowithinalignmentlimits.ThenumberingschemeandformatfortherestoftheRequiredActionsassociatedwithConditionBhavebeenrevisedtoincorporatethischange.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.lV.V.LCO3.1.6,SR3.1.6.1andtheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationhasonlyoneshutdownbankinsteadofatleasttwoasdiscussedintheITS.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionAwasrevisedtospecifythevariableSHUTDOWNHARGINintheCOLRinsteadofafixedvalueasdiscussedinSectionS.iabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheNoteintheApplicabilitysectionwasrelocatedtotheLCOsincethenotediscussesexceptionsoftheLCOandisthepreferredlocationbythelicensedpersonnel.TheNotewasrevisedtoclearlydescribewhatexceptionsareallowedbythenote.ChangesweremadetotheBasestoincorporatethischange.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheApplicabilityandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtochangetheMODE2ApplicabilityrequirementtoNODE2withK.<<>1.0insteadofHODE2withanycontrolbanknotfullyinsertedsincetheserequirementsarenotconcernsuntilthereactoriscritical.Theshutdownbank,togetherwiththecontrolbanksensurethatSDHismaintainedwhenthereactoriscriticalandduringsubsequentpoweroperation.Priortoreactorcriticality,theSDMismaintainedbyLCO3.1.1.RequiredActionB.1wasrevisedtorequireareductiontoMODE2withK,<<<1.0(insteadofMODE3)inordertotaketheplantoutofapplicabilityofthisLCO.ThischangeisconsistentTravellerMSTS-4,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheSurveillanceRequirementsandtheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.'53-Hay1995 Vi.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuance.oftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.5wasnotincorporated.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.AbriefdiscussionofwherethefullywithdrawnpositionfortheshutdownbanksandthecontrolbanksisdefinedwasaddedtoavoidconfusionwithcurrentGinnaStationdocumentation.C.d.e.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.IThediscussionoftheSR3.1.6.1wasrevisedtoremovedescriptionof.averificationthatisperformedpriortoanapproachtocriticalitysincethisisoutsidetheApplicabilityoftheLCO.ThediscussionofRequiredActionsA.l.1,A.l.2,andA.2wasrevisedtoincludethedescriptionfromtheBasesofSR3.1.1.1withregardstowhatshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenperformingareactivitybalancecalculationinsteadofjustreferencingSR3.1.1.1.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.7wasnotincorporated.Theparag}aphswerealsoreformattedtoimprovereadability.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.10.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.6.14.ITS3.1.7ConditionAwasrevisedtospecifythevariableSHUTDOWNNRGINintheCOLRinsteadofafixedvalueasdiscussedinSectionS.iabove.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.l.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheNoteintheApplicabilitysectionwasrelocatedtotheLCOsincethenotediscussesexceptionsoftheLCOandisthepreferredlocationbylicensedpersonnel.TheNotewasrevisedtoclearlydescribewhatexceptionsareallowedbythenote.ChangesweremadetotheBasestoincorporatethischange.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-54-Hay1995 ConditionAwasrevisedtogeneralizethecontrolbanklimits(i.e.,deleteinsertion)suchthatConditionAandConditionBcanbecombinedtogethersincetheRequiredActionsarethesameandseparateConditionentryisnotallowed.ConditionBwasthendeletedandConditionCwasrelabeledConditionB.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ConditionCandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtorequireareductiontoHODf2withK,<<<1.0whentheRequiredActionsforConditionAandtheassociatedCompletionTimesarenotmet.ThisreductionwouldbringtheplanttoaConditionwhentheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheSurveillanceRequirementsandtheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.Thisisan'ITSCategory(iv)change.SR3.1.7.2andtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtodividetheSurveillanceRequirementintotwoSurveillances.ThediscussionintheFrequencycolumnaboutwhenthesurveillancemustbeperformedwasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnintheformofaNote.ThisclarifiesthepurposeofeachoftheNotesthatmodifytheSurveillanceRequirementinNUREG-1431andispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.8.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.,GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-21,C.5wasnotincorporated.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.ThediscussionoftheshutdownbankswasrevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhasoneshutdownbankinsteadofatleasttwoaslistedinITS.c.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.-55-Hay1995 d.ThetitlestoLCO3.1.5andLCO3.1.7wereaddedtothebackgrounddiscussiontoprovideconsistency.e.ThediscussionofthecontrolrodinsertionlimitsfigurewasrevisedtoremoveFigureB3.1.7-1fromtheBasessincethisisonlyanexampleofthefigurethatiscontainedintheCOLR.ThiseliminatesthepotentialforerrorinusingthebasesfigureinsteadoftheCOLRfigure.ix.f.ThediscussionofRequiredActionsA.1.1,A.1.2,andA.2wasrevisedtoincludethedescriptionfromtheBasesofSR3.1.1.1withregardstowhatshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenperformingareactivitybalancecalculationinsteadofjustreferencingtheSR.Assuch,theapprovedTravellerWOG-21,C.7wasnotincorporated.g.Adiscussionoftherodinsertionlimitmonitoroperabilityrequirementswasaddedtoclarifythatamorefrequentsurveillanceisnecessarywhenthemonitorisinoperable.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.9.x.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.7.xi.'ncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-03,C.3.xii.SR"3.1.7.1wasrevisedtorequireverificationthattheestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinCOLRlimitspriortocriticalityinsteadofwithin4hourspriortocriticality.ThisverificationiscurrentlyperformedatGinnaStation;however,thisisanewtechnicalspecificationrequirement.Currentoperatingproceduresrequiretheverificationtobemadepriortocriticalitybutallowforthetesttobecompletedwhenitwillbeaccurateandyetnotaffectthestartupoftheplant.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.'5.ITS3.1.8Thediscussionofthepositionindicationsystemswasrevisedtoreflectactualsystemdesign.ThisincludesrevisingtheBasesandtheLCOtoreflectthatGinnaStationhasaHicroprocessorRodPositionIndicationSystem(HRPI)"insteadofaDigitalRodPositionIndicationSystemlistedinITS.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.10.'-56-Hay1995 RequiredActionC.1.2andtheBaseswererevisedtorequireverificationthatthemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodare<12stepsfromthedemandpositionindicatorforthatbankinsteadof<12stepsapart.ThisisconsistentwiththerequirementsofSR3.1.8.1.TherequiredActionasitiscurrentlywrittenallowsforonlya12stepdifferencebetweenthemostwithdrawnandtheleastwithdrawnrodswhiletherevisedRequiredActionandSR3.1.8.1allowfora24stepdifferencebetweenthemostwithdrawnandtheleastwithdrawnrodswhich'isconsistentwiththesafetyanalysesasdiscussedinthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.AnewConditionEwasaddedtoclarifythatifmorethanoneHRPIisinoperablepergroupforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankisinoperableforoneormorebanksthentheplantmustenterLCO3.0.3immediately.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-17,C.2wasnotincorporatedsincetheRequiredActionassociatedwithCondition0onlyappliestoConditionsA,B,andC.TheFrequencyofSR3.1.8.1wasrevisedtorequireverificationoftheagreementbetweenHRPIandthegroupdemandpositionindicationpriortocriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorhead.ThisSurveillanceRequirementisperformedduringaplantoutageorduringstartupandisusuallyonlyperformedonce;however,iftheplantshouldhavetoshutdownandremovethereactorheadafterthisSurveillanceRequirementhasbeenperformed,itshouldbeclearthatthisrequirementshouldbecompletedagaintove'rifythatnothinghasaffectedtheOPERABILITYofeitheroftherodpositionindicatibnsystems.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~b.c~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.Thediscussionoftheshutdownandcontrolbankswasrevisedtoincludeadescriptionoftheirdifferentfunctions.-57-Hay1995 d.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.e.ThediscussionwithregardstotheHRPIOPERABILITYwasrevisedtoreflectthatHRPIindicationisavailableontheHRPIscreeninthecontrolroomortherelayroomorontheplantprocesscomputer.f.ThediscussionwithregardstoHRPIOPERABILITYwasrevisedtoincludeadescriptionoftheHRPIfaultdetectionsystemandtodescribewhatshouldbeusedtodetermineifabrieffaulthasrenderedarodpositionindicationinoperable.ApprovedTravellerWOG-02,C.8wasnotincorporatedsincethesechangesarenotconsistentwiththerequirementsforHRPIOPERABILITY.TheHRPIsystemisnotconsideredinoperableifarodisnotwithin12stepsofthegroupstepcounterascanbeimpliedbythechangesmadebyapprovedTravellerWOG-02,C.8,butrathertheroditselfisconsideredoutofalignment.g,h.ThediscussionoftheNotemodifyingtheRequiredActionswasrevisedtoreflectthatwithmorethanoneHRPIpergroupinoperableormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3.ThediscussionoftheadministrativemeanstoverifythattherodpositionindicatorsareOPERABLEwasrevisedtoincludealistofmethodsthatcouldbeusedtomaketheverification.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-03,C.4.TheApplicabilityandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtochangetheMODE2ApplicabilityrequirementtoNODE2withK,<<Z1.0insteadofallofMODE2sincetherequirementsassociatedwithrodOPERABILITYandalignmentarenotconcernsuntilthereactoriscritical.TheRodPositionIndicationsystemsprovidepositionindicationforalloftheshutdownandcontrolrods.RequiredActionD.lwasrevisedtorequireareductiontoMODE2withK,<1.0inordertotaketheplantoutofapplicabilityofthisLCO.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheNotemodifyingtheActionstablewasrevisedtoclarifywhenseparateconditionentryisallowed.Thischangeisnecessarytoprovideabetterunderstandingthateachgrouporbankmayentertheconditionseparately;nottheindividualrodpositionindicators.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-58-Hay1995 X.ConditionBwasrevisedtochange"inexcessof24steps"to">24steps".ThischangeismadetoclarifytherequirementandtobeconsistentwiththestandardNUREG-1431formatdescribedinNUMARC93-03.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.16.ITS3.1.9LCO3.1.9andtheassociatedSRandBaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofoneoftheLCOslisted.ThereforenoneoftheseMODE1PHYSICSTESTexceptionsarenecessary.Assuch,approvedTravellers,WOG-03,C.5;WOG-03,C.3;WOG-21,C.ll;andWOG-21,C.2havenotbeen.incorporated.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.4.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.17.ITS3.1.101V.V.V1~LCO3.1.10wasrevisedtoclearlyspecifywhattheTHERMALPOWERmustbelimitedtoasisdiscussedinConditionB.AnewSR3.1.10.4'ndBasesdescriptionswereaddedtorequireacheckthattheTHERMALPOWERiswithinlimitsevery30minutesinordertoverifyConditionB.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.1.10andSR3.1.10.3wererevisedtospecifythevariableSHUTDOWNMARGINintheCOLRinsteadofafixedvalueasdiscussedinSectionS.iabove.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-4,C.l.'hisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-17,C.3.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,,WOG-02,C.2.TheBaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~TheGinnaStationterminologywasusedtosubstitute"Differentialboronworth"for"boronreactivitycoefficient"inthedescriptionoftheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInsertedTest.b.ThedescriptionsoftheMODE2PHYSICSTESTSwererevisedtoreflectactualtestsperformedatGinnaStation.-59-May1995 c.TheLCOslistedintheapplicablesafetyanalysissectionwerereformattedtobeconsistentwiththeBasesofLCO3.1.8andtoincludeallofthetitlesoftheLCOs.d.ThediscussionoftherequirementsforreloadPHYSICSTESTSwasrevisedto,reflectthatthetestsperformedatGinnaStationareperformedinaccordancewithTSrequirements,fuelvendorguidelinesandestablishedindustrypractices.e.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.1.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.3.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-03,C.6.ix.X.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-21,C.ll.SR3.1.10.1wasrevisedtospecifyaFrequencyofoncewithin7dayspriortocriticalityinsteadofwithin12hourspriortocriticality.ThisSurveillanceRequirementiscurrentlynotinthelicensingbasisforGinnaStation.ThisrevisionreflectsthecurrentstartupandoperationproceduresusedatGinnaStation.The7dayrequirementissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEpriortocriticalitywithoutbecomingacriticalpathitemimmediatelypriortostartup.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.18.ITS3.1.11LCO3.1.11andtheassociatedSRandBaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotrequirearelaxationoftheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementsforanyoftheMODE2PHYSICSTESTS.ThereforenoneoftheseMODE2SHUTDOWNMARGINPHYSICSTESTexceptionsarenecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.19.ITS3.2.11~LCO3.2.1Awasrevisedtoremove"F~Methodology"fromthroughoutthetechnicalspecificationandBases.GinnaStationdoesnotfollowagenericForFoMethodology.LCO3.2.1Bwasthendeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.LCO3.2.1A,ActionA.2wasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththeformatofActionsA.1,A.3andA.4.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-60-May1995

LCO3.2.1A,ActionA.4wasrevisedtorequireareductionintheOvertemperatureATtripsetpointswhenFoisabovethelimit.ThisrequirementiscurrentlyintheGinnaStationtechnicalspecificationsandisnecessarytopreservethe.,reactorcoresafetylimitsandotherassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalyses.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-17,C-4.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheLCO,theSurveillanceRequirements,andtheBasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.AnewSR3.2.1.2andassociatedBaseswereaddedtorequireaverificationofFoevery24hourswheneveronepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER>75%RTP.ThisrequirementwasrelocatedfromSR3.2.4.2sincegPTRcannotbeaccuratelymeasuredwith1excoredetectorinoperableatthispowerlevelanditisdifficulttoperformapartialfluxmapatGinnaStation.Thissurveillanceisusedtoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableandthattheassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysesarepreserved.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.2.1.2wasnotaddedsincethisrequirementisnotcurrentlycontainedintheGinnaStationtechnicalspecificationsandisnotconsiderednecessarytoensurethatFo(Z)iswithintherequiredlimits.GinnaStationiscurrentlyrequiredtomeasurethesteadystatevaluesofFo(Z)takingintoconsiderationmeasurementuncertaintiesandmanufacturingtolerances.VariouschangeswerealsomadethroughouttheBasestoreflectthischange.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-22,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-22,C.3.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows:(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes)'a~GinnaStation'asdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967(Ref.9)wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.ThediscussionofSR3.2.1.1wasrevisedandexpandedtoincludeplant-specificconsiderations.-61-Hay1995 c.Thediscussionofnon-equilibriumsituationswasrevisedtoincludeadefinitionofloadfollowoperation.d.ThediscussionoftheLOCAanalysiswasrevisedtodiscusswhytheLOCAanalysisistypicallymorelimitingforFothanothersafetyanalyses.e.TheLCOwasrevisedtoremovetheFoequationsandtheexampleK(Z)curvesincetheactualequationsandK(Z)curvearelocatedintheCOLR.f.ActionA.1wasrevisedtospecifywhenthe15minuteCompletionTimetoreduceTHERMALPOWERbegins.TheActionsforFooutoflimitwererevisedtoincludeexamplesofa'eductiontotheacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDandareductiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints.h.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.2.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.2wasrevisedtoallow8hours(insteadof4hours)toreducetheAFDacceptableoperationlimits.ThisrequirementisnotreflectedinthecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasisandhasbeenaddedforcompleteness.TherevisiontotheCompletionTimereflectstheamountoftimeitwouldtaketoaccuratelyrevisetheacceptableoperationlimitsandensurethattheappropriaterestrictionsareinplaceforTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPatGinnaStation.The8hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodresultingfromAFDoutsidethereducedacceptableoperationlimitsandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisanITScategory*(i)change.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.3wasrevisedtoallow72hours(instead.of8)toreducethePowerrangeneutronfluxhightripsetpoints.TheGinnaStationtechnicalspecificationscurrentlydonotspecifyacompletiontimetoreducethetripsetpointsand72hoursismoreconsistentwiththeactualtimeneededtosafelyreducethePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripsetpoints.The72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisanITScategory(i)change.-62-May1995 20.ITS3.2.2ConditionAandtheassociatedRequiredActionsofLCO3.2.2wererevisedtoreflectthecurrentlicensingbasisforGinnaStation.GinnaStationiscurrentlyrequiredtoperformthesameactionswhetherFo(Z)orF~isnotwithintherequiredlimits(exceptwithrespecttoAFD).ForthecasewhenF~isoutoflimit,theTHERHALPOWERandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighTripsetpointswouldbereducedby1%ofRTPforeach1%F~wasabovethelimitwithin15minutesand72hours,respectively.ThischangewouldalsorequireareductionintheOvertemperatureandOverpowerhTtripsetpointsiftheF~remainedoutoflimitfor72hours.ThischangeincludesreplacementverbiageintheBasesforthenewRequired.ActionsforConditionA.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AnewSR3.2.2.2andassociatedBaseswereaddedtorequireaverificationofF~every24hourswheneveronepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERHALPOWER>75%RTP.Thisrequirementwas,relocatedfromSR3.2.4.2sincegPTRcannotbeaccuratelymeasuredwith1excoredetectorinoperableatthispowerlevelanditisdifficulttoperformapartialfluxmatatGinnaStation.Thissurveillanceisusedtoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableandthattheassumption'smadeinthesafetyanalysesarepreserved.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a;Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttotheapplicableDNBcorrelationswasadded.b.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBases,toprovideconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.2,andtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.C.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.lv~d.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.2.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-22,C.3.-63-May1995 21.ITS3.2.3iv.V.vl~LCO3.2.3wasrevisedtoincludearequirementfortheAFDmonitoralarmtobeOPERABLE.AFDiscontinuouslymonitoredbytheGinnaStationPlantProcessComputerSystemandwhenAFDisoutoflimitanalarmissoundedimmediatelyinthecontrolroom.TheITScur'rentlyhasaprovisioninSR3.2.3.2specifyingrequirementsnecessarywhentheAFDalarmisinoperable.InordertoclarifytherequirementsfortheoperatorthisrequirementwasaddedtotheLCO.ConditionsDandEandtheassociatedRequiredActionswereaddedtorefertheoperatortotheappropriatesurveillancerequirementswhenthealarmisinoperable.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheNotesforLCO3.2.3werereformattedandplacedattheendoftheLCOsection.TheNotefromtheApplicabilitysectionwasalsomovetotheLCOsectionasNote4.Additionally,theNoteforLCO3.2.3awasrevisedtoreflectthecurrentoperationproceduresusedatGinnaStationtodeterminewhetherAFDisoutsideofthetargetband.ThecurrentGinnaStation'technicalspecificationsspecifiestheuseoftheaverageofthefour(orthree,inthecaseofonedetectoroutofservice)OPERABLEexcorechannelstoindicateAFDisoutsidethetargetbandinsteadofa2outof4channellogicasspecifiedinITS.Thisdifferenceisconsidered'minorsinceiftwoexcorechannelsindicateAFDoutsidethetargetband,theaveragevalueismostlikelyoutsidethetargetbandaswell.NotesforLCO3.2.3bandLCO3.2.3cwerealsorevisedtoindicatethepowerlevelsforwhichtheyapply.ThesechangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityoftheLCO.TheApplicabilityNotewasrevisedtoallowthe'AFDtobeoutsidethetargetbandforupto16hoursduringsurveillanceofthepowerrangechannelseven.withTHERMALPOWER>90%RTPwhentheacceptableoperationlimitsdonotapply.Thisisconsideredaminorchangesinceitistheoriginalintentofthisnotetoallowpoweroperationduringthissurveillancewithoutarequirementtoreducepower.ThischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheLCO,theSurveillanceRequirementsandtheBasesandtoreflectpl,ant-specificconsiderations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-16,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-16,C.2.ConditionDandtheassociatedRequiredActionoftheapprovedTravellerWOG-16,C.2werenotaddedsinceentryintotheRequiredActionisduetooperationwitha-64-Hay1995 cumulativepenaltydeviationtime>1hourandLCO3.2.3callowsunlimitedpenaltydeviationtime.Thusapowerreductionto<50%RTPasisrequiredbyRequiredActionC.1wouldrestorecompliancewiththeLCOandafurtherreductionto<15%RTPisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.RequiredActionB.lasrevisedtorequireinitiationofthepowerreductionto<90%RTPimmediatelyinsteadofthecompletepowerreductionwithinthenext15minutes.Similarly,RequiredActionC.1wasrevisedtorequireinitiationofthepowerreductionto<50%RTPimmediatelyinsteadofthecompletepowerreductionin30minutes.ThesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.10.2.9and3.10.2.10.ThesechangeswillallowforapowerreductioninanorganizedfashionwithoutchallengingplantsystemsandwillallowpowerascensiononcetheplantisoutofConditionBorC.ThenotemodifyingConditionCwasremove'dsinceitdoesnotapplytotherevisedRequiredAction.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.'R3.2.3.1wasnotaddedsincethisrequirementisnotcurrentlycontainedin>theGinna.StationtechnicalspecificationsandisnotconsiderednecessarytoensurethatAFDiswithinthetargetband.ThecontinuousmonitoringprovidedbythecomputerissufficienttoensurethattheAFDiswithinthetargetband.WhenthecomputermonitorisinoperabletheAFDisloggedevery15minuteswhenTHERMALPOWERisabove90%RTPandeveryhourwhenTHERMALPOWERisbetween15%and90%RTP.TheBaseshavebeenrevisedtoreflectthischange.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.2.3.2andtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtodividetheSurveillanceRequirementintotwosurveillances.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnwasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumn.ThisclarifiesthepurposeoftheNotesthatcurrentlymodifythesurveillanceandispreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.2.3.3wasrevisedtoremovethedifferentmethodsavailabletoupdatethetargetfluxdifferencefromthespecification.TheallowedmethodsaredescribedintheBasessuchthatreferencetotheminthespecificationisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-17,C.5.LCO3.2.3BandtheassociatedSurveillanceRequirementsweredeletedsinceGinnaStationusestheCAOCmethodology.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.PThebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv),changes):-65-May1995 a~TheAFDdefinitionintheLCOsectionisrevisedtobeconsistentwiththedefinitioninSection1.0.b.TheexamplefigurefortheAFDacceptableoperationlimitsandtargetbanklimitswasremovedsincetheactualfigureisprovidedintheCOLRandthismaycauseconfusion.c.AdditionalchangesconsistentwithapprovedTraveller,WOG-16,.C.2.d.SR3.2.3.2wasrevisedtoincludeadiscussionoftheAFDmonitorandwhenthealarmswillbeprovided.SR3.2.3.3andSR3.2.3.4wererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoupdateandmeasurethetargetfluxdifferenceofeachOPERABLEexcorechannelsinceGinnaStationusesanaveragechannelmeasurementcomparisoninsteadofanindividualmeasurementcomparison.ThisisconsideredanminordifferencesinceiftwoexcorechannelsindicateAFDoutsidethetargetband,theaveragevalueismostlikelyoutsidethetargetbandaswell.ThischangeisconsistentwiththerequirementofTS3.10.2.7.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.22.ITS3.2.4LCO3.2.4wasrevisedtoincludearequirementforthegPTRmonitor.alarmtobeOPERABLE.quadrantPowerTiltiscontinuouslymonitoredbytheGinnaStationPlantProcessComputerSystemandwhenthegPTRisabovethelimitanalarmissoundedimmediatelyinthecontrolroom.TheITScurrentlyhasaprovisioninSR3.2.4.1specifyingrequirementsnecessarywhentheqPTRalarmisinoperable.Inordertoclarifytherequirementsfortheoperator,thisrequirementwasaddedtotheLCO.ConditionCandtheassociatedRequiredActionwereaddedtorefertheoperatortotheappropriateSurveillanceRequirementwhenthealarmisinoperable.ConditionBwasalsorevised'oindicatewhichConditionitappliestosinceConditionCwasadded.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-66-Hay1995 RequiredActionA.IwasrevisedtolimitTHERMALPOWERto31.belowRTPforeach1%bywhichthegPTRexceedsI.OOinsteadofrequiringapowerlevelreduction.ThisisnecessarysinceduringstartupgPTRmaybeinexcessof1.02becauseoftransientcoreconditionswhichareusuallyself-correctingaspowerincreases.SinceConditionAofLCO3.2.4providesforcontinuedoperationforanunlimitedperiodoftime,itisacceptableperLCO3.0.4toentertheApplicabilityofLCO3.2.4withgPTRinexcessof1.02,providedtheRequiredActionsaremet.LimitingTHERMALPOWERratherthanreducingTHERMALPOWERallowsforthecasewheretheApplicabilityofLCO3.2.4isenteredwithgPTRinexcessof1.02.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.9,Rev.l.ChangesassociatedwiththeincorporationofapprovedtravellerWOG-02,C.9,Rev.IwerealsomadetothecompletionTimesofRequiredActionsA.3.2andA.3.3.,RequiredActionA.3.1wasremovedsincetheperformanceofSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1inRequiredActionsA.2andA.3.3confirmsthattheincorepowerdistributionisacceptable,andconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthesafetyanalyses.TheNoteforA.3.2wasrevisedtorequireverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitspriortorecalibrationoftheexcoredetectors.Thischangeisnecessary.toensurethatthepowerdistributionisacceptablepriortoeliminatingtheindicatedtiltandincreasingpowerabovethelimitsofA.1andA.2.Ifthepeakingfactorsarenotwithintheirlimits,theappropriaterestrictionsfromLCO3.2.1andLCO3.2.2willbeimplemented.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,WOG-02,C.lRequiredActionA.3.3wasrevisedtoincludetwoadditionalNotes.ThefirstNotewasaddedtoclarifythatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesdonotneedtobeperformedagainwhenthecauseofthegPTRalarmisonlyduetoinstrumentationbeingmisaligned.PerformanceofnewRequiredActionA.3issufficienttodeterminewhetherthecauseofthegPTRalarmisrelatedtoconditionsofthecoreortoinstrumentation.Recalibrationoftheexcoredetectorswillnotaffectthesecoreparameterswhenthealarmisonlyduetoinstrumentation.ThelastnotewasaddedtoclarifythatSRs3.2.1.1and3.2.2.1shouldbeperformedwithin24hoursafterreachingratedTHERMALPOWER(RTP)orwithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.l,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst.ThisdoesnotchangetheoriginalintentoftheRequiredActionandisaddedtoprovideclarificationoftheoriginalintent.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-67-May1995 SR3.2.4.IandtheassociatedBaseswererevisedtodividetheSurveillancerequirementintotwosurveillances.ThisclarifiesthepurposeoftheNotesthatcurrentlymodifythesurveillanceandispreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.2.4.2andtheassociatedBaseswerenotaddedtothisspecificationsincegPTRcannotbe"verified"bytheincoredetectors.TheincoredetectorsarenotusedtoverifygPTRbutrathertoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.GinnaStationdoesnothave8pairsofsymmetricthimbleplugswhicharenecessarytoperformapartialfluxmapandthuswouldhavetocompleteafullcorefluxmaptoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.SR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2wereaddedtoLCO3.2.1andLCO3.2.2,respe'ctively,toverifythatthecorepeakingfactorsarewithinlimitsandthatthecorepowerdistributionremainsacceptablesincethisisconsistentwiththeactualsurveillancethatmustbeperformedatGinnaStation.TheseaddedsurveillancesfulfilltherequirementsofSR3.2.4.2andaremoreconservative.NoteswereaddedtoSR3.2.4.1andthenewSR3.2.4.2toclarifythatabove75%RTPSR3.2.2.1andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedinsteadofSR3.2.4.1orSR3.2.4.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,MOG-22,C.3.Thebases,wererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~b.C.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheBases,to'rovideconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.2,andtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.ThediscussionofthegPTRwasexpandeddescribewhatthegPTRisandwhatthelimitprevents.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGOCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.-TheBaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.d.SeveralchangesweremadetotheBasestoaddorremoveportionsofsectionsinordertoprovideaconsistencythroughouttheBasesofChapter3.2.-68-Hay1995 xi.23.ITS3.3.1FrequencyforRequiredActionA.2wasrevisedtoallowforequilibriumconditionstobereachedasthepowerlevelisreducedbeforethe24hourtimeclockstartsforperformanceofSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.l.ThisisnecessarysincethenewRequiredActionA.2requiresacalculationofgPTRevery12hoursandanadditionalpowerreductionifnecessary.Thefluxmapsneedtobeperformedafterequilibriumconditionshavebeenestablished.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.RequiredActionA.3.2wasrewordedtorequirecalibrationoftheexcoredetectorinstrumentationtoeliminatethetilt.ThiswordingismoreaccuratesincethegPTRshouldbe1.0,notzeroasthecurrentRequiredActionindicates.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheCompletionTime,inoperablechannelbypasstimelimitandBaseswererevisedfor'variousRTSFunctions.TheCompletionTimetoplaceaninoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionwasrevisedfrom6hoursto72hours.Thetimelimitthataninoperablechannelmaybebypassedforsurveillancetestingofotherchannelshasbeenrevisedfrom4hoursto12hours.ThesetimelimitsarejustifiedinReference30.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.RequiredActionsD.2.1,0.2.2andassociatedBaseswasrevisedtorequiretheperformanceofSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2asanalternatetoreducingthermalpower.ThisisconsistentwithSR3.2.4.2(gPTRverification)whichisperformedatpowerlevelsoflessthan75%RTP.Atpowerlevelsgreaterthanorequalto75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapisperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusing,thethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifygPTR.Performingafullcoremapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthattheheatfluxhotchannelfactorandnuclearenthalpyrisehotchannelfactorremainwithinlimitsandcorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.TheCompletionTimeforRAD.2.2wasalsorevisedfrom12hoursto24hoursconsistentwiththeFrequencyofSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.AsaresultoftherevisiontoRAD.2.2,approvedTravellerWOG-34,C.l,wasnotincorporated.TheRequiredActionswererenumberedconsistentwiththeWritersGuidedocument.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-69-May1995

TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionL.3andtheassociatedBaseswasrevisedtodeletethe1hourverificationoftheSDHconsistentwiththerequirementsofLCO3.1.1.TheConditionisenteredandSR3.1.1.1performedwhenbothsourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsareinoperableinModes3,4,or5withtheRTBsopen.Atthepointintimewhentwosourcerangechannelsbecomeinoperable,theSDHisassumedtobewithinlimit.VerificationthattheSDHiswithinlimithadbeenpreviouslydemonstratedbytheperiodicperformance(ataFrequencyof48hours)of-SR3.1.1.1.Sinceoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionshavebeensuspendedandunboratedwatersourceisolationvalveshavebeenclosed,corereactivityconditionswillremainstable.Therefore,theneedtoperformanadditionalverificationwithin1hourisnotnecessary.ConfirmationthatcorereactivityremainsstablewillcontinuetobeperformedataFrequencyofonceper12hoursuntilatleastoneSRHisrestoredOPERABLEandtheConditionexited.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.2.TravellerNRC-02,C.1whichaddedaConditionfortwoinoperableRTBswasnotaddedsinceasimilarConditionwasnotaddedforanyoftheremainingRTSfunctions.ThisissueisaddressedinthebasesfortheACTIONSwhichspecifiesthatLCO3.0.3shouldbeenteredwhenmorecomponentsareinoperablethanspecifiedintheapplicableConditions.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisincludestheuseofonlyaTripSetpointcolumninTable3.3.1-1basedontheGinnaStationsetpointmethodology(seeTableNote(a)).TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-33,C.4.Thistravellerwasrevisedbasedonlicensedpersonnelpreferencewithoutanychangeintheintent.TheproposedchangestothetravellerareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-33,C.l.ThistravellerwasrevisedtorelocatetheNotesintheFrequencycolumntotheSurveillancecolumnbasedonlicensedpersonnelpreferences.Inaddition,sincetheRTSInterlockswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications,theFrequencyassociatedwith"priortoreactorstartup"wasnotadded.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.-70-May1995 X.XiXii.X111.XiV.XV'vi.Xvii.SR3.3.1.16andassociatedBasesdenotingtherequirementforresponsetimetesting(RTT)ofvariousRTSFunctionswasnotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdoesnotcontainthistestingrequirement.Inaddition,severalongoingindustryprogramsareattemptingtorelocatethesetestingrequirementssincetheydonotrevealanyfailureswhichcanbediscoveredbyotherrequiredtesting.AsaresultofthedeletionofthisSR,approvedTravellerWOG-07,C.8(Rev2),wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-30,C.l.TheLCOs,Conditions,SRs,andBasesforvariousRTSFunctionsandInterlockswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TheseFunctionsandInterlocksarenotapplicabletotheGinnaStationRTSdesignandthedeletionoftheserequirementsisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.AsaresultofthedeletionofFunction18.f,approvedTravellerWOG-25,C17,wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-33,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-33,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.l.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,andassociatedBaseswasrevisedtorelocatecertainparametersoftheOvertemperature~TandOverpower~TTripSetpointsNotes1and2totheCOLR.TheTripSetpointswererelocatedtotheCOLRconsistentwiththelevelofdetailofotherlimitsandvaluesbeingrelocatedtotheCOLR(i.e.SDNlimit).RelocatingthesetpointinformationtotheCOLRallowstheplanttomakechangesinaccordancewith10CFR50.59tothesesetpoints.Inaddition,theAllowableValuecolumnwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssuchthatthefirstsentenceoftheNoteswasnotadded.Finally,theequationswererevisedconsistentwiththeequationcurrentlyspecifiedintheGinnaStationTS.Asaresultofthesechanges,approvedTravellerWOG-07,C.4,wasonlypartiallyincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases,provideconsistency,ortoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.b.TheSLwasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationRCSdesignpressure.-71-May1995 c.ApprovedTravellerWOG-08,C.6wasnotaddedduetodeletedtext.d.,GinnaStationisdesignedwithsystem(relaysystem)ratherprotectionsystem.Asaresultrevisions,portionsofapprovedwerenotincorporated.ananalogprotectionthanasolidstateofthesedeletionsorTravellerWOG-07,C.8xviii~e.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.4(Rev1).f.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-07,C.9.g.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.8.h.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.ll.i.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.l.j.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.2.k.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-31,C.3.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.12.m.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.34.n.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.18.o.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.I9.p.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.15(Rev2).q.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.36.RequiredActions8.2.2andU.2.2werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.OnceRequiredAction8.2.1andU.2.1havebeencompleted,theplantexitstheHODEofApplicabilityforthemanualreactortripchannelandRTB,respectively.Therefore,accordingtotheITSusagerules,theplantexitstheConditionandentersanyotherapplicableCondition.Inthesecases,thiswouldbeConditionCwhichallowsanadditional48hourstorestoretheinoperabletripfunctionchannel.Anadditional48hoursisconsideredacceptablesincetheplantisinHODES3,4,or5withreducedtemperaturesandpressures.Inaddition,theonlyaccidentofconcernisarodejectioneventwhichismuchlessprobableundertheseconditions.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-72-Hay1995 Xix~XX.Xxi.Xxi1.XX111.Xx)V.TheRTSInterlockswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSonlyrefertotwoInterlocks(P-7andP-8)inTS2.3.3asbeingthepointinwhichthepowerrangenuclearfluxandsingleRCSlooplossofflowtripfunctionscanbeblocked.TheInterlocksrequiredinITSactuallyprovidetwofunctions,ablockfunctionandanenablefunction.TherequirementsfortheseInterlocksinNUREG-1431,Table3.3.1-1aremisleadingsincethesetwofunctionsarenotseparatelyidentified.Therefore,theITSmayrequireanInterlockforMODESinwhichthetripfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Tocorrectthisdiscrepancy,theInterlockswereremovedfromTable3.3.1-1andallreferencestotheInterlockswerereplacedwithactualRTPlevels.Inaddition,SR3.3.1.13wasremovedandreplacedwithSRswhichverifythateachtripfunctionthatcanbeblockedbyanInterlockisnotblockedinaregioninwhichthetripfunctionisassumedtobeOPERABLE.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.ThetextforITSConditionsF,G,andHwererevisedtoprovidegreaterclarity.TheseareadministrativechangesonlywithnotchangeintheintentoftheCondition.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.TheRequiredActiontocloseunboratedwatersourceisolationvalveswithin1hourwasnotaddedtoConditionL.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.Inaddition,thisrequirementisunnecessarysinceSDMisverifiedbySR3.1.1.1suchthatthisactionisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ThetextforCondition0wasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththebasessincethereisoneRCPbreakerpositionchanneltripfunctionperRCP.Inaddition,theNoteintheRequiredActioncolumnwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheinoperablechannelcannotbebypassedduringsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannel.Thatis,,theRequiredActionforCondition0istorestoretheinoperablechannelwithin72hoursorshutdown(versusplacingthechannelintrip).Therefore,thisNoteisnotrequired.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.Notes1and2forConditionRwasrevisedtoallowtheRTBstobebypassedfor8hoursduringsurveillancetestingandmaintenanceoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanisms.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotplaceatimelimitforbypassoftheRTBs.TheproposedchangeisconsistentwithReference57.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Note2forSR3.3.1.2wasrevisedtoprovideadditionalclarityforlicensedpersonnel.ThischangedoesnotaltertheintentoftheNote.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-73-May1995 XXV.XXV1~XXV11.XXV111.SR3.3.1.3andSR3.3.1.6wererevisedtocorrectadiscrepancybetweenthesetwosurveillances.Essentially,SR3.3.1.6isinitiallyperformedfollowingeachrefuelingoutage.PerformanceofthisSRsatisfiestherequirementsofSR3.3.1.3.Therefore,theFrequencyoftheseSRswasrevisedtoreflectthisandaNoteaddedtoSR3.3.1.3.Inaddition,theFrequencieswererevisedconsistentwithGinnaStationpractices.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.SR3.3.1.10,.SR3.3.1.11,andSR3.3.1.12weremergedintoonecommonSurveillanceandrenamedSR3.3.1.10.Thiswasperformedforthefollowingreasons.First,GinnaStationdoesnothaveRCSresistancetemperaturebypassloopssuchthatSR3.3.1.12doesnotapply.Second,theNoteforSR3.3.1.10relatestoverificationoftimeconstantseventhoughthisSRappliestotripfunctionswhichdonotusetimeconstants.ThisNotewasdeletedwithareferencetothetimeconstantsprovidedinthebases.Inaddition,thedefinitionforCHANNELCALIBRATIONwasrevisedtoincludetimeconstants.Therefore,basedonthesechanges,onlyoneSurveillanceisrequiredforCHANNELCALIBRATIONwiththeNotefromSR3.3.l.11retained.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnforSR3.3.1:15wasrelocatedtotheSurveillancecolumnsincethisisthepreferredlocationforlicensedpersonnel.'ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheTripSetpointvaluesforvarioustripfunctionswasreplacedwithaNotestatingthatthesevaluesare"basedonestablishedlimits."Theaffected,tripfunctionsarenotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Inaddition,thesetripvaluesarenotspecificallylistedinthecurrentGinnaStationTS.Therefore,thistripsetpointsarecontrolledwithinplantproceduresandthesetpointmethodologyprogram.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.t24.ITS3.3.2TheCompletionTime,inoperablechannelbypasstimelimitandBaseswererevisedforvariousESFASFunctions.TheCompletionTimetoplaceaninoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionwasrevisedfrom6hoursto72hours.Thetimelimitthataninoperablechannelmaybebypassedforsurveillancetestingofotherchannelshasbeenrevisedfrom4hoursto12hours.ThesetimelimitsarejustifiedinReference30.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-74-May1995 TheLCOs,Conditions,SRs,andBasesforvariousESFASFunctionsandInterlockswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TheseFunctionsandInterlocksarenotapplicabletotheGinnaStationESFASdesignandthedeletionof'theserequirementsisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.UFSARSection7.3describestheapplicableESFASFunctionsandassociatedInterlocksforGinnaStation.Instead,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifythateachESFAS.functionthatcanbeblockedbyanInterlockisnotblockedinaregioninwhichthetripfunctionisassumedtobeOPERABLE.AsaresultofthedeletionofthevariousrequirementsassociatedwiththeESFASFunctions,approvedTravellerWOG-25,C.24(Rev4),forFunction4.d,WOG-07,C.5forFunction6.h,andapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.3(Rev2)forSR3.3.2.11werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ConditionHandassociatedBaseswasnotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TheincorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.14,providedanoptionto.useConditionGforplantsrequiringtheTurbineTripandFeedwaterIsolationFunctioninMode3.ConditionHonlyprovidesashutdownactiontoMode3,whereasConditionGprovidesashutdownactiontoMode4.GinnaStationrequiresthisFunctiontobeOPERABLEinMode3.Therefore,ConditionGratherthanConditionHisutilized.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionIandassociatedBaseswasnotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TheincorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.14,providedanoptiontouseCondition0forplantsrequiringtheSGWaterLevel-HighFunctioninMode3.ConditionIonlyprovidesashutdownactiontoMode3,whereCondition0providesashutdownactiontoMode4.GinnaStationrequiresthisFunctiontobeOPERABLEinMode3.Therefore,Condition0ratherthanConditionIisutilized.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Theincorporationofapproved.TravellerWOG-07,.C.I,wassupersededbytheincorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-29,C.I.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.3(Rev2).ThistravellerwasrevisedtoapplytoboththemanualfunctionsandautomaticactuationlogicfunctionsforthereasonsprovidedinSectionC,item24.xvbelow.ThechangesareITSCategory(iv)changes.-75-May1995

SR3.3.2.10andassociatedBasesdenotingtheRTTrequirementforvariousESFASFunctionswasnotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdoesnotcontainthistestingrequirement.Inaddition,severalongoingindustryprogramsareattemptingtorelocatethesetestingrequirementssincetheydonotrevealanyfailureswhichcanbediscoveredbyotherrequiredtesting;Asaresultofthedeletionoftheserequirements,portionsofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.3,werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ConditionEandassociatedBaseswasnotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TherequirementsfortheContainmentPressure-High3FunctionwasrevisedfromConditionEtoConditionD.TheGinnaStationinstrumentlogicisatwo-out-of-three-twicedesignwh'ichallowsplacinganinoperablechannelinthetrippedcondition.TheGinnaStationdesigndoesnotprovideabypassswitchwhichisassumedinthebasisforConditionE.TherevisiontoCondition0reflectsthecur'rentlicensingbasistoallowtheinoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedcondition.Asaresultofthedeletionoftheserequirements,portionsofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.8,werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheLCOrequirementfortheManualInitiationFunctionofSteamLineIsolationwasrevisedtooneperloopconsistentwithGinnaStationdesign.ManualInitiationisaccomplishedfromthecontrolroomfromtwoswitches.EachswitchcaninitiateactiontoimmediatelycloseitsrespectiveMSIV.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.14.TheincorporationofaportionofapprovedTravel1erWOG-25,C.16,wassupersededbytheincorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-29,C.l.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases,provideconsistency,ortoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.b.ApprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.6wasnotaddedduetodeletedtext.-76-May1995 C.GinnaStationisdesignedwithananalogprotectionsystem(relaysystem)ratherthan'asolidstateprotectionsystem.Asaresultofthesedeletionsor'evisions,portionsofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.8andapprovedTravellersWOG-25,C.7,WOG-25,C.8(RevI),andWOG-25,C.22(RevI)werenotincorporated.d.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.20.e.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.21.f.ApprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.8wasnotaddedduetodeletedtext.g.GinnaStationdesignfeaturesaredescribedindetail.xv.h.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.5.i.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.4.j.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.3.k.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.l.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-31,C.2.m..IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.34.n.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.5.o.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-l8,C.36.'heConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.3.2andTable3.3.2-1wererevisedtoeliminatetheuseofthe"OR"and"AND"logicwithdifferentCompletionTimes.IncludedwiththischangeistherelocationoftheRequiredActionNotestotheSurveillancessincetheseNotesonlyapplytotheperformanceoftheSRs.ThesechangesdonotrevisetheintentoftheLCObutprovideconsistencywiththeITS.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.3.2.2,SR3.3.2.3,SR3.3.2.4,andSR3.3.2.6werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSonlyrequireperformanceofaCOTonamonthlybasis.ThisisrevisedtoquarterlybasedonReference48.TheESFASdesigndoesnotallowforACTUATIONLOGICTESTINGorMASTERandSLAVERELAYTESTINGonamonthlybasis.Therefore,thesewerenotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-77-Hay1995 25.ITS3.3.3iv~vTheRequiredActionandassociatedBasesforConditionBwererevisedtorequiretheimmediateinitiationofactiontosubmitaSpecialReportsinceSpecification5.9.2.cwasdeleted.ThereferencetotheSpecialReportisthesamelevelofdetailasprovidingareferencetoSpecification5.9.2.c.ThedetailsdenotedinSpecification5.9.2.cwere'relocatedtothePAMInstrumentationBases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheConditions,RequiredActionsandassociatedBaseswererevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththoseforLCO3.3.IandLCO3.3.2.ThesechangesdonotchangetheintentoftheseConditionsandRequiredActionsbutareahumanfactorsimprovement.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCOs,Conditions,SRs,andBasesforvariousPAMFunctionswererevisedconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasisforclassificationofTypeAandCategoryIvariables.TheseFunctionswerereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCasdetailedinReference35.AsaresultofthedeletionofthevariousrequirementsassociatedwiththePAMFunctions,approvedTravellerHWR-06,C.9(Rev3)forFunction9wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)'hange.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases,provideconsistency,ortoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.b.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.25.c.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.8.Thistravellerwasslightlymodifiedbasedonotherbaseschanges.d.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-05,C.2.e.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-07,C.13.f.GinnaStationdesignfeaturesaredescribedindetail.g.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.34.-78-May1995 26.ITS3.3.4ThisLCOandassociatedBaseswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyrequirementsfortheremoteshutdownsystem.GinnaStationutilizeslocalstationsthroughouttheplantforsafeshutdownoutsidethecontrolroom.ThesafeshutdownsystemsatGinnaStationaredesignedtoAIF-GDCllrequirementsandareincompliancewiththesafetyobjectivesofSEPTopicVII-3.TheNRCreviewofthistopicisdocumentedinReference36.AsaresultofthedeletionofthisLCO,approvedTravellersBWR-18,C.2,BWR-18,C.34,BWR-18,C.40,andWOG-08,C.4werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.27.ITS3.3.5TheLCOandassociatedBaseswererenumberedduetothedeletionofLCO3.3.4.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.SR3.3.5.1,SR3.3.5.3,andBasesdenotingtheCHANNELCHECKandRTTrequirementsfor.theLOPDGStartinstrumentationwerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdoesnotcontainthesetestingrequirements.Sinceeachchanneliscomprisedofalossofvoltagerelayanddegradedvoltagerelay,aCHANNELCHECKisnotpractical.Inaddition,severalongoingindustryprogramsareattemptingtorelocatethesetestingrequirementssincetheydonotrevealanyfailureswhichcanbediscoveredbyotherrequiredtesting.Asaresultofthedeletionoftheserequirements,approvedTravellerBWR-18,C.34wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases,provideconsistency,ortoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.b.GinnaStationdesignfeaturesaredescribedindetail.C.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-OS,C.3.-79-Nay1995 iv.V.1TheLCO,Conditionsandbaseswererevisedtorequiretwochannels'ofLOPDGStartInstrumentationforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.TheexistingdesignatGinnaStationutilizesaone-of-two-logictakentwice.Eachlogicchanneliscomprisedofonedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagerelay.Theactuationofeitherrelaytripsthechannel.BothchannelsmusttriptogenerateaLOPDGstart.However,thefailureofeitherrelayinalogicchannelrequirestheentirechanneltobetripped(i.e.,the.lossofpowerrelayanddegradedvoltagerelaycannotbeisolated).Therefore,ifonechannelisinoperable,whetherornotitisduetothelossofonerelayorbothrelayswhichcomprisethechannel,requiresthechannelbeplacedintripwithin6hours.Ifbothchannelsareinoperable,thentheassociatedDGmustbedeclaredinoperable.ThesechangesprovideclearandconciseOPERABILITYrequirementstotheoperatorsandisconsistentwiththecurrentdesignandoperatingpractice.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Basedonthesechanges,approvedTravellerWOG-08,C.5wasnotadded.TheNoteforRequiredActionA.lwasrelocatedtotheSurveillancessincethisNoteonlyappliestotheactualperformanceofaSR.TherelocationofthisNotedoeschangeitsintent.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.28.ITS3.3.6ThisLCOandassociatedBaseswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSrequirementsarebeingrelocatedtotheTRH.ThebasesforthisLCOistoclosethemini-purgeandshutdownpurgeisolationvalvesonahighradiationsignal.Thissignalisnotcreditedinanyaccidentanalysisduringoperation.AsstatedinthecurrentGinnaStationBases,automatici'solationofmini-purgesystemistoprovideadditionalmarginfor10CFRPart20releases.Therequirementsforthehighradiationsignalduringfuelhandlinginthecontainmentisnotrequiredsincetheaccidentanalysisassumesnoisolationofcontainment.ThisisdiscussedingreaterdetailinChapter3.9.AsaresultofthedeletionofthisLCO,approvedTravellersBWR-18,C.34,NRC-05,C.l,WOG-07,C.6,MOG-07,C.8,WOG-07,C.16,MOG-25,C.2(Rev2),WOG-25,C.3(Rev2),WOG-25,C.9,WOG-25,C.10(Rev2),WOG-25,C.ll,MOG-25,C.12(Rev1),-andWOG-25,C.26werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.29.ITS3.3.7Variouswordingchanges,includingrenamingthetitle,weremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.Inaddition,theLCOandassociatedBaseswererenumberedduetothedeletionofLCO3.3.4andLCO3.3.6.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-80-Hay1995 IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-OS,C.2..TherequirementsforConditionsA,B,D,andEandassociatedBaseswereeitherdeletedorrevisedtoreflecttheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)design.TheCREATSconsistsofonefiltrationtrainandredundantdampersasdescribedintheBasesfornewSpecification3.7.10.TherevisionstoConditionAreflectscurrentlicensingbasisexceptfortheCompletionTimeof48hourswhichisdiscussedinAttachmentD,item15.vii.ThedeletionofConditionBandConditionEreflecttheGinnaStationdesignofasinglefiltrationtrain.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.SR3.3.7.1andassociatedBasesdenotingtheChannelCheckrequirementfortheCREATSinstrumentationwerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdoesnotcontainthesetestingrequirements.Asaresultofthedeletionoftheserequirements,BWR-18,C.34wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-25,C.3.TheLCOs,SRs,andBasesforvariousCREATSinstrumentationwerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.TheseFunctionsarenotapplicabletotheGinnaStationCREATSdesignandthedeletionoftheserequirementsisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.TheCREATSconsistsofonefiltrationtrainandredundantdampersasdescribedintheBasesfornewSpecification3.7.10.TherequirementsfortheGinnaspecificFunctionswereaddedtoTable3.3.7-1toreflectcurrentdesignoftheCREATS.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Basedonthesechanges,approvedTravellerWOG-25,C.10wasnotincorporated.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases,provideconsistency,ortoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.b.GinnaStationdesignfeaturesaredescribedindetail..c~d.e.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-05,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-OS,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-07,C.S.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-25,C.13.-81-Hay1995 30.ITS3.3.831.ITS3.3.9ThisLCOandassociatedBaseswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStation.TSdonotcontainanyrequirementsfortheFBACS.(orABVS)actuationinstrumentation.TheABVSisanon-ESFsystemonlyrequiredfollowingafuelhandlingaccidenttoensureoffsitedosesarewellwithin10.CFR100limitsintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.IftheABVSwereunavailable,offsitedoseswouldincrease,butremainbelow10CFR100limits.Noautomaticisolationisassumedordesignedforthesystem.AsaresultofthedeletionofthisLCO,approvedTravellersBWR-18,C.34,WOG-08,C.3,WOG-25,C.3,andWOG-25,C.27(Rev1)werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.32.ITS3.4.1ThisLCOandassociatedBaseswerenotaddedtothenewSpecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyrequirementsnorisGinnaStationdesignedwithaBoronDilutionProtectionSystem.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Correctionofatypographicalerror.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.LCO3.4.1wasrevisedtorequirethatpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperatureandRCStotalflowrateshallbewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLRinsteadofprovidingtheactualvalues.ThischangewasmadesinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothaveaDNBspecification.TheseparametersareaninputtothecorereloadanalysesthatusegenericmethodologywhichhasreceivedNRCapproval.Aspartoftheconversionto18monthcycles,RGKEisconsideringseveralchangesincludingarevisiontoT.,.Inordertopreventtheneedforadditionaltechnicalspecificationamendments,especiallyrelatedtorequirementsthatGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothave,theseparametershavebeenmovedtotheCOLR.Theproposedbasesprovidedescriptionsofhowtheseparametersareselectedsuchthatanychangeswillbeaddressedunder"10CFR50.59.TherelocationoftheseparameterstotheCOLRisalsoconsistentwitharecentlyapprovedLARforKewaunee(Ref.10).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-82-May1995 TheApplicabilityNotewasrelocatedtotheLCOwhichisthepreferredlocationforGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.Inaddition,aclarificationwasprovidedfortheNotesincethepressuretransientresultingfromtheTHERMALPOWERramporstepmaylastlongerthantheactualperformanceoftheTHERMALPOWERchange.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.SR3.4.1.3wasnotaddedsincetheGinnaStationTScurrentlydonotcontainthisrequirementandtheexistingcontrolboardflowmetersdonotprovidesufficientresolutiontomeasurethespecifiedvalues.Theseflowmetersare100%scaledevicesthatareintendedtoprovideoperatorswithindicationthatRCSflowthrougheachloopisapproximatelyequal,butnotexactflowindication.SinceamodificationwouldberequiredtoimplementthisSR,areactortripcurrentlyexistsforlowRCSflow,andaprecisionheatbalanceisperformedfollowingstartupfromeachrefuelingoutage,thissurveillancerequirementwasnotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheNoteforSR3.4.1.4wasmodifiedtoonlyrequireverificationofRCSflowwithin7daysafterreaching95%RTPsinceGinnaStationdoesnotcurrentlyhavethisrequirement.Requiringthisverificationwithin24hourswouldplaceaburdenonoperationsandreactorengineersimmediatelyfollowingstartupduetothecalculationswhicharerequired.Allowing7dayswouldprovidesufficienttimetoperformthenecessarycalculationsandallowanypotentialRCSfluctuationsfollowingthestartuptostabilizeandprovidemoreaccuratereadings.Inaddition,therequirementtoverifyflowbya"precisionheatbalance"wasrevisedtorelocatetheactualmethodtothebasessincethereareseveralmethodsofperformingthiswhichcanbecontrolledundertheBasesControlProgram.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.Plant-specificinformationwithrespecttotheDNBlimitswasaddedsincethisisanewrequirement.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.-83-May1995 33.ITS3.4.2iv.V.LCO3.4.2andthebaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoRCSloopsversusfour.Consequently,T,,inoneorbothRCSloopsmustbewithinlimits.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.RequiredActionA.lwasalsorevisedtorequireentryinMODE2withk,<<<1.0consistentwiththeApplicability.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofproposedTravellerGEOG-06andapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.lwhichadded"thereafter"totheFrequencyof30minutes.TheNotewasalsorelocatedfromtheFrequencycolumntotheSurveillancecolumnwhichispreferredtobyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.Inaddition,theNotewasrevisedtoreflectthattheSRmustbeperformedifthelowT,,alarmisinoperableornotreset.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.S.Thebaseswererevisedtoincorporatevariouswordingchangestoimprovetheirreadabilityandunderstanding.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.34.ITS3.'4.3ThereferencetoWCAP-7924-AwasreplacedwithWCAP-14040(Ref.11)whichisarecentWOGdocumentintendedtoreplacethe1970vintageWCAP.WCAP-14040iscurrentlyundergoingseparateNRCreview.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedtoincorporatevariouswordingchangestoimprovetheirreadabilityandunderstanding.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTraveller,BWR-18,C.56.35.ITS3.4.41~TheApplicabilityandsectiontitlewerechangedtorequiretwoOPERABLEandoperatingRCSloopsinMODEI>8.5%RTPonlyandnotMODE2consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.l.I.l.a.Adetaileddiscussionofthesechangesisprovidedinsection36.ibelow,andsectionC.2,item6.i.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):-84-May1995 a.SecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSthatarenotrelevanttoMODE1operationwereremoved.b.Plant-specificconsiderationswereadded(e.g.,twoRCSloopsversusfour).C.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissections(e.g.,B3.4.4).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.36.ITS3.4.5iv.LCO3.4.5andtheApplicabilitywererevisedtorequiretwoRCSloopsOPERABLEandoneoperatingduringMODES1<8.5%RTP,2and3consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.l.l.c.ActionA.1wasalsorevisedbasedoncurrentTS3.1.1.l.bandTS3.l.l.l.dtorequireverificationofshutdownmarginifoneRCSloopisinoperableinadditiontorecoveringtheinoperableloopwithin72hours.TheseareconservativeadditionswhichwerepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.12).Thebaseswerealsoexpandedasnecessarytoreflectthischange.Thediscussionrelated'totheRodControlSystemwasremovedfromtheLCOandActionCwasdeletedsincetheserequirementsarenotcontainedinthecurrentGinnaStationTS.Thisisaconservativechangesincethetextwhichwasdeletedrelatestorelaxingtherequirementsifthereactortripbreakersarenotclosed.Thistextcannotbesupportedbyexistingaccidentanalyses.SectionC.2,item6.iprovidesadditionalinformationwithrespecttoalldifferencestocurrentTS3.l.l.l.a,3.1.l.l.b,3.l.l.l.c,and3.1.l.l.d.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Also,duetotheabovechanges,approvedTravellerWOG-O9,C.7wasnotincorporated.iTheLCO,Actions,SurveillanceRequirements,andbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoRCSloopsversusfour.Consequently,bothRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandonloopinoperationbythisLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCONotewasrevisedtoonlyallowbothRCPstobede-energizedinMODE3.ThisisaconservativechangeconsistentwithTS3.1.l.l.c.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory.(iv)changes):a.SecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSthatpertaintoMODE2and3operationwereadded.-85-May1995 b.TheApplicabilitysectionwasdeletedandreplacedwithplant-specificdiscussions.takenfromthecurrentGinnaStationTS3.1basesandtheUFSAR.C.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingareferencetopreviouslyconductedstartuptesting.v~1vi.d.ThetextwasrevisedtoensureconsistencybetweenthebasesforLCOs3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.(Note,thisisanITSCategory(iii)change).ANotewasaddedtoActionA.1whichstatesthatLCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.ThisNoteenablesaMODEchangewithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation.ThisconfigurationiscurrentlyallowedbyGinnaStationTS3.l.l.l.cforanindefinitetimeperiodprovidedthattheinoperableRCSloopiscapableofnaturalcirculation.ThecapabilityfornaturalcirculationisnotspecifiedsincethenewLCOrequiresbothRCSloopstobeOPERABLEwithanOPERABLESG.Therefore,itisconsideredacceptabletoallowaMODEchangewithonlyonetrainofRCSOPERABLEandoperatingforadefinedtimeperiodnottoexceed72hours.ThisisaGinnaCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.8.37.ITS3.4.6Note2wasrevisedtoallowstartinganRCPbelowtheLTOPenabletemperatureifthepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level)consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.l.l.l.k.ThebaseswerealsorevisedtoreflectthisadditiontotheNote.TheNoteandbaseswerealsorevisedtorelocatethespecifiedtemperaturelimittothePTLR.ThischangewasmadetoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.4.12whichmovedthelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)setpointtothePTLR.TheintentofthisNoteistopreventRCPstarts'belowtheLTOPsetpointwithoutcertainrestraintsonRCStemperatureandpressurizerlevel.Therefore,relocatingtheLTOPsetpointtothePTLRwithoutasimilarchangeforthisLCOdefeatsthepurposeofcreatingthePTLR.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheActionsandbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoRCSloopsversusfour.Consequently,bothRCSloops,bothRHRloops,oroneRCSandoneRHRlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-86-May1995 Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingareferencetopreviously.conductedstartuptestingandprovidingconsistencybetweentheLCOandthebases.iv.v~b.ThetextwasrevisedtoensureconsistencybetweenthebasesforLCOs3,.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.(Note,thisisanITSCategory(iii)change).c.CorrectionoftheuppertemperaturerangeforNODE3.(Note,thisisanITSCategory(iii)change).IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.ANotewasaddedtoRequiredActionB.1tostatethatifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperable.ConditionCshouldbeenteredandnotConditionB.ThisNoteisrequiredsinceallConditionsmustbeenteredforeachplantconditionpertheusagerules.WithallRCSandRHRloopsinoperable,ConditionsA,B,andCwouldallapply.RequiredActionsA.landC;2aresimilarwhileRequiredActionB.1conflictswithC.l.Therefore,thisNotewasaddedtoensurethatnoNODEchangewasmadewithnoRCSorRHRloops,OPERABLE.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.38.ITS3.4.7TheActionsandbapeswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoRCSloopsversusfour.Consequently,bothRHRloops,oroneSGandoneRHRlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Note2wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.4.8.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesprovidingareferencetopreviouslyconductedstartuptestinganddescribingwhentheRCSisconsideredtobefilled.b.ThetextwasrevisedtoensureconsistencybetweenthebasesforLCOs3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.(Note,thisisanITSCategory(iii)change).-87-May1995 '1V.V.c.AreferencetoNotes2and4wasaddedforActionsB.landB.2sincetheseNotesalsoaddressanexceptiontorequiringanRHRloopinoperation.Note3andtheassociatedbaseswererevisedasdiscussedin37.iabove.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.9.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.10.vii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.ll.39.ITS3.4.8Note1andtheassociatedbaseswererevisedtoprovideconsistencywithsimilarNotesandbasesforLCOs3.4.5,3.4.6,and3.4.7.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Also,incorporatedapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.TheActionsandbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoRHRloops.Consequently,bothRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.iii.'hebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.b.ThetextwasrevisedtoensureconsistencybetweenthebasesforLCOs3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.(Note,thisisanITSCategory(iii)change).iv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.12.40.ITS3.4.9LCO3.4.9andtheassociatedbaseswererevisedtorequirethatthepressurizerbeOPERABLEsincetheactualparameterswhichdefine'operabilityarespecifiedintheapplicablesurveillancerequirements.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithothersimilarrequirements(e.g.,ITS3.4.16).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-88-May1995

ThepressurizerheatersforGinnaStationareorganizedintotwogroups:acontrol/variablegroupandabackupgroup.Bothgroupscanbesuppliedbythedieselgeneratorsandbothhavethe'apacitytoprovidetheminimumrequired100KW.HoweverNUREG-0737,ItemII.E.3.1onlyrequiredredundantpressurizerheaterTSrequirementsforOperatingLicenseApplicants,andnotfacilitieswithanexistingoperatinglicense.SinceGinnaStationhadaProvisionalOperatingLicenseatthetimethatNUREG-0737wasissued,thecurrentTSonlyrequirepressurizedheaterswithatotalcapacityof100KW(TS3.1.1.5.a).Therefore,theexistingrequirementwasmaintainedwhichspecifiestheminimumrequiredpressurizerheatercapacityneededtosupportnaturalcirculation.Sinceavaluebelow100KWcouldpossiblyresultinlossofsinglephasenaturalcirculation,theactionrequiredistoinitiateshutdowntoHODE3within6hoursandHODE4within12hours(LCO3;4.9.B).Inaddition,SR3.4.9.2wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationthatatotalcapacityof100KWisavailablefromthe.pressurizerheatersconsistentwiththeactualLCOrequirement.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.SR3.4.9.3wasnotaddedsincebothgroupsofpressurizerheatersarenormallysuppliedbyEngineeredSafety(ESF)Buses14and16.TheITSbasesforthissurveillancestatethattheSRisnotapplicableiftheheatersare'ermanentlypoweredbyClasslEpowersupplies.Therefore,thissurveillanceisnotrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~SeveralchangesweremadetoclarifythebaseswithrespecttothefunctionofthepressurizerheatersandthisLCO.AsdiscussedinthebasesforthecurrentGinnaStationTS,andinthebasescontainedinNUREG-0452(Ref.13),theTSrequirementforpressurizerheatersistoensurethatadequatecapacityisavailabletosupportnaturalcirculation.ThenecessarypressurizerheatercapacityneededtosupportnormalpoweropyrationiscontrolledbythepressurizerlevelrequirementandLCO3.4.1.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.-89-Hay1995 C.ThebasesforSR3.4.9.2wererevisedtoremovethetextassociatedwithverifying,thatthepressurizerheatersareattheirdesignrating.Thisisacommercialconcernthatisnotrequiredto'ewithinTS.Instead,thetextwasrevisedtostate-that-thesurveillanceisintendedtoverifythattheminimumrequiredheatercapacityisavailabletosupportnaturalcirculation.-v.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2.41.ITS3.4.1011~TheApplicabilityandRequiredActionforLCO3.4.10wasrevisedtorelocatetheMODE4temperaturelimittothePTLR.ThischangewasmadetoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.4.12whichmovedthePORVsetpointforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)tothePTLR.TheintentofthisspecificationistorequirebothpressurizersafetyvalvesabovetheLTOPsetpoint.Therefore,relocatingtheLTOPsetpointtothePTLRwithoutasimilarchange,forLCO3.4.10defeatsthepurposeofcreatingthePTLR.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2,C.5,C.8andC.ll.ivV.vi~TheLCO,Actions,andbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwopressurizersafetyvalves.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingadditionalreferencesasneeded.b.ThebaseswererevisedtoreflectthatforlockedrotoraccidentsasevaluatedforGinnaStation,thelimitforRCSpressureis<120%ofdesign.TheApplicabilityNote"wasrelocatedtoSR3.4.10.1whichisthepreferredlocationforGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisalsoprovidesconsistencywithotherspecificationssincetheNoteonlypertainstothisSR.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointswererevisedtot1%followingtestingand+2.4%and-3%forOPERABILITYbasedonthevaluesusedintheaccidentanalysis.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.-90-Hay1995 TheActionsandbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoPORVs.Consequently,bothPORVsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCO.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionCandtheassociatedbaseswererevisedtoapplytothecasewithoneorbothblockvalvesinoperable.ConditionFandGandtheassociatedbasesweredeletedsincetheywerenolongerrequiredafterthischange.ThecurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.1.4doesnotspecifyaCompletionTimetorestoretheinoperableblockvalve.RGSEbelievesthataCompletionTimeshouldbeprovidedforthisconditionsinceitisnolongerpossibletoisolateastuckopenPORV.However,aCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreoneoftwoblockvalves(ConditionF)isinadequatetopreformmostrepairssincetheblockvalvesarelocatedinsidecontainment.Alimitof72hoursprovidesthenecessarytimetoperformmostrepairsandisconsideredacceptablesincethePORVremainscapableofperformingitsfunctionasspecifiedintheLCObasis.AnewNotewasaddedtotheACTIONtabletoallowseparateentryintothenewConditionC.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ConditionEandtheassociatedbaseswererevisedtorequiretheimmediateinitiationofactionstorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatusandtolimittheshutdownwithbothPORVsinoperabletoMODE3withT.,<500'F.ThhcurrentGinnaStationTS3.l.l.4doesnotrequireashutdownwithbothPORVsinoperable.RG8EbelievesthatalimitedshutdownshouldbeinitiatedundertheseconditionssinceneitherPORVisavailabletosupportthemitigationofaSGTRevent.Inaddition,immediateactionsshouldbeinitiatedtorestoreatleastonePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.TherequirementtoenterMODE3withT,,<500'FwillensurethataSGTRdoesnotresultinliftingoftheSGreliefvalves.SincetheRWSTcontainsalargervolumeofwaterthanthesecondarysideofaSG,theRCSwillbecomeisolatedaftertheSGisfilledviatherupturedtube.RequiringentryintoMODE4wouldmostlikelyresultintheneedforLTOPduetothecloseproximityoftheLTOPsetpointandMODE4definition(330Fversus350F).NewLCO3.4.12wouldrequireimmediateRCSdepressurizationandtheestablishmentofasystemventwithnoOPERABLEPORVs.RGEEdoesnotbelieveit'isprudenttorequireentryintoanotherNODEwhichrequiresthesamefailedcomponents.ThischangealsoprovidesconsistencywiththelossofRHRwhichdoesnotrequireentryintoreducedMODESwhereRHRisusedfordecayheatremovalandLCO3.4.16withhighRCSspecificactivity.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.-91-May1995 SR3.4.11.3andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsince,thesolenoidaircontrolvalveandcheckvalveontheai}accumulatorsaretestedbySR3.4.11.2whichverifiestheOPERABILITYofthenitrogenaccumulatorsthatareusedformanualPORVoperation.AverificationoftheautomaticPORVcomponents(e.g.,instrumentairrelatedequipment)isnotrequiredinordertomeetthedefinitionofPORVOPERABILITYasspecifiedintheLCObasis.Therefore,thissurveillancewasnotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3'.4.11.4andtheassociatedbaseswerenot'addedsincethemanualPORVfunctionandtheblockvalvesaresuppliedfromvitalbusesthatarebackedbyemergencypowersources.Thebasesstatethatthissurveillanceisnotrequiredforplantswithpermanent1Epowersuppliestothevalves.Therefore,thissurveillanceisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesaddingvalvenumbersandgreaterdetailsconcerningtheactualdesignofthePORVs.Thetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithinthebases.c.ThebasesforLCONote1wasrevisedtostatethatthisNoteonlyappliestoConditionAsinceallotherConditionsaddresstheblockvalvesorthefailureofbothPORVs.d.ThebasesforActionA.1wasrevisedtoprovideareferencetoLCO3.4.13withrespecttoseatleakageforadditionaloperationinformation.e.Reference1wasdeletedsincethePORVswereinstalledpriortothisregulatoryguideanditwasnotconsideredapplicable.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.2andC.9.-92-May1995 ConditionAandBwererevisedtoreflectthesituationwithaPORVbeingOPERABLEbutincapableofautomaticcontrolandaPORVbeinginoperable,respectively.ThesechangesweremadesincetheITSbasesdescribeaPORV'sOPERABILITYwith'especttoitscapabilityforbeingmanuallycycled.Therefore,aPORVcannotbe"inoperableandcapableofbeingmanuallycycled"asdefinedinConditionA.Also,ConditionBisredundantinspecifyinga"PORVinoperableandnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled."SinceaPORVisinoperablewhenitcannotbemanuallycycled,theonlyreasonstoisolateaPORVareduetoleakageorifaPORVcancauseasmall-breakLOCA.RCSleakageisdefinedandcontrolledbyLCO3.4.13.APORVcandirectlycauseasmall-breakLOCAonlyifitiscapableofautomaticallyopeningbutnotautomaticallyclosingwhichisnowaddressedbyConditionA.RequiringisolationofaPORVunderanyothercircumstance(e.g.,PORVcannotautomaticallyopen)forcestheoperatortomanuallyopentheblockvalveinadditiontomanuallyopeningthePORV.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheNoteforSR3.4.ll.lwasrevisedtoreplace"met"with""performed"andtodeletethereferencetoConditionBandE.ThisminorchangeprovidesaclarificationsincethisSRisperformedonceevery92days.Iftheblockvalveisclosedduringthetimeintervalbetweenscheduledtests,theSRisstillconsidered"met"untilthe92daysplusthe25%extensionareexpiredsinceitisthePORVandnottheblockvalvewhichwasinoperable.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.4.2.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.NoteIfortheACTIONStablewasrevisedtoclarifythatseparateConditionentryforeachPORVisonlyallowedforConditionA.AllotherConditionseitheraddresstheinoperabilityoftwoPORVsorarerestrictedtoonlyoneinoperablePORV.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-93-May1995 43.ITS3.4.121~iv.v~viTheLCO,RequiredActions,andbaseswererevisedtorequirethatallSIpumpsbeincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhenthePORVsareusedastheRCSventandaminimumoftwoSIpumpsrenderedinoperablewhentheRCSisdepressurizedandanRCSventestablishedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaTS3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8.ThisdifferencefromITSisduetotheplantspecificLTOPanalysisperformedforGinnaStation.TheITSrequirementtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontolimittheSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSwithanumbergreaterthanlistedaboveforthetwoconditionsremainsthesame.SR3.4.12.1wasalsoseparatedintotwoSRstoreflectthetwopossibleconditions.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Asaresultofthesechanges,approvedTravellerWOG-09,C.2wasnotincorporated.TheApplicability,RequiredActions,andbaseswererevisedtorelocatetheRCScoldlegtemperaturespecificationforLTOPtothePTLR.ThischangewasmadetoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.4.12whichmovedthepressurizerPORVsetpointtothePTLR.RelocatingtheLTOPsetpointtothePTLRwithoutasimilarchangefortheRCScoldlegtemperaturedefeatsthepurposeofcreatingthePTLR.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtostatethattheLTOPSystemmustbeOPERABLEiftheRHRsystemisintheRHRmodeofoperationconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.15.TheLTOPSystemforGinnaStationalsoprovidesRHRsystemoverpressureprotectioncapabilityandmustbeOPERABLEwheneverthesystem,isintheRHRmodeofoperation.ThisisaconservativeadditionandisanITSCategory(ii)change.lTheApplicabilityNotewasrelocatedtotheLCOwhichisthepreferredlocationforGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionBandSR3.4.12.2werenotaddedsincetheLTOPanalysesforGinnaStationassumethatallchargingpumpsarecapabl.eofinjectingintotheRCS.Therefore,theRequiredActionsassociatedwiththisConditionandtheSurveillanceRequirementsarenotnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ESR3.4.12.5wasrevisedtoadd"vent"totheFrequencydescriptiontoprovideconsistencywiththeSurveillancewording.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-94-Hay1995 TheLCO,RequiredActionsandbaseswererevisedtoshowthatonlythetwoPORVscanbeusedastheRCSreliefvalves.TheRHRsystemutilizestheLTOPSystem(i.e.,thePORVsorRCSvent)topreventoverpressurizationsincesufficientreliefcapabilityisnotavailablewithinthesystem.Therefore,theRHRsystemreliefvalve(RV203)isnotcreditedintheLTOPSystemLCOandsurveillancesSR3.4.12.4andSR3.4.12.7wereriotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheCompletionTimeforrestoringthePORVtoOPERABLEstatusforConditionFwasrevisedfrom24hoursto72hours.ThecurrentGinnaStationTS3.15doesnotprovideareducedCompletionTimeforrestoringaninoperablePORVduringMODES5and6.RGLEbelievesthatareducedoutagetimeisprudentduetotheincreasedconsequencesofapressurizationeventduringtheseMODES.However,24hoursmaynotprovideadequatetimetoperformcleanupoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinsignificantlyincreasedpersonnelexposures.ItisalsoquestionablewhetherthehydrogenlevelsintheRCScouldbereducedsufficientlyinthistimeframetolevelswhichwouldpreventpotentiallyexplosivemixtures.Theproposed72hoursisconsistentwithotherLCOsthathaveareducedlevelofredundancy.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.ConditionGwasrevisedtoremovespecifiedConditionsthatarenolongerapplicablebasedonchangesdiscussedabove.TheremainingspecifiedConditionsaretheonlyonesinthisLCOwhichdonotaddresstheplantbeinginaventedconditioninitially.ThesechangesareconsistentwithapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.3.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Also,anewRequiredActiontoverifyatleastonechargingpumpinthepull-stoppositionwithtwoinoperablePORVswasaddedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.2.5.ThisisanITSCategory(i).change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesaddinggreaterdetailsconcerningtheactualdesignoftheLTOPSystem.b.Redundanttextwasdeleted.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-20,C.l,C.2,andC.3.-95-May1995 xv.ThebasesforSR3.4.12.3wasrevisedtostatethatanSIpumpcanberenderedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSbyplacingthemotoroperateddischargeisolationvalvestothe'CSintheclosedpositionwithACcontrolpowerremovedoramanualisolationvalvelockedclosed.ThisisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.1.7.1,3.3.1.8.1,and3.3.1.8.2.BothoftheseactionsrequiretwoseparateactionsbeforerenderingaSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS(i.e.,restorepowerorremovethelockandthenreopenthevalve).AllowingthesealternatemeansofisolatinganSIpumpenablesthepumpstoberemovedfromthepull-stoppositiontoperformrequiredDGsurveillancetesting.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtostatethattheLTOPSystemisonlyrequiredinMODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.TheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwaysprovidealargevent'pathsimilartothe'eacto'rheadwhichuponremovalpreventsanypotentialoverpressurization.TheadditionofthesemanwaysisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheLCOandBaseswererevisedtostatethatthePORVsandRCSventsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringtheperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictests;however,allthreeSIpumpsmustbeincapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.15.1andisfurtherdiscussedinReference14.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thetitle"EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem"wasaddedtothefirstuseofaccumulatorsintheLCOandthebases.ThePORVsutilizenitrogenaccumulatorsintheirLTOPconfiguration.TopreventconfusionwithrespecttowhichaccumulatorsarerequiredtobeisolatedbytheLCO,aclarificationwasprovided.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheNoteforSR3.4.12.8wasrevisedtoprovide.greaterclarityforlicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-96-Nay1995 XV11.XV111~X1X.AnewSR3.4.12.7wasaddedrelatedtoaccumulatorisolation.ThecurrentLCOonlyrequiresverificationthattheaccumulatorisisolatedonceevery12hours(SR3.4.12.3).However,verificationthatpowerisremovedfromtheisolationvalvescanonlybeaccomplishedoutsidethecontrolroom.Sincetheseisolationvalvesareunderadministrativecontrol,theyshouldbetreatedsimilartoverifyingthatthevalvesarefullyopenduringHODES1,2,and3.Therefore,SR3.4.12.3wasrevisedconsistentwithSR3.5.1.1andnewSR3.4.12.7wasaddedconsistentwith3.5.1.5.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.ThebasesforConditionGwererevisedtoincludediscussionrelatedtoLCO3.0.4andtheLTOPSystem.LCO3.0.4wouldallowtheplanttoentertheApplicabilityforLTOPwhenbothPORVswereinoperablesincethisLCOdoesnotapplytodecreasingNODESorbelowMODE4.TheaddeddiscussionclarifiestheuseofLCO3.0.4inthisinstancebystatingthatitisnotdesirabletoentertheLTOPSystemApplicabilitywithbothPORVsinoperableexceptwhendepressurizingtoperformahardwarerelatedrepairofthePORVs.ThisisaconservativeadditionandanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-09,C.10.44.ITS3.4.13,~1~LCO3.4.13.dandthebaseswererevisedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.5.2.l.dwhichlimitsSG'eakageto'0.1gpmwhenaveragedover24hours.ThenewlimitisbasedonstressesinducedfollowingaSLBandisaconservativechangesincethelimitislowerthanthatprovidedinLCO3.4.13.Inaddition,LCO3.4.13.ewasnotaddedsinceitisnotrequiredbasedonthechangestoLCO3.4.13.d.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.MIncorporationofapprovedTravellerMOG-15,C.l.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.b.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCOs3.4.14and3.4.15.-97-Nay1995 1'V.v~c.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludestheadditionofplant-specificinformationwhereappropriateandtoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoSGs.d.ThebasisforSR3.4.13.1wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeactualSR.TheConditionBstatementwasrevisedtoadd"RCS"before"pressureboundary."ThisclarificationisanITSCategory(iv)change.SR3.4.13.1wasrevisedtoremovetheNoteintheFrequencycolumnsinceitwasredundanttotheNoteintheSurveillancecolumn.TheNoteintheSurveillancecolumnwasalsoclarifiedtospecifythattheSRisnotrequiredtobeperformeduntil12hoursofsteadystateoperationandevery72hoursthereafter.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.45.ITS3.4.14TheApplicability,RequiredActions,andthebaseswererevisedtoeliminatealldiscussionconcerningtheexclusionforPIVsintheRHRflowpathduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.TheonlytwoPIVsintheRHRsystemwhicharegovernedbythisLCOarecheckvalvesintheflowpathswhichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenumduringtheECCSmodeofoperation(853Aand853B).Therefore,flowthroughthesevalveswouldnotoccurduringtheRHRmodeofoperationandthisexceptionisnotrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Asaresultofthesechanges,approvedTravellerBWOG-09,C.1wasnotincorporated.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-02,C.2.ThefirstoptionforRequiredActionA.2wasselected,butthebaseswererevisedtoincludediscussionprovidedintheReviewer'sNote.Thisbasischangeresultsinamoreconservativeinterpretationofthefirstoptionsinceitdiscussestheimpactofusinganon-PIVasanisolationdevice.ThisisanITSCategory(i)'change.-98-May1995 ConditionC,andSR3.4.14.2,andSR3;4.14.3werenotaddedsinceaRHRSystemautoclosureinterlockdoesnotexistatGinnaStation.TwoRHRmotoroperatedvalveswhichisolatethenormalletdownfromtheRCS(700)andtheinjectionlinefortheRHRmodeofoperation(721)haveapressureinterlockwhichpreventsopeningabove410psigonly(i.e.,thisinterlockperformsnoautomaticclosurefunction).However,thisinterlockisnotconsiderednecessarytoaddtotechnicalspecificationssincethevalvesarenormallyclosedwiththebreakerlockedoff..Thesecondin-seriesmotoroperatedvalvesforthesetwolinesarealsomaintainedclosedwiththebreakerlockedoff.Therefore,multiplehumanerrorswouldhavetooccurpriortothesevalvesbeingopenedabovetheRHRpipingsystemdesignpressure.ThisconfigurationwasapprovedbyReference15.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Note1forSR3.4.14.1wasrevisedtoprovidegreaterclaritysincetheexistingNotewasconsideredconfusing.TheNotecontinuestoremainconsistentwiththebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheConditionstatementwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.4.14.1wasseparatedintotwoSRsduetodifferentsurveillanceFrequenciesforPIVs.SR3.4.14.1appliestoPIVsintheSIcoldleginjectionlinesandtheRHRPIVswhileSR3.4.14.2appliestoPIVsintheSIhotleginjectionlines.ThenewSR3.4.14.1maintainstheITSproposedFrequencyrequirements.SR3.4.14.2requiresleakagetestingoftheSIhot'leginjectionlinePIVsonceevery40months.Inaddition,testingofthesevalvesisnotrequiredpriortoenteringMODE2iftheplanthasbeeninMODE5forgreaterthan7days.ThesefrequenciesareconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.3.3(seealsoRef.16).Also,therequirementtoperformleakagetestingwithin24hoursofaPIVopeningwasrevisedtoincludemaintenanceactivitieswhichmaybeperformedonthevalve.ThebaseswererevisedtoreflectthesechangesconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.3.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludestheadditionofplant-specificinformationwhereappropriatesinceseveralflowpathsincludethreePIVs.-99-May1995

b.ThetextwasrevisedtostatethatthisLCOonlyappliestorisksignificantPIVssincetheremainingPIVsaregovernedbyotherLCOs.ThischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationrequirementsrelatedtoPIVs.C.d.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.4.13and3.4.15.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in.1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.ix~IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-22,C.6andC.13.x.TheSRFrequencyforSR3.4.14.1wasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVifinMODE5for>7daysandthesubjectvalveshavenotbetestedinthelast9months.Thesevalvesmustbetestedonceevery24monthsandwithin24hoursofbeingopened.Requiringthistestingonamorefrequentbasisisnotnecessarysincethevalvesarenotusedduringcold.shutdownandiftheywere,arerequiredtobetestedbytheremainingFrequencystatement.Th'isisanITSCategory(i)change.46.ITS3.4.15LCO3.4.15wasrevisedtoreplacethedischargeflowportionofthecontainmentsumpmonitorwithpumpactuationtoreflectGinnaStationdesign.Thisisanacceptablechangesincemonitoringactualstartsofthesumppumpwillprovideoperatorswithaneasytofollowtrendofincreasedleakageinsidecontainmentbasedontimebetweenactuations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-100-May1995 111.iv~TherequirementforacontainmentaircoolercondensateflowratemonitorwasnotaddedforLCO3.4.15.RG1.45(Ref.17)requiresatleastthreeseparatesystemsfordetectingRCSleakage.Twosystemsarerequiredtobethesumplevelandflowmonitorandtheairborneparticulateradioactivitymonitor.Thethirdsystemmaybeeitherthecondensateflowratemonitorortheairbornegaseousradioactivitymonitor.TheproposednewLCO3.4.15containsthetworequiredmonitoringsystemsandtheairbornegaseousmonitor.WhileonlytwoleakagedetectionsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwithoutbeinginaLCO,sufficientdetectionisprovidedconsideringthealternatemeansofidentifyingRCSleakage.Thisincludescontainmentpressureandtemperaturemonitoring,andtheVolumeControlTank(VCT)level(Ref.18).TherequirementforonlytwosystemsisalsoconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.5.1.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AnewLCOwascreatedforthecasewhereonlythegaseouscontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorisOPERABLE.Inthisinstance,thecapabilitytodetecta1.0gpmleakwithinfourhoursperGenericLetter84-04(Ref.19)maynotbepossibledue.tothesensitivitylimitsofthegaseous'onitor.Therefore,anLCOisproposedtolimitthisconditiontolessthan30daysandrequirecompensatorymeasuresofeitherperforminganRCSwaterbalancesurveillanceorgrabsampleonceevery24hours.Supportingbaseswerealsoadded.ThisisaconservativeadditionconsistentwithLCO3.4.15.Aand.3.4.15.BandisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.Plant-specificinformationwithrespecttotheleakagedetectionsystemdesignswasadded.Thisincludesrevisingthebasestoreflectthesensitivitiesoftheinstalledleakagedetectionsystems,discussionofasymmetricloads,componentidentifiers,andtoreflectthattherearetwocontainmentsumppumpswhichcanbeusedformonitoringpurposes.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.-101-Nay1995 V.vi.c.Discussionsassociatedwithnon-TSrelatedleakagedetectionsystemsweredeletedandreplacedwithashortsummary.ThistypeofinformationiscontainedintheUFSAR,procedures,andothermoreappropriatedocuments.AdiscussionofIEBulletinNo.80-24wasalsoaddedtothebasesforcompleteness.d.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-09,C.4.TheRequiredActionsforConditionAwererevisedtoincludetheuseoftheaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemasanalternativetoperformingaRCSwaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)withaninoperablecontainmentsumpmonitor.TheNoteassociatedwithSR3.4.13.1statesthatthisSurveillancecannotbeperformeduntilafter12hoursofsteadystateoperation.SinceLCO3.0.4isnotapplicableforConditionA,-theplantcanbeattemptingtoenterMODE4withthesumpmonitorinoperablebutcannotchangeMODESifperformanceofSR3.4.13.1istheonlyoption.Theadditionoftheaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemprovidesanacceptablealternativeinthisinstance.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheConditionstatementwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.47.ITS3.4.16IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-02,C.3.ThebaseswerechangedfromthatproposedbyTravellerBWOG-02tobetterdescribethereasoningforallowingMODEchangeswithDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131limits>1.0yCi/gm.Thesechangeswereminorandwerebaseduponthejustificationforthetraveller.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-04,C.1.LCO3.4.16.AwasrevisedtorequireverificationofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131onceevery8hoursinsteadof4hours,andtoallowoperationforatotalof7daysversus48hourswithhighvalues.ThesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.4.3.aandTable4.1-4,84a.ThespecifiedConditionwasalsorevisedtomakeitconsistentwiththeLCO.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.May1995 LCO3.4.16.BwasrevisedtoeliminatetherequirementtoperformSR3.4.16.2whenthegrossspecificactivitylimitforreactorcoolantisexceeded.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotrequirethisadditionalsurveillance.SincetheLCOrequires=theplanttobeshutdowninashorttimeperiodwhenthelimitisexceeded,theadditionofthissurveillanceisaburdenontheoperationsstaff.Also,sincetheperformanceofSR3.4.16.2typicallyrequires-severalhourstocomplete,anyfindingswithrespecttoDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131wouldnotresultinafastershutdownthanalreadyspecified.TheCompletionTimeforLCO3.4.16.Bwasalsorevisedfrom6hoursto8hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.4.2.Theadditionof2hoursisaverysmallinterval.Also,themajorityofITSCompletionTimesforenteringMODE3(i.e.,350F-540F)followingfailedequipmentis6hours.Providinganadditional2hourstocooldowntheRCSbelow500FafterenteringMODE3isappropriateandfurtherreducesthepotentialtochallengeplantsystems.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.TheCompletionTimeforLCO3.4.16.Cwasrevisedfrom6hoursto8hoursforthereasonsoutlinedin47.ivabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheFrequencyforperformingSR3.4.16.2followingah15%reactorthermalpowerchangewasrevisedfrom2-6hoursto2-10hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTSTable4.1-4,84.b.,Theadditional4hoursisverysmallandprovidesoperationswithgreaterflexibilitytoobtaintherequiredsample.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprove.thereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.b.C.d.Plant-specificinformationwasaddedwithrespecttotheSGTRanalysistobettersupporttheLCO.Thisincludesnomenclaturechanges.DiscussionsassociatedwithRCSspecific.activitylimitsandnon-TSactivitiesweredeleted.ThistypeofinformationiscontainedintheUFSAR,procedures,andothermoreappropriatedocuments.AdiscussionofthemethodfordeterminingDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131wasaddedtothebasessincethiswasrelocatedfromthedefinitionssection.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.2.-103-Hay1995 SR3.4.16.3anditsassociatedNotewererevisedtostreamlineandclarifytheintent.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.48.ITS3.4.17ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveRCShotorcoldlegisolationvalves.AdrawingoftheRCSlayoutisprovidedinUFSARFigure5.1-1.49.ITS3.4.18ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveRCShotorcoldlegisolationvalves.AdrawingeftheRCSlayoutisprovidedinUFSARFigure5.1-1.50.ITS3.4.1951.ITS3.5.1ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationhascompletedallinitialstartuptestingasdocumentedinUFSARChapter14.ThecapabilityofGinnaStationtoachievenaturalcirculationwasdemonstratedduringthisinitialtesting.Reference20documentstheNRCevaluationofthisissueforGinna,Station.Sincethenaturalcirculationtestshavebeencompleted,thereisnoneedforthistestexception.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-09,C.2wasnotincorporated.SR3.5.1.1and3.5.1.5wererevisedtospecify"motoroperated"isolationvalveconsistentwiththebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.SR3.5.1.2wasrevisedtorequireaverificationofaccumulatorvolumewithrespecttocubicfeetinsteadofgallons.ThecurrentbasesforGinnaStationTS3.3.1.1specifyavolumeincubicfeetwhichismorefamiliartoplantoperators.Thereisnotechnicaldifferencebetweenspecifyingavolumeincubic,feetorgallons.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-104-Hay1995 SR3.5.1.4wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofaccumulatorboronconcentrationonastaggeredmonthlybasisconsistentwiththecurrenttestingFrequency(TSTable4.1-2,814).ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.Inaddition,verificationofboronconcentrationwithin6hoursfollowinganincreaseduetoRCSinleakagewasnotadded.Theaccumulatorisnormallymaintainedat2000ppmsinceitisfilledfromtheRWST.Theworstcasescenarioforinleakageisbasedonaninitialaccumulatorvolumeof1120ft(50%).Assumingthattheisolationcheckvalvesleakedsufficientlytofilltheaccumulatorstotheupperlimitof1190ft'82%),atotalof70ft'fwaterisadded.Ifthiswatercontains0ppmboronconcentration,theresultingaccumulatorboronconcentrationisonly1880ppmwhichisabovethe1800ppmminimumlimit.'herefore,thisrequirementisnotconsiderednecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a0Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttoaccumulatorvolume,pressure,andboronconcentrationwasadded.ThisincludesrevisingthebasesandLCOactionstatementstoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwoaccumulatorsinsteadofthefourlistedin.ITS.b.Thebasisforlockingopentheaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveswasrevisedtoreflectactualsystemdesign.C.d.e.Thediscussionofinstrumentuncertaintywithrespecttotheaccumulatorwatervolumewasremovedsinceinstrumentuncertaintyisnotdiscussedforanyotheraccumulatorparameter.Thediscussionoftheaccumulatormaximumboronconcentrationlimitwasr'evisedbasedonissuesspecifictotheGinnaStationdesign.Inaddition,thebasisforselectingtheactuallimitwasaddedsincethisisanewrequirement.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.Nay1995 V.vi~ThebasisforSR3.5.1.5waschangedtoremovereferencetoasinglefailurecoincidentwiththeLOCAsincethereisnoactivesinglefailurewhichwouldpreventinjectionfromtheOPERABLEaccumulator.,Instead,aLOCAinthecoldlegcontainingtheOPERABLEaccumulatorwouldpreventinjection.Inaddition,thediscussionwithrespecttoprovidingoperatorflexibilityforremovingACpowertothemotoroperatedisolationvalveswasdeletedsincethisdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-10,C.I.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-28,C.l.TheaccumulatorboronconcentrationlimitswererelocatedtotheCOLRsincethesevaluesmaychangeduetofuelcyclechanges,etc.Thisfuelcyclechanges,etc.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.52.ITS3.5.2AnewactionstatementwasaddedrequiringimmediateentryintoLCO3.0.3ifbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable.Supportingbasesinformationwasalsoadded.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithothersimilarspecificationsrelatedtoredundanttrainsorcomponents'e.g.,ITS3.5.1).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.5.2.1wasrevisedtodeletetherequirementforverifyingthatpowertothelistedvalveoperators,wasremoved.Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedintheirpositionsbyadministrativecontrol.AllmanipulationsandmaintenanceactivitiesassociatedwiththesevalvesrequiresindependentverificationofthevalvepositionandbreakerorDCcontrolpowerstatuspriortodeclaringitOPERABLE.Also,theverificationofthebreakerstatusforseveralvalvesrequiresentryintoelectricalbuscubicleswhichhasthepotentialforreactortripsorotherundesirableconsequences'."Verificationevery12hoursthatavalveisinitslistedpositionprovidesappropriatecontrolstoensurethatthevalvehasnotbeenchangedwithoutoperationsknowledge.AcheckofthebreakerandOCcontrolpowerstatuswillbeperformedduringtheperformanceofSR3.5.2.3.ThissurveillanceintervalisconsistentwithSR3.5.1.5.ItshouldbenotedthattheGinnaStationTScurrentlydonotrequireeitherSR3.5.2.1SR3.5.2.2,orSR3.5.2.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-106-May1995 SR3.5.2.3wasnotaddedsince-thisrequirementisnotcurrentlycontainedwithintheGinnaStationTSandisnotconsiderednecessarytoensureoperabilityoftheECCSsystems.TheperiodictestingoftheECCSsystemsinaccordancewiththeISTprogramprovidessufficientmeanstoeliminatethemostlikelygasaccumulationscenarios.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.5.2.7wasnotaddedsincetheECCSsystemsatGinnaStationdonotutilizeanyvalvesinathrottledpositionforflowdistribution.Instead,flowdistributionisperformedbyairoperatedvalvesorbythedesignandresistanceoftheinstalledsystem.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.5.2.8wasnotaddedsincevisualinspectionoftheECCStraincontainmentsumpinletandtrashsere'ensisnotcurrentlycontainedwithintheGinnaStationTSandthissurveillanceisconsideredahousekeepingactivity.Also,othersystemsutilizescreenstopreventinadvertentadditionofforeignmaterials(e.g.,ServiceMater)withoutanysimilarsurveillancerequirement.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttotheECCSdesignwasadded.ThisincludesrevisingthebasesandLCOactionstatementstoreflectthatGinnaStationonlyhastwotrainsofECCS,specificationofContainmentSumpB,andgreaterdetailsconcerningtheoperationoftheSIandRHRsystemsduringbothinjectionandrecirculation.ThebasisandNote2wererevisedtoreflectthatthechargingsystematGinnaStationdoesnotperformanECCSfunction.ThechargingsystemisusedtocontrolRCSinventoryandchemistryconditionsandprovidereactorcoolantpumpsealinjection.ThepumpsarestrippedfromthesafeguardsbusesuponESFASactuationandarenotcreditedinanyUFSARChapter15analysiswithrespecttoanECCSfunction.ForsmallbreakLOCAswhichdonotinitiallydepressurizeRCSsufficientlybelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead,AFMisusedtoprovidecorecooling.AfterRCSpressuredropstoapproximately1500psig,theSIpumpsprovidethenecessaryhigh-headinjectioncapability.Hay1995 C.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.d.AdiscussionconcerningMODE4corecoolingrequirementswasaddedtotheApplicabilitysectionforconsistencysinceMODES1,2,3,5,and6werediscussed.e.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.f.DeletedReference6sincethisInformationNoticedoesnotapplytothedesignoftheECCSatGinnaStation.vi1.vi11~ix.X.TheApplicabilitynoteforLCO3.5.2wasrevisedtoallowtheSImotoroperatedisolationvalvestohavepowerrestoredforupto12hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingprovidedthatonlyonevalvewasenergizedatatime.ThisisconsistentwithGinnaStationTS3.3.2.dandisanITSCategory(ii)change.eThelistingofvalvesforSR3.5.2.1wasgeneratedfromcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.l.1.gand3.3.1.1.j.SeealsoSectionD,13.viii.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.9.TheLCOtitlewaschangedfrom"ECCS-Operating"toECCS-HODES1,2,and3"sinceoperatingonlypertainstoMODES1and2.ThischangeprovidesconsistentlywithotherLCOtitlesinChapter3.8.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.53.ITS3.5.3SR3.5.2.1andnewSR3.5.2.3werenotaddedduringMODE4conditions.TheITSbasesstatethatasinglefailuredoesnotneedtobeconsideredduringthismodeofoperationandthatsufficienttimeexistsformanualactuationofECCSandoperatoraction.SincethebasesforSR3.5.2.1andnewSR3.5.2.3statethatthesesurveillancesareperformedtoaddresssinglefailuresandinadvertentmisalignmentofvalves,verificationofvalveandbreakerpositionisnotconsiderednecessaryduringMODE4.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-108-Hay1995 54.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttotheECCSdesignwasadded.ThisincludesrevisingthebasesandLCOactionstatementstoprovidegreaterdetailsconcerningtheoperationoftheSIandRHRsystems.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.TheLCOtitleswaschangedfrom"ECCS-Shutdown"to"ECCS-MODE4"sinceshutdowncoversMODES3-6.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithotherLCOtitlesinChapter3.8.ThisisanITSCategory'iv)change;ITS3.5.4i.SR3.5.4.1andthesecondpartofLCO3.5.4.Awasnotadded.TheRWSTforGinnaStationislocatedwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingandisnotsubjecttotemperatureextremeswhichwouldrequireanactionstatementandsurveillancerequirement.LCO3.5.4.BwasalsorevisedandadditionalinformationwasaddedtotheBasestoreflectthisdesignconsideration.ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Discussionsrelatedtonon-TSrelatedfunctionsoftheRWSTweredeleted.ThistypeofinformationiscontainedintheUFSAR,procedures,andothermoreappropriatedocuments.b.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignoftheRWSTincludingthesuctionandrecirculationlinesfortheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumpswasadded.ThisincludesrevisingthebasestoreflectthatGinnaStationdoesnotusethesafetyinjectionpumpsasasourceofnormalcharging.C.ThediscussionoftheRWSTmaximum'oronconcentrationlimitwasexpandedtodiscussthebasisforselectingtheactuallimitsincethisisanewrequirement.1V.d.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-10,C.2.TheRWSTboronconcentrationlimitswererelocatedtotheCOLRsincethesevaluesmaychangeduetofuelcyclechanges,etc.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-109-May1995 55.ITS3.5.5Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheITSbasesstatethat"thisLCOisapplicableonlytothoseunitsthatutilizethecentrifugalchargingpumpsforsafetyinjection."GinnaStationutilizesaseparatechargingsystemfromthesafetyinjectionsystem(UFSARChapter9.3.4).Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttothe,existingdesign.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-23,C.1wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.56.ITS3.5.6Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheBoricAcidStorageTanks(BASTs)nolongerprovideafunctionwithrespecttoemergencycorecoolingandwereremovedfromtechnicalspecificationsbyReference21.SeeITS3.1fordiscussionwithrespecttothefunctionprovidedbytheBASTsformaintainingRCSboronconcentration.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.57.ITS3.6.1iv.TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisa1argedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnforSR3.6.1.1wasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnaspreferredbylicensedpersonnel.Inaddition,"containmentmini-purgevalve"wasaddedtothetextofSR3.6.1.1asanexemptionsincethemini-purgevalveleakageacceptancecriteriaisspecifiedinnewSR3.6.3.4.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.Also,approvedTravellerBWR-14,C.lwasonlypartiallyincorporatedduetotheproposednewAppendixJrulewhichwasrecentlypublishedforcomment(Ref.22).Thechangesprovideconsistencywiththeproposednewrule.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedwithrespecttocontainment.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.S.-110-Hay1995

58.ITS3.6.21V.v.V1,V11.V111~1X.TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Note2forConditionsAandBwasrevisedtoprovideadditionalclarificationandconsistencywiththeConditionstatement.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheNoteintheFrequencycolumnforSR3.6.1.2wasmovedtotheSurveillancecolumnaspreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheFrequencyforSR3.6.2.2wasrevisedfrom184daysfollowingentryintocontainmenttoonceevery24months(i.e.,onceeveryrefuelingoutage).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainaSurveillancefortheairlockdoorinterlockmechanism;however,RGS.Ebelievesthatitis'rudenttoaddaSRtoensurecompliancewiththespecification.AFrequencyofonceevery24monthsisconsideredappropriatesince'heinterlockispurelymechanicalandproceduresareinplacetocontrolpersonnelaccesstocontainmentduringHOOESIthrough4.Also,thissurveillancecouldchallengecontainmentintegrityiftheinterlockweretofailandbothairlockdoorswereopenedsimultaneously.Finally,iftheinterlockisdefeatedduringanyshutdowncondition,itmustberetestedpriortodeclaringitOPERABLE.Duetothesechanges,approvedTravellerBWR-15,C.2wasonlyincorporatedinpart.ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedwithrespecttothecontainmentairlocks.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.tIncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.20.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-23,C.4.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.24.Note3wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithLCO3.6.3,Note4.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-lll-Hay1995 X.Xl~59.ITS3.6.3RequiredActionsC.2andC.3wererevisedtomakeairlockpluralsincemorethanoneairlockmaybeaffectedwheninConditionC.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwiththebasesforthisCondition.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Theairlockacceptancecriteriawasalsorevisedtobeg0.05L.foreachairlockand<0.01L.foreachdoor.ThesechangesareconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationtestingpracticessinceairlockacceptancecriteriaarenotspecifiedinTS.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.1V.V.TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thetitle,LCO,Conditions,Surveillances,andbaseswererevisedtoreplace"valves"with"barriers."ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.3andtheITSbaseswhichrequirevalves,blindflanges,andclosedsystemstobeOPERABLE.Sincevalvesareonlyasubsetofthedeviceswhichprovidecontainmentintegrity,"barriers"isconsideredamoreappropriateterm(seeRef.23).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Note3wasrevisedtoprovideclarityandconsistencywiththebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.ConditionsAandBwererevisedtobecomemoregenericandConditionCwasnotadded.TheITSbasesstatethatisolationdevicesareeitheractive.orpassiveandthatclosedsystemsprovideapassivebarrier.ThebasesalsostatethatclosedsystemsarerequiredtobeintactfornormallyclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeconsideredOPERABLE.However,theConditionsareorganizedbasedonpenetrationswhichhavecontainmentisolationvalvesandpenetrationswhichhaveclosedsystems.Toensureconsistencywiththebases,ConditionsAandBwerechangedtoapplytoallpenetrations.AnewRequiredActionA.2wasalsoaddedwhichallowsaclosedsystemtobeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrier.ThischangenowallowsanydevicewhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeettheLCOtobeusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationbarrier'.ThischangeaddressestheissuesdiscussedinReference24.AnewRequiredActionB.2,similartoA.l.2,wasalsoaddedasaresultoftheabovechange.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.15.Hay1995

ConditionD,SR3.6.3.11,andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveashieldbuilding.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerBWR-14,C.3andC.4werenotincorporated.SR3.6.3.1andthe.associatedbaseswerenotaddedsince,theShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedbyablindflange(seeRef.25).TheLCObaseswererevisedtoreflectthattheblindflangemustbeinstalledforthecontainmentisolationbarrierfortheShutdownPurgeSystemtobeconsideredOPERABLE.VerificationthatthisblindflangeisinplaceisaccomplishedbynewSR3.6.3.2.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AssuchapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.21wasnotincorporated.SR3.6.3.2andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincethissurveillanceisnotinthecurrentGinnaStationTS.TheBackgroundbaseshavebeenrevisedtostatethat"emphasisshallbeplacedonlimitingpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasreasonablyachievable."AllusesoftheMini-PurgeSystemareunderproceduralcontrol.Inaddition,thestatusofthemini-purgeisolationvalvesiscontinuouslyavailableinthecontrolroomsuchthatoperatorswouldbequicklyawareofanyvalvethatisnotclosed.VerificationofthesestatuslightsisperformeddailybyoperatorssuchthataSurveillanceevery31daysisunnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.,Assuch,approvedTravellerBWR-15,C-19,Revision1wasnotincorporated.SR3.6.3.3andSR3.6.3.4havebeenrevisedtoclarifythatthisverificationisperformedtoensurethatnonautomaticisolationbarrierswhichaierequiredtobeclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentareinfactclosed,versusensuringisolationbarriers"closedduringaccidentconditionsareclosed."Sinceseveralpenetrationsarenormallyopenbutareisolatedduringaccidentconditionsifthefirstpassivebarrierfails,theexistingSRwordingismisleading.Also,theSRFrequencywasrevisedfrom31daysto184days,consistentwithGinnaStationpractices.Inaddition,thisSRwasrevisedtonotrequireverificationofisolationbarrierswhicharelocked,sealedclosed,orotherwiseisolatedsimilartootherSurveillances.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.However,allcontainmentisolationbarriershaveaspecialfieldtagidentifyingthedeviceasanisolationbarrierandspecifiesthatOperationsmustbenotifiedbeforechangingthepositionofthedevice.ThistagprovidessufficientadministrativecontrolssuchthataFrequencyof184daysisconsideredadequate.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Hay1995 X.X1.SR3.6.3.5andthebaseswererevisedtoremoveverificationof"eachpoweroperated"containmentisolationvalve'sisolationtime.ThisSRisperformedtoensurethatthosecontainmentisolationvalveswhichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltoautomaticallyclosearetestedinaccordancewiththeISTprogram.At'innaStation,severalpoweroperatedcontainmentisolationvalvesdonotreceiveacontainmentisolations'ignal.Therefore,theisolationtimeofthesevalvesis.notrelevanttothisLCO.ThechangealsoprovidesconsistencywithnewSR3.6.3.5.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.6.3.6,SR3.6.3.9,andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincethesetestsareonlyrequiredforplantswithsubatmosphericcontainmentswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.SR3.6.3.7andthebaseswererevisedtoprovideconsistencywithSR3.6.2.1.TheSRtextwasalsochangedsinceitonlyappliestothe'Mini-PurgeSystemastheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedaboveMODE5perthenewLCObases.ThespecifiedFrequencywasrevisedsincetherequirementformorefrequenttestingofthemini-purgeisolationvalveswasremovedfromtheGinnaStationTSbyAmendmentNo.54(Ref.23).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ApprovedTravellerBWR-14,C.3wasalsoincorporated.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.9,Revisionl.xv.SR3.6.3.10andtheassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedinMODESl,2,3,and4byablindflange.TheNUREG-1431basesstatethatthisSRonlyappliestoplantswhichcanhavetheshutdownpurgevalvesopenaboveMODE5.Therefore,thisSRisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-ll,C.lwasnotincorporated.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.9.-ll4-May1995 XV11.XV111.X1X.XX.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-16,C.22.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-15,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.2.TheLCOwasrevisedtoaddaNotestatingthatthemainsteamisolationvalves,mainsteamsafetyvalves,andatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotincludedinthisLCOwhentheyarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinChapter3.7.ThevalvesallcredittheSGtubesasaboundarysuchthatadditionaltimeisallowedtorestoreOPERABILITY.ThischangeisconsistentwiththebasesforITSChapter3.7.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.kConditionEwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithLCO=3.6.2.Themini-purgevalvesatGinnaStationhavesimilarleakageacceptancecriteriatothecontainmentairlockdoors.Assuch,failureofonemini-purgevalvedoesnotrequireevaluationwithrespecttoover'allcontainmentleakage.However,failureofbothvalvesdoesrequire'onsiderationofcontainmentleakagesincethepenetrationnolongermeetsitsleakage.criteriaasspecifiedinnewSR3.6.3.4;Therefore,ConditionEwasrevisedtoapplytoonemini-purgevalvenotwithinleakagelimitsandanewConditionwasaddedfortwovalvesnotwithinleakage-limits.InbothoftheseConditions,RequiredActionE.3wasnotaddedsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.Also,duetothedesignofthemini-purgepenetrations,itmaynotbepossibletotestamini-purgevalveifthesecondin-seriesvalveisexcessivelyleaking.TheseareITSCategory(iii)and(i)changes.60.ITS3.6.4TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.4B)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lwasrevisedfromIhourto24hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.2.Allowing24hourstorestorepressuretowithinlimitsisacceptableduetothelargecontainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeofthecontainmentMini-PurgeSystem.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-ll5-May1995

Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.iv.V.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadeto.improvethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.l.61.ITS3.6.5TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.5BandLCO3.6.5C)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lwasrevisedfrom8hoursto24hours.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonothavearequirementforaveragecontainmentairtemperature.SincetheFrequencyforverifyingthattheaveragetemperatureis<120Fis24hours,RG&Ebelievesthat24hourstorestorethetemperaturetowithinlimitsisappropriate.ACompletionTimeof24hoursisalsoconsistentwithnewLCO3.6.4(andcurrentGinnaStationTS3.6.2).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change'.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a0b.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.May1995 62.ITS3.6.6TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheaders(includingLCO3.6.6B,LCO3.6.6C,LCO3.6.60andLCO3.6.6E)associatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.SincetheContainmentSpraySystematGinnaStationiscreditedforiodineremoval,LCO3.6.6Awaschosen;ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCOtitle,Conditions,Surveillances,andbaseswererevisedtoreplace"CoolingSystem"with"RecirculationFanCoolingSystem"consistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.Also,thePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemwasaddedtothisLCOforreasonsdescribedbelow.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionsCandEwererevised,ConditionDwasdeleted,andthreenewConditionswereaddedwithrespecttoinoperablecontainmentrecirculationfancooling(CRFC)unitsandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains.Thesechangeswerenecessaryduetoplant-specificdesignfeaturesrelativetotheCRFCunitsthatdifferfromthemodelplantusedtoproduceNUREG-1431.AtGinnaStation,therearefourCRFCunitswhichareallsuppliedbyasingleServiceWater(SW)loopheader(i.e.,theSWsystemisonlyorganizedintotrainsatthepumplevel,notatthelooplevel).Inaddition,twoofthefourCRFCunits(i.e.,unitsAandC)connecttothePostAccidentCharcoalSystemwhichdoesnothaveitsownseparatefansystem.Consequently,ifeitherCRFCunitAorCisinoperable,thentheassociatedpostaccidentcharcoalfiltertrainisinoperablesuchthatConditionDcannotapplytoGinnaStation(i:e.,onewouldhavetoenterLCO3.0.3).Inaddition,anyoneofthefollowingcombinationsissuccessfulforradioactiveiodineremovalpostaccident:a~b.C.Twocontainmentspray(CS)trains;OneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain;orTwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains.-117-Hay1995 However,sinceatleastoneCStrainmustbeOPERABLEaboveMODE5forcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol,thelastcombinationisnotused.As-such,organizingthisLCObytrainsfortheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolingSystemandseparatingoutthefunctionoftheSpray,AdditiveandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsisnotpossible.Therefore,anewCondition(i.e.,B)wasaddedwhichallowsonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintobeinoperableforupto7dayssinceatleastoneredundantpost-accidentcharcoalfilterandoneCStrainisavailable.AsecondnewCondition(i.e.,C)wasaddedfor,thecasewithtwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltersinoperablewhichrequiresthattheyberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursconsistentwithConditionAforlossofoneCStrain.AthirdCondition(i.e.,0)wasaddedwithrespecttoaninoperablesprayadditivetanksincethisrenderstheCSiodineremovalcapabilityi'noperable.ACompletionTimeof72hoursisprovidedforthisCondition.also.Inaddition,existingConditionCwasrevisedtoaddressthecaseofoneortwoinoperableCRFCunitsandConditionEwasrevisedtoreflectallthepossiblecombinationswhichresultintheneedtoenterLCO3.0.3.ANotewasaddedtotheLCOtorequiredeclaringtheassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperablewhenCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.,Also,thenecessarySurveillancesandbasesassociatedwiththePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemandthesprayadditivetankwereadded.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.ConditionFwasrelocatedaboveConditionGconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-03,C.9,Revisionl.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsIncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-23,C.6.-118-May1995 v)11.ixTheCompletionTimelimitof"10daysfromthediscoveryoffailuretomeettheLCO"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.TheintentofaddingthislimittotheCompletionTimeistopreventaplantfromcontinuouslybeingintheLCOwithoutevermeetingthefullsystemrequirements.ThisabuseoftheLCOisbesthandledunderplantproceduressincetheadditionofthislimittotheCompletionTimecolumncreatesconfusionamonglicensedpersonnel.ProvidingthislimitcanstillresultinLCOabusesincethesystemscanallbedeclaredOPERABLEforonlyafewminutesandthentheLCOimmediatelyenteredagain.SufficientNRCguidancealreadyexistswithrespecttoextensiveuseofLCOtime(e.g.,Ref.26).Inaddition,theMaintenanceRule(10CFR50.65)requiresmonitoringofequipmentperformance.Finally,areviewofGinnaStationplantrecordsindicatesthatthesystemscoveredbythisLCOwereoutofserviceatotalof1017hoursfromJune1990toJuly1994(or<4%ofthetimeinwhichtheplantwasaboveColdShutdown)whichdemonstratesthatthislimitisunnecessary.SR3.6.6.A.3wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisSRrequiresverificationofaminimumSWflowratethroughthefancoolers.ThisprocessvariableisnotusedorcreditedintheDBAortransientanalyses.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthissurveillance.'Inaddition,noothercomponentsuppliedcoolingwaterbySW(e.g.,DGs,CCW)hasanyflowrateverificationsurveillance.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.63.ITS3.6.7ThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheywererelocatedtoLCO3.6.6as.discussedabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.64.ITS3.6.8iv.TheGinnaStationcontainmentdesignisalargedrystructuretypicalforasingleunitPWR.Therefore,allbasesandheadersassociatedwithsubatmospheric,icecondenseranddualcontainmentstructuresweredeleted.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedsinceLCO3.6.7wasrelocatedtoLCO3.6.6.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change;IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-ll,C.5.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-11,C.l.-119-May1995 V.V1~'ISR3.6.8.1,SR3.6.8.2,andSR3.6.8.3werenotaddedsincethecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainarequirementforthehydrogenrecombinersorthesesurveillances.Asdescribedinthenewbasesforthissection,thehydrogenrecombinersinstalledatGinnaStationareinsidecontainmentandaredesignedaroundtheuseofacombustionchambertocontrolhydrogengeneration.Performingafunctionaltestwouldmostlikelyrequireanevacuationofcontainmentforsafetyreasonswithlittlebenefit.Instead,RG&EproposestoperformaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelevery24monthstoensurethateachhydrogenrecombinerwillprovidethecorrecthydrogenandoxygenmixtureinthecombustionchamber.Inaddition,theblowerfanforeachhydrogenrecombinerwillbeoperatedforz5minutesevery24months.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingdiscussionconcerningthedesignofthehydrogenrecombiners.65.ITS3.6.9b.GinnaStationhasanalternatehydrogenpurgesystemasdescribedinUFSARSection6.2.5.2.2andacceptedbytheNRCinReference27.Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheHydrogenMixingSystemasdefinedinthebasesisusedtoensurethatcontainmentatmosphereisuniformlymixed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaHydrogenMixingSystemandinsteadusestheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolingSystemforthisfunction(LCO3.6.6).Therefore,this"requirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.66.ITS3.6.10Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheHydrogenIgnitionSystemasdefinedinthebasesisusedtocontrolhydrogenlevelswithincontainmentpostaccident.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaHydrogenIgnitionSystemandinsteadusestheHydrogenRecombinerSystemforthisfunction(LCO3.6.7).Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaSt'ationdesign.Thisisan,ITSCategory(i)change.-120-May1995 67.ITS3.6.11VThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsincetheywererelocatedtoLCO3.6.6asdiscussedabove.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.68.ITS3.6.12Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.Thefunctionofthecontainmentvacuumreliefval,vesasdefinedinthebasesistoensurethatcontainmentisprotectedagainstnegativepressure.GinnaStationdoesnothavecontainmentvacuumreliefvalves.ProtectionagainstnegativepressureisprovidedbyLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.69.ITS3.6.13Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheShieldBuildingAirCleanupSystem(SBACS)asdefinedinthebasesisusedtoensurethatradioactivematerialswhichleakfromcontainmentfollowingaDBAisadequatelyfilteredandabsorbed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaSBACSsincetheleakagethroughthecontainmentlineriscontrolledbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.70.ITS3.6.14This.sectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.TheAirReturnSystemasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.71.ITS3.6.15Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.AnicebedasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.72.ITS3.6.16Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.IcecondenserdoorsasdefinedinthebasesareonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-121-May1995 73.ITS3.6.1774.ITSThissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.AdividerbarrierasdefinedinthebasesisonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.3.6.18Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.ContainmentrecirculationdrainsasdefinedinthebasesareonlyusedatIceCondenserdesignswhichdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.75.ITS3.6.19Thissectionandassociatedbaseswerenotadded.AShieldBuildingasdefinedinthebases'isusedtoensurethatradioactivematerialswhichleakfromcontainmentfollowingaDBAareadequatelyfilteredandabsorbed.GinnaStationdoesnothaveaShieldBuildingsincetheleakagethroughthecontainmentlineriscontrolledbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment."Therefore,thisrequirementisnotrelevanttotheGinnaStationdesign.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.76.ITS3.7.1Table3.7.1-1wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationaccidentanalysesassumethatalleightmainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)areavailableforpressurerelief.Noanalyseshavebeenperformedatlowerpowerlevelstosupporttheinoperabilityofoneormoresafetyvalves.Consequently,Table3.7.1-1andthesecondpartofConditionBdonotapplytoGinnaStation.RequiredActionA.1wasalsodeletedandreplacedwitharequirementtorestoreaninoperableMSSV(s)toOPERABLEstatuswithin4hoursconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.1.Thebaseswererevisedtostatethatthe4hourCompletionTimeistoaddressinstanceswheretheHSSVsareadministrativelydeclaredinoperablesincehardwarerelatedrepairs'cannotbeperformedduringMODES1,2,or3,similartoapprovedTravellerMOG-15,C.l(Rev.1).TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.-122-May1995 lv.Table3.7.1-2wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsincethistableonlyprovidestheliftsettingsoftheHSSVs.ThesevalueswererelocatedtoSR3.7.1.1toconsolidatethedefinitionofMSSVOPERABILITY.Thatis,SR3.7.1.1nowrequiresthattheHSSVshavean"asleft"liftsettingwithin+1%ofthespecifiedsetpointandan"asfound"liftsettingwithin+3%ofthespecifiedsetpoint.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheNOTEforSR3.7.1.1wasrevisedtoprovideclarificationthatthisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoentryintoMODE2fromMODE3consistentwiththeNUREG-1431.bases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbases.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasissectionsasnecessary.V.77.ITS3.7.2IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2.TheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtorequiretheHSIVstobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3regardlessofthepositionofthevalve.ThebaseswerealsorevisedtostatethatanMSIVwhichis,closedandde-activatedisconsideredOPERABLEsincethevalveisinitsassumedpositionfortheaccidentanalysis.Assuch,ConditionsAand8arenolongerapplicableandweredeleted.ThischangeeliminatespotentialconfusionandclarifieswhatisdefinedasanOPERABLEHSIV.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.l,waschangedfrom8hoursto24hours.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyRequiredActionswithrespecttoaninoperableMSIV.ACompletionTimeof24hourswasselectedtoallowrestorationofaninoperableMSIVduetotheabilitytoisolateaSGbyothermeans(e.g.,turbinestopvalves).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-123-May1995 TheNoteforConditionCwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceGinnaStationonlyhastwoinstalledHSIVs.Consequently,ifbothHSIVsareinoperable,the.plantisoutsidetheaccidentanalysisintheeventofaSLB.Thisisalsotrueifbothnon-returncheckvalvesareinoperable,oroneormoreisolationvalvesfromeachSGareinoperable.ThedescriptionforConditionCwasalsorevisedtolimititsapplicationtoonlyoneinoperableHSIV.AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatoneormoreisolationvalvesfromeachSGaredeclaredinoperablerequiringentryintoLCO3.0.3.TheseareITSCategory(iv)and(iii)changesrespectively.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.2wasrevisedfromonceevery7daystoonceevery31days.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.AFrequencyofonceevery,31daysisconsistentwiththeRequiredActionsforLCO3.6.3whichisappropriatesincetheHSIVsalsoperformacontainmentisolationbarrierfunctionasdescribedinthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.7.2.1wasrevisedtorequire'hateachHSIVbetestedundernoflowandnoloadconditionsconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.7.Thisisaconservativetestsincethevalveisassistedinclosingwhensteamflowisavailable.Assuch,thevalveclosuretimeunderhotconditionswouldbedependentuponavailablesteamflow.Inaddition,anewSurveillance(SR3.7.2.2)wasaddedwhichrequiresverificationonceevery24monthsthateachHSIVcancloseonanactuationsignal,independentofclosuretime,consistentwiththe'accidentanalysisassumptionsandcurrenttestingpractices.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywithcurrentGinnaStationTSbasesandtheaccidentanalyses.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-24,C.3wasnotadded.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.c.DiscussionwasaddedrelatedthefunctionoftheHSIVswithrespecttocontainmentisolation.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2.Hay1995 lx.TheLCOwasrevisedtoaddrequirementsandsurveillancesfornon-returncheckvalveswhichare.in-serieswitheach.HSIV.Thesenon-returncheckvalvesarecreditedintheaccidentanalysisarethereforeaddedtothenewspecifications.Thetitleandbaseswerealsoappropriatelyrevised.TheseareITSCategory(ii)changes.VariouseditorialchangesweremadewhichprovideclaritybutdonotaltertheintentoftheLCO.TheseareITS,Category(iv)changes.78.ITS3.7.31V.V.ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichincludestheuseof"mainfeedwaterpumpdischargevalve(HFPDV)."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.ConditionDwasnotaddedsincethecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontaintheserequirements.Thefactthattwoparallelvalvesareinoperableshouldnotrequireashorterisolationtimesincecontainmentisolationpenetrationsdonothavesimilarrequirements.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionsA.2,B.2,andC.2wasrevisedfromonceevery7daystoonceevery31days.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.AFrequencyofonceevery31daysisconsidered'acceptableduetotheavailableindicationsofvalvepositionavailabletoplantoperators.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothHFWflowpathstotheSGshaveatleastoneinoperablevalve.ThenewConditionrequiresentryintoLCO3.0.3sincetheplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Asaresultofthisaddition,ConditionEwasrevisedtospecifythatitwouldonlybeenteredintheeventthattheRequiredActionsofConditionA,B,orCwerenotsatisfiedconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.-125-Hay1995 vi.79.ITS3.7.4b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesthedeletionoftextthatisnotrelatedtothetechnicalspecificationfunctionperformedbytheMFRVsandbypasscontrolvalves.TheApplicabilityandbaseswererevisedtorequiretheMFRVsandbypassvalvestobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3regardlessofthepositionofthevalves.Thebaseswererevisedtostatethatavalvewhichisclosedandde-activated,orisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve,isconsideredOPERABLEsincethevalveisinitsassumedpositionfortheaccidentanalysis.ThischangeeliminatespotentialconfusionandclarifieswhatisdefinedasanOPERABLEMFRVandbypassvalve.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.7.3.1wasseparatedintotwosurveillancessincetheMFPDVshaveadifferentisolationtime(asassumedintheaccidentanalysis)thantheotherisolationvalves.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.iv.ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichincludestheuseof"atmosphericreliefvalve(ARV)"versus"atmosphericdumpvalve(ADV)."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCO,Conditions,RequiredActions,SurveillancesandbaseswererevisedsincetheARVsatGinnaStationdonothavearemoteoperatedblockvalve.ThespuriousopeningofanARVisconsideredwithintheaccidentanalysessuchthatablockvalveisnotrequired.Assuch,SR3.7.4.2wasnotadded.'hisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheApplicabilityandRequiredActionsC.landC.2wererevisedtoonlyrequiretheARVsinMODESIand2andwhentheRCSaveragetemperatureis>'500FinMODE3.AtGinnaStation,theARVsareonlycreditedintheaccidentanalyseswithrespecttoprovidingcooldowncapabi.lityfollowingaSGTRinordertomaintainsubcoolingmargin.WiththeRCSaveragetemperature<500F,thesaturationpressureoftheprimarysystemisbelowtheMSSVsetpointsandtheARVsarenotrequired.Seethenewbasesforadditionalinformation.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.'onditionBwasrevisedtorequireentryintoLCO3.0.3immediatelywhenbothARVsareinoperable.SinceGinnaStationonlyhastwoARVs,theinoperabilityofbothvalveswouldresultinthelossofasafetyfunctionasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-126-May1995 v~vi.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesthedeletionoftextthatisnotrelatedtothetechnicalspecificationfunctionperformedbytheARVs.ThetextofSR3.7.4.1wasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithothersimilartests(seeSR3.4.11.1)andthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.80.ITS3.7.511~TheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystematGinnaStationis,comprisedoftwosystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFW)System.EachsystemprovidesaportionoftheoverallAFWSystemfunction.TheLCO,Conditions,RequiredActions,Surveillances,andbaseswereallrevisedtoreflectthefunctionsofthepreferredAFWandSAFWSystemsasdescribedinthenewbases.TheConditions,RequiredActions,andtheirCompletionTimeswerealsosignificantlyrevisedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS8.4.2.However,severalchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerealsomadetoprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandforhumanfactorreasons.ThesechangesarediscussedindetailinSectionD,item14.ii.NewSurveillanceswerealsoaddedwithrespecttotheSAFWSystemconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.8.Reference28providesadditionalinformation.TheseareCategory(i)and(ii)changes.TheLCONoteandConditionEwerenotadded,andtheApplicabilityandassociatedbaseswererevisedtoonlyapplyinMODES1,2,and3consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.2.TherequirementforAFWduring.MODE4whentheSGsarebeingrelieduponforheatremovaliscontrolledbynewLCO3.4.6whichspecifiesrequiredSGlevelrequirements.DuetothewidevarietyofmeansofprovidingdecayheatremovalinMODE4(e.g.,AFW,SAFW,MFW,condensateboosterpumps),RG&EdoesnotbelievethatitisnecessarytospecifyAFWrequirements.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference26.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.AssuchapprovedTravellerWOG-27,C.1wasonlypartiallyincorporated(seealsoSectionC,item80.ivbelow).-127-May1995 TheNoteforSR3.7.5.2andSR3.7.5.3wasrevisedtorequiretheturbinedrivenAFWpumptobetestedpriortoenteringMODE1consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS4.8.6.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference28.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.SR3.7.5.3andSR3.7.5.4wererevisedtodelete"wheninMODE1,2,or3"fromtheendoftheSurveillancedescriptionconsistentwithapprovedTravellerWOG-27,C.l.ThebasesstatethattheseSurveillancesshouldonlybeperformedduringshutdownconditionstopreventthepossibilityofcreatingaplanttransient.ThedeletedtextimpliesthatthistestshouldbeonlyperformedinMODE1,2,or3.TheintentionofthetwoSRsistoensurethatAFWwillcorrectlyactuatewhenitisinitsMODE1,2,or3configuration.SpecifyingthisintheSurveillanceisinconsistentwithallotherSRs(e.g.,ECCS)andisunne'cessary.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.SR3.7.5.5wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainthisrequirement.TheverificationofthecorrectlineupoftheAFWandSAFWSystemsisperformedbySR3.7.5.1.Inaddition,theAFWSystemtakessuctionfromtheCSTsduringnormalstartupandshutdownconditions.ThebasesforSR3.7.5.5statesthatthisSRisnotrequiredforplantswhichusetheCSTundertheseconditions.Thisisan.ITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-01,C.2IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-13,C.1.-128-May1995 ix.81.ITS3.7.6TheCompletionTimelimitof"10daysfromthediscoverytofailuretomeettheLCO"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.TheintentofaddingthislimittotheCompletionTimeistopreventaplantfromcontinuouslybeingintheLCOwithoutevermeetingthefullAFWSystemrequirements.ThisabuseoftheLCOisbestaddressedunderplantproceduressincetheadditionofthislimittotheCompletionTimecreatesconfusionamonglicensedpersonnel.ProvidingthislimitcanstillresultinLCOabusesincetheAFWSystemcanbedeclaredOPERABLEforonlyaseveralminutesandthentheLCOimmediatelyenteredforextendedperiods.SufficientNRCguidancealreadyexistswithrespecttoextensiveuseofLCOtime(e.g.,Ref.26).Inaddition,theHaintenanceRule(10CFR50.65)requiresmonitoringofequipmentperformance.Finally,areviewofGinnaStationplantrecordsindicatesthattheAFWSystemwasoutaserviceatotalof2600hoursfromJune1990andJuly1994(or9%ofthetimeinwhichtheplantwasinHODE1,2,and3.Thetitle,LCO,SurveillancesandbaseswererevisedtoreflectthatGinnaStationhastwocondensatestoragetanks(CSTs)insteadofoneasreferencedinNUREG-1431.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCOwasrevisedtorequirethattheCSTsbeOPERABLEwiththespecificOPERABILITYrequirementsspecifiedintheSurveillanceRequirement.Inaddition,ConditionA,Require'dActionA.2,andSR3.7.6.1wererevisedtoreplacethereferencetoCST"level"withCST"watervolume"whichistheactualparameterusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywithLCO3.5.4.TheseareITSCategory(iii)changes.TheApplicabilityandRequiredActionB.2wererevisedtoonlyrequiretheCSTstobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3consistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.3.TherequirementfortheCSTsduringHODE4whentheSGsarebeingrelieduponforheatremovaliscontrolledbynewLCO3.4.6whichspecifiesrequiredSGlevelrequirements.Duetothewidevarietyofmeanso'fprovidingdecayheatremovalinHODE4(e.g.,AFW,SAFW,HFW,condensateboosterpumps),RGEEdoesnotbelievethatitisnecessarytospecifyCSTrequirements.ThisisalsodiscussedinReference28.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-129-Hay1995 iv..V.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1wasrevisedtoremovethecontinuedverificationevery12hoursofthebackupwatersupplytotheCSTs.ThecurrentGinnaStationTS3.4.3doesnotcontainthisrequirement.Inaddition,thesourcesofwaterwhichwouldnormallybeusedincludetheSWSystem(whichhasLakeOntarioasawatersupply)andtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetankwhichhasanormalstoredvolumeof100,000gallons(UFSARSection10.7.4).EitherofthesesourcesprovidemuchmorewaterthanisrequiredforAFWduringaDBAornormalcooldown.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~b.82..ITS3.7.7Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswere'ddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandbasesfortheCSTwatervolumerequirement.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.TheLCO,Conditions,andbaseswererevisedtoreflecttheactualdesignofthecomponentcoolingwater(CCW)systematGinnaStation.TheCCWSystemiscomprisedoftwo100%capacitypumpswhichfeedacommonloopheader.Thiscommonloopheaderthensplitsintoparallelflowpathsfortwo100%capacityheatexchangers.Theoutletoftheheatexchangersthenmeettore-formthecommonloopheaderwhichprovidescoolingwaterto-thesafetyandnonsafetyrelatedsystemloads.'hedischargeflowthroughthesesystemloadsthencombinetore-formthecommonheaderwhichprovidessuctiontothetwoCCWpumps.Assuch,theLCOwasrevisedtorequirethetwoCCWpumptrainsandtheCCWloopheadertobeOPERABLE.TheNoteforRequiredActionA.1wasalsonotaddedsincetheinoperabil'ityofasingleCCWtraindoesnotaffecttheabilityofCCWtoprovidecoolingtoeitherRHRheatexchanger.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-130-Hay1995 AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothCCWtrainsortheCCWloopheaderwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,CCWcannotsupporttheOPERABILITYoftheECCSandCSpumpsandalossofmultiplesafetyfunctionsexist.However,itisnotprudent-toenterLCO3.0.3inthisconditionsinceitwouldrequireentryintoMODE5whereCCWmustbeavailabletosupporttheRHRheatexchangers.Instead,thenewConditionrequiresimmediateactiontorestoreoneCCWtrainortheloopheaderandtoplacetheplantinMODE4within12hours.RestrictingthecooldowntoMODE4placestheplantinaconditioninwhichthe'RCPsandAFWcanbeusedtoprovidedecayheatremovalwhileattemptstorestoreCCWcontinue.IntheeventthattheRCPsorAFWisalsolost,thetimerequiredbeforeRHRmustbeavailablefordecayheatremovalisincreasedinthislowerMODE.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwiththeRequiredActionsforalossofRHRandcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheCCWSystemisonlyrequiredbytheaccidentanalysesduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandismanuallyinitiated.Therefore,theCCWSystemdoesnotreceiveanyactuationsignalsuchthatSR3.7.7.2andSR3.7.7.3arenotapplicabletoGinnaStation.However,anewSurveillancewasaddedtorequireacompletecycleofthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers.AllotherCCWflowpathstocomponentsrequiredfollowingaDBAarenormallyopenanddonot'equiretesting.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2wasnotincorporated.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(thes'eareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~b.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheCCWSystem.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.8.SR3.7.7.1wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofmanualandpoweroperatedvalvesintheCCWtrainorloopheaderflowpaththatservicepost-accidentrelatedequipmentwhichisamoreaccuratedescriptionoftheactualSR.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.3.May1995 83.ITS3.7.8iv~ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturewhichdoesnotabbreviatetheterm"system"withrespecttotheServiceWater(SM)System.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCO,Conditions,andbaseswererevisedtoreflecttheactualdesignoftheSWsystematGinnaStation.TheSWSystemiscomprisedoftworedundanttrains.Eachtrainincludestwo100%capacitypumpswhichfeedacommonloopheader.Thiscommonloopheaderprovidescoolingwatertothesafetyandnonsafetyrelatedsystemloads.Assuch,theLCOwasrevisedtorequirethetwoSWpumptrains.andtheSWloopheadertobeOPERABLE.TheNotesforRequiredActionA.1werealsonotaddedsincetheinoperabilityofasingleSMtraindoesnotaffecttheabilityofSMtoprovide'oolingtoeitherRHRheatexchangerorthedieselgenerators.Inaddition,theLCObaseswererevisedtostatethattheSMloophead'erendsatthefirstisolationvalveforanysuppliedcomponent.Ifcoolingwaterthroughorfromanycomponentrequiredbytheaccidentanalysisisunavailable,thentheapplicableLCOshouldbeentered.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Asuch,approvedTravellerWOG-12,Cllwasnotincorporated.AnewConditionwasaddedintheeventthatbothSWtrainsortheSWloopheaderwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,SWcannotsupporttheOPERABILITYoftheSIpumps,CRFCs,CCWheatexchangers,dieselgenerators,orAFWpumpsandalossofmultiplesafetyfunctionsexist.However,itisnotprudenttoenterLCO3.0.3inthisconditionsinceitwouldrequireentryintoHODE5whereSWmustbeavailabletosupporttheRHRheatexchangers.Instead,thenewConditionrequiresimmediateactiontorestoreoneSWtrainortheloopheaderandtoplacetheplantinMODE4within12hours.RestrictingthecooldowntoHODE4placestheplantinaconditioninwhichtheRCPsandAFWcanbeusedtoprovidedecayheatremovalwhileattemptstorestoreSWcontinue.Intheevent'hattheRCPsorAFWisalsolost,thetimerequiredbeforeRHRmustbeavailablefordecayheatremovalisincreasedinthislowerHODE.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheSWSystem.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.-132-Hay1995 c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.7.v.Incor'porationofapprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.3.vi~84.ITS3.7.9IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-Ol,C.2.ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyrequirementsfortheUltimateHeatSink(UHS).Inaddition,theUHSforGinnaStationisLakeOntario(therearenoinstalledcoolingtowers)andtheonlysafetyrelatedfunctionwhichrequirestheUHSistheSWSystem.Assuch,thebasesforLCO3.7.8wererevisedtospecifythattheSWtrainsareconsideredOPERABLEwhensufficientNPSHisavailableandthetemperatureoftheSWsuctionsourcewaswithinacceptablelimits.TheselimitsarethencontrolledbytheBasesControlProgram.ItshouldbenotedthattheNPSHrequirementfortheSWpumpsisfarlessthanotherequipment(i.e.,CirculatingWaterPumpsandFireWaterPumps)suchthatsufficientalarmsandindicationswouldbeavailabletoplantoperators.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.85.ITS3.7.10TheLCOtitlewasrenamedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofLCO3.7.9(UHS).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv)changes.-133-May1995 TheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)consistsofonefiltrationtrainandredundantdampers(seebasesandcurrentGinnaStationTS3.3.5).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperableupto48hourssincethesuccessfuloperationofthecontrolroomisolationdamperswillresultinacceptabledoseswithinthecontrolroom.However,ifanyradioactivegaswerereleasedandenteredthecontrolroomenvironment,thereisnomeanstoremovethegas.Therefore,48hourswasdeterminedtobeacceptableCompletionTimeforrestoringthesystemtoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheCREATSinthetoxicgasmode.Inaddition,sincethereareredundantdampers,inoperabilityofthedampersweretreatedsimilartotheCREFtrainsinNUREG-1431(i.e.,aCompletionTimeof7daysisallowedtorestoreoneinoperabledamperandarequirementtoenterLCO3.0.3withtwoinoperabledampersforagivenoutsideairflowpath).ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandwithNUREG-1431tothegreatestdegreepossible.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Assuch,approvedTravellersWOG-24,C.SandNRC-Ol,C.2werenotincorporated.ConditionCwasrevisedtorequireplacingtheOPERABLEGREATSisolationdampersintheemergencyradiationprotectionmodewhenevertheRequiredActionsofConditionsofAor(new)BarenotmetinNODE5or6,orduringfuelmovement.Theemergencyradiationprotectionmodeisamoreconservativeconfigurationsincenooutsideairisallowedintothecontrolroom.Sincethedoesratestotheoperatorshasbeendeterminedtobeacceptablewiththecontrolroomisolated,thisispreferredtheconfiguration.ThisisanITSCategory(i)'change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheCREATS.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.SR3.7.10.4wasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationtechnicalspecificationsdonotcontainthisrequirement.ThecontrolroomenvironmentalcontrolsystemswereassessedaspartofTMIActionPlanrequirements(i.e.,NUREG-0737,SupplementI,itemIII.D.3.4)andfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.28).Therefore,RGKEdoesnotbelievethatthissurveillanceisrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Hay1995 vi.ApprovedTravellerWOG-12,C.2wasnotaddedsincetheCREATSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE6whichincludesallCOREALTERATIONSbydefinition.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.86.ITS3.7.11ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenot.addedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdo.notcontainanytemperaturecontrolrequirementsforthecontrolroomenvironment.TheexistingsystemwasevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableaspartoftheTMIActionPlanRequirements(i.e.,NUREG-0737,Supplement1,itemIII.D.3.4).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Assuch,approvedTravellersWOG-12,C.2andWOG-24,C.lwerenotincorporated.87.ITS3.7.12ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainanyrequirementsforaECCSpumproomexhaustaircleanupsystem(PREACS).ThebasesforthisLCOstatethatthePREACSisusedforfilteringairfromtheareaofactiveECCScomponentsduringtherecirculationphaseofan,accidentandtoprovideenvironmentalcontrol(e.g.,temperatureandhumidity).StandardReviewPlan15.6.5statesthatforplantswhichdonotprovideanESFatmospherefiltrationsystem,50gpmleakagefromagrossfailureofapassivecomponentshouldbeassumed24hoursafteranaccident.ThisisassumedforGinnaStationwithrespecttotheRHRpumps(UFSAR,Section5.4.5.3.5).Inaddition,UFSARSection9.4.2statesthatthecoolingsystemsrelatedtoECCSequipmentarenotrequiredevenwithbothtrainsofECCSinoperation.Therefore,thisLCOdoesnotapplytoGinnaStationandwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.88.ITS3.7.13TheLCOtitlewasrenamedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclaturesincethereisnoseparatefuelbuilding.Inaddition,theLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofprevioussections.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv)changes.-135-Hay1995 ~~111.TheLCO,Applicability,Conditions,Surveillances,andthebaseswereallrevisedtobeconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.11.1.ThisrequirestheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)associatedwiththeSFPtobeOPERABLEwhenfuelisbeinghandledorstoredinSFPwhichhasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.TheABVSisdefinedasoneAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfan,theAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfan1C,SFPcharcoalabsorbers,androughingfilters.TheABVSonlyensuresthatoffsitedosesarewellwithin10CFR100limitsintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.IftheABVSwereunavailable,offsitedoseswouldincrease,butremainbelow10CFR100limits.Therefore,singlefailuresoralossofoffsitepowerisnotaconsiderationforthisLCO.IftheminimumABVSisinoperable,thenewConditionrequiressuspensionofmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingimmediatelywhichpreventsafuelhandlingaccidentfromoccurringthatrequirestheABVS.SincetheABVSisanon-EngineeredSafetyFeaturessystem,aridisonlyrequiredfollowingafuelhandlingaccident,themajorityofsurveillancerequirementsdonotapplytoGinnaStation.TheonlySRswhicharenecessaryarethoserelatedtotheVFTPandtoensurethatthesystemisinoperationduringfuelmovementorCORE'LTERATIONS(newSR3.7.10.1).AllotherSRswhichrequireoperationofsystemheaters(SR3.7.13.1),verifyactuationoftheABVSonasafetyinjectionsignal(SR3.7.13.3);verifytheabilitytomaintainanegativepressureinthefuelhandlingbuilding(SR3.7.13.4)orverifythatthebypassdampercanbeclosed(SR3.7.13.5)donotapplytoGinnaStationandwerenotadded.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.Assuch,approvedTravellerWOG-24,C.6wasnotincorporated.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingusingGinnaStationnomenclatureandprovidingconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesforoperationoftheABVS.iv.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThetextofSR3.7.10.2wasrevisedtoreflectthatonlytheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemisrequiredtobeverifiedsincetheABVShasseveralcharcoalfiltercomponents.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-136-Hay1995 89.ITS3.7.1490.i.ThisLCOandassociatedbaseswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceGinnaStationdoesnothaveapenetrationroomexhaustaircleanupsystem(PREACS).ThebasesdescribethePREACSasasystemwhichfiltersairfromthepenetrationareabetweencontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuilding.AtGinnaStation,thecontainmentanAuxiliaryBuildingarejoinedsuchthatthereisnospace(i.e.,penetrationarea)betweenthesebuildings.Therefore,thisLCOisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.ITS3.7.15ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclatureincludingtheuseofabbreviation"SFP"for"spentfuelpool."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignofthespentfuelpool(SFP)andtheSFPCoolingSystemwasadded.b.Discussionsofnon-TSrelatedfunctionsofmaintaininglevelintheSFPweredeleted.ThistypeofinformationiscontainedintheUFSAR,procedures,andothermoreappropriatedocuments.c.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtoreflectplant-specificconsiderations.d.ThebaseswereexpandedtodiscusswhytheLCOwasnotapplicableforotherplantconditions.TheFrequencyforSR3.7.15.1wasrevisedfrom7daysto31days.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisSurveillanceRequirement.However,:consistentwiththecurrentsurveillanceforSFPboronconcentration(GinnaStationTSTable4.1-2,817),amonthlysurveillanceofSFPwaterlevelisconsideredadequateduetothedesignoftheSFPasdiscussedinthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.91.ITS3.7.16ThetitlewasrevisedtobeconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclatureincludingtheuseof"SFP"for"spentfuelpool."ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-137-May1995 lv.v~TheLCOandassociatedbaseswererevisedtorelocatetheactualboronconcentrationlimittotheCOLR.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithothersimilarrequirements(e.g.,ITS3.9.1).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignoftheSFPwasaddedincludingdiscussionconcerningIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbersasusedinRegionl.b.'ariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtouseGinnaStationnomenclature.c.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.17.(Note-thisisanITSCategory(iii)change.)RequiredActionA.2.2wasrevisedtorequireperformanceofaSFPverificationinsteadofverifyingthataSFPverificationhadalreadybeenperformed.IfaSFPverificationhadbeenperformed,thenthisLCOwouldnotbeineffectpertheApplicability.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeintendedoptiontoimmediatelyperformtheverificationwhentheSFPboronconcentrationisnotwithinlimits.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheFrequencyforSR3.7.16.1wasrevisedfrom7daysto31daysconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTSTable4.1-2,817.Sincetheboronconcentrationisnotexpectedtochangerapidlyduetothelargevolumeofwaterwhichisavailable,amonthlyverificationisconsideredacceptable.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.92.ITS3.7.17Thetitlewas'revisedtobemoreconsistentwiththeactualLCOsincenewfuelcanbestoredintheSFPifthefuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirements.Also,theabbreviation"SFP"for"spentfuelpool"wasusedconsistentwithGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.-138-Hay1995

TheLCOandApplicabilitywererevisedtoproviderequirementsforbothregionsoftheSFP.ThischangewasrequiredsincebothRegionIandRegion2havelimitswithrespecttothefueltobestoredinadditiontotheupperU-235enrichmentlimitof5.05weightpercent.Assuch,RequiredActionswere,necessaryiftheselimitsareexceeded.Inaddition,separateSurveillanceswereaddedforeachRegiontoensurethatthelimitsaremet.TheselimitsareconsistentwithReference29.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):Plant-specificbackgroundinformationwithrespecttothedesignoftheSFPwasaddedincludingdiscussionconcerningIntegralBurnableAbsorbersasusedinRegionl.b.c~93.ITS3.'7.18VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebasesandtouseGinnaStationnomenclature.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththebasesforLCO3.7.16.(Note-thisisanITSCategory(iii)change.)iv.ThisLCOwasrenumberedduetothedeletionofpreviousLCOsections.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheCompletionTimesforRequiredActionsA.landA.2wererevisedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.1.4.4whichallow8hourstoreachMODE3and40hourstoreachMODE5.ThissmallincreaseintimeisconsideredminorandacceptablesincetheaccidentanalyseshavebeenperformedusingveryconservativevaluesforprimarysystemI-131andnocreditistakenforactivityplateoutorretention.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Plant-specificdesignconsiderationswereaddedincludingusing.GinnaStationnomenclatur'eandprovidingconsistencywiththedoseanalyses.b.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-24,C.5-139-Hay1995 94.ITS3.8.1lv.V.VlTheLCO,Conditions,andassociatedBaseswererevisedtoreflectonlyoneOPERABLEoffsitecircuitisrequiredtoeachofthe480Vsafeguardsbuses.TheGinnaStationoffsitedistributionisdesignedtoprovidepowertothe480Vsafeguardsbusesfromeitherstationauxiliarytransformerorfrombothstationauxiliarytransformers.Currentlicensingbasisallowsindefinite,operationineitherconfiguration.ThecurrentlicensingbasisprovidesforatotalofthreeACsources(theoffsiteandthetwoDGs).ThenumberofsourcesrequiredandtheassociatedactionsandCompletionTimesisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasisasapprovedintheNRCSER(Ref.31).TheassociatedconditionswererevisedtoreflectatotalofthreeACsources.TheCompletionTimesassociatedwithestablishingamaximumtimeallowedforanycombinationofrequiredACpowersourcestobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtomeet.theLCOhavebeendeleted.TheseweredeletedsinceanytwoormoresourcesinoperablewouldrequireentryintoLCD3.0.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES1,2,3,and4"tobeconsistentwiththeactualLCOrequirements.Thisisan.ITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCO,Conditions,SRs,andassociatedBaseswererevisedtodeletethereferencestotheautomaticloadsequencers.GinnaStationisdesignedsuchthatanysequencerfailuremodeonlyaffectstheability,oftheassociatedDGtopoweritsrespectivesafetyloadsfollowingalossofoffsitepower.CurrentlicensingbasisallowsthisfunctiontobeconsideredintheoperabilitydeterminationoftheDG.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-07,C.1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-05,C.l.SR3.8.1.8,SR3.8.1.10,andSR3.8.1.13wererevisedtorestrictperformanceoftheseSRsinModes3and4.SinceGinnaStationonlyrequiresthreeOPERABLEpowersources,performingtheseSRswouldreducethenumberofavailablesourcesandcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.Thisisconsistentwithcurrentlicensingbasisandisaconservativechange.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.-140-May1995 v)ii.ix.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursforrestorationofaninoperableDGwasrevisedto7days.ThisCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasisasapprovedintheNRCSERs(Refs.31and32).ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.VariousSRsandassociatedBaseswererevisedornotaddedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationDGtestingrequirements.Specifictestingvalueswerealsonotaddedforvarioustestrequirementssincethisinformationiscurrentlycontrolledbyprocedures.SurveillancetestfrequenciesreflectcurrentlicensingbasisasapprovedintheNRCSERsduringreviewofSEPTopicVIII-2(Refs.31,'2,33,and34).Asaresultoftherevisionordeletionoftheserequirements,approvedTravellersBWR-17,C.2(Rev.3),C.7(Rev.1),C.9(Rev.3),C.10(Rev.1),andC.11;BWR-18,C.64;NRC-02,C.23(Rev.1);WOG-13,C.2,C.3,andC.8;andWOG-26,C.2andC.3werenotincorporated.Thisis-anITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.95.ITS3.8.2Theplant-specificdescriptionoftheoffsiteandonsitepowersourceswasadded.ThisincludeschangestoreflectthatGinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,Appendix'.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES5and6"sincetherearenosafeguardsrelatedsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportfuelmovement.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.May1995 iv.V.vi~TheLCO,Conditions,andassociatedBaseswererevisedconsistentwithnewLCO3.8.1.TheserequirementsreflectonlyoneOPERABLEoffsitecircuitandoneonsitesourcerequiredtoeachofthe480Vsafeguardsbuses.TheGinnaStationoffsitedistributionsystemisdesignedtoprovidepowertothe480Vsafeguardsbusesfromeitherstationauxiliarytransformerorfrombothstationauxiliarytransformers.Currentlicensingbasisallowsindefiniteoperationineitherconfiguration(Refs.31,32,33,,and34).Asaresultoftherevisionsordeletionsoftheserequirements,approvedTravellersBWR-17,C.6,C.7(Rev.1),andC.9(Rey.3)werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-06,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-13,C.9.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-26,C.4.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.96.ITS3.8.3TheLCO,Conditions,SRs,andassociatedBasesforonsitedieselfueloilwererevisedandtherequirementsforthelubeoil,newfueloil,andstartingairsystemwerenotaddedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationDGtestingrequirements.Specifictestingvalueswerealsonotaddedforvarioustestrequirementssincethisinformationiscurrentlycontrolledbyprocedures.GinnaStationcurrentlicensingbasis,asapprovedintheNRCSERsduringreviewofSEPTopicVIII-2(Refs.31,32,33,and34),allowsthesefunctionstobeconsideredintheoperabilitydeterminationoftheOG.Asaresultoftherevisionordeletionoftheserequirements,approvedTravellersNRC-19,C.1andWOG-13,C.9,C.10,andC.11werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-13,C.4.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.-142-Hay1995 b.Theplant-specificdescriptionofthedieselfueloilandtransfersystemwasadded.97.ITS3.8.4iv.TheSRsandassociatedBaseswererevisedornotaddedconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationbat'terytestingrequirements.Specifictestingvalueswerealsorevisedornotaddedfortestrequirementssincethisinformationiscurrentlycontrolledbyprocedures.GinnaStationcu}rentlicensingbasis,asapprovedintheNRCSERsduringreviewofSEPTopicVIII-3a(Refs.3.8.3,3.8.5,and3.8.6),allowsthesefunctionstobeconsideredintheoperabilitydeterminationoftheDCsources.Asaresultoftherevisionordeletionoftheserequirements,approvedTravellersNRC-19,C.landWOG-13,C.9,C.10,andC.llwerenotincorporated.Inaddition,thetitlewasrevisedtobe"NODES1,2,3,and4"tobeconsistentwiththeactualLCOrequirements.TheseareITSCategory(i,)changes.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-05,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-14,C.l.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Various'wordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.c~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.Theplant-specificdescriptionoftheDCsourceswasadded.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-26,C.5.-143-Nay1995 98.ITS3.8.5lv,v.TheConditions,SRsandassociatedBaseswererevisedornotaddedconsistentwithnewLCO3.8.4.Aplant-specificdescriptionoftheDCsourceswasaddedreflectingadesignofonlyonestationbatterypertrain.Thecurrentlicensingbasis,asapprovedintheNRCSERsduringreviewofSEPTopicVIII-3a(Refs.33,36,and37),allowsthesefunctionstobeconsideredintheoperabilitydeterminationoftheDCsources.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-06,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-13,C.12.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"HODES5and6"sincetherearenosafeguardsrelatedsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportfuelmovement.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~99.ITS3.8.6Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywith'therbasessections.lvv.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerGEOG-Ol,C.l.TheFrequencyof7daysforperformanceofSR3.8.6.1wasrevisedto31days.TheFrequencyof24,hoursfor.performanceofSR3.8.6.2forabatterydischargeoroverchargewasrevisedto7days.TheFrequencyinSR3.8.6.1isconsistentwiththecurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasisasapprovedintheNRCSERs(Refs.33,36,and37).TheFrequenciesinSR3.8.6.2arenewrequirementsforGinnaStationandareconsideredconservativechanges.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerGEOG-Ol,C.2.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerCEOG-Ol,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerCEOG-Ol,C.4.-144-Hay1995 vi.The,baseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a.Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.100.ITS3.8.71V.VariouswordingchangesweremadetotheLCOandSRtoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES1,2,3,and4"tobeconsistentwiththeactualLCOrequirements.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TheLCO,RequiredActions,andCompletionTimeswererevisedtoreflectcurrentlicensingbasisasapprovedintheNRCSER(Ref.38).Asaresultoftherevisionordeletionoftheserequirements,approvedTravellersBWR-08,C.2andC.3werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-08,C.1(Rev.2).Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.101.ITS3.8.81V~TheLCO,Conditions,SR,andassociatedBaseswererevisedconsistentwithnewLCO3.8.7.Aplant-specificdescriptionoftheinverterswasaddedreflectingadesignofonlyoneinverterpertrain.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES5and6"sincetherearenosafeguardsrelatedsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportfuelmovement.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-06,C.1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-13,C.12.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbases.sections.-145-May1995 102.ITS3.8.91V.V.VariouswordingchangesweremadetotheLCOandSRtoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES1,2,3,and4"tobeconsistentwiththeactualLCOrequirements.ThisisanITS.Category(iv)change;IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-20,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-18,C.66.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.103.ITS3.8.10Theplant-specificdescriptionofthedistributionsystemswasadded.VariouswordingchangesweremadetotheLCOandSRtoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature.Thisincludesrevisingthetitletobe"MODES5and6"sincetherearenosafeguardsrelatedsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportfuelmovement.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-06,'.l.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.104.ITS3.9.1IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-05,C.l.Thistravellerwasmodifiedtoprovidevariouswordingchangestoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-146-May1995 iv.TheLCOwasrevisedconsistentwithsimilarLCOs.ThedetailsassociatedwiththeLCOwererelocatedtothebases.IncludingthesedetailsintheBaseseliminatesambiguities(e.g.,whentheplantinitiallyentersMODE6andwhenRCSloopsareisolated).ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.Theplant-specificdescriptionoftheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingwasadded.c~GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomic'ndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.d.Thetextwasrevisedtoclarifythatnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposesoftemperaturecontrolisnotconsideredasanadditionofpositivereactivity.e.Thetextwasrevisedtoclarifythatthesample-.takenisrepresentativeoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavity.OnlyonesampleisrequiredsinceoperationoftheRHRassumesuniformmlxingIQ5.ITS3.9.2LCO3.9.2,"UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValves"andassociatedBases,aspresentedinNUREG-1431,werenotaddedandsubsequentLCOsandBaseshavebeenrenumberedinconsecutiveorder.GinnaStationhasaplantspecificsafetyanalysis(UFSARSection15.4.4.2)foranuncontrolledborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumingtheworstcasescenariowiththemaximumnumberofpumpsandflowpathsavailable.Theconclusionoftheanalysisestablishesthatoperatorshavesufficienttime(i.e.,greaterthan30minutesrequiredbySection15.4.6ofReference3.9.1)tomitigatetheeffectsofaborondilutioneventinMODE6priortoalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN.Therefore,theLCOforisolatingunboratedwatersourcesinMODE6isnotrequired.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-147-May1995 106.ITS3.9.3lv.V.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerGEOG-02,C.3.Thistraveller,wasrevisedtodeletetheword"required"sincethereareonlytwoindependentsourcerangechannels.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.2wasrevisedtodeletethe4hourverificationoftheboronconcentrationlimitsinceGinnaStationcurrentlydoesnothavethisrequirement.Thisrequirementisperfo'rmedwhentwosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsbecomeinoperable.Atthepointintimewhentwosourcerangechannelsbecomeinoperable,therefuelingboronconcentrationisassumedtobewithinlimit.VerificationthattheboronconcentrationiswithinlimithadbeenpreviouslydemonstratedbytheperiodicperformanceofSR3.9.1.1.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandtheadditionofpositivereactivityhavebeensuspended(asaresultofoneinoperablesourcerangechannel),corereactivityconditionswillremainstable.Therefore,theneedtoperformanadditionalverificationwithin4hoursisnotnecessary.Confirmationthat'corereactivityremainsstablewillcontinuetobeperformedevery12hours.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.TheActionswererevisedtoaddaconditiontoaddressthelossoftheaudiblecountratefunction.TheaudiblecountratefunctionisaninitialassumptionoftheborondilutionduringrefuelingeventatGinnaStation.AudiblecountrateisprovidedbyoneofthetworequiredOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxchannels.TheadditionoftheActionsisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS3.8.l.c.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):'a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisincludesprovidingconsistencywiththeLCOandotherbasessections.b.ThetextwasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywiththeLCOaddressingtheaudiblecountrate,functionsuppliedfromeitheroftheOPERABLEsourcerangechannels.-148-Hay1995 c.GinnaStationwasdesignedandbuiltpriortotheissuanceoftheGDCcontainedin10CFR50,AppendixA.However,thedraftGDCissuedbytheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)in1967wereutilizedinthedesignofGinnaStation.Thebaseswererevisedtoreflectthisdifference.d.Thetextwasrevisedtoclarifythatnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposesoftemperaturecontrolisnotconsideredasanadditionofpositivereactivity.vi.107.ITS3.9.4Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandtoreflectplant-specificnomenclature(e.g.,replace"monitors"with"channels").ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.TwoRequiredActions,similartothoseforConditionAwithoneinoperablesourcerangefluxchannel,wereaddedtoConditionBtorequireimmediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditions.ThesechangesprovideahumanfactorsimprovementsinceRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andB.1allhaveimmediateCompletionTimes.LocatingalltheserequirementsintoConditionBiseasierforoperationspersonneltoimplement.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.9.4,"ContainmentPenetrations"andassociatedBases,aspresentedinNUREG-1431,werenotaddedandsubsequentLCOsandBaseshavebeenrenumberedinconsecutiveorder.GinnaStationhasaplantspecificsafetyanalysis(UFSARSection15.7.3.3)forafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentwhichassumesnoisolationofthecontainmentandnofiltrationfollowingtheaccident.TheNRChasconcludedthatthisanalysisis"wellwithin"10CFR100limits(Ref.3.9.2).SinceLCO3.9.4requirementsonlyensurefissionproductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentduetoafuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingare"wellwithin"10CFR100limits(seeBases),theserequirementswerenotadded.ThischangeisdiscussedindetailinsectionC.2ofthisAttachment(item18.i).AsaresultofthedeletionofITS3.9.4,approvedTravellersBWOG-03,C.3,BMOG-03,C.6,WOG-05,C.2,andMOG-05,C.3,werenotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.-149-May1995 108.ITS3.9.5iv.V.I'ncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.2.SR3.9.5.1wasrevisedtoremovetheflowratefortheRHRloopinoperation.ForGinnaStation,theborondilutioneventistheonlyeventpostulatedtooccurinMODE6whichassumestheRHRsysteminoperation.,TheGinnaStationsafetyanalysisforborondilutioninNODE6(UFSARSection15.4.4.2)assumesuniformmixingoftheboratedcoolantasaresultofaRHRpumpbeinginoperationanddoesnotspecifyagivenflowrate.Therefore,thereisnoanalyticalbasisfortheinclusionofaflowrateintheSR.Thewords"andcirculatingreactorcoolant"werealsodeletedandrelocatedtothebases.ThisisanimpliedfunctionforanRHRloopinoperationandisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisandSR3.4.8.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-05,C.4.RequiredActionA.4andassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceG'irmaStationTScurrentlydonotcontainthisrequire'ment.TheITSRequiredActionto"closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere"isbasedonthescenariothattherearenoRHRloopsinoperation.Thiscouldleadoveraperiodoftimetoboilingofthecoolantand,shouldwaterlevelnotbemaintained,eventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.-Theclosureof"allcontainmentpenetrations"isonlyprovidedtolimitthereleaseofradioactivegasestotheatmosphere.PlantproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereestablishedatGinnaStation.inresponsetoGenericLetter88-017(Ref.3.9.3).'heseproceduresandadministrativecontrolsinclude(1)providingatleasttwoadequatemeansofaddinginventorytotheRCSand(2)closingcontainmentpenetrationsduringreducedRCSinventoryoperation.TheseproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereverifiedbytheNRCtobe.adequatelyimplemented(Ref.3;9.4).Sincepreviouslyapprovedcontrolsarein-placetoensureradioactivityreleasesfromchallengestotheintegrityofthefuelcladding,addingadditionalrestrictionsatahigherwaterlevelarenotnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a0Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.-150-May1995 b.ThebaseswasrevisedsincethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionsforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6.Thereis,however,anassumptionintheborondilutioneventthatoneRHRpumpisinoperation.C.Thebaseswasrevisedtoclarifythatwhileultimatelyitmaybepossibletoachievecriticalitywithoutthepresenceofmixing(e.g.,thermalorboronstratification),theborondilutionanalysisassumesthecoolantremainsahomogeneousmixture.Additionally,thebaseswasrevisedtoeliminatethetemperatureindicatingdevicesincethedefinitionofoperabilityfortheRHRloopwouldencompassthisdevice.vi.VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheRequiredActionconsistentwithLCO3.4.8.ThetitleforLCO3.9.5wasrevisedtobe"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23ft"whichisconsistentwiththeApplicability,GinnaStationprocedures,andallactivitieswhichrelatetoshutdownoperations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.109.ITS3.9.6IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.Incorporationofapp'rovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.2.Thistravellerwasmodifiedtoprovidevariouswordingchangestoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.May1995 4 RequiredAction8.3andassociatedbaseswerenotaddedsinceGinnaStationTScurrentlydonotcontainthisrequirement.TheITSRequiredActionto"closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere".isbasedonthescenariothattherearenoRHRloopsinoperation.Thiscouldleadoveraperiodoftimetoboilingofthecoolantand,shouldwaterlevelnotbemaintained,eventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.Theclosureof"allcontainmentpenetrations"isonlyprovidedtolimitthereleaseofradioactivegasestotheatmosphere.PlantproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereestablishedatGinnaStationinresponsetoGenericLetter88-017(Ref.3.9.3).Theseproceduresandadministrativecontrolsinclude(I)providingatleasttwoadequatemeansofaddinginventorytotheRCSand(2)closingcontainmentpenetrationsduringreducedRCSinventoryoperation.TheseproceduresandadministrativecontrolswereverifiedbytheNRCtobeadequatelyimplemented(Ref.3.9.4).Sincepreviouslyapprovedcontrolsarein-placetoensureradioactivityreleasesfromchallengestotheintegrityofthefuelcladding,addingadditionalrestrictionsatahigherwaterlevelarenotnecessary.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.rSR3.9.6.1wasrevisedtoremovetheflowratefortheRHRloopinoperation.ForGinnaStation,theborondilutioneventistheonlyeventpostulatedtooccurinMODE6whichassumestheRHRsysteminoperation.TheGinnaStationsafetyanalysisforborondilutioninMODE6(UFSARSection15.4.4.2)assumesuniformmixingoftheboratedcoolantasaresultofaRHRpumpbeinginoperationanddoesnotspecifya,givenflowrate.Therefore,thereisnoanalyticalbasisfortheinclusionofaflowrateintheSR.Thewords"andcirculatingreactorcoolant"werealsodeletedandrelocatedtothebases.ThisisanimpliedfunctionforanRHRloopinoperationandisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisandSR3.4.8.1.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsistencywithotherbasessections.b.Thebaseswasrevisedsince,thereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionsforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminMODE6.Thereis,however,anassumptionintheborondilutioneventthatoneRHRpumpisinoperation.-152-May1995 C.Thebaseswasrevisedtoclarifythatwhileultimatelyitmaybepossibletoachievecriticalitywithoutthepresenceofmixing(e.g.,thermalorboronstratification),theborondilutionanalysisassumesthecoolantremainsahomogeneous.mixture.Additionally,thebaseswasrevisedtoeliminatethetemperatureindicatingdevicesincethedefinitionofoperabilityfortheRHRloopwouldencompassthisdevice.vi~110.ITS3.9.7VariouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingoftheConditionsandRequiredActionsconsistentwithLCO3.4.8.ThetitleforLCO3.9.5wasrevisedtobe"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23ft"whichisconsistentwiththeApplicability,GinnaStationprocedures,andallactivitieswhichrelatetoshutdown.operations.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-03,C.6.Thebaseswererevisedasfollows(theseareITSCategory(iv)changes):a~Variouswordingchangesweremadetoimprovethereadabilityandunderstandingofthebases.Thisincludesprovidingconsi.stencywithotherbasessections.b.Thebaseswasrevisedtoclarifythatthefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentis"wellwithin"theexposure'uidelinesof10CFR100.ThisfractionalreleaselimithasbeenpreviouslyapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.3.9.2).TheApplicabi1itywasrevisedtorelocatethe"duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment"priorto"duringCOREALTERATIONS."TheexistingApplicabilityisveryconfusingwiththeexceptiontoCOREALTERATIONSprovided.Thishumanfactorsimprovementispreferredbylicensedpersonnel.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerGEOG-03,C.l(Rev.1)wasnotincorporatedsincethisdoesnotapplytoGinnaStation.Atypographicalorminorclarificationisidentified.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.Hay1995 112.ITS4.2113;ITS4.3-ApprovedTravellerNRC-01,C.lwasnotincorporatedsincethisdoesnot,applytoGinnaStation.ThecontrolrodassemblymaterialdescriptionwasnotaddedtothespecificationssincethespecificationalreadyrequiresNRCapprovalofthismaterial.Therefore,anychangeinmaterialwouldrequirebothaTSchangeandNRCapproval.ThisisaITSCategory(i)change.1V~v~ITS4.3.1.l.cand4.3.l.l.dwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseitemsarenotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThespacingoffuelassembliesintheSFPisultimatelycontrolledbyITS4.3.l.l.aand4.3.l.l.bwhichstatethatthespentfuel.storageracksaredesignedtolimitk,<<<0.95assumingthepoolcontainsfuelassemblieswith5.05weightpercentU-235enrichmentandisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.'hisisanITSCategory(i)change.ITS4.3.1.l.eand4.3.l.l.fwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseitemsarecontrolledbynewITS3.7.17.TherevisedITS3.7".17provideslimitsonthestorageoffuelinthetwoSFPregionswithappropriateaction.statementssuchthatTS4.3.l.eand4.3.l.farenolongerrequired.Consequently,approvedTravellerNRC-06,C.l(Rev.1)wasalsonotadded.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TheuseofconsolidatedrodstoragecanisterswasaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationTS5.4.4andReferences29and39.ITS4.3.1.2.dwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisisnotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.Thespacingoffuelassembliesin-thenewfuelpoolisultimatelycontrolledbyITS4.3.1.2.aand4.3.1.2.bwhichstatethatthenewfuelstorageracksaredesignedtolimitk,<<<0.95assumingthepoolcontainsfuelassemblieswith5.05weightpercentU-235enrichmentandisfullyfloodedwithunboratedwater.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.Thedescriptionofthenewfuelstoragerackswasclarifiedtostatethatthedescriptionappliedtothe"dry"racksconsistentwithReference29.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-154-Hay1995 VlITS4.3.2wasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclatureandtoprovideclarification.TheseareITSCategory(iv)changes.ITS4.3.3wasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationnomenclature.ThisisaITSCategory(iv)change.ItisnotedthatthevaluespecifiedfortheSFPcapacityisatheoreticalvaluebasedontheexclusiveuseofconsolidatedfuelcanisters(i.e.,nofuelassemblies).,ThecurrentSFPislimitedto1016fuelassembliesduetolimitationsoftheSFPCoolingSystem(seethebasesforcurrentGinnaStationTS5.4).SincetheheatremovalcapabilityoftheSFP.CoolingSystemdoesnotmeetthecriteriaoftheNRCPolicyStatement,thenewspecificationwasbasedonthetheoreticalvalue.114.ITS5.1IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.l.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.21.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.2.115.ITS5.21V~TS5.2.l.c-Thissectiondescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohave'irectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementtosupportmitigationoftheirconcernswasnotadded.TS5.2.l.arequiresthat"linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationshallbe'stablishedanddefinedthroughoutthehighestmanagementlevels."TheorganizationalstructureisspecifiedintheGinnaStationgAProgram.SincechangestothegAProgramarecontrolledby10CFR50.54(a)(3),equivalentcontrolisprovided.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.3.TS5.2.2.b-Thissectiondescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswasnotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(l),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and5.2.2.e.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.4.Hay1995 TS5.2.2.e-This.sectiondescribingtheovertimerequirementforunitstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionstorequirecontrolinaccordancewithanNRCapprovedprogramwasrevised.RGSEcurrentlyutilizesastaffworkinghourcontrolprogramwhichslightlydiffersfromheNRCPolicyStatementonWorkingHours(GenericLetter88-12).ThisprogramwaspreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.40).TheproposedwordingisconsideredmoreappropriateandconsistentwiththecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.2.2.f-ThissectiondescribingtherequirementsfortheOperationsManagertoholdanSROlicensewasnotadded.ThequalificationsofthispositionareaddressedinANSIStandardN18.1-1971referencedinTS5.3.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.2.2.g-ThissectiondescribingtherequirementsoftheShiftTechnicalAdvisors(STAs)wasrevised.TherequirementsspecifiedinTS5.3.1aremovedtoTS5.2.2.ginaccordancewithapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.6.ThewordingofTravellerBWOG-09,C.6wasrevisedtoreflectmoreappropriateandconsistentwordingtoGinnaStationcommitments.TheSTAprogramdoesnotmeetallherequirementsdenotedintheCommissionPolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift(GenericLetter86-04).ThecurrentSTAprogramisdiscussedinReferences41and42andwasreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.3.1-TherequirementforqualificationsofstaffnotcoveredbyRegulatoryGuide1.8wasnotadded.Thisrequirementwasnotconsiderednecessarysinceallactivitieswhichaffectnuclearsafetyarecontrolledbyothertechnicalspecificationrequirements,existingregulations,andthegAProgram.Also,Revision1ofRegulatoryGuide1.8wasnotrevisedtoRevision2inordertomaintainconsistencywiththecurrentgAProgramandexistingprocedures.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.6.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.8.-156-May1995 119.ITS5.6120.ITS5.7IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.9.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.1,wasmodifiedduetotheformatchangesprovidedbyTravellerBMOG-09,C.9.1V~v.V1.1XX.X1.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.10.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.7.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.11,supersedeschangesproposedbyapprovedTravellersWOG-06,C.2,andMOG-06,C.3.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.12.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.13.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.13,supersedeschangesproposedbyapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.3.Additionalcrossreferences,similartothosedeletedbyTravellerSMOG-09,C13,werenotadded.Ingeneral,theformatoftheNUREG-1431doesnotincludetheuseofcrossreferences.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.Thesechangesareprovidedforconsistencywiththenew10CFR20references.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.14.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.15.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.16.IncorporationofI'approved]TravellerBWOG-09,C.17.TS5.7.2.13-TherequirementsfortheSteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgramwererevisedtoreflectcurrentGinnaStationlicensingbasis.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.18,providedareviewersnotethatthelicenseescurrentlicensingbasisprogramdescriptionbeprovided.TheproposedTS5.5.9providesthisprogramdescription.ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerWOG-06,C.4.-157-May1995 XlV.XV.Xvl.Xvl1.XV111.Xlx.XX.121.ITS5.8TS5.7.2.15-TherequirementsfortheVentilationFilter'estingProgram(VFTP)wererevisedtoreflectcurrentGinnaStationtestfrequenciesandmethods.Theseareperformed,wherepractical,inaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52andANSIN510-1975.DuetotherevisionofTS5.7.2.15,theapprovedtravellerWOG-06,C.5,wasnotincorporated.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerNRC-02,C.13.TS5.7.2.16-TherequirementforcontrolofthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinoutdoorliquidradwastetankswasnotaddedsincetherearenooutdoorliquidradwastetanksatGinnaStation.Thedescriptionofthemethodologyusedindeterminingradioactivityquantitiesinthewastegasdecaytankswasrevisedtoreflectcurrentlicensing'asis.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.7.2.12-Theinservicetestingprogramdescriptionwasrevisedtoincludehighenergypipingoutsidecontainmentandsteamgeneratortubes.ThisisconsistentwiththeGinnaStationcurrentlicensingbasisandapprovedISTprogram.ThisisanITSCategory(ii)change.TS5.7.2.17-TherequirementdenotingthepurposeofthedieselfueloiltestingprogramwasrevisedtoreflectGinnaStationcurrentlicensingbasis.ApprovedTravellerWOG-06,C6,wasnotincorporatedduetotheproposedrevisionstotheserequirements.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.19.TS5.7.2.14-ThesecondarywaterchemistryprogramwasrevisedconsistentwiththecurrentprogramspecifiedintheGinnaStationlicense.TheseareITSCategory(i)changes.122.ITS5.9IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.20.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-25,C.3.~~lloIncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.21.TheincorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.21,wasrevisedtoreflectasubmittaldateconsistentwiththereportingrequirementsof10CFR20.2206(c).ThisisanITSCategory(iv)change.-158-Hay1995 1V.v.V1,1X.123.ITS5.10IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.22.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.23.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.T.TS5.9.2.b-Therequirementforaspecialreportfollowingfourormorevalidfailuresofanindividualemergencydieselgeneratorinthelast25demandswasnotaddedsincetherequirementisnotspecifiedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Anyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.9.2.d-TherequirementforaspecialreportfollowingdegradationofthecontainmentstructuredetectedduringtestrequiredbythePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramwasnotaddedsincetherequirementis,notspecifiedinthecurrentTechnicalSpecifications.Anyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.18.ThisTravellerwasrevisedtoreflectthattherequirementforaspecialreportforsteamgeneratortubeinspectionswasnotaddedsincetherequirementisnotspecifiedinthecurr'entTechnicalSpecifications.Anyrequiredreportcanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicenseesadministrativecontrols.ThisisanITSCategory(i)change.TS5.9.2.c-TherequirementforaSpecialReportfollowingextendedPostAccidentMonitoringinstrumentationinoperabilityandtheassociateddetailsofthereportandwhenitshouldbesubmittedwerenotadded.Thedetailscanbeadequatelycontrolledbythelicensee'sadministrativecontrols.ThisinformationwasaddedtothebasesfortheLCORequiredActionswhichrequiredtheSpecialReporttobewritten.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.IncorporationofapprovedTravellerBWOG-09,C.24,supersedestheincorporationofapprovedTravellerBWR-06,C.8.124.ITS5.11Thesechangesareprovidedforconsistencywiththenew10CFR20references.ThisisanITSCategory(iii)change.May1995 JUSTIFICATION(CURRENTGINNATS)ConvertingtotheITSformatwillprovideasignificanthumanfactorsimprovementbylocatingsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesectionandalsoprovideastandardstructure.Inaddition,theexpandedbasesinformationwillsupportpreparationofsafetyevaluationsandtrainingactivities.ThereareseveraltypesofchangesthatarebeingrequestedbythisLARinordertoperformtheconversion.ThesechangesarewithrespecttoboththeITSandthecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.ThetechnicalandsignificantadministrativechangesrelatedtothecurrentGinnaStationTSareorganizedintomultiplecategoriesassummarizedbelow.RelocationofRequirementsWithinTechnicalSpecificationsManycurrentspecificationsaremovedtosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirementswithinthesamesection.Sincetherequirementsareonlybeingrelocatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications,thereisnoreductioninsafety.Thiscategoryismainlyusedtoidentifymultiplerequidementsthatareconsolidatedintoasinglenewspecificationandnotfor.listingrequirementswhichar'eonlyrenumbered.EliminationofDuplicatedRegulatoryRequirementsSeveralspecificationscurrentlyduplicateexistingregulatoryrequirements.Theremovalofthesespecificationseliminatestheneedtochangetechnicalspecificationswhentherearerulechanges.SincealllicenseesmustmeettheapplicablerequirementscontainedintheCodeofFederalRegulations,orhaveNRCapprovedexemptions,therearesufficientregulatorycontrolsinplacetoalloweliminationofduplicatedrequirementsfrom,technicalspecifications.Theimplementationoftheserequirementsarecontainedinproceduresandotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.iii.RelocationofCurrentRequirementsToOtherControlledDocumentsTherelocationofcertainrequirementstootherlicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSAR,gAProgram,andplantprocedures)doesnoteliminatetherequirement.Instead,therequirementsarerelocatedtoothermoreappropriatedocumentsandprogramswhichhavesufficientcontrolsinplacetomanageimplementationandfuturechanges(e.g.,10CFR50.54(a)(3)and10CFR50.59).TherelocationoftheseitemswillenableRGEEtomoreefficientlymaintaintherequirementsunderexistingregulationsandreducetheneedtorequesttechnicalspecificationchangesforissueswhichdonotaffectpublicsafety.-160-May1995 iv.AdditionofNewITSRequirementsThereareseveralrequirementscontainedinNUREG-1431whicharenotcurrentlyintheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications.TheseITSrequirementswereaddedinordertoprovideamorecompletespecification.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(iv.a)ora"lessrestrictivechange"(iv.b).V.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Technical)SeveralchangestoexistingrequirementsweremadetoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431.ExamplesincludemovingrequirementstoLCONotesandrevisingthecurrentspecifiedCompletionTime.Alsoincludedwithinthiscategoryaretherevisionoftheexistingbasestoreflectmorecurrentinformation.Changeswithinthiscategoryarefurtheridentifiedaseitherbeinga"morerestrictivechange"(v.a),"lessrestrictivechange"(v.b),oran"administrativechange"(v.c).vi.OtherChangestoTechnicalSpecifications(Administrative)Severalminorchangestothetechnicalspecificationsweremadethatareminorrevisionsonlyanddonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.ExamplesincludeupdatesofreferencestotheCodeofFederalRegulations.ThefollowingsectiondiscusseschangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhichwerenotaddressedinSectionC'ofthisattachment.ThissectionisorganizedbasedontheexistingTSchapternumberstofacilitateeasierreview.Eachchangeisalsoidentifiedwithrespecttooneoftheabovecategories(e.g.,GinnaStationTSCategory(i)).AmarkedupcopyoftheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisprovidedinAttachment8whichidentifiesmajorchangesonly.Acrossreferenceisprovidedinthemarginofeachspecificationthathasbeenchangedbyuseofacirclecontainingsectionnumbersfrombelow.Forexample,"l.i"foundinthemarginofthemarkupwouldrefertosectionl.ibelow.AcrossreferencebetweentheITSandcurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecific'ationsisalsoprovidedinAttachmentE.TechnicalSpecification1.0TS1.2-ThedefinitionsofoperatingMODESwererevisedasfollows(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):a..Refueling-seeNotel.iibelow./b.ColdShutdown-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom<-1~k/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.-161-May1995 HotShutdown-Thereactivitylimit.wasrevisedfrom<-1~k/k%to<0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperaturewasalsorevisedfrom>540Fto>350F.Thischangeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnot'efinedinTS1.2.TheexpansionofthistemperaturerangeisconservativesincethecurrentTSonlyusetheHotShutdownMODEintwoaspects..Thefirstmethodisrequiringashutdowntothismodedueto.plantconditions.Sincetheuppertemperaturerangefor'otShutdownremainsthesame(i.e.,theOperatingMODEtemperature),thereisnoimpact.ThesecondmethodistorequirecertainequipmenttobeOPERABLEinthismode.However,loweringthetemperaturelimitto350FrequiresthattheequipmentwouldbeOPERABLEforalargertemperaturerange..Operating-Thereactivitylimitwasrevisedfrom>-1~k/k%to>0.99k,<<whichareequivalentlimits.Theaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureof-580FwasnotaddedsincethisparameterisspecifiedinnewLCO3.4.1.Inaddition,theOperatingMODEwasseparatedintotwomodes:OperatingandStartup.Theonlydifferencebetweenthesetwo'modesisthatStartupisdefinedwhenthereactoris<5%RatedThermalPower(RTP)whiletheOperatingMODEiswhenthereactoris>5%RTP.Anewoperatingmode(HotStandby)wasprovidedbetweenHotShutdownandColdShutdown.Thismodeisdefinedaswhenthereactivityconditionis<0.99k.<<andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis350Fand>200Fwhenthereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarefullytensioned.Thedefinitionofthisnewmodeeliminatestheuseofanintermediatemodeof350FasfoundthroughoutthecurrentTSwhichisnotdefinedinTS1.2.-162-May1995

TS1.3-Thisdefinitionofrefuelingwasdeleted.ThecurrentTS1.2providesadefinitionofrefuelingasbeingthereactormodewhenreactivityis<-5~k/k%andtheaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureis<140F.TS1.3statesthatrefuelingis"anyoperationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrodswhenthevesselheadisunbolted"whichisasubsetofthemodedefinedinTS1.2.ThenewTSTablel.1-1statesthatrefuelingisanyconditioninwhich"oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltislessthanfullytensioned"withfuelinthereactor.Whileanaveragereactorcoolanttemperatureorreactivitylimitisnolongerprovidedfortherefuelingmodedefinition,thereactorvesselheadclosureboltscannotberemovedatelevatedreactorcoolanttemperaturesorwhentheRCSispressurizedduetotheirdesign.AreactivitylimitisalsonotrequiredwhentheRCSisdepressurized.Therefore,thenewdefinitionoftherefuelingmodeismoreconservativethancurrentTS1.3andgenerallyconsistentwithTS1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS1.5-ThedefinitionforOperatingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisaddressedbythenewdefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITY.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS1.6-ThedefinitionforDegreeofRedundancy(InstrumentChannels)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisno'ongerrequired.'Thisdefinition'isaddressedwithinnew'TS3.3(Instrumentation).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.7.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecifythattheCHANNELCALIBRATIONincludestherequiredinterlockandtimeconstantfunctionsofthechannel.Inaddition,discussionofcalibratinginstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetectorswasaddedforclarification.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.2-Thelastsentenceofthisdefinitionwasrevisedasfollows:IThisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossiblecomparisonofthechannelindicationamdt'~'.aid'status~~48otherindicationsastorsatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.TheseminorchangesprovidegreaterclarificationofthedefinedtermandareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.-163-Hay1995 TS1.7.3-Thedefinitionsfortestingofanalogandbistablechannelswerecombinedintoonedescriptionwithanewtitle.Theonlydifferencebetweenthetwodefinitionsisthattestingofbistablechannelsrequiredinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensorversus"asclosetothesensoraspossible"foranalogchannels.Sincethebistablemustbeactuatedtodetermineoperability,maintainingtheanalogchanneldescriptionforthecombineddefinitionisacceptable.Inaddition,thecombineddefinitionwasexpandedtorequire"adjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthe'setpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy."TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.7.4-ThedefinitionforSourceCheckwasnotaddedtothenewspeci'ficationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheperformanceofaSourceCheckisnowaddressedwithinthedefinitionofCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCHANNELOPERATINGTEST(COT).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.8-ThedefinitionforContainmentIntegritywasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ContainmentIntegrityisaddressedbynewTS3.6whichessentiallyrequirescompliancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.10-ThedefinitionforHotChannelFactorswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheHotChannelFactorlimitisonlydiscussedinoneLCOwiththelimitdefinedintheCOLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TSl.11-Thispreviouslydeleteddefinitionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS1.12-TheFrequencyforSurveillanceRequirementsisnowspecifiedinhours,daysormonthsinthenewspecificationssuchthatthecurrentdefinitionofFrequencyNotationisnolongerrequired.Consequently,thisdefinitionwasreplacedwithageneraldescriptionofhowtouseandapply.theFrequencyrequirements.Inaddition,thedefinitionofrefuelingFrequencywasrevisedfrom18monthsto24monthsforallsystems.ThisisdiscussedinAttachmentHandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.1)change.TS1.13-ThedefinitionforOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.TheODCMisdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.May1995 XV.XX.TS1.14-ThedefinitionforProcessControlProgram(PCP)wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThePCPwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRManddoesnotneedtobedescribedw'ithinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.15-ThedefinitionforSolidificationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.SolidificationisdescribedwithinthePCPwhichwasrelocatedfromthetechnicalspecificationstotheTRM.Therefore,thisdefinitiondoesnotneedtobeprovidedinnewTS1.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.16-ThedefinitionforPurge-Purgingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurge.systemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.17-ThedefinitionforVentingwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitiononlypertainstotheContainmentPurgesystemwhichisdescribedinnewTS3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS1.18-Thereferencetothe"doseconversionfactorsforadultthyroiddoseviainhalation"wasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceaspecificreferencetoTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109wasadded.Thistableonlycontainsdoseconversionfactorsforadultsviainhalation..,Therefore,theexistingreferenceisnolongernecessary.ThischangeisconsistentwithTravellerWSTS-l,C.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS1.19-ThedefinitionforReportableEventwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ReportableEventsaredescribedin10CFR50.72and50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS1.20-ThedefinitionforCanistersContainingConsolidatedFuelRodswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitisnolongerrequired.ThisdefinitionisprovidedinnewTS4.3whichistheonlysectionthataddressesconsolidated,fuelrods.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-165-May1995 TS1.21-ThedefinitionforShutdownMarginwasexpandedtorequireanotherassumptionthatinHODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotze}opowertemperature.Also,thedefinitionwasr'evisedtorequireconsiderationofanyRCCAknowntobeincapableofbeingfullyinserted.ThisisinadditiontotheexistingassumptionsrelatedtoastuckfullywithdrawnsingleRCCAwiththehighestreactivityworth.Thedefinitiondescriptiondiscussing"nochangesinxenonorboronconcentration"wasdeletedsincethislevelofdetailisnotrequired.Theseclarifications,whichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431,areGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS1.4-ThedefinitionforOPERABLE-OPERABILITYwasrevisedtoremove"supports."ThisphrasewasaddedtothecurrentdefinitionbyReference3butisnotconsistentwiththedefiniti'onasprovidedinNUREG-1431.Therefore,toprovidedconsistency,thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Thefollowingdefinitionswereaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheassociatedtermsareusedthroughoutthedocument(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):a~b.C.d.e.f.g,h.1~J~k.ACTIONS ACTUATIONLOGICTESTAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCECOREALTERATIONCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)LEAKAGEPHYSICSTESTSPRESSURETEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)RATEDTHERMALPOWERSTAGGEREDTESTBASISTRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseofLogicalConnectorswithinthenewTS.'hissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v..c)change.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheCompletionTimeconventionwithinthenewTS.ThereareseveralchangesfromthecurrentGinnaStationTSformatwhicharediscussedinthissection(theseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes):-166-Hay1995 a0CompletionTimesinthenewTSarebasedontheformatthattheclockforallRequiredActionsbeginfromthetimethattheConditionisentered.TheCompletionTimesinthenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSaretypicallyequal.Forexample,thenewspecificationsmayrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within36hoursforaspecifiedConditionwhilethecurrentGinnaStationTSrequirethattheplantbeinMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4withinanadditional30hoursforthesameCondition.TheintentofboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTSisthesame(i.e.beinMODE4within36hours).xxvi~b.ThenewspecificationsrestrictmultipleentriesintotheACTIONtableforseparateConditionsunlessitisspecificallystatedasacceptable.Forexample,ifoneSIpumpisinoperableandduringtheLCO,asecondSIpumpisde'claredinoperable,theplantwouldenter3.0conditionsinboththenewspecificationsandthecurrentGinnaStationTS.IfthefirstSIpumpwererestoredtoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringMODE3,theplantcouldresumeoperationinbothTS.However,inthecurrentTS,theCompletionTimeforrestoringthesecondSIpumptoOPERABLEstatuswouldbeginfromthetimethatitwasdeclaredinoperable.Inthenewspecifications,theCompletionTimewouldbeginfromthetimethefirstpumpwasdeclaredinoperable'withanadditional24hoursallowed.Thisisaconservativechange.AnewsectionwasaddedtothespecificationswhichexplainstheuseoftheFrequenciesspecifiedwithintheSRs.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements,onlyadescriptionandexamplesofhowtousethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TechnicalSpecification2.11~TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtonotonlyincludewhenthereactorisin"operation"orcritical,butalsowheninMODE2andsubcritical.ThisensuresthattheReactorCoreSafetyLimitsarealsometduringreactorstartupsincethereisapotentialforaninadvertentcriticalitywiththereactornearnormaloperatingtemperatureandpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-167-May1995 3.TechnicalSpecification2.2TheApplicabilitywasrevisedto"HODES1,2,3,4,and5."TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequirethisSafetyLimit(SL)tobemetwhenfuelisinthevesselwithoneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensionedorwiththeheadremoved.Withthereactorheadboltslessthanfullytensioned,itishighlyunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurizedgreaterthantheSLpressureduetothelowtemperatureover-pressureprotectionrequirements.Withtheheadremoved,itisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.2)change.TechnicalSpecification2.3ThisentiresectionwasrelocatedtoITSChapter3.3,"Instrumentation."ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3-Variouslimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)areaddressedas"TripSetpoints,""AllowableValues,"or"ApplicableHodes"(aspermissives)fortheirrespectiveReactorTripSystem(RTS)instrumentationFunctionsinnewLCO3.3.1.SpecificchangestotheLSSSarediscussedbelowforeachoftheassociatedFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS2.3.1.2.dandTS2.3.1.2.e-VariousparametersusedinthemethodologyfordeterminingtheOvertemperature~TandtheOverpower~TFunctionswerenotaddedtothespecifications.TheseparametersareassociatedwithvariableswhichmaychangeasaresultofareloadanalysisandarerelocatedtotheCOLR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.iv.V.TS2.3.3.1,TS2.3.3.2,andFigure2.3-1-TheLSSSforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumTripSetpointvalue.CriteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebasesforLCO3.3.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS2.3.1.2.g-TheLSSSfortheRCPunderfrequencyFunctionswas'notaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisisjustifiedinReference44whichshowsthatthistripfunction,thoughinstalledatGinnaStation,isnotrequiredorapplicablebasedontheoffsitepowersourcedesign.ThissetpointandrequirementarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-168-Hay1995 TechnicalSpecification3.0AnewsectionLCO3.0.1wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheApplicabilitystatementinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.1.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.1V.AnewsectionLCO3.0.2wasaddedwhichexplainstheuseoftheassociatedACTIONSupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCOinthenewTS.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithLCO3.0.2.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.0.1-ThiswasrevisedtoclarifytheuseoftheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)anassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies,or(2)theconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThecurrentrequirementthattheLCOtimelimitsapplyiftheyaremorelimitingthatthoserequiredbyLCO3.0.3isdeletedandanexpandeddiscussionisprovidedintheBasistoclarifytheapplicabilityofthisrequirement.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheclarificationsandexamplesarebasedontheusethenewITSformat.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionLCO3.0.4wasaddedwhichexplainsthelimitationsonchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmetinthenewTS.ThissectionprovidesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Hay1995 v~vi.AnewsectionLCO3.0.5wasaddedtoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forinstanceswhererestorationofinoperableequipmenttoanOPERABLEstatuscouldnotbeperformedwhilecontinuingtocomplywithRequiredActions.HanyTechnicalSpecificationACTIONSrequireaninoperablecomponenttoberemovedfromservice,suchas:maintaininganisolationvalveclosedortrippinganinoperableinstrumentchannel.ToallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstratetheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice,ortodemonstratetheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentwhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedwithoutreturningtheequipmenttoservice,anexceptiontotheseRequiredActionsisnecessary.LCO3.0.5isnecessarytoestablishanallowancethat,althoughinformallyutilizedinrestorationofinoperableequipment,isnotformallyrecognizedinthepresentSpecifications.MithoutthisallowancecertaincomponentscouldnotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandaplantshutdownwouldensue.Clearly,itisnottheintentordesirethattheTechnicalSpecificationstoprecludethereturntoserviceofasuspectedOPERABLEcomponenttoconfirmitsOPERABILITY.Thisallowanceisdeemedtorepresentamorestable,safeoperationthanrequirin'gaplantshutdowntocompletetherestorationandconfirmatorytesting.Sincethisrequirementisinformallyutilizedandhasnolicensingbasis,thissectionisconsideredtoprovidenewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseand'formatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.0.2-ThiswasdeletedandreplacedbyLCO3.0.6whichprovidesguidanceregardingtheappropriateACTIONStobetakenwhenasingleinoperability(e.g.,asupportsystem)alsoresultsintheinoperabilityofoneormorerelatedsystems(e.g.,supportedsystem(s)).SinceitsfunctionistoclarifyexistingambiguitiesandtomaintainactionswithintherealmofpreviousindustryinterpretationsandNRCpositions,thisnewprovisiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.TheinformationcontainedinTS3.0.2wasrelocatedtoLCO3.8.1whichallowsonepowersourcetoasafeguardsbusandaredundantsafetyfeaturesonasecondbustobeinoperablefor12hoursversus1hour.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-170-Hay1995 TechnicalAnewsectionLCO3.0.7wasaddedtoprovideguidanceregardingTestExceptionsforLCO3.1.8.ThisLCOallowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecificationrequirementstobechanged(i.e.,madeapplicableinpartorwhole,orsuspended)topermittheperformanceofspecialtestsoroperationswhichotherwisecouldnotbeperformed.IfthisTestExceptionLCOdidnotexist,manyofthespecialtestsandoperationsnecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,specialmaintenanceactivitiesandspecialevolutionscouldnotbeperformed.ThisSpecificationeliminatestheconfusionwhichwouldotherwiseexistastowhichLCOsapplyduringtheperformanceofaspecialtestoroperation.WithoutthisspecificallowancetochangetherequirementsofanotherLCO,aconflictofrequirementscouldbeincorrectlyinterpretedtoexist.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.ThisLCOprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheLCOsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification3.1.1TS3.1;l.l.b-ThisrequirementwaschangedtorequireentryintoMODE1<8.5%RTPwithinfourhoursversusanimmediatepowerreductionunderadministrativecontrol.Thischangedefinesaspecificnumberofhourstoreachthisconditionwhichprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperators.TheremainingactionsasspecifiedbyTS.3.l.l.l.bwererelocatedtoLCO3.4.5andarediscussedin6.iibelow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.1.l.b,3.1.1.l.c,and3.l.l.l.d-TheserequirementswererevisedpernewLCO3.4.5torequirebothreactorcoolantloopsOPERABLEwithoneloopinoperationduringMODES1<8.5%RTP,andMODES2and3,versusoneinoperationandtheotherOPERABLEfornaturalcirculationbetween350Fand8.5%RTP.However,oneRCSloopisnowallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursprovidedthattheshutdownmarginasprovidedintheCOLRismaintainedandthenon-operatingRCSloopisOPERABLE(i.e.,availablefornaturalrecirculation).Theseareallconservativechanges(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes)since:a0b.TwoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.AdefinedperiodoftimeisnowspecifiedforoneRCSloopoperationwhichaddressestheconcernraisedbyReference12.Inaddition,CompletionTimesarenowspecifiedforverifyingshutdownmarginandnaturalcir'culationcapability.-171-May1995 TS3.1.1.l.f-TheexceptionfornotrequiringtheRCSorRHRloopsduringsteamgeneratorcrevicecleaningoperationswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceRGREnolongerperformsthisactivityandthenewSGsscheduledtobeinstalledin1996donothavecrevicessubjectedtocleaningasdescribedinthisspecification.Thisisaconserva'tivedeletionandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.1.l.g-TheactiontobeinColdShutdown(i.e.,(200F)within24hourswasnotaddedfortheConditionwithbothRHRloopsinoperableandonlyoneRCSloopinoperableconsistentwithConditionBofLCO3.4.6.SinceRHRistheonlysystemwhichprovideslong-termdecayheatremovalbelow200F,itisnotprudenttobringtheplanttoalowerMODEuntilRHRisrecovered.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.l.l.l.k-ThisrequirementwaschangedintoaNoteforLCO3.4.6and3.4.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.l.l.l.f-ThisrequirementwasrevisedtorequireoneRHRlooptobeoperating.wheninMODE5consistentwithLCO3.4.7and3.4.8.A'RHRpumpisrequiredtobeoperatingsinceaRCP'annotberoutinelyoperatedundertheselowtemperatureandpressureconditions.However,aSGwithminimumwaterlevelof16%canprovideanalternatemeansofdecayheatremovaltotheoperatingRHRloopinMODE5withtheloopsfilled.Inaddition,alimitof15minutes(versus1hour)was'lacedonremovingbothRHRloopsfromserviceinMODE5withtheloopsnotfilledduetothereducedRCSinventory.Th'eseareconservativechangestothecurrentrequirementsandareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.l.l.l.e-ThenoteassociatedwiththepowersourcesfortheRHRloopshasbeenrelocatedtothespecificationsforelectricalrequirementsduringMODES5and6(i.e.,LCOs3.8.2,3.8.5,3.8.8,and3;8.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.1.l.iand3.1.l.l.j-TheserequirementswerenotaddedduetotheexpandedspecificationsprovidedinnewTS3.4.4,3.4.5,3.4.6,3.4.7,and3.4.8.,ThenewspecificationsensurethattheappropriateRCSorRHRloopisavailabletoprovideforcedflowfordecayheatremovalandboronmixing.Therefore,theserequirementsarenolongernecessary.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-172-May1995 TS3.1.1.5.a-Thelowerlimitforpressurizerwaterlevel(12%)wasnotadded.ThislowerlimitwasrelatedtothepreviousSafetyInjectionactuationlogicwhichrequiredacoincidentlowpressurizerlevelandlowpressurizerpressuretrip.ThislogicwasmodifiedasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45)toeliminatethecoincidentlowpressurizerleveltrip(Ref.46)suchthatthesetpointisnolongerusedinanUFSARChapter15accidentanalysis.Therefore,thelowpressurizerwaterlevelsetpointisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.3)change.TS3.1.1.5.b-ThecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringthepressurizerheatersandwaterlevelsetpointsduringtheRCShydrotestwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowMODE3conditions'i.e.,<350F).SincethenewspecificationonlyrequiresthepressurizertobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.1.6-TherequirementforthereactorvesselheadventswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseventsdonotmeetthecriteriaspecifiedintheNRCPolicyStatement.ThisisduetothefactthattheventsareusedtoexhaustnoncondensiblegasesandsteamfromtheRCSwhichcouldinhibitnaturalcirculationfollowinganaccidentwithanextendedlossofoffsitepower.However,theseventsarenottheprimarysuccesspathandareonlyusedbyoperatorsifbothpressurizerPORVsareunavailable.TheseventsarenotusedinthesafetyanalysesnorwereidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantintheGinnaStationLevel2PRA(Ref.47).Thisrequirement'illberelocatedfromTStotheTRM.TheremainingrequirementscontainedwithinthisspecificationrelatetothepressurizerPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalveswhichareaddressedin,TS3.1.1.4.TheserequirementswererevisedasdiscussedinSection0,items6.xiiiand6.xivbel'ow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.1.1.3.aand3.1.1.3.b-TheserequirementswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotprovideoverpressurizationprotectionduringColdShutdownandRefuelingconditions..Thisisprovidedbythelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)requirementasspecifiedincurrentTS3.15andnewLCO3.4.12.Sincethepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperform'safetyfunctionduringtheselowMODESofoperation,theserequirementswerenotretained.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.4)change.-173-May1995 xiv~xv.xvi.TS3.1.1.4.a.iand3.1.1.6-ThesewererevisedtoprovideseparateRequiredActionsforthePORVsbasedonthereasonfortheirinoperability.APORVwhichisinoperableforautomaticfunctionsbutcapableofmanualactuationmustbeisolatedbyitsblockvalveconsistentwiththecurrentrequirement.However,aPORVwhichisincapableofmanualcyclingisrequiredtobeisolatedbyitsblock.valvewithin1hourandrepairedwithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.Inaddition,withbothPORVsinoperable,acontrolledshutdowntoMOOE3conditionswithRCS<500'Fmustbeaccomplishedwithin8'ours.ThislimitonoperationwithaninoperablePORVisprovidedsinceaSGTReventcannotbemitigatedunderthiscondition.The72hoursforoneinoperablePORVisallowedsincethesecondPORVisavailable.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.1.1.4.a.iiand3.1.1.6-'hiswasrevisedtorequirethatoneorbothinoperableblockvalvesmustberestored'oOPERABLEstatuswithin72hoursortheplantmustinitiateacontrolledshutdown.ThislimitonoperationwithaninoperableblockvalveisprovidedsinceastuckopenPORVcannotbeisolatedinthiscondition.ThesechangesalsosupersedethoseproposedinReference60.ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.1.1.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.TS3.1.1.3.d-ANotewasaddedwhichallowsthepressurizersafetyvalvestoberemovedfromserviceabove350'Fforthepurposeofsettingthevalvesunderhot(i.e.,ambient)conditionsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.May1995 xvl1.TechnicalTS3.1.1.3.c-Thiswasrevisedtochangethepressurizersafetyvalveliftsettingsfrom2485psig+1%to2485psig+2.4%,-3%.Thevalveliftsettingsarerequiredtobesettowithin+1%followingtesting;howevertheOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenrevised.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceshavebeenevaluatedinthemostlimitingpressuretransientsforGinnaStation(i.e.',lossofexternalloadandlockedrotorevents)andfoundtoresultinacceptableresultswithrespecttothesafetylimitvalues.Thischangeisaresultofaneventinwhichthepressurizersafetyvalveswerefoundtohavedriftedoutsidetheexisting'1%tolerancebandfollowingtesting(Ref.58).RevisingtheOPERABILITYtoleranceswillreducethepotentialforfutureLERsforanissuewhichhasbeendemonstratedtoremainwithintheaccidentanalysisrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.45)change.Specification3.1.2TS3.1.2.l.a,Figure3.1-1,andFigure3.1-2-TheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswererelocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLRwhichisaddressedunderAdministrativeControls.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.1.2.l.b-TherequirementforperiodicallyrecalculatingtheRCStemperatureandpressurecurvesandtheRCSheatupandcooldowncurvesandlimitswasrelocatedfromtechnicalspecificationstothePTLR.Aperiodicreviewisalreadyrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixHwhichdoesnotneedtoberestatedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.1V.TS3.1.2.1.c.l'-ThetimeallowedtoperformanengineeringanalysistodeterminethattheRCSisacceptabletocontinueoperationafterapressureand/ortemperaturelimitisexceededwasincreasedfrom6hoursto72hours.Adurationof6hoursisnotsufficienttimetoaccomplishtherequiredengineeringanalysis,especiallyiftheeventweretooccurduringeveningorearlymorninghourswithlimitedstaffsupportimmediatelyavailable.SinceNRCacceptedguidanceforperforming.thenecessarycalculationsexists,allowing72hourstocompletetheanalysesisappropriate,especiallysincethedurationofeventisverylimited(i.e.,controlledbyLCO3.4.3).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.6)change.TS3.1.2.2-Thiswasnotaddedsincethistemperaturelimitisnotrequiredforsafeoperation.AllnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesarerelocatedtothePTLRwhilenewLCO3.4.1provideslimitsonRCSpressure,temperature,andflow.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.5)change.-175-May1995 V.TS3.1.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethepressurizerheatupandcooldownratestothePTLR.Themaximumtemperaturedifferencebetweenthepressurizerandsprayfluidwasnotaddedsincethislimitiscontrolledbythecooldowncurves.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changesrespectively.TechnicalSpecification3.1.3TS3.1.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoraisetheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityfrom500Fto540F.Thischangewasmadetocorrectadiscrepancybetweenthedefinitionofreactoroperatingmodesandthisrequirement.Currently,GinnaStationTS1.2definesHotShutdownasReactivity<-1~k/kKandT.,>540F.Inordertoachievecriticalityat500F,theHotShutdownconditionwouldhavetobedirectlybypassed.Avalueof540Fwasselectedforthenewminimumtemperatureforcriticalitybasedonpreviousoperatingexperienceduringstartupconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.1.3.2-ThiswasnotaddedsinceLCO3.4.2specifiestheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheminimumtemperaturewithrespecttothereactorvesseliscontainedinthePTLRandisbelowthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.4.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.3.3-TheexistingactionstatementwasrevisedtorequirethattheplantbeinMODE2withk,<<<1.0within30minutesifT.,foroneorbothRCSloopswas<540Fversussubcriticalbyanamountequaltoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityduetodepressurization.Thenewrequirementprovidescleara'ndpreciseinstructionstooperationsandensuresthattheplantisquicklybroughttoaconditioninwhichtheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.iv~V.TS3.1.3.1-TheMTCrequirementsaremovedfromtheRCSchapterintheGinnaStationTStotheReactivityControlSystemsChapter.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.1.3.'1-ThiswasrevisedtoreferencecyclespecificMTCrequirementsintheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheMTCmaximumupperlimitdescribedinTS3.1.3.1remainsthesameinITSLCO3.1.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.May1995 9.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4TS3.1.4.4-ThisspecificationwasrevisedtoonlyrequireshutdowntoMODE3withT.,<500'Fwithin8hoursversusColdShutdownwithin40hoursconsistentwiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.1.4.l.c-ThelimitonsecondarycoolantactivityisnowrequiredtobemetinMODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustwhenthereactoriscriticalorRCStemperatureis>500F.Thesecondarycoolantactivitylimitisbasedonasteamlinebreakandtheresultingdoseconsequences.ARCStemperatureof>500FisbasedonpreventingtheMSSVsfromliftingfollowingaSGTR(i.e.,aRCStemperatureof500Fisonlyapplicabletoprimarysystemactivitylimitsnotsecondarylimits).Inaddition,ifthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitsarenotmet,TS3.1.4.4requiresenteringcoldshutdown(i.e.,MODE5)within40hours.RequiringthesecondarycoolantactivitylimitstobemetforallofMODE4(i.e.,RCSis>200F)providesconsistencywithNUREG-1431andthecurrentRequiredActionsifthelimitisexceeded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.10.TechnicalSpecification3.1.5TS3.1.5.1.1-Addedanewrequirementforthecontainmentsump"A"levelorpumpactuationperLCO3.4.15.Thisleakagedetectionsystemreplacesthecontainmenthumiditydetectorsandtheaircoolercondensateflowmonitor.Thecontainment'humiditydetectorsdonotmeettherequiredleakageratedetectioncapabilityof1.0gpmwithin4hoursasrequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.19).Inaddition,thecontainmenthumiditydetectorsarerecommendedbyRG1.45(Ref.17)toonlybeusedasanalarmorindirectindicationofleakagetocontainmentandnotasaseparatemethodofdetectingleakage.TheremainingleakagedetectionsystemsprovideadequatemonitoringasdiscussedinthenewbasesandSectionC,item46.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.1.5.1.1and3.1.5.1.2-TheRCSleakagedetectionsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandRCSLEAKAGEwithinlimitsaboveMODE4.(200'F)andnot350FperLCO3.4.15and3.4.13.TheincreasedLCOApplicabilitywilladdressallMODESinwhichtheRCSisatanincreasedtemperatureandpressure.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.May1995 iv.TS3.1.5.1-AddedanotewhichallowsachangeinMODEifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitors'areinoperableperLCO3.4.15.ThisnoteisappropriateconsideringtheotherinstrumentationthatisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.7)change.TS3.1.5.2.2.c-Therequirement.tocommenceareactorshutdownwithexcessiveSGtubeleakagewasrevisedtoallowanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramconsistentwithLCO3.4.13.B.RequiringareactorshutdownformostadministrativeerrorsisnotprudentbasedontheincreasedriskforatransientwhilechangingMODES.However,iftheintegrityofthetubeisdeterminedtobeinadequate,areactorshutdownwillcontinuetobeimmediatelyinitiated.Also,therequirementtoperformaSGinspectionwithexcessiveleakageifaninspectionhasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast6monthswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.AnySGinspectionswillbedeterminedaspartofthecorrectiveactionsnecessarytorepairtheleakingtubeandinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.SinceLCO3.0.4appliestothisLCO,theplantcannotgoaboveMODE5withoutverifyingthattheSGtubeintegrityisacceptable.TheseareGinnaTSCategory-(v.b.8)changes.11.Technical12.TechnicalSpecification3.1.6TS3.1.6-ThisentiresectionwasnotaddedsinceRCSChemistrydoesnotmeettheNRCPolicyStatement.RCSChemistryiscontrolledbyplantproceduresandisnotrequiredtobeaddressedwithinthetechnicalspecifications.ThisrequirementisbeingrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.2TS3.2.5-Therequirementwasrevisedtorequireplacingachargingpumpinpull-stopwithin1hourregardlessofthestatusoftheRHRpumpsortheMODE.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesdirectoperatorguidancetoperformanactionwithinadefinedtimeperiod.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.Theverificationofthechargingpumpstatusevery12hourswasalsonotaddedsincetheplantisrequiredtobeinadepressurizedandventedconditionwithin8hourswhichremovestheneedtoisolateachargingpump(i.e.,a1.1squareinchventcanmitigateacharging/letdownmismatchevent).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a),(i),and(v.c)changes,respectively.-178-Hay1995 ~~ll~111~lv~TS3.2.1andTS3.2.1.1-TherequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsduringcoldshutdownandrefuelingwhichspecifiesthenumberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLEwerenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.2.2andTS3.2.4-Therequirementsfortheboricacidinjectionflowpathsabovecoldshutdownwhichspecifiesthe.numberofflowpathsthatmustbeOPERABLE,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTransient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.,Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.2.3andTable3.2-1-TherequirementsfortheBoricAcidStorageTank(s)whichspecifies'heboronconcentrations,minimumvolumeandsolutiontemperature,werenotadded.TheborationsubsystemisnotassumedtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBAorTtansient.Further,theborationsystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitereleases.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthissystemdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementTechnicalSpecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.,ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-'179-Hay1995 13.TechnicalSpecification3.3TS3.3.l.l.band3.3.1.3-LCO3.5.1ConditionAwasaddedwhichallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbases'tatethatallowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesincethevolumeofwaterintheaccumulatorsisthecriticalfeature.Attemptingtocorrectboronconcentrationwithinthecurrent1hourlimitwouldcreateasignificantburdenontheoperationsstaff.Therefore,thecurrent1hourLCOwasonlymaintainedforaccumulatorpressureandvolume.Inaddition,theaccumulatorsboronconcentrationlimitswererelocatedtotheCOLRsincethesevaluescanchangeduetorefuelingcyclechanges.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.9)and(iii)changes,respectively.TS3.3.l.l.aand3.3.1;2-LCO3.5.4.Awasaddedwhichallows8hourstorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimits.TheITSbasesstatethat.allowingalongerperiodoftimetocorrectboronconcentrationisacceptablesinceitrequiresalongerperiodoftimetoperformthistypeofadjustmentduetothelargevolumeofwatercontainedwithintheRWST.Inaddition,theRWSTboronconcentrationlimitswererelocatedtotheCOLRsincethesevaluescanchangeduetorefuelingcyclechanges.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.10)and(iii)changes,respectively.TS3.3.l.l.c-TwonotesassociatedwithLCO3.5.2wereadded.ThefirstnoteallowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting.TheITSbasesstatethatthisisacceptablesincetheisolationvalvescanbeopenedfromthecontrolroom.Thesecondnoteallowsupto4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations.ThisnotewasaddedsincetheLTOPsetpointof330FisveryclosetotheMode3definitionof>350F.AsdescribedintheITSbases,thisnoteprovidesoperatorflexibilitytorestoretheinoperablepumptoOPERABLEstatus.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.11)changes.iv.TS3.3.1.5.d-ThiswasrevisedandusedasanoteforLCO3.5.2.Thespecificationnowonlyallows878A,878B,878C,and878DtohavepowerinstalledduringMODE3forthe,specificpurposeofperformingpressureisolationvalvetesting.Isolationvalves896A,896Band856mustnowhaveDCpowerremovedaboveMODE3orbothtrainsofECCSwillbedeclaredinoperable.Thischangewasmadesincethereisnoregularlyscheduledtestingof896A,896B,and856above350F.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-180-Hay1995 LCO3.5.3wasaddedwhichrequiresonetrainofSIandRHRduringMODE4.Thisnewrequirementisbeingaddedtoaddresslowprobabilityaccidentswhichmayoccurduringthismodeofoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.3.1.l.b-Thecurrentexceptionfornotrequiringtheaccumulatorsduringhydrotestswasnotaddedtothenewtechnicalspecifications.ThesehydrotestsareperformedwithRCStemperaturesbelowMODE3conditions(i.e.,350F).SincethenewspecificationonlyrequirestheaccumulatorswhenRCSpressureis>1600psigduringHODE3,thisexceptionisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.3.l.l.b-ThebasesforTS3.3wererevisedtoupdatethespecifiedwatervolumecontainedintheaccumulatorwithrespecttothe50%and82%levels.TherequiredlevelsspecifiedinTS3.3.l.l.bhavenotbeenchanged,onlythecorrespondingwater'volumesprovidedinthebases.Thenewvaluesareconsistentwiththoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(seeCOLR,Table1).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.3.1.l.g-Hotoroperatedisolationvalves851Aand851BwereaddedtonewSR3.5.2.1sincethesevalvesmustremainopenwithACpowerremovedtoensuretheavailabilityofContainmentSumpBtotheRHRsystemfollowingaLOCA.Theadditionofthesevalvesisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.l.l.h-Checkvalves877A,877B,878F,878H,andmotoroperatedisolationvalves878Aand878CwereaddedtothisrequirementsincethevalvesarerequiredtobetestedasPIVsbycurrentGinnaStationTS4.3.3.3.ThisprovidesamorecompletespecificationandisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.1.l.hand3.3.1.5-TheserequirementswererevisedtorequirePIVstobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4andnotjustabove350F(i.e.,inMODE3andabove).Therefore,theplantmustnowenterHODE5within36hoursiftheRequiredActionscannotbeaccomplished.ThisisaconservativerevisionwhichexpandstheLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-181-Hay1995 Xi~xivTS3.3.1.5.e-Thecurrentrequirementallows12hourstorepairaleakingcheckvalveifthein-seriesmotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.ThiswasrevisedtospecifythataleakingPIV(checkvalveormotoroperated)mustbeisolatedwithin4hourswithaleaktestedvalve,andthatasecondleaktestedvalvemustbeclosedwithin72hours.Thisisgenerallyaconservativechangesinceatimelimitisnowspecifiedforisolatingtheleakingvalveandthesecondisolationvalvemustnowbeleaktested.Theonlyexceptionisthat72hoursisnowprovidedtoperformrepairsversus12hours.Theexistingallowedrepairtimeisinsufficienttoperformmostleakagerepairsandwouldmostlikelyrequireareactorshutdown.Sincetherearethreeisolationvalvesforseveralflowpaths,andtheLCOapplicabilityhasbeenexpandedtoincludeMODE4,thischangeisconsideredacceptable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8-TheexceptionforallowingtheSIpumpstobeOPERABLEduringDGloadandsafeguardsequencetestingwasnotaddedsincethenewbasesallowthepumps'obeOPERABLEifadischargeisolationvalveislockedclosed.Therefore,thisexceptionisnotrequired.Also,theserequirementswererelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.'S3.3.1.7.1and3.3.1.8.1-ThesespecificationswereconvertedintoSurveillanceRequirementsconsistentwiththeITSformatandrelocatedtotheLTOPspecificationtoconsolidateallrelatedrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.3.1.8.2-ThisrequirementwasnotaddedsincethenewbaseslistthecriteriaforensuringthataSIpumpisincapableofinjectingintotheRCS.LimitingtheoperationtooneSIpumpwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathisnotnecessaryiftheisolationdevicerequirestwoseparateactionsbeforeprovidinganinjectionpathtotheRCS.Therefore,operatingmultipleSIpumpswillnotposeanythreattooverpressurizingtheRCSwiththisisolation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-182-May1995 0 XV.xvi.TS3.3.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallowbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(includingtheCRFCunitswhichsupplythem)tobeinoperableforupto72hoursifbothcontainmentspray(CS)trainsareOPERABLE.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywiththeaccidentanalyseswhichdemonstratethateithertwoCStrains,oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsareadequatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaDBA(i.e.,eachCStrainandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainprovides50%oftherequirediodineremovalrequirements).However,twoCStrainscannotbeinoperablesinceatleastonetrainmustoperateforcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Inaddition,twoCRFCunitscannowberemovedfromserviceforupto7dayssincetheaccidentanalysesonlycredittwoofthefourcoolingunitsasbeingOPERABLEwithrespecttocontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.Finally,withoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperableandnotrestoredwithin7days,theplanthasonly36hourstoreachMODE5versus84hoursduetotheimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentpressureandtemperaturecontrol.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l2)changes.TS3.3.3.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireoneofthetwoCCWheatexchangerstobeOPERABLEandtospecifythattheCCWloopheadermustalsobeOPERABLE.AsdiscussedinSectionC,item82.iabove,theCCWheatexchangersare100%redundantandareseparatedfromtheCCWpumptrainsbyasectionofcommonpiping.TheCCWheatexchangersarepassivedevicessuchthatanyfailureofaheatexchangerisboundedbyafailureoftheCCWpipingintheloopheader.Theloopheaderisdefinedasthesectionofpipingfromthedischargeofthepumpstothefirstisolationvalveofeachsuppliedcomponent.Theloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofthesuppliedcomponenttothesuctionofthepumps.Sincethereisnosingleactivefailurewhichmustbeconsideredfortheheatexchangers,theyareconsideredpartoftheCCWloopheaderandonlyoneheatexchangermustbeOPERABLE.RequiringtheCCWloopheadertobeOPERABLEprovidesaclearandconciseLCOrequirementforoperators.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l3)and(v.a)changes.-183-May1995 TS3.3.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(versus24hours)torestoreaninoperableCCWpumpbeforerequiringaplantshutdown..However,theplantisnolongerallowedtoremainatHotShutdownfor48hoursbeforerequiringadditionalcooldowntoColdShutdownconditions.Assuch,thetotaltimeinwhichaCCWpumpcanremaininoperableremainsthesame(i.e.,72hours)buttheplantisnotrequiredtobegincooldownactivitiesafter24hours.TheonlysafetyrelatedfunctionssupportedbytheCCWSystemarewithrespecttotheRHR,SI,andCSSystems,whichallallow72hourstorestoreaninoperabletrain.Therefore,thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethatthesixsetsofmotoroperatedisolationvalvesusedintheSWSystemtobeOPERABLEfortheSWSystemtobeconsideredOPERABLE.CreditistakenforthesevalvestoisolatethenonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentswithintheSWSystemfollowingacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignal.Thisisaconservativechangewhichprovidesaclarificationtolicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.3.4.2-ThiswasrevisedtoallowoneSWtraincomprisedoftwopumpsandsixmotoroperatedvalvessuppliedbythesameelectricaltraintobeinoperablefor72hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.SincetheSWtrainsarel005redundant,.removingoneoftwotrainsonlyaffectsredundancyanddoesnotplacetheplantoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Sincemostothersafetyfunctionsallow72hoursforonetraintobeinoperable(e.g.,ECCStrains),thischangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecifications.Inaddition,thisspecificationwasrevisedtoaddressthescenarioifallSWpumpsortheSWloopheaderareinoperable.Inthiscondition,immediateactionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreoneSWpumportheloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus;however,itisnotprudenttoexittheMODEofApplicabilitysincetheSWSystemisrequiredinMODE5fordecayheatremoval.Instead,RequiredActionshavebeenprovidedtorequireacooldowntoMODE4.InthislowerMODE,AFWisprovidingfordecayheatremoval.IfAFWwerelost,additionaltimeisrequiredbeforeRHR(andconsequentlySW)wouldberequired.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwiththeRequiredActionsforlossofCCW.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.-184-May1995 XX.Xxi.TechnicalTS3.3.5.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem(CREATS)tobeOPERABLEinMODES1through6andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinsteadofonlywhenRCSis>350F.CurrentGinnaStationTS3.5.6requiresthatthecontrolroomHVACdetectionsystem(i.e.',chlorine,ammonia,andradioactivitymonitors)beOPERABLEatalltimes.However,thefiltrationsystemisonlyrequiredtobeOPERABLEabove350F.ThefiltrationsystemisdesignedtoensurethatdoseratestooperatorsarewithintheguidelinesofGDC19intheeventofanaccident.WhiledoseratestooperatorsisexpectedtobelowerwhentheRCSis<350F,nocurrentanalysesexistundertheseconditions.Inaddition,failuresofthewastegasdecaytankscanstilloccurbelow350Fwhichalsorequirecontrolroomisolation.Therefore,theMODEofApplicabilitywasrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithinthespecificationsandtheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.3.5.2-Thiswasrevisedtoproviderequirementsforan.inoperablefiltrationtrainandinoperabledampers.TheCREATSdampersisolatethecontrolroomintheeventofaradiologicaleventwhilethefiltrationtrainfiltersthecontrolroomatmospherefollowingisolation.Thenewspecificationcontinuestoallowthefiltrationtraintobeinoperablefor48hoursbeforerequiringashutdownorplacingthecontrolroomintheemergencyradiationmode(i.e.,CREATSMode6).Ifoneofthetworedundantdampersineachoutsideairflowpathisinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow7daystorestorethedampertoOPERABLEstatussimilartorestoringonetrainofredundantCREFSinNUREG-1431.Ifbothdampersareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3sincethecontrolroomcannolongerbeisolated.IfbothdampersarelostinMODES5or6,orduringfuelmovement,thenfuelmovementandCOREALTERATIONSmustbesuspendedimmediately.ThesechangesprovideconsistencywiththeaccidentanalysesandNUREG-1431.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.IrSpecification3.4TS3.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtospecificallyrequirethatallHSSVsbetestedpriortoenteringMODE2versusthecurrentwordingwhichallowstheHSSVstoberemovedfortestingatanytime.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentoperatingpracticesandensuresthattheHSSVsare'PERABLEbeforethereactorgoescriticalbutallowstheMSSVstobetestedunderhotconditions(i.e.,Z350F).Inaddition,theHSSVsetpointswereaddedtothenewspecificationsincetheseareassumptionswithintheaccidentanalyses.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.-185-Hay1995

TS3.4.2.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththe'ccidentanalysisassumptionsasdiscussedinthenewbases.Essentially,theaccidentanalysestreatthepreferredAFWSystemasfourtrains(i.e.,twomotordriventrainsandtwoturbinedriventrains)suchthateachSGreceivesflowfromtwoAFWtrains.Therefore,thefailureofbothmotordriventrainsortheturbinedriventrain(orbothflowpaths)hasthesameconsequence(i.e.,lossofonetraintoeachSG).Sincetheturbinedriventrainisallowedtobeinoperableforupto72hoursperTS3.4.2.2.a(andNUREG-1431),thisspecificationwasrevisedtoallowbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstobeinoperableforupto72hours.Inaddition,ifbothAFWtrainstoacommonSGareinoperable,thenewspecificationsallow4hourstorestoreatleastonetrainbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.AtimelimitforbeinginthisconfigurationisnecessarysincenoAFWwouldbeavailable-intheeventofaHELBwhichaffectstheonlySGabletoreceiveAFW.RequiringanimmediatecooldowninthisconfigurationisnotconsideredprudentsinceAFWprovidesfordecayheatremovalinlowerMODES.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.14)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.4.2.3-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatthe.SAFWcross-tiebeavailablewhentheSAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thischangeisrequiredsincetheaccidentanalysescredittheuseofthecross-tieforHELBswithafailureofoneSAFWpump.Eachcross-tiemotoroperatedvalveisconsideredpartoftheSAFWtrainwhichsharesthesameelectricalpowersource.ThisisaGinnaStationTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.4.3-TherequirementforSWsuctionfortheAFWandSAFWpumpswererelocatedtotheLCOforthesepumps.TheCSTsprovidethepreferredsourceofcondensatetothepreferredAFWpumpswhiletheSWSystemisthesafetyrelatedsourceforboththepreferredandstandbyAFWsystems.TherelocationoftheneedforaSWsupplytotheAFMpumpswithintechnicalspecificationsdoesnotreducetherequirement.Instead,thechangeprovidesconsistencywithinthenewspecificationsandiseasierforlicensedpersonneltounderstand.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-186-Nay1995 V.TS3.4.3-Thiswasrevisedtorequirethatabackupsourceofcondensatebeverifiedwithin4hourswhentheCSTsareinoperableversusdemonstratingtheoperabilityoftheSMSystem.Specifyingatimelimitforverifyingthebackupcondensatesourceisaconservative.changewhichnowprovidesaclearandconciserequirementforplantoperators.RevisingtheActionstoallowanyalternatesourcetobeusedasabackupsourceprovidesadditionaloperationalflexibilitysinceothercondensatesourcesthantheSWSystemcanbeusedifnecessary.ThesesourcesaredescribedinthebasesfornewLCO3.7.6.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.15.TechnicalSpecification3.5ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.1orTable3.5-1:Table3.5-1,Columns1,2,and3-Thecolumnsforthe"Total,NumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"=andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheOPERABILITYoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesorareadequatelydescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"channeloperableabove"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.ChangestotheApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.c~Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit815-ThetripFunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.RemovalofthistripfunctionisjustifiedinReference44whichshowsthatbasedontheoffsitepowersystemconfiguration,thistripFunctionisnotapplicabletoGinnaStation.Therefore,thistripFunctionwasrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory'(iii)change.-187-May1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹1forFunctionalUnit¹1-ThisactionwasrevisedtoaddrequirementsforoperabilityoftheHanualReactorTripfunctioninHodes3,4,and5whenthereactortripbreakersareclosedandtherodcontrolsystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal(LCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Theseactionsensurestheplantisplacedinaconditioninwhichthetripfunctionisnolongerrequiredfortheassociatedmodesofoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-1,Note1forFunctionalUnits¹2,¹3,and¹4-ThenotesorremarkswhichdescribeanoperationaldetailthatarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheOPfRABILITYoftheinstrumentationwerenotadded.ThesedetailswererelocatedtothebasesorareadequatelydescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnits¹2("lowsetting"and"highsetting"),¹5,¹6,and¹7Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto12hours(ratherthan2hours)duringsurveillancetesting.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,Column4-Thisrequirementwasrevisedtoassociatethepermissive(orbypass)detailswiththespecificpermissive(orinterlock)numbersandtoclarifytheapplicabilityoftheFunctionwithanassociatedHode.ThedetailsofthepermissiblebypassconditionsfortheassociatedFunctionsarediscussedintheUFSARandITSBases.ChangestotheApplicabilityofaFunctionalUnitdifferentfromthosediscussedinColumn4arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-188-Hay1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹2forFunctionalUnit¹2("highsetting")-ThisactionwasrevisedtoaddarequirementtoeitherreduceThermalPowertolessthanorequalto75%RTPwithin12hoursortoperformafluxmapevery24hours(consistentwithSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2).Theserequirementsareinadditiontotherequirementtoplacethechannelinthetrippedconditionwithin72hoursasdiscussedinSectionD,item15.i.f.Reducingthepowerlevelpreventsoperationofthecorewithradialpowerdistributionsbeyondthedesignlimits.PerformingafluxmapcompensatesforthelostmonitoringcapabilityduetotheinoperableNISpowerrangechannelandallowscontinuedoperationatpowerlevelsabove75%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹3forFunctionalUnit¹3-Thisactionwasrevisedtoclarifytheapplicabilityoftheintermediaterangeneutronfluxtocorrespondtothespecificpermissiveswitheitheroneortwochannelsinoperable.TheNISintermediaterangeneutronfluxchannelsmustbeOPERABLEwhen,thepowerlevelisabovethecapabilityofthesourcerangeandbelowthecapabilityofthepowerrange.TheassociatedRequiredActionsensuretheplantisnolongerintheapplicableconditionthroughcontrolledpoweradjustmentsandtakingintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventduringtheperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionoftheNIStrip.ThischangesupersedesthatproposedinReference61.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.k.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹4forFunctionalUnit¹4-.Thisactionwasrevisedtoclarifythe.ApplicabilityandaddassociatedRequiredActionsforinoperableSRMs.ForMode2belowthepermissiveandonlyoneSRMOPERABLE,theplantwouldnotberequiredtoshutdown.'owever,withtwoSRMs~inoperabletheplantwouldberequiredtoimmediatelyopentheRTBs.ForModes3,4,and5,withtheRTBsopen,anadditionalaction(LCO3.3.1,RAL.2)wasaddedthatrequirestheperformanceofaSDMverification.Theseclarificationsandadditionalrestrictionensuretheplantisnolongerintheapplicableconditionorisina'orestablecondition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-189-May1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹lland¹13-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).Thischange'sdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹5forFunctionalUnits¹8,¹9,¹10("lowflowinoneloop"),¹lland¹13-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),¹14and¹15-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedin'thetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.This'saGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l5)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnits¹10("lowflowinbothloops"),and¹14-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Hay1995 Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit816-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethegPTRHonitorOPERABILITYrequirementstoChapter3.2.Inaddition,requirementswereaddedtoverifywithacalculationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis<75KRTPandtoverifywithafullcorefluxmapthatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptableevery24hourswhenthequadrantPowerTiltMonitorisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis>75%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit817-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationWaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.TheCirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstrumentsonlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedintheGinnaStationsafetyanalysis.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.'Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnits818and819-TheFunctionalUnitapplicabilitywasrevisedtorequiretheinstrumentstobeapplicableinallmodesassociatedwithDGoperability.ThisensuresthattheDGcanperformitsfunctiononalossofvoltageordegradedvoltageto.the480Vbuses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement87forFunctionalUnits818and019-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6hours(ratherthan1hour).ThisCompletionTimeissufficienttoallowrestorationofthechannelandtakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannels,andthelowprobability.ofaneventrequiringaLOPstartoccurringduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.16)change.-191-Hay1995 Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannel(consistentwithLCO3.0.5)inordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswiththeassociatedlogic.Bypassingtheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.Additionally,anotewasaddedclarifyingthatentryintotheassociateConditionsandRequiredActionscanbedelayedforupto4hoursforperformanceofrequiredsurveillance.EnteringDGactionsduringtestingisnotnecessarysincetheCompletionTimesforaninoperableDGismuchgreaterthanthetimetoperformtheSR(72hoursvs6hours).TheSRNotetimeof6hourstakesintoaccounttheredundancyofthetripchannelsandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringaLOPstartoccurringduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.17)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹7forFunctionalUnits¹18and¹19-ThisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentshutdownactionswitharequirementtorestorechannelstoanOPERABLEstatusortoentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.TheactionsofnewLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2provideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.Thelossoftheminimumrequiredlossofvoltageordegradedvoltagechannels(onebus)shouldresultinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.l)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹18and¹19-Thenumberofchannelswasreformattedtorequireonlytwoundervoltagechannelsperbusversustwochannelsofthelossofvoltagefunctionandtwodegradedvoltagefunctionperbus.Thebusundervoltagedesignisaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogicsuchthatonedegradedvoltagechannelandonelossofvoltagechannelcompriseeachofthetwoundervoltagechannels.However,duetothesystemdesign,ifeitherofthedegradedvoltageorlossofvoltagefunctionsisinoperable,theentireundervoltagechannelmustbetripped(i.e.,boththedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltagefunctionsaretripped).Thischangeprovidesgreaterclaritytotheoperatorswithoutanyreductioninthesystemrequirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.18)change.May1995 l/ w.X.aa.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.ThisfunctionanticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.ThefunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.ThisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,FunctionalUnit¹20andassociatedActionStatement¹14-ThisrequirementwasreformattedtoseparatelydenotetheReactorTripBreakers,theReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms,andtheAutomaticTripLogicfunctions(LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Functions¹15,¹16,and¹17).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow6hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoHode3(newLCO3.3.1,Conditiong).Therestorationtimeof6hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l8)change;Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinModes1and2priortoinitiatingaplantshutdowntoMode3(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR).Therestorationtimeof1hourisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLERTBisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.19)change.Hay1995 bb.CC.dd.ee.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit,¹20(AutomaticTripLogic)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Therestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreaker)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallow48hourstorestorethebreakertoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopentheRTBs(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).Therestorationtimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattheremainingOPERABLEbreakerisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.20)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtoonlyallow1hourtoopentheRTBsfollowingtheactiontorestoretheRTBtoOPERABLEstatusinHodes3,4,and5(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionC).ThecurrentGinnaStationTSallows6hourstoperformthisactionbuttakesintoaccountashutdownfromHodes1and2.The1hourprovidessufficientamountoftimetoaccomplishtheactioninHodes3,4,and5inanorderlymanner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Table3.5-1,ActionStatement¹14forFunctionalUnit¹20(ReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanisms)-Thisactionwasrevisedtospecifyalimitof2hourstobypasstheRTBforsurveillancetestingand8hourstobypasstheRTBformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms(newLCO3.3.1,ConditionR,Notes1and2).ThecurrentGinnaStation-TSforbypassingduringmaintenancedoesnotspecifyatimelimit.TheITSwouldsetalimitonthistime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-194-Hay1995 ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.2,Table3.5-2,orTable3.5-4a~b.C.TS3.5.2.2,3.5.2.3andTable3.5-2,Columns1,2,and3-ThedetailsdescribingtheoperabilityacceptancecriteriaforTripSetpointsincludingthecolumnsforthe"TotalNumberofChannels,"the"NumberofChannelstoTrip,"andthe"MinimumOperableChannels"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperabilityoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,Column6-Thecolumnforthe"ChannelOperableAbove"wasrevisedconsistentwiththechangestotheModetabledefinitionsinITSChapter1.0.Changestothe'ApplicabilitydifferentfromthosediscussedinChapter1.0arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Notused.d.e.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnits¹l.cand¹1.d-ThenotesorremarkswhichdescribeoperationaldetailsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock,werereformattedasModeApplicabilitiesanddefaultconditionsinthenewspecifications.AnewSR3.3.2.6,wasaddedtospecificallydenotetheoperabilityrequirementsforthePressurizerPressureinterlock.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹1.c,¹1.d,¹3.b.i,¹S.cand¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoreplacethecurrentlimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.May1995 Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹9forFunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹l.c,¹l.d,¹3.b.i,¹5.cand¹6.b-Thisactionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplaced'inthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.LCO3.3.2,FunctionalUnits¹1.b,¹2.b,¹3.b,¹4.b,¹S.a,and¹6.a,"AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays,"wereaddedfortheESFASInstrumentation.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.ThisismerelyapresentationchangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsasthislogiccircuitryisassumedwithintheoperabilityofthespecificFunctions.Additionally,theautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforvariousFunctionsarerequiredOPERABLEinMode4tosupportsystemlevelmanualinitiation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnit¹3.c-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin48hours(ratherthan1hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory.(v.b.l5)change.'able3.5-2,ActionStatement¹11forFunctionalUnit¹2.b-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l5)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹11'forFunctionalUnit¹2.b-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthan2hours).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.-196-May1995 Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹3.a-Therequirements.fortheAuxiliaryFeedwaterHanualInitiationwerenotadded.TheindividualAFWpumpinstrumentrequirementsonlyprovideamanualfunctionwhichisnotassumedintheGinnaStationsafetyanalysis..TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH;ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,¹3.c,¹5.a,and5.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoreplacethelimitationofoperation(tiedtothenextchannelfunctionaltestofanOPERABLEchannel)toallowthebypassingofaninoperablechannelforupto12hoursinordertoperformsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ThecurrentrequirementlimitstheabilitytoperformchannelfunctionaltestsonOPERABLEchannelsforFunctionalUnitswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.Providinganotetobypasstheinoperablechannelprovidesasufficienttimeframetoperformtherequiredsurveillancetestinginasafeandorderlymanner.ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l5)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹12forFunctionalUnits¹3.b.ii,¹5.a,and5.b-TheactionassociatedwiththeseFunctionswasrevisedtoallowaninoperablechanneltobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours(ratherthanI'hour).ThischangeisdiscussedandjustifiedinReference30.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.15)change.Table3.5-2,ActionStatement¹6forFunctionalUnit¹3.e-TheactionassociatedwiththisFunctionwasrevisedtoamorerestrictiverestorationtimeof48hoursforaninoperablechannelratherthanplacingthechannelinthetrippedconditionwithinonehour.Theallowanceof48hourstoreturnthetraintoanOPERABLEstatusisjustifiedinReference48.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-197-Hay1995 Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹3.f-TherequirementsfortheStandbyAuxiliaryFeedwaterHanualInitiationwerenotadded.TheindividualStandbyAFWpumpinstrumentrequirementsonlyprovideamanualfunctiontotheStandbyAFWpumpswhichbackuptheAFWpumps.TheGinnaStation.safetyanalysisdoesnotmodeltheindividualmanualfunctionforthesepumps.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-2,FunctionalUnit¹4.2andTable3.5-4,FunctionalUnit¹3.b-TherequirementsfortheContainmentVentilationIsolationFunctionwerenotadded.Thecontainmentventilationcomponentsincludetheshutdownpurgeandmini-purgelines.Theselinesareautomaticallyisolated.onacontainmentisolationsignalfromSI.TheR-29andR-30instrumentsarenotassumedintheGinnasafetyanalysisasESFASisolationfunctions.Theseinstrumentsare,however,requiredtoperformapost-accidentmonitoringfunctioninaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.97andareretainedinnewLCO3.3.3.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,theHanualIsolationandHighContainmentRadioactiveFunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.TheHanualSprayandSafetyInjectionFunctions,aredeletedsincethesefunctionsareduplicatedbyotherFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(ii)change,respectively.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits¹I.b,¹I.d,and¹2.b-TheseFunctionalUnitAllowableValueswererevisedtoreflecttheactualvaluesusedintheaccidentanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-198-Hay1995 s.Table3.5-4,FunctionalUnits87.aand87.b-TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionswererevisedtoprovideaminimumvalue.Criteriafortheestablishmentofequivalentvaluesbasedonmeasuredvoltageversusrelayoperatingtimewasrelocatedtothebases.fornewLCO3.3.4)'.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table3.5-4,Notes1and2forFunctionalUnits86.aand86.c-ThenoteswhichdescribedesigndetailsfortheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowFunctionandLossof4kVFunctionwerenotadded.ThesedetailsarerelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS3.5.3orTable3.5-3:TS3.5.3.2,TS3.5.3.3,andTable3.5-3,Columns1and2-Thecolumnsforthe"TotalRequiredNumberofChannels,"andthe"MinimumChannelsOperable,"werenotaddedforeachofthefunctionalunits.Thecolumnswerereplacedwithanewcolumndenoting"RequiredChannels."SystemdesignandoperationaldetailsarenotdirectlyrelatedtotheoperabilityoftheinstrumentationandwererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedintheUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.b.C.TS3.5.3.2-Therestorationtimerequirementof7daysforoneinoperablechannel(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedto30days.The30dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEchannel,thepassivenatureoftheinstrument,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.TS3.5.3.2-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan7days(forFunctionswithtwochannels)wasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrumentsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimposestringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.Hay1995 d.TS3.5.3.3-Therestorationtimerequirementof48hoursfortwoinoperablechannelswasrevisedto7days.The7dayCompletionTimewasrevisedbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformationandthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPAHinstrumentationduringthisinterval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)change.'.Table3.5-3-ThePostAccidentHonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRG1.97,TypeAandCategoryIvariables.ThesefunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.59).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.5.4andTable3.5-6-Therequirementsforradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentation,providedtomonitorradiationlevelsinselectedplantlocationsfollowinganaccident,werenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfor'heserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.5.6.1-Therequirementsforthechlorinegas.andammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.LCO3.3.5,ConditionsBandC,wereaddedfortheControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(GREATS)actuationinstrumentation.ThesenewrequirementsspecifyRequiredActionsforvariousmodesofoperationwhentheCREATSisolationdamperscannotbeplacedintheemergencyradiationprotectionmode.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-200-Hay1995 vi1~V111~16.TechnicalTS3.5.6.2-Therequirementforonedetectionsysteminoperablehasbeenrevisedtoallowmorethanonechannelinoperablewithanactiontoisolatethecontrolroominonehour.EvenwithalossofFunctionoftheautomaticactuationlogic,theCREATSmaystillbecapableofbeingmanuallyisolatedwithin1hourandperformingitssafetyfunction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change./TS3.5.5andTable3.5-5-TherequirementsforradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationwhichensuresthatthelimitsofTS3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceededwerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableor,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocated.totheODCMandtheEffluentControls'rogramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.Specification3.611~TS3.6.1-ThetextallowingclosedcontainmentisolationvalvestobeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolswasrelocatedtoaLCONoteconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.6.2-TheApplicabilityformaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitswasrevisedfromreactorcriticalitytoMODE4.Thischangeisnecessarytoprovideconsistencywiththerequirementsforcontainmentintegrity(i.e.,LCO3.6.1)sinceexceedingthesepressurelimitscouldresultinaoverpressureofcontainmentifanaccidentweretooccur.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-201-May1995 TS3.6.3-ThetitleforthisLCOwasrevisedfromcontainmentisolation"boundary"to"barrier"whichprovidesgreaterconsistencywiththebasesforNUREG-1431.Inaddition,threenewrequirementswereadded.Thefirstrequiresthatapenetrationwithbothcontainment,barriersinoperablebeisolatedwithin1hourversus4hours.ThischangeprovidesconsistencywithTS3.6.1sincecontainmentintegrityispotentiallyviolated.Assuch,verificationofcontinuedacceptablecontainmentleakagemustbeinitiatedimmediatelyifbothbarriersaredeclaredinoperable.Inaddition,newrequirementswithrespecttoaninoperableairlock(includingtheuseofanairlockwithaninoperabledoororinterlockmechanism)andcontainmentmini-purgepenetrationswithisolationvalvesthatexceedtheirleakagerateacceptancecriteriawereadded.Thenewrequirementfortheairlocksspecifiesthataninoperableairlockdoor(includinganinoperableinterlockmechanism)mustbeisolatedwithin1hourandlockedclosedwithin24hours.However,adedicatedindividualcanbeusedinthecaseofaninoperableinterlockmechanismtoallowentryandexitthroughtheairlock.Thenewspecification'rovidesspecificRequiredActionsintheeventthatcurrentGinnaStationTS4.4.2.4.cisexceeded.Thenewrequirementforthemini-purgepenetrationsspecifiesthattheaffectedpenetrationmustbeisolatedwithin24hoursifanisolationvalveexceedsitsleakagelimit.Thesenewrequirementsprovideaddedassurancethatpenetrationswhichcanprovidedirectaccesstotheoutsideenvironmentareaddressedquicklywhentheirisolationbarriersbecomeinoperable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.3-Theuseofaclosedsystemtoisolateaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrierwasaddedtothisspecification.Consequently,aclosedsystemwhichmustbeOPERABLEtomeetthisspecificationcanbeusedtoisolateafailedisolationbarrier.Also,isolationdeviceslocatedoutsidecontainmentthatwereusedtoisolateafailedcontainmentisolationvalvearerequiredtobeverifiedclosedonceevery31days.Forisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,theymustbeverifiedcloseduponentryintoHODE4fromHODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92days.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.22)changes.TS3.6.5-ThiswasrelocatedtothebasesforITS3.6.3sinceitdoesnotmeetanyofthefourcriteriaanddoesnotspecifyanyRequiredActions.OperationoftheHini-PurgeSystemisperformedunderproceduressuchthatitsuseisstrictlycontrolled.Placingthisinformationinthebasesalsoprovidessimilarcontrolunder10CFR50.59(i.e.,theBasesControlProgram).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-202-Hay1995 TS3.6-Anewrequirementwasaddedwhichspecifiesthattheaveragecontainmentairtemperatureshallbe<120F.aboveMODE5.ThistemperaturelimitisnecessarytoensurethattheresultingcontainmenttemperaturefollowingaDBAiswithintheassumptionsusedforenvironmentalqualificationofcomponentswithincontainment.Iftheaveragecontainmentair"temperatureis>120F,itmustberestoredwithin24hours.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhichrequiresthehydrogenrecombinerstobeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.Thehydrogenrecombinersareassumedintheaccidentanalysestobeusedtopreventahydrogenexplosionwithincontainmentthatcouldoverpressurizethecontainmentstructure.ThenewLCOallows30daystorestoreaninoperablerecombinerand7daystorestoretwoinoperablerecombinersiftheMini-PurgeSystemisOPERABLE.Inaddition,theplantcanenterMODES1and2withaninoperablehydrogenrecombiner.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4.1andTS3.6.4.3-TheApplicabilityforthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedtoincludeMode3requirements.Thesevariablesarerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinModes1,2,and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.6.4.2-Theactionforonechannelinoperableformorethan30dayswasrevisedfromrequiringaplantshutdowntorequiringaSpecialReport.Duetothepassivefunctionoftheseinstrumentsandtheoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentutilizingalternateinstrumentsandmethodsformonitoring,itisnotappropriatetoimpose'tringentshutdownrequirementsforout-of-serviceinstrumentation.ThisisaGinna.TSCategory(v.b.21)change.TS3.6.l.bandTS3.6.l.c-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityforcontainmentintegritywasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecontainmentintegrityisnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.Thefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysis(UFSAR15.7.3.3)takesnocreditforisolationofthecontainment,containmentintegrity,noreffluentfiltrationpriortorelease.TherequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinal.PolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRM.BoronconcentrationchangesinMODE6andRequiredActionstosuspendpositivereactivityadditionsisprovidedinnewLCO3.9.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-203-Hay1995 17.TechnicalSpecification3.7TS3.7.1.l.b,3.7.l.l.d,and3.7.I.l.e-Thecoldshutdownorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)forthe480Vsafeguardsbuses,batteriesandDCtrains,and120VACinstrumentbuseswererevisedfromrequiringonlyonetraintobeOPERABLEtorequirethenecessarytrain(s)tosupport'llotherLCOrequirements.Consequently,oneorbothtrainsofthesesystemsmayberequireddependingonothersystemrequirements(e.g.,RHR).InMODES5and6,sufficientelectricalpowerredundancymustbeavailabletomitigateaneventcoincidentwitheitheralossofoffsitepower,lossofallonsitestandbyemergencypower,oraworsecasesinglefailure.ThischangeensuresthatallnecessaryelectricalsupportsystemsareOPERABLEtorespondtoaDBAoratransient.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.7.1.2-Coldorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)fortheDGfueloilsupplyandthebatteryparametershave.beenaddedtoproviderestorationtimesforspecifiedconditionsconsistentwiththeITS.Thesetimesaresufficienttocompleterestorationofthedegradedparameterpriortodeclaringthecomponentinoperableandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiodandthefactthatthecomponentremainscapableofperformingmostrequiredfunctions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.7.2.1.b.2,3.7.2.2.a,and3.7.2.2.b-Therequirementsfortwooffsitesourceswerenotadded.Thecurrentactionsallowtheplanttooperateindefinitelywithoneoffsitesourceinoperable.Thenew,ITSformatcriteriawouldnotspecifytheserequirementsintheTS(i.e.,require.acomponentforaMODEchangebutallowthecomponenttoremaininoperableindefinitelyoncetheMODEchangeiscomplete).Therefore,theserequirementsaredeleted.TheoffsitepowersourcesarefurtherdiscussedinReference32.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.23)change.iv~TS3.7.2.2.b.1-TheactionsforaninoperableDGhavebeenrevised:(I)toeliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure,and(2)torequireverificationoftheoffsitepowercircuittotheaffectedACdistributiontrain.Inaddition,theOPERABLEDGmustonlybetestedonceduringthe7dayallowedoutagefortheinoperableDG.TherevisedactionfortheOPERABLEDGeliminatesunnecessarytestingduringaperiodinwhichtheplantreliesononly'neDG.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.b.2)and(v.a)changes.-204-May1995 V.Vi~TS3.7.2.2.c-TheCompletionTimefortheactiontore-energizethe480Vsafeguardsbushasbeenrevisedfrom1hourto8hours.ThetimeisconsistentwiththeITSwhichassumesnotonlyrestorationofthebusbutalsotheassociatedloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcomprisetheACelectricaltrain.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.24)change.TS3.7.2.2.d-ThiswasrevisedtoaddressthescenariowithbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperable.Inthiscondition,nolossofsafetyfunctionexistssincetheremainingDGisavailabletoprovidepowertooneESFtrain.However,thetimeinthisConditionshouldbelimitedduetothepotentialtolosemultiplesafetyfunctionsifthe,remainingDGwerelost.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovided.However,ifbothoffsitepowerandoneDGwereinoperabletothesameACelectricaltrain,thenthetimewouldberestrictedto8hoursasdiscussedinSectionD,item17.vabove.Thisi'aGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TechnicalSpecification3.8'ITS3.8.l.aand3.8.3-Therequirementstoclosecontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelhandlinginthecontainmentwerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincetheseconditionsarenotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.Thefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysis(UFSAR15.7.3.3)takesnocreditforisolationofthecontainmentnoreffluentfiltrationpriortoreleasefromthecontainmentbuilding.Therefore,closureofcontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelhandlinginsidecontainmentisnotrequired.Theclosureofthecontainmentpenetrationswereestablishedtoprovideadditionalmarginforthefuelhandlinganalysisandtoprovideprotectionagainstthepotentialconsequencesofseismiceventsduringrefueling.Thedoseconsequences,however,ofthefuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentanalysisisestimatedatapproximately30/of10CFR100limits.Thiswasfoundtobe"wellwithin"limitsasdocumentedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)datedOctober7,1981(Ref.49).TherequirementsspecifiedfortheseconditionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRN.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-205-Hay1995 TS3.8.1.b-TherefuelingorMODE6requirementforthecontainmentradiationmonitorswhichprovidemonitoringforpersonnelsafetywasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecause.theprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thecontainmentradiationmonitorsareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityoftheSRHswasrevised.Thephrase",,whenevergeometryisbeingchanged"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofMODE6.TherequirementthatoneSRMbeOPERABLEwhencoregeometry"isnotbeingchanged"iscoveredbytheRequiredActionforoneinoperableSRH.ThiswouldrestrictCOREALTERATIONandpositivereactivityadditionswhencoregeometryisnotbeingchanged.RequiredActionswerealsoprovidedwhentwoSRHsbecomeinoperableorwhentheaudibleindicationislost.Thesenewactionsrequireverificationofboronconcentrationevery12hoursandensuresthestabilizedconditionofthereactorcore.TheseareaconservativerevisionsandGinnaTSCategory(v.a)and(iv.a)changes,respectively.TS3.8.l.e-Therequirementdescribingthespecificapplicabilityandfrequencyoftheboronconcentrationsamplingwasrevised.Thephrase"immediatelybeforereactorvesselheadremovalandwhileloadingandunloadingfuelfromthereactor"iscoveredbythenewTSdefinitionofMODE6.ThiswouldadditionallyrequireboronconcentrationsamplingthroughoutMODE6.Thesamplingfrequency,however,wasalsorevisedtorequiresamplingevery72hours.Theserevisionsconsiderthelargevolumeoftherefuelingcanal,RCS,andrefuelingcavityandareadequatetoidentifyslowchangesinboronconcentration.Rapidchangesinboronconcentration,describedinUFSAR15.4.4.2,aredetectedbytheSRMinstrumentationrequiredbynewTS3.9.2..ThisisaconservativerevisionandaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.8.l.f-TherequirementforcommunicationwiththecontrolroomduringCOREALTERATIONSisnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincecommunicationsisnotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-206-May1995 vi~19.TechnicalTS3.8.l.d(footnote*)andTS3.8.l.g(footnote*)-Therequirementthateitherthepreferredortheemergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachresidualheatremovalloopisnotadded.ThisdetailisencompassedinthedefinitionofoperabilitydescribedinnewTSl.landtheelectricpowerrequirementscontainedinChapter3.8.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.8.l.c-TherequirementtoprovideSRNaudibleindicationinthecontainmentwasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsincethemonitoredparameter(audibleindicationincontainment)isnotassumedintherefuelingsafetyanalysis.ThesafetyanalysisassumesaudibleindicationinthecontrolroomwhichisdenotedbynewLCO3.9.2.Theaudibleindicationisforpersonnelsafetyonly.Further,theaudibleindicationisanon-significantrisk'ontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,'herequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtoproceduresorotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification3.9TS3.9.1.I-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,AppendixB,TableII,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControls'rogramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively'.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-207-May1995 TS3.9,.1.2andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseordosecommitmenttoindividualswhichresultsfromcumulativeliquideffluentdischargesduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodsandisintendedtoassurecompliancewiththedoseobjectivesof.10CFRPart50,AppendixI,werenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,radioactiveliquideffluentdoseprojectedvalueisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.1.3-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,theloss.ofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.1-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplybecause'heprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfythe.NRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-208-Hay1995 TS3.9.2.2.a,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.2.b,TS3.9.2.2.c,andTS3.9.2.4-Therequirementsfordoseduetoradioiodine,radioactivematerialsinparticulateform,andradionuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhalf-livesgreaterthan8daysreleasedwithgaseouseffluentswere'notadded.Theselimitsarenot'elatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thesegaseouseffluentsdosesareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtothe'DCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,.respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.9.2.5andTS3.9.2.6-Thespecificrequirementsforwhichlimitconcentrationofoxygeninagasdecaytankandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.llandamoregenericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-209-Mayl995 ix.TS3.9.2.7-Therequirementsforthesolidradwastesystemwhichprocesseswetradioactivewasteandoperatesinaccordancewith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,foreffluentcontrolwerenotadded.TheoperabilityofthesystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,radioactivewasteisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadiologicalEffluentControlsProgramdesc}ibedin'ewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.20.TechnicalSpecification3.10TS3.10.1-ThiswasrevisedtoincludespecificactionsandCompletionTimesforcaseswhentheshutdownbankinsertionlimitsandthecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsarenotwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Theseactionsrequireverificationwithin1hour'hattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinlimitsandrestoringtheassociatedvaluetowithinlimitswithin2hoursorbeinMODE3within6additionalhours.Theseaddition'sweremadetoensurethatthecontrolbanksandtheshutdownbankareavailableasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.10.1.1-Thiswasrevisedtoincludeaspecifi0actiontoinitiateborationwithin15minuteswhentheSHUTDOWNMARGINisnotwithinlimits.TheadditionofthisactionensuresthatSHUTDOWNMARGINismonitoredandquicklyrestoredwithinlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.10.1.1andFigure3.10-2-ThesewererevisedtorelocatetheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementsandFigure3.10-2totheCOLR.SHUTDOWNMARGINcanbeusedinfuelmanagementandasavariabletosolveplantspecificproblems.SHUTDOWNMARGINimpactsanumberofanalyses(i.e.,uncontrolledborondilutionandsteamlinebreak)andissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankposition,corepowerlevel,coolanttemperatureandcyclespecificparameterssuchasfuelburnup,xenonconcentrationandboronconcentration.TheinclusionofSHUTDOWNMARGINintheCOLRprovidesmoreflexibilityinplantoperation,inperformingthedesign,andinobtaininggoodfueleconomicsparticularlyforextendedcycleoperation.WiththeSHUTDOWNMARGINincludedin'heCOLR,thecoredesigncanbefinalizedaftershutdownsothattheactualendofcycleburnupisknownwhichisparticularlyhelpfulwhentheactualburnupdiffersfromtheprojectedvalue.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.'I-210-May1995 TS3.10.1.2andTS3.10.1.3-ThesewererevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsfortheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimits.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheinsertionlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.1.3andFigure3.10-1-ThesewererevisedtorelocatethecontrolrodinsertionlimitsandthesequenceandoverlaplimitstotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.1.5-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoneofthePHYSICSTESTScurrentlyperformedatGinnaStationcurrentlyrequirearelaxationoftheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirements.ThereforenoneoftheseSHUTDOWNMARGINPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsorRequiredActionsarenecessary.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethelowpowerPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsincenewLCO3.2.1andLCO3.2.2whichcontainthepeakingfactorrequirementsareonlyapplicableinMODE1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforthegPTR.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthegPTRlimitand.theITSLCO3.2.4whichcontainsgPTRisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.2.8,TS3.10.2.9andTS3.10.2.10-ThesewererevisedtoremovethePHYSICSTESTexceptionsforAFD.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionoftheAFDlimitsandtheITSLCO3.2.3whichcontainsAFDisonlyapplicableinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.3.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtoreducetheminimumT.,fortheroddroptestfrom540Fto500F.The500Ftemperatureisconservativesincethewaterwillbeslightlydenseratthelowertemperaturewhichhasthepotentialtoslowdownthedroppedrods.Thischangewouldenablethe'lanttocompletetheroddroptestatanearliertimeduringplantstartupandisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.'ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.-211-May1995 Xi.xv.TS3.10.4.1-ThiswasrevisedtoindicateonlylowpowerPHYSICSTESTexceptionsforcontrolbankalignment.GinnaStationcurrentlydoesnotperformaPHYSICSTESTinMODE1whichwouldrequiretheexceptionofthealignmentlimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS3.10.4.2andTS3.10.4.3-Thesewererevisedtoremoveconditionsofrodinoperabilityduetobeingimmovable.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippableeveniftheyareimmovable.Referencetofulllengthrodswasalsoremovedsincetherearenopartlengthrodsinthereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.4.3.2-Thiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementtodeclareamisalignedrodinoperablewhentherodcannotberestoredtowithinthealignmentlimitsin1hour.TheITSBasesstatethattherodsareconsideredtobeOPERABLEiftheyaretrippable'eveniftheyareimmovable.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.a-Thisoptionforrestoringarodtowithinalignmentwasremovedfrom'theLCOandrelocatedtotheBasesforITS3.1.4whichiscontrolledundertheBasesControlProgram.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.b.iiiandTable3.10-1-ThesewererevisedtoremoveTable3.10-1fromthespecifications.TheITSrequiresevaluationsofaccidentanalysistobeperformedtodeterminethatthecorelimitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccident.AnevaluationofeachoftheanalysesonTable3.10-1maynotberequiredtodeterminethatthecorelimitswillnotbeexceed.ThistablewasrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.4.3.2.bandTS3.10.4.3.2.c-Thesewererevisedtoremovetherequirementtoreducethehighneutronfluxtripsetpointto<85%RTPwhenthepowerlevelisreducedto<75%RTP.Thisrequiredactionisdeletedbasedonagreements=betweentheNRCandtheownersgroupsandisconsistentwithWCAP-13029(Ref.50)whichstatesthatthesafetyanalysesresultswouldnotbesignificantlyaffectedbychangestotheirinitialassumptionsasaresultofincreasedpeakingfactorscausedbyrodmisalignment.Additionally,thepeakingfactorlimitverificationwithin72hoursandthere-evaluationofthesafetyanalysiswithin5daysthatarerequiredbythisspecificationprovidefurtherassurancethatthe,assumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisarepreserved.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-212-Hay1995

Xvii.XX.TS3.10.4.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanactiontoverifySHUTDOWNMARGINorinitiateborationwithin1hourwhenmorethanonerodisoutofalignment.TheITSBasesstatethat1hourisareasonabletimebasedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenondistributionandthelowprobabilityofaaccident.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.1-ThiswasrevisedtoaddanactionstatementtoclarifythatifmorethanoneMRPIisinoperablepergroupforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankisinoperableforoneormorebanksthentheplantmustenter3.0.3immediately.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.5.2.-a-Thiswasrevisedtoallow4hours(insteadofimmediately)toverifyrodposition.Therodpositioncannotbedeterminedimmediately.Ittakestimetoacquirethedataandobtaintheresults."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontime.TheITSBasesstatethat4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositionswhileareductionto<50%RTPwillavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat>50%RTPwith2ormorerodsmisaligned.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.1-Thiswasrevisedtorequiremeasurementofthepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortooperationoftheplantatorabove75%RTPinsteadofpriorto50%RTPconsistentwithITS.ThisrequirementensuresthatthedesignlimitsarenotexceededwhenRTPisachieved,sincepeakingfactorsareusuallydecreasedaspowerincreases.Requiringthissurveillanceat75%versus50%stillprovidesthenecessarymargintoensurethatdesignsafetylimitsare'otexceededandprovidestheoperatorwithmoreflexibilityduringpowerascensionfollowingarefueling.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.25)change.TS3.10.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtodeletetherequirementtoverifygPTRusingmovableincoredetectorsorcoreexitthermocoupleswithonepowerrangedetectorinoperableatTHERMALPOWERZ75%RTPandreplacedwitharequirement.toperformafluxmaptoverifythathotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitsconsistentwithITS.TheincoredetectorsarenotusedtoverifygPTRbutrathertoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.GinnaStationdoesnothave8pairsofsymmetricthimbleplugswhicharenecessarytoperformapartialfluxmapandthuswouldhavetocompleteafullcorefluxmaptoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptable.ThischangeisconsistentwithcurrentinterpretationsatGinnaStationandispreferredbyGinnaStationlicensedpersonnel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-213-May1995 TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethehotchannelfactorsbewithinlimitonlyinMODE1.TheproposedApplicabilitydoesnotrequiretheFoorF~limitstobemetinMODES2-5orduringrefueling.AsdescribedintheITSBases,FoandF~mustbewithinlimitsduringMODE1;however,suchlimitsarenotnecessaryinMODE2becausethereisinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorbeingtransferredtothecoolanttorequiretheselimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.26)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatethelimitsforFo(Z)andF~andtheFigure3.10-3totheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanadministrativeActiontoreducetheAFDacceptableoperationallimitsspecifiedintheCOLRbythepercentagethatFoexceedsthelimit.ThisisnecessarysinceachangeinFocanadverselyimpactAFDlimits.ACompletionTimeof8hoursisallowedtoperformthisaction.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.ITS3.10.2.2-Thiswasrevisedtoallow72hours(insteadof24hours)toreduce'theOverpowerhTandtheOvertemperaturehTtripsetpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThissectionwasalsorevisedtoincludeaCompletionTimeof72toreducethePowerRangeNeutronFluxHightripsetpoints.Theseactionsprovidefurtherprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributions.The72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthistimeperiodandtheinitialpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWER.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.27)change.TS3.10.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoaddaRequiredActiontobeinMODE2within6hoursif.theRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesfortheConditionwhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimitsisnotmet.ThisactionplacestheplantinaconditionoutsideoftheApplicabilityrequirementsfortheHotChannelFactorrequirements.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursissufficienttoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerwithoutchallengingplantsystems.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-214-May1995 TS3.10.2.3and3.10.2.4-ThesewererevisedtospecificallydefinetheApplicabilityrequirementsforgPTRasMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ThisApplicabilityisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforGinnaStationsincecontinuedoperationisallowedforanunlimitedperiodoftimewhenTHERMALPOWERis<50%RTP.TheITSBasesstatethatbelow50%RTPthereiseitherinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorinsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofagPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.Inaddition,theLCOlimitof1.12wasremovedsincetheprimarylimitof1.02willbereachedinitiallyandactionswillalreadybeinprogresstoaddressthetilt.'HERMALPOWERwillcontinuetobereducedifthetiltratiocontinuestoincrease.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS3.10.2.3-ThiswasrevisedtolimittheTHERMALPOWERrelativetothepercentageofquadrantpowertilt,(i.e.,limitpowerto3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichthegPTRexceeds1.00)insteadofrequiringanimmediateactiontogobelow75%RTP.Thereductionto75%RTPessentiallyemploysa2%RTPreductionforeach1%thegPTRwasabove1.00upuntilgPTRequalled1.12whereareductionto50%RTPwasrequired.Theproposedchangewouldprovideflexibilitywiththeinitialreduction,butwouldrequireatleasta3%RTPreductionforeach1%gPTRexceeded1.00.Thus,theproposedchangewhilerequiringasmallerreductionforsmalltiltsismoreconservativeforlargertiltswhichwouldsuggestamoreseriousproblem.ThisrevisionisconsistentwiththechangesmadeinWCAP-12159(Ref.51)andcurrentindustrypractice.TherequirementtomeasurethehotchannelfactorswhenthegPTRexceeds1.02ischangedfromwithin2hourstowithin24hourssincetheTHERMALPOWERisappropriatelylimitedwithin2hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS3.10.2.4-Thiswasrevisedtodeletetherequirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorlimitpowerto<50%RTP.Identificationofthecauseofthetiltisnotalwayspossibleandotheractionsalreadyunderwayareadequatetoassuresafeoperationoftheplant(e.g.,surveillances).ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-12159(Ref53).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.28)change.May1995 ThefollowingRequiredActionswereaddedfortheConditionwhenQPTRisnotwithinthelimit:TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.a.ArequirementtoverifybycalculationthattheQPTRiswithinlimitsandlimitpoweraccordinglyevery12hours.b.ArequirementtorecalibratetheexcoredetectorspriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimitspriortorecalibrationoftheexcoredetectors.C.ArequirementtoverifyFoandF~within.limitseitherwithin24hoursafterreachingRTPorwithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitinTS3.10.2.3.ThisactionismodifiedbyseveralNotes.ThefirstNoteclarifiesthatwhentheQPTRalarmisduetoinstrumentationalignmentthisactiondoesnotneedtobe'ompleted.Thesecondnoteallowsthisactiontobecompletedonlyaftertheexcoreshavebeenrecalibrated.ThethirdnoteclarifiesthattheCompletionTimeapplicablefirstistheonethatmustbemet.d.Arequirementtoreducepowerto<50%RTPwithin4hoursiftheinitialRequiredActionsarenotmetwithintheassociatedcompletiontime.ThistakestheplantoutoftheApplicabilitywhentheactionsarenotmetandprovidesanadditionalactionbeforeplantshutdownisrequired.TS3.10.2.5-Thiswasdeletedsincethe1.12QPTRlimitnolongerappliesandtheApplicabilityrequirementforQPTRhasbeenrevisedto>50%RTP.Actionsalreadyinprogress(i.e.,limitingpowerby3%belowRTPforeach1%QPTRexceeds1.00)aresufficienttoaddressthetilt.Thisis-aGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.7-Thiswasrevisedtorequireameasurementofthetargetfluxdifferencewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelinginsteadofwithin92EFPD.ThisrequirementisalsomodifiedwithanotethatallowsthepredictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.Thechangetowithin31EFPDismoreconservativethanwithin92EFPDandisnecessarytoperformtheinitialmonthlytargetfluxdifferenceupdatealsorequiredbyTS3.10.2.7.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory'v.a)change.-216-May1995 TS3.10.2.8-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandtotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovidesflexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthelowamountsofstoredortransferredenergyinthelowerMODES.The-AFDattheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTS,Category(iii)and(v.c)changes,respectively.TS3.10.2.9-Thiswasrevisedtospecify15minutes(insteadofimmediately)torestoreAFDtowithinthetargetbandandthenimmediatelyinitiateactionstoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPiftheAFDisnotrestoredwithintheinitial15minutes.'hisisconsistentwiththeintentofthecurrentGinnaStationtechnicalspecifications."Immediately"isconsideredastarttimenotacompletiontimeand15minutesisconsidered'asufficientamountoftimetorestoreAFDwithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftimepriortoareductioninpower.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.10.2.10a-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheAFDtargetbandandtheacceptableoperationlimitstotheCOLR.ThischangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andprovides,flexibilityduringreloadcoredesign.TheApplicabilityrequirementwasalsorevisedtospecifyMODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15%RTP.AsdescribedintheITSBases,thisApplicabilityisacceptablebecauseofthelowamountsofstoredortransferredenergyinthelowerMODES.TheAFD.attheselowerconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.Additionally,thelowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.c)changesrespectively.TS3.10.2.12-.Thiswasrevisedtorequireaverificationthat'heAFDiswithinlimitsandtologtheAFDevery15minuteswithTHERMALPOWER>90%RTPandonceeveryhourwithTHERMAL'OWER<90%RTPwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableinsteadofeveryhourforthefirst24hoursandeveryhalfhourthereafter.Thismodificationreflectstheimportanceofstayingwithinthetargetbandatabove90%RTPandisc'onsistentwiththeRequiredActioniftheAFDisoutsidethetargetband.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-217-May1995 21.TechnicalSpecification3.11TS3.11.1-ThiswasrevisedtorequirethattheAuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)beOPERABLEwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.ThespecificcomponentswhicharerequiredfortheABVStobeconsideredOPERABLEwererelocatedtothebasessimilarwiththestructureofNUREG-1431andtheITSWriter'sGuide.ThebasesforLCO'3.7.10nowrequirethatoneofthetwo100%capacityAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans,exhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystem,andallassociatedductwork,valvesanddampersbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,TS3.ll.l.cwasrevisedtorequireanegativepressurewithintheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorwithrespecttotheoutsideenvironmentinsteadofrequiringalldoors,windows,andotherdirectopeningsbetweentheoperatingfloorarea,andtheoutsidetobeclosed.Thischangeprovidesconsistencywithassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentasdescribedinthebases.Thischangealsoprovidesamuchclearerspecificationwhichiseasierforlicensedpersonneltoreadandunderstandwithoutanyreductioninactualrequirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(i)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS3.11.2-TherequirementtocontinuouslymonitorradiationlevelsintheSFPareawasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,theSFPradiationlevelsonlyprovideabackupsourcetoaSFPproblem.OtherLCOsprovideadequateverificationofSFPprimary'indications(i.e.,levelandboronconcentration)whichensurethatallaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremet.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,personnelwouldbestationedwithintheAuxiliaryBuildingandimmediatelyawareofaproblem.Therefore,therequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.11.3and3.11.5-TheheavyloadrestrictionformovementofloadsovertheSFPwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheheavyloadlimitofthisLCOisnotanin'itialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-218-Hay1995 iv.TS3.11.4-TheSFPwatertemperaturelimitwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementbecausetheSFPwatertemperaturelimitofthisLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.TherequirementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.22.TechnicalSpecification3.12TS3.12.1-TherequirementforthenumberofthimblesperquadrantrequiredtoOPERABLEduringrecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystemwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TherequirementsforthissurveillancearenotaninitialassumptionofanyDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,thisspecificationdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.23.TechnicalSpecification3.13TS3.13-Therequirementsforsnubbersoperabilitywerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheInserviceTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8andmoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.24.TechnicalSpecification3.14None.25.TechnicalSpecification3.15TS3.15.1-TheLTOPexceptionduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestingwasrelocatedasaNOTEtonewLCO3.4.12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS3.15.1-ThePORVsetpointduringLTOPconditionswasrelocatedtothePTLRconsistentwithLCO3.4.12.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.15.1-TheaccumulatorsarenowrequiredtobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanthemaximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperaturesasspecifiedinthePTLRconsistentwithConditionCofLCO3.4.12.ThisnewrequirementpreventsanaccumulatorfromoverpressurizingtheRCSandcausinganactuationoftheLTOPSystem.Theoperatorisinstructedtoisolateordepressurizetheaffectedaccumulatorundertheseconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-219-May1995 iv.V.V.1~TS3.15.1.1-AnewrequirementwasaddedwhenaPORVisinoperableduringHODES5and6duetotheincreasedconsequencesfromanoverpressurizationeventundertheseconditions.ThisnewrequirementspecifiesthatthePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.Thelimitof72hourswithonePORVinoperableisconsistentwiththeallowedoutagetimeforonetrainofECCSequipmentduringHODES1,2and3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS3.15.1.3-Thereportingrequirementforthelowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)systemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementtoincludedocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisdetailedinproposedTS5.6.4,"HonthlyOperatingReports"andisgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCSpressuretransientthatexceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS3.15-TheApplicabilitywasrevisedtospecifythatLTOPisonlyrequiredinHODES5and6whenthereactorvessel.headisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.ThischangeisconsistentwiththecurrentrequirementsforisolatingtheSIpumpsforLTOPconditions(3.3.1.7and3.3.1.8)andtheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.26.TechnicalSpecification3.16TS3.16.1andTable3.16-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogram.whichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforspecifiedradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.Thisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionof'hepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-220-Hay1995 TS3.16.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications.5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS3.16.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyand.offsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.27.TechnicalSpecification4.0AnewsectionSR3.0.1wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementsandlimitationsthattheSRsmustmeetduringtheHODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithSR3.0.1.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.This*isaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.Hay1995 TS4.0-Thiswasrevisedtoclarifythebasicapplicationofthe25%extensiontoroutinesurveillancesconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.Theintervalextensionconceptisbasedonschedulingflexibilityforrepetitiveperformances.ThereareclarificationsprovidedinSR3.0.2forSurveillanceswhicharenotrepetitiveinnatureandessentiallyhavenointervalasmeasuredfromthepreviousperformance.Thisprecludestheabilityto'extendtheseperformances.TheexistingSpecification4.0canbeinterpretedtoallowtheextensiontoapplytoallSurveillances.Anadditionalclarificationprovidesthebasisforconsistencyinschedulingflexibilityforallperformancesofperiodicrequirements,whethertheyareSurveillancesorRequiredActions.Theintentremainstoperformtheactivity,ontheaverage,onceduringeachspecifiedinterval.ThissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirementsbutprovidesclarificationandadescriptionofSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewsectionSR3.0.3wasaddedwhichestablishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableor-anaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.TheSRpermitsthedeclarationoftheLCO-not-mettobedelayedforupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency(whicheverisless),andeliminatesconfusioninapplyingthecorrectACTIONtimelimitsattheendofthis24hourperiod.Thevastmajorityofsurveillancesperformeddemonstratethatsystemsorcomponents,infact,areOPERABLE.MhenaSurveillanceismissed,itisprimarilyaquestionofOPERABILITYthathasnotbeenverifiedbytheperformanceoftherequiredsurveillance.Basedonconsiderationofplantconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillanceandthesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtheSurveillance,theNRChasconcludedthat24hoursisanacceptabletimelimitforcompletingamissedSurveillancewhentheallowableoutagetimesoftheACTIONSarelessthanthe24hourlimitorashutdownisrequiredtocomplywithACTIONS(Ref.53).Thissection,inpart,providesnewrequirementsconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-222-Hay1995 iv.AnewsectionSR3.0.4wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.Thissectiondoesnotprovideanynewrequirements.PreviousguidanceprovidedbytheNRC(e.g.,GenericLetter87-09)regardingtheintentandinterpretationofexistingSpecificationsisconsistentwithSR3.0.4.ThisSRprovidesclarifyinganddescriptiveinformationfortheSRsapplicabilityconsistentwiththeuseandformatoftheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.28.TechnicalSpecification4.1ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.1orTable4.1-1:'a~Table4.1-1,Columns2(Calibrate)and3(Test)VariouscalibrationandtestingintervalrequirementsforRTSandESFASFunctionswererevisedconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ChangestothetestingintervalrequirementsdifferentfromthoseidentifiedanddiscussedinNUREG-1431arediscussedwiththespecificchangestotheFunctionalUnits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l5)change.b.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-1(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):1.-SR3.4.2.1-requiresverificationevery30minutesthatT,,foreachRCSloopis>540FwhenanyRCSloopT,,isknowntobe<547F.Thissurveillanceis.intendedtoensurethattheminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotexceededwhentheRCSisatlessthanHotZeroPowerconditions(i.e.,547F).Thesurveillanceisnotrequiredtobeperformedifthe'lowT.,alarmineachloopisresetwithasetpoint>540F.2.SR3.4.3.1-requiresverificationevery30minutesthatRCSpressure,temperature,h'eatupandcooldownratesarewithinlimits.ThissurveillanceisonlyrequiredduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperations,andinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.The30minuteFrequencyisbasedonthefactthatheatupandcooldownratesarespecifiedinhourlyincrementswhichprovidesadequatemargintocorrectminordeviations.-223-Hay1995 3.5.SR3.4.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatpressurizerpressureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinna.TSTable4.1-1,¹7whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.2-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitsduringMODE1.ThissurveillanceissimilartocurrentGinnaTSTable4.1-1,¹33whichisperformedtosupportreactortripfunctions.SR3.4.1.3-requiresperformanceofaprecisionheatbalancetoverifythatRCSflowiswithinlimitsevery24'months.Thissurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysofenteringMODE1andreaching95%RTP.SR3.1.6.1-Requiresverificationwithin4hourspriortocriticalitythatthecriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinlimitsintheCOLR.7.SR3.1.6.4-Requiresverificationevery12hourswhencriticalthatthesequenceandoverlaplimitsforthecontrolbanksnotfullywithdrawnare.withinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.8.9.SR3.1.8.4-Requiresverificationevery30minutesduringMODE2PHYSICSTESTSthatTHERMALPOWERg5%RTP.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERlevelwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.SR.3.2.4.1-Verificationwithacalculationusingthepowerrange'channelsevery7daysthatthegPTRiswithinlimits.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹1,¹2,¹3,¹8,¹17,¹23,¹25,¹38a,¹38b,¹39,¹40,¹4la,and¹4lb-Thenotes,orremarkswhichdescribeanoperationaldetail,werenotadded.Thesedetailswererelocatedtothebasesoraredescribedin'theUFSAR.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-224-May1995 LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹10wasaddedfortheRCPBreakerPosition.ThisfunctionanticipatestheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripsbymonitoringeachRCPbreakerpositiontoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuates.ThefunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolossofflowineitherasinglelooportwoloopconfiguration.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.LCO3.3.1,Table3.3.1-1,Function¹14wasaddedfortheSIInputfromESFAS.ThisfunctionensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.'hisisaconditionofacceptabilityfortheLOCA.Areactortripisinitiatedeverytime.anSIsignalispresent.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.SR3.3.1.14,SR3.3.1.15jSR3.3.1.16,SR3.3.1.17,SR3.3.1.18wereaddedfortheReactorTripSystemInterlocks(P-6throughP-10).Thesesurveillancesareprovidedtoensurereactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.TheyareprovidedtobackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctions.arenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionsarenotbypassed.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change'.Table4.1-1,Functions¹34and¹35-Therequirementsforthechlorinegasandammoniagasinstrumentationmonitorsforcontrolroomhabitabilitywerenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementssincethemonitoredparametersarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.Thesemonitorsarenotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹Iand2wererevisedtorequireaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)onthepowerrangeandtheintermediaterangechannelswithin7dayspriortoreactorcriticality.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe7daytimelimitsissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingthePHYSICSTESTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-225-Hay1995 Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹4wasrevisedtoincludeanoterequiringachannelcheckevery30minuteswhileimplementingMODE2PHYSICSTESTexceptions.VerificationoftheRCStemperaturewillensurethattheinitial,conditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹18,¹28,and¹29-TheSurveillancerequirementsforradiationmonitorsR-1throughR-9andR-17,emergencyplanradiationinstruments,andenvironmentalmonitors,werenotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹25-Thecalibrationandtestingrequirementsforthecontainmentpressurenarrowrangetransmitterwerenotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThisinstrumentisnotusedorcreditedinanyDBAortransientanalysis.Thisinstrumentisonlyusedtoverifythatcontainmentpressureremains<1.0psigandZ-2.0psigduringnormaloperation.TheseitemswererelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnit¹3-ThiswasrevisedtoaddarequirementwhichestablishesasurveillanceforaSRMCHANNELCALIBRATIONinMODE6.Thiscalibrationconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedataandisconsistentwithcurrentGinnaStationprocedures.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.Table4.1-1,FunctionalUnits¹14,¹16,and¹19wererelocatedtotheTRHforthesamereasonsasdescribedinSectionD,items12.ithrough12.iv.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes.-226-Hay1995 IThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-2:a~b.C.d.e.Table4.1-2,¹6awasrevisedto'xtendthesurveillanceFrequencyofthecontrolrodexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days.TheITSBasesstatesthatthe92dayFrequencytakesinto"considerationtheotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandthechannelcheckwhichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofrodoperability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.29)change.4Table4.1-2,¹5and¹6bwererevisedtoremovereferencetoonceevery18monthsoreachrefuelingshutdownfromtheFrequency.Thesesurveillancesareonlyperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorhead.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹7wasrevisedtorelocatethesurveillanceFrequencyofthepressurizersafetyvalvestotheISTProgramconsistentwithSR3.4.10.1.TheFrequencycontinuestoremaininaprogramrequiringNRCapproval.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹10was'notaddedtothenewspecifications.TherequirementforverifyingtherefuelingsysteminterlocksisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.ThisrequirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRN.ThischangeisconsistentwithWCAP-11618(Ref.52)andisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹13wasrevisedperSR3.6.6.8torequireverificationofthesprayadditivetankNaOHconcentrationonceevery184daysinsteadofmonthly.This.changeisacceptablesincethesprayadditivetankisnormallymaintainedisolatedatpowersuchthatchangestotheNaOHconcentrationorlevelarenotexpected.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.30)change.,-227-May1995 Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹15wasrevisedtorequireRCSwaterinventorybalancesevery72hoursduringsteadystateoperationversusdailyconsistentwithSR3.4.13.1.ThisincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptablebasedontheleakagedetectionsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.4.15andthevariousindicationsavailabletooperators(e.g.,volumecontroltanklevelandradiationalarms).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.31)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹17wasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofSFPboronconcentrationonceevery31dayswhenfuelisstoredintheSFPandthepositionoffuelassemblieswhichweremovedintheSFPhavenotbeenverified.Thecurrentmonthlyrequirement(regardlessofthestatusoftheSFPverification)isnotreflectedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichdoesnotcredittheavailabilityofsolubleboron.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.32)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹19-ThetripfunctionrequirementfortheCirculationWaterFloodProtectionwasnotadded.TheCirculationWaterFloodProtectioninstruments.onlyprovideananticipatoryturbinetripandisnotassumedintheGinnaStationsafetyanalysis.TheseinstrumentsdonotmonitorparameterswhichareinitialassumptionsforaDBAortransient,donotidentifyasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary,anddonotprovideanymitigationofadesignbasisevent.Therefore,.therequi,rementspecifiedforthisfunctiondoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory,(iii)change.ThefollowingnewrequirementswereaddedtoTable4.1-2(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes):1.SR3.1.1.1-Requiresverificationevery48hoursthattheSHUTDOWNHARGINiswithinthelimits.TheITSBasesstatethata,Frequencyofevery48hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangein.boronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDH.-228-Hay1995

SR3.1.3.1-RequiresverificationpriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingthatHTCiswithintheupperlimit.TheITS.BasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.3.2-RequiresverificationpriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingthatMTCwillbewithinthe70%RTPHTCupperlimitandtheEOLlowerHTClimit.TheITSBasesstatethatmeetingthelimitpriortoenteringNODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.SR3.1.8.3-Requireverificationevery24hourswhileimplementingtheHODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsthattheSHUTDOWNMARGINiswithinthelimits.TheITSBasesstatethataFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringwithouttherequiredSDH.SR3.5.1.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthateachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveisfullyopenabove1600psig.SR3.5.1.3-requiresverificationevery12hours.ofanupperlimitforthenitrogenpressureblanketintheaccumulatorstopreventliftingofthereliefvalveandoverpressurizationofthetank.Avalueof790psigwasselectedsinceitisabovetheaccumulatorpressureupperalarmsetpointof760psigandbelowthereliefvalvesetpointof800psig.SR3.5.1.4-requiresverificationevery31daysonanSTAGGEREDTESTBASISofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheaccumulatorsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselected.sincethiswouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainment(andaccumulator)temperatureof60F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalculationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.-229-Hay1995 SR3.5.1.5-requiresverificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromtheaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorabove1600psig.ThissurveillanceisconsistentwithcurrentTS3.3.l.1.i.Avalueof1600psigwas.selected(i.e.,thesamevalueasthatforaccumulatoroperability)sincetheRCSpressureinterlock(i.e.,P-ll)asdiscussedinNUREG-1431doesnotexistatGinnaStation.Therefore,thereisnointerlocksignaltoopentheisolationvalvesintheeventthattheyareclosed.SR3.5.4.2-requiresverificationevery7daysofanupperlimitforboronconcentrationintheRWSTsincethislimitisusedindeterminingthetimeframewhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwasselectedsincethiswouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuilding(andRWST).temperatureof50F.ThisisalsoboundedbythecontainmentsumppHcalculationsandassumptionsusedforchemicalsprayeffects.SR3.6.5.1-requiresverification,.every24hoursthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureis<120F..SR3.6.6.7-requiresverificationevery184daysthatthesprayadditivetankvolumeis>4500gallons.SR3.7."11.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthat>23feetofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracksduringfuelmovementintheSFP.Thisverificationisrequiredsincethefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatatleast23feetofwaterisavailablewithrespecttoiodinereleases.SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7..13.2-verificationpriortofuelmovementintheSFPthattheassociatedfuelassemblymeetsthenecessaryrequirementsforstorageintheintendedregion(e.g,enrichmentlimit,burnablepoisonspresent).ThisverificationisrequiredtolimittheamountoftimethatafuelassemblycouldbemisloadedintheSFP.-230-Hay1995 14.SR3.7.6.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthattheCSTvolumeis>22,500gallons.ThisensuresthattheminimumvolumeofcondensateisavailableforthepreferredAFWSystemfollowinganaccident.15.SR3.7.7.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCCWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.16.SR3.7.7.2-requiresperformanceofacompletecycleofeachCCWmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheRHRheatexchangersinaccordancewiththeISTProgram.ThisensuresthatthenormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalvesarecapableofbeingopenedfollowingaDBA.17.SR3.7.8.1-requiresverificationevery31daysthateachSWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheSWpumptrainorloopheaderflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheSWSystemiscapableofperformingitsfunctionfollowingaDBAtoprovidecoolingwatertosafetyrelatedcomponents.17.SR3.4.15.5-requiresaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthecontainmentaircoolercondensatesystemmonitorevery24monthswhenthissystemisbeingusedinplaceofthecontainmentsumpmonitor.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnits¹Iand¹2-ThesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationsforthereasonsdiscussedinSectionD,itemll.i.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.k.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹16-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofDGfueloilinventoryonceevery31daysinsteadofdaily.Sincethestoragetanksareofpassivedesignandareprovidedwithvariouslevelalarms,verificationevery31daysisconsideredadequate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.33)change.-231-Hay1995

n.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹4-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRH'forthesamereasonsasdescribedinSectionD,item12.iv.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹12-ThiswasrelocatedtotheTRHsinceitdoesnotmeetanyoftherequirementsforinclusionintheITS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Table4.1-2,FunctionalUnit¹8-TheFrequencyfordetermininggrossspecificactivityofthesecondarysystemwasrevisedfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery31days.Inaddition,thedeterminationofI-131wasalsochangedtoonceevery31daysindependentofthelastactivitylevelsincethecurrentGinnaTSallowupto6monthsbetweentests.ThesechangesareallconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.3orTable4.1-3:'a~Table4.1-3-ThePostAccidentHonitoringInstrumentationFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwererevisedtoincludeonlyRegulatoryGuide1.97,TypeAandCategory1variables.TheseFunctionsaredenotedinUFSARTable7.5-1andhavebeenpreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC(Ref.35).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.2orTable4.1-4:a~Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnit¹1wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.1toonlyrequireverificationofreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityonceevery7dayswhenT.,>500Fversusonceevery72hoursaboveColdShutdown(i.e.,T.,Z200F).Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisacceptablebasedonthesmallprobabilityofagrossfuelfailureduringtheadditional4days.Fuelfailuresaremorelikelytooccurduringstartuporfastpowerchangesandnotduringsteadystatepoweroperationduringwhichthemajorityofsamplingisperformed.GrossfuelfailureswillalsoresultinLetdownradiationalarmsandpossiblycontainmentradiationalarmsprovidingadditionaloperatorindication.OnlyrequiringthissurveillancewhenT.,>500FprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.34)change.-232-Hay1995 b.Table4.1-4,FunctionalUnitP2wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.2torequireverificationofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131whenT,,Z500Finsteadofabove5'l.reactorpower.ThisconservativechangeprovidesconsistencywiththeLCOApplicability.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.cTable4.1-4,FunctionalUnit83wasrevisedperSR3.4.16.3todelaydeterminationofEuntil31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofMODE1operationfollowingthereactorbeingsubcriticalfor>48hours.The31dayswasaddedtoensurethatradioactivematerialsareatequilibriuminordertoprovideatruerepresentativesampleforEdeterminationandeliminatepossiblefalsesamples.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.V.ThefollowingchangesweremadetoTS4.1.4orTable4.1-5:,a.Table4.1-5,FunctionalUnit83bwasrevisedtorequireachannelcheckofparticulatesamplerR-llevery12hoursversusweekly.ThisisrequiredsinceR-llisbeingusedtomonitorRCSleakageandmaybetheonlyinstalledsystemOPERABLEtoperformthistaskforupto30dayspernewLCO3.4.15.b.TS4.1.4andTable4.1-5-TheRadioactiveEffluentMonitoringInstrumentFunctionsrequiredbythisspecificationwerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincetheseprocessvariablesarenotaninitialconditionoraDBAortransientanalysis.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthesefunctionsdo,notsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandwererelocatedtotheODCHandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.29.TechnicalSpecification4.2TS4.2.1-ThespecificrequirementsfortheInserviceInspectionProgram,whichincludegualityGroupsA,B,andCcomponents,highenergypipingoutsideofcontainment,snubbersandsteamgeneratortubes,werenotadded.Thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(GinnaStationgAManual,AppendixB)andamore,genericdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-233-May1995

30.TechnicalSpecification4..3TS4.3.5.6-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedforthereasonsdiscussedunderSectionC;item6.xi.ThisSurveillancehasbeenrelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.3.5.3.b-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedsinceperformanceofpumptestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingprogramshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingRHRpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredbynewSR3.4.6.3whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestingismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringshutdownconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureoperabilityduringNODE4operations.However,thisSurveillanceisrequiredforECCSduringMODE4(seenewSR3.5.3.1)ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3-Thefollowingnewrequirementswereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):SR3.4.6.3,3.4.7.3and3.4.8.2-Requirestheverificationofcorrectbreakeralignmentforthenon-operating,butrequired,RHRpumpinMODES4and5.b.c~SR3.4.9.2-Requiresverificationthatthetotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersis>100KWonceevery92days.SR3.4.11.2-RequiresacompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogensystemonceevery24months.iv.TS4.3.3.1,4.3.3.2,and4.3.3.3-Therequirementthattheleakagetestsbeperformedwitha'inimumtestdifferentialpressureof150psidwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThebasesfornewLCO3.4.14referenceASME,SectionXI(Ref.53)whichprovidesacceptableguidanceforperformingtheseleakagetests.Thisincludesadjustingtheobservedleakageratesforteststhatarenotconductedatthemaximumdifferentialpressurebyassumingthatleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.ThisisaconservativechangeinmostcasessinceitrequiresthatthePIVsbetestedunderthemaximumdifferentialpressureconditions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-234-May1995 v~Vi.Viii.31.TechnicalTS4.3.3.4-TheallowedleakageratesforPIVswasadjustedfromasinglevalueforallvalvestoavaluebasedonvalvesizeconsistentwithSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2.Thischangeprovidesgreaterinformationofvalvedegradationandremovesanunjustifiedpenaltyonlargervalves(Ref.54).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.3.5.5-ThissurveillancewasnotaddedduringMODE1operationsincethereisareactortripfunctionwhichprotectstheSGlevel.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.3.1.1-Thisrequirementwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssinceitonlystatesthatthereactorvesselmustbetestedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixH.SincethisrequirementisalreadyspecifiedintheCFR,itdoesnothavetoberetained.withtheTSandwasdeleted.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS4.3.3.1-ThiswasmodifiedtoremovetherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdown.AtGinnaStation,theseflowpathsareonlyusedforemergencyinjection(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringcoldshutdownconditions).Sincethevalvesaremaintainedclosedatalltimes,requiringaleaktestwithin24hoursofbeingopenedorhavingmaintenanceperformed,andonceevery24monthsprovidesadequateprotection.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.35)change.Specification4.4TS4.4.4-Therequirementsforthetendonstresssurveillanceswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePre-stressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.6andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.4.3-Therequirementsforthe,testingoftheportionoftheRHRsystemintherecirculationconfigurationwerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtothePrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.2andamoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-235-May1995

ill.lv~v.Vl.Vl1~TS4.4.1(exceptdefinitionforL,),4.4.2.1,4.4.2.2,and4.4.2.4-Thesewerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisinformationiscontainedin10CFR50,AppendixJanddoesnotneedtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecifications.SRs3.6.1.1and3.6.1.2provideforthenecessaryrelationfromtechnicalspecificationstoAppendixJ.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(ii)changes.TS4.4.2.3.aand4.4.2.3.b-Thesewererevisedtorequirethatiftheallowed10CFR50,AppendixJleakagelimitsareexceeded,theymustberestoredwithin1hourversus48hoursconsistentwithLCO3.6.1.However,theleakagelimitof<0.6L.wasrevisedtobeconsistentwiththenewAppendixJruleandimplementationguidance(i.e.,theleakagelimitis<0.6L,onamaximumpathwayleakageratebasispriortoenteringMODE4forthefirsttimefollowingeachrefuelingoutageand<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakageratebasisforallothertimeperiods).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS4.4.2.4.c-Aspecifiedairlockleakageacceptancecriteria'f<0.05L.whentestedatZP,wasaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisacceptancecriteriaisrequiredtoberetainedwithintechnicalspecificationsby10CFR50,AppendixJ,SectionIII.D.2(iv)andisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andcurrenttestingrequirements.Inaddition,anewSurveillancewasaddedtoverifythatonlyonedoor,ineachairlockcanbeopenedatatimeonceevery24months.ThistestisnecessarytoensurethattheOPERABILITYoftheairlocks,asdefinedinthenewbasesforLCO3.6.2ismaintained.TheseareGinnaCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.2.3.c-Therequirementtoperformanengineeringevaluationifthemini-purgesupplyandexhaustlinesisolationvalveleakageexceeds0.05L,wasrevisedtorequireisolationoftheaffectedpenetrationwithin24hours.Inaddition,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeverifiedisolatedonceevery31daysifitisoutsidecontainment,oronceevery92daysifitisinsidecontainment.ThesechangesprovidedirectguidancetooperatorswhichareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.4.5.1-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.6.3.1andSR3.6.3.2)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationofthecorrectpositionofcontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedoutsidecontainmentonceevery184daysandinsidecontainmentpriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifithasnotbeenperformedwithintheprevious184days.Thesesurveillancesen'surethatthecontainmentisolationbarriersremainOPERABLEaboveMODE5.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.-236-May1995 1X.X.32.TechnicalTS4.4.6.2-TheSurveillanceFrequencyforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveshasbeenrevisedfrom18to24months(seeSection0,iteml.xii).TheresponsetimesforCIVsisdiscussedinthebasesfornewLCO3.6.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.l)change.TS4.4-TwonewSurveillanceswereaddedwithrespecttothehydrogenrecombiners(SR3.6.7.1andSR3.6.7.2).ThefirstnewSurveillancerequiresthattheblowerfanforthehydrogenrecombinersbeoperatedfor>5minutesonceevery24months.ThesecondnewSurveillancerequiresthataCHANNELCALIBRATIONbeperformedonthehydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannelsonceevery24months.TheperformanceoftheseSRsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareOPERABLEandcapableofperformingtheirpost-accidentfunction.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.TS4.4.7-TheFrequencyforperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKofthehydrogenmonitorswasrevisedfromdailytomonthly.Inaddition,theFrequencyforCHANNELCALIBRATIONSwas'evisedfromquarterlytoevery24months.ThesechangesareconsistentwithNUREG-1431andarejustifiedbyindustryexperience.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.21)changes.Specification4.5TS4.5.1.l.a-ThiswasrevisedtodeletethestatementthattheSIandRHRpumpsarepreventedfromstartingduring,thistest.Sincethesecomponentshaverecirculationlinesavailable,thisstatementisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS4.5.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtorelocateallSI,RHR,andCSpumptestingfrequenciesanddischargepressurerequirementstotheInserviceTestingprogramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8consistentwiththeITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.2.c-ThetestrelatedtoaccumulatorcheckvalvetestingforoperabilityeveryrefuelingshutdownwasrelocatedtotheGinnaStationInserviceTestingprogram.Thevalvesarecurrentlypartiallystroketestedquarterlyandrefurbishedeverysixyears.LeakageassociatedwiththesecheckvalvesisaddressedbySR3.5.1.2.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.1VThefollowingnewITStestingrequirementswereadded(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change):-237-Hay1995 a~SR3.5.2.1-requiresverificationevery12hoursthatECCSrelatedisolationvalvesareintheirrequiredposition.ThesevalvesarecurrentlyspecifiedinTS3.3.l.l.g,3.3.1.l.i,and3.3.l.l.j.b.SR3.5.2.2-requiresverificationevery31daysthatECCSrelatedvalveswhicharenotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionareintheircorrectposition.TS4.5.2.3-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheairfiltrationsystemtestswerenotaddedtothe-newspecifications.ThislevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVentilationFilterTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.Inaddition,theremainingrequirementswereallrelocatedtotheAdministrativeControlssection.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.5.2.3.6.a-Thesetestrequirementswererevisedtoclarifythattwoseparatetestsareperformed.AHEPAfiltertestandacharcoaladsorberbanktestareseparatelyperformedwitheachrequiringalimitoflessthan3inchesofwater.Thisisessentiallyequivalenttoacombinedtestoflessthan6inchesofwaterandisconsistentwithspecifiedtestingstandards.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS4.5.1.2-AnewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.1)wasaddedtoverifythecorrectpositionofeachmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheCSflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition.ThisSurveillanceensuresthattheCSSystemisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.5.1.2.b-TheFrequencyofperformingthespraynozzlegastestwasrevisedfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10yearsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.14.Theincreasedsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptableduetothepassivenatureofthespraynozzlesandpreviousacceptableresults.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.36)change.TS4.5.2.3.5-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireactuationofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfromanactualorsimulatedSIsignal,onceevery24monthstoensurethatthesystemalignsitselfcorrectly(SR3.6.6.12).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersmuststillbeopenedatleastonceper31daystoallowthesystemtooperateforz15minutes.Consequently,onlythefrequencyoftheautomaticalignmentofthedampersisbeingrevisedtoprovideconsistencywithotherspecifications.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.37)change.-238--May1995 X.Xl.TS4.5.2.2.a-ThiswasrevisedtoadjustthetestingFrequencyofthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlytoonceevery24monthsconsistentwithSR3.6.6.13.ThisincreasedtestingintervalisacceptablesincethesystemonlyneedstobeverifiedthatitcanactuateonanactualorsimulatedSIsignalonarefuelingbasissimilartotheSIandRHRsystems.AnyadditionalvalvetestingisaddressedbytheISTprogram.'naddition,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.9)wasaddedtoverifythattheCSmotoroperatedisolationvalvesactuatetotheircorrectpositiononceevery24monthsfollowinganactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Finally,anewSurveillance(SR3.6.6.14)wasaddedtoverifythatthesprayadditiveflowrateiswithinlimitsonceevery5years.ThesechangesensurethattheCSandsprayadditivetankLCOscontinuetobemet.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.b.38)changes.TS4.5.2.3.3and4.5.2.3.4-ThesewererevisedtorequirethateachCRFCunitbeoperatedfor>15minutesonceevery31days(SR3.6.6.2).ThistestwillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.Inaddition,anewSurveillanceisalsorequiredonceevery24monthstoensurethattheCRFCunitsstart'onanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.ThesetestswillensurethattheCRFCunitsareOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeLCO.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.a)changes.TS4.5.2.3.9-ThiswasrevisedtorequireatestoftheautomaticactuationcapabilityoftheCREATSonceevery24months.Thisverificationisnecessarytoensurethatthecontrolroomenvironmentcanbeisolatedintheeventofaradiologicalrelease.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.33.TechnicalSpecification4.6TS4.6.1.a-Thecoldorrefuelingrequirements(MODES5and6)fordemonstratingDGoperabilityhavebeenrevisedtoinclude(1)verificationofDGdaytankfueloillevel,(2)verificationoftheonsitesupplyoffueloil,and(3)operationofthefueloiltransfersystem.'heseareconsistentwiththerequiredsurveillancesforDGoperabilityinMODES1,2,3,and4andprovideassurancethattheDGisOPERABLE.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.6.l.b.6-TherequirementtoverifythattheDGisalignedtoprovidestandbypowertotheassociatedemergencybuseswasnotadded.ThisrequirementiswithinthedefinitionofanOPERABLEDGandisdenotedinthebasesofnewTS3.8.1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.-239-May1995

TS4.6.l.c-TherequirementtoperformthetestsinSpecification4.6.l.bpriortoexceedingcoldshutdownwasnotadded.Thisrequirementwasreplacedwithageneralprovision(newSR3.0.4)thatrestrictsentryintoaHODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOunlesstheLCO'ssurveillanceshavebeenmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.6.l.d-ThedieselfueloiltestrequirementswererelocatedtonewTS5.5.12andareproposedtobeidentifiedasa"program"consistentwiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.'6.l.e.l-TherequirementtoinspecttheDGinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationswasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyforthisrequirementsinceDGinspectionsarenotpartoftheprimarysuccesspathassumedinthemitigationofaDBAortransient.TherequirementdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.l.e.3(b)-TherequirementforDGtestingsimulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontestsignalwasrevised.DetailsofthetestacceptancecriteriawererelocatedtotheTRHsincethislevelofdetailisnottypicallyspecifiedintheSR.'hisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.6.2.aand4.6.2.b-Thestationbatterytestingrequirementswererevisedtoaddacceptancecriteria,parameters,andassociatedactionsforbatteryoperabilitysupportingDC'lectricalpowersubsystems.TheserequirementsareprovidedinthebasesandenhancethecurrentcriteriaspecifiedintheTSandisaconservativechangeregardingthedefinitionofbatteryOPERABILITY.Inaddition,theelectrolytetemperatureisonlytobemeasuredevery92daysversusmonthlyconsistentwithIEEE-450requirements.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)and(v.a)changes,respectively.TS4.6.2.f-Thedetailsdenotingbatterydegradationweremovedtothebasesandwererevisedtoinclude.expectedlifeparametersofthebatterywhencomparedtoacapacitycriteriaof100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.ThiscriteriaisusedinconjunctionwithidentifyingwhenthesurveillanceFrequencymustbeincreasedandisconsistentwith,ITS.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.a)changes,respectively.-240-Hay1995 1X.X;34.TechnicalTS4.6.2-Twonewsurveillances(SR3.8.4.1andSR3.8.5.1)wereaddedwhichrequireverificationevery31daysthatthebatterychargingcapabilityis>150ampsduringoperatingandshutdownconditions.ThissurveillanceensuresthattherequiredbatterychargerremainscapableofmaintainingDCsystemloadsandafloatchargeonthebattery.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.6.2.c-TherequirementfortrendingbatterytestdatawasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisistrendingmustbeperformedtomeettheFrequencyrequirementsforSR3.8.6.2andSR3.8.4.3.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Specification4.7TS4.7wasrevisedtoincludeasurveillancetoensurethateachMSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalevery24monthsconsistentwithNUREG-1431and.currentGinnaStationTSTable3.5-2whichrequirethattheisolationsignalstotheHSIVsbeOPERABLE.Inaddition,RequiredActionswereprovidedintheeventthattheMSIVscannotcloseasrequiredbythisSurveillance.Theseactionsrequirerestorationof,orclosureofaninoperableHSIV,within24hours.IntheeventthatbothMSIVsareinoperable,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3.Finally,requirementsforthemainsteamnon-returncheckvalveswe}eadded.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.35.TechnicalSpecification4.8TS4.8.1and4.8.2-TheFrequencyoftheAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASME,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.8.3-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheAFWsuctionanddischargevalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,thecross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalveswerenotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethesevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalyses(seebasesfornewLCO3.7.5).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(v.b.39)changes,respectively.Hay1995 0 ivV.TS4.8.4-TheFrequencyoftheSAFWpumptestswaschangedfrommonthlytoasdefinedintheInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithASME,SectionXIrequirements.TheacceptancecriteriawasalsorelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Thisprogramprovidessufficientcontrolforthesetestingactivities.Inaddition,allOPERABILITYrequirements(e.g.,requiredpumpflowrates)wererelocatedtotheLCObasesconsistentwiththeITSWriter'sGuide.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iii)and(i)changes,respectively.TS4.8.5-ThisSurveillancewasrevisedtorelocatetheFrequencyoftestingtheSAFWsuction,discharge,andcross-overvalvestotheInserviceTestingProgramwhichprovidessufficientcontrolofthesetestingactivitiesconsistentwithNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.8.6-ThiswasrevisedtorelocatetheacceptancecriteriafortheAFWandSAFWteststotheactualproceduresperformingthesetests.ThenewbasesidentifywhatisrequiredforOPERABILITYoftheAFWandSAFWSystemssuchthatspecifyingthisacceptancecriteriaisunnecessary.Inaddition,boththebasesandtestproceduresarecontrolledunder10CFR50.59.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.vi.'S4.8-AnewSurveillancewasaddedrequiringverificationevery31daysofthecorrectpositionofeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperatedandautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredinposition.Thisverificationisrequiredto'ensurethattheAFWandSAFWSystemsareOPERABLEwhennotinservice.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS4.8.10-TherequirementtomeasuretheresponsetimeoftheAFWpumpsandvalvestobe<10minutesonceevery18monthswasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.ThetimerequirementsfortheAFWSystemaredescribedinthenewbases.WhilesomeaccidentsdonotrequireAFWfor10minutes,thesmallbreakLOCAandlossoffeedwatertransientsrequireAFWwithinmuchshortertimeframes.Therefore,thisSurveillanceisnotaccurateandisnotrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.40)change.-242-May1995

36.TechnicalSpecification4.9TS4.9-ThiswasrevisedtoincludeanLCOrequirementthatthemeasuredcorereactivitybewithin1%hk/kofthepredictedvaluesandtoaddaspecificsurveillanceFrequencyofevery31EFPDaftertheinitialnormalization.TheSurveillanceRequirementwasdividedintotwosurveillancestoclarifythedifferencebetweentheinitialnormalizationandthemonthlyverification.Theseare.GinnaTSCategory(v.c)changes.37.TechnicalSpecification4.10TS4;10.1andTable4.10-1-Therequirementsfortheradiologicalenvironmentalprogramwhichprovidesmeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecification"screeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.10.2-Therequirementsforthelandusecensuswhichsupportsthemeasurementofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinna.TSCategory(iii.).change.-243-May1995 TS4.10.3-Therequirementsoftheinterlaboratorycomparisonprogramwhichconfirmstheaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinspecifiedexposurepathwaysandforthoseradionuclideswhichleadtothehighestpotentialradiationexposuresformembersofthepublicwerenotadded.ThisprogramisnotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis.Further,thisprogramisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.38.TechnicalSpecification4.11TS4.11.1-TherequirementsdenotingtheFrequencyandconditionsoftheSFPfiltr'ationsystemtestswerenotadded.ThelevelofdetailisrelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.10.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.11.l.l.a,4.11.l.l.b,and4.11.l.l.c-ThesecharcoaladsorbersystemtestingrequirementswererelocatedtotheVFTPdescribedintheAdministrativeControls(TS5.5.10).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS4.11.l.l.d-Thiswasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisverificationisnotrequiredtoensurethatinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesarestillmet.TheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemdoesnotutilizeheaters.ThebasesforSR3.7.13.1statethatoperatingtheventilationsystemfor>15minutesevery31daysforsystemswithoutheatersistoensuresystemoperation.InaccordancewithnewLCO3.7.10(NUREG-1431LCO3.7.13),theABVSisrequiredtobeinoperationduringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Assuch,theABVSisnotastandbysystematGinnaStation(i.e.,thesystemmustbebothOPERABLEandinoperationduringitsNODEofApplicability).Therefore,amonthlyverificationprovidesnoverificationofanyaccidentanalysisassumption.Instead,anewSurveillancewasaddedwhichrequiresverificationevery24hoursthattheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloorlevelisatanegativepressurewithrespecttotheoutsideenvironment.Thisverificationisconsistentwithplantpracticesandensuresthataninitialassumptionofthefuelhandlingaccidentisbeingmaintained.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithReference55.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-244-Nay1995 iv.V.vi39.TechnicalTS4.11.2.1-ThiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireverificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYonceevery12hoursversus4hoursconsistentwithSR3.9.3.1.AFrequencyof12hoursisadequateduetothealarmsandindicationsavailabletotheoperatorswithrespecttoRHRpumpandloopperformance.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.41)change.TS4.11.2.2-ThiswasrevisedtoremovetherequirementforanInserviceTestoftheRHRpumps.AnInserviceTestshouldnotberequiredforanoperatingpump.Thestatusofanon-operatingRHRpumpisassuredby.newSR3.9.4.2whichrequirestheverificationofthebreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletothepump.TheInserviceTestingprogramtestismainlyperformedtoensureadequateperformanceduringaccidentconditionswhichfarexceedstherequirementsduringnormalconditions.ThistestisnotnecessarytoensureOPERABILITYduringMODE6operations.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.42)change.TS4.11.3.1-Thiswasrevisedtoonlyrequireaverificationofthewaterlevelinthereactorcavitywithin24hoursoffuelmovementversus2hours.ThenewTSusagerulesstatethataSRistobecontinuouslyperformedatitsrequiredFrequency.However,'heSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenintheMODEofApplicability.Therefore,aSRwithaFrequencyof24hoursmusthavebeenperformedwithin24hoursbeforeenteringtheMODEofApplicability.AFrequencyof24hoursisacceptableduetothelargevolumeofwateravailableandtheproceduralcontrolsinplace.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.Specification4.12TS4.12.1.1andTable4.12-1-Therequirementsforradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareaswhicharelimitedtotheconcentrationsspecifiedin10CFRPart20,AppendixB,Table.II,Column2,werenotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaapplyfortheserequirementsbecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,liquidreleasesduringnormaloperationareanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCMandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-245-May1995 TS4.12.1.2-Therequirementsfortheliquidradwaste,treatmentsystemwhichcontrolsthereleaseofsiteliquideffluentsduringnormaloperationaloccurrencesconsistentwith10CFRPart50,AppendixA,GDC60and10CFRPart50,AppendixI,SectionII.D,werenotadded.Nolossofprimarycoolantisinvolved,neitherisanaccidentconditionassumedorimplied.Further,thelossofthesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspeci,ficationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.1andTable4.12-2-Therequirementswhichassurecompliancewith10CFRPart20forthedoserateduetoradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentsbeyondthesiteboundarywerenotadded.Noscreen'ingcriteriaapplybecausetheprocessvariableoftheLCOisnotaninitialconditionofaDBAortransientanalysis.Further,gaseouseffluentdoserateduringnormaloperationisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS4.12.2.2-Therequirementsfordoseduetonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsduringnormaloperationoverextendedperiodswerenotadded.TheselimitsarenotrelatedtoprotectionofthepublicfromanyDBAortransientanalysis;Further,gaseouseffluentsdose(noblegas)valuesisanon-significantriskcontribut'ortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-246-Hay1995 v~TS4.12.3-Therequirementsforthegaseouswastetreatmentsystemwhichreducestheactivitylevelingaseouswastepriortodischargetotheenvironswerenotadded.TheventilationexhaustsystemisnotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,thesystemisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecifiedforthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheODCHandtheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.40.TechnicalSpecification4.13TS4.13-Therequirementsforperiodictestingofleakageforradioactivesourceswerenotadded.ThesourceleaktestarenotassumedintheanalysisofanyDBAortransient.Further,theleakagefromradioactivesourcesisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamage'requencyandoffsiterelease.Therefore,therequirementsspecified'forthisfunctiondonotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaandarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.41.Technical42.TechnicalNone.Specification4.14TS4.14-Therequirementsforthetestingofsnubberswerenotadded.SincesnubberstestingiscontrolledwithintheInserviceTestingProgram,thelevelofdetailisrelocatedtoInserviceTestingProgramdescribedinnewSpecification5.5.8andmoregenericprogramdescriptionisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification4.1543.TechnicalSpecification,4.16TS4.16-,Anewsurveillancewasaddedwhichrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatanaccumulator'smotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosedwhenitspressureisgreaterthanorequaltothepressureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLRconsistentwithSR3.4.12.3.Inaddition,averificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedtotheseisolationvalvesisalsoadded.TheseverificationsareneededtoensurethattheaccumulatordoesnotdischargeintotheRCSandcauseanoverpressureeventwhichchallengestheLTOPSystem.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-247-Hay1995 TS4.16.l.a-ThissurveillancewasrevisedtodelayperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriortoenteringtheLTOPSystemApplicability.Thischangeeliminatestheperformanceofthefunctionaltest'whenRCSisbetween330F(theLTOPenabletemperature)and350F(NODE3lowerlimit)duringforcedshutdowns.Instead,thetestcanbeperformedwithin12hoursofenteringthespecifiedconditionandreducestheimmediateoperatorburden.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.43)change.44.TechnicalSpecification5.1TS5.1.1,TS5.1.2,andFigure5.1-1-Thedescriptionandfigureofthesiteareaboundary'ndexclusionareaboundarywasnotaddedtothenewspecificationsconsistentwithTravellerGEOG-03,C.1.SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments'i.e.,UFSAR,Section2.1.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.45.TechnicalSpecification5.246.TechnicalTS5.2-Thedescriptionofthecontainmentdesignfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificcontainmentfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).Sincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoes'otsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSections3.8.1and6.2).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.Specification5.3TS5.3:l.aandTS5.3.I.c-ThedescriptionofthereactorcoredesignfeatureswasrevisedconsistentwiththestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431.Thesectionnowincludestheamount,kind,andsourceofnuclearmaterialrelatedtothereactorcore.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS5.3.1.b-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturewithrespecttothemaximumenrichmentweightpercentwasrevisedandrelocatedtonewSpecification4.3.1.Thechangesareinaccordancewiththechangesdiscussedinitem47.ii,below.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(i)changes,respectively.-248-May1995 TS5.3.2-Thedescriptionofthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)designfeatureswasnotadded.SpecificRCSfeaturesarecoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sand,therefore,doesnotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARSection3.7.1andChapter5).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.lv.47.TechnicalTS5.3.l.b-Thiswasrevisedtoincreasethefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent.Thischangehasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptablewithrespecttopostulatedfuelhandlingaccidents(Ref.29).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.46)change.Specification5.4TS5.4.1,5.4.2,5.4.6,andFigures5.4-1and5.4-2-ThedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturesdenotingspentfuelstorageregionsandboratedwaterconcentrationswasrelocatedtoChapters3.7and3.9.ThesefeaturesarediscussedinLCO,3.7.11,LCO3.7.12,LCO3.7.13,andLCO3.9.1asappropriate.Inaddition,appropriateRequiredActionswereaddedintheeventthatSFPwaterlevel,boronconcentration,orSFPregionstoragerequirementsarenotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.ITS5.4.2-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeatureswasrevised.Therevisiontothesefeaturesarebasedonarevisedcriticalityanalysissupportingtheproposed18monthfuelcycle(Reference29).ThedescriptionofthesefeaturesfollowthestandardguidelineofNUREG-1431whichwouldincludetheamount,kind,andsourceofspecialnuclearmaterialwiththeexceptionthatnominalcentertocenterspacingbetweenthefuelassemblieswasnotadded.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.-249-Hay1995 iv~V.48.TechnicalTS5.4.3-Thedescriptionofthefuelstoragedesignfeaturedenotingthe60-daylimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2wasnotadded.NoscreeningcriteriaappliesforthetimelimitonstorageofdischargedfuelassembliesinRegion2.Thecurrent60-daylimitwase'stablishedtoprovidesufficientmargininspentfuelpooltemperaturecalculationsasaresult'fdecayheatloadsinRegion2fromdischargedfuelassemblies(Reference39).Althoughthespentfuelpool'oolingsystemand,thus,theassociatedrestrictiononheatloadpreventstructuralintegritydamagetothespentfuelpool,theyarenotassumedtofunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofadesignbasisaccident(DBA).Therestrictiononheatloadisnotusedfor,norcapableof,detectingasignificantabnormaldegradationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundarypriortoaDBA.Therestrictiononheatloadisanon-significantriskcontributortocoredamagefrequencyandoffsitedoses.SincenoNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteriaapply,thisrequirementisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS5.4.4and5.4.5-ThesewererevisedconsistentwithReferences29and39toprovidetheamount,kind,andsourceofmaterialwhichisstoredinthecanisters.TS5.4.4.band5.4.5werenotaddedthenewspecificationsforthereasonsdiscussedinitem47.iiiabove.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(v.c)and(iii),respectively.TS5.4-ThiswasrevisedtoincludedescriptionsoftheSFPdrainagesystemandcapacity.Thisinformationiscurrentlycontainedinthebasesforthissection.SinceNUREG-1431,Chapter4doesnotcontainanybases,thisinformationhasbeenrelocatedtothespecification.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory'(i)change.Specification5.5TS5.5-Thedescriptionofthewastetreatmentsystemsdesignfeatureswasnotadded.Noscreeningcriteriaapplyforthedescriptionofthesefeatures.SpecificwastetreatmentsystemsfeaturesareeithercoveredintheTechnicalSpecificationLCO'sorhavebeenrelocatedtootherlicenseecontrolleddocumentsand,therefore,donotmeetthecriteriaforDesignFeaturesdescribedin10CFR50.36(c)(4).SincethedescriptionofthesedesignfeaturesdoesnotsatisfytheNRCFinalPolicyStatementtechnicalspecificationscreeningcriteria,thisdescriptionisrelocatedtolicenseecontrolleddocuments(i.e.,UFSARChapterll).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.-250-Hay1995 49.TechnicalSpecification6.1TS6.1.1-TherequirementwasrevisedtoincludeastatementthatthePlantHanagershallapproveeachproposedtest,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.TS6.1-Anewrequirement(Specification5.1.2)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforShiftSupervisorresponsibility.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.50.TechnicalSpecification6.2Cross.referencestoexistingregulatoryrequirementsareredundantandgenerallynotincorporatedintoNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.PlantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesinthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsarereplacedwithgenerictitles.Personnelwhofulfillthesepositionsarerequiredtomeet'pecificqualificationsasdetailedinproposedTS5.3,andcompliancedetailsrelatingtotheplantspecificmanagementpositiontitlesareidentifiedinlicenseecontrolleddocuments.Thetwomajorspecificreplacementsarethegeneric"PlantHanager"forthemanagerlevelindividualresponsiblefortheoverallsafeoperationoftheplantandthegenericdescriptiveuseof"thecorporateexecutiveresponsibleforoverallplantnuclearsafety"inplaceoftheVicePresidentposition.Theplantspecifictitlesfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedinaplantcontrolleddocumentwithspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges(e.g.,astheUFSARorgAProgram).Thischangedoesnoteliminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirementsforthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.2.l.d-Therequirementdescribingthecapabilityoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassurancetohavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementtosupportmitigationoftheirconcernswasnotadded.ProposedTS5.2.l.arequiresthat"linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationshallbeestablishedanddefinedthroughoutthehighestmanagementlevels."TheorganizationalstructureisspecifiedintheGinnaStationgAProgram.SincechangestothegAProgramarecontrolledby10CFR50.54(a)(3),equivalentcontrolisprovided.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.-251-Hay1995

iv.v~vi.TS6.2.2.b-Therequirementsdescribingtherequiredoperatingcrewcompositionswerenotadded.Theserequirementsarespecifiedin10CFR50.54(k),(1),and(m)andproposedTS5.2.2.a,5.2.2.b,and5.2.2.e.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.2.2.d-Therequirementwasrevisedtoclarifythattheindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresisallowedtobeabsentfornotmorethantwohours.Thisisconsistentwiththerequirementsforshiftcrewcomposition.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.TS6.2.2.e-TherequirementdescribingtheovertimerequirementforplantstaffwhoperformsafetyrelatedfunctionswasrevisedtoreferenceaNRCapprovedprogramforcontrollingovertime.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.51.TechnicalSpecification6.3TS6.3.1-ThereferencetotheRGLEletterdatedDecember30,1980,wasreplacedwithwordingconsideredmoreappropriate.ThecurrentSTAprogramatGinnaStationisdiscussedinReferences40and42andwasreviewedand'pprovedbytheNRC.TherevisedwordingeliminatestheneedtorevisetheTechnicalSpecificationsiftheSTAprogramislaterrevised,butstillrequiresNRCapprovalofthesechanges.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.52.TechnicalSpecification6.4TS6.4-TherequirementsforaTrainingProgramwerenotadded.Therequirementsaree'itheradequatelyaddressedbyotherSection5.0administrativecontrolsorareaddressed.by10CFR55requirements.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.53.TechnicalSpecification6.5None.54.TechnicalSpecification6.6None.55.TechnicalSpecification6.71~TS6.7.l.a-TheinitialoperatoractionsforSafetyLimit(SL)violationswererevisedasfollows:-252-May1995

a.ForviolationoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2,therequirementtoimmediatelyshutdownthereactor(effectivelytobeinMODE3)wasrevisedtoallow1hourtorestorecomplianceandplacetheunitinMODE3.Immediatelyshuttingdownthereactorcouldinferactiontoimmediatelytripthereactor.Therevisionprovidesthenecessarytimetoshutdowntheunitinamorecontrolledandorderlymannerthanimmediatelytrippingthereactorwhichcouldresultinaplanttransient.TheproposedtimecontinuestominimizethetimeallowedtooperateinMODE1or2withaSLnotmet.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.b.44)change.b.ForviolationoftheRCSPressureSLinMODES3,4,and5,anadditionalactionwasaddedwhichrequiresrestoringcompliancewiththeSLwithin5minutes.Specifyingatimelimitforoperatorstorestorecomplianceprovidesgreaterguidancetoplantstaff.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.a)change.TS6.7.l.b-TherequirementfornotificationtomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.NotificationrequirementsarerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TherequirementfornotificationtotheNRCofaSLviolationwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisrequirementisdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.72.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.7.l.c-TherequirementthataSafetyLimitViolationReportbepreparedwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TherequirementfortheonsitereviewcommitteetoreviewtheSafetyLimitViolationReportwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.TheresponsibilitiesoftheonsitereviewcommitteearerelocatedtotheTRM.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.SLviolationsarereportedtotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof10CFR50.73.ThedetailsdescribingtherequirementsforcontentoftheSafetyLimitViolationReportis,therefore,controlledbytheprovisionsof10CFR50.73anddoesnotneedtobespecifiedinTS.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change,-253-Hay1995 iv.TS6.7.I.d-TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttotheNRCwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thisisaduplicationofrequirementsdenotedin10CFR50.36and10CFR50.73.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(,ii)change.TherequirementforthesubmittalofaSafetyLimitViolationReporttomanagementpersonnelandtheoffsitereviewfunctionwasnotaddedtothenewspecifications.Thedistributionofreportssubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.73arerelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.56.TechnicalSpecification6.8TS'6.8.l.d-TheOffsiteDoseCalculationHanualimplementationiscoveredbyamoregenericitemwhichisspecifiedinSection5.5.Itisnotnecessarytospecificallyidentify'eachprogramunderprocedures(seeSectionD,item56.iv).Sincetherequirementsremain,thisisconsideredtobeachangeinthemethodofpresentationonly.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.TS6.8.l.e-ThePCPdescriptionwasnotaddedsincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFR20,10CFR61,and10CFR71anddoesnotimposeanynewregulations.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocumentswiththerequirementforthePCPrelocatedtotheTRH.This*isaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.l.b)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenemergencyoperatingproceduresimplementingtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.-254-Hay1995 TS6.8.1-Anewspecification(TS5.4.I.e)wasaddedwhichestablishestherequirementforwrittenproceduresforprogramsandmanualsdenotedinnewSpecification5.5.TheseProgramsinclude:ITSCurrentTS~Proram5.5.15.5.25.5.35.5.45.5.55.5.65.5.75.5.85.5.95.5.105.5.115.5.125.5.135.5.141.13&6.14.4.3New3.9&3.16New4.4.4New4.24.24.5.2.3&4.11.13.9.2.5&,3.9.2.64.6.l.dNewNew50ffsiteDoseCalculationManualPrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentPostAccidentSamplingProgramRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramComponentCyclicorTransientLimitPre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramReactorCoolantPumpFlywheelInspectionProgramInserviceTestingProgramSteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgramVentilationFilterTestingProgramExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactiveMonitoringProgram.DieselFuelOilTestingProgramTechnicalSpecificationBasesControlSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramThetechnicalcontentofseveralrequirementsarebeingmovedfromotherchaptersofthecurrentTechnicalSpecificationsandareproposedtobeidentifiedasProgramsinaccordancewiththeformatofNUREG-1431.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Otherprogramswereadded,exceptasdiscussedbelow,toensureconsistencyintheimplementationofrequiredprogramswithinthecurrentlicensingbasis.TheRadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramwasaddedduetotherelocationoftheradiologicalTechnicalSpecificationsconsistentwithGenericLetter89-Olandthechangesto10CFR20.TheBasesControlprogramwasaddedtospecificallydelineatetheappropriatemethodsandreviewsnecessaryforachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationBases.TheSafetyFunctionDeterminationProgramwasaddedtosupportimplementationofthesupportsystemoperabilitycharacteristicsoftheTechnicalSpecifications-(newLCO3.0.6).TheseareGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)changes.-255-May1995 57.TechnicalSpecification6.9TS6.9-Thereferencetoreportingrequirementswererevisedconsistentwith10CFR50.4.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.9.1.1-TherequirementtosubmitaStartupReportwasnotadded.TheStartupReportismoreappropriatelyaddressedintheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportauthorizinganOperatingLicense,increasedpowerlevel,installationofanewnuclearfueldesignormanufacturer,ormodificationswhichsignificantlyalterthenuclear,,thermal,orhydraulicperformancesoftheplant.TheStartupReportisrequiredtobesubmittedwithin90daysfollowingcompletionoftheaboveactivitiesanddoesnotrequireNRCapproval.Therefore,inclusionoftherequirementforthisreportinTechnicalSpecificationsisnotnecessarytoassuresafeplantoperation.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.TS6.9.1.2-Therequirementsdescribingthedetailsofthemonthlyreportwerenotadded.Thesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtoprocedures.orotherlicenseecontrolleddocuments.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.lvv.Vl.TS6.9.1.3,TS6.9.1.4,Table6.9-1andTable6.9-2-Thedetailsandmethodsimplementingthesespecificationswerenotadded.ThesedetailsareappropriatelyrelocatedtotheODCMandtheEffluentControlsProgramdescribedinnewSpecifications5.5.1and5.5.4,respectively.The,submittaldatewasalsochangedtoMay15thtoallowthesubmittaloftheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReporttocorrespondwiththeMonthlyOperatingReportsubmittaldate.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.TS6.9.1.4-Thespecificdatereferencedfortheannualsubmittalwasrevisedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR50.36a.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.TS6.9.1.5-Therequirementforthereportingofchallengestopressurizer-PORVsorsafetyvalves'wasrevisedfromanannualtoamonthlyreportandrelocatedtotheMonthlyOperatingReport(new'pecification5.6.4).ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change;TS6.9.2.1-Thereportingrequirementrelatedtosealedsourceswasnotaddedsincethisisspecifiedin10CFR30.50.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.-256-May1995 ix.X.TS6.9.2.4-Thereportingrequirementforreactoroverpressureprotectionsystemoperationwasrevised.ThereportingrequirementisdetailedinproposedSpecification5.6.4,andisgenerallyincludedintheLERrequirementstoreportaRCS.pressuretransientthat.exceedsexpectedvaluesorthatiscausedbyunexpectedfactors.Sincethecriteriaidentifiedin10CFR50.73includestheareaofdegradedboundariesthatnecessitatesreporting,anyminordifferencesarenegligiblewithregardtosafety.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.AnewrequirementTS5.6.5wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheCOLR.TheCOLRisrequiredduetotheremovalofexistingTechnicalSpecificationcoreoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.AnewrequirementTS5.6;6wasaddedwhichestablishesthereportingrequirementfortheRCSPTLR.ThePTLR'isrequiredduetotheremovalof.existingTechnicalSpecificationpressureandtemperatureoperatinglimits.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iv.a)change.58.TechnicalSpecification6.10None.59.TechnicalSpecification6.11None.60.TechnicalSpecification6.12None.61.TechnicalSpecification6.13TS6.13.1-PlantspecificpositiontitlesinthecurrentGinnaStationTSwerereplacedwithgenerictitles.Theplantspecifictitlesfulfillingthedutiesofthesegenericpositionswillcontinuetobedefined,established,documentedandupdatedinaplantcontrolleddocumentwithspecificregulatoryreviewrequirementsforchanges(e.g.,theUFSARorgAProgram).Thischangedoesnoteiiminateanyofthequalifications,responsibilitiesorrequirements-forthesepersonnelorthepositions.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.62.TechnicalSpecification6.14None.-257-Hay1995 63.TechnicalSpecification6.15TS6.15.l.b-TheapprovalprocessforODCHchangeswasrevisedtoclarifythattheeffectivechangesbeapprovedbythePlantManagerinsteadoftheonsitereviewfunction.SincetheonsitereviewfunctionreportstothePlantManager,thisisaconservativechange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(v.c)change.64.TechnicalSpecification6.16TS6.16-TheprocessforchangestothePCPwasnotaddedtothenewspecificationssincethisprogramonlyimplementstherequirementsof10CFRPart20,10CFRPart61,and10CFRPart71anddoesnotimposeanynewrequirements.ThedetaileddescriptionofthePCPisprovidedinlicenseecontrolleddocumentsandtherequirementfortheprogramisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(ii)change.65.TechnicalSpecification6.17TS6.17-Therequirementsformajorchangestoradioactivewastetreatmentsystemswasnotadded.Changestothesesystemsarecontrolledby10CFR50.59.NRCnotificationofsignificantchangestothesesystemsisaddressedby10CFR50.59(b)(2).Therefore,thisspecificationisrelocatedtotheTRH.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(iii)change.66.NewRequirements(GinnaTSCategory(iv.a)Changes)LCO3.4.1andtheassociatedsurveillancerequirementswereaddedforDNBlimits.Thisnewrequirementplaceslimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowratetoensurethattheminimumDNBRwillbemetforallanalyzedtransients.LCO3.7.3andtheassociatedsurveillanceswereaddedfortheHFWpumpdischargevalves(HFPDVs),HFWregulatingvalves,andtheassociatedbypassvalves.Thisnewrequirementspecifiesanisolationtimeof80secondsfortheHFPDVsand10secondsfortheremainingvalvesandrequiresthemtobeOPERABLEaboveMODE4toprovideisolationcapabilityasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.LCO3.7.4andtheassociatedsurveillancewereaddedfor.theatmosphericreliefvalves(ARVs).TheLCOrequiresthattheARVsbeOPERABLEwhenRCSaveragetemperatureis>500FinMODE3toprovidecooldowncapabilityfollowingaSGTReventasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ASurveillancetoverifythateachARViscapableofopeningandclosingonceevery24monthswasalsoadded.-258-Hay1995 iv.ACOLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedwithreactorphysicparametersthatmaychangewitheachrefueling.TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,GenericLetter88-16(Ref.56)allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStationCOLRisprovidedinAttachmentF.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtotheCOLR:a~b.C.d.e.f.g.h.l.k.l.m.SHUTDOWNMARGINMODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENTShutdownBankInsertionLimitControlBankInsertionLimitsHeatFluxHotChannelFactorNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactorAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEOvertemperatureATandOverpowerhTTripSetpointsRCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsAccumulatorBoronConcentrationRWSTBoronConcentrationSpentFuelPoolBoronConcentrationRefuelingBoronConcentrationV.ARCSPTLRwasdevelopedwhichcontainstheactuallimitsforLCOsassociatedRCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsandLTOP.,TopreventtheneedtoreviseTechnicalSpecificationsforparameterswhicharecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology,NUREG-,1431allowstheselimitstoberelocatedfromthetechnicalspecifications.AcopyoftheproposedGinnaStation'PTLRisprovidedinAttachmentG.ThefollowingparameterswererelocatedtothePTLR:67.Licensea~b.C.RCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemEnableTemperatureLTOPSetpointThelicensewasrevisedtorelocaterequirementsassociatedwithSecondaryWaterChemistryMonitoringProgram,SystemsIntegrity,andIodineMonitoring.toAppendixAofthelicense(i.e.,TS).ChangestoboththelicenseandTSrequireNRCapprovalsuchthatthereisnoreductionincommitmentwithrespecttothischange.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(i)change.Minoreditorialchangesweremadetoprovideconsistencywithinthelicense.Theseareadministrativechangesonlywhichdonotchangetheintentofthelicense.TheseareGinnaTSCategory(vi)changes.-259-May1995 iv.Theexemptionto10CFR50.48(c)(4)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionexpiredin1986andisnolongerrequired.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.Theexemptionto10CFR50.46(a)(1)wasremovedfromthelicensesincethisexemptionisnolongerrequiredsincetheECCSmodelsforGinnaStationhavesincebeenrevised.ThisisaGinnaTSCategory(vi)change.E.SIGNIFICANT-HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATIONTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDareorganizedinto6categoriesandsubcategoriesasnecessary.Thesecategoriesofchangesareevaluatedwithrespectto10CFR50.92(c)andshowntonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdescribedbelow.E.lSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-ADMINISTRATIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(i),(ii),(v.c),or(vi)changesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolveeither(1)therelocationofrequirementswithintheTechnicalSpecificationstosupportconsolidationofsimilarrequirements,(2)thereformatting,renumberingorrewordingoftheexistingTechnicalSpecificationstoprovideconsistencywithNUREG-1431,(3)thedeletionofduplicateregulatoryrequirements,or(4)minorchangestotheTechnicalSpecificationssuchthatthechangesdonotinvolveanytechnicalissues.Assuch,thischangeisadministrativeinnatureanddoesnotimpactinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsorassumedmitigationofaccidentortransientevents.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibility'fanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimposeanynewordifferentrequirements.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-260-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactanysafetyanalysisassumptions.Thesechangesareadministrativeinnature.Assuch,noquestionofsafetyisinvolved,andthechangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.2SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-RELOCATEDSPECIFICATIONSTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStation'echnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iii)donotinvolveasignificanth'azardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesrelocatesrequirementsandsurveillancesforstructures,systems,componentsorvariableswhichdidnotmeetthecriteriaforinclusioninTechnicalSpecifications.Theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesarenotassumedtobeinitiatorsofanalyzedeventsandarenotassumedtomitigateaccidentortransientevents.Therequirementsandsurveillancesfortheseaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariableswillberelocatedfromtheTechnicalSpecificationstoanappropriateadministrativelycontrolleddocument(e.g.,TechnicalRequirementsManualorUFSAR)whichwillcontinuetobemaintainedpursuantto10CFR50.59.Inaddition,theaffectedstructures,systems,componentsorvariablesareaddressedinexistingsurveillanceprocedureswhicharealsocontrolledby10CFR50.59andsubjecttothechangecontrolprovisionsintheAdministrativeControlsSectionoftheTechnicalSpecifications.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinmethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangeswillnotimpose.oreliminateanyrequirementsandadequatecontrolofexistingrequirementswillbemaintained.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-261-May1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangeswillnotreduceamarginofsafetybecausethechangesdonotimpactanysafetyanalysisassumptions.'naddition,therelocatedrequirementsandsurveillancesfortheaffectedstructure,system,componentorvariableremainthesameastheexistingTechnicalSpecifications.Sinceanyfuturechangestotheserequirementsorthesurveillanceprocedureswillbeevaluatedpertherequirementsof10CFR50.59,noreduction(significantorinsignificant)inamarginofsafetywillbeallowed.TheexistingrequirementforNRCreviewandapprovalofrevisions,inaccordancewith10CFR50.92,tothesedetailsproposedforrelocation,doesnothaveaspecificmarginofsafetyuponwhichtoevaluate.However,themajorityofchangesareconsistentwiththeMestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecification,NUREG-1431,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Therefore,revisingtheTechnicalSpecificationstoreflecttheapprovedlevelofdetailensuresnosignificantreductioninthemarginofsafety.ForthoserequirementsproposedtoberelocatedwhichareretainedwithinNUREG-1431,therelocateditemsaresimilarinnaturetootherrelocatedrequirementsorarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysesforGinnaStation.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.3SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-MORERESTRICTIVECHANGESTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnical,SpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.a)and(v.a)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:Cl.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesprovidemorestringentrequirementsforoperationofthefacility.Thesemorestringentrequirementsdonotresultinoperationthatwillincreasetheprobabilityofinitiatingananalyzedeventanddonotalterassumptionsrelativetomitigationofanaccidentortransientevent.Themorerestrictiverequirementscontinuetoensureprocessvariables,structures,systemsandcomponentsaremaintainedconsistentwiththesafety'analysesandlicensingbasis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesof'naccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-262-Nay1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththe-proposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Theproposedchangesdoimposedifferentrequirements.However,thesechangesareconsistentwithassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensingbasis.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theimpositionofmorerestrictiverequirementseitherhasnoimpactonorincreasesthemarginofplantsafety.AsprovidedinthediscussionofthechangeinSectionD,eachchangeinthiscategoryisbydefinitionprovidingadditionalrestrictionstoenhanceplantsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.E.4SIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONEVALUATION-LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGESLESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.1)fTheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.1)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:I.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRequiredActionsoftheDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)startinstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits818and819)fromanactiontoshutdowntoanactiontorestorethechanneltoanOPERABLEstatusorentertheapplicableconditionsforaninoperableDG.Thestartinstrumentationfunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEstart,instrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.I-263-Nay1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewotdifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatarenomorerestrictivethanactionsforthelossofoneDG.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithinsafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(iv.b.2)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsas.discussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(iv.b.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheactionsforaninoperableDGto:(I)eliminatethetestingoftheOPERABLEDGif,within24hours,itcanbedeterminedthattheOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetoacommoncausefailure,and(2)eliminatetherequirementtotestthe.OPERABLEDGonceevery24hoursuntilthesecondDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus(TS3.7.2.2.b.1).ThetestingrequirementsforanOPERABLEDGarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGfromperformingitsintendedfunctionsincesomeDGfailurescanbeconclusivelydeterminednottoapplytoasecondDGwithoutrequiringexcessivetesting.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-264-May1995 2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatpreventunnecessaryDGstartswhichcanpotentiallyadverselyaffectDGreliability.ThechangemaintainsDGOPERABILITYrequirementswithinthesafetyanalysesandlicensingbases.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccident'reviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.1)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.l)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRefuelingFrequencywhichisusedtodefineCHANNELCALIBRATIONandothertestingintervals,from18monthsto24months(TS1.12and4.4.6.2).TheFrequencybetweenCHANNELCALIBRATIONSisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TSrequiredequipmentiscurrentmaintainedunderaReliabilityCenteredNaintenanceprogramsuchthattheirfailuresaretrackedandtrended.Inaddition,instrumentationsetpointsandequipmenthistoryhavebeenverifiedtobeacceptablewithrespecttothischange.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-265-May1995

2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theequipmenttestingintervalsareincreased,buttheystillmustbemaintainedOPERABLEconsistentwiththeirTSrequirements.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor,differentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.2)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.2)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheapplicabilityassociatedwiththeRCSSafetyLimits(SL)inMODE6(currentTS2.2).Adequatemarginexistssuchthatitis-notpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinMODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedcondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyan'alyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent.kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-266-Mayl995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceitisnotpossibletopressurizetheRCSgreaterthantheSLpressurewhileinMODE6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.3)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.3)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeremovestherequirementforthepressurizerwaterlevellowerlimitof12%(currentTS3.1.1.5.a).ThisrequirementrelatestoareactortripfunctionthatwasremovedatGinnaStationasaresultofIEBulletin79-06A(Ref.45).Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentnorsignificantly'increasetheconsequen'cesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplantsincethetrip.functionhasalreadybeenremoved.Theproposed"changeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethepressurizerlowleveltripfunctionisnolongercredited.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-267-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewor'ifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.4)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.4)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheapplicabilityanddeletesrequirementsassociatedwiththeoverpressurizationprotectionfunctionofthepressurizersafetyvalvesinMODES5and6(currentTS3.1.1.3.aandTS3.1.1.3.b).Thepressurizersafetyvalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctionintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethepr'obabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theselimitsarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccidentintheomittedconditions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethesevalvesdonotperformasafetyfunctioninMODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-268-May1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.5)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.5)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:-OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedeletestherequirementsassociatedwithSGtemperatureandpressurevariables(currentTS3.1.1.2andTS3.1.2.2).Thetemperatureand,pressurevariablesarenotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisexceptthroughthevariablesofRCSpressure,temperature,andflowwhichareaddressedintheheatupandcooldownratesinthePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,theseSGvariablesarenotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.Operation,ofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessinceallnecessaryheatupandcooldownratesareaddressedbythePTLR.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificant.reductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-269-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.6)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.6)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisestheperiodoftime(from6hoursto72hours)continuedoperationisallowedpriortoconfirmingthroughtheperformanceofanengineeringevaluation,thestructuralintegrityoftheRCSafterexceedingpressureortemperaturelimits(currentTS3.1.2.l.c.l).Therequirementisassociatedwithafunctionthatisnotanassumedinitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyevaluatedsincetheexceededlimitsaresubsequentlyrestored.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Further,thisfunctionisnotcreditedformitigationofanyaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangedoesnotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Thechangemaintains,requirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincethetimethatout-of-conditionlimitsarerestoreisnotchanged.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.This'changeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-270-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviously,evaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.7)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.7)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesaNoteallowingtheplanttochangeMODESifeitherthecontainmentsumpmonitororboththecontainmentatmosphericradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable(currentTS3.1.5.1).TheRCSLEAKAGEdetectionsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincesomeformofLEAKAGEdetectionmustalwaysremainOPERABLEunderthesecircumstancesoraplantshutdowncommenced.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanew-ordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincesomeformofRCSLEAKAGEdetectionmustremainOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and-4.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-271-May1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolvea'ignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.8)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.8)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowsanadditional4hourstocorrectadministrativeandothersimilardiscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgrambeforecommencingareactorshutdown(currentTS3.1.5.2.2).AdministrativediscrepanciesintheSGTubeSurveillanceProgramarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheSGtubestoperformtheirintendedfunctionsincethelimitonSGtubeleakageremains.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordance*withtheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeresultsinactionsthatallowrestorationofminoradministrativediscrepancieswithoutaffectinganysafetyanalysisassumptionswithrespecttoSGtubeleakage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-272-May1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolve'asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.9)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.9)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversusIhour(currentTS3.3.l.l.band3.3.1.3).Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheaccumulatortoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.%perationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotheraccumulatorparameters(e.g.,watervolume)such.thatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-273-May1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolve"'asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.9)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.9)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversusIhour(currentTS3.3.1.l.band3.3.1.3).Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheaccumulatortoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theaccumulatorboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotheraccumulatorparameters(e.g.,watervolume)suchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff..-273-Hay1995

Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety,.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.10)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.l0)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows72hourstorestoreaccumulatorboronconcentrationtowithinacceptablelimitsversusIhour(currentTS3.3.1.l.aand3.3.1.2).TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorfaranyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRWSTtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessinceitwillonlyallowadditionaltimetorestore,thesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident,fromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheRWSTboronconcentrationisnotascriticalfeatureasotherRWSTparameters(e.g.,watervolume)suchthatadditionaltimeforrestorationdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.'hischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-274-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinthe'probabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92,(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.Il)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.ll)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnot'nvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechange:(I)allowsbothSIpumpflowpathstobeisolatedforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetesting,and(2)allowsupto:4hours,oruntiltheRCScoldlegsexceed375F,toplaceintoserviceECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperableduetoLTOPconsiderations(currentTS3.3.l.l.c).TheECCSSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCSandreducesthepotentialforatransienttochallengetheLTOPSystem.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.'.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityof'newordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeallowsrequiredtestingtobeperformedontheECCS,reducesthepotentialforatransienttochallengetheLTOPSystems,andareconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.-275-May1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductionina'marginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRE5TRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.12)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.12)donot'involveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesanAOTof72hoursfortwoinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains(currentTS3.3.2.2).Thesystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.ThiswillallowanadditionaltimetorestorethesystemtoanOPERABLEstatuspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchange-doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormal.plantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheCRFCunitswhichsupplythepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsmayberemoved-fromserviceforupto7dayspriortoinitiatingaplantshutdown.Inaddition,the100%redundantCStrainsmustremainOPERABLEinthiscondition.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-276-May1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.13)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.13)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor.consequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheCCWheatexchangerrequirementstoonlyrequire1heatexchangertobeOPERABLE(currentTS3.3.3.1).TheCCWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCCWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheheatexchangerisapassivedevicesimilartotheCCWpiping.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheCCWpipingisalsoapassivedevice,whichifitweretofail,wouldresultinthelossoftheentireCCWSystemwhichhasbeenanalyzedwithacceptableresults.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-277-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.14)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.14)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTfortwomotordrivenAFWpumps,from24hoursto72hours,tobeconsistentwiththatfortheturbinedrivenAFWpump(currentTS3.4.2.l.b).TheAFWsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThischangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincethetu}binedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingbothSGs.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccident'romanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangemaintainsrequirementswithincurrentsafetyanalysessincetheturbinedrivenAFWpumpisfullycapableofsupplyingbothSGs.Inaddition,foraccidentconditionsinwhichAFWisnotimmediatelyrequired(i.e.,notrequiredfor10minutes),theSAFWSystemisavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.-278-Hay1995 Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.15)Theproposed'hangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.15)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheproposedchangesincreasetheSurveillanceTestIntervals(STIs)andAOTsforinstrumentationsupportinganumberofTSFunctions.Therearenoactualrelatedmodificationstoanyoftheaffectedsystems.However,thechangesareexpectedtoreducethetestrelatedplantscrams,reducethetestinducedwearontheequipment,andreducethenumberofforcedoutagesrelatedtotestactivities.Therefore,thereisnosignificantincreaseintheprobabilityofoccurrenceofapreviouslyevaluatedaccident.WestinghousetopicalreportsWCAP-10271-P-A(Ref.48)andWCAP-14333(Ref.30)andassociatedsupplementsshowedthattheeffectsoftheseextensionsofSTIsandAOTs,whichproducednegligibleimpact,areboundedbypreviousanalyses.Further,theNRChasreviewedthereportsassociatedwithWCAP-10271-P-Aandapprovedtheconclusionsonagenericbasis.Therefore,thechangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyevaluatedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thedesignandfunctionaloperationoftheaffectedequipmentarenotchangedbytheproposedrevisions.TheproposedchangesaffectonlytheSTIsandAOTsandwillnotimpactthefunctionofmonitoringsystemvariablesovertheanticipatedrangesfornormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,oraccidentconditions.Further,theproposedchangesdonotintroduceanynewmodesofplantoperation,makeanyphysicalmodifications,oralteranyoperationalsetpoints.Therefore,thepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanypreviouslyevaluatedisnot-created.-279-May1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchanges'onotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Theimpactofreducedtesting,.otherthanasaddressedabove,istoallowalongertimeintervaloverwhichinstrumentuncertainties(e.g.,drift)mayact.Implementationoftheproposedchangesis'xpectedtoresultinanoverallimprovementinsafetydueto:loReducedtestingwhichresultsinfewerinadvertentreactortrips,lessfrequentactuationofESFcomponents,andgreaterequipmentavailability.Improvementsintheeffectivenessoftheoperatingstaffinmonitoringandcontrollingplantoperationresultingfrom'essfrequentdistractiontoattendtotesting.Therefore,theproposedchangesdonotsignificantlyreducethemarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.16)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.l6)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTfromIhourto6hourstoplaceaninoperableDGLOPinstrumentationchannelinthetrippedcondition(currentTable3.5-I,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19).ThisFunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Sincetheactionistoplacethechannelinthetrippedcondition,theFunctionwillcontinuedtoperformitssafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-280-May1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,'hischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangesdonotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.17)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.l7)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeprovidesanexceptiontoallowbypassingofaninoperableDGLOPinstrumentationchannelandtodelayentryintoaConditionforthechannelbeingtested(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits¹18and¹19).ThisFunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangeisexpectedtoreducethetestrelatedplantscrams,reducethetestinducedwearontheequipment,andreducethenumberofforcedoutagesrelatedtotestactivities.Sincetripcapabilityismaintained,theFunctionwillcontinuedtoperformitssafetyfunction.-Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Hay1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferent-kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.The'roposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Theproposedchangesdonotalterthemannerinwhichsafetylimits,limitingsafetysystemsettings,orlimitingconditionsforoperationaredetermined.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithas,beendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpr'eviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.18)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.18)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestherequiredchannelsforDieselGenerator(DG)LossofPower(LOP)startinstrumentation(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnits818and819)fromindividuallyspecifyingthelossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagechannelstorequiringtwochannelsofundervoltageper480Vsafeguardsbus.Thestartinstrumentationfunctionisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.ThechangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheOPERABLEDGLOPinstrumentationchannelsfromperformingtheirintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-282-Hay1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationofthe.plant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeonlyclarifiestheactualdesignoftheDGLOPinstrumentationwithoutaffectingthesafetyfunctionofthespecifiedchannels.TherequirementforalossofvoltageanddegradedvoltagefunctionisspecifiedinthesurveillancerequirementforthisLCO.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.8asedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.l9)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.19)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRequiredActionsforaninoperablereactortripbreakertoallowIhourtorestoretheinoperablebreakerbeforerequiringaplantshutdown(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnit820).Thereactortripbreakersareonlyconsideredaninitiatorforpreviouslyanalyzedtransientswithrespecttotheirspuriousopening.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangedoesnotfurtherdegrade,underthecircumstances,thecapabilityofthereactortripbreakerfromperformingitsintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.May1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechangeallowsashortperiodtorestoretheinoperablereactortripbreakerbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.ThistimetorestoretheinoperablebreakerisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.L'ESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.20)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.20)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:1.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchange,doesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheRequiredActionsforoneinoperabletrainofAutomaticTripLogic-(orreactortripbreaker)toallow48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusinModes3,4,and5priortoinitiatingactiontoopenthereactortripbreakers(currentTable3.5-1,FunctionalUnit820).Theautomatictriplogicisonlyconsideredaninitiatorforpreviouslyanalyzedtransientswithrespecttotheirspuriousoperation.Thereactortripbreakersareonlyconsideredaninitiatorforpreviouslyanalyzedtransientswithrespecttotheirspuriousopening.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangedoesnotfurtherdegrade,underthecircumstances,thecapabilityoftheAutomaticTripLogic(orreactortripbreaker)fromperformingitsintendedfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesof,apreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-284-Hay1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)orchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedo'esnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeallowsaperiodoftimetorestoretheinoperableAutomaticTripLogicandreactortripbreakerbeforerequiringaplantshutdown.TheprimaryaccidentofconcernduringMODES3,4,and5istherodejectionaccidentwhichisveryunlikelyduetothereducedsystempressuresandtemperatures.Therefore,thischangedoesnot-involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.21)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscGssedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.21)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisesthecurrentAOTtorestoreinoperablePostAccidentMonitors(PAMs),revisestheactionsforinoperablePAMsthatarenotrestoredto'servicewithintheAOT,andrevisesthePAHtestingfrequencies(currentTS3.5.3,3.6.4.2,and4.4.7).ThePAMsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-285-May1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThePAMsarenotrequiredtoprovideautomaticresponsetoanydesignbasisaccident.TheadditionaltimeandsurveillancefrequencieshasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedbytheNRCtonotsignificantlyaffectthecontributionofthemonitorstoriskreduction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbythe.NRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges.totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.22)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.22)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallowstheuseofaclosedsystemtobeusedtoisolateapenetrationwithafailedcontainmentisolationvalve(currentTS3.6.3).Thecontainmentisolationsystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobability.ofapreviously.analyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthecontainmentisolationsystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincetheclosedsystemisapassivedevicewhichismissileprotected.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.-286-Hay1995 2.3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnot.involveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thecontainmentisolationsystemremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionsincetheclosedsystemismissileprotected,leaktested,andcapableofmaintainingcontainmentintegrityintheeventofanaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSp'ecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.23)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.23)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityor'onsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtohavetwooffsitepowersourcesOPERABLEpriortogoingabove350F(currentTS3.7.2.l.b.2,3.7.2.2.a,and3.7.2.2.b).ThecurrentTSonlyrequiretwosourcesinordertochangeMODESbutallowindefiniteoperationoncetheMODEhasbeenchanged.Therefore;totallyeliminatingthisrequirementdoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentnorsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-287-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Onlyrequiringoneoffsitepowersourcedoesnotadverselyaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceoffsitepowerisonlyassumedavailableifitresultsinworseconsequences(e.g.,steamlinebreak).Inaddition,asecondsourceofoffsitepowerisavailablebybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformer.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.24)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.24)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:2.OperationofGinnaStationinacc'ordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheAOTforaninoperable480VsafeguardsbusfromIhourto8hoursbeforerequiringaplantshutdown(currentTS3.7.2.2.c).The480Vsafeguardsbusesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthe480Vsafeguardsbusestoperformtheirrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstancessincearedundanttrainisavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e;,no-newordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-288-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allowingadditionaltimetorestoreaninoperable480Vsafeguardsbusdoesnotadverselyaffecttheaccidentanalysessincearedundanttrainisavailable.TheincreasedtimeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.25)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.25)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangerevisestherequirementtoverifypowerdistributionaftereachrefuelingfrompriortoreaching50%RTPto<75%RTP(currentTS3.10.2.1).Peakingfactorsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-289-Nayl995 0 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allowingpowerascensionto75%RTPbeforeverifyingpowerdistributionstillprovidesthenecessarymargintoensuredesignlimitsaremetsincepeakingfactorsaremostdecreasednear100%RTP.,Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolve.asignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.26)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.26)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestherequirementtomaintainFoandF~withinlimitsatalltimestoonlyinMODEl.(currentTS3.10.2.2).Thesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreate"thepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysical'alterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-290-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotnecessarytobe.metduringMODE2sincethereisinsufficientenergyinthefueltorequiretheselimits.InMODES3,4,5,and6,thereactorisnotcritical'nd,assuch,theselimitsarenotrequired.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.8asedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.27)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifica'tionsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.27)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:I.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheCompletionTime,from24hoursto72hours,toreducetheOverpower~T,Overtemperature~T,andPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripsetpointswhenFoorF~isnotwithinlimits(currentTS3.10.2.2).Thesepowerdistributionlimitsarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviously-analyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionunderthesecircumstances,sincetheRequiredActionsforthesepowerdistributionlimitsalreadyrequireapowerreductionindirectrelationshiptothepercentagethatthelimitwasexceeded.Thereductionoftripsetpointsonlyprovidesadditionalprotection.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-291-May1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Allowingadditionaltimetoreducethesetpointsforassociatedreactortripfunctionsonlyprovidessecondaryprotectionwithrespecttopotentialunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincereactorpowerhasalreadybeenreduced.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeforOverpower~TisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginof'afety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIYECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.28)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.28)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.'he'hangedeletestherequirementtoidentifythecauseofgPTRexceeding1.02orlimitpowerto<50%RTP(currentTS3.10.2.4).ThegPTRisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.IfthegPTRisnotwithinlimits,thermalpowerisrequiredtobereducedproportionaltothepercentagethat'PTRisoutsidethelimitstocompensateforthetiltandfluxmappingmustbeinitiated.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasethe,consequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).,Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-292-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Removingtherequirementtoidentifythecauseofthetiltorreducepowerto<50%RTPdoesnotadverselyaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceapowerreductionproportionaltothepercentagethatgPTRisoutsidethelimitisrequired.ItisnotalwayspossibletoidentifythecauseofthetiltandtheremainingRequiredActionsalreadyunderwayareadequatetoassuresafeoperationoftheplant.ThispowerchangeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431andWCAP-12159(Ref.Sl).Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheabove'nformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.29)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.29)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformanceofcontrol'odexercisesfrommonthlytoevery92days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit86a).ControlRodsareonlyconsideredasaninitiatorforrodejectionaccidentswhicharenotrelatedtothisSurveillance.Therefore,thischangedoesnot.significantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethisSurveillanceonlyconfirmsnormaloperationalindicationsofcontrolrodOPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2;OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-293-Hay1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ControlRodOPERABILITYisnormallyverifiedbynormaloperationalpracticessuchthatincreasingtheallowedSurveillanceintervaldoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.30),TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCate'gory(v.b.30)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingtheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankfrommonthlytoonceevery184days(currentTable'4.1-2,FunctionalUnitffl3).Thesprayadditivetankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeinconcentration.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-294-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivetankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,this-changedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.,8asedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinna'tationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductionina.marginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.31)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.31)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperforminganRCSwaterinventorybalancefromdailytoonceevery72hours(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit5'15).VerifyingRCSwaterinventoryisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindications,includingletdown,areavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromany'accidentpreviouslyevaluated.-295-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyLEAKAGEintheRCSsinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESS'RESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.32)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.32)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingverificationoftheSFPboronconcentrationfromonceevery31daystoonceevery31daysifaverificationoffuelstoragehasnotbeencomplete(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit817).VerifyingSFPboronconcentrationisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityof'previouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysessinceboronconcentrationisonlycreditedduringafuelhandlingaccidentpriortothetimewhichthefuelhasbeenverifiedtobecorrectlystored.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindof'accidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated..-296-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.The'changeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotaffecttheassumptionsusedforafuelhandlingaccident.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginof-safety.Thischange(withtheexceptionofthe31dayFrequency)isalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges.totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.33)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.33)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:I.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingtheDGfueloilinventoryfromdailytoonceevery31days(currentTable4.1-2,FunctionalUnit816).TheDGfueloiltankisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethetankispassivewithavailablelevelindicationstotheoperatorswhichwouldindicateachangeininventory.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-297-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposed-changedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSu)veillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheDGfueloiltankfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsinceotherindicatorsareavailabletooperators.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.34)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.34)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseinthe"probabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityfromonceevery72hourstoonceevery7days(currentTable4.1-4,FunctionalUnit81).VerifyingRCSgrossspecificactivityisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifyfuelfailuressinceotherindications,includingradiationalarms,areavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-298-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotdegradethecapabilityofoperationstoidentifygrossfuelfailuresinceotherindicationsareavailable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.35)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.35)donotinvolveasignifi.canthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:I.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheSIcoldleginjectionandRHRRCSPIVseachcoldshutdowngreaterthan7days(currentTS4.3.3.1).Thesevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed(i.e.,theyarenotrelieduponorusedduringpoweroperationorcoldshutdownconditions).PerformingtestingonthesePIVsshouldonlyberequiredonceevery24monthsorwithin24hoursoftheirbeingopenedsincemorefrequenttestingwouldnotlikelyprovideanyadditionalinformation.Therefore,thischange,doesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyze'daccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthePIVstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethevalvesaremaintainedclosed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.l-299-Hay1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRCSPIVSfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheywillbetestedaminimumofonceevery24months.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.36)The-proposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.36)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthespraynozzlegastestfromonceevery5yearstoonceevery10years(currentTS4.5.1.2.b).Thesprayringnozzlesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheCSSystemtoperformitsrequiredfunctionsincethenozzlesarepassiveandlocatedinagenerallyunaccessiblearea.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-300-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheCSSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431andNUREG-1366(Ref.8).Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthatthe'roposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVE,CHANGECATEGORY(v.b.37)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedin'ectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.37)donotinvolveasignifi.cant'hazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentprevi'ouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingactuationtestingofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterdampersfrommonthlytoonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.3.5).Thepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.The.proposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterstoperformtheirrequiredfunctionsincethedampershavedemonstratedahighdegreeof,reliabilityandtheCSSystemprovidesa100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-301-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthepost-accidentfiltersfromperformingtheirintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.8asedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcluded,thattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.38)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.38)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconse'quencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforperformingthesprayadditivevalvesfrommonthlyonceevery24months(currentTS4.5.2.2.a).Thesprayadditivevalvesarenotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityofthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunction.sincehavedemonstratedahighdegreeofreliabilityandthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltersprovide100%redundantiodineremovalcapability.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.,2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-302-Hay1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThechangeinSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventthesprayadditivesystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TherevisedFrequencyisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheabove-information,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanew-ordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.39)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.39)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtotesttheAFWmotordrivenpumpcross-overmotoroperatedisolationvalves(currentTS4.8.3).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemsincethecross-overisolationvalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthe-methodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-303-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThedeletionoftheAFWcross-overisolationvalvestestingrequirementsdoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethevalvesarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.40)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.40)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeeliminatestheneedtoperformaverificationthattheAFWpumpscanstart'within10minutes-onceevery18months(currentTS4.8.10).TheAFWSystemisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheAFWSystemfromperformingitsrequiredfunctionsincethisverificationisnotconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysistimes.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-304-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThedeletionofthisSurveillancedoesnotpreventtheAFWSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincethe10minuteverificationisnotconsistentwiththeaccidentanalysisassumptions.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.41)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.41)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangerevisestheFrequencyforverifyingaRHRpumpisprovidingforcedflowinMODE6fromonceevery4hourstoonceevery12hours(currentTS4.11.2.1).VerificationofRHRpumpOPERABILITYisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremovalsincetherearenumerousindicationsavailabletoplantoperatorsofalossofanRHRpump.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2;OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththepr'oposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously'evaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-305-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Thechange'inSurveillanceFrequencydoesnotpreventtheRHRSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunction.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.42)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.42)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeremovestherequirementtoperformInserviceTestingsurveillancesoftheRHRpumpsduringMODES5and6(currentTS4.11.2.2).AtleastoneRHRpumpisoperatingandthebreakersofthesecondpumpareverifiedduringtheseconditionssuchthatperformanceofthistestisonlyaduplicationofexistingsurveillances.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.TheproposedchangedoesnotfurtherdegradethecapabilityoftheRHRSystemtoprovidedecayheatremovalsincetherearealternateSurveillancesverifyingpumpOPERABILITY.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofa,newordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-306-May1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThedeletionofthisSurveillancedoesnotpreventtheRHRSystemfromperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionsincetheInserviceTestingSurveillanceismainly.performedtoverifypumpoperationathighpressureswhichdonotexistinNODES5and6.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddono'tinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.43)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.43)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:1.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangedelaysperformanceofthePORVfunctionalchanneltestuntil12hoursafterdecreasingtotheLTOPenabletemperature.specifiedinthePTLRinsteadofwithin31dayspriortoenteringthiscondition(currentTS4.16.l.a).ThePORVsareonlyconsideredasaninitiatorforapreviouslyanalyzedaccidentwithrespecttospuriouslyopening.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident'.TheproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetoverifythatthePORVisOPERABLEforitsLTOPfunctionssincethePORVprovidesalternatefunctions,withdifferentsetpoints,inhigherNODES.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.The'roposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled)..Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-307-Nay1995

3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheshortperiodprovidedtoperformthePORVtestingensuresthatthePORVremainscapableofperformingitsmultiplefunctionsthroughallrequiredMODES.ThisperiodoftimeisconsistentwithNUREG-1431.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.44)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedin'ectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.44)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:l.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeallows1hour.torestorecomplianceforviolationsoftheReactorCoreorRCSPressureSLinMODES1and2insteadofrequiringanimmediateshutdownoftheplant(currentTS6.7.l.a).SincethischangeaffectstheRequiredActionsfollowingaviolationofSLs,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Theproposedchangeonlyprovidesashortperiodoftimetorestorecompliancebeforeperformingashutdownoftheplantinordertolimitthepotentialforadditionaldamage.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-308-May1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.The,shortperiodprovidedtorestorecomplianceprovidesoperatorswithtimetostabilizetheplantbeforerequiringashutdown.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.ThischangeisalsoconsistentwithNUREG-1431whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNRCStaff.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchanges-totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.45)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSection0anddenotedbyCategory(v.b.45)donotinvolve'asignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThechangeincreasestheOPERABILITYtoleranceforthepressurizersafetiesfrom+1%to+2.4%,-3%(currentTS3.1.1.3.c.).SincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointremainsabovethenormaloperatingpressureandthePORVsetpoint,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttothemostlimitingpressuretransientsandshowntobeacceptable.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously'valuated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperationsincethepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointsfollowingtestingremain+1%.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.-309-Hay1995 3.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheincreasedOPERABILITYtoleranceallowsforsetpointdriftwhichhasbeendemonstratedtoexistatGinnaStation.Theincreasedtoleranceshavebeenanalyzedforthemostlimitingpressuretransientswithsafetylimitsstillbeingmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.LESSRESTRICTIVECHANGECATEGORY(v.b.46)TheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsasdiscussedinSectionDanddenotedbyCategory(v.b.46)donotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Thechangeincreasesthefuelenrichmentlimitfrom4.25weightpercentto5.05weightpercent(currentTS5.3.I.b).Thefuelenrichmentlimitisnotconsideredasaninitiatorforanyaccidentspreviouslyanalyzed.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincreasetheprobabilityofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.Thechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttofuelhandlingaccidentsandshowntobeacceptablewithrespecttooffsitedosesand10CFR100.Therefore,thischangedoesnotsignificantlyincrease'theconsequencesofapreviouslyanalyzedaccident.2.OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangedoesnotinvolveaphysicalalterationoftheplant(i.e.,nonewordifferenttypeofequipmentwillbeinstalled).Theproposedchangeintroducesnonewmodeofplantoperationorchangesinthemethodsgoverningnormalplantoperation.Thus,thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.May1995 3.Operationof.GinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.TheincreasedfuelenrichmentlimitallowsforGinnaStationtoconvertto18monthcycles.Thechangehasbeenanalyzedandshownt'hatallsafetylimitsarestillmet.Therefore,thischangedoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanew.ordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.ENVIRONMENTALCONSIDERATIONRG&Ehasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationas~documentedinSectionDabove;2.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsitesinceallspecificationsrelatedtooffsitereleasesareretained,addressedbyexistingregulations,orrelocatedtoalicenseecontrolledprogramsubjecttothecurrentregulations;and3.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincenonewordifferenttypeofequipmentarerequiredtobeinstalledasaresultofthisLAR,andthefrequencyofrequiredtestingwhichmayresultinradiationexposureistobeoptimizedconsistentwithindustrypractices.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.-311-May1995 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SEPTopicsV-IO.B,V-II.B,andVII-3,datedSeptember29,1981.-312-May1995 16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

OrderforModificationofLicenseConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,datedApril20,1981.RegulatoryGuide1.45,ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryLeakageDetectionSystems.NUREG-0821,IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessmentSystematicEvaluationProgram,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,December1982.GenericLetter84-04,SafetyEvaluationofklestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingwithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPh/RPrimaryMainLoops,February1,1984.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

NaturalCirculationCooldown,GenericLetter81-Zl,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedNovember22,1983.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.57toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedDecember7,1993.FederalRegister,Yolume60,page9634,February21,1995.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.54toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.M77849),datedAugust30,1993.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

ContainmentIsolationBoundaries(TACM77849),datedDecember21,1994.LetterfromG.E.Lear,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

ContainmentPurgeTechnicalSpecifications,IssuanceofAmendmentNo.13toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedFebruary15,1986.NRCTemporaryInspection2515/126,EvaluationofOn-LineMaintenance.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

LessonsLearnedCategory"A"Evaluation,datedFebruary15,1986.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

TMIActionPlanTechnicalSpecifications,datedApril20,1981.Westinghouse,CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,datedJune,1994.WCAP-14333,ProbabilisticRiskAnalysisoftheRPSandESFASTestTimesandCompletionTimes,May1995.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.47toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.77515),datedNovember19,1991.-313-Hay1995 32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

DieselGeneratorSurveillanceandTesting,datedApril23,1981.\NUREG-0944,SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheFull-TermOperatingLicenseforR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedOctqber1983.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVI1'1'-2,datedJune24,1981.Letter-A.R.Johnson(NRC),toR.C.Hecredy(RG&E),

Subject:

EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3,datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromH.B.Fairtile,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

TechnicalSpecificationson.-BatteryDischargeTesting,datedHay8,1986.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

SafetyEvaluationforGinna-SEPTopicVIII-,3A,datedJuly31,1981.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,.

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.51toOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedApril13,1993.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

IncreaseoftheSpentFuelPoolStorageCapacity,datedNovember14,1984.LetterfromW.A.Paulson,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

PlantStaffirkingHoursandReportingRequirementsforSafetyValve.andReliefValveFailuresand.Challenges,datedJanuary31,1984.LetterfromR.W.Kober,RG&E,toH.Fairtile,NRC,

Subject:

PolicyStatementonEngineeringExpertiseonShift(GenericLetter86-04),datedHay14,1986.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

NUREG-0737,ItemI.A.I.1,ShiftTechnicalAdvisor,datedOctober12,1989.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.E.White,RG&E,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.33toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,datedJune13,1980.LetterD.M.Crutchfield(NRC)toJ.E.Haier(RG&E),SafetyEvaluationforGinna:SEPTopicVII-6,datedJune24,1981.IEBulletin79-06A,ReviewofOperationalErrorsandSystemMisalignmentsIdentifiedDuringTNIncident.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,datedJune15,1979.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

GenericLetter88-20,datedMarch15,1994.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.l,June1990.-314-Hay1995 0 49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield(NRC)toJ.Haier(RG&E),

Subject:

FuelHandlingAccidentInsideContainment,datedOctober7,1981.WCAP-13029,NERITSProgram,PhaseII1',CommentsonDraftNUREG-1431,StandardTechnicalSpecificationswestinghousePlants,July1991.WCAP-12159,HERITSProgram,Phase1'I,TechnicalSpecificationsand.Bases,Harch1989.WCAP-11618,NERITSProgram,PhaseII,Task5,CriteriaApplication,November1987.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.EG&EReport,EGG-NTAP-6175,In-ServiceLeakTestingofPrimaryPressureIsolationValves,February1983.LetterfromV.L.Rooney,NRC,toJ.F.Opeka,NortheastNuclearEnergyCompany,

Subject:

IssuanceofAmendmentNo.105(TACNo.889518),datedFebruary22,1995.Generic.Letter88-16,RemovalofCycle-SpecificParameterLimitsfromTechnicalSpecifications,datedOctober4,1988.LetterfromA.G.Hansen,NRC,toR.E.Link,

Subject:

AmendmentNos.157and161toFacilityOperatingLicenseNos.DPR-24andDPR-27(TACSP185689and885690),datedDecember8,1994.GinnaStationLER95-001,

Subject:

PressurizerSafetyValveLiftSettingsFoundAboveTechnicalSpecificationToleranceDuringPost-ServiceTestDueto'wtpointShifts,ResultsinIndependentTrainBeingConsideredInoperable,datedHarch6,1995.LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision3(TACNo.880439),datedFebruary24,1993.LetterfromR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

GenericLetter90-06,ResolutionofGenericIssue70,"PowerOperatedReliefValveandBlockValveReliability"andGenericIssue94,"AdditionalLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLightI'aterReactors,"datedSeptember15,1992.LetterfromR.E.Smith,RG&E,toC.Stahle,NRC,

Subject:

ChangeP-10Permissive,datedDecember22,1988.-315-Hay1995 0','fI ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentBVolumeII ATTACHMENTBMarkedUpCopyofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationsIncludedpages:AllpagesinFull-TermOperatingLicenseandAppendixAtothatlicenseupto,andincluding,AmendmentNo.59.Theseareorganized,withrespecttotheproposednewITSprovidedinAttachmentC.May1995

gy,SRKCIc+C~4'o!Ql"~J~I0UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONWASHINGTON,O.C.20555ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDOCKETNO.50-244R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSELicenseNo.DPR-18I.TheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(theCommission)hasfoundthat:A.TheapplicationcomplieswiththerequirementsoftheAtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended(theAct),andtheregulationsoftheCommissionsetforthin10CFRChapterIandallreouirednotifica-tionstootheragenciesorbodieshavebeendulymade;ConstructionoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(thefacility)hasbeensubstantiallycompletedinconformitywithConstructionPermitNo.CPPR-19,asamended,aridtheapplication,I,hepruvi~'uI>>oftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCommission;Q).4(a).iiD.E.Thefa'cilitywilloperateinconformitywiththeapplicat".'on,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCollmiss1on(e~~~a.Thereisreasonableassurance(i)thatthefacilitycaneoperatedatpowerlevelsupto1520megawatts(thermal)withoutendangeringthehealthandsafetyofthepublic;and(ii)thatuchactivitieswillheconductedincompliancewiththeregulationsoftheCommission.TheapplicantistechnicallyandfinanciallyqualifiedtoengageintheactivitiesauthorizedbythisoperatinglicenseinaccordancewiththerulesandregulationsoftheCommission;Theapplicanthasfurnishedproofoffinancialprotectionthatsatisfiestherequirementsof10CFRPart140;andG.Theissuanceofthislicensewillnotbeinimicaltothecolmondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.2.TheProvisionalOperatingLicensedatedSepteIIIber19,1969,issupersededbyFacilitvOperaingLicenseNo.DPR-18herebyissI;edtoRochesterGasandElecricCorporaiontoreadasfollows:A.ThislicenseappliestotheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,aclosedcycle,pressurized,light-water-Iloderatedandcooledreactor,andelectricgeneratingeauipment(hereinreferredtoas"the facility")whichisownedbytheRochesterGasandElectricCorpora-tion(hereinafter"thelicensee"nr"RC8E"}.Thefacilityislocatednnthelicensee'ssiteonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,WavneCounty,NewYork,about16mileseastoftheCitvnfRochesterandisdescribedinlicenseapplicationAmendmentHn.6,"FinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport,"andsubsequentamendmentsthereto,andintheapplicationforpowerincreasenotarizedFebruary2,1971,andAmendmentHos.1through4thereto(hereincollectivelyre:erredtoas"theapplication").B.Subjecttntheconditionsandrequirementsincorporatedherein,theCommissinnherebylicensesR48E:(1)PursuanttoSection104boftheActand10CFRPart50,"DomesticLicensingofProductiorandUtilizationFacilities,"topossess,use,andooeratethefacilityatthedesignatedlocationinWayneCounty,HewYork,inaccordancewiththeproceduresand',imitationssetforthinthislicense;(2)PursualttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceive,possess,anduseatanytimespecialnuclearmaterialnrreactorfuel,inaccordancewiththelimitationsforstorageandamnuntsreouiro.dforreactoroperatinnasdescribedintheFinal'afetvAnalysisReport,asamended,andCommissionSafetvEvaluationsdatedNovember15,1976,October5,1984,andNovember14,1984.(a)Pursuant+otheActand10CFRPart70,toreceiveandstorefour(.4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,,1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20,1979);(b)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,topossessandusefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20,1979},assupplementedFebruary20,1980andMarch5,1980;(3)PursuanttntheAc+ar5i0CFP.Parts30,40,and70toreceive,possess,anduseatanytimeanybyproduct,source,andspecialnuclearmaterialassealedneutronsourcesfnrreactorstartup,sealedsourcesfnrreactorinstrumentationandradiationmonitoringeouipmentcalibration,andasfissinndetectorsinamountsasrequired;(4)PursuanttntheActand10CFP.Parts,3C,40,and70,t>receive,possess,anduseinamountsasreouiredarybyproductsource,orsnecialnuclearmaterialwithou+restrictiontochemicalnrphvsicalfnrm,forsampleana>ysisorinstrta.ntcalibratinnnrassociatedwi+hradioactiveapoaratusnrcomponents:and CPursuanttotheActand10CFRparts30and70,topossess,butnotseparate,suchbyproductandspecialnuclearmaterialsasmaybeproduced.bytheoperationofthefacility.Thislicenseshallbedeemedtocontainand,issubjecttotheconditionsspecifiedinthefollowingCommission-regulationsin10CFRPart20,Section30.34ofPart30,Section40-41ofPart40,Sections50.54and50.59ofPart50,andSection70.32ofPart70;andissubjecttoallapplicableprovisionsoftheActandrules,regulationsandordersoftheCommissionnoworhereafterineffect;andissubjecttotheadditionalconditionsspecifiedbelow:(1)MaximumPowerLevelRGGEisauthorizedtooperatethefacilityatsteady-statepowerlevelsuptoamaximumof1520megawatts(thermal).(2)TechnicalSpecificationsTheTechnicalSpecificationscontainedinAppendixA,areherebyincorporatedinthelicense.ThelicenseeshalloperatethefacilityinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.(3)FireProtection(a)Thelicenseeshallimplementandmaintainin)effectallfireprotectionfeaturesdescribedinthelicensee'ssubmittalsreferencedinandasapprovedormodified,bytheNRC'sFireProtectionSafetyEvaluation(SE)datedFebruary14,1979andSEsupplementsdatedDecember17,1980,February6,1981,June22,1981,February27,1985andMarch21,1985.orconfigurationssubsequentlyapprovedbytheNRC,subjecttoprovision(b)be1ow.(b)Thelicenseemaymakechangestotheapproved.fireprotectionprogramwithoutpriorapprovaloftheCommissiononlyifthosechangeswouldnotadverselyaffecttheabilitytoachieveand,maintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.AmendmentNo.49 4)SecondaWaterChemist:MonitorinProram5.5,lgThelicenseeshallimplementasecondaryterchemistrymonitoringprogramtoinhibitteamgeneratortubedegradation.Thisproamshallbedescribedintheplantproceduresshallinclud'e:(a)Identificationofasamplgscheduleforthecriticalparametersandontrolpointsfortheseparameers;(b)Identificationofeproceduresusedtomeasurethevalueofthecriticallparameters;(c)Identificat'ofprocessamplingpoints;(d)Procedurefortherecordiandmanagementofdata;(e)Produresdefiningcorrectivetionsforocontrolpointchemistryconchions;and(f)Aprocedureidentifying(i)theauthityresponsiblefortheinterpretationofedata,and.(ii)thesequenceandtimingoadministrativeeventsrequiredtoinitiatecorrectiveaction.S.SiZ.temsInteritThelicensee'she~implementap~rramtcreduceleakagefromsystemsoutside~ontainmentthatwouldorcouldcontain'l~~dioactivefluidsduringaserious~asientoraces.toaslowasreasonab~chievablelevels.Thispramshalludethefollowing:AmendmentNa.49 

 ~a)--Px'ovisiorsestablishingpreventivemaintenance-andperiodic.visualinspectionrequirnts';andII(h~Leak+estrequkreme~nsfor~ahsvstematafrequencynrxt.-t~xceedrefuelingcycleintervals.(6>-.IodineMonitorinThelicenseeshallimplementaprogramwhichwiIensurethecapabilityto"accuratelydeterminetheairborneiodineconcentra+ioninvitalareasunder~ccidentconditions.Thisprogramshallincludethe.foll@wing:(a)Trainingofpersormel;(b)Procedux-esformonitoringand~~~~(c)rovisionsformaintenanceofsamplingandanalysisequipment.4Tho-"uireromcertainrequiremenisofAendixJto10CFRPart50.Thesanexemptiorom50.46a1,aperformanceecalculatediccordancewithanceptablecalculanalmodelwhiconformstotheprisionsinAendixK(SdatdApril18978).TheexempnwillexpireiptandaroyalofrevisedECCSculations;(certainexemptionsfromAppendixJto10CFRPart50secionII.A.4.(a)maximumallowable1eakagerateforreducedpressuretests,sectionIII.R.1acceotahletechnique~orperforminglocal(Type8)leakageratetests,sectionIII.D.1schedulinqofcontainmentintegratedleakageratetits,andsectionIII.D.2testinqintervalforcontainmentailocks(SERdatedMarch781978)an~nexemotinn..tesceuarrequiremen,orealte~rWiveshutdownsvstemssetforthgn10CFR50.<c)(4)(HRCl~erda+edMayN,f19S..th-.*pt'.ff'al~5clingoutae~eaforementionedexemptionsareauthorizedbyawanwillnotendangerlifeorpropertyorthecommondefenseandsecurityandareotherwiseinthepublicinterest.Therefore,theexemptionsareherebygrantedpursuantto10CFR50-12-PhysicalProtection-The>icenseeshallmaintainineffectandfullyimplementallprovisionsothefnllowingCommission-aporoveddocuments,includingamendmen+sandchangesmadepursuant.othe'uthorityof10CFR50.54(p),whicharebeingwi+hheldfrompublicdisclosurepursuanttn10CFR73.21:

AttachmenttoAmendmenttoFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-I8E.ThelicenseeshallfullyimplementandmaintainineffectallprovisionsoftheCommission-approvedphysicalsecurity,guardtrainingandqualification,andsafeguardscontingencyplansincludingamendmentsmadepursuanttoprovisionsoftheMiscellaneousAmendmentsandSearchRequirementsrevisionsto10CFR73.55(51FR27827and27822)andtotheauthorityof10CFR50.90and10CFR50.54(p).Theplans,whichcontainSafeguardsInformationprotectedunder10CFR73.21,areentitled:"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantPhysicalSecurityPlan,"withrevisionssubmittedthroughAugust18,1987;"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantGuardTrainingandgualificationPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughJuly30,1981;and"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantSafeguardsContingencyPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughApril14,1981.Changesmadeinaccordancewith10CFR73.55shallbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeschedulesetforththerein.F.Thislicenseiseffectiveasofthedateofissuanceandshallexpireatmidnight,September18,2009.FORTHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOriginalsignedbyDarrellG.Eisenhut,DirectorDivisionofLicensing

Attachment:

Appendix'-TechnicalSpecificationsDateofIssuance:December10,1984

TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSDEFINITIONSThefollowingtermsaredefinedforuniforminterpretationofthespecifications.ThermalPowerTheratethatthethermalenergygeneratedbythefuelisaccumulatedbythecoolantasitpassesthroughthereactorvessel.Reactor0eratinaModesModeReactivityakk'oolantTemperatureoFRefuelingColdShutdownHotShutdownOperatingT=14'0T<200T>540T580Any.operationwithinthecontainmentinvolvingmovementoffueland/orcontrolrodswhenthevesselheadisunbolted. erable-erabilitAsystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceshallbeoperableorhaveoperabilitywhenitiscapableofperformingitsspecifiedfunction(s).Implicitinthisdefinitionshallbetheassumptionthatallnecessaryattendantinstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpowersources(subjecttoSection3.0.2),coolingorsealwater,lubrication,orotherauxiliaryeauipment)thatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,componentordevicetoperformitsfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).

Perormingallintena~f--zntheintendedDeseectRedundanc(InstrumentChannels)Thediffereweenthenumoperablechannelsandthenumberchannelswhich,.'d,willcauseanautomaticsysemtrip.instrumentSurveillanceChannelCalibrationTheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechanneloutputsothatitrespondswiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracytoknownvaluesofthe'arameterwhichthechannelmonitors.TheChannelCalibrationshallencompasstheentirechannelincludingthesensorandalarmand/ortripfunctions,andshallincludetheChannelFunctionalTest.TheChannelCalibrationmaybeperformedbyanyseriesofsequential,overlappingortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.ChannelCheckThequalitativeassessmentofchannelbehaviorduringoperationbyobservation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,where'oss'ble,comparisonofthe'hannelindicationand/orstatuswithotherindicationsand/orstatusder'vedfromindependentinstrumentationchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter. ChannelFunctionalTesta.Analogchannels-theinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifyoperabilityincludingalarmand/ortripfunctions.b.Bistablechannels-theinjectionofasimulatedorsourcesignalintothesensortoverifyoper-abilityincludingalarmand/ortripfunction.SourceCheckTheaualitata,thechannelessmentofcharmsexposedtoansewhentiveource. Conta-.nr.:".ntTntcqritvContainmentintegrityisdefinedtoexistShen:a.Allnon-automaticcontairmentisolationvalvwhicharenorequiredtobeopenduringaccidenconditionsareclosedblindflangesareinstedi;I"-rerequired.b.Theequi~enoorisproperclosedardsea1ed.c.Atleastonedooreapersonnelairlockisproperlyclosedandsealed.d.Allautomationtainmentistionvalvessecuredtheclosedpositionor'latedvaesorflangesapermittedbyLimitOperation.e.Thecontai~ttent'leakagesatisfiesTechnicalareoperable,byclosedmanualConditionsfrf/1Speciation,-'adrantPowerTiltTheratioofhighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,thethreeinserviceunitsareusedincanputingtheaverage. HotChannelFactorsF<,HeatFluxHotChannelFactor,isdefinedasthemaximumlocalheatfluxinthesurfaceofafuelroddividedbyearagefuelrodheatfluxallowingformanufacturintolercesonfuelpelletsandrods.F~<,NuclearatFluxHotChannelFacto,isdefinedasthemaximumlocalfuerodlinearpowerensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinepowersityassumingnominalfuelpelletandroddimensionF~<,EngineeringHeFluxHotChnelfactor,,isdefinedastheratiobweenF<andF"<anditheallowanceonheatfluxrendu'dformanufacturingtoleranceF"~,NuclearEnthalphyRiseHotChannelFactor,zdefined-astheratiooftheintegraloflinearpoweralongthrod/'onwhichminimumDNBRoccursto'theaveragerodpower./.r FreauencNotationThefrequencynotationspecifiedfortheperformanceofsurveillancerequirementsshallcorrespondtotheintervalsdefinedbelow.NotationFreauencvS,FachShiftD,DailyTwiceperweekW,WeeklyB/Ã,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/N;BimonthlyQ,QuarterlySA,SemiannuallyA,AnnuallyN.A.PRAtleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastonceper4daysandatleasttwiceper7daysAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper14daysAt,leastonceper31daysAtleastonceper62daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastoncepe12monthsAt.leastonceper18monthsPriortoeachstartupNotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin12hourspriortoeachreleaseOffsiteDoseCalculationManualODOMTheODCM'sa'.~ngthemethodologyandIsmeterstobeusedforcalcula'offsite 'osesetolicyidandgaseousradiologicaleffeat~.,incalculationo'dandgaseousuentmonitoringinstrumentationalarm/5'ents,andintheIconductoenvironmentalradiologica'toringrogram.ProcessControlProramPCPTheisamanualoutliningthemethodforprocessiwetsolidwasd,forsolidificationofidI~xivwastes.ItshallincludeprssparametersandevaluationmethodsusoassuremeWintherecpxirementsofl0CFR71priortoshipmentofcontainedXoactivewastefromthesite.'ication'olidificationsharaChoactive~wastesfromlicpxidsystemstoahomogeiiecnPurae-Purainlid.orpurgingisthecontrolledprocessof'diging.air.orgasconfinedspacetoaintemperature,pressure,humidity,coationorotheroperatingconditio'uchamannerthatreementairorasisrequiredtopurifytheconfinedspace.Ventinagisthecontrolledprocessofdischarginga'-orgasfromainedspacetomaint'mpezatuza.pressure,humidity,concionorotheroperatingcondition,chamannerthatrelantairisprovidedorreauired. DoseEuivalentI-131'i.XV\ixThedoseequivalentI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131whichalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,I-134andI-135actuallypresent.'Thedoseconversionfactorsusedforthiscalculationshallbethosefortheadultthyroiddoseviainhalation,containedinNRCRegulatoryGuide1.109Rev.1October1977.1.19rtableEventAReportableEventsason50.73to10CFRPart50.conditionsspecified';120lXXCanistersContaininConsolidatedFuelRods"Canistertainingconsolidatedfuelrodsarestainsteelcanisterscontainthefuelrodsoomorethantwofuelassemblieswhichhae-decayedatstfiveyearsandarecapableool.ezngstoredinastoragecellofthesfuel1~21ShutdownMarinShutdownmarginshallbetheamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcritical,orwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassumingallrodclustercontrolassembliesXX'I(shutdownandcontrol)arefullyinsertedexceptforthesinglerodclustercontrolassemblyofhighestreactivityworthwhichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,andassumingnochangesinxenonorboronconcentration. 2eoSAFETYIIMITSANDIIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGS2.1SafetyE,imit-ReactorCoreAlicabilitAppliestoelimitingcombinati~onsofthermalpower,reactorcolantsystempressurandcoolanttemperature'duringeration.Ob'ectve:Toman.ntaintheintegrityfthefuelcladding.Thecombinationofthermalpowerlevel,coolantpressureandcoolanttemperatureshallnotexceedthelimitsshowninFigure2.1-1.Thesafetylimitisexceededifthepointdefinedbythecombinationofreactorcoolantsystemaveragetemperatureandpowerlevelisatanytimeabovetheappropriatepressuieline.3.S:-Tomaiintheintegrityofthefuelcladdingandpreventfi'onproductrelea,itisnecessarytopreventoverheatinthe\claddingunderallcratingconditions.Thisisccomplishedby11operatingwithinthenucteboilingregiofheattransfer,Iwhereintheheattransfercoef'ensverylargeandthecladsurfacetemperatureisonlyadegesFahrenheitabovethecoolanttemperature.Thpperboundaryoenucleateboilingregimeistermeddarturefromnucleateboiling)andatIthispointreisasharpreductionoftheheattranscoeff'ntwhichwouldresultinhighcladtemperaturesandossibilityofcladfailure.DNBisnot,however,anobservable arameterduringreactoroperation.Therefore,theobservablepaameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpreurehaveeenrelatedtoDHBthroughtheM-3and/orWRB-1DNBcorelation.TheseDcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheNBfluxandelocationofDNBforaxiallyuniformandno-uniformneatfluxditributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxrao,definedas-theratiootheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtoelocalheatflux,isindicaveofthemargintoDNB.AminimumalueoftheDNBratio,NDR,isspecifiedso,thatduringsteadysteoperation,normalperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransien,thereisa9/probabilityata95%confidencelevelthatDNB'llnotoc.ThecurvesofFigure2.1-1representtheloi~'coolantsystempressureandaveminimumDNBvalueissatisfiedbelowtheselines.ofointsofthermalpower,etemperatureforwhichthiseareaofsafeoperationis!Sinceitispossibletovesomewhateaterenthalpyrisehotchannelfactorsatparpowerthanatfulpowerduetothedeepercontrolbankinsert'whichispermittedapartpower,aconservativealloancehasbeenmadeinobtai'thecurvesinFigure2.1-1fanincreaseinF>withdecreasgpowerlevels.Rodwithdrawblockandloadrunbackoccursbeforereactortripsetpoinarereached.TheRactorControlandProtectiveSystemisdesignedtopventanant'cipatedcombinationoftransientconditionsorreacroolantsystemtemperature,prcssureandthermalpowerleveltht ~~~l4wouesu1tintherebeing1essthana95KprobabHityata9confidence1evetDNBwou1dnotoccur.(I)FSAR,Section(2)SafeuationforR.E.Transitionl4x14OptimizedFue1Assemb1>WestinghouseE1ectricCorporation,Novem83. W.t.i-IFIGURE~59~COREONBSAFETYLIMITS2LOOPOPERATION6606502400PSZAWACCHTABLEOPERATION6402250PSZA6306202000PSZA610~~600590580ACCEPTABLEOPERATION5700.;1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.91.1.11.2POMER(fractionofnomina1) 2.2SafeLimit-ReactorCoolantSstemPressure/AppliestothelimitonReactorCoolantSystempressure.H~Ob'ective:I',TomaintaintheintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystem.I/TheReactorCoolantSystempressureshallnotexceed2735psigithfuelassembliesinstalledinthereactorvessel.asis:TheactorCoolantSystemservesasabarrierpreventingradio-'1)nuclidescoainedinthereactorcoolantfromreachingtheatmophere.Intheeventofaelcladdingfailure,theReactorCoolantSystemis'..rltheprimarybarrierainstthereleaseoffissionproducts.Byes-'tablishingasystempressurlimit,thecontinuedintegrityofthereactorcoolantsystemandfuelcddingisassured.Themaximumtransientpressureallowable'hereaorcoolantsystempressurevesselundertheASMEode,SectionIII,isO~oofdesignpressure.Themaximumtrnsientpressureallowableintheactorcoolantsystempipin'g,valvesandfittingsunderUSASSectionB.1is120'P~~J'ofdes'ignpressure.Thus,thesafetylimitof2735psig(110o'I'i(2)ldesignpressure)hasoeenestablished. 1esettingsofthepower-operatedreliefvalves'(2335psig),thereactorhpressuretrip{2385psig),andthesafetyvalves~(Z485psig)haveeenestablishedtoassureneverreingtheReactorCoolantSysteressuresafetyli.Theinitialhydro-statictestwas'conductedat3pstoassuretheintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystem.

References:

(l)FSAR,Section4(2)FSAR,Section4.3~~ 6.76.7.1SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONThefollowingactionsshallbetakenintheeventaSafetyLimitisviolated:ea.Theprovisionsof10CFR50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)shallbecompliedwithimmediately.SS.Vi5$.'<vbCeTheSafetyLimitviolationshallbereportedtotheSeniorVicePresident,CustomerOperations,totheoffsitereviewfunction,andtotheNRCimmediately.~UASafetyLimitViolationReportshallbeprepared.Thereportshallbereviewedbytheonsitereviewfunction.Thisreportshalldescribe(1)applicable/circumstancesprecedingtheviolation,(2)effects/Joftheviolationuponfacilitycomponents,systems/orstructures,and(3)correctiveactiontakentopreventrecurrence.TheSafetyLimitViolationReportshallbesubmittedtotheNRC,theoffsitereviewfunction,andtheSeniorVicePresident,CustomerOperationswithintwoweeksoftheviolation.~S.')'i%5.iv~*Analterna'maybedesignated~fo-spositioninaccordancewith10Ca)(3requirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecifications~thepositionwiththealternate<<tieasywiththespecifxe.AlternatetitlesshaspecifiedintheUpdatedFinalsafeal~sisRe Lco=-.~.'co3.D'.LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATIONAPPTTC~TTTwP-LLOYD.03~5'.~i~3.0.2.In-theeventaLimitingConditionforOperationand/orassociatedactionrequirementscannotbesatisfiedbecauseofcircumstancesinexcessofthoseaddressedinthespecification,within1houractionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours(i.e.,atotalofsevenhours),and'natleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours(i.e.,atotalof37hours)unlesscorrect'vemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationunderthepermissibleactionstatementsforthespecifiedtimeintervalasmeasuredfrominitialdiscoveryoruntilthereactorisplacedinamodeinwhichthespecificationisnotapplicable.IftheactionstatementcorrespondingtotheLimitingConditionforOperationthatwasexceededcontainstimelimitstohotandcoldshutdownthatarelessthanthosespecifiedabove,thesemorelimitingtimelimitsshallbeapplied.Exceptionstotheserequirementsshallbestatedintheindividualspecifications.Whenasystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelybecauseitsemergencypowersourceisinoperable,orsolelybecauseitspreferredpowersourceisinoperable,it:maybeconsideredoperableforthepurposeofsatisfyingtherequirementsofitsapplicableLimitingConditionforOperation,provided:

l.CQ3.0to'2iVL(1)itscorrespondingpreferredoremergencypowersource)isoperable;and(2)allof'itsredundantsystem(s),subsystems(s),train(s),component(s)anddevice(s)areoperable,orlikewisesatisfytherequirementsofthisspecification.Unlessbothconditions(1)and(2)are'atisf'edwithin1hour,theunitshallbeplacedinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours,andinat'Leastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Thisspecificationisnotapplicableincoldshutdownorjassisrefuelingmodes..Specification3.0.1delineatestheACTIONtobetakenfor>.rcircumstancesnotdirectlyprovidedforintheACTIONstatementsandhwhoseoccurrencewouldviolatetheintentofthespecificat'on.Forjexample,Specification3.3.2reguirestwoContainmentsprayPumpsto~~~beoperableandprovidesexplicitactionrequirementsifonespraypumpisinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpeciXication3.0.1,ifbothoftherequiredContainmentSprayPumpsareinoperable,theunitis7Lrequiredtobeinatleasth'otshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandinatleastcoldshutdownMthenext30hours.Thesetimelimitsapplybecausethetimeimitsforonespraypumpinoperable(6hourstohot'hutdown,wai48hoursthen30hourstocoldshutdown)arelesslimiting.AsafurtherexampleSpecification3.3.1requireseachReaeorCoolantSystemaccumulatotobeoperableandprovidesexpcitactionrequirementsifoneaccumulatoris(inoperableUnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifrethanoneaccumutorisinoperable,withinIplac'etheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithinanadditional301houractionshallbeiniWatedtoshutdownwithin6hoursandcoldhours.Thetimelimitof6hours ,Itohotshutdownand30hourstocoldshutdowndonotapply..'hetimelimitsforlaccumulatorinoperablearemorelj.mj.tj.ng.Zt!/IIisassumed.thattheunit'sbroughttotherequiredmodewithinthe/'equiredtjmesbypromptlyjnitiatingandcarryingoutthe'ppropriateactionstatement..////Spec'fication3.0.2delineateswhatadditionalconditionsmustbe//satisfiedtopermitoperationtocontinue,consistentwiththeaction1Istatementsforpowersources,whenapreferredoremergencypowersourceisnotoperable.Xtallo~soperationtobegovernedbythetimelimitsoftheactionstatementassociatedwiththeLimitingI/ConditionforOperationforthepreferredoremergencypowersource,,/nottheindividualactionstatementsforeachsystem,subsystem,!Itrain,componentordevicethatisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelyi/'/lbecauseoftheinoperabilityofitspreferred.oremergencypower/'ource-4Forexample,Specification3.7.2.I.arequiresinpartthattwoemergencydieselgeneratorsbeoperable.Theactionstatementprovidesforamaximum/out-of-servicetimewhenoneemergencydiesel/generatorisnotoperable.Ifthedefinitionofoperablewere/.appliedwithoutconsiderationofSpecification3..0.2,allsystems,//subsystems,traihs,componentsand.devicessupplied.bytheinoperableemergencypowersourcewouldalsobeinoperable.This.woulddictate/IIinvokingtheapplicableactionstatementsforeachofthe.applicableLimiting'ConditionsforOperation.However,theprovisionsof./ISpecification3.0.2permitthetimelimitsforcontinuedoperationtoI/beconsistentwiththeactionstatementfortheinoperableemergency~~~~dieselgeneratorinstead,providedtheotherspecifiedconditionsareatisfied.Inthiscase,thiswouldmeanthatthecorresponding eferred.po~ersourcemustbeoperable,andallredundanttems,subsystems,ins,components,anddevi'cesmeoperableorotherwisesatisfySpecitheirdesignfunctionaaveatstonepreferredorone'on3.0.2'.e.,becapableofperformingemergencypoweurceoperable).Iftheyartsatisfied,shutisrequiredinaccordancewiththisspecification.-Amen P7.cQ7iLLQ7t4~OsRzo.2~m.~iAJJseao.tAJJ5R3,0.3AJJ$P.3.o.4SURVEXLLMCEHZOUX~NTSSpecifiedintervalsmaybeadjustedplusorminus25%toaccommodatenormaltestschedules.4.1OperationalSafetyReviewApplicability:Appliestoitemsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-Tospecfytheminimumfreouencyand,typeofsurveillancetobeaooliedtoolanteauipmentandconditions.Specif'ation:4.1.14.1.2(4.1.3I4.1.4Calibration,testing,andcheckingofanalogchannelandtestingoflogicchannelshallbeperz;ormedasspec.edinTable4.1-1.EauipmentandsamplingtestsshallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.EachaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedoperablebyperforzancofthecharnelcheckandchannelcalibrationooerationsatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-3.Eachradioactiveeffluent.monitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstrated'ooeablebypeformingIthechannel,check,sourcecheck,channelfunctionaltest,andchannelca3'brationatthefrequencyshcwn'nTable4.1-5. 3.1.3NinimumConditionsforCriticalitlie'~~3.1.3.1Exceptduringlowpowerphysicstests,thereacto'Lc<5i.%shallnotbcmadecriticalatatemperaturebelowg~o3~LS50(PF,andifthemoderatetemperaturecoefficientismorcpositivethana.5pcm/'F(below70percentofratedthermalpower)b.0pcm/'F(atorabove70percent.ofratedthermal.4~4~%~Basispower)Innocaseshallthereactorbemadecri'ticalaboveandtotheleftofthecriticalitylimitlineshiaonFigue3.1-1ofthesespecifications.Whenthereactorcoolanttemperatueisbelowtheminimumtemperaturespecif'edab'o've,thereactorshallIbesubcriticalbyanamounteaualtoorgreaterthanthepotentialreactivityinsertionduetodepressurizati"nPrevioussafetyanalyseshaveassume'dthat,forDesignBasisEven-s(DB'tiatedfromthehot,zeropowerorhig.."powecondit'on,themoderatemperaturecoefficie~MTC)wase'erzeroornegative.3egirax'ne14,thesa=etyana'yses(1)(2)'haveaSsumedthata.maximumof+5p'Fcanexis-upto70%power.Analyses.hshownthatthedesigncr'iacanbesatisfiedtheDBK'swiththisassumption.Atg170'owertheMTCmustbczeroornegative.-erthan3.1-19

TeNTCarewaivedforlowpowerpheststopermitmeasurementoftheMTCsicsdesignparametersofinterest.D'hesetestsspecialoperatingpre'onswiltaken.I'herequirementthatthereactorisnottobemadecriticalaboveandtotheleftofthecriticalitylimitprovidesincreasedassurancethattheproperrelationshipbetweenreactorcoolantpressureandtemperaturewillbemaintainedduringsystemheatupandpressurization.Heatuptothistemperaturewillbeaccomplishedbyoperatingthereactorcoolantpumps.Ifthe'pecifiedshutdownmarginismaintained,thereisnopossibilityofanaccidentalcriticalityasaresultofanincreaseinmoderatortemperatureoradecreaseofcoolantpressure.Reference(1)'SAR(2)FSARFigure3.2.1-8(3)SafetyEvaluationfor.GinnaTransitxo14x14Optimizedmber1983;ssemblies,westinghouseElectricCorpo'on,3.1-20 32ChemicalandVolumeControSstemcabAppliestotheoperatiotatusofechemicalandvolume32~1i2.ih~~32~1~1322iLVo~~323fgaLVcontrolsystem.,Todethoseconditionsofthechemicalandvolumontrolsystemnecessarytoassuresafereactoroperation.ecxcoDuringcoldshutdownorrefuelingwithfuelinthereactorthereshallbeatleastoneflowpathtothecoreforboricacidinjection.Theminimumcapabilityforboricacidinjec-tionshallbeequivalenttothatsuppliedfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Withthisflowpathunavailable,immediatelysuspendallIoperationsinvolvingcorealterationsorpositivereactivitychangesandreturnaflowpathtooperablestatusassoonaspossible.Whenthereactorisabovecoldshutdown,twoboroninjectionflowpathsshallbeoperablewithoneoperablechargingpumpforeachoperableflowpath,andoneoperableboricacid'ransferpumpforeachoperableflowpathfromtheboricacidstoragetank(sIfrequiredbyspecification3.2.2above,theBoricAcid$torageTank(s)shallsatisfytheconcentration,minimumvolumeandsolutiontemperaturerequirementsofTable3.2-1.AmendmentNo.$35732-1 3-2.4WithonlyoneoftherequiredboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCSoperable,restoreatleasttwoboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCStooperablestatuswithin72hours,orwithinthenext6hoursbeinatleasthotshutdownandboratedtoashutdownmarginequivalenttoatleast2.454deltak/katcold,noxenonconditions.Xftherequirementsof3.2.2arenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional7days,thenbeincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.3.2.5p+WhenevertheRCStemperatureisgreaterthan200oPandisbeingcooledbytheRHRsystemandtheover-pressureprotec-tionsystemisnotoperable,atleastonechargingpumpshallbedemonstratedinoperableatleastonceper12hoursbyverifyingthatthecontrolswitchisinthepull-stopposi-tion.AmendmentNo.57.3%22 Table3.2-1BoricAcidStorageTank(s)Minimum-Volume-Temperature-Concentration~concentrationppmboronMinimumVolumegal.'inimumSolutionTemperatureop4700tolessthan5000tolessthan6000tolessthan'7000tolessthan8000tolessthan9000tolessthan10000tolessthan11000tolessthan12000tolessthan13000tolessthan14000tolessthan15000tolessthan16000tolessthan17000tolessthan18000toless.than19000tolessthan20000tolessthan21000tolessthan22000tolessthan500060007000800Q 9000100001100012000 130001400015000,1600017000 1800019QQQ2000021000 2200023000840078006400540Q4700 4200380035003200 3000 270025002400'20021002000190018001800405262707885919710310&113118123127131137 140143 145AmendmentNo.573&22a sisThehemicalandvolumecontrolsystemprovidescontroloftheeactorsysteboroninventory."'hisisnormallyaccomplishedbyus'ngoneormorechging'pumpsinserieswithoneofthetwoboricaidtransferpumps.(3)Abovecoldsutdownconditions,aminimumoftwooffouboroninjectionflowpathsareequiredtoreinsuresinglefunctionalcapabilityintheeventthatanaumed'ingleactivefailurerenrsoneoftheflowpathsinoperable.Theborationvolumeavailablthroughanyflowpathissufficienttopro'detherequiredshutdownarginatcoldconditionsfromanyexpectedopertingconditionandtocompensateforshrinkageoftheprimarycoolantfrthecooldownocess.Themaximumvolumerequirementisassociatedwithboratiofromjustcritical,hotzeropower,peakxenonwithconolrodsttheinsertionlimit,tocoldshutdownwithsinglereactorcooltloopoperation.Thisrequires26,000+gallonsof2000ppmbrtedwaterfromtherefuelingwaterj.storagetankortheconcentrtonsandvolumesofboratedwaterspecifiedinTable3.2-1fromthebricacidstoragetanks.Twoboricacidstoragetanksareavaiable.0ofthetwotanksmaybeoutofserviceprovidedtherequ'dvolumeoboricacidisavailabletotheoperableflowpaths.Abovecoldshutdown,woofthefollowinfourflowpathsmustbeoperablewithoneoprablechargingpumpforachoperableflowpath,andoneoperablebricacidtransferpumpforchoperableflowpathfromtheboricadstoragetanks.(1)Boricacidstoragetanksviaoneboricidtransferpumpghthenormalmakeup(FCV110A)flowpatothesuctionothechargingpumps.(2)oricacid,storagetanksviaoneboricacidtrasferpumpthroughtheemergencyborationflowpath(MOV350tothesuctionofthechargingpumps.RefuelingwaterstoragetankviagravityfeedthroughAOV12Btothesuctionofthechargingpumps.AmendmentNo.573.2-3 ~e~ue~xng~seerstoragecancvxagravityfeedthroughnualbypassvalve358tothesuctionofthechargingpumpsAvlableflowpathsfromthechargingpumpstothereactocoolantsysteincludethefollowing:(1)ChargingflowPaththroughAOV392AtotheRCSLoPBhotleg.(2)ChargingflowpaththroughAOV294totheRCSoopBcoldleg.(3)alinjectionflowpathtothereactorcooantpumps.Therateoforicacidinjectionmustbesufficnttooffsetthemaximumadditiofpositivereactivityfromthecayofxenonafteratripfromfull.per.Thiscanbeaccomplishedtroughtheoperationofonechargingpumpminimumspeedwithsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Alsohetimerequiredforbicacidinjectionallowsforthelocalalignmeofmanualvalvest,providethenecessaryflowpaths.Thequantityofboricacispecifiedinable3.2-1foreachconcentra-tionissufficientatanytimeinrelifetoboratethe.reactorcoolanttotherequiredcoldhutdoconcentrationandprovidemakeuptomaintainRcsinventoryduriecooldown.ThetemperaturelimitsspecifiedonTable3.2-1arerequedtomaintainsolutionsolubilityattheupperconcentrationineachan.ThetemperatureslistedonTable3.2-.1aretakenfromReferenc(4).arbitrary5FisaddedtotheReference(4)formargin.HettracingaybeusedtomaintainsolutiontemperatureatoraboveeTable3.21limits.Zfthesolutiontemperatureofeithertheflowpathortheoratedwatersourceisnot,maintainedatoraboveeminimumtemperatuspecified,theaffectedflowpathmustbedlaredinoperableandeappropriateactionsspecifiedin3.2.4flowed.Placingachargingpinpull-stopwhenevertheretorcoolantsystemtemperatureis>20FandisbeingcooledbyRHR'thouttheover-pressureprotectonsystemoperablewillpreventinadveentoverpres-surizationofeRHRsystemshouldletdownbeterminated.ce(1)(2)(3)ARSection9.3.4.2QREDesignAnalysisDA-NS-92-133-00"BASTBoronConcenttionReductionTechnicalSpecificationValues"datedDec.14,192L.D.Mhite,Jr.letterA.Schwencer,NRC,

Subject:

ReactorVesselOverpressurization,datedFebruary24,1977entNo.5732-4 (4)Kerr-McGeechemxces"dated.5/84etin0151"BoricAcid-Techni-AmendmentNo.573.2-5

3.ControlRodandPowerDistributionLimitslicabilitApplieotheoperationofthedistribution1ts.olrodsandpowerToensure(1oresuhcritica'tyafterareactortrip,limitedpotentialreactiveinsertionsfromypotheticalcontrolrodejection,and.anacceptablecorepowerdistxihutionduringpovereration.Secification3.10.1ControlRodInsertionLimits2o,i3-10~1~1LLOS.h,hcc.o3-~~ZD.LLgp,ihWhenthereactorissuhcriticalpriortostartup,thchotshutdownmarginshallbeatleastthatshownin'heshutdownmarginasusedhercisdefinedastheamounthyvhichthereactorcorevouldhcsuhcriticalathot,shutdownconditions(547'F)ifallcontrolrodsveretripped,assumingthatthchighest,vorthcontrolrodremainedfullyvithdraw'n,andassumingnochangesinxenonorhoxon.Amen30,3.10-1 2oi<<bcpmcv-3.10.1.2'M3,$5LQO3i)ig3.10.1.3t'o3.1~LCD3,).%~g.o,v3.10.1.4'3sla5LCD3il,lpWhenthereactoriscriticalexceptforhysicstestsandcontrolrodexercises,theshutdowncontrolrodsshallbefullywithdrawn(indicatedposition).Whenthereactoriscritical,exceptforphysicstestsandcontrolrodexercises,eachgroupofcontrolroshallbeinsertednofurtherthanthelimitsshownbythelinesonFigure3.10-1andmovedsequentiallywita100(+5)step(demandposition)overlapbetweensuccessivebanks.~Rei~kehMi<DuringcontrolrodexercisesindicatedinTable4.1-2,theinsertionlimitsneednotbeobservedbuttheFigure3.10-2mustbe,observed.Porc.r20.ivgpc.c.i4Jq~+hCCeca,.3.10.1.5uringmeasurementofcontrolrodworthandshutdownmain,theshutdownmarginrequirement,Specificat'3.10.1.,neednotbeobservedprovidedthertivity2equivalenttoatleastthehighestestimadcontrolrodworthisavaiblefortripinsertionEachfulllengthcontrolrodnotflyinserted,ttis,therods.availablefortripinstion,hallbedemonstratedcapableoffullinsertioentrippedfromatleastthe'I50%withdrawnpositi(indica)within24hourspriortoreducingtheutdownmargintosthanthelimitsofSpecifica'on3.10.1.1.Thepositioneachfulllengthrnotfullyinserted,thatis,availaefortriinsertion,shallbedeterminedatleastoncehours.3.10-2 3.10.2PowerDistributionLimitsandMisaliedControlRod3.10.2.1Themovabledetectorsystemshallbeusedtomeasurepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriorto'perationoftheplantat50%ofratedpowertoensurethatdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Ifthecoreisoperatingabove,75$powerwithoneexcorenuclearchanneloutofservice,thenthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratioshallbedeterminedonceadaybyatleastoneofthefollowingmeans:a.Novabledetectorsb.Core-exitthermocouples3.10.2.2Powerdistributionlimitsareexpressedashotchannelfactors.Atalltimes,gQ,V(LWeeks-thehotchannelfactorsmustmeetthefollowing.limits:F~(Z)=(2.32/P)*K(Z)FQ(Z)=4~64*K(Z)FhH=1.66[1+.3(1-P)]forP>.5forP<.5for0<P<1.00WherePisthefractionofratedpoweratwhichthecoreisoperating,K(Z)isthefunctiongivenbyFigure3.10>>3,andZistheheightinthecore.ThemeasuredF~shallbeincreasedbythreepercenttoyieldF~.EfthemeasuredF~orFhHexce'edsthelimitingvalue,withdueallowanceformeasurementerror,themaximumallowablereactorpowerlevelandtheNuclearOverpowe.TripsetpointshallbereducedonepercentforeachpercentwithFAHorF~exceedsthelimitingvalue,whicheverismorerestrictive.Ifthehotchannelfactorscannotbereducedbelowthe3.10-3 2o.v<'i>3.10..2.3~~~~~3.10.2.43.10.2.53.10.2.6hlimitingvalueswithinoneday,theOverpowersTtripsetpointandtheOvertemperatur'eh.Tsetpointshallbesimilarlreduced.thequadrant:,toaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12,thenwithintwohours:a.Correctthesituation,orb.Determinebymeasurementthehotchannelfactors,andapplySpecification3.10.2.2,orc.Limitpowerto75%ofratedpower.Ifthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12farasustainedperiodofmorethan24hourswithoutknowncause,orifsuchatiltrecursintermittentlywithoutknowncause,thereactorpowerlevelshallberestrictedsoasnottoexceed50%ofratedpower.Ifthecauseofthetiltisdetermined,'ontinuedoperationatapowerlevelconsistentwith'.10.2.2above,shallbepermitted.Exceptforphysicstest,ifthequadranttoaveragepowertiltratiois1.12orgreater,within2hourseither.reducethequadranttoaveragepowertiltratiotowithinitslimit,arreducepowertolessthan50%ofratedpo~er.Withinanadditional4hours,eitherreducetheratiotowithinitslimitorbeathotshutdown.Subsequentoperationforthepurposeofmeasuringandcorrectingthetiltispermittedprovidedthepowerleveldoesnot.exceed50%ofratedpowerandtheNuclearOverpowerTripsetpointisreducedby50%.Followinganyrefuelingandatleasteveryeffectivefullpowermonththereafter,fluxmaps,usingthcmovabledetectorsystem,shallbemadetoconfirmthat3.10-4 thehotchannelfactorlimitsofSpecification3.10.2.2aremet.3-10.2.7Thereferenceequilibriumindicatedaxialfluxdifference,asafunctionofpowerlevel(called'thetargetfluxdifference)shallbemeasuredatleastonceperequivalentfullpowerquarter.Thetargetfluxdifferencemustbeupdatedatleasteachequivalentfullpowermonthusingameasuredvalueorbylinearinterpolationusingthemostrecentmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueattheendofthecyclelife.2biiX3.10.2.8Exceptduringcontrolrodexercises,~~~20.L'g3.10.2.9S~$12*I'"ll~controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibration,at,apowerlevelgreaterthan.90percentofratedpower,iftheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencedeviatesfromitstargetband.Thefluxdifferenceshallbereturnedtothetargetbandimme-diatelyorthereactorpowershallbereducedtoalevelnogreaterthan90percentofratedpower.excoredetectorcalibration,andexceptasmodifiedby3.10.2.9through3.10.2.12,theindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceshallbemaintainedwithinX5gofthetargetfluxdifference(.definesthetargetbandonaxialfluxdifference).Axialfluxdifferenceforpowerdistributioncontrolisdefinedastheaveragevalueforthefourexcoredetectors..Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreeshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.3.10-5 gb<X3.10.2.10Exceptduringcontrolrodexercises,orexcorecalibration,atapowerlevellessthanorequalto90percentofratedpower:a.Theindicatedaxialfluxdifferencemay'deviatefromits+5%targetbandforamaximumofonehour(cumulative)inany24hourperiod,however,thefluxdifferenceshallnotexceedanenvelopeboundedby-11percentand+11percentat90%powerandincreasingby-1percentand+1percentforeach2percentofratedpowerbelow90%power.b.,IfSpecification3.10.2.10aisviolated,thenthereactorpowershallbeimmediatelyreducedtonogreaterthan50%power.c.Apowerincreasetoalevelgreater,than90percentofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencebeingwithinitstargetband.3.10.2.11Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan50%ofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencenotbeingoutsideitstargetbandformorethantwohours(cumulative)outofthepreceding24hourperiod.Onehalfthetimetheindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceisoutofitstargetbandupto50%ofratedpoweristobecountedascontributingtotheonehourcumulativemaximumthefluxdifferencemaydeviatefromitstargetbandatapowe"level3essthanorequalto90percentofratedpower.3.10-6 3.10.2.12Whenthereactoriscriticalandthermalpowerislessthanorequalto90%ofratedpower,analarmiprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferencehasbeenoutsidethetargetbandformorethanonehour(cumulative)outofany24hou'rperiod.Inaddition,whenthermalpowerisgreaterthan90%ofratedpower,analarmisprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferenceisoutsidethetargetband.Ifeitheralarmisoutofservice,thefluxdifferenc'eshallbeloggedhourlyforthefirst24hoursthealarmisoutofserviceandhalf-hourlythereafter.3.10.3ControlRodDroTime3.10.3.1'M3,>,Q0Whilecritical,theindividualfulllength(shutdown'andcontrol)roddroptimefromthefullywithdrawnposition(indicated)shallbelessthanorequalto1.8secondsfrombeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentrywith:a.Tgreaterthanorequaltoandb.Allreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.S00F3.10.3.2.Withthydroptimeofanyfulllengthroddeterminedtoexceedtheabovelimit,restoretheroddroptimetowithintheabovelimitpriortocriticality.~~~\ZD,g>3.10.43.10.4.1LCoS.>,9LCD3~l~$ControlRodCrouHeiht)oMouJEaWhilecritical,andexceptforphysicstesting,allfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)rodsshallbeoperableandpositionedwithin+12steps(indicatedposition)oftheirgrouptepcounterdemandposition.II3.10-7

3.10.4.2Nithanyuc.o3.L0rodknowntobeuntripable,determinethattheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1issatisfiedwithin1hourandbeinhotshutdownwithin6hours.3'0.4.3LCoB.>,4~ao,>>.>>Kithone~~~misalignedfromitsgroupstepcounterdemandpositionbymorethanf12steps(indicatedposition),operationmaycontinueprovidedthatwithinonehoureither:3.10.4.3.1LL.D3,>id~~~~~,y)jI3.10.4.3.2le3li2DxivLco9.)..4&xscspQDg,lATherodisrestoredtooperablestatuswithinthe(abovealignmentrequirements,orTheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1issatisfied.'perationsmaythencontinueprovidedeither:a.Theremainderoftherodsinthegroupwiththeinoperablerodarealignedtothesameindicatedpositionastheinoperablerodwithinonehour,whilemaintainingthe.limitofSpecification3.10.1.3:orb.Thepowerlevelisreducedtolessthanorequalto75%ofratedpowerwithinthenextonehour,2DXVlfollowingevaluationsareperformed:(i)TheshutdownmarginrequirementofSpecification3.10.1.1isdeterminedatleastonceper12hours.3.10-8 Leo~i4(ii)ApowerdistributionmapisobtainedfromthemovableincoredetectorsandF~(Z)andPareverifiedtobewithintheirlimitswithin72hours.(iii)Areevaluationofeachaccidentanalysis'4-isperformedwithin5days;thisreevaluationshallconfirmthatthepreviouslyanalyzedresultsoftheseaccidentsremainvalidforthe'urationofoperationundertheseconditions.3.10.4.4Q(g)3.hiQgp,<VllWithtwoormorefulllengthrodsinoperableormisalignedfromthegroupstepcounterdemandpositionbymorethani12steps(indicatedposition),beinhotshutdownwithin6hours.3.10&3.10.5.1Lto3.a.-lZ().gghlControlRodPositionIndicationSstemsWhilecritical,therodpositionindicationsystemandthestepcountersshallbeoperableandcapableofdeterminingthecontrolrodpositionswithinf12steps.3.10-9 F10.5.2Lc.o3,L,l2o,iI$Withamaximumofonerodpositionindicationperbankinoperableeither:~a.Determinethepositionofthenon-indicatingrod(s)indirectlybythemovableincoredetectorsatleastonceper8hoursandimmediatelyafteranymotionofthenon-indicatingrodwhichexceeds24steps(demandposition)inonedirectionsincethelastdeterminationoftherod'sposition,orb.Reducethepowertolessthan50%ofratedpowerwithin8hours.3.10.5.3WithamaximumofonestepcounterperbankinoperableLCo3il9either:a.Verifythatpositionindicationforeachrodoftheaffectedbankisoperableandthattherodsofthebankareatthesameindicatedpositionatleastonceper8hours,orb.Reducethepowertolessthan50%ofratedpowerwithin8hours.asis7hertivitycontrolconceptisthatreactivchangesaccomingchangesinreactoreraxecompensatedbycontrodmotioReactivitychangesassociatedwithxenon,sfueldepletion,andlargechangesinreorcoolantternature(operatingtemperature'oldshutdown)arecompensabychangesintholubleboronconcentration.Duringpowetheshutdowngroupsarefullywithdrawn3.10-10eratior dcontrolofreactorpowerisbythecontrolgroupAactortripoccurringduringpoweroperationwiputereactorintothehotshutdowncondition.Theconolrodinsertionlimitsprovideforievinghotshutdbyreactortripatanytime,asumingthehighestwocontrolrodremainsfullyw'rawnwithsufficientmarinstomeettheassumptisusedintheaccidentanalysi.Inaddition,yprovidealimitonthemaximinsertedrodwthintheunlikelyeventofahypotheti1rodeject',andprovideforacceptablenuclearpea'ngfacts.ThelinesshownonFigur3.11meettheshutdownrequirement.Themaximumtdownmarginrequirementoccursatend-of-cyclelidisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisoftheypotheicalsteambreakaccident.Earlyinclelife,lssshutdownmarginisrequired,andFigure3.10-2showseshutdownmarginequivalenttothathichisrequiredtend-of-life.withrespecttouncontrolledcooldo.Allotheraccidentanalysarebasedon1%reactivtyshutdownmargin.Anupperbondenvelopeof2.32timesthenolixedpeakingctoraxialdependenceofFigure3.10-hasbeenderminedfromextensiveanalysesconsiderigoperaingmaneuversconsistentwiththeTechnicalSpeificationsonpowerdistributioncontrolasgiveniSection3.10.Theresultsofthelossofcoolantaccidentanalysesbasedonthisupperboundenvelope emonstratecompliancewiththeFinalAcceptanceCr'terialimitforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystems.WheanF~measurementistaken,bothexperiment1errorBmanufacturingtolerancemustbeallodfor.Fivepeentistheappropriateallowancefoa'fullcoremapkenwiththemovableincoredetctorfluxmappingsystandthreepercentistheppropriateallowanceforufacturingtolerance.Whenameasurement,ofP>Histaken,xperimentalerrorustbeallowedforand4percentisthappropriatelowanceforafullcoremapwiththemovleincordetectorfluxmappingsystem.Measurementsofthehotcelfactorsarerequiredaspartofstartupphysicssts,atleasteachfullpowermonthofoperationandeneverabnormalpowerdistributionconditionrequirereductionofcorepowertoalevelbasonmeasuredotchannelfactors.Theincoremaptakfollowinginiti1loadingprovidesconfirmationofebasicnucleardesibasesincludingproperfuelloaingpattern.Theperio'cincoremappingproviesadditionalassurancethatthenucleardesignbaseremaininviolateandidentifiesoperationaanomalieswhichmight,otherwise,ffeetthe'sebaes.Fornoaloperation,itisnotnecessarytomeasethesequantities.Insteadithasbeendeterminedtha,providedcertainconditionsareobserved,thehochannelfactorlimitswillbemet;these3.10-12 cditionsareasfollows:1.Controlrodsinasinglebankmovetogetherwinindividualrodinsertiondifferingbymorethan25sepsfromthebankdemandposition.2.Controrod"banksaresequencedwithoverappingbanksasescribedinSpecification3.3.Thefulllegthcontrolbankinsertnlimitsarenotviolated.4.Axialpoverdisibutionlimitvhicharegivenintermsoffluxdifrencelim'andcontrolbankinsertionlimitsarobseed.FluxdifferenceisqT-qBasdefinedincification2.3.1.2d.Thepermittedrelaxation'Hvithreducedpowerallowsradialpowershaechaesvithrodinsertiontoheinsertionlimi.Ithasbeendeterminedthatprovidedtheaboveonditions1ugh4areobserved,thesehotchannefactorslimitsareet.InSpecification3.10,Fis.artrarilylimitedforPloverpaverysicstests).tThelimitsonaxialpowerdistribute.'"0.5(exceptforredtoaboveardesignedtominimizetheeffectsoxenonrcdist'butionontheaxialpoverdistributionuringloadollowmaneuvers.Basically,controloffludierenceisrequiredtolimitthedifferencebetenecurrentvalueofFluxDifference(dI)andarefencealuewhichcorrespondstothefullpowerequilibrium3.10-13AmendmentNo.22 /lueofAxialOffset(AxialOffset=bI/fractiona].por).Thereferencevalueofflux,differencevariewithpowerlevelandburnupbutexpresseasaxiaoffset'tvariesprimarilywithbup.ThetechnalspecificationsonpowerdisibutionassurethattheF~upperboundenvelopeof2.32timesFigure.10-3isnotexceededdxenondistributionsanotdevelopedwh',atalatertime,couldcausereaterlocalwerpeakingeventhoughthefluxdiffenceisenwithinthelimits..Thetarget(orreferencealueoffluxdifferenceisdeterminedasfollow.tanytimethatequilibriumxenonconditionsha0eeeneslished,theindicatedfluxd-'fferenceisotedwithptlengthrodswithdrawnfromcoreandwithntrolBankDmorethan190seps(indicatedposi'on)withdrawn.Thisvalue,videdbythefractionofullpoweratwhichthcorewasoperatingistheullpowervalueofetargtfluxdifference.Valuesorailothercorepowerlevelsaretainedbymuiplyingthefullpowervaluebythefrtionalpow.Sincetheindicatedequilibriumvaluewned,noallowancesforexcoredetectorerrorarecessaryandindicateddeviationofi5percenthIispermittedfromtheindicatedreferencevalue.Duringperiodswhereextensiveloadfollowingis3.10-14AmendmentNo.22

requireimossibestablishtherequiredcoreconditionsfeasuringthetaluxdifferenceeverym.Forthisreason,twomethodsare ermissibleforupdatingthetargetfluxdifference.Sictcontrolofthefluxdifference(androdposition}isntasnecessaryduringpartpoweroperation.Thisisbecausexenondistributioncontrolatpartpowerisnotassiificantasthecontrolatfullpoweranallowancehbeenmadeinpredictingtheheatfpeakingfactoforlessstrictcontrolatpartpower.Strictcontrolthefluxdifferenceisnotossibleduringcertainphicstests,controlrodeercises,orduringtherequidperiodicexcorecaibrationwhichrequirelargeruxdifferencesanpermitted.Therefore,thespecificaionsonpowedistributionarenotapplicableduringysicssts,controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibra'on,thisisacceptableduetotheextremelylowproblityofasignificantaccidentoccurringduringtheoerations.Excorecalibrationincludesthateriodotimenecesarytoreturntoequilibriumopratingcondiions.Insomeinstancesofpidplantpowereductionautomaticrodmotiowillcausethefluxifferencetodeviatefromtheargetbandwhenthereducdpowerlevelisreach.Thisdoesnotnecessarilyffectthexenondiibutionsufficientlytochangeeenvelopeopeakingfactorswhichcanbereachednasubsequetreturntofullpowerwithinthetargetband,owever,tosimplifythespecification,alim'tationofonehourinanyperiodof24hoursisacedonoperationoutsidetheband.Thisensures3.10-15 attheresultingxenondistributionsarenotsignificalydierentfromthoseresultingfromoperationwithinthergetband.Theinstantaneousconsequenceofbeingotsidetheband,providedrodinsertionlimisareobsed,isnotworsethana10percentincrentinpeakingctorforfluxdifferenceinthere+14percentto-14ercent(+11percentto-11perentindicated)increaingby+1percentofeachpercentdecreaseinratedpwer.Therefore,whileedeviationexiststhepowerleveislimitedto90rcentorlowerdependingontheindicadfluxdifferce.If,foranyreason,flux'fference'otcontrolledwithinthei5percentbandrasngaperiodasonehour,thenxenondistributionmbesignificantlychangedandoperationat50pentisrequiredtoprotectagainstpotentiallyrevereconsequencesofsomeaccidents.Asdiscussedabove,thessenceofthlimitsistomaintainthexenondisibutionintheoreasclosetotheequilibriumllpowerconditionapossible.-Thisisaccomplisd,withoutpartlengthds,byusingthechemilvolumecontrolsystemtopsitionthefulllengcontrolrodstoproducethereiredindicationuxdifference.Theeffecofexceedingthefluxdifferencebandaorbelowlfpowerisapproximatlyhalfasgreatasiwoulbeat90/ofratedpower,wheretheeffectofdeiationhasbeenevaluated.

4ereason.forrequiringhourlyloggingistoprovidconinuedsurveillanceofthefluxdifferenceifenormaalarmfunctionsareoutofservice.Itintendethat.thissurveillancewouldbetempoaryuntilthelarmfunctionsarerestored.Thequadrant.wert5)tratiolimitassuresthefLheradialpowerdtributionsatisfiesthedesignvaluesusedinthepowecapabilityanalysisRadialpowerdistributionmeasentsaremadeuringstartupI'testingandperiodicalyduringpweroperation.Thelimitof1.02atwh'chcorrctiveactionisrequiredprovidesDNBanliarheatgenerationrateprotectionwithx-yplane.pwertilts.Alimitingtiltof1.025canbetolerateerethemarginforuncertaintyinFisdeleted.Therefore,theqlimitingtilthasbeesetas1.0.Toavoid.unnecessarypowercanges,theopetorisallowedtwohoursinwhichtoerifythetiltreingand/ortodetermineandcrectthecauseoftheilt.Shouldthisactionvifyatiltinexcessof1.2whichremainsuncorected,themarginforuncert'ntyinP~andP>isreinstatedbyreducingthepowby2/foreacpercentoftiltabove1.0,inaccordewiththe2o1ratioabove,orasrequiredbytheresictiononpeakingfactors.Ttwohoursin3.10.2.3areacceptabl.sincecompleterodmisalignment(full-lengthcontrolrod123.10-17 eetoutofalignmentwithitsbank)doesnotreultin'xceedingcoresafetylimitsinsteadystatoperationatratedpowerandisshortwihrespectoprobabilityofanindependentacdent.Ifinsteaofdeterminingthehotchannelactors,theoperatodecidestoreducepower,especified75%powermatainsthedesignmargitocoresafetylimitsf'pto1.12powerilt,usingthe2to1ratio.Recingtheoveowertripsetpointensuresthateproteconsystembasisismaintainedforsustaipltoperation.Atiltratioof1.12ormorei'icativeofaseriousperformanceanomalyandalantshutdownisprudent.Themaximumroddropimerstrictionisconsistentwiththeassumedrdroptimusedinthesafetyanalyses.MeasurmentwithTgreaterthanoravequalto540'Fndwithbothreacorcoolantpumpsoperatingensresthatthemeasureddroptimesvillbe.;.epesen'at;i"eof:.inse>.'o'.;'.:.esexperiencedduringaeactortripatoperatingcon'tions.Thevar'ouscontrolrodbanks(shutdownbnks,contrbanksA,B,C,andD)areeachtobeovedasbank;thatis,withallrodsinthebawihinonestep(5/8inch)ofthebankpositio~ositx~nindicationisprovidedbytwomethods:adigitalcountofactuationpulseswhichshowsthe(310-18AmenamentNo.22 demandpositionofthebanksandamicroprocessorrdpositionindication(MRPI)systemwhichindatestheactualrodposition.Thedigitalcountersreknownasthe'stepcounters.Operabi'tyofthecontrolrodpositioniicationisrequirtodeterminecontrolrodpostionsandtherebyensecompliancewiththeconolrodalignmentand'nsertionlimits.The12steppermissiblederndtoindicatedmialignmentandthe0steprodtood.indicatedisalignmentensuresthatthe25tepmisal'gnmentassumedin."thesafetyanalysisimet.heMRPIsystemdisplaysthepositionoa'rodsonaCRT.AfailureoftheCRTwouldesultinlossofposition(indicationoftherodsevethoughtheMRPIsystemisstilloperable.ncethMRPIsystemalsotransmitsrodposioninforma'ontothePlantProcessComputerystem(PPCS),ePPCScanbeusedforrodpoitionindicationtiltheCRTismadeoperableTheactiontaiementswhichpermit.'<.in'Wdvariationsfrothebasicrequirementsareacompaniedbyaddiionalrestrictionswhichensurethttheorigialdesigncriteriaaremet.Misalignmtofardrequiresmeasurementofpeakingfactorso1(3.10-19AmendmentNo.22

rerictioninpower;eitheroftheserestric'onsprovidssuranceoffuelrodintegrityingcontinuedoration.Inaddition,sesafetyanalysesaffecteyamisalignrodarereevaluatedtoconfirmthattherultsemainvalidduringfutureoperation.

References:

(1)UpedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSAR)Section4.2.enen

MFLsC)ICIO10080C60oI/Itoo.40o200I')Gl)BE3)0CONTROLAODINSERTIONLIHITSVERSUSCOREPOWERlOAOOLTIIAOIJGIIEOI.----DashedlineisapplicableonlyforCycle19withcycleburnupgreaterthan5250%H)/M1UprovidingCycle18burnuphasexceeded12150MHD/YIu.IIll)I;tnk')I)~0~~i)"0III;Iil.'I~Ii)1~t~ili~~It'II::~~~0~~;II~Ij:II:IIIII~~~)LI.:Ii~ye~.".I~~~III~~el:~~\~~~I)::i11.1~~~}~0I'ie'~l)I!IIIlIil.'i}}:i))iI!}IIdl~IIIIll)!iJIl~!illi'!il!!'!IIll000liel~0,!}}!li'II}i!iI801020030..40.'.50;.60"70CorePotver'(Percent'of1520HWT)el~I~lee)~~i'I:0~~~00)I)I'ILit!}i\0~~Ialii:le.'~0~\0i!!I!i'.i0)iliili:II!1)I'~~II90~~!I)'.tl-:00II.~~~~I~I.:II00.I;00~~Ijli:ill}iI!I!I:)0!ile~II:I:itel.~~~~~~I~~:I:~~0~00::I:~~:i.:I:I.~~~~~~~0~100}o(f82.25t] 3.00~II~I~~I,II.IoII~.I:liIJII!iliilIi!I'jt)III~~~I.l'~I,II~~II.liI~IIIONELOOPOPERATION2.OQ%OLOOPOPERATION~I)1.000.01Ilr;:III:II00iiIII~~~J~')00il)0lIIl:I';i)50~~~ICOOLANTBORONCONCENTRATION(PPM)REQUIREDSHUTDOMHMARGINFIGIURE3.10-2 I.2$00AOANLIZEOANlAL'EPEHONCEFACTORFORFqVS.ELEVATlONFIGURE3.10-3I.OOOO0.)$000.5000~~0.2$00~~TOTALFo2.320COniIIEICIIT0000F000Io.cooI2000I.000I'0000~8%00.6iT~~0.0ClCllDIEDNOAEIlfICIITlfTIDOO~DC7AJ Table3.loCCIDENTANALYSISREUIRINGRE:-VALUATIOThEEVs~OFANINOPERABL=CONTROODRodInsertionCharacisticsRodMisalignmentLossofReactorCoolantFromaRupturedPipes0"FromCracksInLargePipesWhichActusThe"gencyCoreCool'ngSystemRodWithdrawalAt,FPower~tajorReactorCantSystempipeRuptures(LossfCoolantAccident)SteamL'reakRodjection3.10-23 3,).4.qi~~~.l,t..i~R,>.k.EL,QTABLE4.1-1HINIHUHFREQUENCIESFORCHECKSgCALIBRATIONS,ANDTESTOFINSTRUHENTCHANNELSChannel1.NuclearPowerRangeSR->1.8.ie.i.hCheckSH*(3)CalibrateD(1)Q*(3)TestB/W(2)(4)P(2)(5)~Wto~ay~Q,Q2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)RangeZR3I't3N.ADP(2)4.ReactorCoolantTemperatueSL~,S.g.~~CXhh~5.ReaCtOW"Coolan"FI5Q'l.3SH(l)(2)3.NuclearSourceRangeS(l)N.A.p(z)Remarks1)fleatbalanceca1culation**2)SignaltoWT;bistableaction(permzssive>rodstop<Crj.ps)3)Upperandlowerchambersfor.axialoffset**4)blighsetpoint(<109%ofratedpower)5)Lowsetpoint(<25%otratedpower)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction'permissive>rodstop<trap)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Bistableaction(alarmstrip)1)Overtemperature-DeltaT!2)Overpower-DeltaT3.36.PressurizerWaterLevelS7.PressurizerPressureSH8.4KvVoltage6FrequencyN.AReactorProtectioncircuitsonly9.RodPositionIndicationS(lg2)N~A~1)Withstepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice*Bymeansofthemovablein-coreuet'ectorsystem.**Notrequiredduringhotscold~orrefuelingshutdownbutassoonaspossibleatterreturntopower. Channelesc0TABLE4.1-1(Continued)~CecgC<~~ate~estgeI!laa}issps.<,s:i10.RodPositionBank~az.>,t,.zCountersQpll.SteamGeneratorLevelSRS(1c2)N~A.N.A.1)Hithrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindication.each4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofserviceMI<ei.en12.ChangFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlow14.BoricAcio5.RefuelingHaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlanLevelN.ADRH.A.H.A.N.A.H.A.Note4N.A.N.A.17.ReactorContainmentPressureDRM(1)1)IsolationValvesignal18.RadiationMonitoringSstem19.BoricAcidControl28;mRMAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1720.ContainmentDrainSumpLevelH.A.R.¹A.-21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.H.A.22.Pump-ValveInterlock23,TurhineTripSet-PointN.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1)BlockTrip24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureSN.A.AmemdmelltNo.g574.1-6 'SlySl25,l.'3,kSg3,s.'Z,mQR3.l,S.g~8.'i'I.iTABLE4.1-2MTNLet1.,FEEUENUZ-S--EUIPNENTENOSEMPLYN4TSTS1.ReactorCoolantChemiatrySamples2.ReactorCoolant,BoronChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentrationFrec~en~c3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelow2SO'FWeekly3.RefuelingMaterStorageTankMaterSampk.e4.BoricAcidtoraTankBoronConcentrationWeeklyTwice/Meek~~S.ControlRodsR~~~t-8.'a'a,Q6a.FullLengthControlRock>03.l.d.gm6.'E'a.O6b.FullLengthControlRods.s.'3.i.1.lES.E'i.kc7.PressurizerSafetyValves8eMainSteamSafetyValves9.~ContainmentIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRoddroptimesofallfulllengt,hrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficient.numberofstepsinanyonodirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughitsfulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointSetpointFunctioningFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandat,leastonceper18months(I)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperationsAmendmentNe.g,574~1-8 ~~cIt4,9RtivitAnomaliesALicabilxAppliestopotentialriyaaomalies.~ObectiveTorequirevaluationofreactivityanomalieshinthertor.Followinganormalizatioaofthecomputedboronconcentrationasafunctionofburnup,theactualboroacoacentrationofthecoolantshallbeperiodicallycomparedwiththepredictedvalue.'BasisToelinate'possibleerrorsinthecaLculationsoftheinitialresivityofthecoredthereactivitydepletioarate,thepredictedLationbe-tweenfuelbura-undtheboronconcentration,necsarytomaintainadequatecontrolcharacaccuratelyreflectactualcoreninitially,aadwiththecontroLrodsinthedesiredpositions,theistics,mustbeadjted(normalized)toditioaVfhenfullpowerisreachedboronconcentrationismeasedandtheprctedcurveisadjustedtothispoint.Aspowoperationproceeds,themshredboroncon-centrationiscoparedwiththepredictedconcentrationdtheslopeofthecrelatingburn-upandreactivityiscomparedwithtt ThisprocessofnorxnaHzationshouldbecompletedafteraboutf0joofthetotalcoreburn-up.Thereafter,actualboroncon-EPs,i.z,icentrationcanbecomparedwithpredicted,andthereactivitystatusLgo3a1~z.ofthecorecanbecontinuouslyevaluated.Anyreactivityanomalygreaterthan1%wouldbeunexpected,andconsideredanabnormalcondition;itsoccurrencewouldbethoroughlyinvestigatedandevaluated.CThemethodsemployedincalculatingthereactivityofthecorevs.burn-(1)upandthereactivityworthofboronvs.burn-uparegivenintheFSAR.Thevalueof1%isconsideredasafelimitsinceashutdownmarginLC.OS,l,Z.'of'tleast1%withthemostreactiverodinthefullywithdrawnposi-tionisalwaysxnaintained.

Reference:

(1)FSAR-Section3.2.14.9-2 TABLE3.5-1CONTlHUEDPROTECTIOHSYSTEHIHSTRUHENTATlON.~e.QPa~3.3HO.FUNCTIOHALUNITTOTALHO.ofHQ.ofCtlAHNELSCHANNELSTOTRIPHIN.OPERABLECHANNEISPERHISSIBl.EBYPASSCONDITIONSOPERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOl.UHN1OR3CANNOTBEHETCINHNELOPERABLEUlBOVEll.TurbineTrip50KPower12.Deleted13.LoLoSteamGeneratorMaterLevel3(loop2/loop2/loopHotShutdown14.15.Undervoltage4KVBusUnderfrequency4KVBus2/bus2/bus1/bus{bothbusses)1/bus.{bothbusses)2/bus{oneitherbus)2/bus{oneitherbus5%Power5%Power16.Quadrantpowertilt1monitor{upperClowerex-coreneutrondetectors).NAEmvq2.4hou.vsv<vi)jnPTP6,Qa.Lcolcxflor4,Wee,eMAti'O~<+<lSo/ooyN.viQo~opoAlrdic4ibubo~i~o.ee.ep)e.4bqg+IIgovt.01~~aP>(Qgggfv!ALPoNM>'7s~io0{'otShutdownLogindividualupperllowerionchambercurrentsonce/hrCafteraloadchangeof10%orafter4Bstepsofcontrolrodmotion 3.10.23.10.2.1SR.~.z.i.ic.g,p.2.2..hg9.XXRg~.c.l..Z.59.3.2.".KPowerDistributionLimitsandMisaliedControlRodThemovabledetectorsystemshallbeusedtomeasurepowerdistributionaftereachfuelreloadingpriortoy75'%r'perationoftheplantat~ofratedpowertoensurethatdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Ifthecoreisoperatingabove75/powerwithone'xcorenuclearchanneloutofservice,theeanttoragepowertiratioshallbedinedona29.XXldaybyatoneofthefola.MovedetectbCore-exitthermocouplezngmeans:PgQrrHinKr<4l~vhap~qong<vw~atQ~wp.nntlPaGW5,3.10.2.2Q.Q9&vs,P3i'Lgt"03<2~ILC,O3,T.,2.Powerdistributionlimitsareexpressedashotchannel~go.x'i)nfhaQ8'I.d'llwihyteststhehotchannelfactorsmustmeettheIddca.&limits~>~%at.C.><<.20i%'%legQs~l0F(Z)=(2.32/P)*K(Z)Fg(Z)=4.64*K(Z)FLH=1.66[1+.3(l-P)]forP>.5forP<.5for0<P<1.0020.xx'Vg0.vXviWherePisthefractionofratedpoweratwhichthecoreisoperating,K(Z)isthefunctiongivenbyFigure3.10-3,andZistheheightinthecore.ThemeasuredFshallbeincreasedbythreepercenttoyieldF.IfthemeasuredForFhexceedstheNlimitingvalue,withdueallowanceformeasurementerror,themaximumallowablereactorpowerlevelandtheNuclearOverpowe-.TripsetpointshallbereducedonepercentforeachpercentwithFhHorF~exceedsNthelimitingvalue,whicheverismorerestrictive.Ifthehotchannelfactorscannotbereducedbelowthe3.10-3 72l.our<<Fc.c.HRgf~g~~~~L3.10,.2.3L.~O3.2.QgOa$gV'll2O.VN'Ii~iI3.10.2.4LCO3.2.,QZOsXXgll20<0.XX'43.10.2.5wO,XVX>3.10.2.6QR3.2~l.lSV3.2,2,.llimitingvalueswithin~~~theOverpowergTtripsetpointandtheOvertemperature4Tsetpoincshallbesimilarlyreduced.Excetforhsicstests,ifthequadrant:,toaveragepowertiltratioexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12,thenwithintwohours:a.Correctthesituation,orb.Determinebymeasurementthehotchannelfactors)3%~tomKTP4ie.at:wl'loobG,PYRl.55andapplySpecification3;10.2.2,orc.LimitpowertoIftheadranttoaveraeertiltratieptforphysicstest,ifthequadranttoaveragepowertiltiois1.12orgreater,within2hourseireducetheranttoaveragepowertiltratiotxthinitslimitorredpowertolessthanofratedpower.Withinanadditi4houra,therreducetheratiotowithinitslimiteathotshutdown.Subsequentoperationthepurposemeasuringandcorrectingthe'spermittedprovidedtheerleveldoesnoxceed50%,ofratedpowerandtheNupowerTripsetpointisreducedhy50%.FollowinganYrefuelingandateasteveryeffectivefullpowermonththereafter,fluxmaps,usingthemovabledetectorsystem,shallbemadetoconfirmthatCPIgpowoexceeds1.02butislessthan1.12forasustainedperiodofmorethan24hourswithoutknowncause,orifsuchatiltrecursintermittentlywithoutknowncause,thereactorpowerlevelshallberestrictedsoasnottoexceed50%of'atedpower.Xfthecauseofthetiltisdetermined,continuedoperationatapowerlevelconsistentwith3.10.2.2above,shallbepermitted.AmendmentNo.563.10-4 thehotchannelfactorlimitsofSpecification3.10.2.2aremet.3.10.2.7Thereferenceequilibriumindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceas-a'unctionofpowerlevel(calledthetargetfluxdifference)shallbemeasuredatleastonceperequivalent2Di&4$Ll<g.3.2,S.3-+<-~ET'.a.s.l3.10.2.8fullpowerquarter.Thetargetfluxdifferencemustbeupdatedatleasteachequivalentfullpowermonthusingameasuredvalueorbylinearinterpolationusingthemostrecentmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueattheendofthecyclelife.Excetdurinhsicstests,controlrodexercises,L"0~'23o.excoredetectorcalibration,andexceptasmodifiedby20agg)(l'll~~3.10.2.9through3.10.2.12,theindicatedaxialflecloC4~~targetfluxdifference(definesthetargetbandonaxialfluxdifference).Axialfluxdifferenceforpowerdistributioncontrolisdefinedastheaveragevalueforthefourexcoredetectors.Ifoneexcore/HAP'KP3.l3.10.2.9Lc.o3,2,,~detectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreeshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.Exceptduringphsicstests,controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibration,atapowerlevelgreaterthan.90g.oVXklgpercentofratedpower,iftheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencedeviatesfromitstargetband.Thefluxdifferenceshallbereturnedtothetargetbandwaate-44m-~~orthereactorpowershallbereducedtoalevelnogreaterthan90percentofratedpo~er.l+14~~LS3.10>>5 H=~-..~PYsR.3.10.2.10'Exceptduringphysicstests,controlrodexercises,orexcorecalibration,atapowerlevelless,thanorequalto90percentofratedpower:(caio~CoMa;Theindicatedaxialfluxdifferencemaydeviatefromits~~+5%targethandforamaximumofohehour(cumulative)inany24hourperiod,however,thefluxdifferenceshallnotexceedanenvelopetboundedby-11percentand+11percentat90%powerandincreasingby-1percentand+1percentforeach2percentofratedpowerbelow90%power.b.IfSpecification3.10.2.10aisviolated,thentheQQQSi2s3reactorpowershallbe-immediatelyreducedton'ogreaterthan50%power.lCD3,Z,33.10.2.11LC.O3X3C.'.Ncm)'c.Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan90percentofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencebeingwithinitstargetband.Apowerincreasetoalevelgreaterthan50%ofratedpoweriscontingentupontheindicatedaxialfluxdifferencenotbeingoutsideitstargetbandformorethantwohours(cumulative)outofthepreceding24hourperiod.Onehalfthetimetheindicatedaxialfluxdifferenceisoutofitstargetbandupto50%ofratedpoweristobecountedascontributingtotheonehourcumulativemaximumthefluxdifferencemaydeviatefromitstargetbandatapowe"level3essthanorequalto90percentofratedpower.3.10-6 3.10.2.125R.3.2.,3.1cP~,~,3,'L20,V.&viWhenthereactoriscriticalandthermalpowerislessthanorequalto90%ofratedpower,analarmiprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferencehasbeenoutsidethetargetbandformorethanonehour(cumulative)outofany24hourperiod.Znaddition,whenthermalpowerisgreaterthan90%ofratedpower,analarmisprovidedtoindicatewhentheaxialfluxdifferenceisoutsidethetargetband.Zfeitheralarmisoutofservice,thefluxdifferenc'eshallbeloggedhourlyforthefirst24hoursthealarmisoutofserviceandhalf-hourlythereafter.3.10.33~10.3.13.10.3.2310.43~10~4~1ControlRodDroTimeWhilecritical,theindividualfulllength(shutdown.andcontrol)roddroptimefromthefullywithdrawnposition(indicated)shallbelessthanorequalto1.8secondsfrombeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpot.entrywith:a.Tgreaterthanorequalto540'F,andavgb.-Allreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.Withthei-cptimeo.'~nyiul'.lengt'.>roddeterred'.ne..toexceedtheabovelimit,restoretheroddroptimetowithintheabovelimitpriortocriticality.ControlRodCrouHeihtWhilecritical,andexceptforphysicstesting,allfulllength(shutdownandcontrol)rodsshallbeoperableandpositionedwithin+12-steps(indicatedposition)oftheirgroup"tepcounterdemandposition.3.10-AmendmentNo.22 andcontrolofreactorpowerisbythecontrol'groups.Areactortripoccurringduringpoweroperationwillputthereactorintothehotshutdowncondition.Thecontrolrodinsertionlimitsprovideforachievinghotshutdownbyreactortripatanytime,assumingthehighestworthcontrolrodremainsfullywithdrawnwithsufficient,marginstomeettheassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysis.Inaddition,theyprovidealimitonthemaximuminsertedrodworthintheunlikelyeventofahypotheticalrodejection,andprovideforacceptablenuclearpeakingfactors.ThelinesshownonFigure3.10-1.meettheshutdownrequirement.Themaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatend-of-cyclelifeandisbasedonthevalueused.inanalysisofthehypotheticalsteambreak.accident.Earlyincyclelife,lessshutdownmarginisrequired,andFigure3.10-2showstheshutdownmarginequivalenttothatwhichisrequiredatend-of-lifewithrespecttoanuncontrolledcooldown.Allotheraccidentanalysesarebasedon1%reactivityshutdownmargin.upperboundenvelopeof2.32timesthenormalizedpeakinactoraxialdependenceofFigure3.10-3sbeendeterminemextensiveanalysessideringoperatingmaneuversconsistheTechnicalSpecificationsonpoistributionrolasgiveninSecti.0.Theresultsofthelossofcontaccidentanalysesbasedonthisuerboundenveloe donstratecompliancewiththeFinalAcceptanceCririalimitforEmergencyCoreCoolingSystems.!WhenaFmeasurementistaken,bothexperimentalIerioranmanufacturingtolerancemustbeallodfor.Fivepercetistheappropriateallowancefoa'fullcoremaptaknwiththemovableincoredettorfluxmappingsystemandthreepercentisthepropriateallowanceformaufacturingtolerance.WhenameasurementofF>Histaken,erimentalerrormstbeallowedforand4percentisthappropriatealowanceforafullcoremapwiththemovleincoreetectorfluxmappingsystem.Measurementsofthehotannlfactorsarerequiredaspartofstartupphysicsests,atleasteachfullpowermonthofoperation,nwheneverabnormalpowerdistributionconditionsequirareductionofcorepowertoalevelbaseonmeasudhotchannelfactors.Theincoremaptakenfollowinginiialloadingprovidesconfirmationofthbasicnucleardeignbasesincludingproperfuelloadingpattern.'heperidicincoremappingprovidadditionalassuranceththenucleardesignbasesemaininviolateand~identifieoperationaanomalieswhichmight,otherwise,affectthesebas.Fornoaloperation,itisnotnecessarytomearethesquantities.InsteadithasbeendeterminedIth,providedcertainconditionsareobserved,thehotchannelfactorlimitswillbemet;these3.10-12 conditionsareasfollows:1.Controlrodsinasinglebankmovetogetherwithoindividualrodinsertiondifferingbymorean2Sstepsfromthebankdemandposition.2.ConolrodbanksaresequencedwithoverlaingbanksasdescribedinSpecification3.10.3.Thefullengthcontrolbankinsertionlmitsarenot.violed.4.Axialpowedistributionlimitswhiaregivenintermsoffldifferencelimitscontrolbankinseztionlimisareobserved.luxdifferenceisqT-qBasdefidinSpecifiation2.3.1.2d.ThepermittedrelaxatninFwithreducedpower'allowsradialpowershachgeswithrodinsertiontoheinsertionlimits.thasbeendeterminedthatprovidedtheabovecondi'on1through4areobserved,thesehotchannelfacrslimiaremet.InSpecificatio3.10,F~isazbitralylimitedrP<0.5(exceptforlowerpowerphysitests).Thelimitsonaalpowerdistribu~".=.iredtoabovearedes'gnedtominimizetheeffecsofxenonredistributonontheaxial'owerdistribu'onduringload-follmaneuvers.Basically,controlofluxdiffereceisrequiredtolimitthedifferencetweenthecurrentvalueofFluxDifference(II)andareerencevaluewhichcorrespondstothefullpowerequilibri3.10-13AmendmentNo.22 alueofAxialOffset(AxialOffset=~I/fractionalpoer).Thereferencevalueoffluxdifferencevariwithpowerlevelandburnupbutexpressedasaxiaoffsetitvariesprimarilywithburnup.Thetechnxalspecificationsonpowerdistributio/assurethat.eF~upperboundenvelopeof2.32'imesFigure310-3isnotexceededandxenondistributionsanotdevelopedwhich,ataatertime,couldcausereaterlocalpowerpeakingeven/thoughthefluxdiferenceisthenwithintheilimits..Thetarget(orreferenc)valueoffluxdifferenceisdeterminedasfollows.Atatimethatequilibriamxenonconditionsha0ekeenhhlished,theindicatedfluxd-'fferenceisnotedwiartlengthrodswithdrawnfromthecoredwicontrolBankDmorethan190steps(iicatedpoition)withdrawn.Thisvalue,dividedthefractionoffullpoweratwhichthecoreasoperatingisfullpowervalueofthetartfluxdifference.Valuesforallothercorepowerlevelsaeobtainedbymultiplyigthefullpowervaluebytheractionalpower.Sicetheindicatedequilibriumvaluwasnoted,nallowancesforexcoredetectorerrorrenecessaryandindicateddeviationof25percentb,Iipermittedfromtheindicatedreferencevalue.Dungperiodswhereextensiveloadfollowingis3.10-14AmendmentNo.22 requireeimpossibleablishtherequiredcore-conditionseasuringthexdifferenceevmonth.'orthisreason,twomethodsare3.10<<14aAmendmentNo.22 ermissibleforupdatingthetargetfluxdifference.Sictcontrolofthefluxdifference(androdposition)lisotasnecessaryduringpartpoweroperation.ThisisbeccaexenondistributioncontrolatpartpowerisInotassignificantasthecontrolatfullpoweran/allowanhasbeenmadeinpredictingtheheatfl'uxIIpeakingfctorsforlessstrictcontrolatpar5power.Strictconolofthefluxdifferenceisnotossibleduringcerta'nphysicstests,controlrodercises,orduringtheequiredperiodicexcorecalirationwhichrequire1rgerfluxdifferencesthanpermitted.aTherefore,thespcificationsonpower,distribution/arenotapplicable.uringphysicstests,controlrod!exercises,orexcorealibrations;)hisisacceptable'uetotheextremelyloprobabil'tyofasignificant.Iaccidentoccurringduringtheseoperations.Excorecalibrationincludesthatpr'odoftimenecesarytoreturn'toequilibriumoperigconditions.Insomeinstancesofrap'lanpowerreductionautomaticrodmotionw'causefluxdifferencetodeviatefromthetartbandwhenreducedpowerlevelisreached.hisdoesnotnecesarilyaffectthexenondistritionsufficientlytocangetheenvelopeofpekingfactorswhichcanberachedonasubsequentturntofullpowerwithinthetgetband,hower,tosim.~lifythespecification,alimitat'onofonehourinanyperiodof24hourssplaceonoperationoutsidetheband.Thisensuresj.) thattheresultingxenondistributionsarenotsignificatlydxferentfromthoseresultingfromoperationwithintheargetband.Theinstantaneousconsequenceofbeingutsidetheband,providedrodinsertionlim'areobseed,isnotworsethana10percentincmentinpeakinfactorforfluxdifferenceintherge+14percentto4percent(+11percentto<<11pcentI'ndicated)inreasingby+1percentofea2percentdecreaseinradpower.Therefore,wh'thedeviationexiststhepowerevelislimitedto0percentorlowerdependingontheinicatedfluxdierence.lf,foranyreason,uxdiffereceisnotcontrolledwithinthef5percentbdforaslongaperiodasonehour,thenxenondistribu'osmaybesignificantly~changedandoperationat5ercentisrequiredtoprotectagainstpotentiaymresevereconsequencesofsomeaccidents.Asdiscussedabove,eessenceothelimitsistomaintainthexenonistributioninecoreasclosetotheeguilibrifullpowerconditxnaspossible.Thisisaccomplihed,withoutpartlenthrods,byusingthechem'calvolumecontrolsystemtopositionthefulllenhcontrolrodstoproducethrequiredindicationluxdifference.Theeffecofexceedingthefluxdifferencebanatorbelowhfpowerisapproximatlyhalfasgreataitwouldeat90%ofratedpower,wheretheeffeetofdeviionhasbeenevaluated.3.10-16 ereasonforrequiringhourlyloggingistoprovidecon'nuedsurveillanceofthefluxdifferenceifthnormallarmfunctionsareoutofservice.Itisintendedat,thissurveillancewouldbetemporauntilthearmfunctionsarerestored.jThequadrantportiltratiolimitassuresthilltheradialpowerdisibutionsatisfiesthedes'gnvaluesusedinthepowerpabilityanalysis.Rdialpowerdistributionmeasurementsaremadedurigstartuptestingandperiodicallduringpoweoperation.Thelimitof1.02atwhichcorrect'actionisrequiredprovidesDNBandlieareatgenerationrateprotectionwithx-yplane.powtilts.Alimitingtiltof1.025canbetoleratedborethemarginforuncertaintyinFisdepled.Threfore,thelimitingtilthasbeentas1.02.Toavoid.unnecessarypowerches,theoperatisallowedtwohoursinwhichtovifythetiltreadigand/ortodetermineandcorctthecauseofthetit.Shouldthisactionveriyatiltinexcessof1.02whichremainsuncorrcted,themarginforuncertaininF~andP>Hireinstatedbyreducingthepo~er2%foreachpcentoftiltabove1.0,inaccordancewiththe2toratioabove,orasrequiredbytherestriiononpeakingfactors.Thetohoursin3.10.2.3areacceptabj.sincecorneterodmisalignment(full-lengthcontrolrod123.10-17 etoutofalignmentwithitsbank)doesnotresuinexceedingcoresafetylimitsinseadystateopetionatratedpowerandissrtwithrespecttoproilityofanindependentaccident.Ifinsteadofdetermingthehochannel.factors,theoperatordecidestorucpower,thespecified75%powermaintainsthedigmargintocoresafetylimitsforupo1.12powetilt,usingthe2to1ratio.Rcingtheoverpoweripsetpointensurethattheprotectionsystembisismaintaidforsustainedplantoperation.A'lt'aoof1.12ormoreisindicativeofaseriouslperformanceanomalyandalantshutdownisrudent.Themaximumroddroptimerestrictionisconsistentwiththeassumedroddroptimeusedintheafetyanalyses.MeasurementwithTgreaterthanoravgequalto540'Fandwithbothreactorcoolantpumpsoperatingensuresthatthemeasureddroptimesw)llbe;.presen'ti"eof:.inse.-'~';.<imesexperiencedduringareactortripatoperatingconditions.Thevariouscontrolrodbanks(shutdownbanks,controlbanksA,B,C,andD)areeachtobemovedasabank;thatis,withallrodsinthebankwithinonestep(5/8inch)ofthebankposition.Posit14nindicationisprovidedbytwomethods:adigitalcountofactuationulseswhichwe3.10-18AmenamentHo.22 l.2$00tlORNLtZEOAXthL.OEPEHOENCEFACTORFORFqYS.ELEYATlOHFltiURE3.10-31.0000O.lSOO0OPP0.2500TOTALrO2.320COAEIIEICIIT0.0006.000l0.800l2.000K{7)l.000l;0000F9000.611~~0.0CICJAlCOnEIIElCIIT<rr)OO +R'3.c.Q.(TABLE4l-1INININUNFREQUENCIESFORCHECKSgCALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUNENTCHANNELShannelNuclearPowerRangeCheckSN*(3)D(1)Q*(3)e/W(2)(4).1)P(2)(5)2)4)5)I~,UAIS$SIICalibrateTestRemarksHeatbalancecalculation**SignaltoWT;bistableaction(permissive,rodstop<trips)Upperandlowerchambersforaxialoffset**Highsetpoint(<109%oiratedpoweLowsetpoint(<25%ot;:atedpower)2.NuclearIntermediateS(l)Range3.NuclearSourceRangeS(1)N.ADN.AP(2)p(z)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction(permissive<rodstop<trip)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Bistableaction(alarmstrip)4.ReactorCoolantTemperature:.SN(l)(2)1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT5.ReactorCoolantFlowS6.PressurizerWaterLevel7.PressurizerPressureSN8.4KvVoltage6N.A.RFrequencyReactorProtectioncircuitsonly9RodPositionIndicationS(1,2)NA~1)Withstepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisout.ofservicetOymeansofthemovablein-coreuetectorsystem.l*~gNotrequireaduringhotscold~orrefuelingshutdownbutassoonaspossibleatterreturntopower' %s2,.3LimitineSa!etvSstemSettins,ProtectiveL.sirumeneation'AlicabiliApplies.totripsettingsforinstruments.-monitoringreactorpowreactorcoolantpressure,temper-ature,andQow:anressurizerlevel.Toprovideforautomaticproteveactionintheeventthattheprincipalprocessvariables'approhasafetylimit..,~siti*.Z.3.1Protectiveinstrumentationforreactortripsettingshallbe.asfoQows:LQ3j,3,l,table3.3.I-l23.l.1StartuaProtection~Fuag.IHighQua,powerrange(lowsetpoint)-=25%afratedpower.2.3.1.2CoreProtect'.onFg82.a..a.Highfluv,powerange(highsetpoint)-<1095ofI,ratedpower.b.Highpressurizerpressure-<2385psig.c.Lowpressurizerpressure->>865psig-L(o3.3'.)d.Overtemperature0,Tl+zlSSdT.[Kl+K(P-P)-KS(T-T)(l+g2S))-f(dl)11whereTo=ind'cated~Tat'atedpower'FT=averagetemperature,4FT=573.5oFP=pressurizerpressure,psigP=2235psig1K=1.20.000900$LLtK=.0209rl=25sect2=5secandf(dZ)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweent.opandbottomdetectorsofthepower-rangenuclearionchambers;withgainstobeselectedbasedonmeasuredinstrumentresponseduringplantstartuptestswhereqtandqbarethepercentpowerinthetopandbottomhalvesofthecorerespectivel.y,andqt+qbisthetotalcorepowerinpercentofratepowersuchthat:r(i)forq-qblessthan+13percent,f(dl)=0 (ii)foreachpercentthatthemagnitudeofqqismorepositivethan+13percent,thegTtripsetpointshallbeautomaticallyreducedbyequivalent.of1.3percentofratedpower.e.OverpowerhTx3STSLAT[K4-K5(T-T)-K6T3S+1]-f{dX).1whereK4K~K6f(AI)indicatedhTatratedpower,'Faveragetemperature,PindicatedTavgatnominalconditionsat,ratedpower,'F1.0770.0forT<T0.0011forT>T0.0262forincreasingT0.0fordecreasingT10secasdefinedin2;3.1.2.d

~~(Q.f.Lowreactorcoolantflow->90%ofnormalindicatedflow.2.3.1.3OtherreactortrisFu.~aFgwl5b.Highpressurizerwaterlevel-<88%.ofspan.Low-lowsteamgeneratorwaterlevel->16%ofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan2.3.2Protectiveinstrumentationsettingsforreactortripinterlocksshallbeasfollows:2.3.2.1Removebypassof"atpower"reactortripsathighpowerFus7,'~i~~8i(lowpressurizerpressureandlowreactorcoolantflow)F<"'I.h(F'm~<).forbothloops:Powerrangenuclearflux-<8..5%ofratedpower(1)(Note:Duringcoldroddroptests,'hepressurizerF4%9highleveltripmaybebypassed.)2.3.2.2Removebypassofsinglelossofflowtripathigh+~.~C<~k'ibpower:Powerrangenuclearflux-<=50%ratedpower2.3.3j.cog.gq2.3.3.1W3.3'.O.2W.tvRelayoperatingwillbetestedtoinsurethattheyperformaccordingtotheirdesigncharacteristicswhichmustfallinwithintherangesdefinedbelow:Lossofvoltagerelayoperatingtime<8.5secondsfor~~480voltsafeguardsbusvoltages.<368volts.measuredvalesshallfalltleast5%belothetPeoreticalimit.Th's5%marginisshownasthe5/tolerancecurveiFigure2.3-1. 2.3.3;2~3.9.0.g.t.(vAcceptabledegradedvoltagerelayoperatingtimesandsetpoints,for480voltsafeguardsbusvoltages<414voltsand>368voltsaredefinedy.thesafeguardequipmentermalcapabilitycueshowninFigure2.3-1.Iasuredvaluesshallfallatleast5%belowthethereticallimit.Thi5%marginisshownasthe5;.'orancecurveinFire2.3-1.%is:Theh'fluxreactortrip(lowsetpoint,}providesredundantprotection+inthepowerrangeforapowerexcursionbeginningfromlo~~power.Thistripvaluewasusedinthesafetyalysis.Inthepowerrang'eofoperation,theoverpowernuclearuxreactortripprotects"-.thereactorcoreagainstreactvityexcursiogs'.'hicharetoorapidtobe,rotectedbytemperatureandpressureprotective.circuitry.Theoerpowerlimitriteriaisthatcorepowerbepreventedfromreachinavaluatwhichfuelpellet~centerlinemeltingwouldoccur.Treactorispreventedfromreachingtheoverpowerlimitcoition'hyactionofthenuclear/overpowerandoverpowerATMips.Thehigandlowpresurereactortripslimittheressurerangeinwh"hreactoroperationa.spermitted.The'ghpressurizerpressurereactortripisalsoabackuptotherssurizercodesafetyvalvesforerpressureprotection,disthereforesetlower.thanthesetpresurefortheseves(2485psig).Thelowpressurizerpressureretortrialsotripsthereactorintheunlikely'eventofalossooolantaccident.

STheovertemperatureaTreactortripprovidescoreprotection,/ainstDNBforallcombinationsofpressure,power,coolant/.temperature,andaxialpowerdistribution,providedonlythat
(1)theitransientisslowwithrespecttothethermalcapacityofthereactrcoolantsystemtorespondtopowerincreasesand(2)presureiswithintherangebetweenthehighandlow/pressurereacortrips.withnormalaxialpowerdistribution,thereactortrilimit,withallowanceforerrors,isalways/belowthecoresatylimitasshowninFigure2.1-1.Ifaxialpeaks'aregreaterthndesign,asindicatedbydifferencebetweentoopandbottompowerrgenucleardetectors,thereactortriplimiti isautomaticallyreuced.eoverpowerLTreactortrippreventspowerdensityanywreinthecorefromexceedingavalueatwhichfuelpelletcenerlinemeltingwouldoccurasdescriedinSection7.2ofeSAR.Thissetpointincludesrrectionsforaxialpower/distrition,changeindensityandheat,capacityofwaterwiMtemperatue,anddynamiccompensation/forpipingdelaysfrom:thecoretotheoptemperaturedetectors.Thespecifiedsetpntsmeetthisrequireentandincludeallow-anceforinsrinstrumenterrors.Thelowfloweactortripprotects(1)thecoreagainstDNBintheeventofasudden1sofpowertooneorbothreactorcoolantpumps.Theset,pointsspecifiedareIconsistenwiththevalueusedintheaccidentanaly's-Theunderfquencyreactortripprotectsagainstadecreaseinflowcausedbylowelectricalfrequency.Thespecifiedsetpoassuresareactortripsignalbeforethelowflowtrippointiscached.

Thehighpressurizerwaterlevelreactortripprotectsthepressurizersafetyvalvesagainstwaterrelief.Approximatelv/700ft.fwatercorrespondsto92%ofspan.Atrip,'at.thissetpointcontainsmarginforbothnormalinstrumenterrorandJtransient-overshootoflevelbeyondthistripsetting.Anadditional4%instenterrorhasbeenassum'edtoaccountfortheeffectsofelevatdtemperaturesonlevelmeasurementipaccordancewithIEBulletin79-21.,'hereforeatripsetpoint<12),.'f88/preventsthewaterevelfromreachingthesafetyvalves.0~'(4IThelow-lowsteamgeneratorwaterlevelreactortripprotectsIagainstlossofteedwaterflowiccidents.Asetpointof5%isequivalenttoatleast40,000lbs.;ofwaterandassuresthattherewillbesufficient,waterinventoryinthesteamgeneratorsatthetimeoftripto'llowforstartingdelaysfortheauxiliary(5)feedwatersystem..'nadditional11%hhsbeenaddedtothesetpointtoaccount:.,forerrorwhichmaybeintr'oducedintothesteamgeneratorlevel.systematacontainmenttemperatureof286'Fasdeterminedby'valuationperformedfortemperature.effectsonIlevelmeasurementsrequiredbyIEBulletin79-21../.ThespecifiedreactortripsareblockedatlowpowerwhetheyIarenorequiredforprotectionandwouldotherwiseinterfewinormalplantoperations.'heprescribedsetpointabovewchthesetripsare'nblockedassurestheiravailabilityintheowerrangewhereneeded. 0rationwithonepumpwillnotbepermittedabove130(8.5,.Anorderlypowerreductiontolessthan130{8.5,willbeccomplishedifapumpislostwhileoperat'ngbetween130MWT(8.5%)and50%.Automaticprotectionisrovidedsothaapower-to-flwratioismaintainedequaltoolessthanone,whichinsuresttheminimumDNBratioinceasesatlowerflowbecausethemaximenthalpyrisedoesnoincrease.For@isreasonthesinglep~lossofflowtricanbebypassedbelow50%power.Thelossofvoltageanddradedvotagetripsensureoperabilityofsafeguardsequipmentdurigaostulateddesignbasiseventconcurrentwithadegradedbusvoltagecondition.'9><10~11Theundervoltagesetpointsaveeenselectedsothatsafeguardsmotorswillstartandaccleratethdrivenloads(pumps)withintherecpxiredtimeandllbeabletoperformforlongperiodsoftimeatdegradedcoitionsabovethetrapsetpointswithoutsignificantlossdesignlife.Allcontrolcircuitryorsafetyrelatedcontrolcentersandloadcenters,exceptformotorcontrolcentersManL,ared.c.Therefore,degradedgidvoltagesdonotaffecthesecontrol,centersandloadcenters.MotorcontrolcentersandL,whichsupplythestandbyAuxiliaryFedwaterSyst,arefullyprotectedbytheundezvoltagesetpoinFuer,theStandbySystemisnormallynotinserviceand,isanuallyoperatedonlyintotallossoffeedwaterandauxiliary~feedwater.

The,erancecurveinFigure2.3-1'andtherecpxireofspecifications2.3.and2.3.3.2include5'wanceformeasurementerror.Thus,prove.emeasurementerrorislesthan5%,measuredvaluesbedirectlycredtothecurve.Ifmeasurementmade.rexceeds5%,appropriateallowancallbe Reerences:15.0(2)UFSAR5.4(3)UFSAR15.(4)UFSAR7.2(5)UFSAR15.2(6)(8)DeletedDeletedDeleted(9)ZetterfromT.D.'te,Jr.A.Schwencer,NRC,(10)datedSeptember0,1977.Z,etterfromD.White,Jr.datedSepmber30,1977.toA.Swencer,NRC,(11)GetterromZ.D.White,Jr.toD.Ziemann,C,(12)datdJuly24,1978.etterfromZ,.D.White,Jr.toB.Grier,USNRCdatedSeptember14,1979.

600LOSSANDSECONDLEVEL(DEGRADED)UNDERVOLTAGERELAYOPERATINGRANGESIII~1400FIG.2.3-1'oc0O Cl~~~~~I)~~)'~)I~~)I~~:ItII)1200..1000IEOIH30O20O10O8~5cn&.0O~4w,.IC~.~~LOSSOFVOLGE..OPERATINGNGE607024052%8032070%l/lISecondleveoperating.egionluioment900mr)~600O400z200o0120 480104%909236880%thalcapaility~Icurvel~i5%toleranceurve100i03.11041490'LO0CDOlCCIsJEOCoQowlOo~)CCOr~Ol5C)CC4Jr.Wo~0oVlSAFEGUARDSBUSVOLTAGE2.3-10 3.5InstrumentationSystemsLCOS.>.l3.5.13.5.1.1Todelineatetheconditionsoftheplantinstrumentationandsafetycircuits.SecificationProtectionSystemInstrumentationTheProtectionSystemInstrumentationshownonTable3.5-1shallbe.operablewhenevertheconditionsspecifiedinColumn6areexceeded.3.5.1.23.5.2LCO33.Z3.5.2.1Inteeventthenumbeofchannelsoaparcuarsub-systemfallsbelowthelimitsiveninthecolumns1or3ofTable3.5-1,actionshalletaenaccogtotherequiremenssnownincolumn5ofTable3.5-'EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationInstrumentationTheEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)instrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-2shallbeoperablewiththeirtripsetpointssetconsistentwiththevaluesshownintheTripSetpointcolumnofTable3.5-4,whenevertheconditionsspecifiedincolumn6ofTable3.5-2areexceeded.)co3.3.33.5.2.23.5.2.33.5.33.5.3.1Inteeventthenumberofchannesoaparticularsubsvstemfallsbelowthelimitsaivenincolumns1or3ofTable3.5-2,actionshallbetakenaccorxngtotherequ'ementsofcolumn5ofTable3.5-2.Wztrumentationchanneltripset'ssconservativeevalueshown'AllowableValuescolumnofTableclarethechannelinoperableandtakeanacc'otherequire-mentsofcolumTable3.5-2untxchannelisrestoredperablestatuswiththetripsead'dconsistentwiththeTripSetpointvalue.AccidentNonitoringInstrumentationTheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-3shallbeoperablewheneverthereactorisatorabovehotshutdown.

3.5-3.2Jcb3.33caAWhenrequiredby3'.3.1,iththenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsshowninTable3.5-3,Gpd8c-aO/6(r~gdN54844m+OtC44nhe))3.5.3.34co9.3.>m&Qfg.i,LI.Aeitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperable0>s.ii'.b-statuswithinQ7days,rez.na'astotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.uc,.c.CaMC.Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableiaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirementsofTablohCItalo4IrcBit3.5-3eitherrestoreto7da.S'c.c.operablestatuswithinoreinatleasth~shutdownwithinthenext12hours.TheradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchsshowninTable3.5-6shallbe-rable,whenevertherorisatoovehotshutdown.Withoneormorez.nopezrationmonitoringchannelsltaketheactionshownin~Keble3.5-6.Jtartupmaycommenceorcontinueconaiatenttw'ththe/ato3.5.5RadioactiveEffluentMonitoringEnstrumentatio3.5.5.1Theradioactiveeffluentmonitoringin-entationshowninTable3.5-5shallbeoableatalltimeswithalarmand/ortripointssettoinsurethatthelimitsofSp'fication3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arewreak~~a;.~~y~gggotexcee.Alarmand/ortripsetpointsshallbeeslishedinaccordancewithcalculationalmethodssetforthintheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual-

3.5.52Ifthesetpointforaradioactiveeffluentmonitoralarmand/ortripisfoundtobehigherthanrequired,oneofthefollowingthreemeasuresshallbetakenimmediately:I(i)thesetpointshallbeimmediatelycorrected(ii)(iii)withoutdeclaringthe'channelsinoperable;orimmediatelysuspendthereleaseofeffluentsmonitored-bytheeffectedchannel;ordeclarethechannelinoperable.3.5.5.3Ifthenumberofchannelswhichareoperableisfoundtobelessthanrequired,taketheactionshowninTable.3.5-5.ExertbesteffortstoreturntheinstrumentstoOPERABLEstatuswithin31daysand,ifunsuccessful,.explaininthenextR"dioactiveEffluentReleaseReportwhytheinoperabilitywasnotcorrectedinatimelymanner.3.5.635'61ControlRoomHVACDetectionSystemsDuringallmodesofplantoperation,detectionsystemstca2.5.~forcueradioactivityinthecontrolroomHVACintakeshallbeoperable.withsetpointstoisolateairintakeadjustedasfollows:

(f55vchlorine,/'<5ppmi~leQ35]mmonia1<35mrazoactivity,partzcuxate<1x10iodine<9x10noblegas<1x10"IS',Vii3.5.6.2ithoneofthedetectionsstemsa.noperwithin1hourisolatethecontrolroomHVACazrxnake.Maintaintheairintakeisolatedexceptforshortperiods,notCo~~~<<~toexceed1houraday,whenfreshairmakeupisnJo+g'llowedtoimprovetheworkingenvironmentinthe'ontrolroom.~cM9I5'.v'<Cn~dgyS1STDuriqplantoperations,thecompleteinstrumentationsystemwillnormallybeopeable.ReactorsafetyisprovidedbytheReactor-ProtectionSystem,whichautomaticallyinitiatesappropriateactiontopreventexceedingestablishedlimits.Safetyisnotcompromised,>however,bycontinuingoperationwithcep'aininstrumentation,channelsinoperablesinceprovisions.iweremadeforthisintheplantdesign.Thisspecification..outlineslimitingconditionsforoperationnecessarytopreservetheeffectivenessofthereactorconsolandprotectionsystemwhenanyoneormoreofthechanrielsisinoperable.Almostallreactorprotectionchannelsaresuppliedwithsufficientredundancytoprovidethecapabilityfor'hannelcalibrationandtestatpower.Exceptionsarebackupchannelssuchasreactorcoolantpumpbreakers.Theremoval,ofonetripchannelisaccom-plishedbyplacingthatchannel'bistableinatrippedmode;e.g.,atwo-out-of-threecircuitbecomes.aone-out-of-twocircuit-TestingdoesnottripthesystemunlessatripconditionexistsIinaconcurrentchannel.Theoperabilityoftheaccidentmonitorirrginstrumentationensuresthatsufficientinformationisavailableon,,selectedplantparameterstomonitorandassesq<thesevariablesduring,andfollowinganaccident.Thiscapabilityisconsistent,with"therecommendationsofNUREG-0578,"-2LessonsLearnedTaskForce.StatusReportandShort-Termcommendations".Theradioac'veliquideffluentinstrumentationispovidedmonitoran+/orcontrol,asapplicable,thereleasesofradioactive'aterial+inliquideffluents.Thealarmand/ortripsetpointsfortheeinstrumentsarecalculatedinaccordancewith%eODCMtoenrethatalarmand/ortripwilloccurpriortoexceedingtheimitsof10CFRPart20.TheoperabilityanduseofthisitrumentationisconsistentwiththerequirementsofGeneral'.esigncriteria60,63and64ofAppendixAto10CFRpart50.

Theradioactivegaseouseffluentinstrumentationispovidedtomonitoandcontrol,asapplicable,therelsesofradioactivematerialsingaseousefflents.Thearmand/ortripsetpointsfortheseinstrentsarecallatedi:naccordancewiththeODCMtensurethatalarmand/ortripwilloccurpriortoexceedingthelimitso10CFRPart20.Thisinstrumentatiqnalsoincludesovisionsformonitoringtheconcentra-tionsofpotentilyexplosivegasmixturesinthewastegasholdupstern.Theoperabilityanduseofthisinstrumentation'sconsisttwiththerequire-mentsofGeneralDesignCriteon64ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50.ControlRoomHVACdetectiystemsaredesignedtopreventtheintakeofcorinammoniaandradiationatconcentrationswhimayprentplantoperatorsfromperformingthe'equiredfuntions.Concentra-tionswhichinitieisolationofthcontrolroomHVACsystemhavbeenestablishedusintheguidanceofseveraleslishedreferences(2-4).Thechlorinisolationsetpointis1/3efetoxicitylimitofference2butslightlygreaterththeshort-texposurelimitofreference4.Theonia'etpo'isestablishedatapproximately1/3oftoxiitylimitforanhydrousammoniainreference2anequaltotheshorttermexposurelimitofreferenc4.hesetpointsforradioactivitycorrespondtothe(ZZW aximumpermissibleconcentrationsofreference3Cs-3.37,I-131andKr-85.Themi'ni-purgesystemisconnectedtotheplantvent.10CFRPart,100typereleasesviamini-purge.:are'limitedbyanisolationsignalgeneratedfromSI.10CFRPart20reeasesfrommini-purgearconsideredtobesimilartooerplantventilatio<releasesandaremonitoredbyR-10B,'3,-13,andR-14R-14AmaybeasubstituteforR-10B.~+Automatirisolationofmini-purgefor10CFRPart20typereleasesisconsideredunnecessarduetothelowflowassociedwithmini-purgeand~continuousmonitoring.however,theautomaticisolationprovisionsusingR11prR12provideadditionalmarginfor10CFRPart20ypereleases.,Therefore,R-llorR-12isrequiredtosamplecontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation.ToensurethecontainmentshmplemonitoredbyR-llor-12isrepresentativeofthecontainment/atmospher,atleastonerecirculationfanisrequiredtobeioperationduringmini-purgeoperation;.ShouR-11and/orR-12becomeinoperable,a1urliitischosentobeconsistent'withthegeneralacceptedtimeforpromptaction. eferences1)UpdatedFSAR-Section7.2.2)USNRCReguloryGuide1.78,Je1974,Assump-tionsforEvalua'theitabilityofaNuclear'overPlantControlRDuringaPostulatedHazardousChemicaelease.3)10CFR20AppdixB,TableI.4)ThresholdimitValuesfoiChemicalstancesandPhysiAgentsinthecworkEnvironment,82.PishedbyAmericanConferenceofGovexnmenIndustrialHygienists. I5.c.aLc03.3.tTWGLC3.3.I-lTOTALNO.ofIIANHEI.SNO.FUNCTIONALVNIT.Cw/Alsn~ceciFtt4I1.HanuaI234NO.ofCIIANHEI,STOTRIPHIN.OPF.RABI.ECIIAHNEJ.SPERMISSIBLEBYPASSCONDITIONSTABLE3.5-1PROTECTIONSYSTEHINSTRVHENTATION5O"ERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOLUHNIOR3,CANNOTBEHETIIS.c.eCIIAHHEI.Ol'ERABI,EABOVEwenltithdrawnFQ~22.uclearFluxPowerHangRI$gowsettingKQ82mI>ighset.t.in4.NuclearFluxSourceRangeAbAJeg>eJmCkcp4rQIF4445.OvertemperaturedTFtttt&6.Overpower-dTFQII7.tc7.LowPressurizerPressurefr<7bS.IliPressurizerPressureF0889.Presgyrizer-IliWaterLevy,iFU~ja10.LowFlowinoneloopFtltI'I.I~~LowFlowothloopsta-.5@SOIS~c.4ftj433.NuclearFluxIntermediateRange3/loop2/loop(eitherloop)3/loop2/1oop(bothloops)For1owsctt,ing,2of4powcrrangechannesgrrat.crthan%F.I'.2of4powerrangechannelsgreaterhanIS.i.Iof2intermediaterangechannelsgreaterthanIOamps.2/loop(bothloops)2/)oop(cithr.rloop)Is,'chIS.c.l,2(ii'~l3IS~I.e5whenRCCAiswithdrawnwivernRCCAiswit.I>drawnwhenItCCAiswit.hdrawnote2Hotc3llot.Shutdownllot.Sliutilown5/powerllotShutdown5%power5%power5/pnwcr' TABLE3.5-1CONTINUEDPROTECTIONSYSTEHIHSTRUHENTATIONHO.FUNCTIONALUNIT51.TurbineTripTOTALHO.ofNO.ofCHANNELSCHANNELSTOTRIPIBIN.OPERABLECHANNELSPERHISSIBLEBYPASSCONDITIONSOPERATORACTIONIFCONDITION/OFCOl.UHN1OR3CANNOTBENETCINNNELOPERABLEABOVE50%Power'Rl>i&13.LoLoSteamGeneratorHaterLevel3/loop2/loop2/loopNotShutdown8~(114.Undervoltage4KV)g-BUS2/bus1/bus2/bus(bothbusses)(oneitherbus)5%Power15.Underfrequncy4KVBus2/b1/bus(bothbusss)2/bus(oneithebus)5%Powe16.Quadrantpowertiltmonitor(upper&lowerex-coreneutrondetectors)A,ur~ssedwe&Chapgci3.Z.Logindividualupper&lowerionchambercurrentsonce/hr&afteraloadchangeof10%orafter48stepsofcontrolrodmotionHotShutdown TABLE3.5-1(Continued)PROTECTIONSYSTEMINSTRUIKHTATIONNO.FUNCTIONALUNITTOTALNO.ofCIIANNEI.S2I3HO.ofIIIN.CIIAHNELSOPERABLETOTRIPCIIANHEI.S45,OPFRATORACTIONPERIIISSIBLEIFCOHDITIOHSOFBYPASSCOI.UIIH1OR3COHnITIONSCANNOTBEHFTCIIAHHEI.OPFBABI.EABOVF.I.CirculatingWaterFdProtectiona.Coenser15.t2setsof32of3in2of3ineit.hersetbottisetsllo.hut.downPoweroperat.ionmaybecontinuedforaperiodopto7<lays~i'f.h1channel.~1setofthro~inoperableetforaperiodof24hrs.withtwochannels(2setsofoft,hree)inoperable.Otlierwisebeinhotshutdowninanadditional6hours.I~C53..b.ScreenhouseLossofVoltage480VSafeguardsBus2setsof32setsof2/bus1of2ineachsetinonebus2of2inoneofthetwoset.s2of3in2of3ineitheetbothsetsHotShutdownTRCS350FPoweroperationmaybecontinuedforaperiodofuptdayswith1charm(1setofthree)ierableorforape'of24hrs.withtwchannels(2setsoofthree)inoperable.Otherwisebeinhotshutdowninanadditional6hours. Tnutd3.5-1Cont~inuedPROTECTIONSYSTEMINSTRUMENTATIONNO.I5.i.vFUNCTIONALUNITF08)5.0.PuttIf.aFusl7AutomaticTripLogicIncludingReactorTripBreakersLCO'3.3.II19.DegradedVoltage480VSafcguardsBusTOTALNO.ofCHANNELS2/bu'O.ofMIN.CHANNELSOPERABLETOTRIPCHANNELS2/bus1/busIS.i.o.PERMISSIBMBYPASSCONDITIONSee-~~eNote45OPERATORACTIONIFCONDITIONSOFCOLUMNlOR3CANNOTBBMET14CHANNELOPERABMC"~Note5IS.<.e,yaga.NVZE2stbfi~(c'.4(bNOTE3PU4RN<tc(e}Q,gRtgcPQQ<I7NOTE5:gas(j)CannesshoudbeoperaGleataTT.modesheMoQEhebypassconditionwiththereactortripsystembreakersinthcclosedpositionandcontrolroddrivesystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.Channelsshallbeoperableatallmodesbelowthebypassconditionexceptduringrefuelingdefinedtobcwhenfuelisinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensions.Jorwiththeheadremoved.Oncreactortripbreakermaybcbypassedforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheotherreactortripbreakerisoperable.Channelsshallbeoperableatallmodesaboverefuelingwhenthccontrolroddrivesystemiscapableofrodwithdrawalunlessboth.actortripbreakersareopen. TABLE3.5-2ENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONINSTRUHENTATION5.Ii.lyNO~FUNCTIONALUHITTOTAI.HO.ofHIN.NO.oI.CIIAHNEI.SOPERABI.ECIIANHFLSTOTillPCIIANHl'.I.S4PERHISSIIll.F.BYPASSCONDITIONS5OFFRATORACTIOHIFCONDITIONSDFCol.UHN1OR3CANNOTBEHETCllhNNEI.Ol'ERABLEABOVEIFutlFu~I.C.Fu4I.tsSAFETYINJECTIONa.Hanualb.IlighContainmcntI'cssurcc.St.cornGenerat.orI.owSt.earnPressure/I.oopFtl4I,Jd.PressurIzcrLowPressure2~CONTAINHENTSPRAYa.Hanua'Ib~Ni-lliContainmentRl42gPressure(Contain-mentSpray)2setsof32of3inbotltStstS2persetineithersctPrimaryprcssure1cssthan2000psigPrimarypressIIrclesst.ban2000psig9R3.>.Z4<ch.a,.89Lco33.2toCab910RCS"RCSis350I'oTRCi350FRC.'o1ilSbutdownColilSlu>t<lownooiiustsctuste2switchessimulssnconsiy.~ISiia.,ylAddFunctusÃI,b,"AuIs<<<oKc<o+ol<<<<c.ggobobo.Job,~sAddFuush'oo42b~4doo4'tuohooIg'olAskoi""Palqs"IZ.M TABI.F.3.5-2(Continued)~~~EHGIHEFRI'.DSAFFTYFEATUREACTUATIONINSTRUHI'.NTATIONISLi.~IS,L<,',4IS.~.KNO.FUNCTIONALUNIT3.AUXILIARYFEEDWATFRHotorandTiirl>ineDriven3TOTAI.,NO.ofHIH.NO.orCIIAIINEI.SOPERABl.t:.CIIANHFI.STOTRIPCIIAHHFI.SPERHISSIBl.l'.BYPASSCOHDITIOHS5OPERA'fOItACTIONIFCONDI'I'IONSbFCOI.UHNIOR3CANHOTBL'ETCIIAHHEI.OPFRABLF.ABOVF.As6.bb.Stm.G<n.Wat<rI.<v<I-low-Ioui.SLLIlntnrl)rive<iI'<impsii.StartTurbineDrivenPump3/stm.g<ii.2/stm.gc<i.2/stm.g<n.i!itl><!rg<~<i.l>otligi!o.3/st.m.g<.n.2/stm.gcii.2/st.m.gcii.bot.hg<!i<.ciLlir.rgr.n12I'ISOIIRCS350nF~+ggc.lossof4KVVolt.ageStartTurbineDrivenPompd.SafetyInjectionStartIlotorDrivenPumps2/busI/bos2/bos(l>otlil>us<!s)(ciLli<!rb<is)(sr.clt.<!mI)TIICS3~0Ilg.u.oe.TripofbothFeed-<<atcrPumpsstarts)IoLorDrive<iPumpsSL>in<11>yHLorl)rive<>~~il.lit>Ill>i2/pompI/piirnpI/piimpbotlipumpsI/pomp2/pompcit.lierpiimpI/piwnp5I<t,r>5'/,p<>wrr'f,=:)50~1'.S5e<4e 'LS>>i,.o.TAIILE3.5-2(Continued)EH(iIHEEREDSAFFTYFEATINEACTUATIOHIHSTBINENTATIONa.ii.4HO.FliHCTIONAI.UHI'I'OTALNO.ofCIIAHNII.S2<3HO.ofHIH.CIIAHHEI.SOl'ERAlll.l'.'I'()'I'RII"',CIIANNI'.I.SI'EINISSII)I.I'.IIYPASS:OHI)I'I'()NS5OPFRATORACTIONIFCONDITIONS.OFCOI.UIINIOR3CANNOTIllNETCIIANHEI.Ol>l:.BARI.Ehl)OVEC()HrhiHNt:.NrISO(.AI'ION4.IC<><<taiumentIsulationPtlQ>a..>.I).>un<>I10(.0I>ISill<t<I<>Wnf'4+3i('>.Safe(.yInjrction(hulohctuat.ion)(S<<..'<<l>l<~3.5-2,ItrmI)4.2Cont.ainmentVentilat.ionIsolationa.IIanua1I>.IlighontainmrntRad'ctivitc.Hua.prayd.Safet,yIn't.ion(SeaTnl>:3.5-2,+Lcm2a)(S<.eahle3.5,ItemI)5ili~0<IShut<0nCoI<IShu<IoM<< Thfff.f'.3.5-2(Conti<I<>r<l)EN(MINII'.HEI)SAI'ETYVl'.h'I'IIH('.ACTUA'I'IONINS'I'f((ffll'.HTA'I'IONLS:u.a.15.ii.bNO.FIINCTIOHAf.UNITsornf.NO.oICl(ANNFI.SNO.ofCIIANNEI,STOTl(ll'IH.Of'EHhBI.EcifnNNELS45Ol'EBATORACTIONII'.I(nfSSIBI.F.IVCONI)IrIONS'OVBYI'ASSCOI.UHNIOH3CON()I'I'IOHSCAHNO'I'EI(ETCIIAHNELOl'EBABI.EAIIOVE5.STEnffLINEISOI,ATIONFfft(4(>a.Ili-IliSteamFlow2lli-IliSFwithSafetln<!ctionwithS.I.she>h(c)oreachloopISl'it.hS~I~In<!achI<loll12"'T=350Vw/K)V'ol><~<IFqt<4$bit.hS.l.1hreelrhIOof>lliSt.camVlow;In<12lliSFa<I<I2of4I.owTwith4I.owTSc>f<tyIIIj<<'OnWIIliSVan<i2IowT~>>gwithS.t.for<eachIoop12'I'=:150I'/JI'kl'V>i><~<Ifg(14,<c.Containment,~gk)prcssnrcf/'.4C<I.(fan<lalFo<>&ofe(c)6.FEEI)WATFHI.IHEISOI.ATIOHI/IoopI/IoopI/loopT<350oVw/Niv's'pen"O',='150Vw/lK)V'sopenFll4t).C.a.Safct.yInject.ioncFL(<Lt)gb.iliSt.earnGenerator4(g)Level(Sc<'.Table3..5>"2,it.cmI)3/Ioop2/Iool>in2/Ioof>ineitherloopbothloops"-:I3>0I'/FHF9soIvaIvrsopc<IHCStcmperat<<rcmayhcabove350'VifHSIV's:lrcclose<1.~"('4"-"RCStcmeraturcmabcabove350FifVWIsnl.valvesar<!closr<l.:'-::Bothtrainsm<<stbccapableoff>rovi<fingaS.I.sig<<altorachloop.f>c~""(c,"ftc)cccc<cc.Akccckcclalcc.acJQc+a<<c~((clcy)4lFun~4o~h.a.)"A~ggggL.~~~.PI,"I8>Li.(j15.ti.CSF45Pj'e)>)<>rl>>C'r8'ctsvve~~(~~"l5;tc..l LG03.3.lCond8QoniI,CSoioitACTIONSTATEMENTSWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinhotshutdownwithallRCcA'sfullyinsertedwithinthenext6hours.LCoa.3.iCond0Q~otE,QOFiCLN2<&.i,.fViththenumberofoperablechazxnelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedtheinoperablechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionwitHinkhourandtherequirementsfortheminimumnumbe"ofchannelsoperablearesatisfied.However,theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforuptoghoursforsurveillancetest'nofotherchanne's.Add.AA0;t.La~0>.II5.c'.AWiththenumberofoperablechannelslessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,beataconditionwhere.operabilityisnotrequ'redaccordingtoColumn6ofTable3.5-1within6hours~CO3.P.I3~CondF/8/HIWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimum.OperableChannelsrequirement,susendalloerationsinvolvinositivereact'vitchangesandaveallRCCA'suyz,nsertewzta.n6hours.WiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequirement,suspendalloperationsinvolvingpositivereactivitychanges.Ifthechannelisnotrestoredtooperablestatuswithin48hoursreactortripbreakerwithinthenexthourypassofanioperablechanneltavoidegenerionofreactotripgnal,oerationmproceuntilisChanelFunctonalTet.AtetimeothisnetCharmFunctlopaG8&Ol5.t..ool5;cinTest.orzratanytimethenumberooperecannes>>lessthantheMinimumOperableChannels,beatacondtionwherechanneloperabilityisnotrequiredaccording<<Column6ofTable3.5-1withinthenext6hours.AddNa+e.5':g,.oo4C72tS;t..JgO3.3~I5.Withnumbersoperecannsoeessanthe/TotalNumber'fChanpels,operationmarocedunt'heVxtWwMChannelFunctionalTestrovidet,exnperablecannexspacedxnerxppeconditionwithinhour.WiththeCawHnumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableQoJPChannelsreeataconztxonwerechanneoperxstyx.snotrequireaccordingtoColumn6ofTable3.5-1withinthenext6IS.i.oem$('()$3)6.WiththenumberofoperablechannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedthejnoperablechannelislacedinthetrippedconditionwithinS.inhour.SouldthenexChannenczonaTestrelretelcO3.3.~ l5.i..5}.COD.47.WiththenumberofoperablechannelslesthantheTotalNumberofg<pChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedteinoperablechannelislacedinthetrippedconditionwithin1hour.Soyldthenext'~CannenctzonaTesrequiretheyppssoanznopprablechannelItoavoithegeneration(ofatrips'al,operationmayproceed9untilpubisChannelFunctionalTestAtthetimekfthisChanneFuncti6nalTest,oxaanmeenumberofoperablechannesasessanzeMinimumOperableChannels,eithergglJHrlS'-i"')beaHotShutdown!withinthenext6hoursandanRCS;ternraturelessthan350Fwithinthefollowing,6hours,,'n88iorCo~ACi/b)eergizetheafectedbuswitadieselgenerator.WiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinHotShutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350oFwithinthefollowing6hours.WiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsreuired,eraionmayproceeduntilthenexcanneOw7Q~dtroveeeznoperaecannezsplacedxnthetrxedpositionwithin+hour.tenexanneunczonah+eesoraanymmeenumerofoperablecanneszsessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,beatHotShutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Fwithinthefollowing6hours.gc~dQa-xELco32.~AX~ndLWiththenumberofoperablechannelsonelessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,restoretheinoperablechanneltooperable'tatuswithin48hoursorbeinHotShutdownwithinanadditional6.hours,andatcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.1~ii.5eI.LolWithenumberofoperablechannelslesshantheTotalNumberofChannels,operationmayproceedprovidedteinoperablechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionwithinghours.ShouldthenextChannelFunctionalTestrequirethebypassofaninoperablechanneltoavoidthegenerationofanactuationsignal,operationmayproceeduntilthisChannelFunctionalTest.Atthetime.ofthisChannelFunctionalTest,orifatanytimethenumberofoperablechannelsislessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,beat.HotShin6hoursandatCouownwxthxnefollowing30hours. CV~WithtNumberinoperayzlS:<<.~numbeofoperablechannelslessthantheTotalfChannels.,operationmayproceedprovidedthelechannelisplacedinthetrippedconditionMom~g~i.cadk)S.ii,p13.Co~dVIs;c.dd'-'O3.3.)14.C.oWC.C~~4<dQwtakE4~i'bin1hShouldthenextChannelFunctionalTLouL~estrequirethebypassofaninoperablechanneltoavoidthegenerationofanactuationsinaloperands.onmayproceeauntxtnzsannelFunctionalTest.AtthetimeofthisChanne<t'nalTestorifatanytametenumoer".,operablechannelsislessthantheMinimumOperableChannelsrequired,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperatureless,than350Fwithin6hours.:Ifoneofthediversereactortripbreakertripfeatures!(undervoltageorshunttrip'attachment).ononebreakeris:'noperable,restoreittooperablestatuswithin48hours.'rdeclarebreakerinoperable.Ifattheendofthe48.ihourperiodonetripfeatureisinoperableitmustbe!'epairedortheplantmustnotbeintheoperatingmode,'.andthereactortripbreakermustbeoen,followinan'~additionalsixhourtimeperiod.(Thereersa1not%ebypassedwhx.eoneoez.versetripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredforperformingmaintenancetorestorethebreakertooperablestatus.WithenumberoperablechannelslessLantheMinimumOperleChannelsrequired>,operationmaycontinuepridedtheontainmentreandva1$.i..6agl5,(.cc.(5.z.~iIS".L.44houldonereactortrir.breakeornanneloftrilogicS',.beinoperabletheplantmustnotbeintheoperatingmouefollowingasixhourtimeperiod,andthebreakermustbe~open. )5.<<<-~$5.Al~+3AccidentMonitorinInstrumentationTOTALREQUIREDNO.OFCHANNELS(7)MILSPERABLE(7)il.PresrizerWaterLevel(1)3~AuxiliaFeedwaterFlowRate(2)(3)SteamGenetorWaterLevel-WideRange(3)2/steamgenerato1/steamgenertor1/steamgenerator1/steamgeneratorReactorCoolanSystemSubcooling.MarginMonitor)6.PORVBlockValvePosionIndicator(1)7.zg.PressurizerSafetyValveositionIndicator(5)ContainmentPressure(8)5.PressurizerPORVPitionIndicator(5)/Valve1/Valve2/Valve1/Valve0/Valve1/Valve9.ContainmentWaterLevel(NarrowngeSumpA)1(6)1(6)10.Containment'Water'evel(WideRang,SumpB)/Core-ExitThermocouplesI4/corequadrant2/corequadran12.ReactorVesselLevelIndicatinSystemNotes(1)Emergencypowerforprsurizerequipment,NUREG-37,itemII.G.l.(2)(3)Auxiliaryfeedwaterystemflowindication,NUREG-07,itemII.E.1.2.COnly2outoftheindications(twosteamgeneratora'liaryfeedwaterflowandonewid-rangestcamgeneratorlevel)arerequirtobeoperable,NURE0737,itenII.E.1.2.(4)Instrumentatonfordetectionofinadequatecorecooling,NUREG"0737itenII.F.2.1.(5)Direct'icationofreliefandsafetyvalveposition,NUREG-0737,itemI.D.3.TwochannelsincludeaprimarydetectorandRTDasthebackudetector.(6)OpationmaycontinuewithlessthantheminimumchannelsoperablepovidedthattherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.1aremet.(7)SeeSpecification3.5.3forrequiredaction.8)Coninmentressuremonitor,NUREG-0737'temII.F.1.4. FUHCTIOHALUNITlco3.Z.Zl.SAFETYINJECTIONANDFl'.EDWA'I'ERISOI.ATIONRA<l.CI.IIanuaiInit.iationFl!II:I'dI>.IlighContainmentI'rcssurcPQ+f,kr.I.nwPressurizerPrcssurePllIIl.e.LCbS.3.2gatis$.0.<I.I.nwSlc)ml,incPr)ss<<rcCONTAINHEHTSl'RAYa.NanualInitiationPQQggb.Iligh-llighContainm<.ntPress<<regg03+g3.CONTAINIIEHTISOI,ATIONTRIPSf:.Tl'OINTNotAppIicable4.0psig1723psig.')14ps)gH<ltApl)1)cable28psig15m,i,.gALOWABI.EVAIUKS",Nothp))1icable4.0,)s)g1715psig~s6)48$I')gHothl)llIir'>bIc32.5~IHI)ps)gFQ83.a.FQ~3.c.ContainmentIsolation1.HanuaI2.I'romSatetyInjectionAutomaticActuationl,ogicb.ContainmentVeilationIsolationHotAppIicabIcNotApplicabl>>IlotApplicableIjothpplical>lcI5'.t)..pI.IIan<<a2.IliContainmentdioactivity3.I'romS')fctyI<<lecti<4.-'I<<l)llSpr')yNothpplic')blvHntc3Not.pp1ical>Iv))<h<)<)<ical)<).Notpl>Ii<';)l>I<~Nh))pIir;Ibl<Not)I>I)a.)bI)~<<thppI)r;)I>Ie

Thill.F.3.5-4(Continur>I)FNGIHEEREDShl'I'.TYFFATUREACTUhTIOHSYSTEMIHSTRIIMENTh'I'IONTRIPSFTPOIH'fSI'UNl:TIONAI.UHIT~~()S~'24.STEAMI.IHI:.ISOLATIONTRIPSETI'OINTAI.I.OWhiII.EVAI.UFSa.11a>>uaIb.IlighContainmentpr<<ssur<<c.IlighSt<<amFlow,Coinci>I>nLwithLowTandSlavgQ84.e.<I.Iligh-ll>ghStcamLinnFlowCoincid<<nt,withSlHothppIica1>1cI8psig>lpror><<spr>I>>lingt>><0.49x10ll>s/hr'>t755psigT>'>4">"I'Vg>Ipro>rrsppn>IIng3.f>x10Ibs/hrat755ps1gIiotApplicable20I>sig>IPmrr<<sl>opdingt.o<0.55x)0lbs/hrat7.'>5I>sigT>>43olvg>l~>rorrrsI>>>>>>ljngLo<3.7x10llis/hrat.755psig5.FEEI)WATI'.RISOI.ATIOH+415;Qa.IlighSteamGeneratorWat<<rLevel)COB3~6.AlfXILIARYFEEI)WATERI'gQ.4.ba.Low-LowSteamGeneratorWaterI.evel<67/ofnarrowrangeinstrum<<nLspancaehstcamgenerator17/.ofnarrowrangeinstrumentspaneachit<<amgcn<<rator68/ofnarrowrangeinstrumenLspan<<achstcamgenerator16'/ofnarrowra>>geInstrumentspaneach>tteamgcnrr;>Lor.S<<cIIoteFllILC.b.FromSafetyInjectionQIIg.gc.I.ossof4kVVoltag<<(Start.TAFP)cl.F>>>Iw:>trrI'>m>pIlrct>k>rs01>'n(slaftMAFI')62'/of4160volLsHot<<2Not.ApplicableN>>tr2Nnthl>pli<<al>le 0 TAIILE3.5-4(Continue<l)EHGIHEERFDSAFETYFEATUREACTUATIONSYSTEIIIHS'I'RUIIEHTATIOHTRIPSETPOIH'I'SFUNCTIONAIUHITEt:03.3Lt7.LOSSOFVOLTAGETRIPSETPOINTALI.OWAIII.EVAI.UES5'g3.).g,ga.480VSaf<guardsBusUn<lcr-voltage(I.ossofVoltagr)sccFigurc2.3-lI<~<i.C'83.3.9.2.b.480VSafrguar<lsIIusUn<I<.'r-v<>ltag<~(DegradedVoltag<~)sc<.Figurv2.3-IENGINEEREIISAFFTYFEATUREA(I'NATIONSYSTFHINTERI.OCKSa.PressurizerI'ressurc,(hlock,unblockSl)<<2000l>slg<<2000psigts.ii.sNoLcI:.AposiveII/errorhabreninLolhesteamgen<ratrIvvcby>><.valuationp<rrmv<Ionincludr<linthectpoinltoaccount(errorswhichmayhcntrod<<cedImcasur<mrntsytcmat'>vo<>t;>inmvnt,cmpcrat.ureof286~I'<I<.tcrmine<llc<>>I>erat>>rc<.frctsonI<.v<.Isystv.asre<iniredl>yIEI!IIrtin79-2I.~~~~~yagHot<'.2<'fhissctpontvalueisI'romicrsct.imvcurveforTr<.lay(406C883)withIapsellingof82voltsandtimei>Iset.LingofI.<.Iay;>t62/voltages3.6sccon<ls.TIallowablcvalu<s,v.+5'/oft,heI.ripseLpoint.l5':L'.PNote3:ThetripeLpointsforcontairntventilat.ionisolionwhilepurgingsIIbccstablisl<<.dtocorrespdLotheIimilsol'CFRPart.20forunrstrict<<larvas.Thsctpointsarcdcl<<rm<<:<IprocedallyinaccordancewithTcchnicalSpccifration3.9.2l>ycal<lalingeffluentmonircount,rateimits,whichlaketoaccountappropriacfactorsfor<Ictrcrcalibration,v<nLiIlionflowrat,andaveragesiteclcoroloAllowableValuesarcthosevaluesassume<Iinaccidentanalysis.C

Table3.5-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinInstrumentationGrossActivityMonitors(Liquid)MinmnmChannels~crableActicra;LiquidRadwaste(R-18)1b.SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19),r2e1.f4Qmsselu44~p43,9~5.03.c.TurbineBuildingFloorDrains(-21)d.HighConductivityWaste(R-22)'.Containment,FanCoolers(RW6)f.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatchangerBLoop(R-20B)PlantVentilationa.WithoutMini-PurgeNoble"GasActivity(R-14)(ProvidingAlarmandIsolationofJGasDecayTanks))ArticulateSampler(R-13)'XodineSampler(R-108orR-14A*~~)b.WithJlini-Purge1+4t'5f',1.24~NobleGasActivity(R-14)ParticulateSampler(R-13)IodineSampler(R-10BorR-14A~**)NobleGasActivity(R-12)orParticulateSampler(R-11)1111++55 83.ShutdmmPurge'.Noble'GasActivity(R-12)b.ParticulateSampler(R-11) Minimum'nannelso~erable'nniec.XodineSampler(R-10AorR-12A***)AirEffectorMonitor(R-15orR-1SA***)WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitor1+.]*05NotrequiredwhenSteamGennotreleased).torBlowdownisbeingTecycled(i.e.NotreedduringCAl'eeTable3.5-6.ApplicablewhenHeatExchangerinservice.RequiredonlydurinshutdownpurgesandrequiredtosamplethecontainmentsrackRequiredto~piecontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation.oldorRefuelingShutdown. TABLE3.5-5.Continued)Action1-IA@temeJat%Ch~r8'.OAction2-Action3Act'nTablNotationIfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequire-ment,effluentreleasesfromthetankmay,continueforupto14days,providedthatpriortd'nitiatingarelease:l.Atleasttwoindependentsamplesofthetank'scontentsareanalyzed,inaccor'dancewithSpecification4.12.1.1.a,and\2.AtleasttwotechnicallyqualifiedmembersoftheFacilityStaffindependentlyverifythereleaseratecalculatioasanddischargelinevalving;Otherwise,suspendreleaseofradioactiveeffluentsviathispathway.WhenSteamGeneratorSlowdownisbeingreleased(notrecycled)andthe,numberofchannel.soperableislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperable'.requirements,'effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovid'edgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(betaorgamma)atalimitofdetectionoQatmost,10-7uCi/gram:1.Atleastonceper8hourswhentheconcentrationofthesecondarycoolantis>0.01uCi/gramdoseequivalentI-131./2.Atleastonceper24hourswhentheconcentrationofthesecondarycoolantis<0.01uCi/gramdose~equivalentI-131./IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthaniequiredbytheMinimumChannelsoperablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedthatatleastonceper24hoursgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(betaorgamma)atalimitofdetectionofatmost10-7uCi/gm-IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumchannelsoperablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenatleastonceper8hoursandthesesamplesareanalyzedforisotopicactivitywithin24hoursorR14Aisoperableandreadingsarereviewedatleastonceer8hours. TABK.E3.S-SContinued)TableNotationActionSAction6IfthenumberofoperablechannelsisssthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperlerequire-ments,effluentreleasesviathisthwaymaycontinueprovidedsamplesarecoznuouslycollectedasrequiredbyTable4.12-2IteEwithauxiliarysamplingequipment./IfthenumberofoperablchannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumhannelgOperableandth'SecondaryActivityis1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesmaycontin'iathispathwayprovidedgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(betaorgamma)atletonceper24hours.Ifthesecondaryactivityisgaterthan1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesvithispathwaymaycontinueforupto31daysproviedgrabsamplesaretakenevery8hoursandanaledwithin24hours.Action7Action8Iftchannelisinoperable,asampleofthegasfrotheinservicegasdecaytankshallbeanalyzedfoxygencontentatleastonceevery4hours.IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperable,oratleastonecontainmentfancoolerisnotoperating,within1hourterminatethepurge. Table3.5-6RadiationAccidentMonitorinInstrumentationInstrumentMinimum+Channe(~)arableActiong1.ContainmentArea(g9andR-30)21\2.NobleGasEffluentMon'torsi.PlantVent(R-aeA)11ii.AMainSteamLine(R-31.11iii.BMainSteamLine(~32)11iv.ContainmentPurge+(R-12A)1*1v.AirEjector(R-SA)11ActionStatementsActien1-Withthenumberofoperablechannellessthanrequiredby+eMinimumChannelsOperablerequirements,eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tookerablestatuswithin7daysoftheevent,orpreparehadsubmitapecialReporttotheCommissionwithinRdaysfollowintheeventoutliningtheactiontaken,the"auseoftheinoperabilityandtheplansandscheduleforestoringthesystemtooperablestatus'nlywhentheshutdownpurgeflangesareremoved. 3.6.33.6.3.1ContainmentIsolationBoundariesWithacontainmentisolationboundaryinoormorecontainmentpenetr~ti.ons,eileforoneQ4sgeJo/C4y~r3.g'a4b.C>>RestoreeachinoperablendarytoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours,orIsolateeaaffectedpenetrationwithin4hoursbyuseoatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalveredintheisolationposition,oneclosedmanualvalve,orablindflange,orBeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.LCO3,3.33-6.4+cL4lc33)64Fu~tl(g.Viii3-6.4.2~CdA~gQf{,,iy3.6.4.3Q.Vii>Ce~h<3.6.5CombustibleGasContralWithnohydrogenmonitorsoperable,restoreatleastonemonitortooerablestatuswithin72hoursorbeznateaotshutownwxxnours~ContainmentMini-Purehenthereactoriscriticalatleasttwoindependentcaxnmentyrogenmonsorsshallbeoperable.OneofthemonitorsmaybethePostAccidentSamplingSystem.Withonlyonehydrogenmonitoroperable,restoreasecondmonitortooerablestatuswithin3sexneaWheneverthecontainmentintegrityisrequired,asiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingatingtimestoaslowasachievable.Themini-eisolationvalveswillremainclosedtothem'xtentpracticablebutmaybeopenforurecontrol,forAZAR,forrespirablequalityconsiderationsforpersonnelentrsurveillanceteststhatmayrequirethevalveobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.A44mzgeJwi4hChap&i3.g

'23.12MovableIn-CoreInstrumentationAlieabiliAppliestotheoperabilityofthemovabledetectorinstru-mentationsystem.~~JObective:'I~Tospecifyfunctionalrequirementsontheuseofthein-coreinstrumentationsystemsfortherecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystem.Secification:3.12.1spaz'3,3,1.4'K2i*Aminimumof2thimblesperquadrantandsufficientmov-ablein-coredetectorsshallbeoperableduringrecalibrationoftheexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystem.3.12.2PowershaQbelimitedto90Ioofratedpowerifthecalibra-3.3,L.4rtionrequirementsforexcoreaxialoff-setdetectionsystem,identifiedinTable4.1-1,arenotmet.sis'1)TheMoveIn-CoreInstrumentationSystemhasfourdri,fourdetectors,and36'lesinthecore.EachdetorcanberoutedrtonineteenormorethimbleConseqy,thefullsystemhasagreatdealmorecapabilitythwoulweededforthecalibrationoftheexcoredetecs.Tocalibretheexcoredetectorchannels,itisonlynesarythattheI3.12-1 MovableIn-CoreSystembeusedtodeterminethegrosspowerdis-."ibutioninthecoreasindicatedbythepowerbalancebetweeetop.dbottomhalvesofthecore.AftertheexcoresystemiscalibratedinitiaQy,recrationisneededonlyinfrequetlytocompensateforchangesinecore,dueforex-ampletofueldepetion,andforchangesinedetectors.Iftherecalibrationinotperformed,emandatedpowerreductionassuressafeoperationoereaorsinceitwillcompensateforanerrorof10'ntheexcore(Switzerland)andQinnassho~~orinstr'umentchannelsisverysli-consideredtoeveryconservative.tectionsystem.'xperienceatBeznauthatdriftduetochangesinthecoreIght.Thus,the10'eductionisC

Reference:

(1)CESAR-Section7.63.12-2 I 4.0SURVEILLANCEREOUIBZNENTS4.1Specifiedintervalsmaybeadjustedplusorminus25%toaccommodatenormaltestschedules.OperationalSafetyReviewAppliestoitemsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-hObjective:Tospecifytheminimumfreauencyandtypeofsurveillancetobeappliedtoplanteeuipmentand,cond"'tions.Speciication:41.1ico3S.lLCo3.E.K403.$.I..>O'3.35'.1.24.1.3LGo3.3-~Cal'bration,testing,andcheckingofanalogcharnelandtstingoflogicchhrwelshallbeperformedasspeciiedinTable4.1-1.En:imentandsamplingtestsshallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.Eachaccidentmonitoringinst~entationchanelshallbedmonstratedoperablebyperformanceofthecharwelcheckandchannelcalibrationoperationsatthefreauenciessholeminTable4.1-3.4.1.4Eachradioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedopeableormingthechannelcheck,soueck,channelfunctionaltest-~annelca3'brationatthefzeauencyshcwninTable4.1-S.~dcltch'$cJay~Chape~~4.1-1 Basis:Checkiluressuchasblowninstrumentfuses,defectiveindators,faultedamplifierswhichresultin"upscale"or"doscale"indicationcanbeeasilyrecognizedbysimpl/observat'onofthefunct'oningofaninstrument'orsystem-Pur&ermorsuchfailuresare,inmanycases,revealedbyalarmorunciatoract,'on,andthistypeofbu'lt-insurvei'lance.Basedonexperienceinoperationofa'ndnucleaplantsytems,whentheacheckssupplementsbothconventionalPplantisinoperation,themin'mumcheckingeauencyofonce.peshiftisdeemedadequateforreacorandsteamsysteminstmentationControlRoomproceduresre"'rea.checkoftheRadiationMonitoringSystem(HHS)panelmetersandstripchartsrecordersforproperreadoutoneeachshif".AdailysurveiancelogisalsomaintainedintheControRoom'll/formanualentryofHIISreadouts,a,disindependentlyreviewedbyHealthysicssupervisioatleast,weekly.Aradiationmonirdownscalefailurew'llresultinaconspicuousviualindicationontheRHSanel(nosprang-reurnedtothe"operate"a-deafte"ingtuinedtoTheefore,togehewithanyo"testo"checkmode.the"esigneaturesoftheRi~!S,procecuresensurethecon-inuedplantsurve'la..ceavailabil'tvcfechaudibleala).Radiationmonitorcontro'itchesareadiationmon'tortoperformitsintendedunct'on.

al"orationCalib-tionsa=eperfox...ed:oensuretheprese..tatonand-acouisi:ionofaccuatinfomation.The..clearilu'linearlevel)channesarecalibrateddailyagainsta}.atbalancestand'ardtoaccountforerrorsinduedbychangingrodggdpatternsandcorephysicsparameters.Othe"channelsaresuo-ectonlytothe"6nft"errorsinducedvi-;;"'ntheinstrumentationitselfand,conseouently,cantoleratelonger"ter-Cvzlsbee:eencalibration.Procsssysteminstrumentationerrors'nducedcydrtcanbeexpctedtoremainivitB.-..acceptabletolerancesacnre.uelingshutdo~.recal'bratonisper:rmedatintervalsoSubsta.tia1carrt'wnshiftswithinachannel(esentallyachannelfalure)~ailerevealedduringroutinecheckingandstingprocedures~Tnusi-"i-u=calibration'lu-1..eareie))channels,frequenciesofonce-per-dayrthenucleaandonceeachrefuelingshutco~mrtherocesssysemchannelsisconsideredacceptable. ~Testineminimumtestingfrequencyforthoseinstrumentchannelsconctedtothesafetysystemisbasedonanaverageunsaffaxlurrateof2.5x10failure/hr.per'channel.This'sbasedonoperangexperienceatconventionalandnuclear-plan.An"unsafefaire"isdefinedasonewhichnegateschanneoperabilityanwhich,duetoitsnature,isrevealednlywhenthechannelisttedorattemptstorespondtoabonafide'1gnal~Forthesecifiep'edonemthtestinterval,theaverageunprotectedtimeis360hohoursincasefafailureoccurrigbetweentestintervals.Thus,theprobabityoffailureofonechannelbetween.testintervalsis3602.5x10ox.9x10.Sincetwochannelsmustfailinorderqnegatthesafetyfunction,theprobabilityofsimultaneousfaxuroftwo-out-ofthreechannelsis'3is'3(.9x10)=2.4x10.Thisreprsentsthe-32fractionoftitimeinwhicheachthre-chnnelsyst:emwouldhaveoneoperableandtwoinoperableannelsndequals2.4x10x8760hoursperyear,or(apprimately)1mute/year.Because'oftheirgreatedegreeofredundancy,e1/3and2/4logicarrasrogyprovidevengreatermeasureofprtectionandaretherebyacctableforthesametestinginterval.Those1temsspecif'formonthlytestingareassociatedwiprocessreotherIreansofverificationprovideaddiional/~~)assncethatthechannelisoperable,therebyregniring1s/hequenttestin

TABLE4.1-1HINIHUHFREQUENCIYSFORCHECKS'AfIBRATIONSANDrESTOFINSTRUHENTCHANNELSIChannelDes~ctitionl.NuclearPowerRange)"2Ag.l)tSZICZ.ZI)~CkgrzDC3lnCkIIsleM~,ICheckI(I.I.IIS3(3.3.1)7.PressurizerPressure3II7(3,3.I)4.41tvVoltage8l.d(3llIIllilL5.3.P)FB(..e,(3.>>.3)I(3.I.I)SI(33.t)N~ADI().3.A2.NuclearIntermediateStel3(3.).l)Range~e(zleqviremn4SkUresleJ~1Chohr3.'3I(O.Z.I)3.NuclearSourceRangeSl43.3.II(3,3.1),~).,~ReactorCoolantSemeQtue-~i~.'A,II(3.'3.l)5.,ReacoroolantFlowQSI(3.3.1)I(7.'3.I)6.PressurizerNaterQs$8(330LevelCalxbrateZ.0.3.1)6(3.3.I)n(3.WI)N~kIb(g.1.1)RIo(33.I)R@IDi>IIJio(3.%.1)CNNcfi.i.l)zbIM.I)R5'(3.3.ATest7(331)cb4)p(%95)8(3.3.1)P7(PNIsblc8+5)I3(cIzoocalP7(3.3.I)1)(2)>>(>.7.I)~>>(3.).1)y(3.3.I)g,(3.3.4)1cp.>.l'33(J.l.c)28,i,tlRemarks<<e<<e<<<<<<<<<<gh~f~<<mineecserv<<)ogle1bitablectio(erm'ssiero12$.I..C.1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT28.i.c.~~ziz.'L.<<atba).ancecalculation*"2)SignaWT;~b'aeaction(perm3.s~s,stop>trs.ps)3)Uexandlowercha0sforaxialoffset**4flighsetpoint<I)94oYratedpower)5)Lowsetpoint(<25%otratedpower)9.RodPositionIndication+le,"Rcpeye~S(lg2)R~t+o~"ftI30Fknc.be~>IQ'XZnIzed,+Fro~gpgg*Notreurein5R3.3.1.z.coze1)with.stepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutof.serviceN.A~PIIdPDSaeeIe<<i18.4orOAnzII:3,I>13.i.refueingsutownbutassoonasŽpossibleatterrIctu'Itcif"tot>owtIr.'I Channelesc0~Cai>~tefest~ecTABLE4.1-1(Continued)ABibP~e>~a~s~se~Ja~Chot'ai3.I10.RodPositionBankCountersFv"tpC3.z.g))i~SteamGeneratorLevel~S.S'-~(..(via')12.ChargingFlow~pgpp13.ResidualHeatRemoval~p~<<<lPumpFlowS(1,2)I(b.0.lSi(w.~H.A.H.A.N.A.<oO.X~)Rg(W.a)R>*(s~~)~RH.A.1)2)NL)I)QCLy.x)N.A.WithrodpositionindicationLogrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitor/isoutofservice24.BoricAcidStorageTankLevelDN.A.Note415.-RefuelingWaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlTankLevel17.ReactorContainmentPressureL,eC.3.3.2.)Fu~<c-Cg.Z,Z.$18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControl20.ContainmentDrainSumpLevelH.A.N.A.N.A.H.A.N.A.t(NCr.v.~)NBA.N.A.Addrs>eJ~f4Chapter3.403.5AreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR17Aaarmsed~i%c4phr3.%f3.58~I21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.H~A.p22'>4><VJPump-ValveInterlockQ8l023.TurbineTrip(~>.ASet=Point24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureN.A.N.A.H.A.N.A.(,))l&(xa.))2Q.i~cPdd~ssU~~y4gQ,+t3+ Channelg(4ITABLE4.1-1.(CONTINUED)20.l,.aRB.i,25.ContainmentPressure2(.SteamGeneratorPressure~"Ia(.ss.z)27.T((rbineFirstStagePressure28.FmcrgencyPlanRadiationInstrumentsCheckIQSt3.3.3'lCalibrateR(5.3.l)TestaRamaakarrowangecontaentprsure-3.0t3psig)eluded$(I(l.tiC29.EnvironmentalMonitors30.LossofVoltage/DegradedLco3.g.gVoltage480VoltSafeguardsBus31.TripofHainFeedwaterPumpsFu~6.4(3.XZ)32.SteamFlow-f'ga+h~w'+.c(3.ka)Ft1~4~'(a.9'.ZiChorgoneetector,ControlRoomArNAICsS(ps.>)(g'g.3ANANANAkQR((,Ia((NN(AI'4(AIa(..NARI((I(a)~2(II((q(.3.>.3>g.(33<)35.AmmonintakeontrolRoom38a.TripBreaker,gLogicChannelTesting38b.TripBreaker.LogicChannelTestingFOBl(~.3.l)NANA36.RadiationDetectors,ControlRoomNAAirIntakegg33337.ReactorVesselLevelIndicationSystem3(3.33)xg.>.S)3(3.3r)(RR5(I(A~(Ri(w.A~RNAf(>.3.3)NANP.(33.i)NA2and3QCPtC~28(L.C TABLE4.1-1(Continued)28.r..o.ChannelWEIILUlFU<l539.ReactorTripBreakers(3.>.l)~ecN.AFgrr)40.ManualTripReactor(Wr)N.A..Fgrr104la.ReactorTripBypassBreakerN.A.(3.v.rbSR3.3.lelg~rrollqhM3,3I~lCgg.'c.g~s)(g.lpl.bReactorTripBypassBreakerN.A.N.A.N~A.g.gr)QnN.A.C).s.r)gIs.~cai~atefestH.A.rr'n28.i.b-Pe~a~sQ;w.c.AuomaticallytriptheundervoltaPiattachment.nctxontest-Includesindependengteingofbothundervoltageandshpfittripattachmentofreactorripbreaks.Eachofthetworactortripbakerswillbetepedonalternatmonths.IncludesindgegndentPestingofbothundervoltagea%/shunttripcirc-uits.Thetest>ghallalsoverifytheoperability.o'fhebypassbreak-er./Usingtest/switchesinereactorprotectiorfrackmanuallyipthereactortripbypassbreakerusingthesdnttripcoil.NOTE1!SR.9.3.l.<LogictrainswilletestedonalternatemonthscorresondintothereactortbreakertestiMonthlylogiesngwxvexfytheoperabtyofallsetsofreactortripogicactuatingcntactsonthattrin(SeeNote3).Refuelingshutdowtestingwilverifytheoperailityofallsetofreactortripctuatingcorrtactsnbothtrain.Intesting,opationofonesetfcontactswillsuitinareactoripbreakertip;theoperatioofallotherseofcontactswilbeverifiedbythuseofindicioncircuitry.OTE:Ttingshallbeperfomedmonthly,lesstherectortripbreersareoporshaerfoedriortotartuifteas.noteeperformedithinthelst30dasNOTE3:NOTE4eThesourerangetrilogicmaybexcludedfromonthlytesngprovideditstestewithin0dayspritostartup.HhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.'hÃpJH) TABLE4-1-2MINIMUMFREUENCIESFOREUIPMENTANDSAMPLINGTESTS1.ReactorccblantChemiatrySamples2~ReactorCoolant,BoronChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentration~r~cru~enc3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleast,everyseconddayexceptwhenbelow250FWeekly3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSamleBoronConcentrationPdlreccalwikLQhop+v8.+<<34.Bort.cTankageoroncontratzon5.ControlRodsRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)6a.FullLengthControlRodHoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionaaindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemHonthlygdhttcM4~4~c~p~-~i6b.FullLengthControlRodMoveeachrodthroughitafulllengthtoverifythat.therodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurEachRefuelingShutdown7~PresaurircrSafetyValvesSetpointEachRefuelingShutdownMainSteamSafetyValves8.10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksS8.>.3.z,q9.ContainmentIsolationTripSetpointFunctioningFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperationsA4WiyC4a~m3.Q 11.ServiceHaerSystem2.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupplyTestFunctioningFunctioningFreauencvEachRefueling'hutdownMonthly$4.~~t&~,~CD'~13.SprayAdditiveTank14.Accumulator15.PrimarySystemLeakaeNaOHConcentBoronConcentrationEvaluateMonthlyBi-Monthl,yDailygJQ~Q5$$~I'4~p~J.4Act.4(ewwChyle~EA<3..16.DieselFuelSupplyFuelInventory17.SpentFuelPitBoronConcentrationDailyMonthlyAJJrcgscJm<+&3.74+.18.SecondaryCoolantGrossActivitySamples19.CircatingHat&CalibratdFlodProtectiyKEipment72hours(2)(3)~~~3.QEachReflingShutdownNotes:~)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemvhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10~oftheallowablelimit.(4)WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable./ TABLE4.1-31InstrumentChannelCheckChannelCalibrationAccidentMonitorinInstrumentationSurveillanceRuirementsChannelTest!1.PressurizWaterLevel(1)2.AuxiliaryFeeterFlowRate(4)seeTable4.1-1seeTable.1-1seeSection4.8.130ReactorCoolantstemSubcoolingMarginnitor(2)4PressurizerPORVPosi'on.Indicator(primarydetetor)(3)5.6.PressurizerPORVPositionIndicator(RTD-backupdetetor)(3)PORVBlockValvePosition.Indicator(1)7ePressurizerSafetyValvePositionIndicator(primarydetector)(3)8.9.PresurizerSafetyValvePositionIndicator(RTD-backupdetector))ContainmentPressureNA10.SteamGeneratorWaterLevelWideRangell.ContainmentWaterLevel(NarrowRange>SumpA)M12.ContainmentWaterel(WideRange<SumpB)13.CoreExitThermouples14.ContainmentHighRangeRadiation(R-29andR0)(5)(1)EmergePowerSupplyRequirementsforPressurizerLevelIndicatorsNUREG0578Item.1.11(2)InsntationforDetectionofInadequate,CoreCooling-NUREG0578I2.1.1(3)D'ctIndicationofpowerOperatedReliefValveandSafetyValvePositio78item2.1.3.a(4)AuxiliaryFeedwaterFlowIndicationtoSteamGeneratorNUREG0578item2-17(5AcceptablecriteriaforcalibrationareprovidedinTableII.F.1-3ofNUREG0748UiL N~.adQh~&SATAI3LC4'-4REACTORCOOLANTSPECIFICACTIVITYSAMPLEANDANALYSISPROGRAMTYPEOPMEASUREMENTANDANALYSISSAMPLE-ANDANALYSISi'FRI";QUENCY1.GrosActivityDeterminationAtleastonce'per72hours(beta'-gamma)(1)MODESWHICHSAMPLEANDALYSXSREQUIREDovecoXdshutdown2.IsotopicAnalysisforDoseEquivalentI-131Concentra-tion1per14daysAbove5Sreactorpower3.RadiochemicalforEDetermination(2)4.IsotopicAhalysisforIodineIncludingI-131,I-133,andI-1351per6months(3)a)Onceper8"hrs,whenevertheI-131uivalentactivity,,xceedsthe-limitof3.~14.1.bb)Onp'samplebetween2and.10Poursfollowingareactor.power.changeexceeding15per-centwithina1-hourperiodAbove5SreactorpowerAsrequiredbySpecificati'on3.1~4'.c*Hot.shutdownorabove(1)Agrossradibactivityalysisshallconsistofthequantitativ~measurementofthetotalradio-activityoftheprimacoolantinunits~Ci/gm.Thetotalprimarycoolantactivityshallbethesumofthedassedbeta-gammaactivityandthetotalofallidentifiedgaseousactivitie15minutesaftereprimarysystemissampled.(2)Aradiochemicgkanalysisshallconsistoft.hequantitativemeasurementoftheactivityforeachradionidewhichisidentified'intheprimarycoolant15minutesaftertheprimarysystemissampledTheactivitiesfor,theindividualisotopesshallbeusedinthedeterminationofH.(3)Samptobetakenafteraminimumof2EFPDand20daysofpoweroperationhaveelapsedsinceretorwaslastsubcriticalfor48hoursorlonger.*xceptatrefuelingshutdown,samplingshallbecontinueduntiltheactivityofthereactorcoolantsstenisresditslimit Pgrts4;c4Iwc%C~rS.oTable4.1-RadioactiveEffluent.MonitorinaSurveillanceRequirementsInstrumentChannelCheekSourceCheckFunctionalChpnnelTest'ab(brationb.c~SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)TurbineBuildingD(7)FloorDrains(R-21)GrossActivityMonitor(Liquia)a.LiquidRadWaste(R-18)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(M(4)(1)R(5)R(5)R(5)d.HighConductivityWaste(R-22)D(7)M(4)Q(1)R(5)e.ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)f.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)h)7)))44)Q(2)/D(7)M(4)Q(2)D(7fM(4)Q(2)R(5)R(5)R(5)PlantVentilationa.NobleGasActivity(R-14)yD(7),(AlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)W(7) H(7)b.ParticulateSampler(R13)c.IodineSampler(R-108andR-14A/)d.FlowRateDeteinationN.A.Adbr~sd~ContainmentPurge+hopper34N.A.N.A.N.A.Q(1)N.A.N.A.R(5)R(5) R(5)R(6)a.NobleGasActivity(R-12)b..ParticulateSampler(R-11)c.IodineSampler(10AandR-12A)d.lowRateDeterminationD(7)H(7)W(7)N.A.PRN.A.N-A.N.A.Q(1)Q(1)N.A.R(5)R(5)R(5)R(6)AEjectorMonitor-15andR-15A)D(7)M(2)R(5)WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitor'lainSteamLines(R-31anaR-32)DN.A.N.A.N.A.Q(3) TABLE4.1-5(Continued)~~TABLENCEATION(1)TheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethataticisol'ationofthispathwayandcontrolroomalarmoccurifanyofthellowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethalarmand/ortripsetpoint.2.Powerfailure.(2)TheChannelFunctionalTestshallalsoderntratethatcontrolrocmala~occursifanyofthefollowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentindicatesmeasuredlelsabovethealaansetpoint.2.Powerfailure.(3)TheChannelCalibrationshalleludetheuseofstandardgassamplescontaininganominal:1.Zerovolumepercentxygen;and2.Threevolumeperntoxygen.(4)Thischeckmayraretheuseofanexternalsourceduetohighbackgroundinthesamplec(5)SourceusedrtheChannelCalibrationshallbetraceabletotheNationalBureauofSndards(NBS)orshallbeobtainedfromsuppliers(e.g.Amersham)thatprov'ourcestraceabletootherofficially~signatedstandardsagencie(6)Flowteformainplantventilationexhaustandcontainmentpurgeexhaustarecaulatedbytheflowcapacityofventilationexhaustfansinserviceandsllbedeterminedatthefrequencyspecified.(7)Appliesonlyduringreleasesviathispathway. 4.4.4.2thetendoncontaining6brokenwires)shallbeinspectect.Theacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorethan4brokenwiresinanyoftheadditional4tendons.Ifthiscriterionisnotsatisfied,allofthetendonsshallbeinspectedandifmorethan5%ofthetotalwiresazebroken,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurized.Pre-StzessConfirmationTesta0b.Lift-offtestsshallbeperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin4.4.4.1aabove,attheintervalsspecifiedin4.4.4.15;Iftheaveragestressinthe14tendonscheckedislessthan144,000psi(60%ofultimatestress),alltendonsshallbecheckedforstressandretensioned,ifnecessary,toastressof144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionalstress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilityofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressappliedduringaccidentconditions.4.4.54.4.5.1ContainmentIsolationValvesEachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeGinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFRso.ssa.4.4.64.4.6.1ContainmentIsolationResonseEachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEby.theperformanceoftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandat,thefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1..4.6.2Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludes.onlythevalvetraveltimeforthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal.AmendmentNo.9,XE,544.4-11 4.4.74.4.7.1TR.3.'K.a.i4.4.7.2zt.~asas:ContainmentHdroenHonitorsDemonstratethattwohydrogenmonitorsareoperableatleast~~byverifyingthattheunitisonorinstandby.Zg~~Atleastonceper@KrZ+performacannelcalibrationusingtwosamplegasescontainingknownconcentrationsofhydrogen.Thecyp)a1isdesignedforanaccidentpressureof60psig-Whiletctorisoperatingitheinternal'mentofthecontainmentwillbe'tapproximateosphericpressure.Themaximumtemperatursteam-airmixtureatthepeakaccidentpressureof1scadtobe286F.4.4-llaAmendmentNo.9

4.8.8Atleast,onceper18monthsduringshutdown:a.b.Veriythateachautomat'cvalveintheflowpathforeachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpactuatestoitscorrectpositionuponreceptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.Verifythateachauxiliaryfeedwaterpump-startsasde'signedautomaticallyuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.4.8e9~~>.3.Z:\F.u.'kQEachinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedoperablebytheperformanceofthe'hannelCheck,ChannelCalibration,andChannelFunctionalTestoperationsforthemodesandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.35;vis4.8.10timeofeachpumpandvalverequiredoperationofeac~tr-'ofauxi'rshallbedemonstratedtobmfa-,lALminutesatleastonces~/BasisThemonthlytestingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingfeedwatertothesteamgeneratorswillverifytheirabilitytomeetminimumrequiredflowrates.Thecapacityofanyoneofthethreeauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsissufficienttomeetdecayheat.removalrequirements.'"Properfunctioningofthesteamturbineadmissionvalveandthe"feedwaterpumpsstartwilldemonstratetheintegrityofthesteamdrivenpump-'"Monthly'testingofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingwaterfrotaacondensatesupplytanktothestemgeneratorswillverifytheir'bilitytomeetminimumrequiredflowrates.Thestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswouldbeusedonlyifallthreeauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswereunavailable.'Oneofthetwostandbypumpswouldbesufficienttomeetdecayheatremoval'equirements.Properfunctioningofthesuctionvalvesfromtheservicewatersystem,,thedischargevalves,andthecrossovervalveswilldemonstratetheiroperability.Theoperabilityofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathsbetweenthepumpsandthesteamgeneratorsisdemonstratedusingwaterfromthetesttank.Testingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsusingtheirprimarysourceofwatersupplywillverifytheoperabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowpath.Verificationofcorrectoperationwillbemadebothfrominstrumentationwithinthemaincontrolroomandbydirectvisualobservationofthepumps. ReactorCoo'ntSystemADDlicabxlzt::Appl~estotheoperatingstatusoftheReactorCoolantSystemwhenfuelisinthereactor.Tospecifq.thoseconditionsoftheReactorCoolantSystemwhichmustbemet,toassuresafereactoroperaon.Spec.ca-cnOpera='na'omoonentsReac-o"Coo'antLoopsa.Whenthereactorpowerisabove130NWT(8.5%),both."eactorcoolantloopsandtheirassociatedsteamgeneratorsandreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation.b.If"heconditionsof3.1.1.1.aarenotmet,thenimmediatepowerreductionshallbeinitiatedunderadmxnxstrativecontrol.IftheshutdownmarginmeetstheonelooprequirementsofFigure3.10-2,thenthepowershallbereducedtolessthan130NWT.IftheoneloopshutdownmarginofFigure3.10-2isnotmet,theplantshallbetakentothehotshutdownconditionandtheoneloopshutdownmarginshallbemet.C.Exceptforspecialtests,whentheRCStemperatureisatorabove350'Fwiththereactorpowerlessthanorequalto130HWT(8.5/),atleastonereactorcoolantloopanditsassociatedste~mgeneratorandreactorcoolantpumpshallbein operation.Theotherloopanditsassociatedsteamgeneratormustbeoperablesothatheatcouldberemovedvianaturalcirculation.However,both"eactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedforuptoIhourprovided(I)nooperationsarepermittedthat~ouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturat'ntemperature.d.Iftheconditionsof3.l.l.l.carenotmet,thenLcoLcmCILrnnnk>>~aIll~)IIe.(i)'oneloopisinoperation,buttheotherloopisnotoperable,restoretheinoperablelooptooperablestatuswithin72hoursortaketheplanttothehotshutdownconditionandreducetheRCStemperaturetolessthan350Fwithinthenext12hours,or(ii)ifneitherloopisinoperationsuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionin,boronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturnacoolantlooptooperation.WhentheRCStemperatureislessthan350'F,atleasttwoofthefollowingcoolantloopsshallbeoperable:(i)reactorcoolantloopAanditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump-(ii)reactorcoolantloopBanditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump. (iii)residualheat:removalloopg.>>(iv)residualheat.removalloopB.>>~coZw.~cLCDgih.1h*11*inoaragraph3.1.1.1.eshallbeinoperationwhileRCStemperatureislessthan350'F.However,bothreactorcoo'artpumpsandresidualheatremcvaljumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided,1)nooperat'onsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentation,and2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Pbelowsaturationtemperature.Zftheconditionsof3.1.1.1.earenotmet,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveaction.toreturntherequired,loopstooperablestatus,andif.notincoldshutdownalready,beincoldshutdownwithin24hours.iftheconditionsof3.1.1.1.farenotmet,thensuspend,alloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrat'onoftheReactorCoolantSystemand.immediatelyinitiatecor'rectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.*Thepreferredoremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperablewhileincoldshutdown. i.Atleastonereactorcoolantpumportheres'l3elIcantpumpshallbein.iedtran'onfromoneReactorIcreas6inthereactorcoot.AtleastonereactoroperationforaOperatingNetoanotherinvolvinninthebonconcentrationofthereactorcont,.captforemergencyboration.hearemovalsystemshallbeinoperatiwhenareduction'adeintheboroncoentrationofLl,~3.W.(nk.AreactorcoolantpumpshallnotbestartedwithoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures<330'Funlessl)thepressurizerwatevolumeisless.than324cubicfeet(38%level)or2)thesecondarywatertemperatureofeachsteangeneratorislessthan50'PaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatues.eratora.Thetemperatushallnotexceed100'F.thetubesheetCa~'x'L4(,x4SafetvValyesDuringcoIdshutdownorrefuel.ingwhenthereactorheisboltedonthevessel,atleastonesurizercodesafetIveshallbeoperablehaliftsettingof2485psiIX.'so.1.1..arenotmet,irmediatelyb.Iftheconditionsoflsuspendailerationsinvolvingpositi~ereactivitvchasandng~paceanoperableRHRloopintooperationintheshutdowncoolingmode. Lcoc.WheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCS,temperatureof350'F,bothpressurizercodesafetyvalvesshallbeoperablewithaliftsettingof2485psig21%.d.IfonepressurizercodesafetyvalveisnotoperablewhilethereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,theneitherrestoretheinoperablevalvetooperablestatuswithin15minutesorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof350'Fwithinan.additional6hours.ReliefValvesa.Bothpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andtheirassociatedblockvalvesshallbeoperablewheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,or<M3.M,4(i)withoneormorePORV(s)inoperable,within1houreitherrestorethePORV(s)tooperablestatusorclosetheassociatedblockvalve(s);otherwise,beinat'leasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours,or(ii)withoneormoreblockvalve(s)inoperable,within1houreitherrestoretheblockvalve(s)tooperablestatusorclosetheblockvalve(s)andremovepowerfromtheblockvalve(s)'

3.1.1.5Jotherwise,beinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbelowanRCStemperatureof350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.Pressurizera-WheneverthereactorisatoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'Fthepressurizershallhaveatleast100kwofheatersoperableandawaterlevelmaintainedbetween12'nd87$oflevelspan.Ifthepressurizerisinoperableduetoheatersorwaterlevel,restorethepressurizertooperablestatuswithin6hrs.orhavethereactorbelowanRCStemperatureof350'FandtheRHRsysteminoperationwithinanadditional6hrs.b.equirementshallnotapplyduringperformanceofRCShydrotesvidedthetestpeted!andthepressurizer-'perable~.1.1.5awithinours.3.1.1.6ReactorCoolantSstemVentsa.Whenthereactorisathotshutdownorcritical,atleastonereactorcoolantsystemventpathconsistingoftwovalvesinseriesshallbeoperableandclosed*ateachofthefollowinglocations:C32.Pressurizersteamspace*ThePORVblockvalveisnotrequiredtobeclosedbutmustbeoperableifthePORViscapableofbeingopened. b.Withoneormoreventsattheabovereactorcoolantsystemventpathlocationsinoperable,startupmaycommenceand/orpoweroperationmaycontinueprovidedatleastoneventpathisoperableandtheinoperableventpathsaremaintainedclosedwithmotivepowerremovedfromthevalveactuatorofallthevalves.intheinoperableventpaths.Iftheequirementsof3.1.1.6aarenotmetwithin30days,beinhotshutdownwithin6hoursandbelow350'Fwithinthefollowing30hours.C.Withalloftheabovereactorcoolantsystemventpathsinoperable;maintaintheinoperableventpathsclosedwithpowerremovedfromthevalveactuatorsofallthevalvesintheinoperablevent.paths,andrestoreatleastoneoftheventpathstooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinhotBasshutdownwithin6hoursandbelow350'Fwithinthefollowing30hours.Theplantisdesignedtewithallreactorcoolaninoperationandmaintainthovetvalueduring operationsandanticipatedtransients.Eeattransferanalesswthatreactorheatequivalentto130MNT(8.5%)caneremoedbynaturalcirculationalone.Thereforeoperaionwithone'opatingreactorcoolantloopwhilebelow130adequatergin.providesThespecificionpermitsanorderlyreductionnpowerifareactorcoolantumpislostduringoperatiobetween130NNTand50/ofratedpowe0(2)Above50%%u'ower,aautomaticreactortripwilloccurifetherpumpislost.Thepower-to-flowratiowilI..bemaintainedequatoorlessonewhichensuresthattheminimumDNBratioincasesatwerflowsincethemaximumenthalpyrisedoesnotincree.Whenthereactorcoolantsysteveragetemperatureisabove350'F,asinglereactorcooltloprovidessuficientheatremovalcapabilityforremvingdecaheat;however,singlefailureconsiderationsquireoneloopbeinoperationandtheotherloopbecapablefremovingheatvia;naturalcirculation.Whenthereactorclantsystemaveragetemperatureisbetween200'Pand350'Fwhileincoldshutdown,asinlereactorcoolantloopoRHRlo'opprovidessufficientheatovalcapabilityforremovindecayheat;butsinglefailure.considera'onsrequirethatatlsttwoloopsbeoperable.Thus,ifthereactocoolantloopsaenot,operable,thisspecification,requirestwoloopstobeoperable.'w'htheboronconcent.rationofthereactorcoolantsystemistoereducdtheprocssmustbeuniform.topreventsuddenreactivity31-7 I/angesinthereactcr.Nixingofthereactorcoolantwillbe./suresenttopreventasuddenincreaseinreactivityifatleast/oneractorcoo1.antpumporoneresidualheatremovalpumpiis!0runningwhilethechangeistakingplace.Theresidualeatremovalpumpwillcirculatetheprimazysystemvolume,inapproximatelone,halfhour.Thepressurizerisafnoconcernbecauseofthelowpressurizervolumeandbecause.thepressurizerboronconcentrationwillbehigherthanthatof.therestafthereactorcoolant.Whenthebozonconcentrationofthereactorcoolantsystemistoeincreased,theprocessmustbeuniformtapreventsuddenrectivityincreasesinthereactordur'ngsubsequent/staztupofthereactorcoo%antpumps./Mixingofthereactorcoolant,willbeillbesui'c'enttamaintainauniformboronconcentzation1fat-leastonereactorcoolant.pumaisrunningwhilethechangeistakinlacgplace."-mergencyboraCionwithoutareactorcoolantpumpinopeationisnotprohibited~.bythisspecificat'rohibitingreac"arcoolantpumpstartswithoutal-rgevoidinr$thepressurize,orwithoutalimitedRCS'temperatuzdifferential/willpreventRCSove~ressurizationdueta'expansionofcoolerRCSwRSwaterasit,entersawarmersteamgenerator.A38/levelinthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromareactorcoolant,pumpstartwithaRCStemperatue'of140'Pandsteamgeneratorsecondarysidetemperatureof340'F,'~orthe/l;maximumtemperaturewhichu"-allyexistspriortocoolzngtheIreactorwiMtheBHRsystem.//i3.1.-8 emperaturerequirementsforthesteamgeneratorcorrespondwithmesuredNDTfortheshellandallowablethermalstressesinthe~tubehect.Eachofthepressurizercodesafetyvalvesisdesignedtorlieve288<000lb..perhr.ofsaturatedsteamatthevalvesetpoint.0Below350Fnd350psiginthereactorcoolantsystemtheresidualheatmova1systerncariremovedecayheatndtherebycontrolsystemteeratureandpressure.Ifnorsidualheatwereremovedbyanyoftmeansavailable<theamountofsteamwhichcouldbegenerated,atafetyvalvereliefpssurewouldbelessthanhalfthevalves'acity.OnevalvItherefore>providesadequatedefenseagainstovrpressurizaion.Thepoweroperatedreliefvals(POVs)operatetorelieveRCSpressurebelowthesettingofthpressurizercodesafety,valves.Thesereliefvalveshaveremoteycratedblockvalvestoprovideapositiveshutoffcapabilitshouldreliefvalvebecomeinoperable.Theelectricalpowerforbththereliefvalvesand!/theblockvalvesiscapa'bleofbeingsuppl'edfromanemergencyrpowersourcetoensuretheabilitytoseal.tispossiblekCSleakagepath.,Therequirementthat100kwofpessurizerheatersandtheirassociatedcontrolsbecapableofbeingsuppliedelectricalpowerfromanemergencybusprovidesassancethattheseheaterscanbeenergizedduringalossofoffsit.powercondititomaintainnaturalcirculationathotshutdowanddurincooldown.3.1-9AmendmentNo.9 eactorCoolantSysternVents~tRectorCoolantSystemVentsareprovidedtoexhaustnoncon-denselegasesand/orsteamfromtheprimarysystemthatouldinhibitnaturalcirculationcorecooling.Theoperabityofatleastoneeactorcoolantsystemventpathfromtheeactorvesselheadandonefromthepressurizersteamspaceensesthecapabilityexistoperformthisfunction.Thevalveredundacyofthereactorcoolantstem.ventpathsservestominimizeeprobabilityofinadertentorirreversibleactuationwhileensurithatasingleilureofaventvalve>powersupplyorcontrolstemdoesntpreventisolationoftheventpath.Thefunction>capabilities<anstingrequirementsofthereactorcoolantsystemventsytsareconsistentwiththerequirementsofItemII.B.1fNUR-0737,"ClarificationofTNIActionPlanRequirements"November180.References(1)FSARSection141.6'(2)FSARSection72.3(3)Letterfrom.D.White<Jr.toOctober17<979D.L.Zieann<USNRC<dated3-1-9AmendmentNo.9 HeatuaandCooldownLimitCurvesforNormalQeration'hereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureandystem.heatupandcooldownrates(withtheexceptionGfthepressurizer)shallbelimitedinaccordancewizhFigures3.1-1.and3.1-2forthefirst21.0efectivefullpoweryears.a.Allowablecombinationsofpressureandtemperatureforspecifictemperaturechangeratesarebelowandtotherightofthelimitlinesshown.Theheatupandcooldownratesshallnotxceed60'F/hrand100'/hr,respectively.Limitlinesorcooldownratesbetweenthosepresentedmaybeobtainedbyinterpolation.b.Figures3.1-1and3.1-2definelimitstoassurereven"'onoEnon-ductilefailureonly.Thelimni"nesshowninFigures3.1-1and3.1-2shallberecalculatedperiodicallyusingmethodsdiscussedintheBasisSection.C~ZfthelimitsonFigures3.1-1and3.1-2areexceeded,restore.thetemperatureand/orpressuretowithinthelimitwithin30minutes;andeither1)within~hours,performanengineeringevaluationtodeterminetheeffectsofcheout-of-limitconditiononthestructuralintegrityoftheReactorCoolantSystemanddeterminethattheReactorCoolantSystemremainsacceptableforcontinuedoperation,or ")within6hoursbeinatleast"HOTSHUTDOWN,andwithinthenext30hoursreduceRCStemperatureandpressuretolessthan200'Fand500psig,respectively.esecondarysideofthesteamgeneratort,bepressurizedabovthetemperatureoftheearngeneratorvesselisbelow70'F.Thepressurizerheatupandcooownratesnotexceedshallnotbeusedifbetweenthepurizerandthesprayfluirand200F/hr,respecvely.Thesprayemperaturedifferenceatertea0<<. BsisFractureTouhnessPropertiesThefracturetoughnesspropertiesofthefrriticmaterialsinthereactorvesselaredete'nedinaccordancewiththeSummer1965SectioIIIoftheASIDEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,eference(1),adASTME185,Reference(2),and,iaccordancewithacidtionalreactorvesselrerements.ThesepropeiesarethenevaluateinaccordancewithAppendixGofthe1972SummerAddendatoSectionIIIoftheASMBoilerandPressureVesselCode-Reference(3)and,thecculationethodsdescribedinReference(4).Theresusarrepor"edinReference(5)forICapsuleT.Theheatupancooldopressure-teperazureconservator.smexistsincurvesareEasedonnominalidications.Sufficientthealgorithmfromwhichthecurveswerederivedtoacountforinstrumentunctainties.TEXTDELETED3.1-11 ///Theemperaturerequirementsforthesteamgeneratorcorrespondswiththemeasured.HDTfrtheshellfthoesteamgenerator.lAtemperaturedifferenceof320'Pbetweenthnepressur-zeran@reactorcoolantsystemmaintainsstresseswithint'.epessurizerspraynozzlebelowdesign'mits.I/(g)(2)ii1(4)(5)II////)ASNEBoiler-andPressure~VesselCodeSectionXXX(Summer1965(/ASTNE185/SurveillanceTestsonStructuralMaterialsinNuclerReactorskASMEoilerandPressureVesselpode,SectionXZZ,Summ1972Addenda(noteCodeClass1514)RelatoryGuide1.99,Rev.2,Nay3888,"Radiation!rittlementofReactorVesselHaterls."IWestinghouseReport,"RochesterGasapdElectricReactorVesselLifeAttainmentP3.an",datedNarch1990.~AmementNo.75,483.1-12 lVIVaLRCS2500SSURX(PSIG)V~IVVI~II!Il~~vI2250LINKINGMhTERIALCIRCUMFERENTIALVELDLIMITING1/4TRTndt210'FLIMITIHQ,3/4TRTndt178'FHYDROLIMITlIVII~I~17501500Iv~XI~I~~!UNhCCEPTABLEOPERhTI0%,1250.'000I60'F/HR750hCCEPTABLROHNhTIOH'29'FlI2500050.'00150200250300RCSTEMPERhTORB(DBGF)350Figue3.1-1:GinnaReactorVesselHeatupfort:hefirst21EPPYusingLhnitationahpplicableRegGuide1.99,'Rev.2~~ RCPRESSURE(PSIG)250022502000I:IIIrLIBBINGMATERIALCIR~FERENTIALVELDLIMITING@1/4TRTndt210'FLIMITIN+3/4TRTndt178'FiisX.~III>ilIII>i~~I'II1750i~g~IIII1~~15001250IUNACCEPTABLEOPERATIONX7505002500'P/HR20'P/HR'0'P/HR60'P/HR100'P/HRACCEPTABLEOPERATION'~0'50;Figure3100150200250300'50400450500RCSTEMPERATURE(DECF)-1-2:GinnaReactorVesselCooldomLimitationsAyplcable.forthefirst21EFPYusingRegGuide1.9%,Revh2.~ 3.1.3MinimumCondit'onsforCriticalit3.1.3.1Q.~/Exceptduringlowpowerphysicstests,thereactorshallnotbemadecriticalatatemperaturebelow500F,andifthemoderatetemperaturecoefficientismorepositivethan-a.5pcm/'F(below70percentofratedthermalpower)b.0pcm/F(atorabove70percentofratedthermal.~1o>>o~power)eshalltheeactorbemadecriti'veandtotheleftoftlimitlinesholemon.1-1ofthesespecifications.3.1.3.3Whenthereactorcoolanttemperatureisbelowtheminimumtempeaturespecif'edabo've,threactorshallbesubcriticalbyanamountecrualtoorgreaterthanthepotent"'aleactivityinsertionduetodepressurizati"n.Bas'reviousstyanalyseshaveassumedthatforDesignBasEven"s(DBE)'nitdromthehotzeropowerorh'chepowerIes'ondition,themoderatoreratuxecoef'nt(NTC)wase'therzeroornegative.(1)(2)-;~Begirnin~Cycle14,thesa=etyanalys'havea~sunedthatamaximumof+5pcm'anexis-upto70%power.Analyses.havownthatthedesigncr'tacanbesatisfiedfoeDB:-'swiththisassumption.Atgre"rthan70%potheMTCmustbezeroornegative. ThlimitationsonMTCarewaivedforlowpowerphysicsteststoperm'.measurementoftheMTCandotherphysicsdesign,paretersofinteest.DuringthesetestsspecialoperatingprecautionsIwillbeten.Therecpxirementhatthereactorisnottobemacriticalaboveandtotheeftofthecriticalitylimitrovidesincreasedassurancethattheoperrelationshipbetwnreactorcoolantpressureandtemperatuewillbemaintaindduringsystemheatupandpressurization.Heaptothisteeraturewillbeaccomplished'byoperatingthereactorcolantps.Ifthespecifiedshutdownmarg'smaintained,thereisnopossibilityofanaccidentalcriticalityasaresultofanincreaseinmoderatortemperatureordecreaseofcoolantpressure.I1IReference(1)FSARTabl'e3.2.1-1//(2)FSARFigure3.2.1-8(3)SafetyEvaluationforR.E.GinnaTransitionto1414timizedFuelAssemblies,WestinghouseElectricCoration,November1983. MaximumCoolantActivitSecifications4cQZ,Q,LLoCam4aMwC.b.cc.o3.Q.>sc~who<AHheneverthereactoriscriticalorthereactorcoolantaveragetemperatureisgreaterthan5004P:Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed84/EpCi/gm,whereEistheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesperdisintegrationinMev.TheI-131equivalentoftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed0.2pCi/gm.Co3'.4.2TheI-3.31equivalentoftheiodineactivityonthe'isecondarysideofasteamgeneratorshallnotexceed0.1pci/gm.ICthelimitof3.1.4.1.aisexceeded,thenbesubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500Fwithin.8hours.31.43aoIftheI-131equivalentactivityinthereactorcoolantexceedsthelimitof3141bbutislessthantheallowablelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,operationmaycontinueforupto168hours.AmendmentNo.$7,58 Thereactormaybetakencriticalorreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturemaybeincreasedabove0a500FwiththeI-131equivalentactivitygreaterthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.baslongastheprovisionsofthisparagrapharemet.b.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimit-of3.1.4.l.bformorethan168hoursduringonecontinuoustimeintervalorexceedsthelimitshownon2'igure3.1.4-1,besubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500Fwithin8hours.gC.02.'E,ibc.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimit.of3.1.4.1.b,thenperformsamplingandanalysisasrequiredbyTable4.1-4,item4a,untiltheactivityisreducedtolessthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.b.3.1.4.4(CaZ.~.<>Ifthelimitof3.1.4.1.cisexceeded,thenbeathotshutdownwithin8hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing32hours.espondsto'/fueldefects.Thetotalactive.tfortheprimarysystemoperationwiththeplantdesiRadiationshieldinandtheradioactivewastedispostems /redesignedforoperationwith1%defects.Thelimitfor(2)secndaryiodineactivityisconservativelyestablishedvzthilrespettothelimitsonprimarysystemiodineactivitandprimary-o-secondaryleakage(Specification3'~5.2}:ZftheIactivitysouldexceedthespecifiedlimitsfollow'nqapowertransientthmajorconcernwouldbewhetheradditionalfue1/defectshaddevlopedbrinqinqthetotalto'above1%defects./Appropriateactiom,tobetakentobringthe,:activitywithin/specificationincludeoneormoreofthefollowing:gradual/decreaseinpowertoaiiowerbasepower/increaseinletdownflowrate,andventingof'hevolumegcontroltankgasestotne.qasdecaytanks.Thespecifiedactivitylimits'prvideprotectiontothepublicagainstthepotentialreleaseofreactorcoolantactivitytotheatmosphere,asdemonstr,edbytheanalysisofasteamgeneratortuberuptureaccident.Pto681psia,whichirelief.valves.I,at.atemperatureelow.500Pcanbecontainedbclosinq.thesteamThe500oPterneratureithespecificationcorrespondsatsaturationbelowthesetpointofthesecondarysideThefore,potentialprimaryosecondaryleakagelineisolationvalves.

References:

(1)PSARTable9.2-5Section11.1.3(2)Fs(3}etterdatedSeptember24,1981fromUSHRC,toJohnE.Maier,RGGE.DennisM.Crutchfied,A "1g~r40lZWOO200I'IFUiiACCCPTP8LFo~r=r'ATtoNU0O5lKPQ~H10050>+7t'TI':CCL'I'~tl'.0LEOPL=FI'iXYION~/OiI.Js2304050607080'000.12@i/gmPERCENTOPHATEDTHEER1ALPOWERFigure3.1.4-'1FZ-131EcuivalehtReactorCoolan"SpecificActivityPercento.HatedThernalPower/Lir:.itVersus 3.1.5RCSLeakace3.1.5.1DetectionSystems3.1.5.1.1WithanRCStemperaturegreaterthan350'F,twoofthefollowzrgleakdetectionsystems,includingonesystemsensitivetoradioactivity,shallbeinoperation.LC.o"=.~.iSa.Theconta~nmentairparticulatemonitorb.Thecontainmentradiogasmonitorc.Thecontainmentatmospherehumiditydetectord.ThecontainmentwaterinventorymonitoringsystemLea3.1.5.1.2Whenasystemsensitivetoradioactivityisnotoperable,operat'onmaycontinueforupto30daysprovidedgrabsampleso=thecontainmentatmosphereareobtainedandanalyzeda-leastonceevery24hours.Otherwisebein3.1.5.2hotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandhavetheRCStemreraturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.RCSLeakaceLimits3.1.5.2.1WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,RCSL<o3.%.iSleakageshallbelimitedto:a.Noleakage.,ifknowntobethroughanRCSpressureboundarysuchasapipe,vesselorvalvebody,b.10gpmfromaknownleakagesourceotherthantheabove,"c.1gpmfromanunidentifiedleakagesource,d..1gpmtubeleakageinonesteamgeneratorwhenaveragedover24hours. 3.1.5.2.2Ifthei>mitsspecifiedaboveareexceededthefollowingactionisrequired.a.withanyRCSpressureboundaryleakage,asdefinedLCDin3.1.5.2.1.a,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursLC.0andatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Finthefollowing6hours.b.Withleakageinexcessof3.1.5.2.1borc,reduceleakageratetowithinlimitswithin4hoursorbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'E'ithinthefollowing6hours(coL.w,i3LQzvc.Withsteamgeneratortubeleakageinexcessof3.1.5.2.ld,beathotshutdownwithin6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.Ifmorethansixmonthshaveelapsedsincethelaststeamgeneratorinspection,performaninspectioninaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification4.2.1sIWaterintorybalances,monitoringequipment,boricacidcrystallinedeposits,andsicalinspectionscandisclosereactorcoolanleaks.Anyleakofioactivefluid,whetherornotlsfromthereactorcoolantsystemssureboundary,beaseriousproblemwithrespecttoin-plantr'oivitycontaminationoritcoulddevelopintoastillreseriouroblemiftheleakageIrateisofsufficxenz,gnitudetoeffect.coolinfthereactorcore;and,thore.fzrstindicationsofsuchleakageouldbeinves'tedassoonaspracticable.hmnnrlrnnn+MnOil3.1-26 Ileakageistothecontainment,itspresencemaybeindicatedbyeormoreo"thefollowingmethods:a.Thecontainmentairparticulatemonitorissen>tivetolowleakrates.Therateofleakagetowichtheinstrument:issensitiveis0.01.3gprrwithintwentvr,inutes,assumingthepresenceocorrosionocuctactivity.b.cThecontainmentradiogasmonitorilesssensitivebutcnbeusedasabackuptoteairparticulatemoni=or.Thesensitivityranyeoftheinstrumentisapproximately2gpmtogeaterthan10gpm.//Thehumicity.detectorprovidesabackuptoa.andb.Thesensitivityrangefthisinstrumentisfrom.approximately2gpio10gpm.d.,Aleakagedetectisystemwhichdeterminesleakagefromwaterandteamsystemswithinthecontainmentcollectsandeasuresmoxsturecondensedfromthecontainmenatmospherebycolingcoilsofthemainrecircultionunits.Thissyternprovidesadepenbleandaccuratemeansodeterminingtotalleaage,includingleaksfromtheoolingcoils.Tissystemcandetectleakagefromproximately1/2gpmto10gpm.l'AmendmentNp.243.1-27 ~/Indicationofleakagef'romtheabovesourcesshouldbecauseforainvestigationandcouldrequireacontainmententryandlimitdinsctionatpowerofthereactorcoolantsystem.Visualinctionproceures,i.e.,lookingforsteam,floorwetnessorboricac'dvarietyofsourcessuchasthecomponentcoolingsystem,the//servicewatersystem,thesecondarysystem;thereactormake-upC/crystalformations,wau1dbeused.Itshouldenotedthatdetectionsystemssensitivetoradioactivity,Iwillhaveaindicationthatissensitivetothecoantactivity/'ndthelocatinoftheleakaswellastheleakrate.Also/sinceleakagediectlyintothecontainmentcouldbefromaIwatersystem,thechemicalandvolumectrolsystem,thesealinjectionsystem,thesamlingsystem,aswellastheprimarycoolantsystem,anincreaseincont,inmentairmoistureorsumpactuationdoesnotnecessarilmeanaprimarysystemleak.Waterinventorybalances,liquidwastactivitiesandtritiumcontentcanallbeusecindeterminingthnatureofaleakinsidethecontainment.Ifleakageistoanothrsystem,itwilbedetectedbytheplantradiationmonitorsd/orwaterinventorcontrol.Whenthesourceoleakagehasbeeninvestated,thesituationcanbeevaluatetodetermineifoperationcbecontinuedsafely.Thievaluationwillbewithinthecrieriaofthisspecificat'on.AmendmentHo.243.1-28 a-Aleakofanymagnitudeinapipe,vessel,valvebodyinthecoolantsystempressurebodarycompromisestheintegrityofthatsystemdigniicantlyalterstheprobabilityofalos-of-clantaccidentoccurring.Thereto,promptshudownofthereactororisolatioftheleakingcompoentisrequiredtoreduceheconsequencesothi'ventorpreventitsccurrence.b..heident'iedleakagerateisrestrictedtolessthan25%othecoolantake-upcapabilitywiththeminimumhargingcpacitypoweredbyemergencypower.thesysThisdesaowforfurtherdegradationofterndurintheevaluationandshutdownprocesswithasuncethatadequatecoolingmake-upcaoailityxists.Ifthemaximumallowablecoolantaivityexised,the10gpmleakratewouldntresultindossinexcessoftheannualavereallowedby10CFPart20.Shouldapostulaedtransientoraccidentccur(suchasarodexsectionorsamlinebreakaccident),theiftheprimarytosecondarylakrateislimitedto0.1gpmpe'rsteamgenerator,thesiteundarydswouldbemaintainedwellwithintheguidellinesdallsteamgeneratortubeswouldmaintaitheirintegrity.Connuousoperabilityoftwosystemsofdiversepr'nciplesis/tdsiredtoassuresomesurveillanceofcoolantleakag'.1-29AmendmentNo.24however, duetotheredundancyofsystemsdesignedtomonitordegradothereactorcoolantpressureboundary,provisionsforhorttedegradationofonesystemorlongtermsubstitutiQfsystemdonotmateriallyalterthedegreeofsafety.

Reference:

(1)FSARSe'on11.2.3,14.2.4endmentNo.24F1-30 3.1.6MaximumReac:orCoolantOxygen,Fluoride,andChlorieConcent"ation3.1..1WithanRCStemperatureabove200'F,theRCSchistryshallbemaintainedwithinthefollowinglimis.Contaminant*ygenChioxde<~uorSteady-State9.100.150.15TnsienttmF001.501.503.1.6;23.1.6.3I3.1.6.4Withan'eormoreofthechestryparametersin.excesso=xsSteadyStateLiit,butwithinitsTrans'ntLima,restoretparametertowithinitsSteacvStateLim'twithi24hoursorbeinatleasthotshu=downwithi6oursandbelowanRCStempera-tureo20G'Fwithiefollowing30hours.Withanyoneorreofhechemistryparametersinexcessc"sansientLi't,beinatleasthotshutdownwit,in6hoursandblowanRCStemperatureof200'Fthinthefollowing3hoursandperformanengreer'gevaluationinaccoancewith3.1.6.5./WithheRCStemperatureatorbelow00'F,theRCSchistryshallbemaintainedwithintfollowingimits.ContaminantNormalLimitTransientLxitm)Oxygen,SaturatedSaturatedLimitsforOxygenno.applicablebelow250'F.~,llmonhmanft)n3-1-31 ChlorideFluoride0.150.151.503.1.6.5Basis:theconcentrationofchlorideorfluor'exceedstheStdyStateLimitformoreth48hours,orexceedstheansient'imitaizrtaiethe'CSpressurelessthan500psigperformanengineeringevaluationoftheef.ectstheouoflimitconditionsonthestructu"integrityoftheRThisevaluationsldeterminethatthe.RCSremainscceptableforcontinuedoperationpriortoincreasingRtemperatureandpressureabove200'Fand500psigrespectivemaintainingtheoxyge...chlorideandfluorideconcentrationsinereactorcoolantbelowthenormallimitsasspecified,thelintegritoftheReacto"CoolantSystemisassuredunderalloperatingcoitions(1).Ifnormallimitsareexceede,measurescanbetakentorrectthecondition,e.g.,repla-mentofionexchangeresin,theditionofhydrazinedurgsubcriticaloperation,oradjustmentfthehydrogenoncentrationinthevolumecontroltank(2)duri'oweoperation.Becauseofthetimedependentnatureofanyaeeeffectsarisingf-omoxygen,kchloride,andfluoridecontration'xcessofthelimits,itisunnecessarytoshudownimmediatelys'etheconditioncanbecorrected.Ts,theperiodof24hoursfcorrectiveactiontorestorencentratxonswithinthelimitshasbnestablisheed.Iftheorrectiveactionhasnotbeeneffectiveattheendoftheboneless+IIe3.132, 'hourperiod,thentheRCSwillbebroughtbelow200'Fandcorectiveactionwillcontinue.Theeffectsofcontaminantsintheeactorcoolantaretemperaturedependent.Itisconsistetherezre,topermitasteadystateconcentrationinexcesflimittexistforalongerperiodoftimeatthecolder5temperatusandstillprovidetheassurancethatthetegrityoftheprimycoolant,systemwil1bemaintained.Iordertorestorethec".tam.nantconcentrationstowithinecificat'onlimits"intheeventsu1'itswereexceeded,mixingftheprimar}coolantwiththereactoroolant.'umpsmayberequir.Thiswillresultinasmallheatuposhort,durationandw'notincreasetheaveragecoolanttempeatureabove250'F

Reference:

//(1)FSAR,Section4.2(2)FSAR,Sect'on9.2/~Amendmentt(o.243.1-33 -2.4WithonlyoneoftherequiredboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCSoperable,restoreatleasttwoboroninjectionflowpathstotheRCStooperablestatuswithin72hours,orwithinthenext6hoursbeinatleasthotshutdownandboratedtoashutdownmarginequivalenttoatleast2.454deltak/katcold,noxenonconditions.Xftherequirementsof3.2.2arenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional7days,thenbeincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.3.2.5lE.OWhenevertheRCStemperatureisgreaterthan200OPandisbeingcooledbytheRHRsystemandtheover-pressureprotec-tionsystemisnotoperable,atleastonechargingpumpshallbedemonstratedinoperableatleastonceper12hoursbyverifyingthatthecontrolswitchisinthepull-stopposi-tion. <Pa~!(4)Refuelingwaterstoragetankviagravity'eedthroughmanualbypassvalve358tothesuctionofthechargingpumps.Availableflovpathsfromthechargingpumpstothereactorcoolantsystemincludethefollowing:(1)ChargingflowpaththroughAOU392AtotheRCSLoopBhotleg.(2)ChargingflovpaththroughAOU294totheRCSLoopBcoldleg.(3)Sealinjectionflovpathtothereactorcoolantpumps.Therateofboricacidinjectionmustbesufficienttooffsetthemaximumadditionofpositivereactivityfromthedecayofxenonafteratripfromfullpower.Thiscanbeaccomplishedthroughtheoperationofonechargingpumpatminimumspeedvithsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Alsothetimerequiredforboricacidinjectionallowsforthelocalaliqnmentofmanualvalvestoprovidethenecessaryflow~~~paths.ThequantityofboricacidspecifiedinTable3.2-1foreachconcentra-tionissufficientatanytimeincorelifetoboratethereactorcoolanttotherequiredcoldshutdovnconcentrationandprovidemakeuptomaintainRCSinventoryduringthecooldown.ThetemperaturelimitsispecifiedonTable3.2-1arerequiredtomaintainsolutionsolubilityattheupperconcentrationineachrange.ThetemperatureslistedonTable3.2-1aretakenfromReference(4}.Anarbitrary5Fisadded,totheReference(4)formargin.HeattracingmaybeusedtomaintainsolutiontemperatureatorabovetheTable3.2-1limits.Ifthesolutiontemperatureofeithertheflovpathortheboratedwatersourceisnotmaintainedatorabovetheminimumtemperaturespecified,theaffectedflowpathmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheappropriateactionsspecifiedin3.2.4folloved.Placxringpumpinpull-stopwheneverthereoolantsystemtemperatureis>200'sbeinbyRHRwithouttheover-pressureprotectionsoperablevxentinadvertentoverpres-surizatheRHRsystemshouldletdownbetermina

References:

(1)(2)UFSARSection9.3.4.2RG&EDesignAnalysisDA-NS-92-133-00"BASTBoronConcentrationReductionTechnicalSpecificationValues"datedDec.14,1992(3)eJr.letterA.Schwencer,NRCReac-torVesselOverpressuaedFebruary24,1977endmentN32-4 AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof3504F,tworesidualheatremovalpumpsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,tworesidualheatremovalheatexchangersareoperable.At-theconditionsrequiredinathrougheabove,allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.Atorabove.anRCStemperatureof350F,A..C.powershalltberemovedfromthefollowingvalveswiththevalvesintheopenposition:safetyinjectioncoldleginjectionvalves878BandD.A.C.powershallberemovedfromsafetyinjectionhotleginjectionvalves878AandCwiththevalvesclosed.D.C.controlpowershallberemovedfromrefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliveryvalves896A,.896Band856withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof3504F,checkvalves853A,853B,867A,867B,878G,and878Jshallbeoperablewithlessthan5.0gpmleakageeach.TheleakagerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.2.1are'tillapplicable.Aboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,A.C.power)shallberemovedfromaccumulatorisolationvalves841and865withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350',A.C.powershallberemovedfromSafetyXnjectionsuctionvalves825AandBwiththevalvesintheopenposition,andfromvalves826A,B,C,Dwiththevalvesintheclosedposition. Iftheconditionsof3.3.1.1aarenotmet,thensatisfytheconditionwithin1hourorbeathotshutdowninthenext.6hoursandatleastcoldshutdownwithinandditioflal,30hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1band3.3.1.1imaybemodifiedtoallowoneaccumulatortobeinoperableorisolatedforuptoonehour.Iftheaccumulatorisnotoperableorisstillisolatedafteronehour,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCSpressureof1600psigwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1cmaybemodifiedtoallowonefsafetyingectionpumptobeinoperableforupto72hours.IfIthepumpzsnotoperableafter72hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCStemperaturelessthan350Fwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.maybemodifiedtoallowcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.Norethanonecomponentmaybeinoperableat,anyone,timeprovidedthatonetrainoftheECCSisoperable.Iftherequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.arenotsatisfiedwithinthetimeperiodspecifiedbelow,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdown.within6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350oFinanadditional6hours.a.Oneresidualheatremovalpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours. b.Oneresidualheatremovalheatexchangermaybeoutofserviceforaperiodofnomorethan72hours.CAnyvalve,interlock,orpipingrequiredforthefunc-tioningofonesafetyinjectiontrainand/oronelowheadsafetyinjectiontrain(RHR)maybeinoperableprovidedrepairsarecompletedwithin72hours(except,asspeci-fiedine.below).d.e.Lcz)I'3.wiPowermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferencedin3.3.1.1g:forthepurposesofvalvetestingprovidednomorethanonesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingis'.Icompletedandpowerremovedwithin12hours.Thosecheckvalvesspecifiedin3.3.1.1hmaybeinopera-ble(greaterthan5.0gpmleakage)providedtheinline'MOVsarede-energizedclosedandrepairsarecompletedwithin12hours.ed 3~3~l~7Q.c5,1%)Q.x%%3.3.1.7.1Exceptduringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetestingorwhenthevesselheadisremoved,orthesteamgeneratorprimarysystemmanwayisopen,nomorethanonesafetyinjectionpumpshallbeoperablewhenevertheoverpressurizationprotectionisprovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.(3-15.1.b).Wheneveronlyonesafetyinjectionpumpmaybeoperableby3.3.1.7,atleasttwoofthethreesafetyinjectionpumpsshallbeverifiedinoperable,asdefinedintheBasisforthissection,aminimumofoncepertwelvehours.3.3.'.8Exceptduringdieselgeneratorloadandsafeguardsequencetest'gorwhenthevesselheadisremoved,orthesteamgeneratorprimarysystemmanwayisopen,Q~4~4~4l~SR.2.u.sZ..2\R,xi'i'iallthreesafetyinjectionpumpsshallbeinoperableandsafetyinjectiondischargepathstotheRCS.isolatedwheneveroverpressureprotectionisprovidedbythepressurizerPORVs(3.15.1.a).Wheneversafetyinjectionpumpsarerequired'obeinoperableby3.3.1.8,thesafetyinjectionpumpsshall'beverifiedinoperable,asdefinedintheBasisofthissection,aminimumofoncepertwelvehours.SimilarlysafetyinjectiondischargepathstotheRCSshallbeverifiedtoheisolatedaminimumofoncepertwelvehours.~1 Therequirementsof3.3.1.&maybemodifiedtoallowoperationofoneSIpumpprovidedtheassociatedpathstotheRCS.areisolatedbyA.C.powerbeingremovedtothedischargeMOVsintheclosedposition,orthemanualisolationvalvesclosed.Isolationofthe.dichargepathsshallbeverifiedatleastonceper12hours. 3.3.5ControlRoomEmerencvAirTreatmentSstem3.3.5-1TheRCStemperatureshallnotbeatorabove350opunlessthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem3-3.5.2isoperable.Therecuirementsof3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallowthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemtobeinoperableforaperiodof48hours.Ifthesystemisnotmaceoperablewithinthose48hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotsnutdownwithinthenext6hoursanatheRCStemperaturelessthan350'Pinanaddi"ona'2hours. eactorcoolanttonearoperatingtemperaturebyrunningtheReactoCoantPumps.Thereactoristhenmadecriticalbywithdrawin(1)contrarodsand/ordilutingboroninthecoolant.Withthisodeofstartutheenergystoredinthereactorcoolantduringeapproachtocriticaliissubstantiallyequaltothatduringpowerperationandereoreallenineeredsafeguardsandauxiliarycoingsystems,withtheoneexception~onefancooler,asdiscussedelow,arerequiredtobefullyoperable.uringlowtemperature,ysicstests,thereisanegligibleamountofstredenergyintheeactorcoolant,thereforeanaccidentcomparableinsveritytothDesignBasisAccidentisnotpossible,andtheengineeredseguassystemsarenotrequired.Theoperablestatusofthevarioussystemsandcomponentsistobedemonstratedbyperiodictestsntheofthesetestswillbeperforedwhilepowerrange.Efacompentisfoundpecifications.Alargefraction5threactorisoperatingintheI!tobeinoperable,itwillbepos-'sableinmostcasesteffectrepairsandrestoethesystemofulloperabilitywithinrelativelyshorttime.Forainglecomponenttobeinoperableesnotnegatetheabilityofthesystetoperformitsfunction,bitreducestheredundancyprovidedintheeactordesignandtherylimitstheabilitytotolerateaddtionalequipmetfailures.Toprvidemaximumassurancethattheredundantcomponent)will'0 operateifrequiredtodoso,theredundantcomponent(s)aretobetesdpriortoinitiatingrepairoftheinoperablecomponent.Ifdevelopshat(a)theinoperablecomponentisnotrepairedthinthespecifiedallobletimeperiodor(b)asecondcompoentinthesameorrelatedsystemifoundtobeinoperable,theeactorwillinitiallybeputinthehotshutdownconditiontopro'forreductionofthedecayheatfromthefuel,and.nseqntreductionofcoolingrequire-mentsafterapostulatedloss-ocooantaccident.Thiswillalsoper-'mitimprovedaccessforpairsinsomeases.Afteralimitedtimeinhotshutdown,iftmalfunction(s)arenotcrected,thereactorwillbeplacedthecoldshutdowncondition,utilizinnor>sh'downandcooldawnprocedures.Inthecoldshutdowncondition,ereisnoposvilityofanaccidentthatwouldreleasefissionproductsoramagethefuelelements.Theplantoperatingprocedureswillrequireimmediateactiontoeffectrepairsof'aninoperablecomponent,andthereforeinmostcasesrepairswillbecompletedinlessthanthespecifiedallowablerepairtimes.Furthermore,thespecifiedrepairtimesdonotapplytoregularlyscheduledmaintenanceoftheengineeredsafeguardssystems,whichEisnormallytobeperformedduringrefuelingshutdowns.Thelimitingtimestorepairarebasedon:(1)Assuringwithhighreliabilitythatthesafeguardsystemwillfunctionproperlyifrequiredtodoso.3-3-10 OverressureProtectionSstemAnlicabilittcDZ.Q.'L2ApplieswheneverthetemperatureofoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsis<330'P,ortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemisxnoperation.Topreventoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantsystemandtheresidualheatremovalsystem.Secification3.'5.l.ExceptduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestsinwhichRCSpressureistoberaisedabovethePORVsetpoint,atleastoneofthefollowingover-pressureprotect'onsystemsshallbeoperable:a.Twopressurizerpoweroperatedre3.iefvalves(PORUs)withaliftsettingof<424psig,orb.Areactorcoolantsystemventof>1.1squareinches.3.3.>.1.1>5'.as3.15.1.2WithonePORUinoperable,eitherrestorethe.inoperablePORVtooperablestatuswithin7daysordepressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)withinthenext8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.WithbothPORVsinoperable,depressurizeand.venttheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)within8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORUshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.3'5.1.3UseoureprotectionsystemtanRCSorRHRSpressuretrad040ereportedinAnRCSventopeningaterthan1.1squareasuresthat:)theRCSwillbeprotectedtransientswhichcouldexceedthelimitsoGto1t50whenoneormoreoftheegsare<330P'.Thisrexacitywill rr~~~~'eorethat-no:.-oyerpressurizationofthe.RHRsystemcouldoccu,."'Th'ent.opening.protectstheRCSandRHRSfromovexpressuriz&ionwhenetransientislimitedtoeither1)thestart,ofaniluteRCPwiththsecondarywatertemperatureofthesteamgenerate<50'FabovetheCScoldlegtemperatureor2)thestartoasafetyinjectionppanditsinject'onintoawatersolidTheoperabilityftwopressurizerPORUsensuresattheRCSwillbeprote"tedfromressuretransientswhichcoulexceedth'elim=ts-~fAppendixGto1CFRPart50whenoneorreoftheRCScoldlegsare<330F'~'.hisreliefcapacitywialsoensurethat,nooverpressurizationofeRHRsystemcouldccur.EitherPORVhasadequaterelievingcaplitytoprotetheRCSandBHRSfromoverpressurizationwhenthtransient'slimitedtoeither1)thestartofanidleRCPwiththseconwatertemperatureofthesteamgenerator<50'FaboveeRCScoldlegtemperatureor2)charging/letdownmismatchwithreechargingpumpsinoperationRe"rences:(2)L.D.Whit,Jr.,lettertoASchwencer,NRC,July29,977.1SERorSEPTopicsU-10.B,U-11,9iX-3,Shdown,"datedSeptember29,3.981.datedIinSafet(3)estinghouseReport,,"R.E.GinnaLowemperatureOverpressureProtectionSystem(LTOPS)SetpntPhaseXXEvaluationFinalReport,"datedFebru1991submittedbylettertoAllenR.Johnson,NRC,atedFebruary15,'991. SA.2.N.i.~8.t.4TABLE41-1MINIMUMFREQUENCIESFORCHECKS,CALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUMENTCHANNELS~JChannelDes~ctition1.NuclearPowerRangeCheckSM*(3)2.NuclearInteimediateS(l)Range4.ReactorCoolantTemperature3.NuclearSourceRangeS(l)CalxbrateD(1)Q*(3)NBA.NA~TestB/W(2)(4)P(2)(5)P(2)p(z)M(1)(2)+e3IRemarks1)fleatbalancecalculatinn**2)SignaltoWT;bistableaction(permissive<rodstop>trips)3)Upperandlowerchambersforaxialoffset**4)Highsetpoint(<109%,ofratedpower)~5)Lowsetpoint(<25%otratedpower)e1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel;bistableaction(permissive>rodstop<trip)1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Bistableaction(alarm>trip)1)Overtemperature-DeltaT2)Overpower-DeltaT5.ReactorCoolantFlowS6.PressurizerHaterSLevelel7.-PressurizerPressureSM,8.4KvVoltageFrequency'.RodPositionIndicationNBAS(lg2)N~A~ReactorProtectioncircuitsonly1)Hithstepcounters2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitor:isoutofserviceBymeansofthemovablein-coredetectorsystem.Notrequiredduringhotscoldsorrefuelingshutdownbutassoonaspossibleatterreturntopower. ChannelesctoTABLE4.1-1(Continued}~C~ec~Ca~~te~et~e~a~s10.RodPositionBankCounters11.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlowS(1,2)N.A.N.A.H.A.N.A.N.ADN.A.1)Withrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservice14.BoricAcidStorageTank.LevelDH.A.Note415.RefuelingWaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlTankLevelH.A.N.A.H.A.N.A.17.ReactorContainmentPressure18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControlDH.A.RM(1)N.A.1)IsolationValvesignalIAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR17<<P3.w.is;320.containmentDrainSumpLevel21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.RN.A.N.A.N.A.3lh22~23ePump-ValveInterlockTurbineTripSet-Point'.A.H.A.N.A.M(1)1)BlockTrip24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureNeA.AmendmentNo.Pg74.16 )gQgll~)TABLE4.1-2MINIMUM."'REUENCIESFOREUIPMENTANDSAMLINGTESTSgFelle)1.ReacolantChemistrySam2.ReactorCoolaBoronChlorideandFluorideBoronConcentration~Fre)~enc3times/weatleastev).rddaytimes/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexceptwhenbelo~250oF3.RefuelingWaterStorageTankWaterSampleBoronConcentrationWeekly4.BoricAcidStarageBaronConcentrationTankTwice/Week"'.ControlRods6a.FullLengthControlRad6b.FullLengthControlRodRoddroptimesafallfulllengthrodsHoveanyradnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstepsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughitsfulllengthtoverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdown3Q,~i.c~~~3,$,)o.LPressurizerSafetyValvesSetpointEachRefuelingShutdown8*MainSteamSafetyValves9.ContainmentIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksSetpointFunctioningFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperations ~S.012.13.ServiceWaterSystemFireProtectionPumpandPowerSupplySprayAdditiveTank~estFunctioningFunctioningNaOHConcent,Frect~encEachRefuelingShutdownMonthlyMonthly~g~g,l3IL~.;s.fC~C4n,oKa~A18.SecondaryCoolant.Samples19.CirculatingWaterFloodProtectionEquipment14.AccumulatorPrimarySystemLeakage16.DieselFuelSupply17.SpentFuelPitBoronConcentrationEvaluateFuelInventoryBoronConcentrationGrossActivityCalibrateBi<<MonthlDailyDailyMonthly72hours(2)(3)EachRefuelingShutdownNotes:(3)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.Anisotopicanalysisfor1-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheall'owablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10<oftheallowablelimit.WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable. iyITABLE4.1-4REACTORCOOLANTSPECIFICACTIVITYSAMPLEANDANALYSISPROGRAMTYPEOPHEASUREHENTANDANALYSISM,3A.ii..i>av'.~1;Gros:cvityDetermination(beta-gamma)(1)<>'i~<i.Z.iv42..IsotoAnalysisforDoseEquivalentI-131Concentra-tionR'.S.ii.3ZS,iv.C.3.RadiocmcalforEDetermination(2)3'I.iso~44.IsotopicAhalysisforIodineIncludingI-131,I-133,andI-135LC.QQ,q,iiSAMPLEANDANALYSISPRl',QUENCYAtleastonceper72hours1per14days1per6months(3)a)Onceper8'hours,whenevertheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3'.4'.bb)Onesamplebetween2and.10hoursfollowingareactor.powerchangeexceeding15per-centwithina1-hourperiodMODESINWHICHSAMPLEANDANALYSISREQUIREDAbovecoldshutdownAbove5%reactorpowerAbove5%reactorpowerAsrequiredbySpecificati'on3<<1.4'.c*Hotshutdownorabove(1)Agrossradibactivityanalysisshallconsistofthequantitativemeasurementofthetotalradio-activityoftheprimarycoolantinunits+Ci/gm.Thetotalprimarycoolantactivityshallbethesumqfthedegassedbeta-gammaactivityandthetotalofallidentifiedgaseousactivitie<'5minutesaftertheprimarysystemissampled.(2)Aradiochemicalanalysisshallconsistof/hequantitativemeasurementoftheactivityforeachradionuclidewhichisidentifiedintheprimarycoolant15minutesaftertheprimarysystemisaamplerl.Theactivitiesfortheindividualisotopesshallbeusedinthedetermination(3)Sample,.tobetakenafteraminimumof2EFPDand3daysofpoweroperationhaveelapsedsincereactor'waslastsubcriticalfor48hoursorlonger.Exceptatrefuelingshutdown,samplingshallbecontinueduntiltheactivityofthereactorcoolantsystemisrestoredtowithinitslimits. Table4.1-5InstrumentRadioactiveEffluentMonitorinaSurveillanceRequirementssSourceFunctionalChannelCheckTestCalibrationc.TurbineBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)D(7)GrossActivityMonitor(Liquid)a.LiquidRadWaste(R-3.8)D(7)b.SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)R(5)R(5)R(5)d.HighConductivityWaste(R"22)e.'ontainmentFanCoolers(R-16)f.SpentFuelPoolHeat,ExchangerALoop(R-20A)g.SpentFuelPo'olHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)PlantVentilationD(7)D(7)D(7)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)M(4)Q(2)R(5)1R(5)R(5)R(5)a.NobleGasActivity(R-14)(MarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)D(7)Q(1)R(5)b.ParticulateSampler(R-13)c.IodineSampler(R-10BandR-14A)W(7)N.A.N.A.W(7)N.A.MR(5)R(5)3~Sg.3.q.~5l.~.qSR.3.q.g5.~'.g,.yI,d.FlowRateDeterminationContainmentPuea.NobleGasActivity(R-12)R5t.v~b.iculateSampler(R-11}c.IodineSampler(R-10AandR-12A)d.PlowRateDeterminationAirEjectorMonitor(R-15andR-15A)WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorNA.D(7)W(7) W(7}N.A. D(7)DN.A.N.A.PRQ(1)NA.Q(1)N.A.N.A.N.A-M(2)IN.A.N.AR(6)R(5)R(5)R(5)R(6)R(5)Q(3)MainSteamLines(R-31andR-32)MN.A. ~~~~~I~~~II0~0~~~0~III~~I~I~~~~~~~0~~~~I~~0~I~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~~III~~II~~~~~~~~~~~I~~II~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II 4.3Sg.AlicabilitS'.Appliestosurveillanceofthecomponents.l.MeZ+Q~La3~9le~3.9,v.2.,3,<1.9,z3~~l.lI,QreactorcoolantsystemanditsToensureoperabilityofthereactorcoolantsystemanditscomponents.Secifications:ReactorVesselMaterialSurveillanceTesting4.3.1.1Thereactor'wremovedandexammaterialsurveilletermxclemensshallbeesintheirmaterial4.3.24.3.2.13.u.9.1ertiesasreuiredbyAppendixHto10CFRParPressurizerThepressurizerwaterlevelshallbeverifiedtobewithinitslimitsatleastonceper12hoursduringpoweroperationandhotshutdown. 4.3.3CheckValves4.3.3.1Leakagetestinaofcheckvalves853A,8538,867A,8678,878Gand878Jshallbeaccomplishedpriortocriticalitv,exceotorlowpowerphysicstes',ng,following(1)refueling,and(3)maintenance,repairorreplacementworkonthevalves.Leakagemaybemeasuredindirect~vfromtheperformanceofpressureindicators,systemvolumemeasurementsorbydirect.measurement.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallbegreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4fotallowableleakagerates.4.3.3.2Checkvalves8786and878Jwillbetestedforleakagefollowingeachsafetyinjectionflowtest.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallheoreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4forallowableleaka'gerates.<.3.3.3Motor-operatedvalves8?8Aand878Candcheckvalves87?A,8778,878F,and878Hshallbetestedatthefirstrefuelingoutaaefollowingth~da~eofthisorder*toindividuallyassureintegrityofatleasttwoo'thethreepressureboundariesineachhotleghigh-headsafetyinjectionpath.Testingshallalsobeperformedafteranyopeningofeithermotor-operatedvalveandataminimum,onceevery40months.Opening,oftheno+or-operatedvalves,andtesting,aretobeperformedatatestpressurelessthanthatofthe lowest.designpressureofanyportion'fthehigh-headsafetyinjectionsystemwhichmaybepressurizedduringthetest.Minimumtestdifferentialpressureshallbegreaterthan150psid.See4.3.3.4forallowableleakagerates.Allowablecheckvalveleakageratesareasfollows:(a)Leakagerateslessthanorequalto1.0gpmareconsideredacceptable.(b)Leakageratesgreaterthan1.0gpmbutlessthanorequalto5.0gpmareconsideredacceptable.ifthelatestmeasuredratehasnotexceededtheratedeterminedbytheprevioustestbyanamountthatreducesthemarginbetweenmeasuredleakagerateandthemaximumpermissiblerateof5.0gpmby50%orgreater.(c)Leakageratesgreaterthan1.0gpmbutlessthanorequalto5.0gpmareconsideredunacceptableifthelatestmeasuredrateexceededtheratedeterminedbytheprevioustestbyanamountthatreducesthemarginbetweenmeasuredleakagerateandthemaximumpermissiblerateof5.0gpmby50%orgreater.V(d)Leakageratesgreaterthan5.0gpmareconsideredunacceptable. 4.3.44.3.4.24.3.54.3.5.1ZR3.H.i(.i4.3.6.24.3.S.3ReliefValvesEachPORYshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonce.per18monthsbyperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATION.ExceptduringcoldaHdrefuelingshutdowneachblockvalveshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper92daysbyoperatingthevalvethroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelunlessthevalveisalreadyclosed.ReactorCoolantLoopsWhenreactorpowerisabove130MWt(8.5%),thereactorcoolantpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.Whentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisabove350'Fbutthereactorisnotcritical,whenthereactorisathotshutdown,orwhenthereactoriscriticalbutreactor~powerislessthanoreaualto130MWt(8.5%):a)theoperatingreactorcoolantpump(s)shallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours,andb)ifareactorcoolantpumpisnotoperating,butmustbeoperable,itshallbedemonstratedoperableonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.Whenthereactorisatcoldshutdownorwhentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisbetween200'Fand350'P,andfuelisinthereactor,thefollowingshallbeperformedtodemonstratealoopisoperable.Testsformedifaloopis.notreliedupontoquirementsofSpecification3.1.1.1.e.neednotbeper-satisfythere-

a).--.todemonstrateareactorcoolantloopoperablertheasreactorcoolantpump(s)<ifnotinoperation<shallcg~.M.(..5bedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.demonstratearesidualheatremovalpumpi30.>ioperable<theillanceseintheInservicePumalveTestamprepared4'.5.4Nhenthereactorisatcoldshutdownorwhentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisbetween200Fand350Fandfuel005fi3.H.~.IK<2,Z.s.a.>isinthereactor<atleastonecoolantloopshallbeverified'tobeinoperationandcirculatingreactor4.3.5.5coolantatleastonceper12hours.Inadditiontotheaboverequirements<inordertocg.a.~<.).E5.('3,9.~~2,SRZ.~.7.2.demonstratethatareactorcoolantloopisoperable~thesteamgeneratorwaterlevelshallbegreaterthanorequalto16$ofthenarrowrangeinstrumentspan5-6Eachreactorcoolantsystemventpathshallbedemondoperableatleastonceper18monty:Verifyingallmasolationvesineachventpatharelockedinopenposx2VerifyiowthroughthereactorcoolantvenBasis.systemventpaths,usingeitherliquidorgas-Thismaterialsurveilrogrammonitorschnthefracturetoughnessproperferrxaterialsinthereactorvessone,regionofthereactorresultingfromereto neuirradiationandthethermal'nvironment.Thetest4obtainedfromisprogramwillbeusedtodetermineeconditionsunderwhichereactorvesselceoperatedwithadequatemarginsofsafetyagarlife.cturethroughoutitsserviceIThesurveillancercerementsonpressurizerequintwillassureproperpermanceofthepressurizerfunctionandgiveea'n'tionofmalfunctions. 4.16OveroressureProtectionSstemAolicabilit:Appliestothereactorcoolantsystem,ovezpressureprotectionsystem.Ob'ective:Toverifythat,theoverpressureprotectionsystemwillfunctionproperlyifneeded.Secification4.16'.23g.'2.w.~z.593.i'iSR~~~~Eacha~cPORVshallbedemonstratedoperableby:Performanceof'channelfunctionaltestonthePORVactuationchannel,butexcludingvalveopera-tion,within.31dayspriortoenteringaconditioninwhichthePORVisrequiredoperableandatleastonceper31daysthereafterwhenthePORVisrequiredoperable.PerformanceofachannelcalibrationonthePORVactuationchannelatleastonceper18months.VerifyingthePORVisolationvalveisopenatleastonceper72hourswhentheoverpressureprotectionsystemisrequiredtobeoperable.4.16.2TheRCSvent(s)shallbeverifiedtobeopenatleastonceper12hourswhenthevent(s)isbeingusedforoverpressureprotectionexceptwhentheventpathwayisprovided,withavalvewhichislocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintheopenposition.Thenverifythesevalvesopenatleastonceper31days. 3.EmerencCoreCoolinSstemAuxiliarCoolinSstemsAirRecirculationFanCoolersContainmentSraandCharcoalObe'veTodefinenormalshutdownsituat'(2)toremoveheatfromcontain-HEPAFiltersoseconditionsfororationthatareneces-sary:(1)toremoveecayhearomthecoreinemergencyormentinnormalcratingandergencysituations,.(3)to3.3.1lremoveaiorneiodinefromthecainmentatmospherefollingapostulatedDesignBasisAcciden>and(4)tominimizecontainmentleakagetotheenvironmentsubsenttoaDesignBasisAccident.SecificationSafetInectionandResidualHeatRemovalSstems3.3.1.1ThereactorshallnotbetakenabovethemodeindicatedunlessCQ3.$.42.5.l2,S~'l~zthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Abovecoldshutdown,therefuelingwaterstoragetankcontainsnotlessthan300,000gallonsofwater,withaCPt.egg~i~boronconcentration'Cco3.S-(~c(3,vix5.vagLC.n3.S.Z.Ol3.I.Itb.ciAboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,eachaccumulatorispressurizedtoatleast700psigwithanindicatedlevelofatleast.50<andamaximumof824with~@~&49-i~~~~Raboronconcentra'tionAtoraboveareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureof350F,threesafetyinjectionpumps,areoperable. LCO~.T.2.d.e.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350F,tworesidualheatremovalpumpsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,tworesidualC~3.5.2.f.heatremovalheatexchangersareoperable.Attheconditionsrequiredinathrougheabove,allLco--.s-4icot~3.5N4~S.S.ig,S,i.Sgh.valves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'F,A.C.powershallberemovedfromthefollowingvalveswiththevalvesintheopenposition:safetyinjectioncoldleginjectionvalvesS78BandD.A.C.power'hallberemovedfrom*safetyinjectionhotleginjectionvalves878AandCwiththevalvesclosed.,D.C.controlpowershallberemovedfromrefuelingwaterstoragetankdeliveryvalves896A,896BandS56withthevalvesopen.AtoraboveanRCStemperatureof350'p,checkvalves4853A,853B,867A,867B,878G,and8788shallbeoperablewithlessthan5.0gpmleakageeach.Theleakage!jrequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.1.5.2.1are!stillapplicable.Aboveareactorcoolantsystempressureof1600psig,exceptduringperformanceofRCShydrotest,A.C.power)shallberemovedfromaccumulatorisolationvalves841and865withthevalvesopen.Atorabove.anRCStemperatureof350',A.C.powershallberemovedfromSafetyInjectionsuctionvalves825AandBwiththevalvesintheopenposition,andfromvalves826A,B,C,Dwiththevalvesintheclosedposition. 3~3-12cco3.s'.9l3~j,i3.3.1.3'.s.L3.3.1.43.3.1.5Lco3,5.zIftheconditionsof3.3.1.1aarenotmet,thensatisfytheponditionwithin1hourorbeathotshutdowninthenext6hoursandatleastcoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1band3.3.1.1imaybemodifiedtoallowoneaccumulatortobeinoperableoriltdCisoaeforuptoonehour.Iftheaccumulatorisnotoperableorisstillisolatedafteronehour,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCSpressureof1600psigwithinanadditional6hours.Therequirementsof3.3.1.1cmaybemodifiedtoallowonesafetyinjectionpumptobeinoperableforupto72hours.Xfthepumpisnotoperableafter72hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandbelowaRCStemperaturelessthan350oFwithinanadditional6hours.Ther'equirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.maybemodifiedtoallowcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.MorethanonecomponentmaybeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthatonetrainoftheECCSisoperable.Iftherequirementsof3.3.1.1dthroughh.arenotsatisfiedwithinthetimeperiodspecifiedbelow,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotshutdown.within6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350oFinanadditional6hours.a0(c.a3'.a.2.Oneresidualheatremovalpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours. l"03.'5.2.b.C~d.Oneresidualheatremovalheatexchangermaybeoutofserviceforaperiodofnomorethan72hours.Anyvalve,interlock,orpipingrequiredforthefunc-tioningofonesafetyinjectiontrainand/oronelowheadsafetyinjectiontrain(RHR)maybeinoperableprovidedrepairsarecompletedwithin72hours(exceptasspeci-fiedine.below).Powermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferencedin3.3.1elgvforthepurposesofvalvetestingprovidednomorethan-,.~2.(Moke.)'I3.lVonesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingiscompletedandpowerremovedwithin12hours.hosecheckvalvesspecifiedin3.3.l.lhmaybeinoeble(greatere0gpmleakazdedtheinlineMOVsarede-en'losedan'rsarecompletedin12hours.3 opateifrequiredtodoso,theredundantcomponent(s)aretobePtestepriortoinitiatingrepairoftheinoperablecomponent.Ifitdevelopsthat(a)theinoperablecomponentisnotrepairedwiththespecifiedaowabletimeperiodor(b)asecondcomponentinesameorrelatedsyemisfoundtobeinoperable,thereactorinitiallybeputinthehothutdownconditiontoprovideforredutionofthedecayheatfromthefuel,andconsequentreductionfcoolingrequire-mentsafterapostulatdloss-of-coolantacciden.Thiswillalsoper-mitimprovedaccessforepairsinsomecasps.Afteralimitedtimel.inhotshutdown,ifthemalfction(s)areotcorrected,thereactor1,willbeplacedinthecoldshutwncondition,utilizingnor~hutdownandcooldownprocedures.Intheodshutdowncondition,thereisnoopossibilityofanaccidentthatwodeleasefissionproductsordamage/rthefuelelements.Theplantoperatingprocedureswillrequireimmediateactiontoeffectrepairsofaninoperable'component,andtheeforeinmostcasesrepairsIwillbecompletedin'ssthanthespecifiedalloablerepairtimes.Furthermore,thespecifiedrepairtimesdonotalytoregularly~~~scheduledmaintenanceoftheengineeredsafeguardsstems,whichfisnormalltobeperformedduringrefuelingshutdowns'Thelimitingthesafeguardsystemgwill/Jsowtimesto'epairarebasedon:(1),>Assuringwithhighreliabilitythatfunctionproperlyifrequiredtodo33-(2)Allowancesofsufficienttimetoeffectrepairsusngsafeaproperprocedures.Asmingthereactorhasbeenoperatingatfullratedpowerfatbreast0days,themagnitudeofthedecayheatdecreasessfollowsafterintia'nghotshutdown.e.~SterShutdownDecaHeatjofRatedPower1min.4.53min.2.01ho1..628hours0.9648hours0.62Thus,therequirementforcorecolingincaseofapostulatedloss-of-coolantaccidentwhi1eintheotshutwnconditionissignificantlyre-ducedbelowtherequireentsforapostedloss-of-coolantaccidentduringpoweroperati.Puttingthereactornthehotshutdowncon-dition,significantreducesthepotentialconseencesofaloss-of-!coolantaccide;andalsoallowsmorefreeaccessosomeoftheen-gineeredseguardscomponentsinordertoeffectrepas.1IFailureocompleterepairswithin48hoursofgoingtotheotshutdownicondonisconsideredindicativeofarequirementformajormainten-/ceandtttere!oreinsuchacasethereactoristobeputintothecold)shutdowncondition.Withrespect.othecttte,smefun Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps'nlyoneisneededduringtheinjectionphase,andtwoareregiiredduringtherecirculationphaseofpostulatedloss-of-coolantaccident.'Thecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemisdesignedtofilterthecontrolroomatmosphereduringperiodswhenthecontrolroomisisolatedandtomaintainradiationlevelsinthecontrolroomatacceptablelevelsfollowing"heDesignBasisAccident.'Reactoropezat'nmaycontinueforalimitedtimewhilerepairsarebeingmadetotheairtreatmentsystemsinceitisunlikelythatthesystemwouldbeneeded.TechnicalSpec'fication3.3.5appl-'esonlytotheequipmen"necessarytofilterthecontrolroomatmosphere.Equipmentnecessarytoinitiateisolationofthecontrolroomiscove4edbyanotherspecfication.helimitsortheaccumulatorpressureandvoleassutherequiredamountofwaterinjectiduringanaccidenandarebasedonvaluesed.fortheaccidentanalys.Theindicedlevelof50%correspondsto1108iceetofwaterintheaccumulatorandthein'teevelof82%correspondsto1134cubicfeThelimita'ofn'omorethan.onesainjectionpumpbeoperablewhenoverpressureproteconisingprovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.insure3.3-13 Channelesc010.RodPositionBankCountersll.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlowTABLEincS(1,2)H.A.JJ.A.~P4.1-1(Continued)CalibrateTestP~e~a~sN.A.H.ADH.A.H.A.1)Withrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofserviceMI14.BoricAcidStorageTankLevsRs.sA.>15.RefuelingHaterStorageTankLevel16.VolumeControlTankLevel1J.A.N.A.HAH.A.h4lyN.A.JJote43l317.ReactorContainmentPressure18.RadiationMonitoringSystem19.BoricAcidControl20.ContainmentDrainSumpLevelH.A.N.A.M(1)N.A.N.A.1)IsolationValvesignalAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1721.ValveTemperatureInterlocksH.A.H.A.ea.r.xX22.Pump-ValveInterlock'ZFj,ha423.TurbineTripSet-PointN.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1)BlockTrippx.s'.i.2.24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureZ,t.i..gRN.A.3,'3 TABLE4.1-2MIJN>MUNFPEUENC~ESFOREUXPYiENTi~.NDSPAPLXHQTESrB1.ReactorCoolantChemistrySamplesTostChlorideandFluorideOxygenFreceu~enc3times/weekandatleast,everythirddayStimes/weekandatleast,everyseconddayexceptwhenbelow2SO~F2.ReactorCoolantBoronConcentrationBoronMeeklySC.3.5.<,Z.3.'2$.'it.}4.RefuelinggatorBoronConcentrationStoragoTankManorSampleBoricAcidStorageBoronConcentrationTankTwice/Reek~"S.ControlRods6a.FullWngthControlRod6bFullLengthControlRod7.PressuriterSafetyValvos-8.MainSteamSafet,yValves9.ContainmsntIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRoddroptisnosofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstopsinanyonedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbythorodpositionindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughitsfulllengthtaverifythattherodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointSetpaintFunctioningFuncr,ioningAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1}MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPr'iartaRefuelingOperations 'Z,6,3.c,,'3.7,~s',0ServiceWaterSystemTestFunctioningFe~cru~encEachRefuelingShutdown12.13.Sg.a.S.iA14.15.FireProtectionPumpandPo~erSupp>ySprayAddi.tiveTankAccumulatorPrimarySystemLeakageFunctioningNaOHConcentBaronConcentrationEvaluateMonthlyMonthlyBi-MonthlyDai.lyZ.8~is.DieselFuelSupplyFuelInventoryDaily17-SpentFuelPit,18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationCrossActivityMonthly'72hours(2}(3}'1S-CirculatingWaterFloodProtectionEcyxipment,CalibrateEachRefuelingShutdownNates:Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffected.individualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthanXOOoftheallowablelimithutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10~oftheallowablelimit.ShenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.I1/'mendmeneNo.g,574'-9

ReliefYalvesEachPORYshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonce.per18monthsbyperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATION.ExceptduringcoldaHdrefuelingshutdowneachblockvalveshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper92daysbyoperatingthevalvethroughonecompletecycleoffulltravelunlessthevalveisalreadyclosed.ReactorCoolantLoopsWhenreactorpowerisabove130MNt(8.5%),thereactorcoolantpumpsshallbeverified.tobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastoncepez12hours.Whentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisabove,350'Pbutthereactorisnotcritical,whenthereactorisathotshutdown,orwhenthereactoriscriticalbutreactorpowerislessthanoreaualto130MNt(8.5%):a)theoperatingreactorcoolantpump(s)shallbe!verifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours,and/b)ifareactorcoolantpumpisnotoperating,butmustbeoperable,itshallbedemonstratedoperableonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentssandindicatedpoweravailability.Whentheaveragecoolanttemperatureisbetween200'Fand350'F,andfuelisinthereactor,thefollowingshallbeperformedtodemonstratealoopisoperable.Testsneednotbeper-formedifaloopisnotreliedupontosatisfythere-quirementsofSpecification3.1.1.1.e.4.3-4' a)--.todemonstrateareactorcoolantloopoperable~thereactorcoolantpump(s)iifnotinoperation>shallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonce,per7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.Sg.3.e'.'z.)b)todemonstratearesidualheatremovalpumpisoperable>thesurveillancespecifiedintheInservicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.55ashallbeperformed.4.3.5.4Hhenthereactorisatcoldshutdownorwentheaveragecoolantte'mperatureisbetween200Fand350Fandfuel43.5.5isinthereactor>atleastone.coolantloopshallbeverified'tobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.Inadditiontotheaboverequirements<inordertodemonstratethatareactorcoolantloopisoperable~thesteamgeneratorwaterlevelshallbegreaterthanor43.5.6equalto16%ofthenarrowrangeinstrumentspan.Eachreactorcoolantsystemventpathshallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper18monthsby:l.Verifyingallmanualisolationvalvesineachventpatharelockedin.theopenposition.24Verifyingflowthroughthereactorcoolantventsystemventpathsusingeitherliquidorgas-Basis:IThismaterialsurveillanceprogrammonitorschangesinthefracturetoughnesspropertiesofferriticmaterialsinthereactorjvesselbeltlineregionofthereactorresultingfromexposuretoJ4'-5AmendmcntNo.9 4.5SafetIn'ection,ContainmentSnraandIodineBemovalSstemsTestsAolicabil.itAppliestotestingoftheSafetyInjectionSystem,theContain-mentSpraySystem,andtheAirFiltratiorSysteminsideCcn-tainment.Qbiective:Toverifythatthesubjectsystemswillrespondpromptlyandperformtheirintendedfunctions,ifrequired.Secification:4.5.1,SafetvTests4.5.l.1Safetyln'ectionSstema.Systemtestsshallbeperformedateachreactorrefuelinginterval.Thetestshallbeperformedinaccordancewiththefollowing:Withthereactorcoolantsystempressurelessthanor,equalto350psigandtemperaturelessthanorequalto350F,atestsafetyinjectionsignalwillbeappliedtoinitiateoperationofthesystem.Thesafetybing'dresidualheatrepumpmotorsareprfromstartingthetest. 'b.Thcsystemtestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifcontrolboardindicati'.nandvisualobservationsindicatethatallvalveshavereceivedtheSafetyInjectionsgnalandhavecomplctcdtheirtravel.Thcproperscnucnceandtimin<<ofthcrotating$~componentsaretobcverifiedinconjunctionivithSection4.6.1b.qII~~~'g4.5.l.2Contain...cntSoraS~'stema.Systemtestsshallbcperformedat,eachrc'"ctorre-fuelingint.erval.Thetestshallbepcriormcdwiththciso)aticnvalves,inthcspraysupply)ines,atthccon-1tainmcntblocl'cdclosed,Operationofthcsystemisinitiatedbytrippingthcnormalactuationinstrumcn-~tation.b.Thespraynor~lessha]Lbccheckedforproperfunctioning)atleasteveryfiveyears.c,Thctest'willbcconstdcredsatisfactoryifvisualobser-vationsindicateallcomponentshaveoperatedsatisfac-orilq~4.5.2ComonentTests4.S.2.1Purnnsa0QP-P.5g1Srz3.S.z..9P2,.cc.'xceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdo~vsthhsafetyinjectionpumps,residual,heatrerovalpu~s,andcontainncntspraypumpsshallbesiartcdatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.Thepumpsshallbetestedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceedslmonth.4.5-2 ~.5.3.LELa.s.r.'fsa32~cLb.Accept,ablelevelsofperformanceforthepumpsshall'bethatthepumpsstart,operate,anddeveloptheminimumdischargepressurefortheflowslistedinthetablebelow:DISCHARGEPRESSURE'ontaintSprayPumResidualHeatRemovalPumpsSafetyInjectionPumps35gpm[200gpm]450gpm[5gpm]150m240psig[140ps'g]138sig[1420psig]1356psigNotes(2)Table4.-1Notes(1)Itemsinarebracketsareeffectivuntiltheinstallonofthenewresidualhearemovalminimflowrecirculationsystem.(2)Imsinsquarebracketsareeffective'lnstallationofthenewsafetyinjectionminimflowrecirculationsystem.4.5.2.2Valvesa.Except.duringcoldorrefuelingshutdownsthesprayadditivevalvesshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.NiththepumpsshutdownandthevalvesupstreamanddownstreamArandnantNo.334.5-3 o"thesprayadditivevalvesc3.osed,eachvalvevillbeopenedandclosedbyoperatoract'on.ThistestshallbeperormedpriortastaztupIithetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemon"h.heaccumulatorcheckvalvesshallbecheckedorapeabi3.ityduringeachrefuelingshutdown.AiF='"zat'on'SvsemAt1astonceevery18monthsoratezeveg720hoursofchazcca3.tzationsvstemoperat'onsincethelasttest~a1lozol'cwinqpainti"g,'zeozchem'alreleaseinanvven-tat'cn"onecommunicat'ngwiththesvstem,thepostacc'"e..tcnazcca'ystemsha13.havethefollowingcondonsdemonstzted.a0b.C~The"ressuzedopacrossthecharcoaladsozberbankislessthan3inchesozwateratdesignflowrate(~108).EnplaceFreontesting,underambientconc'"'ons,shallfshowatleast99%removal./heiod'neremovalefic'encyofatleastorecharcoalfi'terceU.sha'1bemeasured.Thef"ercel'obetestedsna'3.beselectedrandom3.yzomthosecel'swiththelongestin-hankresidencetime.Themin~acceptablevalueforiltereficiencyis90$ormavalo=methyliod=dewhentestedat,at'east285'Pand95'Handat1.="to2.0mg/m3CB3Z.loadinqwi"htaggedI/i4~~

c-The"estsinSpecification4.6.1bwillbeperfo~dpriortoexceedi.ngcoldshutdownifthetimesinlasttestexceeds31days.d.Atleastonceper92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTabl'e1ofASTHD975-78whencheckedforviscosity,waterandsediment.e.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdownby:1.Inspectingthedieselinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationsforthisclassofstandbyservice.2.Verifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytorejectaloadof295KMwithouttripping.3.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwitha.safetyinjectiontewsignaland:(a)Verifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses.<R.z.s.z.(>3,va(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormalstandbyconditionontheauto-startsignal,energizestheautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloadswiththefollowingmaximumbreakerclosuretimesaftertheinitialstartingsignalforTrainsAandBnotbeingexceededDieselplusSafetyInjectionPumpplusRHRPumpA20secB22secAllBreakers40sec42secandoperatesfor>fiveminuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthata11dieselgeneratortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andovercrank,areautomaticallybypasseduponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal.L~~lC'1 C,~R~ Containme..tCoolinandIodineRemovalThereactor'hallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Thesprayadditivetankcontainsnotlessthan4SOOgallonsofsolutionwithasodiumhydroxideconcentrationofnotlessthan30%byweight.b.Bothcontainmentspraypumpsareoperable.c.Pourec'rculationfancoolerunitsincludingthelassoc'ate"HEPAfilterunitswithdemistersareoperable.d.Bo".hpos-accidentcharcoalfilterur.itsareoperable.e.Al;valvesandpipirgassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswhicharerequiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.Therequrementsof3.3.2.1maybemodifiedtoallow-componentstobeinoperableatanyonetimeprovidedthat1)thetimelimitsandotherrequirementsspecifiedinathroughbelowaresatisfied,and2)atleast1CQcontainmentspraypump,ancoolerunits,gpHEPAf'lterunitswithdemisters,and1charcoalfilterunxtandallrequiredvalvesandpipingassociatedwiththesecomponentsareoperable.Iftheserequire-mentsarenotsatisfied,thereactorshallbeinhotshutdownwithin6hours.Iftherequirementsarenotsatisfiedwithinanadditional48hours,beincoldshutdownwithinthenext30hours.~o~~OneHEPAfilterunit,ordemisterand/orassociatedrecirculationfancoolermaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan7days.9-..M) b.Onecontainmentspraypumpmaybeinoperableprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.3.4.Lyc.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctioncuringaccidentconditions,maybeinoperableprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.d.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritsassocmatedfancoolermaybeinoperableprovidedtheunzt.isrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7pceh.-o.cm~e+~~NE-.c+re~aau~days.4(~pe~~~++ol~Manx'+4,c~e.'hesprayaastavesystemmaybeinoperableforaperioco'omorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.3.3.33.3.3.1ComponentCoolznSstemThereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Bothcomponentcoolingpumpsareoperable.b.Bothcomponentcoolingheatexchangersareoperable.c.Allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswh'charerequ'redtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.3-3-3.2Therequirementsof3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowbeinoperableat!oneofthefollowingcomponentstoanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnot,restoredtomeettheconditionsof3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiod

(2)undancyzorcertainrangesofbreaksires..Thcontain-.entcoolingandiodineremovalfunctionsaopraviedbvtoindependentsvstems:(a)fan-coolerspluspostaccintcharcafiltersand(b)containmentspraywithsod'umhyroxideaddition.Duringnormalpoweropeation,onlytwooftefourfan-coolersarereauiredtoremovehea"lostfrcmecpmentandpipingwithinontainment.IntheeventofaDsig'nBasis(3)Accident,anyonothefol'owingwillservetoreduceairborneiodineactivityanma'ntaindoseswithinthealuescalculatedintheFSAR:(l)twcontainmentsprayournsandsodiumhydroxideadd'ion,(2)two"an-olersandtwocosacc'dentcharcoalilebs,or(3)cnecanta'ntspraypandsod'hydoxideaddit'onplusanean-ecoleandonepostaccidentcharcaa'4)filter.Inaddition,thentnmentintegrityana'ys'sassumes'hatonecontainmentspypumpandtwa=an-coolersaper-atetoreduceccntainmentaresureollowingaDes'gnBasis(9)Accident.Becauseotdi"'cuyofaccesstomakerepa'rstoaan-cao'erandbecaseothe'awrababili"yo=aDesignBasisAccidentduringhattime,anaddit'onalsevencaysopea-t'onw'thanLnoperlean-coolerispermited.Thecantainmen-spraypumpsandsrayadditivesystemareloctedoutsidecon-tainmentanda,ther'ore,lessdif'culttopa'.There-~ore,threeayswi"haninoperablecontainmentspavpumpa'rspayadd'vesvstem'sdeemedacceptable.TheCcmponen"CoolingSvstemisdi"=erent;"rcmtheothesystemsd'scussedaboveinthattheccmponentsareso'ocatedn"heAuvi'arBuild'ngastcbeacessibleforra'ra"eraoss-o=-coolantacc'dent;Inadd't'on,iduringthe"ost-acciden"5"hase"..ementcoolcomponentcco'ingwate"supply'slost,careandcon"irgcouldbemaintaineduntilrepairswereeffected.(6)(7)

()Deleted(2)UFSARSection6.3.3.1(3)UFSARSection6.2.2.1(4)FSARSection15.6.4.3(5)UARSection9.2.2.4(6)UFSSection9.2.2.4(7)Deleed(8)UFSARection9.2.1.2(9)UFSARSchion6.2.l.1(ContainmtIntegrity}andUFSARSetion6.4(CREmergencyAirTreatment)(10)WestinghoseReport,"R.E.G'aBoricAcidStorageTankBoroConcentrationeductionStudy"datedNov.1992C.J.NcHughdJ.J.SpryshakendmentNe.

3.6ContainmentSstemAlicabilitAppliestotheintegrityofreactorcontainment.Todefinetheoperatingstatusofthereactorcontainmentforplantoperation.Secification:3.6.1ContainmentInterita.Exceptasallowedby3.6.3,containmentintegrityOshallnotbeviolatedunlessthereactorisinthecoldshutdowncondition.,'Closed""valvesmaybeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrol.:b.Thecontainmentintegrityshallnotbeviolatedwhenthereactorvesselheadisremovedunlesstheboronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm-3.6.2c.Positivereactivitychangesshallnotbemadebyroddrivemotionorborondilution.wheneverthecontainmentintegrityisnotintact.unlessthes--~-w.!nternalPressureXftheinternalpressureexceeds1psigortheinternalvacuumexceeds2.0psig,theconditionshallbecorrectedwithin24hoursorthereactorrenderedsubcritical.AmendmentNo.4$s543.6-1 3.6.33.6.3.1<co'3.C.Z,Lcm3.c.SContainmentIsolationBoundariesWithacontainmentisolationboundaryinoperableforoneormorecontainmentpenetrations,either:a.RestoreeachinoperableboundarytoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours,or~~l~.ia<I&iitciIsolateeachaffectedpenetrationwithin4hoursbyuseofatleastonedeactivatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheisolationposition,oneclosedmanualvalve,orablindflange,orBe'inatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.3.6.43.6.4.13.6.4.2CombustibleGasControlWhenthereactoriscritical,atleasttwoindependentcontainmenthydrogenmonitorsshallbeoperable.OneofthemonitorsmaybethePostAccidentSamplingSystem.Withonlyonehydrogenmonitoroperable,restoreasecondmonitortooperablestatuswithin30daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.3.6.4.3Withnohydrogenmonitorsoperable,restoreatleastonemonitortooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours.3.6.5ContainmentMini-Pure~l4.V,Wheneverthecontainmentintegrityisrequired,emphasiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasachievable.Themini-purgeisolationvalveswillremainclosedtothemaximumextentpracticablebutmaybeopenforpressurecontrol,forAIBA,forrespirableairqualityconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,forsurveillanceteststhatmayrequirethevalvetobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.9.4,5Amendment,No.9,XS3.6-2 3.6-3Theeactorcoolantsystemconditionsofcoldshutdownassurethatnsteawillbeformedandhencetherew'ouldbenopressurebuildupthecotainmentifthereactorcoolantsystemruptures.Theshutownmarginsareselectedbasedonthetyeoftgcrriedout.The(2000ppm)boronconcenationypeoacx,tresprovidessutdownmarginwhichprecludescriticalitycircumstance.Whenthereactorheadisnottobereranyshutdownmar'nof1n,ooeremove,acoldg'no4~k/kprecludescriticalityinanyourrence.Regardinginte~alpressurelimitations,thecontaentdesignpressureof60psigwouldnotbeexceedediftheinternalpressurebeforeamajorsteambreakaccidentwereasmuchas1'"Thnmentisdesx~edtowithstandaninternalvacuumof2e5siThe2.0sivacuumxspgspecifiedasanoperatinglimittoavoidanymo.psig.difficultieswithmothcooling.nordertominimizecontainmentleakagedaccidentinvolvexngaesxgnbasisdinvolvinga~significant,fissionproductlp'otrequiredkraccidentmitigationareprovidedwithreease,isolationboundaries.Thes'solationboe{dariesconsistofeitherrocedureudpassivedevicesoractiveatomaticva5resandarel'dpnerthecontrolofheQualityAssuranceProgramCldmanualvalvesdeaceactivatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosed.ramose',.secured,position(includingcheckvalves~>thflowthhth\),bl'andflangesandclosedgystemsareconsideredpassive:,devices.Automaticisolationvalvqdesignedtoclosefollw'solationdevice'thoutoperatoraction,evconsideredactivedeviTwndevicesareprovidedforeachmechanical.penetration,suchthatnosinglecrediblefailureyearmalfunctionofanactivectlcancauseav~~alossofisolation,orresultinaleakageratethat',exceedslimitsassumedinthe'afetyanalqas+.Intheeventthatoneisolionboundaryis9,noperable,theaffected'ffectedbasi,penetrationmustbeisolatedwithatleastor<~boundarythtr<~axsriot',thiscriterionayingleactivefailure.Isolationboundariesthatt.inareaplumedanddeactivatedautomaticcontainmant/mee.',isolationvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,orahlihdflange.Thaopenrngofclospdcontainmentisolationvalvesonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecontrolincludesthefollowingconsiderations:pl)stationinganindividualqualiflect.inaccordancewithstationppocedures,whoisinconstantcommunicationwiththecontrol.room,gtthevalvecontrols(2)instructingth',di'desevalvesznanaccidentsituation,and(3)assuringthatenvironment/1conditionswillnotprecludeaccessto.-isolatetheIboundary.andthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivityoutsidethecontainment.endmentNo.gg,$$,58 ferences:(1WestinghouseAnalysis,"ReportfortheBASTConcentrationReductionforR.E.Ginna",August1985,submittedviApplicationforAmendmenttotheOperatingLicenseinletterfromR.W.Kober,RGGEtoH.A.Denton,NRC,dadctober16,1985(2)UAR-Section6.2.1.4(3)UFS-Section6.2.4IIJAmendmentNo.543.6-4 Z,s.i,MSgTABLB.4o1-1(CONTINUED)ChannelDescrition25.Co~nmentPreseCheckCalibrateTestRemarksNarrrangecontaTnmpressur~0,+3psig)exded2G.StcamGeneratorPressure27.T<<rbincFirstStagePressure28.EmergencyPlanRadiationInstruments29.EnvironmentalMonitorssNAM30.LossofVoltage/DegradedVoltage480VoltSafeguardsBus31.TripofHainFeedwaterPumps32.SteamFlow.NANA33~Thewy34.ChlorineDetector,ControlRoomNAAirIntakeNA37.ReactorVesselLevelIndicationSystem35.AmmoniaDetector,ControlRoomAirIntake36.RadiationDetectors,ControlRoomNAAirIntake38a.TripBreakerLogicchannelTesting38b.TripBreakerLogicChannelTestingNANANANANotes1,2and3Note1 TABLE4.1-2H7NIHUH+REUENCEKSrOREUXPHENTANDSA'MPLXNG'PESTS1.ReactorCoolantChemist,rySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoroni instChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentrationFr~cru~enc3times/weekandat,leasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexcept,whenbolo~2504FMeokly3.RofuolingWaterStorageTankMaterSampleBoronConcentrationMeekly4.BaricAcidStorageBaronConcentrationTankTwice/Week"'.ControlRods6a.FullLongthControlRad6b.FullLengthContxolRod7.PressuriserSafetyValves8.HainSteamSafetyValves9.CantainmontIsolationTrip10.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsHoveanyrodnatfullyinsertedasufficient,numberofstepsinanyanedirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbytherodpositionindicationsystemHoveeachradthxoughitsfulllengthtaveri.fythattherodposj.tianindicationsystemtransitionsoccurSetpointSetpoi.ntFunctioningFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandat,leastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperati.onsAmendmentNo.,57.4.a-s 11.ServiceWaterSystem12.FireProtectionPumpandPowerTestFunctioningFunctioning~recccancvEachRefuelingShutdownMonthly13.SprayAdditiveSC.S.~.v8TankNaOHConcent.15.16ccumulatorBoronConcentrationPrimarySystemEvaluateLeakageDieselFuelSupplyFuelXnventory'K(r<Bi-MonthlyDailyDaily17.SpentFuelPit18.SecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationGrossActivityMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingWater~FloodProtectionEquipmentCalihrateEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:(>)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan10%oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10~oftheallowablelimit.(4)whenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.AmendmeneNog,57. 4.4ContainmentTestsAlicabilitAppliestocontainmentleakageandstructuralintegrity.~0bectiveToverifythatpotentialleakagefromtheontainmentandthepre-stressingtendonloadsareintainedthinspecifiedvalues.)t,4.4.14.4.1.1SecficationrIntearaedLeakaoeRateTestDefinitionPa(psig)isthecontainmentvesseldesignpressureof60psig.Pt(psig)istentainmentvesselreducedtestpressureforperiodictestng.Lt(weghtpercent/24urs)isthemaximumallowablekageratesofthectainmentvesseltestatmosphereatpressurePt.4.4-1 ~~~La(weightpercent/24hours)isthemaximumallowableleakagerateofthecontainmentvesseltestatnns-phereatpressurePa,'.2X/24hrs.LamndLtm(weightpercent/24hours)arethetalmeasredcontainmentleakageratesofthecntain-aentsseltestatmosphereatpressuresaandPtrespectely.PretestRequiemntsa.Avisualeminationoftheaccssibleinteriorandexteriorurfacesoftheontainmentstructureshallbeperfodtouncovranyevidenceofstructuraldeterorationhichmayaffecteitherthecontainmentstucteintegrityorleak-tightness.Ifthereisevidenceofstructuraldeterioration,intgraedleakratetestingshallnotbeperformeuntilapropriatecorrectiveactionhasbeentake.Exceptfrepairstocorrectstructuralterioration,hever,norepairsoradjustmensshallbevadedurgtheperiodbetweentheiniiationoftheinspectioandtheperformanceofttest.b.Csureofcontainmentisolationvalesshallbeccomplishedbynormaloperationandthoutanypreliminaryexercisingoradjustments.4.4-2 44.1.3ConductofTestsa.AllintegratedleakratetestsshallbeconducteinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofAmericanNationaltStandardN45.4-1972,LeakageRateTestingof'Con-tainmentStructuresforNuclearReactors,March16,1972.b.eaccuracyofeachintegratedleakratetestshalll.beerifiedbyasupplementaltestwhichconfirmstheaccucyofthetestinstrumentationandcalculationalmethodsbydeterminingalearatewhichiswithin0.25Ltothetestresult.Ifresultsarenotwithin0.25Lttheasonshalledetermined,correctiveactiontakenadasucessfulsupplementaltestper-,formed.ZLLllc.Integratedleakrattestsshallbeconductedataninitialpresure(begningoftest)Pt>35psig-d.Ifdurinthetest,inclingthesupplementaltest,potentllyexcessiveleakaepathsareidentified~whicwillinterferewithsatsfactorycompletionofthetest,orwhichresultinthetestnotmeetingheacceptancecriteria,thetesthallbeterminatedandtheleakagethroughsuchpathsallbemeasuredusinglocalleakagetestingmethods.epairsand/or~*adjustmentstoequipmentshallbemadeadanintegratedleakratetestperformed.4.4-3 '~4.4~AccetanceCriteria)~b.CeTheleakagerateLtmshallbe<0.75LtatPt.iefinedasthecontainmentvesselredutestpresswhichisgreaterthanorequal35psig.Ltmisde-nedasthetotalmeascontainmentleakageratearessurePt.isdefinedasthemaximumallowableageeatpressure.Pt.fPtl~i*Ltshallbedeteedas=La'lealwhichequals.1528percentightperdaya35psig.Paisdefinedaecalculatedpeakcontaentinternalpressrelatedtodesignbasis'ccidenhichisterthanorequalto60psig.Laisde&.asthemaximumallowableleakagerateatPawhz.equals.2percentweightperday.TheleakagerateatPa(Lam)shallbe<0.75La.Lamisdefinedasthetotalmeasuredcontainmenteakagerateatpressur4..1.5TestFreuencAsetofthreeintegratedleakratetestsshbeperformedatapproximatelyequalintervalsduringeach10-yearserviceperiod.Thethirtestofeachsetshallbeconductedinthefiyearofthe10-yearserviceperiodoroneyebeforeorafterthefinalyearofthe10-yearerviceperiodovided:Zl.'iSl~~~theintervalbetweenatwoTypeAtestsdoesnotexceedfourars,folowingeachiserviceinspection,theconinmentaircks,thesteamgeneratorinspection/maienancepenetration,andtheequipmethachareleaktestedpriortoreturnineplanttooperation,andanyrer,placement,ormodificationofacoainmentbarrierresultingfromtheinsiceinspeionsshallbefollowedbyappropriatelkagetest.i/IAmpndmentNo.544.4-4 b.Ifanytestfailstomeettheacceptancecriteriof4.4.1.4.athetestscheduleforsubsequenlregul'arlyscheduledinservicetestsshallesub-mittedtotheComnissionforreviewanapproval.c.Itwoconsecutivetestsfailtoettheacceptancecriteiaof4.4.1.4.a,aretesshallbeperformedateachfuelingshutdownrapproximatelyevery18months,wichevercomesfirst,uritiltwocon-secutivetestseteacceptancecriteriaof4.4.1.4.a,afterhchtimetheretestscheduleof4.4.1.5.amayeresu4.4.1..6AdditionalRuirementsa.AsurytechnicalreportshabesubmittedtotCommissionaftertheconductoeachintegratedleakratetest.Informationonanyvaveclosuremalfunctionorvalveleakagethatrequirecor-rectiveactionbeforethetestshallbeincdedinthereport.LocalLeakDetectionTests4.4.2.1Testa.Localleaeratetesallbeperformedatintervaecifiin4.4.2.4belowandatapressureofnotlessthansig.4.4-5 ~~i~K,1'llb.Thelocalleakagerateshallbemeasuredforechofthefollowingcomponents:i.Containmentpenetrationsthatemployesilientseals,gaskets,orsealantcompnds,pipingenetrationswithexpansiobellowsandeltricalpene'trationswthflexiblemetalsealsemblies.ii.Airlockndequipmentdoorseals.iii.FueltransfetuivIsolationvalonthetestablefluidsystemstlinespeneratingecontainment.Otherntainmentcoonents,whichrequirelearepairinordertoeettheacceptanceiterionforanyintegradleakageratetest.4.4.2.2AccetanceCriterionontainmentisolationboundariesareinoperableomaleakagestandpointwhenthedemonstratedleakageofsingleboundaryorcumulativetotalleakageofallboundariesisgreaterthan0.60La.4.4.2e3CorrectiveAction4~O3.v.a3l..ivaeIfatanytimeitisdeterminedthatleakagefromallpenetrationsandboundariesexceeds0.60La,repairsinitiatedimmediately.thetotalisolationshallbeAmendmentNo.544.4-6 3'L.svb.Ifrepairsarenotcompletedandconformancetotheacceptancecriterionof4.4.2.2isnotdemonstratedwithin48hours,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurizeduntilrepairsareeffectedandthelocal~eo.~.z.q3l,qcileakagemeetstheacceptancecriterion.Ifitisdeterminedthattheleakagethroughamini-purgesupplyandexhaustlineisgreaterthan0.05Laanengineeringevaluationshallbeperformedandplansforcorrectiveactiondeveloped.4.4.2.4TestFreenca0ceptasspecifiedinb.modifiedbyapprovxemptions.andc.beloindividual+penetionsandcontainmentisol'nvalvesshallbetestedinaordancewith0CFR50,AppendixZ,asb.Thecontaitecpxipmenatch,fueltransfertube,Isteamneratorinspection/maintncepenetration,and/utdownpurgesystemflangesshallbeestedateach!refuelingshutdownoraftereachuse,ifthatsooner.'

$1.'ltd'~Thecontainmentairlocksshallbetestedatintervalsofnomorethansixmontbypressurizingthespacebetweentherlockdors.Xnaddition,followingopen'ngoftheairockdoorduringtheinteal,atestshallbperformedbypressuringbetweenthedualsealofeachdoorened,within48hoursoftheopening,unssthereactorwasinthecoldphuowncoditionatthetimeoftheopeningorhaensubsequentlybroughttothecoldshutdondition.AtestshallIIIalsobeperformdbypressurizingbetweentheIdualsealsoeachdoor'thin48hoursofIleavingtcoldshutdowncdition,unlesslthedoohavenotbeenopenscethelasttesterformedeither,bypressuzingthespebetweentheairlockdoorsorbyressurizingbetweenthedualdoorseals.~~Ii'I' bec.Visualinspectionshallbemadeforexcessiveleakagefromcomponentsofthesystem.Anysignificantleakage.g0shallbemeasuredbycollectionandweighingorbyan%Jequivalentmethod.4.4.3.2AcceptanceCriterionThemaximumallowableleakagefromtherecirculationheatremovalsystemscomponents(whichincludesvalvestems,flangesandpumpseals)shallnotexceedtwogallonsperhour.4.4.3.3CorrectionActiona.Repairsshallbe.madeasrequiredtomaintainleakagewithintheacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2.b.Ifrepairsarenotcompletedwithin24hours,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepressurizeduntilrepairsareeffectedandtheacceptancecriterionof4.4.3.2issatisfied.Testsof'therecirculationheatremovalsystemshallbecon-ductedatintervalsnottoexceed12months.3.to.s.W4.4.4TendonStressSurveillancensectionforBrokenWiurteenspecifictendons,equa~~tndthe!

containmentshallbeinspectedperiodicallyforthepresenceofbrokenwires.b.Theinspectionintervals,measuredfromtheateofteinitialstructuraltest,shallbeasfoLLows:6mnths1year3years8yearsandyearsintervalsthreafter.c.Theacceptanccriteriaforteinspectionarethatnomorethanatotalf38wirs(in14tendons)arebrokenandthatnotmorethn6rokenwiresexistinanyonetendon.Ifmorethanbrokenwiresarefound,alltendonsshalLbeipecteIfinspectionrevealsmorethan5%ofthettalwiresbrken,thereactorshallbeshutdownandepressurized.d.Ifmoretan20wires(in14tendon)havebeenbrokensinceelastinspection,alltendonshallbeinspected.Ifipectionrevealsmorethan5~oofthtotaLwiresboken,thereactorshalLbeshutdownandepressurized.e.Ifasmanyas6brokenwiresarefoundin~nonetendon,fourimmediatelyadjacenttendons(twooneachideof4.4-10 K3thetendoncontaining6brokenwires)shallbeinspeed.heacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorehan4benwiresinanyofthe'dditional4tendo.Ifthiscritionisnotsatisfied,alloftheteonsshallbeinspectandifmorethan5%oftheotalwiresarebroken,threactorshallbeshutdoanddepressurized.4.4.4.2Pre-StressConationTesta~b;Lift-offtestseperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin..laabove,attheintervalsspecifiedin..4.1.Iftheaveragestressinthe14tendonheckedis1than144,000psi(60%ofultimastress),alltensshallbecheckedforstressandretensioned,ifnessary,toastressof144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionstress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressapplieduringaccidentconditions.4.4.54.4.5.1ContainmentIsolationValvesEachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeGinnaStationPumpandValveTest.programsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.55a.4.4.6ContainmentIsolationResonse4.4.6.14.4.6.2~g.3.4.3.5glY'L1IEachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEby.theperformanceoftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonce,per18months.Theresponsetimeincludes.onlythevalvetraveltime.forthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal.AmendmentNo.9,ZZ~544.4-11

4.4.74.4:7.1ContainmentHdroenMonitors~tDemonstratethattwohydrogenmonitorsareoperableatleastdailybyverifyingthattheunitisonorinstandby.4.4.7.2Atleastonceperquarterperformachannelcalibrationusingtwosamplegasescontainingknownconcentrationsofhdrogen.Thecyy)ainmen'signedforanaccidentpressureof60psig-Nhllethereasoperating<theinnvironmentofthecontainmentwillbeairaeyatmosphericpressure.Themaximumureofam-airmixtureatthepeakaccideureof60psigiscalculatee286F.4-4-llaAmendmentNo.9 riortoinitialoperation,thecontainmentwasstrengthtestedatpsandthenwasleaktested.Theacceptancecriterionforpre-IoperaonalleakageratetestwasestablishedasO.IVoper2hoursat4econstruction$.6(Lpsig.Thisleakageratewasbelievedconsistentwith(2)ofthecontaent,whichisequippedwithindepenntleak-testableTpenetrationsacontainschannelsoveraQcontaentlinerweMs,whichwereindependentlyleaktestedduringcstruction.Safetyanalyseshaveeenperformedonthbasisofaleakagerateof0.20foper24hoursat6psig.WiththleakagerateandwithminimumIcontainmentengineeredsauardscrating(i.e.,either2filterunitsandnospray,or1filterunitEn1spray,ornofilterunitsand2sprays)t'epublicexposurewouldbeellbelow10CFR100valuesintheevent(3)-ofthedesignbasisaccidePerformanceoftheingratedleakagertetestprovidesanover-allassessmentofpoteialleakagefromthecontainmentincaseofanaccidentthatwodpressurizetheinteriorofecontainment.InordertoproLdearealisticappraisaloftheinteityofthecontain-mentundraccidentconditions,thetestistobeperormedwithoutprel,iLnaryleakdetectionsurveysorleakrepairs,ancontain-mtisolationvalvesaretobeclosedinthenormalmann.Theestpressureof35psigfortheintegratedleakagera'tetestisuf-ficientlyhightoprovideanaccuratemeasurementoftheleakagerateanditdupl.ic'atesthepreoperationalleakageratetestat35psig.~4.4-12

ThSpecificationalsoallowsforpossibledeteriorationofthleakeratebetweentests,byrequiringthatthetotalmeasedleakagratebeonly75%ofthemaximumallowableleakagere.TheduratioandmethodsfortheintegratedleakageratetestestablishedbANSIN45.4-1972provideaminimumleveofaccuracyandallowford'lycyclicvariationintemperateandthermalradiation.Thefquencyoftheintegratedleageratetestiskeyedtotherefuelgschedulefortheretor,becausethesetestscanbestbeperfomnedduringrefuelinshutdowns.Refuelingshutdowns.arescheduledaapproximatelyoneyearintervals..ileakageratetestsisbasedirstisthelowprobabilityofThespecifiedfrequencyofintgratonthreemajorconsiderations.leaksintheliner,becauseof)euseofweldchannelstotesttheleaktightnessofthewelduringerection,(b)conformanceofthecompletecontainmenta0.1%perdayleakrateat60psig~~duringpreoperationaltsting,and(c)abenceofanysignificantstressesinthelineruringreactoroperati.Secondisthemorefrequenttesting,thefullaccidentpressurofthoseportionsofthecontainmetenvelopethataremostlikelytodevelopleaksduringreactooperation(penetrationsandisolate,nvalves)andthelowvale(0.60La)ofthetotalleakagethatispecifiedasacceptab.Thirdisthetendonstresssurveillanceproam,whichprovldassurancethananimportant.partofthestcturalinterityofthecontainmentismaintained.AmendmentNo.544.4-13

hebasisforspecificationofatotalleakageof0.60Lafrompeetrationsandisolationboundariesisthatonlyaportionofth~'Iallobleintegratedleakagerateshouldbefromthosesourcesinorderprovideassurancethattheintegratedleakagerateouldremainwihinthespecifiedlimitsduringtheintervalsetweenintegratedeakageratetests.Becausemostleakageduringanintegratedlearatetestoccursthoughpenetrationsdisolationvalves,andbecaseformostpenetrationsandisotionvalvesasmallerleakagerawouldresultfromanintegraedleaktestthanfromalocaltest,adateassuranceofmaintaningtheintegratedleakageratewithinthepecifiedlimitsisovided.ThelimitingleakageratesfromtheecirculationHatRemovalSystemsarejudgementvaluesbased.prilyonasuringthatthecomponentscouldoperate'withoutmechaniclfaireforaperiodontheorderof200daysafteradesignbasiscident.Thetest4.4-14

ressure,350psig,achievedeitherbynormalsystemoperationobyhydrotictesting,givesanadequatemarginoverehighestpressurewithinthestemafteradesignbaaccident.Similarly,thehydrostatictestpressurecontainmentsumpreturnlinesandthereactorcoolantaintankpipinonnectionstotheresidualheatremovastemof100psiggivesanadequaarginoverthe(<)histpressurewithinthelinesafteradesignbasisacciArecirculationsystemleakageof2gal./hrwilliimitoffsiteexposure'.duetoleakagetoinsignificantlevelsrelativetothosecalculatedforleakagedirectlyfromthecontainmentinthedesignbasisaccident.Thedosecalculatedasaresultofthisleakageis7.7mrfora2-hr(5)exposureatthesiteboundary.Incaseoffailuretomeettheacceptancecriteriaforleakagefromtheres'idualheatremovalsystemorthepenetrations,itmaybepossibletoeffectrepairswithinashorttime.Ifso,itisconsideredunnecessaryandunjustifiedtoshutdownthereactor.Thetimesallowedforr'epairsareconsistentwiththetimesdevelopedinSpecification3.3.P~~.~Thetendonsurveillanceprogramisbasedonassuringthat,ontheaverage,theload-carrvingcapabilityofthetendonsismaintainedatapproximately95/odesign.srEa"'hatt4'-]5 hepre-stressconfirmationtestprovidesadirectmeasureoftheload-carryingcapabilityofthetendon.Ifthesurveillanceprogramindicatesbyextensivewirebreakageortendonstressrelationthatthepre-stressingtendonsarenotbehavingasexpected,thesituationwillbeevaluatedimmediately.Thespecifiedacceptancecriteriaaresuchastoalertattentiontothesituationwellbeforethetendonload-carryingcapabilitywoulddeterioratetoapointthatfailureduringadesignbasisaccidentmightbepossible.Thusthecauseoftheincipientdeteriorationcouldbeevaluatedandcorrectiveactionstudiedwithoutneedtoshutdownthereactor.Thecontainmentisprovidedwithtworeadilyremovabletendonsthatmightbeusefultosuchastudy.Inaddition,thereare40tendons,eachcontainingaremovablewirewhichwillbeusedtomonitorforpossiblecorrosioneffects.Operabilityofthecontainmentisolationboundariesensuresthat,econtainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromtheoutsideen'ronmentintheeventofareleaseofradioactivematerialtotheontainmentatmosphereorpressurizationofthecontainmentPerfonceofcyclingtestsandverification'ofisolationtsassociadwithautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvesiscovredbythePandValveTestProgram.CompliancewithAppendJto10CFR50iaddressedunderlocalleaktestingrequiremes.

References:

(1)UFSARSectio3.1.2.2.7(2)UFSARSection6..6.1(3)UFSARSection15.6.31(4)UFSARSection6.3.3.8(5),UFSARTable15.6-9(6)FSARPage5.1.2-28(7)North-American-RockwellReport550-x-32,ReliabilityHandbook,ebruary1963.(8)FSARPage5.1.2-28AutoneticsAmendmentNo.544-4-17 b.ThcsystemtestwilLbcconsideredsatisfactoryifcontrolboardindicati.nandvisualobservationsindicatethatallvalveshavereceivedtheS"fctyInjectionsignalandhavecomplctcdtheirtravel.Thcproperscouenceandtimingof.therotatingcomponents*retobeverifiedinconjunctionivithSection4.6.1b.4.5.l.2ContainmcntSoraSt.sterna.Systemtestsshallbcperformedat,eachrc"ctorre-fuelinginterval.Thetestshallbcperformedwithtncisolationvalves,inthcspraysupplylines,atthccon>>tainmcntbloclcdclosed.Operationofthcsystemisinil.iatcdbytrippingthcnormalactuationinstrurncn-tation.gg.S.~.~.l5Thcspraynoxzlcsshallbccheckedforproperfunctioning~+atleastevery~years.c.Thetestwillbcconsideredsatisfactoryifvisualobscr-vationsindicateallcomponentshaveoperatedsatisfac-torily.4.5.2ComoncntTests4.5.2.1"PIIrnnsSlz.2,4,ggExceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdo>>nsth~saf<<Yinjectionpumps,residualheatresealpu"ps>containmcntspraypumpsshall,bes2.artedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth.Thepumpsshallbetestedpriortostartupifthetimesincethelasttestexceeds1month.4.5-2 Za.z,(,~qb.Acceptablelevelsofperformanceforthepumpsshallbethatthepumpsstart,operate,anddeveloteminimumdischargepressurefortheflowsliedintetablebelow:~MaoDISCHARContainmentSprayPumpsResidualHeatRemovalPumps35gpm[20gp45040psig[140psig]138psigNotesSafetyXnjectionPumps[gpm50gpm[1420psig31356psigTe4.5<<1Notes(1)Ttemsisquarebracketsareeffectivetiltheinstaltionofthenewresidualheatremoval.min'lowrecirculationsystem.(2)Itsinsquarebracketsareeffective'stallationofthenewsafetyinjectionminimlowrecirculationsystem.4.5.22Rg'X,g~qSR,Sa~.g.4,qa.Exceptduringcoldorrefuelingshutdownsthesprayadditivevalvesshallbetestedatintervals.notto%l~vd~exceedMiththepumpsshutdownandthevalvesupstreamanddownstreamAnatxhraatNo.334.5-3 ofthesprayadditivevalvesc3.osed,eachvalvewillbeopenedandclosedbvoperatoract'on.Thistestsha3.1beperformedpriortostartupifNetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemon&..heaccumulatorcheckvalvesshallbecheckedoroperabilityduringeachrefuelingshutdown.AirKiltation'SvsemAtleastonceevery18monthsorate"every720hoursofcharcoa'i},trationsystemoperationsincethelasttest,orollcwingpaint'".g,ieozchem'ca3.re'easeinanyven-t'3.at'on-onecommunicatingwiththesystem,the"ostaccidentchazcoa'ystemsha13.havethefo3.lowingcond't-onsdemonstxatedThepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsozberbankislessthan3inchesoxwateratdes'nxlowrate(.10%).b.XnplaceFreontesting,underambientconc'"ions,sha'1showatlease99%removal.C~Theiod'neremovalefic'encvoxatleastonechaxcoa'i'erceU,sha'1bemeasured.Thef"ercel'obetestedsna'1beselectedrandomlyromthosecellswiththelongestin-hankresidencetime.Theminimumacceptablevalueforiltereficiencyis90%or"=movalo"methyliod'dewhentestedatat'east285'Fand95%REandat3..5to2.0mg/m33.oadingwithagcecCS3X.4.5-4 Atereacn"placementofacharcoaldrawerorateanvstruc"almaintenanceonthe.housing~othe~ostaccidentcharcoalsystem,theconditionofSpecification4.5.2.3.'.bshal'edemonstratedfortheafectedport'ono"".esystm.Atleas"everyl8monthsorfollowi..coaintinci-e,ochem'cal"'easeinanyvent'lationzonecommunicatingwiththesvstem,thecontainmentrec'rculationsystemshallhavethe"ollowingcondit'onsdemonstratd.a.T..epessuredropacrosstheHZPAfiltebank'slessthan3inchesowateatdesignflowrate(-:15%}.b.Znp'acethermallygererated".OPtestingofthe.-."-"-Afilterssha13.showatleast99Krmova'.AfteeachcompleteorpartialreplacementoftheHZPA"terbankora"o=anystructualmaintenanceonahousingforthecontainmentreciculationsys=em,thecondit'onofSpec'ation4.5.2.3.3.bshallbedemonstratedforrheafectdpor"'onofthesystem.=-xcp"duringcoldorrefuelingshutdowns~hepostacc=entcharcoa'=solationva3.vessha3.lbetestedatnter;a'snotgcate"".anonemonthtoveifvooeabi'itvand."-"""erorientationardlowshallbemaintaired"'oughthesystemcoa"3.east15minutes.Thetestsha3.3.beoerfcec===otostarpithe..timesincehelastestexceedslmen='"..4'-5 4.5.2.3.9Zxceptdu"ingcoldorrefuelingshutdownstheautomaticinit'at'onothecontrolroomemezgencyairteatmentsystemshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonth,to.veriyoperabilitvandpzoperorientat'onandflowshalliIbemaintainedtMoughthesystemforatleast15minutes.!ThetestshallbeperformedpriortostaztupiftheM/sincethelasttestexceedsonemonth.s's'ndtheCcn-i.==entS"ySvstR~~0~c~~'~i~sp~gl'~saa~8noi>>>>l'noteeA1'iV'0>>>>>>ahabi4~>>i>>e>>CLIGal~Comp'e.esystesstscannctbe-ez"ormedwhenŽereac"orisc"erat'".g"ecauseSa=etvZn'ectionsigncauescon-tainme-isolationandantainme..tSo"Syst~test"=quizs".'.osystemto"etLilpo='ycablec.hemeho"ofassur'"."c=erab'1'ofthesetems's".erefczetoco--=--st=misteststobepez=oeddm'".gannualp'a.".shu"-dawns,w'".".mor==cuentponenttests,h-chc~bepez=ozmecidur'~greactoo-ezation.Theannuals-stems"ssdemonstztepreseautcmopezat'ono'heae"yZn,ectionandContamatSpzaSystems.!Ii"thepumpsblocfcedromsa'"-.atestsignalisappliedtoin'tiateautomaticaction m.~.~>>andverificationmadethatthecomponentsreceivehesafetyinjectioninthepropersequence.The.test.demonstratestheoperationofthevalves,pumpcircuiteakers,andautomaticcircuitry.'>>'u'ngreactoroperation,theinstrumentatonwhichisdepededontoinitiate..-safety.njectionandcontaientsprayisgenerallychecdailyandtheinitiatigcircuitsaretestedmonly.Inaddition,Itheact'vcomponents(pumpsanvalves)aretobetestedmontlytochecktheoperationofthestartingcircuitsandtoverifyatthepumpsare.insatisfactoryrningordeanddeveloptherainimumrequiredpressuretomeetfaccidentconditions.'~'he/minimumdischargeessurevalueslistedinTable4.5-1arebasedonanasseddegradationofthepump.head-capacity(charactrisic)curveadjustedtowatertemperatureof6Fasfllows:ContainmentSprayPumps5%"ResiduaL~HeatRemovalPpsSt*SafetynjectionPumps3$**Perpntageisbasedontheheadatthebestefciencypointofflow.Thetestintervalofonemontisbasedonthejugementthatmoreignificantlyincreasefrequenttstingwouldthereliabiity(i.e.,probabilitythatthecomponentwouloperateperiodsoftime.required)and~ouldresultinincreasedwearovernet/the/when//1long'.5-8 Othersystemsthatarealsoimportanttotheemergencycolingfunctionaretheaccumulators,cooingsystem,conta'nmentfancoolers.thecomponttheservicewater'ystemantheITheaccumulatorsareapassivsafeguard.Inaccordanceththeperformance.Theairfiltrationporonofthecontainmentairrecirculationsystemiaassivesafeguardwhichisisolatedfromthelreactoroperation.oolingairflowduringnoxmalHencethecharcoalshouldhaveaThefilterramesthathousethelongusefullifeme.charcoalareindefinitelstainlesssteelanshould.alsolastIIThepressuredxop,lterefficiency,Ifrequencies'l,assuxethat.Ctomeetitsdeignfunction.'ndvalveoperationtestthesyemcanoperatespecificaions,thewater.volumeandpresurein:theaccumulatorarechecked'eriodically'.'heothersystemsment,'onedoperatewhenthereactorisinoperationandbthesemeansareconnuouslymonitoredforsatisfactoryperformance.ereactorcoolantdraintankpumpsorateinterm'entlyduringreactoroperation,andthusaealsonitoredforsatisfactoryunderaccidentconditions.Astheadsorbisormallyisolated,thetestschedule,ursofoperationaswellaselapsedtime,thatitdoesnotdegradebelowtherequiredcharcoal\rlatedto'.Iwilassureadsoioni/AaarxhantNo.3345-9 Thetestconditionsfo'oalsampleefficiahosewhichmightbeefficienradsorbingeredunderanaccidentsituation.'ilterthecontrolroomatmosphere(recirculationandintakeair)duringcontrol",zoomisolation:conditions..HEPAfiltersazeinstalledbeforethecharcoalfilterstoremoveparticu~atematterandpreventcloggingoftheiodineadsorbers.The'charcoalfiltersreduce.theThecontrolroomairtreatmentsystemisdesignedto'irborneradioiodineinthecontzolroom.Bypassleakagemustbeataminimuminorderfoxthesefilterstoperformtheirdesignedfunction.Zftheperfoxmancesareasspecified.thecalculateddoseswillbelessthanthoseanalyzed..'etestingofthepostaccidentcharcoalsystemorthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystem'heentofpainting,fire,orchemicaleleaseiszecpxizonlyifthesystemiscratingandistprovidingiltzationfoxthareainwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillhe,totheextentitcangiventhconfigurationofthesystems,inacconcewithANSI'511975,"TestingofNuclearACleaningSystems."RneedmentNo.3345-10 References=(1)UFSARSection6.3.5.22)UFSARFigures15.6-12and.15.6-13(3UFSARSection6.5.1.2.4(4)FSARSection..6.44.l4.5-aa 3-1.4MaximumCoolantActivitSecifications3.1.4.1Wheneverthereactoriscriticalorthereactorcoolantaveragetemperatureisgreatertllan500'F:a.Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed84(EpCi/gm,whereEistheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesperdisintegrationinMev.b..TheI-131equivalentoftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed0.2pCi/gm..c.TheI-131equivalentof.theiodineactivityonthesecondarysideofasteamgeneratorshallnot.exceed0.1CO3pCi/gm.1.4.2Ifthelimitof3.1.4.1.aisexceeded,thenbesubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500'Pwithin.8hours.3.1.4.3a..IftheI-131equivalentactivityinthereactorcoolantexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.bbutislessthantheallowablelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,operationmaycontinueforupto168hours.AmendmentNo.$7,583~121 Thereactormaybetakencriticalorreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturemaybeincreasedabovea500FwiththeI-131equivalentactivitygreaterthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.baslongastheprovisionsofthisparagrapharemet.b.IftheI-131equivalent,activityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.bformorethan168hoursduringonecontinuoustimeintervalorexceedsthelimitshownonFigure3.1.4-1,besubcriticalwithreactorcoolantaveragetemperaturelessthan500Fwithin8hours;c.IftheI-131equivalentactivityexceedsthelimitof3.1.4.1.b,thenperformsamplingandanalysisasrequiredbyTable4.1-4,item4a,untiltheactivityisreducedtolessthanthelimitof3.1.4.1.b.L.co3.1.4a4Basis.Ifthelimitof3.1.4.1.cisexceeded,thenbeathotshutdownwithin8hoursandincoldshutdownwithinIthefollowing32hours.Thetotalactivitylimitfortheprimarysystemcorrespondstooperationwiththeplantdesignbasisof1/fueldefects.~Radiationshieldingandtheradioactivewastedisposalsystems 1veredesignedforoperationwith1%defects~~(2)Yhe'orctivityisconservatary.syssecondaryrespecttothelimitsonestablishedwitheactivityandprimary-condaryleakage(Specification3.1.5.2XftheactivityshouldexceedthespecifiedlimitsfollowingapowertransientthemajorconcernwouldbewhetheradditionalfueLdefectshaddevelopedbringingthetotaltoabove1%defects.Appropriateactiontobetakentobring'heactivityvithinspecificationincludeoneormoreofthefollowing:gradualIdeceaseinpovertoalowerbasepower,increaseinletdownflowrate,andventingofthevolumecontrol-tankgasestotnegasdecaytanks.Thespecifiedactivitylimitsprovideprotectiontothepublicagainstthepotentialrelease.ofreactorcoolantactivitytotheatmosphere,asdemonstratedbytheanalysisofasteamgenerator(3)tuberuptureaccident.The500Ptemperatureinthespecificationcorrespon'dsatsaturationto681psia,whichisbelowthesetpointofthesecondarysidereliefvalves-Therefore,pote'ntialprimarytosecondaryleakageatatemperaturebelow500Pcanbe.containedbyclosingthesteamlineisolationvalves.

References:

(1)PSARTable9.2-5(2)FSARSection11(3)LetterdatedSeptember24,1981fromDennisM.Crutchfield,/leiUSHRC,toJohnE.Haier,RGKE. b.Onecontainmentspraypumpmaybeinoperableprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin3days.c.Anyvalveorpipinginasystem,requiredtofunctionduringaccidentconditions,maybeinoperableprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin72hours.d.Onepostaccidentcharcoalfilterunitand/oritsassociatedfancoolermaybeinoperable.provided\theunitisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin7days.e.Thesprayadditivesystemmaybeinoperableforaperiodofnomorethan3daysprovidedthatbothcharcoalfilterunitsareoperable.3.3.33.3.3.1ComponentCoolinSstemThereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:a.Bothcomonentcoolinumsareoperable.b.componentcoozngeatexcanger/'areoperable.c.Allvalves,interlocksandpipingassociatedwiththeabovecomponentswh'harerequ'redtofunctionduringaccidentconditionsareoperable.3.3.3.2co'~~~i3~XVssTherequirementsof3.3.3.1maybemodifiedtoallowoneofthefollowingcomponentstobeinoperableatanyonetime.Ifthesystemisnotrestoredtomeettheconditionsof3.3.3.1withinthetimeperiod specified,therctorshallbeinhotshutdownwithinan@thenext6hours.I-f-Uco3.a.)L3~yhlthereactorshallbeinthecoldshutdownconditionwithinthefollowing30hours.Ifneithercomponentcoolingoi~'oaks~'I'feAtLQQwaterloopisoperable,tereaororsSsaTfbemaintainedbelowareactorcoolantsystemtemperatureof350Finsteadofatcoldshutdownandcorrectiveactionshallbeinitiatedtorestoreacomponentcoolingwaterlooptooperablestatusassoonaspossible.a.Onecomponentcoolingpumpmaybeoutofserviceprovidedthepumpisrestoredtooperablestatuslwith'nhours.b:-neheatexchangerorotherpassivecomponentmbeoutofservzc'dedthmmaystillopeateat1~pacityandrepairsaetednothin24hours.3.3'3.3.4.1ServiceWaterSystemThereactorshallnotbetakenabovecoldshutdownunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:y~~XV'ali3.3.4.2Lc.oa,g,pIZ.v.i~a.Atleasttwoservicewaterumsoneonbus17six~~dtsol~om<andoneonbus1B,andoneloopheaderareoperable.b.Allvalves,interlocks,andpipingassociatedwiththeoperationoftwopumpsareoperable.Anytimethattheconditionsof33~wept~~n+met,thereactorshallbeplacedin41abovecannotbehotshutdownwithin6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinanadditional30hours 4l 3.3.5ControlRoomEmerencvAirTreatmentSystem3.3.5.1ShallM~~~~K3.~~'.3.5.2~4OuQ~sa~as~~oll+44~+,ftrraeiwM.QRc3Therequirementsof3.3.5.1maybemodifiedtoallthecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemtobe~~operableinoperableforaperiodof48hours.Iftnesystemisnotmadeoperablewithinthose48hours,thereactorshallbeplacedinhotsnutdownwithinthenext6ChHN'3oadditional~hours.d'~lMmmsasasThe'normalroceduretoheatthssLrsteom<~~~~~4~~iSt~~~,<~4~4M.~i~a~++~>>~~K~@+4CuC~SCHIC@.a~~~4,,~desL~3~0~32~p undancyforcertainrangesofbreaksizes.'2)Thecontainmentcoolingand'odineremovalfunctionsa>>eprovidedbvtwoindependentsystems:(a)fan-coolerspluspostaccidentcharcoalfiltersand(b)containmentspraywithsodiumhydroxideaddition.Dur'ngnormalpoweroperation,onlytwoofthefourfan-coolersarereauiredtoremovehea"lostfromequipmentandpipingwithinconta'ment.IntheeventofaDesignBasis~(3)Accident,anyoneothefol'owingwillservetoreduceairborneiodineactivityandmaintaindoseswithinthevaluescalculatdintheCESAR:(1)twocontainmentspraypumpsandsodiumhydroxideadd'ion,(2)two"an-coolersandtwopostaccidentcharcoa'lters,or(3)onecontainmentspraypumpandsod'hydoxideaddit'onplusonefan-coolerfilter.,Inaddition,the,(~)assumesthatonecontainmentandonepostaccidentcharcoalcontainmentintegrityanalysisspravpumpandtwo"an-coolersoper-ate-toreducecontainmentpressureollowingaDes'gnBasis(9)Accident.Becauseothedif'cultyofaccesstomakerepa'rstoaan-coolerandbecauseofthe'owprobabilityo=aDesignBasisAcc'dentduringthattime,anadditionalsevendaysoce"a-t'onw'thaninoperablean-cooleris=ermitted.Thecontainmen"spraypumpsandsprayadd'ivesystemarelocatedoutsidecon-tainmentanda>>e,therefoe,lessdiff'culttorepai.There>>ore,">reecayswithaninoperablecontainmentspraypumpo'sprayaddit'vesystem'sdeemedacceptable.TheoonentCoolingSystemisdiferent:rcmtheothe>>svd'scusseda"ovthatthecomponentsareso'ointneAuxarBuildingastco=-coolntaccident.cessibl:rrpaira"ealoss-'t'on,'~du'ngthepost-acciden=phase"hecompo.ccoingwatersupple's'os,oreandcon"men>>ol"rgcouldbemaintaineduntilrepairswereeffected. Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps.,pnlyoneisneededduringtheinjectionphase,andtwoerecpcid=duringtherecircu'lationphasefapostulateloss-of-coolant,accident.'~'ontrolroomemergenc.airtreatmentsystemisdesignedtofilterthecontrroomatmospheredungperiodswhenthecontrolroomisolatedandtmaintainradiationlevelsinthecontro+roomatacceptablelevelsfollowingtheDesignBas"Accident.'Reactoroperationmaycontinue'orlimited.timewhile'repairsarebeingmdetotheatreatmentsystemsinceitisunlielythatthesystemMouldbeneeded.'ZechnicalSp"'ficat'n3.3.5appl-'esnlytotheequipmentnecessarytofilterthecontrlroomatmosere.Ecruipmentnecessarytoinitiateisotionof.thecontrolroomiscove/edbyanothrspecfication.Thelimitsortheaccumulatorpressureandvolumeassuretherequired,amountofwaterinjectionduringanaccident,andarebasedonvaluesusedforthe,accidentanalyses.Theindicatedlevelof50%correspondsto1108cubicfeetofwaterintheaccumulatorandtheindicatedlevelof82%correspondsto1134cubicfeet.Thelimitationofn'omorethan.onesafetyinjectionpumptobeoperablewhenoverpressureprotectionisbeingp'rovidedbyaRCSventof>1.1sq.in.insures3.3-13 eferences()Deleted(2)UFSARSection6.3.3.1(3)UFSARSection6.2.2.1(4)SARSection15.6.4.3(5}UFARSection9.2.2.4(6}UFSSection9.2.2.4(9)DeletedUFSARSction9.2.1.2UFSARSetion6.2.1.1(ConainmentIntegrity)andUFSARSection6.4(CREmeencyAirTreatment)(10)WestinghousReport,"R.GinnaBoricAcidStorageTankBoronConcentratonReductionStudy"datedNov.1992byC.J.McHghandJ.J.Spryshakt/1Il/~~/endment:No.3-3.14a 3.4TURBINECYCLEAoolicabili"vOb'ective3.4.1MAINSTEANSAFETYVALVESSecificationApplie~theoperatingstatusofturbinece.Todefineconditionstturbinecyclesteam-relievingcapacity,andtoinetheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemandsupporting~iceWaterSystemoperationasnecessarytoensuretWecapabilitytoremovecoredecay.TheStandbyiaryPeedwaterSystemprovidesadditionalaanceofcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.shouldtneAux'yPeedwaterSystembeunavailable.DExceptduringtestingofthe'mainsteamsafetyvalves,withtheRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,aminimumturbinecyclecodeapprovedsteamrelievingcapabilityofeight(8)mainsteamsafetyvalvesshallbeavailable.actionWithoneormoremainsteamcodesafetyvalvesinoperable,restoretheinoperablevalve(s)tooperablestatuswithin4hoursorbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Pwithinthefollowing6hours.3.4.2AUXILIA'RYFEEDWATER3'.2.l.MOTOR-DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSaecificationWiththeRCStemperatureatorabove3SO'F,bothmotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsmustbeoperable,eachwithanoperableflowpathfromthecondensatestoragetankstoitsrespectivesteamgenerator.Actiona-Withonemotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperableand'atleastoneturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathoperable,restorethepumptooperablestatuswithin7daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursand.atanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Pwithinthefollowing6hours. 4a+4o(p~,~C~'.a~cd.Iw'hbothmotor-dr'en~auxil'ryeertwazer@zipsinoperable,and~~'turbine-'"'enauxiiaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathoperable(see3.4.2.2),orwitha!motor-drivenandturbine-drivenpump~e~flowpat~inoperable,restoreapumptooperablestatuswithihoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandat'anRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours.~~A~+4~~~~"~~s.$AAo~~~4oeW.Withallaux'iaryfeedwaterpumpsinoperable(motor-driven,turbine-'driven,andstandby),immediatelyinitiate'orrectiveactiontorestoreanyofthesepumpstooperablestatusassoonaspossible.3.4.2.2TURBINE-DRIVENAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSecification(~Z,1.5.0.$.2WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,theturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpassociatedflowpathsfromthecondensatestoragetankstothesteamgenerators,andflowpathsofsteamfromeachsteamgeneratortothefumyturbine,1'-81'dmustbeshowntobeoperablepriortoexceeding5%power.)ActionWiththeturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpand/orbothassociatedflowpathsinoperable,restorethepump(andatleastoneflowpath)tooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatan.RCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthenext6hours.b.Withoneassociatedflowpathoftheturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperable,restoretooperablestatuswithin7daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthenext6hours.3.4.2.3STANDBYAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMSecificationQc.o3.~.+~~]Q.ih3504F,twostandbyassociatedflowpath~steam~o%<ActionWiththeRCStemperatureatoraboveauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpseachwithanfromthe.,servicewatersystemtogenerator,shallbeoperable.a.Withonestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpinoperablerestorethepumptooperablestatuswithin14daysorbeinhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandat.anRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours. b.Wit-".boths"and"yauxi'iaryeecwazermumpsrestoreatleast.onestandbyauxil'aryfeedwaterpumptooperablestatuswithin7daysorhe'atleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursand.atanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Finthefollowing6hours.3-4'SOURCESOFAUXILiARYFEEDWATERSecificationLcms,~.~a0WiththeRCStemperatureatorabove350'F,thefollowingsourcesofauxiliaryfeedwatershallbeoperable:l)oneormorecondensatestoragetanks.withaminimumo22,500gallonsofwater,and2)Service~aterastheprimarysupplytothestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsActicn~O3o>~LA.s<a.Withthecondensate'toragetanksinoperable,within4hourseither:1)restorethecondensatestoragetanksto'operablestatus,orbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350'Fwithinthefollowing6hours,QR2)'emonstratetheoperabilityoftheservicewatersystemasawatersupplytothemotor-drivenandturbine-driven<auxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsandrestorethecondensatestoragetankstooperablestatuswithin7days,orbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandatanRCStemperaturelessthan350Fwithinthefollowing6hours.b.Withtheservicewatersystemtooneorbothstandbauxiliaryfeedwaterpump(s)inoperable,declarethestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpump(s)inoperableandcomplywithSpecification3.4.2.3.Areactorshut.ompowerrequiresremovalofcore.decayImmediatedecayheatremequirementsarenormallysat'ythesteambypasstothecondenser.erefore,coreyheatcanbecontinuously'dissipatedviathestetothecondenserasfeedwaterinthesteamgenerator'onvetosteambyheatabsorption.Normally,theilitytoreturnfeeflowtothesteamgeneratorsiovided,byoperationoftheturb'lefeedwatersys t'.".eevent""areac""randturbinetrip,=ogetherwitha1ossofitepower,'nmediatedecayheatremovaliseffected.viahemainstesafetyvalves.hee'ghtmainsteamsafetyvalveshaveatotalcombiedratedcapabilityof6,580,000lbs/hr.Thiscapabilityexceedstheto1full.powersteamflowof6,577,279lbs/hr.Followinreactor/turbinetrip,themotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwatesystemisautomaticallyinitiatedonlow-lowlevel.inonestegenerator,SafetyInjectionsignal,or,atripofbothmainfeedwerpumps.Theturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpisinitiatonlow-'lowsteamgenerator.levelinbothsteamgenerators,ora1ssofpowertoelecicalbuses11Aand11B.Themotor-drivenailiaryfeedwatersystehastwo100%capacitypumps,eachnormallysevingonesteamgenerator.Theirsourcesofwterincludethenormally-alignedbunon-safety-relatedandnonSei'cCategoryIcondensatestorage'nks,andthesafety-relatedserviwatersystem.Theturbine-ivenauxiliaryfeedwatersystemconsitsofone200%capacitypump,twosteamsupplyflowpaths(onefromeahsteamgenerator),anormsourceofwaterfromthenon-safety-relaedcondensatestorages,andabackup'ourceofwaterfromthefety-relatedserviceatersystem."TheGinna'Stationaccidentalyses'*'ssume2gpmisdeliveredtoanoperablesteamgenerator,'rdertoremovetherequireddecayheat.Thecombinationofmotor-driveandturbinerivenauxiliaryfeedwater-pumpsassuresoperabilityoftesystemomeettheserequirements,evenassumingasinglefailure.Intheeventofahighenergylineakoutsidecontainment,'theoperabilityofthemotor-drivenandbine<<drivenauxiliaryfeedwater.!systemscannotbeensured,sincethstemsarenotqualifiedfortheensuingharshenvironment.Thetanyauxiliaryfeedwatersystem,whichconsistsoftwo-redundantumps,dischargeflowpathtoeach!steamgeneratorandsuctionomboth[oopsofthesafety-relatedservicewatersystem,performthisfuncti.OperatoractionfromthecontrolroomisrequiredtoffectoperationoftheSAFWsystem.Theworst-caseanalysis,afeeaterlinebreak,"hasbeenperformed,andtheconsequenceswerefodtobeacceptable.IIThemiriimnmimountofsterinthecondensatestoragetanksistheamountneededtoremodecay'heatfor2hoursaerreactortripfromfullpower.'Anunmited,sourceforauxiliaryfewaterisavailableusingthesafety-ratedservicewatersystem.

References:

(1)UFSARSect.n10.5(2)UFSARStions15.2,15.3,15.6(3)"EffetsofHighEnergyPipeBreaksOutsidethentainmentBuiing"submittedbyletterdated,November1,.1973romK.W.Amsh,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoA.G1usso,putyDirectorforReactorProjects.-I(L.D.White,Jr.lettertoMr.D.Z.Ziemann,USNRCdatedNarc28,1980.(5)SEPTopicXV-6,FeedwaterSystemPipeBreaks,NRCSERdated9/4/J.

FuelHandlinintheAuxiliaBuildinAlicabilitApplieolimitationswhilemovingirradiatedfuetheoperatingrareaoftheauxiliauilding.TolimitdosesieeventaniriatedfuelassemblyIisdasignificantly.SecificationDuringhandlingoffuelassembliesintheauxiliarybuildingwheneitherthefuelbeinghandledorthefuelstoredinthespentfuelstoragepoolhasdecayedlessthan60dayssinceirradiation,thefollowingconditionsshallbesatisfied:a0b.C~Oneauxiliarybuildingmainexhaustfanshallbeoperating.Theauxiliarybuildingexhaustfan1C,whichtakessuctionfromthespentfuelstoragepoolIarea,shallbeoperating.S,k~W~CLIAAF.Q~~~Al-1-deems-sMheoperatingfloorarea~theoutsideeclosedexceptthatthepersoeoraccessired>>d.Roughingfiltersshallbeinstalledattheinlettotheadsorbers.

e.Charcoaladsorbers-shallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuelstoragepoolareaandshallbeoperable'.'onlevelsinthespentfuelstorcontinuously.3~~Aloadxnexcessofonefuelassemblyand'ts'ngtoo)shallnes'rpermittedtopaysoveigerackscontainingspentu3.11.fuelpooltemperatuimitedtoTherestr>ct)onof3.11.3aboveshallnotapplytomovement-~cannisterscontafnfnnsadatedfuelrods~fthespent&neaththetransportedercontainonlyspentfuelthathas-decaedatleastb0dayssincereactorshutdown.Bases:arcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequenceofareclingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofsingleirradiatefuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorrsshouldbeemployedwneverrecentlyirradiatedfueliinghandled.Thisrequiresthatheventilationsystemsuld.beoperatinganddrawingairthroughthadsorbers.Thenlyexceptionto.the'nghandled,oranyfuelinleast60dayssinceirradiation.requirementoccurswhenthfueloperationofthecharaladsorbersisnificantlylessthantheguidelinesof0CFg100.thestoragepoolshasdecayedTheconsequencesofafueandlingccidentinthiscase'-withoutAmendmentNo.$.18~L2~1/AmendmentNo../

~V~edesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromthoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towadthentfuelstoragepool,intotheareaexhaustducts,thughtheadsrbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhasttothefaciltyvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuildiexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilaonsystemexhaustduct'llgothroughaHEPAandbedischargdtothe1facilityvent.perationoftheexhaustfanforhespentfuelstoragepoolareaausesairmovementontheocratingfloortobetowardthepool.Preroperationofthefsandsettingofdamperswouldresultianegativepressueontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcausealeakagetobintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflow'sfromtlocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)tothareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhausirflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalefoebeingdischargedfromthefacility.Theroughingfilerprotctstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsrberremoveiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsijnficance,resulingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffecivenessofcharcoalrremovingiodineisassuredbyhavinghighthroughputandahxhremovalefficiency.Thethroughput'sattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalfficiencyisattainedbyminimizintheamountofiodinethabypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotentiforremovingtheiodinethatdoespassthrghthechareal.'/3~11-3AmendmentNo.19 hespentfuelpooltanperatureislimitedto150'Fbecauseithespentfuelpoolcoolingsystemisnotatthattemperatue,suffi'enttime(approximately7hours)isavailabletoov'idebackupcoling,assumingthemaximumanticipatedheatad(fullcoredischae6previouslystoredfuel),untilatperatureof180'Fisreached,thetemperatureatvhichthestcturalintegrityofthepoolvasanalyzedandfoundacceptable.Therequirementofll.5insuresthatshoulahandlingaccidentoccurduringthemovementofaconsolidatfuelcannister(asdescrihedin5.4.)thedoseattheexclusionareahoundazywouldsatisfytherequirementsof10CFR100.References(1)FSAR-Section9.3-1s(2)AHS-5.1(N18.6),Octor1973(3)Letter,J.A.Zwolinsk',(USNRC)toR.W.Kober,(RG6E),November14,1984.311-4Amendment50.gy19.' ER.saSaSRSt2ZASgs,aTABLE4.1-2INXMUMFR~F.UENC'<FPFOREAU'aMiNTANDcAt~~N~E~1.ReactorCoolantChemistrySamples2.ReactorCoolantBoronChlorideandFluorideOxygenBoronConcentration~recruency3times/weekandatleasteverythirdday5times/weekandatleasteveryseconddayexcept,whenbelow250FWeekly3.RefuelingHaterStorageTankWaterSample4.BoricAcidStorageTankBoronConcentrationSaranConcentrationWeeklyTwice(Week'+5.ControlRads6a.FullLengthControlRod6b.FullLengthControlRod7.Pressurizer.Safety~Valvesst,g.'>.a.l8;HainSteamSafetyValves9.ContainmentIsolationTri0.RefuelingSystemInterlocksRoddroptimesofallfulllengthrodsMoveanyrodnotfullyinsertedasufficientnumberofstopsinanyanodirectiontocauseachangeofpositionasindicatedbythorodpasitianindicationsystemMoveeachrodthroughit:sfulllengthtaverifythatt:herodpositionindicationsystemtransitionsoccur.SetpaintloGeant.FunctioningFunctioningAftervesselheadremovalandatleastonceper18months(1)MonthlyEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownEachRefuelingShutdownPriortoRefuelingOperationsAmendmentNe.g,574~1-8 8.'ii.tn11.ServiceWaterSystem12.FeProtectioumpandPowSupplyTestFunctioningFunction'~FrsauencEachRefuelingShutdownonthly13.SprayAdditiveTankNaOHConcentMonthly15.PrimarySystemLeakage14.AccumulatorBoronConcentrationEvaluateBi-MonthlyDaily16.~6.4i.DieselFuelSupplyFuelInventoryDailySP3,'7.A7~gg.3.1N.l19SpentFuelPitSecondaryCoolantSamplesCirculatingWaterFloodProtection-EcyxipmentBoronConcentrationGrossActivityCalibrateMonthlyEachRefuelingShutowNotes:(1)Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptime'ofthosesecificNotrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisfogJ'-131ecLaivalentactivityistaisedatleastmonthlwhenverthegrossacvxyetermxnationxndicesxoonencentrationgreerthan104ofhealablelimitonlyonceperonthswhenevertgrosstivity.deteinationindicatiodineconcentraonbelow10<ofthelowablelimit.HhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.3-('33AmendmentNo.g,5741-9

4.5.2.3.6AtleastonceeverylSmonthsozafterevery720hoursocharcoaliltzationsystemoperationsincethelasttest,orfollowingpain'ng,f'zeozchemicalreleaseinanyventilat'onzonecommunicatingwiththesystem,thecontzolrccmemergencyairtrea"-.entsvstemshallhave"".eollowingcond'onsdemons=ratd.a~Thepressuredzopacrossthecomb'ned=-PAiltrsandcharcoaladsorbezbanksis1ssthan6"ofwateratde-qg.'3.lA,3;)R,K~Wes'os'c..flowrate<~3.0$).b.Znp'aceFreontesting,undeambientcondt-cns,sha'-showatleast99$removal.cInplacetheme.1ygeneratedDCPtestingothe2=-PAtersshallshowat:least99Kremoval.d..Thesuitsoflaboratoryanalysisonacarbor.samplshal'how908o-greaterradioact'vemethy'od'dezemova'hentestedatat'ast125'=and95>>RHan"at.1.5to2.0mg/mloadingw'.ztaggedCH3Z.4.5.2.3.7A"tereachcompleteorpartia'eplacementoftheHZPA'tezbankorafteranystucturalmaintenanceonthea~PAhous'ngzorthecontrolzoomemerge..cya'rtreatmentsvstea,thecon-donofSpeci"'cat'n4.5.2.3.6.csha3.1bedemons"="edo"4.5.2.'.3theafectedpor"'onofthesystem.Afteeachreplacementofacharcoaldrawerora"anystz'turalmaintenanceonthechazcoa'ousing="rthe"".".zol:roomerne"=encyairtea"..entsvstem.theconditionGfSpecf'a='n4.5.2.3.6.bshabede,o..s""atedorthes<<<o~<<ad<<<<<<<<portio..othesystem. 4~5.2.3.95g.9.~<3.l.8.2.=-xcept"ur'ngcoldorefuelingshutdownstheautomaticinit'ationothecon""oloomemergencyairtreatmentsystemshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonthto.verifyoperahilitvandproperorientat'cnandflowsha'1bemaintainedtMoughthesystemforatleast15minutes.Thetstshallbeperformedpriortostar='ifmet'-esincethelasttestexceedsonemonth.Bas5SafetvTn~ecticnS~)s~~andheCcnta=-..on-S-ravvs~o-.,arov<<i<<~~~>>1<<1>>v+WoOc0M&4saogu>><<<<tk4a>at+opo~1~s)4<<<<eg>>4+rV<<or<<4<<<<<<<<<<<<sag4=c<<vrcpa+asos~'so=erat.ng"ecauseSa=etvinjectionsigna~cuoscon<<ai:me.-so'atonandCcntainmentSoaySjstemtestq'"e"."osvstemobetemporarydisablec."omehc"Compeesystemstestscannotbepero~edwhen"".ereacorofassur'".gcperabilityofthesesvsiems:s"".erefcretoco-;bin=-st"="s"eststobeper=ormeddwingannualp'."shut-downs,w'thmor=recuentc"mponenttests,wnich~~be"eformedduringreactoro-eration.operat'nS1stemsstoems$sdemonsr>>te'hort"eSaety,L.jection,andConta~entScravNi"hthepumpsblcckedfromsta'"-atstsignalisappliedtoinit'ateautcmaticact'cn

efficiency.Thetestconditionsforcharcoalsamplead.sorbingefficiencyarethosewhichmightbeencounteredunderanaccidentsituation.'~'controlroomairtreatmentsystemisdesignedtfiterthecontrolroomatmosphere(recirculationdintaeair)duringcontrol.roomisolation:condiions..HEPAftersareinstalled,beforethecharcoafilterstoremovpartin~atematterandpreventoggingoftheiodinedsorbers.Thecharcoalfiltsreduce.theairborneradiiodineinthecontrolroom.Bypassleakagemusthetaminimuminorderforthesefilterstoperformthedesignedfction.Xftheperformancesareasecifiedtcalculated.doseswillbelessthanthoseanalred.'etestingofthepostac'ntcharcoalsystemorthecontrolroomemeigencyaitreatmentsystemintheeventofpainting,ire,chemicalreleaseisrecgxiredonlyifhesystem'soperatingand,isprovidingfiltrion,forthe,eainwhichthepainting,fireorchemicalreleaseocurs.Testingofeairfiltrationsystemsillbe,totheextentitcan,giventheconfigurationofthesystems,inaccdancewithMSXN510-197S,"TestingfNuclearAir-eaningSystems."tNo.3345-10 References.1)UFSARSection6.3.5.2()UFSARFigures15.6-12and15.6-13(3)UFSARSection6.5.1.2.4(4)SARSection..6.4~.3.tNo33 MainSteamIsolation<ValvesAolicabilitAppliestoperiodictestingofthemainsteamisolationvalves.~Ob'ective,Toverifytheabilityofthemainsteamisolationvalvestoclose5g.3.l.x.<SR.uonsignal.OOc'-',y~QgSecificationThemainsteamisolationvalvesshallbetestedateachre&clinginterval.Closuretimeoffivesecondsorlessshallbeverified.loadconditions.ThevalvesaretestedundernofiowandatnoWV,sW~~~S~Ma~~~~o3L.e-"~XMe3acL"gva3eau~erg~hiS1sThemasteamisolationvalvesservetolimitanexcessivereaorcoolantIsystemcooldnrateandresultantreactivityinsertionowingamainsteambreakincidenTheirabilitytocLoseuposignalshouldbeveri-fiedateachscheduledrelingshutdownAclosuretimeoffiveseconds'Iwasselectedasbeingconsistentexpectedresponsetimeforinstru-mentationasdetailedinthsteamlinereakincidentanalysis.Brfereccee:F'SA-Section10.4rSAR-Section14e2.54.7-1 4.8AUXILIARYPEEIMATERSYS~AlicabilitvAppliestoperiodictestingrequirementsoftheturbine-driven,motor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps,andofthestandbyauxiliary.feedwaterpumps.Toverifytheoperabilityoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemandthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwater.systemandtheirabilitytorespondproperlywhenrequired.SecificationSa.4.8.1Exceptwhenbelow350'Feachmotor-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump,unlessitisdeclared,inoperablewithouttestinwillI*CH(Io.h+~4.8.2Exceptwhenbelow350hythesteamturhine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump,unlessitisdeclaredinoperablewithouttestinwillbestartedatintervalsnottoexceedeontfg'aad-a~~ratIfonediscargepaeraexnaccorancewithSpeci'.4.2.2,'flowof2QOgpmc.-hestah3i.Oncetheinoperable/dischargefloweurneestatusaflowof4beestablishedw'ithin72hourste4'.34.8.435.i'AA4.8.5Sg..~.5's35.4vExceptwhenbelow..359'~he~ucili~geedyaterpumpssuctiondischarge,hllIexercisedatintervalsa~a-exae~~enExceptwhenbelow350'Feacstandbyaux'aryewaezpump,unlessitisdeclaredinoperablewithouttestinwillbeddhhmbl-isExceptwhenbelow350'Fthe'a~Pean<<rossovermotoroperatedvalvesforesanyaum.xfeedwaterhill44.8.6SnZ.~.S;E4.8.7esbeconsidereds1boardindicationaervationoftheequipmentrat:ethatallcomponentshaveoeraThesetestsshallbeper.ormepriortoexceedin~..55owerduringstartupAtleastonceepr(@Wontsh,controloEthestandhyauxiliaryfeedsyst:empumpsandvalvesfromthecontrolroomwillbedemonstrated.S~acQ.a~.~Prn~ ZL4.8.8AtleaseonceperQ"'monthsduz'ngshutdown:Verifythateachautomaticvalveintheflowpath"reachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpactuatestoitscorrectposit'uponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.Sa.s.~.5-.L.b.Verifythateachauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpstartsasdesignedautomaticallyuponreceiptofeachauxiliaryfeedwateractuationtestsignal.C~c.W~A4~~~4.8.9Eachinstrumentationchannelshallhedemonstratedoperahlehytheperformanceof.theChannelCheck,ChannelCalibration,andChannelFunctionalTestoperationsforthemodesand,atthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.'.4.8.10Theresponsetimeofeachpumpandvalverequiredfortheoperationofeach"train"ofauxiliaryfeedwatershallbedemonstratedtobewithinthelimitof10minutesatleastonceper18months.asm,sThenthlytestingoftheauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingfeedwatto'hesteamgeneratorswillverifytheirabilitytomeetminimumrizedflowrates.ThecapacityofanyoneoftKethzeeauxiliaryfwaterpumpsissufficienttomeetdecayheatremovalreguirements'.~properfunctioningcfthesteamturhineadmissionvalveandthefeechqaterpumps'.startwilldemonstrate.theintegrityofthesteamdrivenpMonthly'testingofthestandbyauxiliaryfeedwaterpumpsbysupplyingwaterfromacondensatesugp+tanktothesteamgeneratorswillverifytheir'bilitytomeetminimumrequiredftowrates.IThestandbyauxiliaryfeedwatezpwouldbeusedonlyifallthree.auxiliaryfeedwaterpumpswereunavaile."'neofthetwostandbypumpswouldbesufficientto<meetdecayheatremoval'equirements.Properfunctioningofthesuctionvalvesfrtheservicewatersystem,thedischargevalves,anctAhecrossovervalvewilldemonstratetheiroperability.Theoperabilityofthestandbyaliaryfeedwaterpumpflowpathsbetweentpumpsandthesteamgeneratsisdemonstratedusingwaterfrometesttank.Testingofthealiaryfeedwaterpumpsusingrprimarysourceofwatersupplywxverifytheoperabilitytheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowpath.Verific~onofcorrectoperationwillbemadebothfrominstrentationwithinthemaincontrolroomandbydirectvialobrvationofthepumps. ~I~Rences:(1)FSAR-'on1O.5(2)FSAR-Sections15.,5.3,15.6(3)"EffectsofHighPiprea)j:sOutsidetheContainment~Building"s'dbyletterdateovember1,1973fromK.W.Amish,esterGasandElectricCorpo'ontoA.Giambusso,yDirectorforReactorProjects,U.AtomicEnergyCommission. 4~11RefuelinAlicabilitF11.14.11.1Appliestorefuelingandtofuelhandlinginthespentfuelpool.SpentFuelPitCharcoalAbsorberSystem.1Within60dayspriortoanyoperationofthespentfuelpoolcharcoal2ldsozbezsystemasrequiredbySection3.11,thefollowingconditionsshallbedemonstrated.IAftertheconditionshavebeendemonstrated,theoccurrenceofpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunicatingwiththespentfuelpoolcharcoalQ~Q9$+zsystemshal1requirethatthefollowingconditionsberedemonstrated,beforefuelhandlingmaycontinue,ifoperationofthespentfuelp0r31charcoa1adsorbedsystemisrequiredpersection3.'lla.Thetotalairflowratefromthecharcoal4dSorhL~),10b.Coshallbeatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithacompletesetofnewabsorbers.Zn-placeFreontesting,.underambientconditions,shallshowatleast99%removal.Theresultsoflaboratoryanalysisonacarbonsampleshallshow90%orgreaterradioactivemethyliodideremovalwhentestedatleast1504Fand95%RHandat1.5to2.0mg/mloadingwithtaggedCH3Z. d.Flowbemaintainedthroughthesystemeitherthefilterorowpathforatleast1'eachmonth.4.11.1.2Aftereachreplacementofacharcoalfilterdrawerorafteranystructuralmaintenanceonthecharcoalhousingforthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbezsystem,theconditionofSpecification4.11.1.1.bshallbedemonstratedfortheaffectedportionofthesystem.ResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculation4.11.2.1Whenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelis'nthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandc'zculating4.11.2.24.11.34.11-3.1reactorcoolantatleastonceper4hours.Whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofreactorvessel-flangeislessthan23feet.,bothRHRpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeoperablebyperformingthesurveillancespecifiedintheInsezvicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CZa.50.SSa.WaterLevel-ReactorVesselThewaterlevelinthereactorcavityshallbedeterminedtobeatleast,itsminimumrequireddepthwithin2hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterduringmovement,offuelassembliesorcontrolrodsincontainment.Themeasurementairflowassuresthatairisb'awnfromthespentfuelpitareaanroughtheadsorbers.Theflowismeanortoemployingtheadsorberestablishthat4.11-2 1TheFreontestprovidesameasureo'ftheamountofleakagefromaroundthecharcoaladsorbent.Theabilityofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeteriorateasthe'harcoalagesandweathers.Testingthecapacityofthecharcoaltoadsorbiodineassuresthatanacceptableremovalefficiencyunderoperatingconditionswouldbeobtained.Thedifferencebetweenthetestrequiementofaremovalefficiencyof90%formethyliodineandthepercentageassumedintheevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccidentprovidesadequatesafetymarginfordegrada-tionofthefilteraftrthetests.Retesingofthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersystemintheeventofpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseisreguiredonlyifthesystemisoperatingandisprovingfiltrationfortheareainwhichthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfiltrationsystemswillbetested,totheextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,in'ccordancewithANSIN510-1975,"TestingofNuclearAir-C'aningSystems".Theoperabilityrequirementsfor-residualheatremovalloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelingmode.Therequire-mentfor23feetofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangewhilehandlingfuelandfuelcomponentsincontpnmentisconsistentwiththeassump-tionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.

Reference:

(1)LetterfromE.J.Nelson,RochesterGasandElect"icCorporationtoDr.PeterA.Norris,U.S.AtomicEnegyCommission,datedFebruary3,19714.11-3 5.4FuelStorageSecification5.4.25.RAThenewandspentfuelpitstructuresaredesigned.towi~~andtheanticipatedearthcpxakeloadingslassIstructures;..Thespentfuelpithasstainless,steel~'r..<I).<.".r..linertoensureagainst-osswater.~<'henewandspentfstorageresaredesignedsothat~~itisimpos'betoinsertfuelassemblie~otherthanthprescribedlocations.Thespent,fuelstoragesaredividedintotworegionsasdepictedonFigure5.4-1.The~,Q.AL,o5.4.33wl+))fue'sstoredverticallyinanarraywithsufficientcentetocenterdistancebetweenassembliestoassure'eff<0.95for(1)unirradiatedfuelassembliesdelivereda<kk'>niVo.feaiich~9priortoJanuary1,1984(Region1-15)Q<e<<bc<Mba,nQQQ~c<qhtpttce<<+@~A/5and(2)uniLrradiatedQiHLl<<<ga.lf1Hl'l'1ft~1.1184~Chnc4mc~4Mqrea~rf4ln4OSlac~h4en%0235Bothcasesassumunboratedwaterusedinthepool.InRegion2ofthespentfuelstorageracks,fuelisstoredinaclosepackedarrayutilizingfixedneutronpoisonsineachofthestoredlocations.Fordischarged~+<fuelassembliestobestoredinRegion2,(1)6oYsmusthaveeapsedsinethecorecachedhotspriortoischarged2)thecombinationofassemblyaverageburnupandinitialU-235enrichmentmustbe<utah-'thatt:1~pniot-d"ti<-eai'jlesecwoparametersonFigure5.4-2isabovethelineapplicabletot.'articularfuelassemblydesign,thereforeassuringthatKeff<0.95 ~I~5.4.4l.3.t.l~ILL<.CannisterscontainingconsolidatedfuelrodsmayhestoredineitherRegionlor2providedthat:'-.i4~-.averagebmnupandmt~=-lenridmcg5~f+Bio'uelassembliesfromwhichtherodswareremovedasatisfytherequirementsof5.4.2and5.4.3.above,andb.theaveragedcayheatthefueassemblyfmhichthedswereemovedisessthan205.4.55.46'~)ereguirentsof.4.4amayexceptedorthoseconsolitedfuelsembliesfRegionThespentfue3.storagepitisfilledwithhoratei}vater.ataconcentrationtomatchthatusedinthereactorcavityandrefuelingcanalduringrefuelingoperations~whenever.thereisfuelinthepit.I,cpu1of100.InRegion2,Keff<.isinsured~~addition'ofLixedneutronpoison(borex)ineaftheRegionstorage~~1ocations,andamizumumburnuprccpzirementaSanctionofinitialenrichmentfcreachfuelassambljdesign~$0de*'coolxhg~~re~~&a.~ur~s~'raQostulo,Msw+rcttheresultingdoseattheKASwouldbewithin19'sof100.2lSXSecenterto4=enterspacingofRegion2tKeff<0.95foxtheenrichmentlimitationsxpeciin542,an6forapostulatedmissileimpactthegdoseattheESsrouMhewithinthedes i<<W).<<W).~5)<<XLWRRRQW5%%%WXXXXQOXWSW%%%%Rtxawxi:<<ii-.<<ii:<<x=<<sraaraaaxxNaaaaaxwaasaaxwsemww)-<<XC<<Xi.~WC(WRWXXXRRWWROXWRWXWRRRWXXXRRIRIXIx>.ii.(xi(g~<<waawxxwxxwxaaaaRNaawaxNNRWwxICi>.<5~{i.EQRXXRWRXWXIQXQXXRXXXXXRWXRXN5XMhei~=<<i~=<<i=<<aSWWalaaeIWalwweearWaraWeIWIXIc<<xc<<we<<ae<<warwweawwaxewwwwwwxwwiwwwwwewwehei~=<<r:<<i=eWWWXIWWNMaWWSWWrWXWeaaeaWeaeMC<<XC<<RC<<WC<XRXXXRXRXRRRXRRXXXRXXRXXX8%51XRW)35~.<<5)<<Wi<<OXXXXXWWSMQWQMWWaWWWWWWWQSNMSM)-<<5).<<5~.<<5)3XWXWWXMXSSIOXXIXXXRXXRWXXRMS+IXIX).~5i.<%i".<<Wi~%WWWWIWWWSSSWMWMQMWWSWW%%%8%%%)<<II)<<Wi.<<X>.(XWXXXX1XMXXRWXRWXXRXWOWXXRRRXXWSU~5).~%i.~5~<<QXWWQWWXXQSXNMWXXWWWWWWQWWQMSM%).lX>3%><<C<WC<HC<<X><<W)3%6<<5).<IWXXXRQXIOISIIIXXRXXXNRXXWRS'WIIW)-<<5>31>3%5%)-<<X><<INC<<SC<QC<<X)3i<<NWWWOISMWISMWHMW%%%%5WWWWWII;:SWIw)35)-(x)3%)<<wc<<5><<w><<xc<<wc<<xQawwwwRRwwrxwQxwwrxrwwwNRNtNx65)-<x)-<wt3%i35><<>35>3N)<<1i<<%)iaaaawRwxxxaaaaalxaawwwwaQxxWi<<Xi<<Wi<<Wi3%i5li3Xi3li.<<Wi3Wi.(WRISTWIIIRISIRRRIRISIRRIWRIIII><A><5><5><5>35>35M>>%><5><%5XRWXR55555555%5555%5555'II%%5SC<<WC<<5i<<%><<5<<Xi(M355ai<<X>3WWWWWSWWrWWOWXXWXWWWWOWW%5%%%ggi=<<5i"<<x"<<%~"<<'Qi<<5=<<%"<<w<<5<<5><<5Qxwwwxx%%%5xwxxxwxwwwx%5%%wQQxc<<xc<<ae<<.'IIi=<<avw"<<a-<<ai-.<<a"<<Xe<<xwrxwwxxrrlaxrarxrxwrrwrraxxerwxi=<<ri=<<i=<<wi-.<<i"~wxwwwxxarwwxaMxxxxaawwsaMawxic~gi<wc<<xi.(w>3xRWRRRRRRRRwlxrwrxwrrwwRR.Rgg':-lIc<<a-x:<<a:<<x=iaxxxwxxwwaxxxxxxwxwxslsxexelww6g=<<aiba~=<<X3%WXWRWSRNXRXIRIXIWI%%WIIIIWWIW'IXIg)"<<QCQC<<W>3%iW55%XWWQX%%%%%%%%%8%8558%5M8%1 I(4IISIIIfaI'IOrIICINCII~I4ISSICCIII'sCeIalvISLI4lb'LLssco.ea~e1ss~s~FIGURE5.4-2Ill;s30gAg2010aI~~~I~~elI~Il,~~~'fef~~~ilosl!r.~I~IssIfa:I~~~~~~l~~~s~~'s~~ITENREGIONSOFILSPACCRAHPGETABOFITYYATHPGI'DFUEUHLACCINREBILON2TAI~l~-illFORSTOI~II~lliaI~'o<<~l~~~~(.I~I(It~;ilI~eI~elitIlli~le'l,~~ls~~;lii~I'I~I'~I'II:IsIs'<<IIi~~~~~~.I'I.-"e~~~I('srj}i';!IIle~~~~a~~ll~I~',IJe!I~~~~~~~(~e~~~I~llll'.'~~~~~I~~~I"so<<<<ll'l~*l:I.~~~s<<IliI'~~~EPTABLE.II~~~I~FORllIsI.'III:RACC'ell<<ll~J(lel~~slI..I'jile~~ll~~~~UELDELIVEREDPRIO'iJANUARY1,198~o~~lisle~~~I.<<4~~~~~~(~~~I'l~eo~I"J'.'J('I~~IIl.~j~o~~<<se.(fI,I~s~'l~~a~~I~~~~~~~s~f~~e~ll~I~~I:,::~~1.50~o\~I~,aJe"5.'o:I.I~~~~e~I~~ll~~~~~~e}e~~~'.ll.:.I;i:l(}~e~~~~~~I2.00~~~~~I.(II~llI.~~I~~IREG~ITOa~i}'.~jl::;Iil',IO~To~II~~I~~~~:II'2IsfsI'li'i(I;~;(a~~:(ijj::!!l"I~~~I~lslsii-';ll)I,'.:.IIliII.l!r,ll~(~ll"'s~I;~'~a}I~}I.II',I.;qrIl~~(Ts(ll,~,'.I'}Il(I~III~lll~~-'II~'sI'J('eI(~~~~~~~~~~a~~s}i:ll}Ill~~~~el~li~(~~Iiael:I(Ie.:Il}WV]I~~~~lse~.I:,;I'~IlIi'~(I.Il,':i'lj;:~I~~IlI>>~s~Il~'lIll':I:!III~~I!!~;'I'I~~s~~(~~l'elIII'Iellel~IIl'~fl,(II~~ls}~~ss[[I!IlsIsI~a'I~sI.';li(i}Isl~a~'i;~~~Iel'l'~~~I~IsI~~~~lI'l~Ij.III.'~elI-(rl,l~('(e~~~~I~jj.l~oa(~s~~lelI!I}jI-}-elll~~(~I:,~s~IUN<<oIj,I:I'~~~~~lI'I~~I(."3.00INITXALENRICJJHENT:II:(el:',1)',,i}I(:I"as~'ll}'(j.'l';'.IP,~~:II~~~~I}tI~I~I~~I~~a~:I':~e:l'}IIIIIII;~<<s'I}~I(~I'~Isll.~~:I'ill~IIjeIII<<-,}".f~.ll'Is.~To'I:.:I~I~~'i/e]e~~~i~~I~~~!it!lI~~~l~Ii:I}(.l:i}}:.CC~~s~(~ABLEEPTel~~;:;.:.J.:.}:i'i';:'i!II}::":.:I}(FUELaill~sI..(l.I:i.lee(ll~~si~~ls'l~~~lI~I~~~~~~I~I~~~Is.'I~',~~JAs~l(NUA~ll'l~~I~'lI'lIlTeI'ei,~~(:I'(ll~s~llsI'}li'I:s~~~I~~i~'~~'I>>~II~a:;j'i"I'II~~}.'.~jJ,lIsIi~I~,'.lI:<<}~~~~I~o~~eI~~ssI'~(~I(.':I~l'IIs\~<<e~~Iw'II'1:(~s~l~~l".:I:~I:sl:FO~e~l~lI~~~I'~~~s'II~~~I:ail'illI..I~I~~~~~I~f~fI~l(,"~s'1!::la:!~~s(.~ll~Is~l'~~flis;ll~SII;I)f'.lE:ON:(a">>I..;a~eI-~EGX~lI~Is~l}J,':l}'.I~r:.Iil:;iI~s~}~I~~~~:,}I("e~I~,~I~I~~~IlI'JE.ll~:l..~lle~~~~l'~Il'~~a~~ll~~iI~~~e~~l~~'}~'"II."ll::.el'I~II4.004.25DELIVHREDFTHRJARY1,19aa1:eg~el.la~e,o~WIoaI.alalI.I.-I;"ao

ThetwocurvesofFigure5.4-2dividethefuelessemhdesignsintotvogroups.ThefirstgroupisallfueldeliverpriorQJanuary1,1984.This.iacoxporatm.a'-l~>ml's~g-houseEX'esignsasedat,Ginna.Thesecondcarve~ortheMestinghousOptimizedFuelAssemblydesigndeliveredGinnaheginningiaxuaxy1984.TheassemblyaveragebuxxorpiscalculdusingIECOREl,t'generatedpowersharingdataandtheactualyantoperating~history.Theaalculadassemblyaverageupshouldbereducedhy10'oaccountforuncertainties.ancextuntyof4gisassociatedwiththeaeasuzementofposershying.Theadditional-6gprovidesadditionalmarginhoundthebuxnup.uncertaintyassociatedwiththetimehetweeneasuzements,an6updatesOEcoreturnup.'%ecuxvesoffiguref.4-incozporatetheuncertaintiesofthecalculation-ofassemblyxea~Theca1culationsoffuelasslyhuxxa@Sorcamyaxb'ontothecuxvesofFigure-5.4-2todeterminetheacceptability'orstorageinRegion2shallhe~dependently.TherecordofthesecalculationsshaDhekeptfor'asEonfuel.assembliesxenuaininthepl.Mestorage.cannistersaredesignedIthatrsoxmallyfycancontaintheecpxivalentmeteroffu'ols~mMouelassembliesinaclosepackedaxray,andcaneatored.~eitherRegion1orRegion2.racklocationsTheseQackeP.ax~yviU.iasure~e'Kcoftherackconfigurationconganynumberofcauustersvi11belessthanthatforstozedSeelJassembliesatthesamehuxnupandinitialenrichment.The~eptio

fparagraph5.4.5ispossiblebecausetheconsolidatedconfiaisubstantiallylessreactivethanthat,ofafuel~embl/he8cayheatxhcpireme'ntvi11ins~pxe..that',loca~"boilingvillnotoccurbetweentheclosepackedfuelifthepooltemperatureisaaintainedatorbelowLSD'F.ThedeciyheatoftheassywillbedeterminedusingAMS5,ASS9-2.:orotheracceptahlsubstitutestandards.Withtheadditionofthestoraofconsolidatedfuelc:annisters,thetheoreticaletoragecacityofthepoolmu1dbeincreasedto2032fuelassemblie(2x10L6).Rowever,duetolimitationontheheatremofa1abilityofthespentfuellpoolcoolingsystem,t3'torecapacityislimitedtoN16.fuelassemblies.S'ReferencesX.Letter,Z.E.ertoB.R.eton,=NaxuxaxyM,3.984-"--.-l2.LetterZ.Z.khd.er~H.R.Ston,Mmnxary8,19843.CriticalMaQyiisofRegion2oftheFuelrageRack.Pickard,XeveanCGaxrfck,mRSpent-8~%984,T.R.Robbins,Pickard,XoweandGarrick,J.D.Cook,mt"BZMarchLS,1984.Xetter,D.M.Cru&~eldtoJ.E.Maier,November,~t5,XSBLr~~44'",~'I4~~~ 3.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOR'PERATION3.0.1APPLICABILITYIntheeventaLimitingConditionforOperationand/orassociatedactionrequirementscannotbesatisfiedbecauseofcircumstancesinexcessofthoseaddressedinthespecification,within1houractionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours(i.e.,atotalof'sevenhours),andinatleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours(i.e.,atotalof37hours)unless'orrect'vemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationunderthepermissibleactionstatementsforthespec'edtimeintervalasmeasuredfrominitialdiscoveryIoruntilthereactorisplacedinamodeinwhichtheIspecificationisnotapplicable.IftheactionstatementIcorrespondingtotheLimitingConditionforOperationthatwasexceededcontainstimelimitstohotandcoldshutdownrequirementscifications.thatarelessthanthosespecifiedabove,thesemore)limitingtimelimitsshallbeapplied.Exceptionstothese/shallbestatedintheindividual,'3.0.2C~%.8.lSviWhenasystem,subsystem,train,componentordeviceisdeterminedtobeinoperablesolelybecauseitsemergencypowersourceisinoperable,orsolelybecauseitspreferredpowersourceisinoperable,itmaybeconsideredoperableforthepurposeofsatisfyingtherequirementsofitsapplicableLimitingConditionforOperation,provided:Amendm~No."t3.0-1 1 (1)itscorrespondingpreferredoremergencypowersourc~isoperable;and(2)allof'itsredundantsystem(s),subsystems(s),train(s),component(s)anddevice(s)areoperable,orlikewisesatisfytherequirementsofspecif'cation.ssbothconditions(1)and(2)aresatis'edwithintheunitshallbeplacedinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hours,andinatleastcoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Thisspec'ficationisnotapplicableincoldshutdownorrefuelingmodes.Speciication3.0.1delineatestheACTIONtobetakenforcircumstancesnotdirectlyprovidedforintheACTIONstatementsandwhoseoccurrencewouldviolatetheintentofthespecification.Forexample,Specification3.3.2requirestwoContainmentSprayPumpstobeoperableandprovidesexplicitactionrequirementsifonespraypumpisinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifbothoftherequiredContainmentSprayPumpsareinoperable,theunitisrequiredtobeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthefollowing6hoursandinatleastcoldshutdowninthenext30hours.Thesetimelimitsapplybecausethetimelimitsforonespraypumpinoperable(6hourstohotshutdown,wait'48hoursthen30hourstocoldshutdown)arelesslimiting.'safurtherexample,Specification3.3.1requireseachReactorCoolantSystemaccumulatortobeoperableandprovidesexplicitactionrequirementsifoneaccumulatorisinoperable.UnderthetermsofSpecification3.0.1,ifmorethanoneaccumulatorisinoperable,within1houractionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheunitinatleasthotshutdownwithin6hoursandcoMshutdownwithinanadditional30hours.Thetimelimitof6hoursAmendgsettNo.2p,473.0-2 tohotshutdownand30hourstocoldshutdowndonotapplybecausethetimelimitsfor1accumulatorinoperablearemorelimiting.Ztisassumedtnattheunitisbroughttotherequiredmodewithintherequiredtimesbypromptlyinitiatingandcarryingouttheappropriateactionstatement.pec'fication3.0.2delineateswhatadditionalconditionsmustsasfiedtopermitoperationtocontinue,consistentwiththeaionstatentsforpowersources,whenapreferredoremergenpowersourceinotoperable.ltallowsoperationtobegoveredbythetimelimitsoftheactionstatementassoc'.atedwithheLimitingConditionforerationforthepreferred.oremergepowersource,nottheindividuactionstatementsforeachystem,subsystem,train,componentorvicethatisdeterminedbeinoperablesolelyVl5becauseoftheinopersource.lityofitsprefredoremergencypowerForexample,specification.7.2.1requiresinpartthattwoemergencydieselgeneratorsbe.perable.Theactionsratementprovidesforamaximumout-of-sarvitimewhenoneemergencydieselgeneratorz.snotoperable.ZftheefznzMonofoperablewereappliedwithoutconsiderionofSpecifition3.0.2,a11systems,subsystems,trains,coponentsanddevicessuliedbytheinoperableemergencypowersocewould,alsobeinoperable.ThiswoulddictateinvokingtheapicableactionstatementsforeachftheapplicableLimitingCoitionsforOperation.However,therovisionsofSpecificaon3.0.2permitthetimelimitsforcontinuederationtobeconstentwiththeactionstatementfortheinoperableergencydieselgeneratorinstead,providedtheotherspecifiedconditionsaiesatisfied.inthiscase,thiswculdmeanthattheccrrespcndingAmen~ntHo.N4473.0-3 referredpo~ersourcemustbeoperable,anda'1redundantsystemssystems,ssystems,'rains,components,anddevi'cesmustbeoperableothewisesatisfySpecification3.0.2(i.e.,becapableofperforingtheirdesignZunct'onandnaveatleastonepreferredoneemergencpowersourceoperable).Eftheyarenotsisfied1fshutdownirequiredinaccordancewiththisspecificatin./endgsaKNo.2A.473.0-4 3.7AUXILIARYELECTRICALSYSTEMSAppliestotheavailabilityofelectricalpowerfortheoperationofplantauxiliaries.Todefinethoseconditionsofelectricalpoweravailabilitynecessarytoprovideforthecontinuingavailabilityofengineeredsafeguards.3-7.1Secification3.7.1.1Whenincoldshutdownorrefueling,withfuelinthereactorvessel,thefollowingconditionsaretobemet:gOjF.la.Oneindependentoffsitepowersourceoperable,orbackfeedthroughunitauxiliarytransformer1X;andOnetrainof480-voltbuses(14and18,or16and17)operablegandOnedieselgeneratoroperablewithonsitesupplyof5,000gallonsoffuelavailableandeitherbuses14and18,or16and17,capableofbeingsuppliedfromthatdieselgenerator.~CQ385d.l.co3'.44,co~%.l0geo3.8.8lc.o3.$.lo~a.i3.7.1.2One.batteryandonedcsystem,andatleast150ampsofbatterychargercapacitytothebatterymustbeoperable.Either120voltA.C.InstrumentBus1Aor1Cenergizedfromitsassociatedinverter.ActionsToBeTakenIfConditionsof3.7.1.1.AreNotNet:Lco3SRCondA/9lLco3P.5II.CQ3A8'nJAQP,f.loCondA4-~~.'iL.3~<A(Q/<Withlessthantheaboveminimumrequiredpowersourceoperable,Iimmediatelysuspendalloperationsinvolvingpositivereactivity<changes,corealterations,movementof,IM3J,QWm*)g3~71 '.irradiatedfuelandinitiatecorrectiveactiontorestorethe-~:requiredpowersourcestooperablestatus.3'.7.23.7.2.1a~LCO35I(co3.5.3Lcog.$.Ql.co3.3.t,Lcog.'ecificationThereactorcoolantsystemshallnotbetakenabovethemodeindicatedunlessthefollowingconditionsaremet:Abovecoldshutdown;1.Oneindependentoffsitepowersourceoperable.2.the480;voltbuses14and18(TrainA)andbuses16and17(TrainB)areenergized.3.thetwodieselgeneratorsareoperablewithonsitesupplyof5,000gallonsoffuelavailableforeachdieselgenerator.4.bothbatteriesandbothdcsystemsareoperable.~~5.atleast150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityforeachDCsystemthatisinservice.6.120voltA.C.InstrumentBuseslAand1Careenergizedfromtheirassociatedinverters.LMb.7.120voltA.C.InstrumentBus1BisenergizedfromitsassociatedconstantvoltagetransformerfromMCC1C.Above350~F1.Allconditionsof3.7.2.1aabovearemet;andz~~,B.L37'-2a~2.Twoofsitesources/(34.5kv-4160vdltstationservcetraformers,12Aithdedicatedircuit751,a12Bwihdedicatedccuit767)areperable.ActionsToBeTakenIfConditionsof3.7.2.1AreNotMet:Operatonabove350'aycontinueithoneoffsiesourcel7.ic'i'~Q.8.lI7.ia".inopable,providmeallremainingconditionsof.7.2.1areHithoneorbotindependentoffsitesourcesoperable,andonedieselgeneratorinoperableabovecoldshutdown,demonstratetheoperabilityoftheremainingdieselgeneratorby:h3%72 1.Performingthesurveillancerequirementsa.dentifiedin<Iv~Zpeoifioationa4.6.1.b.4and4.6.1.b.6within1hourand~~~~~~at,leastonceper24hoursthereafterandrestoretheinoperabledieselgeneratortooperablestatuswithin7RASAdays;OTHERWISE:2~}.cagoalCanJaReducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownvithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthe(coP.'3.9Co~rIAzDLco3.8.8C~~8ACd~48d.e.following30hours.g&aura~17,Withonesafetyrelated480VBus(i.e.,bus14or16or17or18)de-energized,re-energizethebuawithin~orreducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownvithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours,unlesscorrectiveactionsarecompletethatpermitcontinuedoperation(i.e.,thebusisreturnedtoservice).Withbothindependentoffsitesourcesinoperable,bothdieselgeneratorsmustbeoperable.Xnaddition,restoreoneindependentoffsitesourcewithin72hours,orreducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.Operationabovecoldshutdown'maycontinueiflessthan150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityisavailabletoonedcsystem,providedatleast150ampsofbatterychargingcapacityisavailabletoeachdcsystemwithin2hours.Zfnotavailable,reducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdovnwithinthefolloving30hours.3~73 LcQ3.'5.7f.WitheitherInstrumentBus1Aor1Cnotenergizedfromitsassociatedinverter:gAA.>.1.Re-energizethebusvithin2hours(backupormaintenancesupply),AND2.Re-energizethebusfromasafetyrelatedsupply(backup3~orinverter)within24hours,ANDRe-energizethebusfromitsassociatedinvertervithin72hours,OTHERWISE4.Reducetoamodeequaltoorbelovhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursand,beincoldshutdownvithinthefollowing30hours.g.With'nstrumentBus1BnotenergizedfromitsassociatedLc.~q.ggconstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)fromMCC1C:1.Re-energizethebuswithin2hours(maintenancesupply),ANDCo~+~2~3Re-energizethebusfromitsassociatedCVTfromMCC1Cwithin7days,OTHERWISEReducetoamodeequaltoorbelowhotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandbeincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing30hours.3~73a Basisfor3.7-1and,3.7..2:'heelectrica'lsstemse/yquipment'sarrangedsothatnosinsingefailurecan'nactivateenoughsafeguardsequipmenttojeopardize'theplantsafety.The480-voltsafeguardsequipmentisarranarrangeon4safeguardsbuses.The4160-voltequipment(noneofwhichissafety-r1related),issuppliedfrom4buses.Twoseparateoffsitesourcessupplystationservicepowertotheplant.Theplantauxiliaryequipmentisarrangedelectricallysothatredundantsafeguardsloadsreceivepowerfromseparate'ources.Enlttheeventthat1offsitesource.isnotavailable,theremaining~offsitesourceiscapableofsupplyingbothtrainsofsafeguardshads.Safeguardsloadssuchassafety..injectionpumps,containmentloPfans,residualheatremovalpumps,andmotorcontrolcentersLCandr1Daredividedbetweenthe480-voltbusesNo..14and16.RedundantrloadsincludingservicewaterpumpsaresuppliedbybusesNo.18and17.TogetherthesebusesformtheTrainAand8'redundantClasslEIsources.ACpowerfor.safeguardsequipmentoriginatesfrombothoffsiteandINonsitesources.Theoperabilityofthesepowersourcesandasso'ateddistributionsystemsensuresthatsufficientpowerwi4beailabletosupplythesafety-relatedequipmentrequiredfor(1)t&ei3'"4 safeshutdownoftheplant,and(2)themitigationandcontrolofacidentconditionswithintheplant.WhentheRCSisabovecoldshutdown,bothemergencydieselgeneratorsarerequiredtobeoperable.Thetwodieselgeneratorshavesufficientcapacitytostartandrunalltheengineeredsafeguardsequipmentatdesignloads..Thesafeguardsequipmentoperatedfromonedieselgeneratorcanadequatelycoolthecoreandmaintainthecontainmentpressurewithinthed'esignvalueforanylossofcoolantincident.Theminimumdieselfueloil..inventoryismaintainedtoassurethat.bothdieselscanoperateat.theirdesignratingsfor24hours.Thisassuresthatbothdieselscancarrythedesignloadsofrequiredengineeredsafeguardsequipmentforanyloss,ofcoolant.'accidentconditionsforatleast40hours,orforoneengineeredsafetyfeaturetrainfor80hours."'ommercialoilsuppliesandtruckingfacilitiesexisttoassuredeliverieswithin8hours.Theoffsitepowersourceconsistsofseparate:,dedicated34.5kv-4160'Ivoltstationservicetransformersservedbydedicated34.5kvlines(12Atransformerwithdedicatedcircuit751,or12B'>>transformerwithdedicatedcircuit767)inoperablestatus.Eitheroffsitesourceofpowercansupplyailauxiliaryloadsandtransfercanbeaccomplishedwithinthetime."constraintsofGDC17.Thus,GDC17isexplrcitlymet.WithfueZinth'ereactor-vesselaminimumofoneoffsitesource,oneonsitesourceofACpowerandoneDCpowertrainarerequired.eo.sitepowersourcemaybeprovidedbyoneofthreeconfigurations:3.7-5 3.Transformer12Aservedbyadedicated34.5kvline(circuit751),orTransformer12Bservedbyadedicated34.5kvline(circuit.767),orBackfeedthroughunitauxiliarytransformer11.TheoffsitepowersourceisthepreferredsourceofACpower.Operabilityofanoffsitesourcerequiresthatonestationservicetransformerservedbyadedicated34.5kvlineisoperatingandprovidingpowertotheunit.TheemergencydieselgeneratorprovidesEpoweruponlossof.theoffsitesource.Oneemergencydieselgeneratorwith5,000gallonsoffuelcanprovidepowertoaminimumlevelofengineeredsafeguardsequipmentfor40hoursthereuiredsafeuards(gloadsatcoldshutdown/refuelingaresignificantlylessthanduringpoweroperation).Oneoperabledieselfueloiltransferpumpis~~onebatterybackedinstrumentpositivereactivitychanges,irradiatedfuelshalloccur.requiredtosupplyfuelfromoneofthetwofuelstoragetankstothedaytankoftheoperabledieselenerator.WithlessthanoneoffsiteACpowersource,andoneonsiteAC'powersourceoneDCpowertrainandIIbusavailable,nooperationsinvolvingcorealterations,andmovementof./Batterychargerswithat,least150ampscapacitgshallbein.serviceforeachbatterysothatthebatterieswillalwaysbeatfullcharge.Thisensuresthatadequatedcpowerwillbeavailable.Theplantcanbesafelyshutdownwithouttheuseofoffsxiepowersinceallvitalloads,(safetysystems,instruments,etc.)canbesypliedfrom.theemergency,dieselgenerators'andthestationbatteries.strumentBuses1A,.1$,and1Cprovidepowertovitalplantinstrumentatio.Allthreebusesarebackedupbysafetyrelatedemergencysupplies;b1Ar'rom,battery1A,bus1Cfrombattery1B,andbus1Bfromdieselgenerator1A.3.7-6 Thediesel"generators,.eachcapable.ofsupplyinafeguardsloads,andthe,'onauxiliarytransformerspxdefourseparatesourcesofpowerimmediatelxlablefeoperation.oftheseloads.Thus,thepowersupplymeetsth~xngle'lurecriteria.Reforancos(1SAR-Sect'on9.5.43~77 Zu.~~s3O.3.w,oa3.STes't~FLeaueneServiceWaterSystemFunctioningEachRefuelingShutdow13.FireProtectionPumpandPowerSupplySprayAdditiveTankFunctioningNaOHConcent.MonthlyMonthly14.AccumulatorPrimarySystemLeakageBoronConcentrationEvaluateBi-MonthlyDailySP'3.%.l'(16.SR3.8.3.5z'Q,'i(.18SpentFuelPitSecondaryCoolantSamplesBoronConcentrationGrossActivityDieselFuelSupply'uelInventoryMonthly72hours(2)(3)19.CirculatingWaterCalibrateFloodProtectionEquipmentEachRefuelingShutdownNotes:Alsorequiredforspecificallyaffectedindividualrodsfollowinganymaintenanceonormodificationtothecontrolroddrivesystemwhichcouldaffectthedroptimeofthosespecificrods.Notrequiredduringacoldorrefuelingshutdown.AnisotopicanalysisforI-131equivalentactivityisrequiredatleastmonthlywheneverthegrossactivitydeterminationindicatesiodineconcentrationgreaterthan104oftheallowablelimitbutonlyonceper6monthswheneverthegrossactivity.determinationindicatesiodineconcentrationbelow10%oftheallowablelimit.(4)WhenBASTisrequiredtobeoperable.AmendmentNa.g,574.1-9 4.6preferredandEveren'owerSystemsperiodcTestsAppliestoperiodictestingandsurveillancerequirements!ofthepreferredandemergencypowersystems.1Toverifythatthepreferredandemergencypowersystemswillrespondpromptlyand.properlywhenrequired.SecificationThefollowingtestsandsurveillanceshallbeperformedasstated:Diese3.GeneratorsAtleastonedieselgeneratorshallbedemanstratedaperable:LcaK.'C.l..a.Duringcoldorref'e3.ingshutdownatleastonceper31daysby:1.Verifyingthediesel.startsfromnorma3.standbytI33'~conditions,andattainsratedvoltageandZrequenEachdieselgeneratorshallbedemonstratedoperable:b.Exceptduringcoldorrefuel'gshutdownatleastonceper31daysby:1.Verifyingthefue33.eve3.inthedaytank.2.Verifyingaminimumoilstorageof5,000gallonsforeachgenerator.thatisOnsite.5P,s.s.l.S'.Verifyingthefueltransferpumpcanbestarted.andtransferfuelframthestoragesystemtothedaytank.sg~.p.hg4,Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnorma3.standbyconditions,andattainsratedvoltageandfrequency.SR3.Z.l.g5.Verifyingthegeneratorissynchronized,loadedtoatleast1950kwbutlessthanthe2hourratingof2250kwandoperatesforatleast60minutesbutlessthan120minutes.C6.Verifyj.ngthediesel.generator'Malignedto/~33:iiprevisestsndhypawrtathesssaaistederaergenay/buses.4.6-1 5R4.09sLils8,3Z.s.aThetests'.".Spqcification4.6.:1bwillberformepriortoexceng.coldshutdownifthetimeisincethe1/sttes/Atleastonceper92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofAS'975-78whencheckedforviscositwaterandsediment.e.Atleastoncepexthsduringshutdownby:1.Inspetingtheeselincordancew'anacturer'ecommendatinsforthisclassoftsndbservie.SR3.3.l'75R3'.8.19SS38'..~.o.58.$.V.lR,bSR84.l.l.c.2.3aVerifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytorejectaloadof295KMwithouttripping.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunct'nwithasafetyinjectiontewsignaland:(a)Verifyingde-energizationoftheemergencybusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergencybuses.(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnorma3.,standbycoalitionontheauto-startsignal,energizestheautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloadsiththefollowingmax'akerclosuretimesafterthextialstartingnalforTrainsAnotbeingexceeded33.vi.ABDieselplusetyInjection20sec22secPumppluPumpBreakers40sec4cSR3.r.t.Fandoperatesfor>fiveminuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthatalldieselgeneratortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andovercrank,areautomaticaUYbypasseduponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal. Slz38.I.2.4-Thistestmayalsoservetoconcurrentlymeettherequirementsof4.6.l.aandb.4-6-2a 0 4.6.2StationBatteriesSg..E,Z;Q3eVIIa.EverymonththevoltageofeachcelI{tothenearest0.01volt),thespecificgravityandtemperatureofapilotcellineachbatteryshallbemeasuredandrecorded.b.Every3monthsthespecificgravityofeachcell,thetempera-turereadingofeveryfifthcell,theheighr.ofelectrolyte,andtheamountofwateraddedshallbemeasuredandrecorded.4.6-3 c.Ateachtieda.taisrecored,newdatashallbe>~./comparedrtholdtodetecsignsofdetiorationA~~(,s5R3$.92~a38.0.3,5P.'.5,42.4'achbatterysilhesuhjectetoaloadtestgatin,atwelve-montperiodfromthlastloadtest;however,topermiteload,testtocoincidewitha/scheduledrefuelinggtheperiodmextendforasadditionalthreenths.Thebatteryvoltageasafunctionoftimeshallbemonitoredtoestablishthatthebatteryperformsasexpectedduringheavydischargeandthatallelectricalconnectionsaretight.Eachbatteryshallbesubjecttoadischargetestatleastonceper60months.Thepurposeofthistestistoshowthatthebatterycapaciyisat'east80'%fthisdischargetestmaysubstitutefortheloadtest.Thedischargetestshallbeperformedannuallyforanybatterythatshowssignsofdegradation.Degradation33&fLLi4.6e3ZC.'g.8.i,'SSa,>A,.a..<ZC.3.8.s.i5R3.8.1.(.isindicatedwhenthebatterycapacitydropsmore.thaa///10%ofratedcapacityfromitsaverageonprevious/dischargetests,or~isbelow90%oPthemanufaturer'sgrating.Preferred(Offsite)PowerSuliesEachoffsitepowersourceshallhedemonstratedoperable:a.Atleastonceper7daysby:Verifyingnominalvoltageindicationsonthehigh-voltagesideoftransformers12Aand12B;andonthe4160voltbuses12A,and.12B.2.Verifying4160voltci.rcuitbreakers12AXor12BX.AND12AYor12BYareopen.3.Verifyingtiebreakers52/BT16-14and52/BT17-18areopenwhenplmodeisabove200'P.2Qb.Atleastonceperthsbytransferringunitpowersupplyto4160voltbuses12Aand12Bfromthenormalcircuit,i.e.,transformer12Aforbus12Atransformer12Bforbus129tothealternatecircuit,i.e.,transformer12Bfozbus12Aandtransformer12Aforhus12B.4.6-4 4.6.4InstrumentBusesEachsafetyrelatedinstrumentbusrequiredtobeoperable,shallbedemonstratedoperableatleastonceper7daysby:SPQ.Q.g.~*sa.Z.Q.io.<VerifyingnominalvoltageindicationsontheIn-strumentBuses1A,1B,1C.SQ.R.8.Q.zsa.3.8.~.<SP3'8,40.l2~>LZ'.o.w.ISQ3.$.7.~,sa~,8.B.<3say.a.~.i(s,az.e.s.i(VerifyingpropersupplybreakeralignmentforInstrumentBuses1A,1B,and1C.VerifyingproperstaticswitchalignmentforIn-strumentBuses1Aand1C.4.6-4a basisThtestsspecifiedaredesignedtodemonstratethatthedieellgeneratorswill'providepowerforoperationofequipment.Theyisoassureattheemergencygeneratorsyst:emcontrolsandthecntrolsystemsfothesafeguardsequipmentwillfunctionautomaticallyintheeventofalossofallnormal480VACstationservice,power."/~~Thetestingfrequencyspecifiedwillbeoftenenougtoidentifyandcorrectanymechanicalorelectricaldeficiencbeforeitcanresultinasystemfailure.Thefuelsupplyandsartingcircuitsandcontrolsarecontinuouslymonitoredandanyfaultsare/indicatedbyalarm.Anabn'ormalconditionin<4hesesystemscanbe/identifiedwithouthavingto".testthedieselgenerators.Periodictestsarealsospecified.todemonstratethattheoffsite/powersourceswillprovidepowerfor;operationofequipment.Offsitepowersourceoperabilityrsquires,correctbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityfromthetwopreferredpowercircuits,767-and751,tothe,4160voltbuses.Theserequirementsaremetbymonitoringnominalvoltageindicationsonthehigh-/voltagesideoftranformers12Aand12B;and.onthe4160voltbuses12Aand12B../Offsite"powersourceindependencerequiresseparate~4160voltIcircuitssupplying'owertothe4160voltbuses.terlockspreventconcurretclosureof12AXand12BX,OR12AYand1Y;andsurveillanceispecifiedtoensureseparationismaintaineInstrumenbuspowersourceoperabilityrequirescorrectbreakralignmeandindicatedpoweravailability.Theserequirementsarmetbmonitoringnominalvoltageindicationsonthebusesandprorbreakeralignment.4.6-5

urthermore,toassureindependencebetweenredundantClass1E4vobuses14and18(TrainA)andbuses16and17(TrainB),iebreakrs52/BT1$-14and52/BT17-18arerequiredtobeopenwhetheplantmeisabove200F..Oncetiebreakersareopen,intlockspreventcsuxewhenindependentandredundantbusesareenergized.Stationbatteriesmaydetexioratewithtime,butrecipitousfailureisextxelyunlikely.Thesurveillancespecifiedisthatwhichhasbeendemotratedovertheyearstoprovid'eanindicationofacellbecomingserviceablelongbeforetfails,andtoensurethatthebatteryapacityisacceptablTheequalizingcharge,asremmendedbytmanufacturer,isvital~~tomaintaxnxngtheampere-houcapabil'ofthebattery.Asacheckupontheeffectivenessoftealizingcharge,thebatteryshouldbeloadedratherheavilyathevoltagemonitoredasafunctionoftime.Ifacellhasderratedorifaconnectionisloose,thevoltageunderloadilldrexcessivelyindicatingreplacementormaintenance.Theminimumpermissible,bn-sitefuelinvento,10,000gallons,(5,000gallonsforegalgenerator),issufiicitforoperation-underloss-of-coolataccidentconditionsoftwoenineeredsafetyfeaturestrainsfear40hours,orforonetrainfor80ours,orforoperationofbathdieselgeneratorsattheirdesignrat'ngsfor24hours.(2)Reference(1)AR,Section8.3(2)UPSAR,Section9.5.44.6-5a 4hrezgyJQhaw3.33.5.3.23.5.3.33.5.4Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsshowninTable3.5-3,eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin7days,orbeinatleasthotshutdown~withinthenext12hours.Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperable\acc'dentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirementsofTable3.5-3eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleasthot-shutdownwithinthenext12hours.TheradiationaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-6shallbeoperable,wheneverthereactorisatorabovehotshutdown.3.5.53.5.5.1Withoneormoreradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable,taketheactionshowninTable3.5-6.Startupmaycommenceorcontinueconsistentwiththeactionstatement.RaioactiveEffluentMonitoringinstrumentationeradioactiveffluentmonitringinstrumentatonshowninTable~.5-5shallboperablatalltimeswithalarmaq4/ortripsetintssettoinsuthatthelimitsfSpecificat'3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceeed.Alarman/ortripsetpoinshallbeestablihedinaccordncewithcalculaonalmethodssetfrthintheOfiteDoseQalculionManual-Qu~QIVRSFh~mmesOoAb%(wIAoOK&,as~PgÃ856M~APTERK( ~S~v%%%-5.5.23.5.5.335.6356.1Ifthesetpointforaradioactiveeffluentmonitoralarmrand/ortripisfoundtobehigherthanrequired,onMofhefollowingthreemeasuresshallbetakenimmediately:(i)thesetpointshallbeimmediateycorrectedwithoutdeclaringthe'channelsinoperable;orimmeatelysuspend,threleaseofeffluentsrmonitorebytheffectedchannel;or(iii)declaretheannelinoperable.Ifthenumberofannelswha.chareoperableisfoundtobelesstharequired,takethe'actionshowninTable3.5-5.xertbesteffortstoreturntteinstrumentstoOPBLEstatuswithin31daysand,ifunsuccessful,.explaininthenextRadioactiveEffluentReleasReporbwhy'theinoperabilitywasnotcorrectedinatimely/manner.lControlRoomHVACDetectionSystemsDuringallmodesofplantoperation,detectionsystemsforchlorinegas,ammoniagasandradioactivityinthecontrolroomHVACintakeshallbeoperablewithsetpointstoisolateairintakeadjustedasfollows:2 Qdhm~zeJ~JQga~v5.0maximumpermissibleconcentrationsofreference3for.Cs-137,E-131andKr-85.Shemini-purgesystemisconnectedtotheplantvent.10FRPart100typereleasesviamini-purgearelimitedbyanisolationsignalgeneratedfromSI10CFRPart0releasesfrommini-purgearecons'redtobesimilartootherplantventilationreleasesandare\monitoredbyR-.3.0B,R-13,andR-14.R-4Amaybeasubsti"uteforR-'lOB.Automaticisoationofmini-purgefor10CFRPart20typereleasessconsideredunnecessadueto"helowflowassociatewithmini-purgeandWcontinuousmonitoring.Howver,theautomaticisolationprovisionsusingRllor2provideadditionalmarginfor10CFRPart20treleases.Therefore,R-11orR-12isrequiredtosamplecontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation.ToesurethecontainmentsamplemonitoredbyR-11orR-2isrepresentativeofthecontainment)tatmospheeatleastonerecirculationfanisrequiredItobeioperationduringmini-purgeoperation.ShoudR-11and/orR-12become.inoperable,a.1hour1itischosentobeconsistentwiththegenerally1cceptedtimeforpromptaction. Table3.5-5RadioactiveEffluentMonxtorinInstrumentationNinimnmChannelsQ~erahleActiGrossActivityMonitors(Liquid)a.LiquidRadwaste(R-18)b.ce.SteamGeneratorBlowdown(R-19).TurbineBuildingFloorDrains(R-213HighConductivityWaste(R-22)ContainmentFanCoolers(R-16)~ageSpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)L+~+SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-2083L+++2~PlantVentxlationa~WithoutMini-Purge2~3.b.WthMini-PurgeNobleGasActivity(R-14)(ProvidingAlarmandIsolationofGasDecayTanks)ParticulateSampler(R-13)IodineSampler(R-10BorR-14A>>*)5s)15,vis2~3.4NobleGasgctivity(R-14)ParticulatkSampler(R-13)IodineSampler(R-1QBorR-4A~*~)NobleGasActivity(R-12)orParticu9.ateSampler(R-1LLL)++ShutdownPurgea.NobleGasctivity(R-12)b.ParticulteSampler(R-3.1)&I&iI c.MineSampler(R-10AorR-12A**+)AirE5ectorMonitor(R-15orR-15A***)WasteGasSystemOxygenMonitorChannels~erableActian1**'1NotrequiredwhenSteamGeneratorBlowdownisheingzecycl.ed(i.e.notreleased).Requiredonlyduringshutdownpurgesandrequiredtosamplethecontainmentstack.Requiredtosamplecontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation.NotrequiredduringColdorRefuelingShutdown.AlsoseeTahle3.5-6.ApplicahlewhenHeatExchangerinservice./4dre~seJu/Cfl&p~Q,Q QoreaweJ~1Ch~&G.oTABIE3.5-5Continued)TableNotation;Action5IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequire-ments,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedsamplesarecontinuouslycollectedasrequiredbyTable4.12-2ItemEwithauxiliarysamplingequipment.Action6IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperableandthhSecondaryActivityis51x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesmaycontinueviathispathwayprovidedgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactivity.(betaorgamma)atleastonceper24hours.Ifthesecondary,actxvxtyisgreaterthan1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesvxathispathwaymaycontinueforupto31daysprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenevery8hoursandanalyzedwithin24hours.Action7-Action8Ifthechannelisinoperable,asampleofthegasfromtheinservicegasdecaytankshallbeanalyzedforoxygencontentatleastonceevery4hours.Ifthe/numbercfcpeiahlechannelsislesstHan/requiredbytheMizdmumChannelsOperable,.=oratleast;onecontainmentfancoo3.erisnotoperating,within1hourterminatethe;purge./r 3.6ContainmentSstemAlicabilitAppliestotheintegrityofreactorcontainment.Todefinetheoperatingstatusofthereactorcontainmentforplantoperation.Secification.3.6.1ContainmentInterita0Exceptasallowedby3.6.3,containmentintegrityshallnotbeviolatedunlessthereactorisinthecoldshutdowncondition.Closedvalvesmaybeopenedonanintermittentbasisunderadministrativecntrol.~l(.x~3.6.2b.econtainmentintegrityshallnotbeviolwheneactorvesselheadisremovedstheboronconceniaD,isgreater00ppm.InternalPressurec.-Positivereactiv'angessnotbemadebyroddrivwonorb'orondilutionheneverthecnmentintegrityisnotintactunthe'oronconcentrationisgreaterthan2000ppm.Iftheinternalpressureexceeds1psigortheinternalvacuumexceeds2.0psig,theconditionshallbecorrectedwithin24hoursorthereactorrenderedsubcritical. 3.8REFUELTNGAlicabilitAppliestooperations.operatinglimitationsduringrefueling3.8.1ToensurethatnoincidentcouldoccurduringrefuelingoperationsthatwouldaffectpublichealthandsafetySecificationDuringrefuelingoperationsthefollowingconditionsshallbesatisfied.aContainmentpenetrationsshallbeinthefollowngstatus: i.TheequipmenthatchshallbeinplacewithatQastoneaccessdoorclosed,theclosure.Iplatethatrestrictsairflow'fromcontainmentshallbinplace,ii.Atleastoneaccessorinthepersonnelairlockshallbelod,andiii.Eachpenetratnorovidingdirectaccessfromthecontentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosreshallbeex.er:Closedbyflange,or2.Becapableautomaticvalve.anisolationvalve,blindmanualvalve,ofbeingclosedby'PERABLEshutdownpurgeorminurge~cog.9.2.Ce/cog.t.z-Mc.~1'8~'UIL~BI.hRadiation"levelsntheontaientsh1beonitorecontinusly.Coresubcriticalneutron.fluxshallbecontinuouslymonitoredbyatleasttwosourcerangeneutronmonitors,eachwithcontinuousvisualindicationinthecontrolroomandonewithaudibleindicationinthecontrolroomavailablewhenevercoregometryisbeingchaned.Shencegeomtryisnobeingcangedat ~IS:yiy'4.1c.oPg,p+Itg9II(IQll/ge'ea-toes""rce,ngeneutrofluxmonirshallbinsvlvicAtleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeoperation.*Immediatey.befozeactorveselheadrovalandwhLl~loadingandunldingfuelomtherector,theminimumboronconcentrationof2000ppmshallbemaintained,inthey1eyy*yyyC.gc,r72,Ho~Dectommunxcatibetentcontrol'oomanthe.efuengvity.nipatarranesIrailheavilahlewhenerangesxncaegeamtziiare/takingple.Inadditiontotherequirementsofparagraph3.8.1.d,whileintherefuelingmodewithlessthan23feetofwaterabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,tworesidualheatremovalloopsshallbeoperable.*Duringmovementoffuelorcontrolrodswithinthereactorvessel'avity,atleast23feetofwatershallbemaintainedoverthetopofthereactorvessel.*Eithrthepreferred.ortheemergencypowersourcemaybe)g,viinoperableforeachresidualheatremovalloop. 3.8e2Lcc3R.>MD.5'o3R.Z,MA/0/<-I.co3.'I.3C4A<cod.S.qGae/SL~ge5co-~Aflange.Ifthisconditionisnotmet,alloperationsinvolvingmovementoffuelorcontrolrodsinthereactorvesselshallbesuspended.Ifanyofthespecifiedlimitingconditionsforrefuelingisnotmet,refuelingofthereactorshallcease;work*shallbeinitiatedtocorrecttheviolatedconditionssothatthespecifiedlimitsaremet;nooperationswhichyincreasethereactivityofthecoreshallbemade.(Q;8.3Ifthecond'onsof3.1.dditiontotherecpxiementsshutdownrgeandni-purgehours.arenmet,theninof38.2,isolatthepeetrationswhin4s1S0ThaaquzpntandgeneralprocedurestobeutilizuringjrefuelingarediscusntheUFSAR.'etainstructions,theabovespecifiedprecautions,and.~esignofthefuelhandlingeguipmeatincorporating'ininterlocksmndsafetyfeatures,provideassurancatnoincidentcouldoccurdurin~erefuelingoperatthatwouldresultinahazard3.8-3 durngrefuelingtoinsuresafehandling.telockistopublichealthandsafety.Wheneverchangesarenotpejn(1)mae'ncoregeometryonefluxmonitorissufficient.This,'e~'maintenanceoftheinstrumentation.Continuousmni-toringofradiationlevelsandneutronfluxprovides'diateI'.indication"ofanunsafecondition.Theresidualhutpumpisusedtomaint'ainauniformboronconcentration.Theshutdownmarinasindicatedwillkeepthcoresubcritical,evenifallcontrolrodswere.withdrawnfmthecore.During~.1=a=slang,thereactorrefuelingcavityjisf'liedvi"a.doroxi-ma-e'y230,000gallonsofberatedwaFer.Tbeboronconcentrationof"'v'swaterat:2000ppm'boronissufficienttomaintainthe~~~reaco"subcriticalbyatleast'%hk/kinthecoldcondi">onvi~>allrodsinserted(bestestimateof10/subcritical),and~~~~~~illalsomaintainthecorsesubcriticalevenifnocontrolrodsvereinsertedintothe'reactor.Periodicchecksofrefueling~~waterboronconcentrationinsurethepropershutdownmargin.'Communicationreauirementsallowthecontrolroomoperatortoinormthemapipulatoroperatorofanyimpendingunsafeconditiondetec-edfromthemaincon"rolboardindicators,duringfuelmovemenInadtiontotheabovesafeguads,interlocksareutilizedAnexcessweiggt3.8-4 providedontheliftinghoisttopreventmovementofmorethanoneClassemblyatatime.Thespentfueltransfermechanismcanaccommodateonlyonefuelassemblyatatime.Inadditiinterlocksontheauxiliarybuildingcranewillprevent,thetroleyfrombeingmovedoverstoredrackscontainingspentfuel.!aTheoperability~requirementsforresidualheatremovaloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelinmode.Therequirementfor23feetofwaterabovethereactovesselflange3jwhilehandlingfuel~andfuelcomponentsin/containmentisconsistentwiththeassumptions.ofthefuel'andlingaccidentanalysis.t~Theanalysis>forafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentestablishesacceptableoffsitelimitingdosesfollowingruptureofallrodsofanassemblyoperatedatpeakpower.Nocreditistaken'orcontainmentisolationorefluentQ,ltrationpriortorelease.Requiringclosureofpenetrataonswhichprpvidedirectaccessfrom/containmentatmospheretdtheoutsideoosphereestablishesf.additionalmarginforthfuelhandlingaccidentandestablishesaseismicenvelopetoprotectagainstthepotentialconsequencesofseismiceventsduringrefueling.Isolationofthese"penetrationsmaybeachievedb.anOPERABLEshutdownpurgeorminr-purgevalve,blindflange,isolationvalve.AnOPERABLEshutdopurgeormini-purgevveiscapableofbeingautomaticallyisolatedbyR11orR12.enetrationswhichdonotprovidedirectaccefromcontaitatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheresurtcontaient,integritybyeitheraclosedsystem,necessaryisolionvalves,-oramaterialwhichcanprovideatemporaveilationbarrier,atatmosphericpressure,forthecontainmentenetrationsduringfuelmovement.38-5 ~~nces(1)UFSARSe~9.1.4.4an...5(2)ReloadTran'eely~ort,Cycle14(3Section15.7.3.34/~I3.8-6 TABLE4.l-lMINIMUMFREQUENCIESFORCHECKSfCALIBRATIONSANDTESTOFINSTRUMENTCHANNELSM~s~agw)cvkc-33~ChannelDes~crttion1.NuclearPowerRangeCheckSM*(3)CalxbrateD(1)O*(3)TestB/W(2)(4)1)P(2)(5)2)4)5)Remarksf)eatbalancecalculation**SxgnaltoWT;bistableaction(permzssive<rodstop>trxps)Upperandlowerchambersforaxialoffset**Haghsetpoint(<109%ofratedpower}iLowsetpoint(<25tofratedpower)/2.NuclearIntermediateS(1)Range5R3'lZ.ir4.ReactorCoolantSTemperatureNBA.P(2)M(l)(2)N~A.zg~~P1)2)Once/shiftwhennserviceBistableaction(alarm>trap)1.)2)Ovprtemperature-DeltaTOverpower-DeltaT1)Once/shiftwheninservice2)Loglevel:bistableaction(permissive>rodstopftrap)f000IaRZerntSav~g..7HttR%DOESaaeassfo/cwartzt335.ReactorCoolatFlowSRSRjLfhrefwJfi/Chp43.36.PressurizeraterLevel7.PressurizrPressure/!8.4KvVo)Rage&Frequecy9.RodPsitionIndi/ation/,f*~gIlmeansofthemovable.~*PotrequireddurinhotReactorProtectionircuitsonly~urernuhafSRMNBA.RMhS(lg2)/N.A.My')Nithstepcounter2)Logrodpositioindicationseach4hourswhenredeviationmonitorIisoutofservicein-oreuetectorsystem./cldorunfeelingshutdownbutassoonasposslblafterreturntopouur

d.Flowshallbemaintainedthroughthesystemusing~,eitherthefilterorbypassflowpathforatleast15minuteseachmonth.4.11.1.24.11.2Aftereachreplacementofacharcoalfilterdrawerorafteranystructuralmaintenanceonthecharcoalhousingforthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsorbersystem,theconditionofSpecification4.11.1.1.bshallbedemonstratefortheaffectedportionofthesystem.ResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculation4.11.2.1WhenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelisDQ,aV~~~4.11.2.2Zg.SP4.11.34.11.3.1Basisinthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantat1eastonceperphouzs.Whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofreactorvesselflangeislessthan23feet,bothRHRpumpsshallbeverifiedtobeoperablebyperformingthesurveillancespecifiedintheInservicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CZR50.55a.MaterLevel-ReactorVesselZhewatergaveljnthereactor'cavityshallbedetemninedtobeatleastitsmizumumraguireddepthwithin~ourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodsincontainment.ThemeasurementoftheairfIowassuresthatairisbeingwithdrawnfromthespentfuelpitareaandpassedthroughtheadsorbers.ThefIowismeasuredpriortoempIoyingtheadsorberstoestabIishthat4.11-2 therehasbeennogrosschangeinperformancelastused.TheFreontestprovidesameasuresincethesystemwaoftheamountofleakagefromaroundthecharcoaladsorbent.Theabilityofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeteriorateasthecharcoalagesandweathers.TestingthecapacityofthecharcoaltoadsorbiodineassuresthatanacceptabLeremovalefficiencyundeoperatingconditionswouldbeobtained.ThedifferencebetweenthetestrequirementofaremovaLefficiencyof90%formethyliodineandthepercentageassumedintheevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccidentprovidesadequatesafetymarginfordegrada-:.tionofthefilterafterthetests.Retestingofthespentfuelpitcharcoaladsozbersystemintheeventofpainting,fire,orchemicaLreleaseisrequiredonlyifthesystemisoperatingandisprovidingfiltrationfortheareawhichthepainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testingoftheairfilt"ationsystemswillbetested,totheextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,inaccordancewithANSIN510-1975,"TestingofNuclearAir-C'eaningSystems'~Theoperrequirements'forresidualheatremovalloopswiensureadequateheatremoileintherefuelingerequire-mentfor23feetofwaterabovethoelflangewhilehandlingfuelandfuelincontainmentisconsistentwithsulllp-nsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.eference:(1)LetterfromE.J.Nelson,RochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoDr.Peter.A.Norris',U.S.AtomicEne"gyCommission,datedFebruary3,1971 5.05.14:lDESIGNFEATURESSite'~+lornTheg.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlanti"-locatedv+h~onthesouthshoreofLakeontario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork.ForthepurposesofimplementingGinnaRadiologihnicalSpecifications,,andforevaluatingradiologicalreleasestheUnrestrictedArea,theUnrestrictedAreaBoundaryisassaedtocoincide'heExclusionArea.~1,Boundary.ThesitemapshoinFigure5.3.-1depictsMeGinnaExclusionAreandary(alsocalledUnrestrictedAreaBoundary)location.5.3..2The'boundaryshallbethatlinebeyondwW'chthelandsneitherowned,norleased,norotherwisecontroedbylRochesterGas6ElectricCorporation.

P41HHhSITSHAPI++~yytktloleeATAN(lCI~~LiquideffluentsGIIeeoue.effluents~~LIoI~tiQroseOOCAB24EhB(~LI@ah.-?.i)0,ffOf~>>~~3IG<<IIuuuuoffluent'ale<<copointsIl.Turbinehuildlngrant-assumedatqradaIi.Plantvent-42o.<<hovagrade3.ContalnoenL'vent-42ie:~bovegIade4..B1oIIdcvntankvent.-,annexedatgrado~5.hlrannularvunt=aaaurIIedatgradeptr~LlqIIWoEflupiItsrcleaeepointl.Dl.achargIIcanal-atlakelovelly~~~~4'('g~gEhB-ExclusionbreaBoundary L'4~fM~~r~.2ContainmentDesignFeatures'5.2%iReactorContainmenta.Thereactorcontainmentcompletelyenclosesthentirereactorandreactorcoolantsystemandensusthatan'acceptableupperLimitforleakageofradactivematerialA~4~...~~~~'.2.2totheenvironmentisnotexceededevifgrossfailureofthereactorcoolantsystemoccurs.ThestructureIprovidesbioLogicaLshieldingforbothnormalandacci-!dentsituation.Ib.Thecontainmentstructureis'designedforaninternalpressureof60psig1ustheloadsresultingfromanearthquakeprodu"ng.,08gintheverticalandhorizontalplanessimultaa'eously.Thecontainmentisalsostructur-~allydesigntowithstandan;externalpressure2.5psi(>1higherthantheinternalpressure.Penetratio'nsa.Apenetrationsthroughthecontainmentreinforcedcon-cretepressurebarrierforpipe,electrcalconductors,(2)'uctsandaccesshatchesareofthedoublearriertype.Ib.Theautomaticallyactuatedcontainmentisolatnvalvesaredesignedtocioseuponhighpressureinthecontain-ment(setpointnohigherthan6psig)orhighradiatn thecontainmentvesseL.Theactuationstemdesignedsuchthatnosinglecomponentailurewillr\~5.2.3preventcontainmentisolationifrequiredContainmentSstemsa.Tecontainmentvesselhasat1aanernaspraysystemwhich'scapableofprovidingadistributedboratedwatersprayofatleast1200gpm.Duringtheinitial/periodofsprayoperation,sodiuxnhydroxidewouldbeaddedtotheshespra~watertozncreasetheremovalof(3)iodinefromthe'containmentatmosphere./b.Thecontainmentv vesselhasaninternalairrecirculatiosyste~whichconsistsof'fourventilationfansandaircoolerscapableofatotaLheatremovalcapabilityof'II55,.600~tuIBu/secunderconditions,foLlowingalossofI/coolantaccidennt.TwoofthefancoolerunitsareqppwithactivatedcharcoaLfiltertoremove.euiedw(4)volatileiodinefollowinganaccident.Referen'ces:~~(1)SAR-Section5.I(2)CESAR-Section.".l.2.73)CESAR-Section6.4./(4)FSAR-Secti.6.3 535.3.1ReactorDesiPeaturesReactorCoreThereactorcorecontainsapproximately45metrictonsofuraniumintheformofuraniumdioxidepellets...Thepelletsar"encapsulatedinZircaloy4tubingtoformfuelrods.Thereactorcoreismadeupof121fuelassemblies"'itheachfuelassemblycontaining179fuelrodlocations.Puelrodlocationsatanytimeduringplantlife,mayconsistoffuelrodscladwithZircaloy-4orfillerrodsfabricatedfromZircaloy-4orstainlesssteelifjustifiedbycycle-specificreloadanalysis.Shouldmorethan30rodsinthecore,or10rodsinanyassemblybereplacedperrefueling,areportdescribing,thenumberofrodsreplacedandassociatedcycle-specificevaluationshallbesubmittedItotheCommissionprior.tocriticality.Eachfuelassemblyalsocontains16guidetubesandoneinstrumentationthimbleallarrangedina14x14arraytoformafuelassembly.Theenrichmentofreloadfuelshallbenomorethan3e5weight,percent,U-235forregionsdeliveredprior5;oStoJanuary1,1984(Regions1-15),~weightpercentU-235forregionsdeliveredafterJanuary1,1984,orthe'requivalentsintermsofreactivity.g.z.ZcThereare29full-lengthassembliesinthereactorcore.EachRCCassemblycontains16144inchlengthsofsilver-indium-cadmiumalloycladwithstainlesssteelwhichactasneutronabsorberswheninsertedintothecoreBasisTheDNBRsfrthereconstituteassembliesareconse.ativelydeterminedyassumingthefillrodsareoperatingatehighestpowe~lnnereconstz.tutedfuassembly. ReactorCoolantSstema.Thede"ianof.thereactorcoolantsystemcplieswiththecoderequirements.bc~Alliinp'p',componentsandsupporngstructuresoftereactorcoolantsystemareesignedtoClassIrequirements,andhavebeenesignedtowithstand:i.Thedes.insgseismigroundacceleration,0.08g,wzhstressesintainedwithincodeallowableworkingstre'es.ii.Themamummpotentialseismicgroundaccelera-txo,0.2g,actinginythehorizontalandticaldirectionssimultaneously.withnolossoffunctions~~Thenominalliquidvolumeofthereacto'rcoolantsystem,atratedoperatingconditions,is6cubicfeet.

Rerences:(1)FS-S-ction3.2.(2)FSAR-tion2(3}FSAR-Secon.2.1(4)FSARSection3.2.(5)FR-Section3.2.1and2.3(FSAR-Table4.1.9 FuelStoraeSecification;5.4~1...ThenewandscentfuelpitstructuresaredesignedtowithstandtheanticipatedearthcpxakeloadingsasClasslIstructures.Thespentfuelpithas,astainlesssteellinertoensureagainstlossoTwater.ii5.4.2Thenewandspentfuelstorageracksaredesignedsothat.itisimpossibletoinsertfuelassembliesinotherthan~~.th~escribedlocations.Thespentfuelstorageracksare','ividedintotworegionsasdepictedonFigure5.4-1.iThefuelisstoredverticallyinanarraywithsufficientcentertocenterdistancebetweenassembliestoassureKeff<0.95=for(1)unirradiatedfuelassembliesdeliveredr~ÃhN>Kd.lear>Chmen4priortoJanuary1,1984(Region1-15)9'@an~.gOocecqhtPerddw4and(2)unirradiated,~~HL'in'ih~lWl'i'fi*Wi,igi~r.>Cso-~s-~n405Zei4)@+=~~A+5Bothcasesassume'.4.341.7<i?i3unboratedwaterusedinthepool.InRegion2ofthespentfuelstorageracks,fuelisstoredinaclosepackedarray,utilizingfixedneutronpoisonsineachofthestoredlocations.FordischargedfuelassembliestobestoredinRegion2,(1)60aysP'usthaveeapsedsinethecorecachedhotstdownpriortoischarged(2)thecombinationofassemb2.yaverageburnupandinitialU-235enrichmentmustbe~uch'thattb~pn'int'"'dnti+-'eaby"these"cw'oparametersonFigure5.4-2isabovethelineapplicabletot:particularfuelassemblydesign,thereforeassuringthatKeff<0 54.3.l.l5.4.5.CannisterscontainingconsolidatedfuelrodsmayhestoredineitherRegionIor2providedthat'iceaverageburw~pand~+'al-enrichm~5oftheTuelassembliesfromwhichtherodsmereremovedsatisfytherequirementsof5.4.2and5.4e3ehove,andb.theaveragedcayheatthefueassemblyfomhichthedswereemovedisessthan20BTU/hrereguirentsof.4.4amayeexceptedorthose*.consolitedfuelassembliesfRegionRahP2.5.4.6Thespentfuelstoragepitisfilledwithboratedwater'ataconcentrationtomatchthatusedinthereactor~~cavityandrefuelingcanalduringrefuelingoperations.<,whenever.thereisfuelinthepit.IThecentertoaenterspacingofRegionIinsure~hat-:,Keff<0.95fortheenrichmentlimitations~cifiedin54-2randforapostulatedmissileimpactthezgCoseattheEABIvouMhevithintheguide3.xnesofIOCERXOO.InRegion2,Keff<0:95isinsuredhytheadditionofinixedneutronpoison(horex)ineach~oftheRecp.on.2storagelocations,andaminimumhuznupzecpxirementasaSunctionofinitialenrichmentforeachfuelassemblydesign.--,The50dayIl+-!cool&tz+.~reg~r&BQt&sureswurst:forapos&ated-.sxsswciimpacttheresultingdoseattheKABwouldhewithinMegaide-Minesoflooo i:~ae~aeiae~aa"mearaWaaeaaWMMXaaXXXXaaaamaWOgyp'><g><gjEQNWQWQWgWgggggggggggggggWggggg)-<Qi.~Xi3gi35WHRRRNSHXMSSRHWMWQSWWRSXXRWNRRWeWi-.~W:~ri=ieaWaaaeaameXXXaaWWmaXWarXaeaaCWeire~We~WWWWXaaaWaeaaaraaaeaXeaaWWaaaiei=~x=~i=~wwaaaearrrWaawwwaaaeseaammeaa)35C~XCEXCEMXXXSXQRSXRXIWQRROXSRRXWORQRNNXM5)iX>35>3W><OSNWWXWWW%%%%%5%%%%%%%%5%%NWWS=5:5=835%5%%5%%5NS55%5%%WSWSSWWWSSQNraW)356(WC<Wi3%5WWWWWWWWNWWW%%%%0%WXWNSQNWQi:~RC~gi35C~NWORRWRRSWRRRRRRRRSRRWOW%%%51%%RC(W>.<W>-(W>iOQRRSOXRWXHRRSRXSSQSRQNRSRXNON)~QC~WAQASW5%%WN%%%0%5'ORRRRRR%WRQWRRRNQWW>.~5).<N).<5iiWXWWWNRXSXWSQXX%55%5W%5%%N%5%5W-W5"5N5"55"05%555IRRWRRWRSRRRWRRSRRNRRR105)3%~35i3W<lwi3W>3XC<WCi5>3WC~Si3%15%WNRQWSW5%8%%W%%%W%%%W%15%%ie~ai-.~ii=~ei"~X>-~Xeia=~aC~aeiaC~WaamaeaWaraaavrMaaaMNaaWaaamaaaPBW)(5)(X[{X>(W>3W)35i3X)3W>3%)<WW5%%%NRXSXSWSWXSSQSRMSOXX5%5N)<Wt<W)<5><8>3W>35i35f(g)3W>35WIN551N5%555%%5555555%5555ggg)ik><5>EX><fl><5>35>(%95>25>i5>"<5%5%55%5%%55%55555%555555%%XRRi>:ia>-~a>=<i&>=<ave".ian~ana>-.<a>.-~aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaarre~ivW=~ez~e>-~X=~X"~a=iW=<N>-~aeaameWaaaWrraaaaammaaaaweararraXC(W)3X)<5MXC<%35(Wi.iWQW)35XMMOXMMRWMXMXHRMXMR0XRWRXMXRXMi".~i-.~W=~Wi=~W=XaaXraaaaaaaaaXaaamaWraWarmsWNC~i".~We~r-.~m=~MaaaaXaaaaaXeWaWWasWaWMMXXMaaalg)31i3Wi.<%i3Wi<5%M8%%%MONWX55%%%M%MNNQO5SQWXQC~W~35C<W>BW~3%%NMXCRIM%WXMN%%%%XX'I%5RSRX5RR5)<WC<M>"<%VX:iaaaaaawrarraeaarararaerarrewaa Il~e'tr,:slXrstTOrllCIIICII~IluILCttl'2>>jsLVIILIslLSSLtlCO.oo~s~et<<1~Fa~5'H.FIGURE5.4-230g20eIo~llI10.'"Is~0.>>lIoI~IT,o~litaery~II.oo~f~~~o's'(leREGIONSOFHPEACCRAGSTOFOReo~~~~oll~o~~~~1~oI.I'l,l1'l'~:ll.'l;IIee~~~Ia~'e'sI~~IIlle,'o~eo'"liI~frll:Il::illlo'IeoKr1If~~o~~'ll~o~IeII~I~.s'I'~~~I~~lj(~re'~~lill.N2IIoIl:e~~sI~'.~~leo~I-stl~sl~o~oooos~II~~'o~Ils1,o~'I';I.'~~~1'1eoo~~elII~RHG'll.1s,t~~sl:I-.'i}:~:Ilie:l(ojsl>>TO1il~,"1o~1~~o~el.'II~l1,":ACCoEPTADLEFORIo'.I.~aII~il::it:,lieRIO~o11eeoI1!iii'..I~f1~,I1!.;Ioo.'I'oII~o~ia~I~~~~si'1I:'.rfIe)elI'1.lI1~e'Is~~aIlolrii-il,',~~II:!.:Ii}:~Il~'ll'1~~lltjr;oI1'1f'Ia4!~l,l~leI;o.I:1o~~e~f~~Iis:II~~o~~o'l:sllleall';I.~e~esl(.:Tla~11'1'~~~llillaI:,:;,':.'II.'RII.I'~1'I!.~o1~'ll:::li:.'tlrIj!',',Ij;e:l.:lsil~~~i~~~o~e~eill!jlsiI(III:IIroI'-'I,>>iI~I~~~~~l:Ioalil:e.I~tl'1eIe.'Iillale,l~'s~1~l>>~~~I}II',as~1FUELDELIVERED0~I!iimj(}'P~elrl-'.If~~JANUARY1,19B~'IallI,~(IlI1}IeII:l!s'llll!IelI'~O~11o~~III~1(lII(ilhiII,Il~leI."l;.llllj:l.'~~ll'1;.I!ol~~~'o~'~~~a~I:elI..lal~sPPP~(IllIlji"I:sIl};e'llle~lI~1i'lllilIk~~f~~o~sl~:ellltl~Ii>>~>>~~~a~a>>'at'e~~~I.Il~.e.~~I1IIl:e,ill!I:!~elif>>:I'oI!ilj(lI~~I':I~lIo.',Ie'li'1Tkj>>T>>:i(II}I~(~~~~'s1~~~o~'jk1.50i2~00~>>~K<<K>>KKIAL3.0ENRI0Cl!HEATr..$U/QTADILITYAllDUHACCHPTADIIITY-OFSPENTFUELINREGION2IIal~~oIs~I~~~~~il'I:..'I'(iIl~ll:o:l"IT1~~~ll,~el~le~:i.:l~I.',l;ill~j~I:.ilI:Il.:~~~~o~IlPI~o~~~,I'~'po~r~;I':Ito.~ilfiCCes~HPTjlNA~f~>>o~~~~~all:~ee(l'tTl~oo~I-'o:r,'i'sle~aS}FuCL;lej",li~~~I~~(~Is~~e~~I~~!o~E'I'DELIVEREDlAFTERJANU19ARY1,e!j(o~~~~~"1'~I~'~~~~s~eIIoIo~11~lireI1I:(ll,i....I,:)I:s:ili'!'-I>>io~Io~l.II>>.it.~~I~Il~'ll~i~~o'1'IsIs.I'~I'Io'~I;~l'sl~~~~sl::ro~1~~Ie~1~~leoelI,Is1~1:.li.:~IIls~~I~~~IgljI(:'('.:IIIlit!ADLI~'il'soe~o'is~~~I~~I.tT.I.li~~~.1:.(I!I:'I,'.~~~~~~o,~~~~o~HGIoIoi~~-;sI:a.:II~s(o!I'll.'l~~~oe~I~I'i.,s.II(~o'!;I:.eilll11.I'.:,li:I"oa~~o~~~eI~~:Io~1~~o~~:IlsI~e>>e'.,;o~~~I'I:lel~~l~l;:OHFORsll~~IoIli"I',i:~~I.i:Il1",I'!,.llo:js.II'i'I::~~1I'~~s~~II1~o~II~sI~I,~~Is4.004.25e>> ThetwocurvesofFigure5.4-2dividethefuelassembly'esignsintotwogroups.Thefirstgroupisallfueldelivered..*pn.ortoJanuary1,1984.ThisincorporatesallKxxoaandMestmg-IhouseHIPARdesignsasedat,Qinna.Thesecondcurve~Xorthe1WestinghouseOptimizedFuelAssemblydesigndeliveredtoGinnaheginninginFebruary1984.IIrTheassemblyaverageburnupiscalculatedusingIMPLOREgeneratedpowersharingdataandtheactualplantoperatinghistory.Thecalculatedassemblyaveragehuxnupshouldhereducedhy10'oaccountforuncertainties.~uncert-~tyof4Xisassociatedwiththemeasurementofpowersharing.Theadditional;"4gprovidesadditionalmargintohoundthehuznup.uncertaintyjassociatedwiththetimebetween',a'easurementsandupdatesofcoreyPhuxnup."Thecurvesoffigure5.4-2.incoxporatetheuncertaintiesofthecalculation-ofassemblyreactivity.-ThecalculationsoffuelasseinblybuxnupforaemparisonCothecixxvesofFigure5.4-2todetexmine.,Meacceptability'orstorageinRegion2shallhe~dependentlychecked.ThexecordIofthesecalculationsshallhekeptf'ras3,ong-asfuel.assembliesremaininthepool.Me,fuelstoragecannistersaredesicpmdsathati!normally,theycancontaintheecpxivalentwumberoffuelrods:Sromtwofuelassembliesinaclosepackedarray,andcan'be4:;storedineitherRegion1orRegion2.racklocations.Theclose.pace"arayvillinsuretheKooftherackconfigurationconfining='anynumberofcannistersvillbelessthanthatforstoredfuel'assembliesatthesamehuxnupandinitialenrichment.Theexception.~~~

fparagraph5.4.5ispossiblebecausetheconsolidatedconfigurais'substantiallylessreactivethanthatofafuelaSReably;The'~decayheatxhcpirementvill&curethat.localfBm'-*-.cboilingvillnotoccurbetweenthe'closepackedfuel'fthepooltemperatureisaaintainedatorbelow150'F."ThedecayheatoftheasslyvillhedeterminedusingASS5ASS9-2ootheracceptablesubstitutestandards.Withthi-.additionofthestoraofconsolidatedfuelcannisters,thetheoreticalstoragecapacity,ofthepoolmouldhea@creasedto2032fuelassemblies<(2xlQ16).However,duetolimitationontheheatremovalcapabilityofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem,thestoragecapacityislimitedto1016.fue1lassemblies.+vs.v~References8gX984.,T.R.Robbins,Pickard,LoveandJ.D.Cook,EREMarchL5,1984.~~~~~5'.Letter,D.M.CrutchfieldtoJ.Z.Naier,Carrick,November5,X981-l.Letter,J.Z.SaiertoB.R.DentonJanuaryl8,1984-----/.2.SetterJ.Ey5aiertoR.R.Dentcn,Dancery~18,2984.~~~S.CntxcalatyMulysisofRe9icn2oftheCloneRDR,SpentFuel8rageRack,Pickard,LoveandCarrick,Xnc. JlJIWasteTreatmentSystemsThegaseousradwastesystemisdesignedtocollectoff-gasfromtheprimarycoolantsystemandholdforradioactivedecaypriortoreleasetotheenvironment.sThegaseousradwastetreatmentsystemconsistsoffour.(4)GasDecayTanksandtwo{2)gascompressors.OnlyonecompressorandthreeGasDecayTanksarenecessarytothesystem.'hVentilationExhaustSystemTheventilati.onexhaustistreatedtoreducegaseousradioiodineandmaterialinparticulateformbypassingRadioactiveLicpzidVasteTrez'anent..Theliquidwastetreatmentsystemconsistsofa,Hastes'oldupTank,aHasteEvaporatorandamixed,beddemineraliz~f'Portionsofthesystemmaybebypassedandstillmeetthereleaselimits.GaseousRadwasteTreatmentr1throughcharcoaladsorbersand/orHE?A.filters.Thissystemhasnoeffectonnoblegaseiffluents.'The'omponentsoftheventilationexhaust'.systenaxe:,r'AuxiliaryBuildingHEPAfiltersAuxiliaryBuilding"6"CharcoalZE=PAfiltersAuxiliaryBuilding"A"CharcoalAdsorbersContainmentPurgeCharcoal.&3%PA.filtersSolidRadwasteSystem3ThesolidradwastesystemconsistsofpipingzndvalvesintheDrummingStationwheebwasteevapora"orconcentrates cire6~~sbyothe~~ernatxve3.-y-.-~andpreprshipmentbyawasteevaporatorx(4,$ieCQtiSteSee>eeactorezfezzedintopzep/

1.12FreauencNotationThefrecpzencynotationspecifiedfortheperformanceofsurveillancereauirementsshal3.correspondtotheintervalsdef'nedbelow.NotationIS,FachShifD,DailyTwicepeweekW,WeeklyB/W,BiweeklyM,MonthlyB/M,Bimont>~yQ,QuarterlySA,Semiannual3.yA,AnnuallyS/UN.A.pQdrzsseJ~+QhopQrI.oPRFreauencvAtleastonceper12hoursAtleastonceper24hoursAtleastonceper4daysandatleasttwiceper7daysACleastoncepe"7daysIAtleastoncepe"14daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper62daysAt,leastoncepe92daysAtleastonceper6monthsAtleastoncepe"12monthsAtleastonceper18months-PriortoeachstartupNotApplicablePriortoeachstartupifnotdonepreviousweekWithin3.2hourspriortoeachreleaseOffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCt"'heODCMisamanualcontainingthemethodo'ogyandparameterstobeusedforcalculatingtheoffsite liILLSo.5'.Idosesduetolicpzidandgaseousradiologicaleffluents,incalculationoflicpxidandgaseouseffluentmonitoinginstrumentationalarm/tripsetpoints,andi,ntheconductoftheenvironmentalradiologicalmonitoringprogram.ProcessControlProcrramPCPThePCPisamanualoutliningthemethodforprocessinwetsolidwastesand,forsolidificationofliquidwastes.Itshallincludetheprocessparametersandevaluationmethodsusedtoassuremeetingthereguiremenof10CFRPart71priortoshipmentofcontainersofradioactivewastefromthesite.1.1S1.16SolidificationSolidificationshallbetheconversionofradioactivewastesfromliqvidsystemstoahomogeneoussolid.Purge-Purainc1.17Purgeorpurgingisthecontrolledproce'ssofdischarginairorgasfromaconfinedspacetomaintaintemperature,pressure,humidity,concentrationorotheroperatingcondition,insuchamannerthatreplacementairorgasisreauiedtopurifytheconfinedspace.Vent'naVentingisthcontrolledprocessofdischargingairorgasfromaconfinedspacetomaintaintemperaura./pressure,humidity,concentrationo-otheroperatingcondition,insuchamannerthatrep3.acementairisnotprovidedorrecruied.AddtezscJCh~r~,lO $3.5.3.2Whenrequiredby3.5.3..1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheTotalNumberofChannelsshowninTable3.5-3,3.5.3.33.5.4eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin7days,orbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.Whenrequiredby3.5.3.1,withthenumberofoperableaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationchannelslessthantheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirementsofTable3.5-3eitherrestoretheinoperablechannel(s)tooperablestatuswithin48hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext12hours.Theradiationaccident.monitoringinstrumentationchannelsshowninTable3.5-6shallbeoperable,wheneverthereactorisat,orabovehotshutdown.3.5.5Withoneormoreradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable,taketheactionshowninTable3.5-6.startupmaycommenceorcontinueconsistentwiththeIIIactionstatement.RadioactiveEffluentmonitoringInstrumentation3.5.The'radioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumenwon)Q,vieshinTable3.5-5shallbeoperablt,alltimeswithalarmortripsetpoisettoinsurethatthelimitsofSpecx'on3.9.1.1and3.9.2.1arenotexceeded.armand/oripsetpointsshallbeestabledinaccordancewithcalctionalmethodsetforthintheOffsiteDoseCalculationM1-

Zfthesetpointforaradioactiveeffluentmonitoralarmand/ortripisfoundtobehigherthanrequired,oofefollowingthreemeasuresshallbetakenimmeiately:(i)thesetpointshallbeimmediateycorrectedithoutdeclaringthecharmsinoperable;orimme'atelysuspendthreleaseofeffluentsmonitoredtheeffectedchannelfor(ii)(iii)eaininthenestR"fioactiveEffluentReleaseaportwhy'theinoperabilitywasnotcorrectedinatimemanner.declarethecnelinoperable.Ifthenumberofchannelswhicareoperableisfoundtobelessthanruired,takethetionshowninTable3.5-5.ExebesteffortstoreturnthinstrumentstoOPERABRstatuswithin31daysand,ifuuccessful,.ControlRoomHVACDetectionSystemsDuringallmodesofplantoperation,detectionsystemsforchlorinegas,ammoniagasandradioactivityinthelcontrolroomHVACintakeshallbeoperablewithsetpointsitoisolateairintakeadjustedasfollows:/

~a~3~3.5.6.2chlorine,<5ppm3ammonia,<35mg/mradioactivity,particulate<1x10iodine<9x10noblegas<1x10Withoneofthedetectionsystemsinoperable,within1hourisolatethecontrolroomHVACairintake.Maintaintheaxrintakeisolatedexceptforshortperiods,nottoexceed1houraday,whenfreshairmakeupi'llowedtoimprovetheworkingenvironmentinthecontrolroom.BasisDuringplantoperations,thecompleteinstrumentationsystemwillnormallybeoperable.Reactorsafetyi:sprovidedbytheReactorProtectionsystemoh.ichautomaticallyinitiatesappropriateactiontopreventexceedingestablishedlimits.Safetyisnotcompromised,however,bycontinuingoperationwithcertain!instrumentatxonchannelsinoperablesinceprovisionsweremadeforthisintheplantdesign.Thisspecificationoutlineslimitingconditionsforoperationnecessarytopreservetheeffectivenessofthereactorcontrolandprotectionsystemwhenanyoneormoreofthechannelsisinoperable.Almostallreactorprotectionchannelsaresuppliedwithsufficientredundancytoprovidethecapabilityforchannelcalibrationandtestatpower.Exceptionsarebackupchannelssuchas:reactorcoolantpumpbreakers.Theremovalofonetripchannelisaccom-plishedbyplacingthatchannelbistableinatrippedmode;e..g.,atwo-out-of-threecircuitbecomesaone-out-of-twocircuit.Testingdoesnottripthesystemunlessatripconditionexistsinaconcurrentchannel.ITheoperabilityoftheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationensures/thatsufficientinformationisavailableonselectedplantparameters'omonitorandassessthesevariables,duringandfollowinganaccident.ThiscapabilityisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofNUREG-0578,"TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShort-TermRecommendat"ns".adioactiveliquideffluentinstrumentationisprovidmonitorcontrol,asapplicable,thereleasradioactivematerialsinliquluents.ThealaortripsetpointsfortheseinstrumentsarexnaccordancewiththeODCMtoensurethatalarmarzpwcurpriortoexceedingthelimitsofPart20.Theoperabxduseofthisinstrwonisconsistentwiththerequirements.GeneralgxgnCriteria60,63and64ofAppendixAto10CFRPart erauioactivegaseouseffluentinstrunentationisprovedtomonitorandcontrol,asapplicable,releasesradioactivematerialsingaseousfluents.Thealarmandtripsetpointsforthesinstrumentsarecalculatedi:ncordancewithODCMtoensurethatalarmand/ortrip'llocrpriortoexceedingthelimitsof10CFRPartThisinstrumentationalsoincludesprovis'formonoringtheconcentra-tionsofpotentilyexplosivegasmzturesinthewastegashdupsystem.Theoperabilitynduseofthisitrumentationisconsistentwiththereire-mtsofGeneralDesignCriterion64ofAppendixAo10CFRPart50.ControlRoomHVACdetectionsystemsaredesignedtopreventtheintakeofchlorine,ammoniaandradiationatconcentrationswhichmaypreventplantoperatorsfromperformingtheirrequiredfunctions.Concentra-tionswhichinitiateisolationofthecontrolroomHVACsystemhave.beenestablishedusingtheguidanceofseveralestablishedreferences(2-4).Thechlorineisolationsetpointis1/3ofthetoxicitylimitofreference2butslightlygreaterthantheshorttermexposurelimitofreference4.Theammoniasetpointisestablishedatapproximately1/3ofthetoxicitylimitforanhydrousammoniainreference2Iandequalto.theshorttermexposurelimitofreference4-NThesetpointsforradioactivitycorrespondtothe IS.valiTable3.5-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorinInstrumentationMinimChanels0eehleActie:GroActivityMonitors(LiquiC)b.e,'quidRadwaste(R-1&)SteGeneratorSlowdown(R-19)TurbieBuildingFloorDrains(R-21)HighCouctivityWaste(R-22)ContainmeFanCoolers(R-16)SpentFuelPolHeatExchangeALoop(R-20A)1i++SpentFuelPooHeatExchanerBLoop(R-20B)1+++2.PlantVents,lationa.WithoutMini-Purge2~3~NobleGasAtity(R-3.4)(ProvidingAlaandIsolationofGasayT)ParticuteSampl(R-13)Xodineampler(R-1BorR-14A"~~)l5~lb.WithMini-e1.2.3.4~NoleGasActivity(R-1PrticulateSampler(R-3.odineSampler(R-3.0Bor14A~*~)NobleGasActivity(R-12)orParticulateSampler(R-11)455)pl3eShutdPurgea.NobleGasActivity(R-12)bParticulateSampler(R-ll)3.5-208&!e/AmendmtNo.gg,gp,43 MinimumChannelsrahleant[.nn5.c.IodineSampler(R-10AorR-12A***)E]ectorMonitor(R<<15orR-15A~*+)MastGasSystemOxygenMonitor*0*NotrequirewhenSteamGeneratorSlowdowniheingrecycled(i.e.notreleaseRequiredonlyuringshutdownpurgesanrequiredtosamplethe:containmentstaRequired.tosampleontainmentduringmini-purgeoperation..NotrequiredduringCldorRetuelgShutdown.AlsoseeTable3.5-6.ApplicablewhenHeatExcherinserv9.ce.3.5-20aAmendment.gp,43I;IS.vihl TABLE3.5-5ContinuedTableNotationActiIfthenumberofoperablechannelsislesthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablerequire-ment,effluentreleasesfromthetankm/ycontinueforupto14days,providedthatpriortoinitiatingarelease:I\iAction2IIlIIAction3Action4-1.Atleasttwoindependentsampleofthetank'scontentsareanalyzed,inaccordancewithSpecification4.12.1.1.a,and/2.t'easttwotechnicallylifiedmembersofthe2'aciI.ity.Staffindependentlyverifytherel'easeratecalculationanddischargelinevalving;Otherwise,suspendreleasofradioactiveeffluentsvxathxspathway.WhenSteamGeneratorBowdownisbeingreleased(notrecyc'ed)andtBenerofchannelsoperableislessthanrequiredbjtheMinimumChannelsOperablerequirements,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinueprovidedgrabsamplesareanalyzedforgrossradioactive('betaorgamma)atalimitofdetectionofatost1-7uCi/gram:l.Atleastanceper8ourswhentheconcentrationofthesecondarycoolant,.is>0.01uCi/gramdoseequivalentI-131./2.Atleastonceper24hours~whentheconcentrationoftt(esecondarycoolantis.<0.01uCi/gramdoseequ'valentI-131.Ifthnumberofoperablechan'nels'slessthanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsoperablerequirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymay.continueprvidedthatatleastonceper24holmgrabsampleseanalyzedforgrossradioactivity(b4aorgamma)talimitofdetectionofatmost10-7uCi/gm.IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessanrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablereirement,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycontinuprovidedgrabsamplesaretakenatleastoncep8hoursandthesesamplesareanalyzedforisotopiactivitywithin24hoursorR14Aisoperableandreadingsarereviewedatleastonceper8hours.3.5-21endmentNo.W,29 TABLE3.5-5ContinuedTableNotation'ActionAct'on6-Action7IfthenumberofoperablechannelsislessthrequiredbytheMinimumChannelsOperablereire-ments,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymcontinueprovidedsamplesarecontinuouslyollectedsrequiredbyTable4.12-2ItemEwithailiaryplingequipment.IfhenumberofoperablechannelsisessthanrequedbytheMinimumChannelgOperleandtheSeconryActivityis51x10uCigm,effluentreleasemaycontinueviathispathayprovidedgrabsampleseanalyzedforgrossrad'oactivity(betaorgamma)tleastonceper24hrs.Ifthesecondaryactivityigreaterthan1x10uCi/gm,effluentreleasesviathispathwaymaycntinueforupto31daysprovidedrabsamplesaretakenevery8hoursandanalyzedwin24hours.Ifthechannelisinoperab,asampleofthegasfromtheinservicgasdaytankshallbeanalyzedforoxygencontentlet,onceevery4hours.Action8IfthenumberofoperrequiredbytheMinimleast.onecontainmenfwithin1hourtermiateechannelsislessthanhannelsOperable,oratcoolerisnotoperating,thpurge.I3.5-22endmento.+,29 9PlantEffluentsAlicabilitAppliestothecontrolledreleaseofradioactive~~1~I9.iliquidsandgasesfromtheplant..'~a'odefinetheconditionsforreleaseofradioactiveliquidndgaseouswastes.8ecificationsiLiquidEffluents3.9.1.1Concentration3.9.1.1.aThereleaseofradioactiveliquideffluentsshallbesuchthattheconcentrationinthecirculatingwaterdischargedoenotexceedthelimitsspecifiedinaccordance.withAppendix8,TableII,Column'andNotestheretooflOCFR20;Fordissolvedorentrainednoble~gasesthetotalactivitydue~odissolvedor-4~~.entrainednoblegasesshallnotexcee2x10uCi/mL.'.3.9.1.1.bIftheconcentrationofradioactivematerialinthecirculatingwaterdischargeexceedsthelimitsof3.9~1.1.a,measuresshaLlbeinitiatedtoresthre'heconcentrationtowithinthoselimitsassoonaspracticable.~ck..1.2Dose3.9.1.2.aTe-doseordosecommitmenttoanig6iviualascal-culatedinthe041~mradioactivematerialsinliquid.ef<luentsreleasedtounre~edareasshall.helimized: (i)Duringanycalendarquarterto<1.5mrstothetotalbodyandto<5mremtoanyorgand3.9.1(ii)SafeDrinkingMaterAct.Duringanycalendaryearto<3mrtothetotalbodyandto<10mremtoanyorgan.h.2.bwhenever.thecalculateddoserasul'ngfromthareleaseofradioactivematerialsinlid,effluentsexceedstheqaaMeelylimitacf3.9.4.2.a(i),aSpecialRepeat.shallbesubmitted'.tothe"CommissionwithinthirtyJdayswhichincludesthefollowinginformati.on:(i).Identificationof'.thecauseforexceedingthedoselimiE.(ii)Correctiveactionstakenand/ortobetakentoreducethereleasesofra'dioactivematerialin,./'XqLIideffluentstoassurethatsubsequentreleaseswillremainwithinthabovelimits.(ii'i),Theresultsoftheradiologicalanalysesofthenearestpublicdrinkingwatersource,andanevaluationoftheradiologicalimpactwdueto~licenseereleasesonfinisheddrinkingwer~withregardtotherequirementsof4QCAR1413.3LiquidHasteTreatment3.9.1.3.aThe--liau>8watertreatmentsystemshausedtoreducetheradioactive-materials'quidwastespriortotheirdischarge'assary,tomethatthecumulativeseduetoliquideffluentreleaseswhen,~ad over31daysdoesnotexceed0.06mremtothetotalbodyor0.2mremtoanyorgan..3.9.1.3.bIftheliquidradwastetreatmentsystemisnoterableformorethan31daysand,ifradioactiveliquidvasteisbeingdischargedwithouttreatment,x'esultingin'hdosesinexcess.ofSpecificationS'.9.1.3.a,aSpecialReportshallbesubmittedto""theCommissionwithinthirtydayswhichincludesthefollowinginformation:L.(i)Identificationofequipmentorsubsystemsnot/operableandthereasons./(ii)."Action(s)takentorestoretheinoperable~Wequipmenttooperablestatus.(iii)SummarydescriptionoEaction(s)takenoreventarecurrence.3.9.3.9.2.X'.9.2.1.aGaseousMastesoseRateThe'tantaneousdoserate,ascalculatintheODCM,due.toradioactivemateialseasedingaseouseffluentsfromesite.shalllimitedtothefollowingvalues:(ii)Thedoseratorblegasesshallbe<500mrem/yrthetotalboKand<3000mrem/vrtothkin,andThedoseratef-allradioiodines,radioactivematerialsinparticulatfoam,andra'onuclidesotherthannoblegaseswithhal-livesgrterthan8daysshallbe<1500mrem/yrtoanyorg

3.9.2.1.b.Forunplannedreleaseofgaseouswastes,compliance~~with3.9.2.1.amaybedeterminedbyaveraginoovera'h24-hourperiod.;,3.9.2.1.cIfthecalculateddoserateofradioactivematerialsrelease6ingaseouseffluenus"fromthesiteexceedsthelimitsof3.9.2.1~.or3.9.2.1,.b,measuresshallbeinitiatedtorestorereleases-towithinthoseJlimitsassoonaspracticable.-,'3.'9.2:1.dCompliancewith3.9.2.l.aand3.9.2-.k.bshallbe-determinedbyconsideringtheapplicable-ventilationsystemflowrates.Theseflowratesshallbedetermined!..-atthefrequencyrequiredbyTable4.1-5.3.9.2.2Dose(10CPRPart50,AppendixI)3.9.2.2.a"--Theairdose,.ascalculatedintheODCM~etonoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluaentsfromthesiteshallbelimitedtothe~fo11owing:(i}Duringanycalendarquarterto<5mradforgammaradiationand.to<10mradforbetaradiation.(ii)Duringanycalendaryearto<11-mradforgammaradiationandto<20mradforbetarad~on.3.9.2.edosetoanindividual,ascalculatedinthefromradioiodine,radioactivematerialparticulateformandradionuclidther~ablegaseswithhalf-livesgreateeightdayreleasedwithgaseofluentsfromthesiteshallhe'tedtothefollowing: jp~-(.i)DuringanyaIlyOrgcLn"'ii)DuryAcalendarcharterto<7calendaryearto<-"15.mremtoanyorgan3~.2.cWheneverthecalculateddosetoanindividualresulting>..fromnoblegasesorfromradionuclidesotherthan'Anoblegasesexceedstheauarterlylimitsof.3;9.2.2.a(i)or3.9.2.2.b(i)aSpec'alReport:shallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwithinthirtydayswhichincludesthefollowinginformation:Edentificati'onofthecauseforexceedingthedoselimit.(ii)Correctiveactionstakenand/ortobetakentoreducereleasesofzadioactivematerialingaseouseffluentstoassurethatsubsecruentreleaseswillbewithin.theabovelimits.3.9.2.3GaseousWasteTreatment3.9.2.3.a3A9A2A3ebThegaseousradwastetreatmentsystemshallbe~usedtoIAreduceradioactivematerialsingaseouswa'stepriorto~A~theirdischarge,ifnecessary,to.a'ssurethatthecumulativeairdosedueto.gaseouseffluentreleasestounrestrictedaeasw'henaveragedover31daysdoesnotexceed0.2.mradforgammaradiationand0.4mradforbetaradiationtothemaximallyexposedindividual.TheappropriateportionsoftheventilationexhaustAsystemshallbeusedtoreduce'=~cLioactivematerialsingaseouswastepriototheir-discharge,ifnecessary,f~l'l.Vt'.l.A Ftoassurethatthecumulativedosedueto~aseoeffluentreleasesfromthesitewnenaveragover31aysdoesnotexceed0.30mremtoanyorgan3.9.3.3.cXfthe~aseousradwastetreatment.sternorventilationexhaustsyternisinoperablefomorethan31daysandxfgaseouswasaisbeing'hargedwithouttreatmentresultingindoses'ne-essofSpecifications3.9.2.3.or3.9.2.3.b,aSpecjaReportshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwi.Minthidayswhichincludesthe*~t<Cfollowinginformation:(i)Identificationofequipmentorsubsystemsnotoperableandthereasons.(gi,)Action(s)takentorestoretheinoerable.equipmenttooperablestatus.~~~~(iii)Summarydescriptionofaction(s)takentpreventarecurrence.3.2.4Dose(40CPRPart190)3.9.2.4.Ifthecalculateddosefromthereleaseofradioact'aterialsfromtheplantinliquidorgaseouffluentsexceedstw',thelimitsofSpecificans3.9.1.2.a,3.9.2.2.a,or3...2.b,aSpewsReportshallbesubmittedtotheCommis'withinthirtydaysandsubsequentreleaseshallbetedsothatthedoseordosecztmenttoarealindividislimitedto2mremtothetota"bodyoranyorgan(ept.~~~thyroid,whichislimitedto<'75mrem)forthecndaryearthatinludestherelease(s)coveredbyth'srepoiIQ.~ll.~jg,v'i

=thisreportshallincludeananalysiswhichdemo~stratas.thatradiationexposurestoallreal""ndividualsfromtheplant.arelessthanthe40'.CFRPart190limitsinaccordance-withmethodssetforthintheODCM.Otherwise,the"reportshallrequestavariancefromtheCommissiontopermitraisestoexceed40CPRPart;190.Submittalofther'aport~iconsideredaelyrequest,andavarianceisgranteduntstaffact'onontherequestiscomplete.'=.9.2.5ExplosiveGasMixture)~M~3.9.2.5.aTheconcentrationofoxygenineachgasdecaytankshallbelimited,3~2.5.bIftheconcentrationof>'2/byvolumebut<4%ofoxygentowithinthe3.9.2.5.cIftheconcentric-'onofoxygeninagasdecaytankisbyvolume,restorethecon'centrationAlimitwithinaoursox~znagasdecaytankis(Ill.v~iI3.9.2.6>4/byvolume,immech.ateemovethattankfrom"reuse"'service"statusandcetheconcentrat'onHasteGasDecayTanksoxygento'<2%within48hou"sifsuchmeasdonot.conflictwithotherradiologicallimitsor-procedu3.9.2.6.aThequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegass.S,il(3.9.2.6.b1decaytankshallbelimitedtoe'ssthan.orequalto200,000curiaeofnlegas(consi.deredvasXe-133)atallmes.Ifthequti"yofradioac+ivmaterialinanywtergasdectankexceedstheimitof3.9.2.6.a,m.-ed'atelysuspendalladd'tionsofadioactivemaaria'o&e

f,'/L4L,tankandrucathetankcontentswithin48.hoursif/suchmeasuresdonotconflictvithotherradiologicallimitsorprocedures.y3M'.7SolidRadioactiveWaste3.9.2.7.a'~Thesolidzadwastesystemshallbeusedas
.applicableinaccordancewiththeProcessControlProgramforthesolidificationand.packagingofradioactivewastetoensuremeetingtheretirementsof10CFRPart71priorptoshipmentofradioactivewastes"omthasite.3.9.2.7.bIfthepackagingzecpzizamentsof10CFRPaz71aranotsatisfied,suspendshipmentsofdafic'entypackaged,.~solidradioactivewastesfromthesiteuntilappropatacorrectivemeasureshavebeentaken.~Za'sisMcgzidwastesfromtheRadioactiveWasteDisposalSystemaredilutedintheCirculatingMateSystemdischargepriortoreleasetothelake'ithtwo~pumpsoperating,-thecapacityoftheCirculatingMaterSystemisapproximately400,00gpm.Operat'onofasinglecirculatingwater'mpreducesthenominalflowratebyabout50%.Tecirlatingwaterflowunde=variousoperatingonditionshabeencalculatedfromtheheaddiffrentialaczossthepumosandthemanu-facturer'ead-capacitycurves.Becauseofthe.3.owLradioativitylevelsin+Decirculatingwa5edischarge,Lthconcentrationoflicpidrad'oactivaefflueraatthispointisnotmeasureddirectly.Theconcent"ion

~"~'nthecirculatingwaterdischargeiscalculatedfram/themeasuredconcentrationintheNasteCondensate,.Tank,theflowrateoftheMasteCondensatePumps,andthef1oeinthecitculatingWaterSystemRadioactiveeffluentsreleasedtounrestricted,areasonthebasisofgrossbeta-gammaanalysisarebasedontheassumptionthatI-129andradiumarenotpre0ent.Accordingly,sAppendix3,TableZX,Column2of10CPR20willpermitIaconcentzationupto1x10uCi/ml'nthecirculariwaterMscharge.Otherwise,ifcontrolledonaradio-Inuclidebasis,thepermitteddischargeconcentrationwillbeinaccordancewithNote1of10CPR20,Append'x,B,TableXI,Column2.Xftheconcentrationofliquid'astesinthecirculatingwaterdischargeeaualstheMaximumPermissibleConcentration(MPC)asspecified,ttheaverageconcent=ationattheintakeofthenearest.publicwatezsubplyatOntario,New'cwork,wouldbewellbelowMPC.,Thus,theselimitationsprovide.(2)additionalassurancethattheconcentrationsofwater-borneradioactivitywillresultinon1yminimalpotentiala/publicexposureswithin(1)SectionZX.AofAppendix/I,.10CFRPart50,and(2)thelimimof10CPRPart20.106(e).i!The'cucentrationlimitfornoblegasesisbasedupon/theassumptionthatXe-135isthecanroll'ngradio-isotopeanc.tsK?Cinairwasconvertedtoanenlivalenti'oncentrationinwaterus'ngXCRPPublication2me~+odology.

<<<<ClC...~.',.:<<mac;s...n..'..<<A.'~4.~~~iraat~Cfa":~',*.'.'TheSpecificationswhichlimit'thedosetoanindivil~~~~~~fromradioactivelicpxideffluentsareprovidedtoimplementtherequirementsofSectionsII.A,ILEandiIV.Aof:10CFRPart50,AppendixP.TheLimi'Condition'~forOperationimp1ementstheguidesetforthinSectionIX.Aof10CFRPart50,pendixI.TheSpecificationsprovidetherequired.aeratingflexibilityanatthesametimeimplementtheguides/setforthinSectionIV.Aof10CFRart50,AppendixI.ThedosecalculationsintheODCNplement.thereauiie-ments.inSectionIIAof10CPart50,AppendixIthatconformancewith'theguisofApoendixIisto.beshownbycalculationalprceduzesbased,onsuchmodelsanddatathatthetualexposureofareal.individualthroughappzoriatepathwaysisunlikelytobesubstantiallyunderstimated.Also,thereisreasonableassurancesthattheoperationoftheplantwillnotresult'aterborneradi'onuclidedischargeswhichcausetheotentialexposurefomthefinisheddrinkingwateingestiontoexceedtheecpxiremenmof40CFR141.Theremiementsthattheappropriateportnsotheliauidadwastetreatmentsystembeusedwheaspeciiedproviedassurancet~tthereleasesofradioactive.matrialsinliquide.:fluentsvillbekept"asloyasi,reasonablyachieve,>e."Thisspeciicationimnlentstheretirementsof10CFRPart50.36a,General'.

~~~~llIIII1esignCriterion60ofAppendixAto10CPRPart:50and,designobjectiveSectionII.DofAppendixI.'.The.,/limigoverningtheuseofappropriateportionsofCthelictuidradwastetreatmentsystemwerespecifiedas/'asuitable.fractionoftheguidesetforthinSectionII.Aof10CPRPart,50,AppendixIforicgzideffluents./-Thecumulative'.maximumdosetoan-offsiteindividual/fromwaterborner'adioactiveeffluenfsisdeterminedinordertoverifythattheaveragedoseovera31-day/periodisreasonablysmall,evenifthelictuidradwastetreatmentsystemisnot.operatedduringthatperiod./However,acumulativedosewhichexceedsthstatedJlimitdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatallportionsof/thelictuidradwastetreatmentsystembeused;certainsubsystemsmayhaveonlyminimaleffectsonreducing/doses.I!Thelimitfordoserateisprovided.toensurethatthedoserateatanytimeatthesiteboundaryfromgaseouseffluentswillbewithintheannualdoselimitsof%~~x10CFRPart,,20"forunrestrictedareas.'Theannualdoselimisarethedosesassociatedwith'heconcentrat'ons/of10CPart20,Appendix3,TableII.Theselimitsprovireasonableassurancethatradioactive:.material/discHargedingaseouseffluentswillnotresul+intheeosureofanind-'vidualinanunrestrictdarea,'.toualaverageconcentrations:ceedingthelimim

~~e,aJ'w'p~"',~w'LA/sPecitiedinAPPendix8,TableIIof10CPRPazt20//f0CFRPart20a106(b)).Forindividualswhomay,'attimesbewithinthesiteboundary,theseoccupancy/timeswillbesufficientlysmalltocompensateforany/Iincreaseintheatmosphericdiffusionfactorabovethatforesiteboundary.a/TheSpecificationswhichlimitthedose/fromradioactive/gaseouseffluentsareprovidedtoimplementtherecpxirementsofSectionsII.B,II.C,.III.AandIV.Aof110CFRPart50,AppendixI.TheLimitingConditionlforOperationimplementstheguidessetforthin/.SectionsII.BandII.Cof10CFRPart50,AppendixI.j'zhespecificationspzovideMezequizedapezatingflexibilityandatthesame.timeimplementtheguides/setforthinSectionIVof10CFRPart50;Appendix~Thezequizementthattheappzopziatepoztionsofthagaseousradwasteeatmentsystemandtheventilationexhausttreatmtsystembeusedwhen'specifiedprovidesreasonableaurancethatthereleasesfradioactivematerialsigaseouseffluentswillbeket"aslowasisreasoablyachievable."Thisspecifica'onimplementsthereirementsof10CFRPart50.36a,GeneralDesignCri"rion60ofAppendixAto10CZRPart50,d'deignobjectiveSectionII.DofAppenci'zI.Theimitsgoverningtheuseofappropriateportionsof

\A~'~~&I~'~i(O'AthesystemswerespecifiedasasuitablefractionoftheguidesetforthinSectionsZI.BandII.Cof10,'FRPart50,AppendixI,forgaseouseffluents.Thecumulatxvemaximumdosetoanoffsiteindividual;fromairborneradioactiveeffluentsisdeterminedInorder/toverifythattheaveragedoseovera31-dayperiod/is,reasonably,small,eveninthe-unlikely'ventthatathegaseousradwastetreatmentorventilationexhaust//systemsarenot.operatedduringthat,period.However,acumulativedosewhichexceedsthestatedIJ'~tdoesnotnecessarilyimply/thatallportinsfons0thegaseousandventilationexhausttreatmentsystemsIheused;ceztainsuhsysuemsmayhaveonlyminimaleffectonzeducingdoses.,TheSpecificationon'dose(40CPRPart190)isprovidedtomeetthereportingrequirementsof'40CFRPart190.FISincetheplant,isiwellremovedfromotherfuelcyclefacilities,xtxssufficienttoapplytheSpecificationonlytotheplantinaccordancewithmethodsprovided.intheODCMTheSpecificationonexplosivegasmixtureisprovided/toensurthattheconcentrationofpotentrallyexplosivegasmixturescontainedin.thegasdecaytanks'.are/~/maintainedbelowtheflammabilitylimitofoxyg/~e0Yidxnainxngtheco-..centrationofoxygenbelowitsflammabilitylimitsprovidesassurancethatthereleases PIAll~a\'PILI4"haiku,AAJJ4'4'J'I@4,u'I~Ca4~~~a~V~aPAko~~sk)ak~4~V,",'v(4~!.iofradioactive.materialswillbecontrolledinconformancewiththerequirementsofGeneralDesignCriterion6ofAppendixAto10CFRPart50.ewastegasdecaytankcurielimitisprovidedinordertoassurethatintheunlikelyeventofanluncontrolledreleaseofagasdecaytank'scontents,theresul'otalbodygammaexposuretoanindividualatthenearestexclusionarea,boundarywillnotexceedTherequirementpertainingtosolidradioactivewasteisprovidedtoassurethat.thesolidradioactivewastesystemwillbeusedasappropriatefortheprocessingandpackagin+gofsolidradioactayewastes'.Thespecification'alsoestablishestheProcessControl.Programiwhichincludestheprocessparametersandevaluationmethodsusedtoensuremeeting.therequire-mentsof10CFRPart71priortobeingshippedoffsite.;References'1)(2))FSAR,Section10.2FSAR,Section2,Appendix2AFSAR,Sections2.6and2.7

313SnuhhezsmitinCnditionfo0eration3.13.15.$.e:3~13~2WithRCSconditionsbovecoldutdown,allsafety-relatedsnubbersshallbeoperable.xsspecificationdoesnapp3gtothosesnubbersinstalledonnonsafetelatedsystemsxthesnubberfailure,andaresultgfailureofthesupportednsafety-relatedsysteowntobecausedbythatsnubberfailure,wouldhavenoadverseeffectonanysafety-relatedsysten.ActionWithoneormorepriubbersinoperable,within72hoursreplaceorrestoretheinoperablesnubber(s}tooperableIstatusanperformanengineeringevaluationperSpecifi.dation4.14.1fonthesupportedcomponetordeclare,Ithesupportedsysteminoperableandfollowtheapopriateactionstatementforthatsystem.1sSnubberrerequiredtobeoperabletoensurethatthestturalintegrityoftreactorcoolantsystemandallotherfety-relatedsystemsismaintaineduringandfollowingasmicorothereventnitiatingdynamicloads.nubbersmaybereplacedrigidstcturalsupports(bumpers)rovidedananalysisperformedtodemonstethatappropriatecceptancecrriaaresatisfiedfordesignbasis'smicandpipereakevtsandprovidedthatthebumpersareinspectedpe'icallyamannerappropriateforrigidstructural'supports. Vt' 3~l3OverressureProtectionSstemAlicabilit~~Applieswheneverthetc.-,."-"raturcofoneormoreoftheRCScoldLegsis<330'F,ortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemisznoperation.ObectiveTopreventoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantsystemandtheresidualheatremovalsystem.Secification3.'i.1ExceptduringsecondarysidehydrostatictestsinwhichRCSpresureistobe.raisedabovethePORVsetpoint,atleastoneofthefollowingover-pressureprotectionsystemsshallbeoperable:a.Twopressurizerpoweroperatedreiiefvalves(PORvs)withalift"settingof<424psig,orb.Areactorcoolantsystemventof>1.1squareinches.3.15.1.13'3+1'tt'3.15.1.32.5.v'ithonePORUinoperable,eitherrestoretheinoperablePORVtooperablestatuswithin7daysordepressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)withinthenext8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.WithbothPORVsinoperable,depressurizeandventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)within8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedconditionuntilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.UseoftheoverpressureprotectionsystemtomitigateanRCS;orBHRSpressuretransientshallbereportedin-ccord'ancewith6.9BasisAnRcsventopeningot'reaterthan1.1squareinchesensuresthatItheRCSwillbeprotectedfrompressuretransientswhichcouldexceedthelimitsofAppendixGto10CFRPart50whenoneormoreoftheRCS"oldlegsare<330F'~Thisreliefcapacitywill QrL3'6RadioloicalEnvironmentalMonitozinApp'toroutinetastingoftheplantenvirons.Ob'ectiveToestablishaprogramwhichwillassurerecognitionJ'fchangesinzadioactivityorexposurepathwaysin,/theenvirons./8'16el3.16.1.1f3.16.1e2Soecifi".ationMonitorinaPrramTheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogramshallbeconductedasspecifiedinTable3.16-1atthearrlocationsgivenintheODCM.rZftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitorringprogramr.~isnotconductedasspeciiedi.nTable3.16-1,prepareandsubmittotheCommission,intheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReport,adescriptionofthereasonsfornotconductingtheprogramasrequired'andtheplansforpreventingarecurrence.(Deviations3..16.1.3'repermittedfromtherequiredsamplingscheduleispecimensareunobtainableduetohazardousconditions,seasonalavailability,ortomalfunctionofautomaticsamplingequipment.Xfthelatter,efortsshaLJbemadetocompletecorrectiveactionpziorttheendo-thenextsamplingperiod.)Tfthelevelofradioact'vityinanenvironme"t--'amplingmc.diumatoneozmoreotheLocations'peci-fied'ntheODCMexceedsthespottinglevelsofTahl+s.

.9-2.whenaveragedoveranycalendarquarter,aSpecialReortshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwithinthirdayswhichincludesanevaluationofanyrelasecondit'ons,environmentalfactorsorotheraspectwhichcausedhereportinglevelsofTable6.9-tobeexceeded.Whenmorethn.oneoftheradionuclides'able6.9-2aredetectedithesamplingmedium,thireportshallbesubmittedif:concentration1limitlevel(1)concentration2+....~1.0limitleve(2)WhenradionuclidesoterthanoseinTable6.9-2aredetectedandarethersuitofplanteffluents,thisreportshallbesubmittedxthepotentialannualdosetoanindividualisgreaterhaSpecifications3.9.1.2aor3..thecalendaryearlimitof2.2.b.Thisreportisnotrequiredifthemearedleveloradioactivitywasnot.theresultofplaeffluents;howeer-,insuchanevent,theconditionhallbereportedandescribedintheAnnualRadioogicalEnvironmentalOpertingReport.3.16.1.4IfmilkorfreshleafyvegetablesamplesreunavailableformorthanonesampleperiodfromoneomoreofthesampnglocationsindicatedbytheODCM,adiscussionshlbeincludedintheRadioactiveEffluenReleaseeportwhichidentifiesthecauseoftheunavaililityofsamplesandidentifieslocationsforAm.dmentNo.583.16-2 2hvobtainingreplacementsamples.Xfamilkorleaf,vegetablesamplelocationbecomesun~aailable,thelocationsfromwhichsamales'wereunavailablemaythenbedeletedfromtMODCN,pr'ovidedthatcomparablelocationsareaddedtotheenvironmentalmonitoringprogram.LandUseCensusAlandusecensusshallbeconductedand,shallid'fythelocationofthenearestmilkanimalandtheearestridenceineachofthe16meteorologicalsectorswit2u.adistanceoffivemiles.Anonsitgardenlocatedinthemeteorologicalsectorhavingthe'est'.historicalD/maybeusedforbroadleafvegeationsamplin'nlieuofagardencensus;otherwiselandusecensusshallalsoidentifythelocationthenearestgardenofgreaterthan500scpxarefeetineaofthe16meteorologicalsectorswithinadistanceof"'vemiles.D/QshallbedeterminediODCH.accordancewithmeodsdescr"'bedintheEfa1duse'ensusidentifiesalocatn(s)whichyielacalculateddoseordosecommitmengreateranthatofthemaximallyexposedindividual-rent'.".heingcalculatedinSpecification..12.2.2,thewidentifiedlocation(s)shallbereportedintheSem'-annualRadioactiveReleaseRe,-~ 3.6.2.4Xfalandusecensusidentifiesamilklocytiop(swhichyieldsacalculateddoseordoseco'enteaterthanthatatalocationfromwchsamplesarecurretlybeingobtainedinaccoancewithSpecifi-cation3..1,thenewiden-'fiedlocation(s)shallbereportedinthSemialRadioactiveReleaseReport.~eThenewlocationlbeadded,totheradiologicalenvironmentmonitoringprogramwithinthirtydays,ifpossile.Themilklocatihavingthelowestca,"culateddoseordosecommitmentaybedeletedfromthismonitoringprogramafterOctober31thevearinwhichthislandusecensuswasconducted.Q4.l.'ll.6.33.16.3.13.16.3.2InterlaboratorvComparisonProramAnalysesshallbeperformedonapplicabradioactiveenvirentalsamplessuppliedpart,ofaninter-laboratorycoarisonpramwhichhasbeenapprovedbyHRC,ifsuchramexists.Efanalyarenotperfozmeasrequiredabov,rrtthecorrectiveactionstakenopreventarecurrenceintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvx,entalQperatngReport..BasisTheradio'calmonitoringprogrquiredbythisspecificationprovieementsofradiationand.ofradioact'vemrialsinthexposurepathwaysandforoseadionuclideswhicnleac.ehighestpotentalradiationexposuresofindividualsresult ramthestationoperation.Thismonitoringprogram,.threbysupplementstheradiologicaleffluentmonitoziprogramhyverifyingthatthemeasurab3.econcentrationsofradioactivematerialsandlevelsofradiationare/-nothighe'hanexpectedonthebasisoftheeffluentmeasurementsandmodelingoftheenvironmentalexposurepathways.Theinitiallyspecifielmonitoringprogramwillbeeffectiveforat,leastthreeyears.Following/thisperiod,programchangesmaybe..'initiatedbasedonoperationalexperience.ThedetectioncapabilitiesrequiredbyTable4.1-1areste-of-the-aztfor/routineenvironmentalmeasuremen+minindustriallaboratories.Lowerlimtsrofdetection(LLDs)areintendedasapriori(hefo're-the-fact)limits,and/Xanalyseswillbeconduced'uchamannerthatthestatedLLDswillbeacievedunderroutineconditions.,/Thelandusecensusrequirement.i'sprovidedtoensure.lthatchangesintheuseofunrestricedareasareidentifiedand.thatmodificationstoe'mon'oring/programaremadeifrequiredEytheresitsofthiscensus.A~ardencensusisnotrequired'fanonste/gardenislocated'nthemetorologicalsecorhaving~thehighesthisto=icalD/QisusedforhroadXtaafveget'ationsampling.Th"'scensussatisfiestherequirementsofSectionIV.B.3ofAppendixIto0CZRartSO.! Xq~t",.~~~areperformedaspartofalityassurancepro'gramforenvironmentalmo'ringinoertodemonstratethattheresularereasonablyvalid.eelysampleswithradioactivitylevelscomparabletolevel'nenvironmentalsamplesneedbeanalyzed.Therequirementforparticipationinaninterlabororycomparisprogramisprovidedtoensurethaizndependen.checksonthecisionandaccuracyoPemeasurementsofradioactivemater~ainenvironmentalsamplematrices

AAAA!!h4IWeTABLE3;16-1!6RADIOLOGICALENVIRONNENTALNONITORINGPROGRAMExosurePataNumberofSamlesandSamleLocataonsSamlinandCollectionFa'euencTeandeuencofAhalsasl.AIRBORNE2.a.Radioiodineb.ParticulatesIRECTRADIATION10indicator-10control11placedgreaterthan5milesfromplantsiteTfDsatileastquarterly.AindicatorContinuousoperation"Radioiodinecanister.2controlofsamplerwithsample'nalyzewithin7dayscollectionatleast'fcol?ectionofI-13onceper10days.w7indicator-~~Sameasabove.Particulatesampler.5controlAnalyzeforgrossPetaradioactivity>24hoursfollowingfilterchange.Performgammaisotopicanalysison'eachsampleforwhichgrossbetaactivityis10timesthemeanofoffsitesamples.!Performgammaisotopicanplysisoncomposite(by'1;ocation)sampleatleastonceper92days.GananadoseGnflrte&1ga~~Il! fgTABLE3.16-1CONTINUEDI(~RADIOLOGICALENVIRONMENTALMONITORINGPRORAM~Exosureatllwaandor'Same3.WATERBORNEa,SurfaceiNumberofSamlesandSamleLocationsI~1control(RussellStation)1indicatorndenserMaterDisbarge)SamlinandCollectionFreuencComposite*samplecol-lectedoveraperiodof<31days..T'andFreuencofAnalsz.sGrossbetaandgammaisotopicanalysisofeachcompositesamplTritiumanalysisofonecompositesampleatleastonceper92days~b.Drinking1indicator(OntarioMater~DistrictIntake)Sameasabove.rSameasabove./r'r~//ompostesampletobecollectedbycollectinganaliquotatintervalsnotexceeding2hos. TABLE3.16-1(CONTINUED)IlRADIOI.OGIGALENVIRONHENTALHONITORINGPROGRAHExosurePathwaandorSamle4.INGESTIONa.HiikNumberofSamlesandSamleLocations1cotrol3indiatorJunethru~ctobereachof3fms'amlinandCollectionFreuenchtleastonceper15days.ITandFreuencgofAnalysisGammaisqtopicandl-131anqlysisofeachsam~>le.b.Fishc.FoodProducts1controlIindicatqrNovemberthruHayoneofthefarms4control4indicator(OffshoreatGinna)1contr2incator(Onse)htleastnccper31days.Tweduringfishingseasoincludingatleastforspecies.Annualattimeharvest.Samplemtwoofthefollowing:1.apples2.cherries3.grapesGammaisotopicahdI-131anqlysisofeachsample.Gammaisotopicanalysisonedibleportionsofeachsample.-'.Gammaisutopacanalysisonedibleportionqfsample.Ikf.~'control2indicator(Onsitegardenornearestoffsitegardenwithin5milesinthehighestD/gmeteorologicalsector)Attameofharvest.Onesampleof:1.broadleafvegetation2.othervegetableGamma.sntopicanalysinedibleportionsoeachsample.

4.04.1SURVEii~~dfCEREQUIREMENTSSpec'iedinte~alsmaybetoaccommodatenormaltestOcea'onalSafetyReviewadjustedplusorminus25/schedules.1Applicability:Appliestoitemsdirectlyrelatedtosafetylimitsandlimitingconditionsforoperation:-Ob)ec"'ve:Tospec'theminimumfreouencyandtobeappliedtoplanteauipmentandtypeofsurveillance:cond'ions.Stoeci=atior:4.1.14.1.24.1.3Calibration,testing,andcheckingofanalogcharnelandts"i.".goflogicchannelshallbeper=ormedasspecie"inTable4.1-1.Ecn.ipmentandsamplingtestsshallbeconductedasspec'fiedinTable4.1-2and4.1-4.Eachacci"entmonitoringinstrumentationchannelshallbede.orst"atedoperablebyperformancofthechannelcheckandchanelcalibrationoperationsatthefrecpenca.essholeminTable4.1-3.Each,radioactiveeffluentmonitoringinstrumentationchan..hallbedemonstratedopeableeformingthechannel,check,cc,channelfunctionaltest,andceca3'brationafreouencyshe~a/.c'

Basis:CheckFailuressuchasblowninstrumentfuses,defective1ind'a"c"s,faultedamplifiers,whichresultin"upscale"'.or"downscale"indicationcanbeeasilyrecognizedbysimpleobservationofthefunctioningofaninstrumentorsystem.Fu".r-..ore,suchfailuresare,inmanycases,evealedbyalarmora."".unciatoraction,andachecksupplementsthis"-,-eofbuilt-'nsurveillance.Basedonexperience'noperationofbothconventionalanc.".""'rp'antsystems,whentheplantisinoperation:,the.-..'n'.-..mcheckingfzecruencyofoncepershiftisdeemedadca"efozeactorandsteamsystminstrumentatxonCon-"o'oomproceduresrecruireacheckoftheRadiationMonitcri.".gSystem(RNS)panelmetersandstripchartrecor"ersforproperreadoutonceeachshif".Adailysuz-~eillancelogisalsomaintainedintheContolRoomfo"manualentryofRHSreadouts,andisindependentlyreviewed,byHealthPhysicssupervisionatleastweekly.Aradiat'onmonitordownscalefailurewillrseltina~.'tconicuousvisualindicationontheRMSpanel(notchesareaudiblea.).Radiationmonitorcontrolspring-returnedte"operate"n-afterbeingturnedtoanyothetestorcheckmTheafore,togetherwiththe"esigneaturoftheRMS,n"surve'lla.ceprocedureensurethecontinuedavailab'tyo-eachaa"ionmon'tortooerformitsintendedfane+ Channelescio10.RodPositionBankCounters~w)~)w~~S(1,2)N.A.N.A.TABLE4.1-1(Continued)QCec,~c>~ate~entP~e~a~s1)Hithrodpositionindication2)Logrodpositionindicationseach4hourswhenroddeviationmonitorisoutofservicell.SteamGeneratorLevel12.ChargingFlow-13.ResidualHeatRemovalPumpFlowN.A.H.A.N.A.N.A.14.BoricAcidStorageTank.LevelDN.A,Hote415.RefuelingHaterStorageTankLevelH.A.N.A.16.VolumeControlTank'LevelH.A.N.A.17.ReactorContainmentPressure18.RadiationMonSystem19.BoricAcidControl)>h)DN.A.M(1)NBA.me1)IsolationValvesignalAreaMonitorsRltoR9,SystemMonitorR1720.ContainmentDrainSumpLevel21.ValveTemperatureInterlocksN.A.N.A.'.A.N.A.22.Pump-ValveInterlock23.TurbineTripSet-PointH.A.N.A.N.A.M(1)1)BlockTrip24.AccumulatorLevelandPressureN.A.mennmentNc.g574.1-6 ITABLS.i1"1(CONTINUBD)Channel25.ContainmentPressure2G.StcamGeneratorPressure27.TurbineFirstStagePressure28.gcncyPlanRationnstrumentsCheckCalibrateTestSRMSSRemarks4JJCg~41&5Narrowrangecontainmentpressure(>>3.0,+3psiglexcluded29.30.i.ronmcntanitorsLossofVoltage/DegradedVoltage480VoltSafeguardsBusNAM"'",.33.34.35.ChlorineDetector,ControlRoomAirIntakeAmmoniaDetector,ControlRoomAirIntake31.TripofMainFeedwaterPumps32.SteamFlow.NANANANARRMRMRMM36.37.RadiationDetectors,ControlRoomNAAirIntakeReactorVesselLevelIndicationSystemNA38a.TripBreakerLogicChannelTestingNANANotes1,2and338b.TripBreakerLogicChannelTestingNANote1 Table4.1-5RadioactiveEffluentMonitorincSurveillanceRequirementsInstrumentChannelCheckSourceFunctionalCharmCheckTestCelihcicec;TurbineBildingFloorOra(R-21)D(7)GroActivityMonitor(Liquid)a.LiidRadHaste(R-18)0(7).b.SteameneratorBlowdown(R-19)D(7)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1)M(4)Q(1R(5)R(5)R(5)d.HighConductiv'tyWaste(R"22)e.ContainmentFanCooers(R-16)SpentFuelPool.HeatExchangerALoop(R-20A)0(7)D(7)O(7)M(4)M(4)4)Q(2)Q(2)R(5)R(S)R(5)g.SpentFuelPoolHeatExchangerBLoop(R-20B)D(7)M(4)Q(2)R(5)PlantVentilationa.NobleGasActivity(R-14)(AlarmandisolationofGasDecayTanks)b.ParticulateSampler(R-13)c.iodineSampler(R-10BandR-14A)7)H(7)H(7)N.N.A.Q(1)N.A.R(5)R(5)R(5)d.FlowRateOeterminatinContainmentPurgea.NobleGasActivy(R-12)b.ParticulateSler(R-11)c.T.odlneSer(R-10AanR-12A)d.FlowReOeterminationN.A.D(7)H(7)H(7)N.A.N.A.N.N.A.N.A.PRQ(1)N.A.Q(1)N.A.MR(6)R(5)R(5)R)R(6)AirEjectMonitor(R-15aR-15A)D(7)'M(2)R(5)HasteasSystemOxygenMoniorDN.AN.A.Q(3)MainSteamLines(R-31andR>>,32)N.A. TABLE4.1-5(Continued)aTABLENOTATION(1)ThehannelFunctionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatautomaticisolatioofthisthwayandcontrolroomalarmoccurifanyofthefollowingcondit'sexist:1.Insntindicatesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmand/ortrisetpoint.2.Powerlure.(2)TheChannelFunionalTestshallalsodemonstratethatcontroroomalarmoccursifanyofefollowingconditionsexist:l.Instrumentinditesmeasuredlevelsabovethealarmtpoint.2.Powerfailure.(3)TheChannelCalibrations1includetheuseofstardgassamplescontaininganominal:1.Zerovolumepercentoxygeand2.Threevolumepercentoxygen.(4)Thischeckmayrequiretheuseofanxte1sourceduetohighbackgroundinthesamplechamber.(5)SourceusedfortheChannelCalibratiosllbetraceabletotheNationalBureauofStandards(NBS)orshallby/ohtaaedfromsuppliers(e.g.iermhs)mmthatprovidesourcestraceabletooeroffi'ly-designatedstandardsagencies.(6)Flowrateformainplantventiltionexhaustandontainmentpurgeexhaustarecalculatedbytheflowcapacityofventilationextfansinserviceandshallbedeterminedatthefequencyspecified(7)Appliesonlyduringreleasviathispathway.41-13AmendmehtNo.9 4.2InserviceXnsctionlicabilitvAppliesotheinserviceinspectionofQualityGroupsAandCCompone~HighEnergyPipingOutsideof~cotainment,Snubbersandsteam"<eneratortubes.Ztal'soappliestoinservicepumpandvalvetesting.Toprovideassuranceoperationalinteg'<ysystems'n.accordance50.55athecontinuingstructuralandofthestructures',componentsandwiththerequirementsof10CPRecificat'on4.2.1The'nserviceinspectionprogramforQualityGroupsA,B,andCComponents,HighEnergyPipingOutsideofContainment,SnubbersandSteamGeneratortubesshallbeinaccordancewitAppndixBoftheGinnastationQualityAssuranceual.Thisinse'cepumpandvalvetestingprogramallbeinaccordancewithppendixCoftheGinStationQualityAssuranceManual.Theinservicespectionprogramsshalldefinethespec'ficrequiretsoftheeditionandAddendaoftheASMEBoileranressureVesCode,SectionXI,whichareapplicablorthefortymonthper>..ofthetenyearinspectinterval.Theprograms'enyeainspectioniervalshallbebasedonthefollowingcommencingdaAmendmentHo.5,374.2-3.

TheinspectionintervalforQualityGroupAcomponentsshalbetenyearintervalsofservicecommencingonJanuary1,1970.4.2.1.34.2.1.4TheinspectionintervalsforQualityGroup8andComponentsshallbetenyearintervalsofservicemmencingwxhMay1,1973,January1,1980,1990and2000,respctively.TheinectionintervalsfortheHighEnergyapingOutsideofContainmtshallbetenyearintervlsofservicecommencingay1,1973,January1,180,1990and2000,respectively.Theinspectionprogramderringeachthirdofthefirstinspectiointervalprovidesforexaminationofallweldsatdesignbisbreaklocionsandone-thirdofall'weldsatlocationshereaeldfailurewouldresultinunacceptableconsegunce.Duringeachsucceedinginspectioninterval,~zprogramshallprovideforanexaminationofeachofhesignbasisbreaklocationwelds,andeachoftheweldsatlocatenswhereaweldfailurewouldresultinunaccetableconseuences.TheinspectionintervalsforSteamGeneratorTubesshallbespecifiedinthe"InserviceInspectionProgram"ortheapplicablefortymonthperiodcommencingwithMay1,1973.4.2.1.4.aSteamgeneratortubesthathaveimperfectionsgreaterthan40.throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.4.2.1.4.bSteamgeneratorsleevesthathaveimperfectionsgreaterthan304throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.gmencfme~a .&.5lneeSVioeZnaneoticnOiASNECededianai,CiassPandc3"-components(QualityGroupsA,B,andC)shallbepformedinacco'rdancewithSctionXIoftheASMEBoilerndPresunressureVesselCodeancLapplicableAddendaasreq'dby10CFR50tSection.50.55a(g),exceptwherespericwrittenreliefhasbeengrantedbytheNRuantto10CFR50,Section50.55a(g)(6)(l).4.2.1e6TheinspectioniIervalfortheInsarvicePumpandValve4.2.1.7TestingProgramshallbetenyearintervalcommencinthgWlJanuary1,1981,1990and2000.heinspectionintervalsforSnubbersshallbeasdefiSpecification4.14.asiaTheinservice'spectionprogramprovidesassuranceforthontinuedstructuralintha~ityofthestructures,componentsandsystemsofGinnaation.TheprogramscomplywiththeASMEBoilerandVesselCodeSectionZI"RulesforInser'InspectionofNuclearPowerPlantComponents"aspracticable,with"duensiderationtothedesignandphysicalaccessofthe.structures,cornentsandsystemsasmanufacturedandconstructed.Thiscompliance'constitutean.r~racceptablebasisfor~satisfyingtherequirementsofGealDesignCriterion32,AppendixAof10CFRPart50andtherequiremeofSection50.55a,paragraphgof10CFRPart50. i ~Ba4PWMu~~%I%Kg~erepaircriteriaof4.2.1.4.aand4.2.1.4.bare.basedonthrequ'mentsofUSNRCRegulatory.Guide1.121,"BasesforPlugg'zngDegrade-WRSteamGeneratorTubes"asimplementedbyRG&E(erencei).ThiscyanidedescribesamethodacceptabletotheNpd'taffforestablishingthlimitingsafeconditionsoftubedegraationofsteam~Pgeneratortubing.~herepaircriteriaisbasedonstructural~4,/allowances,anallowanc~foreddycurrentmeasurementerrorandanallowancefordegradation"=uringthe~operatingperiod.Theseallowancesareaddedtogethertoderminetherepaircriteriawhichistypically40tforsteamgeneratortuS~hs.Basedoncalculationstheappropriatesleeveplugginglim&isa424"thruwalldefect.Inorder~<otoallowforconservatism,30%plugginglimMforsleeveswillbeutilized.Reference1:"SteamGeneratorRapidSleevingProgramesign.VerificationReport",R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlaAugust1982. ~t 4.4.3RecirculationHeatRemovalSstems4.4.3.1Test5.5.Za~Theportionoftheresidualheatremovalsystemthatisoutsidethecontainmentshall~@~betestedbyuseinnormaloperationorhydrostati-callytestedat,350psigattheintezvapecifiedin4.4.3.4.b.Sucpipingfromcoxnmentsump8tothereactorcooaintankpumpandthedischargepipingfthepumpotheresidualheatrvalsystemshallbehydrotically,testedatnolessthat100psigattheintein4:4.3.4.specific

fromcomponentsofthesystem.Anysignifictleakageshallbemeasuredbycollectionandweighgorbyanequ'alentmethod.4.4.3.2AccetanceriterionThemaximumawableleakageomtherecirculationheatremoval.systemscoonent(whichincludesvalvestems,flangesandpumpseals)allnotexceedtwogallonsperhour.4.4.3.3CorrectionActiona.RepairsshaHbe.madeasreuiredtomaintainleakagewithintacceptancecriterion4.4.3.2.b.Zfrepairsarenotcompletedwithin4hours,thereactorsallbeshutdownanddepressurizedutilrepairsareeffectedandtheacceptancecriterionof4..3.2issatisfied.4.4..4TestFreauencTestsoftherecirculationheatremovalsystemshallbeon-ductedatintervalsnottoexceed12months.4,44TendonStressSurveillance4.4.4.1InsctionforBrokenWirgFourteenspecifictndons,equallyspadaroundthe' containmentshallbeinspectedperiodicallyforthepresenceofbrokenwires.b.Theinspectionintervals,measuredfromthedatofeinitialstructuraltest,shallbeasfollows6onths1yea3years8yearsandyearsintervalstheafter.c.Theacceptancecriteriaforthirispectionarethatnomorethanatotal38wire(in14tendons)arebrokenandthatnotmoretha6rokenwiresexistinanyonetendon.Ifmorethanokenwiresarefound,alltendonsshalLbeinsected.inspectionrevealsmorethan5jyofthetot1wiresbrokethereactorshallbeshutdownandepressurized.d.Ifmoreth20wires(in14tendons)haebeenbrokensincethlastinspection,alltendonsshalleinsoected.Ifinsectionrevealsmorethan5%ofthetotawiresbren,thereactorshallbeshutdownanddepresurized.e.iIfasmanyas6brokenwiresarefoundin~nyonetedon,r~fourimmediatelyadjacenttendons(twooneachsideof

4.4.4.2thetendoncontaining6brokenwires}shallbeinspecd.Theacceptedcriterionthenshallbenomorean4brokenwiresinanyoftheadditional4tendonIfthiscriterionisnotsatisfied,allofthetensshallbeectedandifmorethan5%ofthe/talwiresarebro,thereactorshallbeshutdonddepressurized.'Pre-StresMonfirmationTest'a~Lift-offtesshabeperformedonthe14tendonsidentifiedin.4.4.1aabove,attheintervalsspecifiedin.4...Zftheaveragestressinthe14tendoncheckedisssthan144,000psi(60%ofultima+astress),alltensshallhecheckedforstressandretensioned,ifessary,toastresso144,000psi.Beforereseating,atendon,additionatress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilitofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressappliedngaccidentconditions.4.4.54.4.5.1ContainmentIsolationValvesEachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeQinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.55a.4.4.64.4.6.14.4.6.2ContainmentIsolationResonseEachcontainmentisolationinstrumentationchannelshallbedemonstrated-OPERABLEbytheperformanceofthe'CHANNEL.CHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION,andCHANNELFUNCTIONALTESToperationsfortheMODESandatthefrequenciesshowninTable4.1-1.Theresponsetimeofeachcontainmentisolationvalveshallbedemonstratedtobewithinitslimitatleastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludesonlythevalvetraveltimeforthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptionstakecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainmentisolationsignal.

ressure,350psig,achievedeitherbynormalsystemoperationrbydrostatictesting,givesanadequatemarginovertheh'estpressuwithinthesystemafteradesignbasisaccident.Similarly,thehydrosttictestpressureforthecontainmentsreturnlinesandthereactorcoolantdraintankpioingconnectiostotheresidualheatremovalsystemof100psiggivesanadeqtemarginoverthe(<)highestpressurewithetheLinesafterades'gnbasisaccident.Arecirculationsystemlakageof2gal.rwillLimitoffsiteexposurduetoleakagetoinsignificanLevelselativetothosecalculatedforleakagedirectlyfromthecontazntinthedesignbasisaccident.Thedose'alculatedasaresultfisleakageis7.7mrfora2-hr(5)exposureatthesiteboundarIncaseoffailuretomeetheacceptanceriteriaforleakagefromtheresidualheatrevazsystemorthepenetrations,itmaybepossibletoeffectepairswithinashorttime.so,itisconsideredunnecessaryaunjustifiedtoshutdownthereactr.ThetimesallowedforepairsareconsistentwiththetimesdevopedinISpecificion3.3.Thetndonsurveillanceprogramisbasedonassuringthat,onth'avrage,theload-carrvingcapabilityofthetendonsismaintaiedatapproximately95/odesign. Thisisconsistentwiththedesigncriteriaforthetendons,whichaLLforniformcapacityreductionof0.95and'whichcontemplatethatIsmallfctionoftheindividualwires0.03--0.5%maybreakdingQ(s)'ensioning.PeriodicvisuaPinspectionisthemethodtobeusedtodetrminelossofload-carryingcapabilitybecauseofwirebreakage.Sincethetendoisunderastressofapproximately144,000psi,shuldawirebreak,thebuttonheadwillriseaovethetopanchorhdwhereitcanbereadilyobserved.Assuminghat38brckeniresareobservedin14tendons(90wirespertendon},w'chcorespondstoa.meanbreakageleof3%(97%designload-carryingcapaility),itcanbestatedwith95%confidencethatthefractionofbroenwiesinthetotal.containmentisbetweenZ.1and4.0%.Thisibasedonre'abiLitytablesdeveloped7)byNorthAmericanAviatio,forstatisticaltuationsthatcanberepresentedbyaPoissdistribution.AconditioforfittingaPoissondistributionisthattepossibilityofwirebreakageisconstantandsmalL.Thespec'ficationrelatingtoasmanyas6brokewiresinonetendon(6.6%)rovidesthattheassumptionofaconstantprbabilityofoccurrencisnotsignificantlyviolated.ThedesignLoadcanecarried(8)evenifreeadjacenttendonsfailcmpletely.Thespecificatnhastheurposeofalertingagainstpossibledeteriorationatanytimeineantoperatingltime. Thhapre-stressconfirmationtestprovidesadirectmeasureofthloa'arzyingcapabilityofthetendon.Xfthesurveillanceprogramindicatesbyextensivewirebreakgeortendonsgessrelationthatthepre-stree'singtendonsenotbehavingasiexpected,thesituationwillbeevaluatedidiately.Thespecified,acceptancecriteriaaresuchastoalerttentionto'thesituationwellbeforethetendonload-carryingcaggilitywoulddeterioratetoa~pointthatfailureduringadesignQasisaccidentmightbepossible-Thusthecauseoftheincipientdeteriorationcouldbeevaluatedgndcorrectiveactionstudiecfwithoutneedtoshutdownthereact'or.Thecontainmentis/providedwithtworeadilyremovabletendonsthatmightbeuseful'tosuchastudy.Inaddition,thereare40tendons,eachcontainingaremovablewirewhichwillbeusedtomonitorforossiblecorrosioneffects.Operabilityofthecontainmhgtisolationboundariesensuresthatthe'containmentatmospherebg.llbe<~isolatedfromtheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofaleaseofradioactivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphereorpsurizationofthecontainment.Performanceofcyclingtestsand,erificationofisolationtimesassociatedwithautomaticcontafnmetisolationvalvesiscoveredbythePumpandValveTestProgram.ompliancewithAppendixJto10CFR50isaddressedunder/Localleatestingrequirements./

References:

(1),UFSAR(2)UFSAR(3)UFSAR(4)UFSAR(5)UFSARSection3.1.;2.2.7Section6'.2.6.1Section15.6.4.3Section6.3.3.8Table15.6-9(6)FSPage5.1.2-28(7)orth-American-RockwellReport550-x-32,ReliabilityHandbook;February1963.(8FSARPage5.1.2-28Autoetics

AJJ~s~d~/'3.8ofthespzayadditivevalvesc'osed,eachval'zewillbeopenedandclosedbvoperatoract'on.Thistestshallbeper"ormedpriortostaztupifthetimesincethelasttestexceedsonemon"N.heaccumulatocheckvalvesshallbecheckedor'perabilityduringeachrefuelingshutdcwn.4.5.2.34'.2.3.1AirFiltration'SvsemAtleastoeeverv18mothsorterevry720hoursc"Qz.v-charcoaltrat'onsvorocwingpain"'.".emoperat'ons'ce"".e3.ast"s'reorchem'3.releaseinanven-~,$gg-atil'cnzonecoiicati.gwith"esvstem,"".e"ostaccdentcharcoalsvstemshallhavetheo13.owingcond't-cnsdemons"=ted'4Thepressuredopacrossthecharcoaladsczberbank'slessthan3inchesofwatatdes'gnflowrat(~10~).b.XnplaceFreontesting,undeambientconditions,sha'-~xi.v(gQC~showatleast99%remova3..ITheiod'neremovalef'cie'ncvozatfi'terc1shallbemeured.The/withelongestin-'nkresidenceime.Theminimumacceptablevaluefor=ilter.ef'c'e..cris90%or"-movalo=methy'od=dehentestedat(a"'eas"28'P0mg/m3oad'..gwithtaggedand95RHandat1.to2.jjCS3'eas"orecharcoa'Iferce3.'obetestedna'beselectdrandomlyrothosecel' .5.2.3.232.v4.5.2.3.3~re.~/Atereach'eplacementofafcharcoa'raweor8teanv/sructuralmainta..anceomthehousing"orthe~postacci"antcharcoalsystem,thecond'tionofSpecifiction4.5.2.3.1.bshal"bedemonstratefortheafected-rt'ono"".eSPstam~At'eastevery18monthsofo3.lowincpainti.c,'raochem'"'easeinanyent'at'nzonec.unicat'<<cw".thesstem,thecontainmantrec'=cu'at'onsystemshallhavethefolow1<<gcond'nscemonstazadThepassuredroa'crssthe.-.=2'Afil"harM's'assthan3'.".chesowat.atdesinfow=ate(-:108).EnplaceC~~0>test"ngofthe;."-"-A-'trsshall-showatleast99Kramova'4'.2.3.4Afte"ehcompleteorar"ialreplace.ntofthaH:-'PA=tar~zz..bankoaftaanystctualmaintanconahousi.theontainmentrac'rculationsvs"a,thaconc't'.Spc'ca'on4.5.3.3.bsha'bdemonstratedor-".eactdpor='oo=thesstem.(4.5:2.3.5xceptu'cco'dorrefuelingshutdownsthepos"ace=."a"-charcoa'lt'solationvalvesshallbetastedat'..ta<<'a'snotgeaterthan'nemon4tove<<'voper~iili"tand.p""perorientationardlowshallbemaintained":ouchthesystemoratleast15minutes.Thetas"shallbeperfc=..:apr=ortostart'p'he..t'...esince"".e's"testa@cads1mcn"'"..W~eJw/Qhcp~g,4

  • PrAt'eastoce.every18mogEzsorafterevery720hoursa'charcoaf'tratiansystimoperationsihethelas'tet,or./followngpainting,f'orchemicaleleaseinanyent'lat'anzonecommunicatingwththesystem,thecantolrccmernegencyairteatmentsvstenshallnavethefollowingca..d'onsdemons--ated.a~ThepressuredropacrossthecombnedK=PA=lt"sandcharcoaladsorberbanksislassthan6"ofwateatde-s'n'wrate(~'8).b.Znp'aceFreontesting,underambientconc.'"'s,shashawa"least99Kremoval.c.XnplaceDCPtestingo=ze.-.=PAr-shallshow'atleast99%'removal.d.'.Theresultsoflaboratorvanalysison'acabor.sampleshashow90$o-greaterad'oact'vemethyiodideremovalwhentestedatat'east125':and958RKan"a"J'P~~v1.5o2.0mm3loadingw"atagged'S:.Afereachcompleteorpartialreplacementofthe~=PA"Yankorafterany.stuctu1ma'ntenanceonthen=.ous'ngtrolroomemercencyair'reat;.,en"-sem,thecon-ditionoSpecirt'on4.5-2.3.6.cs1bedemons"-atedforthea=ectdpar"="anofsvamAteeachreplacemenachardrawerora"eanystructuralma'oomeme..cyairtrea..entsvstem..".econd="=nanceonthecharcaa'ing=crtheccn"rol)cfS=ec=-~'ca"ion4.5.2;3.6.bshabedemonstratedar"".en4<aparLanafthes'vsterni P4res%l'.JC4,.a.V4.5.2.3.9Exceptduingcold,orrefuelingshutdcwnstheautomaticinitiat'onothecontrolroomemergencyairtreatment-systemshallbetestedatintervalsnottoexceedonemonthto.verifyoperabilitvandproerorientat'cnandflowshallbemaintainedt!roughthesystemforatleasl5minutes.Thetstshallbe.er"ormedpriortos"artup'"thet'~.sincethelasttestexceedscnemonth.~M.is:SatvZn-'ectionSvst~~andheCcr-'~'"-~"-'~~rpraoohsaegu<<s~eJogI'4asw%eJohv4~Cciliole>>svstemsescannctbe-e"ernewhenthereac-o='sa=erat'ngbecauseS=etvTn'ec"cnsignacauescan-nmet'soai'aancCcni.e..tSoravSyst~"st"=--<<egofassuringc=erabw=thesesvs-.ss="ee=-cretothesystemtoLetemorar=csabled.'h;.,ehc"IcpEbiie=---stmstestsbeper=orned8m~.annalol."."shut-downs,w'thmor==.uentcompo..nttests,JchczQeearneaca~reacororatxon.Thear."s-stems"stsdemonstrteprcpea'cnoea"or.oftheSaety,In~ac"'anandCantamentScrSyems.s'gnalisNi"hthepumpsblccked'omsta'".atestapp'iedtoinitiatautomat'cact'cn andverificationmadethatthecomponentsreceivesafetyinjectioninthepropersequence.Theestemonstratestheoperationofthevalves,pumpcircuitbrewers,and,automaticcircuitry.'~'uringreactoroperation,theinstrumenta'onwhichisdependeontoinitiate..-safety.njectionandcontainmensprayisgenerallychecddailyandtheinitiatingcircuitsaretestedmohly.lnaddition,atheactivecomponents(pumpsadvalves)aretobetestedmonthlyto+checktheoerationofthestartingcircuitsandtoverifyhatthepumpsarein.'atisfactoryrunning'deanddeveloptheminimumrequiredpressuretomee,accidentconditions.'~'heminimumdischargepresevalueslistedinTable4.5-1arebased,onanasseddegradationofthepumphead-capacity'charactistic)curveadjustedtcwatertemperatureof6yasfollows:ContainmeSprayPumpsResidual+eatRemovalPumps5%*SafetyhjectionPumps3t*"Peretageisbasedontheheadtthebesteff'ciencypointofflow.Theestintervalofonemonthisbasedn,thejuementthat:morefrequenttestingwouldnotgnificantlyincreasethereliability(i.e.,probabilitythatthecomponentwouldoperaterequired]andwould.resultinincreasedwearoverperiodsoftime.hewhenlong

lQthersystemsthatarealsoimportanttotheemergencycoolingfunctionaretheaccumulators,thecomponent'tcoolingsystem,theservicewatersystemand'thecontainmentfancoolers.Theaccumulators,reapassive".safeguard.Inaccordancewith.the~specifications,thewatervolumeandpressurein:the?laccumulatorsyarechecked'eriodically'.-~'heothersystemsmentionedoperatewhenthe,.'reactorisinoperationandbythesemeansarecontinuouslymonitored/'orsatisfactory~rformance.Thereactorcoolantdraintankpumpsoperateintermittentlyduringreactor:'peration,andthusareisomonitoredforsatisfactoryJ'erformance.tTheairfiltrationportioofthecontainmentair'ecirculationsyst:emis."apassivesafeguardwhichis<~isolatedfromtheC'oolingairsflowduringnormalreactoroperation.'encethechamcoa3.should,havea;~tlogf31-/charcoalares'tainlesssteelandshouldalsolastc'indefinitelyjThepressuredray,filterefficiency,j~antivalveoperationtestfrequencieswillassurethatthesystcanoperatetomeetitsdesignunctionfJjunderccidentcond'tions.Astheadsorbingccoalisormallyisolated,thetestschedule,relatetohoursofoperationaswellaselapsedtime,willassure;ythatit.doesnotdegradebelowtherequiredadsorption

fficiency.Thetestconditionsforcharcoalsamplad.sbingefficiencyarethosewhichmighteencounredunderanaccidentsituation.'~'hecontrzoomaiztreatmentsystemisdes'.edtofilterthentrolzoomatmosphere(recircationandintakeair)dingcontrolroomisolation:conditions..-HEPAfiltersazenstalled.beforethearcoalfilterstoremoveparticulatematterand."eventcloggingoftheiodineadsorbers.iThecharcoalfiltersreduce.theairborneradioiodineithedecontrolroom.Bypassleakagemustbeataminimum;Knorderforthesefilterstoperformtheirdes'd.function.Zftheperfozmancesareasspew.fiedhecalculateddoseswillbelessthanthoseanalyzed.'~Retestingoftheostaccidentccoalsystemorthecontrolroomergencyairtreatmentsystemintheeventof,.painting,fire,orchemicalreleaseisrequiredoy,ifthesystemisoperatingandisproviding:filtrationfortheareaiwhichthepainting",fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.Testigoftheairfiltrationsystemswillb,totheexttitcan,giventheconfigurationofthestems,iaccordancewithANSXN510-1975,"TestingofHuearr-CleaningSystems."

References:

(1)UFSction6.3'.5.2(2)UFSARFigures.6-12and15.6-13(3)UFSARction6.5.1.2.FSARSection..6.4.3.l 5.5.I2c-ThetestsinSpecif'cation4.6'bwillbeperformdpriortoexceeding.coldshutdownifthetimesinlasttestexceeds31days.Atleastonceper92daysbyverifyingthatasampleofdieselfuelfromthefuelstoragetankiswithintheacceptablelimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTHD975-78whencheckedforviscosity,waterandsediment..e.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdownby:1.Inspectingthedieselinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendationsforthisclassofstandbyservice.2.Verifyingthegeneratorcapabilitytorejectaloadof295KMwithouttripping.3.Simulatingalossofoffsitepowerinconjunctionwithasafetyinjectiontewsignaland:(a)Verifyingde-energizatianaftheemergexgqbusesandloadsheddingfromtheemergency'uses.(b)Verifyingthedieselstartsfromnormalstandbyconditionontheacta-startsignal,energy.'zestheautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloadswiththefollowingmaximumbreakerclosuretimesaftertheinitialstartingsignalforTrainsAandBnotheingexceededABDieselplusSafetyInjection20sec22secPumpplusRHRPumpAllBreakers40sec42secandoperatesfor>fiveminuteswhileitsgeneratorisloadedwithemergencyloads.(c)Verifyingthatall.dieselgeneratortrips,exceptengineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,and.overcrank,areautomaticallybypasseduponasafetyinjectionactuationsignal. RadiologicalEnvironmentalNonitorincrAaolicabilitv-Appliestoroutinetestingox.-plantenv'irons.dl'*hl.'l'1'gwhichwillassurerecognition"ofchangesinradioactivity>tintheenvirons.Spec'fication/TheradiolorealenvironmentalmitoringsamplesshallbecollectedpursuanttoTable3.16-.AcceptablecasionsareshownintheODCH.SamplesallbeanalyzedpursuanttotheretirementsofTables.6-1and4.10-1.landusecensusshallbecoductedannuall(betweenJune1andctober1).zofthe.resultsobtainedaspartofizedInterlaboratoonshallbeincludedineAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperat'ngSW-BasisTheenvironmentalsurveyhasbeendesigned.,toutilizetheknowledgeaboutdilutioninthe.atztospheeandinthelakewhichhasbeengaineduringthepre-operational'andoperationalpeiodastudy.Theradiologicalonitoringprogramprovidesmeasuzementsrofradiationandofradioactivematerialsinthoseexposurepathwaysandfoxthosexadionuclideswh'cheadtothehighes-.potentialradiationex@os"resofindividualsresultingfromthestationoperation.Ms

'teriaPro9remtherebyeuppyementethelffluentmore.oringprogrambyverifyingthatthemeasurableconcentrationsofradioactivemater'alsandlevelsofr/adiationarenothigherthanexpectedonthe//basxsoftheefluentmeasurementsandmodelingoftheenvironmentalexposurepathways.Thedetectioncapabil'itiesrequiredbyTable4.10-1arestaie-of-De-artforroutineenvironmentalmeasurements'/1inindustziallaboratories.,Thespec'iedloverlimiisofdetectionforI-133.inwate,milk,andotheroodproductscorrespondtoapproximatelyone-auare"'fthe10CFRPart50Appen@.xIdesignobjectivecose-equivalentof15mrem/yearoratmosphericreleasesand10mrem/yearforlanguidrelea~sestothemaximallyexposedorganand,/'.ndiv3.dual~,"Participationinanapprovedintelaboratorycohpazisonprogramassuresthattheadequacyofenvironraentallaboratorymeasurementsismaintainedonacont='nuingbasisthroughindependentcross-checking. TABLE'.10-1I~MAXIMUMVALUESFORTliELONERLIMITSOF.DETECTION(LLD)Tobeachievedon98%ofanalysesAnalysisgrossbetaHNatCiI4b2000(1000).AirborneParticulateorGagCim1x10FishCikwetMilkQiCi/~1FoodProdctsCikwets'I"Mn1513059F'058,60C1565Zn30Zr-Nb15131I.134,137C~15(10),187x101x101306060Oa-La15c15

~pe:TABLE4.10-1(Continued)TABLENOTATIONThLLDisthesmallestconcentrationofradioactivegatezialinasamplethatwillbedetectedwith95%probabilitywithnly-5%probabilityoffalselyconcludingitspresence.Foraparticularmeasurementsystem(whichmayincluderadiochemicalseparation):LLD.=4e66sE.U.2.22.Y.exp(-Aht)where/jLLDisthelowerlimitofdetectionpsdefinedabove~(aspCiperiunitmassorvolume)S~isthestandarddeviationof"ebackgroundcountingateorofthecountingrateofa'lanksampleasappropriate(ascountspezminute).Eisthecountinge'ciencyascountspertransoxmationVisthesample'size(iurwtsofmassorvolume}2.22isthenumberoftrformationsperminuteper'pLcocu>>IeYisthefractionalrdiochemicalyield(whenapplicable)A,istheradioactivdecayconstantfortheparticularradionuclide.htistheclapsdtimebetweensample'collectionandanalys15ThevalueofssedinthecalculationofthLLDforadetectionsyst.shallbebasedontheactualobservedvarianceofebackgroundcountingraeo.r"ofQecountingrateofthelanksamples(asappropriate}ratherthanonanunveri-dtheorticallypredic"edvariance.IncalculatingtheLZDfaradionuclidedetexminedbygamma-rayspec-"ometrythebackoundshallincludethetypica~contributionsofutherp(dionuclidesnormallypresentirthesamples(e,.g.,potasum-40inmilk'samples}.TypicalvaluesofE,V~+Yandshouldbeusedinthecalcu'ations.lysesshallbepex'xozmedinsnamanne-thatthetatedLLDswillbeachievedunderroutineconditions.Occasionallybackgroundfluctuations,unavoidablysmall

TABLE4.10-1(Continued)TABLENOTATIONsamplesizes,the"presenceofinterferringnucl'des,oroAeruncontrollable-qircumst~cesmayrendertheseLLDsunachievable.Insuchcases~thecontributingfactorswillheidentifiedanddescriPeinthePmualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingRepoTheT,LZ)isdefinedasananriorieforethefact)limitrenresenting.Mecapahiliyofameasamentsystemandnotf(((*((-'.'*(measuremen-.fordrinkingwater.cTotalforparentanddaughter. F11Refuelin///Appliestorefuelingandtofuelhandlinginthespenti/fuelpool./i41.1SpentFuelitCharcoalAQSOZheZSystem.11.1.1Within60dayspriortoanyperationofthespent.fuel5;5'.10poolcharcoaladsozhezsystemthefollowingconditionsshallbedemonstrated.Aftertheconditionshavebeendemonstrated,theoccurrence/f/ofpainting,re,orchemicalreleaseinanyventilationzonecommunatingwiththespetfuelpoolcharcoaladsozbezystemshallrequirthat.thefollowingcoitionsberedeonstrated,before~uelhandlingmaycontie,ifoperationofthespentFuelp001chaWoa1adsorbe/systisrequiredparsection3.11QNtl.la~b.CoThetotalairflowratefromthecharcoaladLsozhezsshallbeatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithacompletesetofnewabsorbers.In-placeFreontesting,underambientconditions,shallshowatleast99%removal.Theresultsoflaboratory.analysisonacarbonsampleshallshow90%orgreaterradioactivemethyliodideremovalwhentestedatleast150'Fand958RHandat1.5to2.0mg/mloadingwith3taggedCH>I. HAJJ,re,seed~/CWp&v3.'7Flowshallbemaintainedthroughthesystemusingeitherthefilterorbypassflowpathforatleastlsnutes4.11.1.2Afterchreplacementofachacoalfilterdrawerorafteanystructuralmaintenaceonthecharcoalhoungfothespentfuelpitcharoaladsorbersystem,nditionofSpecificatio4.11.1.1.bshallbedonstratedfortheaffectedportioofthesystem.4.11.2ResidualHeatRemovalandCoolantCirculation4.11.2.1Whenthereactorisintherefuelingmodeandfuelisinthereactor,atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper4hours.4.11.2.2Whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofreactorvesselflangeislessthan23feet,bothRHRpumpsshallbever'fiedtobeoperablebyperformingthesuzve'llancespecifiedintheInsexvicePumpandValveTestProgrampreparedpursuantto10CFR50.55a.4.11.34.11-3.1WaterLevel-ReactorVesselThewaterlevelinthereactorcavityshallbedeterminedtobeatleastitsminimumre~ireddepthwithin2hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hours'thereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontorodsincontainment.BasSsThemeasurent.oftheairflowssuresthatairisbeigwithdrawnfromthepentuelpitareaadpassedthroughtheaorbers.TheflowimeasuredpriortoemoyingtheadsorberstestablishthatAddri>dwlPhp~3.l therehasbeennogrosschangeinperformancesincethesystemwaslaused.TheFreontestprovidesameasureo'ftheamountofleakafomaroundthecharcoaladsorbent.Theabiliofcharcoaltoadsorbiodinecandeterioratesthecharcoalagandweathers.Testingthecapacityofecharcoaltoadsorbiodxeassuzesthat,anacceptableremovalefficiencyundeoperatingconditionswouldbeobtained.diffe"ncebetweentheteetbgquirementofaremovaleffiencyof90/formethyliodineandthpercentageassumedineevaluationofthefuelhandlingaccident,providesadequatesafetymarginfordegzada-tionofthe'ilterafter;thetests.Retesiagofthespentfuckpitcharcoaladsorbersystemintheeventofpainting,fire,orchemicilreleaseisrequiredonly,ifthesystemisopeatingandis'pxovidingfiltrationfortheareain,f~whichthpainting,fire,orchemicalreleaseoccurs.jTesti"goftheairfiltrationsystemswillbetested,totheextentitcanbeg'ventheconfigurationofthesystems,injoaccordancewithANSIN5'10-1975,"Testing'ofNuclearAir-C'eaningSystems"5,4d~~J'heoperabilityrequirementsforresidualheatremovalloopswillensureadequateheatremovalwhileintherefuelingmode.Therequire-mentfor23feetofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangewhilehandlingfuelandfuelcomponentsincontainmentisconsistentwiththeassump-tionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis.Re(1)LetterfromE.J.RrGasandElect=icCorporationr.PeterA.Morris,mmission,datedFebruary3,1971tomicEnergy

4.12,EffluentSurveillanceApplicability.cAppliestotheperiodictestandrecordecpu.rementsoftheplanteffluents.~b'oascetainthatradioactivelicnxidandgaseousreleasesfxomthep3.antarewithinallowablelimiw.Soecizications
4.12.1'4.12.1.1-,'4.12.1.1.a4'211brZicpxidEffluentsConcent=ationTherad'oactivitycontentozeachbatchozradioactiveliauidwastetobedischargedshallbedeterminedpriortoreleasebysamplingandanalysisinaccordancwithTable4.12-1.Theresultsofpre-releaseanalysesshallbeusedwiththecalculationalmethodsintheODCNtoassuethattheconcntrationatthepointozreleaseislimitedtothevaluesinSpecification3;9.1.1.a.lPost-releaseanalysesofsamplescompositdfrom'atchreleasesshallbeperformed,inaccordancwithTab3.e4.12-1.The.resultsofthepost-releaseanalys'shallbeusedwiththecalculationalmethodsintheODCMtoassurethatthedoescommitmentsfromliquids.verelimitedtothevaluesinSpecifics"ion3.9,1.2.

.1.2.aCumulativedosecontributionsfrom1'entsshallbedete~-acedancewiththeODCMat4.12.24.12.'2.14.12.2.1.aleastonceper31days.,GaseousWastesReleaseRateTheeffluentcontinuousmonitorsas.'stedinTable4.12.2.1.b4.12.2.23:5-6havingprovisionsforthetomaticterminatioqofgas'ecaytank,shutdown,purgeormini-purgereleases,shallbeused,"tolimitreleaseswithinthevaluesestablishedinSpecification3.9.2.1when.--Lmonitorsetpointvaluesareexceeded.Thedose.rateduetoradiactivematerials,otherthannoblegases,ingaseouseluentsshallbeeterminedinaccordancewiththemethodsoftheODCMbyobtainingrepresentativesamplesandperforminganalysesinaccordancewiththeamplingandanalysisprogram,specifiedinTable4.12-2.Dose(10CFRPart50,AppendixI);GaseousWa~eTr'eatment.4.12.2'.2.aCumulativedosexbutionsfromgaseouseffluentshedeterminedinaccordancewiththe-.QDCMatleastonceevery31days.4.12.3steGasDecayTsIIThequantityofadioactivematericontainedin:IeachwastegasdecaytankshalledeterminedtobeAmendmentNo.29 withinthel~imitspec'fiedi3.9.2.6.aatleaonceper24housifthetotalpimazycoolant.no/egasconcentzionexceeds250pCi/gramandpriary.coolant~gasiseingtransfeetothegaseousdwastetreatmentsystem.heels:Sufficienttestswillbemadetc'ecettainthatradioactivematerialsarenotreleasedtothevironmentinquanti'tiesgreate"thanallowable.ZnstaQ.edradiationmon'toringequipmentintheplanwillbe/usedinconjunctionwithlaboratoryanalysestomaintainsurveil4ancofnormaleffluents.Sufficientrecordswillbemaintainedtodetermine~~~~jtheconcentrationofradioactive..materialsin'unresictejareas.isotopicanalysisofrepresentativesampleswillservetoverifytheaccuracyofroutinesamples/byidentificationofsigzu.fi'cantenergypeaks.fThequantityofradioactivityiheachgasdecaytankisdeterminedwhenenoblegasoncentr~tionintheprimarycoolantsternincreasessiificantlyenoughtopotentiallyontributeanappreciequantityofnoblegasactivitytothegaseousradwas=system.Therequiresurveillancewillbeinitiateataprimarynoblegasconcentrationlevelwhich,ifattainedwillstillallowsufficientmarginbowthe~l.specifiedcurieimitforasinglegasdeayt~.Determinationoftankcuriecontentm-ybeperoed.,.bysamplingand/orcalculation. TABLE4.12-1RADIOACTIVELIUIDWASTESAMPLINGANDANALYSISPROGRAMBatchWastebReleaseTanksPRPREachBatchEachBatchSamplingMinimumIiauidRelaseTypeFreauencyAnalysisFrequencyTypeofActivityAnalysis1..PrincipaEmittersI-131LowerLim=ofDetct=(LLD)(uCi/ma)5xao1x10or2.Grssbet.a-a*5xaOPOneBch/M'MissolvedandEntrainedGases(GammaEmitters)1x10PRMEachBatchCositeGrossalpha1x101x10.PRcEachBateComposieSr-89,Sr-90Fe-555xlo1x10WPrincipGammaCompositeEm-'ttersard'-131\5x10axaOGrossbeta-gamma1x10(,Continuous'elease!iRetentionTankContinuous::"ServiceWaterContinuousMor'CVFanCooleyandS**SFPFXlines)GrabIfaegSbetaisperformedforbatch.releases,thenaweeklycornsite-..shaalsobeanalyzedforPrincipalGammaEmittersandI-'31.**rvicewatersamplesshallbetakenandanalyzedonceper12hoursialarmsetpointisreachedoncontinuousmonitor. asTABKZ4.12-3.Continued)TABKZNOTATION~TheZLDisthesmallestconcentrationofradioac~emater'alinasamplethatwillbedetected.with95/probabilitywithS/probabilityoffalselyconcludingitspesence.rForaparticularmeasurementsystem(whichm~includeradiochemicalseparation):4..66sE.v.2.22x10.Y.exp)~Rat)where~KEGisthelowerlimitofdetectionasdefinedabove(asuCiperunitmassorvolume)sisthestandarddeviationofthebackgroundcountingrteorofthecoun-ingraPeofablanksampleasappropriate(ascountsperminute)./Eisthecountingefficiency,(ascountspertransformation)Visthesamplesize..(inunits.ofmassorvolume)2.22x'0isthenumberoftransformations"perminut6permicrocuriej\Yisthefractionalradiochemicalyield(whenapplicable)IA.istheradioactivedecayconstan"fortheparticularradionuclide'h,tisthe,:elapsedtimebetweenmidpointof.samplecollect-'on:and.time.>ofcounting(forplanteffluents,notenvironmentalsamplesr)Thevalue<'ofsusedinthecalculationoftheLLDforadetectiorisystemshallbebasedontheactualobservedvarianofthebackgroundcountingrateorofthecountingrateftheblanksamples(asappropriate)rathethanonanerif'ed.theoret'callypredictedvariance.Encalcu'.atingtheLDforaradionuclidedeterminedbygamma-rayspect"cmety,,-'hbackgroundshallincludethetypicalcontributionsooeradionuclidesnormallypresentinthesamples.icalvaluesofE,V,Yandatshouldoeusedinthecalculition. fi.1'.C.rThebackgroundcountrateiscalculatedfromthebackgraundhcountsthataredeterminedtobewithin+one=briMenergybandaboutthee..cyofthegammaraypeakusedforthe,,quantitativeanlysisforthisradionuclide.TheLLDisdef'nedasanaoriori(beforethefact}li}aitrepresent'ngthecapabilityofameasurementsystemandnot'asaz}osteziozi(afterthefact)limitforaparticularmeasurement.AnalysesshallbeperformedinsuchamannethatthestatedLLDswillbeachievedunderroutine.conditions.Occasiona3.1ybackgroundf3.uctuations;unavoidablysmallsamplesizes,thepresenceofinterfer'ngnuclides,orotheuncontzo3.lablecrcumstancesmayrendertheseLLDs.unachievable.WhencircumstancesresultinLLDshighsthanrequired,thereasonsshallbedocumented'ntheSemiannualRadioactiveEffluentReport.Abatchreleaseisthedischargeofliquidwastesofadiscretevolume.,s'compositesample'sonei'nwhichthequantityof3.icuidsampledispropor-ionaltothequantityofliquidwastedischargedandnwhichthemethodofsampl'ngemployed'esults.inaspecimenwhichisrepresentativeoftheliquids'zeleasea.;dTheprincipalgammaemittersforwhicntheLLDspecificationwillapolyareexclusivelythefollowingad'onuclides:Mn-54,re-59,Co-58,Co-60,Zn-65,Cs-134,Cs-137,andCe-141.Thislistdoesnotmeanthatonlythesenuclidesaretobedetectedandreported.Otherpeakswhicharemeasurableandidentifiable,togetherwiththeabovenuclides,shallalsobeidentifiedandreported.HuclideswhicharebelowtheZLDfortheanalysesshou3.dbereportedaslessthantheZLDandshouldnocbereportedasbeingpresentat/theLMlevel.Thelessthanvaluesshouldnotbeusedinjthereequizeddoseca3.culations.Whenunusualcircumstancesres@itinLLDshighezthanrequired,thereasonsshallbedocumented,intheSemiannualRadioactiveEffluentRelease/Rapport./,'e./Acon"inuousreleaseisthedischargeofliauiduastes',o=ann-discretevolume;e.g.fromavolumeofsystemthathasaninputflowduringthecontinuousrelease. TABLE4.l.2>>2RADIOACTIVEGASEOVSMhSTESAMPLINGANDANALYSISPROGRAM1GaseouseaseTeSamplingFreuencNinimumAnalysisTypeofActivitAnalsisLowerL~iiofDetectaon(OLD).uCimlA.GasDeca+gankB.ContainmentPurgeC.AuxiliaryBuildingVen.'ationD.AirEjectorE.AllReleaseTypesaslistedinBandCabovePREachTankGrabSampleREacurge'rabSampleNGrabSampleNb,f,hGrabSampleContinuousConnuousContinuousContinuousF.AllReleaseTypesContinuousaslistedinB,CandDabovePREachTankPrincipalGammaEmittePREachPurgeCharcoalSampleParticulateSampleNCompositeParticulateSampleQCompositeParticulateSampleNobleGasNonitorI-133PrincipalGammmitters(I-131,Others)':.GrossalphaSr-09,Sr-90,BetaorGammaew~~lAatPt&l&tOIW!PrincipaammaEmittersH-3rincipalGammaEmittersH-3PrincipalGammaEmitters,I-1311x101x101x101x101x101x101x1010-121x10-101x101x$0II10-111x10 TABZZ4.12-2ContinuedTABLENOTATIONThelowerlimitofdetection(LLD)is'definedinableHotationa.ofTable4.12-1.AnalysesshallalsobeperformedwhenNemonitoronthecontinuous'samplerreachesits.setpoint.~<<TritiumgrabsamplesshallbetakenatleastNreetimesperweekwhenthereactorcavityisflooaed./TheratioofthesampleflowratetothesampledstreamflowrateshallbeknownforNetime'eriodcoveredbyeachdoseordoserateicalculationmadeinacccdancewithspecifications3.9.2.1.'a,3.9.2.2..aand3.9.2.2.b.TheprincipalgammaemittersforwhichNeLEZ}specificationwillapplyareexclusivelythe'ollowingradionuclides:Kr-85m,Xe-133,Ze-133m,and'Ze-135forgaseousemissionsandNn-54,Fe-59,Co-58,Co-60,~Zn-65,Mo-99,Cs-134,Cs-137,Ce-141andCe-144.orpariculateemissions.ThislistdoesnotmeanNat,'onlytheseMuclidesaretobedetectedandreported.~Otherpeakswhicharemeasurableandidentifiable,togetherwiNtheabovenuclides,shallalsobeidentified'andreported.'uc3.ideswhicharebelowNeELDfortheanalysesshouldnotbereportedasbe'ngpresentatNe.LLDlevelforthatnuclide.'~WhenunusualcircumstancesresultinLLDshigherNanrequi"ed,thereasonsshaXlbedocumented,inNeSemiannual'-ffluentReleaseReport.Airej'ectorsamplesarenotreouiredduringcoldorrefuel'ng~shutdowns.'rejectortritiumsampleno)requiredifthesecondactivityislessthan1x10pCi/gm.AirejectoriodinesamplesshallbetakenandanalyedweeklyifNesecondarycoolantactivityexceeds1x10p'ggm.3V~Lks 41$RadioactiveMaterialSourceLeakaeTestlicabilitAppliestotheperiodictestforleakageofradioactivematerisourcesperformedbythelicenseeorbyotherpersospecificayauthorizedbytheCommissionorthestate.O~b'ectiveToascertainthta,Ileakagefromradioactivemateri1sources1ssufficientlLovs~Ssecificsticn,l3.1ources~;hichcontainquantit'esfby-p"oductmate~izlthatexceedthequantitieslistedi10CFR30.71ScheduleBandallothersources,'includingalaemitters)con-jtaininggreaterthan.d.lmicrocuriessha1beleaktested~asfollows:~~a.Exceptforealedsourcesthataretordandnotbeinguse,andexceptforstartupsource,eachsealedsourcecontainingradioactivemateri,otherthanHydrogen3,withahalf-lifegreatertha30sandinanyfor'therthangasshall~etestedforLeakageand/orcontaminrtionatintervasnottoexceedsixmonths.

b.Sealedsourcesthat.arestoredandnotbeingusedshallbetestedforleakagepriortouseortrasfertoanotheruserunlesstheyhave'beentestedithinixmonthspriortothedateofuseortrafer.Seadsourcesreceivedfromatransferohall,intheabnceofacertificatefromtheransferorindicatingthatatesthasbeenperrmedswithinsixmonthsprrtothetransferhetestedpriortouse.C~Startupsourceshallble&testedpriortoandfolloMinganyrepairrma'ntenanceandbeforebeingsubjectedtocorelux.Theleakagetestshallbecapableofdetctingthepresenco0.005microcuxiesofradioactivmaterialontheestsample.Xfthetestrevealsthepcsenceof.005microcuriesormoreofremovablecontamition,shallimmediatelybevithdrw~nfromuse,dcontam".atedfandrepaired,orbedisposedofinaccordancewithCommissionregulatis.BasisIngestionorinhalationofsourcematrialmaygiverisetototbodyoroganirradiation.Thissecificationassuresthateakagefromdioactivematerialsourcsdoesnotexceedallowabelimits.Inheunlikelyeventthatose )hIX.:~riesofralioacriveby-procInctcaaaerialsofinctothisspecsionwhichareexemptreakagetestingareingestedorinhaled,t.esentlesthanonemaximumpernissiblhdGyburdenfortot:aLbodyirradiation.Thelimitorallothersources(includingalpitters)baedupon10CPR70.39(c)limitsforplutonium.~!.-:)II'hIh~",C~~ SnubberSurveillanceReirementsEachsnubberrequiredbySpecification3.13tobeOPERAEshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbytheperformancethefolowinginserviceinspectionprograminaddititotherequirementsofSpecification4.2.a.InsectionTesb.Asuseinthisspecification,"typefsnubber"shallmeansnubersofthesamedesigandmanufacturer,irrespectiveofcapacity.VisuallnsectxnsSnubbersarecategorizedazinaccessibleoraccessibleduringreactoropera'on.Eachof'thesecategoriesc(inaccessibleand.accessible)maybeinspectedindependentlyacordingtithe.scheduledetermine.by-Table4.14-1.'ThevisualinspectionintervalforeachtypeofsnnbbershallbedeterminedbaseduponthecriteridprcvidedinTable4.14-1.'yVisua.XnsectionAccetanceCriteria~.Viualinspectionsshallverifythat(1)"thesnubberasnovisibleindicationsofdamageor~impairedOPERABILITY,(2)attachmentstothefoundationor

.14-1.c.(continued)supportingstructurearefunctional,and(3)fastersfortheattachmentof0hesnubbertothecompontandtothesnubberanchoragearefunctional.Snubberswhichappearinoperableasaresultofvisualinspectionsshallbeclassifiedasacceptableandmaybereclassifiedacceptablefrthepurposeofestablishingthenextvisualnspectioninterval,provided~that:(1)thecauseoftherejectionisclearlyestablishedandrediedforthatparticularsnubberandfo~othersnubbers,irrespectiveof.typethatmaybegeneallysusceptible;and(2)theaffectedsnubberisfunctionallytestedintheas-foundcondit'onanddeterminedOPEBABLEperSpecification4.14.1e.All;snubbersfoundconnectedtoaniperablecommonhydraulicfluidreservoirshallbecountedasunacceptablefordeterminingthenext:inspectioninterval.Arevie~andevaluationshallbeperformedanddocumentedtojustiycontinued~~'operationwithanunacceptablesnubber.Ifcontinued'perationcannotbejustified,thesnubbershaledeclaredinoperableandtheACTIONrequirementshallbemet. 4TABLE4.14'-1SNUBBERVISUALINSPECTIONINTERVALNUMBEROFUNACCEPTABLESNUBBERSRef.Note7PopulatxqnorCategory.Notes1an280ColumnAExtendIntervalNotes3and600ColumnBRepeatIntervalNotes4and600ColumnCReduce",Interval/NotesS.and6jI100015020003aa13300v12254001836500122475020781000orgreater2956109Note1:'henextvisualinspectionintervalforasnubberpopulationorcategorysizeshallbedeterminedbasedupothepreviousinspectionintervalandthenumberofunacceptabesnubbersfoundduringthatinterval.Snubbersmaybecateorized,basedupontheiraccessibilityduringpoweroperatio,asaccessibleorinaccessible.Thesecategoriesmaybeexaminedseparately.orjointly.However,thisdecisionmustbe TABLE4.14-1(continued)documentedbeforeanyinspectionandshallbeusedathebasisuponwhichtodeterminethenextinspectionintealforthat,category.Interpolationbetweenpopulationorcategorysiesandtheumberofunacceptablesnubbersispermissibp.Usenext1erintegerforthevalueofthelimitforC61umnsA,B,orCithat,integerincludesafractionalvalueofunacceptablesnubbsasdeterminedbyinterpolation.IfthanumberofunacceptablesnubbersisequaltoorlessthanthenberinColumnA,thenext'nspectionintervalmaybetwicetheeviousintervalbutngreaterthan48months.IfthenumberunacceptablesndbarsisequaltoorlessthanthenumberinColumnBbut'reaterthanthenumberinColumnA,thenextinspectionintervalshallbethesameasthepreviousinterval.~IfthenumberofunaccepesnubbersisequaltoorgreaterthanthenumberinColn~C,thenextinspection'ntervalshallbetwo-thirdsofdepreviousinterval.However,ifthenumber,ofunacceptablesnubbersislessthan,thenumberinColumnCbutgreatrthanthenumberinColumnB,thenextintervalshallbdreducedproportinallybyinterpolation,thatis,thepviousintervalshall~(ereducedbyafactorthatisone-0irdoftheratioofthe'fferencebetweenthe/numberofunacceptablesnubbersfoundAiringthepreviousintervalandthenumberinColumnBtothe'differenceinthenumbersinColumnBandC.TheprvisionsofSpecificationSection4e0areplicableforallnspectionintervalsuptoandincluding48mnths.Tdeterminethenextsurveillanceinterval,anunaeptablesnubbermaybereclassifiedasacceptableifitnbedemonstratedthatthesnubberisoperableinitsas-undconditionbyperformanceifafunctionaltestandifsatisfiestheacceptancecriteriaforfunctionaltesting.

.14.1.dFunctionalTestsAtleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown,representativesample(atleast104ofthesnubbsrequiredbySpecification3.13)shallbefunctiollyestedeitherinplaceorinabenchtest.Foeachsnberthatdoesnotmeetthefunctionaltestaeptance.criteiaofSpecification4.14.1e,anadditinal100ofthesnuersshallbefunctionallytestedntilnomorefailuresefoundoruntilallsnubershavebeenfunctionallyested...Therepresentatisampleselected,forfunctionaltemptingshall,asfaraspractical,includetheriousconfigrations,-operatingenvironments,rangefsizesandapacitiesofsnubbers.Xnadditiontotheregulasapie,snubbersplacedinthesamelocationsassnubbewhichfailedthepreviousfunctionaltestshallbeetesdatthetimeofthenextfunctionaltest.Add'onally,afailedsnubberhasbeenrepairedandrnstalledinatherlocation,thatfailedsnubbershllalsobereteste.Thesesnubbersshallnotbeiludedintheregularsale.Xfduringefunctionaltesting,additionalamplingisrequireduetofailureofon3yonetypeofsnber,thefunczonaltestingresultsshallbereviewedatthttimetdetermineifadditionalsamplesshouldbelimitdtothetypeofsnubberwhichhasfailedthefunctio1testin

FunctionalTestAccetanceCriteriaesnubberfunctionaltestshallverifythat.:p1)Activation(restrainingaction)isachievedwiintespecifiedrangeinbothtensionandcompession;2)Snubbereed,orreleaseratewherereired,ispresentinthtensionandcompressionwithinthespecifiedrange3)Whererequired.teforcerecLuirtoinitiateormaintainmotionofthsnubberisithinthespecifiedrangeinbothdirectionofavel;and4)Forsnubbersspecificallecpxirednottodisplaceundercontinuousload,heab'lityofthesnubbertowithstandloadwithtdisplacentisverified.Testingmethodsmbeusedtomsureparametersindirectlyorpametersother.thanthospecifiedifthoseresultcanbecorrelatedtotspecifiedparametershroughestablishedmethods.FunctionalTestFailureAnalsis/Ananysisshallbemadeofeachfailuretomeethefctionaltestacceptancecriteriato,determineecauseofthefailure.Theresultsofthisanalysis

4.14.1.f.'ontinued)shall.beused,ifapplicable,inselectingsnubberstoetestedinanefforttodeterminetheoperabilityofoersnbbers,ixrespectiveoftype,whichmay'besubjcttothearnefailuremode.Forthespecificcaeofasnubberselectedforfunctionaltestingwhcheitherfailstoctivateorfailstomove,i.e,frozen-in-place,thecusewillbeevaluatedan,ifcausedbymanufacturerordesigndeficiency,asnubbersofthesametypesubjettothesamedefectshallbefunctionallytested'evaluatinamannertoensux'etheiroperability.Anyestigperformedaspartofthisrequirementshallbeinendent.oftherequirementsstatedinSpecification4.14.forsnubbersnotmeetingthefunctionaltestcceptanceiteria.Foranysnubrsfoundinoperableanengineeringevaluationsallbeperformedonthecornonentstowhichtheinopablesnubbersaxeattached.Tpurposeofthisegineeringevaluationshallbetodete'neifthetheclsIsnubbersinordertoensurethatthecomponentremacapableofmeetingthedesignedservice.cornonentstowhichtheinoperablesnubbersarettached.ereadverselyaffectedbytheinoperabilityo

~4~.gSnubberSealServiceLifeMonitorinThelservicelifeofhydraulicsnubbersshallonitoredandsealsreplacerequiredtoenhattheservicelifeisnotexceededbetwesuranceinspectionsduringaperiodwheesnubberisrequiredtobeerable..Theseallacementsshallbedocumentedandthedocument'onshallberetainedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification6.10.asisofunacceptablesnubbersdduringtpreviousinspectioninproportion.tothesizesofthvaoussnubberpopulationsorcategories.AsnubberisconsideedacceptableifitfailstheacceptancecriteriadelineatbySpecificatx,4.14.1.c.Thevisualinspectionintervalismaybeaslongawofuelcycles,nottoexceed48months,dependingonseduponthepreviousinsptionintervalandSnubrsareprovidedtoensurethatthestructuralintegrityofhereactorclantsystemandallothersafetyrelatedsemsismaintainedduriandfollowingaseismicor.otherevt,initiatingdynamicloads.Thevxalinspectionfrequencyiasedonthenumber~thenumofunacceptablesnubbersfoundduringthepreviovisual1pection.

siscontinuedUnaeptablesnubbersshallbeevaluatedtodetermineiftheyareinoperae.Forinoperablesnubberstheapplicableactionrequiremenshallbet.Whenasnubberisfoundinoperable,anengineeingevaluationofhesupportedcomponentisperformedinordertodeermineifanysafety-retedcomponentorsystemhasbeenadverselyaec0ed-bytheinoperabilityothesnubber.Thisevaluationisinadtiontothedeterminationofthenubbermodeoffailure.Teengineeringevaluationshalldeterm'inwhetherornotthesnberfailurehasimpartedasignificanteffectnorcauseddegradaonofthesupportedcomponentorsystem,toensure%heyremainpableofmeetingthedesignedservice.Whenthecauseoftherejectionofasnerisclearlyestablishedandremediedforthatsnubberandforanyhersnubbersthatmaybegenericallysusceptible,andveriedbyinseicefunctionaltesting,thatsnubbermaybeexemptefrombeingcuntedasinoperable.Genericallysusceptiblesnubrsarethosewhichaofaspecificmakeormodelandhavethesedesignfeaturesdirectrelatedtothesnubberrejectedorarehosewhicharesimilarlylocatorexposedtothesameenvironment1conditionssuchastemperature,riation,andvibration.Todetinethenextsurveillanceinterval,anuncceptableisnubbermayberclassifiedasacceptableifitcan-bedemonstradthatthesnubbersoperableinitsas-.foundconditionbyperformancefafunctio1testandifitsatisfiestheacceptancecriteriarfuionaltesting. BasiscontinuedTorovideassurance,ofsnubberfunctionalreliability,areprestativesamploftheinstalledsnubberswillbefunctionallystedduringplantshdownsatlessthanorequalto18monthinrvals.ObservedfailuresofhesesamplesnubbersshallrequireunctionaltestingofadditionalunitHydraulicsnubbersandchanicalubbersmayeachbetreatedasadifferententityfortheabosveillanceprograms.Theservicelifeofasnubberisevaluatevia.anufacturerinputandengineeringinformationthroughconderationefesnubberserviceconditionsandfunctionaldesignquirements.Theosnubbercomponentswithservicelivesnexpectedtoexceedplantliaresealsando-ringsfabricatedomcertainsealmaterials.Therefore,asealreplacementprogramsrequiredtomonitorsnubbersealando-ringrvicelifetoassesnubberoperabilityisnotdegradedduetoexceedingomponent1rvicelife. 5II:0

6.06.16.1.15.I.IADKZN1STRATIVECONTROLSRESPOHSXBITXTYThePlantManager,GinnaStationshallberesponsiblefor~~overallon-siteGinnaStationopezatio~andshalldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence. 6.26.2.1ORGANIZATIONOnsiteandOffsiteOranizationunsiteandanoffsiteorganizationshallbeestablishedforunitoperationandcorporatemanagement.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.a.Linesofauthority,responsibilityandgo'Z.4.~~so.,5.<.'i~ccommunicationshallbeestablishedanddefinedfromthehighestmanagementlevelsthrough'intermediatelevelstoandincludingallPlant.managementpositions.Thoserelationshipsshallbedocumentedandupdated,asappropriate,intheformoforganizationcharts.TheseorganizationchartswillbedocumentedintheUFSARTheeniorVicePresident,CustomerOperationsshallhavecorporateresponsibilityforoverallPlantnuclearsafety,andshalltakeanymeasuresneededto.assureacceptableperformanceofthe.staffinoperating,maintaining,andprovidingtechnicalsupportinthePlantsothatcontinuednuclearsafetyisassured.~$Q.'ssternatetitlemaybedesignatedfortositioninaccordanceCFR50.54(a)(3).quirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecificaothe-positionwiththealternatetitleaswiththe'dtitle.AlternatetitlesshaspecifiedintheUpdatedFinanalysisep

c.ThePlantManager,GinnaStationshallhaveresponsibilityforoverallunitoperationandshallhavecontroloverthoseresourcesnecessaryfortoanappropriaanageronsi,butshallhavedirectaccesstoresponcorporatemanagementatalevelweactionappropriatetoCmitigatoftraining,healthphysicsandqualityassuranceconcernscanbeaccomplished.the/safeoperationandmaintenanceofthePlant.'.epersonsresponsibleforthetraining,heaphysicsqualityassurancefunctionsreportacilitStaffTheFacilityorganizationshallincludethefollowing:a.Anauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtothe'hiftcrewwithfuelinthereactor.AnadditionalauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewaboveColdShutdown.tleastonelicensedoperatorshallbepresenthecontroMrmmwhenfuelisinteactor.Inaddition,aboveColdown,atleastone(licensedS'ReactorOperator(Sallbeesentinthecontrolroom.CeShiftcrewcompositionmaybelessthantheminimumrequirementsof"10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)andSpecifications6.2.2.aand6.2.2.fforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoreshiftcrewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirement.

dePm,%.c~so,v~e.g~.v'i~~"5.<.x.e.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresshallbeonsitewhenfuelisinthereactor.Adequate,shiftcoverageshallbemaintainedwithoutroutineheavyuseof-overtime.Administrativeproceduresshallbedevelopedandimplementedtolimit:theworkinghoursofunitstaffwhoperformsafety-relatedfunctionsincludingseniorreactoroperators,reactoroperators,healthphysicists,auxiliaryoperators,"'andkeymaintenancepersonnel.ChangestotheguidelinesfortheadministrativeproceduresshallbesubmittedtotheNRCforIreview.The.ShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermalhydraulics,'reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothe'afeoperationoftheunit.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewaboveColdShutdown.*ernatetitlemaybedesignatedforta.tion.AllrecpxiremeneseTechnicalS'ationsapplytothepositionwiththealtern'sapplywiththespecifiedSo,,~title.Alterna'sshallbespe'theUpdatedFinalSnalysisReport. 6.36.3.1STATIONSTAFFUALIFICATIONSEachmemberofthefacilityshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-.1971,"SelectionandTrainingofNuclearPowerPlantPersonnel",assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,September1975,forcornarablepositionsexceptfortheShiftTechnicalAdvisor.ReferencesK2.2.~~Ltr.J.Maier(RG&E)toD.Crutchfield(5RC),datedDecember30,1980.5l.i<

~~~V~~.'..J',,"'~46.4.164.2TRAINING10CFRPart55.ThetrainingprogramshtorexceedNFPANo.27,1975Section40,eptthat(1}ainingforsalvageoperationsnnotbeprovidedand(2)tFireBrigadetrainsessionsshallbeheldatleastqterly.illsareconsideredtobetrainingsessions.A'retrainingandreplacementtrainingprogramforthefaitystaffshallbemaintainedunderthedirect'fltheDivi'TrainingManagerandshallmeorexceedtherequirementandrecommendationsSection5.5ofmSXN18.1-1971andAndixA!*Analternatetitlemaybedesignatedforthisposition.AllrequirementsoftheseTechnicalSpecificationsapplytothepositionwiththealternatetitleasapplywiththespecifiedtitle.AlternatetitlesshallbespecifiedintheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport. 6.5

6.6

6.86.8.1PROCEDURESWrittenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefollowingactivities:9'A.)g.~.>~s".'54.iia0b.coTheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978.FireProtectionProgramimplementation.Theradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringprogram.OffsiteDoseCalculationManualimplementation.ProcessControlProgramimplementation. 6.9ReoortinRecruirementsXnadditiontotheapplicablereportingrequirements'ofTits3.0,.odcofFederalRegulations,thefollowing~~7.<~:identifiedzepoztsshallbesubmittedtotheRegionalAdministratoroftheUSMC,Region1,unlessotherwiseJnoted.6.9.1RoutneReportsaztuuReooz-AsummazyzepoztofplantstaztupazcI.Ipoweescalationtestingshallbesubmitted.following(1)receiptofanoperatinglicense,(2)amendmenttothelice.seinvolvingaplannedincrease.znpowerlevel,(3)intallationoffuelthathasadifferentdesignorhasbeenmanufacturedbyyadiferentfuel"suppliez,and(4)modifications/thatmayhavesignificantlyalteredthenuclear,tBezmal,,orhydraulicpezformanceoftheplant.Thereport'shalladdresseach'ofthetestsperformedandshallingeneralincludeadescription',ofthemeasured,vatuesofthoperatingconditionsorF'characte'sicsobtainedduringtht'estprogramanda/compar'sonof.thesevalueswithdesignpredictionsandspec'cations.Anycorrectiveactionsthatwererecruired'toobtainsatisfactoryoperationshallalsobeFdescribed.Anyadditionalspecificdetailsrequi"edinlicenseconditionsbasedonothe-commitmentsshalZ;bencludedinthisrepoM6.9-1

6.9.1.2Mtupreportsshallbesubmittedwithin(1)90dayfollowingmpletionofthestartuptestprogr,or.(2)90daysfollowingzesumptionofcommercial.poweropezation,whichevezisazliesi.WtheStaztupRepoztdoesnotcovezbothets(i.e.,completionofstartuptestprogram,dresumptioofcommercial~poweroperation,supplementaryreportssallbesubmiteatleast..everythreemonthsuntilbotheventsebeenr~completed.MonthlyOneratincrResort.Routinezepoztsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperienceshallbesubm'tted~oW~ccu.ir4./8~5'a-.Ybythefifteenthofeachmonthfollowing,thecalendarmonthcovezed,bythereport.hemonthlyreportshallincludeanaxratisummaryofone<tingexperiencedescribingtheoperationI,ofthefacility,incdingmajorsaftyrelatedmaintenance!,.'forthemonthlyperiod,except~atsafetyrelatedOmaintenanceperformedduxngtheuel'ngoutagemayQI.Lti~~bereportedinmonthlyreportormonthfo'lowingtheendoage.theoutageratherthaneachmonthingthe6.9.1.3AnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOoeratin"mortAradiolog'calenvironmertalop~ra+wngreportcov"r'ngtheoperationoftheuritduringtheprev'ouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedprio"tcMay&ofeachveer.1%

TheannualradiologicalenvironmentalreportsEallincludesummaries,interpretations,.and~lysisoftrendsoftheresultsoftheradiologicalenvironmental'1l**thpy'.~lacompazisonwithbackground(control)sampandpreviousenvironalsurveillanceepoztsandanassessmentoftheobse'dpampaoftheplantoperationontheenviroent.Thereportsshallalso-includetheiresuCsoflandusecensusesasreauired.The'annualradiologicalenvironmentaloperatingreportshallincludesummarizedandtabulatedresultsintheformatofTable6.9-1ofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplesCakenduringthereportperiod.Intheeventthatsomeresultsarenotavailablefozinclusionwiththereport.,thereportshallbesubmittednotingand'xplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedassoonaspossiblein"asupplementaryreport..Inaddition,theannualreportshMa-1includeadhscussz.onwhichx.dentxfxes&ecxwcumstanceswhireventanyrequireddetectionlimitsfor~environmentalsampanalysesfom,.beingmet,andadiscussionofalldeviatefromthesampleschedu'eofTable3.16-1.Thereportshal.alsoincludethefollowing:~summarydescriptionofradiologicalenvizonmen"almonitoringprograminclud;.rgamaoofallplinglocationskeyedtoatablegivingdistances.

andfromthereactor,andtherenxnterlaborato-mpazjsonprogram.RadioactiveEffluent'ReleaseReortRoutineradioactiveeffluentreleasereportscoveringtheoperationoftheunitduring-theprevioustwelvemonthsofoperationshallbesubmittedbyThisreportshallincludeasummary,onaquarterlybasis,ofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsandsolidwastereleasedasoutlinedinRegulatoryGuide1.21,Revision1.aThisportshallincludeanassessmentofdiationdosesfrotheradioactiveliquidandgaseseffluentsreleasedfromheunitduringeachoftpreviousfourcalendarquartersoutlinedinReatoryGuide1.21,Revision1.Znadditn,thesiteoundarymaximumnoblegasgammaairandbetaaidosshall'beevaluated.TheassessmentofradiationsshallbeperformedinaccordancewiththeODC.Thissereportshallincludeanannualsummaryofourlymeteorolocaldatacollectedoverthepreviocalendaryear.Altnatively,thelicenseehaseoptionofretainingthissuryonsiteinafileatshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponquest.Also,thereportshallincludeanynearbylocation(s)identifiedbythelandusecensuswhich yieldacalculateddoseordosecormnitmentgreaterthanthoformingthebasisofSpecifications4.12.2.2or3.16.1.Thereportshallalsocontainadiscussionwhichidentit:iesthecausesofthe;unavailahilityof.milkorieafyvegtablesamplesandidentifies1oc'ationsforobtainingrep1acementsamplesinaccordancewithSpecification3.16.1.4.Theradioactiveeffluenteleasereportshallincludeadiscussionwhichidentifiesthcircumstanceswhichprevent..:Y.anyrequireddetectionlimits.foreffluentsampleanalysesIIfrombeingmet.TheradioactiveeffluentreleasereportsshallincludeanyJ'changesmadedgningthereportingperiodt'atheODCNas:.specifiedin/Section6.15,andtotheProcess';ControlProgram:asspecifiedinSection6.16.Theradioactiveeffluent.release'reportsshallalsoincludeadiscussionofnymajorchgestoradioactivewastetreatmentsystemsinaccordanceithSpecification6.17.2.1.6.9.1.5PressurizerReliefandSafetValveChallenesb,h.Q,Challengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesor'afetyvalvesshallbereportednolessfrequently.than;7ytonanannualbasis~

61An:Resultsofrequiredleaktestpereon'sourcesiftheepresenceof0.005eormoreofremovablecon'on.6.9.2.2Annually:Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utilityandotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposuresgreaterthan100mrem/yrandtheirassoci'atedman-remexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions,e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,in-serviceinspection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance(describemaintenance),wasteprocessing,andrefueling.Thedoseassignment.tovariousdutyfunctionsmaybeestimatesbasedonpocketdosimeter,TLD,orfilmbadgemeasurements.Smallexposurestotallinglessthan20%oftheindividualtotaldoseneednotbeaccountedfor.Intheaggregate,atleast804ofthetotalwhole.bodydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshallbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.(NOTE:ThistabulationsupplementstherequirementsofSection20.407of10CFRPart20) ctorOverpressureProtectionSystemOperationZntheeveitherthePORVsortheRCSventareusedtomitigateaRCSssuretransientSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmiotheCommissionwithinthirtydays.Thereporalldescribecircumstancesinitiatingthransient,theeffectoftheVsorvent(snthetransientandanyothercorrectiveactionecessarytopreventrecurrence. TABLE6.9-1ENVIRONMENTALRADIOLOGICALMONITORINGPROGRAMSUMMARYNameofFacilityR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244LocationofFacilityWaeCountNewYorkReportingPeriodTypndLowerLimitMediumorPathway'otalNume~ofSampledofAnalysesDqtectionanitof.Measurement)Performed(LLD)ionAllIndicator$ocationsLocationswithHgistAnnualMsanControlLocgtMean[1)Name~.Mean($)Mean(()RangeDistanceagdDirectionRangeJRange~aNominalwerLialitofDetection(LLD)asdefinedinTableNotationa.bfTable4.12-1.Meyn.andrangebasedupondetectablemeasurementsonly.Fractionofdetectablemeasurementsatspecifiedlocationsisindicatedinparentheses(1).~~~

TABLE6.9-2REPORTINGLEVEISFORRADIOACTIVITYCONCENTRATIONSINENVIRONMENTALSAMPIESIReportingLevelsAnalysisH-3Fe-59Co-58Co-60Zn-65Zr-Nb-95Water(pCi/1)2x1010004001000i300300400<)AirborneParticuateFishorGases(pci/m)(pCi/Kg,wet)3x101x'10~3x10Milk.~'pCi/1)BroadLeafVegetables(pCi/Kg,wet)I-131Cs134s137a-La-14030502O0<a)0.910201x102x1036070>>3001x101z102x10()talfo:eparent,anddaughter 610 6.11 1~6.120 6.136.13.15.a,iHIGHRADIATIONAREA1nlieuofthe"controldevice"or"alarmsignal"requiredbyparagraph20.203(c)(2)of10CPRPart20:EachHighRadiationAreainwhichtheintensityofradiationis1000mrem/hrorlessshallbebarri-cadedandconspicuouslypostedasahighradiationareaandentrancetheretoshallbecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentersuchareasshallbeprovidedwithoneormoreofthefollowing:(1)A.radiationmonitoringdevicewhichcon-tinuouslyindicatestheradiationdoserateinthearea.(2)A=radiationmonitoring.devicewhichcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived.Entryintosuchareaswiththismonitoringdevicemaybemadeafterthedoseratelevelsintheareahavebeenestablishedandpersonnelhavebeenmadeknowledgeableofthem.fgRadiationProtectionpersonnelshallbeexemptfromtheRWPissuancerequirementduringtheperformanceoftheirassignedradiationprotectionduties,providingtheyarefollowingplantradiationprotectionproceduresforentryintohighradiationareas.**atetitlemaybedesignatedforthisposxtxrequirementsTechnicalSpecifiapplytothe~~~positionwiththealternaelywiththespecifiedtitle.AlternasshallbespecxxUdatediyAnalysisReport. (3)AQualifiedhealthphysicist(i.e.,qualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedures}witharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevicewhoisresponsibleforprovidingpositivecontrolovertheactivitieswithintheareaandwhowillperformperiodicradiationsurveillanceat.thefrequencyspecifiedintheHPHP.Thesurveillancefrequencywillbeestablishedby'planthealthphysicist.b.EachHighRadiationAreainwhichtheintensityofradiationisgreaterthan1000mrem/hrshallbesubjecttotheprovisionsof6.13.1a.above,andinaddition,lockeddoorsshallbe.providedtopreventunauthorizedentryinto.theseareasandthe-keystounlocktheselockeddoorsshallbemaintainedundertheadministrativecontroloftheShiftSupervisoronduty.'alternatetitlemaybedesignatedfor'ation.AlentsoftheseTechniczficationsapplytotheposalternatetitleasapplywiththespecie.etitlesshallbe'pecitheUpdatedFinalSafetyReport. \6.14i(I 6.156.15.16.15.1.aOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCH)AnychangestotheODCMshallbemadebythefollowingmethod:LicenseeinitiatedchangesshallbesubmittedtotheCommissionwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodinwhichthechange(s)wasmadeandshallcontain:sufficientlyd'etailedinformationtosupporttherationaleforthechange.(ii)adeterminationthatthe'changewillnotreducetheaccuracyorreliabilityofdosecalculationsorsetpointdeterminationsgand(iii)documentationofthefactthatthechangehasbeenreviewedandfoundacceptablebytheonsitereviewfunction.6.3.5.1.bLicenseeinitiatedchangesshallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptanceby.theonsitereviewfunctiononadatespecifiedbthelicensee. ~~46M6processControlproram(pCp)6.16.'QAllychangestothePCPshallbemadebythefollowing'...~~~ethod:6.16.1.aLinseeinitiatedchangesshallbesubmittedtothCommiss.onwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleasReportforthepe'odinwhichthechange(s)wasmeandshallcontain:(i)sufficientlyetailedinforma'ontosupporttherationalefortchange;(ii)adeterminationthaechangewillnotreducetheoverallconfoncefthesolidifiedwasteproducttoex'ngcriteriforsolidwastes;and(iii)documationofthefactthattheangehasbereviewedandfoundacceptablebytonsitereviewfunction.'C6.16.1&censeeinitiatedchangesshallbecomeeffectiveafreviewandacceptancebytheonsitereviewfunctiononadatespecified'bythe.licensee.

.17oChanestoRadioactiveHasteTreatmentSstems(Liquid,GaseousandSolid)FUNCON6~17.1617.2617~2~1Theradioactivewastetreatmentsystems(l'id,seousandsolid)arethosesystemsdef'nedinTecnicalSpecification5.5.Majorhangestotheradioactivewaesystems(liquidandgaseus)shallbereportedbyhefollowingmethod.Forthepuoseofthisspecifiation,"majorchanges"isdefinedinpecification&.'17e3below.TheCommissionsallbeinormedofallmajorchangesbytheinclusionoas'tablediscussionorbyreferencetoasuitabdiscussionofeachchangeintheRadioactiveEffenReleaseReportfortheperiodin.whichthechangeswerede.Thediscussionofeachchangeshallctain:a)b)asummerlyoftheevaluatlothatledtothedeteinationthatthechangecouldbemade(inacrdancewith10CPR50.59);ufficientdetailedinformationtosupportthereasonforthechange;adetaileddescriptionoftheequipment,componentsaridprocessesinvolvedandtheinterfaceswithotherplantsystems;

d)anevaluationofthechangewhichshowsthepred'cted~releasesofradioactivematerialsinliquidandcg,.caus"effluentsfromthoseprevious@predicted;e)evaluationofthechangewhichshows.theezoectedlmaximumexposurestoindividualinWeeunrestrictedareaandtothgenealpopulation,'fromthosepreviouslestimated;f)documentationofthefactthatthech~uaevasreviewedandfoundacceptab'lehy.thePOPC."MajorChanges"toradioactivewastesystems(liquid,/gaseousandsolid)shall'excludethefollowing:,Fa)Majorchangesinrocess.equipment,components,andstzuctuzeszomthoseinuse(e.g.,deletion/ofevapozatozsand'nstallati'onofdeminealisezs);Ib)Majorchangesinthedesignofradwastetreatmentsystems'liquid;gaseousandsolid)'..Juratcouldsignificantlyalterthecharacteristicsiand/oryiantitiesofeffluentsreleased;c):-Changesinsystemdesignwhichmayinvalidatetheaccident.analysis(e.g.,changesintankcapacity.thatwouldalterthecuriesreleased). ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentCChapters1.0-3.4VolumeIII I4\AIIa/i ATTACHMENTCProposedRevisedR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsRevisethepagesasfollows:RemoveLicenseTableofContentsEntireSection1.0EntireSection2.0EntireSection3.0EntireSection4.0EntireSection5.0.EntireSection6.0InsertGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationGinnaStationITSLicenseITSTableofContentsITSSection1.0ITSSection2.0ITSSection3.0ITSSection4.0ITSSection5.0Hay1995 ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONDOCKETNO.50-244R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSELicenseNo.DPR-18TheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(theCommission)hasfoundthat:A.Theapplicationcomplieswiththerequirementsofthe;AtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended(theAct),andtheregulationsoftheCommissionsetforthin'0CFRChapterIandallrequirednotificationstootheragenciesorbodieshavebeendulymade;ConstructionoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(thefacility)hasbeensubstantiallycompletedtoconformitywithConstructionPermitNo.CPPR-19,asamended,andtheapplication,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCommission;C.D.E.F.Thefacilitywilloperateinconformitywiththeapplication,theprovisionsoftheAct,andtherulesandregulationsoftheCommission(exceptasexemptedfromcomplianceinSection2.Dbelow);Thereisreasonableassurance(i)thatthefacilitycanbeoperatedatpowerlevelsupto1520megawatts(thermal)withoutendangeringthehealthandsafetyofthepublic;and(ii)thatsuchactivitieswillbeconductedincompliancewiththeregulationsoftheCommission(exceptasexemptedfromcomplianceinSection2.Dbelow);TheapplicantistechnicallyandfinanciallyqualifiedtoengageintheactivitiesauthorizedbythisoperatinglicenseinaccordancewiththerulesandregulationsoftheCommission;Theapplicanthasfurnishedproofoffinancialprotectionthatsatisfiestherequirementsof10CFRPart140;andG.Theissuanceofthislicensewillnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.TheProvisionalOperatingLicensedatedSeptember19,1969,issupersededbyFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18herebyissuedtoRochesterGasandElectricCorporationtoreadasfollows: ThislicenseappliestotheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,aclosedcycle,pressurized,light-water-moderatedandcooledreactor,andelectricgeneratingequipment(hereinreferredtoas"thefacility")whichisownedbytheRochesterGasandElectricCorporation(hereinafter"thelicensee"or"RG&E").Thefacilityislocatedonthelicensee'ssiteonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,WayneCounty,NewYork,about16mileseastoftheCityofRochesterandisdescribedinlicenseapplicationAmendmentNo.6,"FinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport,"andsubsequentamendmentsthereto,andintheapplicationforpowerincreasenotarizedFebruary2,1971,andAmendmentNos.1through4thereto(hereincollectivelyreferredtoas"theapplication").Subjecttotheconditionsandrequirementsincorporatedherein,theCommissionherebylicensesRG&E:(1)PursuanttoSection104boftheActand10CFRPart50,"DomesticLicensingofProductionandUtilizationFacilities,"topossess,use,andoperatethefacilityatthedesignatedlocationtoWayneCounty,NewYork,inaccordancewiththeproceduresandlimitationsset'orthinthislicense;(2)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceive,possess,anduseatany.timespecialnuclearmaterialorreactorfuel,inaccordancewiththelimitationsforstorageandamountsrequiredforreactoroperationasdescribedintheFinalSafetyApalysisReport,asamended,andCommissionSafetyEvaluationsdatedNovember15,1976,October5,1984,andNovember14,1984.(a)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,toreceiveandstorefour(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20,1979);(b)PursuanttotheActand10CFRPart70,topossessandusefour.(4)mixedoxidefuelassembliesinaccordancewiththelicensee'sapplicationdatedDecember14,1979(transmittedbyletterdatedDecember20.1979)assupplementedFebruary20,1980andMarch5,1980;(3)PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30,40,and70to'eceive,possess,anduseatanytimeanybyproduct,source,andspecialnuclearmaterialassealedneutronsourcesforreactorstartup,sealedsourcesforreactorinstrumentationandradiationmonitoringequipmentcalibration,andasfissiondetectorsinamountasrequired;(4)PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30,40,and70,toreceive,possess,anduseinamountsas'requiredanybyproduct,source,orspecialnuclearmaterialwithoutrestrictiontochemicalorphysicalform,forsampleanalysis orinstrumentcalibrationorassociatedwithradioactiveapparatusorcomponents;and(5)PursuanttotheActand10CFRParts30and70,topossess,butnotseparate,suchbyproductandspecialnuclearmaterialsasmaybeproducedbytheoperationofthefacility.ThislicenseshallbedeemedtocontainandissubjecttotheconditionsspecifiedinthefollowingCommissionregulationsin10CFRPart20,Section30.34ofPart30,Section40.41ofPart40,Sections50.54and50.59ofPart50,andSection70.32ofPart70;andissubjecttoallapplicableprovisionsoftheActandrules,regulationsandordersoftheCommissionnoworhereafterineffect;andissubjecttotheadditionalconditionsspecifiedbelow:(1)MaximumPowerLevelRG&Eisauthorizedtooperatedthefacilityatsteady-statepowerlevelsuptoamaximumof1520megawatts(thermal).(2)TechnicalSecificationsTheTechnicalSpecificationscontainedinAppendixA,areherebyincorporatedinthelicense.ThelicenseeshalloperatethefacilityinaccordancewiththeTechnicalSpecifications.(3)FireProtection(a)Thelicenseeshallimplementandmaintainineffectallfireprotectionfeaturesdescribedinthelicensee'ssubmittalsreferencedinandasapprovedormodifiedbytheNRC'sFireProtectionSafetyEvaluation(SE)datedFebruary14,1979andSEsupplementsdatedDecember17,1980,February6,1981,June22,1981,February27,1985andMarch21,1985orconfigurationssubsequentlyapprovedbytheNRC,subjecttoprovision(b)below.(b)ThelicenseemaymakechangestotheapprovedfireprotectionprogramwithoutpriorapprovaloftheCommissiononlyifthosechangeswouldnotadverselyaffecttheabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire. D.E.F.Thefacilityrequires-exemptionsfromcertainrequirementsofAppendixJto10CFRPart50.TheseincludecertainexemptionsfromAppendixJto10CFRPart50sectionIII.A.4(a)maximumallowableleakagerateforreducedpressuretests,sectionIII.B.1acceptabletechniqueforperforminglocal(TypeB)leakageratetests,sectionIII.D.1schedulingofcontainmentintegrateleakageratetests,andsectionIII.D.2testingintervalforcontainmentairlocks(SERdatedHarch28,1978).Theaforementionedexemptionsareauthorizedbylawandwillnotendangerlifeorpropertyorthecommondefenseandsecurityandareotherwiseinthepublicinterest.Therefore,theexemptionsareherebygrantedpursuantto10CFR50.12.PhysicalProtection-ThelicenseeshallmaintainineffectandfullyimplementallprovisionsofthefollowingCommission-approveddocuments,includingamendmentsandchangesmadepursuanttotheauthorityof10CFR50.54(p),whicharebeingwithheldfrompublicdisclosurepursuantto10CFR73.21:ThelicenseeshallfullyimplementandmaintainineffectallprovisionsoftheCommission-approvedphysicalsecurity,guardtrainingandqualification,andsafeguardscontingencyplansincludingamendmentsmadepursuanttoprovisionsoftheMiscellaneousAmendmentsandSearchRequirementsrevisionsto10CFR73.55(51FR27827and27822)andtotheauthorityof10CFR50.90and10CFR.50.54(p).Theplans,whichcontainSafeguardsInformationprotectedunder10CFR73.21,areentitled:"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantPhysicalSecurityPlan,"withrevisionssubmittedthroughAugust18,1987;"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantGuardTrainingandgualificationPlan"withrevisionssubmittedthroughJuly30,1981;and"RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlantSafeguardsContingencyPlan"with.revisionssubmittedthroughApril14,1981.Changes-madeinaccordancewith10CFR73.55shallbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeschedulesetforththerein.Thislicenseiseffectiveasofthedateofissuanceandshallexpireatmidnight,September18,2009.FROMTHENUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION

Attachment:

AppendixA-TechnicalSpecificationsDateofIssuance: TABLEOFCONTENTS1.01.1 1.2 1.31.42.0 2.12.23.03.0USEANDAPPLICATIONDefinitionsLogicalConnectors,CompletionTimes.FrequencySAFETYLIMITS(SLs)SLs~~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~SLViolationsLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITY.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENT(SR)APPLICABILITY1.1-11.1-1 1.2-11.3-1 1.4-12.0-12.0-1 2.0-13.0-1 3.0-43.13.1.1 3.1.23.1.33.1.43.1.53.1.6 3.1.73.1.8REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS.SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)CoreReactivityModeratorTemperatureCoefficientRodGroupAlignmentLimits....ShutdownBankInsertionLimits..ControlBankInsertionLimitsRodPositionIndicationPHYSICS'TESTSExceptions-MODE2(HTC)3.1-13.1-13~123.1-43.1-63.1-103.1-12 3.1-143.1-173.23.2.13.2.23.2.33.2.43.3 3.3.1 3.3.23.3.33.3.43.3.5POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"~~)AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)INSTRUMENTATIONReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationPostAccidentMonitoring(PAM)Instrumentation...LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)Actuation3.2-13.2-13.2-43.2-63.2-113.3-13.3-13.3-193.3-283.3-323.3-34(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftA 0 TABLEOFCONTENTS3.43.4.13.4.23.4.33.4.43.4.53.4.63.4..73.4.83.4.93.4.103.4.113.4.123.4.13 3.4.143.4.153.4.163.53.5.1 3'.23.5.3 3.5.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDepartureNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsRCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityRCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-MODE1)8.5%RTPRCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,and3RCSLoops-MODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledPressurizerPressurizerSafetyValvesPressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)RCSOperationalLEAKAGERCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage..RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationRCSSpecificActivityEMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)Accumulators.................ECCS-MODES1,2,and3ECCS-MODE4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)s)System~~~from3.4-13.4-13.4-3 3.4-4 3.4-63.4-7 3.4-103.4-13 3.4-16 3.4-183.4-203.4-223.4-263.4-32 3.4-34 3.4-383.4-423.5-13.5-13.5-3 3.5-6 3.5-83.63.6.13.6.2 3.6.33.6.4 3.6.53.6.63.6.73.73.7.13.7.23.7.33.7.43.7.5 3.7.63.7.73.7.8CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSContainmentContainmentAirLocksContainmentIsolationBarriers....ContainmentPressureContainmentAirTemperatureContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~HydrogenRecombinersPLANTSYSTEMSHainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesHainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs),HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(MFRVs)andAssociatedBypassValvesAtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.......CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System.ServiceWater(SW)System3.6-1 3.6-1 3.6-3 3.6-83.6-173.6-183.6-19 3.6-243.7-13.7-13~733.7-53.7-8 3.7-103.7-143.7-153.7-17(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftA TABLEOFCONTENTS3.73.7.93.7.103.7.113.7.123.7.133.7.14PLANTSYSTEMS(continued)ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentControlSystem(CREATS)AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVs)SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelSpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationSpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageSecondarySpecificActivity3.7-193~7233.7-243.7-25 3.7-273.7-303.8 3.8.13.8.23.8.33.8.43.8.53.8.63.8.7 3.8.83.8.9 3.8.103.93.9.13.9.23.9.33.9.43.9.5ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS.ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4ACSources-MODES5and6DieselFuelOilDCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4DCSources-MODES5and6BatteryCellParametersACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,andDistributionSystems-MODES5and6REFUELINGOPERATIONS.BoronConcentrationNuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtRefuelingCavityWaterLevel..~~~~,and4~~~4~~3.8-13.8-1 3;8-7 3.8-10 3.8-123.8-153.8-17 3.8-20 3.8-223.8-243.8-263.9-13.9-13.9-23.9-43.9-63.9-84.0 4.1 4.24.35.05.15.25.35.45.5 5.6 5.7DESIGNFEATURESSite0~~~t~~~~ReactorCore.FuelStorage....ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSResponsibility.Organization.PlantStaffgualificatiProcedures......ProgramsandManuals.ReportingRequirementsHighRadiationArea~~ons~~~~~~~~4.0-14.0-14.0-14.0-25.0-15.0-15.0-25.0-4 5.0-55.0-6 5.0-17 5.0-22R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftA TABLEOFCONTENTS2.02.1.12.1.2B3.0B3.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)ReactorCoreSLs.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSL.LIMITINGCONDITION.FOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITY.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITY2.0-12.0-12.0-83.0-13.0-12B3.1B3.1.1B3.1.2B3.1.3B3.1.4B3.1.5B3.1.6B3.1.7B3.1.8REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS.SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)CoreReactivityModeratorTemperatureCoefficientRodGroupAlignmentLimits.ShutdownBankInsertionLimits.ControlBankInsertionLimitsRodPositionIndicationPHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2(HTC)~~~~~~~B3.1-1B3.1-1B3.1-8B3.1-15B3.1-22B3.1-34B3.1-41B3.1-49B3.1-57B3.2B3.2.1B3.2.23.2.33.2.43.33.3.1 3.3.23.3.33.3.43.3.5B3.4B3.4.1B3.4.2B3.4.3B3.4.4B3.4.5B3.4.6B3.4.7B3.4.8B3.4.9B3.4.10B3.4.11POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelNFactor(F>>)AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)INSTRUMENTATIONReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationPostAccidentHonitoring(PAH)Instrumentation.LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation............ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsRCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityRCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPRCSLoops-MODES1g8.5%RTP,2,and3RCSLoops-MODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledPressurizerPressurizerSafetyValvesPressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)3.2-1 3.2-13.2-83.2-173.2-29B3.3-1B3.3-13.3-653.3-106B3.3-127B3.3-1343.4-1B3.4-1B3.4-8B3.4-12B3.4-20B3.4-24B3.4-31B3.4-37B3.4-43B3.4-47B3.4-53B3.4-58(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantlvDraftA TABLEOFCONTENTS3.4B3.4.12B3.4.13B3.4.14B3.4.15B3.4.16REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)(continued)LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemRCSOperationalLEAKAGERCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage..RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationRCSSpecificActivityB3.4-67B3.4-84B3.4-92B3.4-100B3.4-108B3.5B3.5.1B3.5.23.5.33.5.4EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)Accumulators~~~~~~~~~~~~ECCS-MODES1,2,and3ECCS-MODE4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BBBBB3.5-1 3.5-13.5-10 3.5-243.5-28B3.6B3.6.1B3.6.2B3.6.3B3.6.4B3.6.5B3.6.63.6.73.73.7.13.7.23.7.33.7.43.7.53.7.6B3.7B3.7.7B3.7.8B3.7.9B3.7.10B3.7.11B3.7.12B3.7.13B3.7.14CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSContainmentContainmentAirLocksContainmentIsolationBarriers.ContainmentPressureContainmentAirTemperatureContainmentSpray(CS)RecirculationFanCooler(CFRC),andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsHydrogenRecombiners(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)\PLANTSYSTEMSHainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs).HainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValves.HainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs),HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs)andAssociatedBypassValvesAtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs).......AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.......CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)PLANTSYSTEMS(continued)ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System.ServiceWater(SW)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)..............AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystems(ABVS)SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelSpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationSpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageSecondarySpecificActivityB3.6-1B3.6-;1B3.6-8B3.6-17B3.6-36B3.6-40B3.6-443.6-613.7-13.7-1 3.7-6B3.7-13B3.7-21B3.7-25B3.7-373.7-413.7-48B3.7-57B3.7-65B3.7-70B3.7-74B3.7-78B3.7-85(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDraftA TABLEOFCONTENTS83.883.8.183.8.283.8.383.8.483.8.583.8.683.8.783.8.883.8.983.8.1083.983.9.183.9.283.9.383.9.483.9.5ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS.ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4ACSources-MODES5and6DieselFuelOilDCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4DCSources-MODES5and6BatteryCellParametersACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES5and6DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,andDistributionSystems-MODES5and6REFUELINGOPERATIONS.BoronConcentrationNuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval'(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23FtResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtRefuelingCavityWaterLevel~~~~and483.8-183.8-183.8-2483.8-3183.8-3683.8-4683.8-5283.8-6283.8-6983.8-7583.8-:8983.9-183.9-183.9-683.9-1183.9-1583.9-19R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantviDraftA

Definitions1.11.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.1DefinitionsNOTEThedefinedtermsofthissectionappearincapitalizedtypeandareapplicable.throughoutthese'echnicalSpecificationsandBases.TermACTIONSACTUATIONLOGICTESTAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)CHANNELCALIBRATIONDefinitionACTIONSshallbethatpartofaSpecificationthatprescribesRequiredActionstobetakenunderdesignatedConditionswithinspecifiedCompletionTimes.AnACTUATIONLOGICTESTshallbetheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.TheACTUATIONLOGICTEST,asaminimum,shallincludeacontinuitycheckofoutputdevices.AFDshallbethedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetector.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONshallbetheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechannelsothatitrespondswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONshallencompasstheentirechannel,includingtherequiredsensor,alarm,interlock,timeconstants,andtripfunctions.Calibrationofinstrumentchannelswithresistancetemperaturedetector(RTD)orthermocouplesensorsmayconsistofaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorandnormalcalibrationoftheremainingadjustabledevicesin'thechannel.Wheneverasensingelementisreplaced,thenext-requiredCHANNELCALIBRATIONshallincludeaninplacequalitativeassessmentofsensorbehaviorthatcomparestheothersensingelementswiththerecentlyinstalledsensingelement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(continued)DraftA Definitions1.11.1DefinitionsCHANNELCALIBRATION(continued)CHANNELCHECKCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)COREALTERATIONCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONmaybeperformedbymeans.ofanyseriesofsequential,overlappingcalibrationsortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.ACHANNELCHECKshallbethequalitativeassessment,byobservation,ofchannelbehaviorduringoperation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.ACOTshallbetheinjectionofasimulatedoractualsignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifytheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,andtripfunctions.TheCOTshallincludeadjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy.COREALTERATIONshallbethemovementofanyfuel,sources,or,otherreactivitycontrolcomponents,withinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadremovedandfuelinthevessel.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.TheCOLRistheplantspecificdocumentthatprovidescyclespecificparameterlimitsforthecurrentreloadcycle.ThesecyclespecificparameterlimitsshallbedeterminedforeachreloadcycleinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.5.PlantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualSpecifications.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131(microcuries/gram)thatalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,I-134,andI-135actuallypresent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(continued)DraftA Definitionsl.l1.1Definitions(continued)E-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYL.LEAKAGEEshallbetheaverage(weightedinproportiontotheconcentrationofeachradionuclideinthereactorcoolantatthetimeofsampling)ofthe,sumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergies(inNeV)perdisintegrationfornon-iodineisotopes,withhalflives>15minutes,making'patleast95%ofthetotalnon-iodineactivityinthecoolant.Themaximumallowableprimarycontainmentleakagerate,L.,shallbe0.2%ofprimarycontainmentairweightperdayatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentpressure(P,).LEAKAGEfromtheRCSshallbe:a.IdentifiedLEAKAGEl.LEAKAGE,suchasthatfrompumpsealsorvalvepacking(exceptreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealwaterinjectionorreturn),thatiscapturedandconductedtocollectionsystemsorasumporcollectingtank;2.LEAKAGEintothecontainmentatmospherefromsourcesthatarebothspecificallylocatedandknowneithernottointerferewiththeoperationofleakagedetectionsystemsornottobepressureboundaryLEAKAGE;or3.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)LEAKAGEthroughasteamgenerator(SG)totheSecondarySystem;b.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEAllLEAKAGE(exceptRCPsealwaterinjectionorreturn)thatisnotidentifiedLEAKAGE;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-3DraftA Definitions1.11.1Definitions'LEAKAGE(continued)MODEOPERABLE-OPERABILITYPHYSICSTESTSc.PressureBoundarLEAKAGELEAKAGE(exceptSGLEAKAGE)throughanonisolablefaultinanRCScomponentbody,pipewall,orvesselwall.AMODEshallcorrespondtoanyoneinclusivecombinationofcorereactivitycondition,powerlevel,averagereactorcoolanttemperature,andreactorvesselheadclosurebolttensioningspecifiedinTable1.1-1withfuelinthereactorvessel.Asystem,subsystem,train,component,ordeviceshallbeOPERABLEorhaveOPERABILITYwhenitiscapableofperformingitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)andwhenallnecessaryattendantinstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpower,coolingandsealwater,lubrication,andotherauxiliaryequipmentthatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,component,ordevicetoperformitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).PHYSICSTESTSshallbethosetestsperformedtomeasurethefundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthereactorcoreandrelatedinstrumentation.Thesetestsare:a.DescribedinChapter14,InitialTestProgramoftheUFSAR;b.Authorizedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59;orc.OtherwiseapprovedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-4(continued)DraftA Definitions1.11.1Definitions(continued)~~PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)RATEDTHERMALPOWER(RTP)SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)ThePTLRistheplantspecificdocumentthat~providesthereactorvesselpressureandtemperaturelimits,includingheatupandcooldownrates,andthepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsandenabletemperatureassociatedwiththeLowTemperatureOverpressurizationProtectionSystemforthecurrentreactorvesselfluenceperiod.ThesepressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbedeterminedforeachfluenceperiodinaccordancewithSpecification5.6.6.Plantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualspecifications.gPTRshallbetheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.RTPshallbeatotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolantof1520HWt.SDMshallbetheinstantaneousamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcriticalorwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassuming:a.Allrodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)arefullyinsertedexceptforthesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworth,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn.WithanyRCCAsnotcapableofbeingfullyinserted,thereactivityworthoftheRCCAsmustbeaccountedforinthedeterminationofSDH;andb.InMODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-5(continued)DraftA Definitionsl.lI.1Definitions(continued)STAGGEREDTESTBASISTHERMALPOWERASTAGGEREDTESTBASISshallconsistofthe'testingofoneofthesystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsduringtheintervalspecifiedbytheSurveillanceFrequency,sothatallsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsaretestedduringnSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,wherenisthetotalnumberofsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsintheassociatedfunction.THERMAL'OWERshallbethetotalreactorcoreheattransferr'atetothereactorcoolant.TRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)ATADOTshallconsistofoperatingthetripactuatingdeviceandverifyingtheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,andtripfunctions.TheTADOTshallincludeadjustment,asnecessary,ofthetripactuatingdevicesothatitactuatesattherequiredsetpointwithintherequiredaccuracy.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-6DraftA Definitions1.1Table1.1-1(page1of1)MODESMODETITLEREACTIVITYCONDITION(k,)RATEDPOWERaAVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTTEMPERATURE('F)PowerOperationStartupHotShutdownHotStandby(b)5ColdShutdown()Refueling()Z0.99>0.99<.0.99<0.99<0.99NA>5<5~NANANANANA>350350>T,>200~200(a)Excludingdecayheat.(b)Allreactorvesselheadclosureboltsfullytensioned.(c)Oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytension'ed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.1-7DraftA LogicalConnectors1.21.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.2LogicalConnectorsPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoexplainthemeaningoflogicalconnectors.LogicalconnectorsareusedinTechnicalSpecifications(TS)todiscriminatebetween,andyetconnect,discreteConditions,RequiredActions,CompletionTimes,andFrequencies.TheonlylogicalconnectorsthatappearinTSareANDOR.Thephysicalarrangementoftheseconnectorsconstituteslogicalconventionswithspecificmeanings.BACKGROUNDSeverallevelsoflogicmaybeusedtostateRequiredActions.Theselevelsareidentifiedbytheplacement(ornesting)ofthe'logicalconnectorsandbythenumberassignedtoeachRequired.Action.ThefirstleveloflogicisidentifiedbythefirstdigitofthenumberassignedtoaRequiredActionandtheplacementofthelogicalconnectorinthefirstlevelofnesting(i.e.,leftjustifiedwiththenumberoftheRequiredAction).ThesuccessivelevelsoflogicareidentifiedbyadditionaldigitsoftheRequiredActionnumberandbysuccessiveindentationsofthelogicalconnectors.WhenlogicalconnectorsareusedtostateaConditionCompletionTimeorFrequericy,onlythefirstleveloflogicisused,andthelogicalconnectorisleftjustifiedwiththestatementoftheConditionCompletionTime,orFrequency.EXANPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseoflogicalconnectors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-1DraftA LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-1LOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.lVerify.ANDA.2Restore.InthisexamplethelogicalconnectorANDisusedtoindicatethatwheninConditionA,bothRequiredActionsA.1andA.2mustbecompleted.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-2DraftA LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.2-2MULTIPLELOGICALCONNECTORSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.lORTripA.2.1Verify.ANDA.2.2.1Reduce.ORA.2.2.2Perform.ORA.3Align...Thisexamplerepresentsamorecomplicateduseoflogicalconnectors.RequiredActionsA.1,.A.2,andA.3arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformedasindicatedbytheuseofthelogicalconnectorORandtheleftjustifiedplacement.AnyoneofthesethreeActionsmaybechosen.IfA.2ischosen,thenbothA.2.1andA.2.2mustbeperformedasindicatedbythelogicalconnectorAND.RequiredActionA.2.2ismetbyperformingA.2.2.1orA.2.2.2.TheindentedpositionofthelogicalconnectorORindicatesthatA.2.2.1andA.2.2.2arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.2-3DraftA

CompletionTimes1.31.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.3CompletionTimesPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoestablishtheCompletionTimeconventionandtoprovideguidanceforitsuse.BACKGROUNDLimitingConditionsforOperation(LCOs)specifyminimumrequirementsforensuringsafeoperationoftheplant.TheACTIONSassociatedwithanLCOstateConditionsthattypicallydescribethewaysinwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOcanfailtobemet.SpecifiedwitheachstatedConditionareRequiredAction(s)andCompletionTime(s).DESCRIPTIONTheCompletionTimeistheamountoftimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredAction.Itisreferencedtothetimeofdiscoveryofasituation(e.g.,inoperableequipmentorvariablenotwithinlimits)thatrequiresenteringanACTIONSConditionunlessotherwisespecified,providingtheplantisinaMODEorspecifiedconditionstatedintheApplicabilityoftheLCO.RequiredActionsmustbecompletedpriortotheexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime.AnACTIONSConditionremainsineffectandtheRequiredActionsapplyuntiltheConditionnolongerexistsortheplantisnotwithintheLCOApplicability.IfsituationsarediscoveredthatrequireentryintomorethanoneConditionatatimewithinasingleLCO(multipleConditions),theRequiredActionsforeachConditionmustbeperformedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime.WheninmultipleConditions,separateCompletionTimesaretrackedforeachConditionstartingfromthetimeofdiscoveryofthesituationthatrequiredentryintotheCondition.IOnceaConditionhasbeenentered,subsequenttrains,subsystems,components,orvariablesexpressedintheCondition,discoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,willnotresultinseparateentryintotheCondition,unlessspecificallystated.TheRequiredActionsoftheConditioncontinuetoapplywithCompletionTimesbasedoninitialentryintotheCondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-1DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)H,hbti,by,pt,variableexpressedintheConditionisdiscoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,theCompletionTime(s)maybeextended.ToapplythisCompletionTimeextension,twocriteriamustfirstbemet.Thesubsequentinoperability:a.Hustexistconcurrentwiththefirstinoperability;andb.Hustremaininoperableornotwithinlimitsafterthefirstinoperabilityisresolved.ThetotalCompletionTimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredActiontoaddressthesubsequentinoperabilityshallbelimitedtothemorerestrictiveofeither:a.ThestatedCompletionTime,asmeasuredfromtheinitialentryintotheCondition,plusanadditional24hours;orb.ThestatedCompletionTimeasmeasuredfromdiscoveryofthesubsequentinoperability.TheCompletiontimeextensioncannotbeusedtoextendthestatedCompletionTimeforthefirstinoperabletrain,subsystem,component,orvariable.TheaboveCompletionTimeextensionsdonotapplytothoseSpecificationsthathaveexceptionsthatallowcompletelyseparatere-entryintotheCondition(foreachtrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheCondition)andseparatetrackingofCompletionTimesbasedonthisre-entry.TheseexceptionsarestatedinindividualSpecifications.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3;2DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)TheaboveCompletionTimeextensiondoesnotapplytoaCompletionTimewithamodified"timezero."Thismodified"timezero"maybeexpressedasarepetitivetime(i.e.,"onceper8hours,"wheretheCompletionTimeisreferencedfromapreviouscompletionoftheRequiredActionversusthetimeofConditionentry).Anexampleofa.modified"timezero"withtheCompletionTimeexpressedas"onceper8hours"isillustratedinExample1.3-6,ConditionA.Inthisexample2,theCompletionTimemaynotbeextended.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseofCompletionTimeswithdifferenttypesofConditionsandchangingConditions.EXAMPLE1.3-1COMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursConditionBhastwoRequiredActions.EachRequiredActionhasitsownseparateCompletionTime.EachCompletionTimeisreferencedtothetimethatConditionBisentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-3DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-2DEFAULTCONDITIONSLCO3.0.3ENTRYCOMPLETIONTIMESTheRequiredActionsofConditionBaretobeinMODE3within6hoursANDinMODE5within36hours.Atotalof6hoursisallowedforreachingMODE3andatotalof36hours(not42hours)isallowedforreachingMODE5fromthetimethatConditionBwasentered.IfMODE3isreachedwithin3hours,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext33hoursbecausethetotaltimeallowedforreachingMODE5is36hours.IfConditionBisenteredwhileinMODE3,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext36hours.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.-A.lRestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.~NDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursWhenatrainisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisentered.IfthetrainisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,ConditionBisalsoenteredandtheCompletionTimeclocksforRequiredActionsB.1andB.2start.IftheinoperabletrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusafterConditionBisentered,ConditionAandBareexited,andtherefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionBmaybeterminated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-4DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-2(continued)Whenasecondtrainisdeclaredinoperablewhilethefirsttrainisstillinoperable,ConditionAisnotre-enteredforthesecondtrain.LCO3.0.3isentered,sincetheACTIONSdonotincludeaConditionformorethanoneinoperabletrain.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterLCO3.0.3isentered,butcontinuestobetrackedfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.WhileinLCO3.0.3,ifeitheroftheinoperabletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasnotexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionA.WhileinLCO3.0.3;ifeitheroftheinoperabletrainsisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionB.TheCompletionTimeforCondition8istrackedfromthetimetheConditionACompletionTimeexpired.UponrestoringeitherofthetrainstoOPERABLEstatus,theConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,but,continuesfromthetimethefirsttrainwasdeclaredinoperable.~ThisCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthetrainrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperabletrain.A24hourextensiontothestated7daysisallowed,providedthisdoesnotresultinthesecondtrainbeinginoperablefor>7days.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-5DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-3MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOHPLETIONTIMES(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.A.lRestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.OneFunctionYtraininoperable.B.1RestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursC.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.ANDOneFunctionYtraininoperable.C.lRestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ORC.2RestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-6DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-3(continued)WhenoneFunctionXtrainandoneFunctionYtrainareinoperable,ConditionAandConditionBareconcurrentlyapplicable.TheCompletionTimesforConditionAandConditionBaretrackedseparatelyforeachtrainstartingfromthetimeeachtrainwasdeclaredinoperableandtheConditionwasentered.AseparateCompletionTimeisestablishedforConditionCandtrackedfromthetimethesecondtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,thetimethesituationdescribedinConditionCwasdiscovered).IfRequiredActionC.2iscompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,ConditionsBandCareexited.IftheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1hasnotexpired,operationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA.TheremainingCompletionTimeinConditionAismeasuredfromthetimetheaffectedtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,initialentryintoConditionA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-7DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-4MULTIPLEFUNCTIONCOMPLETIONTIMESACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.lRestorevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursAsingleCompletionTimeisusedforanynumberofvalvesinoperableatthesametime.TheCompletionTimeassociatedwithConditionAisbasedontheinitialentryintoConditionAandisnottrackedonapervalvebasis.Declaringsubsequentvalvesinoperable,whileConditionAisstillineffect,doesnottriggerthetrackingofseparateCompletionTimes.OnceoneofthevalveshasbeenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetimethefirstvalvewasdeclaredinoperable.TheCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthevalverestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperablevalve.TheConditionACompletionTimemaybeextendedforupto4hoursprovidedthisdoesnotresultinanysubsequentvalvebeinginoperablefor>4hours.IftheCompletionTimeof4hours(plustheextension)expireswhileoneormorevalvesarestillinoperable,ConditionBisentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-8DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-5SEPARATEENTRYCONDITIONACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperablevalve.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreA.1RestorevalvetovalvesOPERABLEstatus.inoperable.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursTheNoteabovetheACTIONStableisamethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistracked.IfthismethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistrackedwasapplicableonlytoaspecificcondition,theNotewouldappearinthatCondition,ratherthanatthetopoftheACTIONStable.TheNoteallowsConditionAtobeenteredseparatelyforeachinoperablevalve,andCompletionTimestrackedonapervalvebasis.Whenavalveisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredanditsCompletionTimestarts.Ifsubsequentvalvesaredeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-9DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-5(continued)IftheCompletionTimeassociatedwithavalveinCondition,Aexpires,ConditionBisenteredforthatvalve.If-theCompletionTimesassociatedwithsubsequentvalvesinConditionAexpire,ConditionBisenteredseparatelyforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.Ifa'valvethatcausedentryintoConditionBisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,ConditionBisexitedforthatvalve.SincetheNoteinthisexampleallowsmultipleConditionentryandtrackingofseparateCompletionTimes,CompletionTimeextensionsdonotapply.EXAMPLE1.3-6MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onechannelinoperable.A.lPerformSR3.x.x.x.ORA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERtog50%RTP.Onceper8hours8hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinHODE3.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-10DraftA

CompletionTimes'.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-6(continued)EntryintoConditionAoffersachoicebetweenRequiredActionA.1orA.2.RequiredActionA.1hasa"onceper"CompletionTime,whichqualifiesforthe25%extension,perSR3.0.2,toeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.Theinitial8hourintervalofRequiredActionA.1beginswhenConditionAisentered,andtheinitialperformanceofRequiredActionA.1mustbecompletedwithinthefirst8hourinterval.IfRequiredActionA.lisfollowed,andtheRequiredActionisnotmetwithintheCompletionTime(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.IfRequiredActionA.2isfollowedandtheCompletionTimeof8hoursisnotmet,ConditionBisentered.IfafterentryintoConditionB,RequiredActionA.1orA.2ismet,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaythencontinueinConditionAuntiltheLCOismet.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-11DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.3-7MULTIPLEACTIONSWITHINACONDITIONCOMPLETIONTIMEEXTENSIONSACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesubsystem'noperable.A.1Verifyaffectedsubsystemisolated.ANDA.2RestoresubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.1hour~NDOnceper8hoursthereafter72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursRequiredActionA.1hastwoCompletionTimes.The1hourCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheConditionisenteredandeach"Onceper8hoursthereafter"intervalbeginsuponperformanceofRequiredActionA.l.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-12DraftA CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-7(continued)IfafterConditionAisentered,RequiredActionA.1isnotmetwithineithertheinitial1houroranysubsequent8hourintervalfromthepreviousperformance(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterConditionBisentered,butcontinuesfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.IfRequiredActionA.1ismetafterConditionBisentered,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA,providedtheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.2hasnotexpired.IMMEDIATEWhen"Immediately"isusedasaCompletionTime,theCOMPLETIONTIMERequiredActionshouldbepursuedwithoutdelayandinacontrolledmanner.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.3-13DraftA Frequency1.41.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.4FrequencyPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistodefinetheproperuseandapplicationofFrequencyrequirements.DESCRIPTIONEachSurveillanceRequirement(SR)hasaspecifiedFrequencyinwhichtheSurveillancemustbemetinordertomeettheassociatedLCO.AnunderstandingofthecorrectapplicationofthespecifiedFrequencyisnecessaryforcompliancewiththeSR.The"specifiedFrequency"isreferredtothroughoutthissectionandeachoftheSpecificationsofSection3.0,SurveillanceRequirement(SR)Applicability.The"specifiedFrequency"consistsoftherequirementsoftheFrequencycolumnofeachSRaswellascertainNotesintheSurveillancecolumnthatmodifyperformancerequirements.SituationswhereaSurveillancecouldberequired(i.e.,itsFrequencycouldexpire),butwhereitisnotpossibleornotdesiredthatitbeperformeduntilsometime.aftertheassociatedLCOiswithinitsApplicability,representpotentialSR3.0.4conflicts.Toavoidtheseconflicts,theSR(i.e.,theSurveillanceortheFrequency)isstatedsuchthatitisonly"required"whenitcanbeandshouldbeperformed.WithanSRsatisfied,SR3.0.4imposesnorestriction.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratethevariouswaysthatFrequenciesarespecified.Intheseexamples,theApplicabilityoftheLCO(LCOnotshown)isMODES1,2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-1DraftA Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.4-1SINGLEFREUENCY(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYPerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursExample1.4-1containsthetypeofSRmostoftenencounteredintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).TheFrequencyspecifiesaninterval(12hours)duringwhichtheassociatedSurveillancemustbeperformedatleastonetime.PerformanceoftheSurveillanceinitiatesthesubsequentinterval.AlthoughtheFrequencyisstatedas12hours,anextensionofthetimeintervalto1.25timesthestatedFrequencyisallowedbySR3.0.2foroperationalflexibility.IftheintervalspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheplantisinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCO,andtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceisnototherwisemodified(referto,Example1.4-3),thenSR3.0.3becomesapplicable.IftheintervalasspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheplantisnotinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCOforwhichperformanceoftheSRisrequired,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithintheFrequencyrequirementsofSR3.0.2priortoentryintotheHODEorotherspecifiedcondition.FailuretodosowouldresultinaviolationofSR3.0.4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-2DraftA Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-2MULTIPLEFREUENCIESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCE'FRE(UENCYVerifyflowiswithinlimits.Oncewithin12hoursafter25%RTPAND24hoursthereafterExample1.4-2hastwoFrequencies.ThefirstisaonetimeperformanceFrequency,andthesecondisofthetypeshowninExample1.4-1.Thelogicalconnector"AND"indicatesthatbothFrequencyrequirementsmustbemet.Eachtimereactorpowerisincreasedfromapowerlevel<25%RTPtoz25%RTP,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithin12hours.Theuseof"once"indicatesasingleperformancewillsatisfythespecifiedFrequency(assumingnootherFrequenciesareconnectedby"AND").ThistypeofFrequencydoesnotqualifyforthe1.25timesthestatedFrequencyextensionallowedbySR3.0.2."Thereafter"indicatesfutureperformancesmustbeestablishedperSR3.0.2,butonlyafteraspecifiedconditionisfirstmet(i.e.,the"once"performanceinthisexample).Ifreactorpowerdecreasesto<25%RTP,themeasurementofbothintervalsstops.Newintervalsstartuponreactorpowerreaching25'%%uoRTP(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-3DraftA

Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES(continued)EXAMPLE1.4-3FREUENCYBASEDONSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY-NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterZ25%RTP.Performchanneladjustment.7daysTheintervalcontinues,whetherornottheplantoperationis<25%RTPbetweenperformances.AthNtdiff'hqid~ff'hSurveillance,itisconstruedtobepartofthe"specifiedFrequency."Shouldthe7dayintervalbeexceededwhileoperationis<25%RTP,thisNoteallows12hoursafterpowerreachesZ25%RTPtoperformtheSurveillance.TheSurveillanceisstillconsideredtobeperformedwithinthe"specifiedFrequency."Therefore,iftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthe7day(plustheextensionallowedbySR3.0.2)interval,butoperationwas<25%RTP,itwouldnotconstituteafailureoftheSRorfailuretomeettheLCO.Also,noviolationofSR3.0.4occurswhenchangingMODES,evenwiththe7dayFrequencynotmet,providedoperationdoesnotexceed12hourswithpower>25%RTP.Oncetheplantreaches25%RTP,12hourswouldbeallowedforcompletingtheSurveillance.IftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthis12hourinterval,therewouldthenbeafailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyandtheprovisionsofSR3.0.3wouldapply.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant1.4-4DraftA 'SLs2.02.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)2.1SLs2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsInMODES1and'2,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWER,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)averagetemperature,andpressurizerpressureshallnotexceedtheSLsspecifiedinFigure2.1.1-1.2.1.2RCSPressureSLInMODES1,2,3,4,.and5,theRCSpressureshallbemaintainedg2735psig.2.2SLViolations2.2.1IfSL2.1.1isviolated,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2IfSL2.1.2isviolated:2.2.2.1In.MODE1or2,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2.2InMODE3,4,or5,restorecompliancewithin5minutes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2.0-1DraftA SLs2.06706606506402400psia2250psiaUNACCEPTABLEOPERATION630G620I6102000psia1775psia600590580ACCEPTABLEOPERATION5700.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.01.11.2POWER(FractionofNominal)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant2.0-2DraftA ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)B2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6(Ref.1)requiresthatthereactorcoreshallbedesignedtofunctionthroughoutitsdesignlifetimewithoutexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimitswhichhavebeenstipulatedandjustified.Thisintegrityisrequiredduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).Thisisaccomplishedbyhavingadeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designbasis,whichcorrespondstoa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatDNBwillnotoccuronthelimitingfuelrodsandbyrequiringthatfuelcenterlinetemperaturestaysbelowthemeltingtemperature(Ref.2).tTherestrictionsofthisSLpreventoverheatingofthefuelandcladding,aswellaspossiblecladdingperforation,thatwouldresultinthereleaseoffissionproductstothe~reactorcoolant.Overheatingofthefuelispreventedbymaintainingthesteadystatepeaklinearheatrate(LHR)belowthelevelatwhichfuelcenterlinemeltingoccurs.Overheatingofthefuelcladdingispreventedbyrestrictingfueloperationtowithinthenucleateboilingregime,wheretheheattransfercoefficientislargeandthecladdingsurfacetemperatureisslightlyabovethecoolantsaturationtemperature.FuelcenterlinemeltingoccurswhenthelocalLHR,orpowerpeaking,inaregionofthefuelishighenoughtocausethefuelcenterlinetemperaturetoreachthemeltingpointofthefuel.Expansion'ofthepelletuponcenterlinemeltingmaycausethepellettostressthecladdingtothepointoffailure,allowinganuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-1DraftA ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)OperationabovetheboundaryofthenucleateboilingregimecouldresultinexcessivecladdingtemperaturebecauseoftheonsetofDNBandtheresultantsharpreductioninheattransfercoefficient.Insidethesteamfilm,highcladdingtemperaturesarereached,andacladdingwater(zirconium-water)reactionmaytakeplace.Thischemicalreactionresultsinoxidationofthefuelcladdingtoastructurallyweakerform.Thisweakerformmayloseitsintegrity,resultinginanuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.TheproperfunctioningoftheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andmainsteamsafetyvalvespreventsviolationofthereactorcoreSLs.APPLICABLEThefuelcladdingmustnotsustaindamageasaresultofSAFETYANALYSESnormaloperationandAOOs.ThereactorcoreSLsareestablishedtoprecludeviolationofthefollowingfueldesigncriteria(Ref.3):a.Thehotfuelpelletinthecoremustnotexperiencecenterlinefuelmelting;andb.Theremustbeatleast95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehotfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-2DraftA ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)InmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,nuclearandthermalparameters,fuelfabricationparametersandcomputercodesmustbeconsidered.jheeffectsoftheseuncertaintieshavebeenstatisticallycombinedwiththecorrelationuncertaintytodeterminedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesthatsatisfytheDNBdesigncriterion.Theobservableparameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavebeenrelatedtoDNBthroughtheW-3and/orWRB-IDNBcorrelation.TheseDNBcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheDNBfluxand,thelocationofDNBforauxiliaryuniformandnon-uniformheatfluxdistributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxratio,definedastheratiooftheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtothelocalheatflux,isindicativeofthemargintoDNB.AminimumvalueoftheDNBratioisspecifiedsothatduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransients,thereisa95/probabilityata95%confidencelevelthatDNBwillnotoccur.ThecurvesofFigure2.l.l-lrepresentthelociofpointsofthermalpower,coolantsystempressureandaveragetemperatureforwhichthisminimumDNBvalueissatisfied.Theareaofsafeoperationisatorbelowtheselines.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoahigherDNBRlimit.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility(Ref.4).TheReactorTripSystemsetpointsspecifiedinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation",incombinationwithalltheLCOs,aredesignedtopreventanyanticipatedcombinationoftransientconditionsforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)temperature,pressurizerpressure,andTHERMALPOWERlevelthatwouldresultinaDNBRoflessthantheDNBRlimitandprecludetheexistenceofflowinstabilities.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant82.0-3DraftA

ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)AutomaticenforcementofthesereactorcoreSLsisprovidedbythefollowingfunctions(Ref.5):a.'vertemperatureATtrip;b.Overpower4Ttrip;c.PowerRangeNeutronFlux,trip;andd.Steamgeneratorsafetyvalves.Additionaltripfunctionsareprovidedtobackupthesefunctionsforspecificabnormalconditions.TheSLsrepresentadesignrequirementforestablishingtheRPStripsetpointsidentifiedpreviously.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits,"ortheassumedinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalyses(Ref.6)providemorerestrictivelimitstoensurethattheSLsarenotexceeded.SAFETYLIMITSFigureB2.l.1-1showsanexampleofthereactorcoresafetylimitsofTHERMALPOWER,RCSpressure,andaveragetemperatureforwhichtheminimumDNBRisgreaterthanorequaltothesafetyanalyseslimit,thatfuelcenterlinetemperatureremainsbelowmelting,thattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquid,orthatthecoreexitqualityiswithinthelimitsdefinedbytheDNBRcorrelation.Fromthistypeoffigure,thecurvesonFigure2.1.1-1oftheaccompanyingspecificationcanbegenerated.EachofthecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1hasthreedistinctslopes.Workingfromlefttoright,thefirstslopeensuresthattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquidsuchthatovertemperaturehTindicationremainsvalid'.Thesecondslopeensuresthatthehotlegsteamqualityremains,z15%asrequiredbyW-3-correlation.ThefinalslopeensuresthatDNBRisalwaysZ1.3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-4DraftA ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1BASESSAFETYLIMITS(continued)TheSLishigherthanthelimitcalculatedwhentheAxialFluxDifference(AFD)iswithinthelimitsoftheF(b,I)functionoftheovertemperatureATreactortrip.WhentheAFDisnotwithinthetolerance,theAFDeffecton'heovertempe'ratureATreactortripswillreducethesetpointstoprovideprotectionconsistentwiththereactorcoreSLs.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.1onlyappliesinHODES1and2becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical.AutomaticprotectionfunctionsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEduringHODES1and2toensureoperationwithinthereactorcoreSLs.ThesteamgeneratorsafetyvalvesandautomaticprotectionactionsservetopreventRCSheatuptothereactorcoreSLconditionsortoinitiateareactortripfunction,whichforcestheplantintoMODE3.SetpointsforthereactortripfunctionsarespecifiedinLCO3.3.1.InMODES3,4,5,and6,ApplicabilityisnotrequiredsincethereactorisnotgeneratingsignificantTHERMALPOWER.SAFETYLIHITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.1isviolated,therequirementtorestorecomplianc'eandgotoMODE3placestheplantinasafeconditionandinaMODEinwhichthisSLisnotapplicable.TheallowedCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofbringingtheplanttoaMODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable,andreducestheprobabilityoffueldamage.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionsshallcontinueinordertobringtheplanttoaMODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-5DraftA ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGKE,

Subject:

"DeletionofInformationPertainingtoDefinitionofHotChannelFactors,"datedHay30,1985.3.UFSAR,Section4.2.1.3.3.4.UFSAR,Section4.4.3.5.WCAP-8745,"DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpowerDeltaTandThermalOvertemperatureDeltaTTripFunctions,"March1977.6.UFSAR,Section7.2.1.1.1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-6DraftA ReactorCoreSLSB2.1.17570656055I-,LU-l50O45402000psia1775psia---OTATForCoreLimitatEachPrcssure2250psia2400psia'P~TLocusofPointsWhereSteamGeneratorSafetyValvesOpen35CoreLimits30565570575580.,585590595600605610615620625630T-AVG('F)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-7DraftA 0 RCSP>essureSLB2.1.2B2.0SAFETYLIHITS(SLs)B2.1.2ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSLBASESBACKGROUNDTheSLonRCSpressureprotectstheintegrityoftheRCSagainstoverpressurization.Intheeventoffuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductsarereleasedintothereactorcoolant.TheRCSthenservesastheprimarybarrierinpreventingthereleaseoffissionproductsintotheatmosphere.ByestablishinganupperlimitonRCSpressure;thecontinuedintegrityoftheRCSisensured.AccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundary,"GDC33,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryCapability,"andGDC34,"ReactorCoolantPressureBoundaryRapidPropagationFailurePrevention"(Ref.1),thereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)designconditionsarenottobeexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).ThedesignpressureoftheRCSis2485psig(Ref.2).DuringnormaloperationandAOOs,RCSpressureislimitedfromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,inaccordancewithSectionIIIoftheASHECode(Ref.3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure(Refs.4,5,and6).Toensuresystemintegrity,allRCScomponentsarehydrostaticallytestedat125%ofdesignpressure,accordingtotheASHECoderequirementspriortoinitialoperationwhenthereisnofuelinthecore.Followinginceptionofplantoperation,RCScomponentsarepressuretested,inaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheapprovedGinnaISI/ISTProgramwhichisbasedonASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.7).OverpressurizationoftheRCScouldresultinabreachoftheRCPBreducingthenumberofprotectivebarriersdesignedtopreventradioactivereleasesfromexceedingthelimitsspecifiedin10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria"(Ref.8).Ifsuchabreachoccursinconjunctionwithafuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductscouldenterthecontainmentatmosphere.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-8(continued)DraftA RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheRCSpressurizersafetyvalves,themainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSVs),andthereactorhighpressuretriphavesettingsestablishedtoensurethattheRCSpressureSLwillnotbeexceeded.TheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesaresizedtopreventsystempressurefromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,asspecifiedinSectionIIIoftheASMECodeforNuclearPowerPlantComponents(Ref.3)exceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.Thetransientthatestablishestherequiredreliefcapacity,andhencevalvesizerequirementsandliftsettings,isacompletelossofexternalloadwithoutadirectreactortrip.Duringthetransient,nocontrolactionsareassumed,exceptthatthesafetyvalvesonthesecondaryplantareassumedtoopenwhenthesteampressurereachesthesecondaryplantsafetyvalvesettings.TheReactorTripSystemsetpoints,togetherwiththesettingsoftheMSSVs,providepressureprotectionfornormaloperationandAOOs.Thereactorhighpressuretripsetpointisspecificallysettoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurization(Ref.9).ThesafetyanalyseswhichcrediteitherthehighpressuretriportheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesareperformedusingconservativeassumptionsrelativetotheotherpressurecontroldevices.Morespecifically,nocreditistakenforoperationofthefollowing:a.Pressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves;b.Steamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalves;c.SteamDumpSystem;d.ReactorControlSystem;e.PressurizerLevelControlSystem;orf.Pressurizersprayvalves.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-9(continued)DraftA RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASES(continued)SAFETYLIMITSThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpressurevesselundertheASHECode,SectionIII,is110%ofdesignpressureexceptforlockedrotoraccidentswhichmustbelimitedto120%ofthedesignpressure.ThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpiping,valves,andfittingsundertheoriginaldesignrequirementsforGinnaStation(Ref.5)is120%ofdesignpressure.Themostlimitingofthesetwoallowancesisthe110%ofdesignpressure;therefore,theSLonmaximumallowableRCSpressureis2735psig.APPLICABILITYSL2.1.2appliesinMODES1,2,',4,and5becausethisSLcouldbeapproachedorexceededintheseMODESduetooverpressurizationevents.TheSLisnotapplicableinMODE6becausethereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarenotfullytightened,makingitunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurized.SAFETYLIHITVIOLATIONSIfSL2.1.2isviolatedwhenthereactoris.inMODE1or2,therequirementistorestorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLmaycauseimmediateRCSfailureandcreateapotentialforradioactivereleasesinexcessof10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).TheallowableCompletionTimeof1importanceofreducingpowerlevelwherethepotentialforchallengesminimized.IftheCompletionTimeshallcontinueinordertorestoreandbringtheplanttoMODE3.hourrecognizesthetoaHODEofoperationtosafetysystemsisisexceeded,actionscompliancewiththeSL(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-10Draft'A RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESSAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS(Continued)IfSL2.1;2isexceededinMODE3,4,or5,RCSpressuremustberestoredtowithintheSLvaluewithin5minutes.Exceedingthe.RCSpressureSLinMODE3,4,or5ismoreseverethanexceedingthisSLinHODE1or2,sincethereactorvesseltemperaturemaybelowerandthevesselmaterial,consequently,lessductile.Assuch,pressuremustbereducedtolessthantheSLwithin5minutes.IftheCompletionTimeisexceeded,actionshallcontinueinordertoreducepressuretolessthantheSL.TheactiondoesnotrequirereducingMODES,si'ncethiswouldrequirereducingtemperature,whichwouldcompoundtheproblembyaddingthermalgradientstressestotheexistingpressurestress.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC9,33,and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section5.1.4.3.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,ArticleNB-7000.4.5.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-1,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XV-15,andXV-17,DesignBasisEve'nts,AccidentsandTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyof'MechanicalEngineers,1967edition./6.UFSAR,Section15.3.2.7.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.8.10CFR100.9.UFSAR,Section7.2.2.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB2.0-11DraftA LCOApplicability3.03.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYLCO3.0.1LCOsshallbe,metduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicability,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.2and3.0.7.LCO3.0.2UpondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theRequiredActionsoftheassociatedConditionsshallbemet,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.5andLCO3.0.6.IftheLCOismetorisnolongerapplicablepriortoexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime(s),completionoftheRequiredAction(s)isnotrequiredunlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.3WhenanLCOisnotmetand(1)theassociatedACTIONSarenotmet,(2)anassociatedACTIONisnotprovided,or(3)ifdirectedbytheassociatedACTIONS,theplantshallbeplacedinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichtheLCOisnotappl,icable.Actionshallbeinitiatedtoplacetheplant,asapplicable,ina.MODE3within7hours;b.MODE4within13hours;andc.MODE5within37hours.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.WherecorrectivemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationinaccordancewiththeLCOorACTIONS,completionoftheactionsrequiredbyLCO3.0.3isnotrequired.LCO3.0.3isonlyapplicableinMODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-1(continued)DraftA

LCOApplicability3.0,3.0LCOAPPLICABILITY(continued)LCO3.0.4WhenanLCOisnotmet,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallnotbemadeexceptwhentheassociatedACTIONStobeenteredpermitcontinuedoperationintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityforan'unlimitedperiodoftime.ThisSpecificationshallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.LCO3.0.5EquipmentremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONSmaybereturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontrolsolelytoperformtestingrequiredtodemonstrateitsOPERABILITYortheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesystemreturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontroltoperformthetestingrequiredtodetermineOPERABILITY.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-2(continued)DraftA LCOApplicability3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITY(continued)LCO3.0.6WhenasupportedsystemLCOisnotmetsolelyduetoasupportsystemLCOnotbeingmet,theConditionsandRe'quiredActionsassociatedwiththissupportedsystemarenotrequiredtobeentered.OnlythesupportsystemLCOACTIONSarerequiredtobeentered.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesupportedsystem.Inthisevent,additionalevaluationsandlimitationsmayberequiredinaccordancewithSpecification5.5.14,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP)."Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriate.ConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.Whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.LCO3.0.7TestExceptionLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTException-MODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformanceofspecialtestsandoperations.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisdesiredtobemetbutisnotmet,theACTIONSoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbemet.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisnotdesiredtobemet,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallbemadeinaccordancewiththeotherapplicableSpecifications.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-3DraftA SRApplicability3.03.0SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENT(SR)APPLICABILITYSR3.0.1SRsshallbemetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforindividualLCOs,unlessotherwisestatedintheSR.FailuretomeetaSR,whethersuchfailure.isexperiencedduringtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceorbetweenperformancesoftheSurveillance,shallbefailuretomeettheLCO.FailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyshallbefailuretomeettheLCOexceptasprovidedinSR3.0.3.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentorvariablesoutsidespecifiedlimits.SR3.0.2ThespecifiedFrequencyforeachSRismetiftheSurveillanceisperformedwithin1.25timestheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency,asmeasuredfromthepreviousperformanceorasmeasuredfromthetimeaspecifiedconditionoftheFrequencyismet.ForFrequenciesspecifiedas"once,"theaboveintervalextensiondoesnotapply.IfaCompletionTimerequiresperiodicperformanceona"onceper..."basis,theaboveFrequencyextensionappliestoeachperformanceafterthe.initialperformance.ExceptionstothisSpecifi'cationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.SR3.0.3IfitisdiscoveredthataSurveillancewasnotperformedwithinitsspecifiedFrequency,thencompliancewiththerequirementtodeclaretheLCOnotmetmaybedelayed,fromthetimeofdiscovery,upto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless.Thisdelayperiodi'spermittedtoallowperformanceoftheSurveillance.IftheSurveillanceisnotperformedwithinthedelayperiod,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-4DraftA SRApplicability3.03.0SRAPPLICABILITYSR3.0.3(continued)WhentheSurveillanceisperformedwithinthedelayperiodandtheSurveillanceisnotmet,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheapplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.SR3.0.4EntryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOshallnotbemadeunlesstheLCO'sSurveillanceshavebeenmetwithintheirspecifiedFrequency.ThisprovisionshallnotprevententryintoMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.0-5DraftA LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0B3.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYBASESLCOsLCO3.0.1throughLCO3.0.7establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.1LCO3.0.IestablishestheApplicabilitystatementwithineachindividualSpecificationastherequirementforwhentheLCOisrequiredtobemet(i.e.,whentheplantisintheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicabilitystatementofeachSpecification).LCO3.0.2LCO3.0.2establishesthatupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theassociatedACTIONSshallbemet.TheCompletionTimeofeachRequiredActionforanACTIONSConditionisapplicablefromthepointintimethatanACTIONSConditionisentered.TheRequiredActionsestablishthoseremedialmeasuresthatmustbetakenwithinspecifiedCompletionTimeswhentherequirementsofanLCOarenotmet.ThisSpecificationestablishesthat:a.CompletionoftheRequiredActionswithinthespecifiedCompletionTimesconstitutescompliancewithaSpecification;andb.CompletionoftheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,unlessotherwisespecified.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-1,DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)Therearetwo.basictypesofRequiredActions.ThefirsttypeofRequiredActionspecifiesatimelimitinwhichtheLCOmustbemet.ThistimelimitistheCompletionTimetorestoreaninoperablesystemorcomponenttoOPERABLEstatusortorestoie'variablestowithinspecifiedlimits.IfthistypeofRequiredActionisnotcompletedwithinthe.specifiedCompletionTime,ashutdownmayberequiredtoplacetheplantinaNODEorconditioninwhichtheSpecificationisnotapplicable.(WhetherstatedasaRequired'Actionornot,correctionoftheenteredConditionisanactionthatmayalwaysbeconsidereduponenteringACTIONS.)ThesecondtypeofRequiredActionspecifiestheremedialmeasuresthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantthatisnotfurtherrestrictedbytheCompletionTime.Inthiscase,compliancewiththeRequiredActionsprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.CompletingtheRequired'ActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetorisnolongerapplicable,unlessotherwisestatedintheindividualSpecifications.ThenatureofsomeRequiredActionsofsomeConditionsnecessitatesthat,oncetheConditionisentered,theRequiredActionsmustbecompletedeventhoughtheassociatedConditionnolongerexists.Inthisinstance,theindividualLCO'sACTIONSspecifytheRequiredActions.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-2DraftA

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)TheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsarealsoapplicablewhenasystemorcomponentisremovedfromserviceintentionally.ThereasonsforintentionallyrelyingontheACTIONSinclude,butarenotlimitedto,performanceof,Surveillances,preventivemaintenance,correctivemaintenance,orinvestigationofoperationalproblemsasrequiredbytheLCO.EnteringACTIONSforthesereasonsmustbedoneinamannerthatdoesnotcompromisesafety.IntentionalentryintoACTIONSshouldnotbemadeforoperationalconvenience.Alternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantequipmentbeinginoperableshouldbeusedinstead.Doingsolimitsthetimebothsubsystems/trainsofasafetyfunctionareinoperableandlimitsthetimeotherconditionsexistwhichmayresultinLCO3.0.3beingentered.IndividualSpecificationsmayspecifyatimelimitforperforminganSRwhenequipmentisremovedfromserviceorbypassedfortesting.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsareapplicablewhenthistimelimitexpires,iftheequipmentremains.removedfromserviceorbypassed.WhenachangeinMODEorotherspecifiedconditionisrequiredtocomplywithRequiredActions,theplantmayenteraMODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhich'anotherSpecificationbecomesapplicableandthenewLCOisnotmet.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesofthenewRequiredActionswouldapply'fromthepointintimethatthenewSpecificationbecomesapplicable,andtheACTIONSCondition(s)areentered.LCO3.0.3LCO3.0.3establishestheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand:a.AnassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-3DraftA LCOApplicability83.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)b.TheconditionoftheplantisnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThismeansthatnocombinationofConditionsstatedintheACTIONScanbemadethatexactlycorrespondstotheactualconditionoftheplant.Sometimes,possiblecombinationsofConditionsaresuchthatenteringLCO3.0.3iswarranted;insuchcases,theACTIONSspecificallystateaConditioncorrespondingtosuchcombinationsandalsothatLCO3.0.3beenteredimmediately.ThisSpecificationdelineatesthetimelimitsforplacingtheplantinasafeMODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhenoperationcannotbemaintainedwithinthelimitsforsafeoperationasdefinedbytheLCOanditsACTIONS.Itisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencethatpermitsroutinevoluntaryremovalofredundantsystemsorcomponentsfromserviceinlieuofotheralternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantsystemsorcomponentsbeinginoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-4DraftA

LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)Uponentering.LCO3.0.3,theShiftSupervisorshallevaluatetheconditionoftheplantanddetermineactionstobetaken,consideringplantsafetyfirst,thatwillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown.Theseactionsshallincludepreparationforasafeandcontrolledshutdown,aswellasactionstocorrecttheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3.Ifitisdeterminedthattheconditionthat.causedentryintoLCO3.0.3canbecorrectedwithinareasonableperiodoftimeandstillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown,apowerreductiondoesnothavetobeinitiated.Thisincludescoordinatingthereductioninelectricalgenerationwithenergyoperationstoensurethestabilityandavailabilityoftheelectricalgrid.TheshutdownshallbeinitiatedsothatthetimelimitsspecifiedtoreachlowerNODESofoperationpermittheshutdowntoproceedinacontrolledandorderlymannerthatiswellwithinthespecifiedmaximumcooldownrateandwithinthecapabilitiesoftheplant,assumingthatonlytheminimumrequiredequipmentisOPERABLE.ThisreducesthermalstressesoncomponentsoftheReactorCoolantSystemandthepotentialforaplantupsetthatcouldchallengesafetysystemsunderconditionstowhichthisSpecificationapplies.TheuseandinterpretationofspecifiedtimestocompletetheactionsofLCO3.0.3'areconsistentwiththediscussionofSection1.3,CompletionTimes.AplantshutdownrequiredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.3maybeterminatedandLCO3.0.3exitedifanyofthefollowingoccurs:a.TheLCOisnowmet.b.AConditionexistsforwhich.theRequiredActionshavenowbeenperformed.c.ACTIONSexistthatdonothaveexpiredCompletionTimes.TheseCompletionTimesareapplicablefromthepointintimethattheConditionisinitiallyenteredandnotfromthetimeLCO3.0.3isexited.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-5DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)ThetimelimitsofLCO3.0.3allow37hoursfortheplanttobeinMODE5whenashutdownisrequired.IfalowerMODEisreachedin.lesstimethanallowed,however,thetotalallowabletimetoreachMODE5,orotherapplicableMODE,isnotreduced.'orexample,ifMODE3isreachedin2hours,'henthetimeallowedforreachingMODE4isthenextllhours,becausethetotaltimeforreachingMODE4isnotreducedfromtheallowablelimitof13hours.Therefore,ifremedialmeasuresarecompletedthatwouldpermitareturntoMODE1,apenaltyisnotincurredbyhavingtoreachalowerMODEofoperationinlessthanthetotaltimeallowed.InMODES1,2,3,and4,LCO3.0.3providesactionsforConditionsnotcoveredinotherSpecifications.Therequirements-ofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinMODES5and6becausetheplantisalreadyinthemostrestrictiveConditionrequiredbyLCO3.0.3.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability(unlessinMODE1,2,3,or4)becausetheACTIONSofindividualSpecificationssufficientlydefinetheremedialmeasurestobetaken.ExceptionstoLCO3.0.3areprovidedininstanceswhererequiringaplantshutdown,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.3,wouldnotprovideappropriateremedialmeasuresfortheassociatedconditionoftheplant.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.7.11,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevel."LCO3.7.11hasanApplicabilityof"DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP."Therefore,thisLCOcanbeapplicableinanyorallMODES.IftheLCOandtheRequiredActionsofLCO3.7.11arenotmetwhileinHODE1,2,or3,thereisnosafetybenefittobegainedbyplacingtheplantinashutdowncondition.TheRequiredActionofLCO3.7.11of"SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP"istheappropriateRequiredActiontocompleteinlieuoftheactionsofLCO3.0.3.TheseexceptionsareaddressedintheindividualSpecifications.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-6(continued)DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASES(continued)LCO3.0.4LCO3.0.4establisheslimitationsonchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitywhenanLCOisnotmet.ItprecludesplacingtheplantinadifferentMODEorother.specifiedconditionstatedinthatApplicabilitywhenthefollowingexist:'a~PlantconditionsaresuchthattherequirementsofanLCOwouldnotbemetintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeentered;andb.TheplantwouldberequiredtoexittheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitydesiredtobeenteredinordertocomplywiththeRequiredActionsoftheaffectedLCO.CompliancewithRequiredActionsthatpermitcontinuedoperationoftheplantforanunlimitedperiodoftimeinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.ThisiswithoutregardtothestatusoftheplantbeforeoraftertheMODEchange.Therefore,insuchcases,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitymaybemadeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheRequiredActions.TheprovisionsofthisSpecificationshouldnotbeinterpretedasendorsingthefailuretoexercisethegoodpracticeofrestoringsystemsorcomponentstoOPERABLEstatusbeforeenteringanassociatedMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.TheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstoLCO3.0.4arestatedintheindividualSpecifications.TheexceptionsapplytoACTIONSwhichallowplantoperationintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityforonlyalimitedperiodoftimeforspecifiedplantconditions.ExceptionsmayapplytoalltheACTIONSortoaspecificRequiredActionofaSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-7DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.4(continued)Surveillances.donothavetobeperformedontheassociatedinoperableequipment(oronvariablesoutsidethespecifiedlimits),aspermittedbySR3.0.1.Therefore,changingMODESorotherspecifiedconditionswhileinanACTIONSCondition,isnotaviolationofSR3.0:IorSR3.0.4forthoseSurveillancesthatdonothavetobeperformedduetotheassociatedinoperableequipment.However,SRsmustbemettoensureOPERABILITYpriortodeclaringtheassociatedequipmentOPERABLE(orvariablewithinlimits)andrestoringcompliancewiththeaffectedLCO.LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.5establishestheallowanceforrestoringequipmenttoserviceunderadministrativecontrolswhenithasbeenremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONS;ThesolepurposeofthisLCOistoprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2(e.g.,tonotcomplywiththeapplicableRequiredAction(s))toallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstrate:a.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice;orb.TheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.TheadministrativecontrolsensurethetimetheequipmentisreturnedtoserviceinconflictwiththerequirementsoftheACTIONSislimitedtothetimeabsolutelynecessarytoperformtheallowedSRs.ThisSpecificationdoesnotprovidetimetoperformanyotherpreventiveorcorrectivemaintenance.AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoserviceisreopeningacontai.nmentisolationvalvethathasbeenclosedtocomplywithRequiredActionsandmustbereopenedtoperformtheSRs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-8DraftA LCOApplicability83.0BASESLCO3.0.5(continued)Anexampleof.demonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopreventthetripfunctionfromoccurringduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelintheothertripsystem.AsimilarexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopermitthelogictofunctionandindicatetheappropriateresponseduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelinthesametripsystem.LCO3.0.6LCO3.0.6establishesanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forsupportsystemsthathaveanLCOspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).ThisexceptionisprovidedbecauseLCO3.0.2wouldrequirethattheConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheassociatedinoperablesupportedsystemLCObeenteredsolelyduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem.Thisexceptionisjustifiedbecausetheactionsthatarerequiredtoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionarespecifiedinthesupportsystems'CO'sRequiredActions.TheseRequiredActionsmayincludeenteringthesupportedsystem'sConditionsandRequiredActionsormayspecifyotherRequiredActions.WhenasupportsystemisinoperableandthereisanLCOspecifiedforitintheTS,thesupportedsystem(s)arerequiredtobedeclaredinoperableifdeterminedtobeinoperableasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability.However,itisnotnecessarytoenterintothesupportedsystems'onditionsandRequiredActionsunlessdirectedtodosobythesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.Thepotentialconfusionandinconsistencyofrequirementsrelatedtotheentryintomultiplesupportandsupportedsystems'CO'sConditionsandRequiredActionsareeliminatedbyprovidingalltheactionsthatarenecessarytoensuretheplantismaintainedinasafeconditioninthesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-9DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.6(continued)However,thereareinstanceswhereasupportsystem'sRequiredActionmayeitherdirectasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforthesupportedsystem.ThismayoccurimmediatelyoraftersomespecifieddelaytoperformsomeotherRequiredAction.Regardlessofwhetheritisimmediateorafter'somedelay,whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.Specification5.5.14,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP),"ensureslossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionsaretaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6,anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherlimitations,remedialactions,orcompensatoryactionsmaybeidentifiedasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionsandRequiredActions.TheSFDPimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.Crosstraincheckstoidentifyalossofsafetyfunctionforthosesupportsystemsthatsupportmultipleandredundantsafetysystemsarerequired.ThecrosstraincheckverifiesthatthesupportedsystemsoftheredundantOPERABLEsupportsystemareOPERABLE,therebyensuringsafetyfunctionisretained.Ifthisevaluationdeterminesthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-10(continued)DraftA

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASES(continued)LCO3.0.7Therearecertainspecialtestsandoperationsrequiredtobeperformedatvarioustimesoverthelifeoftheplant.Thesespecialtestsandoperationsarenecessarytodemonstrateselectplantperformancecharacteristics,toperforms'pecialmaintenanceactivities,andtoperformspecialevolutions.TestExceptionLCO3.1.8,"PHYSICSTESTException-NODE2,"allowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformancesofspecialtestsandoperations,whichotherwisecouldnotbeperformedifrequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsoftheseTS.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.ThiswillensureallappropriaterequirementsoftheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionnotdirectlyassociatedwithorrequiredtobechangedtoperformthespecialtestoroperationwillremainineffect.TheApplicabilityofaTestExceptionLCOrepresentsaconditionnotnecessarilyincompliancewiththenormalrequirementsoftheTS.AspecialoperationmaybeperformedeitherundertheprovisionsoftheappropriateTestExceptionLCOorundertheotherapplicableTSrequirements.IfitisdesiredtoperformthespecialoperationundertheprovisionsoftheTestExceptionLCO,therequirementsoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbefollowed.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,B3.0-11DraftA .SRApplicabilityB3.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASESSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3.0.4establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.SR3.0.1SR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespeci,fiedintheindividualSRs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutesafailuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecification,however,istobeconstruedasimplyingthatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknownnottobemetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformances.SurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheplantisinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithatestexceptionareonlyapplicablewhentheTestExceptionLCOisusedasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.UnplannedeventsmaysatisfytherequirementsforagivenSR.Inthiscase,theunplannedeventmaybecreditedasfulfillingtheperformanceoftheSR.ThisallowanceincludesthoseSRswhoseperformanceis'ormallyprecludedinagivenMODEorotherspecifiedconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-12DraftA LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.1(continued)Surveillances,includingSurveillancesinvokedbyRequiredActions,donothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentbecausetheACTIONSdefinetheremedialmeasuresthatapply.SurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.Uponcompletionofmaintenance,appropriatepostmaintenancetestingisrequiredtodeclareequipmentOPERABLE.Thisincludesensuringappli.cableSurveillancesarenotfailedandtheirmostrecentperformanceisinaccordancewithSR3.0.2.PostmaintenancetestingmaynotbepossibleinthecurrentNODEorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityduetothenecessaryplantparametersnothavingbeenestablished.Inthesesituations,theequipmentmaybeconsideredOPERABLEprovidedtestinghasbeensatisfactorilycompletedtotheextentpossibleandtheequipmentisnototherwisebelievedtobeincapableofperformingitsfunction.ThiswillallowoperationtoproceedtoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhereothernecessarypostmaintenancetestscanbecompleted.Ifsubsequentpostmaintenancetestingfails,theappropriatecomponentLCOshallbeentered.SR3.0.2SR3.0.2establishestherequirementsformeetingthespecifiedFrequencyforSurveillancesandanyRequiredActionwithaCompletionTimethatrequirestheperiodicperformanceoftheRequiredActionona"onceper.interval.SR3.0.2permitsa25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency.ThisextensionfacilitatesSurveillanceschedulingandconsidersplantoperatingconditionsthatmaynotbesuitableforconductingtheSurveillance(e.g.,transientconditionsorotherongoingSurveillanceormaintenanceactivities).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-13DraftA' LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.2(continued)The25%extensiondoesnotsignificantlydegradethereliabilitythatresultsfromperformingtheSurveillanceatitsspecifiedFrequency.Thisisbasedontherecognitionthatthemost.probableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththeSRs.TheexceptionstoSR3.0.2arethoseSurveillancesforwhichthe25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequencydoesnotapply.TheseexceptionsarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.AnexampleofwhereSR3.0.2doesnotapplyisaSurveillancewithaFrequencyof"inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions."TherequirementsofregulationstakeprecedenceovertheTS.TheTScannotinandofthemselvesextendatestintervalspecifiedintheregulations.Therefore,thereisaNoteintheFrequencystating,"SR3.0.2isnotapplicable."AsstatedinSR3.0.2,the25%extensionalsodoesnotapplytotheinitialportionofaperiodicCompletionTimethatrequiresperformanceona"onceper..."basis.The25%extensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.TheinitialperformanceoftheRequiredAction,whetheritisaparticularSurveillanceorsomeotherremedialaction,isconsideredasingleactionwithasingleCompletionTime.Onereasonfornotallowingthe25%extensiontothisCompletionTimeisthatsuchanactionusuallyverifiesthatnolossoffunctionhasoccurredbycheckingthestatusofredundantordiversecomponentsoraccomplishesthefunctionoftheinoperableequipmentinanalternativemanner.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2arenotintendedtobeusedrepeatedlymerelyasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals(otherthanthoseconsistentwithRefuelingintervals)orperiodicCompletionTimeintervalsbeyondthosespecified.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-14(continued)DraftA LCOApplicabi1ityB3.0BASES(continued)SR3.0.3SR3.0.3establishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithinthespecifiedFrequency.Adelayperiodofupto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless,appliesfromthepointintimethatitisdiscoveredthattheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,andnotatthetimethatthespecifiedFrequency.wasnotmet.ThisdelayperiodprovidesadequatetimetocompleteSurveillancesthathavebeenmissed.ThisdelayperiodpermitsthecompletionofaSurveillancebeforecomplyingwithRequiredActionsorotherremedialmeasuresthatmightprecludecompletionoftheSurveillance.Thebasisforthisdelayperiodincludesconsiderationofplantconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,thesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtherequiredSurveillance,andtherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththerequirements.WhenaSurveillancewithaFrequencybasednotontimeintervals,butuponspecifiedplantconditionsoroperationalsituations,isdiscoverednottohavebeenperformedwhenspecified,-SR3.0.3'allowsthe.fulldelayperiodof24hourstoperformtheSurveillance.SR3.0.3alsoprovidesatimelimitforcompletionofSurveillancesthatbecomeapplicableasaconsequenceofMODEchangesimposedbyRequiredActions.FailuretocomplywithspecifiedFrequenciesforSRsisexpectedtobeaninfrequentoccurrence.UseofthedelayperiodestablishedbySR3.0.3isaflexibilitywhichisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-15DraftA

LCOApplicability83.0BASESSR3.0.3(continued}IfaSurveill.anceisnotcompletedwithinthealloweddelayperiod,thentheequipmentisconsideredinoperableorthevariableisconsideredoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponexpirationofthedelayperiod.IfaSurveillanceisfailedwithinthedelayperiod,thentheequipmentisinoperable,orthevariableisoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponthefailureoftheSurveillance.CompletionoftheSurveillancewithinthedelayperiodallowedbythisSpecification,orwithintheCompletionTimeoftheACTIONS,restorescompliancewithSR3.0.1.SR3.0.4SR3.0.4establishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.ThisSpecificationensuresthatsystemandcomponentOPERABILITYrequirementsandvariablelimitsaremetbeforeentryintoMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichthesesystemsandcomponentsensuresafeoperationoftheplant.ThisSpecificationappliestochangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityassociatedwithplantshutdownaswellasstartup.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.0-16DraftA

LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.4(continued)However,incertaincircumstancesfailingtomeetanSRwillnotresultinSR3.0.4restrictingaMODEchangeorotherspecifiedconditionchange.Whenasystem,subsystem,train,component,device,orvariableisinoperableoroutsideitsspecifiedlimits,theassociatedSR(s)arenotrequiredtobeperformed,perSR3.0.1,whichstatesthatsurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipment.Whenequipmentisinoperable,SR3.0.4doesnotapplytotheassociatedSR(s)sincetherequirementfortheSR(s)tobeperformedisremoved.Therefore,failingtoperformtheSurveillance(s)withinthespecifiedFrequency,onequipmentthatisinoperable,doesnotresultinanSR3.0.4restrictiontochangingMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability.However,sincetheLCOisnotmetinthisinstance,LCO3.0.4willgovernanyrestrictionsthatmay(ormaynot)applytoMODEorotherspecifiedconditionchanges.ThepreciserequirementsforperformanceofSRsare,specifiedsuchthatexceptionstoSR3.0.4arenotnecessary.ThespecifictimeframesandconditionsnecessaryformeetingtheSRsarespecifiedintheFrequency,intheSurveillance,orboth.ThisallowsperformanceofSurveillanceswhentheprerequisitecondition(s)specifiedinaSurveillanceprocedurerequireentryintotheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheassociatedLCOpriortotheperformanceorcompletionofaSurveillance.ASurveillancethatcouldnotbeperformeduntilafterenteringtheLCOApplicability,wouldhaveitsFrequencyspecifiedsuchthatitisnot"due"untilthespecificconditionsneededaremet.Alternately,theSurveillancemaybestatedintheformofaNoteasnotrequired(tobemetorperformed)untilaparticularevent;condition,ortimehasbeenreached.Furtherdiscussionofthespecificformatsof.SRs'nnotationisfoundin.Section1.4,Frequency.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.0-17DraftA SDH3.1.13.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)LCO3.1.1SDHshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE2withk.ff<10>MODES3,4,and5.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDHnotwithinlimit.A.lInitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.l.1VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.48hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-1DraftA CoreReactivity3.1.23.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.2CoreReactivityLCO3.1.2Themeasuredcorereactivityshallbewithin+1%Ak/kofpredictedvalues.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK,ffz1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Measuredcorereactivitynotwithinlimit.A.1ANDA.2Re-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.EstablishappropriateoperatingrestrictionsandSRs.72hours72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,ff(1.0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-2DraftA" CoreReactivity3.1.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.2.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoentryinHOOEl.Verifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin1%hk/kofpredictedvalues.OnceaftereachrefuelingSR3;1.2.2NOTES1.Onlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).2.Thepredictedreactivityvaluesmaybeadjusted(normalized)tocorrespondtothe-measuredcorereactivitypriortoexceedingafuelburnupof60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.Verifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin+1%hk/kofpredictedvalues.31EFPDR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3;1-3DraftA

HTC3.1.33.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.3ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)LCO3.1.3TheHTCshallbemaintainedwithinthebeginningofcyclelife(BOL)limitandtheendofcyclelife(EOL)limitspecifiedintheCOLR.Themaximumupperlimitshallbelessthanorequalto5pcm/'Fforpowerlevelsbelow70%RTPandlessthanorequalto0pcm/'Fatorabove70%RTP.APPLICABILITY:MODE1andHODE2withk,<<Z1.0fortheupperHTClimit,MODES1,2,and3forthelowerHTClimit.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA---------NOTE---------RequiredActionA.1mustbecompletedwheneverConditionAisentered.HTCnotwithinupperlimit.A.1EstablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbankstomaintainHTCwithinlimit.24hours,B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE2withkff(I0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-4DraftA

HTC3.1.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC---------NOTE---------RequiredActionC.lmustbecompletedwheneverConditionCisentered.ProjectedEOLHTCnotwithinlowerlimit.C.1'Re-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.OncepriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE4.12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.3.1VerifyMTCiswithinupperlimit.OncepriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefuelingSR3.1.3.2ConfirmthatHTCwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTPandatEOL.OncepriortoenteringHODE1aftereachrefuelingR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-5DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.43.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsLCO3.1.4AllshutdownandcontrolrodsshallbeOPERABLE,withallindividualindicatedrodpositionswithin12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandposition.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK,<<a1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIRED'ACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorerod(s)untrippable.A.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthe1imitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.ANDA.2BeinMODE2withK,<1.0.1hour1hour6hoursB.Onerodnotwithinalignmentlimits.B.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORB.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-6DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)B.2ANDReduceTHERMALPOWERtog75%RTP.2hoursB.3VerifySDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.~NDOnceper12hours8.4ANDB.5ANDB;6PerformSR3.2.1.1.PerformSR3.2.2.1.Re-evaluatesafetyanalysesandconfirmresultsremainvalidfordurationofoperationundertheseconditions.72hours72hours5daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1BeinMODE2withKff<1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-7DraftA

RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Morethanonerodnotwithinalignmentlimit.D.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORD.1.2InitiateborationtorestorerequiredSDMtowithinlimit.AND0.2BeinMODE2withK,g<1.0.1hour1hour6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.4.1Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.12hoursSR3.1.4.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.Verifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-8DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimits3.1.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.4.3Verifyrodfreedomofmovement(trippability)bymovingeachrodnotfullyinsertedinthe'coretoaHRPItransitionineitherdirection.92daysSR3.1.4.4Verifyroddroptimeofeachrod,fromthefullywithdrawnposition,isg1.8secondsfromthebeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentry,with:a.Taiga>500'F;andb:'othreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.OncepriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-9DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.53.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitLCO3.1.5TheshutdownbankshallbeatoraboveinsertionlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.NOTETheshutdownbankmaybeoutsidethelimitwhenrequiredforperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withK,ffz1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Shutdownbanknotwithinlimit.A.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthe1imitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.~NDA.2Restoreshutdownbanktowithinlimit.1hour1hour2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,(1.0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-10DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimit3.1.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.5.1VerifytheshutdownbankinsertioniswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-11DraftA ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.63.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.6ControlBankInsertionLimitsLCO3.1.6Controlbanksshallbewithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimits.specifiedintheCOLR.NOTEThecontrolbankbeingtestedmaybeoutsidethelimitswhenrequiredfortheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk,<<Z1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Controlbanklimitsnotmet.A.l.lVerifySDHiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ORA.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDHtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hour,A.2Restorecontrolbank(s)towithinlimits.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withK,ff<1.0.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-12DraftA ControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.6.1VerifyestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OncepriortoachievingcriticalitySR3.1.6.2VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.1.6.3-NOTE-Onlyrequiredtobeperformediftherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin4hoursand.every4hoursthereafterSR3.1.6.4VerifyeachcontrolbanknotfullywithdrawnfromthecoreiswithinthesequenceandoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-13DraftA

RodPositionIndication3.1.73.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.7RodPositionIndicationLCO3.1.7/TheMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)SystemandtheDemandPositionIndicationSystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,HODE2withK,ffz1.0.ACTIONS-----NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachgroupwithnomorethanoneinoperablerodpositionindicatorinthegroupandforeachbankwithnomorethanoneinoperabledemandpositionindicatorinthebank.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.A.lORA.2Verifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTP.Onceper8hours8hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-14DraftA RodPositionIndication3.1.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorerodswithinoperablepositionindicatorshavebeenmoved>24stepsinonedirectionsincethelastdeterminationoftherod'sposition.B.1ORVerifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.4hoursB.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERtos50%RTP.8hoursC.Onedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.C.l.lVerifybyadministrativemeansallMRPIsfortheaffectedbanksareOPERABLE.'nceper8hoursC.1.2ORVerifythemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodoftheaffectedbanksareg12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorforthatbank.Onceper8hoursC.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50%RTP.8hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,ConditionBorConditionCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE2withK,q<1.0.6hours(continued)R.E.Ginna'NuclearPowerPlant3.1-15DraftA

RodPositionIndication3.1.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEE.MorethanoneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.ORMorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.1.7.1VerifyeachHRPIagreeswithin12stepsofthegroupdemandpositionforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravel.PriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-16DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2LCO3.1.8DuringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTS,therequirementsofLCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.4.2,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";"ControlBankInsertionLimits",;"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality"maybesuspended,provided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintainedg5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisZ530'F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE2duringPHYSICSTESTS.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.lInitiateborationto'estoreSDMtowithinl,imit.ANDA.2SuspendPHYSICSTESTSexceptions.15minutes1hourB.THERMALPOWERnotwithinlimit.B.1Openreactortripbreakers.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-17:DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.8ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturenotwithinlimit.C.1RestoreRCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturetowithinlimit.15minutesD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.1.8.1PerformaCOTonpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelsperSR3.3.1.7andSR3.3.1.8.Oncewithin7dayspriortocriticalitySR3.1.8.2VerifytheRCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisZ530'F.30minutesSR3.1.8.3VerifyTHERMALPOWERisg5%RTP.30minutesSR3.1.8.4VerifySDHiswithinthe=limitsspecifiedintheCOLR.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.1-18DraftA

SDHB3.1.1B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28(Ref.1),twoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsmustbeavailableandcapableofholdingthereactorcoresubcriticalfromanyhotstandbyorhotoperatingcondition.MaintenanceoftheSDHensuresthatpostulatedreactivityeventswillnotdamagethefuel.SDHrequirementsprovidesufficientreactivitymargintoensurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitswillnotbeexceededfornormalshutdownandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)whicharedefinedasCondition2eventsinReference2(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).Assuch,theSDM'definesthedegreeofsubcriticalitythatwouldbeobtainedimmediatelyfollowingtheinsertionorscramofallshutdownandcontrolrods,assumingthatthesinglerodclusterassemblyofhighestreactivityworthisfullywithdrawn'ndthefuelandmoderatortemperaturearechangedtothenominalhotzeropowertemperature.Thesystemdesignrequiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsbeprovided,andthatoneofthesesystemsbecapableofmaintainingthecoresubcriticalundercoldconditions.Theserequirementsareprovidedbytheuseofmovablerodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)andsolubleboricacidintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)whicheachprovideaneutronabsorbingmechanism.TheControlRodSystemcancompensateforthereactivityeffectsofthefuelandwatertemperaturechangesaccompanyingpowerlevelchangesovertherangefromfullloadtonoload.Inaddition,theControlRodSystem,togetherwiththeborationsystem,providestheSDHduringpoweroperationandiscapableofmakingthecoresubcriticalrapidlyenoughtopreventexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimits',assumingthattherodofhighestreactivityworthremainsfullywithdrawn.Thechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemcancontrolthesolubleboronconcentrationtocompensateforfueldepletionduringoperationandallxenonburnoutreactivitychangesandmaintainthereactorsubcriticalundercoldconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-1DraftA

SDMB3.1.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Duringpoweroperation,SDMcontrolisensuredbyoperatingwiththeshutdownbankfullywithdrawnandthecontrol,bankswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."The.shutdownbankfullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Whentheplantisintheshutdownandrefuelingmodes,theSDMrequirementsaremetbymeansofadjustmentstotheRCSboronconcentration.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheminimumrequiredSDMisassumedasaninitialconditioninthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalysis(Ref.3)establishesaSDMthatensuresspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsare"notexceededfornormaloperationandAOOs,withtheassumptionofthehighestworthrodstuckoutfollowingascram.TheacceptancecriteriafortheSDHrequirementsarethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Thisisdonebyensuringthat:a.Thereactorcanbemadesubcriticalfromalloperatingconditions,transients,andDesignBasisAccidents;b.Thereactivitytransientsassociatedwithpostulatedaccidentconditionsarecontrollablewithinacceptablelimits(departurefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR),,fuelcenterlinetemperaturelimitsforAOOs,andg200cal/gmenergydepositionfortherodejectionaccident);andc.'hereactorwillbemaintainedsufficientlysubcriticaltoprecludeinadvertentcriticalityintheshutdowncondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-2DraftA SDHB3.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemostlimitingaccidentfortheSDHrequirementsisbasedonasteamlinebreak(SLB),asdescribedinthe.accidentanalysis(Ref.3).Theincreasedsteamflowresultingfromapipebreakinthemainsteamsystemcausesanincreasedenergyremovalfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator(SG),andconsequentlytheRCS.Thisresultsinareductionofthereactorcoolanttemperature.Theresultantcoolantshrinkagecausesareductioninpressure.Inthepresenceofanegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficient,thiscooldowncausesanincreaseincorereactivity.ThemostlimitingSLBforbothoneloopandtwoloopoperation,withrespecttopotentialfueldamagebeforeareactortripoccurs,isaguillotinebreakofamainsteamlineinsidecontainmentinitiatedattheendofcorelife.ThepositivereactivityadditionfromthemoderatortemperaturedecreasewillterminatewhentheaffectedSGboilsdry,thusterminatingRCSheatremovalandcooldown.FollowingtheSLB,aposttripreturntopowermayoccur;however,nofueldamageoccursasaresultoftheposttripreturntopower,andTHERHALPOWERdoesnotviolatetheSafetyLimit(SL)requirementofSL2.1.1.InadditiontothelimitingSLBtransient,theSDHrequirementmustalsoprotectagainst:a.Inadvertentborondilution;b.Anuncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromsubcriticalorlowpowercondition;c.Startupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP);andd.Rodejection.Eachoftheseeventsisdiscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-3DraftA SDHB3.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Intheborondilutionanalysis(Ref.4),therequiredSDHdefinesthereactivitydifferencebetweenaninitialsubcriticalboronconcentrationandthecorrespondingcriticalboronconcentration.Thesevalues,inconjunctionwiththeconfigurationoftheRCSandtheassumeddilutionflowrate,directlyaffecttheresultsoftheanalysis(i.e.,thetimeavailabletooperatorstostopthedilutionevent).Thiseventisanalyzedforrefueling,shutdownandpoweroperationconditionsandismostlimitingatthebeginningofcorelife,whencriticalboronconcentrationsarehighest.Dependingonthesysteminitialconditionsandreactivityinsertionrate,theuncontrolledrodwithdrawaltransientisterminatedbyeitherahighpowerleveltriporahighpressurizerpressuretrip(Ref.5).Inallcases,powerlevel,RCSpressure,linearheatrate,andtheDNBRdonotexceedallowablelimitsifSDHhasbeenmaintained.ThestartupofaninactiveRCPwillnotresultina"coldwater"criticality,evenifthemaximumdifferenceintemperatureexistsbetweentheSGandthecore(Ref.6).ThemaximumpositivereactivityadditionthatcanoccurduetoaninadvertentRCPstartislessseverethantheeffects'fasmallsteamlinebreakwithoneloopoperation.StartupofanidleRCPcannot,therefore,produceareturntopowerfromthehotstandbyconditionifSDHhasbeenmaintained.TheejectionofacontrolrodconstitutesabreakintheRCSwhichrapidlyaddsreactivitytothereactorcore,causingboththecorepowerlevelandheatfluxtoincreasewithcorrespondingincreasesinreactorcoolanttemperaturesandpressure(Ref.7).Theejectionofarodalsoproducesatimedependentredistributionofcorepowerwhichresultsinahighneutronfluxtrip.Fuelandcladdinglimitsarenotexceededif.SDHhasbeenmaintained.SDMsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedfromthecontrolroom,SDMisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseitisperiodicallymonitoredtoensurethattheplantisoperatingwithinthebounds'ofaccidentanalysisassumptions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-4(continued)DraftA SDM83.1.1BASES(continued)LCOSDMisacoredesignconditionthatcanbeensuredduringoperation.throughcontrolrodpositioning(controlandshutdownbanks)andthroughthesolubleboronconcentrationintheRCS.TheCOLRprovidestheshutdownmarginrequirementwithrespecttoRCSboronconcentration.TheSLB(Ref.3)andtheborondilution(Ref.4)accidentsarethemostlimitinganalysesthatestablishtheSDHcurveintheCOLR.ThemaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatendofcyclelifeandisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisfortheSLB.ForSLBaccidents,iftheLCOisviolated,thereisapotentialtoexceedtheDNBRlimitandtoexceed10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.8).For.theborondilutionaccident,iftheLCOisviolated,theminimumrequiredtimeassumedforoperatoractiontoterminatedilutionmaynolongerbeapplicable.APPLICABILITYInMODE2withk,<<<1.0andinMODES3,4and5,theSDHrequirementsareapplicabletoprovidesufficientnegativereactivitytomeettheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesdiscussedabove.InMODE6,theshutdownreactivityrequirementsaregiveninLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration."InMODE1andMODE2withK,<<Z1.0,SDMisensuredbycomplyingwithLCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"and.LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."(continued)'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-5DraftA SDMB3.1.1BASES(continued)ACTIONSA,lIftheSDHrequirementsarenotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.ItisassumedthatborationwillbecontinueduntiltheSDHrequirementsaremet.Inthedeterminationoftherequiredcombinationofborationflowrateandboronconcentration,thereisnouniquerequirementthatmustbesatisfied.SinceitisimperativetoraisetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSassoonaspossible,theflowpathofchoicewouldutilizeahighlyconcentratedsolution,such'asthatnormallyfoundintheboricacidstoragetank,ortherefuelingwaterstoragetank.Theoperatorshouldboratewiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.Indeterminingtheborationflowrate,thetimeincorelifemustbeconsidered.Forinstance,themostdifficulttimeincorelifetoincreasetheRCSboronconcentrationisatthebeginningofcyclewhentheboronconcentrationmayapproachorexceed2000ppm.AssumingthatavalueofI/.b,k/kmustberecoveredandaborationflowrateof10gpm,itispossibletoincreasetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSby100ppminapproximately35minutes.Ifaboronworthof10pcm/ppmisassumed,this.combinationofparameterswillincreasetheSDHby1%hk/k.Theseborationparametersof10gpmand13,000ppmrepresenttypicalvaluesandareprovidedforthepurposeofofferingaspecificexample.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-6(continued)DraftA SDMB3.1.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.1.1InMODE2withK,<<(1.0andMODES3,4,and5,theSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconc'entration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC)..TheFrequencyof48hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.Thisallowstimefortheoper'atortocollecttherequireddata,whichincludesperformingaboronconcentrationanalysis,andcompletethecalculation.REFERENCES2.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27and28,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967."AmericanNationalStandardNuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.4.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.3.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.8.10CFR100.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-7DraftA CoreReactivityB3.1.2B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.2CoreReactivityBASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30(Ref.1),reactivityshallbecontrollable,suchthatsubcriticalityismaintainedundercoldconditions,andacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.Therefore,reactivitybalanceisusedasameasureofthepredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityduringpoweroperation.TheperiodicconfirmationofcorereactivityisnecessarytoensurethatDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientsafetyanalysesremainvalid.Alargereactivitydifferencecouldbetheresultofunanticipatedchangesinfuel,controlrodworth,oroperation'tconditionsnotconsistentwiththoseassumedinthepredictionsofcorereactivity,andcouldpotentiallyresultinalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)orviolationofacceptablefueldesignlimits.ComparingpredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityvalidatesthenuclearmethodsusedinthesafetyanalysisandsupportstheSDHdemonstrations(LCO3.1.1,SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)"inensuringthereactorcanbebroughtsafelytocold,subcriticalconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-8DraftA CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Whenthereactorcoreiscriticalorinnormalpoweroperation,areactivitybalanceexistsandthenetreactivityiszero.Acomparisonofpredictedandmeasuredreactivityisconvenientundersuchabalance,sinceparametersarebeingmaintainedrelativelystableundersteadystatepowerconditions.Thepositivereactivityinherentinthecoredesignisbalancedbythenegativereactivityofthecontrolcomponents,thermalfeedback,neutronleakage,andmaterialsinthecorethatabsorbneutrons,suchasburnableabsorbersproducingzeronetreactivity.Excessreactivitycanbeinferredfromtheboronletdowncurve(orcriticalboroncurve)inthecoredesignreport,whichprovidesanindicationofthesolubleboronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)versuscycleburnup.PeriodicmeasurementoftheRCSboronconcentrationforcomparisonwiththepredictedvaluewithothervariablesfixedorstable(suchasrodheight,temperature,pressure,andpower),providesaconvenientmethodofensuringthatcorereactivityiswithindesignexpectationsandthatthecalculationalmodelsusedtogeneratethesafetyanalysisareadequate.Inordertoachievetherequiredfuelcycleenergyoutput,theuraniumenrichment,inthenewfuelloadingandinthefuelremainingfromthepreviouscycle,providesexcesspositivereactivitybeyondthatrequiredtosustainsteadystateoperationthroughoutthecycle.WhenthereactoriscriticalatRTPandnormaloperatingtemperature,theexcesspositivereactivityiscompensatedbyburnableabsorbers(ifany),controlrods,whateverneutronpoisons(mainlyxenonandsamarium)arepresentinthefuel,andtheRCSboronconcentration.WhenthecoreisproducingTHERMALPOWER,thefuelisbeingdepletedandexcessreactivityisdecreasing.Asthefueldepletes,theRCSboronconcentrationisreducedtodecreasenegativereactivityandmaintainconstantTHERMALPOWER.TheboronletdowncurveisbasedonsteadystateoperationatRTP.Therefore,deviationsfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvemayindicatedeficienciesinthedesignanalysis,deficienciesinthecalculationalmodels,orabnormalcoreconditions,andmustbeevaluated.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-9(continued)DraftA CoreReactivity'B3.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforcorereactivityarethatthereactivitybalancelimitensuresplantoperationismaintainedwithintheassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses.Accuratepredictionofcorereactivityiseitheranexplicitorimplicitassumptionintheaccidentanalysisevaluations.Everyaccidentevaluation(Ref.2)is,therefore,dependentuponaccurateevaluationofcorereactivity.Inparticular,SDMandreactivitytransients,suchascontrolrodwithdrawalaccidentsorrodejectionaccidents,areverysensitivetoaccuratepredictionofcorereactivity.Theseaccidentanalysisevaluationsrelyoncomputercodesthathavebeenqualifiedagainstavailabletestdata,operatingplantdata,andanalyticalbenchmarks.MonitoringreactivitybalanceadditionallyensuresthattheNuclearDesignMethodologyprovidesanaccuraterepresentationofthecorereactivity.DesigncalculationsandsafetyanalysesareperformedforeachfuelcycleforthepurposeofpredeterminingreactivitybehaviorandtheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsforreactivitycontrolduringfueldepletion.Thecomparisonbetweenmeasuredandpredictedinitialcorereactivityprovidesanormalizationforthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictcorereactivity.IfthemeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrationsforidenticalcoreconditionsatbeginningofcyclelife(BOL)donotagree,thentheassumptionsusedinthereloadcycledesignanalysisorthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictsolubleboronrequirementsmaynotbeaccurate.IfreasonableagreementbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivityexistsatBOL,thenthepredictionmaybenormalized'tothemeasuredboronconcentration.Thereafter,anysignificantdeviationsinthemeasuredboronconcentrationfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvethatdevelopduringfueldepletionmaybeanindicationthatthecalculationalmodelisnotadequateforcoreburnupsbeyondBOL,orthatanunexpectedchangeincoreconditionshasoccurred.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-10DraftA CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThenormalizationofpredictedRCSboronconcentrationtothemeasuredvalueistypicallyperformedafterreachingRTPfollowingstartupfromarefuelingoutage,withthecontrolrodsintheirnormalpositionsforpoweroperation.ThenormalizationisperformedatBOLconditions,sothatcorereactivityrelativetopredictedvaluescanbecontinuallymonitoredandevaluatedascoreconditionschangeduringthecycle.CorereactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOLongtermcorereactivitybehaviorisaresultofthecorephysicsdesignand-cannotbeeasilycontrolledoncethecoredesignisfixed.Duringoperation,therefore,theLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurementandtracking,andappropriateactionstakenasnecessary.LargedifferencesbetweenactualandpredictedcorereactivitymayindicatethattheassumptionsoftheDBAandtransientanalysesarenolongervalid,orthattheuncertaintiesintheNuclearDesignMethodologyarelargerthanexpected.Alimitonthereactivitybalanceofi1%hk/khasbeenestablishedbasedonengineeringjudgment.A1%deviationinreactivityfromthatpredictedislargerthanexpectedfornormaloperati,onandshouldthereforebeevaluated.Whenmeasuredcorereactivityiswithin1%hk/kofthepredictedvalueatsteadystatethermalconditions,thecore-isconsideredtobeoperatingwithinacceptabledesignlimits.SincedeviationsfromthelimitarenormallydetectedbycomparingpredictedandmeasuredsteadystateRCScriticalboronconcentrations,thedifferencebetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalueswouldbeapproximately100ppm(dependingontheboronworth)beforethelimitisreached.Thesevaluesarewellwithintheuncertaintylimitsforanalysisofboronconcentrationsamples,sothatspuriousviolationsofthelimitduetouncertaintyinmeasuringtheRCS.boronconcentrationareunlikely.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant8.3.1-11(continued)DraftA CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThelimitsoncorereactivitymustbemaintainedduringMODE1andMODE2withK,<<Z1.0becauseareactivitybalancemustexistwhenthereactoriscriticalorproducingTHERMALPOWER.Asthefueldepletes,coreconditionsarechanging,andconfirmationofthereactivitybalanceensuresthecoreisoperatingasdesigned.ThisSpecificationdoesnotapplyinMODE2withK,<<<1.0orMODES3,4,and5becausethereactorisshutdownandthereactivitybalanceisonlychangingbecauseofxenon.InMODE6,fuelloadingresultsinacontinuallychangingcorereactivity.Boronconcentrationrequirements(LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration")ensurethatfuelmovementsareperformedwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis.AnSDHdemonstrationisrequiredduringthefirststartupfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(SR3.1.2.1).ACTIONS.A.landA.2Shouldananomalydevelopbetweenmeasured.andpredictedcorereactivity,anevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysismustbeperformed.Coreconditionsareevaluatedtodeterminetheirconsistencywithinputtodesign,calculations.Measuredcoreandprocessparametersareevaluatedtodeterminethattheyarewithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis,andsafetyanalysiscalculationalmodelsarereviewedtoverifythattheyareadequateforrepresentationofthecoreconditions.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod,andallowssufficienttimetoassessthephysicalconditionofthereactorandcompletetheevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-12DraftA CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)Followingevaluationsofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,thecauseofthereactivityanomalymayberesolved.IfthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisamismatchincoreconditionsatthetimeofRCSboronconcentrationsampling,thenarecalculationoftheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsmaybeperformedtodemonstratethatcorereactivityisbehavingasexpected.Ifanunexpectedphysicalchangeintheconditionofthecorehasoccurred,itmustbeevaluatedandcorrected,ifpossible.Ifthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisinthecalculationtechnique,thenthecalculationalmodelsmustberevisedtoprovidemoreaccuratepredictions.Ifanyoftheseresultsaredemonstrated,anditisconcludedthatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheboronletdowncurvemayberenormalizedandpoweroperationmaycontinue.IfoperationalrestrictionoradditionalSRsare.necessarytoensurethereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheymustbedefined.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisadequateforpreparingwhateveroperatingrestrictionsor.Surveillancesthatmayberequiredtoallowcontinuedreactoroperation.B.1Ifthecorereactivitycannotberestoredtowithinthe1%hk/klimit,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.IftheSDMforMODE2withK,<<<1.0isnotmet,thentheborationrequiredbySR3.1.1.1wouldoccur.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-13(continued)DraftA

CoreReactivityB3.1.2BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.1.2.1Corereactivitymustbeverifiedfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(e.g.,fuelmovement,controlrodreplacement,controlrodshuffling).ThecomparisonmustbemadepriortoenteringHODE1whenthecoreconditionssuchascontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,andsamariumconcentrationarefixedorstable.'incethereactormustbecriticaltoverifycorereactivity,itisacceptabletoenterHODE2withKeffZ1.0toperformthisSR.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotetoclarifythattheSRdoesnotneedtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringHODE.1..SR3.1.2.2CorereactivityisverifiedbyperiodiccomparisonsofmeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrations.Thecomparisonismade,consideringthatothercoreconditionsarefixedorstable,includingcontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,fueltemperature,fueldepletion,xenonconcentration,andsamariumconcentration.'heFrequencyof31EFPD,isacceptable,basedontheslowrateofcorechangesduetofueldepletionandthepresenceofotherindicators(QPTR,AFD,etc.)forpromptindicationofananomaly.TheSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthattheSRisonlyrequiredafter60effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).ThesecondNoteindicatesthatthenormalizationofpredictedcorereactivitytothemeasuredvaluemusttakeplacewithinthefirst60EFPDaftereachfuelloading.Thisallowssufficienttimeforcoreconditionstoreachsteadystate,butpreventsoperationforalargefractionofthefuelcyclewithoutestablishingabenchmarkforthedesigncalculations.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and30,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-14DraftA HTCB3.1.3B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.3ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8(Ref.I),thereactorcoreanditsinteractionwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)mustbedesignedforinherentlystablepoweroperation,eveninthepossibleeventofanaccident.Inparti'cular,thenetreactivityfeedbackinthesystemmustcompensateforanyunintendedreactivity.increases.TheHTCrelatesachangeincorereactivitytoachangeinreactorcoolanttemperature(apositiveHTCmeansthatreactivityincreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature;conversely,anegativeHTCmeansthatreactivitydecreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature).HTCisdefinedasthechangeinreactivityperdegreechangeinmoderatortemperaturesincetemperatureisdi'rectlyproportionaltocoolantdensity.ThereactorisdesignedtooperatewithanegativeHTCoverthelargestpossiblerangeoffuelcycleoperation.Therefore,acoolanttemperatureincreasewill'auseareactivitydecrease,sothatthecoolanttemperaturetendstoreturntowarditsinitialvalue.Reactivityincreases'hatcauseacoolanttemperatureincreasewillthusbeselflimiting,andstablepoweroperationwillresult.HTCvaluesarepredictedatselectedburnupsduringthesafetyevaluationanalysisandareconfirmedtobeacceptablebymeasurements.Bothinitialandreloadcoresaredesignedsothatthebeginningofcyclelife(BOL)HTCislessthanzerowhenTHERMALPOWERisatRTP.TheactualvalueoftheMTCisdependentoncorecharacteristics,suchasfuelloadingandreactorcoolantsolubleboronconcentration.ThecoredesignmayrequireadditionalfixeddistributedpoisonstoyieldanHTCatBOLwithintherangeanalyzedintheplantaccidentanalysis.Theendofcyclelife(EOL)HTCisalsolimitedbytherequirements-oftheaccidentanalysis.FuelcyclesthataredesignedtoachievehighburnupsorthathavechangestoothercharacteristicsareevaluatedtoensurethattheHTCdoesnotexceedtheEOLlimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-15DraftA HTCB3.1.3BASESBACKGROUNDThelimitationsonHTCareprovidedtoensurethatthevalue(continued)ofthiscoefficientremainswithinthelimitingconditionsassumedintheUFSARaccidentandtransientanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheacceptancecriteriaforthespecifiedHTCare:a.TheHTCvaluesmustremainwithintheboundsofthoseusedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2);andb.TheHTCmustbesuchthatinherentlystablepoweroperationsresultduringnormaloperationandaccidents,suchasoverheatingandovercoolingevents.TheUFSAR,Chapter15(Ref.2),containsanalysesofaccidentsthatresultinbothoverheatingandovercoolingofthereactorcore.HTCisoneofthecontrollingparametersforcorereactivityintheseaccidents.BoththemostpositivevalueandmostnegativevalueoftheHTCareimportanttosafety,andbothvaluesmustbebounded.Valuesusedintheanalysesconsiderworstcaseconditionstoensurethattheaccidentresultsarebounding(Ref.3).Theconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreoverheatingmustbeevaluated'whentheHTCispositive(i.e.,upperlimit).SuchaccidentsincludetherodwithdrawaltransientfromeitherzeroorRTP,lossofmainfeedwaterflow,andlossofforcedreactorcoolantflow.TheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreovercoolingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCisnegative(i.e.,lowerlimit).Suchaccidentsincludesuddenfeedwaterflowincreaseandsuddendecreaseinfeedwatertemperature.Inordertoensureaboundingaccidentanalysis,theHTCisassumedtobeitsmostlimitingvaluefortheanalysisconditionsappropriatetoeachaccident.Theboundingvalueisdeterminedbyconsideringroddedandunroddedconditions,whetherthereactorisatfullorzeropower,andwhetheritisatBOLorEOL.Themostconservativecombination-appropriatetotheaccidentisthenusedfor-theanalysis(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-16DraftA

HTCB3.1.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)HTCsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughit.isnotdirectlyobservedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom,HTCisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseofitsdependenceonboronconcentration.LCOLCO3.1.3requirestheHTCtobewithinthespecifiedlimitsoftheCOLRtoensurethatthecoreoperateswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.Duringthereloadcoresafetyevaluation,theHTCisanalyzedtodeterminethatitsvaluesremainwithintheboundsoftheoriginalaccidentanalysisduringoperation.AssumptionsmadeinsafetyanalysesrequirethattheHTCbelesspositivethanagivenupperboundandmorepositivethanagivenlowerbound.TheMTCismostpositiveatBOL;thisupperboundmustnotbeexceeded.ThismaximumupperlimitoccursatBOL,allrodsout(ARO),hotzeropower(H2P)conditions.AtEOLtheMTCtakesonitsmostnegativevalue,whenthelowerboundbecomesimportant.ThisLCOexiststoensurethatboththeupperandlowerboundsarenotexceeded.IIDuringoperation,therefore,theconditionsoftheLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurement.TheSurveillancecheckatBOLonMTCprovidesconfirmationthattheHTCisbehavingasanticipatedandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpower,andEOLsothattheacceptancecriteriaaremet.TheLCOestablishesamaximumpositivevaluethatcannotbeexceeded.TheBOLpositivelimitandtheEOLnegativelimitareestablishedintheCOLRtoallowspecifyinglimitsforeachparticularcycle.Thispermitstheplanttotakeadvantageofimprovedfuelmanagementandchangesinplantoperatingschedule.IftheLCOlimitsarenotmet,theplantresponseduring,transientsmaynotbeaspredicted.Thecorecouldviolatecriteriathatprohibitareturntocriticality,orthedeparturefromnucleateboilingratiocriteriaoftheapproved:correlationmaybeviolated,whichcouldleadtoalossofthefuelcladdingintegrity.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-17(continued)DraftA HTCB3.1.3BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODE1,theupperandlowerlimitsonMTCmustbemaintainedtoensurethatanyaccidentinitiatedfromTHERMALPOWERoperationwillnotviolatethedesignassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.InMODE2withthereactorcritical,theupperlimitmustalsobemaintainedtoensurethatstartupandsubcriticalaccidents(suchastheuncontrolledCONTROLRODassemblyorgroupwithdrawal)willnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.ThelowerHTClimitmustbemaintainedinMODES2and3,inadditiontoMODE1,toensurethatcooldownaccidentswillnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysissinceHTCbecomesmorenegativeasthecycleburnupincreases,theRCSboronconcentrationisreduced.InMODES4,5,and6,thisLCOisnotapplicable,sincenoDesignBasisAccidentsusing.theHTCasananalysisassumptionareinitiatedfromtheseHODES.ACTIONSA.1HTCmustbekeptwithintheupperlimitspecifiedinLCO3.1.3toensurethatassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.TheupperlimitofConditionAistheupperlimitspecifiedintheCOLRsincethisvaluewillalwaysbelessthanorequaltothemaximumupperlimit'specifiedintheLCO.If'theupperHTClimitisviolatedatBOL,administrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanksmustbeestablishedtomaintaintheHTCwithinitslimitsinthefuture.ACompletionTimeof24hoursprovidesenoughtimeforevaluatingtheHTCmeasurementandcomputingtherequiredbankwithdrawallimits.Ascycleburnupisincreased,theRCSboronconcentrationwillbereduced.ThereducedboronconcentrationcausestheHTCtobecomemorenegative.Usingphysicscalculations,thetime-incyclelifeatwhichthecalculatedMTCwillmeettheLCOrequirementcanbedetermined.AtthispointincorelifeConditionAnolongerexists.TheplantisnolongerintheRequiredAction,sotheadministrativewithdrawallimitsarenolongerineffect.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-18DraftA HTCB3.1.3BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)ConditionAhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresthatRequiredActionA.1mustbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperatewhereHTCwouldbeabovetheupperlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.8.1IftherequiredadministrativewithdrawallimitsatBOLarenotestablishedwithin24hours,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ToachievethisstatustheplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withk,<<(1.0.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1ExceedingtheEOLMTClowerlimitmeansthatthesafetyanalysisassumptionsoftheEOLaccidentsthatuseaboundingnegativeHTCvaluemaybeinvalid.'fitisdeterminedduringphysicstestingthattheEOLHTCvaluewillexceedthemostnegativeHTClimitspecifiedintheCOLR,thesafetyanalysis'ndcoredesignmustbere-evaluatedprior.toreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmtoensurethatoperationneartheEOLremainsacceptable.The300ppmlimitissufficienttopreventEOLoperationatorbelowtheaccidentanalysisMTCassumptions.ConditionChasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresthatRequiredActionC.1mustbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateatconditionswheretheHTCwouldbebelowthemostnegativelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-19DraFtA BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1Ifthere-evaluationoftheaccidentanalysiscannotsupportthepredictedEOLHTClowerlimit,oriftheRequiredActionsofConditionCarenotcompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimetheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.3.1ThisSRrequiresmeasurementoftheMTCatBOLpriortoenteringMODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostpositiveHTCLCO.HeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.TheBOLMTCvalueforAROwillbeinferredfromisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC)measurementsobtainedduringthephysicstestsafterrefueling.TheAROvaluecanbedirectlycomparedtotheBOLMTClimitoftheLCO.Ifrequired,measurementresultsandpredicteddesignvaluescanbeusedtoestablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanks.ThemeasurementoftheHTCatthebeginningofthefuelcycleisadequatetoconfirmthattheHTCremainswithinitsupperlimitsandwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTP,fullpowerandatEOL,sincethiscoefficientchangesslowly,dueprincipallytothereductioninRCSboronconcentrationassociatedwithfuelburnup.ThismeasurementisconsistentwiththerecommendationsdetailedinReference4.b(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-20DraftA

HTCB3.1.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.3.2ThisSRrequiresmeasurementofHTCatBOLpriortoenteringHODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththe70%RTPHTClimitandthemostnegativeHTCLCO.MeetingtheselimitspriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevelsandatEOL.TheMTCvalueforEOLisalsoinferredfromtheITCmeasurements.TheEOLvalueiscalculatedusingthepredictedEOLHTCfromthecoredesignreportandthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandpredictedITC.TheEOLvalueisdirectlycomparedtothemostnegativeEOLvalueestablishedintheCOLRtoensurethatthepredictedEOLnegativeHTCvalueiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC8,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.WCAP9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationHethodology,"July1985.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"InspectionReportNo.50-244/88-06",datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-21DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.4RodGroupAlignmentLimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(e.g.,trippability)oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.MaximumrodmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM).TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27and28(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).-Mechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking',duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDM.=Limitsoncontrolrodal'ignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore(uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCRDHmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximately%inch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-22DraftA

RodGroupAlignmentLimits-B.3.1.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.Theshutdownbankismaintainedeitherinthefullyinsertedorfullywithdrawnposition.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbankBbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankAstopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankBcontinuestomoveout.WhencontrolbankBreachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,B,andCareatthefully,withdrawnpositio'n,andcontrolbankDisnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bank0isinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetri,cpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andtheMicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-23DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4.BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromthe.rodcontrolsystemthatmovestherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+1stepori%inch),butifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.,TheHRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactualcontrolrodposition,butatalowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofonedigitaldetectorassemblyp'errod.AllthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputtotworedundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheHRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsduetothe12-stepintervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Withanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.ThesafetyconcernsassociatedwiththeHRPIsystemareassociatedwithgenerationofaroddrop/rodstopsignalwhichblocksautorodwithdrawalandtheabilitytocomplywiththerodmisalignmentrequirement.Arodbottomsignalfrombothsignalprocessorsisrequiredtogeneratearoddrop/rodstopsignal.Thetwo-out-of-twocoincidentsignalrequirementreducesinadvertentroddrop/rodstopbutdoesnotaffecttheaccidentanalysisassumptions.ThebankdemandpositionandtheHRPIrodpositionsignalsaremonitoredbyaroddeviationmonitoringsystemthatprovidesanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.TheroddeviationalarmwillbegeneratedbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-24.(continued)DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESControlrodmisalignmentaccidentsareanalyzedinthesafetyanalysis(Ref.3).Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingcontrolrodinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Twotypesofmisalignmentaredistinguished.Duringmovementofacontrolrodgroup,onerodmaystopmoving,whiletheotherrodsinthegroupcontinue(i.e.,staticrodmisalignment).Thisconditionmaycauseexcessivepowerpeaking.Thesecondtypeof.misalignmentoccursifonerodfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionrequiresanevaluationtodeterminethatsufficientreactivityworthisheldintheremainingcontrolrodstomeettheSDHrequirement,withthemaximumworthrodstuckfullywithdrawn.Threetypesofanalysisareperformedinregardtostaticrodmisalignment(Ref.4).Thefirsttypeofanalysisconsidersthecasewhereanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedintothecorewithallotherrodscompletelywithdrawn.Withcontrolbanksattheirinsertionlimits,thesecondtypeofanalysisc'onsidersthecasewhenanyonerodiscompletelyinsertedintothecore.Thethirdtypeofanalysisconsidersthecaseofacompletelywithdrawnsinglerodfromabankinsertedtoitsinsertionlimit.Satisfyinglimitsondeparturefromnucleateboilingratioinallthreeofthesecasesboundsthesituationwhenarodismisalignedfromitsgroupby12steps.ThesecondtypeofmisalignmentoccursifoneRCCAfailstoinsertuponareactortripandremainsstuckfullywithdrawn.ThisconditionisassumedintheevaluationtodeterminethattherequiredSDMismetwiththemaximumworthRCCAfullywithdrawnfollowingamainsteamlinebreak(Ref.5).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-25DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheRequiredActionsinthisLCOensurethateitherdeviationsfromthealignmentlimitswillbecorrectedorthatTHERHALPOWERwillbeadjustedsothatexcessivelocallinearheatrates(LHRs)willnotoccur,andthattherequirementsonSDHandejectedrodwortharepreserved.Continued'perationofthe,reactorwithamisalignedcontrolrodisallowediftheheatfluxhotchannelfactor(Fo(Z))andthenuclearenthalpyhotchannelfactor(F~)areverifiedtobewithintheirlimitsintheCOLRandthesafetyanalysisisverifiedtoremainvalid.Whenacontrolrodismisaligned,theassumptionsthatareusedtodeterminetherodinsertionlimits,AFDlimits,andquadrantpowertiltlimitsarenotpreserved.Therefore,thelimitsmaynotpreservethedesignpeakingfactors,andFo(Z)andF~<mustbeverifieddirectlybyincoremapping.BasesSection3.2(PowerDistributionLimits)containsmorecompletediscussionsoftherelationofF<(Z)andF~<totheoperatinglimits.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYandalignmentaredirectlyrelatedtopowerdistributionsandSDH,whichareinitialconditionsassumedinsafetyanalyses.Therefore'theysatisf'yCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOAllshutdownandcontrolrodsmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidethenegativereactivitynecessarytoprovideadequateshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditions.ShutdownandcontrolrodOPERABILITYisdefinedasbeingtrippablesuchthatthenecessarynegativereactivityassumedintheaccidentanalysisisavailable.Ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovablebutremainstrippableandaligned,'hecontrolrodisconsideredtobeOPERABLE.Thelimitsonshutdownorcontrolrodalignmentsensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysiswillremainvalid.TherequirementsonOPERABILITYensurethatupon,reactortrip,theassumedreactivitywillbeavailableandwillbeinserted.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsalsoensurethattheRCCAsandbanksmaintainthecorrectpowerdistributionandrodalignment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-26DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASESLCO(continued)TherequirementtomaintaintherodalignmentofeachindividualrodpositionasindicatedbyHRPItowithinplusorminus12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandpositionisconservative.Theminimummisalignmentassumedinsafety'nalysiswithrespecttopowerdistributionandSDMis25steps,whileatotalmisalignmentfromfullywithdrawntofullyinsertedisassumedforthecontrolrodmisalignmentaccident.Therodpositiondeviationmonitorisusedtoverifyrodalignmentonacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwhenevertheindividualrodpositionsignaldeviatesfromthebankdemandsignalby>12steps.Verification.thattherodpositionsarewithinthealignmentlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.4.1).Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinlimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.4.2).FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceunacceptablepowerpeakingfactorsandLHRs,orunacceptableSDMs,allofwhichmayconstituteinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYTherequirementsonRCCAOPERABILITYandalignmentareapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<z1;0becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichneutron(orfission)powerisgenerated,,andtheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability)andalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,5,and6,thealignmentlimitsdonotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.IntheshutdownMODES,theOPERABILITYoftheshutdownandcontrolrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDH,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNHARGIN-(SDH),"forSDMinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirementsduringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.1-27(continued)DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.l.landA.1.2Whenoneormorerodsareuntrippable,thereisapossibilitythattherequiredSDHmaybeadverselyaffected.Undertheseconditions,itisimportanttodeterminetheSDH,andifitislessthantherequiredvalue,initiateborationuntiltherequiredSDHisrecovered.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisadequatefordeterminingSDHand,ifnecessary,forinitiatingemergencyborationtorestoreSDM.BorationisassumedtocontinueuntiltherequiredSDMisrestored.Inthissituation,SDHverificationmustincludetheworthoftheuntrippablerod,aswellasaremainingrodofmaximumworth.A.2Iftheuntrippablerod(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.B.2B.3B.48.5andB.6Forcontinuedoperationwithamisalignedrod,reactorpower.mustbereduced,SDHmustperiodicallybeverifiedwithinlimits,hotchannelfactors(Fo(Z)andF~<<)mustbeverifiedwithinlimits;andthesafetyanalysesmustbere-evaluatedtoconfirmcontinuedoperationispermissible.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-28DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONSB.2B.3B.48.5and8.6(continued)Reductionofpowerto75%RTPensuresthatlocalLHRincreasesduetoamisalignedRCCAwillnotcausethecoredesigncriteriatobeexceeded(Ref.6).The'CompletionTimeof2hoursgivestheoperatorsufficienttimetoaccomplishanorderlypowerreductionwithoutchallengingtheReactorProtectionSystem.Whenarodis'nowntobemisaligned,thereisapotentialtoimpacttheSDM.Sincethecoreconditionscanchan'gewithtime,periodicverificationofSDHisrequired.AFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensurethisrequirementcontinuestobemet.VerifyingthatFo(Z)andF>>arewithintherequiredlimits(i.e.,SR3.2.1.IandSR3.2.2.1)ensuresthatcurrent"operationat75%RTPwitharodmisalignedisnotresultinginpowerdistributionsthatmayinvalidatesafetyanalysisassumptionsat'fullpower.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursallowssufficienttimetoobtainfluxmapsofthecorepowerdistributionusingtheincorefluxmappingsystemandtocalculateFo(Z)andF~.Oncecurrentconditionshavebeenverifiedacceptable,timeisavailabletoperformevaluationsofaccidentanalysistodeterminethatcore'imitswillnotbeexceededduringaDesignBasisAccidentforthedurationofoperationundertheseconditions.ACompletionTimeof5daysissufficienttimetoobtaintherequiredinputdataandtoperformtheanalysis.C.1MhenRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintheirCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours,whichobviatesconcernsaboutthedevelopmentofundesirablexenonorpowerdistributions.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingtheplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-29,DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESACTIONS(continued)D.l.landD.l.2Morethanonecontrolrodbecomingmisalignedfromitsgroupaveragepositionisnotexpected,andhasthepotentialtoreduceSDM.Therefore,SDMmustbeevaluated.OnehourallowstheoperatoradequatetimetodetermineSDM.RestorationoftherequiredSDM,ifnecessary,requiresincreasingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoprovidenegativereactivity,asdescribedintheBasesofLCO3.1.l.TherequiredCompletionTimeof1hourforinitiatingborationisreasonable,basedonthetimerequiredforpotentialxenonredistribution,thelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurring,andthestepsrequiredtocompletetheaction.Thisallowstheoperatorsufficienttimetoaligntherequiredvalvesandstarttheboricacidpumps.BorationisassumedtocontinueuntiltherequiredSDMisrestored.0.2Ifmorethanonerodisfoundtobemisalignedorbecomesmisalignedbecauseofbankmovement,theplantconditionsfalloutsideoftheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Sinceautomaticbanksequencingwouldcontinuetocausemisalignment,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE2withK,<<<1.0fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-30(continued)DraftA

RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.4.1VerificationthatindividualrodpositionsarewithinalignmentlimitsusingHRPIorthePPCSataFrequencyof12hoursprovidesahistorythatallowstheoperatortodetectarodthatisbeginningtodeviatefromitsexpectedposition.ThisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.SR3.1.4.2Whentherodpositiondeviationmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)isinoperable,no.controlroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourFrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofarodmisalignment.AreductionoftheFrequencyto4hours'rovidessufficientmonitoringoftherodpositionswhenthemonitorisinoperable.ThisFrequencytakesintoaccountotherrodpositioninformationthatiscontinuouslyavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,sothatduringactualrodmotion,deviationscanimmediatelybedetected.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatperformanceofthisSRisonlynecessarywhentherodpositiondeviationmonitorisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.1-31DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.4.3VerifyingeachcontrolrodisOPERABLEwouldrequirethateachrodbetripped.However,inHODESIand2withK,<<z1.0,trippingeachcontrolrodwouldresultinradialoraxialpowertilts,oroscillations.Exercisingeachindividualcontrolrodevery92daysprovidesincreasedconfidencethatallrodscontinuetobeOPERABLEwithoutexceedingthealignmentlimit,eveniftheyarenotregularlytripped.HovingeachcontrolrodtoaHRPItransitionwillnotcauseradialoraxialpowertilts,or.oscillations,tooccur.The92dayFrequencytakesintoconsiderationotherinformationavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomandSR3.1.4.1,whichisperformedmorefrequentlyandaddstothedeterminationofOPERABILITYoftherods.DuringorbetweenrequiredperformancesofSR3.1.4.3(determinationofcontrolrodOPERABILITYbymovement),,ifacontrolrod(s)isdiscoveredtobeimmovable,butremainstrippableandaligned,thecontrolrod(s)isconsideredtobeOPERABLE.Atanytime,ifacontrolrod(s)isimmovable',adeterminationofthetrippability(OPERABILITY)ofthecontrol'rod(s)mustbemade,andappropriateactiontaken.SR3.1.4.4Verificationofroddroptimesallowstheoperatortodeterminethatthemaximumroddroptimepermittedisconsistentwiththeassumedroddroptimeusedinthesafetyanalysis.Heasuringroddroptimespriortoreactorcriticality,afterreactorvesselheadremoval,ensuresthatthereactorinternalsandroddrivemechanismwillnotinterferewithrodmotionorroddroptime,andthatnodegradationinthesesystemshasoccurredthatwouldadverselyaffectcontrolrodmotionordroptime.ThistestingisperformedwithallRCPsoperatingandtheaveragemoderatortemperatureZ500'Ftosimulateareactortripunderactualconditions.ThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutage,duetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandthepotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-32(continued)DraftA RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.4BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.'tomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6,14,27,and28,Issuedfor.commentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50;46.'.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.5.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB.3.1-33DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5f83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.5ShutdownBankInsertionLimitBASESBACKGROUNDTheinsertionlimitsofthe'shutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.Theinsertionlimitsdirectlyaffectcorepowerandfuelburnupdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableejectedrodworth,SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDMlimitsarepreserved.Therodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andL'CO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.Theshutdownbankisrequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-34DraftA

ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforprecisereactivitycontrolofthereactor.ThepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormallyautomaticallycontrolledbytheRodControlSystem,butthey.canalsobemanuallycontrolled.Theyarecapableofaddingnegativereactivityveryquickly(comparedtoborating).Thecontrolbanksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormalfullpoweroperations.Hence,theyarenotcapableofaddingalargeamountofpositivereactivity.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangeassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.Thedesigncalculationsareperformedwiththeassumptionthattheshutdownbankiswithdrawnfirst.Theshutdownbankcanbefullywithdrawnwithoutthecoregoingcritical.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.Thisprovidesavailablenegativereactivityintheeventofborationerrors.Theshutdownbankiscontrolledmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator.Theshutdownbankiseitherfullywithdrawnorfullyinserted.Theshutdownbankmustbecompletelywithdrawnfromthecore,priortowithdrawinganycontrolbanksduringanapproachtocriticality.Theshutdownbankisthenleftinthispositionuntilthereactorisshutdown.Theshutdownbankaffectscorepowerandburnupdistribution,andaddsnegativereactivitytoshutdownthereactoruponreceiptofareactortripsignal.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecore'mustbelimited,sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-35DraftA

ShutdownBankInsertionLimit83.1.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Th'eshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally,thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsrestrictthereactivitythatcouldbeaddedintheeventofarodejectionaccident,andtheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsensuretherequiredSDHismaintained.OperationwithinthesubjectLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),lossofflow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfuncti'on.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOnareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolbanks),,exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumamountofnegativereactivityona'eactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDH(see'LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthe'mostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDHatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitalsolimitsthereactivityworthofanejectedshutdownrod.Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionl.imitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentisthat:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-36DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.RCSpressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,theshutdownbankinsertionlimitaffectssafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandSDM(Ref.3).TheSDMrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedgPTRpresent.OperationattheinsertionlimitmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvalueinfuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.Thecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits,togetherwithAFD,gPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDH,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Theshutdownbankinsertionlimitpreservesaninitialconditionassumedinthesafetyanalysesand,assuch,satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheshutdownbankmustbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitanytimethereactoriscritical.ThisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDHfollowingareactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-37DraftA

ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingtheLCOrequirementissuspendedduringSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequirestheshutdownbanktomovebelow.theLCOlimits,whichwouldnormallyviolatetheLCO.TheshutdownbankinsertionlimitisdefinedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITYTheshutdownbankmustbewithintheinsertionlimit,withthereactorinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<Z1.0.ThisensuresthatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDHfollowingareactortrip.InMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODE3,4,5,or6,theshutdownbankinsertionlimitdoesnotapplybecausethereactorisshutdownandnotproducingfissionpower.InshutdownMODEStheOPERABILITYoftheshutdownrodshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDM,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheRCS.RefertoLCO3.1.1forSDMrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5.LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"ensuresadequateSDMinMODE6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.l.2andA.2Whentheshutdownbankisnotwithininsertionlimit,verificationofSDHorinitiationofborationtoregainSDHwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDHinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<z1.0isensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits(seeLCO3.l.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)").Iftheshutdownbankisnotwithintheinsertionlimit,thenSDMwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-38DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASESACTIONSA.l.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinordertotakeconservativeactionbecausethesimultaneous'occurrenceofeitheraLOCA,.lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistributionorreactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability.Twohoursisallowedtorestoretheshutdownbanktowithintheinsertionlimit.ThistimelimitisnecessarybecausetheavailableSDMmaybesignificantlyreduced,withtheshutdownbanknotwithintheinsertionlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblemswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.IandA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwheretheLCOisnotapplicable..Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE2withk,<<<1.0withinaCompletionTimeof6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingthe'equiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.1.5.1Sincetheshutdownbankispositionedmanuallybythecontrolroomoperator,averificationofshutdownbankpositionataFrequencyofevery12hours,isadequatetoensurethatthebankiswithintheinsertionlimit.Also,the12hourFrequencytakesintoaccountotherinformationavailableinthecontrolroomforthepurposeofmonitoringthestatusofshutdownrods.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-39(continued)DraftA ShutdownBankInsertionLimitB3.1.5BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR5P.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-40DraftA ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEHSB3.1.6ControlBankInsertionLimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheinsertionlimitsoftheshutdownandcontrolrodsdefinethedeepestinsertionintothecorewithrespecttocorepowerwhichisallowedandareinitialassumptionsinallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.TheinsertionlimitsdirectlyaffectcorepowerandfuelburnupdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableejectedrodworthSHUTDOWNHARGIN(SDH),andinitialreactivityinsertionrate.TheapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsareAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46(Ref.,2).Limitsoncontrolrodinsertionhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Therod-clustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs)aredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.Abankof'CCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.SeeLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"forcontrolandshutdownrodOPERABILITYandalignmentrequirements,andLCO3.1.7,"RodPositionIndication,"forpositionindicationrequirements.ThecontrolbankinsertionlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.Thecontrolbanksarerequiredtobeatorabovetheinsertionlimitlines.,TheinsertionlimitsfigureintheCOLRalsoindicateshowthecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern.Overlapisthedistancetravelledtogetherbytwocontrolbanks.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-41,DraftA

ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecontrolbanksareusedforpr'ecisereactivi.tycontrolofthereactor.Thepositionsofthecontrolbanksarenormally'controlledautomaticallybytheRodControlSystem,butcanalsobe'anuallycontrolled;Theyarecapableofaddingnegativereactivityveryquickly(comparedtoboratingordiluting).Thecontrolbanksmustbemaintainedabovedesignedinsertionlimitsandaretypicallynearthefullywithdrawnpositionduringnormalfullpoweroperations.ThefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedintheCOLR.BorationordilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)compensatesforthereactivitychangesassociatedwithlargechangesinRCStemperature.Therodinsertionlimi'tmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificationthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).Thecontrolbanksaremovedinanoverlappattern,usingthefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbankBbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankA.ControlbankAstopsatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrol,bankBcontinuestomoveout.Whencontrolbank8reachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,B,andCareatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbank0isnearthefullywithdrawnpositionatRTP.Theinsertionsequenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequence(i.e.,bank0isinsertedfirst)butfollowsthesameoverlappattern.Thecontrolrodsarearrangedinaradiallysymmetricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasymmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-42DraftA

ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimited,sothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"providelimitsoncontrolcomponentoperationandonmonitoredprocessvariables,whichensurethatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteria.Theshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionandalignmentlimits,AFD,andgPTRareprocessvariablesthattogethercharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Additionally,thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsrestrictthereactivitythatcouldbeaddedintheeventofarodejectionaccident,andtheshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsensuretherequiredSDNismaintained.OperationwithintheAFD,gPTR,shutdownandcontrolbankinsertionand,alignmentLCOlimitswillpreventfuelcladdingfailuresthatwouldbreachtheprimaryfissionproductbarrierandreleasefissionproductstothereactorcoolantintheeventofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),-lossofflow,ejectedrod,orotheraccidentrequiringterminationbyaReactorTripSystem(RTS)tripfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-43(continued)DraftA

ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOnareactortrip,allRCCAs(shutdownbankandcontrolbanks),exceptthemostreactiveRCCA,areassumedtoinsertintothecore.Theshutdownbankshallbeatorabovetheinsertionlimitandavailabletoinsertthemaximumamoiintofnegativereactivityonareactortripsignal.Thecontrolbanksmaybepartiallyinsertedinthecore,asallowedbyLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheshutdownbankandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsareestablishedtoensurethatasufficientamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactorandmaintaintherequiredSDM(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)")followingareactortripfromfullpower.Thecombinationofcontrolbanksandtheshutdownbank(lessthemostreactiveRCCA,whichisassumedtobefullywithdrawn)issufficienttotakethereactorfromfullpowerconditionsatratedtemperaturetozeropower,andtomaintaintherequiredSDMatratednoloadtemperature(Ref.3).Thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsalsolimitthereactivityworthofanejectedcontrolbankrod.Theacceptancecriteriaforaddressingshutdownandcontrolbankinsertionlimitsandinoperabilityormisalignmentarethat:a.Therebenoviolationsof:1.Specifiedacceptablefueldesignlimits,or2.ReactorCoolantSystempressureboundaryintegrity;andb.Thecoreremainssubcriticalafteraccidenttransients.Assuch,thecontrolbankinsertionlimitsaffectsafetyanalysisinvolvingcorereactivityandpowerdistributions(Refs.4,5,6,and7).TheSDMrequirementisensuredbylimitingthecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimitssothatallowableinsertedworthoftheRCCAsissuchthatsufficientreactivityisavailableintherodstoshutdownthereactortohotzeropowerwithareactivitymarginthatassumesthemaximumworthRCCAremainsfullywithdrawnupontrip(Refs.4,5,6,and7).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-44DraftA 00 ControlBankInsertionLimits83.1.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)OperationattheinsertionlimitsorAFDlimitsmayapproachthemaximumallowablelinearheatgenerationrateorpeakingfactorwiththeallowedgPTRpresent.Operationattheinsertionlimi-tmayalsoindicatethemaximumejectedRCCAworthcouldbeequaltothelimitingvalueinfuelcyclesthathavesufficientlyhighejectedRCCAworths.Thecontrol'andshutdownbankinsertionlimits,togetherwithAFD,OPTRandthecontrolandshutdownbankalignmentlimits,ensurethatsafetyanalysesassumptionsforSDM,ejectedrodworth,andpowerdistributionpeakingfactorsarepreserved(Refs.4,5,6,and7).Thecontrolbankinsertion,sequenceandoverlaplimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement,inthattheyareinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.LCOThelimitsoncontrolbankssequence,overlap,andinsertion,asdefinedintheCOLR,mustbemaintainedbecausetheyservethefunctionofpreservingpowerdistribution,ensuringthattheSDMismaintained,ensuringthatejectedrodworthislimited,andensuringadequatenegativereactivityinsertionisavailableontrip.Theoverlapbetweencontrolbanksprovidesmoreuniformratesofreactivityinsertionandwithdrawalandisimposedtomaintainacceptablepowerpeakingduringcontrolbankmotion.TherodinsertionlimitmonitorisusedtoverifycontrolrodinsertiononacontinuousbasisandwillprovideanalarmwheneverthecontrolbankinsertiondeviatesfromtherodinsertionlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Verificationthatthecontrolbanksarewithintheinsertionlimitismadeevery12hours(SR3.1.6.2).Whentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperableaverificationthattherodpositionsarewithinthelimitmustbemademorefrequently(SR3.1.6.3).TheLCOismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingtheLCOrequirementsaresuspendedduringtheperformanceofSR3.1.4.3.ThisSRverifiesthefreedomoftherodstomove,andrequiresthecontrolbanktomovebelowtheLCOlimits,whichwouldviolatetheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-45(continued)DraftA ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThecontrolbankinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsshallbemaintainedwiththereactorinMODE1andMODE2withk,<<z1.0.Theselimitsmustbemaintained,sincetheypreservetheassumedpowerdistribution,ejectedrodworth,SDM,andreactivityrateinsertionassumptions.ApplicabilityinMODE2withk,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,5,and6isnotrequired,sinceneitherthepowerdistributionnorejectedrodworthassumptionswouldbeexceededintheseMODES.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2Whenthecontrolbanksareoutsidetheacceptableinsertionlimits,outofsequence,orinthewrongoverlapconfiguration,theymustberestoredtowithinthoselimits.Thisrestorationcanoccurintwoways:a.Reducingpowertobeconsistentwithrodposition;orb.Movingrodstobeconsistentwithpower.Also,verificationofSDHorinitiationofborationtoregainSDHwithin1hourisrequired,sincetheSDHinMODES1and2isnormallyensuredbyadheringtothecontrolandshutdownbankinsertionlimits(seeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)")hasbeenupset.Ifcontrol,banksarenotwithintheirlimits,thenSDMwillbeverifiedbyperformingareactivitybalancecalculation,takingintoaccountRCSboronconcentration,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-46DraftA

ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESACTIONSA.1.1A.1.2andA.2(continued)OperationbeyondtheLCOlimitsisallowedforashorttimeperiodinordertotakeconservativeactionbecausetheoccurrenceofeitheraLOCA,lossofflowaccident,ejectedrodaccident,orotheraccidentduringthisshorttimeperiod,togetherwithaninadequatepowerdistr'ibutionor.reactivitycapability,hasanacceptablylowprobability.Thus,theallowedCompletionTimeof2hoursforrestoringthebankstowithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsprovidesanacceptabletimeforevaluatingandrepairingminorproblems.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.1andA.2cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoHODE2withK,<<<1.0,wheretheLCOisnotapplicable..TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredHODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.1.6.1ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtoensurethatthereactordoesnotachievecriticalitywiththecontrolbanksbelowtheirinsertionlimits.SR3.1.6.2WithanOPERABLEbankinsertionlimitmonitor,verificationofthecontrolbankinsertionlimitsataFrequencyof12hoursissufficienttoensureOPERABILITYofthebankinsertionlimitmonitorandtodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimitssince,normally,verylittlerodmotionoccursin12hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-47,DraftA 0 ControlBankInsertionLimitsB3.1.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.1.6.3Whentheinsertionlimitmonitor(i.e.,thePPCS)becomesinoperable,nocontrolroomalarmisavailablebetweenthenormal12hourfrequencytoalerttheoperatorsofacontrolbanknotwithintheinsertionlimits.AreductionoftheFrequencytoevery4hoursprovidessufficientmonitoringofcontrolrodinsertionwhenthemonitorisinoperable.VerificationofthecontrolbankpositionataFrequencyof4hoursissufficienttodetectcontrolbanksthatmaybeapproachingtheinsertionlimits.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthatperformanceofthisSRinonlynecessarywhentherodinsertionlimitmonitorisinoperable.SR3.1.6.4WhencontrolbanksaremaintainedwithintheirinsertionlimitsasrequiredbySR3.1.6.2andSR3.1.6.3above,itisunlikelythattheirsequenceandoverlapwillnotbeinaccordancewithrequirementsprovidedintheCOLR.AFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeinsertionlimitcheckaboveinSR3.1.6.2.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,28,29,and32,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.5.UFSAR,Section15.4.1.6.UFSAR,Section15.4.2.7.UFSAR,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-48DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMB3.1.7RodPositionIndicationBASESBACKGROUNDTheOPERABILITY(i.e.,trippability),includingpositionindication,oftheshutdownandcontrolrodsisaninitialassumptioninallsafetyanalysesthatassumerodinsertionuponreactortrip.MaximumrodmisalignmentisaninitialassumptioninthesafetyanalysisthatdirectlyaffectscorepowerdistributionsandassumptionsofavailableSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH).RodpositionindicationisrequiredtoassessOPERABILITYandmisalignment.AccordingtotheAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13(Ref.I),instrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystemsovertheiroperatingrangesduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andaccidentconditionsmustbeOPERABLE.LCO3.1.7isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITYofthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstodeterminecontrolrodpo'sitionsandtherebyensurecompliancewiththecontrolrodalignmentandinsertionlimits.Mechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup..Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymmetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotalavailablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDH..LimitsoncontrolrodalignmentandOPERABILITYhavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignpowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,aremovableneutronabsorbingdeviceswhicharemovedoutofthecore(uporwithdrawn)orintothecore(downorinserted)bytheircontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCRDHmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximately5/8inch)atatime,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutputfromtheRodControlSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-49DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheRCCAsaredividedamongcontrolbanksandashutdownbank.Controlbanksareusedtocompensateforchanges.inreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuch,ascoolanttemperature,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn.Eachbankisfurthersubdividedintogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroupsthataremovedinastaggeredfashionbutalwayswithinonestepofeachother.TherearefourcontrolbanksandoneshutdownbankatGinnaStation.Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(commonlycalled.groupstepcounters)andtheHicroprocessorRodPositionIndication(HRPI)System.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtheRodControlSystemthatmovetherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythegroupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(+Isteport'!sinch),butifaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.1-50DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheHRPISystemalsoprovidesahighlyaccurateindicationofactual.controlrodposition,butata'lowerprecisionthanthestepcounters.TheHRPIsystemconsistsofonedigitaldetectorassemblyperrod.AllthedetectorassembliesconsistofonecoilstackwhichismultiplexedandbecomesinputtotworedundantHRPIsignalprocessors.Eachsignalprocessorindependentlymonitorsallrodsandsensesarodbottomforanyrod.TheHRPIsystemdirectlysensesrodpositioninintervalsof12stepsforeachrod.Thedigitaldetectorassembliesconsistof20discretecoilpairsspacedat12-stepintervals.Thetruerodpositionisalwayswithin+8stepsoftheindicatedposition(+6stepsdueto'he12-step.intervaland+2stepstransitionuncertaintyduetoprocessingandcoilsensitivity).Withanindicateddeviationof12stepsbetweenthegroupstepcounterandHRPI,themaximumdeviationbetweenactualrodpositionandthedemandpositionwouldbe20steps,or12.5inches.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESControlandshutdownrodpositionaccuracyisessentialduringpoweroperation.Powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,orSDHlimitsmaybeviolatedintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(Ref.2),withcontrolorshutdownrodsoperatingoutsidetheirlimitsundetected.Therefore,theacceptancecriteriaforrodpositionindicationisthatrodpositionsmustbeknownwithsufficientaccuracyinordertoverifythecoreisoperatingwithinthegroupsequence,overlap,designpeakinglimits,ejectedrodworthlimits,andwithminimumSDH(LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits").Therodpositionsmustalsobeknowninordertoverifythealignmentlimitsarepreserved(LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits").Controlrodpositionsarecontinuouslymonitoredtoprovideoperatorswithinformationthatensurestheplantisoperatingwithintheboundsoftheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Thecontrolrod.positionindicatorchannelssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Thecontrolrodpositionindicatorsmonitorcontrolrodposition,whichisaninitialconditionoftheaccident.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-51(continued)DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASES(continued)LCOLCO3.1.7specifiesthattheMRPISystemandtheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystembeOPERABLE.ForthecontrolrodpositionindicatorstobeOPERABLErequiresthefollowing:a.FortheHRPISystemtherearenofailedcoilsandrodpositionindicationisavailableontheHRPIscreen(ineitherthecontrolroomorrelayroom)ortheplantprocesscomputersystem;andb.TheBankDemandIndicationSystemhasbeencalibratedeitherinthefullyinsertedpositionortotheHRPISystem.The12stepagreementlimitbetweentheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemandtheHRPISystemasrequiredbySR3.1.7.1indicatesthattheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisadequatelycalibrated,andcanbeusedforindicationofcontrolrodbankposition.Adeviationoflessthantheallowable12stepagreementlimit,inpositionindicationforasinglecontrolrod,ensureshighconfidencethatthepositionuncertaintyofthecorrespondingcontrolrodgroupiswithintheassumedvaluesusedintheanalysis.TheHRPIsystemisdesignedwitherrordetectionsuchthatwhenafaultoccursinthebinarydatareceivedfromthecoilstacksorprocessingunitanalarmisannunciatedattheHRPIdisplay.Wherithefaultclears,thesystemprovidesselfvalidationofdataintegrityandreturnstoitsnormaldisplaymode.Becauseofthedigitalnatureofthesystemanditsinherentdiagnosticfeatures,intermittentdataalarmscanmaskpositionindicationandgeneratetheperceptionthatasinglerodpositionisunmonitored.Forasinglerodpositionindicationfailure,HRPIisconsideredOPERABLEifafaultoccursandclearswithinfiveminutesandtheindicatedpositioniswithinexpectedvalues.TheserequirementsensurethatcontrolrodpositionindicationduringpoweroperationandPHYSICSTESTSisaccurate,andthatdesignassumptionsarenotchallenged.OPERABILITYofthepositionindicatorchannelsensuresthatinoperable,misaligned,ormispositionedcontrolrodscanbedetected.Therefore,powerpeaking,ejectedrodworth,andSDHcanbecontrolledwithinacceptablelimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-52(continued)DraftA RodPositionIndication83.1.7BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTherequirementsontheMRPIandstepcountersareonlyapplicableinMODE1andMODE2withK,<<Z1.0(consistentwithLCO3.1.4.andLCO3.1.5,andLCO3.1.6),becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical,andtheOPERABILITYandalignmentofrodshavethepotentialtoaffectthesafetyoftheplant.IntheshutdownMODES,theOPERABILITYoftheshutdownandcontrolbankshasthepotentialtoaffecttherequiredSDM,butthiseffectcanbecompensatedforbyanincreaseintheboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.SeeLCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM),"forSDHrequirementsinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5andLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration,"forboronconcentrationrequirementsduringMODE6.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthataseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachgroupwithnomorethanoneinoperablerodpositionindicatorinthegroupandforeachbankwithnomorethanoneinoperabledemandpositionindicatorinthebank.ThisisacceptablebecausetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablepositionindicator.Withmorethanoneinoperablerodpositionindicatorpergroupormorethanoneinoperabledemandpositionindicatorperbank,theplantmustenterLCO3.0.3.A.1WhenoneMRPIpergroupfails,thepositionoftherodcanstillbedeterminedbyuseofthemovableincoredetectors.Basedonexperience,normalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofbanks.Ifabankhasbeensignificantlymoved,theRequiredActionofB.1orB.2belowisrequired.Therefore,verificationofRCCApositionwithintheCompletionTimeof8hoursisadequateforallowingcontinuedfullpoweroperation,sincetheprobabilityofsimultaneouslyhavingarodsignificantlyoutofpositionandaneventsensitivetothatrodpositionissmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-53DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2ReductionofTHERHALPOWERto<50%RTPputsthecoreintoaconditionwhererodpositionisnotsignificantlyaffectingcorepeakingfactors.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreducingpowertog50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.labove.B.landB.2TheseRequiredActionsensurethatwhenoneormorerodswithinoperablepositionindicators(i.e.,HRPI)havebeenmoved>24stepsinonedirection,sincethepositionwaslastdetermined,theRequiredActionsofA.1andA.2arestillappropriatebutmustbeinitiatedpromptlyunderRequiredActionB.Itobeginverifyingthattheserodsarestillproperlypositioned,relativetotheirgrouppositions.If,within4hours,therodpositionshavenotbeendetermined,THERHALPOWERmustbereducedtog50%RTPwithin8hourstoavoidundesirablepowerdistributionsthatcouldresultfromcontinuedoperationat>50%RTP,ifoneormorerodsaremisalignedbymorethan24steps.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursprovidesanacceptableperiodoftimetoverifytherodpositions.Acceptableverificationofrodpositionwithin4hoursre-initiatestheclockforRequiredActionA.l.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-54DraftA RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASESACTIONS(continued)C.l.landC.l.2Withonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperable,therodpositions.canbedeterminedbytheHRPISystem.Sincenormalpoweroperationdoesnotrequireexcessivemovementofrods,verificationbyadministrativemeansthattherodpositionindicatorsareOPERABLEandthemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodare<12stepsfromtheOPERABLEdemandpositionindicatorforthatbankwithintheallowedCompletionTimeofonceevery8hoursisadequate.Thisverificationcanbeanexaminationoflogs,administrativecontrols,orotherinformationthatshowsthatallHRPIsintheaffectedbankareOPERABLE.C.2ReductionofTHERHALPOWERto<50%RTPputsthecoreintoaconditionwhererodpositionwillnotcausecorepeakingtoapproachthecorepeakingfactorlimits.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreducingpowerto<50%RTPfromfullpowerconditionswithoutchallengingplantsystemsandallowingforrodpositiondeterminationbyRequiredActionA.labove.D.1IftheRequiredActionscannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE2withK,<<<1.0within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredHODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.lWithmorethanoneHRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroupsormorethanonedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks,animmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-55(continued)DraftA

RodPositionIndicationB3.1.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.1.7.1VerificationthattheHRPIagreeswiththegroupdemandpositionwithin12stepsforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravelensuresthattheHRPIisoperatingcorrectly.SincetheHRPIdoesnotdisplaytheactualshutdownrodpositionsbetween0and230steps,onlypointswithintheindicatedrangesarerequiredincomparison.ThisSurveillanceisperformedduringaplantoutageorduringplantstartup,priortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadduetotheplantconditionsneededtoperformtheSRandthepotentialforanunplannedplanttransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC12and13,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-56DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.8PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheMODE2PHYSICSTESTSexceptionsistopermitrelaxationsofexistingLCOstoallowcertainPHYSICSTESTStobeperformed.SectionXIof10CFR50,AppendixB(Ref.1),requiresthatatestprogrambeestablishedtoensurethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinservice.Allfunctionsnecessarytoensurethatthespecifieddesignconditionsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesmustbetested.Thistestingisanintegralpartofthedesign,construction,andoperationoftheplant.RequirementsfornotificationoftheNRC,forthepurposeofconductingtestsandexperiments,arespecifiedin10CFR50.59(Ref.2).Thekeyobjectivesofatestprogramareto:a.Ensurethatthefacilityhasbeenadequatelydesigned;b.Vali'datetheanalyticalmodelsusedinthedesignandanalysis;c.Verifytheassumptions.usedtopredictplantresponse;d.Ensurethatinstallationofequipmentinthefacility~hasbeenaccomplishedinaccordancewiththedesign;ande.Verifythattheoperatingandemergencyproceduresareadequate.Toaccomplishtheseobjectives,testingisperformedpriortoinitialcriticality;duringstartup,lowpower,powerascension,andatpoweroperation;andaftereachrefueling.ThePHYSICSTESTSrequirementsforreloadfuelcyclesensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwiththedesignpredictionsandthatthecorecanbeoperatedasdesigned.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-57DraftA N PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)PHYSICSTESTSproceduresarewrittenandapprovedin'ccordancewithestablishedformats.Theproceduresincludeallinformationnecessarytopermitadetailedexecutionofthetestingrequiredtoensurethatthedesignintentismet.PHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewiththeseprocedures,andtestresultsareapprovedpriortocontinuedpowerescalationandlongtermpoweroperation.ThePHYSICSTESTSperformedatGinnaStationforreloadfuelcyclesinNODE2include:Ia.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawn;b.CriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInserted;c.ControlRodWorth;andd.IsothermalTemperatureCoefficient(ITC).Theseandothersupplementarytestsmayberequiredtocalibratethenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems.ThesetestsmaycausetheoperatingcontrolsandprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOrequirementsduringtheirperformanceasdescribedbelow.a4TheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsWithdrawnTestmeasuresthecriticalboronconcentrationathotzeropower(HZP).Withallrodsout,bankDisatornearitsfullywithdrawnposition..HZPiswherethecoreiscritical(k,<<=1.0),andtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)isatdesigntemperatureandpressureforzeropower.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.3,"HoderatorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-58DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)b.CoTheCriticalBoronConcentration-ControlRodsInsertedTest.measuresthecriticalboronconcentrationatHZP,withabankhavinga'worthofatleast1%hk/kfullyinsertedintothecore.Thistestisusedtomeasurethedifferentialboronworth.WiththecoreatHZPandallbanksfullywithdrawn,theboronconcentrationofthereactorcoolantisgraduallyloweredinacontinuousmanner.Theselectedbankistheninsertedtomakeupforthedecreasingboronconcentrationuntiltheselectedbankhasbeenmovedoveritsentirerangeoftravel.Thereactivityresultingfromeachincrementalbankmovementismeasuredwithareactivitycomputer(i.e.,thePPCS).Thedifferencebetweenthemeasuredcriticalboronconcentrationwithallrodsfullywithdrawnandwiththebankinsertedisdetermined.Thedifferentialboronworthisdeterminedbydividingthemeasuredbankworthbythemeasuredboronconcentrationdifference.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits;"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit;"orLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."TheControlRodWorthTestisusedtomeasurethereactivityworthofselected.controlbanks.ThistestisperformedatHZPandhastwoalternativemethodsofperformance.Thefirstmethod,theBoronExchangeMethod,variesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationandmovestheselectedcontrolbankin'responsetothechangingboronconcentration.Thereactivitychangesaremeasuredwithareactivitycomputer(i.e.,thePPCS).Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.Thesecondmethod,theBoronEndpointMethod,movestheselectedcontrolbankoveritsentirelengthoftravelandthenvariesthereactorcoolantboronconcentrationtoachieveHZPcriticalityagain.Thedifferenceinboronconcentrationistheworthoftheselectedcontrolbank.Thissequenceisrepeatedfortheremainingcontrolbanks.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,orLCO3.1.6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-59,DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)d.TheITCTestmeasurestheITCofthereactor.Thistest.isperformedatHZPusingtheSlopeMethod.TheSlopeMethodvariesRCStemperatureinaslowandcontinuousmanner.Thereactivitychangeismeasuredwithareactivitycomputer(i.e.,thePPCS)asafunctionofthetemperaturechange.TheITCistheslopeofthereactivityversusthetemperatureplot.Thetestisrepeatedbyreversingthedirectionofthetemperaturechange,andthefinalITCistheaverageofthetwocalculatedITCs.TheModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)'atBOL,70%RTPandatEOLisdeterminedfromthemeasuredITC.ThistestsatisfiestherequirementsofSR3.1.3.1andSR3.1.3.2.PerformanceofthistestcouldviolateLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThefuelisprotectedbymultipleLCOsthatpreservetheinitialconditionsofthecoreassumedduringthesafetyanalyses.ThemethodsfordevelopmentoftheseLCOs,thatareexceptedbythisLCO,aredescribedintheWestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport(Ref.3).TheabovementionedPHYSICSTESTS,andotherteststhatmayberequiredtocalibratenuclearinstrumentationortodiagnoseoperationalproblems,mayrequiretheoperatingcontrolorprocessvariablestodeviatefromtheirLCOlimitations.TheUFSARdefinesrequirementsforinitialtestingofthefacility,includingPHYSICSTESTS.'eference4summarizestheinitialzero,lowpower,andpowertests.ReloadfuelcyclePHYSICSTESTSareperformedinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecificationrequirements,fuelvendorguidelinesandestablishedindustrypracticeswhichareconsistentwiththePHYSICSTESTSdescribedinReferences5and6.AlthoughthesePHYSICSTESTSaregenerallyaccomplishedwithinthelimitsofallLCOs,conditionsmayoccurwhenoneormoreLCOsmustbesuspendedtomakecompletionofPHYSICSTESTSpossibleorpractical.Thisisacceptableaslongasthefueldesigncriteriaarenotviolated.TherequirementsspecifiedinthefollowingLCOsmaybesuspendedforPHYSICSTESTING:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-60DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESAPPLICABLE'AFETYANALYSES(continued)LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.4.2,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit";"ControlBankInsertionLimits";and"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality".WhentheseLGOsaresuspendedforPHYSICSTESTS,thefueldesigncriteriaarepreservedaslongasthepowerlevelislimitedto<5%RTP,thereactorcoolanttemperatureiskepta530'F,andSDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThePHYSICSTESTSincludemeasurementof.corenuclearparametersortheexerciseof.controlcomponentsthataffectprocessvariables.AmongtheprocessvariablesinvolvedareAFDandgPTR,whichrepresentinitialconditionsoftheplantsafetyanalyses.Alsoinvolvedarethemovablecontrolcomponents(controlandshutdownrods),whicharerequiredtoshutdownthereactor.ThelimitsforthesevariablesarespecifiedforeachfuelcycleintheCOLR.PHYSICSTESTSmeetthecriteriaforinclusionintheTechnicalSpecifications,sincethecomponentsandprocessvariableLCOssuspendedduringPHYSICSTESTSmeetCriteria1,2,and3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOallowsthereactorparametersofMTCandminimumtemperatureforcriticalitytobeoutsidetheirspecifiedlimitstoconductPHYSICSTESTSinMODE2,toverifycertaincorephysicsparameters.Inaddition,itallowsselectedcontrolandshutdownrodstobepositionedoutsideoftheirspecifiedalignmentandinsertionlimits.OperationbeyondspecifiedlimitsispermittedforthepurposeofperformingPHYSICSTESTSandposesnothreattofuelintegrity,providedtheSRsaremet.TherequirementsofLCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.4,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,andLCO3.4.2maybesuspendedduringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTSprovided:a.THERMALPOWERismaintained~5%RTP;b.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureisz530'F;andc.SDMiswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-61(continued)DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE2whenperforminglowpowerPHYSICSTESTS.TheapplicablePHYSICSTESTSareperformedinMODE2atHZP.ACTIONSA.landA.2IftheSDMrequirementisnotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.Theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantconditions.BorationwillbecontinueduntilSDMiswithinlimit.Suspensiono'fPHYSICSTESTSexceptionsrequiresrestorationofeachoftheapplicableLCOstowithinspecificationwithinIhour.8.1WhenTHERMALPOWERis>5%RTP,theonlyacceptableactionistoopenthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)topreventoperationofthereactorbeyonditsdesignlimitssinceaMODEchangehasoccurred.ImmediatelyopeningtheRTBswillshutdownthereactorandpreventoperationofthereactoroutsideofitsdesignlimits.C.1WhentheRCSloopwiththelowestT.,is<530'F,theappropriateactionistorestoreT.,towithinitsspecifiedlimit.TheallowedCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidestimeforrestoringT.,towithinlimitswithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.Operationwiththereactorcriticalandwithtemperaturebelow530'Fcouldviolatetheassumptionsforaccidentsanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-62DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1IfRequiredActionC.1cannotbecompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebrought.toaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3withinanadditional15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15additionalminutesisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingMODE3fromMODE2inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.1.8.1ThepowerrangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEinMODE2byLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACHANNELOPERATIONALTESTisperformedoneachpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelwithin7dayspriortocriticality.ThiswillensurethattheRTSisproperlyalignedtoprovidetherequireddegreeofcoreprotectionduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTS;The7daytimelimitissufficienttoensurethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforeinitiatingPHYSICSTESTS.SR3.1.8.2VerificationthattheRCSlowestloopT.,is>530'Fwillensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginaconditionthatcouldinvalidatethesafetyanalyses.VerificationoftheRCStemperatureataFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-63DraftA PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE2B3.1.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.1.8.3VerificationthattheTHERMALPOWER<5%RTPusingtheNISdetectorswillensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginaconditionthatcouldinvalidatethesafetyanalyses.VerificationoftheTHERMALPOWERataFrequencyof30minutesduringtheperformanceofthePHYSICSTESTSwillensurethattheinitialconditionsofthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.SR3.1.8.4TheSDMisverifiedbycomparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonthegenerallyslowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandonthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDM.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixB,SectionXI.2.10CFR50.59.3.WCAP-9272-P-A,"WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodologyReport,"July1985.4.UFSAR,Section14.6.5.LetterfromR.W.Kober(RGE)toT.E.Hurley(NRC),

Subject:

"StartupReports,"datedJuly9,1984.6.LetterfromJ.P.Durr(NRC)toB.A.Snow(RGE),

Subject:

"Inspection.ReportNo.50-244/88-06,"datedApril28,1988.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.1-64DraftA

3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor.(Fo(Z))LCO3.2.1Fo(Z)shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Fo(Z)notwithinlimit.A.lANDA.2ANDA.3AND'A.4ANDReduceTHERMALPOWERZ1%RTPforeach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.ReduceAFDacceptableoperationlimitsZ1%foreach1%Fa(Z)exceedslimit.ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints>1%foreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.ReduceOverpowerAT,andOvertemperaturehTtripsetpointsz1%foreach1%Fo(Z)exceedslimit.15minutes8hours72hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-1DraftA Fo(Z)3.2.1ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.5PerformSR3.2.1.1'rSR3.2.1.2.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.lB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.1VerifymeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTP~ND31EFPDthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.22DraftA

Fa(Z)3.2.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.2-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWERZ757RTP.VerifymeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant312-3DraftA F~N3.2.23.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)LCO3.2.2F~<shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F~<notwithinlimit.A.lReduceTHERMALPOWER>1%RTP,foreach1%F>exceedslimit.AND15minutesA.2ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints>1%foreach1%F>exceedslimit.72hoursA.3ANDA.4ReduceOverpowerhTandOvertemperaturehTtripsetpointsp1%foreach1%F~zexceedslimit.PerformSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2.72hoursPriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.l(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-4DraftA F~~N3.2.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.2.1VerifyF~iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPAND31EFPDthereafterSR3.2.2.2-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWERZ75/RTP.VerifyF~<iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-5DraftA AFD3.2.33.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)LCO3.2.3TheAFDmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandAFD:'a~b.C.ShallbemaintainedwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifferencewithTHERMALPOWERZ90%RTP.ThetargetbandisspecifiedintheCOLR.HaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbutZ50%RTP,providedAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsandcumulativepenaltydeviationtimeisg1hourduringtheprevious24hours.TheacceptableoperationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.HaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<50%RTP.2.3.',NOTESTheAFDshallbeconsideredoutsidethetargetbandwhentheaverageoffourOPERABLEexcorechannelsindicateAFDtobeoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsshallbeusedtoderivetheaverage.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa1minutepenaltydeviation.foreach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWERZ50%RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa0.5minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithTHERMALPOWER>15%RTPand<50/RTP,andAFDoutsidethetargetband.Atotalof16hoursofoperationmaybeaccumulatedwithAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithoutpenaltydeviationtimeduringsurveillanceofpowerrangechannelsin*accordancewithSR3.3.1.6.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>15/.RTP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-6DraftA AFD3.2.3ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.THERMALPOWER>90%RTP.ANDAFDnotwithinthetargetband.A.lRestoreAFDtowithintargetband.15minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.8.1InitiateactiontoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTP.ImmediatelyC.THERMALPOWER<90%RTPandZ50%RTPwithcumulativepenaltydeviationtime>1hourduringtheprevious24hours.ORTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPandh50%RTPwithAFDnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits.C.1InitiateactiontoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-7DraftA AFD3.2.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.THERMALPOWER90%RTPANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.D.lPerformSR3.2.3.1.Onceevery15minutesE.THERMALPOWER<90%RTP.ANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.E.lPerformSR3.2.3.2.Onceevery1hourR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-8DraftA AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.1NOTES-1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonito'ralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWER>90%%uoRTP2.AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexist'duringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin15minutesandevery15minutesthereafterSR3.2.3.22.-NOTESOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewhenTHERMALPOWER(90%RTP.AssumeloggedvaluesofAFDexistduringthepreceding24hourtimeintervalifactualAFDvaluesarenotavailable.VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.Oncewithin1hourandevery1hourthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-9DraftA AFD3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.3Updatetargetfluxdifference.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND31EFPDthereafterSR3.2.3.4NOTETheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefuelingmaybedeterminedfromdesignpredictions.Determine,bymeasurement,thetargetfluxdifference.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingAND92EFPDthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-10DraftA PPTR3.2.43.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)LCO3.2.4ThegPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandgPTRshallbeg1.02.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50%RTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.gPTRnotwithinlimit.A.1LimitTHERMALPOWERtoZ3%belowRTPforeach1%ofgPTR>1.00.2hoursA.2ANDA.3ANDPerformSR3.2.4.1andlimitTHERMALPOWERtoZ3%bel'owRTPforeach1%of0PTR>1.00.PerformSR3.2.,1.1andSR3.2.2.1.Onceper12hoursWithin24hoursafterachievingequilibriumconditionswithTHERMALPOWERlimitedbyRequiredActionsA.landA.2-ANDOnceper7daysthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-11DraftA QPTR3.2.4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.4--------NOTE---------PerformRequiredActionA.4onlyafterRequiredActionA.3hasverifiedthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimits.ANDCalibrateexcoredetectorinstrumentationtoeliminatetheindicatedtilt.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.landA.2(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-12DraftA QPTR3.2.4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.5--------NOTES--------1.OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifthecauseoftheQPTRalarmisnotassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.2.PerformRequiredActionA.5onlyafterRequiredActionA.4iscompleted.3.OnlyoneoftheCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.PerformSR-3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.Within24hoursafterreachingRTPORWithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.landA.2B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lReduceTHERMALPOWERtog50%RTP.4hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-13DraftA QPTR3.2.4ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.QPTRmonitoralarminoperable.C.lPerformSR3.2.4.2OROncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterC.2PerformSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2,2Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.4.1NOTES1.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER(75%RTP,theremainingthreepowerrangechannelscanbeusedforcalculatingQPTR.2.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER~755RTP,performSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.VerifyQPTRiswithinlimitbycalculation.7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-14DraftA 0PTR3.2.4SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.4.22.NOTESOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifthegPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERHALPOWER<75%RTP,theremainingthreepowerrangechannelscanbeusedforcalculatinggPTR.3.WithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERHALPOWERh75%RTP,performSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.VerifygPTRiswithinlimitbycalculation.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.2-15DraftA

Fo(Z)B3.2.183.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.1HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthelimitsonthevaluesofFo(Z)istolimitthelocal(i.e.,pellet)peakpowerdensity.ThevalueofFo(Z)variesalongtheaxialheightofthecore(Z).F0(Z)isdefinedasthemaximumlocalfuelrodlinearpowerdensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinearpowerdensity,assumingnominalfuelpelletandfuelroddimensionsadjustedforuncertainty.Therefore,Fo(Z)isameasureofthepeakpellet.powerwithinthereactorcore.Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO'.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.Fo(Z)issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,'ontrolbankinsertion,fuelburnup,andchangesinaxialpower'istribution.F~(Z)ismeasuredperiodicallyusingtheincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreatornearsteadystateconditions.Withthemeasuredthreedimensionalpowerdistributions,itispossibletodetermineameasuredvalueforFo(Z).However,becausethisvaluerepresentsasteadystatecondition,itdoesnotincludevariationsinthevalueofF<(Z),whicharepresentduringanonequilibriumsituationsuchasloadfollowingwhentheplantchangespowerleveltomatchgriddemandpeaksandvalleys.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(i.e.,ConditionIeventsasdescribedinReferenceI)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,QPTR,andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-1(continued)

Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLELimitsonFo(Z)precludecorepowerdistributionsthatSAFETYANALYSESviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:a.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.2);c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.3);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)withthehighestworth'ontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.4).LimitsonFo(Z)ensurethatthevalueofthetotalpeakingfactorassumedasaninitialconditionintheaccidentanalysesremainsvalid.Othercriteriamustalsobemet(e.g.,maximumcladdingoxidation,maximumhydrogengeneration,eoolablegeometry,andlongtermcooling).However,thepeakcladdingtemperatureistypicallymostlimiting.TheFo(Z)limitsprovidedintheCOLRarebasedonthelimitsused,intheLOCAanalysis.Fo(Z)l,imitsassumedintheLOCAanalysisaretypicallylimitingrelativeto(i.e.,lowerthan)theFo(Z)assumedinsafetyanalysesforotheraccidentsbecauseoftherequirementssetforthin10CFR50.46(Ref.2)andECCSmodeldevelopmentinaccordancewiththerequiredfeaturesoftheECCSevaluationmodelsprovidedin20CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.5).Therefore,thisLCOprovidesconservativelimitsforotheraccidents.Fo(Z)satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-2(continued)

FQ(Z)B3.2.1BASES(continued)LCOTheFo(Z)shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipsprovidedintheCOLR.The,F<(Z)limitsdefinelimitingvaluesforcorepowerpeakingthatprecludespeakcladdingtemperaturesabove2200'FduringeitheralargeorsmallbreakLOCA(Refs.6and7).ThisLCOrequiresoperationwithintheboundsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.CalculationsareperformedinthecoredesignprocesstoconfirmthatthecorecanbecontrolledinsuchamannerduringoperationthatitcanstaywithintheLOCAFo(Z)limits.IfF<(Z)cannotbemaintainedwithintheLCOlimits,reductionofthecorepowerisrequired.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsforFo(Z)mayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifadesignbasiseventoccurswhileFo(Z)isoutsideitsspecifiedlimits.APPLICABILITYTheFo(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedwhileinMODE1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.ACTIONSA.1ReducingTHERMALPOWERbyZ1%foreach1%bywhichFo(Z)exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableabsolutepowerdensity.The15minuteCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheanalysisofanincorefluxmapverifiesthelimitisexceededandtheshiftsupervisorhasbeennotified.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-3 Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2WhencorepeakingfactorsaresufficientlyhighthatLCO3.2.1doesnotpermitoperationatRTP,theacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDarereduced.Theacceptableoperationlimitsarereduced1%foreach1%bywhichFo(Z)exceedsitslimit.Forexample,ifthemeasuredFo(Z)exceedsthelimitby3%andtPeacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDarei11%at90%RTPand231%at50%RTP,thentherevisedAFDAcceptableOperationLimitswouldbea8%at90%RTPand+28%at50%RTP.Thisensuresanearconstantmaximumlinearheatrateinunitsofkilowattsperfootattheacceptableoperationlimits.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursforthechangeinsetpointsissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisrelativelyshorttimeperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.A.3AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-,Hightripsetpointsbyz1%foreach1%bywhichFo(Z)exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethistripsetpointhelpsprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,givenanFo(Z)limitof2.32,ameasuredFQ(Z)of2.4,andaPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointof108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3.4%to104.6%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-4 Fo(Z)B3.2.1BASESACTIONS(continued)A.4ReductionintheOverpowerbTandOvertemperature4Ttripsetpointsbyz1%foreach1%bywhichF<(Z)exceedsitslimit,isaco'nservativeactionfor.protectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionssincethesetripsetpointshelpprotectreactorcoresafetylimits.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.VerificationthatFo(Z)hasbeenrestoredtowithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.1.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.1ensuresthatcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.1IftheRequiredActionsofA.1throughA.5cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.ThisallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-5(continued) Fa(Z)B3.2.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.1.1VerificationthatFo(Z)iswithinitslimitinvolvesincreasingthemeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)toallowformanufacturingtoleranceandmeasurementuncertaintiesandthenmakingacomparisonwiththelimits.'heselimitsareprovidedintheCOLR.Specifically,themeasuredvalueoftheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo)isincreasedby3%toaccountforfuelmanufacturingtolerancesandby5%forflux,mapmeasurementuncertaintyforafullcorefluxmapusingthemovableincoredetectorfluxmappingsystem.ThisprocedureisequivalenttoincreasingthedirectlymeasuredvaluesofFo(Z)by1.0815%beforecomparingwithLCOlimits.PerformingtheSurveillanceinMODE1priortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPaftereachrefuelingensuresthatFo(Z)iswithinlimitwhenRTPisachievedandprovidesconfirmationofthenucleardesignandthefuelloadingpattern.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisadequateformonitoringthechangeofpowerdistributionwithcoreburnupbecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyforthisamountoffuelburnup.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheFo(Z)limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofduration.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.1.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.1.2doesnotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.1.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.1.2meetstherequirementsofSR3.2.1.1.SR3.2.1.2Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-6, BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.1.2(continued)WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfor,detectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.1.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatForemainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERish75%RTP.REFERENCES1.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedMaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.2.10CFR50.46.3.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.1.4.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.6.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.1.7.UFSAR,Section15.6.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-7

FgpN83.2.2B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS83.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F>)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthepowerdensityatanypointinthecoresothatthefueldesigncriteriaarenotexceededandtheaccidentanalysisassumptionsremainvalid.Thedesignlimitsonlocal(pellet)andintegratedfuelrodpeakpowerdensityareexpressedintermsofhotchannelfactors.Controlofthecorepowerdistributionwithrespecttothesefactorsensuresthatlocalconditionsinthefuelrodsandcoolantchannelsdonotchallengecoreintegrityatanylocationinthecoreduringeithernormaloperationorapostulatedaccidentanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses.F~<isdefinedastheratiooftheintegralofthelinearpoweralongthefuelrodwiththe'highestintegratedpowertotheaverageintegratedfuelrodpower.Therefore,F~>isameasureofthemaximumtotalpowerproducedinafuelrod.TheF>>limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.Thischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityfordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).F~issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,andfuelburnup.F><typicallyincreaseswithcontrolbankinsertionandtypicallydecreaseswithfuelburnup.F~<isnotdirectlymeasurablebutisinferredfromapowerdistributionmapobtainedwiththemovableincoredetectorsystem.Specifically,theresultsofthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionmapareanalyzedbyacomputertodetermineF<<.Thisfactoriscalculatedatleastevery31EFPD.However,duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.F~<andthegPTRLCOlimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-8 CHB3.2.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheCOLRprovidespeakingfactorlimitsthatensurethatthedesignbasisvaluefordeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientconditionarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency.TheDNBdesignbasisprecludesDNBandismetbylimitingtheminimumlocalDNBheatfluxratio.AllDNBlimitedtransienteventsareassumedtobeginwithanF>valuethatsatisfiestheLCOrequirements.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.DNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthe,safetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-9 BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-1andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.The,W-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationappliesintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30.OperationoutsidetheLCOlimitsmayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.TheDNBdesignbasisensuresthatthereisnooverheatingofthefuelthatresultsinpossiblecladdingperforationwiththereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLimitsonF~precludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthefollowingfueldesignlimits:a.Duringalossofforcedreactorflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),peakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.1);C~d.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDHwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-10 BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)FortransientsthatmaybeDNBlimited,theReactorCoolantSystemflowandF~<arethecoreparametersofmostimportance.ThelimitsonF><ensurethattheDNBdesign,basisismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientsarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency(i.e.,Condition1eventsasdescribedinReference4).TheDNBdesignbasisismetbylimitingtheminimumDNBRtothe95/95DNBcriterion.TheallowableF~<limitincreaseswithdecreasingpowerlevel.ThisfunctionalityinF~isincludedintheanalysesthatprovidetheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)ofSL2.1.1.Therefore,anyDNBeventsinwhichthecalculationofthecorelimitsismodeledimplicitlyusethisvariablevalueofF>>intheanalyses.Likewise,alltransientsthatmaybeDNBlimitedareassumedtobeginwithaninitial'F<asafunctionofpowerleveldefinedbytheCOLRlimitequation.TheLOCAsafetyanalysisindirectlymodelsF>asaninputparameter.TheNuclearHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))andtheaxialpeakingfactorsareinserteddirectlyintotheLOCAsafetyanalysesthatverifytheacceptabilityoftheresultingpeakcladdingtemperature(Ref.1).ThefuelisprotectedinpartbyTechnicalSpecifications,whichensurethattheinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyandaccidentanalysesremainvalid.ThefollowingLCOsensurethis:LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"LCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.2,"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~),"andLCO3.2.1,"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))."F~>ismeasuredperiodicallyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystem.Heasurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreat,ornear,steadystateconditions.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(Condition1events)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,QPTR,andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimits.F~satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-11(continued) FggNB3.2.2BASES(continued)LCOF~<shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipprovidedintheCOLR.TheF~limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.ThischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityforDNB.ThelimitingvalueofF~,describedbytheequationcontainedintheCOLR,isthedesignradialpeakingfactorusedintheplantsafetyanalyses.Apowermultiplicationfactorinthisequationincludesanadditionalmarginforhigherradialpeakingfromreducedthermalfeedbackandgreatercontrolrodinsertionatlowpowerlevels.ThelimitingvalueofF~isallowedtoincrease0.3%forevery1%RTPreductioninTHERMALPOWER.APPLICABILITYTheF~,limitsmustbemaintainedinMODE1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthefueldesignlimitsforDNBRandPCT.Applicabilityinothermodesisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficient.storedenergyinthefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.S~ecifically,thedesignbaseseventsthataresensitivetoF~inMODES2,3,4,and5'havesignificantmargintoDNB,andtherefore,thereisnoneedtorestrictF~>inthesemodes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-.12(continued)

BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lReducingTHERMALPOWERbyZ1%foreach1%bywhichF<<exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableDNBRmargin.WhentheF><limit'isexceeded,theDNBRlimitisnotlikelyviolatedinsteadystateoperation,becauseeventsthatcouldsignificantlyperturbtheF~value(e.g.,staticcontrolrodmisalignment)areconsideredinthesafetyanalyses.However,theDNBRlimitmaybeviolatedifaDNBli'mitingeventoccurs.ReducingTHERMALPOWERincreases-theDNBmarginanddoesnotlikelycausetheDNBRlimittobeviolatedinsteadystateoperation.The15minuteCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheanalysisofanincorefluxmapverifiesthelimitisexceededandtheshiftsupervisorhasbeennotified.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.A.2AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-.Hightripsetpointsbyz1%foreach1%bywhichF~exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionsandensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,giventhattheF~limitisexceededby3%andthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointis108%,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3%to105%.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodof.aseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithrequiredactionA.l.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-13 FhHB3.2.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.3ReductionintheOverpowerATandOvertemperatureATtripsetpointsbyp1%foreach1%bywhichF~exceedsitslimit,ensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.A.4VerificationthatF~hasbeenrestoredwithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.1ensuresthatthecausethatledtotheF>>exceedingitslimitiscorrected,andcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.B.1IftheRequiredActionsofA.1throughA.4cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-14(continued)

BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.2.2.1ThevalueofF~>>isdeterminedbyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystemtoobtainafluxdistributionmap.AdatareductioncomputerprogramthencalculatesthemaximumvalueofF>>fromthemeasuredfluxdistributions.ThemeasuredvalueofF>>mustbemultipliedby1.04toaccountformeasurementuncertaintybeforemakingcomparisonstotheF>>limit.Aftereachrefueling,F>>mustbedeterminedinMODE1priortoexceeding75/RTP.ThisrequirementensuresthatF>>limitsaremetatthebeginningofeachfuelcycle.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisacceptablebecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyoverthisamountoffuelburnu~.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheF>>limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofoperation.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.2.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.2.2doesnotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.2.2meetstherequirementsofSR3.2.2.1.Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,gPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.2.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF>>remainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERisZ75KRTP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-15(continued) BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.1.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly101967.4.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheOesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-16 AFDB3.2.3B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthevaluesoftheAFDinordertolimittheaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoeitherthetoporbottomofthecore.Bylimitingtheamountofpowerdistributionskewing,corepeakingfactorsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.Limitingpowerdistributionskewingovertimealsominimizesthexenondistributionskewing,whichisasignificantfactorinaxialpowerdistributioncontrol.Theoperatingschemeusedtocontroltheaxialpowerdistribution,Constant'xialOffsetControl(CAOC),involvesmaintainingtheAFDwithinatolerancebandaroundaburnupdependenttarget,knownasthetargetfluxdifference,tominimizethevariationoftheaxialpeakingfactorandaxialxenondistributionduringplantmaneuvers.Thetargetfluxdifferenceisdeterminedat.equilibriumxenonconditions.ThecontrolbanksmustbepositionedwithinthecoreinaccordancewiththeirinsertionlimitsandControlBankDshouldbeinsertednearitsnormalposition(i.e.,z210stepswithdrawn)forsteadystateoperationathighpowerlevels.ThepowerlevelshouldbeasnearRTPaspractical.ThevalueofthetargetfluxdifferenceobtainedundertheseconditionsdividedbythefractionofRTPisthetargetfluxdifferenceatRTPfortheassociatedcoreburnupconditions.TargetfluxdifferencesforotherTHERHALPOWERlevelsareobtainedbymultiplyingtheRTPvaluebytheappropriatefractionalTHERHALPOWERlevel.Periodicupdatingofthetargetfluxdifferencevalueisnecessarytofollowthechangeofthefluxdifferenceatsteadystateconditionswithburnup.TheNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)andQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)LCOslimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-17(continued)

AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheAFDisameasureofaxialpowerdistributionskewingtothetoporbottomhalfofthecore.TheAFDissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankpositions,corepowerlevel,axialburnup,axialxenondistributionand,toaless'erextent,reactorcoolanttemperatureandboronconcentrations.TheallowedrangeoftheAFDisusedinthenucleardesignprocesstoconfirmthatoperationwithintheselimitsproducescorepeakingfactorsandaxialpowerdistributionsthatmeetsafetyanalysisrequirements.TheCAOCmethodology(Ref.I)entails:a.Establishinganenvelopeofallowedpowershapesandpowerdensities;b.Devisinganoperatingstrategyforthecyclethatmaximizesplantflexibility(maneuvering)andminimizesaxialpowershapechanges;c.Demonstratingthatthisstrategydoesnotresultincoreconditionsthatviolatetheenvelopeofpermissiblecorepowercharacteristics;andd.Demonstratingthatthispowerdistributioncontrolschemecanbeeffectivelysupervisedwithexcoredetectors.ThelimitsontheAFDensurethattheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))isnotexceededduringeithernormaloperationorintheeventofxenonredistributionfollowingpowerchanges.ThelimitsontheAFDalsolimittherangeofpowerdistributionsthatareassumedasinitialconditionsinanalyzingCondition2,3,and4events(Ref.2).Thisensuresthatfuelcladdingintegrityismaintainedforthesepostulatedaccidents.ThemostimportantCondition4eventisthelossofcoolantaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition3eventisthelossofflowaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition2eventsareuncontrolledbankwithdrawalandborationordilutionaccidents.Condition2accidents,assumedtobeginfromwithintheAFDlimits,areusedtoconfirmtheadequacyofOverpowerhTandOvertemperaturehTtripsetpoints.ThelimitsontheAFDsatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-18(continued) AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)LCOTheshapeofthepowerprofileintheaxial(i.e.,thevertical)directionislargelyunderthecontroloftheoperator,througheitherthemanualoperationofthecontrolbanks,orautomaticmotionofcontrolbanksrespondingtotemperaturedeviationsresultingfromeithermanualoperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemtochangeboronconcentration,orfrompowerlevelchanges.SignalsareavailabletotheoperatortohelpdefinethepowerprofilefromtheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excoreneutrondetectors(Ref.3).Separatesignalsaretakenfromthetopandbottomexcoreneutrondetectors.TheAFDisdefinedasthedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetectorineachdetectorwell.Forconvenience,thisfluxdifferenceisconvertedtoprovidefluxdifferenceunitsexpressedasapercentageandlabeledas%4fluxor%4I.WithTHERMALPOWER>90%RTP(i.e.,PartAofthisLCO),theAFDmustbekeptwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.WiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER>90%RTP,theassumptionsof.theaccidentanalysesmaybeviolated.WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTP,theAFDmaybeoutsidethe'targetbandprovidedthatthedeviationtimeisrestricted.ItisintendedthattheplantisoperatedwiththeAFDwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.However,duringrapidTHERMALPOWERreductions,controlbankmotionmaycausetheAFDtodeviateoutsideofthetargetbandatreducedTHERHALPOWERlevels.Thisdeviationdoesnotaffectthexenondistributionsufficientlytochangetheenvelopeofpeaking'factorsthatmaybereachedonasubsequentreturntoRTPwiththeAFDwithinthetargetband,providedthetimedurationofthedeviationislimited.Accordingly,whileTHERHALPOWERisZ50%RTPand<90%RTP(i.e.,PartBofthisLCO),aIhourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimelimit,cumulativeduringthepreceding24hourswhen>15/RTP,isallowedduringwhichtheplantmaybeoperatedoutsideofthetargetbandbutwithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesascalculatedbyNotes2and3ofthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-19 AFDB3.2.3BASESLCO(continued)ForTHERMALPOWERlevels>15%RTPand<50%RTP(i.e.,PartCofthisLCO),deviationsoftheAFDoutsideofthetargetbandarelesssignificant.Thereducedpenaltydeviationtimeaccumulationratereflectsthisreducedsignificance.'ithTHERMALPOWER<15%RTP,AFDisnotasignificantparameterintheassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisand,therefore,requiresnolimits.BecausethexenondistributionproducedatTHERMALPOWERlevelslessthanRTPdoesaffectthepowerdistributionaspowerisincreased,unanalyzedxenonandpowerdistributionispreventedbylimitingtheaccumulatedpenaltydeviationtime.ThefrequencyofmonitoringtheAFDbythePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)isnominallyonceperminuteprovidinganessentiallycontinuousaccumulationofpenaltydeviationtimethatallowstheoperatortoaccuratelyassessthestatusofthepenaltydeviationtime.TheinoperabilityofthismonitorrequiresindependentverificationthatAFDremainswithinlimitandthatthepeakingfactorsassumedintheaccidentanalysesremainvalid.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-20 AFDB3.2.3BASESLCO(continued)ThisLCOismodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstNotestatestheconditionsnecessaryfordeclaringtheAFDoutsideofthetargetband.Therequiredtargetbandvarieswithaxialburnupdistribution,whichinturnvarieswiththecoreaverageaccumulatedburnup.ThetargetbanddefinedintheCOLRmayprovideonetargetbandfortheentirecycleormorethanoneband,eachtobefollowedforaspecificrangeofcycleburnup.TheaverageofthefourOPERABLEexcoredetectorsisusedtodeterminewhenAFDisoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsareusedtoderivetheaverageAFD.ThesecondandthirdNotesdescribehowthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiscalculated.ThesecondNotestatesthatwithTHERMALPOWER>50%RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof1minuteforeach.1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetarget,band.ThethirdNotestatesthatwithTHERMALPOWER>15%RTPand<50%RTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof0.5minutes'foreach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband.ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesfromNotes2and3ofthisLCO.ThefourthNoteaddressesAFDoutsideofthetargetbandduringsurveillances.ForsurveillanceofthepowerrangechannelsperformedaccordingtoSR3.3.1.6,deviationoutsidethetargetbandispermittedfor16hoursandnopenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulated.SomedeviationintheAFDisrequiredfordoingtheNIScalibrationwiththeincoredetectorsystem.Thiscalibrationisperformedevery92days.ViolatingtheLCOontheAFDcouldproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaCondition2,3,or4eventoccurswhiletheAFDisoutsideitslimits'.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-21(continued) AFDB3.2.3BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYAFDrequirementsareapplicableinMODE1above15%RTP.Above50%RTP,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWERandcorepeakingfactorsarethecoreparametersofprimaryimportanceinsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).Above15%RTP,thisLCOisapplicabletoensurethatthedistributionsofxenonareconsistentwithsafetyanalysisassumptions.Atorbelow15%RTPandforloweroperatingMODES,thestoredenergyinthefuelandtheenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolantarelow.Also,lowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15%RTP.ThevalueoftheAFDintheseconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.ACTIONSA.lWiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandandTHERMALPOWERZ90%RTP,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolatedwithrespecttothemaximumheatgeneration.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof15minutesisallowedtorestoretheAFDtowithinthetargetbandbecausexenondistributionschangelittleinthisrelativelyshorttime.-8.1IfRequiredActionA.1isnotcompletedwiththerequiredCompletionTimeof15minutes,theaxialxenondistributionstartstobecomeskewed.ImmediatelyinitiatingactiontoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPplacesthecoreinaconditionthathasbeenanalyzedandfoundtobeacceptable,providedthattheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ImmediatelyinitiatingthereductioninTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPallowsforacontrolledreductioninpowerwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-22 0P/'l$ AFDB3.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1ThisRequiredActionmustbeimplementedwithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbutZ50%RTPifeitherthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis>Ihourduringtheprevious24hours,ortheAFDisnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoperationlimits;WithTHERMALPOWER<90%RTPbutz50%RTP,operationwiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandisallowedforuptoIhouriftheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.WiththeAFDwithintheselimits,theresultingaxialpowerdistributionisacceptableasaninitialconditionforaccidentanalysesassumingthethenexistingxenondistributions.TheIhourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimerestrictstheextentofxenonredistribution.Withoutthislimitation,unanalyzedxenonaxialdistributionsmayresultfromadifferentpatternofxenonbuildupanddecay.Immediatelyinitiatingthereductiontoapowerlevel<50%RTPwi11putthereactorataTHERMALPOWERlevelatwhichtheAFDisnotasignificantaccidentanalysisparameter.IftheindicatedAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandoutsidetheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR,thepeakingfactorsassumedinaccidentanalysismaybeexceededwiththeexistingxenoncondition.AnyAFDwithinthetargetbandisacceptableregardlessofitsrelationshiptotheacceptableoperationlimits.D.1WhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis>90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredto'etectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofevery15minutestoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequatetoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevelsandisconsistentwiththeCompletionTimeforrestoringAFDtowithinlimits(ConditionA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-23 AFD83.2.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.IWhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERHALPOWERis<90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofeveryhourtoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof1hourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefrom.thetargetbandforupto1hourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.2.3.1TheAFDismonitoredonacontinuousbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasanAFDmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesthe1minuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.Thecomputer,alsosendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeisz1hourwithintheprevious24hours.Thisalarmmessagedoesnotclearuntilthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis<1hourwithintheprevious24hours.WiththeAFDmonitoralarminoperable,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtime.Duringoperationat>90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof15minutestoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERHALPOWERlevels.TheAFDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyduringperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDismorelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-24

AFD83.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.I(continued)SR3.2.3.IismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthissurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhen'.theAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWERZ90%RTP.,ThesecondNotestatesthatmonitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderfortheoperatortocomputethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.SR3.2.3.2TheAFDismonitoredona,continuousbasisusingthePPCSthathasanAFDmonitor.alarm.ThePPCSdeterminestheIminuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.Thecomputer,alsosendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiszIhourwithintheprevious24hours.Thisalarmmessagedoesnotclearuntilthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis<Ihourwithintheprevious24hours.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-25 e AFDB3.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.2.3.2(continued)WiththeAFDmonitoral'arminoperable,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtime.Duringoperationat<90/RTP,but>15KRTP;theAFDmeasurementismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyofIhourtoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyofIhour'isadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforuptoIhourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired.TheAFDshouldbemonitoredandloggedmorefrequentlyinperiodsofoperationforwhichthepowerlevelorcontrolbankpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswhentheAFDismorelikelytomoveoutsidethetargetband.SR3.2.3.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthissurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperablewithTHERHALPOWER<90%RTP.ThesecondNotestatesthatmonitoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintervalinorderfortheoperatorto.computethecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsor,handlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs.SR3.2.3.3.ThisSurveillancerequiresthatthetargetfluxdifferencebeupdatedataFrequencyof31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)toaccountforsmallchangesthatmayoccurinthe.targetfluxdifferencesinthatperiodduetoburnup.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-26 AFD83.2.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.3.3(continued)Therearetwomethodsbywhichthisupdatecanbecompleted.ThefirstmethodrequiresmeasuringthetargetfluxdifferenceinaccordancewithSR3.2.3.4.Thismeasurementmaybeobtainedusingincoreorexcoreinstrumentation.Thesecondmethodinvolvesinterpolationbetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalues.Thenucleardesignreportprovidespredictedvaluesfortargetfluxdifferenceatvariouscycleburnups.Thedifferencebetweenthelastmeasuredvalueandthepredictedvalueatthesameburnupisappliedtothepredictedvalueattheburnupwherethetargetfluxdifferenceupdateisrequired.Thisrevisedpredictedvaluecanthenbeusedtodeterminetheupdatedvalueofthetargetfluxdifference.SR3.2.3.4Measurementofthetargetfluxdifferenceisaccomplishedbytakingafluxmapwhenthecoreisatequilibriumxenonconditions,preferablyathighpowerlevelswiththecontrolbanksnearlywithdrawn.This.fluxmapprovidestheequilibriumxenonaxialpowerdistributionfromwhichthetargetvaluecanbedetermined.Thetargetfluxdifferencevariesslowlywithcoreburnup.AFrequencyof31EFPDaftereachrefuelingand92EFPDthereafterforremeasuringthetargetfluxdifferencesadjuststhetargetfluxdifferencetothevaluemeasuredatsteadystateconditions.ThisisthebasisfortheCAOC.Remeasurement.atthisSurveillanceintervalalsoestablishestheAFDtargetfluxdifferencevaluesthataccountforchangesinincore-excorecalibrationsthatmayhaveoccurredintheinterim.SR3.2.3.4ismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsthepredictedbeginningofcycleAFDfromthecyclenucleardesigntobeusedtodeterminetheinitialtargetfluxdifferenceaftereachrefueling.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-27(continued) AFD~B3.2.3BASES,(continued)REFERENCES1.WCAP-8403(nonproprietary),"PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures,."WestinghouseElectricCorporation,September1974.2.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedMaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.3.UFSAR,Section7.7.2.6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-28 QPTRB3.2.4B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)BASESBACKGROUNDTheQPTRlimitensuresthatthegrossradialpowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththedesignvaluesusedinthesafetyanalyses.Preciseradialpowerdistributionmeasurementsaremadeduringstartuptesting,afterrefueling,andperiodicallyduringpoweroperation.QuadrantPowerTiltisacoretiltthatismeasuredwiththeuseoftheexcorepowerrangefluxdetectors.Acoretiltisdefinedastheratioofmaximumtoaveragequadrantpower.TheQPTRisdefinedastheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.LimitingtheQPTRpreventsradialxenonoscillationsandwillindicateanycoreasymmetries.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimitedsothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits;"providelimitsonprocessvariablesthatcharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Controlofthesevariablesensuresthatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteriaandthatthepowerdistributionremainswithintheboundsusedinthesafetyanalyses.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLimitsonQPTRprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:a.Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95departurefromnucleateboiling(DNB)criterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;b.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),thepeakcladdingtemperature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.I);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-29 QPTRB3.2.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,theenergydepositiontothefuelwillbebelow200cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDHwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).TheLCOlimitsontheAFD,theQPTR,theHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F~(Z)),theNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~<),andBankInsertion,SequenceandOverlapLimitsareestablishedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthesafetyanalyseslimits.TheQPTRlimitsensurethatF~<andF<(Z)remainbelowtheirlimitingvaluesbypreventinganundetectedchangeinthegrossradialpowerdistribution.InNODE1,theF~andFo(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingdesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheQPTRsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO'ITheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbemaintainedatorbelowthelimitof1.02.QPTRismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasaQPTRmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesfromtheexcoredetectoroutputstheratio'ofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaverageofnuclearpowerinthefourquadrantsandprovidesanalarmmessageiftheQPTRisabovethe1.02limit.TheQPTRlimitof1.02,atwhichcorrectiveactionisrequired,providesamarginofprotectionforboththeDNBratioandlinearheatgenerationratecontributingtoexcessivepowerpeaksresultingfromX-Yplanepowertilts.AlimitingQPTRof1.025canbetoleratedbeforethemarginforuncertaintyinFo(Z)andF~ispossiblychallenged.However,theadditionalQPTRof0.005isprovidedformarginintheLCO.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-30(continued)/

QPTR83.2.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheQPTRlimitmustbemaintainedinMODE1withTHERMALPOWER)50%RTPtopreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthedesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Applicability'inMODE1<50%RTPandinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneithersufficientstoredenergyin'hefuelnorsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofaQPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.TheQPTRlimitintheseconditionsis,therefore,notimportant.NotethattheF~andFo(Z)LCOsstillapplybelow50%RTP,butallowprogressivelyhigherpeakingfactorsasTHERMALPOWERdecreasesbelow50%RTP.ACTIONSA.1WiththeQPTRexceedingitslimit,limitingTHERMALPOWERtoZ3%belowRTPforeach1%bywhichtheQPTRexceeds1.00isaconservativetradeoffoftotalcorepowerwithpeaklinearpower.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursallowssufficienttimetoidentifythecauseandcorrectthetilt.Notethatthepowerreductionitselfmaycauseachangeinthetiltedcondition.AfurtherincreaseintheQPTRwouldrequirealowerlimittoTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2.A.2AftercompletionofRequiredActionA.1,theQPTRalarmmaystillbeinitsalarmedstate.Assuch,anyadditionalchangesintheQPTRaredetectedbyrequiringacheckoftheQPTRinaccordancewithSR3.2.4.1onceper12hoursthereafter.IftheQPTRcontinuestoincrease,THERMALPOWERmustbelimitedaccordingly.A12hourCompletionTimeissufficientbecauseanyadditionalchangeinQPTRwouldberelativelyslow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-31 QPTR83.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)A.3IThepeakingfactorsF~andFo(Z)areofprimaryimportanceinensuringthatthepowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.PerformingSRsonF~andFo(Z)withintheCompletionTimeof24hoursensuresthattheseprimaryindicatorsofpowerdistributionarewithintheirrespectivelimits.ACompletionTimeofwithin24hoursafterachievingequilibriumconditionswithTHERMALPOWERlimitedbyRequiredActionsA.1andA.2takesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.Ifthesepeakingfactorsarenotwithintheirlimits,theRequiredActionsoftheseSurveillancesprovideanappropriateresponsefortheabnormalcondition.IftheQPTRremainsaboveitsspecifiedlimit,thepeakingfactorsurveillancesarerequiredeach7daysthereaftertoevaluateF~andFo(Z)withchangesinpowerdistribution.RelativelysmallchangesareexpectedduetoeitherburnupandxenonredistributionorcorrectionofthecauseforexceedingtheQPTRlimit.TheperformanceofSR3.2.1;1andSR3.2.2.1isnolongerrequiredonceConditionAisexited.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.1.2orSR3.2.2.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.1.2orSR3.2.2.2donotneed'tobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2meettherequirementsofSR3:2.1;1andSR3.2.2.1,respectively.A.4IftheQPTRhasexceededthe1.02limitandtheverificationofF~>andFo(Z)showsthatsafetyrequirementsaremet,theexcoredetectorsarerecalibratedtoeliminatetheindicatedtiltpriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2.ThisisdonetoallowtheoperatortoclearlydetectanysubsequentsignificantchangesinQPTRandtoprovideameaningfulQPTRalarm.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-32. QPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONSA.4(continued)RequiredActionA.4ismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthattherecalibrationoftheexcoredetectorscannotbeperformeduntilafterthereisverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimits(i.e.,RequiredActionA.3).Itisnecessarytoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptablepriortoadjustingtheexcoredetectorstoshowzerotiltandincreasingpowertoensurethattheplantisnotoperatinginanunanalyzedcondition.A.SAfterthefluxtiltiszeroedout(i.e.,RequiredActionA.4isperformed),itisacceptabletoreturntofullpoweroperation.However,asanaddedcheckthatthecorepowerdistributionatRTPisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisassumptions<RequiredActionA.5requiresverificationthatFo(Z)andF~arewithintheirspecifiedlimitswithin24hoursofreachingRTP.Asanaddedprecaution,ifthecorepowerdoesnotreachRTPwithin24hours,butisincreasedslowly,thenthepeakingfactorsurveillancesmustbeperformedwithin48hoursofthetimewhentheascenttopowerwasbegun.TheseCompletionTimesareintendedtoallowadequatetimetoincreaseTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1andA.2,whilenotpermittingthecoretoremainwithunconfirmedpowerdistributionsforextendedperiodsoftime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-33 gPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONSA.5(continued)RequiredActionA.5ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatitisnotnecessarytoperformRequiredActionA.5if'thecauseofthegPTRalarmisassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythatthecorepowerdistributiondoesnothavetobere-verifiedifthegPTRalarmisonlyduetotheinstrumentation(i.e.,theexcoredetectors)beingoutofalignmentandnotduetoananomalywithinthecore.ThesecondNotestatesthatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesarenotrequireduntilaftertheexcoredetectorshavebeencalibrated,toshowzerotilt(i.e.,RequiredActionA.4).TheintentofthisNoteistohavethepeakingfactorsurveillancesperformedatoperatingpowerlevels,whichcanonlybeaccomplishedaftertheexcoredetectorsareadjustedtoshowzerotiltandthecorereturnedtopower.ThethirdNotestatesthatonlyoneofthefollowingCompletion.Times,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.TheintentofthisNoteistoclearlyindicatethatthefirstCompletionTimetobecomeapplicableistheCompletionTimewhichmustbemettosatisfyRequiredActionA.5.B.1IfRequiredActionsA.lthroughA.5arenotcompletedwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtherequirementsdonotapply.Toachievethisstatus,THERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<50%RTPwithin4,hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimerequiredtoreachthereducedpowerlevelwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-34 QPTRB3.2.4BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2WhentheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperabletheQPTRmustbeverifiedwithinlimitsatafrequencyofevery24hourstoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.WhenTHERMALPOWERisZ75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable,QPTRcannotbeadequatel'ymeasuredusingtheexcoredetectors.Inthissituationafluxmapmustbecompletedtoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.ACompletionTimeof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesinQPTR,becauseforthosecausesofQPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertiltandprovidessufficienttimetostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmapwhennecessary.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.4.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheQPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyof7dayswhentheQPTRalarmisOPERABLEisacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilitythatthisalarmcanremaininoperablewithoutdetection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-35 0PTRB3.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.2.4.1(continued)SR3.2.4.1ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstallowsgPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERisR75%RTPandone.powerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERisa75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifygPTR.Above75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,gPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatFoandF~<remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.SR3.2.4.2ThisSurveillanceverifiesthatthegPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimitswhenthegPTRalarmisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelatively.slowchangesingPTR,becauseforthosecausesofgPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertilt.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.2-36 0PTR83.2.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.2.4.2(continued)'ISR3.2.4.2ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthesurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedifthegPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.ThissurveillancerequiresamorefrequentverificationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsincethemonitoralarmisinoperable.ThesecondNoteallowsgPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechan'nelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThethirdNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERisZ75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis>75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifygPTR.Above75%RTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,gPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.Performingafullcorefluxmapprovidesan.accuratealternativemeansforensuringthatFoandF~remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.5.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC29,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.2-37 RTSInstrumentation3.3.13.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.1TheRTSinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.1-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.1-1.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.One.ormoreFunctionswithoneormorerequiredchannelsinoperable.A.lEntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.1-1forthechannel(s).ImmediatelyB.OneManualReactorTripchannelinoperable.B.1ORRestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursB.2.1BeinMODE3.54hoursC.Onechannelortraininoperable.C.1ORRestorechannelortraintoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursC.2OpenRTBs.49hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-1DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.OnePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highchannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.D.1.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<75%RTP.ANDD.1.2Placechannelintrip.OR0.2.1PerformSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.AND0.2.2Placechannelintrip.OR24hours72hoursOncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter72hoursD.3BeinMODE3.78hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-2DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.Onechannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.E.lPlacechannelin.trip.ORE.2'einMODE3.72hours78hoursF.OneIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER>5E-llampsand<8%RTP.F.lORReduceTHERMALPOWERto<5E-11amps.F.2IncreaseTHERMALPOWERtoZ8%RTP.2hours2hoursG.TwoIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelsinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER>5E-11ampsand<8%RTP.G.1ANDG.2Suspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<5E-llamps.Immediately2hoursH.OneortwoIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelsinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER<5E-11amps.H.1Restorechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatus.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERto>5E-llamps(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~33DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEI.OneSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperable.Suspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyJ.TwoSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelsinoperable.J.lOpenRTBs.ImmediatelyK.OneSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperable.K.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.OR48hoursK.2OpenRTBs.49hoursL.RequiredSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperable.L.1Suspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyL.2PerformSR3.1.1.1.Oncewithin12hoursandevery12hoursthereafter(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-4DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEM.Onechannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.M.lPlacechannelintrip.OR72hoursM.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<8.5%RTP.78hoursN.OneReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)channelperloop.inoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels..N.lPlacechannelintrip.OR72hoursN.2ReduceTHERMALPOWER'o<50%RTP.78hours0.OneReactorCoolantPump(RCP)BreakerPositionchannelperRCPinoperable.0.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.OR0.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.72hours78hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-5DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinued'ONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEP.OneTurbineTripchannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.P.lPlacechannelintrip.OR72hoursP.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.78hoursOnetraininoperable.------------NOTE-------------Onetrainmaybebypassedforupto4hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.Q.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursORQ.2BeinMODE3.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-6DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHER.OneRTBtraininoperable.------------NOTES------------1.Onetrainmaybebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.2.OneRTBmaybebypassedforupto8hoursformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.R.lRestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.1hourORR.2BeinHODE3.7hoursS.OnetripmechanisminoperableforoneRTB.S.1ORRestoreinoperabletripmechanismtoOPERABLEstatus./48hoursS.2BeinHODE3.54hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~37DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS--NOTERefertoTable3.3.1-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachRTSFunction.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.1.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.1.2NOTESl.AdjustNISchannelifabsolutedifferenceis>2%.2.Requiredtobeperformed,'forthesecondfrequencywithin12hoursafterTHERMALPOWERisZ50%RTP.CompareresultsofcalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtoNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)channeloutput.24hoursSR3.3.1.3-NOTES-.1.AdjustNISchannelifabsolutedifferenceisZ3%.2.Requiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERis>50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandiftheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31EFPD.3.PerformanceofSR3.3.1.6satisfiesthisSR.CompareresultsoftheincoredetectormeasurementstoNISAFD.31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-8DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.4NOTEThisSurveillancemustbeperformedonthereactortri.pbypassbreakerpriortoplacingthebypassbreakerinservice.PerformTADOT.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.5PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.6NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERisZ50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandiftheSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92EFPD.Calibrateexcorechannelstoagreewithincoredetectormeasurements.92EFPDSR.3.3.1.7NOTERequiredtobeperformedforsourcerangeinstrumentation.within4hoursafterenteringMODE3fromMODE2.PerformCOT.92days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-9DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3:3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.1.8NOTE1.Notrequireduntil4hoursafterreducingpower<8%RTPforpowerrangeandintermediaterangeinstrumentation.2.Notrequireduntil4hoursafterreducingpower<5E-llampsforsourcerangeinstrumentation.PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.1.9NOTEVerificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.92daysSR3.3.1.10-NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsSR3.3.1.11NOTEVerificationof.setpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-10DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.12NOTE-1.Onlyrequiredwhennotperformedwithinprevious31days.2.Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.PriortoreactorstartupSR3.3.1.13VerifythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERis<6%RTPwhileinMODE1.24monthsSR3.3.1.14VerifytheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotblockedwhenbothIntermediateRangechannelsare<5E-llamps.24monthsSR3.3.1.15VerifythePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusllAand118tripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERis>8.5%RTP.24monthsSR3.3.1.16VerifytheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERisZ50%RTP.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-11DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.17VerifytheTurbineTripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERish50%RTP.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-12DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page1of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIOHSREQUIREDCHANNELSCONDITIONSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1.ManualReactorTrip1~23(a)4(a)5(a)BSR3.3.1.11CSR3.3.1.11NAHA2.PoMerRangeNeutronFluxa.Highb.LoM1,21(b)2SR3.3.1.1SR3.3~1.2SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.1SR3.3~1.8SR3.3.1~10SR3.3.1~13s108XRTPs24XRTP3.IntermediateRange1(),2()NeutronFlux2(d)F,GSR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.13SR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.144~SourceRangeNeutronFlux2(d)3(a)4(a)>(a)3(e)4(e)5(e)J,KSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.14SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.14SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.10NA(continued)(a)MithReactorTripBreakers(RTBs)closedandControlRodDrive(CRD)SystemcapableofroduithdraMal.(b)THERMALPOMER<<6XRTP.(c)OneOPERABLEIntermediateRangechannelaSE-11a@ps.(d)BothIntermediateRangechannels<<SE-11amps.(e)lliththeRTBsopenortheRodControlSystemnotcapableofrodwithdrawal.Inthiscondition,sourcerangeFixationdoesnotprovidereactortripbutdoesprovideindication.(f)Basedonestablishedlimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-13DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page2of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHAHNELSSURVEILLANCECOHDITIOHSREQUIREHEHTSTRIPSETPOINT5.OverteaperaturehT1,2SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.3SR3.3.1.6SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10RefertoNote1(page3.3-17)6.OverpowerhT1,2SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10RefertoNote2(page3.3-18)7.PressurizerPressurea.Lowb.High1(g)1I2SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.15SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10z1873psigs2377psig8.PressurizerMaterLevel-High1~2SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1~7SR3.3.1~10s87X9.ReactorCoolantFlow-Lowa.SingleLoopb.TwoLoops1(h)3perloop3pcl'oopSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10SR3.3'.16SR3.3.1~1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3'.10SR3.3.1.15z91Xz91X(continued)(f)Basedonestablishedlimits.(g)THERHALPOMER>8.5XRTP.(h)THERHALPDMERz50XRTP~(i)THERHALPOMER>8.5XRTPandReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionblocked.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-14DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page3of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUHCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIOHSREQUIREOSURVEILLANCECHAHHELSCOHOITIOHSREQUIREHEHTSTRIPSETPOIHT10.ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)BreakerPositiona.SingleLoopb.TooLoops11~Undervoltage-Bus11Aand1181(h)1(g)1perRCP1perRCP2perbusSR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.16SR3.3.1.11SR3.3'.15SR3.3.1.9SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.15NANA12.SteamGenerator(SG)WaterLevel-LoMLoM1,23perSGSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.1013.TurbineTripa.LogAutost'opOilPressureb.TurbineStopValveClosure14.SafetyInJection(Sl)InputfranEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)1(h)1,2PSR3.3.1.10SR3.3~1~12SR3.3~1.17SR3.3.1.12SR3.3~1.17SR3.3.1.11NA,(continued)(f)Basedonestablishedlimits.(g)THERHALPOWER>8.5XRTP.(h)THERHALPOWER250XRTP(J)THERHALPOWER>8.5XRTPandRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionblocked.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-15DraftA RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page4of6)ReactorTripSystemtnstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHEHTS.TRIPSETPOIHT15.Reactor'gjpBreakers16.ReactorTripBreakerUndervoitageandShuntTripHechanisms17.AutomaticTripLog'Ic1,23(a)4(a)5(a)1,23(a)4(a)5(a)1,23(a)4(a)5(a)2tra'ins2trains1eachperRTB1eachperRTB2trains2trainsSR3.3.1.4SR3.3~1.4SR3.3~1.4SR3.3.1.4SR3.3~1.5SR3.3~1.5NAHANANANA(a)llithRTBsclosedandCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.(k)IncludinganyreactortripbypassbreakersthatarerackedinandclosedforbypassinganRTB~R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-16DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page5of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationNote1:OvertemeratureATTheOvertemperatureATFunctionTripSetpointisdefinedby:1+T,SOvertemperaturehT8hT0K,+K~(P-P')-K(T-T')'f(h1)1+f,SWhere:ATismeasuredRCSAT,'F.AT,istheindicatedATatRTP,'F.sistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'TisthemeasuredRCSaveragetemperature,'F..TisthenominalT.,atRTP,'F.Pisthemeasuredpressurizerpressure,psig.PisthenominalRCSoperatingpressure,psig.K,istheOvertemperatureATreactortripsetpointasspecifiedintheCOLR.K~istheOvertemperatureATreactortripdepressurizationsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.K3istheOvertemperatureATreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR7',and7',arethemeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantsasspecifiedintheCOLR.f(AI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetopandbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelsas-specifiedintheCOLR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-17DraftA

RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page6of6)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationNote2:'OverowerATTheOverpowerATFunctionTripSetpointisdefinedby:OverpoMelhT64ToKaKe(1')Ke-(hI>1>S+1Where:ATismeasuredRCSAT,'F.AT0istheindicatedATatRTPFsistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'.TisthemeasuredRCSaveragetemperature,'F.TisthenominalT.,atRTP,'F.K4istheOverpowerATreactortripsetpointasspecifiedintheCOLR.K,istheOverpowerATreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.K,istheOverpowerATreactortripthermaltimedelaysetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.r~isthemeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantasspecifiedintheCOLR.f(AI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetopandbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelsasspecifiedintheCOLR.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-18DraftA ESFASInstrumentation3.3.23.3INSTRUHENTATION3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.2TheESFASinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.2-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.2-1.ACTIONS-------NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormorerequiredchannelsortrainsinoperable.A.1EntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.2-1forthechannel(s)ortrain(s).Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-19DraftA ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDI'IONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEB.Onechannelortraininoperable.B.lRestorechannelortraintoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursC--------NOTE----------0OnlyapplicabletoFunction6.e.C.IBeinMODE36hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.D--------NOTE----------OnlyapplicabletoFunctionsI.a,4.a,and6.d.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCondition8notmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursE--------NOTE----------OnlyapplicabletoFunctions2.aand3.a.E.lBeinMODE3.AND6hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.E.2BeinHODE5.36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-20DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEF.Onetraininoperable.F.lRestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.24hoursG---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicabletoFunctions1.b,4.b,5.a,and6.a.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFnotmet.G.1ANDG.2BeinMODE3.BeinHODE4.6hours12hoursH---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicabletoFunctions2.band3.b.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFnotmet.H.1BeinMODE3.ANDH.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-21DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEI.Onechannelinoperable.--------NOTE---------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.Placechannelintrip.72hoursJ---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicabletoFunctions1.dandI.e.ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursRequired'ActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionInotmet.J.2Reducepressurizerpressureto(2000pslg.12hoursK---------NOTE--------'-OnlyapplicabletoFunctions1.c,4.c,4.d,4.e,S.b,and6.b.K.lBeinMODE3.ANDK.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionInotmet.(condition)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-22DraftA ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEL---------NOTE---------OnlyapplicabletoFunction2.c.Requir'edActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionInotmet.L.IANDL.2BeinHODE3.BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-23DraftA 0 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTES-1.RefertoTable3.3.2-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachESFASFunction.2.WhenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances;entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActions-maybedelayedforupto12hoursprovidedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainsESFASinitiationcapabil'ity.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.2.2PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.2.3NOTE-Verificationofrelaysetpointsnotrequired.PerformTADOT.92daysSR3.3.2.4NOTEVerificationofsetpointsnotrequired.PerformTADOT.24monthsSR3.3.2.5PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsSR3.3.2.6VerifythePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000ps19~24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-24DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page1of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrmentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEHODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEALLOMABLECONDITIONSREQUIREHEHTSVALUETRIPSETPOIHT1.SafetyInjectiona.HanualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,31,2,32trainsB,DSR3.3.2.4F,GSR3.3.2.4HAc.ContaireentPressure-High1,2,3I,KSR3.3.2.1SR3.3-2.2SR3.3.2.5s6.0psigs4.0-psigd.PressurizerPressure-Loue.SteamLinePressure-Lou1,2,3(')3persteamlineSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.6SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5SR,3.3.2.6z1715psigz1750psigz358psigz514psig~~2.ConteireentSpraya.ManualInitiation1,2,3,41B,ESR3.3.2.4HAb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,3,42trainsF,HSR3.3.2.4HAc.Contain>>ntPressure-HighHigh1,2,3,41per'etI,LSR3.3.2.1s32.5psigs2BpsigSR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.53.ContaiwentIsolation.a.HanualInitiation1,2,3,42B,ESR3.3.2.4HANAb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysc.SafetyInjection1,2,3,42trainsF,HSR3.3.2.4RefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.HA(a)PressurizerPressure>2000psig.(cont>nu)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-25DraftA ESFASInstrumentationI~3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page2of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIOHAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREOUIREDSURVEILLANCEALLOMABLECHANNELSCONDITIONSREQUIREHEHTSVALUETRIPSETPOIHT4.SteamLineIsolationa.HanualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandAc'tua't'ionRelays12(b)3(b)12(b)3(b)1perloop2trainsF,GSR3.3.2.4B,DSR3.3.2.4HANANAHAc.ContaireentPressure-HighHigh12(b)3(b)3I,KSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5s20psigs18psigd.HighSteamFlow1,2,3(b)(b)2persteamlineI,KSR3.3~2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3s0.55E6ibm/hr9755psigs0.4E6ibm/hr9755psigCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.CoincidentwithT~-Low1232perloopI,KSR3.3.2.1a543FSR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5a545Fe.High-HighSteam12(b)3(b)2perFlowsteamlineI,KSR3.3.2.1s3.7E6SR3.3'.2Ibm/hr9SR3.3.2.5755psigs3.6E6ibm/hr9755psigCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.(b)ExceptwhenbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-26DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page3of3)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEHCOESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDSURVEILLANCEALLONABLECHANNELSCONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSVALUE5.FeedwaterIsolationa.AutomaticAc'tua'tionLogicandActuationRelays1,2(c)3(c)2trainsF,GSR3.3.2.4NAb.SGlisterLevel-High12(c)3(c)3perSGI,KSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5s68Xs67Xc.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliaryFeedwatera~AutMlat'IcActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,32trainsF,GSR3.3.2.4NANAb.SGllaterLevel-LowLow1,2,33perSGI,KSR3.3.2.1216XSR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.5a17Xc.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.d.Undervoltage-Bus11Aand1181,2,32perbusB,DSR3.3'.3~2450Va2579Vwiths3.6'iths3.6sectimesectimedelaydelaye.TripofBothHainFeedwaterPumps1,22perAFMpunpB,CSR3.3.2.4NANA(c)'ExceptwhenallHainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant30327DraftA I PAHInstrumentation3.3.33.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.3PostAccidentHonitoring(PAM)InstrumentationLCO3.3.3ThePAMinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.3-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES1.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormorerequiredchannel(s)inoperable.A.lEntertheCondition(s),referencedinTable3.3.3-1forthechannel(s).ImmediatelyB.Onerequiredchannelinoperable.,B.1RestorerequiredchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.30daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.C.1InitiateactiontoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReport.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-28DraftA PAHInstrumentation3.3.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Tworequiredchannelsinoperable.ORD.lRestoreonechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOnerequiredchannelinoperableandnodiversechannelOPERABLE.E.Twohydrogenmonitorchannelsinoperable.E.1Restoreonehydrogen,monitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursF----------NOTE--------OnlyapplicabletoFunctions7and10.F.lInitiateactiontoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReport.ImmediatelyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionDnotmet.G---------NOTE---------NotapplicabletoFunctions7and10.G.lBeinMODE3.AND6hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsDandEnotmet.G.2BeinHODE4.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-29DraftA

PANInstrumentation3.3.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTE-SR3.3.3.1andSR3.3.3.2applytoeachPANinstrumentationFunctioninTable3.3.3-1.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.3.1PerformCHANNELCHECKforeachrequiredinstrumentationchannelthatisnormallyenergized.31daysSR3.3.3.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION."24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-30DraftA

PAMInstrumentation3.3.3Table3.3.3-1(page1of1)'ostAccidentMonitoringInstrumentationFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHANNELSCONDITIONS1.PressurizerPressure2.PressurizerLevel3.4.5.6.7.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)HotLegTemperatureRCSColdLegTemperatureRCSPressure(WideRange)RCSSubcoolingMonitorReactorVesselWaterLevel15. 16. 17.18.19.20.21.22.CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant1CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant2CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant3CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant4AuxiliaryFeedwaterFlowSteamGenerator(SG)'WaterLevel(NarrowRange)SGWaterLevel(WideRange)SGPressure8.ContainmentSumpBWaterLevel9.ContainmentPressure(WideRange)10.ContainmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)ll.HydrogenMonitors12.CondensateStorageTankLevel13.RefuelingWaterStorageTankLevel14.ResidualHeatRemovalFlow1perloop'22 2222(a)2(a)2(a)2(a)2perSG.2B,C,D,GB,C,D,G B,C,D,GB,C,D,FB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,FB,C,E,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C.D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,GB,C,D,G2perSGB,C,D,G2B,C,D,G2B,C,D,G2B,C,D,G1perloopB,C,D,G(a)Achannelconsistsoftwocoreexitthermocouples(CETs).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-31DraftA 0 LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.43.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationLCO3.3.4Each480VsafeguardsbusshallhavetwoOPERABLEchannelsofLOPDGStartInstrumentation.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onechannelinoperable.A.lPlacechannelintrip.6,hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.ORTwochannelsperbusinoperable.B.IEnterapplicableCondition(s)andRequiredAction(s)fortheassociatedDGmadeinoperablebyLOPDGstartinstrumentation.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.3-32DraftA LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTEWhenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyfortheperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintotheassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto4hoursprovidedthesecondchannelmaintainsLOPDGstartcapability.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.4.1PerformTADOT.31daysSR3.3.4.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONwithTripSetpointandAllowableValueasfollows:a.Lossofvoltage:24monthsAllowableValueBusvoltageZ368VTimedelay<2.75secb.Degradedvoltage:AllowableValueBusvoltageZ414VTimedelay<1520secTripS~etoint>372.8V2.4+0.12secTrip~Setoint>419.2V<1520secR;E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant30333DraftA CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.53.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.5ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationLCO3.3.5TheGREATSactuationinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.5-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,4,5,and6,Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormorechannelsinoperable.A.l--------NOTE--------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedfor<1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceCREATS,inHodeF.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinHODE1,2,3,or4.B.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-34DraftA CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet-inMODE5or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.C.IANDInitiateactiontorestorechannel(s)ortraintoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyC.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyC.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-35DraftA

CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.5SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSNOTERefertoTable3.3.5-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachCREATSActuationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFRE(}UENCYSR3.3.5.1PerformCOT.92daysNOTESR3.3.5.2Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.24monthsSR3.3.5.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant3.3-36DraftA

CREATSActuationInstrumentation3.3.5Table3.3.5-1(page1of1)CREATSActuationInstrurentationFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1~ManualInitiation1trainSR3.3.5.22.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1trainSR3.3.5.1NA3.ControlRoonRadiationIntakeMonitora.IodineSR3.3.5.1SR3.3.5.3s9x10pCi/ccb.NobleGasSR3.3~5~1SR3.3.5.3s1x10pCi/ccc.ParticulateSR3.3'.1SR3.3.5.3s1x10'Ci/ccR.E.GinnaNuclearPlant30337DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14(Ref.1)requiresthatthecoreprotectionsystems,togetherwithassociatedengineeredsafetyfeaturesequipment,bedesignedtopreventorsuppressconditionsthatcouldresultinexceedingacceptablefueldesignlimits.TheRTSinitiatesaplantshutdown,basedonthevalues.ofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingthecorefueldesignlimitsandReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryduringanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)andtoassisttheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)Systemsinmitigatingaccidents.Theinstalledprotectionandmonitoringsystemshavebeendesignedtoassuresafeoperationofthereactoratalltimes.Thisisachievedbyspecifyinglimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)intermsofparametersdirectlymonitoredbytheRTS,aswellasspecifyingLCOswithrespecttotheseparametersandotherreactorsystemparametersandequipment.TheLSSS,definedinthisspecificationastheTripSetpoints,inconjunctionwiththeassociatedLCOs,establishthethresholdforprotectivesystemactiontopreventexceedingacceptablelimitsduring.DesignBasisAccidents(DBAs).Theseacceptablelimitsare:a.TheSafetyLimit(SL)valuesshallbemaintain'edtopreventdeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB);b.Fuelcenterline'meltshallnotoccur;andc.TheRCSpressureSLof.2735psigshallnotbeexceeded.OperationwithintheSLsofSpecification2.0,"SafetyLimits(SLs),"maintainstheabovevaluesandassuresthatoffsitedosewillbewithin10CFR100limits(Ref.2)duringAOOs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-1DraftA 0 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)DBAsareeventsthatareanalyzedeventhoughtheyarenotexpectedtooccurduringtheplantlife.TheDBAacceptancelimitisthatoffsitedosesshallbemaintainedwithinanacceptablefractionof10CFR100limits(Ref.2).Therearefivedifferentaccidentcategorieswhichareorganizedbasedontheprobabilityofoccurrence(Ref.3).Eachaccidentcategoryisallowedadifferentfractionofthe10CFR100limits,inverselyproportionedtotheprobabilityofoccurrence.Heetingtheacceptabledoselimitforanaccidentcategoryisconsideredashavingacceptableconsequencesforthatevent.TheRTSinstrumentationissegmentedintothreedistinctbutinterconnected'modulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4):a.Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;b.Signalprocesscontrolandprotectionequipment;andc.Reactortripswitchgear.ThesemodulesareshowninFigureB3.3.1-1anddiscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Toaccountforthecalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-2DraftA I RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessControlandProtectionEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4),Chapter6(Ref.5),andChapter15(Ref.6).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefieldtransmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Ifaparameterhasnomeasurablesetpointandisonlyusedasaninputtotheprotectioncircuits(e.g.,manualtripfunctions)twochannelswithaone-out-of-twologicaresufficient.Athirdchannelisnotrequiredsinceno.surveillancetestingisrequiredduringthetimeperiodinwhichtheparameterisrequired.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.7).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-3DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUNDSinalProcessControlandProtectionEuiment(continued)Thetwo,three,andfourprocesscontrolchannelsdiscussedaboveallfeedtwologictrains.FigureB3.3.1-1showsatwo-out-of-fourlogicfunctionwhichprovidesinputintotwologictrains(TrainAandB).Twologictrainsarerequiredtoensurethatnosinglefailureofonelogictrain'willdisabletheRTS.Provisionstoallowremovinglogictrainsfromserviceduringmaintenanceareunnecessarybecauseofthelogicsystem'sdesignedreliability.Duringnormaloperation,thetwologictrainsremainenergized.ReactorTriSwitchearThereactortripswitchgearincludesthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)andbypassbreakersasshownonFigure83.3.3-1.TheRTBsareintheelectricalpowersupplylinefromthecontrolroddrivemotorgeneratorsetpowersupplytothecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).OpeningoftheRTBsinterruptspowertotheCRDHs,whichallowstheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecorebygravityandshutdownthereactor.EachRTBmaybebypassedwithabypassbreakertoallowtestingoftheRTBwhiletheplantisatpower.Duringnormaloperation,theoutputfromtheprotectionsystemisavoltagesignalthatenergizestheundervoltagecoilsintheRTBsandbypassbreakers,ifinuse.Whentherequiredlogicmatrixcombinationiscompleted,theprotectionsystemoutputvoltagesignalisremoved,theundervoltagecoilsarede-energized,thebreakertripleverisactuatedbythede-energizedundervoltagecoil,andtheRTBsandbypassbreakersaretrippedopenallowingtheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecore.Therefore,alossofpowertotheprotectionsystemorRTBswillcauseareactortrip.Inadditiontothede-energizationoftheundervoltagecoils,eachbreakerisalsoequippedwithashunttripdevicethatisenergizedtotripthebreakeropenuponreceiptofareactortripsignalfromtheprotectionsystem(exceptforthezirconiumguidetubetripwhichonlyutilizestheundervoltagecoils).EithertheundervoltagecoilortheshunttripmechanismissufficientbyitselftoopentheRTBs,thusprovidingdiversetripmechanisms.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-4(continued)DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYTheRTSfunctionstomaintaintheSLsduringallAOOsandmitigatestheconsequencesofDBAswhichinitiatein'nyMODEinwhichtheRTBsareclosed.Eachoftheanalyzedaccidentsandtransientscanbedetected'byoneormoreRTSFunctions.TheaccidentanalysisdescribedinReference6takescreditformostRTStripFunctions.RTStripFunctionsnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisarequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseRTStripFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheymayalsoserveasbackupstoRTStripFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentanalysis.TheLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganRTSFunction,listedinTable3.3.1-1intheaccompanyingLCO,tobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliability,oftheaffectedFunctions.TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeorfourchannelsineachinstrumentationFunction,twochannelsofManualReactorTripineachlogicFunction,andtwotrainsineachAutomaticTripLogicFunction.FourOPERABLEinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationarerequiredwhenoneRTSchannelisalsousedasacontrolsysteminput.ThisconfigurationaccountsforthepossibilityofthesharedchannelfailinginsuchamannerthatitcreatesatransientthatrequiresRTSaction.Inthiscase,theRTSwillstillprovideprotection,evenwithrandomfailureofoneoftheotherthreeprotectionchannels.Threeoperableinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-threeconfigurationaregenerallyrequiredwhenthereisnopotentialforcontrolsystemandprotectionsysteminteractionthatcouldsimultaneouslycreate'aneedforaRTStripanddisableoneRTSchannel.Thetwo-out-of-threeandtwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedorbypassedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausingareactortrip.Specificexceptionstotheabovegeneralphilosophyexistandarediscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-5DraftA RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCOandAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachRTSFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.1-1.IncludedonTable3.3.1-1areTripSetpointsforallapplicableRTSFunctions.TripSetpointsforRTSFunctionsnotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisarebasedonestablishedlimitsprovidedinplantprocedures.AnalyticalvaluesforRTSFunctionswhichensurethatSLsarenotviolatedduringAOOsandthattheconsequencesofDBAswillbeacceptable,providedthattheplantisoperatedwithintheLCOs,includinganyRequiredActionsthatareineffectattheonsetoftheAOOorDBAandtheequipmentfunctionsasdesignedareprovidedinplantprocedures.NotethatintheaccompanyingLCO3.3.1,theTripSetpointsofTable3.3.1-1aretheLSSS.TheTripSetpointsarethenominalvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracy.TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences4,5,and6.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotection'sprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,andinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimitsusedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTrip.Setpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference8.TheRTSutilizesvariouspermissivesignalstoensurereactortripFunctionsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.ThesepermissivesbackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionisavailable.ThereareninepermissivesintheRTSofwhichfivearerelatedtotheapplicableMODESandspecifiedconditionsforRTSFunctionsspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1.Thesefivearediscussedindetailbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-6DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)P-6PermissiveTheP-6permissivepermitsbypassingtheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionduringanapproachtopower.ThispermissiveisderivedfromabistablecircuitintheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentationwhenanychannelgoesapproximatelyonedecade(lE-10amps)abovetheminimumchannelreading.Afterthepermissiveiseffective,twodefeatpushbuttonsmustbedepressedtoblocktheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunction.IfbothIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelsfallbelowIE-10amps,thepermissiveisautomaticallydefeated.ThepermissivemaybemanuallydefeatedifbelowtheP-10setpointbysimultaneouslydepressingbothdefeatpushbuttons.Duringadecreaseinpower,thepermissiveresetsat5E-llamps.P-7PermissiveTheP-7permissiveisusedtobypassthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlowLow(TwoLoops),ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)BreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andtheUndervoltageBusllAandllBtripFunctionsduringlowpowerandstartupoperations.Thepermissiveisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating<8.5%RTPasmeasuredbyeitherthefirststageturbinepressureorPowerRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentation.P-8PermissiveTheP-8permissiveallowsachangeintheReactorCoolantFlow-LowandRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionssothatalossofasingleloopwillnotcauseareactortrip.Thepermissiveissetfor<50%RTPassensedbythePowerRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentation.P-9PermissiveTheP-9permissivepreventsareactortriponLowAutostopoilpressureandTurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionswhenaturbinetripoccurs<50%RTP.Thispreventsunnecessaryreactortripswhenthesteamdumpsystemisavailable.Thepermissivereceivesinputfromcondenserpressureandcirculatingwaterpumpbreakerposition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-7DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)P-10PermissiveTheP-10permissiveisusedtobypasstheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxandPowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionsduringanapproachtopower.ThepermissivealsoprovidesabackuptotheP-6permissivetoblocktheSourceRangeNeutrontripFunctionandprovidesinputtotheP-7permissive.Thepermissiveisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>8%RTPasmeasuredbythepowerrangeneutronfluxinstrumentation.InordertoblockthesetripFunctions,twopushbuttonsfortheIntermediateRangeFluxtripFunctionandtwopushbuttonsforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionmustbedepressedafterthepermissivebecomeseffective.IfTHERHALPOWERis<8%asmeasuredbyatleastthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannels,thepermissiveautomaticallyblocksthesetripFunctions.Duringadecreaseinpower,thepermissiveresetsatZ6%RTP.ThesafetyanalysesandOPERABILITYrequirementsapplicabletoeachRTSFunctionprovidedinTable3.3.1-1arediscussedbelow:1.HanualReactorTriTheHanualReactorTripFunctionensuresthatthecontrolroomoperatorcaninitiateareactortripatanytimebyusingeitheroftworeactortrippushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard;AHanualReactorTripenergizestheshunttripdeviceandde-energizestheundervoltagecoilsfortheRTBsandbypassbreakers.ItisusedatthediscretionofthecontrolroomoperatorstoshutdownthereactorwheneveranyparameterisrapidlytrendingtowarditsTripSetpointorduringotherdegradingplantconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-8DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY1.ManualReactorTri(continued)TheLCOrequibeOPERABLE.reactortriptripbreakerarerequiredwilldisablefunctionhasassociateanprovided.restwoManualReactorTripchannelstoEachchanneliscontrolledbyamanualpushbuttonwhichactuatesthereactorinbothtrains.TwoindependentchannelstobeOPERABLEsothatnosinglefailuretheManualReactorTripFunction.ThisnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoLSSS,thereforenosetpointsareInMODE1or2,manualinitiationcapabilityofareactortripmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheMODESinwhichtheshutdownrodsand/orcontrolrodsarepartiallyorfullywithdrawnfromthecore.InMODE3,4,or5,themanualinitiationFunctionmustalsobeOPERABLEiftheRTBsareclosedandtheControlRodDrive(CRD)Systemiscapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorthecontrolrods.Inthiscondition,inadvertentcontrolrodwithdrawalispossible.InMODE3,4,or5,manualinitiationofareactortripisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEiftheCRDSystemisnotcapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorcontrolrods,orifoneormoreRTBsareopen.Iftherodscannotbewithdrawnfromthecore,thereisnoneedtobeabletotripthereactorbecausealloftherodsareinserted.InMODE6,neithertheshutdownrodsnorthecontrolrodsarepermittedtobewithdrawnandtheCRDHsaredisconnectedfromthecontrolrodsandshutdownrods.Therefore,themanualinitiationFunctionisnotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-9DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)2.PowerRaneNeutronFluxThePowerRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.TheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)powerrangedetectors(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISpowerrangedetectorsprovideinputtotheCRDSystemfordeterminationofautomaticrodspeedanddirection.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.a~PowerRaneNeutronFlux-HihThePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovided,fromallpowerlevels,againstapositivereactivityexcursionleadingtoDNBduringpoweroperations.ThesereactivityexcursionscanbecausedbyrodwithdrawalorreductionsinRCStemperature.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionchannelstobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-10DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Kih(continued)InMODEIor2,whenapositivereactivityexcursioncouldoccur,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-KightripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionwillterminatethereactivityexcursionandshut'ownthereactorpriortoreachingapowerlevelthatcoulddamagethefuel.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.IntheseMODES,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandreactivityexcursionsintothepowerrangeareextremelyunlikely.OtherRTSFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionswheninMODE3,4,5,or6.b.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-LowTheLCOrequirementforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstapositivereactivityexcursionfromlowpowerorsubcriticalconditions.TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionchannels(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)tobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-11DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Low(continued)InHODE1,below6%RTP,andinHODE2,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Lowtripmust'beOPERABLE.ThisFunctionmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorwhentwo-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsaregreaterthanapproximately8%RTP(P-10setpoint).ThisFunctionisautomaticallyunblockedwhenthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsarebelowtheP-10setpoint.AbovetheP-10setpoint,positivereactivityadditionsaremitigatedbythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunction.InHODE3,4,5,or6,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandtheNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstpositivereactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinHODE3,4,5,or6.3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFluxTheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalcondition.ThistripFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionandisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.TheNISintermediaterangedetectors(N-35andN-36)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISintermediaterangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputtocontrolsystems.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-12DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.IntermediateRaneNeutronFlux(continued)TheLCOrequirestwochannelsoftheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.BecausethistripFunctionisimportantonlyduringlowpowerconditions,thereisgenerallynoneedtodisablechannelsfortestingwhiletheFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Therefore,athirdchannelisunnecessary.InMODE1below6%RTP,andinMODE2,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripmustbeOPERABLEsincethereisapotentialforanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.Above8%RTP(P-10setpoint),tliePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripprovidescoreprotectionforarodwithdrawalaccident.InMODE3,4,or5,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheNISintermediaterangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange'.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinMODE3,4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-13DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)SourceRaneNeutronFluxTheLCOrequirementfortheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromasubcriticalconditionandprovidesprotectionagainstborondilutionandrodejection.ThistripFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsinHODES1and2andisnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisattheseconditions.TheNISsourcerangedetectors(N-31andN-32)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISsourcerangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputstocontrolsystems.ThesourcerangetripistheonlyRTSautomaticprotectionfunctionrequiredinHODES3,4,and5.Therefore,thefunctionalcapabilityatthespecifiedTripSetpointisassumedtobeavailable.TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglefailurewilldisablethistripFunction.TheLCOalsorequiresonechanneloftheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctiontobeOPERABLEinHODE3,4,or5withRTBsopenortheCRDSystemnotcapableofrodwithdrawal.Inthiscase,thesourcerangeFunctionistoprovidecontrolroomindication.TheoutputsoftheFunctiontoRTSlogicarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLE'whentheRTBsareopenortheCRDsystemisnotcapableofrodwithdrawal.TheSourceRangeNeutronFluxTripFunctionprovidesprotectionforcontrolrodwithdrawalfromsubcritical,borondilutionandcontrolrodejectionevents.TheFunctionalsoprovidesvisualneutronfluxindicationinthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-14DraftA I RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESechannelsarep(hp)n),theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripmustbeOPERABLE.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Lowtripwillprovidecoreprotectionforreactivityaccidents.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theNISsourcerangedetectorsaremanuallyde-energizedbytheoperatorandareinoperable.InMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoprovidecoreprotectionagainstarodwithdrawalaccident.IftheRTBsareopenortheCRDSystemisnotcapableofrodwithdrawal,thesourcerangedetectorsarenotrequiredtotripthereactor.However,theirmonitoringFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtomonitorcoreneutronlevelsandprovideindicationofreactivitychangesthatmayoccurasaresultof.eventslikeaborondilution.TherequirementsfortheNISsourcerangedetectorsinMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation."APPLICABLE4.SourceRaneNeutronFlux(continued)SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andInMODE2whenbothintermediaterangAPPLICABILITY<5E-11amsbelowteP-6seto'(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-15DraftA

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.OvertemeratureATTheOvertemperaturehTtripFunctionisprovidedtoensurethatthedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)ismet.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherangeoverwhichtheOverpowerhTtripFunctionmustprovideprotection.TheinputstotheOvertemperaturehTtripincludepressure,T.axialpowerdistribution,andreactorpowerasindicatedbyloopATassumingfullreactorcoolantflow.ProtectionfromviolatingtheDNBRlimitisassuredforthosetransientsthatareslowwithrespecttodelaysfromthe.coretothemeasurementsystem.Theovertemperature4TtripFunctionmonitorsboth,variationinpowerandflowsinceadecreaseinflowhasthesameeffectonhTasapowerincrease.TheOvertemperaturebTtripFunctionusestheATofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerandiscomparedwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheat'capacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;~pressurizerpressure-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesinsystempressure;and~axialpowerdistributionf(b,I)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.Dynamiccompensationisincludedforsystempipingdelaysfromthecoretothetemperaturemeasurementsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-16DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY5.OvertemeratureAT(continued)TheOvertemperatureATtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote1ofTabl.e3.3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOvertemperaturehTTripSetpointisreachedintwo-out-of-fourchannels.Sincethepressureandtemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOvertemperaturehTconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresallfourchannelsoftheOvertemperaturehTtripFunctiontobe'OPERABLE.Notethat.theOvertemperaturehTFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.Failur'esthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InMODE1or2,theOvertemperatureATtripmustbeOPERABLEtopreventDNB.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutDNB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-17DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheOverpowerbTtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedtoensuretheintegrityofthefuel(i.e.,nofuelpelletmeltingandlessthan1%claddingfailure)underallpossibleoverpowerconditions.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherequiredrangeoftheOvertemperaturebTtripFunctionandprovidesabackuptothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighSetpointtrip.TheOverpowerhTtripFunctionensuresthattheallowableheatgenerationrate(kW/ft)ofthefuelisnotexceeded.ItusesthehTofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolan'tdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;rateof-changeofreactorcoolantaveragetemperature-includingdynamiccompensationforthedelaysbetweenthecoreandthetemperaturemeasurementsystem;andaxialpowerdistributionf(h,I)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote2ofTable3.3.1-1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-18DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY6.TheOverpowerhTtripFunctioniscalculatedintwochannelsforeachloopasdescribedinNote2toTable3.3.1-1.AreactortripoccursiftheOverpowerbTtripsetpointisreachedintwo=out-of-fourchannels.Sincethetemperaturesignalsareusedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuationandasinglefailureintheremainingchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltogenerateaturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.A'turbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOverpowerATconditionandmaypreventanunnecessaryreactortrip.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofthe-OverpowerhTtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOverpowerbTtripFunctionreceives,inputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.Failuresthat'ffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.'nHODE1or2,theOverpowerbTtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheonlyHODESwhereenoughheatisgeneratedinthefueltobeconcernedabouttheheatgenerationratesandoverheatingofthefuel.InHODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutfueloverheatingandfueldamage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-19DraftA

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)7.PressurizerPressureThesamesensors(PT-429,PT-430,andPT-431)provideinputtothePressurizerPressure-Highand-LowtripsandtheOvertemperatureATtripwiththeexceptionthatthePressurizerPressure-LowandOvertemperature4TtripsalsoreceiveinputfromPT-449.SincethePressurizerPressurechannelsarealsousedforothercontrolfunctions,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotection'systeminteractionsforthisfunction.a.PressurizerPressure-LowThePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowpressure.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsofthePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Includedwithinthefourchannelsareleadtimeandlead/lagconstraints.InMODEI,whenDNBisamajorconcern,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripfunctionmustbeOPERABLE.ThistripFunctionisautomaticallyenabledonincreasingpowerbytheP-7interlock(8.5%RTP).Ondecreasingpower,thistripFunctionisautomaticallyblockedbelowP-7.BelowtheP-7setpoint,thePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausenoconceivablepowerdistributionscanoccurthatwouldcauseDNBconcerns.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-20DraftA

RTSInstrumentation-83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.PressurizerPressure-HihThePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstoverpressurizingtheRCS.ThistripFunctionoperatesinconjunctionwiththepressurizerreliefandsafetyvalvestopreventRCSoverpressureconditions.TheLCOrequiresthreechannelsofthePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.InMODE1or2,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtohelppreventRCSoverpressurizationandminimizechallengestothereliefandsafetyvalves.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldcauseanoverpressureconditionwillbeslowtooccur.Therefore,theoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtakecorrectiveactions.Additionally,lowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionsystemsprovideoverpressureprotectionwheninorbelowMODE4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-21DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)8.PressurizerWaterLevel-HihThePressurizerMaterLevel-HightripFunctionprovidesabackupsignalforthePressurizerPressure-Hightripandalsoprovidesprotectionagainstwaterreliefthroughthepressurizersafetyvalves.Thesevalvesaredesignedtopasssteaminordertoachievetheirdesignenergyremovalrate.Areactortripisactuatedpriortothepressurizerbecomingwatersolid.ThistripFunctionisnotspecificallymodeledintheaccidentanalysis.TheLCOrequiresthreechannelsofthePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Thepressurizerlevelchannels(LT-426,LT-427,andLT-428)arealsousedforothercontrolfunctions.Section7.2.5ofReference4discussescontrolandprotectionsysteminteractionsforthisfunction.Thelevelchannelsdonotactuatethesafetyvalves,andthehighpressurereactortripissetbelowthesafetyvalvesetting.Therefore,withtheslowrateofchargingavailable,pressureovershootduetolevelchannelfailurecannotcausethesafetyvalvetoliftbeforethereactorhighpressuretrip.'nMODE1or2,whenthereisapotentialforoverfillingthepressurizer,thePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InMODES3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldraisethepressurizerwaterlevelwillbeslowandtheoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluateplantconditionsandtake~correctiveactions.9.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)and(TwoLoops)tripFunctionsutilizethreecommonflowtransmittersperRCSlooptogenerateareactortripabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint).FlowtransmittersFT-411,FT-412,andFT-413areusedforRCSLoopAandFT-414,FT-415,andFT-416areusedforRCSLoopB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-22DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,and'PPLICABILITY(continued)'a~b.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowSinleLooTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowintheRCSloop,whileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.AbovetheP-8setpoint,(50%RTP),alossofflowineitherRCS.loopwillactuateareactortrip.EachRCSloophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorflow.The,flowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionchannelsperRCSlooptobeOPERABLEinHODE1>50%RTP(aboveP-8setpoint).InHODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinoneRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore.InHODE1belowtheP-8setpointtheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoosTheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflowinbothRCSloopswhileavoidingreactortripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionchannelsperlooptobeOPERABLEinHODE1above8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunction,isOPERABLE(belowtheP-8setpoint).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-23DraftA RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoos(continued)Above.theP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinbothloopswillinitiateareactortrip.Eachloophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorflow.Theflowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.BelowtheP-7setpoint,thistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlowflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlowflowinbothRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpoint,theReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauselossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.10.RCPBreakerPositionBothRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctions(SingleLoopandTwoLoops)utilizeacommonauxiliarycontactlocatedoneachRCP.TheseFunctionsanticipatetheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripstoavoidRCSheatupthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuatesbutarenotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysis.a.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionSinleF00TheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinoneRCSloop.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfoneRCPbreakerisopenabove50%RTP,areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-24DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa4b.RCPBreakerPositionSinleLoo(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinHODE1above50%RTP(abovetheP-8setpoint).OneOPERABLEchannelissufficientforthistripFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofapump.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.InHODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,whenalossofflowinanyRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.InHODE1belowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossof'flowinoneloophasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptable(Ref.6).RCPBreakerPositionTwoLoosTheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloops.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfbothRCPbreakersareopenabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)andbeforetheRCPBreakerPosition(OneLoop)tripFunctionisOPERABLE(belowtheP-8setpoint),areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-25DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionTwoLoos(continued)TheLCOrequiresoneRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionchannelperRCPtobeOPERABLEinMODEIabovetheP-7andbelowtheP-8setpoints.OneOPERABLEchannelissufficientforthisFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionofplantSLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofanRCP.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.InMODEIabovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allreactortripsonlossofflow(includingRCPbreakerposition)areautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlossofflowinbothRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-26DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)11.Undervoltae-Bus11Aand11BTheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BreactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinbothRCSloopsfromamajornetworkvoltagedistribution.ThevoltagetoeachRCPismonitored.Above8.5%RTP(theP-7setpoint),anundervoltageconditiondetectedonbothBuses11Aand11Bwillinitiateareactortrip.ThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.TimedelaysareincorporatedintotheUndervoltageBus11Aand11Bchannelstopreventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowertransients.TheLCOrequirestwoUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BtripFunctionchannelsperbustobeOPERABLEinNODE1abovetheP-7setpoint.Below.theP-7setpoint,theUndervoltage-BusllAand11BtripFuncti'onisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11Bisautomaticallyenabled.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-27DraftA RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)12.SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowTheSteamGenerator(SG)WaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstalossofheatsinkandactuatestheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystempriortouncoveringtheSGtubes.TheSGsaretheheatsinkforthereactor.Inordertoactasaheatsink,theSGsmustcontainaminimumamountofwater.AnarrowrangelowlowlevelinanySGisindicativeofalossofheatsinkforthereactor.ThreeleveltransmittersperSG(LT-461,LT-462,andLT-463forSGAand,LT-471,LT-472,andLT-473forSG8)provideinputtotheSGLevelControlSystem.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.This'unctionalsoperformstheEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)functionofstartingtheAFWpumpsonlowlowSGlevel.TheAFWSystemisthesafetyrelatedbackupsourceofwatertoensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofSGWaterLevel-LowLowperSGtobeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.InMODE1or2,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethataheatsinkisavailabletothereactor.InMODE3,4,5,or6,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperating.DecayheatremovalisaccomplishedbytheAFWSysteminMODE3andbytheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SysteminMODE4,5,or6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-28DraftA RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)~biTiCreditforthesetripFunctionsisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.a0TurbineTri-LowAutostoOilPressureTheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingaturbinetripfromapowerlevelabove50%RTP(theP-9setpoint).BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.ThreepressureswitchesmonitorthecontroloilpressureintheAutostopOilSystem.Alowpressureconditionsensedbytwo-out-of-threepressureswitcheswillactuateareactortrip.Thesepressureswitchesdonotprovideanyinputtothecontrolsystem.TheplantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionandRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.TheLCOrequiresthreetripFunctionchannelsofTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretobeOPERABLEinNODEIaboveP-9.BelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseloadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InNODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,therefore,thereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-29DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveClosureTheTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionanticipatesthelosso'fheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingaturbinetripfromapowerlevelabove50%RTP(theP-9setpoint).BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.ThistripFunctionwillnotandisnotrequiredtooperateinthepresenceofasinglechannelfailure.TheplantisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunction,andRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.ThistripFunctionisdiversetotheTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunction.EachturbinestopvalveisequippedwithonelimitswitchthatinputstotheRTS.Ifbothlimitswitchesindicatethatthestopvalvesareclosed,areactortripisinitiated.ThisFunctiononlymeasuresthediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheturbinestopvalves.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwoTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionchannels,onepervalve,tobeOPERABLEinMODE1aboveP-9.Bothchannelsmusttriptocausereactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-30DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveClosure(continued)BelowtheP-9setpoint,theTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealoadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InMODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,thereforethereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.14.SafetIn'ectionInutfromEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemTheSafetyInjection(SI)InputfromESFASensuresthatifarea'ctortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactortripuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.Thistripisassumedinthesafetyanalysesforthelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).However,othertransientsandaccidentstakecreditforvaryinglevelsofESFperformanceandrelyuponrodinsertion,exceptforthemostreactiverodthatisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,toensurereactorshutdown.Therefore,areactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.TripSetpointsarenotapplicableto'hisFunction.TheSIInputisprovidedbyrelaysintheESFAS.Therefore,thereisnomeasurementsignalwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwotripFunctionchannelsofSIInputfromESFAStobeOPERABLEinMODE1or2.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.Therefore,thistripFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2,whenthereactoriscritical,andmustbeshutdownintheeventofanaccident.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thereactorisnotcritical,andthistripFunctiondoesnotneedtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-31DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE15.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)ReactorTriBreakersThistripFunctionappliestotheRTBsexclusiveofindividualtripmechanisms.TheOPERABILITYrequirementfortheindividualtripmechanismsisprovidedinFunction16below.TheLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEtrainsoftripbreakers.Atripbreakertrainconsistsofalltripbreakersassociated'ithasingleRTSlogictrainthatarerackedin,closed,andcapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem.Thus,thetrainmayconsistofthemainbreaker,bypassbreaker,ormainbreakerandbypassbreaker,dependinguponthesystemconfiguration.TwoOPERABLEtrainsensurenosinglefailurecandisabletheRTStripcapability.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InHODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsorassociatedbypassbreakersareclosed,andtheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.16.ReactorTriBreakerUndervoltaeandShuntTriMechanismsTheLCOrequiresboththeUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanismstobeOPERABLEforeachRTBthatisinservice.ThetripmechanismsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEfortripbreakersthatareopen,rackedout,incapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem,ordeclaredinoperableunderFunction15above.OPERABILITYofbothtripmechanismsoneachbreakerensuresthatnosingletripmechanismfailurewillpreventopeninganybreakeronavalidsignal.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakersareclosed,andtheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.(continued)"R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-32DraftA -RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)17.AutomaticTriLoicTheLCOrequirementfortheRTBs(Functions15and16)andAutomaticTripLogic(Function17)ensuresthatmeansareprovidedtointerruptthepowertoallowtherodstofallintothereactorcore.EachRTBisequippedwithanundervoltagecoilandashunttripcoiltotripthebreakeropenwhenneeded.EachRTBisalsoequippedwitharedundantbypassbreakertoallowtestingofthetripbreakerwhiletheplantisatpower.ThereactortripsignalsgeneratedbytheRTSAutomaticTripLogiccausetheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakerstoopenandshutdownthereactor.The'LCOrequirestwotrainsofRTSAutomaticTripLogictobeOPERABLE.HavingtwoOPERABLEtrainsensuresthatfailureofasinglelogictrainwillnotpreventreactortrip.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2becausethereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakersareclosed,andtheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.TheRTSinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.ACTIONSTheACTIONSforeachinoperableRTSFunctionareidentifiedbytheConditionscolumnofTable3.3.1-1.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarify'heapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.1-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttoanalyticalval,uesspecifiedinplantprocedures,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-33DraftA

RTSInstrumentation'83.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)AsshownonFigureB3.3.1-1,theRTSiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticTripLogic(Function17inTable3;3.1-1).Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrumentorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothRTStrainsthatiscomprisedoftheRTBsandAutomaticTripLogicFunction.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualReactorTripandSIInputfromESFAStripFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis(i.e.,failureoftheseFunctionsmayonlyaffectoneRTStrain).A.lConditionAappliestoallRTSprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneor,morerequiredchannelsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistorefertoTable3.3.1-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithatripFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyenteredifthetripFunctionisapplicableinthecurrentMODEofoperation.ThisessentiallyappliestothelossofmorethanonechannelofanyRTSFunctionexceptwithrespecttoConditionsG,H,andJ.B.lB.2.1andB.2.2Condition8appliestotheManualReactorTripFunctioninMODE1or2.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEchannelisadequatetoperformtherequiredsafet'yfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-34DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSB.IB.2.1andB.2.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanothermanualinitiationchannelOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.IftheManualReactorTripFunctioncannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallowed48hourCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6additionalhours(54hourstotaltime).The6additionalhourstoreachMODE3fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.WiththeplantinHODE3,ConditionBnolongerappliesandConditionCisentered.C.landC.2ConditionCappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctionsinMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal:~HanualReactorTrip;~RTBs;~RTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms;and~AutomaticTripLogic.Withonechannelortraininoperable,theinoperablechannelortrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.IftheaffectedFunction(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallowed48hourCompletionTime,.theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theRTBsmustbeopenedwithinthenexthour(49hourstotaltime).Theadditionalhourprovidessufficienttimetoaccomplishtheactioninanorderlymanner.WiththeRTBsopen,theseFunctionsarenolongerrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-35DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSC.IandC.2(continued)TheCompletionTimesarereasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunction,andgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.D.l.land0.1.2WithoneoffourPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionchannelsinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorTHERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<75%RTPwithin24hours.Reducingthepowerlevelpreventsoperationofthecorewithradialpowerdistributionsbeyondthedesignlimits.WithoneoftheNISpowerrangedetectorsinoperable,onequarteroftheradialpowerdistributionmonitoringcapabilityislost.InadditiontoreducingTHERMALPOWER,aknowninoperablechannelmustbeplacedinthetrippedcondition.Thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.D.2.1and0.2.2Asanalternativetotheaboveactions,afullcorefluxmapmaybeperformedwithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter.Theinoperablechannelmustalsobeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.Calculatingafullcorefluxmapevery24hourscompensatesforthelostmonitoringcapabilityduetotheinoperableNISpowerrangechannelandallowscontinuedplantoperationatpowerlevels>75%RTP.The24hourFrequencyisconsistentwithSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.Inadditiontoperformingthefullcorefluxmapsaknowninoperablechannelmustbeplacedinthetrippedcondition.Thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-36DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)D.3AsanalternativetobothaboveActions,iftheinoperablechannelcannotbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,theplantmaybeplacedinaNODEwherethisLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethis,6hours(78hourstotal)areallowedtoplacetheplantinNODE3.Thisisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachNODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassconditionforupto12hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingofother,channels.ThisincludesplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassconditiontoallowsetpointadjustmentsofotherchannelswhenrequiredtoreducethesetpointinaccordancewithotherTechnicalSpecifications.The12hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.E.1andE.2ConditionEappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;OvertemperaturehT;OverpowerbT;PressurizerPressure-High;PressurizerWaterLevel-High;andSGWaterLevel-LowLow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-37DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSE.1andE.2(continued)Withonechannelinoperable,theknowninoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripcondition.ForthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low,OvertemperatureAT,andOverpowerATfunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.ForthePressurizerPressure-highandPressurizerMaterLevel-HighFunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-oftwologicforactuation.FortheSG,MaterLevel-LowLowFunction,thisresultsinaone-out-of-twologicpereachaffectedSGforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.IftheinoperablechannelcannotbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE3withinthenext6hours(78hourstotaltime).TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toplacetheplantinNODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.FortheSGWaterLevel-LowLowFunctions,ConditionEappliesonaperSGbasis.ThisallowsoneinoperablechannelfromeachSGtobeconsideredonaseparateconditionentrybasis.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto12hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The12hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-38DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)F.landF.2ConditionFappliestotheIntermediateRangeNeutron'FluxtripFunctionwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-6setpoint(5E-llampasderivedfromabistablecircuitoftheintermediaterangechannels)andbelowtheP-10setpoint(85RTPasderivedfromabistablecircuitofthePowerRangechannels)andonechannelisinoperable.AbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperformsamonitoringandprotectionfunction.WithoneNISintermediaterangechannelinoperable,2hoursisallowedtoeitherreduceTHERMALPOWERbelowtheP-6setpointorincreaseTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-10setpoint.IfTHERMALPOWERisgreaterthantheP-10setpoint,theNISpowerrangedetectorsperformthemonitoringandprotectionfunctionsandtheintermediaterangeisnotrequired.TheCompletionTimesallowforaslowandcontrolledpoweradjustmentaboveP-10orbelowP-6andtakeintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheredundantOPERABLEchannel,andthelowprobabilityofitsfailureduringthisperiod.Thisactiondoesnotrequiretheinoperablec."'.anneltobetrippedbecausetheFunctionusesone-out-of-twologic.Trippingonechannelwouldtripthereactor.Thus,theRequiredActionsspecifiedinthisConditionareonlyapplicablewhenchannelinoperabilitydoesnotresultinreactortrip.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-39DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)G.landG.2ConditionGappliestotwoinoperableIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelswhenTHERHALPOWERisabovetheP-6setpoint(5E-llampsasderivedfromabistablecircuitoftheintermediaterangechannels)andbelowtheP-10setpoint(8%RTPasderivedfromabistablecircuitofthepowerrangechannels).RequiredActionsspecifiedinthisConditionareonlyapplicablewhentheinoperabilityofbothchannelsdonotresultinreactortrip.AbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperformsamonitoringandprotectionfunction.WithnointermediaterangechannelsOPERABLE,theRequiredActionsaretosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsimmediately.ThiswillprecludeanypowerlevelincreasewithnoOPERABLEIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannels.TheoperatormustalsoreduceTHERHALPOWERbelowtheP-6setpointwithin2hours.BelowP-6,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelsperformtherequiredmonitoringandprotectionfunctions.TheCompletionTimeof2hourswillallowforaslowandcontrolledpowerreductiontolessthantheP-6setpointandtakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofoccurrenceofaneventduringthisperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionaffordedbytheNISIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtrip.IfbothIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux-tripchannelsareinoperable,thesourcerangechannelsmaybeusedtodeterminethattheplantisbelowtheP-6setpoint.ThisactionplacestheplantbelowtheHODEinwhichtheP-6interlockis'required.SincetheIntermediateRangeNeutrontripFunctionisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis,lossofbothchannelsisnotalossofsafetyFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-40DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)H.IConditionHappliestotheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-6setpoint(5E-IIassasderivedfromabistablecircuitoftheintermediaterangechannels)andoneortwochannelsareinoperable.BelowtheP-6setpoint,theNISsourcerangeperformstherequired.monitoringandprotectionfunctions.Therefore,theinoperableNISintermediaterangechannel(s)mustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoincreasingpowerabovetheP-6setpointatwhichpointtheNISintermediaterangechannelsprovidethemonitoringandprotectionfunction.SincetheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis,lossofbothchannelsisnotalossofsafetyFunction.ConditionIappliestooneinoperableSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelwheninMODE2,belowtheP-6setpoint.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withoneofthetwochannelsinoperable,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.ThiswillprecludeanypowerescalationsincewithonlyonesourcerangechannelOPERABLE,coreprotectionisseverelyreduced.ConditionJappliesto.twoinoperableSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelswheninMODE2,belowtheP-6setpoint,orinMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.IntheseConditions,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withbothsourcerangechannelsinoperable,theRTBsmustbeopenedimmediatelysinceasafetyfunctionhasbeenlost.WiththeRTBsopen,thecoreisinamorestableconditionandtheplantentersConditionL.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-41DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)K.landK.2ConditionKappliestooneinoperablesourcerangechannelinMODE3,4,or5withthe.RTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withoneofthesource.rangechannelsinoperable,48hoursisallowedtorestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.IfthechannelcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatus,1additionalhour(49hourstotaltime)isallowedtoopentheRTBs.Theallowanceof48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatus,andthe1additionalhour(49hourstotaltime)toopentheRTBs,isconsistentwithReference10.L.1andL.2ConditionLapplieswhentherequiredSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelisinoperableinMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsopenortherodcontrolsystemnotcapableofrodwithdrawal.InthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withnosourcerangechannels.OPERABLE,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.Thiswillprecludeanypowerescalation.Also,theSDMmustbeverifiedonceevery12hoursandevery12hoursthereafterasperSR3.l.l.1,SDHverification.WithnosourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,coreprotectionisseverelyreduced.VerifyingtheSDMonceper12hoursallowssufficienttimetoperformthecalculationsanddeterminethattheSDHrequirementsaremetandtoensurethatthecorereactivityhasnotchanged.RequiredActionL.1precludesanypositivereactivityadditions;therefore,corereactivityshouldnotbeincreasing,anda12hourFrequencyisadequate.TheCompletionTimeofonceper12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperienceinperformingtheRequiredActionsandtheknowledgethatplantconditionswillchangeslowly.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-42DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)M.landM.2ConditionMappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:~PressurizerPressure-Low;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops);~Undervoltage-BusllAandllB.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactortrip.The72hoursallowedtoplacethechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9iftheinoperablechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Anadditional6hours(78hourstotaltime)isallowedtoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)atwhichpointtheFunctionisnolongerrequired.ThisplacestheplantinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.AnalternativeisnotprovidedforincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-8setpointfortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)andRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionssincethisplacestheplantinConditionNandCondition0,respectively.AllowanceofthistimeintervaltakesintoconsiderationtheredundantcapabilityprovidedbytheremainingredundantOPERABLEchannel(s),andthelowprobabilityofoccurrenceofaneventduringthisperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionaffordedbytheFunctionsassociatedwithConditionM.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-43DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSM.1andM.2(continued)FortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)Functions,ConditionMappliesonaperloopbasis.FortheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)Function,ConditionMappliesonaperRCPbasis.ForUndervoltage-Bus11AandllB,ConditionMappliesonaperbusbasis.Thisallowsoneinoperablechannelfromeachloop,RCP,orbustobeconsideredonaseparateconditionentrybasis.TheRequiredActiogshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto12hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The12hourtimelimitis"consistentwithReference9.N.landN.2ConditionNappliestotheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)reactortripFunction.Withonechannelperloopinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.IfthechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorthechannelplacedintripwithin72hours,thenTHERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<50%RTP(P-8setpoint)withinthenext6hours(78hourstotaltime).ThisplacestheplantinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThistripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbelow50%RTPbecauseotherRTStripFunctionscanprovidethenecessarycoreprotection.The72hoursallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusorplaceintripandthe6additionalhoursallowedtoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTPareconsistentwithReference9.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto12hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The12hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-44DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)0.1and0.2Condition0appliestotheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunction.ThereisonebreakerpositiondeviceperRCPbreaker.WithonechannelperRCPinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.IfthechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe72hours,thenTHERMALPOWERmustbereducedto<50%RTP(P-8setpoint)withinthenext6hours(78hourstotaltime).ThisplacestheplantinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbelow50%RTPbecauseotherRTSFunctionsprovidecoreprotection.The72hoursallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusandthe6additionalhoursallowedtoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTPareconsistentwithReference9.P.1andP.2ConditionPappliestoTurbineTriponLowAutostopOilPressureoronTurbineStopValveClosureinMODEIabove50%RTP.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.orplacedinthetrippedcondition"within72hours.Ifplacedinthetrippedcondition,thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactortrip.IftheinoperablechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours,thenpowermustbereducedto<50%RTP(P-9setpoint)withinthenext6hours(78hourstotaltime).The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionandthe6additionalhoursallowedforreducingpowerisconsistentwithReference9.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto12hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The12hourtimelimitisconsistentwithReference9.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearIPowerPlantB3.3-45DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued).1and.2ConditiongappliestotheSIInputfromESFASreactortripandtheRTSAutomaticTripLogicinHODES1and2.Withonetraininoperable,6hoursareallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.IftheinoperabletraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin6hours,thentheplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOnolongerapplies.ThisisaccomplishedbyplacingtheplantinMODE3withinthenext6hours(12hourstotaltime).TheCompletionTimeof6hourstorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus(RequiredActiong.1)isreasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof6hourstoplacetheplantinMODE3(RequiredActiong.2)isreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerinanorderly,mannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsbypassingonetrainupto4hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.R.landR.2ConditionRappliestotheRTBsinNODES1and2.Withonetraininoperable,1hourisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatusortheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinMODE3withinthenext6hours(7hourstotaltime).TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.The1hourand6hourCompletionTimesareequaltothetimeallowedbyLCO3.0.3forshutdownactionsintheeventofacompletelossofRTSFunction.PlacingtheplantinMODE3removestherequirementforthisparticularFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-46DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSR.1andR.2(continued)TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1allowsonetraintobebypassedforupto2hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.Note2allowsoneRTBtobebypassedforupto8hoursformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanismsiftheotherRTBtrainisOPERABLE.S.landS.2ConditionSappliestotheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanismsinMODES1and2.WithonetripmechanismforoneRTBinoperable,itmustberestoredtoanOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursortheplantmustbeplacedinaMODEwheretherequirementdoesnotapply.ThisisaccomplishedbyplacingtheplantinMODE3withinthenext6hours(54hourstotaltime).TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WiththeplantinHODE3,ConditionSnolongerappliesandConditionCisentered.TheaffectedRTBshallnotbebypassedwhileoneofthediversetripfeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredtoperformmaintenancetooneofthediversetripfeatures.Theallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthediversetripfeaturesis8hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditionR.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredActionS.1isreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditionthereisoneremainingdiversetripfeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLERTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-47(continued)DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSTheSRsforeachRTSFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.1-1forthatFunction.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTablestatingthatTable3.3.1-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichRTSFunctions.NotethateachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheRTS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrain8mustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrain8mustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies(Ref.8).SR3.3.1.1ACHANNELCHECKisrequiredforthefollowingRTStripfunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;SourceRangeNeutronFlux;OvertemperaturehT;OverpowerAT;PressurizerPressure-Low;PressurizerPressure-High;PressurizerWaterLevel-High;ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);andSGWaterLevel-LowLow(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-48DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.1(continued)PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatgrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationthattheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Channelcheckacceptancecri,teriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaffbasedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.1.2ThisSRcomparesthecalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtotheNISPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highchanneloutputevery24hours.IfthecalorimetricexceedstheNISchanneloutputby>2%RTP,theNISisstillOPERABLEbutmustbeadjusted.IftheNISchanneloutputcannotbeproperlyadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB.3.3-49DraftA

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.2(continued)SR3.3.1.2ismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1indicatesthatthe.NISchanneloutputshallbeadjustedconsistentwiththecalorimetricresultsiftheabsolutedifferencebetweentheNISchanneloutputandthecalorimetricis>2%RTP.Note2clarifiesthatthisSurveillanceisrequiredonlyifreactorpowerisZ15%RTPandthat12hoursisallowedforperformingthefirstSurveillanceafterreaching15%RTP.Atlowerpowerlevels,calorimetricdataareinaccurate.TheFrequencyofevery24hoursisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.TogetherthesefactorsdemonstratethechangeintheabsolutedifferencebetweenNISandheatbalancecalculatedpowersrarelyexceeds2%inany24hourperiod.Inaddition,controlroomoperatorsperiodicallymonitorredundantindicationsandalarmstodetectdeviationsinchanneloutputs.SR3.3.1.3ThisSRcomparestheincoresystemtotheNISchanneloutputevery31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD).Iftheabsolutedifferenceis>3%,theNISchannelisstillOPERABLE,butmustbereadjusted.IftheNISchannelcannotbeproperlyreadjusted,thechannelisthendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoverifythef(b,I)inputtotheovertemperaturehTFunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-50DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.1.3(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbythreeNotes.Note1indicatesthattheexcoreNISchannelshallbeadjustediftheabsolutedifferencebetweentheincoreandexcoreAFDisz3%.Note2clarifiesthattheSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERHALPOWERis>50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowingeachrefuelingandifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast31EFPD.Note3statesthatperformanceofSR3.3.1.6satisfiesthisSRsinceitisamorecomprehensivetest.TheFrequencyofevery31EFPDisbasedonplantoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.Also,theslowchangesinneutronfluxduringthefuelcyclecanbedetectedduringthisinterval.SR3.3.1.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISoftheRTB,andtheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.Thetestshallincludeseparateverificationoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsexceptforthebypassbreakerswhichdonotrequireseparateverificationsincenocapabilityisprovidedforperformingsuchatestatpower.TheindependenttestforbypassbreakersisincludedinSR3.3.1.14.However,thebypassbreakertestshallincludealocalshunttrip.ANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethatthistestmustbeperformedonthebypassbreakerpriortoplacingitinservicetotaketheplaceofaRTP.NTheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-51DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.5ThisSRistheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTESTontheRTSAutomaticTripLogicevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.Thetrainbeingtestedisplacedinthebypasscondition,thuspreventinginadvertentactuation.Allpossiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.TheFrequencyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisbasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.1.6ThisSRisacalibrationoftheexcorechannelstotheincorechannelsevery92EFPD.Ifthemeasurementsdonotagree,theexcorechannelsarestillOPERABLEbutmustbecalibratedtoagreewiththeincoredetectormeasurements.Iftheexcorechannelscannotbeadjusted,thechannelsarethendeclaredinoperable.Thissurveillanceisperformedtoverifythef(bI)inputtotheovertemperaturehTFunction.SR3.3.1.6hasbeenmodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafterTHERMALPOWERisZ50%RTPbutpriortoexceeding90%RTPfollowing.eachrefuelingandifithasnotbeenperformedwithinthelast92EFPD.TheFrequencyof92EFPDisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.(continued).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-52DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.7istheperformanceofaCOTevery92daysforthefollowingRTSfunctions:~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;~SourceRangeNeutronFlux(inMODE3,4,or5withRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal);.~OvertemperaturehT;~OverpowerAT;PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressurizer-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolant.Flow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);:and~SGWaterLevel-LowLowACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.Setpointsmustbewithintheanalyticalvaluesspecifiedinplantprocedures.The"asleft"-valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedrift'allowanceusedin"thesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-53DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.7(continued)SR3.3.1.7ismodifiedbyaNotethatprovidesa4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillanceforsourcerangeinstrumentationwhenenteringMODE3fromHODE2.ThisNoteallows'anormalshutdowntoproceedwithoutadelayfortestinginMODE2andforashorttimeinMODE3untiltheRTBsareopenandSR3.3.1.7isnolongerrequiredtobeperformed.IftheplantisinMODE3withtheRTBsclosedforgreaterthan4hours,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin4hoursafterentryintoMODE3.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithReference10.SR3.3.1.8ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTasdescribedinSR3.3.1.7forthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low,IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,andSourceRangeNeutronFlux,exceptthatthistestalsoincludesverificationthattheP-6andP-10interlocksareintheirrequiredstatefortheexistingplantcondition.-SR3.3.1.8ismodifiedbytwoNotesthatprovidea4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillance.TheseNotesallowanormalshutdowntobecompletedandtheplantremovedfromtheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillancewithoutadelaytoperformthetestingrequiredbythissurveillance.TheFrequencyofevery92daysthereafterappliesiftheplantremainsintheMODEofApplicabilityaftertheinitialperformancesofpriortoreactorstartupand4hoursafterreducingpowerbelowP-10orP-6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-54DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(}UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.8(continued)TheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillanceis<P-10forthepowerrangelowandintermediaterangechannelsand<P-6fortheSourcerangechannels.OncetheplantisinMODE3,thissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.Ifpoweristobemaintained<P-10or<P-6formorethan4hours,thenthetestingrequiredbythissurveillancemustbeperformedpriortotheexpirationofthe4hourlimit.FourhoursisareasonabletimetocompletetherequiredtestingorplacetheplantinaMODEwherethissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.ThistestensuresthattheNISsource,intermediate,andpowerrangelow,channelsareOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalandafter.reducingpowerintotheapplicableMODE(<P-10or<P-6)forperiods>4hours.SR3.3.1.9ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTfortheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BtripFunction.TheFrequencyofevery92daysisconsistentwithReference10.SR3.3.1.9ismodifiedbyaNotethatexclude'sverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOT.SincethisSRappliestoBus11AandllBundervoltagerelays,setpointverificationrequireselaboratebenchcalibrationandisaccomplishedduringtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONrequiredby-SR3.3.1.10.SR3.3.1.10ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthefollowingRTSFunctions:PowerRangeNeutronFlux;IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;SourceRangeNeutronFlux;OvertemperatureAT;OverpowerhT;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-55DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.1.10(continued)~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~UndervoltageBus11Aand11B;~SGWaterLevel-LowLow';andI~TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.CHANNELCALIBRATIONSmustbeperformedconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheplantspecificsetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionof24monthcalibrationintervalsinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-56DraftA 0 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.1.10(continued)SR3.3.1.10ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthepowerrangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofanormalizationofthedetectorsbasedona'owercalorimetricandfluxmapperformedabove50%RTP.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestothemanufacturer'sdata.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredfortheNISpowerrangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2or1,andisnotrequiredfortheNISintermediaterangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2,becausetheplantmustbeinatleastMODE2toperformthetestfortheintermediaterangedetectorsandMODE1forthepowerrangedetectors.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedonthe24monthFrequency.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-57DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.11ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheManualReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,andtheSIInputfromESFAStripFunctions.ThisTADOTisperformedevery24months.ThistestindependentlyverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsfortheManualReactorTripFunctionfortheReactorTripBreakersandReactorTripBypassBreakers.TheReactorTripBypassBreakertestshallincludetestingoftheundervoltagetrip.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOTbecausetheFunctionsaffectedhavenosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3.3.1.12ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTforTurbineTripFunctionswhichisperformedpriortoreactorstartup.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceisnotrequiredifithasbeenperformedwithintheprevious31days.AsecondNotestatesthatverificationoftheTripSetpointdoesnothavetobeperformedforthisSurveillance.PerformanceofthistestwillensurethattheturbinetripFunctionisOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalbecausethistestcannotbeperformedwiththereactoratpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-58DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.3.1.13ThisSRensuresthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandtheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-10interlockwhileinHODE1.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitofthePowerRangechannels.PeriodictestingoftheP-10channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.SetpointsmustbewithintheTripSetpointof<6%RTP.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthesetpointmethodology.IftheP-10interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-10interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonblocked).Ifplacedinthenonblockedcondition,theSRismetandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctions.wouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.14ThisSRensurestheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-6interlockwhileinMODE2.PeriodictestingoftheP-6channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-59DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCE'EQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.14(continued)Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP-6interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thentheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-6interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonblocked).Ifplacedinthenonblockedcondition,theSRismetandtheSRMFunctionwouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.15ThisSRensuresthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BtripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-7interlocksetpointwhileinMODE1.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindication,>8.5%RTPasmeasuredbyTurbineFirstStagePressureChannelsandthePowerRangechannels.PeriodictestingoftheP-7channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-60DraftA RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.1.15(continued)IftheP-7interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusllAandllBFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-7interl,ockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonblocked).Ifplacedinthenonblockedcondition,theSRismetandthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusllAandllBFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.16ThisSRensurestheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)FunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERHALPOWERisabovetheP-8'interlocksetpointwhileinHODE1.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>50%RTPasmeasuredbythepowerrangechannels.Periodictestingofthechannelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP-8interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thentheReactorCoolantFlow-low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-8interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonblocked).Ifplacedinthenonblockedcondition,theSRismetandtheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-61DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.3.1.16(continued)TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityofthe,Functionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.17ThisSRensurestheTurbineTripFunctionsarenotblockedwhenTHERHALPOWERisabovetheP-9interlockwhileinHODEl.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>50%RTPasmeasured,bythepowerrangechannels.CondenserpressureandcirculatingwaterpumpbreakerstatusisalsoaninputtoP-9butarenotrequiredtobeverifiedbythisSR.PeriodictestingoftheP-9channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwi'ththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP-9interlocksetpoint.isnonconservative,thentheTurbineTripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-9interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonblocked).Ifplacedinthe"nonblockedcondition,theSRismetandtheTurbineTripFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-62(continued)DraftA I~f/f-.,Ct4'i"i~' RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR100.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.UFSAR,Chapter7.5.UFSAR,Chapter6.6.UFSAR,Chapter15.7.IEEE-279-1971.8.RGKEEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)5126,"GuidelinesforInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointYerification,"August1992.9.WCAP-14333,Hay1995.10.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990;ll.WestinghouseTechnicalBulletin,NumberNSD-TB-92-14-RO,"InstrumentationCalibrationatReducedPower,"dated.January18,1993.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-63DraftA

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESPlaidInstrunontPlaidInstrunantSignalProcessCoatzolaProtactionEquipnaatChaanolChanaolIIIII-IIIIIIIIIIIIIICharmolChaanolSignalProcassXVrCotolaProtoctionEquipnontII2/aAutocraticRTSPunctlons2/aSignalPzocossControlaProtsctionEquipnontRoactorTripSvitchgoar1/nIII'LIIIIRanualRTSpunctionSignalPzocossControlaProtactionEqui@nantRoactorTripSvitchgoarBIPaasRTBUVaadShuatTripNachanisnRTBUVandRTBUVaadShuntTripShuntTripMochanlsnYmchaaiscLBypassRTBUVandShuntTripYmchanianBIpasaRTBRBIPassRTBB1/2-TrainkTrainBgBistablo~~AntarcticTripLogicQ120VRCPovorSourca125VDCPovorSourceFigureB3.3.1-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-64DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUND-AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC15(Ref.I)requiresthatprotectionsystemsbeprovidedforsensingaccidentsituationsandinitiating.theoperationofnecessaryengineeredsafetyfeatures.TheESFASinitiatesnecessarysafetysystems,basedonthevaluesofselectedplantparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingcoredesignlimitsandtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundary,andtomitigateaccidents.TheESFASinstrumentationissegmentedintotwodistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesasdescribedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.2):~Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;and~Signalprocessingequipment.Thesemodulesarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.FieldTransmittersandProcessSensorsFieldtransmittersandprocesssensorsprovideameasurableelectronicsignalbasedonthephysicalcharacteristicsoftheparameterbeingmeasured.Tomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancyandreliability,two,three,anduptofourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasurerequiredplantparameters.Inmanycases,fieldtransmittersorsensorsthatinputtotheESFASaresharedwiththeReactorTripSystem(RTS).Toaccountforcalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichisassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-65DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)SinalProcessinEuimentTheprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter6(Ref.3),Chapter7(Ref.2),andChapter15(Ref.4).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofplantparametersmeasuredbythefield.transmittersandsensors.Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheprotectionsystemandacontrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation,.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.5)..TheactuationofESFcomponentsisaccomplishedthroughmasterandslaverelays.Theprotectionsystemenergizesthemasterrelaysappropriatefortheconditionoftheplant.Eachmasterrelaythenenergizesoneormoreslaverelays,whichthencauseactuationoftheenddevices.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-66(continued)DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSELCO,ANDAPPLICABILITYEachoftheanalyzedaccidentscanbedetectedbyoneorS,moreESFASFunctions.OneoftheESFASFunctionsistheprimaryactuationsignalforthataccident.AnESFASFunctionmaybetheprimaryactuationsignalformorethanonetypeofaccident.AnESFASFunctionmayalsobeasecondary,orbackup,actuationsignalforoneormoreotheraccidents.Forexample,PressurizerPressure-Lowisaprimaryactuationsignalforsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidents(LOCAs)andabackupactuationsignalforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)outsidecontainment.Functionssuchasmanualinitiation,notspecificallycreditedintheaccidentsafetyanalysis,arequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisfortheplant.TheseFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheseFunctionsmayalsoserveasbackupst'oFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.4).ThisLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganESFASFunctiontobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.The,LCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofthreeorfourchannelsineachinstrumentationfunctionandtwochannelsineachlogicandmanualinitiationfunction.Thetwo-out-of-threeandthetwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausinganESFASinitiation.TwologicormanualinitiationchannelsarerequiredtoensurenosinglefailuredisablestheESFAS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-67DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES7LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachESFASFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.2-1.IncludedonTable3.3.2-1areAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforallapplicableESFASFunctions.Setpointsinaccordanc'ewiththeAllowableValueensurethattheconsequencesofDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)willbeacceptable,providingtheplantisoperatedwithintheLCOs,includinganyRequiredActionsthatareineffectattheonsetoftheOBAandtheequipmentfunctionsasdesigned.TheTripSetpointsarethenominalvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobeproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithintheallowabletolerancebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracy.TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesarebasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferences2,3,and4.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelays,calibrationtolerances,instrumentationuncertainties,aridinstrumentdriftaretakenintoaccount.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinTable3.3.2-1arethereforeconservativelyadjustedwithrespecttotheanalyticallimits(i.e.,AllowableValues)usedintheaccidentanalysis.AdetaileddescriptionofthemethodologyusedtoverifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference6.IfthemeasuredsetpointexceedstheTripSetpointValue,thebistableisconsideredOPERABLEunlesstheAllowableValueasspecifiedinplantproceduresisexceeded.TheTripSetpointsandAllowableValueslistedinTable3.3.2-1havebeenconfirmedbasedonthemethodologydescribedinReference6,whichincorporatesalloftheknownuncertaintiesapplicableforeachchannel.Themagnitudesof.theseuncertaintiesarefactoredintothedeterminationofeachTripSetpoint.Allfieldsensorsandsignalprocessingequipmentforthesechannelsareassumedtooperatewithintheallowancesoftheseuncertaintymagnitudes.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.83.3-68DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)TherequiredchannelsofESFASinstrumentationprovideplantprotectionintheeventofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents.ESFASprotectionfunctionsprovidedinTable3.3.2-1areasfollows:I.SafetIn'ectionSafetyInjection(SI)providestwoprimaryfunctions:1.Primarysidewateradditiontoensuremaintenanceorrecoveryofreactorvesselwaterlevel(coverageoftheactivefuelforheatremoval,cladintegrity,andforlimitingpeakcladtemperatureto<2200'F);and2.BorationtoensurerecoveryandmaintenanceofSDH(k,<1.0).Thesefunctions.arenecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofhighenergylinebreaks(HELBs)bothinsideandoutsideofcontainment.TheSIsignalisalsousedtoinitiateotherFunctionssuchas:ContainmentIsolation;ContainmentVentilationIsolation;ReactorTrip;FeedwaterIsolation;andStartofmotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-69DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYI.SafetIn'ection(continued)Theseotherfunctionsensure:Isolationofnonessentialsystemsthroughcontainmentpenetrations;Tripofthereactortolimitpowergeneration;Isolationofmainfeedwater(MFW)tolimitsecondarysidemasslosses;andStartofAFWtoensuresecondarysidecoolingcapability.a~SafetInection-ManualInitiationThisLCOrequiresonechannelpertraintobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.IntheseMODES,thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems.TheoperatorcaninitiateSIatanytimebyusingeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentswiththeexceptionofContainmentIsolationandContainmentVentilationIsolation.TheLCOfortheManualInitiationFunctionensurestheproperamountofredundancyismaintainedinthemanualESFASactuationcircuitrytoensuretheoperatorhasmanualESFASinitiationcapability.Eachchannelconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogiccabinet.Eachpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.Thisconfigurationdoesnotallowtestingatpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-70DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.SafetInection-ManualInitiation(continued)ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsand'espondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.b.SafetIn'ection-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasThisLCOrequirestwotrainstobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.IntheseMODES,thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstowarrantautomaticinitiationofESFsystems.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetheconsequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-71DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABILITYSAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)c.SafetIn'ection-ContainmentPressure-HihThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLBinsidecontainment;LOCA;and~Feedlinebreakinsidecontainment.ContainmentPressure-Highprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirements,withatwo-out-of-threelogic.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthrucontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,thehighpressureFunctionwillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmentfoll'owingapipebreak.InMODES4,5,and6,ContainmentPressure-HighisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainment.d.SafetIn'ection-PressurizerPressure-LowThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~Inadvertentopeningofasteamgenerator(SG)atmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve;~SLB)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-72DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SafetIn'ection-PressurizerPressure-Low(continued)~Rodclustercontrolassemblyejectionaccidents(rodejection);Inadvertentopeningofapressurizerrelieforsafetyvalve;LOCAs;and~SGTubeRupture.Sincetherearededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.Thetransmittersarelocatedinsidecontainment,withthetapsinthevaporspaceregionofthepressurizer,andthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(LOCA,SLBinsidecontainment,rodejection).Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)tomitigatetheconsequencesofanHELBinsidecontainment.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint.AutomaticSIactuationbelowthisinterlocksetpointisperformedbytheContainmentPressure-Highsignal.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE3belowthePressurizerPressureinterlocksetpoint.OtherESFfunctionsareusedtodetectaccidentconditionsandactuatetheESFsystemsinthisMODE.InMODES4,5,and6,thisFunctionisnotneededforaccidentdetectionandmitigation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-73DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)e.SafetIn'ection-SteamLinePressure-LowSteamLinePressure-Lowprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLB;Feedlinebreak;andInadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforanSGsafetyvalve.Steamlinepressuretransmittersprovidecontrolinput,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsoneachsteamlinearesufficienttosatisfytheprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogiconeachsteamline.WiththetransmitterslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringasecondarysidebreak.Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-74DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.SafetIn'ection-SteamLinePressure-Low(continued)SteamLinePressure-LowmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3(abovethePressurizerPressureinterlock)whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvecouldresultintherapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowtheinterlocksetpoint.Belowtheinterlocksetpoint,feedlinebreakisnotaconcern.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE4,5,or6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttocauseanaccident.2.ContainmentSraCSCSprovidesthreeprimaryfunctions:1.Lowers,containmentpressureandtemperatureafteranHELBincontainment;2.Reducestheamountofradioactive'iodineinthecontainmentatmosphere;and3.AdjuststhepHofthewaterincontainmentsump8aftera,largebreakLOCA.Thesefunctionsarenecessaryto:Ensurethepressureboundaryintegrityofthecontainmentstructure;Limitthereleaseofradioactiveiodinetotheenvironmentintheeventofafailureofthecontainmentstructure;andMinimizecorrosionofthecomponentsandsystemsinsidecontainmentfollowingaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-75DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY2.CS(continued)CSisactuatedmanuallyorbyContainmentPressure-HighHigh.TheCSactuationsignalstartstheCSpumpsandalignsthedischargeofthepumpstotheCSnozzleheadersintheupperlevelsofcontainment.WaterisinitiallydrawnfromtheRWSTbytheCSpumpsandmixedwithasodiumhydroxidesolutionfromthesprayadditivetank..Duringtherecirculationphaseofaccidentrecovery,thespraypumpsuctionsaremanuallyshiftedtocontainmentsumpBifcontinuedCSisrequired.a0CS-ManualInitiationTheoperatorcaninitiateCSatanytimefromthecontrolroombysimultaneouslydepressingtwoCSactuationpushbuttons.BecauseaninadvertentactuationofCScouldhaveseriousconsequences,twopushbuttonsmustbesimultaneouslydepressedtoinitiatebothtrainsofCS.ManualinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4becauseaDBA'ouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InMODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-76DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.C.CS-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuate~RelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsiblefor.actuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,3,and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InHODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredto.beOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseHODES.InHODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.CS-ContainmentPressure-HihHihThis.signalprovidesprotectionagainstaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainment.Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthrucontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelocatedoutsideofcontainment.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ThisistheonlyFunctionthatrequiresthebistableoutputtoenergizetoperformitsrequiredaction.ItisnotdesirabletohavealossofpoweractuateCS,sincetheconsequencesofaninadvertentactuationofCScouldbeserious.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-77Draft'A ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc.CS-ContainmentPressure-HihHih(continued)TheContainmentPressure-HighHighinstrumentfunctionconsistsoftwosetswiththreechannelsineachset.Eachsetisatwo-out-of-threelogicwheretheoutputsarecombinedsothatbothsetstrippedinitiatesCS.Sincecontainmentpressureisnotusedforcontrol,thisarrangementexceedstheminimumredundancyrequirements.AdditionalredundancyiswarrantedbecausethisFunctionisenergizetotrip.ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,3and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.InNODES5and6,thisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausetheprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InNODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.3.ContainmentIsolationContainmentIsolationprovidesisolationofthecontainmentatmosphere,andselectedprocesssystemsthatpenetratecontainment,fromtheenvironment.ThisFunctionisnecessarytopreventorlimitthereleaseofradioactivitytotheenvironmentintheeventofaLOCA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-78DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESateallypines,exceptfeedwaterlines,mainsteamlines,andcomponentcoolingwater(CCW).Themainfeedwaterandsteamlinesareisolatedbyotherfunctionssinceforcedcirculationcoolingusingthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andSGsisthepreferred(butnotrequired)methodofdecayheatremoval.SinceCCWisrequired~tosupportRCPoperation,notisolatingCCWenhancesplantsafetybyallowingoperatorstouseforcedRCScirculationtocooltheplant.IsolatingCCWmayforcetheuseoffeedandbleedcooling,whichcouldprovemoredifficulttocontrol.APPLICABLE3.ContainmentIsolation(continued)SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andContainmentIsolationsignalsisolAPPLICABILITYautomaticallisolatablerocess1'a~ContainmentIsolation-ManualIsolationManualContainmentIsolationisactuatedbyeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.Eitherpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationalsoactuatesContainmentVentilationIsolation.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateunitconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-79DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.ContainmentIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateunitconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.c.ContainmentIsolation-SafetIn'ectionContainmentIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatautomaticallyinitiateSI.TheContainmentIsolationrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingFunctions-.andrequirements.4.SteamLineIsolationIsolationofthemainsteamlinesprovidesprotectionintheeventofanSLBinsideoroutsidecontainment.Closureofthemainsteamisolationvalves(HSIVs)andnon-returncheckvalveslimitstheaccidenttotheblowdownfromonlytheaffectedSG.ForanSLBdownstreamoftheHSIVs,closureoftheHSIVsterminatestheaccidentassoonasthesteamlinesdepressurize.SteamLineIsolationalsomitigatestheeffectsofafeedlinebreakandensuresasourceofsteamfortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpduringafeedlinebreak.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-80DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)a.SteamLineIsolation-ManualInitiationHanualinitiationofSteamLineIsolationcanbeaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.Therearetwoactuationdevices(onepushbuttonandoneswitch)onthemaincontrolboardforeachHSIV.EachdevicecaninitiateactiontoimmediatelycloseitsrespectiveHSIV.TheLCOrequiresonechannel(device)perlooptobeOPERABLE.ManualinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofsignificantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.b.SteamLineIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-81DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb."C.SteamLineIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelas(continued)AutomaticinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofsignificantquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6,thesteamlineisolationfunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGstoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-Hih~HihThisFunctionactuatesclosureofbothMSIVsintheeventofaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainmenttomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Thetransmittersarelocatedoutsidecontainmentwiththesensinglinespassingthrucontainmentpenetrationstosensethecontainmentatmosphereinthreedifferentlocations.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditions,andtheTripSetp'ointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.ContainmentPressure-HighHighprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithtwo-out-of-threelogic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-82DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYC.d.SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-HihHih(continued)ContainmentPressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3,becausethereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidetopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipebreak.Thiswouldcauseasignificantincreaseinthecontainmentpressure,thusallowingdetectionandclosureoftheMSIVs.Thesteam-lineisolationFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES4,5,and6thesteamlineisolationFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisnotenoughenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidestopressurizethecontainmenttotheContainmentPressure-HighHighsetpoint.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithT-LowThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheMSIVs.duringanSLBorinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvetomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehighsteamflowinonesteamline.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthatthefunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.Theone-out-of-twoconfigurationallowsonlinetestingbecausetripofonehighsteamflowchannelisnotsufficienttocauseinitiation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-83DraftA 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithT-Low(continued)Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainment,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointsreflectbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThemainsteamlineisolatesonlyifthehighsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIandlowRCSaveragetemperature.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.TwochannelsofT,,perlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLE.forthisFunction.TheT,,channelsarecombinedinalogicsuchthatanytwoofthefourT,,channelstrippedinconjunctionwithSIandoneofthetwohighsteamlineflowchannelstrippedcausesisolationofthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamlineflowchannels.TheaccidentsthatthisFunctionprotectsagainstcausereductionofT,,intheentireprimarysystem.Therefore,theprovisionoftwoOPERABLEchannelsperloopinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationensuresnosinglefailuredisablestheT.,-LowFunction.TheT,,channelsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.'Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-84DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafet'n'ectionandCoincidentWithT-Low(continued)ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctioni.srequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.e.SteamLineIsolation-HihHihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheHSIVsduringasteamlinebreak(orinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve)tomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehigh-highsteamflowinonesteamline.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-85DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe.SteamLineIsolation-HihHihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ection(continued)Thema'insteamlinesisolateo'nlyifthehigh-highsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIsignal.Steamlineisolationoccursonlyforthesteamlineassociatedwiththetripp'edsteamflowchannels.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothHSIV'sareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-86DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.FeedwaterIsolationTheprimaryfunctionoftheFeedwaterIsolationsignalsistopreventandmitigatetheeffectsofhighwaterlevelintheSGswhichcouldcausecarryoverof.waterintothesteamlinesandresultinexcessivecooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSGhighwaterlevelisduetoexcessivefeedwaterflows.ThisFunctionisactuatedbyeitheraSGWaterLevel-HighorbyanSIsignal.TheFunctionprovidesfeedwaterisolationbyclosingtheHFRVsandtheassociatedbypassvalves.Inaddition,onanSIsignal,theAFWSystemisautomaticallystarted,andtheHFWpumpbreakersareopenedwhichclosestheHFWpumpdischargevalves.TheSIsignalwasdiscussedpreviously.'a~FeedwaterIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES2and3unlessallHainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InHODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-87DraftA 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.FeedwaterIsolation-SteamGeneratorWater~L1-HihTheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-HighFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstexcessivefeedwaterflow.TheESFASSGwaterlevelinstrumentshavededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-Highisapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.C.FeedwaterIsolation-SafetIn'ectionTheSafetyInjectionFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbine'eneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-88DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc.FeedwaterIsolation-SafetInectionFeedwaterIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatinitiateSI.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.InsteadFunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliarFeedwaterTheAFWSystemisdesignedtoprovideasecondarysideheatsinkforthereactorintheeventthattheHFWSystemisnotavailable.Thesystemhastwomotordrivenpumpsandaturbinedrivenpump,makingitavailableduringnormalplantoperation,duringalossofACpower,alossofHFW,andduringaFeedwaterSystempipebreak(dependingonbreaklocation).ThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemisthecondensatestoragetank(CST)whichisnotsafetyrelated.UponalowlevelintheCSTtheoperatorscanmanuallyrealignthepumpsuctions-totheServiceWater(SW)Systemwhichisthesafetyrelatedwatersour'ce.TheAFWSystemisalignedsothatuponapumpstart,flowisinitiatedtotherespectiveSGsimmediately.a.AuxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitry.housedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuati'ngtheESFequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-89DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa.AuxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelas(continued)AutomaticinitiationofAuxiliaryFeedwatermustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-90DraftA ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)b.AuxiliarFeedwater-SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowSGWaterLevel-LowLowmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toprovideprotectionagainstalossofheatsink.Afeedlinebreak,insideoroutsideofcontainment,oralossofMFW,wouldresultinalossofSGwaterlevel.SGWaterLevel-LowLowineitherSGwillcausebothmotordrivenAFWpumpstostart.Thesystemisalignedsothatuponastartofthepump,waterimmediatelybeginstoflowtotheSGs.SGWaterLevel-LowLowinbothSGswillcausetheturbinedrivenpumpto.start.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-LowLowisapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainmentandthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions.(feedlinebreak),theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-91DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)c.AuxiliarFeedwater-SafetIn'ectionTheSIfunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.AnSIsignalstartsthemotordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWpumps.'heAFWinitiationfunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.d.AuxiliarFeedwater-Undervoltae-BusllAand11BTheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand11BFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-92DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYd.e.AuxiliarFeedwater-Undervoltae-Bus11Aand118(continued)Alossofpowerto4160VBus11Aand11BwillbeaccompaniedbyalossofpowertobothHFWpumpsandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatremoval.Thelossofoffsitepowerisdetectedbyavoltagedroponeachbus.LossofpowertobothbuseswillstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumptoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainsenoughwatertoserveastheheatsinkforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremovalfollowingthereactortrip.AuxiliarFeedwater-Tri'fBothHainFeedwater~PumsATripofbothHFWpumpsisanindicationofalossofMFWandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatandsensibleheatremoval.TheHFWpumpsareequippedwithabreakerpositionsensingdevice.Anopensupplybreakerindicatesthatthepumpisnotrunning.TwoOPERABLEchannelsperAFWpumpsatisfyredundancyrequirementswithtwo-out-of-twologic.AtripofbothHFWpumpsstartsbothmotordrivenAFWpumpstoensurethatatleastoneSGisavailablewithwatertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinHODES1and2.ThisensuresthatatleastoneSGisprovidedwithwatertoserveastheheatsinktoremovereactordecayheatandsensibleheatintheeventofanaccident.InHODES3,4,5,and6theHFWpumpsarenotinoperation,andthuspumptripisnotindicativeofaconditionrequiringautomaticAFWinitiation.\R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-93(continued)DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)ACTIONSTheACTIONSforeachinoperableESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheConditioncolumnofTable3.3.2-1.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditions"ofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.2-1.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOCondition(s)enteredfortheprotectionFunction(s)affected.AsshownonFigureB3.3.2-1,theESFASiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticActuationLogic.Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrument,lossof120VACinstrumentbuspowerorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothESFAStrains.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualESFASandAutomaticActuationLogicFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis.TheAutomaticActuationLogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystem,includingthemasterrelays,slaverelays,andinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactivatingtheESFequipment.A.lConditionAappliestoallESFASprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorechannelsortrainsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistorefertoTable3.3.2-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-94DraftA 0 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinanESFASFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithanESFASFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO=3.0.3shouldbeimmediatelyenterediftheESFASfunctionisapplicableinthecurrentMODEofoperation.B.1ConditionBappliestothechannelortrainorientationoftheESFASforthefollowingFunctions:~ManualInitiationofSI;~ManualInitiationofCS;~ManualInitiationofContainmentIso'lation;~ManualInitiationofSteamLineIsolation;~Undervoltage-BusllAandllB;and~TripofBothHFWPumps.Ifachannelortrainisinoperable,48hoursisallowedtoreturnittoanOPERABLEstatus.FortheManualInitiationFunctions,thespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanother,manualinitiationtrainOPERABLEforeachFunction(exceptforCS),andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.For.theUndervoltage-BusllAandllBFunctionandTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctions,thespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthenatureoftheseFunctions,theavailableredundancy,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctionisconsistentwithReference7.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-95DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1IfthechannelforFunction6.ecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionB,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.land0.2IfthechannelforFunction6.dorthetrainforFunctionl.aor'4.acannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofCondition8,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE4withinl2hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.landE.2IfthetrainforFunction2.aor3.acannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionB,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-96DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)F.1ConditionFappliestotheautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforthefollowingFunctions:~SI;CS)~ContainmentIsolation;~SteamLineIsolation;~FeedwaterIsolation;and~AuxiliaryFeedwater.ConditionFaddressesthetrainorientationoftheprotectionsystemandthemasterandslaverelays.Ifonetrainisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof24hoursisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatthereisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisconsistentwithReference8.G.1andG.2IfthetrainforFunction1.b,4.b,5.a,or6.acannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionF,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-97DraftA ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)H.1andH.2Ifthe'trainforFunction2.bor3.bcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionF,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.I.1'onditionIappliestothefollowingFunctions:~ContainmentPressure-High;~ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~ContainmentPressure-HighHigh;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~SteamLinePressure-Low;~HighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjectionandCoincidentWithT,,-Low;~HighHighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjection;~SGWaterLevel-High;and~SGWaterLevel-LowLow.ConditionIappliestoFunctionsthattypicallyoperateontwo-out-of-threelogic.Therefore,failureofonechannelplacestheFunctioninatwo-out-of-twoconfiguration.OnechannelmustbetrippedtoplacetheFunctioninaone-out-of-twoconfigurationthatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-98DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSI.l(continued)Ifonechannelisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof72hoursisallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusortoplaceitinthetrippedcondition.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionconservativelycompensatesfortheinoperability,restorescapabilitytoaccommodateasinglefailure,andallowsoperationtocontinue.TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNotethatallowstheinoperablechanneltobebypassedforupto12hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursallowedtorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedcondition,andthe12hoursallowedfortesting,arejustifiedinReference8.J.landJ.2IfthechannelforFunctionI.dorl.ecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<2000psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.K.landK.2IfthechannelforFunctionI.c,4.c,4.d,4.e,S.b,or6.bcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-99DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)L.landL.2IfthechannelforFunction2.ccannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhich"theLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSTheSRsforeachESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.2-1.EachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheESFAS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.Note1hasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.2-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichESFASFunctions.Note2hasbeenaddedtoindicatethat,when,achannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto12hours,providedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainstripcapability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe12hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedontheassumptionthat12hoursistheaveragetimerequiredtoperformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,12hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheESFASinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-100DraftA

ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.1IPerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatagrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetect'grosschannelfailure;thus,itisaverificationtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.CHANNELCHECKacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.2.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTevery92days.ACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedFunction.SetpointsmustbefoundtobewithintheAllowableValuesspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1.The"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithinReference7.TheFrequencyisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-101DraftA ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.3ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery92days.ThistestisacheckoftheUndervoltage-BusllAandllBFunction.Thetestincludestripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectlytotheprotectionsystem.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsforrelays.RelaysetpointsrequireelaboratebenchcalibrationandareverifiedduringCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheFrequencyof92daysisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.2.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery24months.ThistestisacheckoftheManualInitiation,AutomaticActuationLogic,andTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctions.Thistestincludestheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.Relayandcontactoperationisverifiedbytheactuationoftheenddevice(i.e.,pumpstarts,valvecycles,etc.).TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalrefuelingcycle.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsduringtheTADOT.TheManualInitiation,AutomaticActuationLogic,andTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctionshavenoassociatedsetpoints.SR3.3.2.5ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-102DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.2.5(continued)CHANNELCALIBRATIONS-mustbeperformedconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheplantspecificsetpointmethodology.The"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.3.3.2.6ThisSRensuresthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000psigwhileinMODE3.Periodictestingofthepressurizerpressurechannelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.6).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.Ifthepressurizerpressureinterlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,thepressurizerpressureinterlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-103(continued)DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)REFERENCESNl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC15,IssuesforCommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Chapter7.3.UFSAR,Chapter6.4.UFSAR,Chapter15.5.IEEE-279-1971.6.EWR-5126,"GuidelinesForInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.7.WCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990.8.WCAP-14333,May1995.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-104DraftA

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESPieldInstrumentyieldInstrumentSignalProcessEquipmentOChannelChannelIQZZIIIIIIIIIIII,IIIChannelChannelSignalProcessZZZgIVgEquipmentIIII2/42/a8IlutoaaticI-----ESPlSIIPunctionsII1/nIIIIManualESPlSPunction1/nMasterRelaysEasterRelays!,Slave!RelaysIrT1I-"rI-v-~I--rI-v-~SlaveRelaysIndividualComponentsIndividualComponents-TrainlgSistahleQ120vlcposersourceTrainS<~lutotaaticactuationZogic125VDCPoserSourceFigureB3.3.2-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-105DraftA 4PAHInstrumentation83.3.3B3.3INSTRUHENTATIONB3.3.3PostAccidentHonitoring(PAH)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUND.TheprimarypurposeofthePAHinstrumentationistodisplayplantvariablesthatprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorsduringaccidentconditions.Thisinstrumentationprovidesthenecessarysupportfortheoperatortotakerequiredmanualactions,verifythatautomaticandrequiredmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeencompleted,andtodetermineiffissionproductbarriershavebeenbreachedfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheOPERABILITYoftheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationensuresthatthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassessplantstatusandbehaviorduringanaccident.Theavailabilityofaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationisimportantsothatresponsestocorrectiveactionscanbeobservedandtheneedfor,andmagnitudeof,furtheractionscanbedetermined.TheseessentialinstrumentsareidentifiedinReferenceIaddressingtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.97(Ref.2)asrequiredbySupplementItoNUREG-0737(Ref.3).TheinstrumentchannelsrequiredtobeOPERABLEbythisLCOprovideinformationforkeyparametersidentifiedduringimplementationofRegulatoryGuide1.97asCategoryIvariables.CategoryIvariablesareorganizedintofourtypesandarethekeyvariablesdeemedrisksignificantbecausetheyareneededto:a~b.Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortotakespecificmanuallycontrolledactionsforwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunctionsforDBAs(TypeA).Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortoverifythatrequiredautomaticandmanuallycontrolledfunctionshavebeenaccomplished(TypeB);(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-106DraftA PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)c~Provideinformationtothecontrolroomoperatorsthatwillenablethemtodeterminethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease(TypeC);andd.Provideinformationregardingthereleaseofradioactivematerialstoallowforearlyindicationoftheneedtoinitiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublic,andtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat(TypeE).AllTypeAandkeyTypeB,C,andEparametershavebeenidentifiedasCategoryIvariablesinReference1whichalsoprovidesjustificationfordeviatingfromtheNRCproposedlistofCategoryIvariables.ThespecificinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1arediscussedintheLCOsection.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThePANinstrumentationensurestheavailabilityofRegulatoryGuide1.97CategoryIvariablessothatthecontrolroomoperatingstaffcan:PerformthediagnosisspecifiedintheemergencyoperatingproceduresfortheprimarysuccesspathofDBAs(e.g.,lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA));Takethespecified,pre-planned,manuallycontrolledactions,forwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunction;Determinewhetherrequiredautomaticandmanualsafetyfunctionshavebeenaccomplished;Determinethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease;Determineifagrossbreachofabarrierhasoccurred;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-107DraftA PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~Initiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublicandtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat.PAHinstrumentationthatmeetsthedefinitionofTypeAinRegulatoryGuide1.97satisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.CategoryI,non-TypeA,instrumentationmustberetainedinTSbecauseitisintendedtoassistoperatorsinminimizingtheconsequencesofaccidents.Therefore,CategoryI,non-TypeA,variablesareimportantforreducingpublicriskandsafetyCriterion4.LCOThePAHinstrumentationLCOprovidesOPERABILITYrequirementsforRegulatoryGuide1.97TypeAmonitors,whichprovideinformationrequired"bythecontrolroomoperators'toperformcertainmanualactionsspecifiedintheplantEmergency'OperatingProcedures.Thesemanualactionsensurethatasystemcanaccomplishitssafetyfunction,andarecreditedinthesafetyanalyses.Additionally,thisLCOaddressesRegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentsthathavebeendesignatedCategoryI,non-TypeA.TheOPERABILITYofthePAHinstrumentationensuresthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedplantparameterstomonitorandassessplantstatusfollowinganaccident.ThisLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEchannelsformostFunctions.TwoOPERABLEchannelsensurenosinglefailurepreventsoperatorsfromobtainingtheinformationnecessarytodeterminethesafetystatusoftheplant,andtobringtheplanttoandmaintainitinasafeconditionfollowinganaccident.Furthermore,OPERABILITYoftwochannelsallowsaCHANNELCHECKduringthepostaccidentphasetoconfirmthevalidityofdisplayedinformation.Horethantwochannelsmayberequirediffailureofoneaccidentmonitoringchannel.resultsininformationambiguity(thatis,theredundantdisplaysdisagree)thatcouldleadoperatorstodefeatorfailtoaccomplisharequiredsafetyfunction.Table3.3.3-1listsallCategoryIvariablesidentifiedbyReference1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-108DraftA 4 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)CategoryIvariablesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyare.capableofprovidingimmediatelyaccessibledisplayandcontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroom.TheHydrogenMonitorsareconsideredOPERABLEwhencontinuousreadoutisavailableintheControlRoomorintherelayroom.Eachchannelmustalsobesuppliedbyseparateelectricaltrainsexceptasnotedbelow.Inaddition,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.6,itisnotrequiredtodeclareasupportedsysteminoperabledueto'theinoperabilityofthesupportsystem(e.g.,electricpower).SincetheinoperabilityofInstrumentBusDdoesnothaveanyassociatedRequiredActions,thelossofthispowersourcemayaffecttheOPERABILITYofthePressurizerPressureandSGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)Functions.ListedbelowarediscussionsofthespecifiedinstrumentFunctionslistedi'nTable3.3.3-1.1.PressurizerPressurePressurizerPressureisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.PressurizerpressureisalsousedtoverifytheplantconditionsnecessarytoestablishnaturalcirculationintheRCSandtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredfor'thisfunction:~.PT-429andPT-431;~PT-430andPT-431;~PT-429andPT-449;ePT-430andPT-449;or~PT-431andPT-449ThelossofInstrumentBusDrequiresdeclaringPT-449inoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-109DraftA PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)2.PressurizerLevelPressurizerLevelisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.Pressurizerwaterlevelisalsousedtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~LT-426andLT-428;or~LT-427andLT-428.3,4.ReactorCoolantSstemRCSHotandColdLeRCSHotandColdLegTemperaturesareCategoryIvariables(RCSColdLegTemperatureisalsoaTypeAvariable)providedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCShotandcoldlegtemperaturesare'sedtodetermineRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSsubcoolingmarginwillallowterminationofSI,ifstillinprogress,orreinitiationofSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.Inaddition,RCScoldlegtemperatureisusedinconjunctionwithRCShotlegtemperaturetoverifynaturalcirculationintheRCS.Temperatureinputsareprovidedbytwoindependenttemperaturesensorresistanceelementsandassociatedtransmittersineachloop.TemperatureelementsTE-409B-1andTE-410B-1providetherequiredRCScoldlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.TemperatureelementsTE-409A-1andTE-410A-1providetherequiredRCShotlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-110DraftA

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)5.RCSPressureWideRaneRCSwiderangepressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandthelongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.RCSpressureisusedtoverifydeliveryofSIflowtotheRCSfromatleastonetrainwhentheRCSpressureisbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.RCSpressureisalsousedtoverifyclosureofmanuallyclosedpressurizerspraylinevalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andfordeterminingRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSpressurecanalsobeused:todeterminewhethertoterminateactuatedSIortoreinitiatestoppedSI;todeterminewhentoresetSIandstoptheresidualheatremovalpumps(RHR);tomanuallyrestarttheRHRpumps;asreactorcoolantpump(RCP)tripcriteri'a;tomakeadeterminationonthenatureoftheaccidentinprogressandwheretogonextintheemergencyoperatingprocedure;andtodeterminewhethertooperatethepressurizerheaters.RCSpressureisalsorelatedtothreedecisionsaboutdepressurization.Theyare:todeterminewhethertoproceedwithprimarysystemdepressurization;toverifyterminationofdepressurization;andtodeterminewhethertocloseaccumulatorisolationvalvesduringacontrolledcooldown/depressurization.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-111DraftA PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO5.RCSPressureWideRane(continued)RCSpressureisaTypeAvariablebecausetheoperatorusesthisindicationtomonitorthecooldownoftheRCSfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)orsmallbreakLOCA.Operatoractionstomaintainacontrolledcooldown,suchasadjustingsteamgenerator(SG)pressureorlevel,wouldusethisindication.RCSpressuretransmittersPT-420andPT-420Aprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.6.RCSSubcoolinMonitorRCSSubcoolingMonitorisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.TheRCSSubcoolingMonitorisusedtoprovideinformationtothe.operator,derivedfromRCShotlegtemperatureandRCSpressure,onsubcooling.RCSsubcoolingmarginisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithas,beenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresdetermineRCSsubcoolingmarginbasedonthecoreexitthermocouples(CETs)andRCSpressure.Therefore,anyofthefollowingcombinationofparameterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~TI-409AandTI-410A;or~OnepressurizerpressuretransmitterandtwoCETsineachofthefourquadrantssuppliedbyelectricaltrainAandtrainB(i.e.,totaloftwopressurizerpressuretransmittersand16CETs).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-112DraftA

PANInstrumentation'3.3.3BASES.LCO(continued)7.ReactorVesselWaterLevelReactorVesselWaterLevelisaTypeAvariable'rovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.Itisalsousedforaccidentdiagnosisandtodeterminereactorcoolantinventoryadequacy.WhenbothRCPsarestopped,theReactorVesselWaterLevelIndicationSystem(RVLIS)providesadirectmeasurementofthecollapsedliquidlevelabovethefuelalignmentplate.Thecollapsed'levelrepresentstheamountofliquidmassthatisinthereactorvesselabovethecore.WhentheRCPsareoperating,RVLISindicatesthefluidfractionoftheRCS.Heasurementofthecollapsedwaterlevelorfluidfractionisselectedbecauseitisadirectindicationofthewaterinventory.LeveltransmittersLT-490AandLT-490Bprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.8.ContainmentSumWaterLevelContainmentSumpBWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.ContainmentSumpBWaterLevelisusedtodetermine:~containmentsumplevelforaccidentdiagnosis;~whentobegintherecirculationprocedure;and~whethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress.LeveltransmittersLT-942andLT-943,eachwithfivediscretelevelswitches,providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-113DraftA PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)9.ContainmentPressureWideRaneContainmentPressure(WideRange)isaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofRCSandcontainmentOPERABILITY.ContainmentPressure(WideRange)isusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogressandwhen,andif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~PT-946andPT-948;or~PT-950andPT-948.10.ContainmentAreaRadiationHihRaneContainmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)isaTypeECategoryIvariableprovidedtomonitorforthepotentialofsignificantradiationreleasesintocontainmentandtoprovidereleaseassessmentforusebyoperatorsindeterminingtheneedtoinvokesiteemergencyplans.Containmentradiationlevelisusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogress(e.g.,LOCA),andwhen,orif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.RadiationmonitorsR-29andR-30areusedtoprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.HdroenHonitorsHydrogenConcentrationisaTypeCCategoryIvariableprovidedtodetecthighhydrogenconcentrationconditionsthatrepresentapotentialforcontainmentbreachfromahydrogenexplosion.Thisvariableisalsoimportantinverifyingtheadequacyofmitigatingactions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-114DraftA PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCOll.HdroenMonitors(continued)HydrogenmonitorsHMSLCPAandHMSLCPBprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Inaddition,thePostAccidentSamplingSystemmaytaketheplaceofoneofthesemonitors.ThePASSsystemHydrogenFunctionisnotrequiredtoprovidecontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroomorrelayroomforOPERABILITY.12.CondensateStoraeTankCSTLevelCSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtoensureawatersupplyisavailableforthepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.TheCSTconsistsoftwoidenticaltanksconnectedbyacommonoutletheader.CSTlevelis'usedtodetermine:~ifsufficientCSTinventoryisavailableimmediately,followingalossof-normalfeedwaterorsmallbreakLOCA;and'whentomanuallyreplenishtheCSToralignthesafetyrelatedsourceofwater(servicewater)tothepreferredAFWsystem.LeveltransmittersLT-2022AandLT-2022Bprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.13.RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevelRWSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyingawatersourcetotheSI,RHR,andCS(CS)Systems.TheRWSTlevelaccuracyisestablishedtoallowanadequatesupplyofwatertotheSI,RHR,andCSpumpsduringtheswitchovertotherecirculationphaseofanaccident.AhighdegreeofaccuracyisrequiredtomaximizethetimeavailabletotheoperatortocompletetheswitchovertothesumprecirculationphaseandensuresufficientwaterisavailabletomaintainadequateNPSHtooperatingpumps.LeveltransmittersLT-920andLT-921providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-115DraftA PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)14.RHRFlowRHRFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyinglowpressuresafetyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtotheCSandSIpumps.RHRflowisusedtodeterminewhentostoptheRHRpumpsandifsufficientflowisavailabletotheCSandSIpumpsduringrecirculation.SincedifferentflowtransmittersareusedtoverifyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtoverifyflowtotheCSandSIpumps,FT-626andFT-931AcompriseonerequiredchannelandFT-689andFT-931Bcompriseasecondrequiredchannel.15,16,17,18.CoreExitTemeratureCoreExitTemperatureisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.AnevaluationwasmadeoftheminimumnumberofvalidCETsnecessaryformeasuringcorecooling.TheevaluationdeterminedthenecessarycomplementofCETsrequiredtodetectinitialcorerecoveryandtrendtheensuingcoreheatup.Theevaluationaccountedforcorenonuniformities,includingincoreeffectsoftheradialdecaypowerdistribution,excoreeffectsofrefluxinthehotlegs,andnonuniforminlettemperatures.Basedontheseevaluations,adequatecorecoolingisensuredwithtwovalidCoreExitTemperaturechannelsperquadrantwithtwoCETsperrequiredchannel.CoreExitTemperatureisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillin,progress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.CoreExitTemperatureisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-116DraftA

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO15,16,17,18.CoreExitTemerature(continued)TwoOPERABLEchannelsofCoreExitTemperaturearerequiredineachquadranttoprovideindicationofradialdistributionofthecoolanttemperaturerisea'crossrepresentativeregionsofthecore.Becauseofthesmallcoresize,tworandomlyselectedthermocouplesaresufficienttomeetthetwothermocouples.perchannelrequirementinanyquadrant.However,aCETwhichliesdirectlyonthedividing'inebetweentwoquadrantscanonlybeusedtosatisfytheminimumrequiredchannelsforonequadrant.ACETisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitiswithin+35'FoftheaverageCETreading.AtleasttwoCETsfromeachofthefollowingtrainsmustbeOPERABLEineachofthefourquadrants:TrainACETLocationTrainBCETLocationT2H6T5J3T6I2T7J6T8L10T9J8T12H6T15H9T18F8T21C11T22HllT23H13T26I10T28D5T33D2T34C3T36B7T38B5T39D7T1T3T4T10T13T14T16T17T19T20T24 T25T27 T29 T30T31 T32T35T37I4L7K3J9K11D12 H10E10G7C8F12G12E6E4G4G2GlA7C6(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-117DraftA 0 PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESLCO(continued)19.AFWFlowAFWFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofthepreferredAFWsystem.TheAFWSystemprovidesdecayheatremovalviatheSGsandiscomprisedofthepreferredAFWSystemandtheStandbyAFW(SAFW)System.TheuseofthepreferredAFWorSAFWSystemtoprovide.thisdecayheatremovalfunctionisdependentuponthetypeofaccident.AFWflowindicationisrequiredfromthethreepumptrainswhichcomprisethepreferredAFWSystemsincethesepumpsautomaticallystartonvariousactuationsignals.ThefailureofthepreferredAFWSystem(e.g.,duetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding)isdetectedbyAFWflowindication.Atthispoint,theSAFWSystemismanuallyalignedtoprovidethedecayheatremovalfunction.SAFWflowcanalsobeusedtoverifythatAFWflowisbeingdeliveredtotheSGs.However,theprimaryindicationofthisisprovidedbySGwaterlevel.Therefore,flowindicationfromtheSAFWpumpsisnotrequired.EachofthethreepreferredAFWpumptrainshastworedundanttransmitters;however,onlytheflowtransmittersuppliedpowerfromthesameelectricaltrainastheAFWpumpisrequiredforthisLCO.Therefore,flowtransmittersFT-2001andFT-2007comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandFT-2002andFT-2006comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-118DraftA 0 PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESLCO20,21.SGWaterLevelNarrowandWideRane(continued)SGWaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Forthenarrowrangelevel,thesignalsfromthetransmittersareindependentlyindicatedonthemaincontrolboardas0%to100%.Thiscorrespondstoapproximatelyabovethetopofthetubebundlestothetopoftheswirlvaneseparators(span'of143inches).Forthewiderangelevel,signalsfromthetransmittersareindicatedas0to520inches(0%to100%)onthemaincontrolboard.SGWaterLevel(NarrowandWideRange)isusedto:~identifythefaultedSGfollowingatuberupture;~verifythattheintactSGsareanadequateheatsinkforthereactor;~determinethenatureoftheaccidentinprogress(e.g.,verifyanSGTR);and~verifyplant"conditionsforterminationofSIduringsecondaryplantHELBsoutsidecontainment.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbytwotrainsofinstrumentation.S/GWaterLevel(NarrowRange)requires2channelsofindication(oneperSG)whichcanbemetusinganyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitters:LT-461andLT-471;LT-462andLT-471;LT-462andLT-472;LT-462andLT-473;LT-463andLT-472;andLT-463andLT-473.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-119"OraftA

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO20,21.SGWaterLevelNarrowandWideRane(continued)ThelossofInstrumentBusDrequiresdeclaringLT-463andLT-471inoperable.SGWaterLevel(WideRange)requires2channelsofindicationperSG.TwochannelsperSGarerequiredsincethelossofonechannelwithnobackupavailablemayresultinthecompletelossofinformationrequiredbytheoperatorstoaccomplishnecessarysafetyfunctions.LeveltransmittersLT-504andLT-505comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandLT-506andLT-507comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.22.SGPressureSGPressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Thesignalsfromthetransmittersarecalibratedforarangeof0psigto1400psig.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbythreeavailabletrainsofinstrumentation.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:PT-468andPT-478;PT-469andPT-478;PT-479andPT-482;andPT-482andPT-483.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-120DraftA PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESAPPLICABILITYThePAHinstrumentationLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.Thesevariables.arerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.TheapplicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinMODES1,2,and3.InMODES4,5,and6,thePAHinstrumentationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE'becauseplantconditionsaresuchthatthelikelihoodofaneventthatwouldrequirePAHinstrumentationislow.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1hasbeenaddedtoexcludetheNODEchangerestrictionofLCO3.0.4.ThisexceptionallowsentryintotheapplicableMODEwhilerelyingontheACTIONSeventhoughtheACTIONSmayeventuallyrequireplantshutdown.Thisexceptionisacceptableduetothepassivefunctionoftheinstruments,theoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentusingalternateinstrumentsandmethods,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringtheseinstruments.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.3-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwas.enteredforthatFunction.A.1ConditionAappliestoallPAHinstrumentationfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorerequiredchannelsforoneormorerequiredFunctionsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistoimmediatelyrefertoTable3.3.3-1andtaketheRequiredActionsfortheinstrumentationfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-121.DraftA

PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)8.1ConditionBapplieswhenonerequiredchannelisinoperable.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneRCShotlegorcoldlegtemperaturechannel.ItalsoincludestheinoperabilityofoneSGWaterLevel(WideRange)channelinoneorbothSGs.RequiredActionB.1requiresrestoringtheinoperablechanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEchannel(orinthecaseofaFunctionthathasonlyonerequiredchannel,othernon-RegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentchannelstomonitortheFunction),thepassivenatureoftheinstrument(nocriticalautomaticact'ionisassumedtooccurfromtheseinstruments),andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentationduringthisinterval.C.1ConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimesforConditionBisnotmet;ThisConditionrequirestheimmediateinitiationofactionstoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReporttotheNRC.Thisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheConditionisentered.Thisreportshalldiscusstheresultsoftherootcauseevaluationoftheinoperabilityandidentifyproposedrestorativeactionsoralternatemeansofprovidingtherequiredfunction.Thisactionisappropriateinlieuofashutdownrequirementsincealternativeactionsareidentifiedbeforelossoffunctionalcapability,andgiventhelikelihoodofplantconditionsthatwouldrequireinformationprovidedbythisinstrumentation.Ifalternatemeansaretobeused,theymustbedevelopedandtestedpriortosubmittaloftheSpecialReport.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-122DraftA PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)D.lConditionDapplieswhenaFunctionhastwoinoperablerequiredchannelsorwhenaFunctionhasoneinoperablerequiredchannelandnodiversechannelOPERABLE(i.e.,completelossofRCSHotLegTemperatureorRCSColdLegTemperatureFunctions).ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftwoSGWaterLevel(WideRange)tooneorbothSGs.ThisConditionrequiresrestoringonechannelintheaffectedFunctiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCompletionTimeof7daysisbasedontherelativelylowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuousoperationwitheithertworequiredchannelsinoperableinaFunctionorcompletelossoffunctionisnotacceptablebecausethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallperformancequalificationrequirementsappliedtothePANinstrumentation.Therefore,requiringrestorationofoneinoperablechanneloftheFunctionlimitstheriskthatthePANFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur.ConditionEapplieswhentwohydrogenmonitorchannelsareinoperable.ThisConditionrequiresrestoringonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedo'nthebackupcapabilityofthePostAccidentSamplingSystemortheredundanthydrogenmonitorchanneltomonitorthehydrogenconcentrationforevaluationofcoredamageandtoprovideinformationforoperatordecisions.Also,itisunlikelythataLOCAwhichwouldpotentiallyrequireuseofthehydrogenrecombinerswouldoccurduringthistime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-123DraftA

PAHInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)F.lIfonechannelforFunction7or10cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionD;theplantmusttakeimmediateactiontoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReporttotheNRC.Thisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheactionisrequired.ThisreportdiscussesthealternatemeansofmonitoringReactorVesselWaterLevelandContainmentAreaRadiation,thedegreetowhichthealternatemeansareequivalenttotheinstalledPAHchannels,theareasinwhichtheyarenotequivalent,andascheduleforrestoringthenormalPAHchannels.ThesealternatemeansmusthavebeendevelopedandtestedandmaybetemporarilyinstalledifthenormalPAHchannel(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallottedtime.G.landG.2IfonechannelforFunction1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,'19,20,21,or22cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe.requiredCompletionTimeofConditionDorifonechannelforFunctionllcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionE,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCO'doesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.ConditionGismodifiedbyaNotewhichclarifiesthatthisConditionisnotapplicabletoFunctions7and10.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-124DraftA 00 PANInstrumentation83.3.3-BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatSR3.3.3.1andSR3.3.3.2applytoeachPANinstrumentationFunctioninTable3;3.3-1.SR3.3.3'.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery31daysensuresthatagrossinstrumentationfailurehasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisnormallyacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriousinstrumentconditions.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannel.failure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Thehighradiationinstrumentationshouldbecomparedtosimilarplantinstrumentslocatedthroughouttheplant.Channelcheckacceptancecriteriaaredeterminedbytheplantstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingisolation,indication,andreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethecriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.AsspecifiedintheSR,aCHANNELCHECKisonlyrequiredforthosechannelsthatarenormallyenergized.TheFrequencyof31daysisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstratesthatchannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.3-125.DraftA PAN'InstrumentationB3.3.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.3.3.2ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstomeasuredparameterwiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyisbased'noperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section7.5.2.2.RegulatoryGuide1.97,Rev.3.3.NUREG-0737,Supplement1,"THIActionItems."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-126DraftA

LOPDGStart"InstrumentationB3.3.4B3.3INSTRUHENTATIONB3.3.4LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheDGsprovideasourceofemergencypowerwhenoffsitepoweriseitherunavailableorisinsufficientlystabletoallowsafeplantoperation.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationconsistsoftwochannelsoneachofsafeguardsBuses14,16,17,and18(Ref.1).Eachchannelcontainsonelossofvoltagerelayandonedegradedvoltagerelay.Aone-out-of-twologicinbothchannelswillcausethefollowingactionsontheassociatedsafeguardsbus:a.tripofthenormalfeedbreakerfromoffsitepower;b.tripofthebus-tiebreakertotheoppositeelectricaltrain(ifclosed);C.shedofallbusloadsexcepttheCSpump,componentcoolingwaterpump(ifnosafetyinjectionsignalispresent),andsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters;andd.startoftheassociatedDG.Thedegradedvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoprotectEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)componentsfromexposuretolongperiodsofreducedvoltageconditionswhichcanresultindegradedperformanceandtoensurethatrequiredmotorscanstart.Thelossofvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoensuretheDGisstartedwithinthetimelimitsassumedintheaccidentanalysistoprovidetherequiredelectricalpowerifoffsitepowerislost.Thedegradedvoltagerelayshavetimedelayswhichhaveinverseoperatingcharacteristicssuchthatthelowerthebusvoltage,thefastertheoperatingtime.Thelossofvoltagerelayshavedefinitetimedelayswhicharenotrelatedtotherateofthelossofbusvoltage.Thesetimedelaysaresettopermitvoltagetransientsduringworstcasemotorstartingconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-127DraftA, LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLOPDGstartinstrumentationis'requiredfortheESFSystemstofunctioninanyaccidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ItsdesignbasisisthatoftheESFActuationSystem(ESFAS).UndervoltageconditionswhichoccurindependentofanyaccidentconditionsresultinthestartandbusconnectionoftheassociatedDG,butnoautomaticloadingoccurs.AccidentanalysescredittheloadingoftheDGbasedonthelossofoffsitepowerduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThemostlimitingDBAofconcernisthelargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)whichrequiresESFSystemsinordertomaintaincontainmentintegrityandprotectfuelcontainedwithinthereactorvessel(Ref.2).Thedetectionand'rocessingofanundervoltagecondition,andsubsequentDGloading,hasbeenincludedinthedelaytimeassumedforeachESFcomponentrequiringDGsuppliedpowerfollowingaDBAandlossofoffsitepower.ThelossofoffsitepowerhasbeenassumedtooccureithercoincidentwiththeDBAoratalaterperiod(40to90secondsfollowingthereactortrip)duetoagriddisturbancecausedbytheturbinegeneratortrip.Ifthelossofoffsitepoweroccursatthesametimeasthesafetyinjection(SI)signalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheSIsignalwillactuatetheDGwithin2secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursbeforetheSIsignalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillactuatetheDGwithin2.75secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12.75secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursaftertheSIsignalparametersarereached(griddisturbance),theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillopenthefeederbreakertotheaffectedbuswithin2.75secondsandtheDGwillconnecttothebuswithinanadditional1.5seconds(DGwasactuatedbySIsignal).Thegriddisturbancehasbeenevaluatedbasedona140'FpeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduringaLOCAanddemonstratedtoresultinacceptableconsequences.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-128DraftA

LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThedegradedvoltageandundervoltagesetpointsarebasedontheminimumvoltagerequiredforcontinuedoperationofESFSystemsassumingworstcaseloadingconditions(i.e.,maximumloadinguponDGsequencing).TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltagerelays,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:a.ActuatetheassociatedDGwithin2.75secondsasassumedintheaccidentanalysis;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailableandduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestassumedvoltagedropbelowthevoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheTripSetpointforthedegradedvoltagechannels,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations;a.Preventmotorssuppliedbythe480Vbusfromoperatingatreducedvoltageconditionsforlongperiodsoftime;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailable,andduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestvoltagedropbelowthemaximumvoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction.TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-129(continued)DraftA LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOrequiresthateach480VsafeguardsbushavetwoOPERABLEchannelsoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentationinMODESI,2,3,and4whentheassociatedDGsupportssafetysystemsassociatedwiththeESFAS.InMODES5and6,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsforeach480Vsafeguardsbus'mustbeOPERABLEwhenevertheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheautomaticstartoftheDGisavailablewhenneeded.LossoftheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctioncouldresultinthedelayofsafetysystemsinitiationwhenrequired.Thiscouldleadtounacceptableconsequencesduringaccidents.TheLOPstartinstrumentationisconsideredOPERABLEwhentwochannels,eachcomprisedofonedegradedvoltageandonelossofvoltagerelaysareavailableforeach480Vsafeguardsbus(i.e.,Bus14,16,17,and18).EachoftheLOPchannelsmustbecapableofdetectingundervoltageconditionswithinthevoltagelimitsandtimedelaysassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforthedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltageFunctionsarespecifiedinSR3.3.4.2.TheAllowableValuesspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethosesetpointswhichensurethattheassociatedDGwillactuatewithin2.75secondsonundervoltageconditions,andthattheDGwillnotactuateonmomentaryvoltagedropswhichcouldaffectESFactuationtimesasassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethenominalsetpointsselectedtoensurethatthesetpointmeasuredbytheSurveillancedoesnotexceedtheAllowableValueaccountingformaximuminstrumentuncertaintiesbetweenscheduledsurveillances.Therefore,LOPstartinstrumentationchannelsareOPERABLEwhentheCHANNELCALIBRATION"asleft"valueiswithintheTripSetpointlimitsandtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandTADOT"asfound"valueiswithintheAllowedValuesetpoints.ThebasisforallsetpointsiscontainedinReference3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.3-130(continued)DraftA LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctionsarerequiredinHODES1,2,3,and4becauseESFFunctionsaredesignedtoprovideprotectionintheseHODES.ActuationinHODE5or6isrequiredwhenevertherequiredDGmustbeOPERABLEsothatitcanperformitsfunctiononan'OPordegradedpowertothe480Vsafeguardsbuses.ACTIONSIntheeventarelay'sTripSetpointisfoundtobenonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthechannelisfoundtobeinoperable,thenthechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOConditionenteredasapplicable.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.ThisNotestatesthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.A.lConditionAappliestotheLOPDGstartFunctionwithonechannelperbusinoperable.Withonechannelinoperable,RequiredActionA.1requiresthatchanneltobeplacedintripwithin6hours.Withanundervoltagechannelinthetrippedcondition,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelsareconfiguredtoprovideaone-out-of-onelogictoinitiateatripoftheincomingoffsitepowerfortherespectivebus.TheremainingOPERABLEchanneliscomprisedofone-out-of-twologicfromthedegradedandlossofvoltagerelays.AnyadditionalfailureofeitherofthesetwoOPERABLErelaysrequiresentryintoConditionB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-131'raftA

LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1ConditionBappliestotheLOPDGstartFunctionwhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAarenotmetorwhentwochannelsofLOPstartinstrumentationperbusareinoperable.ConditionBrequiresimmediateentryintotheApplicableConditionsspecifiedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"orLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6,"fortheDGmadeinoperablebyfailureoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentation.TheactionsofthoseLCOsprovideforadequatecompensatoryactionstoassureplantsafety.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSTheSurveillancesaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethat,whenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto6hours,providedthesecondchannelmaintainstripcapability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,or'xpirationofthe4hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicabl'eConditionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedonassumptionthat4hoursistheaveragetimerequiredtoperformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,4hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.SR3.3.4.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery31days.Thistestcheckstripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectly.Forthesetests,therelayTripSetpointsareverifiedandadjustedasnecessarytoensureAllowableValuescanstillbemet.The31dayFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftherelaysandcontrolsandhas.beenshownto'eacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-132DraftA LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.4.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.Thevoltagesetpointverification,aswellasthetimeresponsetoalossofvoltageandadegradedvoltagetest,shallincludeasinglepointverificationthatthetripoccurswithin'therequiredtimedelay.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycleandisjustifiedbytheassumptionofa24monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.REFERENCESI.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.RG&EDesignAnalysisDA-EE-93-006-08,"480VoltUndervoltageRelaySet'tingsand.TestAcceptanceCriteria."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-133DraftA 00 CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5B3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.5ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheCREATSprovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontroltheplantfollowinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivity.ThissystemisdescribedintheBasesforLCO3.7.9,"ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)."ThisLCOonlyaddressestheactuationinstrumentationforthehighradiationstateCREATSModeF.ThehighradiationstateCREATSModeFactuationinstrumentationconsistsof,noblegas(R-36),particulate(R-37),andiodine(R-38)radiationmonitors.ThesedetectorsarelocatedontheoperatinglevelontheTurbineBuildingandutilizeacommonairsupplypump.AhighradiationsignalfromanyofthesedetectorswillinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolateeachairsupplypathwithtwodampers.ThecontrolroomoperatorcanalsoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolatetheairsupplypathsbyusingamanualpushbuttoninthecontrolroom.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.TheGREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinMODESI,2,3,and4,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.I).ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.InMODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-134DraftA GREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESAPPLICABLETheCREATSActuation,InstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3SAFETYANALYSESoftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)LCOTheLCOrequirementsensurethatinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSisOPERABLE.1.ManualInitiationTheLCOrequiresonetraintobeOPERABLE.Thetrainconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogic.TheoperatorcaninitiatetheCREATSFiltrationtrainatanytimebyusingapushbuttoninthecontrolroom.ThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentsinthesamemannerasanyoftheautomaticactuationsignalsrequiredbythisLCO.2.AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasTheLCOrequiresonetrainofActuationLogicandActuationRelaystobeOPERABLE.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsystem,includingtheinitiationrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheCREATS.3.ControlRoomRadiationIntakeMonitorTheLCOspecifiessinglechannelsofiodine(R-38),noblegas(R-36),andparticulate(R-37)oftheControlRoomIntakeMonitorstoensurethattheradiationmonitoringinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolationdampersremainsOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDesignBasisAccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-135DraftA CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)InMODE5or6,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSThemostcommoncauseofchannelinoperabilityisfailureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesufficienttoexceedthetoleranceallowedbytheplantspecificcalibrationprocedures.Typically,thedriftisfoundtobesmallandresultsinadelayofactuationratherthanatotallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymadeduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whentheprocessinstrumentationissetupforadjustmenttobringitwithinspecification.The"asleft"TripSetpointmustbewithinthetolerancespecifiedbythecalibrationprocedure.Ifthe"asfound"TripSetpointexceedsthelimitsspecifiedinTable3.3.5-1,thechannelmustbedeclaredinoperableimmediatelyandtheappropriateCondition'ntered.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONSindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.5-1intheaccompanyingLCO.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel/trainofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.A.1ConditionAappliestooneormoreFunctionswithoneormorechannelsoftheCREATSactuationinstrumentationinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-136DraftA

CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)Ifoneormoreradiationmonitorchannels,themanualinitiationtrain,ortheautomaticactuationlogictrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithinIhourorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisConditionforthemanualinitiationtraininoperableoraradiationmonitorchannelinoperable,theremainingCREATSactuationinstrumentationisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbuttheactuationtimeorresponsivenessoftheCREATSmaybeaffected.InthisConditionfortheautomaticactuationlogictraininoperableorallradiationmonitorchannelsinoperable,theCREATSisnotcapableofperformingitsintendedautomaticfunction.Thisisconsideredalossofsafetyfunction:TheCREATS,however,maystillbe,capableofbeingplacedinCREATSModeFbymanualoperatoractions.TheIhourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoautomaticallyisolatethecontrolroomorbemanuallyisolatedbytheoperator.TheRequiredActionforConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24.hours.Thisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebased.onthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.B.IandB.2Condition8applieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetandtheplantisinMODEI,2,3,or4.TheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-137DraftA 0 CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.lC.2andC.3ConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetinHODE5,or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoretheinoperablechannel(s)ortraintoOPERABLEstatustoensureadequateisolationcapabilityintheeventofawastegasdecaytankrupture.HovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesandCOREALTERATIONSmustalsobesuspendedimmediatelytoreducetheriskofaccidentsthatwouldrequireCREATSactuation.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafe'position.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.5-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichCREATSActuationFunctions.SR'.3.5.1ThisSRistheperformanceofaCOTonceevery92daysoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.ThistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidetheautomaticCREATSactuation.Thesetpointsshallbeleftconsistentwiththeplantspecificcalibrationproceduretolerance.TheFrequencyof92daysisbasedontheknownreliabilityofthemonitoringequipmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.5.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheHanualActuationFunctionsevery24months.TheHanualActuationFunctionistestedupto,andincluding,themasterrelaycoils./(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-138DraftA

CREATSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.5.2(continued)TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionandtheredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsbecausetheManualInitiationFunctionhasnosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3.3.5.3ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-139DraftA

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)83.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDTheseBasesaddressrequirementsformaintainingRCSpressure,temperature,andflowratewithinlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalyses(Ref.1)ofnormaloperatingconditionsandanticipatedoperationaloccurrencesassumeinitialconditionswithinthenormalsteadystateenvelope.ThelimitsplacedonRCSpressure,temperature,andflowrateensurethatthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designcriterionwillbemetforeachofthetransientsanalyzed.ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactors,ITDPdesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesaredeterminedinordertomee'ttheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1;52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-1DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits83.4.lBASESBACKGROUND(continued)ForboththeWRB-.landWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandtherefore.areonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationisappliedintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30.TheRCSpressurelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithoperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Pressurizerpressureindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerpressurewillcausethereactorcoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitasspecifiedintheCOLR,isconsistentwithfullpoweroperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Indicationso'ftemperatureareaveragedtodetermineavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AhigheraveragetemperaturewillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCSflowrateasspecifiedintheCOLR,normallyremainsconstantduringanoperationalfuelcyclewithbothpumpsrunning.TheminimumRCSflowlimitcorrespondstothatassumedforDNBanalyses.Flowrateindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerRCSflowwillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.Operationfor,significantperiodsoftimeoutsidetheseDNBlimitsincreasesthelikelihoodofafuelcladdingfailureinaDNBlimitedevent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-2(continued)DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB.3.4.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherequirementsofthisLCOrepresenttheinitialconditionsforDNBlimitedtransientsanalyzedintheplantsafetyanalyses(Ref.1).ThesafetyanalyseshaveshownthattransientsinitiatedfromthelimitsofthisLCOwillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion.ThisistheacceptancelimitfortheRCSDNBparameters.ChangestotheplantthatcouldimpacttheseparametersmustbeassessedfortheirimpactontheDNBdesigncriterion.Thetransientsanalyzedincludelossofcoolantfloweventsanddroppedorstuckrodevents.AkeyassumptionfortheanalysisoftheseeventsisthatthecorepowerdistributioniswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)."Thelimitforpressurizerpressureisbasedona+30psiginstrumentuncertainty.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatnominalpressureismaintainedat2235psig.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedpressureis2235psig.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitis,basedonat4'Finstrumentuncertaintywhichincludesak1.5'Fdeadband.ItisassumedthatnominalT.,ismaintainedwithinX1.5'Fof573.5'F.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedtemperatureiswithin1.5'Fofnominal.ThelimitforRCSflowrateisbasedonthenominalT.,andSGpluggingcriterialimit.Additionalmarginofapproximately3%isthenaddedforconservatism.TheRCSDNBparameterssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOspecifieslimitsonthemonitoredprocessvariables-pressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrate-toensurethecoreoperateswithinthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.OperatingwithintheselimitswillresultinmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterionintheeventofaDNBlimitedtransient.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-3DraftA

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESLCO(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethelimitonpressurizerpressureisnotapplicableduringshorttermoperationaltransientssuchasaTHERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminuteoraTHERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.Theseconditionsrepresentshorttermperturbationswhereactionstocontrolpressurevariationsmightbecounterproductive.Also,sincetheyrepresenttransientsinitiatedfrompowerlevels<100%RTP,anincreasedDNBRmarginexiststooffsetthetemporarypressurevariations.AnothersetoflimitsonDNBrelatedparametersisprovidedinSL2.1.1,"ReactorCoreSLs."ThoselimitsarelessrestrictivethanthelimitsofthisLCO,butviolationofaSafetyLimit(SL)meritsastricter,moresevereRequiredAction.Shouldaviolation.ofthisLCOoccur,theoperatormustcheckwhetherornotanSLmayhavebeenexceeded.APPLICABILITYInMODE1,thelimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCScoolantaveragetemperature,andRCSflowratemustbemaintainedduringsteadystateoperationinordertoensureDNBdesigncriteriawillbemetintheeventofanunplannedlossofforcedcoolantfloworotherDNBlimitedtransient.InMODE2,anincreasedDNBRmarginexists.InallotherMODES,thepowerlevelislowenoughthatDNBisnotaconcern.ACTIONSA.1RCSpressureandRCSaveragetemperaturearecontrollableandmeasurableparameters.WithoneorbothoftheseparametersnotwithinLCOlimits,actionmustbetakentorestoreparameter(s).RCStotalflowrateisnotacontrollableparameterandisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperation.IftheindicatedRCStotalflowrateisbelowtheLCOlimit,powermustbereduced,asrequiredbyRequiredActionB.1,torestoreDNBmarginandeliminatethepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-4DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)The2hourCompletionTimeforrestorationoftheparametersprovidessufficienttimetodeterminethecausefortheoffnormalcondition,toadjustplantparameters,andtorestorethereadingswithinlimits,andisbasedonplantoperatingexperience.B.lIfRequiredActionA.lisnotmetwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE2within6hours.InHODE2,thereducedpowerconditioneliminatesthepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonabletoreachtherequiredplantconditionsinanorderlymanner.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.1.1SinceRequiredActionA.1allowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestorepaiametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforpressurizerpressureissufficienttoensurethe.pressurecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-5~DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued')SR3.4.1.2SinceRequiredActionA.1allowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforRCSaveragetemperatureissufficienttoensurethetemperaturecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.SR3.4.1.3HeasurementofRCStotalflowrateonceevery24monthsverifiestheactualRCSflowrateisgreaterthanorequaltotheminimumrequiredRCSflowrate.Thisverificationmaybeperformedviaaprecisioncalorimetricheatbalanceorotheracceptedmeans.TheFrequencyof24monthsreflectstheimportanceofverifyingflowafterarefuelingoutagewhenthecorehasb'eenaltered,whichmayhavecausedanalterationofflowresistance.VerificationofRCSflowrateonashorterintervalisnotrequiredsincethisparameterisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperationastherearenoRCSloopisolationvalvesorotherinstalleddeviceswhichcouldsignificantlyalterflow.Reducedperformanceofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)wouldbeobservableduetobusvoltageandfrequency'hanges,andinstalledalarmsthatwouldresultinoperatorinvestigation.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoHODE1,withouthavingperformedtheSR,andplacementoftheplantinthebestconditionforperformingtheSR.TheNotestatesthattheSRshallbeperformedwithin7daysafterreaching95%RTP.Thisexceptionisappropriatesincetheheatbalancerequirestheplanttobeataminimumof95%RTPtoobtainthestatedRCSflowaccuracies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-6DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NRCHemorandumfromE.L.Jordan,AssistantDirectorforTechnicalPrograms,DivisionofReactorOperationsInspectiontoDistribution;

Subject:

"DiscussionofLicensedPowerLevel(AITSF14580H2),"datedAugust22,1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-7DraftA-RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM'(RCS)B3.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisbaseduponmeetingseveralmajorconsiderationsbeforethereactorcanbemadecritical'ndwhilethereactoriscritical.Thefirstconsiderationismoderatortemperaturecoefficient(HTC),LCO3.1.4,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)."Inthetransientandaccidentanalyses,theHTCisassumedtobeinarangefromslightlypositivetonegativeandtheoperatingtemperatureisassumedtobewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopewhilethereactoriscritical.TheLCOonminimumtemperatureforcriticalityhelpsensuretheplantisoperatedconsistentwiththeseassumptions.Thesecondconsiderationistheprotectiveinstrumentation.Becausecertainprotectiveinstrumentation(e.g.,excoreneutrondetectors)canbeaffectedbymoderatortemperature,atemperaturevaluewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosentoensureproperindicationandresponsewhilethe'eactoriscritical.Thethirdconsiderationisthepressurizeroperatingcharacteristics.Thetransientandaccidentanalysesassumethatthepressurizeriswithinitsnormalstartupandoperatingrange(i.e.,saturatedconditionsandsteambubblepresent).ItisalsoassumedthattheRCStemperatureiswithinitsnormalexpectedrangeforstartupandpoweroperation.SincethedensityoftheRCSwater,andhencetheresponseofthepressurizertotransients,dependsupontheinitialtemperatureofthemoderator,aminimumvalueformoderatortemperaturewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosen.Thefourthconsiderationisthatthereactorvesselisaboveitsminimumnilductilityreferencetemperaturewhenthereactoriscritical.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-8(continued)DraftA

RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLEAlthoughtheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotSAFETYANALYSESitselfaninitialconditionassumedinDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs),thecloselyalignedtemperatureforhotzeropower(HZP)'saprocessvariablethatisaninitialconditionofDBAs,suchastherodclustercontrolassembly(RCCA)withdrawal,RCCAejection,andmainsteamlinebreakaccidentsperformedatzeropowerthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.AlllowpowersafetyanalysesassumeinitialRCSlooptemperaturesgreaterthanorequaltotheHZPtemperatureof547'F.Theminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimitationprovidesasmallband,7'F,forcriticaloperationbelowHZP.ThisbandallowscriticaloperationbelowHZPduringplantstartupanddoesnotadverselyaffectanysafetyanalysessincetheMTCisnotsignificantlyaffectedbythesmalltemperaturedifferencebetweenHZPandtheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOCompliancewiththeLCOensuresthatthereactorwillnotbemadeormaintainedcritical(k,<<z1.0)atatemperaturelessthanasmallbandbelowtheHZPtemperature,whichisassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Failure'tomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYInMODE1,andMODE2withk,<<z1.0,LCO3.4.2isapplicablesincethereactorcanonlybecritical(k,<<21.0)intheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-9DraftA

RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ThespecialtestexceptionofLCO3.1.10,"MODE2PHYSICSTESTSExceptions,"permitsPHYSICSTESTStobeperformedatg5%RTPwithRCSloopaveragetemperaturesslightlylowerthannormallyallowedsothatfundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthecorecanbeverified.Inorderfornuclearcharacteristicstobeaccuratelymeasured,itmaybenecessarytooperateoutsidethenormalrestrictionsofthisLCO.Forexample,tomeasuretheMTCatbeginningofcycle,itisnecessarytoallowRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowT~~whichmaycauseRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowthetemperaturelimitofthisLCO.TheneedtoperformthePHYSICSTESTStoensurethattheoperatingcharacteristicsofthecoreareconsistentwithdesignpredictionsprovidessufficientjustificationtoallowatemporarydecreaseintheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimit.ACTIONSA.1Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitcannotberestored,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE2withK,<<<.1.0within30minutes.Rapidreactorshutdowncanbereadilyandpracticallyachievedwithina30minuteperiodduetotheproximitytoMODE2conditions.Theallowedtimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE2withK,<<<1.0inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.2.1RCSloopaveragetemperatureisrequiredtobeverifiedatorabove540'Fevery30minutesinMODE2withk,<<Z1.0.The30minutetimeperiodislongenoughtoallowtheoperatortoadjusttemperaturesordelaycriticalitysotheLCOwillnotbeviolated,therebyprovidingassurancethatthesafetyanalysesarenotviolated.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-10DraftA

RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.2.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequirestheSRtobeperformedifanyRCSloopT.,is<547'FandthelowT,,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.TheT,,alarmprovidesoperatorindicationoflowRCStemperaturewithoutrequiringindependentverificationwhileaT.,>547'FinbothRCSloopsiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.IftheT,,alarmistobeusedforthisSR,itshouldbecalibratedconsistentwithindustrystandards.ThissurveillanceisreplacedbySR3.1.10.2duringPHYSICSTESTING.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-11DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDAllcomponentsoftheRCSaredesignedtowithstandeffectsofcyclicloadsduetosystempressureandtemperaturechanges.Theseloadsareintroducedbystartup(heatup)andshutdown(cooldown)operations,powertransients,andreactortrips.ThisLCOlimitsthepressureandtemperaturechangesduringRCSheatupandcooldown,withinthedesignassumptionsandthestresslimitsforcyclicoperation.ThePTLRcontainsP/Tlimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,inserviceleakandhydrostatic(ISLH)testing,anddataforthemaximumrateofchangeofreactorcoolanttemperature(Ref.1).EachP/Tlimitcurvedefinesanacceptableregionfornormaloperation.Theusualuseofthecurvesisoperationalguidanceduringheatuporcooldownmaneuvering,whenpressureandtemperatureindicationsaremonitoredandcomparedtotheapplicablecurvetodeterminethatoperationiswithintheallowableregion.TheLCOestablishesoperatinglimitsthatprovideamargintobrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandpipingofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).Thevesselisthecomponentmostsubject'tobrittlefailure,andtheLCOlimitsapplymainlytothevessel.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer,whichhasdifferentdesigncharacteristicsandoperatingfunctions.10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2),requirestheestablishmentofP/TlimitsforspecificmaterialfracturetoughnessrequirementsoftheRCPBmaterials.Reference2requiresanadequatemargintobrittlefailureduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andsystemhydrostatictests.Itmandatestheuseof,theAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)Code,SectionIII,AppendixG(Ref.3).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-12DraftA RCSP/TLimits83.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)1Theneutronembrittlementeffectonthematerialtoughnessisreflectedbyincreasingthenilductilityreferencetemperature(RT>>)asexposuretoneutronfluenceincreases.TheactualshiftintheRT>>ofthevesselmaterialhasbeenestablishedbyperiodicallyremovingandevaluatingtheirradiatedreactorvesselmaterialspecimens,inaccordancewithASTME185(Ref.4)andAppendixHof10CFR50(Ref..5).TheoperatingP/TlimitcurveshavebeenadjustedbasedontheevaluationfindingsandtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.99(Ref.6).TheP/Tlimitcurvesarecompositecurvesestablishedbysuperimposinglimitsderivedfromstressanalysesofthoseportionsofthereactorvesselandheadthatarethemostrestrictive.Atanyspecificpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchange,onelocationwithinthereactorvesselwilldictatethemostrestrictivelimit.AcrossthespanoftheP/Tlimitcurves,differentlocationsaremorerestrictive,and,thus,thecurvesarecompositesofthemostrestrictiveregions.Theheatupcurverepresentsadifferentsetofrestrictionsthanthecooldowncurvebecausethedirectionsofthethermalgradientsthroughthevesselwallarereversed.Thethermalgradientreversalaltersthelocationofthetensilestressbetweentheouterandinnerwalls.ThecriticalitylimitcurveincludestheReference2requirementthatitbeZ40'Fabovetheheatupcurveorthecooldowncurve,andnotlessthantheminimumpermissibletemperatureforISLHtesting.However,thecriticalitycurveisnotoperationallylimiting;amorerestrictivelimitexistsinLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-13DraftA

RCSP/TLimitsB'3.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheconsequenceofviolatingtheLCOlimitsisthattheRCShasbeenoperatedunderconditionsthatcanresultinbrittlefailureoftheRCPB,possiblyleadingtoanonisolableleak'orlossofcoolantaccident.Intheeventtheselimitsareexceeded,anevaluationmustbeperformedtodeterminetheeffectonthestructuralintegrityoftheRCPBcomponents.TheASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),providesarecommendedmethodologyforevaluatinganoperatingeventthatcausesanexcursionoutsidethelimits.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromDesignBasisAccident(DBA)analyses.Theyareprescribedduringnormaloperationtoavoidencounteringpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchangeconditionsthatmightcauseundetectedflawstopropagateandresultinnonductilefailureoftheRCPBwhichisanunanalyzedcondition.ReferenceIestablishesthemethodologyfordeterminingtheP/Tlimits.AlthoughtheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromanyDBA,theP/Tlimitsareacceptancelimitssincetheyprecludeoperationinanunanalyzedcondition.RCSP/TlimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThetwoelementsofthisLCOare:a.Thelimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting;andb.Limitsontherateofchangeoftemperature..TheLCOlimitsapplytoallcomponentsoftheRCS,exceptthepressurizer.Theselimitsdefineallowableoperatingregionsandpermitalargenumberofoperatingcycleswhileprovidingawidemargintononductilefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-14DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESLCO(continued)Thelimitsfortherateofchangeoftemperaturecontrolthethermalgradientthroughthevesselwallandareusedasinputsforcalculatingtheheatup,cooldown,andISLHtestingP/Tlimitcurves.Thus,theLCOfortherateofchangeoftemperaturerestrictsstressescausedbythermalgradientsandalsoensuresthevalidityoftheP/Tlimitcurves.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsplacesthereactorvesseloutsideoftheboundsofthestressanalysesandcanincrease'tressesinotherRCPBcomponents.Theconsequencesdependonseveralfactors,asfollow:TheseverityofthedeparturefromtheallowableoperatingP/Tregimeortheseverityoftherateofchangeoftemperature;b.C.Thelengthoftimethelimitswereviolated(longerviolationsallowthetemperaturegradientinthethickvesselwallstobecomemorepronounced);andTheexistences,sizes,andorientationsofflawsinthevesselmaterial.APPLICABILITYTheRCSP/TlimitsLCOprovidesadefinitionofacceptableoperationforpreventionofnonductilefailureinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixG'(Ref.2).AlthoughtheP/Tlimitsweredevelopedtoprovideguidanceforoperationduringheatuporcooldown(NODES3,4,and5)orISLHtesting,theirApplicabilityisatalltimesinkeepin'gwiththeconcernfornonductilefailure.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant-B3.4-15DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)DuringMODES1and2,otherTechnicalSpecificationsprovidelimitsforoperationthatcanbemorerestrictivethanorcansupplementtheseP/Tlimits.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality";andSafetyLimit2.1,"SafetyLimits,"also.provideoperationalrestrictionsforpressureandtemperature.Furthermore,MODES1and2areabovethetemperaturerangeofconcernfornonductilefailure,andstressanalyseshavebeenperformedfornormalmaneuveringprofiles,suchaspowerascensionordescent.ACTIONSA.landA.2'OperationoutsidetheP/TlimitsduringHODE1,2,3,or4mustbecorrectedsothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalyses.,The30minuteCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofrestoringtheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Mostviolationswill'otbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedinthistimeinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineif.RCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifytheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingoperation.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzed.transientsinthestressanalyses,newanalyses,orinspectionof"thecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoaccomplishtheevaluation.Theevaluationforamildviolationispossiblewithinthistime,butmoresevereviolationsmayrequirespecial,eventspecificstressanalysesorinspections.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingtooperate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-16DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)ConditionAismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatRequiredActionA.2shall'ecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionA.IisinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.B.IandB.2IfaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinalowerHODEbecauseeithertheRCSremainedinanunacceptableP/Tregionforanextendedperiodofincreasedstressorasufficientlysevereeventcausedentryintoanunacceptableregion.Eitherpossibilityindicatesaneed.formorecarefulexaminationoftheeventwhichisbestaccomplishedwiththeRCSatreducedpressureandtemperature.Inreducedpressureandtemperatureconditions,thepossibilityofpropagationwithundetectedflawsisdecreased.Iftherequiredrestorationactivitycannotbeaccomplishedwithin30minutes,RequiredActionB.1andRequiredAction8.2mustbeimplementedtoreducepressureandtemperature.Iftherequiredevaluationforcontinuedoperationcannotbeaccomplishedwithin72hoursortheresultsareindeterminateorunfavorable,actionmustproceedtoreducepressureandtemperatureasspecifiedinRequiredActionB.IandRequiredActionB.2.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedanddocumentedbeforereturningtooperatingp}essureandtemperatureconditions.PressureandtemperaturearereducedbybringingtheplanttoHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5withRCSpressure<500psigwithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-17DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2Actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytocorrectoperationoutsideofthe'P/TlimitsattimesotherthanwheninHODE1,2,3,or4,sothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalysis.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofinitiatingactiontorestoretheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Hostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedquicklyinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifythattheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedpriortoentryintoHODE4.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoterequiringRequiredActionC.2tobecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoFtheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionC.1isinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.4.3.1VerificationthatoperationiswithinthePTLRlimitsisrequiredevery30minuteswhenRCSpressureandtemperatureconditionsareundergoingplannedchanges.ThisFrequencyi.sconsideredreasonableinviewofthecontrolroomindicationavailabletomonitorRCSstatus.Also,sincetemperaturerateofchangelimitsarespecifiedinhourlyincrements,30minutespermitsassessmentandcorrectionforminordeviationswithinareasonabletime.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-18DraftA RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.3.1(continued)Surveillanceforheatup,cooldown,orISLHtestingmaybediscontinuedwhenthedefinitiongivenintherelevantplantprocedureforendingtheactivityissatisfied.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequiresthisSRtobeperformedduringsystemheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting.NoSRisgivenforcriticalityoperationsbecauseLCO3.4.2containsamorerestrictiverequirement.REFERENCES1.WCAP-14040,"HethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureHitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"Revision1,December1994.2.10CFR50,AppendixG.3.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,AppendixG.4.ASTHE185-82,July1982.5.10CFR50,AppendixH.6.RegulatoryGuide1.99,Revision2,Hay1988.7.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,AppendixE.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-19DraftA 'h RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTP'3.4.4B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.4RCS.Loops-MODEI>8.5%RTPIBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimaryfunctionoftheRCSisremovaloftheheatgeneratedinthefuelduetothefissionprocess,andtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerators(SGs),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:'a~Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission;Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector;,c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.Thereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,'ressure,levelandtemperatureinstrumentationforbothcontrolandprotection.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsinktotheisolatedsecondarycoolant.TheRCPscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.Thisforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolantensuresmixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrol.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalysescontainvariousassumptionsforthedesignbasesaccidentinitialconditionsincludingRCSpressure,RCStemperature,reactorpowerlevel,coreparameters,andsafetysystemsetpoints.TheimportantaspectforthisLCOisthereactorcoolantforcedflowrate,whi'chisrepresentedbythenumberofRCSloopsinservice.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-20DraftA RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'othtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThetransientandaccidentanalysesfortheplanthavebeenperformedassumingbothRCSloopsareinoperation.Themajorityoftheplantsafetyanalysesarebasedoninitialconditionsathighcorepowerorzeropower.TheaccidentanalysesthataremostimportanttoRCPoperationarethetwopumpcoastdown,singlepumplockedrotor,singlepump(brokenshaftorcoastdown),androdwithdrawalevents(Ref.1).SteadystateDNBanalysishasbeenperformedforthetwoRCSloopoperation.FortwoRCSloopoperation,thesteadystateDNBanalysis,whichgeneratesthepressureandtemperatureSafetyLimit(SL)(i.e.,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)limit)assumesamaximumpowerlevelof109%RTP.ThisisthedesignoverpowerconditionfortwoRCSloopoperation.Thevaluefortheaccidentanalysissetpointofthenuclearoverpower(highflux)tripis118%andisbasedonananalysisassumptionthatboundsallpossibleinstrumentationerrors(Ref.2).TheDNBRlimitdefinesalocusofpressureandtemperaturepointsthatresultinaminimumDNBRgreaterthanorequaltothecriticalheatfluxcorrelationlimit.Theplantisdesignedtooperatewithboth'RCSloopsinoperationtomaintainDNBRabovetheSL,duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.Byensuringheattransferinthenucleateboilingregion,'adequateheattransferisprovidedbetweenthefuelcladdingandthereactorcoolant.Adequateheattransferbetweenthereactorcoolantandthesecondarysideisensuredbymaintainingz16%SGlevelinaccordancewithLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation,"whichprovidessufficientwaterinventorytocovertheSGtubes.RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-21(continued)DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequireanadequateforcedflowrateforcoreheatremoval.FlowisrepresentedbythenumberofRCPsinoperationforremovalofheatbytheSGs.TomeetsafetyanalysisacceptancecriteriaforDNB,twopumpsarerequiredtobeinoperationatratedpower.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPinoperationprovidingforcedflowforheattransportandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.APPLICABILITYInMODE1>8.5%RTP,thereactoriscriticalandthushasthepotentialtoproducemaximumTHERMALPOWER.Thus,toensurethattheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesremainvalid,bothRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationinthisMODEtopreventDNBandcoredamage.Thedecayheatproductionrateismuchlowerthanthefullpowerheatrate.Assuch,theforcedcirculationflowandheatsinkrequirementsarereducedforlowerMODESasindicatedbytheLCOsforMODES1~8.5%RTP,2,3,4,and5.OperationLCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,LCO3.9.4,inotherHODESiscoveredby:"RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-HODE4";"RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-22(continued)DraftA RCSLoops-HODE1>8.5%RTPB3.4.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSIftherequirementsoftheLCOarenotmet,theRequiredActionistore'ducepowerandbringtheplanttoHODE1<8.5%RTP.ThislowerspowerlevelandthusreducesthecoreheatremovalneedsandminimizesthepossibilityofviolatingDNBlimits.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE2fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingsafetysystems.SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.4.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremovalwhilemaintainingthemargintoDNB.Useofcontrolboardind'icationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.UFSAR,Section15.0.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-23DraftA

RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,and3B3.4.5B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.5RCSLoops-MODES1g8.5%RTP,2,.AND3BASESBACKGROUNDInMODE1<8.5%RTP,andinMODE2and3,theprimaryfunctionoftheRCSistheremovalofdecayheatandtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerator(SG),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission(HODE1~8%RTPandHODE2only);b.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector(HODE1S8%RTPandMODE2only);c.Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andd.Providingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloops,connectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPscirculatethewaterthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.InMODE1g8.5%RTPandMODE2,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoensuremixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrolandtoremovethelimitedamountofreactorheat.InMODE3,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationforheatremovalduringheatupandcooldown.TheMODE1S8.5%RTP,2,and3reactoranddecayheatremovalrequirementsarelowenoughthatasingleRCSloopwithoneRCPrunningissufficienttoremovecoredecayheat.However,twoRCSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensureredundantcapabilityfordecayheatremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-24(continued)DraftA RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESBothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformed.toestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).InHODE1<8.5%RTP,andinHODES2and3,theseanalysesincludeevaluationofmainsteamlinebreaksanduncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromasubcriticalcondition.ThemostlimitingaccidentwithrespecttoDNBlimitsforMODES1g8.5%RTP,2,and3isamainsteamlinebreak.Thisisduetothepotentialforrecriticalityandbecauseofthehighhotchannelfactorsthatmayexistifthemostreactivecontrolrodisstuckinitsfullywithdrawnposition.AmainsteamlinebreakhasbeenanalyzedforboththecasewithoneandtwoRCSloopsinoperationathotzeropower(HZP)conditionswithacceptableresults(Ref.1).However,withonlyoneRCSloopinoperationandoffsitepoweravailable,additionalshutdownmarginisrequiredsincethereducedflowproducesanadverseeffectonDNBlimits.Thestartupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP)upto8.5%RTPhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtoresultinonlylimitedpowerandtemperatureexcursionsthatareboundedbyamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSLoopinoperation(Refs.2and3).Analyseshavealsobeenperformedwhichdemonstratethatreactorheatgreaterthan5%RTPcanberemovedbynaturalcirculationalone(Ref.4).Failuretoprovidedecayheatremovalmayresultinchallengestoafissionproductbarrier.TheRCSloopsarepartoftheprimarysuccesspaththatfunctionsoractuatestopreventormitigateaDesignBasisAccidentortransientthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.RCSLoops-HODES1S8.5%RTP,2,and3satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-25(continued)DraftA RCSLoops-MODESIg8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatbothRCSloopsbeOPERABLE.OnlyoneRCSloopinoperationisnecessarytoensureremovalofdecayheatfromthecoreandhomogenousboronconcentrationthroughouttheRCSupto8.5%RTP.AnadditionalRCSloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsafetyanalyseslimitsaremet.RequiringoneRCSloopinoperationensuresthattheSafetyLimitcriteriawillbemetforallofthepostulatedaccidents.TheNotepermitsallRCPstobede-energizedforsIhourper8hourperiodinMODE3.ThepurposeoftheNoteistoperformteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthesetestsisvalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurveusedasinputtoanumberofaccidentanalysesincludingalossofflowaccident.Thistestwassatisfactorilyperformedduringtheinitialstartuptestingprogram(Ref.5).If,however,changesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesofthecoastdowncurvemustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.Aswiththevalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurve,thistestshouldbeperformedonlyonceunlesstheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCSarechanged.TheIhourtimeperiodspecifiedisadequatetoperformthedesiredtests,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationoftheNoteispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,therebymaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-26DraftA

RCSLoops-MODES1g8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESLCO(continued)b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.AnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.5.2.AnRCPisOPERABLEifitiscapableofbeingpoweredandabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODES1g8.5%RTP,2,and3,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovereactoranddecayheatfromth'ecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,LCO3.9.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRCSloopisinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.The.RequiredActionsaretoverifythattheSDMiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.ThisactionisrequiredtoensurethatadequateSDMexistsintheeventofamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation.The12hourFrequencyconsidersthetimerequiredtoobtainRCSboronconcentrationsamplesandthelowprobabilityofamainsteamlinebreakduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-27DraftA RCSLoops-MODES1g8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)TheinoperableRCSloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof72hours.Thistimeallowanceisajustifiedperiodtobewithouttheredundant,nonoperatingloopbecauseasingleloopinoperationhasaheattransfercapabilitygreaterthanthatneededtoremovethereactoranddecayheatproducedinthereactorcoreandbecauseofthelowprobabilityofafailureintheremainingloopoccurringduringthisperiod.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenoneRCSloopisinoperable.Thisallowance.isprovidedbecauseasingleRCSloopcanprovidetherequiredcoolingtoremovereactoranddecayheat.B.1Ifrestorationoftheinoperableloopisnotpossiblewithin72hours,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4.InMODE4,theplantmaybeplacedontheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.TheadditionalCompletionTimeof12hoursiscompatiblewithrequiredoperationstoachievecooldownanddepressurizationfromtheexistingplantconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-28DraftA RCSLoops-MODES1g8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1C.2andC.3IftwoRCSloopsareinoperable,ornoRCSloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbytheNoteintheLCOsection,allCRDHsmustbede-energizedbyopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsets.AlloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspended,andactiontorestoreoneoftheRCSloopstoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheHGsetsremovesthepossibilityofaninadvertentrodwithdrawal.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.5.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofthecontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.SR3.4.5.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthat,thesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelisZ16%fortwoRCSloops.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinkforremovalofreactorordecayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoalossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-29DraftA RCSLoops-NODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3B3.4.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.4.5.3Verificationthat-therequiredRCPisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCPcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.,TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSARSection15.1.5.2.UFSARSection15.4.3.3.LetterfromD.N.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGEE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-9,StartupofanInactiveLoop,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.4.UFSARSections14.6.1.5.6and15.2.5.2.5.UFSARSection14.6.1.5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-30DraftA RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4BASESBACKGROUNDInMODE4,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattoeitherthesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.ThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughtwoRCSloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaSG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladdedfuel.TheSGsortheRHRheatexchangersprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPsandtheRHRpumpscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandtopreventboricacidstratification.InMODE4,eitherRCSorRHRloopscanbeusedtoprovideforcedcirculation.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRCSoroneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRCSlooporoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.Theotherintentofthis'LCOistorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyfordecayheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE4,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRCSandRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSLoops-MODE4havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-31(continued)DraftA

RCSLoops-HODE4-83.4.6BASES(continued)LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLEinMODE4andthatoneoftheseloopsbeinoperation.TheLCOallowsthetwoloopsthatarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoconsistofanycombinationofRCSloopsandRHRloops.Anyoneloopinoperationprovidesenoughflowtoremovethedecayheatfromthecorewithforcedcirculation.AnadditionalloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.Note1permitsallRCPsorRHRpumpstobede-energizedfor<1hourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermitteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1).IfchangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinHODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronst'ratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNote1ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremetalongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:,Pa.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-32DraftA

RCSLoops-NODE4B3.4.6BASESLCO(continued)Note2requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe~50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofanRCPwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturepreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterentersthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedcondition.AnOPERABLERCSloopcomprisesanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.6.2.RCPsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.SimilarlyfortheRHRSystem,anOPERABLERHRloopcomprisesanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.AnOPERABLERHRloopmaybeisolatedfromtheRCSprovidedthattheloopc'nbeplacedintoservicefromthecontrolroom.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-33(continued)DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE:4B3.4.'6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODE4,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OneloopofeitherRCSorRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,twoloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSandRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,LCO3.9.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.lIfoneRCSloopisinoperableandtwoRHRloopsareinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.IfnoRHRisavailable,theplantcannotenterareducedMODEsincenolongtermmeansofdecayheatremovalwouldbeavailable.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.B.1IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothRCSloopsareinoperable,aninoperableRCSorRHRloopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatustoprovidearedundantmeansfordecayheatremoval.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-34DraftA RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASES,ACTIONSB.I(continued)Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitscannotberestored,thepl'antmustbebroughttoMODE5within24hours.BringingtheplanttoHODE5isaconservativeactionwithregardtodecayheatremoval.WithonlyoneRHRloopOPERABLE,redundancyfordecayheatremovalislostand,intheeventofalossoftheremainingRHRloop,itwouldbesafertoinitiatethatlossfromMODE5(Z200'F)ratherthanMODE4(200to350'F).TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5fromMODE4inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.RequiredActionB.1ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatonlytheRequiredActionsofConditionCareenteredifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperable.WithallRCSandRHRloopsinoperable,MODE5cannotbeenteredandRequiredActionsC.IandC.2aretheappropriateremedialactions.C.landC.2IfnoloopisOPERABLEorinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNoteIintheLCOsection,alloperatio'nsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andthemargintocriticalitymustnotbereducedinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationfordecayheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-35(continued)DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.6.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRCSorRHRloopisino>eration.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSandRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.6.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.SGOPERABILITYisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelisZ16%.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis<16%,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinknecessaryforremovalofdecayheat.The12hourFrequenc'yisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel..SR3.4.6.3VerificationthattherequiredpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCSorRHRpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-36DraftA

RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.7RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInNODE5withtheRCSloopsfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheateithertothesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.WhiletheprincipalmeansfordecayheatremovalisviatheRHRSystem,theSGsarespecifiedasabackupmeansforredundancy.EventhoughtheSGscannotproducesteaminthisNODE,theyarecapableofbeingaheatsinkduetotheirlargecontainedvolumeofsecondarywater.AslongastheSGsecondarysidewaterisatalowertemperaturethanthereactorcoolant,heattransferwilloccur.Therateofheattransferisdirectlyproportionaltothetemperaturedifference.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierfor.solubleneutronpoison,boricacid..InNODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thereactorcoolantisnormallycirculatedbymeansoftwoRHRloopsconnectedtotheRCS,eachloopcontaininganRHRheatexchanger,anRHRpump,andappropriateflowandtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.OneRHRpumpcirculatesthewaterthroughtheRCSatasufficientratetopreventboricacidstratification.Thenumberofloopsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequirethatasecondpathbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.TheLCOprovidesforredundantpathsofdecayheatremovalcapability.ThefirstpathcanbeanRHRloopthatmustbeOPERABLEandinoperation.ThesecondpathcanbeanotherOPERABLERHRloopormaintainingoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevelabove16%toprovideanalternatemethodfordecayheatremoval.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-37(continued)DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES~4InMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation./RCSLoops-MODE5(LoopsFilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleastoneoftheRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandinoperationwithanadditionalRHRloopOPERABLEoroneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel>16%.OneRHRloopprovidessufficientforcedcirculationtoperformthesafetyfunctionsofthereactorcoolantundertheseconditions.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.However,ifthestandbyRHRloopisnotOPERABLE,anacceptablealternatemethodisoneSGwithasecondarysidewaterlevel>16%.ShouldtheoperatingRHRloopfail,theSGcouldbeusedtoremovethedecayheat.Note1permitsallRHRpumpstobede-energized<1hourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermittestsdesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogramwasthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow(Ref.1).IfchangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.ThenoflowtestmaybeperformedinMODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsde-energizingofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.The1hourtimeperiodisadequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotlikelyduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNote1ispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyothercon'ditionsimposedbytestprocedures:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant=B3.4-38DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESLCO(continued)a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodg2hours,providedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhensuchtestingissafeandpossible.Note3requiresthatthepressurizerwatervolumebe<324cubicfeet(38%level),orthatthesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe<50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)withanRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperaturearetopreventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstartedandthecolderRCSwaterentersthewarmerSGandexpands.ViolationofthisNoteplacestheplantinanunanalyzedCondition.Note4providesforanorderlytransitionfromMODE5toMODE4duringaplannedheatupbypermittingremovalofRHRloopsfromoperationwhenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.ThisNoteprovidesforthetransitiontoMODE4whereanRCSloopispermittedtobeinoperationandreplacestheRCScirculationfunctionprovidedbytheRHRloops.Aplanned'heatupisascheduledtransitiontoMODE4withinadefinedtimeperiod.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.ASGcanperformasaheatsinkwhenitisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,withtheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.7.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-39(continued)DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thisLCOrequiresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.TheRCSloopsareconsideredfilleduntiltheisolationvalvesareopenedtofacilitatedrainingoftheRCS.Theloopsarealsoconsideredfilledfollowingthecompletion'ffillingandventingtheRCS.OneloopofRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,oneadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,orthesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastoneSGisrequiredtobe~16%.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,LCO3.9.4)"RCSLoops-MODEI>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODESIg8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft",(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.landA.2IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandbothSGshavesecondarysidewaterlevels<16%,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusortorestoreatleastoneSGsecondarysidewaterlevel.EitherRequiredActionA.IorRequiredActionA.2willrestoreredundantheatremovalpaths.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilanRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorSGsecondarysidewaterlevelisrestored.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-40DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled83.4.7BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNotes1,2,and4,orifnoloopisOPERABLE,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedand'ctiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.4.7.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.Useofcontrolboardindicationfortheseparametersisanacceptableverification.TheFrequencyof12hoursis'sufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperator'nthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.7.2ThisSRrequiresverificationofSGOPERABILITY.VerifyingthatatleastoneSGisOPERABLEbyensuringitssecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelis>16%ensuresanalternatedecayheatremovalmethodintheeventthatthesecondRHRloopisnotOPERABLE.IfbothRHRloopsareOPERABLE,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-41DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)'R3.4.7.3VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbyRHRpump.Ifsecondarysidewaterlevelis>16KinatleastoneSG,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section14.6.1.2.6R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-42DraftA rRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledBASESBACKGROUNDInMODE5withtheRCSloopsnotfilled,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattothecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesteamgenerators(SGs)arenotavailableasaheatsinkwhentheloopsarenotfilled.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withloopsnotfilled,onlyRHRpumpscanbeusedforcoolantcirculation.Thenumberofpumpsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRpumpfordecayheatremovalandtransportandtorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationofanaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequateforheatremovalandforboronmixing.RCSloopsinMODE5(loopsnotfilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandoneoftheseloopsbeinoperationtotransferheatfromthereactorcoolantatacontrolledrate.HeatcannotberemovedviatheRHRSystemunlessforcedflowisused.AminimumofoneoperatingRHRpumpmeetstheLCOrequirementforoneloopinoperation.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-43DraftA RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilled83.4.8BASESLCO(continued)NoteIpermitsallRHRpumpstobede-energizedforg15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanother.ThecircumstancesforstoppingbothRHRpumpsaretobelimitedtosituationswhentheoutagetimeisshortandrequiresthatthefollowingconditionsbemet:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction;andc.NodrainingoperationsarepermittedthatwouldfurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumeandpossiblycauseamorerapidheatupoftheremainingRCSinventory.Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodofg2hours,providedthattheotherloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhenthesetestsaresafeandpossible.AnOPERABLERHRloopiscomprisedofanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInNODE5withloopsnotfilled,thisLCOrequirescoreheatremovalandcoolantcirculationbytheRHRSystem.TheRCSloopsareconsiderednotfilledfromthetimeperiodbeginningwiththeopeningofisolationvalvesanddrainingoftheRCSandendingwiththecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-44DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.9.3,LCO3.9.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTP";"RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,AND3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft"(MODE6);and"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft"(MODE6).ACTIONSA.1Ifonly'oneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntilthesecondRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.land8.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNote1,orifnoloopisOPERABLEalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-45(continued)DraftA RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.8.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.8.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-46DraftA

PressurizerB3.4.9B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.9.PressurizerBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerprovidesapointintheRCSwher'eliquidandvaporaremaintainedinequilibriumundersaturatedconditionsforpressurecontrolpurposestopreventbulkboilingintheremainderoftheRCS.Keyfunctionsincludemaintainingrequiredprimarysystempressureduringsteadystateoperation,andlimitingthepressurechangescausedbyreactorcoolantthermalexpansionandcontractionduringnormalloadtransients.ThepressurecontrolcomponentsaddressedbythisLCOincludethepressurizerwaterlevelandtherequiredheatercapacity.PressurizersafetyvalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"andLCO3.4.11,"PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs),"respectively.TheintentofthisLCOistoensurethatasteambubbleexistsinthepressurizerpriorto,andduring,poweroperationtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Thepresenceofasteambubbleisconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.RelativelysmallamountsofnoncondensiblegasesaretypicallypresentintheRCSandcaninhibitthecondensationheattransferbetweenthepressurizersprayandthesteam,anddiminishthesprayeffectivenessforpressurecontrol.Thesenoncondensiblegasescanbeignoredifthesteambubbleispresent..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-47DraftA

PressurizerB3.4.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOalsoensuresthatadequateheatercapacityisavailableinthepressurizertosupportnaturalcirculationfollowinganextendedlossofoffsitepower.Electricalimmersionheaters,locatedinthelowersectionofthepressurizervessel,keepthewaterinthepressurizeratsaturationtemperatureandmaintainaconstantoperatingpressure.Theseheatersaredividedintotwogroups,acontrol/variablegroupandabackupgroup.Thecontrol/variablegroupisnormallyusedduringpoweroperationsincetheseheatershaveinverseproportionalcontrolwithrespecttothepressurizerpressure.Thebackupgroupiseitherfullyonoroffwithsetpointsthatarebelowthosefor.thecontrol/variablegroup.BothgroupsofheatersreceivepowerfromtheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)480Vbuses,however,theheatersareshedfollowingalossofoffsitepowerorsafetyinjectionsignal.Theheaterscanbemanuallyloadedontothedieselgeneratorsifrequired.AminimumrequiredavailablecapacityofpressurizerheatersensuresthattheRCSpressurecanbemaintainedduringnaturalcirculation.ThecapabilitytomaintainandcontrolsystempressureisimportantformaintainingsubcooledconditionsintheRCSandensuringthecapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.Unlessadequateheatercapacityisavailable,therequiredsubcoolingmarginintheprimarysystemcannotbemaintained.Inabilitytocontrolthesystempressureandmaintainsubcoolingunderconditionsofnaturalcirculationflowintheprimarysystemcouldlead,toalossofsinglephasenaturalcirculationanddecreasedcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.HaintainingnecessarysubcooledmarginduringnormalpoweroperationiscontrolledbymeetingtherequirementsforpressurizerlevelandLCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDepartureFromNucleateBoiling(DNB)."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-48(continued)DraftA e PressurizerB3.4.9BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESInHODESI,2,and3,theLCOrequirementforasteambubbleisreflectedimplicitlyintheaccidentanalyses.SafetyanalysesperformedforlowerHODESarenotlimitingwithrespecttopressurizerparameters.Allanalysesperformedfromacriticalreactorconditionassumetheexistenceofasteambubbleandsaturatedconditionsinthepressurizer.Inmakingthisassumption,theanalysesneglectthesmallfractionofnoncondensiblegasesnormallypresent.ThemaximumpressurizerwaterlevellimitensuresthatasteambubbleexistsandsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.SafetyanalysespresentedintheUFSAR(Ref.I)donottakecreditforpressurizerheateroperation,however,theneedtomaintainsubcoolinginthelongtermduringlossofoffsitepower,asindicatedinNUREG-0737(Ref.2),isthereasonforprovidinganLCO.Thepressurizerheatersareassumedtobeavailablewithinonehourfollowingthelossofoffsitepowerandinitiationofnaturalcirculation(Ref.3).LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethatasteambubbleexistswithinthepressurizerandthatsufficientheatercapacityisavailabletosupportanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.ForthepressurizertobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestablishedintheSRsforwaterlevelandheatercapacitymustbemetandtheheatersmustbecapableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersourcewithinonehour.APPLICABILITYTheneedforpressurecontrolismostpertinentwhencoreheatcancausethegreatesteffectonRCStemperature,resultinginthegreatesteffectonpressurizerlevelandRCSpressurecontrol.Thus,applicabilityhasbeendesignatedforHODESIand2.TheapplicabilityisalsoprovidedforHODE3topreventsolidwaterRCSoperationduringheatupandcooldowntoavoidrapidpressurerisescausedbynormaloperationalperturbation,suchasreactorcoolantpumpstartup.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-49DraftA PressurizerB3.4.9BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)InMODESI,2,and3,thereisneedtomaintaintheavailabilityofpressurizerheaters,capableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersupply(Ref.4).Intheeventofalossofoffsitepower,theinitialconditionsoftheseMODESgivethegreatestdemandformaintainingtheRCSinahotpressurizedconditionwithloopsubcoolingforanextendedperiod.ForMODE4,5,or6,itisnotnecessarytocontrolpressure(byheaters)toensureloopsubcoolingforheattransferwhentheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR).Systemisinservice,andtherefore,theLCOisnotapplicable.ACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelis>650cubicfeet,whichisequivalentto87%,theabilitytomaintainasteambubblemaynolongerexist.Thesteambubbleisnecessarytoensurethecapabilitytoestablishandmaintainpressurecontrolforsteadystateoperationandtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Requiringthepresenceofasteambubbleisalsoconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.Pressurizerwaterlevelcontrolmalfunctionsorotherplantevolutionsmayresultinapressurizerwaterlevelabovethenominalupperlimit,evenwith'theplantatsteadystateconditions.NormallytheplantwilltripinthiseventsincetheupperlimitisthesameasthePressurizerHighLevelTrip.Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelisnotwithinthelimit,actionmustbetakentorestoretheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3,withthereactortripbreakersopen,within6hoursandtoHODE4within12hours.ThistakestheplantoutoftheapplicableMODESandrestorestheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafety,analyses.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsin,anorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-50DraftA

PressurizerB3.4.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2Ifthepressurizerheaterscapacityis<100KW,theabilitytomaintainRCSpressuretosupportnaturalcirculationmaynolongerexist.BymaintainingRCSpressurecontrol,.amargintosubcoolingisprovided.Thevalueof100KWisbasedontheamountneededtosupportnaturalcirculationafteraccountingforheatlossesthroughthepressurizerinsulationduringanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.Ifthecapacityofthepressurizerheatersisnotwithinthelimit,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.9.1ThisSRrequiresthatduringsteadystateoperation,pressurizerlevelismaintainedbelowthenominalupperlimittoprovideaminimumspaceforasteambubble.TheSurveillanceisperformedbyobservingtheindicatedlevel.TheFrequencyof12hourshasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassesslevelforanydeviationandverifythatoperationiswithinsafetyanalysesassumptions.Alarmsarealsoavailableforearlydetectionof.abnormallevelindications.SR3.4.9.2ThisSRissatisfiedwhenthepowersuppliesaredemonstratedtobecapableofproducingtheminimumpowerrequired.ThismaybedonebytestingthepowersupplyoutputbyverifyingtheelectricalloadonBuses14and16withtherespectiveheatergroupsonandoff.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsideredadequatetodetectheaterdegradationandhasbeenshownbyoperatingexperiencetobeacceptable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-51(continued)DraftA PressurizerB3.4.9BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter15.2.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTHIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.3.LetterfromB.L.King,WestinghouseElectricCorporation,toR.C.Hecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"AbilitytoHaintainSubcooledConditionsDuringanExtendedLossofOffsitePower,"datedSeptember26,1979.4.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toL.D.White,Jr.RGKE,

Subject:

"LessonsLearnedCategory'A'valuation,"datedJuly7,1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-52DraftA

PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesBASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovide,inconjunctionwiththeReactorProtectionSystem,overpressureprotectionfortheRCS.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedpoptype,springloaded,selfactuatedvalveswithbackpressurecompensation.ThesafetyvalvesaredesignedtopreventthesystempressurefromexceedingthesystemSafetyLimit(SL),2735psig,whichis110%ofthedesignpressure.Becausethesafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedandselfactuating,theyareconsideredindependentcomponents.Thereliefcapacityforeachvalve,288,000ibm/hr,isbasedonpostulatedoverpressuretransientconditionsresultingfromacompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine.Thiseventresultsinthemaximumsurgerateintothepressurizer,whichspecifiestheminimumreliefcapacityfor.thesafetyvalves.Thedischargeflowfromthepressurizersafetyvalvesisdirectedtothepressurizerrelieftank.Thisdischargeflowisindicatedbyanincreaseintemperaturedownstreamofthepressurizersafetyvalvesorincreaseinthepressurizerrelieftanktemperatureorlevel.OverpressureprotectionisrequiredinMODES1,2,3,4,and5andinMODE6withreactorvesselheadon;however,inMODE4,witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,andMODE5andMODE6withthereactorvesselheadonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbyoperatingproceduresandbymeetingtherequirementsofLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."Theupperandlowerpressurelimitsarebasedonthei1%tolerancerequirement(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheliftsettingisfortheambientconditionsassociatedwithMODES1,2,and3.Thisrequireseitherthatthevalvesbesethotorthatacorrelationbetweenhotandcoldsettingsbeestablished.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-53DraftA

PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thepressurizersafetyvalvesarepartoftheprimarysuccesspathandmitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedaccidents.OPERABILITYofthesafetyvalvesensuresthattheRCSpressure'illbelimitedto110%ofdesignpressureforallanticipatedtransientsexceptforthelockedrotoraccidentwhichremainsbelow120%ofthedesignpressureconsistentwiththeoriginalmaximumtransientpressurelimitfortheRCS(Refs.2,3and4).TheconsequencesofexceedingtheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASHE)andUSASSectionB31.1pressurelimits(Refs.1and4)couldincludedamagetoRCScomponents,increasedleakage,or'requirementtoperformadditionalstressanalysespriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAllaccidentandsafetyanalysesintheUFSAR(Ref.5)thatrequiresafetyvalveactuationassumeoperationofbothpressurizersafetyvalvestolimitincreasesinRCSpressure.Theoverpressureprotectionanalysis(Ref.6)isalsobasedonoperationofbothsafetyvalves.Accidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationifnotproperlyterminatedinclude:a.Uncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromfullpower;b.Lossofreactorcoolantflow;c.Lossofexternalelectricalload(includingthecompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine);d.Lossofnormalfeedwater;e.LossofallACpowertostationauxiliaries;andf.Lockedrotor.DetailedanalysesoftheabovetransientsarecontainedinReference5.Safetyvalveactuationisrequiredineventsc,d,e,andf(above)tolimitthepressureincrease.CompliancewiththisLCOisconsistentwiththedesignbasesandaccidentanalysesassumptions.PressurizersafetyvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-54(continued)DraftA

PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASES(continued)LCOThetwopressurizersafetyvalvesaresettoopenattheRCSdesignpressure(2500psia),andwithintheASHEspecifiedtolerance,toavoidexceedingthemaximumdesignpressureSL,tomaintainaccidentanalysesassumptions,andtocomplywithASHE.requirements.Theupperandlowerpressuretolerancelimitsarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirements(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.ThelimitprotectedbythisSpecificationisthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)SLof110%ofdesignpressureforalltransientsexceptlockedrotoraccidentswhichhasanallowedlimitof120%ofdesignpressure.InoperabilityofoneormorevalvescouldresultinexceedingtheSLifatransientweretooccur.TheconsequencesofexceedingtheASHEpressurelimitcouldincludedamagetooneormoreRCScomponents,increasedleakage,oradditionalstressanalysisbeingrequiredpriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,andportionsofMODE4abovetheLTOParmingtemperature,OPERABILITYoftwovalvesisrequiredbecausethecombinedcapacityisrequiredtokeepreactorcoolantpressurebelow110%ofitsdesignvalueduringcertainaccidents.MODE3andportionsofMODE4areconservativelyincluded,althoughthelistedaccidentsmaynotrequirethesafetyvalvesforprotection.TheLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4wheneitherRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorinMODE5becauseLTOPisprovided.OverpressureprotectionisnotrequiredinNODE6withthereactorvesselheaddetensionedortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorthepressurizermanwayopen.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-55(continued)DraftA PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1Withonepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable,restorationmusttakeplacewithin15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesreflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheRCSOverpressureProtectionSystem.AninoperablesafetyvalvecoincidentwithanRCSoverpressureeventcouldchallengetheintegrityofthepressureboundary.B.landB.2IftheRequiredActionofA.1cannotbemetwithintherequiredCompletionTimeorifbothpressurizersafetyvalvesareinoperable,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4witheitherRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachthe'equiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WithanyRCScoldlegtemperatureatorbelowtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbytheLTOPSystem.ThechangefromMODE1,2,or3toMODE4reducestheRCSenergy(corepowerandpressure),lowersthepotentialforlargepressurizerinsurges,andtherebyremovestheneedforoverpressureprotectionbybothpressurizersafetyvalves.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.10.1SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram.PressurizersafetyvalvesaretobetestedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref.7),whichprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytheSRs.Noadditionalrequirementsarespecified.Thepressurizersafetyvaluesetpointis+2.4%,-3%forOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto+1%duringthesurveillancetoallowfordrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-56DraftA PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.10.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoHODES3and4withouthavingperformedtheSRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditions.Thispermitstestingandexaminationofthesafetyvalvesathighpressureandtemperatureneartheirnormaloperatingrange,butonlyafterthevalveshavehadapreliminarycoldsetting.ThecoldsettinggivesassurancethatthevalvesareOPERABLEneartheirdesignconditionu'ntilcompletionofthesurveillance.REFERENCESl.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII.2.UFSAR,Section15.3.2.3.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGLE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicXV-l,XV-2,XV-3,XV-4,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-8,XV-10,XV-12,XV-14,XY-15,andXV-1'7,DesignBasisEvents,Accidents,andTransients(R.E.Ginna),"datedSeptember4,1981.4.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers,1967edition.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.WCAP-7769,"TopicalReport,OverpressureProtectionforWestinghousePressurizedWaterReactors,"Rev.1,June1972.7.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-57DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThepressurizerisequippedwithtwotypesofdevicesforpressurerelief:pressurizersafetyvalvesandPORVs.ThePORVs(430and431C)areairoperatedvalvesthatarecontrolledtoopenataspecificsetpressurewhenthepressurizerpressureincreasesandclosewhenthepressurizerpressuredecreases.ThePORVsmayalsobemanuallyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Motoroperatedblockvalves(515and516),whicharenormallyopen,arelocatedbetweenthepressurizerandthePORVs.Theblockvalvesareusedtoisolatethe.PORVsincaseofexcessiveleakageorastuckopenPORV.Blockvalveclosureisaccomplishedmanuallyusingcontrolsinthecontrolroom.AstuckopenPORVis,ineffect,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Assuch;blockvalveclosureterminatestheRCSdepressurizationandcoolantinventoryloss.ThePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesmay-beusedbyplantoperatorstodepressurizetheRCStorecoverfromcertaintransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.Additionally,theseriesarrangementofthePORVsandtheirblockvalvespermitperformanceofsurveillancesonthevalvesduringpoweroperation.ThePORVsmayalsobeusedforfeedandbleedcorecoolinginthecaseofmultipleequipmentfailureeventsthatarenotwithinthedesignbasis,suchasatotallossoffeedwaterandauxiliaryfeedwater.ThePORVsarealsousedtomitigatetheeffectsofananticipatedtransientwithout-scram(ATWS)eventwhichisalsonotwithinthedesignbasis.ThePORVs,theirblockvalves,andtheircontrolsarepoweredfromthevitalbusesthatnormallyreceivepowerfromoffsitepowersources,butarealsocapableofbeingpoweredfromemergencypowersourcesintheeventofalossofoffsitepower.ThetwoPORVs(inmanualoperationonly)andtheirassociated,blockvalvesarepoweredfromtwoseparatesafetytrains.(continued)R.E.'innaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-58DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheplanthastwoPORVs,eachhavingareliefcapacityof179,000lb/hrat2335psig.ThePORVsarenormallyopenedbyusinginstrumentairwhichissuppliedthroughseparatesolenoidoperatedvalves(8620Aand8620B).ThesafetyrelatedsourceofmotiveairisfromtwoseparatenitrogenaccumulatorsthatarenormallyisolatedfromthePORVsbysolenoidoperatedvalves8619Aand8619B;however,solenoidoperatedvalves8620Aand8620BmustbeintheventpositiontoclosethePORVsregardlessofwhichmotiveairsourceisused.ThefunctionaldesignofthePORVsisbasedonmaintainingpressurebelowthepressurizerhighpressurereactortripsetpointfollowingastepreductionof50%offullloadwithsteamdump.Inaddition,thePORVsminimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalvesandalsomaybeusedforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP).SeeLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESPlantoperatorsemploythePORVstodepressurizetheRCSinresponsetocertainplanttransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.FortheSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)event,thesafetyanalysisassumesthatmanualoperatoractionsarerequiredtomitigatetheevent.Alossofoffsitepowerisassumedtoaccompanytheevent,andthus,normalpressurizersprayisunavailabletoreduceRCSpressure.ThePORVsareassumedtobeusedforRCSdepressurization,whichis'neofthestepsperformedtoequalizetheprimaryandsecondarypressuresinordertoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowandtheradioactiver'eleasesfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator.ThePORVsarealsousedinsafetyanalysesforeventsthatresultinincreasingRCSpressureforwhichdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)criteriaarecritical.ByassumingPORVmanualactuation,theprimarypressureremainsbelowthepressurizerhighpressuretripandpressurizersafetyvalvesetpoints;thustheDNBRcalculationismoreconservativeassumingthesameinitialRCStemperaturesincethepressurizerpressureislimited.Eventsthatassumethisconditionincludealossofexternalelectricalloadandothertransientswhichresultinadecreaseinheatremovalbythesecondarysystem(Ref.1).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-59DraftA PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'ressurizerPORVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvestobeOPERABLEformanualoperationbythenitrogenaccumulatorstomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.BymaintainingtwoPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesOPERABLE,thesinglefailurecriterionissatisfied.Theblockvalvesareavailabletoisolatetheflowpath.througheitherafailedopenPORVoraPORVwithexcessiveleakage.SatisfyingtheLCOhe)psminimizechallengestofissionproductbarriers.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,thePORVisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTRanditsblockvalvemustbeOPERABLEtolimitthepotentialforasmallbreakLOCAthroughtheflowpath.ThemostlikelycauseforaPORVsmallbreakLOCAisaresultofapressureincreasetransientthatcausesthePORVtoautomaticallyopenwithasubsequentfailuretoclose.ImbalancesintheenergyoutputofthecoreandheatremovalbythesecondarysystemcancausetheRCSpressuretoincreasetothePORVopeningsetpoint.ThemostrapidincreaseswilloccuratthehigheroperatingpowerandpressureconditionsofMODES1and2.PressureincreasesarelessprominentinMODE3becausethecoreinputenergyisreduced,buttheRCSpressureishigh.ThePORVsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3tominimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalves.Therefore,theLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.TheLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4whenbothpressureandcoreenergyaredecreasedandthepressuresurgesbecomemuchlesssignificant.ThePORVsetpointisreducedforLTOPinMODES4,5,and6withthereactorvesselheadinplace.LCO3.4.12addressesthePORVrequirementsintheseMODES.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-60(continued)DraftA

PressurizerPORVsB3.4.llBASES(continued)ACTIONSNoteIhasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothpressurizerPORVsaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes(i.e.,theCompletionTimeisonacomponentbasis)forConditionA.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifythatbothblockvalvesaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes,forConditionC.TheexceptionforLCO3.0.4,Note3,permitsentryintoMODESI;2,and3toperformcyclingofthePORVsorblockvalvestoverifytheirOPERABLEstatus.TestingisnotperformedinlowerMODESduetoLTOPconsiderations.A.landA.2WiththePORVsOPERABLEandnotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,eitherthePORVsmustberestoredortheflowpathisolatedwithinIhour.AlthoughaPORVmaynotbecapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolled,itmaybeabletobemanuallyopenedandclosed,andtherefore,abletoperformitsfunction.APORVisconsiderednotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolledforanyproblemwhichpreventsthePORVfromautomaticallyclosingonceithasautomaticallyopened.ThismaybeduetoinstrumentationproblemsbutdoesnotincludeproblemswhichonlypreventthePORVfromautomaticallyopening(e.g.,lossofinstrumentairtothePORV)orwhichpreventthePORVfrombothautomaticallyopeningandclosing.Forthesereasons,theblockvalvemaybeclosedtoisolatetheflowpathsbuttheActionrequirespowerbemaintainedtothevalve.TheflowpathmayalsobeisolatedbyplacingthePORVcontrolswitchtomanual.ThisConditionisonlyintendedtopermitoperationoftheplantforalimitedperiodoftimenottoexceedthenextrefuelingoutage(MODE6)sothatmaintenancecanbeperformedonthePORVsto.eliminatetheproblem.Normally,thePORVsshouldbeavailableforautomaticmitigationofoverpressureeventsandshouldbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoenteringstartup(MODE2).SeatleakageproblemsarecontrolledbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."guickaccesstothePORVforpressurecontrolcanbemadewhenpowerremainsontheclosedblockvalve.TheCompletionTimeofIhourisbasedonplantoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatminorproblemscanbecorrectedorclosureaccomplishedinthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-61DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)B.IB.2andB.3IfonePORVisnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,itisinoperableandmustbeeitherrestoredorisolatedbyclosingtheassociatedblockvalveandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalve.PORVinoperabilityincludes(butisnotlimitedto)theinabilityofthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefromthenitrogenaccumulatortoopenorthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefrominstrumentairtovent.TheCompletionTimesofIhourarereasonable,basedonchallengestothePORVsduringthistimeperiod,andprovidetheoperatoradequatetimetocorrectthesituation.IftheinoperablevalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,itmustbeisolatedwithinthespecifiedtime.BecausethereisasecondPORVthatisOPERABLE,anadditional72hoursisprovidedtorestoretheinoperablePORVto'PERABLEstatus.IfthePORVcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionD.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-62DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2Ifoneorbothblockvalvesareinoperable,thenitisnecessarytoeith'errestoretheblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorplacetheassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.,Theprimeimportanceforthecapabilitytoclosetheblockvalveistoisolatea-stuckopenPORV.Therefore,iftheblockvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour,theRequiredActionistoplacethePORVinmanualcontroltoprecludeitsautomaticopeningforanoverpressureeventandtoavoidthepotentialfor.astuckopenPORVatatimethattheblockvalveisinoperable.HanualcontrolisaccomplishedbyplacingthePORVcontrolboardswitchintheclosedposition.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeperiod,andprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.BecausethePORVisnotcapableofautomaticallyopeningandthesmallpotentialforanSGTRorothereventrequiringHanualoperation,theoperatorispermittedaCompletionTimeof72hourstorestoretheinoperableblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus.Thetimeallowedtorestoretheblockvalveislimitedto72hourssincethePORVsarenotcapableofautomaticallymitigatinganoverpressureeventwhenplacedinmanualcontrol.IftheblockvalveisrestoredwithintheCompletionTimeof72hours,thePORVwillagainbecapableofautomaticallyrespondingtoanoverpressureevent,andtheblockvalvescapableofisolatingastuckopenPORVwhichmayresultfromtheoverpressureevent.Ifitcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionD.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-63DraftA t PressurizerPORVs83.4.11BASESACTIONS(continued)D.land0.2IftheRequiredActionofConditionA,B,orCisnotmet,,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InMODES4and5,maintainingPORVOPERABILITYmayberequired.SeeLCO3.4.12.E.lE.2E.3andE.4IfbothPORVsarenotcapableofbeingmanuallycycled,theyareinoperableanditisnecessarytoinitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatusimmediatelysincenoreliefvalveisavailable'tomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.Therefore,operatorsmusteitherrestoreatleastonevalvewithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorisolatetheflowpathbyclosingandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalves.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeandprovidestheoperatortimetocorrectthesituation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-64DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSE.1E.2E.3andE.4(continued)IfonePORVisrestoredandonePORVremainsinoperable,thentheplantwillbeinConditionBwiththetimeclockstartedattheoriginaldeclarationofhavingtwoPORVsinoperable.IfnoPORVsarerestoredwithintheCompletionTime,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEwhichdoesnotrequiremanualPORVoperation.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3withT.,<500'Fwithin8hours.InMODE3withtheRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,thesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.SincetheRWSTcontainsalargervolumeofwaterthanthesecondarysideofanSG,theleakthroughtherupturedtubewillstopaftertheSGisfilledtocapacity.Therefore,anSGTRcanbemitigatedundertheseconditionswithoutanyreleaseofradioactivefluidthroughthemainsteamsafetyvalves.EnteringalowerMODEisnotdesirablewithbothPORYsinoperableandnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycledsincethePORVsar'ealsorequiredforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-65(continued)DraftA PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.11.1Blockvalvecyclingverifiesthatthe.valve(s)canbeclosedifneeded.The'asisfortheFrequencyof92daysistheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateaPORVthatiscapableofbeingmanuallycycled,theOPERABILITYoftheblockvalveisofimportance,becauseopeningtheblockvalveisnecessarytopermitthePORVtobeusedformanualcontrolofreactorpressure.IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateanotherwiseinoperablePORV,themaximumCompletionTimetorestorethePORVandopentheblockvalveis72hours,.whichiswellwithintheallowablelimits(25%)toextendtheblockvalveFrequencyof92days.Furthermore,thesetestrequirementswouldbecompletedbythereopeningofarecentlyclosedblockvalveuponrestorationofthePORVtoOPERABLEstatus(i.e.,completionoftheRequiredActionsfulfillstheSR).TheNotemodifiesthisSRbystatingthatitisnotrequiredtobeperformedwiththeblockvalveclosed.SR3.4.11.2ThisSRrequiresacompletecycleofeachPORVusingthenitrogenaccumulators.OperatingaPORVthroughonecompletecycleensuresthatthePORVcanbeman'uallyactuatedformitigationofanSGTR.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonatypicalrefueling"cycleandindustryacceptedpractice.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section15.2.2.ASNE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-66DraftA P LTOPSystemB3.4.12B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheLTOPSystemcontrolsRCSpressureatlowtemperaturessotheintegrityofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)isnotcompromisedbyviolatingthepressureandtemperature(P/T)limitsof10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.1).ThereactorvesselisthelimitingRCPBcomponentfordemonstratingsuchprotection.TheLTOPsystemalsoprotectstheRHRsystemfromoverpressurizationduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.ThePTLRprovidesthemaximumallowableactuationlogicsetpointsforthepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andthemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureduringcooldown,shutdown,andheatuptomeettheReference1requirementsduringtheLTOPMODES.Thereactorvesselmaterialislesstoughatlowtemperaturesthanatnormaloperatingtemperatures.Asthevesselneutronexposureaccumulates,thematerialtoughnessdecreasesandbecomeslessresistanttopressurestressatlowtemperatures(Ref.2).RCSpressure,therefore,ismaintainedlowatlowtemperaturesandisincreasedonlyastemperatureisincreased.The.potentialforvesseloverpressurizationismostacutewhentheRCSiswatersolid,occurringonlywhileshutdown;apressurefluctuationcanoccurmorequicklythananoperatorcanreacttorelievethecondition.ExceedingtheRCSP/Tlimitsbyasignificantamountcouldcausebrittlecrackingofthereactorvessel.LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"requiresadministrativecontrolofRCSpressureandtemperatureduringheatupandcooldowntopreventexceedingthePTLRlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-67DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThisLCOprovidesRCSoverpressureprotectionbyrestrictingcoolantinputcapabilityandhavingadequatepressurereliefcapacity.LimitingcoolantinputcapabilityrequiresisolatingtheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)accumulatorsandrenderirigallsafetyinjection(SI)pumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingaminimumoftwoSIpumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventzl.1squareinches.ThepressurereliefcapacityrequireseithertworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSandanRCSventofsufficientsize.OnePORVortheopenRCSventistheoverpressureprotectiondevicethatactstoterminateanincreasingpressureevent.Byrestrictingcoolantinputcapability,theabilitytoprovidecorecoolantadditionisminimized.TheLCOdoesnotrequirethemakeupcontrolsystemtobedeactivatedortheSIactuationcircuitsblocked.DuetothelowerpressuresintheLTOPMODESandtheexpectedcoredecayheatlevels,themakeupsystemcanprovideadequateflowviathemakeupcontrolvalve.IftheconditionsrequiretheuseofSIformakeupintheeventoflossofinventory,thenpumpscanbemadeavailablethroughmanualactions.ThetworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSwithanopenRCSventisalsosufficienttoprotecttheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationforeventswhichcauseanincreaseinsystempressure.PORVReuirementsAsdesignedfortheLTOPSystem,eachPORVissignaledtoopeniftheRCSpressureexceedsthelimitselectedtopreventaconditionthatisnotwithintheacceptableregionprovidedinthePTLR.ThePORVsareopenedbycoincidentactuationoftwo-of-threeRCSpressurechannels.ThePTLRpresentsthePORVsetpointforLTOP.WhenaPORVisopenedinanincreasingpressuretransient,thereleaseofcoolantwillcausethepressureincreasetoslowandthenreverse.AsthePORVreleasescoolant,the'RCSpressuredecreasesuntilaresetpressureisreachedandthevalveissignaledtoclose.Thepressurecontinuestodecreasebelowtheresetpressureasthevalvecloses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-68DraftA 00 LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)RCSVentReuirementsOncetheRCSisdepressurized,aventexposedtothecontainmentatmospherewillmaintaintheRCSatcontainmentambientpressureinanRCSoverpressuretransient,iftherelievingrequirementsofthetransientdonotexceedthecapabilitiesofthevent.Thus,theventpathmustbecapableofrelievingtheflowresultingfromthelimitingLTOPmassorheatinputtransient,andmaintainingpressurebelowtheP/Tlimits.Therequiredventcapacitymaybeprovidedbyoneormoreventpaths.ForanRCSventtomeettheflowcapacityrequirement,itrequiresremovingapressurizersafetyvalve,removingaPORV'sinternalsorblockingitopen,anddisablingitsblockvalveintheopenposition,orsimilarlyestablishingaventbyopeninganRCSventpath.Theventpath(s)mustbeabovethelevelofreactorcoolant,soasnottodraintheRCSwhenopen.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalyses(Ref.3)demonstratethatthereactorvesselisadequatelyprotectedagainstexceedingtheReference1P/TlimitsforallDesignBasisAccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,andinMODE4withRCScoldlegtemperatureexceedingtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,thepressurizersafetyvalveswillpreventRCSpressurefromexceedingtheReference1limits.AtorbelowtheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,overpressurepreventionfallstotwoOPERABLEPORVsortoadepressurizedRCSandasufficientlysizedRCSvent.Eachofthesemeanshasalimitedoverpressurereliefcapability.TheactualtemperatureatwhichthepressureintheP/Tlimitcurvefallsbelowthepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointincreasesasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlement.EachtimethePTLRcurvesarerevised,theLTOPSystemmustbere-evaluatedtoensureitsfunctionalrequirementscanstillbemetusingtheRCSreliefvalvemethodorthedepressurizedandventedRCScondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-69DraftA LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThePTLRcontainsthe-acceptancelimitsthatdefinetheLTOPrequirements.AnychangetotheRCSmustbeevaluatedagainsttheReference3analysestodeterminetheimpactofthechangeontheLTOPacceptancelimits.TransientsthatarecapableofoverpressurizingtheRCSarecategorizedaseithermassorheatinputtransients,examplesofwhichfollow:MassInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentsafetyinjection(SI);orb.Charging/letdownflowmismatch.HeatInutTeTransientsa.Inadvertentactuationofpressurizerheaters;b.LossofRHRcooling;orc.Reactorcoolantpump(RCP)startupwithtemperatureasymmetrywithintheRCSorbetweentheRCSandsteamgenerators.AnalyseshavedeterminedthatthemassinputtransientsaretheboundingcaseforoverpressurizationoftheRCS(Ref.3).Thetwocategoriesofmassinputtransientswereanalyzedwithrespecttoutilizingasingle"PORVoranRCSventzI.Isquareinchesasoverpressureprotection.The.inadvertentactuationofasingleSIpumpprovidesalargermassadditiontotheRCSthanisolationofletdownwithall,threechargingpumpsoperating.AsinglePORVwasdeterminedtobeincapableofmitigatingtheoverpressuretransientresultingfromactuationofaSIpump,butiscapableofmitigatingthecharging/letdownmismatchtransient.AnRCSventZ1.1squareinchescanmitigateboththeinadvertentSIandcharging/letdownflowmismatchtransients.Therefore,thefollowingarerequiredduringtheLTOPMODEStoensurethatmassandheatinputtransientsdonotoccur,whicheitheroftheLTOPoverpressureprotectionmeanscannothandle:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,B3.4-70DraftA

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'0RenderingallSIpumpsincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingallbutoneSIpumpincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventofZ1.1squareinches;b.Deactivatingtheaccumulatordischargemotoroperatedisolationvalvesintheirclosedpositions;andC.DisallowingstartofanRCPifsecondarytemperatureismorethan50'Faboveprimarytemperatureinanyonelooporpressurizerlevel<38%.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"andLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"providethisprotection.TheReference3analysesdemonstratethateitheronePORVorthedepressurizedRCSandRCSventcanmaintainRCSpressurebelowlimitswiththemaximumallowedcoolantinputcapability.SinceneitheronePORVnortheRCSventcanhandlethepressuretransientproducedfromaccumulatorinjectionwhenRCStemperatureislow,theLCOalsorequirestheaccumulatorsisolatedwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressure,fortheexistingRCScoldl,egtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Theisolatedaccumulatorsmusthavetheirdischargevalvesclosedandthevalvepowersupplyremoved.TheanalysesshowtheeffectofaccumulatordischargeisoveranarrowerRCStemperaturerange(200'Fandbelow)thanthatoftheLCO.FracturemechanicsanalysesestablishedthetemperatureofLTOPApplicabilityattheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.Theconsequencesofasmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)inLTOPMODE4conformto10CFR50.46and10CFR50,AppendixK(Refs.4and5),requirementsbyhavingprocedurestomanuallyestablishmakeupcapability.TheeventswhichpotentiallyoverpressurizetheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationareincludedwithinthemassandheatinputtransientsanalyzedforLTOPconditions.Therefore,anOPERABLELTOPSystemensuresthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurizedduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-71DraftA LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)'ORVPerformanceThefracturemechanicsanalysesshowthatthevesselisprotectedwhenthePORVsaresettoopenatorbelowthelimitshowninthePTLR.ThesetpointsarederivedbyanalysesthatmodeltheperformanceoftheLTOPSystem,assumingthelimitingLTOPtransientforthePORVsofacharging/letdownflowmismatch.TheseanalysesconsiderpressureovershootandundershootbeyondthePORVopeningandclosing,resultingfromsignalprocessingandvalvestroketimes.ThePORVsetpointsatorbelowthederivedlimitensurestheReferenceIP/TlimitswillbemetandthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurized.ThePORVsetpointsinthePTLRareupdatedwhentherevisedP/TlimitsconflictwiththeLTOPanalysislimits.TheP/Tlimitsareperiodicallymodifiedasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlementcausedbyneutronirradiation.Revisedlimitsaredeterminedusingneutronfluenceprojectionsandtheresultsofexaminationsofthereactorvesselmaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimens.TheBasesforLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"discusstheseexaminations.ThePORVsareconsideredactivecomponents.Thus,thefailureofonePORVisassumedtorepresenttheworstcase,singleactivefailure.RCSVentPerformanceWiththeRCSdepressurized,analysesshowaventsizeof1.IsquareinchesiscapableofmitigatingtheallowedLTOPoverpressuretransient.Thecapacityofaventthis.sizeisgreaterthantheflowofthelimitingtransientfortheLTOPconfiguration,whichmaintainsRCSpressurelessthanthemaximumpressureontheP/Tlimitcurve.ThelimitingtransientforthisLTOPconfigurationisanSIactuationwithoneSIpumpOPERABLE.AnRCSventZI.IsquareincheswiththeRCSdepressurizedalsopreventsoverpressurizationoftheRHRsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-72DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)TheRCSventsizewillbere-evaluatedforcomplianceeachtimetheP/Tlimitcurvesarerevisedbasedontheresultsofthevesselmaterialsurveillance.TheRCSventispassiveandisnotsubjecttoactivefailure.TheLTOPSystemsatisfiesCriterion2ofth'eNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattheLTOPSystemisOPERABLE.TheLTOPSystemisOPERABLEwhentheminimumcoolantinputandpressurereliefcapabilitiesareOPERABLE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldleadtothelossoflowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationandviolationoftheReferenceIlimitsasaresultofanoperationaltransient.Tolimitthecoolantinputcapability,theLCOrequirestheaccumulatorstobeisolated.LCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"definesSIactuationOPERABILITYfortheLTOPMODE4smallbreakLOCA.TheelementsoftheLCOthatprovidelowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationare:a.TwoOPERABLEPORVsandnoSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.APORVisOPERABLEforLTOPwhenitsblockvalveisopen,itsliftsetpointissettothelimitrequiredbythePTLRandtestingprovesitsabilitytoopenatthissetpoint,andmotivepowerisavailabletothevalveanditscontrolcircuits.b.AdepressurizedRCSandanRCSventandamaximumofoneSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.AnRCSventisOPERABLEwhenopenwithanareaofzl.lsquareinches.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-73DraftA

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESLCO(continued)EachofthesemethodsofoverpressurepreventioniscapableofmitigatingthelimitingLTOPtransient.TheLCOismodifi'edbytwoNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictestswithoutthePORVsandRCSventOPERABLE;howevernoSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.Thisexclusionisnecessarysinceapressuredifferentialof<800psidismaintainedbetweentheprimaryandsecondarysidesduringthetest.ThisrestrictedpressuredifferentiallimitsthestressesplacedontheSGwhichcancausecladdingintheprimarychanneltoseparatefromthebasemetalandresultin-theneedfordifficultrepairsinahighradiationarea.Tomaintainthispressuredifferential,RCSpressuremustbeincreasedabovethePORVsetpointforLTOPconditions.ThetestcannotbeperformedabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturesincethesteamlinesmaynotbeabletoaccommodatetheassociatedthermalexpansioniftheyareheated.Therefore,allthreeSIpumpsmustbeincapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthesesecondarysidehydrostatictests(Ref.6).ThesecondNoteonlyrequiresanaccumulatortobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.AccumulatorpressurebelowthislimitwillnotoverpressurizetheRCSbeyondanalyzedconditions.Theaccumulatorisisolatedwhenthedischargemotoroperatedvalveisclosedanditsassociatedpowersupplyisremoved.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-74(continued)DraftA

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRortheRHRsystemisintheRHRoperatingmode,inMODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,andinMODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.ThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovideoverpressureprotectionthatmeetstheReference1P/TlimitsabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.WhenthereactorvesselheadisoffortheSGprimarysystemmanwayorpressurizermanwayareopen,overpressurizationcannotoccur.LCO3.4.3providestheoperationalP/TlimitsforallMODES.LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"requirestheOPERABILITYofthepressurizersafetyvalvesthatprovideoverpressureprotectionduringMODES1,2,and3,.andMODE4abovetheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.LowtemperatureoverpressurepreventionismostcriticalduringshutdownwhentheRCSiswatersolid,andamassorheatinputtransientcancauseaveryrapidincreaseinRCSpressure'whenlittleornotimeallowsoperatoractiontomitigatetheevent.ACTIONSA.lWithoneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyofremovingtheRCSfromthiscondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-75DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONS(continued)8.1WithtwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandtheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>1.1squareinches,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyofremovingtheRCSfromthiscondition.C.lD.land0.2Anunisolatedaccumulatorrequiresisolationwithin1hour.ThisisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingtemperatureallowedbytheP/Tlimitcurves.Ifisolationisneededandcannotbeaccomplishedin1hour,RequiredActionD.1andRequiredAction0.2providetwooptions,eitherofwhichmustbeperformedinthenext12hours'yincreasingtheRCStemperaturetogreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,amaximumaccumulatorpressureof800psig(reliefvalvesetpoint)cannotexceedtheLTOPlimitsiftheaccumulatorsarefullyinjected.DepressurizingtheaccumulatorsbelowtheLTOPlimitfromthePTLRalsogivesthisprotection.TheCompletionTimesarebasedonoperatingexperiencethattheseactivitiescanbeaccomplishedinthesetimeperiodsandonengineeringevaluationsindicatingthataneventrequiringLTOPisnotlikelyintheallowedtimes.IE.1InNODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR,withonerequiredPORVinoperable,thePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTimeof7days.TwoPORVsarerequiredtoprovidelowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationwhilewithstandingasinglefailureofanactivecomponent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-76DraftA LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESACTIONSE.1(continued)TheCompletionTimeconsidersthatonlyonePORV,isrequiredtomitigateanoverpressuretransientandthatthelikelihoodofanactivefailureoftheremainingvalvepathduringthistimeperiodisverylow.F.lTheconsequencesofoperational.eventsthatwilloverpressurizetheRCSaremoresevereatlowertemperature(Ref.7).Thus,withoneofthetwoPORVsinoperableinMODE5withtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,orinNODE6withtheheadonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayclosedandsecuredinposition,thePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusin72hours.RestoringthePORVtoOPERABLEstatusprovidesrequiredredundancy.TheCompletionTimeof72hourstorestorethePORVtoOPERABLEstatusrepresentsareasonabletimetoinvestigateandrepairseveraltypesofreliefvalvefailureswithoutexposuretoalengthyperiodwithonlyonePORVtoprotectagainstoverpressureevents.TheCompletionTimeisalsoconsistentwiththetimeallowedforrestorationofonetrainofECCS,LCO3.5.2"ECCS-Operating"=.G.landG.2Atleastonechargingpumpmustbeinthepull-stoppositionwithin1hourandtheRCSmustbedepressurizedandaventmustbeestablishedwithin8hourswhen:a.BothrequiredPORVsareinoperable;orb.ARequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,0,E,orFisnotmet;orc.TheLTOPSystemisinoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,C,E,orF.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-77DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSG.1andG.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeofonehourtorestrictthecoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSconsiderstherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodandprovidestheoperatortimetorenderachargingpumpincapableofinjectingbyplacingitinthepull-stopposition.Onlyonedisablingdeviceisrequiredsincethereisarelativelysmallprobabilityofaninadvertentchargingpumpactuationduringthe8hoursbeforeRCSdepressurizationisachievedandaventestablished.ThedisablingofachargingpumpisnecessarysinceRV203cannotmitigateacharging/letdownmismatcheventifRHRisprovidingdecayheatremovalaboveMODE5andthreechargingpumpsareoperating.Theventmustbesized>1.1squareinchestoensurethattheflowcapacityisgreaterthanthatrequiredfortheworstcasemassinputtransientreasonableduringtheapplicableNODES.ThisactionisneededtoprotecttheRCPBfromalowtemperatureoverpressureeventandapossiblebrittlefailureofthereactorvess'elandtoprotecttheRHRsystemfromoverpressurization.TheCompletionTimeof8hourstodepressurizetheRCSandestablishaventconsidersthetimerequiredtoplacetheplantinthisConditionandtherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodduetoincreasedoperatorawarenessofadministrativecontrolrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-78DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONSG.1andG.2(continued)LCO3.0.4onlyappliesforentryintoMODES1,2,3,and4whichincludesonlypartoftheApplicabilityforthisLCO.SincetheLTOPSystemhelpsmaintaintheintegrityoftheRCPBduringlowtemperatureconditions,itisundesirabletoentertheLTOPSystemApplicabilitywithnomitigationcapability.ThisappliestobothincreasingordecreasingMODES.EntryintotheLTOPSystemApplicabilitywithbothPORVsinoperableshouldnotbemadeunlessitisrequiredtoperformnecessaryrepairsofthePORVs.ExamplesofthisincludeahardwarerelatedfailureofbothPORVswhichrequiresbreachingtheirintegritytorestoreOPERABILITY.ItisundesirabletoperformthistypeofmaintenanceatelevatedRCSpressureswithonlyoneisolationvalveavailable(i.e.,PORVblockvalve).Therefore,entryintotheLTOPSystemApplicabilitycanbeperformedinor'dertoreachaventedconditionoftheRCS.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3Tominimizethepotentialforalowtemperatureoverpressureeventbylimitingthemassinputcapability,allSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath(LCO3.4.12.a)andaminimumoftwoSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedandanRCSventZ1.1squareinchesisestablished(LCO3.4.12.b).TheSIpumpsarerenderedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSthroughremoving-thepowerfromthepumpsbyrackingthebreakersoutunderadministrativecontrol.AnalternatemethodofLTOPcontrolmaybeemployedusingatleasttwoindependentmeanstopreventapumpstartsuchthatasinglefailureorsingleactionwillnotre'suitinaninjectionintotheRCS.Thismaybeaccomplishedthroughthefollowing:a.placingthepumpcontrolswitchinthepull-stoppositionandclosingatleastonevalveinthedischargeflowpath;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-79DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.12.1SR3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3(continued)b.lockingclosedamanualisolationvalveintheinjectionpath;orc.closingamotoroperatedisolationvalveintheinjectionpathandremovingtheACpowersource.Theflowpathsthroughthetestconnectionsassociatedwiththeaccumulatorcheckvalves(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves839A,839B,840A,and840B)andtheaccumulatorfilllines(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves835Aand835B)donothavetobeisolatedforthisSRsincethepotentialmassadditionfromasingleSIpumpthroughthesesixlinesislimitedbytheinstalledorificestolessthanthatassumedforthecharging/letdownmismatchanalysis.Theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvescanbeverifiedclosedbyuseofcontrolboardindicationforvalveposition.ThisverificationisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureislessthanthislimit,noverificationisrequiredsincetheaccumulatorcannotpressurizetheRCStoorabovethePORVsetpoint.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficient,consideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,toverifytherequiredstatusoftheequipment.SR3.4.12.4TheRCSventof>1.1squareinchesisprovenOPERABLEbyverifyingitsopenconditioneither:a.Onceevery12hoursforavalvethatcannotbelocked.b.Onceevery31daysforavalvethatislocked,sealed,orsecuredinposition.Aremovedpressurizersafetyvalvefitsthiscategory.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-80IDraftA

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.12.4(continued)ThepassiveventarrangementmustonlybeopentobeOPERABLE.This'Surveillanceisrequiredtobeperformedif"theventisbeingusedtosatisfythepressurereliefrequirementsoftheLCO3.4.12b.SR3.4.12.5ThePORVblockvalvemustbeverifiedopenevery72hourstoprovidetheflowpathforeachrequiredPORVtoperformitsfunctionwhenactuated.Thevalvemayberemotelyverifiedopeninthemaincontrolroom.ThisSurveillanceisperformedifthePORVsatisfiestheLCO.Theblockvalve.isaremotelycontrolled,motoroperatedvalve.Thepowertothevalveoperatorisnotrequiredtoberemoved,andthemanualoperatorisnotrequiredtobelockedintheinactiveposition.Thus,theblockvalvecanbeclosedintheeventthePORVdevelopsexcessiveleakageordoesnotclose(sticksopen)afterrelievinganoverpressuresituation.The72hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,suchasvalvepositionindication,thatverifythatthePORVblockvalveremainsopen.SR3.4.12.6PerformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)isrequiredevery31daysoneachrequiredPORVtoverifyand,asnecessary,adjustitsliftsetpoint.TheCOTwillverifythesetpointiswithintheallowedmaximumlimitsinthePTLR.PORVactuationcoulddepressurizetheRCSandisthereforenotrequired.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-81DraftA

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.4.12.6(continued)REQUIREHENTSANotehasbeenaddedindicatingthatthisSRisrequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRifithasnotbeenperformedwithin.theprevious31days.Dependingonthecooldownrate,theCOTmaynothavebeenperformedbeforeentryintotheLTOPHODES.Thetestmustbeperformedwithin12hoursafterenteringtheLTOPHODES.The12hoursconsiderstheunlikelihoodofalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduringthistime.SR3.4.12.7Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveensuresthatatleasttwoindependentactionsmustoccurbeforetheaccumulatoriscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideassurancethat'owerisremoved.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheSurveillanceisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperature'allowedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureisbelowthislimit,theLTOPlimitcannotbeexceededandthesurveillanceisnotrequired.SR3.4.12.8PerformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONoneachrequiredPORVactuationchannelisrequiredevery24monthstoadjustthewholechannelsothatitrespondsandthevalveopenswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-82(continued)DraftA LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)'EFERENCES1.10CFR50,AppendixG.2.GenericLetter88-11,"NRCPositiononEmbrittlementofReactor'VesselMaterialsanditsImpactonPlantOperations."3.UFSAR,Section5.2.2.4.10CFR50,Section50.46.5.10CFR50,AppendixK.6.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RGKE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.27toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedJuly26,1979.7.GenericLetter90-06,"Resolutionof'GenericIssue70,"Power-OperatedRelief,ValveandBlockValveReliability,"andGeneric'Issue94,"AdditionalLow-TemperatureOverpressureProtectionforLight-.WaterReactors."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-83DraftA RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGEBASESBACKGROUNDComponentsthatcontainortransportthecoolanttoorfromthereactorcoremakeuptheRCS.Componentjointsaremadebywelding,bolting,rolling,orpressureloading,andvalvesisolateconnectingsystemsfromtheRCS.Duringplantlife,thejointandvalveinterfacescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantLEAKAGE,througheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.ThepurposeoftheRCSOperationalLEAKAGELCOistolimitLEAKAGEfromthesesourcestoamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThisLCOspecifiesthetypesandamountsofLEAKAGE.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofits.source.TheseleakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."ThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplantandthepublic.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-84DraftA

RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Alimitedamountofleakageinsidecontainmentisexpectedfromauxiliarysystems(e.g.componentcoolingwater)thatcannotbemade'00%leaktight.Leakagefromthesesystemsshouldbedetected,located,andisolatedfromthecontainmentatmosphere,ifpossible,tonotinterferewithRCSleakagedetection.ThisLCOdealswithprotectionofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)fromdegradationandthecorefrominadequatecooling,inadditiontopreventingtheaccidentanalysesradiationreleaseassumptionsfrombeingexceeded.TheconsequencesofviolatingthisLCOincludethepossibilityofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESExceptforprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,thesafetyanalysesdonotaddressoperationalLEAKAGE.However,otheroperationalLEAKAGEisrelatedtothesafetyanalysesforLOCA;theamountofleakagecanaffecttheprobabilityofsuchanevent(Ref.2).PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisafactorinthedosereleasesoutsidecontainmentresultingfromasteamlinebreak(SLB)accident.Toalesserextent,otheraccidentsortransientsinvolvesecondarysteamreleasetotheatmosphere,suchas'asteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Thesafetyanalysisforaneventresultinginsteamdischargetotheatmosphereassumesa0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEastheinitialcondition.Theleakagecontaminatesthesecondaryfluid.TheUFSAR(Ref.3)analysisforSGTRassumesthecontaminatedsecondaryfluidisonlybrieflyreleasedviasafetyvalvesandthemajorityissteamedtothecondenser.Theassumed0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisrelativelyinconsequential.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-85DraftA

RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALY(continuedTheSLBoutsideofcontainmentismorelimitingforsiteSIS'adiationreleases.ThesafetyanalysisfortheSLB)accidentassumes0.5gpmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinonegeneratorasaninitialcondition.Thedoseconsequencesresulting.fromtheSLBaccidentoutsideofcontainmentarewellwithinthelimitsdefinedin10CFR100orthestaffapprovedlicensingbasis(i.e.,asmallfractionoftheselimits).However,alowerLEAKAGElimitisassumedforallSLBstopreventacoincidentSGTRduetothelargestressesplacedontheSGtubesasaresultoftherapidcooldownanddepressurization.Thesestresscalculationsconservativelyassumeatubewitha0.4inchlongthrough-wallcrackinalocationwith40%localwallthinning.TheanalysesdemonstratethattheintegrityoftheselectedtubeismaintainedwithsufficientmarginaftertheSLB.Theassumedthrough-wallcrackof0.4inchescorrespondsto0.Igpmleakageundernormaloperatingconditions(Ref.4).Therefore,theprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEislimitedtoO.lgpmperSG.TheRCSoperationalLEAKAGEsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a0PressureBoundarLEAKAGECNopressureboundaryLEAKAGEisallowed,beingindicativeofmaterialdeterioration.LEAKAGEofthistypeisunacceptableastheleakitselfcouldcausefurtherdeterioration,resultinginhigherLEAKAGE.YiolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB.LEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-86DraftA RCSOperational.LEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESLCO(continued)b.C.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEOnegallonperminute(gpm)ofunidentifiedLEAKAGEisallowedasareasonableminimumdetectableamountthatthecontainmentairmonitoringandcontainmentsumplevelmonitoringequipmentcandetectwithinareasonabletimeperiod.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB,iftheLEAKAGEisfromthepressureboundary.IdentifiedLEAKAGEd.Upto10gpmofidentifiedLEAKAGEisconsideredallowablebecauseLEAKAGEisfromknownsourcesthatdonotinterferewithdetectionofidentifiedLEAKAGEandiswellwithinthecapabilityofachargingpumpoperatingatitslowspeedsetting.IdentifiedLEAKAGEincludesLEAKAGEtothecontainmentfromspecificallyknownandlocatedsources,LEAKAGEthroughtwoin-seriesPIVs,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,butdoesnot'includepressureboundaryLEAKAGEorcontrolledreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturn(anormalfunctionnotconsideredLEAKAGE).ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofacomponentorsystem.PrimartoSecondarLEAKAGEthrouhEachSteamGeneratorSGTotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEamountingto0.1gpmthrougheachSGproducesacceptableoffsitedosesandtubestressesintheSLBaccidentanalysis.ViolationofthisLCOcouldexceedtheoffsitedoselimitsforthisaccidentorresultinacoincidentSGTR.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEmustbeincludedinthetotalallowablelimitforidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheSGsshallalsobeOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-87(continued)DraftA

RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecaus'ethepotentialforRCPBLEAKAGEisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.InNODES5or6,thetemperatureis~200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.Sincethetemperaturesandpre'ssuresarefarlowerthanthoseforNODESI,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationismuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinNODES5and6.LCO3.4.14,"RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage,"measuresleakagethrougheachindividualPIVandcanimpactthisLCO.Ofthein-seriesPIVsineachisolatedline,leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVdoesnotresultinRCSLEAKAGEwhentheotherisleaktight.IfbothvalvesleakandresultinalossofmassfromtheRCS,thelossmustbeincludedintheallowableidentifiedLEAKAGE.ACTIONSA.1UnidentifiedLEAKAGE,identifiedLEAKAGE,or'rimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinexcessoftheLCOlimits'mustbereducedtowithinlimitswithin4hours.ThisCompletionTimeallowstimetoverifyleakageratesandeitheridentifyunidentifiedLEAKAGEorreduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimits-beforethereactormustbeshutdown.ThisactionisnecessarytopreventfurtherdeteriorationoftheRCPB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-88DraftA RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1WiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram(Specification5;5.9)notmet,integrityofsteamgeneratortubesmustbedeterminedtobeacceptableforcontinuedoperationwithin4hours.ThisConditionspecificallyaddressestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventanon-significantProgramdiscrepancyisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginHOOfS1,2,3,or4.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultininadequatetubeintegrity.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorrectionofadministrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletionTimeisbasedonengineeringjudgement.ThisConditiondoesnotsupersedetheACTIONSofConditionAintheeventLEAKAGEfromoneormoresteamgeneratorsexceedstheLCOlimit.Intheeventthisoccurs,theLEAKAGEmustberestoredtowithinlimitswithin4hours,oraplantshutdowncommenced.ThisConditionisalsonotapplicabletoasituationinwhichintegrityofthetubeisquestionable.Intheeventintegrityofthetubeisdeterminedtobeinadequate,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandConditionCofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedduringHODES1,2,3and4.C.landC.2IfanyRCSpressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists,oriftheRequiredActionofConditionAorBcannotbecompletedwithin4hours,thereactormustbebroughttolower.pressureconditionstoreducethe'severityoftheLEAKAGEanditspotentialconsequences.ThereactormustbebroughttoHODE3within6hoursandHODE5within36hours.ThisactionreducestheLEAKAGEandalsoreducesthefactorsthattendtodegradethepressureboundary.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-89DraftA RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InNODE5,thepressurestressesactingontheRCPBaremuchlower,andfurtherdeteriorationismuchlesslikely.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.13.1VerifyingRCSLEAKAGEtobewithintheLCOlimitsensurestheintegrityoftheRCPBismaintained.PressureboundaryLEAKAGEwhichisnotallowedbythisLCO,wouldatfirstappearasunidentifiedLEAKAGEandcanonlybepositivelyidentifiedbyinspection.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEandidentifiedLEAKAGEaredeterminedbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalance.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisalsomeasuredbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalanceinconjunctionwitheffluentmonitoringwithinthesecondarysteamandfeedwatersystems.TheRCSwaterinventorybalancemustbeperformedwiththeRCSatsteadystateoperatingconditions.Therefore,thisSRisrequiredtobeperformedonceduringtheinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationandevery72hoursthereafter.Steadystateoperationisrequiredtoperformaproperinventorybalance;calculationsduringmaneuveringarenotusefulandaNoterequirestheSurveillancetobemetwhensteadystateisestablished.ForRCSoperationalLEAKAGEdeterminationbywaterinventorybalance,steadystateisdefinedasstableRCSpressure,temperature,powerlevel,pressurizerandvolumecontroltanklevels,makeupandletdown,andRCPsealinjectionandreturnflows.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-90DraftA RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.4.13.1(continued)Anearlywarni'ngofpressureboundaryLEAKAGEorunidentifiedLEAKAGEisprovidedbytheautomaticsystemsthatmonitorthecontainmentatmosphereradioactivityandthecontainmentsumplevel.ItshouldbenotedthatLEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.LeakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."The72hourFrequencyisareasonableintervaltotrendLEAKAGEandrecognizestheimportanceofearlyleakagedetectioninthepreventionofaccidents.SR3.4.13.2ThisSRprovidesthemeansnecessarytodetermineSGOPERABILITYinanoperationalHODE.TherequirementtodemonstrateSGtubeintegrityinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramemphasizestheimportanceofSGtubeintegrity,eventhoughthisSurveillancecannotbeperformedatnormaloperatingconditions.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingwithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryHainLoops."3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.LetterfromR.APurple,NRC,toL.D.White,RGKE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-91DraftA 0 RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.1483.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageBASESBACKGROUND10CFR50.2,10CFR50.55a(c),andAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53(Refs.1,2,and3),defineRCSPIVsasanytwonormallyclosedvalvesin-serieswithinthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB),whichseparatethehighpressureRCSfromanattachedlowpressuresystem.Duringtheirlives,thesevalvescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantleakagethrougheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.TheRCSPIVLeakageLCOallowsRCShighpressureoperationwhenleakagethroughthesevalvesexistsinamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.ThePIVleakagelimitappliestoeachindividualvalve.Leakagethroughbothin-seriesPIVsforagivenlinemustbeincludedaspartoftheidentifiedLEAKAGE,governedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE."ThisistrueduringoperationonlywhenthelossofRCSmassthroughin-seriesvalvesisdeterminedbyawaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)orotherconfirmatorytests.AknowncomponentoftheidentifiedLEAKAGEbeforeoperationbeginsistheleastoftheindividualleakratesdeterminedforleakingseriesPIVsduringtherequiredsurveillancetesting;leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVinalineisnotRCSoperationalLEAKAGEiftheotherisleaktight.Priortotherequiredsurveillancetesting(SR3.4.14.1)andwaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)inNODES3and4,anyleakagethroughthePIVsisconsideredunidentifiedLEAKAGE.AlthoughthisspecificationprovidesalimitonallowablePIVleakagerate,itsmainpurposeistopreventoverpressurefailureofthelowpressureportionsofconnectingsystems.Theleakagelimitisanindicationtha'tthePIVsbetweentheRCSandtheconnectingsystemsaredegradedordegrading.PIVleakagecouldleadtooverpressureofthelowpressurepipingorcomponents.Failureconsequencescouldbealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)outsideofcontainment(i.e.,intersystemLOCA),anunanalyzedaccident,thatcoulddegradetheabilityforlowpressureinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-92DraftA RCSPIVLeakage83.4.14BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThebasisforthisLCOisthe1975NRC"ReactorSafetyStudy"(Ref.4)thatidentifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcoredamage.Asubsequentstudy.(Ref.5)evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurationstodeterminetheprobabilityofintersystemLOCAsandtoidentifywhichconfigurationsdominatetherisk,profileforintersystemLOCApotential.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformedtoidentifythemostrisksignificantconfigurations.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofaPIV,whichcouldleadtooverpressurizationofalowpressuresystemandthelossoftheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESReference4identifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributorto'theriskofcoredamage.ThedominantaccidentsequenceintheintersystemLOCAcategoryasidentifiedbyReference4wasthefailureofthelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemoutsideofcontainment.ThisaccidentistheresultofapostulatedfailureofthePIVs,whicharepartoftheRCPB,andthesubsequentpressurizationoftheRHRSystemdownstreamofthePIVsfromtheRCS.BecausethelowpressureportionoftheRHRSystemisdesignedfor600psig,overpressurizationfailureoftheRHRlowpressurelinewouldresultinaLOCAoutsidecontainmentandsubsequentincreasedriskofcoredamage.Reference5evaluatedvariousPIVconfigurations,leakagetestingofthevalves,andoperationalchangestodeterminetheeffectontheprobabilityofintersystemLOCAs.ThisstudyconcludedthatperiodicleakagetestingofthePIVscansubstantiallyreducetheprobabilityofanintersystemLOCA.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformed.PIVsinthefollowingsystemsconnectedtotheRCSwereevaluated:a.residualheatremoval(RHR);b.safetyinjection(SI);andc.chemicalandvolumecontrol.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-93DraftA RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheevaluationofintersystemLOCAsconcludedthatseveralconfigurationsidentifiedinReferences4and5existedintheRHRandSIsystems.ThePIVconfigurationsintheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwerenotidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantduetotheinstalledorificesintheletdownpipingandtheuseofpipingdesignedtoRCSpressur'econditionsfromthedischargeofthepositivedisplacementpumpstocontainment(Ref.7).ThePIVsidentifiedintheSIandRHRSystemsarelistedbelow:853A853B867A867B 877A877B878A878C878F878G 878H.878'HRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorACheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorBCheckValvetoRCSColdLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeIsolationHOVtoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeIsolationHOVtoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegB'IPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegARCSPIVleakagesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSPIVleakageisidentifiedLEAKAGEintoclosedsystemsconnectedtotheRCS.Isolationvalveleakageisusuallyon.theorderofdropsperminute.Leakagethatincreasessignificantlysuggeststhatsomethingisoperationallywrongandcorrectiveactionmustbetaken.ThisLCOonlyappliestothosePIVswhicharedeterminedtobeinthemostrisksignificantconfigurations(Ref.7)aslistedinApplicableSafetyAnalysis.TheremainingPIVsaregovernedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE"andLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationValves."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-94DraftA

RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOPIVleakagelimitis0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizewithamaximumlimitof5gpm..Aleakageratelimitbasedonvalvesizeisusedsincethisissuperiortoasingleallowab'levalue(Ref.8).Reference9permitsleakagetestingatalowerpressuredifferentialthanbetweenthespecifiedmaximumRCSpressureandthenormalpressureoftheconnectedsystemduringRCSoperation(themaximumpressuredifferential)inthosetypesofvalvesinwhichthehigherservicepressurewilltendtodiminish.theoverallleakagechannelopening.Insuchcases,theobservedratemaybeadjustedtothemaximumpressuredifferentialbyassumingleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,thisLCOappliesbecausethePIVleakagepotentialisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.InMODES5or6,thetemperatureisg200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.Sincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowertha'nthoseforMODESI,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandisolationfailuresaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheActionsaremodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIprovidesclarificationthateachflowpathallowsseparateentryintoaCondition.Thisisallowedbaseduponthefunctionalindependenceoftheflowpath.Note2requiresanevaluationofaffectedsystemsifaPIVisinoperable.Theleakagemayhaveaffectedsystemoperability,orisolationofaleakingflowpathwithanalternatevalvemayhavedegradedtheabilityoftheinterconnectedsystemtoperformitssafetyfunction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-95DraftA

RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESACTIONS(continued)A.laridA.2Aleakingflowpathmustbeisolatedbytwovalves.RequiredActionsA.land'A.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatthevalvesusedforisolationmustmeetthesameleakagerequirementsasthePIVsandmustbewithintheRCPBorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.RequiredActionA.1requiresthatisolationoftheaffectedflowpathwithonevalvemustbeperformedwithin4hours.Fourhoursprovidestimetoreduceleakageinexcessoftheallowablelimitandtoisolatetheaffectedsystemifleakagecannotbereduced.The4hourCompletionTimeallowstheactionsandrestrictsoperationwithleakingisolationvalves.RequiredActionA.2specifiesthatthedoubleisolationbarrieroftwovalvesberestoredbyclosingsomeothervalvequalifiedforisolation.TheuseofavalveotherthanthepreviouslyleakingPIVmustincludeconsiderationthattheplantmaynolongerbeinananalyzedcondition.The72hourCompletionTimeafterexceedingthelimitconsidersthetimerequiredtocompletetheActionandthelowprobabilityofasecondvalvefailingduringthistimeperiod.B.land8.2Ifleakagecannotbereduced,thesystemisolated;ortheotherRequiredActionsaccomplished,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandNODE5within36hours.ThisActionmayreducetheleakageduetoreducedRCSpressurewhilereducingthepotentialforaLOCAoutsidethecontainment.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonablebasedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-96(continued)DraftA

RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2PerformanceofleakagetestingoneachRCSPIVorisolationvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionA.2isrequiredtoverifythatleakageisbelowthespecifiedlimitandtoidentifyeachleakingvalve.Theleakagelimitof0.5gpmperinchofnominalvalvediameterupto5gpmmaximumappliestoeachvalveandshouldbebasedonanRCSpressureof+20psigofnormalsystemoperatingpressure.Leakagetestingrequiresastablepressurecondition.Formultiplein-seriesPIVs,theleakagerequirementappliestoeachvalveindividuallyandnottothecombined1'eakage.acrossbothvalves.IfthePIVsarenotindividuallyleakagetested,onevalvemayhavefailedcompletelyandnotbedetectediftheotherin-seriesvalvemeetstheleakagerequirement.Inthissituation,theprotectionprovidedbyredundantvalveswouldbelost.Testingofthecheckvalves(877A,877B,878F,and878H)andthemotoroperatedvalves(878Aand878C)identifiedasPIVsintheSIhotleg.injectionlinesistobeperformedatleastonceevery40months.ThisextendedsurveillanceintervalisallowedsincethetwoSIhotlegin'jectionlinesaremaintainedclosedtoaddresspressurizedthermalshock(PTS)concerns.Eachinjectionlineisisolatedbytwocheckvalvesandonemotoroperatedvalvein-serieswhichmustallfailtocreatethepotentialforanintersystemLOCA.TestingoftheremainingRCSPIVsintheSIandRHRsystemsistobeperformedevery24months,atypicalrefuelingcycle.The24monthFrequencyisconsistentwith10CFR50.55a(g)(Ref.10)ascontainedintheInserviceTestingProgram,iswithinthefrequencyallowedbytheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)Code,SectionXI(Ref.9),andisbasedontheneedtoperformsuchsurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringanoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-97DraftA RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2(continued)Inadditiontotheperiodictestingrequirements,testingmustbeperformedonceafterthevalvehasbeenopenedbyflow,exercised,orhadmaintenanceperformedonittoensuretightreseating.Thismaintenancedoesnotincludeminoractivitiessuchaspackingadjustmentswhichdonotaffecttheleaktightnessofthe'valve.PIVsdisturbedintheperformanceofthisSurveillanceshouldalsobetestedunlessdocumentationshowsthataninfinitetestingloopcannotpracticallybeavoided.Testingmustbeperformedwithin24hoursafterthevalvehasbeenreseated.Alimitof24hoursisareasonableandpracticaltimelimitforperformingthistestafteropeningorreseatingavalve.TheleakagelimitistobemetattheRCSpressureassociatedwithHODES1and2.ThispermitsleakagetestingathighdifferentialpressureswithstableconditionsnotpossibleintheHODESwithlowerpressures.EntryintoHODES3and4isallowedtoestablishthenecessarydifferentialpressuresandstableconditionstoallowforperformanceofthisSurveillance.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.2.2.10CFR50.55a(c).3.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53,Issuedforcomme'ntJuly10,1967.4.WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),"AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPower'Plants,"AppendixV,October1975.5.NUREG-0677,"TheProbabilityofIntersystemLOCA:ImpactDuetoLeakTestingandOperationalChanges,"Hay1980.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-98DraftA 0 RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCE,.RE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.14.1andSR3.4.14.2(continued)Inadditiontotheperiodictestingrequirements,testingmustbeperforme'donceafterthevalvehasbeenopenedbyflow,exercised,orhadmaintenanceperformedonittoensuretightreseating.Thismaintenancedoesnotincludeminoractivitiessuchaspackingadjustmentswhichdonotaffecttheleaktightnessofthevalve.PIVsdisturbedintheperformanceofthisSurveillanceshouldalsobetestedunlessdocumentationshowsthataninfinitetestingloopcannotpracticallybeavoided.Testingmustbeperformedwithin24hoursafterthevalvehasbeenreseated.Alimitof24hoursisareasonableandpracticaltimelimitforperformingthistestafter,openingorreseatingavalve.TheleakagelimitistobemetattheRCSpressureassociatedwithHODES1and2.Thispermitsleakagetestingathighdifferential'pressureswi.thstableconditionsnotpossibleintheHODESwithlowerpressures.EntryintoHODES3and4isallowedtoestablishthenecessarydifferentialpressuresandstableconditionstoallowforperformanceofthisSurveillance..REFERENCES1.10CFR50.2.2.10CFR50.55a(c).3.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.4.MASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),"AnAssessmentofAccidentRisksinU.S.CommercialNuclearPowerPlants,"AppendixV,October1975.5.NUREG-0677,"TheProbabilityofIntersystemLOCA:ImpactDuetoLeakTestingandOperationalChanges,"Hay1980.6.GenericLetter,"LWRPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedFebruary23,1980.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-98DraftA RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESREFERENCES(continued)7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGKE,

Subject:

"OrderforHodificationofLicenseConcerningPrimaryCoolantSystemPressureIsolationValves,"datedApril20,1981.8.EG&GReport,EGG-NTAP-6175.9.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.10.10CFR50.55a(g).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-99DraftA

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34(Ref.1)alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.Industrypracticehasshownthatsmallwaterflowchangescanbereadilydetectedincontainedvolumesbymonitoringchangesinwaterlevelorintheoperatingfrequencyofapump.ThecontainmentsumpusedtocollectunidentifiedLEAKAGE(i.e.,containmentsumpA)ismonitoredforlevelandsumppumpactuationandcanmeasureapproximatelya2.0gpmleakinonehour.ThissensitivityisacceptablefordetectingincreasesinunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Thereactorcoolant'ontainsradioactivitythat,whenreleasedtothecontainment,canbedetectedbyradiationmonitoringinstrumentation.Reactorcoolantradioactivitylevelswillbelowduringinitialreactorstartupandforafewweeksthereafter,untilactivatedcorrosionproductshavebeenformedandfissionproductsappearfromfuelelementcladdingcontaminationorcladdingdefects.Theparticulatemonitor(R-ll)candetectaleakof0.013gpmwithin20minutesassumingthepresenceofcorrosionproducts.Thegaseousmonitor(R-12)candetectaleakof2.0to10.0gpmwithin1hourandisconsideredabackuptotheparticulatemonitor.RadioactivitydetectionsystemsareincludedformonitoringbothparticulateandgaseousactivitiesbecauseoftheirsensitivitiesandrapidresponsestoRCSLEAKAGE.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-100DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESBACKGROUND(continued)AlternativemeansalsoexisttomonitorRCSLEAKAGEinsidecontainment.Theseincludehumiditydetectors,airtemperatureandpressuremonitoring,andcondensateflowratefromtheaircoolers.ThecapabilityofthesesystemstodetectRCSleakageisinfluencedbyseveralfactors'includingcontainmentfreevolumeanddetectorlocation.ThesesystemsaremostusefulasalarmsorindirectindicatingdevicesavailabletotheoperatorsandarenotrequiredbythisLCO(Ref.2).Theleakagedetectionsystemsarealsousedtosupportidentificationofl'eakagefromopensystemsfoundincontainment.Thisincludesservicewaterandfireservicewatersystems.LeakagefromthesesystemsisrequiredtobemonitoredinresponsetoIEBulletinNo.80-24(Ref.3).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringthe1970's,theNRCbeganevaluatingasymmetricloadsthatresultfrompostulatingrapidopeningofdouble-endedrupturesofRCSpipingatcertainlocationsinPWRs.Theasymmetricloadsproducedbythepostulatedbreaksaretheresultofanassumedpressureimbalance,bothinternalandexternaltotheRCS.Theinternalasymmetricloadsresultfromarapiddecompressionthat'auselargetransientpressuredifferentialsacrossthecorebarrelandfuelassemblies.Theexternalasymmetricloadsresultfromtherapiddepressurizationofannulusregions,suchastheannulusbetweenthereactorvesselandtheshieldwall,andcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialstoactonthevessel.TheseasymmetricloadscoulddamageRCSsupports,corecoolingequipmentorcoreinternals.ThisconcernwasfirstidentifiedasHultiplantAction(HPA)D-10andsubsequentlyasUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)2,"AsymmetricLOCALoads"(Ref.4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-101DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'heresolutionofUSI-2forWestinghousePWRswasuseoffracturemechanicstechnologyforRCSpiping>10inchesdiameter(Ref.5).Thistechnologybecameknownasleak-before-break(LBB).IncludedwithintheLBBmethodologywastherequirementtohaveleakagedetectionsystemscapableofdetectinga1.0gpmleakwithinfourhours.Thisleakagerateisdesignedtoensurethatadequatemarginsexisttodetectleaksinatimelymannerduringnormaloperatingconditions.TheuseofLBBforGinnaStationisdocumentedinReference6.ThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,detectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakageoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheplantandthepublic.RequiredcorrectiveactionsareprovidedinLCO3.4.13,RCSOperationalLEAKAGE.ThecapabilityoftheleakagedetectionsystemswasevaluatedbytheNRCinReference7.RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion1oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnemethodofprotectingagainstlargeRCSLEAKAGEderivesfromtheabilityofinstrumentstorapidlydetectextremelysmallleaks.ThisLCOrequiresinstrumentsofdiversemonitoringprinciplestobeOPERABLEtoprovideahighdegreeofconfidencethatextremelysmallleaksaredetectedintimetoallowactionstoplacetheplantinasafecondition,whenRCSLEAKAGEindicatespossibleRCPBdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-102DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOissatisfiedwhenmonitorsofdiversemeasurementmeansareavailable.Thus,thecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuationfromeithersumpApump),incombinationwith'agaseous(R-12)orparticulate(R-11)radioactivitymonitorprovidesanacceptableminimum.Alternatively,theplantventgaseous(R-14)orparticulate(R-13)monitorsmaybeusedinplaceofR-12andR-ll,respectively,providedthataflowpaththroughnormallyclosedvalve1590isavailableandR-14AisOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYBecauseofelevatedRCStemperatureandpressureinMODES1,2,3,and4,RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLE..InMODE5or6,thetemperatureis<200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationaremuchsmaller..Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSA.l.lA.1.2andA.2WiththerequiredcontainmentsumpAmonitorino'perable,nootherformofsamplingcanprovidetheequivalentinformation;however,thecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorwillprovideindicationsofchangesinleakage.InadditiontoanOPERABLEgaseousorparticulateatmospheremonitor,thecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemmustbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEwithin24hours,ortheperiodicsurveillanceforRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedatanincreasedfrequencyof24hourstoprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.Theuseofthegaseousmonitor(R-12)isacceptableduetotheincreasedfrequencyofperformingSR3.4.13.1ortheuseofthecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-103DraftA

RCSLeakageDetection.Instrumentation83.4.15BASESACTIONSA.l.lA.l.2andA.2(continued)ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLEiftheflowpathsfromallfourcontainmentaircoolerstotheirrespectivecollectiontanksareavailableandSR3.4.15.5hasbeenperformed.ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisprovidedasanoptionfordetectingRCSleakagesinceSR3.4.13.1isnotperformeduntilafter12hoursofsteadystateoperation.Therefore,thiscollectionsystemcanbeusedduringMODEchangesifthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.RestorationoftherequiredsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTimeof30daysisrequiredtoregainthefunctionafterthemonitor'sfailure.Thistimeisacceptable,consideringtheFrequencyandadequacyoftheRCSwaterinventorybalancerequiredbyRequiredActionA.1.RequiredActionsA.1.1,A.1.2,andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.B.l.lB.1.2and8.2.1Withbothgaseous(R-12)andparticulate(R-11)containmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitoringinstrumentationchannelsinoperable(andtheiralternativesR-13andR-14),alternativeactionisrequired.Eithergrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmospheremustbetakenandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalances,inaccordancewithSR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedtoprovidealternateperiodicinformation.Withagrabsampleobtainedandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalanceperformedevery24hours,thereactormaybeoperatedforupto30daystoallowrestorationoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitors.The24hourintervalprovidesperiodicinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.The30dayCompletionTimerecognizesthatatleastoneotherformofleakagedetectionisavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-104DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSB.1.1B.1.2and8.2.1(continued)RequiredActionsB.1.1,B.1.2,and8.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenthegaseousandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorsareinoperable.Thisallowanceisprovidedbecause'therinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorforRCSLEAKAGE.C.1.1C.1.2C.2.1andC.2.2Withtherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitorandtheparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-11)inoperable,theonlyinstalledmeansofdetectingleakageisthegaseouscontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-12).Thisconditiondoesnotprovideadiversemeansofleakagedetection.Also,thegaseousmonitorcanonlymeasurebetweena2.0and10.0gpmleakwithin1hourwhichmaynotmeetthe1.0gpminlessthanfourhour'detectionraterequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.5).TheRequiredActionsaretoanalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphereorperformRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,atafrequencyof24hours.Thecombinationof,thegaseousmonitorandeithertheperiodicgrabsamplesorRCSinventorybalanceprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.Rest'orationofeitheroftheinoperablemonitorstoOPERABLEstatuswithin30daysisrequiredtoregaintheintendedleakagedetectiondiversity.The30dayCompletionTimeensuresthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedinareducedconfigurationforalengthyperiodoftime.RequiredActionsC.1.1,C.1.2,andC.2.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-105DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONS(continued)D.land0.2IfaRequiredActionofConditionA,8,orCcannotbemet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1Withallrequiredmonitorsinoperable,noautomaticmeansofmonitoringleakageareavailable,andimmediateplantshutdowninaccordancewithLCO3.0.3isrequired.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.15.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.The'heckgivesreasonableconfidencethatthechannelisoperatingproperly.TheFrequencyof12hoursisbasedonin'strumentreliabilityandisreasonablefordetectingoffnormalconditions.SR3.4.15.2ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)ontherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thetestensuresthatthemonitorcanperformitsfunctioninthedesiredmanner.Thetestverifiesthealarmsetpointandrelativeaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring.TheFrequencyof92daysconsidersinstrumentreliability,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatitisproperfordetectingdegradation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-106DraftA

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.4.15.3SR3.4.15.4andSR3.4.15.5REgUIREHENTS(continued)'heseSRsrequiretheperformanceofaCMANNELCALIBRATIONforeachoftheRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationchannels.Thecalibrationverifiestheaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring,includingtheinstrumentslocatedinsidecontainment.TheFrequencyof24monthsconsiderschannelreliabilityandoperatingexperiencehasproventhatthisFrequencyisacceptable.SR3.4.15.5ismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheSurveillanceisonlyrequiredto.beperformedwhencomplyingwithRequiredActionA.2sincethecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeet'CO3.4.15.REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16and34,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.RegulatoryGuide1.45.3.IEBulletinNo.80-24,"PreventionofDamageDuetoWaterLeakageInsideContainment."4.NUREG-0609,"AsymmetricBlowdownLoadsonPWRPrimarySystems,"1981.5.6.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingWithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryHainLoops."LetterfromD.C.DiIanni,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGLE,

Subject:

"GenericLetter84-04,"datedSeptember9,1985.7.NUREG-0821,"IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,R.E.NuclearPowerPlant,"December1982.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-107DraftA RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDThemaximumdosetothewholebodyandthethyroidthatanindividualatthesiteboundarycanreceivefor2hoursduringanaccidentisspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.1).Thelimitsonspecificactivityensurethatthedosesareheldtoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsduringanalyzedtransientsandaccidents.TheRCSspecificactivityLCOlimitstheallowableconcentrationlevelofradionuclidesinthereactorcoolant.TheLCOlimitsareestablishedtominimizetheoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesintheeventofasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)accident.ThespecificactivitylimitsforbothDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityareprovidedintheSRs.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131iscalculatedusingTableE-7ofRegulatoryGuide1.109(Ref.2).Theallowablelevelsareintendedtolimitthe2hourdoseatthesiteboundarytoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.ThelimitsintheLCOarestandardized,basedonparametricevaluationsofoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesfortypicalsitelocations.TheparametricevaluationsshowedthepotentialoffsitedoselevelsforaSGTRaccidentwereanappropriatelysmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.Eachevaluationassumesabroadrangeofsiteapplicableatmosphericdispersionfactorsinaparametricevaluation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLCOlimitsonthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantensuresthattheresulting2hourdosesatthesiteboundarywillnotexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimitsfollowingaSGTRaccident.TheSGTRsafetyanalysis(Ref.3)assumesthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantattheLCOlimitandanexistingreactorcoolantsteamgenerator(SG)tubeleakagerateof0.5gpm.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-108DraftA

RCSSpecificActivity83.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)'heanalysisfortheSGTRaccidentestablishestheacceptancelimitsforRCSspecificactivity.ReferencetothisanalysisisusedtoassesschangestotheplantthatcouldaffectRCS'pecificactivity,astheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.Theanalysisisfortwocasesofreactorcoolantspecificactivity(Ref.4).Onecaseassumesspecificactivityat1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131withaconcurrentlargeiodinespikethatincreasestheI-131activityinthereactorcoolantbyafactorofabout500foradurationoffourhoursimmediatelyaftertheaccident.Thesecondcaseassumestheinitialreactorcoolantiodineactivityat60.0pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131duetoapre-accidentiodinespikecausedbyanRCStransient.Inbothcases,thenoblegasactivityinthereactorcoolantassumes1%failedfuel,whichcloselyequalstheLCOlimitof100/EpCi/gmforgrossspecificactivity.TheSGTRcausesareduction,inreactorcoolantinventory.ThereductioninitiatesareactortripfromalowpressurizerpressuresignaloranRCSovertemperaturehTsignal.TheanalysisalsoassumesalossofoffsitepoweratthesametimeasthereactortripfollowingtheSGTRevent.Thecoincidentlossofoffsitepowercausesthesteamdumpvalvestoclosetoprotectthecondenser.TheriseinpressureintherupturedSGdischargesradioactivelycontaminatedsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheSGatmosphericreliefvalvesandthe,mainsteamsafetyvalves.Thissteamreleasecontinuesforeighthoursuntiltheresidualheatremovalsystemisutilizedforcooldownpurposes.AllnoblegasactivityintheRCSwhichistransportedtothesecondarysystembythetuberuptureisassumedtobeimmediatelyreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheunaffectedSGremovescoredecayheatbyventingsteamtotheatmosphereuntiltheinitialcooldownendsandtheRCSsystempressurestabilizesbelowthereliefvalvesetpoint.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-109DraftA RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)'hesafetyanalysisshowstheradiologicalconsequencesofanSGTRaccidentarewithinasmallfractionoftheReference1doseguidelinelimits.OperationwithiodinespecificactivitylevelsgreaterthantheLCOlimitispermissible,iftheactivitylevelsdonotexceedthelimitsshowninFigure3.4.16-1formorethanoneweek.TheincreasedpermissibleiodinelevelsshowninFigure3.4.16-1areacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilityofaSGTRaccidentoccurringduringtheestablishedoneweektimelimit.TheoccurrenceofanSGTRaccidentatthesepermissiblelevelscouldincreasethesiteboundarydoselevels,buttheywouldstillbewithin10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.RCSspecificactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificiodineactivityislimitedto1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131,andthegrossspecificactivityinthereactorcoolantislimitedto100/EpCi/gm(whereEistheaveragedisintegrationenergyofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesofthecoolantnuclides).ThelimitonDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131ensuresthe2hourthyroiddosetoan.individualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)willbeasmallfractionoftheallowedthyroiddose.Thelimitongrossspecificactivityensuresthe2hourwholebodydosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDBAwillbeasmallfractionoftheallowedwholebodydose.TheSGTRaccidentanalysis(Ref.3)showsthatthe2hoursiteboundarydoselevelsarewithinacceptablelimits.ViolationoftheLCOmayresultinreactorcoolantradioactivitylevelsthatcould,intheeventofanSGTR,leadtositeboundarydosesthatexceedthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.4-110(continued)DraftA RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature>500'F,operationwithintheLCOlimitsforDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityarenecessarytocontainthepotentialco'nsequencesofanSGTRtowithintheacceptablesiteboundarydosevalues.ForoperationinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,andinMODES4and5,thereleaseofradioactivityintheeventofaSGTRisunlikelysincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftpressuresettingsofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.ACTIONSA.landA.2WiththeDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131greaterthantheLCOlimit,samplesatintervalsof8hoursmustbetakentodemonstratethatthelimitsofFigure3.4.16-1arenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisrequiredtoobtainandanalyzeasample.Samplingisdonetocontinuetoprovideatrend.TheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131mustberestoredtowithinlimitswithinoneweekifthelimitviolationresultedfromnormaliodinespiking.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO.3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhentheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131isgreaterthantheLCOlimitandwithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.4.16-1.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseofthesignificantconservatismincludedintheLCOlimit.Also,reducingtheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131towithinlimitsisaccomplishedthroughuseoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)demineralizers.ThiscleanupoperationparallelsplantrestartfollowingareactortripwhichfrequentlyresultsiniodinespikesduetothelargestepdecreaseinreactorpowerlevelandRCSpressureexcursion.ThecleanupoperationcannormallybeaccomplishedwithintheLCOCompletionTimeofoneweek.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-111DraftA

RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1IfaRequiredActionandtheassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAisnbtmetoriftheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivityisintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1,thereactormustbebroughttoMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'Fwithin8hours.Thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500'FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500'Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1Ifthegrossspecificactivityisnotwithinlimit,.thechangewithin8hourstoMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500'FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvalvesandpreventsautomaticallyventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheallowedCompletionTimeof8hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500'Ffrom.fullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.16.1ThisSRrequiresperformingagammaisotopicanalysisasameasureofthegrossspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantatleastonceevery7days.Whilebasicallyaquantitativemeasureof.radionuclideswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines,thismeasurementisthesumofthedegassedgammaactivitiesandthegaseousgammaactivitiesinthesampletaken.ThisSurveillanceprovidesanindicationofanyincreaseingrossspecificactivity.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-112DraftA RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.16.1(continued)TrendingtheresultsofthisSurveillanceallowsproperremedialaction'tobetakenbeforereachingtheLCOlimitundernormaloperatingconditions.TheSurveillanceisapplicableinHODES1and2,andinHODE3withT,,p500'F.The7dayFrequencyconsiderstheunlikelihoodofagrossfuelfailureduringthistime.SR3.4.16.2This.SRisonlyperformedinHODE1toensureiodineremainswithinlimitsduringnormaloperationandfollowingfastpowerchangeswhenfuelfailureismorelikelytooccur.The14dayFrequencyisadequatetotrendchangesintheiodineactivitylevel,consideringgrossactivityismonitoredevery7days.TheFrequency,between2and10hoursafterapowerchange>15%RTPwithina1hourperiod,isestablishedbecausetheiodinelevelspeakduringthistimefollowingfuelfailure;samplesatothertimeswouldprovideinaccurateresults.SR3.4.16.3AradiochemicalanalysisforEdeterminationisrequiredevery184days(6months)withtheplantoperatinginHODE1equilibriumconditions.TheEdeterminationdirectlyrelatestotheLCOandisrequiredtoverifyplantoperationwithinthespecifiedgrossactivityLCOlimit.TheanalysisforEisameasurementoftheaverageenergiesperdisintegrationforisotopeswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines.TheFrequencyof184daysrecognizesEdoesnotchangerapidly.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatessamplingisonlyrequiredtobeperformedinHODE1within31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofHODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalforatleast48hours.ThisensuresthattheradioactivematerialsareatequilibriumsotheanalysisforE'isrepresentativeandnotskewedbyacrudburstorothersimilarabnormalevent.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-113(continued)DraftA RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.RegulatoryGuide1.109,Revisionl.3.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.4.WCAP-11668,"LOFTTR2AnalysisofPotentialRadiologicalConsequencesFollowingaSGTRattheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,"November1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.4-114DraftA RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.13.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsLCO3.4.1RCSDNBparametersforpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrateshallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.~NOTEPressurizerpressurelimitdoesnotapplyduringpressuretransientsdueto:a.THERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminute;orb.THERMALPOWERstep>10%RTP.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreRCSDNBparametersnotwithinlimits;A.1RestoreRCSDNBparameter(s)towithinlimit.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-1DraftA

RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREIOUENCYSR3.4.1.1'erifypressurizerpressureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.4.1.2VerifyRCSaveragetemperatureiswithinlimitspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursSR3.4.1.3---------NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin7daysafter>95%RTP.VerifyRCStotalflowrateiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-2DraftA RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.23.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityLCO3.4.2EachRCSloopaveragetemperature(T.,)shallbez540'F.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk<<,z1.0.ACTIONSCONDITION,REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.T,,inoneorbothRCSloopsnotwithinlimit.A.l'einMODE2withK,ff<1.0.30minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.2.1-NOTEOnlyrequiredifanyRCSloopT.,<547'FandthelowT.,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.VerifyRCST.,ineachloopZ540'F.Oncewithin30minutesandevery30minutesthereafterR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-3DraftA RCSP/TLimits3.4.33.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsLCO3.4.3RCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:Atalltimes.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE---------RequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.A.1ANDA.2Restoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.30minutes72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.8.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hours8.2BeinMODE5withRCSpressure<500psig.36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-40DraftA

RCSP/TLimits3.4.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTINEC---------NOTE---------RequiredActionC.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetanytimeinotherthanHODE1,2,3,or4.C.1ANDC.2Initiateactiontorestoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.ImmediatelyPriortoenteringHODE4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.3.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperationsandRCSinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.VerifyRCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupand'cooldownratesarewithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.30minutesR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-5DraftA

RCSLoops-HODE1>8.5%RTP3.4.43.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.4RCSLoops-MODE1>8.5%RTPLCO3.4.4TwoRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY'ODE1>85%RTP~ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsofLCOnotmet.A.1BeinMODE1<8.5%RTP.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.4.1VerifyeachRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-6DraftA

RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.53.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.5RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,and3LCO3.4.5'woRCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneloopshallbeinoperation.NOTEBothreactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedinHODE3for<1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.APPLICABILITY:MODES1g8.5%RTP,MODES2and3.ACTIONS.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME'.OneRCSloopinoperable.-------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1VerifySDMis,withinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.,ANDA.2RestoreinoperableRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper12hours72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-7DraftA RCSLoops-MODES1<8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE4.12hoursC.BothRCSloopsinoperable.HORC.1De-energizeallCRDHs.ANDImmediatelyNoRCSloopinoperation.C.2ANDC.3SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.5.1VerifyrequiredRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.5.2VerifysteamgeneratorsecondarysidewaterlevelsareZ16%fortwoRCSloops.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-8DraftA RCSLoops-NODESI<8.5%RTP,2,and33.4.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.5.3Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicated.powerareavailabletotherequiredRCPthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-9DraftA RCSLoops-MODE43.4.63.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4LCO3.4.6'woloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSloopsandresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneloopshallbeinoperation.NOTES1.Allreactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedforg1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.NoRCPshallbestartedwithanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a.Thesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachsteamgenerator(SG)is~50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;orb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).'PPLICABILITY:MODE4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-10DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRCSloopinoperable.ANDTwoRHRloopsinoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDTwoRCSloopsinoperable.-------------NOTE------------RequiredActionB.1isnotapplicableifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperableandConditionCisentered.24hoursB.1BeinMODE5.C.AllRCSandRHRloopsinoperable.OR NoRCSorRHRloopinoperation.C.1ANOC.2Suspend'l1operationsinvolving.areductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreonelooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-11;DraftA RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.6.1VerifyoneRHRorRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.6.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelisa16%foreachrequiredRCSloop.12hoursSR3.4.6.3Verifycorrectbreaker.alignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-12DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.73.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)r3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledLCO3.4.7Oneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation,andeither:a.OneadditionalRHRloopshallbeOPERABLE;orb.Thesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastonesteamgenerator(SG)shallbez161.I-------------NOTES1.TheRHRpumpoftheloopinoperationmaybede-energizedfor<Ihourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.2.OnerequiredRHRloopmaybeinoperableforg2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.3.NoreactorcoolantpumpshallbestartedwithoneormoreRCScoldlegtemperatureslessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRunless:a0ThesecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGis<50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures;orb.Thepressurizerwatervolumeis<324cubicfeet(38%level).4.AllRHRloopsmayberemovedfromoperationduringplannedheatuptoMODE4whenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsfilled.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-13DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDBothSGssecondarysidewaterlevelsnotwithinlimits.A.1ORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontorestorerequiredSGsecondarysidewaterlevelstowithinlimits.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.TwoRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.lANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.7.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.7.2VerifySGsecondarysidewaterlevelis>16%intherequiredSG.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-14DraftA RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.7.3'erifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerar'eavailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-15DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.83.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLCO3.4.8Tworesidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneRHRloopsha11beinoperation.NOTESl.AllRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfors15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanotherprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature;andc.NodrainingoperationstofurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumearepermitted.2.OneRHRloopmaybeinoperablefor<2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE.5withRCSloopsnotfilled.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.A.lInitiateactiontorestoreRHR.looptoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-16DraftA

RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.8ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.TwoRHR'loopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.1ANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.8.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.8.2VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotheRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-17Draft'A

Pressurizer3.4.9'.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)3.4.9PressurizerLCO3.4.9ThepressurizershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Pressurizerwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.lBeinMODE3withreactortripbreakersopen..ANDA.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursB.Pressurizerheaterscapacitynotwithinlimits.B.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-18DraftA Pressurizer3.4.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.9.1Verifypressurizer.waterlevelisg87%.12hoursSR3.4.9.2VerifytotalcapacityofthepressurizerheatersisZ100Kw.92daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-19DraftA PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.103.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesLCO3.4.10'wopressurizersafetyvalvesshallbeOPERABLEwithlift'ettingsZ2410psigandK2545psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3,MODE4withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.Onepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable.A.1RestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.15minutes8.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.ORBothpressurizersafetyvalvesinoperable.B.1~ND8.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4withanyRCScoldlegtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-20,DraftA PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.10SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.10.1NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin36hoursofenteringMODE4fromMODE5withallRCScoldlegtemperaturesgreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditionsonlyprovidedapreliminarycoldsettingwasmadepriortoheatup.VerifyeachpressurizersafetyvalveisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-21DraftA 0 PressurizerPORVs3.4.113.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs).LCO3.4.11EachPORVandassociatedblockvalveshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES1.SeparateentryintoConditionAisallowedforeachPORV.2.SeparateentryintoConditionCisallowedforeachblockvalve.3.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTION.COHPLETIONTIHEA.OneorbothPORVsOPERABLEandnotcapable=ofbeingautomaticallycontrolled.A.1Closeandmaintainpowertoassociatedblockvalve.ORA.2PlaceassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.1hour1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-22DraftA PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.OnePORVinoperable.B.lCloseassociatedblockvalve.ANDB.2Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalve.AND1hour1hour8.3RestorePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursC.Oneorbothblockvalvesinoperable.C.1PlaceassociatedPORV(s)inmanualcontrol.ANDC.2Restoreblockvalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.1hour72hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,orCnotmet.0.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-23DraftA PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.TwoPORVsinoperable.E.lInitiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.~NDE.2Closeassociatedblockvalves.ANDImmediately1hourE.3ANDE.4Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalves.BeinMODE3withT.,<500'F.1hour8hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-24DraftA / PressurizerPORVs3.4.11SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.11.1.NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedwithblockvalveclosed.Performacompletecycleofeachblockvalve.92daysSR3.4.11.2PerformacompletecycleofeachPORV.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-25DraftA

LTOPSystem3.4.123.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemLCO3.4.12AnLTOPSystemshallbeOPERABLEwiththeEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemaccumulatorsisolatedandeitheraorbbelow.a.Twopoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)withliftsettingswithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLRandnosafetyinjection(SI)pumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.b.TheRCSdepressurizedandanRCSventofZ1.1squareinchesandamaximumofoneSIpumpcapableofinjectingintotheRCS.-NOTES-1.ThePORVsandanRCSventz1.1squareinchesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictests.However,noSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.2.AccumulatorisolationisonlyrequiredwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE4whenanyRCScoldlegtemperatureislessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLRorwhentheRHRsystemisintheRHRmodeofoperation,MODE5whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition,MODE6whenthereactorvesselheadisonandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-26DraftA

LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ANDThePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath.A.1InitiateactiontoverifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ImmediatelyB.TwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ANDTheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventofZ1.1squareinches.8.1Initiateactionto~verifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ImmediatelyC.Anaccumulatornotisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpress'ureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.C.1Isolate,affectedaccumulator.1hour(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-27DraftA LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.1ORD.2IncreaseRCScoldlegtemperaturetogreaterthantheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.Depressurizeaffectedaccumulatortolessthanthemaximum'CSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.12hours12hoursE.OnerequiredPORVinoperableinMODE4.E.1RestorerequiredPORV,toOPERABLEstatus.7daysF.OnerequiredPORVinoperableinHODE5orMODE6.F.1RestorerequiredPORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-28DraftA

LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEG.TworeqdiredPORVsinoperable.ORRequiredActionand-associatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,D,E,orFnotmet.ORLTOPSysteminoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,C,E,orF.G.l~NDG.2Verifyatleastonechargingpumpisinthepull-stopposition.DepressurizeRCSandestablishRCSventofz1.1squareinches.1hour8hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.12.1-NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.a.VerifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hoursSR3.4.12.2NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-29DraftA LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.3NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Verifyeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisclosed.12hoursSR3.4.12.4-NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyRCSventZ1.1squareinchesopen.12hoursforunlockedopenventvalve(s)AND31daysforlockedopenventvalve(s)SR3.4.12.5VerifyPORVblockvalveisopenforeachrequiredPORV.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-30'DraftA

LTOPSystem.3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.6NOTERequiredtobeperformedwithin12hoursafterdecreasingRCScoldlegtemperaturetolessthanorequaltotheLTOPenabletemperaturespecifiedinthePTLR.PerformaCOToneachrequiredPORV,excludingactuation.31daysSR3.4.12.7NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveoperator.31days,SR3.4.12.8.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachrequiredPORVactuationchannel.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-31DraftA

RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.133.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGELCO3.4.13'CSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE;b.1gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.10gpmidentifiedLEAKAGE;andd.0.1gpmtotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEthrougheachsteamgenerator(SG)whenaveragedover24hours.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RCSLEAKAGEnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.A.1ReduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimits.4hoursB.SteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramnotmet.8.1Determinesteamgeneratortubeintegrityisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.4hoursC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.ORRCSpressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-32DraftA

RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.13.1.NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedduringsteadystateoperation.PerformRCSwaterinventorybalance.Onceduringinitial12hoursofsteadystateoperationAND72hoursthereafterSR3.4.13.2VerifysteamgeneratortubeintegrityisinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillancePr'ogramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-33,DraftA RCSPIVLeakage3.4.143.4REACTORCOOLANT.SYSTEM(RCS)3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageLCO3.4.14'eakagefromeachRCSPIVshallbewithinlimit.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSNOTES-1.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachflowpath.2.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyaninoperablePIV.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreflowpathswithleakagefromoneormoreRCSPIVsnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------EachvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionA.2musthavebeenverifiedtomeetSR3.4.14.1orSR3.4.14.2andbeinthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorthehighpressureportionofthesystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-34DraftA RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.lIsolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofoneclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.4hoursANDA.2Isolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofasecondclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckval've.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-35DraftA RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.1.NOTES1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringHODE2fromHODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIcoldleg'njectionlineandeachRHRRCSPIVisequivalenttog0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressureZ2215psigandg2255psig.24monthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalve(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-36DraftA RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEiFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.2NOTES1.NotrequiredtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringHODE2fromHODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIhotleginjectionlineRCSPIVisequivalentto<0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure>2215psigandg2255psig.40monthsANDMithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalveR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-37DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.153.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationLCO3.4.15ThefollowingRC$leakagedetectioninstrumentationshallbeOPERABLE:a.OnecontainmentsumpAmonitor(levelorpumpactuation);andb.Onecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(gaseousorparticulate).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.l.1PerformSR3.4.13.1.ORA.1.2VerifycontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLE.ANDA.2RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper24hours24hours30days(continued),.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-38DraftA

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEB.Requiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.-----------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.B.l.lAnalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.OROnceper24hoursB.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1.Onceper24hoursANDB.2RestorerequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-39DraftA RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.ANDParticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.C.l.lAnalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.ORC.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1Onceper24hoursOnceper24hoursANDRestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days+0C.2.2RestoreparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursD.2BeinMODE5.36hoursE.Allrequiredmonitorsinoperable.E.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-40DraftA

RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3;4.15SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.15.1PerformCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.12hoursSR3.4.15.2PerformCOToftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.92daysSR3.4.15.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitor.24monthsSR3.4.15.4PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.24monthsSR3.4.15.5NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithRequiredActionA.1.2forLCO3.4.15PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentaircoolercondensatesystemmonitor.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-41DraftA RCSSpecificActivity3.4.163.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityLCO3.4.16Thespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:HODES1and2,HODE3withRCSaveragetemperature(T,,)>500'F.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETION.TIHEA.DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivitynotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4.isnotapplicable.A.1ANDVerifyDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131withintheacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.Onceper8hoursA.2RestoreDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131towithinlimit.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.ORDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivityintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.B.lBeinHODE3withT,,<500'F.8hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-42DraftA RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Grossspecificactivitynotwithinlimit.C.1BeinMODE3withT,(500'F.8hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.16.1Verifyreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityg100/EyCi/gm.7daysSR3.4.16.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedinHODE1.VerifyreactorcoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivity~1.0pCi/gm.14daysANDBetween2and10hoursafteraTHERMALPOWERchangeof>15%RTPwithina1hourperiod(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-43DraftA 1' RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.16.3.NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1within31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofMODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalforz48hours.DetermineEfromareactorcoolantsample.184daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.3.4-44DraftA 0iIIlIf-'-*II RCSSpecificActivity3.4.163004g0MMOOIH25020015010050ACCEPTABLEOPERATZONUNACCEPTABLEOPERATZON12ui/cpn2030405060708090100PERCENTOFRATEDTHERHALPOWERFigure3.4.16-1ReactorCoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131SpecificActivityLimitVersusPercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWERR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.4-45DraftA 9/1E ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentCChapters3.5-5.0VolumeIV aII'IIEIIW~n~v~~ Accumulators3.5.13.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.1AccumulatorsLCO3.5.1TwoECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.1Restoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursB.1RestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.B.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.1.hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.6hoursBeinMODE3.C.1~ND12hoursReducepressurizerpressuretog1'600pslg~C.2D.Twoaccumulatorsinoperable.ImmediatelyD.1EnterLC0.3.0.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-1DraftAAPPLICABILITY:HODES1and2,MODE3withpressurizerpressure>1600psig. Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hours'R3.5.1.2VerifyboratedwatervolumeineachaccumulatorisZ1126cubicfeet(50%)and<1154cubicfeet(82%).12hoursSR3.5.1.3VerifynitrogencoverpressureineachaccumulatorisZ700psigandZ790psig.12hoursSR3.5.1.4VerifyboronconcentrationineachaccumulatoriswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.5.1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve-operatorwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-2DraftA 0 ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.23.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-MODES1,2,and3LCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.---------------NOTES-InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedbyclosingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Powermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878A,878B,878C,and878Dforupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4.14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime.2~OperationinMODE3withECCSpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureofbothRCScoldlegsexceeds375'F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperable.ANDAtleast100%ofthe'CCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable;A.lRestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantt3.5-3DraftA

ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1ANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE4.12hoursC.Twotrainsinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.2.1Verifythefollowingvalvesareinthelistedposition.NumberPositionFunction12hours825A825B826A826B 826C826D851A8516856878A 878B878C878DOpen OpenClosedClosed Closed ClosedOpenOpen OpenClosedOpenClosedOpen896AOpen896BOpenRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsSumpBtoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandContainmentSpray(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-4DraftA

ECCS-MODES1,2,and33.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinued'SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.2.2VerifyeachECCSmanual,poweroperated,.andautomaticvalveintheflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.3Verifyeachbreakerorkeyswitch,asapplicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.5.2.4VerifyeachECCSpump'sdeveloped'headatthetestflowpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.5.2.5VerifyeachECCSautomaticvalveinthyflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactu'atestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.5.2.6VerifyeachECCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-5DraftA ECCS-MODE43.5.33.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.3ECCS-MODE4LCO3.5.3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.lInitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.RequiredECCSSafetyInjection(SI)subsysteminoperable.B.IRestorerequiredECCSSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionand'ssociatedCompletionTimeofCondition8notmet.C.IBeinMODE5.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-6DraftA

ECCS-NODE43.5.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.3.1NOTEAnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.ThefollowingSRisapplicableforallequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE:SR3.5.2.4InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-7DraftA RWST3.5.43.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.RWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits.B.IRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.IBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-8DraftA RWST3;5.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.4.1.VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeisZ300,000gallons(88%).7daysSR3.5.4.2VerifyRWSTboronconcentrationiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.5-9DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1B3.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoFtheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereafter,andtoprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.Thereactorcoolantinventoryisvacatingthecoreduringthisphasethroughsteamflashingandejectionoutthroughthebreak.TheblowdownphaseofthetransientendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.Intherefillphaseof,aLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,thecoreisessentiallyinadiabat'icheatup.Thebalanceofaccumulatorinventoryisavailabletorefloodthecoreandhelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoastoestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomofthecore.Theaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwithboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.(continued)R.E.Gin'naNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-1DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued),EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegviaanaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinseries.Themotoroperatedisolationvalves(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis>1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref.1).ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3.Theaccumulatorsize,watervolume,andnitrogencoverpressureareselectedsothatoneofthetwoaccumulatorsissufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingaLOCA.TheneedtoensurethatoneaccumulatorisadequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.4).ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelate.totheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativeassumptionsaremadeconcerningtheavailabilityofECCSflow.IntheearlystagesofalargebreakLOCA,withorwithoutalossofoffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.TheassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulationsandconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgothroughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios,theentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.W(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-2DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSFS(continued)ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeof.thereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.Asaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.ThisdelayaccountsforSIsignalgeneration,thedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.Duringthistime,theaccumulatorsareanalyzedasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeo'fsmall'reaks,therateofblowdownissuchthattheincreaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcooling.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsandsafetyinjectionpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingtheriseincladtemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthesafetyinjectionpumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingthetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethat.thefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby'0CFR50.46(Ref.5)willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis<2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationisg0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis~0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbe.generatedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-3DraftA

Accumulators83.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontainedwatervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulatorsareemptied,oncedischarged.Forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduetothereducedgasvolume.Apeakcladtemperaturepenaltyisanassumedincreaseinthecalculatedpeakcladtemperatureduetoachangeinaninputparameter.Forlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodingportionofthetransient.Theanalysisusesanominalaccumulatorvolumeandincludesthelinewatervolumefromtheaccumulatortothecheckvalveduetothesecompetingeffects.TheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.ThemaximumboronconcentrationisusedindeterminingthetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.Themaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwater'volumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)System.ThemaximumvaluespecifiedintheCOLRwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingacontainmenttemperatureof60'F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-4DraftA Accumulators83.5.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuationat800psig,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.8and9).TheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRC'PolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulator'sareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.Twoaccumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillreachthecoreduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecontentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.IflessthanoneaccumulatorisinjectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECCSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.5)couldbeviolated.ForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,themotor-operatedisolation.valvemustbefullyopen,powerremovedabove1600psig,andthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYInNODESIand2,andinMODE3withRCSpressure>1600psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsarebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-5DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued),ThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>1600psig.Atpressures<1600psig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequate=injectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CFR50.46(Ref.5)limitof2200'F.InMODE3,withRCSpressure<1600psig,andinMODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisallowsRCScooldownanddepressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA.lIftheboronconcentrationofoneaccumulatorisnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthe.limitswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theabilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybereduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalityduringrefloodsincetheaccumulatorwatervolumeisverysmallwhencomparedtoRCSandRWSTinventory.BoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringrefloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsinthecore.Inaddition,currentanalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulatorsarenotexpectedtodischargefollowingalargesteamlinebreak.Eveniftheydodischarge,theirimpactisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-6DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESACTIONS(continued),8.1Ifoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsofoneaccumulatorcannotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplanttoa'LOCAundertheseconditions.C.landC.2IftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedtog1600psigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.lIfbothaccumulatorsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-7(continued)DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.1.1Eachaccumulatormotor-operatedisolationvalveshouldbeverifiedtobefullyopenevery12hours.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions:ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3Theboratedwatervolumeandnitrogencoverpressureshouldbeverifiedevery12hoursforeachaccumulator.ThisFrequencyissufficienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignofthe,accumulator,a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperator,toidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.Haincontrolboardalarmsarealsoavailablefortheseaccumulatorparameters.OperatingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectionandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.SR3.5.1.4Theboronconcentrationshouldbeverifiedtobewithinrequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTFrequencysincethestaticdesignoftheaccumulatorslimitsthewaysinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31daySTAGGEREDTESTFrequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrommechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakage.TheboronconcentrationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-8DraftA AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCE.SR3.5.1.5RE(UIREHENTS(continued)Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureis>1600psigensuresthatanactive'failurecouldnotresultintheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,noaccumulatorswouldbeavailableforinjectioniftheLOCAweretooccurinthecoldlegcontainingtheonlyOPERABLEaccumulator.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.REFERENCES1.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."2.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicsVI-7.F,VII-3,VII-6,andVIII-2,"datedJune24,1981.3.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RGKE,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.'.UFSAR,Section6.3.5.10CFR50.46.6.UFSAR,Section3.11.7.10CFR50.49.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.9.UFSAR,Section15.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-9DraftA ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5.2B3.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.2ECCS-HODES1,2,and3BASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefollowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andcoolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalchargingsystem;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledsteamreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).The'additionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantpower..\TherearetwophasesofECCSoperation:injectionandrecirculation.Intheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)andinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)throughthecoldlegsandreactorvesselupperplenum.WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalandthecontainmentsumphasenoughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedtoContainmentSumpBforrecirculation.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousECCSinjectionisusedtoreducethepotentialforboilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresultingboronprecipitation.TheECCSconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWSTarealsopartoftheECCS,butarenotconsideredpartofanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-10DraftA 0 ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued),TheECCSflowpathswhichcomprisetheredundanttrainsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheRHRpumps,heatexchangers,andtheSIpumps.TheRHRsubsystemconsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainsthatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.TheSIsubsystemconsistsofthreeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredto.mitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident.Theseinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesignsprovidetheoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilizecomponentsfromoppositetrainstoachievetherequired100%flowtothecore.DuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,suctionheaderssupplywaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSpumps.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andcontainmentspray(CS)System'pumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-series,motor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations.TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostli/<elycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintaini'ngthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthe'controlroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.1).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B),whicharemaintained,openbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-11Draft:A ECCS-NODES1,2,and'3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued).Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethe'alvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.3).ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAandBeachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(871Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseachcontaininganormallyclosedmotoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum.ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepressurizetheRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,thesteamgeneratorsprovidecorecoolinguntiltheRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheSIpumpshutoffhead.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve-856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896A'and896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-12DraftA

ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued),TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.6).TheRHRpumpscanalsoprovidesuctiontotheCSpumpsforcontainmentpressurecontrol.Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequatecoreandcontainmentcooling,theSIandCSpumpsremaininpull-,stop.Duringrecirculation,flowisdischargedthroughthesamepathsastheinjectionphase.Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumps,isusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHRthroughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.ThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainmentSumpBtotheRHRpumpsalsocontainamotoroperatedisol.ationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand851Barealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions.TheremovalofACpowertotheseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinanundesirableactuation(Ref.2).TheSIsubsystemoftheECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasasteamlinebreak(SLB).Thelimitingdesignconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,limitations.areplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-13DraftA ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued),TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSI,signal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetime.delayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5.4,"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeetAIF-GDC44(Ref.8).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSISTheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR50.46(Ref.9),willbemetfollowingaLOCA:.a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis<2200'F;b.c~HaximumcladdingoxidationisS0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis<0.01timesthehypotheticalamountgeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.TheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialforaposttripreturntopowerfollowinganSLBeventandhelpsensurethatcontainmenttemperaturelimitsaremetpostaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-14DraftA ECCS-NODESI,2,and3B3.5.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSfS(continued)BothECCSsubsystemsaretakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.6and10).ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasmallbreakLOCAevent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthepumps.TheSGTRandSLBeventsalsocredittheSIpumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:a.AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystem-operation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedbytheSIpumpsintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.TheRHRpumpsinjectdirectlyintothecorebarrelbyupperplenuminjection.'Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.10andll).TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwatertomatchboiloffratesquicklyenoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecoreb'einguncoveredfollowingalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,theSIpumpsdeliversufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-15(continued)DraftA ECCS-NODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASES(continued)LCOInMODES1,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.InMODES1,2,and3,anECCStrainconsistsofanSIsubsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthe'iping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanSIsignalandtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpB.ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow.EINPositionSecuredinPositionB825A825B826A 826B826C 826D851A 851B 856.878A878B 878C8780896A896BOpen OpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpenOpenClosedOpenClosedOpenOpenOpenRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemoval RemovalRemovalRemoval RemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACpowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchangertakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andcapableofinjectingthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headrecirculationtotheSIandCSpumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-16DraftA ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESLCO(continued),AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(viaRHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.TheflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensurethatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprovideforreducedcoolingrequirementsinthelowerMODES.TheSIpumpperformancerequirementsare,basedonasmallbreakLOCA.,MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODE1analysis.InMODE4,theECCSrequirementsareasdescribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4."InMODES5and',plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft,"andLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."AsindicatedinNote1,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2hoursinHODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.Theflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrolroomorbyfieldtestpersonnel.ThenotealsoallowsanSIisolationMOVtobepoweredforupto12hoursfortheperformanceofthistesting.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-17DraftA

ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESAPPLICABILITY.(continued),AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"maybenecessarysincetheLTOParmingtemperatureisneartheMODE3boundarytemperatureof350'F.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.WhenthistemperatureisneartheMODE3boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestorethe'noperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.InMODES4,5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.Mode4corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-Mode4,"andLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown."CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5'areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-Low.WaterLevel."ACTIONSA.lWithonetraininoperableandatleast100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasirigleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.12)andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.AnECCStrainisinoperableifitisnotcapableofdelivering100%designflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableofperformingtheirdesignfunctionornecessarysupportingsystemsarenotavailable..(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-18DraftA ECCS-MODESI,2,and3B3.5.2BASESACTIONSLl(continued)TheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofoneactivecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferent,train,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthat100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponentsinoppositetrains.areinoperable.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B.AneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.'reliabilityanalysis(Ref.2)hasshownthattheimpactofhavingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.B.landB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-19DraftA ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESACTIONS(continued),C.1IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCS.pumpstotheRCSismaintained.Useofcontrolboardindicationforvalvepositionisanacceptableverification.MisalignmentofthesevalvescouldrenderbothECCStrainsinoperable.ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.Thesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionofthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.Theverificationofthevalve'breakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3.MispositioningofthesevalvescandisablethefunctionofbothECCStrainsandinvalidatetheaccidentanalyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinvi.ewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedvalve'sunlikely.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-20DraftA ECCS-HODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.5.2.2Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnot-requireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositioninmostcases,wouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorDCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.,Ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-21DraftA ECCS-HODESI,2,and3B3.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR-3.5.2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomplishedbymeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadatasinglepointofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesboththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.SR'3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveactuatestotherequiredpositiononanactualorsimulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpump,startsonreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.-Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,andequipmentperformanceismonitoredaspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-22(continued)DraftA

ECCS-MODES1,2,and3B3.5.2BASES(continued)REFERENCES2.3.4.LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RG8E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18,"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."LetterfromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Hecredy,RGEE,'ubject:"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.42toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.79829),",datedJune3,1991.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGKE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFSwitchoverfromInjection'oRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.5.NUREG-0821.6.UFSAR,Section6.3.7.8.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RGKE,

Subject:

"SEPTopicIX-4,BoronAdditionSystem,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC44,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.9.10CFR50.46.10.11."12.UFSAR,Section15.6.UFSAR,Section6.2.NRCMemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-23DraftA

ECCS-MODE483.5.3B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.3ECCS-HODE4BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE4,therequiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SI)andresidualheatremoval(RHR).TheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)followingtheaccidentsdescribedinBases3.5.2.TheRHRsubsystemmustalsobecapableoftakingsuctionfromcontainmentSump8toproviderecirculation.APPLICABLETheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofBases3.5.2alsoSAFETYANALYSESappliestothisBasessection.DuetothestableconditionsassociatedwithoperationinMODE4andthereducedprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereduced.Itisunderstoodinthesereductionsthatcertainautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)actuationsarenotavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeexistsformanualactuationoftherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA(Ref.I).OnlyonetrainofECCSisrequiredforMODE4.ThisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailableforoperatorstorespondtoanaccident.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.5-24(continued)DraftA ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3.BASES(continued)LCOInMODE4;oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaDBA.InMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofanSI-subsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransfe}ringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.ThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringMODE4consistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSump8),andabletoinjectthroughoneoftwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromthe'WSTandinjectingthroughoneoftwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredintheMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtotheRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.BasedonthetimeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduringMODE4,ECCScomponentsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingreconfiguredtotheinjectionmode(remotelyorlocally)within10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes.LCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem"containsadditionalrequirementsfortheconfigurationoftheECCStrains.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5.2.InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350'F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-25DraftA

ECCS-NODE4B3.5.3BASESAPPLICABILITY.(continued).InNODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinNODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."NODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.lWithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelytoinitiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysome=alternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.ThealternatemeansofheatremovalmustcontinueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoNODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRHRsubsystem.Therefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-26DraftA ECCS-MODE4B3.5.3BASESACTIONS(continued),8.1WithnoECCSSIsubsystemOPERABLE,duetotheinoperabilityoftheSIpumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotpreparedtoprovidehighpressureresponsetoDesignBasisEventsrequiringSI.The1hourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastoneSIsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoreinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinMODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.1WhentheRequiredActionsofConditionBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.5.3.1TheapplicableSurveillancedescriptionfromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeofoperationandnototherwiseinoperable.'hisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringMODE4,ifnecessary.REFERENCES1.WCAP-12476,"EvaluationofLOCADuringMode3andMode4OperationforWestinghouseNSSS,"November1991.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-27DraftA RWSTB3.5.4B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUNDTheRWSTsuppliesboratedwatertobothtrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)Systemduringtheinjectionphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)recovery.AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andCSpumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandCSSystempriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.TherecirculationmodeisenteredwhenpumpsuctionistransferredtothecontainmentsumpbasedonRWSTlevel.UseofasingleRWSTtosupplybothtrainsoftheECCSandCSSystemisacceptablesincetheRWSTisapassivecomponent,andpassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50'Fand104'F(Ref.1).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.DuringnormaloperationinNODES1,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI),RHR,andCSpumpsarealignedtotakesuctionfromtheRWST.TheECCSandCSpumpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoperatingatornearshutoffheadconditions.TherecirculationlinesfortheRHRandCSpumpsaredirectedfromthedischargeofthepumpstothepumpsuction.TherecirculationlinesfortheSIpumpsaredirectedbacktotheRWST.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-28DraftA RWST83.5.4BASESBACKGROUND'(continued).WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandCSpumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTandSIpumprecirculationflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstotheAuxiliaryBuildingandtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.ThisLCOensuresthat:a.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSandCSsystemduringtheinjectionphase;b.SufficientwatervolumeexistsinthecontainmentsumptosupportcontinuedoperationoftheECCSandCSpumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andc.ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultininadequateNPSHfortheRHRpumpswhenthetransfertotherecirculationmodeoccurs.ImproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDMorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswellasexcessivecaustic'tresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandCSpumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.3).ThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussedintheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofLCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODESI,2,and3";LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4";andLCO3.6.6,"ContainmentSpray,ContainmentRecirculationFanCooling,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems."TheseanalysesareusedtoassesschangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffectsinrelationtotheacceptancelimitsintheanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-29Draft' RWSTB3.5.4BASES'APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)'heRWSTmustalsomeet.volume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincethevolumerequiredforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupisasmallfractionoftheavailableRCSvolume.ThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAandcontainmentanalyses.FortheRWST,thedeliverablevolumeisselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.Theminimumboronconcentrationisanexplicitassumptioninthesteamlinebreak(SLB)analysistoensuretherequiredshutdowncapability.Themaximumboronconcentrationisan'xplicitassumptionintheevaluationofchemicaleffectsresultingfromtheoperationoftheCSSystem.ForalargebreakLOCAanalysis,theminimumwatervolumelimitof300,000,gallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimitareusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore.Theupperlimitonboronconcentrationisusedtodeterminethetime.frameinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheCSSystem.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50'F(Ref.I).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.I).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-30(continued)DraftA RWSTB3.5.4.BASES(continued)LCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinthecontainmentsumptosupportECCSandCSpumpoperationintherecirculationmode.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewatervolumeandboronconcentrationlimitsestablishedintheSRs.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,RWSTOPERABILITYrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandCSSystemOPERABILITYrequirements.SinceboththeECCSandtheCSSystemmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLE'-tosupporttheiroperation.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.4,"Residual,HeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.lWith-RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinlimitswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedconsideringthetimerequiredtochangetheboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankaresti.llavailableforinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-31DraftA RWSTB3.5.4BASESACTIONS'continued).B.1WiththeRWSTwatervolumenotwithinlimits,itmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheCSSystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaMODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired.Theshorttimelimitof1hourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbasedonthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.landC.2IftheRWSTcannot.bereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwi.thoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.4.1TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandCSSystempumpoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystableand.theRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichprovidessufficientleakdetectioncapability,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeen.showntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-32DraftA RWSTB3.5.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS.(continued)SR3.5.4.2TheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboronconcentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheRWSTboronconcentrationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section3.11.2.10CFR50.49.3.UFSAR,Section6.3andChapter15.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-33DraftA Containment3.6.13.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.1ContainmentLCO3.6.1ContainmentshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.Containmentinoperable.A.1RestorecontainmenttoOPERABLEstatus.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.AND8.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-1DraftA Containment3.6.1'URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.1.1-NOTE,SR3.0.2,isnotapplicable.Performrequiredvisualexaminationsandleakageratetestingexceptforcontainmentairlockandcontainmentmini-purgevalvetesting,inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptionsSR3.6.1.2VerifycontainmentstructuralintegrityinaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-2DraftA

ContainmentAirLocks3.6.23.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEMS3.6.2ContainmentAirLocksLCO3.6.2TwocontainmentairlocksshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONS----------NOTESI.Entryandexitispermissibletoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponents.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedfor.eachairlock.3.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.-CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithonecontainmentairlockdoorinoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsA.l,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCis.entered.2.Entryandexitthroughaninoperableairlockdoorispermissiblefor7daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothairlocksareinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-3DraftA

ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.(continued)A.lVerifytheOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.ANDA.2LocktheOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.ANDIhour24hoursA.3--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifytheOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-4DraftA

ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithcontainmentairlockinterlockmechanisminoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitofcontainmentthroughanairlockwithaninoperableairlockinterlockmechanismispermissibleunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividual.B.IVerifyanOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.IhourANDB.2Lockan'OPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.24hoursAND8.3--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifyanOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-5DraftA

ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEC.Oneormorecontainmentairlocks.inoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionAorB.C.IANDInitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.ImmediatelyC.2Verifyadoorisclosedintheaffectedairlocks.~NDC.3RestoreairlockstoOPERABLEstatus.Ihour24hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.D.lBeinHODE3.ANDD.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-6DraftA ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.2.1-NOTESl.Aninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.2.ResultsshallbeevaluatedagainstacceptancecriteriaofSR3.6.1.1inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.3.SR3.0.2isnotapplicable.Performrequiredairlockleakageratetestinginaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theacceptancecriteriaforairlocktestingare:Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions'a~b.Leakagerateforeachairlockisg0.05L.whentestedat>P..Leakagerateforeachdooris<0.01L,whentestedat>P,.SR3.6.2.2Verifyonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatime.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-7DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.33.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBarriers1LCO3.6.3'EachcontainmentisolationbarriershallbeOPERABLE.-NOTES1.ThemainsteamisolationvalvesandmainsteamsafetyvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODES1.,2,and3.2.TheatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODESIand2,andMODE3withtheReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T.,)Z500'F.APPLICABILITY:HODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSNOTESI.Penetrationflowpath(s),exceptforshutdownpurgeflowpaths,maybeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.3.4.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyfailedcontainmentisolationbarriersorasaresultofperformingtheRequiredActionsforthisLCO.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.I,"Containment,"whenisolationbarrierleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecri'teria.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-8DraftA l ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmentisolationbarrierinoperableexceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinl.imit.A.1.1Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,orcheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.4hoursANDA.1.2--------NOTE---------Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainmentOR(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-9DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continudd)A.2Verifytheaffectedpenetrationisisolated.byanOPERABLEclosedsystem.4hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-10DraftA

ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithtwoc'ontainmentisolationbarriersinoperableexceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit.B.1ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.1hourB.2~NDB.3EvaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.------NOTE-----------Isolationdevi'cesinhighradiation'areasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.24hoursVerifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-11DraftA

ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Oneormoremini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithonevalvenotwithinleakagelimits.C.1ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.24hoursC.2--------NOTE---------Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-12DraftA

ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Oneormoremini-purgepenetrationflowpathswithtwovalvesnotwithinleakagelimits.D.lANDInitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.Immediately0.2Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.1hourD.3---------NOTE--------Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffected'penetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment~NDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5if-notperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainment(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-13DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.E.lANDE.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-14DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.3.1-NOTEIsolationbarriersinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativecontrols.Verifyeachnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarrierthatislocatedoutsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionandrequiredtobeclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentisclosed,'xceptforcontainmentisolationbarriersthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.184daysSR3.6.3.2NOTEIsolationbarriersinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifyeachnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarrierthatislocatedinsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionandrequiredtobeclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentisclosed,exceptforcontainmentisolationbarriersthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.\PriortoenteringHODE4fromHODE5ifnotperformedwi'thintheprevious184daysSR3.6.3.3Verifytheisolationtimeofeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswithinlimits.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-15DraftA

ContainmentIsolationBarriers3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.3.4Performrequiredleakageratetestingofcontainmentmini-purgevalveswith'esilientsealsinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theacceptancecriteriaforeachmini-purgevalvewithresilientsealsisg0.05L.whentestedatzP..Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.SR3.6.3.5Verifyeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvethatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-16DraftA

ContainmentPressure3.6.43.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.4ContainmentPressureLCO3.6.4'ontainmentpressureshallbea-2.0psigand~1.0psig.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTION'OMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentpressurenotwithinlimits.A.lRestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.'4.1Verifycontainmentpressureiswithinlimits.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-17DraftA ContainmentAirTemperature3.6.53.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.5.ContainmentAirTemperatureLCO3.6.5'ontainmentaverageairtemperatureshallbe<120'F.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithinlimit.A.1Restorecontainmentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimit.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.AND.B.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.5.1Verifycontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithinlimit.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-18DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.63.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC),andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsLCO3.6.6TwoCStrains,fourCRFCunits,twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandthesprayadditivetankshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONS------------------------------NOTESDeclareassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperableifCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTINEA.OneCStraininoperable.A.1RestoreCStraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.Onepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertr'aininoperable.B.1Restorepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.Twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.C.1Restoreonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainto'PERABLEstatus.72hoursD.Sprayadditivetankinoperable.D.lRestoresprayadditivetanktoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E..GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-19DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTION,COMPLETIONTIMEE.Required'ActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,orDnotmet.E.IBeinMODE3.ANDE.2BeinMODE5.6hours84hoursF.OneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable.F.lRestoreCRFCunit(s)toOPERABLEstatus.7daysG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFnotmet.G.lANDG.2BeinMODE3..BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-20DraftA

CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEH.TwoCStPainsinoperable.ORSprayadditivetank,andoneorbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.ORAnycombinationofthreeormoreCRFCunitsinoperable.ORAnycombinationofthreeormoreCSandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.H.IEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-21DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCERE(}UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6.1VerifyeachCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.6.6.2OperateeachCRFCunitfor>15minutes.31daysSR3.6.6.3Operateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainforz15minutes31daysSR3.6.6.4VerifyeachCSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedh'ead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.6.6.5Performrequiredpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertestinginaccordance.withtheVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).Inaccordance"withtheVFTPSR3.6.6.6PerformrequiredCRFCunittestinginaccordancewiththeVFTP.InaccordancewiththeVFTPSR3.6.6.7Verifysprayadditive'olutionvolumeis>4500gal.184daysSR3.6.6.8VerifysprayadditivetankNaOHsolutionconcentrationis>30%byweight..184days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-22DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems3.6.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.6.9'erifyeachautomatic-CSvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.10VerifyeachCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.11VerifyeachCRFCunitstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.12Verifyeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraindamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.13Verifyeach.automaticsprayadditivevalveintheflowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactual.orsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.6.6.14Verifysprayadditiveflowratethrougheacheductorpath.5yearsSR3.6.6.15Verifyeachspraynozzleisunobstructed.10yearsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-23DraftA HydrogenRecombiners3.6.73.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.7HydrogenRecombinersLCO3.6.7-'wohydrogenrecombinersshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onehydrogenrecombinerinoperable.A.l--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestorehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysB.Twohydrogenrecombinersinoperable.B.lANDVerifybyadministrativemeansthatthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained.1hour,ANDOnceper12hoursthereafterB.2RestoreonehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-24DraftA HydrogenRecombiners3.6.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.7.1OperateeachhydrogenrecombinerblowerfanforZ5minutes.24monthsSR3.6.7.2PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.6-25DraftA

ContainmentB3.6.183.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.1ContainmentBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentconsistsoftheconcretecontainmentstructure,itssteelliner,andthepenetrationsthroughthisstructure.ThestructureisdesignedtocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)inaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC10and49(Ref.I).Additionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentisareinforcedconcretestructurewithacylindricalwall,aflatbasemat,andahemisphericaldomeroof.Theinsidesurfaceofthecontainmentislinedwithacarbonsteellinertoensureahighdegreeofleaktightnessduringoperatingandaccidentconditions.Eachweldseamontheinsideofthelinerhasa'eaktestchannelweldedoverittoallowindependenttestingofthelinerwhenthecontainmentisopen.Thelinerisalsoinsulatedwithclosed-cellpolyvinylfoamcoVeredwithmetalsheetinguptothecontainmentsprayringheaders.Thefunctionofthelinerinsulationistolimitthemeantemperatureriseoftheliner.toonly10'FatthetimeassociatedwithmaximumpressurefollowingaDBA(Ref.2).ThecontainmenthemisphericaldomeisconstructedofreinforcedconcretedesignedforallDBArelatedmoments,axialloads,andshearforces.Thecylinderwallisprestressedverticallyandreinforcedcircumferentiallywithmildsteeldeformedbars.Thebasematisareinforcedconcreteslabthatisconnectedtothecylinderwallbyuseofahingedesignwhichpreventsthetransferofimposedshearfromthecylinderwalltothebasemat.Thishingeconsistsofelastomerbearingpadslocatedbetweenthebottomofthecylinderwallandthebasemat,andhighstrengthsteelbarswhichconnectthecylinderwallshorizontallytothebasemat(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-1DraftA ContainmentB3.6.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Thecylinderwallisconnectedtosandstonerocklocatedbeneaththecontainmentbyuseof160post-tensionedrockanchorsthatarecoupledwithtendonslocatedinthecylinderwall.Thisdesignensuresthattherockactsasanintegralpartofthecontainmentstructure.The,concretecontainmentstructureisrequiredforstructuralintegrityofthecontainmentunderDBAconditions.Thesteellineranditspenetrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryofthecontainment.MaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLElimitstheleakageoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmenttowithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).SR3.6.1.1leakageraterequirementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.4),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthecontainmentboundaryareapartofthecontainmentleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarriera.Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:1.CapableofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.ClosedbyOPERABLEcontainmentisolationbarriers,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarriers."b.EachairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."c.Allequipmentandpersonnelhatchesordoorsareclosedwhentheairlockisnotbeingusedforentryintoandexitfromcontainment.APPLICABLEThesafetydesignbasisforthecontainmentisthattheSAFETYANALYSEScontainmentmustwithstandthepressuresand'emperaturesofthelimitingDBAwithoutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-2DraftA

ContainmentB3.6.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'heDBAsthatresultinachallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromhighpressuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccident(REA)(Ref.5).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthatthecontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,releasetotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasoriginallystrengthtestedat69psig(115%ofdesign).Theacceptancecriteriaforthistestwas0.1%ofthecontainmentairweightperdayat60psigwhichwasbasedontheconstructiontechniquesthatwereused(Ref.5).Followingsuccessfulcompletionofthistest,theaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingaleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperday.Thisleakagerate,incombinationwiththeminimumcontainmentengineeredsafeguardsoperating(i.e.,either2post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandnocontainmentspray,1post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainand1containmentspraytrain,ornopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsand2containmentspraytrains)resultsinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)intheeventofaDBA.Theleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperdayisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.5),asL,:themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressure(P.)resultingfromthelimitingDBA.TheallowableleakageraterepresentedbyL,formsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedonallcontainmentleakageratetesting.L.isassumedtobe0.2%perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP.=59.8,psig(Ref.5).SatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-3(continued)DraftA 'l ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)LCOContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitingleakagetos1.0L.exceptpriortoenteringMODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofperiodictestingperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ.Atthattime,thecombinedTypeBandCleakagemustbe<0.6L.onamaximumpathwayleakagerate(HXPLR)basis,andtheoverallTypeAleakagemustbe<0.75L,.Atallothertimespriortoperformingasfoundtesting,theacceptancecriteriaforTypeBandCtestingis<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakagerate(HNPLR)basis.ContainmentOPERABILITYisalsodefinedbyacceptablestructuralintegrityfollowingaDBA.CompliancewiththisLCOwillensureacontainmentconfiguration,includingpersonnelandequipmenthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleakagetothoseleakageratesassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Individualleakageratesspecifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO3.6.2)andmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals(LCO3.6.3)andadministrativelimitsforindividualisolationbarriersarenotspecificallyp'artoftheacceptancecriteriaof-10CFR50;AppendixJ.Therefore,leakageratesexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultinthe'containmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaofAppendixJforTypeA,8,andCtests.APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,containmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-4(continued)DraftA

ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)ACTIONSIntheeventcontainmentisinoperable,thecontainmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocorrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentduringHODES1,2,3,and4.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofanaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.B.landB.2IfcontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-5(continued)DraftA , ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.1.1HaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualexaminationsandleakageratetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.4),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions(Refs.6and7).Failuretomeetairlockandmini-purgevalvewithresilientsealleakagelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2andLCO3.6.3doesnotinvalidatetheacceptabilityoftheseoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributiontooverallTypeA,B,andCleakagecausestheselimitstobeexceeded.AsleftleakagepriortoenteringMODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofrequired10CFR50,AppendixJperiodictesting,isrequiredtobe<0.6L,forcombinedTypeBandCleakageonaHXPLRbasis,and<0.75L.foroverallTypeAleakage(Ref.8).Atallothertimesbetweentherequiredleakagetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakagelimitof<1.0L..ThisismaintainedbylimitingcombinedType8andCleakageto<0.6L.onaNXPLRbasisuntilperformanceofasfoundtesting.At<1.0L.,theoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysis.SRFrequenciesareasrequiredbyAppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Thus,SR3.0.2(whichallowsFrequencyextensions)doesnotapply.Theseperiodictestingrequirementsverifythatthecontainmentleakageratedoesnotexceedtheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.2ThisSRensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthecontainment-willbemaintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestingandFrequencyaregenerallyconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.9)exceptthattendonmaterialtestsandinspectionsarenotrequired(Ref.10).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-6(continued)DraftA ContainmentB3.6.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustryForum,GDC10and49,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section3.8.1.3.10CFR100.4.10CFR50,AppendixJ.5.UFSAR,Section6.2.,6.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"AmendmentNo.17toProvisionalOperatingLicense,"datedHarch28,1978.7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"CompletionofAppendixJReview,"datedHay6,1981.8.RegulatoryGuideDG-1037.9.RegulatoryGuide1.35,R'evision2.10.LetterfromJ.A.Zwolinski,NRC,toR.'.Kober,RG&E,

Subject:

"SafetyEvaluationContainmentVesselTendonSurveillanceProgram,"datedAugust19,1985.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-7DraftA ContainmentAirLocks83.6.283.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.2ContainmentAirLocksBASESBACKGROUNDContainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundaryandprovideameansforpersonnelaccessduringallMODESofoperation.TherearetwocontainmentairlocksinstalledatGinnaStation,anequipmenthatchandapersonnelhatch.Bothairlocksarenominallyarightcircularcylinderwithadoorateachendtoallowpersonnelaccess.Thetwodoorsoneachairlockareinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopening.DuringperiodswhencontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.EachairlockdoorhasbeendesignedandtestedtocertifyitsabilitytowithstandapressureinexcessofthemaximumexpectedpressurefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)incontainment.Assuch,closureofasingledoorsupportscontainmentOPERABILITY.Eachofthedoorscontainsadouble-tongue,singlegasketedsealandlocalleakageratetestingcapabilitytoensurepressureintegrity.Toeffectaleaktightseal,theairlockdesignusespressureseateddoors(i.e.,anincreaseincontainmentinternalpressureresultsinincreasedsealingforceoneachdoor).Eachpersonnelairlockisprovidedwithlimitswitchesonbothdoorsthatprovideacontrolboardalarmifanydoorisopened.Asinglecontrolboardalarmexistsforallfouraccessdoors.Additionally,acontrolboardalarmisprovidedifhighpressureexistsbetweenthetwodoorsforeitherairlock.Thecontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Assuch,airlockintegrityandleaktightnessisessentialformaintainingthecontainmentleakageratewithinlimitintheeventofaDBA.Notmaintainingairlockintegrityorleaktightnessmayresultinaleakagerateinexcessofthat.assumedintheplantsafetyanalyses.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-8(continued)DraftA ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccidentandarodejectionaccident(Ref.1).Intheanalysisofeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasdesignedwithanallowableleakagerateof0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday(Ref.1).Thisleakagerateisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.2),asL.0.2%ofcontainmentairweightperday,themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressureP.=59.8psigfollowingaDBA.ThisallowableleakagerateformsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedontheSRsassociatedwiththeairlocks.ThecontainmentairlockssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheequipmenthatchandpersonnelhatchcontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Aspartofcontainment,theairlocksafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofthecontainmentleakageratefollowingaDBA.Thus,eachairlock'sstructuralintegrityandleaktightnessareessentialtothesuccessfulmitigationofsuchanevent.EachairlockisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.FortheairlocktobeconsideredOPERABLE,theairlockinterlockmechanismmustbeOPERABLE,theairlockmustbeincompliancewiththe10CFR50,Appendix3TypeBairlockleakagetest(i.e.,SR3.6.2.1),andbothairlockdoorsmustbeOPERABLEsuchthattheycanremainclosedwithleakagewithinacceptablelimitsfollowingaDBA.Theinterlockallowsonlyonedoor-ofanairlocktobeopenedatatime.ThisprovisionensuresthatagrossbreachofcontainmentdoesnotexistwhencontainmentisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Closureofasingledoorineachairlockissufficienttoprovidealeaktightbarrierfollowingpostulatedevents.Nevertheless,bothdoorsarekeptclosedwhentheairlockisnotbeingusedfornormalentryintoandexitfromcontainment.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-9(continued)DraftA ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,thecontainmentairlocksarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6topreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainment.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedby'threeNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsentryandexittoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponent.Iftheouterdoorisinoperable,thenitmaybeeasilyaccessedtorepair.Iftheinnerdooristheonethatisinoperable,however,thenashorttimeexistswhenthecontainmentboundaryisnotintact(duringaccessthroughtheouterdoor).TheabilitytoopentheOPERABLEdoor,evenifitmeansthecontainmentboundaryistemporarilynotintact,isacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimeinwhichtheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.Aftereachentryandexit,theOPERABLEdoormustbeimmediatelyclosed.IfALARAconditionspermit,entryandexitshouldbeviaanOPERABLEairlock.AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateCondition.entryisallowedforeachairlock.Intheeventtheairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria,Note3directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-10DraftA

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.1A.2andA.3Mithoneairlockdoorinoneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperable,theOPERABLEdoormustbeverifiedclosed(RequiredActionA.1)ineachaffectedcontainmentairlock.Ifthebetweenairlockdoorvolumeexceedstheallowedleakagecriteria,andleakageisverifiedtobeintocontainment(e.g.,leakagethroughtheequalizingvalve),thentheinnerairlockdoorshallbedeclaredinoperableandthisConditionentered.Ifleakageexiststotheoutsideenvironment,thenConditionCisentered.ThisensuresthataleaktightcontainmentbarrierismaintainedbytheuseofanOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisactionmustbecompletedwithin1hourandmayconsistofverifyingthecontrolboardalarmstatusfortheairlockdoors.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequirescontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.Inaddition,theaffectedairlockpenetrationmustbeisolatedbylockingclosedtheOPERABLEairlockdoorwithinthe24hourCompletionTime.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonableforlockingtheOPERABLEairlockdoor,consideringtheOPERABLEdooroftheaffectedairlockisbeingmaintainedclosed.RequiredActionA.3verifiesthatanairlockwithaninoperabledoorhasbeenisolatedbytheuseofalockedandclosedOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisensuresthatanacceptablecontainmentleakageboundaryismaintained.TheCompletionTimeofonceper31daysisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelowlikelihoodofalockeddoorbeingmispositionedandotheradministrativecontrols.RequiredActionA.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-11DraftA

ContainmentAirLocks83.6.2BASESACTIONSA.IA.2andA.3(continued)TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIspecifiesthatRequiredActionsA.1,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedandRequiredActionsC.1,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.TheexceptionofNoteIdoesnotaffecttrackingtheCompletionTimefromtheinitialentryintoConditionA;onlytherequirementtocomplywiththeRequiredActions.Note2allowsuseoftheairlockforentryandexitfor7.daysunderadministrativecontrolsifbothairlockshaveaninoperabledoor.This7dayrestrictionbeginswhenthesecondairlockisdiscoveredtobeinoperable.ContainmententrymayberequiredonaperiodicbasistoperformTechnicalSpecifications(TS)SurveillancesandRequiredAct'ions,aswellasotheractivitiesonequipmentinsidecontainmentthatarerequiredbyTSoractivitiesonequipmentthatsupportTS-requiredequipment.ThisNoteallowsperformingotheractivities(i.e.,nonTS-requiredactivities)ifthecontainmentisentered,usingtheinoperableairlock,toperformanallowedactivitylistedabove.ThisallowanceisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimethattheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.B.IB.2andB.3Withanairlockinterlockmechanisminoperableinoneormoreairlocks,theRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesareconsistentwiththosespecifiedinConditionAwiththeexceptionthatbothairlockdoorsarestillOPERABLEandeitherdoorcanbeusedtoisolatetheairlockpenetration.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-12DraftA.

ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONSB.1B.2andB.3(continued)TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1specifiesthatRequiredActionsB.1,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlockinoperable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosedand'RequiredActionsC.1,C.2,andC.3aretheappropriateremedialactions.Note2allowsentryintoandexitfromcontainmentthroughanairlockwithaninoperableairlockinterlockmechanismunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividualstationedattheairlocktoensurethatonlyonedoorisopenedatatime(i.e.,theindividualperformsthefunctionoftheinterlock).RequiredActionB.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeans(e.g.,procedurecontrol)isconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobe'intheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-13DraftA ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONSC.1C.2andC.3(continued)WithoneormoreairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanthosedescribedinConditionAorB(e.g.,bothdoorsofanairlockareinoperable),RequiredActionC.1requiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentairlocktestresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothdoorsinanairlockhavefailedasealtestoriftheoverallairlockleakageisnotwithinthelimitsofSR3.6.2.1.Inmanyinstances,containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.1anditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationoftheinoperableairlockdoorwithinthe1hourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.1beforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,'venwithbothdoorsfailingthe,sealtest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweentheairlockleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.RequiredActionC.2requiresthatonedoorintheaffectedcontainmentairlocksmustbe'verifiedtobeclosedwithinthe1hourCompletionTime.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequiresthat"containmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin'hour.Additionally,theaffectedairlock(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe24hourCompletionTime.ThespecifiedtimeperiodisconsideredreasonableforrestoringaninoperableairlocktoOPERABLEstatus,assumingthatatleastonedoorismaintainedclosedineachaffectedairlockandthecontainmentoverallleakagerateisacceptable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-14DraftA ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONS(continued)D.landD.2IftheinoperablecontainmentairlockcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequired'CompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmust'bebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.2.1MaintainingcontainmentairlocksOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththeleakageratetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.2),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions(Ref.3).ThisSRreflectstheleakageratetestingrequirementswithregardtoairlockleakage(TypeBleakagetests).Theacceptancecriteriawereestablishedbasedonindustryexperience.Theperiodictestingrequirementsverifythattheairlockleakagedoesnotexceedtheallowedfractionoftheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.TheSRhasbeenmodifiedby.threeNotes.NoteIstatesthataninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.ThisisconsideredreasonablesinceeitherairlockdooriscapableofprovidingafissionproductbarrierintheeventofaDBA.Note2requiresthattheresultsofthisSRbeevaluatedagainsttheacceptancecriteriaofSR3.6.1.1.Thisensures.thatairlockleakageisproperlyaccountedforindeterminin'gtheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.Note3statesthatSR3.0.2(whichallowsFrequencyextensions)doesnotapplysincetheFrequencyisrequiredbyAppendixJ(Ref.2),asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.(Ref.3)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-15DraftA 00 ContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.6.2.2REQUIREMENTS(continued)'heairlockinterlockisdesignedtopreventsimultaneousopeningofbothdoorsinasingleairlock.Sinceboththeinnerandouterdoorsofanairlockaredesignedtowithstandthemaximumexpectedpostaccidentcontainmentpressure,closureofeitherdoorwillsupportcontainmentOPERABILITY.Thus,thedoorinterlockfeaturesupportscontainmentOPERABILITYwhiletheairlockisbeingusedforpersonneltransitinandoutofthecontainment.Periodictestingofthisinterlockdemonstratesthattheinterlockwillfunctionasdesignedandthatsimultaneousopeningoftheinnerandouterdoorswillnotinadvertentlyoccur.Duetothepurelymechanicalnatureofthisinterlock,andgiventhattheinterlockmechanismisonlychallengedwhenthecontainmentairlockdoorisopened,thistestisonlyrequiredtobeperformedonceevery24months.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsofdoorandinterlockmechanismstatusavailabletooperationspersonnel.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.1.2.10CFR50,AppendixJ.3.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RGEE,

Subject:

"AmendmentNo.17toProvisionalOperatingLicense,"datedMarch28,1978.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-16DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.383.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.3ContainmentIsolationBarriersBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentisolationbarriersformpartofthecontainmentpressur'ebarrierandprovideameansforfluidpenetrationstobeprovidedwithtwoisolationbarriers.Theseisolationbarriersordevicesareeitherpassiveoractive(automatic).Manualvalves,checkvalves,de-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredintheirclosedposition,blindflanges,and'losedsystemsareconsideredpassivedevices.Automaticvalvesdesignedtoclosewithoutoperatoractionfollowinganaccident,areconsideredactivedevices.TwobarriersinseriesareprovidedforeachpenetrationsothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedslimitsassumedinthesafetyanalysesinaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC53and57(Ref.I).TheseactiveandpassivebarriersmakeuptheContainmentIsolationSystem.TheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovideisolationcapabilityfollowingaDesignBasi'sAccident(DBA)'orallfluidlineswhichpenetratecontainment.Allmajornonessentiallines(i.e.,fluidsystemswhichdonotperformanimmediateaccidentmitigationfunction)whichpenetratecontainment,exceptforthemainfeedwaterlines,componentcoolingwatertothereactorcoolantpumps,andmainsteamlines,areeitherautomaticallyisolatedfollowinganaccidentorarenormallymaintainedclosedinMODESI,2,3,and4.Automaticcontainmentisolationvalvesaredesignedtocloseonacontainmentisolationsignal'hichisgeneratedby,eitheranautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)signalorbymanualactuation.TheContainmentIsolationSystemcanalsoisolateessentiallinesatthediscretionoftheoperatorsdependingontheaccidentprogressionandmitigation.Asaresult,thecontainmentisolationbarriershelpensurethatthecontainmentatmospherewillbeisolatedfromthe'utsideenvironmentintheeventofareleaseoffissionproductradioactivitytothecontainmentatmosphereasaresultofaDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3;6-17DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforcontainmentisolationbarriershelpensurethatcontainmentisisolatedwithinthetimelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequirementsprovideassurancethatthecontainmentfunctionassumedinthesafetyanalyseswillbe,maintained.Inadditiontothenormalfluidsystemswhichpenetratecontainment,therearetwosystemswhichcanprovidedirectaccessfrominsidecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.ShutdownPureSstem36inchurevalvesTheShutdownPurgeSystemoperatestosupplyoutsideairintothecontainmentforventilationandcoolingorheatingandmayalsobeusedtoreducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccessbelowMODE4.Thesupplyandexhaustlineseachcontainoneisolationvalveandonedoublegasketedblindflange.Becauseoftheirlargesize,theshutdownpurgevalvesarenotqualifiedforautomaticclosurefromtheiropenpositionunderDBAconditions.Also,duetothedesignoftheblindflangeassembly,theisolationvalveisnotrequiredtobecreditedasacontainmentisolationbarrier.Therefore,theblindflangesareinstalledinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethatthecontainmentbarrierismaintained(Ref.2);Mini-PureSstem6inchurevalvesTheMini-PurgeSystemoperatesto:a.Reducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccess,andb.Equalizeinternalandexternalpressures.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-18DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers83.6.3BASESBACKGROUNDHini-PureSstem6inchurevalves(continued)Thesystemisdesignedwithsupplyandexhaustlineswhicheachcontaintwoairoperatedisolationvalves.SincethevalvesusedintheMini-PurgeSystemaredesignedtomeettherequirementsforautomaticcontainmentisolationvalves,thesevalvesmaybeopenedasneededinNODESI,2,3,and4;however,emphasisshallbeplacedonlimitingpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasreasonablyachievable.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThecontainmentisolationbarrierLCOwasderivedfromtheassumptionsrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierduringmajoraccidents.Aspartofthecontainmentbarrier,OPERABILITYofdeviceswhichactascontainmentisolationbarrierssupportsleaktightnessofthecontainment.Therefore,thesafetyanalysesofanyeventrequiringisolationofcontainmentisapplicabletothisLCO.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andarodejectionaccident(Ref.3).Intheanalysesforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisolationbarriersareeitherclosedorfunctiontoclosewithintherequiredisolationtimefollowingeventinitiation.Thisensuresthatpotentialpathstotheenvironmentthroughcontainmentisolationbarriers(includingcontainmentmini-purgevalves)areminimized.ThesafetyanalysesassumethattheShutdownPurgeSystemisisolatedateventinitiation.TheDBAanalysisassumesthat,within60secondsaftertheaccident,isolationofthecontainmentiscompleteandleakageterminatedexceptforthedesignleakagerate,L..TheMini-PurgeSystemisassumedtobeisolatedwithin5secondssincethesepenetrationsprovideadirectpathfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment(Ref.2).Thecontainmentisolationtotalresponsetimeof5secondsor60secondsincludessignaldelay,dieselgeneratorstartup(onlyformotoroperatedvalvesaffectedbyalossofoffsitepower),andcontainmentisolationvalvestroketimes.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-19DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriers,B3.6.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovidetwoinseriesbarriersforeachpenetrationsothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedsthelimitsinthesafetyanalyses.ThissystemwasoriginallydesignedinaccordancewithAIFGDC53(Ref.1)whichdoesnotcontainthespecificdesigncriteriaspecifiedin10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57(Ref.4).Ingeneral,theContainmentIsolationSystemmeetsthecurrentGDCrequirements;however,severalpenetrationsdifferfromtheGDCfromthestandpointofinstalledvalvetype(e.g.,checkvalveversusautomaticisolationvalve)orvalvelocation(e.g.,bothcontainmentisolationbarriersarelocatedinsidecontainment).TheevaluationofthesepenetrationsisprovidedinReference3."Thecontainment.isolationvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOContainmentisolationbarriersformapartofthecontainmentpressurebarrier.Thecontainmentisolationbarriers'afetyfunctionisrelatedtominimizingthelossofreactorcoolantinventoryandestablishingthecontainmentbarrierleakageratesduringaDBA.ThebarrierscoveredbythisLCOarelistedinReference5.Thesebarriersconsistofisolationvalves(manualvalves,checkvalves,airoperatedvalves,andmotoroperatedvalves),pipeandendcaps,closedsystems,andblindflanges.Therearethreemajorcategoriesofcontainmentisolationbarrierswhichareuseddependingonthetypeofpenetrationandthesafetyfunctionoftheassociatedpipingsystem:a.Automaticcontainmentisolationbarrierswhichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltoclosefollowinganaccident;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-20DraftA 00 ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESLCO(continued)b.C.NormallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarrierswhicharemaintainedclosedinMODESI,2,3,and4sincetheydonotreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltocloseandthepenetrationisnotusedfornormalpoweroperation(butmaybeusedforanaccidentmitigationfunction);andNormallyopen,butnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarrierswhicharemaintainedopensincethepenetrationisrequiredfornormalpoweroperation.Penetrationswhichutilizethesetypeofisolationbarriersalsocontainapassivedevice(i.e.,closedsystem),suchthatthenormallyopen,butnonautomaticisolationbarrierisonlyclosedafterthefirstpassivebarrierhasfailed.Theautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriers(i.e.,valves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarede-activatedandsecuredintheirclosedpositionorarecapableofclosingwithinthestroketimespecifiedinReference5.ThenormallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarriersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthemanualvalvesareclosed,airoperatedormotoroperatedvalvesarede-activatedandsecuredintheirclosedposition,checkvalvesareclosedwithflowsecuredthroughthevalve,blindflanges,pipeandendcapsareinplace,andclosedsystemsareintact.Thenormallyopen,butnonautomatic,containmentisolationbarriers(e.g.checkvalves.andmanualvalves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyare'capableofbeingclosed.Inaddition,bothpenetrationsassociatedwiththeShutdownPurgeSystemmustbeisolatedbyablindflangecontainingredundantgaskets,orasinglegasketedblindflangewithade-activatedautomaticisolationvalve(i.e.,twopassivebarriers).Containmentisolationbarrierleakageper10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeBandCtesting,isonlyaddressedbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"andisnotaconsiderationindeterminationofcontainmentisolationbarrierOPERABILITY.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-21DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESLCO(continued)*ThisLCOprovidesassurancethatthecontainmentisolationbarrierswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstocontr'olleakagefromthecontainmentduringDBAs.TheLCOismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthemainsteamisolationvalvesandmainsteamsafetyvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODESI,2,and3.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.1,"HainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs),"andLCO3.7.2,"HainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValves,"whichprovideappropriateRequiredActionintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.'IThesecondNotestatesthattheatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODESIand2,andMODE3whentheReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T,,)is>500'F.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.4,"AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs),"whichprovidesappropriateRequiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,thecontainmentisolationbarriersarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and-6.ACTIONS0TheACTIONSaremodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstNoteallowspenetrationflowpaths,exceptfortheshutdownpurgevalvepenetrationflowpaths,tobeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.Theseadministrativecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedindividualqualifiedinaccordancewithplantproceduresatthevalvecontrols,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhenaneedforcontainmentisolationisindicated.Duetothesizeoftheshutdownpurgelinepenetrationandthefactthatthesepenetrationsexhaustdirectlyfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutside(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-22DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.ThisisacceptablesincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablecontainmentisolationbarrier.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andsubsequentinoperablecontainmentisolationbarriersaregovernedbysubsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions.AthirdNotehasbeenaddedwhichensuresappropriateremedialactionsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystemsarerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablecontainmentisolationbarrier,orastheresultofperformingtheRequiredActionsdescribedbelow.Finally,intheeventtheisolationbarrierleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria,Note4directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-23DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)A.l.lIntheeventonecontainmentisolationbarrierinoneormorepenetrationflowpathsisinoperable(exceptformini-purgevalveleakagenotwithinlimit),theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,ablindflange,andacheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.ForapenetrationflowpathisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.I,thedeviceusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldbetheclosestavailableonetocontainment.RequiredActionA.l.Imustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODESI,2,3,and4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-24DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)A.l.2ForaffectedpenetrationflowpathsthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe4hourCompletionTimeandthathave.beenisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionsA.l.I,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathsmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Thisisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccidentandnolongercapableofbeingisolatedfollowingasinglefailurewillbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingordevicemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE'5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevices'ndotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionA.1.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-25DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2Analternativetoisolatinganaffectedpenetrationwithaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,oracheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecuredistouseaclosedsystem.,ForapenetrationisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2,OPERABILITYoftheclosedsystemcanbeaccomplishedthroughnormalsystemoperation,containmentleakagedetectionsystems,surveillancesystems,oroperatorwalkdowns.Closedsystemsmustbeprotectedagainstpipewhipandmissiles,seismiccategoryIandsafetyclass2piping.RequiredActionA.2mustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,3,and4.B.1B.2andB.3Withtwocontainmentisolationbarriersinoneormorepenetrationflowpathsinoperable(exceptformini-purge-valveleakagenotwithinlimit),theaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve',aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.Checkvalvesandclosedsystemsarenotacceptableisolationdevicesinthisinstancesincetheycannotbeassuredtomeetthedesignrequirementsofanormalcontainmentisolationbarrier.The1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-26DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONSB.1B.2andB.3(continued)IntheeventtheaffectedpenetrationisisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionB.1,theimpactofusinganisolationdevicewhichisnotnormallyconsideredacontainmentisolationbarriermustbeevaluatedwithrespecttotheoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.RequiredActionB.2requiresthatacceptableTypeA,B,andCleakagemustbeverifiedwithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimeprovidessufficienttimetoreviewplantrecordsorperformnecessaryleakagetestingondevicesusedtoisolatetheaffectedpenetrationandconfirmthatcontainmentleakageremainsacceptable.ACompletionTime.of24hoursisappropriateconsideringthefactthatthepenetrationremainsisolatedunderadministrativecontrol,thetimerequiredtoperformtheleakagetesting,andthemarginavailablebelow1.0L.asassumedintheaccidentanalyses.IftheaffectedpenetrationisisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionB.1andcontainmentremainsOPERABLEperRequiredActionB.2,theaffectedpenetrationmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasisperRequiredActionB.3.Thisperiodicverificationisnecessarytoassureleaktightnessofcontainmentandthatpenetrationsrequiringisolationfollowinganaccidentareisolated.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationdevicesoutsideofcontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithinthelast92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgementandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-27DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONSB.1B.2andB.3(continued)RequiredActionB.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.C.1Intheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontainonevalvenotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,mini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithin,limits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionC.1musthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.3.4.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,considering'thatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-28DraftA

ContainmentIsolationBarriers83.6.3BASESACTIONS.C.2(continued),InaccordancewithRequiredActionC.2,thispenetrationflowpathmust-beverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeing.mispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,.thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityof.theisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionC.2ismodifiedby.a'otethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified);Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-29DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)D.1Intheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontaintwovalvesnotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,RequiredActionD.1requiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentmini-purgeresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothmini-purgevalveshavefailedaleakagetestorarenotwithinthelimitsofSR3.6.3.4.Inmanyinstances,containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.1anditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationofthemini-purgepenetrationflowpathwithinthe1hourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.1beforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,evenwithbothvalvesfailingtheleakagetest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweenthemini-.purgevalveleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptance.criteria.D.2and0.3RequiredActionD.2requiresthatthemini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionD.2musthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.3.4.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-30DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONSD.2andD.3(continued)InaccordancewithRequiredActionD.3,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.RequiredActionD.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-31/DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.landE.2IftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.3.1ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachnonautomaticcontainmentisol.ationbarrierlocatedoutsidecontainmentandnotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionandrequiredtobeclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentisclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentbarrieriswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationbarriersoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Nonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriersincludemanualvalves,blindflanges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationbarriersaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationbarriertagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowanda184dayFrequencytoverifytheircorrectpositionisappropriate.TheSRspecifiesthatisolationbarriersthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimethebarriersareopen.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-32DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.3.1(continued)TheNoteappliestocontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseo'fadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringHODESI,2,3and4forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseisolationbarriers,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.SR3.6.3.2ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarrierlocatedinsidecontainmentandriotlocked,sealedorotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionandrequiredtobenormallyclosedimmediatelyfollowinganaccidentisclosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccidentleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentbarrieriswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthose'solationbarriersinsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Nonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriersincludemanualvalves,blindflanges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationbarriersaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationbarriertagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowandFrequencyof"priortoenteringHODE4fromHODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious184days"isappropriate.TheSRspecifiesthatisolationbarriersthatareopenunderadministrativecontrolsarenotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheyareopen.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-33DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3IBASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.3.2(continued)TheNoteappliestocontainmentisolationbarrierslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringMODES1;2,3,and4forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheseisolationbarriers,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheirproperposition,issmall.SR3.6.3.3VerifyingthattheisolationtimeofeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswithinlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.Theisolationtimetestensuresthevalvewillisolateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheisolationtimeandFrequencyofthisSRareinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.6.3.4Forcontainmentmini-purgevalveswithresilientseals,additionalleakageratetestingbeyondthetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ,isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITY.Operatingexperiencehasdemonstratedthatthistypeofsealhasthepotentialtodegradeinashortertimeperiodthandoothersealtypes.Basedonthisobservationandtheimportanceofmaintainingthispenetrationleaktight(duetothedirectpathbetweencontainmentandtheoutsideenvironment),aleakage,acceptancecriteriaof<0.05L,whentestedatzP,isspecifiedforeachmini-purgeisolationvalvewithresilientseals.TheFrequencyoftestingisspecifiedin10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions(Refs.6and7).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-34DraftA ContainmentIsolationBarriersB3.6.3'ASESSURVEILLANCE.SR3.6.3.5REQUIREHENTS(continued)AutomaticcontainmentisolationvalvescloseonacontainmentisolationsignaltopreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainmentfollowingaDBA.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvewillactuatetoitsisolationpositiononacontainmentisolationsignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForumGDC53and57,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionCSB6-4,"ContainmentPurgingDuringNormalOperation."3.UFSAR,Section6.2.4andTable6.2-15.4.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57.5.GinnaStationProcedureA-3.3.6.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"AmendmentNo.17toProvisionalOperatingLicense,"datedHarch28,1978.7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"CompletionofAppendixJReview,"datedHay6,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-35DraftA

ContainmentPressureB3.6.4B3.6CONTAINMENT,SYSTEMS83.6.4ContainmentPressu}eBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentpressureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Theselimitsalsopreventthecontainmentpressurefrom'xceedingthe'containmentdesignnegativepressuredifferentialwithrespecttotheoutsideatmosphere.Containmentpressureisaprocessvariablethatismonitoredandcontrolled.Thecontainmentpressurelimitsarederivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalysis.ShouldoperationoccuroutsidetheselimitscoincidentwithaDBA,postaccidentcontainmentpressurescouldexceedcalculatedvalues.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmentpressureoutsidethelimitsoftheLCOviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentinternalpressureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysesperformedtoestablishthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressure.ThelimitingDBAsconsidered,relativetocontainmentpressure,aretheLOCAandSLB,whichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively;TheworstcaseSLBgenerateslargermassandenergyreleasesthantheworstcaseLOCA.Thus,theSLBeventboundstheLOCAeventfromthecontainmentpeakpressurestandpoint(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-36DraftA ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Theinitialpressureconditionusedinthecontainmentanalysiswas15.7psia(1.0psig).ThemaximumcontainmentpressureresultingfromtheworstcaseSLB,59.8psig,doesnotexceedthecontainmentdesignpressure,60psig.Thecontainmentwasalsodesignedforaninternalpressureloadequivalentto-2.5psig.However,internalpressureislimitedto-2.0psigbasedonconcernsrelatedtoprovidingcontinuedcoolingforthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainment.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Therefore,fortherefloodphase,thecontainmentbackpressure.iscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).ServiceMaterSystem(LCO3.7.8)temperatureplaysanimportantroleinboth'aximizingandminimizingcontainmentpressurefollowinga-DBAresponse.ContainmentpressuresatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintainingcontainmentpressureatlessthanorequaltotheLCOupperpressurelimitensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theresultantpeakcontainmentaccidentpressurewillremainbelowthecontainmentdesignpressure.MaintainingcontainmentpressureatgreaterthanorequaltotheLCOlowerpressurelimitensuresthatthecontainmentwillnotexceedthedesignnegativedifferentialpressure.However,-thelowerpressurelimitspecifiedforthisLCOissetatamorelimitingpressuretoensurecontinuedcoolingofthereactorcoolantpumpmotorsinsidecontainmentwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLEforalargeportionofMODES1,2,3,and4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-37(continued)DraftA ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.Sincemaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitsisessentialtoensureinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesaremaintained,theLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,3and4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentpressurewithinthelimitsoftheLCOisnotrequiredinMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.1WhencontainmentpressureisnotwithinthelimitsoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithintheselimitswithin24hours.TheRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The24hourCompletionTimeisgreater.thantheACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.However,duetothelargecontainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeofthecontainmentMini-PurgeSystem,24hoursisallowedtorestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.ThisisjustifiedbythelowprobabilityofaDBAduringthistimeperiod.B.landB.2IfcontainmentpressurecannotberestoredtowithinlimitswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-38(continued)DraftA ContainmentPressureB3.6.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.4.1Verifyingthatcontainmentpressureiswithinlimitsensuresthatplantoperationremainswithinthelimitsassumedinthecontainmentanalysis.ThisverificationshouldnormallybeperformedusingPI-944.The12hourFrequencyofthisSRwasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingofcontainmentpressurevariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmentpressurecondition.CalibrationofPI-944orothercontainmentpressuremonitoringdevicesshouldbeperformedinaccordancewithindustrystandards,REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50,AppendixK.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-39DraftA ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.5ContainmentAirTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditions.assumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperaturelimitisderivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalyses.ThisLCOensuresthatinitialconditionsassumedintheanalysisofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotviolatedduringplantoper'ations.ThetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfromcontainmentbytheContainmentSpray(CS)andContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CRFC)Systemsduringpostaccidentconditionsisdependentupontheenergyreleasedtothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellastheinitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighertheinitialtemperature,themoreenergythatmustberemoved;resultinginhigherpeakcontainmentpressureandtemperature.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmenttemperatureinexcessoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentaverageairtemperatureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysestoensurethatthetotalamountofenergywithincontainmentiswithinthecapacityoftheCSandCRFCSystems.Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureisalsoanimportantconsiderationinestablishingthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforbothpressureandtemperature.ThelimitforcontainmentaverageairtemperatureensuresthatoperationismaintainedwithintheassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesforcontainment(Ref.I).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-40DraftA ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'helimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmentOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtothecapabilityoftheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemstomitigatetheaccident,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.Consequently,theESFsystemsmustcontinuetofunctionwithintheenvironmentresultingfromtheDBA'hichincludeshumidity,pressure,temperature,andradiationconsider'ations.Thelimi'tingDBAforthemaximumpeakcontainmentairtemperatureisanSLB.Theinitialcontainmentaverageairtemperatureassumedinthedesignbasisanalyses(Ref.I)is120'F.Thisresultsinamaximumcontainmentairtemperatureof374'F.TheinitialtemperaturelimitspecifiedinthisLCOisalsousedtoestablishtheenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforcontainment.ThemaximumSLBpeakcontainmentairtemperaturewascalculatedtoexistforonlyafewsecondsduringthetransient.Thebasisof'thecontainmentdesigntemperature,however,istoensuretheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinsidecontainment(Ref.2).Thermalanalysesshowthatthetimeintervalduringwhichthecontainmentairtemperaturepeakedwasshortenoughthattheequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelowtheirdesigntemperatures'.Also,theequipmentandcablinginsidecontainmentareprotectedagainstthedirecteffectsofaSLBbyconcretefloors.andshields.Therefore,itwasconcludedthatthecalculatedtransientcontainmentairtemperaturefollowingaLOCA(286'F),becomes.limitingforenvironmentalqualificationreasons.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-41DraftA ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'hecontainmentpressuretransientissensitivetotheinitialairmassincontainmentand,therefore,totheinitialcontainmentairtemperature.ThelimitingDBAforestablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureisaSLB.Thetemperaturelimitisusedinthisanalysistoensurethatintheeventofanaccidentthemaximumallowablecontainmentinternalpressurewillnotbeexceeded.ContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaverageairtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperaturelimit,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthecontainmentdesigntemperature.Asaresult,theabilityofcontainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctionisensuredandtheOPERABILITYofequipmentwithincontainmentismaintained.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentaverageairtemperaturewithinthelimitisnotrequiredinMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.IWhencontainmentaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithinthelimitwithin24hours.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The24hourCompletionTimeisacceptableconsideringthesensitivityoftheanalysistovariationsinthisparameterandprovidessufficienttimetocorrectminorproblems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-42.DraftA

ContainmentAirTemperatureB3.6.5BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IfthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturecannotberestoredtowithinitslimitwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.5.1VerifyingthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithintheLCOlimitensuresthatcontainmentoperationremainswithinthelimitassumedforthecontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethecontainmentaverageairtemperature,anarithmeticaverageiscalculatedusingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthecontainmentselectedtoprovide,arepresentativesampleoftheoverallcontainmentatmosphere.Thereare6containmentairtemperatureindicators(TE-6031,TE-6035,TE-6036,TE-6037,TE-6038,andTE-6045)suchthataminimumofthreeshouldbeusedforcalculatingthearithmeticaverage.The24hourFrequencyofthisSRisconsideredacceptablebasedonobservedslowratesoftemperatureincreasewithincontainmentasaresultofenvironmentalheatsources,(duetothelargevolumeofcontainment).Furthermore,the24hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmenttemperaturecondition.Calibrationofthesetemperatureindicatorsshallbeperformedinaccordancewithindustrystandards.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.2.10CFR50.49.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-43DraftA-CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.6ContainmentSpray(CS),ContainmentRecirculationFanCooler(CFRC),andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsBASESBACKGROUNDTheCSandCRFCsystemsprovidecontainmentatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandtemperatureincontainmenttolessthanthedesignvalues.ReductionofcontainmentpressureandtheiodineremovalcapabilityoftheCSsystemandthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconnectedtotheCRFCunitsreducesthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheenvironment,intheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),towithinlimits.TheCS,CRFCandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsaredesignedtomeettherequirementsofAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61(Ref.1).TheCSandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsalsoaredesignedtolimitoffsitedosesfollowingaDBAwithin10CFR100guidelines.TheCRFCSystem,CSSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemareEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systems.Theyaredesignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapabilityrequiredduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeattainedandreducethepotentialreleaseofradioactivematerial,principallyiodine,fromthecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment.TheCS'System,CRFCSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemprovideredundantmethodstolimitandmaintainpostaccidentconditionstolessthanthecontainmentdesignvalues.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-44DraftA CS,CRFC,-andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ContainmentSraSstemTheCSSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesapump,sprayheaders,sprayeductors,nozzles,valves,andpiping.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateESFbus.Therefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)suppliesboratedwatertotheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphaseofoperationthroughacommonsupplyheadersharedbythesafetyinjection(SI)system.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,CSpumpsuctioncanbetransferredfromtheRWSTtoContainmentSumpBviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)system.TheCSSystemprovidesasprayofcoldboratedwatermixedwithsodiumhydroxide(NaOH)fromthesprayadditivetankintotheupperregionsofcontainmenttoreducethecontainmentpressureandtemperatureandtoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphereduringaDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisanimportantfactorindeterminingtheheatremovalcapabilityoftheCSSystemduringtheinjectionphase.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,heatisremovedfromthecontainmentsumpwaterbyt'eresidualheatremovalcoolers.However,theCSSystemcanprovideadditionalcontainmentheatremovalcapabilityifrequired.EachtrainoftheCSSystemprovidesadequatespraycoveragetomeetthesystemdesignrequirementsforcontainmentheatremoval.TheNaOHmixtureisinj'ected"intotheCS'flowpathviaaliquideductorduringtheinjectionphaseofanaccident.TheeductorsaredesignedtoensurethatthepHofthespraymixtureisbetween8.3and9.1.TheresultingalkalinepHofthesprayenhancestheabilityofthespraytoscavengefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheNaOHaddedinthesprayalsoensuresanalkalinepHforthesolutionrecirculatedinthecontainmentsump.ThealkalinepHofthecontainmentsumpwaterminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheoccurrenceofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentsexposedtothefluid(Ref.2).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-45DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6'ASESBACKGROUNDContainmentSraSstem(continued)TheCSSystemisactuatedeitherautomaticallybyacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignalormanually.DBAswhichcangenerateanautomaticactuationsignalincludethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andsteamlinebreak(SLB).AnautomaticactuationopenstheCSpumpmotoroperateddischargevalves(860A,860B,860C,and860D),opensNaOHadditionvalves836Aand836B,startsthetwoCSpumps,andbeginstheinjectionphase.AmanualactuationoftheCSSystemrequirestheoperatortoactuatetwoseparatepushbuttonssimultaneouslyonthemaincontrolboardtobeginthesamesequence.TheinjectionphasecontinuesuntilanRWSTlowlevelalarmisreceivedsignalingthestartoftherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.3and4).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumps.arethen'toppedandtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumpsrecirculationline.TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.5).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwith896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhighheadrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequateinjectionflowforcorecooling,theSIpumpsremaininpull-stop.'(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-46DraftA

CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESBACKGROUNDContainmentSraSstem(continued)TheCSSystemisonlyusedduringtherecirculationphaseif.-containmentpressureincreasesaboveapressureatwhichcontainmentintegrityispotentiallychallenged.Otherwise,thecontainmentheatremovalprovidedbytheCRFCunitsandContainmentSumpB(viatheRHRsystem)isadequatetosupportcontainmentheatremovalneedsandthelimitsonsumppH(Refs.2and6).OperationoftheCSSystemintherecirculationmodeiscontrolledbytheoperatorinaccordancewiththeemergencyoperatingprocedures.ContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstemTheCRFCSystemconsistsoffourfanunits(A,B,C,andD).Eachcoolingunitconsistsofamotor,fan,coolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,highefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters,ductdistributorsandnecessaryinstrumentationandcontrols.Themoistureseparatorsfunctiontoreducethemoisturecontentoftheairstreamtosupporttheeffectivenessofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.CRFCunitsAandDaresuppliedbyoneESFbuswhileCRFCunits8andCaresuppliedbyaredundantESFbus.AllfourCRFCunitsaresuppliedcoolingwaterbytheService'ater(SW)Systemviaacomm'onloopheader.Airisdrawnintothecoolers'hroughthefananddischargedintothecontainmentatmosphereincluding'hevariouscompartments(e.g.,steamgeneratorandpressurizercompartments).Duringnormaloperation,atleasttwofanunitsaretypicallyoperating.TheCRFCSystem,operatinginconjunctionwithothercontainmentventilationandairconditioningsystems,isdesignedtolimittheambientcontainmentairtemperatureduringnormalplantoperationtolessthanthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentAirTemperature."Thistemperaturelimitationensuresthatthecontainmenttemperaturedoesnotexceedthe'initialtemperatureconditionsassumedfortheDBAs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-47DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6.BASESBACKGROUNDContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSstem(continued)InpostaccidentoperationfollowingaSIactuationsignal,theCRFCSystemfansaredesignedtostartautomaticallyifnotalreadyrunning.ThedischargeofCRFCunitsAandCthentransfertoforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.ThetemperatureofthecoolingwatersuppliedbySWSystem(LCO3.7.8)isanimportantfactorintheheatremovalcapabilityofthefanunits.Post-AccidentCharcoalSstemThePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesanairtightplenumcontainingtwobanksofcharcoalfiltercellsforremovalofradioiodines.Airflowenterstheplenumthroughtwoholesinthebottom(oneateachend),passesthroughthecharcoalfilterbankstothecenter,andisexhaustedfromtheplenumthroughaholeinthetop.Twonormallyclosedairoperateddampersisolateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfromCRFCunitsAandC(dampers5871and5872forTrainAand5874arid5876forTrainB).ASIsignalopensthesedampersandclosestwobypassdampersfromtheCRFCunits(dampers5873forCRFCunitAand5875for.CRFCunitC)toforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSSystemandCRFCSystemlimitthetemperatureandpressurethatcouldbeexperiencedfollowingaDBA.ThelimitingDBAsconsideredaretheLOCAandtheSLBwhichareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandtemperaturetransients.NoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtocontainmentESFsystems,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailure.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-48DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)Theanalysisandevaluationshowthatundertheworstcasescenario,thehighestpeakcontainmentpressureis59.8psigandthepeakcontainmenttemperatureis374'F(both.experiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeettheintentofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3.6.4,"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentTemperature,"foradetaileddiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsassumeaplantspecificpowerlevelof102%,oneCStrainandonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperating,andinitial(pre-accident)containmentconditionsof120'Fand1.0psig.Theanalysesalsoassumearesponsetimedelayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculatedcontainmentpressureandtemperatureresponses.Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,theeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedin,amannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.7).TheeffectofaninadvertentCSactuationisnotconsideredsincethereisnosinglefailure,includingthelossofoffsitepower,whichresultsinaspuriousCSactuation.ThemodeledCSSystemactuationfortheconta'inmentanalysisisbasedonaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHi-HipressuresetpointtoachievingfullflowthroughtheCSnozzles.ToincreasetheresponseoftheCSSystem,theinjectionlinestothesprayheadersaremaintainedfilledwithwater.TheCSSystemtotalresponsetimeof37.5seconds(assumingthecontainmentHi-Hipressureisreachedattimezero)includesdieselgenerator(DG)startup(forlossofoffsitepower),openingofthemotoroperatedisolationvalves,containmentspraypumpstartup,andspraylinefilling(Ref.8).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-49DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThemodeledCRFCSystemactuationforthecontainmentanalysisisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingtheSIactuationlevelstoachievingfullCRFCSystemairandsafetygradecoolingwaterflow.TheCRFCSystemtotalresponsetimeof44seconds,'includessignaldelay,DGstartup(forlossofoffsitepower),andservicewaterpumpandCRFCunitstartuptimes(Ref.9).DuringaSLBorLOCA,aminimumoftwoCRFCunits.andoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintaincontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits.TheCSandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsoperatetoreducethereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmentto,theoutsideenvironmentintheeventofaDBA.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactiveiodinewithincontainmentaretheLOCAorarodejectionaccident(REA).Intheanalysisforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatadequate'containmentleaktightnessisintactateventinitiationtolimitpotentialleakagetotheenvironment.Additionally,itisassumedthattheamountofradioactiveiodinereleasedislimitedbyreducingtheiodineconcentrationpresentinthecontainmentatmosphere.TherequirediodineremovalcapabilityoftheCSandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDBA,whichisaLOCA.Theaccidentanalyses(Ref.10)assumethateithertwotrainsofCS,oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsoperatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheCS-System,CRFCSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-50(continued)DraftA

CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASES(continued)LCODuringaDBA,aminimumof2CRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintainthecontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits(Ref.8).Additionally,twoCStrains,twoCRFCunitswithpostaccidentcharcoalfilters(i.e.,unitsAandC),oroneCRFCunitwithpostaccidentcharcoalfiltersincombinationwithoneCStrainarealsorequiredtoremoveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphereandmaintainconcentrationsbelowthoseassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Toensurethattheserequirementsaremet,'woCStrains,fourCRFCunits,andtwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandthesprayadditivetankmustbeOPERABLE.Therefore,intheeventofanaccident,atleastoneCSandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,andtwoCRFCunitsoperates,assumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurs.EachCStrainincludesaspraypump,sprayheaders,nozzles,valves,sprayeductors,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTuponanESFactuationsignalandtransferringsuctiontoContainmentSumpBviatheRHRpumps.ForthesprayadditivetanktobeOPERABLE,.thevolumeandconcentrationofsprayadditivesolutioninthetankmustbewithinlimitsandairoperatedvalves836Aand836BmustbeOPERABLE.EachCRFCunitincludesamotor,fancoolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,HEPAfilters,ductdistributors,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.ForCRFCunitsAandC,flowthrougheitherthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterorthebypassisrequiredfortheunitstobeconsideredOPERABLE.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludesaplenumcontainingcharcoalfilterbanksandisolationdamperstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-51(continued)DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems'3.6.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInHODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperaturerequiringtheoperation'oftheCSSystem,CRFCSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystem.InHODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseHODES.Thus,theCSSystem,CRFCSystem,andthePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyaNotewhichrequiresthattheassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbedeclaredinoperableifCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCresultsintheassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.A.1WithoneCStraininoperable,theinoperableCStrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEsprayandCRFCunitsareadequatetoperformtheiodineremovalandcontainmentcoolingfunctions.The72hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheredundantheatremovalcapabilityaffordedbytheCSSystem,theredundantiodineremovalaffordedbythePost-AccidentCharcoalSystem,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-52DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued),8.1Withonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable,theinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainiscapableofproviding50%oftheradioactive'iodineremovalrequirementsfollowingaDBA.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCalsoresultsinitsassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.The7dayCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.1torestoretheinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,includingtheCRFCunit,isjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimepe'riod.C.1Withbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,atleastonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hour,CompletionTimetorestoreoneinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.Theinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludes,butisnotlimitedtoinoperableCRFCunitsAandC.D.lWiththesprayadditivetankinoperable,OPERABLEstatusmustberestoredwithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimetorestorethesprayadditivetankisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbythePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-53DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued),E.landE.2IftheinoperableCStrain,post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,orthesprayadditivetankcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,the.plantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within84hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,to.reachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinan"orderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheextendedintervaltoreachMODE5allowsadditionaltimeforattemptingrestorationoftheinoperablecomponent(s)andisreasonablewhenconsideringthedrivingforceforareleaseofradioactivematerialfromtheReactorCoolantSystemisreducedinNODE3.WithoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable,theinoperableCRFCunit(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Theinoperablecomponentspreviouslyprovidedupto100%ofthecontainmentheatremovalneedsandmayhaveprovidediodineremovalcapabilitiesifeitherCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeisjustifiedconsideringtheredundantheatremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbycombinationsoftheCSSystemandCRFCSystemandthelowprobabilityofDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.IfbothCRFCunitsAandCareinoperable,thenConditionCmustalsobeentered.G.landG.2IftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionFofthisLCOarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-54DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASESACTIONS(continued).WithtwoCStrainsinoperable,thesprayadditivetankandoneorbothpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,anycombinationofthreeormoreCRFCunitsinoperable,oranycombinationofthreeormoreCSandpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.6.1Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheCSflowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforCSSystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring..ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvesoutsidecontainment(therearenovalvesinsidecontainment)andcapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.SR3.6.6.2OperatingeachCRFCunitfor>15minutesonceevery31daysensuresthatallCRFCunitsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioning'properly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthefanunitsandcontrols,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationoftheCRFCunitsoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-55DraftA

CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems83.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.3Operatingeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfor>15minutesonceevery31daysensuresthatalltrainsareOPERABLEandthatalldampersarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockagecanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.'he31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrains,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationofthetrainoccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasalsobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.6.6.4VerifyingeachCSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedheadensuresthatspraypumpperformancehasnotdegradedduringthecycle.FlowanddifferentialpressurearenormaltestsofcentrifugalpumpperformancerequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref.11).SincetheCSpumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughthesprayheaders,theyaretestedonrecirculationflow.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurveandisindicativeofoverallperformance.SuchinservicetestingconfirmscomponentOPERABILITY,trendsperformance,anddetectsincipientfailuresbyabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyoftheSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.6.6.5ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheVFTPincludestestingcharcoalabsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-56DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCE.SR3.6.6.6REQUIREMENTS(continued)ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCRFCunittestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVFTP.TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance.SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.SR3.6.6.7Toprovideeffectiveiodineremoval,thecontainmentspraymustbeanalkalinesolution.,SincetheRWSTcontentsarenormallyacidic,thesprayadditivetankmustprovideasufficientvolumeofsprayadditivetoadjustpHforallwaterthatisinjected.ThisSRisperformedtoverifytheavailabilityofsufficientNaOHsolutioninthesprayadditivetank.The184dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedonthelowprobabilityofanundetectedchangeintankvolumeoccurringduringtheSRintervalsincethetankisnormallyisolated.Tanklevelisalsoindicatedandalarmedinthecontrolroom,sothatthereishighconfidencethatasubstantialchangeinlevelwouldbedetected.SR3.6.6.8ThisSRprovidesverificationoftheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankandissufficienttoensurethatthespraysolutionbeinginjectedintocontainmentisatthecorrectpHlevel.The184dayFrequencyissufficientto'nsurethattheconcentrationlevelofNaOHinthesprayadditivetankremainswithintheestablishedlimits.Thisisbasedonthelowlikelihoodofanuncontrolledchangeinconcentrationsincethetankisnormallyisolatedandtheprobabilitythatanysubstantialvarianceintankvolumewillbedetected.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-57DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.9andSR3.6.6.10TheseSRsrequireverificationthateachautomaticCSvalveintheflowpath(860A,860B,860C,and860D)actuatestoitscorrectpositionandthateachCSpumpstartsuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHighHighpressuresignal.Thissurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols;The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.6.6.11ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachCRFCunitactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedon'engineeringjudgmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.10andSR3.6.6.11,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-58DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCE.SR3.6.6.12REQUIREMENTS(continued)ThisSRrequiresverificationevery24monthsthateachtrainofpost-accidentcharcoalfiltersactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.9andSR3.6.6.10,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.13ThisSRprovidesverificationthateachautomaticvalveinthesprayadditivetankflowpath(836Aand836B)actuatestoitscorrectpositionuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.9andSR3.6.6.10,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.14ToensurethatthecorrectpHlevelisestablishedintheboratedwatersolutionprovidedbytheCSSystem,flowthroughtheeductorisverifiedonceevery5years.ThisSRinconjunctionwithSR3.6.6.13providesassurancethatNaOHwillbeaddedintothe,flowpathuponCSinitiation.Aminimumflowof20gpmmustbeestablishedasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Duetothepassivenatureofthesprayadditiveflowcontrols,the5yearFrequencyissufficienttoidentifycomponentdegradationthatmayaffectflowinjection.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-59DraftA CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsB3.6.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.6.15WiththeCSinletvalvesclosedandthesprayheaderdrainedofanysolution,lowpressureairorsmokecanbeblownthroughtestconnections.ThisSRensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstructedandprovidesassurancethatspraycoverageofthecontainmentduringanaccidentisnotdegraded.Duetothepassivedesignofthenozzle,atestat10yearintervalsisconsideredadequatetodetectobstructionofthenozzles.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC49,52,58,59,60,and61,issuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.BranchTechnicalPositionMTEB6-1,"pHForEmergencyCoolantWaterForPWRs."3.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFAutomaticSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.4.NUREG-0821.5.UFSAR,Section6.3.6.UFSAR,Section6.1.2.4.7.10CFR50,AppendixK.8.UFSAR,Section6.2.1.2.9.UFSAR,Section6.2.2.2..10.UFSAR,Section6.5.ll.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-60DraftA HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.7HydrogenRecombinersBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionofthehydrogenrecombinersistoeliminatethepotentialbreachofcontainmentduetoahydrogenoxygenreaction.Per10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlSystemsinLight-Mater-CooledReactors"(Ref.1),hydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtoreducethehydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentfollowingalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)orsteamlinebreak(SLB).Therecombinersaccomplishthisbycollectingthehydrogenandoxygenatmosphericmixtureinsidecontainmentandoxidizingthehydrogeninacombustionchamber.Additionalhydrogenisaddedbytherecombinertoensurethatthenoncondensiblecombustionproductsthatcouldcauseaprogressiveriseincontainmentpressureareavoided.Oxygenisalsoaddedtopreventdepletionofoxygenbelowtheconcentrationrequiredforstableoperationofthecombuster.Theproductofcombustion,watervapor,iscooledandcondensedfromtheatmospherebytheContainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSystem.ThehydrogenrecombinersaremanuallyinitiatedsinceflammablelimitswouldnotbereacheduntilseveraldaysafteraDesignBasisAccident(DBA).PreventionofhydrogenaccumulationduringnormaloperationisaccomplishedbyuseoftheMini-PurgeSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.6-61DraftA

HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Two100%capacityindependenthydrogenrecombinersystemsareprovided.EachconsistsofcontrolslocatedintheIntermediateBuilding,apowersupplyfromaseparateEngineeredSafetyFeaturesbus,andarecombiner.Therecombinersarecomprisedofablowerfantocirculatecontainmentairtothecombuster,acombusterchamberwithamainburner,twoigniters(includesaninstalledspare),apilotburner,andadilutionchamberdownstreamoftheflamezonewhereproductsofthecombustionaremixedwithcontainmentairtoreducethetemperatureofthegasleavingthesystem.Asinglerecombineriscapableofmaintainingthehydrogenconcentrationincontainmentatapproximately2.'0volumepercent(v/o)whichisbelowthe4.1v/oflammabilitylimit.Tworecombinersareprovidedtomeettherequirementforredundancyandindependence.'PPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThehydrogenrecombinersprovideforthecapabilityofcontrolling.thebulkhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthanthelowerflammableconcentrationof4.1v/ofollowingaDBA.Thiscontrolpreventsacontainmentwidehydrogenburn,thusensuringthepressureandtemperatureinsidecontainmentasassumedintheanalysesarenotexceeded.ThelimitingDBArelativetohydrogengenerationisaLOCA.HydrogenmayaccumulateincontainmentfollowingaLOCAasaresultof:a.Ametalsteamreactionbetweenthezirconiumfuelrodcladdingandthereactorcoolant;b.RadiolyticdecompositionofwaterintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)andthecontainmentsump;c.Hydrogen-intheRCSatthetimeoftheLOCA(i.e.,hydrogendissolvedinthereactorcoolantandhydrogengasinthepressurizervaporspace);ord.CorrosionofmetalsexposedtocontainmentsprayandEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsolutions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-62DraftA HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ToevaluatethepotentialforhydrogenaccumulationincontainmentfollowingaLOCA,thehydrogengenerationasafunctionoftimefollowingtheinitiationoftheaccidentiscalculated.ConservativeassumptionsrecommendedbyReference2areusedtomaximizetheamountofhydrogencalculated.Theminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitis4.1v/o,however,allhydrogenmustbeignitedbeforeaconcentrationof6.0v/oisreachedsinceadynamicoverpressureofcontainmentcouldresultifthehydrogenwereignitedatthisconcentration(Ref.3).Analternativetotheignitionofhydrogenatconcentrationsh6.0v/oisventingofcontainmentusingtheHini-PurgeSystem.However,ventingwouldmostlikelyrequireevacuationsofthegeneralpublicwithinaradiusof.severalmilessurroundingtheplant.BasedontheconservativeassumptionsusedtocalculatethehydrogenconcentrationversustimeafteraLOCA,thehydrogenconcentrationintheprimarycontainmentwouldreach5.5v/oabout31daysaftertheLOCAifnorecombinerwasfunctioning(Ref.3).However,amorerealisticmodelpredictsthatahydrogenconcentrationof4..1v/o(thelowerflammabilitylimit)willbereachedin31days.Operationofthehydrogenrecombinersbelowaconcentrationof6.0v/owillensurethatcontainmentisnotoverpressurizedgivenanignitionsource.Thehydrogenrecombinersaredesignedsuchthat,withtheconservativelycalculatedhydrogengenerationratesdiscussedabove,asinglerecombineriscapableoflimitingthepeakhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthan4.1v/o(Ref.3).ThehydrogenrecombinerssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB=3.6-63(continued)DraftA HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASES(continued)LCOTwohydrogenrecombinersmustbeOPERABLEandcapableofbeingplacedintooperationbeforetheminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitof4.1v/oisreachedfollowingaDBA.Thisensuresoperationofatleastonehydrogenrecombinerintheeventofaworstcasesingleactivefailure.ThenecessaryhydrogenoroxygenrequiredtooperatethehydrogenrecombinerdoesnothavetobeavailableonsiteforthehydrogenrecombinertobeconsideredOPERABLE.Operationwithatleastonehydrogenrecombinerensuresthatthepost-LOCAhydrogenconcentrationcanbepreventedfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimitorcausinganoverpressurizationofcontainmentgivenahydrogenignitionsource.APPLICABILITYInMODESIand2,twohydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtocontrolthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammabilitylimitof4.1v/ofollowingaLOCA,assumingaworstcasesinglefailure.InMODES3and4,boththehydrogenproductionrateandthetotalhydrogenproducedafteraLOCAorSLBwouldbelessthanthatcalculatedfortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMODES,theprobabilityofanaccident.requiringthehydrogenrecombinersislow.Therefore,thehydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredinMODE3or4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesofaDBAarelow,-duetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Therefore,hydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredintheseHODES.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-64(continued)DraftA HydrogenRecombinersB3.6.7BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lWithonecontainmenthydrogenrecombinerinoperable,theinoperablerecombinermustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.Inthiscondition,theremainingOPERABLEhydrogenrecombinerisadequatetoperformthehydrogencontrolfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLErecombinercouldresultinreducedhydrogencontrolcapability.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.RequiredActionA.IhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatstatestheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenonerecombinerisinoperable'.Thisallowanceisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-65DraftA HydrogenRecombiners83.6.7BASESACTIONS(continued)B.land8.2Withtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperable,theabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionviaalternatecapabilitiesmustbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithinIhour.ThealternatehydrogencontrolcapabilitiesareprovidedbytheMini-PurgeSystemwhichconsistsoftwoisolationvalvesperpenetrationflowpaththatarecapableofopeningandasupplyfancapableofperformingpurgingfunctions.TheIhourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetoverifythatalossofhydrogencontrolfunctiondoesnotexist.Inaddition,thealternatehydrogencontrolsystemcapabilitymustbeverifiedonceper12hoursthereaftertoensureitscontinuedavailability.Both'theinitialverificationandallsubsequentverificationsmaybeperformedasanadministrativecheckbyexamininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabilityofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperformanySurveillancesneededtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem(e.g.,openingofmini-purgevalves).Iftheabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained,continuedoperationispermittedwithtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperableforupto7days.SevendaysisareasonabletimetoallowtwohydrogenrecombinerstobeinoperablebecausethehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintainedandbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenintheamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.C.1Iftheinoperablehydrogenrecombiner(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnot.apply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursis.reasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-66(continued)DraftA HydrogenRecombiners83.6.7I.BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.7.1Operatingeachhydrogenrecombinerblowerfanforz5minutesevery24monthsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareoperationalandcanoxidizethehydrogenwithincontainmentfollowingaDBA.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesefansusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.6.7.2ThisSRrequiresperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisrequiredtoensurethatthehydrogenrecombinerwillprovidethecorrecthydrogen/oxygenmixturetothecombustionchamber.The24monthFrequencyforthisSurveillancewasdevelopedconsideringtheincidenceofhydrogenrecombinersfailingtheSRinthepastislow.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.44.2.SafetyGuide1.7,Rev.0.3.UFSAR,Section6.2.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.6-67DraftA HSSVs3.7.13.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.1MainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)LCO3.7.1'ightHSSVsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreMSSVsinoperable.A.1RestoreinoperableHSSV(s)toOPERABLEstatus.-4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-1DraftA

MSSVs3.7.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.1.1)NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoentryintoMODE2fromMODE3.VerifyeachMSSVliftsetpointspecifiedbelowinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithint1.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramVALVENUMBERSGASGB35093508351135103515351235133514LIFTSETTINGsi+1%-3%1140114011401085R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-2DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.23.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.2MainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesLCO3.7.2TwoHSIVsandtwonon-returncheckvalvesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODESI,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneHSIVinoperable.A.lCloseinoperableHSIV.ANDA.2VerifyHSIVisclosed.24hoursOnceper31daysB.Onenon-returncheckvalveinoperable.B.1Isolateaffectedmainsteamline.24hoursC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBorCnotmet.C.1ANDC.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3073DraftA MSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves3.7.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Oneormolevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromeachsteamgenerator.D.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.2.1VerifyclosuretimeofeachMSIVisz5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.2Verifyeachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.2.3VerifyeachMSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.'4monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-4DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves3.7.33.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.3MainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs),MainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs),andAssociatedBypassValvesLCO3.7.3TwoMFPDVs,twoHFRVsandassociatedbypassvalvesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.CONDITIONREqUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable.A.1CloseinoperableHFPDV(s).ANDA.2VerifyHFPDV(s)isclosed.,24hoursOnceper31daysB..OneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable.B.lCloseinoperableHFRV(s).AND8.2VerifyHFRV(s)isclosed.24hoursOnceper31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-5DraftA MFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves3.7.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Oneormo'eHFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable'.C.1CloseHFRVbypassvalve(s).ANDC.2VerifyMFRVbypassvalve(s)isclosed'.24hoursOnceper31daysD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursE.OneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable.OROneorHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-6DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves3.7.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.3.1VerifytheclosuretimeofeachHFPDVisg80secondsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.3.2VerifytheclosuretimeofeachHFRVandbypassvalveis~10secondsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTesting.,ProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~77DraftA ARVs3.7.43.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)LCO3.7.4TwoARVsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1and2,MODE3withReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T,,)Z500'F.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneARVinoperable.A.1--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestoreARVtoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE3withT.,<500'F.8hoursC.TwoARVsinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-8DraftA ARVs3.7.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.4.1PerformacompletecycleofeachARV.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-9DraftA AFWSystem.3.7.53.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemLCO3.7.5ThreeAFWtrainsandtwostandbyAFW(SAFW)trainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathinoperable.OROnemotordrivenAFWtraininoperable.A.lRestoreturbinedrivenAFWflowpathormotordrivenAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.TurbinedrivenAFWtraininoperable.OR TwomotordrivenAFWtrainsinoperable.+0.One'turbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathandonemotordrivenAFWtraininoperabletooppositesteamgenerators(SGs).B.1RestoreoneAFWtrainorturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathtoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-10DraftA AFWSystem3.7.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEC.OneSAFWtraininoperable.C.1RestoreSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.14daysD.BothSAFWtrainsinoperable.D.lRestoreoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysE.AllAFWtrainsandflowpathstooneormoreSGsinoperable.E.1RestoreoneAFWtrainorflowpathtoeachaffectedSGtoOPERABLEstatus.4hoursF.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA,B,C,0,orEnotmet.F.lBeinHODE3.ANDF.2BeinHODE4.6hours12hoursG.ThreeAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsinoperable.G.l---------NOTE--------'CO3.0.3andallotherLCORequiredActionsrequiringHODEchangesaresuspendeduntiloneAFWorSAFWtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Initiateactiontorestore,.oneAFWorSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-11DraftA AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.5.1VerifyeachAFWandSAFWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveineachwater'lowpath,andinbothsteamsupplyflowpathstotheturbinedrivenpump,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.5.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringNODE1fortheturbinedrivenAFWpump.VerifythedevelopedheadofeachAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.3VerifythedevelopedheadofeachSAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.4PerformacompletecycleofeachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheServiceWaterSystem,'achAFWandSAFWdischargemotor'operatedisolationvalve,andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.5VerifyeachAFWautomaticvalvethatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,actuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-12DraftA AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.5.6'OTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringNODE1fortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpVerifyeachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.7.5.7VerifyeachSAFWtraincanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-13DraftA CSTs3.7.63.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)LCO3.7.6TheCSTsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CSTwater'olumenotwithinlimit.A.lANDA.2VerifybyadministrativemeansOPERABILITYofbackupwatersupply.RestoreCSTwatervolumetowithinlimit.4hours7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.1AND8.2-BeinHODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.6.1VerifytheCSTwatervolumeisZ22,500gal.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-14DraftA CCWSystem3.7.73.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemLCO3.7.7TwoCCWtrainsandtheCCWloopheadershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCCWMaininoperable.A.lRestoreCCWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursC.TwoCCWtrainsorloopheaderinoyerable.C.1~NDInitiateActiontorestoreo'eCCWtrainorloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyC.2,BeinMODE3.~NDC.3BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-15DraftA CCWSystem3.7.7,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.7.1NOTEIsolationofCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheCCWloopheaderinoperable.VerifyeachCCWmanualandpoweroperatedvalveintheCCWtrainflowpathandloopheaderservicingpost-accidentrelatedequipment,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.7.2Performacompletecycleofeachmotoroperatedisolationvalvetotheresidualheatremovalheatexchangers.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-16DraftA SWSystem3.7.83.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemLCO3.7.8TwoSWtrainsandtheSWloopheadershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTINEA.OneSMtraininoperable.A.1.RestoreSWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1"ANDBeinHODE3.6hoursB.2BeinHODE5.36hoursc.TwoSWtrainsorloopheaderinoperable.C.1ANDC.2ANDC.3InitiateActiontorestoreoneSWtrainorloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus.BeinHODE3.BeinMODE4.Immediately6hours12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-17DraftA SWSystem3.7.8SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY'SR3.7.8.1-NOTE-IsolationofSWflowtoindividual~componentsdoesnotrendertheSWloopheaderinoperable.VerifyeachSWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheSWtrainflowpathandloopheaderservicingpost-accidentrelatedequipment,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.8.2VerifyeachSWautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,actuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsSR3.7.8.3Verifyeach'SWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-18DraftA CREATS3.7.93.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)LCO3.7.9.TheCREATSshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,4,5,and6,During,movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.CREATSfiltrationtraininoperable.A.lRestoreCREATSfiltrationtraintoOPERABLEstatus.OR48hoursA.2---------NOTE--------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedforg1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.PlaceisolationdampersinCREATSModeF.48hoursB--------NOTE---------SeparateCondition.entryallowedforeachdamper.B.lRestoreisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneCREATSisolationdamperinoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-19DraftA CREATS3.7.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Required'ActionandassociatedCompletionTimeoFConditionAorBnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.C.1BeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAor8notmetinMODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuel.0.1PlaceOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)i.nCREATSModeF.~NDD.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyImmediately0.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyE.TwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreairsupplypathsinoperableinMODE1,2,3,or4.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-20DraftA CREATS3.7.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEF.TwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreairsupplypathsinoperableinMODE5or6,duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,orduringCOREALTERATIONS.F.lInitiateactionstorestoreoneisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.ANDF.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDF.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-21DraftA

CREATS3.7.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIRBlENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.9.1OperatetheCREATSfiltrationtrain>15minutes.31daysSR3.7.9.2PerformrequiredCREATSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewithVFTPSR3.7.9.3VerifytheCREATSactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-22DraftA ABVS3.7.103.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)LCO3.7.10'heABVSshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.TheABVSisinoperable.A.1SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuilding.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.10.1VerifyABVSisinoperation.24hoursSR3.7.10.2PerformrequiredSpentFuelPoolCharcoalAdsorberSystemfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewiththeVFTPR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3~723DraftA SFPWaterLevel3.7.113.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelLCO3.7.11TheSFPwaterlevelshallbeZ23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SFPwaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.l--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.SuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFP.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.11.1VerifytheSFPwaterlevelisZ23ftabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-24DraftA SFPBoronConcentration3.7.123.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.12SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationLCO'.7.12'heSFPboronconcentrationshallbewithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:WhenfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFPandaSFPverificationhasnotbeenperformedsincethelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP;ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.SFPboronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.A.1Suspendmovementof'uelassembliesintheSFP.ImmediatelyA.2.1ORInitiateactiontorestoreSFPboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelyA.2.2InitiateactiontoperformSFPverification.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-25DraftA SFPBoronConcentration3.7.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.12.1VerifytheSFPpoolboronconcentrationiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-26DraftA

SFPStorage3.7.133.7PLANTSYSTEHS3.7.13Spent,FuelPool(SFP)StorageLCO3.7.13,Fuelassemblystorageinthespentfuelpoolshallbemaintainedasfollows:a.FuelassembliesinRegion1shallhaveaK-infinityof<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditions;andb.FuelassembliesinRegion2shallhaveinitialenrichmentandburnupwithintheacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.APPLICABILITY:Wheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredinthespentfuelpool.ACTIONS,CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.RequirementsoftheA.1LCOnotmetforeitherregion.--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.Initiateactiontomovethenoncomplyingfuelassemblyfromtheapplicableregion.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-27DraftA SFPStorage3.7.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.13.1NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.VerifybyadministrativemeanstheK-infinityofthefuelassemblyisg1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditions.PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion1SR3.7.13.2VerifybyadministrativemeanstheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1.PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-28DraftA SFPStorage3.7.1340000ACCEPTABLE3000003a)20000P0$EUNACCEPTABLE10000-OFAFuel&ExxenFuel----SrDFuell.83.03.43.8NominalUEnrichment(m/o)4.24.86.0Figure3.7.13-1FuelAssemblyBurnupLimitsinRegion2R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-29DraftA SecondarySpecificActivity3.7.143.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityLCO3.7.14Thespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantshallbe60.10yCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Specificactivitynot-withinlimit.A.1BeinHODE3.~NDA.2BeinHODE5.8hours40hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.14.1Verifythespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantis<0.10pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.31daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.7-30DraftA HSSVsB3.7.1B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.1HainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheHSSVsistoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysystem.TheHSSVsalsoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurizingthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)byprovidingaheatsinkfortheremovalofenergyfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)ifthepreferred(butnonsafetyrelated)heatsink,providedbythecondenserandcirculatingwatersystem,isnotavailable.FourHSSVsarelocatedoneachmainsteamheader,outsidecontainmentintheIntermediateBuilding,upstreamofthemainsteamisolationvalves(Ref.1).HSSVs3509,3511,3513,and3515arelocatedonthesteamgenerator(SG)AmainsteamheaderwhileHSSVs3508,3510,3512and3514arelocatedontheSGBmainsteamheader.TheHSSVsaredesignedtolimitthesecondarysystemto<110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignflow.TheHSSVdesignincludesstaggeredsetpointssothatonlytheneededvalveswillactuate.Staggeredsetpointsreducethepotentialforvalvechatteringthatisduetosteampressureinsufficienttofullyopenallvalvesfollowingaturbine/reactortrip.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheHSSVsistolimitthesecondarysystempressuretog110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignsteamflow.ThisdesignbasisissufficienttocopewithanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrenceoraccidentconsideredintheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysis.TheeventsthatchallengetherelievingcapacityoftheHSSVs,andthusRCSpressure,arethosecharacterizedasdecreasedRCSheatremovalevents(Ref.2).Ofthese,thefullpowerlossofexternalloadeventisthelimitingDBA.Thiseventalsoresults.inthelossofnormalfeedwaterflowtotheSGs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-1DraftA

MSSVsB3.7.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'hetransientresponseforalossofexternalloadeventwithoutadirectreactortrip(i.e.,lossofloadwhen<50%RTP)presentsnohazardtotheintegrityoftheRCSortheMainSteamSystem.Fortransientsatpowerlevels>50%,theeffectonRCSsafetylimitsisevaluatedwithnocredittakenforthepressurerelievingcapabilityofpressurizerspray,thesteamdumpsystem,andtheSGatmosphericreliefvalves.ThereactoristrippedonhighpressurizerpressurewiththepressurizersafetyvalvesandHSSVsrequiredtobeo'penedtomaintaintheRCSandHainSteamSystemwithin110%oftheirdesignvalues.TheHSSVsareassumedtohavetwoactiveandonepassivefailuremodes.Theactivefailuremodesarespuriousopening(asaninitiatingeventonly),andfailuretorecloseonceopened.Thepassivefailuremodeisfailuretoopenupondemandwhichisnotconsideredintheaccidentanalyses.TheHSSVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheaccidentanalysisrequiresfourHSSVspersteamgeneratortoprovideoverpressureprotectionfordesignbasistransientsoccurringat102%RTP.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdefinedastheabilitytoopenwithinthesetpointtolerances,relieveSGoverpressure,andreseatwhenpressurehasbeenreduced.TheOPERABILITYof.theHSSVsisdeterminedbyperiodicsurveillancetestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Theliftsettings,accordingtoSR3;-7.1.1intheaccompanyingLCO,correspondtoambientconditionsofthevalveatnominaloperatingtemperatureandpressure.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSSVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinachallengetotheRCPBorsecondarysystem.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-2(continued)DraftA HSSVsB3.7.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,fourHSSVsperSGarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheRCSremainswithinitspressuresafetylimitandthatthesecondarysystem,fromtheSGstothemainsteamisolationvalves,islimitedtog110%ofdesignpressureforallDBAs.InMODES4and5,therearenocredibletransientsrequiringtheMSSVs.TheSGsarenotnormallyusedforheatremovalinMODES5and6,andthuscannotbeoverpressurized;thereisnorequirementfortheHSSVstobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableis"modifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.WithoneormoreHSSVsinoperable,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysisforlossofexternalloadmaynolongerbevalidandthesafetyvalve(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.ThisConditionspecificallyaddressestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventthatanon-significantdiscrepancyrelatedtotheHSSVsisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginMODES1,2,or3.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultinalossofHSSVcapabilitytorelievesteam.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorrectionofadministrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletiontimeisbasedonengineeringjudgement.ThisConditionisnotapplicabletoasituationinwhichtheabilityofaHSSVtoopenorrecloseisquestionable.Inthisevent,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandConditionBofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbe'implementedduringMODES1,2,and3.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-3DraftA MSSVs83.7.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.land8.2IftheHSSV(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.1.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsbytheverificationofeachHSSVliftsetpointinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.TheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.3),requiresthatsafetyandreliefvalvetestsbeperformedinaccordancewithANSI/ASMEOH-1-1987(Ref.4).AccordingtoReference4,thefollowingtestsarerequired:a.Visualexamination;b.Seattightnessdetermination;c.Setpoint.pressuredetermination(liftsetting);d.Compliancewithowner'sseattightnesscriteria;ande.Verificationofthebalancingdeviceintegrityonbalancedvalves.TheANSI/ASHEStandardrequiresthatallvalvesbete'stedevery5years,and'aminimumof20%ofthevalvesbetestedevery24months.TheASHECodespecifiestheactivitiesandfrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.ThisSRallowsa+1%and-3%setpointtoleranceforOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresettot1%duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-4DraftA MSSVsB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoandoperationinMODE3priortoperformingtheSR.TheMSSVsmaybeeitherbenchtestedortestedinsituathotconditionsusinganassistdevicetosimulateliftpressure.IftheMSSVsarenottestedathotconditions,theliftsettingpressureshallbecorrectedtoambientconditionsofthevalveatoperatingtemperatureandpressure.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section10.3.2.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.2.3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.4.ANSI/ASMEOM-1-1987.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-5DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(MSIVs)andNon-ReturnCheckValvesBASESBACKGROUNDTheHSIVs(3516and3517)isolatesteamflowfromthesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).HSIVclosureisnecessarytoisolateaSGaffectedbyasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventorasteamlinebreak(SLB)tostopthelossofSGinventoryandtoprotecttheintegrityoftheunaffectedSGfordecayheatremoval.TheHSIVsareairoperatedswingdiskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbyanairoperatoragainstspringpressure.TheHSIVsareinstalledtousesteamflowtoassistintheclosureofthevalve(Ref.1).AHSIVislocatedineachmainsteamlineheaderoutsidecontainmentintheIntermediateBuilding.TheHSIVsaredownstreamfromthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)andturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumpsteamsupply,toassuretheHSSVspreventoverpressureonthesecondarysideandassuresteamisavailabletotheAFWsystemfollowingHSIVclosure.ClosingtheHSIVsisolateseachSGfromtheother,andisolatestheturbine,steamdumpsystem',andotherauxiliarysteamsuppliesfromtheSGs.TheHSIVscloseonamainsteamisolationsignalgeneratedbyeitherhighcontainmentpressure,highsteamflowcoincidentwithlowT.,andsafetyinjection(SI),orhigh-highsteamflowcoincidentwithSI.TheHSIVsaredesignedtoworkwithnon-returncheckvalves(3518and3519)locatedimmediatelydownstreamofeachHSIVtoprecludetheblowdownofmorethanoneSGfollowingaSLB.TheHSIVsfailclosed'nlossofcontroloractuationpowerandlossofinstrumentaironcetheairisbledofffromthesu'pplyline.TheHSIVsmayalsobeactuatedmanually.EachHSIVhasanormallyclosedmanualHSIVbypassvalve.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-6(continued)DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesisestablishedbythelargeSLB(Ref.2).TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity.TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHSIVontheintactSGforthiscaseisassumedtoclosetopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.TheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolantmaximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Duetothenon-returncheckvalveonthefaultedSG,reverseflowfromthesteamheadersdownstreamoftheHSIVandfromtheintactSGispreventedfromcontributingtotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.Thischeckvalveisapassivedevicewhichisnotassumedtofail.SLBsoutsideofcontainmentcanoccurintheIntermediateBuildinganddownstreamoftheHSIVsintheTurbineBuilding.ASLBinpiping>6inchesdiameterintheIntermediateBuildingisnotrequiredtobeconsideredduetoanaugmentedpipinginspectionprogram(Ref.3).ForaSLBintheTurbinebuilding,theHSIVsonbothSGsmustclosetoisolatethebreakandterminatetheevent.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-7DraftA

HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'heHSIVsarealsocreditedinaSGTRtomanuallyisolatetheSGwiththerupturedtube.Inadditiontominimizingtheradiologicalreleases,thisassiststheoperatorinisolatingtheRCSflowthroughtherupturedSGbypreventingtheSGfromcontinuingtodepressurizeandcreatingahigher'ressuredifferencebetweenthesecondarysystemandtheprimarysystem.TheHSIVsarealsoconsideredinotherDBAssuchasthefeedwaterlinebreakinwhichclosureoftheHSIVontheintactSGmaximizes'theeffectofthebreaksincetheenergyremovalcapabilityoftheintactSGwouldbereduced.InadditiontoprovidingisolationofafaultedSGduringaSLB,feedwaterlinebreak,oraSGTR,theMSIVsalsoserveasacontainmentisolationbarrier.TheHSIVsarethesecondcontainmentisolationbarrierforthemainsteamlinepenetrationswhichusethesteamlinesandSGsinsidecontainmentasthefirstbarrier.TheHSIVsdonotreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignalsinceaspurioussignalcouldresultinasignificantplanttransient.TheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOrequiresthattwoHSIVsandthenon-returncheckvalvesinthesteamlinesbeOPERABLE.TheHSIVsareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyareclosedanddeactivatedorwhentheirisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignal.AHSIVmustalsobecapableofisolatingaSGforcontainmentisolationpurposes.Thenon-returncheckvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofclosing.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalveswillperformtheirdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoffsiteexposurescomparabletothe10CFR100(Ref.4)limits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-8(continued)DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValves83.7.2BASESAPPLICABILITYTheHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenthereissignificantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGstochallengetheintegrityofcontainment,orallowatransienttoapproachDNBRlimits.WhentheHSIVsareclosedandde-'activated,andthenon-returncheckvalvesareclosed,theyarealreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunction.InMODE4,theHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesarenormallyclosed,andtheRCS,includingSGenergy,islow.InMODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;therefore,theHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialmainsteampipebreaksintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.A.landA.2WithoneHSIVinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatusorplacetheHSIVintheclosedpositionwithin24hours.SomerepairstotheHSIVcanbemadewiththeplantunderhotconditions.The24hourCompletionTime=isreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequirea'losureoftheMSIVsandtheabilitytoisolatetheaffectedSGbyturbinestopvalves.The24hourCompletionTimeisgreaterthanthatnormallyallowedforcontainmentisolationbarriersbecausetheMSIVsarevalvesthat.isolateaclosedsystempenetratingcontainment.Thesevalvesdifferfrommostothercontainmentisolationbarriersinthattheclosedsystemprovidesanadditionalmeansforcontainmentisolation.FailureofthisclosedsystemcanonlyresultfromaSGTRwhichisnotpostulatedtooccurwithanyotherDBA(e.g,LOCA).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-9DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)ForaninoperableHSIVthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,butisclosed,theinoperableHSIVmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasistobeclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofHSIVstatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareintheclosedposition.B.1Withonenon-returncheckvalveinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatusorisolatethe.affectedmainsteamline.'checkvalveisapassivedevicethatcannotbeinspectedormaintainedunderhotconditions.Therefore,theinoperabilityofthenon-returncheckvalvewillmostlikelyresultfromnon-significantProgramdiscrepancies.The24hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetocorrectthediscrepancy.The24hourCompletionTimeisbasedonengineer'ingjudgementandtheinstalledin-seriesHSIVs.C.landC.2IftheHSIVcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorisnotclosedandperiodicallyverifiedclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,orthenon-returncheckvalveisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedatleastinHODE3within6hours,andinHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachthe'equiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-10DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)ForaninoperableHSIVthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,butisclosed,theinoperableHSIVmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasistobeclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofHSIVstatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareintheclosedposition.8.1Withonenon-returncheckvalveinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatusorisolatetheaffectedmainsteamline(i.e.,linewithinoperablevalve).Acheckvalveisapassivedevicethatcannotbeinspectedormaintainedunderhotconditions.Therefore,theinoperabilityofthenon-returncheckvalvewillmostlikelyresultfromnon-significantProgramdiscrepancies.The24hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetocorrectthediscrepancy.The24hourCompl'et'ionTimeisbasedonengineeringjudgementandtheinstalledin-seriesMSIVs.C.landC.2IftheMSIVcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorisnotclosedandperiodicallyverifiedclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,orthenon-returncheckvalveisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedatleastinMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-10DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESACTIONS(continued)0.1IfoneormorevalvesintheflowpathfromeachSGareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesareinoperablesuchthatatleastonevalveisinoperablein.eachofthetwomainsteamflowpaths.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.2.1ThisSRverifiesthatHSIV.closuretimeis<5secondsundernoflowandnoloadconditions.TheHSIVsareswing-diskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbytheirairoperatorsagainstspringpressure.OncetheHSIVsbegintocloseduringhotconditions,thesteamflowwillassistthevalveclosuresuchthattestingundernoflowandnoloadconditionsisconservative.The5secondclosuretimeisconsistentwiththeexpectedresponsetimeforinstrumentationassociatedwiththeHSIVandtheaccidentanalysisassumptions.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisin,accordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.7.2.2ThisSRverifiesthateachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.Asthenon-returncheckvalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-11DraftA HSIVsandNon-ReturnCheckValvesB3.7.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.7.2.3ThisSRverifiesthateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceis.normallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.TheHSIVsshouldnotbetestedatpower,sinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheri'skofavalveclosureandplanttransientwhentheplantisabove-MODE4.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirements'uringoperationinMODES1,2and3.ThefrequencyofHSIVtestingisevery24months.The24monthFrequencyfortestingisbasedontherefuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESUFSAR,Section5.4.4.2.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.3.UFSAR,Section3.6.2.5.1.10CFR100.11.5.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-12DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValvesB3.7.383.7PLANTSYSTEHS83.7.3HainFeedwaterPumpDischargeValves(HFPDVs),HainFeedwaterRegulatingValves(HFRVs),andAssociatedBypassValvesBASESBACKGROUNDTheMFPDVs(3977and3976),HFRVs(4269and4270)andtheirassociatedbypassvalves(4271and4272)isolatemainfeedwater(HFW)flowtothesecondarysideofthesteamgenerators(SGs)followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThesafetyrelatedfunctionoftheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesistoprovideforisolationofHFWflowtothesecondarysideoftheSGsterminatingtheDBAforlinebreaksoccurringdown'streamofthevalves.Closureeffectivelyterminates.theadditionoffeedwatertoanaffectedSG,limitingthemassandenergyreleaseforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)orfeedwaterlinebreaks(FWLBs)insidecontainment,andreducingthecooldowneffectsforSLBs.TheMFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalves,inconjunctionwithcheckvalveslocateddownstreamoftheisolationvalvesalsoprovideapressureboundaryforthecontrolledadditionofauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)totheintactSG.OneHFPDVislocatedintheTurbineBuildingonthedischargelineofeachHFWpump(Ref.1).OneHFRVandassociatedbypassvalveislocatedoneachHFWlinetoitsrespectiveSG,outsidecontainmentintheTurbineBuilding.TheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesarelocatedupstreamoftheAFWinjectionpointsothatAFWmaybesuppliedtotheSGsfollowingclosureoftheHFRVsandbypassvalves.ThepipingvolumefromthesevalvestotheSGsisaccountedforincalculatingmassandenergyreleases,andmustberefilledpriortoAFWreachingtheSGfollowingeitheranSLBorFWLB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-13DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves83.7.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheHFPDVclosesontheopeningoftheHFWpumpbreaker,whichoccursonreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignaloralowpumpsuctionpressure.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvescloseonreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,aSGhighlevelsignal,oronareactortripwithT,,<554'FwiththeassociatedHFRVinauto.Allvalvesmayalsobeactuatedmanually.InadditiontotheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalves,acheckvalvelocatedoutsidecontainmentforeachfeedwaterlineisavailable.Thecheckvalveisolatesthefeedwaterlinepenetratingcontainmentprovidingacontainmentisolationbarrier.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesisestablishedbytheanalysesfortheSLB.TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity(Ref.2).TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).Themostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpump'whichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHFRVandbypassvalveontheintactSGforthiscaseareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumps,whichhavetheirbreakersopenedbyaSIsignal,andtheHFPDVwhichcloseonopeningoftheHFWpumpbreakers.(continued)'R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-14'DraftA

HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValvesB3.7.3BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'heSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolant,maximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TheHFRVandbypassvalveonthefaultedSGareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventcontinuedcontributiontotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumpsandclosureoftheHFPDVs.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvesarealsocreditedforisolationinthefeedwater'ransientanalyses(e.g.,increaseinfeedwaterflow).ThesevalvescloseoneitherasafetyinjectionorhighSGlevelsignaldependingonthe'scenario.ThevalvesalsomustcloseonaFWLBtolimittheamountofadditionalmassandenergydeliveredtotheSGsandcontainment.ThefailureoftheHFRVstocontrolflowisalsoconsideredasaninitiatingevent.ThisincludesconsiderationofavalvefailurecoincidentwithanatmosphericreliefvalvefailuresinceasinglecomponentintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)controlsbothcomponents(Ref.3).ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttoDNBsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbytheSLBaccident.TheHFPDVs,HFRVs;andbypassvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-15DraftA MFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves83.7.3BASESLCOThisLCOensuresthattheMFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalveswillisolateHFWflowtotheSGs,followingaFWLBorSLB.ThisLCOrequiresthattwoHFPDVs,twoHFRVs,andtwobypassvalvesbeOPERABLE.TheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhenisolationtimesarewithinlimitsandtheycancloseonanisolationactuationsignalorwhenthevalvesareclosedandde-activated,orisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.FailuretomeettheLCOrequirementscanresultinadditionalmassandenergybeingreleasedtocontainmentfollowinganSLBorFWLBinsidecontainment.Itmayalsoresultintheintroductionofwaterintothemainsteamlinesforanexcessfeedwaterflowevent.-APPLICABILITYTheHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesmustbeOPERABLEwhenev'erthereissignificantmassandenergyintheRCSandSGs.Thisensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theaccidentanalysisassumptionsaremaintained.InMODES1,2,and3,theHFPDVs,HFRVs,andthebypassvalvesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtolimittheamountofavailablefluidthatcouldbeaddedtocontainmentinthecaseofasecondarysystempipebreakinsidecontainment.Whenthevalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve,theyarealreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunction.InMODE4,theMFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesarenormallyclosedsinceAFWisprovidingdecayheatremovalduetothelowSGenergylevel.'nMODE5or6,theSGsdonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowtheboilingpointofwater;therefore,theHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesarenotrequiredforisolationofpotentialpipebreaksintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-16DraftA

MFPDVs,'FRVs,andAssociatedBypassValvesB3.7.3BASESACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.A.1andA.2WithoneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheMFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFPDVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.B.landB.2WithoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftehHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-17DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValvesB3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.landC.2WithoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The.24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.An.inoperableHFRVbypassvalvethatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.0.1and0.2IftheHFPDV,HFRV,orbypassvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorclosedwithin24hoursorcannotbeverifiedclosedonceper31days,theplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastHODE3within6hours,andinHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB,3.7-18DraftA

HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValves.B3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1IfoneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s),oroneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFPDVbypassvalve(s)areinoperable,thepl'antisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesareinoperablesuchthataHFWpump,condensatepump,orcondensateboosterpumpcanprovideunisolableflowtooneorbothSGs.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.3.1ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachHFPDVis~80secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal(i.e.,fromopeningofHFWpump'reakers).Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowirigarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstroke'xerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI,(Ref.4)requirementsduringoperationinHODES1,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-19DraftA HFPDVs,HFRVs,andAssociatedBypassValvesB3.7.3BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.7.3.2RE(UIREHENTS(continued).ThisSRverifiesthattheclosuretimeofeachHFRVandbypassvalveis<10secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactu'alorsimulatedactuationsignal.Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollow'ingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.4),requirementsduringoperationinHODES1,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section10.4.5.3.2.UFSAR,Section15.1.5.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.4.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-20DraftA ARVs83.7.4B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.4AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs)BASESBACKGROUNDThereisanARV(3410and3411)locatedoneachsteamgenerator(SG).TheARVshavetwofunctions(Ref.1):a.providesecondarysystemoverpressureprotectionbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs);andb.provideamethodforcoolingtheplantshouldthepreferredheatsinkviathesteamdumpsystemtothecondensernotbeavailable.Theaccidentanalysesdonotcrediteitherofthesefunctionssince'theARVsdonothaveasafety-relatedsourceofmotiveairandtheaccidentanalysesdonottypicallyrequirecooldowntotheresidualheatremovalentryconditionssincetheplantwasoriginallydesignedtomaintainHotShutdownconditionsindefinitely.Theonlyexceptioniswithrespecttosteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventswhichrequiretheuseofatleastoneARVtoprovideheatremovalfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)topreventsaturationconditionsfromdeveloping.TheARVsareairoperatedvalveslocatedintheIntermediateBuildingwithareliefcapacityof329,000ibm/hreach(approximately5%ofRTPpower).TheARVsarenormallyclosed,failclosedvalveswhichreceivemotiveairfromtheinstrumentairsystem.Thevalvescanalsoreceivemotiveairfromanon-seismicbackupnitrogenbottlebanksystem.TheARVsarenormallycontrolledbytheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)butcanalsoberemotemanuallyoperatedandopenedlocallybyuseofhandwheelslocatedonthevalves'.R.E.GirmaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-21(continued)DraftA ARVsB3.7.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisfortheARVsisestablishedbytheSGTRevent(Ref.2).Forthisaccidentscenario,theoperatorisrequiredtoperformalimitedcooldowntoestablishadequatesubcoolingasanecessarysteptoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowintotherupturedSG.FollowingaSGTR,theHSSVswillmaintainthesecondarysystempressure,atapproximately1085psigwh'ichcouldresultinthelossofsubcoolingmarginsincetheRCSaveragetemperatureisattemptingtostabilizeatapproximately547'F.TheARVsareusedduringthefirst30to60minutesoftheSGTRtocontinuetheRCScooldowninanefforttoreduce,andeventuallyterminate,theprimarytosecondarysystemflowintherupturedSG.Theinabilitytocooldowncouldresultininadequatesubcoolingmarginwhichwoulddelaytheterminationoftheleakagethroughtherupturedtube.TheopeningoftheARVsisalsoconsideredcoincidentwithafailureofamainfeedwaterregulatingvalve(Ref.3)sinceasinglecomponentintheADFCScontrolsbothcomponents.ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttodeparturefromnucleateboilingsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbythesteamlinebreakaccident.TheARVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRC.PolicyStatement.LCOTwoARVsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEformanualoperationeitherlocally(usingthehandwheelorlocalpanel)orremotelytorelievemainsteampressure.FailuretomeettheLCOcanresultintheinabilitytocooltheplantfollowingSGTReventinwhichthecondenserisunavailableforusewiththesteamdumpsystem.AnARVisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitiscapableofbeingmanuallyopenedwithin20minutesofdeterminingtheneedtoutilizetheARVfollowingaSGTR.TheARVmustalsobecapableofclosingwithin15minutesintheeventthevalvespuriouslyopensontheSGwiththerupturedtube.Finally,theARVmustbecapableofclosingwithin5minutesinthe~eventthattheARVontheintactSGfailstoclosefollowinginitializationofacooldown.Fortheclosurerequirements,eithertheARVoritsassociatedblockvalvemaybecreditedforOPERABILITY.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-22(continued)DraftA ARVsB3.7.4BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature>500'F,theARVsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.InMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,andinMODE4,theARVsarenotrequiredsincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftsettingsoftheHSSVs.InMODE5or6,anSGTRisnotacredibleeventsincethewaterintheSGsisbelowtheboiling-pointandRCSpressureislow.ACTIONSA.lWithoneARVinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestorethevalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsfortheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheremainingOPERABLEARVandanonsafetygradebackupinthesteamdumpsystem.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.4doesnotapplysincethesteamdumpsystemwouldnormallybeinserviceduringlowerMODESofoperationandcanprovideanacceptablealternative.totheinoperableARV.B.lIftheARVcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'Fwithin8hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothARVsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalysesforaSGTRevent;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-23(continued)DraftA

ARVs83.7.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.4.1ToperformacooldownoftheRCS,theARVsmustbeabletobeopenedeitherremotelyorlocally.ThisSRensuresthattheARVsaretestedthroughafullcontrolcycleatleastonceperfuelcycle.PerformanceofinservicetestingoruseofanARVduringaplantcooldownmaysatisfythisrequirement.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.TheFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.3.2.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.6.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.1.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-24DraftA AFWSystem83.7.5B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheAFWSystemsuppliesfeedwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)toremovedecayheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)uponthelossofnormalfeedwatersupply.TheSGsfunctionasaheatsinkforcoredecayheat.TheheatloadisdissipatedbyreleasingsteamtotheatmospherefromtheSGsviathemainsteamsafetyvalves(MSSVs)oratmosphericreliefvalves.Ifthemaincondenserisavailable,steammaybereleasedviathesteamdumpvalves.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwoseparatesystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFW(SAFW)System(Ref.1).AFWSstemThepreferredAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenAFWpumpsandoneturbinedrivenpumpconfiguredintothreeseparatetrainswhicharealllocatedintheIntermediateBuilding.Eachmotordriventrainprovides100%ofAFWflowcapacity,andtheturbinedrivenpumpprovides200%ofthe'requiredcapacitytotheSGs,asassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thepumpsareequippedwithindependentrecirculationlinestothecondensatestoragetanks(CSTs).EachmotordrivenAFWtrainispoweredfromanindependentClasslEpowersupplyandfeedsoneSG,althougheachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGviacross-tielinescontainingnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4000Aand4000B).ThetwomotordrivenAFWtrainswillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalineitherSG,openingof"themainfeedwater(MFW)pumpbreakers,asafetyinjection(SI)signal,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(AMSAC).Thepumpscanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-25DraftA

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThesteamturbinedrivenAFWpumpreceivessteamfromeachmainsteamlineupstreamofthetwomainsteamisolationvalves.Eitherofthesteamlineswillsupply100%oftherequirementsoftheturbinedrivenAFWpump.TheturbinedrivenAFWpumpsuppliesacommonheadercapableoffeedingbothSGsbyuseoffail-open,air-operatedcontrolvalves(4297and4298).TheturbinedrivenAFWpumpwillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalinbothSGs,lossofvoltageon4160VBusesllAandllB,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(ANSAC).Thepumpcanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.ThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemistheCSTswhicharelocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding.TheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8)canalsobeusedtosupplyasafety-relatedsourceofwaterthroughnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4013,4027,and4028)whichsupplyeachAFWtrain.SAFWSstemTheSAFWSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenpumpsconfiguredintotwoseparatetrains.EachmotordrivenSAFWtrainprovides100%oftheAFWflowcapacityasassumedintheaccidentanalysesandsuppliesoneSGthroughtheuseofanormallyopenmotor-operatedstopcheckvalve.EachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGvianormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves'9703Aand97038).EachpumpispoweredfromanindependentClass1EpowersupplyandcanbepoweredfromthedieselgeneratorsprovidedthatthebreakerfortheassociatedAFWpumpisopened.Thesafety-relatedsourceofwaterfortheSAFWSystemistheSWSystemthroughtwonormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9629Aand9629B).Condensatecanalsobesuppliedbya10,000galloncondensatetesttankandtheyardfirehydrantyardloop.TheSAFWSystemismanuallyactuatedintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemhasfailedduetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding,aseismicorfireevent.TheSAFWtrainsarelocatedintheSAFWPumpBuildinglocatedadjacenttotheAuxiliaryBuilding.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-26DraftA 'I AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheSAFWPumpBuildingenvironmentiscontrolledbyroomcoolerswhicharesuppliedbythesameSWheaderasthepumptrains.ThesecoolersarerequiredwhentheoutsideairtemperatureisZ80'FtoensuretheSAFWPumpBuilding'emainsg120'Fdurin'gaccidentconditions.TheAFWSystemisdesignedtosupplysufficientwatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatwithSGpressureatthelowestHSSVsetpressureplusI/ooftheHSSVs.Subsequently,theAFWSystemsuppliessufficientwatertocooltheplanttoRHRentryconditions,withsteamreleasedthroughtheARVs.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheAFWSystemistosupplywatertotheSG(s)toremovedecayheatandotherresidualheatbydeliveringatleasttheminimumrequiredflowratetotheSGsatpressures'correspondingtothelowestHSSVsetpressureplus1%..TheAFWSystemmitigatestheconsequencesofanyeventwiththelossofnormalfeedwater.ThelimitingDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)andtransientsfortheAFWSystemareasfollows(Ref.2):a.FeedwaterLineBreak(FWLB);b.LossofHFW(withandwithoutoffsitepower);c.SteamLineBreak(SLB);d.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);e.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR);andf.Externalevents(tornadosandseismicevents).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-27DraftA

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'heAFWSystemdesignissuchthatanyoftheaboveDBAscanbemitigatedusingthepreferredAFWSystemorSAFWSystem.FortheFWLB,SLB,andexternaleventsDBAs(itemsa,c,andf),theworstcasescenarioisthelossofallthreepreferredAFWtrainsduetoaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuilding,orafailureoftheIntermediateBuildingblockwalls.Forthesethreeevents,theuseoftheSAFWSystemwithin10minutesisassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.SinceasinglefailuremustalsobeassumedinadditiontotheHELBorexternalevent,thecapabilityoftheSAFWSystemtosupplyflowtoanintactSGcouldbecompromisediftheSAFWcross-tieisnotavailable.ForHELBswithincontainment,useofeithertheSAFWSystemortheAFWSystemtotheintactSGisassumedwithin10minutes.FortheSGTRevents(iteme),theaccidentanalysesassumethatoneAFWtrainisavailableuponaSIsignalorlow-lowSGlevelsignal.AdditionalinventoryisbeingaddedtotherupturedSGasaresultoftheSGTR-suchthatAFWflowisnotacriticalfeatureforthisDBA.ForthelossofHFWeventsandsmallbreakLOCA(itemsbandd),twotrainsofAFWareassumedavailable'(i.e.,twomotordrivenAFWtrainsortheturbinedrivenAFWtrain)uponalow-lowSGlevelsignalandSIsignal,respectively.TwoAFWtrainsareassumedavailablesincenosinglefailurecanresultinthelossofmorethanoneAFWtrain.ThelossofHFWisaCondition2event'(Ref.3)whichplaceslimitsontheresponseoftheRCSfromthetransient(e.g.,nochallengetothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisallowed).TwotrainsofAFWarerequiredtomaintaintheselimits.The-smallbreakLOCAanalysisrequirestwotrainsofAFWtolowerRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-28DraftA AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)In,additiontoitsaccidentmitigationfunction,the"energyandmassadditioncapabilityoftheAFWSystemisalsoconsideredwithrespecttoHELBswithincontainment.ForSLBsandFWLBswithincontainment,pumprunoutfromallthreeAFWpumpsisassumedfor10minutesuntiloperationscanisolatetheflowbytrippingtheAFWpumpsorbyclosingtherespectivepumpdischargeflowpath(s).Therefore,themotoroperateddischargeisolationvalvesforthemotoroperatedAFWpumptrains(4007and4008)aredesignedtolimitflowto<230gpm.TheAFWSystemsatisfiestherequirementsofCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheAFWSystemwillperformitsdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationofthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryorcontainment.TheAFWSystemiscomprisedoftwosystemswhichareconfiguredintofivetrains.TheAFWSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthecomponentsandflowpaths.requiredtoprovideredundantAFWflowtotheSGsareOPERABLE.Thisrequiresthat,thefollowingbeOPERABLE:a~b.TwomotordrivenAFWtrainstakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andcapableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGwith>200gpmandZ230gpmtotalflow;1TheturbineAFWtraintakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),providedsteamflowfrombothmainsteamlinesupstreamoftheHSIVs,andcapableofsupplyingbothSGswithz200gpmeach;andc~TwomotordrivenSAFWtrainscapableofbeinginitiatedeitherlocallyorfromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes,takingsuctionfromtheSWSystem,andsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGandtheoppositeSGthroughtheSAFWcross-tielinewithz200gpm.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-29DraftA AFW.SystemB3.7.5BASES.LCO(continued)Thepiping,valves,instrumentation,andcontrolsintherequiredflowpathsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thecross-tielineforthepreferredAFWmotordrivenpumpisnotrequiredforthisLCO.TherecirculationlinesforthepreferredAFWsystemandSAFWsystempumpsarenotcreditedintheaccidentanalysisandarealsonotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheHSSVsmaintaintheSGpressurebelowthepump'sshutoffhead.TheSAFWPumpBuildingroomcoolersarerequiredtobeOPERABLEwhentheoutsideairtemperatureisZ80'F.Ifoneroomcoolerisinoperable,theassociatedSAFWtrainisinoperable.APPLICABILITYInHODESI,2,and3,theAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheeventthatitiscalledupontofunctionwhentheHFWSystemislost.Inaddition,theAFWSystemisrequiredtosupplyenoughmakeupwatertoreplacetheSGsecondaryinventory,lostastheplantcoolstoHODE4conditions.InHODE4,5,or6,theSGsarenotnormally'usedforheatremoval,andtheAFWSystemisnotrequired.ACTIONSA.lIfonemotordrivenAFWtrainisinoperable,oroneoftheturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathsisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheflowpathortheAFWmotordriventraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonthefollowingreasons:a.TheredundantOPERABLEturbinedrivenAFWpumpflowpath;b.TheavailabilityofredundantOPERABLEmotordrivenAFWandSAFWpumps;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-30DraftA

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)C.Thelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringthatrequirestheinoperableturbinedriven.AFWpumpflowpathormotordrivenAFWpumptrain.AturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.B.1WiththeturbinedrivenAFWtraininoperable,bothmotordrivenAFW.trainsinoperable,oroneturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathandonemotordrivenAFWtraininoperabletooppositeSGs,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.IftheinoperablemotordrivenAFWtrainsuppliesthesameSGastheinoperableturbinedrivenflowpath,ConditionEmustbeentered.AturbinedrivenAFWtrainiscomprisedofthepumpandtwoflowpaths.AturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.ThecombinationoffailureswhichrequiresentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossofonetrain(oroneflowpath)ofpreferredAFWcoolingtoeachSGsuchthatredundancyislost.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.C.1WithoneSAFWtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin14days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneofthetwoSAFW'cross-tie"valveswhichrequiresdeclaringtheassociatedSAFWtraininoperable(e.g.,failureof9703BwouldresultindeclaringSAFWtrain0inoperable).The14dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-31DraftA AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESACTIONS(continued)D.lWithbothSAFWtrairisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftheSAFWcross-tie.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.E.1WithallAFWtrainsandflowpathstooneorbothSGsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastonetrainorflowpathtoeachaffectedSGtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.AturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.Thecombinationoffailureswhich'requireentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossofpreferredAFWcoolingtoat-leastoneSG.Thetwomotordriventrainsofthepreferred.AFWSystemarenormallyusedfordecayheatremovalduringlowpoweroperationssinceairoperatedbypasscontrolvalvesareinstalledineachtraintobettercontrolSGlevel.Sinceafeedwatertransientismorelikelyduringreducedpowerconditions,4hoursisprovidedtorestoreatleastonetrainofadditionalpreferredAFWbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.ThiswillalsoprovidetimetofindacondensatesourceotherthantheSWSystemfortheSAFWSystemifallthreeAFWtrainsareinoperable.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-32DraftA AFWSystem83.7.5BASESACTIONSF.landF.2(continued)WhenRequiredActionA.1,B.1,C.1,D.1,orE.lcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hours,andinNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.G.lIfallthreepreferredAFWtrainsandbothSAFWtrainsareinoperabletheplantisinaseriouslydegradedconditionwithnosafetyrelatedmeansforconductingacooldown,andonlylimitedmeansforconductingacooldownwithnonsafetyrelatedequipment.Insuchacondition,theplant,shouldnotbeperturbedbyanyaction,includingapowerchange,thatmightresultinatrip.TheseriousnessofthisconditionrequiresthatactionbestartedimmediatelytorestoreoneAFWorSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.RequiredActionG.lismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatallrequiredNODEchangesorpowerreductionsaresuspendeduntiloneAFWorSAFWtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Inthiscase,LCO3.0.3isnotapplicablebecauseitcouldforcetheplantintoalesssafecondition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-33(continued)DraftA AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.5.1Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheAFWandSAFWSystemwaterandsteamsupplyflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforAFWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3.7.5.2PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASHE,SectionXI(Ref.4)detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHEcode.SectionXIoftheASHEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringHODE1fortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpsincesuitabletestconditionsmaynothavebeenestablished.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-34DraftA AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.7.5.3PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachSAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsofASHE,SectionXI(Ref.4)detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofanincipientfailure.BecauseitisundesirabletointroduceSWintotheSGswhiletheyareoperating,thistestingisperformedusingthetestcondensatetank.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHEcode.SectionXIoftheASHEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.SR3.7.5.4ThisSRverifiesthateachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheSWSystem(4013,4027,4028,9629A,and9629B),eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedvalve(4007,4008,9704A,9704B,and9746),andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve(9703Aand9703B)canbeoperatedwhenrequired.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.4).SR'.7.5.5,ThisSRverifiesthatAFWcanbedeliveredtotheappropriateSGintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignal,bydemonstratingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.The24monthFrequencyisacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandthedesignreliabil,ityoftheequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-35DraftA

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.7.5.6REgUIREHENTS(continued)'hisSRverifiesthattheAFWpumpswillstartintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanactuationsignalbydemonstratingthateachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.The24monthFrequencyisbasedonthepotentialneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRisonlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringHODE1fortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpsincesuitabletestconditionsmaynothavebeenestablished.SR3.7.5.7'hisSRverifiesthattheSAFWSystemcanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.TheSAFWSystemisassumedtobemanuallyinitiatedwithin10minutesintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedatpower.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.5.2.UFSARChapter15.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurized*WaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-36DraftA CSTsB3.7.6B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.6CondensateStorageTanks(CSTs)BASESBACKGROUNDTheCSTsprovideasourceofwatertothesteamgenerators(SGs)forremovingdecayandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).TheCSTprovidesapassiveflowofwater,bygravity,tothepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System(LCO3.7.5).TheresultingsteamproducedintheSGsisreleasedtotheatmospherebythemainsteamsafetyvalvesortheatmosphericreliefvalves.Whenthemainsteamisolationvalvesareopen,thepreferredmeansofheatremovalfrom,theRCSistodischargesteamtothecondenserbythenonsafetygradepathofthesteamdumpvalves.ThecondensedsteamisthenreturnedtotheSGsbythemainfeedwatersystem.Thishastheadvantageofconservingcondensatewhileminimizingreleasestotheenvironment.Therearetwo30,000gallonCSTslocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding(Ref.I).TheCSTsarenotconsideredsafetyrelatedcomponentssincethetanksarenotprotectedagainstearthquakesorothernaturalphenomena,includingmissiles.ThesafetyrelatedsourceofcondensatefortheAFWandStandbyAFWSystemsistheServiceWater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8).TheCSTsareconnectedbyacommonheaderwhichleadstothesuctionofallthreeAFWpumps.AsingleleveltransmitterisprovidedforeachCST(LT-2022AandLT-20228).TheCSTscanberefilledfromthecondenserhotwellortheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetank.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheCSTsprovidecoolingwatertoremovedecayheatandtocooldowntheplantfollowingalleventsintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2)whichassumesthatthepreferredAFWSystemisavailableimmediatelyfollowinganaccident.ForanyeventinwhichAFWisnotrequiredforatleast10minutesfollowingtheaccident,theSWSystemprovidesthesourceofcoolingwatertoremovedecayheat.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPower'PlantB3..7-37DraftA CSTsB3.7.6BASES'APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'helimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forthecondensatevolumeisthelossofnormalfeedwatereventandsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)(Ref.2).Forthelossofnormalfeedwaterevent,flowfromatleasttwoAFWpumpsisrequired.uponalowlevelsignalineitherSGtomeettheacceptance'criteriaforaCondition2event(Ref.3).ForthesmallbreakLOCA,twoAFWpumpsarerequiredtolowertheRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadofthesafetyinjectionpumps.AssumingthatallthreeAFWpumpsinitiateattheirmaximumflowrate,theCSTsprovide'sufficientinventoryforatleast20minutes(atgreaterthanrequiredflowrates)beforeoperatoractiontorefilltheCSTsortransfersuctiontotheSWSystemisrequired.AnonlimitingeventconsideredinCSTinventorydeterminationsisamainfeedwaterlinebreakinsidecontainment.Thisbreakhasthepotentialfordumpingcondensateuntilterminatedbyoperatoractionafter10minutessincethereisnoautomaticre-configurationoftheAFWSystem.FollowingterminationoftheAFWflowtotheaffectedSGbyclosingtheAFWtraindischargevalvesorstoppingapump,flowfromtheremainingAFWtrainortheSAFWSystemisdirectedtotheintactSGfordecayheatremoval.ThislossofcondensateispartiallycompensatedforbytheretentionofinventoryintheintactSG.ForcooldownsfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower,theCSTscontainsufficientinventorytoprovideaminimumof2hoursofdecayheatremovalasrequiredbyNUREG-0737(Ref.4),itemII.E.I.I.ThisbeyondDBAr'equirementprovidesmorelimitingcriteriaforCSTinventory.TheCSTssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTosatisfyaccidentanalysisassumptions,theCSTmustcontainsufficientcoolingwatertoremovedecayheatforatleast10minutesfollowingalossofHFWeventfrom1025RTP.Afterthistimeperiod,theaccidentanalysesassumethatAFWpumpsuctioncanbetransferredtothesafetyrelatedsuctionsource(i.e.,"theSWSystem).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-38DraftA CSTsB3.7.6BASESLCO'(continued)TherequiredCSTwatervolumeisz22,500gallons,whichisbasedontheneedtoprovideatleast2hoursofdecayheatremovalfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower.TheCSTsareconsideredOPERABLEwhenatleast22,500gallonsofwaterisavailable.The22,500galminimumvolumeismetifoneCSTisZ21.5ftorifbothCSTsareZ12.5ft.SincetheCSTsare30,000gallontanks,onlyoneCSTisrequiredtomeettheminimumrequiredwatervolumeforthisLCO.TheOPERABILITYoftheCSTsisdeterminedbymaintainingthetanklevelatorabovetheminimumrequiredwatervolume.APPLICABILITYInNODESI,2,and3,theCSTsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupporttheAFWSystemrequirements.InNODE4,5,or6,theCSTisnotrequiredbecausetheAFWSystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ACTIONS.IandA.2IftheCSTwatervolume-isnotwithinlimits,theOPERABILITYofthebackupsupplyshouldbeverifiedbyadministrativemeans'ithin4hours.OPERABILITYofthebackupfeedwatersupplymustincludeverificationthatthe,flowpathsfromthebackupwatersupplytothepreferredAFWpumpsareOPERABLEandimmediatelyavailableuponAFWinitiation,andthatthebackupsupplyhastherequiredvolumeofwateravailable.Alternatesourcesofwaterinclude,butisnotlimitedto,theSWSystemandtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatetank.Inaddition,theCSTsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,becausethebackupsupplymaybeperformingthisfunctioninadditiontoitsnormalfunctions.Continuedverificationofthebackupsupplyisnotrequiredduetothelargevolumeofwatertypicallyavailablefromthesealternatesources.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonanOPERABLEbackupwatersupply,beingavailable,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodrequiringtheCSTs.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-39DraftA CSTsB3.7.6BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2If.thebackupsupplycannotbeverifiedortheCSTscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,'heplantmustbeplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastHODE3within6hours,andinHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimes.arereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.6.1ThisSRverifiesthattheCSTscontaintherequired'volumeofcoolingwater.The22,500galminimumvol.umeismetifoneCSTisZ21ftorifbothCSTsareZ12.5ft.The12hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheneedforoperatorawarenessofplantevolutionsthatmayaffecttheCSTinventorybetweenchecks.Also,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindications'inthecontrolroom,includi.ngalarms,toalerttheoperatortoabnormaldeviationsintheCSTlevel.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section10.7.4.'.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.4.NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTHIActionPlanRequirements,"November1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-40DraftA CCWSystemB3.7.783.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheCCWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theCCWSystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.TheCCWSystemservesasabarriertothereleaseofradioactivebyproductsbetweenpotentiallyradioactivesystemsandtheServiceWater(SW)System,andthustotheenvironment.ThesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheCCWsystem.arecoveredbythisLCO.TheCCWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%capacity,safetyrelatedpumptrains(Ref.1).EachCCWtrainconsistsofamanualsuctionanddischargevalve,apump,andadischargecheckvalve.TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWtrainsandcontains'woparallelheatexchangers,eitherofwhichcansupplythesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbyCCW.Theloop'headercontinuesuptothefirstisolationvalveforeachcomponentsuppliedbytheCCWSystem.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachsuppliedloadtothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.EachpumpispoweredfromaseparateClasslEelectricalbus.AnopensurgetankinthesystemprovidesforthermalexpansionandcontractionoftheCCWsystemandensuresthatsufficientnetpositivesuctionheadis.availabletothepumps.TheCCWSystemisalsoprovidedwitharadiationdetector(R-17)toisolatethesurgetankfromtheAuxiliaryBuildingenvironmentandtoprovideindication'ofaleakofradioactivewaterintotheCCWSystem.TheCCWSystemisnormallyma'intainedbelow100'Fbytheuseofonepumptraininconjunctionwithoneheatexchanger.ThestandbyCCWpumpwillautomaticallystartifthesystempressurefallsto50psig.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-41DraftA CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionoftheCCWSystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviatheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)System.SincetheremovalofdecayheatviatheRHRSystemisonlyperformedduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident,theCCWpumpsdonotreceiveanautomaticstartsignal.Followingthegenerationofasafetyinjectionsignal,thenormallyoperatingCCWpumpwillremaininserviceunlessanundervoltagesignalispresentoneitherClass1EelectricalBus14orBus16atwhichtimethepumpisstrippedfromitsrespectivebus.ACCWpumpcanthenbemanuallyplacedintoservicepriortoswitchingtorecirculationoperationswhichwouldnotberequireduntilaminimumof46minutesfollowinganaccident.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtrainandoneCCWheatexchangertoremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase.TheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andcontainmentmodelsforaLOCAeachconsidertheminimumperformanceoftheCCWSystem.ThenormaltemperatureoftheCCWisg100'F,and,dur'ingLOCAconditions,amaximumtemperatureof120'Fisassumed.ThispreventstheCCWSystemfromexceedingitsdesigntemperaturelimitof200'F,andprovidesforagradualreductioninthetemperatureofcontainmentsumpfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)bytheECCSpumps.TheCCWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-42DraftA CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheCCWSystemcanalsofunctiontocooltheplantfromRHRentryconditions(T.,<350'F),toNODE5(T.,<200'F),duringnormalcooldownoperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350'Fto200'FisafunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRtrainsoperating.SinceCCMiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsindrainingtheCCWSystemwithinashortperiodoftime.TheCCWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofCCWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).LeakswithintheCCWSystemduringpostaccidentconditionscanbemitigatedbytheavailablemakeupwatersources.TheCCWSystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIntheeventofaDBA,one'CCWtrainandtheloopheaderisrequiredtoprovidetheminimumheatremovalcapabilityassumedinthesafetyanalysisforthesystemstowhichitsuppliescoolingwater.Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofCCWandtheloopheadermustbeOPERABLE.AtleastoneCCWtrainwilloperateassumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ACCWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenthepumpisOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheader.TheautomaticstartlogicassociatedwithlowCCWsystempressureisnotrequiredforthisLCO.Inaddition,ifaCCWpumpfailsanInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead)thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-43DraftA CCWSystem83.7.7BASESLCO(continued)TheCCWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,oneoftwoCCWheatexchangers,surgetank,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwatertothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.TwoRHRheatexchangers;b.TwoRHRpumpmechanicalsealcoolersandbearingwaterjackets;c.Threesafetyinjectionpumpmechanicalsealcoolers;andd.Twocontainmentspraypumpmechanicalsealcoolers.TheCCWloopheadertemperaturemustalsobeg120'FpriortotheCCWcoolingwaterreachingthefirstisolationvalvesupplyingthesecomponents.TheCCWtrainsandloopheadeiareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheycanbeplacedintoservicewithinthetimelimitsassumedbytheaccidentanalyses(i.e.,46minutes).TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWpumptrains,throughoneoftwoCCWheatexchangers,anduptothefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachoftheabovecomponentstothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.OnlyoneofthetwoCCWheatexchangersisrequiredsincetheheatexchangerisapassivedevicesimilartotheloopheaderpiping.TheportionofCCWpiping,valves,instrumentationandcontrolsbetweentheisolationvalvestocomponentsathroughdaboveisaddressedbythefollowingLCOs:a.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"b.LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"c.LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled,"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-44Draft,A CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESLCO(continued)d.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3,"e.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4,"f.LCO3.9.3,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft,"andg.LCO3.9.4,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."TheCCWpipinginsidecontainmentforthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andthereactorsupportcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationbarrier.ThisisaddressedbyLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarriers."TheCCWsystemradiationdetector(R-17)isnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheCCWsystemoutsidecontainmentisnotrequiredtobeaclosedsystem.TheisolationofCCWfromothercomponentsorsystemsnotrequiredforsafetymayrenderthosecomponentsorsystemsinoperablebutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheCCWSystem.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theCCWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystem,whichmustbecapabletoperformitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCA.InMODE5or6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheCCWSystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.4.7,LCO3.4.8,LCO3.9.3,andLCO3.9.4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.B3.7-45(continued)DraftA CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lIfoneCCWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECCWtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLECCWtraincouldresultinlossofCCWfunction.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.B.landB.2IftheCCWtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachthe'requiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1C.2andC.3WithbothCCWtrainsorthe'oopheaderinoperable,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestoreOPERABLEstatustooneCCWtrain.ortheloopheader.InthisCondition,thereisnoOPERABLECCWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisalossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofCCWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachiev'ethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastNODE3within6hoursandinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantisnotrequiredtoexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,enterMODE5)untilatleastoneCCWtrainortheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant'3.7-46(continued)DraftA CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.7.7.1VerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanualandpoweroperatedvalvesintheCCWflowpathservicingpost-accidentrelatedequipmentprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathsexistforCCWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesevalvesareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,througha"systemwalkdown,thatthose.valvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperablebutdoesnotaffectth'eOPERABILITYoftheCCWloopheader.SR3.7;7.2ThisSRverifiesthatthetwomotoroperatedisolationvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers(738Aand738B)canbeoperatedwhenrequiredsincethevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.2).REFERENCES1.'FSAR,Section9.2.2.2.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-47DraftA SWSystemB3.7.8B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.8ServiceWater(SW)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheSWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaloperation,andanormalshutdown,theSWsystemalsoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.ThesafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheSWSystemarecoveredbythisLCO.TheSWSystemconsistsofasingleloopheadersuppliedbytwoseparate,100%capacity,safetyrelatedpumptrains(Ref.1).ThephysicaldesignoftheSWSystemissuchthatone100%capacitypumpfromeachclasslEelectricalbus(Buses17and18)isarrangedonacommonpipingheaderwhichthensuppliestheSWloopheader.ForthepurposesofthisLCO,aSWtrainisbasedonelectricalsourceonly.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateClass1Eelectricalbusandconsistsoftwo100%capacitypumpsandassociateddischargecheckvalvesandmanualisolation'alves.TheSWloopheaderbeginsfromthedischargeofthetrainsandsuppliesthesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbySW.Thepumpsinthesystemarenormallymanuallyaligned.Onepumpineachtrainisselectedtoautomaticallystartuponreceiptofanundervoltagesignalonitsrespectivebus.Uponreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,eachSWpumpwillautomaticallystartinapredeterminedsequence.TheSWloopheadersuppliesthecoolingwatertoallsafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.Thenonsafetyrelatedandlong-termsafetyfunctions(e.g.,componentcoolingwaterheatexchangers)canbeisolatedfromtheloopheaderthroughuseofredundantmotoroperatedisolationvalves.ThesevalvesautomaticallycloseonacoincidentsafetyinjectionsignalandundervoltagesignalonBuses14and16.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-48DraftA

SWSystemB3.7.8BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThesuctionsourcefortheSWSystemisthescreenhousewhichisaseismicstructurelocatedonLakeOntario.ThedischargefromtheSWSystemsuppliedloadsreturnsbacktoLakeOntario.TheprincipalsafetyrelatedfunctionsoftheSWsystemistheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorvia'heComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System,providecoolingwatertothedieselgenerators(DGs)andcontainmentrecirculationfancoolers(CRFCs)andtoprovideasafetyrelatedsourceofwatertotheAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheSWSystemisforoneSW.traininconjunctionwitha100%capacitycontainmentcoolingsystem(i.e.,CRFC)toprovideforheatremovalfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB)insidecontainmenttoensurecontainmentintegrity.TheSWSystemisalsodesigned,inconjunctionwiththeCCWSystemanda100%capacityEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemandcontainmentcoolingsystem,toremovethelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumpduringtherecirculationphase(Ref.2).ThispreventsthecontainmentsumpfluidfromincreasingintemperatureduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandprovidesforagradualreductioninth'etemperatureofthisfluidasitisrecirculatedtotheReactorCoolantSystembytheECCSpumps.TheSWSystemisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingacoincidentlossofoffsitepower.Followingthereceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,allfourSWpumpsaredesignedtostart(ifnotalreadyrunning)tosupplythesystemloads.Ifacoincidentsafetyinjectionandundervoltagesignaloccurs,theneachnonsafetyrelatedandnonessentialloadwithintheSWSystemisisolatedbyredundantmotoroperatedvalvesthatarepoweredbyseparateClasslEelectricaltrains.TheSWpumpsaresequencedtostartwithin17secondsfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheselectedSWpumpsaresequencedtostartaftera40secondtimedelayfollowinganundervoltagesignalontheelectricalbussupplyingtheselectedpump(i.e.,Bus17orBus18).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-49DraftA SWSystemB3.7.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSWsystem,inconjunctionwiththeCCWSystem,canalsocooltheplantfromresidualheatremoval(RHR)entryconditions(T,,<350'F)toMODE5(T.,<200'F)duringnormaloperations.Thetimerequiredtocoolfrom350'Fto200'FisqfunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRSystemtrainsthatareoperating.SinceSWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsinfailingtheSWSystemtopotentiallymultiplesafetyrelatedfunctions.TheSWsystemhasbeenevaluatedtodemonstratethecapabilitytomeetcoolingneedswithanassumed500galleak.TheSWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornados.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofSWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAFWSystems)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).ThetemperatureofthefluidsuppliedbytheSWSystemisalsoaconsiderationintheaccidentanalyses.IfthecoolingwatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfancoolersandCCWheatexchangersistoowarm,theaccidentanalyseswithrespecttocontainmentpressureresponsefollowingaSLBandthecontainmentsumpfluidtemperaturefollowing.aLOCAmaynolongerbebounding.Ifthecoolingwatersupplyistoocold,thecontainmentheatremovalsystems'aybemoreefficientthanassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thiscausesthebackpressureincontainmenttobereducedwhichpotentiallyresultsinincreasedpeakcladtemperatures.TheSWsystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIntheeventofaDBA,oneSWtrainandtheloopheaderisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovidetheminimumheatremovalcapabilitytoensurethatthesystemfunctionstoremovepostaccidentheatloadsasassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofSWandtheloopheadermustbeOPERABLE.AtleastoneSWtrainwilloperateassumingthattheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwiththelossofoffsitepower.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-50DraftA

SWSystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)ASWtrainisdefinedbasedonelectricalpowersourcesuchthatSWPumpsAandCformonetrainandSWPumpsBandDformthesecondtrain.ASWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhenonepumpinthetrainisOPERABLEandcapableoftakingsuctionfromthescreenhouseandprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheaderasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Thisincludesconsiderationofavailablenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)totheSWpumpsandthetemperatureofthesuctionsource.ThefollowingaretheminimumrequirementsofthescreenhousebaywithrespecttoOPERABILITYoftheSWpumps:a.Level>5feet;andb.Temperature>35'Fabove50%RTPand<80'F.Thelowerscreenhousebaytemperatureisonlyspecifiedabove50%RTPsincethisvalueisonlyaconsiderationwhenevaluatingLOCAatornearfullpowerconditions.Inaddition,ifaSWpumpfailsonInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead),thepumpisonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses(Ref.1).AnOPERABLESWtrainalsorequiresthatallnonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedloadscanbeisolatedbythesixmotoroperatedisolationvalveswhicharepoweredfromthesameClass1Eelectricaltrainasthepumps.Therefore,motoroperatedvalves4609,4614,4615,4616,4663,and4670mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsAandCwhilevalves4613,4664,4733,4734,4735,and4780mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsBandD.TheSWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwaterfromeachOPERABLESWtraintothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a.FourCRFCs;b.TwoCCWheatexchangers;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-51DraftA SWSystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)c.TwoDGs;d.ThreepreferredAFWpumps;e.TwostandbyAFWpumps;andf.Threesafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolers.AnOPERABLESWloopheaderalsorequiresaflowpaththroughthedieselgenerator(4665,4760,4669,and4668B)andCRFC(4756and4639)cross-ties.TheSWtrainsandloopheaderareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheycansupply:a.TheCRFCs,DGsandsafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolersimmediatelyfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal(i.e.,aftertheloopheaderbecomesrefilled);b.ThepreferredAFWandSAFWpumpswithin10minutesfollowingreceiptofalowSGlevelsignal;andc.TheCCWheatexchangerswithin46minutesfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheSWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeofbothSWpumptrainsandendsatthefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.SincetheSWSystemdischargesbacktoLakeOntario,thecoolingwaterflowpaththroughtheabovecomponentsandsubsequentdischargeisaddressedundertheirrespectiveLCO.Thisincludes:a.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3;"b.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODE4;"c.LCO3.6.6,"CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems;""*d.LCO3.7.5,"AFWSystems;"e.LCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem;"(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-52DraftA SW.SystemB3.7.8BASESLCO(continued)f.LCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4;"andg.LCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."TheSWpipinginsidecontainmentfortheCRFCsandthereactorcompartmentcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationbarrier.'hisisaddressedunderLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarriers."APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,theSWSystemisanormallyoperatingsystemwhichmustbecapableofperformingitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAorlossofcontainmentintegrityfollowingaSLB.InMODES5and6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheSWsystemaredeterminedbyLCO3.6.6,LCO3.7.7,andLCO3.8.2.ACTIONSA.lIfoneSWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLESWtrainisadequatetoperformthe-heatremovalfunction.,However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLESWtraincouldresultinlossofSWSystemfunction.The72hourCompletionTimeisb'asedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-53DraftA

SWSystem83.7.8BASESACTIONS(continued)B.IandB.2IftheSWtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.lC.2andC.3WithbothSWtrainsortheloopheaderinoperable,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestoreOPERABLEstatustooneSWtrainortheloopheader..InthisCondition,thereisnoOPERABLESWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisthelossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofSWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE4withinI'2hours.TheallowedComplet'ionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantshouldnotexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,enterMODE5)untilat'eastoneSWtrainortheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-54(continued)DraftA

SWSystem.B3.7.8BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCESR3.7.8.1REQUIREMENTSVerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheSWflowpathservicingpost-*accidentrelatedequipmentprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathsexistforSWoperation.ThisincludesverificationoftheSWcross-connectvalves.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortobeinglocked,sealed,orsecured.'ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheSWflowtoindividualcomponentsorsystemsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperable,butdoes'otaffecttheOPERABIlITYoftheSWSystem.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-55DraftA

SWSystemB3.7.8BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.7.8.2RE(UIREHENTS(continued)'hisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSWmotoroperatedisolationvalvesonanactualorsimulatedactuation.signal.SWisanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedaspartofnormaltesting.ThisSurveillanceisnotrequiredforvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredintherequiredpositionunderadministrativecontrols.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ISR3.7.8.3jThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSWpumpsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.SWisanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedaspartofnormaltestingduringnormaloperation.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewere.performedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.2.1.2.UFSAR,Section6.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-56DraftA

CREATSB3.7.9B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.9ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)BASESBACKGROUNDAccordingtoAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDCll(Ref.1),acontrolroomshallbeprovidedwhichpermitscontinuousoccupancyunderanycrediblepostaccidentconditionwithoutexcessiveradiationexposuresofpersonnel.ExposurelimitsareprovidedinGDC19of10CFR50,AppendixA(Ref.2)whichrequiresthatcontrolroompersonnelberestrictedto5remwholebody,oritsequivalency,forthedurationof,theaccident.TheCREATSprovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontroltheplantfollowinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivity.TheCREATSispartoftheControlBuildingventilationsystem.TheCREATSconsistsofahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filter,activatedcharcoalabsorbersforremovalofgaseousactivity(principallyiodines),andtwofans(controlroomreturnairfanandemergencyreturnairfan).Ductwork,dampers,andinstrumentationalsoformpartofthesystemaswellasdemisterstoremovewater.dropletsfromtheairstream(Ref.3).TheCREATSisanemergencysystem,partsofwhichmayoperateduringnormalplantoperations.ActuationoftheCREATSplacesthesysteminoneoffiveseparatestatesoftheemergencymodeofoperation,depending-ontheinitiationsignal.ThefollowingarethenormalandemergencymodesofoperationfortheGREATS:CREATSModeATheCREATSisinthestandbymodewiththeexceptionthatthecontrolroomreturnairfanisinoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-57DraftA CREATSB3.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeBThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowinganaccidentwitharadiationreleaseasdetectedbyradiationmonitorR-l.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfm(approximatelyonefourthoftheControlBuildingVentilationSystemdesign)throughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.AlloutsideairthatenterstheCREATS,ascontrolledbyanairadjustswitch(S-81),isalsocirculatedthroughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.CREATSModeCThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeBwiththeexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.CREATSModeDThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofsmokewithintheControlBuilding.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemcontinuestodrawoutsideair.However,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfmthroughtheCREATS'ndHEPAfilters.Thiseffectivelypurgesthecontrolroomairenvironment.CREATSModeEThisisthesameGREATSconfigurationasModeDwithexception,thatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupply'flowpath.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-58DraftA CREATSB3.7.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)CREATSModeFThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofatoxicgasasindicatedbythechlorineorammoniadetectors,orhighradiationasdetectedbyR-36(gas),R-37(particulate),orR-38(iodine).Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemalignsitselfconsistentwithModeCexceptthattwodampersineachairsupplypathareisolated.Normallyopenairsupplyisolationdampersarearrangedinseriessothatthefailureofonedampertoclosewillnotresultinabreachofisolation.Theairenteringthecontrolroomiscontinuouslymonitoredbyradiationandtoxicgasdetectors.Onedetectoroutputabovethesetpointwillcauseactuationoftheemergencyradiationstateortoxicgasisolationstate,asrequired.Theactionsofthetoxicgasandhighradiationstate(ModeF)aremorerestrictive,andwilloverridetheactionsoftheemergencyradiationstate(HodeBorC).OnlythehighradiationstateCREATSModeFisaddressed.bythisLCO.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelocationofcomponentsandCREATSrelatedductingwithinthecontrolroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesupplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.TheCREATSprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperatorsinMODES1,2,3,and4,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentandsteamgeneratortuberupture(Ref.3).ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.InMODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-59DraftA CREATSB3.7.9BASESAPPLICABLETheCREATSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicySAFETYANALYSESStatement.(continued)'COTheCREATSiscomprisedofafiltrationtrainandtwoindependentandredundantisolationdampertrainsallofwhicharerequiredtobeOPERABLE.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultinexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorsintheeventofalargeradioactiverelease.TheCREATSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytopermitCREATSNodeFoperationareOPERABLE.TheCREATSfiltrationtrainisOPERABLEwhentheassociated:'a~b.ControlroomreturnairandemergencyreturnairfansareOPERABLEandcapableofprovidingforcedflow;HEPAfiltersandcharcoalabsorbersfortheemergencyreturnairfanarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andarecapableofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andc.Ductwork,valves,anddampers(includingAKD09)areOPERABLE,andaircirculationcanbemaintained.-TheCREATSisolationdampersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthedamper(AKD01,AKD04,AKD05,AKD08,andAKD10)cancloseonanactuationsignaltoisolateoutsideairorisclosedwithmotiveforceremoved.Twodampersareprovidedforeachoutsideairpath.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-60DraftA CREATSB3.7.9BASESLCO(continued)Inaddition,thecontrolroomboundarymustbemaintained,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdoors.Openingoftheaccessdoorsforentryandexitdoesnotviolatethecontrolroomboundary.Anaccessdoormaybeopenedforextendedperiodsprovidedadedicatedindividualisstationedattheaccessdoortoensureclosure,ifrequired(i.e.,theindividualperformstheisolationfunction),thedoorisabletobeclosed,andtheCREATSfiltrationtrainisOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDBA.InMODE5or6,theCREATSisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuel,handlingaccident.ACTIONSA.landA.2MiththeCREATSfiltrationtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisCondition,theisolationdampersareadequateto.performthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbutnomeansexisttofiltertherelease'fradioactivegaswithinthecontrolroom.The48hourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoisolatethe.controlroom.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-61DraftA

CREATSB3.7.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.IWithoneCREATSisolationdamperinoperableforoneormoreoutsideairflowpaths,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECREATSisolationdamperisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailurein.theOPERABLECREATSisolationdampercouldresultinlossofCREATSfunction.The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod,andabilityoftheremainingisolationdampertoprovidetherequiredisolationcapability.C.IandC.2InMODEI,2,3,or4,iftheRequiredActionsofConditionsAorBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3.within6hours,andinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.D.l0.2andD.3InMODE5or6orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,iftheRequiredActionsofConditionsAorBcannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,actionmustbetakentoimmediatelyplacetheOPERABLEisolationdamper(s)inCREATSModeF.Thisactionensuresthattheremainingdamper(s)areOPERABLE,thatnofailurespreventingautomaticactuationwilloccur,andthatanyactivefailurewouldbereadilydetected.Inaddition,actionmustbeimmediatelytakentosuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ThisrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandthesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-62DraftA CREATS83.7.9BASESACTIONS(continued)E.1InMODE1,2,3,or4,ifbothCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreairsupplyflowpathsareinoperable,theCREATSmaynotbecapableofperformingtheintendedfunctionandtheplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Failureoftheintegrityofthecontrolroomboundary(i.e.,walls,floors,ceilings,ductworkoraccessdoors)alsoresultsinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.F.landF.2andF.3InMODE.5or6,duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies'withtwoCREATSisolationdampersforoneormoreairsupplyflowpathsinoperable,actionmustbetakenimmediatelyto'restoreoneisolationdamperineachaffectedairsupplypathtoOPERABLEstatus.Inaddition,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ThisrequiresthesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandthesuspensionofmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Thisplacestheplantin'aconditionthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.9.1Standbysystemsshouldbecheckedperiodicallytoensurethattheyfunctionproperly.Astheenvironmentandnormaloperatingconditionsonthissystemarenottoosevere,testingeachCREATSfiltrationtrainonceevery31daysforZ15minutesprovidesanadequatecheckofthissystem.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthereliabilityoftheequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-63IDraftA CREATSB3.7.9BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.7.9.2REQUIREMENTS(continued)'hisSRverifiesthattherequiredCREATStestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheCREATSfiltertestsareingeneralaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).TheVFTPincludestestingtheperformanceoftheHEPAfilter,charcoalabsorberefficiency,minimumflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.SpecifictestFrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.SR3.7.9.3ThisSRverifiesthattheCREATSfiltrationtrainstartsandoperatesandeachCREATSisolationdamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC11,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC19.3.UFSAR,Section6.4..4.RegulatoryGuide1'2,Revision2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-64DraftA ABVSB3.7.10B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.10AuxiliaryBuildingVentilationSystem(ABVS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheABVSfiltersairborneradioactiveparticulatesfromtheareaofthespentfuelpool(SFP)followingafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVS,inconjunctionwithothernormallyoperatingsystems,alsoprovidesenvironmentalcontroloftemperatureandhumidityintheAuxiliaryBuildingincludingtheSFParea.TheABVSconsistsofanair'handlingunit,aseriesofexhaustfans,charcoalfilters,ductwork,anddampers(Ref.1).TheexhaustfansincludethefollowingfanswhichalldischargeintoacommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansAandB:a.IntermediateBuildingexhaustfansAandB;b.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC;c.AuxiliaryBuildingcharcoalfilterfansAandB;d.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanG;ande.ControlaccessexhaustfansAandB.tTheonlycomponentswhichfiltertheenvironmentassociatedwiththeSFParetheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC.Therefore,thesearetheonlyfansconsideredwithrespecttotheABVSinthisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-65DraftA ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)BACKGROUND(continued)AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtakessuctionfromtheSFPanddecontaminationpitareasontheoperatingleveloftheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheairisfirstdrawnthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemwhichconsistsofroughingfiltersandcharcoalabsorbers.Theroughingfiltersprotectthecharcoalabsorbersfrombeingfouledwithdirtparticleswhilethecharcoalabsorbersremovetheradioactiveiodinesfromtheatmosphere.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCthendischargesintothecommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans.Thiscommonductworkcontainsahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filt'erwhichisnotcreditedinthedoseanalyses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansareeach100%capacityfanswhichcanmaintainanegativepressureontheoperatingflooroftheAuxiliaryBuildingthroughorientationofthesystemdampers.ThisnegativepressurecausesairflowontheoperatingfloortobetowardtheSFPwhichensuresthatairinthevicinityoftheSFPisfirstfilteredthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandexhaustfanCarepoweredfromnon-EngineeredSafeguardsFeaturesbuses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansdischargetotheplantventstack.Theplantventstackiscontinuouslymonitoredfornoblegases(R-14),particulates(R-13)andiodine(R-108).Duringnormalpoweroperation,theABVSisplacedinthe"out"modebytheinterlockmodeswitchwhere"out"definesthestatusoftheSFPcharcoalfilters.ThiscausesallexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingtheAuxiliaryBuildingHainexhaustfans)andAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtotripuponasignalfromR-lOB,R-13orR-14tostopthereleaseofanyradioactivegases.Duringfuelmovementwithin-theAuxiliaryBuilding,theinterlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"modesuchthatonlyexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans)aretripped.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-66(continued)DraftA ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheABVSdesignbasisisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA),whichisafuelhandlingaccident.Theanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccident,giveninReference2,assumesthatallfuelrodsinanassemblyaredamaged.TheDBAanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccidentassumesthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,theSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem,andoneAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanisfunctional.Theaccidentanalysisaccountsforthereduction.inairborneradioactivematerialprovidedbytheminimumfiltrationsystemcomponentswhichresultinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).Thefailureofanyorallofthesefiltrationsystemcomponentsresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.ThefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsandtheanalysisfollowtheguidanceprovidedinRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).TheABVSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatoffsitedosesarewellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)followingafuelhandlingaccidentintheAuxiliary-Building.ThefailureoftheABVScoincidentwithafuel.handlingaccidentresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.TheABVSisconside'redOPERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytocontrolexposureintheAuxiliaryBuildingfollowingafuelhandlingaccidentareOPERABLEandinoperation.TheABVSisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitsassociated:'a~b.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCandeitherAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanAorBisOPERABLEandinoperation;AuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanHEPAfilterandSFPcharcoaladsorbersarenotexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemiscapableofperformingitsfiltrationfunction;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-67DraftA ABVSB3.7.10BASESLCO(continued)c.Ductwork,,valves,anddampersareOPERABLE,andaircirculationandnegativepressurecanbemaintainedontheAuxiliaryBuildingoperatingfloor;andd.Interlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"mode.APPLICABILITYDuringmovementofirradiatedfuelintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoalleviatetheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccident.TheABVSisonlyrequiredwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.Anyfuelhandlingaccidentwhichoccursafter60daysresultsinoffsitedoseswhicharewellwithin10CFR100limits(Ref.3)duetothedecayrateofiodine.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,theABVSisnotNODEdependantandonlyrequiredwhenirradiatedfuelisbeingmoved.ACTIONSA.1WhentheABVSisinoperable,actionmustbetakentoplacetheplantinaconditioninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.ActionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuilding.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffueltoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-68(continued)DraftA ABVSB3.7.10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS-SR3.7.10.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheABVSandtheintegrityoftheAuxiliaryBuildingenclosure.TheabilityoftheAuxiliaryBuildingtomaintainnegativepressurewithrespecttotheuncontaminatedoutsideenvironmentisperiodicallyverifiedtoensureproperfunctionoftheABVS.Duringfuelmovementoperations,theABVSisdesignedtomaintainaslightnegativepressureintheAuxiliaryBuilding,topreventunfilteredLEAKAGE.ThisSRensuresthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,andeitherAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfanAorBareinoperation,anegativepressureisbeingmaintainedintheAuxiliaryBuilding,andthattheABVSinterlockmodeswitchisinthecorrectposition.TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgementandshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.7.'10.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemtestingisperformedinaccordance'iththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).'TheSFPCharcoalAbsorberSystemfiltertestsareingeneralaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.5).TheVFTPincludestestingcharcoalabsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section9.4.2.2.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.2.3.10CFR100.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Rev.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-69,DraftA SFPWaterLevelB3.7.1183.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.11SpentFuelPool(SFP)WaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDTheminimumwaterlevelinthespentfuelpool(SFP)meetstheassumptionsofiodinedecontaminationfactorsfollowingafuelhandlingaccident.Thespecifiedwaterlevelprovidesprotectionagainstexceedingtheoffsitedoselimits.TheSFPisaseismicallydesignedstructurelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuilding(Ref.1).Thepoolisinternallycladwithstainlesssteelthathasaleakchasesystemateachweldseamtominimizeaccidentaldrainagethroughtheliner.TheSFPisalsoprovidedwithabarrierbetweenthespentfuelstorageracksandthefueltransfersystemwinch.Thisbarrier,uptotheheightofthespentfuelracks,preventsinadvertentdrainageoftheSFPviathefueltransfertube.TheSFPCoolingSystemisdesignedtomaintainthepool<120Fduringnormalconditionsandrefuelingoperations(Ref.2).ThecoolingsystemnormallytakessuctionnearthesurfaceoftheSFPsuchthatafailureofanypipeinthesystemwillnotdrainthepool.Thecoolingsystemreturnlinetothe'poolalsocontainsa0.25inchventholelocatedneartheSFPsurfaceleveltopreventsiphoning.Finally,controlboardalarmsexistwithrespecttotheSFPlevelandtemperature.ThesefeaturesallhelptopreventinadvertentdrainingoftheSFP.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheminimumwaterlevelintheSFPisanassumptionofthefuelhandlingaccidentdescribedintheUFSAR(Ref.3)andRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).Theresultant2hourthyroiddoseperpersonattheexclusionareaboundaryasbasedonthisassumptionisasmallfractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.5)limits.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-70DraftA SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)'asedontherequirementsofReference4,theremustbe23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthedamagedfuelbundleandthefuelpoolsurfaceduringafuelhandlingaccident.With23ftofwateravailable,theassumptionsofReference4canbeuseddirectly.-Theseassumptionsincludetheuseofadecontaminationfactorof100intheanalysisforiodine.Adecontaminationfactorof100enablestheanalysistoassumethat99KofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofalldroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytheSFPwater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory.Inpractice,thisLCOpreservesthisassumptionforthebulkofthefuelinthestorage,racks.Inthecaseofasinglebundledroppedandlyinghorizontallyontopofthespentfuelstorageracks,however,theremaybe<23ftofwaterbetweenthetopofthefuelbundleandthesurface,indicatedbythewidthofthebundleanddifferencebetweenthetopoftherackandactivefuel.Tooffsetthissmallnonconservatism,theanalysisassumesthatallfuelrodsfail,althoughanalysisshowsthatonlythefirstfewrowsfailfromahypotheticalmaximumdrop.TheSFPwaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheSFPwaterlevelisrequiredtobeZ23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.Thespecifiedwaterlevelpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.3).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredduringmovementofirradiatedfuel.assemblieswithintheSFP.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-71(continued)DraftA

SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES.(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOappliesduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthespentfuelpool,sincethepotentialforareleaseoffissionproductsexists.Sinceafuelhandling.accidentcanonlyoccurduringmovementoffuel,thisLCOisnotapplicableduringotherconditions.DuringrefuelingoperationsinHODE6,theSFPwaterlevel(andboronconcentration)areinequilibriumwiththerefuelingwatercavity.ThewaterlevelundertheseconditionsisthencontrolledbyLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel"whichrequirestherefuelingcavitywaterleveltobemaintainedz23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Arefuelingcavitywaterlevelofz23feetabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangewillresultin>23feetofwaterabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracksassumingthatatmosphericpressurewithincontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuildingareequivalent.ACTIONSA.1Whentheinitialconditionsassumedinthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiscannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoprecludetheaccidentfromoccurring.WhentheSFPwaterlevelislowerthantherequiredlevel,themovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheSFPisimmediatelysuspended.Thisactioneffectivelyprecludestheoccurrenceofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,movementtoanavailablerackposition).RequiredActionA.IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceifmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.Ifmoving-irradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODESI,2,3,and4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-72(continued)DraftA SFPWaterLevelB3.7.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.11.1ThisSRverifiessufficientSFPwaterisavailableintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thewaterlevelinthespentfuelpoolmustbecheckedperiodicallyduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliestoensurethefuelhandlingaccidentassumptionsaremet.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeinthepoolisnormallystableandtheSFPisdesignedtopreventdrainagebelow23ft.Waterlevelchangesarecontrolledbyplantproceduresandareacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.VerificationofSFPwaterlevelcanbeaccomplishedbyseveralmeans.ThetopoftheupperSFPpumpsuctionlineis23ftabovethefuelstoredinthepool.IfthereisZ23ftofwaterabovethereactorvesselflange(asrequiredbyLCO3.9.5),withequalpressureinthecontainmentandtheAuxiliaryBuilding,thenatleast23ftofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracks.Inadditiontothephysicaldesignfeatures,therearetwoSFPlevelalarms(LAL634)whichareavailabletoalerttheoperatorsofchangingSFPlevel.AlowlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelfalls4inchesormorefromthenormallevelwhileahighlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelrises4inchesormorefromthenormallevel.ThesealarmsmustreceiveacalibrationconsistentwithindustrypracticesbeforetheyaretobeusedtomeetthisSR.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.UFSAR,Section9.1.3.3.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,Rev.0.5.10CFR100.11.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-73DraftA SpentFuelPoolBoronConcentrationB3.7.12B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.12SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThewaterinthespentfuelpool(SFP)normallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,<<of0.95bemaintainedintheabsenceofsolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothSFPregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN-16.1-1975(Ref.1)andReference2allowscredit'orsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themo'stsevere'ccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.Eitherscenariocouldp'otentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2..Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.SafeoperationofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewithLCO3.7.17,"FuelAssembliesStorage."Within7dayspriortomovementofanassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12.1.PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7.13.2asapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-74(continued)DraftA SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidents,intheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Ref.3and4).Thefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingin.theSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1to,Region2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconcentrationofdissolvedboronintheSFPsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheSFPboronconcentrationisrequiredtobewithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.ThespecifiedconcentrationofdissolvedboronintheSFPpreservestheassumptionsusedintheanalysesofthepotentialcriticalaccidentscenariosasdescribedinReferences3and4(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident).ThisconcentrationofdissolvedboronistheminimumrequiredconcentrationforfuelassemblystorageandmovementwithintheSFPuntilthefuelassemblieshavebeenverifiedtobestoredcorrectly.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-75(continued)DraftA SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOapplieswheneverfuelassembliesarestoredintheSFP,untilaSFPverificationhasbeenperformedfollowingthelastmovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP.TheSFPverificationisaccomplishedbyperformingSR3.7.13.1orSR3.7.13.2aftermovementoffuelassembliesdependingonwhichSFPregionwasaffectedbythefuelmovement.Iffuelwasmovedintobothregions,thenbothSR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2mustbeperformedafterthecompletionoffuelmovementbeforeexitingtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.ThisLCOdoesnotapplyfollowingtheverification,sincetheverificationwouldconfirmthattherearenomisloadedfuelassemblies.Withnofurtherfuelassemblymovementsinprogress,thereisnopotentialforamisloadedfuelassemblyoradroppedfuelassembly.ThisLCOdoesnotapplytofuelmovementwithinaSFPregionsincetheaccident'analysesassumeeachregioniscompletelyfilledinaninfinitearray.ACTIONSA.lA.2.1andA.2.2WhentheconcentrationofboronintheSFPi'slessthanrequired,immediateactionmustbetakentoprecludetheoccurrenceofanaccidentortomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentinprogress.Thisismostefficientlyachievedbyimmediatelysuspendingthemovementoffuelassemblies.Theconcentrationofboronisrestoredsimultaneouslywithsuspendingmovementoffuelassemblies.AnacceptablealternativeistoimmediatelyinitiateactiontoperformaSFPverification(SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2).TheperformanceofthisverificationremovestheplantfromtheApplicabilityofthisLCO.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition(e.g.,movementtoanavailabler'ackposition).'heRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinMODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinNODE1,2,3,or4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementoffuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-76(continued)DraftA SFPBoronConcentrationB3.7.12BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.12.1ThisSRverifiesthattheconcentrationofboronintheSFPiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.AslongasthisSRismet,theanalyzedaccidentsarefullyaddressed.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevolumeandboronconcentrationinthepoolisnormallystableandallwaterlevelchangesandboronconcentrationchangesarecontrolledbyplantprocedures.ThisSRisrequiredtobeperformedpriortofuelassemblymovementintoRegion1orRegion2andmustcontinuetobeperformeduntilthenecessarySFPverificationisaccomplished(i.e.,SR3.7.13.1and3.7.13.2).REFERENCESl.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableMaterialsOutsideReactors."2.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.3.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.4.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-77DraftA SFPStorageB3.7.13B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSrB3.7.13SpentFuelPool(SFP)StorageBASESBACKGROUNDThespentfuelpool(SFP)isdividedintotwoseparateanddistinctregions(seeFigureB3.7.13-1)which,forthepurposeofcriticalityconsiderations,areconsideredasseparatepools(Ref.1).Region1,with176storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodateneworspentfuelutilizingatwooffourcheckerboardarrangement.Afuelassemblywithanenrichmentof<4.05wt%canbestoredatanyavailablelocationinRegion1sincetheaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingthatRegion1wasfilledwithfuelassembliesofthisenrichment.Afuelassemblywithanenrichment>4.05wt%U-235canalsobestoredinRegion1providedthatintegralburnablepoisonsarepresentintheassembliessuchthatk-infinityinthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditionsis<1.458.TheexistingdesignusesIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbers(IFBAs)asthepoisonforfuelassemblieswithenrichments>4.05wt%.IFBAsconsistofneutronabsorbingmaterialwhichprovidesequivalencingreactivityholddown(i.e.,neutronpoison)thatallowsstorageofhigherenrichmentfuel.Theneutronabsorbingmaterialisanon-removableorintegralpartofthefuelassemblyonceitisapplied.Theinfinitemultiplicationfactor,K-infinity,isareferencecriticalitypointofeachfuelassemblythatifmaintained<1.458,willresultinak,<<<0.95forRegion1.TheK-infinitylimitisderivedforconstantconditionsofnormalreactorcoreconfiguration(i.e.,typicalgeometryoffuelassembliesinverticalpositionarrangedinaninfinitearray)atcoldconditions(i.e.,68'Fand14.7psia).Region2,with840,storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithintheacceptabledomainaccordingtoFigure3.7.13-1,intheaccompanyingLCO.ThestorageoffuelassemblieswhicharewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1inRegion2ensuresaK,<<<0.95inthisregion.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-78(continued)DraftA SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscanalsobestoredineitherregionintheSFPprovidedthattheminimumburnup.ofFigure3.7.17-1ismet.Inaddition,allcanistersplacedintoserviceafter1994musthave<144rodsorZ256ro'ds(Ref.2).Thecanistersarestainlesssteelcontainerswhichcontainthefuelrodsofamaximumoftwofuelassemblies(i.e.,358rods).Allbowed,broken,orotherwisefailedfuelrodsarefirststoredinastainlesssteeltubeof0.75inchouterdiameterbeforebeingplacedinacanister.Eachcanisterwillaccommodate110failedfuelrodtubes.ThewaterintheSFPnormallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlost,specifythatalimitingk,<<of0.95bemaintainedintheabsenceofsolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothregionsisbasedontheuseofunboratedwatersuchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovement.ofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement)maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditionduringnormaloperationwiththeregionsfullyloaded.ThedoublecontingencyprinciplediscussedinANSIN16.1-1975(Ref.3)andReference4allowscreditforsolubleboronunderabnormaloraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredatonetime.Forexample,themostsevereaccidentscenariosareassociatedwiththemovementoffuelfromRegion1toRegion2,andaccidentalmisloadingofafuelassemblyinRegion2.EitherscenariocouldpotentiallyincreasethereactivityofRegion2.Tomitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.SafeoperationofthestoragerackswithnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordancewiththisLCO.Within7dayspriortomovementofanassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisnecessarytoperformSR3.7.12.1.PriortomovinganassemblyintoaSFPregion,itisalsonecessarytoperformSR3.7.13.1or3.7.13.2asapplicable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-79(continued)DraftA

SFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Refs.2and5).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenariowithrespecttoreactivity;Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiod'forpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimited'toasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.TheconfigurationoffuelassembliesinthespentfuelpoolsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTherestrictionsontheplacementoffuelassemblieswithintheSFPensurethek.<<oftheSFPwillalwaysremain<0.95,assumingthepooltobefloodedwithunboratedwater(Specification4.3.1.1).Forfuelassembliesstored.inRegion1,eachassemblymusthaveaK-infinityof~1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationatcoldconditions.Normalreactorcoreconfigurationisthetypicalgeometryoffuelassembliesintheverticalpositionarrangedinaninfinitearray.Coldconditionsisdefinedas68Fandanatmosphericpressureof14.7psia.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-80DraftA

SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESLCO(continued)ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion2,initialenrichmentandburnupshallbewithin'heacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.Thex-axisofFigure3.7.13-1isthenominalU-235enrichmentwt%whichdoesnotincludethe+0.05wt%*tolerancethatisallowedforfuelmanufacturingandlistedinSpecification4.3.1.1.APPLICABILITY,ThisLCOapplieswheneveranyfuelassemblyisstoredintheSFP.ACTIONSA.1WhentheconfigurationoffuelassembliesstoredineitherRegion1orRegi'on2oftheSFPis'otwithintheLCOlimits,theimmediateactionistoinitiateactiontomakethenecessaryfuelassemblymovement(s)tobringtheconfigurationintocompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.Thiscompliancecanbemadebyrelocatingthefuelassemblytoadifferentregion.RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatLCO3.0.3doesnotapplysinceiftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinMODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfunabletomoveirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1,2,3,or4,theactionisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytomovefuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-81'continued)DraftA hSFPStorageB3.7.13BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.13.1ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheK-infinityofeachfuelassemblyis<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationatcoldconditionspriortostorageinRegion1.Iftheinitialenrichment'ofafuelassemblyis<4.05wt%,aK-infinityofs1.458isalwaysmaintained.Forfuelassemblieswithenrichment>4.05wth,aminimumnumberofIFBAsmustbepresentineachfuelassemblysuchthatk-infinityg1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationatcoldconditionspriortostorageinRegion1.Thisverificationisonlyrequiredonceforeachfuelassemblysincetheburnablepoisons,ifrequired,areanintegralpartofthefuelassemblyandwillnotberemoved.Theinitialenrichmentofeachassemblywillalsonotchange(i.e.,increase)whilepartiallyburnedassembliesarelessreactivethanwhen'heywerenew(i.e.,fresh).PerformanceofthisSRensurescompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion1toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12,"SFPBoronConcentration."ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisverificationisnotrequiredwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.TheverificationisnotrequiredsinceRegion2isthelimitingSFPregion,andas.such,thefuelhasalreadybeenverified.tobeacceptableforstorageinRegionl.SR3.7.13.2ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthattheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.13-1intheaccompanyingLCOpriortostorageinRegion2.OnceafuelassemblyhasbeenverifiedtobewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,furtherverificationsarenolongerrequiredsincetheinitialenrichmentorburnupwillnotadverselychange.ForfuelassembliesintheunacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,performanceofthisSRwillensurecompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-82DraftA SFPStorageB3.7.13BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.13.2(continued)ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion2toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.1.2.2.Westinghouse,"CriticalityAnalysisoftheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantFreshandSpentFuelRacks,andConsolidatedRodStorageCanisters,"datedJune1994.3.ANSIN16.1-1975,"AmericanNationalStandardforNuclearCriticalitySafetyinOperationswithFissionableHaterialsOutsideReactors."4.LetterfromB.K.Grimes,NRC,toAllPowerReactorLicensees,

Subject:

"OTPositionforReviewandAcceptanceofSpentFuelStorageandHandlingApplications,"datedApril14,1978.5.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-83DraftA SFPStorageB3.7.13SpentFuelStorageRacksNHWA1KRBOXES0STORAOECELLSREGION1RCSTORAOECAPACITY176IOOXSTORAOECAPACITYNO~TOTALCAPACITY10I6FUELASSEhBLIESFigureB3.7.13.1SpentFuelPoolR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-84DraftA SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.14SecondarySpecificActivityBASES*BACKGROUNDActivityinthesecondarycoolantresultsfromsteamgenerator(SG)tubeoutleakagefromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Understeadystateconditions,theactivityisprimarilyiodineswithrelativelyshorthalflivesand,thus,indicatescurrentconditions.Duringtransients,I-131spikescanbeobservedaswellasincreasedreleasesofsomenoblegases.Otherfissionproductisotopes,aswellasactivatedcorrosionproductsinlesseramounts,mayalsobefoundinthe'econdarycoolant.Alimitonsecondarycoolantspecificactivityduringpoweroperationminimizesreleasestotheenvironmentbecauseofnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andDesignBasisaccidents(DBAs).ThislimitisbasedonanactivityvaluethatmightbeexpectedfromaO.lgpmtubeleak(LCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE")ofprimarycoolantatthelimitof1.0pCi/gm(LCO3.4.16,"RCSSpecificActivity").Asteamlinebreak(SLB)isassumedtoresultinthereleaseofthenoblegasandiodineactivitycontainedintheSGinventory,thefeedwater,andthereactorcoolantLEAKAGE.Hostoftheiodineisotopeshaveshorthalflives(i.e.,<20hours).I-131,withahalflifeof8.04days,concentratesfasterthanitdecays,butdoesnotreachequilibriumbecauseofblowdownandotherlosses.Withthespecifiedactivitylimit,theresultant2hourthyroiddosetoapersonattheexclusionareaboundary(EAB)wouldbeapproximately10remifthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs)wereleftopenfor2hoursfollowingatripfromfullpower.Operatingaplantattheallowablelimitscouldresultina2hourEABexposureofasmallfractionof-the10CFR100(Ref.1)limits.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-85(continued)DraftA

SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccidentanalysisoftheSLB,(Ref.2)assumestheinitialsecondarycoolantspecificactivitytohavearadioactiveisotopeconcentrationof0.10pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131.Thisassumptionisusedintheanalysisfordeterminingtheradiologicalconsequencesofthe'ostulatedaccident.Theaccidentanalysis,basedonthisandotherassumptions,showsthattheradiologicalconsequencesofanSLBdonotexceedasmallfractionoftheplantEABlimits(Ref.1)forwholebodyandthyroiddoserates.Withthelossofoffsitepower,theremainingSGisavailableforcoredecayheatdissipationbyventingsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheHSSVsandsteamgeneratoratmosphericreliefvalve(ARV).TheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemsuppliesthenecessarymakeuptotheSG.VentingcontinuesuntilthereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavedecreasedsufficientlyfortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemtocompletethecooldown.Intheevaluationoftheradiologicalconsequencesofthisaccident,theactivityreleasedfromtheSGconnectedtothefailedsteamlineisassumedtobereleaseddirectlytotheenvironmentwithin60seconds.TheunaffectedSG'isassumedtodischargesteamandanyentrainedactivitythroughtheHSSVsand.ARVfortheinitialtwohoursoftheevent.Primarycoolantwasassumedtobe3.0pCi/gmforthisanalysisbasedonpreviouslyallowedlimitswhichisafactorofthreegreaterthancurrentlimitsspecifiedinLCO3.4..16.Sincenocreditistakenintheanalysisforactivityplateoutorretention,theresultantradiologicalconsequencesrepresentaconservativeestimateofthepotentialintegrateddoseduetothepostulatedsteamlinefailure.SecondaryspecificactivitylimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOThespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantisrequiredtobe<0.10pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131tolimittheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBAtoasmallfractionoftherequiredlimit(Ref.1).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.7-86DraftA SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14BASESLCO(continued)Monitoringthespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantensuresthatwhensecondaryspecificactivitylimitsareexceeded,appropriateactionsaretakeninatimelymannertoplacetheplantinanoperationalHODEthatwouldminimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thelimitsonsecondaryspecificactivityapplyduetothepotentialforsecondarysteamreleasestotheatmospherefromaSLB.InMODES5and6,theSGsarenotbeingusedforheatremoval.BoththeRCSandSGsaredepressurized,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisminimal.Therefore,monitoringofsecondaryspecificactivityisnotrequired.ACTIONSA.landA.2DOSEE(UIVALENTI-131exceedingtheallowablevalueinthesecondarycoolant,isanindicationofaproblemintheRCSandcontributestoincreasedpostaccidentdoses.IfthesecondaryspecificactivityisnotwithinlimitstheplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within8hours,andinMODE5'within40hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-87(continued)DraftA BASES(continued)SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.14SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.14.1ThisSRverifiesthatthesecondaryspecificactivityiswithinthelimitsoftheaccidentanalysis.Agammaisotopicanalysisofthesecondarycoolant,whichdeterminesDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131,confirmsthevalidityofthesafetyanalysisassumptionsastothesourcetermsinpostaccidentreleases.ItalsoservestoidentifyandtrendanyunusualisotopicconcentrationsthatmightindicatechangesinreactorcoolantactivityorLEAKAGE.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonthedetectionofin'creasingtrendsofthelevelofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,andallowsforappropriateactiontobetakentomaintainlevelsbelowtheLCOlimit.REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGEE,

Subject:

"SEPTopic,XV-2,SpectrumofSteamSystemPipingFailuresInsideandOutsideContainment;XV-12,SpectrumofRodEjectionAccidents;XV-16,RadiologicalConsequencesofFailureofSmallLinesCarryingPrimaryCoolantOutsideContainment;XV-17,SteamGeneratorTubeFailure;andXV-20,RadiologicalConsequencesofFuelDamagingAccidents-R.E.Ginna,"datedSeptember24,1981.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.7-88DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.13.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.1ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.1ThefollowingACelectricalsourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepowersourcecircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses;andb.Twoemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)capableofsupplyingtheirrequiredonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Nooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es).A.lANDA.2Declarerequiredfeature(s)inoperablewhenitsredundantrequiredfeature(s)isinoperable.RestoreoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.12hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionAconcurrentwithinoperabili.tyofredundantrequiredfeature(s)72hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-1DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.OneDGinoperable.B.1ANDB.2ANDB.3.1ORPerformSR3.8.1.1fortheoffsitecircuit.Declarerequiredfeature(s)supportedbytheinoperableDG.inoperablewhenitsrequiredredundantfeature(s)isinoperable.DetermineOPERABLEDGisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure.1hourANDOnceper12hoursthereafter4hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionBconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequired feature(s)24hoursB.3.2PerformSR3.8.1.2forOPERABLEDG.ANDB.4RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.24hours7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-2DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONC.Nooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es).ANDOneDGinoperable.REQUIREDACTION-----------NOTE--------------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActions,ofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4,"whenConditionCisenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.C.1RestorerequiredoffsitecircuittoOPERABLE.status.ORC.2RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.COMPLETIONTIME12hours12hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.TwoDGsinoperable.E.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-3DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityfortheoffsitecircuittoeachofthe480Y.safeguardsbuses.7daysSR3.8.1.2NOTES1.PerformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSR.2.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.VerifyeachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.31daysSR3.8.1.3NOTES1.DGloadingsmayincludegradualloadingas'ecommendedbythemanufacturer.h2.Momentarytransientsoutsidetheloadrangedonotinvalidatethistest.3.ThisSurveillanceshallbeconductedononlyoneDGatatime.VerifyeachDGissynchronizedandloadedandoperatesforZ60minutesand<120minutesataload>1950kWand<2250,kW.31daysSR3.8.1.4Verifythefueloillevelineachdaytank.'31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-4DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.1.5VerifytheDGfueloiltransfersystemoperatestotransferfueloilfromeachsto}agetanktotheassociateddaytank.31daysSR3.8.1.6VerifytransferofACpowersourcesfromthepreferredoffsitecircuit(50/50mode)tothealternateoffsitecircuit(100/0modeand0/100mode).24monthsSR3.8.1.7---------------NOTEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,-2,3,or4.VerifyeachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof>295kW.24monthsSR3.8.1.8NOTEThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4..VerifyeachDG'sautomatictripsarebypassedonanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjection(SI)signalexcept:a.Engineoverspeed;b.Lowlubeoilpressure;andc.Startfailure(overcrank)relay.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-5DraftA

ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.1SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3819-----------------NOTES1.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinHODE1,2,3,or4.VerifyonanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal:a.De-energizationof480Vsafeguardsbuses;24monthsb.C.Loadsheddingfrom480Vsafeguardsbuses;andDGauto-startsfromstandbycondition,energizesautomaticallyconnectedemergencyloads,andoperatesfor~5minutes.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-6DraftA ACSources-MODES5and63.8.23.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.2ACSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.2lThefollowingACelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.Onequalifiedindependentoffsitepowersourcecircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardbusesrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6";andb.Oneemergencydieselgenerator(DG)capableofsupplyingonetrainoftheonsitesafeguardbus(es)requiredbyLCO3.8.10.APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Nooffsitepowertooneormorerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es).------------NOTE-------------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.10,withonerequiredtrainde-energizedasaresultofConditionA.A.lORDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)withnooffsitepoweravailablefromarequiredcircuitinoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediately(continued)R.E.'innaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-7DraftA aACSources-HODES5and63.8.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.(continued)A.2.2ANDInitiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyA.2.3InitiateactiontorestorerequiredoffsitepowercircuittoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyB.NoDGtotherequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es).B.I~NDB.2ANDB.3SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.InitiateactiontorestorerequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-8DraftA ACSources-NODES5and63.8.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.2.1ForACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRsareapplicable:SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.1.5InaccordancewithapplicableSRsR.E.Ginna.NuclearPowerPlant3.8-9DraftA

DieselFuelOil3.8.33.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.3DieselFuelOilLCO3.8.3Thestoreddieselfueloilshallbewithinlimitsforeachrequiredemergencydieselgenerator(DG).APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONS-----------------NOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachDG.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredDGswithonsitefueloilsupplynotwithinlimit.A.1Restorefueloilleveltowithinlimit.48hoursB.OneormorerequiredDGswithstoredfueloiltotalparticulatesnotwithinlimit.B.lRestorefueloiltotalparticulateswithinlimit.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.OROneormorerequiredDGsdieselfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanConditionAorB.C.1DeclareassociatedDGinoperable.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-10DraftA DieselFuelOil3.8.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.3.1Verifyanonsitesupplyof~5000galofdieselfueloilavailableforeachrequiredDG.31daysSR3.8.3.2Verifyfueloilpropertiesofstoredfueloilaretestedinaccordancewith,andmaintainedwithinthelimitsof,theDieselFuelOilTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeDieselFuelOilTestingProgramR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-11DraftA DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.43.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.4DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4LCO3.8.4TheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable.A.lRestoreDCelectricalpowersource,toOPERABLEstatus.2hoursB.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMode5.6hours36hoursC;BothDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-12DraftA DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and43.8.4SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.4.1Verifybatterychargingcapacityof>150amps.31daysSR3.8.4.2-NOTES-1.SR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedin.HODE1,2,3,or4.Verifybatterycapacityisadequatetosupply,andmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.24months(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-13DraftA DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.4.3NOTE-ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.VerifybatterycapacityisZ80%ofthemanufacturer's,ratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.60monthsAND12monthswhenbatteryshowsdegradation,orhasreached85%ofexpectedlifewithcapacity(100%ofmanufacturer'sratingAND24monthswhenbatteryhasreached85%oftheexpectedlifewithcapacityZ100%ofmanufacturer'sratingR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-14'raftA DCSources-MODES5and63.8.53.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHS3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.5DCelectricalpowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6.",APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersource(s)inoperable.A.lORDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS..ANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyA.2.4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredDCelectricalpowersource(s)toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-15DraftA DCSources-MODES5and63.8.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.5.1ForDCsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRisapplicable:SR3.8.4.1InaccordancewithapplicableSRR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-16DraftA BatteryCellParameters3.8.63.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.6BatteryCellParametersLCO3.8.6BatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesshallbewithinlimits.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4,WhenassociatedDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinCategoryAorBlimits.A.lAND.VerifypilotcellselectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagemeetTableB3.8.6-1CategoryClimits.1hourA.2VerifybatterycellparametersmeetTableB3.8.6-1CategoryClimits.~ND24hoursANDOnceper7daysthereafterA.3RestorebatterycellparameterstoCategoryAandBlimitsofTableB3.8.6-1.31days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-17DraftA BatteryCellParameters3.8.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lDeclareassociatedbatteryinoperable.ImmediatelyOROneormorebatterieswithaverageelectrolytetemperatureoftherepresentativecells<65'F.OROneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinCategoryCvalues.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-18DraftA BatteryCellParameters3.8.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.6.1VerifybatterycellparametersmeetTableB3.8.6-1CategoryAlimits.3l.daysSR3.8.6.2VerifybatterycellparametersmeetTableB3.8.6-1CategoryBlimits.92daysANDOncewithin7daysafterabatterydischarge<105VANDOncewithin7daysaftera'batteryovercharge>150VSR3.8.6.3Verifyaverageelectrolyte'temperatureofrepresentativecellsisZ65'F.92daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-19DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.73.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.7ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,,2,3,and4LCO3.8.7Thefollow'ingACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLE:a.InvertersforInstrumentBusesAandC;andb.Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)forInstrumentBusB.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneinverterinoperable.A.lPowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClass1Eornon-ClasslECVT.ANDA.2PowerACinstrumentbusfromitsClasslECVT.AND2hours24hoursA.3RestoreinvertertoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.ClasslECVTforACInstrumentBusBinoperable.B.1PowerACInstrumentBusBfromitsnon-Class1ECVT.ANDB.2RestoreClasslECVTforACInstrumentBusBtoOPERABLEstatus.2hours7days(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-20DraftA

ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.7ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAorBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursD.Twoormorerequiredinstrumentbussourcesinoperable.0.1EnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.7.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.7daysSR3.8.7.2VerifycorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-21DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and63.8.83.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.8ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6LCO3.8.8ACinstrumentbuspowersourcesshallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheonsiteClasslEACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITY:HODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.OneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)inoperable.A.lDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ORA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2.3Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyA.2.4InitiateactiontorestorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersource(s)toOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-22DraftA 0 ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and63.8.8SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.8.1VerifycorrectstaticswitchalignmenttorequiredACinstrumentbus(es).7days.SR3.8.8.2VerifycorrectClasslECVTalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbus.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-23DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.93.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.9DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4/LCO3.8.9TrainAandTrainBofthefollowingelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE:a.ACpower;b.ACinstrumentbuspower;andc.DCpower.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.A.1RestoreACelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursB.OnerequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.B.lRestorerequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hoursC.OneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable.C.1RestoreDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-24DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and43.8.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsA,B,orCnotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursE.Twoormoredistributiontrainsinoperablethatresultinalossofsafetyfunction.E.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.9.1VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-25DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and63.8.103.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6LCO3.8.10ThenecessaryportionofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLEtosupportequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormorerequiredAC,DC,orACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontrainsinoperable.A.lORDeclareassociatedsupportedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.~NDImmediatelyA.2.3ANDInitiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.'Immediately(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-26DraftA /DistributionSystems-MODES5and63.8.10ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.2.4ANDA.2.5InitiateactionstorestorerequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontrain(s)toOPERABLEstatus.Declareassociatedrequiredresidualheatremovalloop(s)inoperableandnotinoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY'R3.8.10.1VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.8-27DraftA ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.1ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofACpowerwhicharerequired'osupplythe480VsafeguardsbusesandassociateddistributionsubsystemduringHODES1,2,3,andTheplantACsourcesconsistofanindependentoffsitepowersourceandtheonsitestandbyemergencypowersource(Ref.1).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.2)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,-andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andprotectionsystems.TheoffsiteandonsiteACsourcescaneachsupplypowerto480Vsafeguardsbusestoensurethatreliablepowerisavailableduringanynormaloremergenoymodeofplantoperation.The480Vsafeguardsbusesaredividedintoredundanttrainssothatthelossofanyonetraindoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionsfrombeingperformed.SafeguardsBuses14and18areassociatedwithTrainAandsafeguardsBuses16and17areassociatedwithTrainB.SinceonlytheonsitestandbypowersourceisclassifiedasClassIE,theoffsitepowersourceisnotrequiredtobeseparatedintoredundanttrains.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-1DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theindependentoffsitepowersourceconsistsofbreakers,transformers,switches,interrupting,devices,cabling,andcontrolsrequiredtotransmitpowerfromtheoffsitetransmissionnetworktotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.Theindependentoffsitepowersourceessentiallybeginsfromtwostationauxiliarytransformers(SAT12Aand12B)eachsuppliedfromanindependenttransmissionlineemanatingfromseparateswitchyards(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).SAT12Aisconnectedtothe34.5kVtransmissionsystem(circuit751)and.SAT12Bisconnectedtotheplant115kVswitchyard(circuit767).TheSATsmaybeconfiguredinthefollowingmodes:Ca.SAT12A(orSAT'2B)suppliessafeguardsBuses16and17andSAT12B(orSAT12A)suppliessafeguardsBuses14and18(50/50mode);b.SAT12AsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(0/100mode);orc.SAT12BsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(100/0mode).Thepreferredconfigurationisthe50/50mode;however,allthreemodesofoperationmeetapplicabledesignrequirementsfornormaloperation(Ref.1).Offsitepowercanalsobeprovidedduringanemergencythroughtheplantauxiliarytransformer11bybackfeedingfromthe115kVtransmissionsystemandmaintransformer.SATs12Aand12Bareeachconnectedtotwonon-Class1E,4.16kVbuses(12Aand12B).The4.16kVBus12AfeedstheClass1Eloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses14and18and,4.16kVBus12BfeedstheClass1Eloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses16and17(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).Lossofpowertoanyofthesafeguardsbuses,asaresultofinoperableoffsitecircuitcomponent(s),isalossofoffsitepower.Theoffsitepowersourceendsafterthefeederbreakersupplyingeach480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-2DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Theonsitestandbypowersourcesconsistoftwo1950kWcontinuous.ratingemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)PconnectedtothesafeguardsbusestosupplyemergencypowerintheeventoflossofallotherACpower.TheDGsarelocatedinseparateroomsinaSeismicCategoryIstructurelocatedadjacenttothenortheastwalloftheTurbineBuilding.EachDGroomhasitsownventilationsystem.'heventilationsystemisdesignedtomaintaintheDGroombetween60Fand104Fandtoremoveanyhydrocarbongasesintheroom(Ref.3).Eachventilationsystemconsistsoftwofansandassociatedductworkanddampersthatfailopenonlossofinstrumentairandcontrolpower.OnefanisdesignedtostartonDGactuationwithasecondfandesignedtostartwhentheroomtemperaturereaches90F.Thesecondfan'sdischargeairflowisdirectedtotheDGcontrolpanelandhasadelayedstarttopreventpotentiallyfreezingthecoolingwaterjacketpipingduringcoldweatherconditions.TheDGsutilizeanairmotorforstarting.TheairmotorissuppliedbytworeceiverswhichprovidesufficientairforfiveDGstartsbeforerequiringarechargeofthereceivers.TheDGsaresuppliedbyseparatefueloildaytankswhichcanbecross-tiedifrequired.Additionalfueloilcanbetransferredfromredundantundergroundfueloilstoragetanks.Adedicatedfueloiltransferpumpisusedforthistransfer.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valve,ortank,toresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.DGAisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses14and18andDGBisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses16and17.ADGstartsautomaticallyonasafetyinjection(SI)signaloronanundervoltagesignalonitscorresponding480Vbuses(refertoLCO3.3.5,"LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation").IntheeventofonlyanSIsignal,theDGsautomaticallystartandoperateinthestandbymodewithouttyingtothesafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-3DraftA ACSources-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Intheeventoflossofoffsitepower,orabnormaloffsitepowerwhereoffsitepoweristrippedasaconsequenceofbusundervoltageordegradedvoltage,theDGsautomaticallystartandtietotheirrespectivebuses.Allbusloadsexceptforthecontainmentspray(CS)pump,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pumpandsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcentersaretrippeduponactuationoftheundervoltagerelays.ThisisindependentoforcoincidentwithanSIsignal.OncetheundervoltagerelayresetsindependentofaSIsignal,theoperatormaymanuallyconnectloadsontothebus(es).DuringacoincidentSIsignal,theCCWpumpisalsotrippedandloadsaresequentiallyconnectedtotheirrespectivebusesbytheautomaticloadsequencer.Intheeventoflossofoffsitepowertoonlyonesafeguardsbusinatrain,theDGwillautomaticallystartandtieonlytotheaffectedbus.DuringacoincidentSIsignal,thenormalfeedbreakeronthesecondbusontheaffectedtrainwillbetrippedbytheundervoltagerelayonthefailedbuscausingtheDGtoautomaticallytietobothbuses.Thisconditionwillthenactuatetheautomaticloadsequencer.IntheeventofalossofoffsitepowerandacoincidentSIsignal,theelectricalloadsareautomaticallyconnectedtotheDGsinsufficienttimetoprovideforsafereactorshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Certainrequiredplant1'oadsarereturnedtoserviceinapredeterminedsequencebytheautomaticloadsequencerinordertopreventoverloadingtheDGduringthestartprocess.WithinapproximatelyIminuteaftertheinitiatingsignalisreceived,allloadsneededtorecovertheplantormaintainitinasafeconditionarereturnedtoservice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.'8-4(continued)DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDBAandtransientanalyses(Refs.4and5)assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheACelectricalpowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"'ndSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisresultsinmaintainingatleastonetrainoftheonsitestandbypoweroroffsiteACsourcesOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworst,casesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofoffsiteoronsitestandbyACpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofonsitestandbypower).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-5DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneACpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,ar'edundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetied.intotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.1).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.6)canbemetatalltimes.TheDGsaredesignedtooperatefollowingaDBAor.anticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)untiloffsitepowercanberestored.AnAOOisdefinedasaCondition2eventinReference7(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).TheDGsarerequiredtosta}twithin10secondsandbeginloading.TheDGscanbeginreceivingupto30%ofdesignloadsafterthe10secondstarttimeandcanaccept100%ofdesignloadswithin30seconds.TheDGsaremanuallyloadedifonlyanundervoltagesignalispresentandloadsequencedifacoincidentundervoltageandSIsignalispresent.Theloadsaresequencedasfollows(assumeSIsignalat0seconds):(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-6DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)DGLoadDGATimeDGBTime480VsafeguardsbusesandCSpumps10SIpumpAandB15SIpumpC20Residualheatremovalpump25Selectedservicewaterpump30Firstcontainmentrecirculationfancooler35Secondcontainmentrecirculationfancooler40Motordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump45101522273237 4247SincetheDGsmuststartandbeginloadingwithin10seconds,onlyoneairstartmustbeavailableintheairreceiversasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThelongtermoperationoftheDGs(untiloffsitepowerisrestored)isdiscussedinLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil."TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3ofNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowersourcecircuitconnectedbetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandseparateandindependentDGsforeachtrainensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.AnOPERABLEindependentoffsitepowersourcecircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguardsbuses.Powerfromeitheroffsitepowercircuit751or767satisfiesthisrequirement.ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-7DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESLCO(continued)b.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,CCWpump,andCSpump"arecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal);c.TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervalsfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);d.TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfor>1hourat110%designloads;e.ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andf.AventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.TheACsourcesinonetrainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,separationandindependencemustbecompleteassumingasingleactivefailure.Fortheindependentoffsitepowersource,separationandindependencearetotheextentpractical(i.e.,operationispreferredinthe50/50mode,butmayalsoexistinthe100/0or0/100mode).APPLICABILITYTheACsourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-8DraftA ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)b..AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheACpowerrequirementsforNODES5and6arecoveredinLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-NODES5and6."ACTIONSA.landA.2Withnooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardbus(es),assurancemustbeprovidedthatacoincidentsinglefailurewillnotresultinacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.Iftheredundantsafetyfeaturetothecomponentortrainaffectedbythelossofoffsitepowerisalsounavailable,theassumptionthattwocompletesafetytrainsareOPERABLEmaynolongerexist.Asanexample,ifoffsitepowerwereunavailableto480VBus14,DGAcouldsupplythenecessarypowertothebus.Ifresidualheatremovalpump(RHR)B(suppliedpowerbyBus16)wereinoperableatthesametime,oratanytimeafterthelossofoffsitepowertoBus14,alossof,redundantrequiredsafetyfeaturesexistssinceafailureofDGAwouldresultinthelossofemergencycorecooling.Therefore,RHRpumpAonBus14wouldhavetobedeclaredinoperablewithin12hoursafterRHRpumpBand.offsitepowertoBus14weredeclaredunavailable.TheCompletionTimeof12hoursasprovidedbyRequiredActionA.1todeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthanthe'CompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheoffsitepowercircuitandallsafetyfeaturesaffectedby.thelossofthe480Vbus.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbythelossofoffsitepower(i.e.,usingthesameexampleasabove,the72hourCompletionTimeforrestoringRHRpumpBwasdevelopedassumingthatRHRpumpAhadbothoffsiteandonsitestandbyemergencypoweravailable).Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow12hoursinthisconfiguration.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-9DraftA ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredActiontheCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythat:a.Thereisnooffsitepoweravailabletooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus;andb.Aredundantrequiredfeatureisinoperableonasecond480Vsafeguardsbus.IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofConditionA,aredundantrequiredfeaturebecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimebeginstobetracked.RequiredActionA.1canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.ThelevelofdegradationduringConditionAmeansthattheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigateth'eeffectsofanaccident;however,theonsitestandbyACsourceshavenotbeen'degraded.Thislevelofdegradationgenerallycorrespondstoeither:a.LossofoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand/orSAT12B;b.FailureofSAT12Aor12Bor4.16kVBus12Aor12B;orc.Failureofastationservicetransformersupplyinga480Vsafeguardsbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-10DraftA. ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSA.landA.2(continued)WithatotallossoftheoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforeithertrain.WithlossofoffsitepowertoSAT12Aor12B',failureofSAT12Aor12B,orfailureofBus12Aor12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforasingleACelectricaltrain.Withafailureofastationservicetransformer,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentforone480VsafeguardsbusinoneACelectricaltrain.Inallcases,sufficientonsiteACsourcesareavailabletomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdownconditionintheeventofaDBAortransient.Infact,asimultaneouslossofoffsiteACsources,aLOCA,andaworstcasesinglefailurewerepostulatedasapartofthedesignbasisinthesafetyanalysis.Thus,the72hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetoeffectrestorationoftheoffsitecircuitcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintaininganACelectricalpowersystemcapableofmeetingitsdesigncriteria.B.1WithoneDGinoperable,itisnecessarytoverifytheavailabilityoftheoffsitecircuittoeachoftheaffected480Vsafeguardsbusesonamorefrequentbasis.SincetheRequiredActiononlyspecifies"perform,"afailureofSR3.8.1.1acceptancecriteriadoesnotresultinaRequiredActionbeingnotmet(i.e.,ConditionDwouldnotapply).However,ifacircuitfailstopassSR3.8.1.1,itisinoperableandConditionCwouldbeentered.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-11DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B.3.8.1BASESACTIONS(continued)8.2RequiredActionB.2isintendedtoprovideassurancethatalossofoffsitepower,duringtheperiodthataDGisinoperable,doesnotresultinacompletelossofasafetyfeature.Thesefeaturesaredesignedwithredundantsafetyrelatedtrainswhicharesuppliedpowerfromseparateandindependentonsitepowersources.Ifoneonsitepowersourceisinoperable,itmustbeassuredthattheredundantsafetyrelatedtrainsuppliedbytheOPERABLEDGisavailabletoprovidethenecessarysafetyfunction.TheCompletionTimeof4hoursforRequiredActionB.2isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabiliti.es.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredAction,theCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythatboth:a.AninoperableDGexists;andb.Arequiredfeatureontheothertrain(TrainAorTrainB)isinoperable.IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofthisCondition(oneDGinoperable)arequiredfeaturesupportedbytheOPERABLEDGsubsequentlybecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimewouldbegintobetracked.DiscoveringonerequiredDGinoperablecoincidentwithoneormoreinoperablerequiredsupportorsupportedfeatures,orboth,thataresuppliedpowerbytheOPERABLEDG,resultsinstartingtheCompletionTimeforRequiredAction8.2.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEDGandtheoffsitecircuitareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-12DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.2(continued)TheCompletionTimeof4hourstodeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatitislessthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheDGandallsafetyfeaturessupportedbytheDG.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbytheinoperableDG.Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow4hoursinthisconfiguration.Additionally,the4hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.RequiredActionB.2canbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.B.3.1andB.3;2RequiredActionB.3.1providesanallowancetoavoidunnecessarytestingoftheOPERABLEDG.Ifitcanbedeterminedwithin24hoursthatthecauseoftheinoperableDGdoesnotexistontheOPERABLEDG,SR3.8;1.2isnotrequiredtobe'performed.IfthecauseofinoperabilityisdeterminedtoexistontheotherDG,thesecondDGwouldbedeclaredinoperableupondiscoveryandConditionEwouldbeentered.Oncethefailureisrepaired,thecommoncausefailurenolongerexists,andRequiredActionB.3.1issatisfied.IfthecauseoftheinitialinoperableDGcannotbeconfirmednottoexistonthesecondDGwithin24hours,performanceofSR3.8.1.2sufficestoprovideassuranceofcontinuedOPERABILITYofthatDG.IntheeventtheinoperableDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspriortocompletingeitherB.3.1orB.3.2,activitiesmustcontinuetoevaluatethecommoncausepossibility.Thiscontinuedevaluation,however,isnolongerunderthe24hourconstraintimposedwhileinConditionB.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-13DraftA

ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSB.3.1andB.3.2(continued)The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoconfirmthattheOPERABLEDGisnotaffectedbythesameproblemastheinoperableDG(Ref.8).B.4WithoneinoperableDG,theremainingOPERABLEDGandtheoffsitecircuitareadequatetosupplyelectricalpowertotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.The7dayCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources',areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1Withnooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)andoneDGinoperable,redundancyislostinboththeoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpowersystems.Sincepowersystemredundancyisprovidedbythesetwodiversesourcesofpower,theACpowersourcesareonlydegradedandnolossofsafetyfunctionhasoccurredsinceatleastoneDGandpotentiallyoneoffsiteACpowersourceareavailable.However,theplantisvulnerabletoasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovidedtoeitherrestoretheoffsitepowercircuitortheDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeislessthanthatforaninoperable,offsitepower,sourceoraninoperableDGduetothesinglefailurevulnerabilityofthisconfiguration.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-14DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)AsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredeveniFallACsourcestoeithertrainwereinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofthisConditionaremodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthattheRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4"mustalsobeimmediatelyenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonedistributiontrain.ThisallowsConditionCtoproviderequirementsforthelossofanoffsitepowercircuitandoneDG,withoutregardtowhetheratrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.9providestheappropriaterestrictionsforade-energizedtrain.D.landD.2IftheinoperableACelectricpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3'within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1IfbothDGsareinoperable,alossofsafetyfunctionwouldexistifoffsitepowerwereunavailable;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-15(continued)DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheACsourcesaredesignedtopermitinspectionandtestingof.allimportantareasandfeatures,especiallythosethathaveastandbyfunction(Ref.2).Periodiccomponenttestsaresupplementedbyextensivefunctionaltestsduringrefuelingoutages(undersimulatedaccidentconditions).SR3.8.1.1ThisSRensurespropercircuitcontinuityfortheindependentoffsitepowersourcetoeachoftheonsite480VsafeguardsbusesandavailabilityofoffsiteACelectricalpower.Checkingbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabilityverifiesthateachbreakerisinitscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloadsareconnectedtotheirqualifiedpowersource.TheFrequencyof7daysisadequa'tesincebreakerpositionisnotlikelytochangewithouttheoperatorsknowledgeandbecausealarmsandindicationsofbreakerstatusareavailableinthecontrolroom.SR3.8.1.2ThisSRverifiesthateachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.ThisensurestheavailabilityoftheDGtomitigateDBAsandtransientsandtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.TheDGvoltagecontrolmaybeeitherinmanualorautomaticduringtheperformanceofthisSR.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1indicatesthatperformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSRsinceSR3.8.1.9isacompletetestoftheDG.ThesecondNotestatesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.Thisminimizesthewearonmovingpartsthatdonotgetlubricatedwhentheengineisnotrunning.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-16DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.3ThisSRverifiesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloadsgreaterthanorequaltotheequivalentofthemaximumexpectedaccidentloads.Aminimumruntimeof60minutesisrequired,tostabilizeenginetemperatures.Amaximumruntimenottoexceed120minutesminimizesthetimethattheDGisconnectedtotheoffsitesource.AlthoughnopowerfactorrequirementsareestablishedbythisSR,theDGisnormallyoperatedatapowerfactorbetween0.85laggingand0.95lagging.Theupperloadbandlimitof2250kWisprovidedtoavoidroutineoverloadingoftheDGwhichmayresultinmorefrequentinspectionsinaccordancewithvendorrecommendationsinordertomaintainDGOPERABILITY.ThelowerloadbandlimitistheexpectedmaximumloadfollowingaDBA.InadditiontoverifyingtheDGcapabilityforsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloads,theDGventilationsystemshouldalsobeverifiedduringthis.surveillance.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismod'ifiedbythreeNote's.Note1indicatesthatdieselenginerunsforthisSurveillancemayincludegradualloading,asrecommendedbythemanufacturer,sothatmechanicalstressandwearonthedieselengineareminimized.Note2statesthatmomentarytransientsoutsidetheloadband(e.g.,duetochangingbusloads),donotinvalidatethistest.Similarly,momentarypowerfactortransientsaboveorbelowtheadministrativelimitdonotinvalidatethetest.Note3indicatesthatthisSurveillanceshouldbe'onductedononlyoneDGatatimeinorderto'-avoidcommoncausefailuresthatmightresultfromoffsitecircuitorgridperturbations.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-17DraftA ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.4ThisSRprovidesverificationthattheleveloffueloilineachdaytankisatorabovethelevelatwhichfueloilisautomaticallyaddedwhenthefueloiltransferpumpisinautoandtheDGisoperating.Thislevelensuresadequatefueloilforaminimumof1hourofDGoperationat110%offullload.Thisisequivalenttoadaytanklevelof8.25inchesabovethetanksuctionline.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoensurethatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sincelowlevelalarmsareprovidedandoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.SR3.8.1.5ThisSRdemonstratesthateachDGfueloiltransferpumpoperatesandtransfersfueloilfromitsassociatedstoragetanktoitsassociateddaytank.ThisisrequiredtosupportcontinuousoperationoftheDGs.ThisSurveillanceprovidesassurancethatthefueloiltransferpumpisOPERABLE,thefueloilpipingsystemisinta'ct,thefueldeliverypipingisnotobstructed,andthecontrolsandcontrolsystemsforautomaticormanualfueltransfersystemsareOPERABLE.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,sincethedesignofthefueloiltransfersystemissuchthatpumpsoperateautomaticallyormustbestartedmanuallyinordertomaintainanadequatevolumeoffueloilinthedaytanksduringorfollowingDGoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-18DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.6ThisSRinvolvesthetransferofthe480Vsafeguardsbuspowersupplyfromthepreferredoffsitepowercircuitconfiguration(50/50mode)tothealternateoffsitepowercircuitconfigurations(100/0modeand0/100mode)whichdemonstratestheOPERABILITYofthealternatecircuitdistributionnetworktopowertherequiredloads.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationtheplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.8.1.7ThisSRverifiesthateachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof>295kW.EachDGisprovidedwithanengineoverspeedtriptopreventdamagetotheengine.Recoveryfromthetransientcausedbythelossofalargeloadcouldcausedieselengineoverspeed,which,ifexcessive,mightresultinatripoftheengine.ThisSRdemonstratestheDGloadresponsecharacteristicsandcapabilitytorejectthelargestsingleloadonthebusessuppliedbytheDG(i.e.,asafetyinjectionpump).InordertoensurethattheDGistestedunderloadconditionsthatareasclosetodesignbasisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactorS0.9lagging.ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresentativeoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthattheDGwouldexperience.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-19DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.7(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseMODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult,plantsafetysystems.SR3.8.1.8ThisSRdemonstratesthatDGnoncriticalprotectivefunctions(e.g.,overcurrent,reversepower,localstoppushbutton)arebypassedonanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal,andcriticalprotectivefunctions(engineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andstartfailure(overcrank)relay)triptheDGtoavertsubstantialdamagetotheDG.ThenoncriticaltripsarebypassedduringDBAsbutstillprovideanalarmonanabnormalenginecondition.Thisalarmprovidestheoperatorwithsufficienttimetoreactappropriately.TheDGavailabilitytomitigatetheDBAismorecriticalthanprotectingtheengineagainstminorproblemsthatarenotimmediatelydetrimentaltoemergencyoperationoftheDG.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremovearequiredDGfromservicewhichisundesirableintheseMODES.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-20DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.9IntheeventofaDBAcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower,theDGsarerequiredtosupplythenecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,RCS,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.ThisSRdemonstratestheDGoperationduringanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationofconnectionandloadingofloads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1statesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodwhichisintendedtominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginelubeoilcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendationsfortheDGs.Note2statesthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4sinceperformingtheSurveillanceduringtheseMODESwouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,causeperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystems,andchallengesafetysystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-21(continued)DraftA ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1BASES(continued)1REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Chapter8.2.3.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967./UFSAR,Section9.4.9.5.4.UFSAR,Chapter6.5..UFSAR,Chapter15.6.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.7."AmericanNationalStandard,NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.8.GenericLet'ter84-15,"ProposedStaffActionstoImproveandHaintainDieselGeneratorReliability,"July2,1984.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-22DraftA ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.1STATION204SWITCHYARD115KVSTATION13ACKT751CKT767SAT12A52/751)34$KV/4160VSAT12B~12AXI12AY~12BX~12BY19KV/4160VUNITAUXXFMRREMOVABLEUNKMAINXFMR19KV/115KV4160VBUS12B4160VBUS11BDUMMYBKR4160VBUS11A4160VBUS12AREMOVABLEUNK))))TASERVICESTASERVICEXFMRNO.16XFMRNO.15)))STASERVICESTXFMRNO.13SERVICERNO.14EXC-PMO480VBUS15STASERVICE480VBUS16~)+)+480VBUS14480VBUS13'~)+I)+)f~STASERVICEXFMRNO.16~)/NEUTRAL480VBUS17DQA480VBUS18IllaamOFFSITEPOWERSOURCEf+MUSTBEOPENWHENTave>200F~ONSITE480VBUS$ONSITESTANDBYEMERGENCYSOURCEFigureB3.8.1-1R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-23DraftA ACSources-HODES5and6B3.8.2B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.2ACSources-HODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionforBases3.8.1,"ACSources-HODESI,2,3,and4"isapplicabletothesesBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InHODE5or6theminimumrequiredACsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherHODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACpowersources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6."APPLICABLETheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACelectricalpowersources'AFETYANALYSESduringHODES5and6ensuresthat:a.Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;andb.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACelectrical,powersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-24DraftA ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelev'elofriskis'notexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InHODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-25DraftA ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwith.multipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingHODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnequalifiedindependentoffsitepowercircuitsupplyingtheassociatedACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6,"ensuresthatallrequiredloadsarepoweredfromoffsitepower.AnOPERABLEDG,capableofsupportingthedistributionsystemrequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,ensuresadiversepowersourceisavailabletoprovideelectricalpowersupport,assumingalossoftheindependentoffsitepowercircuit.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredoffsitecircuitandDGensurestheavailabilityofsufficientACsourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).AnOPERABLEqualifiedoffsitecircuitisonethatiscapableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingrequiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothe480Vsafeguardsbus(es).Powerfromeitheroffsitepowercircuit751or767,orbybackfeedingthroughauxiliarytransformerllsatisfiesthisrequirement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-26DraftA ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESLCO(continued)ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a~b.C.d.e.~TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pump,andcontainmentspray(CS)pumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentsafetyinjection(SI)andundervoltagesignal);TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsmanually.SincemostequipmentwhichreceivesaSIsignalareisolatedintheseNODESduetomaintenanceorlowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionconcerns,andtheDBAofconcern(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)wouldnotgenerateaSIsignal,manualloadingoftheDGswillmostlikelyberequired.TheseloadsmustbecapableofbeingaddedtotheOPERABLEDGwithin10minutes;TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilforZ1hourat110%designloads;ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andAventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE;R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-27(continued)DraftA ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESAPPLICABILITYTheACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedeventsandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4-."ACTIONSA.1AsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystem'sACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoitareinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethatwhenConditionAisenteredwithnoonsiteoroffsiteACpowertoanyrequired480Vsafeguardsbus,theACTIONSforLCO3.8.10mustalsobeimmediatelyentered.ThisNoteallowsConditionAtoproviderequirementsforthelossoftheoffsitepowercircuit,whetherornotatrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.10wouldprovidetheappropriaterestrictionsforthesituationinvolvingacompletelyde-energizedtrain.Withnooffsitepoweravailabletooneormorerequired480Vsafeguardsbus(es),assurancemustbeprovidedthatthereisnotacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,onetrainwithoffsitepoweravailablemaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONS,oroperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablethatarenotpoweredfromoffsitepower,appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.Requiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaqualifiedoffsitepowercircuit,evenifthatcircuitisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-28DraftA

ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2andA.2.3WiththeoffsitepowercircuitnotavailabletoallrequiredACelectricaltrains,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1andA.2.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.Itisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiate'ctiontorestoretherequiredoffsitepowerACsourcesandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequiredoffsitepowersourcesshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinorderto.minimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.B.1B.2andB.3WiththerequiredDGinoperable,theminimumrequireddiversityofACpowersourcesisnotavailable.Therefore,itisrequiredthatCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsbeimmediatelysuspended.PerformanceofRequiredActionB.landB.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeoftemperaturecontrol.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-29DraftA ACSources-MODES5and6B3.8.2BASES'ACTIONSB.1B.2andB.3(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatusandtocontinuethisaction,untilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowerredundancytoplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDGshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientredundantpower:SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.2.1ThisSRrequirestheperformanceofSRsfromLCO3.8.1thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheACsourcesinMODES5and6.ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDG(s)frombeingparalleledwiththeoffsitepowernetworkorotherwiserenderedinoperableduringperformanceofSRs,precludesde-energizingarequired480Vsafeguardsbus,andprecludesunnecessarytransfersoftheoffsitepowersourceconfigurations.WithlimitedACsourcesavailable,asingle,eventcouldcompromiseboththerequiredcircuitandtheDG.Therefore,therequirementtoperformSR3.8.1.3,andSR3.8.1.6through3.8.1.9issuspended.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.1foradiscussionofeachSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-30DraftA DieselFuelOilB3.8.3B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.3DieselFuelOilBASESBACKGROUNDFueloilisprovidedtoeachemergencydieselgenerator(DG)byadedicated350galdaytanklocatedneartheDG.Eachdaytankissuppliedfromanassociated6000galundergroundfueloilstoragetank.Eachstoragetankprovidesaminimumfueloilcapacityof5000gal.ThetwostoragetanksaresufficienttooperatebothDGsatdesignratingsfor24hours.ThetotalminimumfueloilcapacityalsoensuresthatbothDGscanoperateforaperiodof40hourswhileprovidingforamaximumpostlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)loaddemand.ThemaximumloaddemandiscalculatedusingtheassumptionthatbothDGsareavailable,andislessthantheDGdesignrating.TheminimumonsitefuelcapacityissufficienttooperatetheDGsforlongerthan8hourswhichisthetimerequiredtoreplenishtheonsitesupplyfromoutsidesources(Ref.I).Fueloilistransferredfromeachstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankbyadedicatedfueloiltransferpump.Eachfueloiltransferpumpispoweredbya480VsafeguardsbusthatisbackedbytheassociatedDG.OnefueloiltransferpumphasthecapabilitytosupplybothDGsoperatingwith110%oftheirdesignloads.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valveortanktoresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.Alloutsidetanks,pumps,andpipingarelocatedundergroundtoprotectthemfrompotentialmissiles.-HeattracingisprovidedintheexposedsuctionpipingtothefueloilpumpsintheeventthatheatingislostintheDGrooms.Theheattracingisthermostaticallycontrolledtomaintainthefueloilinthepipe>40Fwhichisabovethecloudpointtemperatureofthefueloil(0F).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-31(continued)DraftA DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemsareOPERABLE.TheDGsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."SincedieselfueloilsupportstheoperationofthestandbyACpowersources,itsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOStoredonsitedieselfueloilisrequiredtohavesufficientsupplyfor40hoursofmaximumpost-LOCAloaddemand.Itisalsorequi'redtomeetspecificstandardsforquality.This'equirement,inconjunctionwithanabilitytoobtainreplacementfueloilsupplieswithin8hours,supportstheavailabilityofDGsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandtomaintainitinasafeconditionforananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBAwithlossofoffsitepower.DGdaytankfuelrequirements,aswellastransfercapabilityfromthestoragetankto.thedaytank,areaddressedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."APPLICABILITYTheACsources(LCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2)arerequiredtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.SincestoreddieselfueloilsupportsLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2,storeddieselfueloilisrequiredtobewithinlimitsinMODES1,2,3and4,andwhentheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES,5and-6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-32(continued)DraftA DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1WithoneormorerequiredDGswithanonsitesupplyof<5000galoffueloil,theassumed40hourfueloilsupplyfor'DG.isnotavailable.Thiscircumstancemaybecausedbyevents,suchasfullloadoperationafteraninadve}tentstartwithaninitialminimumrequiredfueloillevel,orfeedandbleedoperations,whichmaybenecessitatedbyincreasingfueloilparticulatelevelsoranynumberofotheroilqualitydegradations.RequiredActionA.1allowssufficienttimeforobtainingtherequisitereplacementvolumeandperformingtheanalysesreguiredpriortoadditionoffueloiltothetank.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursisconsideredsufficienttocompleterestorationoftherequiredlevelpriortodeclaringtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisacceptablebasedontheremainingcapacity,thefactthatactionswillbeinitiatedtoobtain.replenishment,andthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiod.B.1IfoneormoreDGshas'storedfueloilwithtotalparticulatesnotwithinlimits,thefueloilmustberestoredwithinlimitswithin7days.Thefueloilparticulatepropertiesofviscosity,water,andsedimentareverifiedbySR3.8.3.2.Trendingofparticulatelevelsnormallyallowssufficienttimetocorrecthighparticulatelevelspriortoreachingthelimitofacceptability.Poorsamplepractices(bottomsampling),contaminatedsamplingequipment,orerrorsinlaboratoryanalysiscanproducefailuresthatdonotfollowatrend.Sincethepresenceofparticulatesdoesnotmeanfailureofthefueloiltoburnproperlyinthedieselengine,andparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,andproperengineperformancehasbeenrecentlydemonstrated(within31days),itisprudenttoallowabriefperiodpriortodeclaringtheassociatedDGinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsforfurtherevaluation,resamplingandre-analysisoftheDGfueloil.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-33DraftA DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASESACTIONS(continued)C.IWithaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet,oroneormoreDG'sfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanaddressedbyConditionsAorB(e.g.,cloudpointtemperaturereached),theassociatedDGmaybeincapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperable.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.3.1ThisSRverifiesanonsitesupplyof>5000galoffueloilisavailableforeachrequiredDG.ThisensuresthatthereisanadequateinventoryoffueloilinthestoragetankstosupporteachDG'soperationfor'40hourswhileprovidingmaximumpost-LOCAloads.The40hourperiodissufficienttimetoplacetheplantinasafeshutdownconditionandtobringinreplenishmentfuelfromanoffsitelocation.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoensurethatasufficient-supplyoffueloilisavailable,sinceindicationsareavailabletoensurethatoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueloilduringthisperiod.SR3.8.3.2ThisSRprovidesameansofdeterminingwhetherstoredfueloilhasbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatwouldhaveanimmediate,detrimentalimpactondieselenginecombustion.ThisensurestheavailabilityofhighqualityfueloilfortheDGs.Fueloildegradationduringlongtermstorageisindicatedbyanincreaseinparticulate,duemostlytooxidation.Thepresenceofparticulatedoesnotmeanthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyinadieselengine.Theparticulatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueloilinjectionequipment,however,whichcouldeventuallycauseenginefailure.AfueloilsampleisanalyzedtoestablishthatpropertiesspecifiedinTableIofASTHD975-78(Ref.4)forviscosity,water,andsedimentaremetforthestoredfueloil.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPl'antB3.8-34DraftA DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSR3.8.3.2(continued)TheFrequencyofthisSRtakesintoconsiderationfueloildegradationtrendsthatindicatethatparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenFrequencyintervals.TheFrequency,asspecifiedintheDieselFuelOilTestingProgram,is92days.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section9.5.4.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3..UFSAR,Chapter15.4.ASTHStandards,D975-78,Table1.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-35DraftA DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.4DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).SeparatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforthesetwoelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandwhethertheyareClassIE(i.e.,supplysafetyrelatedorengineeredsafeguardsfunctions)ornonessential.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofDCpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplytheDCbusesandtheirassociateddistributionsystemduringHODES1,2,3,and4.ThestationDCelectricalpowersubsystemprovidestheACemergencypowersystemwithcontrolpower.ItalsoprovidesbothmotiveandcontrolpowertoselectedsafetyrelatedequipmentandpreferredACinstrumentbuspower(viainverters).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.1)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheengineeredsafetyfeaturesandprotectionsystems.The125VDCelectrical.powersystemconsistsoftwoindependentandredundantsafetyrelatedClass1EDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrain(TrainAandTrainB).Eachsubsystemconsistsofone125VDCbattery,twobatterychargerssuppliedfromthe480Vsystem,distributionpanelsandbuses,andalltheassociatedcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThebatteriesandbatterychargersareaddressedbythisLCO.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-36DraftA DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)EachbatteryprovidesaseparatesourceofDCpowerindependentofACpower.EachofthetwobatteriesiscapableofcarryingitsexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.2).Therearefourbatterychargersavailabletothebatteries.ChargersIAand1Bareratedat150ampsandchargerslA1and1Blareratedat200amps.Batterychargers1Aand1A1arenormallyalignedtobatteryA,andbatterychargers1Band1BlarenormallyalignedtobatteryB.Achargingcapacityofatleast150ampsisnormallyrequiredtosupplythenecessaryDCloadsoneachtrainandtoprovideafullbatterychargetoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheDCpowerdistributionsystemisdescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystem-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsoprovideDCelectricalpowertotheinverters,whichinturnpowertheACinstrumentbuses.TheinvertersaredescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.8,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6."TrainAEngineeredSafetyFeature'(ESF)equipmentissuppliedfrombatteryA,while'rainBESFequipmentissuppliedfrombatteryB.Additionally,the480VESFswitchgearanddieselgenerator(DG)controlpanelsaresuppliedfromeitherbatterybymeansofanautomatictransfercircuitintheswitchgearandcontrolpanels.ThenormalsupplyfromTrainA(Buses14and18andDGA)isfromDCdistributionpanelsA.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencyDCsupplyforTrainB.Similarly,thenormalsupplyfromTrainB(Buses16and17andDGB)isfromDCdistributionpanelsB.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencydcsupplyforTrain'A.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-37DraftA DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Each125VDCbatteryandassociatedbatterychargersareseparatelyhousedinaventilatedroomwithitsassociateddistributioncenter.Eachsubsystemislocatedinanareaseparatedphysicallyandelectricallyfromtheothersubsystemtoensurethatasinglefailureinonesubsystemdoesnotcauseafailureinaredundantsubsystem.ThetwobatteryroomsaresuppliedwithventilationbyacommonACpoweredairconditioningandheatingunitwhichalsoprovidessufficientairchangestopreventhydrogenbuildup.AredundantDCpoweredfanisalsoavailableintheeventthatallACpowerislost.ThefailureofboththeACpoweredandDCpoweredunitsdoesnotresultinunacceptableroomserviceconditionsuntil'fter5hoursofcontinuousbatteryoperationdu'ringaDBA(Ref.2).ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemaresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesandthe100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.Theminimumvoltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltageoutputof128Vperbattery.EachbatterychargerfortheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemhasamplepoweroutputcapacityforthesteadystateoperationofconnectedloadsrequiredduringnormaloperation,whileatthesametimemaintainingitsbatterybankfullycharged.Eachbatterychargeralsohassufficientcapacitytorestorethebatteryfromthedesignminimumchargetoitsfullychargedstatewithin24hourswhilesupplyingnormalsteadystateloadsdiscussedintheUFSAR,Chapter8(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofaDBAandtransientanalyses(Refs.3and4),assumethatESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpower=.fortheDGs,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallNODESofoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-38DraftA DCSources-NODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheOPERABILITYoftheDCsourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingatleastonetrainofDCsourceOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCelectricalpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneDCelectricalpowersource).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofDCpowerensuresthatatleastoneDCpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisin'the100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.6).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref;7)canbemetatalltimes.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-39(continued)DraftA DCSources-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)LCOTheTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersources,eachconsistingofonebattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,.andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafteranAOOorapostulatedDBA.LossofanyonetrainDCelectricalpowersourcedoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionfrombeingperformed.AnOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcerequiresthebatteryandatleastonebatterybatterychargerwithacapacityZ150ampstobeoperatingandconnectedtotheassociatedDCbus.TheACpoweredandDCpoweredfanunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmayberequiredforSR3.8.6.3.APPLICABILITYTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4toensuresafeplantoperationandtoensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-40(continued)DraftA DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1WithoneDCelectricalpowersourceinoperable,OPERABILITYmustbere'storedwithin2hours.InthisCondition,redundancyislostandonlyonetrainiscapabletocompletelyrespondtoanevent.IfoneoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesisinoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowersourcehasthecapacitytosupportasafeshutdownandtomitigateanaccidentcondition.Asubsequentworstcasesinglefailurewould,however,resultinthecompletelossoftheremaining125VDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemwithattendantlossofESFfunctions.The2hourCompletionTimereflectsareasonabletimetoassessplantstatusasafunctionoftheinoperableDCelectricalpowersubsystemand,iftheDCelectricalpowersourceisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,topreparetoeffectanorderlyandsafeplantshutdown.8.1andB.2IftheinoperableDCelectricalpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.1IfbothDCelectricalpowersourcesareinoperable,alossofmultiplesafe'tyfunctionsexists;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-41(continued)DraftA

DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.4.1ThisSRverifiesthateachbatteryhasabatterychargerwithacapacityofz150amps.Thisverificationhelpstoensuretheeffectivenessofthechargingsystemandtheabilityofthebatteriestoperformtheirintendedfunction.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsideredacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortobatterymalfunctions.SR3.8.4.2ThisSRverifiesthatthecapacityofeachbatteryisadequatetosupplyandmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.Abatteryservicetestisaspecialtestofbatterycapability,asfound,tosatisfythedesignrequirements(batterydutycycle)oftheDCelectricalpowersystem.ThedischargerateandtestlengthcorrespondstothedesigndutycyclerequirementsspecifiedinReference2.TheSurveillanceFrequencyof24monthsisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.32(Ref.5)andRegulatoryGuide1.129(Ref.6),whichstatethatthebatteryservicetestshouldbeperformedduringrefuelingoperationsoratsomeotheroutage,withintervals-betweentestsnottoexceed24months.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1statesthatSR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.ThissubstitutionisacceptablebecauseSR3.8.4.3representsamoreseveretestofbatterycapacitythandoesSR3.8.4.2.Note2statesthatthissurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4becauseperformingtheSurveillancewouldperturbtheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-42DraftA DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.4.3ThisSurveillanceverifiesthateachbatterycapacityisZ80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.Abatteryperformancetestisatestofconstantcurrentcapacityofabattery,normallydoneintheasfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacityasdeterminedbyspecifiedacceptancecriteria.Thetestisintendedtodetermineoverallbatterydegradationduetoageandusage.Abatteryshouldbereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80%ofthemanufacturerrating.Acapacityof80%showsthatthebatteryrateofdeteriorationisincreasing,evenifthereisamplecapacitytomeettheloadrequirements.TheFrequencyforthisSRis60monthswhenthebatteryis<85%ofitsexpectedlifewithnodegradationand12monthsifthebatteryshowsdegradationorhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithacapacity<100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.Whenthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithcapacityz100%ofthemanufacturer'srating,theFrequencybecomes24months.Batterydegradationisindicatedwhenthebatterycapacitydropsby'orethan10%relativetoitscapacityonthepreviousperformancetestorwhenitisZ10%belowthemanufacturerrating.TheseFrequenciesareconsideredacceptablebasedonthetestingbeingperformedinaconservativemannerrelativetothebatterylifeanddegradation.Thisensuresthatbatterycapacityisadequatelymonitoredandthatthebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSRshallnotbeperformedinHODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseHODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-43(continued)DraftA DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.4BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section8.3.2.3.UFSAR,Section9.4.9.3.4.UFSAR,Chapter6.5.UFSAR,Chapter15.6.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.7.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.8.RegulatoryGuide1.32,February1977.9.RegulatoryGuide1.129,December1974.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-44'raftA Klm416QVBUS12A4160VBUS128O5SERVICENO.LL)14T.S.C.VITALBATTERYDG8460VSTATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERNO.16BUS16IIIcIsIOCol~Q7CO40CItCOIBATIERYCHARGER1A1BATTERYCHARGER1ADIST.PANELA125.VBATIERYAABATT.DLSCON.iSWITCHi8BATT.T.S.C.DISCON.BATTERYDISCONNECT'SWITCHT.S.C.125.V+VITALBATT.iiBATlERYMANUAL8THAOWOVERiSWITCHFUSECABINET8BATTERYCHARGER18DcDIST.PANEL8BATTERYCHARGER181I460VBUS13MCCAINVERT.ATODCTRAINAINVERT.8MCC8EMERINSTR.TRANSFORMEA78KVA120VOLTAUTOSTATICTRANSFEAA7$KVA,110VOLTCONST.VOLTAGETRANSFORMERA]0)Alfl'0STATICTRANSFEA87$KVA110VOLTCONST.VOLTAGETRANSFORMER8INSTILBUSAINSTA.BUS8INSIR.BUSCINSTR.BUSD+NOAMALLYOPENWHENTavei200FDCSOURCEt~1DCDISTSYSTEM)~iDCELECPOWERSOURCES,[iINST.BUSPOWERSOURCES a9 DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.5DCSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODESI,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredDCelectricalsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberorrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheDCelectricalsources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredDCelectricalsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumDCelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresth'at:a.Requiredfeaturesneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;b.Requiredfeaturesnecessarytomitigate'theeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andc.Instrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecifications'requirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-46DraftA

DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOs"forthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InHODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3;and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsiderati,on.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-47DraftA DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportthedistributionsubsystemsrequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-Shutdown."IfonlyoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,theminimumsourceconsistsofabattery,,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithintherequiredtrain.IfbothDCelectricalpowertrainsarerequired,oneDCsourcemustcontainabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainsystem.ThesecondDCsourcemayconsistofonlyabatterychargerwithacapacityofatleast150amps,orabattery,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling.Thetwomustbesufficientlyindependentthatalossofalloffsitepowersources,alossofonsitestandbypower,oraworstcasesinglefailuredoesnotaffectmorethanonerequiredDCelectricalpowertrain.ThisensurestheavailabilityofsufficientDCelectricalpowersourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).The,ACpoweredandDCpoweredfanventilationunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformofventilationmayberequiredtomeetSR3.8.6.3.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-48(continued)DraftA DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASES(continued)APPLICABILITY.TheDCelectricalpowersourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5'and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheaffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSAlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6,"theremainingDCelectricaltrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientsystemstoallowcontinuationof.COREALTERATIONS,andoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperableassociatedwiththerequiredinoperableDCpowersource(s),appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinaccordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.RequiredfeaturesremainingpoweredfromaDCelectricalsource,evenifthatsourceisconsideredinoperablebecauseitisnotpoweringotherrequiredfeatures,arenotdeclaredinoperablebythisRequiredAction.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-49DraftA

DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4WithoneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.1.-PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDCelectricalpowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryDCelectricalpowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.5.1SR3.8.5.1requirestheperformanceoFSRsfromLCO3.8.4thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersubsysteminMODES5and6.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-50DraftA DCSources-MODES5and6B3.8.5BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.5.1(continued)ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcefrombeingremovedfromservicetoperformabatteryservicetestoraperformancedischargetest.Withlimited.DCsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromisemultiplerequiredsafetyfeatures.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDCelectricalpower,sourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.4foradiscussionofthespecifiedSR.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-51DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.6BatteryCellParametersBASESBACKGROUNDEachDCelectricalpowertraincontainsa125VDCbatterywhichiscapableofcarryingtheexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.1).ThebatteriesarenormallyinstandbysincetheassociatedbatterychargersprovidefortherequiredDCsystemloads.ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpoweraresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesand100%'designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.Theminimumvoltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltageoutputof128Vperbattery.ThisLCOdelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytetemperature,level,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityfortheDCpowersourcebatteriestoensurethatthebatteriesarecapableofperformingtheirsafetyfunctionasrequiredbyLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-52(continued)DraftA

BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransient.analysesassumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE(Refs.2and3).TheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerforthedieselgenerators,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchingduringallNODESofoperation.TheDCsourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecesarypowertoEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."BatterycellparameterssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.'COThisLCOrequiresthatbatterycellparametersforTrainAandBbatteriesbewithinlimitstoensureavailabilityoftherequiredDCpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrenceorapostulatedDBA.Batterycellparametersaredefinedforelectrolytelevel,temperature,floatvoltage,andspecificgravity.Thelimitsforelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityareconservativelyestablishedforbothdesignatedpilotcellsandconnectedcells(CategoryAandB,respectivelyofTableB3.8.6-1).Theselimi'tsallowcontinuedDCelectricalsystemfunctionevenwithCategoryAandBlimitsnotmetforalimiteddurationprovidedthattheupperlimitforeachconnectedcell(CategoryC)isnotexceeded.Inaddition,theaverageelectrolytetemperatureofthebatterycellsmustbeZ65'F.ThebatterycellparametersarespecifiedinTableB3.8.6-1.Thistabledelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityforthreedifferentcategories.Themeaningofeachcategoryisdiscussedbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-53DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESLCO(continued)CateorACategoryAdefinesthenormalparameterlimitforeachdesignatedpilotcellineachbattery.Thecellsselectedaspilotcellsarethosewhosetemperature,level,voltage,andelectrolytespecificgravityapproximatethestateofchargeoftheentirebattery.TheCategoryAlimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevelarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendationsandareconsistentwiththeguidanceinIEEE-450(Ref.3),withanadditional'llowanceof',inchabovethehighwaterlevelindicationmarkforoperatingmargintoaccountfortemperatureandchargeeffects.Inadditiontothisallowance,footnoteatoTableB3.8.6-1permitstheelectrolyteleveltobeabovethespecifiedmaximumlevelduringequalizingcharge,provideditisnotoverflowing.Thespecifiedmaximumlevelisdefinedas',inchabovethemaximumindicationmark.Theselimitsensurethattheplatessuffernophysicaldamage,andthatadequateelectrontransfercapabilityismaintainedintheeventoftransientconditions.IEEE-450(Ref.3)recommendsthatelectrolytelevelreadingsshouldbemadeonlyafterthebatteryhasbeenatfloatchargeforatleast72hours.TheCategoryAlimitspecifiedforfloatvoltageisZ2.13Vpercell.ThisvalueisbasedontherecommendationsofIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichstatesthatprolongedoperationofcells<2.13Vcanreducethelifeexpectancyofcells.TheCategoryAlimitspecifiedforspecificgravityforeachpilotcellisz1.193forBatteryAandZ1.197forBatteryB(0.015belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity)orabatterychargingcurrentthatisstabilizedatavalueof<2amps.Thisvalueischaracteristicofachargedcellwithadequatecapacity.AccordingtoIEEE-450(Ref.3),thespecificgravityreadingsarebasedonatemperatureof77'F(25'C).Thespecificgravityreadingsarecorrectedforactualelectrolytetemperatureandlevel.Foreach3'F(1.67'C)above77'F(25'C),1point(0.001)isaddedtothereading;1pointissubtractedforeach3'Fbelow77'F.Thespecificgravityoftheelectrolyteinacellincreaseswithalossofwaterduetoelectrolysisorevaporation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-54DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3..8.6,BASESLCOCatecaorA(continued)FootnotebtoTableB3.8.6-1requirestheabovementionedcorrectionforelectrolytelevelandtemperature,withtheexceptionthatlevelcorrectionisnotrequiredwhenbatterychargingcurrentis<2ampsonfloatcharge.Thiscurrentprovides,ingeneral,anindicationofoverallbatteryconditionandcanbeusedasanalternativetospecificgravity.CateorBCategoryBdefinesthenormalparameterlimitsforeachconnectedcell.Theterm"connectedcell"excludesanybatterycellthatmaybejumperedout.TheCategoryBlimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagearethesameasthosespecifiedforCategoryAandhavebeendiscussedabove.TheCategoryBlimitspecifiedforspecificgravityforeachconnectedcellis>1.188forBatteryAandZ1.192forBatteryB(0.020belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity)orabatterychargingcurrentthatisstabilizedatavalue<2amps.Theaverageofallconnectedcellsmustalsobe>1.198forBatteryAand>1.202forBatteryB(0.010belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Thesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturer'srecommendations.Theminimumspecificgravityvaluerequiredforeachcellensuresthattheeffectsofahighlychargedornewlyinstalledcellwillnotmaskoveralldegradationofthebattery.ThetemperaturecorrectionforspecificgravityreadingsisthesameasthatforCategoryAandhasbeendiscussedabove.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-55DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESLCO(continued)~CateorCCategory6definesthelimitsforeachconnectedcell.Theterm"connectedcell"excludesanybatterycellthatmaybejumperedout.Theselimits,althoughreducedfromtheCategoryAandBlimits,provideassurancethatsufficientcapacityexiststoperformtheintendedfunctionandmaintainamarginofsafety.MhenanybatteryparameterisoutsidetheCategoryClimit,theassuranceofsufficientcapacitydescribedaboveno,longerexists,andthebatterymustimmediatelybedeclaredinoperable.TheCategoryClimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevel(abovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing)ensurethattheplatessuffernophysicaldamageandmaintainadequateelectrontransfercapability.TheCategoryClimitforfloatvoltageisbasedonIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichstatesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelow,underfloatconditionsandnotcausedbyelevatedtemperatureofthecell,indicatesinternalcellproblemsandmayrequirecellreplacement.TheCategoryClimitfortheaverageofallconnectedcellsspecifiesaspecificgravityZ1.188forBatteryAand>1.192forBatteryB(0.020belowthemanufacturerrecommendedfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Thesevalvesarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendations.Inadditiontothatlimit,itisrequiredthatthespecificgravityforeachconnectedcellmustbenomorethan0.020belowtheaverageofallconnectedcells.Thislimitensuresthattheeffectofahighlychargedornewcelldoesnotmaskoveralldegradationofthebattery.ThetemperaturecorrectionforspecificgravityreadingsisthesameasthatforCategoryAandhasbeendiscussedabove.Becauseofspecificgravitygradientsthatareproducedduringtherechargingprocess,delaysofseveraldaysmayoccurwhilewaitingforthespecificgravitytostabilize.Astabilizedchargercurrentisanacceptablealternativetospecificgravitymeasurementfordeterminingthestateofcharge.ThisphenomenonisdiscussedinIEEE-450(Ref.3).rR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-56(continued)DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThebatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesarerequiredsolelyforthesupportoftheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystem.Therefore,thebatterycellparameterlimitsofTableB"3.8.6-1arerequiredtobemetwhentheDCpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.SincetheTrainAandTrainBbatteriessupportLCO3.8.4andLCO3.8.5,thebatterycellparametersofTableB3.8.6-1arerequiredtobemetinNODESI,2,3,and4,andwhentheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.ACTIONSTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyaNotetoprovideclarificationthatseparateconditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.SeparateConditionentryisacceptablesincethebatterycellparametersofTableB3.8.6-1areprovidedonabatterybasis.A.lA.2andA.3Withoneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinlimits(i.e.,CategoryAlimitsnotmet,CategoryBlimitsnotmet,orCategoryAandBlimitsnotmet)butwithintheCategoryClimitsspecifiedinTableB3.8.6-1thebatterycellsaredegradedbutthebatterystillhassufficientcapacitytoperformitsintendedfunction.Therefore,theaffectedbatteryisnotrequiredtobeconsideredinoperableperLCO3.8.4or'CO3.8.5solelyasaresultofCategoryAorBlimitsnotmetandoperationispermittedforalimitedperiodbeforethebatterycellparametersmustberestoredwithinlimits.WithoneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinCategoryAorBlimits,thepilotcellelectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagearerequiredtobeverifiedtomeettheCategoryClimitsofTableB3.8.6-1withinIhour.Thischeckwillprovideaquickindicationofthestatusoftheremainderofthebatterycells.TheCompletionTimeofonehourprovidessufficienttimetoinspecttheelectrolytelevelandtoconfirmthefloatvoltageofthepilotcells.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-57DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)Ifthepilotcell'selectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagearefoundtobewithintheTableB3.8.6-1CategoryClimits,allconnectedcellsmustbeverifiedtobewithinCategoryClimitswithin24hours.CompletionTimeof24hoursisallowedtocompletetheinitialverification.Thistakesintoconsiderationboththetimerequiredtoperformtherequiredverification(includingspecificgravitymeasurements)andtheassurancethatthebatterypilotcellparametersarenotseverelydegraded.Thisverificationisrequiredevery7daysuntilallbatterycellparametersarerestoredtoCategoryAandBlimits.Thisperiodicverificationismorerestrictivethanthenormalfrequencyofpilotcellsurveillances.BatterycellparametersmustberestoredtowithinCategoryAandBlimitswithin31days.ACompletionTimeof31daystorestorebatterycellparameters'towithinlimitsisacceptablesincethebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctioninthiscondition.B.1IftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,orwithoneormorebatterieswithanaverageelectrolytetemperatureofrepresentativecells<65'F,orwithoneormorebatterieswith,oneormorebatterycellparametersoutsidetheCategoryClimitsforanyconnectedcell,sufficientcapacitytosupplythemaximumexpectedloadrequirementisnotassuredandthecorrespondingDCelectricalpowertrainmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperableandactionstakenperLCO3.8.4orLCO3.8.5.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-58DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.6.1ThisSRverifiesthatTableB3.8.6-1CategoryAbatterycellparametersareconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichrecommendsregularbatteryinspectionsincludingfloatvoltage,specificgravity,andelectrolytelevelofeachpilotcell.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).SR3.8.6.2ThisSRverifiesthatTableB3.8.6-1CategoryBbatterycellparametersareconsistentwi'thIEEE-450(Ref.3).Thebatteryinspectionshallincludefloatvoltage,specificgravity,andelectrolytelevelofeachconnectedcell.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).Inaddition,within7daysofabatterydischarge(105Vorabatteryovercharge>150V,thebatterymustbedemonstratedtomeetCategoryBlimits.ThisinspectionisalsoconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichrecommendsspecialinspectionsfollowingaseveredischargeorovercharge,toensurethatnosignificantdegradationofthebatteryoccursasaconsequenceofsuchdischargeorovercharge.SR3.8.6.3ThisSRverifiesthattheaveragetemperatureofrepresentativecellsisZ65'F.ThisisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofIEEE-450(Ref.3).Lowerthannormaltemperaturesacttoinhibitorreducebatterycapacity.ThisSRensuresthattheoperatingtemperaturesremainwithinanacceptableoperatingrange.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-59(continued)DraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section3.8.2.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.IEEE-450-1980.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-60OraftA BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6TableB3.8.6-1(page1of1)BatteryCellParametersRequirementsPARAMETERCATEGORYA:LIMITSFOREACHDESIGNATEDPILOTCELLCATEGORYB:LIMITSFOREACHCONNECTEDCELLCATEGORYC:ALLOWABLELIMITFOREACHCONNECTEDCELLEiect~o'IyteLevela>minimumlevelindicationmark,andz~inchabo'vemaximumleve)jndicationmarkka)>minimumlevelindicationmark,and<',inchabovemaximumlevefjndicationmarkAbovetopofplates,andnotoverflowingFloatVoltage>2.13V22.13V>2.07VSpecifigbGravity'>1.193forBatteryAanda1.197forBatteryBZ1.188forBatteryAandZ1.192forBatteryBANDAverageofallconnectedcells:>1.198forBatteryAand>1.202forBatteryBNotmorethan,0.020belowaverageofallconnectedcellsANDAverageofallconnectedcells:Z1.188forBatteryAandZ1.192forBatteryB(a)Itisacceptablefortheelectrolyteleveltotemporarilyincreaseabovethespecifiedmaximumlevelduringequalizingchargesprovideditisnotoverflowing.(b)Correctedforelectrolytetemperatureandlevel.Levelcorrectionisnotrequired,however,whenbatterychargingis<2ampswhenonfloatcharge.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-61DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.7ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)isnormallysuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanon-ClasslEconstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigure3.8.4-1).Thesethree120VACinstrumentbuses(A,B,andC)supplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuatetheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andothercomponents(Ref.1).ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatures.ActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentHonitoringInstrumentation."InstrumentBusesAandCcanbesuppliedpowereitherfrominverterswhicharepoweredfromseparateandredundantDCpowersources,anon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower,oraClass1ECVT(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).TheinvertersarethepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusAandCbecauseofthestabilityandreliabilitytheyachieve.InstrumentBusBcanbesuppliedpowerfromeitheraClasslECVToranon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower.TheClass1ECVT,suppliedbymotorcontrolcenterC(HCCCissuppliedby480VsafeguardsBus14),isthepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusBbecauseofthepotentialtohaveapowerinterruptionifoffsitepowerwereunavailable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-62DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)"Themajorityofinstrumentationandcontrolssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesarefailsafedevicessuchthattheygototheirpostaccidentpositionuponlossofpower.However,anotableexceptiontothisis,theactuationlogicforContainmentSpray(CS)Systemwhichrequires120VACand125VDCpowerinordertofunction.ThispreventsaspuriousCSactuationfromoccurringifcontrolpowerwerelost.TheactuationlogicforCSispoweredfromallthreeinstrumentbusesandfrombothDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrains.APPL'ICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.2and3),assumeEngineeredSafetyFeaturesystemsareOPERABLE.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesaredesignedtoprovidetherequiredcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertotheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbasedonmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingrequiredACinstrumentbusesOPERABLEintheevent-of:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACelectricalpowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofAC'nstrumentbusesareavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneACinstrumentbuspowersource).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-63DraftA ~, ACInstrumentBusSource-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources'i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofACinstrumentbuspoweralsoensuresthatatleastonetrainofACinstrumentbusesisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.4).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.5)canbemetatalltimes.TheACinstrumentbussourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheACinstrumentbussourcesensuretheavailabilityof120VACelectricalpowerfortheinstrumentationforsystemsrequiredtoshutdown'thereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.HaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClass1E480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-64DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESLCO(continued)ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").ForaClasslECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClass1E480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4").APPLICABILITYTheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.ACinstrumentbuspowerrequirementsforMODES5and6arecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.8,"Inverters-MODES5and6.",ACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3Withaninverterinoperable,itsassociatedACinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromeitheritsClasslEornon-Class1ECVT.RequiredActionA.1allowstheinstrumentbustobepoweredfromeitheritsassociatedClassIECVTorfromanon-Class1ECVT.ForInstrumentBusesAandC,thenon-ClasslEpowerissuppliedbyanon-safetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursisconsistentwithLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4".(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-65DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)RequiredActionA.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethattheinstrumentbuscanbeconnectedtoa.non-ClasslEpowersupply.The24hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClass1ECVTortheinverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheconnectiontoanon-ClassIEpowersupply.RequiredActionA.3allows72hourstofixtheinoperableinverterandrestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.The72hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationthe,timerequiredtorepairaninverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheinverterinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhentheACinstrumentbusispoweredfromitsCVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleACelectricalpowersources(offsiteandonsite).Theuninterruptible,batterybackedinvertersourcetotheACinstrumentbusesisthepreferredsourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.B.land8.2WiththeClassIECVTforInstrumentBusBinoperable,theinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromitsnon-Class1ECVT.RequiredActionB.1requiresInstrumentBusBtobepoweredfromitsnon-Class1ECVTwithin2hours.Thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanonsafetyrelated480Vmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-66DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-HODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASESACTIONSB.1andB.2(continued)RequiredActionB.2'isintendedtolimitthe.amountoftimethatInstrumentBusBcanbeconnectedtoanon-Class1Epowersupply.The7daylimitisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClass1ECVTandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheClass1ECVTinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhenInstrumentBusBispoweredfromitsnon-Class1ECVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleoffsiteACelectricalpowersources.TheClass1E,dieselgeneratorbacked,CVTtoInstrumentBusBisthepreferredpowersourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.C.landC.2IftheinoperabledevicesorcomponentscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionAorB,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.0.1IftwoormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenbothinverters,oroneormoreinvertersandtheClass1ECVTtoInstrumentBusBarediscoveredtobeinoperable.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-67(continued)DraftA ACInstrumentBusSource-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.7.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttoInstrumentBusAandC.ThisverifiesthattheinvertersarefunctioningproperlyandACInstrumentBusAandCareenergizedfromtheirrespectiveinverter.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinvertersandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.SR3.8.7.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClass1ECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.ThisverifiesthattheClasslECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClass1ECVTmalfunctions.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Chapter8.3.2.2.UFSAR,Chapter6.3.UFSAR,Chapter15.4.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.,5.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-68DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.8ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUNDTheBackgr'oundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredACinstrumentbusesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherHODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACinstrumentbussources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredAC,instrumentbuselectricalsubsystem'isbasesontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACinstrumentbuspower.sourcestoeachrequiredACinstrumentbusduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a.,Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;b.Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andc.Instrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-69DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES'(continued)Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheACinstrumentbusesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-70DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and6B3.8.8BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomiccons'ideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingHODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Haintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduPinganevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACinstrumentbuspowersourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClass1E480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-71DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and6B3.8.8BASESLCO(continued)ForaClasslECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-HODES1,2,3,and4).PowersourcesensuretheavailabilityofsufficientpowertotherequiredAC'nstrumentbusestooperatetheplantinasafe,mannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).APPLICABILITYTheinvertersrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofaDBAandtomaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionareavailable.ACInstrumentBuspowerrequirementsforHODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.7.ACTIONSA.1AlthoughtwotrainsmayberequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HODES5and6,"theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationswithapotentialforpositivereactivityadditions.ByallowingtheoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperablewiththeassociatedACinstrumentbuspowersourceinoperable,appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedin.accordancewiththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.ThisconditionmustbeenteredwhentheinvertersforInstrumentBusAorCareinoperable,ortheClass1ECVTforInstrumentBusBisinoperable.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-72DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6B3.8.8BASESACTIONS(continued)A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5WithoneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompleti,onofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpowerorpoweredfromanalternatepowersource.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.8.1ThisSRverifiescorrectstaticswitchalignmenttotherequiredACinstrumentbuses.ThisSRverifiesthattheinverterisfunctioningproperlyandtheACinstrumentbusenergizedfromtheinverter.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheinverterandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-73DraftA ACInstrumentBusSources-HODES5and6B3.8.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS(continued)SR3.8.8.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClassIECVTalignmentwhenInstrumentBusBisrequired.ThisverifiesthattheClassIECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailablein'he.controlroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClassIECVT'alfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-74DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.9DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4BASESBACKGROUNDAsourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactioncomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswhicharerequiredtosupplysafetyrelatedandEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)SystemsinMODES1,2,3,and4.TheonsiteClass1EAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsareeachdividedintotworedundantandindependentdistributiontrains.Eachoftheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andtheirtrains,arediscussedindetailbelow.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-75DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ACElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClass'lEACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).Eachtrainconsistsoftwo480Vsafeguardsbuses,distributionpanels,motorcontrolcentersandloadcenters(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).The480Vsafeguardsbusesforeachtrainarecapableofbeingsuppliedfromtwosourcesofoffsitepoweraswellasadedicatedonsiteemergencydieselgenerator(DG)source.ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."The480Vsafeguardsbusesinturnsupplymotorcontrolc'enters,distributionpanelsandloadcenterswhichsupplymotivepowertorequiredmotoroperatedvalves,pumps,dampers,oranyothercomponentwhichrequiresACpowertoperformitssafetyrelatedfunction.TheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliesoneofthethreerequiredACinstrumentbusesthroughaconstantvoltagetransformerandprovidesabackupsourcefortheothertwoinstrumentbuses.ThelistofallrequiredAC480Vsafeguardsbusesisprovided'inTableB3.8.9-1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-76DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)DCElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClass1EDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).EachtrainconsistsofaClasslEbatteryandtwobatterychargers(withachargingcapacityofatleast150amps)whichsupplyamain125VDCdistributionpanel(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."Eachmaindistributionpanelsuppliessecondarydistribution.panelswhichprovidecontrolpowertoACpoweredcomponentsandcontrolpowerforotherdevicessuchassolenoidoperatedvalvesandairoperatedvalves.TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliestwoofthefourACinstrumentbusesthroughinverters.ThelistofallrequiredDCdistributionpanelsisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-77DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ACInstrumentBusElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)issuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanonClass1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).Thesethreebusesareorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).ThesetrainssupplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuateESFandothercomponents.TrainAconsistsoftwobuseswithonebus(InstrumentBusA)normallypoweredfromaninverterandtheother(InstrumentBusB)normallypoweredfromaClass1ECVT.TrainBconsistsofonebus(InstrumentBusC)normallypoweredfromaninverter.Thelong-termalternatepowersuppliesforInstrumentBusAandCaretwoClasslECVTs,eachpoweredfromthesametrainastheassociatedbatterychargers,andtheiruseisgovernedbyLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4."Thelistofrequired120VACinstrumentbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureAcutationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentMonitoring(PAN)Instrumentatio'n."(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-78DraftA DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalyses(Refs.Iand2).assumeESFsystemsareOPERABLE.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsaredesignedtoprovide,sufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesfor'ection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSystems."TheOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheplant.ThisincludesmaintainingpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofallACoffsitepowerorallonsitestandbyACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainofeachdistributionsubsystemisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofoffsitestandbyACpower).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-79DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)\'ngeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneAC,DC,andACinstrumentbustrainisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsite'owercanbeobtained'ybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwatertrainduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.3).Therefore,the,requirementsofGDC'7(Ref.4)canbemetatalltimes.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTrainAandTrainBoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.ThepowerdistributionsubsystemsandtheirtrainslistedinTableB3.8.9-1ensuretheavailabilityofAC,DC;andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerforthesystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-80DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESLCO(continued)OPERABLEAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbuses,loadcenters,.motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelstobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.MaintainingtheTrainAandTrainBAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFisnotcompromised.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithintheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswillnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.TiebreakersbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionsubsystems,iftheyexist,mustbeopen.Thispreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowerdistributionsubsystemfrompropagatingtotheredundantsubsystem,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsystemandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanyofthefollowinglistedtiebreakersareclosed,theaffectedredundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisconsideredinoperable.Thisdoesnot,however,precludeACbusesfrombeingpoweredfromthesameoffsitecircuit.a.ACpower480Vsafeguardsbustiebreakers(Ref.5)Bus-Tie14-16Bus-Tie16-14Bus-Tie17-18Bus-Tie16-15Bus-Tie14-13b.DCcontrolpowerautomaticthrowoverswitches(innormalposition)(Ref.6)DGControlPanelADGControlPanelBBus14ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus16ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus17ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinetBus18ControlPowerandUndervoltageCabinet(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-81DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESLCO(continued)-ThetrainsasspecifiedinTable3.8.9-1onlyidentifythemajorAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcomponents.Atrainisdefinedtobeginfromtheboundaryofthepowersourcefortherespectivesubsystem(asdefinedinthepowersourceLCOs),andcontinuesuptotheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponent(e.g.,safetyinjectionpump).TheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponentisonlyconsideredpartofthetrainwhenthedeviceisnotcapableofopeningtoisolatethefailedcomponentfromthetrain(e.g.,breakerunableto.openanovercurrent).Otherwise,thefailureoftheisolationdevicetoclosetoprovidepowertothecomponentisaddressedbytherespectivecomponent'sLCO.Theisolationdevicefornonsafetyrelatedcomponentsareconsideredpartofthetrainsincethesedevicesmustbeavailabletoprotectthesafetyrelatedfunctions.Therefore,thetrainboundaryessenti'allyendsatthemotorcontrolcenterorbuswhichsuppliesmultiplecomponents.Theinoperabilityofanycomponentwithintheabovedefinedtrainboundariesrendersthetraininoperable.APPLICABILITYTheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-82DraftA

DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)ElectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedinLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."ACTIONSA.1WithoneACelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingACelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelswhichcompriseatrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.TheworstcaseConditionAscenarioisonetrainwithoutACpower(i.e.,nooffsitepowertothetrainandtheassociatedDGinoperable).InthisCondition,theplantismorevulnerabletoacompletelossofACpower.TheCompletionTimeforrestoringtheinoperabletrainbeforerequiringaplantshutdownislimitedto8hoursbecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyiftheplantoperator'sattentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessarytorestorepowertotheaffectedtrain;andb.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithACpowerwhichresultsinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-83DraftA DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)8.1WithonerequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdowntheplantandmaintainitinthesafeshutdowncondition.Overallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingACinstrumentbustraincouldresultintheminimumESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACinstrumentbustrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionBrepresentsoneACinstrumentbustrainwithoutpower'whichincludesthepotentiallossofboththeDCsourceandtheassociatedACsourcestotheinstrumentbus.Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallnoninterruptiblepower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursduetothepotentialvulnerabilities.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequate120VACpower,thatwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hoursifdeclaredinoperable,isacceptablebecauseof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.C.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousApplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutadequate120VACpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;andThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEACinstrumentbustrain.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-84DraftA DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONS(continued)B.1(continued)The2hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheimportancetosafetyofrestoringtheACinstrumentbustraintoOPERABLEstatus,theredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheotherOPERABLEinstrumentbustrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1WithoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraininoperable,theremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdowncondition.Theoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureintheremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributiontraincouldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredDCdistributionpanelsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.ConditionCrepresentsonetrainwithoutadequateDCpower(e.g.,thebatteryandrequiredbatterychargerareinoperable).Inthissituation,theplantissignificantlymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofallDCpower.Therefore,theCompletionTimeislimitedto2hoursduetothispotentialvulnerability.TakingexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithoutadequateDCpower,whichwouldhaveCompletionTimesshorterthan2hours,isacceptablebecauseof:a.-Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangeinplantconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)andnotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutDCpower'ndnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-85DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASESACTIONSC.1(continued)c.ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintheOPERABLEtrainwithDCpower.D.land0.2IftheinoperabledistributionsubsystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbe'broughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachieve'thisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.1Iftwoormoretrainsareinoperable,thepotentialforalossofsafetyfunctionisgreater.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionexists,noadditionaltimeisjustifiedforcontinuedoperationandLCO3.0.3mustbeentered.ThisConditionmaybeenteredwiththelossoftwotrainsofthesameelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,orwithlossofTrainAofoneelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcoincidentwiththelossofTrainBofasecondelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsuchthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-86(continued)DraftA DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.8.9.1ThisSRverifiesthattheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarefunctioningproperly,withallrequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,tie-breakersopen,andthebusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.RequiredvoltagefortheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemis~420VAC;fortheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,Z108.6VDC;andforACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,between113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofpropervoltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableform'otiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Chapter6.2.UFSAR,Chapter15.3.UFSAR,Section8.3.1.4.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.5.UFSAR,Figure8.3-1.6.UFSAR,Figure8.3-6.7.UFSAR,Figure8.3-4.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-87DraftA DistributionSystems-NODES1,2,3,and4B3.8.9TableB3.8.9-1(page1of1)ACandDCElectrical-PowerDistributionSystemsDISTRIBUTIONSUBSYSTEHVOLTAGETRAINATRAIH8ACPower480VBus14Bus18Bus16Bus17DCPower125VHainOCFuseCabinetA(OCPDPCB02A)HainOCDistributionPanelA(OCPDPC803A)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPABOIA)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelAl(DCPOPAB02A)OGAOCDistributionPanelA(DCPOPDGOIA)ScreenhouseOCDistributionPanelA(OCPDPSH01A)HCBDCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPOC804A)HainDCFuseCabinet8(DCPDPC8028)HainOCDistributionPanel(DCPDPC8038)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanel8(DCPOPAB018)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanel81(DCPDPAB028)OG8OCDistributionPanel8(DCPDPOGOIB)ScreenhouseDCDistributionPanel8(DCPOPSHOIB)MCBDCDistributionPanel8(DCPDPC8048)TurbineBldgDCDistributionPanel(DCPOPT8018)ACInstrumentBus120VBusABus8BusCR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-88DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.10DistributionSystems-MODES5and6BASESBACKGROUND-TheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,arid4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODES5or6,thenumberofrequiredAC,DC,andinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,orthenumberorrequiredtrainswithintheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,mustberemovedfromservice.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:a0b.c~Systemsneededtomitigateafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;Systemsnecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatcanleadtocoredamageduringshutdownareavailable;andInstrumentationandcontrolcapabilityisavailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheplantinacoldshutdownconditionandrefuelingcondition.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-89DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODES1,2,3,and4havenospecificanalys'esinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)and)hecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoc'currencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODES1,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromHODE1,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-90DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.'.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent.IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-91(continued)DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)LCOVariouscombinationsofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,trainswithinthesesubsystems,andequipmentandcomponentswithinthesetrainsarerequiredOPERABLEbyotherLCOs,dependingonthespecificplantcondition.ImplicitinthoserequirementsistherequiredOPERABILITYofnecessarysupportfeatures.ThisLCOexplicitlyrequiresenergizationoftheportionsoftheelectricaldistributionsystemnecessarytosupportOPERABILITYofrequiredsystems,equipment,andcomponents-allspecificallyaddressedineachLCOandimplicitlyrequiredviathedefinitionofOPERABILITY.TheLCOswhichapplywhentheReactorCoolantSystemisz200'Fandwhichmayrequireasourceofelectricalpowerare:LCO3.1.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.7LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.12LCO3.7.9LCO3.9.2LCO3.9.3LCO3.9.4SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)NuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevelResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevelMaintainingtheseportionsofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerthedistributionsubsystemsenergizedensurestheavailabilityofsufficientpowertooperatetheplantinasafemannertomitigatetheconsequencesof'ostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-92(continued)DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYTheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6provideassurancethatsystemsrequiredtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulatedevent'ndmaintaintheplantinthecoldshutdownorrefuelingconditionare'available.TheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4."ACTIONSA.lAlthoughredundantrequiredfeaturesmayrequireredundanttrainsofelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeOPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemtrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.Byallowingtheoptionto=declarerequiredfeaturesassociatedwithaninoperabledistributionsubsystemortraininoperable,appropriaterestrictionsareimplementedinaccordancew'iththeLCOACTIONSoftheaffectedrequiredfeatures.A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A..2.4andA.2.5Withoneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsortrainsinoperable,the,optionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.1.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionofnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.I(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-93Draft.,A DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASESACTIONSA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5(continued)ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.InadditiontoperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2;A.2.3,andA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5requiresdeclaringRHRinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHRactions.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-94(cont>nued)DraftA DistributionSystems-MODES5and6B3.8.10BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.10.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarefunctioningproperly,withalltherequiredpowersourcecircuitbreakersclosed,requiredtie-breakersopen,andtherequiredbusesenergizedfromtheirallowablepowersources.-RequiredvoltagefortheACpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisz420VAC,fortheDCpowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemZ108.6VDC,andforACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionelectricalsubsystemisbetween113VACand123VAC.Requiredvoltageforthetwincopanelssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesisbetween115.6VACand120.4VAC.Theverificationofprope}voltageavailabilityonthebusesensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctionsforcriticalsyste'mloadsconnectedtothesebuses.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccountthecapabilityofthe,AC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESNone.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.8-95DraftA BoronConcentration3.9.13.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.1BoronConcentrationLCO3.9.1BoronconcentrationsshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Boronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.A.1~NDA.2~NDA.3SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.Initiateactiontorestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.1.1VerifyboronconcentrationiswithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.72hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-1DraftA NuclearInstrumentation3.9.23.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationLCO3.9.2TwosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelinoperable.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.AND'.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.Twosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsinoperable.B.lANDInitiateactiontorestoreonesourcerangeneutronfluxchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately8.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyB.3AND8.4Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.PerformSR3.9.1.1.ImmediatelyOnceper12hours(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-2DraftA NuclearInstrumentation3.9.2CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Noaudiblecountrate.C.1ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyC.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyC.3PerformSR3.9.1.1Onceper12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.9.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.9.2.2NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachsourcerange.24monthsR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-3DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelh23Ft3.9.33.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.3ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23FtLCO3.9.3OneRHRloopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.NOTETherequiredRHRloopmayberemovedfromoperationfor~I'ourper8,hourperiod,providednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)boronconcentration.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevelZ23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RHRlooprequirementsnotmet.A.lANDA.2ANDA.3SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration.Suspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.InitiateactiontosatisfyRHRlooprequirements.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-4DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23Ft3.9.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.3.1VerifyoneOPERABLERHRloopisinoperation.12hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-5DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft3.9.43.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.4ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtLCO3.9.4TwoRHRlo'opsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.A.lORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontoestablishZ23ftofwaterabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.TwoRHRloopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.lANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninReactorCoolantSystemboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-6DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft3.9.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.9.4.1VerifyoneOPERABLERHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.9.4.2VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpoweravailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-7DraftA 0 3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.5RefuelingCavityWaterLevelLCO3.9.5RefuelingcavitywaterlevelshallbemaintainedZ23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.APPLICABILITY:Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,DuringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Refuelingcavitywaterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.IANDA.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Suspendmovement.ofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.5.1VerifyrefuelingcavitywaterlevelisZ23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.24hoursR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant3.9-8DraftA BoronConcentrationB3.9.1B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS-83.9.1BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDThelimitontheboronconcentrationensuresthereactorremainssubcriticalduringNODE6.RefuelingboronconcentrationisthesolubleboronconcentrationinthefilledportionsoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcoreduringrefueling.Thesolubleboronconcentrationoffsetsthecorereactivityandismeasuredbychemicalanalysisofarepresentativesampleofthecoolant.Therefuelingboronconcentrationlimitisspecified.intheCore.OperationLimitsReport(COLR).Plantrefuelingproceduresensurethespecifiedboronconcentrationinordertomaintainanoverallcorereactivityofk,<<g0.95duringfuelhandling,withcontrolrodsandfuelassembliesassumedtobeinthemostadverseconfiguration(leastnegativereactivity)allowedbyplantrefuelingprocedures.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27requiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemspreferablyofdifferentdesignprinciplesbeprovided(Ref.I).Inadditiontothereactivitycontrolachievedbythecontrolrods,reactivitycontrolisprovidedbythechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)whichregulatestheconcentrationofboricacidsolutionneutronabsorberintheRCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtoprevent,underanticipatedsystemmalfunction,uncontrolledorinadvertentreactivitychangeswhichmaystressordamagethefuelbeyondallowablelimits.Thereactorisbroughttoshutdownconditions(i.e.,NODE5)beforebeginningoperationstoopenthereactorvesselforrefueling.AftertheRCSiscooledanddepressurizedthevesselheadisunboltedandremoved.Therefuelingcanalandtherefuelingcavityarethenfloodedwithboratedwater.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-1DraftA BoronConcentration83.9.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)ThepumpingactionoftheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SystemintotheRCS,andthenaturalcirculationduetothermaldrivingheadsinthereactorvesselandrefuelingcavityprovidemixingfortheboratedcoolantintherefuelingcanal.TheRHRSystemisinoperationduringrefueling(seeLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23Ft,"andLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft")toprovideforcedcirculationintheRCSandassistinmaintainingtheboronconcentrationintheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityabovetheCOLRlimit.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringrefuelingoperations,twotypesofaccidentscanoccurwithincontainmentthataffectthefuelandrequirecontrolofreactivity.Thesetwoaccidenttypesareafuelhandlingaccidentandaborondilutionevent.Bothaccidentsassumethatinitialcorereactivityisatitshighest(i.e.,atthebeginningofthefuelcycleortheendofrefueling).Afuelhandlingaccidentoccursduringfuelmovementinthereactorvessel,therefuelingcanal,ortherefuelingcavityandincludesadroppedfuelassemblyandanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly.Themostlimitingfuelhandlingaccidentisadroppedfuelassemblywhichisdroppedadjacent'ootherfuelassembliessuchthatitresultsinthelargestexposureoffuelinthedroppedassembly.Thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivityforbothtypesofaccidents.Hence,theboronconcentrationensuresthatk,<<<0.95(i.e.,5%hk/kSHUTDOWNMARGIN)duringtherefuelingoperation.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-2DraftA BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Thesecondtypeof.accidentisaborondilutioneventwhichresultsfrominadvertentadditionofunboratedwatertotheRCS,refuelingcavity,andrefuelingcanal.Theassumptionsusedintheborondilutionevent(Ref.2)provideforamaximumdilutionflowof120gpmthroughtwochargingpumps(i.e.,60gpmperpump)usingunboratedwaterassuppliedbythetworeactormakeupwaterpumps(60gpmperpump).TheRCSisalsoassumedtobeatlowwaterlevels,uniformlymixedbytheRHRSystem,withtheminimumboronconcentrationasspecifiedintheCOLR.Theoperatorhaspromptanddefiniteindicationofsignificantborondilutionfromanaudiblecountratefunctionprovidedbythesourcerangeneutronfluxinstrumentation(seeLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation").Theincreasedcountrateisafunctionoftheeffectivesubcriticalmultiplicationfactor.Theresultsofthisanalysisconcludethatanoperatorhasatleast48.8minutesbeforeSHUTDOWNMARGINislostandthereactorgoescriticalwhichissufficienttimeforoperatorstomitigatethisevent.Thistimeisalsogreaterthanthe30minutesrequiredbyReference3fordilutioneventsduringrefueling.Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesand/orstoppingthereactormakeupwaterpumps.TheRCSboronconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequiresthataminimumboronconcentrationbemaintainedintheportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledwiththereactorcorewhileinMODE6.The'oronconcentrationlimitspecifiedintheCOLRensuresthatacorek,<<of<0.95ismaintainedduringfuelhandlingoperationsandthatacorek,<<of<1.0ismaintainedduringaborondilutionevent.ViolationoftheLCOcouldleadtoaninadvertentcriticalityduringMODE6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-3(continued)DraftA BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE6toensurethefuelinthereactorvesselwillremainsubcritical.Therequiredboronconcentrationensuresak,<<g0.95duringfuelhandlingoperations.InMODES1and2withk,<<~1.0,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimits,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits"ensureanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdownthereactor.InMODES2withk,<<<1.0andMODES3,4,and5,LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"ensuresanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletomaintainthereactorsubcritical.ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3IftheboronconcentrationofthefilledportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityhydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcore,islessthanitslimit,aninadvertentcriticalitymayoccurduetoaborondilutioneventorincorrectfuelloading.Tominimizethepotentialofaninadvertentcriticalityresultingfromafuelloadingerrororanoperationthatcouldcauseareductioninboronconcentration,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.SuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsshallnotprecludemovingacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.InadditiontoimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivityadditions,borationtorestoretheconcentrationmustbeinitiatedimmediately.Therearenosafetyanalysisassumptionsofborationflowrateandconcentrationthatmustbesatisfied.Theonlyrequirementistorestoretheboronconcentrationtoitsrequiredvalueassoonaspossible.Inordertoraisetheboronconcentrationassoonaspossible,theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailableforplantconditions.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-4DraftA BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESACTIONSA.1A.2andA.3(continued)Onceactionhasbeeninitiated,itmustbecontinueduntiltheboronconcentrationisrestored.Therestorationtimedependsontheamountofboronthatmustbeinjectedtoreachtherequiredconcentration.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.9.1.1ThisSRensuresthecoolantboronconcentrationiswithintheCOLRlimits.Theboronconcentrationofthecoolantisdeterminedbychemicalanalysis.ThesampleshouldberepresentativeoftheportionsoftheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitythatarehydraulicallycoupledwiththereactorcore.AFrequencyofonceevery72hoursisareasonableamountoftimetoverifytheboronconcentrationofrepresentativesamples.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperience,whichhasshown72hourstobeadequate.REFERENCESl.AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC27,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.3.NUREG-0800,Section15.4.6.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-5DraftA NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.2NuclearInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDThesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsareusedduringrefuelingoperationstomonitorthecorereactivitycondition.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxchannels(N-31andN-32)arepartoftheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS).Thesedetectorsarelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselanddetectneutronsleakingfromthecore.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronfluxdetectorsareproportionalcountersthatarefilledwithborontriflouride(BF,)gas(Ref.I).Thedetectorsmonitortheneutronfluxincountspersecondandprovidecontinuousvisualindicationinthecontrolroom.Audiblecountrateisalsoavailableinthecontrolroomfromeitherofthesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelstoalertoperatorstoapossibleborondilutionevent.TheNISisdesignedinaccordancewiththecriteriapresentedinReference2.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTwoOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsarerequiredtoprovideredundantindicationtoalertoperatorsofunexpectedchangesincorereactivity.Anincreaseintheaudiblecountratealertstheoperatorsthataborondilutioneventisinprogress.SufficienttimeisavailablefortheoperatortorecognizetheincreaseinaudiblecountrateandtoterminatetheeventpriortoalossofSHUTDOWNMARGIN(seeBasesforLCO3.9.I,"BoronConcentration").Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesandstoppingreactormakeupwaterpumps.ThesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E..GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-6(continued)DraftA NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)LCOThisLCOrequirestwosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsbeOPERABLEtoensureredundantmonitoringcapabilityisavailabl'etodetectchangesincorereactivity.TobeOPERABLE,eachchannelmustprovidevisualindicationandatleastoneofthetwochannelsmustprovideanaudiblecountratefunctioninthecontrolroom.Withthedischargeoffuelfromcorepositionsadjacenttosourcerangedetectorlocations,countsdecreasingtozeroistheexpectedresponse.Basedonthisindicationalone,sourcerangedetectionshouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.Followingafullcoredischarge,sourcerangeresponseisverifiedwiththeinitialfuelassemblyreload.APPLICABILITYInNODE6,thesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsmustbeOPERABLEtodeterminechangesincorereactivity.TherearenootherdirectmeansavailabletocheckcorereactivityconditionsinthisNODE.InNODES2,=3,4,and5,thesesameinstalledsource,rangedetectorsandcircuitryarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACTIONSA.1andA.2WithonlyonesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelOPERABLE,redundancyhasbeenlost.Sincetheseinstrumentsaretheonlydirectmeansofmonitoringcorereactivityconditions,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.IandA.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ForthepurposeofthisCondition,asourcerangeneutronfluxchannelisinoperablewhennovisualindicationisavailable.ThelossoftheaudiblecountratefunctionisaddressedbyConditionC.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-7DraftA NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASESACTIONS(continued)B.lB.2B.3andB.4MithnosourcerangeneutronfluxchannelOPERABLEtherearenodirectmeansofdetectingchangesincorereactivity.Therefore,actionstorestoreachanneltoOPERABLEstatusshallbeinitiatedimmediatelyandcontinueuntilasourcerangeneutronfluxchannelisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntilthesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsareOPERABLE.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensuretherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TheCompletionTimeofonceper12hoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentrationandtoensureunplannedchangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.The12hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.C.lC.2andC.3Withnoaudiblecountrateavailable,onlyvisualindicationisavailableandpromptanddefiniteindicationofaborondilutioneventhasbeenlost.Therefore,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsC.1andC.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntiltheaudiblecountratecapabilityisrestored.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensurethattherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TheCompletiontimeofonceper12hoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentrationandtoensureunplannedchangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-8DraftA NuclearInstrumentationB3'.-9.2BASESACTIONS(continued)The12hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.2.1SR3.9.2.1istheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECK,whichisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronanotherchannel.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatthetwoindicationchannelsshouldbeconsistentwithcoreconditions.Changesinfuelloadingandcoregeometrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesbetweensource.rangechannels,buteachchannelshouldbeconsistentwithitslocalconditions.TheinoperabilityofonesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelpreventsperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKfortheoperablechannel.However,theRequiredActionsfortheinoperablechannelrequiressuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsuchthattheCHANNELCHECKoftheoperablechannelcanconsistofensuringconsistencywithknowncoreconditions.TheFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeCHANNELCHECKFrequencyspecifiedsimilarlyforthesameinstrumentsinLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."SR3.9.2.2SR3.9.2.2istheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24months.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestobaselinedata.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.UR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-9l(continued)DraftA NuclearInstrumentationB3.9.2BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section7.7.3.2.2.Atom'icIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC13and19,IssuedforCommentJuly10,1967.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-10DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23FtB3.9.3B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.3ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23FtBASES'ACKGROUNDThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminMODE6istoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratification(Ref.I).HeatisremovedfromtheRCSbycirculatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)andbypassline(s).MixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.Inordertoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,oneloopoftheRHRSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,andinoperationwhilein'MODE6,withwaterlevelZ23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-11DraftA

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23FtB3.9.3BASESAPPLICABLEWhilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecaySAFETYANALYSES.heatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6,ifthe(continued)reactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.DuetothewatervolumeavailableintheRCSwithawaterlevelZ23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,asignificantamountoftimeexistsbeforeboilingofthecoolantwouldoccurfollowingalossoftherequiredRHRpump.SincethelossoftherequiredRHRpumpresultsinthesuspensionofoperationsinvolvingareductioninreactorcoolantboronconcentration,aborondilutioneventisveryunlikely.Therefore,thisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailabletooperatorstorespondtoalossoftheoperatingRHRpump.TheLCOpermitsde-energizingtherequiredRHRpumpforshortdurations,,undertheconditionthattheboronconcentrationisnotreduced.Thisconditionalde-energizingoftherequiredRHRpumpdoesnotresultinachallengetothefissionproductbarrierorresultincoolantstratification.ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevelsatisfiescriterion4oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOOnlyoneRHRloopisrequiredfordecayheatremovalinNODE6,withthewaterlevela23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,becausethevolumeofwaterabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesbackupdecayheatremovalcapability.OneRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationtoprovidemixingofboratedcoolant.AnOPERABLERHRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-12DraftA

RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23FtB3.9.3BASESLCO(continued)TheLCOismodifiedbyaNotethatallowstherequiredoperating,RHRlooptoberemovedfromserviceforuptoIhourper8hourperiodprovidednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration.Boronreductionisprohibitedbecauseuniformconcentrationdistributioncannotbeensuredwithoutforcedcirculation.Thisallowstheoperatortoviewthecoreandpermitsoperationssuchascoremappingoralterationsinthevicinityofthereactorvesselhotlegnozzles.ThisalsopermitsoperationssuchasRCStoRHRisolationvalvetesting.DuringthisIhourperiod,decayheatisremovedbynaturalconvectiontothelargemassofwaterintherefuelingcavity.ShouldbothRHRloopsbecomeinoperableatanytimeduringoperationinaccordancewiththisNote,theRequiredActionsofthisLCOshouldbeimmediatelytaken..APPLICABILITYOneRHRloopmustbeOPERABLEandinoperationinMODE6,withthewaterlevelZ23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremovalandmixingoftheboratedcoolant.The23ftwaterlevel.wasselectedbecauseitcorrespondstothe23ftrequirementestablishedforfuelmovementinLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel."RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminMODESI,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODEI;"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."TheRHRlooprequirementsinMODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-13(continued)DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel>23FtB3.9.3BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lA.2andA.3IfRHRlooprequirementsarenotmet,therewillbenoforcedcirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformboronconcentrations.ReducedboronconcentrationscanoccurbytheadditionofwaterwithalowerboronconcentrationthanthatcontainedintheRCS.Therefore,actionsthatcouldresultinareductioninthecoolantboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedimmediately.Withnoforcedcirculationcooling,decayheatremovalfromthecoreoccursbynaturalconvectiontotheheatsinkprovidedbythewaterabovethecore.Aminimumrefuelingwaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesanadequateavailableheatsink.Suspendinganyoperationthatwouldincreasedecayheatload,suchasloadingafuelassembly,isaprudentactionunderthiscondition.Therefore,actionsshallbetakenimmediately'osuspend'oadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.WiththeplantinNODE6andtherefuelingwaterlevel~23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,removalofdecayheatisbyambientlossesonly.Therefore,correctiveactionsshallbeinitiatedimmedi'atelyandshallcontinueuntilRHRlooprequirementsaresatisfied.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.9.3.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneOPERABLERHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingdecayheatremovalcapabilityandmixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratificationinthecore.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section'.4.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-14DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.4B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.4Residual<23FtHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminMODE6istoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtoprovidemixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratification(Ref.I).Heatisremoved'fromtheRCSbycirculatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCSloop"B"coldleg.OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfrom,thecontrolroom.Theheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolant'throughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)andbypassline(s).HixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.The'nalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.WhilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminMODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.Thiscouldleadtoalossofcoolantinthereactorvessel.Inaddition,boilingofthecoolantcouldlead'toareductioninboronconcentrationinthecoolantduetoboronplatingoutoncomponentsneartheareasoftheboilingactivity.Thelossofcoolantandthereductionofboronconcentrationinthereactorcoolantcouldeventuallychallengetheintegrityofthe.fuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-15DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Inordertopreventachallengetofuelcladdingandtoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,twoloopsoftheRHRSystemarerequiredOPERABLE,andoneloopinoperationwhileinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevelsatisfiescriterion4oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOBothRHRloopsmust.beOPERABLEinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Inaddition,oneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinordertoremovedecayheatandprovidemixingofboratedcoolant.AnOPERABLERHRloopincludesanRHRpump,aheatexchanger,valves,piping,instrumentsandcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.TheflowpathstartsintheRCSloop"A"hotlegandisreturnedtotheRCSloop"B"coldleg.APPLICABILITYTwoRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopmustbeinoperationinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremovalandmixingoftheboratedcoolant.RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminMODESI,2,3,4,and'5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODEI;"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."TheRHRlooprequirementsinMODE6withthewaterlevelZ23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelz23Ft."R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-16(continued)DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft83.9.4BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.landA.2IfonlyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreeitherasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatusorwaterlevelz23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.TheactionstorestoremustcontinueuntileitherthesecondRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorwaterlevelisestablished>23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.B.landB.2IfnoRHRloopisinoperationorifnoloopisOPERABLEalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneOPERABLERHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingdecayheatremovalcapabilityandmixingoftheboratedcoolanttopreventthermalandboronstratificationinthecore.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-17DraftA RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23FtB3.9.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)SR3.9.4.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptableby,operatingexperience./REFERENCES1.UFSAR,Section5.4.5.2.UFSAR,Section15.4.4.2.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-18DraftA RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.5B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.5RefuelingCavityWaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDThemovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentorperformanceofCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts,requiresaminimumwaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.Thisrequirementensuresasufficientlevelofwaterismaintainedintherefuelingcavityorportionshydraulicallyconnected(e.g.,refueling.canal)toretainiodinefissionproductactivityresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.I).Theretentionofiodineactivitybythewaterlimitstheoffsitedosefromtheaccidentwellwithinthevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.2).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDuringCOREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,thewaterlevelintherefuelingcavityisaninitialconditiondesignparameterintheanalysisofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.I).Aminimumwaterlevelof23ftallowsadecontaminationfactorof100tobeusedintheaccidentanalysisforiodine(Ref.3).Thisrelatestotheassumptionthat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofallthedroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytherefuelingcavitywater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory(Ref.3).Withaminimumwaterlevelof23ftandaminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortofuelhandling,theanalysisandtestprogramsdemonstratethattheiodinereleaseduetoapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentisadequatelycapturedbythewaterandoffsitedosesaremaintainedwithinallowablelimits(Ref.2).RefuelingcavitywaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-19(continued)DraftA RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.5BASES(continued)LCOAminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeisrequiredtoensuretheradiologicalconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentarewithinacceptablelimitsandpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.I).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredlevelduringmovementoffuelassemblieswithincontainment.MaintainingthisminimumwaterlevelintherefuelingcavityalsoensuresthatZ23ftofwaterisavailableinthespentfuelpoolduringfuelmovementassumingthatcontainmentandAuxiliaryBuildingatmosphericpressuresareequal.APPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicablewhenmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.ThisLCOisalsoapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts.TheLCOensuresasufficientlevelofwaterispresentintherefuelingcavitytominimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment.RequirementsforfuelhandlingaccidentsinthespentfuelpoolarecoveredbyLCO3.7.11,"SpentFuelPoolWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.landA.2Whentheinitialconditionassumedinthefuelhandlingaccidentcannotbemet,stepsshouldbetakento.precludetheaccidentfromoccurring.Withawaterlevelof<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,alloperati,onsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinthecontainmentshallbesuspendedimmediatelytoensurethatafuelhandlingaccidentcannotoccur.ThesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandfuelmovementshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.9-20(continued)DraftA RefuelingCavityWaterLevelB3.9.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.5.1Verificationofaminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangeensuresthatthedesignbasisfortheanalysisofthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingoperationsismet.Waterattherequiredlevelabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangelimitstheconsequencesofdamagedfuelrodsthatarepostulatedtoresultfromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment(Ref.1).TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelargevolumeofwaterandthenormalproceduralcontrolsofvalvepositions,whichmakesignificantunplannedlevelchangesunlikely.REFERENCESl.UFSAR,Section15.7.3.3.2.10CFR100.3.RegulatoryGuide1.25.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant83.9-21DraftA DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.1SiteLocationThesitefortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantislocatedonthesouthshoreofLakeOntario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork.4.2ReactorCore4.2.1FuelAssemb1iesThereactorshallcontain121fuelassemblies.Eachassemblyshallconsistofamatrixofzirconiumcladfuelrodswithaninitialcompositionofnaturalorslightlyenricheduraniumdioxide(UO,)asfuelmaterial.Limitedsubstitutionsofzirconiumalloyorstainlesssteelfillerrodsforfuelrods,inaccordancewithapprovedapplicationsoffuelrodconfigurations,maybeused.FuelassembliesshallbelimitedtothosefueldesignsthathavebeenanalyzedwithapplicableNRCstaffapprovedcodesandmethodsandshownbytestsoranalysestocomplywithallfuelsafetydesignbases.Alimitednumberofleadtestassembliesthathavenotcompletedrepresentative,testingmaybeplacedinnonlimitingcoreregions.4.2.2ControlRodAssembliesThereactorcoreshallcontain29controlrodassemblies.ThecontrolmaterialshallbeasapprovedbytheNRC.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-1(continued)DraftA DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES(continued)4.3FuelStorage4.3.14.3.1.1Thespentfuelstorageracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:a.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;b.k,<<g0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedintheUFSAR;c.ConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscontainingZ358undamagedrodsorg110bowed,broken,orotherwisefailedrods.Canistersmustmeet'herequirementsofSpecification3,7.17(fortheapplicableregiononly)andSpecifications4.3.1.l.aand4.3.l.l.b.4.3.1.2Thenewfuelstoragedryracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:4.3.2~Drainaea.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentof5.05weightpercent;b.k,<<g0.95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedintheUFSAR;ckffS0~98ifmoderatedbyaqueousfoam,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedintheUFSAR;andThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedtopreventinadvertentdrainingofthepoolto(23ftabovethetopofthefuelassemblies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-2DraftA DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.3FuelStorage(continued)4.3.3~CaacitThespentfuelpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedwithastoragecapacitylimitedtonomorethan2032'fuelassemblies.aR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant4.0-3DraftA Responsibility5.15.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.1Responsibi1ity5.1.1ThePlantManagershallberesponsibleforoverallplantoperationandshalldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence.ThePlantManager,orhisdesignee,shallapprovepriortoimplementation,eachproposedtest,experimentormodificationtostructures,systemsorcomponentsthataffectnuclearsafety.TheShiftSupervisor(SS)shallberesponsibleforthecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinMODE1,2,3,or4,anindividualwithanactiveSeniorReactorOperator(SRO)licenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.DuringanyabsenceoftheSSfromthecontrolroomwhiletheplantisinMODE5or6,anindividualwithanactiveSROlicenseorReactorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-1DraftA Organization5.25.0ADHINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.2Organization5.2.1OnsiteandOffsiteOranizationsOnsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallbeestablishedforplantoperationandcorporatemanagement,respectively.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.a.Linesofauthority,responsibility,andcommunicationshallbedefinedandestablishedthroughouthighestmanagementlevels,intermediatelevels,andalloperatingorganizationpositions.Theserelationshipsshallbedocumentedandupdated,asappropriate,inorganizationcharts,functionaldescriptionsofdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandrelationships,andjobdescriptionsforkeypersonnelpositions,orinequivalentformsofdocumentation.TheserequirementsshallbedocumentedintheUFSAR;b.ThePlantHanagershallberesponsibleforoverallsafeoperationoftheplantandshallhavecontroloverthoseonsiteactivitiesnecessaryforsafeoperationandmaintenanceoftheplant;andc.Aspecifiedseniorcorporateexecutiveshallhavecorporateresponsibilityforoverallplantnuclears'afetyandshalltakeanymeasuresneededtoensureacceptableperformanceofthestaffinoperating,maintaining,andprovidingtechnicalsupporttotheplanttoensurenuclearsafety.5.2.2PlantStafFTheplantstafforganizationshallincludethefollowing:a.Anauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwithfuelinthereactor.AnadditionalauxiliaryoperatorshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinHODEI,2,3or4.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-2DraftA Organization5.25.2Organization5.2.2PlantStaff(continued)b.Shiftcrewcompositionmaybeonelessthantheminimumrequirementof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)andSpecifications5.2.2.aand5.2.2.eforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoretheshiftcrewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirements.C~d.e.Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionproceduresshallbeonsitewhenfuelisinthereactor.Thepositionmaybevacantfornotmorethan2hours,inordertoprovideforunexpectedabsence,providedimmediateactionistakentofilltherequiredposition.TheamountofovertimeworkedbyplantstaffmembersperformingsafetyrelatedfunctionsshallbelimitedandcontrolledinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram.TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheShiftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermalhydraulics,reactorengineering,andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationoftheplant.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinNODE1,2,3or4andshallmeetthequalificationsspecifiedwithinaNRCapprovedSTAtrainingprogram.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-3DraftA PlantStaffgualifications5.35.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.3PlantStaffequalifications5.3.1EachmemberoftheplantstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminimumqualificationsofANSIStandardN18.1-1971,assupplementedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8,Revision1,September1975,forcomparablepositions.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-4DraftA Procedures5.45.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.4Procedures5.4.1Writtenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefollowingactivities:a~b.c~TheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978;TheemergencyoperatingproceduresrequiredtoimplementtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNUREG-0737,Supplement1,asstatedinGenericLetter82-33;Effluentandenvironmentalmonitoring;d.FireProtectionProgramimplementation;'ande.AllprogramsspecifiedinSpecification5.5.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-5DraftA ProgramsandManuals5.55.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.5ProgramsandHanualsThefollowingprogramsandmanualsshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintained.5.5.1OffsiteDoseCalculationManualODCH'a~TheODCHshallcontainthemethodologyandparametersusedinthecalculationofoffsitedosesresultingfrom.radioactivegaseousandliquideffluents,inthecalculationofgaseousandliquideffluentmonitoringalarmandtripsetpoints,andintheconductoftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoring-program;andb.TheODCHshallalsocontaintheradioactiveeffluentcontrolsandradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesanddescriptionsoftheinformationthatshouldbeincludedintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingandRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReports.LicenseeinitiatedchangestotheODCH:a.Shallbedocumentedandre'cordsofreviewsperformedshallberetained.Thisdocumentationshallcontain:1.sufficientinformationtosupportthechange(s)togetherwiththeappropriateanalysesorevaluationsjustifyingthechange(s),2.adeterminationthatthechange(s)maintainthelevelsofradioactiveeffluentcontrolrequiredby10CFR20.1302,40CFR190,10CFR50.36a,and10CFR50,AppendixI,anddoesnotadverselyimpacttheaccuracyorreliabilityofeffluent,dose,orsetpointcalculations;b.ShallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptancebytheonsitereviewfunctionandtheapprovalofthePlantManager;and(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-6DraftA ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals5.5.1ODCH(continued)C.ShallbesubmittedtotheNRCintheformofacomplete,legiblecopyoftheentireODCHasapartoforconcurrentwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodofthereportinwhichanychangeintheODCHwasmade.Eachchangeshallbeidentifiedbymarkingsinthemarginoftheaffectedpages,clearlyindicatingtheareaofthepagethatwaschanged,andshallindicatethedate(i.e.,monthandyear)thechangewasimplemented.5.5.2rimarCoolantSourcesOutsideContainmentProram5.5.3Thisprogramprovidescontrolstominimizeleakagefromthoseportionsofsystemsoutsidecontainmentthatcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsduringaserioustransientoraccident.ThesystemsincludeContainmentSpray,SafetyInjection,andResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)intherecirculationconfiguration.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Preventivemaintenanceandperiodicvisualinspectionrequirements;andb.Integratedleaktestrequirementsforeachsystematrefuelingcycleintervalsorless.PostAccidentSamlinProraThisprogramprovidescontrolsthatensurethecapabilitytoobtainandanalyzereactorcoolant,radioactivegases,andparticulatesinplantgaseouseffluentsandcontainmentatmospheresamplesunderaccidentconditions.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Trainingofpersonnel;b.Procedures.forsamplingandanalysis;andc.Provisionsformaintenanceofsamplingandanalysisequipment.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-7DraftA ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProramThisprogramconformsto10CFR50.36aforthecontrolofradioactiveeffluentsandformaintainingthedosestomembersofthepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonablyachievable.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheODCH,shallbeimplementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsare'xceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a~LimitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCH;b.Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialreleasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingtotentimestheconcentrationvaluesin10CFR20,AppendixB,Table2,Column2;c.Monitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.1302andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCH;d.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttounrestrictedareas,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;e.DeterminationofcumulativeandprojecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCHatleastevery31days;f.Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiod'of31dayswouldexceed2%oftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-8DraftA ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals5.5.4RadioactiveEffluentControlsProram(continued)g.Limitationsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentstoareasbeyondthesiteboundaryconformingtothedoseassociatedwith10CFR20,AppendixB,TableII,Column1;h.Limitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesresultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromtheplanttoareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;andLimitationsontheannualdoseordosecommitmenttoanymemberofthepublicduetoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190.'.5.55.5.6ComonentCclicorTransientLimitThisprogramprovidescontrolstotrackthereactorcoolantsystemcyclicandtransientoccurrencesspecifiedintheUFSARtoensurethatcomponentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.Pre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringanytendondegradationinpre-stressedconcretecontainments,includingeffectivenessofitscorrosionprotectionmedium,toensurecontainmentstructuralintegrity.TheTendonSurveillanceProgram,inspectionfrequencies,andacceptancecriteriashallbeinaccordancewithaNRCapprovedprogram.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheTendonSurveillancePrograminspectionfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-9DraftA ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals(continued)5.5.7ReactorCoolantPumFlwheelInsectionProram5.5.8ThisprogramshallprovidefortheinspectionofeachreactorcoolantpumpflywheelpertherecommendationsofRegulationPositionc.4.bofRegulatoryGuide1.14,Revision1,August1975.InserviceTestinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforinservicetestingofASHECodeClass1,2,and3componentsincludingapplicablesupports,highenergypipingoutsideofcontainment,andsteamgeneratortubes.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.TestingfrequenciesspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaasfollows:ASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaterminologyforinservicetestingactivitiesRequiredFrequenciesforperfo'rminginservicetestinactivitiesWeeklyHonthlyquarterlyorevery3monthsSemiannuallyorevery6monthsEvery9monthsYearlyorannuallyBienniallyorevery2yearsAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper184daysAtleastonceper276daysAtleastonceper366daysAtleastonceper731daysb.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2areapplicabletotheaboverequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestingactivities;c.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.3areapplicabletoinservicetestingactivities;andd.NothingintheASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeshallbeconstruedtosupersedetherequirementsofanyTechnicalSpecification.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-10DraftA ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.9SteamGeneratorSGTubeSurveillanceProramEachSGshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyperformanceofaninserviceinspectionprogram.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:'a~TheinspectionintervalsforSGtubesshallbespecifiedinInserviceInspectionProgram.5.5.10b.SGtubesthathaveimperfections>40/throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.c.SGsleevesthathaveimperfections>30Kthroughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.VentilationFilterTestinProramVFTPAprogramshallbeestablishedtoimplementthefollowingrequiredtestingofEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)filterventilationsystems.Thetestfrequenciesandmethods,wherepractical,willbeperformedinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.52.a0b.Post-AccidentCharcoalSystem1.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoalabsorberbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+101).2.Demonstratethatan'in-placeFreontestofthecharcoalabsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.01,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.DemonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofZ90Kofradioactivemethyliodide.ContainmentRecirculationSystem1.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthehighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(t101).(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-11DraftA

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals5.5.10VFTP(continued)2.Demonstratethatanin-placedioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.C.ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)l.DemonstratethepressuredropacrosstheHEPAfilterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(X10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placedioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.3.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoalabsorberbankis<3inchesofwaterflowrate(+10%).4.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoalabsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.5.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyof>90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.d.SpentFuelPitCharcoalAbsorberSystem1.Demonstratethatthetotalairflowratefromthecharcoalabsorbersshowsatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithacompletesetofnewabsorbers.2.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoalabsorbersbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.DemonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyofZ90%ofradioactivemethyliodide.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheVFTPfrequencies.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-12DraftA ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.11ExlosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivitHonitorinProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsforpotentiallyexplosivegasmixturescontainedinthewastegasdecaytanksandthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinwastegasdecaytanks.ThegaseousradioactivityquantitiesshallbedeterminedfollowingthemethodologyinNUREG-0133.Theprogramshallinclude:a.Thelimitsforconcentrationsofhydrogenandoxygeninthewastegasdecaytanksandasurveillanceprogramtoensurethelimitsaremaintained.Suchlimitsshallbeappropriatetothesystem'sdesigncriteria(i.e.,whetherornotthesystemisdesignedtowithstandahydrogenexplosion);andb.Asurveillanceprogramtoensurethatthequantityofradioactivitycontainedineachwastegasdecaytankislessthantheamountthatwouldresultinawholebodyexposureofz0.5remtoanyindividualinanunrestrictedarea,intheeventofanuncontrolledreleaseofthetanks'ontents.5.5.12TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramsurveillancefrequencies.D'eselFuelOilTestinProramAdieselfueloiltestingprogramtoimplementrequiredtestingofbothnewfueloilandstoredfueloilshallbeestablished.Theprogramshallincludesamplingandtestingrequirements,andacceptancecriteria,allinaccordancewithlimitsspecifiedinTable1ofASTMD975.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-13DraftA

ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.13TechnicalSecificationsTSBasesControlProramThisprogramprovidesameansforprocessingchangestotheBasesoftheseTechnicalSpecifications.ChangestotheBasesoftheTSshallbemadeunderappropriateadministrativecontrolsandreviews.b.cLicenseesmaymakechangestoBaseswithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangesdonotinvolveeitherofthefollowing:1.AchangeintheTSincorporatedinthelicense;or2.AchangetotheUFSARorBasesthatinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.TheBasesControlProgramshallcontainprovisionstoensurethattheBasesaremaintainedconsistentwiththeUFSAR.d.ProposedchangesthatmeetthecriteriaofSpecification5.5.13.b.1orSpecification5.5.13.b.2shallbereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.ChangestotheBasesimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalshallbeprovidedtotheNRConafrequencyconsistentwith10CFR50.71e.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-14DraftA ProgramsandHanuals5.55.5ProgramsandManuals(continued)5.5.14SafetFunctionDeterminationProramSFDPThisprogramensuresthatalossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionstaken.UponentryintoLCO3.0.6anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,otherappropriateactionsmaybetakenasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability.TheseappropriateactionswillbestatedinanexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionandRequiredActionsas.providedintheSpecifications.ThisprogramimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.TheSFDPshallcontainthefollowing:a.Provisionsforcrosstraincheckstoensurealossofthecapabilitytoperformthesafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysisdoesnotgoundetected;b.Provisionsforensuringtheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionifalossoffunctionconditionexists;c.Provisionstoensurethataninoperablesupportedsystem'sCompletionTimeisnotinappropriatelyextendedasaresultofmultiplesupportsysteminoperabilities;andd.Otherappropriatelimitationsandremedialorcompensatoryactions..Alossofsafetyfunctionexistswhen,assumingnoconcurrentsinglefailure,asafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysiscannotbeperformed.Forthepurposeofthisprogram,alossofsafetyfunctionmayexistwhenasupportsystemortrainisinoperable(i.e.,theConditionsandRequiredActionshavebeenentered),and:a.Arequiredsystemortrainredundanttothesupportedsystem(s)ortrainisalsoinoperable;orb.Arequiredsystemredundanttothesystem(s)ortrainsupportedbytheinoperablesupportedsystemortrainis'lsoinoperable;or(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-15DraftA ProgramsandManuals5.55.5ProgramsandHanuals-5.5.14SFDP(continued)c.Arequiredsystemortrainsredundanttotheinoperablesupportsystem(s)ortrainforthesupportedsystems(a)and(b)aboveisalsoinoperable.TheSFDPidentifieswherealossofsafetyfunctionexists.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.5.5.15SecondarWaterChemistrProramThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringsecondarywaterchemistrytoinhibitSGtubedegradation:Thisprogramshallinclude:a.Identificationofasamplingscheduleforthecriticalvariablesandcontrolpointsforthesevariables;b.Identificationoftheproceduresusedtomeasurethevaluesofthecriticalvariables;C~Identificationofprocesssamplingpoints;d.Proceduresfortherecordingandmanagementofdata;e.Proceduresdefiningcorrectiveactionsforalloffcontrolpointchemistryconditions;andAprocedureidentifyingtheauthorityresponsiblefortheinterpretationofthedataandthesequenceandtimingofadministrativeevents,whichisrequiredtoinitiatecorrectiveaction.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-16DraftA ReportingRequirements5.65.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.6ReportingRequirementsThefollowingreportsshall'besubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.4.5.6.1OccuationalRadiationExosureReort5.6.2Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utility,andotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposures>100mrem/yrandtheirassociatedmanremexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions(e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,inserviceinspection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance,wasteprocessing,andrefueling).Thistabulationsupplementstherequirementsof10CFR20.2206.Thedoseassignmentstovariousd'utyfunctionsmaybeestimatedbasedon,pocketdosimeter,thermoluminescentdosimeter(TLD),orfilmbadgemeasurements.Smallexposurestotalling<20%oftheindividualtotaldoseneednotbeaccountedfor.Intheaggregate,atleast80%.ofthetotalwholebodydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshouldbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.ThereportshallbesubmittedonorbeforeApril30ofeachyear.AnnualRadioloicalEnvironmental0eratinReortTheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantduringthepreviouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedbyMay15ofeachyear.Thereportshallincludesummaries,interpretations,andanalysesoftrendsoftheresultsoftheradiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringactivitiesforthereportingperiod.Thematerialprovidedshall'beconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM),andin10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionsIV.B.2,IV.B.3,andIV.C.TheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportshallincludetheresultsofanalysesofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplesandofallenvironmentalradiationmeasurementstakenduringtheperiodpursuanttothelocationsspecifiedinthetableandfiguresintheODCM,aswellassummarizedandtabulatedresultsoftheseanalysesandmeasurementsintheformatofthetableintheRadiologicalAssessmentBranchTechnicalPosition,Revision1,November1979.Intheeventthatsomeindividualresultsarenotavailableforinclusionwiththereport,thereportshallbesubmittednotingandexplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedinasupplementaryreportassoonaspossible.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-17DraftA ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements(continued)5.6.35.6.45.6.5RadioactiveEffluentReleaseReortTheRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportcoveringtheoperationoftheplantshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.36a.Thereportshallincludeasummaryofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsandsolidwastereleasedfromtheplant.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheODCMandinconformancewith10CFR'0.36aand10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionIV.B.1.Monthl0eratinReortsRoutinereportsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperience,includingdocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorpressurizersafetyvalves,shall.besubmittedonamonthlybasisnolaterthanthe15thofeachmonthfollowingthecalendarmonthcoveredbythereport.COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORTCOLRa~LCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,LCO3.3.1,LCO3.4.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"'MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(MTC)";"Shutdown-BankInsertionLimit";"ControlBankInsertionLimits""HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))";"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"~)";"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)"'ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation";"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";'Accumulators";"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)";"SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentration";"BoronConcentration";LCO3.5.1,LCO3.5.4>LCO3.7.12,LCO3.9.1,Coreoperatinglimitsshallbeestablishedpriortoeachreloadcycle,orpriortoanyremainingportionofareloadcycle,andshallbedocumentedintheCOLRforthefollowing:(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-18DraftA ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements5.6.5COLR(continued)b.TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminethecoreoperatinglimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:WCAP-9272-P-A,("WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodology,"July1985.)(MethodologyforLCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,LCO3.5.1,LCO3.5.4andLCO3.9.1.)2.3.5.6.7.WCAP-9220-P-A("WestinghouseECCSEvaluationModel-1981Version,"Revision1,February1982.)(MethodologyforLCO3.2.1.)WCAP-8385,("PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures-TopicalReport,"September1974.)(MethodologyforLCO3.2.3.)WCAP-8745-P-A("DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpowerhTandThermalOvertemperatureATTripFunctions,"September1986.)(MethodologyforLCO3.3.1,OvertemperaturehTandOverpowerATtripsetpoints)WCAP-8567-P-A,("ImprovedThermalDesignProcedure,"February1989.)(MethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingITDP.)WCAP11397-P-A,("RevisedThermalDesignProcedure,"April1989.)(HethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingRTDP.)WCAP-11596-P-A,("gualificationofthePHOENIX-P/ANCNuclearDesignSystemforPressurizedWaterReactorCores,"June1988.)(MethodologyforLCO3.7.12.)(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-19DraftA

ReportingRequirements5.65.6.5COLR(continued)C.Thecoreoperatinglimitsshallbedeterminedsuchthatallapplicablelimits(e.g.,fuelthermalmechanicallimits,corethermalhydrauliclimits,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)limits,nuclearlimitssuchasSDH,transientanalysislimits,andaccidentanalysislimits)ofthesafetyanalysisaremet.d.TheCOLR,includinganymidcyclerevisionsorsupplements,shallbeprovideduponissuanceforeachreloadcycletotheNRC.5.6.6ReactorCoolantSstemRCSPRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITS~RRPRTPTTRIa.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsforheatup,cooldown,criticality,andhydrostatictestingaswellasheatupandcooldownratesshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits"b.ThepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsrequiredtosupporttheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,andtheLTOPenabletemperatureshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves";andLCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem."c~TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminetheRCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:1.WCAP-14040,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"RevisionI,December1994.,R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-20(continued)DraftA ReportingRequirements5.65.6ReportingRequirements5.6.6PTLR(continued)2.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,,RGKE,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

"TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgram,"datedMay5,1995.(MethodologyforLCOs3.4.6,3.4.7,3.4.10and3.4.12-LTOPEnableTemperatureandLCO3.4.12-PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValveLiftSettingLimits.)d.ThePTLRshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponissuanceforeachreactorvesselfluencyperiodandforanyrevisionorsupplementthereto.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-21DraftA IHighRadiationArea5.75.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.7HighRadiationArea5.7.1Pursuantto10CFR20,paragraph20.1601(a),inlieuoftherequirementsof10CFR20.1601(c),eachhighradiationarea,asdefinedin10CFR20,inwhichtheintensityofradiationis)100mrem/hrbutg1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,shallbebarricadedandconspicuouslypostedasahighradiationareaandentrancetheretoshallbecontrolledbyrequiringissuanceofaRadiationWorkPermit(RWP).Individualsqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedures(e.g.,RadiationProtectionTechnicians)orpersonnelcontinuouslyescortedbysuchindividualsmaybeexemptfromtheRWPissuancerequirementduringtheperformanceoftheirassigneddutiesinhighradiationareaswithexposureratesg1000mrem/hr,providedtheyareotherwisefollowingplantradiationprotectionproceduresforentryintosuchhighradiationareas.Anyindividualorgroupofindividualspermittedtoentersuchareasshallbeprovidedwithoraccompaniedbyoneormoreofthefollowing:a.Aradiationmonitoringdevicethatcontinuouslyindicatestheradiationdoserateinthearea.b.Aradiationmonitoringdevicethatcontinuouslyintegratestheradiationdoserateintheareaandalarmswhenapresetintegrateddoseisreceived.Entryintosuchareaswiththismonitoringdevicemaybemadeafterthedoseratelevelsintheareahavebeenestablishedandpersonnelareawareofthem.c~Anindividualqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedureswitharadiationdoseratemonitoringdevice,whoisresponsibleforprovidingpositivecontrolovertheactivitieswithintheareaandshallperformperiodicradiationsurveillanceatthefrequencyspecifiedintheRWP.(continued)R-E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-22DraftA III0I HighRadiationArea5.75.7HighRadiationArea(continued)5.7.25.7.3InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.I,areaswithradiationlevels>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cmshallbeprovidedwithlockedorcontinuouslyguardeddoorstopreventunauthorizedentryandthekeysshallbemaintainedundertheadministrativecontroloftheShiftSupervisorondutyorradiationprotectionsupervision.DoorsshallremainlockedexceptduringperiodsofaccessbypersonnelunderanapprovedRWPthatshallspecifythedoseratelevelsintheimmediateworkareasandthemaximumallowablestaytimesforindividualsinthoseareas.InlieuofthestaytimespecificationoftheRWP,directorremote(suchasclosedcircuitTVcameras)continuoussurveillancemaybemadebypersonnelqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedurestoprovidepositiveexposurecontrolovertheactivitiesbeingperformedwithinthearea.InadditiontotherequirementsofSpecification5.7.I,forindividualhighradiationareaswithradiationlevelsof>1000mrem/hratadistanceof30cm,accessibletopersonnel,thatarelocatedwithinlargeareassuchasreactorcontainment,wherenoenclosureexistsforpurposesoflocking,orthatcannotbecontinuouslyguarded,andwherenoenclosurecanbereasonablyconstructedaroundtheindividualarea,thatindividualareashallbebarricadedandconspicuouslyposted,andaflashinglightshallbeactivatedasawarningdevice.R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant5.0-23DraftA ll ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentDChapters1.0-3.3VolumeV I.IVI ATTACHMENT0MarkedUpCopyofImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(NUREG-1431)Includedpages:AllpagescontainedinNUREG-1431,Revision0.May1995 ~d>'j/>>~c>>" Definitions1.11.0USEANDAPPLICATIONl.1Definitions---NOTEThedefinedtermsofthissectionappearincapitalizedtypeandareapplicablethroughouttheseTechnicalSpecificationsandBases.'ermACTIONSACTUATIONLOGICTESTAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)CHANNELCALIBRATIONl.<'<v'CIYgeo-lqVo&v4~s~~ac-~~ice&auve.en,uQkamoNl.gviiCbo.ll>RcluheaIDefinitionACTIONSshallbethatpartofaSpecificationthatprescribesRequiredActionstobetakenunderdesignatedConditionswithinspecifiedCompletionTimes.AnACTUATIONLOGICTESTshallbetheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.TheACTUATIONLOGICTEST,asaminimum,,shallincludeacontinuitycheckofoutputdevices,AFDshallbethedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthe+opandbottomhalvesofatwosectionexcoreneutrondetector@ACHANNELCALIBRATIONshallbetheadjustment,asnecessary,ofthechannelsothatitrespondswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONshallencompasstheentirechannel,includingtherequiredsensor,aarm,interlock,@~@andtripfunctions.Calibrationofinstrumentchannelswithresistanceterneraturedetector(RTD)orthermocouplesensorsconsistofaninplaceandnormalcalirationoftherema~ninad'ustabledevicesinthechannel.Wheneverasensingelementisrepaced,thenereuvreinplaceAgRQ~ytheothersensingeementswiththerecentlyinstalledsensingelement.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONmaybeperformedbymeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlappingcalibrationsortotalchannelstepssothattheentirechanneliscalibrated.CesporeiR6~Gem~Asegaaur~o~Q'lo.~~AcaiROE'sl(continued) Definitions1.11.1Definitions~noae~m(PCHANNELCHECKCHANNELOPERATIONALTEST(COT)l.XisjCOREALTERATION(QvCOREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)QvVtttSDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131~i..vACHANNELCHECKshallbethequalitativeassessment,byobservation,ofchannelbehaviorduringoperation.Thisdeterminationshallinclude,wherepossible,comparisonofthechannelindicationandstatustootherindicationsorstatusderivedfromindependentinstrumentchannelsmeasuringthesameparameter.ACOTshallbetheinjectionofasimulatedoractualsignalintothechannelasclosetothesensoraspracticabletoverifytheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,+~~andtripfunctions.TheCOTshallincludeadjustments,asnecessary,oftherequiredalarm,interlock,andtripsetpointssothatthesetpointsarewithintherequiredrangeandaccuracy.COREALTERATIONshallbethemovementofanyfuel,sources,reactivitycontrolcomponents,oroterwithintereactorvessenittevesseeeadremovedandfuelinthevessel.Su'spensionofCOREALTERATIONSshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.hasteTheCOLRisthe'pecificdocumentthatprovidescyclespecificparameterlimitsforthecurrentreloadcycle.ThesecyclespecificparameterlimitsshallbedeterminedforeachreloadcycleinaccordancewithSpecificationPlantoperationwithintheselimitsisaddressedinindividualSpecifications.DOSEE(UIVALENTI-131shallbethatconcentrationofI-131(microcuries/gram)thatalonewouldproducethesamethyroiddoseasthequantityandisotopicmixtureofI-131,I-132,I-133,I-134,dI-I35actuallresent.Thethyroidoseconversiofactorsuseorthiscalculionshallbethose.istedin[TaeIIIofTID-144,AEC,192,"CalculatiofDistanceFctorsforPowerndTestReactrSites,"ortselistedinTablE-7ofReguloryGuide1.10,Rev.1,NRC19771,1.1-2(continued) Definitions1.1).KVlii1.1DefinitionsE-AVERAGEDISINTEGRATIONENERGYEREDSAFETYFEATURRESPONSETIHE~(Qvnon-ioclc'~e,Eshallbetheaverage(weigedinproportiontotheconcentrationofeachrdionuclideinthereactorcoolantatthetimeofsamlinofthesumoftheaveraebaandgammaenergiesperdisintegrationinHeV)forjsotopes,withhaives>+15@'minutes,maingupatleast95%ofthetotalnoidineactivityinthecoolant.TheESFRESPONSETIHEshallbethattimeintervalfromwhenthemonitoredparamexceedsitsESFactuationsetpo'hechannelsensoruntiltheESFequiiscapableofformingitssafunction(i.e.,thevalvestravet'equiredpositions,pumpdischargepressretheirrequiredvalues,etc.).'sshallincluselgeneratorstartingandsequenceloadingdelays,eapplicable.Theresponsetimemaybemeasurednsofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,or1stepsso,thattheentireresponsetimeismeasureLEAKAGELEAKAGEshallbe:hv~~~gala.IdentifiedLEAKAGE1.LEAKAGE,suchasthatfr'ompumpsealsorvalvepacking(exceptreactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealwaterinjectionor~~~),thatiscapturedandconductedtocollectionsystemsorasumporcollectingtank;2.LEAKAGEintothecontainmentatmospherefromsourcesthatarebothspecificallylocatedandknowneithernottointerferewiththeoperationofleakagedetectionsystemsornottobepressureboundaryLEAKAGE;or3.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)LEAKAGEthroughasteamgenerator(SG)totheSecondarySystem;~ggg~gp~gf[yujcgIgpplw+ig(w4Hn<<~lcA.k4$e'kallkryo~o.'l+pofpri~a~co++'r~~+p<d+gct'heccIcvlc.%cdgeeaco~n~c@continued)1A1.1-3 Definitions1.11.1DefinitionsLEAKAGE(continued)b.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEAllLEAKAGE(exceptRCPsealwaterinjection~o+rteeiebED)thatisnotidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.PressureBoundarLEAKAGELEAKAGE(exceptSGLEAKAGE)througha.nonisolablefaultinanRCScomponentbody,pipewall,orvesselwall.MASTERRELAMASTERRELAYTESTshsH.energizingaandverifyingtheOPERABILITYofMODEOPERABLE-OPERABILITYO'l-i)cOs-W~OP~g.ssi6aLGVPHYSICSTESTSeachrelay.TheESTshallincludeacontinuitycheckofeachassociatesAMODEshallcorrespondtoanyoneinclusivecombinationofcorereactivitycondition,powerlevel,averagereactorcoolanttemperature,andreactorvesselheadclosurebolttensioningspecifiedinTable1.1-1withfuelinthereactorvessel.Asystem,subsystem,train,component,ordeviceshallbeOPERABLEwhenitiscapableofperformingisspecstedsaetyfunction(s)andwhenallnecessaryattendantinstrumentation,controls,normaloremergencyelectricalpower,coolingandsealwater,lubrication,andotherauxiliaryequipmentthatarerequiredforthesystem,subsystem,train,component,ordevicetoperformitsspecifiedsafetyfunction(s)arealsocapableofperformingtheirrelatedsupportfunction(s).PHYSICSTESTSshallbethosetestsperformedtomeasurethefundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthereactorcoreandrelatedinstrumentation.Thesetestsare:a.DescribedinChapter+14,InitialTestProgram+oftheSAR;LAb.Authorizedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59;or(continued)1.1-4 l.1Definitions~Q~po~o~b.t.ga.gga~4,M~~~~~Ou~P~un~43nP~~anDefinitions1.1PHYSICSTESTS(continued)PRESSUREAND<vTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)c.OtherwiseapprovedbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommissionPlo,n+ThePTListhspecificdocumentthatprovidesthereactorvesselpressureandtemperaturelimits,includingheatupandcooldownQUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)ortheratiooft'werexcoredetector'alibratedouttheavethelowerexcoreorcalibratedoutputs,wiiser.-rae,forthecurrentreactorvesselfluenceperiod.ThesepressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbedeterminedforeachfluenceperiodinaccordancewithSpecification.Pantf.vttsoperationwithintheselimitsisaresseiLC:.4.3,"RGSPressure.an~d,d,lemperature(P/T)Limits,".andLCO3,:4.12,mtnw:ctvi2~~3TemperatureOverressure<<Protectione'TOPSystem."gPTRshallbetheratioofthmaximumupperd)oftheucoredetector'tedoutputs,RATEDTHERMAL(RTP)RIPSYSTEM(RTSTIMEPOWERRTPshallbeatotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolantofQ~MWt.TheRTSRESPONSETIMEshallbethattvalfromwhenthemonitoredexceedsitsRTSiseto'channelsensoruntillossofre~ipercoilvoltage.Theresponsetimemaybemeasmeansofanyseriesofsequential,overlapping,orstepssothattheentireresponsetimeismeasured..jSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)SDMshallbetheinstantaneousamountofreactivitybywhichthereactorissubcriticalorwouldbesubcriticalfromitspresentconditionassuming:a,Allrodclustercontrolassemblies'(RCCAs)are'ullyinsert'edexceptforthesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworth,whichisassumedtobefullywithdraw;and~~V'PARh(~PA~'PQ<fimA2m'oninued)1.1-5 Definitions1.11.1Definitions'avgSHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)(continued)I~xiiSLAVERELSTAGGEREDTESTBASISTHERMALPOWERTRIPACTUATINGDEVICEOPERATIONALTEST(TADOT)I.xi>>.b.InMODES1and2,thefuelandmoderatortemperaturesarechangedtothe~nominalzeropowerh\5WithanyRCCAnotcapableofbeingfullyinserted,thereactivityworthoftheRCCAmustbeaccountedforinthedeterminationofSDM.ASLAVERELAYTESTshallconsistofeizingverelaeOPERABILITYofre.SLAVERELAYTESTshallinclude,asaminimum,acon'eckofassociatedtestableactuationdevices.ASTAGGEREDTESTBASISshallconsistofthetestingofoneofthesystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsduringtheintervalspecifiedbytheSurveillanceFrequency,sothatallsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsaretestedduringnSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,wherenisthetotalnumberofsystems,subsystems,channels,orotherdesignatedcomponentsintheassociatedfunction.THERMALPOWERshallbethetotalreactorcoreheattransferratetothereactorcoolant.ATADOTshallconsistofoperatingthetripactuatingdeviceandverifyintheOPERABILITYofrequiredalarm,interlock,andtripfunctions.TheTADOTshallinclueadjustment,asnecessary,ofthetripactuatingdevicesothatitactuatesattherequiredsetpointwithintherequiredaccuracy,.1.1-6 ~~Insertl.l.lhighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants. Definitions1.1Table1.1-1(page1of1)MODESMODETITLEREACTIVITYCONDITION(k.n)%RATEDPOWERaAVERAGEREACTORCOOLANTTEMPERATURE('F)o31-xiii4PowerOperationStartupHotStandbyHotShutdownColdShutdown()Refueling()>0.99>0.99<0.99<0.99<0.99>5NANANANA>+350@/50+>T.,>+00+<+200~(a)Excludingdecayheat.(b)Allreactorvesselheadclosureboltsfullytensioned.(c)Oneormorereactorvesselheadclosureboltslessthanfullytensioned.1.1-7 LogicalConnectors1.21.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.2LogicalConnectorsPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoexplainthemeaningoflogicalconnectors.LogicalconnectorsareusedinTechnicalSpecifications(TS)todiscriminatebetween,andyetconnect,discreteConditions,RequiredActions,CompletionTimes,andFrequencies.TheonlylogicalconnectorsthatappearinTSareANDandOR.Thephysicalarrangementoftheseconnectorsconstituteslogicalconventionswithspecificmeanings.BACKGROUNDSeverallevelsoflogicmaybeusedtostateRequiredActions.Theselevelsareidentifiedbytheplacement(ornesting)ofthelogicalconnectorsandbythenumberassignedtoeachRequiredAction.ThefirstleveloflogicisidentifiedbythefirstdigitofthenumberassignedtoaRequiredActionandtheplacementofthelogicalconnectorinthefirstlevelofnesting(i.e.,leftjustifiedwiththenumberoftheRequiredAction).ThesuccessivelevelsoflogicareidentifiedbyadditionaldigitsoftheRequiredActionnumberandbysuccessiveindentationsofthelogicalconnectors.C3Whenogirsareusedtostat',only,thefirstlevelof1elogicalconnector.iiewiththeConditionstatemen.WhenloicalconnectorsareusedtostateaCompletionTime~orFrequency,onlythefirstleveloflogicisuse,antelogicalconnectorisleftjustifiedwiththestatementoftheCompletionTime/<'rFrequency.Cc,eh+a~EXAMPLESThe.followingexamplesillustr'atetheuseoflogicalconnectors.(continued) LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES'XAMPLE1.21)si(gg,gt4ga<ToRS(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.1Verify.ANDA.2Restore.InthisexamplethelogicalconnectorANDisusedtoindicatethatwheninConditionA,bothRequiredActionsA.1andA.2mustbecompleted.(continued) LogicalConnectors1.21.2LogicalConnectorsEXAMPLES~~'XAMPLE1.2-2hiveTIPLCL06lcALcotuUFcTDRS(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LCOnotmet.A.lTripORA,2.1Verify...AND.A.2.2.1Reduce.ORA.2.2.2Perform.ORA.3Align...Thisexamplerepresentsamorecomplicateduseoflogicalconnectors.RequiredActionsA.l,A.2,andA.3arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformedasindicatedbytheuseofthelogicalconnectorORandtheleftjustifiedplacement.AnyoneofthesethreeActionsmaybechosen.IfA.2ischosen;thenbothA.2.1andA.2.2mustbeperformedasindicatedbythelogicalconnectorAND.RequiredActionA.2.2ismetbyperformingA.2.2.1orA.2.2.2.TheindentedpositionofthelogicalconnectorORindicatesthatA.2.2.1andA.2.2.2arealternativechoices,onlyoneofwhichmustbeperformed. ~~~~~~CompletionTimes1.31.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.3CompletionTimesPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistoestablishtheCompletionTimeconventionandtoprovideguidanceforitsuse.BACKGROUND+~~+~$%n4aWmgQwO~om(LCOs}specifyminimumrequirementsforensuringsafeoperationoftheTheACTIONSassociatedwithanLCOstateConditionsthattypicallydescribethewaysinwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOcanfailtobemet.SpecifiedwitheachstatedConditionareRequiredAction(s)andCompletionTime(s).DESCRIPTIONgaePTheCompletionTimeistheamountoftimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredAction.Itisreferencedtothetimeofdiscoveryofasituation(e.g.,inoperableequipmentorvariablenotwithinlimits)thatrequiresenteringanACTIONSConditionunlessotherwisespecified,providingthe'sinaNODEorspecifiedconditionstatedintheApplicabilityoftheLCO.RequiredActionsmustbecompletedpriortotheexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime.AnACTIONSConditionremainsineffectandtheRequiredActionsapplyuntiltheConditionnolongerexistsorthisnotwithintheLCOApplicability.IfsituationsarediscoveredthatrequireentryintomorethanoneConditionatatimewithinasingleLCO(multipleConditions),theRequiredActionsforeachConditionmustbeperformedwithintheassociatedCompletionTime.WheninmultipleConditions,separateCompletionTimesaretrackedforeachConditionstartingfromthetimeofdiscoveryofthesituationthatrequiredentryintotheCondition.OnceaConditionhasbeenentered,subsequenttrains,subsystems,components,orvariablesexpressedintheCondition,discoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,willnotresultinseparateentryintotheCondition,unlessspecificallystated.TheReuiredActionsoftheConditioncontinuetoapply,withCompletionTimesbasedoninitialentryintotheCondition.(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesDESCRIPTION(continued)However,whena~subseuenttrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheConditionisdiscoveredtobeinoperableornotwithinlimits,theCompletionTime(s)maybeextended.ToapplythisCompletionTimeextension,twocriteriamustfirstbemet.Thesubsequentinoperability:.a.Mustexistconcurrentwiththefirstinoperability;andb.Mustremaininoperableornotwithinlimitsafterthefirstinoperabilityisresolved.ThetotalCompletionTimeallowedforcompletingaRequiredActiontoaddressthesubsequentinoperabilityshallbelimitedtothemorerestrictiveofeither:a.ThestatedCompletionTime,asmeasuredfromtheinitialentryintotheCondition,plusanadditional24hours;orZNSEmb.ThestatedCompletionTimeasmeasuredfromdiscoveryofthesubsequentinoperability.TheaboveCompletionTimeextensionootapplytothoseSpecificationsthathaveexceptionsthaallowcompletelyseparatere-entryintotheCondition(foreachtrain,subsystem,component,orvariableexpressedintheCondition)andseparatetrackingofCompletionTimesbasedonthisre-entry.TheseexceptionsarestatedinindividualSpecifications.TheaboveCompletionTimeextensiondoesnotapplytoaCompletionTimewithamodified"timezero,"Thismodified"timezero"maybeexpressedasarepetitivetime(i.e.,"onceper8hours,"wheretheCompletionTimeisreferencedfromapreviouscompletionoftheRequiredActionvhftionentresefQifbytherase"frodiscover..xamplel.-3illustrtesoneusefthistypofCompeonTime.T10dayCompletonTimespifiedforonditionsAndBinExampl1.3-3mayotbeextded.1.3-f2(continued) INSERT1.3.1TheCompletionTimeextensioncannotbeusedtoextendthestatedCompletionTimeforthefirstinoperabletiain,subsystem,components,orvariable.INSERT1.3.2Anexampleofamodified"timezero"withtheCompletionTimeexpressedas"onceper8hours"isillustratedinExample1.3-6,ConditionA.Inthisexample,theCompletionTimemaynotbeextended. CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratetheuseofCompletionTimeswithdifferenttypesofConditionsandchangingConditions..c.~'XAMPLE1.3-1owed.~cmACTIONSCONDITIONB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.REQUIREDACTIONB.IBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.COMPLETIONTIME6hours36hoursConditionBhastwoRequiredActions.EachRequiredActionhasitsownseparateCompletionTime.EachCompletionTimeisreferencedtothetimethatConditionBisentered.TheRequiredActionsofConditionBaretobeinMODE3within6hoursANDinMODE5within36hours.Atotalof6hoursisallowedforreachingMODE3andatotalof36hours(not42hours)isallowedforreachingMODE5fromthetimethatConditionBwasentered.IfMODE3isreachedwithin3hours,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext33hoursbecausethetotaltimeallowedforreachingMODE5is36hours.IfCondition8isenteredwhileinMODE3,thetimeallowedforreachingMODE5isthenext36hours.(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimessEXAMPLES~<IIEXAMPLE1.3-2QzFALLLTcQrdolrlbNSLLO~b.3~(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME~3.vaLftatnA.One~inoperable.~tnA.lRestore~toOPERABLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.ZBeinNODE5.6hours36hours~3.vii9>>V4C~inaLS,aaWhenaisdeclaredinoerable,ConditionAisentered.IftheisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinays,Condition8isenteredandtheCompletionTimeclocksforRequiredActionsB.l.andB.2start.IfthesnoperaisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusafterConditionBisentered,theRequiredActionsofCondition8maybeterminated.cb+,na~P.~~,sghenasecon~isdeclaredinoperablewhilethefirstisst'llinoperable,ConditionAisnotre-enteredforthesecones¹maLCO3.0.3isentered,sincetheACTIONSdonotincludeaConditionformorethanoneinoperabled833psdr>>i>>TheCompletionTimeclackforConditionAdoesnotstopafterLCO3.0.3isentered,butcontinuestobetrackedfromthetimeConditionAwasinitiallyentered.eire~an'hWhileinLCO3.0.3,if~oftheinoperable~~isrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimeforConditionAhasnotexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionA.C,H4erWhileinLCO3.0.3,ifeaeoftheinoperableisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandtheCompletionTimefor(continued) ~~.-1"~CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-2(continued)ConditionAhasexpired,LCO3.0.3maybeexitedandoperationcontinuedinaccordancewithConditionB.TheCompletionTimeforConditionBistrackedfromthetimetheConditionACompletionTimeexpired.Upme<'fhcrn~6&restoring~ofthetoOPERABLEstatus,theConditionACompletionTimeisnotresetbutcontinuesfromthetimethefirstasdecaredinoperae.~sCompletionTimemaybeextendediftherestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperable.A2ourextensiontothestated7daysisallowed,providedthisdoesnotresultinthesecondg9iiiPbeinginoperablefor~>7days.(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES~EXAMPLE1.3-3uL-iPFUMOMOMCOmpore(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.A.lRestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7days10dayromdiscoverfailtomtLCOB.OneFunctionYtraininoperable.B.lRestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours10dayfrodiscoverffailtomtLCOC.OneFunctionXtraininoperable.ANDOneFunctionYtraininoperable.C.1RestoreFunctionXtraintoOPERABLEstatus..ORC.2RestoreFunctionYtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hours72hours(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-3-(continued)3ynltWhenoneFunctionXtrainandoneFunctionYtrainareinoperable,ConditionAandCondition8areconcurrentlyapplicable.TheCompletionTimesforConditionAandConditionBaretrackedseparatelyforeachtrainstarting=-fromthetimeeachtrainwasdeclaredinoperableandtheConditionwasentered.AseparateCompletionTimeisestablishedforConditionCandtrackedfromthetimethesecondtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i.e.,thetimethesituationdescribedinConditionCwasdiscovered).IfRequiredActionC.2iscompletedwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,ConditionsBandCareexited.IftheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lhasnotexpired,operationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA.TheremainingCompletionTimeinConditionAismeasuredfromthetimetheaffectedtrainwasdeclaredinoperable(i'.e.,initialentryintoConditionA).CompletionTimesofConditionsAandBaremodifiedbylogsconnectorwithaseparate10dayCompletionTimmeasureomthetimeitwasdiscoveredtheLCOwasotmet.Inthixample,withouttheseparateComple'tionTime,itwouldbepossetoalternatebetweenConditionsA,B,andCinsuchamannthatoperationgouTdcontinueindefinitelywithouteverestoringstemstomeettheLCO.TheseparateCompletionTimemqdifiedbythephrase"fromdiscoveryoffailuretomee~he~LCO"isdesignedtoprevent!indefinitecontinuedoper.ationwhilenotmeetingtheLCO.ThisCompletionTieallowsforanexcep~tothenormal"timezero"fgmbeginningtheCompletionTim~clock".Inthisinstee,theCompletionTime"timezero"is~ecifiedasconcingatthetimetheLCOwasinitiallynotme+ieadofatthetimetheassociatedConditionwasentere.(continued)1.3-7 CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES+"'XAMPLE1.3-4l'n(t.a~PUIUcTlhdcQmp(continued)ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.lRestorevalve(s)toOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursAsingleCompletionTimeisusedforanynumberofvalvesinoperableatthesametime.TheCompletionTimeassociatedwithConditionAisbasedontheinitialentryintoConditionAandisnottrackedonapervalvebasis.Declaringsubsequentvalvesinoperable,whileConditionAisstillineffect,doesnottriggerthetrackingofseparateCompletionTimes.OnceoneofthevalveshasbeenrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,theConditionACompletionTimeisnotreset,butcontinuesfromthetime.thefirstvalvewasdeclaredinoperable.TheCompletionTimemaybeextendedifthevalverestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswasthefirstinoperablevalve.TheConditionACompletionTimemaybeextendedforupto4hoursprovidedthisdoesnotresultinanysubsequentvalvebeinginoperablefor>4hours.usthe,IftheCompletionTimeof4hours(~u&agextensio~expireswhileoneormorevalvesarestillinoperable,ConditionBisentered.(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLES.t.ciEXAMPLE1.3-5(continued)ACTIONSlrtOIVNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachinoperablevalve.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorevalvesinoperable.A.lRestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursQ.iv%.5~~ai'n'eh~c-o.~44cuet+A~no~a+4'L~.TheNoteabovetheACTIONStableisamethodofmodifyinghowtheCompletionTimeistracked.IfthismethodofmodifinghowtheCompletionTimeistrackedwasapplicableonltotheNote~appearin~~Conditio~>waugh.~%ho.arTheNoteallowsConditionAtobeenteredseparatelyforeachinoperablevalve,andCompletionTimestrackedonapervalvebasis.Whenavalveisdeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredanditsCompletionTimestarts.Ifsubsequentvalvesaredeclaredinoperable,ConditionAisenteredforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-5(continued)IftheCompletionTimeassociatedwithavalveinConditionAexpires,ConditionBisenteredforthatvalve.IftheCompletionTimesassociatedwithsubsequentvalvesinConditionAexpire,ConditionBisenteredseparatelyforeachvalveandseparateCompletionTimesstartandaretrackedforeachvalve.IfavalvethatcausedentryintoConditionBisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,ConditionBisexitedforthatvalve.SincetheNoteinthisexampleallowsmultipleConditionentryandtrackingofseparateCompletionTimes,CompletionTimeextensionsdonotapply.EXAMPLE1.3-6lhOLTIPLEAclleJ5QAHIMAComQ1rloQCaeMLKvo~Tzustoro'CTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onechannelinoperable.A.1PerformSR3.x.x.x.Onceper8hoursORA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50%RTP.8hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.6hours(continued) ~~'I~*CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESO'.EXAMPLE1.3-6(continued)EntryintoConditionAoffersachoicebetweenRequiredActionA.lorg2.RequiredActionA.lhasa'onceper"CompletionTime,whichqualifiesforthe25%extension,perSR3.0.2,toeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.IfRequiredActionA.lisfollowed,andtheRequiredActionisnotmetwithintheCompletionTime~M~theQSQextensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBssenere.IfRequiredActionA.2isfollowedandtheCompletionTimeof8hoursisnotmet,ConditionBisentered.IfafterentryintoConditionB,RequiredActionA.lorA.2ismet,ConditionBisexitedandoperationmaythencontinueinConditionAv<Q%~CC.O'ervW~~~QAcWch~AMm4.~0m6Q,~~Wv44Rto-~Q~in'+~~4~~%.A.cfA.'LrwuZ4~~~%m~4~iMim~4~+(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesExANpLEs~+"'xANpLE1.3-7MuLT1pLsAchaNsa1~sNAcaNO<'noaa/camp~am(continued)TIIAE~~vows,ACTIONS'ONDITIONREIOUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.Onesubsysteminoperable.A.lVerifyaffectedsubsystemisolated.1hourANDANDA.2RestoresubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.Onceper8hoursthereafter72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.ANDB.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursRequiredActionA.1hastwoCompletionTimes.The1hourCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheConditionisenteredandeach"Onceper8hoursthereafter"intervalbeginsuponperformanceofRequiredActionA.1.IfafterConditionAisentered,RequiredActionA.lisnotmetwithineithertheinitial1houroranysubsequentlux8hourintervalfromthepreviousperformanceg~hÃipheRgb.extensionallowedbySR3.0.2),ConditionBisentered.TheCompletionTimeclockforConditionAdoesnotstopafterConditionBisentered,butcontinuesfromthetime(continued) CompletionTimes1.31.3CompletionTimesEXAMPLESEXAMPLE1.3-7(continued)3v$14ConditionAwasinitiallyentered.IfRequiredActionA.lismetafterConditionBisentered,Condition8isexitedandoperationmaycontinueinaccordancewithConditionA,providedtomleionTimeforRequiredActionA.2hasnotesecondCompetionT)meofActionA.lhasamo>"'me".e.,aftertheinitial1hourmmeo'onentry),theaoraCompletionTimeextensionaplyIMMEDIATEWhen"Immediately"isusedasaCompletionTime,theCOMPLETIONTIMERequiredActionshouldbepursuedwithoutdelayandinacontrolledmanner. Frequency1.41.0USEANDAPPLICATION1.4FrequencyPURPOSEThepurposeofthissectionistodefinetheproperuseandapplicationofFrequencyrequirements.DESCRIPTIONEachSurveillanceRequirement(SR)hasaspecifiedFrequencyinwhichtheSurveillancemustbemetinordertomeettheassociatedLCO.AnunderstandingofthecorrectapplicationofthespecifiedFrequencyisnecessaryforcompliancewiththeSR.The"specifiedFrequency"isreferredtothroughoutthissectionandeachoftheSpecificationsofSection3.0,SurveillanceRequirement(SR)Applicability.The"specifiedFrequency"consistsoftherequirementsoftheFrequencycolumnofeachSRaswellascertainNotesintheSurveillancecolumnthatmodifyperformancerequirements.SituationswhereaSurveillancecouldberequired(i.e.,itsFrequen'cycouldexpire),butwhereitisnotpossibleornotdesiredthatitbeperformeduntilsometimeaftertheassociatedLCOiswithinitsApplicability,representpotentialSR3.0.4conflicts.Toavoidtheseconflicts,theSR(i.e.,theSurveillanceortheFrequency)isstatedsuchthatitisonly"required"whenitcanbeandshouldbeperformed.WithanSRsatisfied,SR3.0.4imposesnorestriction.EXAMPLESThefollowingexamplesillustratethevariouswaysthatFrequenciesarespecified.Intheseexamples,theApplicabilityoftheLCO(LCOnotshown)isMODESI,2,and3.(continued) Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLESW-~iEXAMPLE1.4-1"~~elEPREQmuCY(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYPerformCHANNELCHECK.12hours~laa+Example1.4-1containsthdtypeofSRmostoftenencounteredintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).TheFrequencyspecifiesaninterval(12hours)duringwhichtheassociatedSurveillancemustbeperformedatleastonetime.PerformanceoftheSurveillanceinitiatesthesubsequentinterval.AlthoughtheFrequencyisstatedas12hours,anextensionofthetimeintervalto1.25timesthestatedFrequencyisallowedbSR3.0.2foroerationalflexi't.emeasurementoisintervaatallimtheSRisnot'bemetperSR3.0.1(suchaswheninoperable,avariableespecifiedlimitsorteicabilitoeLCO.IftheintervalspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhiletheisinaMODEorotherspeciieconiionintheApplicabilityoftheLCO,andtheperformanceoftheSurveillanceisnototherwisemodified(refertoExample1.4-3),thenSR3.0.3becomesapplicable.IftheintervalasspecifiedbySR3.0.2isexceededwhilee-~isnotinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityoftheLCOforwhichperformanceoftheSRisrequired,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithintheFrequencyrequirementsofSR3.0.2priortoentryintotheMODEorotherspecifiedcondition.FailuretodosowouldresultinaviolationofSR3.0.4.'continued) Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES2ic.iEXAMPLE1.4-2gULTlPLCFREGLlKAJCtES(continueSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYVerifyflowiswithinlimits.Oncewithin12hoursafter>25%RTPAND24hoursthereafterExample1.4-2hastwoFrequencies.ThefirstisaonetimeperformanceFrequency,andthesecondisofthetypeshowninExample1.4-1.Thelogicalconnector"AND"indicatesthatbothFrequencyrequirementsmustbemet.Eachtimereactorpowerisincreasedfromapowerlevel<25%RTPto>25%RTP,theSurveillancemustbeperformedwithin12hours.Theuseof"once"indicatesasingleperformancewillsatisfythespecifiedFrequency(assumingnootherFrequenciesareconnectedby"AND").ThistypeofFrequencydoesnotualiffothextensionallowedbySR3.0.2."Thereafter"indicatesfutureperformancesmustbeestablishedperSR3.0.2,butonlyafteraspecifiedconditionisfirstmet(i.e.,the"once"performanceinthisexample).Ifreactorpowerdecreasesto<25%RTP,themeasurementofbothintervalsstops.Newintervalsstartuponreactorpowerreaching25%RTP.(continued)

Frequency1.41.4FrequencyEXAMPLES~Hc.~EXAMPLE1.4-3(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEr(PwrFREQUENCY-NOTE---------'-----@Rlffequiredtobeperformed12hoursafter>25%RTP.Performchanneladjustment.7daysO3.v@<akTheintervalcontinues,whetherornotthe~operationis<25%RTPbetweenperformances.d<<hSurveillance,itisconstruedtobepartofthe"specifiedFrequency."Shouldthe7dayintervalbeexceededwhileoperationis<25%RTP,thisNoteallows12hoursafter.powerreaches>25%RTPtoperformtheSurveillance.TheSurveillanceisstillconsideredtobeperformedwithinthe"specifiedFrequency."Therefore,iftheSurveillancewerenoterformedwith'he7dalu@~aSR3.0.2)interval,butoperationwas<25%RTP,itwouldnotconstituteafailureoftheSRorfailuretomeettheLCO.Also,noviolationofSR3.0.4occurswhenchangingNODES,evenwiththe7dayFrequencynotmet,providedoperationdoesnotexceed12hourswithpowerZ25%RTP.Oncethe~reaches25%RTP,12hourswouldbeallowedforcompletingtheSurveillance.IftheSurveillancewerenotperformedwithinthis12hourinterval,therewouldthenbeafailuretoerformaSurveillancewit'hsecifiedFreuenc,wouldapply.aneprov>sionso3.0.3 ~~SLs2.02.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)2.1SLs2.1.1ReactorCoreSLsInNODES1and2,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWER,Reactor(Ri~,dpressurizerpressureshallnotexceedtheSLsspecifiedinFigure2.1.1-1.2.1.2RCSPressureSLInNODES1,2,3,4,and5,theRCSpressureshallbemaintained2735psig.2.2SLViolations2.2.1IfSL2.1.1isviolated,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3within1hour.2.2.2IfSL2.1.2isviolated:2.2.2.1InMODE1or2,restorecomplianceandbeinMODE3.within1hour.2.2.2.2InMODE3,4,or5,restorecompliancewithin5minutes.(Q2.2.4With'4hours,otifythe[PltSuperintendntandVice~~Predent-NuclrOperationsandthe[offs'reviewerspifiedinSpification5..2,"[OffsiteReviewandAudit"].2.2.5Within/30daysaLienseeEventport(LER)sllbepreparpursu4ntto10CF50.73.TheRshallbesmittedtothNRC,theoffsitereviwersspecifiinSpecificion5.5.2],dthe[PlntSuperintedentandVicPresident-uclear0eratins].2.0-1ARpage,s SLS2.0680238psigI00NOTOPERATEINTHISAREA660LLICCI-CL"UJCLLLlI-C9CC:LLJ)OOI-C9CQO640620600560560I5IS40THISFIGUREFOR"ILLUSTRATIONONLY.00NOTUSEFOROPERATION2235psig1985psigw71685psigACCEPTABLEOPERATION52020406060100120PERCENTOFRATEDTHERMALPOWERFigure2.1.1-1{page1of1)ReactorCoreSafetyLimits2.0-2 ReactorCoreSLs82.1.1B2.0SAFETYLIMITS(SLs)82.1.1ReactorCoreSLsBASESZ'esca~2.).IBACKGROUND=-i(~.a.duringsteadystateopera>on,normaoperaionatransients,andanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs).Thisisaccomplishedbyhavingadeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB)designbasis,whichcorrespondstoa95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatDNBwillnotoccur~andbyrequiringthatfuelcenterlinetemperaturestaysbelowithemeltingtemperature~>(a~r.z,On+Leli~a4,'lmd'herestrictionsofthisSLpreventoverheatingofthefuelandcladding,aswellaspossiblecladdingperforation,thatwouldresultinthereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.Overheatingofthefuelispreventedbymaintainingthesteadystatepeaklinearheatrate(LHR)belowthelevelatwhichfuelcenterlinemeltingoccurs.Overheatingofthefuelcladdingispreventedbyrestrictingfueloperationtowithinthenucleateboilingregime,wheretheheattransfercoefficientislargeandthecladdingsurfacetemperatureisslightlyabovethecoolantsaturationtemperature.FuelcenterlinemeltingoccurswhenthelocalLHR,orpowerpeaking,inaregionofthefuelishighenoughtocausethefuelcenterlinetemperaturetoreachthemeltingpointofthefuel.Expansionofthepelletuponcenterlinemeltingmaycausethepellettostressthecladdingtothepointoffailure,allowinganuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.S.it.i..eOperationabovetheboundaryofthenucleateboilingregimecouldresultinexcessivecladdingtemperaturebecauseoftheonsetofDNBandtheresultantsharpreductioninheattransfercoefficient.Insidethesteamfilm,highcladdintemperaturesarereached,andacladdingwater(zirconiuwater)reactionmaytakeplace.Thischemicalreactionresultsinoxidationofthefuelcladdingtoastructurallyweakerform.Thisweakerformmayloseitsintegrity,resultinginanuncontrolledreleaseofactivitytothereactorcoolant.(continued)82.0-1 5~4~I.~.rINSERT2.1.1AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC6(Ref.1)requiresthatthereactorcoreshall~~bedesignedtofunctionthroughoutitsdesignlifetimewithoutexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimitswhichhavebeenstipulatedandjustified.Thisintegrityisrequired ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESBACKGROUNDTheproperfunctioningoftheReactorProtectionSystemoft'hereactorcoreSLs.'PPLICABLEThefuelcladdingmustnotsustaindamageasaresultofSAFETYANALYSESnormaloperationandAOOs.ThereactorcoreSLsareestablishedtoprecludeviolationofthefollowingfueldesigncriteria:~R$3)bp'.Theremustbeatleast95%probabilityata95%confidencelevel(the95/95DNBcriterion)thatthehotfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceDNB;.~<9'.Thehotfuelpelletinthecoremustnotexperiencecenterlinefuelmeltin>aJ,ITheReactorTripSystemsetpoints.incombinationwithalltheLCOs,aredesignedtopreventanyanticipated5.LiiC,=Pere'onoftransientconditionsforReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)temperature,~ressure,andTHERMALPOWERlevelthatwouldresultinaS.CCc.~L~DNBR+oflessthantheDNBRlimitandprecludetheexistenceofflowinstabilities.>>',p,g;.>co33.<,mA'~c5~~>~'n~q<<<~(gT5)pnsmuwc~4c.bio~"Automaticenforcementofthesereactorcores>sprov>ebythefollowingfunction:(za.s1~s.tti.da.g.OvertemperaturehTtrip;4A'.OverpowerhTtrip;Qfe'mesc'4saeasp~v'identg4atcg.vf4e5C4.~&o~s4~gpecaGccb~o~alCo&I*ten5cg.PowerRangeNeutronFluxtrip;andSteamgeneratorsafetyvalves.Thelimiationthateaveragenthalpyin/hehotlegt)lessthnorequalt6theenthapyofsaturafI;edliquidaflsoensurethatthe6measuredbinstrumentgtion,usedyhtheRPSdsignasamsureofcoepower,is(proportionafl'o<corepower.(continued)B2.0-2 INSERT2.1.2InmeetingtheDNBdesigncriterion,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,nuclearandthermalparameters,fuelfabricationparametersandcomputercodesmustbeconsidered.Theeffectsoftheseuncertaintieshavebeenstatisticallycombinedwiththecorrelationuncertaintytodeterminedesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesthatsatisfytheDNBdesigncriterion.Theobservableparameters,thermalpower,reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehave.beenrelatedtoDNBthroughtheW-3and/orWRB-IDNBcorrelation.TheseDNBcorrelationshavebeendevelopedtopredicttheDNBfluxandthe}ocationofDNBforauxiliaryuniformandnon-uniformheatfluxdistributions.ThelocalDNBheatfluxratio,definedastheratiooftheheatfluxthatwouldcauseDNBataparticularcorelocationtothelocalheatflux,isindicativeofthemargintoDNB.AminimumvalueoftheDNBratioisspecifiedsothatduringsteadystateoperation,normaloperationaltransientsandanticipatedtransients,thereisa95%probabilityata95/.confidencelevelthatONBwillnotoccur.ThecurvesofFigure2.l.l-lrepresentthelociofpointsofthermalpower,coolantsystempressureandaveragetemperatureforwhichthisminimumDNBvalueissatisfied.Theareaofsafeoperationisatorbelowtheselines.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoahigherDNBRlimit.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownONBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility. ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)TheSLsrepresentadesignrequirementforestablishingtheRPStripsetpointsidentifiedpreviously.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits,"ortheassumedinitialcond'nsofthesafetyanalysesRe6Z)providemorerestrictivelimitstoensurethatthesarenotexceeded.anma.~le.o4e.r~<+OrCOrC.Sdl.yI<'me+aISAFETYLIMITS!FigureB2.1.1-1shfTHERMALPOWER,.RCSpressure,andaveragetemperatureforwhichtheminimumDNBRisthesafety.analyseslimit,thatfuelcenterlinetemperature5:~vrema~nsbelowmelting,thattheaverage'nthalpyinthehot0legislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturated5:cL'i,.c,liquid,orthattheexitqualityis.withinthelimitsdefinedbytheDNHRcorrelation.c-~~~~aCerC.5;ui.checuvesareedonentalpyhotchnnelfactorimitsproviedintheOLR.ThedashedlinofFigureB.1.1-1showanexampeofalim'tcurveat235psig.add'tion,it'ustratesthevariouRPSfunctiothataredeinedtoreventtheu'achAmia<FtuteQ<~ce4~)TheSLishigherthanthelimitcalculatedwhenth,iswithinthelimits'oftheFgb,I)functionoftheovertemperaturehTreactortrip.WhentheAFDisnotwithinthetolerance,theAFDeffectontheovertemperaturehTreactortripswillreducethesetpointstoprovideprotectionconsistentwiththereactorcoreSLQ~~APPLICABILITY5.aLe..Cg,tib.CSL2.1.1onlyappliesinMODES1and2becausethesearetheonlyMODESinwhichthereactoriscritical.AutomaticprotectionfunctionsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEduringMODES1and2toensureoperationwithinthereactorcSLs.ThesteamgeneratorsafetyvalvesauomaticprotectionactionsservetopreventRCSheatuptothereactorcoreSLconditionsortoinitiateareactortripfunction,whichforcestheunitintoMODE3.Setpoi'ntsforthereactortrifunctionsaresecifiedinLCO3.3.~InMODES3,4,(continued)82.0-3 ~~4~~Insert2.1.3FromthistypeofFigure,thecurvesonFigure2.1.1-1oftheaccompanyingspecificationcanbegenerated.EachofthecurvesofFigure2.1.1-1hasthree~~~~~~~~~~~distinctslopes.Workingfromlefttoright,thefirstslopeensuresthattheaverageenthalpyinthehotlegislessthanorequaltotheenthalpyofsaturatedliquidsuchthatovertemperaturethehotlegsteamqualityremainsg151asrequiredbyW-3correlation.ThisfinalslopeensuresthatONBR>1.3.' ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESAPPLICABILITY5,and6,Applicabilityisnotrequiredsincethereactoris(continued)notgeneratingsignificantTHERMALPOWER.SAFETYLIMIT-VIOLATIONS!e54ureConplianc.e.andIfSL2.1.1isviolated,therequirementtootoMODE3placestheunitinaMODEinwhichthisSLisnotapplicable.incgeeCani'no.ndTheallowedCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofbringingtheunittoaNODEofoperationwherethisSLisnotapplicable,andreducestheprobabilityoffueldamage.QL2'-3IfSL2..1isviolat,theNRCOpertionsCentermtbenotifiewithin1ho,inaccordancwith10CFR5.72(Ref.2.2.4IfSL2.1.1isviolated,tePlantSuperiendentandtheVicePresient-Nuclear0erationsshallenotifiedwiin24hours.This24hourpriodprovidesimeforthepltoperatorsandstafftotetheappropr'eimmediateationandassestheconditionoftheunitborereportingotheseniormnagement.2.2.5IfSL2.1.isviolated,LicenseeEventeportshallbepreparedadsubmittedwihin30daystoheNRC,thePlanSuperinteentandtheV'cePresident-NclearOperations.Thisrequrementisinccordancewith0CFR50.73(Ref.6)(continued)B2.0-4 '0e~~',~d~~7~orReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1BASESSAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS(continued)2.2.6IfSL2.1.1iviolated,resrtoftheunitallnotcommenceunt'uthorizedbtheNRC.ThisrquirementensurestheRCthatallnessaryreviews,nalyses,andactionsarcompletedbefetheunitbegiitsrestarttonormalopeation.REFERENCES7.z,.l.~I~doWQNSAR,Section~A4'ZAJtdSfgjJFOrtd~(AIF)~~Cdd)TuleIo,I'l47.Liower~~~J,4.~tddddidddi~dM~+4bR~+kOIe,R5ug~ec,+'Qelchano4Zn4~mc,+0%Qp4etddtd'n*08.'4al'e4oelo44kCh~nc(F~4s)<+i.ggag~(egg>>>~a.,5+..4.2.l.z.Z4."QFSAk,5CC+On4.4,3@<A>-8745")asdqn4aoew4r4e@serfsIdverpowerDella.Wa~4Tied'eeea.IDid'erfe~perc4~e.Qelgc~Fueeckone,Qa.~Qi%7ddB2.0-5 ~+~ReactorCoreSLsB2.1.1RcPIOcRw(QF'5AlZ.Fi)5'.o-I680660OTDELTATOPDELTATDONOTOPERATEINTHISAREAABOVEANDTOTHERIGHTOFLINES640UCLEARVERPONER620C)C5I-600COOS/GSAFETYVALVES580560ACCEPTA8LEOPERATION540FORILLUSTRATIONONLY.DONOTUSEFOROPERATION.520020,406080IOO120PERCENTOFRATEDTHERMALPOWER(%)FigureB2.1.1-1(pagetoft)ReactorCoreSafetyLimitsvs.BoundaryofProtectionB2.0-6 RCSPressureSLB2.1.2B2.0SAFETYLIHITS(SLs)B2.1.2ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PressureSLBASESBACKGROUND5.mi.c,A4&du.4alton,~CAzl=beve9,"BeakCoolant-thaau<eQoundnry>"<>C33,"Re".WC~i.+Pr~~.e.Bouda.y<P4:l,'4),"a4CDC34,"l2e~eh~<IIi<<fReSSIIrCunJa.~yRaplJPrgpo,garo~IIta4re.F'reve+on.$~5.Lii.c.eepf4-(ac&m*r~Ident~k~eknSIZ+Ale.lm4l4l~~~edesignpressure(ReG.A,y,a.J0)rc4~cingAenumberafP&4fT4c4orrILrige;,qeggpaveIf'ac4oactivest,lease,iM~~ceecllnq%leI'~ITSTheSLonRCSpressureprotectstheintegrityoftheRCSagainst.overpressurization.Intheeventoffuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductsarereleasedintothereactorcoolant.TheRCSthenservesastheprimarybarrierinpreventingthereleaseoffissionproductsintotheatmosphere.Byestabl,ishinganupperlimitonRCSpressure,thecontirittheRCSisensured.AccordingtoIIIIIIe.1,ereacorecoo5:s.'i.designconditionsarenooeexceeedduringnormaloerationandanticiatedoerationaloccurrencesAOOs.Also,incorancewt,"activityiss(Ref.1)reactivitaccidents,iludingrodjection,donotresltindamaetotheRCPthalimitedlocalieldzus5~;Ca,r.z').ThedesignpressureoftheRCSisurgingnormaloperationandAOOs,RCSpressureislimitedfromexceedingthedesinressurebymorethan10%inaccordancewithSectionIIIoftheoe(Ref>Toensuresystemintegrity,allRCScomponentsareydrostaticallytestedat125%ofdesignpressure,accordingtotheASHECoderequirementspriortoinitialoperationwhenthereisnofuelinthecore.Followinginceptionofunitoperation,RCScomponentspressuretested,inaccancewiththe~reuirementsofASHECodeSectionXI(Ref.S.iik.c+<<PPlls~~n4-WZZiTrIItQ~~SIk'IsasconOverpressurizationoftheRCScouldresutinabreachotRCPBPIfsuchabreachoccursinconjunctionwithafuelcladdingfailure,fissionproductscouldenterthecontainmentatmospher.specifiedin10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria"(Ref.APPLICABLETheRCSpressurizersafetyvalves,themainsteamsafetySAFETYANALYSESvalves(HSSVs),andthereactorhighpressuretriphavesettingsestablishedtoensurethattheRCSpressureSLwillnotbeexceeded.(continued)dRmi&B2.0-7 RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)5~".amc~4lomeJ.paaro.cc,i]en+;auhg+raus+bcJini4QQIZ,ORA4edmsf+C5$VIC~TheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesaresizedtopreventsystempressurefromexceedingthedesignpressurebymorethan10%,asspecifiedinSectionIIftheASMECodeforNuclearPowerPlantComonentsRef.>Thetransientthatestablishestherequiredreliefcapacsy,andhencevalvesizerequirementsandliftsettings,isacompletelossofexternalloadwithoutadirectreactortrip.Duringthetransient,nocontrolactionsareassumed,exceptthatthesafetyvalvesonthesecondaryplantareassumedtoopenwhenthesteampressurereachesthesecondarlantsafetvalvesetting~Bc'.C5-U.L.C.5aI.t.4.CTheReactorTripSystemsetpoints~e~),togetherwiththesettingsoftheMSSVs,providepressureprotectionfornormaloperationandAOOs.Thereactorhighpressuretripsetpointisspecificallyttoprovideprotectionaainst>~~,.yoverpressurization(Ref.~P).ThesafetyanalysesthehighpressuretripheRCSpressurizersafetyvalvesareperformedusingconservativeassumptionsrelativetot4ol4ressurecontroldevices.0Morespecifically,nocreditistakenforoperationofthefollowing:a.Pressurizeroweroperatedreliefvalves(g%R+;<~C~~<gf~~ph~cb.earnreiefvale~~c.SteamDumpSystem;d.ReactorControlSystem;e.PressurizerLevelControlSystem;orPressurizersprayvalv~sSAFETYLIMITSe~~+6taci,eJiJwagl;,o(u45e.l;~;$D0olZG7oof-6e,desqfreShvte.5;iii.e.~~gr'i'gna.tdusq~re)~are~~4trsanal4+pnThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpressurevesselundertheASMECode,SectionIII,is110%ofdesignressureThemaximumtransientpressureallowedintheRCSpepinvalves,andfittingsunder(Ref.s120%ofdesignpressure.Themostlimit>ngoftheseoallowancesisthe110%ofdesignpressure;therefore,theSLonmaximumallowableRCSpressureis2735psig.B2.0-8(continued) RCSPressureSL82.1.2BASES5.iii..APPLICABILITYSL2.1.2appliesinMODES1,2,3,4,and5becausethisSLcouldbeapproachedorexceededintheseMODESduetooverpressurizationevents.TheSLisnotapplicableinHODE6becausethereactorvesselheadclosureboltsarenotfullytightened,makingitunlikelythattheRCScanbepressurized.SAFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS2.l.ZIfSLisviolatedwhenthereactorisinMODE1or2,therequirementistorestorecomplianceandbeinNODE3within1hour.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLmaycauseimmediateRCSfailureandcreateapotentialforradioactivereleasesinexcef10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits.(Ref.P)TheallowableCompletionTimeof1hourrecognizestheimportanceofreducingpowerlevel'oaMODEofoperationwherethepotentialforchallengestosafetysystemsisminimized.Z.t.2If'LisexceededinMODE3,4,or5,RCSpressuremustberestoredtowithintheSLvaluewithin5minutes.ExceedingtheRCSpressureSLinMODE3,4,or5ismoreseverethanexceedingthisSLinMODE1or2,sincethereactorvesseltemperaturemaybelowerandthevesselmaterial,consequently,lessductile.Assuch,pressuremustbereducedtolessthantheSLwithin5minutes.TheactiondoesnotrequirereducingMODES,sincethiswouldrequirereducingtemperature,whichwouldcompoundtheproblembyaddingthermalgradientstressestotheexistingpressurestress.(continued)B2.0-9 RCSPressureSLB2.1.2BASES'AFETYLIMITVIOLATIONS(continued)C~Q2.2.3IftheRCSpressureSisviolated,theNRCOperaionsCentermutbenotif'within1ur,inaccordncewith10CFR5.72(Ref.2.2.4IftheRCpressureSLiviolated,thePlantSuperintndentandtheVcePresidentNuclearOperaonsshallbentifiedwithin2hours.The4hourperiodovidestimefotheplantopratorsandsfftotaketheappropriateimediateactionndassesstheconditionofteunitbeforeeportingtosenirmanagement2.2.5IftheRCSpresureSLisvioated,aLicenseEventReportshallbeprepredandsubmitdwithin30daytotheNRC,thePlantSuerintendentantheVicePresidnt-NuclearOperations.Thisrequiremetisinaccordaewith10CFR50.7(Ref.8).2.2.6IftheRCSressureSLiviolated,retartoftheuitshallnotcmmenceuntiauthorizedbtheNRC.Th'srequiremenensuresthNRCthatallecessaryrev'ews,analyses,ndactionsrecompletedeforetheun'eginsitsrestattonormaloperation.REFERENCESThd$41$2xAf(AIF)GDC,l33,o034,Js>"~'FBvuO'QIO,l'f67.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,~~ArticleNB-7000.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXQ8.10CFR100.(continued)B2.0-10 RCSPressureSL82.1.2BASESr.z.

2.2REFERENCES

Q~SAR,Section~.(continued)~~~~~~P'.USASB31.1,StandardCodeforPressurePiping,AmericanSocietyofHechanica1Engineers,1967.4;UFSAR.,5~1.L~H~Ib.>.C.0><IP;~lgNRC4,ZE,.g~f~R6iESUbgf'-c+SEPlop)~X'll-)yg.pgypyy4)(yXV8XVIO)CVIeepp)pXy~CCRJE~4gndl~SSe~$g(ggd~4e4Sep>ele.4,198l~UrSAR,gg.82.0-11 LCOApplicability3.03.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYLCO3.0.1~7.LILCOsshallbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsin"theApplicability,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.2QOrVLCO3.0.2LCO3.0.3~7.xx'aUpondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theRequiredActionsoftheassociatedConditionsshallbemet,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.0.6.LCo3.o.s<<JIftheLCOismetorisnolongerapplicablepriortoexpirationofthespecifiedCompletionTime(s),completionoftheRequiredAction(s)isnotrequiredunlessotherwisestated.7.x'tic,~0>p<~s~~<cL6'f4.dSSia4ztAljlQIJ5(2lWhenanLCOisnotmetan~heassociatedCTIONSarenotl~f.met,~nassociatedACTIONisnotprov'ided,theca+iallbe'edinaMODEorotherspecifiedconditioninwhichtCOisnotapplicable.ActionshallbeinitiatedeeiKR~pdiitoplacethe,asapplicable,in:a.MODE3within7hours;b.MODE4within13hours;andc.MODE5within37hours.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.WherecorrectivemeasuresarecompletedthatpermitoperationinaccordancewiththeLCOorACTIONS,completionoftheactionsrequiredbyLCO3.0.3isnotrequired.LCO3.0.3isapplicableinMODES1,2,3,and4.onLCO3.0.4WhenanLCOisnotmet,entryintoaHODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallnotbemadeexceptwhentheassociatedACTIONStobeenteredpermitcontinuedoperationintheMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityforanunlimitedperiodoftime.This(continued)3.0-1 LCOApplicability3.03.0LCOAPPLICABILITYLCO3.0.4(continued)SpecificationshallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSecificationseseexcep>onsaowentrinootherspecifiedconditionsinApplicabilitywheniatedtobeenteredallowunitoperationisecifiedconditionippicabilityonlyforal~miofLCO3.0.5EquipmentremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIONSmaybereturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontrolsolelytoperformtestingrequiredtodemonstrateitsOPERABILITYortheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesystemreturnedtoserviceunderadministrativecontroltoperformthetestingrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.LCO3.0.6S.B.QWhenasupportedsystemLCOisnot-metsolelyduetoasupportsystemLCOnotbeingmet,theConditionsandRequiredActionsassociatedwiththissupportedsystemarenotrequiredtobeentered.OnlythesupportsystemLCOACTIONSarerequiredtobeentered.ThisisanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2forthesupportedsystem.Inthisevent,additionalevaluationsandlimitationsmayberequiredinaccorancewithSpecificatio,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP)."Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.Whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoCo'nditionsa'ndRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.3.0-2 Insert3.0.1LCO3.0.7ggiTestExceptionLM:",:::Spk;.8,;!",,PBYESICSs,:ms:::,':-:Excerpt'k'ont.-";:::i:.QDBi2j':.allowsspecifiedTechnscalSpecifi~cason(TS)requirementstob~echangedtopermitperformanceofspecialtestsandoperations.Unlessotherwisespecified,'llotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisdesiredtobemetbutisnotmet,theACTIONSoftheTestExceptionLCO.shallbemet.WhenaTestExceptionLCOisnotdesiredtobemet,entryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityshallbemadeinaccordance,withtheotherapplicableSpecifications. SRApplicability3.03.0SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYSR3.0.17xltlSRsshallbemetduringtheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforindividualLCOs,unlessotherwisestatedintheSR.FailuretomeetawhethersuchfailureisexperiencedduringtheperormancoftheSurveillanceorbetweenperformancesoftheSurveillance,shallbefailuretomeettheLCO.FailuretoperformaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequencyshallbefailuretomeettheLCOexceptasprovidedinSR3.0.3.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentorvariablesoutsidespecifiedlimits.SR3.0.2ThespecifiedFrequencyforeachSRismetiftheSurveillanceisperformedwithin1.25timestheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency,asmeasuredfromthepreviousperformanceorasmeasuredfromthetimeaspecifiedconditionoftheFrequencyismet.ForFrequenciesspecifiedas"once,"theaboveintervalextensiondoesnotapply.IfaCompletionTimerequiresperiodicperformanceona"onceper..."basis,theaboveFrequencyextensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.ExceptionstothisSpecificationarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.SR3.0.3IfitisdiscoveredthataSurveillancewasnotperformedwithinitsspecifiedFrequency,thencompliancewiththerequirementtodeclaretheLCOnotmetmaybedelayed,fromthetimeofdiscovery,upto24hoursoruptothelimitofthespecifiedFrequency,whicheverisless.ThisdelayperiodispermittedtoallowperformanceoftheSurveillance.7,vs@IftheSurveillanceisnotperformedwithinthedelayperiod,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmet,andtheaplicableCondition(s)mustbeentered.eompeionimysoequiregcionseginimmiatelyponex+rationfthedrayperi(continued)3.0-3 SRApplicability3.03.0SRAPPLICABILITYSR3.0.3(continued)7vL4WhentheSurveillanceisperformedwithinthedelayperiodandtheSurveillanceisnotmet,theLCOmustimmediatelybedeclarednotmetandthealicableConditionsmustbeentered.ThCompe>onimesoftheRequiredActonsbegin>mmeiatelyuponfailurtomeetthSurveillanc.SR3.0.4e~i'nb7.xLUEntryintoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilityofanLCOshallnotbemadeunlesstheLCO'sSurveillanceshavebeenmetwithintheirspecifiedFreuency.ThisprovisionshallnotpreventNODESor.otherspecifiedconditionsw+he-ppuc<<b<i'4ore.~>re4Q~plyCu'i+hACT'fOp/5,3.0-4 LCOApplicabilityB3.0B3.0LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION(LCO)APPLICABILITYBASESLCOs7LCO3.0.1throughLCO3.0+establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.LCO3.0.1~7p,'<iiLCO3.0.1establishestheApplicabilitystatementwithineachindividualSpecificationastherequirementforwhentheLCOisrequiredtobemet(i.e.,whenthevs+4isinheMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicabilitystatementofeachSpecification).LCO3.0.2LCO3.0.2establishesthatupondiscoveryofafailuretomeetanLCO,theassociatedACTIONSshallbemet.TheCompletionTimeofeachRequiredActionforanACTIONSConditionisapplicablefromthepointintimethatanACTIONSConditionisentered.TheRequiredActionsestablishthoseremedialmeasuresthatmustbetakenwithinspecifiedCompletionTimeswhentherequirementsofanLCOarenotmet.ThisSpecificationestablishesthat:a.CompletionoftheRequiredActionswithinthespecifiedCompletionTimesconstitutescompliancewithaSpecification;and,b.CompletionoftheRequired-ActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetwithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,unlessotherwisespecified.TherearetwobasictypesofRequiredActions.ThefirsttypeoFRequiredActionspecifiesatimelimitinwhichtheLCOmustbemet.ThistimelimitistheCompletionTimetorestoreaninoperablesystemorcomponenttoOPERABLEstatusortorestorevariablestowithinspecifiedlimits.IfthistypeofRequiredActionisnotcompletedwithinthesecifiedCompletionTime,ashutdownmayberequiredtoplacethe'naNODEorconditioninwhichtheSpecificationisnotapplicable.(WhetherstatedasaRequiredActionornot,correctionoftheenteredConditionisanactionthatmayalwaysbeconsidereduponentering(continued)B3.0-1 LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.2(continued)7axL<Q~~~7.xvQcaf+tAFCr7ATLt,gqg<gCO7.xii.ifAo.g7.xLl.LACTIONS.)ThesecondtypeofRequiredActionspecifiestheremedialmeasuresthatpermitcontinuedoperationofthethatisnotfurtherrestrictedbytheCompletionTime.Inthiscase,compliancewiththeRequiredActionsprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.CompletingtheRequiredActionsisnotrequiredwhenanLCOismetorisnolongerapplicable,unlessotherwisestatedintheindividualSpecifications.3~.>,"Rt'cPressedli~Te<~(P/7iLimHS~ThenatureofsomeRequiredActionsosomeonitionsnecessitatesthat,oncetheConditionisentered,tRequiredActionsmusteecompletedeventhouhtheassociatedConditiongnolongerexisolaeindividualLCO'sACTIONSspecifytheRequiredActions.AnexampleofthisisinLCOTheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsarealsoapplicablewhenasystemorcomponentisremovedfromserviceintentionally.ThereasonsforintentionallyrelyingontheACTIONSinclude,butarenotlimitedto,performanceofSurveillances,preventivemaintenance,correctivemaintenance,orinvestigationofoperationalproemsEnteringACTIONSforthesereasonsmustbedoneinamannerthatdoesnotcompromisesafety.IntentionalentryintoACTIONSshouldnotbemadeforoperationalconvenience.Alternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantequipmentbeinginoperableshouldbeusedinstead.Doingsolimitsthetimebothsubsystems/trainsofasafetyfunctionareinoperableandlimitsthetimeotherconditionsexistwhichresultinLCO3.0.3beingentered.IndividualSpecificationsmayspecifyatimelimitforperforminganSRwhenequipmentisremovedfromserviceorbypassedfortesting.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsareapplicablewhenthistimelimitexpires,iftheequipmentremainsremovedfromserviceorbassed.n~h+4ane~C.<onomWhenachangeinNODEorothersecifiedcondstionisrequiredtocomplywithRequiredtions,the'ayenteraNODEorotherspecifiedconditioinwhichanotherSpecificationbecomesapplicabl.Inthiscase,theCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionswouldapplyfromthepointintimethatthenewSpecificationbecomesapplicable,andtheACTIONSCondition(s)areentered.newB3.0-2(continued) LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASES(continued)LCO3.0.3LCO3.0.3establishestheactionsthatmustbeimplementedwhenanLCOisnotmetand:pk,~+7,BALLL~7xui~lanklo'4V'%q06AWCdb.HgO~~owSa.AnassociatedRequiredActionandCompletionTimeisnotmetandnootherConditionapplies;orb.Theconditionofthe~+&isnotspecificallyaddressedbytheassociatedACTIONS.ThismeansthatnocombinationofConditionsstatedintheACTIONScanbemadethatexactlycorrespondstotheactualconiion.oe.Sometimes,possiblecombinationsofConditionsaresuchthatentering'LCO3.0.3iswarranted;insuchcases,theACTIONSspecificallystateaConditioncorrespondingtosuchcombinationsandalsothatLCO3.0.3beenteredimmediately.ThisSpecificationdelineatesthetimelimitsforplacingte'nasafe,NODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhenoperationcannotbemaintainedwithinthelimitsforsafeoperationasdefinedbytheLCOanditsACTIONS.Itisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencethat,permitsroutinevoluntaryremovalofredundantsystemsorcomponentsfromserviceinlieuofotheralternativesthatwouldnotresultinredundantsystemsorcomponentsbeinginoperable.2.02Upon,enterinLCO3.0.IThisincludesthereductioninelectrica1generationwithtoensurethestabilityandavailabilityoFtheelectricalgrid.ThetimelimitsspecifiedtoreachlowerNODESofoperationpem>esuowntoproceedinacontrolledandorderlymannerthatiswellwithinthesecifiedmaximumcooldownrateandwithinthecapabilitiesothe,assumingthatonlytheminimumrequiredequipmentisOPERABLE.ThisreducesthermalstressesoncomponentsoftheReactorCoolantSystemandthepotentialforaplantupsetthatcouldchallengesafetysystemsunderconditionstowhichthisSpecificationapplies.TheuseandinterpretationofspecifiedtimestocompletetheactionsofLCO3.0.3areconsistentwiththediscussionofSection1.3,CompletionTimes.S~~~~n<~~<~,~~se~~~(continued)B3.0-3 Insert3.0.3theShiftSupervisorshallevaluatetheconditionoftheplantanddetermineactionstobetaken,consideringplantsafetyfirst,thatwillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown.Theseactionsshallincludepreparationforasafeandcontrolledshutdown,aswellasactionstocorrecttheconditionwhichcausedentryintoLCO3.0.3.Ifitisdeterminedthattheconditionthatcaused~~~~~~~~entryintoLCO3.0.3canbecorrectedwithinareasonableperiodoftimeandstillallowsufficienttimeforanorderlyplantshutdown,apowerreductiondoesnothavetobeinitiated. LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)shutdownrequiredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.3maybeterminatedandLCO3.0.3exitedifanyofthefollowingoccurs:a.TheLCOisnowmet.~7;Xiii~Qhh47.xU.c7,xcLCb.AConditionexistsforwhichtheRequiredActionshavenowbeenperformed.c.ACTIONSexistthatdonothaveexpiredCompletionTimes.TheseCompletionTimesareapplicablefromthepointintimethattheConditionisinitiallyenteredandnotfromthetimeLCO3.0.3isexited.lC,Oihihei<<~h..ii>>ihtobeinMODE5whenashutdownisrequireddurgNODE1peration.1ftheunitsinaowerooperaionwhenahutdownisquired,theimelimitorreacinthenelowerNODElies.IfalowerHisreachedinlesstimethanalowe,owever,thetotalallowabletimetoreachMODE5,orotherapplicableMODE,isnotreduced.Forexample,ifNODE3isreachedin2hours,thenthetimeallowedforreachingHODE4isthenextllhours,because'hetotaltimeforreachingMODE4isnotreducedfromtheallowablelimitof13hours.Therefore,ifremedialmeasuresarecompletedthatwouldpermitareturntoNODE1,apenaltyisnotincurredbyhavingtoreachalowerMODEofoperationinlessthanthetotaltimeallowed.InMODES1,2,3,and4,LCO3.0.3providesactionsforConditionsnotcoveredinotherSpecifications.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinMODES5and6beet'salreadyinthemostrestrictiveConditionrequiredbyLCO3.0.3.TherequirementsofLCO3.0.3donotapplyinotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability(unlessinNODE1,'2,3,or4)becausetheACTIONSofindividualSpecificationssufficientlydefinetheremedialmeasurestobetaken.ExcetionstoLCO3.0.3'reprovidedininstanceswhererequiring'hutdown,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.3,wouldnotrovideappropriateremedialmeasuresfortheassociaeconiionoe.AnexampleofthisisinLCO3.7."uelg~PoolWaterLevel."LCO3.7.asanApplicabilityof"Duringmovementofirradiatedfuel(SFP)(continued)B3.0-4 LCOApplicability83.0BASESLCO3.0.3(continued)~+.xiiolassembliesinthTherefore,thisLCOcanbealicableinanorallMODES.IftheLCOandtheequirectionsofLCO3.7.Q)arenotmetwhileinNODEI,2or3,thereisnosafetybenefittobegainedbyplacingthe'nashutdowncondition.TheRequiredActionofLCO3.7.of"Suspendvementofirradiatedfuelassembliesintheee"istheappropriateRequiredActiontocompleteinlieuoftheactionsofLCO3.0.3.TheseexceptionsareaddressedintheindividualSpecifications.+,~+tWAj4jgLCO3.0.4LCO3.0.4establisheslimitationsotherspecifiedconditionsintheisnotmet.ItprecludesplacingMODEorothersecifiedcondition&landConJ.kionC.a.rsuCh+haa.JherequirementsofanLC~oath+o0eno+wAppj<coti<jik'gde+redqh+rcclonchangesinMODESorApplicabilitwhenanLCtheeH+inadiferentwhenthefollowingexist:.and~hlaMcj.'LpdL+4,~~euQ.Ac+owgWcMc%-M~iWwoudresultinthebeinreuiredtotocompywiteRequiredActions.~it9hcppjircj<,'eq.recen~rtcl7.xi.i~~la~aTheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheAlicilit.thatarerequiredtocorn1withACTIONS.7.'%%ted/7gciiPAaoEorotherseriicond.4o~ok4hompiancewiequiredActionstatpermitcontinuedoerationofthforanunlimitedperiodoftimeinaODEorotherspecifiedconditionprovidesanacceptablelevelofsafetyforcontinuedoperation.ThisiswithoutregaroesausobeforeoraftertheMODEchange.Therefore,insuchcases,entryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicabilitymaybemadeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheRequiredActions.TheprovisionsofthisSpecificationshouldnotbeinterpretedasendorsingthefailuretoexercisethegoodpracticeofrestoringsystemsorcomponentstoOPERABLEstatusbeforeunitstartup.(continued)B3.0-5 LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.4(continued)~~o~~~alii~aha~~i~~~a<iw~~E'W@VS~Ip'l~~eMW~.ExceptionstoLCO3.0.4arestatedintheindividualSecifications.ExceptionsmayapplytoalltheACTIONSortoaspecs>cequiredActionofaSpecification.Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedontheassociatedinoperableequipment(oronvariablesoutsidethespecifiedlimits),aspermittedbySR3.0.1.Therefore,changingMODESorothersecifiedconditionswhileinanACTIONSCondit'onisnotaviolationof.IorSR3.0.4forthoseSurveillancesthatdonothavetobeperformedduetotheassociatedinoperable'quipment.However,SRsmustbemettoensureOPERABILITYpriortodeclaringtheassociatedequipmentOPERABLE(orvariablewithinlimits)andrestoringcompliancewiththeaffectedLCO.LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.5establishestheallowanceforrestoringequipmenttoserviceunderadministrativecontrolswhenithasbeenremovedfromserviceordeclaredinoperabletocomplywithACTIN.TAIpI'IprovideanexceptiontoLCO3.0.2(e.g.,tonotcomplywiththeapplicableRequiredAction(s))toallowtheperformanceofSRstodemonstrate:a.TheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoservice;orb.TheOPERABILITYofotherequipment.TheadministrativecontrolsensurethetimetheequipmentisreturnedtoserviceinconflictwiththerequirementsoftheACTIONSislimitedtothetimeabsolutelynecessarytoperformtheallowedSRs.ThisSpecificationdoesnotprovidetimetoperformanyotherpreventiveorcorrectivemaintenance.AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYoftheequipmentbeingreturnedtoserviceisreopeningacontainment(continued)B3.0-6 LCOApplicability83.0BASESLCO'.0.5(continued)isolationvalvethathasbeenclosedtocomplywithRequiredActionsandmustbereopenedtoperformtheSRs.AnexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopreventthetripfunctionfromoccurringduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannelintheothertripsystem.AsimilarexampleofdemonstratingtheOPERABILITYofotherequipmentistakinganinoperablechannelortripsystemoutofthetrippedconditiontopermitthelogictofunctionandindicatetheappropriateresponseduringtheperformanceofanSRonanotherchannel'nthesametripsystem.LCO3.0.6~7.xui.qLCO.3.0.6establishesanexception-toLCO3.0.2forsupportsystemsthathaveanLCOspecifiedintheTechnicalSpecifications(TS).ThisexceptionisprovidedbecauseLCO3.0.2wouldrequirethattheConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheassociatedinoperablesupportedsystemLCObeenteredsolelyduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem.Thisexceptionisjustifiedbecausetheactions~alii<thatarerequiredtoensurethe~smaint~ined.inasafeconditionarespecifiedinthesupportsystemmCO'sRequiredActions.TheseRequiredActionsmayincludeenteringthesupportedsystem'sConditionsandRequiredActionsormayspecifyotherRequiredActions.WhenasupportsystemisinoperableandthereisanLCOspecifiedforitintheTS,thesupportedsystem(s)arerequiredtobedeclaredinoperableifdeterminedtobeinoperableasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperability.However,itisnotnecessarytoenterintothesupportedsystems'onditionsandRequiredActionsunlessdirectedtodosobythesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.Thepotentialconfusionandinconsistencyofrequirementsrelatedtot~eentryintomultiplesupportandsupportedsystems'COs'UConditionsandRequiredActionsareeliminatedbyprovidinalltheactionsthcessartoensurethe~ismaintainedinasafeconditioninthesupportsystem'sRequiredActions.However,thereareinstanceswhereasupportsystem'sRequiredActionmayeitherdirectasupportedsystemtobe(continued)B3.0-7 LCOApplicabilityB3.0BASESLCO3.0.6(continued)declaredinoperableordirectentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforthesupportedsystem.Thismayoccurimmediatelyoraftersome,specifieddelaytoperformsomeotherRequiredAction.Regardlessofwhetheritisimmediateoraftersomedelay,whenasupportsystem'sRequiredActiondirectsasupportedsystemtobedeclaredinoperableordirectsentryintoConditionsandRequiredActionsforasupportedsystem,theapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsshallbeenteredinaccordancewithLCO3.0.2.Specification~,"SafetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFDP),"ensureslossofsafetyfunctionisdetectedandappropriateactionsaretaken.Upon,anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineiflossofsafetyfunctionexists.Additionally,'therlimitations,remedialactions,orcompensatoryactions~maybeidentifiedasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionsandRequiredActions.TheSFDPimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.Crosstraincheckstoidentifyalossofsafetyfunctionforthosesupportsystemsthatsupportmultipleandredundantsafetysystemsarerequired.ThecrosstraincheckverifiesthatthesupportedsystemsoftheredundantOPERABLEsupportsystemareOPERABLE,therebyensuringsafetyfunctionisretained.Ifthisevaluationdeterminesthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.Qg(SPEWQO.PB3.0-8 Insert3.0.2LCO3.0.7Therearecertainspecialtestsandoperationsrequiredtobeperformedatvarioustimesoverthelifeofthep0.'i'n'4.Thesespecialtestsandoperationsarenecessarytodemon~srateselectjfieCperformancecharacteristics,toperformspecialmaintenanceactivities,andtoperformspecialevolutions.TestExceptionkCg8:":f!':8):',-'";,;:.,'ffCSge8'fj6icijt'i'ong~NkjallowsspecifiedTechnicalSpecification(TS)requirementstobechangedtopermitperformances=ofspecialtestsandoperations,whichotherwisecouldnot.beperformedifrequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsoftheseTS.Unlessotherwisespecified,allotherTSrequirementsremainunchanged.ThiswillensureallappropriaterequirementsoftheNODEorotherspecifiedconditionnotdirectlyassociatedwithorrequiredtobechangedtoperformthespecialtestoroperationwillremainineffect.TheApplicabilityofaTestExceptionLCOrepresentsaconditionnotnecessarilyincompliancewiththenormalrequirementsoftheTS.AspecialoperationmaybeperformedeitherundertheprovisionsoftheappropriateTestExceptionLCOorundertheotherapplicableTS'requirements.IfitisdesiredtoperformthespecialoperationundertheprovisionsoftheTestExceptionLCO,therequirementsoftheTestExceptionLCOshallbefollowed. SRApplicabilityB3.0B3.0SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENT(SR)APPLICABILITYBASESSRsSR3.0.1throughSR3.0.4establishthegeneralrequirementsapplicabletoallSpecificationsandapplyatalltimes,unlessotherwisestated.SR3.0.1.O.4SR3.0.1establishestherequirementthatSRsmustbemetduringtheNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityforwhichtherequirementsoftheLCOapply,unlessotherwisespecifiedintheindividual'Rs.ThisSpecificationistoensurethatSurveillancesareperformedtoverifytheOPERABILITYofsystemsandcomponents,andthatvariablesarewithinspecifiedlimits.FailuretomeetaSurveillancewithinthespecifiedFrequency,inaccordancewithSR3.0.2,constitutes'failuretomeetanLCO.SystemsandcomponentsareassumedtobeOPERABLEwhentheassociatedSRshavebeenmet.NothinginthisSpecification,however,istobeconstruedasimplyingthatsystemsorcomponentsareOPERABLEwhen:a.Thesystemsorcomponentsareknowntobeinoperable,althoughstillmeetingtheSRs;orb.TherequirementsoftheSurveillance(s)areknownnottobemetbetweenrequiredSurveillanceperformances.pea+Surveillancesdonothavetobeperformedwhentheea+4-isinaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionforwhichtherequirementsoftheassociatedLCOarenotapplicable,unlessotherwisespecified.TheSRsassociatedwithagestg<ceptionareonlyapplicablewhenthetestexceptionisasanallowableexceptiontotherequirementsofaSpecification.Surveillances,includingSurveillancesinvokedbyRequiredActions,donothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipmentbecausetheACTIONSdefinetheremedialmeasuresthatapply.SurveillanceshavetobemetandperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,priortoreturningequipmenttoOPERABLEstatus.(continued)B3.0-9 Insert3.0.4UnplannedeventsmaysatisfytherequirementsforagivenSR.Inthiscase,theunplannedeventmaybecreditedasfulfillingtheperformanceoftheSR.ThisallowanceincludesthoseSRswhoseperformanceisnormallyprecludedinagivenMODEorotherspecifiedconditions. SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.1(continued)~7x"'poncompletionofmaintenance,appropriatepostmaintenancetestingisrequiredtodeclareequipmentOPERABLE.ThisincludesensuringapplicableSurveillancesarenotfailedandtheirmostrecentperformanceisinaccordancewithSR3.0.2.PostmaintenancetestingmaynotbepossibleinthecurrentNODEorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilityduetothenecessary~arametersnot'avingbeenestablished.Inthesesituations,theequipmentmaybeconsideredOPERABLEprovidedtestinghasbeensatisfactorilycompletedtotheextentpossibleandtheequipmentisnototherwisebelievedtobeincapableofperformingitsfunction.ThiswillallowoperationtoproceedtoaNODEorotherspecifiedconditionwhereernecessaryostmaintenancetestscanbecompleted.z+subs~~ip<s+'mainawe%+ed%>ili<4eappropriate~p~i~>Ms<ll4pn4trek.SR3.0.2SR3.0.2establishestherequirementsformeetingthespecifiedFrequencyforSurveillancesandanyRequiredActionwithaCompletionTimethatrequirestheperiodicperformanceoftheRequiredActionona"onceper.,interval.SR3.0.2permitsa25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequency.ThisextensionfacilitatesSurveillanceschedulingandconsidersplantoperatingconditionsthatmaynotbesuitableforconductingtheSurveillance(e.g.,transientconditionsorotherongoingSurveillanceormaintenanceactivities).The25%extensiondoesnotsignificantlydegradethereliabilitythatresultsfromperformingtheSurveillanceatitsspecifiedFrequency.ThisisbasedontherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeingperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththeSRs.TheexceptionstoSR3.0.2arethoseSurveillancesforwhichthe25%extensionoftheintervalspecifiedintheFrequencydoesnotapply.TheseexceptionsarestatedintheindividualSpecifications.Anexampleofwhere.SR3.0.2doesnotapplyisaSurveillancewithaFrequency,of"inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions."TherequirementsofregulationstakeprecedenceovertheTS.TheTScannotinandofthemselvesextendatestintervalspecifiedintheregulations.(continued)B3.0-10

SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.2(continued)Therefore,thereisaNoteintheFrequencystating,"SR3.0.2isnotapplicable."AsstatedinSR3.0.2,the25%extensionalsodoesnotapplytotheinitialportionofaperiodicCompletionTimethatrequiresperformanceona"onceper..."basis.The25%extensionappliestoeachperformanceaftertheinitialperformance.TheinitialperformanceoftheRequiredAction,whetheritisaparticularSurveillanceorsomeotherremedialaction,isconsideredasingleactionwithasingleCompletionTime.Onereasonfornotallowingthe25%extensiontothisCompletionTimeisthatsuchanactionusuallyverifiesthatnolossoffunctionhasoccurredbycheckingthestatusofredundantordiversecomponentsoraccomplishesthefunctionoftheinoperableequipmentinanalternativemanner.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2arenotintendedtobeusedrepeatedlymerelyasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervalsrperiodicCompletionTimeintervalsbeyondthosespecified.(~~~~+,Reive]~~glnkervgs5SR3.0.3orUpgo4le.liwi44-<heoPec4edFrequency,whichercrless)~7xiii4'R3.0.3establishestheflexibilitytodeferdeclaringaffectedequipmentinoperableoranaffectedvariableoutsidethespecifiedlimitswhenaSurveillancehasnotbeencompletedwithin-.thespecifiedFrequency.Adelayperiodofuto24hoursappliesfromthepointintimethatisiscoveredtaeSurveillancehasnotbeenperformedinaccordancewithSR3.0.2,andnotatthetimethatthespecifiedFrequencywasnotmet.ThisdelayperiodprovidesadequatetimetocompleteSurveillancesthathavebeenmissed.ThisdelayperiodpermitsthecompletionofaSurveillancebeforecomplyingwithRequired.ActionsorotherremedialmeasuresthatmightprecludecompletionoftheSurveillance.Thebasisforthisdelayperiodincludesconsiderationofconditions,adequateplanning,availabilityofpersonnel,thetimerequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,thesafetysignificanceofthedelayincompletingtherequiredSurveillance,andtherecognitionthatthemostprobableresultofanyparticularSurveillancebeing(continued) SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR3.0.3(continuedT.)(Ll.l.>CLLtperformedistheverificationofconformancewiththerequirements.WhenaSurveillancewithaFrequencbasednotontimeintervals,butuponspecified~conditionsoroperationalsituations,isdiscoverednottohavebeenperformedwhenspecified,SR3.0.3allowsthefulldelayperiodof24hourstoperformtheSurveillance.pemocLSR3.0.3alsoprovidesaforcompletionofSurveillancesthatbecomeapplicableasaconsequenceofMODEchangesimposedbyRequiredActions.FailuretocomplywithspecifiedFrequenciesforSRsisexpectedtobeaninfrequentoccurrence.UseofthedelayperiodestablishedbySR3.0.3isaflexibilitywhichisnotintendedtobeusedasanoperationalconveniencetoextendSurveillanceintervals.IfaSurveillanceisnotcompletedwithinthealloweddelayperiod,thentheequipmentisconsideredinoperableorthevariableisconsideredoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponexpirationofthedelayperiod.IfaSurveillanceisfailedwithinthedelayperiod,thentheequipmentisinoperable,'orthevariableisoutsidethespecifiedlimitsandtheCompletionTimesoftheRequiredActionsfortheapplicableLCOConditionsbeginimmediatelyuponthefailureoftheSurveillance.CompletionoftheSurveillancewithinthedelayperiodallowedbythisSpecification,orwithintheCompletionTimeoftheACTIONS,restorescompliancewithSR3.0.1.SR3.0.47xLLl.SR3.0.4establishestherequirementthatallapplicableSRsmustbemetbeforeentryintoaMODEorotherspecifiedconditionintheApplicability.ThisSpecificationensuresthatsystemandcomponentOPERABILITYrequirementsandvariablelimitsaremetbeforeentryintoMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheAlicabilitforwhichthesesystemsandcomponentsensuresafeoperationofthe~.ThisSpecificationappliestochangesinMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsinthe(continued)B3.0-12 SRApplicabilityB3.0BASESSR304~Rxxv(continued)7,wi.i.INSERT~~3.0.3to<Alicabilityassociatedwith~shutdownaswellassartup.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.4shallnotpreventchangesinNODESorotherspecifiedconditionsintheApplicabilitythatarerequiredtocomplywithACTIONS.Thepreciserequirementsfor,performanceofSRsarespecifiedsuchthatexceptionstoSR3.0.4arenotnecessary.ThespecifictimeframesandconditionsnecessaryformeetingtheSRsarespecifiedintheFrequency,intheSurveillance,orboth.ThisallowsperformanceofSurveillanceswhentheprerequisitecondition(s)specifiedinaSurveillanceprocedurerequireentryintotheNODEorotherspecifiedconditioninthe,ApplicabilityoftheassociatedLCOpriortotheperformanceorcompletionofaSurveillance.ASurveillancethatcouldnotbeperformeduntilafterenteringtheLCOApplicability,wouldhaveitsFrequencyspecifiedsuchthatitisnot"due"untilthespecificconditionsneededaremet.Alternately,theSurveillancemaybestatedintheformofaNoteasnotrequired(tobemetorperformed)untilaparticularevent,'ondition,ortimehasbeenreached.FurtherdiscussionofthespecificformatsofSRs'nnotationisfound-inSection1.4,Frequency.B3.0-13 INSERT3.0.3However,incertaincircumstancesfailingtomeetanSRwillnotresultinSR~~3.0.4restrictingaMODEchangeorotherspecifiedconditionchange.Whena'7%hisystem,subsystem,train,component,device,orvariableisinoperableoroutsideitsspecifiedlimits,theassociatedSR(s)arenotrequiredtobeperformed,perSR3.0.1,whichstatesthatsurveillancesdonothavetobeperformedoninoperableequipment.Whenequipmentisinoperable,SR3.0.4doesnotapplytotheassociatedSR(s)sincetherequirementfortheSR(s)tobeperformed.isremoved.Therefore,failingtoperformtheSurveillance(s)withinthespecifiedFrequency,onequipmentthatisinoperable,doesnotresultinanSR3.0.4restrictiontochangingMODESorotherspecifiedconditionsoftheApplicability.However,sincetheLCOisnotmetinthisinstance,LCO3.0.4willgovernanyrestrictionsthatmay(ormaynot)applytoMODEorotherspecifiedconditionchanges. ~~~3.1.1LCO3.1.1SDMshallbe-3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.1SHUTDOMN,MARGIN(SDM)~F."0lJJa04I~+4.laaaqgaa~CafigJ%he-C,gLR.APPLIC/VILITY:MODE2withk,f~1.0,MODES3,4+andSj.E.'E'EiACTIONSNONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.lInitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.15minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSFREQUENCYSR3.1.1.1VerifySDMishouCSMH-4Da,%AC.)L~lh~Equi'Cd344mM<<3.1-1 ~~~~I~~~I~~I~I~ CoreReactivity23.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1./CoreReactivityLCO3-.1.3g.Themeasuredcorereactivityshallbewithin~lXdk/kof'redictedvalues.APPLICABILITY:HOOEPIY~Hlb.i~o2.~i~KcgACTIONSNDREQUIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Measuredcorereactivitynotwithinlimit.A.lANDRe-eva'iuatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.72hoursA.2EstablishappropriateoperatingrestrictionsandSRs.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMOOE6hours1D.i3.1-3 CoreReactivity3.1NSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSURVLNFREQUENCYSR3.1Y.l10~l.aL--NOTE-----Theictedreactivituesmaybeadjustedalizeocorrespondtothemeasuredcorerivitypriortoexceedingafuelburof60tivefullpowerdays)aftereachfuefDCLVVerifymeasuredcorereactivityiswithin~1X4k/kofpredictedvalues.gOTK---<</wevt0+~pcs"farYelcdPv>orOnce~~aftereachrefuelingTE---'nlyreirafter60D31POereafterl0it.i~.K.2.2.--No~\,clelqYcltuvuBcIgkcYccOgfcckvcFullP+ulc-YQs[BC'P)l)p.Thc.pN'edic.baclrc.ac.bvihqvo.1~allama.qlccad,juciecL(IloYluull~)Qcot're,sgnd,+~nnegxgu~cdcove.YclccklvlgPYo~4cua,cgcllllg0f~l6ucngpof$0pFpj4055Qcl~~QILY>QYCCCICVCtrLCCIYCYCuc+v>Q'A)IALIIIL/C,V/ggPICd'CACdva.~~t'-s,3iEFV'753.1-4 MTC3.1~33.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1PModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)tugt~~t~go0cga-4.~a~~~~o~~li~'4a~d4WCpdo~C.qctc.L.Pc.(.Ebt)laTheMTCshallbemaintainedwithinthe-Hen+e~specifiedinLCO3.1.~II.cl<<S4trta.~ovgcle1d3.(Q5fcp~/op'Ov'ORACY1CV4lS4C-10%70"/oPXPCpvd.\C.Sa,~<OvC.g~d3tW0pean/p'.+CpeOlOOVd'0~/OPTPAPPLICABILITY:MODE1andMODE2withk,<<~1.0fortheupperMTClimit,MODES1,2,and3forthelowe~MTClimit.ACTIONS0NREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.MTCnotwithinupperlimit.A.3.EstablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbankstomaintainMTCwithinlimit.20-hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE2withk,<1.0.6hoursC.MTCnotwithinlowerlimit.MODE12hoursll.i.i.i-----hlovK----/RANg.>ifcoIAcl1owQ.lM%9~b<ecp~pe.Wcduhmdvcv-Q13nd3+On03'~eart+VCd3.1-5 INSERT3.I.4Al(.iiiC.-------NOTE-----RequiredActionC.lmustbecompletedwheneverConditionCisentered.ProjectedEOLMTCnotwithinlowerlimit.C.1Re-evaluatecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,anddeterminethatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.Oncepriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibrium.RTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppm.0.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinHOOE4.l2hours MT'URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSURVLNFREQUENCY3WSR3.1.E.1VerifyMTCiswithinupperlimit.'i<Su,P-7OncepriortoenteringNODEIaftereachrefuelingSR3.1.4.2VerifyMTCiswithin300ppmSurveillancelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.----NOTE-----Notrequiretobeperfoduntil7effivefullower.days(E0afterrachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmOnceeachcycleSR3.1.4.32.ESaaewaaamaaawIftheMTCimorenegatithanthe300ppmSueillancelimittLCOlimit)scifiedintheCOLR,SR3..3shallberepeatedoncper14Dduringtheremainderofthfcycle.SR3.1.4.3neednotberepeatediftheMTCmeasuredattheequivalentofequilibriumRTP-AROboronconcentrationof~60ppmislessnegativethanthe60ppmSurveillancelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.----NOTE-----Notrequiredtobeperformeduntil7EFPDafterreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumTP-AROboronccentrationof00ppmVerifyMTCiswithinlowerlimit.Eachcycle3.1-6 INSERT3.1.4B1l.t~SR3.1.3.2ConfirmthatMTCwillbewithinlimitsat70KRTPandatEOL.OncepriortoenteringMODE1aftereachrefUeling ~~PHTC3.1~$:8EDI.7j/C3ju.6LllOlCLI-4\lXIIIACCEPTABLEOPERATlONUNACCEPTABOPERATlI.IiIICCO.2IX:1OTHlSFlGUREFORlLLURAlONONLYDONOTUSEFOOPERAON010203040506008090100PERCENTRTPFigure3.1.4-1{page1of1)ModeratorTemperatureCoefficientvs.PowerLevel3.1-7 RodGroupAlignmentLimits~3.1.V3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.IRodGroupAlignmentLimitsLCO3.1Ji'llshutdownandcontrolrodsshallbeOPERABLE,withallindividualindicatedrodpositionswithin12stepsoftheirgroupstepcounterdemandposition.APPLICABILITY:ACTIONS~.~i+(~~(LHhlIf'SMOOEPl,a~~'",p~,/cdin+I.c.Co<.R..hhoDK2mh4lccQ>(,0.REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorerod(s)untrippable.12ix.A.l.l+0A.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.At(0A.2BeinMODE~2ml%~fcl,o,1hour1hour6hoursB.Onerodnotwithinalignmentlimits.L2xi8.1.1VerifSDMi1hour(continued)'4,spcclhcdin .ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONRodGroupAlignmentLimits~3.1.8)COMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)~z.xi(g..xil2xi~liatS~rg'g+Q)Qga~<Bcs<IZ..g'IB&1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.~AttDBW2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~75KRTP.AttDB&3VerifSDMis~ANDBA.4PerformSR3.2.1.1.~ANDB.5PerformSR3.2.2.1.~ANO1hour2hoursOnceper12hours72hours72hoursigi.i.lgSKRTCQtbmae.BHBRe-evaluatesafetyanalysesandconfirmresultsremainvalidfordurationofoperationundertheseconditions.5daysbP.Norethanonerodnotwithinalignment-1imit.)Z.Lg.1.1VerifDMOR~~~~.1.2InitiateborationtorestorerequiredSDMtowithinlimit.AND1hour1hour(continued)3.1-9 RodGroupAlignmentLimits.z3.1.$ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEl2,iilmsaTG(continued)G9.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionBnotmet.g.2BeinMODE~2co'l4k.~gf41.o'g(.1BeinMODEg.Ziigke.40<l.e6hours6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSFREQUENCYSR3.1.8'.IVerifyindividualrodpositionswithinalignmentlimit.12hoursSR.3,i.9.212.iii~~~~NOT~Ow(qYQDived+lpga.tvfewmcdi4Wc.i-nhpcsihlc~Akc.vicibo~iv~oni4v.isivopc,ra.Sic..Vgl'iQi~dl'vidualrocdP~i4dnsV)i$4in0-ligvimc.i~4l>i'Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafterwhen~8~ed-pos4Waa-dev~@camSA440~wepe~AeSR3.1.+:P-Verifyrodfreedomofmovement(trippability)bymovingeachrodnotfullyinsertedinthecore-ineitherdirection.92daysoM%'PLIZ~i~I+ro.n~i9io~(continued)3.1-10 RodGroupAlignmentLimits~3.1.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCESR.3.1~~Verifyroddroptimeofeachrod,fromthefullywithdrawnposition,issecondsfromthebeginningofdecayofstationarygrippercoilvoltagetodashpotentry,with:FREQUENCYOne'iortoreactorcriticalityaftereach'emovalofthereactorhead'Z.v'i)2.via.T,~~500'F;andb.-AHreactorcoolantpumpsoperating.BA3.1-11 s~~QO'TFT4C.Shuk*~<1BB4-Wk~Mo+sidcphd'-limtkus4c.et-cts.tvccLf'Ob'e.VCOVidee.n~O45P1$,1ShutdownBankInsertionLimits3.1.4LCO3.1.3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1k.ShutdownBanklnsertinLimit+13.y513.1O<OJOb~a,~hshutdownbankshallbeemadrin>nsertionlimit+specifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:13.iiiMODE1,KeÃ+l.o.MODE2withThisLCOisnota-NOTE-rmingSR3.1.5.2.ACTIONSNDITINREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME13,33banksnotwithinlimiA.l.lVerifySDMisOR1hour,mt&i~+AC.limit+S(C.C.sflCClkn%AC.C.CBL,P..A.l.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.AND1hourA.2Restoreshutdownbantowithinlimit@.'hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE~1'5.VI2WRY'kcR4lsO6hours3.1-12 ShutdownBankInsertionLimit+~3.1.89SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSl3,j.VEILNE<S.vFREQUENCY<4~rVgtevt-IOaSR3.I.B.IVerifyeach-shutdownbankdiswithinthelimits'specifiedintheCOLR.12hours3.1-13 bJovE.b~g4q/LSD~~~/Iclc0~4idwW4~hh~i%5M~Ytgu\v4y+g/gal'foYwl~MoFSP3elela93.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.PControlBankInsertionLimitsControlBankInsertionLimits3.1.MJg.elLCO3.1.WControlbanksshallbewithintheinsertion,sequence,andoverlaplimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk,ff~1.0.-NOTE-ThisLCOisnota~~020ACTIONSNDIlCii;REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Controlbanklimitsnotmet.A.l.1VerifSDMi1.6'Ldk/k.1hourli~Spccsf'lcds<roc.Qo~g;.A.1.2InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.ANDA.2Restorecontrolbank(s)towithinlimits.1hour2hours(continued)3.1-14 ControlBankInsertionLimitsACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEControlbanksequenceerlaplimitsnotmet.B.l.lVerifySDMis-[1.6]Xhklk.ORInitiborationtooreSDMtowithinimANDB.2Restorecontrolbanksequenceandoverlaptowithinlimits.1hour1houroursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8J.lBeinMODEj/6hoursIO.iug~)4hkeg<lb.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSURVEILNFREQUENCYSR3.1.EelVerifyestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Once,priortoachievingcriticality(continued)3.1-15 ControlBankInsertionLimits(nSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYbPSR3.1.%.2VerifyeachcontrolbankinsertioniswithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.12hoursthol~onlyvapori'rect&bc.P4~~+~'~~~lAg~klow3a&A&ON14YIO)vere.rcrJo<Vt<i~g~c4~~ho)ha~<>neo~~'I~)5%h'4~nAchemhsp~ilcd,CO~P..Oncewithin4hoursandevery4hoursthereafterwhen-i~edSR3.1.~VerifyequenceandoverlaplimitstheCOLR.controllCvbannotfullyw)trawnfromthecore~i5Mikhin&c,12hours3.1-16 RodPositionIndication3.1A13.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.8RodPositionIndication7~Lih4tc.ADpvo4EssofLCO3.1.SThe'dPositionIndication(IOIRPI)SystemandtheDemandPositionIndicationSystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPBILITY:'5.vI'>1MODEl>u~~Macsz~i'~h.~+l.o,VJIA>~ACTIONS)5~IgSeparateConditionIvl~groupandeachWkv-NOTE-entryisallowedforeachnoperablerodpositionindicatordemandpositionindicatorpeIbank.;+~NIaQ'AoAOYC444Mone,aesoCgc44)+iSItAOneRPIpergroupinoperableforoneormoregroups.A.lORREQUIREDACTIONVerifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.COMPLETIONTIMEOnceper8hoursA.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto-50KRTP.8hoursB.OneormorerodswithOinoperableposition15.$indicatorshavebeend~4stepsinonedirectionsincethelastdeterminationoftherod'sposition.B.lVerifythepositionoftherodswithinoperablepositionindicatorsbyusingmovableincoredetectors.4hours(continued)3.1-17 ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONRodPositionIndication3.1A7COMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)B.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~51KRTP.8hours~~l5.iiiC.Onedemandpositionindicatorperbankinoperableforoneormorebanks.fvbm~gpgg.A6LE<c-~a.~dposiho<lnd~co.tt)rba.ny,C.l.lVerifybyadminirativemeansO/5)al1PIsfortheaffectedbanksareOPERABLE.ANDC.l.2Verifythemostwithdrawnrodandtheleastwithdrawnrodoftheaffectedbanksare~12steps~~C.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50KRTP.Onceper8hoursOnceper8hours8hours,D.RequiredActionandOassociatedCompletiony'pterTimeofConditionAConditionB,orConditionCnotmet.D.lBeinMODE3.z,~')&k,~g(l,o,6hours15.iv~ovLW~o~MQ.9lpCrrgee~)napper4delc.f0~y~~ov~ace.oops~oR.lAov44e.~a~c.&can~pbs4o~awd<ew+g<~~<nopC.vobk.f'ovone.OV'Ab~CEi'IGgj-cvLc.o3~o.3,3'-18Rev.l%cJ44.lt SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSUVELNRodPositionIndication3.1A7FREQUENCYSR3.1..1l5'VeriyeachRPIagreeswithin12stepsofthegroupdemandpositionforthe[fu11indicatedrangeofrodtravel.l5.v'rribv4rcaeQgc,r'i4M',Qag~~ecu.+rc,mapsof~cVcr.krh~3.1-19 PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE13.1.91REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE1LCO3.9DuringtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTS,therequementsofLCO3.1.5,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";LCO3.1.6,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.1.7,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";dCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPR)"mabesuspended,provided:a.ERMALPOWERismaintained-XRTP;b.PowRangeNeutronFlux-Hhtripsetpointsare-10RTPabovetheTHERMAPOWERatwhichthetestisperfod,withamaximusettingof90KRTP;andc.SDMis~1.6]Xhk/k.APPLICABILITY:MODE1duringPHYSIESTS.ACTIONSNDITNREQUIRACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.1InitiatebrationtorestoreSDMowithinlimit.ANDA.2SuspendPHYSICSTESexceptions.15minutes1hour(continued)GSTS3.1-20Rev.0,09/28/ PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE3..9ACTIONSontinued)CONIONREQUIREDACTIONCOETIONTIMEB.THERMALPOWERnotwithinlimit.B.lReduceTHERMALPOWEtowithinlimit.01hourB.2spendHYSICSTESTSexcons.1hourC.PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints>IOXRTPabovethePHYSICSTESTpowerlevel.'ORPowerRangeutronFlux-Hitripsetpois>90KRTP.C.1ORC.2RestorePowergeNeutronFlux-Higtripsetpointsto~lOXabovethePHYSICSTESTpowerlevel,orto~90KRTP,whicheveris.lower.SuspendPHYSICSTESTSexceptions.1hour1hour3.1-21 PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MOOE13.1SURVEILLANCUIREMENTSURVEILNREQUENCYSR3.1.9.1VerifyTHERMALPOis~85%RTP.1hourSR3.1.9.2VerifyPowerRangeNeutrolu-Hightripsetpointsare-10KabthePHCSTESTpowerlevel,and~9RTP.Within8hourspriortoinitiationofPHYSICSTESTSSR3.1.9.3PerfoSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1.12oursSR3.1..4VerifySDMis-[1.6]Xhk/k.24hoursWOGSTS3.1-22Rev.0,09/28/92 PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.1e83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS3.1.MPHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE28LCO3.1.18Duringtheperformance8ofPHYSICSTESTS,therequirementsofLCO3.1A"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)";LCO3.1%"RodGroupAlignmentLimits";LCO3.is8Sh"utdownBankInsertionLimItp";LCO3.1".P,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";andLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality")7al)APPLICABILITY:MODE2duringPHYSICSTESTS.maybesuspended,provided:~ERMALPoubaPbm.RCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureis~@34gc'F;andst~CP.'DMis-[1.6]Xhk/k.aQB~h%l;edI'n+hC.<t-"k<<ACTIONSNDINREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SDMnotwithinlimit.A.1InitiateborationtorestoreSDMtowithinlimit.15minutesA.2SuspendPHYSICSTESTSexceptions.1hourB.THERMALPOWERnotwithinlimit.B.lOpenreactortripbreakers.Iamediately(continued)3.1-23

ACTIONS(continued)PHYSICSTESTSExceptions-MODE23.1.488CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.RCSlowestloopaveragetemp'eraturenotwithinlimit.C.1RestoreRCSlowestloopaveragetemperaturetowithinlimit.15minutesOcdAcho')7.iiiassocia.i.cd~~pleo'~~LACot-nd'i4onC.notBeinMODE3.ML)5BfPminutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSURVLN17,i<>FREQUENCYSR3.1MIQoTPerformonpowerrangeandintermediaterangechannelsper+SR3.3.1+7SR3.3.1.8~I-One75pithin%Hate".>priorto~Q~~vi4CA.lsSR3.1.81.2VerifytheRCSlowestloopaveragetemperatureis~~PF.S9030minutes8MdSR3.1AO.+VerifySDMis~1.6]Xhk/k.24hoursl~~%4gpc~PscJi~44c.C-><+'7.150~inufc53.1-24 I~~~I'III~~I~)IIII~~I~~~~~~II~~~~I~I~~~~I~III~)~)g))~I.~~II~~I~~I~I)'~~~I~III~~I~I~~I~~~I~I~~ ~F:i'DMTestException3.11SULLANCEREQUIREMENTSRVLNFQUENCYSR31111------------------NOTE-----Onlyquiredforcontrolrodsnotfullinserte.Determinetheposionofeacontrolrod.2hoursSR3.1.11.2-----------E-Onlyrequiredforontrolrodsnoullyinserted.Tripcontrolrodfrom-the50Kwitrawnposition,andverifyfullcontrolinsertion.thin24hourspr1toreducSDMoutsideits3.1-26 B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSBASES7LLLY.)v.a.A4m,'ClVCtmbi'~lFov~~g)P)Lz])(27avidZf+MOI&CCvldCntAccordingtoHB6-~(Ref.1),~eactivitycontrosystemsmustbndcapableofholdingthereactorcoresucl'itiMaintenanceoftheSDMensuresthatpostulatedreactivityeventswillnotdamagethefuel.BACKGROUNDaVa.ilo.blc.'tI.H.o.Corn~~sotSF~4qo.hatOP@.v~lngCD')0vlg,lV,behlcacur@dcAncdaSCond8\on2casen+rn<CECvCnC,C.aCi;C.,CVCvl+lOhi~C~b4<xpccfcd"ooccurclu.vivlgQ.ca'IcvdctAcltCA,v'lOIK4h~aLff'C)~~),roC,hu.S,4Yg.ill.bh,M~hPCOVld,C4-alt.u%Ono.gsovloin)NlC&AH'l@VS~~~mc~Go+~ohduringoperationandallxenonurnoutreactivitycangesandmaintainthereactorsubcriticalundercoldconditions.g,lu.4SDMrequirementsprovidesufficientreactivitymargintoensurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitswillnotbeexceededfornormalshutdownandanticipatedoperationalurrencesAOOsAssuch,theSDMdefinesthedegreeofsubcriticaitytatwouldbeobtainedimediatelyfollowingtheinsertionorscramofallshutdownand.controlrods,assumingthatthesinglerodclusterassemblofreactivityworthisfullyawn~a~dthc.~>~Ivlndcvagv-g,lV4~+c~pcva.Kuc.~~@~needto<<~dna.+vopou~ThesystemdesignrequirestwoindepenenrWagerbcvcontrolsystems'eprovided,andthatoneofthesesystemsbecapableofmaintainingthecoresubcriticalundercoldconditions.TheserequirementsarerovidedbtheuseofR~c.q+movableontrolassembliesansoubeori.caciinteReactorCoolantSstemRCSTheControlRodSystemcancompensaeorereacivityeffectsofthefuelandwatertemperaturechangesaccompanyingpowerlevelchangesovertherangefromfullloadtonoload.Inaddition,theControlRodSystem,togetherwiththeborationsystem,providestheSDMduringpoweroperationandiscapableofmakingthecoresubcriticalrapidlyenoughtopreventexceedingacceptablefueldamagelimits,assumingthattherodofhighestreactivityworthremainsfullywithdrawn.dg,w'c-Tlic.Splukko~~v4.0q~i44@voMnp05i~0~lbac.Awed4'.ColR..Duringpoweroperation,SDMcontrolisensuredbyoperatingwiththeshutdownbanksfullywithgrawnandthecontrolbankswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.,"ControlBankInsertionLimits."Whenth'sintheshutdownandrefuelingmoes,theSDrequirementsaremetbymeansofadjustmentstotheRCSoronconcentration.ho.vhyonlvo5+lnA.aolu.hlc.bo(onconaQln+rn%ion+0(continued) SDMB3.1.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOg.>v.4/alloi/ubtrna4.TheminimumrequiredSDMis.assumedas.aninitjalconditionisafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalysis(Ref)establishesap'DMthatensuresspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededfornormaloperationandAOOs,withtheassumptionofthehighestworthrodstuckoutscram.TheacceptancecriteriafortheSDMrequirementsarethatspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimitsareThisisdonebyensuringthat:$,iv,4>,4.ba.Thereactorcanbemadesubcriticalfromalloperatingconditions,transients,andDesignBasisAce.ice~b.Thereactivitytransientsassociaewipostulatedaccidentconditionsarecontrollablewithinacceptablelimits(departurefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR),fuelcenterlinetemperaturelimitsforAOOs,and~488~eel/gmenergydepositionfortherodejection2ooaccident);andC.Thereactorwillbemaintainedsufficientlysubcriticaltoprecludeinadvertentcriticalityintheshutdowncondition.$.>v.d-g.iv.PThemostlimitingaccidentfogtheSDMrequirementsisbasedona~HtqjsteamlinebreakpfSLB),asdescribedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.>gf.Theincreasedsteamflowresultingfromapipebreakinthemainsteamsystemcausesanincreasedenergyremovalfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator(SG),andconsequentlytheRCS.Thisresultsinareductionofthereactorcoolanttemperature.Theresultantcoolantshrinkagecausesareductioninpressure.Inthepresenceofanegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientsthiscooldowncausesanincreaseincorereactivity.~CSThemostlimitingLB,withrespecttopotentialfueldamagebeforeareactortripoccurs,isaguillotinebreakofamainsteamlineinsidecontainmentinitiatedattheendof'corelife.ThepositivereactivityadditionfromthemoderatortemperaturedecreasewillterminatewhentheaffectedSGboilsdry,thustrminatingRCSheatremovalandcooldown.FollowingtheLB,aposttripreturntopowermayoccur;however,nofueldamageoccursasaresultoftheposttripreturntoOfgvbta~oenLlotbpdnackg.e.dKQCblOOPOPL@OJ10ms.(continued) BASESKiv,bSOM83.1.1ot,ncxlyzcdvygefl~ShukdCXun~JP~erOP<.ada.hOnQO/Idl4'1~lQPPilcASu=-power,andTHERMALPOWERdoesnotviolatetheSafetyLimit(SL)requirementofSL2.1.1.-(Conw~~d)InadditiontothelimitingMSLBtransient,theSOMrequirementmustalsoprotectagainst:a.Inadvertentborondilution;b.,Anuncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromsubcriticalorlowpowercondition;Ic.Startupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP);andd.Rodejection.$.iv.bU+Wl.AChvAt)4bit,'trbgc,vakovg+skop%ac.dl)tAAlOutC.af~k),tea(thais'l4c.vs'4.ed.~OgA.S~lleh~Ital@,~loopo~gf~>~bibkSabyCCJC.l'~~+fQQgOhaChl-APld~qQ.iv.bEachoftheseeventdiscusselow..ld~c4Intheborondilutionanlysis,erequiredSOMdefinesthereactivitydifferencebetweenaninitialsubcriticalboron.concentrationandthecorrespondingcriticalboronconcentration.Thesevalues,inconjunctionwiththeconfigurationoftheRCSandtheassumeddilutionflowrate,directlaffecttheresultsoftheanalsisThiseventismossmisngatebeginningocorese,whencriticalboronconcentrationsarehighest.AeeaNHeesaddsreactivitytothereactorcore,causingboththecore'powerlevelandheatfluxtoincreasewithcorrespondingincreasesinreactorcoolanttemperaturesandpressureThe~~w&ofrode/alsoproducesatime(ita$g)eftlteloQaVl83.1-3(continued)Oependingonthesysteminitialconditionsandreactivityinsertionrate,theuncontrolledrodwithdrawaltransientisterminatedbeitherahighpowerleveltriporahighpressurizerpressureripInallcases,powerlevel,RCSpressure,linearheatrate,andtheONBRdonotexceedallowablelimits.ThestartupofaninactiveRCPwillnotresultina"coldwater"criticality,evenifthemaximumdifferencein(4<'ItptemperatureexistsbetweentheSGandthecor.emaximupositivereactivityadditionthatcanoccurduetoaninadvertentRCPstartisaffnidleRCPcannot,therefore,produceareturntopowerfromthotstandbycondition4SbAK4A-slc.~Cjc.CtlOnC,Vi/lVhgl&fA.l~+The~ofcontrolro~V,iv.4 BASES~ha~ct5u)$g<'~n,hj<aeuhovfig.~%rip.Cue]a.~dc,la/Jiblhami'ksa,rgng)f~g~~e.dif6bM4<54Ecnvnn.iwfmnQ,SDMB3.1.1ApPucAS<c,-dependentredistributionofcorepowerSMsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.EventhoughitisLc~~6Avc.d)notdirectlyobservedfromthecontrolroom,SDMisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseitisperiodicallymonitoredtoensurethattheunitisoperatingwithintheboundsofaccidentanalysisassumptions.g,>v.bLCOIN55R.T~.i.1ASDMisacoredesignconditionthatcanbeensuredduringoperationthroughcontrolrodpositioning(controlandshutdownbanks)andthroughthe'solubleboronconcentrationadtaretstnanalsesae0.ForSLBaccidents,ieisviolated,thereisapotenti'altoexceedtheDNBRlimitandtoexceed10CFR100,"ReactorSiteCriteria,"limits(Ref.Qf.For.theborondilutionaccident,iftheLCOisviolated,theminimumrequiredtimeassumedforoperatoractiontoterminatedilutionmaynolongerbeapplicable.ivi+4cg.CS,APPLICABILITY/aliiE.w.bACTIONSg,'>ii~>Q~d~InMODE2withk,<<<1.0andinMODES3+@~theSDMrequirementsareapplicabletoprovidesufficientnegativereactivitytomeettheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesdiscussedabove.InMODE6,theshutdownreactivityrequirementsaregiveninLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration."IgMODE(1and~SDMisensured~bC,v'iicomplyingwithLCO3.l.k,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit/,"andLCO3.1.M<ObE,2.mphVc.K>l0'erhmllnsmtubnL~~'aAA.lIftheSDMrequirementsarenotmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoperatortocorrectlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.ItisassumedthatborationwillbecontinueduntiltheSDMrequirementsaremet.(continued) TheCOLRprovidestheshutdownmarginrequirementwithrespecttoRCSboronconcentration.TheSLB(Ref.3)andtheborondilution(Ref.4)accidentsarethemostlimitinganalysesthatestablishtheSDMcurveintheCOLR.ThemaximumshutdownmarginrequirementoccursatendofcyclelifeandisbasedonthevalueusedinanalysisfortheSLB. SDMB3.1.1BASES(.1V,4Loveih0c,hot~mo~HuAilt'ze.-Inthedeterminationftherequiredcombinationofboration,flowrateandboroconcentration,thereisnouniquerequirementthtustbesatisfied.SinceitisimperativetoraisetheoronconcentrationoftheRCSassoonaspossible,theahighlyconcentratedsolution,suchasthatnormallyfoundintheboricacidstoragetank,orthe-l~a4edWaterstoragetank.Theoperatorshouldboratewiththebestsourceavailablefortheplantcondig.vt.'4fsvillIndeterminingtheionflowrate,thetimenorelifemustbeconsidered.Forinstance,themostdifficulttimeincorelifetoincreasetheRCSboronconcentrationisatthebeginningofcyclewhentheboronconcentrationmayapproachorexceed2000ppm.Assumingthatavalueof1%hk/kmustberecoveredandaborationflowrateof'lo7gpm,itispossibletoincreasetheboronconcentrationoftheRCSby100ppminapproximately35minutes.Ifaboronworthof10pcm/ppmisassumed,thiscombinationofparameterswillincreasetheSDMby.lXhk/k.Theseborationparametersnf~lejgpmand~pmrepresenttypicalvaluesandareprovidedforthepurposefofferingaspecificexample.,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSQ.gv.e.$eVI'1HSG8-'T3.hh.SR~3.1.1.1InS1and2,SDMisverifiedbyobservingterequiremenCO3.1e6andLCO3.1.7Intheeventthatarodisbeale,however,SDMverificationmuorteableroMOOEZms~JInODES3,4,and5,theSDMisverifiedbyanboronconcentration;b.Controlbankpoc.RCSaveragetere;d.urnupbasedongrossthermalenergygenera(continued) comparingtheRCSboronconcentrationtoaSHUTOOWNMARGINrequirementcurvethatwasgeneratedbytakingintoaccountestimatedRCSboronconcentrations,corepowerdefect,controlbankposition,RCSaveragetemperature,fuelburnupbasedongrossthermalenergygeneration,xenonconcentration,samariumconcentration,andisothermaltemperaturecoefficient(ITC). SDMB3.1.1BASESg<gq~LAt4cGg~v<RKMMTs(e~S~m)e.nconcentration;f.Samariumconcon;and(ITC).UsingtheIcountsforDopplerreactivityscalcu'becausethereactorissubcritical,andtlteraturewillbechaninatthesamerateastheRCS.kVTheFrequencyof~oursisbasedonthegenerallys'lowchangeinrequiredboronconcentrationandthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouttherequiredSDH.Thisallowstimefortheoperatortocollecttherequireddata,whichincludesperformingaboronconcentrationanalysis,andcompletethecalculation.REFERENCESUA,UFSAR,10CFR100.Secho~ig.l.~g.w.Q.'I~Pr&UUA'C1UAh~bAAA1t=OV~(41F)C~D+'tb5UACdfllUCh~~'IrKAAlqID>IRtl7,Z.A~AranLIhAA~)Kba.~hVdhfuekaASa+<<A~UAaPSfd.bdlnmzypi'csg~racdVl~y~~AlJs2-lgqg,s.>Fsaa.~>~'S'0'Fc~~5a.t)ion15.'4~3iuFggQgggklbnl~el~~UB3.1-6(eoat4ax4) SDMTave-200FB3.1.2B3.1EACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1.2TDOWNMARGIN(SDM)-T,g~200'FBASESBACKGROUNDAordingtoGDC26(Ref.I),thereactivitycorolsystemsmusberedundantandcapableofholdingtherctorcoresubcticalwhenshutdownundercoldconditins.MainteanceoftheSDMensuresthatpostuladreactivityevents'llnotdamagethefuel.SDMrequirentsprovidesufficientreaivitymargintoensurethatcceptablefueldesignlimswillnotbeexceededforormalshutdownandantiipatedoperationaloccurrences(As).Assuch,theSdefinesthedegreeofsubcriticalityatwouldbeobtaidiomediatelyfollowingtheinsertionorcramofallshudownandcontrolrods,assumingthesinglrodclusterssemblyofhighestreactivityworthisullywithawn.Thesystemdesignrequ'restttwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsbeprovedandthatoneofthesesystemsbecapableofmaintaininhecoresubcriticalundercoldconditions.Theserequintsareprovidedbytheuseofmovablecontrolassembl'esadsolubleboricacidintheReactorCoolantSyste(RCS).TheControlRodSystemcancompensatefortherctivityfectsofthefuelandwatertemperaturechangesaccompanyingowerlevelchangesovertherangefromfuloadtonolo.Inaddition,theControlRodSyst,togetherwitheborationsystem,providesSDMdingpoweroperationndiscapableofmakingthecoresubcticalrapidlyenoughtpreventexceedingacceptablefeldamage'limitsassuming'attherodofhighestretivityworthremainsfullythdrawn.Thesolublebronsystemcancompensateforf1depletionduringerationandallxenonburnoutreaivitychanges,andmatainthereactorsubcriticalundercldconditions.Durgpoweroperation,SDMcontrolisensuredyoperatingwitheshutdownbanksfullywithdrawnandtheontrolnkswithinthelimitsofLCO3.1.7,"ControlBakInsertionLimits."Whentheunitisintheshutdoandrefuelingmodes,theSDMrequirementsaremetbymesofadjustmentstotheRCSboronconcentration.WSTSB3.1-7(continued)Rev.0,09l28l92 ),iSDM-T,y-200FB3.1.2BASEAPPLICAB-TheminimumrequiredSDMisassumedasaninitialcontionSAFETYANYSESinthesafetyanalysis.Thesafetyanalysis(Ref.2establishesanSDMthatensuresspecifiedacceptablfueldesignlimitsarenotexceededfornormaloperatiandAOOswiththeassumptionofthehighestworthrodstoutonscram.Specifically,forMODE5,theprimaryfetyanalysisthatreliesontheSDMlimitsistheorondilutionalysis.ThecceptancecriteriafortheSDMrequiementsarethatspec>iedacceptablefueldesignlimitsremaintai'ned.Thisidonebyensuringthat:a.Theeactorcanbemadesubcricalfromalloperatingcondiions,transients,and0ignBasisEvents;b.Thereacivitytransientssociatedwithpostulatedaccidentnditionsarectrollablewithinacceptablelimits(derturefromnleateboilingratio,fuelcenterlinetperatureimitsforAOOs,and-280cal/gmergydositionfortherodejectionaccident);andc.Thereactorwillmaintainedsufficientlysubcriticaltopecdeinadvertentcriticalityintheshutdowncondion.Intheborondilionanalyst,therequiredSDMdefinesthereactivitydiffencebetweeninitialsubcriticalboronconcentrationdthecorresponngcriticalboronconcentratio.Thesevalues,inonjunctionwiththeconfiguratioftheRCSandtheaumeddilutionflowrate,directlyfeettheresultsoftheaalysis.Thiseventismostlimingatthebeginningofcorlifewhencriticalboronncentrationsarehighest.SDMatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPoliStatement.Eventhghitisnotdirectlyobservedfromthecontrolroom,isconsideredaninitialconditionprocevariableecauseitisperiodicallymonitoredtoensurethattheunitisoperatingwithintheboundsofaccidentanalisassumptions.MSTS83.1-8(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 SDM-T,~~200'FB3.1.BASLCO-SDMisacoredesignconditionthatcanbeensuredduingoperationthroughcontrolrodpositioning(controldshutdownbanks)andthroughthesolubleboronconctration.Theborondilutionaccident(Ref.2)isthemostimitinganalysisthat-establishestheSDMvalueoftheCO.Fortheorondilutionaccident,iftheLCOisviolat,thenthemimumrequiredt'imeassumedforoperatoraiontotenatedilutionmaynolongerbeapplicae.APPLICABILITYInMODE5,eSDMrequirementsareaplicabletoprovidesufficientnativereactivitytometheassumptionsofthesafetyanasesdiscussedaboveInMODES3and4,theSDMrequirementsaregiveninLCO.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)-T,,>200"InMODE6,heshutdownreactivityrequirementsaregseninLCO3.1,"BoronConcentration'."InMODES1and2,SDisensurdbycomplyingwithLCO3.1.6,"ShutdownnkInrtionLimits,"andLCO3.1.7.ACTIONSA.1IftheSDMrequiremesarenmet,borationmustbeinitiatedpromptly.ACompletiTimeof15minutesisadequateforanoratortocorrtlyalignandstarttherequiredsystemsandcomponents.tisassumedthatborationwillcontinueduntilthSDMrequirementsaremet.Inthedetinationoftherequiredcoinationofborationflowratandboronconcentration,theresnouniquerequirentthatmustbesatisfied.SineitisimperativetoraietheboronconcentrationoftheRCSassoonaspossle,theboronconcentrationshouldbehighlyconentratedsolution,suchasthatnormallyundinthe.bicacidstoragetankortheboratedwaterstagetank.eoperatorshouldboratewiththebestsourceailablefortheplantconditions.Indeterminingtheborationflowratethetimecorefemustbeconsidered.Forinstance,themostdifficultimeincorelifetoincreasetheRCSboronconcentrationistthe"beginningofcycle,whentheboronconcentrationmayWSTSB3.1-9(continued)Rev.0.09/28/92 ~t~vSDM-T,,-200B3..2BASES-approachorexceed2000ppm.AssumingthatavalofIXhk/kmustberecoveredandaborationflowraeof[]gpm,itispossibletoincreasetheborononcentrationoftheRCSby100ppminapproximately35mines.Ifaboronworthof10pcm/ppmisassumed,thiscbinationofarameterswillincreasetheSDMby1%hk/kTheseborationrametersof[]gpmand[]ppmrepresttypicalvaluesanareprovidedforthepurposeofofferngaspecificexale.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSR.l.IInMODE5,eSDMisverifiedbperformingareactivitybalancecalcation,considerinthefollowingreactivityeffects:a.RCSboronccentratio;b.Controlbankpitic.RCSaveragetempture;d.Fuelburnupbaedonrossthermalenergygeneration;e.Xenonconceration;f.Samariumoncentration;ang.Isothealtemperaturecoeff>ient(ITC).UsingthITCaccountsforDopplerretivityinthiscalculaonbecausethereactorissubitical,andthefueltemperurewillbechangingatthesamerateastheRCS.Therequencyof24hoursisbasedonthenerallyslowchgeinrequiredboronconcentrationandothelowpobabilityofanaccidentoccurringwithouterequiredDM.Thisallowstimeenoughfortheoperatorocollecttherequireddata,whichincludesperformingabonconcentrationanalysis,andcompletethecalculaten.WOSTSB3.1-10(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 ~'L~'~,~SDM-T,>>FB3.1.2BASESREFERENCES-l.'0CFR50,endixA,GDC26.2.,Chapter{15].WOGB3.1-11Rev.(continued) r%~.'c..c'ICoreReactivity83-1.2B3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS83:l.yiCoreReactivityBASESlb,v,o.Fovccvvc(A(F)C~Dr.27>ZWZa~dBACKGROUND5hnaacuN.maaiRJ1D.v.c.AccordingtoRef.1),reactivityshallbecontrollable,suchthatsubcriticalityismaintainedundercoldconditions,andacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededduringnormaloperationandanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.Therefore,reactivitybalanceisusedasameasureof-thepredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityduringpoweroperation.TheperiodicconfirmationofcorereactivityisnecessarytoensurethatDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientsafetyanalysesremainvalid.Alargereactivitydifferencecouldbetheresultofunanticipatedchangesinfuel,controlrodworth,oroperationatconditionsnotconsistentwiththoseassumedredictionsre1eactivity,andcouldpotentiallyresutsnaossoSDM)orviolationofacceptablefueldesignlimits.omparingpredictedversusmeasuredcorereactivityvalidatesthenuclearmethodsusedinthesafetyanalysisandsupportstheSDMdemonstrationsccensuringthereactorcanbebroughtsafelytocold,subcriticalconditions.~<oreggeq~Y+33r~10.i'IMhenthereactorcoreiscriticalorinnormalpoweroperation,areactivitybalanceexistsandthenetreactivityiszero.Acomparisonofpredictedandmeasuredreactivityisconvenientundersuchabalance,sinceparametersarebeingmaintainedrelativelystableundersteadystatepowerconditions.Thepositivereactivityinherentinthecoredesignisbalancedbythenegativereactivityofthecontrolcomponents,thermalfeedback,neutronleakage,andmaterialsinthecorethatcabsorbneutrons,suchasburnableabsorbersproducingzeronetreactivity.Excessreactivitycanbeinferredfromtheboronletdowncurveor'roncurvewhichproviesaninicationofthesolubleboronconcentrationintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)versuscycleburnup.PeriodicmeasurementoftheRCSboronconcentrationforcomparisonwiththepredictedvaluewithothervariablesfixe(suchasrodheight,temperature,pressure,andpower),providesaconvenientmethodofensuringthatcorereactivityiswithindesignexpectationsandthatthe(continued)B3.1-12 CoreReactivityB3.1/2.BASES+~6Roou~(co~Wg~re~~o~~h<calculationalmodelsusedtogeneratethesafetyanalysisareadequate.Inordertoachievetherequiredfuelcycleenergyoutput,theuraniumenrichment,inthenewfuelloadingandinthefuelremainingfromthe'previouscycle,providesexcesspositivereactivitybeyondthatrequiredtosustainsteadystateoperationthroughoutthecycle.WhenthereactoriscriticalatRTPantemperature,theexcesspositivereact>vsyiscompensatedbyburnableabsorbers(ifany),controlrods,whateverneutronpoisons(mainlyxenonandsamarium)arepresentinthefuel,andtheRCSboronconcentration.WhenthecoreisproducingTHERMALPOWER,thefuelisbeingdepletedandexcessreactivityisdecreasing.Asthefueldepletes,theRCSboronconcentrationisreducedtodecreasenegativereactivityandmaintainconstantTHERMALPOWER.TheboronletdowncurveisbasedonsteadystateoperationatRTP.Therefore,deviationsfromthepredictedboronletdowncurvemayindicatedeficienciesinthedesignanalysis,deficienciesin'hecalculationalmodels,orabnormalcoreconditions,andmustbeevaluated.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES/OalV~t~~~5"~qvod0)og'lTheacceptancecriteriaforcorereactivityarethatthereactivitybalancelimitensuresplantoperationismaintainedwithintheassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses.Accuratepredictionofcorereactivityiseitheranexplicitorimplicitassumptionintheaccidentanalysisevaluations.Everyaccidentevaluation(Ref.2)is,therefore,dependent'ponaccurateevaluationofcorereactivity.Inparticular,SDMandreactivitytransients,suchascontrolrodwithdrawalaccidentsorrodejectionaccidents,areverysensitivetoaccuratepredictionofcorereactivity.Theseaccidentanalysisevaluationsrelyoncomputercodesthathavebeenqualifiedagainstavailabletestdata,operatingplantdata,andanalyticalbenchmarks.Monitoring,reactivitybalanceadditionallyensuresthatthegbclearrovideSanaccuraterepresentationofthecorereactivity.Designcalculationsandsafetyanalysesareperformedforeachfuelcycleforthepurposeofpredeterminingreactivity(continued) CoreReactivityB3.1.P'pBASESAPPLicASarSAFgqyA<A~ysis(conk>need)15.44life.(GOCbehaviorandtheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsforreactivitycontrolduringfueldepletion.Thecomparisonbetweenmeasuredandpredictedinitialcorereactivityprovidesanormalizationforthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictcorereactivity.IfthemeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrationsforidenticalcoreconditionsatbeinningofcycldonotagree,thentheassumptionsuse~nereloadcycledesignanalysisorthecalculationalmodelsusedtopredictsolubleboronrequirementsmaynotbeaccurate.Ifreasonableagreementbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivityexistsat~GC-,thenthepredictionmaybenormalizedtothemeasuredboronconcentration.Thereafter,anysignificantdeviationsinthemeasuredboronconcentrationfromthepredicted.boronletdowncurvethatdevelopduringfueldepletionmaybeanindicationthatthecalculationalmodelisnotadequateforcoreburnupsbeyond~orthatanunexpectedchangeincoreconditionshasoccurre./0.v.4ThenormalizationofpredictedRCSboronconcentrationtothemeasuredvalueistypicallyperformedafterreachingRTPfollowingstartupfromarefuelingoutage,withthecontrolrodsintheirnormalpositionsforpoweroperation.Thenormalizationisperformedatconditions,sothatcorereactivityrelativetopredictedaluescanbecontinuallymonitoredandevaluatedascoreconditionschangeduringthecycle.~so~CorereactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOLongtermcorereactivitybehaviorisaresultofthecorephysicsdesignandcannotbeeasilycontrolledoncethecoredesignisfixed.Duringoperation,therefore,theLCOcanonlybeensuredthroughmeasurementandtracking,andappropriateactionstakenasnecessary.LargedifferencesbetweenactualandpredictedcorereactivitymayindicatethattheassumptionsoftheDBAandtransientanalysesarenolongervalid,orthattheuncertaintiesinthe.NuclearDesignMethodologyarelargerthanexpected.Alimitonthereactivity.balanceof~lihk/khasbeenestablishedbasedonengineeringjudgment.A1Xdeviationinreactivityfrom(continued)B3.1-14 CoreReactivityB3.l.j(ZBASESL,CO(can>inure)thatpredictedislargerthanexpectedfornormaloperationandshouldthereforebeevaluated.Whenmeasuredcorereactivityiswithinlfhk/kofthepredictedvalueatsteadystatethermalconditions,thecoreisconsideredtobeoperatingwithinacceptabledesignlimits.SincedeviationsfromthelimitarenormallydetectedbycomparingpredictedandmeasuredsteadystateRCScriticalboronconcentrations,thedifferencebetweenmeasuredandpredictedvalueswouldbeapproximately100ppm(dependingontheboronworth)beforethelimitisreached.Thesevaluesarewellwithintheuncertaintylimitsforanalysisofboronconcentrationsamples,sothatspuriousviolationsofthelimitduetouncertaintyinmeasuringtheRCSboronconcentrationareunlikely.APPLICABILITYODE2-UOi~Keg>l.OMME'2-MA+'QZ1.0ovIo.iv(Sk3.1.2.1)ThelimitsoncorereactivitymustbemaintainedduringMODES1anbecauseareactivitybalancemustexistwhenthereactoriscriticalorproducingTHERMALPOWER.Asthefueldepletes,coreconditionsarechanging,andconfirmationofthereactivitybalanceensuresthecoreisoperatingasdesigned.ThisSpecificationdoesnotapplyinMODES3,4,and5becausethereactorisshutdownandthe/O.iv~~%aoFInMODE6,fueladingresultsinacontnualycanglingcorereactivity.Boronconcentrationrequirements(LCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration")ensurethatfuelmovementsareperformedwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalysis.AnSDMdemonstrationisrequiredduringthefirststartupfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivityACTIONSA.landA.2Shouldananomalydevelopbetweenmeasuredandpredictedcorereactivity,anevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysismustbeperformed.Coreconditionsareevaluatedtodeterminetheirconsistencywithinputtodesigncalculations.Measuredcoreandprocessparametersareevaluatedtodeterminethattheyarewithintheboundsof(continued)83.1-15 CoreReactivity83.1.P2BASESAC.Time6c~k>~$thesafetyanalysis,andsafetyanalysiscalculationalmodelsarereviewedtoverifythattheyareadequateforrepresentationofthecoreconditions.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaOBAoccurringduringthisperiod,andallowssufficienttimetoassessthephysicalconditionofthereactorandcompletetheevaluationofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis.Followingevaluationsofthecoredesignandsafetyanalysis,thecauseofthereactivityanomalymayberesolved.IfthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisamismatchincoreconditionsatthetimeofRCSboronconcentrationsampling,thenarecalculationoftheRCSboronconcentrationrequirementsmaybeperformedtodemonstratethatcorereactivityisbehavingasexpected.Ifanunexpectedphysicalchangeintheconditionofthecorehasoccurred,itmustbeevaluatedandcorrected,ifpossible.Ifthecauseofthereactivityanomalyisinthecalculationtechnique,thenthecalculationalmodelsmustberevised-toprovidemoreaccuratepredictions.Ifanyoftheseresultsaredemonstrated,anditisconcludedthatthereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheboronletdowncurvemayberenormalizedandpoweroperationmaycontinue.IfoperationalrestrictionoradditionalSRsarenecessarytoensurethereactorcoreisacceptableforcontinuedoperation,thentheymustbedefined.TherequiredCompletionTimeof72hoursisadequateforpreparingwhateveroperatingrestrictionsorSurveillancesthatmayberequiredtoallowcontinuedreactoroperation.B.lIO.iIfthecorereactivitycannotberestoredtowithintheIXhk/klimit,theplantmust.bebroughttoaMOOEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmubebrouhttaIawithin6hours.IftheM~isnotmet,thentheborationrequiredbySR3.1.1.1wouldoccur.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingH6~fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued83.1-16R )y.it'hThc,ftcikHo<s4.>ca~4t4.5Pizot4qR9~SqidCRggCr(uoCÃCCbQL4llpo~s(.sr-pb'),CoreReactivity83.1.$ZSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSINsFKz3.L.342~XSR3.1~4CorereactivityisverifiedbyperiodiccomparisonsofmeasuredandpredictedRCSboronconcentrations.Thecomparisonismade,consideringthatothercoreconditionsarefixedorstable,includingcontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,fueltemperature,fueldepletion,xenonconcentration,andsamariumconcentration.-BSE-.ismodifiedbmNotes.Theoteindicatesthatenormalizationopreictedcorereactivitytothemeasuredvaluemusttakeplacewithinthefirst60+f4~~~fsufficienttimeforcoreconditionstoreachsteadystate,butpreventsoperationforalargefractionofthefuelcyclewithoutetablishinnchmarkfocalculations.TheFrequencyof31EFPD,lsacceptable,basedontheslowrateofcorechangesduetofueldepletionandthepresenceofotherindicators(QPTR,AFD,etc.)forpromptindicationofananomaly.REFERENCES2.UFsAR.chapterL15V/0.v.n.~~For~(*>FJC.2ac2>2Qq~~1cdd03Ibh~d4vQ.ore~Y~l~(continued)WO~SS3.1-17 'rl0iiiINSERT3.1.3ASR3.1.2.1Corereactivitymustbeverifiedfollowingoperationsthatcouldhavealteredcorereactivity(e.g.,fuelmovement,controlrodreplacement,controlrodshuffling).ThecomparisonmustbemadepriortoenteringMODEIwhenthecoreconditionssuchascontrolrodposition,moderatortemperature,andsamariumconcentrationarefixedorstable.Sincethereactormustbecriticaltoverifycorereactivity,itisacceptabletoenterMODE'withKeffZ1.0toperformthisSR.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotetoclarifytPattheSRdoesnotneedtobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringMODEl. MTCB3.IPB3.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMSB3.1/'oderatorTemperatureCoefficient(HTC)3-BASES)nd~s&>~lForu.w(Alp)BACKGROUNO0vi.aMTCls4~>~o,s4hzchal-~pin,reackiuiQp.g4cgrc4phily,in!VlO)Lf0-4v~pm+buC-5i~cc.QiviptAi.kv'4,isd,i'vcc4gprapmhona.lHcoolaa4dens'ihq.ll.vibAccordingto-GBCII(Ref.I),thereactorcoreanditsinteractionwiththeReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)mustbedesignedforinherentlystablepoweroperation,eveninthepossibleeventofanaccident.Inparticular,thenetreactivityfeedbackinthesystemmustcompensateforanyunintendedreactivityincreases.TheHTCrelatesachangeincorereactivitytoachangeinreactorcoolanttemperature(apositiveMTCmeansthatreactivityincreaseswithincreasingmoderatortemperature;conversely,anegativeMTCmeansthatreactivitydecreaseswithincreasinmoderatorternerature.Thereactorisesignetooperatewithanegativeoverthelargestpossiblerangeoffuelcycleoperation.Therefore,acoolanttemperatureincreasewillcauseareactivitydecrease,sothatthecoolanttemperaturetendstoreturn.towarditsinitialvalue.Reactivityincreasesthatcauseacoolanttemperatureincreasewillthusbeselflimiting,andstablepoweroperationwillresult.li&(how)ThelimitationsonMTCareprovidedtoensurethatthevalueofthiscoefficientremainswithinthelimitingconditionsassumedintheFSARaccidentandtransientanalyses.MTCvaluesarepredictedatselectedburnupsduringthesafetyevaluationanalysisandareconfirmedtobeacceptablebymeasurements.BothinitialandreloadcoresaredesignedsothatthebeginningofcycleHTCislessthanzerowhenTHERMALPOWERisatRTP.eacuavalueoftheHTCisdependentoncorecharacteristics,suchasfuelloadingandreactorcoolantsolubleboronconcentration.ThecoredesignmayrequireadditionalfixedBoadistributedpoisonstoyieldanHTCat>thinterange,analyzedintheplantaccidentanalysis.TheendofcycleCi4(E~TCisalsolimitedbytherequirementsoftheaccidentanalysis.FuelcyclesthataredesignedtoachievehighburnupsorthathavechangestoothercharacteristicsareevaluatedtoensurethattheMTCdoesnotexceedthelimit.QOl-(continued)B3.1-18 MTCB3.lingBASES&AC'.v-c~kov&1%C.conbnod)movekuendofL<~sc,ch~lh.v>.c.~'iO,~a+70/oRTP,fu'llpoMQr0-wdcd6'OLIftheLCOlimitsarenotmet,the~responseduringtransientsmaynotbeaspredicted.Thecorecouldviolatecriteriathatprohibitareturntocriticality,orthedeparturefromnucleateboilingratiocriteriaoftheapprovedcorrelationmaybeviolated,whichcouldleadtoalossofthefuelcladdininterit.f<<f~ekedofthefuelcycle~'adequatetoconfirmthattheremainswithinitslimitssincethiscoefficientchangesslowly,dueprincipallytothereductioninRCSboronconcentrationassociatedwithfuelburnup.1't.vs.dAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES'Llavl09,.~'i,dIl.vi.dla'msf),~5WCAQlefCt&tntTheacceptancecriteriaforthespecifiedMTCare:i~qo>~s~t~i4rCCOM~~b~a.TheMTCvaluesmustremainwithintheboundsofthose<<>4<<~"usedintheaccidentanalysis(Ref.2);andg.c,A.re~"lb.TheHTCmustbesuchthatinherentlystablepoweroperationsresultduringnormal-operationandaccidents,suchasoverheatingandovercoolingevents.ThegSAR,Chapter15(Ref.2),containsanalysesofaccidentsthatresultinbothoverheatingandovercoolingofthereactorcore.MTCisoneofthecontrollingparametersforcorereactivityintheseaccidents.BoththemostpositivevalueandmostnegativevalueoftheMTCareimportanttosafety,andbothvaluesmustbebounded.Valuesusedintheanalysesconsiderworstcaseconditionstoensurethattheaccidentresultsareboundif.3).li.vi.t.i:c.>u[pc,rTheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreovertinmustbeevaluatedwhentheMTCispositiveSuchaccidentsincludetherodwithdrawaltransientfromeitherzeroQef-.~orRTP,lossofmainfeedwaterflow,andlossofforcedreactorcoolantflow.Thecons'equencesofaccidentsthatcausecoreovercoolingmustbeevaluatedwhentheHTCisneativeSuchaccidentsincludesuddenfeedwaterflowincreaseandsuddendecreaseinfeedwatertemperature.Inordertoensureaboundingaccidentanalysis,theHTCisassumedtobeitsmostlimitingvaluefortheanalysisconditionsappropriatetoeachaccident.Theboundingvalueisdeterminedbyconsideringroddedandunroddedconditions,(continued)B3.1-19 MTCB3.1~/BASESAppLicASt.gSaw~AHALtbSl'5(Cdhniit'hmd5o~~Lwhetherthereactoris,atfullorzeropower,andwhetheriti'Themostconservativecombinationappropriatetotheaccidentisthenusedfortheanalysis,(Ref.2).MTCsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Eventhoughitisnotdirectlyobservedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom,MTCisconsideredaninitialconditionprocessvariablebecauseofitsdependenceonboronconcentration.LCOll,vi.bA.v<.450Lll,vi.dLCO3.1PrequirestheNTCtobeuithinhspecifiedlimits"oftheCOLRtoensurethatthecoreoperateswithintheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.Duringthereloadcoresafetyevaluation,theMTCisana'lyzedtodeterminethatitsvaluesremainwithintheboundsof'theoriginalaccidentanalysisduringoperation.AssumptionsmadeinsafetyanalysesrequirethattheMTCbelesspositivethanagivenupperboundandmorepositive~~Southanagivenlowerbound.TheMTCismostpositiveatWP,thisupperboundmustnotbeexceeded.Thismaximumupplimitoccursa,allrodsout(ARO),hotzeropoweconitions.AtheMTCtakesonitsmostnegativevalue,weneowerboundbecomesimportant.ThisLCOexiststoensurethatboththeupper=andlowerboundsarenotexceeded.'uringoperation,therefore,theconditionsofthe.LCOcanonlybeensuredthrouhmeasurement.TheSurveillanceBOPonMTCprovideSconfirmationthattheNTCisbehavingasanticipatedothathecriteriaaremet.~dV)19~u)1&ivvv4~aLL.>070'/os~~Cts.A~dh.~dMLTheLCOestablishesamaximumpositivevaluethatcannotbexceededThpositivelimitandtheneativelimit<areestablisheintheCOLRtoallowspecifyinglimitsforeachparticularcycle.Thispermitsthetotakepl~+(continued}83.1-20 MTCB3.1~PBASESLCOWtinued)advantageofimprovedfuelmanagementandchangesinuai+operatingschedule.A,ii.8pi~~>APPLICABILITY~~LA.$'i'i.vl.duppmadl1uJcp'ynic,MTCbcgn~e,eceovc.e,~Ãvco.~~~cl44v.vviueq~cv40MA4lOOVO~Q.O~CLAtV&iOniOV.C.duCCd.TeSecificationsplacevaluesonMTC,basedonnaysisassumptionsdescribedabInMODE1,thelimitsonMTCmustbemaintainedtoensurethatanyaccidentinitiatedfromTHERMALPOMERoperationwillnotviolatethedesignassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.InMODE2withthereactorcritical,theupperlimitmustalsobemaintainedtoensurethatstartupandsubcriticalaccidents(suchastheuncontrolledCONTROLRODassemblyorgroupwithdrawal)wil,lnotviolatetheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.ThelowerMTClimitmustbemaintainedinMODES2and3,inadditiontoMODE1,toensurethatcooldownaccidentswillnotviolatetheassumtionsoftheaccidentanalsisInMODES4,5,and6,tisLCssnotapp>cae,sincenoDesignBasisAccidentsusingtheMTCasananalysisassumptionareinitiatedfromtheseMODES.ACTIONSlvsaaT9i4iec.bhdibowAhoshat.~INodsf)chth)AHo+~+vibhu.ivesWa4@q~v'telA,ckianAct'Vi44%4C,t.Omp&Cd,MA.Vit.uLV44iStOrdihOaLVkeVCJ.(Vie%,iS~C.M~qQ4~q&Vl+v4k~Plo.n+hat.'4Ops'~CP&iho~aa~a.~o~d~~c~vppevli~llsc'i4'0CoiA.1~pp4y~(vbd,Athe~MTClimitisviolated,administrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanksmustbeestablishedtomaintaintheMTCwithinitslimits.ACompletionTimeof24hoursprovidesenoughtimeforevaluatingtheMTCmeasurementandcomputingtherequiredbankwithdrawallimits.Ascycleburnupisincreased,theRCSboronconcentrationwillbereduced.ThereducedboronconcentrationcausestheMTCtobecomemorenegative.Usingphysicscalculations,thetimeincyclelifeatwhichthecalculatedMTCwillmeettheLCOrequirementcanbedetermined.AtthispointincorelifeConditionAnolongerexists.TheunitisnolongerintheRequiredAction,sotheadministrativewithdrawallimits'arenolongerineffect.(continued) INSERT3.1.4CA.lMTCmustbekeptwithintheupperlimitspecifiedinLCO3.1.3toensurethatassumptionsmadeinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.TheupperlimitofConditionAistheupperlimitspecifiedintheCOLRsincethisvaluewillalwaysbelessthanoregualtothemaximumupperlimitspecifiedintheLCO. BASESKC>q)gS(c~b'd5~~0l40bEfarCOndsbdhsvOhsib~L~<Cata.svCacnha.VC.ncaa~plsCdsjssle,VC3~h<VCM,'~Cydp..P<<"~~q'Vaao~<+S'll,w.d~P'at~ilvl.4~gdiIftherequiredadministrative~withdrawallimitsat-SOParenotestablishedwithin24hours,theca&-mustbebroughttoODE2withkeff~1.0.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.l),i.i.ii~P8f3)gQedingtheEOCMTClimitmeansthatthesafetyanalysisassumsfortheKOCaccidentsthatuseaboundingnegativeMemaybeinvalid.IftheEOCMTCliisexceeded,theplantbebroughttoaMODEoritioninwhichtheLCOrequirearenotap'.Toachievethisstatus,theunitoughttoatleastMODE4within12hours.TheallowedComonTimeisreasonable,basoperatingience,forreachingtherequiredMODomfullrconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSll,v<,QIN5&PTp~~6~.i-izSR3.1..1ihAi,+Sb<ThisSRrequiresmeasurementoftheMTCatpriortoenteringMODE1inordertodemonstratecompliancewiththemostpositiveMTCLCO.MeetingthelimitpriortoenteringMODE1ensuresthatthelimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevels.TheCvalueforAROwillbeinferredfromisothermaltemperaturecoefficientmeasurementsobtainedduringthephysicstestsafterrefueling.TheARO.valuecanbedirectlcornaredtothClimitoftheLCO.Ifrequire,measurementresultsandpredicteddesignvaluescanbeusedtoestablishadministrativewithdrawallimitsforcontrolbanks.lgszRT3,i.95(continued)83.1-22 INSERT3.1.40C.1Exceeding<heEOLMTClimitmeansthatthesafetyanalysisassumptionsoftheEOLaccidentsthatuseaboundingnegativeMTCvaluemaybeinvalid.IfitisdeterminedduringphysicstestingthattheEOLMTCvaluewillexceedthemostnegativeMTClimitspecifiedintheCOLR,thesafetyanalysisandcoredesignmustbere-evaluatedpriortoreachingtheequivalentofanequilibriumRTPallrodsout(ARO)boronconcentrationof300ppmtoensurethatoperationneartheEOLremainsacceptable.The300ppmlimitissufficienttopreventEOLoperationatorbelowtheaccidentanalysisMTCassumptions.ConditionChasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatrequiresthatRequiredActionC.1mustbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.ThisisnecessarytoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateatconditionsweretheMTCwouldbebelowthemostnegativelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.0.1~cg,wombIf,there-evaluationoftheaccidentanalysiscannotsupportthe'predictedMTClowerlimitoriftheRequiredActionsarenotcompletedwithintheassociatedCompletionTimetheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEorConditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,forreachingtherequiredMODEfromfullpowerconditionsinanor'derlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.INSERT3.1.4ESR3.1.3.2ThisSRrequiresmeasurementofMTCatBOLpriortoenteringMODEIinordertodemonstratecompliancewiththe70KRTPMTClimitandthemostnegativeMTCLCO.MeetingtheselimitspriortoenteringMODEIensuresthat'helimitwillalsobemetathigherpowerlevelsandatEOL.TheMTCvalueforEOLisalsoinferredfromtheITCmeasurements.TheEOLvalueiscalculatedusingthepredictedEOLMTCfromthecoredesignreportandthedifferencebetweenthemeasuredandpredictedITC.TheEOLvalueisdirectlycomparedtothemostnegativeEOLvalueestablishedintheCOLRtoensurethatthepredictedEOLnegativeMTCvalueiswithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions./ MTC53.1PeBASESR.1.4.2andSR3.1.4.similarfashion,theLCOdemandsthattheMTCbelessneativethanthespecifiedvalueforEOCfullpowercontions.ThismeasurementmaybeperformedatanTHEPOWER,butitsresultsmustbeextrapo'lattotheconditssofRTPandallbankswithdrawninorrtomakeapropercoarisonwiththeLCOvalue.BecaustheRTPMTCvaluewilladuallybecomemorenegativewhfurthercoredepletionanoronconcentrationreducti,a300ppmSRvalueofMTCshldnecessarilybelesnegativethantheEOCLCOlimit.T300ppmSRvalues'sufficientlylessnegativethantheELCOlimitvaetoensurethattheLCOlimitwillbemetwhenhe300pSurveillancecriterionismet.SR3.1.4.3ismodifiedbytethatincludesthefollowingrequirements:a.Ifthe300ppmurveillancelitisexceeded,itispossiblethatheEOClimitoncouldbereachedbeforethelannedEOC.BecausetMTCchangesslowlyw'coredepletion,theFrequcyof14efftivefullpowerdaysissufficittoavoidexcingtheEOClimit.b.eSurveillancelimitforRTPboronconcentraonof60ppmisconservative.IfthemeasuredMTCatppmismorepositivethanthe60ppmSurveillancelimit,theEOClimitwillnotbeexceededbecauseofthegradualmannerinwhichMTCchangeswithcoreburnup.REFERENCESeZ.UFSAR.Chapter/15].2I3.WCAP9278-+-A,"WestinghouseMethodology,"July1985.ReladSafetEvaluationQ.u.~6~z.p.b~LNRc)~a,~,s~~ia~~q,<~b;~;"Lns~eCbd3rRC'povtt4O.50-24trtSf.44qdaA.VC.etl6'\ffIRONS,i,gh~;ci~dush~l~o~~(algt.OCg>t~s~d@~QOW~QZ'~lqlO>IItII7.B3.1-23

RodGroupAlignmentLimitsB3.1.$$83.1REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS83.1jlGRodGroupAlignmentLimits.BASESBACKGROUNDfgtV'Lit&TheOPERABILITY(e.g.,tcontrolrodsisaninitithatassumerodinsertiomisalignmentisaninitithatdirectlyaffectscoassumptionsofavailableg~balr4NAAkWippability)oftheshutdownand1assumptioninallsafetyanalysesuponreactortrip.Maximumrod1assumptioninthesafetyanalysisepowerdistributionsandSDM3.Ah~i~idusli~(FOvu~141~3274.nd2go~WA~~</vsorUAFnhva~jovid'4~cm(dionov>~~4k)(g,V<l.C.Theapplicablecriteriaforthesereactivityandpowerdistributiondesignrequirementsaremitt(Ref.1),and10CFR50.46,"Mechanicalorelectricalfailuresmaycauseacontrolrodtobecomeinoperableortobecomemisalignedfromitsgroup.Controlrodinoperabilityormisalignmentmaycauseincreasedpowerpeaking,duetotheasymetricreactivitydistributionandareductioninthetotal.availablerodworthforreactorshutdown.Therefore,controlrodalignmentandOPERABILITYarerelatedtocoreoperationindesignpowerpeakinglimitsandthecoredesignrequirementofaminimumSDM.Limitsoncontrolrodalignmenthavebeenestablished,andallrodpositionsaremonitoredandcontrolledduringpoweroperationtoensurethatthepowerdistributionandreactivitylimitsdefinedbythedesignowerpeakingandSDHlimitsarepreserved.Rodclustercontrolassemblies(RCCAs),orrods,areovedy-the'ontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).EachCROMmovesitsRCCAonestep(approximately%inch)atatsme,butatvaryingrates(stepsperminute)dependingonthesignaloutomtheRodControlSystem./2,v>e5O.TheRCCAsarvidedmongcontrolbanksandnshutdownank.Eachbankfurthersubdividedintotwogroupstoprovideforprecisereactivitycontrol.AgroupconsistsoftwoormoreRCCAsthatareelectricallyparalleledtostepsimultaneously.AbankofRCCAsconsistsoftwogroups(continued)~ottablc.0(+4reebs,orbt~dtt3>CLmnw4tcht4vc.83.1-2428

INSERT3.1.5AControlbanksareusedtocompensateforchangesinreactivityduetovariationsinoperatingconditionsofthereactorsuchascoolanttemperatuee,powerlevel,boronorxenonconcentration.TheshutdownbankprovidesadditionalshutdownreactivitysuchthatthetotalshutdownworthofthebankisadequatetoprovideadequateshutdownforalloperatingandhotzeropowerconditionswiththesingleRCCAofhighestreactivityworthfullywithdrawn. RodGroupAlignmentLimits83.1.$8C>ic.~+4wkbistne~<$~gQi~sl'4u%pohlow4+44,5~c.0vgvgpp~fkcvni)Z,V)BASESSHAK&movedinanoverappattern,usingefollowingwithdrawalsequence:WhencontrolbankAreachesapredeterminedheightinthecore,controlbankBbeginstomoveoutwithk<<k,andcontrolbankBcontinuestomoveout.Whencontrolbank8reachesapredeterminedheight,controlbankCbeginstomoveoutwithcontrolbankB.ThissequencecontinuesuntilcontrolbanksA,B,.andCareatthefullywithdrawnposition,andcontrolbankDisTheinseronseuenceistheoppositeofthewithdrawalsequenceThecontroros.arearrangedinaradiallysyometricpattern,sothatcontrolbankmotiondoesnotintroduceradialasynmetriesinthecorepowerdistributions.~g~v~nikRnvvsTheet~c-(.co~4i'n~d)thataremovedinastaggeredfashion,butalwayswithinone~o~e.~~shutdownbank+a+gin5Q)on/l5k~Theshutdownbanky~aeaintainedeitherin'thefullyinsertedorfullywithdrawnposition.Thecontrolbanksareu)i9ndv~mPQS<boa~8=YP.Ig.V)iA12.viINSER7g.i.56Theaxialpositionofshutdownrodsandcontrolrodsisindicatedbytwoseparateandindependentsystems:wh44~theBankDemandPositionIndicationSystem(comonlycalledgroupstepcounters)andthe~Acr)RodPositionIndication(JBPI)System.hA)croPloc4$5br'4TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemcountsthepulsesfromtherodcontrolsystemthatmovestherods.Thereisonestepcounterforeachgroupofrods.Individualrodsinagroupallreceivethesamesignaltomoveandshould,therefore,allbeatthesamepositionindicatedbythe.groupstepcounterforthatgroup.TheBankDemandPositionIndicationSystemisconsideredhighlyprecise(~Isteporinch)>gfaroddoesnotmoveonestepforeachdemandpulse,thestepcounterwillstillcountthepulseandincorrectlyreflectthepositionoftherod.Systemprovidesahighlyaccurateindicatactualcondposition,butatalowesionthanthestepcounters.'temisoninductiveanalogsignalsfromaseriesofcodalongahollowtubewithacentertocenstanceof.'hes,whichissixsteps.Teasethereliabilityoftern,theinductoilsareconnectedalternatelytodatasAo.Thus,ifonesystemfails,theDRPIwilloonh(continued)B3.1-25 3.2~1)()r3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS~~Iq.;3.2.~HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fa(Z))LCO3.2.lgFs(Z)shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.F()(Z)notwithinlimit.A.1ReduceTHERMALPOWER~liRTPforeachlXFq(Z)exceedslimit.15minutes(a/ofcsa~~'1CONC,N1./tnANDA.2ANDA.3ANDReduceAFDacceptableoperationlimits4yF()(Z)exceedslimit.ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints~1%foreachlXFq(Z)exceedslimit.CQ7Z/')).xiighoursl9.>ii~~~~~~QLOvtv'~Ae4AttDReduceOverpowerhTtripsetpoints~ICforeachlXFq(Z)exceedslimit.72hours(continued)3.2-1 ~R.i~a(z)e3.2.1AACTIONS(co~hwvc,lCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.PerformSR3.2.1.1~SR3.2.1.2.OlPriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.lB.RequiredActionandOassociatedCompletion>q,;zTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE2.6hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.1VerifymeasuredvaluesofFq(Z)arewithinlimits)q~Jpccltlcck~c.o~.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75KRTP31EFPDthereafter(continued)lgSERT<9.vi3~22 INSERT3.2.1ASR3.2.1.2~W-NOTE---OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOWER-75%RTP.VerifymeasuredvaluesofFq(Z)arewithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter Fq(Z)(F,Methodology3.2.SURVEANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFFLUENCYSR3.2.1.21.-NOTES-Fxy)FyevaluatetheeffectofonepredictedFPtodetermineFz(Z)withinitslimits.2.IfP~<F'F',SR3.2.1.shallberepeatedwithi24hoursfteranincreaseinTHEPOatwhichF~waslastdetermined,fatleast20KRTP.VerifyF'<F'.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALOWERexceedingRTPAND31EFPDthereafter3.2-3 s~"r~Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)3.2.13.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.1BHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fq(Z))(FqMethodology)LCO3.2.1BFq(Z),asapproximated.byFa(Z)andFa(Z),sha11withinthellimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:DE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIOCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Fq(Z)notwithinlimit.A.l-ReduceTHLPOWER~1XRTPoreachliFqc(Zexceeds~1imitAND15minutesA.2educePowerRangetronFlux-Hightrsetpoints~1%forchIXFq(Z)exceelimit.8hoursA.3ANDReduceOverpwerhTtripsetpoint~1%foreachliFq(exceedslimit.72hoursA.4'erformSR3.2.1.1.PriortoincreasingERMALPOWERavethelimitofequiredActiA.1(coinued)WOGSTS3.2-4Rev.0,09/28/92 Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)3.2.1ACTIONSg~ntinued)CONDITREQUIREDACTIONPLETIONTIME.B.Fz(Z)notwithinlimits.B.ReduceAFD'ts1Xforach1%Fz(Z)exc1imit.2hoursC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompleTimeofConditAorBnotmC.lBeinMODE2.hoursHOGSTS3.2-5Rev.0,09/28/92 Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)3.2.1BSURVEILCEREQUIREMENTS-NOTE-Duringpowerecalationatthebeginningofeachcycle,THERMALPOWEmaybeincreaseduntilequilibriumpowerlevelhasbeenachieved,atwchapowerdistributionmapiobtained.VEILLANCEFREQUENCVSR3.2.1.1VerifyFq'(Z)isithinlimit.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75KRTPANOOncewithin[12]hoursafterachievingequilibriumconditionsafterexceeding,by-10KRTP,theTHERMALPOWERtwhichFz(Z)slastveifiedANO31EFPDthereaftr(continud)WOGSTS3.2-6Rev.0,09/28/92 Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)3.2.1BSURVEILNCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFREgUENSR3.2.1.2---NOTE-fFz(Z)iswithinlimitsandmeasurementsiicatemamumoverzF(Z)K(Z)hasincreasesincethepreviousevaationofFq'(Z):a.IncreaseF~byafactorf[1.02)andreverify"(Z)iswitnlimits;orb.RepeatSR3.2.1.oncper7EFPDuntiltwosuccessefluxmapsindicatemaximumoverz)K(z)hasnotncreased.VerifyF(Z)iswithinlimit.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding75%RTPontinued)WOGSTS3o2~7Rev.0,09/28I92 F<(Z)(FzMethodolo)3.1BSURVEILLAEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.1.2(cont>ued)Oncewithin[12]hoursafterachievingequi1ibrium'onditionsafterexceeding,by10%RTP,theTHERMALPOWERatwhichFq(Z)waslastverifiedANO31EFPDhereafterWOGSTS3.2-8Rev.0,09/28/92 3.2.23.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.2NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)LCO3.2.2F~shallbewithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE1.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME20iA--------NOTE--------uiredActionsA.2and3mustbecompletwheneverConditionentered.F~notwithinlimit.A.l.lRestoreF~towithinlimit.ORA.1.2.1ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<50KRTP.ANDA.1.2.educewerRangeNonFlux-Highiptpointsto~55KR~ADA.2PerformSR3.2.2.1.AND4hoursours8hours4hours(continue20.'i3.2-9 INSERT3.2.2AA.F~notwithinlimit.A.1ReduceTHERMALPOWER~1%RTPforeach1%F~,exceedslimit.ANDA.2ReducePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpoints~1%foreach1XF~exceedslimit.ANDA.3ReduceOverpowerhTandOvertemperaturehTtripsetpoints~1%foreachlXFgexceedslimit.ANDA.4PerformSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2.15minutes72hours72hoursPriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionA.l(continued) hFH3.2.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)IA.3-------NOTE---------THERMALPOWERdoesnothavetobereducedtocomplywiththisRequiredAction.PerformSR3..1.PriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding50%RTPANDPriortoTHERMALPOWERexceeding,RTPAND24hoursaerTHERMALPOWEreaching~95%RTPB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE2.6hours3.2-10 3.2.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.2.2.1VerifyF~iswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.OnceaftereachrefuelingpriortoTKERNLPOWERexceeding75KRTPAND31EFPDthereafter2.0.~i1HSKQY3,2"28WOGSTS3.2-11Rev.0,09/28/92 g0.iiINSERT3.2.282-SR3.2.E2-NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrangechannelisinoperablewithTHERMALPOMER~75KRTP.VerifyF~iswithinlimitsspecifiedinthe'COLR.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter 3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS333/AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)TheAFE5WOvIIhvUaVOLg~(lhabPGRA8<E'JAt=0:Zl.ii+nCCVJCvO)C.g-gatv'a~ShallbemaintainedwithinthetargetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifferenceTretbandissecifiedintheCOLR.EAIA4THBRaAAlPOu)K,R>9Oy~~Plf.OvE.Cae.aFE.Bckc.c~15o~Qge.voice.q4'C~VIEngWVC.C.4~CC.&v5SHIAljb4.LLgCCltod.<VAMC+MQ.gQvO.QCo1.TheAFDshallbeconsideredoutsidethetargetbandwhen~~>~OPERABLEexcorechannelsindicateAFDtobeoutsidethetargetband.b.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER(90%RTPbut~50%RTP,providedAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsandcumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis-1hourduringtheprevious24hours.TheacceptableoperationlimitsarespecifiedintheCOLR.Zlii2.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa1minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithFDoutsidethetargetband.oulk~so/<R.ra,~elc.MaydeviateoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER<50KRTP.W--NOTES'.Penaltydeviationtimeshallbeaccumulatedonthebasisofa0.5minutepenaltydeviationforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithFDoutsidethe,targetband.qWmA,LOAT@"'>soC~SOZAPPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER)15KRTP.'l.Atotalof16hoursofoperationmaybeaccumulatedwithAFDoutsidethetargetbandwithoutpenaltydeviationtimeduringsurveillanceofpowerrangechannelsinaccordancewithSR3.3.1.6@3.2-12 AFDACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.THERMALPOWER~90%RTPANDAFDnotwithinthe7.l.l<targetband.A.lRestoreAFDtowithintargetband.15minutesgl,iuB.--------NOTE-------RequdActionmustbempledwhenever'tionBise'd.g).v>jB.l~o.c&~+educeTHERMALPOMERto(~RTP.90%lmmcdia.&qRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.(continued)3.2-13 AFD3.2.~3ACTIONS(continued)CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.7t,v'>i-------NOTE---------ReqedActionC,1orC.2tbecompletederConditionenterg,l.viiInhimkc.Archon.bCJfeduceTHERMALPOREto(50%RTP.WIA1mmcdi~h.lgHERMALPOWER(90Kd-50'XRTP.ANDCumulaivepenalydeviatitime>1houruritheprevious2urs.ORAFDnowithinetargbandandnwiintheacceptabeerationlimits.(pJsslzT9,2.54ZL~'i\i~pm,aaAt/~st.<pcso~d~So~totL<PQu-~u.lo-)i~dCAi4-bd~tlatP'lh~ecl~ing4+Ii.]iCAi~ZWb'avvggR.+8<~AtPo~gqcpool~~dwgogog"T~w'~4,P'Qrtor'4y~+~C+3.2-14 INSERT3.2.3AD.THERMALPOWER-90KRTP.AND,AFDmonitoralarminoperable.0.1PerformSR3.2.3.1.Onceevery15minutesE.THERMALPOWER<90KRTP.ANDAFDmonitoralarminoperable.E.1PerformSR3.2.3.2.Onceevery1hour AFD3.2.3A2.l.VIIISURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.1erOPEwithinlceach7daysQI.Y<i1SR3.2.3g,7AFhvo.iwmcore.vsyvo.isobMiOgI~Ll<2Qhour-----------------NOTESZ.AssumeloggedaluesofAFDexistduringtheprecedingimeinterval+VerifyAFDiswithinlimitsandlogAFDforeachOPERABLEexcorechannel.IOnlyrequiredtobeperformedifAFDmonitoralarmisinoperable.1On<grgo~~gVM~v9a.~<P<~AF0Yv~i4<O.ho.v~igivopgvo.g\~iH~hAAL~'E~C~lo>~g'7Rg,AsS~nc.loggedva.l~so<4>>~ye<ocoling294ourr4mc>nHvm>~o.vouch04coatv4va4q4FQL5MIWLm1'l~a~sAFN~gO.gWbPE,KR<LgOncewithin15minutesandevery15minutesthereafterwhenTHERMALPOWER-90%RTP.Oncewithin1hourand.every1hourthereafterwhen-(continued)3.2-15 AFO3.2.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYS3.2.3.3Updatetargetfluxdifferenc.~~~2l.x.ida.terminingthetargetfluxdiffceinrdancewithSR3.2.3,orb.Usinglineariationbetweenthemostreceneasurelue,andeitheepredictedvaluetheendycleorOXAFD.Oncewithin31EFPDaftereachrefuelingANO31EFPDthereafter3.2.3.4~~~Xl.WlvZl,>(lDetermine,bymeasurement,thetargetfluxdifferenc~g/OncewithinEFPDaftereachrefuelingANO92EFPDthereafter2.1.63.2-16 2Ix'iiAFD(RAOCMethodology)3.2.3B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS3.2.3BAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)(RelaxedAxialOffsetControl(RAOC)thodoRgy)LCO3.2.3TheAFDin'XfluxdifferenceunitsshallbemaintaidwithinthelimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.-------NOTE-------------ThAFDshallbeconsideredoutsidelimitswhentwoormoreOPELEexcorechannelsindicateAFDtobeousidelimits.APPLICABILITY:MODE1withRMALPOWER-50KRTP.ACTIONS.CONDITIONRUIREDACTIOCOMPLETIONTIMEA.AFDnotwithinlimits.A.1ReducTHLPOWERto<5RTP.30minutesSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEINCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.3.1VerifyAFwithinlimitsforeachOPERABLEexcoreannel.daysANDOncewhin1houradevery1hrthereafteriththeAFDmoniralarminoperableWOGSTS3.2-17Rev.0,09/28/92 QPTR3.2.43.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSThePTRshallbe~1.02.3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)O~2~1LCO3.2:4@~TPrnonikvolaw<8hall4.QP<RABL<andAPPLICABILITY:MODE1withTHERMALPOWER>50KRTP.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.QPTRnotwithinlimit.g,gallPev@~mSP.3,2W.I~dlsmikYHE~AlPou)ga.4>'3%kc.loudPyp4eewe.Q1'/oOPQ.Pze.>-L.b.Q2.,g(,Limni%A.14edttee-THERMALPOWER4o~3XAaeaTPforeachlioPTRAHQ>1.00.ba.lovJA.2-ANDA.~PerformSR3.2.1.13andSR3.2.2.1.~~gPPg~ggQggvimqc)Allis>>'+wco~d;ho~~',8546,~*<Po~g,e.)q~',P(Qb~Lcgu.lvtdAehaczh5o8A~AND2hours'AHB~Onceper12hours24hoursANDOnceper7daysthereafter22..i~A.Reevaluatesafetylysesandconfirmresuainvalifordurationoperatioerthsconon.PriortoinsngERMALPOWERabovethelimitfRequiredAc.1(continued)3.2-18 ,QPTR3.2.4ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)22.lVA.4----NOTE-----PerformfIequiredActionA.~onlyafterRequiredActionA.3~~hoSVCrTfied~ohWe.hot-Gh~nn<Lf~bx~~CAAOTtki~T>~,'$g~Q3.yiI~~~lv5+~~~4o.40nR.LX~Ano.~~Wn6ACdttCt+ALE--~~)55K@Y3z.9AA.ANDCalibrateexcoredetectors4e-4mwZZaIl'L-----NOTE--------PerRequireAction3.3yafterRe'dAetio;3.2coeted.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1cn44272.vPerformSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.M2ZEl%Within24hoursafterreachingRTPORWithin48hoursafterincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitofRequiredActiongA.1n.MA.ZB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.22~lofCunckikon,AlNSERT~~~~22..',2B.lReduceTHERMALPOWERto~50KRTP.3.2-194hours INSERT3.2.4A-NOTES-1.-Onlyrequiredtobeperformedifthecauseof.thegPTRalarmisnotassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.2.PerformRequiredActionA.5onlyafterRequiredActionA.4iscompleted.OnlyoneoftheCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.~zz.iINSERT3;2.4BC.gPTRmonitoralarminoperableC.lPerformSR3.2.4.2.OROncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafterC.2PerformSR3.2.2.1andSR3.2.2.2.Oncewithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter QPTR3.2.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.2.4.122.vigilS-----NOTb-lWithonepowerrangechannelinoperableandTHERMALPOWER<75%RTP,theremainingthreepowerrangechannelscanbeusedforcalculatingQPTR.gQ.vl>ggoVII)22~viii4.2VerifyQPTRiswithinlimitbycalculation.---l4oTesI.onlyrcquwcdWLc.P~yg9PTg,wlbni.Qy'h4hrnh>5LnaPM~K.Z.K'&0~~P~r-wngc~ndwopcycxblc.~~~HER.MAIPo~FC,(150/~k~P>/het4rvuuny~~g~g~rang<c~tmcl5clice3.cNgplcul~h'nAPER..ROTE.i'4.i'n).~;4lcl~4'NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedifonepowerrchannelisinoperablewithTHERMAPOWER-RTP.7daysOncwithin~oursandeveryoursthereafter~VerifyQPTRisinlimsingthemovableiedetectors..Oncewithin12hoursAND12rsthereagQ,,v'i'i\'4i'll0AgpD~~y~yl)4UhA.NiicJim0pcs~(c~d~G+MALPOEM>p~cgp~pC,war~SkS.Ei1~~a.wdciR3Q,g.g,3.2-20 B3.2.1~B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSlq)B3.2.~HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fa(2))BASESBACKGROUND\QUAL,vl~plAntpro~pmP>~)F'.Vqlh~actagvtJCfCma&P~+o(.ndva.ll~s,ThepurposeofthelimitsonthevaluesofFq(Z)istolimitthelocal(i.e.,pellet)peakpowerdensity.ThevalueofFq(Z)variesalongtheaxialheightofthecore(Z).Fq(Z)isdefinedasthemaximumlocalfuelrodlinearpowerdensitydividedbytheaveragefuelrodlinearpowerdensity,assumingnominalfuelpelletandfuelroddimension.Therefore,Fq(Z)isameasureofthepeakpelletpowerwithinthereactorcore.Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionis'yLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.Therefore,theseLCOspreservecorelimitsonacontinuousbasis.Fq(Z)'uelloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,fuelburnup,andchangesinaxialpowerdistribution.'q(Z)ismeasuredperiodicallyusingtheincoredetector~qsystem.~ythasurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreatornearsteadystateconditions..Withthemeasuredthreedimensionalpowerdistributions,itispossibletodetermineameasuredvalueforFq(Z).However,becausethisvaluerepresentsasteadystatecondition,itdoesnotincludevariationsinthevalueofFq(Z),whicharepresentduringanonequilibriumsituationsuchasloadfollowinThetevalueofthefundamentalra9factor(F~)isagusdentfactortoaccountforsonsinFq(Z)duetotransiencns~11aW.hW~~im4Coremonitoringandcrolunconditionsareaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsofh~L.tl>>.ISomKL%~40t~CA-l'1.x,hmc.rl~(continued)lR,)(..h('i.g.)go~I)io~<eue~4~<~<>'Lc)~>~Qghp'ewcuqk) B3.2.1~BASES~qVLighto~Fa(-+~APPLICABLE+1ri.MBOpreclude@corepowerdistributionsthatviolateSAFETYANALYSESthefollowingfueldesigncriteria:Ig,>aFg(2)lt'swhibp)wsisal~(4dvCOLS,thNB.SL4CdoPi~Ql'lvvvlhgi'~~LOcA~dsiSis,Fq(Z)limitsassumedintheLOCAanalysisaretypicallylimitingrelativeto(i.e.,lowerthan)theFq(Z)assumedinsafetyanalysesforotheraccidentsThereforethisLCOprovidesconservativelimitsforotheracctents.)Fq(Z)satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),1q.x.4-IIl8peakcladdingtemperaturustnotexceed2200Fgee.T)Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,iq.x.~theremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95Ktg.)C.confidencelevel(the95/9/NB)criterion)thatthe-heffuelrodinthecoroesnotexperienceaDNB~condition;c.Duringanejectedrodaccident,thef+s~Menergy>P>>i~o~~otfuelcal/gm(Ref.>g);,and'~lac.ZOGd~audd.Thecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequire@DH)withthehighestworthcontrolrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.<g).1q.hILimitsonFq(Z)ensurethatthevalueofthetotalpeakingfactorassumedasaninitialconditionintheaccidentlR,x.danalysesremainsvalid.Othercriteriamustalsobemet(e.g.,maximumcladdingoxidation,maximumhydrogengeneration,eoolablegeometry,andlongtermcooling).However,thepeakcladdingtemperatureistypicallymostlimiting.t9.x.dCQWu~~oP~gegin-,VCPN<WLGSqp@s'fhiOeFR.5O.qb(.h.f.2)and/CCRC~~e.(~c.uc)openTinoL.~~rQancE&WK449.i'ILQLA.iv4~ECCSsimba.luCJ.ana~mLti'<O4i&dinlOC.Fg.t'pp-.a~v<R4.5).B3.2-2(continued) BASESLCO-TheFq(Z)shallbeF,(Z)'"K(Z)forP>0.5F(Z)-K(Z)forP~0.5Iq.x.e,where:CFQistheFqlimitaTProvidedintheCOLR,K(Z)isthenormaldFq(safunctionofcoreheightprovidedtheCOLR,THEPOWERRTPForthiscility,theactualvaluesofCFgandK(Z)regiventheCOLR;however,CFgisnormallyanumberotheordof+2.32],andK(Z)isafunctionthatlookslikeeonprovidedinFigure83.2.1A-1.TheFq(Z)limitsdefinelimitingvaluesforcorepowerpeakingthatpreciudespeakcladdingtemperaturesabove22DO'pduringeitheralargeorsmallbreakLOC(ge4.&>oi7.ThisLCOrequiresoperationwithintheboundsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.CalculationsareperformedinthecoredesignprocesstoconfirmthatthecorecanbecontrolledinsuchamannerduringoperationthatitcanstaywithintheLOCAFq(Z)limits.IfFq(Z)cannot'bemaintainedwithintheLCOlimits,reductionofthecorepowerisrequired.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsforFq(Z)mayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifadesignbasiseventoccurswhileFq(Z)isoutsideitsspecifiedlimits.APPLICABILITYTheFq(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedwhileinMODE1topreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.ApplicabilityinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereissuff'entstoredenerg'yinthefuelnorenergybeingtransferredtothe~~'SeaICrv~ei~g.(continued) BASES-reactorcoolanttorequirealimitonthedistribution~o4corepower.ACTIONSThaI~~>nv.k~Cam,pit.hon%meba.gi~goy44.analgsz4awinc.op~~)yV.~p,PvLfi4s'9&lim$igL~ccka~a+4s4F+@~q~~~gbu.~netINDE,FcYI9.X.g~.z,<SA.lReducingTHERMALPOWERby~1%foreach1%bywhichFq(Z)exceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableabsolutepowerdensit.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.A.2WhencorepeakingfactorsaresufficientlyhighthatLCO3.2A~doesnotpermitoperationatRTP,thegcceptablePperationgimitsforAFDarettThisensuresanearconstantmaximumlinearheatrateinunitsofkilowattsperfootattheacceptableoperationlimits.TheCompletionTimeghoursforthechangeinsetpointsissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisrelativelyshorttimeperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductionin.THERMAIPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.S>ngC.4'~'~.~p~QOin+htApsProhctf<ac,h~cw4-It~8'5Iq)N5GR.Y3.2,tlCA.3AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutron-Hightripsetpointsby~lXforeach1XbywhichFq(Z)exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainstthecuencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpower~'l,vi)distribution.TheCompletionTimeofghoursis72sufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoooaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMAIPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.0B3.2-4(continued) INSERT3.2.18Theacceptableoperationlimitsarereduced1XforeachllbywhichF<(Z)exceedsitslimit.Forexample,ifthemeasuredF~(Z)exceedsthe1>mitby3%andtheacceptableoperationlimitsforAFDareall%at90KRTPand~31%at50%RTP,thentherevisedAFOAcceptabl'eOperationLimitswouldbe~8%at90%RTPanda28Xat50KRTP.x.gINSERT3.2.1CThisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,givenanFz(Z)limitof2.32,ameasuredF,(Z)of2.4,andaPowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointof108K,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3.4%to104.6X. F,(Z)B3.2.1~BASESSinduc4%s<W>psc.tQDan&hg.lp(roc+.Ygac.b<ll~h@A;4A.5]/l'~~~~I<<0\/C.v'~v'M~V~4~ReductionintheOverpower4Ttripsetpointsby~1%foreachlXbywhichFq(Z)exceedsitslimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretranientunanalzedowerdistributions.TheCompletionTimeof72hours>ssuscsenconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.l.VerificationthatFq(Z)hasbeegge~toredtowithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.1.1~SR3.2.1.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.lensuresthatcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions.8.1IftheRequiredActionsofA.lthroughA./cannotbemetwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEor/onditioninwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Thisisdonebyplacingtheplantin~atleastMODE2within6hours.ThisallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeittakestoreachMODE2fromfullpoweroperationinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSR..1.1VerificationthatFz(Z)iswithinitslimitinvolvesincreasingthemeasuredvaluesofFz(Z)toallowformanufacturingtoleranceandmeasurementuncertaintiesandthenmakingacomparisonwiththelimits.TheselimitsareprovidedintheCOLR.Specifically,themeasuredvalueoftheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(P)isincreasedby3%toaccountforfuelmanufacturingtolerancesandby5%forflux83.2-5(continued) BASESF,(Z)I'avwL.IIeovcfL.zmap4+In9~WlCnVCI.+\CI~COV4,cLckcch)vfltd.gvs~ACCCWdI+lgfgzcFvC)<~iSShakCnogk~~+~<<CI.(Z'.)it~a'fCAWtrigidSzaIrzifiCCI.rtppcvlocL.06clQ.vat,4Dn~VJW.az~gl~9zSatLtvdadqiazz<,4z~.adapl0'fbCVVlq~tr~Crtgea~5R3.2.1.ZdoCSrzCyt'rzCCdfDMSzd~dCCIov.oltvfapcvfrtyICPJ.>tIISinCClhC.PCv&v~nC~OFI>~Z..I.Z.~C.fSacvcIIwvctwzcezt4SPg.2.l.l.>g,VIi-mapmeasurementuncertainty.Thisprocedureisequivalent'oincreasingthedirectlymeasuredvaluesof.Fq(Z)by1.0815KbeforecomparingwithLCOlimits~~PerformingtheSurveillanceinNODE1priortoTHERMALPOMERexceeding75%RTPaftereachrefuelingensuresthatFq(Z)iswithinlimitwhenRTPisachieved~andpv~vlcteseon4v~aho~rzUclCA.Yticstatna,nd%ac-fuaf)Dadi'cz.f+vrt.TheFrequencyof31EFPDisadequateformonitoringthechangeofpowerdistributionwithcoreburnupbecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyforthisamountoffuelburnup.3.2.1.2ThecleardesignincludescalculationsthatpredictttthecocanbeoperatedwithintheFq(Z)limits.Beusefluxmaparetakenatsteadystateconditions,thexialvariationspowerdistributionfornormaloperaonmaneuverssucasloadfollowingarenotpreseninthefluxmapdata.Thesxialvariations-are,howeve,conservativelycallatedbyconsidering,ithenucleardesignprocess,awirangeofunitmaneersinnormaloperation.F,(Z)isthradialpeakinactor,whichisonecomponentofFq(Z)anhouldbensistentbetweenthenucleardesignvaluesandthmeasedvalues.(F,(Z)multipliedbythenormalizedageaxialpoweratelevationZgivesFq(Z).)ThecoreplaneregionsapvocabletoFevaluationexcludethefollowing,asuredinperetofcoreheight:a.Lowercorereon,fromOXto15Kincive;b.Uppercoregion,from85'$to100%.incluse;c.Gridlaneregions,w2%inclusive;andd.replaneregions,within~2Xofthebankdemanpositionofthecontrolbanks.B3.2-6(continued) INSERT3.2.10SR3.2.1.2Duringpower,operation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.1.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatFremainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERis~75KRTP.

FQ(Z)(F~MethodologyB3.2.ABASEThefollowingtermsareusedintheFevaluation:F.">=ThemeasuredvalueofFobtaineddirctlyfromthefluxmapresults.Fy=Themeasuredva1ue,P~,multipliebyI.0815toaccountforfuelmanufacturingterancesandfluxmapmeasurementuncertaint(Ref.2).PTPFLPFXY=FPRQThelimitofF~atRTP.Pg[(1+PFXY)(1-P)](thlimitofFatthecurrentTHERMALPOMERlev1).TpowerfactormultiierforF.[TheFractionofRTPatwhichFwasmeasured.]ThepreictedvaleoftheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor.PndPFXYareprov>intheCOLR.F,"andF$aremeasuredandcalculatetdiscretecoreelevations.NotethatF,canberewriensF(Z)toindicatethatFvariesalongtheax1heitofthecore.Fluxmapdataaretypicallytakefor30t75coreelevations.ThetopandbotmregionsofthcoreareexcludedfromtheF,evaluationcauseofthediffultyofmakingpreciseandmeaningfumeasurementsinthesregionsandalsobecauseoftelowprobabilitythattseregionswouldbemorelimitigthanthecentral70%ofecoreintheaccidentalyses.Gridpleregionsandrodtipregionsareisoexcludedbecausthefluxdatamaygivespuriousvalubecauseofthefficultyinliningupfluxtracesaccurelyinreg'sofrapidlyvaryingflux.Inaddition,hesesmallpoionsofthecorearereducedinlocalpowerensitybcauseofneutronabsorptioninthegridsandcotrolrodsnd,therefore,cannotberegionsofpeaklinearper.AnevaluationofF,(Z)isusedtoconfirmthatFQ(Z)swithinitslimits.If,F'is(Pg,itisconcludedthttheLCOlimitonFQ(Z)ismet.Thisresultistruefor-flumapstakenatreducedpowerbecausetheF~(Z)valueisWOGSTSB3.2-7(continuedRev.0.09/28/92 BASESinherentlydecreasedasTHERMAPOWERisincreased.ThefedbackfromtheDopplercoefficientandmoderatoreffectsflaensthepowerdistributionwithincreasedTHERMALPOWE.ThefirsNoteofthisSurveillanceprovidestheacontobetakensF.'is)F'.Inthiscase,theFq(Z)1'tmay.beexceeded.Proporti~onallyincreasingthepre'ctedFq'"(Z)bytheamounthatF"isexceededgivesanadstedFq(Z),whichiscomparwiththeFq(Z)limit.IfeadjustedFz(Z)exceedstheCOlimit,theoperatorstperformRequiredActionsA.throughA.5.ThesecondNoteinthiSurveillanceatesthatifF~is)Fgbut<F.',thenthiSurveillaeshallberepeatedwithin24hoursafterexceingb)20%RTPtheTHERMALPOWERatwhichF'waslastteined,soastodemonstratethatF(Z)isbeingsufficienreducedaspower,increases.Thisreduction,cseoffeedbackfromtheDopplercoefficientandmoratorffects,ensuresthatwhenRTPisattained,themearedFx(Z)is<Pp'.PerformingtheSurveianceinMODE1iortoexceeding75%RTPaftereachrfuelingensuresthatheFq(Z)limitismetwhenRTPisaseved.TheSurveillanFrequencyof31EFPDisadeqatetomonitorthechangeofowerdistributionwithcoreburpbecausethepowerdtributionchangesrelativelyslowlyforthis.amountofuelburnup.TheSurveillancemaybedemorefrequentifrequiredbytheresultsofFevaluatons.Specifally,theFevaluationisrequiredbythisSurvlanceiftheevaluationshowsthatP~g<F.'anddestratethattheLCOismetafteritslimithasbeeneceded.REFERENCES2Z.10CFR50.46.U<~RgSech)'on)5+<Yl.v.cA~a-icoHa.ho~1S&~da~Ay<<<<~~ssuvi~du)a.H~P<oc.QyPl+Q>'3B3.2-8(continued) BASESrnic.Lndusbio-<MumCALFgpssZg'5sucAv~0~wlcnbdu.lqlo,iRu7.IIuceaoannelFactcertain)'1.gFgP,R,,SacRonIB3.2-9(continued) BASi',x.t'.2DONOTOPERATEINTHISAREA1.0(6.0T.o}(.6,.94}0.8(12.0,0.65}0.4.0.2THISFIGUFORILLUSTRATINONLY.DONOTSEFOROPATION0FT.0('}'II246810118.833.350.0'6,783.3100COAEHEIGHT'ForcoreeIghtof12feetFigureB3.2.1A-1(page1of1)K(Z)-NormalizedF'a(Z)asaFunctionofCoreHeightB3.2-10(contfnued) Fq(Z)(FqMethodolo)B3..1BB3.2OWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.1BeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fq(Z))(FqMethodology)BASESBACKGROUNDTpurposeofthelimitsonthevaluesofq(Z)istolimitthlocal(i.eispellet)peakpowerdensit.ThevalueofFq(Zvariesalongtheaxialheight(Z)othecore.Fq(Z)idefinedasthemaximumlocalfelrodlinearpowerdensityividedbytheaveragefuelrlinearpowe~density,ssumingnominalfuelpelleandfuelroddimensions.Therefore,Fq(Z)isaasureofthepeakfuelpelletpowewithinthereactorcoe.Duringpowereration,theglob1powerdistributionislimitedbyLCO.2.3,"AXIALFXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUANTTILTPOWRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontnuouslymesuredprocessvariables.TheseLCOs,alongwithL03.1.7,"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"maintainthecore1itspowerdistributionsonacontinuousbasis.Fq(Z)varieswithfueloadingpatterns,controlbankinsertion,fuelburn,ndchangesinaxialpowerdistribution.Fq(Z)ismeasuredperiodicalusingtheincoredetectorsystem.Theseasurementsaegenerallytakenwith,thecoreatornesteadystatecnditions.Usingthemsuredthreedimensialpowerdistributions,itispossibltoderiveameasuredvlueforFq(Z).However,becauseisvaluerepresentsasteystatecondition,itdoesnoincludethevariationsintvalueofFq(Z)thatareprsentduringnonequilibriumsitutions,suchasloadfolling.Toaccountforthesepossiblevariations,esteadystatevlueofFa(Z)isadjustedbyanelevationendentfactorhataccountsforthecalculatedworstcasetansientconditions.Coremonitoringandcontrolundernonsteadystateonditionsareaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthe1itsof(continu)WOGSTSB3.2-11Rev.0,09/28/92 Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)B3.2.1BBASES-theappropriateLCOs,includingthelimitsonAFD,QPTR,ndcontrolrodinsertion.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThLCOprecludescorepowerdistributionsthatolatethellowingfueldesigncriteria:a.Dungalargebreaklossofcoolantac'dent(LOCA),theeakcladdingtemperaturemustnotxceed2200'F(Ref.1);b.C.Duringlossofforcedreactorcoantflowaccident,theremusbeatleast95%probabityatthe95Kconfidencelevel(the95/95DNBriterion)thatthehotfuelrointhecoredoesotexperienceadeparturefrnucleateboilg(DNB)condition;Duringanejectrodaccient,thefissionenergyinputtothefuemustnexceed280cal/gm(Ref.2);andd.ThecontrolrodsmusbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimequiredSDMwiththehighestworthcontrolrodtuckullywithdrawn(Ref.3).LimitsonFq(Z)ensuthatthelueoftheinitialtotalpeakingfactorassedintheaccentanalysesremainsvalid.Othercrieriamustalsobeet(e.g.,maximumcladdingoxidatin,maximumhydrogeneneration,eoolablegeometry,andngtermcooling).Howver,thepeakcladdingtempratureistypicallymost'miting.Fq(Z)limiassumedintheLOCAanalysisaetypicallylimitingelativeto(i.e.,lowerthan)the(Z)limitassumednsafetyanalysesforotherpostulataccidents.Therere,thisLCOprovidesconservativelimitforotherpostatedaccidents.FZ)satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatemnt.(continued)WOSTS83.2-12Rev.0,09/28/92 Ig,'tFq(Z)(FqMethodology)B3.2.1BASESLCO-TheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor,Fq(Z),shallbeliitedbythefollowingrelationships:Z)--K(Z)forP>0.5F(Z)--K(Z)forP~0.5where:FgistheFq(Z)limitatRTprovidedintheCR,K(Z)isthenormalizedq(Z)asafunctionofcoreheighprovidedinthCOLR,andTHLPOWERTPForthisfacility,theualvaluesofCF(}andK(Z)aregivenintheCOLR;howr,CFgisnormallyanumberontheorderof[2.32],andZ)isafunctionthatlooksliketheoneprovidedinFigu83..1B-1.ForRelaxedAxialffsetContoloperation,Fq(Z)isapproximatedbyF(Z)andFq(Z).Thus,bothFq(Z)andFq(Z)mustmeetthepecedinglimitsFq(Z).AnFq(Z)evalationrequiresobtainganincorefluxmapinMODE1.Frtheincorefluxmaprultsweobtainthemeasuredvue(Fq(z))ofFq(Z).TheFq(=Fq(Z)[1.0815]where1.0815]isafactorthataccountsrfuelmanuacturingtolerancesandfluxmapmeasuementuncrtainty.(Z)isanexcellentapproximationforFq(Z)wntheeactorisatthesteadystatepoweratwhichthincorefluxmapwastaken.(continued)WOGTS83.2-13Rev.0,09/28/92'j/ Fq(Z)(FqMethodoly)B3.1BBASETheexpressionforFq(Z)is:"q(Z)=Fq(Z)W(Z)whereW(Z)isacycledependentfunctionataccountsforpowerdistributiontransientsencountereduringnormaloperation.W(Z)isincludedintheCOeFq(Z)limitsdefinelimitingvalsforcorepowerpeingthatprecludespeakcladdintemperaturesabove220'FduringeitheralargeorsllbreakLOCA.ThisL0requiresoperationwitntheboundsassumedinthesafetyalyses.CalculationsreperformedinthecoredesignprcesstoconfirmthathecorecanbecontrolledinsuchamanrduringoperatinthatitcanstaywithintheLOCAFq(Z)1'ts.IfFq(Z)cannotbemaintainedwithintheLCOlimits,rductionofecorepowerisrequired.ViolatingtheLlimitforFq(Z)producesunacceptableconsequencesifaesinbasiseventoccurswhileFq(Z)isoutsideitsspecifilimits.IAPPLICABILITYTheFq(Z)limitsustbeaintainedinMODE1topreventcorepowerdisibutionsomexceedingthelimitsassumedinthesafetynalyses.AlicabilityinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecusethereiseierinsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelorinsufficientergybeingtransferredtothereactorclanttorequirea1>itonthedistributionofcorepowIACTIONSA.1bletsmetoowingthenextended/(connued)ducingTHERMALPOWERby-1%RTPforech1Xbywhichq(Z)exceedsitslimit,maintainsanaccetableabsolutepowerdensity.Fq(Z)isFq(Z)multipliedbafactoraccountingformanufacturingtolerancesandeasurementuncertainties.Fq(Z)isthemeasuredvalueoFq(Z).TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanaccetareducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutaplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforperiodoftime.IWSTSB3.2-14tRev.0,09/282 /9.iFq(Z)(FqMethodology)B3.2.1BBAS-A.2IAreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightpsetpointsby~lXforeach1%bywhichF<(Z)exceeitslimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzdpowerstributions.TheCompletionTimeof8hourissufficientcosideringthesmalllikelihoodofasevereransientinthitimeperiodandtheprecedingpromptrductioninTHEPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredctionA.l.A.3ReductioninheOverpowerhTtripetpointsby~1XforeachlXbywhihFq(Z)exceedsitslimit,isaconservativeactionforprottionagainstthconsequencesofseveretransientswithuanalyzedpowdistributions.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursisufficientconsideringthesmalllikelihoodofseveretransientinthistimeperiod,andtheprecedingprotructioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequirtionA.l.A.4VerificationthatFZ)hasbenrestoredtowithinitslimit,byperformgSR3.2.1.priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovetheimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.l,ensuresthatceconditionsdurioperationathigherpowerlevelseconsistentwithsetyanalysesassumptions.B.1IfitsfoundthatthemaximumcalculatedalueofFq(Z)thacanoccurduringnormalmaneuvers,F~(Zexceedsitsspifiedlimits,thereexistsapotentialfoFq(Z)tobcomeexcessivelyhighifanormaloperationatransientccurs.ReducingtheAFDby~1%foreach1%bywhichFq(Z)exceedsitslimitwithintheallowedCompletionTeof2hours,restrictstheaxialfluxdistributionsuchthatevenifatransientoccurred,corepeakingfactorsaenotexceeded.(continueWOGSTSB3.2-15Rev.0,09/28/92 Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)B3.2.18!eAsllC.1IfRequiredActionsA.lthroughA.4orB.larenottwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theplamustbeplacedinamodeorconditioninwhichtheLCOrquirementsarenotapplicable.ThisisdonebyplacingtplantinatleastMODE2within6hours.hisallowedCompletionTimeisreasonablasedonoratingexperienceregardingtheamounoftimeittakestoeachMODE2fromfullpoweroperatininanorderlymannandwithoutchallengingplantstems.AlSURVEIILANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.1.1dSR3.2.1.2aremifiedbyaNote.TheNoteappliesuringthefirstowerascensionafterarefueling.IttatesthatTRMALPOMERmaybeincreaseduntilanequilibiumpowerevelhasbeenachievedatwhichapowerdistributnmapnbeobtained.Thisallowanceismodified,however,onoftheFrequencyconditionsthatrequiresverificatiotatF,'(Z)andFq(Z)arewithintheirspecifiedlimitsafteapowerriseofmorethan10%RTPovertheTHERMALPOMtwhichtheywerelastverifiedtobewithinspecifiedimi.BecauseFq(Z}andFq(Z}couldnothavepreviousbeenasuredinthisreloadcore,thereisasecondFreqncycondiion,applicableonlyforreloadcores,thatreiresdetermitionoftheseparametersbeforeexceedig75KRTP.Th>ensuresthatsomedeterminatioofFqismadeatlowerpowerlevelatwhichadequatemaginisavailablebefegoingto100KRTP.Also,thiFrequencycondition,totherwiththeFrequencyconditiorequiringverificationof'(Z)andFq(Z)followingapowerincreaseofmorethan10K,enresthattheyareverifidassoonasRTP(oranyother1velforextendedoperion)isachieved.IntheabsencetheseFrequencyconitions,itispossibletoincreasepowrtoRTPandoratefor31dayswithoutverificationofq'(Z)andFz(Z).eFrequencyconditionisnotintendedtoreuireerificationoftheseparametersafterevery1increaseinpowerlevelabovethelastverification.Itonrequiresverificationafterapowerlevelisachievedforxtendedoperationthatis10%higherthanthatpoweratwh'chFzwaslastmeasured.(continueHOGSTSB3.2-16Rev.0,09/28/92/ Fq(Z)(FqMethodology)B3.2.1BASESi-SR3.2.1.1lVerificationthatFq(Z)iswithinitsspecifiedliitsinvolvesincreasingFq(Z)toallowformanufactung.toleranceandmeasurementuncertaintiesinordtoobtaingFq(Z).Specifically,Fq(Z)isthemeasuredvaeofFq(Z)obtainedfromincorefluxmapresultsandFq)=Fq(Z)[50815](Ref.4).Fq'(Z)isthencomparedoitsspecifiedlimts.The1itwithwhichFq(Z)iscomparedriesinverselywithpowerddirectlywithafunctioncaedK(Z)providedintheCOLPerformingthisSurveillanceinME1priortoexceeding75%RTPensresthattheFq(Z)1itismetwhenRTPisachieved,beusepeakingfactsgenerallydecreaseaspowerleveliincreased.IfTHERMALPOWERhasbeen'ncreasedby-10%RTPsincethelastdeterminatioofFq'anotherevaluationofthis,factorisrequired12]oursafterachievingequilibriumconditionsatthisherpowerlevel(toensurethatFq(Z)valuesarebeingreddsufficientlywithpowerincreasetostaywithintheLCOits).TheFrequencyof1EFPDadequatetomonitorthechange,ofpowerdistrutionwithoreburnupbecausesuchchangesareslowandellcontrolledhentheplantisoperatedinaccordanceththeTechnicalecifications(TS).SR3.2..2Thencleardesignprocessincludesclculationsperformedto'erminethatthecorecanbeoperedwithintheFq)limits.Becausefluxmapsaretakinsteadystatecditions,thevariationsinpowerdistrutionresultingromnormaloperationalmaneuversarenotpesentinthefluxmapdata.Thesevariationsare,howeveconservativelycalculatedbyconsideringawirangeofunitmaneuversinnormaloperation.Themaximupeakingfactorincreaseoversteadystatevalues,calculedasafunctionofcoreelevation,Z,iscalledW(Z).Mtiplyingthemeasuredtotalpeakingfactor,Fq(Z),byW(Z)gesthe(contied)WOG/STSB3.2-17Rev.0,09/28/9 /g.jFq(Z)(FqMethodologyB3.2BmaximumFq(Z)calculatedtooccurinnormaloperaon,Fq(Z).IThelimitwithwhichFq(Z)iscomparedvariesjmverselywithoweranddirectlywiththefunctionK(Z)pridedintheLR.TheW(Z)curveisprovidedintheCOLRfdiscretecoreelevtions.Fluxmapdataaretypicalltakenfor30to75coelevations.Fq(Z)evaluationsrenotapplicableforthefollowingaxialcoreregionsmeasuredinpercentofcoreheit:a.Loweroreregion,from0t15%inclusive;andb.Uppercoregion,fromto10Kinclusive.Thetopandbott15Kofecoreareexcludedfromtheevaluationbecausoftheowprobabilitythattheseregionswouldbemorelimingthesafetyanalysesandbecauseofthedifficultyofmaigaprecisemeasurementintheseregions.ThisSurveillanceasbemodifiedbyaNotethatmayrequirethatmorefrequentsurveillancesbeperformed.IfFq(Z)isevaluatdandfountobewithinitslimit,anevaluationofeexpressionelowisrequiredtoaccountforanyincresetoFq(Z)thatayoccurandcausetheFq(Z)limittobexceededbeforetheextrequiredFq(Z)evaluationIfthetomostrecentFq(Z)evaluatnsshowanincreaseintheexessionmaximumoverzF,'(Z)K(Z)itisrequiredtomeettheFq(Z)limitwiththlastFq(Z)increasedbyafactorof[1.02],ortoevaluateq(Z)morefrequently,each7EFPD.ThesealternativerequementspreventFq(Z)fromexceedingitslimitforanysigificantperiodoftimewithoutdetection.(continueWOGTSB3.2-18Rev.0,09/28/92

Fq(Z)(FqMethodolgy)B.2.1BBASES-PerformingtheSurveillanceinMODE1pritoexceeding75KRTPensuresthattheFq(Z)limitisetwhenRTPishieved,becausepeakingfactorsareenerallydecreasedasporlevelisincreased.Fq(Z)verifiedatpowerlevels-10%RTPabovetheTHERMALOWERofitslastverifcation,[12]hoursafter'chievingquilibriumconditistoensurethatFz(Z)iswithinits'tathigherwerlevels.TheSurveillancFrequenof31EFPDisadequatetomonitorthechangeofpowdiributionwithcoreburnup.TheSurveillancemaybenemorefrequentlyifrequiredbytheresultsofF<(Z)evtions.TheFrequencyof1EFPDadequatetomonitorthechangeofpowerdistrutionbecausuchachangeissufficientlyslow,whentplantisoperadinaccordancewiththeTS,toprecludeadversepeakingfacorsbetween31daysurveillaes.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.46,1974.RegulatoryGuide1.77,Rev.0,May1973.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC26.4.WCAP-7308-L-P-A,"EvaluationofNuclearHotChanelFactorUncertainties,"June1988.(continued)WOGSTS83.2-19Rev.0,09/28/92 /g,iFq(Z)(FqMethodology)83.2.18BASESFq(Z)(FqMethology)83.2.18DONOTOPERATEINTHISAREA(6.01.0)O.BO.B(12.0,0.65)0.4'.2THISFIGUFORILLUSTRATINONLY.DONOTSEFOROPEATION0FT.0(')%468'ID12.6333Spp667633100~COREHEIGHT'Forcoreheitof12testFigureB3.2.1B-1(page1of1)K(Z)-NormalizedFa(Z)asaFunctionofCoreHeight(continuedMOSTS83.2-20Rev.0,09/28/92 B3.2.2B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.2Nuclear.EnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)BASESBACKGROUND7,0.'iii.bThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthepowerdensityatanypointinthecoresothatthefueldesigncriteriaarenotexceededandtheaccidentanalysisassumptionsremainvalid.Thedesignlimitsonlocal(pellet)andintegratedfuelrodpeakpowerdensityareexpressedintermsofhotchannelfactors.Controlofthecorepowerdistributionwithrespecttothesefactorsensuresthatlocalconditionsinthefuelrodsandcoolantchannelsdonotchallengecoreintegrityatanylocation~duringeithernormaloperationorapostulatedaccidentanalyzedinthesafetyanalyses:F~isdefinedastheratiooftheintegralofthelinearpoweralongthefuelrodwiththehighestintegratedpowertotheaverageintegratedfuelrodpower.Therefore,F~isameasureofthemaximumtotalpowerproducediod.C,oeAehF~issensitivetofuelloadingpatterns,bank>nsertson,andfuelburnup.F~typicallyincreaseswithcontrolbankinsertionandtypicallydecreaseswithfuelburnup.lesaaX3.z.zC.2o.ii;~grafLLifa.g0.t'ai,a.F~isnotdirectlymeasurablebutisinferredfromapowerdistributionmapobtainedwiththemovableincoredetectorsystem.Specifically,theresultsofthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionmapareanalyzedbyacomputertodetermineF~.Thisfactoriscalculatedatleastevery31EFPD.However,duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIOPTR,"whicirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.~Lvc~q~$4L<os~saw'vc.~wc.Lso,con4nuo~'loaiiS.F~zard~OPERLM'lcm'vacL4d.comPo~abTheCOLRprovidespeakingfactorlimitsthatensurethatthe<~g,'designbasisvalueofthedeparturefromnucleateboilingDNismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andanytransientconditionarisingfromeventsofmoderatefrequency.TheDNBdesignbasisprecludesDNBandismetbyIIIIIIII11AllDNBlimitedtransienteventsareassumedtobeginwithanF~valuethatsatisfiestheLCOrequirements.IS<LT,.Z~(continued)83.2-21 INSERT3.2.2CTheF~Hlimitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.Thischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityfordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).INSERT3.2.2D80.ll'l~~ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheDNBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainONBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheDNBuncertaintyfactorsITDPdesignlimitDNBRvaluesaredeterminedinordertomeettheDNBdesigncriterion.TheITDPdesignlimitONBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.DNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysesto.ONBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownDNBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51fortheytypicalandthimblecells,respectively.ForboththeWRB-IandWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryONBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateONBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationappliesintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30. F~B3.2.2BASES-OperationoutsidetheLCOlimitsmayproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaONBlimitingeventoccurs.TheONBdesignbasisensuresthatthereisnooverheatingofthefuelthatresultsinpossiblecladdingperforationwiththereleaseoffissionproductstothereactorcoolant.APPLICABLEgb.tiidSAFETYANALYSESPVVt'l/tO)OlOSSOg49CCCi~O.C.bv-4leChCC.>6~4~LimitsonFdhiiprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthefollowingfueldesignlimits:a.heremustbeatleast95%probabilityatthe95%confidencelevel(the95/95BRBcriterion)thatthehottestfuelrodinthecoredoesnotexperienceaONBcondition;~so.~b.c~Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);peakcladdingternerature(PCT)mustnotexceed2200;(gaqDuringanejectedrodaccident,theenergynoctofeelcal/gent(Ref.eandgo'~/(~~0~zcod.20~911agThc.('lQgC,thrvdkoa~KVtvh'a\0.~~scvtbMh~PgfgVLnC.C.t)e20'tt.gcontrolrodsmustbecapableofsuttingownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDMwiththehighestworthcontrolrodstuck,fullywithdrawngpeg3).FortransientsthatmaybeONBlimited,theReactorCoolantSystemflowandF~arethecoreparametersofmostimportance.ThelimitsonF~ensurethattheDNBdesignbasisismetfornormaloperation,operationaltransients,andantransientsarisingfromeventsofmoderaterequencyTheONBdesignbasisismetbylimitingtheminimumDNBRtothe95/95DNBcriterion.ZO.lll.tt~~TheallowableF~limitincreaseswithdecreasingpowerlevel.ThisfunctionalityinF~isincludedinthe,analysesthatprovidetheReactorCoreSafetyLimits(SLs)ofSL2.1.1..Therefore,anyDNBeventsinwhichthecalculationofthecorelimitsismodeledimplicitlyuse(continued)B3.2-22 CB3.2.2BASESQOtillo420lii.j~~CA-adDvLvla-&ZO.iii.4~~~~'ifthisvariablevalueofF~intheanalyses.Likewise,'alltransientsthatmaybeDNBlimitedareassumedtobeginwithaninitialF~asafunctionofpowerleveldefinedbytheCOLRlimitequation.TheLOCAsafetyanalysisindirectlymodelsF~asaninputparameter.TheNuclearHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fq(Z))andtheaxialpeakingfactorsareinserteddirectlyintotheLOCAsafetyanalysesthatverifythyacceptbilityoftheresultingpeakcladdingtemperature(Ref.>ThefuelisprotectedinpartbyTechnicalSpecifications,whichensurethattheinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyandaccidentanalysesremainvalid.ThefollowingLCOsensurethis:LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"LCO3.1~~"ControlBankInsertionLimits,"LCO3.2.2,"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~),"andLCO3.2.1,"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fq(Z))."F~measuredperiodicallyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystem.Measurementsaregenerallytakenwiththecoreat,ornear,steadystateconditions.Coremonitoringandcontrolundertransientconditions(ConditionIevents)areaccomplishedbyoperatingthecorewithinthelimitsoftheLCOsonAFD,QPTR,andBankInsertioLimits.F~satisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO>O.XiiiF~shallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsoftherelationshipprovidedintheCOLR.TheF~limitidentifiesthecoolantflowchannelwiththemaximumenthalpyrise.ThischannelhastheleastheatremovalcapabilityandthusthehighestprobabilityforaDNB.ThelimitingvalueofF~,describedbytheequationcontainedintheCOLR,isthedesignradialpeakingfactorusedinthewH.safetyanalyses.Apowermultiplicationfactorinthisequationincludesanadditionalmarginforhigherradialpeakingfromreduced(continued)B3.2-23 F~B3.2.2BASESthermalfeedbackandgreatercontrolrodinsertionatlowpowerlevels.ThelimitingvalueofF~isallowedtoincrease0.3%forevery1%RTPreductioninTHERMALPOMER.APPLICABILITY20.'iii.btc0C.+~pg~~~TheF~limitsmustbemaintainedinMODE1to~~corepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthefueldesignlimitsforDNBRandPCT.ApplicabilityinothermodesisnotrequiredbecausethereisaeitherMsufficientstoredenergyinthefuelnorWsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothecoolanttorequirealimitonthedistributionofcorepower.Specifically,thedesignbaseseventsthataretlel~hsignificantmargintoDNB,andtherefore,thereisnoneedtorestrictF~inthesemodes.ACTIONSQQ.IlVSeRT32.ZKMit~.exceedingitslimit,theunitisallowed4houtorestorF~towithinitslimits.Thisrestoration,forexample,'nvolverealigninganymisalignedrodsoreducingpowerenoutobringF~withinitspowerdepenntlimit.MhentheF~mitisexceeded,theDNBRlimisnotlikelyviolatedinstestateoperation,becausventsthatcouldsignificantperturbtheF~value.g.,staticcontrolrodmisalignnt)areconsiderinthesafetyanalyses.However,thNBRlimitbeviolatedifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.s,thelowedCompletionTimeof4hoursprovidesanacceptaemetorestoreF~towithinitslimitswithoutallowingtplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforexndedperiodoftime.ConditionAismodifieyaNotetharequiresthatRequiredActionsA.2dA.3mustbecoletedwheneverConditionAisented.Thus,ifpowerisotreducedbecausethisReq'redActioniscompletedwiinthe4hourtimeperiod,RuiredActionA.2neverthelessruiresanothermeasementandcalculationofF~withinhoursinaccordaewithSR3.2.2.1.Howev,ifpowerisreducedbelow50%RTP,RequiredActiA.3requiresthatanotherdeterminationofF~mustbdonepriortoexceeding50KRTP,priortoexceeding(continued)B3.2-24 INSERT3.2.2EA.lReducingTHERMALPOWERby~1%foreach1%bywhichFgexceedsitslimitmaintainsanacceptableDNBRmargin.WhentheF~limitisexceeded,theDNBRlimitisnotlikelyviolatedinsteadystateoperation,becauseeventsthatcouldsignificantlyperturbtheF~value(e.g.,staticcontrolrodmisalignment)areconsideredinthesafetyanalyses.However,theDNBRlimitmaybeviolatedifaDNBlimitingeventoccurs.ReducingTHERMALPOWERincreasestheDNBmarginanddoesnotlikelycausetheDNBRlimittobeviolatedinsteadystateoperation.The15minuteCompletionTimebeginsatthetimetheanalysisofanincorefluxmapverifiesthelimitisexceededandtheshiftsupervisorhasbeennotified.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoreducepowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforanextendedperiodoftime.A.2AreductionofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Hightripsetpointsby-lXforeachIXbywhichF~,exceedsitsspecifiedlimit,isaconservativeactionforprotectionagainsttheconsequencesofseveretransientswithunanalyzedpowerdistributionsandensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.Thisreductionshallbemadeasfollows,giventhattheF~limitisexceededby3'KandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointis108K,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highsetpointmustbereducedbyatleast3Xto105K.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursissufficient,consideringthesmalllikelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithrequiredactionA.l.A.3ReductionintheOverpower4TandOvertemperature4Ttripsetpointsby-1%foreach1XbywhichF~exceedsitslimit,ensuresthatcontinuingoperationremainsatanacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateDNBRmargin.TheCompletionTimeof72hoursis.sufficientconsideringthesmal1likelihoodofaseveretransientinthisperiod,andtheprecedingpromptreductioninTHERMALPOWERinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.1.A.4VerificationthatF~hasbeenrestoredwithinitslimitbyperformingSR3.2.2.1orSR3.2.2.2priortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovethelimitimposedbyRequiredActionA.lensuresthatthecausethatledtotheF~exceedingitslimitiscorrected,andcoreconditionsduringoperationathigherpowerlevelsareconsistentwithsafetyanalysesassumptions. FNB3.2.2BASES5%RTP,and-within24hoursafterreachingorexceedin9RTP.Inaddition,RequiredActionA.2isperformeifporascensionisdelayedpast24hours.A.1.2.1ndA.1.2.2ZO,iIfthevalofF~isnotrestoredtowithinispecifiedlimiteithebyadjustingamisalignedrodoryreducing,THERMALPOWEthealternativeoptionistorduceTHERMALPOWERto(50RTPinaccordancewithRequirdActionA.1.2.1ndreducethePowerRangeutronFlux-Highto~55KRTPinccordancewithRequiredtionA.1.2.2.ReducingRTPto50KRTPincreasestheBmarginanddoesnotlikelycauseeDNBRlimittobevilatedinsteadystateoperation.ereductionintrisetpointsensuresthatcontinuingopetionremainsatacceptablelowpowerlevelwithadequateBRmargin.ThallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursforRuiredAction.1.2.1isconsistentwiththoseallowedforinRequiredctionA.1.1andprovidesanacceptabletimetorchtheruiredpowerlevelfromfullpoweroperationwitutallingtheplanttoremaininanunacceptableconditionforaextendedperiodoftime.TheCompletionTimesof4urforRequiredActionsA.l.landA.2.2.1arepotadditivTheallowedCompletionTimofhourstoresetthetripsetpointsperRequiredAconA..2.2recognizesthat,oncepowerisreduced,thesaetyanalisassumptionsaresatisfiedandthereisourgentndtoreducethetripsetpoints.Thisisaensitiveoperionth'atmayinadvertentlytriptReactorProtectonSystem.A.2Oncethepowerlevelhasbeenreducedto(5RTPperRequiredActnA.1.1,anincorefluxmap(SR.2.2.1)mustbeobtaineandthemeasuredvalueofF~verifinottoexceedthallowedlimitatthelowerpowerlevel.Theunitisprovied20additionalhounstoperformthistaoverandabethe4hoursallowedbyeitherActionA.l.lorAetioA.1.2.1.TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisacctablebecauseoftheincreaseintheDNBmargin,ichisobtainedatlowerpowerlevels,andthelowprobabilihavingaDNBlimitingeventwithinthis24hourperiod.(continued)B3.2-25 F~B3.2.2BASESditionally,operatingexperiencehasindicated.thatth'omtionTimeissufficienttoobtaintheincoreflmap,perfoherequiredcalculations,andevaluateF".~zo.,A.3VerificationthatF~is'thinitssifiedlimitsafteranoutoflimitoccurrenceureatthecausethatledtotheF~exceedingitslimitcorrected,andthatsubsequentoperationproceewittheLCOlimit.ThisActiondemonstratesthateF~limi'swithintheLCOlimitspriortoexceeg50KRTP,againriortoexceeding75KRTP,andwithi4hoursafterTHERMALWERis-95%RTP.ThisRequedActionismodifiedbyaNotethatstathatTHERMOWERdoesnothavetobereducedpriortoperrmingthisAction.B.1~sac>ectednRequireActions.throughlg-~20>>~d.withintheir'ompletionTi1QYCLKOhmes,theplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Thisisdonebyplacingtheplantinatleast.MODE2within6hours.%TheallowedCompletionTime~~mrsisreasonable~asedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheimetoreachMODE2fromfullpowerhplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.2.2.1ThevalueofF~isdeterminedbyusingthemovableincoredetectorsystemtoobtainafluxdistributionmap.AdatareductioncomputerprogramthencalculatesthemaximumvalueofF~fromthemeasuredfluxdistributions.ThemeasuredvalueofF~mustbemultipliedby1.04toaccountformeasurementuncertaintybeforemakingcomparisonstotheF~limit.(continued)B3.2-26 FNB3.2.2BASES20.1ifhl5$Q.I3,2,2.FAftereachrefueling,F~mustbedeterminedinNODE1priortoexceeding75%RTP.ThisrequirementensuresthatP~limitsaremetatthebeginningofeachfuelcycle.The31EFPDFrequencyisacceptablebecausethepowerdistributionchangesrelativelyslowlyoverthisamountoffuelburnu~.Accordingly,thisFrequencyisshortenoughthattheF~limitcannotbeexceededforanysignificantperiodofoperation.REFERENCES~~20IIIIIC,uxor,AR,~b<~lg,g,S.t.l~10CFR50.46.20%III.Cg.o.llidg+yns.ledusIvi~lFovuŽ(AlF)fevgo~~~+Zul10)1947.lS~W~J4~gII1C.I%Or~MgwOf-SII'O-BQnO.v'sipvC55dvIZ-C4Qgn'15g0l$,2-<'R13,go,i1QIvsI.nVr4Phon.EI'bgIv'tC4dqPSPSw>~h~<spo~vsqv.L~I:s~SR8<>>~~s~~g~gPtOLCd1~CX~+PIVW~'SQ.3.2..'1.lSI~C.C+MP~ArV~~CCOfSR9.2..2.Z.W4JL&5f4<V@IAIVC~$5pfStc!RZ~2l.(continued)B3.2-27 INSERT3.2.2FSR3.2.2.2Duringpoweroperation,theglobalpowerdistributionismonitoredbyLCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR),"whicharedirectlyandcontinuouslymeasuredprocessvariables.WithanNISpowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingSR3.2.2.2ataFrequencyof24hoursprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF~remainswithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.AFrequencyof24hourstakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.ThisSurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthatitisrequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandtheTHERMALPOWERis~75KRTP.

B3.2.+3kB3.2POMERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS~~~~~~~~~2l.<<iB3.2.3AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)BASESBACKGROUND2l.i'iiLo~V~>Axe-(ok'/on'ceo(ThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthevaluesoftheAFDinordertolimittheaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoeitherthetoporbottomofthecore.Bylimitingtheamountofpowerdistributionskewing,corepeakingfactorsareconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.Limitingpowerdistributionskewingovertimealsominimizesthexenondistributionskewing,whichisasignificantfactorinaxialpowerdistributioncontrol.TheoperatingschemeusedtocontroltheaxialpowerdistributionCADEinvolvesmaintainingtheAFDwithinatoleranceandaroundaburnupdependenttarget,knownasthetargetfluxdifference,tominimizethevariationofthe~~~~~axialpeakingfactorandaxialxenondistributionduringg~.',,p(~<~maneuvers.Thetargetfluxdifferenceisdeterminedatequilibriumxenonconditions.ThecontrolbanksmustbepositionedwithinthecoreinaccordancewiththeirinsertionlimitsandControl.Bank0shouldbeinsertednearitsnormalposition(i.e.,)210stepswithdrawn)forsteadystateoperationathighpowerlevels.ThepowerlevelshouldbeasnearRTPaspractical.'hevalueofthetargetfluxdifferenceobtainedundertheseconditionsdividedbytheractionofRTPisthetargetfluxdifferenceatRTPfortheassociatedcoreburnupconditions.TargetfluxdifferencesforotherTHERMALPOMERlevelsareobtainedbymultiplyingtheRTPvaluebytheappropriatefractionalTHERMALPOMERlevel.Periodicupdatingofthetargetfluxdifferencevalueisnecessarytofollowthechangeofthefluxdifferenceatsteadystateconditionswithburnuyg~~~Pou)ER.ViaI+>TheNuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F~)and)PTR)LCOslimittheradialcomponentofthepeakingfactors.0B3.2-28(continued) AFD83.2.3~BASESAPPLICABLETheAFDisameasureofaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoSAFETYANALYSESthetoporbottomhalfofthecore.TheAFDissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssuchascontrolbankpositions,corepowerlevel,axialburnup,axialxenondistributionand,toalesserextent,reactorcoolanttemperatureandboronconcentrations.TheallowedrangeoftheAFDisusedinthenucleardesignprocesstoconfirmthatoperationwithintheselimitsproducescorepeakingfactorsandaxialpowerdistributionsthatmeetsafetyanalysisrequirements.TheCAOCmethodology(Ref+Ientails:a.Establishinganenvelopeofallowedpowershapesandpowerdensities;b.DevisinganoperatingstrategyforthecyclethataximizeseH4-flexibility(maneuvering)andminimizesaxiapowershapechanges.c.Demonstratingthatthisstrategydoesnotresultincoreconditionsthatviolatetheenvelopeofpermissiblecorepowercharacteristics;andd.Demonstratingthatthispowerdistributioncontrolschemecanbeeffectivelysupervisedwithexcoredetectors.ThelimitsontheAFDensurethattheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fz(Z))isnotexceededduringeithernormaloperationorintheeventofxenonredistributionfollowingpowerchanges.ThelimitsontheAFDalsolimittherangeofpowerdistributionsthatareassumedasinitialconditionsinanalyzingCondition2,3,and4events.Thisensuresthatfuelcladdingintegrityismaintainedforthesepostulatedaccidents.ThemostimportantCondition4eventisthelossofcoolantaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition3eventisthelossofflowaccident.ThemostsignificantCondition2eventsareuncontrolledbankwithdrawal,andborationordilutionaccidents.Condition2accidents,assumedtobeginfromwithintheAFDlimits,areusedtoconfirmtheadequacyofOverpowerhTandOvertemperaturehTtripsetpoints.ThelimitsontheAFDsatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.83.2-29(continued) AFDB3.2.R~BASESLCO~C~ec-fV.u.%on~l~All1o~pgu.RonZlotysQalvc.%yfa.~os~cbo'nchangeboronconcentration,orfrompowerlevelchanges.,SignalsareavailabletotheoperatorfromtheNuclear'InstrumentationSystem(NIS)excoreneutrondetectorsRef.>A(.Separatesignalsaretakenfromthetopandbottomdetector's.TheAFDisdefinedasthedifferenceinnormalizedfluxsignalsbetweenthetopandbottoxcoredetectorineachdetectorwell.Forconvenience,thisfluxdifferenceisconvertedtoprovidefluxdifferenceunitsexpressedasapercentageandlabeledasX4fluxorMI.Theshapeofthepowerprofileintheaxial(i.e.,thevertical)directionislargelyunderthecontroloftheoperator,througheitherthemanualoperationofthecontrolbanks,orautomaticmotionofcontrolbanksrespondingtotemperaturedeviationsresultingfromeithermanualoperationoftheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemtoplIllMA4~gee.a~iPo~P-~'8'r.~~,~Avbau't<idC4@a.$av8c-0b~~p<odWdQkL6LvloLkloa4'twigvQ,Q>cga~PofthisLCOismodifiedbyaNotethatstateconditiocessaryfordeclaringtheAFD'ofthetargetband.redtargetarieswithaxialburnupdistribution,whicvarieswiththecoreaverageaccumulateup.ThetarddefinedintheCOLRmaypronetargetbandfortheencleormoreoneband,eachtobefollowedforaspecingeccleburnu.Zi:"k.f'o.r+AOffkiStlC5WitHERMLWER~90%,teAFDmustbekeptwithinthetargetbanWiththeAFoutsidethetargetbandwithTHERMALPOWER~90KRTP,theassumptionsidentanalysesmaybeviolated.~~b~~<~4~+g~2l.lii~g>a"flu.cdiHev~.-~.~a...theAFDwithinthe-targetbandaboutthetargetfluxdifference.However,duringrapidTHERMALPOWERreductions,controlbankmotionmaycausetheAFDtodeviate'outsideofthetargetbandatreducedTHERMALPOWERlevels.ThisdeviationdoesnotaffectthexenondistributionsufficientlytochangetheenvelopeofpeakingfactorsthatmaybereachedonasubsequentreturntoRTPwiththeAFDwithinthetargetband,providedthetimedurationofthedeviationislimited.Accordingly,whileTHERMALPOWERis~50KRTPand(90KRTP(i.e.,PartBofthisLCO),aIhourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimelimit,cumulativeduringthepreceding24hours,isallowedduringwhichthe~,may~~~21olls(continued)B3.2-30 BASESa5coA~a.fggQ~gate.s2e.~ggAFDB3.2.3A'eoperated.outsideofthetargetband.butwithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.Thecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesf+ea-3hcvcduacdPz.~n.lqde~aSic~'tlrlg,Q.c~nnu.LQ.bon.ra.Mc2.l~1\1now'dna.lipForTHERMALPOWERlevels>15KRTPand<<50%RTP(i.e.,PartCofthisLCO),deviationsoftheAFDoutsideofthetargetbandarelesssignificant.reflectsthisreducedsignificance.WithTHERMALPOWER<<15%RTP,AFDisnotasignificantparameter'intheassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisand,therefore,requiresnolimits.BecausethexenondistributionproducedatTHERMALPOWERlevelslessthanRTPdoesaffectthepowerdistributionaspowerisincreased,unanalyzedxenonandpowerdistributionispreventedbylimitingtheaccumulatedpenaltdeviationtime.Zl,ibThefrequencyofmonitoringtheAFDbytheisonceperminuteprovidinganessentiallycontinuousaccumulationofpenaltydeviationtimethatallowstheoperatortoaccuratelyassessthestatusoftheenaltydeviationtime.pa~tpro~55Qo~u.WC,pe~~)YiolatingtheLCOontheAFDcouldproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaCondition2,3,or4eventoccurswhiletheAFDisoutsideitslimits.2l.x'iii.bFigureAFDeoperation1imits.reandandtypicalAPPLICABILITY0l.liiAFDrequirementsareapplicableinMODE1above15%RTP.Above50KRTP,thecombinationofTHERMALPOWERandcorepeakingfactorsarethecoreparametersofprimaryimportanceinsafetyanalyses.(Ref.1).>>ply>>1ensurethatthedistributionsofxenonareconsistentwithsafetyanalysisassumtions.B3.2-31(continued) INSERT3.2.38ThisLCOismodifiedbyfourNotes.ThefirstnotestatestheconditionsnecessaryfordeclaringtheAFDoutsideofthetargetband.Therequiredtargetbandvarieswithaxialburnupdistribution,whichinturnvarieswiththecoreaverageaccumulatedburnup.ThetargetbanddefinedintheCOLRmayprovideonetargetbandfortheentirecycleor-morethanoneband,eachtobefollowedforaspecificrangeofcycleburnup:TheaverageofthefourOPERABLEexcoredetectorsisusedtodeterminewhenAFDisoutsidethetargetband.Ifoneexcoredetectorisoutofservice,theremainingthreedetectorsareusedtoderivetheaverageAFD.ThesecondandthirdNotesdescribehowthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeiscalculated.ThesecondNotestatesthatwithTHERMALPOHER~50KRTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof1minuteforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFD-outsidethetargetband.ThethirdNotestatesthatwithTHERMALPOHER>15%RTPand<50KRTPthepenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulatedattherateof0.5minutesforeach1minuteofpoweroperationwithAFDoutsidethetargetband:ThecumulativepenaltytimeisthesumofpenaltytimesfromNotes2and3ofthisLCO.ThefourthNoteaddressesAFDoutsideofthetargetbandduringsurveillances.ForsurveillanceofthepowerrangechannelsperformedaccordingtoSR3.3.1.6,,deviationoutsidethetargetbaridispermittedfor16hoursandnopenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulated.SomedeviationintheAFDisrequiredfordoingtheNIScalibrationwiththeincoredetectorsystem.Thiscalibrationisperformedevery92days. AFDB3.2.~'ASESg).IiAtorbelow15KRTPandforloweroperatingMODES,thestoredenergyinthefuelandtheenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolantarelow.ThevalueoftheAFDin.theseconditionsdoesnotaffecttheconsequencesofthedesignbasisevents.ForsuceofthepowerrangechaerformedaccordingtoSR..deviatisidethetargetbandispermittedfor16hoursenaltydeviationtimeisaccumulated.SomeationintesrequiredfordoingtheN>brationwiththeincoreestem.Thiirationisperformedevery92days.LowsignallevelsintheexcorechannelsmayprecludeobtainingvalidAFDsignalsbelow15KRTP.ACTIONS.A.lWiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandandTHERMALPOWER~90%RTP,theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysesmaybeviolatedwithrespecttothemaximumheatgeneration.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof15minutesisallowedtorestoretheAFDtowithinthetargetbandbecausexenondistributionschangelittleinthisrelativelyshorttime.2l.ivheAFDcannotberestoredwithinthetargetband,threduc'HERMALPOWERto<90KRTPplacesthecore'conditiohathasbeenanalyzedandfoundtobcceptable,providedthaheAFDiswithintheacceptoperationlimitsprovidetheCOLR.TheallowedCompletion5minutesprovidesanacceptabletimetoeitheetheAFDwithinits.specified,limitsoducepower<90KRTPwithoutallowingthttoremaininanunanedconditionforanexperiodoftime.B3.2-32(continued) ~\~~/laIi)gI,>vINSERT3.2.3CZl,viiB.lIfRequiredActionA.1isnotcompletedwiththerequiredCompletionTimeof15minutes,theaxialxenondistributionstartstobecomeskewed.Imnediatelyinitiatingaction.toreduceTHERMALPOWERto<90KRTPplacesthecoreinaconditionthathasbeenanalyzedandfoundtobeacceptable,providedthattheAFOiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.ImmediatelyinitiatingthereductioninTHERMALPOWERto<90%RTPallowsforacontrolledreductioninpowerwithoutallowingtheplanttoremaininanunanalyzedconditionforanextendedperiodoftime. AFDB3.2.~BASESB.g,).>v'liXL>>'+IfeitrRequiredActionA.lorA.2isnotcompletedwintheirreqredCompletionTimesof15minutes,theaxenondistriionstartstobecomeskewed.Int'ituation,theamptionthatwhentheAFDiutsideitstargetbandfor<1rwithTHERMALPOW<90KRTPbut~50KRTP,thisdeviatidoesnotsi'cantlyaffectthexenondistribution,isnoerd.Reducingthepowerlevelto,<50%RTPwithintheletionTimeof15minutesandcompliancewithLCOr>remenforsubsequentincreasesinTHERMALRensuresthacceptablexenondistributionsarestored.TheComplonTimeof15minutesisacceptablebusethexenonstributionschangelittleinthisrelativelyrttiC.1gf,vii1m~cbiake.lgi'n'skis.ki'nggl.viiWithTHERMALPOWER<90KRTPbut~50KRTP,operationwiththeAFDoutsidethetargetbandisallowedforupto1houriftheAFDiswithintheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR.WiththeAFDwithintheselimits,theresultingaxialpowerdistributionisacceptableasaninitialconditionforaccidentanalysesassumingthethenexistingxenondistributions.The1hourcumulativepenaltydeviationtimerestrictstheextentofxenonredistribution.Withoutthislimitation,unanalyzedxenonaxialu)'Ahdistributionsmayresultfromadifferentpatternofxenonuiupanecay.g'hereductiontoapowerlevel<50KRTPputpthereactorataTHERMALPOWERlevelatwhichtheAFDisnotasignificantaccidentanalysisparameter.IftheindicatedAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandoutsidetheacceptableoperationlimitsprovidedintheCOLR,thepeakingfactorsassumedinaccidentanalysismaybeexceededwiththeexistingxenoncondition.~nyAFDwithinthetargetbandisacceptableregardlessofitsrelationshiptotheacceptableoperationlimits.B3.2-33(continued) AFD83.2.~BASESWsekT3,2>GismodifiedbyaNotRequiredActintered.C.leiedwheneverthis:21,VlMote4~g>~ningofschonC~lg.l.Xll>C.IfRequirection8.1isnotcompletedwithinsrequiredCompletionTim15minutes,theaxialndistributionstartstobecomesiicantlyskeweththeTHERMALPOWER~50%RTP.Inthissitutssumptionthatacumulativepenaltydeviationof1hourorlessduringtheprevious24hourswhtheAFoutsideitstargetbandisacceptable50%RTP,isnoervalid.Reducingthewerlevelto<15KRTPwithinthempletionTimeofoursandcomplyingwithLCOpenaltydeviatimequirementsforsubsequentincreasesinTHERMALPOeurethaiaccetablexenThisRequiredActionmust-a4ee+beimplementedeitherlfthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis>1hourduringtheprevious24hours,ortheAFDisnotwithinthetargetbandandnotwithintheacceptableoerationlimits.Tl~~alPO~KR.490/yg7P~f+'50JoPTPSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSRl,viiiAFDismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingtheproccomputerthathasanAFDmonitoralarm.computerterminesthe1minuteaverageofeoftheOPERABLEexedetectoroutputsandprovianalarmmessageimediaiftheAFDsfortrmoreOPERABLEexcorechannelsaretsidethetatbandandtheTHERMALPOWERis)90KRTP.Ou'pionatTHERMALPOWERlevels(90%RTPbut)15Kthecomputersendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulatpenadeviationtimeis)1hourintheprevi24hours.ThisSurveillanverifiesthattheAFOasscatedbytheNISexcorennelsiswithinthetargetbandannsistentwiththeatusoftheAFDmonitoralarm.TheSurveysnceFrequyof7daysisadequatebecausetheAFDiscooiledbytheoperatorandmonitoredbytheprocess83.2-34(continued) INSERT3.2.30D.lWhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis~90KRTP,theAFDmeasurement-determinedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofevery15minutestoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeof15minutesisadequatetoensurethattheAFDiswithinitslimitsathighTHERMALPOWERlevelsandisconsistentwiththeCompletionTimeforrestoringAFDtowithinlimits(ConditionA).E.lWhentheAFDmonitoralarmisinoperableandTHEfNALPOWERis<90%RTP,theAFDmeasurementdeterminedbythePPCSmustbeindependentlymonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocomputethepenaltydeviationtimeatafrequencyofeveryhourtoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.ACompletionTimeofIhourisadequatesincetheAFDmaydeviatefromthetargetbandforuptoIhourusingthemethodologyofNotes2and3ofthisLCOtocalculatethecumulativepenalty=deviationtimebeforecorrectiveactionisrequired. AFOBASESQ)IlINC<5uv(vnCnkde,prmincdppC~nnuInd@C,nICnkli~~cog)aVIIItarisnotalarmedshoulerromteced.gl.xYIi,dIhlSE<T3.Z..'3Ka2I.ViiIVICO.'S~c.Vv@n+T4~4w+tA~<Aohc.g%hot4nisq~vc>Awny.IsOnly'reap.ivy'4c.PC,V~IIV'+Mhl.nAF'b~tahorO.l~m'IhIn,Opera.'c,iI.miI4~E,t.BAALPcs&.<>clovoatPZl.iiiINSTR,T3.Z8I=pLl.ig)IJSc=kT3,2.~6SR3.2.3.IWiththeAFDmonitoralarminoperable,theAFOmmonitoredtodetectoperationoutsideofthetargetbandandtocornutetheenaltdeviationtime.Duringoperationat~90%,theAFQismonitoredataSurveillanceFrequencyof15minutestoensurethaFOhihTHERMA0levels.Alevels<90KRTP,theSurveillanceFrequencyto1hourbecauseAFDmaydeviatefrargetrupto1hourusingcalculateuatitioniofParts8andCofthitonaltydevi'eforeSR3.2.3.sreuire.]~mC.S~MWIBC.SR3.2.3.Fismodifiedby~NotegstaesamonstoredandloggedvaluesoftheAFDareassumedtoexistforthepreceding24hourintintherortocomputeecumulativeenaltdeviationtimTheAFDsouemonitoreanoggemorefrequentyperiodsofoperationforwhichthe,powerlevelorcontrolbanpositionsarechangingtoallowcorrectivemeasureswenteAFOismorelikelytomoveoidethetargetband.gl.IX2l.x~QEP-W2.X,3HThisSurveillancerequiresthatthetargetfluxdifferenceupdatedataFrequencyof31effectivefullpowerdays(EFPD)toaccountforsmallchangesthatmayoccurinthetargetfluxdifferencesinthatperiodduetoburnup.~tively,linearinterpolationbetweenthemostntmeasuremethetargetfluxdifferencesaredictedendofcyclevauidesareasopdatebecausetheAFOchangesduetoburnupwardOXAFO.WhenthepredictedendofDfromtenuclear.designisdifferenX,itmaybeabettervalueeiolation.SR3.2.3.4B3.2-35(continued) INSERT3.2.3ETheAFDismonitoredonacontinuousbasisusingthePPCSthathasanAFDmonitoralarm.~ThePPCSdeterminesthe1minuteaverageoftheOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidesanalarmmessageandamaincontrolannunciatorimmediatelyiftheaverageAFDisoutsidethetargetbandandthenre-alarmswhenthecumulativepenaltydeviation'imereaches15minuteintervalswithintheprevious24hours.Thecomputer,alsosendsanalarmmessagewhenthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis>1hourwithintheprevious24hours.Thisalarmmessagedoesnotclearuntilthecumulativepenaltydeviationtimeis<1hourwithintheprevious24hours.INSERT3.2.3FifAFDvaluescannotbeobtainedfromthePPCS.InoperabilityofthealarmdoesnotnecessarilypreventtheactualAFDvaluesfrombeingavailable(e.g.,fromthecomputerlogsorhandlogs).AFDvaluesforthepreceding24hourscanbeobtainedfromthehourlyPPCSprintoutsorhandlogs. INSERT3.2.4G+la%XRequiredAction.A.4ismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthattherecalibrationoftheexcoredetectorscannotbeperformeduntilafterthereisverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimits(i.e.,RequiredActionA.3).Itisnecessarytoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptablepriortoadjustingtheexcoredetectorstoshowzerotiltandincreasingpowertoensurethattheplantisnotoperatieginanunanalyzedcondition.INSERT3.2.4HrRequiredActionA.5ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatitisnotnecessarytoperformRequiredActionA.5ifthecauseof.thegPTRalarmisassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythatthecorepowerdistributiondoesnothavetobere-verifiedifthe(}PTRalarmisonlyduetotheinstrumentation(i.e.,theexcoredetectors)beingoutofalignmentandnotduetoananomalywithinthecore.ThesecondNotestatesthatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesarenotrequireduntilaftertheexcoredetectorshavebeencalibratedtoshowzerotilt(i.e.,RequiredActionA.4).TheintentofthisNoteistohavethepeakingfactorsurveillancesperformedatoperatingpowerlevels,whichcanonlybeaccomplishedaftertheexcoredetectorsareadjustedtoshowzerotiltandthecorereturnedtopower.ThethirdNotestatesthatonlyoneofthefollowingCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.TheintentofthisNoteistoclearlyindicatethatthefirstCompletionTimetobecomeapplicableistheCompletionTimewhichmustbemettosatisfyRequiredActionA.5. AFDB3.2.~~BASES3I.xi'>EFPbOAcveachICL.c.l<+go.~2(xi'Measurementofthetargetfluxdifferenceisaccomplishedbytakingafluxmapwhenthecoreisatequilibriumxenonconditions,preferablyathighpowerlevelswiththecontrolbanksnearlywithdrawn.Thisfluxmapprovidestheequilibriumxenonaxialpowerdistributionfromwhichthetargetvaluecanbedetermined.ThetargetfluxdifferencevariesslowlywithcoreburWc.r<~vAFrequencyof2EFPDorremeasuringthetargetfluxdifferencesadjuststhetargetfluxdifference$~~conditions.ThisisthebasisfortheCAOC.RemeasurementatthisSurveillanceintervalalsoestablishestheAFDtargetfluxdifferencevaluesthataccountforchangesinincore-excorecalibrationsthatmayhaveoccurredintheinterim.REFERENCES1.WCAP-8403(nonproprietary),"PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures,"WestinghouseElectricCorporation,September1974..AndersontoK.KnielCerformanceBranc...OperationandSafetyAnalctsofanoadFollowPackage,"uary31,1980.3~~WaterReact,1975.0.B.VaightS-CE-687,3Q.gFSAR,,Se.c.honq.1.Z.42lxiQ,+.2.9q'g,QgA4tC.$~4g-Il5VhLfwt.d<c.eccl4cgi~ni~gof.c.yacc,AP'QQo~445Q.JC,ICsue,l~vdesign4~~<~gg~~,r,c,4.~~~$~nt(ml4'a.v~ppl~dltkr~cra.Ac.r<ac,4~NclgynnJS~c4Lrd~uc.lCcLr'wfc,Q+q~ic4rMsij<<yfSWW~<rP<emuvrzcd~~~~~~~+.~~iB3.2-36(continued) 2IXi1'1'.)AFD83.2.3~10000.DONOTOPERATEINTHISAREAYIITHAFDOUTSlDETHETARGETSAND~(-11,90)(11~90)$0a~70CLIll0eoCL50LUI-C)IQ40I-lL(-31,50)ACCEASLE1OPERAON<WITHcIPENALTYDEYIATIONTIMEACCEPTASOPERATIWITHc1R.PENAYDEYIIONME(31,50)20ACCEPTABLEOPERATIONACCEPTABLEOPERATION10THISFIQUFORILLUSTRATIONLY.DOTUSEFOROPERATION-35-25-1555151535AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(%)FigureB3.2.3A-1(Page1of1)AXIALFLUXDIFFERENGEAcceptableOperationLimitsandTargetBandLimitsasaFunctionofRATEDTHERMALPOV/ERWOGSTSB3.2-37(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 AFD(RAOCMethodology)B3.3BB2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2BAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)(RelaxedAxialOffsetContro(RAOC)Methodology)BASES.BACKGROUNDThepurposeofthisLCOistoestablishlimitsonthevaluesoftheAFDinordertolimittheamouofaxialpowerdistributionskewingtoeitherthetorbottomofthere.Bylimitingtheamountofpordistributionskewing,coepeakingfactorsareconsistenwiththeassumptionsuseinthesafetyanalyses.Limingpowerdistributionskewgovertimealsominimizesthexenondistributionskewi,whichisasignificantfactorinaxialpowerdistribtioncontrol.RAOCisaalculationalprodurethatdefinestheallowedoperationalpaceoftheAversusTHERMALPOMER.TheAFDlimitsaresectedbycosideringarangeofaxialxenondistributionshatmayocurasaresultoflargevariationsoftheAFD.Suequenty,powerpeakingfactorsandpowerdistributionsarexanedtoensurethatthelossofcoolantaccident0),lossofflowaccident,andanticipatedtransielimitsaremet.ViolationoftheAFDlimitsinvalidateconclusions.oftheaccidentandtransientanalysewitregardtofuelcladdingintegrity.AlthoughtheCdefinelimitsthatmustbemettosatisfysafetyanalys,typicallyanoperatingscheme,ConstantAxialOffsetontrol(CAOC),isusedtocontrolaxialpowerdistributioindaytodayoration(Ref.I).CAOCrequirestattheAFDbecontliedwithinanarrowtoleranceandaroundaburnupependenttargettominimizethevaritionofaxialpeakingctorsandaxialxenondistritionduringunitmaneuver.TheOCoperatingspaceistypicalsmallerandlieswitintheRAOCoperatingspace.CorolwithintheCAOCopratingspaceconstrainsthevariatsnofaxialxenonstributionsandaxialpowerdistributons.RAOCalcu'lationsassumeawiderangeofxenodistributionsandthenconfirmthattheresultingpowerdisibutionssatisfytherequirementsoftheaccidentanalyses.MOGSTSB3.2-38(coinued)Rev.0,09//92 AFD(RAOCMethodolgy)83.38BASESAPPLICABLSAFETYANAYSESTheAFDisameasureoftheaxialpowerdistribuionskewingtoeitherthetoporbottomhalfofthecore.heAFDissensitivetomanycorerelatedparameterssucascontrolbankpositions,corepowerlevel,axialburn,axialxenondistribution,and,toalesserextent,reacorcoolanttemperatureandboronconcentration."eallowedrangeoftheAFDisusedinhenucleardesignpcesstoconfirmthatoperationwiththeselimitsproucescorepeakingfactorsandaxipowerdistributionsthateetsafetyanalysisrequiremens.TheRAOmethodology(Ref.2)estaishesaxenondistribuonlibrarywithtentatielywideAFDlimits.OnedimensionaaxialpowerdistribioncalculationsarethenperformedtdemonstratethatrmaloperationpowershapesareacceptabfortheLOCAalossofflowaccident,andforinitialcoitionsofancipatedtransients.ThetentativelimitsareadjustasnecessarytomeetthesafetyanalysisruiremenThelimitsontheAFenurethattheHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(F<(Z))isnotcededduringeithernormaloperationorintheevnofxenonredistributionfollowingpowerchanges.The1mitontheAFDalsorestricttherangeofpowerdistbutionthatareusedasinitialconditionsinthealysesoCondition2,3,or4events.Thisensuresthathefuelciadingintegrityismaintainedforthesepostultedaccidents.ThemostimportantCondition4evetistheLOCA.emostimportantCondition3evntisthelossoffwaccident.ThemostimportantCoition2eventsareunctrolledbankwithdrawaldborationordilutionaidents.Condition2accidentsimulatedtobeginfromwithitheAFDlimitsareusedtonfirmtheadequacyoftheOverperhTandOvertemraturedTtripsetpoints.The1mitsontheAFDsatisfyCriterion2ofteNRCPolicyStament..LCOTheshapeofthepowerprofileintheaxial(i.e.,thvertical)directionislargelyunderthecontroloftheoperatorthroughthemanualoperationofthecontrolbanorautomaticmotionofcontrolbanks.TheautomaticmotiWOSTSB3.2-39(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 AFD(RAOCMethodolo)B3..3BBASES-ofthecontrolbanks,isinresponsetotemperaturdeviationsresultingfrommanualoperationoftChemicalandVolumeControlSystemtochangeboronconcntrationorfrompowerlevelchanges.SsnalsareavailabletotheoperatorfrotheNuclearInsumentationSystem(NIS)excoreneutndetectors(Ref.3).Separatesignalsaretakenfomthetopandbottometectors.TheAFDisdefinedsthedifferenceinnormalizdfluxsignalsbetweentheopandbottomexcoredetectors'neachdetectorwell.Frconvenience,thisfluxdifferenceconvertedtoprovidfluxdifferenceunitsexpressedaspercentageand1cledasX4fluxorXhI.TheAFDlimitsaeprovideditheCOLR.FigureB3.2.3B-lshowstypicalRAOAFDlimi.TheAFDlimitsforRAOCdonotdependonthetgetfxdifference.However,thetargetfluxdifferenmbeusedtominimizechangesintheaxialpowerdistriion.ViolatingthisLCOotheFDcouldproduceunacceptableconsequencesifaCdition,3,or4eventoccurswhiletheAFDisoutsiditsspeciedlimits.APPLICABILITYTheAFDrequementsareapplicablinMODEIabove50KRTPwhenthecoinationofTHERMALPOWandcorepeakingfactorsarofprimaryimportanceinafetyanalysis.ForAFDimitsdevelopedusingRAOCmetdology,thevalueofthAFDdoesnotaffectthelimitingcidentconsuenceswithTHERMALPOWER<50KRTPndforloweropeatingpowerMODES.ACTIONSA.lAsanalternativetorestoringtheAFDtowithinitspecifiedlimits,RequiredActionA.1requiresaTHELPOWERreductionto(50KRTP.ThisplacesthecoreinaconditionforwhichthevalueoftheAFDisnotimportatintheapplicablesafetyanalyses.ACompletionTimeof30minutesisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,reach50KRTPwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WOGSTSB3.2-40(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 QIygllAFD(RAOCMethodology)B3.2.3BASESSURYEILLAEREQUIREMENTSR3.2.3-1TheAFDismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingheunitprocesscomputer,whichhasanAFDmonitoralar@.Thecomputerdeterminesthe1minuteaverageofehof,theOPERABLEexcoredetectoroutputsandprovidanalarmssageinmediatelyiftheAFDfortwoorreOPERABLEexrechannelsisoutsideitsspecifiedimits.ThisrveillanceverifiesthattheAF,asindicatedbytheNISexcrechannel,iswithinitsspifiedlimitsandisconsistewiththestatusoftheAmonitoralarm.WiththeAFDmoitoralarminoperable,heAFDismonitoredeveryhourtodettoperationoutsidetslimit.TheFrequencyof1hourissedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimeequiredtovartheAFD,andthefactthattheAFDisclosemonitoredWiththeAFDmonitoralarmOPERABLE,theSurillancerequencyof7daysisadequateconsideringthatthAFDmonitoredbyacomputerandanydeviationfromrequiernesisalarmed.REFERENCES1.WCAP-8403(noropriery),"PowerDistributionControlandadFoliongProcedures,"WestinghouseElectricCooration,Setember1974.2.R.W.Mileretal.,"RelationofConstantAxialOffsetntrol:FqSurveillceTechnicalSpecifcation,"WCAP-10217(NPJune1983.3.FSA,Chapter[15].MOSTSB3.2-41(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 QPTRB3.2.4B3.2POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITSB3.2.4QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)BASES32.x.bINSET.T'.g,sGBACKGROUNDslQvAbRAhlT'owZRTILTR.Ano(eFva.'),"R2.xA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESaa.x.~P,2ot)cTheQPTRlimitensuresthatthegrossradialpowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththedesignvaluesusedinthesafetyanalyses.Preciseradialpower,distributionmeasurementsaremadeduringstartuptesting,afterrefueling,andperiodicallyduringpoweroperation.Thepowerdensityatanypointinthecoremustbelimitedsothatthefueldesigncriteriaaremaintained.Together,LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD),"LCO3.2.4,anLCO3.1@,"Cohe+InsertionLimits,"providelimitsonprocessvar>ablesthatcharacterizeandcontrolthethreedimensionalpowerdistributionofthereactorcore.Controlofthesevariablesensuresthatthecoreoperateswithinthefueldesigncriteriaandthatthepowerdistributionremains'thintheboundsusedinthesafetyanalyses.omPTR+E8~preclud~corepowerdistributionsthatviolatethefollowingfueldesigncriteria:(.uoc.a')b.p'.Duringalargebreaklossofcoolantaccident,4~peakcladdingtemperaturemustnotexceed2200'F(Ref.I);(per)Duringalossofforcedreactorcoolantflowaccident,theremustbeatleast95Kprobabilityatthe95Kconfidencelevel(the95/954eH~QDNB)criterion)thattheuelrocoredoesnotexperienceaDNBcondition;hoHc~hc.Durinanejectedrodaccident,thef~nenergyothefuelcal/gm(Ref.2);andg~~u)'ll~~to~Z~Q.Qad@d.ThecontrolrodsmustbecapableofshuttingdownthereactorwithaminimumrequiredSDMwiththehighestworth.controlrodstuckfullywithdrawn(Ref.3).TheLCOlimitsontheAFD,theQPTR,theHeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fq(Z)),theNuclearEnthalpyRiseHot(continued)B3.2-42 22.w,bINSERT3.2.4CquadrantPowerTiltisacoretiltthatismeasuredwiththeuseoftheexcorepowerrangefluxdetectors.Acoretiltisdefinedastheratioofmaximumtoaveragequadrantpower.ThegPTRisdefinedastheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaveragenuclearpowerinthefourquadrants.LimitingthegPTRpreventsradialxenonoscillationsandwillindicateanycoreasymnetries.83.2-92o. BASESR~~Y~0QPTR83.2.4SC4}~~Q.NdChlevLapLahathi55RQ~'iRJ.V.h.-ChannelFactor(Fa"),and~plankPaertionreestablishedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsthatexceedthesafetyanalyseslimits.TheQPTRlimitsensurethatF~andFq(Z)remainbelowtheirlimitingvaluesbypreventinganundetectedchangeinthegrossradialpowerdistribution.InMODEI,theF~andFq(Z)limitsmustbemaintainedtoprecludecorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingdesignlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.TheQPTRsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO2Q.x.G.iHSE,RY'.2.4O.Maid'.8LnWhc.Sa+a,nalmes.dega'XaCL.HOAR,VC.Y44K.addi40dct.LSPrR.o~Ck.oosi'P<0<'~<4'PCXvdikedin+4.ICCh.APPLICABILITYTheQPTRlimitof1.02,atwhichcorrectiveactionisrequired,providesamargieofprotectionforboththeDNBratioandlinearheatgenerationratecontributingtoexcessivepowerpeaksresultingfromX-Yplaneowertilts.pAlimitingQPTRof1.025canbetoleratedbeforethemarginforuncertaintyinFq(Z)and+F~)ispossiblychallenged.TheQPTRlimitmustbemaintainedinMODEIwithTHERMALPOWER>50K.RTPtopreventcorepowerdistributionsfromexceedingthedesignlimit.ApplicabilityinNODEI-50%RTPandinotherMODESisnotrequiredbecausethereisneitherInsufficientstoredenergyi'nthefuelnorQVsufficientenergybeingtransferredtothereactorcoolanttorequiretheimplementationofaQPTRlimitonthedistributionofcorepower.TheQPTRlimitintheseconditionsis,therefore,notimportant.NotethattheF~andFq(Z)LCOsstillapplybutallowprogresiv1higherpeakingfactorsbk.g~50/o+~TSQ.dcv~KOmSOe/@WPACTIONSg,gallA.ltodo~a~~gWiththeQPTRexceedingitslimit,~XRTPforeach1XbywhichtheQPTRexceeds1.00isaconservativetradeoffoftotalcorepowerwithpeaklinearpower.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursallowssufficient(continued)B3.2-43 TheQPTRmonitoralarmshallbeOPERABLEandQPTRshallbemaintainedatorbelowthelimitof1.02.QPTRismonitoredonanautomaticbasisusingthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS)thathasaQPTRmonitoralarm.ThePPCSdeterminesfromtheexcoredetectoroutputstheratioofthehighestaveragenuclearpowerinanyquadranttotheaverageofnuclearpowerinthefourquadrantsandprovidesanalarmmessageiftheQPTRisabovethe1.02limit.

(~=BASESggj(,QAk.v44<rinc.rca~i~GPTg~+ILLlF(QL>lgo.1~ili~il-T7dckf<F-'~PO~~'CQc~RC,Mcd<"(4(c.cqluiviedAcl:5nA.2..OPTRB3.2.4QQ,I>1OlhJS~PlQQo1'L\3,+,gg2e'LIg),'t4>>ZAhog.r~afQv~~Q.~lCVXY$q,)Q.iLAlY4AkACo~dzb'o~gTHERMA~POIP&R.b~i&6b~CrqwivcdA,c.ho~aA.lW42.g,2ol4~-timetoidentifythecauseandcorrectthetilt.Notethattheowerreductionitselfmacauseachaneinthetiltedconison.Becausetheaarmisareaest,ditionalchangesintheedetectedbyrequiringachecTRr12hoursthereafter.IfthegPTRcontinuest'ea,MALPOWERhastobereducedaccordi.A12hourCompletionissuffi'auseanyadditionalchangeingPTRweaivelslow.A.~gThepeakingfactorsF~andFq(Z)areofprimaryimportanceinensuringthatthepowerdistributionremainsconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsusedinthesafetyanalyses.PerformingSRsonF~andFq(Z)withintheCompletionTimeof24hoursensuresthattheseprimaryindicatorsofpowerdiionrewithintheirrespectivelimits.ACompletionTimeotakesintoconsiderationtherateatwhichpeakingfactorsarelikelytochange,andthetimerequiredtostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmap.Ifthesepeakingfactorsarenotwithintheirlimits,theRequiredActionsoftheseSurveillancesprovideanappropriateresponsefortheabnormalcondition.IfthegPTRremainsaboveitsspecifiedlimit,thepeakingfactorsurveillancesarerequiredeach7daysthereaftertoevaluateF~andFq(Z)withchangesinpowerdistribution.RelativelysmallchangesareexpectedduetoeitherburnupandxenonredistributionorcorrectionofthecauseforexceedingthegPTRlimit.gJ.IVAlthoughandFq(Z)areofprimaryimportancenitialconditionsihesafetyanalyses,otherchsinthepowerdistributimayoccurasthegPTmitisexceededandmayhaveanimpaonthevaliofthesafetyanalysis.Achangeinoistributioncanaffectsuchreactorparametersaworthsandpeakingfactorsforrodmalfunctionents.thegPTRexceedsitslimit,itdoesnecessarilymeanatyconcernexists.Itdoesmeatthereisanindicationochangeinthegross>alpowerdistributionthatrequiresaistigationandevaluationthatisaccomplishedby'continued)B3.2-44 INSERT3.2.4EA.2AftercompletionofRequiredActionA.1,thegPTRalarmmaystillbeinitsalarmedstate.Assuch,anyadditionalchangesinthegPTRaredetectedbyrequi~ingacheckofthegPTRinaccordancewithSR3.2.4.1onceper12hoursthereafter..IfthegPTRcontinuestoincrease,THERMALPOWERmustbelimitedaccordingly.A12hourCompletionTimeissufficientbecauseanyadditionalchangeingPTRwouldberelativelyslow.INSERT3.2.4FTheperformanceofSR3.2.1,.1andSR3.2.2.1isnolongerrequiredonceConditionAisexited.WhentheplantisalreadyperformingSR3.2.1.2or.SR3.2.2.2tosatisfyotherrequirements,SR3.2.1.2orSR3.2.2.2donotneedtobesuspendedinordertoperformSR3.2.1.1orSR3.2.2.1sincetheperformanceofSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2meettherequirementsofSR3.2.1.1andSR3.2.2.1,respectively. QPTRB3.2.4BASESgg.)v'.Q'k'~2"LII~LIeus~MlvCksCcL~VIL02ZIgeO.5IIIIDglop.ro.HvQ<%~vlZ2><lg56kW3l2.S+Qextheincorepowerdistribution.Specally,thecorepeakinrsandthequadrantt'stbeevaluatedbecausetheyarethethacharacterizethecorepowerdistribution.Thisva'requiredtoensurethat,beforeasingTHERMALPOWvethelimitofR'ctionA.1,thereactorcorecondiar.ostentwiththeassumptionsinthesafet'analses.27aII>a4h,7.ReedActionA.3.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatstatheQPTzeroedoutuntilaftertheationofthesafetyanalystermicoreconditionsatRTParewithinthesaa'sumptions(i.e.,RequiredAc'.1).ThisNoteis>eventaguityabouttherequiredsequenceofactions.sfZZ,gcL+pgcIv)gcWCanI'n4.1Ilm.P1EaJcumIftheQPTRhasexceededthe1.02limitandare-evaluationofthesafetyanalysisiscompletedand,showsthatsafetyequirementsaremet,theexcoredetectorsarerecalibratedtopriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequired.ActionsA.lThisisdonetodetectanysubsequentsignificantchangesinPT.M~x.oIIIAha~gQ~'Ll1A.3-.:P-thefluxtiltiszeroedout(i.e.,RequiredActionA..~sperformed),itisacceptabletoreturntofullpoweroperation.However,asanaddedcheckthatthecorepowerdistributionatRTPisconsistentwiththesafetyanalysisassumptions,RequiredActionA~~requiresverificationthatFq(Z)andF~arewithintheirspecifiedlimitswithin24hoursofreachingRTP.Asanaddedprecaution,ifthecorepowerdoesnotreachRTPwithin24hours,butisincreasedslowly,thenthepeakingfactorsurveillancesmustbeperformedwithin48hoursofthetimewhentheascenttopowerwasbegun.TheseCompletionTimesareintendedtoallowadequatetimetoincreaseTHERMALPOWERtoabovethelimitofRequiredActionsA.1wilenotpermittingthecoretoremainwithunconfirmedpowerdistributionsforextendedperiodsoftime.INSET~22.'VI~ZqRequthersurveillancesmayonyatthe(continued)B3.2-45 INSERT3.2.4GRequiredActionA.4ismodifiedbyaNotethatstatesthattherecalibrationoftheexcoredetectorscannotbeperformeduntilafterthereisverificationthatthehotchannelfactorsarewithinlimits(i.e.,RequiredActionA.3).Itisnecessarytoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisacceptablepriortoadjustingtheexcoredetectorstoshowzerotiltandincreasingpowertoensurethattheplantisnotoperating-inanunanalyzedcondition.g,g,VlINSERT3.2.4HRequiredActionA.5ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatitisnotnecessarytoperformRequiredActionA.5ifthecauseofthegPTRalarmisassociatedwithinstrumentationalignment.TheintentofthisNoteistoclarifythatthecorepowerdistributiondoesnothavetobere-verifiedifthegPTRalarmisonlyduetotheinstrumentation(i.e.,theexcoredetectors)beingoutofalignmentandnotduetoananomalywithinthecore.ThesecondNotestatesthatthepeakingfactorsurveillancesarenotrequireduntilaftertheexcoredetectorshavebeencalibratedtoshowzerotilt(i.e.,RequiredActionA.4).TheintentofthisNoteistohavethepeakingfactorsurveillancesperformedatoperatingpowerlevels,whichcanonlybeaccomplishedaftertheexcoredetectorsareadjustedtoshowzerotiltandthecorereturnedtopower.ThethirdNotestatesthatonlyoneofthefollowingCompletionTimes,whicheverbecomesapplicablefirst,mustbemet.TheintentofthisNoteistoclearlyindicatethatthefirstCompletionTimetobecomeapplicableistheCompletionTimewhichmustbemettosatisfyRequiredActionA.5. QPTRB3.2.4BASESQQ.Vlexcorershavebeencalibratedtoshowzerotil(i.e.,Required'.2).Theintentofoeistohavethepeakingfactorsurrformedatoperatingpowerlevecanonlybelishedaftertheexcoorsarecalibratedtoshowzerot>dcorereturnedtoower.g7.e)(eA.3,2.'0zB.1SIfRequiredActionsA.1throughA.~arenotcompletedwithintheirassociatedCompletionTimes,theunitmustbebroughttoaMODEorconditioninwhichtherequirementsdonotapply.Toachievethisstatus,THERMALPOWERmustbereducedto(50KRTPwithin4hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof4hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperienceregardingtheamountoftimerequiredtoreachthereducedpowerlevelwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCE'EQUIREMENTSPgexoAggaVL(t/hJSN~+p.Z4>SR3.2.4.1SR3...aNotethecalculatedwiththrnTHERMALPOWERisCanonepowerrangechannelisinopeThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheQPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimits.TheFrequencyof7dayswhentheQPTRalarmisOPERABLEisacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilitythatthisalarmcanremaininoperablewithoutdetection.theQPTRalarmisinoperable,theFrequencyisincreasurs.ThisFrequencyetodetectanyrelativelyslowc,ecauseforthosecausesofQPTthatocockly..ropedrod),theretypiceotherindicationsofabnoprvlctiO1QSQQg3,2.WYOgg,vti(continued) INSERT3.2.4IC.landC.2WhentheQPTRmonitoralarmisinoperabletheQPTRmustbeverifiedwithinlimitsatafrequencyofevery24hourstoensurethattheplantdoesnotoperateinanunanalyzedcondition.WhenTHERMALPOWERis~75%RTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable,QPTRcannotbe.adequatelymeasuredusingtheexcoredetectors.Inthissituationafluxmapmustbecompletedtoverifythatthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.ACompletionTimeof24hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesinQPTR,becauseforthosecausesofQPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertiltandprovidessufficienttimetostabilizetheplantandperformafluxmapwhennecessary.A,2~vgag2,V'LAINSERT3.2.4JSR3.2.4.1ismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstallowsQPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75KRTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERis~75KRTPand'nepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPOWERis-75%RTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifyQPTR.Above75KRTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,QPTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF<andF~remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses.

Q2~volg2~vtiiINSERT3.2.4KSR3.2.4.2ThisSurveillanceverifiesthatthegPTR,asindicatedbytheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)excorechannels,iswithinitslimitswhenthegPTRalarmisinoperable.TheFrequencyof12hoursisadequatetodetectanyrelativelyslowchangesingPTR,becauseforthosecausesofgPTthatoccurquickly(e.g.,adroppedrod),theretypicallyareotherindicationsofabnormalitythatpromptaverificationofcorepowertilt.SR3.2.4.2ismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthesurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedifthegPTRmonitoralarmisinoperable.ThissurveillancerequiresamorefrequentverificationthatthegPTRiswithinlimitsincethemonitoralarmisinoperable.ThesecondNoteallowsgPTRtobecalculatedwiththreepowerrangechannelsifTHERMALPOWERis<75KRTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.ThethirdNotestatesthatSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2shouldbeperformedifTHERMALPOWERis~75KRTPandonepowerrangechannelisinoperable.TheintentofthisNoteisclarifythatwhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperableandTHERMALPONERis-75KRTP,afullcorefluxmapshouldbeperformedtoverifythecorepowerdistributioninsteadofusingthethreeOPERABLEpowerrangechannelstoverifygPTR.Above75KRTPwithonepowerrangechannelinoperable,(}PTRmonitoringforaportionofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.Largetiltsarelikelydetectedwiththeremainingchannels,butthecapabilityfordetectionofsmallpowertiltsinsomequadrantsisdecreased.PerformingafullcorefluxmapprovidesanaccuratealternativemeansforensuringthatF~andF~remainwithinlimitsandthecorepowerdistributionisconsistentwiththesafetyanalyses. QPTRB3.2.4BASESgQ.viixSR3.2.4.2ThisurveillanceismodifiedbyaNote,whichstatesthaitisequiredonlywhenonepowerrangechannelisinoperaleandtheTHERMALPOWERis75KRTP.WithanNpowerrangechannelinoperable,tiltmonitingforaport>nofthereactorcorebecomesdegraded.argetiltsarelilydetectedwiththeremainingchannel,butthecapabilitfordetectionofsmallpowertiltssomequadrantsisdeeased.PerformingSR3.2.4.2atFrequencyof12hursprovidesanaccuratealterativemeansforensuringthatytiltremainswithinits1mits.ForpurposesofmonitingtheQPTRwhenoneowerrangechannelisinoperable,hemoveableincoretectorsareusedtoconfirmthattheormalizedsymnetcpowerdistributionisconsistenwiththeindictedQPTRandanypreviousdataindicatinga'lt.Theioredetectormonitoringisperformedwithfullinrefluxmaportwosetsoffourthimblelocationsithrtercoresymmetry.Thetwosetsoffoursymnetricimesisasetofeightuniquedetectorlocations.ThesecationsareC-B,E-5,E-ll,H-3,H-13,L-5,L-ll,andforthreeandfourloopcores.Thesyanetricthimblefluxmcanbeuedtogeneratesytmetricthimble"tilt."hiscanbecaredtoareferencesyanetricthimetilt,fromtheostrecentfullcorefluxmap,togenereanincoreQPTR.herefore,QPTRcanbeusedtoconfithatQPTRiswithinliits.WithoneNIScharminoperable,theindicatedltmaybechangedfromthealueindicatedwithallfourcnnelsOPERABLE.Tonfirmthatnochangeintilthasatuallyoccurred,whimightcausetheQPTRlimittobeexeded,theincoresuitmaybecomparedagainstprevious'flmapseitherusgthesyometricthimblesasdescribedaboveracompletfluxmap.Nominally,quadranttiltfromtheSurvllanceshouldbewithin2Xofthetiltshownbythemorecentfluxmapdata.(continued)B3.2-47 QPTRB3.2.4BASESREFERENCES2Q.'x~c1.10CFR50.46.gFSACS~o~2~)3.22.X..C+Q~iC.l~d~Shi'H<~~~(4)SgC~~Z5qI~vm6ic.o~~~Vgu.~g(continued)83.2-48k RTSInstrumentation3.3.13.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.1TheRTSinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.1-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.1-1.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormorerequiredchannelsinoperable.A.lEntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.1-1forthechannel(s).ImmediatelyB.OneManualReactorTripchannelinoperable.B.1ORRestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursWZ.KvliiB.2.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.'2.penrtripbreakers(R54'hours(continued)3.3-1 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEC.Onechannelortraininoperable.C.1ORRestorechannelortraintoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursC.2OpenRTBs.49hoursD.OnePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highchannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforuptohoursforsurveillancetesting@go-ofotherchannes.D.l.1Placechannelinmo9D.l.2ReduceTHERHALPOWERto75%RTP.ORD.2.1hoursg)hoursa4ANDD.2.2ORD.3BeinHODE3.hourshours(continued)3.3-2 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONOITIONREQUIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEE.Onechannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmabebypassedforuptooursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.E.lORPlacechannelintrip.hoursE.2BeinMOOE3.188hours~~~Qw'aCC~F.HERMALOWnd<eIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelioo~ablF.2IncreaseTHERMALPONERto>jfg9.o~F.lReduceTHERMALPOWERtoOR2hours2hoursZXlc'rrW3aXXX'7loRMGHERMALPOWEandX4onermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelsinoerabl.G.1Suspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyG.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<~.VF-IlcLcnps2hours2'a~'23.pcjpc-I~pcH.HMALPOWER<AeortwoIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannelsin.abltg)ithH.1Restorechannel(s)toOPERABLEstatus.PriortoincreasingTHERMALPOWERto5E-I/cxrpS(continued)pg~<<~Rugl~ifeu:C8ar3033 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEI.OneSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperable.I.1Suspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyJ.TwoSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelsinoperable.J.1OpenRTBs.ImmediatelyK.OneSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannelinoperable.K.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.OR48hoursK.2OpenRTBs.49hoursL.RequiredSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannel/~inoperable.L.lSuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyZ3ill<Qadi)cxIL.2eunbCe~KerSOU1SOllvves.PerformSR3.1.1.11hourANDOnce~12hoursaAcNethereafter(continued)3.3-4 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEM.Onechannelinoperable.ZQ>\------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelbypassedforuptooursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.M.1Placechannelintrip.ORM.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<~NLRBhours'lS'hours~~Z3.1<N.Onechannelinoperable.R~~&e4&~-amoC.~~$~)------------NOTE-------------TheinoperablechanneTmaybebypassedforuptooursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.N.IPlacechannelintrip.ORN.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERto<501oRvPlk&hours~Bhours(continued)3.3-5 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME0.OneReactorCoolantPumpBreakerPositioncannelinoperable.------------NOTE------Theinolechmaybebypassedfor4hoursforsur'ncete'fothechannels.0.1RestorechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.'8hoursOR0.2ReduceTHERMALPOWERhoursP.OneTurbineTripchannelinoperable.------------NOTE-------------Theinoperablechannelmabebypassedforup,tooursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.~Zan(,L)CP.1ORP.2Placechannelintrip.ReduceTERMALPOWERtoM')oR.W'7R.hourshours(continued)3.3-6Rev.00928 1,RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEg.Oneinoperable.train------------NOTE-------------Onetrainmaybebypassedforupto+4~oursforsurveillancetestingprovidedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursQ.2BeinMODE3.12hoursR.OneRTBtrain,inoperable.------------NOTES------------l.Onetrainmaybebypassedforupto~~oursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.~3,.)cali2.OneRTBmaybebassedforupto(Poursformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechanisms,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.R.1RestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.1hourORR.2BeinMODE3.7hours(continued)p;g3~370092892 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMES.Onechannelinoperable.S.1ORS.2Verifyinterlockisinrequiredstateforexistingunitconditions.inMODE3.7hoursT.Onechannelinoperable.ORVerifyinterkis'nrequiredstateexistingunitconditions.1hourT.2BeinMODE27hoursOnetripmechanisminoperableforoneRTB.SIRestoreinoperabletripmechanismtoOPERABLEstatus.ORSQ}2BeinMODE3.48hours54hoursURTB.AQQ-S:T4-3.3-8g~xQdi+Rev.0,09/2892 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS-NOTERefertoTable3.3.1-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachRTSFunction.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.1.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.1.2l.~'3,'2tW~~NOTESAdjustNISchannelifabsolutedifferenceis>2%.~tfhin2.BEiBreqoiredtobeperformedmdKB.~12+hoursafterTHERMALPOWERis>~oRTP.IICompareresultsofcalorimetricheatbalancecalculationtoNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)channeloutput.24hoursSR3.3.1.3~,X%VNOTESl.AdjustNISchannelifabsolutedifferenceis>3%.2.Jhow7euiredtobeerformeduntil7'L~S,i-e~P<~~+tlSo<ag~etW~meedW~~~vc2rteA<~AgQlk~Qt2~~y~Xo.in~'+~tomb~mr~~t~~PPEM3i3.l.bCompareresultsoftheincoredetectormeasurementstoNISAFD.31effecti.vefullpowerdays(EFPD)(continued)'P~I$gA4X3.3-9v.009/28/92 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.1.4NOTE------ThisSurveillancemustbeperformedonthereactortripbypassbreakerpriortoplacingthebypassbreakerinservice.PerformTADOT.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.5PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.1.6NOTE-~RequiredtobeerformeduntiurserMALPR0RTP."2,'3.)cxv'I~7-ffggNft.1'~verg~~~~~ingfognR~$otbvin~~Eh~~.lln~~iR~~c~Ola~~X~+94<FpbCalibrateexcorechannelstoagreewithincoredetectormeasurements.2FPDSR3.3.1.7PerformCOT.92~aysSR3.3.1.8------NOTE-Qj+xLisiancesaveri&inerlocksP-6andP-1areineirrequiteforexistinuniconditions.PerformCOT.i.so+nag~dcu&L~~~~$~s~p~C%)oQ~p~p~Ar4$~92daysnlQTh,---Qq,~md+0~p'jc~iM(pt4~Q~>~ringmo0~yp~,~~~z.,~~kd9l~~Hest-nag~~mhi'.(continued)~SF'lamps~~gj~cu~~~~le&~,3.3-10R 1RTSInstrumentation3.3.1/SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.1.9NOTE-----Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.$92+daysSR3.3.1.10bd~QJ4~cJbug4J~<~~~e~~nal2'3.Xx+'OTEisSurveillanceshaverithetimeconstantsareedtotherescriPerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.(g83lmonthsSR3.3.1.11-NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.PerformCHANNELCALIBRA[18]months+g7QCVaSR3.3.1.12-NOTEsSurveillanceshallincludeverificationofReactorCoolantSystemresistancetemperaturedetectorbypassloopflowrate.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.[18]monthsi$,xtXSR3.3.1.PerformCOT.18nthsal(continued)K~TSPasd~/dkLw'tA3..3-11Rev.0,09/28 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYllSR3.3.1.0)NOTEVerificationofsetpointisnotrequired.PerformTADOT.a4months)2SR3.3.1.@---NOTE-<Verificationofsetpointisnotrequired.QnM'f~H~vre'Oi~~V)~WL-----NOTE---requedwhenoperforwitnpre's-31aysPerformTADOT.PriortoreactorstartupSR3.3.1.16NOTENeutrondetectorsy~xrllfdedfromresponse'meWesting.VerifyRTSRESPONSETIMEiswithinlimits.[18]monthsona&.TAGGEREDTESTBASISme~~P/ii1IQi~1~ItJl;iG3'.3-1228/92 SR3.3.1.13VerifythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERis<6%RTPwhileinMODE1.'4monthsSR3.3.1.14VerifytheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotbypassedwhenbothIntermediateRangechannelsare<1E-10amps.24monthsSR3.3.1.15VerifythePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops,andUndervoltage-Bus11AandllBFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERis>8.5%RTP.24monthsSR3.3.1.16VerifytheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)FunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisa50%RTP.24monthsSR3.3.1.17VerifytheTurbineTripFunctionsarenot'ypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERis>50%RTP.24months RTSInstrumentation3.331Table3.3.1-1(page1of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationMOVllFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIOHSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIOHSREQUIREHENTSLLONABLTRIPVALUE<SETPOINT\1.HanualReactor-Trip1.223(b)A(45(gSR3.3.1.14~SR3.3.1.~NANANA2.PowerRangeHeutronFluxa.Highb.Louc1.21221.2SR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.2SR3-3.1.7SRsR3.3.1.1sR3.31VsSR3.3'.~sR3.3.1.SR3.3.1.3S111.]X'IRTP3s[72]X,lRefrytoNot(1(Flage3.-20)~VRRSQgP'lRTP~33~S~XRTPNote1(Page-20)rRangeHeutronatea.HighPositiveRateb.HighHeaIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux1,2~C1(e)2(d)FPGSR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.1S[NIc28]Xhtinsta[2]sRTPtc.8]XRTPthtimponstana[2]ses[31]'r(RT[31]XRTPsR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.16~ISR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.8coo,SR3.3.1.~>R1sI'l3SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.~se'3.S.~IIRTPwithtimeconstant2[2]sec[5]r(RTPuithtime~rrllOR(continued)(c)(d)MithReactorTripBreakerse>onsmaconte>nonAbleValuede>ngonSetpointSt%i<Q(C,QBt)(RTBs)closedand~RodoutreSystemcapableofroduithdrawal.O~ER~Amm~~~l-WBethdPRDRr~~5K-II~'aaxoR+(e)~RB6>rof'lunarF>oor~~b~ma,L-~W=[pa.<M(8!483gka&~44vRt33~LJ[Pr~Z.Z.vii~R~B~~~~0~faC~~ŽgP,~~MPR8+It@r~ahp~uLL~~ RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page2of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONSourceRangeNeutronFlux++a)ClI~23.&lAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDI7IONSOaC~73(484(&5(KC<'e~3(C4(+)5~()REQUIREDCHANNELSCONDITIONSJ3KSURVEILLANCEREQUIRENEHTSSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.8SR3.3.1.113-CSR3.3.1Atk.(CC)SR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.SR3.3.1ARA"'R3.3.1.&SR3.3.1~1SR3.3.F19ALLOMABLEVALUEs[1.4E)cpss.4E5]ps[1E5]s+3Vl3TRIPSETPOIHT(')~ÃI~N*5Overtemperature6TOverpower6T1,223~Xl1,2RfertoESR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.?~oSRs'l~l'R3.3.1~~cSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.?SR3.3.1.~4~Eote1(Pag3.3-2Refert/Note2(Page3.3-20)RefertoNote1RefertoNote2(Page3.3+(continued)(a)ete:UnitspecificimplementationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuedepei~etpointStudymethodologyusl't~(b)liithRTBsclosedandRodControlSystemcaltdrawal.(e)BelowtheP.6(IntermedeHeutronFlux)interlocks.(f)TBsopen.Inthiscondition,sourcerangeFunctiondoesnotprovidereactortripbu[inputtotheBoronDilutionProtectionSystem(LCO3.3.9),andIindication.ide3.3-14 Insert3.3.1.2(g)(h)(i)(i)Basedonestablishedlimits.THERMALPOWER>8.5%RTP.THERMALPOWERZ50%RTP.THERMALPOWER>8.5%RTPandReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionblocked.THERMALPOWER>8.5%RTPandRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionblocked. RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page3of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCNANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSLLONABLEVALUETRIPSETPOIN~SPressurizerPressurea.Lowb.High1(g)2.8vsi1,2NzgeJcl~>3.xESR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1.<sSR3.3~1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1~10a[1)s[6JgII7'78~5f88@Ps1g83~v'IPressurizerllaterLevel-HighIJReactorCoolantSR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3.1.10PvS[38))liSf'AIFlow-Lowa.SingleLoopb.TwoLoops3perloop'pcl'oopNSRSR SRU,y,;xSRHSRSRSR2Q.SR0~X\tT,3.3.1,13.3.1.73.3.1.103.3.1.QO3.3.1.13.3.1.73.3.1.103.3.1.&KG[89.2]e!2~z[89.2]y.~ed'->.l.ueb~~viewerNote:UnitspecificimplementationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuedependingonSetmetho68togybytheunit.(continued)(g)AbovetheP-7(LowPowerReactorck)interlock(h)AbovetheP-8(PowerRangeNux)interlock.-7(LowPowerReactorTripsBlock)interlockandbelowtheP-8(PowerRangeZ5~)Clx;)interlock.g~~pf~b'8~+3.3-150928/92 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page4of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEHODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANHELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHENTS+Xvl13+V%<LLOMABLETRIPVALUE,SETPOINT10ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)BreakerPositiona.SingleLoopb.TwoLoops3v",aUndervoltage-~~nb~1!523,xtierrequeyRCPsSteamGenerator(SG)MaterLevel-LowLowLevel-Low1(h)1(g)1F21,21perRCP1perRCP2perSGG0Ra3.I~~le~SKI'KH+SR3SR.3.'b.t.ISHSR3.3.1.9SR3.3.1.10~23.xSR3.3.1.~~~~SR3.3.1~16ESR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.70SR3.3.1.10(S%-Z-.R~ESR3.3.1.1SR3.3.1.7SR3.3%~\0.3.1.16NANAzf5.]HzIz(57.5]Hz0.)!zf30.4]AiNACP)iV,0>V!CoincidentwithSteamFlow/FeedwaterFl1,2perSG1SR3.3.1.SR3.3.1.10SR3.3.1~16f42.5])lullstcamlowatRTPsf40]XfullsteamatRTPc)ReviewerNote:UnitspecificimplementationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuede1ngonheunit.(9)AbovetheP-7(LowPowerReactorTripsBlock)1(continued)ln(h)AbovetheP-eNeutronFlux)interlock.AetheP-7(LowPowerReactorTripsBlock)interlockandbelowtheP-8(PowerRangeNeutrux)interlock.3.3-16 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page5of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCOHOITIONSREQUIREDCHAHNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREMENTS+So'vl~LLONABLE-TRIPSETPOIH~VALUE1TurbineTrip2.3e<I)C$QQe5.03.3.1I'IZ3x1cglI~(ag+a.Low~OilPressureb.TurbineStopValveClosureSafetyInjection(SI)InputfromEngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)123PPZ3ovsi2~QSR3.3.1-10SR3.3~1.10SR3.3.1.~[750]pslg1]XoenNA18.ReactorTripSystemInterlocksa.rmediateRangetronFlux,P-b.LowPowerReactorTripsBlock(P-7c.PowerRangeNeutronFlux,P82(e)1pertrainSSR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.13TSR3.3.1SR3..13SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.13z[1~NA[50.a[1E-10]ac@s[48]XRTPd.PowerRangeHeutronFlux,P-9SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.13]gs[50]XRTP[52.2RTPe.PowerRangeNeutronFlP-10f.TurbineIspulsePressure,P-131,2SR.1.11SR3.3..[SR3.3.1']SR3.3.1'0SR3.3'.13]He[12.2turbinpowera[7.8])lRTPand[12.2]RTP)a[10]XRTPS[10])lurbiner3.,/,2(continued)(a)ReviewerNote.methodologyusedbytheunit.(e)BelowtheP-6(IntermediateRangeNtationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuedependingonSetnerlocks..9(PowerRangeNeutronFlux)interlock. RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-'I(page6of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrwentationFUHCTIONAPPLICABl.EIIOOESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIOHSREQUIREDCHANNELSlSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHEHTSLLOMABLEVALUEW3~visTRIPSETPOIH~l5ReactorpBreakersIPReactorTripBreakerUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanismsl7AutomaticTripLogic1,22trains2trains1eachperRTBRSR3.3.1.4CSR3.3.1.4SR3.3.1.4CSR3.3.1.4SR3.3.1.5SR3.3.1.52trainsC1eachperRTB~ZS.2trains0NANANANAKAHAHAHAZZ+V'll(a)RevieMerNote:UnitspecificimplementationsmaycontainonlyAliollableValuedependingonSeHithRTBsclosedandRoe=so~Systemcapableofrodwithdrawal.IncludinganyreactortripbypassbreakersthatarerackedinandclosedforbypassinganRTB.<<~~N&aif'~rfJQ3.3-1892 RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page7of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationNote1:OvertemeratureATZg"'aTheOvterneratureATFjsW~~m<~ALL~-r)-TL'~(~-T'>(gs)sWhere:ATismeasuredRCSAT,'F.AT0istheindicatedATatRTP,'F.sistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'.,TisthemeasuredRCSaverageternerature,'F.TisthenominalT.,atRTP,'F.Pisthemeasuredpressurizerpressure,psigPis.thenominalRCSoperatingpressure,~psigK,~<I":09].K>[0.0138]/'FK=[0.pssg7',>[8]sec--x~<[3secx~<[2]secr4>[33]secv,<[4.sec.r~Z[2secf,(AI)=1.26(35+(q,-q,))whe,":...qb<-[35]0%ofRTPen-[35]%"'RlP<qt-qb<[7]-1.05((q,-s.-7)whenq,-q,>~eq,andqsarepercentRTPintheuppe~andlowerhalvesofthecore,respectively,andq,+q,isthetuinalTHERWALPOWERinpercentRTP.3.3-19 Insert3.3.1.3K,istheOvertemperaturehTreactortripsetpointasspecifiedintheCOLR.K2istheOvertemperaturehTreactortripdepressurizationsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.K~istheOvertemperaturehTreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR7',andr~are-themeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantsasspecifiedintheCOLR.f(AI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetop.andbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelsasspecifiedintheCOLR. RTSInstrumentation3.3.1Table3.3.1-1(page8of8)ReactorTripSystemInstrumentationNote2:OverowerATie4TheOverpowerATFunction-L-BtR-VAtUE-ssee-than-[-3]/~of.AT-span-.Z3.xvig~-v')%UPAS'ETK-K1s)1+O4e~gT'f(hr)1+s4ecp7gs~hWhere:ATismeasuredRCSAT,'F.ATOistheindicatedATatRTP,'F.sistheLaplacetransformoperator,sec'T'sthemeasuredRCSaverageternerature,'F.'isthenominalT.atRTP,F.K4<7'1~[8]secr,<[2]secK,>[0.02]/'FforincreasingT.,ordecreasingT.7,<[3]sec~,>[10K6>0whenT>T0]/'FwhenT<Tv3<[2]sec=0%RTPforallAI. Insert3.3.1.4K4istheOverpowerhTreactortripsetpointasspecifiedintheCOLR.K,istheOverpowerhTreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.K6istheOverpowerhTreactortripthermalt'imedelaysetpointpenaltycoefficientasspecifiedintheCOLR.v~isthemeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantasspecifiedintheCOLR.f(hI)isafunctionoftheindicateddifferencebetweenthetopandbottomdetectorsofthePowerRangeNeutronFluxchannelsasspecifiedintheCOLR. ~~~I'ESFASInstrumentation3.3.23.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationLCO3.3.2TheESFASinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.2-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:AccordingtoTable3.3.2-1.ACTIONS-NOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormorerequiredchannelsortrainsinoperable.A.1EntertheConditionreferencedinTable3.3.2-1forthechannel(s)ortrain(s).ImmediatelyB.Onechannel,ortraininoperable.B.lRestorechannelortraintoOPERABLEstatus.48hoursW.mdivB.2.1eDE3.hour2.2BeinMODE54hours(continued)3.3-21 7ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.H@WeOn+~~~~g~c%gn4C.-~aaaoumdCmhahcgQ~~4~C.1-------NOTE-------Ontrainmaybebypasdforuto[4]houfosurveillatestingprovidedhothertrain'PELE.2q>~vstoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.6hoursC.2.BeinMODE3..2Be'nMODE5.4hoursD.e-e'nerable.Q~~~~Ml.o.W0&4.d~6tg~a8~+~~~~dC.1Clout4~>4+~~--------NOTE-----=-TheinoperaPbe"channelm~bebypassedforupto4]Poursforsueillancetestingoerchannels.Placechan1intrip.6hoursO.)BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE4.12hours(continued)5I~(/AUDrv~<A.,+3~322 7ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEontnPresehannee~4eun~~pQua-~65<~QA8&Do(,lg3885~"~+--------NOTE-------Oneadditionalchannelmaybassedfupto[4]rforsurYecetesting.Placechannelinbypass..RlrE.~BeinMODE3.AND5E.2MBeinMODE.6hourshoursF.Oneinoperable.trainF.lRestoretrainto0BLEstatus.&.hoursORF.2.BeMODE3.54~hoursF.2.2BeinME4.hos(continued} ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTION.COMPLETIONTINEG.CAJ(ceo~i~pCrtcxd-.--------NOTE-------Onetrainmayebypassedfoupto[4]hourorurveiancetestingpr'dedtheothertrin'PERABLE.RestoretraintoOPERABLEstat6hoursG.lBeinNODE3.ANDG.2BeinNODE4.12hoursH.onyapphu~~us+I~I44I(4'Juc.usrcSH.1Qe.~&DO&Bietrainmaybassedforupto[4]oursorsurvencetestingprovitheothertraiisERABLE.estoretrainoABLEstatus.6hoursH.2BeinNODglhours(continued)3.3-24 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEI.Onechannelinoperable.--------NOTE---------TheinoperablechannelmaybebypassedforuptoQ~hoursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.ORPlacechannelintrip.'uhoursBeinM3.EJlllllLsainFatePuhannelerablehlo~$o~ROAN!0I6ondt.e~fed~sfss~acO~~@4ksa~I}nMODE~F~~ss-gnaws~~hours~ZQ'oursK.cnel----hfcvTa--~~app~~~~cb~$.+,+~'A,(jbahsqJ(,~,'Qrd~~OR--------NOTE----.Oneadditionchannelmbypassforuptoursfor'eancetestingPlacecharm1inbypass.6hours(continued)33-25 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEK.(continued)K4ilBeinNODE3.~ANDK.2QIBeinNODEf.12hoursL.chaner~C,le~2.C.>pea,~d+~En.~o"~me~~~~Ste~i~yrnpW~~Verifyinteckisinre'stateforlngunitOll1L.lBeinMODE3.hoursL.265BeinMODE+.hours'M.Z't.v.elinoperable.M.1Verifyinterlockisinrequiredstatexistinion.M.2BeinMODE3.3.3-26Rev.0 ESFASInstrumentation~fLILCUulIAol~~~~lDBAI~y~~3.3.2iIvh~Ih4~or@!IRAQI~Mwct~g+g~~Q~~h~prv~~(eoo<JrccadSUENTS<~~~~~'~~W-NOTERefertoTable3.3.2-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachESFASFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.2.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hours3.3.2.2PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDBASISR3.'3.2.3-NOTE---------Thecontinucheckmaybeeluded.PerformACTUATIOGICST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.PerformMASTERRELAYTEST.daysonaSTAREDTESTBASISSR3.3.2.PerformCOT.92days(continued)p/N,L(~fgkgf/PP5f30327 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.2F---NOTE.Verifi'cationofrelaysetpointsnotrequired.PerformTADOT.92)dayst4~~~V+,~q~~~g~thaplSR3.3.238PerformTADOT.monthsSR3.3.2.NOTEThisSurveillanceshallincludeverificationthatthetimeconstantsareadjustedto'heprescribedvalues.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.months'te'LlSR3.3.2.~~~~c1JUhbhlthA'QLN)ningQ~kW~~~~r~~~)acOCO+<---------NOTE-------Notrequiredtobedfortheturbine'venAFWpumpunti4]hoursaQeGpressureis>[1000]ps'erifymonthsSR3.3.2.11PerforOnceperreactortripbreakercycle3.3-28 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page1ofB>EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrurentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDREOUIREDCONDITIONSCHANNELSKd.y-iVSURVEILLANCECONDITIOHSREQUIREHENTS~A>~4ALLO(ABLETRIPVALUESETPOIN~1~SafetyInjectiona.HanualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationl.ogicandActuationRelaysc.ContairmentPressure-HighQfd.PressurizerPressure-Lowl,2,3grS,R,3gl1,2,31,2,3(">2trains3SSllRSRSRQSAR~j~KXs+SRSRSR~~SR(o,.O3.3.2.1S~3.3.2.5ps>g3.3.2.1(P3.3.2~~pslg3.3.2~ 3.3.2.IOS,SSSR3.3.2$RAC.Ps/S~~+NASR3.3.2.4~2l,xvNAus@s~psigII5t'sI9e.SteamLinePressure-(1)ow1,2;,D3persteamline3~(59SR3.3.2.1~3'.~~>SR3.3.2-~psigSR3.3.28.-'(.v~s:.SR3.3.2.]S0-ps'Ig2)HighferentialPressBetweenSteLinesf.HighSteamFlowinTwoSteamLines1,2,31,2,3(d)3persteamlineSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.100[SR3.3.2.1]SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9S~...100~steline(e)(f)/s[106]psig-~psigCoincidethT-wLow1,2,3(d>1prloopD.SR~1z[550.6]F,z[553]FSR3.3.2.SR3;3.2.9SR33210(continued)g~~r+aae~)~~+PSST~(a)scificilemonmethodoloureoafunctiondefinedas(e)LhPincreasinglinearlyfromandhPcorrespondingto[11C(f)LessthoafunctiondefinedasloaandthenahPincreasinglinearlyfromhPcorrespondingto[44]X,fullsteamflowbelow[20]X,oa,aflowat[20]Aloadto[11CXusteamflowat[100]XloadhPcorrespondingto[owbetween[0])land[20])l[40]Xsteamflowat[20]Xloadto[110]X,futee~lowatlS~S3.3-29Re.0,09/28/92 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page2of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstruaentationFUMCTIONAPPI.ICABLEHODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDREQUIREDCORDITIDMS.CHAMMELS+Q~QtfSURVEILLAMCECONDITIDMSREQUIREHEHTSALLOWABLETRIP~4VALUESETPOIHT~1.SafetyInjection(continued)gHrghS'team0TwoSteamLinesCoincidentwSteamLiPrese-Low2.ConteireentSpraya.ManualInitiation(d)1,23(d)1,2,3,4persline1persteamlinen2ra3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5.2.9SR3.3..SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.10BgSR3.3.2@/af63)a[675]psigPslgMAb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,3,42trainsF,rrHASR3.3.2.4c.ContainnentPressure-rghHigJirtLrLW123/SR3.3.2.1sR3.3.28'.:SR3.3.2.g6*aw.vti~iS~~3a.sS~psrgPS'IgPlants)[3]sets3.3.2.5SRSR33210s.05]PS19(continued)(a)c)(d(e)2(f)Trmeconstantsuslnroeraret,a[0]secondsandtss[5]sconds.eP-12(T,-t.owLow)interlock.LessthanoraquaiondefinedashPcorrespondingto[44)Xfullsteamflowbelow[20]XloadhPincreasinglinearlyfrom[443wat[20]X,loadto[114]XfullstcadeandhPcorrpondsearno0~LessthaltoafunctiondefinedashPcorrespondingto[40]Xfullsteamflow[0]Xand[20]XloadthenahPincreasinglinearlyfrom[40]Xsteamflowat[20]Xtoadto[110]X,fullsteflowat[1]Xload.g~Ba~3.3-30Rev.0,09/28/92 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page3of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrulentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEiMOOESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCOHDI7IOHS+psII,L'IREQUIREDSURVEILLANCECHANNELSCONDITIONSREQUIREMENTSALLONABLEVALUE~l.4TRIPSETPOINT3.ContaiwentIsolationManualInitiationbIAutomaticActuationl.ogicandActuation1,2,3,41,2,3,42trainsB,aSR3.3.2JIHA44~~SR3.3.2.4e~t=-~p"~z~.x.NARe'laysSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.~Phase8Isolation(1)ManualInitiation1,2,3,42pertrain,2trainsBSR3.3.2.8HA(2)AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays2tl'a'lnsCSR3.3.2.2SR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.6HANA(3)Containmen~Press.High>>3(HighHigh)1,2,3(4].ESR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9.2.1012.31]I(12.05]'lgps'IgZQqlll4.SteamLineIsolationa.ManualInitiationb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays12(4)3(4)b.12($)3(i02tlainsIL,DFIOSR3.3.2AHAHASR3.3.2.4~~~ZN.XV(continued)'M.v(ExceptIIhenMSIVsareclosedandrRe-activated].3.3-31 4ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2.1(page4of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLEMODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREOUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSALLOWABLETRIPVALUESETPOINT~4.SteamLineIsolation(continued)c.ContairmentPressure-High2b1,2(+,3(f)13SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.$zSR3.3.2.f>2g,'viii4s~s~pslgpsigd.e>ness2fpersteamlincp.go'c4h.g4p755SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.%~ps>gSR33.2.W'Lwviii(LI~~OqEI,0JJM42Rps19P.(2)NegativeRate-High3(g)(i)3perstcamlineSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.10s[121.6)(h)psi/secS[110)(h)e.HighSteamFlowin1,2',TwoSteamLines3(i)steamline3.3.2.1SR3.3.F5.3.2.9SR3...(e)Coincidentwith1,1perT-LowLow'3(d)(i)LoopSR3.3.2.1z[550.6)FSR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.1053)F(continued)ReviewerNote:Unitspecificinp[ementationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuedependingonSctpointStusedbythcunit.~Q.v'b)AbovetheP-surizerPressure)interlock.(c)Timeconstantsusedinlead/lagcontrolleraret,z[50)sectns[5)seconds.O(d)AbovetheP-12(T~-LowLow)lock.(e)Lessthanorequaltoafunctiondefinhespondingto[44)XfuLLsteamflowbelowt20]Xload,hPincreasinglinearlyfrom[44)Xfullsot20)Xloadto[114)Xfullsteamflowat[100)Xload,andhPcorrespondingto[114)Xfuearnflowabove1oad.(f)LessthanorequaltotiondefinedashPcorrespoto[40)Xfullsteamflowbetween[0)Xand[20)Xloadandthen>ncreasinglinearlyfrom[40)Xsteamflowa)XLoa[100)X(g)BthcP-11(PressurizerPressure)interlock.TiExceptwhenHSIVsareclosedand~de-activat~53.3-32~du.6agrPirdarRev ESFASInstrumentation3.3e2Table3.3.2-1(page5of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHER.SPECIFIEDCOHOITIOHSREQUIREDCHANNELS~peal<SURVEILLANCEALLOMABLECONDITIONSREQUIREHEHTSVALUE2'LevTRIPSETPOIN~4.SteamLineIsolationf.HighSteaminTwoSteamLines,2()2persteamlineSR3..3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.10(e)CoincidentwithSteamLinePI'essowI)F3(i)1persteamlineSR3.-->(6351a[6751SR3.3.2.5ppsi9SR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.10HighSteamFlow'~(v)steamlineSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9fullsteamflowatnoLoadsteampressuresg4fullsteamflowatnoLoadsteampressureCoincidentwith.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.CoincidentwithT~-LowLow1,2~WprLoopSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.287-SR3.3.2AEe8'FF~FeHigh-HighSteamFLowC12(W3(&2pc/'teamline>KSR3.3.2.1SR3-3.2Ãz.SR3.3.2.45g,'jELF+8Sullstam.flotfulloadeessre.(,Ecf'Ws)uefoatfulloadtamessureCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction,1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.(conttnued)(a)ReviewerNote.(d)Abovethe-LowLow)exeeeeFFeeelmlllelveareeeImplementationsmaycontainonlyALLowableValuedependingonSetintStrlock.and+de-activated)5.Rev.0 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page6of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREGUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEALLNIABLETRIPCONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSVALUESETPOINT()~Q.v5.aersoationa.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysb.SGMaterl.evel-HighQC,Q1,22trainsdE>~lWe.M3t'R3.3.2AlbSR3.3.2.1s(6~SR3.3.2.$2.SR3.3.28~a~~~<<.v...NAs~Xc.SafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfmctionsandrequirements.6.AuxiliaryFeedwatera.AutomaticActuat'ionLogic,andActuationReSootectionstem1,2,32trainsPG@~~&NASR33.2.4NAb.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays(BalanceoPlantESFAS1,2,32trainsSR3.3.2.3NANASGHaterLevel-LouLoM1,2,3A3fperSGISR3.3.2.1aQUCAXSR3.3.2.02SR3.3.2N~F>~<<IIR555BX(continued)RevieMerNote:UnitspecificilementationsmacontainonlyAliouabieVonSeti(j(f)Exceptshenal(~~QuarWandassociatedbypassvalves~areclosedandge-activatec~orisolatedbyaclosedmanualvaivegr3.3-34 ESFASInstruct]]entation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page7of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstrunentationFUHCT[OHAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIED,REQUIREDCONDITIONSCNANNEl.SSURVEILLANCEALLOMABLETRIPCONDITIONSREQUIRENENTSVALUESFTPOINT()6.AuxiliaryFeedwater(continued)SafetyInjectiondli6Q'Llh2qSR3.3.2.%>SR3.3.2.WS~~sectimedelayRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationfunctionsandrequirements.e,b1,2,3~perbus~9aQ975]VuithS%8SlsectimedelayUndervoageReacrCoolant[3]perSR3.3.2.7a[69]'Abusa[70SR3.3.2voltagetage3...10TripofaRHainFeedNaterPumps1,2~2~r~pumpSR3.3.2A+~~s]ga~leigB.CAlpv'1\'0h.AuxiliaryFater-PulpSuctioTransferonSuctioPressure-Lou1,2,3[2]SR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2.7SR3.3.2.9a[20.531[psia]psia7.AutomaticSwitchover'toContaIMlentSumpa.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays1,2,3,42trainsSR3..2R3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.6NANAb.RefuelingMaterStorageTank(RUST)Level-LowLOM1,2,3,4SR3.3.2.115]XandSR3.3.2.5SSR3.3.2.9SR3.3.2.10a[]andS[]CoincidithSafetnjectionRefertoFunction1(SafetyInjection)forallinitiationflslctionsandrequirements.(continued)a)RevieMerNote:UnitspecificimplementationsmaycontainonlyAllowableValuedependingonSetpointStudymethodologyusedbytheunit.3.3-35 ESFASInstrumentation3.3.2Table3.3.2-1(page8of8)EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemInstruncntationFUNCTIONAPPLICABLENODESOROTHERSPECIFIEDCONDITIONSREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCECONDITIONSREQUIREHENTSALLOMABLEVALUETRIPSETPOINT(AutomaticSwitchoverontailmntSump(coned)c.RMSTLevel-Low1,2,3,4KSR3.3.2.12[15SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9SR..10a[18]XCoincidentwithSafetyInjectionRefertoFunction1(Sa)ection)forallinitiationfunct'lohsandI'cqu'ItsCoincidentContentSumpel-High1,2,3,4SR3.3.2.1,0)in.SR3.3.2'aboSR3.3.2.9el.[703]SR3.3.2.10a[)in.aboveel.[]ft8.nterlocksEIa.Reactor1~P-41,2,31pCI'rain,2trainsSR3.3.2.11NANAgQ,4b.PressurizerPressure,P-111,2,3S..2.1R3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.9s[1996)ps'Igs[]psigc.T~-LowLow,P-121,2,3perloop3.3.2.1SR.2.5.SR3.3..z[550.6]Fa[553]Fd.SGMaterLevelghHigh,1,2[3]perSGSR3.3.2.1SR3.3.2'SR3.3.3.9s[84.s[82.4]XWOGSTS3.3-36Rev.0,09/28/92 PAHInstrumentation3.3.33.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3.3PostAccidentMonitoring(PAH)InstrumentationLCO3.3.3ThePAHinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.3-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES1.LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME+5aOA.OneormoreFunctionsw>oneequiredchannelinoperable.A.lereqchanness~~M~(t1~~~8aw~~3.3.3-l30daysRequiredActionand-associatedCompletionTimeofConditionQ-notmet.0-AngerLo1InitiateactionnorancSpe'mmediatelyQSe\gCNotapplicabletohydrogenmonitorchannels.C.,lRestoreonechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.7days)OneeFunctionsithtworequiredhannelsinoperable.8,o~rg~L~~QAD~IDF6'oinued)3.3-37 PAMInstrumentation3.3.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMETwohydrogenmonitorchannelsinoperable..1RestoreonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursRequiredActionandaetiqoTimeofd+'onCnotmet.E.1Enteronreferencedinable3.3.3-1forthechanne.Immediately~o~~--*Moqaopb~m'ie.~'p'eeacbwm7uiredbRequire~innE.l)anreferenceeele3.3.3-1.F.lBeinMODE3.AND6hours@g,~~F.2BeinMODE4.~l~o~~~'<~EwvCna<<~~~<~eae-12hoursRequiredActio~n.IandreferencedinTable3.3.3-.G.lInitiatcordancewithSpeciseat-io5.9.2.c.satelyMohoped<4~~OCQuana~C.iu~~a~~~fsOd<<~eAux.~lop~~,b.1~ropia~c.~~)Mofay&~"ldms.

PANInstrumentation3.3.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSC,"AqL---Q>-----------NOTESR3.3.3.1andSR3.3.3WapplytoeachPANinstrumentationFunctioninTable3.3.3-1.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.3.1PerformCHANNELCHECKforeachrequiredinstrumentationchannelthatisnormallyenergized.31daysSR3.3.3.2NeuroGALIBRQAIOR".NOTE-------------excudedfromCHANNELPerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.[~months3.3-39AuLLL(vddudd~"pd>0' PANInstrumentation3.3.3Table3.3.3-1(page1of1)PostAccidentHonitoringInstrunentationFUHCTIONCONDITIONREFERENCEDFRONREQUIREDCHANNELSREQUIREDACTIONE.1f'r~~irP'hat~+C.C.,D)6C3.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)HotLegTemperature4.RCSColdLegTemperature5.RCSPressure(llide,Range)'I~ReactorVesselllaterLevelWaterLevelContairmentPressure(wideRange)iAperlooplcaperloop(a)~Q.CeP,&QICIC)lM~6..Q.,&>SrS.C.,C).012S@CondensateStorageTankLevel15.CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant/It16.CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant42)a-17.CoreExitTecperature-Quadrant~~18.CoreExitTemperature-Quadrant~4)'9.AuxiliaryFeedwaterFlow1D.ContairmentAreaRadiation(HighRange)11.HydrogenMonitors44R.PressurizerLevel2~NICt81OI'2(42(A2(lt)2(b)~z~sag,cG,G~$.4-,6,6.~a.a.,(),c~lb,C..Oi(c~G,C.a(),4~Er,D,Qe*r,oCj~a.c.,a.Q+a.c.,u.g.iredfor>soat>onvavesoadeactivatedIvalveblindflangeorcheckvalvewithflowthroughvr0CSfAchanhelconsistsoftwocoreexitthermocouples(CETs).ReviewerHote:Tablebeamendedforeachunitasnecessarytolis-(1)'llRegulatoryGuidets~andRegulatoryGuide1.97,CategoryI,non-TypeAinstrunit'sRegulatoryGuide1.97,SafetyEvaluationReport.Naccordancewiththeq.~~+\>('~q~B~ger~ig,)HALI.~~uszkn~ay.4~MGo.~a~r(.SC,g~d~(lI~~)aa.S(Aaac~gE(),)~NucJLenvV~3.3-40fi.e.,n,gLt-.oi6S,C.,h,q,I+$2116ie,iDiG6L,b

~I~l~~g~IIII~II,~I~~~IIIIII~~~~~~,~~~I oeShutdownSyste3.3SURILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREgUCYSR3.3.1PerformCHANNELCHECKforeachrequiredinstrumentationchannelthatisnormallyenergized.31dsSR3.3.4.2rifyeachrequiredcontrolcircuitandtrsferswitchiscapableofperformingtheintendedfunction.[18]monthsSR3.3.4.3------------------NOTENeutrondeectorsareexcludedfroCHANNELCALIBRATIONPerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONfeachrequiredinstrumntationchanel.[18]months!4SR3.3.4.4PerformTADOTofthectortripbreakeropen/closedication.18monthsOGSTS3.3-42Rev.0,09/28/92 ~~rRemoteShutdownSystem3.3.4Table3.3.4-1(page1of1)RemoteShutdownSystemInstrmentationandControlsNOTE-Reviewerote:Thistableisforillustrationpurposesonly.ItdoesnotattesttoencompasseryFumtionuateveryunit,butdoescontainthetypesof'Factionscceaoniyfound.NCTION/INSTRUHENTCONTROLPARAHETERREQUIREDNUHBEROFFUNCTNSReactivityControla.SourceRangeNeutFluxb.ReactorTripBreakersitionc.HanualReactorTrip[1petripbreaker)[2]2.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PrureControla.PressurizerPressureorRCSHideRangePressureb.PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefVal(PORV)ControlandBlockValveControl[1,ontrolsnastbeforPORV&blockvalvesonsameline]7e.SGLevelOIARIFlow3.DecayHeatRemovalviaSteamGenerators(SGs)a.RCSHotLegTemperatureb.RCSColdLegTemperaturec.AFMControlsCondensateStorageTankLeld.SGPressure[1perloop][1perloop][1perSG][1perSG]4.RCSInventoryControla.PressurizerLevelb.ChargingPmpControWOOSTS3.3-43Rev.0,09/28/92 LOPDGStartInstrumentation<3.3.P3.3INSTRUMENTATION3.3MLossofPower-(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationLCO3.3MAPPLICABILITY:ACTIONS[Three]cormerbusofthe1geunctionand[three]channelsedegradedvoltageFunctionshaLE.C~QQovs~~cwMa3<M~~wgpg.hpg~~0w~cAlDMODESI,2,3,anWhenassociatedDGisreuiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-s~4NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.One~onecanneinoperable.A.l------NOTE------Theoperablechannemaybbypassedupto4hoursrsurve'ncettingofherchannels.Placechannelintrip.6hoursB.OneFunctionswithtwoormorchannelsperbusinoperB.1RestorealloOPERABLEus.hour(continued)3.3-44 LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3.S~ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEERequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.~Cc~hx4oe,AEnterapplicableCondition(s)andRequiredAction(s)fortheassociatedDGmadeinoperablebyLOPDGstartinstrumentation.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY12hoursSR3.3AERPerformTADOT.[31days]SR3.3.5.3Versywithinlinmpo>meis[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDBASIS(continued)@<~'l4~xv&hPtxoe4~u'~~~<A,h~~,~~<~~~Cue>.~i5g3.3-45 LOPDGStartInstrumentation3.3m'iSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.~PermCHANNELCALIBRATIONwith~g~@ripSetpointandAllowableValue~asfollows:[18]monthsa~LosofvoltageAllowableValue>[29Vwithatimedelayo[0.8]2]second.LossofvoltaTripSeointh[2975]Vwithtidelayof[0.8]+[]seconDegradedvolteAllowaeValue>[3683]Vmthatime'deof[20]+[Jseconds.DegredvoltageTripSetpointa[Ã46]VwithatimedelayofPO]+[]seconds.g~54Lvoea.~'.QklbQJ0344V~coNa~qigv'SL'bSac.tSuo~3.3-46 ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentation3.3.613.INSTRUMENTATION3.3.6ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationLCO3.3.TheContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationinstrumtationforeachFunctioninTable3.3.6-1shallbeOPERABAPPLICABILITY:ODES1,2,3,and4,0ingCOREALTERATIONS,Du'ngmovementofirradiatedfuelassembeswithinontainment.ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisalowedforeachFunion.CONDITIONRE(UIACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.Oneradiationmonitoringchannelinoperable.A.lsoretheaffectedchan1toOPERABLEstatus4hours(continued)MOGSTS3.3-47lRev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentation3.3.6ACTNScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONIMEB--------NOTE---------OnlyalicableinMODEI,,3,or4.Oneormoreunctionswithoneormemanualorautoticactuationtrainsinoperable.ORTwoormoreradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable.ORB.IEnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationValves,"forcontainmentpurgeandexhaustisolatiovalvesmadeinoperablebyisolationinstrumentationImmedielyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.(continued)WOGSTS3.3-48Rev.0,09/28/9 ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIs~aaEI'onnnstrumentation3.3a6ACTNScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIOIHEC-------NOTE---------OnlyaplicableduringCOREALTTIONSormovementirradiatedfuelassembieswithincontainment.OneormoreFunctionswithoneormore~<manualorautomatic~actuationtrainsinoperable.ORTwoormoreradiationmonitoringchannelsinoperable.ORCaIORC.2Placeandmaintaincontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalvesinclosedposition.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsLCO3.9.4,"ContainmentPenetrations,"forcontainmentrgeandexhaustisationvalvesmainoperabebyisolatininstrentation.ImmeditelyImmediatelyRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforCondition'Anotmet.WOGSTS3.3-49Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolatsonlnsWrummentati>n,3.3SVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS---------NOTEReferTable3.3.6-1todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachContainentPurgeandExhastIsolationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.6.1PeormCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.3.6.2PerformTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR,3.3.6.3PerformMASTERRELYTEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.3.6e4PerformCOT.92daysSR3.3.6.5PerformSLARELAYTEST.[92]daysSR3.3.6.6PerfoTADOT.[18]monthsSR3.3.6.7erformCHANNELCALIBRATION.8]monthsWOGSTS3.3-50Rev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentation3.3.6Table3.3.6-1(page1of1)ContaiwentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrunentationFUNCTIONREOUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIRENENTSTRIPSETPNT1.Nanua[ImiationSR3.3.6.6NA2.AutomaticActtionLogicandActuationRela3.ContaiteentRadiat'on2trainsSR3.3.6.2SR3.3.6.3SR3.3.6.5NAa.GaseousSR3.3.6.1SR3.3.6.4SR3.3.6.7s[2xbackground]b.ParticulateSR3.3..1SR3.3.4SR3..6.7s[2xbackground]c.IodineSR3.3.6.13.3.6.4R3.3.6.7s[2xbackground]d.AreaRadiationSR3.3.6.1SR3.3.6.4SR3.3.6.7s[2xbackground]4.ConteireentIsolation-PhaseARefertoLCO3.initiationfact"ESFASInstrunentation,"Function3.a.,forallandrequirements.(WOGS3.3-51"Rev.0,09/28/92 C.R.PA~a"ActuationInstrumentation3.3H'.3INSTRUMENTATIONc-8~6K3.3.P.ControlRoomEmergencSystem(BsNEIna)ActuationInstrumentationSLCO3.3.Wk.~VSTheCIEEDactuationinstrumentationforeachFunctioninTable3.3MIshallbeOPERABLE.5APPLICABILITY:NODESI,2,3,4,+and6,3Durin'movementofirradiatedfuelassemblies~~~sjACTIONSNOTE-SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEMI~ttsA.OneormoreFunctionswithonechannelortraininoperable.A.I-----NOTE-------Placintoxicasprotec'onmeifautomaticansfertotoxiga~proteionmod'sinoerable.PlaceoneSsnerne[ra'onotection]mode.7days(continued)~own.~uiasaf~~Z.Qha~C2ere~~~3.3-52 ~ca-s'Cg~ActuationInstrumentation3.3.%rACTIONScont'inuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.OneormoreFunctionsthtwochannelsortworainsinoperable.-----------NOTE-------------Placeinthetoxicgasprotectionmodeifautomatictransfertotoxicgasprotectionmodeisinoperable.B.l.lPlaceoneCStraininemergey[radiatinproteron]mode.ANDImmediatelyBsIEnterlicableConditionandRequiredAc'onsforoneCREFStraimadeinoperablebyinoperableCREFSactuationinstrumentation.ImmediatelyORB.2Placebothtrainsinemergency[radiationprotection]mode.Immediate~~asia8RequiredActionandassociatedCompletion'imeforConditionA~notmetinMODEI,2,3,or4.ANDEW2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hours(continued)3.3-53 ACTIONScontinuedTAX~5+@A+0~H~~v~<r)oc~wow<ape~AnbQ~"ActuationInstrumentation3.3.7CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEie,MQCSo@4orJRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA~notmeduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies9H~'~SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.AND9-.2'uspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyE.Requiredcwn-andassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAorBnotmetinMODE5orE.IInitiateactiontorestoreoosAREERABLEstatus.eySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSc.PO'Prig-------NOTERefertoTable3.3.~todeterminewhichSRsapplyforeachActuationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY~~~SR3.3.~PerformCOT.92days(continued)3.3-54 @PS'tuationInstrumentation'tCAiR3~3~7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.31daysSEDTESTASISSR3.3.7.4PerformMASTERREEST.31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR..7.5PerformSLAVERELAYTEST.[92]days,5,KSR3.3.~PerformTADOT.monthsS,RSR3.3.%2>PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.~months\~~~~thxvhLs,3.3-55

C~strss~@8++ActuationInstrumentation3.3.W~S-<Table3.3.43)(page1of1)~~goghActuationInstrunentationcE.citsFUXCTIOHREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTRIPSETPOINT1.NanuaiInitiation2.5.Va2.AutomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelaysCQ4trainaft-trairar-S.s-SR3.34QbS.lSR3.3JQPAll-4v3~$~~4.HANA%9.ys3.ControlRoomRadiatioca.tSR3'3s~SR3.3~SR33SR3.3.EmbC~~9ts.IDC;/s(a~pI~ICI"~C;)cs(~~4.SafetyInjeion2-'I.v'i.RetoLCO3.3.2,"ESFASInstation,"FunctionorallnitiationfunctionsandIrements.3.3-56 FBACSActuationInstrumentationi,3.3.3.INSTRUMENTATION3.3.FuelBuildingAirCleanupSystem(FBACS)ActuationInstrumentaonLCO3.3.8TheFBACSactuationinstrumentationfor-eachFunioninTable3.3.8-1shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:[MODESI,2,3,and4,]uringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemiesinthefuelbuilding.ACTIONS-----------------------NOTESeparateConditionentryiallowedforeachFution.CONDITIONREQUI0ACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreFunctionswithonechannelortraininoperable.A.laceoneFBACStrainoperation.7daysB.OneormoreFunctionswithtwochannelsortwotrainsinoperable.l.lPlaceoFBACStraininoperaton.ANDImmediatelyB.1.2OREnterapplicabConditionsand.RequiredActionsLCO3.7.13,"FuelBuildingAirCleanupSystem(FBACS),".foronetrainmadeinoperablebyinoperableactuationinstrumentation.Immediately(con'nued)OGSTS3.3-57Rev.0,09/28/92 FBACSActuationInstrumation3.3.8ATIONSCONDITION,REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONIHEB.(coinued)B.2Placebothtrainsinemergency[radiationprotection]mode.ImmedielyC.RequiredActinandassociatedComgetionTimeforConditi+nAorBnotmetdurimovementofirradiaedfuelassembliesintfuelbuilding.C.1Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthefuelbuilding.ImmediatelyD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAorBnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.D.'1ANDD.2BeinDE3.BinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSNOTERefertoTable3.3.8-1tdeterminewhichSRsapplyfoeachFBACSActuationFunction.SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.3.8.1PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hrsSR3..8.2PerformCOT.92daysi,WOGSTS3.3-58(continued)~Rev.0,09/28/92 FBACSActuationInstrumentation3.3.SVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREgUCYSR3.3..3PerformACTUATIONLOGICTEST.3ldsonaSTAEREDTTBASISSR3.3.8.4PrformTADOT.[18]monthsSR3.3.8.5PerformCHANNELCALIBRATION.[18)monthsWOGSTS3.3-59Rev.0,09/28/92 FBACSActuationInstrumentatio3..8Table3.3.8-1(page1of1)FBACSActuationInstrunentat[onFUNCTIONREQUIREDCHANNELSSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSTRSETPOINT1.HanualInitiationSR3.3.8.4NA2.AutomaticctuationLogicandActuationRays2trains[SR3.3.8.3]NA3.FuelBuildingRiationa.Gaseous[2]SR3.3.1SR3.3.2SR3..8.5s[2]mR/hrb.Particulate[2]SR.3.8.1S3.3.8.23.3.8.5s[2]mR/hrWOGSTS3.3-60Rev.0,09/28/92 /,.3.INSTRUHENTATION\1.'.3.9BoronDilutionProtectionSystem(BDPS)BDP3..9LCO3.3.Twotrainsofthe-BDPSshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES[2,]3,4,and5.NOTE-ThborondilutionfluxdoublingsignalaybeblockedinHOD2and3duringreactorstartup.y!ACTIONSCONDITIONREOOIREOACXfOR/COHPLETIONTINEA.Onetraininoperable.A.lRestore'raintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.Twotrainsinoperable.ORRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1AND~/..2.1ORuspendoperationsinvokingpositivereactiityadditions.RestoreoneraintoOPERABLEstats.Immediately1hourI!B.2.2.1Closeunboratedwarsourceisolationvalves.AND1hour(continued)'OGSTS3.3-61Rev.0,09/28/92 BDPS3.3.TIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETITIHEB.(ctinued)B.2.2.2PerformSR3.1.1.1.1hoAnceper12hoursthereafterSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSi.SURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.3.9.1PerformCOT.[92]daysSR3.3.9;2-PerformCHANNELCABION.[18]monthsWOGSTS3.3-62lRev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.183.3INSTRUHENTATIONB3.3.1ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation-4nihu.Y'M'(.Al~I'4(~)JBASESI~pBACKGROUNDTheRTSinitiatesa~tdown,basedonthevaluesofselectedunitparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingthecorefueldesignlimitsandReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundaryduringanticipatedoperationaloccurrences(AOOs)andtoassisttheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)Systemsinmitigatingaccidents.M,k'vii,aSafety~miSL)valuopreventdeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB);Theprotectionandmonitoringsystemshavebeendesignedtoassuresafeoperationofthereactor.Thisisachievedbyspecifyinglimitingsafetysystemsettings(LSSS)intermsofparametersdirectlymonitoredbytheRTS,aswellas~~>~specifingLCOsnoerreacorsysemarametersan~~equipmentPUQmmt45TheLSSS,definedinthisspecificationastheP'ripSetpoints~inconjunctionwiththeLs,establishthethresholdforprotectivesystemactiontopreventexceedingacceptablelimitsduringDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs).DuringAOOs,whicharethoseeventsexpectedtooccuroneormoretimesduringtheunitlife,theacceptablelimitsare:<+~'The~<<KVl'lsSFuelcenterlinemeltshallnotoccur;andTheRCSpressureSLof27psiashallnotbeexceeded.~.xv'si.a,OperationwithintheSLsofSpecification2.0,"SafetyLimits(SLs),"alsomaintainstheabovevaluesandassuresthatoffsitedosewillbewithin10CFR100~ice~ŽbduringAOOs.gg~~areeventsthatareanalyzedeventhoughthey~re~~~notexectedtooduringthe~ife.Theaccept~1mlthatoffsitedos@shallbemaintainedwithinanacceptablefractionof10CFR100)mits.Differentaccidentcategories.areJhow(continued)B3.3-1 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued<.+3C~(un~~.~~M~8n/~an+~io~p.>W~vPPO~4~tapeb~h3x~~Xvci,0,~YV>iw6basedonprobabilityofoccurrence.~Meetingtheacceptaledoselimitforanace~encategoryisconsideredbavintableconsequencesforthatevent.TheRTSinstrumentationissemented'ntodistibutinterconneci;edmodulesas'n0SAR,Chapter+7+(Ref.(P)Fieldtransmittersorprocesssensors;rovideacasuecron>cthephysicalr'surSignalprocessControland8rotectioncusngnaogroectionSystem,InstronSystem(NIS)'ontacts,andprotectionchanetsrovidessignalconditioning,biseintcomparison,procesalgorithmaion,compatibetricalsignaoutpuprotectionsystemdevices,controdcontrolroommiscellaneousi'dStateProtectionSystem(SSPS),'input,logic,anbays:ini'roper'unitshutdownand/orESFoninaccordancewiththedefinedlogic,'sbasenthebistableoutputsfromthesiprocesscontrolanBotectionsysted2Z,wvii.~OS.>.>-l~~~~ieldTransmittersorSensorsReactortripswitchgearorr)rerssanypassbreakers:pro'ecansto>nertothoroddriveechanisms(CRDHs)anclustercontrossemblies(R,or"rods,"tofallincorendshwnthe-reactor.bresalo0~~a~~/lb~P&iM5-M~~Qehm~t.GvgnJ~~aeX~W~pan~haujTomeetthedesigndemandsforredunancandreliability,fourfieldtransmittersorsensorsareusedtomeasuregERparameters.Toaccounforthecalibrationtolerancesandinstrumentdrift,whichassumedtooccurbetweencalibrations,statisticalallowancesareprovided.a,Wc'd~~p~<8Jt~c'~ns~gcWi~nd~~~~~g~~~~~&icontinued)B3.3-2V. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUNDieldTransmittersorSensors(continued)'alues.TheOPERABILIeas."ransmitterorsensorcanbeevaluatedis"asfound"caitiondata'arecornagainstitsdocumentedacceptancriteria.SinalProcessControlandProtectionSstem~~'tsVs\athlaitttaQ,~~ac~lgt,(jJJir&tPt~0gWsm~tttt~n,j,Generally,threeorfourchannelsofprocesscontrolequipmentareusedforthesignalrocessinofdt1fold~nroconisoning,coabloutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthencontroboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsiswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalys.ThesesetpointaredefinedinFSAR,Chapter[7]9.1),Chapter[6](Ref.2),andChapter[15](R.3).Ifthemeasuredvaluofaunitparametereeehepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistablswardedtotheSSPSfordecisievaluation.Chanseparation'aintaineduptoandthroughtheibays.However,nounitparametersrequirefochannelsofsensormeasuremendsignal'proces'.SomeunitparametersprovideinpuonlytothSSPSwhileothersprovideinputtotheSSPS,themaincontrolboarandoneormorecontrosifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threeloicarsufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandreundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwoulntinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctionstillCJEAAQwithatwo-out-of-twologic.Ifonechannelfail~thatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurone-out-of-twologic.fbk3+lfaparameterisused.forinputtothedddnaandaconrolfunction,fourchannelswithatwo-out-of-fourlogicaresufficienttoprovideQerequiredreliabilityandredundancy.HhecircuitC~~'Abletowithstandbothaninpuaiuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.,g~asinglefailurewillneithercausenor(continued)MOGSTSB3.3-3Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.3.1.5Theprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses'.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter7(Ref.4),Chapter6(Ref.5),andChapter15(Ref.6).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.~+~XV'aO eBASESRTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BACKGROUND~~,Mrm,odylew~~nQSQlc~~/~~F~,,f-1S.b~sstTAOCV-s')[0)lcIiLLAC1&(Allop~i4&t4udb~hpc+ms).p,>cuit'aSinalProcessControlandProtectionSstem(continued)preventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Theserequirementsaredescribedin1EEE-279-1971(Ref+7).eerocaquireoreacun>arameteifiedinRerence1.Twologicannelsareequiredtoensurenosinglec@~m)failureo-logicwilldisabletheRTS.aessewhilethreactor'satoweriProvisionstoallowremoving"logic<~ma:hsromserviceduringmaintenanceareunnecessarybecause'ofthelogicsystem'sdesignedreliability.Eqe~~~toc.m~riSetpintsandAllowableValueTheTripSetpointsarethenominalvaluesatwhichtheM~~bistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredto,beproperlyadjustedwhenthe"asleft"valueiswithinthebandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccuracyirationcomaacy.,emirnd~TheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesareasedohtheanalyticallimitsstatedinReferenc.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionis~i.providedwhenallsensorandprocessingtimedelaysaretakenintoaccount.'rumenaionuncertainties,instrumentdrift,andseverenvironmenterrorsforthoseRTSchannelsthatmustfunctio'nhfinedb10CFR50.49Ref.5)%heTripSetpointsspecs)einTable3.3.1-1areconservativelyadjustedwithresecttotheanalticallimits.Adeescrsptionofthemetodologyuset'ku45-ncusngeirexppcsuncertainties,providedinthe"RTS/ESFASSetpointHethodoludy"(Ref.6)TheactualnominalTripSmntenteredintothebistableisservativthatspecifiedbytheAllowableValuetoaanges-inrandommeasurementerrorsdetecKeyaCOT.Oneexasuchachangeinmeasnerrorisdriftduringthesurveiceinterval.IfthemeasuredsetpointdoesnotexceedtheAllowableluethebistableisconsideredOPERABLE(tinued)B3~biM4uP~~ar9/28/92 Insert3.3.1.6TheLCOandApplicabilityofeachRTSFunctionareprovidedinTable3.3.1-1.'ncludedonTable3.3.1-1areTripSetpointsforallapplicableRTSFunctions.TripsetpointsforRTSFunctionsnotspecificallymodeledinthesafetyanalysisarebasedonestablishedlimitsprovidedinPlantprocedures.Analyticalvalues~~~forRTSFunctionswhichensurethatSLsarenotviolatedduringAOOsandthattheconsequencesofDBAswillbeacceptable,providedthattheplantisoperatedwithintheLCOs,includinganyRequiredActionsthatareineffectattheonsetoftheAOOor-DBAandtheequipmentfunctionsasdesignedareprovidedinplantprocedures.NotethatintheaccompanyingLCO3.3.1,theTripSetpointsofTable3.3.1-1aretheLSSS. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESBACKGROUNDz-Z.xv'.<TriSetpintsandAllowableValues(continued)SetpointsinaccordancewiththeAllowableValueensurethat,SLs,arenotviolatedduringAOOs(andthatthecosequencesofbBAswillbeacceptable,providingtheunit'peratedfromwithintheLCOsattheonsetoftheAOODBAandtheequipmentfunctionsasdesigned).NotethatntheaccompanyingLCO3.3.1,theTripSetpointsfTable3.3.1-1aretheLS.EachchanneloftheprocesscontroleipmentcanbetestedonlinetoverrfythatthesignaloysetpointaccuracyiswithinthespecifiedallowancerequirementsofReference2.Onceadesignated'channelistaken'utofservicefortesting,asimulated;signalisinjectedinplaceofthefieldinstrumentsign'al.Theprocessequipmentforthechannelintestisthen<test,verified,andcalibrated.SRsforthechannelsare~specifiedintheSRssection.TheTripSetpointsandAl>lowableValueslistedinTable3.3.1-1arebasedont1emethodologydescribedinReference6,whichincorporateqalloftheknownuncertaintiesapplicableforeachchannel.Themagnitudes'oftheseuncertainti'esarefactoredintothedeterminationofeachTripSetpo>'nt.A'llfieldgensorsandsignalprocessingequipm'entforthesechannelsareassumedtooperatewithintheallowancesofthee'ncertaintymagnitudes./SolidStateProtectionSstemITheSSPS.'equipmentisusedforthedecisionlogicprocessingofoutputsfromthesignalprocessingequipntbistables.Tomeettheredundancy.requirements,twotraisofSSPS,eachperformingthesamefunctions,areprovidd.Ifonetrainistakenoutofserviceformaintenanceotestpurposes,thesecondtrainwillprovidereactoripand/orESFactuationfortheunit.Ifbothtrainsaretenoutofserviceorplacedintest,areactortripwillreslt.Eachdrainispackagedinitsowncabinetforphysicala~~~~~~~lectricalseparationtosatisfyseparationandindendencequirements.Thesystemhasbeendesignedtotripitheeventofalossofpower,directingtheunittoasafehutdowncondition.(continued)MOGSTSB3.3-5Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentation83.3eIBASESBACKGROUND+SolidStateProtectionSstem(continued)TheSSPSperformsthedecisionlogicforactuatingareactortriporESFactuation,generatestheelectricaloputignalthatwillinitiatetherequiredtripoctuation,anrovidesthestatus,permissive,andunciatoroutputsignatothemaincontrolroomofunit.ThebistabletputsfromthignalprocessingequipmentaresensedbythePSepmentandcombinedintologicmatricesthatreprese~ombinationsindicativeofvariousunit"upsetandaccidenttra'ents.Ifarequiredlogicmatrixcombinationiscomplete,~esystemwillinitiatea!reactortriporsendactuationsigna3myiamasterandslaverelaystothosecomponentswhoseaggregate,Functionbestservestoalleviatetheconditionandrestoretheunittoasafecondition.ExamplesaregivenintheApplicableSafeyAnalyses,LCO,andApplicabilitysectionofthis~O.~paa4<lv~~gq)~<a)+VV~~~Q.(A(4~~~~tjIlP!.kvbc)OKi~~~~4Gvia-s6,3.3.<-L.~df1~~~<~Sll<<!<3<Q~m,'d..!oct.~p~~~<P1.4rbS!!~<<p@O4CCbS<tl.M~~~$1~atesfs~<i/4<;f<~~<i~~ptas~)~mm(ei!<ReactorTriSwitchearTheRTBsareintheelectricalpowersupplylinefromthe'controlroddrivemotorgeneratorsetpowersupplytothe(CRDMsI.OpeningoftheRTBsinterruptspowertotheCRDMs,whichallowstheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintthbi.EhRTB~ihbreakeroaowtestingoftheRTBwhilethegistsatpower.Duringnormaloperation~theoutputfromthe65&is~z~~avoltagesignalthatenergizestheundervoltagecoilsintheRTBsandbypassbreakers,ifinuse.Whentherequiredlogicmatrixcombinationiscompleted,the~upuvoltagesignalisremoved,theundervoltagecoilsarede-energized,thebreakertripleverisactuatedbythede-energizedundervoltaecoil,andtheRTBsandbypassreaersarerippeopetheshutdownrodsandcontrolrodstofallintothecore.Inadditiontothe-energizaionotheunervotagecoils,eachbreakerisalsoequippedwithashunttripdevicethatisenergizedtotripthebreakeropenuponreceiptofareactortripsignalfromthe~.Eithertheundervoltagecoilortheshunttripmechanismissufficientbyitself,thusroviding~diversetripmechanis!!g'~<'resTedecisionlogicmatrixFunctionsareescriunctionaldiagramsincludedinReference2.Inaddition(continued)B3.3-6Rev. RTSInstrumentationB3.3elBASESBACKGROUNDW>>~Xvtts~"ReactorTriSwitchear(continued)the-reaqtortriporESF,thesediamsalsodescribethevarious"permi-ssiveinterlochatareassociatedwithunitconditions.'ach-tg'nhasa.builtintestingdevicethatcanautomatica1~1testhadecisionlogicmatrix.Functionsandtheectuationdevicesmhiletheunitisat,power.WhenanyonetrainistakenoutSservicefortesting,theothertrainiscapableofprovingunitmonitori.ngandprotectionuntilthetestinghasbeencomplet'ed.Thetestingdeviceissemiautomatictominimizetestingtime.&2.X,Vissw.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY~~~~~XVaa,a.WWlc:Vit.th.~w;oMTheRTSfunctionstomaintaintheSLsduringallAOOsandmitigatestheconsequencesofDBAsinWHEinwhichtheRTBsareclosed.EachoftheanalyzedaccidentsandtransientscanbedetectedbyoneormoreRTSFunctions.TheaccidentanalysisdescribedinReference3takescreditformostRTStripFunctions.RTStripFunctionsnotspecificallycreditedintheaccidentanalysisarequalitativelycreditedinthesafetanalysisandtheNRCstaffapprovedlicensingasisorthe~.TheseRTStripFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheymayalsoserveasbackupstoRTStripFunctionsthatwerecreditedinthe,accidentanalysis.TheLCOrequiresallinstrumentationperforminganRTSFunction,listedinTable3.3.1-1intheaccompanyingLCO,tobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions.1TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYoffouroreechannelsineachinstrumentationFunction,twochannesofManualReactorTripineachlogicFunction,andtwotrainsi'neachAutomaticTripLogicFunction.FourOPERABLEinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationarerequiredwhenoneRTSchannelisalsousedasacontrolsysteminput.ThisconfigurationaccountsforthepossibilityofthesharedchannelfailinginsuchamannerthatitcreatesatransientthatrequiresRTSaction.In(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-7Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABL'ESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYthiscase,theRTSwillstillprovideprotection,evenwithrandomfailureofoneoftheotherthreeprotectionchannels.Threeoperableinstrumentationchannelsinatwo-out-of-threeconfigurationaregenerallyrequiredwhenthereisnopotentialforcontrolsystemandprotectionsysteminteractionthatcouldsimultaneouslycreateaneed~forRTStripanddisableoneRTSchannel.Thetwo-out-of-threeandtwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausingareactortrip.Specificexceptionstotheabovegeneralphilosophyexistandarediscussedbelow.Y~ThesafetyanalysesandOPERABILITYrequirementsapplicabletoeachRTSFunctionarediscussedbelow:23.%Vsi.O.1.ManualReactorTriTheManualReactorTripensuresthatthecontrolroomoperatorcaninitiateareactortripatanytimebu'singeitheroftworeactortripthecontrol.AManualReactorTrinctionssusetheperaox@osuownthereactorwheneveranyparameterisraidlytrendingtowarditsTriSetpoin.~sds~Vs~~4a.-~ir.Lu4urnl~to~bLP~~~6scod.23.Ocvis.e++T%VieEO.TheLCOrequirestwoManualReactorTripchannels+QrPPEIPIIE.TIdpdIE~~u3~ecPf%oth.d~~~uaj~O.~he&~~'reoeOPBABLEsothatnosingle~wRRs)failurewi11disabletheROuReactorTriFuse0lUIOWdddddd.EEEFl'hns44Scpreha.~d~Straw-Had~nor,maninitiationofareactortripmustbeOPERABLE.ThesearetheMODESinwhichtheshutdownrodsand/orcontrolrodsare.partiallyorfullywithdrawnfromthecore.InMODE3,4,or5,~>g,axa.emanualinitiationFunctionmustalsobeOPERABLEQcendifthetheControlRodQrive(CRD)Systemiscapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrodsorthecontrolrods.Inthiscondition,inadvertentcontrolrodwithdrawalisossibInMODE34,or5,manualinitiationofamdivf-"~reactortriptobeOPERABLEiftheCRDSystemisnotcapableofwithdrawingtheshutdownrods(continued)B3.3-8p(p~LoirbtLfiJ4.TtRev. Insert3.3.1.7TheRTSutilizesvariouspermissivesignalstoensurereactortripFunctionsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthecurrentplantstatus.ThesepermissivesbackupoperatoractionstoensureprotectionsystemFunctionsarenot'bypassedduringplantconditionsunderwhichthesafetyanalysisassumestheFunctionisavailable.8+<~>>.~ThereareninepermissivesintheRTSofwhich,fivearerelatedtotheapplicableMODESandspecifiedconditionsforRTSFunctionsspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1.Thesefivearediscussedindetailbelow.

Insert3.3.1.8P-6PermissiveTheP-6permissivepermitsbypassingtheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionduringanapproachtopower.Thispermissiveisderivedfroma'istablecircuitintheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentationwhenanychannelgoesapproximatelyonedecade(IE-10amps)abovetheminimumchannelreading.Afterthepermissiveiseffective,twodefeatpushbuttonsmustbedepressedtoblocktheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunction.IfbothIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelsfallbelowIE-10amps,thepermissiveisautomaticallydefeated.Thepermissivesetpointbysimultaneouslydepressingbothdefeatpushbuttons.Duringadecreaseinpower,thepermissiveresetsat5E-11amps.P-7PermissiveTheP-7permissiveisusedtobypassthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlowLow(TwoLoops),ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)BreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andtheUndervoltageBusllAandllBtripFunctionsduringlowpowerandstartupoperations.Thepermissiveisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating<8.5%RTPasmeasuredbyeitherthefirststageturbinepressureorPowerRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentation.P-8PermissiveTheP-8permissiveallowsachangeintheReactorCoolantFlow-LowandRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctionssothatalossofasingleloopwillnotcauseareactortrip.Thepermissiveissetfor<50%RTPassensedbythePowerRangeNeutronFluxinstrumentation.P-9PermissiveTheP-9permissivepreventsareactortriponLowAutostopoilpressureandTurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionswhenaturbinetripoccurs<50%RTP.Thispreventsunnecessaryreactortripswhenthesteamdumpsystemisavailable.Thepermissivereceivesinputfromcondenserpressureandcirculatingwaterpumpbreakerposition.P-10PermissiveTheP-10permissiveisusedtobypasstheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxandPowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionsduringanapproachtopower.ThepermissivealsoprovidesabackuptotheP-6permissivetoblocktheSourceRangeNeutrontripFunctionandprovidesinputtotheP-7permissive.Thepermissiveisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>8%RTPasmeasuredbythepowerrangeneutronfluxinstrumentation.InordertoblockthesetripFunctions,twopushbuttonsfortheIntermediateRangeFluxTripFunctionandtwopushbuttonsforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionsmustbedepressedafterthepermissivebecomeseffective.IfTHERMALPOWERis<8%asmeasuredbyatleastthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannels,thepermissiveautomaticallyblocksthesetripFunctions.Duringadecreaseinpower,thepermissiveresetsat<6%RTP; RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,-andAPPLICABILITY~'3.XVcs.~~3,&VolCL>~Q~~~~0=nb.s~~I.HanualReactorTri(continued)orcontrolrods.Iftherodscannotbewithdrawnfromthecore,thereisnoneedtobeabletotripthereactorbecausealloftherodsareinserted.InHODE6,neithertheshutdownrodsnorthecontrolrodsarepermittedtobewithdrawnandtheCRDHsaredisconnectedfromthecontrolrodsandshutdownrods.Therefore,themanualinitiationFunctionisnotrequired.2.PowerRaneNeutronFlux~erangedetectorsareocathereactorvessel~~aronsleakingfrom)thecore.TheNerrangeedeinpuVtotheRnrolSystemandevelControlSystem.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeaeowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheothercharmsrovidinterotectionfunctionactuation.NotethatthisFunctionasoprovidesaaopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalprior.toinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.a.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Hih~Za)CVI\~Q.ThePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovided,fromallpowerlevels,againstapositivereactivityexcursionleadingtoDNBduringpoweroperations.esecanbecausedbyrodwithdrawalorreductionsinRCSterne.TheLCOrequiresalfourofthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighchannelstobeOPERABLE.InHODEIor2,whenapositivereactivityexcursioncouldoccur,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionwillterminatethereactivityexcursionandshutdownthereactorpriortoreachingapowerlevelthatcoulddamagethefuel.InHODE3,4,5,<~OG-SR-rk.5:+~'AuQg~~>g~83.3g(continued)Rev.O,.Ogg~Byg~ Insert3.3.1.9ThePowerRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccident.TheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS)powerrangedetectors(N-41,N-42,N-43,andN-44)arelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNIS-powerrangedetectorsprovideinputtotheCRDSystemfordeterminationofautomaticrodspeedanddirection.3,XVI'Q RTSInstrumentation~B3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY~.x,v'<i,~W+ii'%~~a4PowerRaneNeutronFlux-Hih(continued)or6,theNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutrlevelsIntheseMODES,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HitobeOPERABLEecausethereactorisshutdownandreactivityexcursionsintothepowerrangeareextremelyunlikely.OtherRTSFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstreactivityadditionswheninMODE3,4,5,or6.b.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-LowTheLCOrequirementforthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstapositivereactivityexcursionfromlowpowerorsubcriticalconditions.M3~xvix.0~3.Nv'ii,TheLCOrequiresallfourofthePowerRaneeutronFux-owchannelstoeLE.4ok'nMODE1,below,andinMODE2,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripmustbeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorwhentwo-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsaregreaterthanapproximatelyTP(P-108'l.setpoint).ThisFunctionisautomaticallyunblockedwhenthree-out-of-fourpowerrangechannelsarebelowtheP-10setpoint.AbovetheP-10setpoint,positivereactivityadditionsaremitigatedbythePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunction.e~tlu~owu.dInMODE3,4,5,or6,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowtripFunctiontobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisshutdownandtheNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectneutronlevelsinthisrange.OtherRTStripFunctionsandadministrativecontrolsprovideprotectionagainstpositivereactivityadditionsorpowerexcursionsinMODE3,4,5,or6.(continued)WOGqz~>>~~~+~(8zwB3.3-10Re RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)C.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-fAIThef(hl)FunctionisusedinthecalcutionofheOvertemperaturehTtrip.Itisaunctionofth~indicateddifferencebetweenthupperandlowerMSpowerrangedetectors.isFunctionmeasurestheaxialpowerdistribion.TheOvertemperatir~hTTripSetpoiisvariedtoaccountforimb~ancesinkthaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbtheNISupperandlowerpowerrangede~ctog's.IfaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignTimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweerythupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors',theipSetpointisreducedinaccordaewithNo1ofTable3.3.1-1.TheLCOrequirsallfourchannelsff(b,l)tobeOPERABLE.ThisFunctionactsonlyasaninputtoeOvertemperaturehTFunction;therefore,nLSSSarespecificallyappliedtothef(hl)tripFunction.InrODE1or2,whentheOvertemperaturehTtipisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thef(b,l)Function.mustbeOPERABLEbecausethef(hl)FunctiongprovidesoneoftheinputstotheOvertemperaturLTtrip.3.PowerRaneNeutronFluxRateThePowerRangeNeutronFluxRatetripsusethesamechnelsasdiscussedforFunction2above.PorRaneNeutronFlux-'ositiveRateThePoweangeNeonFlux-HighPositiveRatetripFunctiouresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstr'nasesinneutronfluxthat-arecharacisticofanAdriverodhousingrureandtheaccompanejectionoftheCA.ThisFunctioncomplimethePowerRangeeutronFlux-HighandLowSetpointtrip(continued)MOGSTSB3.3-11Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYPowerRaneNeutronFlux-HihPositiveRate(continued)unctionstoensurethatthecriteriaarmetforaodejectionfromthepowerrange.TheCOrequiresallfourofthePowRangeNeutrFlux-HighPositiveRatecannelstobeOPERABb.InMODEIr2,whenthereispotentialtoaddalargeamontofpositiverectivityfromarodejectionacc'dent(REA),thPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighPoi'tiveRatetipmustbeOPERABLE.InMODE3,4,or6,thPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighPosiiveRatetripFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABEbe+useotherRTStripFunctionsandadmiistfativecontrolswillprovideprotectionainstpositivereactivityadditions.Also,s'onlytheshutdownbanksmaybewithdrawniME3,4,or5,theremainingcomplementocontrolbankworthensuresasuffisentdegeeofSDMintheeventofanREA.InODE6,norodsarewithdrawnandtheSDMisin~easeddurinrefuelingoperations.Thereactoresselheadisisoremovedortheclosurebolsaredetensionepreventinganypressureb'ldup.Inadditio'theNISpowerrangedetectorscannotdetectutronlevelspresentinthismode./PowerRaneNeutronFlux-HihNeativeRateThePwerRangeNeutronFlux-HighegativeRatItripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovideformultipleroddropaccidents.Ath'ghpowerleels,amultipleroddropaccidentcoldcauslealfluxpeakingthatwouldresultinnunconservativelocalDNBR.DNBRisdefidasheratiooftheheatfluxrequiredtocaseaNBataparticularlocationinthecoretthelocalheatflux.TheDNBRisindicativeothemargintoDNB.NocreditistakenfortheoperationofthisFunctionforthoseroddroaccidentsinwhichthelocalDNBRswillbegreaterthanthelimit.continued)B3.3-12 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZZ,xi'~XV<i.CC~-sac~b.PowerRaneNeutronFlux-HihNeativeRate(continued)The-LCOrequiresallfourPowerReNeutronFlux-H'ghNegativeRatecharmstobeOPERABLE.InHODE1or2whentherespotentialforamultipleroddroaccidtooccur,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux'ghNegativeRatetripmustbeOPERABLE.In'-4,5,or6,thePowerRangeNeutronFlu-HighNegativeRatetripFunctiondoesn'thavetobe8ERABLEbecausethecoreisnot~riticalandDNBistaconcern.Also,sinceonlytheshutdownbanksgybewithdrawninHODE3,4,or5,theremaingcomplementofcontrolbankworthensureslcxcr,uhud-~TheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdrawalaccidentfromadii~.TliFunctionprovidesredundantprotectiontothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowSg~n~ntripFunction.TheNISintermediateranedetectorsarelocatedexternalotereactorvesselandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNISintermediaterangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputtocontrolsystems.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltopreventautomaticandmanualrodwithdrawalpriortoinitiatingareactortrip.Limitingfurtherrodwithdrawalmayterminatethetransientandeliminatetheneedtotripthereactor.TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosinglegaade@failurewilldisablethistripFunction.suffsc>entdegreeofSDHsntheeventofanInNODE6,norodsarewithdrawnandtherequire.SDHisincreasedduringrefuelingoperations.Inaddition,theNISpowerrange'detectorscannotdetectneutronleveresentinthist.~hc;~aP<~IntermediateRaneNeutronFlux~oha4d.v(continued)B3.3-13 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYIntermediateRaneNeutronFlux(continued)BecausethistripFunctionisimportantonlyduringC3%~,thereisgenerallynoneedtodisablecannesfortestingwhiletheFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Therefore,athirdchannelisunnecessary.3D~3,.xvah~GIllf'i&a~Qrg,~i~j<.%g0JLJf.~"~~ox>'I5<~InMODE1below,andinMODE2,whenensaoconroenkrodithdrawalteIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripmustbeOPERABLove~(P-10setoing,thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightrieUX-triprovidcoreprotectionforarodwithdrawalaccident.InMODE3,4,or5,tIttRlttFtoeecausethonrorosmusuyesutdownrodswithdrawnhectorcannotbestarte~d~nthiscondition.hecohasther'dSDMtomitigatetheconsequenc0>tivereactivityadditionaccident.IrrMODE6,rodsarefullyinsertedandthecor~hasarequiredincreSDM.Also,theNIintermediaterangedetectorscannotneutrone'hisMSourceRaneNeutronFlux~~tkev0C~ace,isa.~W3,xvli,z.<~<gLuQMwebJ-P~I(<4-h,l~))TheLCOrequirementfor,theSource,RangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstanuncontrolledRCCAbankrodwithdralaccidentromasubcriticaconditionThistripFunctionprovidesredundantrotectiontov>'~~',~thePowerRangeNeutronFlux-'owandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsn,an,amsnisraiveconrosasoeventtheuncontrolledwithdrawalofrods.heNISsourceraneetectorsareocatedexternaltothereactorvesseandmeasureneutronsleakingfromthecore.TheNIS.sourcerangedetectorsdonotprovideanyinputstocontrolsystems.ThesourcerangetripistheonlyRTSautomaticprotectionfunctionrequiredinMODES3,4,and5.Therefore,thefunctionalcapabilityatthespecifiedTripSetpointisassumedtobeavailable.(continued)ev009/28/9~

,RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY22~avid.a~'&~~45&%lOne~~.xvii.aL.~~Q~~kkU~~aÃ4fdr~AWare~~pH>%6106~~Rt~~~~XPiioa.SourceRaneNeutronFlux(continued)TheLCOrequirestwochannelsofSourceRangeNeutronFluxtobeOPERABLE.TwoOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttoensurenosingleMQQwfailurewilldisablethistripFunction.TheLCOalsorequireschanneloftheSourceRangeNeutronFluxoeOPERABLEinMODE.3,4,or5withRTBsope.Inthicase,thesourceraneFunctionistoprov>econtrolroomindicationn)nputrectionBDPS).TheoutputsoftheFunctiontoRTSogicarenotrequiredOPERABLEwhentheRTBsareopen.~~cw~~~fL~p3i~TheSourceRangeNeutronFluxFunctionprovidesprotectionforcontrolrodwithdrawalfromsubcritical,borondilutionandcontrolrodejectionevents.TheFunctionalsoprovidesvisualneutronfluxindic'ationinthecontrolroom.InMODE2when(belowtheP-6setpoint)<K'~@,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripmustbeOPERABLE.AbovetheP-6setpoint,theIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low~~5tripwillprovidecoreprotectionforreactivityaccidents.AbovetheP-6setoint,theNISsourcerangedetectorsarede-energizeaninoperable.InMODE3,4,or5withthe,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionmust~beABL,theSronluxtripmustbOPERABovidecorerionaainstaitrawalaccidentICRDSystemisnotcapablewa,esourcerangedetectorsarenotrequired.totripthereactor.However,theirmonitoringFunctionmustbeOPERABLEtomonitorcoreneutronlevelsandprovideindicationofreactivitychangesthatmayoccurresultofeventslikeaborondilutioneseinrovseoeerequirementsfortheNISsourcerangedetectorsinMODE6areaddressedinLCO3.9.~"NuclearInstrumentation."(continued)B3.3-15 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)~ZiX.Vt\iQ>Z.Mh~.~,Xa'sOmn,m.~~Pt+a<I'~~b~(9liaa~~inst~0~anP~~qk~~OvertemeratureATTheOvertemperaturehTtripFunctionisprovidedtoensurethatthedesignlimit[DNBRjismet.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherangeoverwhichtheOverpowerATtripFunctionmustprovideprotection.TheinutstotheOvertemperature4Ttripinclude)pressure,,axialpowerdistribution,andreactorpowerasindicatedbyloop4Tassumingfullreactorcoolantflow.ProtectionfromviolatingtheDNBRlimitisassuredforthose~~transientsthatareslowwithresecttodelaysfromeceoemeasuremensystem.TheFunctionmonitorsbothvariationinpowerandflowsinceadecreaseinflowhasthesameeffectonbTasapowerincrease.TheOvertemperaturehTtripFunctionuseseachloop~9asameasureofreactorpowerandiscomparedwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;~pressurizerpressure-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesinsystempressure;and~axialowerdibutiof(hI).Dynamiccompensationisincludedforsystempipingdelaysfromthecoretothetemperaturemeasurementsystem.TheOvertemperaturehTtripFunctioniscalculatedforeachloopasdescribedinNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.TrioccursifOvertemperaturebTssepressureandtemperaturessnasareusedotcontrolfunctions.oannputfailuretothecosystem,ichmaythen'onfunctiontuat'nasingleeintheothersrovlaionNotetatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignatogenerateQl.Chgm'I.QHPemQcontinued)Rggoons.N<tttp/'Pmua<~B3.3-16 Insert3.3.1.10theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.If~~axialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicated'bythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote1ofTable3.3.1-1.

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE'AFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYW2~xvat,o+3.)cVti.&,~3.X.VVa.aOvertemeratureAT(continued)aturbinerunbackpriortoreachingtheTripSetpoint.Aturbinerunbackwillreduceturbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyalleviatetheOvertemperatureATconditionandmaypreventAeactortriTheLCOrequiresafourchannelsoftheOvertemperatureATtripFunctiontobeOPERABLEor00equ)resahreechannelsontheOvertemperature'iontoPERABunits.NotethattheOvertemperatureATFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.FailuresthataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InNODE1or2,theOvertemperatureATtripmustbeOPERABLEtoreventDNB.InNODE3,4,5,or6,thisrspFunctiontobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutDNB.OverowerAT3.xV6,0yg4AtTheOverpowerATtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedtoensuretheintegrityofthefuel(i.e.,nofuelpelletmeltingandlessthan1%claddingQH~underallpossibleoverpowerconditions.ThistripFunctionalsolimitstherequiredrangeoftheOvertemperatureATtripFunctionandprovidesabackuptothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-HighSetpointtrip.TheOverpowerATtripFunctionensuresthattheallowableheatgenerationrate(kW/ft)ofthefuelisnotexceeded.ItusestheATofeachloopasameasureofreactorpowerwithasetpointthatisautomaticallyvariedwiththefollowingparameters:~reactorcoolantaveragetemperature-theTripSetpointisvariedtocorrectforchangesincoolantdensityandspecificheatcapacitywithchangesincoolanttemperature;~(continued)83.3-1? RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES+ZZ.xvii.4h~3.+.I.I~u-6~(-vQ~$Ž~~ic~~.XViii5APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY~rateofchangeofreactorcoolantaveragetemperature-includingdynamiccompensationforthedelaysbetweenthecoreandthetemperaturemeasurementsystem.~JQA'heOverpowerbTtrigFunctioniscalculatedforeacoopas@5Note2QTable3.3.1-1.TripoccursiOverpowerhTeemperaturesinalsareusedforoerconrofunctions;theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuationandasinglefailureintheremainincannels'providingtheprotectionuncionactuation.NotethatthisFunctionalsoprovidesasignaltoenerateaturbinerunbackpriortreachinthe.'turbinerunbackwillreduceurbinepowerandreactorpower.AreductioninpowerwillnormallyallevietOverpowerhTconditionandmayprevent"eactortrip.TheLCOrequiresfourchannelsW~,mvai.W~~x.vsi.&noOE.~oeOverpower5tripFunctiontobeOPERABLE.NotethattheOverpowerhTtripFunctionreceivesinputfromchannelssharedwithotherRTSFunctions.Failures~thataffectmultipleFunctionsrequireentryintotheConditionsapplicabletoallaffectedFunctions.InNODE1or2,theOverpowerATtripFunctionmustbeOPERABLE.Thesearetheonlenoughheatisgeneratedintheueoeconcernedabouttheheatgenerationratesandoverheatingofthefuel.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thistripFunctiontobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotoperatingandthereisinsufficientheatproductiontobeconcernedaboutfueloverheatingandfueldamage.PressurizerPressure2,3.xvii<gpss-q~9,PT-4$,~~~P'T-455~C~Ae.M<~~tThesamesensorsprovideinputtothePressurizerPressure-Highand-LowtrisandtheOvertemeratbTtriptePressurizerressurechannelsarealsouse(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-18Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.3.1.11axialpowerdistributionf(hI)-theTripSetpointisvariedtoaccountforimbalancesintheaxialpowerdistributionasdetectedbytheNISupperandlowerpowerrangedetectors.Ifaxialpeaksaregreaterthanthedesignlimit,asindicatedbythedifferencebetweentheupperandlowerNISpowerrangedetectors,theTripSetpointisreducedinaccordancewithNote2ofTable3.3.1-1. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICILIYtP"'ZZxvIwiWPressurizerPressure(continued)theactuationogremuseaetowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherctherotectionfunctionactuation.+~>.~~wA.~u4di~~aa.ondfoP5~%~~~a.PressurizerPressure-Low~3.xvi'~.4~3,XV<~~4ThePressurizerPressure-LowtripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowpressure.MTheLCOrequiresfourchannelsorwoano0units6Q~~ressurizerPressure-LowtobeOPERAB4~+~nens~lprovidedagainstvressuregg,5'~ac~~InMODE1,whenDNBisamajorconcern,thewri)PressurizerPressure-LowtripmustbeOPERABLE.ThistripFunctionisautomaticallyenabledincreasingpowerbytheP-7interlock23~8>>~&ecu~.+~~~~dAlAb.t0(.Onecreassngpower,thistripFunctionomaticallyblockedbelowP-7.BelowtheP-7setointnoconceivablepowerdistributionscanoccurthatwouldcauseDNBconcerns.PressurizerPressure-HihThePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstoverpressurizingtheRCS.ThistripFunctionoperatesinconjunctionwiththepressurizerreliefandsafetyvalvestopreventRCSoverpressureconditions.~~~3.'xvi~.0.heLCOrequires0UnlSannelsortwoandfouofthePressurizerPressure-htobeOPERABLE.(continued)83.3-19 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY3.'xvi%,Wb.PressurizerPressure-Hih(continued)ePressurizerPressure->gLSSSisselectedtobebelowthepressurizersafetyvalveactuaiureandabovetheocratedreliefvalve(PO1ssettingminimizeschallenosaiveswhileavoidingunn~saryreactortripoepressurei&creasesthatcanbecontrolledbyhePORVs.-"~3~XVi%.4InMODEIor2,thePressurizerPressure-HighripmustbeOPERABLEtohelppreventRCSoverpressurizationandminimizechallengestothereliefandsafetyvalves.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionnot~tobeOPERABLEbecausetransientsthatcouldcauseanoverpressureconditionwillbeslowtooccur.Therefore,theoperatorwillhavep~'sufficienttimetoevaluate~condisonsantakecorrectiveactions.Additionally,lowtemperatureoverpressureprotectionsystemsprovideoverpressureprotectionwhenbelowMODE4.VlllA8S.PressurizerWaterLevel-Hih~>.7c.vaaQ%1g(4~~~4i~~~<~s)~~~bq~Q'LWp~~~ŽThePressurizerWaterLevel-HightripFunctionprovidesabackupsignalforthePressurizerPressure-Hightripandalsoprovidesprotectionagainstwaterreliefthroughthepressurizersafetyvalves.Thesevalvesaredesignedtopasssteaminordertoachievetheirdesignenergyremovalrate.Areactortripisactuatedpriortothepressurizerbecominwatersolid.%TheLCOreuiresthreechannelsressurizerWaterLevel-HightobeOPERABLE.er>zeevechannesset1tnsThelevelchannelsdonotactuatethesaeyvalves,andthehighpressurereactortripissetbelowthesafetyvalvesetting.Therefore,withtheslowrateofchargingavailable,pressureovershootduetolevelchannelfailurecannotcausethesafetyvalvetoliftbeforereactorhighpressuretrip.(continued)B3.3-20 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andPPLICABILITY~3RÃVaid4.ne~3,9,5,ur4,~Prue~arg.r~g~gvol~~+~~(]~lQD~b~W~~~E~PressurizerWaterLevel-Hih(continued)Dt~InMODE1,wenthereisapotentialforoverfillingthepressurizer,thePressurizerWaterLevel-Hihtrip~mustbeOPERAB.istripFunctionisauomaticaonincreasin"e-ineroc.Onecreasiowens,thistripFuqctionisautelowtheP~etpointtransientsthatcouldraisethepressurizerwaevelwillbeslowandtheoperatorwillhavesufficienttimetoevaluate~.cionsandtakecorrectiveactions.p4t-ReactorCoolantFlow-Lowa.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowM>>,xvt\.0cp>>~bEVttREhpgag.1,ATheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflow'"~R1111dddtripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.ovetheP-8setpoint,ANRTP)alossofflowingr5Soophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorow.flowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.~S)heLCOreuiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-LowchannesperlooptobeOPERABLEinNODE1idbop-~~)oaudit'~~g~)~tfana+M.it~~OPTIC,hey.a~'di~2.'xv4.aInMODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,alossofflowinoneRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore.InMODE1belowtheP-8setoin,aossofowin0uncion10.b)becauseohelowerpowerlevelandthereatermarinedb.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoosax@~~Odpdgddpdl0~~~)TheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedaainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetolowflow~RRRP111ddddtripsduetonormalvariationsinloopflow.(continued)~QTS+~i'i~td~.~C~~"-'ldB3.3-21Rev

Insert3.3.1.12TheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)and(TwoLoops)tripFunctionsutilizethreecommonflowtransmittersperRCSlooptogenerateareactortripabove8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint).FlowtransmittersFT-411,FT-412,andFT-413areusedforRCSLoopAandFT-414,FT-415,andFT-416areusedforRCSLoopB. RTSInstrumentationB3.3eIBASES"Es.Xv'as.cAPPLICABLE'SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.ReactorCoolantFlow-LowTwoLoos(continued)AbovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-ff1~f1*willinitiateareactortrip.Eachloophasthreeflowdetectorstomonitorflow.Theflowsignalsarenotusedforanycontrolsysteminput.TheLCOrequiresthreeReactorCoolantFlow-LowhannelsperlooptobeOPERABLE.~lfwm)l~gL~P.~tt~p~g~jpbsvstVtsRaa.C.~<'ssr-s"lt&gAD(~~ccsp)(.4a.ltd~PgP~o)~~DE-8setnt,ooptriointallautomaticallydistributionstheReorCoolantFlowowPgl~~E.BeloheP-7reactortrisonlowflowareblockedsincenoconceivablepower"~"'~~~Op~~couldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.lAbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlowflowiniatiEnpRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.Aboveepoint,&lossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuateareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.TDCBreakerPosition)(5sr+~>(~BothRCPBreakerPositiontripFunctions'.opera~auxiliarycontact~o~'oneachRCP4gKZ~.TheseFunctionsanticipate'~",~jtheReactorCoolantFlow-LowtripstoavoidRCSheatuthatwouldoccurbeforethelowflowtripactuatesa.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionSinleLooTheRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinoneRCSloop.ThepositionofeachRCPbreakerismonitored.IfoneRCPbreakerisopenabove,areactortripisinitiated.ThistripFunctionwillgeneratea(continued)83.3-22 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES23.'oCVioor,APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY'a~~AePg.lMP-8aakp<6t)~p<Pgtgykwp~~l-~f*Cfeac&~olRerk-PmBreakerPositionSinle~too(continuereactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)TripSetpointisreached.TheLCOreuiresoneRCPBreakerPositionchannelperoeOPERABLE.OneOPERABLEchannelissufficientforthistripFunctionbecausetheRCSFlow-LowtripaloneprovidessufficientproectionoSLsfor,lossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofapump.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassoc'nLSSS.InMODE1abovetheP-8setpoint,whenalossoflowinanyRCSloopcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecore,theRCPBreakerPositionoprimustbeOPERABLE.In'MODE1owe-sepoint,alossofflowinweoops1recortriecauseofthelowerpowerlevearintothedes'.+.4)ob.ReactorCoolantPumBreakerPositionTwoLoosTheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalossofflowinRCSloos.TheositionofADlnAlgJ~creaerismonsored.oveeeowe-setpoint,alossoflowioorrR,ii'.~-'tPAviThistripFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoAec~Lo~geepb~<Loops)TripSetpointisreached.m0~~g49)itood4P-S~o>tt<)IarTheLCOre'neRCPBreakerPositionch~Wa.~~%iy~e~~taM<'erRCPtobeOPERABLE.OneOPERABLEchannelisufficientforthisFunctionbecausetheRCSw.teoatI~~to-'lW4~lm~P-g~+oo~(continued)~EBingoHoo.&uo-~B3.3-2392 RTSInstrumentationB3.3alBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.(continued).~c.c.vBreakerPositionTwoLoosFlow-Lowtripaloneprovidessufficientprotectionof~SLsforlossofflowevents.TheRCPBreakerPositiontripservesonlytoanticipatethelowflowtrip,minimizingthethermaltransientassociatedwithlossofanRCP.ThisFunctionmeasuresonlythediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheRCPbreaker,usingapositionswitch.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.InNODE1abovetheP-7setpointandbelowtheP-8setpoint,theRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponlossofflowinRCSloopsisautomaticallyenabled.AbovetheP-8setpointalossofflowinanyoneloopwillactuaeareactortripbecauseofthehigherpowerlevelandthereducedmargintothedesignlimitDNBR.Undervoltae/h~1ll8~oCT'P~3o.l,6TheUndervoltagereactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectionisprovidedagainstviolatintheDNBRlimitdeto~RCE1pTAbove(theP-b~~eosnwillinitiateareactortrip.ThistriFunctionwillgenerateareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)TripSetpointiseacmedelaysareincorporatedintotheUndervoltage~channelstopreventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowertransients.~((tt.tavs.9tLG.F'OTheLCOrequiresthreeUndervoltagechannelsperbustobeOPERABLEvaMopeI~C.~p-Wpa+ppssvt:(continued).'..JSG-STS---"~tivoliaB3.3-24'Rev Insert3.3.1.13BelowtheP-7setpoint,theUndervoltage-BusllAandllBtripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseallreactortripsonlossofflowareautomaticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerdistributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowpowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortriponUndervoltage-Bus1IAandllBisautomaticallyenabled.

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLE12.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY%3.Ãvii.ck13.+Ze&(iInMOD1abovetheP-7setpoint,thenderfrequencyRCPstipmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7setpoint,allrctortripsonlossofflowareutomaticallyblockdsincenoconceivablepowerdistibutionsuldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconcernatthislowowerlevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,thereactortronlossoflowintwoormoreRCS1'callyOops1Sautatlenabled.UndervoltaeReactorCoolantPums(continueInNODE1abovetheP-7setpoint,theUndvoltageRCP'ripmustbeOPERABLE.BelowtheP-7sepoint,allreactortripsonlossofflowareautoticallyblockedsincenoconceivablepowerditributionscouldoccurthatwouldcauseaDNBconceratthislowpowerevel.AbovetheP-7setpoint,threactortripon1sofflowintwoormoreRCS1opsisautomaticallyenabled.ThisFunctionusesthsamerelaysastheESFASFunction6.f,"UndervoltgeReactorCoolantPump(RCP)"stuartoftheauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumps.UnderfreuenzReactorCooantPumsTheUnderfrequencyRCPseactortripFunctionensuresthatprotectioni.provdedagainstviolatingtheDNBRlimitduetoalosofflowintwoormoreRCSloopsfromamajornetworkrequencydisturbance.Anundei.frequencycond~onwillslowdownthepumps,therebyreducingteirQoastdowntimefollowingapumptrip.Thepropercoastdhwntimeisrequiredsothatreactorheatcaneremovimmediatelyafterreactortrip.ThefreqencyofeaRCPbusismonitored.AbovetheP-7tpoint,alosoffrequencydetectedontwoormor,RCPbuseswillinitiateareactortrip.ThistripFunctionwillgeneraareactortripbeforetheReactorCoolantFlow-LowwoLoops)TripSetpointisreached.jTimedelaysareincporatedintotheUnderfrequencyRCPschannelstopventreactortripsduetomomentaryelectricalpowerransients.!TheLCOrequiresthreeUnderfrequencRCPschannelsperbustobeOPERABLE.(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-25Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESl~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY&en~(continued)~M3.aver.c>vtt,ago~~~Žma8e~~~~n~~.WVxi.a.~(cT-R~l,L~-~~SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLow~~~,~"g<vv-..sae3The(SG)WaterLevel-LowLowtripFunctionensuresthatprotetionisprovidedagainstalossofheatsinkandactuatesthe(AFW)SystempriortouncoveringtheSGtubes.TheSGsaretheheatsinkforthereactor.Inordertoactasaheatsink,theSGsmustcontainaminimumamountofwater.AnarrowrangelowlowlevelinanySGisindicativeof.alossofheatsinkforthereactor.leveltransmittersprovieinputtoeSGLevelControlSystem.Therefore,theactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstandaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsrovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.isFunctionasoperormsthe(ESFAS)functionofstartingtheAFW~~lowlowSGlevel.~erg)OE,&\%ad~TheLCOrequiresfourhannelsofSGWevel-LowLowerSGtobeOPERABLEorouroopunitsinwisecannesaresarebetwonandfiihthreeSGWaevelsareadicatedtotheRTS,oreeOPERABFu~e.k'OnInNODE1or2,theSGWaterLevel-LowLowtripmusteRABLeewaeW)System(notsafetyrelated).TFWSystemisonly'rationinNODE1or2.eAFWSystemisthesafetytedbackueofwatertensurethateatsinkforthereactor.Duringnormalstartupsarrdutdowns,theSstemrovidesfeedwatertomaintailevInNODE3,4,5,or6,teaereve-LowLow~FunctiontobeOPERABLEbecausetheQygBWisnotoperatingDecayheatremovalisaccomplishedbytheAFWSysteminNODE3andbytheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)SysteminMODE4,5,or6.(continued)~OGMB3.3-26

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICLSAFETYALCO,adAPPLICBI(coninWZ.WiiE~~SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowCoincidentithSteamLYSES,FlowFeedwaterFlowMismatchLITued)SGMaterLevel-Low,inconjunctionwittheSteamFlow/FeedwaterFlowMismatch,ensuresatprotectionisprovidedagainstalossofheatsiandactuates.theAFWSystempriortouncoveringeSGtubes.IndditiontoadecreasingwaterlevintheSG,thed>erencebetweenfeedwaterfloandsteamflowisevaltedtodetermineiffeedwterflowissigniantlylessthansteamlow.Withlessfeedwateflowthansteamflw,SGlevelwilldecreaseatarateendentupontmagnitudeofthedifferenceiflowrates.TherearetwoSGlevelchannelsandtSteamFow/FeedwaterFlowMismatchchannelsperSG.OnerrowrangelevelchannelsensingalowlevecincidentwithoneSteamFlow/FeedwaterFlowHismchchannelsensingflowmismatch(steamflowgreatetnfeedflow)willactuateareactortrip.ITheLCOrequirstwocharmsofSGWaterLevel-LowIcoincidentwiSteamFlow/edwaterFlowMismatch.InNODE12,whenthereactorequiresaheatsink,theSGWarLevel-LowcoincidetwithSteamFlow/FeedwateFlowMismatchtripmustOPERABLE.ThenormalourceofwaterfortheSGsstheHFWSystem(notsafetyrelated).TheHFWSystem'sonlyinoperaioninMODE1or2.TheAFWSystmisthesafeyrelatedbackupsourceofwatertonsurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactr.DuringInomalstartupsandshutdowns,theAFWSystprovidesfedwatertomaintainSGlevel.InMODE3,5,r6,theSGWaterLevel-LowcoincidentwithSteam,Flow/FeedwaterFlowMismatchFunctiondoesnotavetobeOPERABLEbecausetheHFWSystemisnotinopeationandthereactorisnotoperatingorevencriticaDecayheatremovalisaccomplishedbytheAFMSystminNODE3andbytheRHRSysteminMODE4,5,orP.TheHFMSystemisinoperationonlyinMODE1or/2and,therefore,thistripFunctionneedonlybe/OPERABLEintheseNODES./(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-27Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESfQAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYcontinued)~%AuTurbineTriGag~~jn0+QIJL~3,3.xvaa.O-a~a.so9oR.TP44cP-9~anr).<~SfooiTurbineTri-LowFluidOilPressureTheTurbineTrip-Low~OilPressuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcapabilitiesofthesecondarysystemfollowingabinetrihistripncnreterneraturansientonhereactor.Anytur'apowerlevelbelowtheP-9oint,approximatel50%owerwillnotaateareactortri.'eeprureesmonitortecontrooilpressureintheSystem.Alowpressureconditionsensedbytwo-out-of-threepressureswitcheswillactuateareactortrip.p~Thesepressureswitchesdonotprovideaninuttothecontrolsystem.The~isesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunctionandRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.TheLCOrequiresthreechannelsofTurbineTrip-Low5~+OilssuretobeOPERABLEinNODE1aboveP-9.$-3.I~%SeowtheP-9setpoint,urinetripoesnocuaeareacorripIn.MPEW~-,4~or6,aforaturbinetrip,andtherip-Low'Pressuretriuniondoesnotb.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveC1osure~~g)q,RrP(~pq~antTheTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionanticipatesthelossofheatremovalcaabilitiesofthesecondarsystemfollowingaturbineripromapowerlevethisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorin(continued)B3.3-28 Insert3.3.1.14BelowtheP-9setpointthisactionwillnotactuateareactortrip.ThetripFunctionanticipatesthelossofsecondaryheatremovalcapabilitythatoccurswhenthestopvalvesclose.Trippingthereactorinanticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.Insert3.3.1.15theTurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseloadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InNODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,therefore,thereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip. RTSInstrumentationB3.3alBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.TurbineTri-TurbineStoValveClosure(continued)-anticipationoflossofsecondaryheatremovalactstominimizethepressureandtemperaturetransientonthereactor.ThistripFunctionwillnotandisnotrequiredtooperateinthep~presenceofasinglechannelfailure.ThealgaisdesignedtowithstandacompletelossofloadandnotsustaincoredamageorchallengetheRCSpressurelimitations.CoreprotectionisprovidedbythePressurizerPressure-HightripFunction,andRCSintegrityisensuredbythepressurizersafetyvalves.ThistriFunctionidiversetotheTurbineTrip-LowOiPressuretripFunction.Eachturbinestopvalveisequiedwithonelimitswitchthatinputstoe.If4KE3xmllimitswitchesindicatethatthestopvalvesareallclosed,areactortripisinitiated.Qu.~~8un~c~~~~oOW~~,t:Cg'tassteLSS.ion1schanneltrip-adiostheassociatedstopvalveiscompletelyclosed;TheLCOreuiresurbineTrip-TurbineStopalveClosurechannels,onepervalve,tobepOPERABLEinMODEIaboveP-9.cannelsmusttriptocausereactortrip.elowtheP-9setpoint,oadrejectioncanbemDumpSsNODEtsnopotentialforaloadrejectione'ip-StopValveClosripFunctiondoesnotntobePERABLSafetIn'ectionInutfromEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemThe(SOInputfromESFASensuresthatifareactortriphasnotalreadybeengeneratedbytheRTS,theESFASautomaticactuationlogicwillinitiateareactoipuponanysignalthatinitiatesSI.ThisisjfLOCA)However,othertransientsandaccidentstakecreditforvarying(continued)QDC;rHB3.3-29 Insert3.3.1.16.WThisFunctiononlymeasuresthediscreteposition(openorclosed)oftheturbinestopvalves.Therefore,theFunctionhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.~0+Insert3.3.1.17theTurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosuretripFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausealoadrejectioncanbeaccommodatedbythesteamdumpsystem.Therefore,aturbinetripdoesnotactuateareactortrip.InNODE2,3,4,5,or6,theturbineisnotoperating,thereforethereisnopotentialforaturbinetrip.

RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYSafetIn'ectionInutfromEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstem(continued)levelsofESFperformanceandrelyuponrodinsertion,exceptforthemostreactiverodthatisassumedtobefullywithdrawn,toensurereactorshutdown.Therefore,areactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.TripSetpoin@arenotapplicabl~tothisFunction.TheSIInputisprovidedbyrela~intheESFAS.Therefore,thereisnomeasurementsignalwithwhichtoassociateanLSSS.TheLCOrequirestwoM~ofSIInputfromESFAStobeOPERABLEinMODE1or2.AreactortripisinitiatedeverytimeanSIsignalispresent.Therefore,thistripFunctionmustbeOPER'ABLEinMODE1or2,whenthereactoriscritical,andmustbeshutdownintheeventofanaccident.InMODE3,4,5,or6,thereactorisnotcritical,andthistripFunctiondoesnotneedtobeOPERABLE.orr~SstemInterlocksReactorprotectioninterlocksareprovidedtoensureeactortripsareinthecorrectconfigurationforthe>cuentunitstatus.Theybackupoperatoractionstoensur~rotectionsystemFunctionsarenotbypassedduringi@itconditionsunderwhichthesKtyanalysisassumestheeeunctionsarenotbypass.Therefore,theinterlock7wctionsdonotntobeOPERABLEwhentheassociateeactort'pfunctionsareoutsidetheapplicableMODES.are:a0IntermediateRaeNeutrFluxP-6TheInter~ediateRangeNeutronFx~P-6interlockisactuatedwhenanyNISintermediateranechannelgoesapproximatelyonedecadeabovethminimumchannelreading.Ifbothchannelsdpbelowthesetpoint,thepermissivewillautomaticallybedefeated.TheLCOrequireme(continued)B3.3-30 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYa'ntermediateRane'eutronFluxP-6(continued)fortheP-6interlockensuresthatthefollowingFunctionsareperformed:~onincreasingpower,theP-6terlock,allowsthemanualblockoftNISSourceRange,NeutronFluxreactorrip.ThispreventsaprematureblocofthesourcerangetripandallowsthoperatortoensurethattheintermeaterangeisOPERABLEpriortoleav'thesourcerange..Whenthesourcerangeripisblocked,the:,ighvoltagetotheetectorsisalsomoved;~ondecreasingpower,theP-6interlockautomaticallyergizestheNISsourcerangedetectorandenablestheNISSourceRangeNutronluxreactortrip;and~onincreaipower,theP-6interlockprovidesaackupblocksignaltothesourcerayfluxdoublingcir'cuit.Normally~thFunctionismanuallyblockedbytheintroroomoperatorduringthereactorstartu.TheLCOreirestwochannelsofIntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,P-6interlocktobeOPERABLEinMODE2whenbelowthe,P-6interlocksetpoint.AbovetheP-6interl,ock.sqtpoint,theNISSourceRangeNeutronFluxreactor,tripwillbeblocked,andthfsFunctionwillno%angerbenecessary.InNODE3,4,5,or6,the-6interlockdoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecauseheNISSourceRangeisprovidingcoreprotection./b.Low'owerReactorTrisBlockP-7LowPowerReactorTripsBlok,P-7interlockactuatedbyinputfromeithethePowerRangeutronFlux,P-10,ortheTurbieImpulseessure,P-13interlock.TheLrequirement(coninued)WOGSTSBv.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.LowPowerReactorTrisBlockP-7(continued~)fortheP-7interlockensuresthatthefolionglFunctionsareperformed:(1)onincreasingpower,theP-7interockautomaticallyenablesreactortrisonthefollowingFunctions:~PressurizerPressure-Lo;PressurizerWaterLeve-High;~ReactorCoolantFlowLow(TwoLoops);~RCBreakerOpenTwoLoops);~UnderoltageRC;and(2)PressurizerPressureLow;PressurizerMaterLev1-Hih9ow(Two.Loops);oLoops);ReactorCoolantFlow-LRCPBreakerPosition(TUndervoltageRCPs;andUnderfrequencyRCPs.~UnderfruencRCPs.Thesereactort/ipsareonlyrequiredwhenoperatingabovegtheP-7setpoint(approximate1$1'ower).ThereactortripsprovidkproectionagainstviolatingtheONBRlait.BlowtheP-7setpoint,theRCSi/capablefprovidingsufficientnaturalcirculationithoutanyRCPrunning.~ondecreasingpower,teP-7interlockautomaticallyblocksractortripsonthefolio'wingFunctions:tinued)MOGSTSB3.3-32Rev.0,09/28/92

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYLowPowerReactorTrisBlockP-7(conti'nued)TripSetpointandAllowableValuearenotapplicabletotheP-7interlockbecauseit>lsalogicFunctionandthushasnoparameterwthwhichtoassociateanLSSS.kjwC.TheP-7interlockisalogicFunctionwthtrainandnotchannelidentity.Therefore,gkheLCOequiresonechannelpertrainofLow'ower~~actorTripsBlock,P-7interlocktobeOPERABLEinODEl.,Thelow.powertripsareblockedelowtheP-7setpoint'.andunblockedabovethd'-7setpoint.InMODE2~i3,4,5,or6,thisjFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEbecausetheinterlockperformsitsFunctionwhenpowerleveldropsbelow10%power~whichisinNOOE1./PowerRaneNeutr'onFluxyP-8I/ThePowerRangeNeutronplux,P-8interlockisactuatedatapproxima%8y48%powerasdeterminedbytwo-out-of-i'ourNISagowerrangedetectors.TheP-8interlockaut6maticallyenablestheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLop)reactortripsonlowflowinoneor;moreRCSloopsonincreasingpower.TheLCOrequirement,orthistripFunctionensures/thatprotectionisprovidedagainstalossofflowinanyRCSloopthatcouldresultinDNBconditionsinthecorewhengreaterthanapproximately48%power.0decreasing-power,there'actortriponlowflwinanyloopisautomatic'allyblocked./TheLCO.requiresfourchannelsofPerRangeNeutronFlux,P-8interlocktobeOPBLEinMODE1.,:/InMODE1,alossofflowinoneRCSlocouldresultinDNBconditions,sothePowerRngeNeutronFlux,P-8interlockmustbeOPERALE.In/MODE2,3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoescot!havetobeOPERABLEbecausethecoreisnot'continued)WOGSTSB3.3-33Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYcPowerRaneNeutronFluxP-8(continud)producingsufficientpowertobeconernedaboutDNBconditions./d.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-9ThePowerRangeNeutronFlux,)-9interlockis~~actuatedatapproximately50'owerasdeterminedbytwo-out-of-fourNISpowerangedetector's.TheLCOrequirementfortsFunctionensur'esthattheTurbineTrip-LwFluidOilPressureandTurbineTrip-TurbineopValveClosurereactortripsareenabledabovtheP-9setpoint.AbovetheP-9setpoint,atrbinetripwillcausealoadrejectionbeyonthecapacityoftheStham',DumpSystem.Aretortripisautomatically.'jinitiatedonaturinetripwhenitisabove!theQ9setpoint,toinimizethetransientonthhreator.TheLGOrequiresfourchannelsofPowerRangeiNeutron~Flux,P-9interlocktobeOPERABLEinHODEl.XInHODEI,turbinetripcouldcausealoadrejectionbeondthecapacityoftheSteamDumpSystem,sothPowerRangeNeutronFluxinterlockmustbekPERABL.InHODE2,3,4,5,or6,thisFunctiondoesnohavetobeOPERABLEbecausethereactorisnotatpowerlevelsufficientto)havealoadrejectnbeyondthecapacityofteSteamDumpSystem./e.PowerRaneNeutrnFlxP-10~/Th'.PowerRangeNeutronlux,P-10interlockiactuatedatapproximatel10%power,as.determinedbytwo-out-of-urNISpowerrange."detectors.Ifpowerlevelfallsbelow10%RTPjon3of4channels,thenucearinstrumenttris!willbeautomaticallyunbloced.TheLCO"requirementfortheP-10intelockensuresthtthefollowingFunctionsarepeformed:(continued)WOG.STSB3.3-34Rev.0,09/28/92 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLCO,andAPPLICABILITY2Z>pea~e.PowerRaneNeutronFluxP-10(continued)onincreasingpower,theP-10interlockallowstheoperatortomanuallyblockeIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxreacrtrip.Notethatblockingthereacrtripalsoblocksthesignaltopreventutomaticandmanualrodwithdrawal;onincreasingpower,theP-10interlockallowstheoperatortomanulyblockthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-owreactortrip;onincreasingpower,thP-10interlockutomaticallyprovidesabackupsignaltobocktheSourceRanNeutronFluxreactortrap,andalsotodenergizetheNISsourerangedetecors;~theP-1interlkprovidesoneofthetwoinputstthe-7interlock;and~ondecreasipower,theP-10interlockautomaticayenablesthePowerRangeNeutronFux-owreactortripandtheIntermediateRaeNeutronFluxreactortrip(a6drodst)./.TheLCOreqQiresfour'hanelsofPowerRangeNeutronFlx,P-10interloktobeOPERABLEinNODE1or2.OPERABIITYinMODE1ensuretheFunctionisavail+letoperformitsdeerasingpowerFunct>fonsintheeventofarectorshutdown.This/FunctionmustbeOPERABLEinNODE2toensurethatcoreprotectionisrovidedduringastartuporshutdownbythePowerRangeNeutronFt'ux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxr'eactortrips.InMODE3,4,5,r6,this~FunctiondoesnothavetobeOPERALEbecauseth'.reactorisnotatpowerandtheSoceRange~NeutronFluxreactortripprovidesoreprotection.(continued)HOGSTSB3.3-35Rev.0,09/28/92 0 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)f.TurbineImulsePressureP-13ITheTurbineImpulsePressure,P-13ierlockisactuatedwhenthepressureintheerststageofehighpressureturbineisgrterthanapp'mately10%oftheratfullpowerpressure.his.isdetermidbyone-out-of-two'ressuredetes.ThCOrequirementforthisFunctionensurestneoftheinputstotheP-7interlockisave.TheLCOrequiretwochannelsTurbineImpulsePressure,P-1interlocktobe0BLEinMODE1.TheTurbineImpulseChamberPressure,P-interlockmustbeOPERABLEwhentheturbingener'atorisoperating.TheinterlockFunct'is/notrequiredOPERABLEinMODE2,3,4,5,o6becausetheturbinegeneratorisnotoperating.ReactorTriBreakers~op~a-AQwu&Y+p~lUQM3,a,vs.o.ThistripFunctionappliestotheRTBsexclusiveofi'duaimechanisms.TheLCOrequirestwoOPERABLEtrainsonpbreakers.AtripbreakertrainconsistsofalltripbreakersassociatedwithasingleRTSlogictrainthatarerackedin,closed,andcapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem.Thus,thetrainmayconsistofthemainbreaker,bypassbreaker,ormainbreakerandbypassbreaker,dependinguponthesystemconfiuration.TwoOPERABLEtrainsensurenosinglefailurecandisabletheRTStripcapability.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2thereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsorassociatedbypassbreakersareclosed,andtheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.ReactorTriBreakerUndervoltaeandShuntTriMechanismsTheLCOrequiresboththeUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanismstobeOPERABLEforeachRTBthatisin(continued)B3.3-36 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYReactorTriBreakerUndervoltaeandShuntTriMechanisms(continued)service.ThetripmechanismsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEfortripbreakersthatareopen,rackedout,incapableofsupplyingpowertotheCRDSystem,ordeclaredinoperableunderFunction19above.OPERABILITYofbothtripmechanismsoneachbreakerensuresthatnosingletripmechanismfailurewillpreventopeninganybreakeronavalidsignal.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2thereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,theseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsandassociated'bypassbreakersareclosed,and.theCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.AutomaticTriLoicTheLCOrequirementfortheRTBs(Functions19and20)andAutomaticTripLogic(Function21)ensuresthatmeansareprovidedtointerruptthepower,toallowtherodstofallintotereactorcore.u+pp~smo44ag&EachRTBequippewithaypassbreakertoallowtestingofetripbreakerwhilethessatpower.ereactortripsignalsgeneratedbytheRTSAutomaticTripLogiccausetheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakerstoopenandshutdownthereactor.TheLCOrequirestwotrainsofRTSAutomaticTripLogictobeOPERABLE.HavingtwoOPERABLEchannelsensuresthatfailureofasinglelogic46AA~willnotprevenreactortrip.ThesetripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODE1or2~~~thereactoriscritical.InMODE3,4,or5,teseRTStripFunctionsmustbeOPERABLEwhentheRTBsandassociatedbypassbreakersareclosed,andtheCRDSystemiscapableofrodwithdrawal.TheRTSinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.B3.3-37R(continued)

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES(continued)ACTIONS93.>,L'7'XVi>,i~XY)lhgotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifythea'pplicationofCompletionTimerules.ofthiMSecificationmaybeenter'pendentlyforeachFunction'inTable3.-l.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablec/train(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyreanctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionenteredfortunction.Reviewer~Note:CertainLCOCompletionarebasedonappro~vtopicalreports.Inorderforalicentousetheetimes,thelicenseemustjustifytheCompletTimesasrequiredbythestaffSafetyEvaluationReportSERfor+hetopicalreport.Intheeventachannel'sTriSetpointisfoundnonconservaivewithrespectto,orthetransmitter,instrumentloop,signalprocessingelectronics,orbistableisfoundinoperable,thenallaffectedFunctionsprovidedbythatchannelmustbedeclaredinoperableandtheonisonenteredforthe'rotectionfunction(s)affected.enumberofinoperablechannels~i~Functionexceeose'ne.rerrelated'Conditionsassociatedwithatri-mrc>,entheunitisoutsidethesafetyanal'Therefore,LCM.Q,3mustbeimmediateleredifapplicableinthe'currentNODEofopera'.1~2lCVlRConditionAappliestoallRTS.protectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorerequiredchannelsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperableThRhfdtfffTable3.3.1-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.B.l8.2.1andB.2.2~+~XVl>,oCondition8appliestotheManualReactorTripinNODE1ol2.Withonechannelinoperable,the(continued)&GI'S~B3.3-38 Insert3.3.1.18TheACTIONSforeachinoperableRTSFunctionareidentifiedbytheConditioncolumnofTable3.3.1-1.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.1-1.Insert3.3.1:19AsshownonFigureB3.3.1-1,theRTSiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomaticTripLogic(Function17inTable3.3.1-1).Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrumentorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothRTStrainsthatiscomprisedoftheRTBsandAutomaticTripLogicFunction.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheHanualReactorTripandSIInputfromESFAStripFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis(i.e.,failureoftheseFunctionsmayonlyaffectoneRTStrain).Insert3.3.1.20WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithatripFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyenteredifthetripFunctionisapplicableinthecurrentHODEofoperation.ThisessentiallyappliestothelossofmorethanonechannelofanyRTSFunctionexceptwithrespecttoConditionsG,H,andJ. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSQ~,7cVii.4B.1B.2.1andB.2.2(continued)inoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLE,channelisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunction.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsandanothermanualinitiationchannelOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.IftheManualReactorTripFunctioncannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallowed48hourCompletionTimee<~mustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichthedoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,themuse4roughttoatleastMODE3within6additionalhours(54hourstotaltimee.The6additionalhourstoreachMODE3~'a%fM~Wreasonablebasedon/oeratinexerienceromu~poweroperationi,mannwioutchallenin~systemsjWiththe{gRBbinMODE3,olongerandihi~pojiigC.landC.2ConditionCappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctionsinMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal:ManualReactorTrip;RTBs;RTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms;andAutomaticTripLogic.Z.Z.Y.vii.o.tithonechannelortraininoperable,theinoperablechannelortrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.IftheaffectedFunction(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallowed48hourCompletionTime,the~cK~RmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhich(continued)/~Ri-B3.3-3922~~2 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSC.landC.2continued)<4>1~dppl.1I1I1,1RTBsmustbeopenedwithinthenexthour.Theadditionalhourprovidessufficienttimetoaccomplishtheactioninanorderlymanner.WiththeRTBsopen,theseFunctionsarenolongerrequired.TheCompletionTim@'dihreasonableconsideringthatinthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunction,andgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.0.1.10.1.2g,~,L.~lK3+Vtt,OpKZtton>tion0appliestothePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Highnction.TheSpowerrangedetectorsprovideinputtotheSystemdtheSGWaterLevelControlSystemand,erefore,haveatw-out-of-fourtriplogic.Aknowninorablechannelmusbeplacedinthetrippedcondit.This'esultsina~rtialtripconditionrequir'onlyone-out-of-threglogicforactuation.T6hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelintherippedconditionisjustifiedinWCAP-171-P-A(Ref.7)Inadditiontoplacingeinopy"ablechannelinthetrippedcondition,THERMALPOWERstYereducedto<75%RTPwithin12hours.Reducingthepolevelpreventsoperationofthecorewithradialpowerd>tributionsbeyondthedesignlimits.WithoneofthISperrangedetectorsinoperable,I/Oofthradialpordistributionmonitoringcapabilityislost.Asanalternativ,totheaboveactiontheinoperablechannelcanbe~lacedinthetrippedcditionwithin6hoursandtHegPTRmonitoredonce'ver12hoursasperSR3.2.4.2<"qPTRverification.CalculatigPTRevery12hourscompensatesforthelostmonitorincapabilityduetotheinoperableNISpowerrangechannelanallowscontinuedunitoperationatpowerlevels>75%RTP.The6hourCompletionTimeandthe12hourFrequencyareconsistentwithLCO3.2.4,"gUAORANTPOWERTILTRATIO(gPTR)."(continued) Insert3.3.1.21WithoneoffourPowerRangeNeutronFlux-HightripFunctionchannelsinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorTHERHALPOWERmustbereducedto<75%RTPwithin24hours.Reducingthepowerlevelpreventsoperationofthecorewithradialpowerdistributionsbeyondthedesignlimits.WithoneoftheNISpowerrangedetectorsinoperable,onequarteroftheradialpowerdistributionmonitoringcapabilityislost.InadditiontoreducingTHERHALPOWER,aknowninoperablechannelmustbeplacedinthetrippedcondition.Thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.0.2.1andD.2.2'g3.iI>>.ŽAsanalternativetotheaboveactions,afullcorefluxmapmaybeperformedwithin24hoursandevery24hoursthereafter.Theinoperablechannelmustalsoplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.Calculatingafullcorefluxmapevery24hourscompensatesforthelostmonitoringcapabilityduetotheinoperableNISpowerrangechannelandallowscontinuedplantoperationatpowerlevels>75%RTP.The24hourFrequencyisconsistentwithSR3.2.1.2andSR3.2.2.2.Inadditiontoperformingthefullcorefluxmapsaknowninoperablechannelmustbeplacedinthetrippedcondition.Thisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequiringonlyone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.'.3AsanalternativetobothaboveActionsiftheinoperablechannelcannotbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithinthespecifi'edCompletionTime,theplantmaybeplacedinaHODEwherethisLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethis,6hours(84hourstotal)areallowedtoplacetheplantinHODE3.Thisisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems. RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESACTIONS.l.10.1.20.2.l0.2.2and0.3(continuedIfRequiredActionsdescribedabovannotbemetwith'nthespecs'ompletionTimes,tnitmustbeplacedinNODEwherethisionisnongerrequiredOPERABLE.Aadditional6hoursbeyoeCompletionTimeforRequiredAction0.1.2andReq'Ac'.2.1areallowedtoplacetheunitinNODE.Sixhoursiseasonabletime,basedonoperatingerience,toreachNODfromfullpowerinanorderlarmerandwithoutchallengingitsystems.IfRequirActions0.2.2cannotbecompletedw'thintheiralledCompletionTimes,LCO3.0.3mustbeentereTheRequiredActionsavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassconditionforuptoQhourswhileperformingroutinesur'llancetestingofotherchannels.~~placingtheinoperablechannelintheypassconditiontoallowsetpointadjustmentsofotherchannelswhenrequiredtoreducethesetpointinaccordancewithotherTechnicalSpecifications.ThehourtimelimitisjustifiedinReferenceg.E.landE.2ConditionEappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;=-.ower-Zane-NeatrvrPFR3%II~Overtemperature4T;~Overpower4T;gronFlux-HieNeutronFlux-Hihe;.te;PressurizerPressure-High;SGWaterLevel-LowLow~~-SG-Wa.te&(continued)r@~B3.3-41ev. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSE.landE.2(continued)nowninoperable'channelmustbeplacedinterico'nwithin6hours.Placingthechannetrippedcoonresultsinaipconditionrequiringonlyont-ogicforactuationofthetwo-out-of-threesone-out-of-threelogicforactuationetwo-out-of-rtrips.The6hoursallowtoetheinoperablechannelnthetriedcondition'ustifiedinrence722KVeeWOC~6'gh~A~*~i.2.m.iIftheoperablechannelcannotbeplacedinthetriconditihinthespecifiedComletionTimethemustbeaMODEtrpet~~~hollofixhoursis~reasonable~,aseonoperatingexperience,toplacethe~inMODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchengingsystems.lOss>eRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacintheinoperablechannelinthebypassed~e,)~~rued)~"Lvsaltst.)~P~~Q.~aagn)ConditionFappliestotheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxriwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-6setpointaneowe-setpoinandonechannelisinoperable.AbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperforms~monitoringFunction~isgrealessthantheP-10setpointwedtoreRMALPOWERbelowthetpointorincrease8>,aii'c-wnvB~0~TALU-Q,tc~PAN4l~p.~~ls)e'/tuselsOconiionorupo%hourswhileperformingroutine'urveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.Theourimeb~~~limitisReferenceg.~o~M~'lp.Mc~~.~4-.andF.2a~~~JLt~~Labs~hll5~4Lf&4~c~h~~1~4JAAlr'78pg~8K.F~Pg~~~crt~~~-lO~~toTHERMALPOWsetpoint.TheNISIntermediateReutronhannelsmustbeOPERABLEhenerlevelisabovetheca'fthesourcerange,IfTHERMALPOWERisgreaterthantheP-10setpoint,theNISpowerrangedetectorsperformthemonitoringandprotectionfunctionsandtheintermediaterangeisnotrequired.TheCompletionTimesallowforaslowandcontrolledpoweradjustmentaboveP-10orbelowP-6andtake(continued)B3.3-42R

Insert3.3.1.22Withonechannelinoperable,theknowninoperablechannelmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin72hours.Placingthechannelinthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripcondition.ForthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low,OvertemperaturehT,andOverpowerhTfunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-of-threelogicforactuation.ForthePressurizer>>~i'.~Pressure-highandPressurizerWaterLevel-HighFunctions,thisresultsinaone-out-oftwologicforactuation.FortheSGMaterLevel-LowLowFunction,thisresults-inaone-out-of-twologicpereachaffectedSGforactuation.The72hoursallowedtoplacetheinoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9.

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSF.landF.2(continued)intoaccounttheredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheredundantOPERABLEchannel,andthelowprobabilityofitsfailureduringthisperiod.ThisactiondoesnotrequiretheinoperablechanneltobetrippedbecausetheFunctionusesone-out-of-twologic.Trippingonechannelwouldtripthereactor.Thus,theRequiredActionsspecifiedinthisConditionareonlyapplicablewhenchannelfailuredoesnotresultinreactortrip.G.landG.2ZZ.)aaa.a.3,f.z3Pa~~~IVLQ~g+g0'twasClvQ.p~WowConditionGaliestotwoinoperableIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripchannewennandsetposnt.RequiredAct>oniei'onareonlyappliAbovetheP-6setpointandbelowtheP-10setpoint,theNISintermediaterangedetectorperformsCjbmonsorangŽFunction&'.WithnointermediaterangechannelsOPERABLE,theRequiredActionsaretosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsimmediatel.Thiswillprecludeanypowerlevelincrease"fioOPERABLEIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxchannels.TheoperatormustalsoreduceTHERMALPOWERbelowtheP-6sepointwithin~hours.BelowP-6,theSourceRangeNeutronFluxchannels.rTheCompletionTimeof2hourswillalloyslowandcontrolledpowerreductiontolessthantheP-6setpointandtakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofoccurrenceofaneventduringthisperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionaffordedbytheNISIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtrip.pe'-(li~~4H.l~o~~3~C.lrUAL4c)ConditionHappliestotheIntermediateRangeNeutronFlutripwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-6setpointandoneortwochannelsareinoerable.BelowtheP-6setpoint,theISsourcerangeperormstemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.AeinoperableNISintermediaterangechannel(s)musereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoincreasingeraovee-seporn.(continued)HQLSTS-B3.3-43P~~~~'R Insert3.3.1.23whenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-6setpoint(5E-11,ampsasderivedfromabistablecircuitoftheintermediaterangechannels)andbelowtheP-10setpoint(SXRTPasderivedfromabistablecircuitofthepowerrangechannels).RequiredActionsspecifiedinthisConditionareonlyapplicablewhentheinoperabilityofbothchannelsdonotresultinreactortrip.Insert3.3.1:24IfbothIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelsareinoperable,thesource~~rangechannelsmaybeusedtodete'rminethattheplantisbelowtheP-6setpoint.ThisactionplacestheplantbelowtheNODEinwhichtheP-6interlockisrequired.SincetheIntermediateRangeNeutrontripFunctionisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis,lossofbothchannelsisnotalossofsafetyFunction.Insert3.3.1.25atwhichpointtheNISintermediaterangechannelsprovidethemonitoringand~~~~protectionfunction.SincetheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunction'isnotcreditedintheaccidentanalysis,lossofbothchannelsisnotalossofsafetyFunction.

RTSInstrumentationB3.3aIBASESH.1(continued)capabilityoftheurceraP-6,andbelowtheapabilityofepowerrange,P-~~XVtt,4ConditionIappliestooneinoperableSourceRangeNeutronFluxtrichannelwheninMODE2,belowtheP-6setpoint~anperorm)ngareacortaru.e't'onbelow-,theNISsourcerangeperformsemonioranganprotectionfunctions.Withoneofthetwochannelsinoperable,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.1owerescalatsourcerangechannel0tionisseverereducedansonsthataddpositivsbesuspendedimmediately.oewrcn-cP~os~,~Pbtltit.~~ConditionJappliestotwoinoperableSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripchannelswheninMODE2,belowtheP-6setpoint,.orinMODE3,4,ortheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.,tNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandproectionfunctions.Withbothsourcerangechannelsinoperable,thesmustbeopeneimmesaey.WiththeRTBsopen,thecoreisinamorestableconditionandtbe<aBQ~ensConditionL.K.landK.2ConditionKappliestooneinoperablesourcerangechannelinMODE3,4,or5withtheRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.AnthisCondition,theNISsourcerangeperformsthemonitoringandprotectionfunctions.Withoneofthesourcerangechannelsinoperable,48hoursisallowedtorestoreittoINOPERABLEstatus.Ifthechannelcannotbereturnedtod&OPERABLstatus,IadditionalhourisallowedtoopentheRTBs.<'8h~s6fZw~~(continued)B3.3-44 RTSInstrumentation83.3.1BASESACTIONSK.landK.2(continued)~~2Zax,v<g~~1Theallowanceof48hourstorestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatus,andtheladditionalhourtoopentheRTBs,Referencec,~KKA~4rtt.')ConditionLapplieswhentherequiredSourceRaneNeutronFluxchannelMsin3,4,or5withe.RTsopen.nthisCondition,theNISsource.rangeperformsthemonitorinandprotectiofunctions.WithourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,operationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsshallbesuspendedimmediately.Thiswillprecludeanowerescalation.aiion*ttcouldaddunoraeRCSmustbeclosedwithih1hourasspec'inLCO..Theisolationofunboratersourceswillprecluendilutionaccit.>n%Z~\'L43~xvic.oAlso,theSDMmustbeverifiedonceeveryoursthereafterasperSR3.1.1.1,SDMverification.~u~WithnosourcerangechannelsOPERABLE,coreprotectiontt.tiitttt't~sufficienttimetoperformthecalculationsanddeterminethattheSDMreuirementareme.emusasoereaftertoensurethaecorereactivityhasnotcange.RequiredActionL.1precludesanypositivereactivityadditions;therefore,corereactivityshouldnotbeincreasing,anda12hourFrequencysadTheCompletionTimeSofonceper12hours~basedonoperatingexperienceinperformingtheRequiredActionsandtheknowledgethat~c'nswillchangeslowly.M.1andM.2ConditionMappliestothefollowingreactortripFunctions:~PressurizerPressure-Low;(continued)B3.3-45

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS3'KitN.IandH.2(continued)&3'sc.'it~0ipcA~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops);Undervoltage85P.~@3.OPERE'~H~F9~S.l~2+.PcV'a.EXWithonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannelmustbeplacedinthetrippedconditionwithin6-ours.Placingthechannel'nthetrippedconditionresultsinapartialtripconditionreuiringonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactortrivee-seownanep-ppo>n.isFunctiondoesnothaeOPERABLEbelwhaecsetpointbecausetherenolossofflowtripselowtheP=7~ei~oint.e6hoursallowedtoplacethehannelinthetr'nditionisjustifiedinReference7~nadditiona6-harsisallowedtoreduceHERMALPtNERtobelowP-7iftheilechannelcannoteCoredtoOPERABLEstatusorlacedinr'inthgecifiK3iTs.Vta.Q.AllowanceofthistimeintervaltakesintoconsiderationtheredundantciityprovidedbytheremainingredundantOPERABLEchannel,andthelowprobabilityofoccurrenceofaneventduringthisperiodthatmayrequiretheprotectionaffordedbytheFunctionsassociatedwithConditionH.S.'3.l.I'ITheRequiredActionPavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto4'-hourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The4-ourtimelimitisReference~Ibqv~~goOfXAA6LL~~qhuaCLt~+vPP~j~t+l~+3+'b'2Z.~Via.N.landN.2ConditionNappliestotheReactorCoolantFlowLow(SingleLooreactortriFunction.Withonechannelinoperable,theinoperablechannemustbeAWBEe.IfthechannelcannoterestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorthechannelplacedintripwithinours,(continued)'NGG-STSr,pl~t>>.6.Qln>O.>>~ty~B3.3-46ev-.0-,99fNf92-. Insert3.3.1.26The72hoursallowedtoplacethechannelinthetrippedconditionisconsistentwithReference9iftheinoperablechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Anadditional6hours(78hourstotaltime)isallowedtoreduceTHERMALPOWERto<8.5%RTP(P-7setpoint)atwhichpointtheFunctionisnolongerrequired.ThisplacestheplantinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.AnalternativeisnotprovidedforincreasingTHERMALPOWERabovetheP-8setpoint>>.gVlifortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)andRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)tripFunctionssincethisplacestheplantinConditionN.Insert3.3.1.41FortheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops)Functions,ConditionMappliesonaperloopbasis.FortheRCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops)Function,ConditionMappliesonaperRCPbasis.ForUndervoltage-BusllAandllB,ConditionM~appliesonaperbusbasis.Thisallowsoninoperablechannelfromeachloop,RCP,orbustobeconsideredonaseparateconditionentrybasis.

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONSZZ,jcvala+<Vth,Ch22lqg.hew@&W~N.1andN.2(continued)eC5b'1.RTthenTHERMALPOWERmustbereduced~~(P-8setpoint)withinthenextours.ThisplacestheunitinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongerapplicable.ThistripFunction~tbOPEIABLEb1otherRTStriFunctionsprovidecoreprotection@~XfgbToursaowedtorest~ethechanneltostatusorplaceintripandthe8%dditionalhoursallowedtoreduceTHERMALPOWERtoare'eference.~SOfoAT4'15~+'a~TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforuptoamourswhileperformingroutinesurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.The4ourtime~Rfgl0.1and0.223.WVl1.th.~RaP()Cl1Condition0appliestotheRCPBreakerPositi(SingleLoop)~~rtripFunction.Thereisonreakerposition'eviceperRCPbreaker.Withonechannelinoperable,the~@a.~inoarablechanneimustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus).within"&hours.IfthechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinth(E(hours,thenTHERMALPO+Rmustereduce-8setpoint)withinthenextours.ThislacesthegabinaMODEwheretheLCOisnolongeructitobeOPERABLEbelobecauseotherRTSFunctionsrov'decoreprotectionThe+oursallowed~orestorethechanneltoOPERABLEstatusandthead'nalhoursallowedtoreduceTHERMALOWERto~o~oareference('~~~i~eequsrecsona'erablechannelssedconditionforupto4hoeperformingroutinesurveillancetWi.otheothernnels.The4hourtimelimiti~ustifiedinReference7.(continued)B3.3-47ev.0

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESACTIONS(continued)MeRVW\a0EK,~VXtsOnP.landP.2ConditionPappliestoTurbineTriponLow<EBiBrOilPressureoronTurbineStopValveClosure.Withonechanneinoerable,theinoperablechannelmustbeplacedintheonditionwithin8hours.Ifplacedinthetrippednion,tisresultsinapartialtripconditionrequirinonlyoneadditionalchanneltoinitiateareactorrip.IftechannelcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspacedinteconditio,thenpoyermustbedP-9.setpointwiinenext~ours.Thehoursaoweoplacethy,inoperablechannelinthetrippedconditionandtheoursallowedforreducingpower(~~~Referenceg.'TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodified'byaNotethatallowsplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassedconditionforupto~ourswhileperformingroutinsurveillancetestingoftheotherchannels.Theourtimei*~Rfg.~xA4dq~~ec'h~~~~KVet,O.gg,ls.1and.2ConditiongappliestotheSIInputfromESFASreactotripandtheRTSAutomaticTripLogicinMODES1and2.Thesa-Withonetraininoperable,6hoursareallowedtoretorethetraintoOPERABLEstatuscTheCompletionTimeof6hoursequ>reisreasonableconsideringthatinthis0Condition,theremainingOPERABLEtrainisadequatetoperformthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeofours(RequiredActiong.2)isreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachNODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~systemsTheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbyaNotethatallowsbypassingonetrainupto~+hoursforsurveillancetesting,providedtheothertrainisOPERABLE.(continued)B3.3-48Rev.

Insert3.3.1.27IftheinoperabletraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin6hours,thentheplantmustbeplacedinamodeinwhichtheLCOnolongerapplies.ThisisaccomplishedbyplacingtheplantinNODE3withinthenext6hours'12hourstotaltime). RTSInstrumentationB3.3eIBASESACTIONS(continued)uxk~~uodms'~aea~eden~R.landR.2~aa.Qcx&rlharpfoe>~~~+(pROLLSL'7h~~~~'onditionRappliestotheRTBsinMODESIand2.heseeoTBsWithonetraininoperable,ihour>saowedtorestothetraintoOPERABLEstatusortheustbeMODEVTheCompletionimeooursisreasonable,basedonoperaingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullowerinanorderlmannerandwithoutchallenging~systems.eIhourand6hourCompletionTimesareequaltothetimeallowedbyLCO3.0.3forshutdownactionsintheeventofacompletelossofRTSFunction.Placingthe~inMODE3removestherequirementforthisparticularFunction.TheRequiredAetioaveeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIallowsone4gj~vtobebypassedforupto2hours~forsurveillancetesting,providedtheotherChaajijjjBisOPERABLE.Note2allowsoneRTBtobebypassedforupto~8hoursformaintenanceonundervoltageorshunttripmechnisms'rRTBtrainisOPERABLE.eimelimitisjustifiedinReerenceS.landS.2iionSappliestotheP-6andP-10interlocks.Withonechannelinoperableforone-out-of-twoortwo-out-of-fourincidencelogic,theassociatedinterlockmustbeverifiedtoinitsrequiredstatefortheexistingunitconditionwithinhourortheunitmust.beplacedinMODEinthenexturs.Verifyingtheinterlockusmanuallyaccomplishest'erlock'sFunction.eCompletionTimeofIhourisbasedonratingerienceandtheminimumamountoftimeallowedforal'operatoractions.TheCompletionTimeof6hoisrnable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreODE3fromfuwerinanorderlymannerandw+iutchallengingunitsystem.TheIhouran6hourCpTetionTimesareequaltothetimeaedbyLCO..3forshutdownactionsintheevent,ofacotosofRTSFunction.(continued)PI~bu+oust/~+"B3.3-49092892

Insert3.3.1.28ConditionSappliestotheRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripHechanismsinHODESIand2.WithoneofthetripmechanismsforoneRTBinoperable,itmustbeQ5.<<"restoredtoanOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursortheplantmustbeplacedinaNODEwheretherequirementdoesnotapply.ThisisaccomplishedbyplacingtheplantinNODE3withinthenext6hours(54hourstotaltime).TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.WiththeplantinNODE3,ConditionSnolongerappliesandConditionCisentered.TheaffectedRTBshallnotbebypassedwhileoneofthediversefeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequiredtoperformmaintenancetooneofthediversefeatures.Theallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthediversefeaturesis2hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditionR.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredActionS.lisreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditionthereisoneremainingdiversefeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLERTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval. 0 RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESAGTIONSoinued).1andT.2ConditionTappliestotheP-7,P-8,P-9,andP-13interlocks.Withonechannelinoperableforone-out-of'-two"ortwo-out-of-fourcoincidencelogic,theassociateinterlockmustbeverifiedtobeinitsrequiredfatefortheexistingunitconditionwithin1hourorthunitmust'eplacedinMODE2withinthenext6hours.eseactionsareconservativeforthecasewherepowerleelisbeingised.Verifyingtheinterlockstatusmaallyaccqmplishestheinterlock'sFunction.eCompletionTimeofI+ourisbasedonoperatingexperiejiceandtheminimumamount~pftimeallowedformanualoperatoractions.TheCompleti'oqTimeof6hoursisreasorvable,basedonoperatingexperienceytoreachMODE2fromfp'llpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.U.lU.2.1and2.2ConditionUappliesoteRTBUndervoltageandShuntTripMechanisms,ordiversripfeatures,inMODES1and2.Withoneofthediver,tripfeaturesinoperable,itmustberestoredtoanOPERAGLEtatuswithin48hoursortheunitmustbeplacedina'ODEeretherequirementdoesnotapply.Thisis'ccomplishebyplacingtheunitinMODE3withinthenext;6hours(54hurstotaltime)followedbyopeningtheRTEsin1addition1hour(55hourstotaltime).TheCompletianTimeof6hoursiareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachODE3fromfullpowerinanorderly;mannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.WiththeRTBsopenandtheunitinHADE3,thistripFunction~isnolongerrequiredtobeERABLE.TheaffectedRTB.sha'llnotbebypassedwhileoneofhediversefeaturesisinoperableexceptforthetimerequirdtoperformmaint'enancetooneofthediversefeatureTheallowabletimeforperformingmaintenanceofthedivsefeaturesis2hoursforthereasonsstatedunderConditinR.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforRequiredAcionU.1isreasonableconsideringthatinthisConditiontheisone,iremainingdiversefeaturefortheaffectedRTB,andoneOPERABLERTBcapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionandgiventhelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.WOGSTSB3.3-50(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92

RTSInstrumentation~B3.3.1BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS~>.KVaa.o.TheSRsforeachRTSFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.1-1forthatFunction.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheSRTablestatingthatTable3.3.1-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichRTSFunctions.Notethateachchannelofprocessprotect'onsuppliesbothtrainsoftheRTS.WhentestingChannel,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.SimilarlTrain.AandTrainBsmuseexam1nedwhentes1ngannel,Channel,anannel(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.~haXtd\'\a%Note:topicalrepors.times,the1'.cebythe-afSERCertainFrequenciesaroval1censeetousethesemUStJUS1requenciesasrequiredforthetopicalreport.+'E.xv4,0.2Xwvlwoh'erformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsormoreserious.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itisthattheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.criteriaaredeterminedbytheditaastaffbasedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethe~~criteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexper'emonstrateschannelfailureisrare.(continued) Insert3.3.1.29NotethateachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheRTS.WhentestingChannelI,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies(Ref.8).SR3.3.1.1ACHANNELCHECKisrequiredforthefollowingRTStripfunctions:~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-Low;~~0'%Vss~~IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;SourceRangeNeutronFlux;OvertemperatureAT;~OverpowerAT;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);and~SGMaterLevel-LowLow RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS63sbqV~~SR3.3.1.1(continued)t~s.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessforma,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.W-~}qhwhsI~CsSR3.3.1.2SR3.3.1.2calorimetricheatbalance0~~s&4'.Ga90~~t~~mQtjtHhgI~iC~~)Ad1~R.T~g~gib~~OPIA~QQQ~,)~vM~0~MoH~'~~WVai<<hTR~T!ecaorhmerscexceeds'theNISchanne]outpu~tb>2%IMP;hS'noarable'utmustbeadjuse.IftheNISchanneloutputcannotbeproperlyadjusted,thechannelisdeclaredinoperable.NoteindicatesthattheNISchanneloutputshallbeadjustedconsistentwiththecalorimetricresultsiftheabsolutedifferencebetweentheNISchanneloutputandthecalorimetricisI'.ll.~Rhdhillh<<hl'isrequiredonlyifreactorpoweris>'.Pana12hoursisallowedforperformingthefirstSurvei11anceafterreaching.RTP.Atlowerpowerlevels,calorimetricdataareinaccurae.-so~XWVhi,KTheFrequencyofevery24hours'isbasedon=~~~~operatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.TogetherthesefactorsdemonstratethechangeintheabsolutedifferencebetweenNISandheatbalancecalculatedpowersrarelyexceeds2%inany24hourperiod.Inaddition,controlroomoperatorsperiodicallymonitorredundantindicationsandalarmstodetectdeviationsinchanneloutputs.SR3.3.1.3~aRR~p~~~}cgiI,<SR~~+comparestheincoresystemtotheNISchanneloututever31(EFPgl.Iftheabsolutedifferenceis>3%,theNISchannelisstillOPERABLE,butmustbereadjusted.(continued)83.3-52

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSZ3.smvas,Q.Wak+v+7$~g<<~~~ihAAEgarne.gEL+5@~EG>+~pros'suncsan~vvstlO+otEsswvmoIvsLWa'tv~cL~~nstp&oc5vvsastSAre%Can+2IK3.XVt's.a.i=t=f'0.SR3.3.1.3(continued)~~ryan,cs%-.-4<<IEgt=sAf(~~'ij~~-~~CA.fL~~IftheNISchannelcannotbeproperlyreadjusted,thechannelisdeclaredinoperable.TwoNotesmodifySR3.3.1.3.Note1indicatesthattheexcoreNISchannelshallbeadjustediftheabsolutedifferencebetweentheincoreandexcoreAFDis>3%.ote2clariiesthattheSurveilanceisrequirenlyieactoreris>a4oursallowehj~ft1oRTP.TheFrequencyofevery31EFPD'asedonoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydataforinstrumentdrift.Also,theslowchangesinneutronfluxduringthefuelcyclecanbedetectedduringthisinterval.P'T~SR3.3.1.4fA.c~I'~R~~istheperformanofaTADOTevery31daysonasye.ycVa%CSSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyactuationoftheenddevices.~cL'0~>.I.XIZ-.X'V'Is.lr~~m~&4pf~~tgq~to-~~~CYgSR3.3.1.5P>ghVdee4LbEioheRTBtesunervoages.Thebypassbreakertestshallincludeashun'Notehasbeenaddedtoi~~~ethatthistestmustbeperfumedontheypreakerriortolacinitinservicTh~efrenancyofevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISis+3.V.Ya'LsOVi'L~~+SRIEmI~istheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTES~every31daysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS~Thetrainbeingtestedisplacedinthebypasscondition,thuspreventinqinadvertentactuation.411possiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicablepermissives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.The(continued)B3.3-53

Insert3.3.1.31Thetestshallincludeseparateverificationoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsexceptforthebypassbreakerswhichdonotrequireseparateverificationsincenocapabilityisprovidedforperformingsuchatestatpower.TheindependenttestforbypassbreakersisincludedinSR3.3.1.14.However,thebypassbreakertestshallincludealocalshunttrip.ANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethatthistestmustbeperformedonthebypassbreakerpriortoplacingitinservicetotaketheplaceofaRTP. BASES~~p(~~ms.iRISty>csf~PM+Pvaye+g2g+pA~l.m,osivaMr+OA,Wekavas*~v'.~Ct=.tQ.RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS+X~XVia.Q~hcvM~v4~~~hLks~g~0~v~~tQcs~reuencyoeveryaysonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS~me=gusSR3.3.1.6~~~~~~SR~&isacalibrationoftheexcorechannelstotheincorechannels.Ifthemeasurementsdonotagree,thepea~ss'3,Xiyaaexcorecannelsarebutmustbecalibratedtoagreewiththeincoredetectormeasurements.lftheexcorechannelsca~beadjusted,thechannelsaredeclaredinoperable.~~~~~~~M'b~~<~+~~~Q~)~~~~~~a,~a9t~AT~tl~~~Q.)CsI~nit~thatthiris>.RSR3.3.1.6anceisreuireonlyireactorpand-at[24]oursisallowforpeveillancea+terreachi50%RTP.rv,o.v,'heFrequencyof92EFPDi~'5>n.h5SR3.3.1.7bOnx~~tsSR3.3.1.7istheperformanceofaCOTevery+92+daysACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformthtendedFunction.Setpointsmustbewithinthe~Vsecifiedinlo-9~~~~+~LQW'3.'KVi~ebs1eenceeweenecurenasounvauesrioustest"asleft"valuesmustbecon'iththerifdinthesetpoiodology.Thesetpointshallbeleftsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentunitificsetpcrimethodology.The"asf"and"asleft"valuesmustalsberecordedandrewedforconsistencywiththeassumptioofefrence7.TheFrequencyo~f92~aysisReferenceAf(continued)W+O~ISB3.3-54892 P3.XVii~Insert3.3.1.32~PowerRangeNeutronFlux-High;~SourceRangeNeutronFlux(inMODE3,4,or5withRTBsclosedandtheCRDSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal);~OvertemperaturehT;~Overpower-hT;~PressurizerPressure--Low;~PressurizerPressurizer-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);and~SGWaterLevel-LowLowInsert3.3.1.33SR3.3.1.7ismodi'fiedbyaNotethatprovidesa4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillanceforsourcerangeinstrumentationwhenenteringMODE3fromMODE2.ThisNoteallowsa'normalshutdowntoproceedwithoutadelayfor<-,~testinginMODE2andforashorttimeinMODE3untiltheRTBsareopenandSR3.3.1.7isnolongerrequiredtobeperformed.IftheplantisinMODE3withtheRTBsclosedforgreaterthan4hours,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin4hoursafterentryintoMODE3. Insert3.3.1.34TheFrequencyof"4hoursafterreducingpower<8%"(applicabletopowerrangeandintermediaterangechannels)andtheFrequencyof"4hoursafterreducingpower<5E-llamps"(applicabletosourcerangechannels)allowsanormalshutdowntobecompletedandtheplantremovedfromtheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillancewithoutadelaytoperformthetestingrequiredbythissurveillance.TheFrequencyofevery92daysthereafterappliesiftheplantremainsintheMODEofApplicabilityaftertheinitialperformancesofpriortoreactorstartcpand4hoursafterreducingpowerbelowP-10orP-6.Z3+F.'vasheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillanceis<P-.IOforthepowerrangelowandintermediaterangechannelsand<P-6fortheSourcerangechannels.OncetheplantisinMODE3,thissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.Ifpoweristobemaintained<P-10or<P-6formorethan4hours,thenthetestingrequiredbythissurveillancemustbeperformedpriortotheexpirationofthe4hourlimit.FourhoursisareasonabletimetocompletetherequiredtestingorplacetheplantinaMODEwherethissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.ThistestensuresthattheNISsource,intermediate,andpowerrangelowchannelsareOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalandafterreducingpowerintotheapplicableMODE(<P-10or<P-6)forperiods>4hours.Insert3.3.1.35~~XVi~.<fortheUndervoltage-BusllAandllBtripFunction.TheFrequencyofevery92daysisconsistentwithReference10.Insert3.3.1.36ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthefollowingRTSFunctions:~PressurizerPressure-Low;~~Yai.Q.,~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~UndervoltageRCPs;~SGWaterLevel-LowLow;~TurbineTrip-LowFluidOilPressure;~TurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosure;~PowerRangeNeutronFlux;

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASES23.xvai,a.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(contindpdh~+~-L~,Q4e.r~~I4J~~~geudnr)<SR33.1.8~LyvLC3JUL~SRKhdBPistheperformanceofaCOTasdescribedinSR3.3.1.excepterificationthattheP-6andP-10interlocksreintheirrequiredstatefortheexistingconsson.p.z,>.Q>'Vtt.QSR3.3.1.9SR3.3.1.9istheerformanceofaTAOOTHBSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationof~,~gadsetpointsfromtSincethisSRappliestoT<6undervoltagerelays,setpointverificationrequireselaboratebenchcalibrationandisaccomplishedduringtheCHANNELCALIBRATION~~q.~.l,>>+9/l~22~)CViaoC'.>'XVtt,ch&2.'sLVtt.thACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedeverygQmonths,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.CHANNELCALIBRATIONemustbeerormecon'<~githteassumptionsofe05+AspecificsepornmeooogyThedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"as1'eft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyofmonthsisbasedontheassumptionof&~monthcalibrationinterval)inthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.SR3.3.1.10ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthat(continued)B3.3-55

eInsert3.3.1.34SR3.3.1.8ismodifiedbytwoNotesthatprovidea4hourdelayintherequirementtoperformthissurveillance.TheseNotesallowanormalshutdowntobecompletedandtheplantremovedfromtheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillancewithoutadelaytoperformthetestingrequiredbythissurveillance.TheFrequencyofevery92daysthereafterappliesiftheplantremainsintheMODEofApplicabilityaftertheinitialperformancesofpriortoreactorstartupand4hoursafterreducingpowerbelowP-10orP-6.TheMODEofApplicabilityforthissurveillanceis<P-10forthepowerrangelowandintermediaterangechannelsand<P-6fortheSourcerangechannels.OncetheplantisinMODE3,thissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.Ifpoweristobemaintained<P-10or<P-6formorethan4hours,thenthetestingrequiredbythissurveillancemustbeperformedpriortotheexpirationofthe4hourlimit.Fourhoursisareasonabletimetocompletetherequiredtestingorplacetheplant'inaMODEwherethissurveillanceisnolongerrequired.ThistestensuresthattheNISsource,intermediate,andpowerrangelowchannelsareOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalandafterreducingpowerintotheapplicableMODE(<P-10or<P-6)forperiods>4hours.Insert3.3.1.35)g))QfortheUndervoltage-Bus11Aand118tripFunction.TheFrequencyofevery92daysisconsistentwithReference10.Insert3.3.1.36ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthefollowingRTSFunctions:~PowerRangeNeutronFlux;~IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux;~SourceRangeNeutronFlux;~OvertemperaturehT.~OverpowerhT;andoPressurizerPressure-Low;~PressurizerPressure-High;~PressurizerWaterLevel-High;~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop);~ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops);~UndervoltageRCPs; Insert3.3.1.36(continued)~SGWaterLevel-LowLow;~TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure;Insert3.3.1:3783.&l/(kQQggVIneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthepowerrangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofanormalizationofthedetectorsbasedonapowercalorimetricandfluxmapperformedabove15%RTP.TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeandintermediaterangeneutrondetectorsconsistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvestothemanufacturer'sdata.ThisSurveillanceis.notrequiredfortheNISpowerrangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2orI,andisnotrequiredfortheNISintermediaterangedetectorsforentryintoMODE2,becausetheplantmustbeinatleastMODE2toperformthetestfortheintermediaterangedetectorsandMODEIforthepowerrangedetectors.The24monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedonthe24monthFrequency. RTS.InstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)J~kSR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.11istheperformanceofaCHANCALIBRATION,asscribedinSR3.3.1.10,every[18]months.ThisSRismoiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheCHANNELCALIBRAONforthepowerrangeneutrondetectoronsistsof-anorma'zationofthedetectorsbasedonowercalorimetricndfluxmapperformedabove.RTP.TheCHANNELCALIBIONforthesourcerangndintermediaterangeneutrondectorsconsistsofainingthedetectorplateauorpreamp'riminatorces,evaluatingthosecurves,andcomparingthecurvtothemanufacturer'sdata.ThisSurveillanceisnoreiredfortheNISpowerrangedetectorsforentryintoDE2or1,andisnotrequiredfortheNISintermedirandetectorsforentryintoMODE2,becausethnitmustinatleastMODE2toperformthetesortheinterme'erangedetectorsandMODE1forthpowerrangedetectorThe[18]monthFrequencybasedontheneedtopermthisSurveillanceundertconditionsthatapplyduringalantoutageandthepentialforanunplannedtransienti+heSurveillancewerperformedwiththereactoratpower.Ope~ting'eeriencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedonthe[18]monthFrequency.iseNELCALIBRATION,asebedinSR3.3.1.10,every[18]months.ThisSRis.modifieNotestatingthatthistestshallincluverificationoRCSresistancetemperaturetor(RTD)bypassloopflowThistestwillverifytheragensationforflowfromthecoretotheTheFrequisjustifiedbytheassumptionofanmontcalionintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitoequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.(continued)83.3-56 Insert3.3.1.38ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheManualReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,andtheSIInputfromESFAStripFunctions.ThisTADOTisperformedevery24months.ThistestindependentlyverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheundervoltageandshunttripmechanismsfortheManualReactorTripFunctionfortheReactorTripBreakersandReactorTripBypassBreakers.TheReactorTripBypassBreakertestshallincludetestingoftheundervoltagetrip.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfromtheTADOTbecausetheFunctionsaffectedhave-nosetpointsassociatedwiththem.SR3.3.1.12ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTforTurbineTripFunctionswhichisperformedpriortoreactorstartup.ThistestshallverifyOPERABILITYbyacutationoftheenddevices.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceisnotrequiredifithasbeenperformedwithintheprevious31days.AsecondNotestatesthatverificationoftheTripSetpointdoesnothavetobeperformedforthisSurveillance.PerformanceofthistestwillensurethattheturbinetripFunctionisOPERABLEpriortotakingthereactorcriticalbecausethistestcannotbeperformedwiththereactoratpower.SR3.3.1.13ThisSRensuresthe'PowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandtheIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-10interlockwhileinMODE1.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitofthePower'Rangechannels.PeriodictestingoftheP-10channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.SetpointsmustbewithintheTripSetpointof<6%RTP.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthesetpointmethodology.IftheP-10interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePowerRangeNeutron Insert3.3.1.38(continued)Flux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-10interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandthePowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannel-redundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.14ThisSRensurestheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisnotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisbelowtheP-6interlockwhileinMODE2.PeriodictestingoftheP-6channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.~~,~~<<,',.>>Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfoundva"luesandprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP6interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thentheSourceRangeNeutronFluxtripFunctionisconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-6interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondit'ion,theSRismetandtheSRMFunctionwouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.15ThisSRensuresthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-Bus11AandllBtripFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-7interlocksetpointwhileinMODE1.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindication,>8.5%RTPasmeasuredbyTurbineFirstStagePressureChannelsandthePowerRangechannels.PeriodictestingoftheP-7channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP-7interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusllAandllBFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-7interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandthe

Insert3.3.1.38(continued)PressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusIIAandllBFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.16ThisSRensurestheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)FunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-8interlocksetpointwhileinMODEl.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>50%RTPasmeasuredbythepowerrangechannels.Periodictestingofthechannelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.IftheP-8interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thentheReactorCoolantFlow-low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLoop)tripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-8interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandtheReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)tripFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.1.17ThisSRensurestheTurbineTripFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenTHERMALPOWERisabovetheP-9interlockwhileinMODEI.ThisFunctionisderivedfromabistablecircuitindicating>50%RTPasmeasuredbythepowerrangechannels.CondenserpressureandcirculatingwaterpumpbreakerstatusisalsoaninputtoP-9butarenotrequiredtobeverifiedbythisSR.PeriodictestingoftheP-9channelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.8).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology. Insert3.3.1.38(continued)IftheP-9interlocksetpointisnonconservative,thentheTurbineTripFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,theP-9interlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandtheTurbineTripFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.~~~TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionsandmultichannelredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued}SR.3.3.1.13SR3.3.1.13istheperformanceofaCOTofRTSiterlocksevery[18]months.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityofheinterlocksandthemultichannelredundancyavailabl'ndhasbeenshown,tobeacceptablethroughoperati'gexperience.R3~yt.Vat,ch.~a.wvt't,pSR3.3.1.14omthase.of0riexceptAit(hasio6ofisattheIv'R3.3.1.14istheperformanceofaTADOT:oftheManuaReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,and,theSIInputfESFAS.ThisTADOTisasdescribedinSR3.3.1.4,excelthatthetestisperformedevery[18],months./TheFrequencyisbasedonthe,known!reliabilityoftheFunctionsandthemultichannel;redu'ndancyavailable,anbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperienctTheSRismodifiedbyaNotethat,excludesverification'setpointsfromtheTADOT.The!Funhtionsaffectedhavesetpointsassociatedwiththem'.,/'R3.3.1.15SR3.3.1.15istheperformanceofaTADOTofTurbineTFunctions.ThisTADOT.isasdescribedi,nSR3.3.1.4,thatthistestisperformedpriortoreactorstartup.Notestatesthatthis'urveillanceisnot;requiredifbeenperformedwithintheprevious31days.VerificattheTripSetpointoesnothavetobepformedforthSurveillance.Pe.formanceofthistesti'KlensurethturbinetripFunctionisOPERABLEpriorttakingthereactorcritical.Thistestcannotbeperormedwithtreactoratpowerandmustthereforebepero'rmedpriorreactorstartup.,SR3.3.'1.16~~SR3..1.16verifiesthattheindividualchanneltraiactuationresponsetimesarelessthanorequaltothe(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-57Rev.0,09/28/92

RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.1.16(continued)maximumvaluesassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Respons'etimetestingacceptancecriteriaareincludednTechnicaquirementsManual,Section15(Ref.8).Idividualcomponentresponsetimesarenotmodeleditheanalyses.IITheanalysesmodeltheoverallortotalepsedtime,fromtheprintatwhichtheparameterexceedshetripsetpoinkvalueathesensortothepointatwhihtheequipmentreachesthrequiredfunctionalstatei.e.,controlandshutdownroawfullyinsertedintheractorcore).forchannelsthatincludedynamicansferFunctions(e.g,,lag,lead/lag,rate/lag,etc.),teresponsetimetestmaybeperformedwiththetransfer.Fnctionsettoone,withtheresultingmeasuredresponseticomparedtotheappropriateFSARresponsetime.Agternaty,theresponsetimetestt:anbeperformedwiththet9qecstantssettotheirnominal~value,providedtherequiteresponsetimeisanalyticallgcalculatedassumingthetieconstantsaresetattheirnominalvalues.Theresnsetimemaybemeasuredbyaseriesofoverlappingtstssuchthattheentireresponseitimeismeasured.Asappropriate,eacchannel'sresponsemustbeverifiedevery[18]monthsnaSTAGGEREDTETBASIS.Testingofthefinalactuationvicesisincluded'nthetesting.Responsetimesnnotbedeterminedringunitoperationbecauseequipmtoperationisrequiretomeasurerespons'etimes.Experjencehasshown"thatthese,componentsusually',passthissufveillancewhenperformedat/the18month!Frequency.,Therefore,theFrequencywasoncludedtobeacceptable'romareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.3/I.16ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthaneutrondetect'orsareexcludedfromRTSRESPONSETIMEesting.ThiNote~isnecessarybecauseofthedifficultyingqneratingaappt'opriatedetectorinputsignal.ExcludingthedetectorsisacceptablebecausetheprinciplesofdetectoroperationensureavirtuallyinstantaneousresponseREFERENCESfj.@SAR,Chapter/7].FSAR,Chapter+6f.(continued)SffQ~wut.)maG..e~oumr+~'3.3-58ev. RTSInstrumentationB3.3.1BASESREFERENCES<'$.QSAR,Chaptet+15P(continued)1$.IEEE-279-)971.~D+.MCAP-10271-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.1,June1990.WOGSTSB3.3-59Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.3.1.40l.AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC14,IssuedforcommentJuly10,1967.2.10CFR100.3.AmericanNationalStandard,"NuclearSafetyCriteriafortheDesignofStationaryPressurizedWaterReactorPlants,"N18.2-1973.8.RGSEEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)5126,"GuidelinesforInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.9.WCAP-14333,May1995.11.WestinghouseTechnicalBulletin,NumberNSD-TB-92-14-RO,"InstrumentationCalibrationatReducedPower,"datedJanuary18,1993. ESFASInstrumentation83.3.283.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.2EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationBASES~q,;;;.~BACKGROUNDXaaa.<vp(Xiia.o,ignalbaseerTheESFASinitiatesnecessarysafetysystems,basedonthevaluesofselectedparameters,toprotectagainstviolatingcoredesignlimitsandtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)pressureboundary,andtomitigateaccidents.TheESFASinstrumentationissegmentedintodistinctbutinterconnectedmodulesas~~a~J1&vp'(.~Fieldtransmittersorrocesssensors'andameys~calcahed'ignalprocessingequipmentanaogerInstrumentationstem,fieMcontacts,andprotectionchannels:providesignaTconditioning,bistablesetpocomparison,processatgithmactuation,cotibleelectricalsignaloutputrotectionstemdevices,andcontrolboard/contr/miscellaneousindications;andW(,Xiaa.~SolidStatePectionSystem(SSPncludinginput,logic,andtputbays:initiatestheerunitshutdoworengineeredsafetyfeature(ESF)tuationinaordancewiththedefinedlogicandbasedontheb'bleoutputsfromthesignalprocesscontrolandprotectionsystem.y~dopgp~~~AQ(ODa~~i2,9v'aiaa,aFieldTransmittersorSensorsTomeetthedesigndemandsforredundancandreliability,d~fPi1d<<iorsensorsareusedtomeasure%~parameters.nmanycases,fieldtransmittersorsensorsthatinputtotheESFASaresharedwiththeReactorTripSystem(RTS).nsomeasestheasoroveecorosysteminputs.Toaccountforcalibrationtolerancesaninsrumenriwhichareassumedtooccurbetweencalibrationsstatisticalallowancesiepeprovided.>na(continued)Pe.,$o.N~cii~f(~(Ao&B3.3-60ev. I Insert3.3.2.IAtomicIndustrialForum(AIF),GDC15(Ref.1)requiresthatprotectionsystemsbeprovidedforsensingaccidentsituationsandinitiatingtheoperationofnecessaryengineeredsafetyfeatures. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2.BASESBACKGROONDFieldTransmittersorSensors~g,Xaaa.QValues.The0ransmitterorsensorcanbeevaluatedwhenit"foun'brationdataareomparedagain~sdocumentedacceptaecriteria.W,~ia,.~'sp+,7CIttSinalProcessinEuimentGenerally,threeorfourchanne'Isofprocesscontrol~pit~equipmentareusedforthesignalprocessingofpdbyhfildi~.pQ~ashspmenpng,comparaleoutputsignalsforinstrumentslocatedonthemainrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalshsetpoihts,establishedbysafetyanalyses.sesetpointsaredefinedin..FSAR,Chapter[6](Ref.,Chapter[7](Ref.2),andChapr[15](Ref.3)fthemeasuredvalueofaunitparameteredstheedeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisardedtotheSSPSfordecisioevaluation.Channelseation'intaineduptoandthroughtheinputb.However,notunitparametersrequirefourchelsofsensormeasurementsignal'processing.omeunitparametersprovideinputtothSSPS,whiothersprovideinputtotheSSPS,themacontrolboard,theunitcomputer,andoneormorecontrolstZtapa'rameterisused~forinputtotherotecti~H~,i:-he~channelswithatwo-out-of-~loicarsufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilitandredundaonatwoulresuaartialFunctiontrip,theFu'ilPERABLEwithawo-onechannelfailsuchthata'nctiontr>p,iwillnotccur~ionisstillOPERABLEwithaoloiZAgian.s'-erally,ifaparameterisusedforinputtotheSSPSandaconro'fourchannelswithat-o-fourlogicaresufficien'tiredreliabilityandredundancy.Thecircuiteawithstandbothaninputfailurecontrolsystem,whichmnrequiretheprionfunctionactuation,andasinglefaireintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionB3.3-61 Insert3.3.2.2Thesestatisticalallowancesprovidethebasisfordeterminingacceptable"asleft"and"asfound"calibrationvaluesforeachtransmitterorsensor.Insert3.3.2.3Theprocesscontrolequipmentprovidessignalconditioning,comparableoutputsignalsfor-instrumentslocatedonthemaincontrolboard,andcomparisonofmeasuredinputsignalswithsetpointsestablishedbysafetyanalyses.ThesesetpointsaredefinedinUFSAR,Chapter6(Ref.3),Chapter7(Ref.2),andChapter15(Ref.4).Ifthemeasuredvalueofaplantparameterexceedsthepredeterminedsetpoint,anoutputfromabistableisforwardedtothelogicrelays.Insert3.3.2.4Ifaparameterisusedonlyforinputtotheprotectioncircuits,threechannelswithatwo-out-of-threelogicaretypicallysufficienttoprovidetherequiredreliabilityandredundancy.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatwouldnotresultinapartialFunctiontrip,theFunctioncanstillbeaccomplishedwithatwo-out-of-twologic.IfonechannelfailsinadirectionthatapartialFunctiontripoccurs,atripwillnotoccurunlessasecondchannelfailsortripsintheremainingone-out-of-twologic.Insert3.3.2.5Thisensuresthatthecircuitisabletowithstandbothaninputfailuretothecontrolsystem,whichmaythenrequiretheprotectionfunctionactuation,andasinglefailureintheotherchannelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctionactuation.Therefore,asinglefailurewillneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfunctionactuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIEEE-279-1971(Ref.5).TheactuationofESFcomponentsisaccomplishedthroughmasterandslaverelays.Theprotectionsystemenergizesthemasterrelaysappropriatefortheconditionoftheplant.Eachmasterrelaythenenergizesoneormoreslaverelays,whichthencauseactuationoftheenddevices. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESBACKGROUNDKR.Xhi.~SinalProcessinEuiment(continued)actuation.ga'ir;atinglefai].ure'illneithercausenorpreventtheprotectionfu~actuation.TheserequirementsaredescribedinIE~79-1971(Ref.4).Theactualnumberofchannelsrequiredforcaw+unitparameter-isspecifiedinReference2./Cgeg,QVuTheTripSetpointsarethenominalvaluesatwhichthebistablesareset.Anybistableisconsideredtobe~e~properlyadjustedwhenthe."asleft"valueiswithinthe,bandforCHANNELCALIBRATIONaccurac~+bG7c'seeiWPq+P~~~/r+/...~4c>0~~c~oTheTripSetpointsusedinthebistablesareasedontheanalyticallimitsstatedinReference'2.TheselectionoftheseTripSetpointsissuchthatadequateprotectionisprovidedwhenalsensorandrocessintimedelaysccount.Toallowfcaibraionoerancesainies~instrumentdrifterorsoroseln10CFR50.49SetointsandllowableValusenirumfunction(Ref.inTable3.3.2-1ncornAdetailedIdescripipolnonofthemethodologyusedtongeciuncertainties,isrovidedinthe"RTS/ESFASSetpointHethodotod7"(Ref.6)-.-.Tkeactualnominal'ointenteredintotbistableisnormaonservativethanthatspecifiedbytheAllowabuetoaccrchangesinrandomeasureerrorsdetectablebyaCO.exampleofsuhchgeinmeasurementerrorisdriftduringturveillanceinterval.IfthemeasuredsetpointdoesnoxceedtheAllowableValuethebistableisconsidereERABLSetpoisinaccordancewiththeAlowableValueensurethatheconsequewibeacceptableeunitistedfromwithintheLCOs'-at-teonsetoftheDBAandtheequitfunctionsasdesigned.(continued)RaCi'wince4~eMc~peb~83~362~~

Insert3.3.2.6verifytheadequacyoftheexistingTripSetpoints,includingtheirexplicituncertainties,isprovidedinReference6.IfthemeasuredsetpointexceedstheTripSetpointValue,thebistableisconsideredOPfRABLEunlesstheAllowableValueasspecifiedinplantproceduresisexceeded. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESBACKGROUNDr'tointsandA1'lowahleValues(continEachchannebetestedonlineerifythatthesignalprocessingequipmendsetpoiaccuracyiswithinthespecifiedallowancerequ>sofReference2.Onceadesignatedchannelistnouto'esting,asimulatedsignali~sigectedinplaceofthefieldinstrumentsigna/:Theprocessequipmentforthechannelintestisthentested,verified,andcalibrated.SRsforthechannelsavespecifiedintheTheTriSetointsandAllowableValueslistedinae3.3.2-basedonthemethodologydescribedinReference6,whichincorporatesalloftheknownuncertaintiesapplicableforeachchannel.ThemagnitudesoftheseuncertaintiesarefactoredintothedeterminationofeachTripSetpoint.Allfieldsensorsandsignalprocessingequipmentforthesechannelsareassumedtooperatewithintheallowancesoftheseuncertaintymagnitudes.SolidStateProtectionSstem'TheSSPSequipmentisusedforthedecisionlogicprocessingofoutputsfromthesignalprocessingequipmentbitables.Tomeattheredundancyrequirements,twotrainfSSPS,eachperformingthesamefunctions,arepro'd.Ifonetrainistakenoutofserviceformainteceortestpurposes,themecondtrainwillprovidESFactuationfortheunit.Ifbahtrainsaretakeutofserviceorplacedintest,areactortripwillrest.Eachtrainispackagedinitsowncabinetfor.physicafandelectricalseparationtosatisfyseparationandsendencerequirements.Thesystemhasbeendesignedtripintheeventofalossofpower,directingtheittosafeshutdowncondition.TheSSPSperformshedecisionlo'cforactuatingESFequipmentactu>on;generatestheectricaloutputsignalsthatinitiate%herequiredactuation;ndprovidesthestatus,permissive,andannunciatorouttsignalstothemaincont/olroomoftheunit.Theb~'stableoutputsfromthesignalprocessinquipmentaresensedbytheSSPSequipmentandcombinedintologicmatricesthatrepresentcombinationsindicativeofvarious(continued)83.3-63 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESBACKGROUNOSolidStateProtectionSstem(continued)transients.Ifarequiredlogicmatrixombinationiscompleted,thesystemwillsendactuat'signalsviamasterand,slaverelaystothosecomponentsoseaggregateFunct,ionbestservestoalleviateteconditionandrestoretheumittoasafecondition.ExplesaregivenintheApplicah1eSafetyAnalyses,LCO,andApplicabilitysectionofthisBases.Eachtrainh'asabuiltinttingdevicethatcanautomaticallyitestthedec'sionlogicmatrixfunctionsandtheactuationdeviceswhietheunitisatpower.Whenanyonetrainistakenoutservicefortesting,theothertrainiscapable'qfprvidingunitmonitoringandprotectionuntilthetestinggabeencompleted.Thetestingdeviceissemiautomatictomiimizetestingtime.TheactuationofSFmponentsisaccomplishedthroughmasterandslavrelaysTheSSPSenergizesthemasterrelaysappropr'ateforteconditionoftheunit.Eachmasterrelay/henenergizoneormoreslaverelays,whichthencausegtuationofthenddevices.Themasterand'slaverelaysareroutinelystedtoensureoperation.ThetestoftPhmasterrelayseneQgizestherelay,whichthenoperates~thecontactsandappl'esalowvoltagetotheassociat~edslaverelays.The1voltageisnotsufficienttoactuatetheslaverelaysbutplydemonstratessignalpathcontinuity.TheSLAVERELAY'VESTactuatesthedevicesifth'eiroperationwillnotinterferewithcontinuedunitoperation.Forthelattercase,actualcomponentoperationis/preventedbytheSLAVERELAYTEST'rcuit,andslaverlaycontactoperationisverifiedbycontinuitycheckofecircuitcontainingtheslaverelay.Reviewer'sNote:NooneunitESFASincorpoatesalloftheFunctionslistedinTable3.3.2-1.Insomeases(e.g.,ContainmentPressure-High3,Function2.c),hetablereflectsseveraldifferentimplementations'ofesameFunction.Typically,onlyoneoftheseimplemenationsareusedatanyspecificunit.83.3-64(continued)

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSELCO,ANDAPPLICABILITY2Nxiiii~S,EachoftheanalyzedaccidentscanbedetectedbyoneormoreESFASFunctions.OneoftheESFASFunctionsistheprimaryactuationsignal'forthataccident.AnESFASFunctionmaybetheprimaryactuationsignalformorethanonetypeofaccident.AnESFASFunctionmayalsobeasecondary,orbackup,actuationsignalforoneormoreotheaccidents.Forexample,PressurizerPressure-LowisaQ~Wprimaryactuationsignalforsmalllossofcooanaccidents(LOCAs)andabackupactuationsignalforsteamlinebreaks(SLBs)outsidecontainment.Functionssuchasmanualinitiation,notspecificallycreditedin.theaccidentsafetyanalysis,arequalitativelycreditedinthesafetyanalysiand.theNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasisforthe~.P<~+TheseFunctionsmayprovideprotectionforconditionsthatdonotrequiredynamictransientanalysistodemonstrateFunctionperformance.TheseFunctionsmayalsoserveasbackupstoFunctionsthatwerecreditedintheaccidentanalysis(Reft).teXl4gaQW9.Xi"ai.%LCOr'equiresallinstrumentationperforminganESFAS.FunctiontobeOPERABLE.Failureofanyinstrumentrenderstheaffectedchannel(s)inoperableandreducesthereliabilityoftheaffectedFunctions..TheLCOgenerallyrequiresOPERABILITYofurohreechannelsineachinstrumentationfunctionandtwochannelsineachlogicandmanualinitiationfunction.Thetwo-out-of-threeandthetwo-out-of-fourconfigurationsallowonechanneltobetrippedduringmaintenanceortestingwithoutcausinganESFASinitiation.Twologicormanualinitiationchannelsarerequiredtoensurenosingle~failuredisablestheESFAS.TherequiredchannelsofESFASinstrumentationprovideprotectionintheeventofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents.ESFASprotectionfunctionsareasfollows:~l84gLvN~f,g~/I.SafetInectionSafetyInjection(SI)providestwoprimaryfunctions:1.Primarysidewateradditiontoensuremaintenanceorrecoveryofreactorvesselwaterlevel(coverageoftheactivefuelforheatremoval,cladintegrity,andforlimitingpeakcladtemperatureto<2200'F);and(continued)WOTShip~suP~PJhMB3.3-65Re ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY2M.xtIt.Q.~~~t(~I5'.SafetInection(continued)2.BorationtoensurerecoveryandmaintenanceofSDM(k,(1.0).Thesefunctionsarenecessarytomitigatetheeffectsofhighenergylinebreaks(HELBs)bothinsideandoutsideofcontainment.TheSIsignalisalsousedtoinitiateotherFunctionssuchas:h~~<<+~~Isolation;~Containment~~gysolation;~ReactorTrip;~FeedwaterIsolation;M~Startofmotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)pumps~~Conmventilationisolat'Enablingaut'witcfEmergencyCoreCoolistems(ECCS)suctionto'p~Theseotherfunctionsensure:Isolationofnonessentialsystemsthroughcontainmentpenetrations;Tripofthegeneration;lIsolationofmainfeedwater(HFg)tolimitsecondarysidemasslosses;~reactortolimitpowerStartofAFWtoensuresecondarysidecoolingcapabilityfthecohabita'nensure(continued)B3.3-662 ESFASInstrumentation83.'3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,and>'lii1.SafetIn'ection(continued)EnablingECCSsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterAPPLICABILITYstoragetank(RWST)switchoveronlowlowRWSTleveltoensurecontinuedcool'aua~~~~+I,2,Pal+.Kw~NecksZ~v~@vien~~d+omahqC~~~$2g~Xiii.a.SafetInection-ManualInitiationTheLCOrequiresonechannelpertraintobeELE.Thtimebyusingeitheroftwos~~~~e~control~.Thisactionwillcauseactuationacomponents'same'auv.4TheLCOfortheManualInitiationFunciov~~~ensurestheproperamountofredundancyismaintainedinthemanualESFASactuationcircuitrytoensuretheoperatorhasmanualESFASinitiationcapability.Eachchannelconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogiccabinet.Eachpush4uttonactuatesbothtrains.Thisconfigurationdoesnotallowtestingatpower.SafetIn'ection-AutomaticActuationLoicand2,Q,wih~<ActuationRelas~moo~>i~~<~.~~~o~~pvs~~CJLC~~In<&~C~!ThisLCOrequirestworainstobeOPERABLEActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.anualandautomaticinitiationofSImust0RABLEinMODES1,2,and3.IntheseHODES,theissufficientenergyinthemaryandsecondarstemstowarrantomaticinitiationofESFsystems.nualtiationisalsorequiredinMODE4automaticactuationisnoequired.IntiE,adequatetiisavailabletomanuallyactuaterequireomponentsintheeventofaDBA,(conted~$~B3.3-67f~(I/~'ev92 Insert3.3.2.7ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatethez~i,v."i.~consequencesofanabnormalconditionoraccident.PlantpressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofplantsystems.

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.SafetIn'ection-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationEbecauseonumberofcornsactuatedonaSI,actuaimplifiedbytheuseofthemanualactonpushAutomaticactualogicandactuationreamustbe0LEinMODE4tosupportsystemlevanualinitiation.'EIBBs-FunctioniepgbnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES~5and6becausethereisadequatetimep,.J-forteoperatortoevaluate~coniionsandrespondbymanuallystartingindividualsystems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatethe,conseuencesofanabnormalconditionoraccient.N+ppressureandtemperatureareverylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadvertentoverpressurizationofsystems.C.SafetInection-ContainmentPressure-HihThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLBinsidecontainment;~LOCA;and~Feedlinebreakinsidecontainment.ContainmentPressure-Highprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.1'hus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogic.Thetransmittersandelectronicsarelooutsieocontainmentwiththesensinglinoc'hus,thehighpressureFunctionwillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.(continued)B3.3-68

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYsaQ,Vtta.4c.SafetIn'ection-ContainmentPressure-Hih(continued)ContainmentPressure-HighmustbeOPERABLEinODESI,2,and3~~thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmentfollowinaie'~~~break.InHOOES4,5,and6,tereissCT~-~~~insufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarsystemstopressurizethecontainment.ElJLC~ad.SafetIn'ection-PressurizerPressure-Low*4sl6aia4-~t,xiii,~Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~Inadvertentopeningofasteamgenerator(SG)relieforsafetyvalve;~SLB;sodclustercontrolassemblyejectionaccidents(rodejection);Inadvertentopeningofapressurizerrelieforsafetyvalve;LOCAs;andSGTubeRupture.someunitspressurizerpressureprovidesbcoolandprotectionfunctions:inputthePressu'rPressureControlSystem,rctortrip,anI.Therefore,theactuonlogicmustbeableowithstandbothinputfailuretocontrolsystwhichmayenrequiretheprotectionfunctioctuaon,andasinglefailureintheothernnelsprovidingtheprotectionfunctioctua'.Thus,fourOPERABLEchannearerequiretosatisfytherequirementsithatwo-out-of-logic.Forunitsthavededicatedprotectiondcontrolchanne,onlythreeprotectionchannelsenecsarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirems.(continued)Leerf~B3.3-69 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)Thetransmittersarelocatedinsidecontainment,withthetapsinthevaporspaceregionofthe~pressurizer,andthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(LOCA,SLBinsidecontainment,rodejection).Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.p~t~W~bd.~~5~~~~ave~~~~(JUL~~~~pakc~AL+~('.SafetInection-PressurizerPressure-LowBe~~rP~~~'~~e.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,and3(above~~tomitigatetheconsequencesofanHELBinsidecontainment.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoperatorbelowthe~setpoint.AutomaticSIactuationbelowthis~asssWsetpointisthenpformedbytheContainmentPressure-Highsignal.ThisetioisnorequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODE3belowsetpoint.OtherESFfunctionsareusedtodetectaccidentconditionsandactuatetheESFsystemsinthisNODE.InMODES4,5,and6,thisFunctionisnotneededforaccidentdetectionandmitigation.SafetIn'ection-SteamLinePressure~L~MU~<~~en'teamLinePressure-Lowprovidesprotectionagainstthefollowingaccidents:~SLB;Feedlinebreak;and~InadvertentopeningofanSGrelieforanSGsafetyvalve.SteamLinePressure~i@provide&&input,controlfunctions.Thus,threeRABLEchannelsoneacsteamlinearesufficienttosatisfytheprotective(continued)B3.3-70,09/28/92 ESFASInstrumentation~83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY2l.xt'it.a.Sqa<<Wa~xAWsbAI"SteamLinePressure-Low(continued)requirementswithatwo-out-of-threelogiconeachsteamline.Withthetransmitters~locatedem~,'*biforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringasecondarysidebreak.Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentaltinstrumentuncertainties.~l,'kiaa.a.Qf'"n'~go>lc.~I.<av'a.Q.-Wt.f."~t,t;t"r~SteamLinePressure-Lowmustbeu:wham.v,'nROBES1,2,and3(abovewhenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvavecouldresultintherapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.Thissignalmaybemanuallyblockedbytheoelowthesetpoint.Below-,feenebreakisnotaconcern.ns>econtainmentSLweterminatedbyautomaticSactuationvi~onf;ainmentsure-HighI,andoutsidecontain4illbeterminatedbyteamLinePressureegativeRat~e-'ghsignalforThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinWOOE4,5,or6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideofthe~touseanaccident.M9,'atSteamLinePressure-HihDifferential~PressureBetweenSteamLinessSteamlanePressure-HighDi"rentialPressureBetween.SteamLiprovidesprotectionagainstthe.followingaccidents~~SLB;~Feedlinebreak;and(continued)83.3-71RORSTSIsi;-ical,.;Jtc,'..!lw'o,'.lr'f;:c.v,~Rev,~~9j28+2-ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(2)SteamLinePressure-HihDifferentialPressureBetweenSteamLines(continued)~InadvertentopeningofanSGrelieforanSGsafetyvalve.SteamLinePressure-HighDifferentiaPressureBetweenSteamLinesprovidenoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Ths,threeOPERABLEchannelsoneachsamlineresufficienttosatisfythereirements,'thatwo-out-of-threelogicoeachsteam1>e.Withthetransmitterstypiclylocatedinsidthesteamtunnels,tispossibleforthtoexperienceaerseenvironntalconditionduringanSLBevent.erefore,thTripSetpointreflectsbthsteadytateandadverseenvironment1instrentuncertainties.SteamlinehhdiferentialpressuremustbeOPERABLEiMESI,2,and3whenasecondarysidereakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultiherapiddepressurizationofthesteamins).ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtoeOPABLEinMODE4,5,or6becausetreisnosufficientenergyinthesecoarysideotheunittocauseanacciden.f,g.SafetIn'tion-HihSteamlowinTwoSteamLinesCoicidentWithT-LowLoworCoincidentWithStmLinePressure-LowThesaga'unctions(I.fandI.g)provdeprotectionstthefollowingaccidents:SLB;andtheinadvertentopeningofanSGlieforanSGsafetyvalve.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinererequiredOPERABLEfortheseFunctions.Theearnlineflowchannelsarecombinedinaone-out-(continue)4963VS-B3.3-72 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYf,g.SafetInection-HihSteamFlawinTwoSteamLinesCoincidentWithT-LowLoworCoinc'dentWithSteamLinePressure-Low(continuedtwologictoindicatehighsteamflowionesteamline.Thesteamflowtransmittsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunconcannotcausetheeventsthattheFunctionustprotectagainst.Therefore,twochannelsresufficienttosatisfyredundancyrequiremens.Theone-out-of-twoconfigurationalowsonlinete'stingbecausetripofoneh'steamflowcha'nnelisnotsufficienttocauseinitiation.Higsteamflow'intwostelinesisacceptableintecaseofasinglesamlinefaultduetothefctthattheremain'intactsteamlineswillp'ckupthefulltrhineload.Theincreasdsteamflowitheremainingintactlineswi1actuatetrequiredsecondhighsteamflowtripAdditio1protectionisprovidedbyFunctionIe.(2),ghDifferentialPressureBetweenStemLins.Onechannel.,perloopandonechanneloflowsteamlinpressurepersteamlinearerequiredOPEE.Foreachparameter,thechannelsforalloopsorsteamlinesarecombinedialoicsuchthattwochannelstrippedwi1causatripfortheparameter.Forexample,orthreeloopunits,thelowsteamlinepressurchannelsaecombinedintwo-out-of-three1gic.Thus,heFunctiontripsonone-o-of-twohighowinanytwo-out-of-threestealinesifthere>one-out-of-onelowlowT.,ripinanytwo-ouof-threeRCSloops,oriftheeisaone-out-of-olowpressuretripinantwo-out-of-threestelines.SincetheacidentsthatthiseventrotectsagainstcauseothlowsteamlinepressuandlowlowT.~,provisionofonechannelpelooporsteamlineensuresno'singlerandomfairecandisablebothoftheseFunctions.Thestealinepressurechannelsprovidenocontrolints.TheT.,channelsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventshattheFunctionactstomitigate.(continued)B3.3-73 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYf,g.SafeLineWith/In'ection-HihSteamFlowinTwoSteamCoincidentWithT-LowLoAorCoincidentteamLinePressure-Lowontinued)TheAlowableValueforhighsearnflowisalineafunctionthatvariesthpowerlevel.ThefuctionisahPcorresndingto44%offullsteamlowbetween0%and%loadto114%offullstamflowat100%lgd.Thenominaltripsetpoint$issimilarlycaOulated.Withthetransmitterspicallylocatedinsidethecontainment(T.,)orinsidethesteamtunnels(HighSteam.Flow),iispossibleforthemtoexperiencedverseteadystateenvironmentalconditionsdringnSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointirefectsbothsteadystateandadverseenviragmntalinstrumentuncertainties.TheSteamLine~ressure-LowsignalwasdiscussedpreviouslyundrtFunctionl.e.(1).ThisFunctiomustbeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3(abovP-12)(whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenalvecoldresultintherapiddepressuriationofhesteamline(s).ThissignalmbemanualblockedbytheoperatorwhenbelwtheP-12stpoint.AboveP-12,thisFunctioisautomaticalyunblocked.ThisFunctusnssnotrequireOPERABLEbelowP-12becauethereactorisntcritical,sofeedlinebreaisnotaconcern.LBmaybeaddressedbyContinmentPressureHigh'i(insidecontainment)oryHighSteamFlowinTSteamLinescoicidentwithSteamLineessure-Low,forStamLineIsolation,followbyHighD'fferentialPressureBetweenTwoSteamLines,frSI.ThisFunctionisnotequiredtobePERABLEinMODE4,5,or6becusethereisinsufficientenergyintheseconarysideoftheunittocauseanaccident.(continued)83.3-74 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESXlllg0APPLICASAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)W(.xc<a.o2.ContainmentSraCGprovidesthreeprimaryfunctions:1.LowerscontainmentpressureandtemperatureafteranMELBincontainment;2.Reducestheamountofradioactiveiodineinthecontainmentatmosphere;and3.AdjuststhepHofthewaterinthecontainmentp.tt1gPktttg.5Thesefunctionsarenecessaryto:~Ensurethepressureboundaryintegrityofthecontainmentstructure;~~.g~)'r;~m<::~~~q,0.68-'~~c&QS....Le~.Limitthereleaseofradioactiveiodinetotheenvironmentintheeventofafailureofthecontainmentstructure;andrequired.ainmentspray'isacuContantPressure-ss.-1menta~ManualInitiationMinimizecorrosionofthecomponentsandsystemsinsidecontainmentfollowingaLOCA.tg1tpumpsandalignsthedisttpp<<t~1tdtheupperlevelsofcontainment.WaterisinitiallydrawnfromtheRWSTbythepumpsandmixedwithasodiumhydroxidesolutionfromthesprayaiivetank.enteSTreaow0esprasuctionsareshiftedtthecontainmentsdcontainmentsprayisTheoperatorcaninitiateanytimefromthecont'urningtwocgactuationofseriousconsequences,twoatroombysimultaneouslyactuation49QXcg&aninadvertentouldhave~fEQ~mustbe(continued)B3.3-75

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY~ca1Initiationcontinued)simultaneousl'oinitiateretwosetsotwoswitcheseach'controlrSimultaneouslyturhe'twoswitchesineithe'rsetwillatecontainment.spr~yinbothtrains'samemannerastheautomaticactu'ignal.7wManualInitiatioitchesineachtrainauiredtbeOPLEtoensurenosinglefailuredis.ManualInitiationFunction.b.ActuationRelasAutomaticActuationLoicandutomaticactuationlogicys.consist'ofthesamefeaturesandoperateinthearnemannerasdescribedforESFASFunctionI.b.Hahualandautomaticinitiationofcontainmtspra'ustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,andwhenthereiapotentialforanaccidenttocur,andsuffiientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstoseathreattocontainmeintegrityduetooverpresureconditions.HanalinitiationisaorequiredinMOD4,eventhoughautomaticatu'ationisnorequired.InthisMODE,adequateimeisavlabletomanuallyactuaterequiredcompoents'heeventofaDBA.However,becauseelargenumberofcomponentsactuatedonantainmentspray,actuationissimplifiebyeuseofthemanualactuationpushbutto.AutomticactuationlogicandactuatiorelaysmustOPERABLEinMODE4tosupporsystemlevelman1initiation.InMODES5an,thereisinsufficitenergyintheprimaryndsecondarysystemstorultincontainmeoverpressure..InMODES5an6,thereialsoadequatetimefortheoperarstoevaleunitconditionsandrespond,tomi'gatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.(continued)B3.3-76Rev.0 Insert3.3.2.8ManualinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI23couldcauseareleaseofrdota~oac~vematerialtocontainmentandani~~re~~~inemperaureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.~~~~~~~~InNODES55and6,thisFunctionisnotreuiredtobeprobabilityandconseufthtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.InMODES5and6thencesoeseeventsarereducedduetotheere1salsoadequateepanconitionsandrespondtomitigatethesoanormaconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents;Insert3.3.2.9Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitruiryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,atingrelayco~ta~t~responsibleforactuatingtheESF~~'Ixia<~"'~~<AutomaticinitiationofCSmustbeOPERABLEinNODESI,23and4couldcausearelease.ofradioactivematerialtoaureanpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheCSSystem.piiyandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedInNODES5and6,theprobabilitaan,ereisalsoadequatetimefortheoepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.InHODESn5startingdd1qencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallyomiigatetheconseuences

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continuedM9aXllhs0,C.-ContainmentPure~<~loc~g~ThissignalprovidesprotectionagainstaanSLBinsidecontainment.Thetransmitters@~arelocatedoutsideofcontainmentwiththesensinglingunmen.Thetransmittersandelectronicsareocatedoutsideofcontainment.Thus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.Thisis~@~theonlyFunctionthatrequiresthebistableoutputtoenergizetoperformitsrequiredaction.Itisnotdesirabletohavealossofpoweractuatecontainmentspray,sincetheconsequencesofaninadvertentactuationofcontainmentspraycouldbeserious.ha@a&wodierentlogicconfigurationsaretypicallyud.Threeandfourloopunitsusefourchaelsinatwo-out-of-fourlogicconfigation.ThisconfigurationmaybeledtheCont'nmentPressure-High3Setpoiforthreeandrloopunits,andContaintPressure-HiHighSetpointforotrunits.Sometwoloopu'tsusethreesetoftwochannels,eachsecombinedinone-out-of-twoconfiguration,witheseoutscombinedsothattwo-out-of-threetsrippedinitiatescontainmentspray.ThisonfigurationiscalledContainmentPressure-ig3Setpoint.Sincecontainmentpressursnotedforcontrol,bothofthesearrgementsexcdtheminimumredundancyrequements.AdditialredundancyiswarrantedcausethisFunction'senergizetotrip.ContnmentPressure-[High[HighHigh]mustbe0RABLEinMODESI,2,and3enthereissuff'entenergyintheprimaryandcondarysidesopressurizethecontainmentfollowapipbreak.InMODES4,5,and6,thereisisufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondanued)B3.3-77Rev.0092892 Insert3.3.2.10TheContainmentPressure-HighHighinstrumentfunctionconsistsoftwosetswiththreechannelsineachset.Eachsetisatwo-out-of-threelogicwheretheoutputsarecombinedsothatbothsetstrippedinitiatescontainmentspray.Sincecontainmentpressureisnotusedforcontrol,thisarrangementexceedtheminimumredundancyrequirements.AdditionalredundancyiswarrantedbecausethisFunctionisenergizetotrip.ContainmentPressure-High3mustbeOPERABLEin~~.~>>',.0-MODES1,2,3and4becauseaDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmenttemperatureandpressurerequiringtheoperationoftheContainmentSpraySystem.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothe'pressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.InMODES5and6,thereisalsoadequatetimefortheoperatorstoevaluateplantconditionsandrespondtomitigatetheconsequencesofabnormalconditionsbymanuallystartingindividualcomponents.

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3s2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZ-'f.gssa~CiMfdgdIIs~Ca.Wf,lc:aaa.gc~(continued)'lldLI~f~-ContainmentPressure-~p<~automaticay>soaeprocoolingwater(CCW),tdttContainment~sure-High3igh)setto3.ContainmentIsolationhContainmentIsolationprovidesisolationofthecontainmentatmosphere,and~processsystemsthatpenetratecontainment,fromtheenvironment.ThisFunctionisnecessarytopreventorlimittherelease-ofradioactivitytotheenvironmentintheeventofaLOCA.ContainmentIsolationsignals~isolate@allines,exceptcomponentforcedcirculation>ngusingthereacorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andSgsisthepreferred(butnotrequired)methodofdecayheatremoval.SinceCCWisrequiredtosuortRCPoperationisolatingCC~a~1enhancesaeybyaowingoperaorstouseforcedRCScirculationtocooltheIsolatingCCWmayforcetheuseoffeedandbleedcooling,whichcouldovemoredifficulttocontrol,smPh'a'seAcontainmentisolatio'nisactuatedautomaticallybySI,ormanu'allyviatheautomaticauationlogic.Allprocesslinespenetratingcon'ent,withtheexceptionofCCW,ar'lated.CCWisn'solatedatthistimetopecontinuedoperationofRCPswithcoolinerflowtothethermalbarrierheaxchangerndairoroil.coolers.Allprocess'otequippedwithremoteoperatedisolationvasamanuallyclosed,orotherwiseisolatepriortorhingNODE4.HanualPhaAContainmentIsolationisaccomplishedbyeitQroftwoswitchesinthecontrolroom.Eitherswitchactuatesbothtrains.Notethat'manual(continued)B3.3-78 Insert3.3.2.11a.ContainmentIsolation-ManualIsolationManualContainmentIsolationisactuatedbyeitheroftwopushbuttonsonthemaincontrolboard.Eitherpushbuttonactuatesbothtrains.ManualinitiationofContainmentIsolationalsoactuatesContainmentVentilationIsolation.HanualinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateunitconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.b.ContainmentIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasActuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingthe.initiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofContainmentIsolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3and4,becausethereisapotentialforanaccidenttooccur.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecontainmenttorequireContainmentIsolation.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheoperatortoevaluateunitconditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolationvalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconditions.c.ContainmentIsolation-SafetInectionContainmentIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatautomaticallyinitiatesSI.TheContainmentIsolationrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingFunctionsandrequirements.

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZd.iiContainmentIsolation(continued)atuationofPhaseAContainmentIsolaonalsoacuatesContainmentPurgeandExhausIsolation.ThehaseBsignalisolatesCCW.isoccursatarelatvelyhighcontainmentpressrethatisindicaiveofalargebreakLOCoranSLB.Fortheseevents,forcedcirculationusitheRCPsisnolongerdesirablIsolatingtheCCWtthehigherpressuredoesnotseachallengetothecontainmentboundarybecausetheCCWSystemisaclosedloopinsidecontainment.AlthoughsomsystemcomponentsdonotmeetalloftASHECode/requirementsappliedtothecontainmentitlf,thesystemiscontinuouslypressurizedtoapressuregreaterthanthePhaseBsetpoint.Thus,outi,heoperationdemonstratestheintegrityofthess'mpressureboundaryforpressuresexceedingthePhaseBsetpoint.Furthermore,becaus,systempressureexceedsthePhaseBsetpoint,,anysystemleakagepriortoinitiationofPhaseB)olationwouldbeintocontainment.Threfore,thecombinationofCCWSystemdesignandPhasd8isolaionensurestheCCWSystemisnotapotentialpathforadioactivereleasefromcontainment.Phase8continmentisolatioisactuatedbyContainment/Pressure-High3orContainmentPressure-AighHigh,ormanualy,viatheautomaticactuation!logic,aspreviouslyiscussed.ForcontainmentpressuretoreachaaluehighenoughtoactuategontainmentPressure-Hih3orContainmentPressure-HighHigh,alargebreaLOCAorSLBmusthaveoccurredandcontainmentspramusthavebeenactuated.RCPoperationwillnoloerberequiredandCCWtotheRCPsis,therefore,nlongernecessary.TheRCPscanbeoperatedithsealinjectionflowaloneandwithoutCCWfwtothetheymalbarrierheatexchanger.HaualPhaseBContainmentIsolationisacomplishedbj'thesameswitchesthatactuateContainmntSpray.Whenthetwoswitchesineithersetareturnedsimultaneously,PhaseBContainmentIsolationandContainmentSpraywillbeactuatedinbothtrains.~0~nued).B3.3-79 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)onManualPhaseAContainmentIsationisactuatedbyeitheroftwosw'tchesinthecontrolroom.Eitherswitactuatesbothtrains.NotethatmanualnitiationofPhaseAContainmentIsoltionalsoactuatesContainmentPurgeIsolion.(2)haseAIsolation-tomaticActuationLicandActuationelasa.ContainmentIsolation-PhaseAIsolationt(I)PhaseAIsolation-ManualInitiiAuomaticActuatinLogicandActuationReysconsistothesamefeaturesandopeateinthearnemannerasdescribedforESFAFunctioI.b.ManualandatomatcinitiationofPhaseAContainmentolaionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,ad,whenthereisapotentialforanaccidenttoccur.ManualinitiationisalsorequiredinHO4eventhoughautomaticactuationisotrequired'nthisMODE,adequatetimisvailabletomanuallyactuaterequiredcoonentintheeventofaDBA,butbecauseofhelarnumberofcomponentsactuatedoaPhaseContainmentIsolation,actuationnssimplifedbytheuseofthemanualactuation/pushbutton.Automaticactuation-logicandactuationreaysmustbeOPERABLEinMODE4t6supportsystlevelmanualinitiation.InMODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheprjmaryorsecondarysystemstopressurizethecohtainmenttorequiPhaseAContainmentIsola(ion.Therealsoisadequatetimefortheopera'tortoevaluateunitonditionsandmanuallyactuateindividualisolatiovalvesinresponsetoabnormaloraccidentconitions.(3PhaseAIsolation-SaftIn'ectionIPhaseAContainmentIsoltionisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionthatinitiateSI.ThePhaseAContainmetIsolationd)B3.3-80 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY)PhaseAIsolation-SafetIn'ection(continued)requirementsfortheseFunct'sarethesameastherequirementsfotheirSIfunction.Therefore,theequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3..2-1.Instead,unction1,SI,isrefencedforallitiatingFunctionsdrequirements.b.ContainmentIsolation-Pa'seBIsolationPhaseBCgtainmentIsationisaccomplishedbyManualInitiation,AomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelays,abyContainmentPressurechannels(thesamehannelsthatactuateContainmentrayFunction2).TheContainmentPressuretripfhaseBContainmentIsolationisenergizedtot'pinordertominimizethepotentialofsrioustripsthatmaydamagetheRCPs.(1)PhaseIsoation-ManualInitiation(2)PhaeBIsolaion-AutomaticActuation'o'candActationRelasnualandautoaticinitiationofPhaseBontainmentisotionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and,whenthereisapotentialforanccidenttooccur.ManualinitiationisalsrequiredinMODE4eventhoughautomaticatuationisnotrequired.InthisMODE,adequtetimeisavailabletomanuallyactuatereiredcomponentsintheeventofaDBA.Howver,becauseofthelargenumberofcompentsactuatedonaPhaseBcontainmentiolation,actuationissimplifiedbytheusefthemanualactuationpushbuttonsAutomaticactuationlogicandactationrelaysmustbeOPERABLEinMODE4tsupportsystemlevelmanualinitiation.InHODES5and6,thereisinsufficientenrgyintheprimaryorsecondarysystemstopessurizethecontainmenttorequirePhaeBcontainment(continuedB3.3-81R 'l ESFASInstrumentation~B3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZA.iiI)PhaseBIsolation-ManualInition(2)ase8Isolation-Automati.cActuationLoandActuationRela.s(continued)isolatio.Theresoisadequatetimefortheoperatooaluateunitconditionsandmanuallyateindividualisolationvalvesinrponseoabnormaloraccidentconditio(3)PhasBIsolation-ContaintPressureebasisforcontainmentpressureODEapplicabilityisasdiscussedforESFunction2.c4.SteamLineIsolationIsolationofthemainsteamlinesprovidesprotectionintheeventofanSLBinsideoroutsidecontainment.~Q,)(4l~~~('.<~Joftemainsteamisolationvalves(MSIVsVslimitstheaccidenttotheromonlytheaffectedSG.ForanSLBdownstreamoftheMSIVs,closureoftheMSIVsterminatestheaccidentassoonasthesteamlinesdepressurize.'teamLineIsoaionalsomitigatestheeffectsofafeedlinebreakandensuresasourceofsteamfortheturbinedrivenAFWpumpduringafeedlinebreak.a.SteamLineIsolation-ManualInitiation2A,YliiAg~~44AK~Couu~4~~~gWu3~)ManualinitiationofSteamLineIsolationcanbeaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TherearetwoSIV.TheLCOrequires~channelobeERABLE.uric.g~}oeP-(continued)MOGSB3.3-82 Insert3.3.2.13HanualinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinHODES12abecauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckoenvalvedepressurizationofthesteamlines.Th'sesearnines.Thiscouldresultinthereleaseofiiquaniiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheearnLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES2and3q.x4'.~bothHSIysareclosedandde-activated.InHPDESg5aisolationfunctionisnotreuiredtonorequiretobeOPERABLEbecausethereisinsufficientBorotheraccidentreleasing ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLEb.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)*~~~Meetj~p~a.~~Steam'Linesoation-uomatic'ctuationLoicandActuationRelas4mggamims!actuationlogic'onsis@ofac;~P)cQ~~0lA?f(,&4.9-~MpNt.MI/OQ!.assJjA+l.<J~(/~aslt.air~AC~~A~nZQ.Xiii.cautomaticinitiationofsteamlineisolationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3QReh,Thiscouldresultinthereeaseofsignaiscanquantitiesofenergyandcauseacooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredin002andunlessaBMSIVsareclosedand@de-activatedj.InMODES4,5and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintheRCSandSGsoexperienceanSLBorotheraccidentreleasingsignificantquantitiesofenergy.QlhQgb~+~WboI~~~"c~~+~,~~.l4M'l.Xit'tg.~AUlh~0J-N~LIi~cw>.CRAUSteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPessure-Hih2~5~ThisFunctionactuatesclosureof~MSIVsintheeventofaLOCAoranSLBinsidecontainmenttomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenerreleasetocontainment.Thetransmittersareocatedoutsidecontainmentwith~hQJ1S1Lpressuresieainment.ontainmeo.sure-Hinycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPEnesaresufficienttosatiotectiveequirithtwo-ou--reelogic.owever,forenhaiability,thisFunctiasdesigne'ourchannewo-o-fourlogic.ThetransmitterstrolocatedoutsideofThus,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseenvironmentalconditions,andtheTripSetpointreflectsonlysteadystateinstrumentuncertainties.~~LContainmentPressure-High8"musbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3,~thereissufficientenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidetopressurizethecontainmentfollowingapipe(continued)B3.3-83W~lS=PfPinna)vVlP~14'~PgC'\f Insert3.3.2.14ContainmentPressure-HighHighprovidesnoinputtoanycontrolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchannelsaresufficienttosatisfyprotectiverequirements4g.X(li.a.withtwo-out-of-threelogic. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY-dvgQ.~4-~~LGfi<<~.~~~0~+~+QPERtr&mEmCsC.SteamLineIsolation-ContainmentPressure-Hih2(continued)break.Thiswouldcauseasignificantincrease.inthecontainmentpressure,thusallowingdetectionandclosureoftheMSIVSteam~t4LineIsolationFunction~i~PERABLEinNODES2and3uless~SIVsareclosedandde-activated.InMODES45antereisnotenoughenergyintheprimaryandsecondarysidestopressurizethecontainmenttotheContainmentPressure-HighQset.SteamLineIsolation-SteamLinePressure(I)SteamLinePressure-LowSteamLinePressure-LowprovidescsureoftheHSIVsintheeventofanSLtomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSasaeatsinkforthereactor,andtlimitthessandenergyreleasetoconinment.ThFunctionprovidesclosuroftheHSIVsinteeventofafeedlinereaktoensureasuppofsteamfortherbinedrivenAFWpumSteamLinePresure-LowwasdiscussereviouslyunrSIFunctionl..l.SteamLinePresureLowFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinHOD,2,and3(aboveP-ll),with'anymainstvalveopen,whenasecondarysidereaorstuckopenvalvecouldresult'heiddepressurization!ofthesteamines.T'ssignalmaybemanuallybekedbytheeratorbelowtheP-llsetpint.BelowP-IaninsidecontainntSLBwillbeterinatedbyautomacactuationviaConta'nmentPressre-High2,andstuckvavetraientsandoutsidecontainmetSLBswibeterminatedbytheSteamLsePessure-NegativeRate-HighsignlforteamLineIsolation.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionremainsOPERABIEinMODES2and3unlessallHSIVsareclose(continued)WOB3.3-84

Insert3.3.2.15d.SteamLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithT-LowThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheHSIYsduringanSLBorinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalvetomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehighsteamflowinonesteamline.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthatthefunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.Theone-out-of-twoconfigurationallowsonlinetestingbecausetripofonehighsteamflowchannelisnotsufficienttocauseinitiation.Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainment,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointsreflectbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.ThemainsteamlineisolatesonlyifthehighsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIandlowRCSaveragetemperature.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.TwochannelsofT.,perlooparerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.TheT.,channelsarecombinedinalogicsuchthatanytwoofthefourT.,channelstrippedinconjunctionwithSIandoneofthetwohighsteamlineflowchannelstrippedcausesisolationofthesteamlineassociatedwiththetrippedsteamlineflowchannels.TheaccidentsthatthisFunctionprotectsagainstcausereductionofT.,intheentireprimarysystem.Therefore,theprovisionoftwoOPERABLEchannelsperloopinatwo-out-of-fourconfigurationensuresnosinglefailuredisablestheT.,-LowFunction.TheT,,channelsprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues. Insert3.3.2.15(continued)ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,and3whenasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHSIVsareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.e.SteamLineIsolation-HihHihSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetInectionThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheHSIVsduringasteamlinebreak(orinadvertentopeningofanSGatmosphericrelieforsafetyvalve)tomaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicatehigh-highsteamflowinonesteamline.Thesteamflowtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninteractionissues.TheAllowableValueforhighsteamflowisahPcorrespondingtoapproximately130%offullsteamflowatfullsteampressure.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.Withthetransmitters(d/Pcells)locatedinsidecontainment,itispossibleforthemtoexperienceadverseenvironmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Therefore,theTripSetpointreflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.Themainsteamlinesisolateonlyifthehigh-highsteamflowsignaloccurscoincidentwithanSIsignal.TheHainSteamLineIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3becauseasecondarysidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurizationofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHSIV'sareclosedandde-activated.ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinHODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheplanttohaveanaccident. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPIICABILITYSteamLinePressure-Low(continued)and[de-activated].ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficienteneyinthesecondarysideoftheunittoheanaccident.(2)teamLinePressure-NeativeRateHihStmLinePressure-NegativeRe-HighproidesclosureoftheMSIVsfanSLBwhenessthantheP-llsetpoit,tomainta'natleastoneunfaultdSGasaheatsikforthereactor,dtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetoontainment.WhentheeratormanuallblockstheSteamLinePresse-LowmainteamisolationsignalwhenessthanteP-llsetpoint,theSteamLinPressur-NegativeRate-Highsignalisautoaticalyenabled.Steam,LinePressure-egiveRate-Highprovidesnoinputtoanyorolfunctions.Thus,threeOPERABLEchnelsaresufficienttosatisfyrequiremnwithatwo-out-of-thrlo'coneachsteamline.SteamLinePssure-egativeRate-HighmustbeOPEABLEinMOD3whenlessthantheP-11stpoint,whensecondarysidebreakortuckopenvalvecouldresultintherapdepressurizationfthesteamline(s.InMODESIand2,ndinMODE3,whenovetheP-llsetpoint,thissignalisatomaticallydisabledandheSteamLiPressure-Lowsignalisatomaticallyebled.TheSteamLineIsolatinFunctionsrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODS2and3unlessallMSIVsareclosedand[de-activated].InMODES4,5,and6,thereisinsufficientenergyintherimaryandsecondarysidestohaveanSLBorotheraccidentthatwouldresultinareleasofsignificantenoughquantitiesofenergytocauseacooldownof.theRCS.(continued)B3'.3-85 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYe,f.(2)StamLinePressure-NeativeRate-Hihcontinued)hilethetransmittersmayexperieelevatedambienttemperaturesdutoanLB,thetripfunctionisbasednrateofhange,nottheabsoluteaccurcyofthedicatedsteampressure..Trefore,theipSetpointreflectsonlysteadystatentrumentuncertainties.SteamLineIsolation-HihearnFlowinTwoSteamLinesCoincidentwit-LowLoworCoincidentWithSteamLinPressure-LowThreeandFourLooUnitsTheseFunctions(4.ed4.f)provideclosureoftheHSIVsduinganLBorinadvertentopeningofanSGreliefrafetyvalve,tomaintainatleastoneunfultSGasaheatsinkforthereactorandt1'mitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainmentTheseFu'nctioswerediscussedpreviouslyasFunctionsI..dI.g.TheseFunionsustbeOPERABLEinHODESIand2,ainHOD3,whenasecondarysidebreakorstucopenvalcouldresultintherapiddepresrizationothesteamlinesunlessallHSIVsreclosedan[de-activated].TheseFunconsarenotrquiredtobeOPERABLEinHOD4,5,and6beausethereisinsufficientenegyinthesecondrysideoftheunittohaveanaccident.g.teamLineIsolation-ihSteamFlowCoincidentithSafetInectionadCoincidentWithT-LowLowTwoLoonitsThisFunctionprovidesclsureoftheHSIVsduringanSLBorinadvertntopeningofanSGrelieforsafetyvalvetoaintainatleastoneunfaultedSGasaheatsinforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergreleasetocontainment.(continued)e. ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY&ill~0T-LowLoTwosteamlirequiredOPEcombinedinahighsteamflflowtransmitcontrolfuncteflowchannelspersteamlinareBLEforthisFunction.Theareone-out-of-twologictoinicatewinonesteamline.Thesteamersprovidecontrolinps,buttheincannotcausetheevtsthatthefunctionmustrotectagainst.Thefore,twochannelsaresuficienttosatisfyredundancyrequirements.heone-out-of-twoconfiguration'llowsonlinetestingbecausetrpofonehighsteamflowchannelisnotsuffiienttocauseinitiation.TheHighSteamFlowAllowabValueisahPoffusteamflowatnoTheripSetpointiscorrespondingto2%loadsteampressur.similarlycalculate.WiththetransmitteslocatedinsidetheforthemtoexperienconditionsduringaTripSetpointsreflcadverseenvironmenal/pcells)typicallymtunnels,itispossibleadverseenvironmentalSLBevent.Therefore,thebothsteadystateandinstrumentuncertainties.Themainsteamlyneislatesonlyifthehighsteamflowsign1occucoincidentwithanSIandlowlowRCSaveragetemperature.TheHainSteamLineIsoationFuntionrequirementsfortheSIFunctinsarethearneastherequirementsfortheirSIunction.Terefore,therequirementsarenotrepeaedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FuctionI,SI,isreferencedforallinitiatingfunctionsandreirements.TwocharmlsofT.,perlooperequiredtobeOPERABLE'TheT.,channelsarcombinedinalogicschthattwochannelstrpedcauseatripforthparameter.TheaccidentthatthisFunctinprotectsagainstcauseductionof7~inthdentireprimarysystem.Threfore,theprovisionoftwoOPERABLEchannelsperloopina/ISteamLineIsolation-HihSteatoFlowCoincient-=WithSafetIn'ectionandCoincidentWithTwoLooUnits(continued)B3.3-87 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYXtta.g.SteaLineIsolation-HihSteamFlowCoincidentWithafetInectionandCoincidentWithT-owLowTwoLooUnits(continued)two-outof-fourconfigurationensuresnosiglerandomiluredisablestheT,,-LowLowFunction.TheTchannelsrovidecontolssvgPinputs,btthecontrolfunctioncannoinitiateeventsthttheFunctionactstomitigate.Therefore,additionalchannelsarend'trequiredtoaddresscontrolprotectioninterctionissues.WiththeT.;,resistancetemperaturedetectors(RTDs)locatedinsidethecontai'nment,itispossibleforthemtoexperience'dverseenvironmental':conditionsduripganSLBevent.Therefore,the'.TripSetpoint/reflectsbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentaluncertainties.',ThisFunctionmustbe0RABLEinMODES1and2,andinMODE3,whenabavetheP-12setpoint,whenasecondaryside'ea/Corstuckopenva1vecouldresultinrapiddpressurizationofthesteamlines.BelowP-1hisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecusetheHighHighSteamFlowcoincidentwithSFunctionprovidestherequiredprotection.TheStamLineIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobePERBLEinMODES2and3unlessallHSIVsarecloseand[de-activated].ThisFunctionisnetrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,nd6becusethereisinsufficientenergyintesecondasideoftheunittohaveanacciden.SteamLiIsolation-ihHihSteamFlowCoincideJ'itWithSafetI'ectionTwoLooUnitsThisFnctionprovidesclsureoftheHSIVsdurinasteamlinebreakorinadvertentopeningofaelieforsafetyvalvtomaintainatleastonenfaultedSGasaheatinkforthereactor,and/tolimitthemassandergyreleasetocontainment.(continued)B3.3-88

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYWha+%'Lt,Qh.StamLineIsolation-HihHihSteamFlowCoicidentWithSafetInectionTwoLooUnits~'coninued)TwosamlineflowchannelspersteamlineerequirdtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction.hesearecoinedinaone-out-of-twologictoindicath,highsteamflowinonesteamli.Thesteamfldwtransmittersprovidecontrolinputs,butthec'ontrolfunctioncannotcauseheeventsthattheFunctionmustprotectagainTherefore,'.twochannelsaresufficinttosatisfyredundancyrequirements.TheAllowab'le~iualueforhighstmflowisahP,correspondingo130%offullearnflowatfull.steampressure.TheTripSetointissimilarlycalculated.IWiththetransmiterstypiallylocatedinsidethesteamtunnels,itisossibleforthemtoexperienceadversenvirnmentalconditionsduringanSLBevent.Terefore,theTripSetpointreflectsbosteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrutuncertainties.ThemainsteamlineislateonlyifthehighsteamflowsignalccursoincidentwithanSIsignal.TheHainSteamLieIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheSIFuntionsarethesameastherequirementfortheirfunction.Therefore,therequirementsaenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1Instead,Funct'on1,SI,isreferencedfallinitiatingnctionsandrequirement.ThisFunctonmustbeOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3wheasecondarysidebreakrstuckopenvalvecoldresultinrapiddepresurizationofthestelinesunlessallNSIVsarclosedand[de-acvated].ThisFunctionisnrequiredtobeOPEBLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsuficientenergyinthesecondarysideoftheunitohaveanaccident.(continued)B3.3-89R ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)5.rareactort'sgenerated.Intheeistakenofflineandtinegeneratormustbetripe.NFsemisalsotakenoutofoerat'o,theAFWSysemisautomaticallystaeS'ldiscussedpreviously.urbineTriandFeedwaterIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasFeedwaterIsolationTheprimaryfunctionsofthFeedwaterIsolationsignalsagBtopreventagwaerine,totopthcimitigatetheeffectsofahighwaterlevelintheSGs,whichcould>ae%p4b-carryoverofwaterintothesteamlinesand~excessivecooldownoftheprimarysystem.TheSGhighwaterlevelisduetoexcessivefeedwaterflows.ThisFunctionisactuatedbygGGMaterLevel-High@~+orbanSIsignal.a'aesautomaticActuationLogicandActuationRelayscotofthesamefeaturesandoperateinthe,samemarasdescribedforESFASFunctionI.b.b.TurbineTriaFeedwaterIsolation-SteamGeneratorWaterLel-HihHihP-14~'1..Xhi.oThissignalprovidesptectionag'texcessivefeedwaterflow.TheESFASGwrlevelinstrumentsprovideinputteSGWaterLevelControlSystem.Thereforeactuationlogicmustbeabletowithstabothinputfailuretothecontrolsystewhichmayenrequiretheprotectionfunctioactuation)andsinglefailureintheerchannelsprovidgtheprotectionftionactuation.Thus,urOPERABLEcnnelsarerequiredtosatistherequiremtswithatwo-out-of-fourlogic.Forunitsathavededicatedprotectionandcoolchaels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.rotherunitsthathaveonlythreechannels,a(continued)p~y,n~F}uGLLe<O~vgQ83.3-90Re

Insert3.3.2.16a~FeedwaterIsolation-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelas~iiMlsy.Qb.Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallHainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.FeedwaterIsolation-SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-HihTheSteamGeneratorWaterLevel-HighFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessallMainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualyalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Thissignalprovidesprotectionagainstexcessivefeedwaterflow.TheESFASSGwaterlevelinstrumentshavededicatedprotectionandcontrolchannels,onlythreeprotectionchannelsarenecessarytosatisfytheprotectiverequirements.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-Highisapercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.c~FeedwaterIsolation-SafetInectionTheSafetyInjectionFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionisrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES2and3unlessallMainFeedwaterRegulatingValvesandassociatedbypassvalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve.InMODES4,5,and6,theHFWSystemandtheturbinegeneratorarenotinserviceandthisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.FeedwaterIsolationisalsoinitiatedbyallFunctionsthatinitiateSI.TheFeedwaterIsolationFunctionrequirementsfortheseFunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.InsteadFunction1,SI,isreferencedforallinitiatingfunctionsandrequirement.

~~~~I~I~~~II.I~~~I~II~II~I~~~I~I~II,~III~~I~~~I~~~o~I~~g~I~~III~~~~~II~I~~I,~~~I~~~~I~I~g~~~II~I~,~~I~IIII~~~~t~~~I~I~~~I~I~~I~~~

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE6.SAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYAuxiliarFeedwater(continued)normallntyrelated).QlowlevelintheCSTrealigq,>thepumpsuctionstotheServiceMater(ESW)System(safetyrelated).TheAFWSystemisalignedsothatuponapumpstart,flowisinitiatedtotherespectiveSGsimmediately.a~AuxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLoicandActuationRelasAutomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysconsistofthesamefeaturesandoperateinthesamemannerasdescribedforESFASFunction1.bb.AxiliarFeedwater-AutomaticActuationLocanActuationRelasBalanceofPlantESFAutomaicactuationlogicandactuatiorelaysconsistthesamefeaturesandopereinthesamemanneasdescribedforESFASnction1.b.C.AuxiliarFeedater-SteamGenetorWaterLevel-LowLowSGWaterLevel-LoLowpridesprotectionagainstalossofhetsi.Afeedlinebreak,insideoroutsideofnainment,oralossofMFW,wouldresultinassofSGwaterlevel.SGWaterLevel-LowLowrovidesinputtotheSGLevelControlSystemThefore,theactuationlogicmustbeableowithsndbothaninputfailuretothecorolsystemwhichmaythenrequireaprotecionfunctiontuationandasinglefailurejntheotherchaelsprovidingtheprotectioy'functionactuationThus,fourOPERABLEchaelsarerequiredtoatisfytherequirementwithtwo-out-of-fourlic.Forunitsthathavededicatedprotectionndcontrolchannelsonlythreeprotectioncharmsarenecessatosatisfytheprotectivereqirements.Foroterunitsthathaveonlythreechaels,amedisignalselectorisprovidedorjus,ificationisprovidedinReference7.(continued)B3.3-92 Insert3.3.1.17Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystems,includingtheinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactuatingtheESFequipment.AutomaticinitiationofAuxiliaryFeedwatermustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremainthe'eatsinkforthereactor.InHODE4,AFWactuationdoesnotneedtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.TheseFunctionsdonothavetobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereis'otenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.b.AuxiliarFeedwater-SteamGeneratorWaterLevel-LowLowSGWaterLevel-LowLowmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toprovideprotectionagainstalossofheatsink.Afeedlinebreak,insideoroutsideofcontainment,oralossofHFW,wouldresultinalossofSGwaterlevel.SGWaterLevel-LowLowineitherSGwillcausebothmotordrivenAFWpump'stostart.Thesystemisalignedsothatuponastartofthepump,waterimmediatelybeginstoflowtotheSGs.SGWaterLevel-LowLowinbothSGswillcausetheturbinedrivenpumptostart.InMODE4,AFWactuationdoesnotneedto'eOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.TheseFunctionsdonothavetobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.TheAllowableValueforSGWaterLevel-LowLowis,apercentofnarrowrangeinstrumentspan.TheTripSetpointissimilarlycalculated.Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)locatedinsidecontainmentandthuspossiblyexperiencingadverseenvironmentalconditions(feedlinebreak),theTripSetpointreflectstheinclusionofbothsteadystateandadverseenvironmentalinstrumentuncertainties.c.AuxiliarFeedwater-SafetIn'ectionTheSIfunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationdoesnotneedtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremoval(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersystemin'peration.TheseFunctionsdonothavetobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.AnSIsignalstartsthemotordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWpumps.TheAFWinitiationfunctionsarethesameastherequirementsfortheirSIfunction.Therefore,therequirementsarenotrepeatedinTable3.3.2-1.Instead,FunctionI,SI,isreferencedforallapplicableinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements. Insert3.3.1.17(continued)d.AuxiliarFeedwater-Undervoltae-Bus11AandllBTheUndervoltage-BusllAand11BFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,and3toensurethattheSGsremaintheheatsinkforthereactor.InMODE4,AFWactuationdoesnotneedtobeOPERABLEbecauseeitherAFWorRHRwillalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayheatorsufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallyplaceeithersysteminoperation.ThisFunctiondoesnothave-tobeOPERABLEinHODES5and6becausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneratedinthereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.Alossofpowerto4160VBus11Aand118willbeaccompaniedbyalossofpowertobothHFWpumpsandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatremoval.Thelossofoffsitepowerisdetectedbyavoltagedroponeachbus.LossofpowertobothbuseswillstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumptoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainsenoughwatertoserveastheheatsinkforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremovalfollowingthereactortrip.e.AuxiliarFeedwater-TriOfBothMainFeedwaterPumsATripofbothHFWpumpsisanindicationofa.lossofHFWandthesubsequentneedforsomemethodofdecayheatandsensibleheatremoval.TheHFWpumpsareequippedwithabreakerpositionsensingdevice.Anopensupplybreakerindicatesthatthepumpisnotrunning.TwoOPERABLEchannelsperpumpsatisfyredundancyrequirementswithone-out-of-twologic.AtripofbothMFWpumpsstartsthemotordrivenAFWpumpstoensurethatatleastoneSG-isavailablewithwatertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES1and2.ThisensuresthatatleastoneSGisprovidedwithwatertoserveastheheatsinktoremovereactordecayheatandsensibleheatintheeventofanaccident.InMODES3,4,and5,theHFWpumpsarenotinoperation,andthuspumptripisnotindicativeofaconditionrequiringautomaticAFWinitiation. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYAuxiliarFeedwater-SteamGeneratorWarLevel-LowLow(continued)Withthetransmitters(d/pcells)loatedinsideontainmentandthuspossiblyexpeencingaverseenvironmentalconditionsfeedlinebrak),theTripSetpointreflestheinclusionofthsteadystateandadvereenvironmentalinstrmentuncertainties.d.AuxiliaFeedwater-SafeIn'ection/AnSIsign1startsthegatordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWmps.TheFWinitiationfunctionsarethesamestheruirementsfortheirSIfunction.TheforetherequirementsarenotrepeatedinTabe33.2-1.Instead,Function1,SI,isreferenceorallinitiatingfunctionsandrequirements.AuxiliarFeedwterLossofOffsitePowerAlossofoffitepowetotheservicebuseswillbeaccompan'byalosofreactorcoolantpumpingporandthesusequentneedforsomemethodofecayheatremoal.Thelossofoffsitepowerisdetectedavoltagedroponeachservicebus.Lossofowertoeitherservice/buswillstartthetrbinedrivenAFWpumpsfoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainsenough'atertoserveasthehatsinkforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremovalfoll.owingthereactortrip.Functions6.athrough6.emustbeOPELEinMODES1,2,andj3toensurethattheSGsremaineheatsinkforthereactor.SGWaterLevel-LowLoinanyoperatingSGwillcausethemotordrivenWpumpstostart.Thesystemisalignedsothatuponastartofthe;pump,waterimmediatelybeginstoflowotheSGs.SG,WaterLevel-LowLowinanytwooperatinSGswillcausetheturbinedrivenpumpstostart.TheeFunctionsdonothavetobeOPERABLEinMODESand6b'ecausethereisnotenoughheatbeinggeneradin.thereactortorequiretheSGsasaheatsink.In/MODE4,AFWactuationdoesnotneedtobeOPERABLEI(continued)B3.3-93 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2~BASES'PPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYWil.xiii6.AuxiliarFeedwater(continued)becauseeitherAFWorresidualheatremov(RHR)willalreadybeinoperationtoremovedecayatorsuffiienttimeisavailabletomanuallplaceeithersysteminoperation.f.AuxiarFeedwater-UndervoaeReactorCoolant~PumAlossopoweronthebuesthatprovidepowertotheRCprovidesincationofapendinglossofRCPforcedflowineRCS.TheUndervoltageRCPFunction/sensestvoltagedownstreamofeachRCPbreaker.Aossofpower,oranopenRCPbreaker,o~twoormoreRCPs,willstarttheturbinedrivenAFWpumptoensurethatatleastoneSGcontainseoughwatertoserveastheheatsinkforreactordcayheatandsensibleheatremovalfollowigtereactortrip.g.AuxiliarFewater-riOfAllMainFeedwater~PumsATripofallMFWpumpsianindicationofalossofWandthesubseqentneedforsomemethoddecayheatandsesibleheatremovaltobringt,ereeratureandressure.AturbinedrivenWpumpispewithPwoponrolair/oillinegforthespeedsysm.pres'sureromeitheroftesepressuresw'sindicatesotorvenWpumpsareequippedwithabreakerpsitionsensingdevice.Anopenspplybreakerndicatesthatthepumpisnotrunnyg.TwoPERABLEchannelsperpumpsatisfyrundancyrequirementswithone-out-of-twotaketwicelogic.AtripofallMFWpumpsstartsthemotordrivenandturbinedrivenAFWpumpstonsurethatatleastoneSGisavailablewithtertoactastheheatsinkforthereactor.Functions6.fand6.gmustbeOPERABLEinMODESand2.ThisensuresthatatleastoneSGisproidedwithwatertoserveastheheatsinktoremoverector(continued)B3.3-94 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZA.66.AuxiliarFeedwater(continued)decaheatandsensibleheatintheeventofanaccidt.InNODES3,4,and5,theRCPsandNFWpumpsybenormallyshutdown,andthusneitherpumptripis'ndicativeofaconditionrequiringautaticAFWinitstion.h.AuxiliarFeedwater-PumSuctionTrasferonSuction'.Pressure-LowAlowpressuresignalintheAFWpmpsuctionlineprotectstheAFWpumpsagaintalossofthenormalsupplyofwaterforthemps,theCST.TwopressureswitchesarelocadontheAFWpumpsuctionlinafromtheCST.Aowpressuresignalsensedbyanyoneoftheswicheswillcausetheemergencysupplyofwaterfrbothpumpstobe!aligned,orcayusetheAFWumpstostopuntiltheemergencysourceofwaterisaligned.ESW!(safetygrade)igthenneduptosupplytheAFWpumpstoensureaadeatesupplyofwaterfortheAFWSystemtoaiainatleastoneoftheSGsastheheatsinforreactordecayheatandsensibleheatremoSincethedetectrsareocatedinanareanotaffectedbyHELsorhighradiation,theywillnotexperienceanyadverseyenvironmentalconditionsathe'TripSetpintreflectsonlysteadystatinstrumentunceainties.ThisFunconmustbeOPERABLE'nNODESI,2,and3tonsureasafetygradepplyofwaterfortheFWSystemtomaintaintSGsastheheats'forthereactor.ThisunctiondoesnothetobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6becausetherisnotenoughheatbeinggeneatedinthereaortorequiretheSGsasaheasink.InNOD.4,AFWautomaticsuctiontransfrdoesnotnedtobeOPERABLEbecauseRHRwilllreadybeioperation,orsufficienttimeisailabletoaceRHRinoperation,toremovedecaheat.(continued)B3.3-95

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSE,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)7.AutomaticSwitchovertoContainmentSumAtheendoftheinjectionphaseofaLOCA,heRWSTwi1benearlyempty.ContinuedcoolingmubeprovidedbytheECCStoremovedecayheatThesourceofwaterfortheECCSpumpsisautomaticlyswitchedtoth'ontainmentrecirculationsump.Thelowheadresidu1heatremoval(RHR)pumpsandontainmentspraypmpsdrawthewaterfromtheontainmentrecircultionsump,theRHRpumpspmpthewaterthroughteRHRheatexchanger,iectthewaterbackintotheRCS,andsupplythecoodwatertotheotherECCSpumps.gSwitchoverfromthRWSTtothecontainmentSumpmustoccurbeoretheRWSTemptiestopreventdamagetotheRHRpumsandalossofcorecoolingcapabiity.Forsim'rreasons,switchovermustnotoccureforethereissufficientwaterinthecontainmentsumptosupporESFpumpsuction.Furthermore,earlswitchvermustnotoccurtoensurethatsufficientbovytedaterisinjectedfromtheRWST.Thisensures~(hereactorremainsshutdownintherecirculationmoda."AutomaticSwitco.ertoContainmentSumAutomaticActutioLoicandActuationRelasAutomaticacationogicandactuationrelaysconsistofesameaturesandoperateinthesamemannerasdescridforESFASFunctionI.b.b,c.AutomaticSwitchovertoontainmentSum-RuelinWaterS&raeTankRWSTLevel-owLowCoincidenWithSafetIn'ectionandCoicidentWithContaientSumLevel-HihDurintheinjectionphaseoaLOCA,theRWSTistheurceofwaterforallECSpumps.AlowlowevelintheRWSTcoincidetwithanSIsigalprovidesprotectionagaistalossofwarfortheECCSpumpsandincatestheendofthinjectionphaseoftheLOCA.TheRWSTiseuippedwithfourleveltransmitrs.Theseansmittersprovidenocontrolfutions.herefore,atwo-out-of-fourlogicadequatetoinitiatetheprotectionfunctionacttion.Althoughonlythreechannelswouldbeufficient,(ntinuedB3.3-96 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZ.hf.4b,c.AtomaticSwitchovertoContainmentSu'm-RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLev'el-LowLowCoincidentWithSafetI'ectionandCoincidentWithContainmentSumLel-Hih(continued)afourth'hannelhasbeenaddedforincreasedreliabi1sty.TheRWST-owLowAllowableVale/TripSetpointhasbothupperandlowerlimit.Thelowerlimitisselectedtb,ensureswitchoeroccursbeforetheRWSTempties,toprevent/hCCSpumpdamage.Theupperlimit%isselectedtoensureenoughboratedwaterisinjectedoensurethereactorremainsshutdown.~Theh'ghlimitalsoensuresadequatewaterinvetoryinthecontainmentsumptoprovideECCSpumpsution.ThetransmittersarecatedinanareanotaffectedbyHELBsorpostaccidenthighradiation.Thus,teyw11notexperienceanyadverseenvironmenalconitionsandtheTripSetpointreflectsonlystedystateinstrumentuncertainties.AutomaticswitoveroccursolyiftheRWSTlowlowlevelsigaliscoincidentwithSI.Thispreventsacct,entalswitchoveruringnormaloperation.PccidentalswitchovecoulddamageECCSpumps~>ftheyareattemptintotakesuctionfromanemptysump.TheautomatiswitchoverFunctionequirementsfortheSIFctionsarethesameastherequirementsforthirSI.function.Therefore,therequiremensarenotrepeat@inTable3.3.2-1.Instead,unctionI,SI,is/referencedforallinitiatingnctionsandrequirements.Revjwer'sNote:Insomeunits,additioalprotectionfromspuriousswitchoverisprvidedby/requiringaContainmentSumpLevel-Hihsj'gnalaswellasRWSTLevel-LowLowandI.~~~~Tisensuressufficientwaterisavailablenontainmenttosupporttherecirculationphaeoftheaccident.AContainmentSumpLevel-Higconinued)B3.3-97 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYZA.t'tC.AutomaticSwitchovertoContainmentSum-RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevel-LowLowCoincidentWithSafetInectinandCoincidentWithContainmentSumLevel-ihontinued)sign1mustbepresent,inadditiontoeSIsigna/andtheRWSTLevel-LowLowsinal,totransferthesuctionsoftheRHRpumstothecontainmentsump.Thecontainmentumpisequippedithfourleveltransmiters.Thesetransmittsprovideno'ontrolunctions.Therefore,two-out-of-four1icisadequatetoinitiatetheprotectionfunctonactuation.Althoughonlythreechannelwouldbesufficient,afourthcharm1hasbeendedforincreasedreliability.TcontainentsumplevelTripSetpoint/AllowabValueisselectedtoensureenoughboratedwariinjectedtoensurethereactorremainsshwn.ThehighlimitalsoensuresadequatewatinventoryinthecontainmentsumptopovideECCSpumpsuction.Thetransmitterse1catedinsidecontainmentandthuspossiblexper'enceadverseenvironmentalcnditionsTherefore,thetripsetpointrefletstheincusionofbothsteadystateandenv'ronmentalintrumentuncertainties.Unitsonlyaveoneofthenctions,7.bor7.c.TheseFuntionsmustbeOPERABEinMODESI,2,3,and4whenthereisapotentalforaLOCAtooccur,oensureacontinuedsuplyofwaterfortheECSpumps.TheseFunctionsenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6beusethereisadeqatetimefortheoperatortoeluateunitconitionsandrespondbymanuallystrtingsyems,pumps,andotherequipmenttomitigatetconsequencesofanabnormalconditinorcident.SystempressureandtemperatueareerylowandmanyESFcomponentsareadministrativelylockedoutorotherwisepreventedfromactuatingtopreventinadveentoverpressurizationofunitsystems.(continued)83.3-98 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY(continued)EninredSafetFeatureActuationSstemIntlocksToallosomeflexibilityinunitoperation,severalinterlocareincludedaspartoftheESF.Theseinterlockpermittheoperatortoblocksmesignals,automaticalyenableothersignals,prevntsomeactionsfromoccurring,andcauseotheractionstooccur.TheierlockFunctionsbackmanualactionstoensurebypaablefunctions'areioperationundertheconditionsasumedinthesafetanalyses.a0EnineeredSatFeatureAuationSstemInterlocks-RectorTriP-4TheP-4interlocisenaedwhenareactortripbreaker(RTB)and'tsaociatedbypassbreakerisopen.Oncethe-4nterlockisenabled,automaticSIinitiatisblockedafteraf]secondtimedelaThisFunctionallowsoperatorstotakemupicontrolofSIsystemsaftertheinitialasegofinjectioniscomplete.OnceSIisblocke,autoaticactuationofSIcannotoccurunt'heRshavebeenmanuallyclosed.ThefuctionsofheP-4interlockare:~Tripthmainturbine;IsolaHFWwithcoincientlowT.,;PrevntreactuationofSIafteramanualrestofSI;~Tansferthesteamdumpfrotheloadjectioncontrollertothenittripontroller;andPreventopeningoftheHFWisoationvalvesiftheywereclosedonSIorSWaterLevel-HighHigh.EchoftheaboveFunctionsisinterloedwith-4toavertorreducethecontinuedcoldownofheRCSfollowingareactortrip.AnexessivecooldownoftheRCSfollowingareactortipcouldcauseaninsertionofpositivereacivitywithasubsequentincreaseingeneratedpoer.83.3-99

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYaoEnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemInerlocks-ReactorTriP-4(continued)Tovoidsuchasituation,thenotedFunctionhavabeeninterlockedwithP-4aspartofthdesignoftheunitcontrolandprotectionstem.NoneofthenotedFunctionsservesamigationfunctionintheunitlicensingbasissfetyanalyses.OnlytheturbinetripFunionisexplicitlyassumedsinceitisaniyediateconsequenceofthereactortripFuction.Neithertupbinetrip,noranyof,theotherfourFunctionsassociatedwiththereactortripsignal,ist;equiredtoshowththeunitlicensingba'sissafetyanalys'sacceptancecriteriaarenotexceeded.TheRTBpositio~switcheshatprovideinputtotheP-4interloonlyfnctiontoenergizeorde-energizeoronorlosecontacts.Therefore,thisFctianhasnoadjustabletripsetpointwithwhictassociate'aTripSetpointandAllowableValue.b.ThisFunctionmusbeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,and3whentherctoraybecriticalorapproachingcricality.ThisFunctiondoesnothavetobeOPE(ABLEinHDE4,5,or6becausethemainturbine,theHFWSystem,andtheSteamDumpSystem~benotinopeation.EnineeredKafetFeatureAtuationSstemInterlocks-PressurizerPreureP-llTheP-llinterlockpermitsarmalunitcooldownanddepessurizationwithoutatuationofSIormainsearnlineisolation.Wittwo-out-of-threepressrizerpressurechannels(iscussedprevously)lessthantheP-llstpoint,theopeatorcanmanuallyblocktheessurizerPrsure-LowandSteamLinePresure-LowSIsinalsandtheSteamLinePressur-Lowsteam1neisolationsignal(previouslyiscussed).hentheSteamLinePressure-Lowteamlineisolationsignalismanuallyblockeamain(continued)

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYb.EnineeredSafetFeatureActuationSstemInterlocks-PressurizerPressureP-ll(ntinued)stmisolationsignalonSteamLinePresure-NegativeRate-Highisenabed.Thisprov'idesprotectionforanSLBbycloreoftheHSIV(Withtwo-out-of-threepressizerpressurechannelsabovetheP-11spoint,thePressuqizerPressure-LowandStmLinePressure-LowSIsignalsandthSteamLinePressurey-Lowsteamlineisolaionsignalareautomaticallyenabled.Theopratorcanalsoenablethetripsbyuseofherespectivemanualrestbuttons.WhenheSteamLinePressure-Lwsteamlineiolationsignalisenabled,themainsteamiolationonSteamLinePressure-NeativeRateHighisdisabled.TheTripSetpointeflectsnlysteadystateinstrumentunctaintis.Ic~ThisFunctionmutbOPERABLEinNODES1,2,and3toallowanoderlycooldownanddepressurizationotheunitwithouttheactuationofSIoainsteamisolation.ThisFunctiondoesnohaetobeOPERABLEinMODE4,5,or6becausesystpressuremustalreadybebelowtheP-lletpoitfortherequirementsoftheheatupancooldowcurvestobemet.EnineeredSfetFeaturActuationSstemInterlocksT-LowLoP-12Onincreaingreactorcoolattemperature,theP-12intlockreinstatesSonHighSteamFlowCoincidetWithSteamLinePssure-LoworCoincidntWithT,,-LowLowndprovidesanarmingsignaltotheSteamDumSystem.Ondeeresingreactorcoolanttemprature,theP-12interockallowstheoperatortmanuallyblockSIoHighSteamFlowCoincidentithSteamLinePresure-LoworCoincidentwithT,,-LowLow.Onaecreasingtemperature,theP-12interlockalsorovesthearmingsignaltotheStamDumpSstemtopreventanexcessivecoolwnoftheCSduetoamalfunctioningSteamDuSystem.(continued)83.3-101

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES,LCO,andAPPLICABILITYc.EnieredSafetFeatureActuationSstemInterlocks-T-LowLowP-12(continued)SinceT.,isusedasanindicationofbulRCStemperature,thisFunctionmeetsredundcyrequirementswithoneOPERABLEchannelneachloop.Inreeloopunits,thesechnelsareusedintwo-ut-of-threelogic.Inourloopunits,theyaeusedintwo-out-offourlogic.This'FunctionmstbeOPERABLE'ODESI,2,and3whenasecndarysidebrakorstuckopenvalvecouldresulintherap'ddepressurizationofthesteamlinesThisFctiondoesnothavetobeOPERABLEinDE4,,or6becausethereisinsufficienteneyinhesecondarysideoftheunittohaveancient.d.EnineeredSafetFeatreActuationSstemInterlocks-SteamGeeatorWaterLevel-Hih~Hi'P-14TheP-14interlocisacttedwhenthelevelinanySGexceedsthighhisetpoint,andperformsthefoowingfuncionsaspartofFunction5:~Tripsemainturbine;~TriptheMFWpumps;~.Iniiatesfeedwaterisolaton;andSutstheHFWregulatingvalesandtheypassfeedwaterregulatingives.TheWpumpsaretripped,feedwateisolationisactuted,andthemainandbypassfewaterregatingvalvesareclosedtoprevetanyfuheradditionofwatertotheSGs.Themaintbineistrippedtopreventcarryoveofecessivemoisturetotheturbine,whicwouldamagetheturbine.ThisFunctionhaseviouslyeendiscussedasFunction5.b.(coninued)B3.3-102 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES:.,LCO,andAPPLICABILITY'IW'l.i'!d.EnineeredSafetFeatureActuatiostemInterlocks-SteamGeneratorMerLevel-HihHihP-14(continued)IThisionmusteOPERABLEinHODES1and2Iwhenthetu'eneratorandtheHFWSystemmaybeinopera'on.ThisFunctiondoesnothavetbeOPERinHOD4,5,or6becausetheturbigeneratorandHFWSystemarenotiasice.aTheESinstrumentationsatisfiesCriteriooftheNIICPol'Statement.IACTIONSi8<.xiii.PYbEGGI~ob-~'~,~~W4JQ~m~A.a'i;,heata~e+L~Xlll,gM4.Xht,~La&tie~'l,xiti,a.Intheeventachannel'sTripSetpointisfoundnoncovtivewithrespecttotheAllowableYaltransmitter,isinoperable,en~FunctiofPhatcannedeclaredinoperableandtheLCOConditionenterprotection%unction'~affected.Whenhasteamline,perloop,esis),thenonditionberedseparaforeacetcasaoriate.ue,ortfoundl~dmustbe~>eeeuir>ha"aper(z,>.i~~theReviewer'sNote:Cer'COComionTimesarebasedonapprovedtopicalreports.orerforalicenseetousethesetimes,thelicenseemusstifytheCompletionTimesasrequiredbythe+saffSafetyEvationReport(SER)forthetopicalreport:WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinatripionexceedthosespecifiedinoneorotherrelatedConditionaMociatedwithatripfunction,thentheunitisoutset'esafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3shouldeenadedintheACTIONStoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFuionlistedonTable3.3.2-1.TheCompletionTime(s)of'>theinoperablechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfrotimetheConditionenteredforthatFunction.(continued)B3.3-103

Insert3.3.2.18TheACTIONSforeachinoperableESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheConditioncolumnofTable3.3.2-1.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifythe~~~~~applicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.2-1.Insert3.3.219AsshownonFigureB3.3.2-1,theESFASiscomprisedofmultipleinterconnectedmodulesandcomponents.ForthepurposeofthisLCO,achannelisdefinedasincludingallrelatedcomponentsfromthefieldinstrumenttotheAutomatic~~~~~ActuationLogic.Therefore,achannelmaybeinoperableduetothefailureofafieldinstrument,lossof120VACinstrumentbuspowerorabistablefailurewhichaffectsoneorbothESFAStrains.TheonlyexceptiontothisaretheManualESFASandAutomaticActuationLogicFunctionswhicharedefinedstrictlyonatrainbasis.TheAutomaticActuationLogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsubsystem,includingthemasterrelays,slaverelays,andinitiatingrelaycontactsresponsibleforactivatingtheESFequipment. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSi(continued)operAAon.A.1ConditionAappliestoallESFASprotectionfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorechannelsortrainsforoneormoreFunctionsareinoperableTAfddfffTable3.3.2-1andtotaketheRequiredActionsfortheprotectionfunctionsaffected.TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions.9,3.~Q0B.lB:2.1andB.2.7g,~isa,a.ConditionBappliesto~SI;~ContainmentSpray;~lpk~j,LLnhuv~+~libodill~MGoWAergP~~~toethefunctiIfachannelortrainisinoperable,48hoursisallowedtoreturnittoanOPERABLEstatusaorconasnmensp'saon,failureofoneorbothchannelsinonetrainrensthetraininoperable.ConditionB,therefoencompaesbothsituations.ThespecifiedCetionTimeisreasoneconsideringthattherearoautomaticactuationtraidanothermanua'tiationtrainOPERABLEforeachFuon,aelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringtherval.IfthetraincannotberestoredtoOPERAstatus,itmustbeplacedinODEinwhichth0doesnotapply.sdonebyplacingtheutinatleastNODE3withinana'onal6hourshourstotaltime)andinNODE5withinaadditial30hours(84hourstotaltime).TheallowabCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingeriencetoreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfu(continued)B3.3-1044~5 Insert3.3.2.20WhenthenumberofinoperablechannelsinanESFASFunctionexceedthosespecifiedinallrelatedConditionsassociatedwithanESFASFunction,thentheplantisoutsidethesafetyanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3shouldbeimmediatelyenterediftheESFASfunctionisapplicableinthecurrentMODEofoperation.Insert3.3.2:21FortheManualInitiationFunctions,thespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthattherearetwoautomaticactuationtrainsand~~~~~~~~~anothermanualinitiationtrainOPERABLEforeachFunction(exceptforCS),andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.FortheUndervoltageBusllAandllBFunctionandTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctions,thespecifiedCompletionTimeof48hoursisreasonableconsideringthenatureoftheseFunctions,theunavailableredundancy,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursforTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctionisconsistentwithReference7. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSB.1B.2.2(continuedpowerconditianorderly'anchal'unitsystems.withoutC.l"2-'t.xtv~(~YthaaO.MS.~tvnaactuationrelaysforthefollowingfunctions:~SI;~Con'nmentSpray;~PhaseAIsotion;~PhaseBIsolation;d~AutomaticSwhovertoCoinmentSump.Thisactiondressesthetrainorient'onoftheSSPSandthemasterandslaverelays.Ifonetrain'sinoperable,6hoursreallowedtorestorethetraintoBLEstatus.ThesecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonableconsiingthat1k~t~~~+~tn.MtheisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthesiervaIfthecaerestoreosaus,the~museplace~aMODE'heLCOdoesnotapply.isneypacingtheunitinateastwiinaneadditional6hours(12hourstotaltime)andinNODE5ithinanadditional30hours42hourstotaltime.TheCompetionTime~reasonable,basedonoperaingexperience,oreachtherequired~conditionsfromfulij.powerconditionsinan:orderlymanneranwithoutchallengingsystems.~~eequirecsonsaremoiieyaoeaato[4]hoursancetesting,providedtheothertr'ABLE.Thisallowanceisbasedoneiabilityana'ssumptionoWCAP-10271-P-A(.8)that4hoursistheaveetimesquiredperformchannelsurveillance.(continued)B3.3-105RSf.nns-l~icitisC!alt'rr'.~~ ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)'83Q-~0.2.1an0.2.2ConditionDappiesto:~Containmentressure-High1;PressurizerPessure-Low(two,three,andfounits);loop~<.xi'teamLinePressre-Low;SteamLineDifferegtialPressure-Hig,HighSteamFlowinTwoSteamLinesoincidentWithT,,-LowLoworCoinidentWithSteamLinePressure-Low;leContainmentPressure-igh2~Steam'Linepressure-Nag/aveRate-High;Is~HighSteamFlowCoincidentMithSafetyInjectionCoincidentWithT,,-L~owLow;~HighHighSteamFloCoincidentWithSafetyInjection;ss~HighSteamFlow)nTwoSteamt.inesCoincidentWithT,-LowLow;and/~SGWaterlevel-LowLow(two,three,andfourloopunits).Ifonechannelisinoperable,6hoursareallowedtorestorethechannelto'PERABLEstatusortop4ceitinthetrippedcondition.GenerallythisConditionapliestofunctionsthatoperateontwo-out-of-threelogic.Therefore,failureofonechahnelplacestheFunctioninawo-out-of-twoconfiguration.OnechannelmustbetrippdtoplacetheFunctioninaone-out-of-threeconfiguratonthatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements.Atsomeunits,bothpressurizerpressureandSGwaterlevelprovideinputstocontrolandprotectionfun)tines.Pressurizerpressureinputstopressurizerpessurecontro.SGwaterlevelinputstoSGwaterlevelcontrl.ItisthreforenecessarytobeabletosustaintwosimultaneouJ(cotihued)MOGSTSB3.3-106Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.3.2.220.1andD.2IfthechannelforFunction6.dorthetrainforFunctionl.aor4.acannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionB,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachieve'~~thisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4withinl2hours.'heallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.E.landE.2IfthetrainforFunction2.aor3.acannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionB,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoat.leastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.F.lConditionFappliestotheautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysforthefollowingFunctions:~SI;~ContainmentSpray;~ContainmentIsolation;~SteamLineIsolation;FeedwaterIsolation;and~AuxiliaryFeedwater.ConditionFaddressesthetrainorientationoftheprotectionsystemandthemasterandslaverelays.Ifonetrainisinoperable,aCompletionTimeof24hoursisallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeisreasonableconsideringthatthereisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisconsistentwithReference8. Insert3.3.2.22(continued)G.landG.2IfthetrainforFunctionI.b,4.b,5.b,or6.acannotberestoretoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionF,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.H.IandH.2IfthetrainforFunction2.bor3.bcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionF,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.ConditionIappliestothefollowingFunctions:~ContainmentPressure-HighI;~ContainmentPressure-High2;~ContainmentPressure-High3;~PressurizerPressure-Low;~SteamLinePressure-Low;~HighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjectionandCoincidentWithT,,-Low;~HighHighSteamFlowCoincidentWithSafetyInjection;~SGWaterLevel-High;and~SGWaterLevel-LowLow.ConditionIappliestoFunctionsthattypicallyoperateontwo-out-of-threelogic.Therefore,failureofonechannelplacestheFunctioninatwo-out-of-twoconfiguration.OnechannelmustbetrippedtoplacetheFunctioninaone-out-of-twoconfigurationthatsatisfiesredundancyrequirements. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSKN.xiqE.IE.2.landE.2.2(continued)actuationisundesirablebecauseofthecleanupproblsprented.Therefore,thesechannelsaredesignedthtwoout-of-fourlogicsothatafailedchannelmayebypasedratherthantripped.Notethatonechelmaybebypasedandstillsatisfythesinglefailureiterion.Furthemore,withonechannelbypassed,asileinstrumentationchannelfailurewillnotsriouslyinitiatecontainmentspray.ToavoidtheinadvertentactuationofontainmentsprayandPhaseBcontainmentisolation,theioperablechannelshouldnotbeplaced'.inthetrippedcondion.Insteaditisbypassed.RestoringthechanneloOPERABLEstatus,orplacingtheinoperablechannel'hebypassconditionwithin6hours,i~sufficientoassurethattheFunctionremainsOPERABLEaqdminimizthetimethattheFunctionmaybeinapartiah,tripcoition(assumingtheinoperablechannelhasfailedh~gh).heCompletionTimeisfurtherjustifiedbasedonth1probabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinterval.iluretorestoretheinoperablechanneltoOPERABLEstus,orplaceitinthebypassedconditionwithin6hors,requirestheunitbeplacedinMODE3withintheflowi6hoursandMODE4withinthenext6hours.The/allowedompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperating'xperienc,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfullpowercoitionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchaTlengingunitstems.InMODE4,theseFunctionsarenolongerrequireOPERABLE.ITheRequiredActionsaremodifiedaNotethatallowsoneadditional,channeltobebypassedfoupto[4]hoursforsurveillancetesting.Placingasecodchannelinthe/bypassconditionforupto4hoursfortestingpurposesisacceptablebasedontheresultsofRefeence8.F.lF.2.1andF.2.2ConitionFappliesto:~ManualInitiationofSteamLineIsolationLossofOffsitePower;(continued)B3.3-108/92 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSW(,x.tvF.lF.2.1andF.2.2(continued)~AuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpSuctionTransferonSctionPressure-Low;and~-4Interlock.Forthe.ManualInitiationandtheP-4InterockFunctions,thisactionaddressesthetrainorientatinoftheSSPS.FortheLossofOffsitePowerFunction,hisactionrecognizesthelackofmanualtripproisionforafailedchannel.FortheAFWSystempumpsuiontransferchannels,thisactionrecognizesthatplacingafailedchannelintripduringoperationisnotnecessarilaconservativeaction.Spurioustripof;thisfunctioncldaligntheAFWSystemtoasourcethatis'notimmediatelcapableofsupportingpumpsuction.Ifatrainorcharmisinoperable,48hoursisallowedtoreturni'ttoOPERLEstatus.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisQasonabeconsideringthenatureoftheseFunctions,theavailbleredundancy,andthelowprobabilityofaneventcurringduringthisinterval.IftheFunctioncannotbeeturnedtoOPERABLEstatus,theunit.mustbeplacedinMODEwithinthenext6hoursandMODE4withinthefollowinghours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basonopqratingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitcondionsfrumpfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithouchallengihgunitsystems.InMODE4,theunitdoesnothaanyanalyzedtransientsorconditionsthatrequirethexplicituseoftheprotectionfunctionsnotedabove.G.lG.2.1andG.2.2/Condition+appliestotheautomaticactuationlogicandactuation'elaysfortheSteamLineIlationandAFWactuationFunctions.tTheaionaddressesthetrainorientatiooftheSSPSandthesterandslaverelaysforthesefuncions.Ifone;traiisinoperab1e,'6hoursareallowedtoestorethetra'ntoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTiforrestoringafaintoOPERABLEstatusisreasonablecons)eringthatthreisanothertrainOPERABLE,andthelowpbabilityofaeventoccurringduringthisinterval.IfthetrainnnotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatus,theunitstbe(continued)B3.3-109 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSW~l,xyvG.lG.2.1andG.2.2(continued)brougttoMODE3withinthenext6hoursandMODE4'inthefolowing6hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesrereasonale,basedonoperatingexperience,toreactherequiredNunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditisinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsyems.PlacingtheunitinMODE4removesallrequirentsforOPERABILITYoftheprotectionchannelsandtuationfunctions.InthisMODE,theunitdoesnhaveanalyzedtransientsor~conditionsthatrequiretexplicituseoftheprotection'~functionsnotedabove.TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbaNotethatallowsonetraintobebypassedforupto[4hoursforsurveillance!'testingprovidedttieothertrainisOPERABLE.This~allowanceisbasedonthereliilityanalysis(Ref.8)assumptionthat4hou'rsisthaveragetimerequiredtoperformchannelsurvei~lanceH.landH.2ConditionHappliesttheautomaticactuationlogicandactuationrelaysfortheTurineTripandFeedwaterIsolationFunction.Thisactionaddrssesthetrain,orientationoftheSSPSandthemasterandaverelaysforythisFunction.Ifonetrainisinoperable,6hoursareallowedtorestorethetraintoOPERABLEstatsortheunitmust5eplacedinMODE3withinthefollowi6hours.TheCompletionTimeforrestoringatraintoOPRABLEstatusisreasonableconsideringthatthereisothertrainOPERABLE,and,thelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthisinteral.TheallowedCompletonTimeof6hoursisreasonale,basedonoperatingexperince,toreachMODE3fromfullowerconditionsinanorderymannerandwithoutchallengingnitsystems.TheseFuncionsarenolongerrequiredinMOD3.PlacingtheuniinMODE3removesallrequirementsrOPERABILITYofthprotectionchannelsandactuationfuntions.InthisMDE,theunitdoesnothaveanalyzedtranientsoronditionsthatrequiretheexplicituseotheprotectionfunctionsnotedabove.cd)B3.3-110 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONSc-0~)6vH.1andH.2(continued)TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNotethatalwsonetraintobebypassedforupto[4]hoursfveillancetestingprovidedtheothertrain'BLE.Thisallowanceisbasedonthe'ailityanalysis(Ref.8)assumptionhthat4houistheaveragetimerequiredtoperformcharrelseillance.I.land.2ContionIapplies>to:'\a,'~O-1'i'LaOpl'~~s~Ott~Qi.4"f~~rj~ntI~~~~EZs(~res:iit.Q.SGWaterLevel-HiHigh(P-14two,hree,andfourloopunits);and~UndervoltageReactorCoolantPump.Ifonechannelisinoperable,8>hours~"allowedtorestore~channeltoOPERABLEstatusortoplaceitinthetr'dcondition.inthetrippedconditionMlleuncinl~e-out-of-two.one-out-of-threelogicwillresultinactuation.hourICompletionTimeisjustifiedinReference8.iureto'estoretheinoyerab3echanneltoOPERE"statusorplaceIitinthetrippedcondit'ion-ddthoursrequirestheunit'obeplacedinNODE3'theF+Uowing6hours.The.alTowedComple>t'oimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedon/operating.experience,toreachNODE3fromfully-pawerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengrng.unitp:syst'ems.InNODE3,theseFunctionsarenolongerrequired'PERAS&.M(iXiii.4ffg0~~l5.1~Wp&.~~(4'~TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNotethatallowstheinoperablechanneltobebypassedforuptooursforsurveillancetestingofotherchannels.The8oursaoweto"acthe'hannelintheti.ippedcondition,aneoursaowedfortesting,arejustifiedineerence(continued)W0~'iF.sRev. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS(continu'ed)J.landJ.2ondjtionJappliestotheAFWpumpstartopofallHFpumps.-ThisactionadestheaionoftheSSPSfortheautostartfunctftheAFWSystemonlossofallHFpumps.TheOPEITYoAFWSystemmustbeassuredballowingauticstartoftheSstempumps.Ifachanneliinoperable,48hoursareatoreturnittoanOPg88LEstatus.Ifthefunctioncannotbernedtoan+PEsareMBDTheallowedCompletionTiml&onable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreach~Wfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenin~systems.noesorconditireexplicitonunctionnotedabove.ThellowancoursothetraintoanOPncdK.2.2aniConditionKappliesto:RWSTLevel-LowLowCoincidentwithSafetyJection;and>'ixivTLevel-LowLowCoincidentwiSafetyInjectionandincidentwithContainmentmpLevel-High.RWSTLevel-LoLowCoinciden+ithSIandCoincidentWithContainmentSumpvel-Highprovidesactuationofswitchovertothecoaimentsump.NotethatthisFunctionrequiresthebistablesenergizetoperformtheirrequiredaction.ThefailuryrofutotwochannelswillnotpreventtheoperationoftKisFunctus.However,placingafailedchannelintheNippedconditicouldresultinaprematureswitchovertethesump,priortoeinjectionoftheminimumvolumefromtheRWST.Plactheinoperablechannelinbypassresultsinatwo-out-f-threelogicconfiguration,whichsatisfiestherequirenttoallowanotherfailurewithoutdisablingactuationfthespiitchoverwhenrequired.RestoringthechanneltoOPERABLs'tatusorplacingtheinoperablechannelinthebypassontinued)83.3-112g,aQ(~PMk0rN,928/92 Insert3.3.2.23IfthechannelforFunction1.dorl.ecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus~~~~withintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE.3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto<2000psigwithin12hours.Insert3.3.2.24K.1andK.2IfthechannelforFunction1.c,4.c,4.d,4.e,S.b,or6.bcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplaptmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems. ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESACTIONS~N.>tvK.1K.2.1andK.2.2(continued)conditionwithin6hoursissufficienttoensurethattheFunctionremainsOPERABLE,andminimizesNetimethattheFunctionmaybeinapartialtripcondition(assumingtheinoperablechannelhaafailedhigh)~The6hourCompletionimeisjustifiedinReference8.IfthechannelcannotberurnedtoOPERABLEstatusoracedinthebypasscon'onwithin6hours,th~unitmustbebroughttoHODE3withinhefollowing6hoursandHODE5withinthenext30hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperaaa-~exper'ience,toreachtherequiredunitconditionsfromfuTl.powerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging"uni.tsystems.InMODE5,theunitdoesnothavean'analyzedtransientsorconditionsthatrequiretheexpTicituseoftheprotectionfunctionsnotedabove.TheRequi,redActionsaremodifiedbyaNotethaallowsplacing.'asecondchannelinthebypassconditionfoupto[4]hoursforsurveillancetesting.Thetotalof12hourstoreachMODE3and4hoursforasecondchannelto.bebyasdisacceptablebasedontheresultsofReferenL.1L.2.1'andL.2.2ConditionLappliestotheP-11andP-12'nterlocks.Withonechannelioperable,theopatormustverifythat',theinterlockisinherequiredatefortheexistingunit<condition.Thisactimanuall.accomplishesthefunctionoftheinterlock.Deteinati~onmustbemadewithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimsequaltothetimeallowedbyLCO.3.0.3toinitiateshunactionsintheeventofacompletelossofESFAS~functi.Iftheinterlockisnotintherequiredstate(orplaceditherequiredstate)fortheexistingunitcondj6on,theunitustbeplacedinNODE3withinthenexthoursandMODE4'thinthefollowing6hours.The,owedCompletionTimearereasonable,basedonoperatingpxperience,toreachthereiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanrderlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems.PlacingtheunitinNODE4~rmovesallrequirementsforOPERABILITYoftheseinterlocks.(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-113'ev.0,09/28/92 ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESACTIONS(continued)1.1andQ.2Xg,xiii~0.why.~e>onsoron>onditioneerockisnotrequired;tobeOPERABLE.ThereotoNODE3withirsisrequireTheCompletionTimesarereasonable,aseonoperatingexper>ence,oreactherequired53g5fromfullpowerinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~sstem.C~~SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSTheSRsforeachESFASFunctionareidentifiedbytheSRscolumnofTable3.3.2-1NothasbeenaddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTae3.3.2-1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichESFASFunctions.'ethateachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppl'thtra'ftheESFAS.WhentestingchannelI,ainAandtrainBtbeexamined.Similarly,trAandtrainBmustbeexam'hentestingchannel,channelIII,andchannelIV(ifapp'e).TheNNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinahatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanacaalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuraciesReviewer':CertainFrequenciesarebasenapprovedtopicreports.Inorderforalicenseetouset's,thelicenseemustjustifytheFrequenciesasreq'bythestaffSERforthetopicalreport.2-R.miis,MSR3.3.2.1PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthatarossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECKi&acomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoring,thesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannels(continued)B3.3-114

Insert3.3.2.25IfthechannelforFunction2.ccannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionI,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.Insert3.3.2:26EachchannelofprocessprotectionsuppliesbothtrainsoftheESFAS.WhentestingChannel1,TrainAandTrainBmustbeexamined.Similarly,TrainAand~~TrainBmustbeexaminedwhentestingChannel2,Channel3,andChannel4(ifapplicable).TheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandCOTsareperformedinamannerthatisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinanalyticallycalculatingtherequiredchannelaccuracies.Insert3.3.2.27Note2hasbeenaddedtoindicatethat,whenachannelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto12hours,providedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainstripcapability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe12hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedontheassumptionthat12hoursistheaveragetimerequiredtoperformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,12hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheESFASinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.

ESFASInstrumentation83.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS0.V~VAa~~V~gB~QRL~~~Xll\~Lokllla&h.~~iXlliashMa'Xl'Las~SR3.3.2.1(continued),nS~~~couldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofmoreseriou.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosscannelfailure;thus,itistheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.~kge~Rhcriteriaaredeterminedbytheulccstaff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindicationandreliability.Ifachannelisoutsidethe8@~criteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.l~4.~~TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethat~demonstrateschannelfailureisrare.eCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.W'l~xv3.3.2.2SR+3.2.2istheperformanceofanACTUATIONCTEST.TheS'estedevery31daysonaSTA0TESTBASIS,usingthesemitictester.Theinbeingtestedisplacedinthebypass'tionuspreventinginadvertentactuation.Throughthesatictester,allpossiblelogiccombinations,'ndwithoplicablepermissives,aretestedforprotectionfunction.~Inaddition,themasterrelcoilispulsetestedforconti'ty.ThisverifihatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEanthatthereisintactvoltagesignalpathtothemasterrecoils.etimeallowedforthetesting(4hours)andtheFequencyarejustifiedinReference8.SR3.3..3SR3.3.2.3istrformancnACTUATIONLOGICTESTasdescribedinSR3.3.2ceptthatthesemiautomatictesterisnotundthetinuitycheckdoesnothavetobeperfor,asexplainedinNote.ThisSRisappliedontinued)B3.3-11592 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS~'(,ev'R3.3.2.3(continued)tobalanceofplantactuationlogicandrelsthatdonavetheSSPStestcircuitsinstalledtoilizethesiautomatictesterorperformthecoinuitycheck.Thites'salsoperformedevery31daysnaSTAGGEREOTESTBASIS.esurveillanceintervaldthetimeallowedforthetestin4hours)arejustifdinReference8.SR3.3.2.4SR3.3.2.4isthepertrmanceaHASTERRELAYTEST.TheHASTERRELAYTESTitheenergizinofthemasterrelay,verifyingcontactperationandalowoltagecontinuitycheckoftheslerelaycoil.Uponmasrelaycontact*operation,awvoltageisinjectedtotheaverelaycoil.Thisoltageisinsufficienttopickupeslaverelay,butAargeenoughtodemonstratesignalpathcontinuit$.Thistestisperformedevery31daysonaSTAGGEREOTESTBASIS.Thetimeallowedforthetesting(4hours)andthesurveillanceintervalarejustifiedinRefer'ence8.SR3.3.2SR3.3.20istheperformanceofaCOT.ACOTisperformedoneachrequiredchanneltoensuretheentirechaillerformtheintendedFunction.etpointsmustbefoundithinheAlValuesspecifiedinTable3.3.1-1.IIprevious"sleft"valuesmustbeconsiste'hedriftallowanceus'hesetpointmeogy.Thesetpointshallbeleftsesiswiththeassumptionsofthecurrentunitspecifi'methodology.The"asfound"asleft"valuesmustaerecordeandrevieorconsistencywiththeassumptionstsurve'nceintervalextensionanalysis(Ref.8)whecableTheFrequencyof92daysiseference~d.Aey~~~~~Dh$~~~~,g~~,~q~+%LE~(continueB3.3-116p,$.firsecNoser'paccr0928/9 ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.2.6S.3.2.6istheperformanceofaSLAVERELAYTEST.TheSLAVEYTESTistheenergizingoftheslaverelays.Contactoper'isverifiedinoneoftwoways.ationequipmentthatmayoperatedinthedesignm'tionMODEiseitherallowedtofun'on,orisplacnaconditionwheretherelaycontactoperaricaverifiedwithoutoperationoftheequipment.ActequipmentthatmaynotbeoperatedinthedesiitigatioDEispreventedfromoperationbytheRELAYTESTcircui.Forthislattercase,contoperationisverifiedbyaco'nuitycheckofthe'uitcontainingtheslaverelay.Thistisperfoevery[92]days.Thetimeallowedforthetes'4hours)andtheFrequencyarejustifiedinference8.SR3.3.2.7SR.3.2.7istheperformanceofaTADOTevery[92]days.ThisestisacheckoftheLossofOffsitePower,UndervotageRCP,andAFWPumpSuctionTransferonctionPressureLowFunctions.EachFunctionistestupto,andincluding,hemastertransferrelaycoils.ThetestalsoeludestripdevicestharovideactuationsignalsdirectlyotheSSPS.TheSsmodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesvericationofsetpntsforrelays.RelaysetpointsrequireeloratebencalibrationandareverifiedduringCHANNECALIBTION.TheFrequencyisjustifiedinReference8.!SR3.3.2.8SR3.3.2.8iseperformanceofaOT.ThistestisacheckoftHanualActuationFunctionandAFWpumpstartontripallMFWpumps.Itisperformevery[18],nths.EachManualActuationFunctiistesteduptoandincluding,themasterrelaycoils.some,stances,thetestincludesactuationofthee,device(i.e.,pumpstarts,valvecycles,etc.).TheFreqncyisjustifiedinReference8.(continued)B3.3-117WOpqP>ns~~dpi,+(gpss Insert3.3.2.28SR3.3.2.3ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery92days.ThistestisacheckoftheLossofBusllAand11BPowerFunction.Thetestincludestripdevicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectlytotheprotectionsystem.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsfoxrelays.RelaysetpointsrequireelaboratebenchcalibrationandareverifiedduringCHANNELCALIBRATION.TheFrequencyof92daysisadequatebasedonindustryoperatingexperience,consideringinstrumentreliabilityandoperatinghistorydata.SR3.3.2.4ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOTevery24months.ThistestisacheckoftheManualInitiation,AutomaticActuationLogic,andTripofBothMFWPumpsFunctions.Thistestincludestheapplicationofvarioussimulatedoractualinputcombinationsinconjunctionwitheachpossibleinterlocklogicstateandtheverificationoftherequiredlogicoutput.Relayandcontactoperationis-~';)verifiedbytheactuationoftheenddevice(iee.,pump'starts,valvecycles,etc.).TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonindustryoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalrefuelingcycle.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsduringtheTADOT.TheManualInitiation,AutomaticActuationLogic,andTripofBothHFWPumpsFunctionshavenoassociatedsetpoints.

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASES~~~)Gill,~~/~Q~wSURVEILLANCESR3.3.2.REQUIREMENTS(continued)SR&~istheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATION.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformederrefuelinompleteceotesnsrumenoop,includingthesensorThetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstomeasuredarameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.~fsÃigg.pCHANNELCALIBRATIONmustbeperformedconsistentwithteassumtinsofthspecificsetpointmeodolo.TheMl"asleft"valuesmustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology.TheFrequencyofmonthsisbasedontheassumptionofaQ-QQmonthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationoftemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointmethodology.~li'lll(lass'edbyaNoincludeverificat'thepre'alueswhereaatthistestshouldstantsareadjustedto3.3.2.10Kg,v'4aThisSRensurestheindividualchannelESFRESPONSESarelessthanorequaltothemaximumvaluesmedintheaccidentanalysis.ResponseTimetestinceptanceiteriaareincludedinTechnicalRerementsManual,Sec'(Ref.9).Individualponentresponsetimesarenotmo'ntheanalys.Theanalysesmodeltheoverallortotaleate,fromthepointatwhichtheparameterexceedsthepointvalueatthesensor,tothepointatwhichequipmennbothtrainsreachestherequiredfunctiostate(e.g.,pusatrateddischargepressure,valvesinfullopenorcloseosition).Forchanne'thatincludedynamictransfernctions(e.g.,lag,ledd/lag,rate/lag,etc.),theresponsemetestmaybeperformedwiththetransferfunctionssettoonewith,theresultingmeasuredresponsetimecomparedtotheappropriateB3.3-118 Insert3.3.2.29SR3.3.2.6SR3.3.2.6ensuresthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsarenotbypassedwhenpressurizerpressure>2000psigwhileinNODE3.Periodictestingofthepressurizerpressurechannelsisrequiredtoverifythesetpointtobelessthanorequaltothelimit.Thedifferencebetweenthecurrent"asfound"valuesandtheprevioustest"asleft"values,mustbeconsistentwiththedriftallowanceusedinthesetpointmethodology(Ref.6).Thesetpointshallbeleftsetconsistentwiththeassumptionsofthecurrentplantspecificsetpointmethodology.Ifthepressurizerpressureinterlocksetpointisnonconservative,thenthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionsareconsideredinoperable.Alternatively,thepressurizerpressureinterlockcanbeplacedintheconservativecondition(nonbypass).Ifplacedinthenonbypassedcondition,theSRismetandthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctionswouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.

ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.2.10(continued)FSARresponsetime.Alternately,theresponsetimetestaqperformedwiththetimeconstantssettotheirnomi1vaeprovidedtherequiredresponsetimeisanalytillycalcuatedassumingthetimeconstantsaresetateirnominalalues.Theresponsetimemaybemeasurbyaseriesofverlappingtestssuchthattheentirresponsetimeismeared.ESFRESPONSETItestsareconductedon[18]monthSTAGGEREDTESTBASTestingofthefalactuationdevices,whichmakeuphebulkofthresponsetime,isincludedinthetestingofeachchael.Thefinalactuationdeviceinonetra'sstedwitheachchannel.Therefore,staggeredtestingeitsinresponsetimeverificationofthesedevicesery[18]months.The[18]monthFrequencyisconstewiththetypicalrefuelingcycleandisbadonunoperatingexperience,whichshowsthatrandomailuresof'trumentationcomponentscausingserousresponsetsedegradation,butnotchannelfailure,areinfrequentoccrences.ThisSRismodifdbyaNotethatclarifiethattheturbinedrivenWpumpistestedwithin24hrsafterreaching[100(VJpsigintheSGs.SR3.3.2'.llSR3.3'.2.11istheperformanceofaTAOOTasdescribedinSR3/3.2.8,exceptthatitisperformedfortheP-4ReactorTrigInter'lock,andtheFrequencyisonceperRTBcycle.ThisFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencedemonstratingthatundetectedfailureoftheP-4interlockometimesoccurswhentheRTBiscycled.REFERENCES~f.QUSAR,Chapterg6~2.QSAR,Chapter~2~IB.SAR,Chapter+15$IEEE-279-1971.(continued) ESFASInstrumentationB3.3.2BASESREFERENCESl4.(continued)6.'yMCAP-10271-P-A,9.nicalRe.imes."~um(.y+)SDc.<S,.A4~p1o,i'd@,'7.'ll~ouse~~'As'upplement2,Rev.1,June1990.ementsManual,ction15,"Respe83.3-120

PAHInstrumentationB3.3.383.3INSTRUHENTATIONB3.3.3Post,AccidentHonitoring(PAH)InstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDASL+~~IfCWa't'+~~inP~i,~0..WO'bE5.v.a.TheprimarypurposeofthePAHinstrumentationistodisplay~variablesthatprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorsduringaccident'situations.Thispfd*typtfttpttotak%Qmanualactions,~F6-Ã8q84484~-DesignBasisAccidents(DBAsaeYTheRABILITYoftheaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationensuresthatthereissufficientinformationavailableonelectedgfrjtparameterstomonitorandtoassess~F'tatusandbehaviorfollowinganaccident.TheavailabilityoFaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationisimportantsothatresponsestocorrectiveactionscanbeobservedandtheneedfor,andmagnitudeof,furtheraetio.canbedeteriTheseessentialinsentsareidentifiedaddressingtherecommendationsofReguatoryuide1.97(Ref.2)asrequiredbySupplement1toNUREG-0737(Ref.3).TheinstrumentchannelsrequiredtobeOPERABLEby.thisLCOparametersidentifiedduring~implementationofRegulatoryGuide1.97's~CategoryIvariables.@peAvariablesareincludedinthisLCObecausetheyrovidetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontroloomoperatortotakespecificmanuallycontractionsforwhichnoaaomaticcontrolispro,andthatarerequiredforsafe~s.stemstoomplish.theirsafetyfunctionsforDBAs.BeethelistofTypeAvariablesdifferswidelybenunits,ble3.3.3-1intheaccompanyincontainsnoexampofTypeAvariables,exceptthosethatmayalsobeCategovariables.CategoryIvariablesarethekeyvariablesdeemedskignificantbecausetheyareneededto:(continued)B3.3-121

Insert3.3.3.1'a~b.Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortotakespecificmanuallycontrolledactionsforwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunctionsforDBAs(TypeA).Providetheprimaryinformationrequiredforthecontrolroomoperatortoverifythatrequiredautomaticandmanuallycontrolledfunctionshavebeenaccomplished(Type8); PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESBACKGROUND~(continued)Determinewhetherothersystemsimportanttosafetyareperformintheirindfunctions.keyProvideinformationtotheoperatorsthatwillenablethemtodeterminethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease;andProvideinformationregardingthereleaseofradioactivematerialstoallowforearlyindicationoftheneedtoinitiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublic,andto-estimatethemagnitudeofanyimethleat.identifie~7,~,tt.svariablesprov>~~ljustificationfordeviatingromtheNRCproposedlistofCategoryIvariables.er'sNote:Table3.3.3-1providesalistofvstypicaloidentifiedbytheunits'egulatoryGuide1.97analyses.e3.3.3-nitspecificTechnicalSpecifiationsistallTypeAandCategoryIvariaentifiedbytheu'cificRegulatoe1.97analyses,asamendedbyte'sSEvaluationReport(SER).ThespecificinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1arediscussedintheLCOsection.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESK').v.a.~~~~K7.4,cThINRegulatoryGuide1.97ategoryIvariablessothatthecontrolroomoperatingstaffcan:~PerformthediagnosisspecifiedintheemergencyoperatinproceduresoreprimarysuccesspathofOBAs,e.g.,lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA));~Takethespecified,pre-planned,manuallycontrolledactions,forwhichnoautomaticcontrolisprovided,andthatarerequiredforsafetysystemstoaccomplishtheirsafetyfunction;(continued)83.3-122 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESWS.v,o.APPLICABLSAFETYANALYSES(continued)~'Determinewhether~Determineifagrossbreachofabarrierhasoccurred;andsafety~functions.~~~I'-~P~Determinethelikelihoodofagrossbreachofthebarrierstoradioactivityrelease;5'.v.w~Initiateactionnecessarytoprotectthepublicandtoestimatethemagnitudeofanyimpendingthreat.PANinstrumentationthatmeetsthedefinitionofTypeAinRegulatoryGuide1.97satisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.CategoryI,non-TypeA,instrumentationmustberetainedinTSbecauseitisintendedtoassistoperatorsinminimizingtheconsequencesofaccidents.Therefore,CategoryI,non-TypeA,variablesareimportantforreducingpublicrisk<(448Q~g~~g~WG.V.CA.LCO~ve.ThePANmEnstrumentationLCOprovidesOPERABILITYrequirementsforRegulatoryGuide1.97TypeAmonitors,whichprovideinformationrequiredbythecontrolroomoperatorstoperformcertainmanualactionsspecifiedintheEmergencyOperatingProcedures.Thesemanualactionsensurethatasystemcanaccomplishitssafetyfunction,andarecreditedinthesafetyanalyses.Additionally,thisLCOaddressesRegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentsthathavebeendesignatedCategoryI,non-TypeA.W~.V.sB.m~.V.cxTheOPERABILITYofthePANinstrumentationensuresthereissufficientinformationavailableonselectedafireparameters~tomonitoraassess~statusfo11owinganaccident.feter-ence-0. ~~~LLCO~~requirestwoOPERABLEchannelsformostFunctions.TwoOPERABLEchannelsensurenosinglefailurepreventsoperatorsfromgettingtheinformationnecessary~MRhtodeterminethesafetystatusofthe,anoringeLaiBtoandmaintainitinasafeconditionfollowinganaccident.(continued)MOB3.3-123Rev.0,09/28/92 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)25,v.exceptiontothetwochannelrequirement'ntainmenIsolatValve(CIV)Position.Inthisse,theimportantinformationestatusoftheconmentpenetrations.TheLCOrequiresositioniatorforeachactiveCIV.Thisissufficienttoreyverifytheisolationstatusofeachisolableetra'itherviaindicatedstatusoftheactiveveandprioredgeofapassivevalve,orviasmboundarystatus.IfaallyactiveCIVisknownbeclosedanddeactivated,positioindicatiisnotneededtodeterminestatus..Therefor,theptionindicationforvalvesinthisstateisnotiredtFurthermore,OPERABILITYoftwochannelsallowsaCHANNELCHECKduringthepostaccidentphasetoconfirmthevalidityofdisplayedinformation.Morethantwochannelsmaybeqid~fafailureof.oneaccidentmonitoringchannelresutsininormationambiguity(thatis,theredundantdisplaysdisagree)thatcouldleadoperatorstodefeatorfailtoaccomplisharequiredsafetyfunction.Table3.3.3-1ovidesaeniieytheunitpecificRegulatoGuide1.97(Ref.1nalyses.ble3.3.3-1initspecificTSouilistTypeACategoryIvar'esidentifieytheun'pecificGuideeNRC'sSER88.3-2-z5.v,aaegoryIvariablesarerequiredtomRegulatory'97CategoryI(Refignandqualificationrequireeismicandenvironmenalualification,s'ilure'utilizationmergencypower,immediatelyaccessinuouListedbelowarediscussionsofthespecifiedinstrumentFunctionslistedinTable3.3.3-1.eseeneprovidedforeach(continued)B3.3-124QppH~.(><i+aurF@.dR Insert3.3.3.2CategoryIvariablesareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofprovidingimmediatelyaccessibledisplayandcontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroom.TheHydrogenmonitorsareconsideredOPERABLEwhencontinuousreadoutisavailableinthecontrolroomorintherelayroom.EachchannelmustalsobesuppliedbymS.~.o.separateelectricaltrainsexceptasnotedbelow.Inaddition,inaccordancewithLCO3.0.6,itisnotrequiredtodeclareasupportedsysteminoperableduetotheinoperabilityofthesupportsystem(e.g.,electricpower).SincetheinoperabilityofInstrumentBusDdoesnothaveanyassociatedRequiredActions,thelossofthispowersourcemayaffecttheOPERABILITVofthePressurizerPressureandSGWaterLevel(NarrowRange)Functions. ~4PANInstrumentation83.3.3BASESLCO(continued)Zg.;vgQs3'~~PowerRaneandSourceRaneNeutronFluxPoweraandSourceRangeNeutruxindicationisprovidedtoifyreactoutdown.ThetworangesarenecessarverthefullrangeoffluxthatmayoccurpocciNeutronxisusedforaccidentd>sis,ver'ationofsubcriticality,anddiagno'fositivereactivityinsertion.3,4.ReactorCoolantSstemRCSHotandColdLe~~~ZZ.v.CtRCSHotandColdLegTemperaturesareCategoryIvariablesprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingdlongtermsurveillanceZZ;v.a,ShotandcoldlegtemperaturesareusedtodetermineRCSsubcoolingmargin.RCSsubcoolingmarginwillallowterminationof~SI~ifstillinprogress,orreinitiationofSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforgjjhstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.sag,v.~QSsVAInaddition,RCScoldlegtemperatureisusedinconjunctionwithRCShotlegterneraturetoverifythenaturalcirculationintheRCS.eaclettemperatureinputsMReactorProtectionSyseytwofastresponseresistanceelendassocransmittersineachlooechannelsprovideindicanoveraa04ES.v.a.ws.v.~5.ressureMideRanedupesiRRCSwiderangepressureisaCgdduu~variableprovidedforverificatiofcorecoolingandRCSintegrity~m4~RCSpressureisusedtoverifydeliveryofSIflowtoRCSfromatleastonetrainwhentheRCSpressureis(continued)B3.3-125Rev.0092892RPg,nroR~mP~~+~ Insert3.3.3.31.PressurizerPressurePressurizerPressureisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.PressurizerpressureisalsousedtoverifytheplantconditionsnecessarytoestablishnaturalcirculationintheRCSandtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction~PT-429andPT-431;~PT-430andPT-431;~PT-429andPT-449;~PT-430andPT-449;or~PT-431andPT-449ThelossofInstrumentBus.0requiresdeclaringPT-449inoperable.2.PressurizerLevelPressurizer.LevelisaTypeAvariableusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifit.hasbeenstopped.Pressurizerwaterlevelisalsousedtoverifythattheplantismaintainedinasafeshutdowncondition.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitterscomprisethetwochannelsrequiredforthisfunction:~LT-426andLT-'428;or~LT-427andLT-428.Insert3.3.3.4Temperatureinputsareprovidedbytwoindependenttemperaturesensorresistanceelementsandassociatedtransmittersineachloop.TemperatureelementsTE-2<.v.a409B-1andTE-410B-1providetherequiredRCScoldlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.TemperatureelementsTE-409A-1andTE-410A-1providetherequiredRCShotlegtemperatureinputforRCSLoopsAandB,respectively.

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO5.ReactorCoolantSstemPressureWideRane(continued)isalso+S.v.<QS.v,Q.I~~f516[~~~;npusedtoverifyclosureofmanuayclosedprayinevalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs).eseversusedfordee'CSmargin.RCS~subcoolingmar'ationofSI,ifstill~.ogressorreinit'ononstoedCSpressurecanalsobeused:~todeterminewhethertoterminateactuatedSIortoreinitiatestoppedSI;~todeterminewhentoresetSIand~R~puP~tomanuallyrestart~asreactorcoolantpump(RCP)tripcriteria;~tomakeadeterminationonthenatureoftheaccidentinroressonextinthe~cry~proceuse-~~am~W~~m~ILGWU)~lQLl~f~~0~25.v.0.RCSpressureisalsorelatedtothreedecisionsaboutdepressurization.Theyare:todeterminewhethertoproceedwithprimarysystemdepressurization;toverifyterminationofdepressurization;andtodeterminewhethertocloseaccumulatorisolationvalvesduringacontrolledcooldown/depressurization.(continued)B3.3-126 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO5.(continued)PressureWideRane~S.w~i.VRCSpressureisaTypeAvariablebecausetheoperatorusesthisindicationtomonitorthecooldownoftheRCSfollowingasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)orsmallbreakLOCA.Operatoractionstomaintainacontrolledcooldown,suchasadjustingsteamgenerator(SG)pressureorlevel,wouldusethisindication.erRSivo4.~pOha~~Pets.~~gL1SdLPL~~~~v~M~qIaJjN'ReactorVesselWaterLevelReactorVesselWaterLevelisprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.Itisalsousedforaccidentdiagnosisandtodeterminereactorcoolantinventoryadequac.i'<~~WeReactorVesselWaterLeveltgjjj3zrz-.@gSystemprovidesadirectmeasurementofthecollapsedliquilevelabovethefuelalignmentplate.Thecollapsedlevelrepresentstheamountofliquidmassthatisinhit~th.ftfcoapsedwatereveisselectedbecauseitisadirectindicationoftewaterinventory./ContainmentSumWaterLevel8Q~egcy-<foL~4v<ZS,v,a.ContainmentSumpWaterLevelisprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.'IContainmentSumpaterLevelisusedtodetermine:~containmentsumplevelaccidentdiagnosis;~whentobegintherecirculationprocedure;and~whethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress.(continued)'fOQ-&73B3.3-1278M.(Q~+7c;~~aI-) Insert3.3.3.56.RCSSubcoolinMonitor'2S,'<eRCSSubcoolingMonitorisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverificationofcorecoolingandlongtermsurveillanceofRCSintegrity.TheRCSSubcoolingMonitorisusedtoprovideinformationtotheoperator,derivedfromRCShotlegtemperatureandRCSpressure,onsubcooling.RCSsubcoolingmarginisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.RCSsubcoolingmarginisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.Theemergencyoperatingprocedu'resdetermineRCSsubcoolingmarginbasedonthecoreexitthermocouples(CETs)andRCSpressure.Therefore,anyofthefollowingcombinationofparameterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsfor'hisfunction:TI-409AandTI-410A;orOnepressurizerpressuretransmitterandtwoCETsineachofthefourquadrantssuppliedbyelectricaltrainAandtrainB(i.e.,totaloftwopressurizerpressuretransmittersand16CETs).Insert3.3.3.6LeveltransmittersLT-942andLT-943,eachwithfivediscretelevelswitches,providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Z.S,v,e. e PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO(continued)z5'~g85,Sf'ontainmentPressureWideRaneContainmentPressure(WideRange)isprovidedforverificationofRCSandcontainmentOPERABILITY.ContainmentpressuresusedtoverifyclosurampPhaseBiswenHigh-3conta1nmenpContainmentIsolationValvePositionCIVPositionisprovidedforverificationofontainmentOPERABILITY,andPhaseAandPhase1St10n.WS.tvWhenusedverifyPhaseAandPhaseBsolation,theimportantinationisthestatusthecontainmentpenetrations.ThCOrequiresopositionindicatorforeachactiveCIV.hisissficienttoredundantlyverifythe1la'onstatusofeachisolablepenetrationeithviaindicatedstatusoftheactivevalveandpr'knledgeofapassivevalve,orviasystemundarystus.IfanormallyactiveCIVisknowtobeclosedddeactivated,positionindicat'isnotneededtoeterminestatus.Therefore,thositionindicationforalvesinthisstateisnorequiredtobeOPERABLE.'sFunctionisonapvalvebasisandConditionAisnteredseparatelyforeachinoperablevalveindicat1n.ANotetotheRequiredChannelsstatesthatthenctionisnotrequiredforisolationvalveswhoseassocatedp~etrationisisolatedbyatleastoneclosed.andd'eactivatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,orcheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.W5.vA10.ContainmentAreaRadiationHihRane0-~~Lt-d~~ContainmentAreaRadiationisprovidedtomonitorfor,WthepotentialofsignificantradiationreleasesandtoWŽprovidereleaseassessmentforusebyoperatorsindeterminingtheneedtoinvokesiteemergencyplans.(continued)B3.3-128ev.

Insert3.3.3.7(MideRange)isusedtodeterminethetypeofaccidentinprogressandwhen,andif,touseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~~.v'.a..~PT-946andPT-948;or~PT-950and-PT-948. PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO~S.v.a,~XlNl"10.ContainmentAreaRadiationHihRane(continuedz>gg:.ContainmentradiationlevelisusedtodeterminegQy~~~vHdroenMonitorsHydrogenNamhhms~providedtodetecthighhydrogenconcentrationconditionsthatrepresentapotentialforcontainmentbreachfromahydrogenexplosion.Thisvariableisalsoimportantinverifyingtheadequacyofmitigatingactions.I2~PressurizerLevelPressurizerLevelisusedtodeterminewhetherterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.KnowledgeofessurizerwaterlevelisalsousedtoverifytheitconditionsecessarytoestablishnaturalcirculionintheRCSatoverifythattheunitismaiainedinasafeshutwncondition.13.SteamGenertorWaterLeveWideRaneSGMaterLeveliprov'dedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremoval'atheSGs.TheCategoryIindicationofSG1eistheextendedstartuprangelevelinstrumention.TheextendedstartuprangelevelcoversapanofZinchesto<394inchesabovethelortubesheet.Themeasureddifferentialpressureidisplayedininchofwaterat68F.Temperarecompensationofthis'icationisperforedmanuallybytheoperator.Redundantmonioringcapabilityisprovidedbyotrainsof-inrumentation.Theuncompensatedlevelsignalisiputtotheunitcomputer,acontrolroomindicator,ndtheEmergencyFeedwaterControlSystem.SGWaterLevel(WideRange)isusedto:(continued) Insert3.3.3e8thetypeofaccidentinprogress(e.g.,LOCA),andwhen,orif,tooseemergencyoperatingprocedurecontainmentadversevalues.~,w.o.RadiationmonitorsR-29andR-30areusedtoprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Insert3.3.3.9HydrogenmonitorsHHSLCPAandMMSLCPBprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.Inaddition,thePostAccidentSamplingSystemmaytaketheplaceofoneofthesemonitors.ThePASSsystemHydrogenFunctionisnotrequiredtoprovidecontinuousreadoutinthecontrolroomorrelayroomforOPERABILITY.12.CondensateStoraeTankCSTLevel<<scp,V.R~~~a,s.-"CSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtoensureawatersupplyisavailableforthepreferredAuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System.TheCSTconsist'softwoidenticaltanksconnectedbyacommonoutletheader.CSTlevelisusedtodetermine:~ifsufficientCSTinventoryisavailableimmediatelyfollowingalossofnormal.feedwaterorsmallbreakLOCA;and~whentomanuallyreplenishtheCSToralignthesafetyrelatedsourceofwater(servicewater)tothepreferredAFWsystem.LeveltransmittersLT-2022AandLT-2022Bprovidethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction.13.RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTLevelRWSTLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyingawatersourcetotheSI,RHR,andContainmentSpray(CS)Systems.TheRWSTlevelaccura'cyisestablishedtoallowanadequatesupplyofwatertotheSI,RHR,andCSpumpsduringtheswitchovertotherecirculationphaseofanaccident.AhighdegreeofaccuracyisrequiredtomaximizethetimeavailabletotheoperatortocompletetheswitchovertothesumprecirculationphaseandensuresufficientwaterisavailabletomaintainadequateNPSHtooperatingpumps.LeveltransmittersLT-920andLT-921providethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction. Insert3.3.3.9(continued)14.RHRFlowRHRFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedforverifyinglowpressuresafetyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtotheCSandSIpumps.RHRflowisusedtodeterminewhentostoptheRHRpumpsandifsufficientflowisavailabletotheCSandSIpumpsduringrecirculation.SincedifferentflowtransmittersareusedtoverifyinjectiontothereactorvesselandtoverifyflowtotheCSandSIpumps,FT-626andFT-931AcompriseonerequiredchannelandFT-689andFT-931Bcompriseasecondrequiredchannel. PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCO13.SteamGeneratorWaterLevelWideRane(continue)~identifythefaultedSGfollowingatube,rupture~verifythattheintactSGsareanadeateheatsinkforthereactor;~determinethenatureoftheaccidntinprogress(e.g.,verifyanSGTR);and~verifyunitconditionsforteminationofSIduringsecondaryunitHELBsutsidecontainment.z,g.~.914.someunits,operatoractionisbasedonthecontrolroindicationofSGlevel.TheRCSresponseduringade'gnbasissmallbreakCAdependsonthebreaksize.)oracertainrange,hfbreaksizes,theboilercondense>modeofheattransferisnecessarytoremovedecayheat.ExtendedstartuprangelevelisaTypeAvariablebecsetheoperatormustmanuallyraiseandcontrolSGlev1toestkblishboilercondenserheattransfer.Operaora+ionisinitiatedonalossofsubcooledmargin.Fyhdwaterflowisincreaseduntiltheindicatedextendstartuprangelevelreachestheboilercondensersetpint.CondensateStoraeTankTLevelICSTLevelisprovidedtoensurewatersupplyforauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW).TCSTprovidestheensuredsafetygradewatersuppfortheAFWSystem.TheCSTconsistsoftwoidenticatanksconnectedbyacommonoutletheader.Inventoryimonitoredbya0inchto;144inchlevelindicationoreachtank.CSTLevel:isdisplayedonacontrolromindicator,stripcheartrecorder,andunitcomputeInaddition,acontrolroomannunciatoralarmsonlowlevel.Atsomeunits,CSTLevelisconsideredaTeA/varia61ebecausethecontrolroommeterandannunciatorareconsideredtheprimaryindicationusedbytheoperator./The~DBAsthatrequireAFWarethelossofelectr'ower,steamlinebreak(SLB),andsmallbrLOCA.(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-130Rev.0,09/28/92 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCOCondensateStoraeTankCSTLe(continued)25,v.wTheCiseofwaterfortheAFWSystem.HowevestheCSTisted,manualoperator~aonisnecessarytoreplenieCSToralig~nuctiontotheAFWpumpsfromthehotwe15,16,17,18.<5',vPCoreExitTemerature0.CoreExitTemperatureisprovidedforverificationandlongtermsurveillanceofcorecooling.AnevaluationwasmadeofthyminimumnumberofvalidE~necessaryformeasuringcorecoolin.Theevaluationdeterminedtheed%&omemnecessarodetectiniiacorerecoveryandtrend+eensuingcoreheatup.TheevaluationsaccounMorcorenonuniformities,includingincoreeffectsoftheradialdecaypower~di<<ibi,fff~thehotlegs,andnonuniforminlettemperatures.Basedontheseevaluations,adequatecorecoolingisensuredwithtwovalidCoreExitTemperaturechannelsperquadrantwithtwoCETsperrequiredchannel.eyievaoforerowerdistribution.xitTemperatureisusedtoeeterminateSI,ifstillss,ortoreinitiateSthasstopped.CoreExitTemperatureisalsousedg,~gIbKS'.v,<TwoOPERABLEchannelsofCoreExitTemperaturearerequiredineachquadranttoprovideindicationofradialdistributionofthecoolanttemperaturacrossrepresentativeregionsofthecore.erisuionsymmerywasconerminingthespec'cnumberandlocationsprovidedfordi.agnosisflocalcoreproblems.Therefore,tworandomlysetedthermocouplesareenttoeetthetwothecoupleannelrequirementinnyquadrant.Thermocouples'ineachchannelustmeetditionalr'rementthatoneisocatearthecenterofthecandtheothernearheoreperimeter,suchthatthepaifCoreExiteraturesindicatetheradialtemperatradient33yl(continued)B3.3-131

Insert3.3.3.10CoreExitTemperatureisusedtodeterminewhethertoterminateSI,ifstillinprogress,ortoreinitiateSIifithasbeenstopped.CoreExitTemperatureisalsousedforplantstabilizationandcooldowncontrol.Insert3.3.3.11Becauseofthesmallcoresize,tworandomlyselectedthermocouplesaresufficienttomeetthetwothermocouplesperchannelrequirementinanyquadrant.However,aCETwhichliesdirectlyonthedividinglinebetweentwoquadrantscanonlybeusedtosatisfytheminimumrequiredchannelsforonequadrant.ACETisconsideredOPERABLEwhenitiswithin+35'FoftheaverageCETreading.AtleasttwoCETsfromeachofthefollowingtrainsmustbeOPERABLEineachofthefourquadrants:TrainACETLocationTrainBCETLocationT2M6T5J3T6I2TjJ6T8L10T9J8T12H6T15H9T18F8T21C11722Hl1T23H13T26I10T28D5T33D2T34C3T36BjT38B5T39DjTlT3T4T10 T13TI4 T16T17T19 T20T24 T25 T27T29T30 T31T3.2T35T37I4L7K3J9 KllD12H10E10G7C8F12G12E6 E4G4G2GlA7C6 PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESCO15,16,17,oreExitTemerature(continued)~S.V.19.acrosstheiruadrant.Un'pecificevaluationinresponsetoItem.UREG-0737(Ref.3)shouldhaveidentifieetulepairingsthatsatisfythesere'ents.Twosetsthermocouplessureasinglefailurewillno'etheabiliodeterminethe.radialtemperaturegrad'MelowFlowisprovidedtomonitoroperationofdayheatremovalviatheSGs.TheAFWFlowtoeachSGisdeterminedfroa~,differentialpressuremeasurementcalibredforagrangeof0gpmto1200gpm.RedundantonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbytwoindepennttrainsofinQtrumentationforeachSG.Each'fferentialpressuretransmitterprovidesaniuttoacontrolroom~indicatorandtheunitcomper.Sincethe.primaryMdicationusedbytheeratorduringanaccidentithecontrolroom'r(dicator,thePANspecificationealsspecificlywiththisportionoftheinstrumentannel.AFWflowisusedthrays:~toverifydeliryAFWflowtotheSGs;~todeterminwhethertoterminateSIifstillinprogress,/nconjunctionithS6waterlevel(narrownge);and~torelateAFWflowsothateSGtubesremaincoveed.Atsomberunits,AFWflowisaTypeAvar'ablebecauseoperatoraction'isrequiredtothrottleowduringanSLB,accidenttopreventtheAFWpumpsfromoperatinginunoutconditions.AFWflowisalsousebytheopratortoverifythattheAFWSystemisdelveringecorrectflowtoeachSG.However,theprimary(continMo~fSB3.3-132i'~rQC

Insert3.3.3.12~V.o-AFWFlowisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofthepreferredAFWsystem.TheAFWSystemprovidesdecayheatremovalviatheSGsandiscomprisedofthepreferredAFWSystemandtheStandbyAFM(SAFM)System.TheuseofthepreferredAFMorSAFWSystemtoprovidethisdecayheatremovalfunctionisdependentuponthetypeofaccident.AFWflowindicationisrequiredfromthethreepumptrainswhichcomprisethepreferredAFWSystemsincethesepumpsautomaticallystartonvariousactuationsignals.ThefailureofthepreferredAFWSystem(e.g.,duetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding)isdetectedbyAFWflowindication.Atthispoint,theSAFWSystemismanuallyalignedtoprovidethedecayheatremovalfunction.AFWflowcanalsobeusedtoverifythatAFWflowisbeingdeliveredtotheSGs.However,theprimaryindicationofthisisprovidedbySGwaterlevel.Therefore,flowindicationfromtheSAFWpumpsisnotrequired.EachofthethreepreferredAFWpumptrainshastworedundanttransmitters;however,'nlytheflowtransmittersuppliedpowerfromthesameelectricaltrainastheAFWpumpisrequiredforthisLCO.Therefore,flowtransmittersFT-2001andFT-2007comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandFT-2002andFT-2006comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.20,21.SGWaterLevelNarrowandWideRaneSGMaterLevelisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSGs.Forthenarrowrangelevel,thesignalsfromthetransmittersareindependentlyindicatedonthemaincontrolboardas0%to100%.Thiscorrespondstoapproximatelyabovethetopofthetubebundlestothetopoftheswirlvaneseparators(spanof143inches).Forthewiderangelevel,signalsfromthetransmittersareindicatedas0to520inches(0%to100%)onthemaincontrolboard.SGMaterLevel(NarrowandWideRange)isusedto:~identifythefaultedSGfollowingatuberupture;~verifythattheintactSGsareanadequateheatsinkforthereactor;~determinethenatureoftheaccidentinprogress(e.g.,verifyanSGTR);and~verifyplantconditionsforterminationofSIduringsecondaryplantHELBsoutsidecontainment.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbytwotrainsofinstrumentation. Insert3.3.3.12(continued)S/GWaterLevel(NarrowRange)requires2channelsofindication(oneperSG)whichcanbemetusinganyofthefollowingcombinationsofleveltransmitters:~LT-461andLT-471;~LT-462andLT-471;~LT-462andLT-472;~LT-462andLT-473.~LT-463andLT-472;and~LT-463andLT-473.ThelossofInstrumentBus0requiresdeclaringLT-463andLT-471inoperable.SGWaterLevel(WideRange)requires2channelsofindicationper'G.TwochannelsperSGarerequiredsincethelossofonechannelwithnobackupavailablemayresultinthecompletelossofinformationrequiredbytheoperatorstoaccomplishnecessarysafetyfunctions.LeveltransmittersLT-504andLT-505comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGAandLT-506andLT-507comprisethetworequiredchannelsforSGB.22.SGPressureSGPressureisaTypeAvariableprovidedtomonitoroperationofdecayheatremovalviatheSG's.Thesignalsfromthetransmittersarecalibratedforarangeof0psigto1400psig.Redundantmonitoringcapabilityisprovidedbythreeavailabletrainsofinstrumentation.Anyofthefollowingcombinationsofpressuretransmitterscomprisethetworequiredchannelsforthisfunction:~PT-468andPT-'478;~PT-469andPT-478;~PT-479andPT-482;and~PT-482andPT-483. PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESLCOKS,V.Chindicat'bytheoperatortoensureanaeqoryisSGlevel.CABILITY'2S.v.o,instrumentationS.ThePAMinstrumentationLCOisapplicableinMODES1,2,and3.Thesevariablesarerelatedtothediagnosisandpre-plannedactionsrequiredtomitigateDBAs.ThealicableDBAsareassumedtooccurinMODES1,2,and3.InMO45andieiatwouldrinstrumentationi,resredtobeOPERABLEintACTIONS~C-MTlvW>'~nhoh+a.d-IIhbddd~11hNIIEchangerestrictionofLCO3.0.4.ThisexceptionallowsentryintotheapplicableMODEwhilerelyingontheACTIONSeventhoughtheACTIONSmayeventuallyrequire~~shutdown.Thisexceptionisacceptableduetothepassivefunctionoftheinstruments,theoperator'sabilitytorespondtoanaccidentusingalternateinstrumentsandmethods,andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringtheseinstruments.Note2hasbeenaddedtoclarifytheapplicationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedonTable3.3.3-1.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.A.l'8SBW1tLZ.5.VhConditionAapplieswenoneormoreFunctionsaveonequirecannethatisinoperable.Require.1requ'ires-~toringtheinoperableoOPERABLEstatuwithin30days.0etionTimeisbasedonoperatingexperinintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEe(orinthecasetionthathasonyquiredchannel,othernon-Regulatoryu(continued)B3.3-133 Insert3.3.3.13thePANinstrumentationisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecauseplantconditionsaresuchthatthelikelihoodofaneventthatwouldrequirePANinstrumentationislow.Insert3.3.3.14toallPANinstrumentationfunctions.ConditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneormorerequiredchannelsforoneormorerequiredFunctionsareinoperable.TheRequiredActionistoimmediatelyrefertoTable3.3.3-1andtaketheRequiredActionsfortheinstrumentationfunctionsaffected..TheCompletionTimesarethosefromthereferencedConditionsandRequiredActions. PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONSA.continued)45.'e',instrumentchannesitortheFunctipassivenatureoftheinstrument(noautomaticactionisassumedtooccureseinstrumenndthelowprobabi'neventrequiringPAMinstrume'uringt'nterval.ZeeConditionBapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionAarenotmet.ThisRequiredActionspecifiesinitiationofactionsinSpecification5.9.2.c,"SpecialReports,"whichrequireawrittenrepoapprovedbythe[onsitereviewcommittee],tobesubmittedtotheNRCimmediately.Thisreportdiscussestheyhsultsoftherootcauseevaluationoftheinoperability~andidentifiesproposedrestorativeactions.This~a'ctionisappropriateinlieu;ofashutdownrequirement~sincefalternativeactionsareidentifiedbefore.Yossoffunctionalcapability,andgiventhelikelihoodof,,Unitconditionsthat.wouldrequireinformatiorr;providedb+ythisinstrumentation.ConditionCapplieswhenone'rmoreFunctionshavetwoinoperablerequiredchanneTs(i.e.,twochannelsinoperableinthesameFunction).RequiredActionC.lrequiresrestoringonechanneli'ntheFunction(s)ytoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCompletionTimeof7Saysisbasedontherelativelylow.'probabilityofaneventQequiringPAMinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofglternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuouoperationwithtworequiredchannelsinoperableinaFunc'onisnotacceptablebe'causethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallper'formancequalificationrequirementsappiedtothePAMiystrumentation.Therefore,requiringrestorationofonei,noperablechanneloftheFunctionlimi,tstheriskthatthePAMFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludeshydrogenmonitorchannels.(continued)B3.3-134.'.($dt~fPf'/.Ll.rQl',m' Insert3.3.3.15B.lConditionBapplieswhenonerequiredchannelisinoperable.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneRCShotlegorcoldlegtemperaturechannel.ItalsoincludestheinoperabilityofoneSGMaterLevel(WideRange)channelinoneorbothSGs.RequiredActionB.lrequiresrestoringtheinoperablechanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.The30dayCompletionTime.isbasedonoperatingexperienceandtakesintoaccounttheremainingOPERABLEchannel(orinthecaseofaFunctionthathasonlyonerequiredchannel,othernon-RegulatoryGuide1.97instrumentchannelstomonitortheFunction),thepassivenatureoftheinstrument(nocriticalautomaticactionisassumedtooccurfromtheseinstruments),andthelowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentationduringthisinterval.CDC.lConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimesforConditionBisnotmet.ThisConditionrequirestheimmediateinitiationofactionstoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReporttotheNRC.Thisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheConditionisentered.Thisreportshalldiscusstheresultsoftherootcauseevaluationoftheinoperabilityandidentifyproposedrestorativeactionsoralternatemeansofprovidingtherequiredfunction.Thisactionisappropriateinlieuofashutdownrequirementsincealternativeactionsareidentifiedbeforelossoffunctional.capability,andgiventhelikelihoodofplantconditionsthatwouldrequireinformationprovidedbythisinstrumentation.Ifalternatemeansaretobeused,theymustbedevelopedandtestedpriortosubmittaloftheSpecialReport.D.1ConditionDapplieswhenaFunctionhastwoinoperablerequiredchannelsorwhenaFunctionhasoneinoperablerequiredchannelandnodiversechannelOPERABLE(i.e.,completelossofRCSHot'egTemperatureorRCSColdLegTemperatureFunctions).ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftwoSGWaterLevel(WideRange)tooneorbothSGs.ThisConditionreq'uiresrestoringonechannelintheaffectedFunctiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheCompletionTimeof7daysisbasedontherelativelylowprobabilityofaneventrequiringPANinstrumentoperationandtheavailabilityofalternatemeanstoobtaintherequiredinformation.ContinuousoperationwitheithertworequiredchannelsinoperableinaFunctionorcompletelossoffunctionisnotacceptablebecausethealternateindicationsmaynotfullymeetallperformancequalificationrequirementsappliedtothePANinstrumentation.Therefore,requiringrestorationofoneinoperablechanneloftheFunctionlimitstheriskthatthePAMFunctionwillbeinadegradedconditionshouldanaccidentoccur. Insert3.3.3.15(continued)E.landE.2IIfonechannelforFunction1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,or22cannotberestoretoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofCondition0,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.Condition0ismodifiedbyaNotewhichclarifiesthatthisConditionisnotapplicabletoFunctions7,10,and11.F.lIfonechannelforFunction7or10cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofCondition0,theplantmusttakeimmediateactiontoprepareandsubmitaSpecialReporttotheNRC.Thisreportshallbesubmittedwithinthefollowing14daysfromthetimetheactionisrequired.ThisreportdiscussesthealternatemeansofmonitoringReactorVesselWaterLevelandContainmentAreaRadiation,thedegreetowhichthealternatemeansareequivalenttotheinstalledPAMchannels,theareasinwhichtheyarenotequivalent,andascheduleforrestoringthenormalPAMchannels.Thesealternatemeansmusthavebeendeveloped'ndtestedandmaybetemporarilyinstalledinthenormalPAMchannel(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheallottedtime.

PAMInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS(continued)2S.t't.I+~Nfvlspiaytted@lgCondition'pplieswhentwohydroenmonitorchannelsareinoperable.requiresrestoringonehydrogenmonitorchanneltoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonablebasedonthebackupcapabilityofthePostAccidentSamplingSystemomonitorthehydrogenconcentrationforevaluationofcoredamageandtoprovideinformationforoperatordecisions.Also,itisunlikelythataLOCA~hichwould~~e.~wouldoccurduringthistime.n~s"Ntene~~CbnditionEapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionCorDarenotmet.RequiredActi'onE.IrequiresenteringtheappropriateConditionreferencedinTable3.3.3-1forthechannelimmediatelheapplicableConditionreferencedintheTableisunctionependentgEachtimeaninoperablechannelhasmetanyequiredAc+ionofConditionCor0,andtheassociated,CompletionTsmehasexpiredCon,ditionEis~nteredforthatchannelandpro%idesfortransfertothepropriatesubsequentCondit'ion.F.landF.2IftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionsCor0arenot.let'.andTable3.3.3-1directsentryintoConditionF,.%heuni't~mustbebroughttoaMODEwheretherequirements'fthisLCi3donotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theurn'ustbebrougtoatleastRQOE3within6hoursandMODE4within12hurs.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonae,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequireunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymanrandwithoutchallengngunitsystems.Athisunit,alternatemeansofmonitoringReactorYeselaterLevelandContainmentAreaRadiationhavebeen(continued)83.3-135gP5innailul~bpi4~,<~~.~'Re,Ogy28792Q

PANInstrumentationB3.3.3BASESACTIONS~S',t'hG.l(continued)deopedandtested.ThesealternatemeansetemporinstalledifthenormalPAannelcannotberestoredtoERABLEstatuswithieallottedtime.Ifthesealternatensareus,heRequiredActionisnottoshutdowntheun>athertofollowthedirectionsofSpecificationS.9.,inAdministrativeControlssectionofth7.ThereportvidedtotheNRCshoulddiscusstalternatemeansused,de'bethedegreetowhichtealternatemeansareequivalenttheinstalledPchannels,justifytheareasinwhichtheynotquivalent,andprovideascheduleforrestoringtnormPANchannels.SURVEILLANCE'EQUIREMENTSZ'0~su".a,ANotehasbeenaddedto@eSRTabletoclarifythatSR3.3.3.1andSR3.3,3.applytoeachPANinstrumentationFunctioninTable3.3.3-1.Z5aV,QZSV,ch,2S.v.th..SR3.3.3.1fPerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery31daysensuresthata'trumentationfailurehasnotoccurred.AHANNELCHECKiacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedontheassumptionthatinstrumentchannelsmonitoringthesameparametershouldreadapproximatelythesamevalue.Significantdeviationsbetweenthetwoinstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationofexcessiveinstrumentdriftinofhh1f~CHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itskeytoverifyingtheinstrumentationcontinuestooperateproperly'etweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.ThehighradiationinstrumentationshouldbecomparesimilaraH-instrumentslocatedthroughoutthe~.+d-criteriaaredeterminedbythecgjR'taff,basedonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertainties,includingisolation,indication,andreadability.IfachannelisoutsidetheC~criteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesignalprocessinequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.nes(continued)B3.3-136R PAMInstrumentation83.3.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSES.v.oSR3.3.3.1(continued)ar.ewitfiinThemchannel1ca1ontaAsspecifiedintheSR,aCHANNELCHECKisonlyrequiredforthosechannelsthatarenormallyenergized.TheFrequencyof31daysisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstratesthatchannelfailureisrare.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessformal,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.3.2<<aS,V.a.~s.i~ACHANNELCALIBRATIONisperformedeverymonths,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstomeasuredparameterwiththenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.isexcusroecalibrationmethodfsecifiedintBasesofheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingpi~i<<hi1idrefuelingcycle.isc.~MREFERENCES2.Regulatoryguide1.97,~~+.~ga<>3.NUREG-0737,Supplement1,"TMIActionItems."WO83.3-137Rev.

RemoteShutdownSysteB3.3.4B.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3.4.RemoteShutdownSystemBASESBACKGROUNDTheRemoteShutdownSystemprovidesthecontroroomoperatorwithsufficientinstrumentationandontrolstolaceandmaintaintheunitinasafeshutd.wnconditionomalocationotherthanthecontrolroym.Thiscabilityisnecessarytoprotectagai&tthepossibilitythatthecontrolroombecomesinaccess<fble.AsafeshutdownconditionisdefinedasMODE3.WittytheunitinMODE3,theA'qxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)Systemandthesteamgenerator(SG)safetyvalvesortheSGatmosphericdumpvalves(ADVs)canbeusedtoremovecoredecayheatandmeetallsafetyrequirements.ThelongtermsulyofwaterfortheAFWSystemandhhtheabilitytoboraetheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)fromoutsidethecontroroomallowsextendedoperationinODE3.Ifthecontrolroombecomsinaccessible,theoperatorscanestablishcontrol>attheremoteshutdownpanel,andplace.andmaintaintheunitiMODE3.Notallcontrolsandnecessarytransfer$wichesarelocatedattheremoteshutdownpanel.Soncontrolsandtransferswitcheswillhavetobeoperatedocallyattheswitchgear,motorcontrolpanels,orother1altations.TheunitautomaticallyreachesMODE3foowinaunitshutdownandcanbemaintainedsafelinHOD3foranextendedperiodoftime.TheOPERABILITYoftheremoeshutdowncontrolandinstrumentatifunctionsens'presthereissufficientinformationailableonselecedunitparameterstoplaceandmaintaitheunitinMODE3houldthecontrolroombecomeinaessible.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheRemoteShutdownSystemisrequiredtoprovideequipmentatapprPpriatelocationsoutsidethecorolroomwithacapabiJitytopromptlyshutdownandmainaintheunitinasafeonditioninMODE3.TheriteriagoverningthedesignandspecifisystemreqrementsoftheRemoteShutdownSystemareocatedin10FR50,AppendixA,GDC19(Ref.1).(cotinued)WOGSTSB3.3-138Rev.0,0928/92 RemoteShutdownSyste'3.3.4BASESAPPLICABLEeRemoteShutdownSystemisconsideredanimporntSAFETYANALYSEScotributortothereductionofunitrisktoacc'dentsand(continued)aschithasbeenretainedintheTechnicalecificationsasiicatedintheNRCPolicyStatement.tLCOTheRemoShutdownSystemLCOprovideseOPERABILITYrequiremetsoftheinstrumentationandcontrolsnecessarytoplaceamaintaintheunitinNODEfromalocationotherthan)econtrolroom.Theinsrumentationandcontrolstyp~allyrequiredarelistdinTable3.3.4-1intheaccompanygLCO.Reviewer'sNote.ForchannelstgtfulfillGDC19requirements,thnumberofOPEABLEchannelsrequireddependsuponthenitlicensinbasisasdescribedintheNRCunitspecificafetyEvaltionReport(SER).Generally,.twodiviionsareequiredOPERABLE.However,onlyonechannelpergiveryFunctionisrequirediftheunithasjustifiedsucaOsign,andNRC'sSERacceptedthejustification.Thecontrols,instrumention,andtransferswitchesarerequiredfor:~Corereactivityontrol(initialandlongterm);~RCSpressurectrol;~DecayheatreovalviatheWSystemandtheSGsafetyvalveorSGADVs;RCSinventycontrolviacharg'ngflow;andSafetysuportsystemsfortheabveFunctions,includinservicewater,componentoolingwater,andonsitepwer,includingthedieselnerators.AFunctionaRemoteShutdownSystemis0ERABLEifallinstrumentndcontrolchannelsneededtosuorttheRemoteShutdownSstemFunctionareOPERABLE.Insoecases,Table3.3-1mayindicatethattherequirediormationorcontrolcpabilityisavailablefromseveralalmatesources.Inthesecases,theFunctionisOPERABLaslong(coninued)WOGSTSB3.3-139Rev.0,09/28/2 RemoteShutdownSystemB3.3.4BASESLCO(continued)asonechannelofanyofthealternateinformatidnorntrolsourcesisOPERABLE.ThremoteshutdowninstrumentandcontrolircuitscoveredbythisLCOdonotneedtobeenergizedtbeconsideredOPERABLE.ThisLCOisintendedtoensurtheinstrumentsandcontrolcircuitswillbeOPERABLEiunitconditionsrequirethattheRemoteShutdownSystembeplacedinoperat'on.APPLICABILITYTheRemotehutdownSystemLCOysapplicableinMODES'1,2,and3.This,isrequiredsotha'ttheunitcanbeplacedandmaintainedin;MODE3foranetendedperiodoftimefromalocationother'hantheconolroom.ThisLCOisnotapplicablinMODE4,5,or6.IntheseMODES,thefacilibgisalreadysubcriticalandinaconditionofreduceRC$'nergy.Undertheseconditions,considerabletimeist,availabletorestorenecessaryinstrumentcontrolfuyctionsifcontrolroominstrumentsor.controlsbecomeunava'iable./~ACTIONSNote1isincluddwhicheeludestheMODEchangerestrictionofKO3.0.4.Thisexceptionallowsentryintoanapplicablegf)DEwhilereigingontheACTIONSeventhoughtheACTIONSmayeventuallyruireaunitshutdown.ThisexceptionisacceptablednetthelowprobabilityofaneventrequirpngtheRemoteShudownSystemandbecausetheequipmentcngenerallybereparedduringoperationwithoutsignificanriskofspurioustriNote2hsbeenaddedtotheACTIOStoclarifytheapplicat',nonofCompletionTimerule.SeparateConditionentryiPallowedforeachFunction1stedonTable3.3.4-1.TheCoppletionTime(s)oftheinoperalechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFjnctionwillbetrackedseparateforeachFunctionstart1ingfromthetimetheConditionwaenteredforthatFunction.(continued)MOGSTS83.3-140Rev.0,09/28/92

RemoteShutdownSystem83.3.4BASESACTIONS(continued)A.1CditionAaddressesthesituationwhereoneomorereiredFunctionsoftheRemoteShutdownSysmareinoerable.ThisincludesanyFunctionlistinTabl3.3.4-1,aswellasthecontrolandansferswitches.TheReuiredActionistorestorethereuiredFunctiontoOPERABLstatuswithin30days.TheCpletionTimeisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheowprobabilityofaneventthawouldrequireevacuationfthecontrolroom.B.landB.2IftheRequireActionandasociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAisntmet,thegnitmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOesnota)ply.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustbebughtoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12ours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,baseooperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditiosfromfullpowerconditionsinan.orderlymannerandwihutchallengingunitsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.4.1PerformanceofheCHANNELCHCKonceevery31daysensuresthatagrossfpilureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.ACHANNELCHECK/isacomparisono8,theparameterindicatedononechannelfoasimilarparametonotherchannels.Itisbasedonth4assumptionthatinstmentchannelsmonitoringthesameprametershouldreadappximatelythesamevalue;Significadeviationsbetweentheoinstrumentchannelscouldbenindicationofexcessiveistrumentdriftinoneoftheannelsorofsomethingevenmreserious.CHANNELCHECKwlldetectgrosschannelfailure,thus,itiskeytoverify'ngthattheinstrumentationcontiestooperatepropeybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION.Agrementcriteriaaredeterminedbytheun'taff,basedoncombinationofthechannelinstrumentunertainties,inudingindicationandreadability.Ifthehannelsarewihinthematchcriteria,itisanindicationthatthecnnelsareOPERABLE.Ifachannelisoutside'thematchontinued)WOGSTSB3.3-141Rev.0,09/28/92>' 4 ASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.3.4.1(continued)RemoteShutdownSysteB3.34IIIIcriteria,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensor'rthesignalproessingequipmenthasdriftedoutside'tslimit./AsspecificintheSurveillance,aCHANNEL<CHECKisonlyrequiredforthosechannelswhicharenormallyenergized.TheFrequencyof31daysisbaseduponperatingexperiencewhichdemonstratesthatchannelfailureisrare.Thechannelchecksupplementslessformal/butmorefrequent,checksofchannelduringnormalopefationaluseofthedisplaysassociatewiththeLCOrquiredchannels.SR3.3.4.2SR3.3.4.2verifieseachreqiredRemoteShutdownSystemcontrolcircuitandtrarisferswitchperformstheintendedfunction.Thisverificatlionisperformedfromtheremoteshutdownpanelandlocall.,asappropriate.Thiswillensurethatifthecontrolroombecomesinaccessible,the.unitcanbeplacedandjrtainainedinMODE3fromtheremoteshutdownpanelandthe'ocalicontrolstations.The[18]monthFrequency/isbased~ontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundert4econdittqnsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotehtialforan,unplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwit(thereactoratpower.(However,thisSurveillanceisnestrequiredtobeperformedonlyduringaurvitoutage.)OperatingexperiencedemonstratesthatremoteshutdownllcontrolchannelsusuallypasstheSurveillancetestwhenpeformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.SR3.3.4.CHANNELCLIBRATIONisacompletechecoftheinstrumentloopandthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondtoameasuredparameterwithinenecessaryrangeandaccracy.TheFrquencyof[18]monthsisbasedupon'operatingexper'enceandconsistencywiththetypical'industryrefueingcycle.WOGSTSB3.3-142(continued)\Rev\0,09/28/92

RemoteShownSystemB3.3.4BASESSURYEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.4.4SR3.3.4.4istheperformanceofaDOTevery18months.ThistestshoudverifytheOPERABITYofthereactor'tripbreakers(RTBs)openandclosedidicationontheremoteshutdownpanel,actuatingthRTBs.TheFrequencyof18monthswaschoenbecauseteRTBscannotbeexercisedwhilethefacilityisatpow.TheFrequencyisbaseduponoperatingexperiencandcosistencywiththetypicalindustryrefuelingotage.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,Appenix,GDC19.WOGSTSB3.3-143Rev.0,09/282 +?~4LOPDGStartInstrumentation83.3gB3.3INSTRUMENTATIONB3.3LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation2+owBASESBACKGROUNDza.;;;~TheDGsprovideasourceofoweriseitherunavailablealowsaeoperation.raeansrsaQlgtp,\emergencypowerwhenoffsiteorisinsufficientlystabletonervoagproossofvoltageordegradedZ-~.'s,ioolgeconditionoccursintheswitchyard.ThereartwoLOPsartsignals,oneforeach4.16kVvitalbus.Threeunervoltagerelayswithinversetimecharteristicsareproviedoneach4160ClasslEinstrumentbsfordetectinggsustaineddegradedvoltageconditinoralossofbusvolthge.Therelaysarecombinedintwo-out-of-teelogictogenerateanLOPs'gnalifthevoltageisbew75'.forashorttimeorblow90/foralongtime.TheOPstartactuationisdcribedinFSAR,Section8.3(Ref.1).TriSetpintsandAlwableValuesITheTripSetpointsusedtheraysarebasedontheanalyticallimitspresentinAR,Chapter15(Ref.2).TheselectionoftheseTripSepointsissuchthatadequate;protectionisprovidedwhenl.sensorandprocessingtime~delaysaretakenintoaccouTheactualnominalTriptpoinenteredintotherelaysisnormallystillmoreconrvativethanthatrequiredbytheAllowableValue.IftemeasuresetpointdoesnotexceedtheAllowableValue,herelayisonsideredOPERABLE.SetpointsadjustednaccordancewittheAllowableValueensurethatthecnsequencesofaccidntswillbeacceptable,prov'dingtheunitisopertedfromwithintheLCOsattheonstoftheaccidentandtttheequipmentfunctionsasdsigned.AllowableVuesand/orTripSetpointsareecifiedforeachFunctinintheLCO.NominalTripSetpo'ntsarealsospecifiedntheunitspecificsetpointcalcultions.Thenominalstpointsareselectedtoensurethattesetpointmeasurebythesurveillanceproceduredoesnotceedthe(continued)~466~i-B3.3-144g.K@imago<~c34cut-K~pl~ Insert3.3.4.1TheLOPDGstartinstrumentationconsistsoftwochannelsoneachofsafeguardsBuses14,16,17,and18(Ref.1).Eachchannelcontainsonelossofvoltagerelayandonedegradedvoltagerelay.Aone-out-of-twologicinbothchannelswillcausethefollowingactionsontheassociatedsafeguardsbus:a.tripofthenormalfeedbreakerfromoffsitepower;b.tripof-thebus-tiebreakertotheoppositeelectricaltrain(ifclosed);.c.shedofallbusloadsexcepttheCSpump,componentcoolingwaterpump(ifnosafetyinjectionsignalispresent),andsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters;andd.startoftheassociatedDG.Thedegradedvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoprotectEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)componentsfromexposuretolongperiodsofreducedvoltageconditionswhichcanresultindegradedperformanceandtoensurethatrequiredmotorscanstart.Thelossofvoltagelogicisprovidedoneach480VsafeguardsbustoensuretheDGisstartedwithinthetimelimitsassumedintheaccidentanalysistoprovidetherequiredelectricalpowerifoffsitepowerislost.Thedegradedvoltagerelayshavetimedelayswhichhaveinverseoperatingcharacteristicssuchthatthelowerthebusvoltage,thefastertheoperatingtime.Thelossofvoltagerelayshavedefinitetimedelayswhicharenotrelatedtotherateofthelossofbusvoltage.Thesetimedelaysaresettopermitvoltagetransientsduringworstcasemotorstartingconditions.

X7~aLOPDGStartInstrumentatioB3.3BASESBACKGROUNDTritpintsandAllowableValues(continued)AllowableVaiftherelayisperformingasrequired.IfthemeasuredsetntdoesnotexceedtheAllowableVatherelayisconsideOPERABLE.OperationwithripSetpointlessconservat)thanthenominalTrSetpoint,butwithintheAllowableVaisacceptprovidedthatoperationandtestingisconsiswitheassumptionsoftheunitspecificsetpointcalculEachAllowableValueand/orTripSetpointsp'ediseconservativethantheanalyticallimitsumedinthetra'entandaccidentanalysesinertoaccountforinstrutuncertaintiesappriatetothetripfunction.Thesuncertaintiesedefinedinthe"UnitSpecificRTS/ESSetpointodologyStudy"(Ref.3).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESR7+$ta~ca~~."tihTheLOPOgstartinstrumentationisrequiredfortheESFQSystemstofunctioninanyaccidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ItsdesignbasisisthatoftheESFActuationSystem(ESFAS).AccidentanalsescredittheloadingoftheDGbaseontheossofoffsiteowerdurinaossocooanapgAashistoricallyeenassocedwiththeESFASactuation.TheloadinghasbeenincdinthedelaytimeassociawitheachsafetysystemcompontrequiringDGsupplipowerfollowingalossofoffsiteer.Theanalysassumeanon-mechanisticDGloadswhichdsnotexplicitlyaccountforeachindividualcornnentflossofpowerdetectionandsubsequentactions.AtimedelayincludesontributifromtheDGstart,DGloading,andSafetynjection(SI)terncomponentactuation.ThersponseoftheDGtoaLOPmustbedemonstratedtfallwithinthisanalysissponsetimewhenincludingtcontributionsofallportionsothedelay.ThereredchannelsofLOPDGstartinstrumentatiinconjutionwiththeESFsystemspoweredfromtheDGs,prodeunitprotectionintheeventofanyoftheanalyzecidentsdiscussedinReference2,inwhichalossofoffsitepowerisassumed.(continued)B3.3-145p1-LA,'gtg11(LrfI~/g~009 Insert3.3.4.2UndervoltageconditionswhichoccurindependentofanyaccidentconditionsresultinthestartandbusconnectionoftheassociatedDG,butnoautomaticloadingoccurs.Insert3.3.4.3DesignBasisAccident(DBA).ThemostlimitingDBAofconcernisthelargebreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)whichrequiresESFSystemsinordertomaintaincontainmentintegrityandprotectfuelcontainedwithinthereactorvessel(Ref.2);Thedetectionandprocessingofanundervoltagecondition,andsubsequentDGloading,hasbeenincludedinthedelaytimeassumedforeachESFcomponentrequiringDGsuppliedpowerfollowingaDBAandlossofoffsitepower.ThelossofoffsitepowerhasbeenassumedtooccureithercoincidentwiththeDBAoratalaterperiod(40to90secondsfollowingthereactortrip)duetoagriddisturbancecausedbytheturbinegeneratortrip.Ifthelossofoffsitepoweroccursatthesametimeasthesafetyinjection(SI)signalparametersarereached,the'ccidentanalysesassumestheSIsignalwillactuatetheDGwithin2secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinanadditional10seconds(12secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursbeforetheSIsignalparametersarereached,theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillactuatetheDGwithin2.75secondsandthattheDGwillconnecttotheaffectedsafeguardsbuswithinan,additional10seconds(12.75secondstotaltime).IfthelossofoffsitepoweroccursaftertheSIsignalparametersarereached(griddisturbance),theaccidentanalysesassumestheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwillopenthefeederbreakertotheaffectedbuswithin2.75secondsandtheDGwillconnecttothebuswithinanadditional1.5seconds(DGwasactuatedbySIsignal).Thegriddisturbancehasbeenevaluatedbasedona140'FpeakcladtemperaturepenaltyduringaLOCAanddemonstratedtoresultinacceptableconsequences.ThedegradedvoltageandundervoltagesetpointsarebasedontheminimumvoltagerequiredforcontinuedoperationofESFSystemsassumingworstcaseloadingconditions(i.e.,maximumloadinguponDGsequencing).TheTripSetpointforthelossofvoltagerelays,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations:a.ActuatetheassociatedDGwithin2.75secondsasassumedintheaccidentanalysis;andb.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailableandduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.TheTripSetpointforthedegradedvoltagerelays,andassociatedtimedelays,havebeenchosenbasedonthefollowingconsiderations;a.Preventmotorssuppliedbythe480Vbusfromoperatingatreducedvoltageconditionsforlongperiodsoftime;and Insert3.3.4.3(continued)b.PreventDGactuationonmomentaryvoltagedropsassociatedwithstartingofESFcomponentsduringanaccidentwithoffsitepoweravailable,andduringnormaloperationduetominorsystemdisturbances.Therefore,thetimedelaysettingmustbegreaterthanthetimebetweenthelargestvoltagedroponthesafeguardsbusbelowthemaximumvoltagesettingandtheresetvalueofthetripfunction. BASESLOPDGStartInstrumentation0aIBS.S.IIISAFETYANALYSES(continued)equipmentince10secondDGdelay,andtheappropriatesequencingapplicable.TheresponsetimesforESFASacequiptt'CO3.3.2,"EngineereSafetyFeatctuationSystem(ESFASumentation,"inclueapproriateloadinandsequencinTheLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannelssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.8'26V~vud~a.a-WAPPLICABLE/TheeimesassumedinthesafetyanalrtheESPLCOZ~~Kth,CEE&~+)LJKSEsd~~l/0-e-suILtC@~WNV~~El'cq~LOPQ.requiresthatree]channelsperbusooe1beOPERABLhnDSI,2h'3and4whentheQS'DGsupports~saeyssemssociatedwiththeESFAS.InMODES5and6,emustbeOPERABLEwhenevertheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattheautomaticstartoftheDGisavailablewhenneeded.LossoftheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctioncouldresultinthedelayofsafetysystemsinitiationwhenrequired.This.couldleadtounaccetableconsequencesdurinaccidents.eossofoffsitepowereowtordrivenauxil>aterpu.iureofthesepumpstostartwouldleaveoe'rivenpump,aswellasanincreasentialforalossoferemovalthesecondarysystem.APPLICABILITY~~SEE4-TheLOPDGStartInstrumentationFunctionsarerequiredinMODES1,2,3,and4becauseESFFunctionsaredesignedtoprovideprotectionintheseMODES.ActuationinMODE5or6isrequiredwhenevertherequiredDGmustbeOPERABLEsothatitcanperformitsfunctiononanLOPordegradedpowertothe~bu~utACTIONSM)~\ththEM~Intheeventa'sTripSetpointisfound~~~~~nonconservativewithrespecttotheAllowableValue,orthehIIfdhhh,hI~h$8BHHKRmustheLCOConditionentered(continued')B3.3-146 Insert3.3.4.4TheLOPstartinstrumentationisconsideredOPERABLEwhentwochannels,eachcompromisedofonedegradedvoltageandonelossofvoltagerelaysareavailableforeach480Vsafeguardsbus(i.e.,Bus14,16,17,and18).EachoftheLOPchannelsmustbecapableofdetectingundervoltageconditionswithinthevoltagelimitsandtimedelaysassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheAllowableValuesandTripSetpointsforthedegradedvoltageandlossofvoltageFunctionsarespecifiedinSR3.3.4.2.TheAllowableValuesspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethosesetpointswhichensurethattheassociatedDGwillactuatewithin2.75secondsonundervoltageconditions,andthattheDGwillnotactuateonmomentaryvoltagedropswhichcouldaffectESFactuationtimesasassumedintheaccidentanalysis.TheTripSetpointsspecifiedinSR3.3.4.2arethenominalsetpointsselectedtoensurethatthesetpointmeasuredbytheSurveillancedoesnotexceedtheAllowableValueaccountingformaximuminstrumentuncertaintiesbetweenscheduledsurveillances.Therefore,LOPstartinstrumentationchannelsareOPERABLEwhentheCHANNELCALIBRATION"asleft"valueiswithintheTripSetpointlimitsandtheCHANNELCALIBRATIONandTADOT"asfound"valueiswithintheAllowedValuesetpoints.ThebasisforallsetpointsiscontainedinReference3. BASESLOPDGStartInstrumentationeR.RIFI~~,atl.ss.ACTIO~~(continued)Becauebasis,theopriate.ciiedonaperbuschbusonmaybeenteresepa~7~\ha~Ck~.3.'E.ANotehasbeenaddedintheACTIONStoclarifyeapplicationofCompletionTimerules.eoniionsors-pecificationmayeenere>ndependacFunctionliMs6d'heLCO.etionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannelunctionwillbetrackedseparatelachFunctions'romthetimetheC'nwasenteredforthatFunction.A.I2lnahh~I,vConditionAappliestotheLOPDGstartFunctionwithonechannelperbusinoperable.~~(Bonechanneliipninoperable,RequiredActionA.1requiresthatchanneltobeplacedintripwithin6hours.With~hannelintlap,theLOPDGstartinstrumentationchannes.Hniguredtoprovideaone-out-of-%bentogictoinitiateatripoftheincomingoffsitepower.~<pQ6upto4-hour~forsurveillancetestingofotherchannefs.Thisallowanceismadewherebypassinqth~hanneldoesnotcauseanactuationandwhe're--atgearttwootherchannelsaremonitoringthatparameter...="ThespecifiedAompletionTimeandtimeallowedforbypassing/onechanne1arereasonableconsideringtheFu'nctionremain~fullyOPERABLEoneverybusandthelowprobabil'ity~7~iVConi'plieswhenmorethanonelossofvoltageo~'.morethanoneedvoltagechannelonasin~Msisinoperable.RequiredActionB.Irequiro'nechanneltoOPERABLEstatus.hourCompletion'houldallowampletimeA~epairmostfailuresandtakesiaccount(continued)~BCSVSB3.3-147PQQinnCi.~~n'd'orfi~r~R.,09/28/92

Insert3.3.4.5ThisNotestatesthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeach480Vsafeguardsbus.Insert3.3.4.6fortherespectivebus.TheremainingOPERABLEchanneliscomprisedofone-out-of-twologicfromthedegradedandlossofv'oltagerelays.AnyadditionalfailureofeitherofthesetwoOPERABLErelaysrequiresentryintoConditionB.

BASESLOPDGStartInstrumentation33.3.PACTIONSZ).tv'1(contid)theloprobabilityofaneverequiringanLOPstaroccringduringthisinterl.c~~~~>t~~4ccEC~m~4m~t3~.1ploYPle&+Condition@appliestoe5i3MtheLOPDGstartFunctionwhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA~arenotmettl&I+IonditionsspecifiedinLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-8p~~,"orLCO3.8.2,"AC,"fortheDGmadeinoperablebyfailureoftheLOPDGstartinstrumentationihifLdfdqcompensatoryactionstoassureuglysafet.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.3.5.1PerfoanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresthataossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.:ACHANNELCKisacomparisonoftheparameterindiedononechannelasimilarparameteronotherchas.Itisbasedontheasmptionthatinstrumentchansmonitoringthesameparametehouldreadapproximaythesamevalue.Significantdeviatiobetweenthetwnstrumentchannelscouldbeanindicationexcessivnstrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofsominenmoreserious.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgrschannelfailure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingthatthe'nstentationcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeeachCHALCALIBRATION.Agreementcriteriaredeterminedbythunitstaff,basedonacombinatiorfofthechannelinstrumentncertainties,includingin+>cationandr'eadability.Ifannelisoutsidethematchcriteria,itmaybeanindicaonthatthesensoror'thesignalprocessingequipmenthasdriedoutsideitslimit.ThFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.Thus,performanceftheCHANNELCHECKensuresthatundetectedovertchanne(continued)B3.3-148R Insert3.3.4.8TheSurveillancesaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethat,whena-channelisplacedinaninoperablestatussolelyforperformanceofrequiredSurveillances,entryintoassociatedConditionsandRequiredActionsmaybedelayedforupto6hours,providedtheassociatedFunctionmaintainstripcapability.UponcompletionoftheSurveillance,orexpirationofthe4hourallowance,thechannelmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusortheapplicableConditionenteredandRequiredActionstaken.ThisNoteisbasedonassumptionthat4hoursistheaveragetime-requiredtoperformchannelsurveillance.Basedonengineeringjudgement,6hourtestingallowancedoesnotsignificantlyreducetheprobabilitythattheLOPDGstartinstrumentationwilltripwhennecessary.

LOPOGStartInstrumentationB3.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSW7~IISk3M.5.1(continued)failureislimiters.TheCHANNELCHECKsupplementslessfal,butmouent,checksofchannelsdurin.ormaloperationaluseodisplaysassociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.2-7~)is.c.cLISR3.3..SR~~istheerformanceofaTADOT.Thetestcheckstrievicesthatprovideactuationsignalsdirectly+oseuim.rthesetests,thereayTripSetpoi.ntsareverifiedand.adjustedasnecessary.eFrequencyisbasedonteliabilityoftherelaysandcontrolsnthe'lreunanaasbeenshowntobeacceptaethroughoperatingexperience.0.5.3Z.ia>sTisSRensurestheindividualchannelLOPDGIstrumentationactuationresponsetimesarelessthoreqaltothemaximumvaluesassumedintheacciP4tanasis.ResponsetimetestingacceptancecteriaareincludinTechnicalRequirementsManual,ection15(Ref.4.ESFRESPONSETtestsareconductonan[18]monthSTAGGEREDTESTBASThe[18]nthFrequencyisconsistentwiththety'lreclingcycleandisbasedounitoperatingexperience,wchshowsthatrandomfailureofinstrumentationcomponcausingseriousresponsetimdegradation,butnotch6nelilure,areinfrequentoccurrences.SR3.~il'lhsCSR3.3.5.4isthepeoaCHANNELCALIBRATION.1Thes',aswellastherespooalossofvtageadegradedvoltagetest,shallinclue'point(continued)B3.3-149R

Insert3.3.4.9SR3.3.4.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery24'onths,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.Thevoltagesetpointverification,aswellasthetimeresponsetoalossofvoltageandadegradedvoltagetest,shallincludeasinglepointverificationthatthetrip-occurswithintherequiredtimedelay.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonoperatingexperienceconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycleandisjustifiedbytheassumptionofa24month,calibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagnitudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis. LOPDGStartInstrumentationB3.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSK+eAXa+SR3.3.5.4(continued)verificionthatthetripoccurswithintherequiredtimedelay,asowninReferencel.ACHANNELCALIBIONisperformedever8]months,orapproximatelyatevrefueling.NNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheitrumeoop,includingthesensor.Thetestverifiesthattheannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenessarngeandaccuracy.TheFrequencyo~f8]monthsisbasedocratingexperienceandconsistencywiththetypical>stryrefuelingcycleandisjustifiedbytheassumptionfan[18]monthcalibrationintervalinthedeterminationofthemagni'tudeofequipmentdriftinthesetpointanalysis.REFERENCES1.QSAR,Sectio~n8.3~2.QUAR,Chapter+15$-.3.ecnacaequiremensanua,Times."B3.3-150 Insert3.3.4.10RGSEDesignAnalysis'A-,EE-93-006-08,"480VoltUndervoltageRelaySettingsandTestAcceptanceCriteria."

ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6B3.3INSTRUNTATIONB3.3.6ContainmntPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentat'closestheecontainmentisolationvalvesintheMin'urgeSystemand'heShutdownPurgeSystem..Thisactiisolatesthecontainmentatmospherefromtheenvironmentominimizereleasesofradioactivityintheeventofanccident.TheMiniPurgeSystemmaybeinuseduringreacroperationandtheShutdownPurgeSystemwillbeinuseththereactorshutdown.Containmentpurgeandexhaustisolatinalsoinitiatesonanautomaticsafety>yjection(SI)sig1throughtheContainmentIsolati"on-PhaseAFution,orbymanualactuationofPhaseA/Isolation.heBasesforLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuionSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"discssthesothermodesofinitiation.Fourradiationmonitoring,cnnelsarealsoprovidedasinputtothecontainmentrgeandexhaustisolation.Thefourchannelsmeasurecoinmentradiationattwolocations.Onechannelscontainmentareagammamonitor,andtheotherthreemesureradiationinasampleofthecontainmentpurgeexust.Tthreepurgeexhaustradiationdetectorsreofthrdifferenttypes:gaseous,particulate,andidinemonitorAllfourdetectorswillrespondtomosteentsthatreleeradiationtocontainment.Hoever,analyseshvenotbeenconductedtodemonstratethaallcredibleevenwillbedetectedbymorethanoneonitor.Therefore,rthepurposesofthisLCOthefoulhannelsarenotconsidredredundant.Instead,tharetreatedasfouroneout-of-oneFunctions.Sincethergeexhaustmonitorsconsttuteasamplingsystem,viouscomponentssuchassampelinevalves,sample1'heaters,samplepumps,andfltermotorsarerequiretosupportmonitorOPERABILITY.Eachfthepurgesystemshasinnerandoutrcontainmentisoltionvalvesinitssupplyandexhaustcts.Ahighradationsignalfromanyoneofthefourchnelsinitiatesc'ainmentpurgeisolation,whichclosesbotinnerandtercontainmentisolationvalvesintheMiniPurgeSystemndtheShutdownPurgeSystem.TheMiniPurgeystemmaybecontinued)WOGSTSB3.3-151IRev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumenation3.3.6BASESBACKGROUND(continued)inuseduingreactoroperationandtheShutdoqdPurgeSystemwilbeinusewiththereactorshutdown.Thesesystemsar'escribedintheBasesforLCO3.P.3,"ContainmetIsolationValves."TheContaigmentPurgeIsolationdiationMonitoringInstrumentatnonisolatesthecontainmentatmospherefromtheenvironmerrttominimizereleasesofadioactivityintheeventot'naccident.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetyanalsesassumethattheontainmentremainsintactwithpenegrationsunnecessaforcorecoolingisolatedearlyigtheevent,with'pproximately60seconds.Theisolationofthpurgevalveshasnotbeenanalyzedmechanistcallyinthedosecalculations,althoughitsrapidisolationisassume.ThecontainmentpurgeandexhaustisolationraiationnitorsactasbackuptotheSIsignaltoensureelopingofhepurgeandexhaustvalves.Theyare.alsotheprimarycansforautomaticallyisolatingcontainmentintheevetfafuelhandlingaccidentduringshutdown.Containmentolationinturnensuresmeetingthecontainmentleakageratassumptionsofthesafetyanalyses,.andensuresthattheclatedaccidentaloffsiteradiologicaldosesarbeow10CFR100(Ref.1)limits.TheContainmentPureandEhaustIsolationinstrumentationsatisfiesCriterio3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheLCOrequirementsensurethatheinstrumentationnecessarytoi.nitiateContainmenPurgeandExhaustIsolation,litedinTable3.3.61,isOPERABLE.1.Manual/Initiation/TheLCOrequirestwochannels0ERABLE.TheoperatorcariinitiateContainmentPurgeIolationatanytimebysingeitheroftwoswitchesithecontrolroom.EifherswitchactuatesbothtrainThisactionwillcauseactuationofallcomponentsthesamemannera~sanyoftheautomaticactuationsnals.TheLCOforManualInitiationensurestheproper/amountofredundancyismaintainedinhemanualWOGSTS83.3-152(continued)~~Rev.0,09/28/92 dddB3.3.6BASESLCOMaualInitiation(continued)iactu'ationcircuitrytoensuretheoperatorhaszmanualiniti'.ationcapability.Eachchannelconsistsofonepushbuttonadtheinterconectingwiringtotheactuation1giccabinet.2.3.AutomaticActuationLoicandActuatiRelasTheLCOrequirestwotrainsofAutoticActuationLogicandActbationRelaysOPERABLtoensurethatnosinglerandomailurecanpreventautomaticactuation.AutomaticActuationLogicandtuationRelaysconsistof,thesamefeat'resandopereinthesamemannerasdescribedforESFSFunction.b,SI,andESFASFunction3.a,ContinmentPaseAIsolation.TheapplicableMODESanspeciiedconditionsforthecontainmentpurgeilatinportionoftheseFunctionsaredifferentandlerstrictivethanthosefortheirPhaseAisolatinandSIroles.If.oneormoreoftheSIorPhaseAiolationFunctionsbecomesinoperableinsuchaanerthatonlytheContainmentPurgeIsolationFunioisaffected,theConditionsapplicabletotheirSIaPhaseAisolationFunctionsneednotbeenter.ThelessrestrictiveActionsspecifiedforinoperabilitoftheContainmentPurgeIsolationFunctinsspecifysufficientcompensatorymeasuresforthiscase.IContainmentadiation/..TheLCOspe'cifiesfourrequiredcannels'fradiationmonitorst6ensurethattheradiatonmonitoring-instrumentationnecessarytoinitiaeContainmentPurgeIslationremainsOPERABLE.Forsayplingsystems,channelOPERABILYinvolvesmore$hanOPERABILITYofthechanneleletronics.OPERABILITYmayalsorequirecorrectvalvlineups,sampepumpoperation,andfiltermotoropation,aswellasdetectorOPERABILITY,ifthesesupp'ingI(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-153Rev.0,09/28/92

~~~~i~,IIIII~~~I~~~~~II'~~I~II~~,.I~II~~I~~g~~,~~~I~III~II~~~I~it~g~I~I~~~-i'~~~~~~~~~~~,~~~~~~~~II~~I~~I,I~'II~~~I~~~~~~~~~III~~II~~I~II~II~IIIIII~I~~I'II~II~I

~2.R.'iContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESACTIONS(continued)ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONStoclarifytheapplycationofCompletionTimerules.TheConditionofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredindependentlyforeachFuncti,onlistedinTable3.3.6-1.TheCompletionime(s)oftheinbperablechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFunctiowillbetracked~separatelyforeachFunctionstartingromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.ConditionAappliestothefailureofonecontainmentpurgeisolationradiationmonitorchannel.Sincethefourcontainmentradiationmonitorsmearedifferentparameters,failureofasinglechannelmayrultinlossoftheradiationmonitqringFunctionfocertainevents..Consequently,th'efailedcharmmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.The4hoursllowedtorestoretheaffectedchannelijustifiebythelowlikelihoodofeventsoccurringduingthiinterval,andrecognitionthatoneormoreofthermainigchannelswillrespondtomostevents.8.1Condition8appliesoallontainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationFunctionandaddssesthetrainorientationoftheSolidStatePotectionStern(SSPS)andthemasterandslaverelaysforheseFunctis.Italsoaddressesthefailureofmultileradiationnitoringchannels,ortheinabilitytorestoreasinglefaledchanneltoOPERABLEstatusinthetimeallowedforReuiredActionA.l.Ifatrainiinoperable,multiplehannelsareinoperable,ortheRequredActionandassociateCompletionTimeofConditionarenotmet,operationmacontinueaslongastheRequiedActionfortheapplicableonditionsofLCO3.6.ismetforeachvalvemadeinerablebyfailureofisolaioninstrumentation.ANote'saddedstatingthatConditionBisnlyapplicableinMODl,2,3,or4.(ctinued)MOGSTSB3.3-155Rev.0,028/92

ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESACTIONS(continued)C.1CnditionCappliestoallContainmentPurgeandaustIolationFunctionsandaddressesthetrainorieationofthSSPSandthemasterandslaverelaysforteseFuntions.Italsoaddressesthefailureofultipleradi'ationmonitoringchannels,ortheinab'tytorestoreasingl'efailedchanneltoOPERABLEstatus'nthetimeallowedforRe'quiredActionA.l.Ifatrainisnoperable,multiplechannel'sareinoperable,ortheRequirdActionandassociat'edCompletionTimeofCondit'Aarenotmet,operationmaycontinueaslongasteRequiredActionto'laceandmaintaincontainmentpueandexhaustisolationvalvesintheirclosedpositionsmetortheapplicableConditionsog,LCO3.9.4,"ContnmentPenetrations,"aremetforeachvalve,madeinoperablbyfailureofisolationinstrumentationeTheCompletionTimefortheseRequiredActionsisImmediately.ANotestatesthatCond'onCisapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSandduringovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincoainment.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSANotehasbeenddedtotheSRTabletoclarifythatTable3.3.6-1dtermineshichSRsapplytowhichContainmentPugeandExhastIsolationFunctions.SR3.3.6.1/PerformanceoftheCHANNELCHEonceevery12hoursensuresthatapressfailureofinstrumtationhasnotoccurredA.CHANNEL'CHECKisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatedononeeh/noeltoasimilarparameteonotherchannels.Itisbased/ontheassumptionthatinstrmentchannelsmonitoringthegameparametershouldreadapprximatelythesamevalue.SigpificantdeviationsbetweenthetoinstrumentchannelscoNdbeanindicationofexcessiveistrumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofsomethingevenmreserious.ACANNELCHECKwilldetectgrosschannelfailure;thus,itiseytoverifyingtheinstrumentationconinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachCHANNELCALIBRATION(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-156Rev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationB3.3.6BASESSURYEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.36.1(continued)Agreemencriteriaaredeterminedbytheunitstaff,baseonacombinationofthechannelinstrumentuncertaintiesincluding';indicationandreadability.Ifachannelisoutsidethematchcriteria,itmaybeanindicationttthesensororthesignalprocessingequipmenthasdrifteoutsideitslimit.TheFrequency.,isbasedonoperatingexperienceatdemonstrateschannelfailureisrare.Thus,rformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKensuresthatundetectedovrtchannelfailureislimit'edto12hours.TheCHANNCHECKsupplementsless(ormal,butmorefrequen,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationalusethedisplaysassociatedwiththe'COrequiredcharms.SR3.3.6.2SR3.3.6.2istheperfoanceoanACTUATIONLOGICTEST.Thetrainbeingtestedipplacdinthebypasscondition,.thuspreventinginadvertegtuation.Throughthesemiautomatictester,allsiblelogiccombinations,withandwithoutapplicableperisives,aretestedforeachprotectionfunction.Inddtion,themasterrelaycoilispulsetestedforcontintylty.ThisverifiesthatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEa6thereisanintactvoltagesignalpathtothemasterreaycoils.Thistestisperformedevery31daysonaSAGGEREDTETBASIS.TheSurveillanceintervalisjustifipdinWCAP-1071-P-A,Supplement2,Rev.I(Ref.2).SR3.3.6.3SR3.3.6.3itheperformanceofaMTERRELAYTEST.TheMASTERRELATESTistheenergizingothemasterrelay,verifyingntactoperationandalowoltagecontinuitycheckoflieslaverelaycoil.Uponmaterrelaycontactoperatio,alowvoltageisinjectedtoheslaverelaycoil.Tisvoltageisinsufficienttopikuptheslaverelay,utlargeenoughtodemonstratesigalpathcontinity.Thistestisperformedevery3daysonaSTAGGEDTESTBASIS.TheSurveillanceintevalisjust'edinReference2.continued)WOGSTSB3.3-157Rev.0,09/28/9 ContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationInstrumentationjB3.3.9'ASESSURVEILLANCEREqUIREHENTS(continued)SR3..6.4ACOTisperformedevery92daysoneachrequired/channeltoensurethentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.TheFrequencyisbasedonthestaffrecommendationforincreasingtheavailabilitofradiationmonitorsaccordingtoNUREG-1366(Ref.3).~histestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidethecontainmentpurgeandexhaustsystem/isolation.Thesetpointshall.beleftconsistentwiththecurrentunitspecificcalibrationproceduretolerace.TheFrequencyisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftmonitoringequipmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablthroughoperatingexperience.SR3.3.6.5SR3.3.6.5istheperformaeofaSLAVERELAYTEST.TheSLAYERELAYTESTisthetergizingoftheslaverelays.Contactoperationisve'fiedinoneoftwoways.Actuationequipmentthatmaybeocratedinthedesignmitigationmodeiseitherallowedtofnc4ionorisplacedinaconditionwheretherelayconttoperationcanbeverifiedwithoutoperationoftheeqipment.T,ActuationequipmentthatmaynotbeoperatedinhedesigmitigationmodeispreventedfromoperationbyheSLAVERLAYTESTcircuit.Forthislattercase,conctoperationisverifiedbyacontinuitycheckofthecipcuitcontainingtheslaverelay.Thistestisperformedevery[92]days.eFrequencyisjustifiedinReference2./SR3.3.6.SR3.3.6.istheperformanceofaTAT.ThistestisacheckoftheManualActuationFunctionandisperformedevery[8]months.EachManualActuatiFunctionistestedupto,andincluding,themasterrelaycils.Insomeinstaes,thetestincludesactuationoftheenddevice(i.e.,pumpstarts,valvecycles,etc.).ThtestalsoincludestripdevicesthatproviideactuationsnalsdirectlytotheSSPS,bypassingtheanalogprocessntrolequipment.Forthesetests,therelaytripsetpointsareverifiedandadjustedasnecessar.TheWOGSTSB3.3-158(ontinued)Rev.0,0/28/92 ~)~~~~I~~II~'II~III~~~s~~~~~~~~~IIIII~~~~~~~I.~~ &~Ms,FActuationInstrumentationB3.3a<tation3.3.W~NSTRUMENTATIONControlRoomEmergencyInstrumentationR.irTiceSystem(SIIEFS)Actuationnthe~eprovidesanenclosedcontrolroomenvironmfromwhltheunitcanbeoperatedfollowinganunconledreleasfradioactivity.Duringnormaloperon,theAuxiliaryildingVentilationSystemprov'controlroomventilation.onreceiptofanactuat'ignal,theCREFSinitiatesfiltereventilationandssurizationofthecontrolroom.ThisternisdeibedintheBasesforLCO3.7.10,"ControlRoomesencyFiltrationSystem."Theactuationinstrumetioncistsofredundantradiationmonitorstheairintaandcontrolroomarea.AhighradiationgnalfromanyoftedetectorswillinitiatebothainsoftheCREFS.ThecrolroomoperatorcaalsoinitiateCREFStrainsbymalswitchesinthecrolroom.TheCREFSisalsoactuateasafetyinjec'(SI)signal.TheSIFunctionisdiscusseinLCO.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemFAS)Instrumentation."3ofaryforIial.'LEINALYSESeepastablefortheoperatorssta'edthereduringaccidentrecoveryandpostaccidentoperateTheCREFSactsoterminatethesupplyofunfiltdoutsideairtothecontrooom,initiatefiltration,dpressurizethecontrolroom.eactionsarenecesytoensure'hecontrolroomiskeptha'blefortheratorsstationedthereduringaccidentrecoandpaccidentoperationsbyminimizingtheradiationeseofcontrolroompersonnel.InMODESI,2,3,andheradiationnitoractuationoftheCREFSisabacfortheSIsignalaation.ThisensuresinitiatoftheCREFSduringalosfcoolantaccidentoramgeneratortuberupture.TherlationmonitoractuationoftheCREFSinMODE5a6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieisetistasle(continued)ed)B3.3-160galeg~~~4!f4Rev.0092892 Insert3.3.5.3Thetrainconsistsofonepushbuttonandtheinterconnectingwiringtotheactuationlogic.Insert3.3.5.4Actuationlogicconsistsofallcircuitryhousedwithintheactuationsystem,includingtheinitiationrelaycontactsresponsiblefotactuatingtheGREATS.

cPcs.Q~ActuationInstrumentationB3.3.~5BASESLCO2.-Automa'ctuationLoican(continued}~uationRelasrestrictivegallonsspec'orinoperabilityoftheCREFSFuoetionsspecifysufficieensatorymeasuresforthiscase.3.ControlRoomRadiationE~35~+~~Vt0-mosphereRadiaMonitorsandtworequiredControlRoomAirIntakeRa'ationMonitorstoensurethattheradiationmonitoringstrumentationnecessarytoinitiateCREFSremainsPERABLE.Forsamplingsyst'ems,channelOPERABTYinvolvesmorethanOPERABILITYiofchannelectronics.OPERABILITYmayalsoruirerrectvalvelineups,samplepumpoperation,firmotoroperation,detectorOPERABILITY,'hesupportingfeaturesarenecessaryfortripoccuruertheconditionsassumedbythestyanalyses.4.~fRrtoLCO3.3.2,FunctionI,forallinititingunctionsandrequirements.APPLICABILITYTeunctionsmustbeOPERABLEinMODESan&duringCONSandmoveirradiatedfuelassemblies.TheFunctionsbeOPERABLEinMODES[5and6]whenreurawastegasenkruptureaccidenensureahabitableenvironmentforontroloerators.ACTIONSZ"t.V'ii+.Themostcommoncauseofchannelinoperabilityis~ipsefailureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesufficienttoexceedthetoleranceallowedbythspecificcalibrationprocedures.Typically,thedriftisfoundtobesmallandresultsinadelayofactuationrather(continued}B3.3-162 Insert3.3.5.5TheLCOspecifiessinglechannelsofiodine(R-38),noblegas(R-36),andparticulate(R-37)oftheControlRoopIntakeMonitorstoensurethattheradiationmonitoringinstrumentationnecessarytoinitiatetheCREATSfiltrationtrainandisolationdampersremainsOPERABLE.Insert3.3.5.6InMODESI,2,3,and4,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocontroloperatorexposureduringandfollowingaDesignBasisAccident.InMODE5or6,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationisrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofawastegasdecaytank.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theCREATSactuationinstrumentationmustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.

ActuationInstrumentationB3.3~~BASESACTIONS(continued)Ke~VI'leCkI~~I~QM~+go~M@%4cknc~3.3,S-Ithanatotallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymadeduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whentheprocessinsttationissetupforadjustmenttobringitifii~IPChTip5tpi"&'l%g'1if'idbhlibprocedure,hechannelmusteecareinoperaimmediatelyandtheappropriateConditionentered.ANotehasbeenaddedtotheACTIONSindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachFunction.TheConditionsofthisSpecificationmaybeenteredsindependentlyforeachFunctionlistedinTable3.3.&lintheaccompanyingLCO.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechanne/train~ofaFunctionwillbetrackedseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthetimetheConditionwasenteredforthatFunction.M'l.Vi'iA.londitionAappliestoeactuationlogictrainFunctionoera)onmonitorchannelFunctions,andaualJveau~jrainisinoperable,oroneradiationmonitorchannelisinoperableinoneormoreFunctions,7daysarepermittedtorestoreittoOPERABLEstatus.The7dayComtionTimeisthesameasisallowedifonetrainofmechanicalportionofthesystemisinoperableebasisforthisCompletionTimeisthesamea.ovidedinLCO3.7.10.If)thechannel/traincannot..berestore'd4oOPERABLEstatus,one'REFStrainmustbep'1acedintheemergencyradiationprotectionmode-ofoperation.Thisaccompl'ishestheactuationin'strumentationFunctionandplacestheunitinaconservativetionTheRequiredActionforConditionAismodifiedy"'aNotethatrequires~lacingoneCREFStrainintoxicgasprotectionmodein~cadofthe[radinprotection]modeofoperationifthea~maticsfertotoxicgasprotectionmodeisinoperThisensurestheCREFStraiisplacedinthemosonservatiodeofoperationrelativetothePHNBILITYoftheasiatedactuationinstrumentn.(continued)83.3-163 Insert3.3.5.7oneormoreFunctionswithoneormorechannelsoftheCREATSactuationinstrumentationinoperable.Ifoneormoreradiationmonitorchabnels,themanualinitiationtrain,ortheautomaticactuationlogictrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithinIhourorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisConditionforthemanualinitiationtraininoperableoraradiationmonitorchannelinoperable,theremainingCREATSactuationinstrumentationisadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbuttheactuationtimeorresponsivenessoftheGREATSmaybeaffected.InthisConditionfortheautomaticactuationlogictraininoperableorallradiationmonitorchannelsinoperable,theCREATSisnotcapableofperformingitsintendedautomaticfunction.Thisisconsideredalossofsafetyfunction.TheCREATS,however,maystillbecapableofbeingplacedinCREATSNodeFbymanualoperatoractions.TheIhourCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoautomaticallyisolatethecontrolroomorbemanuallyisolatedbytheoperator.TheRequiredActionforConditionAismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24hours.Thisallowsfreshair'akeup.toimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod.

~M=A~)QKFSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.V~BASESACTIONS(continued)2Bo$l'lB.l.18.1.2andB.2Conion8appliestothefailureoftwoCREFSactuatitrains,woradiationmonitorchannels,ortwomanualchannels.ThefirstRequiredActionistoplaceonCREFStrainintheergency[radiationprotection)moofoperationimme'ely.ThisaccomplishestheuationinstrumentationFutionthatmayhavebeenstandplacestheunitinaconsertivemodeofoperati.TheapplicableConditionsaRequiredActisofLCO3.7.10mustalsobeenteredfortCREFStrnmadeinoperablebytheinoperableactuationinsmention.ThisensuresappropriatelimitsareplaceduptraininoperabilityasdiscussedintheBasesforLCO.7.Alternatively,bothtrainsaybeplace'ntheemergency[radiationprotection]de.ThisensureseCREFSfunctionisperformedveninthepresenceosinglefailure..TheRequiredAconforConditionBismodifiedbyatethatrequireslacingoneCREFStraininthetoxicgas.protectionodeinsteadofthe[radiationprotection]modeofopera'oniftheautomatictransfertotoxicgasprotec'onmodeisinoperable.ThisensurestheCREFStrainisplcedinthemostconservativemodeofoperationreivetotheOPERABILITYoftheassociatedactuationstrumentation.C.-andC.ConditionplieswhentheRequiredActionandass'dCompletionTimerConditionAorBhavenotbmetandtheunitisinMOD2,3,or4.Theu'stbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLequiremearenotapplicable.Toachievethisstatus,theuustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandMODE5inurs.TheallowedCompletionTimesaresonable,basedoperatingexperience,tortherequiredunitconinsfromfullpowercond'nsinanorderlymannerandwithouchallengunitsystems.(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-164Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.3.5.8B.1andB.2Condition8applieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetandtheplantisinHODEI,2,3,or4.TheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEthatminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.lC.2andC.3ConditionCapplieswhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAhasnotbeenmetinHODE5,or6,orduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.Actionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorestoretheinoperablechannel(s)ortraintoOPERABLEstatustoensureadequateisolationcapabilityintheeventofawaste,gasdecaytankrupture.MovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesandCOREALTERATIONSmustalsobesuspendedimmediatelytoreducetheriskofaccidentsthatwouldrequireCREATSactuation.Thisplacestheplantinaconditionthatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementoffuelorothercomponentstoasafeposition. CCEA.CgglActuationInstrumentationB3.3'~BASESACTIONS.(continued)D.landD.2onditionDapplieswhentheRequiredActionandciatedCletionTimeforConditionAorBhavenotenmetduriCOREALTERATIONSorwhenirradiatuelassembliesarebemoved.MovementofirradifuelassembliesandCOREALTTIONSmustbesuspendimmediatelytoreducetheriskofaceststhatwouldquireCREFSactuation.E.1ConditionEplieswhentRequiredActionandassociatedCompletioimeforConditionorBhavenotbeenmetinMODE5r6.Actionsmustbeini'edtorestoretheinorabletrain(s)toOPERABLEstatu'immediatelytoensureequateisolationcapabilityintheeveofawastegasdecaytankrupture.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSL~'Vat.MANoteha~beenaddedtotheSRTableto'clarifythat.Table3.~1determineswhichSRsapplytowhichActuationFunctions.QQ~SRZ.'E:olPerformanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12hoursensuresagrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnotoccurred.CHANCHECKisacomparisonoftheparameterindicatenonechanto~asimilarparameteronotherchannel.Itisbasedonthesumptionthatinstrumentchannelsonitoringthesameparametshouldreadapproximatelyesamevalue.Significantdeviatiobetweenthetwoiumentchannelscouldbeanindicationexcessiveirumentdriftinoneofthechannelsorofsome'emoreserious.ACHANNELCHECKwilldetectgroshannelfailure;thus,itiskeytoverifyingtheinstrntatcontinuestooperateproperlybetweeneachNELCALIBON.Agreementcrite'redeterminedbytheun'taff,basedonacombinonofthechannelinstrumentunctainties,includiindicationandreadability.Ifacharmisouts'hematchcriteria,itmaybeanindicationatte(continued)+Ra6B3.3-165g~+<fAmt/' ~c.n.-@KBActuationInstrumentationB3.3.~BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR.7.1(continued}sensororthealprocessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimit.TheFrequencyisbasedonopexperiencethatdemonstrateschannelfa'israre.hus,performanceoftheCHANNELCHECKresthatundetectertchannelfailureisli'dto12hours.TheCHANNELsupplemelessformal,butmorefrequent,checkschasduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplayssociatedwiththeLCOrequiredchannels.-~.l,SR3.3~~UACOToncee'very92daysoneachrequirechanneltoensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.ThistestverifiesthecaabilityoftheinstrumentationtoprovidetheQggBcuation.esetpointsshallbeleftconsistentwiththeqrFPtspec~sccalibrationproceduretolerance.TheFrequencyhsaseonqz..theknownreliabilityofthemonitoringequipmentandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.3.s.s.w3.3.7.3istheperformanceofanACTUATIONLOGICTEST.1Theainbeingtestedisplacedinthebypassconditionthuspentingina'dvertentactuation.Throughthesemiautoma'ester,allpossiblelogiccombinats,withandwithoutap'cablepermissives,aretesteoreachprotectionfunctioInaddition,themasrelaycoilispulsetestedforcontity.ThisverifsthatthelogicmodulesareOPERABLEandreisan'actvoltagesignalpathtothemasterrelaycoistestisperformedevery31daysonaSTAGGEREDTASIS.TheFrequencyisjustifiedinWCAP-10271-P-Aupplemt2,Rev.1(Ref.1}.SR3.3.7.4SR3.3.7.4iseperformanceofaMASTERRELAYTES.TheMASTERRELTESTistheenergizingofthemasterrela,verifyincontactoperationandalowvoltagecontinuity(continued}DOG-S~B3.3-166 0 Insert3.3.5.9SR3.3.5.2ThisSRistheperformanceofaTADOToftheHanualActuationFunctionsevery24months.TheHanualActuationFunctionis'testedupto,andincluding,themasterrelaycoils.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheknownreliabilityoftheFunctionandtheredundancyavailable,andhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.TheSRismodifiedbyaNotethatexcludesverificationofsetpointsbecausetheHanualInitiationFunctionhasnosetpointsassociatedwiththem. CR.FM~@KActuationInstrumentationB3.3.~BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.3.7.4(continued)checkoftheslaverelaycoil.Uponmasterrelacontactoperation,alowvoltage'sinjectedtotheslerelayoil.Thisvoltageisinsufficienttopicktheslaverlay,but,largeenoughtodemonstratesignp'athcotinuity.Thistestisperformedevery+1daysonaSTAGEREDTESTBASIS.TheFrequencyisustifiedin1Refeencel.ISR3.37.5SR3.3.7.istheperformancefaSLAVERELAYTEST.TheSLAVERELATESTistheenerzingoftheslaverelays.Contactope<ationisverifidinoneoftwoways.ActuationequipmentthKmaybeopetedinthedesignmitigationMODEiseitheralloedtofuntionorisplacedinaconditionwheretherelayontacoperationcanbeverifiedwithout'operationofthequiment.ActuationequipmentthatmaynotbeoperatedinedesignmitigationMODEispreventedfromoperationbySLAVERELAYTESTcircuit.Forthis.lattercase,contctoperationisverifiedbyacontinuitycheckoftheciuitcontainingtheslaverelay.Thistestisperformedeery[92]Bays.TheFrequencyisjustifiedinReferencel.SR3.3.7.6SR3.3.6istheperformanceof,TADOT.ThistestisacheckoftheManualActuationFun&ionsandisperformedever[18]months.EachManualActuationFunctionistestedupo,andincluding,themasterrelcoils.Insomeintances,thetestincludesactuatiooftheenddevice.e.,pumpstarts,valvecycles,etc.ThetestalsoincludestripdevicesthatrovideactuationsignalsdirectlytotheSolidStateProtecionSystem,bypassingtheanalogprocesscontrolequipmt.Forthesetests,therelaytripsetpointsareverifiedndadjustedasnecessary.TheFrequencyisjustifiedinRefeencel.(continued)B3.3-167 +Ra\+ActuationInstrumentation83.3.MsBASESSR3.3.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continuedACHANNELCALIBRATION'very~months,orapproximatelyateveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.~0Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstoameasured.parameternecessaryrangeandaccuracy.REFERENCESF'~<~~<+.B3.3-168 FBACSActuationInstruentationB3.3.8B3.3INSTRUHETATIONB3.3.8FuelBuiingAirCleanupSystem(FBACS)ActuationnstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDTheFCSensuresthatradioactiveaterialsinthefuelbuildiatmospherefollowingafu1handlingaccidentoralossofoolantaccident(LOCA)aefilteredandadsorbedpriortoexhaustingtotheenvirnment.ThesystemisdescribedintheBasesforLCO.7.13,"FuelBuildingAirCleanupSytern."Thesystemiitiatesfilteredventilationofthefuelbuildingautomatiallyfollowingreceiptofahighradiatinsignal(gaseosorparticulate)orasafetyinjection(S5)signal.Iniiationmayalsobeperformedmanuallyasnededfromthmaincontrolroom.Highgaseousanparticulteradiation,eachmonitoredbyeitheroftwomon'tors,rovidesFBACSinitiation.EachFBACStrainisiniiatebyhighradiationdetectedbyachanneldedicatedttattrain.Thereareatotaloftwochannels,oneforeatrain.Eachchannelcontainsagaseousandparticulemonitor.HighradiationdetectedbyanymonitororanSs'gnalfromtheEngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationystm(ESFAS)initiatesfuelbuildingisolationandstarstheFBACS.Theseactionsfunctiontopreventexfiltrat'onofcntaminatedairbyinitiatingfilteredventila'on,whiimposesanegativepressureonthefuelbuildi.Sinceeradiationmonitorsincludeanairsamplingsytern,varioucomponentssuchassamplelinevalves,sampleineheaters,amplepumps,andfiltermotorsarerequiredtsupportmonitOPERABILITY.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheFBACSesuresthatradioactivmaterialsinthefuelbuildingamospherefollowingafuehandlingaccidentoraLOCAare,f'lteredandadsorbedpriotobeingexhaustedtotheenvirnment.Thisactionreducestheradioactivecontent'nthefuelbuildingexhaustllowingaLOCAorfuelhanlingaccidentsothatoffsiteosesremainwithinthelim'tsspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.I).TheFBCSactuationinstrumentationsatisiesCriterion3oftheNRPolicyStatement.OGSTSB3.3-169(continued)Rev.,09/28/92/ FBAC$ActuationInstrumentationB3.3.8ASES(continued)COThe0requirementsensurethatinstrumentionnecessarytointiatetheFBACSisOPERABLE.TwochanelsoftheFBACSManualInitiaion,twotrainsofAutomatiActuationLogicandActuatioRelays,andtwochannelsofeachFuelBuildingRadiaonMonitorarerequiredPERABLEtoensureautomat'solationandinitiationoffilteredventilationFBACSactuationinstrumenttionisOPERABLEwhen1channelandtraincomponentsecessarytoprovideFBACSactuationsignalarefunctionaldinservice.OnlytheTripSetpointisspeifiedforeachFBACSFunctionintheLCO.heTripSetpoitlimitsaccountforinstrumentuncertainties,whicharedeinedintheUnitSpecificSetpointCalibtionProceure(Ref.2).APPLICABILITYThemanualandauomat'BACSActuationInstrumentation,trainsmustbeOPEBinMODES[I,2,3,and4]andwhenmovingirradiatedassembliesinthefuelbuilding,toensuretheFBACSopatestoremovefissionproductsassociatedwithleageafteraLOCAorafuelhandlingaccident.HighradiationitiatonoftheFBACSisalsorequiredinMODES[I,2,3,nd4]oremovefissionproductscausedbypostLOCAEmergncyCoreCoolingSystemsleakage.TheradiationfuncionsmustalsobeOPERABLEinanyMODEduringmovementofiradiatedfuglassembliesinthefuelbuildingtoensureautmaticinitiagionoftheFBACSwhenthepotentialfoafuelhandlinaccidentexists.WhileinMOES5and6withoufuelhandlinginprogress,theFBACSinstrumentationneenotbeOPERABLEsincethepotentialforradioactivereleaesisminimizedandmanualoperatoractionissufficienttpreventoffsitedoselimitsfrombeigexceeded.ACTIONSThestcommoncauseofchannelinerabilityisoutrightfailreordriftofthebistableorocessmodulesuficienttoexceedthetolerancealowedbyunitspecificcal'brationprocedures.Typically,thdriftisfoundtobe(continued)OGSTSB3.3-170Rev.0,09/28/92

FBACSActuationInstrumentat'onB.3.8BASESACTIONS(continued)a+mallandresultsinadelayofactuationraerthana6)tallossoffunction.ThisdeterminationisgenerallymageduringtheperformanceofaCOT,whetheprocessinstrumentationissetupforadjustmentobringitwithinspeci'fication.IftheTripSetpointisessconservativethantetolerancespecifiedbythecaibrationprocedure,thechaelmustbedeclaredinoperaeimmediatelyandtheapproprieConditionentered.ANotehaseenaddedtotheACTIStoclarifytheapplicationfCompletionTimeres.TheConditionsofthisSpecifitionmaybeenterdindependentlyforeachFunctionlistdinTable3.3.8IintheaccompanyingLCO.TheCompletionTime(s)oftheinoperablechannel(s)/train(s)ofaFunctionw'llbetrackeseparatelyforeachFunctionstartingfromthtimetheonditionwasenteredforthatFunction.A.lConditionAappliesttheactuationlogictrainfunctionof.theSolidStateProtcionSystem(SSPS),theradiationmonitorfunctions,dhemanualfunction.ConditionAappliestothefairefasingleactuationlogictrain,radiationmonitorhanne,ormanualchannel.Ifonechannelortrainsinopeable,aperiodof7daysisallowedtorestoeitto0ERABLEstatus.IfthetraincannotberestoedtoOPELEstatus,oneFBACStrainmustbeplacedinoeration.ThaccomplishestheactuationinstrumentatifunctionandplacestheunitinaconservativePodeofoperatio.The7dayCompletionTimeisthesamesisallowedifoetrainofthemechanicalportionofhesystemisinopeble.ThebasisforthistimeisthsameasthatproviddinLCO3.7.13.8.1.1.1.2B.2Condit'onBappliestothefailureftwoFBACSactuationlogicrains,tworadiationmonitorsortwomanualchanls.TheRequiredActionistolaceoneFBACStraininoerationimmediately.Thisaccomlishestheactuationinsrumentationfunctionthatmayhavebeenlostandplacesthunitinaconservativemodeofopeation.TheapplicableConditionsandReRniredActinsofLCO3.7.13(continued)OGSTSB3.3-171Rev.0,09/28/92 FBACSA'ctuationInstrumentatzo83.3AS'ESACTIONSB.l.18.1.2B.2(continued)ustalsobeenteredfortheFBACStrainmainoperablebyteinoperableactuationinstrumentation.hisensuresaropriatelimitsareplacedontrainiperabilityasdiussedintheBasesforLCO3.7.13.Altenatively,bothtrainsmaybepledintheemergency[raditionprotection]mode.ThissurestheFBACSFunctinisperformedevenintheresenceofasinglefailurC.l'onditionapplieswhenthRequiredActionandassociated~CompletionimeforConditonAor8havenotbeenmetandirradiatedelassembliearebeingmovedinthefuelbuilding.HvementofiradiatedfuelassembliesinthefuelbuildingustbesspendedimmediatelytoeliminatethepotentialforventstatcouldrequireFBACSactuation.D.landD.2ConditionDappliwhentheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeoronditionAor8havenotbeenmetandtheunitisinODE2,3,or4.TheunitmustbebroughttoaHODEinwichtheLCOrequirementsarenotapplicable.Toachievethsstatus,theunitmustbebroughttoHODE3within6housandHODEwithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionimesarereasable,basedonoperatingexperiencetoreachthereuiredunitconditionsfromfullpowercontionsinanordermannerandwithoutchallengigunitsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSANothasbeenaddedtotheSRTabtoclarifythatTabl3.3.8-1determineswhichSRsalytowhichFBACSActutionFunctions.(continued)MOGSTS83.3-172Rev.0,/28/92

~zo.,FBACSActuationInstrumentationB3.3.8BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)3.3.8.1PeormanceoftheCHANNELCHECKonceevery12rsensuresthaagrossfailureofinstrumentationhasnooccurred.ACHANLCHECKisacomparisonoftheparametindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameteronotherchannels.Itisbasedotheassumptionthatinstrumentcnnelsmonitoringthesamparametershouldreadapproximelythesamevalue.Significntdeviationsbetweenthetwonstrumentchannelscouldbenindicationofexcessiveistrumentdriftinoneofthechanelsorofsomethingevemoreserious.ACHANNELCHCKwilldetectgrosschnnelfailure;thus,itiskeytoveriyingtheinstrumentaoncontinuestooperateproperlybeeeneachCHANNELCIBRATION.Agreementcrieriaaredeternedbytheunitstaff,based'nacombinatsnofthechaelinstrumentuncertainties,includingindiationandrdability.Ifachannelisoutsidethemathcriteri,itmaybeanindicationthatthesensororthesinalproessingequipmenthasdriftedoutsideitslimi.~TheFrequencyisbsonoperatingexperiencethatdemonstrateschannefailureisrare.Thus,performanceoftheCHANNELCHECKuresthatundetectedovertchannelfailureislimitet12hours.TheCHANNEICHECKsupplementslessform1,butmorefrequent,checksofchannelsduringnormaloperationaluseofthedisplaysassociatedwittheLCOrequiredchannels.SR3.3.8.2ACOTisprformedonceeve92daysoneachrequiredchannel.tensuretheentirechannelwillperformtheintendedfunction.ThistestverifiesthecapabilityoftheinstrumtationtoprovidetheFBACSactuation.Thesetpoisshallbeleftconsistntwiththeunitspecificcalibrtionproceduretolerance.TheFrequencyof92daysisbaedontheknownreliabilitofthemonitoringequientandhasbeenshowntobacceptablethroughopertingexperience.(continued}WOGSTSB3.3-173Re.0,09/28/92 ~so,,FBACSActuationInstrumentationB3.3BASESSURVEILLANCREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.3.8.3SR3.3.8.3'istheperformanceofanACTUAONLOGICTEST.Theactuationlogicistestedevery31dsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.Allpossiblelogiccombinions,withandithoutapplicablepermissives,aretstedforeachpotectionfunction.TheFrequencysbasedontheknownreiabilityoftherelaysandcontlsandthemultichannelrendancyavailable,andhasbeeshowntobeacceptablethrghoperatingexperience.SR3..8.4SR3.3..4istheperformnceofaTADOT.Thistestisacheckothemanualacttionfunctionsandisperformedevery[1months.Eamanualactuationfunctionistestedupto,anincluding,hemasterrelaycoils.Insomeinstances,thetest'ludesactuationoftheenddevice(e.g.,pumstarts,valvecycles,etc.).TheFrequencyisbasedonopratingexperienceandisconsistentwiththetypicalindtryefuelingcycle.SR3.3.8:5ACHANNELCAIBTIONisperformedevery[18]months,orapproximateyatveryrefueling.CHANNELCALIBRATIONisacompletececkofheinstrumentloop,includingthesensor.Thetestvrifiestatthechannelrespondstoameasuredparameterwithinthenecessaryrangeandaccuracy.TheFrequencisbasedonoperatingexperienceandisconsistentwiththtypicalindusryrefuelingcycle.REFERENCES1.0CFR100.11.2.UnitSpecificSetpointCalibrationProcedure.WOGSTB3.3-174v.0,09/28/92 BDPSB3.3.983.3INSTRUHENTATIO83.3.9BoronDilutionrotectionSystem(BDPS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeoftheBDPSistomitigetheconsequencesoftheinadvertentadditionounboratedprimarygrewaterintotheReactorCoolntSystem(RCS)whentherectorisinashutdowncondion(i.e.,HODES2,3,4,and5).TheBDPSutil'zestwochannelsofsrcerangeinstrumentati.EachsourcerangchannelprovidesasignaltobothtrainsoftheBDPSAunitcomputerisusedtocontinuouslrecordthecounperminuteprovidedbythesesignals.ttheendofchminute,analgorithmcomparesthecoutsperminutvalue(fluxrate)ofthatIminuteintervawiththecuntsperminutevalueforthepreviousnine,Iinuteintrvals.IfthefluxrateduringaIminuteintervaisgrterthanorequaltotwicethe'luxrateduringaofepriornineIminuteintervals,theBDPSprovidesasig1toinitiatemitigatingactions.Upondetectionofauxdoublingbyeithersourcerangeinstrumentation,traianalarmissoundedtoalerttheoperatorandvalveovmentisautomaticallyinitiatedtoterminatethediluionndstartboration.Valvesthatisolatetherefueingwterstoragetank(RWST)areopenedtosupply2000pmboratdwatertothesuctionofthechargingpumps,andvalvewhichisolatetheChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVC)areclosedtoterminatethedilution.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheBDPSensesabnormalincreaesinsourcerangecountsprminute(fluxrate)aactuatesCVCSandRWSTvalvesomitigatetheconsequensofaninadvertentborondilutineventasdescribedinFS,Chapter15(Ref.I).TheacidentanalysesrelyonautoaticBDPSactuationtomitiatetheconsequencesofinadvetentborondilutioneves.TBDPSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.GSTS83.3-175(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 e BDPSB3.3.9BASES(contiued)LCOCO3.3.9providestherequirementsforOPERABILITYfthestrumentationandcontrolsthatmitigatethecoequencesoaborondilutionevent.TworedundanttrainsrereiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovideprotectionainstsinglefaire.BecauetheBDPSutilizesthesourcerangenstrumentationasitsdetectionsystem,the.OPERABILITYfthedetectionsystem'salsopartoftheOPERABILITYtheReactorTripSystem.Thefluxdoublingalgorithm,ealarms,andsignalsothevariousvalvesallmusbeOPERABLEforeachtraininhesystemtobeconsidereOPERABLE.APPLICABILITYThe'BDPSmusbeOPERABLEinHES[2],3,4,and5becausethesafetyalysisidentifiethissystemastheprimarymeanstomititeaninadverentborondilutionoftheRCS.TheBDPSOPERABLITYrequrementsarenotapplicableinHODE[S]I[andbecausaninadvertentborondilutionwouldbeterminaedbysourcerangetrip,atriponthePowerRangeNeutrnFx-High(lowsetpointnominally25%RTP),orOvertmraturehT.TheseRTSFunctionsarediscussedinLCO3..I,"RTSInstrumentation."InHODE6,adiluioeventisprecludedbylockedvalvesthatisolatetheCSfromthepotentialsourceofunboratedwater(accordintoL03.9.2,"UnboratedMaterSourceIsolationValvs").TheApplicablityismoifiedbyaNotethatallowstheborondilutonfluxdoubingsignaltobeblockedduringreactorstrtupinHODESand3.BlockingthefluxdoublingignalisacceptleduringstartupwhileinHODE3,rovidedthereacttripbreakersareclosedwiththeintnttowithdrawrodsforstartup.ACTIONSTheostcommoncauseofchanneinoperabilityisoutrightfaureordriftofthebistableorprocessmodulesficienttoexceedthetolerancallowedbytheunitecificcalibrationprocedure.'Kgpically,thedriftis'undtobesmallandresultsina;delayofactuationratherthanatotallossoffunction.Thideterminationof(continued)MOGSTSB3.3-176Rev.0,09/28/92 BDPSB3.3.9BASESACTIONS(continued)setpointdriftisgenerallymadeduringtheperforanceofaCOTwhentheprocessinstrumentationissetupfdjustmenttobringittowithinspecification.IftheTriptpointislessconservativethanthetoleraespecifiedbthecalibrationprocedure,thechannelmubedeclaredinoerableimmediatelyandtheappropriateonditionented.A.1WithoneainoftheBDPSOPERABL,RequiredActionA.lrequirestattheinoperabletraimustberestoredtoOPERABLEsttuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingthBDPStrainisadeuatetoprovideprotection.The72hourmpletionTimeibasedontheBDPSFunctionandisconsisntwithEnginredSafetyFeatureActuationSystemCompletonTimesforossofoneredundanttrain.Also,theremaiingOPERABEtrainprovidescontinuousindicationofcoepowertatustotheoperator,hasanalarmfunction,adsenasignaltobothtrainsoftheBDPStoassuresyternctuation.B.lB.2.1B.2.2.andB.2.2.2Withtwotrains'peble,ortheRequiredActionandassociatedComption'meofConditionAnotmet,theinitialaction(RequireActionB.l)istosuspendalloperationsinolvingposivereactivityadditionsimmediately.Thisincludwithdrawalofcontrolorshutdownrosandintentio1borondilution.ACompletionTimeof1ourisprovided'restoreonetraintoOPERABLEstatus.AsanaternatetorestoringotraintoOPERABLEstatus(RequiedActionB.2.1),RequirActionB.2.2.1requiresvalvelistedinLCO3.9.2(RequredActionA.2)tobesecuedtopreventtheflowofunoratedwaterintotheRCS.OncitisrecognizedthattwotransoftheBDPSareinperable,theoperatorswillbeaareofthepossibilityoaborondilution,andthe1hourompletionTimeisequatetocompletetherequirementofLCO3.9.2.RequiredActionB.2.2.2accompaniesReiredActionB.2.2.1toverifytheSDHaccordingtoSR3.1.1.within1hourand(continued)WOGSTSB3.3-177Rev.0,09/28/92 9BDPSB3.3.9BASESACTIONSkB.lB.2.18.2.2.1andB.2.2.2(coinued)oceper12hoursthereafter.ThisackupactionisinendedtoconfirmthatnounintededborondilutionhasocrredwhiletheBDPSwasinopable,andthatthereqiredSDHhasbeenmaintaine.ThespecifiedCompletionTimetakesintoconsiderationfficienttimefortheinits1determinationofSDMdotherinformationavailableinthcontrolroomrelatedoSDH.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSTheBDPSrainsaresub'tto=aCOTandaCHANNELCALIBRATIO.SR3.3.9.1SR3.3.9.1req'rtheperformanceofaCOTevery[92]days,toerethateachtrainoftheBDPSandassociatedtriptpointsarefullyoperational.Thistestshallincludeeriicationthattheborondilutionalarmsetpointisealorlessthananincreaseoftwicethecountratew'ina0minuteperiod.TheFrequencyof[92]daysiconsisttwiththerequirementsforsourcerangechanlsin-MCA-10271-P-A(Ref.2).SR3.3..2SR3.39.2istheperformaceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery[18]onths.CHANNELCALITIONisacompletecheckoftheinstrmentloop,includingesensor.Thetestverifiesthatthechannelrespondstomeasuredparameterwithinthenecssaryrangeandaccuracy.FortheBDPS,theCHANNELCAIBRATIONshallincludeveriicationthatonasimulatedoactualborondilutionfluxdblingsignalthecntrifugalchargingpumpsuctiovalvesfromtheESTopen,ndthenormalCVCSvolumecontrotankdischargevalvesloseintherequiredclosuretimef<20seconds.TheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingperienceandconsistencywiththetypicalindustryrefuelingcycle.MOGSTSB3.3-178(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 BDPSB3.3.9BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.SAR,Chapter[15].2.WP-10271-P-A,Supp1ement2,Revision1,une1990.GSTSB3.3-179Rev.0,09/282 1,lC1-SPll ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentDChapters3.4-3.6VolumeVl 1,I1/lI'r,ah Ocs.R&stPressure,Temperature,andFlowDHBLimits3.4.13.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsLCO3.4.1Z2,Lt.RCSDNBparametersforpressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,.andRCStotalflowrate"shallbewithinthelimitsspecified~e~e-,~~~<p.ressurizerpressure>[2200]s'b.RCSaverage"ure<[581]'F;andctotalflowrate>[28,m.,/APPLICABILITY:MODE1.fsrm.to,sawsMVMPSausm,+NOTEPressurizerpressurelimitdoesnotapplydurin:Q2alta.THERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminute;orb.THERHALPOWERstep>10%RTP,ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME.A.OneormoreRCSDNBparametersnotwithinlimits.A.lRestoreRCSDNBparameter(s)towithinlimit.2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletion'imenotmet.B.lBeinHODE2.~s,!6hoursI3.4-1 0-4>>'l/kPtft, RVSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits3.4.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.1.1Veriressurizerpressureis~sNh.A'~s~t.+tw~Co~.12hoursSR3.4.1.2VerifRCSaveragetemperatureis03'Z.l.t.~s+4<<'LtoA.Mt.R.s12hoursI+Ra'IvSR3.4.1.3erflowrateiours32+VvmsA<A+4tSR3.4.1~-NOTE4&/equiredtobeperformeafter>/RTP.VerifytotalflowrateisRCS~monthssI~Ii2/3.4-2 ~~I~~~3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.23.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalitySRcLCO3.4.2EachRCSloopaveragetemperature(T,,)shallbe>F.APPLICABILITY:MODE1,MODE2withk)>1.0.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMECR'o+'~A.T,~inoneoRCSloopsnotwithinlimit.A.1BeinMOD~Zw.WV.~~'l.030minutes3.4-3 RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality3.4.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.2.1VerifyRCST.,ineachloop>(PPFT'SVo'thinl5intespriotoachivscriicaliD-----NOTE------Onlyreuiredrefa1010lowT,~alar<~,~,~d>~set.@ganyRCSlooT.,<@47'~a~3.4-4 RCSP/TLimits3.4.33.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsLCO3.4.3RCSpressure,RCStemperature,andRCSheatupandcooldownratesshallbemaintainedwithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.APPLICABILITY:Atal1times.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME---------NOTE---------ARequiredActionA.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetinMODEI,2,3,or4.A.lANDA.2Restoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.30minutes72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.AND8.2BeinMODE5withRCSpressure'+00~psig.6hours36hours(continued)3.4-5 RCSP/TLimits3.4.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEC.---------NOTE---------RequiredActionC.2shallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.RequirementsofLCOnotmetanytimeinotherthanHODEI,2,3,or4.C.IANDC.2Initiateactiontorestoreparameter(s)towithinlimits.DetermineRCSisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.ImmediatelyPriortoenteringHODE4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.3.1NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedduringRCSheatupandcooldownoperationsandRCSinserviceleakandhydrostatictesting.VerifyRCSpressure,RCStemperature,aridRCSheatupandcooldownratesarewithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTLR.I30minutes3.4-6 RCSLoops-MODE&Ca@~3.4.4CBLCO3.4.43.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.4RCSLoops-HOORBIl~")g.gg,A=aP~RCSloopsshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MOD@l.~~+ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsofLCOnotmet.A.lBeinMODPaPoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.4.lVerifyeachRCSloopisinoperation.,12hours3.4-7 RCSLoops-MODE83.4.53.4REACTORCOOLAOJULOEbPaf~g~~~~as~TO'wa~~4'.4.5RCSLoops-3o~heepz~~ia.a~rdvw>LCO3.4.5+TwoPRCSloopssha11beOPERABLE~and~a.CSloopsshallbeinoperationwhenControlSys'ableofr'wal;orb.OneRCa1beinoperationRodControlsemisnotcapableoftodwithdrawal.NOTE-~reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedfor<1hour-per8hourperiodprovided:a~NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.~OC~S<~9.S'V~~~a,2.o.~hAPPLICABILITY:89@3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.neinoperable.CSloopA.1Restorereu'RABLEsahoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE4.12hours(continued)'0WOGSTS3.4-8Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.4.6A.OneRCSloopinoperable.------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1VerifySDHiswithinlimitsspecifiedintheCOLR.Onceper12hoursANDA.2RestoreinoperableRCSlooptoOPERABLEstatus.72hours RCSLoops-QQ@33.4.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Oner'dRCSloopnotinopera'ndreactortripbreakerclosedandRodControlSystemcapableofrodwithdrawal.C.1ORC.2RestorerequiredRCSlooptooperatiDe-energizcontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDMs).ur1hour4.PwCS1oopsinoperable.ORNoRCSloopinoperation.AND4".2ANDS.3De-energizeallCRDMs.SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRCSlooptoOPERABLE'statusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCE~(s.SR3.4.5.1VerifyrequiredRCSloop@~>inoperation.FRE(UENCY12hours(continued)WOGSTS3.4-9Rev.0,09/28/92 RCSLoops-33.4.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.5.2Verifysteamgeneratorsecondarysidewaterlevelsare>.forRCSloops.~o12hoursSR3.4.5.3Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.7daysWOGSTS3.4-10Rev.0,09/28/92 eFeRCSLoop's-NODE43.4.6,3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4LCO3.4.6$~S~~Od'+schM~<-roP~4~~a~W~~fKaCaAc<Twoloopsconsistingofanycombinati,onofRCSloopsandresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneloopshallbeinoperation.-NOTES1.Allreactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)andRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfor<1hourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10eFowsaturationtemperature.e2.NoRCPshallbestartedwithayRCScoldlegtemperatureunless'.esecondary'r'"wateraboveeachoftheRCScoldleg~teateratures:orAPPLICABILITY:MODE4.@~M~<<~~~voKu~is~+Capo,h~l).ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.One'CSloopinoperabe.ANDA.l-InitiateactiontorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABIEstatus.ImmediatelyTwoRHRloopsinoperable.(continued)3.4-11 '~A)o-<~~9-~heatQ,.)(Su+t~iWa3dlP~R-~LoapgRCSLoops-MODE43.4.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.One'HRloopinoperabe.ANDTwo'CSloopsinoperabe.8.1BeinMODE5.24hoursC.<+~~RCS~RHRloopsinoperable.ORC.1SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.ImmediatelyNoRCSorRHRloopinoperation.ANDC.2InitiateactiontorestoreonelooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.6.1VerifyoneRHRorRCSloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.6.2VerifSGsecondarysidewaterlevel~~+0'.forrequiredRCSloo~loe.12hours(continued)3.4-12 RCSLoops-MODE43.4.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.6.3Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredpumpthatisnotinoperation.7days3.4-13 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.73.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledLCO3.4.7Oneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation,andeither:a~b.OneadditionalRHRloopshallbeOPERABLE;orovtcThesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleastgwePSteamgenerator9-(SGgshallbe>1&NOTES-TheRHRpumpoftheloopinoperationmaybede-'energizedfor<lhourper8hourperiodprovided:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausereductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleastl0'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.'Q,itPMXSvs~~Vtitsdwadt.'Wat%t<aa~r(.~8roi~2.OnerequiredRHRloopmaybeinoperablefor~+2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.3.NoreactorcoolantpumpshallbestartedwithoneorreRCScold1egtemperatures'nle~ss:tite'econdarysidewater'emperatiireofeacSGis<Of'F.aboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures,~r4.AllRHRloopsmayberemovedfromoperationduringplannedheatuptoMODE4whenatleastoneRCSloopisinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSloopsfilled.MS~~as-~~~3.4-14 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.ANDLqiGssecondarys)ewaterlevelsnotwithinlimits.A.1ORA.2InitiateactiontorestoreasecondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontorestorerequiredSGsecondarysidewaterlevelstowithinlimits.ImmediatelyImmediately~OB.~HRloopsinoperable.ORNoRHRloopin.operation.B.1ANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS'URVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.7.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.12hoursSR3.4.7.2VerifSGsecondarysidewaterlevelis'nrequiredSGep-12hours(continued)3.4-15 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled3.4.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.7.3VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentandindicatedpowerareavailabletotherequiredRHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7days3.4-16 RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.83.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)3.4.8RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsNotFilledLCO3.4.8Tworesidualheatremoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLEandoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.NOTES1.AllRHRpumpsmaybede-energizedfor<15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanotherprovided:~W't~.o+~Zarenutletg'tempenatunesmaintaineMdR.0'belowsaturationtemperature~~;NooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcauseareductionoftheRCSboronconcentration;~c.NodrainingoperationstofurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumearepermitted.2.OneRHRloopmaybeinoperablefor<2hoursforsurveillancetestingprovidedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.APPLICABILITY:HODE5withRCSloopsnotfilled.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneRHRloopinoperable.A.1InitiateactiontorestoreRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately(continued)3.4-17 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled3.4.8ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETION.TIMEB.3't.xxHRloopsinoperale.ORNoRHRloopinoperation.B.1ANDB.2SuspendalloperationsinvolvingreductioninRCSboronconcentration.InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCESR3.4.8.1VerifyoneRHRloopisinoperation.FREQUENCY12hoursSR3.4.8.2Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentand~~~indicatedpowerareavailabletothepR~I5~~@RHRpumpthatisnotinoperation.7days3.4-18 Pressurizer3.4.93.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.9PressurizerLCO3.4.9ThepressurizershallbeOPERABLE.Qg+surizerwaterlevel<[92]%.b.TwogroupsofrrsOPERABLEwiththecapacitachgroupZ[125]'.eofbeingedfromanemergencypowersupply].APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Pressurizerwater,levelnotwithinlimit.A.lBeinMODE3withreactortripbreakersopen.ANDA.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursB.n'dgroupofpressurizereainoperable.B.lRestorerequiredgroupofzerrsto.OPERABLEstatus.SOedActiontO.i)associaeetionTimeofnditionoet.PntSSMei~~3CsX~~~~%i~%am'~ANDW2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.6hours12hours3.4-19 Pressurizer3.4.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEgq~SR3.4.9.1Verifypressurizerwaterleveliss(Pg5.FREQUENCY12hours+~SR3.4.9.2Verifycapacityof~~~pressurizerheatersisZ+LOkM.92daysSR3.4.9.3dressurizerheatecapableofbeinanpowersupply.8]months3.4-20 PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.10+l.va3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3,MODE4withallRCScoldlegtemperatures-NOTE-ThelitingsarenotrequiredtobewithinthLlimitsduringand4forthepurpose-osettingthepressurizersafetyvalver.aienC(hot)conditions.Thisexceptionisallowed,ursfollowingentryintoNODE3provipreliminarycolngwasmadepriortop.3.4.10PressurizerSafetyValves(-~LCO3.4.10"pressurizersafetyvalvestshallbeOPERABLEwithsettings>]M~psigand<.-psig.4>>QaG,"~~~~4-T~F~~he'h~,i~i~.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable.A.lRestorevalvetoOPERABLEstatus.15minutesB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.AND6hoursORpressurizersafetyvalvesinoperable.Al.'4iI.t4eB.2CBeinBODE4with4Q.RCScoldlegternerature904.SS~~C~~~cA,iNh~4~P~~%a12hours3.4-21 PressurizerSafetyValves3.4.10SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.10.1VerifyeachpressurizersafetyvalveisOPERABLEinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.'ollowingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram3.4-22 PressurizerPORVs3.F113.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)~3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)LCO3.4.11EachPORVandassociatedblockvalveshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,and3.ACTIONSNOTES-01.Separate~i+ientryisoreachPORV."IE.x'~~~M%ow6LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.R2.~IIs~~~~~i~cs~~ovC.s')~~4wo.aW~c.kv~A.~~CONDITIONho~4Oneor@i)~ORVsA.1RE(VIREOACTIONCloseandmaintainpowertoassociatedblockvalve.COHPLETIONTIHE1hourB.Ol2..vViioc-~aah~E'4mCIQC4L%~+w<m~v.~V~OnePORV~inocrabe.napalngcc6,~9lo.~mme~~&eP-V<~Manu&B.lCloseassociatedblockvalve".ANDsha~c-1hourB.2ANDRemovepowerfromassociatedblockvalve.l,hourB.3.RestorePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(continued)3.4-23 PressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEor4~~+C.Oneblockvalve@inoperable.C.lPlaceassociatedPORVC~1hourinmanualcontrol.ANDC.2Restoreblockvalve<st72hourstoOPERABLEstatus.D.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,orCnotmet.D.lBeinHODE3.ANDD.2BeinHODE4.6hours12hoursE.Two.PORVsinoperae.nneongmayANO.3E.2.Removepowerfromassociatedblockvalves.E.PCloseassociatedblockvalves.1hour1hourANDE.3BeinHODE3.6hoursANDE.4Be'2hoursF.Horeblockvalveinoperabe.F.lPlaceassociatedPORVsinmanualrol1hour(continued)3.4-24 't,',~Insert3.4.24E.lInitiateactiontorestoreonePORYtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyAND ~~rPressurizerPORVs3.4.11ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEF.continued)F.2ANDRestoreoneblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatus[ifthreeblockvalvesareinoperable].2hoursF.3Restoremainingckvalve(s)to.OPEEstatus.72hoursG.RequiretionandasatedCompletionmmeofConditionFnotmet.G.lBeinHODE3.ANDG.2BeinNODE4.6hours12hoursSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.11.1~fQ4'WA+NOTENotrequiredtobewithblockvalveclosed.cPerformacompletecycleofeachblockvalve.92daysSR3.4.11.2PerformacompletecycleofeachPORY.months(continued)3.4-25 PressurizerPORVs3.4.11SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.11.3erletecycleofeachsolen'ircontrolvalveaontheairsinPORVcontrolsy'tems.monthsSR3.4.11.4sandblockvalvesarofbeingpowereencypower18]months3.4-26 LTOPSystem3.4.123.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemLCO3.4;12'43.xvavi]LfiOSea.W~awagadaowtl(ma>Pu~~]sbM]~(t\6za+srveaulPQtf~i"~/[2.residualheatremoval(RHR)suctionre'efvalves'etpoints>[436.5]psi<[463.5]psig,[3.OnePORVwithal'etting,w'helimitsg3.VaiIIspecifiediePTLR,andon'eRHRsucilief/valve'setpoint>[436.5]psigand63.5]psig].TheRCSdepressurizedandanRCSventof>~'Squareincheg.~VVVaCZ.ada~vAuVCk~ISS('~duqSrtP~qa"iAg.r~vrvmvsna'a~fas~AnLTOPSystemshallbeOPERABLEwithlamaximanIonecharinump]capabofinjeheaccumulatorsisolatedandeitheraorbbelow.aaLa~ggiisavfZ.xvTwopoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)withliftsettingswithinthelimitsspecifiedinthePTL~WraSmmwq'PPLICABILITY:MODE4whenanyRCSlegtemperatureisMODE5~W~m3<vaMODE6whenthereactorvesselheadiso,9t.xtVO~(3.xiiiNOTE-Accumula'ionisonlyrequiredwhatorpressureisgreatereemaximumRCSpressureforthe'gCSctemperatureallowedbimitcurvesprovidedintheSG~C~~~~a.~b.p~uri~~aauy~&ch,~Qa~g4+~iiA,art.Qt"Lhsami-i]3.iiiKief~~htE<<g,OE-iA,~PHg.,~~Cb+a<~ROW.3.4-27 Insert3.4.46NOTESThePORVsandanRCSvent>1.1squareinchesarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEduringperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictests.However,noSIpumpmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.2.AccumulatorisolationisonlyrequiredwhenaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.Insert3.4.TlwhentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.TwoormpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.A.1Initiateactiontoverifyamaxipumpiscapabe'ctingintotheRCS.woormorechargingpumcapableofinjectin'ntotheRCS.B.I--------NOTE---------TwochargingpumpsmaybecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringpumwapoperation<15'tes.Initiateiontoverifyamaximof[one]chargingpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ImmediatelyC.AnaccumulatornotisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefor~@existingcold'legtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.C.lIsolateaffectedaccumulator.1hour(continued)3.4-28 Insert3.4.31A.OneormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ANDThePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath.A.lInitiateactiontoverifynoSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ImmediatelyB.TwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.ANDTheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>1.1squareinches.B.1InitiateactiontoverifyamaximumofoneSIpumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Immediately N3.iiACTIONScontinuedCONDIlION~~~.cmap9-,ig,.RE(UIREDACTIONLTOP-System3.4.12COMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCondition[C]notmet.0.1ORIncreaseRCScoldlegtmatureto12hoursD.2DepressurizeaffectedaccumulatortolessthanthemaximumRCSpressureforexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.12hoursE'oR.vE.OnereuirR66'I3-VihinoperaeinMODE4.E.1gCVRestorereuired~toOPERABLEstatus.7daysF.OnerequirecP@iriQQ~Veh\inoperaeinMODE5or6.F.lPoL4RestorereuiretoOPERABLEstatus.~hours(continued)WOGSTS3.4-29Rev.0,09/28/92 LTOPSystem3.4.12ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONf0&VsG.Tworeuiredinoperable.ORG.P.REQUIREDACTIONDepressurizeRCSandestablishRCSventofsquareinces.~~I.sCOMPLETIONTIME8hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,(g~D,E,orFnotmet.ORLTOPSysteminoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,(QC,E,orF.G.i~si+~'s~%-o~wserocAPfota+gvsSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.12.1VerifypulllpiScapableofinjectinginoeCS.12hoursL{3,iR3.4.12.2S+Verifyamaximumofone@led~pumpiscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.12hours93.'gvQ3gvssSR3.4.12.3~K~a~~<g~~v~(sVerifyeachaccumulato12hours(continued)------i4eTC'~~;<<~9ca~Q.cmr~m~Ca~ivy+miM~Og,q,(Pr~~iv~~~~'vQ~~~~~kgi~o~~~L~'RAN.iKAy LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR34124Vfysuctionreliefvanoreach12hoursQ3,.VsSR3.4.12'"NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithLCO3.4.12.b.VerifyRCSvent>.squareinchesopen.Ql.a12hoursforunlockedopenvalve(s)v~~+AND31daysforlockedopenvalve(s)rv~5'R3.4.12.8VerifyPORVblockvalveisopenforeachrequiredPORV.72hoursSR3.4.12.7sociatedRHRsuctionisolationvalveisloc'thpowerremovedfor.ire1onvalve.aysSR3.4.12Mpe.~'4r~t~,W'~--NOTE-------------------@@pequiredtobe~~P12hoursafterdecreasinRCScoldlegtemperaturetoPerformaCOToneachrequiredPORV,excludingactuation.31days(continued)3.4-31 LTOPSystem3.4.12SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.124"PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachrequiredPORVactuationchanne1.f4'onths3L3.4-32 RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.133.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGELCO3.4.13RCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a.NopressureboundaryLEAKAGE;b.1gpmunidentifiedLEAKAGE;c.10gpmidentifiedLEAKAGE;~aO.~e,d.'.igpmtotalprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEthrough~steamgenerators"(S~~ij'PPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETION'TIMEA.RCSLEAKAGEnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.A.lReduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimits.4hoursRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.orcORg.c,sressureboundaryLEAKAGEexists.ANDAP.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE5.6hours36hours3.4-33 Insert3.4.48B.SteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramnotmet.B.1Determinesteamgeneratortubeintegrityisacceptableforcontinuedoperation.4hours RCSOperationalLEAKAGE3.4.13SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.13.1Noruntiloreaystaeoor-----NOTE------Onlyrequired'obeperformedduringsteadystateoperationPerformRCSwaterinventorybalance.72hoursSR3.4.13.2VerifysteamgeneratortubeintegrityisinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram.InaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram3.4-34 RCSPIVLeakage3.4.143.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageLCO3.4.14LeakagefromeachRCSPIVshallbewithinlimit.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,Otvavesintheresidualhefs:iflowpatharenoeettherequirementsofenintheRHRmodeofoperaiACTIONS-----------------------NOTES1.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachflowpath.2.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsystemsmadeinoperablebyaninoperablePIV.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.leakagefromoneormoreRCSPIVsnotwithinlimit.C)no,geClo~p~lS'vi%~~------------NOTE-------------EachvalveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.landRequiredActionA.2musthavebeenverifiedtomeetSR3.4.1'4.landbeinthereactorcoolantpressureboundary~orthehighpressureportionofthesystem/Ž(continued)3.4-35 RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.lIsolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionbyuseofoneclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.4hoursANDQbelllA.2Isolatethehighpressureportionoftheaffectedsystemfromthelowpressureportionby>>useofasecondclosedmanual,deactivatedautomatic,orcheckvalve.72hoursor.2RestoreIVts~ursB.RequiredActionandassociatedComletionTimenotmet.B.IANDBeinMODE3.6hoursB;2BeinMODE5.36hoursC.RHRSyslosureinterlockfunctioninoperable.C.1Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationbmanualordeactivaaticvalve.3.4-36 RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.14.1~9S.vNOTES-.1.Notrequiredtobeperformed652.uiredtobeperformedRCSPIVsflowpathwhen'tdowncode.ofelation.u~~qS-iS,a+aMmhhhQP2RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.MS.vii%i~~bL~~PWQVerifyleakagefromeachssequivalentto<0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure>g22l~psigand<gZ255~sig.accordancwitheInseriTestiProam,d7months+5.xPrortoentingMOD2wheneerthunithbeninMODEfor7daysore,ifleaagetestighasotbeeperformeinhepreviou9onthsAND(continued)WOGSTS3.4-37Rev.0,09/28/92 RCSPIVLeakage3.4.14SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.4.14.1'continued)S.vi'iWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,~flowthroughthevalve,o~ron~v~SR3..2-NOTE-trequiredtobemetwhentheRHRSystemautoreinterlockisdisabledinaccordanceSR3.4.12.7.VerifyRHRSysutoclosure'lockpreventsvalvesfrombeingopenew'imulatedoractualRCSpressuresignalz[425]psig.[18]monthsSR3..3-------NOTE-------------------trequiredtobemetwhentheRHRSystemautoreinterlockisdisabledinaccordance'R3.4.12.7.VerifyRHRSystutoclosure'lockcausestvestocloseau>callywithasimulatedoractualCSpressuresignal>[600]psig.[18]months3.4-38 Insert3.4.72SR3.4.14.2,INOTENotrequired.tobeperformeduntilpriortoenteringNODE2fromNODE3.2.RCSPIVsactuatedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillancearenotrequiredtobetestedmorethanonceifarepetitivetestingloopcannotbeavoided.VerifyleakagefromeachSIhotleginjectionlineRCSPIVisequivalentto<0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizeuptoamaximumof5gpmatanRCSpressure>2215psigand<2255psig.40'onthsANDWithin24hoursfollowingvalveactuationduetoautomaticormanualaction,flowthroughthevalve,ormaintenanceonthevalve RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.153.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationLCO3.4.15ThefollowingRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationshallbeOPERABLE:P~ae.Wo.ta~Onecontainmentsumplevelomonitor,~b.Onecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(gaseousorparticulate~~~$9R44&F+.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitorinoperable.------------NOTE-------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.A.1.tPerformSR3;4.13.1.ANDOnceper24hoursA.2RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days(continued)4tvtA.i.x~caora+~~~v~Catatt~~~~gcheCa,it<~taocoPcRAPtK3.4-39 RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.Requiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.-----------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.B.l.lAnalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.OROnceper24hoursB.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1.Onceper24hoursANOB.2~RestorerequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days.2.2VericonmentaircensateratemonitorisOPEC.Require'nmentaircoolercondensflowratemonitorinoperable.C.1PerformSR3.4.15.1.OR.2PerformSR3.4.08hoursOnceper(continued)3.4-40 Insert3.4.61C.Requiredcontainmentsumpmonitor'inoperable.ANDParticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorinoperable.------------NOTE------------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.C.1.1Analyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphere.ORC.1.2PerformSR3.4.13.1Onceper24hoursOnceper24hoursANDC.2.1RestorerequiredcontainmentsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30daysORC.2.2RestoreparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.Re'dcontainmentatmospheradioactivititorinoperable.ANDRequiredcontainmentaircoolercondensaflowratemon'nopera0.1ORD.2Restorerequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymo'toOPERABLatus.Restorereq'containmentaircoolercondensateflowratemonitortoOPERABLEstatus.30days30daysRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.R'IBeinMODE3.ANDW2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursAllrequiredmonitorsinoperable.P.'IEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.15.1PerformCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.12hours(continued)3.4-41 RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation3.4.15SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.15.2PerformCOToftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.&~daysSR3.4.15.3PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitor.monthsSR3.4.15.4PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Q@%onthsR3.4.15.5PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofthereuiredcontainmentaircoolercondensatemonitor.sIIQQmonthsl'4.vtM%t%Z.M.ts3.4-42 RCSSpecificActivity3.4.163.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityXi7~k&)Mls~LCO3.4.1647.iThesecific.activityofthereactorcoolantshallbe)sedto:4'7.<ia.DOSEE(UIV-31specificactivitandi/gm;b.Grossicactivity<100/EyCi/gm.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,MODE3withRCSaveragetemperature'(T,,)>500'F.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.DOSEEUIVALENT1-131.~c.-ic~~i~A.lVerifyDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131withintheacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.ANDA.2RestoreDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131towithinlimit.Onceper@)hoursQF~4849988-~~l~6~.4l.ivG8.Grossspecificactivitwithinlimit.notB.lerANDB~BeinMODE3withT,,<500'F.oursPours(continued)3.4-43 RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME6RequiredActionandassociatedCompletion,TimeofConditionAnotmet.ORDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131intheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1.BeinMODE3withT,<500'F.~~~4cchic+MwSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.16.1Verifyreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivity<100/EpCi/gm.7daysSR3.4.16.2-NOTE-OnlyrequiredtobeperformedinMODE1.VerifyreactorcoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131specificactivity<1.0pCi/gm.14daysANDetween2andhoursafteraERMALPOWERchangeof>15RTPwithina1hourpeliod(continued)3.4-44 RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE.FREQUENCYt4%'hC5.~athW>9'7.vi4inimumof2effect'owerdaysand20aoerationhaveelapseds'reactorwasasicalfor>48hours.Oe,SR3.4.16.3------NOTE-requiredtobeperforme31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofMODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalfor>48hours.ac~cccuba~+DetermineEfromasam1aeninN184days3.4-45 RCSSpecificActivity3.4.16300THISFIGUREFORILLUSTRATIONONLY.DONOTUSEFOROPERATION.IR0I-O'-OOUOUJ0-COC91I-UJ<<CUJUJCOO CII-KOOOOIOUJCL25020015010050ACCEPTABLEOPERATIONUNACCEPTABLEOPERATIONCDE320304050GD708090100PERCENTOFRATE0THERMALPOWERFigure3.4.16-1{page1of1)ReactorCoolantDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131SpecificActivityLimitVersusPercentofRATEDTHERMALPOWER3.4-46~7 \RCSLoopIsolationValves3.4.17.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.17RCSLoopIsolationValvesLCO3..l7EachRCShotandcoldlegloopisolationvalveshallbopenwithpowerremovedfromeach-isolationvalveoperator.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONS--------------NOTE-SeparateConditionentisallowedforeachRCSloopiolationvalve.CONDITION/REQUIREDACTION/'OMPLETIONTIMEA.Poweravailabletooneormoreloopisolationvalveoperators.A.lRemoveowerfromloopvolationvalveoperators.30minutesB---------NOTE---------AllRequiredActionsshallbecompletedwheneverthisConditionisentered.OneormoreRCSlooisolationvalvesclosed.B.lHaininvalve(s)closeB.2BeinMODEANDB.3BeinMODE5.Immediately6hours36hoursWOGSTS3.4-47Rev.0,09/28/g

RCSLoopIsolationValves3.4.17URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY-SR3..17.1VerifyeachRCSloopisolationvalveisopenandpowerisremovedfromeachloopisolationvalveoperator.31daysPIOGSTS3.4-48Rev.0,09/28/92 ~49.cRCSIsolatedLoopStartup3.4.184REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.8RCSIsolatedLoopStartup'CO3.18EachRCSisolatedloopshallremainisolatedwith:a~Thehotandcoldlegisolationvalvesclosedifboronconcentrationoftheisolatedloopislessthboronconcentrationoftheoperatingloops;andThecoldlegisolationvalveclosedifthcoldlegtemperatureoftheisolatedloopis>[]'Fbelowthehighestcoldlegtemperatureoftheopatingloops.APPLICABILITY:MODES5nd6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDAIONCOMPLETIONTIME!A.Isolatedloophotorcoldleg.isolationvalveopenwithLCOrequirementsnotmet.A.l-------NOTE---------lyrequiredifboonconcentrationrqirementnotmet..Closehandcoldlegisolaionvalves.ImmediatelyA.2--------NOTE--------Onlyrequireditemperaturerequirementnotmet'Closecoldlegisolationvalve.mmediatelyWOGSTS3.4-49Rev.0,09/28/9K RCSIsolatedLoopStartup3.4.18SVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.4.8.1Verifycoldlegtemperatureofisolatedloopis<[20]'Fbelowthehighestcoldlegtemperatureoftheoperatingloops.Within30minutpriortopenithecoldegisationvalveiisolatedoopSR3.4.18.2,Verifybononconcentrationofisolatedopisgreaterhanorequaltoboron~concentratiooftheoperatingloopsWithin2hourspriortoopeningthehotorcoldlegisolationvalveinisolatedloopIIjl'WGGSTS3.4-50Rev.0,09/28/92 ~I~~~so..RCSLoops-TestException3.4.93.4EACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)3.4.19CSLoops-TestExceptionsLCO3.4.19TherequirementsofLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1and2,"maybesuspended,withTHERMALPOWER<P-7.APPLICABILITY:DES1and2duringstartupandPHYSICSTSTS.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.THERMALPOWER>P-7.A.lOpenreacttripbreakers.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCFREQUENCYSR3.4.19.1VerifyTHERMALOWERis<P-1hourSR3.4.19.2PerformaaCOTforeachpowerraeneutronux-lowandintermediateangeneutrofluxchannelandP-7.Within12hourspriortoinitiationofstartupandPHYSICSTESTSWGSTS3.4-51Rev.0,09/292 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.1RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDO32~ALAZ3.~,1Q~s-~~c-9~V>3Z.LIc~Re.4~ca~R.>TheseBasesaddressrequirementsformaintainingRCSpressure,temperature,andflowratewithinlimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Thesafetyanalyses(Ref.I)ofnormaloperatingconditionsandanticipatedoperational~occurrencesassumeinitialconditionswithinthenormalsteadystateenvelope.ThelimitsplacedonRCSpressure,temperature,andflowrateensurethatthedeparturefromnucleateboiling~~(DNBgillbemetoreachof,thetransientsanalyzed.~4Aaf'\Cl~TheRCSpressurelimitisconsistentwithoperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Pressurizerpressureindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerpressurewillcausethereactorcoretoapproachDNBlimits.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitisconsistentwithfullpoweroperationwithinthenominaloperationalenvelope.Indicationsoftemperatureareaveragedtodetermineavalueforcomparisontothelimit.Ahigheraveragetemperaturewillcause.thecoretoapproachDNBlimits.D2.vs.bbeeTheRCSflow'ratenormallyremainsconstantduringanoperationalfuelcyclewithQPpumpsrunning.TheminimumRCSflowlimitcorrespondstothatassumedforDNBanalyses.Flowrateindicationsareaveragedtocomeupwithavalueforcomparisontothelimit.AlowerRCSflowwillcausethecoretoapproachDNBlimits.Operationfor,significantperiodsoftimeoutsidetheseDNBlimitsincreasesthelikelihoodofafuelcladdingfailureinaDNBlimitedevent.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTherequirementsofthisLCOrepresenttheinitialconditionsforDNBlimitedtransientsanalyzedintheplantsafetyanalyses(Ref.I).ThesafetyanalyseshaveshownthattransientsinitiatedfromthelimitsofthisLCOwill(continued)B3.4-1 Insert3.4.76ThedesignmethodemployedtomeettheONBdesigncriterionforfuelassembliesistheImprovedThermalDesignProcedure(ITDP).WiththeITDPmethodology,uncertaintiesinplantoperatingparameters,computercodesandDNBcorrelationpredictionsareconsideredstatisticallytoobtainDNBuncertaintyfactors.BasedontheONBuncertaintyfactors,ITOPdesignlimitdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)valuesaredeterminedinordertomeettheONBdesigncriterion.TheITOPdesignlimitONBRvaluesare1.34and1.33forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively,forfuelanalyseswiththeWRB-2correlation.AdditionalDNBRmarginismaintainedbyperformingthesafetyanalysestoDNBRlimitshigherthanthedesignlimitDNBRvalues.ThismarginbetweenthedesignandsafetyanalysislimitDNBRvaluesisusedtooffsetknownONBRpenalties(e.g.,rodbowandtransitioncore)andtoprovideDNBRmarginforoperatinganddesignflexibility.ThesafetyanalysisDNBRvaluesare1.52and1.51forthetypicalandthimblecells,respectively.ForboththeWRB-1.andWRB-2correlations,the95/95DNBRcorrelationlimitis1.17.TheW-3DNBcorrelationisusedwheretheprimaryDNBRcorrelationsweredevelopedbasedonmixingvanedataandthereforeareonlyapplicableintheheatedrodspansabovethefirstmixingvanegrid.TheW-.3correlation,whichdoesnottakecreditformixingvanegrids,isusedtocalculateDNBRvaluesintheheatedregionbelowthefirstmixingvanegrid.Inaddition,theW-3correlationisappliedintheanalysisofaccidentconditionswherethesystempressureisbelowtherangeoftheprimarycorrelations.Forsystempressuresintherangeof500to1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.45.Forsystempressuresgreaterthan1000psia,theW-3correlationlimitis1.30. s~~RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued22.vl.a32.,vio22.~(.t.gshgensnresultinmeetingtheDNighriterion.~.ThisistheacceptancelimitfortheRCSDNBparameters.Changestothe@+5thatcouldimpactthesearametersmustbeassesortheirimpactontheDNcriteria.eransiensanalyzed~includelossofcoolantfloweventsanddroppedorstuckrodevents.Akeyassumptionfortheanalysisoftheseeventsisthatecorepowerdistributioniswithinthe1~mitsofLCO3,"ControlBankInsertionLimits";LCO3.2.3,"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)";andLCO3.2.4,"QUADRANTPOWERTILTRATIO(QPTR)."Te'rpressurelimitof[2200]psiaveragetemperatur'5'espondtoanalyticallimitpslg'Fusedinthesyses,withallowanceformeasuremen'nt.TheRCSDNBparameterssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO3ss~VC.A.+aevi~03+ass~PThisLCOspecifieslimitsonthemonitoredprocessvariables-pressurizerpressure,RCSaveragetemperature,andRCStotalflowrate-toensurethecoreoperateswithinthelimitsassumed.inthesafetyanalyses.OperatingwithintheselimitswillresultinmeetingtheONN'criterionintheeventofaDNBlimitedtransient.RCtalflowratecontainsameasurementerrorof[2.0]lbasederformingaprecisionheatbalanceandusineresulttolibratetheRCSflowrateindicators.entialfoulingoftheedwaterventuri,whichmightbedetected,could'theresultfromtheprisionheatbalanceinanonconsativemanner.Tefore,apenaltyof[0.1]%forundetecteoulingofefeedwaterventuriraisesthenominalflowmeaeallowanceto[2.1]%fornofouling.Anyfoulingthatmigiastheflowemeasurementgreaterthan[0.1'.canbedetectedbymtoringandtrendingvariplantperformanceparameterIfdetected,eitherthfeetofthefoulingshallbequantedandcompeedforintheRCSflowratemeasurementoheverishallbecleanedtoeliminatethefouling.(continued)B3.4-2 Insert3.4.13Z..V<P-Thelimitforpressurizerpressureisbasedona+30psiginstrumentuncertainty.Theaccidentanalysesassumethatnominalpressureismaintainedat2235psig.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedpressureis2235psig.TheRCScoolantaveragetemperaturelimitisbasedona+O'Finstrumentuncertaintywhichincludesa+1.5'Fdeadband.ItisassumedthatnominalT,ismaintainedwithin+1.5'Fof573.5F.ByReference2,minorfluctuationsareacceptableprovidedthatthetimeaveragedtemperatureiswithin1.5'Fofnominal.ThelimitforRCSflowrateisbasedonthenominalT.,andSGpluggingcriterialimit.Additionalmarginofapproximately3%isthenaddedforconservatism. RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimits83.4.1BASESLCO(continued)~~~2.v<.~e'calvaluesforpressure,te~me~ru~ratearegivenforen-t-hkaaionbuthavenotbeinstrumenterror.32~vLck.APPLICABILITYInMODE1,thelimitsonpressurizerpressure,RCScoolantaveragetemperature,andRCSflowratemustbemaintainedduring~eadystateoperationinordertoensureDNHgcritervm"wil1bemetintheeventofanunplannedlossof1d1111BNB111dotherMODES,thepowerlevelislowenoughthatDNBisnotaconcern.3Na,lilANotehasbeenaddedtoindicatethelimitonpressurizerpressureisnotapplicableduringshorttermoerationaltransientssuchasaTHERMALPOWERramp>5%RTPperminuteoraTHERMALPOWERstepg~+>10%RTP.Theseconditionsrepresentshorttermperturbationswhereactionstocontrolpressurevariationsmightbecounterproductive.Also,.sincetheyrepresenttransientsinitiatedfrompowerlevels<100%RTP,anincreasedDNBRmarginexiststooffsetthetemporarypressurevariations.AnothersetoflimitsonDNBrelatedparametersisprovidedinSL2.1.1,"ReactorCoreSLs."Those.limitsarelessrestrictivethanthelimitsofthisLCO,butviolationofaSafetyLimit(SL)meritsastricter,moresevereRequiredAction.ShouldaviolationofthisLCOoccur,theoperatorustcheckwhetherornotanSLmayhavebeenexceeded.ACTIONSA.1RCSpressureandRCSaveragetemperaturearecontrollableandmeasurableparameters.WithoneorbothoftheseparametersnotwithinLCOlimits,actionmustbetakentorestoreparameter(s).RCStotalflowrateisnotacontrollableparameterandisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperation.IftheindicatedRCStotalflowrateisbelowtheLCOlimit,powermustbereduced,asrequiredbyRequiredAction8.1,torestoreDNBmarginandeliminatethepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.(continued)B3.4-3 Insert3.4.2 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1BASESACTIONS3Z,v4~~~A.l(continued)The2hourCompletionTimeforrestorationofthearametersprovidessufficienttimeoadusanarameerstodeterminethecauseforteoffnormalcondition,4andtorestorethereadingswithinlimits,andisbasedonplantoperatingexperience.B.lIfRequiredActionA.lisnotmetwithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE2within6hours.InMODE2,thereducedpowerconditioneliminatesthepotentialforviolationoftheaccidentanalysisbounds.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonabletoreachtherequiredplantconditionsinanorderlymanner.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.1.1SinceRequiredActionA.lallowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforpressurizerpressureissufficienttoensurethepressurecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessforpotentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.SR3.4.1.2SinceRequiredActionA.lallowsaCompletionTimeof2hourstorestoreparametersthatarenotwithinlimits,the12hourSurveillanceFrequencyforRCSaveragetemperatureissufficienttoensurethetemperaturecanberestoredtoanormaloperation,steadystateconditionfollowingloadchangesandotherexpectedtransientoperations.The12hourintervalhasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassessfor(continued)B3.4-4 RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDNBLimitsB3.4.1rBASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.4.1.2(continued)potentialdegradationandtoverifyoperationiswithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.SR.332,.iV~ma.wThe12hourSurveilarequencyforRCStotrateisperformedusingtheinsta1'umentation.The12hourintervalhasbeeyop'racticetobesufficienttoyassesspotentialdegr'onandtover'tionwithinsafetyanalysisassumptions.Vq'~a~trentSR3.4.19~AKama~tMor~<~Q~o~HeasurementofRCStotalflowrateionceemonthsICI'i=thanorequaltotheminimumrequiredRCSflowrate.TheFrequencyof@@~monthsreflectstheimportanceofverifyingflowafterarefuelingoutagewhenthecorehasbeenaltered,whichmayhavecausedanalterationofflowresistance.3>.vi..~REFERENCESThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoHODE1,withouthavingperformedtheSR,andplacementoftheinthebestconditionforerformintheSR.TheNotesetaeisexceptionisappropriatesineeeatbalancerequirestheplanttobeataminimumo'TPtoobtainthestatedRCSflowaies.shalleperformedwithinafterreaching'TP.Qs71.taFSAR~+15/.gz.vi,'o~~Mq,~c.~M~FromQ.t.Stdbaalim,hccas~abi~dmcmrYmWwaa~+~comahttaaaoaro+6aeQr<gandn.o~EL'AADVqaA,mmmmMa,'L~'ICNJWChMaW4g~aK'lSCAAS'ate~O~Pb~~~(At'TEl=xgsRaHMS,h.~M~t+2>q>Web.83.4-5 ~~'Insert3.4.3VerificationofRCSflowrateonashorterintervalisnotrequiredsincethisparameterisnotexpectedtovaryduringsteadystateoperationastherearenoRCS'oopisolationvalvesorotherinstalleddeviceswhichcouldsignificantlyalterflow.Reducedperformanceofareactorcoolantpump(RCP)wouldbeobservableduetobusvoltageandfrequencychanges,andinstalledalarmsthatwouldresultinoperatorinvestigation. RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.2RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisbaseduponmeetingseveralmajorconsiderationsbeforethereactorcanbemadecriticalandwhilethereactoriscritical.Thefirstconsiderationismoderatortemperaturecoefficient(MTC),LCO3.1.4,"ModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)."Inthetransientandaccidentanalyses,theMTCisassumedtobeinarangefromslightlypositivetonegativeandtheoperatingtemperatureisassumedtobewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopewhilethereactoriscritical.TheLCOonminimumtemperatureforcriticalityhelpsensuretheplantisoperatedconsistentwiththeseassumptions.Thesecondconsiderationistheprotectiveinstrumentation.Becausecertainprotectiveinstrumentation(e.g.,excoreneutrondetectors)canbeaffectedbymoderatortemperature,atemperaturevaluewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosentoensureproperindicationandresponsewhilethereactoriscritical.CBThethirdconsiderationisthepressurizeroperatingcharacteristics.Thetransient4fandaccidentanalysesassumethatthepressurizeriswithinitsnormalstartupandoperatingrange'(i.e.,saturatedconditionsandsteambubblepresent).ItisalsoassumedthattheRCStemperatureiswithinitsnormalexpectedrangeforstartuandowerr,operation.Sincethedensityofthevwater,andhencetheresponseofthepressurizertotransients,dependsupontheinitialtemperatureofthemoderator,aminimumvalueformoderatortemperaturewithinthenominaloperatingenvelopeischosen.Thefourthconsiderationisthatthereactorvesselisaboveitsminimumnilductilityreferencetemperaturewhenthereactoriscritical.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAlthoughtheRCSminimumtemperatureforcriticalityisnotitselfaninitialconditionassumedinDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs),thecloselyalignedtemperatureforhot(continued)B3.4-6 RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticalityB3.4.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)zeropower(HZP)isaprocessvariablethatisaninitialconditionofDBAs,suchastherodclustercontrolassembly(RCCA)withdrawal,RCCAejection,andmain.steamlinebreakaccidentsperformedatzeropowerthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.~~~a~~~M~AlllowpoweraeyanaysesassumeinitialRCSlooptemperatures~heHZPtemperatureof547'F.Theminimumtemperatureforcriticalitylimitationpovidesafl,~,f'liibl!.ThibandallowscriticaloperationbelowHZPduringplantstartupanddoesnotadverselyaffectanysafetyanalysessincetheMTCisnotsignificantlyaffectedbythesmalltemperaturedifferencebetweenHZPandtheminimumtemperatureforcriticality.TheRCSminimumtemperat'urefor.criticalitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOCompliancewiththeLCOensuresthatthereactor.willnotbemadeormaintainedcritical(k,<<>1.0)atatemperaturelessthanasmallbandbelowtheHZPtemperature,whichisassumedinthesafetyanalysis.FailuretomeettherequirementsofthisLCOmayproduceinitialconditionsinconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsassumedinthesafetyanalysis.APPLICABILITYO~33'I'll+oh'nMOD@~nd2~withk.<<z1.0,LCO3.4.2isapplicablesincethereactorcanonlybecritical(k,<<>1.0)intheseMODES.ThespecialtestexceptionofLCO3.1.10,"MODE2PHYSICSTESTSExceptions,"permitsPHYSICSTESTStobeperformedat(5%RTPwithRCSloopaveragetemperaturesslightlylowerthannormallyallowedsothatfundamentalnuclearcharacteristicsofthecorecanbeverified.Inorderfornuclearcharacteristicstobeaccuratelymeasured,itmaybenecessarytooperateoutsidethenormalrestrictionsofthi,sLCO.Forexample,tomeasuretheMTCatbeginningofcycle,itisnecessarytoallowRCSloopaveragetemperaturestofallbelowT.~,whichmaycauseRCSloopaverage(continued)B3.4-7 RCSNinimumTemperatureforCriticalityi~~('A'arRt(,Z83.4.2O~arv.o~oe.ee-~'L&ct'Pl&I&a~W>~.aaWea+ucu~~mrev'.+ea'.aX:v.aAAPPLICABILITYtemperaturestofallbelowthetemperaturelimitofthis(continued)LCO.ACTIONS2~~+~gd,>>h.0lgiMKt~~rtoA4~a~Q<Cq~t~OA.1Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimicannotberestored,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustberougo8.within30minutes.Rapidreactorshutdowncanbereadilyandpracticallyachievedwithina30minuteperio.Theallowedtimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachNODEWinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.Vg.~L.E)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.2.1oaverageteeeratureiarreerauuiiredtobeverifiedat,orabove~~F30every30minuteTheinutet>meperiodislongenoughtoaloteoperatortoadjusttemperaturesordelaycriticalitysotheLCOwillnotbeviolated,therebyprovidingassurancethatthesafetanalysesarenotviolated.hhea4g~teat~V,~~~+t.Q.4.'71modifiestheSR.WhenanyRCSloopaveragetemperature'47]'Fandthe[T.,-T,.tv-'n,lowlowT.,]alarmisaa'CSloagetemperaturescouldfallbelowtheLCOwithoutadditional/warning.TheSerifyRCSloopavemeratureseveryuesisfrequentenoughtopreventvertentviolationoftheLCO.REFERENCESB3.4-8 Insert3.4.74ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequirestheSRtobeperformedifanyRCSloopT,,is<547FandthelowT,,alarmiseitherinoperableornotreset.TheT,alarmprovidestheoperatorindicationoflowRCStemperaturewithoutrequiringindependentverificationwhileT,,>547FinbothRCSloopsiswithinthe'ccidentanalysisassumptions.IftheT,alarmistobeusedforthisSR,itshouldbecalibratedconsistentwithindustrystandards. RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.3RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsBASESBACKGROUNDAllcomponentsoftheRCSaredesignedtowithstandeffectsofcyclicloadsduetosystempressureandtemperaturechanges.Theseloadsareintroducedbystartup(heatup)andshutdown(cooldown)operations,powertransients,andreactortrips.ThisLCOlimitsthepressureandtemperaturechangesduringRCSheatupandcooldown,withinthedesignassumptionsandthestresslimitsforcyclicoperation.ThePTLRcontainsP/Tlimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,inserviceleakandhydrostatic(ISLH)testing,anddataforthemaximumrateofchangeofreactorcoolanttemperature(Ref.I).EachP/Tlimitcurvedefinesanacceptableregionfornormaloperation.Theusualuseofthecurvesisoperationalguidanceduringheatuporcooldownmaneuvering,whenpressureandtemperature,indicationsaremonitoredandcomparedtotheapplicablecurvetodeterminethatoperationiswithintheallowableregion.TheLCOestablishesoperatinglimitsthatprovideamargintobrittlefailureofthereactorvesselandpipingofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).Thevesselisthecomponentmostsubjecttobrittlefailure,andtheLCOlimitsapplymainlytothevessel.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer,whichhasdifferentdesigncharacteristicsandoperatingfunctions.10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2),requirestheestablishmentofP/Tlimitsforspecificmaterialfracturetoughness-requirementsoftheRCPBmaterials.Reference2requiresanadequatemargintobrittlefailureduringnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andsystemhydrostatictests.ItmandatestheuseoftheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)Code,SectionIII,AppendixG(Ref.3).Theneutronembrittlementeffectonthematerialtoughnessisreflectedbyincreasingthenilductilityreferencetemperature(RTQQ7)asexposuretoneutronfluenceincreases.(continued)B3.4-9 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESBACKGROUND(continued)TheactualshiftintheRT>>ofthevesselmaterialestablishederiodicalyremovingandevaluatingtheirradiatedreactorvesselmaterialspecimens,inaccordancewithASTHE185(Ref.4)andAppendixHof10CFR50(Ref.5).TheoperatingP/Tlimitcurvesa3ustedbasedontheevaluationfindingsandtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.99(Ref.6).TheP/Tlimitcurvesarecompositecurvesestablishedbysuperimposinglimitsderivedfromstressanalysesofthoseportionsofthereactorvesselandheadthatarethemostrestrictive.Atanyspecificpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchange,onelocationwithinthereactorvesselwilldictatethemostrestrictivelimit.AcrossthespanoftheP/Tlimitcurves,differentlocationsaremorerestrictive,and,thus,thecurvesarecompositesofthemostrestrictiveregions.Theheatupcurverepresentsadifferentsetofrestrictionsthanthecooldowncurvebecausethedirectionsofthethermalgradientsthroughthevesselwallarereversed.Thethermalgradientreversalaltersthelocationofthetensilestressbetweentheouterandinnerwalls.ThecriticalitylimitcurveincludestheReference2requirementthat'itbe>40'Fabovetheheatupcurveorthecooldowncurve,andnotlessthantheminimumpermissibletemperatureforISLHtesting.However,thecriticalitycurveisnotoperationallylimiting;amorerestrictivelimitexistsinLCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCri'ticality."TheconsequenceofviolatingtheLCOlimitsisthattheRCShasbeenoperatedunderconditionsthatcanresultinbrittlefailureoftheRCPB,possiblyleadingtoanonisolableleakorlossofcoolantaccident.Intheeventtheselimitsareexceeded,anevaluationmustbeperformedtodeterminetheeffectonthestructuralintegrityoftheRCPBcomponents.TheASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7},providesarecommendedmethodologyforevaluatinganoperatingeventthatcausesanexcursionoutsidethelimits.(continued) RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES~jul+i<TheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromDesignBasisAccident(DBA)analyses.Theyareprescribedduringnormaloperationtoavoidencounteringpressure,temperature,andtemperaturerateofchaneconditionsthatmightcauseundetectedflawsopropagaeand~~~nonductilefailureoftheRCPB~anunanalyzedcondition.ReferenceIestablishesthemethodologyfordeterminingtheP/Tlimits.AlthoughtheP/TlimitsarenotderivedfromanyDBA,theP/Tlimitsareacceptancelimitssincetheyprecludeoperationinanunanalyzedcondition.RCSP/TlimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO.ThetwoelementsofthisLCOare:a.Thelimitcurvesforheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting;andb.Limitsontherateofchangeoftemperature.TheLCOlimitsapplytoallcomponentsoftheRCS,exceptthepresturizer.Theselimitsdefineallowableoperatingregionsandpermitalargenumberofoperatingcycleswhileprovidingawidemargintononductilefailure.Thelimitsfortherateofchangeoftemperaturecontrolthethermalgradientthroughthevesselwallandareusedasinputsforcalculatingtheheatup,cooldown,andISLHtestingP/Tlimitcurves.Thus,theLCOfortherateofchangeoftemperaturerestrictsstressescausedbythermalgradientsandalsoensuresthevalidityoftheP/Tlimitcurves.ViolatingtheLCOlimitsplacesthereactorvesseloutsideoftheboundsofthestressanalysesandcanincreasestressesinotherRCPBcomponents.Theconsequencesdependonseveralfactors,asfollow:a.Theseverityofthedeparture=fromtheallowableoperatingP/Tregimeortheseverityoftherateofchangeoftemperature;(continued)B3.4-11 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESLCO(continued)b.Thelengthoftimethelimitswereviolated(longerviolationsallowthetemperaturegradientinthethickvesselwallstobecomemorepronounced);andc.Theexistences,sizes,andorientationsofflawsinthevesselmaterial.APPLICABILITYTheRCSP/TlimitsLCOprovidesadefinitionofacceptableoperationforpreventionofnonductilefailureinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.2).AlthoughtheP/Tlimitsweredevelopedtoprovideguidanceforoperationduringheatuporcooldown(MODES3,4,and5)orISLHtesting,theirApplicabilityisatalltimesinkeepingwiththeconcernfornonductilefailure.Thelimitsdonotapplytothepressurizer.DuringNODES1and2,otherTechnicalSpecifications,providelimitsforoperationthatcanbemorerestrictivethanorcansupplementtheseP/Tlimits.LCO3.4.1,"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";LCO3.4.2,"RCSMinimumTemperatureforCriticality";andSafetyLimit2.1,"SafetyLimits,"alsoprovideoperationalrestrictionsforpressureandtemperature/'-Furthermore,NODES1and2areabovethetemperaturerangeofconcernfornonductilefailure,andstressanalyseshavebeenperformedfornormalmaneuveringprofiles,suchaspowerascensionordescent.ACTIONSTheacfthisLCOconsiderthepremisetviolationofthe'ccurred'rmalplantmaneuvering.Severevip.La~usedbyabnormaltransients,at~mFsaccompaniedbyequipmentfailures,mayalsor~euireadditionalactionsfromemergenc~rating~censures.A.landA.2OperationoutsidetheP/TlimitsduringNODE1,2,3,or4mustbecorrectedsothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalyses.(continued)B3.4-12 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSA.landA.2(continued)The30minuteCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofrestoringtheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Mostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplishedinthistimeinacontrolledmanner.Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifytheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingoperation.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwithpre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,newanalyses,orinspectionof,thecomponents.ASMECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonabletoaccomplishtheevaluation.Theevaluationforamildviolationispossiblewithinthistime,butmoresevereviolationsmayrequirespecial,eventspecificstressanalysesorinspections.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedbeforecontinuingtooperate.S'ba4wo~a~ConditionAismodifiedbyaNote~r@~~QRequiredActionA.2ecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluationoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionA.lisinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.B.landB.2ZN,icIfaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,theplantmustbeplacedinalowerMODEbecauseeithertheRCSremainedinanunacceptableP/Tregionforanextendedperiodofincreasedstressorasufficientlysevereeventcausedentryintoanunacceptableregion.EitherpossibilityindicatesaneedformorecarefulexaminationoftheevenestaccomplishedwiththeRCSatreducedpressureandtemperature.Inreduced~Qq~%$(continued)B3.4-13 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSB.land8.2(continued)pressureandtemperatureconditions,thepossibilityofpropagationwithundetectedflawsisdecreased.Iftherequiredrestorationactivitycannotbeaccomplishedwithin30minutes,RequiredActionB.landRequiredActionB.2mustbeimplementedtoreducepressureandtemperature.Iftherequiredevaluationforcontinuedoperationcannotbeaccomplishedwithin72hoursortheresultsareindeterminateorunfavorable,actionmustproceedtoreducepressureandtemperatureasspecified.inRequiredActionB.landRequiredActionB.2.Afavorableevaluationmustbecompletedanddocumentedbeforereturningtooperatingpressureandtemperatureconditions.PressureandtemperaturearereducedbybringingtheplanttoMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5withRCSpressure<$500gpsigwithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.landC.2ActionsmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytocorrectoperationoutsideoftheP/TlimitsattimesotherthanwheninMODE1,2,3,or4,sothattheRCPBisreturnedtoaconditionthathasbeenverifiedbystressanalysis.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheurgencyofinitiatingactiontorestoretheparameterstowithintheanalyzedrange.Mostviolationswillnotbesevere,andtheactivitycanbeaccomplished'introlledmanner.~~icM~Besidesrestoringoperationwithinlimits,anevaluationisrequiredtodetermineifRCSoperationcancontinue.TheevaluationmustverifythattheRCPBintegrityremainsacceptableandmustbecompletedpriortoentryintoMODE4.Severalmethodsmaybeused,includingcomparisonwith(continued)B3.4-14 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESACTIONSC.landC.2(continued)pre-analyzedtransientsinthestressanalyses,orinspectionofthecomponents.ASHECode,SectionXI,AppendixE(Ref.7),maybeusedtosupporttheevaluation.However,itsuseisrestrictedtoevaluationofthevesselbeltline.ConditionCismodifiedbyaNoterequiringRequiredActionC.2tobecompletedwhenevertheConditionisentered.TheNoteemphasizestheneedtoperformtheevaluat'ionoftheeffectsoftheexcursionoutsidetheallowablelimits.RestorationaloneperRequiredActionC.1'sinsufficientbecausehigherthananalyzedstressesmayhaveoccurredandmayhaveaffectedtheRCPBintegrity.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.3.1VerificationthatoperationiswithinthePTLRlimitsisrequiredevery30minuteswhenRCSpressureandtemperatureconditionsareundergoingplannedchanges.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofthecontrolroomindicationavailabletomonitorRCSstatus.Also,sincetemperaturerateofchangelimitsarespecifiedinhourlyincrements,30minutespermitsassessmentandcorrectionforminordeviationswithinareasonabletime.Surveillanceforheatup,cooldown,orISLHtestingmaybediscontinuedwhenthedefinitiongivenintherelevantplantprocedureforendingtheactivityissatisfied.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatonlyrequiresthisSRtobeperformedduringsystemheatup,cooldown,andISLHtesting.No,SRisgivenforcriticalityoperationsbecauseLCO3.4.2containsamorerestrictiverequirement.O'I.iREFERENCESl.2.10CFR50,AppendixG.bh,~~&~op~~~S-~~~~&Qu~pn~~~hh,<+i~~v.g+~q~~~D<~~p~Q.~>M~&Liwif~~Mi~<~(continued)'L~~u~%AQUAB3.4-15 RCSP/TLimitsB3.4.3BASESREFERENCES(continued)3.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII,AppendixG.,4.ASTHE185-82,July1982.5.10CFR50,AppendixH.6.RegulatoryGuide1.99,Revision2,Hay1988.7.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI,AppendixE.B3.4-16 RCSLoops-MODES1~~~83.4.483.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.4RCSLoops-MODE&1Q~~gs-.'ASES>Q.S48.aPBACKGROUND3'S.hi.~~~s.ii.bO35.;as3S,it~QTheprimaryfunctionoftheRCSisremovaloftheheatgeneratedinthefuelduetothefissionprocess,andtransferofthisheat,viathesteamgenerators(SGs),tothesecondaryplant.ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission;b.Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector;c.Carryingthesolubieneutronpoison,boricacid;~ad.Providingasecondbarrieraainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironmeneoissionecayfollowingaunitsuo+~OThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,eachcontainingaWG,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflowandtemperatureinstrumentationforbothcontrolandprotection.Thereactorvesselcontainsthecladdfuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsinktothe'isolatedsecondarycoolant.TheRCPscirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.Thisforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolantensuresmixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrol.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESSafetyanalysescontainvariousassumptionsforthedesignbasesaccidentinitialconditionsincludingRCSpressure,RCStemperature,reactorpowerlevel,coreparameters,andsafetysystemsetpoints.TheimportantaspectforthisLCOisthereactorcoolantforcedflowrate,whichisrepresentedbythenumberofRCSloopsinservice.(continued)B3.4-17 BASESRCSLoops-HODC-lM.~3.4.4>'th,.~"7oAaAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)3S~iiZS.t't,4~~~S.i'4.'oBothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThetransientandaccidentanalsesfortheplanthavebeenperformedassumingCSoopsareinoperation.Themajorityoftheplansaetyanalysesarebasedoninitialconditionsathighcorepowerorzeropower.TheaccidentanalysesthataremostimportanttoRCPoperationaretheumpcoastdown,singlepumplockedrotor,singlepump(broenshaftorcoastdown),androdwithdrawalevents(Ref.I).~oSteadystateDNBanalysishasbeengperformedfortheRCSloopoperation.For~Sloopoperation,thesteadystateDNBanalysis,w>chgeneratesthepressureandtemperatureSafetyLimit(SL)(i.e.,thedeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)limit)assumesamaximumpowerlevelof109%RTP.Thisisthedesignoverpowerconditionfo@vwn$RCSloopoperation.Thevaluefortheaccidentanalysissetpointofthenuclearoverpower(highflux)trip>s~andisbasedonananalysisassumptionthatbounds~~possibleinstrumentationerrors.TheDNBRlimitdefinesalocusofpressureandtemperatureointsthatresultinaminimumDNBRgreaterthanorequaltothecriticalheatfluxcorrelationl.imit.Q+vThep'lantisdesignedtooperatewith~'RCSloopsinoperationtomaintainDNBRabovetheSL,duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.Byensuringheattransferinthenucleateboilingregion,adequateheattransferisprovidedbetweenthefuelcladdingandthereactorcoolant.~RCSLoops-NOOEQ1duNCos>~se4~Criterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.>B.rVg.-,pLCOOQs.ii.k.'tL.CThepurposeofthisLCOistorequireanadequateforcedflowrateforcoreheatremoval.FlowisrepresentedbythenumberofRCPsinoperationforremovalofheatbytheSGs.TomeetsafetyanalysisacceptancecriteriaforDNBpumpsarerequiredtobedower.~otsvca~owvAnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanOPERABLERCPinoperationprovidingforcedflowforheattransportandan(continued)-B3.4-18 Insert3.4.4Adequateheattransferbetweenthereactorcoolantandthesecondarysideisensuredbymaintaining>16%SGlevelinaccordancewithLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation,"whichprovidessufficientwaterinventorytocovertheSGtubes. RCSLoops-HODEQ-IQ~~3.4.4'35BASES)Q.z'fo~PLCOOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTube(continued)SurveillanceProgram.QS,iLICABILITYzs.ii.b)QsIRYPInMODES-I,thereactoriscriticalandthushasthepotentialtoproducemaximumTHERHAIPOWER.Thus,toensurehattheassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesremainvalid,CSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEandinoperationin(~HO~opreventDNBandcoredamage.Thedecayheatproductionrateismuchlowerthanthefullpowerheatrate.Assuch,theforcedcirculationflowandheatsinkrequirementsarereducedforlowerMODESasindicatedbytheLCOsforMODES3,4andI-8.5'fo0M,>,OperationinotherMODESiscoveredby:LCO3.45"RCSLoops-tS~'CO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCO3.9"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-QgrWaterLevel"MODE6);anLCO3.9.6,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCooanCPCirculation-(CQ.WaterLevel"(HOACTIONSA.lCBIftherequirementsoftheLCOarenotmet,theRequirActionistoreducepowerandbringtheplanttoMODThislowerspowerlevelandthusreducesthecoreheatremovalneedsandminimizesthepossibilityofviolatingDNBlimits.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachHODfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingsafetysystems.B3.4-19(continued) BASES(continued)RCSLoops-HOOEY-IQ~3.4.4)g.s'4c;e!..SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSi44i~&nQr+4@AtPcMp~~g\icr~phage.~i4~omSR3.4.4.1ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthateachRCSloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremovalwhilemaintainingthemarint'oDNB.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsierringoerindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.REFERENCES1.U,FSAR~~@~B3.4-20 RCSLoops-<R3B3.4.5B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.5RCSLoops-~3-l.iBASESvo0it,2.~Q3Io.iccsBACKGROUND.In3,theprimaryfunctionofthe1S~removalofdecayheatandtransferofthisheatviathe3E.EV.c.steamgenerator(SgG,tothesecondaryplant.eco"--"""'"'soactasa'eneutronid.Thereactorcoolantiscirculatedthrough+annIRCSloops,connectedinparalleltothereactorvessel,each=containing~G,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforOcontrol,protection,andindication.Thereactorvesselcontainstheclad~fuel.TheSGsprovidetheheatsink.TheRCPscirculatethewaterthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandpreventfueldamage.+he.54InNODE3,~Psareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationforheatremovalduringheatupandcooldown.TheNODEdecayheatremovalrequirementsarelowenoughthatasingleloopwithoneRCPrunningissufficienttoremovecoredecayheat.However,gtwo~CSloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensureredundantcapabilityfordecayheatremoval.s~~'aAPPLICABLE)everthereactortripbreakers(RTBs)areintheclosedSAFETYANALYSESposi'andthecontrolroddrivemechanisms(CRDNs)are~.energize,thepossibilityofaninadvertentrodwithMwalfromsubcrlalresultinginapowerexcursionJpossible.Suchtransientcouldbecausedamalfunctionoftherodcontrolstem.InadditionepossibilityofZE.iv'.hapowerexcursionduetheejectiofaninsertedcontrolrodispossiblewiththeakeclosedoropen.SuchatransientcouldbecausedbmechanicalfailureofaCRDH.Therefore,in3withRTBsinthecedpositionandRodContrystemcapableofrodwithdrawa,accidentalcontrrodwithdrawalfromsubcriticalisposatedandriresatleast[two]RCSloopstobeOPERABLEainoperationtoensurethattheaccidentanalyseslimitseMOGSTSB3.4-21(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 -Insert3.4.7ThesecondaryfunctionsoftheRCSinclude:a~b.cd.Moderatingtheneutronenergyleveltothethermalstate,toincreasetheprobabilityoffission(MODE2only);Improvingtheneutroneconomybyactingasareflector(MODE2only);Carryingthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid;andProvidingasecondbarrieragainstfissionproductreleasetotheenvironment.Insert3.4.8InMODESI<8.5/RTPand2,theRCPsareusedtoprovideforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoensuremixingofthecoolantforproperborationandchemistrycontrolandtoremovethelimitedamountofreactorheat.Insert3.4.9Bothtransientandsteadystateanalyseshavebeenperformedtoestablishtheeffectofflowonthedeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).InMODESIS8.55RTP,2,and3,theseanalysesincludeevaluationofmainsteamlinebreaksanduncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromasubcriticalcondition.ThemostlimitingaccidentwithrespecttoDNBlimitsforMODES2and3isamainsteamlinebreak.Thisisduetothepotentialforrecriticalityandbecauseofthehighhotchannelfactorsthatmayexistifthemostreactivecontrolrodisstuckinitsfullywithdrawnposition.AmainsteamlinebreakhasbeenanalyzedforboththecasewithoneandtwoRCSloopsinoperationathotzeropower(HZP)conditionswithacceptableresults(Ref.I).However,withonlyoneRCSloopinoperationandoffsitepoweravailable,additionalshutdownmarginisrequiredsincethereducedflowproducesanadverseeffectonDNBlimits.Thestartupofaninactivereactorcoolantpump(RCP)upto8.5%RTPhasbeenevaluatedandfoundtoresultinonlylimitedpowerandtemperatureexcursionsthatareboundedbyamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation(Refs.2and3).Analyseshavealsobeenperformedwhichdemonstratethatreactorheatgreaterthan5XRTPcanberemovedbynaturalcirculationalone(Ref.4). +&ia~OCTi~Q.Mog~PRCSLoops3B3.4.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES'.,(continued)me.econditionswhentheRodControlSsnotcapableofro1twoarerequiredtobeOPERABLE,butoo'redtobeineconsistentwithNODE3acciden3q.lfiLCO3(.<V,c.Failuretoprovidedecayheatremovalmayresultinchallengestoafissionproductbarrier.TheRCSloopsarepartoftheprimarysuccesspaththatfunctionsoractuatestopreventormitigateaDesignBasisAccidento}transientthateitherassumesthefailureof,orpresentsachallengeto,theintegrityofafissionproductbarrier.RCSWoops-ggl@3satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.+qh>i:5>~S,>'LL~,aoa~WcbOqihTheurposeofthisLCOistoreuirethatCoopse<~InBODE3withtheRTsincosiionandRodControlSystemcarodwithdrawa,RCSloopsmustoperation.[Two]RCSloopsarerequiredto'rationinMODE3withRTBsclosedandRodCSystemcofrodwithdrawalduetotheationofapowerexcursioneofanfodwitored~TyoneRCSloopinoperationisnecessaryoensureremovalofdecayheatfromthecoreandhomogenousboronconcentrationthroughouttheRCSAnadditionalRCSloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsafetyanalyseslimitsaremet.34.LV.c~p~g.ZWoR=TPTheNoteermitsallRCPstobede-energizedfor<Iourperourperio.ThepurposeoftheNoteistoperformteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthesetestsisvalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurveusedasinputtoanumberofaccideanalsesincludinalossofflowaccident.ThistesgQs~~~~~~~duringtheinitialstartuinNhqab~3testinroraIf,however,changesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesofthecoastdowncurvemustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.vertentcontrolrodwithdrawal.TherequirednhI'riteriawillbemetforallofthepostulatedaccidents.OWithteositionortheCRDde-energized,theRodCon.ofr(continued)WOGSTS83.4-22Rev.0,09/28/92

~O~-Z(<<S.SV~W~F'sZ~gsRCSLoops-ERR3EB3B3.4.5BASESLCO(continued)3EetV,s.oramoroddropcon1tions,ithoutflow.ToflowtestmaybeerformedinMODE3,4or5.an@.TheNotepermitsthede-energizing*ofthepumpsinordertoperformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalysisvalues.'swiththevalidationofthepumpcoastdowncurve,thistestshouldbeperformedonlyonceunlesstheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCSarechanged.The1hourtimeperiodspecifiedisadequatetoperformthedesiredtests,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationoftheNoteispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,therebymaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.inca~amMrssQtaa'taa4.ChtaanaOIJALAnOPERABLERCSloopconsistsofanna"OPERABLERCPandoneOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram,whichhastheminimumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.5.2.AnRCPisOPERABLEifitiscapableofbeingpoweredandisabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYNsSCsC5\CgS'gsa~a+a4a4setsa.ciocss"++~In,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremoveecatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboromi'nThemoststringentn0is,twoRCSloosandtwoRCSloopsinoperation3withRTBsintheclosed'.Theleaststringentcon,isg(continued)WOGSTSB3.4-23Rev.0,09/28/92 d'~0~ZI-'a~)mO=apZ,~,RCSLoops~QN~"3B3.4.5BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)twoRCooneop-i'ion,app1jg~~QBeRTBs~oen.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredb.)(.StmO=uPLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODESIQ~;LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4";LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCO3.9,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculationMaterLevel"MODE6;LCO3.9.fg"ResidualHeatemoval(RHR)andCooantG<Circulation-LGPWaterLevel"(MODE6.~z.sC'+endear,ACTIONSobanohAa2Ifone~~RCSloopisinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.TheRequiredActions;-~V.aEhr-'oOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeoours.Thistimeallowanceisajustifiedperiodtobewithouttheredundant,nonoperatingloopbecauseasingleloopinoperationhasaheattransfercapabilitygreaterthanthatneededtoremovetheecayheatproducedinthereactorcoreandbecauseofthelowprobabilityofafailureintheremainingloopoccurringduringthisperiod.&0c&s-~a.4..j,V~"r.Ifrestorationdisnotpossiblewithin72hours,the~mz,.mustbebroughttoMODE4.InMODE4,the'u~X~maybeplacedontheResidualHeatRemovalSystem.TheadditionalCompletionTime'of12hoursiscompatiblewithrequiredoperationstoachievecooldownanddepressurizationfromtheexistingplantconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C3C.1anIftherequiredRCSloop'ation,andtheRTBsareclosedandRodContrsemeofrodwithdrawal,theRequiredA'seithertorestoretiredRCSloopationortode-energizeallCRDMsbyopee(continued)WOGSTSB3.4-24Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.4.10KaretoverifythattheSDHiswithinlimits'specifiedintheCOLR.ThisactionisrequiredtoensurethatadequateSDHexistsintheeventofamainsteamlinebreakwithonlyoneRCSloopinoperation.The12hourFrequencyconsidersthetimerequiredtoobtainRCSboronconcentrationsamplesandthelowprobabilityofamainsteamlinebreakduringthistimeperiod.TheinoperableRCSloopmustberestoredInsert3.4.11RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenoneRCSloopisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseasingleRCSloopcanprovidetherequiredcoolingtoremovereactoranddecayheat. rwOa->8.&oO=.(~Z~,RCSLoops-QB/3B3.4.5BASESACTIONSC.dC.2(continued)RTBsorde-gizingthemotorgenerator(HG)se.WhentheRTBsareinclosedpositionandRodrolSystemcapableofrodwithal,itispostulthatapowerexcursioncouldoccurineeventaninadvertentcontrolrodwithdrawal.ThismandateavingtheheattransfercapacityoftwoRCSloonoperon.Ifonlyoneloopisinoperation,themustbeopene.TheCompletionTimesof1hourtororetherequiredRCSlooooperationorde-enerallCRDMsisadequatetoperformeopeonsinanorderlymanner.withoutexposingunittoaskforanunduetimeperiod.C.CCJF:I3k"2andlP.3IfQw~CSloopsareinoperableornoRCSloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbytheNoteintheLCOsection,allCROHsmustbede-energizedbyopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheHGsets.AlloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspended,andactiontorestoreoneoftheRCSloopstoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andopeningtheRTBsorde-energizingtheMGsetsremovesthepossibilityofaninadvertentrodwithdrawal.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS+a~SR3.4.5.1NThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthainoperation.Verificationincludesflowrae,temperature,pumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelp.ensureaflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRCSloopperformance.3'4.iv.c.~so~~~~~Mi~Li~o~Wr~P~~lS+~lbc~oui(continued)WOGSTSB3.4-25Rev.0,09/28/92, o~s<~e.s42:<o,zRCSLoops-(JURY'3B3.4.5BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.4.5.2RE(UIREHENTS(continued)'Kcg.i<.dOPERABILITY+lPOrequiresverificationofSGPERABILITY.SGisverifiedbyensurngthatthesecondarysidenarrowrange'waterlevelisz'oRCSloops.IftheSGsecondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelisC9~<gpss,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedloomanotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinkforremovalo@+decayheat.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortoalossofSGlevel.3(.iv.d3t.vi'sSR3.4.5.3Verificationthatthereu'nsuresthatOPERABLEadditionalcanbepacesnoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabilitytotherequiredRCPs.REFERENCES~~~ch0ld~Ls~MRS~~a~i4vi~cko~o.+~~Ha~~C~hi~~~~Weo~sM~w~CAa'4)~RAM~~~LS.l.5uFKAR.~~~iS.q,g.3.~~~~0~hh.M~~4~k4,QP-C~a.G,k4xim,8-G~c,5~paopec.~v-9A~~p>4~~~cW~~op,~<.'G~~a."4~~~a+2.s,sQQIv+XAL~aM>R.l.l,z-.g~QIs.2..5'.2.uFs.A-A.~>~iM.w.L~s5'OGSTSB3.4-26Rev.0,09/28/92' RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6,B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.6RCSLoops-MODE4BASESBACKGROUND371137'll1~lh~~~ReRq~~llie&~~4.~C+@a~d4u~PmelM+Ra~SlaV.,InMODE4,theprimaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattoeitherthesteamgenerator(SG)secondarysidecoolantorthecomponentcooling,waterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.+~oThereactorcoolantiscirculatedthroughRCSloopsconnectedinparalleltothereactorvesse,each+@.containing~G,areactorcoolantpump(RCP),andappropriateflow,pressure,level,andtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.TheRCPcirculatethecoolantthroughthereactorvesselandSGsatasufficientratetoensureproperheattransferandtopreventboricacidstratification.LCSInMODE4,eitherorRHRloopscanbeusedtoprovideforcedcirculation.TheintofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoroneRHRloopfordecayheatryuqvalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyonedgP-<<>loopo"HRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyfordecayheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES'37,14InMODE4,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationo>7.h'~.aaccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRCSandRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSpops-MODE4havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCOThepurpose,ofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLEinMODE4andthatoneoftheseloopsbeinoperation.TheLCOallowsthetwoloopsthatare,requiredtobeOPERABLEtoconsistofanycombinationofRCS(continued)B3.4-27 RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESLCO(continued)37mtl\,+~w~3V.'><<.b.3l,iii.<c:cWawor~~a%~tWOPewa4)e.MzpkcP<c.4~~a~r<~~~~el&vwL%c~32A~4;<~+Cog<,l~<~rw~RC~6loopsandRHRloops.Anyoneloopinoperationprovidesenoughflowtoremovethedecayheatfromthecorewithforcedcirculation.AnadditionalloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.NoteIpermitsallRCPsorRHRpumpstobede-energizedfor<Ihourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermitteststhataredesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalsesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthesartuptestingprogramthevalidationofroddroptimesduringcoldconditions,bothwithandwithoutflow.enoflowtestmaybeperformedinNODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsthede-energizingofthepumpsinordertoerformthistestandvalidatetheassumedanalsisvalues.'fcangesaremadetotheRCSthatwouldcauseachangeotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductithetestaain.TheIourt>meperio>saequatetoperformthetest,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotaproblemduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNoteIispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremetalongwithanyotherconditionsimposedbytestprocedures:a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleastl0Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.Note2requiresthatthsecondarysidewatertemperatureofeachSGbe<502%I'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofanRCPwithanyRCScoldegemperaure~'F.preventalowtemperatureoverpressureeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstarte~~.<.>z.AnOPERABLERCSloopcomprisesanOPERABLERCPandanOPERABLESGinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTube(continued)B3'28QK~wn~w,a-~~~~m4.iM~ Insert3.4.12ThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.RestraintsonthepressurizerwatervolumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperature BASES~iai~ORCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6gC.Cs~QP~*S(.zp>~~SI.~~~~p~oa4~Sao~CiLCO~~(continued)Z).Lli~0:RhOPER-681.iLAPIo0p~CA.lfoh~'Ah4.RM'p~aoaQ,~hoop~Q,OdO~E~os',,SurveillanceProgram,whichhasthemini'mumwaterlevelspecifiedinSR3.4.6.2.<SimilarlyfortheRHRSystem,anOPERABLERHRloopcomprisesanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofdingforcedflowtoanOPBLERHRheatexchangerRHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapaeofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideforcedflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODE4,thisLCOensuresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecayheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OneloopofeitherRCSorRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,twoloopsconsistingofanycombinationofRCSandRHRloopsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.OperationinotherMODESiscoveredb.)S.sfoC-'rPLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-'ODES1(~P"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-'CO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-,LoopsFilled"',LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCO3.9&,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-~WaterLevel"MODE6);andLCO3.9A,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andooan<5Circulation-~WaterLevel"(MODE6.ACTIONS3+~aa2l.iii.WA.1Ifonee~~@RCSloop'sinoperableandtwoRHRloopsareinoperable,redundancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatus.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimortanceofasntainintheavailabilitoftwoathsforB.1P9pheatremoval.tl.Q~iCcaXD~~~p~~myO(~'ErxoM~~@LA,<QQ~a~oaa~go~~~~s,o~~8-~oo~4~~~3)La->.ih.<Ifone(H~~RHRlooRCSloopsisaad,aninoperableRCSorRHRieopale(continued)B3.4-29 RCSLoops-MODE483.4.6BASESACTIONS~+7,IlaCLP1o.W.iiiAc'.H.SB.l(continued)loopmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatustoprovidearedundantmeansfordecayheatremoval.Iftheparametersthatareoutsidethelimitscannotberestored,th~mustbebroughttoMODE5within24ours.riningthetoMODE5isaconservativeacsonw>tregaroecayheatremoval.WithonlyoneRHRloopOPERABLE,redundancyfordecayheatremovalislostand,intheeventofalossoftheremainingRHRloop,itwouldbesafertoinitiatethatlossfromMODE5(<200'F)raerthanMODE4(200to'@F).TheCompletionTimeof24hoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5fromMODE4inanorderlymanner.andwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.landC.2eIfnoloopisOPERABLEorinoperation,exceptduringconditionspermittedbyNoteIintheLCOsection,alloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboron'concentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRCSorRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Borondilutionrequiresforcedcirculationforpropermixing,andthemargintocriticalitymustnotbereducedinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationfordecayheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustbecontinueduntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS+~.iil.aSR3.4.6.1alarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthemonitorRCSandRHRloopperformance.u.~~Q~~hi~ovc.p~~~s,i"~m~>+g4<vc.vg,~op-.(continued)ThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneRCSorRHRloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsand'IB3.4-30 Insert3.4.5RequiredActionB.1ismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatonlytheRequiredActionsofConditionCareenteredifallRCSandRHRloopsareinoperable.WithallRCSandRHRloopsinoperable,MODE5cannotbeenteredandRequiredActionsC.landC.2aretheappropriateremedialactions.

RCSLoops-MODE4B3.4.6BASESSURVEILLANCESR3.4.6.2REQUIREMENTS<<"".-~(continued)OPERABILITz~.;i',.snarrowrang~urequiresverificatio'ofSGOPERABILITY.SG,YisverifiedbyensuringthatthesecondarysideewaterlevelisZI.ftheSGsecondaryssdenarrowrangewaterlevelis<.,thetubesmaybecomeuncoveredandtheassociatedoopmaynotbecapableofprovidingtheheatsinknecessaryforremovalofdecayheat.Thel2hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel./2'7.Vii.a.SR3.4.6.3VerificationthattherequiredpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalRCSorRHRpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.VerificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletotherequiredpumpTheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.~~WoveREFERENCES(g~MFfiP83.4-31 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled83.4.7B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.7RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled~oe.vBASES~ca,vs~S~maa~XeAOcMvW~c,~Csatan~aas~Macs,~BACKGROUND~~o~(Ao4~P.ii.bOS11i.Q.3V.V'sInMODE5withtheRCSloopsfilled,heprimaryfunctionof=.maddd~thiheat,tothesteamgeneratongr(sGsf)dopresidualheatremoval(RWR)heatexchangers.WhiletheprincipalmeansfordecayheatremovalisviatheRHRSystem,theSGsarespecifiedasabackupmeansforredundancy.EventhoughtheSGscannotproducesteaminthisMODE,theyarecapableofbeingaheatsinkduetotheirlargecontainedvolumeofsecondarywater.AslongastheSGsecondarysidewaterisatalowertemperaturethanthereactorcoolant,heattransferwilloccur.Therateofheattransferisdirectlyproportionaltothetemperaturedifference.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforsolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thereactorcoolantiscirculatedbymeansoftwoRHRloopsconnectedtothe~~),eachloopcontaininganRHRheatexchanger,anRHRpump,andappropriateflowandtemperatureinstrumentationforcontrol,protection,andindication.OneRHRpumpcirculatesthewaterthroughtheRCSatasufficientratetopreventboricacidstratification.Thenumberofloopsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRloopfordecayheatremovalandtransport.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequatefordecayheatremoval.TheotherintentofthisLCOistorequirethatasecondpathbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.TheLCOprovides.'forredundantpathsofdecayheatremovalcapability.ThefirstpathcanbeanRHRloopthatmustbeOPERABLEandinoperation.ThesecondpathcanbeanotherOPERABLERHRloopormaintaining@QS&srwithseconarysidewaterleveldlrabove(M)%toprovideanalternatemethodfordecayheatremoval.dd.%DAN%B3.4-32(continued) RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES3'ii'.ttt~~.~.VseInHODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationof~Waccidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.RCSHoops-HODE5@%opsgilled)havebeenidentifiedintheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCO~a'Z3.Vti.+3e.ii.o.ThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleastoneoftheRHRloopsbeOPERABLEandinoperationwit~o~additionalRHRloopOPERABLEor~Gswithsecondarsidewaerevel>"ggN.OneRHRloopprovidessuicientforcedcirculationtoperformthesafetyfunctionsofthereactorcoolantundertheseconditions.AnadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.However,ifthestandbyRHRooisnotOPERABLE,anacceptablealternatemethodiS~itarnedi11snm.>>hoperatingRHRloopfail,theScouldbeusedtoremovethedecayheat.NoteIpermitsallRHRpumpstobede-energized<Ihourper8hourperiod.ThepurposeoftheNoteistopermittestsdesignedtovalidatevariousaccidentanalysesvalues.Oneofthetestsperformedduringthestartuptestingprogram~thevalidationofroddtimesdurincoldconditions,owianwithoutflowenoflowtestmayeperformedinHODE3,4,or5andrequiresthatthepumpsbestoppedforashortperiodoftime.TheNotepermitsde-energizingofthepumpsinordertoerfothistestandvalidatetheassumedanalsisvalues.IfchangesaremaetotheRCSthawoudcauseacangetotheflowcharacteristicsoftheRCS,theinputvaluesmustberevalidatedbyconductingthetestagain.~eIhourtimeperioisadequatetoperormees,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatboronstratificationisnotlikelyduringthisshortperiodwithnoforcedflow.UtilizationofNoteIispermittedprovidedthefollowingconditionsaremet,alongwithanyotherconditionsimposedby'estprocedures:(continued)B3.4-33 t"I'lt 3RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4a7BASESLCO(continued)a.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;andb.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationflowobstruction.DR.s~ti+.~v:~4+<><~'PP.uset'eCIA+s'~t~oes33.ssi.tn.~P/sf,~~aamNote4providesforanorderlytransitionfromMODE5toMODE4duringaplannedheatupbypermittingremovalofRHR~~loopsfromoperationwhenatleastoneRCSloopisin~coperation.ThisNoteprovidesforthetransitiontoMODE4""P""'whereanRCSlo'sermittedtobeinoperationandVsoRot.'snsa>>~hMtoss&@Latmmrsaausss'Ayhqe)~~~4(a'ts<replaceste'esfunctionprovidedbytheRHR~oops~~~p,nmsnaS'hy~e.so.s~lhs=Qtea%~%MCk.~~~+~w4lRHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapaeoeonweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.SGcanperformasaheatsinkwhenitisOPERABLEinaccordancewitteSteamGeTueSurveillanceProgram,Q~tgggw..e.,h,t.+Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperableforaperiodtjjP-.<<2hours,providedthattheotherRHRloopisOPERABLEaninoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhensuchtestingissafeandpossible.Note3requirestJg.ttheWecondarysidewatertemperatureof~'~,~~.eachSGbe<g50$FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperaturesbeforethestartofareactoantum(RCPwithanRCScoldlegtemperature<~PF.<<~+mme.PeventduetoathermaltransientwhenanRCPisstarteAPPLICABILITYInMODE5withRCSloopsfilled,thisLCOrequiresforcedcirculationofthereactorcoolanttoremovedecaheatfromthecoreandtoprovideproperboronmixing.OneloopofRHRprovidessufficientcirculationforthesepurposes.However,oneadditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,(continued)B3.4-34 Insert3.4.12zs.ivThewatervolumelimitensuresthatthepressurizerwillaccommodatetheswellresultingfromanRCPstart.Restraintsonthepressurizerwater.volumeandSGsecondarysidewatertemperatureInsert3.4.13.ZQ.iii.o~~TheRCSloopsareconsideredfilleduntiltheisolationvalvesareopenedtofacilitatedrainingoftheRCS.TheloopsarealsoconsideredfilledfollowingthecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS. RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3.4.7BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)~yr.;CBorthesecondarysidewaterlevelofatleast(8wsSG2oisrequiredtobeZ,QFg/.~ttOperationinotherMODESiscovered>e.s~rL-.PLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODESILCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-'~>~<~~<s~4~~~~~~LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-04">LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled";LCO3.9A,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-8WaterLevel"MODE6);andLCO3.9.8,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andooanQuCirculation-~WaterLeve"(MODcazarACTIONSA.landA.2ttlo0IfoneRHRloopisinoperableandGshavesecondarysidewaterlevels<.,reunancyforheatremovalislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedimmediatelytorcondRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusortorestoreSGsecondarysidewaterlevel~'itherRequiredActionA.IorRequiredActionA.2willrestoreredundantheatremovalpaths.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.3<.i.ii,bB.land8.2~$+~~wawcsMK~optZdi~~WDC~f't-s=+~Mgcavr&~wt'4CLJ'~'Z'P.lit.cIfno.RHRloopisinoperation,exceptduringconditionsermittedbyNot&'orifnoloopisOPERABLE,alloperasonsinvovingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimesreflecttheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval3Z.t'tt.h~+~~%~w~'Lo~%<opt$,~O(~Rahu=$~C~W~~ewv..B3.4-35(continued) RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledB3;4.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS-~ss.i~P2.M.7,sse.SCsOPstiCAryssssfSR3.4.7.1Osasa,AHR-ThisSRrequiresverification'every12hoursthaKQQ!loopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.~~P~.itt.c.4O~Q.amgX~tsua,SR3.4.7.2~s-~~P~~~~~~su~t~~t~.verifyingthatatleaststssgssgsr'0PERABLEensuring~~5secondarysidenarrowrangewaterlevelensuresanalternatedecayheatremovalmethodintheventthatthesecondRHRloopisnotOPERABLE.IfbothRHRloopsareOPERABLE,thisSurveillanceisnotneeded.The12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomtoalerttheoperatortothelossofSGlevel.SR3.4.7.3VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyinrrbreake~eMaalignmentandpoweravailabletotheRHRpum.IfsecondarysiewaereveisZ~~%inatleast@@SGwisSurveillanceisnotneeded.'heFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.REFERENCESB3.4-36 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.8RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledBASESBACKGROUNDOZg.'<ii6InMODE5withtheRCSloopsnotfilled,theprimaryfunctionoftheeactorcoolantistheremovalofdecayheatandthetransferofthisheattothecomponentcoolingwaterviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)heatexchangers.Thesteamgenerators(SGs)arenotavailableasaheatsinkwhentheloopsarenotfilled.Thesecondaryfunctionofthereactorcoolantistoactasacarrierforthesolubleneutronpoison,boricacid.InMODE5withloopsnotfilled,onlyRHRpumpscanbeusedforcoolantcirculation.Thenumberofpumpsinoperationcanvarytosuittheoperationalneeds.TheintentofthisLCOistoprovideforcedflowfromatleastoneRHRpumpfordecayheatremovalandtransportandtorequirethattwopathsbeavailabletoprovideredundancyforheatremoval.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES3I~IIg,4.InMODE5,RCScirculationisconsideredinthedeterminationofthetimeavailableformitigationoHXit~accidentalborondilutionevent.TheRHRloopsprovidethiscirculation.TheflowprovidedbyoneRHRloopisadequateforheatremovalandforboronmixing.RCSloopsinMODE5(loopsnotfilled)havebeenidentified-intheNRCPolicyStatementasimportantcontributorstoriskreduction.LCO3g,iii.eThepurposeofthisLCOistorequirethatatleasttwoRHRloosbeOPERABLEandoneoftheseloopsbeinoeration~+transfer~heatfromthereactorcoolantatacontrolledrate.HeatcannotberemovedviatheRHRSystemunlessforcedflowisused.'Aminimumofone~P@HRpumpmeetstheLCOrequirementforoneloopinoperation.An'dditionalRHRloopisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetsinglefailureconsiderations.(continued)B3.4-37 RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESLCO(continued)Note1permitsallRHRpumpstobede-energizedfor<15minuteswhenswitchingfromonelooptoanother.ThecircumstancesforstoinbothRHRumsaretobelimited0si~ismalsonswenthe~outaet>me>ssor'[andtisorondilutionIrasonswhenRHorcepped...Note2allowsoneRHRlooptobeinoperablefor'periodof<2hours,providedthattheotherloopisOPERABLEandinoperation.Thispermitsperiodicsurveillanceteststobeperformedontheinoperableloopduringtheonlytimewhenthesetests,.aresafeandpossible.AnOPERABLERHRloopiscomprisedofanOPERABLERHRpumpcapableofprovidingforcedflowtoanOPERABLERHRheatexchanger.RHRpumpsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingpoweredandareabletoprovideflowifrequired.APPLICABILITYInMODE5withloopsnotfilled,thisLCOrequirescoreheatremovalandcoolantcirculationbytheRHRSystem.CB(QOperationiLCO3.4.4,LCO3.4.5,LCO3.4.6,LCO3.4.7,LCO3.9.~QaLCO3.9.MnotherMODESiscovere~~+'e.s%,0-~P"RCSLoops-MODE-15~";"RCSLoops-3";"RCSLoops-MODE4";"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled";"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel"MODE6);and"ResidualHeatemoval(RHR)andooanCirculation-CQh-WaterLevel."(MOD6.ACTIONSA.lIfonlyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatus.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.~aeghanQ.staaQ-Xmsopwp++-pret.+(continued)B3.4-38 Insert3.4.14andrequiresthatthefollowingconditionsbemet:Ia.NooperationsarepermittedthatwoulddilutetheRCSboronconcentration,thereforemaintainingthemargintocriticality.BoronreductionisprohibitedbecauseauniformconcentrationdistributionthroughouttheRCScannotbeensuredwheninnaturalcirculation;b.Coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10Fbelowsaturation'emperature,sothatnovaporbubblemayformandpossiblycauseanaturalcirculationFlowobstruction;andc.No,drainingoperationsarepermittedthatwouldfurtherreducetheRCSwatervolumeandpossiblycauseamorerapidheatupoftheremainingRCSinventory.Insert3.4.15Z9.iii.wTheRCSloopsareconsiderednotfilledfromthetimeperiodbeginningwiththeopeningofisolationvalvesanddrainingoftheRCSandendingwiththecompletionoffillingandventingtheRCS. RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilledB3.4.8BASESACTIONS(continued)~~1't/i43m',tVWmt~C3.~.<4mi-ti-.~Ltaopts'P~P.~>B.landB.2atIfno~j~~RHRlooinoperationexceptduringconditionspermittedyNote1,aoperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentratiosuspendedand'actiontoRooptoOPERABLEsatusandoeratiouiresorceorormi1ution,andcr'be'~ation.(TeimmediateCompletionimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation.~+mmeo~;,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.8.1aeoThisSRrequiresverificationevery12hoursthatoneloopisinoperation.Verificationincludesflowrate,temperature,orpumpstatusmonitoring,whichhelpensurethatforcedflowisprovidingheatremoval.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsideringotherindications'ndalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomtomonitorRHRloopperformance.SR3.4.8.2Verificationtha"ensurestaadditionalpumps-canbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproerbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothe~~~pum~TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewof.otheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience.omm~aatoaeREFERENCESNone.B3.4-39 Insert3.4.16\Imustbeinitiated.Toprevent.borondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthis'typeofoperation. 1Pressurizer83.4.9B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTBI(RCS)B3.4.9PressurizerBASESBACKGROUND90.ir.a.QO.iv.bOE~~tCra(LgHO,ap,bp~i~~P.~~+.4.a73.W.tQIgci.iv,a.Mc,C.,~%Was~ThepressurizerprovidesapointintheRCSwhereliquidandvaporaremaintainedinequilibriumundersaturatedconditionsforpressurecontrolpurposestopreventbulkboilingintheremainderoftheRCS.Keyfunctionsincludemaintainingrequiredprimarysystempressureduringsteadystateoperation,andlimitingthepressurechangescausedbyreactorcoolantthermalexpansionandcontractionduringnormalloadtransients.ThepressurecontrolcomponentsaddresseythisLCOincludetheressurizerwaterlevelerequiredheaters~eatUnlessadequateeatercapacityisavailtherequiresucoolingmarininerimarysysteInabilitytocontrolthesystempressureanmaintainsubcoolingunderconditionsofnaturalcirculationflowintheprimarysystemcouldleadtoPressurizersafetyvalvesandpressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"andLCO3.4.11,"PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs),"respectively.'+s-~g~s:svtTheintentoLCOistoensurethatasteambubbleexistsinthepressurizerpriorto~oweroperationtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Thepresenceofasteambubbleisconsistentwithanalmptions.Relativelysmallamountsofnoncondensiblegasecaninhibitthecondensationheattransferbetween.thepressurizersprayandthesteam,anddiminishthesraectivenessssurcoElectricaimmersioneaers,ocaeineowersecioofthepressurizervessel,keepthewaterinthepressurizeratsaturatiogtemperatureandmaintainaconstantoperatingpressure.minimumrequiredavailablecapacityofpressurizerheatersensuresthattheRCSpressurecanbemaintainedThecapabilitytomaintainandcontrolsystempressureisimportantformaintainingsubcooledconditionsintheRCSandensuringthecapabilitytoremovecoredecayh(continued)B3.4-40 Insert3.4.17~~ThisLCOalsoensuresthatadequateheatercapacityisavailableinthepressurizertosupportnaturalcirculationfollowinganextendedlossofoffsitepower..Insert3.4.18Theseheatersaredividedintotwogroups,acontrol/variablegroupandabackupgroup.Thecontrol/variablegroupisnormallyusedduringpoweroperationsincetheseheatershaveinverseproportionalcontrolwithrespecttothepressurizerpressure.Thebackupgroupiseitherfullyonoroffwithsetpointsthatarebelowthoseforthecontrol/variablegroup.BothgroupsofheatersarereceivepowerfromtheEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)480Vbuses,however,'heheatersareshedfollowingacoincidentlossofoffsitepowerorsafetyinjectionsignal.Theheaterscanbemanuallyloadedontothedieselgeneratorsifrequired. BASESPressurizer"4y~ll.4.9P+~~(~~~'q:.cashea'Ant'.-'ha<<~C.~<.e0S"BACKGROUND(continued)alossofsinglephasenaturalcirculationanddecreasedcapabilitytoremovecoredecayheat.~~lo.'tv.aAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESO80.'tV,hInMODESI,2,and3,theLCOrequirementforasteambubbleisreflectedimplicitlyintheaccidentanalyses.SafetanalysesperformedforlowerMODESarenotlimitin'.1analysesperformedfromacriticalreactorconditionassumetheexistenceofasteambubbleandsaturatedconditionsinthepressurizer.Inmakingthisassumption,theanalysesneglectthesmallfractionofnoncondensiblegasesnormallypresent.Safetyanalysespresentedinthe+FSAR(Ref.1)donottake.creditforressurizerheateroperation,"however,annayses:isthaingatnormalressuThemaximumpressurizerwaterlevellimitsaiCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.8.'~thel&l%~offsitepower,asindicatedinNUREG-0737(Ref.2),isthereasonforprovidinganLCO.~~.LCO/rsl\1aILCOrequirementforthepressurizertobeOPERABLEwithawavolume<[1240]cubicfeet,whichisequivalentto[92]%,euresthatasteambubbleexists.LimitingtCOmaximumopetingwaterlevelpreservesthesteamsceforpressurecontr.TheLCOhasbeenestablishedensurethecapabilitytotablishandmaintainprurecontrolforsteadystateopeionandtominimitheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressutransientsequiringthepresenceofasteambubblealsconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions.TheLCOrequirestwoupsofOPERApressurizerheaters,eachwithacapacip[125]kW,capablefbeingpoweredfromeitherthffsitepowersourceortheergencypowersupply.TinimumheatercapacityrequiredsufficienttomainntheRCSnearnormaloperatingpressurhenaccingforheatlossesthroughthepressurizer'ulation.Bymaintainingthepressureneartheoperat'continued)B3.4-41 ~\PI'M~Insert3.4.19Thepressurizerheatersareassumedtobeavailablewithinonehourfollowingthelossofoffsitepowerandinitiationofnaturalcirculation(Ref.3).Insert3.4.20TheLCO.establishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethatasteambubbleexistswithinthepressurizerandthatsufficientheatercapacityisavailabletosupportanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.,ForthepressurizertobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestablishedintheSRsforwaterlevelandheatercapacitymustbemetandtheheatersmustbecapableofbeingpoweredfromanemergencypowersourcewithinonehour. PressurizerB3.4.9BASESLCO(continued)onewidemargintosubcoolingcanbeo'ntheloops.Theelect-de<<.'valueofisderivedfromtheuseofsevenhea7.9kWeach].TheamountneededainpressureisdepeneheatlosAPPLICABILITYgp.iv.h%0.>v.'oTheneedforpressurecontrolismostpertinentwhencoreheatcancausethegreatesteffectonRCStemperature,resultinginthegreatesteffectonpressurizerlevelandRCSpressurecontrol.Thus,applicabilityhasbeendesignatedforMODESIand2.TheapplicabilityisalsoidfERCSoperationduringheatupanBcooldowntoavoidrapidpressurerisescausedbynormaloperationalperturbation,suchasreactorcoolantpumpstartup.InMODESI,2,and3,thereisneedtomaintaintheavailabilityofpressurizerheaters,capableofbeinpoweredfromanemergencypowersupply."neeventofalossofoffsitepower,theinitialconditionsoftheseMODESgivethegreatestdemandformaintainingthe'RCSinahotpressurizedconditionwithloopsubcoolingforanextendedperiod.ForMODE4,5,or6,itisnotnecessarytocontrolpressure(byheaters)toensureloopsubcoolingforheattransferwhentheResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)Systemisinservice,andtherefore,theLCOisnotapplicable.ACTIONSA.1andA.2OPressurizerwaterlevelcontrolmalfunctionsorotherplantevolutionsmayresultinapressurizerwaterlevelabovethenominalupperlimit,evenwiththeplantatsteadystateconditions.Normallythelantwilltripinthiseventsincetheupperlimit~isthesameasthePressurizerW~Level-igTrip.Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelisnotwithinthelimit,actionmustbetakentorestoretheplanttooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.Toachievethissaus,te'~mustbebroughttoMODE3,withthereactortripbreakersopen,within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.Thistakesthe~outoftheapplicableMODES(continued)B3.4-42 ~~%~{~Insert3.4.21Ifthepressurizerwaterlevelis>650cubicfeet,whichisequivalentto87%,theabilitytomaintainasteambubblemaynolongerexist.Thesteambubbleisnecessarytoensurethecapabilitytoestablishandmaintainpressurecontrolforsteadystateoperationandtominimizetheconsequencesofpotentialoverpressuretransients.Requiringthepresenceofasteambubbleisalsoconsistentwithanalyticalassumptions. PressurizerB3.4.9BASESACTIONSQ.iV.6A.landA.2(cinued)andrestoresthetooperationwithintheboundsofthesafetyanalyses.TheallowedCompletionTimes'arereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.4Q.isIfonerequireofpressurizerheatersisrable,restorationisrequire'n72houreCompletionTimeof72hoursisreasonabderingtheanticipationthatademandcauseossofoffsiterwouldbeunlikely'period.Pressurecontrolmayaintainedistimeusingnormalstationpoweredheaters.~~'c3t.2%0.ihE,RMlandM2ofpressurizerheatersareinoecannotberestoralloionTimeofRequiredActionanroughttoaMODEwdoesnotaly.ToaciethepantmustberougoMO3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSRo.'iq.bSR3.4.9.1ThisSRrequiresthatduringsteadystateoperation,pressurizerlevelismaintainedbelowthenominalupperlimittoprovideaminimumspaceforasteambubble.TheSurveillanceisperformedbyobservingtheindicatedlevel.TheFreuenc2hourshasbeenshownbyoperatingpracticetobesufficienttoregularlyassesslevelforanydeviationandverifythatoperationiswithin(continued)B3.4-43 ~~'L-~Insert3.4.22Ifthepressurizerheaterscapacityis<100KW,theabilitytomaintainRCSpressuretosupportnaturalcirculationmaynolongerexist.BymaintainingRCSpressurecontrol,amargintosubcoo1ingisprovided.Thevalueof100KWisbasedontheamountneededtosupportnaturalcirculationafteraccountingforheatlossesthroughthepressurizerinsulationduringanextendedlossofoffsitepowerevent.Ifthecapacityofthepressurizerheatersisnotwithinthelimit, PressurizerB3.4.9BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.9.1(continued)safetyanalysesassumptions.Alarmsarealsoavailableforearlydetectionofabnormallevelindications.SR3.4.9.290~iV.cHO.e'i~~<+i~+~s~LRerne<<m~~upson~KoQ.TheSRissatisfiedwhenthepowersuppliesaredemonstratedtobecoggleofreducingtheminimumoweismabedonebtestingthepowersupplyotuheFrequencyo92daysisconsideredadequatetodetectheaterdegradationandhasbeenshownbyoperatingexperiencetobeacceptable.S4-9-3ThisSRisnolicableiftheheaterspoweredbyClass1ersupplies.ermanentlyThisSurveillancedemonsestheheaterscanbemanuallytransferromthenormatheemergencypowersupplyandenzed.TheFrequency.of1thsisbasedonatfuelcycleandisconsistent.withsarv'cationsofemergencypowersupplies.REFERENCESl.V,FSAR,<4~~'hS2.NUREG-0737,November1980.oiWhljACÃmy,wbeWVl4~B3.4-44 ~'hhPressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.1083.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)83.4.10PressurizerSafetyValvesBASES0BACKGROUNDgt,dW.CL.~bt="4cW~V~~~ahoW~a-eP~ah~a.~o~~4~44I@T~R.Rl.fv.cThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovide,inconjunctionwiththeReactorProtectionSystem,overpressureprotectionfortheRCS.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesaretotallyenclosedpoptype,springloaded,selfactuatedvalveswithbackpressurecompensation.ThesafetyvalvesaredesignedtopreventthesystempressurefromexceedingthesystemSafetyLimit(SL),+273K@psig,whichis110%ofthedesignpressure.Egg,so~,Becausethesafetyvalvesaretoayenclosedandselfactuating,theyareconsidereindeendentcornonents.reliefcapacityforeachvalve,hr,isbasedonpostulatedoverpressuretransienconstionsresultingfromacompletelossofsteamflowtotheturbine.Thiseventresultsinthemaximumsurgerateintothepressurizer,whichspecifiestheminimumreliefcapacityforthesafetyvalves.Thedischargeflowfromthepressurizersafetyvalvesisdirectedtothepressurizerrelieftank.Thisdischargeflowisindicatedbyanincreaseintemperaturedownstreamofthepressurizersafetyvalvesorincreaseinthepressurizerrelieftanktemperatureorlevel.0erressureprotectionisrequiredinMODES1,23,4,d,h,hdd,ih~temperature@-<'andMODE5andMODE6withthereactorvesseleaon,overpressureprotectionisprovidedbyoperatingproceduresandbymeetingtherequirementsofLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverressureProtection(LTOP)System."~g~S+PCE~~S~~~a,~Q~~hl~~ll&owTheupperandlowerpressurelimitsareaseone+1%tolerancerequirement(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.TheliftsettingisfortheambientconditionsassociatedwithMODES1,2,and3.Thisrequireseitherthatthevalvesbesethotorthatacorrelationbetweenhotandcoldsettingsbeestablished.Thepressurizersafetyvalvesarepartoftheprimarysuccesspathandmitigatetheeffectsofpostulatedaccidents.OPERABILITYofthesafetyvalvesensuresthattheRCSpressurewillbelimitedto110%ofdesignpressur.(continued)B3.4-45 Insert3.4.23't(.'iv.4forallanticipatedtransientsexceptforthelockedrotoraccidentwhichremainsbelow120%ofthedesignpressureconsistentwiththeoriginalmaximumtransientpressurelimitfortheRCS(Refs.2,3and4). PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASES~$4SM~o~83t.ll.tv.'caBACKGROUNDheconsequencesofexceedintheAmericaSocietyo(continued)HechanicalEngineers(ASHEpressurelimi(Ref"IcouldincludedamagetoRCScomponents,increasedleakage,orarequirementtoperformadditionalstressanalysespriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESU5Allaccidentandsafetyanalysesinthe+FSAR(Ref.thatrequiresafetyvalveactuationassumeoperationofpressurizersafetyvalvestolimitincreasesinRCScpressure.Theoverpressurerotectionanalysis(Ref.Qisalsobasedonoperationofsafetyvalves.Accidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationifnotproperlyterminatedinclude:ho+4.a.Uncontrolledrodwithdrawalfromfullpower;l.aV.*b.Lossofreactorcoolantflow;c.Lossofexternalelectricalload;d.Lossofnormalfeedwater;(,svs~~~Rot.g.stt~Hqs~~ie.LossofallACpowertostationauxiliaries;andf.Lockedrotor.4(L.tv.cs.pG.nQDetailedanaplsesoftheabovetransientsarecontainedinReferenceW.Safetyvalveactuationisrequiredineventsc.de<<(above)tolimitthepressureincrease.Comp.iancewiththisLCOisconsistentwiththedesignbasesandaccidentanalysesassumptions.PressurizersafetyvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO+V@OThe(~QressurizersafetyvalvesaresettoopenattheRCSdesignpressure(2500psia),andwithintheASHEspecifiedtolerance,toavoidexceedingthemaximumdesignpressureSL,tomaintainaccidentanalysesassumptions,andtocomplywithASHErequirements.Theupperandlowerpressuretolerancelimitsarebasedonthe+1%tolerancerequirements(Ref.1)forliftingpressuresabove1000psig.+XLsassysves~+(continued)83.4-46 BASESPressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10~r)Q~~.sv/4.b.~~het-4~~~~r~QyQ~4vvvvNctb>>I~Cypcs1cQv'mg,(Ra'~i%aQ(.iv.+COThelimitprotectedbythisSpecificationisthereactor(continued):coolantpressureboundary(RCPB)SLof110%ofdesignpressure.InoperabilityofoneormorevalvescouldresultinexceedingtheSLifatransientweretooccur.TheconsequencesofexceedingtheASHEpressurelimitcouldincludedamagetooneormoreRCScomponents,increasedleakage,oradditionalstressanalysisbeingrequiredpriortoresumptionofreactoroperation.APPLICABILITYjl.iIItSlc.agIravvcasmsarst~~M.~<Ot'.~.a.t.)'nQh"~44InMODES1,2,and3,andportionsofHODE4abovetheLTOParmingtemperature,OPERABILITYof6h~valvesisrequiredbecausethecombinedcapacityisrequiredtokeepreactorcoolantpressurebelow110%ofitsdesignvalueduringcertainaccidents.MODE3andportionsofMODE4areconservativelyincluded,althoughthelistedaccidentsmaynotrequirethesafetyvalvesforprotection.~s+vnmJSTheLCOisnotalicableinHOOEewhen(STT)vRCScoldlegemperatures~srmorinMODE5becauseLTOPisprovided.OverpressureprotectionisnotreuiredinHwithrtorvesselheadd'one.o~~c.(>>f,~~~.~~~;Ql.1lf.a.n.S'sWr,v.scsv~NoteallowsentryintoMODES3and4withthelitsett)outsidetheLCOlimits.Thispermitstest'ndexaminatiothesafetyvalvesathighpressandtemperatureneareirnormaloperatingrange,butonlyafterthevalveshavehadapreliminarycoldsetting.ThecoldsettinggivesassuraricethatthevalvesareOPERABLEneartheirdesignconditionay~onevalveatatimewillberemovedfromserviortesting.TED[54]hourexceptionisbasn18houroutagetimeeachofthe[three]val.The18hourperiodisderived/operatexperiencethathottestingcanbeperformetimeframe.ACTIONSA.lWithonepressurizersafetyvalveinoperable,restorationmusttakeplacewithin15minutes.TheCompletionTimeof15minutesreflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheRCSOverpressureProtectionSystem.Aninoperablesafetyvalve(continued)B3.4-47

PressurizerSafetyValvesB3.4.10BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)coincidentwithanRCSoverpressureeventcouldchallengetheintegrityofthepressureboundary.B.landB.2f4a.<to&en.ah~aS~Q~i~i~iMIftheRthisstatus,theplantmustbebrouhttoatleastMODEwithin6hoursandtoMODE4<'ithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwitutcaengingpantsysems.PtorbelowoverpressureprotectionisprovidedbytheSystem.ThechangefromMODE1,2,or3toNODE4reducestheRCSenergy(corepowerandpressure),lowersthepotentialforlargepressurizerinsurges,andtherebyremovestheneedforoverpressureprotectionby,ressurizersafetyvalves.equiredActionofA.1cannotbemetwithintherequiredCompletionTimeorifressurizersafetyvalvesareinoperable,thepanmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.ToachieveSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSgl.iiQA.15SR3.4.10.1SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram.PressurizersafetyvalvesaretobetestedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionXIoteASHECode(Ref."+,whichprovidestheactivitiesand.FrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytheSRs.Noadditionalrequirementsarespecified.~a,'l4,.ThepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointisorOPERABILITY;however,thevalvesareresetto+1%duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.REFERENCES1.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionIII.S>FSAR,Chapterg15$.(continued)B3.4-48 Insert3.4.75IThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoMODES3and4withouthavingperformedtheSRforthepurposeofsettingthepressurizersafetyvalvesunderambient(hot)conditions.Thispermitstestingandexaminationofthesafetyvalvesathighpressureandtemperatureneartheirnormaloperatingrange,butonlyafterthevalveshavehadapreliminarycoldsetting.ThecoldsettinggivesassurancethatthevalvesareOPERABLEneartheirdesignconditionuntilcompletionofthesurveil-lance. PressurizerSafetyValves83.4.10BASEST~pg~~Wo&tAp~t54~PW~~~c~uc~~~<~~~~ra~~~R5~~~I,REFERENCES(continued)WCAP-7769,Rev.1,June1972.1'.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.B3.4-49 PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.11PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)BASESLiavaiaBACKGROUND+go~4<~i~Qo~co~~4,Thepressurizerisequippedwithtwotypesofdevicesforressurerelief:pressurizersafetyvalvesandPORVs.ThePORVsareairoperatedvalvesthatarecontrolledtoopenataspecificsetpressurewhenthepressurizerpressureincreasesandclosewhenthepressurizerpressuredecreases.ThePORVsmayalsobemanuallyoperatedfromthecontrolroom.Pals'>L459z.vi,a.gX.vs04a.v'<.e-Qg,vii0Slockvalves,whicharenormallyopen,arelocatedbetween.thepressurizerandthePORVs.TheblockvalvesareusedtoisolatethePORVsincaseofexcessiveleakageorastuckopenPORV.Blockvalveclosureisaccomplishedmanuallyusingcontrols.inthecontrolroom.AstuckopenPORVis,ineffect,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Assuch,blockvalveclosureterminatestheRCSdepressurizationandcoolantinventoryloss.ThePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesmaybeusedbyplantoperatorstodepressurizetheRCStorecoverfromcertaintransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.Additionally,the.seriesarrangementofthePORVsandtheirblockvalvespermitperformanceofsurveillancesonthevalvesduringpoweroperation.79,omThePORVsmayalsobeusedforfeedandbleedcorecoolinginthecaseofmultipleequipmentfailureeventsthatarenotwithinthedesignbasis,suchasatotallossoffeedwater.3",9~ThePORVs,theirblockvalves,andtheircontrolsarepoweredfromthevitalbusesthatnormallyreceivepowerfromoffsitepowersources,butarealsocapableofbeingpoweredfromemergentpowersourcesintheeventofalossofoffsitepower.ORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesarepoweredfromsearatesafetytrains(iaweuoQaThetwoPORVseach'resecapacityolb/hrat2335psig.fiefunctionaldesignoftheORsisbasedonmaintainingpressurebelowthedressurizerPtessurereactortripsetpointfollowingastepreductiono0%offullloadwithsteamdump.Inaddition,(continued)83.4-50 Insert3.4.26~~andauxiliaryfeedwater,ThePORVsarealsousedtomitigatetheeffectsofananticipatedtransientwithoutscram(ATWS)eventwhichisalsonotwithinthedesignbasis.Insert3.4.27'hePORVsarenormallyopenedbyusinginstrumentair-whichissuppliedthroughseparatesolenoidoperatedvalves(8620Aand8620B).ThesafetyrelatedsourceofmotiveairisfromtwoseparatenitrogenaccumulatorsthatarenormallyisolatedfromthePORVsbysolenoidoperatedvalves8619Aand8619B;however,solenoidoperatedvalves8620Aand8620BmustbeintheventpositiontoclosethePORVsregardlessofwhichmotiveairsourceisused. PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESBACKGROUND(continued)thePORVsminimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalvesandalsomaybeusedforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP).SeeLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES~lz.vw.QPlantoperatorsemploythePORVstodepressurizetheRCSinresponsetocertainplanttransientsifnormalpressurizersprayisnotavailable.FortheSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)event,thesafetyanalysisassumesthatmanualoperatoractionsarerequiredtomitigatetheevent.Alossofoffsitepowerisassumedtoaccompanytheevent,andthus,normalpressurizersprayisunavailabletoreduceRCSpressure.ThePORVsareassumedtobeusedforRCSdepressurization,whichisoneofthestepsperformedtoequalizetheprimaryandsecondarypressuresinordertoterminatetheprimarytosecondarybreakflowandtheradioactivereleasesfromtheaffectedsteamgenerator.ThePORVsare+'use~insafetyanalysesforeventsthatresultinincreasingRCSpressureforwhichdeparturefromnucleateboilingratio(DNBR)criteriaarecritical.ByassumingPORVmanualactuation,theprimarypressureremainsbelowtheipressurizerpressuretrip>setpoin'se0Rcalcuationismoreconservative)'ventsthatassumethisconitionincuea+4~0~(Ref-2fa.ea.v...v~".a~~~bp,'4ttull~jPiRV~i>>PtllRCP1iStatement.LCQMX.vwi<TheLCOrequiresthePORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvestobeOPERABLEformanualoperation+tomitigatetheeffectsassociatedwithanSGTR.BymaintainingtwoPORVsandtheirassociatedblockvalvesOPERABLE,thesinglefailurecriterionissatisfied.TheblockvalvesareavailabletoisolatetheflowpaththrougheitherafailedopenPORVoraPORVwithexcessiveleakage.SatisfyingtheLCOhelpsminimizechallengestofissionproductbarriers.B3.4-51(continued) BASES(continued)lz~',~4WMo('~mAQ,ti=+o~,~,~~e.~~ocmNPressurizerPORVsB3.4.11+X,vt,MAPPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,and3,thePORanditsblockvalve92.,Vs,E3.QZ.Vi,tb.beOPERABLEtolimitthepotentialforasmallreakLOCAthroughtheflowpath.ThemostlikelycauseforVsmallbreakLOCAisaresultofaressureincreasetransienttatcausesthePOVtoopenImbaancesinthe,energyoutputofthecoreandheatremovalbythesecondarysystemcancausetheRCSpressuretoincreasetothePORVopeningsetpoint.ThemostrapidincreaseswilloccuratthehigheroperatgpowerandpressureconditionsofMODESIand2.+RePORVsarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEinand3tominimizechallengestothepressurizersafetyvalves.PressureincreasesarelessprominentinMODE3becausecoreinputenergyisreduced,buttheRCSressureishihereore,eisappicaein0S1,2,and3.eLCOisnotapplicableinMODE4whenbothpressureandcoreenergyaredecreasedandthepressuresurgesbecomemuchlesssignificant.ThePORVsetpointisreducedforLTOPinMODES4,5,and6withthereactorvesselheadinplace.LCO3.4.12addressesthePORVrequirementsintheseMODES.ACTIONSWt.M~athoftAAL2Vs,sC.Qi,.sa@DEWQ~autttapaCagg~cledv~.~cteethC.qg~~~3s4~q.a,~par~M~~sfxWt~S;,4CCsa+WWC.,4Q,VstaEsLob+~~a&ssOaEL'inta~sea~'rtCC'l~++~Vt.WNote1hasbeenaddedtoclarifythat~ressurizerPORVsaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimes(i.e.,theCompletionTimeisonacornonentbasis.TheexceptionforLCO3.0.4,NoteJtfpermitsentryintoMODES1,2,and3toperformcyclingofthePORVsorlocvalvestoverifytheirOPERABLEstatus.TestingisnotperformedinlowerMODES.A.lo.a*.a-0p~Rdisc,t.e=<FARLm+MiththePORVsapableofbeing~W~eithertePORVserestoredortheflowpathioatedwithin1hourTheblockvalvessouebutpowermelockvalves,sinceremovurendertheblocvavrae.AthoughaPORVmayitmaybeabletobemanuallopenedandcoereore,abletoerformitsfunctioPORVi1oseatleakage,instrproblems,utomaticcontroercausesthatdonotreuseanddonotcreateapa(continued)83.4-52 Insert3.4.25APORVisconsiderednotcapableofbeingautomaticallycontrolledforany.problemwhichpreventsthePORVfromautomaticallyclosingonceithasautomaticallyopened.Thismay.be.duetoinstrumentationproblemsbutdoesnotincludeproblemswhichonlypreventthePORVfromautomaticallyopening(e.g.,lossofinstrumentairtothePORV)orwhichpreventthePORVfrombothautomaticallyopeningandclosing. BASESISol~Q~,~mCtve.g~tybkk/~~K0aav+cQr.W~~oSL.~.~~p~pressurizerPORVsB3.4.11ACTIONSA.1(continued)g~.v'ttQg.hvri~hX~cy,csepeo'shheMES~~~~~8&C~QHtg'PC'sO~ovvo9d~htAQEForthesereasons,theblockvalvemaybeclbuttheActionrequirespowerbemaintainedtothevalve.ThisConditionisonlyintendedtopermitoperationotheplantforalimitedperiodoftimenottoexceedthenextrefuelingoutage(MODE6)sothatmaintenancecanbeperformedonthePORVstoeliminatethNormally,thePORVsshouldeaaeforautomat>cmitigationofoverpressureeventsandshouldbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuspriortoenteringstartup(MODE2).guickaccesstothePORVforpressurecontrolcanbemadewhenpowerremainsontheclosedblockvalve.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisbasedonplantoperatingexperiencethathasshownthatminorproblemscanbecorrectedorclosureaccomplishedinthistimeperiod.92.vtt'tsSB.1B.2andB.3IfonePORVisnotcapableofbeinmanuayccledQ-museeserrestoredor>soateycosingtheassociatedblockvalveandremovinthepowertotheassociatedblockvalve.eCompeionTimesof1hourarereasonable,basedonchallengestothePORVsduringthistimeperiod,andprovidetheoperatoradequatetimetocorrectthesituation.IftheinoperablevalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,itmustbisolatedwithinthespecifiedtime.BecausethereiQ~~~PORVtha~~OPERABLE,anadditional72hours)sproveetorestoretheinoperablePORVtoOPERABLEstatus.IfthePORVcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionaltime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionD.$2.tsof-imWC.landC.2lfoneblockvalveIehalnoperable,thenitisnecessarytoeitherrestoretheblockvalvetoOPERABLEstatuswithintheCompletionTimeof1hourorplacetheassociatedPORVinmanualcontrol.Theprimeimportanceforthecapabilityto-closetheblockvalveistoisolateastuckopenPORV.Therefore,iftheblockvalvecannotberestoredtoOPERABLE(continued)B3,4-53 Insert3.4.28(Z.vsiiPORVinoperabilityincludes(butisnotlimitedto)theinabilityofthesolenoidoperatedisolationvalvefromthenitrogenaccumulatortoopenorthesolenoid'operatedisolationvalvefrominstrumentairtovent. PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONSC.landC.2(continued)M~~mM~wScL~~\M4l.chq'Lo.~i<+~POPMcc+~KM~Q-"~i~Poaa+oaQ~,g1Qg,q~,0statuswithin1hour,theRequiredActionistoplacethePORVinmanualcontroltoprecludeitsautomaticopeningforanoverpressureeventandtoavoidthepotentialforastuckopenPORVatatimethattheblockvalveisinoperable.Theompesonimeoourssreasonae,aseontesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeperiod,andprovidestheoeratortimetocesituation.Becausetheoperaor>sperm>eaompesonmmeoursorestoretheinoperableblockvalvetoOPERAhed<<hbiksinceesarenotcapableofmitigatinanoverpressureeventwhenplacedinmanualcontro.tblockvalveisrestoredwithintheComletionTimeofhoursRsIfitcannotberestoredwithinthisadditionatime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply,asrequiredbyConditionD.~~IX.ya.<0.1and0.2<~~@aco.~h.IftheRequiredActionofConditionA,B,orCisnotmet,thentheplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,.toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InMODES4and5,maintainingPORVOPERABILITYmayberequired.SeeLCO3.4.12.3.H.~9E.lE.2E.3andE.4ba~fORV~4?rnotcapableofbeingmanuaycyce,itisnecessartoitherrestoreatleastonevavew~sntheCompletionTimeof1hourorisolatetheflowpathbyclosingandremovingthepowertotheassociatedblockvalves.TheCompletionTimeof1hourisreasonable,basedonthesmallpotentialforchallengestothesystemduringthistimeandprovidestheoperatortime(continued)(AfS~Q83.4-54 Insert3.4.29~~~initiateactiontorestoreonePORVtoOPERABLEstatusimmediatelysincenoreliefvalveisavailabletomitigatethe.effectsassociatedwithanSGTR.Therefore,operatorsmust PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESACTIONS~Wi~Wcs<<m'e~uiva&00-Vo~~omaE.1E.2E.3andE.4(continued)tocorrectthesituation.l/IfonePORVisrestoredandonePORVremainsinoperable,thentheplantwillbeinConditionBwiththetimeclockstartedattheoriginaldeclarationofhavingtwoPORVsinoperable.IfnoPORVsarerestoredwithineCompletionTime,thenthepantmustbebroughttoaNODEToachievethisstatusthelantmustbebrougtto~~<~Q.Q,'lOTheaoweompeionimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanoonerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsF~A-.R+-F.2andF.3IIIfmorthanoneblockvalveisinoperable,itisnecessarytoeitherestoretheblockvalveswithintheCompletionTimeof1hr,orplacetheassociatedPORVsinmanualcontrolandrtoreatleastoneblockvalvewithin2urs[andrestoretheemainingblockvalvewithinT2hs].TheCompletionTimarereasonable,basedontsmallpotentialforchallenstothesystemdurinhistimeandprovidetheoperatortitocorrectthe'ation.G.landG.2IftheRequiredActionsofonditionarenotmet,thentheplantmustbebroughttaMODEinwhitheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievet'sstatus,theplanustbebroughttoatleastMODE3w'n6hoursandtoMODEwithin12hours.ThelowedCompletionTimesareronable,basedonoatingexperience,toreachtherequ'dplantconditiofromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlarmerandoutchallengingplantsystems.InMODES4an5,m'ainingPORVOPERABILITYmayberequired.SeeCO3.4.12.B3.4-55(continued) Insert3.4.30MODE3withT.,<500'Fwithin8hours.InMODE3withtheRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,thesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.SincetheRWSTcontainsalargervolumeofwaterthanthesecondarysideofaSG,theleakthroughtherupturedtubewillstopaftertheSGisfilledtocapacity.Therefore,anSGTRcanbemitigatedundertheseconditionswithoutanyreleaseofradioactivefluidthroughthemainsteamsafetyvalvesEnteringalowerMODEisnotdesirablewithbothPORVsinoperableandnotcapableofbeingmanuallycycledsincethePORVsarealsorequiredforlowtemperatureoverpressureprotection. PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.4.11.1Blockvalvecyclingverifiesthatthevalve(s)canbeclosedifneeded.ThebasisfortheFrequencyof92daysistheASNECode,SectionXI(Ref.Q.IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateaPORVthatiscapableofbeingmanuallycycled,theOPERABILITYoftheblockvalveisofimportance,becauseopeningtheblockvalveisnecessarytopermitthePORVtobeusedformanualcontrolofreactorpressure.IftheblockvalveisclosedtoisolateanotherwiseinoperablePORV,themaximumCompletion.TimetorestorethePORVandopentheblockvalveis72hours,whichiswellwithintheallowablelimits(25%)toextendtheblockvalveFrequencyof92days.Furthermore,thesetestrequirementswouldbecompletedbythereopeningofarecentlyclosedblockvalveuponrestorationofthePORVtoOPERABLEstatus(i.e.,completionofthe,RequiredActionsfulfillstheSR);TheNotemodifiesthisSRbystatingthatitisnotrequired~ihIbl11dM-s-460.Q2.vs.~SR3.4.11.2.~requiresacompletecycleofeachPORV.OperatingaPORVthroughonecompletecycleensuresthatthePORVcanbemanuallyactuatedformitigationofanSGTR.TheFrequencyofmonthsisbasedonatypicalrefuelingcycleandindustryacceptedpractice.C)SR.13OperatingthesoleaircontrolvalndcheckvalvesontheairaccumulatorsenORVcontrolsystemactuatesproperlywhencupo.heFrequencyof[18]monthsisbanatypicalrefuecleandtheFrequencyeotherSurveillancesusedtoeratePORBILITY.SR3.ThisSurveillanceisnelEpowersothevalves.withpermanent(continued)B3.4-56 PressurizerPORVsB3.4.11BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREVENTS4.11.4(continued)TheSurveillancetratesthatemerowercanbeprovidedandisperformeringpowerfromnormaltoemergencys'upplyaingves.TheFrequencyof[18]montasedonatypicalrefue'leandinacceptedpractice.REFERENCES<FSAR,Sectiongl5.Q.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.B3.4-57

LTOPSystemB3.4.12B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.12LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemBASESBACKGROUNDg3,z.a.TheLTOPSystemcontrolsRCSpressureatlowtemperaturessotheintegrityofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)isnotcompromisedbyviolatingthepressureandtemperature(P/T)limitsof10CFR50,AppendixG(Ref.1).ThereactorvesselisthelimitingRCPBcomponentfordemonstratinsuchrotection.ThePTLRprovidesthemaximumaowableactuationlogicsetpointsforthepoweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andthemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureduringcooldown,shutdown,andheatuptomeettheReference1requirementsduringtheLTOPMODES.I'hereactorvesselmaterialislesstoughatlowtemperaturesthanatnormaloperatingtemperature~Asthevesselneutronexposureaccumulates,thematerialtoughnessdecreasesandbecomeslessresistanttopressurestressatlowtemperatures(Ref.2);RCSpressure,therefore,ismaintainedlowatlowtemperaturesandisincreasedonlyastemperatureisincreased.ThepotentialforvesseloverpressurizationismostacutwhentheRCSiswatersolid,occurringonly~~utdown;apressurefluctuationcanoccurmorequicklythananoperatorcanreacttorelievethecondition.ExceedingtheRCSP/Tlimitsbyasignificantamountcouldcausebrittle,crackingofthereactorvessel.LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"requiresadministrativecontrolofRCSpressureandtemperatureduringheatupandooldowntopreventexceedingthePTLRlimits.~Q4jivy.~owCLT)s.Wc.h~q93.viiisLCOprovidesRCSoverpressureprotectionby~~~~+coolantinputcapabilityandhavingadequatepressurereliefcapacit.LimitingcoolantinputcapabilityreuiresnalbutoneHpandisoaingeaccumuaor.epressurereliccapacityrequireseithertworedundantoradepressurizedRCSandanRCSventofsufficientsize.OnertheopenRCSventistheoverpressure'p'rotectiondevicethatactstoterminateanincreasingpressureevent.Pop-YgC~~~~4a~4>ohwmqC.Ec.cDCOllinB3.4-58

Insert3.4.320TheLTOPsystemalsoprotectstheRHRsystemfromoverpressurizationduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.Insert3.4.33andrenderingallsafetyinjection(SI)pumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingaminimumoftwoSIpumpsincapableofRCSinjectionwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventzI.lsquareinches. LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESBACKGROUND(continued)QS.x.cxN3.xi3.9.35<~ts~acWvo,coolantinputcapabilittheabilitytoproviecorecoolantadditionisN~Ke8.TheLCOdoesnotrequirethemakeupcontrolsystemdeactivatedortheI.,actuationcircuitsblocked.DuetoeowerpressuresintheLTOPMODESandtheexpectedcoredecayheatlevels,themakeupsystemcanrovideadeuatetllathemakeucontrolvalveSystemforpressurereliefconsistsofwowithreductsettings,ortworesidualremoval(RHR)suctionrelief-ves,oroneBOR-andoneRHRsuction',reliefvalve,oradepressu'SandanRCSventofsufficientsize.TreliefvarerequiredforJredundancy.CSreliefvalvehasadequate-believing./capabWytokeepfromoverpressurizationforthereputed'olantinputcapability.PORVReuirements92.x.o.AsdesignedfortheLTOPSsteme'inaledtoenieressurapproachesalimitdeterminedacuaionogic.TheLTOPactuatiomonitorsbothRCStempRCSpressetermineswhenaconditionnotacceptabl'tsisapproached.Thewideranemperatureindicationsarredtoelowesttemperaturesignal.~sttemperaturesignalisprocessedtrougafunctiongethatcalculatesapressure1'-Rn6attemperature.Thecaedpressu'isthencomparedwiththeindicatedRCSawiderangepressurechannel.I'catedpressuremeexceedstheevalue,aPORVissignaledtoopenThePTLRresentsthePORVsetpointa8forLTOP.Thearenormaggeresoonyoneopensduringaloweerpresansient.HavingthesetpointsofbothvalvitsinthePTLRensuresthaerencellimitswillnodln.yzedevent.WhenaPORVisopenedinanincreasingpressuretransient,thereleaseofcoolantwillcausethepressureincreasetoslowandeverse.AsthePORVreleasescoolant,theRCS(continued)B3.4-59 Insert3.4.34IftheconditionsrequiretheuseofSIformakeupintheeventoflossofinventory,thenpumpscanbemadeavailablethroughmanualactions.Insert3.4.35H3.ii'i~~ThetworedundantPORVsoradepressurizedRCSwithanopenRCSventisalsosufficienttoprotecttheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationforeventswhichcauseanincreaseinsystempressure.Insert3.4.36Q3.x.a.exceedsthelimitselectedtopreventaconditionthatisnotwithintheacceptableregionprovidedinthePTLR.ThePORVsareopenedbycoincidentactuationoftwo-of-threeRCSpressurechannels. LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESBACKGROUNDPORVReuirements(continued)pressuredecreasesuntilaresetpressureisreachedandthevalveissignaledtoclose.Thepressurecontinuestodecreasebelowtheresetpressureasthevalvecloses.R'SuctionReliefValveReuirementsDurinTOPNODES,theRHRSystemisoperatedfordecayatremovallowpressureletdowncontrol.ThereforeheRHRsuction'lationvalvesareopeninthepip'romtheRCShotlegstoeinletsoftheRHRpumps.MhilethesevalvesareopenanheRHRsuctionvalvesareopen,theRHRsuctionreliefvalveseexposedtotCSandareabletorelievepressuretransienintheTheRHRsuctionisolationvandtheRHRsuctionvalvesmustbeopentomakethesuctireliefvalvesOPERABLEforRCSoverpressureigation.AutbosureinterlocksarenotpermittedtocasetheRHRsuctionisationvalvestoclose.TheRHuctionreliefvalvesaresp'ngloaded,bellowstywaterreliefvalveswithpressureerancesandaccationlimitsestablishedbySectionIIItheAmeranSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASHE)Codef.3)forClass2reliefvalves.RCSVentReuirements~gQLNcllam~lieb~OncetheRCSisdepressurized,aventexposedtothecontainmentatmospherewillmaintaintheRCSatcontainmentambientpressureinanRCSoverpressuretransient,iftherelievingrequirementsofthetransientdonotexceedthecapabilitiesofthevent.Thus,theventpathmustbecapableofrelievingtheflowresultingfromthelimitingLTOPmassorheatinputtransient,andmaintainingpressurebelowtheP/Tlimits.Therequiredventcapacitymaybeprovidedbyoneormoreventpaths.ForanRCSventtomeettheflowcapacityrequirement,itrequiresremovingapressurizersafetyvalve,removingassnernas,anddisablingitsblockvalveintheopenposition,orsimilarlyestablishingaventbyope'ninganRCSvent.Theventpath(s)mustbeabovethelevelofreactorcoolant,soasnottodraintheRCSwhenopen.B3.4-60(continued)

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASES(continued)~LiaP~4'Z.v'>'g~~RZ.x.a.TheactualtemperatureatwhichthepressureintheP/Tlimitcurvefallsbelowthepressurizersafetyvalvesetpointincreasesasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlement.EachtimethePTLRcurvesarerevised,theLTOPSystemmustbere-evaluatedtoensureitsfunctionalrequirementscanstillbemetusingtheRCSreliefvalvemethodorthedepressurizedandventedRCScondition.@~M~APPLICABLESafetyanalyses(Ref.~@}'emonstratethatthereactorvesselSAFETYANALYSESisadeuatelyprotectedagainstexceedingtheReference1Pimits.InMODES1,2,and3andinMODE4withRCScoegtemperaureexceeing'hepressurizersafetyvalveswillpreventRCSrerefromexceedingtheReference1limits.At'6elo~overressurepreventionalstotwoRABLE'gsbortoadepressurizedRCSandagÃRe-~5)sized-RCSvent.Eachofthesemeanshasalimiteoverressure.reliefcapability.C.a~ThePTLRcontainstheacceptancelimitsthatdefinetheLTOPrequirements.AnchangetotheRCSmustbeevaluatedagainsteReferenc8-analysestodeterminetheimpactofthechangeontheLTOPacceptancelimits.TransientsthatarecapableofoverpressurizingtheRCSarecategorizedaseithermassorheatinputtransients,examplesofwhichfollow:MassInutTeTransientsa0Inadvertentsafetyinjection;orb.Charging/1etdownflowmismatch.HeatInutTeTransientsa4Inadvertentactuationofpressurizerheaters;b.LossofRHRcooling;orC.Reactorcoolantpump(RCP)startupwithtemperatureasymmetrywithintheRCSorbetweentheRCSandsteamgenerators.(continued)B3.4-61 LTOPSystemB3.4R12BASES~d~r~~t~?7DisallowingstartofanRCPifsecondarytemperatureismorethan+Of'Faboveprimarytemperatureinanyoneoop.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4,"andLCO3.4.?,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"providethisprotection.PO40vw'heReference+A"analysesdemonstratethateitheroneTRSsdaRT*dR<<C.g?~ca0fQ~;Mssdr'~v1~lCSg~O2'ltle(<Cnvltsdtdanavwfdfa'5o~ea~lt~JmainalnRCS~ressureeowlmlwenonlyone(anonisebySI.Thus,,'theLCOallowsI]pump'].uringtheLTOPMODES..'inceneitherone~d-RTTM~W~ae44AAaÃtheLCOalsorequirestltSaccumulatorsisolated,,1Mdns~t6TheisolatedaccumulatorsmusthaveeirdischarevalvesclosedandthevalvepowersupplyTRdischargeisoveranarrowerRCStelaperaturerane(~'Fandbelow)thanthatoftheLCOaRROFracturemechanicsanalsesestalseeemperatureofLTOPApplicabilityatt4pa'WS.S,wyuvt+>WtSR'r4Cilail~...~vMC~~(l~('O~Pm(;'~A'Ap'Ja"'.is~//APPLICABLEHeatInutTeTransients(continued)SAFETYANALSES~,~~~WefollowingarerequiredduringtheLTOPMODEStoensurethatmassandheatinputtransientsdonotoccur,whicheitheroftheLTOPoverpressureprotectionmeanscannothandle:Wl=d'.3.l.3>t~~a.Deac>vaoneBLE'yy~MOp~+-~hb.Deactivatingtheaccumulatordischargeisoaivalvesintheirclosedpositions;and44.(W~e~~a<vprcrppendixKRefs.'l4"and~,requirementsyavon)RSttSliITheconsequencesofasmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCAinLTOPROOE4conformto10CFR50.46and10CFR50,~i~~9py93~x'~~+tvtda~o.nca~w@~PomsSss~~~lg~ste~i..(continued)-ilOG-STS-.B3.4-62 Insert3.4.77Analyseshavedeterminedthatthemassinputtransientsaretheboundingcases'foroverpressurizationoftheRCS(Ref.3).ThetwocategoriesofmassinputtransientswereanalyzedwithrespecttoutilizingasinglePORVoranRCSvent>l.lsquareinchesasoverpressureprotection.TheinadvertentactuationofasingleSIpumpprovidesalargermassadditiontotheRCSthanisolationofletdownwithallthreechargingpumpsoperating.AsinglePORVwasdeterminedtobeincapableofmitigatingtheoverpressuretransientresultingfromactuationofaSIpump,butwascapableofmitigatingthecharging/letdownmismatchtransient.AnRCSvent>l.lsquareinchescanmitigateboththeinadvertentSIandcharging/letdownflowmismatchtransients.Insert3.4.37RenderingallSIpumpsincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpathandrenderingallbutoneSIpumpincapableofinjectionintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventofz1.1squareinches;Insert3.4.38procedurestomanuallyestablishmakeupcapability.TheeventswhichpotentiallyoverpressurizetheRHRsystemduringtheRHRmodeofoperationareincludedwithinthemassandheatinputtransientsanalyzedforLTOPconditions.Therefore,anOPERABLELTOPSystemensuresthattheRHRsystemwillnotbeoverpressurizedduringtheRHRmodeofoperation.

LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~'3.vsc0isah~~mi+Wad%W~~~~~<WgPw~PORVPerformanceThefracturemechanicsanalysesshowthatthevesselisprotectedwhenthePORVsaresettoopenatorbelowthelimitshowninthePTLR.ThesetpointsarederivedbyQysesthatmodeltheerformanceoftheLTOPSstem,assuminthelimitingLransientTheseanalysesconsiderpressureoversootandundershootbeyondthePORVopeningandclosing,resultingfromsignalprocessingandvalvestroketimes.ThePORVsetpointsatorbelowthederivedlimitensurestheReferenceIP/Tlimitswillbemet.~~~8-+4~i~m<A~ThePORVsetpointsinthePTLR~WQupaewerevisedP/TlimitsconflictwiththeLTOPanalysislimits.TheP/Tlimitsareperiodicallymodifiedasthereactorvesselmaterialtoughnessdecreasesduetoneutronembrittlementcausedbyneutronirradiation.Revisedlimitsaredeterminedusingneutronfluenceprojectionsandtheresultsofexaminationsofthereactorvesselmaterialirradiationsurveillancespecimens.TheBasesforLCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits,"discusstheseexaminations.ThePORVsareconsideredactivecomponents.Thus,thefailureofonePORVisassumedtorepresenttheworstcase,singleactivefailure.[RHRSuctionReliefValvePerformance]TheRsuctionreliefvalvesdonothavevariablepreareandternatureliftsetpointslikethePORVs.AnsesmustshowtoneRHRsuctionreliefvalvewiasetpointatorbetween.5]psigand[463.5]ps'llpassflowgreaterthanthatriredfortheliingLTOPtransientwhilemaintainingRCSpsurelehantheP/Tlimitcurve.AssumingallreliefrequirementsduringthelimitingLTOPevent,ansuc'eliefvalvewillmaintainRCSpressurowithintheveratedliftsetpoint,plusaccumulationg10%ofratedliftsetpoint.AltgheachRHRsuctionreliefvalvemayitselfmenglefailurecriteria,itsinclusionandlocationwit(continued)B3.4-63 LTOPSystem83.4.12BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSE+h.vttRSuctionReliefValvePerformance(continued)theRHRemdoesnotallowittomeetsinglilurecriteriawhenriousRHRsuctionisolativalveclosureispostulated.AastheRCSP/T'tsaredecreasedtoreflectthelossoftouhessinreactorvesselmaterialsduetoneutronemlement,theRHRsuctionreliefvalvesmustbeazedtillaccommodatethedesignbasistransisforLTOP.TheRHRs~onreliefvalvesareconsideredac'components.Thus,thefailureofonevalveisassumtorepresenttheworstcasesingleactivefailure.9~.x.wgQ~'PClRCSVentPerformanceatheRCSdepressurized,analysesshowaventsizeofsquareinchesiscapableofmitigatingtheallowedLTOPoverpressuretransient.ThecapacityofaventthissizeisgreaterthantheflowofthelimitingtransientfortheLTOPconfiguratiohthemaximumpressureontheP/Timice.'~m.u.mteam'~e~ax<kaanrWa~TheRCSventsizewillbere-evaluatedforcompianceeachtimetheP/Tlimitcurvesarerevisedbasedontheresultsofthevesselmaterialsurveillance.TheRCSventispassiveandisnotsubjecttoactivefailure.TheLTOPSystemsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOR~.iThisLCOrequiresthattheLTOPSystemisOPERABLE.TheLTOPSystemisOPERABLEwhentheminimumcoolantinputandpressurereliefcapabilitiesareOPERABLE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldleadtothelossoflowtemperatureoverpressuremitigationandviolationoftheReference1limitsasaresultofanoperationaltransient.Tolimitthecoolantinutcaability,theLCOreuires(continued)B3.4-64 Insert3.4.39ThelimitingtransientforthisLTOPconfigurationisanSIactuationwithoneSIpumpOPERABLE.AnRCSvent~l.lsquareincheswiththeRCSdepressurizedalsopreventsoverpressurizationoftheRHRsystem. LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESCQLCO(continued)al~ccumulato~rLCO3.3.2,"ngineereSafetyFeaturectuaionystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"definesSIactuationOPERABILITYfortheLTOPNODE4smallbreakLOCA.TheelementsoftheLCOthrovidelowterneratureoverpressuremitigationare:avvQW5'X,~~Re.&aaj<c3e.9Lcs.+".~oOPERABLEPORVg~~PORVisOPERABLEforLTOPwhenitsblockvalveisopen,itsliftsetpointissettothelimitrequiredbythePTLRandtestingprovesitsabilitytoopenatthissetpoint,andmotivepowerisavailabletothe~valvestaod~controlcircuits.0+3.viith~OJKSv~~cA.a~s~p<~~da4.~@,lelm9R.CZS.M.4aAPPLICABILITYva-s~vvacaq,oA%~MCOP~~l&M~nls~4,+pr~o~~@HieR~g~ttt~P.AR~~vaa'VVaeSb4LtwoOPERABLERHRsuctionreliefvalves;or]~~'a.l.7$'hisLCOisapplicableinHODE4whenany'CScoldlegterneraturei'inNODE5andinNODE6whenthereacorvesseeais'oThepressurizersafetyvalvesprovideoverpressureproectionthatmeetstheReference1DS.w.l9f3t+tat(continued)anRctionreliefvalveisOPERABLEOPwhenitsRuctionisolationvalnditsRHRsuctionvalvearen,itsointisatorbetween[436.5]psig463.5]psig,andtestinghaspro>tsabc'oopenatthissetpoint3on'eOPERABLEPORVandoneOPERABLERHRsucreliefvalve;orb.AdepressurizedRCSandanRCSven.AnRCSventisOPERABLEwhenopenwithanareaof>@.07+squareinches.EachohesemethodsofoverpressurepreventioniscapableofmitigatingthelimitingLTOPtransient.83.4-65 ~~Insert3.4.47N>-~'iv93avThisLCOismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNoteallowsperformanceofthesecondarysidehydrostatictestswithoutthePORYsandRCSventOPERABLE;howevernoSIpumpmustbecapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthistest.Thisexclusionisnecessarysinceapressuredifferentialofg800psidismaintainedbetweentheprimaryandsecondarysidesduringthetest.ThisrestrictedpressuredifferentiallimitsthestressesplacedontheSGwhichcancausecladdingintheprimarychanneltoseparatefromthebasemetalandresultintheneedfordifficultrepairsinahighradiationarea.Tomaintainthispressuredifferential,RCSpressuremustbeincreasedabovethePORVsetpointforLTOPconditions.ThetestcannotbeperformedabovetheLTOPenabletemperaturesincethesteamlinesmaynotbeabletoaccommodatetheassociatedthermalexpansioniftheyareheated.Therefore,allthreeSIpumpsmustbeincapableofinjectingintotheRCSduringthesesecondarysidehydrostatictests(Ref.6).ThesecondNoteonlyrequiresanaccumulatortobeisolatedwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.AccumulatorpressurebelowthislimitwillnotoverpressurizetheRCSbeyondanalyzedconditions.Theaccumulatorisisolatedwhenthedischargemotoroperatedvalveisclosedanditsassociatedpowersupplyisremoved.Insert3.4.78'I3.xiiiwhentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinpositionInsert3.4.79fZ~x$4gandtheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition ,LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)$3.i'v,mu-oe~<<PTcj'9ZtvP/TlimitsaboveWhenthereactorvesselheadisoffoverressurizasoncannotoccur.carWQpn~~~&ovasuutsaorpMSahcs~&LCO3.4.3providesteoperaionaTlimitsforallMODES.LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves,"requirestheOPERABILITYofthepressurizersafetyvalvesthatprovideoverpressureprotectionduringMODES1,2,and3,andMODE4abov~LowtemperatureoverpressurepreventionismostcriticalduringshutdownwhentheRCSiswatersolid,andamassorheatinputtransientcancauseaveryrapidincreaseinRCSpressurewhenlittleornotimeallowsoperatoractiontomitigatetheevent.The'lityismodifiedbyaNotestatingthataccumulatoris'sonlyrequiredwhentheacorpressureismorethanoremaximumssurefortheexistingtemperature,asalloweP/Tlimitcurves.ThisNotepermitstheatordischargationvalveSurveillanceperformedonlyunderthesepresstereconditions.ACTIONS93.Folvsp~~',m~~i"msV~+A.lWith(9@}ormore~umpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSRCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyofremovingtheRCSfromthiscondition.RequireodifiedbyaNotet0pumpscapableofRCSitestoallfrC.l.D.landD.2Of3.vtQ3.XaAnccumulatoruisolaterequiresisolationwithin1hour.Thisisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisator~e:ZgPthemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingtemperatureallowedbytheP/Tlimitcurves.(continued)B3.4-66 Insert3.4.40~83.iB.lMithtwoormoreSIpumpscapableofinjectingintotheRCSandtheRCSisdepressurizedwithanRCSventof>'.lsquareinches,RCSoverpressurizationispossible.ToimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestorerestrictedcoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSreflectstheurgencyofremovingtheRCSfromthiscondition. LTOPSystem'3.4.12BASESACTIONS~Xi<~~~~aw~Mt<PC.1D.1andD.2(continued)Ifisolationisneededandcannotbeaccomplishedin1hour,RequiredAction0.1andRequiredAction0.2providetwooptions,eitherofwhichmustbeperformedinthenext12hours.BincreasintheRCStemperaturetoaccumuatorpressureofpsigcannotexceedtheLTOPimitsiftheaccumulatorsareullyingecte.c~s.Av~~9~.~DepressurizingtheaccumulatorsbelowtheLTOPlimitthePTLRalsogivesthisprotection.TheCompletionTimesarebasedonoperatingexperiencethattheseactivitiescanbeaccomplishedinthesetimeperiodsandonengineeringevaluationsindicatingthataneventrequiringLTOPisnotlikelyintheallowedtimes.E.1)ge44cLtlovQoQ0t~OP~me'z~WInMODE4wh*RCScoldlegtemperatureisCompetionTimeof7days.Twohf<<-eom'-e4+ef-va-'Res-3:P<,arerequiredfo'rovidelowf'em'perature'overpressuremitigationwhilewithstandingasinglefailureofanactivecomponent.PaavTheCompletionTimeconsiders</~~+thatonlyone~3&isrequiredtomitigateanoverpressure,transientandthatthelikelihoodofanactivefailureoftheremainingvalvepathduringthistimeperiodisverylow.Theconsequencesofoperationaleventsthatwilloverp[essurizetheRCSaremoresever(Ref.+.ThuswithoneofthetwoinoeraeinMODE5orinMODE6witteeaoeratureP+Q,Vgg>,viiOQ>.vi6w~Z.0.TPrepresentsareasonabletimetoinvestigateandrepairseveraltypesofreliefvalve(continued)B3.4-67 Insert3.4.42andtheSGprimarysystemmanwayisclosedandsecuredinposition,thePORVmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusin72hours.RestoringthePORVtoOPERABLEstatusprovidesrequiredredundancy.Insert3.4.78whentheSGprimarysystemmanwayandpressurizermanwayareclosedandsecuredinposition LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESACTIONS~f3.viti~tbAtst4Mb'S%~tbWC4C~Ec~cso3.sa.c~c-s"f'Z.trtt~.R,loQe.itta4+p~~g~q~teatseath~c42~ur~uts~~3stS~4S4eav~t3.X.o,F.l(continued)failureswithoutexosuretoalengthyperiodwithonlyonetoprotectagainstoverpressureevents.PokvQ.ds.n!hG.'5At-l~+tb~~~a~ahn<<r,!<<,v!<<<<l!<<<<c'J<<a.ÃieRCSmustbedepressurizedandaventmustbeestablishedwithin8hourswhen:Pg<Vea.,Bothrequiredtareinoperable;orb.ARequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,JP;MWE,orFisnotmet;orc.TheLTOPSystemisinoperableforanyreasonotherthanConditionA,C,g,E,orF.!,!TheventmustbesizedZQsquareinchestoensurethattheflowcapacityisgreaerlianthatrequiredfortheworstcasemassinputtransientreasonableduringtheapplicableMODES.ThisactionisneededtoprotecttheRCPB'fromalow,temperatureoverpressureeventandapossiblebrittlefailureofthereactorvesse.heCompletionTimeWonsidersthetimerequiredtoplacetheplantinthisConditionandtherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperioddueto,increasedoperatorawarenessofadministrativecontrolrequirements.~~QA.N3~SURYEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS93.x.'tSR3.4.12.1R3.4.12.2andSR3.4.12.3Tominimizethepotentialforalowtemperatureoveressureeventblimitingthemassinputcapability,'3.9umanamaximumoonecarinverifieddeactivaeantheaccumulatordischa'vavesareveriielockedouTheFrequencyof12hoursissufficient,consideringotherindicationsandalarmsavailabletotheoperatorinthe(continued)B3.4-68 I~,,lf'SilC/t'I4r Insert3.4.43{3.<viicLCO3.0.4onlyappliesforentryintoNODESI,2,3,and4whichincludesonlypartoftheApplicabilityforthisLCO.SincetheLTOPSystemhelpsmaintaintheintegrityoftheRCPBduringlowtemperatureconditions,itisundesirabletoentertheLTOPSystemApplicabilitywithnomitigationcapability.Thisapp'liestobothincreasingordecreasingNODES.EntryintotheLTOPSystemApplicabilitywithbothPORVsinoperableshouldnotbemadeunlessitisrequiredtoperformnecessaryrepairs.ExamplesofthisincludeahardwarerelatedfailureofbothPORVswhichrequiresbreachingtheirintegritytorestoreOPERABILITY.ItisundesirabletoperformthistypeofmaintenanceatelevatedRCSpressurewithonlyoneisolationvalveavailable(i.e.,PORVblockvalve).Therefore,entryintotheLTOPSystemApplicabilitycanbeperformedinordertoreachaventedconditionoftheRCS.Insert3.4.44allSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhenthePORVsprovidetheRCSventpath(LCO3.4.12.a)andaminimumoftwoSIpumpsmustbeverifiedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSwhentheRCSisdepressurizedandanRCSventZ1.1squareinchesisestablished(LCO3.4.12.b).TheSIpumpsarerenderedincapableofinjectingintotheRCSthroughremovingthepowerfromthepumpsbyrackingthebreakersoutunderadministrativecontrol.AnalternatemethodofLTOPcontrolmaybeemployedusingatleasttwoindependentmeanstopreventapumpstartsuchthatasinglefailureorsingleactionwillnotresultinaninjectionintotheRCS.Thismaybeaccomplishedthroughthefollowing:a.placingthepumpcontrolswitchinthepull-stoppositionandclosingatleastonevalveinthedischargeflowpath;b.lockingclosedamanualisolationvalveintheinjectionpath;orc.closingamotoroperatedisolationvalveintheinjectionpathandremovingtheACpowersource.Theflowpathsthroughthetestconnectionsassociatedwiththeaccumulatorcheckvalves(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves839A,839B,840A,and840B)andtheaccumulatorfilllines(i.e.,linescontainingairoperatedvalves835Aand835B)donothavetobeisolatedforthisSRsincethepotentialmassadditionfromasingleSIpumpthroughthesesixlinesislimitedbytheinstalledorificestolessthanthatassumedforthecharging/letdownmismatchanalysis.Theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvescanbeverifiedisolatedbyuseofcontrolboardindicationforvalveposition.ThisverificationisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingRCScoldlegtemperatureallowedbytheP/TlimitcurvesprovidedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureislessthanthislimit,noverificationisrequiredsincetheaccumulatorcannotpressurizetheRCStoorabovethePORVsetpoint. Insert3.4.70TheCompletionTimeofonehourtorestrictthecoolantinputcapabilitytotheRCSconsiderstherelativelylowprobabilityofanoverpressureeventduringthistimeperiodandprovidestheoperatortimetorenderachargingpumpincapableofinjectingbyplacingitinthepull-stopposition.Onlyonedisablingdeviceisrequiredsincethereisarelativelysmallprobabilityofaninadvertentchargingpumpactuationduringthe8hoursbeforeRCSdepressurizationisachievedandaventestablished.ThedisablingofachargingpumpisnecessarysinceRV203cannotmitigateacharging/letdownmismatcheventifRHRisprovidingdecay,heat,removalaboveNODE5andthreechargingpumpsareoperating. LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.4.12.1andSR3.4.12.$(continued)controlroom,toverifytherequiredstatusoftheequipment.SR3.4.12.4B.VLi.EachreqredRHRsuctionreliefvalveshallbedemonatedOPERABLEberifyingitsRHRsuctionvalveandRHsuctionisolationvalareopenandbytestingitincordancewiththeInserviTestingProgram.'ReferSR3.4.12.7fortheRHRsuction'lationvalveSurvance.)ThisSurveillanceisonlyruiredtobepormediftheRHRsuctionreliefvalveisb'ngusedomeetthisLCO.TheRHRsuctionvalveisveritobeopenedevery12hours.TheFrequency'onsiedadequateinviewofotheradministrativetroissuchavalvestatusindicationsavailaetotheoperatorithecontrolroomthatverifytheRsuctionvalveremainsen.TheASHEde,SectionXI(Ref.8),testperInviceTestiProgramverifiesOPERABILITYbyprovingprrre'efvalvemechanicalmotionandbymeasuringand,equired,adjustingtheliftsetpoint.SR3.4.12I.ITheRCSventof>Q~,EisquareinchesisprovenOPERABLEbyverifyingitsopenconditioneither:a.Onceevery12hoursforavalvethatcannotbe.locked.b.Onceevery31daysforavalvethatislocked,sealed,orsecuredinposition.Aremovedpressurizersafetyvalvefitsthiscategory.ThepassiveventarrangementmustonlybeopentobeOPERABLE.ThisSurveillanceisrequiredtobeperformediftheventisbeingusedtosatisfythepressurereliefrequirementsoftheLCO3.4.12b.(continued)B3.4-69 LTOPSystemB3.4.12BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)R3,x.a.5SR3.4.1AThePORVblockvalvemustbeverifiedopenevery72hourstoprovidetheflowpathforeachrequiredPORVtoperformitsfunctionwhenactuated.Thevalveremotelyverified,openinthemaincontrolroom.hisSurveianceisperformedifthePORVsatisfiestheLCOPTheblockvalveisaremotelycontrolled,motoroperatedvalve.Thepowertothevalveoperatorisootrequired'removed,andthemanualoperatorisnotrequiredockedintheinactiveposition.Thus,theblockvalvecanecoseintheeventthePORVdevelopsexcessiveleakageordoesnotclose(sticksopen)afterrelievinganoverpressuresituation.The72hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroom,suchasvalveposition,indication,thatverifythatthePORVblockvalveremainsopen.3.4.12.7Q2.v'i'iEachuiredRHRsuctionreliefvalveshallbedemonatedOPERABLEverifyingitsRHRsuctionvalveandRsuctionisolationvaeareopenandbytestingitinordancewiththeInser'TestingProgram.(ReferoSR3.4.12.4fortheRHRsuctiovalveSurveillanceforadescriptionoftherequirementsotheInservicestingProgram.)ThisSurveillanceisonlypermedifeRHRsuctionrelief"valveisbeingusedtosatiisLCO.Every31daystheRHRtionisoionvalveisverifiedlockedopen,withertothevalveeratorremoved,toensurethataccntalclosurewillnotcur.The"lockedopen"valvestbelocallyverifiedinitenpositionwiththenualactuatorlockedinitsinactiosition.The3ayFrequencyisbasedohengineeringjudnt,iscoistentwiththe.proceduralcontrolsgoverningvaeperation,andensurescorrectvalveposition.(continued)B3.4-70 1~~w~P<~'L,~BASESC.\S+tunic(OP~b~4H~lLTOPSystemB3.4.12SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)LVOPc~b.'bhc-s~g.,Qi~~Oe.~eaohW~%SR3.4.12.PffTird.every31daysoneeoveriyan,asnecessary,adjustitsliftsetpoint.TheCOTwillverifythesetpointiswithinthe~allowedmaximumlimitsinthePTLR.PORVactuationcoulddepressurizetheRCSandisired.4The12houconsiderstheunlikelihoodofalowmeratureoverpressureeventduringthistime.pm~~+%~~ANotehasbeenaddedindicaiRisrequiredtoe12hoursafterdecreasinRCScoldlegterneraturetoSheCOTperformeduntilChteLTOPileesmuseperormew>in12hoursafterenerringtheLTOPMODES.3.g.tlQ~04144JJLSJA~<WinibuS~'L~!SR3.4.12.PerformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONoneachrequiredPORVactuationchannelisrequiredevermonth'stoadjustthewholechannelsothatitrespondsdthevalveopenswithintherequiredrangeandaccuracytoknowninput.REFERENCES2.10CFR50,AppendixG.>osiSamowG~<ri~4~hGenericLetter88-114ebi+~v~~~~~~~hot&h~P%~Q~~b~~&'~10CFR50,Section50.46.10CFR50,AppendixK.7;GenericLetter90-0"McAvM~c4C~c.~C'<,"Pb~~4AS'~+V~~~ibW~~!RA4~hq+~QQ~~c~+c~+~i~~~c.b)oLL~M~~b~a,"viveg.,c~bB3.4-71g.<.~<<~<.i~,+pc-,~c-%.vQ'~,~'~CS~g-+~4~AO.X)~1-fbuihib~BO~~~~t,C~uM+b~4P~<~s6~QTdg24~IQ)g, Insert3.4.41SR3.4.1'2.7jcv\)Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalveensuresthatatleasttwoindependentactionsmustoccurbeforetheaccumulatoriscapableofinjectingintotheRCS.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideassurancethatpowerisremoved.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthesurveillanceisonlyrequiredwhentheaccumulatorpressureisgreaterthanorequaltothemaximumRCSpressurefortheexistingcoldlegtemperatureallowedinthePTLR.Iftheaccumulatorpressureisbelowthislimit,theLTOPlimitscannotbeexceededandthesurveillanceisnotrequired. RCSOperationalLEAKAGE83.4.13B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)B3.4.13RCSOperationalLEAKAGEBASESBACKGROUNDComponentsthatcontainortransportthecoolanttoorfromthereactorcoremakeuptheRCS.Componentjointsaremadebywelding,bolting,rolling,or.pressureloading,andvalvesisolateconnectingsystemsfromtheRCS.Duringplantlife,thejointandvalveinterfacescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantLEAKAGE,througheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.ThepurroseoftheRCSOperationalLEAKAGELCOistol.imitLEAKAGEfromthesesourcestoamountstatdonotcompromisesafety.ThisLCOspecifiesthetypesandamountsofLEAKAGE.endixA,GDC30(Ref.1),requiresordetectingand,ntpractiifyingthesourceofreactorcoollatoryGuide1.45(Ref.2'cceptablemethodsforse'kageionsystems.PcsThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rateandduratiTherefore,detectingandmonitoringEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGEisnecessarytoprovidequantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakoccurthatisdetrimentaltothesafetyoftheandthepublic.Alimitedamountofleakageinsidecontainmentisexpectedfromauxiliarysystemthatcannotbemade100%leaktight.Leakagefromthesesystemsshouldbedetected,located,andisolatedfromthecontainmentatmosphere,ifpossible,tonotinterferewithRCSleakagedetection.ThisLCOdealswithprotectionofthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)fromdegradationandthecorefrominadequatecooling,inadditiontopreventingtheaccidentanalysesradiationreleaseassumptionsfrombeingexceeded.TheconsequencesofviolatingthisLCOincludethepossibilityofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).B3.4-72(continued) Insert3.4.49AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.I)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.TheseleakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.l5,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation." RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(eaz)aH.i'i'<.c.ExceptforprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGE,thesafetyanalysesdonotaddressoperationalLEAKAGE.However,otheroperational.LEAKAGEisrelatedtothesafetyanalysesforLOCA;theamountofleakaecanffecttherobabilitysucaneventThesafetyanalysisforanevenresutinginsteamischargetothe'tmosphereassumesa4pmprimary)tosecondaryLEAKAGEastheinitialcondition.:.'O.SPrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisafactorinthedosereleasesoutsidecontainmentresultingfromasteamlinebreak(SLB)accident.Toalesserextent,otheraccidentsortransientsinvolvesecondarysteamreleasetotheatmosphere,suchasasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theleakagecontaminatesthesecondaryfluid.Q)TheFSAR(Ref.3)analysisforSGTRassumesthecontaminatedsecondaryfluidisonlybrieflyreleasedviasafetyvalveandthemajorityissteamedtothecondenser.Thegpmprimary'tosecondaryLEAKAGEisrelativelyinconsequential.(4al'l%c2.'l.SoTheSLB"ismorelimitingfor.siteradiationrelases.ThesafetyanalysisfortheSLBaccidentassumespmprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinonegeneratorasaninitialcondition.ThedoseconsequencesresultingfromtheSLBaccientmrewellwithinthelimitsdefinedin10CFR100orthestaffapprovedlicensingbasis(i.e.,asmallfractionoftheselimits).TheRCSoperationalLEAKAGEsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement:LCORCSoperationalLEAKAGEshallbelimitedto:a~PressureBoundarLEAKAGENopressureboundaryLEAKAGEisallowed,beingindicativeofmaterialdeterioration.LEAKAGEofthistypeisunacceptableastheleakitselfcouldcausefurtherdeterioration,resultinginhigherLEAKAGE.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB.LEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE.(continued)B3.4-73 Insert3.4.50However,alowerLEAKAGElimitof0.IgpmisassumedforallSLBstopreventacoincidentSGTRduetothelargestressesplacedontheSGtubesasaresultoftherapidcooldownanddepressurization.Thesestresscalculationsconservativelyassumeatubewitha0.4inchlongthrough-wallcrackinalocationwith40%localwallthinning.Theanalysesdemonstratethatthe'ntegrityoftheselectedtubeismaintainedwithsufficientmarginaftertheSLB.Theassumedthrough-wallcrackof0.4inchescorrespondstoO.lgpmleakageundernormaloperatingconditions(Ref.4).Therefore,theprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEislimitedto0.IgpmperS/G.

RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESLCO(continued)b.UnidentifiedLEAKAGEOnegallonperminute(gpm)ofunidentifiedLEAKAGEisallowedasareasonableminimumdetectableamountthatthecontainmentairmonitoringandcontainmentsumplevelmonitoringequipmentcandetectwithinareasonabletimeperiod.ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationoftheRCPB,iftheLEAKAGEisfromthepressureboundary.c~IdentifiedLEAKAGE~~K'~~~P~~Mng~Ar0~'I%y~C~~hd.'AG~~~~Iea~SstmtrnaP%+Prammms~hagEscf+.I1I.C.~VI.iOr~IIAiut.OCXames~Upto10gpmofidentifiedLEAKAGEisconsideredallowablebecauseLEAKAGEisfromknownsourcesthatdonotinterferewithdetectionofidentifiedLEAKAGEaniswewiinthecapaiityoIdentifiedLEAKAGEincludesLEAKAGEtothecontainmentfromspecificallyknownandlocatedsourcesbutdoesnotincludepressureboundaryLEAKAGEorcontrolledreactorcoolantpump(RCP)seal(anormalfunctionnotconsideredLEAKAGE).ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofacomponentorsystem.PrimartoSecondarLEAKAGEthrouhteamo.LrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEamountingto5gpmthrough'5&SgdrproducesacceptableoffsitedosesintheSLBaccidentanalysis.ViolationofthisLCOcouldexceedtheoffsitedoselimitsforthisc'4mSmS:acciden.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEmustbeincuedinthetotalallowablelimitforidentifiedLEAKAGE.e.'martoSecondarLEAKAGEthrouhAnOneSG4~III~Cr<CGOPMASIC,~~~M~~CWvG~Msbd.Reftycx9~cAThe[500]gaerdaylimitonone'sbasedontheassumptionthat'ecrcakingthisamountwouldnotpropagatetoaderthestressconditionsof'aLramainstenerupture.Ifleakedthrmanycracks,thecracksarsmall,andaoveassumptionisconservative.B3.4-74(continued) RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYHa.i'ii.4~~~~In6,LEAKAGElimitsarenotreuirthereactoroolwer,reultinginAKAGE.,essesandreducedpoteni~uc.e~~~u-.InMODESI,2,3,and4,thepotentialforRCPBLEAKAGEisgreatestwhentheRCSispressurized.M4iLlt~CLCO3.4.14,"RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)Leakage,"measuresleakagethrouheachindividualPIVandcanimpactthisLCO.Oftheg@IVsirCherieineachisolatedline,leakagemeasuredthroughoneoesnotresultinRCSLEAKAGEwhentheotherisleaktight.IfbothvalvesleakandresultinalossofmassfromtheRCS,thelossmustbeincludedintheallowableidentifiedLEAKAGE.ACTIONSA.lUnidentifiedLEAKAGE,identifiedLEAKAGE,orprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEinexcessoftheLCOlimitsmustbereducedtowithinlimitswithin4hours.ThisCompletionTimeallowstimetoverifyleakageratesandeitheridentifyunidentifiedLEAKAGEorreduceLEAKAGEtowithinlimitsbeforethereactormustbeshutdown.ThisactionisnecessarytopreventfurtherdeteriorationoftheRCPB.Co~hc.4hcAc&~~QA.land5".2onAoc2iEAEcannotbmwithinours,thereactormustbebroughttolowerpressureconditionstoreducetheseveritoftheLEAKAanditsotenti'conseuencessereactormuseroughttoMODE3wiin6hoursandMODE5within36hours.ThisactionreducestheLEAKAGEandalsoreducesthefactorsthattendtodegradethepressureboundary.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.InMODE5,thepressurestresses(continued)B3.4-75 Insert3.4.51tlh~+InMODES5or6,thetemperatureis<200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODESI,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageand.crackpropagationismuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.Insert3.4.52B.lWiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgram(Specification5.5.9)notmet,integrityofsteamgeneratortubesmustbedeterminedtobeacceptableforcontinuedoperationwithin4hours.ThisCondition.specificallyaddressestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventanon-significantProgramdiscrepancyisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginMODESI,2,3,or4.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultininadequatetubeintegrity.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorrectionofadmiriistrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletionTimeisbasedonengineeringjudgement.ThisConditiondoesnotsupersedetheACTIONSofConditionAintheeventLEAKAGEfromoneormoresteamgeneratorsexceedstheLCOlimit.Intheeventthisoccurs,theLEAKAGEmustberestoredtowithinlimitswithin4hours,oraplantshutdowncommenced.ThisConditionisalsonotapplicabletoasituationinwhichintegrityofthetubeisquestionable.Intheeventintegrityofthetubeisdeterminedtobeinadequate,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandConditionCofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedduringMODESI,2,3and4.

RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESACTIONSC-CE."Iand&2(continued)actingontheRCPBaremuchlower,andfurtherdeteriorationismuchlesslikely.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSW9a~e'a.~c~II4.1'I't,ct~It.tt':C.9'f.ai1.CSR3.4.13.1VerifyingRCSLEAKAGEtobewithintheLCOlimitsensurestheintegrityoftheRCPBismaintained.PressureboundaryLEAKAGEwouldatfirstappearasunidentifiedLEAQKc~anonlbeI1ositive~l~dnti~iedbinsection,'t-.,~niden~i>edLEATQEEanViVen'tifiedLaredeterminedbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventorybalance.PrimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisalsomeasuredbyperformanceofanRCSwaterinventory'alanceinconjunctionwitheffluentmonitoringwithinthesecondarysteamandfeedwatersystems.~v'~~~c.sTheRCSwaterinventorybalancemustbe~withthe~~ThthisSRis-aRrequiredtobeperormed12hoursofsteadystateoperation"'""e=bave:been-'stab~7+~~es+Pcs'4g".1.HJf1SteadystaCeo'peYhtionTsrequi're6toperformaproperinventorybalance;calculationsduringmaneuveringarenotusefulandaNoterequirestheSurveillancetobemetwhensteadystateisestablished.ForRCSoperationalLEAKAGEdeterminationbywaterinventorybalance,steadystateisdefinedasstableRCSpressure,temperature,powerlevel,pressurizerand~anklevels,makeupandletdown,andRCPsealinjectionandretvca@~AnearlywarningofpressureounaryLEAKAGEorunidentifiedLEAKAGEisprovidedbytheautomaticsystemsthatmonitorthecontainmentatmosphereradioactivityandthecontainmentsumplevel.ItshouldbenotedthatLEAKAGEpastsealsandgasketsisnotpressureboundaryLEAKAGE./~leakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."The72hourFrequencyisareasonableintervaltotrendLEAKAGEandrecognizestheimportanceofearlyleakage(continued)B3.4-76 RCSOperationalLEAKAGEB3.4.13BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~vSR3.4.13.1(continued)detectioninthereventionofaccidents.ANoteseadystateoperation.SR3.4.13.2ThisSRprovidesthemeansnecessarytodetermineSGOPERABILITYinanoperationalNODE.Therequirementto,demonstrateSGtubeintegrityinaccordancewiththeSteamGeneratorTubeSurveillanceProgramemphasizestheimpo'rtanceofSGtubeintegrity,eventhoughthisSurveillancecannotbeperformedatnormaloperatingconditions.REFERENCES50,AppendiatoryGuide1.4,3.~FSAR,Section<5;4.3.30.3.6~~acWm~t~RIDeA.C,AiF)(abQJWo'Lgxo,xQ4'3.>~"<'L~<~~C~~mc,~ck+pi~+~<~<%~b<Ch%P~KO~pg~Q~~~p~gPr~~Wo..~~a~.B3.4-77 RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)B3.4.14RCSPressureIsolationValve(PIV)LeakageBASESBACKGROUND5'.vi4,g9Sviii.a.l)~vitec4QS'.visi.~(ia.4b%l9s.v>ii.a.AWmcc.~~1W~m~(.*i'QC10CFR50.2,10CFR50.55a(c),and(Refs.1,2,and3),defineRCSPIVsasanytwonormallyclosedvalvesi~erieswithinthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB),whichseparatethehighpressureRCSfromanattachedlowpressuresystem.Duringtheirlives,thesevalvescanproducevaryingamountsofreactorcoolantleakagethrougheithernormaloperationalwearormechanicaldeterioration.TheRCSPIV-LeakageLCOallowsRCShighpressureoperationwhenleakagethroughthesevalvesexistsinamountsthatdonotcompromisesafety.~rai~~ThePIVleakaelimitappliestoeachindividualvalve.Leakagethroughboth~seriesPIVsalinemustbeincludedaspart'oftheidentifiedLEAKAGE,governedbyLCO3.4.13,."RCSOperational,LEAKAGE."ThisistruedurinoeratioonlywhenthelossofRCSmassthrough4eriesvavesisdeterminedbyawaterinventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)AknowncomponentoftheidentifiedLEAKAGEbeforeoperationbeginsistheleastofthe+~individualleakratesdeterminedforleakingseriesPIVsduringtherequiredsurveillancetesting;leakagemeasuredthroughonePIVinalineisnotRCSoperationalLEAKAGEiftheotherisleaktight.AlthoughthisspecificationprovidesalimitonallowablePIVleakagerate,itsmainpurposeistopreventoverpressurefailureofthelowpressureportionsofconnectingsystems.TheleakagelimitisanindicationthatthePIVsbetweentheRCSandtheconnectingsystemsaredegradedordegrading.PIVleakagecouldleadtooverpressureofthelowpressurepipingorcomponents.FailureconseuencescouldalossofcoolantaccidentOCA)outsideofcontainment,anunanalyzedaccident,thatcoulddegradetheabilityforlowpressureinjection.ThebasisforthisLCOisthe1975NRC"ReactorSafetyStudy"(Ref.4)thatidentifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasasignificantcontributortotheriskofcore~Asubsequentstudy(Ref.5)evaluatedvariousPIV4~a~configurationsto.determinetheprobabilityofintersystemLOCA.~.'L59(continued)B3.4-78 Insert3.4.53Priortotherequiredsurveillancetesting(SR3.4.14.1)andwaters'.vhi.~inventorybalance(SR3.4.13.1)inNODES3and4,anyleakagethroughthePIVsisconsideredunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Insert3.4.54andtoidentifywhichconfigurationsdominatetheriskprofileforintersystemLOCApotential.InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformedtoidentifythemostrisksignificantconfigurations. RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESBACKGROUND(continued)'Hs.vtit~~PPV~reprovidedtoisolatetheRCSfromthefollowing'ypicall~ca0nectedsystems:a.ResidualHHeatemwal(RHR)Systemb.SafetyInjectionSystem,and>>-c.ChemicaVolumeControlSystem.PIVsarelistedintheFSAR,Section[](Ref.6).ViolationofthisLCOcouldresultincontinueddegradationofaPIV,whichcouldle'adtooverpressurizationofalowpressuresystemandthelossoftheintegrityofafissionproductbarrier."fS.V't't'L.CL.APPLICABLEReference4identifiedpotentialintersystemLOCAsasaSAFETYANALYSESsignificantcontributortotheriskofcoreIsaeSRs~edominantaccidentsequenceintheintersystemLOCAcategoryRERrthefailureofthelowressureportionoftheRHRystemoutsideofcontainment.mccienlseresuoapostulatedfailureofthePIVs,whicharepartoftheRCPB,andthesubsequentpressurizationoftheRHR~stemdownstreamofthePIVsfromtheRCS.BecausethelowpressureportionoftheRHR~stemis~~~designedfor600psig,overpressurizationfailureoftheRHRlowpressurelinewouldresultinaLOCAoutsidecontainmentandsubsequent:riskofcore~(Ylatse.Reference5evaluatedvariousconfigurations,leakagetestingofthevalves,andoperationalchangestodeterminetheeffectonthe,probabilityofintersystemLOCAs.ThisstudyconcludedthatperiodicleakagetestingofthePIVscansubstantiallyreducetheprobabilityofanintersystemLOCA.RCSPIVleakagesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCORCSPIVleakageisidentifiedLEAKAGEintoclosedsystemsconnectedtotheRCS.Isolationvalveleakageisusuallyontheorderofdropsperminute.Leakagethatincreases(continued)B3.4-79 Insert3.4.55InresponsetoReference6,aplantspecificevaluationofintersystemLOCAswasperformed.PIVsinthefollowingsystemsconnectedtotheRCSwereevaluated:a."'esidualheatremoval(RHR);b.safetyinjection(SI);c.chemicalandvolumecontrol.0s.viii.bTheevaluationofintersystemLOCAsconcludedthatseveralconfigurationsidentifiedinReferences4and5existedintheRHRandSIsystems.ThePIVconfigurationsintheChemicalandVolumeControlSystemwerenotidentifiedasbeingrisksignificantduetotheinstalledorificesintheletdownpipingandtheuseofpipingdesignedtoRCSpressureconditionsfromthedischargeofthepositivedisplacementpumpstocontainment(Ref.7).ThePIVs853A853B 867A867B877A877B878A878C878F878G878H878'dentifiedintheSIandRHRsystemsarelistedbelow:RHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeRHRInletCheckValvetoReactorVesselCoreDelugeSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorACheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeandAccumulatorACheckValvetoRCSColdLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegBSIPumpDischargeIsolationMOVtoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegB.SIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegBSIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSHotLegASIPumpDischargeCheckValvetoRCSColdLegA ~sRCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESLCO(continued)3.9.5ClsYxg,.ck.significantlysuggeststhatsomethingisoperationallywrongandcorrectiveactionmustbetaken.TheLCOPIVleakagelimitis0.5gpmpernominalinchofvalvesizewithamaximumlimitof5mheprevsocmoravavesizesimunjustifiedpenaltyonveswithoutprovidinginformationiavalvedegradatj>0~to.personnelradiationeitsucnsjleakageraeimitbasedonvalvesizesuperiortoasing'leallowab'levalue.4e.Q.8Reference&permitsleakagetestingatalowerpressuredifferentialthanbetweenthespecifiedmaximumRCSpressureandthenormalpressureoftheconnectedsystemduringRCSoperation(themaximumpressuredifferential)inthosetypesofvalvesinwhichthehigherservicepressurewilltendtodiminishtheoverallleakagechannelopening.Insuchcases,theobservedratemaybeadjustedtothemaximumpressuredifferentialbyassumingleakageisdirectlyproportionaltothepressuredifferentialtotheonehalfpower.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,leakagepotentialmeettheq'erwt-'n~nthelowerreactorpotentialfor1leakagelimitsarenotrcooatscauseducedsnarejoraLOCAouts~eand4,thisLCOappliesbecausethePIVisgreatestwhentheRCSisressurized.eowpa.arenotfACTIONSTheActionsaremodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1providesclarificationthateachflowpathallowsseparateentryintoaCondition.Thisisallowedbaseduponthefunctionalindependenceoftheflowpath.Note2requiresanevaluationofaffectedsystemsifaPIVisinoperable.Theleakagemayhaveaffectedsystemoperability,orisolationofaleakingflowpathwithanalternatevalvemayhave(continued)B3.4-80 Insert3.4.56ThisLCOonlyappliestothosePIVswhicharedeterminedtobeinthemostrisksignificantconfigurations(Ref.7)aslistedinthe'pplicableSafetyAnalysis.TheremainingPIVsaregovernedbyLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLEAKAGE"andLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationValves."Insert3.4.57f>evill,cInMODES5or6,thetemperatureis<200'Fandpressureismai'ntainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODESI,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandisolationfailureismuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.

RCSPIVLeakage83.4.14BASESACTIONS(continued)Rh.viit,0Q>.viai.wY5.iiidegradedtheabilityoftheinterconnectedsystemtoperformitssafetyfunction.A.landA.2QQflowpathmustbeisolatedbytwovalves.RequiredActionsA.1andA.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatthevalvesusedforisolationmustmeetthesameleakagerequirementsasthePIVsandmustbewithintheRCPB@orthehighpressureportionofthesystem+Wlmusis~RequiredActionA.lrequiresthat5Q"isolationwithonevalvemustbeperformedwithin4hours.Fourhoursprovidestimetoreduceleakageinexcessoftheallowablelimitandtoisolatetheaffectedsystemifleakagecannotbereduced.The'4hourCompletionTimeallowstheactionsandrestrictsC5Qoperationwithleakingisolationvalves.RequiredActionA.2specifiesthatthedoubleisolationbarrieroftwovalvesberestoredbyclosing.rome,o.ervalvequaliFiedforisolation,The72hourCompletionTimeafterexceedingthelimitconsidersthetimerequiredtocompletetheActionandthelowprobabilityofasecondvalvefailingduringthistime~period..'he72hourletionTimeafterexceedingthelimitallows-;jfortherestoratsftheleakingPIVtoOPERABLEs&tos..ThistimeframeconsidehetimerequiredeaNpletethis"Actionandthelowprobabilifaseconvalvefailing:.duringthisperiod.(Reviewe:TwooptionsareprovidedforReguired'onA.2.Thendoption(72hourresto'isappropriateifisolaofasecondwouldplacetheunitinanunanalyzed-"~~ltion.)8.1and8.2S.V'tta.a.Ifleakagecannotbereduced,thesystemisolated,ortheotherRequiredActionsaccomplished,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3(continued) Insert3.4.58Theuseofa'alveotherthanthepreviouslyleakingPIVmustincludeconsiderationthattheplantmaynolongerbeinananalyzedcondition. Insert3.4.59Testingofthecheckvalves(877A,8778,878F,and878H)andthemotoroperatedvalvesidentifiedasPIVsintheSIhotleginjectionlines(878Aand878C)istobeperformedatleastonceevery40months.ThisextendedsurveillanceintervalisallowedsincethetwoSIhotleginjectionlinesaremaintainedclosedtoaddresspressurizedthermalshock(PTS)concerns.Eachinjectionlineisisolatedbytwocheckvalvesandonemotoroperatedvalvein-serieswhichmustallfailtocreatethepotentialforanintersystemLOCA. RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESACTIONSdueW~hvarpnLS>m~hhc~+t.i<%As.vicx.cB.landB.2(continued)within6hoursandNODE5wihin36hours.ThisActionmayreucetheleakagthepotentialforaLOCAoutsidethecontainment.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonablebasedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.C.lQS.ivTheinoperabi'ftheRHRautoclosureinterlocderstheRHRsuctionisionvalvesincapableo'latinginresponsetoahighpresconditionreventinginadvertentopeningofthevsCSpressuresinexcessoftheRHRsystemsdesignpur.IftheRHRautoclosure/interlockisinoperablperationmaytinueaslongas/theaffectedRHRionpenetrationisclobyatleastoneclosedalordeactivatedautomaticvalve'thin4hou.ThisActionaccomplishesthepurposeoftheoclosurefunction.SURVEILLANCEHs;v'iiRE(UIREHENTScgz~~s4MMMnwPQ.P~sgQw~r~@3cps~+vafS.viIi.O.OO~t'Cmeieincs~$PLVt~~qS.yells,a.sT-~lr.q.se9$.wSR3.4.14.1~QagPerformanceofleakagetestingoneachRCSPIVorisolationv'alveusedtosatisfyRequiredActionA.1andRequiredActionA.2isrequiredtoverifythatleakageisbelowthespecifiedlimitandtoidentifyeachleakingvalve.Theleakagelimitof0.5gpmperinchofnominalvalvediameterupto5gpmmaximumappliestoeachvalv.Leakagetestingrequiresastablepressurecondition.Fodg-twe~IVsirCseries,theleakagerequirementappliestoeachvalve.individuallyandnottothecombinedleakageacrossbothvalves.IfthePIVsarenotindividuallyleakagetested,onevalvemahavefailedcompletelyandnotbedetectediftheotheravir&seriesmeetstheleakagerequirement.Inthissituation,teprotectionprovidedbyredundantvalveswouldbelost.Testingistobeperformedeverymonthsaticalrefuelincycle,TheFrequencyisAhAhvAMClbvlka1~V4i~(continued)B3.4-82 RCSPIVLeakage83.4.14BASESsp--.u,>g,iSURVEILI.ANCERE(UIREHENTS2.'I.4QHs.v'attis'.Vtit.Wtis.xf5'Ziti~~4w.ivSR3.4.14.1(continued)10CFR50.55a(g)(Ref.SfascontainedintheInserviceTestingProgram,iswithintheAmericanSocietyofHechanicalEngineers(ASHE)Code,SectionXI(Ref.9),andisbasedontheneedtoperformsuchsurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringanoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratower.9haecQv+pata~Drgtv6>%Jp'naddition,testingmustbeperformedonceafterthevalvehbdb1.Ctid-~sisturbedinteperformanceofthisSurveillanceshouldalsobetestedunlessdocumentationshowsthataninfinitetestingloopcannotpracticallybeavoided.Testingmustbeperformedwithin24hoursafterthevalvehasbeenreseated.44hoursisareasonableandpracticaltimeimitorerformingthistestafteropeningorreseatingavalve.TheleakagelimitistobemetattheRCSpressureassociatedwithHODES1and2.ThispermitsleakagetestingathighdifferentialpressureswithstableconditionsnotpossibleintheHODESwith'lowerpressures.EntryintoHODES3and4isallowedtoestablishthenecessarydifferentialpressuresandstablecond'onstoalorerformanceofthisSurveillance.TheNotethat-tlaws-t~rovisioniscompemenaryothe.Frequencyof'iortoentryinoOG~whenevee=thpunithasbeeninHODE5for7days~--more,"ifleakagetestinghas-noMeenrperformed-in"theprevious9months.Inaddition,this'curve.'llanceisnotrequiredtobeperformedan-~RHRSystemweHRSystemisaligneRCSintheishutdowncoolingmoon.PIVscontainedinthelRHRshutdowncoo'wpabeleakageratetested.afterR'ecuredandstableunitco'andthessarydiffertressnresareestablisheKSR3..andSR3.4.14.3VerifyingthattheRHRosuferlocksareOPERABLEensuresthatRCSpressurnessurizetheRHRsystembeyond125%of'-designpressureofig.Theinteracepointthatpreventsthevalvesfrom(continued)B3.4-83 Insert3.4.60orhadmaintenanceperformedonittoensuretightreseating.Thismaintenancedoesnotincludeminoractivitiessuchaspackingadjustmentswhichdonotaffecttheleaktightnessofthevalve.~i)'6 RCSPIVLeakageB3.4.14BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSR3.4.14.2andSR3.4.14.3(continued)opene'ssetsotheactualRCSpressuremustbe([425]p'oopenthevalves.ThissetpoiensurestheRHRdesignprurewillnotbeexceededtheRHRreliefvalveswillnott.The[18]monthequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformSurveillaunderconditionsthatapplyduringaplantou.[18]monthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonc'derationofthedesignreliability(andconfingopeingexperience)oftheequipment.TheseSRsmodifiedbyNotesallowingtRHRautoclosurefunctiobedisabledwhenusingtheRHRSyssuctionrevalvesforcoldoverpressureprotectionincordancesthSR3.4.12.7.REFERENCES1.10CFR50.2.2.10CFR50.55a(c).3.~~is~~~~W~m~4*ipbhC$3,aw~A4rm~vwuvhA4>~"imP~b(ski'Li~~kMc.WLaCd/0~ma~&5.NUREG-0677,Hay1980.'vQGa~vers'c.woQWQ~~~~4.WASH-1400(NUREG-75/014),AppendixV,October1975.ASHE~BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionX~4S.'ixio8.10CFR50.55a(g).9.10n08.uu.M.C.cu'tcNQeXQW4c.~U.w.M,~P-4'<,Pri~p~~+KM~M4<c'c.d~'~~~)(ma.Pr,~~V~g"k~PQ)~~<'3,HZO.~G'6Rapo4+6g-hrWpg(1<B3.4-84 RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation83.4.15B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.15RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUND'+C.aV.4Q4~lVCtQ~,~Mvn~C~s4emma+reaQRrPu~~~ednawa~c~CXPPrKh~s~~Q~0mLP~KiEa.K,h~t..30ofAppendixAto10CFR50(Ref.1)requiresmeansfortingand,totheextentpractical,identifyinlocationoesourceofRCSLEAKAGE.RegulatorGuide1.45(Re.describesacceptablemetforselectingleakagedetionsystems.ILeakagedetectionsystemsmvethecapabilitytodetectsignificantreactorcotpressuoundary(RCPB)degradationassafteroccurrenceascticaltominimizetotentialforpropagationtoasfailure.s'husearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnearytomitproperevaluationofallunidentifiedLEAKAGE.Industrpracticehasshownthat~aatowchanges(of-~canbereadilydetectedincontainedvolumesbymonitoringchangesinwaterlevelorintheoeratinfreuencofaump.ThecontainmetsumusedtocolectnidentifiedLEAKAGis]orerconeneinstrumentedtoalarm~o0.5to1.0minThissensitiviyisaccepaleforetectingincreasesinunidentifiedLEAKAGE.(P.\VvCkf4.hVt-Thereactorcoolantcontainsradioactivitythat,whenreleasedtothecontainment,canbedetectedbyradiationmonitoringinstrumentation.Reactorcoolantradioactivitylevelswillbelowduringinitialreactorstartupandforafewweeksthereafter,untilactivatedcorrosionproductshavebeenformedandfissionproductsappearfromfueldi'~ildid<<.nsr'vitiesof10pCi/ccraioaparticulatemonitoringa'cradioactivityforgaseous'reracticalforthtionsems.Radioactivitydetectionsystemsareincudedormonitoringbothparticulateandgaseousactivitiesbecauseoftheirsensitivitiesandrapidresponses'oRCSLEAKAGE.n1humidityofthecontainmenterewouldindicatereleaseocontainment.Dewpointtemperaturemnscantomonitorhumiditofthecontainmentatmosphereasan(continued)83.4-85 Insert3.4.49AtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC16(Ref.1)requiresthatmeansbeprovidedtodetectsignificantuncontrolledleakagefromthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB).AIF-GDC34(Ref.l)alsorequiresthattheRCPBbedesignedtoreducetheprobabilityofrapidpropagationfailures.Thus,anearlyindicationorwarningsignalisnecessarytopermitproperevaluationofallunidentified.LEAKAGE.TheleakagedetectionsystemssupporttheserequirementsbybothdetectingRCSLEAKAGEandidentifyingthelocationofitssource.TheseleakagedetectionsystemsarespecifiedinLCO3.4.15,"RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation."Insert3.4.62Theparticulatemonitor(R-ll)candetectaleakof0.013gpmwithin20minutesassumingthepresenceofcorrosionproducts.Thegaseousmonitor(R-12)candetectaleakof2.0to10.0gpmwithin1hourandisconsideredabackuptotheparticulatemonitor.Insert3.4.63AlternativemeansalsoexisttomonitorRCSLEAKAGEinsidecontainment.Theseincludehumiditydetectors,airtemperatureandpressuremonitoring,andcondensateflowratefromtheaircoolers.ThecapabilityofthesesystemstodetectRCSLEAKAGEisinfluencedbyseveralfactorsincludingcontainmentfreevolumeanddetectorlocation.ThesesystemsaremostusefulasalarmsorindirectindicatingdevicesavailabletotheoperatorsandarenotrequiredbythisLCO(Ref.2).Theleakagedetectionsystemsarealsousedtosupportidentificationofleakagefromopensystemsfoundincontainment.Thisincludesservicewaterandfireservicewatersystems.LeakagefromthesesystemsisrequiredtobemonitoredinresponsetoIEBulletinNo.80-24(Ref.3). RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESBACKGROUND,.(continued)")4,iv.c.'icatorofpotentialACSLEAKAGE.A1'fincreaseindewpoitiswellwithinthesensitivityrangeofavailableinstrents.1jSincethemiditylevelisinfluencedbyseveraactors,aquantitativevaluationofanindicatedleakaratebythismeans'aybequtionableandshouldbecornredtoobservedincreasesinliquflowintoorfromtheontainmentsump[andcondensatefloromaircoolers]Humiditylevelmonitoringisconsidermostusefusanindirectalarmorindicationtoalerttheoratorapotentialproblem.HumiditymonitorsarenotruedbythisLCO.Airtemperatureandpressemonoringmethodsmayalsobeusedtoinferunidenti'edLEAKAGEthecontainment.Containmenttemperateandpressureuctuateslightlyduringplantoperion,butariseabove(henormallyindicatedrangfvaluesmayindicateRCS~eakageintothecontainment.herelevanceoftemperatureanpressuremeasuremesareaffectedbycontainmentfreevumeand,forternrature,detectorlocation.Alarmsignalsromthesinstrumentscanbevaluableinrecognizingrap'ndsibleleakagetothecontainment.TemperatureandressuremonitorsarenotrequiredbythisLCO.APPLICABLE(SAFETYANALYSES(.aV.Ch.3.M.49QQ.aer.hdtoevaluatetheseverityofanalarmoranindicatio'mportanttotheoperators,andthea'ytocompareandvers'thindicationsfromothstemsisnecessary.ThesystemsetimessensitivitiesaredescribedintheFSAR(Ref.3tipleinstrumentlocationsareutilizedneeded,toethatthetransportdela'ftheleakagefromitse.toaninstrumocationyieldsanacceptableoverallresThesafetysignificanceofRCSLEAKAGEvarieswidelydependingonitssource,rate,andduration.Therefore,'etectingandmonitoringRCSLEAKAGEintothecontainmentareaisnecessary.guicklyseparatingtheidentifiedLEAKAGEfromtheunidentifiedLEAKAGErovi~uantitativeinformationtotheoperators,allowingthemtotakecorrectiveactionshouldaleakageoccurdet'ltothesafetyoftheandthepublic.Q,9.QIP'Leeway.(continued)B3.4-86 Insert3.4.64Duringthe1970's,theNRCbeganevaluatingasymmetricloadsthatresultfrompostulatingrapidopeningofdouble-endedrupturesofRCSpipingatcertainlocationsinPWRs.Theasymmetricloadsproducedbythepostulatedbreaksaretheresultofanassumedpressureimbalance,bothinternalandexternaltotheRCS.Theinternalasymmetricloadsresultfromarapiddecompressionthatcause,largetransientpressuredifferentialsacrossthecorebarrelandfuelassemblies.Theexternalasymmetricloadsresultfromtherapiddepressurizationofannulusregions,suchastheannulusbetweenthereactorvesselandtheshieldwall,andcauselargetransientpressuredifferentialstoactonthe'essel.TheseasymmetricloadscoulddamageRCSsupports,corecoolingequipmentorcoreinternals.ThisconcernwasfirstidentifiedasHultiplantAction(HPA)D-10andsubsequentlyasUnresolvedSafetyIssue(USI)2,"AsymmetricLOCALoads"(Ref.4).TheresolutionofUSI-2forWestinghousePWRswasuseoffracturemechanicstechnologyforRCSpiping>10inchesdiameter(Ref.5).Thistechnologybecameknownasleak-before-break(LBB).IncludedwithintheLBB.methodologywastherequirementtohaveleakagedetectionsystems.capableofdetectinga1.0gpmleakwithinfourhours.Thisleakagerateisdesignedtoensurethatadequatemarginsexisttodetectleaksinatimelymannerduringnormaloperatingconditions.TheuseofLBBforGinnaStationisdocumentedinReference6.Insert3.4.41RequirecorrectiveactionsareprovidedinLCO3.4.13,"RCSOperationalLeakage."ThecapabilityoftheleakagedetectionsystemswasevaluatedbytheNRCinReference7. RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESAPPLICABLERCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationsatisfiesCriterion1SAFETYANALYSESoftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)LCOORv.iv.Q4(..iV.o.j4.(IAPPLICABILITY0(.iv.dc.h4'<OnemethodofprotectingagainstlargeRCSeakagderivesfromtheability-ofinstrumentstorapidlydetectextremelysmallleaks.'hisLCOrequiresinstrumentsofdiversemonitoringprinciplestobeOPERABLEtoprovideahighdegreeofconfidencethatextremelysmallleaksaredeteintimetoallowactionstoplacetheplantinasafecondition,whenRCSLEAKAGEindicatespossibleRCPBdegradation.su~Rpv~(c-iA(R.-ii)TheLCOissatisfiedwhenmonitorsofdiversemeasurementmeansareavailable.Thus,thecontainmentsumpmonito,incombinationwithagaseousrparticulateradioactivitymonitorpi.hlA&mL~,~p'l~v~nm~CAlgb('nM'mK~(-8a~~+qm.+<-6ic0\Pt'~MQ%444aho~+~~vapeorm~~~~v~,LS3osg,m~~,~)A--L'LAi5th06'QA{~L~ecauseoeevaeCStemperatureandpressureinMODES1,2,3,and4,RCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.InMODE5or6,thetemperatureis~g<200'Fandpressureismaintainedloworatatmosphericpressure.SincethetemperaturesandpressuresarefarlowerthanthoseforMODES1,2,3,and4,thelikelihoodofleakageandcrackpropagationaremuchsmaller.Therefore,therequirementsofthisLCOarenotapplicableinMODES5and6.ACTIONSLf4>,iv'.0R.i.<P,.i.~andA.2Miththerequiredcontainmentsumponitorinoperable,nootherformofsamplingcanprovidetheequivalentinformation;however,thecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitoitorwillprovideindicationsofchangesinleakage.atmospheremonitor,theperiodicsurveillanceorRCSwaterinventorybalance,S.4.13.1,Rl..iv.h-'w.cx4w40A+bQAciaF'LA~~lc,g~~oarcr(continued)B3.4-87 ~v'I,'~~rRCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONS4,i<~4f4.lvQ.C~~b~~gp~ft.94.tv.4tea~'tV.h.~4.tv.XA.landA.2(continued)mustbeperformedatanincreasedfrequencyof24hourstoprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.~~~~verRestorationoftherequiredsumpmonitortoOPERABLEstatuswithinaCompletionTimeof30daysisrequiredtoregainthefunctionafterthemonitor'sfailure.Thistimeisacceptable,considering'theFrequencyandadequacyoftheRCSwaterinventorybalancereuiredbyRequiredActionA.l.A.t,IA.l.2.RequiredAetio@~modifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage.dlhbB.l.lB.1.2v.2.1a-a)(g.-at)Withbothgaseousandparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitoringinstrumentationchannelsinoerablalternativeactionisrequired.Eithergrabsampesofthecontainmentatmospheremustbetakenandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalances,inaccordancewithSR3.4.13.1,mustbeperformedtoprovidealternate'eriodicinformation.~realWithaampleobtainedandanalyzedorwaterinventorybalanceperformedevery24hours,thereactormaybeoperatedforupto30daystoallowrestorationofthereuvrecontainmentatmosheradactivitmonitors.AemerationisaowecoolercondensateflowPERABLE,ampesaretakenevery24hours.The24hourintervalprovidesperiodicinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.The30dayCompletionTimerecognizesat.leastoneotherformofleakagedetectionisavailable.RequiredActiouaaremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenthegaseousandparticulatcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorjnoerable.Thisallowance(continued)B3.4"88 Insert'3.4.65Theuseofthegaseousmonitor(R-12)isacceptableduetotheincreasedfrequencyofperformingSR3.4.13.1ortheuseofthecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystem.Thecontainmenta'ircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisOPERABLEiftheflowpathsfromallfouraircontainmentaircoolerstotheirrespectivecollectiontankareavailableandSR3.4.15.5,hasbeenperformed.ThecontainmentaircoolercondensatecollectionsystemisprovidedasanoptionfordetectingRCSLEAKAGEsinceSR3.4.13.1isnotperformeduntilafter12'hoursofsteadystateoperation.Therefore,thiscollectionsystemcanbeusedduringMODEchangesifthecontainmentsumpmonitorisinoperable. RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSB.l.lB.1.28.2.1..~(continued)isprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorforRCSLEAKAGE.1andC.2Withherequiredcontainmentaircoolercondensateflowratemitorinoperable,alternativeactionisagainrequired.EitherSR3.4.15.1mustbeperformedorwinventorylances,inaccordancewithSR3.4.13.1mustbeperformedtorovidealternateperiodicinformat'.ProvidedaCHAELCHECKisperformedevery8ursorawaterinventorylanceisperformedeveryhours,reactoroperationmaycont>uewhileawaitingresrationofthecontainmentaircoolecondensateflowtemonitortoOPERABLEstatus.The24hourintervalprovipeodicinformationthatisadequatetodetectRCSLEAKAD.landD.2Withtherequiredntainmentatmospherradioactivitymonitorandthequiredcontainmentairolercondensateflowratemon'rinoperable,theonlymeanofdetectingleakageisecontainmentsumpmonitor.ThiConditiondoesnotovidetherequireddiversemeansofakagedetect'.TheRequiredActionistorestoreeitroftheinopablerequiredmonitorstoOPERABLEstatuswit'0aystoregaintheintendedleakagedetectiondiveity.e30dayCompletionTimeensuresthattheplantwillntbeoperatedinareducedconfigurationforalengthytimeperiod.Wland.2IfaRequiredActionofConditionA,B,Cor-!@@cannotbemet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtherequirementdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachthe(continued)B3.4-89 Insert3.4.66C.l.lC.l.2C.2.1andC.2.2Withtherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitorandtheparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-ll)inoperable,theonlyinstalledmeansofdetectingleakageisthegaseouscontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor(R-12).Thisconditiondoesnotprovideadiversemeansofleakagedetection.'Also,thegaseousmonitorcanonlymeasureabetweena2.0and10.0gpmleak'within1hourwhichmaynotmeetthe1.0gpminlessthanfourhoursdetectionraterequiredbyGenericLetter84-04(Ref.5).TheRequiredActionsaretoanalyzegrabsamplesofthecontainmentatmosphereorperformRCSwaterinventorybalance,SR3.4.13.1,atafrequencyof24hours.Thecombinationofthegaseousmonitorandeithertheperiodicgrabsamplesor>RCSinventorybalanceprovideinformationthatisadequatetodetectleakage.RestorationofeitheroftheinoperablemonitorstoOPERABIEstatuswithin30daysisrequiredtoregaintheintendedleakagedetectiondiversity.The30dayCompletionTime.ensuresthattheplantwillnotbeoperatedinareducedconfigurationforalengthyperiodoftime.RequiredActionsC.l.1,C.l.2,andC.2.2aremodifiedbyaNotethatindicatesthattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenthecontainmentsumpmonitorandtheparticulatecontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitorareinoperable.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseotherinstrumentationisavailabletomonitorRCSleakage. RCSLeakageOetectionInstrumentationB3.4.15BASESACTIONSWlandE2(continued)requiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.Withallrequiredmonitorsinoperable,noautomaticmeansofmonitoringleakageareavailable,andimmediateplantshutdowninaccordance,withLCO3.0.3isrequired.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSrequirestheperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thecheckgivesreasonableconfidencethatthechannelisoperatingproperly.TheFrequency,of12hoursisbasedoninstrumentreliabilityandisreasonablefordetectingoffnormalconditions.gto.iv'.h.SR3.4.15.2cs*uv~ioPP-P~i~uA<~~SIf<<TTrequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.Thetestensuresthatthemonitorcanperformitsfunctioninthedesiredmanner.Thetestverifiesthealarmsetpointandrelativeccuracyoftheinstrumentstring.Therequencyodaysconsidersinstrumentreliability,andoperatingexperiencehasshownthatitisproperfordetectingdegradation.SR3.4.15.3SR3.4.15.4andSR3.4.15.044~ix~~B3.4-90,(continued)TheseSRsrequiretheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachoftheRCSleakagedetectioninstrumentationchannels.Thecalibrationverifiestheaccuracyoftheinstrumentstring,includingtheinstrumentslocatedinsidecontainment.TheFrequencyof~monthsconsiderschannelreliabilit(~~~~operatingexperiencehasproventhatthisFrequencyisacceptable. Insert3.4.8QSR3.4.15.5ismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisSurveillanceisonlyrequiredtobeperformedwhencomplyingwithRequiredActionA.2sincethecontainmentaircoolercondens'atecollectionsystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEtomeetLCO3.4.15.(continued) ~~RCSLeakageDetectionInstrumentation83.4.15BASES(continued)REFERENCES2.RegulatoryGuide1.45.B3.4-91 Insert3.4.673.IEBulletinNo.80-24,"PreventionofDamageDuetoWaterLeakageInsideContainment."NUREG-0609,"AsymmetricBlowdownLoadsonPWRPrimarySystems,"1981.5.6.7.GenericLetter84-04,"SafetyEvaluationofWestinghouseTopicalReportsDealingWithEliminationofPostulatedPipeBreaksinPWRPrimaryMainLoops."LetterfromD.C.DiIanni,NRC,toR.W.Kober,RGEE,

Subject:

"GenericLetter84-04,"datedSeptember9,1985.NUREG-0821,"IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,R.E.NuclearPowerPlant,"December1982. RCSSpecificActivity83.4.16B3.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.16RCSSpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDThemaximumdosetothewholebodyandthethyroidthatanindividualatthesiteboundarycanreceivefor2hoursduringanaccidentisspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.I).Thelimitsonspecificactivityensurethatthedosesareheldtoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100limitsduringanalyzedtransientsandaccidents.4?,vli4QQsc.~ivAqge~-134%4~F4~cio%'L~iudC,W4.w3TheRCSspecificactivityLCOlimitstheallowableconcentrationlevelofradionuclidesinthereactorcoolant.TheLCOlimitsareestablishedtominimizetheoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesintheeventofasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)accident.~P~uiThespecificactivitylimitsforbothDOSEEQUIVENTI-13landgrossspecificactivity.Theallowablelevelsareintendedtolimitthe2hourdoseatthesieboundarytoasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.ThelimitsintheLCOarestandardized,basedonparametricevaluationsofoffsiteradioactivitydoseconsequencesfortypicalsitelocations.TheparametricevaluationsshowedthepotentialoffsitedoselevelsforaSGTRaccidentwereanappropriatelysmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.Eachevaluationassumesabroadrange-ofsiteapplicableatmosphericdispersionfactorsinaparametricevaluation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES4'7.v'il.chTheLCOlimitsonthespecificactivityofthereactorcoolantensuresthattheresulting2hourdosesatthesiteboundarywill,.notexceedasmallfractionofthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimit~ollowingaSGTRaccident.TheSGTRsafetyanalysis(Ref~~assumesthespecificactivityof~v.vi;,gthereactorcoolantattheLCOlimitandanexistingreactorcoolantsteameeratorStubeleakaerateom.isassumesthespeciiesecondarycoolantatimDOSEEQUIVALENTI-.6,"SecondarySpecificAcivi(continued)B3.4-92 RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)8'7.vii.ca~s'.)7,VT>.b50>Cv-o~cA.4)~f.Mud~<<.hr~'a~44o~,~g~7,V'l't.4~rCWT'tC.Rl,i&R7.vi't.97.iSiTheanalysisfortheSGTRaccidentestablishestheacceptancelimitsforRCSspecificactivity.Refrencetothisanalysisisusedtoassesschangestothe'atcouldaffectRCSspecificactivity',astheyrelaeoeacceptancelimits.Theanalsisisfortwocasesofreactorcoolantspecificactivity.Onecaseassumesspecificactivityat1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131withaconcurrentlargeiodinespikethatincreasesthe-131activityinthereactorcoolantbyafactorofabouimmediatelyaftertheaccident.Theseconcaseassumesthe,initialreactorcoolantiodineactivityat60.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131duetoapre-accidentiodinespikecausedbyanRCStransient.Inbothcases,thenoblegasactivityinthereactorcoolantassumes1%failedfuel,whichcloselyequalstheLCOlimitof100/EpCi/gmforgrossspecificactivity.TheanalysisalsoassumesassofoffsiteoweratthesameimeaseSGTRevent.TheSGTRcausesareuctioninreactorcooantinventory.ThereductioninitiatesareactortripfromalowpressurizerpressuresignaloranRCSovertemperaturehTsignal.Thecoincidentlossofoffsitepowercausesthesteamdumpvalvestoclosetoprotectthecondenser.TheriseinpressureintherupturedSGdischargesradioactivelycontaminatedsteamtotheatmospherethroughtheSG~~<ddbS'nhelfreliefvalvesand.themainsteamsafetyvalves.c-z.~(a.~.c.;eunaectedSGaremovMoredecayheatbyventingsteamtotheatmosphereuntilthecoownendThesafetyanalysisshowstheradiologicalconsequencesoanSGTRaccidentarewithinasmallfractionoftheReference1doseguidelinelimits.OperationwithiodinespecificactivitylevelsgreaterthantheLCOlimitispermissible,.iftheactivitylevelsdonotexceedthelimitsshowninFiure3.4.16-1ormoretan.Thesafetyanalysisnp1man~~hTheermissibleiodinelevelsshowninFigure3.4.16-1areacceptablebecauseofthelowprobabilityofaSGTRaccidentoccurringduringtheestab'lished~48-heeratimelimit.TheoccurrenceofanSGTRO~~ivC.(continued)B3.4-93 Insert3.4.68Thissteamreleasecontinuesforeighthoursuntiltheresidualheatremovalsystemisutilizedforcooldownpurposes.Allnoblegasactivityinthe'CSwhichistransportedtothesecondarysystembythetuberuptureisassumedtobeimmediatelyreleased.totheatmosphere. RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)9).vti.c.accidentatthesepermissiblelevelscouldincreasethesiteboundarydoselevels,butstillbewithin10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.Theecificactiviteforestablishingsta'ationshieldingandnneradiationrotectionpracRCSspecificactivitysatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.IOOC~C;/ttes(Thespecificiodineactivityislimitedto1.0pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131,andtherosssecificactivityintheeacorcooan>ssm>etoLveragedisintegrationenergyofthesumoftheaveragebetaandgammaenergiesofthecoolantnuclides).ThelimitonDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131ensuresthe2hourthyroiddosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)willbeasmallfractionoftheallowedthyroiddose.Thelimitongrossspecificactivityensuresthe2hourwholebodydosetoanindividualatthesiteboundaryduringtheDBAwillbeasmallfractionoftheallowedwholebodydose.TheSGTRaccidentanalysis(Ref++showsthatthe2hoursiteboundarydoselevelsarewithinacceptablelimits.ViolationoftheLCOmayresultinreactorcoolantradioactivitylevelsthatcould,intheeventofanSGTR,leadtositeboundarydosesthatexceedthe10CFR100doseguidelinelimits.APPLICABILITYInMODES1and2,andinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperatureZ500'F,operationwithintheLCOlimitsforDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131andgrossspecificactivityarenecessarytocontainthepotentialconsequencesofanSGTRtowithintheacceptablesiteboundarydosevalues.ForoperationinMODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'F,andinMODES4and5,thereleaseofradioactivityintheeventofaSGTRisunlikelysincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftpressuresettingsofthemainsteamsafetyvalves.B3.4-94(continued) RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASES(continued)ACTIONSR'7.Iii4'7,Vs>.a,A.landA.2WiththeDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131greaterthantheLCOlimit,samplesatintervalsofi+CoursmustbetakentodemonstratethatthelimitsofFigure3.4.16-1arenotexceeded.TheCompletionTimeof-hoursisrequiredtoobtainandanalyzeasample.Samplingisdonetocontinuetoprovideatrend.TheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131mustberestoredtowithinlimitswithiifthelimitviolationresultedfromnormaliodinespiking.~~r9l.ivqq.~ii.b~~~~+~~speci.Qt.CMua~sXsazb%-~~c+1*Witecificactivityinexcessowedlimit,ananalysismuin4hourstodetermineDOSE-131.Timeofreenjred>nobtainandanalyzeasample&echangewithinhours:toMODE3andRCSaveragetemperature<500'FlowersthesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantbelowthesetpointsofthemainsteamsafetyvavesandpreventsventingtheSGtotheenvironmentinanSGTRevent.TheallowedCompletionTimeof(goursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3below500'Ffromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.1fi,se"ah.C.B~)s~~apa~~my.vreasonable,below500'Fandwithoutasedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerchallengingplantsystems.IfaRequiredActionandtheassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAisnotmetoriftheDOSEEQUIVALENT1-131isintheunacceptableregionofFigure3.4.16-1,thereactormustbebrouhttoMODE,3withRCSaveragetemperature<500'Fwiiours.TheCompletionTimeofursis)~vaaiaI~~~~~~sQ~QQPMCgq~'q~~em~~~'V~CLLAQ~+~~~WVC~tt+o~O~&s~~2c,we.B3.4"-95(continued) Insert3.4.69RequiredActionA.1ismodifiedbyaNotethatindicates,thattheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhentheDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131isgreaterthantheLCOlimitandwithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.4.16-1.ThisallowanceisprovidedbecauseofthesignificantconservatismincludedintheLCOlimit.Also,reducingtheDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131towithinlimitsisaccomplishedthroughuseoftheChemicalandVolumeControl'ystem(CVCS)demineralizers.ThiscleanupoperationparallelsplantrestartfollowingareactortripwhichfrequentlyresultsiniodinespikesduetothelargestepdecreaseinreactorpowerlevelandRCSpressureexcursion.ThecleanupoperationcannormallybeaccomplishedwithintheLCOCompletionTimeofoneweek. RCSSpecificActivity83.4.16BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS9+~vent,0,Q)aVahsCLSR3.4.16.1."requiresperformingagammaisotopicanalysisasameasureofthegrossspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantatleastonceevery7days.Whilebasicallyaquantitativemeasureofradionuclideswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines,thismeasurementisthesumofthedegassedgammaactivitiesandthegaseousgammaactivitiesinthesampletaken.ThisSurveillanceprovidesanindicationofanyincreaseingrossspecificactivity.TrendingtheresultsofthisSurveillanceallowsproper-remedialactiontobetakenbeforereachingtheLCOlimitundernormaloperatingconditions.TheSurveillanceisapplicableinMODES1and2,andinMODE3withT,~~+~500'F.The7dayFrequencyconsiderstheunlikelihoodofagrossfuelfailureduring~~time.SR3.4.16.29'l.vii.~Thi~ifdiNDEliodineremainswithinlimi62duringnormaloperationandfollowingfastpowerchangeswhenfuelfailureismore<Qp~i.witooccur.The14dayFrequencyisadequatetotrendchangesintheiodineactivitylevel,consideringgrossactivityisonitoredevery7days.TheFrequency,between2andoursafterapowerchangeZ155RTPwithina1hourperiod,isestablishedbecausetheiodinelevelspeakduringthistimefollowingfuelfailure;samplesatothertimeswouldprovideinaccurateresults.SR3.4.16.3AradiochemicalanalysisforEdeterminationisrequiredevery184days(6months)withtheplantoperatinginMODE1equilibriumconditions.TheEdeterminationdirectlyrelatestotheLCOandisrequiredtoverifyplantoperationwithinthespecifiedgrossactivityLCOlimit.TheanalysisforEisameasurementoftheaverageenergiesperdisintegrationforisotopeswithhalfliveslongerthan15minutes,excludingiodines.TheFrequencyof184daysrecognizesEdoesnotchangerapidly.(continued)B3.4-96 RCSSpecificActivityB3.4.16BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS9').vii.o.SR3.4.16.3(continued)ThisSRodifiedbyNotethatindicatessamplingirequireobeperformedwithin31daysafteraminimumof2effectivefullpowerdaysand20daysofNODE1operationhaveelapsedsincethereactorwaslastsubcriticalforatleast48hours.ThisensuresthattheradioactivematerialsareatequilibriumsotheanalysisforEisrepresentativeandnotskewedbyacrudburstorothersimilarabnormalevent.REFERENCES1.10CFR100e11~~~'FSAR,Section+15.6.3~Xi44S)~0~6t5~Z.A-n~t>R-Fa~WGteeLeewg~Q.~.G.~~a.A~e54orPo~&la)K%'Rl.B3.4-97 RCSLoops-TestExceptionsB3.4.1834REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B3.4.9RCSLoops-TestExceptionsBASESBACKGROUNDTheprimarypurposeofthistestexceptionisoprovidea'exceptiontoLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODES1nd2,"topermitreactorcriticalityundernoflowcoditionsduringertainPHYSICSTESTS(naturalcirculatiodemonstration,sationblackout,andlossofoffsitepor)tobeperformedwhleatlowTHERMALPOWERlevels.SecionXIof10CFR50,AppdixB(Ref.1),requiresthatastprogrambeestabishedtoensurethatstructure,systems,andcompontswillperformsatisfactoryinservice.Allfunctionecessarytoensurethatthespecifieddesignconditionarenotexceededdurinormaloperationandanticipateoperationaloccurreesmustbetested.Thistestingisaintegralpartofhedesign,construction,andoperationofhepowerplantsspecifiedinGDC1,"gualityStandardsandcords"(Ref.2).Thekeyobjectiveofatstprogramaretoprovideassurancethattheaciltyhasbeenadequatelydesignedtovalidatetheanalyticamodelsusedinthedesignandanalysis,toverifyteassumptionsusedtopredictplantresponse,toprovideaurancethatinstallationofequipmentattheuthabeenaccomplishedinaccordancewiththedesign,dtovrifythattheoperatingandemergencyprocedresareaquate.Testingisperformedpriortoiniticriticalitduringstartup,andfollowinglowpoweropetions.Thetestswllincludeverifyintheabilitytoestablishandmaintnnaturalcirculationollowingaplanttripbetween%and20%RTP,performinnaturalcirculationcooldowonemergencypower,anddu'ngthecooldown,showithatadequateboronmixtureocursandthat,pressurecancontrolledusingauxiliaryspraandpressurizerheaerspoweredfromtheemergencypowesources.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSEThetestsdescribedaboverequire'peratingteplantwithoutforcedconvectionflowandassuchareotboundedbyanysafetyanalyses.However,operatingexpeiencehasWOGS83.4-105(coninued)I,IRev.0,09/2+92j RCSLoops-TestException83.4.9BASAPPLICLESAFETYALYSES(contind)demonstratedthisexceptiontobesafeundertheesentapplicability.RCSloops-testexceptionssatisfyCriterionoftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOhisLCOprovidesanexemptiontotherquirementsofL03.4.4.TheCOisprovidedtoallowforthperformanceofPHYSICSTEST+inMODE2(afterarefuelin,wherethecorecoolingrequirementsaresignificantlydM'ferentthanafterthecorehasbeen/operating.WithoutthyLCO,plantoperationswouldbeheldbhrndtothenormaloppratingLCOsforreactorcoolantlo~sandcirculation(MODES1and2),andtheappropriateestscouldnotg6eperformed.InMODE2,whe~corepoW/rlevelisconsiderablylowerandtheassociatedPYSICSTESTSmustbeperformed,operationisallowedundernoowonditionsprovidedTHERMALPOWERis~P-7andthereactrtripsetpointsoftheOPERABLEpowerlevelchannelsare~25%RTP.Thisensures,ifsomeproblemcausedtheplattoenterMODE1andstartincreasingplantower,theReactorTripSystem(RTS)wouldautomaticallystitdobeforepowerbecametoohigh,andtherebypreven.violationffueldesignlimits.Theexemptionisallowedevernthoughtherearenoboundingsafetyanalyses.However,thesetestsareperformedunderclosesupervisionduringthete'rogramandprovidevaluable'nformationontheplant'scapabilitytocooldownwithouPoffsitepoweravailabletothereactorcoolantpump.APPLICABILITYhisLCOisapplicablewhenperforminglopowerPHYSICSTESTSwithoutanyforcedconvectionflow.histestingisperformedtoestablishthatheatinputfromuclearheatdoesnotexceedthenaturalcirculationheatmovalcapabilities.Therefore,nosafetyorfuelde'gnlimitswillbeviolatedasaresultoftheassociatedtsts.WOGSTSB3.4-106Ir(contined)Rev.0,09/28/ 'RCSLoops-TestExceptionsB3.4.19BES(continued)ACTIOA.1WhenTHERMALPOWERisztheP-7interlocksetpoint0%,theonlyacceptableactionistoensurethereactortpbreakers(RTBs)areopenedimmediatelyinaccordncewithRequiredActionA.ltopreventoperationofthfuelbeyonditsdesignlimits.OpeningtheRTBswillshudownthereactorandpreventoperationofthefuelosideofitsesignlimits.IiSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS1IISR3..19.1Verificat'onthatthepowerlevels<theP-7interlocksetpoint(%)willensurethatefueldesigncriteriaarenotviolateduringtheperfornceofthePHYSICSTESTS.TheFrequencyfonceperhouisadequatetoensurethatthepowerlevedoesnotexcedthelimit.PlantoperationsareconductedsllydurinPtheperformanceofPHYSICSTESTSandmonitoringthepowerYevelonceperhourissufficienttoensurethatthewerleveldoesnotexceedthelimit.SR3.4.19.2ThepowerrangehandintermaviaterangeneutrondetectorsandtheP-7interloyksetpointmtbeverifiedtobeOPERABLEandadjustedtothepropervae.ACOTisperformedwithin12hoursprig&toinitiationothePHYSICSTESTS.ThiswillensurVthattheRTSisproplyalignedtoprovidetherequiredytegreeofcoreprotectionduringtheperformanceofthe'HYSICSTESTS.Thetime'limit12hoursissufficienttoenseethattheinstrumentationisOPERABLEshortlybeforinitiatingPHYSICSTESTS.,REFERENCES10CFR50,AppendixB,SectionXI.2.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC1,1988.'WOGSTSB3.4-107

RCSLoopIsolationValvesB3.4.173.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEM(RCS)B34.17RCSLoopIsolationValvesBASESBACKGROUNDTheRCSmaybeoperatedwithloopsisolatedinoertoperformmaintenance.Whileoperatingwithaloopisolated,thereispotentialforinadvertentlyopening$4eisolationvalvesintheisolatedloop.Inthisevent,j'thecoolantintheisolatedloopwouldsuddenlybegintoxwiththeolantintheoperatingloops.ThissitationhasthepoentialofcausingapositivereactivyadditionwithacorrespondingreductionofSDHif:a.etemperatureintheisolategloopislowerthanthetemperatureintheoperatingToops(coldwaterincient);orb.TheboronconcentrationjntheisolatedloopislowerthantheXboronconcentrgtionintheoperatingloops(borondi$tionincident).AsdiscussedintFSAP(Ref.1),thestartupofanisolatedloopispefoymedinacontrolledmannerthatvirtuallyeliminatesnysuddenpositivereactivityadditionfromcoldwaterandoborondilutionbecause:a~LCO3.4.18,'RCSIsatedLoopStartup,"andplantoperatingprocedures<equirethattheboronconcentrionintheiglatedloopbemaintainedhigherhantheboronccentrationoftheoperatingloops>thuseliminatingtepotentialforintroducingcoolantfromtheisolatedopthatcoulddilutetheboonconcentrationintheocratingloops;b.hecoldlegloopisolationvaecannotbeopenedunlessthetemperaturesofbothehotandcoldlegsoftheisolatedlooparewithin2'Fofthetemperaturesofthehotandcoldlesoftheoperatingloops(complianceisensuredbyopertingproceduresandautomatic'interlocks);and.c.Otherautomaticinterlocks,allofwhichrepartoftheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS),prevetopeningthehotlegloopisolationvalveunlesstheoldlegloopisolation'valveisfullyclosed.'WOGSTSB3.4-98(contied), RCSLoopIsolationValvesB3.4.17ASES(continued)APPLCABLESAFETANALYSESDuringstartupofanisolatedloopinaccordancewithLCO3.4.18,thecoldlegloopisolationvalveinterlocksandoperatingprocedurespr'eventopeningofthevalveunPiltheisolatedloopandoperatingloopboronconcentratiopsandtemperaturesareequalized.Thisensuresthatany~undesirablereactivityeffectfromtheisolated'oopdoesnotoccur.ThesafetyanalysesassumeaminimumSOHasaninitialconditionforDesignBasisAccidents(OBAs)(Ref.1).iolationoftheLCO,combinedwithmixingoftheisolated1opcoolantintotheoperatingloops,couldresultintheSDSbeinglessthanthatassumedinthe.'safetyanalyses../.TheaboveanalysesareforDBAsthat.'establishtheacceptancelimitsfortheRCSloop.-isolationvalves.Reference.totheanalysesfortheseOBAsisusedtoassesschangesto/theRCSloopisolationvalvesastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.r'.TheboronconcentrationofanisolatedloopmayaffectSDHandthereforeRloopisolationvalvessatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicStatement./LCOThisLCOensuresttgtaloopisolationvalvethatbecomesclosedinHODESlqfhrough,4isfullyisolatedandtheplantplacedinMODE5jLoopisqlationvalvesareusedforperformingmaintenancewhen<<theplantisinMODE5or6,andstartupofan/isolatedloopiscoveredbyLCO3.4.18.APPLICABILITYInMODE1through4,thisLCOispplicablewhenunisoltinganisolatedloopwithaoronconcentrationlessthanhatoftheoperatingloopsmayauseaninadvertentcriicality.MODES5and6,theSDMoftheoperatiloopsislargeenoughtopermitoperationwithisolated1ps.IntheseMODES,controlledstartupofisolatedloops~spossiblewithoutsignificantriskofinadvertentcritiality.'WQGSTSB3.4-99(contued)Rev.0,09/28/(2 eRCSLoopIsolationValvesB3.4.17ASES(continued)ACTNSTheActionshavebeenprovidedwithaNotetoclarifyttallRCSloopisolationvalvesforthisLCOaretreatedasseparateentities,eachwithseparateCompletionTimi.e.,theCompletionTimeisonacomponentbasis.A.1Ifpowerisinadvertentlyrestoredtooneororeloopisolationvalveoperators,thepotentialex'sforccidentalisolationofaloopwithasubsquentinadvertentartupoftheisolatedloop.Theloop'lationvalveshaemotoroperators.Therefore,thesealveswillmaintainthe)lastpositionwhenpowerisremoedfromthevalveoperator.Withpowerappliedtothealveoperators,only.theintrlockspreventthevalvefrbeingoperated.Althoughoperatingproceduresandnterlocksmaketheoccurrencofthiseventunlikel,theprudentactionistoremovepowerfromtheloopisolionvalveoperators.TheCompletionT~eof30minutesoremovepowerfromtheloopisolationvalNoperatorsisufficientconsideringthecomplexityoftetask.B.lB.2andB.3Shouldaloopisolat'ovalvebeclosedinHODES1through4,theafftedoopmustbefully.isolatedimmediatelyandtplantlacedinHODE5toprecludeinadvertentstarupoftheloopandthepotentialinadvertentcriicality.TCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.lalwstimeforboatingtheoperatingloopstoashutdownbortionlevelsuchtttheplantcanbebroughttoHODE3thin6hoursandHOD5within36hours.TheallowedCpletionTimesarereasable,basedonoperating'experiee,toreachtherequiredantconditionsfromfullpowernditionsinanorderlymanneandwithoutchallngingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSR3.4.17.1TheSurveillanceisperformedatleastoncepe31daystoensurethattheRCSloopisolationvalvesareon,withpowerremovedfromtheloopisolationvalveoperaors.Thej(coninued)jWOGSB3.4-100/Rev.0,09/282~' RCSLoopIsolationValvesB3.4.17BASSURVEINCERE(UIRENTSSR3.4.17.1(continued)primaryfunctionofthisSurveillanceistoensurethatpowerisremovedfromthevalveoperators,sinceSR3..4.1ofLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-NODES1and2,"ensurestttheloopisolationvalvesareopenbyverifyingeveryhoursthatallloopsareoperatingandcirculatingreacrcoolant.TheFrequencyof31daysensuresthatherequiredlowcanbemadeavailable,isbasedonengineinggdgment,andhasproventobeacceptable.cratingexeriencehasshownthatthefailurerate'olowthatthe1dayFrequencyisjustified.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section[15.2.6].OGSTS83.4-101Rev.0,09/28/9 RCSIsolated'oopStartupB3.4.183.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEH(RCS)B.4.18RCSIsolatedLoopStartupBASESBACKGROUNDITheRCSmaybeoperatedwithloopsisolatedinHOS5and6inordertoperformmaintenance.Whileoperatiwithaloopisolated,thereispotentialforinadverttlyopeningtheisolationvalvesintheisolatedloop.Ithisevent,thecoolantintheisolatedloopwouldsuddlybegintomixiththecoolantintheoperatingloops.issituationhastpotentialofcausingapositivereacvityadditionwithacrrespondingreductionofSOHifa~b.etemperatureintheisolatedoopislowerthantheteeratureintheoperatingops(coldwaterinc>ent);orTheborqnconcentrationitheisolatedloopislowerthantheQoronconcentrionintheoperatingloops(boronditionincide).AsdiscussedintFSAR(Ref.1),thestartupofanisolatedloopisdoeacontrolledmannerthatvirtuallyeliminatesany.suddeeactivityadditionfromcoldwaterorborondilutionbecaea~b.C.ThisLCOanplantoperatingproceduresrequirethattheborononcentratibqintheisolatedloopbemaintainhigherthan/heboronconcentrationoftheoperatipgloops,thuselinatingthepotentialforintrodcingcoolantfromeisolatedloopthatcoulddiluetheboronconcentrat'onintheoperatingloops.Tecoldlegloop,isolationvavecannotbeopenednlessthetemperaturesofbothhehotlegandcoldlegoftheisolatedlooparewithn20'Foftheoperatingloops.Compliancewithetemperaturerequirementisensuredbyoperatingroceduresandautomaticinterlocks.Otherautomaticinterlockspreventopenithehotlegloopisolationvalveunlessthecoldlegopisolationvalveisfullyclosed.AllofthinterlocksarepartoftheReactorProtectioSystem.'<OGSTSB3.4-102(contind)Rev.0,09/28/9 RCSIsolatedLoopStartupB3.4.18BASES(continued)APICABLESAFYANALYSESDuringstartupofanisolatedloop,thecoldlegloopisolationvalveinterlocksandoperatingprocedurespreventopeningthevalveuntiltheisolatedloopandoperatingr'loopboronconcentrationsandtemperaturesareequalized.hisensuresthatanyundesirablereactivityeffectfromheisolatedloopdoesnotoccur.ThesafetyanalysesassumeaminimumSDMasanPnitialconditionforDesignBasisAccidents.ViolatipnofthisLCOcouldresultintheSDMbeingreducedinthe~peratingloopsolessthanthatassumedinthesafetyanyses.The.boronconcentrationofanisolatedl.oopmayaffectSDMandthereforeRCSisolatedloopstartup'satisfiesCrite'n2oftheNRCPolicyStatemep't./LCOLoopisolatonvalvesareusedforperformingmaintenancewhentheplantisinMODE5or/6.ThisLCOensuresthattheloopisolation<valvesremain/closeduntilthedifferentialsoftemperatureadboroncpncentrationbetweentheoperatingloopsandtheisotedloopsarewithinacceptablelimits.APPLICABILITYInMODES5and6,teSDgoftheoperatingloopsislargeenoughtopermit.aperatio+withisolatedloops.ControlledstartupofisolaPtdloopsispossiblewithoutsignificantriskofinadvezpentcritical'ty.ThisLCOisapplicableundertheseconditions.ACTIONSIA.landA.2RequPredActionA.landRequiredAetioA.2assumethattheprequisitesioftheLCOarenotmetanaloopisolationvvehasbeeninadvertentlyopened.Thefore,theActionsequireimmediateclosureofisolationvalstoprecludeaborondilutioneventoracoldwaterevent.owever,eachRequiredActionisprecededbyaNotethatstesthatActionisrequiredonlywhenaspecificconcentationortemperaturerequirementisnotmet./.MOGSTSB3.4-103(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92~. RCSIsolatedLoopStartupB3.4.18BSES(continued)SURVELANCERE(UIRENTSSR3.4.18.1ThisSurveillanceisperformedtoensurethatthetemperaturedifferentialbetweentheisolatedlooandtheoperatingloopsis<[20]'F.PerformingtheSureillance30minutespriortoopeningthecoldlegisolaonvalveintheisolatedloopprovidesreasonable'assuran,basedonengineeringjudgment,thatthetemperatured'fferentialwillstaywithinlimitsuntilthecoldlegisolionvalveisened.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntoeacceptabletoughoperatingexperience.SR3..18r2Toensurthattheboronconcentrationoftheisolatedloopisgreaterthanorequaltothegoronconcentrationoftheoperating1ps,aSurveillanisperformed2hourspriortoopeningesherthehotoroldlegisolationvalve.Performingtheurveillance2hourspriortoopeningeitherthehotorcoldegisolatnonvalveprovidesreasonableassurancetheborconcntrationdifferencewillstaywithinacceptable'miuntiltheloopisunisolated.ThisFrequencyhasbeensntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Secion[15.2.6].I:,1WOGSTSB3.4-104Rev.0,09/28/95 Accumulators3.5.13.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.1AccumulatorsWLQ0LCO3.5.1-Pete@ECCSaccumulatorsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2,1Ca00MODE3withpressurizerpressure>+NO@"psig.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneaccumulatorinoperableduetoboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.lRestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.72hoursB.OneaccumulatorinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionA.B.l.RestoreaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAor8notmet.C.1ANDC.2BeinMODE3.Reducepressurizerpressureto~~~psig.ICoa6hours12hoursD.Twoe~~accumulatorsinoperable.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately3.5-1 Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCY5i.'i~ero~NSR3.5.1.1Verifyeachaccumulatorisolationvalveisfullyopen.12hoursSR3.5.1.2Verifyboratedwatervolumeineach.dn2+~Q'sc.~Q(so4)ll58~Sic~%(cx4b12hoursSR3.5.1.3Verifynitrogencoverpressureineachaccumulatoris>)~jpsigandpsig~7oo79012hoursSR3.5.1.4Verifboronconcentrationineachaccumuaoris~QL~V<<31daysQAoSWRGGCRFQ',AkimANDS~.cia-----NOTE------nlyrequiredbeperformefraffectedacumulatorsOnceithi6houtereachsltionvolumencreaseof>[[galons,()%ofind'catedleel]thatisntheresutadditionromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(continued)3.5-2 Accumulators3.5.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.5.1.5Verifypowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoeratorwhenpressurizepressureispslg,+lb~31days(Q3.5-3 ECCS3.5.23.5EHERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.2ECCS-i,~,tgL3,LCO3.5.2TwoECCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.g~.vt.MNOTES-1InMODE3,bothsafetyinjection(SI)pumpflowpathsmaybeisolatedbyclosingtheisolationvalvesforupto2hourstoperformpressureisolationva'IvetestingperSR3.4.14.l.s-z.n<<~2~.<<S'XOperationinMODE3withpumpsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"isallowedforupto4hoursoruntilthetemperatureof~bw~I'CScoldlegsexceeds+75]'F,whichevercomesfirst.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEs2.vi.~A.Onetrai~inoperabe.ANDAtleast100/oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable.A.lRestoretraintoOPERABLEstatus.T2hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.IBeinMODE3.AND8.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hours2.5.33.5-4 Insert3.5.3(sQC.Twotrainsinoerable.C.1EnterLCO3.0.3ImmediatelyInsert3.5.14OISa.YiiPowermayberestoredtomotoroperatedisolationvalves878A,878B,878C,and878Dforupto12hoursforthepurposeoftestingperSR3.4.14.1providedthatpowerisrestoredtoonlyonevalveatatime. ~>Mi,Z,~oECCS-Q~~3.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCY3-5.2.1Verifythefollowinvivesareinthelistedositio2.~I.L,12hoursNumberPositionFunction~E.~[][][][][]>.4MLSSR3.5.2.2VerifyeachECCSmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpath,thatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition;isinthecorrectposition.31days2.cI,lter.31daysSR3.5.2.4VerifyeachECCSpump'sdevelopedheadatthetestflowpointisgreaterthanorequaltothe,requireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram52.ixSR3.5.2.5I~'ir~+]c~,SacLLQL,Mb~srLspy~i+QorihivVerifeachECCSautomaticvalveinthelowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.monthsSR3.5.2.6VerifyeachECCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.0,(continued)3.5-5 0'L,~~~tInsert3.5.4825A825B826A826B826C 8260851A851B856878A878B 878C8780 896A896BPositionOpenOpenClosedClosedClosedClosedOpenOpen OpenClosedOpen'losedOpenOpenOpenFunctionRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsRWSTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsBASTSuctiontoSIPumpsSumpBSuctiontoRHRPumpsSumpBSuctiontoRHRPumpsRWSTSuctiontoRHRPumpsSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegSIInjectiontoRCSHotLegSIInjectiontoRCSColdLegRWSTSuctiontoSIandSprayRWSTSuctiontoSIandSprayInsert3.5.15SR3.5.2.3Verifythebreakerorkeyswitch,asS>,ic'(applicable,foreachvalvelistedinSR3.5.2.1,isinthecorrectposition.31days 52.x~opsi,z~>ECCS-@srgR@3.5.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE'RE(UENCYSR3...7Verify,foreachECCSthrottlevalvelistedbelow,eachpositionstopisecorrectposition.ValveNumbe[18]ms][ISR3.5.2.8er,isualinspection,eachECCStraincontainmenetio'notrestrictedbyde'ettsandscreensshownoevidenceostructuraldistressorabnormalcorrosion.onths3.5-6 ~e-qECCS-~4ewn)3.5.33.5.3ECCS-KQ4~i5~'vLCO3.5.3OneECCStrainshallbeOPERABLE.3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)APPLICABILITY:MODE4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREOUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHE.RequiredECCSresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsysteminoperable.A.lInitiateactiontorestorerequiredECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelySa4.~,~jason(DT)iB.,RequiredECCShead.subsystemP-inoperable.B.lRestorerequiredECCSIhourST,subsystem/toOPERABLEstatus.C.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTime+ofConditionEPnotmet.C.lBeinMODE5.24hours3.5-7 53.a4ECCS-~~3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.5.3.1NOTE-AnRHRtrainmaybeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealignedtotheECCSmodeofoperation.ThefoIlowiopSRea@applicab1eforal'IequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABLE:InaccordancewithapplicableS~SR3.5.2.43.5-8 RWST3.5.43.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)LCO3.5.4TheRWSTshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RWSTboronconcentrationnotwithinlimits.A.IRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.8hoursRWSTboyteatertemperaturenothinits.B.RWSrablreasonenitionAvolvo'.m+~s+4iwIIhp,a+B.lRestoreRWSTtoOPERABLEstatus.IhourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.IBeinMODE3.ANDC.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours3.5-9 RWST3.5.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.NOTEuiredtobeperformedwhentairtempera'[3'[100]'F.~yRWSTboratedwatertemperatureis>[35t'Fand<[100]'F.hoursrSR3.5.4~VerifyRWSTboratedwatervolumeis'V3oo,oooq~~s(za'7,)7daysSR3.5.4.3VerifRWSTboronconcentrationis7daysSl.iV'.5-10 SealInjectionFlow3.5.3.5ERGENCYCORECOOLING'SYSTEMS(ECCS)3.5.5S1InjectionFlowLCO3.5.5Reactorcoolantpumpsealinjectionflowshallbe[4O]gpmwith[centrifugalchargingpumpdischargeheaderpressure>[2480]psigandthe[chargingflow]controlvvefullopen.APPLICABILITY:MODEI,2,and3.ACTIONSCONDITION-REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Sealinjectionflownotwithinlimit.A.Adjustmanalsealinjectionthrottlevalvesgiveaflowwithinimitwithcentifugalchargingpmpdischargeheer]pressureSO]psigandthechaingflow]controvalvefullopen.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet..IBeinMODE3.AND8.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hours3.5-11 SealInjectionFlow3.5.SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUCYSR3.5.5.-NOTENotrequiredtobeperformeduntil4hoursaftertheReactorCoolantSystempressurestabilizesat>[2215psigand2255psig].Ver>manualsealinjectionthrottlevalveareadjustedtogiveaflowwithilimit'th[centrifugalchargingpumpdischarheader]pressure>[2480]pgandthe[argingflow]controlvalvfullopen.31days3.5-l2 3.5ERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)3.5.6BoonInjectionTank(BIT)TheBIT.shallbeOPERABLE.LCO3.5.6APPLICABILITY:HES1,2,and3.'CTIONSREQUIREDACTIOCONDITIONA.BITinoperable.Restore8toOPERABLstatus.B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.BinHODE3.B.lANDBoretoanSDMequivlentto[I]/b,kat200'F.8.2AND8.3RestoreBIToOPERABLEstats.C.RequiredActinandassociatedmpletionTimeofCoditionBnotmet.C.lBeinMODE4.3.5-13COMPLETIONTIHE-1hour6hours6hours7days12hours B3..6SURVEIANCEREQUIREMENTSFREENCYSR3.5.6.1VerifyBITboratedwatertemperatureis>[l45]F.24oursSR3.5.6.2VeriyBITboratedwatervolumeis.>[ll0]ga11ons.7daysSR3.5.6.3VerifyBIToronconcentrationis>[20,000]mand<[22,500]pp.7days3.5-14 AccumulatorsB3.5.1B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.1AccumulatorsBASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionsoftheECCSaccumulatorsaretosupplywatertothereactorvesselduringtheblowdownphaseofalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),toprovideinventorytohelpaccomplishtherefillphasethatfollowsthereaftera,odto~v,oprovideReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)makeupforasmallbreakLOCA.~~dCess>chn%tirh,e~~WVCt.sa4vagI~C4t~fsvsraPosy~~u~<.1N~iQ<aSV,~aao~)~,Sos.+ty'r~avaW~'CWoX.5'~'a.C.Q.TheblowdownphaseofalargebreakLOCAistheinitialperiodofthetransientduringwhichtheRCSdepartsfromequilibriumconditions,andheatfromfissionproductdecay,hotinternals,andthevesselcontinuestobetransferredtothereactorcoolant.TheblowdownphaseofthetransientendswhentheRCSpressurefallstoavalueapproachingthatofthecontainmentatmosphere.IntherefillphaseofaLOCA,whichimmediatelyfollowstheblowdownphase,the~ak.~ecoreisessentiallyinadiabaticheatup.ebalanceofaccumulatorinventoryisQianaavailabletoelpfillvoidsinthelowerplenumandreactorvesseldowncomersoastoestablisharecoverylevelatthebottomfthe5l.1v.bTheaccumulatorsarepressurevesselspartiallyfilledwithboratedwaterandpressurizedwithnitrogengas.Theaccumulatorsarepassivecomponents,sincenooperatororcontrolactionsarerequiredinorderforthemtoperformtheirfunction.InternalaccumulatortankpressureissufficienttodischargetheaccumulatorcontentstotheRCS,ifRCSpressuredecreasesbelowtheaccumulatorpressure.EachaccumulatorispipedintoanRCScoldlegviaanaccumulatorlineandisisolatedfromtheRCSbyamotoroperatedisolationvalveandtwocheckvalvesinseries.emoorocrateisoasonvaveareinterloctwj'zerpressuremeannelstoensurethatthevalvesw'sRCSpressureaovethepermissivecircuitP-(continued)B3.5-1 Insert3.5.1(841and865)aremaintainedopenwithACpowerremovedunderadministrativecontrolwhenpressurizerpressureis)1600psig.Thisfeatureensuresthatthevalvesmeetthesinglefailurecriterionofmanually-controlledelectricallyoperatedvalvesperBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18(Ref.I)ThisisalsodiscussedinReferences2and3. AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)cat.t.V.CA.Ti'rlockalsopreventsinadvertentclosure~evalvesdurirmaloperationpriortoa~cadent.Thevalveswillautoma'pen,hever,asaresultofanSIsignal.Thesefeaturesethatthevalvesmeetthe.requirementsoFtheastuteof'calandElectronicEngineersItandard279-1971(Ref."operatingbypaandthatthe.accumulatorswillbeavailargectionwithoutrelianceonoperatoraction.ssnc.~oTheaccumulatorsize,water(volume,and{nitroencoverressureareselectedsothat(CQWoft%accumulatorst-sufficienttopartiallycoverthecorebeforesignificantcladmeltingorzirconiumwaterreactioncanoccurfollowingaLOCA.Theneedtoensurethatltivvmeam<<accumulator&now'adequateforthisfunctionisconsistentwiththeLOCAassumptionthattheentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorwillbelostviatheRCSpipebreakduringtheblowdownphaseoftheLOCA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheaccumulatorsareassumedOPERABLEinboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesatfullpower(Ref.~."ThesearetheDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatestablishtheacceptancelimitsfortheaccumulators.ReferencetotheanalysesfortheseDBAsisusedtoassesschangesintheaccumulatorsastheyrelatetotheacceptancelimits.InperformingtheLOCAcalculations,conservativebillfi<<flowIn.theearlystagesofalLOCA,withorwithoutalossc'foffsitepower,theaccumulatorsprovidethesolesourceofmakeupwatertotheRCS.TheassumptionoflossofoffsitepowerisrequiredbyregulationsandconservativelyimposesadelaywhereintheECCSpumpscannotdeliverflowuntiltheemergencydieselgeneratorsstart,cometoratedspeed,andgothroughtheirtimedloadingsequence.Incoldlegbreakscenarios,theentirecontentsofoneaccumulatorareassumedtobelostthroughthebreak.ThelimitinglargebreakLOCAisadoubleendedguillotinebreakatthedischargeofthereactorcoolantpump.Duringthisevent,theaccumulatorsdischargetotheRCSassoonasRCSpressuredecreasestobelowaccumulatorpressure.(continued)B3.5-2 ~up~~gotm~<eBASESSwsi~~~AccumulatorsB3.5.1APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)~~Sl.<VaR.5l,iv.CLAsaconservativeestimate,nocreditistakenforECCSpumpflowuntilaneffectivedelayhaselapsed.Thisdelayaccountsfothedieselsstarting,andthepumpsbeingloadedanddeliveringfullflow.iglii,h11ydasprovidingthesolesourceofemergencycorecooling.NooperatoractionisassumedduringtheblowdownstageofalargebreakLOCA.TheworstcasesmallbreakLOCAanalysesalsoassumeatimedelaybeforepumpedflowreachesthecore.Forthelargerrangeofsmallbreaks,therateofblowdownissuchthattheincreaseinfuelcladtemperatureisterminatedsolelybytheaccumulators,withpumpedflowthenprovidingcontinuedcoolin.Asbreaksizedecreases,theaccumulatorsands~~5~~cpumpsbothplayapartinterminatingeriseincladtemperature.Asbreaksizecontinuestodecrease,theroleoftheaccumulatorscontinuestodecreaseuntiltheyarenotrequiredandthecta%~i~(~>>pumpsbecomesolelyresponsibleforterminatingtetemperatureincrease.ThisLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriaestablishedfortheECCSby10CFR50.46(Ref.~willbemetfollowingaLOCA:a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis<2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationis<0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;c.Haximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis<0.01timesthehypotheticalamountthatwouldbegeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume,weretoreact;andd.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry.SincetheaccumulatorsdischargeduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theydonotcontributetothelongtermcoolingrequirementsof10CFR50.46.ForboththelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalyses,anominalcontainedaccumulatorwatervolumeisused.Thecontained(continued)B3.5-3 ':~""'t~~~~u9a~g~(~*~3~Qs'4MvvvvmIC.fs~4rwge~R'n.'a4BASESes.tV.44AccumulatorsB3.5el~~~<me&~u~~~CVb4W4~Gavvr~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)a.av.+~~~<,ce.W5<.'AC-4watervolumeisthesameasthedeliverablevolumefortheaccumulators,sincetheaccumulaorsareemptied,oncedischarged;Forsmallbreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumeisapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyForlargebreaks,anincreaseinwatervolumecanbeeitherapeakcladtemperaturepenaltyorbenefit,dependingondowncomerfillingandsubsequentspillthroughthebreakduringthecorerefloodingportionofthetransient.Theanalysis'filFhecvavefesafetyanaysisassumes-vaso[646gand-feglk]sLallon~oal1onforinstrument,inaccuracy+520]gaTlonsI'et-~20]-gaILaMare:e.-Z'.4'.v'.dtTheminimumboronconcentrationsetpointisusedinthepostLOCAboronconcentrationcalculation.ThecalculationisperformedtoassurereactorsubcriticalityinapostLOCAenvironment.OfparticularinterestisthelargebreakLOCA,sincenocreditistakenforcontrolrodassemblyinsertion.AreductionintheaccumulatorminimumboronconcentrationwouldproduceasubsequentreductionintheavailablecontainmentsumpconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownandanincreaseinthemaximumsumppH.Thet~Si.v5(,iv.QThelargeandsmallbreakLOCAanalysesareperformedattheminimumnitrogencoverpressure,sincesensitivityanalyseshavedemonstratedthathighernitrogencoverpressureresultsinacomputedpeakcladtemperaturebenefit.Themaximumnitrogencoverpressurelimitpreventsaccumulatorreliefvalveactuation,andultimatelypreservesaccumulatorintegrity.+ckSOCip4;444Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesfromtheaccumulatorsareaccountedforintheappropriateanalyses(Refs.~nd4f.rTheaccumulatorssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.B3.5-4(continued) Insert3.5.2thetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpost,LOCA.Themaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheaccumulatorwatervolumeandonchemical.effectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpray(CS)System.ThemaximumvalueSpecificationtheCOLRwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheaccumulatorassumingaContainmenttemperatureof60F(Ref.6).Analysesperformedinresponseto10GFR50.49(Ref.7)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.6).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents. AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASES(continued)LCO5t.l.V,aS<.viTheLCOestablishestheminimumconditionsrequiredtoensurethattheaccumulatorsareavailabletoaccomplishtheircorecoolingsafetyfunctionfollowingaLOCA.accumulatorsarerequiredtoensurethat100%ofthef~1t&il1hhduringaLOCA.Thisisconsistentwiththeassumptionthatthecontentsofoneaccumulatorspillthroughthebreak.Iflessthan~~ccumulatorW'heinjectedduringtheblowdownphaseofaLOCA,theECCSacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50.46(Ref.@couldbeviolated.a0.400va4.1(4OC(a61gForanaccumulatortobeconsideredOPERABLE,)the<isolationvalvemustbefullyopen+4thpowerremoveMandthelimitsestablishedintheSRsforcontainedvolume,boronconcentration,andnitrogencoverpressuremustbemet.APPLICABILITYlcooSL.i.v.4InNODES1and2,andinNODE3withRCSpressure~>4660"psig,theaccumulatorOPERABILITYrequirementsarebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughcoolingrequirementsdecreaseaspowerdecreases,theaccumulatorsarestillrequiredtoprovidecorecoolingaslongaselevatedRCSpressuresandtemperaturesexist.5GOOti,ooThisLCOisonlyapplicableatpressures>~psig.Atpressures<440~sig,therateofRCSblowdownissuchthattheECCSpumpscanprovideadequateinjectiontoensurethatpeakcladtemperatureremainsbelowthe10CFR50.46(RefQl.imitof2200'F.((oOOInNODE3,withRCSpressure<PROpsig,andinNODES4,5,and6,theaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalvesareclosedtoisolatetheaccumulatorsfromtheRCS.ThisalloysRCScooldownand'epressurizationwithoutdischargingtheaccumulatorsintotheRCSorrequiringdepressurizationoftheaccumulators.ACTIONSA.1Ifthe*boronconcentrationofoneaccumulatorisnotwithinlimits,itmustbereturnedtowithinthelimitswithin72hours.InthisCondition,bilitytomaintainsubcriticalityorminimumboronprecipitationtimemaybe'continued)B3.5-5 AccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESACTIONSCaaat~~CX~~ltkMEU~Senable~~cdk~Q+sbR.C.aackmmQR.kjJZ'Y5l.i.v.Q.A.l(continued}hreduced.TheboronintheaccumulatorscontributestotheassumptionthatthecombinedECCSwaterinthepartiallyrecoveredcoreduringtheearlyrefloodingphaseofalargebreakLOCAissufficienttokeepthatportionofthecoresubcritical.Oneaccumulatorbelowtheminimumboronconcentrationlimit,however,willhavenoeffectonavailableECCSwaterandaninsignificanteffectoncoresubcriticalitdurinreflooBoilingofECCSwaterinthecoreduringrefloodconcentratesboroninthesaturatedliquidthatremainsinthecore.Inaddition,currentanalysistechniquesdemonstratethattheaccumulators-de.note.~dischargefollowingalargedaasihsteamlinebreak.~Eiihddhi,hidisminorandnotadesignlimitingevent.Thus,72hoursisallowedtoreturntheboronconcentrationtowithinlimits.B.lIfoneaccumulatorisinoperableforareasonotherthanboronconcentration,theaccumulatormustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithi1hour.InthisCondition,therequiredcontentsof'accumulator~annotbeassumedtoreachthecoreduringaLOCA.DuetotheseverityoftheconsequencesshouldaLOCAoccurintheseconditions,the1hourCompletionTimetoopenthevalve,.removepowertothevalve,orrestoretheproperwatervolumeornitrogencoverpressureensuresthatpromptactionwillbetakentoreturntheinoperableaccumulatortoOPERABLEstatus.TheCompletionTimeminimizesthepotentialforexposureoftheplanttoaLOCAundertheseconditions.C.landC.25<a.ar.WIftheaccumulatorcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoMODE3within6hoursandpressurizerpressurereducedto~gQSBpsigwithin12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.(continued}B3.5-6 ~,,~'(Accumulators83.5.1BASESACTIONS(continued)5L.jv,WD.1G.~f~1P'.ip11,h1aconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSi~c.v;Q.5L.i.v.aLhsaoQca~IanA.i~ham%c-~~~c.Aoe.,&~A~OMos~KkMue.rAcQ~~L<~u~5i.sV.+SR3.5.1.1~~c'~@~~MbIOnOlh,Eachaccumulatorvalveshouldbeverifiedtobefullyopenever12hours.Thisverificationensuresthattheaccumulatorsareavailableforinjectionandensurestimelydiscoveryifavalveshouldbelessthanfullyopen.Ifanisolationvalveisnotfullyopen,therateofinjectiontotheRCSwouldbereduced.Althoughamotoroperatedvalvepositionshouldnotchangewithpowerremoved,aclosedvalvecouldresultinnotmeetingaccidentanalysesassumptions.ThisFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatensureamispositionedisolationvalveisunlikely.SR3.5.1.2andSR3.5.1.3d11ressure'foreachaccumulator.ThisFrequencysssuficienttoensureadequateinjectionduringaLOCA.Becauseofthestaticdesignoftheaccumulator',a12hourFrequencyusuallyallowstheoperatortoidentifychangesbeforelimitsarereached.0cratingexperiencehasshownthisFrequencytobeappropriateforearlydetectianandcorrectionofoffnormaltrends.~~14oclP4~~~eh%.~~~X~Cp~~~~~~SaR4<SR3-5-1-4~yak&Theboronconcentrationshouldbeverifiedtobewithinsi.<Cirequiredlimitsforeachaccumulatorevery31dayssincethestaticdesignoftheaccumulatorslimitsthewasinwhichtheconcentrationcanbechanged.The31darequencyisadequatetoidentifychangesthatcouldoccurfrmechanismssuchasstratificationorinleakae9ccumuatorwit~nera15volumeincreasewillideeakagehascausedarearanconcentrationtobeocA48EwAsg~(coninueB3.5-7 A'ccumulatorsB3.5.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.1.4(continued)Itisnotnecessarytoverifyboronconcentratitheaddedwa'oryisfromtherefue'rstoragetank(RWST),becaontainedintheRWSTiswithintheaccumulonconcen'equirements.Thisisco'iththerecommendationofNUtQ~Lo~Wa"-~r'te.~~CO~44thOPCRAQ~~~~~4'.apl4&O5(.iv.0CS~g<tXVCptaCa+tanttS'V&/'i4CQ~I~l2Pggtkq~(WHXCSB-IZ'ppla~~n0++Ra.r=aaa'humCr.&ao~+4aeweg~~6cQ,Kl~a'ItahV~.SR3.5.1.5Verificationevery31daysthatpowerisremovedfromeachaccumulatorisolationvalveoperatorwhenthepressurizerpressureisg~MPpsigensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresu~ntheundetectedclosureofanaccumulatormotoroperatedisolationvalve.Ifthisweretooccur,(ea~E~M~accumuaorswoueaieforinjectioSincepowerisremoveduneradministrativecontrolthe31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved.ISRallowspowertobesuppliedtothemotoroperaisolat>alveswhenpressurizerpressureis<J2208psig,thusallowingrationalflexibilitybyavoidMgunnecessarydelaysnipulatethe~beakersduringplantstartupsorshutdowns.ithpaQersuppliedtothevalves,inadvertentclosure'tedbytheRCSpressureinterlockassociated'hevalves.Shouldcloofavalveoccurinspiteoftheinck,thesgnalprovidedtothevalveswouldopenacloseveintheeventofaLOCA.REFERENCESMFSAR,Ghai~~10CFR50.46.,'c.~~~@.~~u~Wc.4L,AP-C-,Y.t,b4xtmR.Q~6',M'e~~:"Sa=patap<<<<-l.F'a>-S,Vtt-t,CSAQVitl-X,h.ahe5kTuelwN4Q+g~~s4-.~FSAR,Chapter88aea'VP'S<(2~Mo~<+'~3.~~M~R,A.Pve-~+R.C.~t,h.M4aatat,RG'=,+@4~4~7+Ca>~uteaezgOp+1~+'Rh~o.QPa-aZ"4o.~Q~<g,tsas..WOGSTSB3.5-8M~AA,~~eh~B.67.LOCWP-SX).99.Rev.0,09/28/92 ECCS-Q~~j&jB3.5.2B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.2ECCS-~BASESBACKGROUNDS2-.'A.~.C'-2..vssAnfl4~e'wcasafeardt,~ppaw('.ws~gm5a~~~~Cttwaftccger,sawsaSaycJLh.~m~~Pta~c&%rM.vi..bThefunctionoftheECCSistoprovidecorecoolingandnegativereactivitytoensurethatthereactorcoreisprotectedafteranyofthefol'lowingaccidents:a.Lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)>>coolantleakagegreaterthanthecapabilityofthenormalchargingsystem;b.Rodejectionaccident;c.Lossofsecondarycoolantaccident,includinguncontrolledst'earnreleaseorlossoffeedwater;andd.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR).Theadditionofnegativereactivityisdesignedprimarilyforthelossofsecondarycoolantaccidentwhereprimarycooldowncouldaddenoughpositivereactivitytoachievecriticalityandreturntosignificantpower.~oThereare44reephasesofECCSoperation:-injection<%jPrecirculationIntheinjectionphase,wateristakenfromtherefuelingwaterstoraetankRWSTandin'ectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)throughthecoegs>>WhensufficientwaterisremovedfromtheRWSTtoensurethatenoughboronhasbeenaddedtomaintainthereactorsubcriticaland~4Kbcontainmentsump~~enoughwatertosupplytherequirednetpositivesuctionheadtotheECCSpumps,suctionisswitchedtoCQ-containment/umpfor(j~~recirculation.AfterapproximatelyPours,oilinginthetopofthecoreandanyresut>ngoronprecipitation.TheECCSconsistsof@~separatesubsystems:safetyinjection(SIandresidualheatremoval(RHR)Eachsubsystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains..TheECCSaccumulatorsandtheRWST,,arealsopartofthe(continued)B3.5-9 L~~QQECCS-83.5.2BASESBACKGROUND(continued)5'Z.vi..+ECCS,butarenotconsideredpart'fanECCSflowpathasdescribedbythisLCOCa~tk.~eEW~4,~~~~.V%,QTheECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthat=waterfromtheRWSTcanbeinjectedintotheRCSfollowingtheaccidentsdescribedinthisLCO.ThemajorcomponentsofeachsubsystemaretheheRHRpumsheatexchaners~g.qa.andtheSIpumps.ubsyste~onsistsoftwo100%capacitytrainshatareinterconnectedandredundantsuchthateithertrainiscapableofsupplying100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.>Tholinterconnectingandredundantsubsystemdesign,'provide+'theoperatorswiththeabilitytoutilizecomponentsfromoppositetrainstoacliievetherequired100%flowtothecore.Sz.v~.+DuringtheinjectionphaseofLOCArecovery,&suctionheads~lwaterfromtheRWSTtotheECCSumps.<atepipingsuppieseach.susysemandeacrawithinsubsystem.Thedischargefromthecifugalchargingpumpmbinespriortoenteringboroninjectiontank(BIftheplantuzesaBIT)andthendividesagainintofourss,eachofwhichfeedstheinjectionlinetoonecoeg.ThedischargefromtheSIandRHRpumps'desandfeeds'njectionlinetoeachoftheRCSdlegs.Controlvalv'esarttobalancetowtotheRCS.Thisbalanceensuressuff'tflowtothecoretomeettheanalysisassumptsowingaLOCAinoneoftheRCScoldlegs.ForLOCAsthataretoosmalltodepres'heRCSbelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps,theuntiltheRCSressuredecreasesbelowtheSIumshutoffadXn~.5i<$2..vi..4.2os'o7Duringtherecircuationphase'ofLOCArecovery,gRpumpsuctionistransferredtoChal"u5ntainments9m.gheRHRpumpsensy.recirculatio..'uthesameasasesn~ectionhase.s.(continued)B3.5-10 Insert3.5.5gQ.A.oTheSIsubsystemconsistsofthreeredundant,50%capacitypumpswhichsupplytwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Eachinjectionlineiscapableofproviding100%oftheflowrequiredtomitigatetheaccidentconsequences.Insert3.5.6-AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andContainmentSpray(CS)Systempumps.Thiscommonsupplyheaderisprovidedwithtwoin-seriesmotor-operatedisolationvalves(896Aand896B)thatreceivepowerfromseparatesourcesforsinglefailureconsiderations.TheseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvesfromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident(Ref.I).TheSIpumpsupplyheaderalsocontainstwoparallelmotor-operatedisolationvalves(825Aand825B)whicharemaintainedopenbyremovingACpower.TheremovalofACpowerto'heseisolationvalvesisanacceptabledesignagainstsinglefailuresthatcouldresultinundesirablecomponentactuation(Ref.2).Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.Thissupplyheaderisprovidedwithacheckvalve(854)andmotoroperatedisolationvalve(856)whichismaintainedopenwithDCcontrolpowerremovedviaakeyswitchlocatedinthecontrolroom.TheremovalofDCcontrolpowereliminatesthemostlikelycausesforspuriousvalveactuationwhilemaintainingthecapabilitytomanuallyclosethevalvefromthecontrolroomduringtherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.ThethreeSIpumpsfeedtwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.SIPumpsAandBeachfeedsoneofthetwoinjectionlineswhileSIPumpCcanfeedbothinjectionlines.ThedischargeofSIPumpCiscontrolledthroughuseoftwonormallyopenparallelmotoroperatedisolationvalves(&71Aand871B).TheseisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclosebasedontheoperatingstatusofSIPumpsAandBtoensurethatSIPumpCprovidesthenecessaryflowthroughtheRCScoldleginjectionlinecontainingthefailedpump.ThedischargesofthetwoRHRpumpsandheatexchangersfeedacommoninjectionlinewhichpenetratescontainment.Thislinethendividesintotworedundantcoredelugeflowpathseachcontaininganormallyclosedmotoroperatedisolationvalve(852Aand852B)andcheckvalve(853Aand853B)whichprovideinjectionintothereactorvesselupperplenum. Insert3.5.7B(Refs.4and5).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSarethenstoppedandtheRWSTisolated'byclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandCSpumpcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898fortheSIpumprecirculationline.-Insert3.5.8SIiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffhead(Ref.6)ascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperature,containmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications.TheRHRpumpscanalsoprovidesuctiontotheContainmentSpray(CS)pumpsforcontainmentpressurecontrol.Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwithvalves896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IfRCSpressureissuchthatRHRprovidesadequatecoreandcontainment'cooling,theSIandCSpumpsremaininpull-stopandonlyRHRisusedtoprovidecorecooling.DuringInsert3.5.9Afterapproximately20hours,simultaneousinjectionbytheSIandRHRpumpsisusedtopreventboronprecipitation(Ref.7).ThisconsistsofprovidingSIthroughtheRCScoldlegsandintothelowerplenumwhileprovidingRHRthroughthecoredelugevalvesintotheupperplenum.ThetworedundantflowpathsfromContainment.SumpBtotheRHRpumpsalsocontainamotoroperatedisolationvalvelocatedwithinthesump(851Aand851B).Theseisolationvalvesaremaintainedopenwithpowerremovedtoimprovethereliabilityofswitchovertotherecirculationphase.Theoperatorsforisolationvalves851Aand8518arealsonotqualifiedforcontainmentpostaccidentconditions. ECCS-Q~~83.5.2BASESS2..vi..kBACKGRO(continued)S~ThecsubsystemoftheECCSalsofunctionstosupplyboratedwatertothereactorcorefollowingincreasedheatremovalevents,suchasa~steamlinebreak(PCLB).Thelimiting'designconditionsoccurwhenthenegativemoderatortemperaturecoefficientishighlynegative,suchasattheendofeachcycle.DuringlowtemperatureconditionsintheRCS,limitationsareplacedonthemaximumnumberofECCSpumpsthatmaybeOPERABLE.RefertotheBasesforLCO3.4.12,"LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)System,"forthebasisoftheserequirements.TheECCSsubsystemsareactuateduponreceiptofanSIsignal.Theactuationofsafeguardloadsisaccomplishedinaprogrammedtimesequence.Ifoffsitepowerisavailable,thesafeguardloadsstartimmediatelyintheprogrammedsequence.Ifoffsitepowerisnotavailable,theEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)busesshednormaloperatingloadsandareconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(EDGs).Safeguardloadsarethenactuatedintheprogrammedtimesequence.Thetimedelayassociatedwithdieselstarting,sequencedloading,andpumpstartingdeterminesthetimerequiredbeforepumpedflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaLOCA.TheactiveECCScomponents,alongwiththepassiveaccumulatorsandtheRWSTcoveredinLCO3.5.1,"Accumulators,"andLCO3.5;4,"RefuelingWaterStoraeTank(RWST),"providethecoolingwaternecessarytomeet(Ref.fAep-eQt'gAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheLCOhelpstoensurethatthefollowingacceptancecriteriafortheECCS,establishedby10CFR50.46(Ref./willbemetfollowingaLOCA:9a.Haximumfuelelementcladdingtemperatureis<2200'F;b.Haximumcladdingoxidationis<0.17timesthetotalcladdingthicknessbeforeoxidation;(continued)B3.5-11 ~PCS1,>,~QECCS-~W~83.5.2BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSIS(continued)BothECCSsubsystemsaretakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.6and10).ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.TheSIpumpsarecreditedinasmall.breakLOCAevent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischaygehead'tthedesignpointforthepumps.TheSGTRandPlSLBeventsalsocredittheSIpumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsfortheECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:a.AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedbytheSIpumpsintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,and'refloodsthecore.TheRHRpumpsinjectdirectlyintothecorebarrelbyupperplenuminjection.Theeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.IOand11).TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwatertomatchboiloffratesquicklyenoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoveredfollowingalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,theSIpumpsdeliversufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.5-15 em~t~<,~ZECCS-~~PB3.5.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)C.Maximumhydrogengenerationfromazirconiumwaterreactionis<0.01timesthehypotheticalamountgeneratedifallofthemetalinthecladdingcylinderssurroundingthefuel,excludingthecladdingsurroundingtheplenumvolume;weretoreact;d.Coreismaintainedinaeoolablegeometry;ande.Adequatelongtermcorecoolingcapabilityismaintained.52.iv.c52.ui.hTheLCOalsolimitsthepotentialforaposttripreturntopowerfollowingan@LBevent'nd-en'sure(thatcontainmenttemperaturelimitsaremepos~~c~.aE~~G,~"EachECCSsubsystemMtakencreditforinalargebreakLOCAeventatfullpower(Refs.3andQ.ThiseventestablishestherequirementforrunoutflowfortheECCSpumps,aswellasthemaximumresponsetimefortheiractuation.The'SIpumpsarecreditedinasma1breakD)CAe'vent.Thiseventestablishestheflowanddischargeheadatthedesignpointforthe'ums.TheSGTgandHSLBeventsalsocredRtliepumps.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforteECCSarebasedonthefollowingLOCAanalysisassumptions:'a~AlargebreakLOCAevent,withlossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneRHRpump(bothEDGtrainsareassumedtooperateduetorequirementsformodelingfullactivecontainmentheatremovalsystemoperation);andb.AsmallbreakLOCAevent,withalossofoffsitepowerandasinglefailuredisablingoneECCStrain.DuringtheblowdownstageofaLOCA,theRCSdepressurizesasprimarycoolantisejectedthroughthebreakintothecontainment.Thenuclearreactionisterminatedeitherbymoderatorvoidingduringlargebreaksorcontrolrodinsertionforsmallbreaks.Followingdepressurization,emergencycoolingwaterisinjectedintothecoldlegs,flowsintothedowncomer,fillsthelowerplenum,andrefloodsthecore.PHR.Pu~gwng<c.'r4%lhEc~'l~~Cgav4~~pp~p%cnv~aeg~o~>(continued)83.5-12

~~a;SLs~,~gECCS-~~/83.5.2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)tabac.'hqW5z.vi.45'Lp~~XTheeffectsoncontainmentmassandenergyreleasesareaccountedforinappropriateanalyses(Refs.'.and'.TheLCOensuresthatanECCStrainwilldeliversufficientwateromatcoioraes'~enoughtominimizetheconsequencesofthecorebeinguncoverefollowinalargeLOCA.ItalsoensuresthattheSIpumpswilldeliversufficientwaterandboronduringasmallLOCAtomaintaincoresubcriticality.ForsmallerLOCAs,thdeliver/sufficientfluidtomaintainRCSinventory.ForasmallbreakLOCA,thesteamgeneratorscontinuetoserveastheheatsink,providingpartoftherequiredcorecooling.TheECCStrainssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOInMODESI,2,and3,twoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsarerequiredtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailable,assumingasinglefailureaffectingeithertrain.Additionally,individualcomponentswithintheECCStrainsmaybecalledupontomitigatetheconsequencesofothertransientsandaccidents.2..va..bosZ,Vi..qaInMODESI2adECCStrainconsistsof~anSIsubsystem~andanRHRsubsystem.Eachtrainincludesthepiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingd'~transferringsuctionto~containmentpump<.+-~-1'iOurseventrequiringECCSactuation,aflowisrequiredtodeanabundantsupplyofrfromtheRWSTtotheRCSviaCSpumpseirrespectivesupplyheaderstoeachoftcoldleginjectionnozzles.Intheionm,thisflowmaybeswitchedtotakeitssfromthecontainmentsumpsupplyitsfltheRCShotandcoldlegs.TheflowpathforeachtrainmustmaintainitsdesignedindependencetoensurethatnosinglefailurecandisablebothECCStrains.B3.5-13(continued) Insert3.5.10ThisincludessecuringthemotoroperatedisolationvalvesasspecifiedinSR3.5.2.1inpositionbyremovingthepowersourcesaslistedbelow.EINPositionSecuredinPositionBQQ.di.a825A825B826A826B 826C826D 851A851B856878A878B 878C878D~896A896BOpen OpenClosedClosed Closed ClosedOpen Open OpenClosedOpen ClosedOpen,OpenOpenRemovalRemoval Removal RemovalRemoval Removal RemovalRemoval RemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalRemovalofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPowerofDCControlPowerofACPowerofACPowerofACPower.ofACPowerofDCControlPowerofDCControlPowerThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchangercapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventually'ontainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenumandoneofthetwolineswhichprovidehigh-headrecirculationtotheSIandCSpumps.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainaretwoofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandContainmentSumpB(viaRHR),andinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjectionlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand8708. ECCS~oem>,~,~wB3.5.2BASES(continued)APPLICABILITY5'Z.v33p5Qvm+~Pit%tadv~/ch,ftC~ttthmo~+o~o~~+""8~4rvtaihvacsta<~kezW~.5'2..YL~52..i't.chInMODESI,2,and3,theECCSOPERABILITYrequirementsforthelimitingDesignBasisAccident,alargebreakLOCA,arebasedonfullpoweroperation.Althoughreducedpowerwouldnotrequirethesamelevelofperformance,theaccidentanalysisdoesnotprovedcoolinrequirementsinthelowerMODEThecentrifugalchar'erorsCA,whichestablishesrormancecnceonower.epumpperformancerequirementsareaseonasmabreakLOCA.MODE2andMODE3requirementsareboundedbytheMODEIanalysis.isonlyapplicableinMODE3andabovODE3,the'tointiypassedbyperatorcontrolm'requirementsareelaxed-scribedinLCO3.5.3,"ECCS-AsindicatedinNoteI,theflowpathmaybeisolatedfor2hoursinMODE3,undercontrolledconditions,toperformpressureisolationvalvetestingperSR3.4.14.1.TheflowpathisreadilyrestorablefromthecontrolrooNizam,team.AsindicatedinNote2,operationinMODE3withECCStrainsdeclaredinoperablepursuanttoLCO3.4.12,"IowTematureOverressureProtection(LTOP)SystemM~necessary.<'s~*~~LTOParmingtemperaturneartheMODE3oundarytemperatureof350'P.LCO3.4.12requiresthatcertainpumpsberenderedinoperableatandbelowtheLTOParmingtemperature.Whenthistemperatureis~+neartheNODE3boundarytemperature,timeisneededtorestoretheinoperablepumpstoOPERABLEstatus.laInNODES,and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisexremeyow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsNotFilled."NODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.P;"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel."B3.5-14(continued) Insert3.5.23InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.3,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-MaterLevel>23ft,"andLCO3.9.4,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-MaterLevel(23ft"

52.x~ceSt,r,~pECCS-@~t~tnB3.5.2BASES(continued)ACTIONS5xv'4~~S'x.vi.~.~,~'g~0'A.I'IWithone~~train&inoperableandatleast100/oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainavailable,theinoperablecomponentsmustbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.The72hourCompletionTimeisbasedonanNRCreliabilityevaluation(Ref.'andisareasonabletimeforrepairofmanyECCScomponents.I0+ToAnECtrainisinoperableifitisnotcapableofdeliveringesignflowtotheRCS.Individualcomponentsareinoperableiftheyarenotcapableofperformingtheirdesignfunctionorsuortingsystemsarenotavailable.Ate.estTheLCOrequirestheOPERABILITYofanumberofindependentsubsystems.Duetotheredundancyoftrainsandthediversityofsubsystems,theinoperabilityofonecomponentinatraindoesnotrendertheECCSincapableofperformingitsfunction.Neitherdoestheinoperabilityoftwodifferentcomponents,eachinadifferenttrain,necessarilyresultinalossoffunctionfortheECCS.TheintentofthisConditionistomaintainacombinationofequipmentsuchthatl00/oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainremainsavailable.Thisallowsincreasedflexibilityinplantoperationsundercircumstanceswhencomponentsinoppositetrainsareinoperable.AneventaccompaniedbyalossofoffsitepowerandthefailureofanEDGcandisableoneECCStrainuntilpowerisrestored.Areliabilityanalysis(Ref.'fhasshownthattheimpactofhavingonefullECCStraininoperableissufficientlysmalltojustifycontinuedoperationfor72hours.'e6describessituationsinwhichonecornsuchasanssovervalve,candisablECCStrains.Withoneoromponeinoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivale'eOPERABLEECCStrain.isnotavailableacilityisina'onoutsidetheaccidentsis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3must.be'ately(continued) Insert3.5.21InthecasewhereSIPumpCisinoperable,bothRCScoldleginjections~.vi,mlinesmustbeOPERABLEtoprovide100%oftheECCSflowequivalenttoasingletrainofSIduetothelocationofcheckvalves870Aand870B. ECCShh4KCZS'L,~,CasaQB3.5.2BASESACTIONScontinued)5l..vi,cB.landB.2IftheinoperabletraincannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoNODE3within6hoursandNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfull,powerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSc's52.v't.4caW~~arvtsR+oca.s+\valse,ohaeaifia~!Rc-~~pbhaWb~a.ccsa.~~/VCirwwatdnbA~SR3.5.2.1VerificationofpropervalvepositionensuresthattheflowpathfromtheECCSpumpstotheRCSismaintained.c.aiisaligniaentofthesevalvesCouprederbothECCStrainsinoerabl.,Securingthesevalvesinposition0posltlonpower-or~SR3.5.2.2(ensurethttangepositionaslureOpbeinadvertentl~misaligjlg4,.fhesevalvescandisable'thefunctionofbothECCSTrainsandinvalidatetheaccident/analyses.A12hourFrequencyisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthat~ensureamispositionedvalveisunlikely.Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheECCSflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforECCSoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Avalvethatreceivesanactuationsignalisallowedtobeinanonaccidentpositionprovidedthevalvewillautomaticallyrepositionwithintheproperstroketime.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisappropriatebecausethevalvesareoperated(continued)B3.5-16 Il~I=~~~Insert3.5.11C.1IfbothtrainsofECCSareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Withoneormorecomponent(s)inoperablesuchthat100%oftheflowequivalenttoasingleOPERABLEECCStrainisnotavailable,thefacilityisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeimmediatelyentered.Insert3.5.12ThelistedvalvesaresecuredinpositionbyremovalofACpowerorkeylockingtheDCcontrolpower.Thesevalvesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolssuchthatanychangeswithrespecttothepositionofthevalvebreakersorkeylocksisunlikely.TheverificationofthevalvebreakersandkeylocksisperformedbySR3.5.2.3. ~DCSL,x,~~ECCS-g~~83.5.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE)UIREHENTST~3.s.<gSR3.5.2.2(continued)underadministrativecontrol,andanimpropervalvepositionwouldonlyaffectasingletrain.ThisFrequencyhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.3.5.2.3Withtheceptionoftheoperatingcentrifugalchingpump,theEumpsarenormallyinastandbyonoperatingmode.Assuch,wpathpipinghasthentialtodevelopvoidsandpotsofentraineses.HaintainingthepipingfromtheECCmpstoeRCSfullofwaterensuresthatthesystemwilormproperly,injectingitsfullcapacityintotheRpondemand.Thiswillalsopreventwaterhammerumpcavitatio,andpumpingofnoncondensiblee.g.,air,nitrogen,hydrogen)intothereactorselfollowinganSIsignalorringshutdowncoolinghe31dayFrequencytakesintoconsitionthegranatureofgasaccumulationintheECCSpipindeproceduralcontrolsgoverningsystemoperation.SR3.5.2.4PeriodicsurveillancetestingofECCSpumpstodetectgrossdegradationcausedbyimpellerstructuraldamageorotherhydrauliccomponentproblemsisrequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode.Thistypeoftestingmaybeaccomlishedbmeasuringthepumpdevelopedheadatpointofthepumpcharacteristiccurve.Thisverifiesoththatthemeasuredperformanceiswithinanacceptabletoleranceoftheoriginalpumpbaselineperformanceandthattheperformanceatthetestflowisgreaterthanorequaltotheperformanceassumedintheplantsafetyanalysis.SRsarespecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSectionXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHECodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.SR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6TheseSurveillancesdemonstratethateachautomaticECCSvalveactuatestotherequiredpositiononanactualor(continued)83.5-17 Insert3.5.17SR3.5.2.3Verificationevery31daysthatACorDCpowerisremoved,asappropriate,foreachvalvespecifiedinSR3.5.2.1ensuresthatanactivefailurecouldnotresultinanundetectedmispositionofavalvewhichaffectsbothtrainsofECCS.ifthisweretooccur,noECCSinjectionorrecirculationwouldbeavailable.Sincepowerisremovedunderadministrativecontrolandvalvepositionisverifiedevery12hours,the31dayFrequencywillprovideadequateassurancethatpowerisremoved. BASES5i-.x~baSl,~~QQECCS-@~~)>B3.5.2cv<WA~A.~'g5,AltTI~W~ecka4.~AOS-e,4~IiMO.>~X'~a~gg~q~q~~~W~iG4Awav'yiA~~Ca~4~SURVEILlANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6(continued)simulatedSIsignalandthateachECCSpumpstartsreceiptofanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Themo>hFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformtheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedplanttransientsifthurveillanceswereperformed,withthereactoratpower.ThmonthFrequencyisalsoacceptablebasedonconsiderationofthedesignreliability(andconfirmingoperatingexperience)oftheequipment.TheactuationlogicistestedaspartofESFActuationSystemtesting,andequipmentperformanceismonitoredaspartoftheInserviceTestingProgram.S5.2.752..ivQ,S,<>RealignmentoesintheflowpathonanSIsiis)necessaryforproperperformance.Th~eveshavestopstoallowproperpositifoe~trictedflowtoalrupturedcoldleg,ensuringtthercoldlegsreceive'~atleasttherequired'umflow.Thisveillanceisnotrequired~fopantswithflowlimitingori.The18montM~quencyisbasedonthesamereasonsastsdinSR3.5.2.5andSR3.5.2.6.S.5.2.5Periodicinsionsofthecontainmentsumpsuctionindeensurethatitisestrictedandstaysinproperper'atingcondition.The18monequencyisbasedeneedtoperformthisSurveillanceunthec'onsthatapply!duringaplantoutage,onthehaveaccesstotheIlocation,andbecauseofpotentialanunplannedtransientiftheillancewereperforme'hereactoratr.ThisFrequencyhasbeenfoundsuff'nttodetectabnormaldegradationandisconfiroperatingexperience.,REFERENCES10CFR50.46.~+O~~~~~~~o9~c~C.ASFQ~~@~'i,wSp.utah,Ac-~~~~kg).(continued) Insert3.5.13LetterfromR.A.Purple,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendment7toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,"datedHay14,1975.-2.3.4.5.BranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)ICSB-18,"ApplicationoftheSingleFailureCriteriontoManually-ControlledElectricallyOperatedValves."Letter.fromA.R.Johnson,NRC,toR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,

Subject:

"IssuanceofAmendmentNo.42toFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18-R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant(TACNo.79829),"datedJune3,1991.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicVI-7.B:ESFSwitchoverfromInjectiontoRecirculationMode,AutomaticECCSRealignment,Ginna,"datedDecember31,1981.NUREG-0821.7.LetterfromD.H.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Haier,RG&E,

Subject:

"SEPTopicIX-4,BoronAdditionSystem,R.E.Ginna,"datedAugust26,1981.ll.UFSAR,Section6.2. a%cLwQ3ECCS-4@~~83.5.2BASESREFERENCES(continued)Co.3<FSAR,Section~s".vFshP~~o~'+4NRCMemorandumtoV.Stello,Jr.,fromR.L.Baer,"RecommendedInterimRevisionstoLCOsforECCSComponents,"December1,1975.~~IB3.5-19 ~GC4ECCS-~RQhB3.5.383.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.3ECCS-~~52.ui.'eBASESBACKGROUl4&iga-SI~4e~5TheBackgroundsectionforBases3.5.2,"ECCS-4g~~m,"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.5ct4+anjsbuhOua(<2)5Z.t.tInMODE4therequiredECCStrainconsistsoftwoseparatesubsystems:~'.andresidualheatremoval(RHR),.heECCSflowpathsconsistofpiping,valves,heatexchangers,andpumpssuchthatwaterfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)canbeinjectedintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)followingtheaccidentsdescribedinBases3.5.2.<>~s~e..~~~~>~u~.w~~~~~+m:--:.ue.<On-~W~Mair.u'~M~a~t'prb<a4Mca~%abowAPPLICABLETheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionofBases3.5.2alsoSAFETYANALYSESappliestothisBasessection.DuetothestableconditionsassociatedwithoperationinMODE4andthereducedprobabilityofoccurrenceofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),theECCSoperationalrequirementsarereduced.Itisunderstoodinthesereducgionsthatcertainautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)actuation~noavailable.InthisMODE,sufficienttimeexistsformanualactuationof~5a.i:itherequiredECCStomitigatetheconsequencesofaDBA.(e".thOnlyonetrainofECCSisrequiredforMODE4.ThisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredTheECCStrainssatisfyriterionoeoicyStatement.OpVr~trnaMSP~4-~~ca~~LCOsz.~'.4InMODE4,oneofthetwoindependent(andredundant)ECCStrainsisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatsufficientECCSflowisavailabletothecorefollowingaDBA.InMODE4,anECCStrainconsistsofaZ~subsystemandanRHRsubsystem.Eachtraininclues~epiping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflow(continued) ECCS-fgj~h83.5.3BASESLCO(continued)pathcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandtransferringsuctiontothecontainmentsump.~~3.5.igneventrequiringECCSactuation,aflowsrequiredto'anabundantsupplyoffromtheRWSTtotheRCSviaSpumeirrespectivesupplyheaderstoeachofldleginjectionnozzles.Intheerm,thisflowpabeswitchedtotakeipplyfromthecontainmentsumpand'verowtotheRCShotandcoldlegs.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,and3,theOPERABILITYrequirementsforECCSarecoveredbyLCO3.5;2.InMODE4withRCStemperaturebelow350'F,oneOPERABLEECCStrainisacceptablewithoutsinglefailureconsideration,onthebasisofthestablereactivityofthereactorandthelimitedcorecoolingrequirements.InMODES5and6,plantconditionsaresuchthattheprobabilityofaneventrequiringECCSinjectionisextremelylow.CorecoolingrequirementsinMODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLeve'l,"andLCO3.9."ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculationowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.1WithnoECCSRHRsubsystemOPERABLE,theplantisnotpreparedtorespondtoalossofcoolantaccidentortocontinueacooldownusingtheRHRpumpsandheatexchangers.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelytoinitiateactionsthatwouldrestoreatleastoneECCSRHRsubsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentorestoretherequiredcoolingcapacity.Normally,inMODE4,reactordecayheatisremovedfromtheRCSbyanRHRloop.IfnoRHRloopisOPERABLEforthisfunction,reactordecayheatmustberemovedbysomealternatemethod,suchasuseofthesteamgenerators.Thealternatemeansofheatremovalmust(continued)B3.5-21 1Insert3.5.16g3~iiThemajorcomponentsofanECCStrainduringMODE4normallyconsistsofanRHRpumpandheatexchanger,capableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWST(andeventuallyContainmentSumpB),andabletoinjectthroughoneofthetwoisolationvalvestothereactorvesselupperplenum.AlsoincludedwithintheECCStrainareoneofthreeSIpumpscapableoftakingsuctionfromtheRWSTandinjectingthroughoneofthetwoRCScoldleginjectionlines.Thehigh-headrecirculationflowpathfromRHRtotheSIpumpsisnotrequiredinMODE4sincethereisnoaccidentscenariowhichpreventsdepressurizationtoRHRpumpshutoffheadpriortodepletionoftheRWST.IBasedonthetimeavailabletorespondtoaccidentconditionsduringMODE4,ECCScomponentsareOPERABLEiftheyarecapableofbeingreconfiguredto,theinjectionmode(remotelyorlocally)within10minutes.ThisincludestakingcreditforanRHRpumpandheatexchangerasbeingOPERABLEiftheyarebeingusedforshutdowncoolingpurposes.LCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem"containsadditionalrequirements'ortheconfigurationofECCStrains ECCS-Ggj4de~B3.5.3BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)continueuntiltheinoperableRHRloopcomponentscanberestoredtooperationsothatdecayheatremovaliscontinuous.WithbothRHRpumpsandheatexchangersinoperable,itwouldbeunwisetorequiretheplanttogotoMODE5,wheretheonlyavailableheatremovalsystemistheRH.erefore,theappropriateactionistoinitiatemeasurestorestoreoneECCSRHRsubsystemandtocontinuetheactionsuntilthesubsystemisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.8.1MithnoECCS~subsystemOPERABLE,duetotheinoperabilityofthe.."pumporflowpathfromtheRWST,theplantisnotpreparedtoprovidehighpressureresponsetoDesignBasisEventsrequiringSI.TheIhourCompletionTimetorestoreatleastone~~subsystemtoOPERABLEstatusensuresthatpromptactionistakentoprovidetherequiredcoolingcapacityortoinitiateactionstoplacetheplantinNODE5,whereanECCStrainisnotrequired.C.IWhentheRequiredActionsofCondition8cannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionTime,acontrolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonabletime,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE5inanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystemsoroperators.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS+ss.,SR3.5.3.ITheapplicableSurveillancedescription+fromBases3.5.2apply.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsanRHRtraintobeconsideredOPERABLEduringalignmentandoperationfordecayheatremoval,ifcapableofbeingmanuallyrealigned(remoteorlocal)totheECCSmodeof(continued)B3.5-22 ~bcQECCS-<~SR~83.5.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.5.3.1(continued)operationandnototherwiseinoperable.ThisallowsoperationintheRHRmodeduringNODE4,ifnecessary.Sz."REFERENCESB3.5-23

RWSTB3.5.4B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)83.5.4RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BASESBACKGROUND5'.t.t.,a,~me.i:iio~W~hp'STheRWSTsupyJ~ieboratedwaterto")t~I!CSbothrainsoftheECCSandtheContainmentSpraySystemg~@i~iduringtheinjectionphaseofalossocooanaccident(LOCA)recovery.tmode~herecircu'lationmodeisentereransferredtothecontainmentsumpPSoUseoasinletosupplybotra)nsoftheann+a+aeisacceptablesincetheRWSTisapassivecomponen,an.~spassivefailuresarenotrequiredtobeassumedtooccurcoincidentallywithDesignBasisEvents.itchoverfromnormaloperationtotheinjecti~ophaseofECCSationrequireschangingcentrifugajchargingpumpsuctiontheCVCSvolumecontrolanR(VCT)totheRWSTthroughtheusisolationvires.EachsetofisolationvalvesisinteredsothattheVCTisolationvalveswillbegintoclonceRWSTisolationvalvesarefullyopen.SieetheVCTisunressure,thepreferredpumctionwillbefromtheVtilthetankisisol.Thiswillresultinadelayinob'gtheRoratedwater.TheeffectsofthisdelayaredissedjsntheApplicableSafetyAnalysessectionoftheseBases.~~'S.S'.hIDuringnormaloperationinMODESI,2,and3,thesafetyinjection(SI),HR)pumpsarealignedtotakesuet>onromtheRca4,C.STheECCSandpsareprovidedwithrecirculationlinesthatensureeachpumpcanmaintainminimumflowrequirementswhenoeratinatorneatofheadconditions.~~~~~on<i~~~~~<AP-~Q.cg+~~o~~~~M~oaraXa~~Qmha~~~~e,>(continued}B3.5-24 Insert3.5.18AcommonsupplyheaderisusedfromtheRWSTtothesafetyinjection(SI)andCSSystempumps.Aseparatesupplyheaderisusedfortheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.IsolationvalvesandcheckvalvesareusedtoisolatetheRWSTfromtheECCSandCSpriortotransferringtotherecirculationmode.Insert3.5.19TheRWSTislocatedintheAuxiliaryBuildingwhichisnormallymaintainedbetween50Fand104F(Ref.1).ThesemoderatetemperaturesprovideadequatemarginwithrespecttopotentialfreezingoroverheatingoftheboratedwatercontainedintheRWST.

BASESRWSTB3.5.4ZMpm~BACKGROUND(continued)WhenthesuctionfortheECCSandContainmentSpraySypumpsistransferredtothecontainmentsump,theRWSTflowpathsmustbeisolatedtopreventareleaseofthecontainmentsumpcontentstotheRWST,whichcouldresultinareleaseofcontaminantstothehere"andtheeventuallossofsuctionheadfortheECCSpumps.Qu.S4;i~oThisLCOensuresthat:5S.')').4a0b.TheRWSTcontainssufficientboratedwatertosupporttheECCSdu'ectionphase;<SSufficientwaervoumeexistsinthecontainmentsumtosuortcontinuedoperationoftheECCSand~~+pumpsatthetimeoftransfertotherecirculationmodeofcooling;andM.ii.4<~a~~~wP.cHP~~~aHp~~~c.ThereactorremainssubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.InsufficientwaterintheRWSTcouldresultin/whenthetransfertotherecirculaionmodeoccurs.mproperboronconcentrationscouldresultinareductionofSDHorexcessiveboricacidprecipitationinthecorefollowingtheLOCA,aswell'sexcessivecausticstresscorrosionofmechanicalcomponentsandsystemsinsidethecontainment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES54.<i.heJQc&$'L,z~Q'zDuringaccidentconditions,theRWSTprovidesasourceofboratedwatertotheECCSandContainmentSpraySystempumps.Assuch,itprovidescontainmentcoolinganddepressurization,corecooling,andreplacementinventoryandisasourceofnegativereactivityforreactorshutdown(Ref.+PThedesignbasistransientsandapplicablesafetyanalysesconcerningeachofthesesystemsarediscussed'heAlicableSafetyAnalysessectionof&3.5.2,"ECC';8'3.5.3,"ECCS-QR~";and83.6.,onainmentSprayandCoolingSystems.eseanaysesareusedtoassesscangestotheRWSTinordertoevaluatetheireffects'nrelationthe'accetancelimitsintheanalyses.Ce~iv,~~~~~~~~bKi+1~~f'oct--hew-~~~ohe~c"TheRWSTmustalsomeetvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturerequirementsfornon-LOCAevents.Thevolumeisnotanexplicitassumptioninnon-LOCAeventssincethe(continued) BASESPl.~idRWSTB3.5.44>>~Motor@ac>>'h~~se-mswsC~Žaihytt>>-'~p.TFcaLs>>wwieRcsAPPLICABLErequired~@9;isasmallfractionoftheavailablevolume.SAFETYANALYSESThedeliverablevolumelimitissetbytheLOCAand(continued)containmentanalyses.FortheRRSTthedel'verablevolumeoavoumecontainec,thedesignofthetardc,~canexplicitassumptionintheqggpsteamlinebreakPCLanalsistoensuretherequiredshutdowncaability~Theim'valueissmaorunitsoninjectiontank(BITwiconcentration.FornitswithnoucedBITboronreuireuqoronconcentrationlimitfisanimportanassumptioniiii.iitmv~avecawo+cMiyvm,v'mbh~.tim%Wwrseve'gaw>>+tavecz~c~.boronrtenttypicalinsensitivetemperaturetrationisanexiciassumptionineECCSacuaionanaysis,althoughitisonlimitingeventandtheresultsverytoconcentrations.'aximumensuresthaamocoolingprovidedfromgQ~ttt3oo,s>>OOtheRWSTduringtheheatuafeedlinebreakisconsistentwithsaanalysisassump'theminimumisanassumptio'ththeNSLBandinadvertenactuanalyses,althoughtheinadvertent.ECCSacnentisticallnonlimiting.TLBanalysishasconsideredadelayassociatedwithinterloctweentheVCTandRWSTisolationvalvestheresultsshowthedeparturefromnucleate'ngdesignbasisismet.Thehasbeenestabl's[27]seconds,withoffsiwera'le,or[37]secondswithoutoffsitepower.Thissetimeincludes,[2]secondsforelectro'elay,asecondstroketimefortheRWSTvalv,anda[10]secondstrtimefortheVCTvalves.ntswithaBITneednotbeconcewiththedesincetheBITwillsupplyhighlyborated'watoRWSTswitchover,providedtheBITisbetweenthepumpsandthecore.hashssw4hh.ForalarebreakLOCAanalysis,thewatervolumelimitofallonsandthelowerboronconcentrationlimit45-areusedtocomputethepostLOCAsumpboronconcentrationnecessarytoassuresubcriticality.ThelargebreakLOCAisthelimitingcasesincethesafetyanalysisassumesthatallcontrolrodsareoutofthecore.5u.tt.hTheupperlimitonboronconcentrationtodetermine0'Lzs=-~:.-s.a>isused(continued)B3.5-26 4Insert3.5.20isselectedsuchthatswitchovertorecirculationdoesnotoccuruntilsufficientwaterhasbeenpumpedintocontainmenttoprovidenecessaryNPSHfortheRHRpumps.VInsert3.5.22thetimeframeinwhichboronprecipitationisaddressedpostLOCA.ThemaximumboronconcentrationlimitisbasedonthecoldestexpectedtemperatureoftheRWSTwatervolumeandonchemicaleffectsresultingfromoperationoftheECCSandtheCSSystem.ThevaluespecifiedintheCOLRwouldnotcreatethepotentialforboronprecipitationintheRWSTassuminganAuxiliaryBuildingtemperatureof50F(Ref.1).Analysesperformedinresponseto10CFR50.49(Ref.2)assumedachemicalspraysolutionof2000to3000ppmboronconcentration(Ref.I).ThechemicalspraysolutionimpactssumppHandtheresultingeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponents.ThesumppHalsoaffectstherateofhydrogengenerationwithincontainmentduetotheinteractionofCSandsumpfluidwithaluminumcomponents. RWSTB3.5.4BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)recircuwingaLOCA.ThepurofromcoldlegtohotisoavoidboroninthecorefollowineatheECCSanalysis,thecontainmentspraytemperatureisassutobeequaltotheRWSTlowertemperaturelimitf[35]'F.thelowertemperaturelimitisviolatedecontainmentayfurtherreducescontainmentpsure,whichdecreasesrateatwhichsteamcandventedoutithebreakandincreapeakcladtempeazure.Theuppertemperaturelimitof[I'FisusenthesmallbreakLOCAanalysisandcontainment.OPM.ITYanalysis.Exceedingthistemperaturewillresulmnigherpeakcladtemperature,becauseteislesshtransferfromthe!coretotheinjectwaterforthesmaleakLOCAandhighercontainpressuresduetoreducedtainmentspraycool'apacity.Forthecontainmentressefollow'nHSLB,thelowerlimitonboronconcentr'onaeupperlimitonRWSTwatertemperatureareusedtaximizethetotalenergyreleasetocontainment.TheRWSTsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTheRWSTensuresthatanadequatesupplyofboratedwaterisavailabletocoolanddepressurizethecontainmentintheeventofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),tocoolandcoverthecoreintheeventofaLOCA,tomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingaDBA,andtoensureadequatelevelinhEE<<d~".OSystempumpoperationintherecirculationmode.Tobe.sideredOPERABLE,theRWSTmustmeetthewaterestablishedintheSRs.CduAPPLICABILITYInHODESI,2,3,and4RWSTOPERABILIrequirementsaredictatedbyECCSandystemOPERABILITYEE.EhhhEEdh~~~SystemmustbeOPERABLEinHODESI,2,3,and4,theRWSTmustalsobeOPERABLEtosupporttheiroperation.Corecooling.requirementsinHODE5areaddressedbyLCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-HODE5,LoopsFilled,"andLCO3.4.8,"RCS(continued)B3.5-27 RWSTB3.5.4BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)Loops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."MODE6corecoolingrequirementsareaddressedbyLCO3.9.,"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevel,"andLCO3.9.@"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculationLowWaterLevel."ACTIONSA.1~58.~~notwithinlimits,~faustbereurnetowithinimitswithin8hours.UndertheseconditionsneithertheECCSnordfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEcondition.The8hourlimittorestoretheRWSTboronconcentrationtowithinlimitswasdevelopedcons>eringthetimerequiredtochange(e+Q~theboronconcentrationandthefactthatthecontentsofthetankarestillavailableforinjection.With.theRWSTinoperaeorreasonsotherthanConditionAe.g.,waervolumeimustberesoreosaus'wl1nour.InthisCondition,neithertheECCSnortheContainmentSpraySystemcanperformitsdesignfunction.Therefore,promptactionmustbetakentorestorethetanktoOPERABLEstatusortoplacetheplantinaMODEinwhichtheRWSTisnotrequired.TheshorttimelimitofIhourtorestoretheRWSTtoOPERABLEstatusisbased'onthisconditionsimultaneouslyaffectingredundanttrains.C.landC.2IftheRWSTcannotbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperiende,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfull(continued)B3.5-28 RWSTB3.5.4BASESACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)powerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~S<i.S5.4.1TheRWSTborwatertemperatureshouldbever'devery24hourstobewi'helimitsassumedieaccidentanalysesband.Thisencyissuff'ttoidentifyatemperaturechangethatwoupeitherlimitandhasbeenshowntobeacceptableoperatingexperience.TheSR'ismodifiedaNotethateliminaherequirementtoperformthiurveillancewhenambientairraturesarewithieoperatinglimitsoftheRWST.Witha'taireratureswithintheband,theRWSTtemperatureuldnotexceedthelimits.O'.ii.hHMP-M5~~><>c.oker.<~~Au~i'Ci~~~ilha~eP~~~~c~~<~w~'o~~o.She~TheRWSTwatervolumeshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobeabovetherequiredminimumlevelinordertoensurethatasufficientinitialsupplyisavailableforinjectionandtosupportcontinuedECCSandstemumoperationonrecirculation.SincetheRWSTvoumeisnormaystaeana7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR3.5.4mTheboronconcentrationoftheRWSTshouldbeverifiedevery7daystobewithintherequiredlimits.ThisSRensuresthatthereactorwillremainsubcriticalfollowingaLOCA.Further,itassuresthattheresultingsumppHwillbemaintainedinanacceptablerangesothatboronprecipitationinthecorewillnotoccurandtheeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponentswillbeminimized.SincetheRWSTvolumeisnormallystable,a7daysamplingFrequencytoverifyboron(continued)B3.5-29 RWSTB3.5.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.5.4.3(continued)concentrationisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.REFERENCESU,S'c.~s.Coo3FSAR,4kap'her~andChapter$15+MF'sAR~o~cFPMoe+gQQ,sYB3.5-30 SealInjectionFlowB3.5.B3.EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEMS(ECCS)B3.5.5SealInjectionFlowBASESBACKGROUNDThisLCOisapplicableonlytothoseunitsatutilizethecentrifugalchargingpumpsforsafetyinjtion(SI).Theunctionofthesealinjectionthrottleivesduringanacidentissimilartothefunctionof'ECCSthrottlevaesinthateachrestrictsflowfrthecentrifugalchaingpumpheadertotheReactoroolantSystem(RCS).Thererictiononreactorcoolanpump(RCP)sealinjectionflowli'tstheamountofECCSowthatwouldbedivertedfromthe'njectionpathfollownganaccident.ThislimitisbasedosafetyanalysissumptionsthatarerequiredbecauseRCPealinjectionowisnotisolate'dduringSI.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESAllECCSsubsystesatakencreditforinthelargebreaklossofcoolaccident(LOCA)atfullpower(Ref.I).TheLOCnalysisestablishestheminimumflowfortheECCSpump.hecentrifugalchargingpumpsarealsocreditedinthemallreakLOCAanalysis.Thisanalysisestablishesthflowandischargeheadatthedesignpointforthecentfugalchar'ngpumps.Thesteamgeneratortuberupturandmainstealinebreakeventanalysesalsocreditthcentrifugalcharingpumps,butarenotlimitingintheirdesign.ReferencetheseanalysesismadeinassessgchangestotheSealnjectionSystemforevaltionoftheireffectsinelationtotheacceptancelim'intheseanalyses.isLCOensuresthatsealinjectioflowof<[40]gpm,ithcentrifugalchargingpumpdischrgeheaderpressureZ[2480]psigandchargingflowcontrvalvefullopen,willbesufficientforRCPsealintegriybutlimitedsothattheECCStrainswillbecapableofeliveringsufficientwatertomatchboiloffratessnenoughtominimizeuncoveringof.thecorefollowinglargeLOCA.Italsoensuresthatthecentrifugalchargingpmpswilldeliversufficientwater.forasmallLOCAandufficientborontomaintainthecoresubcritical.ForslierLOCAs,thechargingpumpsalonedeliversufficientfluitoovercomethelossandmaintainRCSinventory.Se1(coninued)R SealInjectionFloB3..5BASAPPLICAESAFETYALYSES(continud)injectionflowsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPicyStatement.LCOTheintentoftheLCOlimitonsealinjectonflowistomakesurethatflowthroughtheRCPsealaterinjectionineislowenoughtoensurethatsuffientcentrifugalcargingpumpinjectionflowisdirectdtotheRCSviatheinfectionpoints(Ref.2).TheL'COisnotstrictlyaflowlim't,butratheraflowlimitliasedonaflowlineresisnce.lnordertoestablisgtheproperflowlinenesistance,apressureandflowmost;beknown.Theflow/incresistanceisdeterminedbyassumingthattheRCSpressureisatnormaloperatingpressureand,thatthecentr'galchargingpumpdischargepressureisgreaterthanoequaltothevaluespecifiedinthisLCO.Thbcentrifugchargingpumpdischargeheaderpressureremainessent'lyconstantthroughalltheapplicableMODESfthsLCO.AreductioninRCSpressurewouldresultinmeowbeingdivertedtotheRCPsealinjection.linethantnormaloperatingpressure.Thevalvesettingsestablishdattheprescribedcentrifugalchargingpumpdischargehder'pressureresultinaconservativevalvepositionouldgSpressuredecrease.Theadditionalmodifierofth'sLCO,thgcontrolvalve(chargingflowforfourloopunisandairoperatedsealinjectionforthreeloopunits)eingfulloperrqisrequiredsincethevalveisdesignedtfailopenforth'eaccidentcondition.Withthedischargpressureandcontrolkvalvepositionasspecifiedbythe40,aflowlimitises&blished.Itisthisflowlimitatisusedintheaccidhgtanalyses.Theimitonsealinjectionflow,ombinedwiththecetrifugalchargingpumpdischargeeaderpressurelimitdanopenwideconditionofthechagingflowcontrolalve,mustbemettorendertheECCSPERABLE.Iftheseconditionsarenotmet,theECCSflowwllnotbeasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.APPLICABITYInMODESI,2,and3,thesealinjectionflowimitisdictatedbyECCSflowrequirements,whicharesecifiedfor(ntinued)B3.5-32 ICSealInjectionFlow'B3.5BASESAPPLICABILTY(continue)MODES1,.2,3,and4.Thesealinjectionflowlim'snotapplicableforMODE4andlower,however,becauseighsealinjectionflowislesscriticalasaresultofelowerinitialRCSpressureanddecayheatremovalreirementsintheseMODES.Therefore,RCPsealinjectionfowmustbelimitedinMODES1,2,and3toensureadeqteECCSerformance.ACTIONSA.1Withtsealinjectionflowexceengitslimit,theamountofchar'ngflowavailabletotheCSmaybereduced.UnderthisCond'tion,actionmustbetentorestoretheflowtobelowitsimit.Theoperatoras4hoursfromthetimetheflowisknotobeabovetheimittocorrectlypositionthemanualvavesandthusbincompliancewiththeaccidentanalyis.TheColetionTimeminimizestheotentialexoseofthelanttoaLOCAwithinsufficientingectsonowansealinjectionflow~~~~limit+ThistimeisconservativewithrcttotheCompletionTimesofotherECCSLCOs;itisbasonoperatingexperienceandissufficientfortak'orrectiveactionsbyoperationspersonnel'.8.1andB.2WhentheRuiredActionscantbecompletedwithintherequiredompletionTime,acorolledshutdownmustbeinitiat.TheCompletionTimef6hoursforreachingMODE3romHODE1isareasonabltimeforacontrolledshutdn,basedonoperatingexpernceandnormalcooldownrat,anddoesnotchallengeplantafetysystemsoropators.ContinuingtheplantshutownbeguninRequiredAionB.1,anadditional6hoursisareasonabletime,asedonoperatingexperienceSndnormacooldown'rates,toreachMODE4,wherethisLCOisnolongeapplicable.B3.5-33R(coninued)

SealInjectionFlowB3.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLA,EREgUIREMENSR3.5.5.1Verificationevery31daysthatthemanualsealnjectionthrottlevalvesareadjustedtogiveaflowwiinthelimitensuresthatpropermanualsealinjectionthrttlevalveposition,andhence,propersealinjectionfow,isaintained.TheFrequencyof31daysisbedongineeringjudgmentandisconsistentwiotherECCSvalveSveillanceFrequencies.TheFrequencyhasproventobeacctablethroughoperatingexperienc.Asnod,theSurveillanceisnotreuiredtobeperformeduntil4hoursaftertheRCSpressur~hasstabilizedwithina+20psirangeofnormaloperatigpressure.TheRCS.pressurequirementisspecificsincethisconfigurationwillproductherequiredpresreconditionsnecessarytoassurethatemanualvalvesresetcorrectly.Theexceptionismitedto4horstoensurethattheSurveillanceistimely.REFERENCES1.FSAR,ChapterandChapter[15].2.10CFR50.46.B3.5-34 BITB3.5.6B3.5EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYSTEHS(ECCS)B3.5.6BoronInjectionTank(BIT)BASESBACKGROUNDTheBITispartoftheBoronInjectionSystemwhichistherimarymeansofquicklyintroducingnegativreactivitytotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)onaafetyinjection()signal.ThemainflowpaththroughtheBoronIectionSystemisfrom0edischargeofthecentrifugalhargingpumpsthroughlineseuippedwithaflowelementadtwovalvesinparallelthatopenonanSIsignal.Thevalvescanbeoperatedom'themaincontrolbod.Thevalvesandflow.elementshaemaincontrolboardindications.Downstreamofthesevalves,theflowenterseBIT(Ref.I).TheBITisastinlesssteeltankcontainingconcentratedboricacid.Twotrainsoftripheatersaremountedonthetanktokeepthemperatreoftheboricacidsolutionabovetheprecipitaionoint.Thestripheatersarecontrolledbytemperteelementslocatednearthe.bottomoftheBIT.ThetempatureelementsalsoactivateHighandLowalarmsonthemnontrolboard.InadditiontothestripheatersonteBIT,thereisarecirculationsystemwithaheattracigsysteincludingthepipingsectionbetweenthemotoperated'solationvalves,whichfurtherensuresthatteboricacidtaysinsolution.TheBITisalsoeguippewithaHighPressurealarmonthemaincontrolboard.TheentirecontentsofheBITareinjectedwhenrequired;hus,thecontainedandeliverablevolumesarethesameDurinnormaloperation,oneofthewoBITrecirculationpumptakessuctionfromtheboronin'tionsurgetank(BT)anddischargestotheBIT.TheolutionthenreturnsttheBIST.Normally,onepumpisrunnngandoneisshutff.OnreceiptofanSIsignal,theruningpumpshutsoffandtheairoperatedvalvesclose.FlowttheBITisthensuppliedfromthecentrifugalchargingpumpsThesolutionoftheBITisinjectedintotheRCSthroughtRCScoldlegs.B3.5-35(contined) S<BI83.5BAS(continued)APPLICALEOuringamainsteamlinebreak(HSLB)orlossofcolantSAFETYALYSESaccident(LOCA),theBITprovidesanimmediatesrceofconcentratedboricacidthatquicklyintroducesnegativereactivityintotheRCS.ThecontentsoftheBITarenotcreditedfoy'orecoolingorimmediateborationintheLOCAanalysis,beforpostLOCArecovery.TheBITmaximumboronconcentrationoft'2,500]ppmisusedtodeterminethemjnimumtimeforhot1grecirculationswitchover.Themiqimumboroncoricentrationof[20,000]ppmisused'odeterminethe'mini'mummixedmeansumpboronconcentrationforpostLOCAshutdownrequirements.FortheHSI8analysis,theBITistheprimarymechanismforinjecting'boronintothecore~tocounteractanypositiveincreasesi'qreactivitycausedbyanRCScooldown.Theanalysisuse%theminimumbo'ronconcentrationoftheBIT,whichalsoaffectsboththedeparturefromnucleateboilingandcontainmentXdesignatralyses.ReferencetotheLOCAandHSLBanalysesis~usedtoassesschangestotheBITtoevaluatetheirefctontheacceptancelimitscontainedintheseanalyses.Theminimumtempeyaturqlimitof[145]'FfortheBITensuresthatthesolutiopdoesnotreachtheboricacidprecipitationpoint.Thetemperatureofthesolutionismonitoredand/alarmedontemaincontrolboard.TheBITboronconcentration1'mitsareestablishedtoensurethatthecoreremainssubcritioalduringpostLOCArecovery.TheBIT,willcounteractanypositiveincreasesinreactivitycausedyanRCScooldown.TheITminimumwatervolumelimit[1-100]gallonsisusedtoensurethattheappropriatequantiofhighlyboratedwterwithsufficientnegativereactivyisinjectedintoheRCStoshutdownthecorefollowingnHSLB,todeterminethehotlegrecirculationswitcovertime,andtosafeguardagainstboronprecipitation.TheBITsatisfiesCriteria2and3oftheNRColicyStatement.~,1~isa-s~83.5-36/(contined) BITB3.5.BAS(continued)LCOThisLCOestablishestheminimumrequirementsforctainedvolume,boronconcentration,andtemperatureofthBITinventory(Ref.2).ThisensuresthatanadequasupplyofboratedwaterisavailableintheeventofaLOorHSLBtomaintainthereactorsubcriticalfollowingtheeaccidents.TobeconsideredOPERABLE,thelimitsestabshedintheSRorwatervolume,boronconcentration,andtemperaturemustbmet.IfeequipmentusedtoverifyBITpaameters(temperature,volume<andboronconcentration)isterminedtobeinoperale,thentheBITisalsoinerable.APPLICABILITYInHODESI,and3,theBITERABILITYrequirementsareconsistentwitthoseofLCO.5.2,"'ECCS-Operating."InMODES4,5,and6,theespectiveaccidentsarelesssevere,sotheBIisnorequiredintheselowerMODES.ACTIONSA.lIftherequiredvlumeisntpresentintheBIT,boththehotlegrecircutionswitchvertimeanalysisandtheboronprecipitationnalysiswouldntbemet.Undertheseconditions,omptactionmusttakentorestorethevolumetoaoveitsrequiredlimitodeclarethetankOPERABLE,rtheplantmustbeplaedinaMODEinwhichtheBITisnrequired.TheBIboronconcentrationisconsidedinthehotlegrecirulationswitchovertimeanalysis,heboronpreipitationanalysis,andthereactivitanalysisforanHSB.Iftheconcentrationwerenotwithitherequiredmits,theseanalysescouldnotbereliedo.Undertheseconditions,promptactionmustbetakentoreoretheconcentrationtowithinitsrequiredlimits,ortheplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheBITisnotequired.TheBITtemperaturelimitisestablishedtoensureatthesolutiondoesnotreachtheboricacidcrystallizatiopoint.Ifthetemperatureofthesolutiondropsbelowthe(continueB3.5-37 BIT83.5BASACTIONSA.l(continued)minimum,promptactionmustbetakentoraisethtemperatureanddeclarethetankOPERABLE,oreplantmustbeplacedinaHQQEinwhichtheBITisnotruired.TheIhourCompletionTimetorestorethe8toOPERABLEstatusisconsistentwithotherCompletioTimesestablished<orlossofasafetyfunctionandensurethattheplantwe'llnotoperateforlongperiodsoutsieofthesafetyanalyses.B.l8.and8.3WhenRequiredActionA.IcannotzecompletedwithintherequiredComp'letionTime,acoy(trolledshutdownshouldbeinitiated.Sixhoursisarm(sonabletime,basedonoperatihgexperience,toreachHODE3fromfullpowerconditionsand'tobeboratetotherequiredSDMwithoutchallengingplantsystems;oroperators.BoratingtotherequiredSDHassur>esthatthepl'antisinasafecondition,withoutneedforanadQitional'boration.Afterdeterminingthat,theBITisinoperableandtheRequiredActionsof/B.and8.2havebeencompleted,thetankmustbereturnedtOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.TheseactionsensurethattheplantwillnotbeoperatedwithaninoperableBITforalengthyperiodoftime.Itshouldbenoted,however,tLatchangestoapplicableMODEScannotbemadeuntiltheBIT'srestoredtoOPERABLEstatuspursuantto/theprovisionsofCO3.0.4.C.1EvenhoughtheRCShasbeenboratedoasafeandstableconitionasaresultofRequiredActin8.2,eithertheBITmtberestoredtoOPERABLEstatus(ReuiredActionC.l)oreplantmustbeplacedinaconditioniwhichtheBITisnotrequired(MODE4).The12hourCompleionTimetoreachMODE4isreasonable,basedonoperatingexerienceandnormalcooldownrates,anddoesnotchallengplantsafetysystemsoroperators.R(coninued) 83..6BAS(continued)SURVEILL,NCEREOUIREMTSSR3.5.6.1Verificationevery24hoursthattheBITwateremperatureisatorabovethespecifiedminimumtemperatreisfrequentenoughtoidentifyatemperaturechangethawouldapproachtheacceptablelimit.Thesolutiontemperureisalsomonitoredbyanalarmthat-providesfurthrassuranceofprotectionagainstlow'temperature.ThFrequencyhasbeenowntobeacceptablethroughoperatigexperience.SR3.5.6.2Verificationevery7daysthatgeBITcontainedvolumeisabovethitrequirediimitisfrP'quentenoughtoassurethatthisvolumewillbeavailableyforquickinjectionintotheRCS.Iftkqvolumeistoogow,theBITwould.notprovideenoughboratewatertoens'uresubcriticalityduringrecirculationyrtoshutownthecorefollowinganHSLB:SincetheBITvolumeisormallystable,a7dayFrequencyisappropriateandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperieceSR3.5.6.3Verificationery7dathattheboronconcentrationoftheBITiswhinthereqiredbandensuresthatthereactorremainssubgriticalfollowvqgaLOCA;itlimitsreturntopowerfolgwinganHSLB,anmaintainstheresultingsumppHinanacp'eptablerangesothatboronprecipitationwillnotoccuri.nthecore.Inaddition,,theeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononmeclienicalsystemsandcompnentswillbeminimized.TeBITisinarecirculationloopatprovidescontinuousirculationoftheboricacidsolutiothroughtheBITandtheboricacidtank(BAT).Therearenumberofpointsalongtherecirculationloopwherelocasamplescanbetaken.TheactuallocationusedtotakesampleofthesolutionisspecifiedintheplantSurveilanceprocedures.SamplingfromtheBATtoverifytheconcenttionoftheBITisnotrecommended,sincethissamplemaynotbehomogenousandtheboronconcentrationofthetwotanksmdiffer.(coinued)83.5-39 BASESSURVEILLAEREQUIREHENSR3.5.6.3(continued)ThesampleshouldbetakenfromtheBITorfrompointintheflowpathoftheBITrecirculationloop.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Chapter[6]andChapter[15].2.10CFR50.46.B3.5-40 Containment3.6.13.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSSs.i3.6.1Containment~~~LCO3.6.1'ontainmentshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentinoperable.A.1RestorecontainmenttoOPERABLEstatus.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours3.6-1 Containment'URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYPerformrequiredvisualexaminationsandleakaratetestingexceptforcontainmentairlocktesting,inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.'mallowableleakagerates[]%ofconaai'erdayatthecalculatecontairessure,p-----NOTE------SR3.0.2isnotapplicable.Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptionsR3.6.1.2VerifycontainmentstructuralintegrityinaccordancewiththeContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.Inaccordance>withtheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram3.6-2 ~s~~5P.'ontainmentAirLocks3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSLCO3.6.2ffwojcontainmentairlockLsgshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSSP.ixNOTES1.Entryandexitispermissibletoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponents.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.3.EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenairlockleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithonecontainmentairlockdoorinoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsA.l,A.2,andA.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitispermissiblefor7daysunderadminjstrativecontrols>fbothairlocksareinoperablgŽ~~w~~t~~'khkCcxaeX~WOC(continued)3.6-3 5'8.'iContainmentAirLocks~~2ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.1VerifytheOPERABLEdoorisclosed,intheaffectedairlock.ANDA.2LocktheOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedair.lock.AND1hour24hoursA.3--'------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifytheOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)3.6-4 ~~%ContainmentAirLocks3.6.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEB.Oneormorecontainmentairlockswithcontainmentairlockinterlockmechanisminoperable.------------NOTES------------1.RequiredActionsB.l,B.2,andB.3arenotapplicableifbothdoorsinthesameairlockareinoperableandConditionCisentered.2.Entryandexitofcontainmentsspermissibleunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividual.~o,ic.%~~Wq~On0sw<ocgK,~cMcLA%Q~B.lVerifyanOPERABLEdoorisclosedintheaffectedairlock.1hourANDB.2LockanOPERABLEdoorclosedintheaffectedairlock.24hoursAND8.3--------NOTE---------Airlockdoorsinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedlockedclosedbyadministrativemeans.VerifyanOPERABLEdoorislockedclosedintheaffectedairlock.Onceper31days(continued)3.6-5 hContainmentAirLocks3~~ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.OneormorecontainmentairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionAorB.C.1ANDC.2InitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.Yerifyadoorisclosedintheaffectedairloc@Immediately1hourAND~(sWC.3RestoreairloctoOPERABLEstatus.24hoursD.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours3.6-6 ContainmentAirLocks.2SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.2.1-NOTES-l.Aninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.2.ResultsshallbeevaluatedagainstacceptancecriteriaofSR3.6.1.1inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.5V'.ai'ka>Q.<'aPerformrequiredairlockleakagerate.testinginaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theacceptancecriteriaforairlocktestingare:a.leakagerateis.05L.whentestedat>P..RrreoW~~b.leakagerateas.OlL.whentestedat>P..-~AOTK--~R3.0.2isnoalicable.Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedby.approvedexemptionsSR3.6.2.2-------------NOTE----------------Onlyrequireo-beerfonentryintocontainmVerifyonlyonedoorinairlockcanbeopenedatatime.3.6-7 3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSBuri~rg3.6.3ContainmentIsotion~~>LCO3.6.3Z.4.'Z.4Cpw,~KR.)ChgAPPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.RO.Era~~Eachcontainmentisolation+WshallbeOPERABLE.-ACTIONS<'TnaaIh4amuaNOTES1.Penetrationflowpath(a~exceptfor'urgecg~&flowpath+maybeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadmsnistraivecontrols.2.SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.C~~~~i'II3~~~~g0,IiEnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforsstemsmadeinoperablebycoinmentisolation~~.~re.rsWia8EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whenisolation~~leakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakagerateacceptancecriteria.gur~e~rCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.--------NOTE--------Onlplicablepenetra'wpathswithtwoinmentisoionvalve..Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainment>soatioC~inoperableQexcetforurevalveA.l.>ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,orcheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.4hoursleakagenotwithin1imi~(continued)3.6-8 ~s~Insert3.6.3.1.a-NOTEThemainsteamisolationvalvesandmainsteamsafetyvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCQinNODESI,2,and3.TheatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinNODESI,2,and3withtheReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature<500'F. ACTIONSLCOItiiOICg~9.i'ContainmentIsolation~a~.;~~n~3.6.3CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)--------NOTE---------ra1a1onareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.~gaiCh~~A~ZVerifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainment8--------NOTE--------Onplicablopenetra'wpathswithtcoinmentisoionvalveOneormorepenetrationflowpathswithtwocontainment1SOa10inoperable'~xcetforurevalveB.lIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.Ihourleakagenotwithinlimit~i~~)nV.rt(continued)3.6-9 Insert3.6.3.1ORA.2VerifytheaffectedpenetrationisisolatedbyanOPERABLEclosedsystem.4hoursInsert3.6.3.2ANDB.2EvaluateoverallcontainmentleakagemoteperLCO3.6.1.AND24hoursB3--------NOTE--------Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetration.flowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment~NDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithin,theprevious92daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment PCa~srC'ontainmentIsolationdIsrlsn..iACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.--------NOTE---------Onapplicabletopenetrionflowpathswithonlyecontainmentilationvalveandaclossystem.Oneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmentisolationvalveinoperable.C.1Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalv,orblindflangeAND\C.2-'-----NOTE---------alvesablindflangesin'radiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans..[4]hoursVerifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Oncepe~r~dayD.Shiel~u'1dingWy~assleakagenotwithin1imit.D.lRestoreleakae1oursIsataAarpv.Oneormore~penetrationflowpathsw'nevalv~notleakagelimits.ANDIsolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyusyofatleastone/closedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflang~24hours(continued)3.6-10 ~aContainmentIsolation3.6.3ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONaroh&cesCOMPLETIONTIME.(continued)~5e.uE2--------NOTE---------inhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffected,penetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment5'R.pw'.3Perfo3.6.3.7fortheresisealpurvesclocomplywithequiredActionE.l.ANDPriortoenteringMODE4',:fromMODE5if:,notperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinside,containmentI~per[92]daysCRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.CP;IBeinMODE3'.ANDC,W2BeinMODE5.6hours'6hours3.6-11 II~'~Insert3.6.3.18D.Oneormoremini-purgepenetration,flowpathswithtwovalvesnotwithinleakagelimits.D.1InitiateactiontoevaluateoverallcontainmentleakagerateperLCO3.6.1.ANDImmediately'.2Isolatetheaffectedpenetrationflowpathbyuseofatleastoneclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanUalvalve,orblindflange.AND1hour03--------NOTE-------Isolationdevicesinhighradiationareasmaybeverifiedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Verifytheaffectedpenetrationflowpathisisolated.Onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentANDPriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92daysforisolationdevicesinsidecontainment atrice'ontainmentIsolation~S'l.'i3.6.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIRENENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.rifyeach[42]inchpurgevalveissealed~sclose,forone"pure'apenetrationflinConditionESR3.Verifyeach[8]inchpurgevalveisclosed,excnthe[8]inchcontainmentvalvesareopressurol,ALARAorairqua'ionsforpersonry,orforSurveilaatuvrethevalvestobeopen.a~otcs.an,awb~>~SR3.6.3.3-NOTE--sinhighradiation~areasmaybeverifiedyuseofadministrativecontrols.~Ott~d-+sfVerifeachcontainmentisolationdiiaanjagthatislocated~~incouslnredtobese~fe'~~cosed1sclosed,exceptforcontainmentisolationthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.Ia(Qdays,~~+>gM'fgy)lpvJjngm0.~%~(continued)3.6-12

Earvie~ContainmentIsolationSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE~Sehhe333,~~OOAri~FRE(UENCYSR.'t'(+ioc.lad,59.ixy+herv31M~estaC~~e~~tWth+ig.&l+LXX184Y'Minhighradiationyuseofareasmayeverifieadministrativemeans.fatsnatt3fo~+icriclVerifeachcontainmentisolationthatislocatedinsieconainndrequiredtobeclose,exceptforcontainmentisolationthatareopenunderadministrativecontrols.PriortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious-days\+NSR3.6.3gVeriftheisolationtimeof6Leei~~eachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswithinlimits.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.CycleeachweightorspringloadedchecktestableduringoperationthroughonecompM~~cleoffulltravelverifyeachcheece-vereakclosedwhenthedifferentialthedirectionofflowis.]psidandopeenthediialpressureinthedirectionowis>[1.2)psidand<[5.0]psid.92da.(continued)3.6-13 ~ISISContainmentIsolationSR.'iSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.3.W----NOTE-Results'eevaluatedaga'cceptancecrite'.1.1inaccordancewithendixJ,asmodifyapprovedexemptioPe~AAMmkageratetestingforcontainmentpurgevaesilient>eals.4dayANi5Withn.92asaferoningtevalv0.xi'<<6.3.8Verifyeachautomaticcontainmentisolation4'valveactuatestotheisolationpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignals~hah4vl~Z[monthsSR3.6.Cycleeachweightorspringloadedchecknottestableduringoperationthrougnecompletecycleoffulltandverifyeacckvalver'closedwhenthedifferentiaureinthedirectionoffl's<[1.2'ndopenswhenth'rentialpressureinionofflowis>[1.2]psidand[5.0]psld.18moSR3.6.3.1h]inchcontainmentvalveisbloceevalvefrom%omonths(continued}3.6-14 Insert3.6.3.15SR3.6.3.4Performrequiredleakageratetestingofcontainmentmini-purgevalveswithresilientsealsinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theacceptancecriteriaforeachmini-purgevalvewithresilientsealsis~0.05Lawhentestedat~Pa.

G~ri~SR'.aiContainmentIsolation~s~.;SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3..1--NOTEsuitsshallbeevaluatedagainstaccececriteriaofSR3.6.1.1inaccordance'0CFR50,AppendixmodifiedbyapproeexemptioVerifytmbinedleakagerateforl-s'uildingbypassleakagepaths'sL.]whenpressurizedto>[psig].[18]months3.6-15 aContainmentPressure3.6.4P3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.4AContainmentPressureLCO3.6.4PContainmentpressureshallbe>~psigandpsig.-2.0).0APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentpressurenotwithinlimits.A.1Restorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.Whoa~aB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinNODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6..1Verifycontainmentpressureiswithinlimits.12hoursr3.6-16 ContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)3.6.483.6ONTAINHENTSYSTEMS3.6.48ontainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)LCO3.6.48Containmentairpartialpressureshallbe>f9.0]iaandwithintheacceptableoperationrangeshownonFigure3.6.48-1.APPLICABILITY:HOS1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Containmentairpartial'pressurenotwithinlimits.A1Restoreconainmentairpartipressuretowithilimits.1hourB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.8.18anMODE3.AND8.2BeinDE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.48.1Vifycontainmentairpartialpressureisthinlimits.12hoursOGSTS3.6-17Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)3.6.412.0RANGES:CONTAINMENTTEMPERATUREf86-120PFREFUELINGWATERSTORAGETANKTEMPERATURE<50]"F(52.5,11.1)11.0LUlY(DCO UJCL10.0CLgI-ill9.0o0'ACCEPTABLEREGIONUNACEPTABLEERATION(95.0,9.125)'NACCTABLEOPERATIONTHISFIG/EFORILLUSTRATIONONLY.DONPTUSEFOROPERATION.8.0354555657585SERVlCENfATERTEMPERATURE(')95100Figure3.6.4B-1(page1of1)ContainmentAirPartialPressureVersusServiceNfaterTemperatureMOGSTS3.6-18Rev.0,09/28/92j ContainmentAirTemperature.5A3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSC+'03.6.5ASContainmentAirTemperatureLCO3.6.QPContainmentaverageairtemperatureshallbe<+130+F.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEOA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithin1imit.A.lRestorecontainmentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimit.8"hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletion.Timenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.5P.1Verify'ontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithin1imit.24hours3.6-19 ContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenserf'".3.6.58.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.5BContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)LCO3.5BContainmentaverageairtemperatureshallbe:a.Z[85]'FandS[110]'FForthecontainmentppercompartment,andb.>[100]'Fand<[120]'Fforthecontainntlowercompartment.-NOTEThe=minimumcontainmentaverageairtemperatureinHODES2,3,ami4maybereducedto[60]'F.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONX(EOMREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTINEA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithinlimits.A.1Resorecontainmentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimits.~8hoursB.RequiredActionand/associatedCompletonTimenotmet.B.lBeinHODE3.ANDB.2BeinHODE5.6hours36hoursWOGSTS3.6-20Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)3.6.5BSVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UEYSR3.6.B.lVerifycontainmentuppercompartmentaverageairtemperatureiswithinlimits.24horsSR3.6.5B.2rifycontainmentlowercompartmentavageairtemperatureiswithinlimits.24hoursWOGSTS3.6-21Rev.0,09/28/92 IContainmentAirTemperature(Subatmospheric)3.6.5.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.5CContainmentAirTemperature(Subatmospheric)LCO3.5CContainmentaverageairtemperatureshallbe>[86Fand<[120]'F.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4:ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.Containmentaverageairtemperaturenotwithinlimits.A.lRestorecontamentaverageairtemperaturetowithinlimits.8hours)B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B1BiMODE3.AND6hoursB.2einME5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.5C.1Verifcontainmentaverageairtemperatureisw'inlimits.2oursWOGSTS3.6-22/Rev.0,09/28/92I 4Z.ia(Q5),EOrgluhesaQn+lCCO.ifCIJ~~F~C~jO1CgLMM*3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~c.r.;3.6.6/PContainmentSraaGred+i-awaken-felid-iae-42.iaLCO3.6.6~TwotrainCo%.lag~~shallbeOPERABLE.containmen4K.'a's'aAPPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.(kS'Sess.m~jso4csccsPra$~~~ccmsJssloQ~js'jt.GCW~ha+A'fCs5les~a~/~ACCO'FCam@i+~c3f~~~~~~~CIa~+ALXWg~~zf~a4WK~~M.CONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTIMEA.Onetraininoperae.~csA.lRestore~+traintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursANDail(pX~V'ssa10sfromd'ovyofailuremeettheLCO3:L4al:E'cRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTime'ofConditionAnotmet.3e,ore.BeinMODE3.ANDBc2BeinMODE5.6hours84hoursast4e~.ti\IjNF-'edcontainosnoper'able.-Onegj.+~t"-R+C-~s~'rop~le,~&PC.aaelhiRestore0saus.4%.Visa7daysNDdfromdveryofailutomeettheLCO(continued)3.6-23 Insert3.6.6.1B.Onepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperable.B.lRestorepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysInsert3.6.6.24Q..'iliC.Twopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsinoperable.C.lRestoreonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursInsert3.6.6.160.Sprayadditivetankinoperable.0.1RestoresprayadditivetanktoOPERABLEstatus.72hours ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.wocontainmentcoo>trainsinoperable;D.1Restoreone[reentcoolingtrainto0status.ourscs~'&."Twotrainsinoperae.ORA.MlEnterLCO3.0.3.po.actinVc.~~MdMfQorbo~hpox+-+<A'a+ca+CWrc.oat4.H4r~nt.trap~isa-U~<ImmediatelyAnycombinationofthree'ormoregg~inoperable.uataabrP~4AhaNOe~CNL+~mba~ee.C.R~Q'-o.~~chv~~ebStRequiredActionandassociatedCompletion-TimeofConditionR~notmet.Q0.1BeinMODE3.AND.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6P.1CVerifyeachanual,poweroperated,andautomaicvaveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisinthecorrectposition.31days(continued)3.6-24 3.6.6PP-SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.6P:2Operateeach~~~~unitfor315minutes.+~a%c.Came31days3.6.3Verifch[required]ainmentcooli~~~tr'oolingwaterowrateis[700]gpm.31daysSR3.6.Qf.4Verifyeachdevelopedheadatthegreaterthanorequaldevelopedhead.Cnpump'sflowtestpointistotherequired~cd-at,mstca.ii~,Inaccordance'iththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.6.(Ai.Verifyeachautomatic~cs~~~valveintheflowpathactuatestotecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.~tlhCSSR3.6.P83i'erifyeachpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.au.(BmimonthsZDCCRC.vuaa'tSR3.6.6+7'erifyeach~Pstartsautomaticallyonanactuaor>~.iisimulatedactuat'ionsignal.~Z.NI+/+monthsSR.~~~'m.'Z&<~~pcah~~~~~+'3L(continued)4~lil3.6-25 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS'continuedSURVEILLANCEGB.SR3.6.~<<hVerifyeachspraynozzleisunobstructed.FREQUENCYAirstrefue'10years(oX.tll/gg~"~t.mM~gat~Qpt;H-r3-~4MC3hOr..g.~'+'MV~+.E~&ov,Pi'L~vPJPSASe~~ues<<ss(P~<<4Aha6sS~0WMe'~~v+,P~V'~~tlh-'hs+4>VF~f'a.3.s.g,7-'V~oxhU<~S,~X~~~MRahu~sp~'~a~~~~~~<<h.QVsch~&ow~m~~csvl'3GIcop~~RAN~v~Qtahs+o~Si~h~~~~gaza.~Meta<<yr'.6-26

ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDua)'i3.6BIl3.6ONTAINHENTSYSTEMS3.6.68ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)reditnottakenforiodineremovalbytheContainmentSprSystem)LCO3.6.6BTwocontainmentspraytrainsand[two]containmntcoolingtrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HOS1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONA.Onecontainmentspraytraininoperable.REQUIREDACTIONRestorecoainmentspraytra'oOPERABLEtatus.\'OMPLETIONTIHEIIC7daysAND14daysfromdiscoveryoffailuretomeettheLCOB.One[required]containmentcoolingtraininoperable.B.lRestorerequired]containmecoolingtrainto0RABLEstatus.7daysAND14daysfromdiscoveryoffailuretomeettheLCOC.Twocontainmentpraytrainsinoperae.C.1RestoreonecontainmentspraytraintoOPERABLEstatus.2hours(cotinued)MOBST3.6-27Rev.0,09/28/9/ ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)3.6.6ACTIONcontinuedONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIOTIMED.Oneconta'nmentspraytrainande[required]ntainmentcooling4raininoperable.D.lRestorecontainmentspraytraintoOPERABLEstatus.OR72hosD.2Restore[required]containmentcoolingtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursE.Two[required]conta'inmentcoolingtrainsinoperable.E.lRestoreone[required]containmtcoolingraintOPERABLEsatus72hoursF.Anycombinationofthreeormoretrainsinoperable.F.lterL3.0.3.ImmediatelyG.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B,C,D,orEnotme:IBeinMODE3.G.2BeinMODE5..6hours36hoursWOGSTS3.6-28Ij/.IRev.0,09/28/92,/ ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)3.6.SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUCYSR3.6.61Verifyeachcontainmentspraymanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisintherrectposition.31dysSR3.6.6B.2Operateach[required]containmentcooingtrainfaunitfor>15minutes.31daysSR3.6.6B.3Verifyeach[ruired]containmecooling,traincoolingwerflowratei>[700]gpm.31daysSR3.6.6B.4Verifyeachcontainmentpraypump'sdevelopedheadatthetestpointisgreaterthanorequalotrequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.6.68.5Verifyeachauomaticcontainmentprayvalveinthelowpathactuatestoecorrectpos'ononanactualorsimatedactuationignal.[18]monthsSR3.6.6B.6Verieachcontainmentspraypumpstartsautaticallyonanactualorsimulatedauationsignal.'18]monthsSR3.6.6B.Verifyeach[required]containmentcool'ingtrainstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18]mohsWOGSTS3.6-29(continued)tRev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual3.68SURILLANCEREOUIRENENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRENCYSR3.6.68Verifyeachspraynozzleisunobstructed.AfirstfuelingAND10yearsI0(MOGSTS3.6-30IRev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)3.6.6C3.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.6CContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)LCO3.6.6TwocontainmentspraytrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.C9ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHE\A.Onecontainmentspraytraininoperable.A;1RestorecontainntspraytraintoOPERABLEstas.72hoursB:RequiredActionandassociated.CompletionTimenotmet.B.l'yBeinHE3.ANDB.28inHODE5.6hours84hoursSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.6C.1Verifychcontainmentspraymanual,poweroperatd,andautomaticvalveintheflowpathhatisnotlocked,sealed,orothisesecuredinpositionisinthecorectposition.31days(continued)OGSTS3.6-31Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondens)3..6CSURVLLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREENCYSR3.6.6C.Verifyeachcontainmentspraypump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequiredevelopedhead.InccordancewththenserviceTestingProgramSR3.6.6C.3Verifeachautomaticcontainmentspravalveitheflowpathactuatestothcorrectsitiononanactualorsimatedactuationignal.[18)monthsSR3.6.6C.4Verifyeachcontinmentsprayumpstartsautomaticallyonactualosimulatedactuationsignal.[18]monthsSR3.6.6C.5Verifyeachspraynoze'sunobstructed.AtfirstrefuelingAND10yearsWOGSTS3.6-32/Rev.0,09/28/92/' QSSystem(Subatmospheric3.6.D3.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.QuenchSpray(QS)System(Subatmospheric)LCO3.6.0TwoQStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY.HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneQStraininoperable.A.lRestoreQStrntoOPERABLEstas.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.BeinE3.6hoursB.2BeinMODE5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVLLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6D.lVerifyehQSmanual,poweroperat,andautomatcvalveintheflowpaththatisnotlked,sealed,orotherwisesecurinposionisinthecorrectposition.31days(continued)MOGSTS3.6-33Rev.0,0/28/92.' gSSystem(Subatmospheric3.6.0SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREgNCYSR3.6..2VerifyeachgSpump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthan'orequaltotherequireddevelopedhead.IncordancewitheserviceestingProgramSR3.6.6D.3VerieachgSautomaticvalveinthefwpathctuatestothecorrectpositionnanactualrsimulatedactuationsignal.[18]monthsSR3.6.60.4Verifyeachpumpstartsautoaticallyonanactualor'mulatedactuatinsignal.[18]monthscSR3.6.60.5Verifyeachspraynzleisunobstructed.AtfirstrefuelingAND10yearsWOGSTS3.6-34Rev.0,09/28/92 RSSystem(Subatmospheric)3.6.63.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.RecirculationSpray(RS)System(Subatmospheric)LCO3.6.EFourRSsubsystemsfandacasingcoolingtank]sallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:NODESI,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIOCOMPLETIONTINEA.OneRSsubsysteminoperable.A.lRestoresubsystemtoOPERLEstatus.7daysB.TwoRSsubsystemsinoperableinonetrain.B.IstoreoneRSubsystemtoOPERABLEtatus.72hoursC.TwoinsideRSsubsystemsinoperable..IRestooneRSsubsysmtoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursD.TwooutsideRSsubsystemsinerable.D.lRestoreoneRsubsystemtoQPBLEstatus.72hours.E.Casincoolingtankinopable.E.lRestorecasingcoolingtanktoOPERABLEstatus.72hours(ontinued}WOGSTS3.6-35Rev.0,09/282 RSSystem(Subatmospheric3.6.ACTNScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIOTIMEF.RequidActionandassociaedCompletionTimenotet.F.lBeinMODE3.ANOF.2BeinMODE5.6houshoursG.ThreeormoreRSsubsystemsinoperabe.G.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.6E.1Verifycasingcoolingttemperatureis>[35]'Fand<[50]'F.24hoursSR3.6.6E.2Verifycasingcooingtankcontaiedboratedwatervoumeis>[116,500gal.7daysSR3.6.6E.3Verifycas'coolingtankboronconcentraionis>[2300]ppmand~[2400ppm.7daysSR3.6.6E.4VefyeachRS[andcasingcooling]manual,peroperated,andautomaticvalveintheowpaththatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinpositionisinthecorrectposition.31sWOGS3.6-36(continuediIRev.0,09/28/92 RSSystem(Subatmospheri)3.6ESVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQNCYSR3.6E.5VerifyeachRS[andcasingcooling]pump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedhead..IncordancewitheIserviceestingProgramSR3.6.6E.6Veifyonanactualorsimulatedactuatisig1(s):a.chRSautomaticvalveintheowpaactuatestothecorrectpsition;4b.EachSpumpstartsautomatially;andc.Eachcangcoolingpumpartsautomaticlly.[18]monthsSR3.6.6E.7Verifyeachspraynozlisunobstructed.AtfirstrefuelingAND10yearsWOGSTS3.6-37Rev.0,09/292 SprayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual3.63.6NTAINHENTSYSTEMS3.6.7SayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenr,and00)LCO3.6.7TheSprayAdditiveSystemshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.SprayAdditiveSysteminoperable..1RestoreSpraAdditiveSyterntoOPERABLEatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1ANDB.2eiMODE3.eiNODE5.6hours84hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSVEILLANCEFREQUENCYll1SR3.6.7.1Verifeachsprayadditivemanual,poweroperted,andautomaticvalveintheflowpathatisnotlocked,sealed,oroerwisesecuredinpositionisintherrectposition.31daysontinued)WOGSTS3.6-38Rev.0,09/2/92.:/ SprayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)3.6SURVEIANCEREUIRENENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUCYSR3.6.7.2Verifysprayadditivetanksolutionvolumeis>[2568]galand<[4000]gal.184ysSR3.6.7.3Verysprayadditivetank[NaOH]solutionconctrationisp[30]%and~[32]%byweight184daysSR3.6.7.4Verifyeachprayadditiveautomaticvalveintheflowpthactuatestothecorectpositiononanctualorsimulateactuationsigna[18]monthsSR3.6.7.5Verifysprayadditiveflowrate]fromeachabsolution'sflowpath.5yearsWOGSTS3.6-39Rev.0,09/28/92 HydrogenRecombiners3.6.P-3.6.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSHdLCO3.6TwohydrogenrecombinersshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESIand2.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onehydrogenrecombinerinoperable.A.l--------NOTE---------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.RestorehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.30daysB.Twohydrogenrecombinersinoperable.B.lANDVerifybyadministrativemeansthatthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained.IhourOwca.~AND2hourstereafterB.2RestoreonehydrogenrecombinertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.IBeinMODE3.6hours3.6-40R ~ns-c-'I.'ydrogenRecombinersAhaSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYrSR3.6.P."IPerformashm1ner.foreachIggmonths'co.SR3.6.examineeachhydrogenrecom'nclosureanevidenceofabn1lons.SR36JfgPeQgPmonths3.6-41 HHS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)3.6.3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.9.ydrogenMixingSystem(HMS)(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andD1)LCO3.6.9[Two]HMStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:ODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME~~~A.OneHMStraincs.;inoperable.--------NOTELCO3.0.4inotapplicablestorHHStraintoELEstatus.30daysB.TwoHHStrainsinoperable.IB.1ANDVerifyadministtivemeansthatthehdrogencontrolfunionismaintained.1hourANDEvery12hoursthereafterB.2RestoreoneHMStraitoOPERABLEstatus.7daysACC.RequiredAcionandassociateCompletionTimenotet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hosHOGSTS3.6-42Rev.0,09/28/92r HNS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)'.3.6URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUCYSR3..9.1OperateeachHHStrainfor>15minutes.92dysSR3.6.9.2VerifyeachHHStrainflowrateonslowspeedisZ[4000]cfm.[18]monthsSR3.6.9.3VerieachHNStrainstartsonanacalorsilatedactuationsignal.[18]monthsWOGSTS3.6-43Rev.0,09/28/92 HIS(IceCondenser)3.6.103.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1HydrogenIgnitionSystem(HIS)(IceCondenser)LCO3.6.TwoHIStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1and2.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneHIStraininoperable..A.lRestoreHIStrintoOPERABLEstas.0A.2PerformR3.6.10.1ontheOPERABLErai.7daysOnceper7daysB.OnecontainmentregioniwithnoOPERABLEhydrogenignitor.B.1estoonehydrogenignitorintheaffectedontainmentregion'toERABLEstatus.7daysC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletinTimenotmet.C.1BeinMODE3.6hoursHOGSTS3.6-44Rev.0,09/28/92 HIS(IceCondens)3..10SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREENCYSR3.6.11EnergizeeachHIS.trainpowersupplybreakerandverify>[32]ignitorsareenergizedineachtrain.92aysCBSR3.6.10.2Ver'fyatleastonehydrogenignitorisOPELEineachcontainmentregion.SR3.6.10.3Energizeechhydrogenignitorandrifytemperature's>[1700]F.,92days[18]monthsWOGSTS3.6-45Rev.0,09/28/9 l'~~g~ICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)3.6.3.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.11IodineCleanupSystem(ICS)(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)LCO3.6.1TwoICStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneICStraininoperable.A.lRestoreICStaintoOPERABLEstus.7daysB.'equiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinODE3.AND6hoursB.2inHODE5.36hoursURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSUEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.11.1OperateachICStrainfor[>10continoushourswithheatersoperatingor(forsysmswithoutheaters)Z15minutes].31daysSR3.6.11.2PerformrequiredICSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).InaccordancewittheVFTP(cont'nued)MOGSTS3.6-46Rev.0,09/28/92

ICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)3.6.1SURVELANCEREgUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UCYSR3.6.11.VerifyeachICStrainactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18)onthsSR3.6.11.4VefyeachICSfilterbypassdampercaneopened.[18]monthsWOGSTS3.6-47Rev.0,09/28/9 VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondense3.6.13.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondenser)LCO3.6.[TwoJvacuumrelieflinesshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onevacuumreliefline4a'inoperable.B.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.A.lB.1ANDrRestorevacuumrelieflinetoOPBLEstatus.eMODE3.72hours6hoursjIIB.2BeinODE5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.12.1VefyeachvacuumrelieflineisOPERABLEiaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingrogram'.naccordanceth,theInrviceTes'ngProgramWOGSTS3.6-48IRev.0,09/28/92

ualandIceCondenser3.6.SBACS(0).6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS3.6.13ShieldBuildingAirCleanupSystem(SBACS}(DualandIceCondser}LCO3.6.1TwoSBACStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneSBACStraininoperable.A.1RestoreSBStraintoOPERABstatus.7daysB.*RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BenHODE3.ANDB.2Be'nHODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILlANCEREQUIREHENTSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.13.10rateeachSBACStrainforz10continuoushourswithheatersoperatingor(forsystemswithoutheaters)>15minutes].31daysSR3..13.2PerformrequiredSBACSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeVentilationFilter'estingProgram(VFTP).InaordancewithteVFTP(contind)MOGSTS.3.6-49Rev.0,09/28l92 SBACS(DualandIceCondenser)3.6.SUEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UCYSR3.6..3VerifyeachSBACStrainactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18]onthsSR3.6.13.4rifyeachSBACSfilterbypassdampercanbepened.[18]monthsSR3.6;13.5VerifyehSBACStrainflowrateis>[,]cfm[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISWOGSTS3.6-50Rev.0,09/28/92 ARS(IceCondenser3.643.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1AirReturnSystem(ARS)(IceCondenser)LCO3.6.4TwoARStrainsshallbe.OPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME+so.;A.OneARStraininoperable,A.1RestoreARSaintoOPERABLEstus.72hoursB.'equiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinODE3.AND6hoursB.2inMODE5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSUEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.14.1VerifyachARSfanstartsonanactuaorsimuledactuationsignal,afteradelof>9.0]minutesand([11.0]minutes,anoperatesfor>15minutes.[92]days(continued)uOGSTS3.6-51Rev.0,09/28/92 ARS(IceCondens)3..14jSVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedISURVEILLANCEFREENCYSR3.6.4.2Verify,withtheARSfandampersclosed,eachARSfanmotorcurrentis>[20.5]ampsand<[35.5]amps[whenthefanspeedisZ[840]rpmand<[900)rpm].92aysSR3.6.14.3Very,withtheARSfannotoperating,eachRSfandamperopenswhen<[11.0]bisappiedtothecounterweight.92daysSR3.6.14.4Verifyeachtoroperatedvalventhehydrogenllectionheaderensonanactualorsimultedactuationgnalafteradelayof>[9.minutesan6[11.0]minutes.92daysWOGSTS3.6-52/Rev.0,09/28/92/ IceBed(IceCondenser3.6.5.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.15IceBed(IceCondenser)LCO3..15TheicebedshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITMODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Icebedinoperable.A.lRestoreiceedtoOPERABLEsatus.48hoursB.'equiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.ANDB.2BeiMODE3.inMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSRYEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.6.15.1Verymaximumicebedtemperatureis7]'F.12hours(continued)MOGSTS3.6-53Rev.0,09/28/92 IceBed(IceCondenser)3.6.15SUEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREgUEYSR3.6..2Verifytotalweightofstorediceis>[2,721,600]lbby:a.Meighingarepresentativesampleof>144icebasketsandverifyingeachbasketcontains>[1400]lbofice;andb.Calculatingtotalweightofstorede,ata95%confidencelevel,ungaicebasketweightsdetermineinSR.6.15.2.a.9monsSR'3.6.15.3Verifyazimuthldistributioniceata'5%confidencevelbysubdiidingweights,asdeterinedbyS3.6.15.2.a,intothefollowingroups:a.Group1-bays1tough8;b.Group2-bays9though16;andc.Group3-bay17throgh24.TheaverageiceweightoftheamplebasketsineagroupfromradlrowsI,2,4,6,8,d9shallbe>[140]lb.9monthsSR3.6.15.4Verifybyvisualinspection,accumulaionofiorfrostonstructuralmemberscornisingflowchannelsthroughtheicecodenseris<[0.38]inchthick.9months(continued)MOGSTS3.6-54Rev.0,09/28/92 I'tl~~IceBed(IceCondense3.65SUVEILLANCEREUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUNCYSR3.6.5.5Verifybychemicalanalysesofatleastninerepresentativesamplesofstoredice:a.Boronconcentrationis>[1800]ppm;and/b.pHis>[9.0]and<[9.5].[18]onthsSR3.6.15.6Visuallinspect,fordetrimentalstructurwear,cracks,corrosion,ootherdamae,twoicebasketsfromechazimuthalgupofbays.SeeSR3..15.3.40monthsMOGSTS3.6-55Rev.0,09/28/92 IceCondenserDoors(IceCondense)3.6.166CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.6IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)LCO3.16Theicecondenserinletdoors,intermediatedecdoors,andtopdeck[doors]shallbeOPERABLEandclosed.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONS----NOTESeparateCondition,entrisallowedforeachicecoenserdoor.CONDITIONRE(UIREDIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormoreicecondenserinletdoorsinoperableduetobeingphysicallyrestrainedfromopening.A.lRestoeinletdoortoOPEBLEstatus.1hourB.OneormoreicecondenserdoorsinoperableforreasonsotherthanConditionornotclosed.ANDB.2Verifymimumicebedtempetureis([27]'F..RestoreicecondserdoortoOPERABLEstatusandclosedpositions.Onceper4hours14days(continued)WOGS3.6-56Rev.0,09/28/92 IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)3.6.1ACTNScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIOTIHEC.RequedActionandassoc>tedCompletionTimeoConditionBnotmet.C.1RestoreicecondenserdoortoOPERABLEstatusandclosedpositions.48horsD.RequiredActiandassociatedCompetionTimeofConditioAorCnotmet.0.1BeinHODE3.6hours0.2BeinHODE5.36hoursjQi~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANFREQUENCYSR3.6.16.1Verifyallinletors'ndicateclosedbyrtheInletDoorPsitiononitoringSystem.'2hoursSR3.6.16.2Verify,byvisualinspection,gachintermed'atedeckdoorisclose/andnotimpairebyice,frost,ordebri"s.7daysSR3.6.16.3Vrify,byvisualinspection,eachinetoorisnotimpairedbyice,frost,ordebris.3monthsduringfirstyearafterreceiptoflicenseAND[]months(ntinued)MOGSTS3.6-57Rev.0,9/28/92j/ IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser3.6.6SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UNCYSR3.6.14Verifytorquerequiredtocauseeachinletdoortobegintoopenis<[675]in-lb.3nthsdlngirstyearafterreceiptoflicenseAND[18]monthsSR3.6.16.5Performatoueteston[asampligof.>25%ofthe]'nletdoors.3monthsduringfirstyearafterreceiptoflicenseAND[18]monthsSR3.6.16.6Verifyforeachiermediateckdoor:a.Novisualidenceofstructraldeteriorion;b.Freemementoftheventassembies;and3monthsduringfirstyearafterreceiptoflicenseANDc.Fremovementofthedoor.[18]monthsSR3.6.16.7Vify,byvisualinspection,eachtopdeckoor]:"a.Isinplace;andb.Hasnocondensation,frost,oriceformedonthe[door]thatwouldrestrictitsopening.9daysMOGSTS3.6-58Rev.0,09/28/92 DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)3.6.17\3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)LCO3.6.Dividerbarrierintegrityshallbemaintained.APPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEQ~.;A---------NOTE--------Forthisaction,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachpersonnelaccessdoororequipmenthatch.Oneormorepersonnelaccessdoorsorequipmenthatchesopenorinoperable,otherthanforpersonneltransitentry.A.lRestorepersonelaccessdoorandequipmentatchestoOPERABLEstatusandclosed6sitions.1hourB.Dividerbarriersealinoperable.B.lRestoreseatoOPERABLEstaus.1hourC.RequiredActiandassociatedCmpletionTimenotmC.lBeinMODE3.~NDC.2BeinNODE5.6hours36hoursWOGSTS3.6-59Rev.0,9/28/92 DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)3.6.17SURVLLANCEREQUIRE>lENTSSURVEILLANCEFREgUENCSR3.6.17.Verify,byvisualinspection,allpersonnelaccessdoorsandequipmenthatchesbetweenupperandlowercontainmentcompartmentsreclosed.PriorenterngNODE4froNODE5SR3.6.17.2Verify,byvisualinspection,thatthesealsasealingsurfacesofeachpersonnelaccessdoorandequipmenthahhave:a.Nodetrintalmisalignments;b.Nocracksodefectsinthsealingsurfaces;anc.Noapparentdetioraonofthesealmaterial.Priortofinalclosureafter,eachopeningAND-----NOTE------Onlyrequiredforsealsmadeofresilientmaterials10yearsSR3.6.17.3Verify,byvisuainspection,echpersonnelaccedoororequipmehatchthathasbeenopenedforpersonneltransitentryiscled.AftereachopeningSR3.6.17.4Removtwodividerbarriersealtestcounsand'verify:[18]monthsBothtestcoupons'ensilestrengthis>[120]psi;[and]b.Bothtestcoupons'longationis[100]%WOGSTS3.6-60(contied)IRev.0,09/28/92! DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondens)3..17SURVEIANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREENCY(~QSR3.6.17.Visuallyinspect>[95]%ofthedividerbarrierseallength,andverify:Sealandsealmountingboltsareproperlyinstalled;andb.Sealmaterialshowsnoevidenceofeteriorationduetoholes,rupture,cemicalattack,abrasion,radiatidaage,orchangesinphysicalapparance.[18monthsMOGSTS3.6-61Rev.0,09/28/92

~eeeeContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenser)3.6.183.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenser)LCO3.6.TheicecondenserfloordrainsandtherefuelingcnaldrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:ODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneicecondenserfloordraininoperable.A.lRestoreiceondenserfloordraitoOPERABLEtatus.1hour,B.Onerefuelingcanaldraininoperable.B.lResorerefuelingaldraintoRABLEstatus.1hourC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.C.NDBeinHE3.6hoursC;2BeinMODE5.36hoursWOGSTS3.6-62Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenser)3.6.1SURILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSFREgUCYSR3.6.1.1Verify,byvisualinspection,that:Eachrefuelingcanaldrainplugisremoved;92dsC.Eachrefuelingcanaldrainisnotobstructedbydebris;andodebrisispresentintheuppermpartmentorrefuelingcanalthcldobstructtherefuelingcandra'n.riortoenteringHODE4fromHODE5aftereachpartialorcompletefillofthecanalSR3.6.18.2Verifyforeaicecondenserfoordrainthatthe:[18]monthsa0b.Valveopeninisnotipairedbyice,frost,ordebis;Valveseat*showsnevidenceofdamage;c.Valveopeningorce'sg[66]lb;andd.Drainlineomtheiccondenserfloortotelowercomptmentisunrestriced.WOGTS3.6-63Rev.0,09/28/92 ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondense)3.6.193.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS3.6.1ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondenser)LCO3.6.TheshieldbuildingshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Shieldbui1dinginoperable.A.1Restore.seldbuildingoOPERABLEstatus.24hoursB.RequiredActionandassociated.CompletionTimenotmet.B.1ANDinMODE3.6hoursB.2BeinODE5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.6.19.1rifyannulusnegativepressureis[5]incheswatergauge.2hours(ntinued)HOGSTS3.6-64Rev.0,09/28/92 ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondense)3.69SURILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQNCYSR3.6.12Verifyeachdoorineachaccessopeningisclosed,exceptwhentheaccessopeningisbeingusedfornormaltransiententryandxit[;then,atleastonedoorshallbeosed].31ysSR3.6.19.3Verifyhieldbuildingstructuralintegitybyperfoingavisualinspectionofteexposedieriorandexteriorsurfacoftheshielduilding.DuringshutdownforSR3.6.1.1TypeAtests.C3SR3.6.19.4VerifyeachShielBuildingAiCleanupSystemtrainwith'nalflow[]cfm,producesapressurequaltoormorenegativethan[-0.5]chtergaugein.theannuluswithin[22sondsafterastartsignal.[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.MOGSTS3.6-65Rev.0;09/28/92 CContainment(IceCondenser)B3.6/3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSIB3..IContainment(IceCondenser)I:BACKGROUNDThecontainmentisafreestandingsteelpresurevesselsurroundedbyareinforcedconcreteshielduilding.Thecontainmentvessel,includingallitspenrations,isalowleakagesteelshelldesignedtocontainPeradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthepeactorcorellowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBk).Additionally,thectainmentandshieldbuildingprovideshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybeprese+inthecontainmentatmosherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentvesselisavericalcylindricalsteelpressure~vesselwithhemisphecaldomeandaconcretebasematwithsteelmembrane.Itiscompletelyenclosedbyareinforcedcqncreteshielduilding.Anannularspaceexistsbetwethewallsddomesofthesteelcontainmentvesselandtheconcreteieldbuildingtoprovideforthecollection,mixg,houp,andcontrolledreleaseofcontainmentoutaka.Icecondensercontainmentsutilizeanouterconcreteu'ingforshieldingandaninnersteelcontainmentforletightness.Containmentpipigpentrationassembliesprovideforthepassageofproess,ser'ce,sampling,andinstrumentationpipelinesintthecontaimentvesselwhilemaintainingcontainment'ntegrity.Thshieldbuildingprovidesshieldingandallowscontroedreleaseoftheannulusatmosphereunderaccidentconitions,aswellasenvironmdntalmissileprotectiforthecontainmentvesselandNuclearSteamSupplySystem.Thearmersteelcontainmentanditpenetrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryofthcontainment.MintainingthecontainmentOPERABLEimitstheleakageofissionproductradioactivityfromtheontainmenttotheenvironment.SR3.6.1.1leakageratereuirementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.I),asmdifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthecontainmentboundaryareapartofthecontainntleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbar'er:(ctinued)I/WOGSTSB'3.6-1Rev.0,09/92 //BAS'IBACKGROD(contied}a~b.C.Containment(IceCondense)B3..1Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduriaccidentconditionsareeither:I.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPELEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.closedbymanualvalves,blindanges,orde-activatedautomaticvalvesecuredintheirclosedpositions,exceptasovidedinLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsoationValves."achair'lockisOPERABLE,exptasprovidedin03.6.2,"ContainmentAir~ocks."Theressurizedsealingmhanismassociatedwithapene'tionisoperable,exceptasprovidedinLCO3..[].APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThesafetydesigbasis.forthecontainmentisthatthecontainmentmustwi,thskandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitingDBAwihoutexceedingthedesignleakagerates.TheDBAsthatrestin,'achallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromighpbqssuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccient(LOC,asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccidnt(REA)(R.2).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantPssionproductadioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itis'assumedtlatthecontainmentiaOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvvingreleaseoffissioqproductradioactivity,releastotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofconta'entleakage.Thecontainmtwasdesignedwithanallobleleakagerateof[0.1]%ofontainmentairweightperday(Ref.3).'hisleakagerate,sedintheevaluationooffsitedosesresultingfromaccidens,isdefinedinCFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.I),asL.:emaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthealculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressure(P,)resultinfromthelimitingDBA.The.allowableleakageratereesentedbyL.formsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaiosedonallcontainmentleakageratetesting.L,isassumetobe[O.l]%perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP.=[144]psig(Ref.3).(contiued}GSTSB3.6-2Rev.0,09/28/9 Containment(IceCondense)B3.1SESAPPLABLESatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsareareqrementforSAFETANALYSEStheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.(cont'nued)ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheRCPolicyStatement.jLCOContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedylimitingleakagetowithintheacceptancecriteriaof10FR50,AppendixJRef.1).ColiancewiththisLCOwillenreacontainmentconfjguration,includingequipmnthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwi1limitleakagetothoseleakagratesassumedintheafetyanalysis.Individualeakageratesecifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO.6.2)[,purgvalveswithresilientseals,andsecondarybassleaka(LCO3.6.3)]arenotspecificallypartoftheaceptanccriteriaof10CFR50,AppendixJ.Therefore,leaageresexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultineontainmentbeinginoperable'whentheleakageresultsiexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaofAppendixJ.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactiymaterialintcontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobatbil.ityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetohepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODESTherefore,containmeisnotrequiredtobeOPEBLEinMODE5topreventeakageofradioactivemarialfromcontainment.TherequirementsforcontainmentdingMODE6areaddressedinL3.9.4,"Containmentenetrations.".ACTIONSA.1Intheeventcontainmentisinoperable,ctainmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetoorrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofm'ntainingontinued)MOGSTSB3.6-3Rev.0,0+28/92' Containment(IceCondenseB3..1BASACTIONA.1(continued)containmentOPERABLEduringMODES1,2,3,and.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurriduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal..1and8.2Icontainmentcannotbe'estoredtOPERABLEstatuswithintheequiredCompletionTime,theantmustbebroughttoaMODE'nwhichtheLCOdoesnotapy.ToachievethisstatustheplantmustbebrougtoatleastMODE3within6hoursndtoMODE5within3hours.The.allowedCompletiTimesarereasonabe,basedonoperatingexperiencetoreachthereiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercondi'onsinanordlymannerandwithoutchallengingantsystemsSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.1.1Haintainingthecnt'nmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualxamintionsandleakageratetestrequirementso10CFR,AppendixJ(Ref.1),asmodifiedbyapprovedeemptions.ailuretomeetairlock[,secondaryctainmentbypaleakagepath,andpurgevalvewithresilntseal]leakaglimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2[andLCO.6.3]doesnotinvaidatetheacceptabilityoftheseovrailleakagedetermintionsunlesstheircontritiontooverallTypeA,,andCleakagecausesthattoeeedlimits.SRFrequencieareasrequiredbyAppdixJ,asmodifiedbyapproveexemptions.Thus,SR.0.2(whichallowsFrequencyexnsions)doesnotapply.Teseperiodic.testingrequirementsrifythattheontainmentleakageratedoesnotexcedtheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.2Forungrouted,posttensionedtendons,thisSensuresthatthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwilbe(coinued)WOGSTS83.6-4Rev.0,09/292 ~e~'IContainment(IceCondens)B3.1BASESURVEILLCEREQUIRENESSR3.6.1.2(continued).maintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsotheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TesngandFrequencyareconsistentwiththerecommendaionsofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.4).REFERENCES1.10CFR50,AppendixJ.2.SAR,Chapter[15].3.FS,Section[6.2].4.RegultoryGuide1.35,Revsion[1].WOGS'IB3.6-5Rev.0,09/292 Containment83.6.183.6CONTAINMENTSYSTBIS83.6.1ContainmentBASESMws.ra,iud<~~BACKGROUNDC.~~csww~z~a~~~waitsMia'm~thwwFo~~4~<~GhC.TCI~cccfssI.Z.E..h.iThecontainmentconsistsoftheconcretereacitssteelliner,andthepenetrationsthroughthisstructure.Thestructureisdesignedtocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfrom~reactorcorefo'IlowTngaUesignBasisAccident(OBA)wAdditionally,thisstructureprovidesshieldingfromthefissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.C.Thecontainmentisa<reinforcedconcretestructurewithacylindricalwall,aflat'.mat,andadomeroof.Theinsidesurfaceofthecontainmentislinedwithacarbonsteellinertoensureahighdegreeofleaktightnessduringoperatingandaccidentconditions.'T"'~hhd,hdhhisprestressedwithapoeminthevertical',hh*h',h~d'eewa~osttensioningsystems.gg~S~ldllc~w.'aseww"am~->4ir+m~TheconcreteisrequiredforstructuralintegrityofthecontainmentunderDBAconditions.Thesteellineranditspenetrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryofthecontainment.HaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLElimitstheleakageoffissionproduct---radioactivityfromthecontainmenttotheenvironmen.SR3.6.1.1leakageraterequirementscomplywith10C50,AppendixJ(Ref."g,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptionsTheisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinthecontainmentboundaryareapartofthecontainmentleak'~~tightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarrier:5+djtha~Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:1./apab1eofbeingclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or(continued)B3.6-6

Insert3.6.1.1Eachweldseamontheinsideofthelinerhasaleaktestchannelweldedoverittoallowindependenttestingofthelinerwhenthecontainmentisopen.Thelinerisalsoinsulatedwithclosed-cellpolyvinylfoamcoveredwithmetalsheetinguptothecontainmentsprayringheaders.Thefunctionofthelinerinsulationistolimitthemeantemperatureriseofthelinertoonly10'FatthetimeassociatedwithmaximumpressurefollowingaOBA(Ref2).ThecontainmenthemisphericaldomeisconstructedofreinforcedconcretedesignedforallDBArelatedmoments,axialloads,andshearforces.Thecylinderwallisprestressedverticallyandreinforcedcircumferentiallywithmildsteeldeformedbars.Thebasematisareinforced'concreteslabthatisconnectedtothecylinderwallbyuseofahingedesignwhichpreventsthetransferofimposedshearfromthecylinderwalltothebasemat.Thishingeconsistsofelastomerbearingpadslocatedbetweenthebottomofthecylinderwallandthebasemat,andhighstrengthsteelbarswhichconnectthecylinderwallshorizontallytothebasemat(Ref.2).Thecylinderwallisconnectedtosandstonerocklocatedbeneaththecontainmentbyuseof160post-tensionedrockanchorsthatarecoupledwithtendonslocatedinthecylinderwall.Thisdesignensuresthattherockactsasanintegralpartofthecontainmentstructure. QkL~~,p~~~iOc-Moc~~Z~wQ-g)u-i~~mrl~e~~~~>;,<BASE~d~awW~in%~ucXi4~LW~nirak..it't~OPRContainment.6.1BACKGROUND(continued)59iicb.2.closedbymalvesove-ivaalvessecuredintheipositions.exceptasprovieinLC,ContainmentIsolationnCPSEachairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."5'7.it'i.a.c.ThepressulingmechanisewithapenetrationisOPsrovidedinLCAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESLv~+,Q.I.iThesafetydesignbasisforthecontainmentisthatthecontainmentmustwithstandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitingDBAwithoutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.'TheDBAsthatresultinachallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromhighpressuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA),asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccident(REA)(Ref.~+.Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthatthecontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreleaseoffissionproductradioactivity,releasetotheenvironmentiscontrolledbtherateofcontainmentleakae.Thecontainmentwasdesigned'-aowa.1%enairweightperday(Ref.3'gerae,sesresult~fro~accidentsiseinedin10CFR0,AppendixJ(RefÃ~,asL.:themaximumallowablecontainmentleakagerateatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressure(P.)resultingfromthelimitingDBA.TheallowableleakageraterepresentedbyL.formsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedonallconainmentleakageratetesting.L.isassumedtobe./.perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP.=QG~sig(Ref.g.5'i.sSatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.B3.6-7(continued) Insert3.6.1.2Thecontainmentwasoriginallystrengthtestedat69psig(1151.ofdesign).Theacceptancecriteriaforthistestwas0.15ofthecontainmentairweightperdayat60psigwhichwasbasedontheconstructiontechniquesthatwereused(Ref.5).Followingsuccessfulcompletionofthistest,theaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingaleakagerateof0.25ofthecontainmentairweightperday.Thisleakagerate,incombinationwiththeminimumcontainmentengineeredsafeguardsoperating(i.e.,either2post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsandnocontainmentspray,1post-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainand1containmentspraytrain,ornopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsand2containmentspraytrains)resultsinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)intheeventofaDBA.Theleakagerateof0.2%ofthecontainmentairweightperday ContainmentBASES(continued)5'~.i'a'a.a.S7saaQ\cWsAst~+~Lack,~Mctami~m~ba.irie:+ContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitinleakageto~p~$C.AA4$L~~~Z.fss,I,fCompliancew'iththisLCOwillensureacontainmentconfiguration,includingequipmenthatches,thatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleakagetothoseleakagerates'assumedinthesafetyanalysis.sertaeas-Individualleakage.ratesrs~pcifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO3.6.2)~pand<purgevalveswithresilientseals(LCO3.6.3)arenotspecificallypartoftheacceptancecrieriao0CFR50,AppendixJ.Therefore,leakageratesexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultinthecontainmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinexceedingtheacceptancecriteriaofAppendixJ.APPLICABILITYDQI~IIICIs-InHODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialintocontainment.InHODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseHODES.ereforecontainmentisnotrequiredtobematerialfromcontainment'mentsf~amenturingNODE6areare..~oitr'rnmeatACTIONS571sta4A.1Intheeventcontainmentisinoperable,containmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.The1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocorrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintainingcontainmentduringHODES1,2,3,and4.ThistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityoFanaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.(continued)B3.6-8 Insert3.6.1.4<1.0L.exceptpriortoenteringHODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofperiodictestingperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixJ.Atthattime,thecombinedTypeBandCleakagemustbe<0.6L,onamaximumpathwayleakagerate(HXPLR)basis,andtheoverallTypeAleakagemustbe<0.75L..Atallothertimespriortoperformingasfoundtesting,theacceptancecriteriaforTypeBandCtestingis<0.6L.onaminimumpathwayleakagerate(MNPLR)basis.ContainmentOPERABILITYisalsodefinedbyacceptablestructuralintegrityfollowingaDBA. ~~.6.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.land8.2IfcontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarer'easonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~~S').ati.C.~R-s4~7G.4.I.SSR3.6.1.1MaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualexaminationsandleakageratetestrequirementsof10CF50,AppendixJ(Ref."~,asmodifiedyapproveexemption.Failuretomeetairlock[andpurgevalvewithresilientseal/leakagelimitsspecified'nLCO3.6.2((andLCO3.6;SadoesnetinvalidatetheacceptabilstyoftheseoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributiontooverallTypeA,B,andCleakagecausesSRFrequenciesareasrequiredbyppenixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Thus,SR3.0.2(whichallowsFrequencyextensions)doesnotapply.Theseperiodictestingrequirementsverifythatthecontainmentleakageratedoesnotexceedtheleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.20~.iit.63A%isSRensuresthatthestructuralintegr)yothecontainmentwillbemaintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestingandFrequencyareconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.~ash.3hsth,VS.REFERENCES10CFR50,AppendixJ.>~+FSAR,e,vng~Rh~ee<%~ClO)3~t0cPg$Q+(continued)B3.6-9 v~~~Insert3.6.1.5l,ll>~ŽAsleftleakagepriortoenteringHODE4forthefirsttimefollowingperformanceofrequired10CFR50,AppendixJperiodictesting,isrequiredtobe<0.6L.forcombinedTypeBandCleakageonaHXPLRbasis,and<0.75'.foroverallTypeAleakage(Ref.8).Atallothertimesbetweentherequiredleakagetests,theacceptancecriteriaisbasedonanoverallTypeAleakagelimitofg1.0L..ThisismaintainedbylimitingcombinedTypeBandCleakageto<0.6L.onaHXPLRbasisuntilperformanceofasfoundtesting.At<1.0L.,theoffsitedoseconsequencesareboundedbytheassumptionsofthesafetyanalysis. ContainmentBASESeePRegulatoryGu>de1.35,Rev>s>oo~.REFERENCES8;FSAR,Section$6.5J,.(continued)q.B3.6-10 Containment(Subatmosphic)8.6.13.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHSB6.1Containment(Subatmospheric)BASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentconsistsoftheconcretereactorbuilding,itssteelliner,andthepenetrations.roughthisstructure.ThestructureisdesignedocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromtgereactorcorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident5BA).Additionally,thistructureprovidesshieldingfromhefissionproductsthat'bepresentinthecontainmenatmospherefollowingac'dentconditions.Thectainmentisareinforedconcretestructurewithacylind'calwall,aflatfoundationmat,andashallowdomeroof.einsidesurfacefthecontainmentislinedwithacarbonst1linertoenreahighdegreeofleaktightnessduringopetingandacidentconditions.Forcontainmeswitungroutedtendons,thecylinderwallisprestressedithaposttensioningsystemintheverticalandhorizontalrctions,andthedomeroofisprestressedutilizingathreayposttensioningsystem.Theconcreteractoruildingisrequiredforstructuralintegrityof>hecontnmentunderDBAconditions.Thesteelliner/anditspentrationsestablishtheleakagelimitingboundaryoftheontainment.HaintainingthecontainmentOPERABLElimi+theleakageoffissionproductradioact'ivityfromthecont'jinmenttotheenvironment.SR3.6/1.1leakageraterequementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.1),asmodifidbyapprovedexemptions.Thisolationdevicesforthepetrationsinthentainmentboundaryareapartothecontainmentleakightbarrier.Tomaintainthisletightbarrier:a.Allpenetrationsrequiredtobecosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:1.capableofbeingclosedbyan0RABLEautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or(ctinued)B3.6-11Rev.0,09//92 Containment(Subatmospheri83..IBASSBACKGRND(contied)b.2.closedbymanualvalves,blindflanges,orde-activatedautomaticvalvessecuredntheirclosedpositions,exceptas',providednLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationVves."EachairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasovidedinLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."ThepressurizedsealingmechanismssociatedwithapenetrationisOPERABLE,exceptprovidedinLCO3.6.[].APPLICABLEThesaftydesignbasisforthecontainmentisthattheSAFETYANALYSEScontainmtmustwithstandthepressuresandtemperaturesofthelimitiDBAwithoutexcdingthedesignleakagerate.TheDBAstharesultinaallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfrmhighprsuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccient(LO),asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionacciden(REA(Ref.2).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfissiopoductradioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfromaLOorREA.,IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthatthecinmentisOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreeasoffissionproductradioactivity,releasetothevironmtiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleage.ThcontainmentwasdesignedwithanallowableleaagerateofO.l]%ofcontainmentairweightperday(Ref3).Thisleaagerate,usedtoevaluateoffsitedoesresultingfromccidents,isdefinedin10CFR50AppendixJ(Ref.IasL,:themaximumallowablcontainmentleakagerteatthecalculatedpeakcontaientinternalpressure(P.resultingfromthelimit'DBA.TheallowableleakaeraterepresentedbyL.forthebasisfortheacceptanceriteriaimposedonallcoainmentleakageratetesting.L.isassumedtob[O.l]XperdayinthesafetyanalyssatP.=[40.4]psigRef.3).SatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILIThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheCPolicyStatement.MSTSB3.6-12(coninued)'ev.0,09/92 Containment(Subatmospheric)B3.6.IBAS(continued)LCOeContainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedbylimitingakagetowithintheacceptancecriteriaof10CFR50,AppedixJ(Ref.1}.CompliancewiththisLCOwillensureacontaientconfiguration,includingequipmenthatches,hatisstructurallysoundandthatwilllimitleagetothoseleakageratesassumedinthesafetyanalyis.Idividualleakageratesspecifiedforhecontainmentairlo(LCO3.6.2)[andpurgevalveswiresilientseals(LCy3.6.3}]arenotspecificallypptoftheacceptancecritegiaof10CFR50,AppendixJ.yTherefore,leakageratesexceedingtheseindividuallimit%nlyresultinthecontainmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinexceedingtheacceptancecriteaofAppendixJ.APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,,and4,DBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivemateialincontainment.InNODES5and6,theprobabilityacosequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressuredtemperaturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Therefore,tainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODE5toreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcoainmestt.TherequirementsforcontainmentduringNODE6aeaddresedinLCO3.9.4,"ContainmentPenetrations."ACTIONSA.1Intheventcontainmentisinoperable,containmentmustberestedtoOPERABLEstatuswithinghour.The1hourColetionTimeprovidesaperiodof%timetocorrectthepblemcommensuratewiththeimportaeofmaintainingontainmentduringNODES1,2,3,and4Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofancident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurringduringeriodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.(con'nued)MOGSTSnB3.6-13Rev.0,09/28/92 Containment(SubatmosphericB3.6.1BASACTIONS(contined)B.landB.2IfcontainmentcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEsatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toacevethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleaHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TallowedompletionTimesarereasonable,basedooperatingperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpoerconditionsinanorderlymannerndwithoutchalengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.1HaintaininghecontainmentERABLErequirescompliancewiththevis1examinationandleakageratetestrequirementso10CFR50AppendixJ(Ref.1),asmodifiedbyapprovedexetions.ailuretomeetairlock[andpurgevalvewithresilintse]leakagelimitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2[andLCO..3]doesnotinvalidatetheacceptabilityofthoverallleakagedeterminationsunlesstheircontributionooverallTypeA,'B,andCleakagecausesthattoexedimits.SR,FrequenciesareasrequiredbyAppeixJ,smodifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Thus,SR3.0.2whichallwsFrequencyextensions)doesnotapply.TheseeriodictesingrequirementsverifythatthecontainmentakageratedonotexceedtheleakagerateassumedinesafetyanalysiSR3..1.2ForngroutedposttensionedtendonsthisSRensuresthatthstructuralintegrityofthecontamentwillbemntainedinaccordancewiththeprovionsoftheontainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestingandFrequencyareconsistentwiththerecommeationsof'egulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.4).jREFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixJ.2.FSAR,Chapter[15].(contued)WOGSTSB3.6-14Rev.0,09/28/2 .....--=Containment(Snbatmospheric)83.6.BASREFERENS(contied)3.FSAR,Section[6.2].4..RegulatoryGuide1.35,Revisionjl].CSWOGSTB3.6-15Rev.0,09/282 Containment(Dual)B3.6.3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3..1Containment(Dual)BASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentisafreestandingsteelpreurevesselsurroundedbyareinforcedconcreteshielduilding.Thecontainmentvessel,includingallitspenrations,isalowleakagesteelshelldesignedtocontaindioactivematerialhatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcrefollowingasignBasisAccident(DBA).Additiolly,thecontainmentanshieldbuildingprovideshieldinfromthefissionproctsthatmaybepresentinthcontainmentatmospherefolioingaccidentconditions.Thecontinmentvesselisaver,icalcylindricalsteelpressuresselwithahemispricaldomeandellipsoidalbottom,coletelyenclosedyareinforcedconcrete-shieldbuilding.A4ftwideannarspaceexistsbetweenthewallsanddomofthest1containmentvesselandtheconcreteshielbuildingtopermitinserviceinspectionandcollectionofcoainmtoutleakage.Dualcontainmentsutilizeanoutercncetebuildingforshieldingandaninnersteelcontainntforleaktightness.Containment'ipinpentrationassembliesprovideforthepassageofprocs,ser'ce,samplingandinstrumentationpipelinesintohecontaientvesselwhilemaintainingcontainment0RABILITY.eshieldbuildingprovidesshieldingaallowscontroedreleaseoftheannulusatmospherenderaccidentconitions,aswellasenvironmtalmissileprotectiforthecontainmentvesselandtheuclearSteamSupplySysem.Theinersteelcontainmentanditsenetrationsestablishtheeakagelimitingboundaryoftheontainment.H'ntainingthecontainmentOPERABLE'mitstheleakageofssionproductradioactivityfromthentainmenttotheenvironment.SR3.6.1.1leakage'ratereirementscomplywith10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.1),asmoifiedbyapprovedexemptions.Theisolationdevicesforthepenetrationsinecontainmentboundaryareapartofthecontainmtleaktightbarrier.Tomaintainthisleaktightbarrir:(contued)WOGSTSB3.6-16Rev.0,09/28/9R) Containment(Dual83.6BASBACKGROND(contied)a~b.Allpenetrationsrequiredtobeclosedduringaccidentconditionsareeither:1.capableofbeingclosedbyanOPERAS'Eautomaticcontainmentisolationsystem,or2.closedbymanualvalves,blindfanges,orde-activatedautomaticvalvesscuredintheirclosedpositions,exceptasprovidedinLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationValves."achairlockisOPERABLE,exceptasprovidedin/03.6.2,"ContainmentAirLpcks."TheressurizedsealingmecPanismassociatedwithapeneationisOPERABLE,xceptasprovidedinLCO3..[].APPLICABLEThesafetydesigbasisorthecontainmentisthattheSAFETYANALYSEScontainmentmustw'thstandthepressuresandtemperaturesof'helimitingDBAwiutexceedingthedesignleakagerate.,TheDBAsthatresuliachallengetocontainmentOPERABILITYfromPghpssuresandtemperaturesarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA,asteamlinebreak,andarodejectionaccident't(REA)(R.2).Inaddition,releaseofsignificantfusionproductadioactivitywithincontainmentcanoccurfranaLOCAorREA.IntheDBAanalyses,itisassumedthagthecontainmentiOPERABLEsuchthat,fortheDBAsinvolvingreleaseoffissioproductradioactivity,releaseg~otheenvironmentisconoiledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmtwasdesignedwithanallowleleakagerateof[O.l]%ofontainmentairweightpery(Ref.3).Thisleakagerate,sedintheevaluationofffsitedosesresultingfromaccides,isdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.1),asL.:emaximumlowablecontainmentleakagerateatthealculatedpeakcontainmentinternalpressure(P.)resultinfromthelimitingDBA.TheallowableleakageratereesentedbyL.formsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaiosedonallcontainmentleakageratetesting.L,isassumetobe[O.l]/perdayinthesafetyanalysisatP,=46.3]psig(Ref.3).WOGSTS83.6-17IRev.0,09/28/9 Containment(DuaB3.1BASAPPLICAESAFETYALYSES(contind)SatisfactoryleakageratetestresultsarearequirementfortheestablishmentofcontainmentOPERABILITY.,ThecontainmentsatisfiesCriterion3oftheCPolicyStatement.LCOontainmentOPERABILITYismaintainedblimitingleakageto'thintheacceptancecriteriaof10R50,AppendixJ(Rf.1).Comp'ancewiththisLCOwillensureacontainmentconfigration,includingequipmerrthatches,thatisstructullysoundandthatwil'imitleakagetothoseleakagetesassumedinthesfetyanalysis.Individualakageratesspifiedforthecontainmentairlock(LCO3.2)[,purgealveswithresil.ientseals,andsecondarybypasleakagegLCO3.6.3)]arenotspecificallypartoftheacctancekiteriaof10CFR50,AppendixJ.Therefore,leakaratsexceedingtheseindividuallimitsonlyresultinthecotainmentbeinginoperablewhentheleakageresultsinceedingtheacceptancecriteria'fAppendixJ.APPLICABIIITYInMODES1,23,and4,DBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactiveylaterialintocntainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequeesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothpressureandtempeturelimitationsoftheseMODES.erefore,containment'snotrequiredtobeOPERABinMODE5topreventleageofradioactivemater'alfromcontainment.TheruirementsforcontainmentdurigMODE6areaddressedinLCO.9.4,"ContainmentPetrations."ACTIONSA.1Intheeventcontainmentisinoperable,continmentmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.e1hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetocrecttheproblemcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaiaining(ctinued)W9GSTSB3.6-18jRev.0,09//92 Containment(Dl)'.B.6.1BASACTIONSA.1(continued)containmentOPERABLEduringMODES1,2,3,an4.Thistimeperiodalsoensuresthattheprobabilityofnaccident(requiringcontainmentOPERABILITY)occurrigduringperiodswhencontainmentisinoperableisminimal.1and8.2IfntainmentcannotberestoredtOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theantmustbebroughttoaMODEi'hichtheLCOdoesnotapy.Toachievethisstatus,heplantmustbebrougtoatleastMODE3within6hoursadtoMODE5within3hours.TheallowedCompletionimesarereasonabe,basedonoperatingexperience,oreachthereiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditisinanordlymannerandwithoutchallengingpltsystemsSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.1.1MaintainingthecotainentOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththevisualaminatnsandleakageratetestrequirementsof0CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.1),asmodifiedbyapprovedexptionsasctainedinthecontainmentLeakageRateestProgram.iluretomeetairlock[,secondarcontainmentbypasleakagepathandpurgevalvewithresilntseal]leakageliitsspecifiedinLCO3.6.2[andLCO.6.3]doesnotinvalidaetheacceptabilityofthese.ovrailleakagedeterminatiosunlesstheircontritiontooverallType,A,8,dCleakagecausesthattoexedlimits.SRFrequenciesareasrequiredbyAppedixJ,asmodifiedbyapprovedexptions.Thus,SR.0.2(whichallowsFrequencyextenso's)doesnotapply.Tseperiodictestingrequirementsverithattheontainmentleakageratedoesnotexceedtleakagerateassumedinthesafetyanalysis.SR3.6.1.2Forungrouted;posttensionedtendons,thisSRensuesthatthestructuralintegrityofthecontainmentwillbe(contind)WOSTSB3.6-19Rev.0,09/28/92~

Containment(DualB3..1BASSURVEILLNCERE(UIREHETSSR3.6.1.2(continued)maintainedinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofheContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram.TestgandFrequencyareconsistentwiththerecommendat'sofRegulatoryGuide1.35(Ref.4).REFERENCES1.10CFR50,AppendixJ.2.SAR,Chapter[15].3.FS,Section[6.2].4.RegultoryGuide1.35,Revion[1].WOGSTSB3.6-20Rev.0,09/28/P ContainmentAirLocksB3.B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.2ContaientAirLocks~~~and-l~'ASESBACKGROUND5'P.v.o.5$,o.%n~e,pea'LcContainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundaryandprovideameansforpersonnelaccessduringallMODSofoperation.alWaQgmpuroe~c.~g,airlock&ominallyarightcircul~ylinder~U:P8withadoorateachen.Th~orsareinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopening.DuringperiowhencontainmentisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thedoorinterlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofanairlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfrequentcontainmententryisnecessary.EachairlockdoorhasbeendesignedandtestedtocertifyitsabilitytowithstandapressureinexcessofthemaximumexpectedpressurefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)incontainment.Assuch,closureofasingledoorsupppgtscontainmentOPERABILITY.Eachofthedoorscontains48ouble~gasketedsealandlocalleakageratetestingcapabilitytoensurepressureintegrity.Toeffectaleaktightseal,theairlockdesignusespressureseateddoors(i.e.,anincreaseincontainmentinternalpressureresultsinincreasedsealingforceoneachdoor).a.c.x.EachpersonnelairlockisprovidedwithlimitswitchesonbothdoorsthatrovideVcontrolriYomindicatio~'-300r5REI.at','iidtoalerttheov-neveiv-4cinterlockisdefeated.5~.M~MThecontainmentairlocksformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Assuch,airlockintegrityandleaktightnessisessentialformaintainingthecontainmentleakageratewithinlimitintheeventofaDBA.Notmaintainingairlockintegrityorleaktightnessmayresultina'eakagerateinexcessofthatassumedinthe@@&safetanaageraereuircomplywith10CFR50AifiedbB3.6-21(continued) h1Insert3.6.2elTherearetwocontainmentairlocksinstalledatGinnaStation,anequipmenthatchandapersonnelhatch.~~Insert3.6.2.2rcboardalarmifanydoorisopened.Asinglecontrolboardalarmexistscg,<,'orallfouraccessdoors.Additionally,acontrolboardalarmisprovidedifhighpressureexistsbetweenthetwodoorsforeitherairlock: ContainmentAirLocks~~2BASES(continued)S~.v<~oS~W~~C,iru~.~~APPLICABLETheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialSAFETYANALYSESwit'ainmentarealossofcoolantaccidentandarod>ejectionaccidente.~.Intheanalysisofeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisOPERABLEsuchthatreleaseoffissionproductstotheenvironmentiscontrolledbytherateofcontainmentleakage.Thecontainmentwasdesignedwithanallowableleakagerateof~o<..ofcontainmentairweightpe}day(Ref..is~~~~~eaaerateisdefinedin10CFR50,AppendixJ(Ref.~i),asL.."/'rday,themaximumallowablecontainmenteaaeraeatthecalculatedpeakcontainmentinternalSs.ppressureP,='~~psigfollowingaDBA.ThisallowableleakagerateformsthebasisfortheacceptancecriteriaimposedontheSRsassociatedwiththeairlocks.IThecontainmentairlockssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOg(g~a'A4Sr.v.~SP.v.4l0C.FRrg,App~~Sue.g~~~~~+4.im41~0~%vlgo.QB*QBPcontainmentairlockform<partofthecontainmentpressureboundary.Aspartofcontainment,theairlocksafetyfunctionisrelatedtocontrolofthecontainmenteaageraaDBA.Thus,eachairlock'sstructuralintegrityandleaktightnessareessentialtothesuccessfulmitigationofsuchanevent.EachairlockisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.FortheairlocktobeconsideredOPERABLE,theairlockinterlockmechanismmustbeOPERABLE,theairlockmustbeincornliancewithe~TypeBairlockleakagetest,anotacrlockdoorsmustbeOPERLE,Theinterlockallow~nlyone(~~+~oorofanairlocktobeopenedat"time.ThisprovisionensuresthatagrossbreachofcontainmentdoesnotexistwhencontainmentisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.Closureofasingledoorineachairlockissufficienttoprovidealeaktightbarrierfollowingpostulatedevents.Nevertheless,bothdoorsarekeptclosedwhentheairlockisnotbeingusedfornormalentryintoandexitfromcontainment.APPLICABILITY'5R.v,'eivyInMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialcontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityand'consequencesoftheseeventsarereduceddue(continued)B3.6-22 ContainmentAirLocksBBASES~~b>WAF't.t=.APPLICABILITYtothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsofthese0(continued~Therefore,thecontainmentairlocksarenotrequiredinNOD5oprevead'vemageziylfro5P,V.tabbcontainTemorthconairlocksuringNODE6.areaddntPenetACTIONS~r.v.a~~bba~.~tTheACTIONSaremodifiedbyeNote~allowsentryandexittoperformrepairsontheaffectedairlockcomponent.Iftheouterdoorisinoperable,thenitmaybeeasilyaccessed.torepair.Iftheinnerdooristheonethatisinoperable,however,thenashorttimeexistswhenthe.containmentboundaryisnotintact(duringaccessthroughtheouterdoor).TheabilitytoopentheOPERABLEdoor,evenifitmeansthecontainmentboundaryistemporarilynotintact,isacceptableduetothelowprobability,ofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainment'duringtheshorttimeinwhichtheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.Aftereachentryandexit,theOPERABLEdoormustbeimmediatelyclosed.IfALARAconditionspermit,entryandexitshouldbeviaanOPERABLEairlock.AsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachairlock.cra~tOIntheeventtheairlockleakaeresultsinexceedingtheoveraconainmeneaagerateNote3directsentryintotbeapplicableConditionsand~ReoinedActionsofLCO3.6.1"Containment."~~o.6~oKuMitsXCALX+.~~attJACE~t~~/aasCJMWQ4O~a~mete,W~(sR.O,.3K~~~W+~~obit'Xa~aICt.%de)~4Lna.awr~gCkaehebaJs'-c4OrS4OS5WW~+t~~W<<w4~4~4t4ea.@<M.0~a~~a~tt~A.lA.2andA.3Withoneairlockdoorinoneormoreconainmenairocs~~~nc-inoperable,theOPERABLEdoormustbeverifiedclosed(RequiredActionA.l)ineachaffectedcontainmentairlock.eThisensuresthataleaktightcontainmentbarrieris..maintainedbytheuseofanOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisactionmustbecompletedwithin1hour.ThisspecifiedtimeperiodisconsistentwiththeACTIONofLCO3.6.1,whichrequirescontainmentberestoredtoPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.,4aPVaebe5.~~~~a->C34V~t+i&+~Dtb~bCi5Clf'4h,W~a.acXa3~a~rf(continued)B3.6-23 SR-hContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESACTIONSKZ.v.h(e'g.>p~tm~~~~'4~~Kvs~vnaARAcasaWPr.h,O,.~,~gA."~V~~(iiarca'eKRSRia~+cneawn.4+V~trope~5'B.va~aA.1A.2andA.3(continued)Inaddition,theaffectedairlockpenetrationmustbeisolatedbylockingclosedtheOPERABLEairlockdoorwithinthe24hourCompletionTime.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonableforlockingtheOPERABLEairlockdoor,consideringtheOPERABLEdooroftheaffectedairlockisbeingmaintainedclosed.RequiredActionA.3verifiesthatanairlockwithaninoperabledoorhasbeenisolatedbytheuseofalockedandclosedOPERABLEairlockdoor.Thisensuresthatanacceptablecontainmentleakageboundaryismaintained.TheCompletionTimeofonceper31daysisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelowlikelihoodofalockeddoorbeingmispositionedandotheradministrativecontrols.RequiredActionA.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadminis~tatiyemeans.Allowingversvcasonyadministrativemeans8sconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.TheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbytwoNotes.Notey-4he-Req~d-~s-aifbothdoorsintesameacrlockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlock~operable,anOPERABLEdoorisnotavailabletobeclosed~~equiredActionsC.C.2aretappropriateremedialactions.ote2allowsuseoftheairlockforentryandexitfor7daysunderadministrativecontrolContainmententrymayberequiredonaperiodicasistoperformTechnicalSpecifications(TS)SurveillancesandRequiredActions,aswellasotheractivitiesonequipmentinsidecontainmentthatarerequiredbyTSoracti'tieoneuimentuortTS-requiredequipment.hisNote.performingotheractivities(i.e.,nonSTS-requ>reactivities)ifthecontainmentisentered,usingtheinoperableairlock,toperformanallowedactivitylistedabove.ThisallowanceisacceptableduetothelowprobabilityofaneventthatcouldpressurizethecontainmentduringtheshorttimethattheOPERABLEdoorisexpectedtobeopen.cP-u~44x~vs++~~~a~~Csca~h4elsbsft,kavvvmstf(coninue0~Va~~+0M Stl'.;ContainmentAirLocksBASESKP.vAACTIONS(continued)B.lB.2andB.3Withanairlockinterlockmechanisminoperableinone,ormoreairlocks,theRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesareconsistentwiththosespecifiedinConditionA~B~~~~0~dh-~~O.ieXC~~s66+~C'~o3E.g~5R.i~Woc-cnM~a8~'~~~~o.adXeetcg~Qja5~M~E,R2.,OQ.%'2~~aqqiiap.al.LeTheRequiredActionshavebeenmodifiedbtwoNQ~Nen+n&~d-a&soiothoors)nesmeasrockareinoperable.Withbothdoorsinthesameairlac~separable,anOPERABLEdoorisavailable~>>tobeclosed%RequiredActionsC.+~and-C.2aretheappropriateremedialactions.Not&2allowsentryintoexitfromcontainmentunderthecontrolofadedicatedindividualstationedatheairlocktoensurethatonlyonedoorisopenedatatimei.e.,theindividualerformsthefunctionoftheinteck).~~~~~~a.'~i~w>>eXcmQh%~%0M~RequiredActionB.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoairlockdoorslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedoorstobeverifiedlockedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccessoeseareassstypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthedoor,onceithasbeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.c'4anaw'.SS',V.ib~~~E.CeE.tm.hSPZi.,<,ga.~S.8-v~~L~~~\~uc4ava>>Ea4ho~W~S~44a~C.lC.2dC3an(sE."~~WoerWo.~cate-l~~a~ca~%>>WithoneormoreairlocksinoperableforreasonsotherthanthosedescribedinConditionAorBRequiredAction'.lrequiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombined.leakaeratesusingcurrentairlocktestresults.Anevaluationsacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothdoorsinanairlockhavefailedasealtestoriftheoverallairlockleakageisnotwithin~limit.InmanyinstancecontainmentremainsLCO3.6.1erequiringaplantsutdown.Inaddition,evenwithohdoorsfailingthesealtest,'theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimits+>~\ca~~~~~'~~~~~~<~~vM.v~(continued)83.6-25

SP.'iContainmentAirLockstmospheiBASESACTIONSSd.xC.lC.2andC.3(continued)RequiredActionC.2~quiresthatonedoorintheaffected=containmentairloclMustbeverifiedtobeclosedwithin'heIhourCompletionTime.Thisspecifiedtimeperiodis.consistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinIhour.SS.v.'eAdditionally,theaffectedairlock(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe24hourCompletionTime.ThespecifiedtimeperiodisconsideredreasonableforrestoringaninoperableairlocktoOPERABLEstatus,assumingthatatleastonedoorismaintainedclosedineachaffectedairlock.us~~>>~D.land0.2IftheinoperablecontainmentairlockcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~~~V.v,4~Q.o~i~A~~SR3.6.2.1MaintainingcontainmentairlocksOPERABLErequirescompliancewiththeleakagratetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ(Re9,asmodifiedbyapprovedexemtionThisSRreflectstheleakageratetestingreuirementswithreardtoairlocleakae(TypeBleakageests.TheacceptancecriteriawereestabiseTheperiodictestingrequirementsveriythattheairockleakagedoesnotexceedthemugionoftheoverallcontainmentleakagerate.heFrequencyasmo'provedexemptions.Thus,SR3.0'ow'sdoesnot(continued),83.6-26 SKiContainmentAirLocksB3.6.2BASESSP.ii(SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS+4.~.TheSRhasbeenmodifiedbNotes.Note1statesthataninoperableairlockdoordoesnotinvalidatetheprevioussuccessfulperformanceoftheoverallairlockleakagetest.ThisisconsideredreasonablesinceeitherairlockdooriscapableofprovidinafissionroductbarrierintheeventofaDBA.Note2eresults<beevaluaeagainsttheacceptancecriteriaofSR3.6.1.1.ThisensuresthatairlockleakageisproperlyaccountedforindeterminingtheoverallcontainmentleakageNaW3s~a~~SR.2.0,Z(~%i~~~+04cv~~~H~5'l&wfg~Qu~~qg~uiv44Q.~Ap~~4CCc,R.iQSR3.6-2.~a~tu.Q<<Sk~~p~~~~~~(4w~5v'.ivTheairlockinterlockisdesignedtopreventsimultaneousopeningofbothdoorsinasingleairlock.Sinceboththeinnerandouterdoorsofanairlockaredesignedtowithstandthemaximumexpectedpostaccidentcontainmentpressure,closureofeitherdoorwillsupportcontainmentOPERABILITY.Thus,thedoorinterlockfeaturesupportscontainmentOPERABILITYwhiletheairlockisbeingusedforpersonneltransitinandoutofthecontainment.Periodictestingofthisinterlockdemonstratesthattheinterlockwillfunctionasdesignedandthatsimultaneousopeningoftheinnerandouterdoorswillnotinadvertentlyoccur.Duetothepurelymechanicalnatureofthisinterlock,and~ivenattheinterlockmechanismisonlychallengedwhen~~icontainmentthistestisonlyrequiredtobeperforator'eeRMR~nsC=is~s~s(Frequencyisbaseonengineeringjudgmentan>scons>eredadequateinviewofotherindicationsofdoorandinterlockmechanismstatusavailabletooperationspersonnel.REFERENCES10CFR50,AppendixJ.IW~SAR,'SectionP~~E+4c~~LI~~Wl~~~~~~QQ~.fhcun~Q~sQgpB3.6-27 Bargi~Sn,;;ContainmentIsolations3..363.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSaccrrh'crS5"-E.tsB3.6.3ContainmentIsolationtmospheHcE-Suba4mBASES59.i'5Q.'sCV.CS,BACKGROUND3.E3.3bcs.t'rs~Thecontainmentisolationformpartofthecontainmentpressureboundaryandprovideameansforfluidpenetrations.,oWeprovidedwithtwoisolationarriersSn.hh'vicesareeitherpassiveoractive(automatic).Manualvalvesde-activatedautom~j.g...valvessecuredintheircoseositio('~h".ho.~h-....-.-.cons>aredpassivedevices.CheckvA-mes,~reer/utomaticvalvesdesignedtoclosewithoutoperatoractionfollowinganaccident,areconsideredactivedevices.Twobarriersinseriesareprovidedforeachpenetrationsothatnosinglecrediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakaethathhcconhainme~o~ien-v'Aves-'akeupheConainmenh*58,xv.cS~.ii5%.itomaticisolationsignalsareproduced"duringaccidentconi'.ContainmentPhase"A"isolationoccursonreceiptofetyinjectionsignal.ThePhd'A"isolationsignalimitatesnonessentialpocesslinesinordertominimizeleakagefiss'productradioactivity.ContainmentPhase"B"isola'cursuponreceiptofacontainmentpressure'ighsignaMndisolatestheremainingprocesines,exceptsystems'redforaccidentation.Inadditiontotheisolasignalslistove,thepurgeandexhaustvalvesreceiveanoationsinalonacontainmentndition.sesut,thecontainmentisolationhelpensurethatthecontainmenamosperewibeisoatedfromtheenvironmentintheeventofareleaseofFissionproductradioactivitytothecontainmentatmosphereasaresultofaBL}.OvsbghWTheOPERABILITYrequirementsforcontainmentisolationhelpensurethatcontainmentisisolatedwithinthe/(continued)B3.6-28 Insert3.6.3.3inaccordancewithAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)00053and57(Ref.I)5'R.XV.s0tInsert3.6.3.45'9,xv,o.TheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovideisolationcapabilityfollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)forallfluidlineswhichpenetratecontainment.Allmajornonessentiallines(i.e.,fluidsystemswhichdonotperformanimmediateaccidentmitigationfunction)whichpenetratecontainment,exceptforthemainfeedwaterlines,componentcoolingwatertothereactorcoolantpumps,andmainsteamlines,areeither.automaticallyisolatedfollowinganaccident,orarenormallymaintainedclosedinMODESI,2,3,and4.Automaticcontainmentisolationvalvesaredesignedtoclos'eonacontainmentisolationsignalwhichisgeneratedbyeitheranautomaticsafetyinjection(SI)signalorbymanualactuation.'heContainmentIsolationSystemcanalsoisolateessentiallinesatthediscretionoftheoperatorsdependingontheaccidentprogressionandmitigation. B~~5~:;tContainmentIsolation7BASESBACKGROUND(continued)Sc.x.vtZen,ebOAY.timelimitsassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Therefore,theOPERABILITYrequirementsprovideassurancethatcontainmentassumedinthesafetyanalyseswill(jghbe(Rg~%t',tna..~~.~55R.av,o,.WVAhk&QC6.%&irA'.'O4'ACA'A~V~M~ao(~ddt.WV,b4&o,~+c)M,vbg0sLe~r.to+MQLsghgh>EttaEr'.tEolc.ttArg$u.iranHWc+Mdct.s-~yiae'Ae'em*4S~ric.s..ShutdownPureSsteminchurevalvesTheShutdownPurgeSystemoperatestosupplyoutsideairintothecontainmentforventilationandcoolingorheatingandmayalsobeusedtoreducetheconcentrationofnobleaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccess'.Thesupplyandexhaustlineseachcontain'~.isolationvalve.Becauseoftheirlargesize,the~><4purgevalvesarenotqualifiedforautomaticclosurefromteiroenpositionunderDBAcon>tions.<Therefore,theurgevalvesareQnKm~maintainedclosedinMODES1,$2,3,and4toensure~EeArAAs~utung'AH+NbtXOeeCAqg~~rl~e.C.'Co~uA+0e.~Min~reSsteminchurevalvesgq<<,(Mt.~).(BTheMin>p6rgeSystem..operatesto:a.Reducetheconcentrationofnoblegaseswithincontainmentpriortoandduringpersonnelaccess,andAOEr~'Ve\+~o~<X~A.'MK~oun,V~g.5~~vitlw~t~o~.containmentisolationCerivedfromtherelatedto<IS~~a~APPLICABLEeAFEYYAYEainmenurgingmagoraccidents.to8X666dAspartofthecon4hRg~A4~~~<ee~~&i4~~containmentbounary,cOPERABILITYsupportsleaktightnessoftecontainment.at'et-as~~o.wmeN4t.tSQ,~gn~en~5t.xv.45'!.xv.~(continued)b.Equalizeinternalandexternalpressures.SincethevalvesusedintheMin>rgeSystemaredesignedtomeettherequirementsforautomaticcontainment,isolationvalves,thesevalvesmaybeopenedasneededinMODES1,2,3,and4.~ada~Qa.~4o~N.~.4voMroe~~~5v~&Aotrewst'n-enet;Xo~roternqtluAi/B3.6-29

Insert3.6.3.5Inadditiontothenormalfluidsystemswhichpenetratecontainment,therearetwosystems.whichcanprovidedirectaccessfrominsidecontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment. S~.i;Containmentolation~~58.;ubatmospheric,ceCondenserandDualB3.6.3BASESTherefore,thesafetyanalysesofanyeventrequiringisolationofcontainmentisapplicabletothisLCO.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)5'w,xv.~58.xv.aTheOBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactivematerialwithincontainmentarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andarodejectionaccident(Ref.~.Intheanalysesforeach~~oftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatcontainmentisolationh~diataiepareeitherclosedorfunctiontoclosewithinthe~~requiredisolationtimefollowingeventinitiation.Thisensuresthatpotential~~/pathstotheenvironmentrougconasnmenisoa>~~~(includingcontainment,~,-~purgevalvesareminimized.Thesafetyanalysesassumethattheateventinitiation.S~av~~sat<r'n~~WA-'~~<Tsn'Lcv-WTheDBAanalysisassumesthat,within60secondsaftertheaccident,isolationofthecontainmentiscompleteandleakageterminatedexceptforthedesignleakagL,.Thecontainmentisolationtotalresponsetimeoedmondsincludessignaldelay,dieselgeneratorstartup(for~ossofoffsitepower),andcontainmentisolationvalvestroketimes.~s-eh~RvWir3.d..>.qVsa.hung05~~~inglefail'urecriterionrequiredtobeimposedint"conduclantsafetyanalyseswasconsideredinoriginaldesofthecontainmentpurgeval.Twovalvesinseriesoneachelineprovideancethatboththesupplyandexhaustlineld'lated'evenifasinglefailureoccurred.Theindoutboardisolationvalvesoneachlinearepedwithdiveowersources,motoroperatedandmaticallyoperatedsprinlosed,respec'.Thisarrangementwasdesignedecludeonmodefailuresfromdisablingbothvalvesonae,'ine.St,xv.trgevalvesmaybeunabletocloseintheenvironmfollowinOCA.Therefore,eachofthepurgesisrequiredtore'ealedclosedduringH,2,3,and4.Inthiscase,singlefecriterionremainsapplicabletothecontainmeevalvesduetofailure'inthecontrolcircuitiatedwitvalve.Again,thepurgesystemdesignprecludesasinailurefromcompro'gcontainmentOPERABILITYaslongasstemoperatedinaccordancewiththesubjectLCO.(continued)83.6-30 Insert3.6.3.6ITheHini-PurgeSystemisassumedtobeisolatedwithin5secondssincethesepenetrationsprovideadirectpathfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironment(Ref.2)Insert3.6.3.7yfdŽTheContainmentIsolationSystemisdesignedtoprovidetwoinseriesbarriersforeachpenetrationsothatnosingle'rediblefailureormalfunctionofanactivecomponentcanresultinalossofisolationorleakagethatexceedsthelimitsinthesafetyanalyses.ThissystemwasoriginallydesignedinaccordancewithAIFGDC53(Ref.I)whichdoesnotcontainthespecificdesigncriteriaspecifiedin10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC55,56,and57(Ref.4).Ingeneral,theContainmentIsolationSystemmeetsthecurrentGDCrequirements;however,severalpenetrationsdifferfromtheGOCfromthestandpointofinstalledvalvetype(e.g.,checkvalveversusautomaticisolationvalve)orvalvelocation(e.g.,bothcontainmentisolationbarriersarelocatedinsidecontainment).TheevaluationofthesepenetrationsisprovidedinReference3.

~Dc@Mucs~~S'1.iaContainmentIsolation5'v.;B3.6.BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ThecontainmentisolationvalvessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.5a.~vsLCO5%.XV,'[ts~.co.3.8SR.xv,gSt,atAswamhagvvrvckrkruatvsXto40cat.evng\~~e'~~~~~a.vim,~Containmentisolation~~~formapartofthecontainment"boundary.Thecontainmentisolation~~2safetyfunctionisrelatedt~~~containmenleakageratesduringaDBA.~o~vAap"-i-ie-"l'oeisolationtimeswithinlimitsandtoactuateonanautoma'solationsignal.The[42]inchpurgevalver'mustbemaintaidsealedclosed[orhaveblocksinstall.edtopreventfullening].[Blockedpurgevalvesa1aoactuateonanautomatic'al.]ThevalvescoveredPjthisLCOarelistedalongwithtirassociatedstroketimesintheFSARThenormallyclosedisolatiomvalvesareconsideredOPERABLEwhenmanualvalvesareclosed-aComaticvalvesarede-activatedandsecuredi~KeirHosedposition,blindflangesare'nplace,andclosedsystareintact.Thesepassiveisolationvagals/devicesarethoslistedinReference1.l,PurgevalvesKithresi'lientseals[andsecondaryctainment;bypassvalves]mustmeetadditionalleakagerateIrequirgWents.Theothercontainmentisolationvalveleage,'ratareaddressedbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"asTypeC~'sting.+CLK'ca~ThisLCOrovidesassurancethatthecontainmentisolationd-Uwillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstocontrolleakagefromthecontainmentduring~men.APPLICABILITY5R,~v.hInMODES1,2,3,and14,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerial4(containment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereduceddue,tothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,thecontainmentisolation~~arenotrequired(continued)B3.6-31 Insert3.6.3.8ThebarrierscoveredbythisLCOarelistedinReference5.Thesebarriersconsistofisolationvalves(manualvalves,checkvalves,air-operatedvalves,andmotor-operatedvalves),pipeandendcaps,closedsystems,andblindflanges.Therearethreemajorcategoriesofcontainmentisolationbarrierswhichareuseddependingonthetypeofpenetrationandthesafetyfunctionoftheassociatedpipingsystem:a.Automaticcontainmentisolationbarriers,whichreceiveacontainmentisolationsignaltoclosefollowinganaccident;b.NormallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarrierswhicharemaintainedclosedinMODESI,2,3,and4sincetheydonotreceiveacontainmentisolationsignal'tocloseandthepenetrationisnotusedfornormalpoweroperation(butmaybeusedforanaccidentmitigationfunction);andc.Normallyopen,butnonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarrierswhicharemaintainedopensincethepenetrationisrequiredfornormalpoweroperation.Penetrationswhichutilizethesetypeofisolationbarriersalsocontainapassivedevice(i.e.,closed'ystem)suchthatthenormallyopenbutnonautomaticisolationboundary,isonlyclosedafterthefirstpassiveisolationboundaryhasfailed.Theautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriers(i.e.,valves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyaredeactivatedandsecuredinpositionorarecapableofclosing'withinthestroketimespecifiedinReference5.'henormallyclosedcontainmentisolationbarriersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenmanualvalvesareclosed,airoperatedormotoroperatedvalvesarede-activatedandsecuredintheirclosedposition,checkvalvesareclosedwithflowsecuredthroughthevalve,blindflanges,pipeandendcapsareinplace,andclosedsystemsareintact..Thenormallyopen,butnonautomatic,containmentisolationbarriers(e.g.,checkvalvesandmanualvalves)areconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyarecapableofbeingclosed.Inaddition,bothpenetrationsassociatedwiththeShutdownPurgeSystemmustbeisolatedbyablindflangecontainingredundantgaskets,orasinglegasketedblindflangewithade-activatedautomaticisolationvalve(i.e.,two'passivebarriers.Containmentisolationbarrierleakageper10CFR50,AppendixJ,TypeBandCtesting,isonlyaddressedbyLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"andisnotaconsiderationindeterminationofcontainmentisolationbarrierOPERABILITY.ThisLCOismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThefirstNotestatesthatthemainsteamisolationvalvesandmainsteamsafetyvalvesarenotaddressedinthisLCOinMODESI,2,and3.ThesevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.1,"HainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs),"andLCO3.7.2,"MainSteamIsolation.Valves(HSIVs)andNon-Returncheckvalves"whichprovideappropriateRe'quiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.ThesecondNotestatesthattheatmosphericreliefvalvesarenotaddressedbythisLCOinMODESI,2,and3whentheReactorCoolantSystemaveragetemperature(T.,)isZ500'F.

Insert3.6.3.8(continued)~~~~~~ThevalvesareaddressedbyLCO3.7.4,"AtmosphericReliefValves(ARVs),"whichprovidesappropriateRequiredActionsintheeventthesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable. 1GcL~i~5S.IContainmentIsolation\BASESAPPLICABILITYtobeOPE(continued)soasonvaveSS.wv.~"Con~Therequirementsrations.entS~.av.tACTIONSink.IVI'~q~~5S,~v.h~M,IIo0pRg4c'MiugIXV.b%us~Ms.~-.~l4gWoSChamgTheACTIONSareoiiedbyw+penetrationpaths,exceptforpurgevalvepenetrationflowpaths,tobeunisolatedintermittentlyunderadministrativecontrols.dministrativecontrolsconsistofstationingadedicatedatthevalvecontrols,whoisincontinuouscommunicationwiththecontrolroom.Inthisway,thepenetrationcanberapidlyisolatedwhena.needforcontainmentisolationisindicated.Duetothes>zeoepurgelinepenetrationandthefactthat~~penetrationsexhaustdirectlfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheenvironment,epenetrationflowpathcontainingthesev+s~oenedunderadativecontrols.~jnglepurge.valveipenetrationowat~e-apecrepairstoanave,asallowedbySR3..IAsecondNotehasbeenaddedtoprovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionisallowedforeachpenetrationflowpath.~~~~ho.~~o.4.4Q~~+A-&~-+athirdNote~~whichensuresappropriateremediaacsonsaretaken,ifnecessary,iftheaffectedsystemsarerenderedinoperablebyaninoperablecontainmentisolation~~~theeventtheleakageresultsinexceedingtheoverallcontainmentleakageratNote4directsentryintotheapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.6.1..a.s~R.l.>Ca.CX's~(XS4)%&g~baXV.Ig~mgtPffhIn<.VUVtII~Kk+bc+,i~l+klglltviI~JIntheeventonecontainmentisolationinoneormorepenetrationfowpaisinoperableeaffectepenerasonowpamustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionarea(continued)83.6-32 Insert3.6.3.17QP,QvIiThisisacceptablesincetheRequiredActionsforeachConditionprovideappropriatecompensatoryactionsforeachinoperablecontainmentisolationbarrier.ComplyingwiththeRequiredActionsmayallowforcontinuedoperation,andsubsequentinoperablecontainmentisolationbarriersaregovernedbysubsequentConditionentryandapplicationofassociatedRequiredActions. ~~eB3.6.3BASESACTIONS+.l,lemmaRkAlX(continued)~.icVsti)closedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,ablindflange,andacheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecured.ForaenetrationflowpathisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredAction.th~Lusedtoisolatethepenetrationshouldetgcosesavailableonetocontainment..RequiredAetio@'ustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandtherelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODES1,2,3,and4.5't,hWR%b~w'eaQQOr~~5t.v.vst'iForaffectedpenetrationflowpathsthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthe4hourCompletionTimeandthathavebeenisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredtio~,theaffectedpenetrationflowpathsmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.ThisisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedlowinganaccidentandnolongercapableofbeinisolatedwillbeintheisolationpositionsoanevenThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingomanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationdevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceper31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthattheta>>'.4~&)areoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.AhasbeenmodifiedbyaNoteindicatin1sConditionislicabletothoseionflowpathsw>thtwoconta>nmentisoves.Forpenetrat>onflowpathswithonlnainmentisoaeandaclosed~s,nitionCprovidestheappropriateaci(continued)83.6-33

58.ii5i.'iContainmentIsolationB3.6.3BASESA.l.iMA,i.i~)ACTIONS,XviitiSol~'o)r),gQiVMi~conlice)iru,)pQrc)cisg-~leP.LCoW.).I.RgiLi~dbCP~02rg.9,~res~o.cctpMir-+~Ag.,ad<.MaXa.~~+mv~jied))l)MnMlingam.~.>0h~<~ichor).Wi~ene.r-aonappropriateconslerlngeacatthe/@~~aoperatedunderadministrativecontrolandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.~~~~ic~+)~~~~p~+~eeordSor~9'r,t~l~~dCon1ismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthiisonlyapplicaenetrationflowithtwocontainmentisolationvavstionAofthisLCOaddressesthec'ofoneconta1n'lationvalventhistypeofpenetrationflowpat.5Q1Vst.rt.1on~tWr)i.(r)M+1llo~~r)ri'+Ina+taairccii~I~~A4n~Q.~Ldll~Qgr)i)i)lcflovTi~rl>l~t'Cappear)reeO1)-Ci(bric)5Q~ct-iciiid~f'A~i)%)col~i'rAir))1~v~~be(~4~v.g~rc(lgpl~rm~>~q~~s~~,~~>>4.vLJ<b~o.U.in0(cl~'>'g~gq~~~cgd~~~lbisn4deJinb.eco~drc~~Sl~girA.tea.A~lAlA~5O~continued)B3.6-34IEt-'"ReuiedActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliesto'ocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesetobe.verifiedclosedbyuseofaministreanAllowingverificationbyministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,the.c.~,ebs)~~robabilityofmisalignmentoftheseQQ~,oncetheyhaveanvuvc~>>mmeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.inwhecr.o.reasfbfmini-pm~4dCv'u')f4u)B.l>64.4LPd6.'5~4m)<lbeemi)~waWithtwocontainmentisolationinoneormore.4~3.penetrationflowpathsinoperableeaectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosedmanualvalve,andablindflange.The1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6..1.Intheevene~~affectedpenetrationisisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionB.ltheaffectedpenetrationmustbeverjfietobeisoaeonaperiodicbasisperRequiredActionA.O.ni<~b.'newbe.Vmu'r)ici).i~~%Thisperiodicverificationisnecessaryr~~ii<~~5vaua<~~~"toassureleaktightnessofcontainmentandthatidol&i)~'s<~~~~~~~e"~~~~penetrationsrequiringisolationllowinganaccidentare&~cCQ~M'livei)r'AAulisolated.TheCompletionTimeo'ceper31daysfor~~IIo~)~.s Insert3.6.3.9A.2Analternativetoisolatinganaffectedpenetrationwithaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,blindflange,oracheckvalvewithflowthroughthevalvesecuredistouseaclosedsystem.ForapenetrationisolatedinaccordancewithRequiredActionA.2,OPERABILITYoftheclosedsystemcanbeaccomplishedthroughnormalsystemoperation,containmentleakagedetectionsystems,surveillancesystems,oroperatorwalkdowns.Closedsystemsmustbeprotectedagainstpipewhipandmissiles,seismiccategoryI,andsafetyclass2piping.RequiredactionA.2mustbecompletedwithin4hours.The4hourCompletionTime"isreasonable,consideringthetimerequiredtoisolatethepenetrationandrelativeimportanceofsupportingcontainmentOPERABILITYduringMODESI,2,3,and4.

Insert3.6.3.10Checkvalvesandclosedsystemsarenotacceptableisolationdevicesinthisinstancesince'theycannotbeassuredtomeetthedesignrequirementsofanormalcontainmentisolationbarrier.Insert3.6.3.llThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,-itinvolvesveriFication,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthosei'solationdevicesoutsideofcontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Insert3.6.3.12Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithinthelast92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgementandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.Insert3.6.3.19RequiredAction8.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ens'uringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.Insert3.6.3.20RequiredActionC.2ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.Insert3.6.3.16TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow. Go.~'~ContainmentIsolationBASESACTIONS(continued)CIandC.2Witoneormorepenetrationflowpathswithonecontainmenisolaionvalveinoperable,theinoperablevalveflowpatmustbrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusortheaffectedpenetraionflowpathmustbe,isolated.Themethodofisolatiomustincludetheuseofatleastoneisolat'onbarrierttcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingactivefailure.olationbarriersthatmeetthiscriter'onareaclosedandd-activatedautomaticvalve,aclosemanualvalve,andaindflange.Acheckvalvemaynbeusedtoisolatetheafctedpenetrationflowpath.quiredActionC.lmustecompletedwithinthe[4]urCompletionTime.Thespeci'edtimeperiodisreasonleconsideringtherelativestabiityoftheclosedsyst(hence,reliability)toactsapenetrationisationboundaryandtherelativeimportaneofmaintainingontainmentintegrityduringNODESI,2,3,d4.IntheventtheaffectedpenetrationflowpathiisolatediaccordancewithRequiredActionC.l,theffectedenetrationflowpathmustbeveriFiedtobeisolateonariodicbasis.Thisperiodicverificationisneesrytoassureleaktightnessofcontainmentandthatcontmentpenetrationsrequiringisolationfollowinganaccitareisolated.TheCompletionTimeofoncepe31aysforverifyingthateachaffectedpenetrationflowpathiisolatedisappropriatebecausethevalvesarecratedueradministrativecontrolsandtheprobilityofthrmisalignmentislow.ConditionCismodiiedbyaNotein%catingthatthisConditionisonlypplicabletothosenetrationflowpathswithonlyonectainmentisolationvalandaclosedsystem.ThisoteisnecessarysincethiConditioniswrittentoscificallyaddressthosepenerationflowpathsinaclosedsystem.RequiredctionC.2ismodifiedbyaNotethaappliestovalvesndblindflangeslocatedinhighradia'on'reasandallowthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyusofadmistrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyad>nistrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinaccesstheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,herobabilityofmisalignmentofthesevalves,oncethehavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.(continued)83.6-35. 3.6.3BASESACTIONS(continued5t.v'iD.IWitheshieldbuildingbypassleakageratenotwinlimit,eassumptionsofthesafetyanalysesarotmet.Therefore,heleakagemustberestoredtowiinlimitwithin4hourRestorationcanbeaccomshedbyisolatingtheperation(s)thatcausthelimittobeexceededbyuseofoclosedanddctivatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvaorbndflange.Whenapenetrationisisolatedtheageratefortheisolatedpenetrationisassumedtotctualpathwayleakagethroughtheisolationice.Ifisolationdevicesareusedtoisolatethenetration,theagerateisassumedtobethelessectualpathwayleakageoetwodevices..The4hourCletionTimeisreasonableconsringthetimereq'dtorestoretheleakagebyisolatingepenetion(s)andtherelativeimportanceofsecondcoinmentbypassleakagetotheoveiallcontainmentunction.gR,wv,o.e,i~c.a.~vvcAaAi-Intheevenorentainmente~penetrati.owpaths~notwithinth"'"'evalveleakagelimits,'gevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolated.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailre.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionarealosedandde-activatedomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange+AgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionWlmusthavebdemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6...ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothata(~~ofcontainmentdoesnotexist.InaccordancewithRequiredAction.2,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationposition(continued)B3.6-36 ~CGAs't~~~.'ContainmentIsolation~Su.;B3.6.3BASESACTIONS5Q.acV'L5Oh~savs6$LLlt~X'lM+SsM~vLttsast~SR.'iv'inutrt'n.u3-0.0Q9.xv.4S~.xt"ts~r(continued)~Co.3,~\shouldaneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Ratheriinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringMODE4fromMODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignmentisanunlikelypossibility.fthecontainment-purgevalvewithresilientseatis'isoinaccordancewithRequiredActionE;I,.6.3,7mustbeprmedatleastonceevery[32].Thisassuresthatdeationoftheresilisealisdetonatedandconfirmsthattakageratthecontainment-":purgevalvedoesnotincrease'timethepenetrationisisolated.ThenormalFguencrSR3.6.3.7,184days,isbasedenanNRCin'tive,GenericueB-20(Ref.3).Sincemorere'eisplacedonasingalvewhileinthisCond'on,itisprudenttoperformtheoreoften.Theree,aFrequencyofonceperf92]dayswascn'andheenshowntobeacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.IftheRequiredActionsandassociatedCompletionTimesarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.B3.6-37(continued) Insert3.6.3.21D.lIntheeventoneormorecontainmentmini-purgepenetrationflowpathscontaintwovalvesnotwithinthemini-purgevalveleakagelimits,RequiredActionD.Irequiresactiontobeinitiatedimmediatelytoevaluatepreviouscombinedleakageratesusingcurrentmini-purgeresults.AnevaluationperLCO3.6.1isacceptable,sinceitisoverlyconservativetoimmediatelydeclarethecontainmentinoperableifbothmini-purgevalveshavefailedaleakagetestorarenotwithinthelimitsofSR3.6.3.4.Inmanyinstances,containmentremainsOPERABLEperLCO3.6.1anditisnotnecessarytorequirerestorationofthemini-purgepenetrationflowpathwithinthe1hourCompletionTimespecifiedinLCO3.6.1beforerequiringaplantshutdown.Inaddition,evenwithbothvalvesfailingtheleakagetest,theoverallcontainmentleakageratecanstillbewithinlimitsduetothelargemarginbetweenthemini-purgevalveleakageandthecontainmentoverallleakageacceptancecriteria.D.2andD.3RequiredAction0.2requiresthatthemini-purgevalveleakagemustberestoredtowithinlimits,ortheaffectedpenetrationflowpathmustbeisolatedwithin1hour.Themethodofisolationmustbebytheuseofatleastoneisolationbarrierthatcannotbeadverselyaffectedbyasingleactivefailure.Isolationbarriersthatmeetthiscriterionareaclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalve,closedmanualvalve,orblindflange.ApurgevalvewithresilientsealsutilizedtosatisfyRequiredActionD.2musthavebeendemonstratedtomeettheleakagerequirementsofSR3.6.3.4.ThespecifiedCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthatonecontainmentpurgevalveremainsclosedsothatamajorviolationofcontainmentdoesnotexist.InaccordancewithRequiredAction0.3,thispenetrationflowpathmustbeverifiedtobeisolatedonaperiodicbasis.Theperiodicverificationisnecessarytoensurethatcontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeisolatedfollowinganaccident,whicharenolongercapableofbeingautomaticallyisolated,willbeintheisolationpositionshould-aneventoccur.ThisRequiredActiondoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolatiohdevicesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.TheCompletionTimeof"onceevery31daysforisolationdevicesoutsidecontainment"isappropriateconsideringthefactthatthedevicesareoperatedunderadministrativecontrolsandtheprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislow.Fortheisolationdevicesinsidecontainment,thetimeperiodspecifiedas"priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5if'notperformedwithintheprevious92days"isbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredreasonableinviewoftheinaccessibilityoftheisolationdevicesandotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatisolationdevicemisalignment.isanunlikelypossibility. 'IInsert3.6.3.21(continued)RequiredActionD.3ismodifiedbyaNotethatappliestoisolationdeviceslocatedinhighradiationareasandallowsthesedevicestobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans(e.g.,ensuringthatallvalvemanipulationsintheseareashavebeenindependentlyverified).Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestricted.Therefore,'theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthesedevices,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobei~theproperposition,issmall. IN 9~~n'mC;CContainmentIsolation-Va4+ee~s~,;B3.6.3BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS59.viiSR3.6.3.1Eac[42]inchcontainmentpurgevalveisrequiredtobeveridsealedclosedat31dayintervals.ThisSurveilceisdesignedtoensurethatagrossbreofcontainmenisnotcausedbyaninadvertentorsriousopeningofantainmentpurgevalve.DetailanalysisofthepurgevalvefailedtoconclusivelydestratetheirabilitytocloseingaLOCAintimelimitoffsitedoses.Therefore,tsevalvesarequiredtobeinthesealedclosedpositionringHODI,2,3,and4.Acontainmentpurgevalvettisealedclosedmusthavemotivepowertothevalveoatorremoved.Thiscanbeaccomplishedbyde-ener'gsourceofelectricpowerorbyremovingtheaisupplyto+evalveoperator.Inthisapplication,eterm"sealed"snoconnotationofleaktightness.heFrequencyisareltofanNRCinitiative,GenerissueB-24(Ref.4),relatedtocontasgentpurgevaluseduringplantoperations.Intheevent~urgevalvekagerequiresentryintoConditionE,theSurveysancepermitsopeningonepurgevalveinapenetrationflowathtoperformrepairs.3.6.3.2ThisSRresthattheminipurgevalvesareclosasrequiredor,open,openforanallowablern.TheSRisnotrequiredemetwhentheminipuvalvesareopenforthereasonsstate.Thevalvesmeopenedforpressurecontrol,ALARAor'rqyconsiderationsforpersonnelentry,orforSurvcesthatrequirethevalvestobeopen.TheipurgeesarecapableofclosingintheenvirentfollowingaA.Therefore,thesevalvesarowedtobeopenforlimperiodsoftime.ThedayFrequencyisconsistentwithorcontaintisolationvalverequirementsdiscussed>S..3.3.'I(continued)B3.6-38 (AtmespWwc,)BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)~~MXk+)~5(4$cubiO~5'~.iX~r~,Ze<War<<indYW~ILO'L~aiddQ~f-i~55,>x~riD~+o~~c-CADKCIlych~(~,g)LiDuDinaThisSRrequiresverificationthateachcontainmentisolatlocatedoutsidconinmentandrequiredtobeisclosed.TheSRhepsoensureaposaccientleakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutsideofthecontainmentboundaryiswithindesignlimits.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthose'vgE@%outsidecontainmentandcapablel.er<vtdd~4.3.)3ovaRepoliionForvalvecontainmentisreadayFrequencyisbasedonen'gmentandwasovidess.ural.~tha~rr~'heSRspecifiesERWdidldddd<<dnotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheQ~areopen.ceWiv.~i~4ho~~~-ddradiationareasandallowstheseevicesobeverifiedclosedbyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringHODESI,2,3and4forALARAreasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentoftheser~~oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheproperposition,issmall.~m(ma,~~44erMMSR3.6.3.P-ThisSRrequiresverificationthateachcontainmentisolationcontainmenandreuiretoelocatedinside5i.'ix.)meld.lMyDIll)iqyo.rime,4d'scosed.TheSRhelpstoensurethatpostaccieneakageofradioactivefluidsorgasesoutthecontainmentboundaryiswithindesinlimits.oronainmen,te,FrequencyooenteringHODEifnotewithintheprevious92days"isapralvesandflangesareoenderadministrativecontrprob'oftheirmisalinmentislow.leSRspecifiesTine~.c+3.r.g.tq(continued)B3.6-39 Insert3.6.3.13Nonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriersincludemanualvalves,blind-flanges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainment~~isolationbarriersaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationboundarytagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowanda184dayFrequencytoverifytheircorrectpositionisappropriate.Insert3.6.3.14QR.ixThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatthoseisolationbarriersinsidecontainmentandcapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.Nonautomaticcontainmentisolationbarriersincludemanualvalves,blindflanges,pipeandendcaps,andclosedsystems.Sincecontainmentisolationbarriersaremaintainedunderadministrativecontrolswithcontainmentisolationboundarytagsinstalled,theprobabilityoftheirmisalignmentislowandFrequencyof"priortoenteringNODE4fromNODE5ifnotperformedwithintheprevious184days"isappropriate. ~s~,;;~sR.iContainmentIsolationmB3.6.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR.'~)c,q,xix~pu~M<~i~a~SR3.6.3(contiuedvatic~+asm<uathat+ggaareopenunderadministrativecontrolsareotrequiredtomeettheSRduringthetimetheyareopen.Notenlocatedinhighraitionareas~oeveriiecoseyuseofadministrativemeans.Allowingverificationbyadministrativemeansisconsideredacceptable,sinceaccesstotheseareasistypicallyrestrictedduringMODES1,2,3forALARA'reasons.Therefore,theprobabilityofmisalignmentofthese,oncetheyhavebeenverifiedtobeintheirproperposition,issmall.\Sb~amSR3.6.3.~s~..Verifying-thattheisolationtimeofeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveiswiinlimitsisrequiredtodemonstrateOPERABILITY.Theisolationtimetestensuresthevalvewillisolateinatimeperiodlessthanorequaltothatassumedinthesafetyanalyses.gfheisolationtimeandFrequencyofthisSRareinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram..6.3.6SA,xiInsubatmosp'ccontainments,thecheckvalveatserveacontainmentisoonfunctionareweigspringloadedtoprovidepositiveceinthed'onofflow.ThisensuresthatthesecheckvaremainclosedwhentheinsidecontainmentatmosrestosubatmosphericconditionsfollowinA.SR3.6.3.quiresverificationoeoperationofthecheckesthataretestablengunitoperation.TheFrequencyodaysiscon'ntwiththeInserviceTestingProgramrequirervalvetestingona92dayFrequency.CDSR.3.6.3.F'ibaForcontainmenturgevalveswithresilientseals,additionalleakageratetestingbeyondthetestrequirementsof10CFR50,AppendixJ,isrequiredtoensureOPERABILITY.(continued)B3.6-40 ~so,;;l~~~.'~<~IJQContainmentIsolation~'(Atmua'mende3.6.3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSM.xiico~~O.OSL-aa.~Sad~K<~abr!tI'0(4r~am~,i,-()~raw~tataetiamV~~W~ug.'SSI,~~'IYX$'QCpIQQfhksh)~wwarlcar+SR3.6.3W(continued)Operatingexperiencehasdemonstratedthatthistypeofsealhasthepotentialtodegradeinashortertimeperiodthandoothersealtypes.Basedonthisobservationandtheimportanceofmaintainingthispenetrationleaktihtduetothedirectpathbetweencontainmentandtheenvironment),oTSayswasestaiseasresolutiono'cnainmentLeakageDuIIiIAlly,thisSRmustbeperformedwithin92days,after;openingthe.The92dayFrequencywaschosenrecognizingthatcyc'valvecoLld-iiitroduceadditionalsealdegradationyaiYdthatoccurringtoavalvethathasnotQeen-dpened).Thus,reasingtheinterval(from-I84days)isaprudentmeasuretavalvebeenopened.AoisSRrequirestheresultstoboval~tedfagainsttheaccep'teria.l.l.Thisensures-thatexcessiveconta'rleakageisproperlyaccounted'terminingtheoverallctleakage:fSR3.6.3A5'3.XiIiAutomaticcontainmentisolationvalvescloseonacontainmentisolationsignaltopreventleakageofradioactivematerialfromcontainmentfollowingaDBA.ThisSRensuresthateachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalvewillactuatetoitsisolationpositiononacontainmentisoaionsigna.eQSPmonthFrequencyisbasedontheoperormthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecornonentsusuallypassthisSurveillancewhenperormeattemonthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.~al~~c:tktg~~&>~5Wt'~~~~~'I~MallplCP~h<~tRA~~a+h$an~a~gIW.Q,1P~~tb.'aaM(continued)B3.6-41 ContainmentIsolations~B3.6.BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)3.6.3.9Insubahericcontainments,thecheckvalvesMtserveacontainmen'lationfunction'areweight.ospringloadedtoprovidepositiclosureinthedirechionofflow.ThisensuresthatthesechvalveswiemainclosedwhentheinsidecontainmentatmospmstosubatmosphericconditionsfollowingaDB6.3.9verifiestheoperationofthechec~alvesthatnottestableduringunitoperation.Frequencyof18moisbasedonsuchfactorsasinaccessibilityoftheseval.thefactthatthitmustbeshutdowntoperformthet,andthccessfulresultsofthetestsonan18monthbarinastunitoperation.SR3.6.3.105t,XiVRevier'sNote:ThisSR'isonlyrequiredforthoseuswithre'lientsealpurgevalvesallowedtobeopenring[NODE1,,3,or4]andhavingblockingdevicesthevalvesthatanotpermanentlyinstalled.Verifyingthateach2]inchcontainmpurgevalveisblockedtorestrictope'ngtog[50.isrequiredtoensurethatthevalvescanclosederconditionswithinthetimesassumedintheanalysesReferences1and2.IfaLOCAoccurs,thepurgevesmustsetomaintaincontainmentleakagehinthevaluesaumedintheaccidentanalysiAtothertimeswhenpuevalvesarerequiredtobapableofclosing(e.g.,durimovementofirradiatedelassemblies),pressurizationconcsarenotpresenthusthepurgevalvescanbefullyopen.18hFrequencyisappropriatebecausetheblockingicesaretypicallyremovedonlyduringarefuelingoutage.ThisSRensuresthatiaagerateofallshieldbuildingbypassleakasishanorequaltothespecifiedleate.Thisprovidesassthattheass'sinthesafetyanalysisaremet.Thee(continued)B3.6-42 E~c-~ContainmentIsolation(Abaeepher~5t,'tOSB3..3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.3.11(continued)raofeachbypassleakagepathisassumedtobethemaxigmpathwayleakage(leakagethroughtheworseofttwois0ationvalves)unlessthepenetrationisisoldbyuseofonclosedandde-activatedautomaticvalveclosedmanualvalvorblindflange.Inthiscase,tleakagerateoftheisatedbypassleakagepathisumedtobetheactualpathwayleakagethroughtheisoiondevice.Ifbothisolationvalleyinthepenetratioreclosed,theactualleakageratesthelesserleagerateofthetwovalves.Thismethodofuantifyinaximumpathwayleakageisonlytobeusedforth~SR'.e.,AppendixJmaximumpathwayleakagelimitsaretequantifiedinaccordancewithAppendixJ).The[18oFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurillancendertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantageandtheotentialforanunplannedtransientftheSurveillanwereperformedwiththereactoratper.OperatingexperieehasshownthatthesecomponeusuallypassthisSurveilcewhenperformedahe[18]monthFrequency.Therere,theFrequencasconcludedtobeacceptablefromaeliabilitystandpnt.ANotehasbeenaddedtothisSRreq'ngtheresstobeevaluatedagainsttheacceptancecrite'aofS3.6.1.1.Thisensuresthatshieldbuildingbypasseakageisproperlyaccountedforindeterminingtheovellcontainmentleakagerate.REFERENCES5Z.CESAR,Section~~~~<~c~c.~-.eGenericIssueB-20,"ContainmentLeakageOe'ion."4.GueB-24.Mc.~A@.tS~eQWW~~~svh~X%D%84l.Cost+omCRQ(ol)Cavba.ie~cFa.~,~~4'9thetaR~Ova ~"r.~'*p~Insert3.6.3.226.LetterfromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toL.D.White,RG&E,

Subject:

"AmendmentNo.17toProvisionalOperatingLicense,"datedMarch28,1978.7.LetterfromD.M.Crutchfield,NRC,toJ.E.Maier,RGLE,

Subject:

"CompletionofAppendixJReview,"datedMay6,1981. ContainmentPressuret83.6.~B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS~<o.'iB3.6.4~ContainmentPressure<(AtmosBASESBACKGROUNDCQ.tta.Q.meaWvvv~m~~Ewtw.u-cs.~o~4~~.c.Ww.co~t'Ao'voa.<>a,~-amt+W:a.-Hat.3.~)<-QB.A'yj.c~"i~+Thecontainmentpressureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)~searnlinebreak(SLB).Theselimitsalsopreventthecontainmentpressurefromexceedingthecontainmentdesignnegativepressure~d'ezenti~~outsideatmosherehww-~ystemContainmentpressureisaprocessvariablethatismonitoredandcontrolled.Thecontainmentpressurelimitsarederivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalysis.ShouldoperationoccuroutsidetheselimitscoincidentwithagBAg-postaccidentpressurescouldexceedcalculatedvalues.~.Ca.L,lAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESCCO-ass,a.StBCRA.C~6c'vm~Hesv~v31~06CaVAC-'>'~+w5~7ca.v.pgc+f'e'u44ContainmentinternalpressureisaninitialconditionusedintheDBAanalysestoestablishthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressure.ThelimitingDBAsconsidered,relativetocontainmentpressuraretheLOCAcc;<<cn~~".f'MandSLBwhicheanalzedusingcomputepressureransients.Theworstcasa"~generateslargermassandenergyreleaserthantheworstcase.Thus,theeventboundstheeventfromthecontainmentpeapressurestandpoint(Ref.I).leC3Theinitialpressconditionusedinthecontainmentanaysiswa.sia.psig).isresutedinafro.o[53m9]psig.Thecontainmentan':emaximumpeakcalculcontainmentpressure,P,resultsro'tingLOCA.Themaximumcontainmenpressureresultingromeworscase,~Qpsig,doesnotexceedthecontainmentdesignpressure,~psig.eoThecontainmentalsodesignedforanapureloadequivalenttoQ2.5sie(continued)B3.6-44 Insert3.6.4.1Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultin1.eakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.OperationwithcontainmentpressureoutsidethelimitsoftheLCOviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis. ContainmentPressureBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continue-2.DsIIS.C.lOCMQOA,~A~~~~r~~~~fMi'un6nou,var,>n~ressurpsiCeE).lil.4Forcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Therefore,fortherefloodphase,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecontainmentpressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).~~~>~~5qskmi<Du'i~~wlc.'~ContainmentpressuresatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyec4Statement.c.a;,.aLCOHcl~g~4~~a~.(avu.i+'i~gpm%~cs~~.Mvmps.4~4vo~44L~+<~~~gyp~~+~l~CO&~rL~<MQ~0PCMpy~f7QftloOte~nWs~nD,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialcontainment.Sincemaintainingcontainmentpressurewithinlimitsisessentialtoensureinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesaremaintained,theLCOisapplicableinMODESI,2,3and4.40.iis.MHaintainingcontainmentpressureatlessthanorequaltotheLCOupperpressurelimitensuresthat,intheeventofaDBA,theresultantpeakcontainmentaccidentpressurewillremainbelowthecontainmentdesignpressure.MaintainingcontainmentpressureatgreaterthanorequaltotheLCOlowerpressurelimitensuresthatthecontainmentwillnotexceedthedesignnegativedifferentialpressure.'$eRa'~InHODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentpressurewithinthelimitsoftheLCOisnotrequiredinMODE5or6.(continued)B3.6-45 ContainmentPressureB3.6.4'ASES(continued)ACTIONSA.lZ"thauc42vWhencontainmentpressureisnotwithinthelimitsofthe-LCO,itmustberestoredtowithintheselimitswithinTheRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalsis.The8hourCompletionTimeisteACTIONSof.L.6.1,"Containment,"which'equiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.3.c.S.aB.land8.2IfcontainmentpressurecannotberestoredtowithinlimitswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplant.mustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS~~eeii~SR3.6.4V.1h<<hhhhh<<heo>>hhhhhhhhhhhcontainmentanalysis.The12hourFrequencyofthisSRwaseveopeaseonoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingofcontainmentpressurevariationsduringtheapplicableMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrplroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontainmentpressurecondition.REFERENCES1.%FSAR,Section+N+.2.10CFR50,AppendixK.lb~~qp]44kyzbBgpcmPrl~C.tAOweloA~QAACLCFhccFoc~hiinnecondn.~en~hndhneinth,s~4AsB3.6-46 Insert3.6.4.2However,duetothelargecontainmentfreevolumeandlimitedsizeofthecontainmentHini-PurgeSystem,24hoursisallowedtorestorecontainmentpressuretowithinlimits.ThisisjustifiedbythelowprobabilityofaDBAduringthistimeperiod.

ContainmentPressure(SubatmospheriB3.6BiB36CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.BContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)gIBASESICoo.'teBACKGROUNDContainmentairpartialpressureisaproceasvariablethatismonitoredandcontrolled.Thecontainmentairpartialpressureismaintainedasafunctionofrefuelingwater'storagetanktemperatureandservicewatertemperatureaccordingtoFigure3.6.4B-loftheLCGtoensurethat,followingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA),thecontainmentwoul'4depressurizein<60minutesto'ubatmosphericconditions.Controllingcontainmenfpartialpressurewithinprescribedlimitsalsopreventsthecontainmentpressurefromexc'cedingthecontainmentdesignnegativepressuredifferenttsalwithrespecttothe'utsideatmosphereintheeventofan>inadvertentactuationoftheQuenchSpray(QS)System.Thecontainment~>internalajrpartialpressurelimitsofFigure3.6.48-1arederive'dfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentDBAanalyses.Limitingthecontainmentinternalairpartiapr~ssureandtemperatureinturnlimitsthepressurethatcodbeexpectedfollowingaDBA,thusensuringcontainment/OPERABILITY.EnsuringcontainmentOPERABILITYlimits>breakageoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainment$otheenvironment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmentairpartialpressureisaninitialconditionusedinthegcontainmentDBAanalysestoestablishthemaximumpepkcontainmentinternalpressure.ThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontaimentpressurearethelossof/coolantaccident(LOCA)andteamlinebreak(SLB).TheLORNAandSLBareanalyzedusingkqmputercodesdesignedtoprpdicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.DBAs~areassumednottooccursimultaneouslyorcoecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsarealkalyaedassumingdgradedcontainmentEngineeredSafetyFeaure(ESF)systemsi.e.,assumingthelossofoneESFbus,whhistheworstcasesingleactivefailure,resultinginonerainoftheQSSystemandonetrainoftheRecirculationSpraSystembecominginoperable).ThecontainmentanalysisortheDBA(Ref.1)showsthatthemaximumpeakcontainmentressure,P~,resultsfromthelimitingdesignbasisLOCA.(continued)MOGSTSB3.6-47Rev.0,09l28/92 ContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)B3.6.4BBASEAPPLICABLSAFETYANASES(continueThemaximumdesigninternalpressureforthecontainentis[45.0]psig.Theinitialconditionsusedinthectainmentdesignbasisanalyseswereanairpartialpressurof[12.2]psiaandanairtemperatureof[120]'F.isresultedinamaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureof[44.9]psig,whichislessthanthemaximumdigninternalressureforthecontainment.Thcontainmentwasalsodesignedforanternalpressureloaof[9.2]psid(i.e.,adesignminimmpressureof[5.5sia).TheinadvertentactuationofthegSSystemwasanalyzetodeterminethereductionicontainmentpressure(Ref.1+Theinitialconditionsusintheanalysiswere[8.6]psia,and[120]'F.Thisresuledinaminimumpressureinsideconf.'ainmentof[7.7]psia,ichisconsiderablyabovethedeignminimumof[5.5psia.Forcertainaspctsoftransieaccidentanalyses,maximizingtheclculatedcoainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inarticular,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreoolingystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalisncreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressu.Fortherefloodphasecalculations,thecont'entbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoyonrvativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,theconta'entressureresponseinaccordancewith10CFR50,ApndixKef.2).ContainmentpressuresatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOMaintainigcontainmentpressurewith'nthelimitsshowninFigure.6.48-1oftheLCOensuresthaintheeventofaDBAthresultantpeakcontainmentaccintpressurewillbemaintinedbelowthecontainmentdesignpssure.TheselimisalsopreventthecontainmentpressufromexceedingthcontainmentdesignnegativepressuredierentialwithpecttotheoutsideatmosphereintheevenofnadvertentactuationoftheqSSystem.TheLlimitsalsoensurethereturntosubatmosphericconditionswthin60minutesfollowingaDBA.MOGSTSB3.6-48i(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92,.: /BSES(continued)ContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)B3.6.4APPLIBILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleasofradioactivematerialtocontainment.Sincemainta'ngcontainmentpressurewithindesignbasislimitsiessentialtoensureinitialconditionsassumedintheaccientanalysesaremaintained,theLCOisapplicablenMODES1,2,3,and4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsuencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetotheReactorCoontSystemressureandtemperaturelimitationsofeseMODES.erefore,maintainingcontainmentpresurewithintheliitsoftheLCOisnotrequiredinDE5or6.ACTIONSA.1WhencontamentairpartialpessureisnotwithinthelimitsofthLCO,containmepressuremustberestoredtowithintheseimitswithinhour.TheRequiredActionisnecessarytorurnoperat'towithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalsis.Th1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwithtACTNSofLCO3.6.1,"Co'ntainment,"whichrequiresthatcoainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1hour.B.landB.2Ifcontainmentir,partialessurecannotberestoredtowithinlimitsithinthereqredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebrouttoaMODEinichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievehisstatus,theplatmustbebroughttoatleastMOD3within6hoursandMODE5within36hours.TheallodCompletionTimesare.rasonable,based,onoperatigexperience,toreachthequiredplantconditionsfrom,fllpowerconditionsinanordlymannerandwithoutchalngingplantsystems.e'URVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSR3.6.48.1Verifyingthatcontainmentairpartialpressuriswithinlimitsensuresthatoperationremainswithinthlimitsassumedinthecontainmentanalysis.The12hourFrequency(coninued)WOGSB3.6-49/Rev.0,09/28/92j ~,~1,~ContainmentPressure(Subatmospheric)B3.6.4BASESSURVEILLAEREQUIREMENSR3.6.4B.1(continued)ofthisSRwasdevelopedconsideringoperatingeeriencerelatedtotrendingofcontainmentpressurevarationsandpressureinstrumentdriftduringtheapplicablMODES.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsidedadequateiniewofotherindicationsavailableintheontrolroom,seludingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcotainmentpressurecondition.REFERENCES1.FR,Section[6.2].2.10CP50,AppendixK.I]WOGSTSB3.6-50Rev.0,09/28/92 ~oi.'ontainmentAirTemperature3.6.5PB3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.5~ContainmentAirTemperatureBASESBACKGROUNDQL,ttaaS41~Imps-.a4oeW.mWcMcaaL~caKThecontainmentstructureservestocontainradioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactorcore'ollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperatureislimitedduringnormaloperationtopreservetheinitialconditionsassumedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)dtfsteamlinebreak(SLB).Thecontainmentaverageairtemperaturelimitisderivedfromtheinputconditionsusedinthecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstructureexternalpressureanalyses.ThisLCOensuresthatinitialconditionsassumedintheanalsisofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotv>oateurinoperations.ThetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfromcontainmentbytheContainmentSprayan~Cool~/stemsduringpostaccidentconditionsisdependentontheenergyreleasedtothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellastheinitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighertheinitialtemperature,themoreenergythatmustberemoved,resultinginhigherpeakcontainmentpressureandtemperature.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressuremayresultinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Operationwithcontainmenttemperaturein.excessoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLETYANALYSESContainmentaverageairtemperatureisnitialconditionusedintheDBAanalyses@QX7establisthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatingenvelopeforbothpressureand.temperature.ThelimitforcontainmentaverageairtemperatureensuresthatoperationismaintainedwithinheassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesforcontainment'ef.I).helimitingDBAsconsideredrelativectainmentOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLBareanalyzedusingcomputer'codesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.The(continued)B3.6-51 BASES,APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)4K~tat.a.~Q.~mba~sirtti~~W'Q,vvi,v~.as'>,o&am,Qn'a,vc4.asm.ye.t'4~dawa~eW~.~Om~QmsHca~stethecontainmentairtemperaturewasshortenoughthgpteequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelowt~esigntemperature.Therefore,it.concludedthatthecalcontainmentaiWtemperaturetN<kgfyliptsssngg>n-toeaepressuriinanalysestoensure'~mitismaintainedfninadvertenoftheo'ntSpraySystem(Ref.I).EOkneSM'-~Thecontainmentpressuretransientissensitivetotheinitialairmassincontainmentand,therefore,totheinitialcontainmentairtemperature.ThelimitingDBAforestablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureisa(@6kThetemperaturelimitisusedinthisanalysistoensurethatintheeventofanaccidentthemaximumcontainmentinternalpressurewillnotbeexceeded.ContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.cR~postulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtoEnineeredSafetyFeatureESF)system,assumingthe;worstcasesingleactivefailure.'noneTraineachof"GeContainmentResidualHeatRemovaSbead'erale.sThelimitingDBAforthemaximumpeakcontainmentairtemperatureisanSLB.Theinitialcontainmentaverageairtemperatureassumediq,thedesignbasisanalyses(Ref.I)is]"F.Thisresult@iinamaximumcontainmentaireratureofQ~'F.'-4empe2'78zpe~.esIr'<<-~~temperaturelimitistoestablishtheenvironmentalualificationoperatingepeforcontainment.Themaximumeakcontainmentairtmturewascalculatedtoforonlyafewsecondsduringthetransient.Thebasisofthecontainmentdesigntemperature,however,istoensuretheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipmentinsidecontainment(Ref.2},ThermalanalysesshothatthetimeintervaldurinwhichB3.6-52(continued) Insert3.6.5.1(~>~MConsequently,theESFsystemsmustcontinuetofunctionwithintheenvironmentresultingfromtheDBAwhichincludeshumidity,pressure,temperature,andradiationconsiderations. ContainmentAirTemperature.6.BASES(continued)LCOGl4I'lDuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaverageairtemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperaturelimit,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthecontainmentdesigntemperature.Asaresult,theabilityofcontainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctionisensure+~~gyg~iuAPPLICABILITYwho'lhx~0InMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerial(Rcontainment.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentaverageairtemperaturewithinthelimitisnotrequiredinHODE5or6.ACTIONSA.IWhencontainmentaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,itmustberestoredtowithinlimitwithin8hours.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoerationtowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.ThQbhourCompletionTimeisacceptableconsideringthesensitivityoftheanalysistovariationsinthisparameter,andprovidessufficienttimetocorrectminorproblems.B.IandB.2IfthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturecannotberestoredtowithinitslimitwithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging,plantsystems.B3.6-53(continued) ContainmentAirTemperatureBASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSCel,'IiI.wSR3.6.5.IVerifyingthatcontainmentaverageairtemperatureiswithintheLCOlimitensuresthatcontainmentoperationremainswithinthelimitassumedforthecontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethecontainmentaverageairtemperature,anarithmeticaverageiscalculatedusingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthecontainmentselectedtoprovidearepresentativesampleoftheoverallcontainmentatmosphere.The24hourFrequencyofthisSRisconsideredacceptablebasedonobservedslowratesoftemperatureincreasewithincontainmentasaresultofenvironmentalheatsources(duetothelargevolumeofcontainment).Furthermore,the24hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalconta)nmenttemperaturecondition.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section2.10CFR50.49.CaL.III.~+~~+cx<:~-c.axiw~-(.oar,'III=-~43I,IE'-(.O3~,~e-Ca3R,~S-~<-4gqp)Su~Mt&a~~I<<~u~g%c-~t~X~I~~OSI4~~C~~a.~Cofitetdnre.q-cittno~echo~~t4(Ug.~(f4.~u~~dsB3.6-54 ContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)B3.6.B3.6NTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.5BontainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainadioactivemqterial,thatmaybereleasedfromthereaorcorefoglowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).hecontainmentaverageairtemperatureislimited,durgnormaloperation,topreservetheinitialconditionsassedintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccidet(LOCA)orsteamlinebreakLB).Thecontai.nmentaverageairtemperaturelimitisderivedfromtheinputconditionsusedithecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandithecontainmentsuctureexternalpressureanalyses.Th'ipLCOensurestatinitialconditionsassumedintheanalysisofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotviolatedduringnitoperations.Thetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfrocontaip'mentbytheContainmentSprayandCoolingsystemsdu<ingostaccidentconditionsisdependentupontheenergyrelystothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellasthinitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighqwheinitialtemperature,themoreenergythatmustbP'emved,resultinginahigherpeakcontainmentpressureandemperature.Exceedingcontainmentdesignpressure~ayresulinleakagegreaterthanthatassumedinthejaccidentanasis.OperationwithcontainmenttemperatureinexcessoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialconditionassumedintheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESWOGSTSThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetoconinmentOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLB.TheDBALOandSLBareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredittheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotoDBAsareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.The/a(coninued)///Rev.0,09/28/92/B3.6-55ContaientaverageairtemperaturisaninitialconditionusedpntheDBAanalysesthatestab'shesthecontainmentenvironmentalqualificationoperatinenvelopeforbothprssureand.temperature.ThelimitrcontainmentaveragertemperatureensuresthatoperationmaintainedwithinheassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesorcontainment(Ref.I).

IW\ContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)B3.6.5BSESAPPLI'CABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)postulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtoEngineereSafetyFeature(ESF)systems,assumingthelossofoeESFbus,whichistheworstcasesingleactivefailureresultinginonetraineachofContainmentSprayystem,ResidualHeatRemovalSystem,andAirReturnSyembeingrenderedinoperable.ThelimitingDBAforthemaximumpeakconta'entairtemperatureisanSLB.Fortheuppercomprtment,the~initialcontainmentaverageairtemperateassumedinthehqsignbasisanalyses(Ref.1)is[110]P.Forthelowercompartment,theinitialaveragecontainmentairtemperatureassumedinthedesignbasisanalysess[120]'F.Thisresul'tedinamaximumcontainmenta'rtemperatureof[326]'FThedesigntemperature'260]'F.Thetemperatureupperlimitsarusedtoestablishtheenvironment'alqualificationoratingenvelopeforbothcontainment'compartments.Temaximumpeakcontainmentairtemperaturef~bothcontainmentcompartmentswascalculatedtoexceedthecontainment~6esigntemperatureforonlyafewsecondsduringttranent.Thebasisofthecontainmentdesigntemperaturehowever,istoensuretheperformanceofsafetyrelatedequipgigntinsidecontainment(Ref.2).Thermalanalysesshdthatthetimeintervalduringwhichthecontainmentaiteh~eratureexceededthecontainmentdesigntemperaturwass)ortenoughthattheequipmentsurfacetemperaresremainedbelowthedesigntemperature.Therefore,it'sconcludedhatthecalculatedtransientcontainmenta~rtemperaturesyareacceptablefortheDBASLB.ThetemperatureupperlimitsarealsousedinthedepressupizationanalysestoensurethattheminimumpressurelimitismaintainedfollowinganinadvertentactuationoftheContainmentSpraySstemforbothcont/inmentcompartments.Tecontainmentpressuretransientissnsitivetothenitialairmassincontainmentand;therefore,totheinitialcontainmentairtemperature.ThegimitingDBAforestablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentiernalpressureisaLOCA.Thetemperaturelowerlimits,[Sg'Ffortheuppercompartmentand[100]'Fforthelower.compartment,areusedinthisanalysistoensurethat,intheeventofanaccident,themaximumcontainmentinternalpressuewillnotbeexceededineithercontainmentcompartment.(cont~ued)WOGSTSB3.6-56Rev.0,09/28/92

vContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)B3.6.5BESAPPLIBLEContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCriteron2ofSAFETYALYSEStheNRCPolicyStatement.(contied)LCODuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaverageairtemperaturewithintheLCOtemperaturelimits,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbeowthecontainmentdesigntemperature.Asarelt,theabilityofcoatainmenttoperformitsdesignfunctj,nisensured.InMODES3and4,containmentairtempera+remaybeaslowas60'Fbqcausetheresultantcalculated/peakcontainmentaccidentpressurewouldnoteyceedtPedesignpressuredue,toalesseramountofenergyreleasedfromthepipebreakintheseMODES.APPLICABILITY1ACTIONSInMODESI,2,3~and4,aDgcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivemateri.altocontfainment.InHODES5and6,theprobabilityandcorisequencjd'softheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureand'temper'aturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,maintainingcontainmentaverageairtemperaturewithinthelimitisnorequiredinMODE5or6.rWhencontainmengaverageairtemperatureintheupperorlowercompartmentisnotwithinthelimitoftheLCO,theaverageair$emperatureintheaffectedcompartmentmustberestoredtojbithinlimitswithin8hoqrs.ThisRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthecqntainmentanalysis.The8houqCompletionTimeisacceptaMeconsideringthesensitivityotheanalysistovariatPonsinthisparameterandprovidesufficienttimetocorretminorproblems.BandB.2IfthecontainmentaverageairtemperaturecannotbrestoredtowithinitslimitswithintherequiredColetionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOId(continue'd(WOGSTSB3.6-57Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentAirTemperature(IceCondenser)83.6.5BASACTIONB.Iand8.2(continued)doesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplamustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimearereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,treachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercditionsinan~orderlymannerandwithoutchallengingpltsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR'3.6.58.1and'SR3.6.58.2VerifyingthatcontainmentaveragairtemperatureiswithintheLCO'limitsensuresthatcontinmentoperationremains.withinthe.limitsassumedfortgecontainmentanalyses.Inordertodeterminethecontaigmentaverageairtemperature,aweightedaverageiscalculatedusingmeasurementstakenatlocationswithinthecontaip'mentselectedtoprovidearepresentative'sampleof$4eoverallcontainmentatmosphere.The24hourFreqbencyof/theseSRsisconsideredacceptablebasedonobserved~slower'atesoftemperatureincreasewithincontainmentasarendu)'tofenvironmentalheatsources(duetothelargevolumePfcontainment).Furthermore,'he24hourFrequency)i8qnsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsavailybleNi'n,thecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatorto~qnabnormalcontainmenttemperaturecondition./REFERENCES1.FSA,Section[6.2].2.19CFR50.49./'OGSTS83.6-58Rev.0,09/28/92, ContainmentAirTemperature(Subatmospheric)B3.6.5CB.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.5CContainmentAirTemperature(Subatmospheric)BASESEDIBACKGROUNDThecontainmentstructureservestocontainraioactivematerialthatmaybereleasedfromthereactocorefollowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TcontainmentverageairtemperatureislimitedduringormaloperationtgpreservetheinitialconditionsassumintheaccidentanalysesforalossofcoolantaccidentLOCA)orsteamlinebreak,(SLB).Theconainmentaverageairtemperarelimitisderivedfromthejnputconditionsusedinecontainmentfunctionalanalysesandthecontainmentstrtureexternalpressureanalyses.ThisLCOensuresthainitialconditionsassumedintheanalystsofcontainmentresponsetoaDBAarenotviolatedduring+unitoperatis.ThetotalamountofenergytoberemovedfrogcontainmntbytheContainmentSprayandCoolingsystemsduringposaccidentconditionsisdependentupontheenergyrelysedothecontainmentduetotheevent,aswellastheitialcontainmenttemperatureandpressure.Thehighereinitialtemperature,themoreenergywhichmustbeembed,resultinginahigherpeakcontainmentpressurandC'perature.Exceedingconta'inmentdesignpressuremresultleakagegreaterthanthatassumedintheaidentanalis.OperationwithcontainmentterneratureinexcsoftheLCOlimitviolatesaninitialcoitionassumedinheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESContainmtaverageairtemperatureianinitialconditionuseditheDBAanalysesthatestablishthecontainmentenvirmentalqualificationoperatingenlopeforbothpresreandtemperature.Thelimitforctainmentaverageairtemperatureensuresthatoperationisma'ntainedwithintassumptionsusedintheDBAanalysesforntainmentef.I).ThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmetOPERABILITYaretheLOCAandSLB.TheDBALOCAandLBareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressuretransients.NotwoDBAareassumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.The(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-59Rev.0,09/28/92 BESAPPLIBLESAFETYALYSES(contied)ContainmentAirTemperature(Subatmospheric)B3.6.IpostulatedDBAsareanalyzedwithregardtocontaientEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systems,assumingthelossofoneESFbus,whichistheworstcasesingletivefailure,resultinginonetrainofthequenchray(gS)SystemandRecirculationSpraySystembeingrnderedinoperable.ThelimitingDBAforthemaximumpeakconainmentairemperatureisanSLB.Theinitialconinmentaverageair:tmperatureassumedinthedesignbasianalyses(Ref.1)isfl]'F.Thisresultedinamaximumontainmentairtempratureof[357]'F.Thedesignemperatureis[347]'F.Theteeratureupperlimitisusdtoestablishtheenvironmtalqualificationopertingenvelopeforcontainmen.Themaximumpeakontainmentairtemperaturewascalculadtoexceedtheontainmentdesigntemperatureforonlyafesecondsduriqgthetransient.Thebasisofthecontainmendesigntern4rature,however,istoensuretheperformancefsafetyelatedequip'mentinsidecontainment(Ref.).Termalanalysesshowedthatthetimeintervalduringwhihecontainmentairtemperatureexceededthecontainntdesigntemperaturewasshortenoughthattheequipmentsacetemp'eraturesremainedbelowthedesigntemperatureThefore,itisconcludedthatthecalculatedtransitconinmentairtemperatureisacceptableforeDBASLB.Thetemperatueupperlimitialsousedinthedepressurizionanalysestoeurethattheminimumpressure1itismaintainedfollwinganinadvertentactuatioofthegSSystem(Ref.Thecoainmentpressure-transientisensitivetotheiniti1airmassincontainmentand,terefore,totheinialcontainmentairtemperature.T'limitingDBAforesablishingthemaximumpeakcontainmentinternalpressureiaLOCA.Thetemperaturelowerlimitissedinthisnalysistoensurethat,intheeventofanccident,themaximumcontainmentinternalpressurewillnobeexceeded.ContainmentaverageairtemperaturesatisfiesCrerion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.WOGSTSB3-6-60(continued)iRev.0,09/28/92<'

~aContainmentAirTemperature(SubatmosphericB3.6CBSES(continued)LCODuringaDBA,withaninitialcontainmentaveragetemperaturelessthanorequaltotheLCOtemperurelimits,theresultantpeakaccidenttemperatureismaintainedbelowthecontainmentdesigntemperture.Asaresult,theabilityofcontainmenttoperforitsdesignfunctionisensured.APPLICABILITYACTIONSMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcoulduseareleaseofrioactivematerialtocontainment.InMODES5and6,theproabilityandconsequencesoftheeeventsarereducedduetotpressureandtemperaturelip(itationsoftheseMODES.Therere,maintainingcontainme4averageairtemperaturewithinelimitisnotrequireinMODE5or6.A.1WhencontainmenaverageairtemperatureisnotwithinthelimitsoftheLCO,itustberestoredtowithinlimitswithin8hours.T'sRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperationtowithinheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.The8hourComplet'onimeisacceptableconsideringthesensitivityofthanasistovariationsinthisparameterandprovidessuficientimetocorrectminorproblems.B.IandB.2IfthecotainmentaverageairmperaturecannotberestoretowithinitslimitswiintherequiredCompletionTime,eplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesotapply.Toachievethisstus,theplantmustbebrohttoatleastMODE3within6hursandtoMODE5wiin36hours.TheallowedCompletiTimesarerasonable,basedonoperatingexperien,toreachtheequiredplantconditionsfromfullpoweronditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplasystems.WOGSTSB3.6-61(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92

~f~II~II~~~~I'~~~~~~'~I~,~~~'~I~~~II~~~I~I~~~Ii~~J~~~~~~~ 4z.',4z.'iid.a,M~~~'~-~w~~K~oc~<y~l6(.~)m~ai~~M~U-~4~a~~Ca(~~(yam)(LrdPac+-~~ias~cdl3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.6PContainmentSpraanBASESBACKGROUND~Q-Pos+O,<<<<,~~~ex>~c~CPFc,~i~Csca%.,Theandsystemsprovidecontainmentatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandtemperatureincontainmenttolessanedesinvaluesductionofcontainmentpressure~sz,andtheiodineremovalcapabilityotereducesthereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromconasnmentotheenvironment,intheeventofaDesinBasisAccident(DBAtowithinlimits.The~~~Csystemsaredesignedtomeettherrementsemova,GDC39,"InspectionofContainmeatemovas,"GDC40,"TestingofCo'entHeatRemovalSystems,41,"ContaitmosphereCleanup,"GDC42,"Inspectionofo'ntAtmosphereCleanupSystems,"andGDC43'stingoinmentAtmosphereCleanupSystef.1),orotherdocumeatwerearo'atthetimeoflicensinidentifiedoiti+-0S.C.l~dlS~~6'.szsg~<~,a9~SP~CSoch~os%-~~4aa,~~@~XlW'.+~~l~Mmz%%@~i'+<<0Mi~t4uuA4i'AC.F'i2IaQ4t.oivalues.ppg(cificbasis).CL~5~CSCh~System~"-~areEngineered.SafetyFeature+SF)systems.Theyare<<,~.~designedtoensurethat,theheatremovalcapabilityrequireddurintheostaccidentperiodcanbeattainedTheSyste~g~rSysteprov>ereunanmethodstolimitandmaintasnpostaccidentconditionstolessthanthecontainmendesign<~~V'i.0~~~~~h<cL~cP'akia~iui'W,Prl~lPa>gi06%AL)ContainmentSraSstem~c:heSystemconsistsoftwoTrainso~,~~veen~dPdd1~>>,*pPdnozzles,valves,andpiping.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateESFbus.Therefuelingwaterstoraetank(EST)suppliesboratedwatertothesystemdUringtheinjectionphaseofoperationIntherecirculationmodeofoperation,Ump~'4O.~~~~~P~V4la.~9~~-o.~.~~~~B3.6-63 (~QBASESgg,d.kFC.,0-QfP'm4--A~~BACKGROUNDs~~'-a=~-.m<O~<<ar~ltsxgc4~oh~~QS~law's(StC)umpdischargevalves.startstetwo8fbC,,~Q~pumps,andbeginstheinjectionphase.manuafh~si<<hoperatortoactuatetwoseparateQij~onemaincontrolboardtobeginthesameseuece.TheinjectionhecontinSTevel'rmisreceive.-LowlevelalarmfortheRWSTactvalvestoaligntheontSpraySystsuetion~inst'rwiththecontainmentsumpando'heoperatortoVali~manuallyalignthesystemerecircuade.TheContainmentSpremintherecirculationmode'nsQa46,anequi'mtemperaturebetweenthecontaishereandtherecirculateds~umwater.OperationoftheeMQamSystemintherecirculationmodeis~C..<>V'hr(continued)ContainmentSraSstem(continued)c~itsstsuctionQtransferredfromtheRWSTtogQZontainmentAmpE&6~ho.~rt~&<~>r~~C~The'ystemprovidesasprayofcoldboratedwatermixedwithsodiumhydroxide(NaOH)fromthesprayadditivetankintotheupperregionsofcontainmenttoreducethecontainmentpressureandtemperatureandto~4'~fissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmosphereduringaDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisanimportantfactorindeterminingtheheatremovalcapabilityofthe~~c~~~nment-Systemduringtheinjectionphase.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,heatisremovedfromthecontainmentsumpwaterbtheresidualheatremovalcoolers.,Eachtrainofthe~~HeSystemprovidesadequatei".~-.,<.~Q,'spraycoverageto,meetthesystemesignrequirementsforcontainmentheatremoval.sSw~'lresusngaainepHotesprayenanceeaiiyofthespraytoscavengefissionproducts.fromthecontainmentatmosphere.TheNaOHaddedinthespray'alsoensuresanalkalinepHforthesolutionrecirculatedinthecontainmentsump.ThealkalinepHofthecontainmentsump'Ln<.Vt..MwaterminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimizestheoccurrenceofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosiononhCR,'wVa-W'aw'<<dautomaticallybyacontainment"(@@~~pressuresignalormanuaAnautomaticactuationoensthe"B3.6-64 BASES4'2.ta~c.a.,~,c,e.~cms-os.pher~~adLBACKGROUNDContainmentSraSstem(continued)controlledbytheoperatorinaccordancewiththeemergencyoperatingprocedures.ContainmentCooSstem4<.4i.a.Cr>>'Vhaf~+wotainmentcooling,eachofsufficicapacitytosupplyIc'equirement,areprovided.Eachtra'nunitsi'tcoolingwaeparatetraiofessentialservicerESM.'risdrawnintothecoolersthroughthefananiscare'th(s'amgeneratorpressurizercompartmen@n~~q~DUO.C"t0%4i~h~th,ts~'~s~>e~~h-+1oeionfanu4i~Via<Q%2~chJLHCR.aC,unaQ6Cw8+~~V~~caafg~~~~2544~<'>.Va'hhh~W~%3.lo.4.SAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESZ.vi.'4eSystem,operatinginconjunctionwithontainmentKentilationandAir8'onditioningsystems,isesignedtomlimittheambientcontainmentairtemperatureduringnormal~operationto'lessthanthelimitspecifiedin'CO3.6.5P,"ContainmentAirTemperature."ThistemperaturelimitationensuresthatthecontainmenttemperaturedoesnotexceedtheinitialtemperatureconditionsassumedfortheDBAs.~SX.npostaccidentoerationfollowingaPoactuationsignal,the'stemfansaredesignedtostartautomatiallifnotalreadrunningrunnaspec,thefanscalyshifttoslowspeed.Thefansarowerspeedduring.accide'onstoreveyt~qr~oe~rmassaiao~shererThetemperatureoftheW.istaaa>anmporantfactorintheheatremovalcapabilityofthefanunits.sioM~/CSThewnkaAuoystemandSystemlimitthetemperatureandpressurethatcoubeexperiencedfollowinaDBA.ThelimitingDBAsconsideredarethe<GABLOCA)andthesLB/~areanalyzedusingcomputercoesesigned(continued)B3.6-65 Insert3.6.6.14TheNaOHmixtureisinjectedintotheCSflowpathviaaliquideductorduringtheinjectionphaseof.anaccident.TheeductorsaredesignedtoensurethatthepHofthespraymixtureisbetween8.3and9.1.Insert3.6.6.3signalingthestartoftherecirculationphaseoftheaccident.DuringtherecirculationphaseofLOCArecovery,RHRpumpsuctionismanuallytransferredtoContainmentSumpB(Refs.3and4).ThistransferisaccomplishedbystoppingtheRHRpumps,isolatingRHRfromtheRWSTbyclosingmotoroperatedvalve856,openingtheContainmentSumpBmotoroperatedisolationvalvestoRHR(850Aand850B)andthenstartingtheRHRpumps.TheSIandCSpumpsarethenstoppedan'dtheRWSTisolatedbyclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve896Aor896BfortheSIandCSpum'pcommonsupplyheaderandclosingmotoroperatedisolationvalve897or898for'theSIpumpsrecirculationline.TheRHRpumpsthensupplytheSIpumpsiftheRCSpressureremainsabovetheRHRpumpshutoffheadascorrelatedthroughcoreexittemperaturecontainmentpressure,andreactorvessellevelindications(Ref.5).Thishigh-headrecirculationpathisprovidedthroughRHRmotoroperatedisolationvalves857A,857B,and857C.Theseisolationvalvesareinterlockedwith896A,896B,897,and898.ThisinterlockpreventsopeningoftheRHRhigh-headrecirculationisolationvalvesunlesseither896Aor896Bareclosedandeither897or898areclosed.IFRCSpressureissuchthatRHR'providesadequateinjectionflowforcorecooling,theSIpumpsremaininpull-stopTheCSSystemisonlyusedduringtherecirculation'phaseifcontainmentpressureincreasesaboveapressureatwhichnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)fortheRHRpumpscannotbeassured.Otherwise,thecontainmentheatremovalprovidedbytheCRFCunitsandContainmentSumpB(viatheRHRsystem)isadequatetosupportcontainmentheatremovalneeds., BASEScx.v'.4APPLICABLEtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandSAFETYANALYSEStemperaturetransients.NoDBAsareassumedtooccur(continued)simultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareadwithreardtocontainmentESFsystems,assumingtetheworstcase..sinleacivefailurean42"Vi.DTheanalysisandevaluationshowthatundertheworstcasescenario,thehihesteakcontainmentressureisepeakcona)nmentemperatureis.'FexperiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeeeintenofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3.6.4g"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5JPforadetaildiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsassumea4~bRWW,andonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperating,andinitia(pre-accident)containmentconditionsof~20PFandpsig.Theanalysesalsoassumearesponsetimeeayedinitiationtoprovideconservativepeakcalculatedcontainmentpressureandtemperatureresponses.(Z.ay',,4Q<.v'io+.G~~~i.c.O'-E4'sForcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculatedcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inparticular,theeffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconserv~ivelminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thec~.'ontainmentpressures"irdancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.~pantacV~Theeffectofaninadvertente~~actuatioverenspruaion.-resu.0psigcontainmentpreewiththesuddencoolingeffe'erioroktihtdHforLCO3.6.4p.c..'hemodeledmeemiememSystemactuation+SISnthecontainmentanalsisbasedonaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmenressuresetpointtoR\'IA~~~~II4t4~*lhshan)CJ.W+~Xs~a~~jg(continued)(SretCanSsdn-8Z,tnMM4/Q.ada.&ISMlt~{'4AI~+,Ind~ji~laf~sg~tPnmeQhMryder.sss<e'apmyTdaCSaduatidh,.B3.6-66 Insert3.6.6.4TheCRFCSystemconsistsoffourfanunits(A,B,C,andD).Eachcoolingunitconsistsofamotor,fan,coolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators,highefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filters,ductdistributorsandnecessaryinstrumentationandcontrols.Themoistureseparatorsfunctiontoreducethemoisturecontentoftheairstreamtosupporttheeffectivenessofthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters.CRFC,;,,unitsAandDaresuppliedbyoneESFbuswhileCRFCunitsBandCare'~~'uppliedbyaredundantESFbus.AllfourCRFCunitsaresuppliedcoolingwaterbytheServiceWater(SW)Systemviaacommonloopheader.Insert3.6.6.5Post-AccidentCharcoalSstemThePost-AccidentCharcoalSystemconsistsoftworedundant,100%capacitytrains.Eachtrainincludesanairtightplenumcontainingtwobanksofcharcoalfiltercellsforremovalofradioiodines.Airflowenterstheplenumthroughtwoholesinthebottom(oneateachend),passesthroughthecharcoalfilterbankstothecenter,andisexhaustedfromtheplenumthoughaholeinthetop.Twonormallyclosedairoperateddampersisolateeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainfromCRFCunitsAandC(dampers5871and5872forTrainAand5874and5876forTrainB).DuringaDBA,aSIsignalopensthesedampersandclosetwobypassdampersfromtheCRFCunits(dampers5873forCRFCunitAand5875forCRFCunitC)toforceflowthroughthepost-accidentcharcoalfilters. BASES(2.>>~c.a.,ContainmentSpraynd-Co0Hng-Systems-espher-&OZ+-%4ss:a~C4~~cCern~in~'Hs-H'~~~ptas&+%4~~a++eae4h.)tainmentcooi~zmmanceorposacciencondiiiveninReference4.:Theresueanalysisisthatraincan.,oftherequirepeakcoolingcapacit'postaccidentcondition.Thetrainpoentcoolincityundervaryingcontaiambientconditions,requirerXnzgthesoshowninReence5~FCThemodeled'ystemactuation~&hecontainmentanalsisisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatewithexceedingthe+cGsetpointtoachievingfullstemairandsafetygradecoolingwaterflow.Teedip<<<<1fem>>signadelay,DGstartup(forlossofof%sitepower),andservicempstartuptimes(Ref.~.smaa4~+4'The-immit~-System,CZFCsystemsatisyriterion3oftheNRCPolicStatement.,a.~imW'r-0~~C3n~~~t~$Sis$.~&to~4'isVaiC,.4.t.4.ssAPPLICABLE,TheSystemtotalresponsetimeofSAFETYANALYSESQQseconsincludesdieselgeneratorDGstartup(for(continued)ossofositepower),continmentspraypumpstartup,andsraylinefilling~~CC'CO(pka%t'-~oCS$CRit=c-tm~s+S%$'~a.Caw~C~~~Ack&+%Jessih-asaaMp>3+'eca~~~~a3-~w+V4t~4m%.Vt.t$Cg'PQncaa+DuringaDBA,aminimumoone-eenhakamen4-cd-andonetrainarerequiredtomaintainthecontainment~eakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimitsRef~~.Additionally,oneam1~htrainorequireoremoveioinefromtecontainmentatmereandmaintainconcentrationsbelowthoseassumedinthesafetyanalysis.Toenethatthesee'mentsainsQg.KCues.sM,cmustbeOPERABLE.Therefore,intheevento~...~~~,accien,aleastonetraijocrates,assumingthetcsesinfailureoccurs.~CC'~pihs+-acctcM~o9~+C.RpcusaaSEac&incuesasprapump,sprayheaders,nozzles,vaves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEfloapae0takingsuetfromtheRWSTuponanESFactuationsignalandtransferringsuctionto~gntainment~ms.~$.t.4.ts'continued)B3.6-67

Insert3.6.6.6DuringaSLBorLOCA,a.minimumof2CRFCunitsandoneCStrainarerequiredtomaintaincontainmentpeakpressureandtemperaturebelowthedesignlimits.TheCSandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsoperatetoreducethereleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttotheoutsideenvironmentintheeventofaDBA.TheDBAsthatresultinareleaseofradioactiveiodine.withincontainmentaretheLOCAorarodejectionaccident(REA).Intheanalysisforeachoftheseaccidents,itisassumedthatadequatecontainmentleaktightnessisintactateventinitiationtolimitpotentialleakagetotheenvironment.Additionally,itisassumedthattheamountofradioactiveiodinereleasedislimitedbyreducingtheiodineconcentrationpresentinthecontainmentatmosphere.Therequirediodineremovalcapability.oftheCSandPost-AccidentCharcoalSystemsisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDBA,whichisaLCOA.Theaccidentanalyses(Ref.10)assumethateithertwotrainsofCS,oneCStrainandonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,ortwopost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsoperatetoremoveradioactiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.Insert3.6.6.15ForthesprayadditivetanktobeOPERABLE,thevolumeandconcentrationofsprayadditivesolutioninthetankmustbewithinlimitsandairoperatedvalves836Aand836BmustbeOPERABLE. BASESCavh.o.~~c.c,9Et'PCS.,C.PPc-,~i'~ha-Oral-~'~~a9~q~~~%R8'C.VwashEachincludes~~~coolingcoils,dampqrs,<@~instruments,andcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.~~~~~a.c,~.g4<h'i'tcss~~,APPLICABILITYInNODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperaturerequiringtheoperationotemns~$'btAwwt~Q~tbg+QrAs~c~~InNODES5and6,theprobabil'ityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandterneraturelimitationsoftheseNODES.Thus,theCSSysteystemarenotreuiredtobeRABLEinNODES5.and6.<<~b.~Qtbb+-6~~+~~r~aQ~t~ACTIONSA.1Cow.Vi.dh.CRFE"uuLt+SWithontraininoperable,theinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswiin2hourInthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLEspraanareadequatetoperformtheiodineremovaandcontainmentcoolingfunctions.The72hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheredundantheatremovalcapabilityaffordedbytheystem,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabilityofaDBAoc'curringduringthisperiod.CZ~~Wv~tEblis,~Ca%~4h~EbTh'-0dayportionoftheCompletionTimeforRequireActionisbase'duponengineeringjudgmentakesintoaccounlowprobabil.ityofcententryintowoConditionsinecific'oupledwiththelowrobabilityofanaccideingduringthistime.efertoSection1.ompletion"foramoredetaileddiscu'ofthepurposeofthe'eryofailureettheLCO"portionoftheCompletionTime.IftheinoperabletoOPERABLEstatuswithint~ogo~Chicrzg~rmha.dt.eland.dlnp~f'~Id.gM~C~A.orC.ri~4,fnHMdt,zoo~P~+'-fA~~~inepLv'~n.cRPe5t-Lcd.f~bs>i't.co+'~I3.6-64%.a~tptb+a+rmaempaAslPQ~~Q;6~<r~~a,or~jM~GAds4IC.~rain,canriotbe"resEorereeuiredCom1etionTime,theA.~gL9clsOga.-'s>PsoPcsakfL4,y~%0connued)'noL~ Insert3.6.6.7ForCRFCunitsAandC,flowthrougheitherthepost-accidentcharcoalfilterorthebypassisrequiredfortheunitstobeconsideredOPERABLE.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainincludesaplenumcontainingcharcoalfilterbanksandisolationdamperstoensureanOPERABLEflowpath.Insert3.6.6.8B.1Withonepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraininoperabletheinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Eachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraini,scapableofproviding50%oftheradioactiveiodineremovalrequirementsfollowingaDBA.ThelossofCRFCunitAorCalsoresultsinitsassociatedpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainbeinginoperablesincethepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrainsdonothavetheirownfanassembly.The7dayCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.ltorestoretheinoperablepost-accidentcharcoalfiltertrain,includingtheCRFCunit,isjustifiedconsideringtheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbytheCSSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringdu}ingthistimeperiod.

em%..ixBASESACTIONSd)5'no~~'~m~C1.v1.4plantmustbebroughttoa,MODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within84hours.TheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.Theextendedintervalto.reachMODE5allowsadditionaltimeforattemptingrestorationofthon-andisreasonablewhenconsier1ngthedrivingforceforareleaseofradioactivematerialfromtheReactorCoolantSystemisreducedinMODE3.'-C.1~k-~~Ctuu-eccl+'IIer0+'~Ora~~+-(UP+ciQ.harcco3~QilWt"~~inof804~ah~c,hercPIkr'WithI7a.h~.musberestoredtoOPERABLEstausw>>ncns1n1sovle10lnremovasandarecapableofro'atleashasa.~r~~~~o~e.>>,p~I~theatremovaTheompe1on1me~remova~~~~*ca~litiesaffordedbySystemandprobabilityofDQAoccurringduringthis~er1o.~PC.4+'\aIQ,+,leJ0dayportionoeompletionT1meforReuAction.as'eduponengineeringjudgm.ttakintoaccounttheobabilityof'idententryinotwoConditionsinthisSpe'1oncoupledwiththeloprobabilityofanacoccurr1'histime.RefertoSect'3foramoredetaileddisc'ofthepurposhe"fromdiscoveryoffailuretomeet104>.iaaWithtworequireainmentcoolingtrainsie,oneoftherequiredcontainmolin'ustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswith'ecomponentsinthisdegradedcon'ovideiodineremovailitiesandeofprovidingatleast100%oftheheaval~m44.~<~~+A4~tno~e.~~~:~~r~thanoh)r+u)~n74.h~'9wh~l'~gg~~'o~~~~~~I*~(continued)as~st~I1aoseraUSc~~Vkc/~~II7.l)A.'Q~~aaMgIl~B3.6-69

Insert3.6.6.10F.1MithoneortwoCRFCunitsinoperable,theinoperableCRFCunit(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.Theinoperablecomponentspreviouslyprovidedupto100%ofthecontainmentheatremovalneedsandmayhaveprovidediodineremovalcapabilityifeitherCRFCunitAorCisinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeisjustifiedbytheredundantiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbycombinationsoftheCSSystemandtheCRFCSystemandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.IfbothCRFCunitsAandCareinoperable,thenConditionCmustalsobeentered.

BASESQQ,Qg~,~l~Q.toz+A~~~cd'~~.6JV-ACTIONSD.ontinued)Q2~aIa(p2~tasea'esmsmmsmVc04-<<'u~c'~~VC~+pOg4~Red,s~needsafteranact.The72hourCoionTimewasdevelopedtakingintoacthndantheatremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbycomtiani+asoftheContainmentSpraySystemandamentCoolingtheiodineremovalf'oftheContainmentSpraySysandtheloabilityofDBAoccurringduringthisperiod..~ihve.~~Nnr4~I"'CC.s~tC,haÃrAl.sad,pg.e~Withtwo'rains<&~nycorninat>onothreeormorerRa~mr'.r=~v~minoperae,theisinaconditionoutsideteaccidentanalysis.Therefore,LCO3.'0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.fQetpMIftRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditiort'~~ofthisLCOarenotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience;toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS4'2.Va.aCoctaV~~ysvtsss~MVbtXams,WAM)SR3.6.6.IVerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforSystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesewereverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRdoes'notrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,thatosevavesousideeoontainment"Mandcapableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.(continued)B3.6-70

83.6.6P"BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS(continued)en~~~Z<~eCn~'att~+.C.g,itSR3.6.6.cRFc.Operatingeach~~~~unitfor>15minutesnsuresthatalareOPERABLEandaallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningpropery.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The31dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofthefanunitsandcontrols,theredundancyavailable,andthelowrobabilityofsigniicantdegradationofthepccurringbetweensurveillances.Ithasasobeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SR~36.6A.3+~iXVerifyingthaterequired]containmentcoolingtraicoolingflowratetoeoolingunitis>[70providesassurancethatthe'lowassumedinthesafetyanalyseswillbeachieved..TheFrequencywasdevelopedconsiderinnownreliabioftheCoolingWaterSys,etwotrainredundancyav'e,andthe~1abi1Ityot'signii'icantdegradationoo~cMngbetweensurveillances.SR3.6.6A-osVif'~>>'1dhdtheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedheadensuresthatspraypumpperformancehasnotdegradedduringthecycle.FlowanddifferentialpressurearenormaltestsofcentrifugalpumpperformancerequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref~.Sincethe~~pumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughthesprayheaders,theyaretestedonrecirculationflow.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurveandisindicativeofoveraj,lperformance.Suchinserviceconfir~ogponentOPERABILITY,trendO<performance,anddete~~ncipientfailuresbyabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyoftheSRisinaccordancewith.theInserviceTestingProgram.(continued)B3.6-71

oc.'nd-4eB3.6.6jP-BASES4+ai'lW~~%E*~.iSURVEILLANCE<t.vi,4REQUIREMENTS(continued)4e'2.vS~~iiwhm~<s.~<~ui~8-4rv~i~~=~~XLl~~c'~on~)oSR3.6.6.PandSR3.6.6'"<,,*,QCb,Scag,34cg~3'4b~~TheseSRsrequireverificatithateachautomaticconte+nmvalveactuatestoitscorrectos'andthateachpumpstartsuponreceitofactualorsimuatedactuationofacontainmentressuresinal.TheQQonthFreuencisbasedontheneetoperformtheseSurveiancesundertheconiionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwiththereactoratpower.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusually.passtheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthemonthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcudedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThesurveitainmentsumpisolalsorequiredbySR3.usohrequirements.s'llancemaybeCo'Z.w<\~~3.4~Q.\3'R3.6.6Cg.FC.an+ThisSRreuiresverification)thateach~acuatesuponreceioanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjection.signal.TheonthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmentanhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.5A~andSR3.6.6Mabove,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthemonthFrequency.9SR3.6.6..8fili<<h~ii11ddhheaderdrainedofanysolution,lowpressureairorsmokecanbeblown.throughtestconnections.ThisSRensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstructedandprovidesassurancethatspraycoverageofthecontainmentduringanaccidentisnotdegraded.Duetothepassivedesignofthenozzle,atestat10yearintervalsisconsidereaequaetodetectobstructionofthenozzles.B3.6-72(continued) Insert3.6.6.12SR3.6.6.5ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraintestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).TheVFTPincludestestingcharcoalabsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.SR3.6.6.6QQslliThisSRverifiesthattherequiredCRFCunittestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeVFTP.TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformance.SpecifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailintheVFTP.Insert3.6.6.7i~lToprovideeffectiveiodineremoval,thecontainmentspraymustbeanalkalinesolution.SincetheRWSTcontentsarenormallyacidic,thesprayadditivetankmustprovideasufficientvolumeofsprayadditivetoadjustpHforallwaterthatisinjected.ThisSRisperformedtoverifytheavailabil'ityofsufficientNaOHsolutioninthesprayadditivetank.The184dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedonthelowprobabilityofanundetectedchangeintankvolumeoccurringduringtheSRintervalsincethetankisnormallyisolated.Tanklevelisalsoindicatedandalarmedinthecontrolroom,sothattherethereishighconfidencethatasubstantialchangeinlevelwouldbedetected.Insert3.6.6.8ThisSRprovidesverificationoftheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditivetankandissufficienttoensurethatthespraysolutionbeinginjectedintocontainmentisatthecorrectpHlevel.The184dayFrequencyissufficienttoensurethattheconcentrationlevelofNaOHinthesprayadditivetankremainswithintheestablishedlimits.Thisisbasedonthelowlikelihoodofanuncontrolledchangeinconcentrationsincethe-tankisnormallyisolatedandtheprobabilitythatanysubstantialvarianceintankvolumewillbedetected. Insert3.6.6.13SR3.6.6.12ThisSRrequiresverificationevery24monthsthateachtrainsofpost-accidentcharcoalfiltersactuatesuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethoughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.9andSR3.6.6.10,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.13/~)lpThisSRprovidesverificationthateachautomaticvalveinthesprayadditivetankflowpath(836Aand836B)actuatestoitscorrectpositionuponrecieptofanactualorsimulatedactuationofacontainmentHi-Hipressuresignal.The24monthfrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgementandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethoughoperatingexperience.SeeSR3.6.6.9andSR3.6.6.10,above,forfurtherdiscussionofthebasisforthe24monthFrequency.SR3.6.6.14EToensurethatthecorrectpHlevelisestablishedintheboratedwatersolution'providedbytheCSSystem,theflowratethroughtheeductorisverifiedonceevery5years.ThisSR,inconjunctionwithSR'3.6.6.13,providesassurancethatthecorrectamountofNaOHwillbemeteredintotheflowpathuponCSinitiation.Aminimumflowof20gpmmustbeestablishedasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Duetothepassivenatureofthesprayadditiveflowcontrols,the5yearFrequencyissufficienttoidentifycomponentdegradationthatmayaffectflowrate. BASES(continued),Q.S,~~iAnilP433~A~~~.6.6AREFERENCES10~CF90,ApOerCdix;~GDC3~GOC39,~GOC40,~43~'1GD42,an44DC43.~~ieEo>>v~vvhvshv~v-vvvvv(.nn)10CFR50,AppendixK.ac3~w,m~~~~~g~<>>z~g4.'2~c.4Cs,Z..G.4A.+FSAR,Section$g.ioM%FSAR,Section~.Cc.~e"SAR,Se-i-on'"[].tFSAR,Sec>r((ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.UMw+C3~S4TS..Q(-g'tQtICx~G6'~~~a~~Ca~~camFCC-P~RG,"tvPC~Fi~4)~~~<&~terbit'-'eF'l-0.R,:CEFWN~O.etcMa~a~~~>iig<>ACi&~~~1M<~~~!\3~~~~'cC~MzR~a.4t>,m~~4>~~a.~~-mva~~KKQPh./ItWuR.eg-~Rwl.VFxxAR.sech',83.6-73~~xeJ~v ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDualB3.6.B6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.66BContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual(CreditnottakenforiodineremovalbytheContainmentSpaySystem)/BASESBACKGROUNDTheContainmentSprayandContainmentCooingsystemsrovidecontainmentatmospherecoolinglimitpostcidentpressureandtemperatureinctainmenttolesstnthedesignvalues.Reductionofcontainmentpressurerecesthereleaseoffissionprodutradioactivityfromcontinmenttotheenvironment,inheeventofaDesignBasisccident(OBA),towithin1mits.TheContainmentSprayadContainmentCoolingstemsaredesignedtomeettherequ'rementsof10CFR50,~AppendixA,GDC38,"ContainmtHeatRemoval,"GPC39,"InspectionofContainmenHeatRemovalSyems,"GDC40,"TestingofContainmenteatRemovalStems,"GDC41,"ContainmentAtmosphereClnup"GDC4,"InspectionofContainmentAtmosphereCleaupSystems,"andGOC43,"TestingofContainmentAtmoheregleanupSystems"(Ref.I),orotherdocumentsthatweapropriateatthetimeoflicensing(identifiedonau'pecificbasis).TheContainmentColiSystemandContainmentSpraySystemareEngineeredSafetyature(ESF)systems.Theyaredesignedtoenquirethatheheatremovalcapabilityrequiredduringthepop'taccidentriodcanbeattained.TheContainment/praySystematheContainmentCoolingSystemprovideregindantmethodstolimitandmaintainpostaccidentConditionstolesstnthecontainmentdesignvalues.ContainmentSraSstemTeContainmentSpraySystemconsistsftwoseparatetrainsfequalcapacity,eachcapableofmee'ngthedesignbases.Eachtrainincludesacontainmentsprayump,sprayheaders,nozzles,valves,andpiping.EachtrainpoweredfromaseparateESFbus.Therefuelingwaterstogetank(RWST)suppliesboratedwatertotheContainmentSpaySystemduringtheinjectionphaseofoperation.Inherecirculationmodeofoperation,containmentsaypump(ctinued)WOGSTSB3.6-74Rev.0,09//92// ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDu83..6B'ASESBACKGROUNContainmentSraSstem(continued)suctionistransferredfromtheRWSTtothecoainmentsump(s).heContainmentSpraySystemprovidesaspryofcoldratedwaterintotheupperregionsofcotainmenttorecethecontainmentpressureandtempatureduringaDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisimportantfactorindeerminingtheheatremovalcapabiityoftheContaientSpraySystemduringtheijectionphase.Intherecircultionmodeofoperation,heisremovedfromthecontainmesumpwaterbytheresialheatremovalcoolers.EachtrainftheContainmentSprSystemprovidesadequatespraycoveratomeetthesystedesignrequirementsforcontainmenthetremoval.TheContainmentraySystemsactuatedeither'utomaticallybyaontainmntHigh-3pressuresignalormanually.Anautomicauationopensthecontainmentspraypumpdischargeals,startsthetwocontainmentspraypumps,andbeginheinjectionphase.AmanualactuationoftheConta'nentSpraySystemrequirestheoperatortoactuatetosarateswitchesonthemaincontrolboardtobenthearnesequence.Theinjectionphasecontinuesun1anRWSlevelLow-Lowalarmisreceived.TheLo-LowlevelaarmfortheRWSTactuatesvalvestoalignecontainmentpraypumpsuctiontothecontainmentanorsumpsignalseoperatortomanuallyalignthesysmtotherecirculat'onmode.TheContainmentSpraySystemintherecirculationmemaintainsanequilibriutemperaturebetweenthecntainmentatmosphereandtherirculatedsumpwater.OperionoftheContainmtSpraySystemintherecircutionmodeiscontroledbytheoperatorinaccordanceiththeemergencyoperangprocedures.CotainmentCoolinSstemwotrainsofcontainmentcooling,eachofsufficintcapacitytosupply100%ofthedesigncoolingrequiments,areprovided.Eachtrainoftwofanunitsissuppliewithcoolingwaterfromaseparatetrainofessentialserviwater(ESW).Airisdrawnintothecoolersthroughtheananddischargedtothesteamgeneratorcompartments,(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-75Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)B3.6.6BASESBACKGROUNContainmentCoolinSstem(continued)pressurizercompartment,instrumenttunnel,andotsidethesecondaryshieldinthelowerareasofcontainmt.Duringnormaloperation,allfourfanunitseoperating.hefansarenormallyoperatedathighspec,withESWspliedtothecoolingcoils.TheContaientCoolingSysem,operatinginconjunctionwiththeontainmentVentlationandAirConditioningsystemisdesignedtolimitheambientcontainmentairtempatureduringnormalunitoprationtolessthanthelimitspecifiedinLCO3.6.,"ContainmentAirTemperaure."Thistemperaturelimitatioensuresthatthecontaimenttemperaturedoesnotexceedthe'tialtemperaturecoitionsassumedfortheDBAs.Inpostaccidenoperationfoowinganactuationsignal,theContainmentolingSystfansaredesignedtostartautomaticallyinsowspecifnotalreadyrunning.Ifrunninginhigh(noal)eed,thefansautomaticallyshifttoslowspeed.Thensreoperatedatthelowerspeedduringaccidentconditnstopreventmotoroverloadfromthehigherdensityathere.ThetemperatureoftheESWcoolingisanimporttctorintheheatremovalcapabilityofthefunitAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheContainmenSpraySystemanContainmentCoolingSystemlimittheteeratureandpressurthatcouldbeexperiencedfollowingaBA.ThelimitingOBAconsideredrelativetoContainmeintegrityarethelossocoolantaccident(LOCA)athesteamlinebreak(SLB).TheLOCAandSLBareanalyzeusingcomputer'odesdesignedopredicttheresultntcontainmentpressureandtempeaturetransients.No0sareassumedtooccursimultaneousorconcutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanazedwithregardtocontainmentESFsystems,assumingthelosofoneESFs,whichistheworstcasesingleactivefaureandesultsinonetrainofContainmentSpraySysteandContainmentCoolingSystembeinginoperable.Theanalysisandevaluationshowthat,underthewostcase'cenario,thehighestpeakcontainmentpressureisf44.1]psig(experiencedduringaLOCA).TheanalysisshowsWOGTSB3.6-76(continue)Rev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDualB3.6BBASEAPPLICABLSAFETYAHAYSES(continuethatthepeakcontainmenttemperatureis[384]'F(experiencedduringanSLB).Bothresultsmeeteintentofthedesignbasis.(SeetheBasesforLCO3..4A,"ContainmentPressure,"andLCO3.6.5Aforadaileddiscussion.)Theanalysesandevaluationsasmeaunitspecificpowerlevelof[100]l,onecontainmntspraytrainndonecontainmentcoolingtrainoperatin,andinitialre-accident)containmentconditionsof20]'Fand[l.]psig.Theanalysesalsoassumeasponsetimedeledinitiationinordertoprovideonservativepeakcalcuatedcontainmentpressureandtperatureresponses.Forcertinaspectsoftransientacdentanalyses,maximizinthecalculatedcontai'nmntpressureisnotconservati.Inparticular,theffectivenessoftheEmergencyCoCoolingSystemdingthecorerefloodphaseofaLOCAanasisincreasesw'increasingcontainmentbackpressure.rthesecalcations,thecontainmentbackpressureislculatediamannerdesignedtoconservativelymin'ze,rherthanmaximize,thecalculatedtransiencontnmentpressuresinaccordancewith10CFR50,Appenix'Ref.2).Theeffectofaninadventcontainmentsprayactuationhasbeenanalyzed.Anidvetentsprayactuationresultsina[-2.0]psigcontainntprsureandisassociatedwiththesuddencoolingeffctintheinterioroftheleaktightcontainment.AdtionaldiscsionisprovidedintheBasesforLCO3.6.4A.ThemodeledCntainmentSpraySystmactuationfromthecontainmentnalysisisbaseduponresponsetimeassociatedithexceedingthecontaientHigh-3pressuresetpointoachievingfullflowthoughthecontainmentspraynozzles.TheContainmentSpraySystemtalresponsetimeof[60secondsincludesdieselgenerator(DG)startup(forlossoffsitepower),blockloadingofeipment,continmentspraypumpstartup,andspraylsefilling(Re.3).ntainmentcoolingtrainperformanceforpostaidentconditionsisgiveninReference4.Theresultotheanalysisisthateachtraincanprovide100%oftheequiredpeakcoolingcapacityduringthepostaccidentcondi'on.Thetrainpostaccidentcoolingcapacityundervarying(continuedMOGSTSB3.6-77Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)'>83.6.6BASEAPPLICABLSAFETYANAYSES(continuecontainmentambientconditions,requiredtoperformheaccidentanalyses,isalsoshowninReference5.ThemodeledContainmentCoolingSystemactuatiofromthecontainmentanalysisisbasedonaresponsetiassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHigh-3pressursetpointtoachievingfullContainmentCoolingSystemaiandsafetyradecoolingwaterflow.TheContainmentoolingSystemttalresponsetimeof[60]secondsinclussignaldelay,DGtartup(forlossofoffsitepower),dServiceWaterpumstartuptimes(Ref.6).TheCotainmentSpraySystemandtheontainmentCoolingSystemtisfyCriterion3oftheNPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,aminimumofoneontainmentcoolingtrainandonecontainmenspraytrainarequiredtomaintainthecontainmentpeapressureantemperaturebelowthedesignlimits(Ref.?).Toensurethattheserequirementsaremet,twocontainmentspaytrasandtwocontainmentcoolinguni'tsmustbeOPERAE.herefore,intheeventofanaccident,atleastorainineachsystemoperates,assumingtheworstcasingleactivefailureoccurs.EachContainmentSpySterntypicallyincludesaspraypump,sprayheader,nozzs,valves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoesureanERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuctionfomtheRWSTuponanESFactuationsignalandautomaticaytransferrinsuctiontothecontainmentsump.EachConta'entCoolingSystemticallyincludesdemisterscoolingcoils,dampers,'nstruments,andcontrolstoensuranOPERABLEflowpath.APPLICABILITYInDESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcausareleaseofrioactivematerialtocontainmentandanincreaseinntainmentpressureandtemperaturerequirgtheoperationfthecontainmentspraytrainsandcontainmetcoolingtrains.(coinued)WOGSTS83.6-78Rev.0,09/28/92 4 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)B3.6.6BASAPPLICABITY'contind)InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencestheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperarelimitationsoftheseMODES.Thus,theContainmenSpraySystemandtheContainmentCoolingSystemarenorequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6.ACTIONSA1Ifecontainmentspraytrainis'inopeble,itmustberestoedtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7dys.Thecomponentsinthidegradedconditionarecapablofprovidingatleast100%ofheheatremovalneeds(forheconditionofonecontainmetspraytraininoperableafteranaccident.The7dayComptionTimewaschosen'nlightoftheredundantheatremovalcapabilitiesaffordbycombinationsofthe1ContainmentSaySystemandCtainmentCoolingSystemandthelowprobabiityofDBAocrringduring'thisperiod.The14dayportiooftheCmpletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lisbaseupongineeringjudgment.IttakesintoaccountthelowrobilityofcoincidententryintotwoConditionsinthi0coupledwiththelowprobability.ofanaccidentoccurriduringthistime.RefertoSection1.3,Complot'imes,foramoredetaileddiscussionofthepposefthe"fromdiscoveryoffailure!tomeettheLCO"prtion'otheCompletionTime.B.lIfoneoftrequiredcontainmencoolingtrainsisinoperableitmustberestoredtoPERABLEstatuswithin7days.ecomponentsinthisdegredconditionarecapablefprovidingatleast100%ofheheatremovalneeds;(fortConditionofonecontainmentcolingtraininopeble)afteranaccident.The7daCompletionTimewasosenbasedonthesamereasonsasgieninRequiredActonA.l.e14dayportionoftheCompletionTimeforequiredctionB.lisbaseduponengineeringjudgment.ttakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofcoincidenteryintotwoConditionsinthisSpecificationcoupledwithelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringduringthistiWOGSTB3.6-79(contied)Rev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDualB3.6.BBASEACTIONSB.1(continued}RefertoSection1.3foramoredetaileddiscusonofthepurposeofthe"fromdiscoveryof-failuretomettheLCO"portionoftheCompletionTime.Wihtwooftherequiredcontainmentsaytrainsinoerable,onemustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72hrs.Thecomponentsinthisdegradedconditionarecapabofprovidingatleast100%ftheheatremovalneedsafteraaccident.The72hourCpletionTimewaschoseninlightftheredundantheatrovalcapabilitiesafforde'dbycombinionsoftheContainntSpraySystemand/ContainmentCoolingSystem,rsonabletimeforrepairs,andlowprobabiltyofDBAoccurngduringthisperiod.D.1andD.2Ifonerequiredcoaimentspraytra'inisinoperableandoneoftherequiredntainmentcoolingtrainsisinoperable,theinoablecontainmentspraytrainortheinoperablecontainentoolingtrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusthinhours.Thecomponentsinthisdegradedcondit'arecaable'ofprovidingatleast100%oftheheatremovneedsaftanaccident.The72hourCompletionTiewaschosensedonthesamereasonsasthosegivennRequiredAetioC.l.E.lIftwrequiredcontainmentcoolingtrainsareinoperable,oneftherequiredcontainmentcoolgtrainsmustbereoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin72ours.Thecomponentsithisdegradedconditionarecapablefprovidingatleast00%oftheheatremovalneedsafterancident.The72hourCompletionTimewaschosenbasedthesamereasonsasthosegiveninRequiredActionC.l.(ctinued}MOGSTSB3.6-80Rev.0,09//92

BASESContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDualB3.6.iz..ACTIONS(continued)F.1Withanycombinationofthreeormorecontainmesprayandcontainmentcoolingtrainsinoperable,theuniisina'onditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.Thefore,CO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.G.lndG.2IfanyftheRequiredActionsorasciatedCompletionTimesfoConditionA,B,C,D,orofthisLCOarenotmet,thelantmustbebroughttoMODEinwhichthe.LCOdoesnotaly.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoaleastMODE3witn6hoursandtoMODE5within36hou.TheallowedompletionTimesarereasonable,badonoperatigexperience,toreachtherequiredplantcnditionsfomfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymanneranwithouchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.6.6B.IVerifyingthecorectalimentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvves,exclingcheckvalves,intheContainmentSpaySystemflopathprovidesassurancethattheproperflwpathexistsfContainmentSpraySystemoperation.hisSRdoesnotalyto.valvesthatarelocked,sed,orotherwisesecredinposition,since.theseweverifiedtobeintherrectpositionspriorto.beingscured.ThisSRdoesnotruiretestingorvalvemanipation.Rather,itinvolvesvrification,throughasystwalkdown,thatthosevalvesouidecontainment(onlychvalvesareinsidecontainment)acapableofpentiallybeingmispositionedareintecorrectposition.SR3.6.6B.2Operatingeach[required]containmentcoolingainfanunitfor>15minutesensuresthatalltrainsareOPBLEandallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,orexssivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.Th31dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedontheknownreliabilitof(continud)WOGSTSB3.6-81Rev.0,09/28/9W ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)B3.6.6BBASESSURVEILLANRE)UIREHENTSR3.6.6B.2(continued)thefanunitsandcontrols,thetwotrainredundanavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificandegradationofthecontainmentcoolingtrainocrringetweensurveillances.SR.6.68.3Verif'ngthateach[required]containntcoolingtrainESWcoolingflowratetoeachcoolinguniis>[700]gpmprovidesssurancethatthedesignfowrateassumedintheanalyses'llbeachieved(Ref;3).TheFrequencywasdevelopedcsideringtheknownriabilityoftheCoolingWaterSystem,thetwotrainredudancyavailable,andthelowprobabilitofasignificadegradationofflowoccurringbetwesurveillancs.SR3.6.68.4Verifyingthateachcoainmentspraypump'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpoingreaterthanorequaltotherequireddeveloped)adsuresthatspraypumpperformancehasnotdegradeddPringthcycle.Flowanddifferentialpressurearenorqe1testsocentrifugalpumpperformancerequiredbySec/~ionXIofthASHECode(Ref.8).Sincethecontainmentsp'aypumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughthesprayheders,theyaretesedonrecirculationflow.Thistestnfirmsonepointonepumpdesigncurveandisindicativofoverallperformance.SuchinserviceinspectinsconfirmcomponentOPERAILITY,trendperfornce,anddetectincipientfauresbyindicatingabnoalperformance.TheFrequencythisSRisinaccodancewiththeInserviceTestingPogram.R3.6.6B.SandSR3.6.6B.6TheseSRsrequireverificationthateachautoticcontainmentsprayvalveactuatestoitscorrectositionandthateachcontainmentspraypumpstartsuponrec'ptofanactualorsimulatedcontainmentHigh-3piessuressnal.The[18]monthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperfortheseSurveillancesundertheconditionsthatapplyduringplant(contind)WOGSTSB3.6-82Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual)B3.6.BASESSURVEILLANREQUIREMENTSR3.6.6B.5andSR3.6.6B.6(continued)outageandthepotentialfora'nunplannedtransitiftheSurveillanceswereperforme'dwiththereactorapower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecompnentsusuallyasstheSurveillanceswhenperformedatthe18]monthequency.Therefore,theFrequencywascoludedtobeaceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThesrveillanceofcontainmentsumpisoationvalvesisalsoruiredbySR3.5.2.5.Asingleurveillancemaybeusedtoatisfybothrequirements.SR3.6.6B.ThisSRensurethateach[requ'd]containmentcoolingtrainactuatesuonreceipt"ofanactualorsimulatedsafetyinjectionsignal.The[18]nthFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgmeandhabeenprovenacceptablethroughoperatingexperienceSeeR3.6.6B.5andSR3.6.6B.6,above,forfurtherdiusionofthebasisforthe.[18]monthFrequency.SR3.6.68.8Miththecontainmtsprayintvalvesclosedandthesprayheaderdrainedoanysolution,lowpressureairorsmokecanbeblownthoughtestconnec'ons.ThisSRensuresthateachspraynoleisunobstructedndthatspraycoverageofthecontainmtduringanaccidentnotdegraded.Becauseofthepass'designofthenozzle,testat[thefirstrefuelingndat]10yearintervalsisconsideredadequatetodetecobstructionofthespraynozzs.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC38,GDC39,C40,GDC4l,GDC42,andGDC43.10CFR50,AppendixA.3.FSAR,Section[15].4.FSAR,Section[6.2].(continueMOGSB3.6-83Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSprayandCoolingSystems(AtmosphericandDual}B3.6.6BBASESREFERENCES(continued)5.FSAR,Section[].6.FSAR,Section[].FSAR,Section[].8.ASME,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,ctionXI.MOGSTB3.6-84Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)B3.6.6CB6CONTAINMENTSYSTEHSB3.6.CContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDTheContainmentSpraySystemprovidescontainntatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandmperatureincontainmenttolessthanthedesignvalues.Reductionofontainmentpressureandtheiodineremovacapabilityofesprayreducethereleaseoffissionoductraioactivityfromcontainmenttotheeironment,intheeveofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)TheContainmentSpraSystemisdesignedtomeettheequirementsof10CF50,AppendixA,GDC38,"ConinmentHeatRemoval,"GDC39,"InspectionofContainmenteatRemovalSystems,"GDC40,'stingofContainmentHatRemovalSystems,"GDC41,"CtainmentAtmosphereeanup,"GDC42,"InspectionfContainmentAtmphereCleanupSystems,"andGDC43,"Test'ngofContainmeAtmosphereCleanupSystems"(Ref.I),oroerdocumentsthatwereappropriateatthetimeoflicensi(identif'onaunitspecificbasis).TheContainmentSpaySyternconsistsoftwoseparatetrainsofequalcapacity,ccapableofmeetingthesystemdesignbases'praycoverage.Eachtrainincludesacontainment'spraypump,onecontientsprayheatexchanger,sprayheaders,nozzles,vveandpiping.EachtrainispoweredfromaseparateEineereSafetyFeature(ESF)bus.Therefuelingwaterorageta(RWST)suppliesboratedwatertotheContainntSpraySyemduringtheinjectionphaseofoperation.Intherecircuationmodeofoperation,containmentraypumpsuctionistransferredfromtheRWSTtothecontinmentrecirculatiosump(s).ThediveionofaportionofthecirculationflowfromeachtrinoftheResidualHeatRemal(RHR)Systemtoaddit'alredundantsprayheaderscoletestheContainmentSpraSystemheatremovalcapability.achRHRtrainiscapleofsupplyingspraycoverage,ifequired,tosplementtheContainmentSpraySystem.heContainmentSpraySystemandRHRSystemrovideasprayofcoldorsubcooledboratedwaterintotheuerandlowerregionsofcontainmentandindeadendedvolumtolimitthecontainmentpressureandtemperatureduringDBA.TheRWSTsolutiontemperatureisanimportantfactor'n(coinued)WOGSTSB3.6-85Rev.0,09/292 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)83.6.6BASBACKGROD(contined)determiningtheheatremovalcapabilityoftheConta'nmentSpraySystemduringtheinjectionphase.Intherecirculationmodeofoperation,heatisremovedfomthecontainmentsumpwaterbytheContainmentSpraystemandRHRheatexchangers.EachtrainoftheContainntSpraySystem,supplementedbyatrainofRHRspray,,rovidesadequatespraycoveragetomeetthesystemdeignequirementsforcontainmentheatremoval.ThSprayAdditiveSysteminjectsasodiuhydroxide(NaOH)solionintothespray.TheresultingkalinepHofthespraynhancestheabilityofthespraytoscavengeiodinefissioproductsfromthecontainmenttmosphere.TheNaOHaddedinthesprayalsoensuresanaalinepHforthesolutioncirculatedinthecontaientsump.ThealkalinepHofthecntainmentsumpwaterm'mizestheevolutionofiodineandtoccurrenceofchioideandcausticstresscorrosiononchanicalsystemsndcomponentsexposedtothefluid.TheContainmentSpaySystemisactuatedeitherautomaticallybyantainmntHigh-3pressuresignalormanually.Anautomat'cauationopensthecontainmentspraypumpdischargevvs,startsthetwocontainmentspraypumps,andbeginsheinjectionphase.AmanualactuationoftheConta'tSpraySystemrequirestheoperatortoactuatetoserateswitchesonthemaincontrolboardtobenthesesequence.Theinjectionphasecontinuesun1anRWSTevelLow-Lowalarmisreceived.TheLo-LowalarmfotheRWSTactuatesvalvestoalignthecontaientspraypumpuctiontothecontainment-sumpand/orsialstheoperatormanuallyalignthesystemtotheecirculationmode.eContainmentSpraySysteminthrecirculationmodemaiainsanequilibriumtemperatureetweenthecontainmentatosphereandtherecirculatdsumpwater.OperationofeContainmentSpraySystemitherecirculationmodeiscontliedbytheoperatorinaccordancewiththeemergencyerationprocedes.TheRsprayoperationisinitiatedmanually,henrequiredbyheemergencyoperatingprocedures,aftertheEmergencyCeCoolingSystem(ECCS)isoperatinginthereirculationde.Thisadditionalspraycapacitywouldtypicabesedaftertheicebedhasbeendepletedandintheventthatcontainmentpressurerisesaboveapredeterminedimit.(continu)WOGSTS83.6-86Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenserB3.6CBASBACKGROD(contind)TheContainmentSpraySystemisanESFsystem.ItisdesignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapabiliyrequiredduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeattainedTheoperationoftheContainmentSpraySystetogetherwiththeicecondenser,isadequatetoassureprsuresuppres'sionduringtheinitialblowdownofteamandwaterromaDBA.Duringthepostblowdownper',theAirReturnStern(ARS)isautomaticallystarted.eARSreturnsuppercompartmentairthroughthedivirbarriertothelowe+compartment.Thisservestoeqlizepressuresincontai"amentandtocontinuecirculatgheatedairandsteamthroughtheicecondenser,wherehetisremovedbytheremaininice.AftertheEPICSisalignedtothrecirculationmode,theRHRsprayisalig'dtotherecircu'tionmode.TheRHRspraysareavailablesupplementteContainmentSpraySystem,ifrequired,inli'tingcontaimentpressure.TheContainmentSpr'aySysemlimitsthetemperatureandpressurethatcouldbyepectedfollowingaDBA.Protectionofcontainmentintegrslimitsleakageoffissionproductradioactivityfromcoinmenttotheenvironment.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelimitingDBAconsideredelativetocontainmentOPERABILITYarehelossofcoo)antaccident(LOCA)andthesteamlinebre(SLB).TheDBOLOCAandSLBareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtoyedicttheresultantcontainmentressureandtemperaturetransients.NotwoDBAsareasumedtooccur.simultaneogslyorconsecutively.ThepostatedDBAsareanalyzed,invqgardtocontainmentESFsysms,assumingthelossofoneE'$Fbus,whichistheworstsesingleactivefailure,resultginonetrainoftheCtainmentSpraySystem,theRHRSystm,andtheARSbeinrenderedinoperable(Ref.2).TDBAanalysesshowthatthemaximumpeakcotainmentessureof[44.1]psigresultsfromtheLOCAalysis,andiscalculatedtobelessthanthecontainmentdes'pressure.Themaximumpeakcontainmentatmosphere~.temperatureof[385]'FresultsfromtheSLBanalysis+andwascalculatedtoexceedthecontainmentdesigntemperatue[forafewseconds]duringtheDBASLB.Thebasisofthe(continue+!WOGSTSB3.6-87Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenserB3.6.CBASEAPPLICABLSAFETYANASES(continuecontainmentdesigntemperature,however,istoensetheOPERABILITYofsafetyrelatedequipmentinsidecotainment(Ref.3).Thermalanalysesshowedthatthetimeintervalduringwhichthecontainmentatmospheretemperureexceedthecontainmentdesigntemperaturewasshortoughthattheequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelothedesignemperature.Therefore,itisconcludedthtthecalculatedtansientcontainmentatmospheretemperatesareacceptablefotheDBASLB.ThemdeledContainmentSpraySystematuationfromthecontaientanalysisisbasedonarponsetimeassociatedwithexcedingthecontainmentHigh-pressuresignalsetpointachievingfullflowthughthecontainmentspraynozzs.Adelayedresponstimeinitiationprovidesconservativenalysesofpeakcculatedcontainmenttemperatureapressurerespoes.TheContainmentSpraySystemtotalreonsetimeof45]secondsiscomposedofsignaldelay,dielgeneratstartup,andsystemstartuptime.Forcertainaspectsotnsientaccidentanalyses,maximizingthecalculadcontainmentpressureisnotconservative.Inpartlar,theECCScoolingeffectiveness:duringthecorerefldpseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingconinmenbackpressure.Forthese'alculations,theontainmenbackpressureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconserva'velyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecculatedtrans>ntcontainmentpressuresinaccordancewit10CFR50,AppenixK(Ref.4).InadvertentctuationoftheContaientSpraySystemisevaluatedtheanalysis,andtherultantreductionincontainmepressureiscalculated.emaximumcalculatedreductioincontainmentpressureresuldinacontainmentexternpressureloadof[1.2]psid,whshisbelowtheconta'entdesignexternalpressureload.TheontainmentSpraySystemsatisfiesCriter'on3oftheNPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,onetrainofContainmentSpraySystemrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumeinthesafetyanalyses.Additionally,aminimumofonetrin(continuedMOGSB3.6-88Rev.0,09/28/92

ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)B3.6.6CBASELCO(continud)oftheContainmentSpraySystem,withspraypHadjusdbytheSprayAdditiveSystem,isrequiredtoscavenge'odinefissionproductsfromthecontainmentatmospheredensuretheirretentioninthecontainmentsumpwater.ensurethattheserequirementsaremet,twocontainmenspraytrainsmustbeOPERABLEwithpowerfromtwosetyrelated,independentpowersupplies.Therefore,inteeventofancident,atleastonetrainineachsysteoperates.EacContainmentSpraySystemtypically'ncludesaspraypump,headers,valves,heatenhancers,ozzles,piping,instruents,andcontrolstoensureaOPERABLEflowpathcapableftakingsuctionfromtheSTuponanESFactuationsignalandautomaticallyransferringsuctiontothecontaientsump.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3and4,aAcouldcauseareleaseofradioactivemater1tocoainmentandanincreaseincontainmentpressuandemperaturerequiringtheoperationoftheContainmentSaSystem.InMODES5and6,,thpobabilityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarereducedecauofthepressureandtemperaturelimitationsoftheMODEThus,theContainmentSpraySystemisnotreiredtobOPERABLEinMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.1Withoncontainmentspraytraininerable,theaffectedtrainstberestoredtoOPERABLEsttuswithin72hours.Thecponentsinthisdegradedconditnarecapableofprovding100/oftheheatremovalandsdineremovalneedsafranaccident.The72hourCompletio'imewasvelopedtakingintoaccounttheredundanheatremovalandodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedbythePERABLEtrainandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringdu'ngthispeliod.WOGSTSB3.6-89(continue!jIRev'.0,09/28/92

ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)B3.6.6CBASEACTIONS(continu)B.landB.2IftheaffectedcontainmentspraytraincannotbeestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletioTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustebroughttotleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5ithinhours.TheallowedCompletionTimesareeasonable,badonoperatingexperience,toreachtrequiredplantconhitionsfromfullpowerconditionsinnorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.heextendedintervgtorea'chMODE5allowsadditinaltimeandisreasonablewhenconsideringthattherivingforceforareleaseogradioactivematerialfrotheReactorCoolantSystemisfeducedinHODE3.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.6C.lVerifyingthecorretaligmentofmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalves,exudingcheckvalves,intheContainmentSpraySystprovidesassurancethatthe'roperflowpathexistsfortainmentSpraySystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotappytvalvesthatarelocked,sealed,-orotherwisesecured'osit'onsincetheywereverifiedinthecorrectpositnpriorbeingsecured.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanyestingorvavemanipulation.Rather,itinvolvesverif'tion,throughsystemwalkdown,thatthosevalvesoutsidcontainmentandpableofpotentiallybeingmisposition,areinthecorrectosition.'IfSR3.6C.2Verifingthateachcontainmentspraypu'sdevelopedheadateflowtestpointisgreaterthanorqualtothereuireddevelopedheadensuresthatsprayumpperformancesnotdegradedduringthecycle.FlowanddifferentialeadarenormaltestsofcentrifugalpumpperrmancerequiredbySectionXIoftheASHECode(Ref..Sincethecontainmentspraypumpscannotbetestedwithflthroughthesprayheaders,,theyaretestedonbypassflow.Thistestconfirmsonepointonthepumpdesigncurveanisindicativeofoverallperformance.SuchinserviceinspectionsconfirmcomponentOPERABILITY,trend(continueII9MOGSTSB3.6-90Res.0,09/28/92i ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenserB3.6.BASSURVEIANCEREQUIRENTSSR3.6.6C.2(continued)performance,anddetectincipientfailuresbyiicatingabnormalperformance.TheFrequencyofthisSisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgra.SR3.6.6C.3andSR3.6.6C.4E3TseSRsrequireverificationthatehautomaticconainmentsprayvalveactuatestoscorrectpositionandeachontainmentspraypumpstartsponreceiptofanactualorsilatedcontainmentsprayacationsignal.The[18]mohFrequencyisbasedonheneedtoperformtheseSurveil'lacesundertheconditinstha'tapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformediththereactoratpower.OperatingexpiencehasswnthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillanswhenpeormedatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therfore,tFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromaeliilitystandpoint.ThesurveillanceofntainmentsumpisolationvalvesisalsorequiredbyS3..6.3.Asinglesurveillancemaybeusedtosatisfybhreirements.SR3.6.6C.5Withthectainmentsprayinlevalvesclosedandthesprayheaderdrinedofanysolution,wpressureairorsmokecanbeownthroughtestconnectns.ThisSRensuresthateachsaynozzleisunobstructedadthatspraycoverageofthentainmentduringanaccidentinotdegraded.Becauseofepassivedesignofthenozzle,atestat[thefirstreclingandat]10yearintervalsisnsideredadequatedetectobstructionofthespraynozzle.4REFERENCESI.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC38,GDC39,GD40,GDC41,GDC42,andGDC43.2.FSAR,Section[6.2].3.10CFR50.49.(continueMOGSTSB3.6-91Rev.0,09/28/92 ee~~~ContainmentSpraySystem(IceCondenser)B3.6.6CBASREFERENS(contined)4.10CFR50,AppendixK.5.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectioXI.WOGSTSB3.6-92Rev.0,09/28/92g

gSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.63.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3..60quenchSpray(gS)System(Subatmospheric)BASESBACKGROUNDThegSSystemisdesignedtoprovidecontainntatmospherecoolingtolimitpostaccidentpressureandemperatureincontainmenttolessthanthedesignvaluesThegSSystem,operatinginconjunctionwiththeRecircationSpray(RS)system,isdesignedtocoolanddepressizethecontainmentructuretosubatmosphericpressurei,lessthan60minutesfolowingaDesignBasisAccident(DB).ReductionofcontainmentpressureandtheiodineemovalcapabilityofthespraylimitthereleaseoffisonproductradioactivityfromctainmenttotheenvironmetintheeventofaDBA..ThegSSystemconsistsoftwoparatetrainsofequalcapacity,eqchcapableofmeeingthedesignbases.Eachtraininclusaspraypump,sprayheaders,nozzles,valves,andpiping.chtrainisoweredfromaseparateEngineeredSafestFeature(ESF}bus.Therefuelingwaterstoragetank(RT)suppiesboratedwatertothegSSystem.ThegSSystemisacuedeitherautomaticallybyacontainmentHigh-Higpressuresignal'ormanually.ThegSSystemprovidesasraofcoldboratedwaterintotheupperregionsofcontaientoreducethecontainmentpressureandtemperatureringaBA.EachtrainofthegSSystemprovidesadequespraycoeragetomeetthesystemdesignrequirementsfrcontainmenheatandiodinefissionproductremoval.ThgSSystemalsorovidesflowtothecontainmentsumptoimprovethnetpositivesuctionheadavailableotheRSSystempumpTheSpryAdditiveSysteminjectssodiumhydroxide(NaOH)solutinintothespray.Theresul'ngalkalinepHofthespraenhancestheabilityofthesprtoscavengeiodinefis)onproductsfromthecontainmentmosphere.TheNaOHaedtothesprayalsoensuresanalkal'nepHforthelutionrecirculatedinthecontainmentmp.ThealkalineHofthecontainmentsumpwaterminimizesheevolutionofiodine.andminimizestheoccurrenceofchloreandcausticstresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcoonentsexposedtothefluid.l(connued)WOGSTSB3.6-93Rev.0,09/28/92 gSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.BASSBACKGRND(contied}ThegSSystemisacontainmentESFsystem.Itissignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapabilityrequirduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeattained.OperaionofthegSSystemandRSSystemprovidestherequiredatremovalcapabilitytolimitpostaccidentconditionslessthanthecontainmentdesignvaluesanddepressuriethecontainmentstructuretosubatmosphericpresurein<60minutesfollowingaDBA.egSSystemlimitsthetemperatureanpressurethatcouldbeexpectedfollowingaOBAandensurthatcontainmentlleaageismaintainedconsistentwittheaccidentanalysis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThelimiingDBAsconsideredarthelossofcoolantaccident$0CA)andthesteaminebreak(SLB).TheLOCAandSLBare/analyzedusingcputercodesdesignedtopredicttheresultantconta'entpressureandtemperaturetransients.DBAsareasumedtooccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.ThepostatedDBAsareanalyzed,withrespecttoconta'inmentFSystems,assumingthelossofoneESFbus,whichis/theerstcasesingleactivefailure,resultinginonetriofthegSSystemandtheRSSysteminoperable.Duringnormalopeation,thecontainmentinternalpressureisvariedtomataintgcapabilityto'depressurizethecontainmenttosubatmoshericpressurein<60minutesafteraOBA.hiscapabiltyandthevariationofcontainmentressurearefutionsoftheservicewatertemperature,theRWSTwatertmperature,andthecontainmentairtempe'ature.TheDBanalyses(Ref.1)showttthemaximumpeakconta'nmentpressureof[44.1]psiresultsfromtheLOCAanasisand.iscalculatedtobelethanthecontainmentdegnpressure.Themaximumpeakctainmentatmospheretperatureof[385]'FresultsfromthSLBanalysisandwasalculatedtoexceedthecontainmentdeigntemperaturefor[afewseconds]duringthetransient.Tbasisofthecontainmentdesign'temperature,however,>toensureOPERABILITYofsafetyrelatedequipmentins'decontainment(Ref.2).ThermalanalysesshowthatthetieintervalduringwhichthecontainmentatmospheretempetureexceededthecontainmentdesigntemperaturewasshortenughthattheWOG'TSB3.6-94(ntinued}IRev.0,09/28/92

gSSystem(SubatmosphericB3.6.BASAPPLICLESAFETYALYSES(contind)equipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainedbelowthedsigntemperature.Therefore,itisconcludedthatthealculatedtransientcontainmentatmospheretemperaturesaracceptablefor.theSLB.ThemodeledgSSystemactuationfromthecontinmentanalysisisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatedwithexceedingthecontainmentHigh-Highpressusignalsetpointoachievingfullflowthroughthesprayozzles.Adelayedsponsetimeinitiationprovidesconserativeanalysesofpecalculatedcontainmenttemperatureandpressureresponses.ThegSSystemtotalrespoetimeof[66]secondscomprisesthesignaldey,dieselgeneratorstartuptime,andsystemstartuptie.Forcertainaspectsofaccidentaalyses,maximizingthecalculated~qontainmentpressuresnotconservative.Inparticular,4hecoolingeffect'nessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorrefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincre4eswithincrasingcontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculations,thcontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinam'apnerdegnedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximi2,thcalculatedtransientcontainmentpressuresinaccordaceith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.3).InadvertentactuatiothegSSystemisevaluatedintheanalysis,andtherultntreductionincontainmentpressureiscalculed.emaximumcalculatedreductionincontainmentpressreresuldinacontainmentexternalpressureloadof[unitspecif>icpressure],whichisbelowthecontainmendesignexternalpressureload.ThegSSystesatisfiesCriterio3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,onetrainofthegSSysteisrequiredtoprovietheheatremovalcapabilityassuedinthesafetyanalsesforcontainment.Inaddition,ogSSystemtrain,wispraypHadjustedbytheSprayAdditivSystem,isrquiredtoscavengeiodinefissionproducts~romtheontainmentatmosphereandensuretheirretenoninthecontainmentsump'ater.Toensurethattheserquirementsaremet,twogSSystemtrainsmustbeOPERABLEwhpowerfromtwosafetyrelated,independentpowersupplie.(con'nued)WOGSTSB3.6-95Rev.0,09/28/92 gSSystem(Subatmospheric)63.6.BASESLCOThereFore,intheeventofan-accident,atleastotrain(continu)ineachsystemwilloperate,assumingthatthewostcasesingleactivefailureoccurs.EachgSSystemincludesaspraypump,sprayhaders,nozzles,valves,piping,instruments,andcotroistoensureanOPERABLEflowpathcapableoftakingsuionfromtheWST.CBAPPLICABILITYInHESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcoulcauseareleaseofradioativematerialtocontainmenandanincreaseincontainentpressureandtemperaterequiringtheoperationofthe9System.InMODES5nd6,theprobabityandconsequencesoftheseeventsarerducedduetothpressureandtemperaturelimitationsotheseHODESThus,thegSSystemisnotrequiredtobePERABLEiMODE5or6.ACTIONSA.IIfonegStrainiinoerable,itmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusithinhours.Thecomponentsinthisdegradedcondionarecableofproviding100%oftheheatremovalandidineremovaneedsafteranaccident.The72hourCometionTimewasdevelopedtakingintoaccounttheredundtheatremovaladiodineremovalcapabilitiesaffordedtheOPERABLEtraiandthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccringduringthisperiB.lndB.2ItheRequiredActionandassociateCompletionTimeareotmet,theplantmustbebroughttoMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethissttus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hrsandtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletion'mesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,oreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercoditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantstems.MOGSTSB3.6-96(ctinued)IRev.0,09/28/92

QSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.61BAS(continued)SURVELANCEREQUIRENTSSR3.6.60.1Verifyingthecorrectalignmentofmanual,poweoperated,andautomaticvalves,excludingcheckvalves,ntheQSSystemprovidesassurancethattheproperflpathexistsforQSSystemoperation.ThisSRdoesnotplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecedinposition,sincetheywereverifiedtobeinthecoectpositionpriortobeingsecured.ThisSRdoes.notreireanytestingorvalvemanipulation.Rather,itinvolsverification,roughasystemwalkdown,thatthosvalvesoutsidectainmentandcapableofpotentilybeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.SR3.60.2VerifyingthateachQSpum'sdevelopedheadattheflowtestpointisgreaterthorequaltotherequireddevelopedhdensuresatQSpumpperformancehasnotdegradeddurithecye.FlowanddifferentialheadarenormaltestsocentfugalpumpperformancerequiredbySectionXIoftECode(Ref.4).Since'theQSSystempumpscannotbetedwithflowthroughthesprayheaders,theyaretestednbypassflow.Thistestconfirmsone'ointontheppdigncurveandisindicativeofoverallperformance.uchiervicetestsconfirmcomponentOPERABILITY,trendpeormance,anddetectincipientfailuresbindicatingbnormalperformance.TheFrequencyofthisSisinaccordaewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR.6.60.3andSR3.6.60.4eseSRsensurethateachQSaomaticvalveactuatestoitscorrectpositionandeachQSumpstartsuponreceiptofanactualorsimulatedcontainmentprayactuationsignal.The[18]monthFrequencyisbasedotheneedtoperformthese.SurveillancesundertheconditinsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforannplannedtransientiftheSurveillanceswereperformedwithtreactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthescomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillanceswhenperformedata[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywascoeludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-97Rev.0,09/28/92

gSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.BASSURVEILNCEREQUIREMTS(contind)SR3.6.6D.SWiththecontainmentsprayinletvalvesclosedadthesprayheaderdrainedofanysolution,lowpressurea'rsmokecanbeblownthroughtestconnections.'hisensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstructedandthatsraycoverageofthecontainmentduringanaccidentisnotgraded.Duetothepassivenatureofthedesignofthenzle,atestat[thefirstrefuelingandat]10yearintvalsisconsidereddequatetodetectobstructionofthenzzles.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section[6.2].2.1CFR50.49.3.10R50,AppendixK.4.ASME,oilerandPreureVesselCode,SectionXI.WOGSTS83.6-98tRev.0,09/28/92/

RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.6EB.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3..6ERecirculationSpray(RS)System(Subatmospheric)BASESBACKGROUNDTheRSSystem,operatinginconjunctionwithequenchSpray(gS)System,isdesignedtolimitthestaccidentpressureandtemperatureinthecontainmenttolessthanthedesignvaluesandtodepressurizetheconinmentstructureoasubatmosphericpressureinlesstha60minutesllowingaDesignBasisAccident(DBA.Thereductionofcotainmentpressureandtheremovalfiodinefromthe.conyinmentatmospherebythesprayimitthereleaseoffissi'productradioactivity.fromcontainmenttotheenviromentintheeventofaDB.TheRSSternconsistsoftwoeparatetrainsofequalcapacity,achcapableofmeingthedesignandaccidentanalysisbas.Eachtrainincludes'oneRSsubsystemoutsideconthjnmentandoRSsubsysteminsidecontainment.Eachsubsysteconsistsfone50%capacityspraypump,onespraycooler,oe180'veragesprayheader,nozzles,valves,piping,strentation,andcontrols.EachoutsideRSsubsystemalsoudesacasingcoolingpumpwithitsownvalves,pipinginstrumentation,andcontrols.ThetwooutsideRSsubsysem'praypumpsarelocatedoutsidecontainmentandhetqinsideRSsubsystems'praypumpsarelocatedinidecontginment.EachRStrain(oneinsideandoneoutseRSsubsytern)ispoweredfromaseparateEngineeredafetyFeature(ESF)bus.EachtrainoftheRSSystempridesadequatespaycoveragetomeetthesystemdesignrquirementsforcontinmentheatandiodinefissionproducremoval.ThewocasingcoolingpumpsandommoncasingcoolingtankardesignedtoincreasethenetsitivesuctionheadPSH)availabletotheoutsideRSumpsbyinjectingcoldaterintothesuctionofthespraymps.Thecasingcoolingwatertankcontains116,500gofchilledandboratedwater.Eachcasingcoolingpusuppliesoneoutsidespraypumpwithcoldboratedwatrfromthecasingcoolingwatertank.ThecasingcoolingppsareconsideredpartoftheoutsideRSsubsystems.EachcaingcoolingpumpispoweredfromaseparateESFbus.WOGSTSB3.6-99(ntinued)Rev.0,09/28/92

RSSystem(Subatmospheric)83.6./BASBACKGRND(contiued)TheRSprovidesasprayofsubcooledwaterintotupperregionsofcontainmenttoreducethecontainmentressureandtemperatureduringaDBA.Upon'eceiptofHigh-Highcontainmentpressuresignal,thetwocasingclingpumpsstartandtheRSpumpsuctionanddischargealvesreceiveanopensignaltoassurethevalvesareop.Aftera[195]secondtimedelay,theinsideRSpupsstart,andaftera[210]secondtimedelay,theouideRSpumpsstart.heRSpumpstakesuctionfromtheconinmentsumpanddchargethroughtheirrespectivespaycoolerstothespyheaders-andintothecontainmtatmosphere.Heatistranferredfromthecontainmentsmpwatertoservicewaterinthspraycoolers.TheSpraAdditiveSysteminjtsasodium.hydroxide(NaOH)solutionntothesuctionofhegSSystempumps.TheNaOHaddedtothgSSystemsprensuresanalkalinepHforthesolutionrecculatedinecontainmentsump.TheresultingalkainepHoftheRSspray(pumpedfromthesump)enhancestheablityothespraytoscavengeiodinefissionproductsfromthcovgainmentatmosphere.ThealkalinepHofthecontainmentmpwaterminimizestheevolutionofiodineandminimiztheoccurrenceofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosionnchanicalsystemsandcomponentsexposedtotheuid.TheRSisaontainmentFsystem.Itisdesignedtoensurethatheheatremovcapabilityrequiredduringthepostaccientperiodcanbettained.OperationofthegSandRSstemsprovidestheruiredheatremovalcapabilitytolim'ostaccidentconditistolessthanthecontnmentdesignvaluesandderessurizethecontainmentstrturetosubatmosphericpressein(60minutesflowingaDBA.heRSlimitsthetemperatureandpreurethatcouldbeexpectedfollowingaDBAandensuresthtcontainmentleakageismaintainedconsistentwiththaccidentanalysis.APPLICABSAFETYNALYSESThelimitingDBAsconsideredarethelossofolantaccident(LOCA)andthesteamlinebreak(SLB).TheLOCAandSLBareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesigntopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandterneraturetransients;DBAsareassumednottooccursimultaneslyor(contied)WOGSTS83.6-100Rev.0,09/28/92 RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.6EAPPLICLESAFETYALYSES(contind)consecutively.ThepostulatedDBAsareanalyzedassuingthelossofoneESFbus,whichistheworstcasesileactivefailure,resultinginonetrainofthegSadRSsystemsbeingrenderedinoperable(Ref.1).ThepeakcontainmentpressurefollowingahighenergylinebreakisaffectedbytheinitialtotalpresseandtemperatureofthecontainmentatmosphereadthegSSystemperation.Maximizingtheinitialcontaienttotalpessureandaverageatmospherictemperaremaximizesthecaulatedpeakpressure.TheheatrevaleffectivenessoftheSSystemsprayisdependentonttemperatureofthewaterintherefuelingwaterstorageank(RWST).Thetimerequi}todepressurizetheconta'entandthecapabilitytomaintinitdepressurizedbeloatmosphericpressuredependonthefunctionalperfornceofthegSandRSsystemsantheservicewatermperature.WhentheServiceWatertempertureiselevateditismoredifficulttodepressurizeecontainmenwithin60minutessincetheheatremovaleectivenessoftheRSSystemislimited.Duringnormalopetionthecontainmentinternalpressureisvariedtomainta'necapabilitytodepressurizethecontainmenttoasubmosphericpressurein<60minutesafteraDBA.Thisapbilityandthevariationofcontainmentpressearfunctionsofservicewatertemperature,RWSwatermperature,andthecontainmentairtemperature.TheDBAanalsesshowthattmaximumpeakcontainmentpressureo[44.1]psigresultfromtheLOCAanalysisandiscalcultedtobelessthantcontainmentdesignpressur.Themaximum[385]'FpkcontainmentatmospheretemperureresultsfromtheSLBaalysisandiscalculatedtoeeedthecontainmentdesignteeraturefor[afewsecds]duringthetransient.Thesisofthecontainmentdigntemperature,however,istoensreOPERABILITYoffetyrelatedequipmentinsidecontainnt(Ref.2).hermalanalysesshowthatthetimeintealduringwhichthecontainmentatmospheretemperatureexcdsthecontainmentdesigntemperatureisshortenohthatequipmentsurfacetemperaturesremainbelowtedesigntemperature.Therefore,itisconcludedthatecalculatedtransientcontainmentatmospheretemperaturesaacceptablefortheSLB.(contued)WOGSTSB3.6-101Rev.0,09/28/92 RSSystem(SubatmosphericB3.6.BASAPPLICAETheRSSystemactuationmodelfromthecontainmenanalysisSAFETYALYSESisbaseduponaresponsetimeassociatedwithexcedingth'(continud)High-Highcontainmentpressuresignalsetpointo'achievingfull.flowthroughtheRSSystemspraynozzlesAdelayinresponsetimeinitiationprovidesconservatieanalysesofpeakcalculatedcontainmenttemperatureanpressure.TheRSSystem'stotalresponsetimeof300sendscomprisestheignaldelay,dieselgeneratorstartupme,andsystemartuptime.Forertainaspectsofaccidentanases,maximizingthecalcuatedcontainmentpressureisotconservative.Inparticar,thecoolingeffectivessoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingstemduringthecorefloodphaseofaLOCAanalysiscreaseswithincreaingcontainmentbackpressure.Fortheselculations,thentainmentbackpressureiscalculatediamannerdesiedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmimize,thealculatedtransientcontainmentpressuresinacordanceth10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.3).TheRSSystemsat>fiCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCODuringaDBA,etrain(o-subsystems)oftheRSSystemisrequiredtopovidethemimumheatremovalcapabilityassumedinesafetyanalys's.Toensurethatthisrequiremenismet,fourRSssystems[andacasingcoolingtank]musbeOPERABLE.This'llensurethatatleastonetrainw'operateassumingtherstcasesinglefailureoccurswhichisintheESFpowerupply.APPLICABILITYMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcaeanincreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperaturereq'ringtheoperationoftheRSSystem.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequcesoftheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandternraturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Thus,theRSSystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODE5or6.MOGSTSB3.6-102(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92/ RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.BAS(continued)ACTIONSA.lMithoneoftheRSsubsystemsinoperable,theinoerablesubsystemmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswihin7days.Thecomponentsinthisdegradedconditionarepableofprovidingatleast100%oftheheatremovalnds(i.e.,150%whenoneRSsubsystemisinoperable)aferanaccident.e7dayCompletionTimewasdevelopedtangintoaccounttredundantheatremovalcapabilitiesafordedbycorninationsoftheRSandgSsystemsanthelowprobilityofaDBAoccurringduringtisperiod:B.1WithtwooferequiredRSsubsyemsinoperableinthesametrain,aleastoneofthe.'noperableRSsubsystemsmustberestoretoOPERABLEstuswithin72hours.Thecomponentsinthidegradedcditionarecapableofproviding100%ofeheatrovalneedsafteranaccident.The72hourCompletinTimeasdevelopedtakingintoaccounttheredundanteatremovalcapabilityaffordedbytheOPERABLEsubsystemreasonableamountoftimeforrepairs,andthelowprbilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.C.1Withtwoinsidesubsystemsinorable,atleastoneoftheinoperableubsystemsmustbestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.Thecomponetsinthisdegradedconditionarcapableofproviding10oftheheatremovalneedsafteranaccident.The72hourpletionTimewaschosenbasdonthesamereasonsasgiveinRequiredActionB.*D.1WitwooutsideRSsubsystemsinoperable,atleaoneofteinoperablesubsystemsmustberestoredtoOPERALEtatuswithin72hours.Thecomponentsinthisdegredconditionarecapableofproviding100%oftheheatreovalneedsafteranaccident.The72hourCompletionTimew(continued)MOGSTSB3.6-103Rev.0,09/28/92~

r/BASACTIONSD.l(continued)RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.6EchosenbasedonthesamereasonsasgiveninRequ'dActionB.l.E.lCB'ththecasingcoolingtankinoperable,eNPSHavailabletotheoutsideRSsubsystempumpsmaynobesufficient.The'noperablecasingcoolingtankmusberestoredtoOPELEstatuswithin72hours.Theomponentsinthisdegradconditionarecapableofprviding100%oftheheatremovaleedsafteranaccident.e72hourCompletionTimewasosenbasedonthesameeasonsasgiveninRequiredAionB.I.F.landF.2IftheinoperableSsubsstem(s)orthecasingcoolingtankcannotberestoredOPRABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,thentmustbebroughtto'MODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnoapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebrougtatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within8hoursTheallowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasole,basonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3freefullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantystems.TheextendedintervaltorachHODE5allowadditionaltimeandisreasonablensideringthatthedrivingforceforareleaseofradioaive.materialfromtheactorCoolantSystemisreduced'ODE3.G.1W'threeormoreRSsubsystemsinoperablconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalysis.CO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.theunitisinherefore,WOGSTS83.6-104(continueRev.0,09/28/92i RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.6EBAS(continued)O"SURVEIANCERE(UIRENTSSR3.6.6E.1VerifyingthatthecasingcoolingtanksolutiontperatureiswithinthespecifiedtolerancesprovidesassuncethatthewaterinjectedintothesuctionoftheoutsdeRSpumpswillincreasetheNPSHavailableasperdesig.The24hourFrequencyofthisSRwasdevelopedconsiderioperatingexperiencerelatedtotheparametervariatinsandnstrumentdriftduringtheapplicableMOS.Furthermore,t24hourFrequencyisconsideredadeqteinviewofotrindicationsavailableinthecontolroom,includingalar,toalerttheoperatortoanaormalcondition.SR3.6.6E.2VerifyingtcasingcoolingtkcontainedboratedwatervolumeprovisassurancethasufficientwaterisavailabletosupporttheutsideRSsusystempumpsduringthetimetheyarerequirtoopera.The7dayFrequencyofthisSRwasdeveloped.onsidergoperat'ingexperiencerelatedtotheparametervarigionsandinstrumentdriftduringtheapplicableNODES.giermore,the7dayFrequencyisconsideredadequateiviewofotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,inludingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormalcontion.SR3.6.6E.3VerifyingtgboronconcentratiofthesolutioninthecasingcoogilngtankprovidesassancethatboratedwateraddedfrogsthecasingcoolingtanktoRSsubsystemswillnotdilutehesolutionbeingrecirculadinthecontainmentsump.he7dayFrequencyofthisSwasdevelopedconsieringtheknownstabilityofstodboratedwaterandtheowprobabilityofanysourceofditingpurewater.R3.6.6E.4Verifyingthecorrectalignmentofmanual,poweoperated,andautomaticvalves,excludingcheckvalves,inheRSSystemandcasingcoolingtankprovidesassurancehattheproperflowpathexistsforoperationoftheRSSysm.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,seed,or(contined)MOGSTSB3.6-105Rev.0,09/28/92,~ ~~BASRSSystem(Subatmospheric)~.B3.6.6EiSURVEILNCEREgUIREklTSotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareveriedasbeinginthecorrectpositionpriortobeingsered.ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipation.Rather,itinvolvesverification,throughasstemwalkdown,'thatthosevalvesoutsidecontainmentandcableofpotentiallybeingmispositionedareintheorrectposition.SR3.6.6E.SVerifyingthateachRS[andcasingoling]pump'sdevelopedheadat,theflowtestpointis.greerthanorequaltotherequireddevelopedheadensuresatthesepumps'performan'hasnotdegradeddungthecycle.Flowanddifferenti1headarenormaltstsofcentrifugalpumpperformanceequiredbySectnXIoftheASMECode(Ref.4).S>cethegSSysempumpscannotbetestedwithflowthroughtesprayheers,theyaretestedonbypassflow.Thistesconfirmonepointonthepumpdesigncurveandisindicativofovrailperformance.SuchinservicetestsconfirmcompneOPERABILITY,trendperformance,anddetectincipientfaresbyindicatingabnormalperformance.TheFuencyofthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTesngrogram.SR3.6.6E.6TheseSRssurethateachaomaticvalveactuatesandthattheRSSyternandcasingcoolsgpumpsstartuponreceiptofanactuorsimulatedHigh-HigcontainmentpressuresignalStartdelaytimesareaoverifiedfortheRSSystpumps.The[18]monthFreencyisbasedontheneedtorformthisSurveillanceunderheconditionsthatapplyduingaplantoutageandthepotent1foranunplannedansientiftheSurveillancewerepeormedwiththeeactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancehenperformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,therequencywas,consideredtobeacceptablefromareliabitystandpoint.//(ctinued)MOGSTSB3.6-106Rev.0,09/28/92 RSSystem(Subatmospheric)B3.6.6EBASSURVEILLNCEREQUIREHTS(continud)SR3.6.6E.7ThisSRensuresthateachspraynozzleisunobstruedandthatspraycoverageofthecontainmentwillmeet'designbasesobjective.Anairorsmoketestisperforedthrougheachsprayheader.Duetothepassivedesignthesprayheaderanditsnormallydrystate,atestathefirstrefuelingandat]10yearintervalsisconsieredadequateordetectingobstructionofthenozzles.REFERENCES1.SAR,Section[6.2].2.IKCFR50.49.3.10C50,AppendixK.4.ASHE,ilerandPressureesselCode,SectionXI.WOGSTSB3.6-107Rev.0,9/28/92 SprayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDua83..7B3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.7SprayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondnser,dDual)BASESBACKGROUNDheSprayAdditiveSystemisasubsystemoftheContainmentraySystemthatassistsinreducingthepodinefissionpructinventoryinthecontainmentatmsphereresultingfroaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Radioiineinitsvariousformsis'efissionproductofprimaryoncernintheevaluationofaDBA.Itisabsorbedbythespayfromthecontainmentamosphere.Toenhancetheiodinebsorptioncapacityofhespray,thespraysolutionisdjustedtoanalkalinepHthatpromotesiodinehydrolysis,iwhichiodineisconvertedtononvolatileforms.Becausofitsstabilitywhenexposedtoradiationandelevatedternerature,so@urnhydroxide(NaOH)isthepreferredsprayaitive.feeNaOHaddedtothesprayalsoensuresapHvaluefbetween8.5and11.0ofthesolutionrecirculatedfromthconainmentsump.ThispHbandminimizestheevolutifiodineaswellastheoccurrenceofchlorideandcaustistresscorrosiononmechanicalsystemsandcomponent.EductorFeedSstemsOnlTheSprayAdditiveSystemcons>tsofonesprayadditivetankthatissParedbythetwotainsofsprayadditiveequipment.Pchtrainofequipmeprovidesaflowpathfromthespyadditivetanktoantainmentspraypumpandconsistsoaneductorforeachcontinmentspraypump,valves,istrumentation,andconnectipiping.EacheductorgfrawstheNaOHspraysolutionomthecommontankusingad'portionoftheboratedwaterdisargedbythecontainmentspraypumpasthemotiveflow.Theeductormixes'heNaOHsolutionandtheboratedwatranddischargesthe/mixtureintothespraypumpsuctionline.TheeductorsardesignedtoensurethatthepHofthesprmixtureistween8.5and11.0.s(contined)WOGSTSB3.6-108Rev.0,09/28/92 5~~~~<rayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)B3.6.7BASESBACKGROUND(continuedGravitFeedSstemsOnlTheSprayAdditiveSystemconsistsofonesprayadtivetank,twoparallelredundantmotoroperatedvalveinthelinebetweentheadditivetankandtherefuelinwatertoragetank(RWST),instrumentation,andreciulationpmps.TheNaOHsolutionisaddedtothesprwaterbyabaancedgravityfeedfromtheadditivetanthroughtheconnqctingpipingintoaweirwithintheRT.There,itmixe%,withtheboratedwaterflowingtotspraypumpsuction,.Becauseofthehydrostaticbalncebetweenthetwotanks,%heflowrateoftheNaOHiscorolledbythevolumeperfoot~qfheightratioofthetwotks.ThisensuresaspraymixtMrepHthatis>8.5and<1.0.TheContainmtSpraySystemactuion.signalopensthevalvesfromthsprayadditivetktothespraypumpsuctionsorthecontainmentsprypumpstartsignalopensthevalvesfromesprayadd'vetankaftera5minutedelay.The28%to31%NaOHolutionisdrawnintothespraypumpsuctions.ThesprayditivetankcapacityprovidesfortheadditionofOHlutiontoallofthewatersprayedfromtheRWSTjncontainment.Thepercentsolutionandvolumeofolutionsprayedintocontainmentensuresalong'ermctinmentsumppHof>9.0andg9.5.Thisensurestheconnueiodineretentioneffectivenessofthesumpwaterdurigthercirculationphaseofsprayoperationandalsminimizestheoccurrenceofchloride~inducedstresscrosioncracingofthestainlesssteelrecirculationp'ping.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheSpraydditiveSystemisessenti1totheremovalofairborneodinewithincontainmentfolowingaDBA.Foliongtheassumedreleaseofradioacivematerialsintocontnment,thecontainmentisassumedtleakatitsdes'gnvaluevolumefollowingtheaccident.Theanalysisaumesthat100%ofcontainmentiscoveredthesprayef.1).TheDBAresponsetimeassumedfortheSprayAddiiveSystemisthesameasfortheContainmentSpraySystemadisdiscussedintheBasesforLCO3.6.6,"ContainmentprayandCoolingSystems."(contied)WOGSTSB3.6-109jRes.0,09/28/92

rayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual83.6BASESAPPLICABLETheDBAanalysesassumethatonetrainoftheContinmentSAFETYANALYSSpraySystem/SprayAdditiveSystemisinoperablendthat(continued)theentiresprayadditivetankvolumeisaddedthe.remainingContainmentSpraySystemflowpath.heSprayAdditiveSystemsatisfiesCriteri3oftheNRClicyStatement.LCOTheSpayAdditiveSystemisnecessartoreducethereleaseofradictivematerialtotheenvionmentintheeventofaDBA.ToeconsideredOPERABLE,evolumeandconcentrat'onofthesprayaddit'solutionmustbesufficientprovideNaOHinjeionintothesprayflowuntiltheCoainmentSpraySyternsuctionpathisswitchedfromtheRWSTothecontainntsump,andtoraisetheaveragesprayslutionpHtalevelconducivetoiodineremoval,'amely,obetween[7.2and11.0].ThispHrangemaximizestheefftivensoftheiodineremovalmechanismwithoutintroducingconitionsthatmayinducecausticstresscorrosioncrangofmechanicalsystemcomponents.Inaddition,itisentialthatvalvesintheSprayAdditiveSystemflopahsareproperlypositionedandthatautomaticvalvesecapleofactivatingtotheircorrectpositions-.APPLICABILITYInNODESI2,3,and4,aDBAouldcauseareleaseofradioactiematerialtocontainmtrequiringtheoperationoftherayAdditiveSystem.ThSprayAdditiveSystemassistinreducingtheiodinefis'onproductinventorypriororeleasetotheenvironment.InODES5and6,theprobabilityandnsequencesoftheseeentsarereducedduetothepressureadtemperatureimitationsintheseNODES.Thus,theSpyAdditiveSystemisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODE5o6.ACTIONSA.1IftheSprayAdditiveSystemisinoperable,itmusberestoredtoOPERABLEwithin72hours.ThepHadjusentof(contied)WOGSTSB3.6-110Rev.0,09/28/92 SprayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualB3.6BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)theContainmentSpraySystemflowforcorrosionrotectionandiodineremovalenhancementisreducedintscondition.TheContainmentSpraySystemwouldstillbeailableandouldremovesomeiodinefromthecontainmenatmosphereinteeventofaDBA.The72hourCompletionimetakesintoacunttheredundantflowpathcapabilitisandthelowprobilityoftheworstcaseDBAoccurr'duringthisperio.B.landB2IftheSpraAdditiveSystemcanntberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompltionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoMODEinwhicheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstaus,theplanmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hrsandtoODE5within84hours.TheallowedCompletionimeofhoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperiencetorachMODE3fromfull'powerconditionsinanordelyarmerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheexndedintervaltoreachMODE5allows48hoursforrestoratinoftheSprayAdditiveSysteminMODE3and36hoursrehMODE5.ThisisreasonablewhenconsideringthreducpressureandtemperatureconditionsinMODE3forthereleaseofradioactive'materialfromtheReactoroolantSystSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.7.1VerifyinghecorrectalignmentofSpyAdditiveSystemmanual,oweroperated,andautomaticivesinthesprayadditiflowpathprovidesassurancethtthesystemisableprovideadditivetotheContainmeSpraySystemintheventofaDBA.ThisSRdoesnotappltovalvesthatarlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinosition,sincetsevalveswereverifiedtobeinthecorrepositioniortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Thisdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation..Rath,itinvolvesverification,throughasystemwalkdown,hatthosevalvesoutsidecontainmentandcapableofpotentialbeing.mispositionedareinthecorrectposition.WOGSTSB3.6-111(continoeii)Rev.0,09/28/92j prayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andQua)B3..7BASESSURVEILLANREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.7.2Toprovideeffectiveiodineremoval,theconta'entspraymustbeanalkalinesolution.SincetheRWSTontentsarenormallyacidic,thevolumeofthesprayaddtivetankmustrovideasufficientvolumeofsprayaddit'toadjustpHrallwaterinjected.ThisSRisperfoedtoverifytheavilabilityofsufficientNaOHsolutionintheSprayAddiveSystem.The184dayFrequencywasdevelopedbasedontlowprobabilityofanundetectchangeintankvolumeoccurringduringtheSRinteral(thetankisisolateduringnormalunitoperatins).Tanklevelisalsoindicateandalarmedinthecont1room,sothatthereishighconfiencethatasubstantichangeinlevelwouldbedetected.SR3.6.7.3ThisSRprovidesvrificionoftheNaOHconcentrationinthesprayadditiveanandissufficienttoensurethatthespraysolutionbeing'ectedintocontainmentisatthecorrectpH.level.T184dayFrequencyissufficienttoensurethattheconenttionlevelofNaOHinthesprayadditivetankremnswiintheestablishedlimits.Thisisbasedonthewlikel>oodofan'ncontrolledchangeinconcentrationetankisrmallyisolated)andtheprobabilityttanysubstanalvarianceintankvolumewillbedeteed.SR3.6..4ThisprovidesverificationthatehautomaticvalveintherayAdditiveSystemflowpathaoatestoitscorrectpos'tion.The[18]monthFrequencyisasedontheneedtopformthisSurveillanceunderthecondtionsthatapplyringaplantoutageandthepotentialfanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformewiththereactoratpower.Operatingexperiencehasownthatthese-componentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenerformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,theFreqncywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystdpoint.OGSTSB3.6-112(continued)pRev.0,09/28/92 ~~I0~4prayAdditiveSystem(Atmospheric,Subatmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)83.6.BASESSURVEILLANREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.6.7.5ToensurethatthecorrectpHlevelisestablishintheboratedwatersolutionprovidedbytheContainmtSpraySystem,theflowrateintheSprayAdditiveSyternisverifiedonceevery5years.ThisSRprovidassuranceatthecorrectamountofNaOHwillbemetedintotheflwpathuponContainmentSpraySystemin'ation.Duetotheassivenatureofthesprayadditivelowcontrols,the5yeFrequencyissufficienttoident'componentdegrationthatmayaffectflowrate.REFERENCES1.FSAR,hapter[15].WOGSTSB3.6-113Rev.0,09/28/92

~~@C3HydrogenRecombinersB3.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB.4IItilA~BASESBACKGROUNDThefunctionofthehydrogenrecombinersistoeliminatethepotentialbreachofcontainmentduetoahydrogenoxygenreaction.~n~3.I.7.\C'(.vi.a,P~~+~~Q~~K~a~Mri~g~C.~a~u~~em~4.o<MMiii-Pu~4%.va,a,Per10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlStemsinLiht-Water-CooledReactors"(Ref.1hydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtoreducethehydrogenconcentrationinthecontainmentfollowingalossofcoolant.accidentLOCAorsteamlinebreakSLB).Therecombinersaccomistisb+popeappall?crt'nsYllmeatvehydrogenrecominersaremanuallyinitiatedsinceflammablelimitswouldnotbereacheduntilseveraldaysafteraDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Two100%capacityindependenthydrogenrecombinersy'stemsareed.Eachconsisofcontrolslocatedinthen~nhi~apowersu1andare'rBv.ih.~gnisaccompisebyheatinalmixtureabove1watervaporanddischarge00edsinglerecombineriscapableofmaintainingthehydrogenconcentrationincontainmentbelowthe4.1v/oPflammabilitylimit.worecombinersareprovidedtomeettherequirementforredundancyandindeendence.acrecorenb~ds~~I~~~proaseparaepow1~2aovol%~f~~Cv/obAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESIIIICa'4.v>,4IThehydrogenrecombinersprovideforthecapabilityofcontrollingthebulkhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttoless-thanthelowerflammableconcentrationof4.1v/ofollowingaDBA.Thiscontrolpreverfscontainmentwidehydrogenburn,thusensuringepressureandratureassumedintheanalysesarenotexceeded.ThelimitingDBArelativetohydrogengenerationisaLOCA.(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-114Rev.0,09/28/92

Insert3.6.7.1collectingthehydrogenandoxygenatmosphericmixtureinsidecontainmentandoxidizingthehydrogeninacombustionchamber.Additionalhydrogenisaddedbytherecombinertoensurethatthenoncondensiblecombustionproductsthatcouldcauseaprogressiveriseincontainmentpressureareavoided.Oxygenisalsoaddedto'preventdepletionofoxygenbelowtheconcentrationrequiredforstableoperationofthecombustor.Theproductofcombustion,watervapor,iscooledandcondensedfromtheatmospherebytheCoatainmentRecirculationFanCoolerSystem.Insert3.6.7.2Therecombinersarecomprisedofablowerfantocirculatecontainmentairtothecombuster,acombusterchamberwithamainburner,twoigniters(includesaninstalledspare),apilotburner,andadilutionchamberdownstreamoftheflamezonewhereproductsofthecombustionaremixedwithcontainmentairtoreducethetemperatureofthegasleavingthesystem'. HydrogenRecombinersBASES"APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)HydrogenmayaccumulateincontainmentfollowingaLOCAasaresultof:'a~b.Ametalsteamreactionbetweenthezirconiumfuelrodcladdingandthereactorcoolant;RadiolyticdecompositionofwaterintheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)andthecontainmentsump;("t.vl.o,~.c.w,>c.HydrogenintheRCSatthetimeoftheLOCA(i.e.,hydrogendissolvedinthereactorcoolantandhydrogengasinthepressurizervaporspace);ord.CorrosionofmetalsexposedtocontainmentsprayandEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemsolutions.ToevaluatethepotentialforhydrogenaccumulationincontainmentfollowingaLOCA,thehydrogengenerationasafunctionoftimefollowingtheinitiationoftheaccidentiscalculated.ConservativeassumptionsrecommendedbyReference~reusedtomaximizetheamountofhydrogencalculated.~Ce'l.va.o.Basedontheconservativeassumptionsusedtocalculatethe'ydrogenconcentrationversustimeafteraLOCA,thehdrogenconcentrationintheprimarycontainmentwouldreac.voabou&daysaftertheLOCAQsiifnorecombinerwasfunctioning(Ref.~Q)nlrogenrecomsnerswenercontainmenthydrogennc.5v/owill'aintainthegcentrationirentbelowfl'~imit~~Thehydrogenrecombinersaredesignedsuchthat,withtheconservativelycalculatedhydrogengenerationratesdiscussedabove,asinglerecombineriscapableoflimitingthepeakhydrogenconcentrationincontainmenttolessthanM4.~/oRef.3.urgeysemessgnesucatontrainsisanotheredundanthdroeners.ThehydrogenrecombinerssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.B3.6-115(continued),

Insert3.6.7.3Theminimumhydrogenflammabilitylimitis4.1v/o,however,allhydrogenmustbeignitedbeforeaconcentrationof6.0v/oisreachedsinceadynamicoverpressureofcontainmentcouldresultifthehydrogenwereignitedatthisconcentration(Ref.3).Analternativetotheignitionofhydrogenatconcentrations~6.0v/o.,isventingofcontainmentusingtheNini-PurgeSystem.However,ventingwouldmostlikelyrequireevacuationsofthegeneralpublicwithinaradiusofseveralmilessurroundingtheplant.Insert3.6.7.4However,amorerealisticmodelpredictsthatahydrogenconcentrationof4.lv/o(thelowerflammabilitylimit)willbereachedin31days.Operationofthehydrogenrecombinersbelowaconcentrationof6.0v/owillensurethatcontainmentisnotoverpressurizedgivenanignitionsource'.

~<.e,',HydrogenRecombinersRemBASES(continued)a.u1.<ense&~~~neo.ural<I.vs.a.~sT~Q,I/ss5,ICsLd'QCClb'pgpLCOTwohydrogenrecombinersmustbeOPERABLE.Tisensuresoperationofatleastonehydrogenrecombinerintheeventofaworstcasesingleactivefailure.~geye~ck~~~~~~~"~~9~<<cong~Operatiithatleastonehydrogenrecombinerensuresthatthepo~tWCAhydrogenconcentrationcanbepreventedfromxceedingtheflammabilitylimitoe-~Seeress~0~psl~geeyd'LcysnOAsbi'c'Wtg.g~.sni+OmCaw<~APPLICABILITYInHODES1and2,twohydrogenrecombinersarerequiredtocontrolthehydrogenconcentrationwithincontainmentbelowitsflammabilitylimitof4.1v/ofollowingaLOCA,assumingaworstcasesinglefailure.or(WInHODES3and4,boththehydrogenroductionrateandthetotalhydrogenproducedafteraLOCA~wouldbelessthanthatcalculatedfortheDBALOCA.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseHODES,theprobabilityofanaccidentrequiringthehydrogenrecombinersislow.Therefore,thehydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredinHODE3or4...hInHODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesofa'relow,duetothepressureandtemperaturelimitationsintheseHODES.Therefore,hydrogenrecombinersarenotrequiredintheseHODES.ACTIONSA.lWithonecontainmenthydrogenrecombinerinoperable,theinoperablerecombinermustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30days.Inthisgondition,theremainingOPERABLEhydrogenrecombinerisadequatetoperformthehydrogencontrolfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLErecombinercouldresultinreducedhydrogencontrolcapability.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.(continued)83.6-116 0 HydrogenRecombinerst,~6~BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)RequiredActionA.1hasbeenmodifiedbyaNotethatstatestheprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicable.Asaresult,aNODEchangeisallowedwhenonerecombinerisinoperable.Thisallowanceisbasedontheavailabilityoftheotherhydrogenrecombiner,thesmallprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),andtheamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccur)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimitB.landB.2Reviewer'sConditionisonlyal1swithanalternatehydroemacceptabletothetechni~a.4k<&:r's-P~c'~,~>~LOhi&.Of)~re~$~'I~vdv~pro~+raktispter~&ako.rz.I~~nl.O~f~~~4.Suyp4aP~ca+wugptLf-~<<+Withtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperable,theabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionviaalternatecapabilitiesmustbeverifiedbyadministrativemeanswithin1hour.Thealternatedroencontrolcapabilitiesareprov~eb'entHydrogenurogenrecombInerydrogenInMixingSst'irDilutionSstemContainmenrr~stem'.The1hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetoverifythatalossofhdrogencontrolf'essodexise'oteistobeusedianon-'cati.on~ernateounctio~n'edta~gstijy~~o0dtiend'~t<<'gdgcapabilitymustbeverified~12hoursereaftertoensureitscontinuedavailability~gBotQthe~initiaLP-verification~ndallsubsequentverification~aybeperformedasanadministrativecheckbyexamininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabilityofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperormQBSurveillancesneededtodemonstrateOPERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.Iftheabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintainedcontinuedoperationispermittedwithtwohydrogenrecombinersinoperableforupto7days'evendaysisareasonabletimetoallowtwohydrogenrecombinerstobeinoperablebecausethehydrogencontrolfunctionis(continued)B3.6-117

HydrogenRecombinersAtmmpherie-,SebabnespBASESACTIONSB.landB.2(continued)maintainedandbecauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAthatwouldgeneratehydrogenintheamountscapableofexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.C.1Iftheinoperablehydrogenrecombiner(s)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hours.TheCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymanner.andwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS'7SR3.6anceofasystemfunctionaltestforeachhydrecombinerestherecombinersareopera'ndcanattainandsustainmeratureneyforhydrogenrecombination.Inparticua'Rverifiesthattheminimumheatersheathatureinsto>700'Fin<90minutes.reaching700F,thepowe'ncreasedtomaxiowerforapproximately2minutesandpowe'edtobe>60kW.OperatingexperiencehasshownthattheseusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthemonthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcudedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR..2ThisSRensuresthereophysicalrsthatcouldaffectrecombineroperation.erecombinersaremechanicallypassive,tenotsuomechanicalfailure.Therediblefailureinvolvesoower,blockaeinternalflow,missileimpact,etc.(continued)83.6-118

Insert3.6.7.5Operatingeachhydrogenrecombinerblowerfanfor~5minutesevery24monthsensuresthatthehydrogenrecombinersareoperationalandcanoxidizethehydrogenwithincontainmentfollowingaDBA. HydrogenRecombinersAtmosphesdz~ubatmhemtcB3.6.~BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIRENENTS4i'l.4ptii.SfiitmiidRieailures.The~MonthFrequencyfort'asdeveloped~si4e'heincidence-ofydrogenrecombinersfailingtheSKi~hepastiISR3.seT'sSRre~aireserformanceofresistscegroundtestfoOr.ash-heaterhasetoensurhaerearenodetectablegroundsinanyheatep.T-'accomplishedbyverifyin~eresistancetogroundorTheQQmonthFrequencyforthisSurveillanceuasdevelopedconsideringtheincidenceofhydrogenrecombinersfailingtheSRinthepastislow.EFERENCES1.10CFR50.44.B~.)V0B3.6-119

HHS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)83.6.B3.6CTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.6.9HyrogenMixingSystem(HMS)(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andual)BASESBACKGROUNDeHMSreducesthepotentialforbreachofntainmentduetoahydrogenoxygenreactionbyprovidinguniformlymixedposaccidentcontainmentatmosphere,theryminimizingthepoteialforlocalhydrogenburnsduetoapocketofhydrogabovetheflammableconcentratin.Maintainingauniformmixedcontainmentatmosphereisoensuresthatthehydrogenonitorswillgiveanaccurameasureofthebulkhydrogenccentrationandgivetheperatorthecapabilityofpreventitheoccurrenceofablkhydrogenburninsidecontainmentpr10CFR50.44,"StdardsforCombustibleGasControlSysteminLight-Water-CledReactors"(Ref.I),and10CFR50,C41,"ContainentAtmosphereCleanup"(Ref.2).ThepostaccidentHisanngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)andisdesignedtowihstadalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)withoutlossofction.TheSystemhastwo.independenttrains,eacconsistingoftwofanswiththeir.ownmotorsandcontrol.Eachtrainissizedfor[4000]cfm.ThetworainareinitiatedautomaticallyonaPhaseAcontainmentsolatisignal.Theautomaticactionistostartthenoperatingydrogenmixingfansonslowspeedandshiftteoperatingdrogenmixingfans(ifany)tosl'owspeed.achtrainisperedfromaseparateemergencypowesupply.Sinceehtrainfancanprovide100%ofthem'ngrequirements,teSystemwillprovideitsdesignfunctonwithalimitingsinleactivefailure.Airisdrnfromthesteamgeneratorompartmentsbythelocallyountedmixingfansandisdiscargedtowardtheupperrgionsofthecontainment.Thismplementstheairpattersestablishedbythecontainmentaicoolers,whichtakeuctionfromtheoperatingfloorlevelanddischargetotheowerregionsofthecontainment,andthcontainmentsay,whichcoolstheairandcausesittodptolowerevations.Thesystemsworktogethersuchthapotentiallystagnantareaswherehydrogenpocketscoulddevepareeliminated.Whenperformingtheirpostaccidenthydrogenmixingfunction,thehydrogenmixingfansoperateonslowspdto(continu)WOGSTSB3.6-120Rev.0,09/28/92

HHS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)B3.6.9BESBACKGUND(contued)preventmotoroverloadinapostaccidenthighpressreenvironment.Thedesignflowrateonslowspeedisbasedontheminimumairdistributionrequirementstoelim'testagnanthydrogenpockets.Eachtrainisredundt(fullcapacity)andispoweredfromanindependentESbus.Thehydrogenmixingfansmaybeoperatedonfastseedduringnormaloperationwhenacontainmentaircoolistakenoutofservice.Assuch,thedesignflowratethehydrogenixingfansforhighspeedoperationisbaedonair'stributionrequirementsduringsuchnoraloperation.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheHprovidesthecapabilityforeducingthelocalhydrogen,concentrationtoapproximelythebulkaverageconcentra4ion.ThelimitingDBAelativetohydrogenconcentratwnisaLOCA.Hydrogen.mayaccumulateincoainmentfollowingaLOCAasaresultof:a.Ametalsteareactibetweenthezirconiumfuelrodcladdinganderectorcoolant;b.RadiolyticdecomsitionofwaterintheReactorCoolantSystem(4gandthecontainmentsump;c.HydrogeninteRCSathetimeoftheLOCA(i.e.,hydrogendisolvedinQereactorcoolantandhydrogenga'sintheressurizerporspace);ord.Corrosiofmetalsexposed>tocontainmentsprayandEmergeyCoreCoolingSystesolutions.ToevaluethepotentialforhydronaccumulationincontainntfollowingaLOCA,thehyogengenerationasafunctioftimefollowingtheinitiatnoftheaccidentiscalcated.ConservativeassumptionsreommendedbyRefence3areusedtomaximizetheamoutofhydrogen.caulated.heHHSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPoliStatement.WOGSTSB3.6-121(continued)/Rev.0,09/28/92

HNS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)~~B3.6.9BAS(continued)LCOTwoHMStrainsmustbeOPERABLE,withpowertoeachfomanindependent,safetyrelatedpowersupply.Eachtra'ypicallyconsistsoftwofanswiththeirownmotosandcontrolsandisautomaticallyinitiatedbyaPhaAcontainmentisolationsignal.OperationwithatleastoneHMStrainprovidthemixingecessarytoensur'euniformhydrogenconcenrationtroughoutcontainment.APPLICABILITYInMODIand2,thetwoHMStrainsensurethecapabilitytoprevetlocalizedhydrogenconcentrationsabovetheflammabiltylimitof4.1volumercentincontainmentassumingaorstcasesingleact'failure.InMODE3orboth"thehydrenproductionrateandthe,totalhydrogenroducedafteaLOCAwouldbelessthanthatcalculatedfortDBALOC.Also,becauseofthelimitedtimeintheseMOD,theobabilityofanaccidentrequiringtheHMSilo.Therefore,theHMSisnotrequiredinMODE3oInMODES5and6,tpbabilityandconsequencesofaLOCAorsteamlinebrea(SLBarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature1'tationintheseMODES.Therefore,theHMSisnotrequ'dinthesMODES.ACTIONSA.IWithonHNStraininoperable,theioperabletrainmustberestordtoOPERABLEstatuswithin30ays.InthisCondion,theremainingOPERABLEHMSainisadequatetoperormthehydrogenmixingfunction.wever,theoverallriabilityisreducedbecauseasingleflureintheERABLEtraincouldresultinreducedhydenmixingcapability.The30dayCompletionTimeisbedontheavailabilityoftheotherHMStrain;thesmalprobabilityofaLOCAorSLBoccurring(thatwouldgenerateanamountofhydrogenthatexceedstheflammabilitylimit),tamountoftimeavailableafteraLOCAorSLB(shouldoneoccr)foroperatoractiontopreventhydrogenaccumulationfrexceedingtheflammabilitylimit,andtheavailabiliof(contind)WOGSTSB3.6-122Rev.0,09/28/92

BASHMS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)B3.6.9tIACTIONA.1(continued)thehydrogenrecombiners,ContainmentSpraySystemHydrogenPurgeSystem,andhydrogenmonitors.RequiredActionA.lhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotthatstates.theprovisionsofLCO3.0.4arenotapplicab.Asaresult,aMODEchangeisallowedwhenoneHtrainisoperable.'hisallowanceisbasedontavailabilityofthotherHMStrain,thesmallprobabiliofaLOCAorSLBoccring(thatwouldgenerateanamounofhydrogenthatexcestheflammabilitylimit),andeamountoftimeavailaleafteraLOCAor.SLB(shouloneoccur)foroperatoactiontopreventhydrogeaccumulationfromexceedingtheflammabilitylimit.B.1and8.2Reviewer'sNote:hisCond'onisonlyallowedforunitswithanalternatedrogecontrolsystemacceptabletothetechnicalstaff.WithtwoHMStrainsierable,theabilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfutiviaalternatecapabilitiesmustbeverifiedbyadminitrative,meanswithinIhour.Thealternatehydrogcontrol~apabilitiesareprovidedby[thecontainmentHydgenPurgestem/hydrogenrecombiner/HydrogenIgnirSystem/HMS/CtainmentAirDilutionSystem/ContainmentertingSystem].heIhourCompletionTimeallowsarsonableperiodoftitoverifythatalossofhydrogenntrolfunctiondoesnoexist.[Reviewer'sNote:Thefollingistobeusedifano-TechnicalSpecificationalternehydrogencontrolfunctionsusedtojustifythisCondion:Inaddition,thealternateydrogencontrolsysmcapabilitymustbeverifiedever12hoursthereaftertonsureits,continuedavailability.]oth]the[initial]vrification[andallsubsequentverificatns]maybeerformedasanadministrativecheck,byexaininglogsorotherinformationtodeterminetheavailabiliofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.ItdoesnotmeantoperformtheSurveillancesneededtodemonstrateERABILITYofthealternatehydrogencontrolsystem.Ifthebilitytoperformthehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintained,continuedoperationispermittedwithtwoHMStrainsOGSTSB3.6-123(continued)iRev.0,09/28/92 BASEHMS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDualB3.6IACTIONSB.landB.2(continued)inoper'ableforupto7days.SevendaysisargsonabletimetoallowtwoHMStrainstobeinoperable%causethehydrogencontrolfunctionismaintainedandbcauseofthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofaLOCAhatwouldgeneratehydrogenintheamountscapableofexceedingthelammabilitylimit.C.1Ifan'noperableHMStraincannotbprestoredtoOPERABLEstatusithintherequiredComplegonTime,theplantmustbebrougtoaMODEinwhichthy'COdoesnotapply..Toachievethsstatus,theplantustbebroughttoatleast.MODE3withsy6hours.ThealowedCompletionTimeof6hoursisreasonable,basednoperatingexperience,toreachMODE3omfullpowepconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchalengingplntsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.9.1OperatingeachHMSgraifor>15minutesensuresthateachtrainisOPERABL+andthallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Itisoensuresthatblockage,fanand/ormotorfailure,orexessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcorrectiveaction.The9dayFrequency.isconsistentwithInserv<eTestingPrograSurveillanceFrequencies,operatingexperience,theknownreliabilityofthefanmotorsancontrols,andthetworainredundancyavailable.SR3.9.2VefyingthateachHMStrainflowrateonslowspeedis4000]cfmensuresthateachtrainispableofaintaininglocalizedhydrogenconcentrat>nsbelowtheflammabilitylimit.The[18]monthFrequenisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundereconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepoteialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewerepeformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhWOGSTSB3.6-124(coninued)Rev.0,09/282 HNS(Atmospheric,IceCondenser,andDual)B3.6.9BESSURVELANCEREQUIRENTSSR3.6.9.2(continued)performedatthe[18]monthFrequency.ThereforetheFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromaeliabilitystandpoint.SR3.6.9.3isSRensuresthateachHHStrainrespndsproperlytoacotainmentcoolingactuationsignal.heSurveillanceversiesthateachfanstartsonslowpeedfromthenonopatingconditionandthateachfanshiftstoslowspeedomfastoperatingconditio~.The[18]monthFrequency,isbasedontheneedtoerformthisSurveillanceunderthegonditionsthatapplyuringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedransientiftheSurveillancewereperformswiththereactatpower.OperatingexperiencehashownthesecmponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhperformeatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandointREFERENCES1.10CFR50.44.2.10CFR50,PppendixA,DC41.3.RegulatoyGuide1.7,Revion[1].OGSTSB3.6-125Rev.0,09/28/92i HIS(IceCondenser)"~B3.6.1B6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMS83.10HydrogenIgnitionSystem(HIS)(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDTheHISreducesthepotentialforbreachofprimarycontainmentduetoahydrogenoxygenreacti'npostaccidentenvironments.TheHISisrequireby10CFR50.44,"StandardsforCombustibleGasControlSytemsinLht-Water-CooledReactors"(Ref.1),podAppendixA,GD41,"ContainmentAtmosphereCleanup"(Ref.2),toreducetheydrogenconcentrationinthepriparycontainmentfolioingadegradedcoreaccident.,~TheHISmustbecapableofhaninganamountofhydrogenequivalenttothatgeneratefromametalwaterreactioninvolving75%ofthefuelcladingsurroundingtheactivefuelregion(excludingtheplenumolume).10CFR50.44ef.1)requiresunitswithicecondensercontainmentstoinstallsuytablehydrogencontrolsystemsthatwouldaccomdatean/a'mountofhydrogenequivalenttothatgeneratedfrtheyeactionof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwater.TheHprovidesthisrequiredcapability.Thisrequirementwasacedonicecondenserunitsbecauseoftheirsmallcontinentvolumeandlowdesignpressure(comparedwithpres~uridwaterreactordrycontainments).Calculationsindiphtethifhydrogenequivalenttothatgeneratedfromt)fereactioof75%ofthefuelcladdingwithwaterweretocollectinthprimarycontainment,theresultinghydrogenconcentra'onwouldbefarabovethelowerflammatfi1itylimitsuchat,ifignitedfromarandomignitionsqdrce,theresultingdrogenburnwouldseriouslychallenge+hecontainmentandsatysystemsinthecontainpnt.The=H4isbasedontheconceptofcotrolledignitionusingthealignitors,designedtobecapaboffunctioninginapoaccidentenvironment,seismicallypported,andcableofactuationfromthecontrolroo.Atotalof64]ignitorsaredistributedthroughouttvariousregionsofcontainmentinwhichhydrogencouldbereeasedortowhichitcouldflowinsignificantquantities.Theignitorsarearrangedintwoindependenttrainssuchthaeachcontainmentregionhasatleasttwoignitors,onfromeachtrain,controlledandpoweredredundantlysothat'gnition(cont>ued)WOGSTSB3.6-126Rev.0,09/28/92

HIS(IceCondenser)B3.6.1BASEBACKGROUN(continu)wouldoccurineachregionevenifonetrainfailetoenergize.WhentheHISisinitiated,theignitorelementareenergizedandheatuptoasurfacetemperatur>[1700]'F.Atthistemperature,theyignitethehydrogegasthatisesentintheairspaceinthevicinityofheignitor.TheHdependsonthedispersedlocationofJeignitorssothalocalpocketsofhydrogenatincreyedconcentrationswoulburnbeforereachingahydrogenconcentrationsigniscantlyhigherthanthelowerffammabilitylimit.Hydrogem,ignitioninthevicinityofjtheignitorsisassumedtooccurpenthelocalhydrogenconcentrationreaches[8.0jvolumepercent(v/o)andresultsin[85]%ofthehydrogenpreMntbeingconsumed.D4[-:aAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheHIScauseshydgeninontainmenttoburninacontrolledmanneraitacumulatesfollowingadegradedcoreaccident(Ref.3.yBurningoccursatthelowerflammabilityconcentraon,wheretheresultingtemperaturesandpressuresarerelptilybenign.Withoutthesystem,hydrogencouldbuil~uptohigherconcentrationsthatcouldresultinaviolenreactioifignitedbyarandomignitionsourceaftersucabuildup.ThehydrogeniitorsarenotinludedformitigationofaDesignBasisccident(DBA)becauseanamountofhydrogenequivalentj;thatgeneratedfromtereactionof75%ofthefuelcladdi'ngwithwaterisfarineessofthehydrogencalculatcfforthelimitingDBAlossocoolantaccident(LOCA).ThehydrogenconcentrationrestingfromaDBAcanbemaitainedlessthantheflammabilityimitusingthehydrenrecombiners.Thehydrogenignito,however,havebeeshownbyprobabilisticriskanalysistobeas'ificantcontributortolimitingtheseveryofaccidentquencesthatarecommonlyfoundtodominate'skforunitswithicecondensercontainments.Assuch,thehrogenignitorsareconsidered.toberisksignificantinccordancewiththeNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTwoHIStrainsmustbeOPERABLEwithpowerfromtwoindependent,safetyrelatedpowersupplies.(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-127IRev.0,09/28/92// HIS(IceCondenser)B3.6.10BASESLCO(continueForthisunit,anOPERABLEHIStrainconsistsof32f33ignitorsenergizedonthetrain.OperationwithatleastoneHIStrainensuresthtthehydrogenincontainmentcanbeburnedinaconoiledmanner.UnavailabilityofbothHIStrainscodleadtodrogenbuilduptohigherconcentrations,ichcouldrultinaviolentreactionifignited.ereactioncouldtaplacefastenoughtoleadtohighteperaturesandoveressurizationofcontainmentand',aresult,breachcontamentorcausecontainmentleakaratesabovethoseassumeinthesafetyanalyses.Damaetosafetyrelatedequipmenlocatedincontainmentcodalsooccur.APPLICABILITYRequiringOPBILITYinNODESand2fortheHISensuresitsimmediatevailabilityafersafetyinjectionandscramactuated,onaLAinitiati.Inthepostaccidentenvironment,thewoHISsSsystemsarerequiredtocontrolthehydrogenconcetratiwithincontainmenttonearitsflammabilitylimito4v/oassumingaworstcasesinglefailure.Thisprevenoverpressurizationofcontainmentanddamagetosafetylatedequipmentandinstrumentslocatedwithincontinmt.InNODES3and4also,beauseofthelimitedtimeintheseNODES,theprobilityofaaccidentrequiringtheHISislow.Therefor,theHISistrequiredinNODES3and4.InMODES5nd6,theprobabiliandconsequencesofaLOCAarereducduetothepressuredtemperaturelimitationsoftheseODES.Therefore,theHisnotrequiredtobeOPERABinNODES5and6.ACTIONS1andA.2WithoneHIStraininoperable,theinoperabetrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7daysorheOPERABLEtrainmustbeverifiedOPERABLEfrequentlybyerformanceofSR3.6.10.1.The7dayCompletionTimeisbaseonthelowprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofadegradedcoreventthatwouldgeneratehydrogeninamountsequivalenttometalwaterreactionof75%ofthecorecladding,thelenthofMOGSTSB3.6-128(contued)/Rev.0,09/28/92;

BASHIS(IceCondenserB3.6.0jACTIONSA.1andA.2(continued)timeaftertheeventthatoperatoractionwoulderequiredtopreventhydrogenaccumulationfromexceedinthislimit,andthelowprobabilityoffailureoftheOPBLEHIStrain.AlternativeRequiredActionA.2,byrequentsurveillances,providesassurancethatthePERABLEtrainontinuestobeOPERABLE.B.lConditonBisonecontainmentregnwithnoOPERABLEhydrogeignitor.Thus,whileinConditionB,orinConditionAandBsimultaneousl,therewouldalwaysbeignitioncabilityintheadjacentcontainmentregionsthatwouldproviredundantcapab'tybyflamepropagationto,theregionwihnoOPERABLEgnitors.RequiredAction.IcallsfortherestorationofonehydrogenignitoreacregiontoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayompletionTimeisbasedonthesamereasonsgivenunderquiredActionA.l.C.1ITheunitmustbeplacedinHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapplyiftheSsubsystem(scannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithitheassociatedmpletionTime.ThisisdonebyplacingheunitinatleastHODE3within6hours.TheallowedCpmpletionTimeof6houisreasonable,basedonoperatiyexperience,toreachHO3fromfullpowercondit'sinanorderlymanneranwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS3.6.10.1ThisSRconfirmsthath[32]of33hydrogennitorscanbesuccessfullyenergizedineachtrain.Theig'torsaresimpleresistanceelements.Therefore,energiz'providesassuranceofOPERABILITY.Theallowanceofoneoperable,hydrogenignitorisacceptablebecause,althoughoeinoperablehydrogenignitorinaregionwouldcompriseMOGSTSB3.6-129(contiued)IRev.0,09/28/92,/

HIS(IceCondenser)83.6.10BASSURVEILNCEREQUIRENETSSR3.6.10.1(continued)redundancyinthatregion,thecontainmentregionareinterconnectedsothatignitioninoneregionwodcauseburningtoprogresstotheothers(i.e.,there'soverlapineachhydrogenignitor'seffectivenessbetweenegions).TheFrequencyof92daysisbasedontheInserviTestingrogramrequirementsfordeterminingequipmtOPERABILITYadhasbeenshowntobeacceptablethrouoperatingexrience.SR3.10.2ThisSRcfirmsthatthetwoinoprablehydrogenignitorsallowedbyR3.6.10.1(i.e.,oneineachtrain)arenotinthesameconainmentregion.Assuch,failureofthisSRresultsinenyintoConditioryB.SeeRequiredActionB.lforadiscussioregardinghowConditionsAandBandtheassociatedRequidActionspnsurethatnomorethanonecontainmentregiocanbewithoutanOPERABLEhydrogenignitorforanylenthoffimewithoutcommencingashutdown.SR3.6.10.3Amoredetailedfctionalstisperformedevery18monthstoverifysystemPERABILITY.Eachglowplugisvisuallyexaminedtoensethatitisleanandthattheelectricalcircuitryisepergized.Allig'tors(glowplugs),includingnorallyinaccessibleinitors,arevisuallycheckedforglowtoverifythateyareenergized.Additionaly,thesurfacetemperatuofeachglowplugismeasuredobeZ[1700]'Ftodemonstrtethatatemperaturesufficitforignitionisachieved.e[18]monthFrequeyisbasedontheneedtoperfothisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringalantoutageandtheotentialforanunplannedtransientitheSurveillanceweperformedwiththereactoratpower.cratingeeriencehasshown'hatthesecomponentsusllypassthewhenperformedatthe[18]monthFrequency,hichisbasedontherefuelingcycle.Therefore,theFrquencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystapoint.WOGSTSB3.6-130(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92'

HIS(IceCondenser)B3.6.10SES(continued)REFERCES1.10CFR50.44.2.,10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC41.3.FSAR,Section[6.2].WOGSTSB3.6-131Rev.0,09/28/92

B.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)B3.6.11IB3.11IodineCleanupSystem(ICS)(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)BASESBACKGROUNDTheICSisprovidedperGDC41,"ContainmentAosphereCleanup,"GDC42,"InspectionofContainmentmosphereCleanupSystems,"andGDC43,"TestingofCoainmenttmosphereCleanupSystems"(Ref.1),toreucetheccentrationoffissionproducts-releasetothecoainmentatmospherefollowingapostutedaccident.TheICSouldfunctiontogetherwiththeCoainmentSprayandCoolisystemsfollowingaDesignBas'sAccident(DBA)toreducehepotentialreleaseofradictivematerial,principalyiodine,fromthecontaienttotheenvironment.TheICSconsistsoftwo100%capaity,separate,independent,handredundanttrai.Eachtrainincludesaheater,[coolingcoils,]aprelter,ademister,ahighefficiencyparticulateair(HA)filter,anactivatedcharcoaladsorberisectionforemovalofradioiodines,andafan.Ductwork,vavesand/rdampers,andinstrumentationalsoformpartoftqsysm.Thedemistersfunctiontoreducethemoisturecytntoftheairstream.AsecondbankofHEPAfiltersfollowtheadsorbersectiontocollectcarbonfinesandprov'backupincaseoffailurein'ectionsofthemainEPAilterbank.TheupstreamHEPAfilterandthecharoaladsrbersectionarecreditedintheanalysis.ThesyyeminitiasfilteredrecirculationofthecontainmentatmospherefoowingreceiptofasafetyinjectionsignaX.The'ystemsignisdescribedinReference2.Thedemisteisincludedformoistu(freewater)removalfromthesstream.Heatersareusetoheatthegasstream,ichlowerstherelativehumiity.Continuousoperatiofeachtrainforatleast10ourspermonthwiththehtersonreducesmoisturebuildupotheHEPAfiltersandsorbers.Boththedemisterandheatareimportanttoeeffectivenessofthecharcoaladsorbes.Teprimarypurposeoftheheatersistoensurthattheelativehumidityoftheairstreamenteringthe'rcoaladsorbersismaintainedbelow70%,whichisconsientwiththeassignediodineandiodideremovalefficienciesasperRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.3).(contind)HOGSTSB3.6-132Rev.0,09/28/92I ICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheriB3.6.11BASBACKGRODAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTwoICStrainsareprovidedtomeettherequirementforseparation,independence,andredundancy.Each/ICStrainispoweredfromaseparateEngineeredSafetyFeat@'resbusandisprovidedwithaseparatepowerpanelandcontrolpanel.I'Essentialservicewaterisrequiredtosupycoolingwatertothecoolingcoils.]Duringnormaloperation,theContainmenCoolingSystemislignedtobypasstheICSHEPAfiltersandcharcoalasorbers.ForICSoperationfollowgaDBA,however,thebyassdampersautomaticallyreposiiontodrawtheairthrghthefiltersandadsorbers.//TheDBAshatresultinare3easeofradioactiveiodinewithinconainmentarealossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)orarodeject/onaccident(A).Intheanalysisforeachoftheseaccidegs,itisaumedthatadequatecontainmentleaktightnessh,isintacateventinitiationtolimitpotentialleakagetotheenvironment.Additionally,itisassumedthatthehamountofradioactiveiodinereleasedislimitedbyreducingftheiodineconcentrationpresentinthecontainmentatmosphere.TheICSdesignbasisiyestablishedbytheconsequences'of/.XthelimitingDBA,whicisaLOCA.Theaccidentanalysis(Ref.4)assumethatonlonetrainoftheICSisfunctionalduetoasinglefailurettdisablestheothertrain;Theaccidentanalysisaccountsforthereductioninairborneradioactiveiodineprovided'bytheremainingone.trainofthisf~iltrationsystem.TheCSsatisfiesCriterion3otheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTwoseparate,independent,andredunntarerequiredtoensurethatatleastoeassumingasinglefailurecoincidentwipower.trainsoftheICSisavailable,alossofoffsite!APPLICARILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,iodineisafissionoductthatcanbereleasedfromthefueltothereactorcolantasa(5ntinued)1SMOGSTSB3.6-133Rev.0,09f28/92

gBASSICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)B3.6.11,APPLICAILITY(contied)resultofaDBA.TheDBAsthatcancauseafailureothefuelcladdingareaLOCA,SLB,andREA.Becausetheeaccidentsareconsideredcredibleaccidentsin'MOD1,2,3,and4,theICSmustbeoperabletoensuretheeductioniniodineconcentrationassumedintheaccidentnalyses..InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequcesofaLOCAarelowduetothepressureandtemperatureimitationsofheseMODES.TheICSisnotrequiredintseMODEStooveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospre.ACTIONSA.1.WithoneStraininoperable,thinoperabletrainmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswith'days.Thecomponentsinthisdegrdedconditionareapableofproviding100%oftheiodinerevalneedsafteraDBA.'The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedoconsideratiofsuchfactorsas:'a4b.C.TheavailabityofeOPERABLEredundantICStrain;Thefactthat,vewithnoICStraininoperation,almostthesameountofiodinewouldberemovedfromthecontainmentatospherethroughabsorptionbytheContainmentSpayStern;andThefactththeCompetionTimeisadequatetomakemostrepais.B.landB.IftheItraincannotberestoretoOPERABLEstatuswithinherequiredCompletionTime,heplantmustbebrougtoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdonotapply.Toachiethisstatus,theplantmustberoughttoatleastMO3within6hoursandtoMODE5with36hours.TheaowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,sedonoperatingperience,toreachtherequiredplantconitionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerwithouchallengingplantsystems.WOGTSB3.6-134(contiued)Rev.0,09/282 ICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)B3.6.11BAS(continued)iSURVEILNCEREOUIREHTS1SR3.6.11.1OperatingeachICStrainfor>15minutesensuresghatalltrainsareOPERABLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italsoensuresthatblkage,fanormotorfailure,orexcessivevibrationcanbetectedforcorrectiveaction.Forsystemswithheatersoperationwiththeheaterson(automaticheatercyclingtomaintainemperature)for>10continuoushourselinatesmoistureontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.Expeiencefromfiltertestingatoperatingunitsindicatesttthe10hourperiodisadequateformoistureeliminationtheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.The31dayFrequencyasdevelopedconsideringtheknownreliabilityofanmotorsandcontrols~~thetwotrainredundancyavailable,andtheiodineremovalcapabilityoftheContaientSpraySystemindependent,oftheICS.SR3.6.11.2ThisSRverifiesChatthrequiredICSfiltertestingisperformedinaccordqnceiththeVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP).The%SfiltertestsareinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.5Ref.3).TheVFTPincludestestingHEPAfilterperformcecharcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflorateandthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharco(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).Secifictes5frequenciesandadditionalinformationardiscussedinydetailintheVFTP.SR3.6.1.3Theautmaticstartup*testverifiethatbothtrainsof/.equipntstartuponreceiptofanatualorsimulatedtestsign.The[18)monthFrequencyisgasedontheneedtoperormthisSurveillanceunderthecohgitionsthatapplydingaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedansientiftheSurveillancewereperfordwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehashownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewheperformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,theFreencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilityandpoint.Furthermore,theFrequencywasdevelopedconsideingthatI(continued)'-OGSTSB3.6-135Rev.0,09/28/92' F ICS(AtmosphericandSubatmospheric)B3.6.1BASESSURVEILLACEREQUIREMENSR3.6.11.3(continued)thesystemequipmentOPERABILITYisdemonstrateda31dayFrequencybySR3.6.11.1.R3.6.11.4ThICSfilterbypassdampersaretestedtverifyOPEBILITY.Thedampersareinthebypspositionduringnormoperationandmustrepositionforaccidentoperationtodraairthroughthefilters.The8]monthFrequencyisconseredtobeacceptablebasedthedamperreliabilyanddesign,themildenv'ronmentalconditionsintheviciniofthedampers,andtfactthatoperatingexperiencesshownthatthedamrsusuallypasstheSurveillancehenperformedatt[18]monthFrequency.REFERENCESl.10CFR50,ApendixA,DC41,GDC42,andGDC43.2.FSAR,Section[5].3.RegulatoryGuide.2,Revision[1].4FSAR,Chapter[].WOGSTSB3.6-136Rev.0,09/28/95,j VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondenserB3.6.2B3.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDThepurposeofthevacuumrelieflinesistprotectthecontainmentvesselagainstnegativepressu(i.e.,alowerpressureinsidethanoutside).Excessivenegativepressure'nsidecontainmentcanoccurifthereisaninadvertentatuationofcontainmentcoolingfeatugrs,suchastheCotainmentSpraySystem.Multipleequipmentfailuresorhumerrorsarenecessarytocause'nadvertentactuationofthesesystems.Theconinmentpressurevesselontainstwo100%vacuumrelieflsesthatprotectthecontainmentfromexcessiveexternal1ading.Forthisfaciity,thecharpcteristicsofthevacuumreliefvalvesandtherlocation~inthecontainmentpressurevesselareasfllows:APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDesignofthevacuumelieflinesinvolvescalculatingtheeffectofinadvertpntctuationofcontainmentcoolingfeatures,whichnredhcetheatmospherictemperature(andhencepressure)nsidecontainment(Ref.1).Conservativeassumptionsarusedforgltherelevantparametersinthecalculation;forexample,ArtheContainmentSpraySystem,theminimumpraywatertemprature,maximuminitialcontainmentemperature,maximsprayflow,allspraytrainsorating,etc.Thereltingcontainmentpressureversusmeiscalculated,incluingtheeffectoftheopeninofthevacuumrelieflinewhentheirnegativepresresetpointisreached.It>alsoassumedthatonevalfailstoopen.Tecontainmentwasdesignedforanexmalpressureloadquivalentto[-2.5]psig.Theinadverntactuationofthecontainmentcooling'featureswasanalyzetodeterminetheresultingreductionincontainmentpressur.Theinitialpressureconditionusedinthisanalysiswa[-0.3]psig.Thisresultedinaminimumpressureinsidecotainmentof[-2.0]psig,whichislessthanthedesignloa.(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-137Rev.0,09/28/92 VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondensr)B3..12BASEAPPLICABSAFETYANYSES(continueThevacuumreliefvalvesmustalsoperformthec*tainmentisolationfunctioninacontainmenthighpressueeventsForthisreason,thesystemisdesignedtotathefullcontainmentpositivedesignpressureandthenvironmentalconditions(temperature,pressure,humidityradiation,chemical,attack,etc.)associatedwiththeontainmentDBA.hevacuumreliefvalvessatisfyCriterin3oftheNRC.licyStatement.LCOTheLCestablishestheminimumeipmentrequiredtoaccompl>hthevacuumrelieffunionfollowingtheinadvertetactuationofcontaientcoolingfeatures.Two~100%vacuurelieflinesareruiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethattleastoneisaailable,assumingoneorboth,valvesintheotherlinefaitoopen.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,aqd4thecontainmentcoolingfeatures,suchastheContainmSpraySystem,arerequiredtobeOPERABLEtomitigateheeffectsofaDBA.ExcessivenegativepressureisicontainmentcouldoccurwheneverthesesystemsarepequidtobeOPERABLEduetoinadvertentactuationofthessyste.Therefore,thevacuumrelieflinesarerequirdtobe0RABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4tomitigatetheeectsofinaertentactuationoftheContainmentSaySystem,guchSpray(gS)System,orContainmentoolingSystem.InMODESand6,theprobabilitandconsequencesofaDBAarereduedduetothepressureantemperaturelimitationsofthesMODES.TheContainmentSpySystem,gSSystem,andCtainmentCoolingSystemarenrequiredtobeOPELEinMODES5and6.Therefore,maintainingOPERABLEvacmreliefvalvesisnotrequiredinODE5or6.ACTIONSA.1Whenoneoftherequiredvacuumrelief'linesisinoperable,theinoperablelinemustberestoredtoOPERABLEtatuswithin72hours.ThespecifiedtimeperiodiscoistentWOGSTSB3.6-138(coninued)/Rev.0,09/28/92 VacuumReliefValves(AtmosphericandIceCondensr)B3..12BASACTIONSA.l(continued)withotherLCOsforthelossofonetrainofaystemrequiredtomitigatetheconsequencesofaLOorotherDBA.B.landB.2IthevacuumrelieflinecannotbereoredtoOPERABLEstuswithintherequiredCompletionime,theplantmustbeboughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCdoesnotapply.Toachieethisstatus,theplantmust/bebroughttoatleastHODE3ithin6hoursandtoHODEPwithin36hours.TheallowedompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperienc'e,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercondtionsinanor'derly'rmerandwithoutchallenginglantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSR3.6.12.1ThisSRcitestheIeviceTestingProgram,whichestablishestherequiementthatinservicetesting'ftheASHECodeClass1,,nd3pumpsandvalvesshallbeperformedinaccornceithSectionXIoftheASHE,BoilerandPressureVessgCodendapplicableAddenda(Ref.2).Therefore,SRFrequencyisgovernedbytheInserviceTestingProgram.REFERENCES1.FSAR,ection[6.2].2.A'S,BoilerandPressureVess1Code,SectionXI.HOGSTSB3.6-139Rev.0,09/28/92,. SBACS(DualandIceCondenser)83.6.13lB.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSlB3.13ShieldBuildingAirCleanupSystem(SBACS)(DualandIceCondeser)IBASESBACKGROUNDTheSBACSisrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixAGDC41,"ContainmentAtmosphereCleanup"(Ref.I),toensurethatradioactivematerialsthatleakfromthepr'rycontainmentintotheshieldbuilding(secondarycontaient)followingaesignBasisAccident(DBA)arefilteredndadsorbedpriortexhaustingtotheenvironment.Theontainmenthasasecondaryconta'nmentcalledtheshielbuilding,whichisaconcretstructurethatsurrounsthesteelprimarycontaientvessel.Betweencontainmtvesselandtheshielduildinginnerwallisannularscethatcollectsanyontainmentleakagethatoccurfolioingalossofcooltaccident(LOCA)~Thisspacealsoaowsforperiodiinspectionoftheoutersurfaceofthsteelcontaientvessel.theanmay(ITheSBACSestablhesangativepressureintheannulusbetweentheshielbuilngandthesteelcontainmentvessel.Filtersinthsystemthencontrolthereleaseofradioactivecontaminstotheenvironment.ShieldbuildingOPERABILITYirequiredtoensureretentionofprimarycontainmenleageandproperoperationoftheSBACS.TheSBACScons'softwosarateandredundanttrains.Eachtraininudesaheater,[coolingcoils,]aprefilter,moisturesep'rators,ahigheficiencypartic'ulateair(HEPA)filr,anactivatedchaoaladsorbersectionforremovaloradioiodines,andafa.Ductwork,valvesand/ordampers,andinstrumentationalsormpartofthesystem.Themo'ureseparatorsfunctiontoeducethemoistureconteoftheairstream.AsecondbkofHEPAfiltersfollwstheadsorbersectiontocolleccarbonfinesandpridebackupincaseoffailureofthemainHEPAfilterbk.OnlytheupstreamHEPAfilterandecharcoaldsorbersectionarecreditedintheanalys.Thesysteminitiatesandmaintainsanegativeairpressreintheshieldbuildingbymeansoffilteredexhaustntilationoftheshieldbuildingfollowingreceiptofasafyinjection(SI)signal.ThesystemisdescribedinReferene2.(coninued)HOGSTSB3.6-140Rev.0,09/28/92 SBACS(DualandIceCondenserB3.63BASBACKGRND(contiued)Theprefiltersremovelargeparticlesintheair,ndthemoistureseparatorsremoveentrainedwaterdroplespresent,topreventexcessiveloadingoftheHEPAfiltersandcharcoalabsorbers.Heaters'maybeincludedtreducetherelativehumidityoftheairstreamonsystemshatoperateinhighhumidity.Continuousoperationofechtrain,foratleast10hourspermonth,withheaterso,reducesmoisturebuildupontheirHEPAfiltersanadsorbers.[Theoolingcoilscooltheai'rtokeepthecrcoalbedsfromcomingtoohotduetoabsorptionoffsionproduct.]Durgnormaloperation,theShield8ildingCoolingSystemisagnedtobypasstheSBACS'sHEPfiltersandcharcoaladsorbrs.ForSBACSoperationfolowingaDBA,however,thebypsdampersautomaticallyrpositiontodrawtheairthroughefiltersandadsorber.TheSBACSrucestheradioactvecontentintheshieldbuildingatmpherefollowinaOBA.L'ossoftheSBACScouldcausesieboundarydes,intheeventofaOBA,toexceedthevalugiveninhelicensingbasis.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheSBACSdesignbasiisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDBA,wh'cisaLOCA.Theaccidentanalysis(Ref.3)assumesthtolyonetrainoftheSBACSisfunctionalduetosingfailurethatdisablestheothertrain.Theaccintanalyisaccountsforthereductioninairborneradioaivemateri1providedbytheremainingonetrainofthisiltrationsysm.TheamountoffissionproductsavaiableforreleasefromcontainmentisdeterminedfraLOCA.ThemodeldSBACSactuationinthesafetyanalysesisbaseduponawrstcaseresponsetimefolwinganSIinitiatedatthelitingsetpoint.Thetotalreonsetime,fromexceengthesignalsetpointtoattaiingthenegativepresreof[Oe5]inchwatergaugeintshieldbuilding,is2seconds].Thisresponsetimeismposedofsignaldeay,dieselgenerato}startupandsequeningtime,systemartuptime,andtimeforthesystemtoatintherequiredressureafterstarting.TheSBACSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPoliStatement.MOGSTSB3.6-141(cnntinued)Rev.0,09/28/92 lBASS(continued)SBACS(DualandIceCondenser)B3.6.13/LCOIntheeventofaDBA,oneSBACStrainisrequiredtprovidetheminimumparticulateiodineremovalassuedinthesafetyanalysis.TwotrainsoftheSBACSmustibeOPERABLEtoensurethatatleastorietrainwilloperate,assumingthattheothertrainisdisabledbyasingleactivefailure.j~APPLICABILITYMODESI,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldlead,ofissionproductreeasetocontainmentthat'eakstothe/shieldbuilding.Theilargebreak.LOCA,onwhichthissystem'sdesignisbaseb,isafullpowerevent.LesssevereLOCAsandleakagestillsquirethesystemtobe,OPERALEthroughout.theseMODES.iTheprobabilityandseveritofaLOCAdecreaseascorepowerandReactorCoolantSy~empressuredecrease.Withtheactorshutdown,theprobabilityofreleaseofradioactiviresultingfromsuhanaccidentislow.InMODES5an6,theprobabgityandconsequencesofaDBAarelowduetohepressure~ndtemperaturelimitationsintheseMODES.Undrtheseyonditions,theFiltrationSystemisnotrequiredtbeOP@ABLE(althoughoneormoretrainsmaybeoperatingfootterreasons,suchashabitabilityduringmaintenanceieshieldbuildingannulus).ACTIONSA.1WithoneSBACS/raininoperale,theinoperabletrainmustberestoredto'PERABLEstatue,within7days.ThecomponentsinthisdegradedcorrditionarecapableofprovidingM0%oftheiodineremvalneedsafteraDBA.The7dayCometionTimeisbasedonconsiderationofsuchfactorsstheavailabilityofthePERABLEredundantSBACStraindthe.lowprobabilityofaAoccurringduringthisperio.TheCompletionTimeisadequtetomakemostrepas..IandB.2IftheSBACStraincannotberestoredtoOPEBLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapp.To(ctinued)WOGSTSB3.6-142Rev.0,09/28/92 SBACS(DualandIceCondenser)B3.6.13BASEACTIONSB.1andB.2(continued)achievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hous.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedooperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditinsfromfullowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwitutcallengingplantsystems.ISURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.&.13.1OperatingachSBACStrainfor>15m'nutesensuresthatalltrainsarePERABLEandthatallasciatedcontrolsarefunctioning~operly.Italsoensesthatblockage,fanormotorfailure,forexcessivevibraioncanbedetectedforcorrectiveacti.Forsystemsithheaters,operationwiththeheaterson(tomaticheatcyclingtomaintaintemperature)for>10continushourseliminatesmoistureontheadsorbersantHEPAfiers.Experiencefromfiltertestingatoperatingqnits'ndicatesthatthe10hourperiodisadequateformoistuWeiminationontheadsorbersandHEPAfilters.The31dFrequencywasdevelopedinconsiderationoftheknreliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrols,thetwotrairendancyavailable,andtheiodineremovalcapabilityoftheCotainmentSpraySystem.SR3.6.13.2ThisSRverifiysthattherequiredBAGSfiltertestingisperformedinccordancewiththeVen'lationFilterTestingProgram(VFT).TheSBACSfiltertesareinaccordancewithReguloryGuide1.52(Ref.4).TVFTPincludestestingHAfilterperformance,'charcoaadsorberLefficien,minimumsystemflowrate,andhephysicalpropertesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generuseandfoliongspecificoperations).SpecifictesfrequenciesandditionalinformationarediscussedindeilintheVFT.MOGSTSB3.6-143(continued)I/Rev.0,09/28/92,. SBACS(DualandIceCondensB3..13BASESURVEILLACEREQUIREHEN(continueSR3.6.13.3TheautomaticstartupensuresthateachSBACStrinrespondsproperly.The[18]monthFrequencyisbasedotheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialfornunplannedransientiftheSurveillancewereperformewiththeractoratpower.OperatingexperiencehashownthatthesecoonentsusuallypasstheSurveillanceenperformedatthe18]monthFrequency.Thereforetherequencywasconcl)edtobeacceptablefromareliailitystandpoint.Furtherore,theSRintervalwasdevelopedconsideringthattheSBACequipmentOPERABILITYisdeonstratedata31dayFrequencySR3.6.13.1.SR3.6.13.4TheSBACSfilterpassdamperaretestedtoverifyOPERABILITY.Thempersarenthebypasspositionduringnormaloperationanmustrepsitionforaccidentoperationtodrawair'hroughtfilt~ers.The[18]monthFrequencyisconside'redtobeacctablebasedondamperreliabilityanddesign,mildenvironntalconditionsinthevicinityofthedampers,andthefachatoperatingexperiencehasshownthatthedamperssualypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe[18]onthequency.SR3.6.13.5Theproperfunct'oningofthefans,dampers,filters,adsorbers,etc.asasystemisverifiedbytheabilityof!eachtraintoroducetherequiredsystmflowrate.The[18]monthFrquencyonaSTAGGEREDTESASISisconsistentwithRegulatryGuide1.52(Ref.4)guidaeforfunctionaltesting.REFERENCESl.1CFR50,AppendixA,GDC41.2.SAR,Section[6.5].3.FSAR,Chapter[15].RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision[1].MOGSTSB3.6-144Rev.0,09/28/92 ,ARS(IceCondenser)83.6elB.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHSB3..14AirReturnSystem(ARS)(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDTheARSisdesignedtoassuretherapidreturofairfromtheuppertothelowercontainmentcompartmtaftertheinitialblowdownfoll'owingaDesignBasiscident(DBA).ThereturnofthisairtothelowercompamentandubsequentrecirculationbackupthroughtheicecondenseraQistsincoolingthecontainmentatmosphereandlimitingpoAaccidentpressureandtemperatureincontainmenttoless%thandesignvalues.LimitingpyessureandtemperaturereducethereleaseoffissionprodctradioactivityfromcontainenttotheenvironmentinheeventofaDBA.'IN.TheARSprovidespostaccidentPydrogenmixinginselectedareasofcontainment.TheasspciatedHydrogenSkimmerSystemconsisofhydrogengollectionheadersroutedtopotentialhydrenpockets'4containment,terminatingonthesuctionsidofeitherofthetwoARSfansattheheaderisolationvalves.Themiimumdesignflowfromeachpotentialhydrogenockissufficienttolimitthelocalconcentrationofhyon.TheARSconsistsoftw'eparatetrainsofequalcapacity,eachcapableofmeinghedesignbases.Eachtrainincludesal00%cacityirreturnfan,associateddamper,andhydrogencolectionheagerswithisolationvalves.Each;trainispoweredfromaseparateEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)bus.TheARSfaareautomaticallystartedandthehydrogencollectioheaderisolationvalveareopenedbythecontainmntpressureHigh-Highsign110minutesafterthecontaientpressurereachesthepreuresetpoint.Thetimelayensuresthatnoenergyrelsedduringtheinit'phaseofaDBAwillbypassthe'cebedthroughtheARSfansorHydrogenSkimmerSystem.terstarting,thefansdisplaceairfromeuppercompartmenttothelowercompartment,therebreturningtheairthatwasdisplacedbythehighenergylinebreakblowdownfromthelowercompartmentandequalizgPressuresthroughoutcontainment.Afterdischargeintothelowercompartment,airflowswithsteamproducedbyresialheat(cont'ed)psl\MOGSTSB3.6-145Rev.0,09/28/92z ARS(IceCondenser)83.6.j/BASBACKGROD(contied)throughtheicecondenserdoorsintotheicecondeercompartmentwherethesteamportionoftheflowicondensed.Theairflowreturnstotheuppercompartmentthroughthetopdeckdoorsintheupperportio%ftheicecondensercompartment.TheARSfansoperatentinuouslyafteractuation,circulatingairthroughtheontainmentvolumeandpurgingallpotentialhydrogenpcketsincontainment.Whenthecontainmentpressurfallsbelowaedeterminedvalue,theARSfansareaumaticallydenergized.Thereafter,thefansareautomaticallycycledonndoffifnecessarytocontrolanyadditionalcontinmentpressuretransients.TheARalsofunctions,afterall/heicehasmelted,tocirculate,anysteamstillenterithelowercompartmenttotheupperompartmentwheretheontainmentSpraySystemcancoolit.TheARSisan%SFsystem.isdesignedtoensurethattheheatremovalcapybilityreiredduringthepostaccidentperiodcanbeatRined.eoperationoftheARS,inconjunctionwithteicbed,theContainmentSpraySystem,andtheResidualHePmoval(RHR)Systemspray,providestherequiredheatrevalcapabilitytolimitpostaccidentconditionstolessathecontainmentdesignvalues.APPLICABLE'SAFETYANALYSESForcertainaspectsoftransientaccidentanalyss,maximizing.thecalculatedcontainmentpressureisotconservative.Inparticular,thecoolingeffectivessoff(contued)ThelimitingDBAsconsidererelativetocontainmenttemperatureapdpressurearehelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andtPesteamlinebrea(SLB).TheLOCAandSLBareanalyzedungcomputercodesdignedtopredicttheresultantcontainmentpressureantemperaturetransients.DBAsarassumed'nottooccursimutaneouslyorconsecively.ThepostulatedDBAsreanalyzed,inregardtoESsystems,assumingthelossofneESFbus,whichistheorstcasesingleactivefailurearesultsinonetrneachoftheContainmentSpraySysm,RHRSystem,andAbeinginoperable(Ref.I).TheDBAaalysesshowthatemaximumpeakcontainmentpressureresusfromtheLOCAanalysisandiscalculatedtobelessthantecontainmentdesignpressure.C1WOGSTS83.6-146Rev.0,09/28/92

ARS(IceCondenser)B3.6.BASEAPPLICABLSAFETYANAYSES(continuetheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemduringthecorerfloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasincontainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculation,thecontainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinamanerdesignedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaximie,thecalculatedtransientcontainmentpressures,accordanceith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).Thanalysisforminimuminternalcontaientpressure(i.,maximumexternaldifferentialcoainmentpressure)assuminadvertentsimultaneousactuaionofboththeARSandthContainmentSpraySystem.Tcontainmentvacuumreliefvivesaredesignedtoaccomdateinadvertentactuationfeitherorbothsystem.ThemodeledPSactuationfromecontainmentanalysisisbaseduponaResponsetimeassiatedwithexceedingthecontainmentpreureHigh-HigsignalsetpointtoachievingfullARSairfloAdelayresponsetimeinitiationprovidesconservat'veanalesofpeakcalculatedcontainmenttemperareadpressureresponses.TheARStotalresponsetimeo0secondsconsistsofthebuiltinsignaldelay.TheARSsatisfiesCrteri3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIntheeventofaDBA,onetrai,oftheARSwiththeHydrogenSkimmerSystemisrequidtoprovidetheminimumairrecirculjtionforheatremovaandhydrogenmixingassumedin/hesafetyanalyses.Toensurethisrequirementismet,tAtrainsoftheARSwithtHydrogenSkimmerSystemmjstbeOPERABLE.Thiswillenurethatatleastonetrain11operate,assumingtheworstsesinglefailureoccur,whichisintheESFpowersupply.APPLICABILITYnMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcauseancreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperaturerequiringteoperationoftheARS.Therefore,theLCOisapplicableinDES1,2,3,and4.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequencesofheseeventsarereducedduetothepressureandtemperature(continueWOGSTSB3.6-147 d83.6.14BASEAPPLICABITYlimitationsoftheseNODES.Therefore,theARSinot(continud)requiredtobeOPERABLEintheseNODES.oneoftherequiredtrainsoftheARSsinoperable,itmtberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswitn72hours.Thecornonentsinthisdegradedconditionecapableofproving100%oftheheatremovalanhydrogenskimmingneedsfteranaccident.The72hoCompletionTimewasdevelopdtakingintoaccounttherdundantheatremovalandhydrogenkimmingcapabilityofteOPERABLEARStrainandthelowpbabilityofaDBAoccrringinthisperiod.B.1and8.2IftheARStrainannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequireCompMtionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaNODEiwhchtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,eplantmustbebroughttoatleastNODE3within6hourdtoNODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionmearereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreatheequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsnanordlymannerandwithoutchallengingplasystems.SURVEILLANCEREgUIRENENTSSR3.6.14.VerifyinthateachARSfanstartsanactualorsimulatedactuatipnsignalandoperatesforz1minutesissufficienttoen4rethatallfansareOPERABLEathatallassociatedcontolsand,timedelaysarefunctioninproperly.Italsoensresthatblockage,fanand/ormotorilure,oreessivevibrationcanbedetectedforcoectiveaction.e[92]dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsideingtheknowneliabilityoffanmotorsandcontrolsandthtwotrainredundancyavailable.(contined)MOBSTSB3.6-148Rev.0,09/28/92 ARS(IceCondenser~)B3.6.1BASESSURVEILLAEREQUIREMENT(continued)SR3.6.14.2VerifyingARSfanmotorcurrenttobeatratedspdwiththereturnairdampersclosedconfirmsoneoperangconditionofthefan.Thistestisindicativeoverallfanmotorperformance.SuchinservicetestscfirmmponentOPERABILITY,trendperformance,and/detectinipientfailuresbyindicatingabnormalperformance.TheFreencyof92daysconformswiththetestingrequirementsfors'milarESFequipmentandconsidersttphknownreliablityoffanmotorsandcontrolsapfthetwotrainredundayavailable./SR3.6.14.Verifyingthe0ERABILITYofthereturnairdamperprovidesassurancethattproperflowpp'thwillexistwhenthefanisstarted.Byalyingthecorrectcounterweight;thedamperoperationcabeconfirmed.TheFrequencyof92dayswasdevelopedconsidingthef'importanceofthedampers,theirlocation,physic1enyoronment,andprobabilityof:failure.OperatingexpiehcehasalsoshownthisFrequencytobeacceptable.SR3.6.14.4VerifyingtheOPERAILITYofthmotoroperatedvalveintheHydrogenSkimmerSy'temhydrogencollectionheadertothelowercontainmentf'compartmentprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpat)~willexistwhenthegvalvereceivesanactuationsignal.ThisSurveillancegsoconfirmsthatthetimedelayto/openiswithinspecifiedgolerances.The92dayFreqncywasdevelopedconsideritheknownreliabilityofthemotoroperatedvalvesdcontrolsandthetwotinredundancyavailable.Operat'ngexperiencehasalsoshownthisFrequency,tobeacceptabREFERENCES1.FSAR,Section[6.2].210CFR50,AppendixK.WOGSTSB3.6-149Rev.0,09/28/92 IceBed(IceCondenser).:B3.6.B3.(B3.6.jI'ASESIceBed(IceCondenser)CONTAINHENTSYSTEMSBACKGROUNDTheicebedconsistsofover2,721,600lboicestoredinbasketswithintheicecondenser.ItspriarypurposeistorovidealargeheatsinkintheeventoareleaseofergyfromaDesignBasisAccident(DBincontainment.Thicewouldabsorbenergyandlimitontainmentpeakpreureandtemperatureduringthecidenttransient.Limi'ngthepressureandtemperatereducesthereleaseoffissioproductradioactivityfrocontainmenttotheenvironntintheeventofaDB..Theicecodenserisanannulcompartmentenclosingapproximateg300'fthepimeteroftheuppercontainmentcompartment,Putpenetratitheoperatingdecksothataportionextendsintotheowercontainmentcompartment.Thelowerportionhaserisofhingeddoorsexposedtotheatmosphereofthlowecontainmentcompartment,which,fornormalunitoperat'onaredesignedtoremainclosed.Atthetopoftheicendenserisanothersetofdoorsexposedtotheatmosphereheuppercompartment,whichalsoremaincloseddurngnrmalunitoperation.Intermediatedeckdoors,locedbelbthetopdeckdoors,formthefloorofaplenumattheupperartoftheicecondenser.Thesedoorsalsorymainclosedringnormalunitoperation.Theupperplenumareaisusedtfacilitatesurveillanceandmaintenanoftheicebed.Theicasketsheldintheiceedwithintheicecondenserareaangedtopromoteheattraferfromsteamtoice.Thisarrangementenhancestheiceondenser'sprimaryfutionofcondensingsteamandabrbingheatenergyreasedtothecontainmentduringaBA.IntheeventofaDHA,theicecondenseinletdoors(locatedbelowtheoperatingdeck)openetothepressureriseinthelowercompartment.Thisallowairandsteamtoflowfromthelowercompartmentintotheiccondenser.Theresultingpressureincreasewithintheicecodensercausestheintermediatedeckdoorsandthetopdeckdrstoopen,whichallowstheairtoflowoutoftheiceconnserinto,theuppercompartment.Steamcondensationwithintheicecondenserlimitsthepressureandtemperaturebuilpin(cont'nued)WOGSTSB3.6-150IRev.0,09/28/92 0 iBASESIceBed(IceCondenser)B3.6.BACKGROU(continud)containment.Adividerbarrierseparatestheupperandlowercompartmentsandensuresthatthesteamisrectedintotheicecondenser.Theice,togetherwiththecontainmentspray,s"adequatetoabsorbtheinitialblowdownofsteamandwatfromaDBAandtheadditionalheatloadsthatwouldenrcontainmenturingseveralhoursfollowingtheinitiallowdown.Theaditionalheatloadswouldcomefromtheresidualheatinthreactorcore,thehotpipingandcoonents,andthesecdarysystem,includingthesteamnerators.Duringtheestblowdownperiod,theAirRetnSystem(ARS)returns,uppercompartmentairthrougthedividerbarriertothelowercompartment.Thisservestoequalizepressuresincontainmentandtocontinuecircultingheatedairandsteamfromthetowercompartmentthroutheicecondenserwheretheheatissremovedbytherema'ngice.Asicemelts,hewaterpassthroughtheicecondenserfloordrainsintothelowerompartment.Thus,asecondfunctionoftheqcebedisobealargesourceofboratedwater(viathecogainmensump)forlongtermEmergencyCoreCoolingSyste(ECC6)'andContainmentSpraySystemheatremovalfunctionsint4recirculationmode.AthirdfunctionofPheh,icebedandmeltediceistoremovefissionproductionet$atmaybereleasedfromthecoreduringaDBA.Ioneremovaloccursduringtheicemeltphaseoftheacc'dentandntinuesasthemeltediceissprayedintothcontainmenatmospherebytheContainmentSpraySystem.TheiceisadgstedtoanalkalinepHthatfacilitatesmovalofradioaciveiodinefromthecontainmentatmosphere.ThealhalinepHalsominimizestheoccurrencofthechlorideandclasticstresscorrosiononmechanicsystemsandcomponentsxposedtoECCSandContainntSpraySystemfluidsinerecirculationmodeofoperat'on.Itimportantfortheicetobeunifolydistributedarndthe24icecondenserbaysandforpenflowpathstoeistaroundicebaskets.Thisisespecilyimportanturingtheinitialblowdownsothatthestemandwatermixtureenteringthelowercompartmentdonopassthroughonlypartoftheicecondenser,depletingtheicetherewhilebypassingtheiceinotherbays.WOGSTS83.6-151(ctinued)JRev.0,09/28/92/ IceBed(IceCondenser)B3.6.15BASBACKGUND(cont'nued)Twophenomenathatcandegradetheicebedduringtheongserviceperiodare:a.Lossoficebymeltingorsublimatioh;andb.Obstructionofflowpassagesthroughthe'bedduetobuildupoffrostorice.Bothoftheedegradingphenomenaarereducedbyminimizingairleakageintoandoutoftheicecondenser,eicebedlimitsthetemperatureandessurethatcouldbexpectedfollowingaDBA,thuslimingleakageoffisionproductradioactivityfromcoainmenttotheenvionment.APPLICABLE'AFETYANALYSESThelimit'ngDBAsconsideredrativetocontainmenttemperaturandpressureareelossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)andesteamlinebrak(SLB).TheLOCAandSLBareanalyzedusincomputerco)sdesignedtopredicttheresultantcontinmentpre/'sureandtemperaturetransients.DBAsarenotasmedtoccursimultaneouslyorconsecutively.Althoughtheicecoenserisapassivesystemthatrequiresnoelectricalpoweoperformitsfunction,theContainmentSpraySystemandeSalsofunctiontoassisttheicebedinlimitingpreuresadtemperatures.Therefore,thepostulatedDBAareanalzedinregardstocontainmentEngineeredSetyFeature(ESF)systems,assumingthelossofoneESFs,whichistworstcasesingleactivefailureanresultsinoneaineachoftheContainmentSpraySyemandARSbeinginerable.TheliitingDBAanalyses(Ref.)showthatthemaximumpeakontainmentpressureresultfromtheLOCAanalysisandislculatedtobelessthantheontainmentdesignprssure.Forcertainaspectsoftetransientaccidentalyses,maximizingthecalculatedntainmentpressureisotconservative.Inparticular,theoolingeffectivenessoftheECCSduringthecorerefloodphaeofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswithincreasingcontainmentbakpressure.Forthesecalculations,thecontainmentbackpssureiscalculatedinamannerdesignedtoconservivelyminimize,ratherthanmaximize,thecalculatedtransietcontainment(continued)WOGSTS83.6-152Rev.0,09/28/92 IceBed(IceCondenser)B3.6.15BASAPPLICLESAFETYALYSES(contined)pressures,inaccordancewith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).ThemaximumpeakcontainmentatmospheretemperateresultsfromtheSLBanalysisandisdiscussedintheBesforLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentAirTemperature."Inadditiontocalculatingtheoverallpeakontainmentressures,theDBAanalysesincludecalculionoftheansientdifferentialpressuresthatoccracrossscompartmentwallsduringtheinitiallowdownphaseoftheaccidenttransient.Theinternalntainmentwallsandstructuresaredesignedtowithstandeselocaltransientpressedifferentialsforthelimit'ngDBAs.TheicedsatisfiesCriterion3ftheNRCPolicy'tatement.LCOTheicebedLCOqequiresthexistenceoftherequiredquantityofstorice,apropriatedistributionoftheiceandtheicebed,oenflpathsthroughtheicebed,andappropriatechemicacoentandpHofthestoredice.ThestoredicefunctionsabsorbheatduringaDBA,therebylimitingcontainment'rtemperatureandpressure.ThechemicalcontentanpHftheiceprovidecoreSDM(boroncontent)andremovradictiveiodinefromthecontainmentatmospherewhentemelteiceisrecirculatedthroughtheECCSandtheCoainmentSpaySystem,respectively.APPLICABILITYInMODES12,3,and4,aDBAcldcauseanincreaseincontainmepressureandtemperatuerequiringtheoperationoftheiebed.Therefore,theLCOisapplicableinMODES,2,3,and4.InMES5and6,theprobabilityandcsequencesoftheseevetsarereducedduetothepressureatemperature1itationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,thicebedisnotquiredtobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.MOGSTS83.6-153(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 IceBed(IceCondenser)B3.6.15BAS(continued)ACTIONSA.lIftheicebedisinoperable,itmustberestoredOPERABLEstatuswithin48hours.TheCompletionimewasdevelopedbasedonoperatingexperience,whichnfirmsthatduetotheverylargemassofstoredice,therameterscomprisingOPERABILITYdonotchangeappreciayinthistimeperiod.Becauseofthisfact,theSurvillanceequenciesarelong(months),exceptforeicebedtperature,whichischeckedevery12hos.Ifadegradedconitionisidentified,evenfortemperure,withsuchalargmassoficeitisnotpossiblefothedegradedcondi'ontosignificantlydegradefurherina48hourperiod.Therefore,48hoursisaresonableamountoftimetocorretadegradedconditionbefreinitiatingashutdown.B.1andB.2IftheRequiredtioncannbemetwithintherequiredCompletionTime,eplanmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesotaly.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughtatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5within36hrs.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonpratingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantcondionfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandithouchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.15.1Verifyingatthemaximumtemperureofthe'icebedis([27]'Fnsuresthattheiceisktwellbelowthemeltingpoint.he12hourFrequencywasbaedonoperatingexperince,whichconfirmedthat,duetothelargemassofstorice,itisnotpossibleforthe'cebedtemperaturetogradesignificantlywithina12houperiodandwasalobasedonassessingtheproximityofeLCOlimittoemeltingtemperature.Furthermore,the12hourFrequencyisconsidedadequateinviewofindicationsinthecontrolroom,inclu'ngthealarm,toalerttheoperatortoanabnormaliceedWOGSTSB3.6-154(coninued)Rev.0,09/2892 IceBed(IceCondense'B3.65BESSURVELANCEREOUIRENTSSR3.6.15.1(continued)temperaturecondition.ThisSRmaybesatisfiedbyuseoftheIceBedTemperatureMonitoringSystem.SR3.6.15.2Theweighingprogramisdesignedtoobtaiarepresentativeampleoftheicebaskets.Therepreseativesampleshallilude6basketsfromeachofthe24icecondenserbaysandsh1consistofonebasketfromradiProws1,2,4,6,8,and.Ifnobasketfromadesignate8rowcanbeobtainedforwighing,abasketfromthesamrowofanadjacentbayshallbweighed.Therowsosenincludetherowsnearesttheinsideandoutsidewalsoftheicecondenser(rows1and2,and8and9,respeively),whereheattransferintotheicecondenserisst'likelytoinfluencemeltingorsublimation.rifyingthe.ytotalweightoficeensuresthatthereisadequaticetoabsorbtherequiredamountofenergytomitigatetheDps.Ifabasketisfoundo'contain<[1400]lbofice,arepresentativesamplef20additionalbasketsfromthesamebayshallbeweighedeaverageweightofice'inthese21baskets(thediscrepanbasketandthe20additionalb'askets)shallbe>[1400]lbata95%confidencelevel.Weighing20add'Siona1basketfromthesamebayintheeventaSurveiancerevealsttasinglebasketcontains<[1400]lbesuresthatnoloczoneexiststhatisgrosslydefipientinice.SuchazonecouldexperienceearlymeltutduringaDBAtransit,creatingapathforsteamtossthroughtheicebedit>houtbeingcondensed.TheFreqncyof9monthswasbasedoicestoragetests'ndtheallwancebuiltintotherequiredemassoverandaboveemassassumedinthesafetyanases.Operatingexperencehasverifiedthat,withthe9nthFrequency,theeightrequirementsaremaintainedwitnosignificantdeadationbetweensurveillances.WOGSTSB3.6-155(connued)IRev.0,09/28/92

IceBed(IceCondenser)83.6.1BASSURVEIANCEREQUIRENTS(contined)SR3.6.15.3ThisSRensuresthattheazimuthaldistributionoiceisreasonablyuniform,byverifyingthattheaveraiceweightineachofthreeazimuthalgroupsoficecondeerbaysiswithinthelimit.TheFrequencyof9monthsasbasedonicestoragetestsandtheallowancebuiltinotherequiredicemassoverandabovethemassassumedithesafetyanalyses.Operatingexperiencehasverifdthat,withthemonthFrequency,theweightrequiremensaremaintainedwshnosignificantdegradationbetweesurveillances.Q(.,SR3..15.4ThisSRsuresthattheflowchnnelsthroughtheicecondenseravenotaccumulatednexcessiveamountoficeorfrostblocke.Thevisualipectionmustbemadefortwoormoreflowhannels,periccondenserbayandmustincludethefollowingecificlocaionsalongtheflowchannel:a.Pastthelorinleplenumsupportstructuresandturningvanesb.Betweenicebasts;c.Pastlatticerame.d.Throughthintermeditefloorgrating;ande.Throughhetopdeckflorgrating.ITheallowae[0.38]inchthickui1dupoffrostoriceisbasedonheanalysisofcontainntresponsetoaDBAwithpartiallockageoftheicecondenerflowpassages.Ifaflowcannelinagivenbayisfountohaveanaccumulationoffrstorice>[0.38]inchthick,representativesampleofadditionalflowchannelsfromthsamebaymustbeviallyinspected.ftheseadditionalflowchannelsarealloundtobeacceptable,thediscrepantflowchannelmayeconsideredsingle,unique,andacceptabledeficiency.rethanonediscrepantflowchannelinabayisnotacceptle,however.Theserequirementsarebasedonthesensitivityfthepartialblockageanalysistoadditionalblockage.The(coinued)WOGSTSB3.6-156Rev.0,09/28/92

IceBed(IceCondenserB3.6.BASSURVEILANCEREQUIREHTSSR3.6.15.4(continued)Frequencyof9monthswasbasedonicestoragetstsandtheallowancebuiltintotherequiredicemassoverandabovethemassassumedinthesafetyanalyses.SR3.6.15.5Vifyingthechemicalcompositionoftstorediceensuresthathestoredicehasaboronconcenrationofatleast[180ppmassodiumtetraborateandyhighpH,>[9.0]and<[9.,inordertomeettherequir/ementforboratedwaterwhenthmeltediceisusedintheCCSrecirculationmodeofoperaion.Sodiumtetraborateasbeenproveneffectiveinmaintaingtheboroncontentforlongstorageperiods,anditalsoenhancestheabiliofthesolutiontoremoveandretainfsionproductione.ThehighpHisrequiredtoenhancetheeffectivenessoftheiceandthemeltediceinremovingiodefromthcontainmentatmosphere.ThispHrangealsominimesthecurrenceofchlorideandcaustic!stresscorrosionomech'calsystemsandcomponentsexposedtoECCSandonPainmentSpraySystemfluidsintherecirculationmodeoperation.TheFrequencyof[18]monthswasdeveedconsideringthesefacts:'a~Longtermicestoratestshavedeterminedthatthechemicalcoositionfthestorediceisextremelystable;b.OperatingexperiencehasmonstratedthatmeetingtheboronpfncentrationandpHequirementshasneverbeenaproem;andc.Soonewouldhavetoenterthecontainmenttotaketsample,and,iftheunitistpower,thatpersonouldreceivearadiationdose.S3.6.15.6hisSRensuresthatarepresentativesamplinoficebaskets,whicharerelativelythinwalled,perratedcylinders,havenotbeendegradedbywear,crackcorrosion,orotherdamage.Eachicebasketmusteraisedatleast12feetforthisinspection.TheFrequencof(contiued)MOGSTSB3.6-157Rev.0,09/28/9'

~~~~~L~$~'II~II~~~I~~~I~',~ IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)83.6.1B3.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHS83.6.16IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDTheicecondenserdoorsconsistoftheinletdoors,theintermediatedeckdoors,andthetopdeckdors.Thenctionsofthedoorsareto:a.Sealtheicecondenserfromairleageduringthelifetimeoftheunit;andb.0nintheeventofaDesignasisAccident(DBA)todirctthehotsteamairmixrefromtheDBAintotheiced,wheretheicewoulabsorbenergyandlimitcontamentpeakpressurendtemperatureduringtheaccidentransient.LimitingthepssureandtmperaturefollowingaDBAreducesthereleseoffiionproductradioactivityfromcontainmenttothenvirment.Theicecondenseriannularcompartmentenclosingapproximately300'theperimeteroftheuppercontainmentcompartment,butpeetatingtheoperatingdecksothataportionextendsiothlowercontainmentcompartment.Theinletdoorssepatethetmosphereofthelowercompartmentfromtheicebeinsidethicecondenser.Thetopdeckdoorsareabovtheicebedndexposedtotheatmosphereoftheuppercoartment.Thetermediatedeckdoors,locatedbelowthetpdeckdoors,forthefloorofaplenumattheupperparoftheicecondenserThisplenumareaisusedtofacil'tesurveillanceandmintenanceoftheicebed.Theibasketsheldintheicebewithintheicecondenserarerangedtopromoteheattransfefromsteamtoice.Thiarrangementenhancestheiceconnser'sprimaryfctionofcondensingsteamandabsor'ngheatenergyeleasedtothecontainmentduringaDBAIntheeventofaDBA,theicecondenserietdoors(locatedbelowtheoperatingdeck)opendueothepressureriseinthelowercompartment.Thisallowsarandsteamtoflowfromthelowercompartmentintotheicecdenser.Theresultingpressureincreasewithintheicecondsercausestheintermediatedeckdoorsandthetopdeckdootoopen,(coinued)MOGSTSB3.6-159Rev.',09/292 IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)~B3616BASESBACKGROUN(continu)whichallowstheairtoflowoutoftheicecondenseintotheuppercompartment.Steamcondensationwithinteicecondenserslimitsthepressureandtemperaturebuidupincontainment.Adividerbarrierseparatestheuprandlowercompartmentsandensuresthatthesteamidirectedintotheicecondenser.eice,togetherwiththecontainmentspra,servesasactainmentheatremovalsystemandisadeuatetoabsorbtheinitialblowdownofsteamandwaterfomaDBAaswellastadditionalheatloadsthatwouldntercontainmentdurintheseveralhours'followingtheinitialblowdown.Thead'tionalheatloadswouldcomeromtheresidualheatintherctorcore,thehotpipingndcomponents,andthesecondaryystem,includingthestamgenerators.Duringthepostblwdownperiod,theAirReturnSystem(ARS)returnsuppecompartmentairtoughthedividerbarriertothelowercornrtment.Thissvestoequalizepressuresincontainmentantocontinuerculatingheatedairandsteamfromthelowercpartmentroughtheicecondenser,wheretheheatisremovbytheemainingice.Thewaterfromthemlticedrainsintothelowercompartmentwhereitvesasasourceofboratedwater(viathecontainmentu)fortheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andtCotainmentSpraySystemheatremovalfunctionsintherirculionmode.Theice(viatheContainmentSprayystem)adtherecirculatedicemeltalsoservetocleanthecontaientatmosphere.Theicecondeserdoorsensurehattheicestoredintheicebediseservedduringnorm1operation(doorsclosed)andthatticecondenserfunctisasdesignedifcalledupontotasapassiveheatsinkollowingaDBA.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmentprsureandtemperaturearethelossofolant.accidentOCA)andthesteamlinebreak(SLB).ThLOCAandSLBarenalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtoprdicttheresultantcontainmentpressureandtemperaturtransients.DBAsareassumednottooccursimultaneouslyoconsecutively.(contued)MOGSTSB3.6-160Rev.0,09/28/92

IceCondenserOoors(IceCondens')B3..16BASEAPPLICABSAFETYANYSES(continueAlthoughtheicecondenserisapassivesystemttrequiresnoelectricalpowertoperformitsfunction,thContainmentSpraySystemandARSalsofunctiontoassistticebedinlimitingpressuresandtemperatures.Therefoe,thepostulatedOBAsareanalyzedwithrespecttoEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systems,assumingtheossofoneESFbus,whichistheworstcasesingleactivfailureandesultsinonetraineachoftheContainntSpraySystemadtheARSbeingrenderedinoperable.TheimitingDBAanalyses(Ref.I)swthatthemaximumpeakontainmentpressureresultsfrmtheLOCAanalysisandiscallatedtobelessthanthentainmentdesignpressureForcertainaspectsofransientaccidentanalyses,aximizingthecalculaedcontainmentpressureisnotconsertive.Inparticul,thecoolingeffectivenessoftheECCSuringthecorerloodphaseofaLOCAanalysisincreaseswitincreasingcoainmentbackpressure.Forthesecalculatens,theconainmentbackpressureiscalculatedinaarmerdesgnedtoconservativelyminimize,ratherthanmaxime,thcalculatedtransientcontainmentpressures,inaccoancwith10CFR50,AppendixK(Ref.2).ThemaximumpeakconaimentatmospheretemperatureresultsfromtheSLBanalysanisdiscussedintheBasesforLCO3.6.5B,"Contnment'rTemperature."Anadditionaldsignrequirentwasimposedontheicecondenserdoordesignforasllbreakaccidentinwhichtheflowofatedairandsteaisnotsufficienttofullyopenthedos.Forthisituation,thedoorsaresignedsothatallofthedoorwouldpartially'openbyapoximatelythesameamountThus,thepartiallyopeneddrswouldmodulatetheflowothat-eachicebaywouldreceiveanapproximatelyequfractionofthetotalflow.Tsdesignfeatureensuresthattheheateairandsteamllnotflowpreferentiallytosomeicebayanddepletetheicetherewithoututilizingtheiceinthotherbays.Inadditiontocalculatingtheoverallpeakcont'nmentpressures,theOBAanalysesincludethecalculatioofthetransientdifferentialpressuresthatwouldoccuraoss(continued}MOGSTSB3.6-161IRev.0,09/28/92

IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)B3.6.16IssIsIITheicecondenserdoorssatisfyCriterion3otheNRClicyStatement.APPLICABLsubcompartmentwallsduringtheinitialblowdownpheofSAFETYANALEStheaccidenttransient.Theinternalcontainmentllsand(continuedstructuresaredesignedtowithstandthelocaltrnsientpressuredifferentialsforthelimitingDBAs.LCOThisLestablishestheminimumequipntrequirementstoassureattheicecondenserdoorsprformtheirsafetyfunction.Theicecondenserinletoors,intermediatedeckdoors,andopdeckdoorsmustbeosedtominimizeairleakageintoandoutoftheicecndenser,withitsattendantleageofheatintoeicecondenserandlossoficethroughmelingandsublimion.ThedoorsmustbeOPERABLEtoensutheproperopeningoftheicecondenserintheeventofaBA.OPEBILITYincludesbeingfreeofanyobstructionsthwoullimittheiropening,andfortheinletdoors,beinga'ustdsuchthattheopeningandclosingtorquesarewinlimits.TheicecondenserdoorsfunctionwiththeicedensertolimitthepressureandtemperaturethatcoulbexpectedfollowingaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,,and4,aDBAouldcauseanincreaseincontainmentprssureandtemperarerequiringthe'operationoftheicec9ddenserdoors.Thereore,theLCOisapplicableeMODES1,2,3,and4.TheprobilityandconsequencesoftheeventsinMODES5and6ay4reducedduetothepressureatemperaturelimitationsoftheseMODES.Therefore,teicecondenserdoorarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEintseMODES.IACTIONSNoteprovidesclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateConditionentryisallowedforeachicecondenseroor.MOGSTSB3.6-162(continued)srRev.0,09/28/92!

IceCondenserDoors(IceCondense)B3.6.16BASACTION(contied)A.1Ifoneormoreicecondenserinletdoorsareinperableduetobeingphysicallyrestrainedfromopening,edoor(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin1our.TheRequiredActionisnecessarytoreturnoperiontowithintheboundsofthecontainmentanalysis.Te1hourCompletionTimeisconsistentwiththeACIONSofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"whichrequirescontainmetoberestoredtoERABLEstatuswithin1hour.B.ladB.2Ifonemoreicecondenserdooy'saredeterminedtobepartiallopenorotherwiseinoperableforreasonsotherthanCondiionAorifadoorisfoundthatisnotclosed,itisaccepbletocontinuenitoperationforupto14days,.pro'dedtheicebtemperatureinstrumentationismonitoredonceer4hourstoensurethattheopenorinoperabledoorsnotalowingenoughairleakagetocausethemaximumicebdterneraturetoapproachthemeltingpoint.TheFrequecy4hoursisbasedonthefactthattemperaturechangesnnotoccurrapidlyintheicebedbecauseofthelargassoficeinvolved.The14dayCompletionTimeisasdonlongtermicestorageteststhatindicatethatifeteeratureismaintainedbelow[27]'F,therewouldnoteasign'ficantlossoficefromsublimation.Ithemaximicebedtemperatureis>[27)'Fatanytime,esituationvertstoConditionCandaCompletionT'of48hoursiallowedtorestoretheinoperableoortoOPERABLEsttusorenterintoRequiredActionsD.and0.2.IcebedtperaturemustbeverifiedtobewiinthespecifiedFrequcyasaugmentedbytheprovisisofSR3.0.2.Ifthisvrificationisnotmade,RequirdActions0.1andD.2,notRuiredActionC.1,mustbeten.C1IfRequiredActionsB.lorB.2arenotmet,thedoorsmustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandclosedpo'tionswithin48hours.The48hourCompletionTimeisbaseonthefactthat,withtheverylargemassoficeinvolved,itwouldnotbepossibleforthetemperaturetodecreasetotmeltingMOGSTSB3.6-163Rev.I(cotinued)0>09l28l92 IceConenseroors(IceCondenser)B3.6.BASACTIONSC.1(continued)pointandasignificantamountoficetomeltin48hourperiod.ConditionCisenteredfromConditiononlywhentheCompletionTimeofRequiredActionB.2istmetorwhentheicebedtemperaturehasnotbeenverfiedattherequiredfrequency.D.andD.2IfRquiredActionA.lorCeIcannotbmetwithintherequidqdCompletionTime,theplantstbebroughttoaMODEin/whichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,0eplantmustbebrought4atleastMODE3within6hoursatoMODE5within36hrs.TheallowedCompletionimesarereasonable,asedonoperatingexperience,reachtherequirdplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditiosinanorderlmannerandwithoutchallengingplatsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6.16.1Verifying,bymeansoeInletDoorPositionMonitoringSystem,thattheinltdrsareintheirclosedpositionsmakestheoperatorwareoaninadvertentopeningofoneormoredoors.TheFequencyf12hoursensuresthatoperatorsoneacshiftareareofthestatusofthedoors.SR3.6.16.Verifyinbyvisualinspection,thaeachintermediatedeckdoorislosedandnotimpairedbyicfrost,ordebrisprovidassurancethattheintermediatdeckdoors(whichformeflooroftheupperplenumwhererequentmainenanceontheicebedisperformed)venotbeenleftoporobstructed.TheFrequencyof7dayisbasedoneineeringjudgmentandtakesintoconsiderionsuchctorsasthefrequencyofentryintotheinrmediateicecondenserdeck,thetimerequiredforsignificatfrostbuildup,andtheprobabilitythataDBAwilloccWOGSTSB3.6-164(cnn'need)Rev.0,09/28/92/ IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenserB3.6.6BASSURVEILLCEREQUIREHES(continueSR3.6.16.3Verifying,byvisualinspection,thattheicecdenserinletdoorsarenotimpairedbyice,frost,orebrisprovidesassurancethatthedoorsarefreetoopenintheeventofaDBA.Forthisunit,theFrequencof[18]months[3monthsduringthefirstyearafterreceitoflicense]isasedondoordesign,whichdoesnotallowatercdensationtofreeze,andoperatingexerience,whichin'catesthattheinletdoorsveryraryfailtomeetthei,SRacceptancecriteria.Becausofhighradiationinthevicinityoftheinletdoorsdurigpoweroperation,thisSurveill,anceisnormally.performedbringashutdown.SR3.6.16.4Verifyingthe'qpeningtorqueftheinletdoorsprovidesassurancethatnodoorshavbecomestuckintheclosedposition.Thevalueof[67']in-lbisbasedonthedesignopeningpressureontheda6rsof1.0lb/ft.Forthisunit,theFrequencyof[lh,mon'ths[3monthsduringthefirstyearafterreceiptoflice~]isbasedonthepassivenatureoftheclosingmechanism.i.e.,onceadjusted,therearenoknownfactorsthatwpulck,changethesetting,exceptpossiblyabuildupofice;iP'ebui'Ldupisnotlikely,however,becauseofthedorpdesign/'whichdoesnotallowwatercondensationtoPeeze).Op/ratingexperienceindicatesthattheinletfloorsusuallymeettheirSRacceptancecriteria.Becauseofhighradi'ationinthevicinityoftheinletdoors$6ringpoweroperati'Qn,thisSurveillanceisnormallypeormedduringashutdon.SR3.6z16.5ThetrquetestSurveillanceensuresthatheinletdoorshavgnotdevelopedexcessivefrictionandhatthereturnspngsareproducingadoorreturntorqueithinlimits.Tetorquetestconsistsofthefollowing:l.Verifythatthetorque,T(OPEN),requiredocauseopeningmotionatthe[40]'penpositionig[1957in-lb;(contind)WOGSTSB3.6-165Rev.0,09/28/92 IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenserB3.6.6BASSURVEILNCERE(UIREMTSSR3.6.16.5(continued)2.Verifythatthetorque,T(CLOSE),requiredholdthe'oorstationary(i.e.,keepitfromclosinatthe[40]'penpositionish[78]in-lb;and3.Calculatethefrictionaltorque,T(FRIC)=0.5(T(OPEN)-T(CLOSE)),andverifythatheT(FRICT)is<[40]in-lb.TpurposeofthefrictionandreturnorqueSpecificationsisoensurethat,intheeventofasallbreakLOCAorSLB,allofthe24doorpairsopenuformly.Thisassuresthat,uringtheinitialblowdownpse,thesteamandwatermixturenteringthelowercompartntdoesnotpassthroughpartofheicecondenser,deplet'theicethere,whilebypassingtheiceinotherbays.Forthisunit,theFrequencyf[18]months[3monsduringthefirstyearafterreceioflicense]isbsedonthepassivenatureoftheclosingchanism(i.e.,nceadjusted,therearenoknownfactorshatwouldchgethesetting,exceptpossiblyabuildupoficicebuilpisnotlikely,however,.becauseofthedrdesig,whichdoesnotallowwatercondensationtofeze).OperatingexperienceindicatesthattheinletdoorvyrarelyfailtomeettheirSRacceptancecriteria.ecauseofhighradiationinthevicinityoftheinleoorsduringpoweroperation,thisSurveillanceisno1performedduringashutdown.SR3.6.16.6VerifyingthePERABILITYofheintermediatedeckdoorsprovidesassrancethattheinermediatedeckdoorsarefreetoopeninheeventofaDBA.Theverificationconsistsofvisuallyispectingtheintermedtedoorsforstructuraldeteriorion,verifyingfreemoventoftheventassembl',andascertainingfreevementofeachdoorwhenliftediththeapplicableforceshobelow:(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-166Rev.0,09/28/92

IceCondenserDoors(IceCondenser)B3.6.1BASSURVEILLNCERE(UIREHTSSR3.6.16.6(continued)DoorLitinFolcea0b.c~d.AdjacenttocranewallPairedwithdooradjacenttocranewallAdjacenttocontainmentwallPairedwithdooradjacenttocontainmetwall(.37.4lb33.8lb31.8lb31.0lbTh18monthFrequency[3monthsduringhefirstyearafterreceiptoflicense]isbasedonthepasivedesignoftheinterhediatedeckdoors,thefrequenofpersonnelentryintotiveintermediatedeck,andtheactthatSR3.6.16.2confirmsgona7dayFrequencythathedoorsarenotimpairedhyice,frost,ordebriswhicharewaysadoorwouldfail~(heopeningforcete(i.e.,bystickingorfromincreaseddorweight).SR3.6.16.7.Verifying,byvisuinsection,thatthetopdeckdoorsareinplaceandnot.obsrutedprovidesassurancethatthedoorsareperformingeirfunctionofkeepingwarmairoutoftheicecondenseruingnormaloperation,andwouldnotbeobstructedifcaedpontoopeninresponsetoaDBA.TheFrequencyof9dayssbasedonengineeringjudgment,whichconsidereduchfactosasthefollowing:'a~b.C.Therelat'veinaccessibiityandlackoftrafficinthevicigityofthedoorsakeitunlikelythatadoorwould5inadvertentlylefopen;Excsiveairleakagewouldba,detectedbytemperaturemotoringintheicecondensebandelightconstructionofthedoowouldensurethat,intheeventofaDBA,airandgaspassingthroughtheicecondenserwouldfindaflowath,evenifadoorwereobstructed.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Chapter[15].2.10CFR50,AppendixK.WOGSTSB3.6-167Rev.0,09/28/92 S DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenserB3.6.B3.CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.6.1DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDThedividerbarrierconsistsoftheoperatindeckandassociatedseals,personnelaccessdoors,adequipmenttchesthatseparatetheupper.andlowerontainmentcompartments.DividerbarrierintegritysnecessarytominYjmizebypassingoftheice.condenserythehotsteamandairmixturereleasedintothelowercopartmentduringaDesign~BasisAccident(DBA).Thiseuresthatmostofthegasespcsthroughtheicebed,whicondensesthesteamandlimitspressureandtemperaturduringtheaccidenttransient/Limitingthepressureandtemperaturereducestherelease;offissionproductrdioactivityfromcontainmentXotheenvironmentntheeventofaDBA.IntheeventosDBA,theiecondenserinletdoors(locatedbelowtheoperatigdeck)openduetothepressureriseinthelowergompartpent.Thisallowsairandsteamtoflowfromthelowercomprtmentintotheicecondenser.The.resultingpressureicrasewithintheicecondensercausestheintermediatedeckoorsandthedoorpanelsatthetopofthecondensertope,whichallowstheairtoflowoutoftheicecondensinttheuppercompartment.Theicecondensesthesteasitnters,thuslimitingthepressureandtemperatureildupincontainment.Thedividerbarrierseparatestheuperandlowecompartmentsandensuresthatthesteamisrectedintothicecondenser.Theice,togetherwitthecontainmentsray,isadequatetoabsorbtheinitiallowdownofsteamand.waterfromaDBAaswellastheadtionalheatloadsthat~ouldentercontainmentoversevalhoursfollowingtheintialblowdown.Theadditioalheatloadswouldcomefrotheresidualheatintherectorcore,thehotpipingandmponents,andthesecoarysystem,includingthesteamnerators.Duringtheostblowdownperiod,theAirReturnSystem(ARS)reurnsuppercompartmentairthroughtheividerbarriertotelowercompartment.Thisservestoequaizepressuresinontainmentandtocontinuecirculatingheatdairandsteamfromthelowercompartmentthroughtheicecoenser,wheretheheatisremovedbytheremainingice.DividerbarrierintegrityensuresthatthehighergyfluidsreleasedduringaDBAwouldbedirectedthrghthe(contued)WOGSTSB3.6-168Rev.0,09/28/92, BASDividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)B3.6.7BACKGRO0(contind)icecondenserandthattheicecondenserwouldfunionasdesignedifcalledupontoactasapassiveheatinkfollowingaDBA.+z..APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESDividerbarrierintegrityensuresthefunconingofeicecondensertothelimitingcontainntpressureandtperaturethatcouldbeexperiencedfoowingaDBA.Thelim'tingDBAsconsideredrelativetoctainmenttemperatureandessurearethelossofcoolantcident(LOCA)andthesteaminebreak(SLB).TheLOCAanSLBareanalyzedusingcompute~codesdesignedtopredictheresultantcontainmentpressure+ndtemperaturetransien.DBAsareassumednottooccursultaneouslyorconseutively.Althoughthevecondenserispassivesystemthatrequiresnoelectricalpwertoperfoitsfunction,theContainmentSpraySystemandheARSalofunctiontoassisttheicebedinlimitingpressesandemperatures.Therefore,thepostulatedDBAsarenaled,withrespecttocontainmentEngineeredSafetyFeae(ESF)systems,assumingthelossofoneESFbus,whichtheworstcasesingleactivefailureandresultseinoperabilityofonetraininboththeContainmenSpraSystemandtheARS.ThelimitingDBAnalyses(Rf.I)showthatthemaximumpeakcontainmenpressurerestsfromtheLOCAanalysisandiscalculatedobelessthantecontainmentdesignpressure.TmaximumpeakcontnmenttemperatureresultsfromtheSanalysisandisdiscusedintheBasesforLCO3.6.5,"ContainmentAirTemperure."Inaddiiontocalculatingtheoveralleakcontainmentpresses,theDBAanalysesincludecallationofthetranentdifferentialpressuresthatoccacrosssubompartmentwallsduringtheinitialbldownphaseoftaccidenttransient.Theinternalcontaientwallsandructuresaredesignedtowithstandtheselo1transientpressuredifferentialsforthelimitingDBAs.Thedividerbarriersatisfies'Criterion3oftheCPolicyStatement.MOGSTSB3.6-169(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92, r~~DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenserB3.6.SES(continued)LCOThisLCOestablishestheminimumequipmentrequirentstoensurethatthedividerbarrierperformsitssafefunctionofensuringthatbypassleakage,intheeventofaDBA,doesnotexceedthebypassleakageassumedintheaidentanalysis.IncludedaretherequirementsthathepersonnelaccessdoorsandequipmenthatchesinthediderbarrierareOPERABLEandclosedandthatthedividebarriersealisproperlyinstalledandhasnotdegradedwihtime.Anexceptiontotherequirementthatthedosbeclosedisadetoallowpersonneltransitentrytoughthedividerrrier.Thebasisofthisexception'stheassumptiontht,forpersonneltransit,thetimeduringwhichadoorisopenwillbeshort(i.e.,shortertntheCompletionTimeofIourforConditionA).Thed'derbarrierfunctionswith'ticecondensertolimittpressureand'temperaturethatcodbeexpectedfollowingaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,aBAcouldcauseanincreaseincontainmentprsureandmperaturerequiringtheintegrityofthedividerbrrier.herefore,theLCOisapplicablein.MODES',2,3,an4.TheprobabilityandnsequencesoftheseeventsinMODES5and6arelowduetepressureandtemperaturelimitationsofthe.MOS.Assuch,dividerbarrierintegrityisnotequireintheseMODES.ACTIONSA.1Ifoneororepersonnelaccessorsorequipmenthatchesareinoprableoropen,exceptforersonneltransitentry,Ihoursallowedtorestorethedoo(s)andequipmenthatchtoOPERABLEstatusandthecledposition.TheIhoCompletionTimeisconsistentwhLCO3.6.1,"Coainment,"whichrequiresthatconta'nmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinIhour.onditionAhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotetopovideclarificationthat,forthisLCO,separateCoitionentryisallowedforeachpersonnelaccessdoororeqipmenthatch.(connued)MOGSTSB3.6-170Rev.0,09/28/92 0 DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenser)83.6.17BASACTIONS(contind)8.1Ifthedividerbarrier.sealisinoperable,1hoursallowedtorestorethesealtoOPERABLEstatus.The1hCompletionTimeisconsistentwithLCO3.6.1,wichrequiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatwithin1hour.C.andC.2IfRe'qyiredActionsA.landB.lcannotemetwithintherequir4CompletionTime,theplantmstbebroughttoaMODEinhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,tplantmustbebroughtatleastMODE3within6hoursantoMODE5within36hrs.TheallowedCompletion'sarereasonable,asedonoperatingexperiencetreachtherequlrdplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditioninanorderlmannerandwithoutchallengingplansystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.6.17.1Verification,byvis1rspection,thatallpersonnelaccessdoorsandeqpmenthatchesbetweentheupperandlowercontainmentompartmetsareclosedprovidesassurancethatdividerbarrerintegriismaintainedpriortothereactorbeingtenfromMODEtoMODE4.ThisSRisnecessarybecasemanyofthedrsandhatchesmayhavebeenopenedfrmaintenanceduritheshutdown.SR3.6.1.2Verifition,byvisualinspection,thathepersonnelaccesdoorandequipmenthatchseals,selingsurfaces,andalimentsareacceptableprovidesassuranthatdividerbaierintegrityismaintained.Thisinsptioncannotbemdewhenthedoororhatchisclosed.Thereore,R3.6.17.2isrequiredforeachdoororhatchhathasbeenopened,priortothefinalclosure.Somedoorsndhatchesmaynotbeopenedforlongperiodsoftime.Thosthatuse,resilientmaterialsinthesealsmustbeopenedaninspectedatleastonceevery10yearstoprovideasuranceMOGSTSB3.6-171(contied)Rev.0,09/28/9

DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondenserB3.6.7BASSURVEILNCEREQUIREMTSSR3.6.17.2(continued)thatthesealmaterialhasnotagedtothepoinofdegradedperformance.TheFrequencyof10yearsisbasdontheknownresiliencyofthematerialsusedforses,thefactthattheopeningshavenotbeenopened(tousewear),andoperatingexperiencethatconfirmsthatthsealsinspectedatthisFrequencyhavebeenfoundtobeaceptable.SR.6.17.3Verifiation,byvisualinspection,aftereachopeningofapersonn1accessdoororequipmenhatchthatithasbeenclosedmestheoperatorawaretheimportanceofclosingitandtheebyprovidesadditioalassurancethatdividerbarrierintrityismaintainwhileinapplicableNODES.SR3.6.17.4Conductingperiodiphyicalpropertytestsondividerbarriersealtestconsprovidesassurancethatthesealmaterialhasnotdegredinthecontainmentenvironment,includingtheeffecirradiationwiththereactoratpower.Therequirdtessincludeatensilestrengthtest[andatestforongatio.TheFrequencyof[18]monthswasdevelopedcsideringchfactorsastheknownresiliencyofesealmateralused,theinaccessibilityofthesealsandabsenceoftrafficintheirvicinity,andtheunitconditnsneededtoperformtheSR.OperatingexperienceasshownthatthesemponentsusuallypasstheSurveillacewhenperformedatth[18]monthFrequency.Therefor,theFrequencywasconcluedtobeacceptablefromareliilitystandpoint.SR3.6.17.5isualinspectionofthesealaroundthepeimeterprovidesassurancethatthesealisproperlysecurediplace.TheFrequencyof[18]monthswasdevelopedconsideingsuchfactorsastheinaccessibilityofthesealsandbsenceoftrafficintheirvicinity,thestrengthofthebotsandmechanismsusedtosecuretheseal,andtheunitcditionsneededtoperformtheSR.Operatingexperiencehasbown(contied)WOGSTSB3.6-172Rev.0,09/28/92i-DividerBarrierIntegrity(IceCondense)B3.617BAESSURVELANCERE(UIRENTSSR3.6.17.5(continued)thatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillncewhenperformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.Therere,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefroareliabilitystandpoint.REFERENCESFSAR,Section[6.2].WOGTSB3.6-173Rev.0,09/282I ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondense)B3.618B.6CONTAINMENTSYSTEMSB3.18ContainmentRecirculationDrains(Ice'ondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDThecontainmentrecirculationdrainsconsisoftheicecondenserdrainsandtherefuelingcanalains.Theicecondenserispartitionedinto24bays,ehhavingapairofinletdoorsthatopenfromthebottompenumtoallowtheotsteamairmixturefromaDesignBisAccident(DBA)toetertheicecondenser.Twentyofe24bayshaveanicecoenserfloordrainatthebottomodrainthemeltediceintthelowercompartment(inthe4baysthatdonothavedrainthewaterdrainsthroughhefloordrainsintheadjacebays).Eachdrainleatoadrainpipethatdropsdownseralfeet,thenmakeseormore90'endsandexitsintthelowercompartmnt.Acheck(flapper)valveattheendfeachpipekeepwarmairfromenteringduringnormaloperaion,butwhenhewaterexertspressure,itopenstoallothewaterspillintothelowercompartment.isprevetswater.frombackingupandinterferingwiththeicondenserinletdoors.Thewaterdeliveredtothewecontainmentservestocoolthe.atmosphereasitfsthroughtothefloorandprovideasourceofboratedweratthecontainmentsumpforlongtermusebytheErgcyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)andtheContainmentSpraSysteduringtherecirculationmodeofoperation.Thetworefuingcanaldr'nsareatlowpointsintherefuelingcal.Duringarfueling,plugsareinstalledinthedrainsandthecanalisfodedtofacilitatetherefuelinprocess.Thewatertstoshieldandcoolthespentfelasitistransferredromthereactorvesseltostorag.After'refueling,theca1isdrainedandtheplugr'emoved.IntheeventofaA,therefuelingcanaldra'arethemainreturnpathtotelowercompartmentforCoainmentSpraySystemwatersprayeintotheuppercmpartment.Theicecondenserdrainsandtherefuelincanaldrainsfunctionwiththeicebed,theContainmentpraySystem,andtheECCStolimitthepressureandtemperatuethatcouldbeexpectedfollowingaDBA.MOGSTSB3.6-174(coninued)/Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenser)B3.6.18BASEScontinued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALESThelimitingDBAsconsideredrelativetocontainmenttemperatureandpressurearethelossofcoolantaident(LOCA)andthesteamlinebreak(SLB).TheLOCAdSLBareanalyzedusingcomputercodesdesignedtopredictheresultantcontainmentpressureandtemperatureransients.BAsareassumednottooccursimultaneouslynsecutively.Althoughtheicecondenseriapassivesternthatrequiresnoelectricalpowertperformitsfuntion,theContainmentSpraySystemantheAirReturnSyst(ARS)alsofunctiontoassisttheicebedinlimitingpressesandtemperatures.ThereforetheanalysisofthepostulaedDBAs,withrespecttoEngieredSafetyFeature(ESF)syems,assumesthelossofoeESFbus,whichistheworstcassingleactivefailurearesultsinonetrainoftheContainentSpraySystemandetrainoftheARSbeingrenderedinorable.ThelimitingDBanalyses(Re.I)showthatthemaximumpeakcontainmentressurereultsfromtheLOCAanalysisandiscalculatedtolesstnthecontainmentdesignpressure.ThemaxiumpecontainmentatmospheretemperatureresultsomheSLBanalysisandisdiscussedintheBasesforLCO.5,"ContainmentAirTemperature."Inadditiontocalcul'ngtheoverallpeakcontainmentpressures,theDBAaalysincludecalculationofthetransientdifferenalprsuresthatoccuracrosssubcompartmentwasduringtheinitialblowdownphaseoftheaccidenttrasient.TheinternalcontainmentwallsandstructuresareesignedtowistandtheselocaltransientpressurediffentialsfortheimitingDBAs.ThecontaientrecirculationdrassatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPicyStatement.LCOThiLCOestablishestheminimumrequireentstoensurethatthcontainmentrecirculationdrainsperftheirsafetyfctions.TheicecondenserfloordrainlvedisksmusteclosedtominimizeairleakageintoandotoftheicecondenserduringnormaloperationandmustopintheeventofaDBAwhenwaterbeginstodrainout.ThefuelingcanaldrainsmusthavetheirplugsremovedandrmaincleartoensurethereturnofContainmentSpraySystemtertothelowercontainmentintheeventofaDBA.Thecontainmentrecirculationdrainsfunctionwiththeie(contied)WOGSTSB3.6-175Rev.0,09/28/92j ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondens)B3..18BASELCO(contind)condenser,ECCS,andContainmentSpraySystemtoimitthepressureandtemperaturethatcouldbeexpectedollowingaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,aDBAcouldcausanincreaseincontainmentpressureandtemperature,whhwouldrequireeoperationofthecontainmentrecircationdrains.Trefore,theLCOisapplicableinHOES1,2,3,and4.TherobabilityandconsequencesofheseeventsinMODES5and6arelowduetothepressuredtemperaturelimita'onsoftheseMODES.Assch,thecontainmentrecircutiondrainsarenotreiredtobeOPERABLEintheseHODS.ACTIONSA.1Ifoneicecondeerflordrainisinoperable,1hourisallowedtorestorthedraintoOPERABLEstatus.TheRequiredActionisessarytoreturnoperationtowithintheboundsofthectainmentanalysis.The1hourCompletionTimeisoistentwiththeACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,"Containment,"wh'chruiresthatcontainmentberestoredtoOPERABLEstatswithi1hour.B.1Ifonereclingcanaldrainiinoperable,1hourisallowedrestorethedraintoPERABLEstatus.TheRequireActionisnecessarytoturnoperationtowithinthebondsofthecontainmentanasis.The1hourComptionTimeisconsistentwitheACTIONSofLCO3.6.1,whirequiresthatcontainmentbertoredtoOPERABLEstusin1hour.C.landC.2IftheRequiredActioncannotbemetwithinherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhich'heLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethistatus,theontinued)MOGSTSB3.6-176Rev.0,09/28/92gi

ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenser)B3.6.1/BASEACTIONSC.1andC.2(continued)IplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3withinhoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletonTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toeachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowercoitionsinanrderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplansystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.6.18.1YerifyinnttheOPERABILITYofthereclingcanaldrainsensuresthattheywillbeabletoerformtheirfunctionsintheeventtrjaDBA.ThisSurveianceconfirmsthattherefuelingcahaldrainplugshavbeenremovedandthatthedrainsareclearofanyobstructionsthatcouldimpairtheirfunctioning.5additiontogebrisnearthedrains,attentionmustbgiventoanydebristhatislocatedwhereitcouldbemovedothedjainsintheeventthattheContainmentSprayStempsinoperationandwaterisflowingtothedrainSR3.6.18.1mustbeperformedbeforeenteringMODE4fromDE5aftereveryfillingofthecanaltoensurethatthepgsh,havebeenremovedandthatnodebristhatcouldipair/hedrainswasdepositedduringthetimethecanalwafilled.gThe92dayFrequencywasdevelopedconsidingsuchfctorsastheinaccessibilityofthedrains,thabsenceoftrfficinthevicinityofthedrains,andtredundancyof4edrains.SR3.6.1.2Verify'theOPERABILITYoftheicendenserfloordrainsensurthattheywillbeabletoperfmtheirfunctionsintheventofaDBA.Inspectingthedraivalvediskensuresththevalveisperformingitsfunctionfsealingthedainlinefromwarmairleakageintotheiecondenseruringnormaloperation,yetwillopenifmetedicefillsthelinefollowingaDBA.Verifyingthattherainlinesarenotobstructedensurestheirreadinesstoainwaterfromtheicecondenser.The[18]monthFrequencwasdevelopedconsideringsuchfactorsastheinaccess'bilityofthedrainsduringpoweroperation;thedesignofthicecondenser,whichprecludesmeltingandrefreezingofheice;andoperatingexperiencethathasconfirmedthathe(continued)WOGSTSB3.6-177Rev.0,09/28/92 ContainmentRecirculationDrains(IceCondenserB3.68BASSURYEILNCEREQUIREETSSR3.6.18.2(continued)drainsarefoundtobeacceptablewhentheSurvllanceisperformedatan[18]monthFrequency.Becausefhighradiationinthevicinityofthedrainsdurinpoweroperation,thisSurveillanceisnormallydoduringashutdown.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section[6.2).WOGSVSB3.6-178Rev.0,09/28/92

ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondenserB3.6.98.6CONTAINHENTSYSTEHSB3.19ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondenser)BASESBACKGROUNDTheshieldbuildingisaconcretestructureatsurroundsthesteelcontainmentvessel.Betweentheontainmentvesselandtheshieldbuildinginnerwallsanannularpacethatcollectscontainmentleakageatmayoccurllowingalossofcool'antaccident(LA).Thisspacealallowsforperiodicinspectionoftheoutersurfaceoftheteelcontainmentvessel.TheShgldBuildingAirCleanupSyem(SBACS)establishesanegativelyressureintheannulusetweentheshieldbuildingandtheselcontainmentvessel.Filt'ersinthesystemthencontrothereleaseofraoactivecontaminantstotheenvironment.TheshieldbuilngisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurerettionofconta'nmentleakageandproperoperationofthSBACS.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESj1..ThedesignbasisforieldbuildingOPERABILITYisaLOCA.HaintainingsldbuildingOPERABILITYensuresthatthereleaseofradictematerialfromthecontainmentatmosphereisrestictedothoseleakagepathsandassociatedleakaratesaumedintheaccidentanalyses.TheshieldbuiingsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOShieldbildingOPERABILITYmustbeaintainedtoensureproperperationoftheSBACSandtomitradioactiveleakafrom.thecontainmenttothosepthsandleakagerateassumedintheaccidentanalyses.APPLICABILITYaintainingshieldbuildingOPERABILITYprevensleakageofradioactivematerialfromtheshieldbuilding.adioactivematerialmayentertheshieldbuildingfromthentainmentfollowingaLOCA.Therefore,shieldbuildingOPEILITYisrequiredinHODESI,2,3,and4whenasteamlineeak,(contied)WOGSTSB3.6-179Rev.0,09/28/92 ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondenseB3.69BASAPPLICALITY(contind)LOCA,orrodejectionaccidentcouldreleaseradioctivematerialtothecontainmentatmosphere.InMODES5and6,theprobabilityandconsequeesoftheseeventsarelowduetotheReactorCoolantSysemtemperatureandpressurelimitationsintheseMODES.Trefore,shieldbuildingOPERABILITYisnotrequiredinHO5or6.ACTIONSA.IIntheeventshieldbuildingOPERABITYisnot'maintained,shieldhildingOPERABILITYmustbrestoredwithin24hours.Twenty-fourhoursisareasonableCompletionTimeconsiderinthelimitedleakageesignofcontainmentand..thelowprobilityofaDesigBasisAccidentoccurringduringthist'period.B.landB.2IftheshieldbuildigannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCpletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEin'chtheLCOdoesnotapply.ToachievethisstatusthelantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hosandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletioTimesareasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,torachthereqiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditioinanorderlmannerandwithoutchallengingpntsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.6..1Verify'ngthatshieldbuildingannulusegativepressureiswithilimitensuresthatoperationrema'withinthelimitassedinthecontainmentanalysis.The2hourFrequencyofhisSRwasdevelopedconsideringopera'ngexperience'ratedtoshieldbuildingannuluspressureariationsandressureinstrumentdriftduringtheapplicabMODES.WOGSTSB3.6-180(contiued)Rev.0,09/28/92I ShieldBuilding(DualandIceCondens)B3..19BASESSURVEILLAEREOUIREMEN(continueSR3.6.19.2MaintainingshieldbuildingOPERABILITYrequiremaintainingeachdoorintheaccessopeningclosed,excepthentheaccessopeningisbeingusedfornormaltrans'ententryandexit(thenatleastonedoormustremaincloed).The1dayFrequencyofthisSRisbasedonenneeringjudgmentadisconsideredadequateinviewofthetherindicationsofoorstatusthatareavailabletotheperator.SR3.&.19.3ThisSRw'dgiveadvanceindicatipnofgrossdeteriorationoftheconcetestructuralintegriPyoftheshieldbuilding.TheFrequencofthisSRisthemeasthatofSR3.6.1.1:Theverificatsnisdoneduringhutdown.SR3.6.19.4TheabilityofaSBAPtrnwithfinalflow<[]cfmtoproducetherequirednivepressure>0.5inchwatergaugeduringthetestorationwithin[22]secondsprovidesassurancethatthebuidiisadequatelysealed.Thenegativepressurepreentseakagefromthebuilding,sinceoutsideairwillberawninbythelowpressure.Thenegativepressurestbeestglishedwithinthetimelimittoensurethatnoignificantqantityofradioactivematerialleaksfmtheshieldbildingpriortodevelopingthenegativeprsure.REFERENCESNone.WOGSTSB3.6-181Rev.0,09/28/92 JI ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentDChapters3.7-5.0VolumeVll h~,j,~~~iHSSVs3.7.13.7PLANTSYSTEHSLCO3.7.1074eSl3.7.1MainSteamSafetyValves(HSSVs)Eio~SSsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.ACTIONS---NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.CONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneormoreHSSVsinoperable.A.1ducepowerto1tharequaotheapplica.RTLlistsn../'3.7.'l-l.4hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.Oneormem'eneratohlessthawo]HSSRABLE.8.1ANDB.2BeinMODE3.BeinMODE4.T6hours12hoursbhssv(s5+PAP-A8s.C7 Pl,~5?~8t1A,tI'I'I SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEMSSYs3.7.1pnowW~~~~~Wa<z~pqo0~SFRE(UENCYSR3.7.1.1------NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformed1Verifeach~~PHSSVliftsetpoint~inaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Followingtesting,liftsettingsshallbewithin+1%.)P~InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramvA4vBhlghhQQQ.ti'd%S~Wg37.)3sopPZS>i3g'g5Wl$33wlO3six.3Si9<<WO,li40~%86.rTS-3o72 0-HSs.7.1Table3.7.1-1(page1of1)OPERABLEHainSteamSafetyValvesversuApplicablePowerinPercentofRATEDTHEPOWERNINIHUNNROFHSSVsPERSTEANGTORRE/VIREOOPERAAPPLICABLEPOWER('FoRTP)3g100~800<40)3.7-3 MSSVs3.7.Table3.7.1-2(page1of1)MainSteamSafetyValveLiftSettingsVALVENUMBERSTEAMGENERATOR¹2[¹3][¹LIFTSETTING(psig+[3]%)3.7-4 ~~*~eMSIVs3.7.23.7PLANTSYSTEMS~~~12ogaaaLCO3.7.2APPLICABILITY:MODE"13.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs~LNo-0+~~~~~~rMSIVsshallbeOPERABLE.~~obio~-~Mrs~~yet~ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTION'OMPLETIONTIMEHSIVinoperableinA.lRestoreHSIt~f8]boorsOPEBLstatus.B.RequiredActindassociateompletionTimeConditionAmet.B.lODE2.6hours~~,'ai7>.iia7'7.;qII7+.Vith------NOTE-----SeparCon'nentryisedforeacIV.One~~9IV~inoerable'~no~-~Mr~~~Cy~4ANDhg.2CloseHSI.VerifyHSIVisclosed.web~~Mae8.g.+~X%~.OnceperCRdaysZl(continued)3.7-5 )V%'l\DamPa&srn~~Vcxhv~HSIVs~3.7.2ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHECgf.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCondition8notmet.ANDC$.2Bein'MODE3.BeinHODE4.6hours12hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.2.1---------NOTE----'--------Onlyrequiredoand2.inMODES1SVericlosuretimeofeachHSIVissecondsn-a~~~~~~aQ.~~v,~~iInaccordancewiththegfnserviceTestinProram3.7-6 Insert3.7.2.1D..Oneormorevalvesinoperableinflowpathfromeachsteamgenerator.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately '6P'-v=.~~HFRVs+ndAssociatedBypassValves+3.7.3LCO3.7.3$1e;3.7PLANTSYSTEMS'Pu~>v~a<~amFW4s~~~3.7.3HainFeedwater'alves(g~)andHainFeedwaterRegulationValves(HFRVs)~andAssociatedBypassValve+~<~cahhFPQsvs~~'HFRVs~ndassociated"bypassvalvershallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODESI,2,+and3.IVHFRV,[orasypassvave>sclosed'iated'bvalve]ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEMF~o<sA.Oneormoreinoperable.A.IuseANDa~~g4.WFPsyvtM.F'PiUV(gQQv~hoursA.2VerifyisclosedOnceper@~daysB.OneormoreHFRVsinoperable.B.1CloseorisolateMFRV.ANDZhoursa%%vB.2VerifyHFRVisclosedOnceperorisolated.SgaysQp(continued)3~77RQV-. MFPa4,FRVs~andAssociatedBypassValvesg-3.7.3ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Ogeormore~FRYbypassvalvesinoperable.C.lClosebypassvalve.ANDC.2Verifybypassvalveisclosed(5p~a.EaXs+~hoursOnceperRdays3)D.Twovalves>~he-sme-~~flowpathinpaours7h.;qRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.QrM~~Mwg8Ou-BeinMODE3.ND.2BeinMODE4.6hours12hoursJ.ill.~3.').3.\SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.3.1VerifytheclosuretimeofeachH~MFRVgandg~&gbypass.valvegis~~secondsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.InaccordancewiththeuserviceTestinProramSC'3,2,3,2,3.'7-8 ~~Insert3.7.3.1E.OneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable.ORE.lEnterLCO3.0.3.ImmediatelyOneormoreMFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV'ypassvalve(s)inoperable. 3.7.43.7PLANTSYSTEMSRc.kt(kAR.z3.7.4AtmosphericjjjijtjpValves()LCO3.7.4shallbeOPERABLE.Ag-VsAPPLICABILITY:MODESl~ACTIONS~ba~4AAgcAL~mCrotah~~t~~chest~~~Nt(Tsocv.tash+CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.Oneinoperable.~~~iiAel----'----NOTE---------LCO3.0.4isnotapplicable.gg.vRestoretoOPERABLEstatus.7daysC~~QRVsR"Twor-m~w~~BV-l+n,inoperae.C'n~Cc.ch>.O,PZVtWilia~.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.va\'to<Csh~&'m43~hWlBeinMODEAN~So@FC.2BeinMODEtrelianceamratorforheatremoval.Whoursours3.7-9 07tYtSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCE~~oPVSR3.7.4.1completecycleofeach~amv.3.7.4FREQUENCYIPgmonths>~.'SR3.7.4.2Veriyonblock[18]months3.7-10 AFWSystem3.7.53.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)System~eso~~A,~QA~Q+VEL~LCO3.7.5~Ze.;Phree+AFWtrainsshallbeOPERABLE.--------------NOTEOnlyoneAFWtrain,includesisrequiredtobeOPERABrivenpump,APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and+.O.'az~ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneturbinedrivenAFW~inoperable.~a~ahaog.ci~~gA.ltoOPERABLEstatus..~bI~d'ri'Igg~osvUgrkr~v~Eh~~;m7days10daromdisceoffa'retoettheLCOgn~e~2.0.5.t90.e'rB.traininoperabeE1,2or3[forreasons'otherthanConditionA].B.lRestoreAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatusANDurs10daysfromdiscoveryofuretomeet(continued)3.7-11 Insert3.7.5.1B.TurbinedrivenAFMtraininoperable.ORTwomotordrivenAFWtrainsinoperable.ORB.lRestoreoneAFMtrainorturbine'drivenAFWtrainflowpathtoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursOneturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathandonemotordrivenAFWtraininoperabletooppositesteamgenerators(SGs).C.OneSAFWtraininoperable.C.lRestoreSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.14daysD.BothSAFWtrainsinoperable.D.lRestoreoneSAFWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.7daysE.AllAFMtrainsandflowpathstooneormoreSGsinoperable.E.lRestoreoneAFWtrainorflowpathtoeachaffected'SGtoOPERABLEstatus.4hours AFWSystem3.7.5ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME6,C.,acr6'O~aFRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeforConditionA~~@aotmet.TwoAFinsinoableE2or3.BeinMODE3.AND.2BeinMODE4.6hoursIhours.QThreePAFWtrainsinoerableCzrSAFEbeam---------NOTE--------LCO3.0.3andallotherLCORequiredActionsrequiringMODEchangesaresuspendedoneAFWtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.InitiateactiontorestoreoneAFWraintoOPERABLEstatusImmediatelySO'hE.RequiredinoperableinMODE4.InitiateactiontoOPERABLEstatus.Im3.7-12 AFWSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.5.1gsar~VerifyeachAFWmanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalveineachwaterflowpath,~andinbothsteamsupplyflowpathstothe~turbinedrivenpump,~hatisnotlocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysgo.;,SR'.7.5.2-----------NOTE------------Notrequireobeperformetheturbinedrivenntil[24hours]after>[1000ginsteamgeneratl~~~~iVl~~figre~~saO~h'SiSR30.sv3.7.5PVerifythedevelopedheadofeachAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanorequaltotheedhead.4CseBAEQstos~+CANmossVerifyeachAFWautomaticvalveactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactuaorsimulatedactuationsignal.a~=egSTA0TESgQmonths~$0'SR3.7.5~--------------NOTE----------Notrequ)tobeperforortheturbinedrivenuntil[24hours]after>[100sagsnsteamgenerVerifyeachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalV~months(continued),3.7-13 Insert3.7.5.2NOTEOnlyrequiredtobeperformedpriortoenteringNODEIfortheturbinedrivenAFWpump.Insert3.7.5.3SR3.7.5.3VerifythedevelopedheadofeachSAFWpumpattheflowtestpointisgreaterthanor.equaltotherequireddevelopedhead.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramSR3.7.5.4PerformacompletecycleofeachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheServiceMaterSystem,eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedisolationvalve,andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve.InaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram AFMSystem3.7.5SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.5.ifyproperalignmentoftherequiredAFWthsbyverifyingflowfromtcondensatestonktoeacgenerator.PrionteringNODE2,wheneverunithasbeeninE5or6for>ysrSR3,).s'.7~ax-g~~~s5(~~Q~~4mXX~Q./13.7-14 CSTF3.7.63.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.6CondensateStorageTankt(CS>)peaACt.eSi.;;LCO3.7.6TheCS8~m~sha11beAPPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,and3.L\~laACTIONSCONDITIONasaaasasua'La~REQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME8<~iwA.CSTQ~~notwithinlimit.A.1Verify'yadministrativemeansOPERABILITYofbackupwatersupply.ANDwasets'ayuA.2RestoreCSTQtowithinlimit.4hoursOnceer12outereaft7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE6hoursIl.IPQhours3.7-15 CST~3.7.6SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.6.1VerifytheCST~is>12-hours3.7-16 ~'p.~~~~CCWSystem3.7.73.7PLANTSYSTEMSLCQ3.7.73.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)System+c.~%aorsWw~TwoCCWtrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCCWtraininoperable.A.l--------NOTE-------erapplicableCon'tionsand=RequirAct'sofLCO3.4.'RCSLoops-OD4,"forresialheatmovallosmadeinopeleCCW;RestoreCCWtraintoOPERABLEstatus.72hoursB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours3.7-17 Insert3.7.7.8C.TwoCCWtrain'sorloopheaderinoperable.C.lInitiateActiontorestoreoneCCWtrainorloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus.ANDC.2BeinHODE3.ANDC.3BeinHODE4.Immediately6hours12hours CCWSystem3.7.7SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.7.1NOTE-------------------Isolation,ofCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheCCWinoperable.(gQ+nxan(~headerVerifyecCCWmanual~power~oerated~PvalveineflowpatPrservicingelatedequipment,thatisnotloce,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.7.2ifyeachCCWautomaticvalveinthew-pathaestothecorrectpo'4-'n-anactualorsimdactual'ignal.18]monthsSR..'erifyeachCCWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.months/3.>.v.z.ei~l~on~Re~~0cAanh~~oaWMI3.7-18 3.7.83.7PLANTSYSTEMS(p~)3.7.8ServiceWatewSystemsz.;LCO3.7.8TwoSCftrainsshallbeOPERABLE.~SWSaoqMa~APPLICABILITY:MODES1;2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME83.gA.OneSWS-traininoperable.A.1RestoreSW&traintoOPERABLEstatus.--------NOTES-------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredAetiosofLCO3.8.1,"ACources-0crating,"foremrgencyieselgenratoradeinoprabebySWS.2.Enter1icableCond'osandReqredctionsofCO3.4.6,SLoopsDE4,"foresidualheatremovalloopsmadeinoperablebySWS.72hours(continued)3.7-19

S~S~4vuu3.7.8ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet;B.lBeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.8.1-NOTEIsolationofS4flowtoindividualcomponentsdoesnotrendertheinoperable.g~locggQ~an4opt~MCVerifyeachSCfmanual,poweroerae,automaticvalveintheflowpatservicingequipment,thatisnotoce,seaed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,isinthecorrectposition.31daysSR3.7.8.2VerifyeachSl4Pautomaticvalveintheflowathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.pa>,wonPaQQmonthsII'sz.;SR3.7.8.3VerifyeachS~pumpstartsautomaticallymonthsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.3.7-20 Insert3.7.8.1C.TwoSMtrainsorloopheaderinoperable.C.lInitiateActiontorestoreoneSWtrainorloopheadertoOPERABLEstatus.ANDC.2BeinMODE3.ANDC.3BeinMODE4.Immediately6hours12hours UHS3.7.97PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.UltimateHeatSink(UHS)LCO3.9TheUHSshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY.MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecoolingtowerswithonecoolingtowerfaninoperable.A.1Restorecoolingower,fan(s)toOPEBLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociated'CompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.B.1BeinODE3.AND6hoursORUHSinoperable[forreasonsotherthanConditionA].B.2iMODE5.36hoursSURVEILLANCEREgUIREMESSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.9.1erifywaterlevelofUHSisZ[562]ft[meansealevel].[24]ours(contiued)MOGSTS3.7-21Rev.0,09/28/92 (3RVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREgUEUHS'SR3.9.2VerifyaveragewatertemperatureofUHSis<[90]'F.24hosSR3.7.9.3Operateeachcoolingtowerfanfor[15]minutes.31daysSR3.7.9.4Verifyachcoolingtowerfanstartsautomat>allyonanactualorsimultedactuationignal.[18]monthsMOGSTS3.7-22Rev.0,09/28/92 3.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.~ControlRoomEmergenc9'8j-."LCO3.7.QP'ystem(C.R<~%5shallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MDDESI,2,3,4,d5,and6,gDuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME<'iA.3.P.RMC.&c~igraininoperable.Cg&l~4t+a&YPAWEB.'lPYA.'IRestoretoOPERABLEstatus.~~~~~>.'\.l9SMrs.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA~a.anotmetinMODEI,2,3,or4.8.1BeinMODE3.ANDk2BeinMODE5.6hours36hours85.VSRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofCgnditioncDYlLnotmet+inMODE5orruriovema'tembli~08~&8~4hmM+<)~Ck~Ol~F;traine.RABL------NOTE-------Plaintoxigasproteiondeifautomatiransfertotoxigproteionmeisinorable.Immediately(continued)347-23 Insert3.7.9.1ORA.2--------NOTE---------Thecontrolroommaybeunisolatedfor<1hourevery24hourswhileinthiscondition.48hoursPlaceisolationdampersinModeF.Insert3.7.9.2B.-------NOTE-------SeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachdamper.B.l.RestoreisolationdampertoOPERABLEstatus.7daysOneCREATSisolationdamperinoneormoreoutsideairflowpathsinoperable. ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME(continued)C-PCA~i~i~ow4C5~P~.KlSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.MNDK-2.$2+Snspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyTwoinoperabeinMODE1,2,3,or4.ff.lEnterLCO3.0.3.Immediately8S'.v'iP."TwoinoperablenMODE5or6,or~uringmovemento'firradiatedfuelassemblies.SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.NDF,~~.E.+~pSuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyp(~Hi~<Ža~s~~~Qde~~SURVEILLANCEREgUIREMENSURVEILLANCEC~ATSWK~Ovt.~amFREQUENCY0crateeachCREFStrainforcoeosstemswsminutes~eaters31days(continued)3.7-24 <RCsot~i8M3.7.~SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYCO~sossZSR3.7.~.2PerformrequiredfiltertestinginaccordancewiththeentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)~Inaccordancewith~FTPP+QC.PE'MSR3.7..3VerifyeachWRZF'ctuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.?VggmonthsSR3.7.'KA~~ifyoneCREFStraincanmaintainaposit)v'of>[0.125]incheswgauge,relativeto+@cga-{onebuilding]durinssuriz~a>5trmedoper~amakeupflowrateof3000]cfm.[18onAGGEREDTESTBASIS3.7-25 CREATC3.7.117PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.1ControlRoomEmergencyAirTemperatureControlSystem(CREATCS)LCO3.11TwoCREATCStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITMODES1,2,3,4,[5,and6,]Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblis.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneCREATCStraininoperable.A.lRestoreCRECStraintoOPERABstatus.30daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmetinMODE1,2,3,or4.B.lANDB.2BeiMODE3.inMODE5.6hours36hoursC.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet[inMODE5or6,or]duringmovementofirrad'edfuelassemblies.ORPlaceERABLECREATCSaininoperation.C.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDC.2.[2]Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelyontinued)WOGSTS3.7-26IRev.0,09/292/ CREATCS3.7.11ACONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIOTIMED.TwoEATCStrainsinopebleinMODE1,2,3,o4.D.1EnterLCO3.0.3.Immed'elyE.TwoCREATCSainsinoperable[iMODE5or6,or]durinmovementofirra'atedfuelassemblies.E.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDE.[2]Suspendmoventofirradiateduelassemblie.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLAEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.11.1VerifyeachCATCStrainhsthecapabilityremovetheassedheatload.[18]monthsWOGSTS3.7-27Rev.0,09/28/92~/ ~~iC'~~a.'7PLANTSYSTEMSECCSPREACS3.7.123..12EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)PumpRoomExhaustAirCleanSystem(PREACS)LCO3.12TwoECCSPREACStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY.MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneECCSPREACStraiinoperable.A.1RestoreECCSEACStraintoOPBLEstatus.7daysB.RequiredActionandassociated'ompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeiMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursfSURVEILLANCEREUUIRENENTSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.12.1OpeateeachECCSPREACStrainfor[10continuoushours.withtheheaterscratingor(forsystemswithoutheaters)Z15minutest.31dayscontinued)IMOGSTS3.7-28.jRev.0,09/282 g~a.;SVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEECCSPREACS3.7.1FRE(UEYSR3.7.2.2PerformrequiredECCSPREACSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththe[VentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)].Inacrdancewithhe[VFTP]SR3.7.12.3VeifyeachECCSPREACStrainactuatesonanctualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18]monthsSR3.7.12.4VerifyonECCSPREACStraincanmaiainapressure<-0.125]incheswatergagerelativetotmosphericpressureringthe[postaccidenmodeofoperatioataflowrateof<[3000'fm.[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.7.12.5VerifyeachECCSPREPSfterbypassdampercanbeclosed.[18]monthsWOGSTS3.7-29ilRev.0,09/28/9& ~a'zm3e7o3.7PLANTSYSTEMS'IO3.7.Q>tOLCO3.7.438.'>>Avt,lt~R'e,i4tv~~i~u~r>t~(pl<VghallbeOPERABL.~Advs2%itAPPLICABILITY:ACTIONSttAv)ty/iDuringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthe~Suildingo~eC~~~O.h~>'4e,.Auxt4~Quih4i'mg~aaM~~h<404~cs'><caManaero,Aa~SCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneFBACStrain.inoperable.storeFaysGG.iB.RequiActionandassocidCompletionTimeConditionAnotmetinMODEI,2,3,or4.ANDB.BeinMODB.lBeinMODE3.6hours36hoursORTwoFBACStra'noperainMODEI,2,or4.C.ReqActionandassociatetionTime[ofConditionnotmetduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthefuelbuilding.C.lPlaceOPERABLEFBACStraininoperation.ORSuspendmoveofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthefuelbuilding.ImmediatelyImmediately(continued)3.7-30 ~RQssACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHERevs,~Sinoerablur)noof'diatedfueliesinthebuilding.Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthe~Shilding.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCERENDUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.7.13.eachFBACStrainfor[>10cont)nwiththeoperatingor(for1ers)89,'i'i)SR3.7.~.2S~~W~~%~~0gg~S~~PerformrequiredfiltertestinginInaccordanceaccordancewiththeentilationFilterwiththegVFTPP-TestingProgram(VFTP)P.SR3.7.13.3Verifyea~actualors'nactuateso1monthsSR3.7.foneFBACStraincanmaintainapressure5incheswateraurespecttoatmosheeuringthemodeofoperationwrate<[20000]cfm[18]moGGEREDTESTBASISBa.i,S%G.~.i.l~~~'~8<<5is~a~cdo~continued)3.7-31 SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEfREQUENCYSR3.7.13.5VericanbeFi1terbamonths3.7-32 PREAC3.7.43.7ANTSYSTEHS3.7.14enetrationRoomExhaustAirCleanupSystem(PREACS)LCO3.7.14TwoPREACStrainsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:ODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONA.OnePREACStraininoperable.RE(UIREDACTIONA.lRestorePREACtraintoOPERABLEtatus.COHPLETIONTIHE7daysB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.B.lBeinDE3.AND8.2BnMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.7.14.1OperateachPREACStrainfor[z10ontinuoushourswithheatersoperingor(forsystemswithoutheaters)>1minutes].31daysSR3.7.14.2PerformrequiredPREACSfiltertestinginaccordancewiththefVentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)].Inacordancewithe[VFTP](contined)WOGSTS34733Rev.0,09/28/ PREA3.74SVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQNCYSR3.7..3VerifyeachPREACStrainactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18monthsSR3.7.14.4rifyonePREACStraincanmaintainaprsureg[-0.125]incheswatergaugerelagivetoatmosphericpressureduringefpostMccident]modeofoperationatalowrateo<[3000]cfm.[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISSR3.7.14.5VerifyeachPACSfilterbypassdamper'canbeclosed.[18]monthsWOGTS3.7-34Rev.0,09/28/92 ~~4,~v~SFFWaterLevel3.7."I~Sp~~~So..3.7PLANTSYSTEHSSFF3.7.@Fuel(gvpr+PoolWaterLevel~llLCO3.7.48.Thewaterlevelshallbe~23ftoverthetopofirraiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.SFPAPPLICABILITY:Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthe5je9~o.;ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHE5o.'waterlevelnotwithinlimit.A.l------NOTE--------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.SuspendmovementofImmediatelyirradiatedfuelassembliesinthe~~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY,",PP'~80~1LlSR3.7.M.I~so.lVerifythe'Raterlevelis-23ftabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.(QaE3'days3.7-35 s~iBoronConcentration3~7~la~q%g~g~boronconcentrationshallbe'.7PLANTSTEMSS~3.7.Fue($6+~~PoolBoronConcentrationPPLCO3.7.8PThe9t.)'gandperformedthe~!SFPCOMPLETIONTIMEREQUIREDACTIONCONDITIONAPPLICABILITY:Whenfuelassembliesarestoredinthe5QPverificationhasnotbeensincethelastmovementoffuelassembliesin\IACTIONS/sFporonconcentrationnotwithinlimit.--------NOTE------"-LCO3.O.3isnotapplicable.A.lSuspendmovementoffuelassembliesins&PthImmediatelyANDA.2.1Initiateactiontosrerestore@i@boronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelyJ-mi~~~a~~W~$QQV~w+CJI53hb~~ORA.2.2rifybyadistrativemes[Regi2]fuelstorageolverificatihasbeenperformsithelastvemento+fuelasmbliesinthe~elstoragepool.Immediately3.7-36 ~ps~SF&BoronConcentration307~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEPPSR3.7.AP:IVerifytheboronconcentrationiswithin.limit.FREQUENCYRays3.7-37 PLANTSYSTEMSp(set>CQP,qzrA3.7.&-SpentFuel~I~Storage~aceStorage3.7.GsLCO3;7.efinitialenrichmentandburspentfuelassemblysosallbewithintheAcceptableBinofFigure3.7.3.7.vi.lncewithSpecification4.3.1.1.Cg9'Z.'si,APPLICABILITY:ACTIONSWheneveranfuelassemblisstoredintheCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.RequirementsoftheLCOnotmet.A.1-----NOTE-------LCO3.0.3isnotapplicable.Initiateactiontomovethenoncomplyingfuelassemblyfrom~cx~4cImmediately9z.ii)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEc3SR3.7.MMVerifybyadministrativemeanstheinitialenrichmentandburnupofthefuelassemblyIisinaccordancewithFigure3.7.-l~3~~~~FREQUENCYPriortostoringthefuelassemblyin+egion23.7-38 Insert3.7.13.1FuelassemblystorageintheSFPshallbemaintainedasfollows:gQ,ila~b.FuelassembliesinRegion1shallhaveak-infinity<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditions;andFuelassembliesinRegion2shallhaveinitialenrichmentandburnupwithintheacceptableareaoftheFigure3.7.13-1.Insert3.7.13.2SR3.7.13.1--NOTENotrequiredtobeperformedwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.Verifybyadministrativemeansthek-infinityofthefuelassemblyis<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditions.PriortostoringthefuelassemblyinRegion1 SpentFuelAssemblyStorage3.7.174030n2520co15CCKO10ACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAINUNACCEPTABLEBURNUPDOMAIN01.5.02.53.03.54.04.55.0INITIALENRICHMENT,%U-235NottobeusedforOperation.Forillustrationpurposesonly.Figure3.7.17-1(page1of1)FuelAssembly'BurnupLimitsinRegion23.7-39 SecondarySpecificActivity3.7.K3.7PLANTSYSTEMS3.7.~SecondarySpecificActivityLCO3.7.%"Thespecificactivityofthesecondarycoo1antsha11be<+0.10+yCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME83.'i'iA.Specificactivitynotwithinlimit.A.1BeinMODE3.ANDA.2BeinMODE5.8WhoursQO~hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRFQUENCYSR3.7.~1Verifythespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantis<g.lepCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.31days3.7-40 MSSVs83.7.1B3.7PLANTSYSTEHS83.7.1HainSteamSafetyValves(MSSVs)BASESc~o.><<vuswv'SSV.PSOS,'3$'ii,~W<9,~--~$ca-Ao~(SCCAero.d%"'dir~NOR.".'S~O.~$~X~~ZS<6~Kcs~So~~P.neo.iv"~~Wo~BACKGROUND(.~+~So.it~~xc~h.gJ<~~~~~94i.~~~nott\~>OO(ich~ri~~-4g~g'heprimarypurposeoftheHSSVsistoprovideoverpressureprotectionforthesecondarysystem.TheHSSVsalsoprovideprotectionagainstoverpressurizingthereactorcoolantpressureboundary(RCPB)byprovidingaheatsinkfortheremovalofenergyfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)ifepreerre+eatsink,providedby'thegondenserandgirculatinggateruSstemisnoailable.IMSSVsa~relocateoneacma~~YtFamheader,outsidecontainment~~upstream'ofthemainsteamisolationvalves(Ref.1).WPeefSddd-dd~dTes4~8-Thed~ddd..~'d<<"ne~ee~valveswillactuate.Staggeredsetpointsreducethepotentialforvalvechatteringthatisduetosteampressureinsufficienttofullyopenallvalvesfollowinga.turbin/reactortrip.SCq(continued)APPLICABLEThedesignbasisfortheHSSVsSAFETYANALYSESiistolimitthesecondarysystem'pressureto<110%ofdesignpressurewhenpassing100%ofdesignsteamflow.Thisdesignbasisissufficienttocopewithanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrence(QRQoraccidentconsideredintheDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysis.TheeventsthatchallengetherelievingcapacityoftheHSSVsdthusRCSpressure,arethosecharacterizedasdecreasedeovalevents74.sV.oRef..0these,thefullpowerm.isthelimitinThiseventasoormaleedwaterftothe~~s.~84lO%dO~u+h"..(sod<~~lo~~CkoThetransientresponsefor'thoutadirect?r,<v.creactortrippresentsnohazardtotheintegrityoftheRCS~~~)~OS'W+gfMTS-83.7-1 BASE~M~~~~~buds>5'7o,~~H~~5HSSVs4-~~~'m~~~,ppv&u~Žmdmgya~me.g~~)>og.M~~.vagg.~.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)ortheHainSteamSystem.'Ifaminimumreac'is'gpressurizerpressure.Inth,thepres'fetyvalvesopen,ndRCSureremainsbelow110%oftheesalue.slres7t.iv.gl4.iv,a,maximumreviyeeacisassume;OlistriovertemperaturehT.Thenucleatboilingrati.,'easesoutthetransient,andnevedropsbelowits'ue.PressurizerreliefvalvesandHSactivatedaneve'ir'ndsecondarysyste~heHSSVsareassumedtohavetwoactiveanoneassivefailuremodes.Theactivefaiuremoesarespuriousopening,andfailuretorecloseonceopened.ThepassivefailuremodeisfailuretoopenupondemanAlA'~'4~QTheHSSVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOIl.<Y.474.>>TheaccidentanalysisrequiresfourHSSVspersteamgeneratortorovideoverressurerotectionfordesinasisransiensoccurrina.RTnHSSVwileredinoperabeifitfailstoopenond.TheLCOrequihatfiveHSSVsbeOPERABL'ompliancewithReference2,evehthisisrequirementoftheDBAanalysis.ThisisoperationwithlessthanthefullnumberofHSSVsiresli'onsonallowableTHERHALPOWEReetASHECoderequire.TheselimitatiareaccordingtoTable3.7.1-1inteaanyingLCO,andReuiredActionA2TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdefinedasthaiittoopenwithinthesetpointtolerances,relieveoverpressure,andreseatwhenpressurehasbeenreduced.TheOPERABILITYoftheHSSVsisdeterminedbyperiodicsurveillancetestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.sa.a.~.i.tTheliftsettings,accordingto.intheaccompanyingLCO,correspondtoambientconditionsofthevalveatnominaloperatingtemperatureandpressure.(continued)B3.7-2 HSSVs83.7.1BASESLCO(continued)APPLICABILITYl4.iv,hTh'isLCOprovidesassurancethattheMSSVswillperformtheirdesignedsafetyfunctionstomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinachallengetotheRCPBotSword+5qg~InHOD'PthenumberofHSSVsmgeneratorrequiredtobeaccordingtoTable3.7.1-1intheacngLCO.BeoMODESI,2,nytwoHSSVspersteamgeneratorarer'beOPERABLE.SGRInMODES4and5,therearenocredibletransientsrequiringtheHSSVs.ThearenotnormallyusedforheatremovalinMODES5and6,andthuscannotbeoverpressurized;thereisnorequirementfortheHSSVstobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.ACTIONSTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachHSSV.A.1WithoneormoreMSSVsinoperablereucepowersothattavaiaeSreiev>ngcapacitymeetsReference2requirementsfortheapplicableTHERMALPOWER.OperanwithlessthanallfiveHSSVsOPERABforeachsteamgentorispermissible,ifTHERMALERisproportionalimitedtothereliefcapstyoftheremainingHSSVs.isisaccomplisheyrestrictingTHERMALPOWERsothaeenergytsfertothemostlimitingsteamgenerator'oteaterthantheavailablereliefcapacityinthatsteanerator.Forexample,ifoneHSSVisinoperableinestegenerator,thereliefcapacityofthatsteamneratoriscedbyapproximately2N'.Tooffsetthieductioninrelicacity,energytransfertothatearngeneratormust'esimrlyreducedbyatleast20.Thisisaccomplishedby.reduceTHERMALPOWERbyaeast20%,whichconservativelylimitstenergytnsfertoallsteamgeneratorstoapproximatelyoftocapacity,consistentwiththereliefcapacityoftmostlimitingsteamgenerator.(continued)B3.7-3 Insert3.7.1.1InMODES1,2,and3,fourHSSVsperSGarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethat,theRCSremainswithinitspressuresafetylimitandthatthesecondarysystem,fromtheSGstothemainsteamisolationvalves,islimitedto<110%ofdesignpressureforallDBAs.Insert3.7.1.2theassumptionsusedintheaccidentanalysisforlossofexternalloadmaynolongerbevalidandthesafetyvalve(s)mustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.ThisConditionspecificallyaddressestheappropriateACTIONStobetakenintheeventthatanon-significantdiscrepancyrelatedtotheHSSVsisdiscoveredwiththeplantoperatinginMODES1,2,or3.Examplesofthistypeofdiscrepancyincludeadministrative(e.g.,documentationofinspectionresults)orsimilardeviationswhichdonotresultinalossofHSSVcapabilitytorelievesteam.The4hourCompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimeforcorr'ectionofadministrativeonlyproblemsorfortheplanttocontacttheNRCtodiscussappropriateaction.The4hourCompletionTimeisbasedon-engineeringjudgement.ThisConditionisnotapplicabletoasituationinwhichtheabilityofaHSSVtoopenorrecloseisquestionable.Inthisevent,thisConditionisnolongerapplicableandCondition-BofthisLCOshouldbeenteredimmediatelysincenocorrectiveactionscanbeimplementedduringMODES1,2,and3. HSSVsB3.7.1BASESACTIONSA.l(continued)reachsteamgenerator,ataspecifiedpressure,thefrtionalreliefcapacity(FRC)ofeachHSSVisdetermedasllows:FRC=-Bwhere:A=theeliefcapacityoftheHSSV;ndB=thetolreliefcapacityofatheHSSVsofthesteamgeerator.TheFRCisthereliccapacitynecesarytoaddressoperationwithreducedTHERMALPOWThereducedTHERMALPOWElevelintheLCOpreventoperationatpowerlevelseaerthanthereliefcapacityoftheremainingHSSVs.TheducedTHERMALPOWERisdeterminedasfollows:RP=1-N1xFRC1+NxFRC2+~+N5xFRC5x100%where:RP=RedudTHERMALPOWERforthestlimitingsteamgenatorexpressedasapercenofRTP;NN~,...NsrepresentthestatusoftheSV1;2,...,5,rspectively,0iftheHSSVisOPERABLE,1iftheHSSVisinoperable;F'FRC~,...,FRC,=thereliefcapacityoftheHSV1,,...,5,respectively,asdefinedabove.(continued)B3.7-4 HSSVsB3.7.1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.landB.2IftheHSSQ)cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTimpXe.~themusteaceina0inwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,the'Qj3mustbeaMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredQjgtconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~systems.passwaypt~.74,ttSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.1.1ThisSRverifiestheOPERABILITYoftheMSSVsbytheverificationofeachHSSVliftsetpointinaccordancewithInserviceTestingProgram.TheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.~,requiresth'atsafetyandreliefvalvetestsbeperformedinaccordancewithANSI/ASHEOH-1-1987(Ref.~~.AccordingtoReference+thefollowingtestsarerequired:a.Visualexamination;b.Seattightnessdetermination;c.Setpointpressuredetermination(liftsetting);d.Compliancewithowner'sseattightnesscriteria;ande.Verificationofthebalancingdeviceintegrityonbalancedvalves.TheANSI/ASHEStandardrequiresthatallvalvesbe'testedevery5years,andaminimumof20%ofthevalvesbetestedevery24months.TheASHECodespecifiestheactivitiesandfrnecessarytosatisfytherequirements.allowsa.setointtolerancefor+)0,~OPERABILITY;however,thevavesarereseoxl/duringtheSurveillancetoallowfordrift.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotethatallowsentryintoandoperationinMODE3priortoperformingtheSR.TheMSSVsmaybeeitherbenchtestedortestedinsituathot(continued)B3.7-.5 MSSVsB3.7.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.1.1(continued)conditionsusingan.assistdevicetosimulateliftpressure.IftheMSSVsarenottestedathotconditions,theliftsettingpressureshallbecorrectedtoambientconditionsofthevalveatoperatingtemperatureandpressure.REFERENCESO.'2.2-81.~FSAR,SectionGede-,&~n-HI,+7c.4o~+FSAR,Sectiong5.2P~A.ASM'randPressureVesselCode,SectionXI~ANSI/ASMEOM-1-1987.83.7-6 HSIVsB3.7.2B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSw7.viiB3.7.2HainSteamIsolationValves(HSIVs~a.4~~BASES(+5i~~QBACKGROUND3o+.2.,/7.Vaaoiwt4uK'VlKQq~7).va.oCREAM~~closure.>fromthe~scandSCcMRS'~~HSIVlosingtheHSIVsisolateseach~,.~ther~andisolatestheturbine,therauxiliarysteamsulieshe~*F43s~~S~~~ismh~signalgeneratedhighcontainmenteHSIVscloseonamainsteamisolationbyeitherressureX~>>.2.'3~.v...3TheHSIVsisolatsteamflowromthesecondarsideofthesteameneratorsfollowinaHSIVclosur~b~Sac.HSIVislocatedineachmainsteamlineouside~containmen.TheHSIVsaredownstreamfromtheearnsaevaves(HSSVs)andauxiiareewater(AFWum'teamsuly,tJ~gnarl~CAcfotPCnKM~~~~dL/ML~$'~35~")to~imaebud~5~htnhil-fo~~M+Mogg+gQlA~~~~pu~~o~b.&5lvs,be+y~gg%.I~g~<W~~tu~~p~g~loSGQgb~APPLICSAFETYANALYSES>n~Q.7.<,gIy'~Worn~l~avesloseacuatemanuaSIVS.eHSsmAesSectionsisf~g~<Id~aac~~egiv~Wa9v'R.~(3~vThe~desinbasisoftheHSIVsisesaise~co'argeLiscusseine,ecion(Ref.2.alsoaffectedbytheaccidentsofeeventspres'heFSonf15.1.5](Ref.3).Thedesignrblowdownofmorethanonesteamge,assumingasinglecomponente.ofoneHSIVtocloseod).e'aseforthecontainmentanalinsidecontainmeniepowerfollowingturbinetriureoftheI~affectedsteam(continued)B3.7-7

Insert3.7.2.2isnecessarytoisolateaSGaffectedbyasteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventorasteamlinebreak(SLB)tostopthelossofSGinventoryandtoprotecttheintegrityoftheunaffectedSGfordecayheatremoval.TheHSIVsareairoperatedswingdiskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbyanairoperatoragainstspringpressure.TheHSIVsareinstalledtousesteamflowtoassistintheclosureofthevalve(Ref.I).Insert3.7.2.3,highsteamflowcoincidentwithlowT.,andsafetyinjection(SI),or>high-highsteamflowcoincidentwithSI.Q~ Insert3.7.2.4q~q,,a.TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity(Ref.2).TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).Themostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafety.injectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delapingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHSIVontheintactSGforthiscaseisassumedtoclosetopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.HTheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolantmaximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizestheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.Duetothenon-returncheckvalveonthefaultedSG,reverseflowfromthesteamheadersdownstreamoftheHSIVand'fromtheintactSGispreventedfromcontributingtotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.Thischeckvalveisapassivedevicewhichisnotassumedtofail.SLBsoutsideofcontainmentcanoccurintheIntermediateBuildinganddownstream'ftheHSIVsintheTurbineBuilding.ASLBinpiping>6inchesdiameterintheIntermediateBuildingisnotrequiredtobeconsideredduetoanaugmentedpipinginspectionprogram(Ref.3).ForaSLBintheTurbineBuilding,theMSIVsonbothSGsmustclosetoisolatethebreakandterminatetheevent.TheMSIVsarealsocreditedinaSGTReventtomanuallyisolatetheSGwiththerupturedtube.Inadditiontominimizingtheradiologicalreleases,thisassiststheoperatorinisolatingtheRCSflowthroughtherupturedSGbypreventingtheSGfromcontinuingtodepressurizeandcreatingahigherpressuredifferencebetweenthesecondarysystemandtheprimarysystem.TheHSIVsarealsoconsideredinotherDBAssuchasthefeedwaterlinebreakinwhichclosureoftheHSIVontheintactSGmaximizestheeffectofthebreaksincetheenergyremovalcapabilityoftheintactSGwouldbereduced.qg,Vl,InadditiontoprovidingisolationofafaultedSGduringaSLB,feedwaterlinebreak,oraSGTR,theHSIVsalsoserveasacontainmentisolationbarrier.'heMSIVsarethesecond'ontainmentisolationbarrierforthemainsteamlinepenetrationswhichusethesteamlinesandSGsinsidecontainmentasthefirstbarrier.TheHSIVsdonotreceiveanautomaticcontainmentisolationsignalsinceaspurioussignalcouldresultinasignificantplanttransient. 7~~Vits~/@apart(~~HSIVs~83.7.2BASESPPLICABLESETYANALYSES(ntinued)s7.v,.'Algeneratortoclose.Atlowerpowers,thesteamgeneratorinventoryandtemperatureareattheirmaximum,maximizigtheanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetothecontainmen.DuetoreverseflowandfailureoftheHSIVtoclose,headditionalmassandenergyinthesteamheadersdowntreamfromtheotherHSIVcontributetothetotalreleas.Withthemostreactiverodclustercontrolassemblyasmedstuckinthefullywithdrawnposition,thereisaninceasedpossibilitythatthecorewillbecomecriticalndreturntopower.ThecoreisultimatelyshutdownbytboricacidinjectiondeliveredbytheEmergencyCoreCoingSystem.T+accidentanalysiscomparesseveraldiferentSLBeventsagainstdifferentacceptance.criteria.elargeSLBoutsigecontainmentupstreamoftheHSIislimitingforoffsithdose,althoughabreakinthisshortsectionofmainsteamheaerhasaverylowprobabily.ThelargeSLBinsideconainmentathotzeropoweisthelimitingcaseforapostipreturntopower.eanalysisincludesscenarioswitoffsitepoweravaiable,andwithalossofoffsitepowerfollowingturbinerip.Withoffsitepoweravailable,therectorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolantthroughthsteamgerators,maximizingtheReactorCoolantSystemcoolwn.Whalossofoffsitepower,theresponseofmitigatinsysemsisdelayed.SignificantsinglefailuresconsideincludefailureofanHSIVtoclose.TheHSIVsserveonlysafety,functionandremainopenduringpoweroperaticn.These+valvesoperateunderthefollowingsituations:a.AnHELBindecontainment.jgordertomaximizethemassandergyreleaseintocogainment,theanalysisassumesattheHSIVintheaffeatedsteamgeneratorremainopen.Forthisaccidents0nario,steamisdischgedintocontainmentfromallteamgeneratorsuntitheremainingMSIVsclose.AfteHSIVclosure,stmisdischargedintocontainmentonfromtheIaectedsteamgeneratorandfromtheresv(ualsteami'nthe,mainsteamheaderdownstreamofthee1osedSIVsintheunaffectedloops.ClosureoftRHSIVsisolatesthebreakfromtheunaffectedsteamgenerators.'continued) ~+ahy't3a~4kloe.-~~~~V~HSIVs~83.7e2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)b.AbreakoutsideofcontainmentandupstreamfromtVsisnotacontainmentpressurizationconcern.Thencontrolledblowdownofmorethanonesteamgenerormustbepreventedtolimitthepoten'uncontrledRCScooldownandpositivereact'tyaddition.losureoftheHSIVsisolatesebreaklimitsthebdowntoasinglesteamnerator.c.AbreakdownstreaoftheHSIVs'eisolatedbytheclosureoftheMVs.forandl~~VtCh.LCOt~Vi~Cbhstva3tat~+Q,S&~r~~an~~'rtAaea-~w~c3~v~ok~~~d.Followingasteamgeneratuberupture,closureoftheHSIVsisolatesthuptbeedsteamgeneratorfromtheintactsteamgrators.+Inadditiontominimizingradiogicalreleasesss.thisenablestheoperatortontainthepressurebfthesteamgeneratorhtherupturedtubebelotwtheHSSVsetpoin,anecessarysteptowardisolingtheflowthrotherupture.IjeHSIVsarealsoutilizedduringothereventsuchasafeedwaterlinebreak.ThiseventislesslimitingsofarasHSIVOPERABILITYisconcerned.e.TheMSIVssatisfCr'ftheNRCPoliQ,~m-~W~V~V~~~MSwŽ4ThisLCOrequiresthat~~MSIVsintheteamlinesbeOPERABLE.TheHSIVsareconsideredOPERABLEhenth~~isolationtimesarewithinlimits~andtheycloseonanisolationactuationsignal.~wee,ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheHSIVswirmtheirdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoffsiteexosurescomarabletothe10CFR100(Ref..4)limits.APPLICABILITYVi.6+WaaVm<~Vca.%auTheHSIVs~musLEinMDDFI,nd3whenthereis*elf'diIRCEd~.WhentheMSIVsareclosed,theyarealreadyperforanngsafetyfunction.~~aM)~Q~tradhwh.-~~~~~v~~m~Wilr~,OCcontinued83.7-9 HSIVsB3.7.2BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)i).va.'hmInHOOE4,or..theHSIVsareclosed,andthe~sWoaenerislow.sInMODE5or6,thedonotcontainmuchenergybecausetheirtemperatureisbelowthe'oilingpointof'water;therefore,theHSIVs~~euiredforisolationofpotentialpipebreaksintheseMODES.ACTIONSElrt.~LkC.4'Oa4EO<~PO~~WithoneHSIVinoperable>inMODE1,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatusihinQ8hours.SomereairstoEecanemadewiththdduaeOhot~ehourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofanaccidentoccurringduringthistimeeriod.v;,ImhthatwouldrequireaclosureoftheHSIV~~~/CE,~'hvantcs.vaRheqv~.TheaPh1iii<<t~allowedforcontainmentisolatio~~becausetheHSIVsEI>~,~~<<ipsedarevalvesthatisolateaclosedsysmpeneraingcontainment.Thesevalvesdifferfromothercontainment~-~ssoat>on'R~inthattheclosedsysteprovidesanadditionalmeansforcontainmentisolation.~os+LOAN0SatEChtert>SPa(g.g.,a~>.Ifthecannotberestoredto0~PEBK-Statuswithin[8]hours,the'ustbeplinaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.vethisstatus,theunitmustbeplacedinHODihin6houConditionCwouldbeentered.TompletionTimesarereasonaasedonoperaexperience,toreachMODE2andtocloseeHSIV@innl.mannerandwilieningunitsysteAPpE.landR.21).iConditionCote'oreachaeSineandoperableinODES2berestoredto(continued)B3.7-10 l)~vyhtsIWoe.-i~,Wcn~~UHSIVs~B3.7.2BASESACTIONSOPERABEE.statusorclosed.Mhenclosed,theMSalreadyinntnep'usrtionequiredQ~hehsumptionsinthesafetyanalysis.TheurCompletionTimeisconsistentwitthaowed~rsswwts.~qCV~sEwana+vS.land4.2QPC+A~t<~~w~d+be>Q.qcaQd(maw'"To~fIftheHSING-cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEsatuor~~otclosedwithintheassociatedCompletionTim,theqncsb-~eimustepacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnot-apply.oacieveisstatus,te'dgjBmustbeplacedatleastinMODE3within6hours,andinMODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexerience,toreachtherequired<conditionsfromconditionsinanorderlymanner!andwithoutchallenging~systems.qtasvbXo.y,tpla,o~Pa~a,gi~~.;;,)I%s4ForinoperableMSIIIBthatcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthespecifiedCompletionTime,butisppcosed,theinoperableHSI~mustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasistobeclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumtionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The(5dayCompetionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inview'ofMSIVstatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareintheclosedposition.pvu~~aakego~SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSSR3.7.2.1g~s-Thig~~iesthatHSIVclosuretimeis<.seconds~onalorsimuatedacfuaBonsigrial.Ilieclosuretimeedintheaccidentandcont'nmanalyses.ThisSurvei'ormalormeduponreturningtheunittooperat'refuelingoutage.TheHSIVsnotbetestedatpo,'eevenapartsxerciseincreasestheriskofavalvecotestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,(continued)B3.7-11 Insert3.7.2.8B.lMithonenon-returncheckvalveinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatusorisolatetheaffectedmainsteamline.Acheckvalveisapassivedevicethatcannotbeinspectedormaintainedunderhotconditions.Therefore,theinoperabilityofthenon-returncheckvalvewillmostlikelyresultfromnon-significantProgramdiscrepancies.The24hour-CompletionTimeallowsareasonableperiodoftimetocorrectthediscrepancy.The24hourCompletionTimeisbasedonengineeringjudgementandtheinstalledin-seriesMSIVs. ~~peInsert3.7.2.5D.1IfoneormorevalvesintheflowpathfromeachSGareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidnetanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHSIVsandnon-returncheckvalvesareinoperablesuchthatatleastonevalveisinoperableineachofthetwomainsteamflowpaths.Insert3.7.2.6undernoflowandnoloadconditions.TheHSIVsareswing-diskcheckvalvesthatareheldopenbytheirairoperatoragainstspringpressure.OncetheMSIVsbegintocloseduringhotconditions,thesteamflowwillassistthevalveclosuresuchthattestingundernoflowandnoloadconditionsisconservative.The5secondclosuretimeisconsistentwiththeexpectedresponsetimeforinstrumentationassociatedwiththeHSIVandtheaccidentanalysisassumptions. 7).vitt~Q.Na~-~~~'~MSIV~B3.7.2BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS'3.I.g,qREFERENCESSR3.7.2.1(continued)SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODE1z.,or3TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththenserviceTestin.Programhe[18]monthFrequencyorvalv0eontherefuelingcycle..Operatiexp'cehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallsstheSurveilwhenperformedatthe[18]monthFequency.Therefore,thequencyisacceptablefomareliabilitystandpoint.Thistestisconducted.ingwiththeunitatoperatingtemperatureandpresse,asdiscdinReference5exercisingrequirnts.ThisSRism'edbyaNotethatallowsentryoandoperationinMODE3pn-toperform'heSR.ThisallowsadelayoftestintilHOD,toestablishconditionsconsistentwiththose~erichtheacceptancecriterionwasgenerated.S.q.ql.~FSAR,Section~u45'.1.52.~FSAR,Section"3.FSAR,SectionIaii-.l-+.~.Ct.e,'L4.10CFR100.11.5.ASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI~B3.7-12 Insert3.7.2.7SR3.7.2.2ThisSRverifiesthateachmainsteamnon-returncheckvalvecanclose.Asthenon-returncheckvalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODEI,2,or3.TheFrequencyisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.SR3.7.2.3ThisSRverifiesthateachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.TheHSIVsshouldnotbetestedatpower,sinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosureandplanttransientwhentheplantisaboveHODE4.AstheHSIVsarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.5),requirementsduringoperationinMODESI,2and3.TheFr'equencyofHSIVtestingisevery24months.The24monthFrequencyfortestingisbased.ontherefuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequency'sacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint. r}7Z.'a3hA}=t>iaaf.HFJQ@~"HFRVs~andAssociatedBypassValvesg-B3.7.3B3.7PLANTSYSTEMS'PP~h>'h.'CdhpP;v,83.7.3MainFeedwater~s~4ioValves(~si~MainFeedwaterRegulationValves(HFRVs)~dAssociatedBypassValves]<wM,F}-tyVdg~~}3(3g~'}ah)MPVSVSsavP'}K'10)~~ocaoaA~ck.ttgf~t(.%1BASES~,-~~<hew}s~TheQP9isolatemainfeedwater(HFW)lowtothesecondary~FpEhvsidihg~iidThesafetyrelatedfunctionofthe(~~torovide~ceilisolation.of,HFWflowtothesecondaryfollowinganfosageoIorHFRVsanddbos:terminatingthfor!EesBNBEmv'liiiebreaksoccurring"g28HMthe:.ic0.in-the-HFW-1-':!---,-'!.."dmso~,erMgl(YTs-and-assooaeted-bydaee-valves-geiveerm>natestheadditionoffeedwatertoanBACKGROUNDQe~v,dh..(crvsyr"vhvsssvv>>'F.vA)R.V.dh.d,g~bavav*(I(w'--v'~c'sa.4~v~<<~o~hsaMs.i~~W",~~~c--<<~}A~pu~'WS~.W~a~i~Ea~~~v~a.cap;~y~ssk(<<t~<<j~tbwt>agv+ov'kg~I(continued)crhdgreleaseforsteaminebreaks(SLBs)or!FWLBs)insidecontainment,andreducingthecooldowneecs.orBs.}AJIV.;hdl!cddgweeR'.hves,>soenonsaelatedportionssafetyrelatedport'fthesystem.Inc->~.:~~~I,~!theeventofaseconarureinside~~ah-~o4~containmentimitthequantityo'eneprovideapressureounaryforthecontroeai~onoauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)totheintact&he,'JneWggRandassociatedass'alvthf=gw,<rvn~SII(assoE"=""'IocatedoneachMFWline,'outsidecontainment'he'voSLu44+.whv4chhhvhg>locatedupstreamoftheAinectionpornsoatAFWmaybesuliedtothes.~aaaaatvsfollowingcosure.TheipingvolumefromthesevaeSCccountedforincalculatingmassandi~eneases,andrefilledpriortoAFWreachingtheHFgv,folowingeitheranSLBorFWLB.S('mfhVARihdANGERbassec'.closeon~receitof<<a,',or-~~,e~m~MraaaE4,ppt3V~w3ohrvva~vad~Q&+TS-.}dipp/4fIdIsa~ag37$3Qua}hsvOWh.~CSktC4Ca~}i<<A.3a(rclg.~~~~wqC,,P-A.})$I~dITbfvl4~Ew434-<<-g~n~dIvkPLVIlk<<

M.&p0vsHFRVs/andAssociatedBypassValves+B3.7.3~8.;>Pw.cJ.BASESBACKGROUND(continued)lo@we,manually.valves,valve'SOAdescr1pSecti+F9'hvz'LLy4WMT=4/B(3ggDmayalsobeactuatedInadditiontothe~andbypassacheckcontainmenisavailable.Thecheckvalveeewaerin~penetratingcontainmennsequenee-eeed-4taBee-een4aieg.ionP~&a4%~8JRWq~barrioAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES>>.v.~hh+OLJV,WMV~Thedesignbasisofthesestablishedbythe1s.aso1nuenceaccidentanalysisforthelargeFWLB.ClosureofeHFIVsdassociatedbypassvalves,orMFRVsandsociatedbypassvas,mayalsobereliedontoterm'anSLBfocoreresponselysisandexcessfeedwaeventuponthereceiptofasteameratorwater1-highhighsignalorafeedwaterisolatioignalighsteamgeneratorlevel.FailureofanMFIV,V,ortheassotedbypassvalvestoclosefollowinSLBorFWLBcanresult-'sadditionalmassandenergyngdeliveredtothesteamgeneratcontringtocooldown.Thisfailurealsoresul'nad'onalmassandenergyreleasesfollowinganSLBorBvent.FpeJvsTheHFRVssatisfCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.aLCO1P.V.C.~8.v.b~wpPwv~ThisLCOreuiresta'.valves.OPERABLE.ThesandvalvesareconsideredOPERABLE'whenWeelv>JF'CVsan-sseypassbeypass.isolationtimesare~PEA,hkFAViThisLCOensuresthattheandbypassvalveswillisolateflowtothe~~~~~.,followinFWLBoresevaaeor'meaeCAg(continued)<Qocm8)B3.7-14v-.-0

Insert3.7.3.2TheSLBisevaluatedfortwocases,onewithrespecttoreactorcoreresponseandthesecondwithrespecttocontainmentintegrity(Ref.2).TheSLBforreactorcoreresponseisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichhavethehighestpotentialforpowerpeakingordeparturefromnucleateboiling(DNB).ThemostlimitingsinglefailureforthisevaluationisthelossofasafetyinjectionpumpwhichreducestherateofboroninjectionintotheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)delayingthereturntosubcriticality.TheHFRVandbypasscontrolvalveontheintactSGforthiscaseareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventexcessivecooldownoftheRCSwhichcouldresultinalowerDNBratio.ThefailureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumps,whichhavetheirbreakersopenedbyaSIsignal,andtheHFPDVwhichcloseonopening,oftheHFWpumpbreakers.TheSLBforcontainmentintegrityisevaluatedassuminginitialconditionsandsinglefailureswhichresultintheadditionofthelargestamountofmassandenergyintocontainment.Forthisscenario,offsitepowerisassumedtobeavailableandreactorpowerisbelow100%RTP.,Withoffsitepoweravailable,thereactorcoolantpumpscontinuetocirculatecoolant,maximizingtheRCScooldown.Atlowerpowerlevels,theSGinventoryandtemperatureareattheirgreatest,whichmaximizes,theanalyzedmassandenergyreleasetocontainment.TheHFRVandbypassvalveonthefaultedSGareassumedtocloseonasafetyinjectionsignaltopreventcontinuedcontributiontotheenergyandmassreleasedinsidecontainmentbytheSLB.The.failureofeitherofthesevalvesisboundedbytheeventualcoastdownoftheHFWpumpsandtheclosureoftheHFPDVs.TheHFRVsandbypassvalvesarealsocreditedforisolationinthefeedwatertransientanalyses(e.g.,increaseinfeedwaterflow).ThesevalvescloseoneitherasafetyinjectiononhighSGlevelsignaldependingonthescenario.ThevalvesalsomustcloseonaFWLBtolimittheamountofadditionalmassandenergydeliveredtotheSGsandcontainment.ThefailureoftheHFRVstocontrolflowisalsoconsideredasaninitiatingevent.Thisincludesconside}ationofavalvefailurecoincidentwithaatmosphericreliefvalvefailuresinceasinglecomponentintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)controlsbothcomponents(Ref.3).Thiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespectto'NBsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.However,thisscenarioisboundedbytheSLBaccident. ~F'PQVa~~5-FRYs~ndAssociatedBypassValves+B3.7.3BASESLCO(continued)77,v',aWP-A,~mac~L~aa~cavan~~~~trtt(~4'ithinlimitsandtheycloseonanisolationactuat'ignal<~~h~~~~S~Qh-~+~~.Q,oc~~~m5hmmLm+~cad~~v~FailuretomeettheLCOrequirementscanresultinadditionalmassandenergybeingreleasedtocontainmentfollowinganSLBorFWLBinsidecontainment.aer1seaevelisreliedontoterminateeewaerfomeet.a.ine>nreductionofwaterintothe'nsteamline.fcaaa~cpyMWaaMwuVbbdnaC4J4ll+~mobv,APPLICABILITY+The~~@"MFRVsandbypassvalvesmustbeERABLEwheneverthereissigniscantmassandenergyinthedfAWE,ensuresa,>neeventofWee.canresrn-..oze.-FPInHODES1,2,~d3gtheFB(~dandtheas~KRhbypassvalvesarerequiredtoeOPERABLEtolimitttteamountofavailablefluidthatcouldbeaddedtodffthmfipbVdSftWOO&iIW~PA~IMSQ~~'ftAitVfear~ciowrvta)L)Uti~+O'&tlattCPftddl1&thQINta~A,fna.ld~4W~1~~~ft"Vtv.a10AM3avACTIONS+"0+emgwgJi'bolcu~P'P~thouuC<energymaycosTheACTIONStableismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatseparateConditionentryisallowedforeachvalve.containmentinthecaseofasecondarysystempipebreakinsidecontainment.Whenthevalvesareclosedandde-activatedorisolatedbyaclosedmanualvalve,theyare~~~~<~"<<~alreadyperformingtheirsafetyfunctiQg,gpouncet~~franInHODNI5andf6c3".Iand"P-.20V'fdrvma~hhFAVvaf.~~Vth-XWithone4@9inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalveftoOPERABLEelivommibiffdwithinf~ours.auftctton(continued)B3.7-15ev-.0~~ 0 Insert3.7.3.4A.landA.2S.'4WithoneormoreHFPDV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFPDVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.B.land8.2WithoneormoreHFRV(s)inoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalvetoOPERABLEstatus,orclosetheinoperablevalvewithin24hours.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthelowprobabilityofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolationoftehHFWflowpaths.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.AninoperableHFRVthatisclosedmustbeverifiedonaperiodicbasisthatitremainsclosed.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.The31dayCompletiontimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgement,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareclosed.

g~e~nHFRVs~dBypassValves+B3.7.3BASESThelE.v.4CACTIONSA-.land(continued)a4ourComletionTimetakesintoaccountthew~.v.o.lowprobabistyofaneventoccurringduringthistimeperi+thatwouldrequireisolationoftheHFWflowpaths..The+ourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedon+F'Rvopera'ngexperience.MoperableI~thatareclosedmost'be79~asil'idpid'ihese~lThisisnecessarytoensurethattheassumtionsinthesafetyanalysisremainvalid.TheayCompetionTimeisreasonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofvalvestatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotheradministrativecontrols,toensurethattheseIandB.2WitheHFRVinoneormoreflowpathsinoperable,actimustbeakentorestoretheaffectedvalvestoOPERAstatus,orocloseorisolateinoperableaffectedveswithin[72]urs.Whenthesevalvesareclosedrisolated,theyeperformingtheirrequiredsetyfunction.The[72]hourCompletiTimetakesinaccounttheredundancyaffordedbythremaininPERABLEvalvesandthelowprobabilityofaneventccurngduringthistimeperiodthatwouldrequireisolonoftheHFWflowpaths.The[72]hourCompletionTimisasonable,basedonoperatingexperience.InoperableHFRVs,thareclosedorisoted,mustbeverifiedonaperi~icbasisthattheyarelosedorisolated.Thisisnecessarytoensurethattassumptionsinthesafetynalysisremainvalid.The7daympletionTimeisreonable,basedonengineeringjudgment,nviewofvalvetatusindicationsavailableinthecontrolom,andoeradministrativecontrolstoensurethatthevaesarlosedorisolated.(continued)83.7-16 NH~-aRRHFRVsPandBypassValve~B3.7.3BASESACTIONS(continued)?P,'t'tC.landC.2ithoneassociatedbypassvalveinoneormoreflowpathsiperable,actionmustbetakentorestoretheaffectedvalestoOPERABLEstatus,ortocloseorisolateinoperbleaffetedvalveswithin[72]hours.Whenthesevalvesecloseorisolated,theyareperformingtheirrequiresafetyunction.The[72]urCompletionTimetakesintoaccounteredundancyffordedbytheremainingOPERABLEvvesandthelowprobabilyofaneventoccurringduringtistimeperiodthatwldrequireisolationoftheHFflowpaths.The[72]hourCpletion.Timeisreasonablebasedonoperatingexperice.Inoperableassociatbypassvalvesthaareclosedorisolatedmustbeveri~iedonaperiodibasisthattheyareclosedor.isolated.isisnecessarytoensurethattheassumptionsinthesafeganalysis/amainvalid.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasoble,bayedonengineeringjudgment,inviewofvalvestaturindicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,andotherdopnistrativecontrols,toensurethatthesevalvesareosedorisolated.D.1Withtwoinoperableva].esinthesmeflowpath,theremaybenoredundantsystemtooperateautgmaticallyandperformtherequiredsafety~function.AlthoughthecontainmentcanbeisolatedwithtjfefailureoftwovalsinparallelinthesameflowpaP,thedoublefailurecabeanindicationofacommonmod@failureinthevalvesofisflowpath,andassuch,itreatedthesameasalosstheisolationcapabilityothisflowpath.Underthesecoditions,affectedvvesineachflowpathmustberestedtoOPERABLEatus,ortheaffectedflowpathisolaedwithin8hours.Thisactionreturnsthesystemtothecnditionwhereleastonevalveineachflowpathisperfingtherequidsafetyfunction.The8hourCompletionTiisreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,tocomplettheactionsrequiredtoclosetheMFIVorHFRV,orotherwiiolatetheaffectedflowpath.I(continued)B3.7-17 ~P'PQV~~~By'MFRV~dAssociatedBypassValve~B3.7.3BASES1>.v.bdali&SaQVrwupvaf5OS~WVaA~hn-<<~mdI.')CPASABQ~eda~"alass~landW2ACTIONS~pPQV(continued)t+v'ftheR'FRV~4R>byvalvcannotstoredtoOPERABLEstatus,,the~mustbeplacedinaMinwiceesnot'pply.Toacieveissaus,te%&mustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,gsndinMODE4within12hour+."TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequired~conditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutochallengingELCvthsystems.b.'i.3.S~SURVEILLARE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.3.WThisSRverifiesthattheclosure{timeofach~htsvqstswapthEa(.~,,e~.ivcach'P,,adhuCg)9P.af.bd~dp1&OdTpareassumeintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisŽ-Surveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningthetooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevena~strokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththe,'eneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASMECode,SectionXI(Ref.~~requirementsduringoperationinHDDESQ{aSHiTheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancs~i&~p.TP.d{1{1{.11P~~hfravecosureisbasedt-refuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencethesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveiwenperformedattte-P~maa4hFreREFERENCESS&'4.5.81.FSAR,SectionASHE,BoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI.B3.7-18 Insert3.7.3.3E.1IfoneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRV(s),oroneormoreHFPDV(s)andoneormoreHFRVbypassvalve(s)areinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenanycombinationofHFPDVs,HFRVs,andbypassvalvesareinoperablesuchthataHFWpump,condensatepump,orcondensateboosterpumpcanprovideunisolableflowtooneorbothSGs. Insert3.7.3.5SR3.7.3.1ThisSRverifiesthat,theclosuretimeofeachHFPDVisz80secondsfromthefullopenpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal(i.e.,fromopeningofHFWpumpbreakers).Thevalveclosuretimesareassumedintheaccidentandcontainmentanalyses.ThisSurveillanceisnormallyperformeduponreturningtheplanttooperationfollowingarefuelingoutage.-Thesevalvesshouldnotbetestedatpowersinceevenapartialstrokeexerciseincreasestheriskofavalveclosurewiththeplantgeneratingpower.Asthesevalvesarenottestedatpower,theyareexemptfromtheASHECode,SectionXI,(Ref.4)requirementsduringoperationinHODESI,2,and3.TheFrequencyforthisSRisinaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram. (AAA4B3.7.4B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSR.l'.<Ih'-B3.7.4Atmospheric(KQ"Valves(BASESBACKGROUNDZ.'l.ti,seADVsprovideamethodforcoolingtheunittoresiduaheaemoval(RHR)entryconditionsshouldthepreferrheatsviatheSteamBypassSystemtothecondernotbeavailaasdiscussedinthe:FSAR,Section.3](Ref.1).ThisdoneinconjunctionwithAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemvidingcoolingwatermthecondensatestoragetank(CST).eADVsmayalsoerequiredtomeetthedesigncooldownrateuringamalcooldownwhensteampressuredropstoolowfor'nanceofavacuuminthecondensertopermituseoftamDumpSystem.OneADVlineforeachthe[four]-stgeneratorsisprovided.EachADVineconsistsofoneandanassociatedblocalve.TheADVs5providedwithupstreamblockvalvestomittheiringtestedatpower,andto'provideanalternatmeofisolation.TheADVsareequippedwithpneumaticntrollerstopermitcontrolofthecooldownrate~Theeusuallyprovidedwithapressurizedgassofbottlednihat,onalossofpressur'normalinstrumentairsugautomat'uppliesnitrogentooperatetheADV'gensupplyissizedtoprovidethesuff'pressurizedgas'atetheADVsforterequiredforReactor,CoolantSyscdontoRHRentryconditions.eADVsisfoundinReferencel.areOPERABLEwithonlya'e.InadditionhandwheiedforlocalmanuaAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESbasisoftheADVsisestablishedbbilitytoeunittoRHconditions.Thecapadesignrateof[75]'FsapplicablefortwosteamgeneratorsioneADV.Tiisadequatetodh(continued) Insert3.7.4.1ThereisanARV(3410and3411)locatedoneachsteamgenerator(SG).TheARVshavetwofunctions(Ref.I):a.providesecondarysystemoverpressureprotectionbelowthesetpointofthemainsteamsafetyvalves(HSSVs);andb.provideamethodforcooling.the.plantshouldthepreferredheats4nkviathesteamdumpsystemtothecondensernotbeavailable.TheaccidentanalysesdonotcrediteitherofthesefunctionssincetheARVsdonothaveasafetyrelatedsourceofmotiveairandtheaccidentanalysesdonottypicallyrequirecooldowntotheresidualheatremovalentryconditionssincetheplantwasoriginallydesignedtomaintainHotIlgShutdownconditionsindefinitely.Theonlyexceptioniswithrespecttosteamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR)eventswhichrequiretheuseofatleastoneARVtoprovideheatremovalfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)topreventsaturationconditionsfromdeveloping.TheARVsareairoperatedvalveslocatedintheIntermediateBuildingwithareliefcapacityof329,000ibm/hreach(approximately5%ofRTPpower).TheARVsarenormallyclosed,failclosedvalveswhichreceivemotiveairfromtheinstrumentairsystem.Thevalvescanalsoreceivemotiveairfromanon-seismicbackupnitrogenbottlebanksystem.TheARVsarenormallycontrolledbytheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS)butcanalsoberemotemanuallyoperatedandopenedlocallybyuseofhandwheelslocatedonthevalves. BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)i~~(a~'hth~<z+d.-~p,g.VgtgmQhmXaZ'4icst.tf,dh.InccidentanalysispresentedinReferenceI,theareassummeI&eusedbytheoperatortocooleunittoRHRentryconi'oraccidentsacniedbyalossofoffsitepower.Prioractionstocooldowntheunit,theADVsandmaiamvalves(NSSVs)areassumedtooperateaticallytorelicamandmaintainthamgeneratorpressurebelowthevaluortherecoveryfromasteamgeneratortuberupR)eventeoperaorisrequireoperormaiecooowntoestablishadequatesubcoolinasanecessarystetoterminatetherimaryosecondarbreakowinoerupture~Thetimerequi(oteteateteprimaryseconarybreakflowanSGTRismorecri'hanthetimerequiredtodowntoRHRconditionsforthintandalsofoeraccidents.Thus,theSGTRisthelimifortheADVs.ThenumberofADVsrequired~tMOP8tosatisfytheSGTRaccidentanalysisrrementsdependsup~e.numberofunitloopsannsiderationofanysinglefailureassu~mptregardingthefailureofoneAOVtoopenonIT~Q~e-e'thblockvoraisTheADVssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOmQ.v.o.Qsdt's,~fayf5pSkPOAL4~l~~+oui~~~~~~~~CKbcag.Pth.~),~~~+M~N.4enmA.ailuretomeettheLCOcanthePl~ea.resultintheinabilitytocoolfollowingeventinwhich>c~i~MsaFILVm<arerequiredtobeOPERABLE.OneADVerequireromoreesearngeneratorsensurethatatoneADVlineisavailabletouctaunitcooldownfollowSGTR,inwhicsteamgeneratorbecomesunavailable,acca'asingle,activefailureofasecondADVlineonnaffecearngenerator.TheblockvalvesmustERABLEtoisolatea'penADVline.Acllockvalvedoesnotrenderitoriline'rableifoperatoractiontimetoopentheblockvveissupportedintheaccidentanalysis.(continued)B3.7-20ev. ~~%~.~,,S,~Insert3.7.4.2FollowingaSGTR,theMSSVswillmaintainthesecondarysystempressureatapproximately1085psigwhichcouldresultinthe'lossofsubcoolingmarginsincetheRCSaveragetemperatureisattemptingtostabilizeatapproximately547F.TheARVsareusedduringthefirst30to60minutesoftheSGTRtocontinuetheRCScooldowninanefforttoreduce,andeventuallyterminate,theprimarytosecondarysystemflowinth'erupturedSG.Theinabilitytocooldowncouldresultininadequatesubcoolingmargin.whichwoulddelaytheterminationoftheleakagethroughtherupturedtube.TheopeningoftheARVsisalsoconsideredcoincidentwithafailureofamainfeedwaterregulatingvalve(Ref.3)sinceasinglecomponentintheADFCScontrolsbothcomponents.ThiscombinedvalvefailureaccidentscenarioisevaluatedwithrespecttodeparturefromnucleateboilingsincealargeRCScooldownispossiblewiththiscombinationoffailures.'owever,thisscenarioisboundedbythesteamlinebreakaccident. n..I~n.v¹B3.7.4BASESLCO(continued)7+.v,o,thecondenserisunavailableforusewiththe~eamQg~~system.~C.'gsartcc~An'55kiscoi~deredOPERABLEwhenitiscapableofr-o'-o3~~CBhcapa&~ef'-f~~openmnd-e>os+nn-demand'sl~i~R~~~tsv50oFI'I-V.t~qId7~d'3APPLICABILITYl'Q.a4,diane)J"InROBESI2and3;:and-ssrHfBBF4~~ss-beanre1.te-uloot-Eomheat~astgtel-thetobeOPERABLE.Farerequired~n'.'InHODE5or6,anSGTRisnotacredibleevent.~~ne.H~<<i,t-~.<SOSI'~m)~j+~flt~nn.c.s~riR:v,c,ACTIONS,V~IrdbQ~dLgC-Spcs%~iA'horn~A.lg,i)dWithoneinoperable,actionmustbetakento.restore-OPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsfortheredundantcaabilityaffordedgggsgddg'6ldg-ngnggddgitisnag.e~.sddd.ddiigdoesnotapplySasdS~2a~~~d'V'.r.iO~khAQt=SO~tbsp-O3'&OWI~rl..~(.eresCadt~~~~N~gdgO'Sagst.Withtwoor"ADV-TYne'sasinoperoasble,acti'on'miist'betaken.torestoreallbuuoADVlinetoOPERABLEstatus..Sincetheblockvalvecanbecdtoisolatea~DV-,somerepairsmaybepossiblewith't.at"power.The24hourCompletionTimeisreasona~orepinoperableADVlines,basedontharmability=oftheStpassSystemandHSSVselowprobabilityofaneventoingd'speriodthatwouldrequiretheADVlines.7~v.MWlaIftheABV-'harms"cannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatusiidid1dTi,gplacedinaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,the@QmustbeplacedinatleastpIns2eP(continued)B3.7-21'.Ray--0-G28j82' Insert3.7.4.3InHODE3withRCSaveragetemperature<500F,andinHODE4,theARVsarenotrequiredsincethesaturationpressureofthereactorcoolantisbelowtheliftsettingsoftheHSSVs.Insert3.7.4.5beingmanuallyopenedwithin20minutesofdeterminingtheneedtoutilizetheARVfollowingaSGTR.TheARVmustalsobecapableofclosingwithin15minutesintheeventthevalvespuriouslyopensontheSGwith'theqqgGrupturedtube.Finally,theARVmustbecapableofclosingwithinGminutesintheeventthattheARYontheintactSGfailstoclosefollowinginitializationofacooldown.Fortheclosurerequirements,eithertheARVoritsassociatedblock.valvemaybecreditedforOPERABILITY. +&VsB3.7.4BASESACTIONS~,~g.CZ~th~<<SOibPl9,t,"tXwEa.&~).9.s+g8WlandW2(continued)MODE3ithinhoursaa@mn&GBE-O';"YK$~~&m.emeyes-.,sheaome~ampTeesonTimsigipreasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,oreacerequiredconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~wystems.~~epics~SR3.7.4.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS~ll.v.miAQ.VzToperformacooldownoftheRCS,theABB~musbea~betobeoenedeitherremotelyorlocally,Qjbro~ThisSRensuresthate555areteseroughafullcontrolcycleatleastonceerfuelcycle.Performanceofinservicetestingor4"useoanduringagPcooownmaysassyssrequirement.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecornonentsusually'asstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthegQ-monthFrequency.TheFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.4.2ThefunctiotheblockvalveistoisolateiledopenADV.Cyclingthevalvebothclos~opendemonstratesitscapabilioperrmthisfunction.Performanceofinservicete'~useoftheblockvalveduringunitcooldow~nsatisfythisrement.Operatingexpel'ehasshownthatthesecontsusuallypasstheer<eillancewhenperformedatthe[18]moFreuency.TheFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabiliandpoint.REFERENCESLQ~'ot,,g,s'.~FSAR,SectionB3.7-22 Insert3.7.4.4C.1~~IfbothARVsareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsideoftheaccidentanalysesforaSGTRevent;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately. AFWSystemB3.7".5B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.5AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)SystemBASES$:O.V'a.cVa.vi,cx~QVtvGgQ,Vw,~6>:BACKGROUND-TheAFW+stemsuppliesfeedwatertothesteamgenerator&toremoveecayheatfromtheReactorCoolantSsteuponthelossofnormalfeedwatersupp~1.T'ak~esuciontTirougui"separateandindeperrentsuction~linesfromestorage-~k(CST)(LCO3.7.6)andpumptothe'steameseada'viaseparateandTddTdd<<hTd.:Tll~h.ThhTTTTdbiifvteh.0-~ttscAmiv&sm+vh4wddhh4srhmdkhdadt4'..o.<~TheAFyssuplyin~aed~e~~esteamgenerators'ng-nornancon's.~~setQ<w04o.wpTheturbindrivenAFW~umsuppliesacommonhea~dercapaeoffeeding-1-M~enera40rs<controlvalveedotfieapp'ropriaesteamgeneraStrengineeredSafetyF~reAct~uaSFAS).Onepumpatfullflo'tficien~o-removedecayheatandtoresidualheatremoval(RRR')-entrPbyreleasingsteamtotheatmospherefromthe4&@viathemainsteamsafetyvalvesHSSVs)oratmosheric<~valves-Ce~f-.+.Ifthemaincondenseriavaiae,steammaybereeasedviathesteam,~i&valves.p~i..ThedAFWSystemconsistsof+two/motordrivenAFWpumpsandoneTmiuuuasturbinedrivenpp~onfiguredinto~reeQtrainsEachmotordriveniqm@provides+00//ofAFWflowcapacity,andtheturbinedrivenpumpprovides00'ftheaccidentanalsis.ThepumpsareequippedwithindependentEachmotordrivenAFW~~ispowereromanindeendentClasslEpowersupplyandfeedsm,althougheachpumphasthecapabilitbereaignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedotherD.'y.s.ene~~~ThesteamturbinedrivenAFpumpceiv'~isoationvalves.~~hesteam5j&lineswillsupply100%oftherequirementsoftheturbinedrivenAFWpump.(continued)83.7-23

Insert3.7.5.4TheAFWSystemiscomprisedof,twoseparatesystems,apreferredAFWSystemandaStandbyAFM(SAFW)System(Ref.I).~AFMSstemInsert3.7.5.5SGviacross-tielinescontainingnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4000Aand4000B).ThetwomotordrivenAFMtrainswillactuate>automaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalineitherSG,openingofthemainfeedwater(HFW)pumpbreakers,asafetyinjection(SI)signal,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(AHSAC).Thepumpscanalsobemanuallystartedfromthecontrolroom.Insert3.7.5.6(4297and4298).TheturbinedrivenAFWpumpwillactuateautomaticallyonalow-lowlevelsignalinbothSG,lossofvoltageon4160VBusesIIAandllB,ortheATWSmitigationsystemactuationcircuitry(ANSAC).Thepumpcan.alsobemanuallystartedfromthe,controlroom.ThenormalsourceofwaterfortheAFWSystemistheCSTswhicharelocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding.TheServiceMater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8)canalsobeusedtosupplyasafetyrelatedsourceofwaterthroughnormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(4013,4027,and4028)whichsupplyeachAFWtrain.SAFWSstemTheSAFMSystemconsistsoftwomotordrivenpumpsconfiguredintotwoseparatetrains.EachmotordrivenSAFWtrainprovides100%oftheAFWflowcapacityandsuppliesoneSGthroughtheuseofanormallyopenmotor-operatedstopcheckvalve.EachpumphasthecapabilitytoberealignedfromthecontrolroomtofeedtheotherSGvianormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9703Aand9703B).EachpumpispoweredfromanindependentClass1EpowersupplyandcanbepoweredfromthedieselgeneratorsprovidedthatthebreakerfortheassociatedAFWpumpisopened.ThesafetyrelatedsourceofwaterfortheSAFWSystemistheSWSystemthroughtwonormallyclosedmotoroperatedvalves(9629Aand9629B).Condensatecanalsobesuppliedbya10,000galloncondensatetesttankandtheyardfirehydrantyardloop. Insert3.7.5.6(continued)TheSAFWSystemismanuallyactuatedintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemhasfailedduetoahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediateBuilding,aseismicorafireevent.TheSAFWtrainsare'ocatedintheSAFWPumpBuildinglocatedadjacenttotheAuxiliaryBuilding.Tworoomcoolers,oneforeachSAFWtrain,arealsoprovidedintheSAFWPumpBuilding.TheroomcoolersaresuppliedcoolingwaterfromthesameSWheaderasitsrespectiveSAFWpump.TheSAFWPumpBuildingenvironmentis'controlledbyroomcoolerswhicharesuppliedbythesaemSWheaderasthepumptrains.ThesecoolersarerequiredtoensuretheSAFWPumpBuildingremains<120'Fduringaccidentconditions. AFWSystem83.7.5BASESBACKGROUNDCOll1lOllS.(continued)powerssemismet.in-motiveO.Z's,h'Ra.v;.cTheAFWSystemisdesignedtosupplysufficientwatertothe~s)toremovedecayheatwithpressureatthesetpointoftheHSSVs.Subsequently,theAFWSystemsuppliessufficientwatertocoolthepetoRentryconditions,withsteamreleasedthroughtheQVh.Tectuatesautomaticallyonsteamgenerwaterlevel-low-lowShesystemalsoactuatesonlosp,ection,adTbMKeys@FWpumps.APPLICABLE~.~SAFETYANALYSESSG(s)90.Vs.oheAFWSystemmitigatestheconsequencesofanyeventwithlossofnormalfeedwater.ThedesinbasisoftheAFWSystem,istosupplywatertothetoremovedecayheatandotherresidualheatbydeliveringatleasttheminimumrequiredflowratetotheatpressurescorrespondingtahelowest'4Y"SSYntheAFWSystemmustsupplyenough'maketoreplacesteamsecondaryiostastheunitcoolstoHODE4con'.'ntAFWflowmustalsobeava'ccountforflowlossessu/ationandlinebreaks.'o.v'a.ThelimitingDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)andtransientsfortheAFWSystemareasfollows:'ae.z.>a.FeedwaterLineBreak(FWLB);ggjbb.LossofHFW<~'~~@~~~H4smp~~3;nal','mavailableAFWflowcharacteristicsareserheanalysisfossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)(continued)B3.7-24 Insert3.7.5.7c.SteamLineBreak(SLB);d.Smallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA);e.Steamgeneratortuberupture(SGTR);andf.Externalevents(tornadoesandseismicevents).TheAFWSystemdesignissuchthatanyoftheaboveDBAscanbemitigatedusingthepreferredAFWSystemorSAFWSystem.FortheFWLB,SLB,andexternaleventsDBAs(itemsa,c,andf),theworstcasescenarioisthelossofallthreepreferredAFWtrainsduetoaHELBintheIntermediateorTurbineBuilding,orafailureoftheIntermediateBuildingblockwalls.Forthesethreeevents,theuseoftheSAFWSystemwithin10minutesisassumedbytheaccidentanalyses.SinceasinglefailuremustalsobeassumedinadditiontotheHELBorexternalevent,thecapabilityoftheSAFWSystemtosupplyflowtoanintactSGcouldbecompromisediftheSAFWcross-tieisnotavailable.ForHELBswithincontainment,useofeithertheSAFWSystemortheAFWSystemtotheintactSGisassumedwithin10minutes.FortheSGTRevents(iteme),theaccidentanalysesassumethatoneAFWtrainisavailableuponaSIsignalorlow-lowSGlevelsignal.Additionalinventoryisbeingaddedto.therupturedSGasaresultoftheSGTRsuchthatAFWflowisnotacriticalfeatureforthisDBA.ForthelossofHFWeventsandsmallbreakLOCA(itemsbandd),twotrainsofAFWareassumedavailable(i.e.,twomotordrivenAFWtrainsortheturbinedrivenAFWtrain)uponalow-lowSGlevelsignalandSIsignal,respectively.TwoAFWtrainsareassumedavailablesincenosinglefailurecanresultinthelossofmorethanoneAFWtrain.ThelossofHFWisaCondition2event(Ref.3)whichplaceslimitsontheresponseoftheRCSfromthetransient(e.g.,nochallengetothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesisallowed).TwotrainsofAFWarerequiredtomaintaintheselimits.ThesmallbreakLOCAanalysisrequirestwotrainsofAFMtolowerRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadoftheSIpumps.Inadditiontoitsaccidentmitigationfunction,theenergyandmassadditioncapabilityoftheAFWSystemisalsoconsideredwithrespecttoHELBswithincontainment.ForSLBsandFWLBswithincontainment,pumprunoutfromallthreeAFWpumpsisassumedfor10minutesuntiloperationscanisolatetheflowbytrippingtheAFWpumpsorbyclosingtherespectivepumpdischargeflowpath(s).Therefore,themotor-operateddischargeisolationvalesforthemotoroperatedAFWpumptrains(4007and4008)aredesignedtolimitflowto<230gpm. AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Qo~vi.Q.AFWSystemdesignissuchthatitcan'performitsfunc'followinganFWLBbetweentheHFWisolation*vesandcon'nment,combinedwithalossofoffsiteprfollowingtinetrip,andasingleactivefaieofthesteamturbineivenAFWpump.Insuchaca,theESFASlogicmaynotdettheaffectedsteameratorifthebackflowcheckvalvetheaffectedheaderworkedproperly.OnemotordrinAFMpuwoulddelivertothebrokenMFWheaderatthepurutflowuntiltheproblemwasdetected,andflowtermibytheoperator.SufficientflowwouldbeivereotheintactsteamgeneratorbytheredunntAFWpump.TheESFASautomMcallyactuatestheAFWtuinedrivenpumpandassociatpoweroperatedValvesandcontrswhenrequiredensureanadequatefeedwatersupplytthesteam'generasduringloss.ofpower.DCpoweroperatedvesarerovidedfor,eachAFWlinetocontroltheAFWflowchsteamgenerator.TheAFMSystemsatisfiestherequirementsofCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO9Q~Vs.0~~'Asa.S.cA~a%0V'a.O.ThisLCOprovidesassurancethattheAFWSystemwillperformitsdesignsafetyfunctiontomitigatetheconsequencesofaccidentsthatcouldresultinoverpressurizationofthereacorcooanpressureounar[Three]indepeneninthreeiverserainsarerequiredtoRABLEtoensuravailabilityofRHRcapabil0yoralleventsaccompaniedbyafoffsiteandasinglefailure.Thisisaccomplishedbyp'woofthepumpsfrom~independentemergenses.The'FMpumpispoweredbyadiffereans,asteamdriventurbiliedwithsteamasourcethatisnotisolatedbyclosurees.giv~TheAFWSystemiconfiguredintotrains.TheAFWSystemisconsideredOPERABLEwhentecomponentandflowpathsrequiredtoprovideredundantAFWflowtotheareOPERABLE.Thisrequiresthatetwomoumpseinoiver,eachsupplyingAsteaors.TheturbinedrivenAFWpumpis'withredundantstea'romeachof[twomainsteam(continued)83.7-25 /.a,-+~q~WmQ~~~C'Qd-+4.gavervS~~l~ta~~MQPc&AOMNcMs~~~~Žb.BASES~miI~~bleo~c~~~mC1tJCSE.~~~AFWSystem83.7e5LCO(continued}QctAj,GTepiping,vaves,instrumentason,an.controlsintherequiredflowpathsalsojarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.o.i;pQaoMW~L~~rumad.do~4~~~Dts~MC~~sard\c~>$QpCtsOH.rsmodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatoneain,whichinclutordrivenpump,isr'obeOPERABLEinMODE4.'ofthereducedheatremovalrequirementsortp'ftimeinMODE4duringwhicisrequiredandtheicientsteama'inMODE4toowerturbinedrivenAPPLICABILITYInMODESI,2,'and3,theAFWSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheeventthatitiscalledupontofunctionweneMFislost.Inaddition,theAFWSystemisrequiredtosupplyenoughmakeupwatertoreplacetheEensgggaissnsecondaryinventory,lostasthe~coo1soMODE4conditions.8a.'tltEEE,I~11dforheatremoval,andtheAFWSystemisnotrequired.ACTIONSAsl+gal~~vadvvsaK&caae.eyeo~IfoneoftheturbinedrivenAFWtrainisinoperable,actionmustetakentorestorOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonthefollowingreasons:'a~b.c~TheredundantOPERABLEdrivenAFWpum'wTheavailabilityofredundantOPERABLEmotordrivenAFWpums.andKAt=LOThelowproabilityofaneventoccurringthatII11~11drivenAFWpump.~~~s"4A%~QAVLhfh(continued}B3.7-26 Insert3.7.5.8thefollowingbeOPERABLE:TwomotordrivenAFWtrainstakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andcapableofsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGwith>200gpmandg230gpm,b.CoTheturbineAFWtraintakingsuctionfromtheCSTsasrequiredbyLCO3.7.6(andcapableoftakingsuctionfromtheSWsystemwithin10minutes),andprovidedsteamflowfrombothmainsteamlinesupstreamoftheHSIVsandcapableofsupplyingbothSGswith>200gpm;andTwomotordrivenSAFWtrainscapableofbeinginitiatedeitherlocallyorfromthecontrolroomwithin10minutes,takingsuctionfrom.theSWSystem,andsupplyingtheirrespectiveSGandtheoppositeSGthoughtheSAFWcross-tielinewith>200gpm.

AFWSystemB3.7.5BASESACTIONSA.1(continued)secondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lestab'salimitonthemaximumtimeallowedranycombinatioConditionstobeinoperabledoinganycontinuousfaitomeetthisLCO.The10dayCompletionTiresalimitationtimeallowedinthisspecificon'nafterdiscoveryoffailuretomeetthe.Thislimsconsideredreasonablefor'ationsinwhichCon'sAandBareenteredcorrently.,TheANDconnectorbe7daysand10daictatesthatbothCompletionTimesappltaneously,andthemorerestrictivemustbemet.3.7.5.~~so,;B.1thoneoftherequiredAFWtrains(pumporflowpath)inerableinNODE1,2,or3[forreasonsotherthanCondionA],actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLstatusithin72hours.ThisConditionincludesthgAossotwosteamupplylinestotheturbinedrivenAFWpfmp.The72hourCometionTimeisreasonable,basedoner'edundantcapabilitiesfordedbytheAFWSystem,time~neededforrepairs,andtheowprobabilityofaDBAogiurringduringthistimeperiod.ThesecondCompletion'forRequipedActionB.lestablishesalimitonthmaximum%'imeallowedforanycombinationofConditionstbe.inoperableduringanycontinuousfailuretomeetthLCO.The10dayCompletionTimprovidealimitationtimeallowedinthisspecifiConditionterdiscoveryoffailuretomeetthe.ThislimiticonsideredreasonableforsitionsinwhichCondit'sAandBareenteredconcurrey.TheANDconnectorbeeen72hoursand10daysdiatesthatbothCompletionTimapplysimultaneous,andthemorerestrictivemustbeet.~1andFP.2CaltLl.lcaeO'IlwhenRequiredActionA.~B.1+cannotbecompletedwithintherequiredCompletionf>me(continued)B3.7-27Rev. ~\~-,,~~~~~'I\Insert3.7.5.9,AturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplyline'ndtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.Insert3.7.5.10WiththeturbinedrivenAFWtraininoperable,bothmotordrivenAFMtrainsinoperable,oroneturbinedrivenAFMtrainflowpathandonemotordrivenAFWtraininoperabletooppositeSGs,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.IftheinoperablemotordrivenAFWtrainsuppliesthesameSGastheinoperableturbinedrivenflowpath,ConditionEmustbeentered.Aturbinedriventrainiscomprisedofthepumpandtwoflowpaths.AturbinedrivenAFWtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/totheSG.ThecombinationoffailureswhichrequiresentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossofonetrain(oroneflowpath)ofpreferredAFWcoolingtoeachSGsuchthatredundancyislost.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedon.redundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistim'eperiod.WithoneSAFWtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin14days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityofoneofthetwoSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalves:Theinoperabilityofoneofthesetwocross-tievalveswhichrequiresdeclaringtheassociatedSAFWtraininoperable(e.g.,failureof9703BwouldresultindeclaringSAFWtrainDinoperable).The14dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFWSystemduringthistimeperiod.D.lMithbothSAFWtrainsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastoneSAFMtraintoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.ThisConditionincludestheinoperabilityoftheSAFWcross-tie.The7dayCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheAFWSyste~,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaHELBorothereventwhichwouldrequiretheuseoftheSAFMSystemduringthistimeperiod. aw~~Insert3.7.5.10(continued)WithallAFWtrainsandflowpathstooneorbothSGsinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreatleastonetrainorflowpathtoeachaffectedSGtoOPERABLEstatuswithin4hours.AturbinedrivenAFMtrainflowpathisdefinedasthesteamsupplylineandtheSGinjectionlinefrom/tothesameSG.ThecombinationoffailureswhichrequireentryintothisConditionallresultinthelossofpreferredAFMcoolingtoatleastoneSG.Thetwomotor-driventrainsofthepreferredAFWSystemarenormallyusedfordecayheatremovalduringlowpoweroperationssinceairoperatedbypasscontrolvalvesareinstalledineachtraintobettercontrolSGlevel.Sinceafeedwatertransientismorelikelyduringreducedpowerconditions,4hours,isprovidedtorestoreatleastonetrainofadditionalpreferredAFWbeforerequiringacontrolledcooldown.ThiswillalsoprovidetimetofindacondensatesourceotherthantheSWSystemfortheSAFMSystemifallthreeAFMtrainsareinoperable.The4hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedonredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheSAFWSystem,timeneededforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod. AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES'RO,hi'tOACTIONSPWlandM2(continued),thedjgbmustbeplacedinaHOD>nwictheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theMR-mustbeplacedinatleastHODE3within6hours,andini40OE4within~hours.TheallowedCompletionTime~keasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredconditio~fromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingQi+5s.n1~1allowedtoconauseonlyonerivenpumpAFWtrainisrequiredinac-theNotethatmodifiestheLCO.Aotrequired,theun'inuetonandinitiateRHR.'drO.Vt,gMl~~54(~Ifall+three/AFWtrainareinoperable~88&-1-.theisinaseriouslydegradedconditionwithnosafetyrelatedmeansforconductingacooldown,andonlylimitedmeansforconductingacooldownwithnonsafetrelatedequipment.Insuchacondition,the~souldnotbeperturbedbyanyaction,includingapowerchange,thatmightresultinatrip.TheseriousnessofthisconditionrequiresthatactionbestartedimmediatelytorestoreoneAFtraintoOPERABLEstatus.orG.RequiredAction8;IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatallrequiredHODEchangesorpowerreductionsaresuspendedor<"~untiloneAFtrainisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.Inthiscase,3isnotapplicablebecauseitcouldforcethe<6nBintoa'lesssafecondition.9<~itInHODE4,eitheereactorcoolantpumpsortheRHcanbeusedtoprovideedcirculation.'addressedinLCO3.4.6,"RCS4."WithonerequiredAFWtrainino,actsstbetakentoimmediatelyreinoperabletrainRABLEstatus.TheateCompletionTimeisconsistentwit3.4.6.'3.7-28(continued) AFWSystemB3.7.5BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS~san.<6'4~aa~i~P~caLL~CJcs~~srar'~~~~ac-~~p~sS.~at~'+~a>~~~'aeptiu,~aoi'c,aaa.~t.C.~4M5r~a~A.aaah,L~SOaaa~6ta~~~aMpm'-+a~iahSa~~SR3.7.5.1~g".A~Verifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheAFWystemwaterandsteamsupplyflowpathsprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathswillexistforAFWoperation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.ThisSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevescapablebeinmispositionedareinthecorrecposition.,~~o-~The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoperation,andensurescorrectvalveositionsMCALDC+CV~~T~CJ+~A~~+~i~AA1n~~~c~~~~~ly~P~.t'i'~P~t~a.Qvh.uwbgsO~~~W+~+%nb+mrs~hisSRvifiesthatthepumpsdevelopscientdiscgepressuretoiverthe.requirwa~~1onpressureoftHSSVs,Becauseitisundes'toroducecoTBAFMintothesteamgeneratiletheyarope'ng,thistestingisperformerecirculationflow.PeriodicaomparingtherefecedifferentialpressuredevelopedatthisdetectstrendsthatmightbindicativeofincipieasPerformanceofinservicetesting'iscussedtheASHECode,ctionXI(Ref.2)(onlyrequirt3monthintervals)sa'esthisrequirem.The[31]dayFrequencyonaSTATESTBASIesultsintestingeachpumponceevery3month,auiredberenceThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSRQ~suitabletestconditionsestablise.1requireecausete7.5IaSR3.7.5.3SG.v;.'bThisSRverifiesthatAFWcanbedeliveredtothehFdSG(continued)B3.7-29 BASES'Vg-I~ViiAFWSystemB3.7.5&A)L%9~LSIgXAAt~msWdh.Wr(~,Vaa44Itao-ChM~iLgL~.uSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS9Q.'IW'OsVI~apettthawWm~SR3.7.5~(continued)transientthatgeneratesanbydemonstratingthateachautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectositiono~~ghra3~~mjlationsignal.innHODE4,ther'wed-AP~ainalreadyalignedan'snotemontrequencyisaseonteneeoperoisurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplydurinaoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewere'performedwiththereactoratpower.ThegE)monthFrequencyisacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandthedesignreliabilityoftheequipment.D~">o.vga,S'o.iiPO~\'IsSR3.7.5~a.~~tsmaigncx3ThisSRverifiesthattheAFWpumpswillstartintheeventofanyaccidentortransientthatgeneratesanbydemonstratingthateachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignalinWQDInandth~bd.auonisnotrequired.emonth~f.diem~~4hL~LSca~~+~e-wa5PmOs'Tesark2.l.s.ttThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheSR55bl<<dii<<blihq~edLbscan~e-4est.3.7.5.5ThisSRve'esthattheAFWisproperlyalibyverifyingthefathsfromtheCSTtchsteamgeneratorpriortoenHODE2ermorethan30daysinHODE5or6.OPERABILIFWflowpathsmustbeverifiedbeforesufficicoreisgeneratedthatwouldrequiretheoperat'ftheAFWSystemingasubsequentshutdown.Trequencyisreasonable,baseengineeringjudgemendotheradministrativecontrolsthatenthatfpathsremainOPERABLE.TofurtherensureAFWSyste(continued)B3.7-30 Insert3.7.5.11SR3.7.5.3PeriodicallycomparingthereferencedifferentialpressureandflowofeachSAFWpumpinaccordancewiththeinservicetestingrequirementsoftheASHE,SectionXI(Ref.4),detectstrendsthatmightbeindicativeofaninsipientfailure.BecauseitisundesirabletointroduceSWintotheSGswhiletheyareoperating,thistestingisperformedusingthetestcondensatetank.TheFrequencyofthissurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestingProgram,whichencompassesSecitonXIoftheASHECode.SectionXIoftheASHEcodeprovidestheactivitiesandFrequenciesnecessarytosatisfythisrequirement.SR3.7.5.4ThisSRverifiesthateachAFWandSAFWmotoroperatedsuctionvalvefromtheSWSystem(4013,4027,4028,9629A,and9629B),eachAFWandSAFWdischargemotoroperatedvalve(4007,4008,9704A,9704B,and9746),andeachSAFWcross-tiemotoroperatedvalve(9703Aand9703B)canbeoperatedwhenrequired.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASHECode,SectionXI(Ref.4). Insert3.7.5.12SR3.7.5.7ThisSRverifiesthattheSAFWSystemcanbeactuatedandcontrolled-fromthecontrolroom.TheSAFWSystemisassumedtobemanuallyinitiatedwithin10minutesintheeventthatthepreferredAFWSystemisinoperable.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedatpower. AFWSystem83.7.5BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS+0.v7.5.5(continued)alignment,flowOPERABILITYisverifiedo.ingextendedoutagestodete'omisU.entofvalveshasoccurred.ThisSRensuresaflowpathfromtheCSTtothesteamgenerisproperlya.(ThisSRisnotreuthoseunitsthatuseAFWfornstartuputdown.)REFERENCES5'e.viiio.s1.FSAR,Section~2.ASIDEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXI~B3.7-31

CST~B3.7.6B3.7PLANTSYSTEHS~g<.,B3.7.6CondensateStorageTan~(CS)BASES9t.v.kBACKoDOARl.v.th.TheCSFrovidedasourceofwater.tothesteamgeneratorforremovingdecayandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).TheCSTrovidesapassiveflowofwater,byravity,totheAuxiliaryeewaer(AFW)ystem..5.Thesteamproducedisreleasedtotheatmospherebythemainsteamsafetyvalvesortheawh~~ŽQSamosper>c-~valves.gfgv~4f(iWhenthemainsteamsolationvalvesareopen,thepreferredmeansofheatremovalistodischargesteamtothecondenserbythenonsafetygradepathofthesteamBygemavaves.econensesteam>s"returnedtotheBBVyec5$-Thishastheadvantageofconservingcondensatewhileminimizingreleasestotheenvironment.'8eoaqsetheCSTisaprincipalcomponentinremovingresidu&aWfromtheRCS;itisdesignedto'withstaearthquakesan*naturalphenomena,includmissilesthatmightbegenerateturalpheno.TheCSTisdesignedtoSeismicCategoryIreavailabilityofthefeedwatersupply.Feedwater'lsoavaefromalternatesources.Adescri'ftheCSTisfoundintheFSAR,Se[9.2.6](Ref.I).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESZ.%elQt~ty,thfl~TheCSlprovidcoolingwatertoremovedecayheatandtocoolcdowntheollowinalleventsintheaccidets)scussedintheFSAR,Chapters[6]a(Re.d3,respectively).Foranticpa.operationalccurrencesan'tsthatdafeettheOPERABILITYofthesteamgenerators1sisassumptionisgenerally30miatHODE3,ste'oughtheHSSVs,followacooldowntoresidualheatremove~entryitionsatthedesigncooldownrate.Thelimitinfhdd(continued)83.7-32 CST~B3.7.6BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)Q'K.~.a.r.Singlefailuresthatalsoaffectthiseventincltheowing:a.FailureoedieselgeneratorpowerithemotordrivenAFWpumotheunaffectedearngenerator(requiringadditionsteamrivetheremainingAFWpumpturbine);andb.FailureoftheamdrivenAFWpp(requiringalongertimorcooldownusingonlyootordrivenAFWpSL~v.o.3.5.I,.tconensateretentionof'TheCST<Criterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Tarenotusuallythelimitingfailuresintermsofonseuencesfortheseevents.,lt~4~AnonlimitingeventconsideredinCSTinventory.determinationsisaea~~:-hmainfeedwater<<gyAT-Hn~e~~ThisbreakhastheotentialfordumpingconensateuntilterminatedbyoeratoractionsineeEmergencyFeewaercysemwouessurebetweenorthibeaklocation.ThislossofyispartiallycompensatedforbytheLCOlossWN~~~TosatisfyaccidentanalysisassumptionstheCSTmustcontainsuffjcientcoolingwatertoemovedecayheatfor~'~~<<~minutes+followinarom102%RTP~Qliv.oRt.y.a.RR,~OocooownteRCStoRHRentrycond~t~ons,assumiacoinciesofoffsitepowerandthemosse,singlefailure.n'his,itmainsufficientwatertoensureadequatenesuctionheadfortheAFWpumpsdurinown,aswellasaforanylossesfromamdrivenAFWpumpturbine,orbefore'ingtoabroken1ine.CS7~~~KM~Therequired'lloswhichisbasedooingteuni2hours,followebyacoolentryconditionsatisisestablishedin'Reference4aevolumerequident(continued)$96-6R))83.7-33 Insert3.7.6.1Therearetwo30,000gallonCSTslocatedinthenon-seismicServiceBuilding(Ref.1).TheCSTsarenotconsideredsafetyrelatedcomponentssincethetanksarenotprotectedagainstearthquakesorothernaturalphenomena,includingmissiles.ThesafetyrelatedsourceofcondensatefortheAFWandstandbyAFWSystemsistheServiceMater(SW)System(LCO3.7.8).TheCSTsareconnectedbyacommonheaderwhichleadstotheElA,osuctionofallthreeAFWpumps.AsingleleveltransmitterisprovidedforeachCST(LT-2022AandLT-2022B).TheCSTscanberefilledfromthecondenserhotwellortheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetank.Insert3.7.6.2(Ref.2)whichassumesthatthepreferredAFWSystemisavailableimmediatelyfollowinganaccident.ForanyeventinwhichAFWisnot.requiredforatleast10minutesfollowingtheaccident,theSWSystemprovidesthesourceofcoolingwatertoremovedecayheat.,Insert3.7.6.3lossofnormalfeedwatereventandsmallbreaklossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)(Ref.2).Forthelossofnormalfeedwaterevent,flowfromatleasttwoAFMpumpsisrequireduponalowlevelsignalineitherSGtomeettheacceptancecriteriaforaCondition2event(Ref.3).ForthesmallbreakLOCA,twoAFWpumpsarerequiredtolowertheRCSpressurebelowtheshutoffheadofthesafetyinjectionpumps.AssumingthatallthreeAFMpumpsinitiateattheirmaximumflowrate,theCSTsprovidesufficientinventoryforatleast20(atgreaterthanrequiredflowrate)minutesbeforeoperatoractiontorefilltheCSTsortransfersuctiontotheSWSystemisrequired. Insert3.7.6.4thereisnoautomaticre-configurationoftheAFWSystem.FollowingterminationoftheAFWflowtotheaffectedSGbyclosingtheAFWtraindischargevalvesorstoppingapump,flowfromtheremainingAFWtrainortheSAFWSystemisdirectedtotheintactSGfordecayheatremoval.Insert3.7.6.5ForcooldownsfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower,theCSTscontainsufficientinventorytoprovideaminimumof2hoursofdecayheatremovalasrequiredbyNUREG-0737(Ref.4),itemII.E.l.l.ThisbeyondDBArequirementprovidesmorelimitingcriteriaforCSTinventory.Insert3.7.6.6Afterthistimeperiod,theaccidentanalysesassumethatAFWpumpsuctioncanbetransferredtothesafetyrelatedsuctionsource(i.e.,theSWSystem).Insert3.7.6.7theneedtoprovideatleast2hoursofdecayheatremovalfollowinglossofallACelectricalpower.TheCSTsarec'onsideredOPERABLEwhen,atleast22,500gallonsofwaterisavailable.The22,500minimumvolumeismetifoneCSTis>21.5ftorifbothCSTsare>12.5ft.SincetheCSTsare30,000gallontanks,onlyoneCSTisrequiredtomeettheminimumrequiredwatervolumeforthisLCO.

CST~B3.7.6BASES'CO(continued)TheOPERABILITYoftheCSPisdeterminedbymaintainingthetanklevelatorabovetheminimumrequiredq~B.kNaa~Vaah&wa>>a.'VIAILITY.LEy~GGiha~Ek~InMODESI,2,and3,ein-ieubeOPERABLE,InMODE5gor6,theCSTisSystemisnotrequired.n-~hen-steeve~stheCSTgasrequir~etodnotrequiredbecausetheAFWbg-CQcL.-CkyvhQ.ahrbdv~bdTbmat>>>>>>CLJEZahaSSaIVbh,va4C414ACTIONSz.~.c,.aI,5"l.aaI))IfhIErneIIhh11I,hEIEIIIIEI1hkIhIdIffdbwithin4hours.nd-'nce-ever-2-hours-tcrea-er-OPERABILITYofthebackupfeedwatersupplymustincludeqbJverificationthattheflow~athsfromthebackupwatersu1toteAFWpumpsareOPERABLE",andthatthebac~kusupplyaserequiredvolumeofwateravailablecZheCS~~'ustberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin7days,ecause~hbkEhh~fiIfaitiontoits'ormalfuno'he4hourbee.'~E.~,k,~'"kg'hthejOEEJIABIZebackupwatersupply.IliaIdayis.~i~~,,'~S.~+,CompletionTimeisreasonaNe,basedonanOPERABLEbackupv~i-~+'.watersupplybeingavailable,andthelowprobabilityofan'"'.;':-~.'""'""-IeentoccurringduringthistimeperiodrequiringtheCSEE~C.Rug4c.(+I-'mtV~~CLV.'tbB.landB.2pl~IftheCSYcannotberestoredtPOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,the~mustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.ToachievethiseebIIIXd6hoursdinMODE'ee-en-t~Q~tiPIhhemh.Eh11dCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperaingexperience,toreachtherequired~conditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~systems.pB3.7-34(continued)ev-.9~ Insert3.7.6.8Alternatesourcesofwaterinclude,butisnotlimitedto,theSWSystem,andtheall-volatile-treatmentcondensatestoragetank.

BASES(continued)CST+B3.7.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSP<~v.o,t.v.4y~~~5+0QtMntcur~SR3761'~I'-~r.g-qWaIs~c'O>Cay'ThisSRverifiesthattheCSTFcontairetherequiredvolumeofcoolingwater.The12hourFrequencisbasedonoperatingexperienceandtheneedfor,operatorawarenessoQiBevolutionsthatmayaffecttheCSTinventorybetweenchecks.Also,the12hourFrequencyisconsideredadequateinviewofotherindicationsinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,toalerttheoperatortoabnormaldeviationsintheCSTlevel.REFERENCESPuiu.a.1.FSAR,Section~.~FSAR,Chapterg5+B3.7-35ev.

CCWSystemB3.7.783.7PLANTSYSTEMS83.7.7ComponentCoolingWater(CCW)SystemBASESBACKGROUND4.a~fvmsD~%wHsataava)~BXvV,C,SaW~~'E~lCm~faute~yc>>tCvts~Cns'V>>cvmw'mevaJr~Cyens'f'Lt+tg>>~9'a.'o.Chatve.'Lce..t4.a.>>plwxvmA.a3.~~"g4Sa~~Qasveyvta,nv~L~~3>>h52APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESs>>QCmobsC,0~~vvm>~TheCCWSystemprovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaoeraion,theCCWSystemalsorovidesthisfunctionforvariouscomponents~~~.TheCCWSystemservesasaarrivertothereleaseofradioactivebyproductsbetweenpotentiallyradioactivesystemsandtheServic~ater*System,andthustotheenvironment.Io.:>>4,lr4'>>rseo44.W'essmmcellscaacit's,an&liasisolaaenonsafaty-rnens.Eachsafetyre%at~cTudesafullapacitypurimge-,ter~teat..exchaner'g~ot]~vesJE1>>>>>>fromaseparatebus.Anopensurgetankinthesystemrovees.umr0.ce-nsurehasu>cleatnetpositivesuctionheadisavailableepumsne'icaystartn-recapo7a!safetyinjection'gna4-ant4el-compllnentsare.~.o-~.,'nformationonthe.designandoe'on-of-the.system,alongwi-.'onentsservy~ssnteFSARSect'-1-'heprincipesaetyrelatedfunctionoftheCCWSystem~~inn.istheremovalofdecayheatfromthereactorviathees>uaeamovaSstem.~Ltgl)QgQOThedesignbasisoftheCCWSystemisforoneCCWtraintoremovethe~lossofcoolantaccident(LOCA)heatloadfromthecontainmentsumdurin'ecirculation'phaseThemerencCoreCoolinSystem(ECCS)andcontainmentLOCA-e.mourn-anminimumpf1<<S~.Tht~em~erteCCWisgAp'F,and,duringunw<-WQDE~~,~[20',)amaximumtemperatureof'Fis~ION(continued)B3.7-36 Insert3.7.7.1gDiV4-safetyrelated,pumptrains(Ref.I).EachCCWtrainconsi,stsofamanualsuctionanddischargevalve,apump,andadischargecheckvalve.TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWtrainsandcontainstwoparallelheatexchangers,eitherofwhichcansupplythesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbyCCW.TheloopheadercontinuesuptothefirstisolationvalveforeachcomponentsuppliedbytheCCWSystem.TheCCWloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachsuppliedloadtothecommonpipingatthe-suctionoftheCCWpumps.Insert3.7.7.2fg.iv.otothepumps.TheCCWSystemisalsoprovidedwitharadiationdetector(R-17)toisolatethesurgetankfromtheAuxiliaryBuildingenvironmentandtoprovideindicationofaleakofradioactivewaterintotheCCWSystem.'ITheCCWSystemisnormallymaintainedbelow100Fbytheuseofonepumptraininconjunctionwithoneheatexchanger.ThestandbyCCWpumpwillautomaticallystartifthesystempressurefallsto50psig.Insert3.7.7.3g.lM.5.SincetheremovalofdecayheatviatheRHRSystemisonlyperformedduringtherecirculationphaseofanaccident,theCCWpumpsdonotreceiveanautomaticstartsignal.Followingthegenerationofasafetyinjectionsignal,thenormallyoperatingCCWpumpwillremaininserviceunlessanundervol,tagesignalispresentoneitherClassIEelectricalBus14orBus16atwhichtimethepumpisstrippedfromitsrespectivebus.ACCWpumpcanthenbemanuallyplacedintoservicepriortoswitchingtorecirculationoperationswhichwouldnotberequireduntilaminimumof46minutesfollowinganaccident. BASESCCMSystemB3.7.7'Cs"~Mi;~Map.~c~tQeseathQiAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)9Ziv.o8X:.v.o..'ivyi7.1.%inmentsumTheCCWSystemsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.assumed.Thisreventstsncreaigptefo,anprov>esagrauareuctionintheemperaureofluidasitsstotheeacorCoolantSystem(RCS)bytheECCSumps.c~,~~heCCWSystemisdessgnerorm>sunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingalossooffsitepower.c,o>nc,iMTheCCWSystealsounctioWtocoolthe~fromRHRentryconditions(T~<+50+FtoMODE5(~~<+00+F),duringnormal~oeraions.Theimereuiredtocoolfrom50'Fto00]'FisfunctionofthenumberofCCWandRHRtrainsop.OneC'cienttoremoveecayeausequent.operationswithassumesamaximumservicewaterteeof[95]'Foccurnn1wit>mumheatloadsonthesstem.LCOQ7.hV.aThereindependentofeachothertothateachhasseparasuppliesoeroesnotdeendonIntheeventoa,oneCCMtrainisrequiredtoprovidetheminimumeatremovacapasiyassumedinthesafetyanalysisforthesystemstowhichitsuppliescoolingwater.iiii*,<<iiCCiiiOPEINBLE.E"AtleastoneCCWtrainwilloperateassumingtheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccurscoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower.ACCWtrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhen't~.L.~0"~yWepumpOPERABL32.tv,cL.g~l~cP4'f'o~tetPCCu3Sg~pc@~igloorag~~O.o-CCu)a'Jhdiping,valves,heatexchaninstrumentationaneoperformtheunctionareOPERABLE.kyytyrra4an6l~gg,y.,~ruA~')eke,(continued)+l~nctfC,em~i~~~~~aD~~d-~~a.e~TheisolationofCCMfromothercomponentsorsystemsnotrequiredforsafetymayrenderthosecomponentsorsystem83.7-37 Insert3.7.7.4SinceCCWiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresults.indrainingtheCCWSystemwithinashortperiodoftime.TheCCWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornadoes.TheplanthasbeenevaluatedforthelossofCCWundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem)withacceptableresults(Ref.l).LeakswithintheCCWSystemduringpostaccidentconditionscanbemitigatedbytheavailablemakeupwatersources.Insert3.7.7.5TheCCWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,oneoftwoCCWheatexchangers,surgetank,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwatertothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a~b.C.d.TwoRHRheatexchangers;TwoRHRpumpmechanicalsealcoolersandbearingwaterjackets;Threesafetyinjectionpumpmechanicalsealcoolers;andTwocontainmentspraypumpmechanicalse'alcoolers.TheCCMloopheadertemperaturemustalsobe<120'FpriortotheCCWcoolingwaterreachingthefirstisolationvalvesupplyingthesecomponents.TheCCMtrainsandloopheaderareconside'redOPERABLEwhentheycanbeplacedintoservicewithinthetimelimitsassumedbytheaccidentanalyses(i.e.,46minutes).TheCCWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeoftheCCWpumptrains,throughoneoftwoCCWheatexchangers,anduptothefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.TheCCMloopheaderthencontinuesfromthelastisolationvalveonthedischargeofeachofthe,abovecomponentstothecommonpipingatthesuctionoftheCCWpumps.OnlyoneofthetwoCCWheatexchangersisrequiredsincetheheatexchangerisapassivedevicesimilartotheloopheaderpiping.TheportionofCCWpiping,valves,instrumentationandcontrolsbetweentheisolation'alvestocomponentsathroughdaboveisaddressedbyhtefollowingLCOs:

Insert3.7.7.5(continued)~g,oa.LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"b.LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"c.LCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled;"d.LCO3.5.2,"ECCS-Operating;"e.LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-Shutdown;"f.LCO3.9.3,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelZ23Ft;"andg.LCO3.9.4,"RHRandCoolantCirculation-WaterLevel<23Ft."TheCCWpipinginsidecontainmentforthereactorcoolantpumps(RCPs)ahdthereactorsupportcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationbarrier.ThisisaddressedbyLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarriers."TheCCWSystemradiationdetector(R-17)isnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCOsincetheCCWSystemoutsidecontainmentisnotrequiredtobeaclosedsystem. PZ..'su.~CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESLCOinoperablebutdoesnot-affecttheOPERABILITYoftheCCM(continued)System.APPLICABILITY~'Q6,bag,SdbACTIONS(c.~~~InHODESI,2,3,and4,theCCWSystemi~sanormallyoperatingsystem,whichmustbe~2erQ<operformitspostaccidentsafetfunctio,pVi~~CS=h,w1sg-the-RgR-hach-meehangee.InHODE5or6,theOPERABILITYreu'softheCCWSystemaredeterminedby-tCQ2.'4.')4CJ~<<'9t-C.Q'l,~h)tcoa.'9Q.A.lRequ~id-4cfjonA.lismodifiedbyaNoteindicatitheapplicable.CRnfi4mqsandRequiredA~oLCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-HODE4,"been'tergdm..ninoperableCCMtrainresultsinaninoperKWHRloop.ThisisbnexceptiontoLCO3.0.6urestheproperactionsaretaeeseIonns.QW.'sv.+C'~ha~\'s,hb<<ns5ts.~~dVMOPC4.the.V".CC.A+~~~A,mh,s.'L+hoggOQ-CC.~uetc3nss<<.sjIfoneCCWtrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,theremainingOPERABLECCMtrainisadequatetoperformtheearemovauncion.The72hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,basedontheredundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.4<.'tv,Gpl~.B.landB.2IftheCCWtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,theGaBmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.To111pltlHODE3within6hoursandinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequired~onditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymanneandwithoutchallenginginncgssystems.pt~P'~*'3B3.7-38(continued) Insert3.7.7.6ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingandcontainmentintegrityduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCA.Insert3.7.7.7C.lC.2andC.3WithbothCCWtrainsortheloopheaderinoperable,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestoreOPERABLEstatustooneCCWtrainortheloopheader.InthisCondition,thereisnoOPERABLECCWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisalossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofCCWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinHODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantshouldnotexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,enterNODE5)untilatleastoneCCWtrainortheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation. CCWSystemB3.7.7BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.7.7.1'hisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheCCWflowtoindividualcomponentsmayrenderthosecomponentsinoperutdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYof.gtheCCWloop4u~rVerifinthecorrectalignmentformanualpoweroperatedBka'I\'IvalvesintheCCWflowpathrovidesassurancethatteproperflowpathsexistforCCMoperat>on.>sdoesnotapplytovalvesthatarelocked,sealed,orotherwisesecuredinposition,sincethesevalvesareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortolocking,sealing,orsecuring.Th'isSRalsodoesnotapplytovalvesthatcannotbeinadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.ThisSurveillancedoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvemanipulation;rather,itinvolvesverificationtha~thosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposition.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverningvalveoeration,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3.7.7.2ThisSRifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheCCWvalvesonaactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TCCMSystemisanoallyoperatingsystemthatcannotfullyactuatedaspartroutinetestingduringnormoperation.The[18]monthFreqcyisbasedontheneeoperformthisSurveillanceundetheconditionsthapplyduringaunitoutageandthepoten'alforanuarmedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperfordwitereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperratthe[18]monthFrequency.Therefore,theequency'sacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.7.7.3ThisSRvifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheCumpsonantualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TheCCWSymisnormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuat(continued)B3.7-39e.

Insert3.7.7.9SR3.7.7.2~~ThisSRverifiesthatthetwomotoroperatedisolationvalvestotheRHRheatexchangers(738Aand738B)canbeoperatedwhenrequiredsincethevalvesarenormallymaintainedclosed.TheFrequencyofthisSurveillanceisspecifiedintheInserviceTestProgramandisconsistentwithASIDECode,SectionXI(Ref.2). CCWSystemB3.7.7BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS3.7.7.3(continued)aspartofronetestingduringnormaloperati.The[18]monthFrequerfey~sbasedontheneederform.thisSurveillanceunderthe~nditionstpplyduringaunitoutageandthepotentialforplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperfordwitht~actoratpower.OperatingexperieasshownthattheseonentsusuallypasstheSurancewhenperformedatthe[nthFrequec.Therefore,theFrequencyisacceptableaabilitystandpoint.REFERENCES1.'FSAR,Section~9.2.2P.2.PSA~mtionB3.7-40 B3.7.8B3.7PLANTSYSTEHS583.7.8ServiceWater"SystemgggilBASESTsISAsamasabass'mmsOI(continued)BACKGROUND-TheSWSrovidesaheatsinkfortheremovalofprocessandoperatingheatfromsafetyrelatedcomponentsduringaDesignBasisAccident(DBA)ortransient.Duringnormaoperation,andanormalshutdown,theSWS'asoprovidesthisfunctionforvarioussafetyrelatedandgsafetrelatedcomponents.ThesafetyrelatedfunctioMcoveredbythi4'"~'CO.~I..I~l~(Sasaow~.ra4'hra!S'3.'IW.aa.s~.4.i""I'she~'umsS-\~tsa~sIsTheSWSconsistsoFtwoseparateI~pacitsafetE~T"f.ca'tum--"one-component-cee.~er--(Egg)=iieQ>>:-.:,.exess':dv~rv'md.~ya)ssfAAThepumps~vepvs~egmy-ea~~'~sI';o,alignedg~~s,(s~)rsvp/~.~automaticallstartQHiponreceiptoI.essenTaavalfes.are..a..ignetoeirpos.pc~cMentpositions.alsoprovidesemer-eup:tothespentfuelisthebackupo.the.Auxil,j.aryFeedwaterSys'ormationaboutthedesignandoeSWS,alongwithaomsserved,is~~~~~~'b~resente~'%heFSAR~Section9..R+$-.1~1The',principalsafetyrelatedfunctiosdsoftheSWSiseremoval(te.,p~WWAS..-.<lnp~'~W~W+n).)ydLCuhWp~tg~O(OS.)f,~~<<-"I-..Z'nsDf'~idts-<~M.tcuas(dt~~Cg-'~~.I~ss2~WCT~SM~~/APPLICABLEThedesignbasisoftheSWS"isforoneSWStrain~in4'~~">~~SAFETYANALYSESconjunctionwiththeCCWSystemanda100%ccontainmentcoolinsystem,toremove~usamsigs:.sgheatI'~4.,~m(Ref.2).ThispreVen'tsthecontainmentsumpfuifromincreasingintemperatureduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAandprovidesforaQ3~v.arect~~rdualreductioninthetemperatureofthisfluidasitistotheReactorCoolantSystembytheECCSpumps.Ssdesignedtoperformitsfunctionwithasinglefailureofanyactivecomponent,assumingChalossofoffsitepower.Q.COsnr.i~f'-pfB3.7-41IiOCSQ."Ossa~~~M!-s~+eas.isIIsIsv Insert3.7.8.2.aqp~40ThephysicaldesignoftheSWsystemissuchthatone100%capacitypumpfromeachclass1Eelectricalbus(Buses17and18)isarrangedonacommonpipingheaderwhichthensuppliestheSWloopheader.ForthepurposesofthisLCO,atrainisbasedonelectricalsourceonly.(newparagraph)Insert3.7.8.2TheSWloopheaderbeginsfromthedischargeofthetrainsandsuppliesthesafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponentscooledbySW.Insert3.7.8.3TheSWloopheadersuppliesthecoolingwatertoallsafetyrelatedandnonsafetyrelatedcomponents.Thenonsafetyrelatedandlong-termsafety'functions(e.g.,componentcoolingwaterheatexchangers)canbeisolatedfromtheloopheaderthroughuseofredundantmotoroperatedisolationvalves.ThesevalvesautomaticallycloseonacoincidentsafetyinjectionsignalandundervoltagesignalonBuses14and16.ThesuctionsourcefortheSWSystemisthescreenhousewhichisaseismicstructurelocatedonLakeOntario.ThedischargefromtheSWSystemloadsreturnsbacktoLakeOntario.Insert3.7.8.4inconjunctionwitha100%capacitycontainmentcoolingsystem(i.e.,containmentrecirculationfancoolers)toprovideforheatremovalfollowingasteamlinebreak(SLB)insidecontainmenttoensurecontainmentintegrity.TheSWSystemisalsodesigned Insert3.7.8.5Followingthereceiptofasafetyinjectionsignal,allfourSWpumpsaredesignedtostart(ifnotalreadyrunning)tosupplythesystemloads.Ifacoincidentsafetyinjection.andundervoltagesignaloccurs,theneachnonsafetyrelatedandnonessentialloadwithintheSWSystemisisolatedbyredundantmotoroperatedvalvesthatarepoweredbyseparateClasslEelectricaltrains.TheSWpumpsaresequencedtostartwithin17secondsfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal.TheselectedSWpumpsaresequencetostartaftera40secondtimedelayfollowinganundervoltagesignalontheelectricalbussupplyingtheselectedpump(i.e.,Bus17orBus18). ~en.;B3.7.8BASEStoremoveecayeaur~uentoperationsinNODssumesamaximumSWStemperatureofoccurringsimultaneo.honthesystem.TheSWSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.WmoorpL~.APPLICABLEqhe,inconjunctionwiththeCCWSystem,alsocool8the~~~SAFETYANALYSESfromresidualheatremoval(RHR)~.'w.c.(continued)entryconditionstoNODE5~duringnormaloperations.Thetsme'redisafunctionoftheofCCWandRHRSstemtrainsthatare,operating.neS5~~ZmeE=(a~cg~LCOx'~EE'S.sv.c~+~~~P~~R0-adC~E.eana~tobeOPERABLEtoprovidethuived-redundatoensurethatthesystemfunctionsto~~'Mremovepostaccidentheatloadsssumingthattheworstcasesingleactivefailureoccursoincidentwiththelossofoffsitepower.~.a.Q,8MS~rainisconsideredOPERABLE~ehenBr'~isOPERABLE;anb.Theassociatedpiping,vacanger,andinstrumentatiorosrequiredtoE""IEIIEIE.APPLICABILITYP9.'iv.KS~~InMODESI2,3,and4,theSWtisanormallocratingsyseaosupore0equipmentservicedOPERABLEin~<~Gu~InMODES5and6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsofthearedeterminedby3,ie.a,~2,'7,'icsQE~3,g.~ACTIONSA.1IfoneSWStrainisinoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin72hours.InthisCondition,(continued)+3~i+B3.7-42 Insert3.7.8.6SinceSMiscomprisedofalargeloopheader,apassivefailurecanbepostulatedduringthiscooldownperiodwhichresultsinfailingtheSWSystemtopotentiallymultiplesafetyrelated,functions.TheSWSystemhasbeenevaluatedtodemonstratethecapabilitytomeetcoolingneedswithanassumed500gal.leak.TheSWSystemisalsovulnerabletoexternaleventssuchastornadoes.Theplanthasbeenevaluatedfor,thelossofSMundertheseconditionswiththeuseofalternatecoolingmechanisms(e.g.,providingfornaturalcirculationusingtheatmosphericreliefvalvesandtheAFWSystem)withacceptableresults(Ref.I).ThetemperatureofthefluidsuppliedbytheSWSystemisalsoaconsiderationintheaccidentanalyses.IfthecoolingwatersupplytothecontainmentrecirculationfancoolersandCCWheatexchangersistoowarm,theaccidentanalyseswithrespecttocontainmentpressureresponsefollowingaSLBandthecontainmentsumpfluidtemperaturefollowingaLOCAmaynolongerbebounding.Ifthecoolingwatersupplyistoocold,thecontainmentheatremovalsystemsmaybemoreefficientthanassumedintheaccidentanalysis.Thiscausesthebackpressureincontainmenttobereducedwhichpotentiallyresultsinincreasedpeakcladtemperatures.Insert3.7.8.7,<~'ntheeventofaDBA,oneSWtrainandtheloopheaderisrequiredInsert3.7.8.8asassumedinthesafetyanalyses.Toensurethisrequirementismet,twotrainsofSMandtheloopheadermustbeOPERABLE.AtleastoneSWtrainwilloperateInsert3.7.8.9onepumpinthetrainisOPERABLEandcapabTeoftakingsuctionfromthescreenhouseandprovidingcoolingwatertotheloopheaderasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.Thisincludesconsiderationofavailablenetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)totheSWpumpsandthetemperatureofthesuctionsource.ThefollowingaretheminimumrequirementsofthescreenhousebaywithrespecttoOPERABILITYoftheSWpumps:'Ia.Level>5feet;andb.Temperature>35Fabove50/RTPand<80F. Insert3.7.8.9(continued)Thelowerscreenhousebaytemperatureisonlyspecifiedabove50%RTPsincethisvalueisonlyaconsiderationwhenevaluatingLOCAatornearfullpowerconditions.Inaddition,ifaSWpumpfailsonInserviceTestingProgramsurveillance(e.g.,pumpdevelopedhead),thepump,isonlydeclaredinoperablewhentheflowratetorequiredcomponentsisbelowthatrequiredtoprovidetheheatremovalcapabilityassumedintheaccidentanalyses(Ref.1).AnOPERABLESWtrainalsorequiresthatallnonessentialandnonsafetyrelatedloadscanbeisolatedbythesixmotoroperatedisolationvalveswhicharepoweredfromthesameClass1Eelectricaltrainasthepumps.Therefore,motoroperatedvalves4609,4614,4615,4616,4663,and4670mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsAandCwhilevalves4613,4664,4733,4734,4735,and4780mustbeOPERABLEandcapableofclosingforSWPumpsBandD.TheSWloopheaderisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheassociatedpiping,valves,andtheinstrumentationandcontrolsrequiredtoprovidecoolingwaterfrom.eachOPERABLESWtraintothefollowingsafetyrelatedcomponentsareavailableandcapableofperformingtheirsafetyrelatedfunction:a~b:C.d.e.f.FourCRFCs;TwoCCWheatexchangers;TwoDGs;Three'referredAFWpumps;TwostandbyAFWpumps;andThreesafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolers.AnOPERABLESWloopheaderalsorequiresaflowpaththroughthedieselgenerator(4665,4760,4669,and4668B)andCRFC(4756and4639)cross-ties.TheSWtrainsandloopheaderareconsideredOPERABLEwhentheycansupply:a.TheCRFCs,DGsandsafetyinjectionpumpbearinghousingcoolersimmediatelyfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal(i.e.,aftertheloopheaderbecomes.refilled);b.ThepreferredAFWandSAFWpumpswithin10minutesfollowingreceiptofalowSGlevelsignal;andc.TheCCWheatexchangerswithin46minutesfollowingasafetyinjectionsignal. Insert3.7.8.9(continued)TheSWloopheaderbeginsatthecommonpipingatthedischargeofbothSWpumptrainsandendsatthefirstisolationvalveforeachoftheabovecomponents.SincetheSWSystemdischargesbacktoLakeOntario,thecoolingwaterflowpaththroughtheabovecomponentsandsubsequentdischargeisaddressedundertheirrespectiveLCO.ThisincludesLCO'a~b.LCO3.5.2,LCO3.5.3,"ECCS-MODES1,2,and3;""ECCS-MODE4;"C.d.e.g.LCO3.6.6,"CS,CRFC,andPost-AccidentCharcoalSystems;"LCO3.7.5,"AFWSystems;"LCO3.7.7,"CCWSystem;"LCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4;"andLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-MODES5and6."TheSWpipinginsidecontainmentfortheCRFCsandthereactorcompartmentcoolersalsoservesasacontainmentisolationbarrier.ThisisaddressedunderLCO3.6.3,"ContainmentIsolationBarriers." Insert3.7.8.10whichmustbecapableofperformingitspostaccidentsafetyfunctions.ThefailuretoperformthissafetyfunctioncouldresultinthelossofreactorcorecoolingduringtherecirculationphasefollowingaLOCAorlossofcontainmentintegrityfollowingaSLB. B3.7.8BASESACTIONS+~,'ti'.1(continued)theremainingOPERABLESWFtrainisadequatetoperformtheheatremovalfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseaslefailureintheOPERABLES~raincouresutinlossofSunction.equsrecsonodefiedbywooes.emrsNoteindicatesteapplicaonditionsandRe'quiredActionsofL..1,"ACSources-Opera"shouldbeenterediinoperableSWStrainresultsinaninleernecydieselgenerator.ThesecondNoteindicatestaplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofL..6,"RCSLo-MODE4,"shouldbeenteredifa'perableSWStrainresults'noperabcayheatremovaltrain.Thisisanexceto.0.6andensurestheroec'retakenforesecornonents.e72hourCompletionTimeisbaseonthereundantcapabilitiesaffordedbytheOPERABLEtrain,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod.~~.Z.ItB.landB.2IftheSRBPtraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,thedhth~musteplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toacievethisstatus,theg+$)mustbepl'acedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingsystems.pl~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMWCm+o3.'iv.4SR3.7.8.1ThisSRismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthattheisolationoftheSMSomponentsorsystemsmayrenderthosecomponensnoperae,butdoesnotaffecttheOPERABILITYoftheSVerifyingthecorrectalignmentformanual,poweroperated,andautomaticvalvesintheS~flowpathprovidesassurancethattheproperflowpathsexistforS~operation.ThisSRdoesnotapplytovalves'thatdsealed,orontinued)<<9~B3.7-43 Insert3.7.8.11C.lC.2andC.3~1~WithbothSWtrains.ortheloopheaderinoperable,actionmustbeimmediatelyinitiatedtorestoreOPERABLEstatustooneSWtrainortheloopheader.InthisCondition,thereisnoOPERABLESWSystemavailabletoprovidenecessarycoolingwaterwhichisalossofasafetyfunction.Also,theplantmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheconsequencesofalossofSWcoincidentwithanaccidentarereduced.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinNODE4within12hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheplantshouldnotexittheApplicabilityforthisLCO(i.e.,,enterMODE5)untilatleastoneSWtrainortheloopheaderisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatustosupportRHRoperation. B3.7.8BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS'lF~.'tv.c.SR3.7.8.1(continued)otherwisesecuredinposition,sincetheyareverifiedtobeinthecorrectpositionpriortobeinglocked,sealed,orsecured,+ThisSRdoesnotrequireanytestingorvalvefman>pulation;rather,itinvolvesverificationthatthosevalvescapableofbeingmispositionedareinthecorrectposiionThisSRdoesnotapYjl~WavesteacaonnoCe.inadvertentlymisaligned,suchascheckvalves.The31dayFrequencyisbasedonengineeringjudgment,isconsistentwiththeproceduralcontrolsgoverning'valveoperation,andensurescorrectvalvepositions.SR3'.7.8.2icyg~symThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSMS~valvesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.~SMSisanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedasaronormaesin.eggmonthFrequencyisasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceunderthe92.aV.uaconditionsthatapplyduringa6KBouageanepoensaforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillanc'ewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusual~1passtheSurveillancewhenperformedatthemonthFrequency.vv~~4.~~<<~kTherefore,theFrequencyisacceptable(fromareliability!oo~'~~~.Mtandpoint.\~~.~<<<"~Pqst'~4~ifvva&csnvWwA%3.7.83'.iv.ThisSRverifiesproperautomaticoperationoftheSMSpumpsonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.~MSssanormallyoperatingsystemthatcannotbefullyactuatedaspartofnormaltestingduringnormaloperation.TheggmonthFrequencyisbasedontheneedtoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringa~outageandthepotentialforanunplannedtransientiftheSurveillancewereperformedwiththereactoratpower.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthemonthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencyiscceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.fQgg-SfS~B3.7-44(continued)Wev;---~09'-2. BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section+9.2.1$2.+FSAR,SectionP6.2PB3.7-45

UHSB3.7.93.7PLANTSYSTEHSB7.9UltimateHeatSink(UHS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheUHSprovidesaheatsinkforprocessingheatfrom'afetyrelatedcomponentsduringaccident,aswellasduringnormaloperatibyutilizingtheServiceWaterSystem(S)omponentCoolingWater(CCW)System.adoperatingtransientorThisisdoneandtheThUHShasbeendefinedasthatcornexofwatersources,includingnecessaryretainingstrucres(e.g.,apondwithitsday,orariverwithitsdam)andthecanalsorconduiPconnectingthesourcesth,butnotincluding,thecoolingwatersystem'intakestrcturesasdiscussedinthe,FSAR,Secb,on[9.2.5](Ref.I.IfcoolingtowersorportionsthhreofarerequiretoaccomplishtheUHSsafetyfunctions,timeyshouldmeethesamerequirementsasthesink.Thetwobprincipalnctionsof'theUHSarethe,dissipationofrqsidualeatafterreactorshutdown,anddissipationofreiduaheatafteranaccident.'varietyofcompleisusedtomeettherequirementsforaUHS.Alakeornoceanmayqualifyasasinglesource.Ifthecomplexiludes'~awatersourcecontainedbyastructure,itilikely%batasecondsourcewillberequired.Thebasicperformancerequirementsarethata30daysupplyofwaterP'eavailable,andthatthedesignbasistempera+resofsafetyrelatedequipmentnotbeexceeded.Basinsfcoolingtowersgenera11+includelessthana30dsupplyofwater,typically+daysorless.A30daysupywouldbedependentonothersrce(s)andmakeupsytern(s)forreplenishingthesourcenthecoolingtowersin.Forsmallerbasinsources,whicmaybeassmallasaIdaysupply,thesystemsforreplenish'ngthebasinandthebackupsource(s)becomeofsufficientportancethatthemakeupsystemitselfmayberequiredtoeetthesamedesigncriteriaasanEngineeredSafetyFeatu(e.g.,singlefailureconsiderations),andmultiplemaeupwatersourcesmayberequired.0i(continued)WOGSTSB3.7-46Rev.0,09/28/92. 83.7.9BASBACKGRODAdditionalinformationonthedesignandoperationthe(contined)system,alongwithalistofcomponentsserved,cbefoundinReferencel.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheUHSisthesinkforheatremovedfromtereactorcoreollowingallaccidentsandanticipatedorationalocurrencesinwhichtheunitiscooledownandplacedonre'dualheatremoval(RHR)operation.ForunitsthatuseUHSasthenormalheatsinkforcondensercoolingviatheCircutingWaterSystem,unitopera/ionatfullpowerisitsmax'mheatload.Itsmaximugpostaccidentheatloadoccurs2minutesafteradesignbasislossofcoolantaccidentOCA).Nearthistime~theunitswitchesfrominjectiontrecirculationandShecontainmentcoolingsystemsandRarerequiredoremovethecoredecayheat.TheoperatingliitsarebedonconservativeheattransferanalysesfortherstcqpeLOCA.ReferenceIprovidesthedetailsoftheassutiohsusedintheanalysis,whichincludeworstexpectmeteorologicalconditions,conservativeuncertaieswhencalculatingdecayheat,andworstcasesingleaivfailure(e.g.,singlefailureofamanmadestructure).TheHSisdesignedinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.27(Ref.2),whichrequiresa30daysupplyofcooligwaterineUHS.LCOTheUHisrequiredtobeOPERABLEaisconsideredOPERAEifitcontainsasufficientvlumeofwateratorbelthemaximumtemperaturethatwoulallowtheSWStoopateforatleast'0daysfollowingthdesignbasisLOCAwthoutthelossofnetpositivesuctionhd(NPSH),andithoutexceedingthemaximumdesigntemperaureoftheequipmentservedbytheSWS.Tomeetthiscoition,theUHStemperatureshouldnotexceed[90'F]andthlevelshouldnotfallbelow[562ftmeansealevel]du'ngnormalunitoperation.WOGSTS83.7-47(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92..r UHB3.7.9BAS(continued)APPLICAILITYInMODESI,2,3,and4,theUHS,isrequiredtosuportthe'OPERABILITYoftheequipmentservicedbytheUHSndrequiredtobeOPERABLEintheseMODES.InMODE5or6,theOPERABILITYrequirementsftheUHSaredeterminedbythesystemsitsupports.ACTIONSA.Ifonormorecoolingtowershaveofaninoperable(i.e.,uptooefanpercoolingtowerinorable),actionmustbetakentoestoretheinoperablecoingtower.fan(s)to.,OPERABLEsatuswithin7days.The7dayComletionTimeisryasonablebasedonthelowprobabilityofnaccidentocgurringduringthe7daysthatonecoolingtowefanisinoerable(inoneormorecoolingtowers),thenumbofavaablesystems,andthetimerequiredtoreasonalycoletetheRequiredAction.B.1andB.2[IfthecoolingtowfannnotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthessociateompletionTime,orjiftheUHSisinoperableforreasonsoththanConditionA,theunitmustbeplaced'MODEinwhitheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethistatus,theunitustbeplacedinatleastMODE3withi6hoursandinMODEwithin36hours.ThealloweCompletionTimesarereasable,basedonoperatinexperience,toreachthereq'redunitconditionsfromfupowerconditionsinanorderlyarmerandwithoutchalleingunitsystems.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSS3.7.9.1hisSRverifiesthatadequatelongterm(30day)olingcanbemaintained.ThespecifiedlevelalsoensuresthatsufficientNPSHisavailabletooperatetheSWSpumps.The[24)hourFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperienceretedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheWOGSTSB3.7-48(continued)/Rev.0,09/28/92 eo;UHSB3.7.SURVLLANCERE(UIRENTSSR3.7.9.1(continued)applicableNODES.ThisSRverifiesthattheUHSWaterlevelis>[562]ft[meansealevel].SR3.7.9.2ThisSRverifiesthattheSWSisavailagetocooltheCCWstemtoatleastitsmaximumdesigntemperaturewiththemimumaccidentornormaldesignheaP'oadsfor30daysfol,owingaDesignBasisAccident.~The24hourFrequencyisbase+onoperatingexperiencerelatedtotrendingoftheparametervariationsduringtheap'plicableNODES.ThisSRverifie's.thattheaveragewateremperatureoftheUHSis<[90'F]gSR3.7.9.3OperatingeachcaolingowerfanforZ[15]minutesensuresthatallfansare'gPEPBLEandthatallassociatedcontrolsarefunctioningproperly.Italso.ensuresthatfanormotor'failure,orexcessijgvibration,canbedetectedforcorrectiveactionJ'h',31dayFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperience,theknownreliabilityofthefanunits,theredundancyavailable,andthelowprobabilityofsignificantdegradationof~theUHScoolingtowerfansoccurringbetweensurveillanes.SR3.7:9.4ThisRverifiesthateachcoolingtowerfanstartsandopeyatesonanactualorsimulatedauatiorisignal.The[P]monthFrequencyisconsistentwitthetypicalfuelingcycle.OperatingexperiencesshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillance)enperformedatthe[18]monthFrequency.'herefore,theequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint./REFERENC1.FSAR,Section[9.2.5].2.RegulatoryGuide1.27.1WOGSTSB3.7-49Rev.0,09/28/92 B3.7PLANTSYSTEMS(as'.;>B3.7.Q9ControlRoomEmergencySystem(~S))BASESC.P-~tniritp~Cto~~v~~cs'L4I4>+Ist~saira~t?EJJA,BACKGROUND'e-"s)Ps:snsif's.'t~.~G~sV.th.CRSc:spbiSTheQ~rovidesaprotectedenvironmentfromwhichoperatorscancontrolthe~followinganuncontrolledreleaseofradioactivity,C.Pc~gTheonsistsofrw-he-cea4rel-r-'i.Each-+pa+nrIlffffIpolar>cu1ateair(HEPA)filter,<@deactivatedcharcoalaChorbeP'~~9forremovalofgaseousactivitIl~),fI,edampers,andinstrumentationalsoformpartofthesystem'--aswellas<Jmisterstoremovewaterdropletsfromtheairsreamdbanoiersoer'ectiontocollectprovidebackupincase(emainHEPAink.,"'lcasvitThe"QKFrisanemergencys,partsofwhichmaQjRboperatedurinnormaloerat'o<gera4~Uponreceiptoftheactuatingsignal(s),normalytothecontrolroomisisolated,andtes%reamofv'tionairisrecirculatedthroughsystemfiltertrains.Tfiltersordemisters~reanylargeparticlesintheai,danyent'nedwaterdropletspresent,topreventexcess'adingoftheHEPAfilters)andcharcoaladsorbersontinuoarationofeachtrainforatleast10~spermonth,withtheherson,reducesmoitnebuildupontheHEPAfiltersanrbers.Bothtemisterandheaterareimportanttothectivenesso~fsnzhexsCttC4~gActuationoftheplacesthesystemindHRiibofseparatestates.oftheemergencymoeooeration,eeninoeiniiaionsigna.Actuationotesseemergencyraiaionstaeoftheemergencofoperatio,osestheunfilteredoutsidentakeandunfilteredexhauers,andsthesystemforrecirculationoftheconoomairthroughtheredundant~trainsofHEPAecharcoal'.Theemergencyradiationealsoinitiatespressuriza'dfiltered..ationoftheairsupplytothecontrolroom.,--"(continued)B3.7-50 Insert3.7.9.3$6',A.(L.AccordingtoAtomicIndustryForum(AIF)GDC11(Ref.I),acontrolroomshallbeprovidedwhichpermitscontinuousoccupancyunderanycrediblepostaccidentconditionwithoutexcessiveradiationexposuresofpersonnel.ExposurelimitsareprovidedinGDC19of10CFR50,AppendixA(Ref.2)whichrequiresthatcontrolroompersonnelberestrictedto5remwholebody,oritsequivalency,forthedurationoftheaccident.1Insert3.7.9.4ThefollowingarethenormalandemergencymodesofoperationfortheCREATS:CREATSModeATheCREATSisinthestandbymodewiththeexceptionthatthecontrolroomreturnairfanisinoperation.CREATSModeBThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowinganaccidentwitharadiationreleaseasdetectedbyradiationmonitorR-l.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersalignedtorecirculateamaximum'f2000cfm(approximatelyonefourthoftheControlBuildingVentilationdesign)throughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.AlloutsideairthatenterstheCREATS,ascontrolledbyanairadjustswitch(S-81),isalsocirculatedthroughtheCREATScharcoalandHEPAfilters.CREATSModeCThisisthesameCREATSconfigurationasModeBwiththeexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrol,roombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath.CREATSModeDThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofsmokewithintheControlBuilding.Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemcontinuestodrawoutsideair.However,thecontrolroomemergencyreturnairfanwillactuateandsystemdampersaligntorecirculateamaximumof2000cfmthroughtheGREATSandHEPAfilters.Thiseffectivelypurgesthecontrolroomairenvironment.CREATSModeEThisisthesameCREATSconfiguration.asModeDwiththeexceptionthatalloutsideairisisolatedtothecontrolroombyonedamperineachairsupplyflowpath. Insert3.7.9.4(continued)CREATSModeFThisistheCREATSconfigurationfollowingthedetectionofatoxicgasasindicatedbythechlorineorammoniadetectors,orhighradiationasdetectedbyR-36(gas),R-37(particulate),orR-38(iodine).Uponreceiptofanactuationsignal,thesystemalignsitselfconsistentwithModeCexceptthattwodampersineachairsupplypathareisolated. ~~~sB3.7.~BASESBACKGROUND(continued)'2S.'.o.QS.iv.>airisfiltered,dilutedwithbuildingairfromelectricaimentandcablespreadingrooms,aedtotheairbeingrecatedfromthecontrom.Pressurizationofthecoroomntsinfiltrationofunfilteredairfromthesurreasofthebuilding.Theactionstakeninoxicgasisoaastatearethesame,exceptesignalswitchescontrolrventil'oanisolationalignmenttopreventoutsienteringthecontrolroom.Theairenteringthecontrolroomiscontinuouslymonitoredbyradiationand.toxicgasdetectors.Onedetectoroutputbh11111Ihgdd<<I1I<<,1d.Th1hgdagB!llI.restrictive,andwilloverridetheactio~nsencyradiationstate~(~~Q~C$0~f~~snabpAsi'nwillpressurizethecontrolroomtoCbader~[0.125]incheswaandprovid'xchangerateinexcessof[25]%perhoerationinhbdblId~hR,cion[6.4](Ref.I).Reelmnhn1andrecirculationtrainsrequiredfiltrationssivepressuredropavD~W'~zroseotherfiltertrai.ormayopenisoaionampersarearrangeinseriespg~sothatthefailureofonedamertoshutwillnotresultinabreachofeisesigneinaccordancewithery<requirements.TheCREFSisdesignedto'controlroomenvironment'for30continuousafteraDesignBa'dentDBAwithoutexceedingaeJse.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESCgam4<+V,aCp.a~-"r'Thelocationof.componentsanductingwithinthecontroroomenvelopeensuresanadequatesuplyoffilteredairtoallareasrequiringaccess.Theprovidesairborneradiologicalprotectionforthecontrolroomoperator,asdemonstratedbythecontrolroomaccidentdoseanalysesforthemostlimitingdesignbasis~~~~'Z.E,~df(continued)83.7-51 B3.7.~'IBASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)4~3.1.9.4Qg.~id4lossofcoolantacciden(Rf.Bd.~-isoox)cgaseeasesemonstratestoxicitylimis.onrolroomfoll'xicchemicalrelease,aserencel.eesingleactivefailureofacornonCREFS,assumingaoesnotimpairtheabiemtoperformsstion.ThesatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.7ZLCOta1<C.A.CNSi~<cF-a.ES.'tv.o.Inaddition,thecontrolroomboundarymustbemaintained,includingtheintegrityofthewalls,floors,ceilings,ductwork,andaccessdoors.rtstsLcan.sa~k~~Ol~+~Jioindependentandredundant@~trainsarereunbredtobeOPERABLEhe-e4hes~in.JTotalsystemfailurecouldresultinexceedingadoseof5remtothecontrolroomoperatorf.intheeventofalargeradioactiverelease.C.Pa;snrsSJThe'@~isconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividualcornentsnecessarytoareOPERABLE+gg&trainisOPERABLEwhentheassociated:~C.g.a.A~SA'L~eberha.aQ@OPERABL;<q,M~t'dk~~kIG-ae~~b.HEPAfiltersandcharcoaadsorbersare~noexcessivelyrestrictingflow,andarecapableofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andCtwd4ubaw.A&best)II,I,ddOPERABLE,andaircirculationcanbemaintained.APPLICABILITY85.'aV,O.'nESI2,3,4,[,'mustbeOPERABLEtocontroeratorexposureuringandfollowingaDBA.44a.s-l~CtdtVS.(continued)Esd~~~~<tdheLLA~M~(I,IE..~de),~~'~~tnbei~>~<~QQ~r+~tfsttA~.GPEAABL& Insert3.7.9.5ThisanalysisshowsthatwithcreditfortheCREATS,orwithcreditforinstantaneousisolationofthecontrolroomcoincidentwiththeaccidentinitiatorandnoCREATSfiltrationtrainavailable,thedoseratestocontrolroompersonnelremainwithinGDC19limits.Insert3.7.9.6InNODES5and6,andduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,theGREATSensurescontrolroomhabitabilityintheeventofafuelhandling~~.~4~accidentorwastegasdecaytankruptureaccident.Insert3.7.9.7TheCREATSisolationdampersareconsideredOPERABLEwhenthedamper(AKDOI,AKD04,AKD05,AKD08,andAKD10)cancloseonanactuationsignaltoisolateoutsideairorisclosedwithmotiveforceremoved.Twodampersareprovidedforeachoutsideairpath.

CRC~83.7.48~BASESAPPLICABILITYcontinued)55.'tv.4Qct.aV,O.C.EE.G'~In+OOE6or6gtheQKIB)isrequiredtocopewiththereleasefromtheruptureofgastan~sJ~~Duringmovementofirradiatedueassemies,themustbeOPERABLEtocopewiththereleasefromafuelhandlingaccident.ACTIONSt'B~t~W~95RS,tv,+o~c.o.t,ecstta%4hIhtt4ttt~~0thCt44/hen-oactionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin7days.InthisConditiontheremainingOPERABLEsadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunction.However,theoverallreliabilityisreducedbecauseasinglefailureintheOPERABLERcouldresultinlossof@Efhufunction.~~cttctt~The7dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeperiod,andabilityoftheremaining~~torovidetherequiredcapaty.CctA~Is"aWland$.-2Chv4~~6or8'l~InMODEI23or4iftheneewithintherequiredtionimeemuseplacedinaMODEthaminimizesaccidentrisk.Toachievethisstatus,the~mustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hours,andinMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequire6'@conditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging@9systems.Scs.v't'LSea(cd'.On,4~~C~]Gs.tt'o.mm~PeP~+,2.tMI.andfInMODE5or6,or~durinmovementofirradiatedfuel'ssemblies.ifthewithintherequireCompletionTime,acionmuseaentoimmediatelyplacetheOPERABLE45KS-inThisactionensuresthattheremaining0+%~OPERABLE,thatnofailurespreventingautomaticactuationioccur,andthatanyactivefailurewouldbereadilydetecte.(~~6-(s)~P<<~~'continued)B3.7-53 Insert3.7.9.8A.landA.2WiththeCREATSfiltrationtraininoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin48hoursorisolatethecontrolroomfromoutsideair.InthisCondition,theisolationdampersareadequatetoperformthecontrolroomprotectionfunctionbutnomeansexisttofilterthereleaseofradioactivegaswithinthecontrolroom.The48hour,CompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthistimeframe,andtheabilityoftheCREATSdamperstoisolatethecontrolroom.RequiredActionA.2ismodifiedbyaNotewhichallowsthecontrolroomtobeunisolatedfor<Ihourevery24hours.ThisallowsfreshairmakeuptoimprovetheworkingenvironmentwithinthecontrolroomandisacceptablebasedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthismakeupperiod. ~>>PratB3.7~BASESACTIONS~css(l(s>>sovtca.srtqh~6-(lsh.~(continued)'tku8>'tv.b~um~6m~~,~Qfsl(Pftv~~dl<"4c4u'J~~attic~theiy(Qil2.C~lsslbfVMMp(~'~~*~~Cne~..~os~ti!.Clad-.~,st.tqSan~h~lmama.~fsj.a~tSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSC.QerEtS+s(~O~SxV.dh-suspendactivitiesthatcoulresuinareleaseofradioactivitthatmihted@.ispacesthee~inaconditionthatminimizesris.ThisdoesnotgprecludethemovementoffueltoasaPnsli'lull.~pl0(Wil~~RequireMettoaJ'..Iis'modifiedbyaNoteind'~jionmodeifautomatictransicgasprotectionmode-i'Rgi+sSsko(Waafsh~(.,~Rv0'0-piev~~gasgas(s~tt~aaa(b~~dtlyseoththmaynotbecapableofperformingeinenedfunctionandthegjjbisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses.Therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediFe.1P.-2~dhy>>d.~d~~)~od~t~<~~thgnHODE5or6dPPduringmovemenoirradiatedfuelassemieswittwoinoperable,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthatcouldresultieeaseoaioactivitythatmightenterthecontrolroom.ispacesthe'~inaconditionthatminimizesŽaccidentrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffuel~toasafeositio~-Aaq~CRBPetTP~~t~~psalms!stInSR3.7.PP.lStandbysystemsshouldbeheckedperiodicallytoensurethattheyfunctionproperly.Astheenvironmentandnormaloeratinconditionsonthissystem'renottooseveretestingeacrainonceerNiiuttbproviesanaequatecheckofthissystem.Honthlyeaeroperaiomoistureaccumuthecharcoalityintheambientair.[SystemsmustbeoperatedforZ10coourswiththeheaters'd.Systemsoutheneedonlbeocratedfor>15min(continued)B3.7-54 BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS'fSR3.7..1(continued)The31dayFrequencisbasedonthereliabilitoftheequipment.~SR3.7.HY2ThisSRverifiesthattherequired<~testingisperformedinaccordancewiththe~entilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)gThe<C@~filtgrtestsareinaccorancewiguaoryuse1.52(Ref..The+FTP+includestestingtheperformanceoftheHEPAfilter,charcoaladsorberefficiency,minimumflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal.SpecifictestFrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailinthe~FTP].SR3.7.-10.3~~~cg.rA~~tCehk~tt~k~(~.W~obt'ThisSRverifiesthat-trainstartsandoperatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.TheFrequencyogPmonthsis'egulatoryGuide1.52(Ref..'bcx~43.7.10.4ThisSRifiestheintegrityofthecontrolroomenclosure,aheassumedinleakageratesofthepotentiallycontaatedair.Thecontrolroom>tivepressure,withrespecpotentiallyconta'tedadjacentareas,isperiodica11ytestoverifoperfunctioningoftheCREFS.Duringtheemerodeofoperation,theCREFSisdesignedtopressurientrolroomh[0.125]incheswatergapositivepurewithrespecttoadjacentareasinertopreventunfildinleakage.TheCREFSisdes'dtomaintainthispositivessurewithonetr'tamakeupflowrateof[3000]cfm.he~Frequenof[18]monthsonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISisco'entwiththeguidanceprovidedinNUREG-0800ef.4).B3.7-55(continued) BASES(continued)REFERENCESl3WFSAR,Section+6.4f.2FSAR,Chapter[15].3;-Regulator1.52,Rev.2.4.~OREG-0800,Section6.4,Rev.July1981.B3.7-56 CREATCB3.7IB3.PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.IControlRoomEmergencyAirTemperatureControlSystem(CRECS)BASESBACKGROUND-TheCREATCSprovidestemperaturecontrolfthecontrolroomfollowingisolationofthecontrolrom.heCREATCSconsistsoftwoindependenandredundanttrainsttprovidecoolingandheatingofrcirculatedcontrolroair.Eachtrainconsistsofhatingcoils,coolingjcoil,instrumentation,andcontrstoprovideforcontrolroommperaturecontrol.TheCATCSisasubsystemprovidigairtemperaturecontrforthecontrolroom.1TheCREATisanemergencystem,partsofwhichmayalsooperatedu'ngnormalunitperations.Asingletrainwillprovidetheequiredtempaturecontroltomaintainthecontrolroomtween[70'Fand[85]F.TheCREATCSoperationinma'ntainithecontrolroomtemperatureisdiscussedintheSARSection[6.4](Ref.I).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasioftCREATCSistomaintainthecontrolroomtemperaturefor3daysofcontinuousoccupancy../TheCREATCS~omponentsararrangedinredundant,safetyrelatedtrains.Duringerneencyoperation,theCREATCSmaintainsthetemperaturebeeen[70]'Fand[85]'F.AsinglectivefailureofacoonentoftheCREATCS,withalossoffsitepower,doesnotimpairtheabilityofthesysttoperformitsdesignfuntion.Redundantdetectorsancontrolsareprovidedforconolroomtemperaturectrol.TheCREATCSisdesignediaccordancewithSeismicategoryIrequirements.TheCREATCiscapableofremovingsensibleandlatentheatloadsfromtcontrolroom,whichincludeconsiderationofequipmentheatloadsandpersonneloccupancyrequirements,to,ensureequipmtOPERABILITY.TheCREATCSsatisfiesCriterion3oftheNRPolicyStatement.WOGSTSB3.7-57(contiued)Rev.0,09/2892 CREATCSB3.7.BAES(continued)LCOTwoindependentandredundanttrainsoftheCREATCarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatatleastoisavailable,assumingasinglefailuredisablingteothertrain.Totalsystemfailurecouldresultintequipmentoperatingtemperatureexceedinglimitsintheventofanaccident.TheCREATCSisconsideredtobeOPERABLEentheindividualcomponentsnecessarytomaintaintheconolroommperatureareOPERABLEinbothtrainsThesecomponentsinludetheheatingandcoolingcoilsndassociatedtemperaturecontrolinstrumentation.Inaddition,theCREASmustbeoperabletotheextntthataircirculationcanbeaintained.APPLICABILITYInNODESI,,3,4,[5,and]andduringmovementofirradiatedfu1assemblies,heCREATCSmustbeOPERABLEtoensurethatthcontrolrmtemperaturewillnotexceedequipmentoperat'onalreirementsfollowingisolationofthecontrolroom.[InNODE5or6,]CRTCSmaynotberequiredforthosefacilitiesthatdoorequireautomaticcontrolroomisolation.ACTIONSA.lWithoneEATCStraininoperab,actionmustbetakentorestoreERABLEstatuswithin3days.InthisCondition,thereminingOPERABLECREATCStraisadequatetomaintainthectrolroomtemperaturewithinimits.However,theover1reliabilityisreducedbecausasinglefailureinthePERABLECREATCStraincouldresulinlossofCREATCSfction.The30dayCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowobabilityofan.eventrequiringcontroloomisolation,heconsiderationthattheremainingtrainan,providetherequiredprotection,andthatalternatesafeornonsafetyrelatedcoolingmeansareavailable.WOGSTSB3.7-58(contied)Rev.0,09/28/9/ CREATCS83.7.1BASESACTIONSB.landB.2(continu)InMODE1,2,3,or4,iftheinoperableCREATCSraincannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithinthrequiredCompletionTime,theunitmustbeplacedinaDEthatminimizestherisk.Toachievethisstatus,heunitmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6hoursandinMODE5ithin36hours.TheallowedCompletionT'sare-rasonable,basedonoperatingexperiencetoreachthereiredunitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanordlymannerandwithoutchallengingnitsystems.C.lC.IandC.2.2[InMODE5or6,or]duringmoventofirradiatedfuel,iftheinoperaeCREATCStraincnotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithitherequiredCopletionTime,theOPERABLECREATCStrainustbeplaceinoperationimmediately.ThisactionensuresatthereiningtrainisOPERABLE,thatnofailurespreventgautoticactuationwilloccur,andthatactivefailureswi1beeadilydetected.AnalternativetoReiredActionC.Iistoimmediatelysuspendactivitiespresentapotentialforreleasingradioactivitythatighrequireisolationofthecontrolroom.Thisplactheuitinaconditionthatminimizesaccidentrisk.hisdoesotprecludethemovementoffueltoasafeposi>on.0.1IfbothREATCStrainsareinoperbleinMODEI,2,3,or4thecotrolroomCREATCSmaynotbcapableofperformingitstendedfunction.Therefore,L03.0.3mustbeenteredimmdiately..IandE.2[InMODE5or6,or]duringmovementofirriatedfuelassemblies,withtwoCREATCStrainsinoperab,actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendactivitiesthacouldresultinareleaseofradioactivitythatmightrequirisolationofthecontrolroom.Thisplacestheunitinandit'ionWOSTSB3.7-59(cotinued)lIRev.0,09/92 CREATCSB3.7.1BASACTIONSE.landE.2(continued)thatminimizesrisk.Thisdoesnotprecludethevementoffueltoasafeposition.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS3.7.11.1ThiSRverifiesthattheheatremovalcaabilityofthesystissufficienttoremovetheassudheatloadinthecontroroom.ThisSRconsistsofacbinationoftestingandcallations.The[18]monthFreencyisappropriatesincesigificantdegradationoftheREATCSisslowandisnotexpecteoverthistimeperiod.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Sectio[6.4].WOGSTSB3.7-60Rev.0,09/28/92 Pj7.'3.7PLANTSYSTEHSIECCSPREACSB37.12EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)PumpRoomExhaustAirCeanupSystem(PREACS)BASESBACKGROUNDTheECCSPREACSfiltersairfromtheareaotheactiveECCScomponentsduringtherecirculationphasefalossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).TheECCSPREAC,inconjunctionithothernormallyoperatingsystems,isoprovideseironmentalcontroloftemperaturendhumidityintheECpumproomareaandthelowerrechesoftheauxiliarybuil'ng.TheECCSPREACSconsistsoftwo'ndependentandredundanttrains.Qachtrainconsistsofaheater,aprefilterordemister,~highefficiencypticulateair(HEPA)filter,anactivate+charcoaladsorbrsectionforremovalofgaseousactive(principayiodines),andafan.Ductwork,valveqordampes,andinstrumentationalsoformpartofthesystem,aswllasdemistersfunctioningtoreducetherelatiAhudityoftheairstream.AsecondbankofHEPAfilterollowstheadsorbersectiontocollectcarbonfinesandprodebackupincasethemainHEPAfilterbankfails.ThednsearnHEPAfilterisnotcreditedintheaccidentanalsis,btservestocollectcharcoalfines,andtobackupeupstreamHEPAfiltershoulditdevelopaleak.ThesysminitiatesyfilteredventilationofthepumproomfollowingreceiptofaSafetyinjection(SI)signal./TheECCSPREACSisastandbysystem,alignedtobypassthesystemHEPAfiltersandcharcoal~adsorbers.Duringemergentoperations,theECCSPREACSdampersarerealigned,andfag(sarestartedtobeginfiltration.UponreceiptofthetuatingEngineeredSafetyFeatueActuationSystemsig1(s),normalairdischargesfromeECCSpumproomisate,andthestreamofventilationa'ischargesroughthesystemfiltertrains.Thepriltersremoveanyargeparticlesintheair,andanyentraindwaterdropletspresent,topreventexcessiveloadingoftheEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorbers.TheECCSPREACSisdiscussedintheFSAR,Section[6.5.1],[9.4.5],and[15.6.5](Refs.1,2,and3,respectily)sinceitmaybeusedfornormal,aswellaspostacc'dent,atmosphericcleanupfunctions.Theprimarypurposeothe,rWOGSTSB3.7-61(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92,: ECCSPRES83.7.12'BAS:BACKGROUND(contihued)heatersistomaintaintherelativehumidityataacceptablelevel,consistentwithiodine'removalefficienciesperRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThedesignbasisoftheECCSPREACSisesblishedbythelargebreakLOCA.ThesystemevaluaonassumesaassivefailureoftheECCSoutsideconainment,suchasanSpumpsealfailure,duringtherecirpulationmode.Insuchacase,thesystemlimitsradio~tivereleasetowithinthelOCFR100(Ref.5)limits,ortfieNRCstaffapprovedlicenaingbasis(e.g.,aspecified>fractionofReference5limits)gTheanalysisoftheeffe'ctsandconsequencesofalargebreakLOCAispresentedin/Reference3.TheECCSPREACSalsoactuatesfollowingpsmallbreakLOCA,inthosecaseswhereitheECCSgoesintof'therecirculationmodeoflongtermcoo]ing,tocleangpreleasesofsmallerleaks,suchasfromvalvestempacP'ing.Twotypesofsystemfailuiesareconsideredintheaccidentanalysis:completeloss'ffunction,andexcessiveLEAKAGE.Eithertypeoffailbre/mayresultinalowerefficiencyofremovalforanygaseousandparticulateactivityreleasedtotheECCSpumprooms+foglowingaLOCA./TheECCSPREACSsptisfiesCriterion3of.theNRCPolicyStatement./LCOTwoindependentandredundanttr'ainsoftheECCSPREACSarerequiredgobeOPERABLEtoensureithatatleastoneisavailable',assumingthatasinglefailuredisablestheothertrainco'incidentwithlossofoffsitgpower.TotalsystemfailurgcouldresultintheatmospherereleasefromtheECCSPumproomexceeding10CFR100litsintheeventofaDes'gnBasisAccident(DBA).ECSPREACSisconsideredOPERABLEwhentheyindividualomponentsnecessarytomaintaintheECCSpumproomfiltrationareOPERABLEinbothtrains.AnECCSPREACStrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhen>'tsassociated:,WOGSTSB3.7-62(conti'nued)Rev.0,09/28/92

ECCSPREACS83.7.12SESLCO(con'nued)a.-FanisOPERABLE;b.HEPAfilterandcharcoaladsorbersarenotexssivelyrestrictingflow,andarecapableofperform'theirfiltrationfunctions;andc.Heater,demister,ductwork,valves,andmpersareOPERABLEandaircirculationcanbemaiained.APPLICABILITYInODES1,2,3,and4,theECCSPREACisrequiredtobeOPELEconsistentwiththeOPERABILYrequirementsoftheECCS.'nNODEor6,theECCSPREACSinotrequiredtobeOPERABLEs'etheECCSisnotruiredtobeOPERABLE.ACTIONS'.1WithoneECCSPREARMtra'ninoperable,actionmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEtauswithin7days.Duringthistime,theremainingOPERABLtrainisadequatetoperformtheECCSPREACSfunction.The7dayCompletiynTimesappropriatebecausetheriskcontributionisssthanttfortheECCS(72hourCompletionTime,andthissternisnotadirectsupportsystem'forthECCS.The7daCompletionTimeisbasedonthelowprobilityofaDBAocrringduringthistimeperiod,andabilityoftheremainngtraintoprovidetherequiredpability.ConcurrntfailureoftwoECCSPREACStrainswouldresultinthe1soffunctionalcapability;thefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeeeredimmediately..1andB.2IftheECCSPREACStraincannotberestoredtoERABLEstatuswithintheassociatedCompletionTime,thunitmustbeplacedinaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotappl.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustbeplacedinatast(contied)WOGSTS83.7-63Rev.0,09/28/92 ECCSPREACSB3.7.12/BASACTIONB.landB.2(continued)MODE3within6hours,andinMODE5within36hos.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedooperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredunitconditiosfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithutchallengingunitsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.7.12.1Standbsystemsshouldbecheckedperodicallytoensurethatthfunctionproperly.Asthenvironmentandnormaloperatinconditionsonthissystearenotsevere,testingeachtrainnceamonthprovidesnadequatecheckonthissystem.Monhlyheateroperatisdryoutanymoisturethatmayhaveacculatedinthechrcoalfromhumidityintheambientair.stemswithatersmustbeoperated>10continuoushoursiththehatersenergized.Systemswithoutheatersndonlyeoperatedforz15minutestodemonstratethefuntionfthesystem.]The31dayFrequencyisbasedotknownreliabilityofequipmentandthetwotrainredundanavailable.SR3.7.12.2ThisSRverifiethatthereqiredECCSPREACStestingisperformedincordancewitht[VentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFT].'heECCSPREACfiltertestsareinaccordanceithReference4.TheVFTP]includestestingHEPAfiltperformance,charcoalasorbersefficiency,minimumstemflowrate,andthephicalpropertiesoftheactivadcharcoal(generaluseandfolowingspecificoperaons).SpecifictestFrequenciesndadditionalinfoationarediscussedindetailint[VFTP].3.7.12.3ThisSRverifiesthateachECCSPREACStrainstatsandoperatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsign.The[18]monthFrequencyisconsistentwiththatspeci'edinReference4.(continue'WOGSTSB3.7-64Rev.,0,09/28/92 ECCSPREACB3.7.2SESSURVLLANCERE(UIMENTS(contued)SR3.7.12.4ThisSRverifiestheintegrityoftheECCSpumpoomenclosure.TheabilityoftheECCSpumproommaintainanegativepressure,withrespecttopotentialluncontaminatedadjacentareas,isperiodicalytestedtoverifyproperfunctioningoftheECCSPREA.Duringthe[postaccident]modeofoperation,theECPREACSisdesignedtomaintainaslightnegativepessureintheECCSumproom,withrespecttoadjacentares,topreventfilteredLEAKAGE.TheECCSPREACSidesignedtomaintaina[-0.125]incheswatergaugerelavetoatmosphericpreureataflowrateof[3000]cfromtheECCSpumproom.TheFrequencyof[18]monthisconsistentwiththeguidancqprovidedinNUREG-0800,ection6.5.1(Ref.6).Thistest~isconductedwiththtestsforfilterpenetrationthus,an[18]mothFrequencyonaSTAGGEREDTESTBASISiconsistentwithatspecifiedinReference4.SR3.7.12.5OperatingtheECCSCSbypassdamperisnecessarytoensurethatthesystpfunctionsproperly.TheOPERABILITYQftheECCSPREACSPypasdamperisverifiedifitcanbespecifiedinRefernce4.REFERENCES1.FSAR,Stion[6.5.1].2.FSAR,Section[9.4.5].3.FS,Section[15.6.5].egulatoryGuide1.52(Rev.2).5.10CFR100.11.NUREG-0800,Section6.5.1,Rev.2,July981.t(fIIWOGSTSB3.7-65IfttRev.0,09/28/92<... B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.1fu'i.nBASES1-caneSystem-(FBAES-)'VeJ~~sea~~BACKGROUNSP.nf88.'a'a;.a."-,'j,io.'heovsCsl=a)The'iltersairbornraioactiveparticulatesfrom.thearea~ueoolfollowinafuelhandlingaccident.QPCA..The~inconjunctionwithothernormallyoperatingsystems,alsoprovsesenvironmentalcontroloftemperatureandhumidityinthearea.SM+iraqlnCl&srata~TheFBACSconsistsoftwoindependentandredundanttrains.chtrainconsistsofaheater,aprefilterordemister,hiefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filter,anactivedcharcqaladsorbersectionforremovalofgaseousactity(princallyiodines),andafan.Ductwork,valvesrdampers,ndinstrumentationalsoformpartofthsystem,aswellasemisters,functioningtoreducetheelativehumidityofeairstream.AsecondbankofPAfiltersfollowstheadrbersectiontocollectcaronfinesandprovidebackupicasethemainHEPAfilrbankfails.ThedownstreamHEPAfierisnotcredited'ntheanalysis,butservestocollectchcoalfines,antobackuptheupstreamHEPAfiltersulditdevopaleak.Thesysteminitiatesfilteredventitionothefuelhandlingbuildingfollowingreceiptofahigraationsignal.TheFBACSisastandbysysm,partsofwhichmayalsobeoperatedduringnormalpntoperations.Uponreceiptoftheactuatingsignal,rmalair'dischargesfromthebuilding,thefuelhdlingbuilding+sisolated,andthestreamofventilaonairdischargesthoroughthesystemfiltertrains.eprefiltersordemisthrsremoveanylargeparticlesineair,andanyentrainedwatrdropletspresent,toreventexcessiveloadingoftheEPAfiltersandchareadsorbers.TheQFCSisdiscussedintheFSAR,Sections[6.5.hl,[9..5],and[15.7.4](Refs.1,2,and3,respective+)bauseitmaybeusedfornormal,aswellaspostaccent,tmosphericcleanupfunctions./B3.7-66ev(continued) Insert3.7.10.1~~%)IIIs~TheABVSconsistsofanairhandlingunit,aseriesofexhaustfans,charcoalfilters,ductwork,anddampers(Ref.1).TheexhaustfansincludethefollowingfanswhichalldischargeintoacommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansAandB:a.IntermediateBuildingexhaustfansAandB;b.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC;c.AuxiliaryBuildingcharcoalfilterfansAandB;d.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanG;ande.controlaccessexhaustfansAandB.TheonlycomponentswhichfiltertheenvironmentassociatedwiththeSFParetheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC.Therefore,thesearetheonlyfansconsideredwithrespecttotheABVSinthisLCO.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCtakessuctionfromtheSFPanddecontaminationpitareasontheoperatingleveloftheAuxiliaryBuilding.TheairisfirstdrawnthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystemwhichconsistsofroughingfiltersandcharcoalabsorbers.Theroughingfiltersprotectthecharcoalabsorbersfrombeingfouledwithdirtparticleswhilethecharcoalabsorbersremovetheradioactiveiodinesfromtheatmosphere.AuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanCdischargesintothecommonductworkthatsuppliestheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans.Thiscommonductworkcontainsahighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterwhichisnotcreditedinthedoseanalyses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansareeach100%capacityfanswhichcanmaintainanegativepressureontheoperatingflooroftheAuxiliaryBuildingthroughorientationofthesystemdampers.ThisnegativepressurecausesairflowontheoperatingfloortobetowardtheSFPwhichensuresthatairinthevicinityoftheSFPisfirstfilteredthroughtheSFPCharcoalAdsorberSystem.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansandexhaustfanCarepoweredfromnon-EngineeredSafeguardsFeaturesbuses.TheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfansdischargetotheplantventstack.Theplantventstackiscontinuouslymonitoredfornoblegases(R-14),particulates(R-13)andiodine(R-10B).Duringnormalpoweroperation,theABVSisplacedinthe"out"modebytheinterlockmodeswitchwhere"out"definesthestatusoftheSFPcharcoaltrains.ThiscausesallexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingtheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans)andtheAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC)totripuponasignalfromR-10B,R-13orR-14tostopthereleaseofanyradioactivegases.DuringfuelmovementwithintheAuxiliaryBuilding,theinterlockmodeswitchisplacedinthe"in"modesuchthatonlyexhaustfanswithoutanyHEPAorcharcoalfilters(excludingtheAuxiliaryBuildingmainexhaustfans)aretripped. BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES8B,~ii,aoreareieeBAGS.'heDBA'lsisolfe~uehandlingaccidentRevs,Theg~designbasisisestablishedbytheconsequencesofthelimitingDesignBasisAccident(DBA),whichisafuelhandlingaccident.Theanalysisofthefuelhandlingaccien,givenineferenc~assumesthatallfuelrodsinanassemblyaredamaedeanaiysiSsoleass'ater'mergencyCi'3,r.iQ.4assumesaonl,Theaccientanaysisaccountsforthere'nairbornradioactivematerialprovided~~lD~main-'Hlfiltrationsst~"feamountoff'svafandlingbuildingis)ete'eCA.jassumptionsandtheanalysisfollowtheguidanceproviedinRegulatoryGuidela25(Ref.4).The&satisfiesCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.ASSAt<AssWkeV'CO+:i.a~.g89,iiaa.TwoidentandredundanttrainsoftheFBACSarerequiredtoeBLEtoensurethatatleastoinisavailable,assumingasfailureth'stheothertrain,coincidentwithalosstepower.Totalsystemfailurecouldintheatmospreleasefromthefuelhauildingexceedingthe10CFR.5)limMtheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.'Av~'i,Meaaaa%+4osa~NMala~Qssagga~~aiv98.aia.sa.TheCOlllaeb.C.@~isconsideredOPERABLEwhentheindividuonentsnecessarytocontrolre'heSuildingareOPERABLEisconsiderePERAitsassociated:AeVn'Absaasargia4a,asa<4wsa~~is0BLE;SFPEPAfilterandcharcoalidsmorberParenotexcessirestrictingflow,and~capableofperformingf':eeductwork,valves,anddampersareOPERABLE,andaircirculationcanbemaintaine~P~~~is=in'ea,~~mba~(4,Q;PASsumumA~~'lhP(ckcJLQanlloydisahlOQ,(continued)B3.7-67 ~1~Insert3.7.10.2~~i'Ill.5componentswhichresultinoffsitedoseswellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3).Thefailure-ofanyorallofthesefiltrationsystemcomponentsresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits.Insert3.7.10.3TheABVSisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensurethatoffsitedosesarewelly>>',o,withinthelimitsof10CFR100(Ref.3)followingafuelhandlingaccidentinthe'uxiliaryBuilding.ThefailureoftheABVScoincidentwithafuelhandlingaccidentresultsindoseswhichareslightlyhigherbutstillwithin10CFR100limits. hev~~~BASES(continued)APPLICABILITY85.s",,.a,InMODE~,2,3,or4,theFBACSisrequiredtobeOPBLEtoprovidefimien~roductremovalassociated'CSleaksduetoaLOCAand--Rakagefrominmentandannulus.iE,PBiidbWEIIABLEUEiidbERAE.:A<<'iB.Duringmovementofirradiatedfuelinthe~,the~@PKQisrequiredtobeOPERABLEtoalleviatetheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccident.~ACTIONS~.IWithoneFBAZSMrininoperable,actionmustbetorestoreOPERABLE'stai,thin7days.Disperiod,theremainingOPERABLEtrainizetoperformtheiFBACSfunction.The7~dMpetionTimeisbasedontheriskfromaneve~occurringrequiringtheii~perableFBACStrain~a-theremainingFBACStrainprovidingthere'~ction./pe..)B:l.andB.2+~InMODEI,2,3;or4,whenRequiredAetio.cannotbecompletedwithinthewssociatedCompl'Time,orwhenbothFBACStrainsareinop'erableunitmustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdooyply.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustplacedinM~within6hours,andinMODE5w'36hours.TheCompleeoTimesarereasonablesedonoperatingexperience,toreatherequ'nitconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinerlymannerandwithoutchallengingunitsystems..IandC.2CGWhenRequirecCieoA.lcannotbecompletedwith'equiredCompletionTime~ngmovirradiatedfuelassembliesinthefuelb'ERABLEFBACStrainmustbestatiatelyorfuelmovemeended.ionensuresthattheremainingtrainisOP(continued)B3.7-68 Insert3.7.10.4TheABVSisonlyrequiredwhenoneormorefuelassembliesintheAuxiliaryBuildinghasdecayed<60dayssincebeingirradiated.Anyfuelhandlingaccidentwhichoccursafter60daysresultsinoffsitedoseswhicharewellwithin10CFR100limits(Ref.3)duetothedecayrateofiodine.Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurasaresultoffuelmovement,theABVSisnotMODEdependantandonlyrequiredwhenirradiatedfuelisbeingmoved. AdvsBASESACTIONSC.handC.2(continued)thatnoundeteci.lurespreventingsystrationwilloccur,andthatanyactiailure'readilydetected.Ifthesystemisncedinoperatithisactionrequiressionoffuelmovement,whichudesafuelhgaccident.Thisdoesnotprecludethemoveofuelassembliestoasafeposition.NlQQYSik'hen8inoerable~h!mustbetakento'aceth~inaconditioninwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Actionmustbetakenimmediatelytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthekltilding.Thisdoesnotprecludethemovementoffueltoa'afeposition.SORVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS6S.'i'i3.7.13.1Standbystemsshouldbecheckedperiodicallytosurethattheytionproperly.Astheenvironmalandnormaloperatinonditionsonthissyste~enotsevere,testingeachtrainceeverymonthprdesanadequatecheckonthissystem.Honthlyheateroperationdr'tanymoistureaccumulatedinthecharcoalfromhu'tyintambientair.[Systemswithheatersmustbecratedfor>Intinuoushourswiththeheatersener'd.Systemswithoutheersneedonlybeoperatedfor5minutestodemonstratethectionofthesystem.]e31dayFrequencyisbasedontheknrelia'tyoftheequipmentandthetwotrainredunavable.Q~,ii;,~SR3.7.1$'.2sFp~~ohAdsorb.~sg~~ThisSRverifiesthattherequired~gbtestingisperformedinaccordancewiththeglentilationFilterTesting(continued) ~pa.'ASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSQ,'ls\,0BQ.'tuI'osFp~~MAbaca<~~~SR3.7.8.2(continued)program(VFTP)gThei8g~filt~testsarein~accordancewithRegulatorGuide1.52(Ref.~.The$4FTPP'includestestingcharcoalabsorberefficiency,minimumsystemflowrate,andthephysicalpropertiesoftheactivatedcharcoal(generaluseandfollowingspecificoperations).Specifictestfrequenciesandadditionalinformationarediscussedindetailinthe+FTP~SR.7MThisSRverifiesthateachstartsandoperatesonanactualor'actuationsigna.18]monthFreue'onsistentwithReference6.Bs.;;~~~~vss~m,odtsvvdt-AdvsIOSR3.7.H'onductedwiththetestsol1epenetration;thus,anaAGGEREDTssentwitReference6O~sZhotChtYcrtr~RGVScanshVM4~~a'hisSRverifiestheintegrityofthe%i'uildingenclosure.Theabilityofthe~uiingtomaintainnegativeressurewithrespecttounconamiiseriodicallytoproperfunctionofthe.Duringoperatio,theisdesignedtomasnannaslightnegative'nthetsmgJkildintore~nunalteredLEAKAGeigomai-.M+-ieswatergaugewithreatmosphericpressureataflowrcfmtothefuelbuilding.encyof[18]mos-insistentwith'nceprovidedinNUREG-0800,Section6..SR3.OperatingtheFBACSfiassisnecessarytoensurethatthesystemfunly.TheOPERABILITYoftheFBACSfiltessdamperisvers'itcanbeclosed.AmonthFrequencyisconsistentw>Rece6.B3.7-70(continued) Insert3.7.10.5gpsslib~+-ThisSRensuresthatAuxiliaryBuildingexhaustfanC,andeitherAuxiliaryBildingmainexhaustfanAorBareinoperation,anegativepressureisbeingmaintainedintheAuxiliaryBuilding,andthattheABVSinterlockmodeswitchisin'thecorrectposition.TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgementandshowntobeacceptablethroughoperatingexperience. BASES(continued)REFERENCES~uR.v.z1.~FSAR,Section~~2-.mMCb'LS.W,3.xr'FSAR,Section~v'.04.RegulatoryGuide1.2510CFR100.RegulatoryGuide1.52fhev.2P~~~)B3.7-71 PCSB3.7.14B7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.4PenetrationRoomExhaustAirCleanupSystem(PREACS)BASESBACKGROUNDThePREACSfiltersairfromthepenetrationarabetweencontainmentandtheauxiliarybuilding.hePREACSconsistsoftwoindependentandredundanttrains.chtrainconsistsofaheater,aprefilerordemister,ahiefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)lter,anactivatedchaoaladsorbersectionforremovalgaseousactivity(prinipallyiodines),andafan.Dtwork,valvesordamperandinstrumentation,asweasdemisters,function'ngtoreducetherelativeumidityoftheairstream,aoformpartofthesysem.AsecondbankofHEPAfilters,wh'chfollowstheadsorersection,collectscarbonfinesandprvidesbackupinceoffailureofthemainHEPAfilterbk.ThedownstearnHEPAfilter,althoughnotcreditedintheaccidentanysis,collectscharcoalfinesandservesasackupshodtheupstreamHEPAfilterdevelopaleak.esystinitiatesfilteredventilationfollowingreceiptoasfetyinjectionsignal.ThePREACSisastandsystem,partsofwhichmayalsooperateduringnormu'toperations.Duringemergencyoperations,thePRCSdaersarerealignedandfansarestartedtoinitiafiltra'on.Uponreceiptoftheactuatingsignals),normalirdischargesfromthepenetrationro,thepenetraionroomisisolated,andthestreamofvenlationairdiscrgesthroughthesystemfiltertrain.Theprefiltersroveanylargeparticlesintheair,awellasanyentrainedaterdroplets,topreventexcessiveoadingoftheHEPAfiltesandcharcoaladsorber.ThePACSis.discussedintheFSAR,Setions[6.5.1],[9.4],and[15.6.5](Refs.1,2,and3,respectively)sieitmaybeusedfornormal,aswellapostaqcident,aosphericcleanupfunctions.Heatersmayeincludedforoistureremovalonsystemsoperatinginhighumidityconditions.TheprimarypurposeoftheheateristomaintaintherelativehumidityatanacceptableevelconsistentwithiodineremovalefficienciesperulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.4).WOGSTSB3.7-72I(continu)Rev.0,09/28/92 PREACB3.7.BAS(continued)APPLICAEThePREACSdesignbasisisestablishedbythelargbreakSAFETYALYSESlossofcoolantaccident(LOCA).Thesystemevaltionassumesapassivefailureoutsidecontainment,schasvalvepackingleakageduringaDesignBasisAccidentDBA).Insuchacase,thesystemrestrictstheradioacvereleasetowithinthe10CFR100(Ref.4)limits,orthNRCstaffapprovedlicensingbasis(e.g.,aspecificfractionof10CFR100limits).TheanalysisofthefectsandonsequencesofalargebreakLOCAarepesentedinRference3.Twopesofsystemfailuresareconderedintheaccidentanalyis:acompletelossoffuncton,andexcessiveLEAKAGEithertypeoffailureyresultinlessefficienremovalofanygaseousrparticulatematerial'releasedthepenetrationroofollowingaLOCA.ThePREACSstisfiesCriteri3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOTwoindependentanreundanttrainsofthePREACSarerequiredtobeOPERAEtoensurethatatleastonetrainisavailable,assumingreisasinglefailuredisablingtheothertraincoincientithalossofoffsitepower.ThePREACSiscsideredERABLEwhentheindividualcomponentsnecssarytocorolradioactivereleasesareOPERABLEinbthtrains.AREACStrainisconsideredOPERABLEwhitsassociated:a.FansOPERABLE;"b.HAfilterandcharcoaladsoerarenotexcessivelyestrictingflow,andarecapabeofperformingtheirfiltrationfunctions;andcHeater,demister,ductwork,valves,anddampersareOPERABLEandaircirculationcanbeintained.APPLICABILITInNODES1,2,3,and4,thePREACSisrequiretobeOPERABLE,consistentwiththeOPERABILITYrequimentsoftheEmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS).MOSTSB3.7-73I(coninued)Rev.0,09/28/9K PREACSB3.7.BASEAPPLICABITYInMODE5or6,thePREACSisnotrequiredtobe0RABLE(continu)sincetheECCSisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLE.ACTIONSA.lthonePREACStraininoperable,theaconmustbetakentorestoreOPERABLEstatuswithin7day.Duringthisperd,theremainingOPERABLEtrainiadequatetoperformtheEACSfunction.The7dayComptionTimeisappropiatebecausetheriskcontritionofthePREACSislessththatoftheECCS(72hoCompletionTime),andthissystmisnotadirectsupptsystemfortheECCS.The7daympletionTimeisbaedonthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurngduringthispiod,andtheremainingtrainprovidingtherequiredcapab'ty.B.landB.2IftheinoperabletrcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintheasiatedCompletionTime,theunitmustbeplacedinaMODinhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstats,thenitmustbeplacedinatleastMODE3within6ours,aninMODE5within36hours.TheCompletionTimarereasonble,basedonoperatingexperience,treachthereq'redunitconditionsfromfullpowercondionsinanorderlmannerandwithoutchallenginunitsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR.7.14.1Sndb'ysystemsshouldbecheckedperio'callytoensureattheyfunctionproperly.Astheenvionmentalandnormaloperatingconditionsonthissystemrenotsevere,testingeachtrainonceeverymonthprovideanadequatecheckonthissystem.Monthlyheateroperatidriesoutanymoisturethat'mayhaveaccumulatedinthearcoalasaresultofhumidityintheambientair.[Systemswithheatersmustbeoperatedfor>10continuoushourwiththeheatersenergized.Systemswithoutheatersneedoybeoperatedfor>15minutestodemonstratethefunctioofthesystem.]The31dayFrequencyisbasedontheknown(continu)WOGSTSB,3.7-74Rev.0,09/28/92 PREACB3.7.4BESSURVELANCEREQUIRENTSSR3.7.14.1(continued)reliabilityofequipmenta'ndthetwotrainreduancyavailable.SR3.7.14.2ThisSRverifiesthattherequiredPREACtestingiserformedinaccordancewiththe[VentiationFilterTestingPgram(VFTP)].ThePREACSfilterttsareinaccordancewiRegulatoryGuide1.52(Ref.5).The[VFTP]includestestgHEPAfilterperformance,chrcoaladsorberefficncy,minimumsystemflowre,andthephysicalpropert'esoftheactivatedcharal(generaluseandfollowinspecificoperations).Specifictestfrequenciesandadditsnalinformationarediscussedindetailinthe[VFTP].SR3.7.14.3ThisSRverifiesatchPREACSstartsandoperatesonanactualorsimulateatuationsignal.The[18]monthFrequencyisconsistwiththatspecifiedinReference5.SR3.7.14.4ThisSRverifestheintegryofthepenetrationroomenclosure.heabilityoftpenetrationroomtomaintainanegativeressure,withrespcttopotentiallyuncontamiatedadjacentareas,periodicallytestedtoverifypoperfunctionofPREACS.Duringthe[postaccide]modeofoperation,thePEACSisdesignedtomaintna<[-0.125]incheswaterugerelativetoatmophericpressureataflowrateo[3000]cfminthepetrationroom,withrespecttoadjaentareas,topreventuilteredLEAKAGE.TheFrequencyof[]months.isonsistentwiththeguidanceprovidedinUREG-0800(Ref.6).Theminimumsystemflowratemaintainsasligtnegativepressureinthepenetrationroomarea,andproidessufficientairvelocitytotransportparticulat(coninued)WOGSTSB3.7-75Rev.0,09/2892 PREACSB3.7.1BASSURVEILNCERENDUIRENTSSR3.7.14.4(continued)contaminants,assumingonlyonefiltertrainisocrating.Thenumberoffilterelementsisselectedtolittheflowratethroughanyindividualelementtoabout[00]cfm.Thismayvarybasedonfilterhousinggeometr.Themaximumlimitensuresthattheflowthrough,andprsuredropacross,eachfilterelementarenotexcesse.Tnumberanddepthoftheadsorbereleentsensurethat,athemaximumflowrate,theresidenctimeoftheairstreminthecharcoalbedachievestdesiredadsorptionrate.Atleasta[0.125]secondresdencetimeisnecessaryforanssumed[99]%efficiency.'hefiltehaveacertainpressedropatthedesignflowratewhenean.Themagnitudeofthepressuredropindicatesaceptableperformae,and'isbasedonmanufacturersrecommendatioforthefilterandadsorberelementsatthdesignflowrate.Anincreaseinpressuredroporadecreaeinfloindicatesthatthefilterisbeingloadedortttheareotherproblemswiththesystem.Thistestisconductalongwiththetestsforfilterpenetration;thus,e18]monthFrequencyisconsistentwiththatspecificinRference5.SR3.7.14.5ltItisnecesrytooperatetheREACSfilterbypassdampertoensureatthesystemfunctisproperly.TheOPERABILYofthePREACSfilterpassdamperis,verifiedifitcbeclosed.An[18]monthFrequencyisconsistentwithtatspecifiedinReference5.REFERENCESFSAR,Section[6.5.1].2.FSAR,Section[9.4.5].3.FSAR,Section[15.6.5].4.10CFR100.WOGSTSB3.7-76(con'nued)/'ev.0,09/282!

PREACB3.7.4BASREFERENS(contied)5.RegulatoryGuide1.52,Rev.2.6.NUREG-0800,Section6.5.1,Rev.2,July19WOSTSB3.7-77Rev.0,028/92 ~~aterLevelB3.7.\B3.7PLANTSYSTEMSB3.7.MFuelQ:-ssacPBASES~5FePoolWaterLevells0PmWsMprO~WO~mq~ieCsS-BACKGROUNDs(sFP3TheminimumwaterlevelinthefuelpoolmeetstheassumptionsofiodinedecontaminationactorsfollowifuelhandlinaccideThesecifiedwaterlevelieanmiralareado~hestorageracksIarefilledtotheirteralsojrovideingduringthemovementofspentue.+asI~3.1.sb.iAgecriptionofthefuelstorageooldesgivenintheF,nt'9.1.2](Ref.escriptionoftheSpentFuelPoolCooieanupSystemisgivenintheFSAR,Secti..Ref.2).tionsofthefuelngaccidentaregivenintheFSAR,on[15.7.4](Ref.3).BarQo~~~a~~90.'is,CiS4srap~~S~Ics.s's.c.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESISa~5a.I"s.C.~seeiiiiiih'~ssumptionasofthefuelhandlingaccidentdescriedinRegulatoryGuide1.25(Ref.4).Theresultant2hourthyroiddoseperpersonattheexclusionareaboundaryisasmallfractionofthe10CFR100Ref.5)limits.gt~Reference4,there3ftofwaterbetweentetopothedamagedfuelbundleandthefuelpoolsurfaceduringafuelhandlingaccident.With23ftofwite,teassumptionsofReference4canbeuseddirectly.npractice,thisLCOpreserves.thisassumptionforthebulkofthefuelinthestorageracks.Inthecaseofasinglebundledroppedandlyinghorizontallyontopofthesentfuelracks,however,theremaybe<23ftofwaterthetopofthefuelbundleandthesurface,indicatedbythewidthofthebundlTooffsetthissmallnonconservatism,theanaysisassumesthatallfuelrods.fail,althoughanalysisshowsthatonlythefirstfewrowsfailfromahypotheticalmaximumdrop.ThewaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.a5'iavLpp10<.7.esa2(continued)B3.7-78 Insert3.7.15.1Wo.'i'i,aTheSFPisaseismicallydesignedstructurelocatedintheAuxiliaryBuilding(Ref1).Thepoolisinternallycladwithstainlesssteelthathasaleakchasesystemateachweldseamtominimizeaccidentaldrainagethroughtheliner.TheSFPisalsoprovidedwithabarrierbetweenthespentfuelracksandthefueltransfertubeandthefueltransferwinch.Thisbarrier,uptotheheightofthespentfuelstorageracks,preventsinadvertentdrainageoftheSFPviathefueltransfertube.TheSFPCoolingSystemisdesignedtomaintainthepool<120Fduringnormalconditionsandrefuelingoperations(Ref.2).Thecoolingsystemnormallytakessuctionnearthesurfaceofthepoolsuchthatafailureof'nypipeinthesystemwillnotdraintheSFP.Thecoolingsystemreturnlinetothepoolalsocontainsa0.25inchventholelocatedneartheSFPsurfaceleveltopreventsiphoning.Finally,controlboard'alarmsexistwithrespecttotheSFPlevelandtemperature.ThesefeaturesallhelptopreventinadvertentdrainingoftheSFP.Insert3.7.15.2Ro.'i'i'Theseassumptionsincludetheuseofadecontaminationfactorof100intheanalysisforiodine.Adecontaminationfactorof100enablestheanalysistoassumethat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellet'to'laddinggapofalldroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytheSFPwater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory. KDWaterLevelB3.7.~<<BASES(continued)LCO~0,ii,cSFPThewaterlevelisrequiredtobe~23ftoverthetopofirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedinthestorageracks.Thespecifiedwaterlevelpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalsis(Ref.3).,Assuch,itistheminimumreuiredovementwithinth~~~g~gc'F'PAPPLICABILITY~~~o,;;,dQFPThisLCOappliesdurinmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesinthesincethepotentialforareleaseoffissionproductsexists.ACTIONS~1CCk~yv~QW<kN~~gli~ro~~3-~~~3+~,ii.C.C.c.%.0~~~+~~~~<ac.~9ih~~pl.r~Xc5w.'ii.c.A.lRequiredActionA.IismodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthatCO3.0.3doesnota1>-'-~Whentheinitialconditions'annotbemet,stepsshouldbetakentoecludethe~accidentfromoccurring.WhentheWaterlevelislowerthantherequiredleve,themovementof/f1bliih/immediatelysuspendedThisactioneffectivelyprecludestheoccurrenceofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisdoesnotprecludemovementofafuelassemblytoasafeposition/'ZfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODE5or6,irradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODESI,2,3,and4,thefuelmovementisindependentofreactoroperations.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS9o,<l,c(continued)t39~*g~gB3.7-79SR3.7-M.IstThisSRverifiessufficientwaterisavailableintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thewaterlevelinthemustbecheckedperiodically.TheayFrequencyisappropriatebecauselC'woSFP3,1<cp'og~Q, Insert3.7.15.3Sinceafuelhandlingaccidentcanonlyoccurduringmovementoffuel,thisLCOisnotapplicableduringotherconditions.DuringrefuelingoperationsinNODE6,theSFPwaterlevel(andboronconcentration)areinequilibriumwiththerefuelingwatercavity.ThewaterlevelundertheseconditionsisthencontrolledbyLCO3.9.5,"RefuelingCavityWaterLevel"~whichrequirestherefuelingcavitywaterleveltobemaintainedZ23ftNO.Ll.uJabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.ArefuelingcavitywaterlevelofZ23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangewillresultin>23FtofwaterabovethetopoftheactivefuelstoredinthestorageracksassumingthatatmosphericpressurewithincontainmentandtheAuxiliaryHuildingareequivalent.

sr-eWaterLevelB3.7.48-BASESSURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTS~C3.'ii,CSFPSR3.7.O'.I(continued)is~wg~~q~~thevolumeinthepoolisnormallystableMaterevechangesarecontrolledbyplantproceduresandareacceptablebasedonoperatingexperience.Duringrefuelingoperations,thelevelinthe~isinequilibriumwiththerefuelingcanal,andthelevelintherefuelingcanalischeckeddailyinaccordancewithSR3.9'.l.5REFERENCES1.FSAR,Section~.1.2~2.FSAR,Section+.1.3g3.jiFSAR.Section815.7.@4.RegulatoryGuide1.25,QRev.OJ.5.10CFR100.11.B3.7-80 Insert3.7.15.4VerificationofSFPwaterlevelcanbeaccomplishedbyseveralmeans.ThetopoftheupperSFPpumpsuctionlineis23ftabovethefuelstoredinthepool.Ifthereis>23ftofwaterabovethereactorvesselflange(asrequiredbyLCO3.9.5),withequalpressureinthecontainmentandAuxiliaryBuilding,thenatleast23ftofwaterisavailableabovethetopoftheactivefuelinthestorageracks.Inadd4tiontothephysicaldesignfeatures,therearetwoSFPlevelalarms(LAL634)whichare-availabletoalerttheoperatorsofchangingSFPlevel.AlowlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelfalls4inchesormorefromthenormallevelwhileahighlevelalarmwillactuatewhentheSFPwaterlevelrises4inchesormorefromthenormallevel.Thesealarmsmustreceiveacalibrationconsistentwithindustry,practicesbeforetheyareusedtomeetthisSR. BoronConcentrationB3.7.?8B3.7PLSYSTEMS~tsol;B3.7.Ã"Fuel(S'~~PoolBoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDtheMaximumDensityRack(HDR)[(Refs.1and2)]destheentfuelstoragepoolisdividedintotwosepeanddistincegionswhich,forthepurposeofcritityconsiderati,areconsideredasseparates.[Region1],wi$336)storagepositio,isdesignedtoaccommodatenewfuwithamaximunrichmentof[4.65]wt%U-235,orspentfuelrrdles~fthedischargefuelburnup.[Region2],with70]storagepositions,isdesignedtoaccommodafuelovariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumedminimumbuswithintheacceptabledomainaccor'toFigure[3.7.17-1],'ntheaccompanyingJLCO.Fu.assembliesnotmeetingthecr>iaofFig[3.7.17-1]shallbestoredinaccordanwithiragrah4.3.1.1inSection4.3,FuelStorage.~,w,i<,'LIRL.at'Li+gieyna.eQ@JARA0(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92B3.7-81WOGSTSThewaterinthenormallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCiguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlostsecifythatG~Q)limitingk.<<of0.95be~MMEintheasenceosolubleboron.Hence,thedesignofbothreg>onsssbasioneuseounoratewateqP~maintainseachregioninasubcriticalcontionduringnormaloperationwiththereionsfullyloaded.:Thedouhlecontinencrincile>scusseinANSIN816.1-1975mndallowscreditforsolubleboronunder~~anormaoraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingleaccidentneedbeconsideredagonetime.Forexample,tmostsevereaccidentscenario~~associatewitmovementoffuelfrom~egion1toRegionQ,andcental(smisloadingofafuelassemblyin~egionQ.(QQcouldesesenafasr.mitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.Safeoperationofthe~"~-'withnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontroll'helocationofeachassemblyinaccordanceL,n~."Ãimovement,anassembly,itisnecessarytoperform3i70~~c=p('nocsSPP~tabuhi+<S<<S4o4SP-c'a~CLWg ~~',.CI~~r~Insert3.7.16.1suchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement) Insert3.7.16.2ThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasic'ategories(Refs.3and4).ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable'(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).Thesecondcategoryis'relatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenarioswithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmallfractionofthetotaloperatingtime.Insert3.7.16.3light>>'hespentfuelpoolverificationisaccomplishedbyperformingSR3.7.13.1orSR3.7.13.2aftermovementoffuelassembliesdependingonwhichspentfuelpoolregionwasaffectedbythefuelmovement.Iffuelwasmovedinbothregions,thenbothSR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2mustbeperformedbeforeexitingtheApplicabilityofthisLCO. SF'Pue4-Stor~~olBoronConcentrationB3.7.QBASESI,APPLICABILITYprogress,thereisnopotentialforamisloadedfuel~~ontinued)assemblyoradroppedfuelassembly.jCt.tvv'.'i,tt.4ACTIONS<<>.,ncLAAchammAe,Ateq~S.ltttb~5Lt~si%shbSURVEILLANCERERUIREHERTEt>.vA.lA.2.1andA.2.2TheRequiredActionsaremodifiedbyaNoteindicatingthaCO3.0.3doesnotapply>~'-~ggPWhentheconcentrationofboronintheuel-st~raislessthanrequired,imediateactionmustetakentoprecludetheoccurrenceofanaccidentortomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentinprogress.Thisismostefficientlyachievedbyimaediatelysuspendingthemovementoffuelassemblies.Theconcentrationofboronisrestoredsimultaneouslywithsuspendinmovementoffuelassemblies.Anacceaeaernaiveistoveriyaminhatthefuesoragepooveri'hasbeenperformedsistmooffuelassembliesinthfuelstoragepoolve,'resumingmovementoffuelasss,theconcentrationofoered-isoesnotprecludemovementoaueassemblytoasafepositioliWftheLCOisnotmetwhilemovingirradiatedfuelassembliesinNODE5or6,LCO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfmovingirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinMODE1.2,3,or4,thefuelmovementisindependentof!reactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytosuspendmovementoffuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.IvM,SR3.7.UP.'ISPPThisSRverifiesthattheconcentrationofboronintheis"withinthe@8~@)limi.AslongasthisSRismet,theanalyzedaccidentsarefulladdressed.TheaFreuencyisappropriatebecausenrepenientoposceoeplaneoverucshortperoftime.Lira~Z.l.\le4~Vey~~chQ~vi~~~rfts+4~h~~qo~h.it~~~pa.t~~fEyui~vvv~41I1$AXOviCmON~q'h~e~~(continued)B3.7-83 Insert3.7.16.4ThisLCOdoesnotapplytofuelmovementwithinaSFPregionsincethe~~~accidentanalysesassumeeachregioniscompletelyfilledinaninfinitearray.Insert3.7.16.5imaediatelyinitiateactiontoperformaSFPverification(i.e.;SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2).TheperformanceofthisverificationremovestheplantfromtheapplicabilityofthisLCO.Insert3.7.16.6Cll.iii4ThisSRisrequiredtobeperformedpriortofuelassemblymovementintoRegion1orRegion2andmustcontinuetobeperformeduntilthenecessarySFPverificationisaccomplished(i.e.,SR3.7.13.1andSR3.7.13.2). BoronConcentrationB3.7.K-BASES(continued)REFERENCESCallawayFSAR,Appendix9.1A,"TheMaximumDensity(HDR)DesignConcept."2.DescriptiodEvaluationforPsedChangestoFacilityOperatLicens-39andDPR-48(ZionPowerStation).3.DoubleingencyprincipleoSIN16.1-1975,asifiedintheApril14,1978NRter(Section1.2)endimpliedintheproposevisiontoRegulatoryGuide1.13(Section1.4,Appendix4.FSAR,SectionI15.7.4].B3.7-84~f ~PPStorage83.7.+~B3.7PLANTSYSTEMS~~I3~ocoWcF~B3.7.+FSpe.ntFuel~lhlerStorage!BASES!sFinBAC3IQca<.t)IiitaTussle+~I>.02fa5sueooisivieinowoseparateandisincrwic,fortheuroseofcriticalityconsiderations,arecons)eredasseparatepools.'feion1,withstoragepositions,isdesinedtoaccommoatfh~~~e'ioegion,withstorageposiions,isessgnedtoaccommodatefuelofvariousinitialenrichmentswhichhaveaccumulatedminimumburnupswithintheacceptable1domainaccordingtoFigure3.7.17-1intheaccompanyingLC~iesnomeeingthecrigure[3.7e17-1inaccordancewith.1inSection4.3,Fue3.i.t'r.6gt.~anoas~iaccimostmovemislCv~~CaS;XD82..t'tt~an+gaOmv(continued)Thewaterinthespentfuel!~~poolnormallycontainssolubleboron,whichresultsinlargesubcriticalitymarginsunderactualoperatingconditions.However,theNRCguidelines,basedupontheaccidentconditioninwhichallsolublepoisonisassumedtohavebeenlostspecifyththelimitingk,<<of0.95beg~iaXa@intheasenceosolubleboron.Hencethedesignofbothregionsisbasedonteuseounboratedwater~Q~Q4maintainseachregioninasubcriticalconditp~nduringnormaloperationwiththereionsfullyloaded.r~'edoublecontingencyprincilediscusseinsl6.1-1975"andM~3-allowscreditforsolubleoronunder~rmaoraccidentconditions,sinceonlyasingledentneedbeconsideredagoptime.Forexample,thesevereaccidentscynariK~~ociatedwiththe~+~mentoffuelfrom~egion1toRegion2g,and~accidentaloadinofafuelassemblyin/legionBr.tSKQvcooudduTmitigatethesepostulatedcriticalityrelatedaccidents,boronisdissolvedinthepoolwater.Safeoperationofthe;withnomovementofassembliesmaythereforebeachievedbycontrollingthelocationofeachassemblyinaccordanceI~L.a'ifassemblyitisnecessarytoperformSR3.7'.Ht-.l.tsJI~I~rcL~S~W~WS83.4-85'&<sar'has~~svtet~aAZl=p~aDev,i+iS~tr<~W~~~Sea.q.sa,geastg>.'9a3~>t~c,~~ Insert3.7.17.3Qg,>(io.neworspentfuelutilizingatwooffourcheckerboardarrangement.Afuelassemblywithanenrichmentof<4.05wtXcanbestoredatanyavailablelocationinRegionIsincetheaccidentanalyseswereperformedassumingthatRegionIwasfilledwithfuelassembliesofthisenrichment.Afuelassemblywithanenrichment>4.05wt/U-235canalsobestoredinRegionIprovidedthatintegralburnablepoisonsarepresentintheassembliessuchthatk-infinityinthenormalreactorconfigurationandcoldconditionsisg1.458.TheexistingdesignusesIntegralFuelBurnableAbsorbers(IFBAs)asthepoisonforfuelassemblieswithanenrichment)4.0wtX.IFBAsconsistofneutronabsorbingmaterialwhichprovidesequivalencingreactivityholddown(i.e.,neutronpoisons)thatallowsstorageofhigherenrichmentfuel.Theneutronabsorbingmaterialisanon-removableorintegralpartofthefuelassemblyonceitisapplied.Theinfinitemultiplicationfactor,K-infinity,isareferencecriticalitypointofeachfuelassemblythatifmaintained<1.458,willresultinak,<<Z0.95forRegionl.Insert3.7.17.4q>','hestorageoffuelassemblieswhicharewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1inRegion2ensuresak,<0.95intheregion.Insert3.7.17.5ConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscanalsobestoredineitherregionintheSFPprovidedthattheminimumburnupofFigure3.7.17-1ismet.Inaddition,allcanistersplacedintoserviceafter1994musthave<144rodsorZ244rods(Ref.2).The.canistersarestainlesssteelcontainerswhichcontainthefuelrodsofamaximumoftwofuelassemblies(i.e.,358rods).Allbowed,broken,orotherwisefailedfuelrodsarefirststoredinastainlesssteeltubeof0.75inchouterdiameterbeforebeingplacedinacanister.Eachcanisterwillaccommodate110failedfuelrodtubes.Insert3.7.17.6suchthatconfigurationcontrol(i.e.,controllingthemovementofthefuelassemblyandcheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement) StorageB3.7.MBASES(continued)tAPPLICABLE:.SAFETYANALYSESiLZ.O'L.s-IM~sge.~-~1.x).7Tpotheticalaccidentscanonlytakeplaceduringas',aresufthemovementofanassembly(Ref.4).orthese:accidentocences,thepresenceofsolubloroninthespentfuelstoraool(controlledby3.7.16,"Fuel.StoragePoolBoronCotration"eventscriticalityinbothregions.Bycloselyingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckineloionofeachassemblyafter;movement,thetimeodforpoten'ccidentsmaybelimitedtoasfractionofthetotalratingtime.Duringthmainingtimeperiodwithnopote'for/accis,theoperationmaybeundertheauspicestheompanyingLCO.TheconfigurationoffuelassembliesinthefuelQ~gbpoolsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement./lLCO~2..ttSF<Therestrictionsonthelacementoffuelassemblieswithinthe',~f%h8assembliesnotectingecriteriaofFiurstoredin!ccor,'PPLICABILITYlk.'t'tThisLCOalieswheneveranfuelassemblyisstoredinthe'aB:;ACTIONSsl82.~\Lt,gA.1equirectionA.l'dified'Hotindica'hCO.0.3doesaly~c.t~@>>on1ov-!5'Ff'hentheconfigurationoffuelassembliesstoredineIl~egion2+theisnotinaccordanceoQtheimmediateactionistoinitiateactiontomakethenecessaryfuel/assemblymovement(s)tobringtheconfiguration=intocompliance,withSpecification4.3.1.1+3IiI~5~~As~~t'.'4'uaa'ascene'a.v'g%t~~a~0~~-~taty.(continued)vMOB3.$-86'co Insert3.7.17.7ThepostulatedaccidentsintheSFPcanbedividedintotwobasiccategories(Refs.3and4):ThefirstcategoryareeventswhichcausealossofcoolingintheSFP.ChangesintheSFPtemperaturecouldresultinanincreaseinpositivereactivity.However,thepositivereactivityisultimatelylimitedbyvoiding(whichwouldresultintheadditionofnegativereactivity)andtheSFPgeometrywhichisdesignedassuminguseofunboratedwatereventhoughsolubleboronisavailable(seeSpecification4.3.1.1).ThesecondcategoryisrelatedtothemovementoffuelassembliesintheSFP(i.e.,afuelhandlingaccident)andisthemostlimitingaccidentscenarioswithrespecttoreactivity.Thetypesofaccidentswithinthiscategoryincludeanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly(e.g.,transferfromRegion1toRegion2ofanunirradiatedoraninsufficientlydepletedfuelassembly)andadroppedfuelassembly.However,forbothoftheseaccidents,thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivity.Bycloselycontrollingthemovementofeachassemblyandbycheckingthelocationofeachassemblyaftermovement,thetimeperiodforpotentialaccidentswhichcredituseofthesolubleboronmaybelimitedtoasmall'fractionofthetotaloperatingtime.Insert3.7.17.8(Specification4.3.1.1).ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion1,eachassemblymusthaveak-infinityofg1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditions.Normalreactorcoreconfigurationisthetypicalgeometryoffuelassembliesintheverticalpositionarrangedinaninfinitearray.Coldconditionsisdefinedas68Fandanatmosphericpressureof14.7psia.ForfuelassembliesstoredinRegion2,initialenrichmentandburnupshallbewithintheacceptableareaofFigure3.7.13-1.Thex-axisofFigure3.7.13-1isthenominalU-235enrichmentwtKwhichdoesnotincludethe+0.05wt/tolerancethatisallowedforfuelmanufacturingandlistedinSpecification4.3.1.1. BASESc54.5ii.'c~Q<<~t9Ac+oA,A.'\ct~QL;~$~etc.i~bwc.~a+M~Mc'a'c~pi~<q.nc.gStorageB3.7.k7-ACTIONSA.l(continued)5CZ)5S~+~~~~using5rrcagc+QCpcsgi5,cJkk0toeSZ'finHODE5or6,CO3.0.3wouldnotbeapplicable.IfunabletomoveirradiatedfuelassemblieswhileinHODEI,2,3,or4,theactionisindependentofreactoroperation.Therefore,inabilitytomovefuelassembliesisnotsufficientreasontorequireareactorshutdown.1&SR3.7.WkPraOr+OS~pC.einitialISURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS+2.,iiThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthatthenrichmentandb~upofthefuelassemblyisinaccordanc.a,n.'ithFiguregY.~-QintheaccompanyingLCO.Forfuel~assembliesintheunacceptablerangeofFigure3..performanceofthisSRwillensurecompliancewithSpecification4.3.l.l.~,),5l,lh'3,g.5'5,lc55REFERENCESFSAR,Appendix9.1A,"TheHaximueyRack(HD'Concept."2.DescriptionauationosedChangestoFac'peratingLicensesDPR-39a-48(ZionowerStation).3.contingencyprincipleofANSI.,asspecifiedine-A~'1Cletter(Sectionimpliedin-thep~oosedrevisiontoatorGuideI13Section1.4,Appends~s'.MFSAR,Section5s'.'7.'3UFshe,Me.&a~Q.i.Z.Am'~5E.5->Q~5-A~~CA'i4~~Ko~ce.ofte9nwaCmd%,Wltticaa454.hh09~aggC5+crt',Q~ckec-g.Cri~,HR+~RA'C~gea~~"OrP~tg&a~Wr>~,ta>Z5c~~e2~B3.-87..'eo.~~~~~5~+A.wa~4it~~R.B4.~~<f4<~~PO~PL~l~h~s~T=vWA.c5.~~<"5~"4~ Insert3.7.17.9SR3.7.17.1ThisSRverifiesbyadministrativemeansthatthek-infinityofeachfuelassemblyis<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditionspriortostorageinRegionl.Ifafuelassemblyis(4.05wtX,ak-infinityof<1.458isalwaysmaintained.Forfuelassemblieswith'enrichments)4.05wtX,aminimumnumberofIFBAsmustbepresentineachfuelassemblysuchthatk-infinity<1.458inthenormalreactorcoreconfigurationandcoldconditionspriortostorageinRegion1.Thisverificationisonlyrequiredonceforeachfuelassemblysincetheburnablepoisons,ifany,areanintegralpartofthefuelassemblyandwillnotberemoved.Theinitialenrichmentofeachassemblywillalsonotchange(i.e.,increase)whilepartiallyburnedassembliesarelessreactivethanwhentheywerenew(i.e.,fresh).PerformanceofthisSRensurescompliancewithSpecification4.3.1.1.ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion1toexittheApplicabilityofLCO.3.7.12,"SFPBoronConcentration."ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotewhichstatesthatthisverificationisnotrequiredwhentransferringafuelassemblyfromRegion2toRegion1.TheverificationisnotrequiredsinceRegion2isthelimitingspentfuelpoolregion,andassuch,fuelhasalreadybeenverifiedtobeacceptableforstorageinRegionl.Insert3.7.17.10OnceafuelassemblyhasbeenverifiedtobewithintheacceptablerangeofFigure3.7.13-1,furtherverificationsarenolongerrequiredsincetheinitialenrichmentorburnupwillnotadverselychange.Insert3.7.17.11ThoughnotrequiredforthisLCO,thisSRmustalsobeperformedaftercompletionoffuelmovementintoRegion2toexittheApplicabilityofLCO3.7.12. SecondarySpecificActivityW'3.'sB3.7.QF->~B3.7PLANTSYSTEHSB3.7.48-SecondarySpecificActivityBASESBACKGROUNDt3'.V>,c.>~~<~u~ac,ActivityinthesecondarycoolantresultsfromsteamgeneratotubeoutleakagefromtheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Understeadystateconditions,theactivityisprimarilyiodineswithrelativelyshorthalflivesand,thusindicatescurrentconditions.Duringtransients,I-131spikesCreenobservedaswellasincreasedreleasesofsomenoblegases.Otherfissionproductisotopes,aswellasactivatedcorrosionproductsinlesseramounts,mayalsobefoundinthesecondarycoolant.Alimitonsecondarycoolantspecificactivityduringpoweroperationminimizesreleasestotheenvironmentbecauseofnormaloperation,anticipatedoperationaloccurrences,andAccidents.M6.or4Thislimitisactivityvaluethatmightbeexpectedfromagpmtubeleak(LCO3.4.13,"RCSO~erationalLEAKAGE")ofprimarycoolantatthelimitof+1.0~pCi/gm(LCO3.4.16,"RCSSpecificActivity").=~~steamlin4~~isassumedtoresultinthereleaseofenoegasandiodineactivitycontainedintheCg~>gg~~inventory,thefeedwater,andthereactorcoolantLEAKAGE.Hostoftheiodineisotopeshaveshorthalflives,(i.e.,(20hours).I-131,withahalflifeof8.04days,concentratesfasterthanitdecays,butdoesnotreachequilibriumbecauseofblowdownandotherlosses.Withthespecifiedactivitylimit,theresultant2hourthyroiddosetoapersonattheexclusionareaboundaryEABwouldbz5mhCE5tremifthemainsteamsafetyvavess)openfor2hoursfollowingatripfromfullpower.IOl~Operatinga~ateallowablelimitscouldresultina2hourEABexposureofractionofthe10CFR100(Ref.I)limi~k~ttti4e-es+abVB3.7-88(continued) SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.38-'"BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES3.iat.da~3.'ta'a.th.Z.iii.lIntheevaluationoftheradiologicalconseuencesofthisaccident,theactivityreleasedfromthe~sGconnectedtothefailedsteamlineisassumedtobereleasedTTffisassumedtodischargesteamandanyentrainedactivityroughtheHSSVsanvSSincenocreditistakenintheanalysis,foractivityplateoutorretention,theresultantradiologicalconsequencesrepresentaconservativeestimateofthepotentialintegrateddoseduetothepostulatedsteamlinefailure.+3.i'a;.arAR.V4~,',+tbmO4ueZ~PrT~c.m+gv)4&~~th.Maa~B'~'C-gSba~dlvv(')~sawtlofDa~cs~hc~tgZ~by)earc)V~<o~Ssesr~va)Ttrt~a+a.Q.Its,)rSecondaryspecificactivitylimitssatisfyCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Theaccidenta~nalsisofthesteamlinebreak(JSLB),(Ref.2)assumestheinitialsecondarycoolantspecificactivitytohavearadioactiveisotopeconcentrationof+0.10/pCi/gmDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131.Thisassumptionisusedintheanalysisfordeterminingtheradiologicalconsequencesofthepostulatedaccident.Theaccidentahalysis,basedonthis.andotherassumptionpshowsthattheradiologicalconsequencesofanWLBdonotexceedasmallfractionofEABlimits(Ref.1)forwholebodyandthyroiddoserates.(pzv)Withthelossofoffsitepower,theremaining~jh.availableforcoredecayheatdissipationbyventinsearntotheatmosphereTthrouhheHSSVsandsteamgeneratoratmosperiKj@valveTheAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemsuppliesthenecessarymakeuptothe~b'==.=--geiera4~e.VentingcontinuesuntilthereactorcoolanttemperatureandpressurehavedecreasedsufficientlyfortheResidualHeatRemovalSystemtocompletethecooldown.LCOd-~:-ed-i~he-ABespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantisrequiredtobe<g0a10@pCi/gmDOSEE(UIVALENTI-131tolimittheradiologicalconsequencesofaQB~toasmallfractionoftherequiredlimit(Ref.1).Monitoringthespecificactivityofthesecondarycoolantensuresthatwhensecondaryspecificactivitylimitsareexceeded,appropriateactionsaretakeninatimelymanner(continued)B3.7-89 SecondarySpecificActivityB3.7.~'~BASESLCO(continued)PMsrtoplacethe~inanoperationalMODEthatwouldminimizetheradiologicalconsequencesofaDBA.APPLICABILITYInMODES1,2,3,and4,thelimitsonsecondaryspecificactivityapplyduetothepotentialforsecondarysteamreleasestothatmosphere,.sssO.SCB5E5d,h~IIdforheatremoval.BoththeRCSand~aredepressurized,andprimarytosecondaryLEAKAGEisminimal.Therefore,.monitoringofsecondaryspecificactivityisnotrequired.ACTIONSA.landA.2DOSEEQUIVALENTI-131exceedingtheallowablevalueinthesecondarycoolant,isanindicationofaproblemintheRCandcontributestoincreasedpostaccidentdoses.IftlfI,secondaryspecificactivitywithinlimitsthe~ustbeplacedinaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toacseve1ssaus,t~mustbeplacedinatleastdhh,ddIIEIhhallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallenging~systems.P'tcasadrSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSt3.~<SR3.7.MP.1ThisSRverifiesthatthesecondaryspecificactivityiswithinthelimitsoftheaccidentanalysis.Agammaisotopicanalysisofthesecondarycoolant,whichdeterminesDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,confirmsthevalidityofthesafetyanalysisassumptionsastothesourcetermsinpostaccident,releases.ItalsoservestoidentifyandtrendanyunusualisotopicconcentrationsthatmightindicatechangesinreactorcoolantactivityorLEAKAGE.The+I+dayFrequencyisbasedonthedetectionofincreasingtrendsofthelevelofDOSEEQUIVALENTI-131,andallowsforappropriateactiontobetakentomaintainlevelsbelowtheLCOlimit.B3.7-90.(continued)

SecondarySpecificActivity83.7.RBASES(continued)REFERENCES1.10CFR100.11.2.<<~~+~X4,AA-c-,~>~~Ma,4-6~6~g~'ePT~p',~)cV-ZP'~Q~~~~~~+~iW~~WMa~O.~~~+WAN~~im~'V-l0+i~~~'~~<q~~~4aMnagX5,t9py',83.7-91 hAab&S~,z,3ACSourceseratin.13.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSLCO3.8.1~qN(~Qa3.8.1ACSources-'TheeratinhhooH-l,2,3,<.A4followingACelectrical-sourcesshallbeOPERABLE:one,Cine4.~~~,'eexnag4e,d~qualifiedetweentheoffsitetransmissionnetworkanheonsitendb.Twodieselenerators(DGs)caableofsupplyinmarrt.quillOnSs&4fo<1~~0.~4uae~.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.fsitepmrmonessrrnhrt$904~ds4.~~rformSR..1.1forired]~OABLfsitecircuit.1urAND0eper8oursereafterANDblinoperaewhenitsredundantrequiredfeature(s)isinoperable.ANDlA.-Declarereuiredfeature(s)~Qhoursprodiscoveryofconcurrenwithinoperabilityofredundantrequired feature(s)(continued)3.8-1 Moo@5t,z,z,~gACSources-Q~~~3.8.1ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIHEA.(continued)g.A.gRestoreoffsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.72hours6dafromdisryoffaureomeetLB.---------NOTE----Req'dActB.3.1orB.3.allbecorned>hisCditionisened.B.lPerformSR3.8.1.1fortheoffsitecircuit1hourANDOnceperhoursthereafterOneinoperae.DGANDB.2ANDB.3.1ORDeclarerequiredfeature(s)supportedbytheinoperableDGinoperablewhenitsrequiredredundantfeature(s)isinoperable.DetermineOPERABLEDGfgisnotinoperableduetocommoncausefailure.4hoursfromdiscoveryofConditionBconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundantrequiredfeature(s)f24+ours8.3.2PerformSR3.8.1.2@4+hoursforOPERABLEDG.AND(continued)3.8-2ev, ACSources-nnooesi,z,zwd.8.1ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINE90.vi'.(continued)B.4RestoreDGtoOPERABLEstatus.6daromdisceoffa'reteet0C.o[required]offsitecirinoperable.C.1ANDDeclarerequiredfeature(s)inoperabwhenitsredurequiredure(s)isierable.1ursfromdiscoveryofConditionCconcurrentwithinoperabilityofredundant'requiredfeaturesC.2Restoreone[required]offsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.24hours(continued)3.8-3 WoeeSI,Z,~,~4ACSources-~~@>3.8.1ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME0inoperable.DGOt%.aQMtIp~e+~core4SOV~~~I~uses),AND------------NOTE-------------EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.9,"Distribution~opg,Systems-,"wenConditionisenteredwithnoACpowersourcetoonetrasn.g.Ji~&4+~Cpestoregrequired3offsitecircuittoOPERABLEstatus.12hoursORH.RestoreDG12hourstoOPERABsaus.E.Twoinoperable.DGsE.l[re0oreoDGto(continued)3.8-4 ACSources-.8.1ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEH.'aiaF.----REYIEWER'SNOTE---isConditionmaybedediftheunitdesigni~uchthatanysequencer-failuremodewillonlyaTfttheabilityoftheassociatedDGtopoweritsrespectivesafetyloadsfollowingalossofoffsitepowerindependentof,orcoincidentwith,aDesignBasisEven.F.lRestore[required][automaticloadsequencer]toOPERABLEstatus.[12]hoursOne[rired][auaticloadquencer]inoperable.(RgiRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionA,B7Cnotmet.bA.1BeinMODE3.ANDl2BeinMODEB.6hours36hoursO<<'.Threeormore[required]ACsoulnoImmediately3.8-5 440Ml(2,3,n~Z4ACSources-.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentndindicatedpoweravailabilityforoffsitecircuit~~~4~SSbuxom7daysSR3.8.1.2-NOTES1.PerformanceofSR3.8.1/PjsatisfiesthisSR.3.AmodifiedDGstartinvolvinagradualacceleratiosyncnousspeedeusedforthisSRrecndedbythemanufactur.Whenmodifiedstartprocedsarenused,thetime,voge,andfrequentolerancesSR3.8.1.7mustbeme.ing2.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmuperiodpriortoloading.l0.v>>'erifyeachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesvoltagefrequencyand(continued)3.8-6 NtooEsi,z,g,a.agACSources-@~~~3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.3l.2.3.4.gQ.VIa~-NOTES-DGloadingsmayincludegradualloadingasrecommendedbythemanufacturer.Momentarytransientsoutsidetheloadrangedonotinvalidatethistest.ThisSurveillanceshallbeconductedononlyoneDGatatime.SRshallbeprecimmediaowwithoutshutdownasulpernceofSR3.8.1.1SR3817VerifyeachDGissynchronizedandloadedandocratesfor>60minutesataload.kWandkW.~(i~-~wLRGDSR3.8.1.4Yerif~N.s"\~incand~fueloil.31daysSR3.8.1.5ecru@i-~ectImuaewaterfrom&daytank[andengine[31]daysSR3.8.1.Verifythouo'peratestofrostoraetanansfersystemtransferfueltothedaytankBL~days(continued)3.8-7 ACSourcesAholdI,g,g,3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSRNOTEstartsmaybeprecededbyaneniprelube'.VerifDGstartsfromstar,itionandachievesin<[10]seconvoltage>[3740]Vand<[4580]V,andfrequency>[58.8]Hzand<[61.2]Hz.184daysSR3.8.1.~RR.vNOTES-------------urveillanceshallneperformeODEned2.CredibetakenforsthatsatisfythisSR.(S'0/50moderccarrer>ytransferofACowersourcesfromthe~moffsitewith'l2RHBKtoffsitecircuit.(lao/omme0doooomala)~months'continued)3.8-8 pQQSllp,~sanA4ACSources-dg~~Q3.8'1SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCY3.8.1.9--NOTES1.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1or2.CreditmaybetakenforunplannentsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyeachDGeratinapowerfactor<[0']rejectsa[1200]kW,and:[18months]k.vi'~b.c~Followingadreje'on,thefrequeis<[63]Hz;in[3]secondsfollowingadrejection,thevoltageis>[37Vand<[4580]V;andWithin[3]secondsfollowingloadrejection,thefrequencyis>[58.8]Hzand~[61.2]Hz.7SR3.8.1~u..-----NOTEM~~ThisSurveillanceshallnotperformedinMODE1~Borunplannedlg.v>ilVerifyeachDGIRBHBIdduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof>~$9kg)CBb215months'continued)3.8-9 ~oCES(,Z,3,~~'fACSources-Q~~p3.8.1~~ISURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS{continued)SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY3-8.1.11--NOTES1.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMOOE1,2,3,or4.3~CreditmaybetakenforunplannedventsthatsatisfythisSR.'WWWW&>>~Verifyon'aqactualorsimulatedloss'ofoffsitepower.signa1:a.Oe-energiztionofemergenybuses;b.Loadsheddingromemgencybuses;[18'monthsjC~OGauto-startsfrstandbyconditionand:1.energizespermanelyconnectedloads~n-[10]secds,2.ergizesauto-connecteshutdownoadsthrough[automaticoadsequencerj,maintainssteadystatevoltag~e[3740]Vand-[4580]V,4.maintainssteadystatefrequency-[58.8]Hzand-[61.2]Hz,and5.suppliespermanentlyconnected[andauto-connected]shutdownloadsfor~5minutes.(continued)3.8-10 ~MShs+s~~ACSources-6j~~~~SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE~REQUENCVSR3.8.1.12NOTESl.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyprelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1or2.3.CreditmaybetakenforunplandeventsthatsatisfythisSR.Verifonanactualorsimu$atedEngineeredSafetyture(ESF)actuationsignaleachDGauto-startsfrosrstandbyconditionand:a.Ing[10]secdsafterauto-startandduringtest,chievesvoltage>[3740]and4580]V;b.In<[I'I(jsecondsafauto-startandduritests,achievesequency8.8]Hzand<[61.2]c.peratesfor>5minutes;dPermanentlyconnectedloadsremainenergizedfromtheoffsitepowersystem;and[18months]e.Emergencyloadsareenergized[orauto-connectedthroughtheautomaticloadsequencer]totheoffsitepowersystem.(continued)3.8-11 SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY~~~~Qt.vui8R3.8.1.~~ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinHODE1R~,"L,b,o~.~2.satisftisfQ,'aiVerifyeachDG's'automatictrisabyassedonors'otagerrentwithanactualorsimulated~~~signal]except:a.Engineoverspeed;~~months5%lwtCC'hOweC5l)(Q+Lowlubeoilpressure;~an(Q@[Startfailurerelay~(Ov~o~~)(continued)3.8-12

~[CSuSS'[,443Chs&~ACSources-.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.1.142.----NOTES-Momentarytransientsoutsidetheloadandpowerfactorrangesdonotinvalidatethistest.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1or2.CreditmaybetakenforunplanneventsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyeachDGoperatingata~owerfactor<[0.9]operatesfor224hohs:a.For>[2]hoursload>[5250]kWand<[5500]kW;andyb.FortheremainipghoursofthetestloadedZ['09]kWand~[5000]kW.[18months]SR3.8.1.15NOT,ES1.ThisPurveillance~qhallbeperformedwitgn5minutesoQshuttingdowntheDCv'aftertheDGhasoperatedp'2]hoursloadedZ[500]kWand<[5000]kW.Momentarytransientsoutsi.ofloadrangedonotinvalidatethistest.2.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbanengineprelubeperiod.hVerifyeachDGstartsandachieves,ing[10]seconds,voltageZ[3740]V,andS[4580]VandfrequencyZ[58.8]Hzand<[61.2]Hz.[18months](contied)3.8-13

~0CM'L,5a2~5ACSources-Gg~~3.8.1SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCE'WaVliaFRE(UENCYSR3.8.1.16L.2.NOTES-ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinNODE1,2,3,or4.CreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.VerifyeachDG:[18months]b.C.Synchronizeswithoffsitepowersourcewhileloadedwithemergency1'oadsuponasimulatedrestorationof.offsitepower;Transfersloadstooffsitepowersource;and.Returnstoready-t'o-loadoperation.y'R3.8.1.172.y.---NOTESThisSurveillanceshall'notbeperformedinNODE1,2,3%or4.fCreditmaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.7Verify,withaDGoperatingintestmodeandonnectedtoitsbus,anactualorsiulatedESFactuationsignaloverridest'etestmodeby:a.ReturningDGtoready-to-loadoperation[;andb.Automaticallyenergizingtheemergencyloadfromoffsitepower].[18months)(.conHnGed)3.8-14

daopa.sl,v.p,~NACSources-4~~3.8.19Q.iiiSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY1.18NOTESThisSurveillanceshallnotbermedinMODE1,2,3,or42.Creditmaybeeventsthats'tunplannedR.'intervalbetweeneachsequencedloablockiswithin+[10Kofdesigninterval]foreachemergency[andshutdown]loadsequencer.8months]SR3.8.1.NOTESl.AllDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengine-prelubeperiod.2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,,2,3,or4.(1Qu3.nparmedentsthatsatisfVerifyonanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulated4&Faationsignal:SZa.De-energizationofem~gaeybuses;b.Loadsheddingfromemergencybuses;andmonths~QSQVSakvcudsc.DGauto-startsfromstandbyconditienergizesonneced~~g~%i~~5nwoes.(continued)WOGSTS3.8-15Rev.0,09/28/92

~~~l,w,Z~'tACSources-g~~3.8.1.Q.vii'('URVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.1.19(continued)2.energizesauto-connectedemergencyloadsthroughlosequencer,3.achievessteadystatvoltage:5.>[3740]Vand<4580]V,achievessteaystatefrequency:>[58..8]."Flzandg[61.2]Hz,andsuppliespermanentlyconnected[adauto-connected]emergencyadsfor>0inutes.SR3.8.1.20-NOTEDGstartsmaybeprecededbyangineprelubeperiod.Verifywhenstartedsimultaneouslyfromstandbycondition,eachDGachieves,in<[10]seconds,voltage>[3744]Vand<[4576]V,andfrequency>[58.8]Hzand<[61.2]Hz.0years3.8-16 0~v'sisTable3.8.1-1(page1of1)DieselGeneratorTestScheduleACSources-Cj~~~n3.8.1NUMBEROFFAILURESINLAST25VALIDTESTS()FFLUENCY331days7days(b)(butnolessthan24hours)(a)CriteriafordeterminingnumberoffailuresandvalidtestsshallbeinaccordancewithRegulatoryPositi'onC.2.1ofRegulatoryGuide1.9,Revision3,wherethenumberoftests.andfailuresisdeterminedonaperDGbasis.(b)Thistestfrequencyshallbemaintaineduntsevenconsecutivefailurefreestartsfromstandbyconditionsandloadaruntestshavebeenperformed.ThisisconsistentwithRegulatoryPition[],ofRegulatoryGuide1.9,Revision3.If,subsequenttthe7failurefreetests,1ormoreadditionalfailuresoccur,suchthathereareagain4ormorefailu'resinthelast25tests,thetestinginrvalshallagainbereducedasnotedaboveandmaintaineduntil7coecutivefailurefreetestshavebeenperformed.Note:I'fRevision3ofRegulatoryGuide1.9'snotapproved,thebovetablewillbemodifiedtobeconsistentwiththeexistingversionoRegula'atoryGuide1.108,GL84-15,orotherapprovedversion./3.8-17 AloM5$~(ACSources-'23.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.2ACSources-W~edouMooss5.~4LCO3.8.2ThefollowingACelectricalowerssshallbOPERABLE:~~o~.WP~rCoNs"C4onaeeac2a.Onequalified~~etweeneositetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteequsrey'tionSystems-4WbR+',andb.Ondieselgenerator(DGcaableofsup1inonetrainassscra8r38s0theonsltrequiredyLCO3.8.10.ego.r.".~8=)APPLICABILITY:IS:ssIACTIONSMODES5and6A.NoCONDITIONoffsiteRE(UIREDACTION------------NOTE-------------COMPLETIONTIMEf&4CrW~S2S'sres~sq,essedCtg~~~QS(8S)EnterapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsofLCO3.8.10,withonerequiredtrainde-energizedasaresultofConditionA.0'5:s'.lORDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)withnooffsitepoweravailableinoperable.{'-~as-~sAAainu~ImmediatelyA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Immediately(continued)3.8-18 t4o0ES5m~~ACSources-QigWQ3.8.2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)ANNDSuspendmovementofiatedfuelassembsInitiateactiontosoperationswithapofdrainingthcovessRVs).ImmediateImmediaA.2Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.2InitiateactiontorestorerequiredoffsitepowercircuittoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelyHoWB.(gag)required95~<<~s~<<~~e~)15.>vANDANDSuspendmovementoftedfuelassemblies.B.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyImmedRSy114B.nitiateactiontosuspRVs(continued)3.8-19

+~0~5Sca.A(pACSources-3..2ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDInitiateactiontorestorerequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.2.115.ii'NOTE------------ThefolSRsarenotedtobeperformed:SR3.3.8.1.8throughSR3.8.1.11,.8.1.1oughSR38o[SR3~8~118>]SR.1.19.QOo~~~yForACsourcesreuiredSRsf,areapplicablEtheInaccordancewithapplicableSRs<4>8'.t.iee>.s.i.~M,30~1~Z.M3p~53.8-2092 DieselFuelOil3.8.33.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.3DieselFuelOilLCO3.8.3Thestoreddieselfueloisha1bewiinlimitsforeachrequireddieselgenerator(DG).emomei,z,>,ard4APPLICABILITY:WhenassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.~~3.W2>"AC.SautCNtabhmhth~40ACTIONSNOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachDG.CONDITION~tns~'cJA.OneormoreOGswith1level<[0g'alangalisoraget~~f.tA.Asml~is+~u7&histRE(UIREDACTIONA.lRestorefueloilleveltowithinlimit+COMPLETIONTIME48hourslubeoilinventory<[500]galand>[42B.1Restoreorytowithinlimits.48hours~~~dOneormore+DGswithstoredfueloiltotalparticulatesithinl4"slimit.Restorefueloiltotalparticulateswithinlimit:7days(continued)3.8-21 DieselFuelOilACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHED.eormoreDGswithnew1oilpropert>otwithinlimits..D.1RestorestoredfueloilpropertiestwithinliaysE.OneormoreDGhstarting'eceiverpres<[225]psigZ[125]psig.E.lRestorertingairreceiverpresto>[225]psig.48hours'RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.OROneormor.DGsdieselfueloil,nowithinlimitsor~reasonsothert.1Declare'associatedDGinoperable..ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREgUIREHENTSSURVEILLANCEan~i~galo$FREQUENCY~q~;SR3.8.3.1Verifgaof>icii~l%elatl~<<Al<A~e~lwvfrcdb631days(continued)3.8-22 DieselFuelOil3.8.3SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY500ryis31daysSR3.&.3.~ac.;Verifyfueloilpropertiesof~~~storedfueloilaretestedinaccordancewith,andmaintainedwithinthelimitsof,theDieselFuelOilTestingProgram.InaccordancewiththeDieselFuelOilTestingProgramSR3.8.3.4VerifyeachDGairstartreceiverpressureis>[225]psig.31daysSR3.8.3.5Cheforandremoveaccumulateaterfromeachfoilstoragetank.[31]daysSR3.8.3.6Foreacheloilstoragank:a.Drainthefueloil;b.Removethesediment;andc.Cleanthetank.10years3.8-23 DCSources-AeOESlasi,3sc3~4,43.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.4OCSOurCeS-~MoueaI,Z,3,~~4~(LCO3.8.4TheTrainAandTrain8DCelectricalpowerubsystemsshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.OneDCelectricalpowerQ~HBa~9r.;inoperable.o~~A.1RestoreDCelectricalpoweraR~~toOPERABLEstatus.2hoursB.RequiredActionandAssociatedCompletionTimeotmet.B.1BeinMODE3.ANDB.2BeinMODE5;6hours36hours~bCelegieslPau)arSCSlLrC45ihip@fLVIW~timur~~o.5.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEg~~C++lsQ~5FREQUENCYSR3.8.4.1'iz.;;;Verifbatterays(continued)3.8-24 DCSources-/~a'~g3.8.4SURVEILLANCEREOUIREHENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCECY3.8.4.2Verifynovisiblecorrosionatterminalsandconnectors.92daysORVerifyconnectionresistance[is<[IE-5ohm]forinter-cellconnections,[lE-5ohm]forinter-rackconnections,E-5ohm]forinter-tierconnections,andlE-5ohm]forterminalconnectis].SR3.8.4.3Verifycells,c1plates,anbatteryracksshownovis1indicaonofphysicaldamageorabnormaleriation.[12]monthsSR3.8.4.4Removevisibletminalcorros',verifycelltocellaterminalconnec'onsarecleanandti,andarecoatedwianti-corros'onmaterial.[12]monthsSR3.8.4.5Verfyconnectionresistance[isIE-5ohm]forinter-cellconnections,[lE-5ohm]forinter-rackconnections,Z[IE-5ohm]forinter-tierconnections,and<[lE-5ohm]forterminalconnections].]months(continued,WOGSTS3.8-25Rev.0,09/28/92 Moorsl,z,3,~w4DCSources-SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCY.8.4.6NOTES1.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeerformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.2.Creditmaakenfo.armedeventsthatsati'sSR.Ve'achbatterychargersupplies[400]ampsat>[125]Vfor>[8]hours.months]SR384~~1.SR3.8.4.SR3.8.4.----NOTESmabeerformedinlieuof2.ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.3.sthatsaisorunplannedVerifybatterycapacityisadequatetosupply,andmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.months~(continued)3.8-26 DCSources-QoQ+),?t9,a&4.3.8.4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTScontinuedSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.4.gNOTA~~ThisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.2.CreorunplannedatsatisVerifybatterycapacityis~80//ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.60monthsAND----NOTE--Onappliablewhenatryshowsdegraionorhaseach[8/oofexpectedlife12months~rcpt64~8uq~tksVCnC'n~3~C~es+y()QbfeOgWan~p.dure.V~+s+~aoD4esttraa~'a~~~~kact-eackc.dCATE)O'LsraIIwlMIg~~Carers3.8-27 'kodesK'~4DCSources-'3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS1B.ib'.8.5DCSources-g~o~W>o~<~~4~seeLCO3.8.5DCelectricalpowercG)~~shallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsstem@requiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-HtsdES5'4~>4'PPLICABILITY:MODES5and6g.~qs.-ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMER8.'tt8.>"A.OneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowerinoperable.~m()A.l.lDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ORA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDendmovementofirrasaassemblieImmediatelyImmediatelyeyDInitiateactiontondoperationswithatidrainintorvesImme'continued)3.8-28V. DCSources-l4DOE,5ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)A.2~Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.2InitiateactiontorestorerequiredDCelectricalpowers~cL~NtoOPERABLEstatus.ImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS-SURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.5.1performed:SR.8.4.7,anNOTE-Theo'Rsarenoobe,SR3dForDCsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLE,thefollowingSRsareapplicable:InaccordancewithapplicableSRs.4SR3.8.4.2S...3SR.4.5SR3.8.4.6.4.7.4.8.3.8-29e BatteryCellParameters3.8.63.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.6BatteryCellParametersLCO3.8.6BatterycellparametersforTrainAandTrainBbatteriesshallbwithin1imitsdid~lPOSI>2,$~d4,APPLICABILITY:WhenassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.can3.1'.5',"OC.S>urceS-&aOK55'~~d4ACTIONS-NOTESeparateConditionentryisallowedforeachbattery.CONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorebatterieswithoneor'morebatterycellparametersnotwithinlimits.ANDA.lVerifypilotcell@sfelectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagemeetTable3.8.6-1~CategoryCQlleeaa<'5IhourA.2ANDA.3Verifybatterycell'arametersmeetTable.8.6-1aegoryCaaeattSRestorebatterycellparameterstoCategoryAandBlimitsofTable3.8.6-1.~s24hoursOnceper>~~<31days(continued)3.8-30 BatteryCellParameters3.8.6ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAnotmet.OROneormorebatterieswithaverageelectrolytetemperatureoftherepresentativecellsB.lDeclareassociatedbatteryinoperable.ImmediatelyOneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersnotwithinCategoryCvalues.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEVerifybatterycellparametersmeetTable3.8.6-1CategoryAlimits.6FREQUENCYD~plFdays(continued)3.8-31

BatteryCellParameters3.8.6SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.6.2VerifybatterycellparametersmeetTable3.8.6-1Category8limits.Q&92daysANDRd5Oncewithi@KB%>afterabatterydischargeANDfdeOncewithinafterabatteryovercharge>Q150+VSR3.8.6.3'erifyaverageelectrolyteterneratureofr'epresentativecellsisz'F.92days3.8-32ev.0 Qou%.MQ,7a,'4leBases99.~~iBatteryCellParameters3.8.6~~ghTable3.8.6-1(page'1of1)BatteryCellParametersRequirementsPARAMETERCATEGORYA:LIMITSFOREACHDESIGNATEDPILOTCELLCATEGORYB:LIMITSFOREACHCONNECTEDCELLCATEGORYC:ALLOWABLEVALUEFOREACHCONNECTEDCELL(dhJElectrolyteLevel>Minimumlevelindicationmark,and<',inchabovemaximumlevefindicationmarklaJ>Minimumlevelindicationmark,and<',inchabovemaximumleveIindicationmark<a)Abovetopof,plates,andnotoverflowingFloatVoltageZ2.13V22.13V>2.07VSpecificgravity4>Q..~l.lQ'Jfor~qbi.tg4'~i~IarANDAverageofallconneccellsQ.\Qt~gAon(>>~>~~@DeNotmorethan0.020belowaverageofallconnectedcellsANDAverageofall.connectedcellsi.ISOfar~8ArdIII'.~'A.ai'i:(a)Itisacceptablefortheelectrolyteleveltotemporarilyincreaseabovethespecifiedmaximumlevelduringequalizingchargesprovideditisnotoverflowing.4(b)Correctedforelectrolytetemperatureandlevel.Levelcorrectionisnotrequired,however,whenbatterychargingis<~~ampswhenonfloatcharge.chargingcurrentis<[2]amscharge.:Thisisacceptableondaysfollowingabatteryreev.00 \OO~i3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS3.8.7fob'iLCO3.8.7la@.;cAc.Inc~~rJug~~-hh~~Es','L<3,r~4~TheOPERABLE.II~ACIllJtfQrt+BUDptfQPC450lLSLC5sha11beOloo~iloo.'Linvex'M9forT.A~YcAIa.,assoc>aaare]energizefrom'sslE]constantvoltaesourcorme;antedACv>tNOTE----------[Onewos]maybe'edfrom[its/their]associatedDCourstoperformanequ'hargeon[its/tessociated[common]btery,provided:C~IE'ccn~+ottawa,~fey~t'.C.VT)~(~W~5u.~6.b.s.ried.APPLICABILITY:MODESl,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneinverterinoperable.loo.lOooo~'tiA.lOC+colchmlB'TANDA4~chew~PowerACbusfromits+ClasslERestoreinvertertoOPERABLEstatus.2hourshours%waraC<n~~+~PeniMclos@iE(continued)3.8-34Re~ J 3.8.7lOh.iiACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME404livRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.~q~~ccrc5or.1BeinMODE3.AND.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursSURVEILLANCE,REQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.7.1RRVerifycorrect~~g~,c~~+l~~~~s7dayspqg,z.A.r~carriedC~lBCENTN'p-~b'lnge~~Sou,C.h.zs~+<'<WM)ceM~+G,us.dinaOc.raCI~p~~lnah~/Alani35C.laswleCvV.RmNccClc.ii4gCAT~AC,XiiSMuoien+Ba~64OPQRAQM$4&a.TmotNore.I'equi'nQY'~Jouv'c~Lnoperagc.,gn~ruOg.o,~.3.8-35 .83.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHS3.8.8I@Ig,LCO3.8.8Ioi.i'nWlns~WSueS~~-<~o<<<~~~lM~s~CIAO~shallbeOPERABLEtosupporttheonsiteClas'slEAC~bbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystequiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-~os~gnM4APPLICABILITY:HODES5and6lol.'nACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHElot.siA.Oneormore+required~>inoperable.inSbunedM'~<s)A.lDeclareaffectedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.ORA.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyImmediatelylol-ivA.usendmovementofirrauelassemblies.Immef0',Iii2.3Initiateactionsuspendoperonsaentialfordr'hereactoressel.AND(continued)3.8-36 .8ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)~~III,'.2.Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.2.Initiateactiontorestorerequired~~toOPERABLEstatus.lllC.3nylon~be>f'~Sou.ru.tabImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCY(jj~,)SR3.8.8.1i&I.ogVerifycorrecC~&OCtICSlO~LAIC~+f'ggal+hCin@&~b~atfs)7days\/37~~IL.V'TOIQIWlvhdAC,tn~~3.8-37892

i+Z.SNOOE,S~,~a~,~+DistributionSystems-.93.8ELECTRICALPOMERSYSTEHSoOESla23.8.9DistributionSystems-g~~~~laX.~IIMi~LCO3.8.9TrainAandTrainBelectricalowerdistributionsusystemsshallbeOPERABLER~</~Ra'>~eeS~~+'hang~cee~JC.~%~P~aAPPLICABILITY:HODES1,2,3,and4.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(VIREOACTIONCOHPLETIONTIHEA.OneACelectricalpowerdistribution~eenbepReapinoperable.(eA.lI4$.)VRestoreACelectricalpowerdistribution~~~~g~w~toOPERABLEstatus.8hoursND16rromdisco~voffairetoetLCOIoz.aa4+,arearei~eB.OneC~g)businoperable.SIC+raUPrunergeS+e'r~+y~+r~~Tequa~~L+B.lRestoreAC+busudag28390toOPERABLEtatus.~Q.Ye(M~eadrWr>~~Iol..H2hours16hofromdiscovrFfailetomLC.OneOCelectricalpowerdistribution~yR~inoperable.aC.1RestoreDCelectricalpowerdistribution~~295toOPERABLE(+~~2hours16hfromdiscoffa'retoetLCO(continued)3.8-38ev. H.ab&5),Q,3amLQDistributionSystems-g~~Q3.8.9ACTIONScontinuedCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMED.RequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet.~SIi@2.)i6~C-D.1BeinMODE3.ANDD.2BeinMODE5.6hours36hoursorcn~~+n~~E.lM~v~3.0.3.~as~~n,SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRE(UENCYSR3.8.9.1Verifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetogrequired~C,DC,andAC~buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.7days3.8-39

lo3-'i3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSDistributionSystemshL~oZSPc~6.10Woo~sS-J.63.8.10DistributionSystems1oE.;LCO3.8.10ThenecessaryportionofAC,DC,andAC@wl)buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsshallbeOPERABLEtosupportequipmentrequiredtobeOPERABL'E.APPLICABILITY:MODES5and6+~Ob.asiACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIME<in'.OneormorerequiredAC,DC,orAC~~buselectricalpower'istributioninoperable.A.lORDeclareassociatedsupportedrequiredfeature(s)inoperable.Immediately.o5~II~A.2.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.AND2.2SuspendmovementofdiatedfuelassemImmediatelyImmediatlb':iaA.DInitiateactiontoendoperationswithaent'rdraininctorveI'ly(continued)3.8-40 ~Gas5~4DistributionSystems-.10ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.(continued)Ic5.;03,'iA.~Initiateactiontosuspendoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditions.ANDA.InitiateactionstorestorerequiredAC,DC,andAC~&>bus~~~eecricapowerdistributionto~sOPERABLEstatus.ANDA.~38'eclareassociatedrequiredresidualheatremovall~Cs>inoperaeandnot~noperation.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.8.10.1VerifycorrectbreakeralignmentsandvoltagetorequiredAC,DC,andACg~buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems.l~vaL437days3.8-41 ACSources%tab%l,Z.,'5,m~48..1B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS83.8.1ACSources-~wrbvDBnnoossi,z.,s,~4BASESBACKGROUNDheunitClast1&BVl:lectr~icaowerDistributionSystemC'isourcesconsistoftheoffsitepowersources(preferredpowersources,normalandalternate(s)),andtheonsitstandby'powersources(TrainAandTrainBdieselgerators(DG's.)).Asrequiredby10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC7(Ref:.1),thedesignoftheACelectricalpowerstemprovidesindependenceandredundancytoensuregnavailablesourceo';powertotheEngineeredSafetyFeatre(ESF)systems.vTheonsiteCl'ass1EACDistributionSysmisdividedintoredundantload'groups(trains)sothatythelossofanyonegroupdoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionsfrombeingperformed.EachtrainhascnectionstotwopreferredoffsitepowersourcesndasingleDG.Offsitepowerissuppliedtoeunitswitchyard(s)fromthe1transmissionnetworkby'[~twtransmissionlines.Fromthe'witchyard(s),twoelectriallyandphysicallyseparatedcircuitsprovideACpowersthrough[stepdownstationauxiliarytransformers]y'ot$e4.16kVESFbuses.AdetaileddescriptionoftheoffsitepowernetworkandthecircuitstotheClasp1EESFbusesisfoundintheFSAR,Chapter[8](Ref.Anoffsitecircytconsistsofallbreakers,transformers,switches,inteyruptingdevices,cabling,andcontrolsrequiredtotyansmitpowerfromtheoffyitetransmissionnetworktotheonsiteClasslEESFbus(e/Certainryquiredunitloadsarereturnedtoserviceinapredeterminedsequenceinordertopreventoerloadingthetransformersupplyingoffsitepowertotheon'teClasslEDistriPutionSystem.Within[1]minuteaftertheinitiatingsignalisreceivedallau,ternati'candpermanentl'yconnectedloadsneededtorecovertheunitormaintainitiasafeconditionarereturnedtoserviceviatheloadsequneer.Tonsitestandbypowersourceforeach4.16kVESFsisadedicatedDG.DGs[ll]and[12]arededicatedtoESFbuses[ll]and[12],respectively.ADGstartsyJ(continued)~TS-Qtvidi~@Jnnt~(H-wB3.8-1=Reu;.=-,D.-,ubyyg8792' ~90.'i~~~~~Insert3.8.1.1Asourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifyth'eminimumsourcesofAC,powerwhicharerequiredtosupplythe480VsafeguardsbusesandassociateddistributionsubsystemduringNODES1,2,3,and4.TheplantACsourcesconsistofanindependentoffsitepowersourceandtheonsite'standbyemergencypowersource(Ref.1).AtomicIndustrialForum(AIF)GDC39(Ref.2)requiresemergencypowersourcesbeprovidedanddesignedwithadequateindependence,redundancy,capacity,andtestabilitytopermitthefunctioningoftheEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andprotectionsystems.TheoffsiteandonsiteACsourcescaneachsupplypowerto480Vsafeguardsbusesto.ensurethatreliablepowerisavailableduringanynormaloremergencymodeofplantoperation.The480Vsafeguardsbusesaredividedintoredundanttrains'othatthelossofanyonetraindoesnotpreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionsfrombeingperformed.SafeguardsBuses14and18areassociatedwithTrainAandsafeguardsBuses16and17areassociatedwithTrainB.Since'onlytheonsitestandbypowersourceisclassifiedasClasslE,theoffsitepowersourceisnotrequiredtobeseparatedintoredundanttrains.Theindependentoffsitepowersourceconsistsofbreakers,transformers,switches,interruptingdevices,cabling,andcontrolsrequiredtotransmitpowerfromtheoffsitetransmissionnetworktotheonsite480Vsafeguardsbuses.Theindependentoffsitepowersourceessentiallybeginsfromtwostationauxiliarytransformers(SAT12Aand12B)eachsuppliedfromanindependenttransmissionline-emanatingfromseparateswitchyards(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).SAT12Aisconnectedtothe34.5kVtransmissionsystem-(circuit751)andSAT12Bisconnectedtotheplant115kVswitchyard(circuit767).TheSATsmaybeconfiguredinthefollowingmodes:a.SAT12A(orSAT12B)suppliessafeguardsBuses16and17andSAT12B(orSAT12A)suppliessafeguardsBuses14and18(50/50mode);b.SAT12AsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(0/100mode);orc.SAT12BsuppliesallsafeguardsBuses(100/0mode).Thepreferredconfigurationisthe50/50mode;however,allthreemodesofoperationmeetapplicabledesignrequirementsfornormaloperation(Ref.1).Offsitepowercanalsobeprovidedduringanemergencythroughtheplantauxiliarytransformer11bybackfeedingfromthe115kVtransmissionsystemandmaintransformer. SATs12Aand12Bareeachconnectedtotwonon-ClasslE,4.16kVbuses(12Aand12B).The4.16kVBus12AfeedstheClassIEloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses14and18and4.16kVBus12BfeedstheClass1Eloadsonthe480VsafeguardsBuses16and17(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).Lossofpowertoanyofthesafeguardsbuses,asaresultofinoperableoffsitecircuitcomponent(s),isalossofoffsitepower.Theoffsitepowersourceendsafterthefeederbreakersupplyingeach480Vsafeguardsbus.Theonsitestandbypowersourcesconsistoftwo1950kWcontinuousratingemergencydieselgenerators(DGs)connectedtothesafeguards,busestosupplyemergencypowerintheeventoflossofallotherACpower.TheDGsarelocatedinseparateroomsinaSeismicCategoryIstructurelocatedadjacenttothenortheastwalloftheTurbineBuilding.EachDGroomhasitsownventilationsystem.TheventilationsystemisdesignedtomaintaintheDGroombetween60Fand104Fandtoremoveanyhydrocarbongasesintheroom(Ref.3).-=Eachventilationsystemconsistsoftwofansandassociatedductworkanddampersthatfailopenonlossofinstrumentairandcontrolpower.OnefanisdesignedtostartonDGactuationwithasecondfandesignedtostartwhentheroomtemperaturereaches90F.Thesecondfan'sdischargeairflowisdirectedtotheDGcontrolpanelandhasadelayedstarttopreventpotentiallyfreezingthecoolingwaterjacketpipingduringcoldweatherconditions.TheDGsutilizeanairmotorforstarting.TheairmotorissuppliedbytworeceiverswhichprovidesufficientairforfiveDGstartsbeforerequiringarechargeofthereceivers.TheDGsaresuppliedbyseparatefueloildaytankswhichcanbecross-tiedifrequired.Additionalfueloilcanbetransferredfromredundantundergroundfueloilstoragetanks.Adedicatedfueloiltransferpumpisusedforthistransfer.Redundancyofpumpsandpiping'precludesthefailureofonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valve,ortank,toresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG,DGAisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses14and18andDGBisdedicatedtosafeguardsBuses16and17.ADGstartsautomaticallyonasafetyinjection(SI)signaloronanundervoltagesignalonitscorresponding480Vbuses(refertoLCO3.3.5,"LossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentation").IntheeventofonlyanSIsignal,theDGsautomaticallystartandoperateinthestandbymodewithouttyingtothesafeguardsbuses.Intheeventoflossofoffsitepower,orabnormaloffsitepowerwhereoffsite.poweristrippedasaconsequenceofbusundervoltageordegradedvoltage,theDGsautomaticallystartandtietotheirrespectivebuses.Allbusloadsexceptforthecontainmentspray(CS)pump,componentcoolingwater(CCW)pumpandsafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcentersaretrippeduponactuationoftheundervoltagerelays.ThisisindependentoforcoincidentwithanSIsignal.OncetheundervoltagerelayresetsindependentofaSIsignal,theoperatormaymanuallyconnectloadsontothebus(es).DuringacoincidentSIsignal,theCCWpumpisalsotrippedandloadsaresequentiallyconnectedtotheirrespectivebusesbytheautomaticloadsequencer. Intheeventoflossofoffsitepowertoonlyonesafeguardsbusinatrain,theDGwillautomaticallystartandtieonlytotheaffectedbus.DuringacoincidentSIsignal,thenormalfeedbreakeronthesecondbusontheaffectedtrainwillbetrippedbytheundervoltagerelayonthefailedbuscausingtheDGtoautomaticallytietobothbuses.Thisconditionwillthenactuatetheautomaticloadsequencer.IntheeventofalossofoffsitepowerandacoincidentSIsignal,theelectricalloadsareautomaticallyconnectedtotheDGsinsufficienttimetoprovideforsafereactorshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDesignBasisAccident(DBA).Certainrequire'dplantloadsarereturnedtoserviceinapredeterminedsequencebytheautomaticloadsequencerinorderto.preventoverloadingtheDGduringthestartprocess.MithinapproximatelyIminuteaftertheinitiatingsignalisreceived,allloadsneededtorecovertheplantormaintainitinasafeconditionarereturnedtoservice. Mao~$,g,g,~v(ACSources-.IBASESBACKGROUND(continued)Q.i'a.Lautomaticallyonasafetyinjection(SI)signal(i.e.,lopressurizerpressureorhighcontainmentpressuresignaloronan[KSFbusdegradedvoltageorundervoltagesig1](refertoLQ3.3.5,"LossofPower(LOP)DieselGeneator(DG)StartInrumentation").AftertheDGhasstaed,itwillautomaticaytietoitsrespectivebusafteroffsitepoweristrippedaconsequenceofESFbusundvoltage"ordegradedvoltage,sependentoforcoincidentithanSIsignal.TheDGswilalsostartandoperatenthestandbymodewithouttyingtoteESFbusonanSIgnalalone.Followingthetripofofitepower,[asuencer/anundervoltagesignal]stripnonpermanentoadsfromtheESFbus.WhentheDGistiedtoheESFb,loadsarethensequentiallyconnectedtoitsspect'ESFbusbytheautomaticloadsequencer.ThesqucinglogiccontrolsthepermissiveandstartingsignalstootorbreakerstopreventoverloadingtheDGbyautomaticaapplication.Intheeventofalossofprerredpow,theESFelectricalloadsareautomacallyconneedtotheDGsinsufficienttimetoprovideorsafereactoshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofaDesignBasisccident(DBA)suchasalossofcoolaaccident(LOCA).Certainrequiredun'oadsarereturnedtoser'ceinapredeterminedsequceinordertopreventoverldingtheDGintheprocessWithin[I]minuteafterthein'tiatingsignalisreceid,allloadsneededtorecoverthunitormaintainitina.safeconditionarereturnedtoserice.RatingsforrainAandTrainBDGssatisfytherequiementsofRegulatryGuide1.9(Ref.3).Thecontinuousser'ceratingofeachDGis[7000]kWwith[10]%overloadpermissileforupto2hoursinany24hourperiod.TheESFloadsthatarepoweredfromthe4.16kVESFbusesarelistedinReference2.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES~IA.IL.LTheinitialconditionfDBtransientanalses+MRNA(Re"4)assumeESFsystems"areOPERABLE.TheACelectricalpow'ersourcesaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenot(continued)AS~Snn~N~~~~aB3.8-209289 ACSourcesBASESsAPPLICABLEexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheSAFETYANALYSESBasesforSection3.2,PowerDistributionLimits;(continued)Section3.4,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);andSection3.6,ContainmentSystems.R<l.txagt.Li'.L+~bgpowera4b.Aworstcasesinglefailure.TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3ofNRCPolicyStatement.TheOPERABILITYoftheACelectricalpowersourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsofthelEccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesignbasisoftheThisresultsinmaintainingatleastonetrainoftheonsitoroffsiteACsourcesOPERABLE~c.~SasatuhLaAnassumedlossofalloffsitepowerorallonsite@Cpower;andLCO(On8@$0'~5;~1ooeequalified~circuit&eteeneoffsitetransmissionnetworkandtheonsiteand'eparateandindependentDGsforeachtrainensureavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteran+A00+orapostulatedDBA.'fiedoffsitecircuitsarethoseth~ata~sc~ssu!11ItheFSAano~feei~sVngbasisfortheunit.Iion,onerequiredautomaimustbeOPERABLE.euencerpertrainWei:Kggs~et~~9.ii.aP~er~~Q~pmwtJWretch-i8'lor~i~df44<+rX~ssh~agerSo~onC,~sa~offsitecircuit~gPcapableofmaintainingratedpid1id,teald<<tOffsetecsrcuicons>sormerBuliedfromSwitchyardBusB'oughbreaker52-3po'SFmer.XNB01,which,inturn,powerstheus'ormalfeederbre.sitecircuit82consistsofartupransformer,whichisnormallyfedfromtheSwitc(continued)DÃAPf-"'~~,~HU4'.xa.f/A~IB3.8-3ev.0O~P2-C

Insert3.8.1.2IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofoffsiteoronsitestandbyACpowerisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofonsitestandbypower).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepower'rovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtoloseall'ffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneACpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercan'eobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.I).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.6)canbemetatalltimes.'GLoad,TheDGsaredesignedtooperatefollowingaDBAoranticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)untiloffsitepowercanberestored.AnAOOisdefinedasaCondition2eventinReference7(i.e.,eventswhichcanbeexpectedtooccurduringacalendaryearwithmoderatefrequency).TheDGsarerequiredtostartwithin10secondsandbeginloading.TheDGscanbeginreceivingupto30%ofdesignloadsafterthe10secondstarttimeandcanaccept100%ofdesignloadswithin30seconds.TheDGsaremanuallyloadedifonlyanundervoltagesignalispresentandloadsequencedifacoincidentundervoltageandSIsignalispresent.Theloadsaresequencedasfollows(assumeSIsignalat0seconds)DGADGBTimeTime480VsafeguardsbusesandCSpumpsSIpumpAandBSIpumpCResidualheatremovalpumpSelectedservicewaterpumpFirstcontainmentrecirculationfancoolerSecondcontainmentrecirculationfancoolerHotordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpump10152025303540451015222732 374247SincetheDGsmuststartandbeginloadingwithin10seconds,onlyoneairstartmustbeavailableintheairreceiversasassumedintheaccidentanalyses.ThelongtermoperationoftheDGs(untiloffsitepoweris

ACSourcesNto~m'l,t,5,~~B..IBASES~f9.i>>.4LCO(continued)andisfedthrouhtheESFormer,which,snuughitsnormalfeederbreaker.gII2ESFbus~9$,<xx'.~9>>i.v'AS~~p,'(.>~e~rs,sFtao-5i~0'-~vtj~l~~~~t(>nhCp~~*~~l~dts.'oD(adx~g~~~ICIG.IC~DIAsgWasttlat.ICO/0Fr'Pd(u.acGmusecapaeofstarting,acceleratingtoratespdandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespectiveEusondectionofbusundervoltage.Thiswillbeamplishedwithinseconds.EachDGmustalsobecaeofacceptingreiredloadswithintheassumoadingsequenceintervals,andtinuetooperateunoffsitepowercanberestoredtothebuses.Thcapabilitiesarerequiredtobemetfromvar'finitialconditionssuchasDGinstandbywiththeinehot,DGinstandbywiththeengineatambientcon'ons,DGoperatinginparalleltestmode.Propersequencingofloads,t'includingtringofnonesrfCialloads,]isarequiredfunctionoGOPBILITY.TheACsoesinonetrainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,.separationandindependence~~as~txa.completeeosiesources,separationandindependencetotheeractical.AcircuitmaybeconnomorethanoneESFbus,'asttransferstytotheothercircuitOPERABLE,and'separationcriteria.Acircuit~t4oconnectedtoanbusisrequiredtoavPERABLEfasttransferinterlockmec'toatleastbust0ofAPPLICABILITYTheACsourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,,anoensurethat:a.Acceptablefuelde'signlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andb.AdequatecorecoolingisprovidedandcontainmentOPERABILITYand.othervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.(continued)B3.8-4 Insert3.8.1.3ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a~b.c~d.e.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,CCWpump,andCSpumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal);TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervalsfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfor>Ihourat110%designloads;ThefueloiltransferpumpfromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andAventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE. Wages%,~,i,~~9ACSources-9~~~B3.8.1BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)TheACpowerrequirementsforNODES5and6arecoveredinLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-onts%~4ACTIONSA.1Toensureahighlyreliablepowersourceremainswithnefsitecircuitinoperable,itisnecessarytoverifthe0BILITYoftheremainingrequiredoffsitecircQtonamorefrequentbasis.SincetheRequiredActiony61yspeci'es"perform,"afailureofSR3.8.1.1acceptancecriteri~doesnotresultinaRequiredActiorynotmet.However,ifasecondrequiredcircuitfailsrSR3.8.1.1,thesecondoffs'atecircuitisinoperable,andXonditionC,fortwooffsiteejrcuitsinoperable,isentered.A.2RequiredActionA.2,phichonly~ppliesifthetraincannotbepoweredfromanofitesoyce,isintendedtoprovideassurancethataneventcoinpidentwithasinglefailu}eof'heassociatedDGwillnesultinacompletelossofsafetyfunctionofcriticredundantrequiredfeatures.ThesefeaturesarepoweredfomtheredundantACelectricalpowertrain.Thisinc)%destordrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.Singletrainpystems,chasturbinedrivenauxiliaryfeedwaterzpumps,maytbeincluded.TheCompletionTieforRequiredAionA.2isintendedto./allowtheoperartimetoevaluatendrepairanydiscoveredinoerabilities.ThisCometionTimealsoallowsforaexceptiontothenormal'mezero"forbeginningtallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredAction,thCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythatboth:a.Ttrainhasnooffsitepowersupplying'tloads;andb.requiredfeatureontheothertrainisinorable.IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofConditionA(efsitecircuitinoperable)aredundantrequiredfeatueubsequentlybecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimebinstobetracked.,/(continued)B3.8-5~ev.~~428 Insert3.8.1.4A.landA.2Withnooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardbus(es),assurancemustbeprovidedthatacoincidentsinglefailurewillnotresultinacompletelossofrequiredsafetyfeatures.Iftheredundantsafetyfeaturetothecomponentortrainaffectedbythelossofoffsitepowerisalsounavailable,theassumptionthattwocompletesafetytrainsareOPERABLEmaynolongerexist.Asanexample,ifoffsitepowerwereunavailableto480VBus14,DGAcouldsupplythenecessarypowertothebus.Ifresidualheatremovalpump(RHR)B(suppliedpowerbyBus16)'ereinoperableatthesametime,oratanytimeafterthelossofoffsitepowertoBus14,alossofredundantrequiredsafetyfeaturesexistssinceafailureofDGAwouldresultinthelossofemergencycorecooling.Therefore,RHRpumpAonBus14wouldhavetobedeclaredinoperablewithin12hoursafterRHRpumpBandoffsitepowertoBus14weredeclaredunavailable.TheCompletionTimeof12hoursasprovidedbyRequiredActionA.1todeclaretherequiredsafetyfeaturesinoperableisbasedonthefactthatiti'essthantheCompletionTimeforrestoringOPERABILITYoftheoffsitepowercircuitandallsafetyfeaturesaffectedbythelossofthe480Vbus.AshorterCompletionTimeisprovidedsincetherequiredsafetyfeatureshavebeenpotentiallydegradedbythelossofoffsitepower(i.e.,usingthesameexampleasabove,the72hourCompletionTimeforrestoringRHRpumpBwasdevelopedassumingthatRHRpumpAhadbothoffsiteandonsitestandbyemergencypoweravailable).Therefore,apenaltyisassessedtoonlyallow12hoursinthisconfiguration.TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.1isintendedtoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanydiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimeisanexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredActiontheCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythat:a.Thereisnooffsitepoweravailabletooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus;andb.Aredundantrequiredfeatureisinoperableonasecond480Vsafeguardsbus.IfatanytimeduringtheexistenceofConditionA,aredundantrequiredfeaturebecomesinoperable,thisCompletionTimebeginstobetracked.RequiredActionA.lcanbeexitediftheinoperableDGortherequiredfeatureontheOPERABLEDGisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus.ThelevelofdegradationduringConditionAmeansthattheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident;however,theonsitestandbyACsourceshavenotbeendegraded.Thislevelofdegradationgenerallycorrespondstoeither:a.LossofoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand/orSAT12B; b.FailureofSAT12Aor12Bor4.16kVBus12Aor12B;orc.Failureofastationservicetransformersupplyinga480Vsafeguardsbus.WithatotallossoftheoffsitepowersourcestoSAT12Aand12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforeithertrain.WithlossofoffsitepowertoSAT12Aor12B,failureofSAT12Aor12B,orfail<reofBus12Aor12B,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheeffectsofanaccidentforasingleACelectricaltrain.Withafailureofastationservicetransformer,theoffsiteelectricalpowersystemdoesnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownandtomitigatetheconsequencesofanaccidentforone480VsafeguardsbusinoneACelectricaltrain.Inallcases,sufficientonsiteACsourcesareavailabletomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdownconditionintheeventofaDBAortransient.Infact,asimultaneouslossofoffsiteACsources,aLOCA,andaworstcasesinglefailurewerepostulatedasapartofthedesignbasisinthesafetyanalysis.Thus,the72hourCompletionTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetoeffect'restorationoftheoffsitecircuitcommensuratewiththeimportanceofmaintaininganACelectricalpowersystemcapableofmeetingitsdesigncriteria.

ACSources-~+084BASESACTIONSA.2(continued)iscoveringnooffsitepowertoonetrain,ofthesiteCsslEElectricalPowerDistributionSystemco'ncident,witoneormoreinoperablerequiredsupportosupportedfeatus,orboth,thatareassociatedwitheothertrainthathaoffsitepower,resultsinstartingheCompletionTimesfortheRequiredAction.Twenty-fohoursisacceptableecauseitminimizesriskwhiallowingtimeforrestorationforesubjectingtheunitotransientsassociatedwitshutdown.TheremainingOPBLEoffsiteciruitandDGsareadequatetosupplyelectricapowertoTrnAandTrainBoftheonsiteClasslEDistibutionSyem.The24hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccouthecoponentOPERABILITYoftheredundantcounterpartthenoperablerequiredfeature.Additionally,the24hoCpletionTimetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilioftheremainingACsources,areasonabl'etimeforrepa,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringth'iod.A.3AccordingtoRegutoryGuidel.(Ref.6),operationmaycontinueinCondionAforaperidthatshouldnotexceed72hours.Withoneoffsitecircuitinoperable,thereliabilityoftheoffsitesystemisdegraded,andthepotentialforalossofoffsitepowerisincreased,withattendantpoentialforachallengetotheunitsafetysystems.IthisCondition,however,tremainingOPERABLEoffsitecicuitandDGsareadequatetopplyelectricalpowertoeonsiteClasslEDistributionstem.The72urCompletionTimetakesintoaccoutthecapacityandcapbilityoftheremainingACsources,aeasonabletimefrrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaBAoccurringdurinthisperiod.TheecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.3estalishesalimitonthemaximumtimeallowedfornycorninationofrequiredACpowersourcestobeinopebledurnganysinglecontiguousoccurrenceoffailingtoeet-thLCO.IfConditionAisenteredwhile,forinstance,aDGisinoperableandthatDGissubsequentlyreturned(continued)B3.8-6 eBASES~wasL,z,s,-4"lACSources-B.8.1ACTIONS(continued)RABLE,theLCOmayalreadyhavebeennotmetforpto72hs.Thiscouldleadtoatotalof144hoursinceinitialluretomeettheLCO,torestoretheffsitecircuit.Atistime,aDGcouldagainbecoinoperable,thecircuitrestodOPERABLE,andanaddit'al72hours(foratotalof9daallowedpriortompleterestorationoftheLCO.e6dayCometionTimeprovidesalimitonthetimeallowe'spefiedconditionafterdiscoveryoffailuretomeett.ThislimitisconsideredreasonableforsituinwhichConditionsAandBareenteredconcurrent.The"AND"connectorbetweenthe72hourand6dayComptionTimescansthatbothCompletionTimesapplys'ltaneously,athemorerestrictiveCompletioimemustbemet.AsinRequiredAconA.2,theCompletionTimellowsforanexceptiontothnormal"timezero"forbeginnintheallowedoutagtime"clock."Thiswillresultinestablishinhe"timezero"atthetimethattheLCOinitiallyotmet,insteadofatthetimeConditionAwasentered.B.1U'm~eMg9.na~~~@,~~CA~34%0vs~~kS(ie.,<oncLiti~5nally>inoperable~itisnecessarytheoffsitecircuitnamoreRequirecsononyspecifiesSR3.8.1.1acceptancecriteriaActionbeinnotmeHowever.1.1,sssinoerableentered.toverifytheavaiasityoffrequentbasis.Sincethe"perform,"afailureofdoesnotresultinaRequiredifacircuitfailstopassB.2QhiLNAAc.salliedpeurpeSea+~W>nbapa~an't@~Qrur~RequiredActionB.2isintendedtoprovideassurancethatalossofoffsitepower,during'theperiodthataDGisinoerabledoesnotresultinacompletelossofsafetyThesefesrs'sreunantsaetyreaedtrain.oŽ%<'~~rS~tui6in~~LLi~~Maoocuvd~cKa.rt.~~~~(continued)Qb6-u4L~~Tf.Q.b~NhL4lhcPAtLLI'3.8-7 4eEblc<<>,~8ACSources-.8.1BASESACTIONSB.2(continued)99.k.obinedrivenauxiliaryfeedw,arenotIincluded.Reunanefailuresconsistof'>inoperabresassociatedwithatrain,ainthathasaninoperableDG.'th~TheCompletionTimeorRequiredActionB.2isintendedoallowtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairanyisdiscoveredinoperabilities.ThisCompletionTimedgew.~+anexceptiontothenormal"timezero"forbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."InthisRequiredAction,theCompletionTimeonlybeginsondiscoverythatboth:}W.lx.a,)n4hlS(Miami~,Vha,ru~ini.OR'K&~c6~C>r~t'oafQv~u,~ple&mT,~Ol~~~~r~M~ape~iolooaad~~~~l+'m~~~~qALWmWi~~c~<<'Q~&@UN9,~06~+~lSo.~~oo,,G.e1,~Mr~m~>~o.~~~~~~~~rk)4h~~~M('cn.~Arequiredfeatureontheothertrain(TrainAordTrainBisinoerable.Ifatanyimeuringteexistenceothisonition(oeDGinoerablCompletionTimewouldbeintobetracked.DiscoveringonerequiredDGinoperablecoincidentwithoneormoreinoerablereuiredsuortorsupportedfeatures,oro,tatare'heOPERABLEDG,resultsg,.>instartingtheComletionimefortheRequiredAction.ourromeiscoveryoeseexisconcurren'cceptab'mizesriskwhileallowiA'onbeforesubjectingtheunittosientsassociatedwithshuoniion,theremainingOPERABLE0andoffsicircuitsaretetosupplyelectricalpoweheonsiteClass1EDistronSystem.,onacomponentbasis,singlefailureprote'rtherequiredfeature'sfunctionmayhavebost;howevunctionhasnotbeenost.The4CompletionTimetakesiccounttheOPERAoftheredundantc'ounterarttothe'ableuiredfeature.Aitionaly,teourompimeaesinoountthecapacityandcapabilityoftheremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.hei~6.LcoM~tdg~uu>~SLY-L6At-~VPPEPA.QLSC6'u~~~iODPga~mc~.(continued)94~I)L~4a.AninoperableDGexists;andPEQAPLRŽb.'5@el+B3.8-8

ACSources-kLopml,~z,~gB..1BASESACTIONS(continued)B.3.1andB.3.2eo'ditionBrequiresthatRequiredAetioorB.3.2mustbeletedifConditi'red.Theintentisthatall0ilesmustbeinvestigatedforcommoailuresregailitypersistsowlongtheDGl9.t~.a~HI%InQhiyeur5RequiredActionB.3.1providesanallowancetoavoidunnecessartestingofOPERABLEDG.Ifitcanbeetermined'hatthecauseoftheinoperablDGdoesnotexistontheOPERABLEDG,SR3.8.1.2nottoeformeIfthecauseofinoperabilityexlsonoer0,theoS~DGwouldbedeclaredinoperableuponiscoeryanonlionwouldbeentere.I~ttCOOncethefailureisrepaired,tecommoncausefailurenolongerexists,andRequiredActionB.3.1issatisfied.Ifin~~thecauseoftheinitialinoperableDGcannotbeconfirmed"P~~~~nottoexistontheMDG.erformanceof~pQ~d-~SR3.8.1.2sufficestoprovideassuranceofcontinuedOPERABILITYofthatDG.c'oGenericLetter84-ef.7),+24~ouMis~reasonabletoconatheOPERABLEDisnotaffectedbythesameproblemastheinoperableD.C~,q)~~~QT~cW~%u~~rahLe~pt'o~~~,'~fthmClsystpbtia4sr6.g,lOr<~>.c,G~4VI4~W4l.II+~~p4lyam5atj~P~~IP.~~tfn~JJA~dnA.,ir..ngbXCpi-<Mc,tile4~stdC,~s+ireey~B4,operaionmayorionBforapericontinueOUrs~nCondition,theremainingOPERABLEDGandoffsitecircuits'-@readeuatetosulyelectricalowertotheonsiteTheComletionRV.ifi4pKta.a,imetakesintoaccountthecapacityandcapabilityofthe~vremainingACsources,areasonabletimeforrepairs,andthe~'louprobabilityofaDBAoccurringduringthisperiod.ecoestabisesemaximumtimeaforanycombinationofrequiredACestobeinoperableduringanysingluousoccurrenceilingtomeettheLConditionBisenteredwhile,fornce,a1tecllCultislnodthatcircuiti(continued)B3.8-9 jKoOSSf,'Z($ACSources-.IBASESACTIONS8.4(continued)suuentlyrestoredOPERABLE,theLCOmayalreadyhavbeennmetforupto72hours.Thiscouldleadtototalof144hosinceinitialfailuretomeettheLCOtorestoretheAtthistime,'noffsitecircuitouldagainbecomeinoable,theDGrestoredOPERAB,andanadditional72hoursoratotalof9days)alowedpriortocompleterestorationoheLCO..The6dayompletionTimeprovidesalimitontimeowedinaspfiedconditionafterdiscoveryoffailureteettheCO.ThislimitisconsideredreasonableforsituaoinwhichConditionsAandBareenteredconcurrently."AND"connectorbetweenthe72hourand6dayComplenTimmeansthatbothCompletionTimesapplysitaneously,dthemorerestrictiveCompletioimemustbemet.AsinRequiredtionB.2,theCompletionTimellowsforanexceptionthenormal"timezero"forbeginnintheallowedme"clock.",Thiswillresultinestablis'ngthe"timeero"atthetimethattheLCOwasinitiallynoet,ineadofatthetimeConditionBwasentered.CI8.8.).5RuiredActionC.l,whichapplieswhentwooffsitecircuisare'perable,isintendedtoprovideassurancethataevent'acoincidentsinglefailurewillnotresinacompleteofredundantrequiredsafetyfun'ons.TheCompletionTiforthisfailureofredundrequiredfeaturesisreducto12hoursfromtallowedforonetrainwithoutoffsitower(RequirActionA.2).Therationaleforthereduc'tohoursisthatRegulatoryGuide1.93(Ref.6)allowsompletionTimeof24hoursfortworequiredoffsiteciritsserable,basedupontheassumptionthattwompletesafetrainsareOPERABLE.Whenaconcurreredundantrequiredurefailureexists,thisassumptisnotthecase,andashorCompletionTimeofoursisappropriate.ThesefeaturarepoweredfromundantACsafetytrains.Thisincludesmordrivenaiaryfeedwaterpumps.Singletrainfeatures,suasturbinedrivenauxiliarypumps,arenotincludedinthelist.(continued)MG~S-H~ny~~~AC"i~B3.8-10V. Insert3.8.1.5Mithnooffsitepowertooneormore480Vsafeguardsbus(es)andoneDGinoperable,redundancyis.lostinboththeoffsiteandonsiteACelectricalpowersystems.Sincepowersystemredundancyisprovidedbythesetwodiversesourcesofpower,theACpowersourcesareonlydegradedandnolossofsafetyfunctionhasoccurredsinceatleastoneDGandpotentiallyoneoffsiteACpowersourceareavailable.However,theplantisvulnerabletoasinglefailurewhichcouldresultinthelossofmultiplesafetyfunctions.Therefore,aCompletionTimeof12hoursisprovidedtoeitherrestoretheoffsitepowercircuitortheDGtoOPERABLEstatus.ThisCompletionTimeislessthanthatforaninoperableoffsitepowersourceoraninoperableDGduetothesinglefailurevulnerabilityofthisconfiguration.

ACSourcesPhooey1,>,>,~QB..IBASESACTIONSC.lndC.2.(continued)TheCompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.lisintdedtoa<11owtheoperatortimetoevaluateandrepairandscoveredinoperabilities.,ThisCompletionTialsoalowsforanexceptiontothenormal"timezer"forbegnningtheallowedoutagetime"clock."IthisRequiredActintheCompletionTimeonlybeginsond'overythatboth:a.Allequiredoffsitecircuitsare'perable;andb.ArequedfeatureisinoperableIfatanytimeuringtheexistencofConditionC(twooffsitecircuitsinoperable)areiredfeaturebecomesinoperable,thismpletionTimeeginstobetracked.AccordingtoRegulatyGuide.93(Ref.6),operationmaycontinueinConditionforperiodthatshouldnotexceed24hours.Thislevelodeadationmeansthattheoffsiteelectricalpowersystemnothavethecapabilitytoeffectasafeshutdownantomitigatetheeffectsofanaccident;however,theoszeAC.sourceshavenotbeendegraded.Thislevelodegadationgenerallycorrespondstoatotallossoftheimmeditelyaccessibleoffsitepowersources.Becauseofthenormlyhighavasabilityoftheoffsitesources,thisleveofdegradatiomayappeartobemoreseverethanothercombinationsofoACsourcesinoperablethatinvolveoneormoreDGsinoperle.However,twofactorstendtodecreasetheseveritofthislevelofdegradation:a.TheconigurationoftheredundantCelectricalpowersystethatremainsavailableisnotusceptibletoasinglbusorswitchingfailure;andb.ThtimerequiredtodetectandrestoreunavailableofsitepowersourceisgenerallymuchlethanthatrquiredtodetectandrestoreanunavailabeonsiteCsource.WitbothoftherequiredoffsitecircuitsinoperablsuficientonsiteACsourcesareavailableto.maintainhe(continued)MQG-STS-Qpr,~tl~~~f~r848B3.8-1I ~gogo>,i,,hi~~ACSources~~BASESACTIONSC.1ndC.2(continued)'tinasafeshutdownconditionintheeventaDBAortraient.Infact,asimultaneouslossoffsiteACsource,aLOCA,andaworstcasesingleailurewerepostulatesapartofthedesignbainthesafetyanalysis.Tthe24hourComplonTimeprovidesaperiodoftimetffectrestoronofoneoftheoffsitecircuitscommensurawiththimportanceofmaintaininganACelectricalpowersysapableofmeetingitsdesigncriteria.AccordingtoRefnce6,withtheilableoffsiteACsources,twossthanrequiredbytheoperationmaycontinuef24hours.Iftwooffsitesourcarerestoredwithinhours,unrestrictedoperationmaycontiIfonlyeoffsitesourceisrestoredwithin24hours,porationcontinuesinaccordancewithConditionA.-n~*S,f.I,Qby',~n.WhC.egaroweeratrainise-energized.LCO3.8p~r~providestheappropriaterestrictionsforade-ener+~di~M~train.0RrcordingtoRegulatoryGuide1.93(Ref.6),operationy'con'nCondition0foraperiodthatshouldnoexceed12hours.D.land0.2cAlafaattdIACO3.0.6,thegistribution(SystemACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoWwereinoperabe,+resultininde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredAct>onao.Condition@taremodifiedbyaNote~eiHEti%5thattheReuiredActionsor3.8.9,ributionSystems-"mustbeimmediately>4t@~ii~enered.ThisaowsConditionoproviderequirementsorelossof4jjBoffsitecircuitaoneDGithout.9P~gizedInCondition0,individuredundancy~iostinboththeoffsiteelectricalpowersysteeonsiteACelectricalpowersystem.Sincepower~sndancyisprovidedbytwodiversesourcesof~ower,however,.hareliabilityofthepowersystems~hisConditionmayappeigherthanthatinConditionC(lossofbothrequiredoffsitircuits).Thisdifferenceinreliabilityisoffsetby(continued)B3.8-12 ~qg-Insert3.8.1.6IftheinoperableACelectricpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,theplantmustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within.6hoursandtoMODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems. Mooa,l,z,g,.m9ACSources-B..IBASESACTIONSu.;and0.2(continued)susceptibiifthispowersystemco'rationtoasinglebusorswitchinghourCompletionTimetakesintoaccountthecyandcapabistyoremainingACsour,reasonabletimeforrepairs,andthelowprobab'odE.l~~Mao@+a~epaa3AL,oL~q~y@p~ane~~r~~~~)~~~,ACithTrainAandTrain8DGsinoperable,therearoriningstandbyACsources.Thus,withasumedlossooffsilectricalpower,insufficientndbyACsourcesareavailatopowertheminimumuiredESFfunctions.Sincetheoff'electricalposystemistheonlysourceofACpowerfor'eveloegradation,theriskassociatedwithconteperationforaveryshorttimecouldbelessthanthociatedwithanimmediatecontrolledshutdowntheimmiateshutdowncouldcausegridinstability,whicouldresultatotallossofACpower).SincenyinadvertentgenatortripcouldalsoresultinatallossofoffsiteACwer,however,thetimeallowforcontinuedoperationisverelyrestricted.Theintehereistoavoidtheriskassoctedwithanimmediacontrolledshutdownandtominimizeheriskassocitedwiththislevelofdegradation.AcrdingtoReference6,withbothDGsinoperable,operationmaycontinueforaperiodthatshouldnotexc2hoursThescer(s)isanessentialsupportsmto[boththeoffsitecirc'dtheDGassociatedwagivenESFbus].[Furthermore,thescerisontprimarysuccesspathformostmajorACelectr>eredsafetysystemspoweredfromtheassociated.]Therefore,lossofan[ESFbussequencer]affseverymaSFsysteminthe[division].ThehourCompletionTimevidesaperiodoftimetoccttheproblemcommensuratewitimportanofmaintainingsequencerOPERABILITY.Thi'meper'lsoensuresthattheprobabilityofanaccident(continued)B3.8-13. ACSources-BASESACTIONSgQ.incF.l(continued)(requiringsequencerOPERABILITY)occurringduringperiodwhenthesequencerisinoperableisminimal.ThisConditionisprecededbyaNotethatallowstheConditiontobedeletediftheunitdesignissuchhatanyequencerfailuremodewillonlyaffecttheabilyoftheaociatedDGtopoweritsrespectivesafety1dsunderanycon'tions.ImplicitinthisNoteistheconeptthattheCondit'mustbe'etai'nedifanysequencerailuremoderesultstheinabilitytostartallorrtofthesafetyloadswhenequired,regardlessofpoweravailability,orresultsinovloadingtheoffsitepowcircuittoasafetybusduringanentandtherebycausitsfailure.Alsoimplicitinthete,isthattheCnditionisnotapplicabletoanytainthatdoesothaveasequencer.G.landG.2(QIftheinoperableACelectpowersourcescannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstasw'thintherequiredCompletionTime,theunitmustberoughtoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toaievethistatus,theunitmustbebroughttoatleastDE3withinhoursandtoNODE5within36hours.TeallowedComplionTimesarereasonable,basednoperatingexper>nce,toreachtherequiredunitcoditionsfromfullpowconditionsinanorderlymannerndwithoutchallengingpntsystems.ConditioHcorrespondstoalevelofdegradatioinwhichallreddancyintheACelectricalpowersupplieshasbeenlost.tthisseverelydegradedlevel,anyfurtherossesinthACelectricalpowersystemwillcausealossofuncion.Therefore,noadditionaltimeisjustifiedcoinuedoperation.TheunitisrequiredbyLCO3.0.3cenceacontrolledshutdown.B3.8-14IP.Ebmnogu~.v(continued) ACSourcesBBASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSfg.v>ilTheACsourcesaredesignedtopermitinspectionandtestingofallimportantareasandfatures,eseciallthosethathaveastandbfunctione~.ergoiccomponentssareeneyexensivefunctionaltestsduringrefuelinoutaest'conditions.remonstratingtheOPERABILITYofaccordancewicommegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.3),oryu>e.,9),andRegulator.137Ref10sedinereesdiscussedhereinspecifyvoltageanrequentolerances,thefollowingisapplicable.Theminimumsdysateoutputvoltageof[3740]Vis90%ofthenomin41Voutputvoltage.Thisvalue,whichisspe'edinANSIC1(Ref.11),allowsforvoltagedrootheterminals4000Vmotorswhoseminimucratingvoltageisspecified90%or3600V.Itallowsforvoltagedropstomotorsaotherequipdownthroughthe120Vlevelwhereminimumoratinoltageisalsousuallyspecifiedas90%ofnameaterating.Thespecifiedmaximumsteadystateputoltageof[4756]Visequaltothemaximumoperagvoltageecifiedfor4000Vmotors.Itensuresthaoralightlyloaddistributionsystem,thevoltagttheterminalsof400motorsisnomorethanthaximumratedoperatingvoltag.Thespecifiedminim@aandmaximumfrequenciesoftheDG58.8Hzand~~61.<Hz,respectively.Thesevaluesareequato+2%of60HznominalfrequencyandarederivedfromerecommendationsgiveninRegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.SR3.8.1.1inde~nsuresproercircuitcontinuityfortheoffsiteg)powetondavailabilitofoffsiteACelectricalpower.~breakeraignmenverifiesthateachbreakerisinsscorrectpositiontoensurethatdistributionbusesandloads~~~areconnectedtotheirpowersource,~r~Theayreencisadequatesincereaeros>tronssno'keltochangewithouttrato&necontrolroom.(continued)B3.8-15 ACSourcesB..1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.2andSR3.8.1.7TeseSRshelptoensuretheavailabilityofthestdbyectricalpowersupplytomitigateDBAsandtransintsandtoaintaintheunitinasafeshutdowncondition.Tomsimizethewearonmovingpartsthatdonogetlubrictedwhentheengineisnotrunning,theSRsare'modifiebyaNote(Note2forSR3.8.1.2)tindicatethatallDGsrtsfortheseSurveillancesmaybprecededbyanenginepreubeperiodandfollowedbyawamupperiodpriortoloading.ForthepurposofSR3.8.1.2andSR.8.1.7testing,theDGsarestartedromstandbyconditio.StandbyconditionsforaDGmeanthathedieselenginecoolantandoilarebeingcontinuouslyirculatedandtmperatureisbeingmaintainedconsistenwithmanufacurerrecommendations.Inordertoreducestrsandwrondieselengines,somemanufacturersrecommendmodiedstartinwhichthestartingspeedofDGsisimied,warmupislimitedtothislowerspeed,andtheDGsaegraduallyacceleratedtosynchronousspeedpriortooading.ThesestartproceduresaretheintentofNote3,hchisonlyapplicablewhensuchmodifiedstartprocedurearerecommendedbythemanufacturer.SR3.8.1.7requirestat,ata'4dayFrequency,theDGstartsfromstandbyonditionsanachievesrequiredvoltageandfrequencywithi10seconds.he10secondstartrequirementsupporstheassumptionofthedesignbasisLOCAanalysisinheFSAR,Chapterf](Ref.5).The10secondartrequirementisnotpplicabletoSR3.8.1.2(sNote3)whenamodifiedtartprocedureasdescribedabeisused.Ifamodifiedartisnotused,the10secodstartrequirementofSR3.8..7applies.SinceSR.8.1.7requiresa10secondstart,itismorerestrictvethanSR3.8.1.2,anditmaybepeormedinlieuofSR3.8.1.2.ThisistheintentofNote1oSR3.8.1.2.Thenprmal31dayFrequencyforSR3.8.1.2(seeTabid3.8.1-1,"DieselGeneratorTestSchedule,"intheaccompanyingLCO)isconsistentwithRegulatoryGuide1.9(continued)~~09/28/92 ~~'ID9Q,vuggInsert3.8.1.7AThisSRverifiesthateachDGstartsfromstandbyconditionsandachievesratedvoltageandfrequency.ThisensurestheavailabilityoftheDGtomitigateDBAsandtransientsandtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.TheDGvoltagecontrolmaybeeitherinmanualorautomaticduringthe'performanceofthisSR.TheFrequencyof31daysisadequatetoprovideassuranceofDGOPERABILITY,whileminimizingdegradationresultingfromtesting.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1indicatesthatperformanceofSR3.8.1.9satisfiesthisSRsinceSR3.8.1.9isacompletetestoftheDG.ThesecondNotestatesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodandfollowedbyawarmupperiodpriortoloading.Thisminimizesthewearonmovingpartsthatdonotgetlubricatedwhentheengineisnotrunning. ACSourcesNa08$I,2('3<M/BASESSURVEILLANCEREqUIREHENTS3.8.1.2andSR3.8.1.7(continued)(Ref.3).Thec3.8.1.7isareductionincoldtestingcse'enericLetter84-15(Ref.7eseFrequenciespadequateassuranceofDGBILITY,whileminimizingdegra'resultingftesting.((~~~~ck&1~levant/5W.i(s(o~~n&44d'aP(s(lg;~QS<<~~bms~~(A.in'bae~n~~>6t(~~~~~Sh~agee4~y~l~~CWl~~~(((C.).sdie((.'tPc.banH.v(~(SR3.8.1.3~g~This'erifiesthattheDGsarecapableofsynchronizingwiththeoffsiteelectricalsystemandacceptingloadsgreaterthanorequaltotheequivalentofthemaximumexpectedaccidentloads.AminimumruntimeofuiredtostabilizeenginetemperaturesqnthetimethattheDGisconnectedtotheoffsitesource.AlthoughnothipowerfactorrequirementsareestablishedbyDGisnormallyocratedataowerfactoraggingPandvaueisiethe1~anon[toensureatingcurrentsarTheloada'ovidedtoavoidroutineoftB.RoutineovingmayresultinteardowninspectionsinaccorwithvendWZWic3'~etweenPt(d(md,L~Qt(~&'Leadt~ssI,~PCuhiChr~+svv,oneino~c+~~((v((ahaCCsNCivsv~~s"~Q~'ttssa~oOpia(v(asu~<l~(.~~~sQ~M~c~Q-Mlk+vcvv~leach~((tdssvgoperaminimized].overloadingorefreeceeThe31daFuenc'~)s~~PW(svs~~CLq,ASORGAN(@ltd~,vesnsvvssstaerg~caisimoiieyNotes.Note1indicatesthatdieselenginerunsorthisSurveillancemayincludegradualloading,asrecommendedbythemanufacturer,sothatmechanicalstressandwearonthedieselengineareminimized.Note2statesthatmomentarytransient,donotinvalidatethistest.Similarly,momentarypower,factortransientsabovethelimidonotinvalidatethetest.Note3indicatesthatthis~orWtmSurveillanceshouldbeconductedononlyoneDGatatimeinordertoavoidcommoncausefailuresthatmihtresufromoffsitecircuitorgridperturbations.a(continued)~~OG-~K~gpt,~JJv.who.r~+~B3.8-17 fL~OESLa'Li'3,~tACSources-.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSoiH,vlli.8.1.3(continued)Asuccesstartmustpreces'ctoryperformance.testtocreditSR3.8.1.4ThisSRprovidesverificationthattheleveloffueloilinthedaytankisatorabovetheqq,levelatwhichfueloilisautomaticallyadded.ThelevelofDGoperationatfullload~~@sekeeh~ensurdequatefueloiloraminimumof1hour~~~+06is~a.tin)~o+~he31dareuencisadequatetothatasufficientsupplyoffueloilisavailable,sincelowlevelalarmsareprovidedandd~EBPoperatorswouldbeawareofanylarge~~usesoffueloilduringthisperiod.SR3.8.1.5~Vila~~+p~icLLGAR~~qoPEa.~U'rybio~y~~P~~~4VbkLa,~~~~g~U~inyOn~~in'6icrobiologicalfoulingisamajorcauseoffueloilgradation.Therearenumerousbacteriathatcaninfuoilandcausefouling,butallmusthaveaerenvimentinordertosurvive.Removaloferfromthefueloiday[andenginemounted)tanksoevery[31]dayseliminatesenecessaryenvironmentfbacterialsurvival.Thisisthemoeffectivemeansofontrollingmicrobiologicalfo'ng.Inad'on,iteliminatesthepotentialforwatereninminthefueloilduringDGoperation.Matermaycoomanyofseveralsources,includingcondensatiogrounater,rainwater,'ontaminatedfuel'andbreaknofthefueloilbybacteria.Freqtcheckingforanemovalofaccumulatedwaterminimifoulingandprovidesdaregardingthewatertightntegrityofthefueloilsystem.TheSurveilcefrequenciesareestablishedbyReatoryGuide.137(Ref.10).ThisSRisfor'preventatimaenance.Thepresenceofwaterdoesnotnecess'a'presentfailureofthisSR,providedtheaccumulatederisremovedduringtheperformanceofthisSurveillance.(continued)B'3.8-18 ACSourcesB3..1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)lq.vanSR3.8.1.6Wale~3..7.1.~Thisdemonstratesthateach~~/>fueloil,transferpumpoperatesandtransfersfueloilfromitsassociatedstoragetanktoitsassociateddaytank.Thisisd*<<pif~~iRH~~ThisSurveillanceprovidesassurancethatthefueloiltransferpumpisOPERABLE,thefueloilpiping.systemisintact,thefueldeliverypipingisnotobstructed,andthecontrolsandcontrolsystemsforautomaticfueltransfersystemsareOPERABLE.TheFrequencyforthisSRisvariable,dependingonindividualsystemdesign,withuptoa[92]dayival.92]dayFrequencycorrespondstothetngrequ)ntsforpumpsascontainedinASHECode,SectionXI.12);however,tesignoffueltransfersystemsissuchumprateautomaticallyormustbestartedmanuallyintomaintainanadequatevolumeoffueloilinty[anden'ounted)tanksduringorfollowintesting.Insuchae,a31dayF}equencyisappiate.SinceproperoperationoeltransferstemsisaninherentpartofDGOPERABILtheFrequencyofthisSRshouldbemodifiedtoreflectindividesigns.SR3.8.1.7SeeSR3.8.1.2.RQ.vuSR3.8.1";8Transferofeach-[4.16kVESFbus]powersupplyfromthenormaloffsitecirc'ostothealternateoffsitecircuitdemonstratestheOPERABIlITY~fthealternatecircuitdistributionnetworkto~theshutdownloads.The[18month]Frequency'heSurveillanceisbasedonengineeringjudge,takingintoeaqsiderationthe.unitconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtyWeconsistentwithexpectedjcyclelengths.Operatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecornaentsusuallypas~heSRwhenperformedatthe[18month]Freqoegcy.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeaccepta6'~fromareliabilitystandpoint.(continued)B3.8-19ev.g09/~2B$9R Insert3.8.1.8SR3.8.1.6ThisSRinvolvesthetransferofthe480Vsafeguardsbuspowersupplyfromthepreferredoffsitepowercircuitconfiguration(50/50mode)tothealternateoffsitepowercircuitconfigurations(100/0modeand0/100mode)whichdemonstratestheOPERABILITYofthealternatecircuitdistributionnetwork-topowertherequiredloads.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationtheplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.SR3.8.1.7'IThisSRverifiesthateachOGdoesnottripduringandfollowingaloadrejectionof>295kW.EachDGisprovidedwithanengineoverspeedtriptopreventdamagetotheengine.Recoveryfromthetransientcausedbythelossofalargeloadcouldcausedieselengineoverspeed,which,ifexcessive,mightresultinatripoftheengine.ThisSRdemonstratestheDGloadresponsecharacteristicsandcapabilitytorejectthelargestsingleloadonthebusessuppliedbytheDG(i.e.,asafetyinjectionpump).InordertoensurethattheOGistestedunderloadconditionsthatareasclosetodesignbasisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactor<0.9lagging.ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresentativeoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthattheDGwouldexperience.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODEI,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseMODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult,plantsafetysystems.SR3.8.1.8ThisSRdemonstratesthatDGnoncriticalprotectivefunctions(e.g.,overcurrent,reversepower,localstoppushbutton)arebypassedonanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal,andcriticalprotectivefunctions(engineoverspeed,lowlubeoilpressure,andstartfailure(overcrank)relay)triptheOGtoavertsubstantialdamagetotheDG.ThenoncriticaltripsarebypassedduringOBAsbutstillprovideanalarmonanabnormal enginecondition.Thisalarmprovidestheoperatorwithsufficienttimetoreactappropriately.TheDGavailabilitytomitigatetheDBAismorecriticalthanprotectingtheengineagainstminorproblemsthatarenotimmediatelydetrimentaltoemergencyoperationoftheDG.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe24monthFrequency.Therefore,thisFrequencyisacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremovearequiredDGfromservicewhichisundesirableintheseMODES.SR3.8.1.9IntheeventofaDBAcoincidentwithalossofoffsitepower,theDGsarerequiredtosupplythenecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,RCS,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.ThisSRdemonstratestheDGoperationduringanactualorsimulatedlossofoffsitepowersignalinconjunctionwithanactualorsimulatedSIactuationsignal.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationofconnectionandloadingof.loads,testingthatadequatelyshowsthecapabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayincludeany'eriesofsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothattheentireconnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof24monthsisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationplantconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1statesthatallDGstartsmaybeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodwhichisintendedtominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginelubeoilcontinuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendationsfortheDGs.Note2statesthatthisSurveillanceshallnotbeperformedinMODE1,2,3,or4sinceperformingtheSurveillanceduringtheseMODESwouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,causeperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystems,andchallengesafetysystems. l,<s3~~ACSources-.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.8(continued)ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonforNotethat;duringoperationwiththereactorcritical,erformanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstoeectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchallenconinuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult'nitsafety,systems.Note2acknowledgesthatcredimaybetakenrunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisS.isSR3.8.1.9EachDGisprov'i/edwithanengineoverspeedtriptopreventdamagetotheengige.Recoveryfromtetransientcausedbythelossofalarge~loadcouldcauseieselengineoverspeed,which,ifxcessive,migresultinatripoftheengine.ThisSurvillancedernnstratestheDGloadresponsecharacteristicandcapailitytorejectthelargestsingleloadwithotexcdingpredeterminedvoltageandfrequencyandwhilema>taiingaspecifiedmargintotheoverspeedtrip.[Forth'nit,thesingleloadforeachDGanditshorsepowerr'ngisasfollows:]AsrequiredbyIEEE-308(Ref.3),theloadrejectiontestisacceptableiftheincreaseindielspeeddoesnotexceed75%ofthedifferencebeteensynronousspeedandtheoverspeedtripsetpointor15%aboesynchronousspeed,whicheverislower.Thetime,voltage,adfrequencytoleraesspecifiedinthisSRarederivedfromRegulatoryGuid1.9(Ref.3)recommendationsforesponseduringloadsquenceintervals.The3secondsspifiedisequalto60/oftypical5secondloadsequenceintervalassociatedwshsequencingofthelargestiload.Thevoltageandfrequencspecifiedareconsistent/withthedesignrangeoftheequsmentpoweredbyth5DG.SR3.8.1.9.acorrespondstotmaximumfrequencyexcursion,whileSR3.8.1.9.bandSR3.8..9.caresteadystat%voltageandfrequencyvaluestowhichtesystemmuff.recoverfollowingloadrejection.The[18mont]FrequencyisconsistentwiththerecommendaionofRegultoryGuide1.108(Ref.9).InordtoensurethattheDGistestedunderloadconditionsthatareasclosetodesignbasisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactor(continued)~~c.bB3.8-20 ~oGsi.z,s~'lACSources-QQEaKggB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.9(continued)<[0.9].ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresenttiveoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthatthDGwouldexperience.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Thereasonforote1isthatduringoperationwiththereactorcritical,erformancetxfthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelecricaldihtributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecontiedsteadystatoperationand,asaresult,unit-safetyystems.Note2cknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenorunplannedeventsthsatisfythisSR.Reviewer'sNo:TheaboveMODErestrictinsmaybedeletedifitcanbedestratedtothestaff,oaplantspecificbasis,thatperforingtheSRwiththereactorinanyoftherestrictedMODEScasatisfythefoliongcriteria,asapplicable:l'(.unl'a~b.c~Performanceofthewillnorenderanysafetysystemorcomponentinerablh;aPerformanceoftheSRwilnotcauseperturbationstoanyoftheelectricaldistrutionsystemsthatcouldresultin'challengetp'teadstateoperationortoplantsafetysystems;andPerformanceofthe$ZorfailureQtheSR,wi11notcause,orresultio',anAOOwithattdantchallengetoplantsafetysstems.SR3.8.1.10ThisSurveillancdemonstratestheDGcapabilitytrejectafullloadwithotoverspeedtrippingorexceedingtpredeterminedoltagelimits.TheDGfullloadrejeionmayoccurbeuseofasystemfaultorinadvertentbrkertripping.isSurveillanceensuresproperenginegenatorloadresposeunderthesimulatedtestconditions.ThitestsimuatesthelossofthetotalconnectedloadthatheDGexperencesfollowingafullloadrejectionandverifithatthDGdoesnottripuponlossoftheload.TheseacceptncecriteriaprovideforDGdamageprotection.WhiletheDisnotexpectedtoexperiencethistransientduring(continued)P~PM~B3.8-21Rev.

ACSources-..IBASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSR3.8.1.10(continued)aneventandcontinuestobeavailable,thisrespsensuresthattheD6isnotdegradedforfutureplication,iludingreconnectiontothebusifthetrip'tiatorcanbeorrectedorisolat'ed.Inorrtoensure'hattheDGistestednderloadconditisthatareasclosetodesignsisconditionsaspossible,testingmustbeperformeduingapowerfactor<[0.9].hispowerfactorischosetoberepresentativeoftheactu1designbasisinductivloadingthattheDGwouldexperiece.The[18month]equencyiscosistentwiththerecommendationofegulatoryuide1.108(Ref.9)andisintendedtobeconstentw'thexpectedfuelcyclelengths.ThisSR.isbeenmodifiytwoNotes.ThereasonforNoteIisthatduringrationwiththereactorcritical,performanceofthisScodcauseperturbationtotheelectricaldistribuonsysemsthatcouldchallengecontinuedsteadysteoperaionand,asaresult,unitsafetysystems.ote2acknoedgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplaedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.Reviewer'sNoe:TheaboveMODEstrictionsmaybedeletedifitcanbedemonstratedtothestff,onaplantspecificbasis,thaperformingtheSRwithtreactorinanyoftherestricteMODEScansatisfythefolioingcriteria,asapplicabl6:a.PrformanceoftheSRwillnotrendeanysafetyystemorcomponentinoperable;b.PerformanceoftheSRwillnotcauseperrbationstoanyoftheelectricaldistributionsystemthatcouldresultinachallengetosteadystateoperaionortoplantsafetysystems;andc.PerformanceoftheSR,orfailureoftheSR,w>1notcause,orresultin,anAOOwithattendantchallengetoplantsafetysystems.(continued)B3.8-22 J~Qcs'L.4,~~3.gACSources-d~~~nt~B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)SR3.8.1.11AsrequiredbyRegulatoryGuide1.108(Ref.9),paragraph,2.a.(1),thisSurveillancedemonstratestheadesignedbperationofthestandbypowersourcesduringossoftheofitesource.Thistestverifiesallactionencounterefromthelossofoffsitepower,includinsheddingofthenonessentialloadsandenergizationofthemergencybuesandrespectiveloadsfromtheDG.IturtherdemonstratesthecapabilityoftheDGtoutomaticallyachievetherequiredvoltageandequencyithinthespecfiedtime.heDGautostartgimeof[10]secondsisder'ivedfromequirementsofthaccidentanalysistorespondtoadesignsislargebreakLCA.Thefrequencysb6uldbe.restoredtothin2%ofnominalfollowingaloadsequencestep.TheSrveillanceshouldbcontinuedfor+minimumof5minutesordertodemonstratthatallstay"tingtransientshavedcayedandstabilityisachieved.T6erequirementtoverifyhecopnectionandpowersupplyofpermanentandautoconnectedlosisintended.tosytisfactorilyshowtherela'onshipoftheseloadstotheD8loadinglogic.Incerta'ircumstances,manyoftheselhadscannotactuallybecnetedorloadedwithoutundueh)rdshiporpotentialforundes'redoperation.Fori(stance,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)injectionvalvesarenotdesiredPobestroedopen,orhighpressureir{jectionsystemsare/notcapablefbeingoperatedatfullfllow,orresidualhMtremoval(RHfb}systemsperformingaddcayheatremoval/unctionarenotVesiredtoberealignedttheECCSmodeofoperation.In1euofactualdmonstrationof/connectionandloadigofloads,testingtatadequately~showsthecapabilitytheDGsystemstoprformthese/functionsisacceptable.Thistestingmayieludeany+eriesofsequential,overlpping,ortotalepssotÃattheentireconnectionandoadingsequenceiserifiedheF>requencyof[18months]isconsistentwiththeecopaendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.108ef.9),argraph2.a.(l),takesintoconsiderationnitconditionsuiredtoperformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeonsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.(continued)B3.8-23 ~CS!,",3ACSources-~a3~goB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCRE(UIREHENTE3.8.1.11(continued),VisaThisSRismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThereasonforNote1istominimizewearandtearontheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthistesting,theDGsmustbestartedfm';standbyconditions,thatis,withtheenginecoolantndoil'.continuouslycirculatedandtemperaturemaintained/consistentwithmanufacturerrecommendations.TreasonforNote2isthatperformingtheSurveillanceuldremove'~Iequiredoffsitecircuitfromservice,pertbtheele'ctricaldistributionsystem,andchallensafetysystems.Note3acknowledgesthatcreditaybetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.SR3.8.1.12ThisSurveillancedemonstratestttheDGautomaticallystartsand'achievestherequirevoltageandfrequencywithinthespeciedtime([10seconds)fromthedesignbasisactuationsial(LOCAignal)andoperatesfor>5minutes.The5inuteeriodprovidessufficienttimetodemonstratestabily.SR3.8.1.12.dandSR3.8.1.12.eensurethatpermanentlyonnectedloadsandemergencyloadsareenergizedfromthesiteelectricalpowersystemonanESFsignaiwithoutlosooffsitepower.TherequirementtoerifytheonnectionofpermanentandautoconnectedloasisintendedosatisfactorilyshowtherelationshipofheseloadstothDGloadinglogic.Incertaincircumances,manyoftheloadscannotactuallybeconnectedrloadedwithoutundueardshiporpotentialforundesiroperation.ForinstancECCSinjectionvalvesareotdesiredtobestrokedop,orhighpressureinjectionsystemsarenotcapableofbeinoperatedatfullflow,orRHRsystemsperformingadecayheremovalfunctiarenotdesiredtoberealignedtohe'ECCSmodeofoperation.Inlieuofactualdemonstrationoconnectionandloadingofloads,testingthatadequatelysowsthecabilityoftheDGsystemtoperformthesefunionsisaeptable.Thistestingmayincludeanyseriesosquential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothatthentireonnectionandloadingsequenceisverified.TheFrequencyof[18months]takesintoconsiderationuitconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillanceandis(continued)B3.8-24 ACSources-nB..1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.1.12(continued)intendedtobeconsistentwiththeexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperiencehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe18month]Frequency.Therefore,theFrequencywasceludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystanoint.ThisRismodifiedbythreeNotes.ThereasonorNote1istoinimizewearandtearontheDGsdurintesting.Forthepurseofthistesting,theDGsmustbstartedfromstandbycditions,thatis,withtheengiecoolantandoilcontinuouscirculatedandtemperatureintainedconsistentwthmanufacturerrecommendions.ThereasonforNote2ishatduringoperationwhthereactor'critical,perfoanceofthisSurveiancecouldcause~perturbationstoheelectricaldiributionsystemsthatcouldchallengecotinuedsteadytateoperationand,asaresult,unitsafetyystems.Ne3acknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenrunplaedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.SR3.8.1.13'lN.viThisSurveillancedernstratethatDGnoncritical'rotectivefunctions(e.g.,hijacketwatertemperature)arebypassedonassofvoltasignalconcurrentwithanESFactuationtessignal,andc'ticalprotectivefunctions(engineoverspe,generatordiffeentialcurrent,[lowlubeoilpressure,ghcrankcasepressu,andstartfailurerelay])tripeDGtoavertsubstantaldamagetotheDGunit.ThencriticaltripsarebypasedduringDBAsandprovideanlarmonanabnormalenginendition.Thisalarmprodestheoperatorwithsufficiettimetoreactappropritely.TheDGavailabilitytomit'tetheDBAismorecrtical.thanprotectingtheengineag'nstminorproblsthatarenotimmediatelydetrimentaltoemergencyoperionoftheDG.Th[18month]Frequencyisbasedonengineeringudgment,tingintoconsiderationunitconditionsrequiredoprformtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobecon'stentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.OperatingexperienehasshownthatthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSRwhenperformedatthe[18month]Frequency.Therefore,the(continudQG-B3.8-25~-0,09/28/92 ~0&5,L,l.,3ACSources-~~~/B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSFrequencywasconcludedtobeacceptablefromareliabilitystandpoint.TheSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonforNoteisatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremovearequ'dDGfrrqservice.Note2acknowledgesthatcreditmayetakenforunlannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.Reviewer'sate:TheaboveMODErestrictionsmaybedeletedifitcanbedemonstratedtothestaff,ona:plantspecificbasis,thatperformingtheSRwiththerea6orinanyoftherestrictedMODES.ansatisfythefollowigcriteria,asapplicable:b;PerformanceofthSRwillnotvenderanysafetysystemorcomponentinoperable~PerformanceoftheSRwillotcauseperturbationstoanyoftheelectricaldigtFibutionsystemsthatcouldresultinachallengetoteadystateoperationortoplantsafetysystems;adc.PerformanceoftheS,orfaireoftheSR,willnotcause,orresultinanAOOwitattendantchallengetoplantsafetysytems.9.gt<cSR3.8.1.14RegulatoryGuide.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.(3),requiresdemonstrationoceper18monthsthattheDGsnstartandruncontinuousyatfullloadcapabilityforan'ntervalofnotlesstha24hours,Z[2]hoursofwhichisaaloadequivalent.110%ofthecontinuousduty,ratingatheremainderpfthetimeataloadequivalenttothecotinuousdutyratirfgoftheDG.TheDGstartsforthisSurveilancecanbeperformedeitherfromstandbyorhotconditionsTheprovisi.onsforprelubricatingandwarmup,discussedinSR3.8!1.2,andforgradualloading,discu'ssedinSR3..8.1'.3,areapplicabletothisSR.InrdertoensurethattheDGistestedunderloadcoitionsthatareasclosetodesignconditionsasWOGSTS83.8-26Rev.0,09/28/92 ACSources-~.-a4.~~B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS.iIQ,'I/IslSR3.8.1.14(continued)possible,testingmustbeperformedusingapowerfactorf<[0.9].ThispowerfactorischosentoberepresentaveoftheactualdesignbasisinductiveloadingthatthDGwouldexperience.TheloadbandisprovidedtoavidroutineoverloadingoftheDG.RoutineoverToadjdgmay'~result-inmorefrequentteardowninspectionsin/accordancewithvendorrecommendationsin,ordertomaintmnDGOPERABILITY.!The[18month]FrequencyisconsistentwihtherecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.168(Ref.9),paragraph.2.a.(3),takesintoconsiderationunitconditionsrequiredto.performtheSurveillance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfuelcyclelengths.IThisSurveillanceismodifiedbythreeNotes.Note1statesthatmomentarytransientsduet'ochangingbusloadsdonotinvalidatethistest+SimilaAy,momentarypowerfactortransientsabovethepqweractorlimitwillnotinvalidatethetest.Thereasonf~ote2isthatduringoperationwiththereactorcritica,performanceofthisSurveillancecouldcauseperturbatior(sqtheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldchaTlenge~,continuedsteadystateoperationand,asaresult,uiMtsafetysystems.Note3acknowledgesthatceditmaybe/takenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisR.SR3.8.1.15ThisSurveiil'ancedemonstratesthattheeieselenginecanrestartfromahotcondition,suchassubequenttoshutdownfromnorma'lSurveillances,andachievetheequiredvoltageandfrequ'encywithin[10]seconds.The[10second.timeisderived/fromtherequirementsoftheaccidentnalysistorespondtoadesign'basislargebreakLOCA.Th[18month]FrequencyisconsistentwiththerecommendationsfRegulatoryGuide1.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.a.(5)TisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.Note1ensuresthatheestisperformedwiththedieselsufficientlyhot.T)oadbandisprovidedtoavoidroutineoverloadingofthDG.Routineoverloadsmayresultinmorefrequentteardo~inspectionsinaccordancewithvendorrecommendationsinconsnued)WOGSTSB3.8-27Rev.0,09/28/92 ACSources-~~i~nB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSffIIIIIIISR3.8.1.15(continued)ordertomaintainDGOPERABILITY.Therequirementthatthedieselhasoperatedforatleast[2]hoursatfullload~conditionspriortoperformanceofthisSurveillance/'basedonmanufacturerrecommendationsforachievingPotconditions.Homentarytransientsduetochanging+usloadsdonotinvalidatethistest.Note2allowsall)3Gstartstobeprecededbyanengineprelubeperiodtomin'zewearandtearonthedieselduringtesting.SR3.6.1.16AsrequiredbyRegulatoryGuide1.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.a.(6),thisSurveillanceensuresthatthemanualsynchronizationandautomaticloadtransferfromtheDGtotheoffsitesourcecanbemadegndtheDGcanbereturnedtoreadytoloadstatuswhen'ffsitepowerisrestored.ItalsoensuresthattheautostartlogicisresettoallowtheDGtoreloadifasubsequek~l.ossofoffsitepoweroccurs.TheDGisconsideredtobeinreadytoloadstatuswhentheDGisatratedspeedanyfvoltage;,theoutputbreakerisopenandcanreceiveanautdclosesignalonbusundervoltage,andtheloadsequencetimersareresetTheFrequencyof8months]isconsistentwiththerecommendationspfRegulatoryGuide1.198(Ref.9),paragraph2.a.$6),andtakesintoconsid'@rationunitconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSurveillance./..ThisSRis>modifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonforNote1isthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldremoveXarequiredoffsitec'ircuitfromservice,perturbtheelectricaldistribdtionsystem,andchallengesafetysystems.Note2acknow/edgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplanndeventsthatgatisfythisSR.i1SR/3.8.1.17/D6monstrationofthetestmodeoverrideensuresthateDGavailabilityunderaccidentconditionswillnotbei'compromisedastheresultoftestingandtheDGwill'automaticallyresettoreadytoloadoperationifaLOC$actuationsignalisreceivedduringoperationintheteqt(continued)MOGSTSB3.8-28Rev.0,09/28/92 ~eauACSourcesQ~~igB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSI'{.vu(SR3.8.1.17(continued)mode.Readytoloadoperationis-definedastheDGrningatratedspeedandvoltagewiththeDGoutputbreakopen.Theseprovisionsforautomaticswitchoverarerequ'dbyIEEE-308(Ref.13),paragraph6.2.6(2).,Therequirementtoautomaticallyenergizetheergencyloadswithoffsitepowerisessentiallyident'caltothatofSR'3.8.1.12.TheintentintherequirementssociatedwithSR3;8.1.17.bistoshowthattheemergencloadingwasnotaffected.bytheDGoperationintestmode'nlieuofactualdemonstrationofconnectionand1,4adingofloads,testingthatzadequatelyshowsthecapaYilityoftheemergencyloads,toperformthesefunctionsisacceptable.Thistestingmay<includeanyseries6fsequential,overlapping,ortotalstepssothatheentireconnectionandloadingsequencisverified.The[18month]Frequency>isconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryG6ide1.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.a.(8),takesintoconsiderationunitconditionsrequiredtoperformtheSur,illance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectedfutecyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwaNotesThereasonforNote1is/thatperformingtheServe'illancehouldremovearequiredopfsitecircuitfromservice,perturbtheelectricaldistributionsystem,andchallengesafetysystems.Note2acknowledges.thatcreditmaybetakenhforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR!/SR3.8.1.18Asrequiredby/RegulatoryGuide1.108(Ref.Q,paragraph2.ai(2),eachDGisrequiredtodemonstrateproperoperationfor,'heDBAloadingsequencetoensurthatvoltageand;frequencyaremaintainedwithin)hequiredlimits.Underaccidentconditions,priortoconntingtheDGsto,theirrespectivebuses,allloadsareshedeceptloadcenterfeedersandthosemotorcontrolcentershatpowerClasslEloads(referredtoas"permanentlyconcted"loads).Uponreaching90%ofratedvoltageandfrequency,theDGsarethenconnectedtotheirrespectivebuses.(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-29Rev.0,09/28/92 ~4Mi,~,s,~8ACSources-~M~nB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSlu.vuggSR~3.8.1.18(continued)Loads.arethensequentiallyconnectedtothebus!ythe[automaticloadsequencer].Thesequencinglog'ccontrolsthepermissiveandstartingsignalstomotoreakerstopreventoverloadingoftheDGsduetohighmorstartingcurrents.The[10]/loadsequencetimeintrvaltoleranceensuresthsufficienttimeexistsfortDGtorestorefrequencyandvoltagepriortoapplyingenextloadandthatsafetyaaalysisassumptionsregarngESFequipmenttimedelaysarenotviolated.Referene2providesasummaryoftheautomaticloadingofELFbuses.TheFrequencyof[IPmonths]isconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGui'de1.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.a.(2),tagesintog(nsiderationunitconditionsrequiredtoperformthSurvei,Tlance,andisintendedtobeconsistentwithexpectefueVcyclelengths.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonforNote1isthatperformingtheSurveilancewouldremovearequiredoffsitecircuitfromsericeyperturbtheelectricaldistributionsystem,achallengesafetysystems.Note2acknowledgesthatcretmaybhtakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSRJReviewer'sNote:jfheaboveMODErestrictionsmaybedeletedifitcanbedemonstratedtothestiff,onaplantspecificbasis,thatperformingtheSRwiththereactorinanyoftherestrictedMODEScansatisfythefollowingcriteria,asapplicable:/la.PerformanceoftheSRwillnotrenderanysafetysystemorcomponentinoperable;/b.Perfd'rmanceoftheSRwillnotcauseprturbationstoany;oftheelectricaldistributionsystemsthatcouldresultinachallengetosteadystateopationortopl,antsafetysystems;andIc.PerformanceoftheSR,orfailureoftheSR,willnotcause,orresulti',anAOOwithattendantcllenge,.'toplantsafetysystems.i(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-30Rev.0,09/28/92 QJbOZSACSources-gg~~B3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE'EQUIREMENTS'.(continued)',~~SR3.8.1.19IntheeventofaDBAcoincidentwithalossofofsitepower,theOGsarerequiredtosupplythenecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,RCS,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.~Thl'sSurveillancedemonstratestheOGoperation,asdiscussedintheBasesforSR3.8.1.11,due'ingalossofoffsit&,poweractuationtestsignalincan'junctionwithan~~ESFactuationsignal.InlieuofactuaVdemonstrationofconnectionandloadingofloads,testin'gthatadequatelyjshowstheca/abilityoftheOGsystem/toperformthesefunctionsisaeptable.Thistestirigmayincludeanyseriesofsequen'al,overlapping,<ortotalstepssothattheentireconnect'andloading,:sequenceisverified.ITheFrequencyof[18nths]tal(esintoconsiderationunitconditionsrequiredtorforp~theSurveillanceandisintendedtobeconsistentihanexpectedfuelcyclelength;of,[18months].N.v>>iThisSRismodifiedbythy'eetes.ThereasonforNote1istominimizewearandfearonheDGsduringtesting.Forthepurposeofthiste~4ing,theGsmustbestartedfromstandbyconditions,thatis,withteenginecoolantandoilcontinuouslycirculaPedandtemperatremaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommentionsforDGs.ThereasonforNote2psthattheperformaneoftheSurveillancewouldremovearequiredoffitecircuitfromservice,perturtv'theelectricaldistributinsystem,andchallengesafetysystems.Note3acknowleesthatcreditmaybetaken$brunplannedeventsthatsatisthisSR.SR3.8.1.0ThisSureillancedemonstratesthattheDGstartinindepeencehasnotbeencompromised.Also,this.SurvelancedemonstratesthateachenginecanachievpropspeedwithinthespecifiedtimewhentheDGsarstaedsimultaneously.(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-31Rev.0,09/28/92 ACSourcesB3.8.1BASESSURVEILLANCE(RE(UIREHENTS:SR3.8.1.20(continued)~~The10yearFrequencyisconsistentwiththerecoayfendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.108(Ref.9),paragraph2.b,'ndRegulatoryGuidel.137(Ref.10),paragraphC.2TsSRismodifiedbyaNote.ThereasonfogtheNoteistominimizewearontheDGduringtesting./orthepurposeofthiXstesting,theDGsmustbestartedfpomstandbycondition~thatis,withtheenginecoolAntandoilcontinuousl~circulatedandtemperature.nnaintainedconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommenda'tions.DieselGeneratorTest,Scheduley~.TheDGtestschedule(Table3.&y.'l-l)implementstherecommendationsofRevisio3ytoRegulatoryGuide1.9(Ref.3).Thepurposeoft'stestscheduleistoprovidetimelytestdatatoestabliphaconfidencelevelassociatedwiththegoaltomaintainQGr@iability)0.95perdemand.AccordingtoRegulatoryGuide1.9,Revision3(Ref.3),eachDGshouldbetestedat1'eastonceeery31days.WheneveraOGhasexperienced4prmorevalidfailuresinthelast25validtests,theaximumtimebetweentestsisreducedto7days.Fourfailesin25validtest+isafailurerateof0.16,orthethesholdofacceptableDGperformance,andhencemaybeanyhrlyindicationofthede'gradationofDGreliability.Wb'enconsideredinthelightofalonghistoryoftests,howey'er,4failuresinthelast25'yalidtestsmayonlybeastath'sticallyprobabledistribution'bfrandomevents.IncreasingthetestFrequencywillallowforamoretimelyaccumulationofadditionaltestdatauponiwhichtobasejudgmentofthereliabilityoftheDG.TheycreasedtestFrequncymustbemaintaineduntilsevenconsutive,failurefeetestshavebeenperformed.TheFreencyforacceleratedtestingis7days,butnlessthan2hours.Therefore,theintervalbetweentestssuldbenoessthan24hours,andnomorethan7days.Asuccesfultestatanintervaloflessthan24hoursshoubecnsideredaninvalidtestandnotcounttowardsthe7concutivefailurefreestarts.AtestintervalinexcessofdaysconstitutesafailuretomeettheSRs.WOGSTSB3.8-32(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 NotsL,4,1,~NACSources-.1BASES(continued)REFERENCES410CFR50,AppendixA,GOC17.I.QU'SAR,Chapter+8~ev.4.QU:SAR,Chapter+6~5.(UU'SAR,Chapter~Sf.8GenericLetter84-15,"ProposedStaffActionstoImproveandHaintainDieselGeneratorReliability,"July2,1984.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC18.9.ReatoryGuide1.108,Re,August1977.10.Regulatory'de7,Rev.[],[date].11.ANSIC84.82.12.A,BoilerandPressureselCode,SectionXI.IEEEStandard308-1978.B3.8-33 W>OKC5'~4pACSources~+dawnB3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.2ACSources-BASESBACKGROUND95'.clq~eAdescriptionoLCO3.rovidedintheBasesforces-Operating."95.<~APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES95;v~Cl~ica9~TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumACsourcesduringMODES5and6'ensuresthat:E~rg'a~rebemaintsionorequiod~~~n1lb.cseninsrumenaionavailasan+8~5~~6.~4au~a-M~~-eCA~Woe~~+oe~y~~~iw(~i~~0V~~l~deuateACelectricapowerssprovidedt'teeventsposucasaninadv~~inownofthevesseorafu~yndlinent(6&JV.Pdl,~~k-I1ug~~~c~~&~G~~~~~~~A.~~jt~~~l.p~~~f}C~V@0PCRRCL,t=w>psgg,Mgg~gIosz.+W~~~Acp~>GA3AC.P~~c"0ao~@aalu~~@<4n.Rc.~c~a~wDuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceising.aVIngeneral,whentheunitisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethatthe~hasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotreuired.manyessgnBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausethenergycontainedwithinthereactorressureboundaryeactorcoolanttemperatureandpressureandthecorrespdingstressesresultintheprobabiliesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownco'tonsareallowedbytheLC~~orreuired~~AlOQHQ5~Q~08~e~~4QA.aul664Lc~~~97.v.a(continued)-STS-gQQ~~vJfQQ'xJ'B3.8-34Rev" Insert3.8.2.1TheBackgroundsectionforBases3.8.1;"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletothesesBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,theminimumrequiredACsourcesmaybereducedsinceless~~~~energyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACpowersources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6." ~OsPfO5~4ACSources-,B..2BASESAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(continued)recognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringHODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InHODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromHODE1,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.Qs.v.c.~~md~igb.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingHODEanalyses,orboth.c.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.d.Haintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODEI,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)aeEHP~>systemsassumedtofunctiondurinanevent.Amtftd~,tlatttdensuresthecaabilityto.supportsystemsnecessaryto~aedrid,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power.TheACsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.q5sq(LCOOneoffsitecircuitsugplintheowerdistri'onsubsysteCO3.8.,>srsusonystems-"ensureshatallrequiredloadsarepoweredfromoffsitepower.AnOPERABLEDG~distributionsystemC5e~requiredtobeOPBLyLCO3.8.10,ensuresadiversepowersourceisavailabletoprovideelectricalpowersupport,assumingalossofthein~~>offsite'rcuit.Together,OPERABILITYoftherequiredr~4.+oRBE.OPERRRLR(continued),8F9(nnaB3.8-35 HcsOk'sS~MACSources-~B3.8.2BASESRS'.V.CsLCO(continued)'lf.i<<QoPeRebLEoffsitecircuitandDGensurestheavailabilitofsufficientACsourcestooperatethe~inasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents4Bbqualifiedoffsitecircuit~~capableofmaintainingratedfrequencyandvoltage,andacceptingreuiredloadsduringanaccident,whileconnectedtothep~pmu4J)lssiOran.~~~in'l$Q~lAJAktAf~en~D8'.a.g.~9S~Offsitecircuit¹1consistsofSafeguardsTransformerB,whichissuppliedfromSwitchyardBusB,andisfedthugheaker52-3poweringtheESFtransformerXNBOl,whi,inturpowersthe¹IESFbusthroughitsnormalfee4rbreakeThesecondoffsitecircuitconsistsotheStartupTransfor,whichisnormallyfedfromtheStchyardBusA,andfedthroughbreakerPA0201peringtheESFtransformer,w'ch,inturn,powersthe¹2SFbusthroughitsnormalfeederreaker.TheDGmustbecapablefstarting,celeratingtoratedspeedandvoltage,andcoectingtitsrespectiveESFbusondetectionofbusundervoge.Thissequencemustbeaccomplishedwithinf10]secon.TheDGmustbecapableofacceptingrequiredloadswithPneassumedloadingsequenceintervals,andcontinuetooperatetiloffsitepowercanberestoredtotheESFbus.ThesepabilitiesarerequiredtobemetfromvarietyofinialconditionssuchasDGinstandbywitheenginehot,DGstandbyatambientconditions,dDGoperatinginapalleltestmode.Propersequencinofloads,includingtrippingofnonessential1ds,isarequiredfunctionforDGOPERABILITY.Inaddi'on,propersequenceroperationisanintegralparofositecircuitOPERABILITYifitsinoperabilityinanyimpactsontheabilitytostartandmaintainenergizedanyloadsrequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8e10.(continued)B3.8-36

Insert3.8.2.2ADGisconsideredOPERABLEwhen:a.TheDGiscapableofstarting,acceleratingtoratedspeed,andvoltage,andconnectingtoitsrespective480Vsafeguardsbusesondetectionofbusundervoltagewithin10seconds;b.Allloadsoneach480Vsafeguardsbusexceptforthesafetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenters,'componentcoolingwater(CCW)pump,andcontainmentspraypumparecapableofbeingtrippedonanundervoltagesignal(CCWpumpmustbecapableofbeingtrippedoncoincidentsafetyinjection(SI)andundervoltagesignal);C.TheDGiscapableofacceptingrequiredloadsbothmanuallyandwithintheassumedloadingsequenceintervalsfollowingacoincidentSIandundervoltagesignal,andcontinuetooperateuntiloffsitepowercanberestoredtothesafeguardsbus(i.e.,40hours);d.TheDGdaytankisavailabletoprovidefueloilfor>Ihourat.110%%udesignloads;e.Thefueloiltransferpump-fromthefueloilstoragetanktotheassociateddaytankisOPERABLEincludingallrequiredpiping,valves,andinstrumentation(long-termfueloilsuppliesareaddressedbyLCO3.8.3,"DieselFuelOil");andf.AventilationtrainconsistingofatleastoneoftwofansandtheassociatedductworkanddampersisOPERABLE.~TheACsourcesinonetrainmustbeseparateandindependentoftheACsourcesintheothertrain.FortheDGs,separationandindependencemustbecompleteassumingasingleactivefailure.Fortheindependentoffsitepowersource,separationandindependencearetotheextentpractical(.i.e.,operationispreferredinthe50/50mode,butmayalsoexistinthe100/0or0/100mode). eIss~\~I~~IVLoOW5~.l.ACSources-B..2BASES(continuedortrainstobecrosstiedduringshutdownnition,'leoffsitepowercircuittosupplyallreuiredtrains.APPLICABILITYqq.r.a~~le'~~~tOYwu.Po>~d~~MdQhu&~WW~ihy~~a,~OAL4~ab.ystemstoprovideadequatecoolantinventoryupareavailablefortheirradiatedfuelasseiesintcoreincaseofan.inadvertentdr'wnofthereactvessel;Systemsneedeomitiafuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;TheACsourcesrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6~provideassurancetha:C.d.Systemsnecsarytomi'tetheeffectsofeventsthatcaeadtocoredamaduringshutdownareavaile;andnstrumentationandcontrolcapabi'savailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheuniticoldshutdownconditionorrefuelincondition.9W,v.a,TheACpowerrequirementsforMODES1,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.1.'sht~-twone~XsZ,>,m+ACTIONSo.e."-"-n0p~Pb~'tS<<BfeaturesCOWQghILLILBCLP~~/ulwstst~p~b~a.y~M~~q~a+Mba:LIItynnqit>03Pa3LI'isag0~~Iabyuir~S~Yhb+b!LClnhygA~'46O~rbnA.1CYL~).~rAsh~offsitepAlV<M@~~ageavailabletoonerequiredthougtwob~~rasnseIBerequsredbyLc03.0.10,IBwhonetrainwithofsstepoweravailablemaybecapableofsupportingsufficientreuiredfeaturestoallowcontinuatioofCOREALTERATIONS,~operations.Byoptiontodeclarerequiredfeaturesinoperaoffsitepoweragjg~,appropriaterestrictionswillbeimplemented'ndancewiththffectedrequiredB3.8-37(continued)92 gpss)IInsert3.8.2.3AsdiscussedinLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystem's-ACTIONSwouldnotbeenteredevenifallACsourcestoitareinoperable,resultinginde-energization.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAaremodifiedbyaNotetoindicatethatwhenConditionAisenteredwithnoonsiteoroffsiteACpowertoanyrequired480Vsafeguardsbus,theACTIONSforLCO3.8.10mustalsobeimmediatelyentered.ThisNoteallowsConditionAtoproviderequirementsforthelossoftheoffsitepowercircuit,whetherornotatrainisde-energized.LCO3.8.10wouldprovidetheappropriaterestrictionsforthesituationinvolvingacompletelyde-energizedtrain. MoOSJ$~4yACSources-$6iRamhB3.8.2BASESACTIONS(continued)hCa4.~i<(.4dl5,iIi'4~vrancqyR~caszcIRCheR.Z.Ic.b~trI~qdtQa~8'~'~~Nyt~Ccs~Vts~+~pupoz4C.rv4>~C,ips~,Q,VsARa.v.4A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3WiththeoffsitecircuitnotavailabletoallrequiredhpisewweeitstdiglqidfeaturesinoerableSincethisoptionmayinvolveunesireadministrativeefforts,theallowanorsufficientlconservativeactionsismade.f-Aerefore,COREALTERATIONS,invprecludeactioryrovoslive~ebs&anoeration1ionnoo~~~tddition.1V1acorvesseed.'oftheseactivitiesdoesnotprecetioofactionsivecondition.Theseac'mizet1nceofatedevents.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmeiatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACsourcesandto%b~~continuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowertothe~~sasystems.tandingperformanceoftheconservativeActions,teu'1cutienACpowersourcestooper~~0asaTherefore,actionmustbeiniti~adtorestoretheminimumreq'Cpowersou~andcontinueuntiltheLCOrequirementslbsV4QpavsbTheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsreuirinromptattention.Therestorationoftherequiredpowersourcesshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichthesafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.rsuanttoLCO3.0.6,theDistributionSystem'sACNSwouteredevenifallACsourcareinoperable,resuin'ion.Therefore,theRequiredActionsoionAare'byaNotetoindicate.@wenConditionAisenteredwithre%ower(continued).<-WQQ,Q,,tata.CS4~4lNLrP~B3.8-38 hLaoasr~lACSources-Shshkewn-B3..2BASESSneer<ACTIONS,A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4A.2.5B.1B.2B.andB.5(continued)SFbus,theforLCO3.8.10mustbeimmediateyThisNoteallowsConditionAtopro'-equirementsforssoftheoffsitecircuit,etherornotatrainisde-energLCO3.8.10would'rovidetheappropriaterestrictionsforituationinvolvingade-energizedtrain.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS4saIPSR3.8.2.1requirestheSRsfromLCO3.8.1thatarenecessaryforensuringtheOPERABILITYoftheACsourcesinDE1serequiredG(s)snotrequndergoperioe)ngsynchronizedtoteoffsitecircuitedbecausestartinindepeisnotrequired'ththe0obeoerabl85a~s~inLridt~,~ha.guC~~esQgmiS.l.bI~g,P,L.Q~~~Q.%.'hA'hisSRC&preclud@requiringtheOPERABLEDG(s)frombeingparalleledwiththeoffsitepowernetworkorotherwiserenderedinoperableduringperformanceofSRs.stimited'~~ACsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromisebothpe'thereunbredcircuitandtheDGItistheintentthattheseSsmuststiecapaeofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDgisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLCO3.8.1foradiscussionofeachSR.REFERENCESNone.B3.8-39 Insert3.8.2.4B.l8.2and8.3MiththerequiredDGinoperable,theminimumrequireddiversityofACpowersourcesisnotavailable.Therefore,itisrequiredthatCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsbeimmediatelysuspended.PerformanceofRequiredActionB.landB.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormal-cooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeoftemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDGtoOPERABLEstatusandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryACpowerredundancytoplantsafetysystems.TheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDGshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichtheplantsafetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientredundantpower. DieselFuelOil~~3B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.3DieselFuelOilBASES4""~CKGROUNDdtu3Mla.~P"vaafsr~Aur~lp~ytsdcN.(.ihe,~~pddsMc~JGKbcmQ~QO~LOC'a9ederu.~~~Otm~Gk&aaa~~~v~4b~~aknocafas.'cIftfootuaf'M~Oa.aaS.a.:aC~a~n,~~lplJQ~~'p."~i~~a~a.~saCkdWC~CIt~L~Pea.faaPCS:PUVP4d}4Qa-0%0v~~act.,d~6Dnt+e4Wtyatyh.L"%06.s~~nf110aibUv,ti/prussia~a<~a.uicienttooperatredTTaasns,~lAt~crU-Qta4ae.Ca~g~Wv~~aO'hara~tDGsisavailable.Thisonsitefueloilcapacityissufficienttooperate.theDGsforlongerthanthetimetoreplenishtheonsitesupplyfromoutsidesources.~w~a:~a.>F'transferredfromstoragetanktodaytankbyeowtransferpumlocWnWa,pstsfsdsm~ream'Waraa~P~1tasbsaCasysoaCea~~CCn(otk4ddnac<nl~<GB5.Redundancyofpumpsandpipingprecludesthefailureoonepump,ortheruptureofanypipe,valveortanktoresultinthelossofmorethanoneDG.orproperoperationofthestandbyDGs,icessaryeuretheproperqualityofthefueloil.Regulate~Gui1.137(Ref.2)addressestherecommendedfu1oilpractiassupplementedbyANSIN195(Ref.3ThefueloilproperesgovernedbytheseSRsarethaterandsedimentcontt,thekinematicviscosit~specificgravity(orAPIgravity),ndimpuritylevel.The06lubricationsysfeisdes'edtoprovidesufficient'ubricationtopermitpropperationofitsassociatedDGunderallloadingconditions.Thesystemisrequiredtojcirculatethelubeoilthe'elengineworkingsurfacesandtoremoveexcesshtgeneratebyfrictionduringoperation.Eacheng'oilsumpcont'nsaninventorycapableofsupporti~aminimumof[7]sofoperation.[Theonsitestoring'einadditiontotheengioilsumpissufficienttopnsure7daysofcontinuousoperation.]ThissupplyissicienttoallowtheoperatortoreenishlubeoilfromOtsidesources.Each96hasanairstartsystemwithadequatecapacityorfi~successivestartattemptsontheDGwithoutrechargit4eaistartreceiversMSa+Acr'~eionximumoaemaniscalculatedusingtheassumptionthataminimumof.anytwor$cf~wct'.(.a~;B3.8-40(continued)Rev.0092892 Insert3.8.3.1Alloutsidetanks,pumps,andpipingarelocatedundergroundtoprotectthemfrompotentialmissiles.HeattracingisprovidedintheexposedsuctionpipingtothefueloilpumpsintheeventthatheatingislostintheDGrooms.Theheattracingisthermostaticallycontrolledtomaintainthefueloilinthepipe>40Fwhichisabovethecloudpointtemperatureofthefueloil(0F). DieselFuelOil,.8.3BASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESTheinitialconditionsotransientanalysesBasisAccident(DBA)andQard3gg.;;:.cic(Re&,assumeEngineereSaeyeauresysemsareOPERABLE.TheDGsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatfuel,ReactorCoolantSystemandcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,PowerDistributionLimits;Section3.4,ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);andSection3.6,ContainmentSystems.Sincedieselfueloilsuppor'0'theoperationofthestandbyACpowersources,satisfCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOWbcu.<Sof~s+~~pen<-LOcA(>~~aCStoreddiese1oilisrequiredtohavesufficientsupplyfordloadagB~B..Itisalsorequiredtoeespeciicsanarsforquality.iionCain01availabletonsooeraisreuirement,inconjunctionwithanabilitytootain.replacementsupplieswithinotPh~availabilityofDGsrequiretoshutdownthereactorandtomaintainitinasafeconditionforananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBAwithlossofoffsitepower.DGdaytankfuelrequirements,aswellastransfercapabilityfromthestoragetanktothedaytank,areaddressedinLCO3.8.1"ACSources-."andLCO3.8.2,"ACSources-WoMSg~glAoaf.Sl4'5~9Thestaringairsystemaminimumattemtswithoutrecgtheairstartreceivers.APPLICABILITYTheACsources(LCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2)arerequiredtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionafteranAOOoraostulatedSincestoreddieselfueloilsuporLCO3.8.1andLCO3.8.2,storeddieselfueloil(continued)TSp~fPJL~B3.8-41 DieselFuelOil~~3BASES94,sAPPLICABILI(continued)LSIh512~iIirhga6t,eaOnd4dsa~requiredtobewithin1imitswhentheassociatedDGisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.snniDQ~5~dQ.ACTIONS-A.1InthisCondition,the7dayfueloilsupplyforaDGisotavailable.However,theConditionisrestrictedtofueoillevelreductionsthatmaintainatleasta6daysupplesecircumstancesmaybecausedbyevents,suchfulllooperationrequiredafteraninadvertentstarwhileatminimmqrequiredlevel,orfeedandbleedoperions,whichmaybenecessitatedbyincreasingparticulatelevelsoranynumberofotheroilqualitydegradations.hisrestrictionallowssuffiajenttimeforobtainingtheequisitereplacementvomeandperformingthealysesrequiredpriortoadditiooffueloiltotheank.Aperiodof48hoursisconsiedsufficientcompleterestorationoftherequiredlevelp'ortodeclingtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisacceptaebaseontheremainingcapacity(>6days),thefactthaproedureswillbeinitiatedtoobtainreplenishment,andlowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiod.8.1Withlubeoilinvtory<500gal,sufcientlubricatingoiltosupport7daysofcontinuousDGorationatfullloadconditionmaynotbeavailable.Hover,theConditionisestrictedtolubeoilvolumeductionsthatmaintainateasta6daysupply.Thisrestr'ctionallowssufficientimetoobtaintherequisitereplacentvolume.Aperiodof48hoursisconsideredsufficienttoompleterestorionoftherequiredvolumepriortodeclar'ngtheDGinoperble.Thisperiodisacceptablebasedontheremaingcapacity(>6days),thelowrateofusage,hefacthatprocedureswillbeinitiatedtoobtainreenishment,andthelowprobabilityofaneventdurinthisbriefperiod.(continued)P~.I83.8-42 Insert3.8.3.2*A.IWithoneormorerequiredDGswithanonsitesupplyof<5000galoffueloil,theassumed40hourfueloilsupplyforaDGisnotavailable.Thiscircumstancemaybecausedbyevents,suchasfullloadoperationafteraninadvertentstartwithaninitialminimumrequiredfueloillevel,orfeedandbleedoperations,whichmaybenecessitatedbyincreasingfueloilparticulatelevelsoranynumberofotheroilqualitydegradations.RequiredActionA.lallowssufficienttimeforobtainingtherequisitereplacementvolumeandperformingtheanalysesrequiredpriortoadditionoffueloiltothetank.TheCompletionTimeof48hoursisconsideredsufficienttocompleterestorationoftherequiredlevelpriortodeclaringtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisacceptablebasedontheremainingcapacity,thefactthatactionswillbeinitiatedtoobtainreplenishment,andthelowprobabilityofaneventduringthisbriefperiod.8.1IfoneormoreDGshasstoredfueloilwithtotalparticulatesnotwithinlimits,thefueloilmustberestoredwithinlimitswithin7days.Thefueloilparticulatepropertiesofviscosity,water,andsedimentareverifiedbySR3.8.3.2.Trendingofparticulatelevelsnormallyallowssufficienttimetocorrecthighparticulatelevelspriortoreachingthelimitof'acceptability.Poorsamplepractices(bottomsampling),contaminatedsamplingequipment,orerrorsinlaboratoryanalysiscanproducefailuresthatdonotfollowatrend.Sincethepresenceofparticulatesdoesnotmeanfailureofthefueloiltoburnproperlyinthedieselengine,andparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenSurveillanceFrequencyintervals,andproperengineperformancehasbeenrecentlydemonstrated(within31days),itisprudenttoallowabriefperiodpriortodeclaringtheassociatedDGinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsforfurtherevaluation,resamplingandre-analysisoftheDGfueloil.C.1WithaRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimenotmet,oroneormoreDG'sfueloilnotwithinlimitsforreasonsotherthanaddressedbyConditionsAorB(e.g.,cloudpointtemperaturereached),theassociatedDGmaybeincapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionandmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperable. DieselFuelOilBBASESACTIONS(continued)CAThisConditionisenteredasaresultofafailuretmettheacceptancecriterionofSR3.8.3.5.Normally,rendingofparticulatelevelsallowssufficienttimetocorectkighparticulatelevelspriortoreachingthelimitofacceptability.Poorsampleprocedures(bottomsampling)>'ontaminatedsamplingequipment,anderrorsin/laboratoryalysiscanproducefailuresthatdonotfoll'owatrend]Sicethepresenceofparticulatesdoesnot~deanfailureIoftheueloiltoburnproperlyinthediese)engine,andpartiulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignifivantlybetweenSurveillanceFreqncyintervals,andproperenineperformancehasbeenrectlydemonstrated:.(within31ays),itisprudenttoalowabriefperiodpriortodel,aringtheassociatedDGinoperable.The7dayCompletionTimeallowsforfurther'valuation,resamplingandre-analysioftheDGfueloil./D.1Withthenew-fueloilroperiesdefinedintheBasesforSR3.8.3.4notwithinterquiredlimits,aperiodof30daysisallowedforroringthestoredfueloilproperties.Tliisperiodovidessufficienttimetotestthestoredfueloiltotqminethatthenewfueloil,whenmixedwithpreviouslyore@,fueloil,remainsacceptable,ortorestorethestoedfuel/oilproperties.Thisrestorationmayinvoefeedadbleedprocedures,filtering,orcombipationsofteseproceduresEve.nifaDGstartandloadasrequireddringthistimeintervalandthefueloilproprtieswereoutsdelimits,thereisahigljlikelihoodthateDGwouldstillbecapableofperformingitsintendedfuction.E.1Withstart'ngairreceiverpressure<[25]psig,sufficiencapacityorfivesuccessiveDGstartatemptsdoesnotexist.owever,aslongasthereceiverressureis>[125]sig,thereisadequatecapacityratleastonestarttempt,andtheDGcanbeconsidereOPERABLEwhiletheaireceiverpressureisrestoredtothrequiredlimiAperidof48hoursisconsideredsufficientocomplet(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-43Rev.0,09/28/92 DieselFuelOil~~3BASESACTIONSE.l(continued)restorationtotherequiredpressureprior&declaringtheDGinoperable.Thisperiodisaccep~tebasedontheremainingairstartcapacity,thctthatmostDGstartsaramplishedonthefir~stempt,andthelowprobabilianeventuringthisbriefperiod.F.lWithyRequiredActionandassociatedCoetionTimenotmet~oroneormoreDG'sfueloilorlubeoiotwithin'mitsforreasonsotherthanaddressedbyCondi'onsA'throughD,theassociatedDGmaybeincapableofpeormingritsintendedfunctionandmustbeimmediatelydeclareinoperable.SURVEILLANCERtsstVstft~~~~~qy+dI~5UUVmo-.r~.d.G6.~GALWOedbJIAyuzekC~~p~t~py~Lofhdje.,S.S".3~3I47~I~~~SR3.8.3.1ThisSRzovidesverificaisanaequatenventoryofnthestoragetankstosuorteachionfor7daysad.eerioissuicienttimetopaceeinasafeshutdownconditionandtobringineplenishmentfuelfromanoffsitelocation.plI~Th1daFreuencisadequatetuensurethatasufficientsuplyoffueloilisavailable,sinceareoperatorswouldbeawareofanylargeusesoffueoiuringthisperiod.SR3.8.3.2isSurveillanceensuresthatsufficientlubeoilinveyisaosupportatleast7daysoffulllooperationforeacThe[500]galreuisbasedontheDGmanufacturercmptiesfortheruntimeoftheDG.Impliciti'therequirementtoverifythecapabiliransferthelub'romitsstorageloc'theDG,whentheDGlubeoidoesnotholdequateinventoryfor7daysoffullloadopera'thout(continued)B3.8-44RevgE.G>nftd~~tLl'P~gP~ Insert3.8.3.3ThisSRprovidesameansofdeterminingwhetherstoredfuel'oilhasbeencontaminatedwithsubstancesthatwouldhaveanimmediate,detrimentalimpactondieselenginecombustion.ThisensurestheavailabilityofhighqualityfueloilfortheDGs.Fueloildegradationduringlongtermstorageisindicatedbyanincreaseinparticulate,duemostlytooxidation.Thepresenceofparticulatedoesnotmeanthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyinadieselengine.Theparticulatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueloilinjectionequipment,however,whichcouldeventuallycauseenginefailure.AfueloilsampleisanalyzedtoestablishthatpropertiesspecifiedinTableIofASTHD975(Ref.4)forviscosity,water,andsedimentaremetforthestoredfueloil.TheFrequencyofthisSRtakesintoconsiderationfueloildegradationtrendsthatindicatethatparticulateconcentrationisunlikelytochangesignificantlybetweenFrequencyintervals.TheFrequency,asspecifiedintheDieselFuelOilTestingProgram,is92days. DieselFuelOilB3.8.3BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREHENTS3.8.3.2(continued)~~~~thelevelreachingthemanufacturerrecommendedminimumvel.A31ayFrequencyisadequatetoensurethaasufficientlubeosupplyisonsite,sinceDGstarts/andruntimearecloselynitoredbytheunitstaff.SR3.8.3.3Thetestslistedbe,'lowareameans'fdeterminingwhethernewfueloilisof%beappropriategradeandhasnotbeencontaminatedwithsubstancestPatwouldhaveanimmediate,detrimentalimpactondieselpiiginecombustion.Ifresultsfromthesetestsarewithjnacceptablelimits,thefueloilmaybeaddedtothestoragtankswithoutconcernforcontaminatingtheentirevmeoffueloilinthestoragetanks.Thesetestsarebeconductedpriortoaddingthenewfueltothestorageank(sbutinnocaseisthetimebetweenreceiptofnewfuelandconductingtheteststoexceed31days.Theests,limits,andapplicableASTHStandardsareasfolows:a.SamplethenefueloilinaccordancewithASTHD4054-[](Ref.6);b.VerifyinaccordancewiththetestspecifiedinASTHD975-[/](Ref.6)thatthesampleResanabsolutespecifidgravityat60/60Fof>0.83'ynd<0.89'ranAPIgravityat60'Fof>27'nd<3',akinematicviscoAtyat40'Cof>1.9centistokesan<4.1cent'stokes,andaflashpointof>125'F;ndc.Vefythat'thenewfueloilhasaclearandrightaearancewithpropercolorwhentestedinacordancethASTHD4176-[](Ref.6).Failretomeetanyoftheabovelimitsiscauseforrejctingthenewfueloil,butdoesnotrepresentafaluretomeettheLCOconcernsincethefueloilisnotaddedotestoragetanks.ithin31daysfollowingtheinitialnewfueloilsample,thefueloilisanalyzedtoestablishthattheothercontinued)WOGSTSB3.8-45Rev.0,09/28/92 DieselFu'elOilBASESsSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSI:SR3.8.3.3(continued)propertiesspecifiedinTable1ofASTND975-[])Ref.7)aremetfornewfueloilwhentestedinaccordancepithASTM%975-[](Ref.6),exceptthattheanalysiforsulfumaybeperformedinaccordancewithASTM522-[](Ref.6orASTMD2622-[](Ref.6).The31dayperiodisacceptlebecausethefueloilpropertiesfinterest,evenifthewerenotwithinstatedlimits,uldnothaveanimmediateffectonDGoperation.ThisurveillanceensurestheavlabilityofhighqualityfeloilfortheDGs.9c.iFueloildegradatioduringlongtermtorageshowsupasanincreaseinparticula,duemostlyoxidation.The,presenceofparticulatedoesnotmenthefueloilwillnotburnproperlyinadieseengine.heparticulatecancausefoulingoffiltersandfueoilijectionequipment,however,whichcancauseen'neailure.ParticulateconcentrationssdbedeterminedinaccordancewithASTMD2276-gMethodA(Ref.6).Thismethodinvolvesagravimeicdetminationoftotalparticulateconcentratiointhefu1oilandhasalimitof10mg/l.Itisacceptaetoobtainafieldsampleforsubsequentlaboratoryestinginlieuffieldtesting.[Forthosedesignsinwhicthetotalstorefueloilvolumeiscontainedintwoororeinterconnectedanks,eachtankmustbeconsideredndtestedseparately.TheFrequencyofhistesttakesintoconsirationfueloildegradationtresthatindicatethatparticuateconcentrationiunlikelytochangesignificanlybetweenFrequencyintvals.SR3.8.3.4ThisSurvillanceensuresthat,withouttheaidofthrefillmpressor,sufficientairstartcapacityforechDGisavaiable.Thesystemdesignrequirementsprovideraminimof[five]enginestartcycleswithoutrecharging[AsrtcycleisdefinedbytheDGvendor,butusuallyimearedintermsoftime(secondsofcranking)orenginecrkingspeed.]The,pressurespecifiedinthisSRis(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-46Rev.0,09/28/92 DieselFuelOilB3..3BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS,SR3.8.3.4(continued)'ntendedtoreflectthelowestvalueatwhiche[five]tartscanbeaccomplished.Th31dayFrequencytakesintoaccountthcapacity,capaylity,redundancy,anddiversityofPheACsourcesandotheridicationsavailableinthecontrolroom,includingalarms,talerttheoperatortobelowormalairstartpressure.SR3.8.3.5Hicrobiologicalfoul'iqgisamajorcauseoffueloildegradation.Therearqnumer9usbacteriathatcangrowinfueloilandcausefoul'ing,butallmusthaveawaterenvironmentinordertosurive.Removalofwaterfromthefuelstoragetanksonceey[31]dayseliminatesthenecessaryenvironmentfor/bcterialsurvival.Thisisthemosteffectivemeansofpontrqllingmicrobiologicalfouling."Inaddition,iteliminatesthegotentialforwaterentrainmentinthefue>loilduri,ngDGoperation.Watermay'omefromanyofsevealsources~~includingcondensation,groundwater,rainwater,andcont'aminatedfueloil',andfrombreakdownoftj(efueloilbybacteria.Frequentcheckingforandrpnovalofaccumulatedwaterminimizesfoulingandprovidesdataregardingthewatertightintegrityofthefueloil@stem.TheSurveiliangeFrequenciesareestablishedbyregulatoryGuide1.137(Rqf.2).ThisSRisforpreventivejaintenance.Thepresence,ofwaterdoesnotnecessarilyrepresentfailureofthisSR,'providedtheaccumulatedwaterisremovedduringperfor'ceoftheSurveillance/SR3.8.3.Drainingofthefueloilstoredinthesupplytan,removalofacculatedsediment,andtankcleaningarereqiredat10yearintervalsbyRegulatoryGuide1.137(Ref.2paragrah2.f.ThisSRalsorequirestheperformancoftheASHECpde;SectionXI(Ref.8),examinationsofthetgks.Topr(eludetheintroductionofsurfactantsinthefuegoilsystem,thecleaningshouldbeaccomplishedusingsodiuhypochloritesolutions,ortheirequivalent,ratherthan(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-47Rev.0,09/28/92 DieselFuelOiB3.8.3BASESSURVEILLANCESSR3.8.3.6(continued)ThisSRisforpreventivemaintenance.TheenceofsedimenotnecessarilyrepresentaailureofthisSR,providedthalatedsedimentisremovedduringperformanceoftheSurveilREFERENCES1.Q'SAR,Section+9.5.4.t+Reulae1.137.ei.QSAR,Chapter+6~.SAR,Chapter+15'AASTHStandards,0975,Tablel.'lerandPressMf~3-+.>Q(neo.NudecorIaau.rP&'3.8-48 .mnzs),~,z,~WDCSources-~B3.8.4B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.3.4DCSources-~srooss1,1.,3,~'4BASES9l.V44.4.BACKGROUNDRl.W<<.4.ThestationDCelectricalpowerystemprovidestheACemergencypowersystemwithcontrolpower.It.alsoprovidesbothmotiveandcontrolpowertoselectedsafetyrelatedequipmentandreferrei'~buspower(viainverters).e.>,9.4.191.1114DCe'lowersystemisdesignesuicientindependence,reunailitytoperformits~14.1<1sc,~(,AIF)g~~~.I)p1Cri1&dGv,Ci~,ClANss.cEdl~~~'<,n~~'4C'4nu~)us1(kiss~pvbRcA~~~5.safetyfu',assumingassnilure.TheDCelcalpowersystemalsoconformstocommendationsoReulator.2andIindependentandredundantsafetrelatedClassIEDCCti@rsbM4S1~electricalpowerTrainAandTrainB.Eachsemcsistso125VDCbatterybatterycharers~~8interconnectingcabling.i~~Bs~.u->>QQV4+~5~Ctr>1oss.ss~4'I.v44.c.The250VDCsourceisobtainedbyuseofthetwo125VDCbatteriesconnectedinseries.Additionallythereisne]arebatterychargerpersubsystem,whichprovidesckupseiceintheeventthatthepreferredbatteryrgerisoutoservice.Ifthesparebatterycharger'ubstitutedforonethepreferredbatterychargers,entherequiremenofindependenceandredundcybetweensubsystemsareaintained.Duringnormaloperat,the5/250]VDCloadispoweredfromthebatterycharge'hebatteriesfloatingonthesystem.Incaseoflosormalpowertothebatterycharger,theDCloadsautoma'callypoweredfromthestationbatteriestsar%~bw+e(The[TrainandTrainB]DCelectricalwersubsystemsprovideecontrolpowerforitsassociatClass1EACpoweradgroup,[4.16]kVswitchgear,andVloadcents.TheDCelectricalpowersubsystemsalsorovideDCeltricalpowertotheinverters,whichinturnpowtheACvitalbuses.(continued)B3.8-49-Re. Insert3.8.4.1Asourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactivecomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).SeparatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforthesetwoelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandwhethertheyareClasslE(i.e.,supplysafetyrelatedorengineeredsafeguardsfunctions)ornoness'ential.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheminimumsourcesofDCpowerwhicharerequiredtosupplytheDCbusesandtheirassociateddistributionsystemduringMODESI,2,3,and4. DCSources-goer~@83.8.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)P..+d8d4~Vil<~.v',.c2hitoPrC,V~~~~h~.t~0md+A~~OA44~L.i<M+~~~~Ac.~Mr'2~~1'.Q,p~o~a'hc.pv~~d~~nei~Q.~d"~.$.g.~h~Ci,CGAau.Aw"44K+~~591pi54Aiw~c4A.i.Rcf.8),'eDCpowerdistributionsystemi~sescribedinmoredetailinLCO3.8.9,"Dis'bastionSystem-Operating,"andLCO3.8.10,"Oi<4onSystems-Shutdown."Eachbatte~rsadequatestoragec'tytocarrytherequireoadcontinuouslyforatleastrsandtopelfmthreecompletecyclesofintermittentadsscussas~~bo~u~Each12atteryseparatelyhousedinaventilatedroom~diddWddsubsystemisocatedinanareaseparatedphysicallyandelectricallyfromtheothersubsystemtoensurethatasinlefailureinonesubsstemdoesnotcauseafailureinaredundantsusstem.hereisenreunems,suchasbatteries,batterydistributiond(~~~eaeriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpowersubsystemWaresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesandthe100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacity5~FBSula-i.t-~n-erf8c+b.eiaido~voltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltaeoututof128VperbatteryiscusseCl1orsizing1storaebatteriRef.5.~~~re<~dg,gyr'dia~'achTrainAandTrainBDC'lectricalpowersubsystemhasamplepoweroutputcapacityforthesteadystateoperationofconnectedloadsrequiredduringnormaloperation,whileatthesametimemaintainingitsbatterybankfullycharged.Eachbatterychargeralsohassufficientcapacitytorestorethebatteryfromthedesignminimumchargetoitsfullychargedstatewithin24hour~whilesupplyingnormal~geadystateloadsdiscussedinthegSAR,Chapter+8~RefL~oAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESaAH)DBA)andPd.Theinitialconditionsofransitanases"'ssumethatSF)'ystemsareOPERABLE.TheDC(continued)WOG"nv)~n.pigrP,+grimB3.8-50 Insert3.8.4.2EachbatteryprovidesaseparatesourceofDCpowerindependentofACpower.EachofthetwobatteriesiscapableofcarryingitsexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.MajorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimesoneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.2).Therearefourbatterychargersavailabletothebatteries.ChargerslAand1Bareratedat150ampsandchargerslA1and1Blareratedat200amps.Batterychargers1Aand1A1arenormallyalignedtobatteryA,andbatterychargersIBand1B1arenormallyalignedtobatteryB.Achargingcapacityofatleast150ampsisnormallyrequiredtosupplythenecessaryDCloadsoneachtrainandtoprovideafullbatterychargetoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDesignBasisAccident(DBA).TheDCpowerdistributionsystemisdescribedinmoredetailinBas'esforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystem-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3;8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6."TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsoprovideDCelectricalpowertotheinverters,whichinturnpowertheACinstrumentbuses.TheinvertersaredescribedinmoredetailinBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4,"andLCO3.8.8,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES5and6."TrainAEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)equipmentissuppliedfrombatteryA,whileTrainBESFequipmentissuppliedfrombatteryB.Additionally,the480VESFswitchgearanddieselgenerator(DG)controlpanelsaresuppliedfromeitherbatterybymeansofanautomatic'transfercircuitintheswitchgearandcontrolpanels.ThenormalsupplyfromTrainA(Buses14and18andDGA)isfromDCdistributionpanelsA.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencyDCsupplyforTrainB.Similarly,thenormalsupplyfromTrainB(Buses16and17andDGB)isfromDCdistributionpanelsB.ThesepanelsalsoprovidetheemergencydcsupplyforTrainA. '40~>lDCSourcessnB3.8.4BASESAPPLICABLEelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergen'cyDCSAFETYANALYSESelectricalpowerfortheDGs,emergencyauxiliaries,and(continued)controlandswitchingduringallMODESofoperation.%lVllt<TheOPERABILITYoftheDCsourcesisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbased'nthedesignbasisofthe~.ThisincluestttEOEEBOttOPEEBBEE~inthe-eventof:plaa.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpowerorallonsiteACpower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure.TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCO~~KcHdc~TheDCelectr>calower@i&~aiiEeach~gpss~c.~onsisingoftwobatte~+demandthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandie~e~.'nterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtoensuretheavailabilityoftherequiredpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafteran00+oraostulatedDBA.LossofanyrainDCelectricalpowerW~QB)doesnotreventtheminimumsafetyfunctionfrombeingperformed..onel.v<<~c-AnOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersggg959arequires5QrtobeoperatingandcectedtociateusWmt~ud~ai~aaue'~d~~~>04>~~ROID~~>,~~enseV~ahn.b~~R~4~'M~/>lsaAPPLICABILITY9l.yll.C'heDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES1,2,3,and4toensuresafeoperationandtoensurethat:pl~a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;and(continued)ST)auEB3.8-51 Insert3.8.4.3IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCelectricalpowerisavailablewith:a.'nassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneDCelectricalpowersource).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofDCpowerensuresthatatleastoneDCpowersourceisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.In.theeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.6).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.7)canbemetatalltimes. Moos.sl,z.,%,~9DCSources-BASESAPPLICABILITY(continued)cia:gLl1.Via~4b.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedineeventofapostulatedDBA.TheDCelectricalowerrequirementsforMODES5and6areaddressedintheLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-taACTIONSA.l4l.Via~C.9'1.ViaCOPS'PWu~fW~~muredu)Mn~eoQAM~apt-KoQcP~~~Va~q~eJcb,~~CA~r~r4'.~~~~@~+4~Mcdad'ConditionArepresentsonetrainwithalossofabilit~tocoelyrespondtoanevent,andapotent'fability'nenergizeddi'aoperation.Itistherefore,imperaAaXtheoperator'sattentionfocusostabilizingenit,min'zingthepotentialforcompletelossofCpowertotheaffectrain.The2hourlimiticons@entwiththeallowedtimeforinoerableDdiributionsstemtrain.edllACL&oneDCelectricalpowerinoerablelnot,pera,orinoperaerandassociatedinoperablebatterynlnctricalpowersubsysteecapacitytosurtasaeneanIsusequentworstcasesinglefailurewould,however,resultinthecornletelossoftheremaining125VDCelectricalpowersubsystemsfEfThe2hourCompletionTllllereflectsareasonabletimetoassess0595sausasaunctionoftheinoerableDCelectricalpowersubsystemand,iftheDC'ectrlcapoweraSRQBBeisnotrestoredtoOPERABLEstatus,topreparetoeffectanorderlyandsafeunitshutdown.L,via~0B.landB.2IftheinoperableDCelectricalpowerM~McannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,themustbebroughttoaMODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theunitmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3within6hoursandtoMODE5(continued)B3.8-52 DCSourcest4EOH(,Z,%~h.fB3.8.4BASESACTIONSc.hLCW~'~v~~'~,O>~~~~bEAytf3TL5'5.0~j0'3B.landB.2(continued)within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequired"q5Rconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinorderlmannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.TheompetymonTimetobringteun)o>sconsistent'euiredinRegulatorGuideef.8.SURVEILLANCEREOOIRENENTSSR3.8.4.1Yifyingbatteryterminalvoltagewhileonfloatchargefortheatterieshelpstoensuretheeffectivenesspfthecharg'ygsystemandtheabilityofthebatteriestoperformtheiri'ntendedfunction.Floatchargeistheconditioninwhichthebargerissupplyingthecontinuouschargerequiredtovercometheinternallosses'ofabattery(orbatterycell)ndmaintainthebattery(orabatterycell)inafullychargqdstate.Thevoltagerequirementsarebasedonthenomi1designvoltage'fthebatteryandareconsistentwiththeinitialvoltagesassumedinthebatterysizingcalculations.>The7dayFrequencyisconsistentwithmanufacturerrecommendions~andIEEE-450(Ref.9).SR3.8.4.29l.aaaVisualinspectionto<detectco~osionofthebatterycellsandconnections,opmeasurementtheresistanceofeachintercell,interrpck,intertier,aterminalconnection,providesanindj4ationofphysicalmageorabnormaldeteriorationatcouldpotentiallyradebatteryperformance.ThelimitsestablishedforthisSRmustbe~morethan20%abovetheresistanceasmeasuredduringinstaN,ationornotabovetceilingvalueestablishedbythemanucturer.TheSveillanceFrequencyfortheseinspections,wichcandeteconditionsthatcancausepowerlossesduetores'stanceheating,is92days.ThisFrequencyiscosideredacceptablebasedonoperatingexperiencerelatedtodetectingcorrosiontrends.(continued)B3.8-53 C2Insert3.8.4.4SR3.8.4.1ThisSRverifiesthateachbatteryhasabatterychargerwithacapacity,ofz150amps.Thisverificationhelpstoensuretheeffectivenessofthechargingsystemandtheabilityofthebatteriestoperformtheirintendedfunction.TheFrequencyof31daysisconsideredacceptablebasedonoperatingexperienceandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthataRrttheoperatortobatterymalfunctions.SR3.8.4.2ThisSRverifiesthatthecapacityofeachbatteryisadequatetosupplyandmaintaininOPERABLEstatus,therequiredemergencyloadsforthedesigndutycyclewhensubjectedtoabatteryservicetest.Abatteryservicetestisaspecialtestofbatterycapability,asfound,tosatisfythedesignrequirements(batterydutycycle)oftheDCelectricalpowersystem.ThedischargerateandtestlengthcorrespondstothedesigndutycyclerequirementsspecifiedinReference2.TheSurveillanceFrequencyof24monthsisconsistentwiththerecommendationsofRegulatoryGuide1.32(Ref.5)andRegulatoryGuide1.129(Ref.6),whichstatethatthebatteryservicetestshouldbeperformedduringrefuelingoperationsoratsomeotheroutage,withintervalsbetweentestsnottoexceed24months.ThisSRismodifiedbytwoNotes.NoteIstatesthatSR3.8.4.3maybeperformedinlieuofSR3.8.4.2.ThissubstitutionisacceptablebecauseSR3.8.4.3representsamoreseveretestofbatterycapacitythan'oesSR3.8.4.2.Note2statesthatthissurveillanceshallnotbeperformed~~~~inNODEI,2,3,or4becauseperformingtheSurveillancewouldperturbtheelectricaldistribution'ystemandchallengesafetysystems.SR3:8.4.3ThisSurveillanceverifiesthateachbatterycapacityisZ80%ofthemanufacturer'sratingwhensubjectedtoaperformancedischargetest.Abatteryperformancetestisatestofconstantcurrentcapacityofabattery,normallydoneintheasfoundcondition,afterhavingbeeninservice,todetectanychangeinthecapacityasdeterminedbyspecifiedacceptancecriteria.Thetestisintendedtodetermineoverallbatterydegradationduetoageandusage.Abatteryshouldbereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80/ofthemanufacturerrating.Acapacityof80'howsthatthebatteryrateofdeteriorationisincreasing,evenifthereisamplecapacitytomeettheloadrequirements. TheFrequencyforthisSRis60monthswhenthebatteryis<85%ofitsexpectedlifewithnodegradationand12monthsifthebatteryshowsdegradationorhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithacapacity<100%ofthemanufacturer'srating.Whenthebatteryhasreached85%ofitsexpectedlifewithcapacity>100%ofthemanufacturer'srating,theFrequencybecomes24months.Batterydegradationisindicatedwhenthebatterycapacitydropsbymorethan10%relativetoitscapacityonthepreviousperformancetestorwhenitis>10%belowthemanufacturerrating.TheseFrequenciesareconsideredacceptablebasedonthetestingbeingperformedinaconservativemannerrelativetothebatterylifeanddegradation.Thisensuresthatbatterycapacityisadequatelymonitoredandthatthebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunction.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatthisSRshallnotbeperformed~~~inMODE1,2,3,or4.ThereasonfortheNoteisthatduringoperationintheseMODES,performanceofthisSRcouldcauseperturbationstotheelectricaldistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems. DCSources-8.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS(continued)R3.8.4.3~~Visualinspectionofthebatterycells,cellplatesandbatteryracksprovidesanindicationofphysicaldamageorabnormaldeteriorationthatcouldpotentiallyder'adebatteryperformance.he12monthFrequencyforthisSRisconsisntwith,EE-450(Ref.9),whichrecommendsdetailevisualinectionofcellconditionandrackinterityonayearlybasiSR3.8.4.andSR3.8.4.5Visualinspeionandresistancemeasurementsofintercell,interrack,intrtier,andtermin8connectionsprovideanindicationofpsicaldamageoy'bnormaldeteriorationthatcouldindicatederadedbattercondition.Theanticorrosionmate'alisustohelpensuregoodelectricalconnectiosandoreduceterminaldeterioration.Thevisualinspectionororrosionisnotintendedtorequireremovalofand'ectionundereachterminalconnection.Theremovajfvisiblecorrosionisapreventivemaintenance/SR.ThepresenceofvisiblecorrosiondoesnotnyessarlyrepresentafailureofthisSRprovidedvisibleorrosioisremovedduringperformanceofSR3.8.4.4.TheconnectionrsistancelimitsorSR3.8.4.5shallbenomorethan20%aovetheresistanceasmeasuredduringinstallation,rnotabovetheceilgvalueestablishedbythemanufactuer.TheSurveilanceFrequenciesof12monthisconsistentwithIEEE-450ef.9),whichrecommendscelltcellandtermi'nalonnectionresistancemeasurementayearlybasis.SR.8.4.6ThiSRrequiresthateachbatterychargerbecapablofsplying[400]ampsand[125]Vfor>[8]hours.Thserquirementsarebasedonthedesigncapacityofthehargers(Ref.4).AccordingtoRegulatoryGuide1.32(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-54Rev.0,09/28/92 ~oMl,x,g~qDCSources-9~~B3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.4.6(continued)(Ref.10),thebatterychargersupplyisrequiredtoebasedonthelargestcombineddemandsofthevarioussteadytateloadsandthechargingcapacitytorestoreebatteryfmthedesignminimumchargestatetothefulchargedsta,irrespectiveofthestatusoftheunitringthesedemanoccurrences.Theminimumrequiredampresandduratioensuresthattheserequirementscabesatisfied.TheSurveilnceFrequencyisacceptable,giventheunitconditionsreiredtoperformthetestpndtheotheradministrativeontrolsexistingtoenreadequatechargerperformancedurithese[18month]itervals.Inaddition,thisFrequencyistendedto.becoistentwithexpected.fuelcyclelengths.ThisSurveillanceisreqiredtoeperformedduringMODES5and6sinceitwouldrequethDCelectricalpowersubsystemtobeinoperable'dur'ngperformanceofthetest.ThisSRismodifiedbytwos.ThereasonforNote1isthatperformingtheSurveiancwouldperturbtheelectricaldistributionsternachallengesafetysystems.Note2acknowledgesthatcreditmbetakenforunplannedeventsthatsatisfythiSR.SR3.8.4.7Abatteryserviceestisaspecialtestfbatterycapability,asfond,tosatisfythedesigrequirements(batterydutycyle)oftheDCelectricalpersystem.ThedischargeratepndtestlengthshouldcorresndtothedesigndutycylerequirementsasspecifiediReference4.TheSurveillnceFrequencyof[18months]iscoistentwiththerecommedationsofRegulatoryGuide1.32(Re.10)andRegulatoryGuide1.129(Ref.11),whichstatethathebatterysrvicetestshouldbeperformedduringreuelingoperatiosoratsomeotheroutage,withintervalsetweentests,ottoexceed[18months].ThisRismodifiedbythreeNotes.Note1allowsthonceper0monthsperformanceofSR3.8.4.8inlieuofSR3.8.4.7.Thissubstitutionisacceptablebecause(continued)WOGSTSB3.8-55Rev.0,09l28l92. ~465S,K,'3~'iDCSources-~oB3.8.4BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.4.7(continued)SR3.8.4.8representsamoreseveretestofbatterycacitythandoesSR3.8.4.7.ThereasonforNote2isthatperformingtheSurveillancewouldperturbtheelecicalistributionsystemandchallengesafetysystems.Note3anowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenforunplanedeventsthasatisfythisSR.SR3.8.4.8Q'l.iNAbatteryperomancetestisatestofnstantcurrentcapacityofabaery,normallydoneinheasfoundcondition,afterhaingbeeninservic,todetectanychangeinthecapacitdeterminedbyheacceptancetest.Thetestisintendedtodetermineorailbatterydegradationduetoageausage.TheacceptancecriteriaforhiSurveillanceareconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.9)andIE-485(Ref.5).Thesereferencesrecommendthatthetterybereplacedifitscapacityisbelow80%ofthemanacturerrating.Acapacityof80%showsthathebateryrateofdeteriorationisincreasing,eveniftheisampcapacitytomeettheloadrequirements.TheSurveillanceFreqncyforthistesis60months,oreveryl2monthsiftebatteryshowsdegdationorhasreached85%ofitsxpectedlife.Degradaionisindicated,accordingtoIEEE-50(Ref.9),whenthebaterycapacitydropsbymoreth10%relativetoitscapac'tyonthepreviousperforancetestorwhenitis'belowthemanufacturerrting.TheseFrequenciesarecosistentwiththerecommentionsinIEEE-450(Ref.9).I'hisSRisodifiedbytwoNotes.ThereasonfoNote1isthatperfmingtheSurveillancewouldperturbthelectricydistributionsystemandchallengesafesystems.Note2acknowledgesthatcreditmaybetakenforuplannedeventsthatsatisfythisSR.WOGSTSB3.8-56(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92

DCSourcesBASES(continued)REFERENCES10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.2.egulatoide1.6,March101971.IEEE-308-4;FSA,ter[8].5.IEEE-485-[1983],JuneU6JSAR,Chapter+6f.QSAR,Chapter+15P.ulatoide1.93,December197.IEEE-450-[17].RegulatoryGuide1.32,February1977.RegulatoryGuide1.129,December1974.B3.8-57 hltaOE5Q~4DCSources-B3..583.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS95.iv3.8.5DCSources-~BASESw7.v~lg.VsbBACKGROUND~x-:CGCSourcprovidedintheBasesfocrating."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES'tiaconditionsofDesignBasisAccidentandtransientans'LysesintheFSAR,Chapter[6]Iaf~]andChapter[15](Ref-.--2).,assumethatEngineeredSafetyFeature.systemsareOPERABLE.TheDCele~tHcalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemerge~ny-"Bt'lectricalpowerfortheieselgenerators,em@gencyauxitiazies,andcontrolandwitchingdurin..al1MODESofoperatio'n-.heOPERABILITYoftheDCsubsystemsis--consistentwiththeinigia1assumptiohsoftheaccidentanalysesandthe-~e"uirementsQq,v.b6.~.d~>sett]]]+idQPA~~+~L~Ar't6]TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumDCelectricalpowersourcesduringMODES5and6ensuresthat:S&PoAlber~~~~~O~BLOC+~~6~CCrs,rdtdcsrlSty~an~>~~~MME.ltb.C.s4andevenpo11s~~ateeh-a~a+i~63sCkC~~~~o@a.]CsLCly~ass~Hrisstsursl~ri~~~~di-Cited.bC~~anC~t~Ig~TheDCsourcessatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.Celectricalpowersubsystems,eachconsis1ngaterychargerperbatterecorrespon1euipmentandinconnectingcablingwithinthetrain,are(continued)83.8-58 Insert3.8.5.1TheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredDCelectricalsourcesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberorrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheDCelectricalsources,mustberemovedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredDCelectricalsourcesisbasedontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"Distribution-Systems-MODES5and6. Insert3.8.5.2Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheDCelectricalpowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofDCsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinNODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinNODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromNODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageisl.imited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.b.Requiringappropriatecompensatoryme'asuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthat,,donotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.C.d.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.Maintaining,totheextent'ractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingNODEI,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent. Insert3.8.5.2(continued)IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power. Insert3.8.5.3TheDCelectricalpowersourcesarerequiredtobeOPERABLEtosupportthedistributionsubsystemsrequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-Shutdown."IfonlyoneDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrainisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,theminimumsourceconsistsofabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithintherequiredtrain.IfbothDCelectricalpowertrainsarerequired,oneDCsourcemustcontainabattery,achargingcapacityofatleast150amps,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcablingwithinthetrainsystem.ThesecondDCsourcemayconsistofonlyabatterychargerwithacapacityofatleast150amps,orabattery,andthecorrespondingcontrolequipmentandinterconnectingcabling.Thetwomustbesufficientlyindependentthatalossofalloffsitepowersources,alossofonsitestandbypower,oraworstcasesinglefailuredoesnotaffectmorethanonerequiredDCelectricalpowertrain.ThisensurestheavailabilityofsufficientDCelectricalpowersourcestooperatetheplantinasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequences.ofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents).TheACpoweredand'CpoweredfanventilationunitsarenotrequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisLCO,butsomeformof'ventilationmayberequiredtomeetSR3.8.6.3. 1sDCSourcesSh&devn.BASESLCO(continued)tosupportrequiredtrainsofthedistributionsysterequiredOPERABLEbyLCO3.8.10,"Di'tionSystems-tdown."ThisensuresiabilityofsufficientDCe'ourcestooperatetheunitinasafemanntomitigaonsequencesofpostulatentsduringshutdown(e.g.,handlingacntsandinadvertentreactorvesseldraindoAPPLICABILITYTo~~paQi4~<acaLcGcau4&<OS<g~Co4~~d-~ngTheDCelectricalpowersourcesreuiredtobeOPERABLEinNODES5and6prov>eassurancetha.Requiredfeaturestoprovideadequatecoolantinventorymakeupareavailablefortheirradiafuelsembliesinthecoreincaseofaninadventdrawnofthereactorvessel;b.Requiredfeaesneededtomiateafuelhandlingaccidentareavable;)mC.d.Requiredfeaturesestomitigatetheeffectsofeventsthatceadtocoramageduringshutdownareavaile;andrumentationandcontrolcapability'vailableformonitoringandmaintainingtheunitincoldshutdownconditionorrefuelingcondition.~q(ve..TheDCelectricalpowerrequirementsforNODESI,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.4.Qc5~5-N,"8,I.z,~~9-jACTIONSQQ.aiQg.tv~~%souNLa.cHAAIte'Lbiq.MhWmmCwk~e$ltbst~aQ4twntrains~SBBBrequiredbyLCO3.0.10,theremainingsB'uicientsystemstoallowcontinuationofCOREforByallowingtheoptiondeclarerequiredfesinoperablewiteaeCpowersource(s)inoerabl,appropriateresr~cionsw>11eimplementedinaccorancewiththfectedrequirefeaturesACTIO~CJL,~(~q~~CnI-PBJLCOAAQpMdhO~p~lytgdyerNt~~LI~,~it+(continued)Y~B~B3.8-59Rev ~~~ay5~(DCSources-4404oxnB3.8.5BASESACTIONS~~annvoveundesiredadministrasve.ereoreeowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactions'de(i.e.,endCOREALTERATIONS,movemeirradiatedfuelassemblies,activitiesthatresultininadvertentdrainingthereavessel,and'perations*involvingpositivereact'dditions).TheRequiredActiontosuspe~nivereactyadditionsdoesnotpreclude~a'mstomaintainorincrereactorvesseerovidisma'fQv<'if.v,c10factionstoestablishasafeconservativecon'on.eseactionsminimizeprobabilityoftheerrenceofpoulatedevents.Itisfurther~reunbredtoimmediatelyinitiactiontorestoretquiredDCelectricalpowersubsystemdtoco'thisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedintoprovidethenecessaryDCelectricalpowertothnitsafesystems.NotwistandingperformanceoftheaconservativeRequiredActions,theunitisstillwithouicientDCpoersourcestooperate-inasafemanner.ThereationmustbeinitiatedtorestoretheminimumrequitingDCowersourcesandcontinueduntiltmentsarerestored.TheCompletionTimeofimmediat'elyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.TherestorationoftherequiredDCelectricalpowersubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimeduringwhichthe'afetysystemsmaybewithoutsufficientpower.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSevobSR3.8.5.1SR3.8.5.1requiresperformanceof11Surveillance,sethelnachS.~LC.O3.%.4~~o~q>~~~~~~~~~p~~~~wmQQ<&5~oL~~B3.8-60ued)28/92 Insert3.8.5.4<<~iiA.2.1A.2.2A.2.3andA.2.4IIMithoneormorerequiredDCelectricalpowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONS,andoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,ahdA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.'tisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredDCelectricalpowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessaryDCelectricalpowertotheplantsafetysystems. Insert3.8.5.5ThisSRprecludesrequiringtheOPERABLEDCelectricalpowersourcefrombeingremovedfromservicetoperformabatteryservicetestoraperformancedischargetest.WithlimitedDCsourcesavailable,asingleeventcouldcompromisemultiplerequiredsafetyfeatures.ItistheintentthattheseSRsmuststillbecapableofbeingmet,butactualperformanceisnotrequiredduringperiodswhentheDCelectricalpowersourceisrequiredtobeOPERABLE.RefertothecorrespondingBasesforLC0,3.8.4foradiscussionofthespecifiedSR. DCSourcesBASES(continued)REFERENCESNrv~pter(ei.2.FSAR,Chapte~B3.8-61 BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.6BatteryCellParametersBASES~99.<w,BACKGROUNDcart3.Q.t.)Q.)v,a~txrkcb>~-~)'<~CDQ~~ma~~(.l~&Cot9pca,~rlPLICABLEYANALYSESQCbGC0aaW9.4aared4aaO)w~(Ifovl+4fvs(ac<%ceo)dacafqCa)Cbala),C'Cdu~daeq)d~A~)Cbd)Cabala/+.4~49ag~4>>aAvdaa)aa)paIig44a9c'ctl4ora9fowtrQWa)Maes(.5a44yFera~>ye~ma~+QeA)Rea).Ml~%~M~4~C)QCbil~)Ki~~bdate)bruce~0~C4vcaQ4UcuAe~B~EC&9CaaE.seaP~9~i~)wC.'9.~:~.4>C.+)~~+'f.~D~~~hc~~(ac.W'e~.)~s.'hisLCOdelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytetemperature,level,floatvoltage,andificgravityfortheDCowersouratterieser->ed'-Bases-f~.8.5,"DC.8.4,ources-anSourcesutow.'uMhi,~,X,~~OM9a5~aa.z,~<<'lTheinitialconditionsoF0'cidentDBandtransientanalysesm-t-P(Ref-.-I-anaer,assumeEngineeredaeyeauresystemsareOPERABLETheDCelectricalpowersystemprovidesnormalandemergencyDCelectricalpowerforthedieselgenerators,emergencyauxiliaries,andcontrolandswitchindurinallMODESofoperation.nBatterycellparameterssatisfytheCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.heOPERABILITYoftheDCsubsystemsisconsistentwithtiialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisedponmeetiwgthedesignbasisoftheunit.T'cludesaintainingatl.eastonetrainofcesOPERABLEduringaccidentconditions;~intentof:AnassamossofalloffsiteACpowerorallonsite~power;aodAworstcasesinlefailure.LCO~l9."~atterycellparametersmustremainwithinacceptablelimitstoeavailabilityofthere'quiredDCsutdown*thereactoran'ainitinconditionafterananticipatedoperationrrenceorapostulatedDBA.Electrolytelim+e-areconserva'lestablished,allowingcontinuedDC~eectricalsystemfunctioneithCategoryAandBlimitsnotmet.STSB3.8-62p,pQ,.:~""~c:"'-c-1c-.'.c..)(continued)8+2 Qg.)v.4~~Insert3.8.6.1EachDCelectricalpowertraincontainsa125VDCbatterywhichiscapableofcarryingtheexpectedshutdownloadsfollowingaplanttripandalossofallACpowerforaperiodof4hourswithoutbatteryterminalvoltagefallingbelow105V.Najorloadsandapproximateoperatingtimes.oneachbatteryarediscussedintheUFSAR(Ref.I).ThebatteriesarenormallyinstandbysincetheassociatedbatterychargersprovidefortherequiredDCsystemloads.ThebatteriesforTrainAandTrainBDCelectricalpoweraresizedtoproducerequiredcapacityat80%ofnameplaterating,correspondingtowarrantedcapacityatendoflifecyclesand100%designdemand.Batterysizeisbasedon125%ofrequiredcapacityforagingconsiderations.Theminimumvoltagelimitis2.13Vpercell,whichcorrespondstoatotalminimumvoltageoutputof128Vperbattery. X,tvadInsert3.8.6.2ThisLCOrequiresthatbatterycellparametersforTrainAandBbatteriesbewithinlimitstoensureavailabilityoftherequiredDCpowertoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafteranan'ticipatedoperationaloccurrenceorapostulatedDBA.Batterycellparametersaredefinedforelectrolytelevel,temperature,floatvoltage,andspecificgravity.Thelimitsforelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityareconservativelyestablishedforbothdesignatedpilotcellsandconnectedcells(CategoryAandB,respectivelyofTableB3.8.6-1).TheselimitsallowcontinuedDCelectricalsystemfunctioneven'ithCategoryAandBlimitsnotmetforalimiteddurationprovidedthattheupperlimitforeachconnectedcell(CategoryC)isnotexceeded.Inaddition,theaverageelectrolytetemperatureofthebatterycellsmustbe>65'F.ThebatterycellparametersarespecifiedinTableB3.8.6-1.Thistabledelineatesthelimitsonelectrolytelevel,floatvoltage,andspecificgravityforthreedifferentcategories.Themeaningofeachcategoryisdiscussedbelow.~CateorACategoryAdefinesthenormalparameterlimitforeachdesignatedpilotcellineachbattery.Thecellsselectedaspilotcellsarethosewhosetemperature,level,voltage,andelectrolytespecificgravityapproximatethestateofchargeoftheentirebattery.TheCategoryAlimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevelarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendationsandareconsistentwiththeguidanceinIEEE-450(Ref.3),withanadditionalallowanceof',inchabovethehighwaterlevelindicationmarkforoperatingmargintoaccountfortemperatureandchargeeffects.Inadditiontothisallowance,footnoteatoTableB3.8.6-1permitstheelectrolyteleveltobeabovethespecifiedmaximumlevelduringequalizingcharge,provideditisnotoverflowing.Thespecifiedmaximumlevelisdefinedas',inchabovethemaximumindicationmark.Theselimitsensurethattheplatessuffernophysicaldamage,andthatadequateelectrontransfercapabilityismaintainedintheeventoftransientcondit'ions.IEEE-450(Ref.3)recommendsthatelectrolytelevelreadingsshouldbemadeonlyafterthebatteryhasbeenatfloat.chargeforatleast72hours.TheCategoryAlimitspecifiedforfloatvoltageisz2a13Vpercell.ThisvalueisbasedontherecommendationsofIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichstatesthatprolongedoperationofcells<2.13Vcanreducethelifeexpectancyofcells.TheCategoryAlimitspecifiedforspecificgravityforeachpilotcellis>1.193forBatteryAand>1.197forBatteryB(0.015belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity)orabatterychargingcurrentthatisstabilizedatavalueof<2amps.Thisvalueischaracteristicofachargedcellwithadequatecapacity. Insert3.8.6.2(continued)AccordingtoIEEE-450(Ref.3),thespecificgravityreadingsarebasedonatemperatureof77'F(25'C).Thespecificgravityreadingsarecorrectedforactualelectrolytetemperatureandlevel.Foreach3'F(1.67'C)above77'F(25'C),Ipoint(0.001)isaddedtothereading;Ipointissubtractedforeach3'Fbelow77'F.Thespecificgravityoftheelectrolyteinacellincreaseswithalossofwaterduetoelectrolysisorevaporation.FootnotebtoTableB3.8.6-1requirestheabovementionedcorrectionforelectrolytelevelandtemperature,withtheexceptionthatlevelcorrectionisnotrequiredwhenbatterychargingcurrentis<2ampsonfloatcharge.Thiscurrentprovides,ingeneral,anindicationofoverallbatteryconditionandcanbeusedasanalternativetospecificgravity.~CateorBCategoryBdefinesthenormalparameterlimitsforeachconnectedcell;Theterm"connectedcell"excludesanybatterycellthatmaybejumperedout.TheCategoryBlimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagearethesameasthosespecifiedforCategoryAandhavebeendiscussedabove.TheCategoryBlimitspecifiedforspecificgravityforeachconnectedcellis>1.188forBatteryAand>1.192forBatteryB(0.020belowthe'anufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity)orabatterychargingcurrentthatisstabilizedatavalue<2amps.Theaverageofallconnectedcellsmustalsobe>1.198forBatteryAand>1.202forBatteryB(0.010belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Thesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturer'srecommendations.Theminimumspecificgravityvaluerequiredforeachcellensuresthattheeffectsofahighlychargedornewlyinstalledcellwillnotmaskoveralldegradationofthebattery.ThetemperaturecorrectionforspecificgravityreadingsisthesameasthatforCategoryAandhasbeendiscussedabove.~CateorCCategoryCdefinesthelimitsforeachconnectedcell.Theterm"connectedcell"excludesanybatterycellthatmaybejumperedout.Theselimits,althoughreducedfromtheCategoryAandBlimits,provideassurancethatsufficientcapacityexiststoperformtheintendedfunctionandmaintainamarginofsafety.WhenanybatteryparameterisoutsidetheCategoryClimit,theassuranceofsufficientcapacitydescribedabovenolongerexists,andthebatterymustimmediatelybedeclaredinoperable. hInsert3.8.6.2(continued)TheCategoryClimitsspecifiedforelectrolytelevel(abovethetopoftheplatesandnotoverflowing)ensurethattheplatessuffernophysicaldamageandmaintainadequateelectrontransfercapability.TheCategoryClimitforfloatvoltageisbasedonIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichstatesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelow,underfloatconditionsandnotcausedbyelevatedtemperatureofthecell,indicatesinternalcellproblemsandmayrequirecellreplacement.TheCategoryClimitfortheaverageofallconnectedcellsspecifiesaspecificgravity>1.188forBatteryAand>1.192forBatteryB(0.020belowthemanufacturerrecommendedfullycharged,nominalspecificgravity).Thesevaluesarebasedonmanufacturerrecommendation.Inadditiontothatlimit,itisrequiredthatthespecificgravityforeachconnectedcellmustbenomorethan0.020belowtheaverageofallconnectedcells.Thislimitensuresthattheeffectofahighlychargedornewcelldoesnotmaskoveralldegradationofthebattery.ThetemperaturecorrectionforspecificgravityreadingsisthesameasthatforCategoryAandhasbeendiscussedabove.Becauseofspecificgravitygradientsthatareproducedduringtheiechargingprocess,delaysofseveraldaysmayoccurwhilewaitingforthespecificgravitytostabilize.Astabilizedchargercurrentisanacceptablealternativetospecificgravitymeasurementfordeterminingthestateofcharge.ThisphenomenonisdiscussedinIEEE-450(Ref.3). BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)or7~6litanyTt'~641@xdOAPPLICABILITY~po~mKLA~1'l.w.a.IONS4'Gw~~~~<~upp~6antq(Mcrm~Ct.e~%Qual~;i'cic.llQCLb~sK~A42~i4lg.Mpo.mrna>~q~8584->HHU46ttpy,as4CtQ.ulna~dtap.0'fsvaihatgh~duad.aMVuapstd~thmll=~ano+.ldt~sntop.Qbmi&q,'3.t.i,-lThebatterycellparametersarerequiredsolelyforthesurtoftheassociatedDCelectricalpowersubsstems.powerrceisreuiredtobeOPERABLE.CO..anLCO3.8.5>>;.~~~~m~~~4-l,g~~~~/+0~>>tv~,a,anger~a~~dQCab.partsaLsnr~~50rult.'.lA.2andA.3ithin1hourThischeckwillproveeauickindicationofthestausoftheremainderofeattercells.9'nehourprovidestimetoinspectheeectrolyteleveandtoconfirmthefloatvoltageofthepilotcells.3'8scar>>0Ctshayr+d-aOl'Pt!~n6O~Meoeri~casonattheCategoryCAllowableVauesareme(quiredActionA.2)providesassurancethatdoric~aimecededtorestorethearameterstotheCatorAPyanlimitthe,batteryisstillcapableofperrmingits'ntendedtion.Aperiodof24hoursallowedtoompletetheuiredverificationbecsespecificgraviteasurementsmuseobtainedforconnectedcell.akingintoconsideronbothtimerequiredtoperfortherequiredverificatianheassurancethatthebattercellparametersarenotselydegraded,thistimeisconsideredreasonable.~haa~pOh+v~'J4eniW.Withoneormoreoneormorebatte'otwithinlimits(i.e.,CategoryAlimitsnotmet,CategoryBlimitsnotmetorCateoryAandBlimitsnotmet)butwithintheategoryClimitsspecifiedinTable.8.6-1isuicemencapacity~~-~'-'toperform~ntendedfunction.thepilotcellelectrolytelevelandfloatvoltageareN~~~~breuiredtobeverifiedttheCategoryC)&~RjhMO3.ia~WLhoContinuedopera'isonlypermitter31daysbeforebatterycellrametersmustberestoredwithinCategoryndBlimits.Withtheconsidera'hat,whilebatteryapacityisdegraded,sufficientcapacitexiststoperftheintendedfunctionandtoallowtimetolyestorethebatterycellparameterstonormallimits,'s/~(continued)~1~iQ(Q/'neoIla<5'l'vR~MfCia~B3.8-63 A.iiiS9.iv,dInser3.8.6.3Ifthepilotcell'selectrolytelevelandfloatvoltagearefoundtobewithintheTableB3.8.6-1CategoryClimits,allconnectedcellsmustbeverifiedtobewithinCategoryClimitswithin24hours.CompletionTimeof24hoursisallowedtocompletetheinitialverification.Thistakesintoconsiderationboththetimerequiredtoperformtherequiredverification(includingspecificgravitymeasurements)andtheassurancethatthebatterypilotcellparametersarenotseverelydegraded.Thisverificationisrequiredevery7daysuntilallbatterycellparametersarerestoredtoCategoryAandBlimits.Thisperiodicverificationismorerestrictivethanthenormalfrequencyofpilotcellsurveillances.BatterycellparametersmustberestoredtowithinCategoryAandBlimitswithin31days.ACompletionTimeof31daystorestorebatterycellparameterstowithinlimitsisacceptablesincethebatteryremainscapableofperformingitsintendedfunctioninthiscondition. BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESACTIONSA.2andA.3timeisacceptableprioinopable.thebatteryB.1Q..'tbegQ.tv'ithoneormorebatterieswithoneormorebattery.ceTlpetersoutsidetheCategoryCAllowableVa+forany.connectesufficientcapacitytosugthemaximumexpectedloadrequntisnotassandthecorrespondingDCelectricosubsystemmustbedeclaredinoperable.Additional~ototentiallyextremeconditions,suchsocompletingeRequiredActionsofConditionintherequiredComplenTimeoraverageelectroplatetemperatureofrepresentativelsfallingbelowO'.F,arealsocauseforimmediatelyderingtheassogiatedDCelectricalpowersubsysteminopera~QEZ.b.>SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.8.6.1ThisSRverifiesthatCategoryAbatterycellparametersareconsistentwithIEEE-450Ref.3whichrecommendsregula.batteryinspectionsincludingvoltage,specificgravity,andelectrolyef~tech~pilotcellS.u84rSR3.8.6.2q'teeequarterlyinspectionofspecificgravityandgeisc'ntwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).Inad',within24hoursodischarge(Vorabatteryovercharge>[150]V,erymustbedemonstratedtomeetCategoryB~l'W.ThisinsionisalsoconsistentwithIEEE-4ef.3),whichrecommenecialipspectionsfollowinseveredischargeorovercharge,ensurethatnosificantdegradationofthebatteryoccurasaconsequenceofsuchdischargeorovercharge.(continued)B3.8-64pP>>~goeiuvieeccc89 Insert3.8.6.4IftheRequiredActionandassociatedCompletionTimeofConditionAarenotmet,orwithoneormorebatterieswithanaverageelectrolytetemperatureofrepresentativecells<65F,orwithoneormorebatterieswithoneormorebatterycellparametersoutsidetheCategoryClimitsforanyconnectedcell,sufficientcapacitytosupplythemaximumexpectedloadrequirementisnotassuredandthecorrespondingDCelectricalpowertrainmustbeimmediatelydeclaredinoperableandactionstakenperLCO3.8.4orLCO3.8.5. Insert3.8.6.5ThisSRverifiesthatTableB3.8.6-1CategoryBbatterycellparametersareconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).Thebatteryinspectionshallincludefloatvoltage,specificgravity,andelectrolytelevelofeachconnectedcell.TheFrequencyof92daysisconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3).Inaddition,within7daysofabatterydischarge<105Vorabatteryovercharge>150V,thebatterymustbedemonstratedtomeetCategoryBlimits.ThisinspectionisalsoconsistentwithIEEE-450(Ref.3),whichrecommendsspecialinspectionsfollowingaseveredischargeorovercharge,toensurethatnosignificantdegradationofthebatteryoccursasaconsequenceofsuchdischargeorovercharge. BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(continued)%ILYING,SR3.8.6.3This~~em.~.~i~~~~<~en/cscevthatconsistentwithIEEE-450Ref.3),~gRRC.OYA~'S-~4anPADZUw~~cb~~'Ilk~,~~Q~~,Ohdl!II.~MpAstedl.Vka.~)~~Ck~wKL~~~~.~~WWC.),owerthannormaltemperaturesacttoinhibitoreducbatterycapacity.ThisSRensuresthattheopatingemperaturesremainwithinanacceptableoperingrang.Tslimitisbasedonmanufacturerrecommeations.Table3.6-1IThistabledeineatesthelimitsonectrolytelevel,flatvoltage,andspcificgravityforreedifferentcategories.Theeaningofeachategoryisdiscussedbelow.CategoryAdefinestheormalparameterlimitforeachdesignatedpilotcellieabattery.Thecellsselectedaspilotcellsarethoseosetemperature,voltage,andelectrolytespecificgravapproximatethestateofcharge.oftheentirebattery.TheCategoryAlimitsspecificforelectrolytelevelarebasedonmanufacturerecommenda'onsandareconsistentwiththeguidance'EEE-450(Re3),withtheextra',inchallowanceovethehighwatlevelindicationforoperatingmargintoaccountfortempeaturesandchargeeffects.InaitiontothisallowancfootnoteatoTable3.8.6-1ermitstheelectrolyte1eltobeabovethespecifiedmamumlevelduringequalizingcharge,provideditisnotovrflowing.Theselimitsensurthattheplatessuffernoysicaldamage,andthatadequateelectrontransferpabilityismaintainedintheevenoftransientconditio.IEEE-450(Ref.3)recommendsthatlectrolytelevelrdingsshouldbemadeonlyafterthebatryhasbeenafloatchargeforatleast72hours.ThetegoryAlimitspecifiedforfloatvoltageish.13Vperell.ThisvalueisbasedontherecommendationsfIEE-450(Ref.3),whichstatesthatprolongedoperationofcells<2.13Vcanreducethelifeexpectancyofcells.(continued)B3.8-65 BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASESSURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSTable3.8.6-1(continued)TheCategoryAlimitspecifiedforspecificgravAyforeachilotcellis>[1.200](0.015belowthemanucturerfullycrgednominalspecificgravityorabatterchargingcurntthathadstabilizedatalowvalue.Thisvalueischararisticofachargedcellwithadeuatecapacity.AccordintoIEEE-450(Ref.3),thespeficgravityreadingsabasedonatemperatureof77'F(25'C).ThespecificgvityreadingsarerrectedforactualelectrolytetempeatureandlevelForeach3'F(1.67'C)above77'F(25'C),Ipoint(0.00)isaddedtothereading;Ipointissubtractforeach'Fbelow77'F.Thespecificigravityoftheelectrlyteincellincreaseswithalossofwaterduetoelectrysisorevaporation.FootnotebtoTable3.8.6-1requirestebovementionedcorrectionforelectrolytelevelandternrature,withtheexceptionthatlevel'correctionisnoteiredwhenbatterychargingcurrentis<[2]ampsofltcharge.Thiscurrentprovides,ingeneral,nindiationofoverallbatterycondition.Becauseofspecifigravitygradntsthatareproducedduringtherecharingprocess,deysofseveraldaysmayoccurwhilewaitngforthespecifigravitytostabilize.Astabilizedcrgercurrentisanaceptablealternativetospecificgraviymeasurementfordeteminingthestateofchargeofthdesignatedpilotcell.hisphenomenonisdiscussediIEEE-450(Ref.3).FootnoectoTable3.8.6-1allowstheloatchargecurrenttobeusasanalternatetospecifgravityforupto[7days]foowingabatteryequalizirecharge.CategorBdefinesthenormalparameterlimitforeachconneedcell.Theterm"connectedcell"excdesanybatteycellthatmaybe'jumperedout.TheategoryBlimitsspecifiedforelectrolyte1elandfltvoltagearethesameasthosespecifiedfortegoryAanhavebeendiscussedabove.TheCategoryBlimisecifiedforspecificgravityforeachconnectedceis>[le195](0.020belowthemanufacturerfullycharged,ominalspecificgravity)withtheaverageofallconnetedelis>[1.205](0.010belowthemanufacturerfullychared,nominalspecificgravity).ThesevaluesarebasedonMOGSTSB3.8-66Rev.0,09/28/92 BatteryCell.parametersB3.8.6BASESSURVEILLANCE;RE(UIREHENTSTable3.8.6-1(continued)manufacturer'srecommendations.Theminimumspe'ficavityvaluerequiredforeachcellensuresththeeectsofahighlychargedornewlyinstallecellwillnotmasoveralldegradationofthebattery.FtnotebtoTable.8.6-1requirescorrectionofspeciicgravityforelectrotetemperatureandlevel.Thisevelcorrectionisnotrequidwhenbatterychargingcurrntis<[2]ampsonfloatchargCategoryCdefiestheAllowableVuesforeachconnectedcell.Thesevals,althoughreced,provideassurancethatsufficientcacityexiststoperformtheintendedfunctionandmaintaiamargiofsafety.WhenanybatteryparameterisoutsidetCatgoryCAllowableValue,theassuranceofsufficientpcitydescribedabovenolongerexists,andthebatterymtbedeclaredinoperable.TheCategoryCAllowablValuspecifiedforelectrolytelevel(abovethetoptheplasandnotoverflowing)ensurethattheplatssuffernoysicaldamageandmaintainadequateeectrontransfecapability.TheCategoryCAllowaeValueforfloatoltageisbasedonIEEE-450(Ref.3,whichstatesthatacellvoltageof2.07Vorbelowunderfloatconditionsndnotcausedbyelevatedtempatureofthecell,indicatinternal,cellproblemsandayrequirecellreplacement.TheCategoyCAllowableValueofaveragespeficgravity>1.195ibasedonmanufacturerrecommendation(0.020belowthemanufacturerrecommendedfullycharged,nominalspecif>i'cgravity).Inadditiontothatlimit,itsrequiredthatthespecificgravityforeachconnectcellmusbenolessthan0.020belowtheaverageofallcnectedcells.Thislimitensuresthattheeffectoahghlychargedornewcelldoesnotmaskoveralldegrationofthebattery.ThefootnotestoTable3.8.6-1areapplicabletoCategoryA,B,andCspecificgravity.WOGSTSB3.8-67(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 BatteryCellParametersB3.8.6BASES(continued)REFERENCES.CESAR,Chapter+6P~~QLPAR,Chapter+15$.IEEE-450-1980+PPg~~gu.C46.rPaaatr1~B3.8-68Rev.0,09/28/92 LOO.i.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMS*>>~~UB3.8.7IhSTAJJ>i~M-3.8.7BASESBACKGROUND+'3.$.1.ilOO.asloo.'a.iv.~oo.if.beinvertersarethepreferredsourceopoweroreviusesbecauseofthestabilityandreliabilityyachievein'ngpoweredfromthe120VDCbattersource.ThefunctionofainverteristoconvertelectricalpowertoACelectrica7peter,thus'nganuninterruptiblepowersourcheinstrumentationandcontrolsfortheRerotectiveSstem(RPS)andtheEngineered~FeatureActuationSysESFAS).Speci>wdetailsoninvertersandtheiropera'ng4eracteristicsarefoundintheFSAR,Chapter[8]f.I).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES(a~.a~a)~lao.w.4lad.i:fdd.iv.a.$0o.iv,4TheinitialconditionsofDesinBasisAccidentDBA)andtransientanalysesi.assumeEngineeredSafetFeaturenmu.~~seare.The~QACCReeEeR>aredesigned~~~toprovidetherequiredcapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertotheRPSandESFQinstrumentationandcontrolssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.TheselimitsarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforSection3.2,"PowerDistributionLimits;"Section3.4,"ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS);"andSection3.6,"ContainmentSstems'~"i~~w~r~TheOPERABILITYofthej~~"'isconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbasedonmeetin'ofthe.ThisincludesmaintainingrequiredACOPEINBLE~h~S>wa.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACelectricalpowerorallonsiteApower;and0b.Aworstcasesinglefailure.satisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.4~~vna~C~~B3.8-69continued) ~kap~itO~x4CInsert3.8.7.1AI0~TheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)isnormallysuppliedfromoffsitepower,viaanon-Class1Econstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigure3.8.4-1).Thesethree120VACinstrumentbuses(A,B,andC)supplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuatetheReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)andEngineeredSafetyFeatures(ESF)andothercomponents(Ref.1).ThelowofInstrumentBusDisaddressedin.LCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.3,"Post-AccidentMonitoringInstrumentation."InstrumentBusesAandCcanbesuppliedpowereitherfrominverterswhicharepoweredfromseparateandredundantDCpowersources,anon-ClasslECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower,oraClass1ECVT(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).TheinvertersarethepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrument'BusAandCbecauseofthestabilityandreliabilitytheyachieve.InstrumentBusBcanbesuppliedpowerfromeitheraClass1ECVToranon-Class1ECVT(maintenanceCVT)poweredfromoffsitepower.TheClass1ECVT,suppliedbymotorcontrolcenterC(MCCCissuppliedby480VsafeguardsBus14),isthepreferredsourceofpowerforInstrumentBusBbecauseofthepotentialtohaveapowerinterruptionifoffsitepowerwereunavailable.Themajorityofinstrumentationandcontrolssuppliedbythe120VACinstrumentbusesarefailsafedevicessuchthattheygototheirpostaccidentpositionuponlossofpower.However,anotableexceptiontothisistheactuationlogicforContainmentSpray(CS)Systemwhichrequires120VACand125VDCpowerinordertofunction.ThispreventsaspuriousCSactuationfromoccurringifcontrolpowerwerelost.TheactuationlogicforCSispoweredfromallthreeinstrumentbusesandfrombothDCelectricalpowerdistributiontrains. Insert3.8.7.2IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainofACinstrumentbusesareavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofoneACinstrumentbuspowersource).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthe'eactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofACinstrumentbuspoweralsoensuresthatatleastonetrainofACinstrumentbusesisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnon'accidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformerll.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbinedrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterpumpduringtheestimated8hoursrequired.toprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.4).Therefore,therequirementsofGDC17(Ref.5)canbemetatalltimes. 0 .8.7BASES(continued)LCOl00.'>v.4le.iitOD~1V'a4~lAurunNOV~TheM~~ensuretheavailabilityof.electricalpowerforthe~~instrumentationreuiredtoshutdowntreactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.snS~~Haintainingtherequired~~QOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPSandESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThensureanuninterrutiblesupplyofACelectricalototheACevenifthe.~eQbusesarecde-energized.~od-9.R."f,glog.>iIOQ<<'Iv.cs~,"RABi<oweredbytheinverter,whichhasthecorrectDCvolte(20]V)appliedfromabatterytotheinverterinp,andinvteroutputACvoltageandfrequencywithintorances.ThisLCO'smodifiedbyaNotethatallows[e/two]inverterstbedisconnectedfroma[commobatteryfor<24hours,ihevitalbus(es)ispowedfroma[ClassIE]consttvoltagetransfoduringtheperiodandallotherinverrsareoperab.Thisallowsanequalizingchargetoplacedonebattery.Iftheinverterswerenotdiscoec,theresultingvoltageconditionmightdamagetheverter[s].Theseprovisionsminimizethelossofeqmenthatwouldoccurintheeventofalossofoffsiteer.Th24hourtimeperiodfortheallowanceminimizesetimeduriwhichalossofoffsitepowercouldresulinthelossofeipmentenergizedfromtheaffectedACitalbuswhiletakingintoconsiderationthetimerequ'dtoperformanequalizichargeonthebatteryban.Whenutilizingtheallowancifoneormoreoftheproisionsisnotmet(e.g.,24hourmeperiodexceeded,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediateTheientofthisNoteistolimitthenumberofvertersthataybedisconnected.Onlythoseinvertersassoatedwitthesinglebatteryundergoinganequalizingchargeaybdisconnected.Allotherinvertersmustbealignedtoeirassociatedbatteries,regardlessofthenumberofnvertersorunitdesin.(continued)B3.8-70 Insert3.8.7.3ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-MODES1,2,3,and4.ForaClasslECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480Vsafeguardsbus,.mustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-MODES1,2,3,and4. BASES(continued)5Ki~s~~~.APPLICABILITYThe"~~arerequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,3,and4toensurethat:INOa1U~~a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andpppgjMOCuuCCLO-Gi~b.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainmentOPERABILITYandothervitalfunctions.aremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.~~5requirementsforMODES5and6arecoveredintheBasesforLCO3.8.8,"Inverters-Qoozs5~tACTIONSWith~~~Binverterinoperable,busbecomesinoperableuntilitisfroits+lass1E><~+r~+itsassociatedAC+~re-energizedOTgACm.-6~lMQVT100.iilua.iu.cOeeRa&LerthisreasonaNotehasbeenincludedinCond'equiring'e-CamiionsanRequiredActionofLCO3.8,'stributionting."ThisensurhatthevnedtoOPtuhin2hoursaCan~~RequiredActionAQallows~hourstofitheinoperableinverterandreturnittg~~.TheQPhourlimittsbaseduponengineeringjudgment,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairaninverterandth'eadditionalr'oichthe~isexposedbecauseoftheinverterinoerabi.ThisMMbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediatesuown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhentheACbusispoweredfromitsltisreyinguponinterruptibleACelectricalpowersources(offsiteandonsite),.Theuninterruptible,batterybackedinvertersourcetotheAC~~busesisthepreferredsourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.4h~~(continued)uaLS.a~Pn~rF~B3.8-71Rev.009289 Insert3.8.7.4RequiredActionA.lallowstheinstrumentbustobepoweredfromeitheritsassociatedClass1ECVTorfromanon-ClasslECVT.ForInstrumentBusesAandC,thenon-Class1Epowerissuppliedbyanon-safetyrelatedmotorcontrolcenter(MCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.TheCompletionTimeof2hoursisconsistentwithLCO3.8.9,DistributionSystems-MODES1,2,3,and4".RequiredActionA.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethattheinstrumentbuscanbeconnectedtoanon-Class1Epowersupply.The24hourCompletionTimeisbaseduponengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClasslECVTortheinverterandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheconnectiontoanon-ClasslEpowersupply.

B3.8.7BASESACTIONS(continued)z.8.'15C.se)OO4B.landB.2ftheinoperabledevicesorcomponentscannotberestotoBLEstatuswithintherequiredComplet'e,theunitmustbroughttoaMODEinwhichCOdoesnotapply.Toac'ethisstatusunitmustbebroughttoatleastMODE3wi'sandtoMODE5within36hours.ThealetionTimesarereasonable,basedonoingexperience,oreachtherequiredunitcondi'fromfullpowerconditi'nanorderlymannerawithoutchallenginlantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTS+~~VJhha~A.eelC.,'0mshrest,lahQ,Am>SZ.a.VSR3.8.7.1Thi~if'ih<<hfunctioninroperlyanACenergizedfromQjjbdenverer.TheerificationensuresthattherequiredpoweriseSBEB,'FavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESF~connectedtotheACbuses.Thedareuenctakesintoaccounttheeunancapailityoftheinvertersandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalertthe'peratortoinvertermalfunctions.REFERENCES1.QSAR,Chapter~8~as2.QSAR,Chapter+6+3.@SAR,Chapter+15f.~.ups,~,Q~'0~"~~,~~sty8-,CO>i'7,B3.8-72 (l00.ii)Insert3.8.7.5WiththeClassIECVTforInstrumentBusBinoperable,theinstrumentbusbecomesinoperableuntilitisre-energizedfromitsnon-ClassIECVT.RequiredActionB.IrequiresInstrumentBusBtobepoweredfromitsnon-Class1ECVTwithin2hours.Thenon-ClassIEpowerissupplied'byanonsafetyrelated480Vmotorcontrolcenter(HCCA)whichissuppliedby480VBus13.RequiredActionB.2isintendedtolimittheamountoftimethatInstrumentBusBcanbeconnectedtoanon-ClassIEpowersupply.The7daylimitisbasedonengineeringjudgement,takingintoconsiderationthetimerequiredtorepairtheClass1ECVTandtheadditionalrisktowhichtheplantisexposedbecauseoftheClasslECVTinoperability.Thismustbebalancedagainsttheriskofanimmediateshutdown,alongwiththepotentialchallengestosafetysystemssuchashutdownmightentail.WhenInstrumentBusBispoweredfromitsnon-ClasslECVT,itisrelyinguponinterruptibleoffsiteACelectricalpowersources.TheClassIE,diesel~generatorbacked,CVTtoInstrumentBusBisthepreferredpowersourceforpoweringinstrumentationtripsetpointdevices.C.l'andC.2IftheinoperabledevicesorcomponentscannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTimeofConditionAorB,theplantmustbebroughttoaHODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnotapply.Toachievethisstatus,theplantmustbebroughttoatleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequiredplantconditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.icy.'D.IIftwoormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesareinoperable,theplantisinaconditionoutsidetheaccidentanalyses;therefore,LCO3.0.3mustbeenteredimmediately.ThisConditionmustbeenteredwhenbothinverters,oroneormoreinvertersandtheClass1ECVTtoInstrumentBusBarediscoveredtobeinoperable. Insert3.8.7.6SR3.8.7.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClassIECVTalignmenttoInstrumentBusB.ThisverifiesthattheClassIECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusB.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.TheFrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClasslECVT.malfunctions. .8.8B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEMSB3.8.8M(n>~~~Q~~BASESBACKGROUND3p'(LCO~,nverters(~Ol.ie)ineasesforAPPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESOl'eV.O-lo,l,e,einitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)tran'analysesintheFSAR,Chapter[6](Ref.andChapter(Ref.2),assumeEngineeredSafeaturesystemsare0LE.TheDCtoACinversaredesignedtoprovidethereq'capacity,cility,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensutheabilityofnecessaryowertotheReactorProtSystemandEngineeredSafetFeaturesActuationSminst'rumationandcontrolssothatthefuel,orCoolantSystem,dcontainmentesignlimirenotexceeded.heRABILITYoftheinvertersisconsistentwitei'alassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandtheequirementsforthesupportedsystems'PERABILITY.IAWLclCJOTheOPERABILITYoftheminimumd~@~toeachACbusduringNODES5and6ensuresthat:i+oneeoe.oaooLdTohonKa.osesoeslol.V.a~~~~et&QC.~izltt~~~CLuagdijDLC.Thedttion-forevailatus;andrumenpoeowerisavairocapailityisteunithasaninadverten~~0c~~~~4.tiOteanuWiWestd-~NRCPolicyStatement.3.Pg.~lol-<<hsatisfyCriterion3ofthemeo4a.~pucMpmumoWOGSTSB3.8-73(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 ~~lol.><Insert3.8.8.1TheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES1,2,3,and4isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODE5or6,thenumberofrequiredACinstrumentbusesmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheACinstrumentbussources,mustbe.removedfromservice.TheminimumrequiredACinstrumentbuselectricalsubsystemisbasesontherequirementsofLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-MODES5and6." Insert3.8.8.2Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheACinstrumentbuspowersourcesensuresthatonetrainoftheACinstrumentbusesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.AnassumedlossofalloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinNODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.WorstcaseboundingeventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowed,bytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringMODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognition,thatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringNODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a~b.C.d.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,rel'ianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingMODEanalyses,orboth.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.Maintaining,totheextent,practical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingNODE1,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent. ~r~'~Inthe'ventofanaccidentwhileinNODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown;assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power. 3.8.8BASES(continued)LCOheinvertersensuretheavailabilityofelectricalprtheinstrumentationforsystemsrequiredtosdownthactorandmaintainitinasafecondit'fterananticipaoperationaloccurrenceorstulatedDBA.Thebatterypowernvertersprovide'erruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowetheAalbusesevenifthe4.16kVsafetybusesar-energized.OPERABILITYoftheinvertersrequiresthetalbusbepoweredbytheinverter.Thinsurestheavailatyofsufficientinverterwersourcestooperatetheu'nasafemannerandtoitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatventsduringshuown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidentsandinadventreactorvesseldraindown.~APPLICABILITYfgy+~>pt)~cfwoJL+dSg~a,ew~4~+~~w-~w~dgOhVLH~~0ea~+PL~O.q~~~JoJ.v.~TheinvertersrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES5and6egg~provideassurancethasemsopn>nvenoareavailablefortheirradiatedfuelinthecaseofaninadvertentdraindownoftheroressel;b.Systemsndtomitigatuelhandlingaccidentareavailable;c.Systemsnecesytomitetheeffectsofeventsthatcan1tocoredamageingshutdownareavaila;andd.nstrumentationandcontrolcapability)available,formonitoringandmaintainingtheunitincolbr~~~peru~~~requirementsforMODESI,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.7.ACTIONS~ai.i.(m44~+JOE+~~4-A.It9)twotrains~requiredbyLCO3.8.10,"DistributioSystems-gjRR~,"theremainingOPERABLEmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallow,~cis'~4(continued)B3.8-74 lO(,4.Insert3.8.8.3MaintainingtherequiredACinstrumentbussourcesOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignoftheRPS.-andESFinstrumentationandcontrolsismaintained.ThetwoinvertersensureanuninterruptiblesupplyofACelectricalpowertoACInstrumentBusAandCevenifthe480Vsafeguardsbusesarede-energized.TheClass1E480VsafeguardbussupplytoInstrumentBusBprovidesareliablesourceforthethirdinstrumentbus.ForaninvertertobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheinverterwithoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowerinputtotheinverterfroma125VDCpowersource(seeLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-NODES1,2,3,and4).ForaClasslECVTtobeOPERABLE,theassociatedinstrumentbusmustbepoweredbytheCVTwiththeoutputvoltagewithintoleranceswithpowertotheCVTfromaClasslE480Vsafeguardsbus.The480VsafeguardsbusmustbepoweredfromanacceptableACsource(seeLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4).PowersourcesensuretheavailabilityofsufficientpowertotherequiredACinstrumentbusestooperatetheplant.inasafemannerandtomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedeventsduringshutdown(e.g.,fuelhandlingaccidents). BASESACTIONSlol.iV'l&l.t<~lol.w.o.ldlol~A.l........a..(continued)continuationofCOREALTERAg~alldoperationswithapotentialforositivereactivityadditions.Byeoptiontodecrequiredfeaturesinoperablewiththeassociatedi~~"~'"~inoperablearoriaterestrictionswillbeimplementedinccorancewiththeaffectedrequiredfeaturesC~nmainsances;isoptionnvoveunesireadministrativeefforts.Therefore,theaforsufficientlyconservativeactionsi(i.e.,tosusCOREALTERATIONS,moveirradiatedfuelassemblies,ac'esthatpotentiallyresultininadvertentdrainingoforvessel,andoperationsinvolvingpositivctivityadditiTheRequiredActiontosndpositivereactivityadditiosnotpreclactionstomaintainorincreasereactorvessentorov'hereuiredSD88,'t.Qlo/v.ca.tol,w.Suspensionoftheseactivitiesshallnotprecluecompeionfactionstoestablishasafeconservativecondition.Theactionsminimizetheprobabilityoftheoccuenceofostuedevents.Itisfurtherrequiredto'diatelyinitiate'ontorestoretherequiredirtersandtocontinuethisa'untilrestoratiosaccomplishedinordertoprovidetheessaryinerpowertotheunitsafetysystems.NotwithstandingperfonceoftheveconservativeRequiredActionseunitisstillwittsufficientACvitalpowerscestooperateinasafemar.Therefore,actionmuseinitiatedtorestoretheminimumuiredACvitalersourcesandcontinueuntiltheLCOrequientslol.v.aRQ.~~Mp~arTheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Theresorationoftherequire4$m~>shouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimetheg~safetysystemsmaybewithoutpowerorpoweredfrom(QsourceB3.8-75(continued) Insert3.8.8.4A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5los,iVWithoneormorerequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourcesinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableperRequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActions'A.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACinstrumentbuspowersourceandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems. ~~s~~~~~-fKMRaa5~3.8.8BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTloLv~LES~~a.8R.~~lute'~~SR3.8.8.1Naha~verifiesACbusesTherl1caionensthattherequiredpowerisavablefortheinstrumentationconnectedtotheACThe7dain~~~ionogentakesintoaccounttheredundantcapoiityofthe~~inverters-andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortoinvertermalfunctions.ThisrequiredREFERENCESFSAR,ChaAR,Cha[15].B3.8-76ev.g0~e$M<fffuctf4r~ Insert3.8.8.5SR3.8.8.2ThisSRverifiesthecorrectClassIECVTalignmentwhenInstrumentBusBisrequired.ThisverifiesthattheClassIECVTisfunctioningproperlyandsupplyingpowertoACInstrumentBusBenergized.TheverificationensuresthattherequiredpowerisavailablefortheinstrumentationoftheRPSandESFconnectedtotheACinstrumentbus.Thefrequencyof7daystakesintoaccounttheredundantinstrumentbusesandotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortotheClassIECVTmalfunctions. l02.s83.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTBIS83.8.9DistributionSystemsDistributionSystems~0MI~La)x~83.8.BASESlog.v.aBACKGROUNDIM.v.b+diZ.ri~,8.9ITheonsiteClass1AC,OC,andACbuselectricalpowerdistributionsystemsaredividedbtrainintogtw~reundantanineendente1s.Me+racaPPdtaaayt.~+4.~~~~,~c>Ch~cM(~gM4Ll<&Aab~i3.Q.QsysemoreactrainconsistsoaprimaryEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)4.16kVbusandsendary[480and120]Vbuses,distributionpanels,orcontrolcentersandloadcenters.Each[4.16kVESFs]hasat+east[oneseparateandindependentoffsiteourceof'ower]aa,we11asadedicatedonsitedieselgeneror(OG)source.Ehqh[4.16kVESFbus]isnormallyconectedtoapreferredoffsitesource.Afteralossoftpreferredoffsitepowersourcetoa4.16kVESFbus,transfertothealternateoffsitesourceisaccomplishedutilizingatimedelayedbusundergoltagereiay.Ifall~offsitesourcesareunavailable,theonsiteemergencyDG6ppliespowertothe4.16kVESFbus.Controlpowerforhe4.16.kVbreakersissuppliedfromtheCla&lEbatter'.AdditionaldescriptionofthissystemmayPefoundintheBasesforLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-erring,"andtheBasesforLCO3.8.4,"OCSources-0ating."ThesecondaryACelectralpoqerdistributionsystemforeachtrainincludesthesafety'relatedloadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributiopanelsshowninTable83.8.9-1.The120VACvibusesarearrangedtwoloadgroupspertrainandarenormallypoweredfromtheinverters.'healternatepersupplyforthevitalbuseareClass1Econstantvltagesourcetransformerspowerfromthesametrainasheassociatedinverter,anditsusisgovernedbyLCO3..7,"Inverters-Operating."EachconsntvoltagesourctransformerispoweredfromaClasslEACus.Thearetwoindependent125/250VDCelectricalpordpi'stributionsubsystems(oneforeachtrain)./ThelistofallrequireddistributionbusesispresentedinTable83.8.9-1.AQQ-STS-83.8-77continued)9f&$/~ Insert3.8.9.2ACElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClasslEACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).Eachtrainconsistsoftwo480Vsafeguardsbuses,distributionpanels,motorcontrolcentersandloadcenters(seeFigureB3.8.1-1).The480Vsafeguardsbusesforeachtrain'arecapableofbeingsuppliedfromtwosourcesofoffsitepoweraswellasadedicatedonsiteemergencydieselgenerator(DG)source.ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.1,"ACSources-NODES1,2,3,and4."The480Vsafeguardsbusesinturnsupplymotorcontrolcenters,distributionpanelsandloadcenterswhichsupplymotivepowertorequiredmotoroperatedvalves,pumps,dampers,oranyothercomponentwhichrequiresACpowertoperformitssafetyrelatedfunction.TheACelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliesoneofthethreerequiredACinstrumentbusesthroughaconstantvoltagetransformerandprovidesabackupsourcefortheothertwoinstrumentbuses.ThelistofallrequiredAC480VsafeguardsbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.DCElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheClass1EDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).EachtrainconsistsofaClasslEbatteryandtwobatterychargers(withachargingcapacityofatleast150amps)whichsupplyamain125VDCdistributionpanel(seeFigureB3.8.4-1).ThesepowersourcesarediscussedinmoredetailintheBasesforLCO3.8.4,"DCSources-HODES1,2,3,and4."EachmaindistributionpanelsuppliessecondarydistributionpanelswhichprovidecontrolpowertoACpoweredcomponentsandcontrolpowerforotherdevicessuchassolenoidoperatedvalvesandairoperatedvalves.TheDCelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemalsosuppliestwoofthefourACinstrumentbusesthroughinverters.ThelistofallrequiredDCdistributionpanelsisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.ACInstrumentBusElectricalPowerDistributionSubsstemTheACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemconsistsoffour120VACinstrumentbuses.Thepowersourceforone120VACinstrumentbus(InstrumentBusD)issuppliedfromoffsitepowerviaanon-ClasslEconstantvoltagetransformer(CVT)suchthatonlythreebusesareconsideredsafetyrelated(seeFigureB.3.8.4-1).Thesethreebusesareorganizedintotworedundantandindependenttrains(TrainAandTrainB).ThesetrainssupplyasourceofpowertoinstrumentationandcontrolswhichareusedtomonitorandactuateESFandothercomponents.TrainAconsistsoftwobuseswithonebus(InstrumentBusA)normallypoweredfromaninverterandtheother(InstrumentBusB)normallypoweredfromaClasslECVT.TrainBconsistsofonebus(InstrumentBusC)normallypoweredfromaninverter.Thelong-termalternatepowersuppliesforInstrumentBusAandCaretwoClasslECVTs,eachpoweredfromthesametrainastheassociatedbatterychargers,andtheiruseisgovernedby Insert3.8.9.2(continued)LCO3.8.7,"ACInstrumentBusSources-MODES'1,2,3,and4."Thelistofrequired120VACinstrumentbusesisprovidedinTableB3.8.9-1.ThelossofInstrumentBusDisaddressedinLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeatureActuationSYstem(ESFAS)Instrumentation,"andLCO3.3.'3,"PostAccidentMonitoring(PAM)Instrumentation." DistributionSystems14oos~c,i.,a,~qBBASES(continued)APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES02..v.rlo2.u.a02..v.clOZ..v.b~d940.5TheinitialconditionsofDesignBasisAccident(DBA)andtransientanalysesssume,sstemsC><~.)OPERABLE.TheACDCandACuseectricalpowerdpidffiicapacity,capability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensuretheavailabilityofnecessarypowertoESFsystemssothatthefuel,ReactorCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesignlimitsarenotexceeded.Theselimj.tsarediscussedinmoredetail~theBases~rSection3.,"owerDistrigtgionLimitsMec'3.4MeactorCoolantSystem(RCS."ndSection3.6"CntainmentSystem."TheOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andAC4~+buselectricalpowerdistributionsystemsisconsistentwiththeinitialassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysesandisbaseduponmeetingthedesinbasisofthaaR-.,ThisincludesmainainingpowerdisriuionsystemsOPERABLEd6iwintheeventof:~ba.Anadlossofall+offsiepowerorallonsiteAC.power;andb.asesinlefailuQC.,~~><~~~~~(CO~ThedistributionystemssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOlo2..v.38.g,$TkerequiredpowerdistributionsubsystemslistedinableB3.8.9-lensuretheavailabilityofAC,DC,anCvtalbuselectricalpowerforthesystemsrequ'shutdowthereactorandmaintainit.inasafeitionafteranantiatedoperationaloccurrenc0)orapostulatedDBA.The,C,andACvitalelectricalpowerdistributionsutemsarequiredtobeOPERABLE.MaintainingtheTr'anainBAC,DC,andACvitalbuselectricalpowistributionsutemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintodesignofESFisnotdefeated.Therefore,asinglefailure'inanysystemorwithintheelectricalpowerdistributionsubtemswilllotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.(continued)B3.8-78 ~C,~"rInsert3.8.9.1Asourceofelectricalpowerisrequiredformostsafetyrelatedandnonessentialactioncomponents.Twosourcesofelectricalpowerareavailable,alternatingcurrent(AC)anddirectcurrent(DC).Separatedistributionsystemsaredevelopedforeachoftheseelectricalpowersourceswhicharefurtherdividedandorganizedbasedonvoltageconsiderationsandsafetyclassification.ThisLCOisprovidedtospecifytheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuspowerelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswhicharerequiredtosupplysafetyrelatedandEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)systemsinNODES1,2,3,and4. Insert3.8.9.3IntheeventofaDBA,theOPERABILITYrequirementsoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainofeachdistributionsubsystemisavailablewith:a.Anassumedlossofalloffsitepower;andb.Aworstcasesinglefailure(includingthelossofonetrainofoffsitestandbyACpower).Ingeneral,theaccidentanalysesassumethatalloffsitepowerislostatthetimeoftheinitiatingeventexceptwheretheavailabilityofoffsitepowerprovidesworstcaseconditions(e.g.,steamlinebreakwithcontinuedoperationofthereactorcoolantpumps).Theavailabilityofredundantoffsitepowersources(i.e.,circuits751and767)helpstoreducethepotentialtolosealloffsitepower.ProvidingredundantsourcesofoffsitepoweralsoensuresthatatleastoneAC,DC,andACinstrumentbustrainisavailableifallonsitestandbyACpowerisunavailablecoincidentwithasinglefailureofoneoffsitepowersourceduringnonaccidentconditions.Intheeventtheplantisinthe100/0or~0/100mode,aredundantsourceofoffsitepowercanbeobtainedbybackfeedingthroughthemaintransformerusingaflexibleconnectionthatcanbetiedintotheplantauxiliarytransformer11.Theplantcansurviveontheavailablebatterypower,alternatepowersources,andturbine,drivenAuxiliaryFeedwatertrainduringtheestimated8hoursrequiredtoprovidethispowertransfer(Ref.3).Therefore,therequirements.ofGDC17(Ref.4)canbemetatalltimes. Insert3.8.9.4TrainAandTrainBoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLE.ThepowerdistributionsubsystemsahdtheirtrainslistedinTableB3.8.9-1ensuretheavailabilityofAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerforthesystemsrequiredtoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeconditionafterananticipatedoperationaloccurrence(AOO)orapostulatedDBA.OPERABLEAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelstobeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.HaintainingtheTrainAandTrainBAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsOPERABLEensuresthattheredundancyincorporatedintothedesignofESFisnotcompromised.Therefore,asinglefailurewithinanysystemorwithintheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemswillnotpreventsafeshutdownofthereactor.TiebreakersbetweenredundantsafetyrelatedAC,DC,and*ACinstrumentbuspowerdistributionsubsystems,iftheyexist,mustbeopen.Thispreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowerdistributionsubsystemfrompropagatingtotheredundantsubsystem,whichcouldcausethefailureofaredundantsubsystemandalossofessentialsafetyfunction(s).Ifanyof.thefollowinglistedtiebreakersareclosed,theaffected'edundantelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemisconsideredinoperable.Thisdoesnot,however,precludeACbusesfrombeingpoweredfromthesameoffsitecircuit.ACpower480Vsafeguardsbustiebreakers(Ref.5)Bus-Tie14-16Bus-Tie16-14Bus-Tie17-18Bus-Tie16-15Bus-Tie14-13b.DCcontrolpowerautomaticthrowoverswitch(innormalposition)(Ref.6)DGControlPanelADGControlPanelBBus14ControlPowerandUndervoltageBus16ControlPowerandUndervoltageBus17ControlPowerandUndervoltageBus18ControlPowerandUndervoltagecabinetcabinetcabinetcabinet Insert3.8.9.4(continued)ThetrainsasspecifiedinTable3.8.9-1onlyidentifythemajorAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcomponents.Atrain-isdefinedtobeginfromtheboundaryofthepowersourcefortherespectivesubsystem(asdefinedinthepowersourceLCOs),andcontinuesuptotheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponent(e.g.,safetyinjectionpump).TheisolationdeviceforthesuppliedsafetyrelatedorESFcomponentisonlyconsideredpartofthetrainwhenthedeviceisnotcapableofopeningtoisolatethefailedcomponentfromthetrain(e.g.,breakerunabletoopenanovercurrent).Otherwise,thefailureoftheisolationdevicetoclosetoprovidepowertothecomponentisaddressedbytherespectivecomponent'sLCO.Theisolationdevicefornonsafetyrelatedcomponentsareconsideredpartofthetrainsincethesedevicesmustbeavailabletoprotectthesafetyrelatedfunctions.Therefore,thetrainboundaryessentiallyendsatthemotorcontrolcenterorbuswhichsuppliesmultiplecomponents.Theinoperabilityofanycomponentwithintheabovedefinedtrainboundariesrendersthetraininoperable. DistributionSystems-B3..9BASESLCO(continued)lO~.s,.g0CdQBLEAC,DC,andACvitalbuseectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequiretheassociatedbuses,load'enters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionelstoeenergizedtotheirpropervoltages.'IInation,tiebreakersbetweenrndantsafetyrelatedAC,DC,and~Cvitalbuspower'ibutionsubsystems,iftheyexist,mus~open.T'spreventsanyelectricalmalfunctioninanypowstributionsubsystemfr'ompropagatingtotheregundantstem,thatcouldcausethefailureofaredupWntsubsystemanlossofessentialsafetyfunction(e).Ifanytiebreakers~eclosed,theaffectedredundantelectricalpowerdistribu'onsubsystemsareconsideredinoperable.Thisappliestotheonsite,safety..relatedredundantelectricalpowerdistritionsubsystems.Itdoesnot,however,precluderedun.ntClassIE4.16kVbusesfrombeingpoweredfroffsitecircuit.APPLICABILITY'heelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarerequiredtobeOPERABLEinNODESI,2,',and4toensurethat:a.AcceptablefueldesignlimitsandreactorcoolantpressureboundarylimitsarenotexceededasaresultofAOOsorabnormaltransients;andlOat.V.Ca.b.Adequatecorecoolingisprovided,andcontainment.OPERABILITYandothervitalfunctionsaremaintainedintheeventofapostulatedDBA.ElectricalpowerdistributionsubsstemrequirementsforHODES5and6are~~&inLCO3.8.10,"DistributionSystems-O0$4Zw.ACTIONSA.1WithoneAC~~c~Peaaasbrv1srluionbl,hiiApowerdistributiontrainiscapableofsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdown(continued)P,PIa,n~)ithbtor'BLtr(RL=B3.8-79Rev.00928/92 MOCsi,~g~qDistributionSystemsB3.8.9BASESACTIOHSA.l(continued)IQk.v,dt.)QK~V.tb~Cam~i~h-~'IQVACq~LI)~~Quinn/0~~Qh~jLeni~~8~@ac~q,'.o~a~~ThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithsinglefailureofaredundantcomponentintherainithACpowerb.~it.n~~~~)OfayQYnuJLSpl>~MOODesecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionA.lestablishesalimitonthemaximumtimeallowedranycinationofrequireddistribution'subsysstobeinoperduringanysinglecontiguouscurrenceoffailingtomtheLCO.IfCondi'isenteredwhile,forinstance,a0isinopeeandsubsequentlyrestoredOPERABLE,thealreadyhavebeennotmetforupto2hours.Thiscoudtoatotalof10hours,sinceinitialfailuretheLC,torestoretheACdistributionsyste.Atthistime,OCcircuitcouldagainbecomeinoperab,andACdistributiontoredOPERABLE.Thiscouldtinueindefinitely./OL,')qTheCoetionTimeallowsforanexceptiontothealmti+zeromforbeginningtheallowedoutagetime"oiooThiswillresultinestablishingthe"timezero"atthetimeconditionTheoverallOreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinlefailuredi<<ibiOmaammtheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,therequiredACbuses,loadcenters,motorcontrolcenters,anddistributionpanelsmusbeoOPERABLEstatuswithin8hours.rrPr'ambitdh~~~~ConditionArsscenarioisonetrainwithoutACpower~(i.e.,nooffsitepowertothetrainandtheassociatedDGinoperable).InthisCondition,the~ismorevunerabletoacomletelossofACpower.,ereor,mpteunioperaor'sattesedonminimizingthepotenowertotheremainingtrainbystabilizinunit,andonringpowertotheaffected'he8hourtimelimitbeforeiringan'tdowni'sConditionisacceptablebecaof:a.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetyifthegled?pl~operator'sattentionisdivertedfromtheevaluationsandactionsnecessartorestorepowertotheaffectedtrain;and(continued)B3.8-80i~NUQRardm.me+8,on~.92 DistributionSystems.8.9BASESACTIONStQ~.a~IOW,V.CL'OW,v.4~wg'MM~ngACC.~ElMichI.OAbAaq'b~~UC~uOsn4~QgpoE.tBedR-t0~MLS~~~A.l(continued)theLCOwasiniieadofthetimeConditionAwered.The16houro'onTimeisanacceptablimitationonthispotentialtofaileettheLCO.indefinitely.~54468p~OB&a~~WoB.~gamb.'VWithonACW+bnsinoperabie,theremainingOPERABLEAC>>fihfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthe~andmaintainitinthesafeshutdowncondition.Overallreliabilityisreuce,owever,resultintheminimumESFfunctionsnoeinsupported.Therefore,therequiredACusmuserestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hoursm>~srmeLBConditionBrepresentsoneAC~uswithoutpowe,n'Inthissituation,the~ssignsicantymorevulnerabletoacompletelossofalnoninterrutiblepower.erizingtheunit,inimizintiaoreremainin~C1%,ar+'Q~glAl~IAA~4WnmihOmNS~sgJV&mnegLbaisMSourliompeionimeallowvastmajoritofsthatrlACrTakinexcetiontoLCO3.0.2forcomponentswithouaequate'ower,atwouldhavegh'CompletionTimesshorterthan2hoursifdeclaredinoperae,isacceptablebecauseof:l><u.CA-'a~b.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachaneinconditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)annotallowingstableoperationstocontinue;ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousApplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutadequate~5@0powerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;and(continued)B3.8-81Rev.0,09/28/92N~ dM,~vs>I,L,X,~i/DistributionSystemsperrL~~~BASESACTIONSBBI(continued)(~2,.v.~QiVc.Thepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithasinglefailureofaredundantcomponen.,~p~~~IrtS~~The2hourCompletionTimetakesintoaccounttheimorancetosafetyof'restoringtheACustoOPERABLsaus,theredundantcapabilityaffordedbytheotherOPERABLEd11bbbffBAduringthisperiod.angtvumaNsecondCompletionTimeforRequiredActionB.lestablishesalimitonthemaximumallowedforancombinationofrequireddistributionsubsystemobeinoperableduringanysinglecontiguousoccrenceofilingtomeettheLCO.IfConditionBsenteredwhile,for,'tance,anAC-busisinoperablendsubsequentlyreturneBLE,"theLCOmayairdyhavebeennotmetforupto8hours.couldleadoatotalof10hours,sinceinitialfailureo0,torestorethevitalbusdistributionsystem.Ats',anACtraincouldagainbecomeinoperable,andtalbusributionrestoredOPERABLE.Thiscoulcontinueindefinely.ThisCompletioimeallowsforanexceptiotothenormal"timezero"fdrbeginningtheallowedoutageime"clock."Thiswillpesultinestablishingthe"timeze"atthetimetheLCO.wasinitiallynotmet,.insteadoftheimeConditionBwasentered.The16hourCompletionTimeisaacceptablelimitationonthispotentialtofailtoeLCOindefinitely.102,,V.BBA.C.1WithDCtraininoperable,theremainingDCfb1~fbifsupportingtheminimumsafetyfunctionsnecessarytoshutdownthereactorandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditioTheoverallreliabilityisreduced,however,becauseasinglefailureitheremainingDCelectricalpowerdistributionM~~couldresultintheminimumrequiredESFfunctionsnotbeingsupported.Therefore,the+required~CmustrestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithin2hours.(continued)fPBBBAA.A..NNA4a.f'NB~8Rk'3.8-82Rev. fAoOasl,t,x,~8DistributionSystems-l~~B3.8.9BASESACTIONS02..v.lyMflkckg<~~CoapQMA~eVM~~~khblldb(e,.g.~~~On~C.1(continued)u~gpConditionCrepresentsonetrainwithoutadeuateDCpower.tInthissituatson,theissignificantlymorevunerabletoacornletelossofalowerss,eraivethateperator'sattentionusonstabilizingtheminimizingthepotentiallossootheremainingtrainsandrestoringpoweraffectedtrain.This2hour1~~tismoreconservativeCompletionTimesalloeC=foFtheva'stmaoritofcornonentswouldwithouwer.a>ngexceptiono03.0.2orcomponentshi1dhCompletionTimesshorterthan'2hours,isacceptablebecauseof:ta.Thepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringachangein~+conditions(i.e.,requiringashutdown)allowingstableoperationstocontinue;b.C.ThepotentialfordecreasedsafetybyrequiringentryintonumerousapplicableConditionsandRequiredActionsforcomponentswithoutDCpowerandnotprovidingsufficienttimefortheoperatorstoperformthenecessaryevaluationsandactionsforrestoringpowertotheaffectedtrain;andThepotentialforaneventinconjunctionwithsinglefailureofaredundantcomponent~~oWae~=<~~nliOZ.cV:The2hourCompletionTimeforDCbusesisconsistenwiegulatoryGuide1.93(Ref.3).ThesecompletionTimeforRequiredActionC.establishesa.'nthemaximumtimeallooranycombinationofrequire'ibutionsubstemstobeinoperableduringanysingle'@usoccurrenceoffailingtomeettheLCO.If~odi'isenteredwhile,forinstance,anACbus..isinoperablearrdsubsequentlyreturnedOPERABLE,theLCOmayalreadyhaveennotmetforupto8hours"-Thiscouldleadtoatotalofhours,sinceinPtfalfailureoftheLCO,torestorethedistributionsystem.Atthistime,anACtraincouldagain(continued)B3.8-83 WoOt,aX,~tia~~~DistributionSystems-.OperarhmpBASESACTIONS0?elVC.l(continued)ecomeinoperable,andDCdistributionrestvOPERABLE.Thitinueindefinitely.ThisCompletionTimeallooranexec~iontothenormal"timezero"forbegi'theallowedoutaget-'"clock."Thiswillresul~tinestablishingthe"timezero"ahetimetheLCOwasinitiallynotmet,insteadofthe,timeCondition~Cwasentered.The16hourCompletionTimeisnacceptablelimitationonthispotentialtofailtomeetthhLCGindefinitely.D.land0.2IftheinoperabledistributionsubsystemcannotberestoredtoOPERABLEstatuswithintherequiredCompletionTime,the~ggardEnnggmustbebroughttoaNODEinwhichtheLCOdoesnot.apply.Toachievethisstatus,themusebroughtto"atleastHODE3within6hoursandtoHODE5within36hours.TheallowedCompletionTimesarereasonable,basedonoperatingexperience,toreachtherequired~conditionsfromfullpowerconditionsinanorderlymannerandwithoutchallengingplantsystems.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS/oztvLAD/Ol.v4SR3.8.9.1~~a~VCH.~~C~tv~<cs~g~ppltst-4.~~,%~Vasss'~~~~~'LsS.teV*CThisSurveillanceverifiesthatthe'C,DC,andbuselectricalpowerdistributi.onysemsarefddhi*dfveriicationofpropervoltageavailabilityontheuseensuresthattherequiredpowerisreadilyavailableformotiveaswel.lascontrolfunctionsfiticsstemdloadsconnectedtothesebusesT~he7dagyreuenctakesintoaccounttheredundantcapabilityoftheAC,DC,andAC@F65.buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,andotherindicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.~-mv~~4lgAtgA)fg3.toVbE.bi><tyrLSH~~~'Ad~)~yA<i~.~ay'gsrc..(continueB3.8-84 Insert3.8.9.5E.lIftwoormoretrainsareinoperable,thepotentialforalossofsafetyfunctionisgreater.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionexists,noadditionaltimeisjustifiedforcontinuedoperationandLCO3.0.3mustbeentered.ThisConditionmaybeenteredwiththelossoftwotrainsofthesameelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystem,orwithlossofTrainAoroneelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemcoincidentwiththelossofTrainBofasecondelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsuchthatalossofsafetyfunctionexists. NtOOEQ)at,)Q,~QDistributionSystems-in.9BASES(continued)REFERENCESl.+SAR,Chapter~6P'.QUSAR,Chapter~5'.lAFSAR,~5.Nfl-<k.~lB3.8-85~g(p6N.l(('k&Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.8.9.64.10CFR50,AppendixA,GDC17.5.UFSAR,Figure8.3-1..6.UFSAR,Figure8.3-6.7.UFSAR,Figure8.3-4. DistributionSystemsperasn.9lOZ..vTableB3.8.9-1ofACandDCElectricalPowerDistributioSystems~II~17VOLTAGETRAINA~TRAINB~10Kv.c.ACDC~80V~~125V~ESFBus][NBOadCente[Ol,N3]MotoCntrolCeers[NG01,NGOlI,NGO,G03C,NGI,03D]stributonPanelsPOI,NP03]s[NKOl]fromttery[NKlanarger21]Bus037fromattyK13]anargerNK23]DistributinPanelsNK41,NK43,NKSFBus][NB02]adCents[N2,04]MotorntrolCts[NGOA,N02I,NGOB,NGC,NGI,.NGO]DstributionPanelsP02,NP04]us[NK02]fromattery[NK12]ancharger[N2]BusNK04frombattery14]anchargeNK24]Disributinanels[NK4,NK44,N5,~9~ACbuseslu'2.v.c~120VPAnvertll]conneobN&BusNN03]nveN13]contetobu[NK03BusNN02]fomerter[N12]onectedbusNKOBus[Nfr'ominverer[4]conntedtou[NK04]subsystem.'stributsonsystems)saB3.8-86gp~gvc4nrfgwc4L~Re Insert3.8.9.7HainOCFuseCabinetA(DCPDPCB02A)HainDCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPCB03A)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPAB01A)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanelAl.(DCPDPAB02A)DGAOCDistributionPanelA(OCPOPDG01A)ScreenhouseDCDistributionPanelA(DCPDPSHOlA)HCBOCDistributionPanelA(OCPDPDCB04A)Insert3.8.9.8HainDCFuseCabinetB(DCPDPCB02B)HainDCDistributionPanel(DCPDPCB03B)AuxBldgOCDistributionPanelB(DCPDPAB01B)AuxBldgDCDistributionPanelBl(DCPDPAB02B)DGBDCDistributionPanelB(DCPDPOGOIB)ScreenhouseDCDistributionPanelB(DCPDPSHOIB)HCBDCDistributionPanelB(OCPDPCB04B)TurbineBldgDCDistributionPanel(DCPDPTB01B) /4,oQK55~4DistributionSystems-w~~B3.8ELECTRICALPOWERSYSTEHSB3.8.10DistributionSystems-Io3.'i%ogpu5~(SESBACKGROUNDeAC,DCicalpowerdistribsisprovidedintheBasesforCO.,Distributionstems-0eratin."APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESlo3.;Q.~.einitsa,coonsoDesignBasisAccidentatvansientanalysesintheFSAR,Chapter[6].1)andChter[15](Ref.2),assumeEngineerefetyFeature(ESF)emsareOPERABLE.TheAC,andACvitalbuselectricalpistributionsemsaredesignedtoprovidesufficientcity,pability,redundancy,andreliabilitytoensureth'labilityofnecessarypowerESFsystemssothatfuel,RerCoolantSystem,andcontainmentdesiimitsarenotexcd.TheOPERABTYoftheAC,DC,andACvitalbelectricalpower'ributionsystemisconsistentwiththe'tialasstionsoftheaccidentanalysesandtherequiretsfthesupportedsystems'PERABILITY.TheOPERABILITYoftheminimumAC,DC,andACHx5buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsduringHODES5and6ensuresthat:6'a~0~(~dhgascii~~~~b.~~@eh.q~~~ear~j-\oVYuhen~~~~~/c.~~~~~alaLC.andpostulateddur'oveeosaninadvertentoE.<<TheACandDClectrical,powerdistributionystemssatisfy~~heCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.plan+~oeH,d.@AM~~Pt~ingc.~A-~k.>0~~~l+'3:iw.$WOGSTSB3.8-87(continued)Rev.0,09/28/92 Insert3.8.10.1TheBackgroundsectionoftheBasesforLCO3.8.9,"DistributionSystems-MODESI,2,3,and4"isapplicabletotheseBases,withthefollowingmodifications.InMODES5or6,thenumberofrequiredAC,DC,andinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,orthenumberorrequiredtrainswithintheseelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsmaybereducedsincelessenergyisretainedwithinthereactorcoolantsystemthanduringhigherMODES.Also,asignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeperformedundertheseconditionssuchthatequipmentandsystems,includingtheelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,mustberemovedfromservice. lO3.<<,QInsert3.8.10.2Ingeneral,whentheplantisshutdown,theTechnicalSpecificationsrequirementsensurethattheplanthasthecapabilitytomitigatetheconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.However,assumingasinglefailureandconcurrentlossofalloffsiteorallonsitepowerisnotrequired.Therefore,theOPERABILITYoftheAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsensuresthatonetrainoftheonsitepoweroroffsiteACsourcesareOPERABLEintheeventof:a.Anassumedlossof'alloffsiteACpower;b.AnassumedlossofallonsitestandbyACpower;orc.Aworstcasesinglefailure.ThisreductioninrequiredACsourcesisallowedbecausemanyDesignBasisAccidents(DBAs)thatareanalyzedinMODESI,2,3,and4havenospecificanalysesinMODES5and6.Worstcasebounding'eventsaredeemednotcredibleinMODES5and6becausetheenergycontainedwithinthereactorpressureboundary(reactorcoolanttemperatureandpressure)andthecorrespondingstressesresultintheprobabilitiesofoccurrencebeingsignificantlyreducedoreliminated,andresultinminimalconsequences.ThesedeviationsfromDBAanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsduringshutdownconditionsareallowedbytheLCOsforthesystemsrequiredinMODES5and6.DuringNODESI,2,3,and4,variousdeviationsfromtheanalysisassumptionsanddesignrequirementsareallowedwithintheRequiredActions.Thisallowanceisinrecognitionthatcertaintestingandmaintenanceactivitiesmustbeconductedprovidedanacceptablelevelofriskisnotexceeded.DuringMODES5and6,performanceofasignificantnumberofrequiredtestingandmaintenanceactivitiesisalsorequired.InMODES5and6,theactivitiesaregenerallyplannedandadministrativelycontrolled.RelaxationsfromMODEI,2,3,and4LCOrequirementsareacceptableduringshutdownmodesbasedon:a.Thefactthattimeinanoutageislimited.Thisisariskprudentgoalaswellasautilityeconomicconsideration.Requiringappropriatecompensatorymeasuresforcertainconditions.Thesemayincludeadministrativecontrols,relianceonsystemsthatdonotnecessarilymeettypicaldesignrequirementsappliedtosystemscreditedinoperatingHODEanalyses,orboth.C~d.Prudentutilityconsiderationoftheriskassociatedwithmultipleactivitiesthatcouldaffectmultiplesystems.Maintaining,totheextentpractical,theabilitytoperformrequiredfunctions(evenifnotmeetingMODEI,2,3,and4OPERABILITYrequirements)forsystemsassumedtofunctionduringanevent. Insert3.8.10.2(continued)IntheeventofanaccidentwhileinMODE5or6,thisLCOensuresthecapabilitytosupportsystemsnecessarytomitigatethepostulatedeventsduringshutdown,assumingeitheralossofalloffsitepoweroralossofallonsitedieselgenerator(DG)power. Wo~s~LDistributionSystems;0BASES(continued)LCO'~~Var'ombinationsof~~~arerequired0RABLEbyothers,dependingon;>>+'h+~thespecificplantcondition.ImplicitinthoserequirementsistherequiredOPERABILITYofnecessarysupportrequiredfeatures.ThisLCOexplicitlyrequiresenergizationoftheportionsoftheelectricaldistributionsystemnecessarytosupportOPERABILITYofrequiredsystems,equipment,andcomponents-allspecificallyaddressedineachLCOandimplicitlyrequirediathedefinitiono'LQQ.'jil,a.OPERABILITY.in~~~~~Maintainingtheseportionsofthedistributionystemenergizedensurestheavailabilityofsufficientpowerto9jR~)Dj~~ocratethe~inasafemannertomitigatetheconsequences~opostulatedeventsdurinshutdowne.~"3.w.~fuelhandlingaccidents~~).0"l03.tel.bAPPLICABILITYM.~>~~.gO-.~~jdd<<8~used~~e<~~,103,llSystemstoprovideadequatecooansnvenorymaeareavailablefortheirradiatedfuelinthecoreseofaninadvertentdraindownofthereacvesb.Systemsnedtomitigateaareavailable;handlingaccidentTheACQmLRFelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsprovideassurancethatC.Systemsnecessaom'tetheeffectsofeventsthatcan1ocore,damauringshutdownareavaila;and(o3.(fjr.a0'3.ljib.0,d.gstrumentationandcontrolcapabilitysvailable~formonitoringandmaintainingtheunitinacolduditionI~~~TheAC,DC,andAC~~buselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsrequirementsforNODESI,2,3,and4arecoveredinLCO3.8.9.llpDj5&jbMaof5Rp~A~j'GWl(B3.8-88Rev.0,09289 Insert3.8.10.3TheLCOswhichapplywhentheReactorCoolantSystemis<200'Fandwhichmayrequireasourceofelectricalpowerare:LCO3.1.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.7LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.12LCO3.7.9LCO3.9.2LCO3.9.3LCO3.9.4SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)ReactorTripSystem(RTS)InstrumentationLossofPower(LOP)DieselGenerator(DG)StartInstrumentationControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)ActuationRCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsFilledRCSLoops-NODE5,LoopsNotFilledLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)NuclearInstrumentationResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-HighWaterLevelResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-LowWaterLevel +ma5Z~4'istributionSystems-ShatdovnrB3.8.10BASES(continued)ACTIONSA.jlo3>g,~03.LN~Wvvhg~WMMi'aAUi'H~~~aL9,~)nf~Q~ZLhDc8UabduiM~~~~~h's+ihAw~~CRrnM~or'~up~a,~~~ic4~y~kg@blo3.14'.aAlthoughredundantrequiredfeaturesmayrequireredundanttrainsofelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemstobeOPERABLE,oneOPERABLEdistributionsubsystemtrainmaybecapableofsupportingsufficientrequiredfeaturestoallowcontinuationofCOREALTRandoeraionsiapotentialfordrainingereacorvesaowingtheoptionto'declarerequiredfeaturasso'dwithaninoperabledistributionssteminoperabe,propriaterestrictionsare'ementedinaccordancewitheaffecteddistribonsubsystemLCO'equiredActions.manyines,this.optionmayinvolveundesiredadmin'veefforts.Therefore,theallowanceforsuffntlycervativeactionsismade(i.e.,tosusCOREALTERATI,ovementofirradiatedfuelassemies,anyactivitiesthatcoesultininadventdrainingofthereactorvessel,anrationsvingpositivereactivityadditions).uspensionofteseaciviisoesnoprecludecompletionofactionstoestablishasafeconservativecondition.heseactionsminimizetheprobabilityoftheoccurrenceofostulatedevents'tisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredACandDCelectricalowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheunitsafetysystems.NotwithstandingperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,arequiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)subsystemmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,theseRequiredActions.ofConditionAdonotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,theRequiredActionsofConditionAdirectdeclaringRHR.inoperable,whichresultsintakingtheroriateRHRactions)OWsgfTheCompletionTimeofimmediatelyisconsistentwiththerequiredtimesforactionsrequiringpromptattention.Therestorationoftherequireddistributionsubsystemsshouldbecompletedasquicklyaspossibleinordertominimizethetimethsafetysystemsmaybewithoutpower.(pP)u.~rj'ruhr)ldll,~.B3.8-89continued)Re.,09/28/92 0 Insert3.8.10.4A.2.1A.2.2A.2.3A.2.4andA.2.5Withoneormorerequiredelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsortrainsinoperable,theoptionexiststodeclareallrequiredfeaturesinoperableper.RequiredActionA.l.Sincethisoptionmayinvolveundesiredadministrativeefforts,theallowanceforsufficientlyconservativeactionsismade.Therefore,immediatesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandoperationsinvolvingpositivereactivityadditionsisanacceptableoptiontoRequiredActionA.l.PerformanceofRequiredActionsA.2.1,A.2.2,andA.2.3shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionofnormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.ItisfurtherrequiredtoimmediatelyinitiateactiontorestoretherequiredAC,DC,andACinstrumentbuselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsandtocontinuethisactionuntilrestorationisaccomplishedinordertoprovidethenecessarypowertotheplantsafetysystems.InadditiontoperformanceoftheaboveconservativeRequiredActions,a,requiredresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopmaybeinoperable.Inthiscase,RequiredActionsA.2.1,,A.2.2,A.2.3,andA.2.4donotadequatelyaddresstheconcernsrelatingtocoolantcirculationandheatremoval.PursuanttoLCO3.0.6,theRHRACTIONSwouldnotbeentered.Therefore,RequiredActionA.2.5requiresdeclaringRHRinoperable,whichresultsintakingtheappropriateRHRactions.

DistributionSystemsShutdown~~BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERERUIREHERTSfU.$~d.~MQ.c~p~~geedNLy~C4Ed~,bC.,OnCItcESR3.8.10.1ThisSurveillanceverifiesthattheAC,DC,andAC~~)uselectricalpowerdistributionsubsystemsarefunctioning,w>aebusesenerized.Theverificationofropervotageavaiasiyonteusesensuresthattherequiredpoweris.readilyavailableformotiveaswellascontrolfunctions~f.criticalsystemloadsconnectedtothesebuses.hedauenctakesintoaccountthecapabilitoeelectricalpowerdistributionsubsystems,another>nicationsavailableinthecontrolroomthatalerttheoperatortosubsystemmalfunctions.REFERENCESFSAR,Cha].AR,Chapter5].v.ktJ.c~~h~Q~(kLQWI~~<GRANv~h.'~P~C'~~~LoLLhV~iIt+pe'4E~GVAC.~~.~VEIi~~~~~~~~~it~.4VA-M~4,'L~,uu~WOGS-B3.8-90Re892g,5'~'NUQgAC'~Cfkc:4 I3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.1BoronConcentrationBoronConcentration3.9.1LCO3.9.1\+/~@MsBoronconcentratiosaemaintainedwithinthelimitspecifiedintheCOLR.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Boronconcentrationnotwithinlimit.A.1ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyA.2Suspend,positivereactivityadditions.ANDImmediatelyA.3~log.iInitiateaetiotorestoreboronconcentrationtowithinlimit.ImmediatelySURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3.9.1.1VerifyboronconcentrationiswithinlimitspecifiedinCOLR.~e72hours3.9-1 loF,iUnboratedWaterSourceIsolationVaes.9.2.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.2UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValvesLCO3.9.2Eachvalveusedtoisolateunboratedwatsourcesshallbesecuredintheclosedposition.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSISeparateConditionentry'sa':llowedvalve./iNE-reachunboratedwatersourceisolationlCONDITION'EQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA---------NOTE---------/RequiredActionA.3/mustbecompletedwheneverConditionAisentered./IOneormorevalesnotsecuredinclosedposition.A.1ANDA.2ANDSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.Initiateactionstosecurevalveinclosedposition.ImmediatelyImmediatelyA.3PerformSR3.9.1.1.4hours3.9-2 UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationives3.9.2(SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCERE(UENCYSR3.9.2.1Verifyeachvalvethatisolatesunboratedwatersourcesissecuredintheclosedposition.31days3.9-3 3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSNuclearInstrumentationg.g3.~NuclearInstrumentation)D(o.Va~~cl~LCO3.~Twosourcerangeneutronflux@gEE595sshallbeOPERABLE.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Onesourcerangeneutronfluxgem-I~inoperable.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDA.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyImmediatelyB.Twosourcerangeneutronfluxoiggsaggagainoperable.~u"""4'.1l>h.ia~o~.vANDInitiateactiontorestoreonesourcerangeneutronflux<59jjj32BrtoOPERABLEstatus.Immediately.q,~oB.~PerformSR3.9.1.1.4our3O4ate1teOnceper12hours3.9-4 INSERT3.9.1ACTIONScontinued-CONDITIONRE(VIREO.ACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEC.Noaudiblecountrate.C.lSuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDC.2Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ANDC.3PerformSR3.9.1.1.ImmediatelyImmediatelyOncepet12hoursINSERT3.9.laANDB.2SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDB.3Suspendpositivereactivityadditions.ImmediatelyImmediately

~~NuclearInstrumentatio3.9.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3...PerformCHANNELCHECK.12hoursSR3.9-NOTENeutrondetectorsareexcludedfromCHANNELCALIBRATION.(os.v'iPerformCHANNELCALIBRATION2Hmonths'ewe.hs'ov~cctaw3.9-5 lo7.i,ContainmentPenetrations3.9,.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS/3.9.4ContainmentPenetrationsILCO3.9.4Thecontainmentpenetrationsshallbeintheflowingstatus:b.Onedoorineachairlockclosed;nda.Theequipmenthatchclosedandheldiplaceby[four]bolts;C.1.closedbyamanualoautomaticisolationvalve,blindflange,oreivalent,or2.capableofbeinclosedbyanOPERABLEContainmentpueandExhstIsolationSystem.Eachpenetrationprovidingdiectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotoutsideatmosphereeither:APPLICABILITY:DuringCOREAJTIONSDuringmovemtofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinc'nugent.'CTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Oneormorecontainmentpenetrationsno/inrequiredstatu.A.1SuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ANDImmediatelyA.2Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Immediately3.9-6 lol.<neraion43..4SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFRUENCYSR3.9.4.1Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpenetrationisintherequiredstatus.daysSR3.9.4.2Verifyeachrequiredcontainmentpurgandexhaustvalveactuatestotheisolatnpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsignal.[18]months3.9-7 RHRandCoolantCirculation-imalitWaterLevel~eat+3.g3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9.ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLevelLCO3.9MOneRHRloopshallbeOPERABLEandinoperation.(ogloS~P----------------NOTETherequiredRHRloopmayberemovedfromoperationfor<Ihourper8hourperiod,providednooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcause~44moftheReactorCoolant,Systemboronconcentration.Pt'.a3CiSn(Rcs)APPLICABILITY:NODE6withthewaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofreactor(~vesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.RHRlooprequirementsnotmet.lOS.vi.AaIANDA.2al(SuspendperationsinvolvingWreductiinR,CSboronconcentration.Suspendloadingirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.ImmediatelyImmediatelyANDA.3InitiateactiontosatisfyRHRlooprequirements.Immediately3.9-8 Q(3glRHRandCoolantCirculation-HighMater3.ACTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTINEA.(continuedA.Closeallctainmentpenetratioprovidingdirect.accessfj.omcontaientatmoseretooutsideatmohere.4hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCE<0$,vi.OPEIZA6LGSR3.VerifoneHRloopisinoeratin.~~lo'S.c~FREQUENCY12hours3.9-9 RHRandCoolantCirculation-~aterLeve~~Z~+3~~3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS"Op"""""LCO3.HeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation~QW-aterLevel~~ego~TwoRHRloopsshallbeOPERABLE,andoneRHRloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.LessantrequednumrofRlooOPBLE.OneRfgRoopIhoperohie.T~oBAR)~psL<aperabate.B.NoRHRloopinlOQ.vioperation.A.IORA.2B.1,ANDInitiateactiontorestore~~~RHRloopgftoOPERABLEstatus.10'l.'t.Initiateactionstoestablish>23ftofwaterabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.allSuspendperationsinvolving4reductioninreactorcoolantboronconcentration.ImmediatelyImmediatelyImmediatelymesio~(continued)3.9-10 c~~Q+RHRandCoolantCirculation-~WaterLeve3.9P'CTIONSCONDITIONREQUIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEB.(continued)l09.viOanae~eM~sa~8.2InitiateactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptooperation.ANDImmediately',0'i.iiiB.3Closeallcntainmentpenetratiosprovidinpdirectaccessjfomcontaireentatmospheretooutsidatmosphere.4hoursSURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYloq.vgi',ivloQ.~L(-QPzRAG(.E'erifyonefRHRloopisinoperatin.~12hoursIferigcrrect'>ppgkee~J,~g~gg$gqJIndict4eJgou>erave,iladleQ+egegu'irateRHR'umpAa+l~no+i~~p~ra5on,7d~gs3.9-11 RefuelingCavityWaterLev3./g3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS3.9gRefuelingCavityWaterLevelLCO3..<RefuelingcavitywaterlevelshallbemaintainedZ23ftabovethe.topofreactorvesselflange.APPLICABILITY:lh0,t<iDuringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandnlatchingofcontrolroddriveshaftscontainment>ACTIONSCONDITIONRE(UIREDACTIONCOMPLETIONTIMEA.Refuelingcavitywater.levelnotwithinlimit.A.ISuspendCOREALTERATIONS.ImmediatelyAD2ANDA.3Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Initiatetionstorestoreefuelingcavityater,levelowithilimits.ImmediatelyImmediately3.9-12 h~It~~RefuelingCavityWaterLeve3.9SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSURVEILLANCEFREQUENCYSR3..Verifyrefuelingcavitywaterlevelish23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.24hours3.9-13 BoronConcentrationB3.9.1,B.3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9.1BoronConcentrationBASESBACKGROUNDlog.<v.o.in+heIlloc.%onsThelimitontheboronconcentratio4,teeactor-CooanSsemereueincana.andtherefuelin'cKVitensuresEgggbthereactorremainssubcriticaldurinNODE6.Refuelingboronconcentrationisesouleboronconcenraiooereacorcoreduringrefueling.%a%are4rquhcalLcdlog.iv.e.355ERT3.92OQ,iv.4ThesolubleboronconcentrationoffsetsthecorereactivityandismeasuredbychemicalanalysisofarepresentativesampleofthecoolantTherefueling~.boronconcentrationlimitisspecifiedintheCOLR.Plantproceduresensurethespecifiedboronconcentrationinordertomaintainanoverallcorereactivityofk,<<<0.95duringfuelhandling,withcontrolrodsandfuelassembliesassumedtobeinthemostadverseconfiguration(leastnegativereactivity)allowedbyplant~procedures.%tons(AXCGOC.g7LPMTCTA.%requiresthattwoindependentreactivitycontrolsystemsdifferentdesignprincilesbervnoesesysemsmusecapaeofholdinthereactorcesubcriticundercoldcoditions.TeChemicalandolumeControSystem(CVCS)isthesystcapableofmntainingthereactorsubcrticalincodconditionsbmaintainineboronconcntration.t'C~e,,caco~5)Thereactorisbroughttoshutdownconditionalbeorebeginningoperationstoopenthereactorvesselforrefueling.AftertheRCSiscooledanddepressurized~~~hdit14P~Therefuelingcanalandtherefuelingcavityarethenfloodedwithboratedwate-romthereueiwaeroragenroepenreactorveselbyavityfedingorbytheseofeResidualeatRoval(R)Sysmpumps~nThepumpingactionoftheRHRSystem~theRC~ndthenaturalcirculationduetothermaldrivingheadsinthereactorvesselandrefuelincavityinerefuelingpwul~Cfixing~4e,LtckeJ.coolang(continued)B3.9-1 INSERT3.9.2Inadditiontothereactivitycontrolachievedby'hecontrolrods,reactivitycontrolisprovidedbythechemicalandvolumecontrolsystem(CVCS)whichregulatestheconcentrationofboricacidsolution'neutronabsorberintheRCS.TheCVCSisdesignedtoprevent,underanticipatedsystemmalfunction,uncontrolledorinadvertentreactivitychangeswhichmaystressordamagethefuelbeyondallowablelimits. BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESBACKGROUND(continued)82~4~le.tv.~canal.eRHRSystemisinoperationduringrefueling(seeLCO3.9>"ResidualHeatoval(RHR)andClantCirculaion-~WaterLevel,"andLCO3.9+"ResidualatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-WaterLeve')toprovideforcedcirculationintheRCSandassistinmaintainingtheboronconcentratiorintheRCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityabovetheCOLRlimit.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESueingrefuelingoperations,thereactivityconditionohe;core~i,sconsistentwiththeinitialconditionsassumefortheborondilutionaccidentintheaccidentanalysiandisconservateforMODE6.TheboronconcentratioimitspecifiedinheCOLRisbasedonthecorereaivityatthebeginningofehfuelcycle(theendof'refing)andincludesanuncerintyallowance.Therequiredboronconntrationandeplantrefuelingproceduresthatverifytcorrectelloadingplan(includingfullcoremappinensethatthek,<<ofthecorewillremain<0.95durinerefuelingoperation.Hence,atleasta5%h,k/kmaiofsafetyisestablishedduringrefueling.Duringrefueling,theatervolumeinespentfuelpool,thetransfercanal,erefuelingcanal,therefuelingcavity,andtherctorvesselformasinemass.Asaresult,thesoleboronconcentrationislativelythesameineachfthesevolumes.X'amg,9.9'ThelimingborondilutionaccidentanalyzedoccsinMODEP(Ref.2).hdetaileddiscussionofthiseueisprovidedinBasesB3.1.2,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)-T,200'P."TheRCSboronconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPolicyStatement.LCOlog.iq.a~~pihe'saaa4CA6CTheLCOrequiresthataminimumboronconcentrationbemaintainedintheCS,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavitywhileinMODE6.TheboronconcentrationlimitspecifiedintheCOLRensuresthatacorek,<<oftom~.o4'cu.~e~jl&448~ca.d.%Decode(continued)B3.9-2 INSERT3.9.3Duringrefuelingoperations,twotypesofaccidentscanoccurwithincontainmentthataffectthefuelandrequirecontrolofreactivity.Thesetwoaccidenttypesareafuelhandlingaccidentandaborondilutionevent.Bothaccidentsassumethatinitialcorereactivityisatitshighest(i.e.,atthebeginningofthefuelcycleortheendofrefueling).Afuelhandlingaccidentoccursduringfuelmovementinthereactorvessel,therefuelingcanal,ortherefuelingcavityandincludesadroppedfuelassemblyandanincorrectlytransferredfuelassembly.Themostlimitingfuelhandlingaccidentisadroppedfuelassemblywhichisdroppedadjacenttootherfuelassembliessuchthatitresultsinthelargestexposureoffuelinthedroppedassembly.Thenegativereactivityeffectofthesolubleboroncompensatesfortheincreasedreactivityforbothtypesofaccidents.Hence,theboronconcentrationensuresthatk.<<<0.95(i.e.,5%b,k/kSHUTDOWNMARGIN)duringtherefuelingoperation.ThesecondtypeofaccidentisaborondilutioneventwhichresultsfrominadvertentadditionofunboratedwatertotheRCS,refuelingcavity,andrefuelingcanal.Theassumptionsusedintheborondilutionevent(Ref.2)provideforamaximumdilutionflowof120gpmthroughtwochargingpumps(i.e.,60gpmperpump)usingunboratedwaterassuppliedbythetworeactormakeupwaterpumps(60gpmperpump).TheRCSisalsoassumedtobeatlowwaterlevels,uniformlymixedbytheRHRSystem,withtheminimumboronconcentrationasspecifiedintheCOLR.Theoperatorhaspromptanddefiniteindicationofsignificantborondilutionfromanaudiblecountratefunctionprovidedbythesourcerangeneutronfluxinstrumentation(seeLCO3.9.2,"NuclearInstrumentation").Theincreasedcountrateisafunction'oftheeffectivesubcriticalmultiplicationfactor.Theresultsofthisanalysisconcludethatanoperatorhasatleast48.8minutesbeforeSHUTDOWNMARGINislostandthereactorgoescriticalwhichissufficienttimeforoperatorstomitigatethisevent.Thistimeisalsogreaterthanthe30minutesrequiredbyReference3fordilutioneventsduringrefueling.Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesand/orstoppingthereactormakeupwaterpumps. BoronConcentrationB3.9.1BASESLCO~io'i'v<<0.95ismaintainedduringfuelhandlingoperations.(continued)ViolationoftheLCOcouldleadtoaninadvertentcriticalityduringMODE6.amdS,w4mCprdk8O&iI.otSdvaoarv'ttklc'aAckwhra$cTfarw0\hhaklRan++dufmhmAlee~~"hAPPLICABILITYThisLCOisapplicableinMODE6toensuega}thefuelinthereactorvesselwillremainsubcritic1.Thereuiredronconcentrationensuresak,<<<0.9.Aove0E6,~~~~~PICl(5/et,V.+3QQLCO3.1,1,"SHUTDOWNMARG200'F,"andLCO3.1'.2,"SHUTDOWN'ARGIN(SDM)-,',,<200'F,",ensurethat~anadequateamount,ifnegativereactivityisavailabletoshut.downthereaptorandmaintainitsubcritc'lACTIONS04.iV.Ch.~SZWT'5.95ContinuationofCORE)LTERATIONSor,positivereactivity',.additions(includingpctionstoreduceboronconcentration)".iscontifngentuponmaintainingthe'nitincompliancewith."'theLCO'.IfthebonconcentrionofanyoolantvolumeRVR,h11,hless'Q'a.'LED~v'n~COREALTERATIONS~.positivereactivityadditionsmustbe,lod.iv.dSuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsshallnotprecludemovingacomponenttoasafeposition@I,~fhOfff<<IqqOIJ~~mf-fhdteOO(a~4VOlu~dh4rQdsIl<T.thtazc.<<h4~ps~~felffapeta&ree>aWi~InadditiontoimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIONSorpositivereactivityadditions,borationtorestoretheconcentrationmustbeinitiatedimmediately.l4me.chranoarRfyavichisfsass'u~p+t'oneofborationflowrateandconcentratiomustsatisfied.Theonlyrequirementistorestoretheboronconcentrationtoitsrequiredvalueassoonaspossible.Inordertoraisetheboronconcentrationassoonaspossible,theoperatorshouldbeginborationwiththebestsourceavailablefor@jj5conditions.plow+(continued)83.9-3 INSERT3.9.4InMODES1and2withk.>1.0,LCO3.1.4,"RodGroupAlignmentLimits,"LCO3.1.5,"ShutdownBankInsertionLimits,"andLCO3.1.6,"ControlBankInsertionLimits"ensureanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletoshutdown,thereactor.InMODES2withk,<<(1.0andMODES3,4,and5,LCO3.1.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"ensuresanadequateamountofnegativereactivityisavailabletomaintainthereactorsubcritical.INSERT3.9.5IftheboronconcentrationofthefilledportionsoftheRCS,therefueling~~canal,andtherefuelingcavityhydraulicallycoupledtothereactorcore,islessthanitslimit,aninadvertentcriticalitymayoccurduetoaborondilutioneventorincorrectfuelloading.Tominimizethepotentialofaninadvertentcriticalityresultingfromafuelloadingerrororanoperationthatcouldcauseareductioninboronconcentration, BoronConcentration83.9.1BASESACTIONS109:ci,At,A2a~A.consnuedQc,sowhasOnceinitiated,itmustbecontinueduntiltheboronconcentrationisrestored.Therestorationtimedependsontheamountofboronthatmustbeinjectedtoreachtherequiredconcentration.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS(Ot.Iv.eM~~maple.o4adhdwey~covaW~ohcAC5~the.SR3.9.1.1c'dvelaw~~l>~~J.~e,pe&elaaccxvi~ThisSRensuresthecoolantboronconcentrationQ~giswithintheOLRlimits.eboronconcentrationofthecoolant430d~dAd~~Frequencyof'onceevery72hoursisareasonableamountoftimetoverifytheboronconcentrationof~crepresentativesampledTheFrequencyisbasedonoperatingexperience,whichhasshown72hourstobeadequate.REFERENCESNomicEndue-io./Ecru~(AZF)CrQC2'7,1SSuedtof-~~~en4-tQeeW~nlS'.'i.R.2.2.0FAR,B3.9-4 I05.E,UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValB9.23.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS83.9.2UnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValvesBASESBACKGROUNDDuringMODE6operations,allisolationivesforreactormakeupwatersourcescontainingunboratwaterthatareconnectedtotheReactorCoolantSyste(RCS)mustbeclosedtopreventunplannedborondilutionthereactorcoolant.Theisolationvalvesmustbesecuredintheclosedposition.TheChemicalandVolumeControlstemiscapableof'upplyingboratedandunboratedyfIatertotheRCSthroughvariousflowpaths.Sinceap0'sitivereactivityadditionmadebyreducingtheboroncocentrationisinappropriateduringMODE6,isolationofllunboratedwatersourcespreventsanunplannedborodilution.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESThepossii1ity(Ref.I)ccurrprecludedbyaofainadvertentborondilutioneventnguring,MODE6refuelingoperationsisencetothisLCO,whichrequiresthatpotential'onsourcesbeisolated.ClosingtherequiredveilsduringrefuelingoperationspreventstheflowofunboyatedwatertothefilledportionoftheRCS.Thevalves5eusedtoisolateunboratedwatersources.Thesevalve(havethepotentialtoindirectlyallowdilutionoftheRCS/boronconcentrationinMODE6.Byisolatingunborate4'watersources,asafetyanalysisforanuncontrailledborondilutionaccidentinaccordancewiththeStandardReviewPlan(Ref2)i.snotrequiredforNODE6.TheRSboronconcentrationsatisfiesCriterion2oftheNRCPol'Statement.LCOhisLCOrequiresthatflowpathstotheRCSfromunboratedwatersourcesbeisolatedtopreventunplannedborondilutionduringMODE6andthusavoidareductioninSDM.B3.9-5(continued) l05'.iPASES(continued)IAPPLICABILITYUnboratedWaterSourceIsolationValvesQB.9.2/InNODE6,thisLCOisapplicabletoprevent.ininadvertentborondilutioneventbyensuringisolationofallsourcesofunboratedwatertotheRCS.ForallotherHDDES,theborondilution/accidentwasanalyzedandwasfoundtobecapableafbeingmitigated.ACTIONSTheACTIONStablehasbeenmodif,edbyaNotethatallowsseparateConditionentryforeachunboratedwatersourceisolationvalve.~ContinuationofCOREAL'TERATIONSiscontingentuponmaintainingtheunit.ancompliancewiththisLCO.Withanyvalveusedtoisolateunboratedwatersourcesnotsecuredinthe,:closedpositipn,alloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSmust~besuspendedimmediately.TheCompletionTimseof"immediately"forperformanceofRequiredActionA.1.shal,lnotgrecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafe-position.Conditi'onAhasbeenmodifiedbyaNotetorequirethatRequiredActionA.3becompletedwheneverConditionAisentered.I~A.Z/Pventinginadvertentdilutionofthereactorcoolantboronncentrationisdependentonmaintainingtheunboratedaterisolationvalvessecuredclosed.Securingthevalvesintheclosedpositionensuresthatthevalvescannotbeinadvertentlyopened.TheCompletionTimeof"immediately"requiresanoperatortoinitiateactionstocloseanopenvalveandsecuretheisolationvalveintheclosedpositionimmediately.Onceactionsareinitiated,theymustbecontinueduntilthevalvesaresecuredintheclosedposition.(continued)83.9-6 05.<UnboratedMaterSourceIsolationVaPOesB3.9.2/BASESACTIONS(continued)A.3Duetothepotentialofhavingdilutedtheiboronconcentrationofthereactorcoolant,SR3.9.1.1(verificationofboronconcentration)mustbeperformedwheneverConditionAisenteredtodempnstratethattherequiredboronconcentrationexists.rTheCompletionTimeof4hoursissufficienttoobtainand..analyzeareactorcoo1antsampleforboronconcentrgaion.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.9.2.1/iThesevalvesaretobescouredclosedtoisolatepossibledilutionpaths.ThelikdlihoodofasignificantreductionintheboronconcentrationduringMODE6operationsisremoteduetothelarg'emassofboratedwaterintherefuelingcavityandithefactthatallunboratedwatersourcesareisolate'd,precludingadilution.Theboronconcentrationisicheckedevery72hoursduringMODE6underSR3.9.1.1..TiesSurveillancedemonstratesthatthevalvesaeclosedthyoughasystemwalkdown.The31dayFrequencyis',basedon;engineeringjudgmentandisconsidered.reasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsthatwillensurethatthevalveopeningisanunlikelyREFERENCES1.FSAR,Section[15.2.4].j2.NUREG-0800,Section15.4.6.jB3.9-7 NuclearInstrumentatioB3.'2B3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9l&NuclearInstrumentationBASESBACKGROUNDlOki.v,aIlot.v.6!ob,v.a.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESQNSErT3.1.biota.u.ache.4.Thesourcerangeneutronfluxd5mBRjBsareusedduringrefuelingoperationstomonitorthecorereactivity~!1,(N3iQg,3)~condition.Theinstalledsourcerangeneutronflux<~~~*arepartoftheNuclearInstrumentationSystem(NIS).Thesedetectorsarelocatedexternaltothereactorvesselanddeteceutronsleakinfromthecore.PrtSPorhrsrta!.Counterscare*neetEssttdronWrsttaorade.g~~r:>PSTheinsaecerangeneutronflux'steal~are(BF)cts(Ref.l)etictors<'operaingineproporipfieddetector/charater's'ueThedetectorsmotrteneuronfuxincountspersecond.einstrument/rangecove>ecaesoneu,ronuxlE+6csNiinumetaccur<<providecontinuvisualindicationinthecontrolroHadahh.hhlh*dhhhhhReferenC>.~1,I<<>>+EEEqe,~boc,~;~~1.k.<<~ot.~~room~dt'si&ed'rf+egovreereqeneubonflux.ckuaclt!-euuJan+>>iraK>nQgctnnel%TwoOPERABLEsourcerangeneutronfluxle~arerequiredtoprovidee~gBsltoalertdgjboperatag~dunexectedchangesincorereactivi.ucaswicciene.<oranimproperly)roadedfuel'ssembly./~heedforysafetyan'alysisforranuncontrolledboroniluionaccitdentiseminatedby'solatingallunbolted4atrsourceasrequ'dbyLCO/3.9.2,OUsboratedWaferorceIsoVationVales.'.-g<<~lgThesourcerangeneutronflux+ma-Ww<<ssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCPolicyStatement.l0!o.v.a.LCOThisLCOrequires~twosourcerangeneutronfluxa<~diddid~>beOpERABLEtoensureBRSEOredundantmonitoringcapabilityisavailabletodetectchangesincorereactivity.f04,Vdt).5.4asta4oaPEPAS!7,eachchannelmostProuidi'-v<sttd1EhJrca+aoanddlenskonecsFHheWochannelsmvJ+psrovlJ.C,~eludehiecovn'f~++ec6cdt<<McitesLcoom.83.9-8(continued) INSERT3.9.6'oco.v.bAnincreaseintheaudiblecountratealertstheoperatorsthataborondilutioneventisinprogress.SufficienttimeisavailablefortheoperatortorecognizetheincreaseinaudiblecountrateandtoterminatetheeventpriortoalossofSHUTOOWNMARGIN(seeBasesforLCO3.9.1,"BoronConcentration").Isolatingtheborondilutionsourceisperformedbyclosingvalvesandstoppingreactormakeupwaterpumps.INSERT3.9.6aMiththedischargeoffuelfromcorepositionsadjacenttosourcerangedetector~~~~~~~locations,countsdecreasingtozeroistheexpectedresponse.Basedonthis~~<.v~indicationalone,sourcerangedetectionshouldnotbeconsideredinoperable.Followingafullcoredischarge,sourcerangeresponseisverifiedwiththeinitialfuelassemblyreload. NuclearInstrumentationB3.BASES(continued)APPLICABILITYlob.va.Cdtnha~goQKdtlsInMODE6,thesourcerangeneutronflux~RA%~mustbeOPERABLEtodeterminechangesincorereactivity.TherearenootherdirectmeansavailabletocheckcorereactivityInMODES2,3,4,and5,thesesameinstalledsourcerangedetectorsandcircuitryarealsorequiredtobeOPERABLEbyLCO3.3.1,"ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation."ACTIONS04.v.ca.los.v.~~KRw3.9.t5)OCosVaaB.la.~G.S~<~C.hxfsndWithnosourcerangetorestoreaimmediatelyg'ntilasourcerangeOPERABLEstatus."4t~e~directfneanaeCJe4chngcha~9c.><"~rerear:RMat.The,rebore,Qhanntneutronfluxd80HEI328OPERABLEactionstoOPERABLEstatusshallbeinitiatedontinueg~>neutronflux~~@isresoreoŽChanel.tA.landA.2ChdqnncIWithonlyonesourcerangeneutronflux@~~OPERABLE,redundancyhasbeenlost.Sincetheseinstrumentsaretheonlydirectmeansofmonitoringcorereactivityconditions,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionA.1~awA<shallnotprecludecornletionofmovementofanttoasafeposition~orporfnacool~n0+eceoa.~Avo4~e+r9hePeasPcahc4spyferal+eeet)ermahreripaa+rol.I04sLLLWithosour'angeneronfluxonitorOPRABLE,hereareodire/HoeverinceCOREALTERATIONShndpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntilthesourcerangeneutronflux~~IdareOPERABLE.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensure~therequired,boronconcentrationexists.canc&cl-i~TheCompletionTimeofoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyze~~~coolantsamplgforboronconcentration@~~~ensur~gj&unplannedcangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.The12hourg~~isreasonable,consideringthelowQayttplebonTame(continued)B3.9-9 INSERT3.9.15~~~ForthepurposeofthisCondition,asourcerangeneutronfluxchannelisinoperablewhennovisualindicationisavailable.ThelossoftheaudiblecountratefunctionisaddressedbyConditionC. NuclearInstrumentationB3.BASESACTIONS~~"~SNSERi3.1.7probabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS10'ov4SR3.9.SR3...1isthepeormanceofaCHANNELCHECK,whichisacomparisonofthepaameterindicatedononechanneltoasimilarparameterontherchannelItisbasedontheassumptionthatthetwoindicationchannelsshouldbeconsistentwithcoreconditions.Changesinfuelloadingandcoregeometrycanresultinsignificantdifferencesbetweensourcerangechannels,buteachchannelshouldbe~FaTconsistentwithitslocalconditions.3.'Ilb~TheFrequencyof12hoursisconsistentwiththeCHANNELCHECKFrequencsecifiedsimilarlforttruntslob.v.a)nLCO3.3>"Re~HE-MIIpCyst~(g~)Z'n~~<~~~~.'R3.9.3.2lobv,cSR3.9.3.2istheperformanceofaCHANNELCALIBRATIONevery%%48-months.ThisSRismodifiedbyaNotestatingthatneutrondetectorsareexcludedfromtheCHANNELCALIBRATION.The,CHANNELCALIBRATIONforthesourcerangeneutronfluxa@A+~consistsofobtainingthedetectorplateauorpreampdiscriminatorcurves,evaluatingthosecurves,comparingthecurvestoaa.eeS~~~e3%8monthFrequencyisbaseontheneetoperformthisSurveillanceundertheconditionsthatapplyduringaplantoutage.OperatingexperiencehasshownthesecomponentsusuallypasstheSurveillancewhenperformedatthe18'monthFrequency.lob.v.c.REFERENCESl.Acmic.ZnduskIalEtu<CA<F)GbC[3and1I,Issuedform~en4July(0,l9lo7.69&-B&.l5;9A.Z.2.0AR,SectionB3.9-10 INSERT3.9.7aC.1C.2andC.3Mithnoaudiblecountrateavailable,onlyvisualindicationisavailableandpromptanddefiniteindicationofaborondilutioneventhasbeenlost.Therefore,COREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsmustbesuspendedimmediately.PerformanceofRequiredActionsC.landC.2shallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositionornormalcooldownofthecoolantvolumeforthepurposeofsystemtemperaturecontrol.SinceCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsarenottobemade,thecorereactivityconditionisstabilizeduntiltheaudiblecountratecapabilityisrestored.ThisstabilizedconditionisdeterminedbyperformingSR3.9.1.1toensurethattherequiredboronconcentrationexists.TheCompletiontimeofonceper12hoursissufficienttoobtainandanalyzecoolantsamplesforboronconcentrationandtoensureunplannedchangesinboronconcentrationwouldbeidentified.The12hourCompletionTimeisreasonable,consideringthelowprobabilityofachangeincorereactivityduringthistimeperiod.INSERT3.9.7bTheinoperabilityofonesourcerangeneutronfluxchannelpreventsperformanceofaCHANNELCHECKfortheoperablechannel.However,theRequiredActionsfortheinoperablechannelrequiressuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandpositivereactivityadditionsuchthattheCHANNELCHECKoftheoperablechannelcanconsistofensuringconsistencywithknowncoreconditions. a3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.4B3.9.4ContainmentPenetrationsBASESBACKGROUNDDuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirrad'edfuelassemblieswithincontainment,areleaseoffissionproductradioactivitywithincontainmentwillbeestrictedfromescapingtotheenvironmentwhentheLCrequirementsaremet.InMODES1,2,3,and4,thisiaccomplishedbymaintainingcontainmentOPERABLEasescribedinLCO3.6.1,"Containment."InMODE6,thepotentialforcontainmentpressurizationasaresultofangccidentisnotlikely;therefore,requirementstoisolatethecontainmentfromtheoutsideatmospherecanbeles+stringent.TheLCOrequirements'rereferredto~as"containmentclosure"ratherthan"containmentOPERABILITY."Containmentclosuremeansthatallpotentialescapepathsareclosedorcapableofbeingclosed.SincetPereisnopotentialforcontainmentpressurization,theAppendixJleakagecriteriaandtestsarenot:required..'hecontainme'nrtservestocontainfissionproductradioactivitythatmaybereleasedfromthereactor.corefollowinganaccident,suchthatoffsiteradiationexposuresaremaintainedwellwithintherequirementsof10CFR100;Additional'ly,thecontainmentprovidesradiationshieldingfromthe-fissionproductsthatmaybepresentinthecontainmentatmospherefollowingaccidentconditions.Thecontainmentequipmenthatch,whichispartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,providesameansformovinglargeequipmentandcomponentsintoandoutof-containment.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,theequipmenthatchmustbehe'ldinplacebyatleastfourbolts.Goodengineering+acticedictatesthattheboltsrequiredbythisLCObe~approximatelyequallyspaced.Thecontainmentairlocks,whicharealsopartofthecontainmentpressureboundary,provideameansforpersonnelaccessduringMODES1,2,3,and4unitoperationinaccordancewithLCO3.6.2,"ContainmentAirLocks."Eachairlockhasadooratbothends.ThedoorsarenormallyinterlockedtopreventsimultaneousopeningwhencontainmentOPERABILITYisrequired.Duringperiodsofunitshutdown(continued)B3.9-11 ~)01.i.ContainmentPenetrationsB3.9.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)whencontainmentclosureisnotrequired,thedoorinrlockmechanismmaybedisabled,allowingbothdoorsofa+airlocktoremainopenforextendedperiodswhenfreyrentcontainmententryisnecessary.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,containmentclosureisrequired;therefore,tedoorinterlockmechanismmayremaindisabled,buoneairlockdoormustalwaysremainclosed.Therequirementsforcontainmentpenetyationclosureensurel,thatareleaseoffissionproductracboactivitywithincontainmentwillberestrictedfromAscapingtothe'nvironment.Theclosurerestrict>onsaresufficienttorestrictfission~ductradioactivityreleasefromcontainmentdueoafuelhandingaccidentduringrefueling.TheContainmentPugeanxhaustSystemincludestwosubsystems.(Thenormalsubsystemincludesa42inchpurgepenetrationhnda42'nchexhaustpenetration.Thesecondsubsystem,a'gesystem,includesan8inchpurgepenetrationandn8inchexhaustpenetration.DuringMODESI,2,3,d4,thetwovalvesineachofthenormalpurgeandexhaustpenetrationsaresecuredintheclosedposition.The/twovalvesineachofthetwominipurgepenetrationscanbeopenedintermittently,butareclosedautomaticallybytheEngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFA).NeitherofthesubsystemsissubjecttoaSpecificatininMODE5.InMODE6,largeairexchangersarenecessarytoconductrefuelinoperations.Thenormal42inchpurgesystemisusedforthispurpose,andallfourvalvesareclosedbytheESFASiaccordancewithLCO3.3.2,"EngineeredSafetyFeaturActuationSystem(ESFAS)Instrumentation."Theinipurge,systemremainsoperationalinMODE6,andallfouvalvesarealsoclosedbytheESFAS.orheminipurgesystemisnotusedinMODE6.Allfour8inch,valvesaresecuredintheclosedposition.Theothercontainmentpenetrationsthatprovidedirectaccessfromcontainmentatmospheretooutsideatmosphere(continued)B.3.9-12 (o7,,ContainmentPenetrations83.9.4BASESBACKGROUND(continued)mustbeisolatedonatleastoneside.IsolationmaybeachievedbyanOPERABLEautomaticisolationvalve,oryamanualisolationvalve,blindflange,orequivalentEquivalentisolationmethodsmustbeapprovedandayincludeuseofamaterialthatcanprovideaternrary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrierfortothercontainmentpenetrationsduringfuelmovements(Ref.1).APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESthatarewellwithinthguidelinevaluesspecifiedin10CFR.(Ref.ofthe'10~~StandardeviewPlan,Section15.7.4,Rev.1efipes"w1within"10CFR100tobe25%orless(FR100vues.TheacceptancelimitsforoffsiteCionj.xposurgwillbe25%of10CFR100valuesorthetaffapprodlicensingbasis(e.g.,aspecifiedionof1CFR100limits).radarNRCfracIContaintpenetrationssatisfyCriterion3oftheNRCInterimolicyStatement.DuringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofiadiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment,themostsevereradiologicalconsequencesresultfromafuelhandl'accidentsThefuelhandlingaccidentisapostulatedevntthatinvolvesdamagetoirradiatedfuel(Ref.2).Fuelandlingaccidents,analyzedinReference3,includeoppingasingleirradiatedfuelassemblyandhalingtooloraheavyobjectontootherirradiatedfuelassblies.TherequirementsofLCO3.9.7,"RefuelingCavityaterLevel,"andtheminimumdecaytimeof100hourspritoCOREALTERATIONSensurethatthereleaseoffissioproductradioactivity,subsequenttoafuelhaningaccident,resultsindosesCOThisCOlimitstheconsequencesofafuelhandlingaccidentinctainmentbylimitingthepotentialescapepathsforfisonproductradioactivityreleasedwithincontainment.TheLCOrequiresanypenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfrmthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospheretobclosedexceptfortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgeandhaustpenetrations.FortheOPERABLEcontainmentpurgendexhaustpenetrations,thisLCOensuresthatthesepenetrationsareisolablebytheContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationSystem.TheOPERABILITYrequirementsforthisLCOensurethattheautomaticpurgeandexhaustvalve(continued)83.9-13 l07.j,ContainmentPenetrations83.9.4BASESLCO(continued)closuretimesspecifiedintheFSARcanbeachievedd,therefore,meettheassumptionsusedinthesafetynalysistoensurethatreleasesthroughthevalvesareteinated,suchthatradiologicaldosesarewithintheaccetancelimit.APPLICABILITYdlingaccient.InMODESI,2,3,tionrequirementsareaddressedbyapotentialforafueland4,containmentpetr3LCO3.6.1.InMODSand6,wheCOREALTERATIONSordfu1assblieswithincontainmentEmovementofirradiatarenotbeingconduced,thepentialforafuelhandlingaccidentdoesnotexst.Tefore,undertheseconditionsnorequirementsareponcontainmentpenetrationstatus.ThecontainmentpenetrationrequirementsareapplicableduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementof'adiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentbecausehisiswhenthereisACTIONSA.landA.2Ifthecontainmenequipmenthatch,airlocks,oranycontainmentpenetkationthatprovidesdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereisnotintherequiredstatus,includingtheContainmentPurgeandExhaustIsolationSystemnotcapableofautomaticactuationwhenthepurgeandexhaustvalvesareopen,theunitmustbe'lacedinagonditionwheretheisolationfunctionisnotneeded.TiesisaccomplishedbyimmediatelysuspendingCOREALTERATIOQandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincahtainment.Performanceoftheseactionsshallnotprecludcompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafepositin.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSS3.9.4.1hisSurveillancedemonstratesthateachofthecontainmentpenetrationsrequiredtobeinitsclosedpositionisinthatposition.TheSurveillanceontheopenpurgeandexhaustvalveswilldemonstratethatthevalvesarenotblockedfromclosing.Als'otheSurveillancewill(continued)B3.9-14

ContainmentPenetrations.B3.9.4ASES.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSPSR3.9.4.1(continued}TheSurveillanceisperformedevery7aysduringCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatefuelassemblieswithincontainment.TheSurveillanceinto(valisselectedtobecommensuratewiththenormaldurg'ionoftimetocompletefuelhandlinoerations.AsuAeillacebeforetestart9PhofrefuelingopaionswillyovidetwoorthreesurveillancevrificationsduringtheapplicableperiodforthisLCO.Assuchthis,Sqrveillanceensuresthatapostulatedfelhadling.a0cidentthatreleasesfissionroductrad'oactiv'itwit'ntheconttllPy~h)a>nmenw)notresultinareleaseoff'ssiorfproductradioactivitytotheenvironmentf.i~SR3.9.4.2demonstratethateachvalveoperatorhasmotiepower,whichwillensurethateachvalveiscapableofbngclosedbyanOPERABLEautomaticcontainmentpurgeandeaustisolationsignal.ThisSurveillncedemonstratesthateachcontainmentpurgeandexhaustvalveactuatestoitsisolationpositiononmanualinitiptionor'onanactualorsimulatedhighradiationsignal.The18monthFrequencymaintainsconsistency'ithothersimilarESFASinstrumentationandvalvetestingrequirements.InLCO3.3.2,theContainmentPurgeIsolationSignal-SystemrequiresaCHANNELCHECKevery7daysandaCOTevery31daystoensurethechannelOPERABIL'ITYduringrefuelingoperations.Every18monthsaCHANNEL'ALIBRATIONisperformed.Thesystemactuationrespopsetimeisdemonstratedevery18months,duringrefueling,onaSTAGGEREDTESTBASIS.SR3.6.3;5demonstratesthattheisolationtimeofeachvalveisinacrdancewiththeInserviceTestingProgramrequirements.TseSurveillancesperformedduringNODE6willensurethatevalvesarecapableofclosingafterapostulatedfuelandlingaccidenttolimitareleaseoffissionproductradioactivityfromthecontainment.B3.9-15 07.j.ContainmentPenetrationsB3.;9.4BASES(continued)REFERENCES1.GPUNuclearSafetyEvaluationSE-0002000-001,Rev.0,May20,1988.J2.FSAR,SectionI;15.4.5].3.NUREG-0800,Section15.7.4,Rev.1,July1981.~~~B3.9-16 ra'..~)~+,VRHRandCoolantCirculation-@PALWaterLeveB3.983.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.9ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation~WsBBWaterlQi.sr"LevelBASESBACKGROUNDlO'g.v-aerne<<udlineh'can)ThepurposeoftheRHRSysteminNODE6istoremovedecayheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem~~(RCS),oprovidemixingoforatecoolantgabtoreventoronstratification(Ref.I).HeatisremoveromtheRSbycirculatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)p'wheretheheatistransferredtotheComponentCoolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCcolleg~OperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownordecayheatremovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)and~bypass.HixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythiscontinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSES~los.v;hcTfd$ERIoS.iv3.'l.8Iftheretorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintainedbelow200'F,bilingofthereatorcoolantcouldresult.Thisvcould1adtoalossof/coolantinthereactorvessel..Additgonally,boilinggfthereactorcaolantcouldleadtoaredut'.tioninboronconcentrationinth'ecoolantdue,t6boronpl+tingoutoncomponentsneartheareasoftheboi.lingactivity.The1ssofreactorcoolantandthereductionofboronconcentrioninthereactorcoolantwould~eventuallychallengethintegrityofthe"'fuelcladding,hichisafissionpructbarrier.OpetrainoftheRSystemisrequiredobeoperationalinNODE6,withhewaterlevel~23fabovethetopos'thereactorvessflange,toprevtthischallenge,."TheLCOdoespmitde-energiz'thHRpumpforshortdurations,undtheconditionateboronconcentrationisnotdilut.Thisconditinale-energizingof:~theRHRpumpdoesotresultinaallengetothefissionroductbarrier.[OS.v.atheNRCPolicStatemen>R<<.siJ~Iece~ol(RHR)<<3JCch3h+Qmv4ko~H>>Level5<<t+<<iWteaCri4C>>tss~4(continued)B3.9-17

INSERT3.9.8ThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboron'concentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthe,system.Therefore,thermalorboronstratificationisnotpostulated.Inordertoensureadequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,oneloopoftheRHRSystemisrequiredtobeOPERABLE,andinoperationwhileinNODE6,withwaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange.WhilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumptionforthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminNODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.DuetothewatervolumeavailableintheRCSwithawaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,asignificantamountoftimeexistsbeforeboilingof,thecoolantwouldoccurfollowingalossoftherequiredRHRpump.SincethelossoftherequiredRHRpumpresultsinthesuspensionofoperationsinvolvingareductioninreactorcoolantboronconcentration,aborondilutioneventisveryunlikely.Therefore,thisrequirementdictatesthatsinglefailuresarenotconsideredforthisLCOduetothetimeavailabletooperatorstorespondtoalossoftheoperatingRHRpump.TheLCOpermitsde-energizingtherequiredRHRpumpforshortdurations,undertheconditionthattheboronconcentrationisnotreduced.Thisconditionalde-energizingoftherequiredRHRpumpdoesnotresultinachallengetothefissionproductbarrierorresultin'oolantstratification. iE>B.4'lRHRandCoolantCirculation-Qgt-WaterLeveB3.BASESAPPLICABLE~SAFETYANALYSES(continued)Ita~rQCOZgs.o+>>ssCessaI(Qw~Ucscv440Pss:~0c3'90(p3M.0eCVslafv50swC4C00OnlyoneRHRloopisrequiredfordecayheatremovalinMODE6,withthewaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofthereactorveselflane/+neRHRlooisreuiretobeecausetevoumeowaterabovethereactoresselflanerovidesbackudecaheatremoalcaabilit.OPERABLEandinoperasontoprovide>xinofboratedcoola~to8IleV.aAPPLICABILITYlog.v.cAnOPERABLERHRloopincludesan,RHRpump,aheatexchanger,.valves,piping,instruments,andcontrolstoensureaOPERABLEflowpaTheflowpathstarsin~ftheRCShotleChandisreturnedtotheRCScoldlee.~I4IsIllthNoeaallowstherequiredremovedfromservicefor+hwifAss&pcoeeiThisperm>soperationssuchasTheLCOismodifiedbyaoperatingRHRlooptobe1hourper8hourperiodcoremappingoralterationsinthevicinityofthereactvesselhotlegnozzl.RCStoRHRisolationvalvetesting.Duringthishourper>o,ecayeatisremovbynaturalconvectiontothelargemassofwaterintherefuelingcavity.'Sh~~lh4eW'EAR.4stqa'beteewesgoeoW\c.satcq4~a5aarseago%seel'te~cJ'vaoccvrcLa~c'c~WHahabe~eeJ"o.QOneRHRloopmustbeOPERABLEandin'operationinMODE6,withthewaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayheatremova.The23ftWi-bxutet~~waterlevelwasselectedbecauseitcorrespondstoth3ftrequirementestablishedforfuelmovementinLCO"RefuelinCavityWaterLevel."equ>remenstheystep>noeyyecovepdbyLathsinStion3s4ReactorCool&tSystem(RCS),ndSection3.5,Emerenc(continued)B3.9-18 ~eVlaRHRandCoolantCirculation-HighWateB3.9.BASES~lot.v.o.APPLICABILITY(continued)Z.Nsh:RT31RRHRlooprequirementsinMODE6w~tewaereve(23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9~/"ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCircolateoo-~WaterLevel."ACTIONSlog-v.cRHRlooprequirementsaremebyhavingeRHRlooOPEMBLEandin/operation,xceptaspeittedineNoteto@heLCO.A.lA.~andA3IfRHRlooprequirementsarenotmet,therewillbenoforcedcirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformboronconcentrations.Reducedboronconcentrationscan~occur'bytheadditionofwaterwithalowerboronconcentrationthanthatcontainedintheRl08.u.i)OgeV.R.ReducedoronconcenQrationscanocrbytheaddit'onofwaterithlowerbo'nconcentratithanthatconainedintheR.Therefor,actionsthatesultinanulannedborodilutionsh1besuspendimmediately.t~tive~'IWeak~lbferiaa>>ac'eckuckeuaa>>e.!~'aela+leeeoee>>wngaealee,eeeeetcheeeJeelactionsshallbetakenimmediatelytendloadinMirradiatedfuelassembliesinthecore.Withnoforcedcirculationcooling,decayeatremovaromthecoreoccursbynaturalconvectiontotheheatsinkprovidedbythewaterabovethecore.Aminimumrefuelingwaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeprovidesanadequateavailableheatsink.Suspendinganyoperation.thatwouldincreasedecayheatload,suchasloadingafuelassembly,isaprudentactionunderthiscondition.ke~R~,IfHRlorequirents.aretmet,tionsallbeitiateandconinuedinodertosisfRlooquirents.ittheinMODE6andtherefuelngla>>+(continued) INSERT3.9.9RequirementsfortheRHRSysteminMODESI,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODEI;"LCO3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled." /QQ.vilRHRandCoolantCirculation-~WaterLevel~83.BASESACTIONStCg.v.cl-ernovaloctecn.qhecL+u4yambi@<+loSSeSonly~74ert.farajco~ec+ue~onsdbctl)be.int+gled<~edt'a~andS<llCpnh'ave.un'~~~IO'Pwater1vel>23ftaoveeopoereacorvesseflange,5Ch5'6'ede105.ivA.4IfRHRloopequirementsarenmet,allcontainmentpenetrationprovidingdirectccessfromtheconf'ainmentatmosphereotheoutsideatmspheremustbeclop'edwithin4hours.iththeRHRloopvequirementsnotmet,thepotentialexistsforthecoo'lanttoboilandreleaseradioactvegastotheconQinmentatmosphere.Closingcontainentpenetrationsthatareopentothe'utsideatmospreensuresdose1mitsarenotexceeded./TheCmpletionTimeofhoursisreasonable,basedonthelowrobabilityofthecoolantboilininthattime.SURVEILLANCERE(UIREMENTSSR3.RTisoperationQCqutrt>verrttgoneveeA.boyl4+o~e+'<miscite)Of-fhego~feJ.'Ccrolcen+RHRloopisinlog.v.clo8.'<<decayheatremovalcapabilityand'opreventthermalandboronstratific'nthecore.TheFrequencyof12hoursissufficientconsiderinavailabletotheoperatorinthecontrolroomoQerieleCa./on(OakaprintREFERENCES7.9.5'ei.lQAR,Section~~}.2.urDALSe4o.iS.V.O.~.tfen*R<kesetic4ht3f(oem'he,4eetfee'c)iverp4enp4+%LANlneg~teegitee'hit@ltcllie>stere+lie+OneWbeeeisro4eht~B3.9-20 )aS.v'atRjjRandCoolantCirculation-jCQilaterLevel~B3.QB3.9REFUELINGOPERATIONS0B3.9ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-~aterLevel~"-~+BASESlo'i.v.aerr'adBACKGROUNDarrlThepurposeoftheRHRSystemiMODE6istoremovedecaheatandsensibleheatfromtheReactorCoolantSystem4h(RCS),oprovidemixingofpBoratecoolanttoprevenboronstratification(Ref.1).HeatisremoveromebycilatingreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRheatexchangr(s)heretheheatistransferredtotheComponentolingWaterSystem.ThecoolantisthenreturnedtotheRCSviatheRCScoeOperationoftheRHRSystemfornormalcooldownecayearemovalismanuallyaccomplishedfromthecontrolroom.TheheatremovalrateisadjustedbycontrollingtheflowofreactorcoontthroughtheRHRheatexchanger(s)and~bypasslins).MixingofthereactorcoolantismaintainedbythisconinuouscirculationofreactorcoolantthroughtheRHRSystem.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESi'.v.cR,Iftheractorcoolantemperatureisnomaintainedbelo200'F,oilingoftheeactorcoolantculdresult.Thicould1adtoalosscoolantintheeactorvessel.Additinally,boilingofthereactorolantcouldleadtoareducioninboroncncentrationintecoolantduetotheboronplatingoutocomponentsnearheareasoftheboil'nga'ctivity.helossofreacrcoolantandtredtionofboronconcentrationithereactorcoolntwillevetuallychallegetheintegrityofthefuelclading,wh'isafissioproductbarrie.TwotrainsofheRHRSyternarerequiedtobeOPERABg,andonetrainnoerationinodetoreventfraischallene.Althou'htheRdoesotmeltaspecficcritrionteNRCPolicStatemen,itwas'dentif'edinthNRColiyStamentaanimpantontributtorisrectionTherethRHRSs'acificion.tacitml~+Qe~mvm.l(l'AR.aNLtjtt'4tw4Ctcivtab~Q'a+eWet~O+a~fiegQr't4ert'On4LCO~jn3ylnMODE6,withthewatbovethetoofthereactorvesselflangeothRHRloopsmustbeOPERABL.(continued)B3.9-21 INSERT3.9.10'CjgglThesafetyanalysisfortheborondilutioneventduringrefuelingassumesoneRHRloopisinoperation(Ref.2).Thisinitialassumptionensurescontinuousmixingoftheboratedcoolantinthereactorvessel.TheanalysisalsoassumestheRCSisatequilibriumboronconcentrationanddilutionoccursuniformlythroughoutthesystem.Therefore,thermalor>boronstratificationisnotpostulated.Whilethereisnoexplicitanalysisassumption'forthedecayheatremovalfunctionoftheRHRSysteminMODE6,ifthereactorcoolanttemperatureisnotmaintained,boilingofthecoolantcouldresult.Thiscouldleadtoalossofcoolantinthereactorvessel.Inaddition,boilingofthecoolantcouldleadtoareductioninboronconcentrationinthecoolantduetoboronplatingoutoncomponentsneartheareasoftheboilingactivity.Thelossofcoolantandthereductionofboronconcentrationinthereactorcoolantcouldeventuallychallengetheintegrityofthefuelcladding,whichisafissionproductbarrier.Inordertopreventachallengetofuelcladdingandtoensure'dequatemixingoftheboratedcoolant,twoloopsoftheRHRSystemarerequiredOPERABLE,andoneloopinoperationwhileinMODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange. yC>ahgaaRHRandCoolantCirculation-gghdiaterLevelB3.9.WqBASESLCO(continued)f8%04(CICCadeeda+CRgdTnaLt+sSn,oneoodgRHRmustbeinoperationinordertoprovide(0'i.v.c,ixingofboratedcoolat.o$.v.achaAEARPEEp~p,'hexchanger,valves,piping,instrumentsandcontrolstoensureanOPERABLEflowpat,EhEEh<<ERepppphRhleg)andisreturnedtotheRCScoldleg/-.~~i-,-h)~p"b"APPLICABILITYTwoRHRloopmustbeinoabovethetoheatremovamiacehg~4ereeuiredtobeOPERABLarqE,andoneRHRlooperationinNODE6,withthewaterlevel<23ftfthereactorvesselflange,toprovidedecayntsfortheRSstemin'recoeredbyLOsinSetion3.4,eacorClan~s~~~Systm(RCS,anSe'3.5EmerencCoreCool'n3,R.lloSemsECS.RHRlooprequirementsin6withthewaterevel>23ftarelocatedinLCO3.9.""ResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)andCoolantCirculation-~WaterLevel.">2.3>ACTIONSA.IandA.2Iog.v.a,(OI.Ve~tLia.S.ilIsthantherequirednumberofRHRloopsareOPERABactions1beimmediatelyinitiatedandcontinntilheRHRloopisoredtoOPERABLEstatusooperationrunti'1>23ftofw~evelisishedabovethereactorvesselflange.Mheaterlevelis>23ftabovethereactorvlange,theAicabilitychangestothatofl50~&5,andonlyoneRHRloop'iredtobe~0RAKEandinoperation.AnimmediateCompleimetecorrectiveaetio(continued)83.9-22 INSERT3.9.llaMODES1,2,3,4,and5arecoveredbyLCO3.4.4,"RCSLoops-MODE1;"LCO~~~~~~~~3.4.5,"RCSLoops-MODES2and3;"LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"andLCO3.4.8,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsNotFilled."INSERT3.9.116IfonlyoneRHRloopisOPERABLEandinoperation,redundancyforRHRislost.ActionmustbeinitiatedtorestoreeitherasecondlooptoOPERABLEstatusorwaterlevel>23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainingtheavailabilityoftwopathsforheatremoval.Theactionstorestore,mustcontinueuntileitherthesecondRHRloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusorwaterlevelisestablished>23ftabovethetopofreactorvesselflange. RHRandCoolantCirculation-QQ-WaterLevelB3.BASESACTIONS(continued)~~~$ER7IOiotaspqgB.lc~xM8IfnoRHRloopisinoperation,therewillbenoforcecirculationtoprovidemixingtoestablishuniformsoron.concejitrations.ReddcedboronconcyiitrationscanotoccurbytNeadditionofPaterwithaloderboronconentration.ththatcontainpdintheRCS,becausealloftheunboratedwtersourcesan6isolated.'fnoRHR/loopisinoperation,actionsshallbeinPtiatedimmedialy,andcontinued,torestoreoneRHRlooptooperat'.SincethyunitisinCoditionsAan/'concurently,therPstorationofoOPERABLEPKRloopsandoneeratinRHRooshouldbaccom'ed/exeditiously.lO"t.u.iIfnoHRloopis'noperationallcontainentpenetratiosprov'dingdirectccessfromecontainmetatmospherettheoutsideatmspheremustclosedwitin4hours.WththRHRloopr.quirementsnomet,theptentialexistfortecoolanttboilandrelaseradioacivegastothontainmenttmosphere.Cosingconta'en'tpenetraionsfthatareoptotheoutsdeatmospherensuresthadoselimitsareotexceeded.TheCompltionTimeofhoursisrsonable,bayedonthelowprobilityof,thecoolantboilnginthatLime.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTSSR3.Thioperatin.pgqMa/CbaIC'flC'4.'how)<<Vtgl2.houa3en~i~OA%~"4~~ce8'La.~+thtoneRHRloopisin!05.ivdecayheatremovalcapabilityandoreventthermalandboronstratif'inthecore.Inaison,during>'perationofthPRHRloowittedwater)velinthejvicingtyoftgreactorvessel6zzlestheRHRumuctionrequirementsmustbemt.TheFrequencyof12hoursissuicientconsidering$4Ja-40,Oni4~+idŽ'tItt.art'tco+a~inJvddsf~ea4e.,$~~pqdgQ~sos~4naira<<5i~K'chhallcontinueQh4ayCC+tla4'rtCVAftOwiO ~~INSERT3.9.12LO~.~~IfnoRHRloopisinoperationorifnoloopisOPERABLEalloperationsinvolvingareductionofRCSboronconcentrationmustbesuspendedandactiontorestoreoneRHRlooptoOPERABLEstatusandoperationmustbeinitiated.Topreventborondilution,forcedcirculationisrequiredtoprovidepropermixingandpreservethemargintocriticalityinthistypeofoperation.TheimmediateCompletionTimereflectstheimportanceofmaintainiegoperationforheatremoval.TheactiontorestoremustcontinueuntiloneloopisrestoredtoOPERABLEstatusandoperation. ~~%,v<<BASESZhlsnRT3.9,I3RHRandCoolantCirculation-(graterLeveB3.9SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTSJog,ivSR3..(continued)availabletotheoperator~inthecontrolroomREFERENCESS.4.5.1.QFAR,SectionQ~UFSAR,Sc-C.btSnIS.'.4~2.+~.N~RHCloopP~greneeeStet<C83.9-24 INSERT3.9.13SR3.9.4.2VerificationthatasecondRHRpumpisOPERABLEensuresthatanadditionalpumpcanbeplacedinoperation,ifneeded,tomaintaindecayheatremovalandreactorcoolantcirculation.Verificationisperformedbyverifyingproperbreakeralignmentandpoweravailabletothestandbypump.TheFrequencyof7daysisconsideredreasonableinviewofotheradministrativecontrolsavailableandhasbeenshowntobeacceptablebyoperatingexperience. RefuelingCavityWaterLeve83.9583.9REFUELINGOPERATIONSB3.<RefuelingCavityWaterLevelBASESBACKGROUNDILQ.Yc..aZNKE'0'r(lllQ;<LLgqiqupctllimcon<a~ca+ThemovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesrperformanceofCOREALTERATIONS,exceptduringlatchingandunlatchingofcontrolroddriveshafts,requiresaminimumwaterlevelof23ftabovethetoofthereactorvesselflane.urgingeue>ng,smasna)nsuicientaterelintheconainment,reclingcan,fueltransfcanal,.refuingcavity,andspentfelpool.Suffirentwaterinecessarytretainiod'fissionproctactivity'nthewater'ntheeventofafuelhdlingaccide(Refs.1a2).Suffientiodinetivitywoulberetainedolimitofftedosesfrtheaccidentto25%of10C100limitsasprovidedytheguidanceoReference3.APPLICABLESAFETYANALYSESllO.'t,i.o.Cae(.a)During.COREALTERATIONSandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblies,thewaterlevelintherefuelingcavityisaninitialconditiondesignparameterintheanalysisofafuelhandlinaccidentincontainmentpagp(Ref.1.Aminimumwaterlevelof23ftallowsadecontaminationfactorof100tobeusedineacc>entanaysisoriosnThisrelatestotheassumptionthat99%ofthetotaliodinereleasedfromthepellettocladdinggapofallthedroppedfuelassemblyrodsisretainedbytherefuelingcavitywater.Thefuelpellettocladdinggapisassumedtocontain10%ofthetotalfuelrodiodineinventory(Ref.3'ithaminimumwaterlevelof23ftandaminimumdecaytimeof100hourspriortofuelhandling,theanalysisandtestprogramsdemonstratethattheiodinereleaseduetoapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentisadequatelycapturedbythewaterandoff'tedosesaremaintainedwithinallowablelimits(Ref/.~~).p(continued)B3.9-25 INSERT3.9.14Thisrequirementensuresasufficientlevelofwaterismaintainedintherefuelingcavityorportionshydraulically.connected(e.g.,refuelingcanal)~~~~~~~~~toretainiodinefission'productactivityresultingfromafuelhandlingaccidentincontainment(Ref.1).Theretentionofiodineactivitybythewaterlimitstheoffsitedosefromtheaccidentwellwithinthevaluesspecifiedin10CFR100(Ref.2). RefuelingCavityWaterLevel-B3.9BASESAPPLICABLERefuelingcavitywaterlevelsatisfiesCriterion2oftheSAFETYANALYSESNRCPolicyStatement.(continued)LCO~~tabb.t,<c~Ear3'l.lbAPPLICABILITYtIO.t.t,.cxanSvreSaSoc'cene1evdn4~~'isP4W+in%he~4nc)aavikqWoesnatac+c%cIAJiolocrtalcopseucnc.~Aminimumrefuelingcavitywaterlevelof23ftabovethereactorvesselflangeisrequiredtoensure~theradiologicalconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainmentarewithinacceptablelimits~~'-theLcoisaliene~IsLCOM~isappicableduringCOREALTERATIONS,exceptdrinlatchinandunlatchinofcontrolroddriveshafs~whenmovingirradiateduelassemblieswithinnainment.TheLCOofafuel.Ifirradiatedfuelassembliesarenotpresentincontainment,therecanbenopostulatedfuelhandlingaccident.Requirementsforfuelhandlingaccidentsinthespentfuelpoolarecoveredby0.7.MKclACTIONS-A.landA.2lAhtel+lA<'hAl$4ngsh~fcLs~~c'wHec~"<<~4occidentcanno+Vte.+QcpcShouldbreclocLe.Weacciden+~nnoccuranIWithawaterlevelof(23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflange,alloperationsinvolvingCOREALTERATIONSormovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinthecontainmentshallbesuspendedimmediatelytoensurethatafuelhandlingaccidehtcannotoccur.ThesuspensionofCOREALTERATIONSandfuelmovementshallnotprecludecompletionofmovementofacomponenttoasafeposition.A.3{fo.t.InadditiotoimmediatelyuspendingCORETERATIONSormovementfirradiatedfue,actionstoreorerefuelingcavityterlevelmustbinitiatedimmeiately.83.9-26(continued) INSERT3.9.16andpreservestheassumptionsofthefuelhandlingaccidentanalysis(Ref.I).Assuch,itistheminimumrequiredlevelduringmovementoffuel~~~~~~~~~~assemblieswithincontainment.Maintainingthisminimumwaterlevelintherefuelingcavityalsoensuresthat>23ftofwaterisavailableinthespentfuelpoolduringfuelmovementassumingthatcontainmentandAuxiliaryBuildingatmosphericpressuresareequal. ce~~',~RefuelingCavityWaterLevB3.BASES(continued)SURVEILLANCERE(UIREHENTS~~lO,u.dtSR3.re@l;c~v'erificationofaminimuaterlevelof23ftabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangeensuresthatthedesignbasisfortheanalysisofthep'ostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentduringrefuelingoperationsismet.Waterattherequiredlevelabovethetopofthereactorvesselflangelimitstheconsequencesofdamagedfuelrodsthatarepostulatedtoresultromafuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment(Ref.~.TheFrequencyof24hoursisbasedonengineeringjudgmentandisconsideredadequateinviewofthelargevolumeofwaterandthenormalproceduralcontrolsofvalvepositions,whichmakesignificantunplannedlevelchangesunlikely.REFERENCES~92'egulatoryGuide1.2QlS.'7.P.3.'I'AR,SectioniEPr~.10CFR100.~~~alinski,D,Bell,.J.,Duhn,E.,andLocae,J.,WAP-828,RdiologicalonsequensofaFueHandlinAccidentDecemberIl.B3.9-27 DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.1Site',Loc&Mon4.1.1SitearidExclusionAreaBoundariesThesiteandexclusionar'eaboundaries[shallasshowninFigure4.1-)].js4.1.2LwPoulationZoneLPZbeasdescribed'rTheLPZ[shallbeasdescribedorashowninFigure.1-2].4.2ReactorCoreII2..l.4.2.1FuelAssembliesI2.IThereactorshallcontainfuelassemblies.Eachassemblyshallconsistofamatrixozirccniu~fuelrodswithaninitialcompositionofnaturalorslightlyenricheduraniumdioxide(UO)asfuelmaterial.Limitedsubstitutionsofzirconiuma/loyorstainlesssteelfillerrodsforfuelrods,inaccordancewithapprovedapplicationsoffuelrodconfigurations,maybeused.FuelassembliesshallbelimitedtothosefueldesignsthathavebeenanalyzedwithapplicableNRCstaffapprovedcodesandmethodsandshownbytestsoranalysestocomplywithallfuelsafetydesignbases.Alimitednumberofleadtestassembliesthathavenotcompletedrepresentativetestingmaybeplacedinnonlimiting,coreregions.4.2.2ControlRodAssembliesThereactorcoresha11contain'.controlrod]assembiias.ThectrolmaterialshallbeasapprovedbytheNRC.Sbt~ttttAuteurPawedPlodtp+86~f0di.e(4.0-1(continued) ThesitefortheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantislocatedonthesouthshoreo'LakeOntario,approximately16mileseastofRochester,NewYork. DesignFeatures4.0<>'<<4-0DESIGNFEATURES4.3FuelStorage'I4.3.14.3.1.1Thespent.fuelstorageracksaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:'a~b.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichment~~of~+weightpercent;S'a0ff(0~95iffullyfloodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforcertaintiesasdescribedin.thSAR@nominal[9.15]inchcentertocenterdistbetw1assembliesplacedingdensityfuelstoragerh'L'Z.i44.3.1.2~~l<3.v[d.Ano.95]inchcentertodistanceeweenfuelassembliesplacedin[lowden'elstorageracks];][e.eworpartiallyspentfuelassemblieswitdiseburnupinthe"acceptablere"ofFigure.7-1]maybeallowerestrictedstoragein[esfuelsgerack(s);and][f.Neworpartiallentfuesemblieswithadischargeupinthe"unacceperange"ofFigur.7.17-1]willbestoredinco'ancewith[FSAR,approvedprocedures,LicenseeConledSpecification,oretc.].]Thenewfuelstoragersaredesignedandshallbemaintainedwith:'a~b.FuelassemblieshavingamaximumU-235enrichmentoff'~weightpercent;5;oskff(095ifful1yf1oodedwithunboratedwater,whichincludesanallowanceforcertaintiesasdescribedin.thSA@;(continued)4.0-2 Insert4.3.1CoConsolidatedrodstoragecanisterscontaining<358undamagedrodsor<110bowed,broken,orotherwisefailedrods.CanistersmustmeettherequirementsofSpecification3.7.17(fortheapplicableregiononly)andSpecifications4.3.1.l.aand4.3.l.l.b. DesignFeatures4.04.0DESIGNFEATURES4.3FuelStorage(continued)c.k,<0.98ifmoderatedbyaqueousfoam,whichincludesanallowanceforuncertaintiesasdescribedin'thk&SARP;andd.Anoinchcentertoccebetween-fuelassthestorageI(L3vxIIz.vox4.3.2Drainaqetainedto23ft.Thespentfuel~~poolisdesignedandshallbemaipreventinadvertentdrainingofthepoolc4.3.3~CaacitThespentfuel~Qpoolisdesignedandshallbemaintainedwithastoragecapacitylimitedtonomorethan(FPP)fuelassemblies.oooo~~j&pc&~QCLhcLctc.MGLi~4.0-3 DesignFeatures4.0Thisfsureshallconsistof[amaof]thesiteareaandprovide,saminimum,theinformiondescribedinSection[2.1.2]ofheFSARrelatingtothemap].Figure4.1-1(page1of1)SiteandExclusionAreaBoundariesWOGSTS4.0-4//Rev.0,09/282 'I)n~~DesignFeature4Thifigureshallconsistof[amapof)thesiteareashowitheLPZboundary.Featuresuchastowns,roads,andrecationalareasshallbe'icatedinsufficientdetailtoliowidentificationsignificantshiftsin'opulation'stributionwithintheLPZ.Figure4.1-2(page1of1).LowPopulationZoneWOGSTS4.0-5/!/Rev.0,09/28/r Responsibility5.15.0ADHINISTRATIYECONTROLS5.1Responsibility5.1el~IIW.i.i7/.n,sta.aespk+h41~22112p121IIICIRI-operationandshalldelegateinwritingthesuccessiontothisresponsibilityduringhisabsence.The/Plant~orhisdesignee,shallapprovepriortohpIIe~pmodificationstocgKBsystemsor~~mg.thataffectnuclearsafety.5~re..Core,povsen5.1.2'.fIl.iiiThe+ShiftSupervisor(SS)3shallberesonsibleforthecontrolroomcommandfunction.<teaiDuringanyabsenceofteSSfromthecontroroomwicetheisin.<<~<<IIXII,2...IIIhdIIhdepppplt~Operator(SRO)licenseshallbedesignatedtoassumethecontrolroomcommandfunction.Duringanyabsenceofthe+SS~romthecontrolroomwhiletheggB)isinHODE5or6,anindividualwithSROlicenseo~rReactorOperatorlicenseshallbedesignatedtoassumet4econtrolroomcomandfunction.QttActssfe5.0-1 Organization5.25.0ADHINISTRATIVfCONTROLS5.2Organization5.2.1OnsiteandOffsiteOranizationspie4OnsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallbeestablishedfordBEBhoperationandcorporatemanagement,respectively.Theonsiteandoffsiteorganizationsshallincludethepositionsforactivitiesaffectingthesafetyofthenuclearpowerplant.ll5.ta.b.C~d.Linesofauthority,responsibiIity,andcommunicationshallbedefinedandestablishedthroughouthighestmanagementlevels,intermediatelevels,andalloperatingorganizationpositions.Theserelationshipsshallbedocumentedand.updated,asappropriate,inorganizationcharts,functionaldescriptionsofdepartmentalresponsibilitiesandrelationships,andjobdescriptionsforkeypersonnelpositions,orinequivalentformsofdocumentation.Theserequirementsshallbedocumentedinthef~A9;/Flanadfei-'JVSAR.The/PIant'-+shallberesponsibleforoverallsafeoperationofthe!antandshallhavecontroloverthoseonsiteactivitiesnecessaryforsafeoperationandmaintenanceoftheplant;~aifttaf<(V@:iVfspecifiedcateexecutive'liallhavecorporateresponsibilityforoverallplantnuclearsafetyandshalltakeanymeasuresneededtoensureacceptableperformanceofthestaffinoperating,maintaining,andprovidingtechnicalsupporttotheplanttoensurenuclearsafet~Theindividualswhotraintheoperatingstaff,carryouthealth'hysics,or'performqualityassurancefunctionsmayreportotheappropriateonsitemanager;however,theseindidualsshallhavesufficientorganizationalfreedomtoenretheirindependencefrom'peratingpressures.5.2.2Rdt~fPldh~+tnclvJe.Ilte.llovasavvsh~ileenffiiii11'~fl5'.Li0~en+4CreacJVien'eraserwhotI36OaasiltnqapraMr44dsjj4f.OSSfCfneJ'Qe(<s.infhcrozk)r-AftcJJihonaI~tasseltdh.~be.<<~ljnmJ+fh<s~sAcrt:~t4<le4ela~4izin'COntinued)NoDE,.>mr~~5.0-2 ~4PKKQ~ryi~gs'-.~Is~.I'III~~I~I~IIIeTii'~IHDIVIII%KKll~~~~~I~I~~~IIIIII,II~I~~~~~I'I~~~-e'I~~II~~~~II~~I~I~~~~II~I'I~I~III'I~I'~I~~~I~~I~~I~~I~~~I~II~~I~~I~~~~~~~~I'~~~I~~I~~'I'~~~~I~~~I~II~~~~~~I1I~II~~'~I~~'I'I~~I~II~II~I'~'~~~~I~III INSERT5.0.1Ib.Shiftcrewcompositionmaybeone1essthantheminimumrequirementof10CFR50.54(m)(2)(i)andSpecifications5.2.2.aand5.2.2.eforaperiodoftimenottoexceed2hoursinordertoaccommodateunexpectedabsenceofon-dutyshiftcrewmembersprovidedimmediateactionistakentorestoretheshiftcrewcompositiontowithintheminimumrequirements.

~~:Organization5.25.2Organization5.2.2UnitStaff(continued)4.Exceptduringextendedshutdownperiods,theuseofovertimeshouldbeconsideredonanindividualba'otfortheentirestaffonashift.AnydeviationtheaboveguidelinessbeauthorizedinadvancebythentSuperintendeorhisdesignee,inaccordancewithapproveminisiveprocedures,orbyhigherlevelsofmanagement,'ccordancewithestablishedproceduresandwithdocuationthebasisforgrantingthedeviation.Controlssbeincludedintheprocedureshthatindiviovertimeshallbereviewedmonthlyby[PlantSuintendent]orhisdesigneetoensurethatexcessourshavenotbeenassigned.Routinedeviationfromthaboveguidelinesisnotauthorized.~l(5'.vTheamountperformingcontrolledaHRC,0proveJroqram~ofovertimeworkedby~6memberssafetyrelatedfuntionsshallbelimitedandinaccordancewitIJS;v~llS.i.ii1l5,viie..TheShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)shallprovideadvisorytechnicalsupporttotheSh'iftSupervisor(SS)intheareasofthermalhydraulics,reactorengineering,'andplantanalysiswithregardtothesafeoperationofthe~pla~&5.0-4 INSERT5.0.2ll5.vac.TheSTAshallbeassignedtotheshiftcrewwhiletheplantisinMODEI,2,3or4andshallmeetthequalificationsspecifiedwithinaNRCapprovedSTAtrainingprogram. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I'II~~II~~I~~~'~~~~~~I~~~I~I~~I~I~~~~I~~~'III-.I~'-~~I~-.I~~~-.~~~~JII~~-I~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~II~III'IIol~I~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..~~~~.~~~~~~I~~'~'i~~~~~~'~I~..~~'~'~~~P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~~~~~~'~~~II~~~'~~'l~L~~'eaI~~~~ I~I~~II~~~I~~I~III~~~~I'II'~I'III'I'I~II~~~I~~I~~~I'~~~~II.I~II~~I~~I~~I~'I~I~,II~~I~I~~,~II..~~'~I~~~'~Is..III,~~~~~~~~~~'II~~~~I~IIII~~g~a~~~<<maa~~s~<<~~<<<<%54%eavwE<<JIF4<<PS<< Raw+~Staffqualifications5.35.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS'/lors.5.3~StaffqualificationsReviewer'dNote:Hinimumqualificationsformembersoftheunitstaff.shallbespecifiedbyuseofan,overallqualificationstatementreferencing.anANSIStandar'dacceptabletotheNRCstafforbyspeci'fyingindividualpositionqualfications.Genera'fly,thefirstmethodispreferable;however,thesecondmethodisadaptabletothoseunitstaffsrequiringspecialqualificationstatecientsbecauseofunique>organizationalstructures.5.3.1Iil4,:-'~II(,.cipea~&EachmemberoftheSikhstaffshallmeetorexceedtheminimumualificationsofa,eguaorypse1.8,Revision,,ormeN!tMdpb1hIIC*ff.Thestaffnncoveredby[ReulatoryGuide1'.8]shallmeetorexceedtheinimumqualifitionsof[Regulations,ReulatoyGuides,orANSIStandardsaccetabletoNRCstaff].Inait>onte>fTecnacavsorsameeequa1>patio@specif'edbythu'CommsionPoicStamentonGdin~ringExpeiseonSHift.PNggg<dAJCN,,Jglj/8(-/97),aSSdypp/efyge~ClLyWequl'Cb4f'g-u.Of'II>i.CVtqfOnIIQ;~-rySOf-lI75,4r"~~pa~Lle'I'oetncnS.5.0-8 /5.0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.4Training/Training5.45.4.1/../Arrainingandreplacement'rainingprogramfortheunit/staffsh1be'maintainedundertdirectionofthe[positiong'itle]dshallmeetorexceedtrequirementsandrecommendationsofection[jof[anANSI$4andardacceptabletotheNRC'taff]and10CFR55,and,forapprriatedesignatedpo'sitions,sallincludefamiliarizationithrelevantindustryoperatinalexperience.5.0-9

~~'<<)~gI'~~I~~~~I~I~~I~~~I~I~,~~I<<~~~~,I~I~~~IIII~III~I~I~I'I~~III~~~~~~I~~II~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~II~II~~II~I~~I<<~<<I'I~~~~~~I~~<<~~~~~<<~~<<~I~~~~~I~~I~~~/I~~~~I~I~~~~~~I~~~I~~~I~~~~II~I~~<<I~1<<<<l~<<I<<CI~I<<g<<PJ<< ReviewsandAudits'/5lReviewsandAudits5.5.1.1.5.5.1.2Functions(continued)..b.Recommendtothe[PlantSuperintendent]approvaordisapprovalofitemsconsideredunderSpecifications5.5.1.2.athrough5.5.1.2.epriortotheirHaplementation,exceptasprovidedinSpecification5.7.1.8;c.'DeterminewhethereachitemconsiderednderSpecifications5.5.1.2.athrough5;5..2.dconstitutesanrunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59;andd.Notifythe[VicePresident-NuclearOperations]ofanysafetysignificantdisagreementbetweenthe[revieworganizationorindividualspecifiedinSpeci.fication5.5.1]andthe[PlantSuperintendent]within24hours.However,the[PlantSuperintendent]shallhave/responsibilityforresolutionofsuchdisagreementspursuanttoSpecification5.1.1.ResponsibilitiesThe[plantreviewmethospecifiedinSpecification5.5.1]shallbeusedtoconduct,as~minimum,reviewsofthefollowing:a'.Allproposedproceduresrequire'dbySpecification5.7.1.1andchangesttrereto;b.AllproposedprogramsrequiredbySpecification'5.7.2andchangesthereto;c.Allproposedchangesandmodificationstounitsystemsorequipmentthataffectnuclearsafety;d.All'roposedtestsandexperiments;thataffectnuclearsfety;ande.AllproposedchangestotheseTechnica]Specifications(TS),theirBases,andtheOperatingLicense.',lt5'.i5.0-11(continue3) gNSReviewsandAudits(continued)ReviewsandAudits5.5,/5.5.2OffsiteReviewandAuditReviewer'sNote:Thelicenseeshalldescribetheprovisionsforreviewsandauditsindependentoftheplant'sstaff(organization,reporting,andrecords)andtheappropriateANSI/ANSStandardsforpersonnelqualifications.Theseindividualsmaybelocatedonsiteoroffsiteprovidedorganizationalindependencefrom'plantstaffismaintained.The[technical]reviewresponsibil,i'ties,Specification5.5.2.4,shallincludeseveralindividualslocatedonsite.5.5.2.1III5.5.2.2FunctionsThe[offsitereviewandauditprovisionsrspecifiedinSpecification5.5.2]shall,asaminimum,incorporatethefollowingfunctionsthat://a.Advisethe[VicePresident-NuclearOperationsjonallmattersrelatedtonuclearsafety;b.Advisethemanagementof,dheauditedorganization,and[itsCorporateHanagementandVicePresident-NuclearOperations],oftheauditresultsastheyrelatetonuclearsafety;c.Recommendtothemanaoementoftheauditedorganization,anditsmanagement,anycorrectiveactiontoimprovenuclearsafetyandplantoperation;and.d.Notifythe[ficePresident-NuclearOperationsjofanysafetysignificantdisagreementbetweenthe[revieworganizationorindividualspecifiedinSpecification5.5.2]andthe[organviationorfunctionbeingreviewed]within24hours.[OffsiteReviewResponsibilitiesThe[reviewmethodspecifiedinSpecification5;5.2]shallberespsibleforthereviewof:'Thesafetyevaluationsforchangestoprocedures,equipment,orsystems,andtestsorexperimentscompletedundertheprovisionsof10CFR50.59,toverifythatsuchactionsdonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefsedin10CFR50.59;(continued)5.0-I2 0 ~',,~ReviewsandAudits:.5.55.ReviewsandAudits'(continued)5-5.2.25.5.2.3[Offsite]ReviewResponsibilities(continued)b.Proposedchangestoprocedures,equipment,orsystemsthatinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59;c.Proposedtestsorexperimentsthatinvolveanunreviewedfetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR0.59;d.ProosedchangestoTSandtheOperatingLicense;/e.Violaionsofcodes,regulations,orders,licenserequirements,andinternalproceduresorinstructionshavingnuclear'safetysignificance;.'.,AllLicenseeEventReports:r'equiredby10CFR50.73;g.Plantstaffperformance;,'h.Indicationsofunanticipateddeficienciesinanyaspectofdesignoroperati'anofstructures,systems,orcomponentsthatcouldaffectnuclearsafety;i.Significantaccidental,unplanned,oruncontrolledIradioactive'rel'eases,includingcorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrence;j.Significantoperatingabnormalitiesordeviationsfromnormalandexpectedperformanceofequipmentthataffectnucleary'safety;andvrk.Theperformanceofthecorrectiveactionsystem.I/Reportsorrecordsofthesereviewsshat/beforwardedtothe[Vice;President-NuclearOperationsjwith>30daysfollowingcompletionofthereview.AuditResponsibilitiesTheauditresponsibilitiesshallencompass:a.TheconformanceofunitoperationtoprovisionsontainedwithintheTSandapplicablelicenseconditions;b.Thetrainingandqualificationsoftheunitstaff;(continua+5.0-13 .5'b.5ReviewsandAudits(continued)~~5.5.k35.5.2.4AuditResponsibilities(continued)c.Theimplementationofallprogramsrequiredb~Specification5.7.2;d,.Actionstakentocorrectdeficienciesoccurringinequipment,structures,systems,component's,ormethodof~operationthataffectnuclearsafety;ande.Otheractivitiesand.documentsasrequestedbythe[VicePresident-NuclearOperations].Reportsorrecordsoftheseauditsshallbeforwardedtothe[VicePresident-NuclearOperations]withfn30daysfollowingcompletionofthereview.;l[Technical]ReviewResponsibiIitiesThe[technical]reviewresponsibilitiesshallencompass:a.Plantoperatingcharacteristics,NRCissuances,industryadvisories,LicenseeEventReports,andothersourcesthatmayindicatearear'arimprovingplantsafety;b.Plantoperations,modifications,maintenance,andsurveillance.foverifyindependentlythattheseactivitiesareperformedsafelyandcorrectlyandthathumanerrorsarereducedas/muchaspractical;c.Internalandexternaloperationalexperienc'einformationthatmayindicateareasforimprovingplantsafety;and/d.Makingdetailedrecommendationsthroughthe[ViceIPesident-NuclearOperations]forrevisingprocedures,quipmentmodificationsorothermeansofimprovingnuclearsafetyandplantreliability.5.5.3ecordsWrittenrecordsofreviewsandauditsshallbeminimumtheserecordsshallinclude:a.ResultsoftheactivitiesconductedunderSection5.5;maintained.Asa~theprovisionsof(continued)5.0-14 ReviewsandAudi5.55.ReviewsandAudits(cor,".imbued)5.5.3cords(continued)b.Recommendationstothemanaementoftheorganizationbeing'udited;c.Anassessmento.esafetysignificanceoftherevieworauditfindin~d.RecommedapprovalordisapprovalofitemsconsideredundSpecifications5.5.1.2.athrouh5.5.1.2.e;andDeterminationwhether.eachitemconsidered-underSpecifications5.5.1.2.athrough5.5.1.2.dconstitutesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR9459.5.0-15 TS-Ba~~oL1Pp.->(,"urn.mirJI(.i(..V0(q5.0IADMINISTRATIVECONTROLSiusgfu(I,f0gA'J1(siEI~~Z.ChangestotheBasesoftheTSsha11bemadeunderappropriateadministrativecontrolsand,r+-.r"r(e<s,LicenseesmaymakechangestoBaseswithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangesdonotinvolveeitherofthefollowing:~i&AchangeintheTSincorporatedinthelicense;orQF5AR'~W?.AchangetotheuorBasesthatinvolvesanunreviewedsafetyquestionasdefinedin10CFR50.59.TheBasesControlProgramshallcontainpro'onstoensurethattheBasesaremaintainedconsistentwithth'AR.5e(g'(a~a~l.or)4r4~SS'Ob2IProposedchangesthatmeetthecriteriaof-~'shall~~cI;;bereviewedandapprovedbytheNRCpriortoimplementation.ChangestotheBasesimplementedwithoutpriorNRCapprovalshallbeprovidedtotheNRConafrequencyconsistentwith10CFR50.7(rCe')I~s(csncssseas1r(us(rs(II'I.i5.0-16 ~l20.5-0ADMINISTRATIVECONTROLS5.)Procedures/Procedures.5W~qf5'.1~Writtenproceduresshallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringthefollowingactivities:a.TheapplicableproceduresrecommendedinRegulatoryGuide1.33,Revision2,AppendixA,February1978;'~l20.'.L~j30.i.b.TheemergencyoperatingproceduresrequiredtoimplementtherequirementsofNUREG-0737andNNUREG-0737,Supplement1,asstatedin+GenericLetter82-33/.1.25.7.1.3~Affffluentandenvironmentalmonitoring;FireProtectionProgramimplementation;and5;5AllprogramsspecifiedinSpecificationReviewandApprovalachprocedureofSpecification5.7.1.1,andchangestheretostbereviewedinaccordancewithSpecification5.5-pprovedbytheIPIantSuperintendent]orhisdesigneeinaancewithapprovedadministrativeprocedurespriortoiementationandreviewedperiodicallyassetforthina'ustrativeprocedures.TemporaryChangesTemporarychangestoocedurefSpecification5.7.1maybemadeprovided:anTintentoftheexistingprocedurenotaltered;Thechangeisapprovedbytwomembersofthetmanagementstaff,atleastoneofwhomholdsaSen'ReactorOperatorlicenseontheunitaffected;and~~l20.Lid5.0-17 j~..FOgP8IPrograms,andManualsQg-.p5.7.1e3s'QO..i.tTemporaryChanges(continued)/c...Thechangeisdocumentedandreviewedinaccordancewith'Specification5.5.1andapprotedbythe[Plant.'uperintendent]orhisdesigneeinaccordancewithapprovedadministrativeprocedures.within14dasof,implementati'on.~~QIProaramsandManual~Thefollowingprograms,shallbeestablished,implemented,andmaintained.5.7.2.1'0'.vt.7.2.2~~~DQ:vIRadiationProtectionPrograms/Proceduresfor,personnelradiationprotectionshallbegpreparedconsistentwiththerequirementsof10CFR20andshaVIbeapproved,maintained,and/adheredtoforalloperationsinvolvingTpersonnelra'diationexposure.d(recessControlProgram(PCP)ThePggshallcontainthecurrentformulas,sampling,analyses,testsand,.determinationstobemadetoensurethatprocessingandpackagingof"solidradioactivewasteswil'Ibeaccomplishedtowensurecompliancewith10CFR20,10CFR61,and10CFR71.state'egulations;burial~groundrequirements;andotherrequementsgoverningthedisposa'fsolidradioactivewaste.Licenseeinitiatedchangesto.thePCP:Ia.Shallbedocumentedandrecordsofn.eviewsperformedshallberetained.Thisdocumentati'hallcontain:I1.sufficientinfomsa'ontosupportthechange(s)andappropriateanaesorevaluationsjtifyingthechange(s),2.adeinationthatthechange(s)maintaintoverallormanceofthesolidifiedwasteproducttotexistingrequirementsofFederal,State,orotherapplicableregulations.(continued)5.0-18 ProgramsandManualsProgramsandManualsQs+OffsiteOoseCalculationManual(OOCM)a.TheODCMshallcontainthemethodologyandparametersusedinthecalculationofoffsitedosesresultingfromradioactivegaseousandliquideffluents,inthecalculationofgaseousandliquideffluentmonitoringalarmandtripsetpoints,andinthe.conductofthegadiologicaI<EnvironmentalmonitoringProgram;andVThe00CMshallalsocontainthefadicactivefff!nentocs,HascontrolsandadiologicalenvironmentalmonitoringanddeFcriptionsotheinormationthatshouldbeincludedintheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingandRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReorts.,b./IProcssControlPrram(PCP)(ctinued)b.Shallbeeffctiveafterriewandaccepncebythe[reviewmeodofSpecifition5.5.1]atheapprovalofnSuerintendenLicenseeinitiatedchangestotheOOCM:a.Shallbedocumentedandrecordsofreviewsperformedshallberetained.Thisdocumentationshallcontain:1.sufficientinformationtosupportthechange(s)togetherwiththeappropriateanalysesorevaluationsjustifyingthechange(s),l30'12.adeterminationthatthechange(s)maintainthelevelsofradioactiveeffluentcontrolrequiredby,40CFR190,10CFR50.36a,and10CFR50,AppendixI,andnotadverselyimpacttheaccuracyorreliabilityofeffluent,dose,orsetpointcalculations;Celb.Shallbecomeeffectiveafterreviewandacceptancebytheandtheapprovalofte+Plant,andgnSlkt.~View)nCAO~(continued)5.0-19 pragramsgandmanualsQ6;S.iCMHtSS'-Z.1ko.xx5.7.2.5Programs7andManualsOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM)(continued)c.ShallbesubmittedtotheNRCintheformofacomplete,legiblecopyoftheentireODCMasapartoforconcurrentwiththeRadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportfortheperiodofthereportinwhichanychangeintheODCMwasmade.Eachchangeshallbeidentifiedbymarkingsinthemarginoftheaffectedpages,clearlyindicatingtheareaofthepagethatwaschanged,andshallindicatethedate(i.e.,monthandyear)thechangewasimplemented.PrimaryCoolantSourcesOutsit0gad~<SIdualHgssagpmmvsslRHIZan%hertcsrcvlcoasThisprogramprovidesconroistominimize'aagefromthoseportionsofsystemsoutsde'containmentthatcouldcontainhighlyradioactivefluidsdurinaserioustransientoracciden6hThesystemsincludeSpray,SafetyInjection,Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.Preventivemaintenanceandperiodicvisualinspectionrequirements;andb.Integratedleaktestrequirementsforeachsystematrefuelingcycleintervalsorless.InPlantRadiationMonitoring.'Thisprgramprovidescontrolstoensurethecapabilitytoaccuratelydeterminetheairborneiodineconcentrationinvitalareas/underaccidentcondi:tions.Thisprogramshallincludethefollowing:l!a.Trainingofpersonel;bProceduresforonitoring;andc.Provisionsfomaintenanceofsalingandanalysisequipment.lZO-<~i(continued)5.0-20 =ProR~esProgramsqandManualsI1P'soccou~r'rograms,:andManualsram'-and-M~s~PostAccidentSamplingr'r.o~~Thisprogramprovidescontrolsthatensurethecapabilitytoobtainandanalyzereactorcoolant,radioactivegases,andparticulatesinplantgaseouseffluentsandcontainmentatmospheresamplesunderaccidentconditions.TheprogramshallincludethefolIowing:a.Trainingofpersonnel;b.Proceduresforsamplingandanalysis;andc.Provisionsformaintenanceofsamplingandanalysisequipment.RadioactiveEffluentControlsProgramThisprogramconformsto10CFR50.36aforthecontrolofradioactiveeffluentsandformaintainingthedosestomembersofthepublicfromradioactiveeffluentsaslowasreasonably~achievable.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheODCM,shallbe'implementedbyprocedures,andshallincluderemedialactionstobetakenwhenevertheprogramlimitsareexceeded.Theprogramshallincludethefollowingelements:a.LimitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityofradioactiveliquidandgaseousmonitoringinstrumentationincludingsurveillancetestsandsetpointdeterminationinaccordancewiththemethodologyintheODCM;b.Limitationsontheconcentrationsofradioactivematerialreieasedinliquideffluentstounrestrictedareas,conformingto,i0CFR20,Appendix0,Table,M,Column2;av'oelI*:2.'r~c.nitoring,sampling,andanalysisofradioactiveliquidandgaseouseffluentsinaccordancewith10CFR20.~~andwiththemethodologyandparametersintheOOCM;~igotd.LimitationsontheannualandquarterlydosesordosecommitmenttoamemberofthepublicfromradioactivematerialsinliquideffluentsreleasedfromeaG~Q4tounrestrictedareas,conformingtol0CFR50,AppendixI;4ipea4(continued)MOG=STS=-5.0-21Reev;-=<9/28/9Z-, ProgramspandManuals~-ProgramsandManualsQ~RadioactiveEffluentControlsProgram(continued)e.gDeterminationofcumulativeandprojecteddosecontributionsfromradioactiveeffluentsforthecurrentcalendarquarterandcurrentcalendaryearinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCHatleastevery31days;Limitationsonthefunctionalcapabilityanduseoftheliquidandgaseouseffluenttreatmentsystemstoensurethatappropriateportionsofthesesystemsareusedtoreducereleasesofradioactivitywhentheprojecteddosesinaperiodof31dayswouldexceed2~oftheguidelinesfortheannualdoseordosecommitment,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitati'onsonthedoserateresultingfromradioactivematerialreleasedingaseouseffluentstoareasbeyondthesiteboundaryconformingtothedoseassociatedwith10CFR20,AppendixB,TableII,ColumnI;m>a~>Limitationsontheannualandquarterlyairdosesesultingfromnoblegasesreleasedingaseouseffluentsfro%~&toareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10CFR50,AppendixI;Limitationsontheannualandquarterlydosestoamemberofthepublicfromiodine-131,iodine-133,tritium,andallradionuclidesinparticulateformwithhalflives>8daysingaseouseffluentsreleasedfromg~~toareasbeyondthesiteboundary,conformingto10~CF50,ApendixI;andetadt'sLimitationsontheannualdoseordosecommimenttoanymemberofthepublicduetoreleasesofradioactivityandtoradiationfromuraniumfuelcyclesources,conformingto40CFR190.RadiolgicalEnvironmentalMonitoringProramThisprogramisformonitoringtheraditionandradionuidesintheenvironsoftheplant.TheprogrshallprovidereesentativemeasurementsofradiotivityinthehihestpoentialexposurejpathwaysandveriicationoftheacuracyofteeffluentmoniP'oringprogramanmodelingofenvionmentalIgQ.'m(continued)5.0-22 Programs;andManualsProgramsandManuals5.7.2.8~no.i.x:IRadiologicalEnvironmentalMonitoringProgram(continued)Iexposurepathways.TheprogramshallbecontainedintheOOCM,shallconformtotheguidanceof10CFR50,AppendixI,andshallincl,udethefollowing:a.Monitoring,sampling,analysis,andreportingofradiationandradionuclidesintheenvironmentinaccordancewiththemethodologyandparametersintheODCM;/ib'.ALandUseCensustoensurethatchangesintheuseofareasatandbeyondthesiteboundaryareidentifiedandthat'modificationstothemonitoringprogramaremadeifrequiredbytheresultsofthiscensus;andII'.ParticipationinanInterlaboratoryComparisonProgramtoensurethat'independentchecksontheprecisionandaccuracyofthemeasurementsofradioactivematerialsinenvironm'entalsamplematricesareperformedaspartofthequality;assuranceprogramforenvironmentalmonitoring.5'5;>(XO.x)c(3~~,5QComponentCyclicorTransientLimit!'ear.4<v.c.oolankspy~Thisprogramprovidescontrolstotrackthe.cyclicandtransientoccurrencestoensurethatcomonentsaremaintainedwithinthedesignlimits.specei~wcursinePre-StressedConcreteContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgram!.br<-CWThisprogramprovides!.controsormonitoringanytendondgdi.sbaai.i1digeffectivenessofitscorrosionprotectionmedium,toensurecntainmentstructuralintegrity.hasTheTenonurvesancerogram,snspectsonrequencses,anacceptancecriteriashallbeinaccordancewith"4-AlRC.approvedpoqmm~TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheTendonSurveillancePrograminspectionfrequencies.(continued)4~+m5.0-23 v05-.7-cedarPrograms~andManualsProgramspandHanualsbSQs4.7InspectionProgram.g~grCoola~~ApneaFIwheiThisprogramprovidescontrols,forinserviceinspectionofASHECodeClass>l,2,and3components,includingapplicablesupports:Theprogramshallincludethe'ollowing:a.Provisionsthatinservceinspectionof/ASMECodeClass1',I.2,,asnd3componentssallbeperformed!inaccordancewithSectionXIoftheASHEBoilerandPres'sureVesselCode.and<</Mlitt~s+IIf.f40Igi5pc't.'.tO~d.NothingintheEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeshallbe'onstruedto;suersedethereuirementsofany75.lzo.vapplicableAddenda/asrequiredby10/CFR50.55a;/i/'.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2areapp)icabletothefrequenciesl/forperforming,inserviceinspectionactivities;~c.'nspectionofeachreactorcoolantpumpflywheelpertherecoamena'onsofRegulationPositionc.4.bofRegulatoryGuide1.14,Revision1,August1975~as.s.sleo.xvii'l20.x~/InserviceTestingProgramIfttqhe~e<<yppv*qztsl5tcleo:coiifrAs~evthlctvtJ<+ctvvvt4CssMI'ca~,v4C.5~ThisprogramprovidescontrolsforinservicetestingofASHECodeClass1,2,and3componentsincludingapplicablesupports>Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.ProvisionsthatinservicetestingofASHECodeClass1,2,andpumps,valv's,andsnubbers.shallbeperformedinaccrdancewithectionXIofthe'ASHEBoilerjandPressureVselCodeanapplicableAddendaasrequir'dbyCFR50.55a.TestingfrequenciesspecifiedinSectionXIoftheASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaasfollows:(continued)5.0-24 ProgramsandManualsljS;~.B(MPrograms~andManualsInserviceTestingProgram(continued)ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeandapplicableAddendaterminologyforinservicetestingactivitiesWeeklyHonthlyquarterlyorevery3monthsSemiannuallyorevery6monthsEvery9monthsYearlyorannuallyBienniallyorevery2yearsRequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestinactivitiesAtleastonceper7daysAtleastonceper31daysAtleastonceper92daysAtleastonceper184daysAtleastonceper276daysAtleastonceper366daysAtleastonceper731days)20.waZJSEkTS.Q.)l29,xi.LbWTheprovisionsofSR3.0.2areapplicabletotheaboverequiredFrequenciesforperforminginservicetestingactivities;TheprovisionsofSR3.0.3areapplicabletoinservicetestingactivities;andNothingintheASHEBoilerandPressureVesselCodeshallbeconstruedtosupersedetherequirementsofanyfggcal$LclrogaSteamGenerator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgramEachSGshallbedemonstratedOPERABLEbyperformanceofaninserviceinspectionprogram.Theprogramshallincludethefollowing:a.SGlubesample@zeselection,p'amplesizeexpansion,andispectionresltclassificatoncriteria.)ampleselectionndtestingallbeinaccoancewith[RelatoryGuide1.83,evision[],te].IC/Reviewer>Av'<Lice~seei~prc~kLtce~cI<ne,ro.io~+ube,Svpuei(ave.cseal(berloca.keL4otheLC.Onodtnc~ere..Ana.pproqadi~~'~Wk~eko4Pro)raevePorMM4i(continued)5.0-25 0 ~'IQQ.X>lINSERT5.0.4a~b.c~TheinspectionintervalsforSGtubesshallbespecifiedinInserviceInspectionProgram.SGtubesthathaveimperfections)40/throughwall,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbypluggingorsleeving.SGsleevesthathaveimperfections)30Kthroughwal-l,asindicatedbyeddycurrent,shallberepairedbyplugging.

Q-ProgramsandManualsPrvgramsandManualsS;sS;5.'t~sw~~Xo.<LiSteamGen'erator(SG)TubeSurveillanceProgram(continued)b.TheestablishmentofSGtubeinspectionfrequencydependeuponinspectionresultclassification.Inspectionfrencyshallbeinaccordancewith[RegulatoryGuide1.83,Revision[],date].c.SGtubeplugging/repairlimits.Theselim'hallbe[40]~ofthenominaltubewallthicknesscons>entwith[RegulatoryGuide1.83,Revisionf1~date].d.SpecificdefinitionsandlimiforSGtubeinserviceinspectionacceptancecriiaconsistentwith[RegulatoryGuide1.83,Revision,datThecontentandfrequcyofwrittenrepotsshallbein~accordancewithSification5.9;2.~TheprovisionofSR3.0.2are.applicabletoSGTubeSurveillancePrograminspectionfrequenciesexceptthoseestablisheMyCategaryC-3inspectionresults.5:S.i<QOgXII>SecondaryWaterChemistryPoor~ThisprogramprovidescontrolsformonitoringsecondarywaterchemistrtoinhibitSGtubedegradatioTheprogramshallinclude:b.Identificationofasamplingscheduleforthecriticalvariablesandcontrolpointsforthesevariables;Identificationoftheproceduresusedtomeasurethev'aluesofthecriticalvariables;c.Identificationofprocesssamplinoint'.Proceduresfortherecordingandmanagementofdata;e.Proceduresdefiningcorrectiveactionsforalloffcontrolpointchemistryconditions;and(continued)5.0-26 Q~Programs~ndHanualsProgramsandManu/".S,s.lsQ~~lko.xii5;5;iO~bozo.~iv~SecondaryM.:terChemistry(continued)f.Aprocedureidentifyingtheauthorityresponsiblefortheinterpretationofthedataandthesequenceandtimin'gofadministrativeevents,whichisrequiredtoinitiatecorrective~stion.VentilationFilterTestingProgram(VFTP)AprogramshallbeestablishedtoimplementthefollowingrequiredtestingofEngineeredSafetyFeature(ESF)filterventilationsystemr~a4-4-.-o~6de.ahd-~eH~~;ASH~&R~~>aYIQ&8~~+cA'f~cnciesoucl/8+/longwkclcp~l>nil4ee(&~cdlt)QQDfJc'ascpJA%pl<%~4A<keI-sz:,Oemonstrateforeachotesystemsthataninpacetestofthehighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterssho~senetratiorandsyst:embypass<[0.05]~whentestedacdancewith-[RegulatoryGuide1;52,Revision2ndAH"N510-89]atthesystemflowratespecifiedbel[~10~3.VentilationSystemlowrateb.OemonstrateforeachoESFsystemsthataninplace~..-.stofthecharcoalassershsapenetrationandsystembypass<[C.5]8entested-inaccordance-with[RegulatoryGuide1.52,isle2,andASME-1989]atthesystemflowratescifiedbelowP10~].ESFVentilationSystemFateWNSER.1';-Or/(continued)Ws=KVR.-5.0-27ev..8 INSERT5.0.5a0Post-AccidentCharcoalSystem1.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoaladsorberbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(t10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoalabsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.b.C.3.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyof>90%ofradioactivemethyliodine.ContainmentRecirculationFanSystem1.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthehighefficiencyparticulateair(HEPA)filterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(X10%).2.Demonstratethatanin-placedioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPA'ilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%.ControlRoomEmergencyAirTreatmentSystem(CREATS)DemonstratethepressuredropacrosstheHEPAfilterbankis<3inchesofwateratadesignflowrate(+10%).2.3.Demonstratethatanin-placethermallygenerateddioctylphthalate(DOP)testoftheHEPAfilterbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass(1.0%.Demonstratethepressuredropacrossthecharcoalabsorberbankis<3inchesofwateratdesignflowrate(+10%).Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoalabsorberbankshowsapenetrationandsystembypass<1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.5.Demonstratefor.acarbonsamplethata,laboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyof>90%ofradioactivemethyliodide. INSERT5.0.5(continued)d.SpentFuelPitCharcoalAdsorberSystem1.Demonstratethatthetotalairflowratefromthecharcoaladsorbersshowsatleast75%ofthatmeasuredwithacompletesetofnewadsorbers.2.Demonstratethatanin-placeFreontestofthecharcoaladsorbersshowsapenetrationandsystembypass(1.0%,whentestedunderambientconditions.3.Demonstrateforacarbonsamplethatalaboratoryanalysisshowstheiodineremovalefficiencyof90%oftheincidentmoleculariodineand70%ofmethyliodide.TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheVFTPfrequencies. ProgramsqandHanualsC3Programs,andHanuals$.5,toVentilationFilterTestingProgram(YFTP)(continued)'.DemonstrateforeachoftheESFsystemsthatalaboratorytestofasampleofthecharcoaladsorber,whenobtainedasdescribedin[RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision23,showstKe;methyliodidepenetrationlessthanthevaluespecified~'belowwhentestedinaccordancewith[ASTHD3803-1989)atatemperatureof~[30'C]andgreaterthanorequaltotherelativehumidityspecifiedbelow.xESFVentilationSystemPenetrationRH~l20.xivI/ReviewesNote:Alliablepenetration=[100%-methyliodideefficiecyforcharcolcreditedinstaffsafetyevauation/(safetfactor).Safetfactor=[51forxsystemswiheaters.=[7forsytemswihoutheaters.d'.DemonstrateforeachofPfheESFsystemsthatthepressuredropacrossthecombined'HEPAfilters,theprefilters,andthecharcoaladsorbersislessthanthevaluespecifiedbelow-whentested,ihaccordaMewith[RegulatoryGuide1.52,Revision2,andASHEN510-1989atthesystemflowratespecifiedbelow.[>>10~].ESFVentilationSystemDeltaPFlowratee.DemonstratethattheheatersforeachoftheFsystemsdissipatethevaluespecifiedbelow[>>10%jwhetestednaccordancewith[ASHEN510-1989].ESFVentilationSystemMattage(continued)5-0-28 B.S,ProgramsfandManuals,ProgramsandManualsQwr(~.]5.7.2.15l2.0.xyl'XO.x'v~VentiationFilterTestingProgram(VITP)(continued)/The.'provisionsofSK3.0.2andSR~.0.3areapplicabletotheYFTPtestfrequencies..'xplosiveGasandStoraeTankRadioactivityMonitorinProramZhlSERTg,O,bgCASCcuba~5+if1Thisprogramprovidesconrosorotentiallexplosivegasmixturescontainedine.Thegaseousradioactivituantitiesshallbed4Ifollowingemeooogy/inBranchTechnicalPosition/(BTP)ETSB11-5,"PotulatedRadioactiveReleaser'uetoWasteGas/SystemLeak~~~~orFailue"].Theliqudradwastequa'ntitiesshallbddeterminedinaccordancewith[StdardReviewirlan,Sectionlg7.3,"Postul~atedRadioactivReleasedue!toTankFailures"].llosay4cvvs~oJm4cryi~ghpg,EQTheprogramshallinclude.m;f-eCah~C~yTCA<<~a.Thelimitsfor~concentrationsofhydrogenandoxygenintheWaste--.andasurveillanceprogramtoensurethelimitsaremaintained.Suchlimitsshallbeappropriatetothesystem'sdesigncriteria(i.e.,whetherornotthesystemisdesignedtowithstandahydrogenexplosion);~r'ageea>et.b.Asurveillanceprogramtoensurethatthe+quantityofradioactivitycontainedin+each.ga~s=o~tank49iK~islessthantheamountthatwouresultinawholeoyexposureof~0.5rem,toanyindividualinanunrestrictedarea,intheeventomanuncontrolledreleaseofthetanks'ontents.c.Asurveillancprogramtoensure;thatthequantityofradioactivitycontainedinalloutdoorliquid,radwastetanksthatarenotsurroundedbylines,dikes,orwalls'apableofholdingetanks'ontentsandthatdonothagetankoverflowsndsurroundingaredrainsconnectedfothe[LiquidRdwasteTreatmentSytern]islessthantheamountthatwoudresultinconcentationslessthanelimitsof10CFR0,Appendix0,TahlIl.,Column2,athenearest:potablwatersupplyandtenearestsurfaceatersupp'lyin',anunestrictedarea,in>eeventofanunontrolled',releseofthetanks'olgents.(continued)5.0-29 INSERT5.0.6(XO.XV$thequantityofradioactivitycontainedinwast'e';',gasstemsdecajtanks~ed rogr'amsandManualsProgramsandManuals~I~~5.5.i2.12.Q,yvct.cExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgram(continued)TheprovisionsofSR3.0.2andSR3.0.3areapplicabletotheExplosiveGasandStorageTankRadioactivityMonitoringProgramsurveillancefrequencies.DieselFuelOilTestingProgramAdieselfueloiltestingprogramtoimplementrequiredtestingofbothnewfueloilandstoredfueloilshallbeestablished.Theprogramshallincludesamplingandtestingrequirements,andpi.111Std-.Tb~1-pgiblitt.spa.cFiiJ'<ntcalejo+ASTIRI>915iaLAcceptabilityofnewfueloilforusepriortoaddition.tostoragetanksbydeterminingthatthefueloilhas:I1.anA~ravityoranabsolutespecificgravitywithinlimits,2.aflashpointaridkinematicviscositywithinlimitsfor~ASTM2Dfueloil,and-3.aclearandbrightappearance,withpropercolor;b.OtherpropertiesforASTH2Dfueloilare.withinlimitswithin30daollowingsamplingandadditiontostoragetanks;ac.Totalparticulateconcentrationofthefueloilis-l0mg/1"whentestedevery31daysinaccordancewithASTM0-2276.MethodA-2orA-3.5.7.2.18l20-xi'ire>ProtectionProgram/Thisprogramprovi,descontrolsto,ensurethatappropriatefirep'otectionmeasuresaremaintainedtoprotecttheplantfromfiredtoensureth8capabilitytopchieveandmaintainsafeshutdownntheeventof/afireismaintained.//NSFRT'.pIpT~gpwtiAL5PEctplCAT<0NSJTS)BASHCoroTacLPROC~WZW~E:R,TE.E,I4SPA=tg~~~~0<f'ROC,<AXI~RR-(5.0-30.R 5ASl4afetyFunctionDeterminationProgram(SFOP)-".Q.'hisprogramensureslossofsafety:funcionisetectedandappropriateactionstaken.Uponfi~k~sattt~W~=anevaluationshallbemadetodetermineifloss~ff<<i.i<<.Addiiiif,PpppiactionsmaybetakenasaresultofthesupportsysteminoperabilityandcorrespondingexceptiontoenteringsupportedsystemConditionandRequiredActions.ThisprogramimplementstherequirementsofLCO3.0.6.TeSFOPshallcontainthefollowin:a.Provisionsforcrosstraincheckstoensurealossofthecapabilitytoperformthesafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysisdoesnotgoundetected;b.Provisionsforensuringtheplantismaintainedinasafeconditionialossoffunctionconditionexists;c.Provisionstoensurethataninoperablesupportedsystem'sCompletionTimeisnotinappropriatelyextendedasaresultofmultiplesupportsysteminoperabilities;andd.Otherappropriatelimitationsandremedialorcompensatoryactions.Alossofsafetyfunctionexistswhen,assumingnoconcurrentsinglefailure,asafetyfunctionassumedintheaccidentanalysiscannotbeperformed.Forthepurposeofthisprogram,alossofsafetyfunctionmayexistwhenasupportsystemisinoperable,and:a.Arequiredsystemredundanttothesystem(s)supportedbtheinoperablesupportsystemisalsoinoperableorlU.ib.Arequiredsystemredundanttothesystem(s)inturnsupportedbytheinoperablesupported'yst'misalsoinoperable(Q~~~;or(continued)5.0-31R Qa4ahhQwh~~ii~l~~P-~r~qr~~~~~lH4aua1~c.Arequiredsystemredundanttothesupportsystem(s)forthesuortedsystems(a)and(b)aboveisalsoinoperableicExample:TrainATraini%1.'gSystemSystemSystemSystemii~(SupportSystem~Id'opcrab1e)11'TivSystems~aseCstem11System~'aseASystemivMase~BTheSFDPidentifieswherealossofsafetyfunctionexists.Ifalossofsafetyfunctionisdeterminedtoexistbythisprogram,theappropriateConditionsandRequiredActionsoftheLCOinwhichthelossofsafetyfunctionexistsarerequiredtobeentered.l2.t.iMOG-SK5.0-32 ReportingRequirementsl12.~5.0AORINISTRATIVECONTROLSc~d~4,~ReportingRequirementsThefollowingreportsshallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.4.5.9.1.1artupReportAsuaryreportofplantstartupandpowerescalationtestingshall'besubmittedfollowing:a.ReceiptofanOperatingLicense;b.Amendmenttothelicenseinvolvingaplanned.increaseinpowerlevel;c.Installationoffuelthathasadifferentdesignorhasbeenmanufacturedby~.adifferentfuelsupplier;andModificationsthatmayhavesignifcantlyalteredthenuclear,thermal,or'>ydraulicrformanceoftheunit.einitialStartupReportsh11p8dresseachofthestartuptestsidentifiedinFSAR,Chapter[14+andshallincludeadescriptionofthemeasuredvaluesoftheperatingconditionsorcharacteristicsobtaineddurngthetestprogramandacomparisonofthesevalueswithdesigpredictionsandspecifications.Anycorrectiveactionsthatvererequire~toobtainsatisfactoryoperationshallalsobHdescribed.An~additionalspecificdetailsrequiredinlicenseconditionsbasedonother.commitmentsshallbeincludedirr'thisreport.SubsequentStartupReportsshalladdressstavtupteststhatarenecessarytodemonstratetheacceptabilityof/changesandmodifications.StartupReposshallbesubmittedwithin90daysgollowingcompIetion~ftheStartupTestProgram;90daysfol>qwingresumption.orcommencementofcommercialpoweroperation;or9montfollowinginitialcriticality,whicheveriseaiest.IftheartupReportdoesnotcoverallthre'eevents(i.e.,nitialcriicality,completionofStartupTestProgram,andresumponorcencementofcommercialoperation),supplementaryreportsI/allesubmittedatleastevery3monthsuntilallthreeeventshavebeencompleted.(continued)5.0-33 g~ReportingRequirements5:bReportingRequirements5.9.14outineReorts(continued)I5.9.1e2,'nnualReports/NOT,.E-Asinglesmittalmaybemadefor'multipleunitstation.The.'ubmittalshouldcombinesectionscommontoallunit'satthestation///,~eww&www//AnnpalReportscoveringtheactivitiesofthe.unitasdescribedbelowforthepreviouscaludaryearshallbgsubmittedby/Hgtrch31ofeachyear.heinitialreports'shallbesubttedbylarch31oftheyearfolowinginitialcrjticality.]~5;411OccupationalRadiationExposureReportI>2s'22.-t'Atabulationonanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,'tility,andotherpersonnel(includingcontractors)receivingexposures>100mrem/yrandtheirassociatedmanremexposureaccordingtoworkandjobfunctions(e.g.,reactoroperationsandsurveillance,inservice,iinsection,routinemaintenance,specialmaintenance,wasteprocessing,andrefueling).istabulationsuppementstherequirementsof~go,2204Thedoseassignmentstovariousdutyfunctionsmaybeestimatedbasedonpocketdosimeter,e4ch~c.~thermoluminescentdosimeter(TLD),orimagedeSs~emeasurements.Smallexposurestotalling<204ofthe.individualtotaldoseneednotbeaccountedfor.Inthe'.aggregate,atleast80~ofthetotalwhole'odydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshouldbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions~WjVSERTQZ-<i~snsar(continued)5.0-34 INSERT5.0.7ltd.vThereportshallbesubmittedonorbeforeApril30ofeachyear. ~112.ReportingRequirementsReportingRequirements\l~~AnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportAsinglesubmitta'Imaybesubmittalshould'combinesstation.----NOTE-madeforamultipleunitstation.ections'ommontoallunitsattheTherJvTheAnnualRadiological]En'vironmentalOperatingReportcoveringtheoperationofthe~>duringthepreviouscalendaryearshallbesubmittedbyMay15ofeachyear.Thereportshallincludesummaries,interpretationsan,danalasesoftrendsoftheresuItsoftheRadiological.environmentalmonitoringdsregsvwggforthereportingperiod.fhematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheOffsiteDoseCalculationManual(ODCM),andin10CFR50,AppendixI,SectionsIV.B.2,IV.B.3,andIV.C.TheAnnualRadiologicalEnvironmentalOperatingReportshallincludetheresultsofanalysesofallradiologicalenvironmentalsamplesandofallenvironmeatalradiationmeasurementstakenduringtheperiodpursuanttothelocationsspecifiedinthetableandfiguresintheODCM,aswellassummarizedandtabulatedresultsoftheseanalysesandmeasurementsPintheformatofthetableintheRadiologicalAssessmentgranchTechnicalPositionRevision1November1979P'tThereportshallidentifytheTLD:'resulsthatrepresenttcotocateddosimetersinrelationtothe:-'RCTLDprogramandthe~exosureperiodassociatedwitheachavaaiaaeforinclusionwiththereport,thereportshallbesubmittednotingandexplainingthereasonsforthemissingresults.Themissingdatashallbesubmittedinasupplementaryreportassoonaspossible.(continued)5.0-35R l2.2.E.~~s.4ReportingRequi.-'.i>entsReportingRequirementscR5.4.3(RadioactiveEffluentReleaseReportNOTEAsinglsubmittalmaybe/madeforamultipjeunitstation.Thesubmitt1shouldcombine/sectionscommontallunitsattstati;however,foritswithseparatradwastesystem,thesubmtalshallspecithereleasesofadioactivematialfromeac,unit.127.xThe'adioactiveEffluentReleaseReportcoveringtheoperationof"*'ttteuuni+shallbesubmittedinaccordancewith10CFR50.36a.Thereportshallincludeasummaryofthequantitiesofradioactiveliquidandgaseous'effluentsandsolidwastereleasedfromtne~.ThematerialprovidedshallbeconsistentwiththeobjectivesoutlinedintheODCMandinconformancewith10CFR50.36aand0CFR50,AppendixI,SectionIV.B.1.F.4,0MonthlyOperatingReportsRoutinereportsofoperatingstatisticsandshutdownexperienceefaincludingdocumentationofallchallengestothepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalvesorpressurizersafetyvalves,jshallbesubmittedonamonthlybasisnolaterthanthe15thofeachmonthfollowingthecalendarmonthcoveredbythereport.COREOPERATINGLINITSREPORT(COLR)a.Coreoperatinglimitsshallbeestablishedpriortoeachreloadcycle,orpriortoanyremainingportionofareloadcycle,andshallbedocumentedintheCOLRforthefollowing:ITheiividualspecifcationsthatadesscoreoperat>glimismustberefeneedhere.b.TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminethecoreoperatinglimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:(continued)5.0-36 ~s:s<~Rep~;"'.ingRequirementsv,4gTASQRT5;0.~,COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT(COLR)(continued)7C.IdentifytheTopicalRapport(s)bynumoer,title,date,andNRCstAffapprovaldocument,orideg.'ifythestaffSafetyEvaluationReportfoaplantspecificmethodology'byNRCletteranddate./cThecoreoperatinglimitsshallbedeterminedsuchthatallapplicablelimits(e.g.,fuelthermalmechanicallimits,corethermalhydrauliclimits,EmergencyCoreCoolingSystems(ECCS)limits,nuclearlimitssuchasSDM,-transientanalysislimits,andaccidentanalysislimits)ofthesafetyanalysisaremet.d.TheCOLR,includinganymidcyclerevisionsorsupplements,shallbeprovideduponissuanceforeachreloadcycletotheNRC.ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)RCSpresureandtemperaturelimits,includingheatundcooldownrates,criticality,andhydrostatica'ndleaktest~mits,shallbeestablishedaeLdocumentedinthePTLR.[The~<dividualSpecificationsthataddressthereactorvesselpressureandtemperaturelimitsandtheheatupandcooTdownratesmaybereferenced.]TheanalyticalmethodusedtodeterminethepressureandtemperatureOmitseludingtheheatupandcooldownratesshallbethoseprevioureviewedandapprovedbytheNRCin[TopicalReport(s),nur,tYt3e,date,andNRCstaffapprovaldocument,orstaffsa~fevaluationreportforaplantspecificmethodologybyNRCletteranddate].The.reactorvesselpressureandtemperature~limits,includingthosefor.heatupandcooldownrates,shal~ledeterminedsothatallapplicablelimits(e.g.,heatupIi~ts,cooldownlimits,andinserviceleakandhydrostatictestiimits)oftheanalysisaremet.ThePTLR,iludingresionsorsupplementsthereto,shallbeprovideduponsuanceoreachreactorvesselfluencyperiod.R+[4.c.ZAl5E'PT'Q.'P5.0-37(continued) INSERT5.0.3.aLCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,LCO3.3.1,LCO3.4;1,LCO3.5.1,LCO3.5.4,LCO3.7.12LCO3.9.1,"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDM)"'HODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(HTC)";"ShutdownBankInsertionLimit.";"ControlBankInsertionLimits";"HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo(Z))";"NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor(F"~)";"AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)"'ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation";"RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits";"Accumulators";"RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)";,"SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentration";"BoronConcentration"; INSERT5.0.3.bWCAP-9272-P-A,("WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationHethodology,"July1985.)(HethodologyforLCO3.1.1,LCO3.1.3,LCO3.1.5,LCO3.1.6,LCO3.2.1,LCO3.2.2,LCO3.2.3,LCO3.5.1,LCO3.5.4andLCO3.9.1.)2.WCAP-9220-P-A("WestinghouseECCSEvaluationHodel-1981Version,"Revision1,February1982.)(HethodologyforLCO3.2.1.)3.WCAP-8385,("PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures-TopicalReport,"September1974.)(HethodologyforLCO3.2.3.)4.5.6.7.WCAP-8745-P-A("DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpower4TandThermalOvertemperaturehTTripFunctions,"September1986.)(HethodologyforLCO3.3.1,OvertemperatureATandOverpowerhTtripsetpoints)WCAP-8567-P-A,("ImprovedThermalDesignProcedure,"February1989.)~(HethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingITDP.)WCAP11397-P-A,("RevisedThermalDesignProcedure,"April1989.)(MethodologyforLCO3.4.1whenusingRTDP.)WCAP-11596-P-A,("gualificationofthePHOENIX-P/ANCNuclearDesignSystemforPressurizedWaterReactorCores,"June1988.)(HethodologyforLCO3.7.12.) INSERT5.0.8ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURELIMITSREPORT(PTLR)'a~~b.C.d.RCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsforheatup,cooldowncriticality,andhydrostatictestingaswellasheatupandcooldownratesshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.3,"RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)Limits"ThepoweroperatedreliefvalveliftsettingsrequiredtosupporttheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemandtheLTOPenabletemperatureshallbeestablishedanddocumentedinthePTLRforthefollowing:LCO3.4.6,"RCSLoops-MODE4;"LCO3.4.7,"RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilled;"LCO3.4.10,"PressurizerSafetyValves;"andLCO3.4.12,"LTOPSystem."TheanalyticalmethodsusedtodeterminetheRCSpressureandtemperaturelimitsshallbethosepreviouslyreviewedandapprovedbytheNRC,specificallythosedescribedinthefollowingdocuments:1.WCAP-14040,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"Revision1,December1994.2.MethodologyforLCOs3.4.6,3.4.7,3.4.10and3.4.12-LTOPEnableTemperatureandLCO3.4.'12-PressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValveLiftSettingLimits.ThePTLRshallbeprovidedtotheNRCuponissuanceforeachreactorvesselfluencyperiodandforanyrevisionorsupplementthereto. s:0ReportingRequirements(continued)ReportingRequirements~++-~l'Q.~vt.)22.v~7ceseeWes-5Ove:syberequiredcoveringinspect',est,andmainnanceaties.These~~raredeterminedonanindividualbasisachunieir.preparationandsubmittalaredesignatedTechnicalSpecifications.SpecialReshallbesubmittedinacncewith10CFR50.4wit'timeperiodspecifiedforeachrepo1mieIj2.LvanIntheevntanECCSisactuatedandinjectswaterinto,the>RCSinMODE1,2,or3,/aSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmittedwithin9Pdaysdescribingthecircumstancesoftheactuationandtheitotalaccumulatedactuationcyclestodate,ThecurrentvpaueoftheusagefactorforeacNaffectedsafetyinjectionnozzlespllbeprovided"nthisSpecialReortwheneveritsvalueexceeds0.70-b.Ifanindividualemergencydieselgenerator(EOG)>'xperiencesfourormorevalidailuresinthelast25demands,thesefailuresandanynonvalidfailuresexperienced'ythatEOGinthttimeperiod',.shallbereportedwiin30days.ReortsonEOGfailuresshallincludethinformationrecmmendedinReulatoryGuide1.,Revision,RegulatoryPos'tionC.5,oristingRegulatoryrGuide1.18reportingreqrement.c.'henepecinTReportisrequiredbyCnditionBorGLCO3..[ll],"PostAccfdentMonitoring(PAM)Instrumentation,"areortshallbeubmittedwithinhefolling14daysfrothe.timeth.actionisrequied-Tnreposhalloutlinehepreplannalternatemetdofmontoring,thecausoftheinorability,andeplansascheduleforreoringthe'trumentationannelsofteFunctiontoOPBLEstatu.(continued)5.0-38 ReportingRequirements5:4~1ReportingRequirementsd.Anyabnormaldegradationof~thecontainmentstiucturedetectedduringthetests.requiredbythePre-stressed.Concret'eContainmentTendonSurveillanceProgramshallbereportedtotheRRCwithin30days.Thereportshall/includeadescription.ofthetendoncondi'tion,thecondition>oftheconcrete(especiallyattendonan'chorages),theyinspectionprocedures,thetolerancespncracking,andhecorrectiveactiontaken.F~llowingeachinserviceinspectionofsteamgenerator(SGP',tu~inaccordancewiththeSGTubeSurveillanceProgram,thenumberoftubespl'uggedandtubessleevedineachGshallbereportedtotheNRCwithin15days.~ThecompleteresultsoftheSGtubeinservicennspection!shallbesubmittedtotheNRCwithin12monthsfollowingthe'ompletionoftheinspection.Therepshallinclude:~1.Numberandextentoftubesinspected,I2.Locationandpercentofall-.thicknesspenetrationforeachindicationofimperfection,and:3.Identification.attubespluggedand~tubessleeved.I.iResultsofSGeinspectionsthatfa'llintoCategoryC-3',shallberetedtotheNRCpriortoresumption.ofplant,'operatio.Thisreportshallprovideadescription.of.investijationsconductedtodeterminecauseofthetubedegradationand.correctivemeasurestakentopreventsvdcurrence.5.0-39'R INSERT5.0.9 RecordRetention5;O'DHINISTRATIYE.Cu">",ROLS5.10'ecordRetention5.10.1Thefollowingrecordsshallberetainedforatleast3years:a.AllLicenseEventReportsrequiredby10CFR50.73;I'.RecordsofchangesmadetotheproceduresrequiredbySpecification5.7.1.1;andc.Recordsofradioactiveshipments.5.10.2Thefollowingrecordsshallberetainedforatleast5years:a.Recordsandlogsofunitoperationcoveringtimeintervalsateachpowerlevel;b.Recordsandlogsofprincipalmaintenanceactivities-inspections,repair,"'ndreplacementofprincipalitemsofequipmentrelatedtonuclearsafety;c.Recordsofsurveillanceactivities,inspections,andcalibrationsrequiredbytheTechnicalSpecifications(TS)[andtheFireProtectionProgram];d.Recordsofsealedsourceandfissiondetectorleaktestsand'esults;and.e.Recordsofannualphysicalinventoryofallsealedsourcematerialofrecord.5.10.3Thefollowingrecordsshallberetained'forthe'urationoftheunitOperatingLicense:a.Recordsanddrawingchangesreflectingunitdesignmodificationsmadetosystemsandequipmentdescribedinthe:FSAR;,.b.Recordsofnewandirradiatedfuelinventory,fuel,transfers;andassemblyburnuphistories;c.Recordsofradiationexposureforallindividualsenteringradiationcontrolareas;(continued)5.0-40ev,-289.... ~5.10RecordRtentionRecordRetention5.10,I'.10.3'continued)d.e.g~h.3~k.[m.n.0~Recordsofgaseousandliquidradioactivematerial'releasedtotheenvirons;Recordsoftransientoroperationalcyclesfor.thoseunitcomponentsidentifiedin[FSAR,SectionX];/Recordsofreactortestsandexperiments;.Records.oftrainingandqualificationformembersoftheunitstaff;LRecordsof'inserviceinspectionsperformedpursuanttotheTS;s/rRecordsofqualityassuranceactivitiesrequiredbytheOperationalqualityAssurance'gA)Manual[notlistedinSpecification5.10.1andwhichareclassifiedaspermanentrecordsbyapplicableregulations,codes,andstandards];Recordsofreviewsperformedforchangesmadetoprocedures,equipment,orreviewsof,testsandexperimentspursuantto10CFR50.59;RecordsofthereviewsandauditsrequiredbySpecificati'on5;5.1andSpeci'fication5.5.2;/Recordsoftheser'vicelivesofallhydraulicandmechanicalsnubbersrequiredby[documentwheresnubberrequirementsrelocated.'to],includingthedateatwhichtheservicelifecommences,andassociatedinstallati'onandmaintenance.,records';.Recordsofsecondarywatersamplingandiwaterquality;]4cordsofanalysesrequiredbytheRadiologicalnvironmentalMonitoringProgramthatwouldpermitevaluationoftheaccuracyoftheanalysisatalaterdate(theserecordsshouldincludeprocedureseffe'ctiveatspecifiedtimesandgArecordsshowing.thattheprocedureswerefollowed);Recordsofreviewsperformedforchangesmade.totOffsiteDoseCalculationManualandtheProcessControlProgm;(continued)5.0-41 5.i~~cordRetentionRecordRetention-",.105.10.3(continued)I.p.Recordsofp~r-sressedconc-econtainmenttendonsurveilances;]andRecordsofsteamgeneratortubesurveillances.5.0-42 ~IIiI~~~~~I'II~Is..~I~~I'I~~I~~I't~I~~~~~~~~~~~I~I7+I~CL~k+L+l~III~ItI~I~~~I~~I~~I~I~I~I~~~I~~~I~II~~III~I~~I~~~~II~II~~I~~~II,~~~~~~~~~~~II~~~~I'I~III'~~Ig~I~t~~~I~~II~I~~~I~I~I~I~~~S~~~Ay~~~~~~>~~~t~II~lt~~lPIII~~I'I~~~I~~%Rima~4~'I~I~lIdeilIK?~oIRRiII~I~~~I~I~oI~~ ~ighRadiationArea~5'7~fBBHighRadiatioj'.':t"aa~5.7.Z.9(continued)'theimmediateworkareasandthemaximumallowablestaytimesfor.individualsinthoseareas.InlieuofthestaytimespecificationoftheRWP,directorremote(suchasclosedcircuitTVcameras)continuoussurveillancemaybemadebypersonnelqualifiedinradiationprotectionprocedurestoprovidepositiveexposurecontrolovertheactivitiesbeingperformedwithinthe'arer~aJd.Con4'kg~TcJl~e~c~k.gck5mica.'how$.7.I~Aorindividualhighradiationareaswithradiationlevelsofmrem/haccessibletoersonnelthatarelocatedwithinplargeareassuchasreactorcontainment,wherenoenclosureexistsforpurposesoflocking,orthatcannotbecontinuouslyguarded,andwherenoenclosurecanbereasonablyconstructedaroundtheindividualarea,thatindividualareashallbebarricadedandconspicuouslyposted,andaflashinglightshallbeactivatedasawarnice.<hc>LacoP36Cm5,0-44 00 ANDRochesterGas8ElectricCorporationR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramSubmittalAttachmentsE,F,G,5HVolumeVIII )CkPjf~1ll'At ATTACHHENTECrossReferenceBetweenGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsandNUREG-1431Table1-CrossreferenceorganizedoncurrentGinnaStationTSnumberTable2-CrossreferenceorganizedbasedonAttachmentBMay1995 PAGENO~05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTER101.01.01.01.11.101.11 1.121.131.131.141.151.16 1.171.181.191.21.201.21-1.31.41.51.61.7.11.7.21~7.31.7.41.81.92.1 2.22.32.3'2.3.1.12.3.1.2.a2.3.1.2.b2.3.1.2.c2.3.1.2.d2.3.1.2.e2.3.1.2.f2.3.1.2.g2.3.1.3.a2.3.1.3.b23223.2*12.3.2.12.32.12.3.2.12.3.2.22.3.2.22.3.32.3.3.12.3.3.23.02.b2~a7.b7.a5698122.b7~a89.b15d9.a1.11.213"1.41.1NoneNone1.15.5.1NoneNone None NoneNone1.1NoneTable1.1-1None1.1Table1.1-11.1NoneNone1.1 1.11.1NoneNone1.12.1.12.1.2Chapter3.3LCO3,31Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,RelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3'.l-lTable3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,LCO3.3.4SR3.3.4.2SR3.3.4.2LCO3.0.1'1oxxiii1.xxiv1.xxv1.xxvil.xl.xil.xxiii+Xiiiloxiiil.xivIXVl.xvi 1oxvil:1exviii1axixl.i1%xx1oxxiloii1oxxii l.iii l.iv l.v1+viliviil.viiil.ix2oi3'4.i4+ii4.iii4~iii4~v4~iv4~iv5.i1.11.21.31.1'.l1.11.1 1.45.0 1.11.1 1.1 1.11.11.11.11.1F11.11.11.1 1.11.11.11.11.11.11-11.12.02.03.33.33.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.33'3;3 3.3 3.33.33.33.33'3.33.33.3333.33.0 S PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.0303.03.03.0.130.23.0.23.1.1.1.a3l.l.l.b3.1.1.1.b3.1.1.1.c 3.1.1.1.d.i 3.1.1.1.d.ii3.1.1.1.e 3.1.1.1.e3.1.1.1.e3.1.1l.f3.1.1.1.f3.1.1.1.f F1.1.1g3.1.1.1.g3.1.1;l.g3.1.l.l.g 3.1.1.1.h3.1.1.1.h3.1.1.1.h3.1.1.1.i3.1.1.1.j3.1.1.1.k 3.1.1.1-k3.1.1.2.a3.1.1.33.1.1.3.a 3.1.1.3-b3.1.1.3.c3.1.1.3.d3'.13-d3.1-.1.4.a.i3.1.1.4.a.i3.1.1.4.a.ii3.1.1.4.a.ii3.1.1.5.a3.1.15.b3.1.1.6.a3.1.1.6.a3.1.1.6.a3.11.6.b3'.1.6.b3.1.1.6.b3.1.1.6.c3.1.1.6.c3.1.1.6.c3.1.2.13.1.2.1.aLCO3.0.2LCO3.0.4LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.7LCO3.0.3LCO30.6LCO3.8.1LCO3.4.4LCO3.4.4LCO3.4.5LCO3.4.5LCO3.4.5LCO3.4.5LCO3.4.6LCO3.4-7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO34.6LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8None NoneLCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7RelocatedtoPTLRLCO3.4.10NoneNoneLCO3.4.10LCO3.4.10LCO3.4.10LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.4'NoneLCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11RelocatedtoLCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11RelocatedtoLCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.4.3RelocatedtoTRMSoiiS.iv5'S.vii S.iiiSovi5+vi6.i6.ii6.ii6.ii6.ii6.vii6.vii 6.vii6.iii6.vi6.vi6.iv6.viii6.viii6.v 6'6.xv6.xvii6.xii6.xii6.xvii6.xvi6.xiii6.xiv6.ix6.x6.xiii6.xiv6'i6~xiv6.xiii6.xi 6.xiii6.xiv6.xi 7.i7.i3.03.03.03.03.03.03.8 3.43.43.4 3.4 3.4 3.43.43.43.4 3.43.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.43.43.43.43.43.43.43.45.03.4 3.43.4 3.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.4 3.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.43.43.4 3.4 3.43.4 PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERF12.1.b31-2l.e.l31.2.1.c.23.1.2.23.1.2.331.33.1.3.131.3.13.1.3.13'.3.13.1.3.2.3.33.1.4.1.a3.1.4.1.b3.1.4.1.c3'-4.23.1.,4.3.aF1.4.3.b3.1.4.3.c31.4.43.1.4.4 3'.5.1.131S.l.l31.5.1.1315.1.2F1.5.2.13-1.5.2.2.a315.2.2.b31.5.2.2.b3.1.5.2.2.c3.1.5.2.2.c 31.6.13.1.6.2 3.1.6.3F1.6.43-1.6.5310.13.10.13.10.1.13-10.1.1310.1.2310.1.23.10.1.3310.1.33.10.1.4 3.10.1.43.10.1.53.10.2.1310.2.13-10.2.13.10.2.1310.2-103.10.2.10a 3.10.2.10bRelocatedtoLCO3.4.3LCO3.4.3RelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3.1.3LCO31.3LCO3.1.8LCO3~1~8LCO3.4.2NoneLCO3.4.2LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.7.14LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.7.14LCO3.4.15LCO3.415LCO3.4.15LCO3.4.15LCO'3.4.13LCO3413LCO3.4.13LCO3.4.13LCO3.4.13LCO3.4.13RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3.1.5LCO3.1.6LCO3.1.1LCO3.1.1LCO3.1.5LCO3.1.8LCO3.1.6LCO3.1.8LCO3.1.5LCO3.1.6None SR3.2.1.1SR3.2.1.2SR3.2.2.1SR3.2.2.2NoneLCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3PTLRPTLRTRMTRM TRMTRMTRM7+ii7iii7eiv70v S.ivB.vS.vB.i8.ii8oiii9.ii9.i10.i10.ii10.iii 10.ii10.ivll.i11.i11.i11~i11.i20.i20.i 20.ii20.iii20.iv20.v20.iv20.vi20.xx20.xxi 20.xx20.xxi20.ix20.xxxv3.4 3.43.45.05.03.1313.13'3.43.43.4 3.43.4373.43.4343.434373.43.43.4 3.43.43.43.43.43.4 3.45.05.0 5.05.0 5.0313.1313.1 3.13.1 3'3.13.1 3.13132323.23.2 3.13.2 32 Cl PAGENO05/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTS8ATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.10.2.10c310.2.11310.2.12310.2123.102.23.10.2.2310.2.23102.2310-2.23.10.2.23.10.2.2 3.10.2.2310-2.23.10.2.33.10.2.33-10.2.3310.2.4310.2.43.10.2.43.10.2.5310.2.63.10.2.6310.2.7310.2.73102.8310.2.8F10.2.9310.2.9310.3.1310.3.23-10.4.13-10.4.13.10.4.23'0.4.33.10.4.3.1F10.43.23.10-4.3.2.3104.3.2.3104.3.2.abb.i b.iiboiiic3.10.43'310.4.43.10.5 3.10.5.13.10.5.23.105.33.11.1.a 3.1l.l.b3.11.1.c3.11.1.d 3.11.1.e3.11.23.11.33.10.4.3.2. 3.10.43.2.oteTRMTRMLCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3NSR3'3.1SR3.2.3.2LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2None LCO3.24LCO3.2.4NoneLCO3.2.4LCO3.2.4LCO3.2.4NoneSR3.2.11SR3.2.2.1SR3.2.3.3SR3LCO3.2.3NoneLCO32.3NoneSR3.1.4.4SR3.1;4.4LCO3.1.4.LCO3.1.8LCO31.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO31.4LCO31.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO31.4NoneLCO314LCO3.1.7'CO3.1.7LCO3.1.7LCO31.7LCO3.7.10LCO3.7.10LCO3.7.10LCO3.710LCO3.7.10Relocatedto'Relocatedto20.xxxvi20.xxii20.xxv 20.xxvi 20.xxiv20.xxiii20.xxv20.xxvi20.xxiv20.vii20.xxvii20.xxviii20.viii20.xxix20.xxvii20.xxx20.xxxi20.xxxii 20.xxxiii20.ix'20.xxxiv20.ix20.x20.xi20.xii20.xii20.xiii20.xiv20.xvi20.xv20.xvi20.xvii20.xviii20.xix21.i21.i21.i21.i 21.i21.ii21.iii3.2323.23.23.23.2 3.23.2 323.23.23.23.1 3.23.23.1 3.23.23.23.2 3.2 3.2 323.23.23.1323.1 313.13'3.13.13.13.13.13.1'3.13.13.13.13;13.13.13.13.13.13'3.7 3.73.7 3.73.73.7 / PAGENO~505/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCE,TOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGZNNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTER3.11.43.11.53.12.1 3.12.23.13.13.13.23143.15 3.15.13.1513.15.13.15.1.13.15.1.13.15.1.2315.1.33.15.1.33;16.1.13.16.1.2 3.16.1.33.16.1.43.16.2.13.16.2.23.16.2.33.16.2.4 3.16.3.13.16.3'3.2.1 3.21.132.232.33.2.3 3.2.43.2.53.F13.3.1.1.a 3.3.1~1.a3.3.1.1.a3.3.1.1b3.3.1.1b3.3.1.1.b 3.3.1.1.c3.3.1.1.d3.3.1.1.e 3.3.1.1f3.3.1.13.3.l.l.f 3.3.1.1.g3.3'.1h3.3.1.13.3.l.l.i3.3'.1i3.3.1.1.j3.3.1.2 3.3.1.3RelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3316SR3.31~6RelocatedtoRelocatedtoNoneLCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.125.6.4NoneRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3.4.12LCO35.3LCO3.54SR35.4'SR3.5.4.2LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.1NoneLCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.4LCO3.5.2LCO3.4.14LCO3.4.14LCO3.5,1SR3.5.1.5LCO3.52LCO3.5.4LCO3.5.1TRMTRM5.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.8 5.5.85.5.85.5.8 5.5.85.5.8TRMTRM TRMTRMTRMTRM21.iv21.iii22i23ei23~i2425.vi25.ii25.i 25.iii25.iv25.v25.v26.i26.i 26.i26.i26.ii 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PAGENO.05/25/956CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDITSTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERPROPOSEDATTACHMENTA,ITSITSSECTIONC2NOTESCHAPTER3.3.1.43.3.1.53.3.1.53.3.1.5a3.3.1.5.b3.3.1.5.c3.3.1.5.d 3.3.1.5.e 3.3.1.73.3.1.7.13.3.1.83.3.1.8.13.3.1.8.23.3.2.1.a3.3.2.1.b3.3.2.1.c3.32.1.d3.3.2.1.e 3.3.2.2.a3.3.2.2.b3~3~2~2~c332.2.d3~3~2~2~e3.3.3.l.a3.3.3.l.b3~3~3~1~c3.3.3.2a3.3.3.2.b3.3.4.1.a 3.3.4.1b3.3.4.23.3.5.13.3.5.23.4.13.4.2.1.a3.4.2.1.b 3.4.2.l.c34.2.234.2.23.4,2.33.4.33.4.33.5.13.5.1.1 3.51.23.5.2 3.5213.52.23.5.2.33.5.3 3.5.3.1 3.5.3.23.5.3.23.5.3.2LCO352LCO34~14LCO3.5.2LCO35.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.52LCO3.5.2LCO3.4.14LCO3.4.12SR3.4.12.1LCO34-12SR3.4.12.2SR3.4.12.2LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO36.6LCO3.6.6LCO36.6LCO3.7.7LCO3.7.7LCO'3.7.7LCO3.7.7LCO3.7.7LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.9LCO3.7.9LCO3.7.1LCO3.7.5LCO37.5LCO3.7.5LCO3.7.5SR3.75-2LCO3.75LCO3.7.5LCO3.7.6LCO3.31LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO332LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2RelocatedtoBasesLCO3.33LCO3.33LCO3.3.3LCO33.3LCO33313%x13.iv13.xi13.xii 13.xiii13.xii13.xiii13oxiv13.xv13.xv13.xvi13.xvii13~xviii13xix13~xx13.xx14.i14.ii14.iii14.iv 14.v15.i.a15.ii.a15~iioa15.iii.a15.iii.b 15.iii.c3.5 3.43.5 3.53.5 3.53.5 3.4 3.43.4 3.4 3.43.43.63.63.63.6 373.63.63.63.63.6373~73~73737 3-7 3'3'3'3'3'3'3'3'373.7 3'3'3.73.3333.33'33333.33.33.33.33.3 33 PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3'.3.33.5.3.33.5.43.5.5.13.5.5'3.5.5.23.5.5.2 3.5.5.33.5.5.3 3.5.63.5613.5.6.2 3.56'"23.63.63.6.1.a3'.1.b3.6.1.c 3.6.23.6.3.13.6.3.1 3.6.4.13.6.4.23'.4.33.6.53.7.1.l.a3.7.1l.b3.7.1.1.c3.7.1.1.c3.7.l.l.d3.7.1.1.d 3.7.1.1.d 3.7.1.1.e3.7.1.1.e3.7.1.23.7.1.23.7.1.23.7.1.237.1.23.7.1.23.7.2.1.a.l3.7.2.1.a.2 3.7.2.1.a.3 3.7.2.1.a.33.7.2.1a43.7.2l.a.43.7.2.1.a.4 3.7.2.l.a.63.7.2.l.a.63.7.2.1.a.73.7.2'.a.73.7.2.1.b.l3.7.2.'1.b23.7.2.2a5.5.4 5.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.54TRMTRMLCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO33.5Table3.3.5-1LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.5.bLCO3.6.5LCO3.6.7LCO3.6.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3.6.4LCO3.6.2LCO3.6.3Table3.3.3-1LCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3LCO3.6.3LCO3.8.2LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.2LCO3.8.3LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.5LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.8LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.2LCO3.8.3LCO3.8.5LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.8LCO3.8.1LCO3'9LCO3.81LCO38.3LCO3.8.4LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.9LCO3.8.7LCO3.8.9LCO38.7LCO38.9None LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.115.iii.d15.iii.a15.iv15.viii15.viii 15.viii15.viii15.viii15.viii15.v15.vii15.vi16.vi16.vii 16.i16.x16.x16.ii16.iii 16.iv16.viii16.ix.16.viii16.v17.i17.i17.i 17.i17'17'17.ii17.ii17.iii17.iii333.33.33.95.0395.03.95.0333.33.33.33.63.63.63'3.93.63.63.63.33.33.3 3.6 38~3.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.83.83.83.8 3.8 3.83.83.83.83.83838383.8 3.8 3'3.83.83.8 3.8 3.83.8

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PAGENO.1105/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGZNNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.4.2l.b44.2.1.c4.42.24.4.2.3.a4.4.2.3.b4.4.2.3.c4.4.2.3.c4.4.2.4.a4.4.2.4'.b4.4.2.4.c4.4.2.4.c4.4.2.4.c 44.3.1.a4.4.3.1.b 4.4.3.1.c 4.4.3.24.4.3.3.a4.4.3.3.b4.4.3.44.4.44.4.44.4.4.l.a4.4.4.1.b4.4.4.1.c4.4.4.1.d4.4.4.1.e4.44.2.a4.4.4.2.b4.4.5.14.4.6.14.4.6.14.4.6.14.4.6.24.47.144.7.24.54.54AS.l.l.a4.5.1.1.b45-1-24.5.1.2.a4.51.2b4.5.1.2.c4.5.2.1.a452.1a4.52.1a45.2.1.b45.2l.b45.2.1.b4.5.2.2.a 4.5.2.2.a 45.2.2.a45.2.2.b4.5.2.2.c5.5.25.5.25.5.25.5.25.5.25.5.25.5.25.5.65.5.65.5.6 5.5.65.5.6 5.5.65.5.6g35.5.8SR3611LCO3.7.5SR3.6.1.1LCO3.6-1LCO3'.1LCO3.6.3SR3'34SR36.1.1SR36.1~1LCO3.6.2SR3.6.2.1SR3.6.2.2RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedto5.5.6SR3.6.1.2RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.6.3.3SR3.6.3.1SR3.6.3.2Table3.3.2-1SR'.6.3.5SR3.3.3.1SR3.3.3.2SR3.5.2.1SR3.5-2.2SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.5SR3.6.6.1SR3.6.610SR3'.6.15SR3.6'.15SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.3.1SR3.6.6.4SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.3.1SR3.6.6.4'SR3.66.13SR3.6.6.14SR3.6.6.9SR3.6.6.9Relocatedto31.iii31.iii31.iv31.iv31.vi31.vi31.iii31.iii31.iii31.v 31.v31~ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.i31.i31.i31.i31.i31.i31.i31.i31.vii31.vii31.vii31.viii3l.x31ax32.iv32+iv32+i32.vii32.viii32'i32'i32.ii32ii32.ii32.ii32~x32~x 32&x32ax32.iii3.6373.63.63.63.63.63.63.6 3.63.63.65.05.0.5.05.05.05.0 5.05.03.65.05.05.05.05'.05.05.03.63.63.63.3 3.63.33.33.53.53.53.53.63.6 3.63.63.5 3.53.6353.53.6 3.63.63.6 3.63.5

PAGENO1205/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGZNNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.52.3.14.5.23.14.5.2.314.52.314.5.2.3.1.a4.5.2.3'.b4.5.2.3.1.c4.5.2.3.1.c 4.5.2.3.24.5.2.3.24.5.2.3.3 4.5.2.3.3 4.5.2.33.a4.5.23'.b4.5.2.3.3.b 4.5.2.3.4 4.5.23.44.5.2.3.54.5.2.3.545.2.3645.2.3.64.5.2.3.6.a4.5.2.3.6.a 4.5.2.3.6.b 4.5.2.3.6.c4.5.2.3.6.d4.5.2.3.74.5.2.3.74.5.2.3.7 4.5.2.3.84.5.2.3.84.5.2.384.5.2.3.9 4.5.2.3.9 4.52.3.94.6.1..a4.6.l.b.l4.6.l.b24.6.1.b.3 4.6.1.b.44.6.1.b54.6l.b.64.6.1.c4.6.1.d 4.6.1.d4.6.1.e.l4.6.1.e.24.6.1.e.3.a4.6.1.e.3.b4.6.1.e.3.b4'.6.l.e.3.b4.6.1.e.3.c4.6.l.e.44.6.2RelocatedtoSR3.6'11SR36.62SR3.66~55.5.10.a5.5.10.a5.5.10.aRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.6,6.5RelocatedtoSR3.6.6.65.5.10.b5.5.10.bRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.6.6.6SR36.612SR3.6.6.3RelocatedtoSR3.7.9.15.5.10.c5.510.c5.510.cRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.7~9~1SR3.7.9.25.5.1032'32.xii 32.xii5.5.105.5.105.5.105.5.105.5.1032%v32~'v32~v32~v32&v32+xi32'32~v 32&v 32'32oxi32~ix5.5.1032.v5.5.10 5.5.105.5.1032~vi32~v32~v32~v 32'32+vSR3.7.9.1SR3.7.9.2SR3.7.9.1SR3.7.9.2SR3.7.9.3SR3.8.2.1SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.3.1SR3.8.1.5SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.1.3LCO3.8.1SR3.0.45.5.12SR3-8.3-2RelocatedtoSR3.8.1.7SR3.8.1.9RelocatedtoSR3.52.6SR3.8.1.9SR,3.8.1.8SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.4.1TRM32.xii33qi33eii33iii33+iv33~v33+vi33+vi33'i33~ixRelocatedto5.5.1032.v5.03.63.6 3.65.05.05.05.05.03.65.03.6 5.05.05.0 5.0363.63.65.03.75.05.05.0 5.05.05.03737503737 3.73.73.73.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.8 3.85.0383.83.83.8 38353.83.83.83.8 PAGENO1305/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.6.24.6.2.a4.6.2.a46.2.b4.6.2.c4.6.2.64.6.2.e4.6.2.e4.6.2.f4.6.3.a.l4.6.3.a.l4.6.3.a.2 4.6.3.a.24.6.3.a.3 4.6.3.b4.6.4.1 4.6.4.14.6.4.24.6.4.2 46.4.24.6.4.2 F6.4.24.6.4.2 46.4.346.4.3474.74.7 474.84.8.1 4.8.104.8.24.8.348.44.8.54.8.648.648.74.8.8.a4.8.8.b 4.8.9494.94.95.15.1.151.25.2.1.a52.1.b5.2.2.a 52.2.b5.2.3.a 52.3-bSR3.8-51SR3.8.6-1SR3.8.6'SR3.862NoneSR38.4'SR3.842SR3.84.3SR3.8.4.3SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.2.1SR3.8.1.1SR3.8.2.1SR3.8.9.1SR3.8.1.6SR3.8.10.1SR3.8.9.1SR38.10.1SR3.8.7.1SR3.8.7.2SR3.8.8~1SR3.8.8.2SR3.8.9.1SR3.8.7.1SR3.8.8.1LCO374SR3.7.2.1'R3.7.2.2SR3.7.2.3SR3.7.5.1SR3.7.5.2NoneSR3.7.5.2SR3.7.5.4SR3.7.5.3SR3.7.54SR3.7.5.2SR3.7.5.6SR3.7.5.7SR375.5SR3.7.5.6Table3.3.2-1,6LCO3.1.2SR3.1.2.1'R3.1.2.24.1UFSAR2.1.2UFSAR2.1.2UFSAR3.81/6.2UFSAR3.8.1/62UFSAR3.81/6.2UFSAR3.8.1/6.2UFSAR3.8.1/62UFSAR3.8.1/6.233~l.X33~vl.l.33ovii33vil.33ox33.viii34.i 34.i 34.i.34.i35.vi35.i 35.vii35.i35.ii35.iii35.iv35.v 35.v36.i44.i44.i44.i 45.i45.i 45.i 45.i 45.i 45.i3.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.8383.83.83.83.8383.83.83.83.83.83.83.8383.837373.73.73.73.73.3'73.73'373.73.73.7373.73.33.1 3.13.1 4P4P4.0404.04.04.04.0 40 PAGENO~1405/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITS8ATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER5.3.1.a5.3.1.b-5~3~1.b5.3.1.c 5.3.2.a5.3.2.a5.3.2.b5.3.2.b5.3.2.c 5.3.2.c5.45.45.45.4 5.4.15.4.25.4.25.4.3 5.4.4.a5.4.4.b5.4.55.4.65.5.1 5.5.25.5.35.546.16.1.1.6.106.11 6.126.13.l.a6.13.1.b 6.13.1.b 6.146.15.1.a6.15.1.a 6.15.1.a 6.15.1.b 6.16.1.a 6.16.1.b6.1716.1726.172.16.17.36.2.1 6.2.1.a6.2.1.b6.2.1c6.2.1.d6.2.2.a6.2.2.b 6.2.2.c6.2.2.d4.2.14.3.1.2.a4.3.1.2.a4.2.2UFSAR37'/50UFSAR3.7.1/50UFSAR3.7.1/5-0UFSAR3.7.1/5.0UFSAR3.7.1/5.0UFSAR3.7.1/504.3.24.3.3LCO3.7.11LCO3.7.12RelocatedtoBases4.31.1RelocatedtoBasesLCO3.7.134.3.1.1NoneNoneLCO3.9.1UFSAR11UFSAR11UFSAR11UFSAR115.1.25.1.1NoneNone None5.7.15.7.25.7.3None5.5.15.5.1.a5.5.l.c5.5.1.bRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRM5.2.15.2.1.a5.2.1.c 52.1.bRelocatedtoQAP5.2.2.aNone5.2.2.b5.2.2.c46.i46.iv46.ii46.i46.iii46.iii46.iii46.iii46.iii 46.iii47.v47.v 47.i47.i47.i47.ii 47.i47.iii47.iv47.iv47.i48-i48.i48.i48.i49.ii 49.i61.i63.i 64.i64.i65.i65.i65.i 65.i50.i50.ii50.iii50.iv50.v4.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.0 4.04.04.04.04.04.0 4.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.04.05.05.0N/AN/A N/A5.0.5.05.0N/A5'5.0 5.05.0 5.0 5.0 5.0505.0 505.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.0 505.05.0 PAGENO.1505/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGZNNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTER6.2.2.e6.2.2.f6.3.16.3.164.16.4.26.56.66.7.1.a6.7.1.b 6.7.1.c 6.7.1.d 6.8.16.8.1 6.8.1.a6.8.1.b6.8.1.c68.1.d6.8.1.e6.969.1.16.91.26.9.1.36.9.1.4 6.9.1.46.9.1.56.9.26.9.26.9.2.16.9.2.1 6.9.2.2 6.9.2.36.9.2.4Figure2.1-1Figure2.3-1Figure3.1-1Figure3.1-2Figure3.1.4-1Figure3.10-1Figure3.10-2Figure3.10-3Figure5.1-1Figure5.4-1Figure5.4-2NewNew NewNewNewNewNewNewNewNew5.2.2'5.2.2.e5.2.2.e5.3.1NoneNoneNone None2.2RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedto5.4.1.b 5.4.1.e 5.4.15.4.15.4.15.51Relocatedto5.6None5.6.45.6.256.356.35.6.45.6.5 5.6.6None None5.6.1None5.6.4Figure2.1.1-RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoFigure3.4.16RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoUFSAR2.1.2RelocatedtoFigure3.7.175.5.135.5.14 55.355.55.5.7LCO3.4.1LCO3.7.2LCO3.7.3SR3.4.15.5'SR3.7.3.1TRMTRM TRM1Proceds PTLRPTLR-1COLRCOLRCOLRBases-150.viSl.i52.i52.i55.i55.ii55.iii55.iv 56.iii56.iv56.i 56.ii57.i,57.ii57.iii'7.iv57.v57.iv57.vi57.ix57.x57.vii57.vii57.viii4.iv7'7.i20.v20.iii20.xxiii44i47.i47.i 56.iv56.iv56.iv56.iv56.iv66.i66.11 66.11128.ii.i66.ii5~05.0505.05.05.0N/AN/A202.2 2'2.25.05.05.05.0 505.05.0 5.0505.05.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.0N/A5.02.1 3.3343.4343.13.1324;0 4.04.05'5.05.0 505.03.4373.73.43.7 0 PAGENO05/25/9516CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGZNNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSif'TTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTERNewNewNew New NewNewNewNewNewNew NewNew New NewTable:TableTableTable TableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable310-13.16-13.2-135-13.5-1 35-13.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3,5-1,3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1~3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,1110 10ll12131415161616161617.a17.b18 1819192.a2~a2.b20202033 44567SR3.7.F1Table3.3.1-1,10Table3.3.1-1,10Table3.3.1-1,14Table3.3.1-1,14Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.2-1,1.bTable3.3.2-1,2.bTable3.3;2-1,3.bTable3.3.2-1,6.aTable3.3.2.1,4.bTable3.3.2.1,5.aTable3.3.2.1,7RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedto5.5.4RelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,9.aTable3.3.1-1,9.bTable3.3.1-1,13NoneTable3.3.1-1,12Table3.3.1-1,11RelocatedtoTRMLCO32.4SR3.2.1.2SR3.2.2.2SR3.2.4.1SR3.2.4.2RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRM,LCO3-3.4LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4LCO3.34RelocatedtoProcedsTable3.3.1-1,2.bTable3.3.1-1,2.aTable3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,16Table3.3.1-1,17RelocatedtoProcedsTable3.3.1-1,3RelocatedtoProceduresTable3.3.1-1,4Table3.3.1-1,5Table3.3.1-1,6Table3.3.1-1,7.a66.iii15.i.w28.i.d15.i.x28.i.e15.i.ff28.i.f15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.g 15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.d20.xv26.i12.iv 15.i.h15.i.a 15.i.b15.i.d15oioc 15.i.h15'.h15.i.c15.i.p15.i.p15.i.p 15.i.p15.i.p 15.i.q15.i.q15.i.v15.i.r15.i.r15.i.v 15.i.e15.i.i15oioy15.i.y15.i.y 15.i.e15.i.j 15.i.e15.i.k3'3'3-3'333.33.33'3.33~33.33.3 333.3 3.33.1 5.05.03'3.33.3 3.33.33~33'333'333'3'323.2 3.23.2323.33'3.3 3'3'3.33.333333.33.3333.33.3333.33.33.33.3

PAGENO.05/25/9517CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTable'ableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTable3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1~3.5-1,3.5-1i35-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,35-1,3-5-1I35-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1i3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1i3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1~8 9AS1AS1AS14AS14AS14AS14AS14AS14AS14AS14AS2AS2AS2.AS2AS2AS2AS2AS3AS3AS3AS4AS4AS4AS4AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS6AS6AS7AS7AS7AS7Note1Note2TableTableTableTableTable3.5-23.5-23.5-2~35-2,3.5-2,1~a1.a1.bTable3.5-1,Note3Table3.5-1,Note4Table3.5-1,Note5Table3.3.1-1,Table3.3.1-1,LCO331LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.31LCO331LCO3.3.1.vLCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.iLCO3.3.1LCO331LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.31LCO3.31LCO3.3.1LCO33.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4LCO33.4LCO3.3.4RelocatedtoBTable3.3.1-1,A,ETable3.3.1-1,ETable3.3.1-1,RTable3.3.1-1,JTable3.3.2-1Table3.3.2-1Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,7.b8asesNoteNoteCondNotel.aNotel.c15.i.d15.i.d15.i.bb15.i.ee15.i.z15.i.dd15.i.cc15.i.aa15.i.dd15.i.i15.i.g15.i.g15.i.f15.i.g15.i.f15.i.f15.i.j15.i.j15.i.j 15.i.k 15.i.k15.i.k15.i.k15.i.l 15.i.m15.i.l15.i.m15.i.l 15.i.m15.i.m15.i.l15~ioo15.i.n15.i.t15.i.u15.i.s15.i.u15.i.e15.ii.a15.ii.b333.33.33.33.3333333333.33.33.3333.33.33'3.3 3.33.33.33333 3.33'333.3 333.3333333 3.33.33.33.33.3333.3333.33.33.3333.33.33.33.3333.333 PAGENO05/25/9518CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSPATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2,35-2~35-2,35-2,35-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2, 3.5-2g3.5-2~35-2,3.5-2, 35-2~35-2,3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~35-2,3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~3.5-2, 3.5-2,3.5-2,35-2,35-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~3.5-2,3.5-33.5-3 3.5-4,35-4,3.5-4,35-4,35-4,3.5-4,35-4,3'-4,3.5-4,3.5-4, 35-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,35-4,3'-4,3.5-4~3.5-4,1.c1d2a2.b3a3.b"'3~c3.d3'3f4.1.a4.1.b 4.2.a4.2.b4.2c4.2.d S.a 5.bS.c 5'6.a6.bAS10AS11AS11AS11AS12AS12AS13AS6AS6AS8AS8AS9AS91~a1.b 1.c1'.d2.a2.b3.a.l3a23.b.l3.b.23.b.33.b.44.a4.b4.c4.dS.aTable3.3.2-1,l.eTable3.3.2-1,1.dTable3.3.2-1,2.aTable3.3.2-1,2.cRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,6.bTable3.3.2-1,6.dTable3.3.2-1,6.cTable3.3.2-1,6.eRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,3.aTable3.3.2-1,3.cRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,4.eTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2.1,4.cTable3.3.2.1,4.aTable3.3.2.1,S.cTable3.3.2.1,S.bLCO33.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2Table3.3.3-1Table3.3.3-1Table3.3.2-1,l.aTable3.3.2-1,1.cTable3.3.2-1,1.dTable3.3.2-1,l.eTable3.3.2-1,2.aTable3.3.2-1,2.cTable3.3;2-1,3.aTable3.3.2-1,3.cRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,4.aTable3.3.2-1,4.cTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2-1,4.e'Table3.3.2-1,5.b15.ii.k15.ii.h15.ii.n15~iioo15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.a15.ii.a15.ii.j15~iiei15.ii.h15ii.l15.ii.m15.ii.p15.ii.n15oiioo15.ii.c 15.ii.e15.ii.f15.iii.e 15.iii.a15.ii.q15.ii.q15.ii.q15.ii.p15.ii.p 15.ii.p15mlisp3.3333.333333.33.333333.33.3 333'33333.33.3333.33.33'3'333.3333.333333.33.33.3333'3.333 3.33'333333333;33.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.33.333 3.33.33.3 PAGENO.05/25/9519CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable Table TableTableTable TableTableTableTable Table Table TableTableTable TableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTable6.a6b6.c6.d7~a7.b8.aNote1Note2Note32b3111101010 1111ll12131415161717181922 202122 222222 22 22 22223.5-4,"3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-53.5-5,3.5-5,3.5-6 4.1-141-14.1-14.1-14.1-14.1-14.1-14.1-14.1-14.1-1 41-1g4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4'-1,4.1-1g4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1~4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1g4.1-1, 4.1-1,Table3.3.2-1,6.bTable3.3.2-1,6.cTable3.3.2-1,6.dTable3.3.2-1,6.eSR3-3'2SR3.3.4.2Table3.3.2-1,7NoneNoneRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedto5.5.4RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMSR3.1.6.1SR3.1.64SR31.8-4SR3.2.F1~SR3.4.1.1SR3.4.1.2SR3.4.1.3SR3.4.2.1SR3.4.3.1Table3.3.3-1SR3.1.8.1Table3.3.1-1,2Table3.3.1-1,5SR3.1.5.1SR3.1.6.2SR3.1.6.3Table3.3.2-1,S.bTable3.3.2-1,6.cTable3.3.3-1,13Relocat'edtoTRMTable3.3.3-1,14RelocatedtoTRMSR3.54.1RelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,1.cTable3.3.2-1,2.cRelocatedto5.5.4RelocatedtoTRMSR3.1.8.1Table3.3.1-1,3SR3.415.3Table3.3.1-1,4SR3.5.2.5SR35.2.6Table3.3.2-1,1Table3.3.2-1,2Table3.3.2-1,3Table3.3.2-1,4Table3.3.2-1,5Table3.3.2-1,615.ii.r15.ii.r15.ii.s 15.ii.s15.ii.p15.viii15.viii15.viii15.iv28.i.b 28.i.b28.i.b28.ib28i.b28.i.b28.i.b28.i.b 28.i.b28.i.a28.i.h28.i.c28.i.c28.i.m28.i.m28.i.m28.i.c 28.i.c28.i.j28.i.m28.i.h28.i.c3.333333.33.33333 3.333335.03.93.93.33.13.13'323.43.43.43.43.43'F13333 3.1313.1 333'3.33'3.33.13.53.1 3.33.3503.1313.33.433353.533333.3 3'3333 PAGENO.05/25/9520CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAiSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTable Table4.1-1,4l-l,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 41-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,41-1,4.1-.1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,41-1,41-1,4'-1,4l-l,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1, 4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-24.1-24.1-24.1-2 4.1-2 4.1-24.1-24.1-24.1-223 242425 25~2628-.293 33030 3132 32 3334353636363738.a38.b39394 444041.a4l.b 567788 8999Note1Note2Note3Table3.3.1-1,14SR3.5.1.2SR3.5.1.3RelocatedtoTRMSR3.6.4'Table3.3.2-1,l.eRelocatedto5.5.4Relocatedto5.5.4SR3.9.2.1Table3.3.1-1,4SR3.3.4.1SR3.3.4.2Table3.3.2-1,6.fTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2-1,4.eTable3.3.2-1,4.dRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.5-1,1Table3.3.5-1,1Table3.3.5-1,3Table3.3.3-1,7Table3.3.1-1,17Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,16SR3.1.8.2Table3.3.1-1,5Table3.3.1-1,6Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1>>1,9Table3.3.1-1,8Table3.3.1-1,7Table3.3.2<<1,1.dTable3.3.1-1,11Table3.3.1-1,12Table3.3.2-1,6.eSR3.141SR3.1.42SR3.8.12SR3.3.1.5NoneNoneSR3.1.1.1SR3.1.3.1SR3.1.3.2SR3.1.8.3SR3.6.4.1SR3.6.5.1SR3.6.6.7SR3.7.11.1SR3.7.13.128~iac~28.i.b28.i.k28.i.j28+i~j28~ioi28.i.c28oiog28.i.g28.i.c 28.i.c 28.i.c28.i.c28.i.i28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28~lei28.i.c28.ii.i28.ii.i 28.ii.i 28.ii.i28.ii.i 28.ii.i 28.ii.i 28.ii.i28.ii.i3.3353.53.63.63.35.05.03.9 333.3333.33.33.33.33.33.33.33.3 333.333333'3.33.13'33 3.33.3 3.3333.33.3333333333.13.1 3.133333'313.1 313.13.6 3.6 3.63.737 PAGENO.05/25/9521CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIONTSNUMBERITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSIPROPOSEDITSifATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTable TableTable Table'able4.1-2 4.1-24.1-2 4.1-2 4.1-2 4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2,41-2,41-2,4.1-2,4.1-2, 41-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-34.1-4,4.1-,4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-541-5,4.1-5,4.1-5,4.1-5, 41-5,4.1-5,410-14.12-1412-24.14-14.5-16.9-16.9-21 10 11111213 1414 14151616171819234, 56a6b 78912344a4b3~a3~a3~a3.b3.b3.bTRMTRMTRM TRM5.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.85.5.45.5.4SR3.7.13.2SR3.7.6.1SR3.7.7.1SR3.7.7.2SR3.7.8.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.7.8.2SR37.8.3RelocatedtoSR3.6.6.8SR3.5.1.1SR3.5.1.4SR3.5.1.5SR3.4.13.1SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.3.1SR3.7.12.1SR3.7.14.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.5.4.2RelocatedtoSR3.1.4.4SR3.1.4.3SR3.1.7.1SR3.4.10.1SR3.7.1.1SR3.3.2.4Table3.3.3-1SR3.4.16.1SR3.4.16.2SR3.4.16.3SR3.4.16.2LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16RelocatedtoSR3.4.15.1SR3.4.152SR3.4.154SR3.4i15.1SR3.4.15.2SR3.4.15.4RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.5.2.3RelocatedtoRelocatedto28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28+ii+)28.ii.d28.ii.m28.ii.e28.ii.i28.ii.i28'i~i28.ii.f28.ii.k28.ii.k28oiiog28.ii.n28.ii.h28~iiog28.ii.i 28.ii.l28.ii.b28.ii.a 28.ii.b28+ii~c28.iii.a 28.iv.a28.iv.b28.iv.c28.i.j28.v.a37+i39.i39.iii41.i32ii57.iv'7.iv37373.7 37373.43.93.7 3.7373.63.53.5 3.53.4 3.83.83.73.733.3.4353.1 3.1 313.13.43.73.33.3 3.43.4 3.43.43.43.4 5.03.434 3.43.4 3.43.45.05'5.0'5.0355.05.0 0 ~ffs~TER035:.-5:..6:..6:.3:-.0:-.0:..9:..3:.3:..3:.3:.3:.3:..3:.3:..3:..3:..3.3:..33:..3

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PAGENO.05/25/9521CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCE':-TABLE1-SORTEDBYGINNASTATIO'.::CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSgATTE:SECTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTable Table Table TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTable Table TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable4.1-24.1-24.1-241-24.1-24.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-2, 4.1-2,4.1-2,4.1-34.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-4,4.1-5'.1-5,F1-5~4.1-5,4.1-5,4.1-5, 4.1-5,4.10-14.12-14.12-24.14-14.5-16.9-16.9-21 10ll111213 14.1414 1516161718 1923456a6b7891234 4a4b3~a3.a3~a3.b3.b3.bTRM TRMTRMTRM5.5.45.5.45.5.4 5.5.45.5.85.5.45.5.4SR3.7.13.2SR3.7.6.1SR37.7'SR3.7.7.2SR3.7.8.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.7.8.2SR3.7.83RelocatedtoSR3.6.6.8SR3.5.1-1SR3.5'~4SR3.5.1.5SR3.4.131SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.3.1SR3.7.12.1SR3.714.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR35.4'RelocatedtoSR3.1.44SR3.1.4SR3.1.7.1SR3.4.10'SR3.7.1~1SR3.324Table3.3.3-1SR3416.1SR3.4.16.2SR34.16.3SR3.4.16,2LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16RelocatedtoSR3.4.15.1SR3.4.15.2SR3.4.15.4SR3.4.15.1SR3.4.15.2SR3.4154RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoSR3.5.2.3RelocatedtoRelocatedto28.28.'82828.28. 28.28.'.28.28.28.28.28.'8.28.28. 28.28. 28.28.28.28.'.28.'.28.28.28.'8.28.28.28.28.-.37~.39.39.41..32.'57.:57.

PAGENO.'5/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,,ITSSECTIONC2NOTESCHAPTER1.01.01.11.101.11 1.131.141.151.161.171.181.191.21.20'.211.3141.51.61.7.1 1.7.21.7.31.7.41.81.91.01.0 1.122.12'6.7.1.aFigure2.1-16.7.1;b67.1.c6.7.1.d3.03.03.03'3.03.0.13.024.0 4.04.04.03.1.33.13.13.1.3.1310.13.10.13.10.1.13.10.1.13.10.1.21.11.41.1NoneNone NoneNoneNone NoneNone1.1NoneTable1.1-1None1.1Table1.1-11.1NoneNone1.11.11.1NoneNone1.11.21.3 1.12.1.12.1.22.2Figure2.1.1-1RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMLCO301LCO3.0.2LCO3.0.4LCO3.0.5LCO3.0.7LCO3.0.3LCO3.0.6SR3.0.1SR3.0.2SR3.0.3SR3.0.4LCO3.1.3LCO3.13LCO3.1.8LCO3.1.5LCO3'.6LCO3.1.1LCO3.1.1LCO3.1.5loxxiiiloxxvil.x1~xil.xiii l.xivl.xv l.xvi l.xvii l.xviiil.xix l.iloxxl.xxi l.iiloxxii loiiil.ivl.vl.vi 1~vii1~viiil.ixl.xxivl.xxv l.xxii2ei3.i55.i55.ii55.iii55.ivS.iSoiiS.iv Sov5.vii 5'iiS.vi27ei 27.II27.iii27+ivS.iv 8.v 8.v"20.i 20.i20.ii 20.iii1.11.11.11.1 1.11.11.11.11.1111.1 1.1 1.11.11.11.11.1 1.11.11.11.1 1.11.11.11.11.2 1.3 1.42.02.02.0 2.12.22.22.23.03.03.03.03.0 3.03.03.0 3.0303.03.1 3.13.13.13.13.1 3.1 3.1

PAGENO.205/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.10.1.2310.1.3-3.10.1.33.10.1.4310.1.43.10.1.5 3.10.2'03.10.2.2 3.10.2.3310.2.83.10.2.93.10.3.1 3.10.3.23.104.13.10.4.13.10.4.23.10.4.33.10.4.3.1 310.4.3.23.10.4.3.2.a3.10.4.3.2.b 3.10.4.3.2.b.i310.4.3.2.b.ii3.10.4.32.b.iii3.10.4.3.2.c3.10.4.43.10.53.10.5.13.10.5.23.10.5.33.2.1 3.2.1.1 3.2.23.2.33.2.33.2.44.9 4.9 4.9Figure3.10-1Figure3.10-2Table3.10>>1Table4.1-1Table4.1-1Table4.1-1Table4.1-1,1Table4.1-1,10Table4.1-1,10Table4.1-1,10Table4.1-1,12Table4.1-1,14Table4.1-1,16Table4.1-1,19Table4.1-1,2LCO3.1.8LCO3.1.6LCO3.1.8LCO3.1.5LCO3.1.6NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneSR3.1.4.4SR3.1.4.4LCO3.1.4'CO3.1.8LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.14LCO3.1.4LCO3.1.4LCO3.14LCO3.1.4NoneLCO3.1'LCO3.1.7LCO3.1.7LCO3.1.7LCO3.1.7RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMLCO3.1.2SR3-1.F1SR312.2RelocatedtoCOLRRelocatedtoCOLRRelocatedtoTRMSR3.1.6.1SR3.1.6.4SR3.1.8'SR3.1.8.1SR3.1.5.1SR3.1.6.2SR3.1.6.3RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMSR3.1F120.iv20.v20.iv20.vi20.ix20.vii20.viii20.ix20.ix20.x20.xi20.xii 20.xii20.xiii20.xiv20.xvi20.xv20.xvi20.xvii20.xviii20.xix12.ii12.ii12.iii2oiii12.iv12.iii36.i20.v20.iii20.xv28.i.b28.i.b 28.i.b28.i.h28.i.m28.i.m28.i.m28.i.m28.i.h3.131313.1 3131313.13.1 313.13.13.13.1 3'3.13.13.13.13.1313.13.1 3.13.13.13.13.13.1 3.13.13.13.13.13.13.13.13.13.1 3.13.1313.13.13.13.13.13.1 3.13.1 3.13.1313.1 PAGENO305/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSPATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTable4.1-1,4Table4.1-1,9Table4.1-1,9Table4.1-1,9Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2,4Table4.1-2,5Table4.1-2,6aTable4.1-2,6b3.1.3.13.10.2.13.10.2.13.10.2.1 3.10.2.13.10.2.10a310.2.10b3.10.2.10c 3.10.2113.10.2.123.10.2.12310.2.23.10.2.23.10.2.23.10.2.2 3.10.2.23.10.2.2 3.10.2.2 3.10.223.10.2.33.10.2.33.10.2.4F10.2.4310.243.10.2.53.10.2.6 3.10.2.6 F10.2.73.10.2.73.10.2.8310.29Figure3.10-3Table3.5-1,16Table3.5-1,16Table3.5-1,16Table3.5-1,16Table3.5-1,16Table4.1-12.32.3.12.3.1.12.3.1.2.aSR3.1.8.2SR31~4~1SR3.1.4.2SR3.81.2SR3.1.1.1SR3.1.3.1SR3.1.32SR3.1.8.3RelocatedtoTRMSRF1.44SR3.1.4.3SR3.1.7.1LCO3.1.8SR3.2.1.1SR3.2.1.2SR3.2.2.1SR32.2.2LCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3NoteSR3.2.3-1SR3.2.3.2LCO321LCO3.2.1LCO32.1LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.2LCO3.2.4LCO3.2.4LCO3-2.4LCO3.2.4LCO3.2.4None SR3.2.1.1SR3.2.2.1SR3.2.3.3SR3.2.3.4LCO323LCO3.2.3RelocatedtoCOLRLCO3.2.4SR3.2.1.2SR3.2.2.2SR3.2.4.1SR3.2.4.2SR3.2'1Chapter3.3LCO3.3.1Table3.3.1-1,2.bTable3.3.1-1,2.a28.i.i28+1+1 28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.l28.ii.b28.ii.a28.ii.b20.xx20.xxi20.xx20.xxi20.xxxv20.xxxvi20.xxii20.xxv20.xxvi20.xxiv20.xxiii20.xxv20.xxvi20.xxiv 20.xxvii20.xxviii20.xxix20.xxvii20.xxx20.xxxi20.xxxii20.xxxiii20.xxxiv20.xxiii15.i.p15.i.p15.i.p 15.i.p15.i.p28-i.b4.i4+ii3.1 3'3.13.13.13'3.13.1 3.13.1313.1 3.2 3.23'3'3-23.23.2 3.23.2323.23.23.2323-2323'3.2323.23.23.23.23.2 323.23.2 3.2 3.2323.23.2 3.23.23.2 3.2 3.23.23.33.3.3.333 PAGENO.405/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER2.3.122.3.1.2.boo .d .e.f~g~'a.b.3-12.3.1.22.3.1.22'.1.22.3.1.22.3.1.32.3.1.323.22.3.2.12.3.2.12.3.2.12.3.2.1 2.3.2.22.3.2.22.3.323.F12.3.323'2.13.12.23.5.13.5.1.1 3.5.1.23.5.2 3.5.2.13.5.2.2 3.5.2.33'.33.5'.'13'.3.235.3.23.5.3.235.3.33.5.3.335.43.5.63.5.6.135.6.235.6.23.6.4.136.4.23.6.4.34.1.14.1.141141.14.1.34.4.6.1447.14.4.7.248.104.8.9Figure2NewTable3.3.1-1,7.bTable3.3.1-1,7.aTable3.3.1-1,5Table3.3.1-1,6Table3.3.1-1,9RelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.1-1,8Table3.3.1-1,12Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1,2.bTable3.3,.1-1,7.aTable3.3.1-1,8Table3.3.1-1,9.bTable3.3.1-1,15.dTable3.3.1-1,9.aLCO3.3.4SR3.3.4.2SR3.3.4.2SR3.3.1.6SR3.3.1.6LCO3.3.1LCO3.F1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2RelocatedtoBasesLCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3,LCO3.33LCO33.3LCO3.3.3Relocatedto5.5.4LCO335Table3.3.5-1LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.5.bTable3.3.3-1,11LCO3.3.3LCO3.3.3LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.5LCO3.3.3Table3.3.2-1,3SR3'3.1SR3.3'2NoneTable3.3.2-1,6RelocatedtoProcedsTable3.3.1-1,104.iii 4.iii4~v4~iv4.iv22~i15.i.a15.ii.a15.ii.a15.iii.a15.iii.b15.iii.c15.iii.d15.iii.a15.iv15.v15.vii15.vi16.viii 16.ix16.viii31~x31.x35.vii4.iv15.i.w'333.33.33.33.3333.33.33.3 3.3333.3 333.3 3.3 3.3 3'3.3 333.3 3'3.33.33.3 3'3.3 3.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.33.33.33.3 3.33.3 3.3 3.3 3.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.33.33.3 0 PAGENO05/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERNewNew NewNewNewNewNewNewNewNewNew,New TableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTable3-5-135-13.5-1 3'-1,35-1,3.5-1,3'-li3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,35-1,35-1,3.5-1, 3'-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3'-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,35-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1i3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1i3'-1,4 5 67 8 9ASASAS ASASASASAS1 114141414 1414111010ll1213141517.a 17.b181819192.a2.a2.b202020 334Table3.3.1-1,10Table3.3.1-1,14Table3.3.1-1,14Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,"15Table3.3.2-1,l.bTable3.3.2-1,2.bTable3.3.2-1,3.bTable3.3.2-1,6.aTable3.3.2.1,4.bTable3.3.2.1,S.aTable3.3.2.1,7Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,9.aTable3.3.1-1,9.bTable3.3.1-1,13None Table3.3.1-1,12Table3.3.1-1,11RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMLCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4*LCO3.3.4RelocatedtoProcedsTable3.3.1-1,2.bTable3.3.1-1,2.aTable3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,16Table3.3.1-1,17RelocatedtoProcedsTable3.3.1-1,3RelocatedtoProceduresTable3.3.1-1,4Table3.3.1-1,5Table3.3.1-1,6Table3.3.1-1,7.aTable3.3.1-1,7.bTable3.3.1-1,8LCO33.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.128.i.d15.i.x28.i.e15.i.ff28.i.f15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.g15.ii.g15oiiog15.ii.d15.i.h15.i.a15.i.b15.i.d15.i.c15.i.h15.i.h15.i.c15.i.q 15.i.q 15.i.v15.i.r15.i.r15.i.v15.i.e15.i.i15.i.y15oioy15.i.y 15.i.e 15i.315.i.e15.i.k15.i.d 15.i.d 15.i.dd15.i.bb15.i.ee 15.i.z15.i.cc15.i.aa333.33.3 3'3.3333.33.33.33.3 3.3 3.33.33.33-33'3.33'3.3333.3333.33.3333.3333.3333.33.33.33.33.33.33-33.33.33.33.3333.33.33.33.3 3.3333.3 3.3333.33.33.3 PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTable3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1, 3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3'-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1~3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1~3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3.5-1,3'-1,Table TableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTable3-5-2 3.5-2 3.5-2, 3.5-2~3.5-2, 3.5-2,3.5-2, 3'-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,35-2,3.5-2,35-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,Table3.5-1,Table3.5-1,Table3.5-1,AS14AS14AS2AS2AS2AS2AS2AS2AS2AS3AS3AS3AS4AS4AS4AS4AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS5AS6AS6AS7AS7AS7AS7Note1Note2NoteNoteNotel.a1~a1.bl.c1.d2.a2.b 3a3b30c 3d3~e3.fLCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1.vLCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.iLCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3F1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4LCO3.3.4RelocatedtoBTable3.3.1-1,A,ETable3.3.1-1,ETable3.3.1-1,RTable3.3.1-1,J Table-3.3.2-1Table3.3.2-1Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,NTable3.3'.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,RelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,Table3.3.2-1,'elocatedtoTRMasesNoteNote'ondNotel.aoteAl.cl.el.d2.a2'6.b6.d6.c6.e15.i.dd15.i.f 15.i.i15.i.g15.i.g 15~iog15.i.f15.i.f15.i.j 15.i.j15.i.j15.i.k15.i.k.15.i.k15.i.k 15.i.m15.i.m15.i.l15.i.l15.i.m15.i.l15.i.m 15.i.l15.i.o 15.i.n15.i.u 15.i.t,15.i.u15.i.s15.i.e15.ii.a15.ii.b15ii.k15.ii.h15.ii.n15.ii.o3.33'3.3333.33'3.33'3.33.33.3 3.33.33'3'3.33.3333.33.3333.3 3.33.3 3.33.3 3.33.3 333.3 333.3333.333333'333333333'3.333333.3 333'333.3 PAGENO05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTERTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTable Table TableTableTable TableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTable TableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable4.1.a 4.l.b4.2.a4.2.b4.2.c 4.2.dS.aS.bS.c5.d6.a6.bAS10AS11AS11AS11AS12AS12AS13AS6AS6AS8AS8AS9AS9l.al.bl.cl.d2.a 2.b3~a%13.a.23.b.l3.b.23.b.33.b.44.a4.b4.c4.dS.a6.a6.b6.c6.d7~a7.b8.aNote1Note2Note335-2,3.5-2, 3.5-2,35-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~3.5-2,35-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2, 3.5-2, 3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2, 3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-2~3.5-2,35-2,3.5-2,3.5-2,35-2~3.5-2,3.5-2,3.5-33.5-33.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4, 3.5-4~3.5-4, 3.5-4, 3,5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4,'.5-4,3.5-4,3.5-4, 3.5-4,3.5-4, 3.5-4,Table3.3.2-1,3.aTable3.3.2-1,3.cRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,4.eTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2.1,4.cTable3.3.2.1,4.aTable.3.3.2.1,S.cTable3.3.2.1,5.bLCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2LCO3.3.2Table3.3.3-1'Table3.3.3-1Table3.3.2-1,l.aTable3.3.2-1,l.cTable3.3.2-1,l.dTable3.3.2-1,l.eTable3.3.2-1,2.aTable3.3.2-1,2.cTable3.3.2-1,3.aTable3.3.2-1,3.cRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.2-1,4.aTable3.3.2-1,4.cTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2-1,4.eTable3.3.2-1,S.bTable3.3.2-1,6.bTable3.3.2-1,6.cTable3.3.2-1,6.dTable3.3.2-1,6.eSR3.3.4.2SR3.3.4.2Table3.3.2-1,7None NoneRelocatedtoTEQf15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.p15oiiop15.ii.a15.ii.a15.ii.h15.ii.j15.ii.i 15.ii.l15.ii.m15.ii.p15.ii.n15.ii.o15.ii.c15.ii.e15.ii.f15.iii.e15.iii.a.15.ii.q15.ii.q15.ii.q15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.p15.ii.r 15.ii.r15.ii.s15.ii.s 15.ii.p3.3 3.33.33.3 3.33.33.33.33.33.33.33.3 3.33.3 3'3~33.33.3 3.33~33'3'.3'33 3.33~,33~'3.3.3'.33.33333333'3.3333.333333.33.33.33.33.3 3.33.33.3333.33.33.33.33.33' PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTAjSECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTERTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTable Table TableTable TableTable TableTable TableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable TableTableTableTableTableTable Table TableTable TableTable TableTableTableTableTableTableTableTable Table11ll11ll13 171722122 2222 22 22222326 3303D 31 32 3233 343536363637 38.a 38.b39394 4 4041.a 4l.b5677888Note1Note2Note31993.5-64.1-14.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4l-l,4'-l,4'-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4'-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4-1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4'-l,4.1-1,4.1-1,4-1-1>4.1-1~4l-l,4l-l,4.1-1,4.1-1,41-1,41-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,41-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1~ 4.1-1~ 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1,4.1-1, 4.1-1,4.1-1g4.1-2,4.1-2gRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.3-1Table3.3.1-1,2Table3.3.1-1,5Table3.3.2-1,5.bTable3.3.2-1,6.cTable3.3.3-1,13Table3.3.3-1,14Table3.3.2-1,1.cTable3.3.2-1,2.cTable3.3.1-1,3Table3.3.1-1,4Table3.3.2-1,1Table3.3.2-1,2"Table3.3.2-1,3Table3.3.2-1,4Table3.3.2-1,5Table3.3.2-1,6,Table3.3.1-1,14Table3.3.2-1,l.eTable3.3.1-1,4SR3.34.1SR3.3.4.2Table3.3.2-1,6.fTable3.3.2-1,4.dTable3.3.2-1,4.eTable3.3.2-1,4.dRelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMTable3.3.5-1,1Table3.3.5-1,1Table3.3.5-1,3Table3.3.3-1,7Table3.3.1-1,17Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1>>1,15Table3.3.1-1,16Table'.3.1-1,5Table3.3.1-1,6Table,3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,15Table3.3.1-1,1Table3.3.1-1,9Table3.3.1-1,8Table3.3.1-1,7Table3.3.2-1,l.dTable3.3.1-1,11Table3.3.1-1,12Table3.3.2-1,6.eSR3.3.1.5NoneNone RelocatedtoTRMSR3.3-2'15.iv28.i.a28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28miog28oisg28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28~i~c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.i.c28.ii.h333333333.33'3.3 3.33'3333.33.33.33.33.3,3.33.33.33.3333.33333333.33.33.33.3333.33.33.3 3.3 3.3333.3333.33.33.3333.33.3 333.333333333333.33.333 PAGENO05/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATZONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTERTable4.1-33.1.1.1.a3l.l.l.b3.1.1.1.b3.l.l.l.c3.1.1.1.d.i 3.1.1.1.d.ii3.1.1.l.e3.1.1.1.e3.1.1.1.e3.1.1.l.f3.1.1.1.f3.1.1.1.f3.1.l.l.g3.l.l.l.g 3.1.1.l.g3.1.1.1.g3.1.11.h3.1.1.1.h3.1.1.l.h3.1.1.l.i3.1.1.1.j3l.l.l.k3.1.1l.k3.1.1.33.1.1.3.a3.1.1.3.b 3.1.1.3.c 3.1.1.3.d3.1.1.3.d3.1.1.4.a.i 3.1.1.4.a.i3.1.1.4.a.ii3.1.1.4.a.ii3.1.1.5.a3.1.1.5.b 3.1.1.6.a3.1.1.6.a3.1.1.6.a3.1.1.6.b 3.1.1.6.b3.1.1.6.b 3.1.1.6c3.1.1.6.c3.1.1.6.c3.1.2.13.1.2.l.a312.1.b3.1.2.1.c.l3.1.2.l.c.23.1.3.13.1.3.2F1.3.33.1.4.1aTable3.3.3-1LCO3.44LCO3.44LCO3.4.5LCO'3.4.5LCO3-4~5LCO3.4.5LCO3.4.6LCO3.47LCO3.48LCO3.4.6LCO34.7LCO3.4.8LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8LCO346LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.8None'NoneLCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO34.10None None,LCO3.4.10LCO3.4-10LCO34.10LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11LCO3.49NoneLCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.4.11LCO3.4.11RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.4.11LCO3.41'1RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.4.3RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMLCO3.4.3LCO3.4.3LCO3.4.2NoneLCO3.4.2'CO3-41628.iii.a6.i 6.ii6.ii6+ii6.ii6.vii6~vii6.vii6.iii 6.vi 6.vi6.iv6.viii 6.viii6'6'6~xvii6.xii6.xii 6+xvii6.xvi6.xiii6.xiv6~ix6.x6.xiii6oxiv 6.xi6.xiv6.xiii6.xi6.xiii6oxiv 6+xi7.i7~i7~ii7~iii8.i8.ii8oiii3.33.43.4 3.43'3'3.43.4 3.43.43.43.4 3.43.43'3.43.43.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.43.43.43'3.4343.43.4 3.4 3.43.43.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.43'4343.43.4343.43.43.4343.43.43.43.4 PAGENO1005/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATZONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBZTSCURRENTGZNNASTATZONTSPROPOSEDZTSATTACHMENTAgSECTZONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTER3.1.4.1.b3.1.4.23.1.4.3a3.1.4.3.b 3.1.4.3.c3.1.4.43.1.5.1~13.1.5.1.13.1.5.1.13.1.5.1.23'.5.2.13.1.5.2.2.a 3.1.5.2.2.b3.15.2.2.b3.1.5.2.2.c3.1.5.2.2.c3.153.15.13.lsd'3.15.1 3.15.1.13.151-13.15.1.23.15.1.33,2'3.3.1.1h3.3l.l.h3'.3.1.53.3.1.5.e3.3.1.73.3.1.7.13.3.1.83.3.1.8.13.3.1.8.24.164.16 4.16.1.a4.16.1.b416.1.c4.1624.21.44.2.1.4 4.3 4.3 4.34.3.1.1 4.3.24.3.2.14.3.3.14.33.24.3.3.34.3.3.44.3.44.3.4.1LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.15LCO3.4.15LCO3.4.15LCO3.4.15LCO34.13LCO3-4.13LCO3.4.13LCO3.4.13iLCO3.4.13LCO3.4.13LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12.LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12NoneLCO34.12LCO3414LCO3.4.14LCO3.4.14LCO3.4.14LCO34.12SR3.4.12.1LCO3.4.12SR34'2-2SR3.4.12.2SR3.4.12.3SR3.4.12.7SR3.4.12.5SR3.4.12.8SR3.4.12.4SR3.4.12.3S.S.9.aSR33.2SR3.4.6.3SR3SR3.4.8.2None SR3.492SR3.4.9.1SR3.4.14.1SR3.4.14.1SR3.4.14.2SR'3.4.14.1SR3.4.11.2SR3.4.12.69.i10.i10.ii10.iii10.ii10.iv25.vi25.iii 25.ii25.i25.iv25.v12.i13eix13'13ax13.xi13.xii13~xiii13.xii13~xiii13xiv43.i43.i43.ii29.i30.iii30.iii30.iii30.vii30.iii30.iv30.iv30.iv30.v30.iii3.43.434343.43.4 3.4 3.4 3.43.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.43.43.43.4'.43.43.4 3.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.43.4 3.4 3-4343.43.4 3.43.43.4343.434'4343.43.43.43.43.43.4

PAGENO+1105/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.3.4.24.3.5.14.3.5.2.a4.3.52.b4.3.5.3.a4.3.5.3.b4.3.5.44.3.5.44.3.5.44.3.5.54.3.5.54.3.5.543.5.6Figure3.1-1Figure3.1-2Figure3.1.4New,NewTable4.1-1Table4.1-1Table4.1-1Table4.1-1.Table4.1-1Table4.1-1,Table4.1-2,Table4.1-2,Table4.1-2,Table4.1-2,Table4.1-4,Table4.1-4,Table.4.1-4,Table4.1-4,Table4.1-4,Table4.1-4,Table4.1-5,Table4.1-5,Table4.1-5,Table4.1-5,Table4.1-5,Table4.1-5,3.3.133.1.1.a3.3.1.l.a3F1.1.a3.3.1.1.b3.3.1l.b3.3.l.l.b3.3.1.l.c3.3.1.1d3.3.1.l.e3.3.1.1f3.3.1.l.f 3.3.1.1.f 3.3.1.1.g201152712344a4b3.a3aa3~a3.b 3.b 3.bTRMPTLR PTLR6-1TRM1SR3.4.11-1SR3'.41SR3'5'SR3.4.5-3SR3.4.6.3NoneSR3.4.61SR3-4'1SR3.481SR3.452SR32SR3.4.7.2RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoFigure3.4.1LCO3.4.1SR3.4.15.5SR3.4.1.1SR3.4.1.2SR3.4.1.3SR3.4.2.1SR3.4.3.1SR3.4.15.3RelocatedtoSR3.4.13.1RelocatedtoSR3.4.10.1SR3.4.16.1SR3.4.16.2SR3.4.16.3SR3.4.16.2LCO3.4.16LCO3.4.16SR3.4.15.1SR3.4.15.2'SR3415.4SR3415-1SR3.4.152SR3.4.15'LCO3.5.3LCO354SR3.5.4.1SR3.5.42LCO35.1LCO3.5.1NoneLCO3.5.2LCO3.52LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.4LCO3.5.230.ii30.vi30.i7'7'66.i28.ii.i28.i.b28.i.b28.i.b28.i.b28.i.b28~iio528.ii.f28.ii.j28.ii.c28.iv.a28.iv.b 28.iv.c28.v.a13.v13.ii13vii13'13ovi13iii13~viii3434343.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.43.43.43.43.43.43.4 3.43.4 3.4 3'3.43.4 3.43.4,3.43.4 3'3.43.4 3.43.4 3.4 3'3.43.43.43.43.43.43.43.43.53.53.5 3.53'3.53.53'3.53'3.53.53.5 3.5 PAGENO.05/25/9512CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.3.1.1.i3.3.1.1.i3.3.1.1.$3.3.123.3.1.33.3.1.43.3.1.53.3.1.5.a3.3.1.5.b3.3.1.5.c3.3.1.5.d4.3.5.3.b 4.54.54.S'il.l.a4.5.1.1.b.45.2.l.a4.5.2.1.a4.5.2.1.b4.5.2.1.b4.5.2.2.c 4.6.1.e.3.bTable4.1-1,15Table4.1<<1,22Table.4.1-1,22Table4.1-1,24Table4.1-1,24Table4.1-2,14Table4.1-2,14Table4.1-2,14Table4.1-2,3Table4.5-13.3.2.l.a 3.3.2.1.b33.2.1.c3.3.2.1.d 3.3.2.2.a3.3.2.2.b3~3~2~2~c33.22d3+3~2'~e3.63.63.6.1.a 3.6.23.6.3.13.6.3.13.654.44.44.4.14.4.1.14.4.1.d.a4.4.1.2.bLCO35.1SR3.5.1.5LCO3.5.2LCO354LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2LCO3.5.2SN3.5.3.1SR3.5.2.1SR3.5.2.2SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.3.1SR3.5.2.4SR3.5.3.1Relocatedto5.5.8SR3.5.2.6SR3.5.4.1SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.6SR3.5.1.2ISR3.5.1.3SR3.5.1.1SR3.5.1.4SR3.5.1.5SR3.5.4.2SR3.5.2.3LCO3.6.6LCO36.6LCO36.6LCO36.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.6LCO3.6.5LCO3.6.7LCO3.6.1LCO3.6.4LCO3.6.2LCO3.6.3LCO3.63SR3.6.7.1SR3.6.7.2SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.113ii13.i13.iv32iv32+iv32~i32mii32oii32ii32+ii32~iii33+vi28.i.b28.ii.i 28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i32+ii13.xv13.xv16.vi16.vii16.i 16.ii16.iii16.iv 16.v31'x31.ix31.iii31.iii31.iii35353.5 353.53.53.53.5 3.53.5 3.53.53.5 3.53.5 3.53.5 353.53.53.53.53.53.53.53.53.5353.53.53.5 3'3.63.6 3.6 3.63.63.63.63.6 3.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63'3.6 3.63.6 3.6 0 PAGENO.05/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.4.1.3.a4.4.1.3.b4.4.1.3.c 4.4.1.3.d44.1.4.a4.41.4.b4.4.1.4.c44.1.5.a4.4.1.5.b4.4.1.5.c4-4-1.6.a 44.2.1.a4.4.2.1.b 4.4.2.24.4.2.3.a4.4.2.3.b4.4.2.3.c4.4.2.3.c4.4.2.4.a4.4.2.4.b4.4.24.c4.4.2.4.c4.4.2.4.c4.4.44.4.5144.6.144.6.14'4.6'4.5.124.5.1.2.a4.5.1.2.b 4.5.1.2.c4.5.2.l.a 4.5.2.1.b4.5.2.2.a4.5.2.2a4.5.2.2.a45.22b4.5.2.F14.5.2.314.5.2.3'4.5.2.3.24.5.23.345.2.3.44.5.2.3.54.5.2.3.5Table4.1-1Table4.1-1Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-23.1.4.1.c3.1.4.4g25 2513SR3'.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3'.1.1SR3.6.1.1SRF61.1SR3.61.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3'.1.1SR3.6.1.1SR3.6.1.1LCO3.6.1LCO3.6.1LCO3.6.3SR3.6.3.4SR3.6.1.1SR3.61.1LCO3.6.2SR362.1SR3.62.2SR3.6.1'SR3.6.3'SR3.6.3.1SR3.6.32SR3.6.3.5SR3'61SR3.6.6.10SR3.6.6.15SR3.6.615SR3.6.6.4SR3.6.6.4SR3.6.6.13SR3~6.614SR3.6.6.9SR3.66'SR3.6.6.11SR3.6.6.2SR3.6.65SR3665SR3~6~66SR3.6.6.6SR3'612SR3.66'Relocatedto'RMSR3.641SR3.64.1SR3.6~5~1SR3-F6-7SR3.6'.8LCO3.7.14LCO3.7.1431.iii 31.iii31iii31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iii 31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iii31.iv31.iv31.vi31.vi31.iii 31.iii31.iii31.v31~v31+i31.vii31.vii31.vii31+viii 32.vii32.viii32mii32~ii32'32+x32'32+x32.xii32.xii32~xi32+xi32.ix28.i.k28.ii.i28+ii+i28.ii.i28.ii.e9.ii3.63.63.6 3.63.63.63.6 3.63.63.63.63.6.3.63.63.6 3.63.63.63.63.63.63.6 3.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.63.636 3.6 3.63.63.63.63.63.63.73.7 PAGENO1405/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.11.1.a3.11.1.b-3.11.1.c3.ll.l.d3.11.1.e3.11.23.11.33.11.43.11.53.3.2.1.e3.3.3.1.a3.3.3.1.b 3.3.3.1.c3.3.3.2.a 3.3.3.2.b3.3.4.1.a3.3.4.1.b33.4.23.3.5.13.3.5'3.4.1 3.4.2.1.a3.4.2.1.b3.4.2.l.c34.2.23.4.2.23.4.2.3 3.4.33.4.34.11.1.14.11.1.14.11'.d4.4.2.1.c 4.5.2.3.6 4.5.2.3.74.5.2.3.7 4.5.2.3.8 4.5.2.3.84.5.2.3.94.5.2.3.9 4.5.2.3.94.74.7 4.74.74.848.14.8.24.8.34.8.4 4.8.54.8.64.8.64.8.7LCO3.7.10LCO3.7.10'LCO3.7.10LCO3.F10LCO3F10RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3.6.6LCO37.7LCO3.7.7LCO3.7.7LCO3.7.7LCO3.77LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.8LCO3.7.9LCO3.7.9LCO3.7.1LCO37.5LCO3.7.5LCO3.7.5LCO3.75SR3.7.5.2LCO3.7.5LCO3.7.5LCO3.7.6SR3.7.10.1SR3.7.10.2NoneLCO3.7.5SR3.7.9.1SR3.7.9.1SR37.92SR3.7.9.1SR3.7.9.2SR3.7.9.1SR3.7.9.2SR3.7.9.3LCO3.7.4SR3.7.2.1SR3.72.2SR3.7.2.3SR3.7.5.1SR3.7.5.2SR3.7.5.2SR37.5.4SR3.7.5.3SR3.7.5.4SR3.7.5.2SR3.7.5.6SR3.7.5.7TRMTRMTRMTRM21.i21.i21.i21i21i21.ii21".iii21.iv21.iii13.xvi13.xvii 13+xviii13.xix13.xx 13~XX14.i14.ii14.iii14.iv14.v38.iii38.iii32.xii34.i 34.i34.i34.i35.vi35.i35.i35.ii 35.iii 35.iv35.v 35.v3737F737373.7.3~73..73~73.7373.73'3.7373.7 3'37373.7 3737373'3.73.73.73.73.7 3.73.73.73.73.73.73.7 3.737373.7 3'373.73.7373.7 3.7373.73.7373.7 3'3.7 PAGENO05/25/9515CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.8.8.a4.8.8.bNew NewNewNewTable4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1<<2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2Table4.1-2,11Table4.1-2,11Table4.1-2,12Table4.1-2,17Table4.1-2,18Table4.1-2,83.0.23.7.l.l.a 3.7.1.1.b 3.7.1.1.c3.7.1.l.c 37l.l.d37.1.1d37.1.1.d3.7.1.l.e 3.7.1.1.e3.7.1.23.7.1.23.7.1.2 3.7.1.2371.23.7.1.23.7.2.1.a.l3.7.2.1.a.237.2.1.a.33.7.2.l.a.3 37.2.l.a.43'.2.1.a.43'.2'a.43.7.2.1.a.6 3'.2.1.a.63.7.2'a.73.7.2.l.a.7372.1b13.72l.b23.72.2.a3.7.2.2.b.l3.7.2.2.b23~7~2~2~c3.7.2.2.d3'a2~2~eSR3.755SR3.7.5'LCO3.7.2LCO3.7.3SR3.7.3.1SR3.7.4.1SR3.7.11.1SR3.7.13.1SR3.7.132SR3.7.6.1SR3.7.7'SR3.7SR3.7.81SR3.7.8.2SR3.7.8.3RelocatedtoTRMSR3.7.12.1SR3.7.14.1SR3.71.1LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.2LCO3.8.10LCO38.2LCO38.3LCO3.8.10LCO3.85LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.8LCO3.8.10LCO3.8.2LCO38.3LCO38.5LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.8LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.9LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.3LCO38.4LCO3.8.6LCO3.8.9LCO3.8.7LCO3.8.9LCO3.8.7LCO3.8.9NoneLCO3.8.1LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.9LCO3.8.1LCO3.8.466.1166.11166.ii66.iii28.ii.i28.ii.i 28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.i28.ii.m28.ii.g28.ii.n5+vi17.i17.i17.i17+i17.i17.i17.ii17.ii17.iii17.iii17.iv17'i37373~73+73'3'3'3~73'373.73'3.7F7F73'3'3'373.83.83.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.8383.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.83.8 3.8 3.83.83.8383.83.83.8383.83.8383.83.83.8 383.8 PAGENO.05/25/9516CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.7.2.2.f3~7~2~2~Cf4.6.1.a4.6.1.b.l4.6.1.b.24.6.1.b.34.6.1.b.44'.1.b.546.1.b.64.6.l.c 4.6.1.d 4.6.1.e.l4.6.1.e.24.6.l.e.3.a4.6.1.e.3.b4.6.1.e.3.b4.6.1.e.3.c4.6.1.e.44.6.24.624.6.2.a4.6.2.a4.6.2.b4.6.2.c 4.6.2.d4.6.2.e4.6.2.e 4.6.2.f 4.6.3a.l4.6.3.a.l 4.6.3.a.24.6.3.a.24.6.3.a.34.6.3.b4.64.14.6.4.14.64.24.6.4.2 46.4.24.6.4.2 4.6.4.24.6.4.24.6.4.3 4.6.4.3Table4.1-2,16Table4.1-2,163.5.5.13.5.5.23.55'3.6.1.b3.6.1.c3.813.8.1.a 3.8.1.bLCO3.8.7LCO3.8.7SR3.8.2.1SR3.8.1.4SR3.8.3.1SR3.8.1.5SR3.8.12SR3.8.1.3LCO3.8.1SR30.4SR3.8.3.2RelocatedtoSR3.81.7SR3.8.1.9RelocatedtoSR3.8.1.9SR3.8.1.8SR3.8.1.2SR3.8.4.1SR3.8.5.1SR3.8.6.1SR3'.6.3SR3.8.6.2NoneSR38.42SR3.8.4.2SR3.8.4.3SR3.8.4.3SR3.8.11SR3.8.2.1SR3.8.1.1SR3.8'.1SR3.8.9.1SR3.8.1.6SR3.8.10.1SR3.8.9.1SR3.8.10-1SR3.8.7.1SR3.8.7.2SR3.8.8.1SR3.8.8.2SR3.8.9.1SR3.8.7.1SR3.8.8.1SR3.8.1-4SR3.8.3.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoLCO3'.2RelocatedtoRelocatedto5.5.4 5.5.4 5.5.4TRMTRMTRMTRM33~i33+ii33iil,33'33'i33'i33~ix33eix33~vii33'ii33~vii33+x33.viii28.ii.k28.ii.k15.viii15.viii15.viii 16.x 16.x18.iii 18.i18.ii383.83.83.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.8 3.8 3.83.83.8 3.83.83.8 3.83.83.83.8 3.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.83.8 3.83.83.8 3.83.83.83.83'3.8383.93.9 3.93.9 3.93.93.93.9 PAGENO.1705/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.8.l.c3.8.l.c3.8.1.d38.l.d3.8.1.e3.8.1.e 3.8.1.f3.8.1.g 3.8.1.g3.8.1.?I3.8.23.8.23.8.23.8.23.8.23.823.834.11.2.1 4.11.2.14.11.2.2 4.11.2.2 4.11.3.1Table3.5-5,2bTable3.5-5,3Table4.1-1,3Table4.1-2,105.15.1.1 51.25.2.1a5.2.1.b5.2.2.a5.2.2.b5.2.3.a5.2.3.b5.3.1.a5.3.1.b5.3.1.b5.3.1.c5.3.2.a 5.3.2.a53.2.b5.3.2.b5.3.2.c5.3.2.c 5.45.45.45.4 5.4.1 5.4.25.4.25.4.35.4.4.aLCO3.9.2LCO3.9.2LCO3.8.10LCO3.9.3LCO3.9.1SR3.9.1.1RelocatedtoTRMLCO3.8.10LCO3.9.4LCO3.9.5LCO3.9.1LCO3.9.2LCO3.9.3LCO3.9.4LCO3.9.5LCO3.9.5RelocatedtoTRMSR3.9.3.1SR3.9.41SR3.9.4.1SR3.9SR3.9.5.1RelocatedtoTRMRelocatedtoTRMSR3.9.2.1RelocatedtoTRM4.1UFSAR2.1.2UFSAR2.1.2UFSAR3.8.1/6.2UFSAR3.8.1/6.2UFSAR3.8.1/6-2UFSAR3.8.1/6.2UFSAR38.1/62UFSAR3.81/6242.14.3.1.2.a4.3.1.2.a4.2.2UFSAR3.7.1/5.0UFSAR3.7.1/5.0UFSAR3.7'/5.0UFSAR3.7~1/5.0UFSAR3.7~1/5.0UFSAR371/504.3.24.3.3LCO3.7.11LCO3.7.12RelocatedtoBases4'.1.1RelocatedtoBasesLCO3.7.134'.1.118.vii 18.iii18.vi18.iv18.iv18.v 18.vi18.i38.iv 38.iv38.v38..v38.vi15.viii15.viii28.i.i28.ii.d44.i44.i44.i45.i45.i 45.i 45.i45.i 45.i 46.i46.ii46.iv 46.i46.iii 46.iii46.iii 46.iii46.iii46.iii47.v47.v 47.i 47.i47.i 47.ii 47.i47.iii3.93.93.93.93.93.93.9 3.9393.93.93.9 3.9 3.93.93.93.93.93.93.9 3.93.9393.93.9 3.9 4.04.0 4.04.04.04.0 4.04.0 4.0 4.04.0 4.04.04.0 4.04.0404.04.04.04.0 4.0404.04.04.0404.0 PAGENO.1805/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBZTSCURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSfATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER5.4.4.b5.4.55.4.65.5.15.5.25.535.5.4Figure5.1-1Figure5.4-1Figure5.4-21.133.1.1.2.a3.1.2'3.1.2.33.1.6.13.1.6.23.1.6.3 3.1.6.43.1.6.5 3.13.13.13.2315.1.33.16.1.1 3.16.1.23.16.1.3 3.16.1.4 3.16.2.13.16.2.23.16.2.33.16.243.16.3'3.16.3.23.5-513.5.5.2 3.5.5.33.9.l.l.a3.9.1.1.b3.9.1.2.a 3.9.1.2.b,3.9.1.3.a3.9.1.3.b3.9.2.1.a3.9.2.1.b 3.9.2.1.c39.2l.d,3.9.2.2.a39.2.2.b3.9.2.2c3.9.2.2.c3.9.2.3.a3.9.2.3.b3.9.2'.c3.9.2.4.a3.9.2.4.aNoneNone LCO3.9.1UFSAR11UFSAR11UFSAR11UFSAR11UFSAR2.1.2RelocatedtoFigure3.7.15.5.1RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedto5.6.4RelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoRelocatedtoBases7-1PTLR PTLRPTLR'RMTRMTRM TRM TRM5.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.8 5.5.8 5.5.85.5.85.5.85.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.4 5.5.455.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.45.5.4 5.5.45.5.45.5.4 5.5.45.5.447.iv47.iv47.i 48.i48.i 48.i 48.i44.i47.i47.il.xiii6.xv7~iv7~vll.i 11.ill.ill.i11.i23+i23+i25.v 26.i26.i 26.i 26.i26.ii26.ii~26.ii26.ii26.iii26.iii15.viii15.viii15.viii19.i19.i19.ii19.ii 19iii19.iii19.iv19.iv19.iv19.iv19.v19.vi19.vi 19.v 19.vii 19.vii19.vii 19.ii 19.v4.04.04.04.04.04.04.0 4.04.04.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.0505.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0

PAGENO.1905/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDZTSgATTACHMENTAgSECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER3.9.2.4.a3.9.2.5.a3'.2.5.b3.9.2.5.c 3.9.2.6.a3.9.2.6.b 3;92.7.a3.9.2.7.b 4.1.44.10.14.10.2 4.10.3F11.1.14.11.1.1.a 4.11.1.1.b4.11.1.1.c4.11.1~1.c4.11.1.2 4.12.1.1.a4'2.1.1.b4.12.1.2.a4.12.2.1.a4.12.2.1.b4.12.2.2.a4.12.34.13.1.a4.13.l.b4.13.1.c 4.13.24.14.1.a4.14.1.b4.14.1.c4.14.1.d4.14.1.e4.14.1.f 4.14.1.g'.24.2.1 4.2.1.14.2.1.2 42.1.34.2.1.4.a4.2.1.4.b4.2.154.2.1.64.2.1.74.4.3.1.a44.3.1.b4.4.3.1.c4.4.3.24.4.3.3.a4.4.3.3b4.4.3.44.4.4Relocated5.5.11RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.5.10.d5.5.10.dRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated Relocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.5.9RelocatedRelocatedRelocated Relocated5.5.9.b 5.5.9.cRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.5.6to5.5.4to5.5.11to5.5.11to5'.11to5.5.11to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4toTRMtoTRMtoTRMtoTRMto5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to55.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.8to5.5.2to5.5.2to5.5.2to5.5.2to5.5.2to5.5.2to55219.vi19.viii 19.viii19.viii19.viii 19.ix19.ix28.v.b 37+i37'i37iii38.i38.i 38.ii 38.ii 38.i38.i39.i 39.i39.ii39.iii39.iii39.iv39.v40.i40.i40.i40.i 41.i41.i41.i41.i41.i41.i41.i 29.i29.i29.i 29'29.i29.i29.i29.i 31.ii 31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii31.ii5.05.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.0 5.0 5.05.05.0 5.05.0 5.0 5.0 5.05.0505.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.0505.05.05.0505.05.05.0 5.05.05.0505.05.05.050

PAGENO2005/25/95CURRENTGINNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPERATTACHMENTBITSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITS8ATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESITSCHAPTER4.4.4.1.a4.4.4.1.b4.4.4l.c4.4.4.1.d 4.4.4.1.e4.4.4.2.a 4.4.4.2.b45.2314.5.2.3.1.a4.5.2.3.1.b4.5.2.3.1.c4.5.2.3.1.c 4.5.2.3.2 4.5.2.3.34.5.2.3.3.a4.5.2.3.3.b 4.5.2.3.3.b4.52.3.44.5.2.3.64.5.2.3.6a4.5.2.3.6.a4.5.2.3.6.b 4.5.2.3.6.c4.5.2.3.6.d4.52.3745.23.846.1.d6.16.1.16.13.1.a6.13.1.b6.13.l.b 6.15.1.a6.15.1.a6.15.1.a 6.15.1.b6.16.l.a616.l.b6.17.16.17.26.17.2.16.17.36.2.1 6.2.1.a62.1.b6.2.l.c6.2.1.d6.2.2.a62.2.b6.2.2.c.6-22.d6.2.2.e 6.2.2.f6.3.1RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocated Relocated5.5.10.a5.5.10.a5.5.10.aRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.5.10.b5~5~10.bRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.5.10.c5.5.10.c5.5.10.cRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated5'.1251.25.1.15.7.157.25.7.35.5.15.5.1.a5.5.1.c5'.1.bRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocated5.2.15.2.1.a.5'.1.c5.2.1.bRelocated5.2.2aNone5.2.2.b52.2.c.5.2.2.d.5.2.2.e5.2.2.eto5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.6to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10to5.5.10toTRMtoTRMtoTRMtoTRMtoTRMtoTRMtoQAP31.i31+i31.i31.i31.i31.i31.i32+v32'32~v32'32~v32~v32'32'32~v 32~v32'32'i32&v32'32~v32'32~v32'33eiv49.ii49.i61.i63.i64.i64.i65.i65.i65.i65.i50.i50.ii50.iii50.iv50.v50.vi51.i5.05.0505.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.05.0 5.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0,5.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.'0505.05.05.05.05.05.0505.05.05.050 PAGENO.2105/25/95CURRENTGZNNASTATIONTSCROSSREFERENCETOPROPOSEDTABLE2-SORTEDPER'ATTACHMENTBZTSCURRENTGINNASTATIONTSPROPOSEDITSATTACHMENTA,SECTIONC2NOTESZTSCHAPTER6.3.16.4.164.26.8.16.8.16.8.1.a 6.8.1.b6.8.1.c 6.8.l.d6.8.1.e 6.9 69.1.16-F1269.1.369.1.46.9.1.469.1.56.9.2 69.269.2.16.9.2.1 6.9.2.269.2.4NewNewNewNewNew Table3.16-1Table3.2>>1Table3.5-5Table4.1-1,18Table4.1-1,28Table4.1-1,29Table4.1-5Table4.10-1Table4.12-1Table4.12-2Table4.14-1Table6.9-1Table6.9-23.144.156'06ll6.12 6.146.56.66.9.2.35.3.1NoneNone5.4.1b5.4.1.e 5.4.1 5.4.15.4.15.F1Relocated5.6None5.6.45.6.25.6.35.6.3 5.6.45.6.55.6.6NoneNone5.6.1 5.6.45'.135.5.145.535.555.5'RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedRelocatedRelocatedRelocated RelocatedNoneNoneNone NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNonetoTRMto5.5.4toTRMto5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.4to5.5.8to5.5.4to5.5.452.i52.i56.iii56.iv56.i56.ii57.i57.ii57.iii57.iv 57.v57.iv57.vi57.ix 57.x57.vii57.vii57.viii56.iv 56.iv56.iv56.iv56.iv26.i12.iv15.viii28.i.j28.i.j 28.i.j28.i.j37+i39.i39.iii 41.i57.iv57.iv24425.05.05.05.0 5.05.0 5.05.0 5.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.0505.05.0 5.0 5.05.05.05.05.0 5.05.0 5.05.0 5.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.05.0N/A N/AN/AN/AN/AN/AN/A N/A N/A ATTACHHENTFR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantCoreOperatingLimitsReport(COLR)May1995 Thereactorphysicsparametersfor-eachreloadcycledifferdependingonsuchvariablesasthepreviouscycleburnup,numberandenrichmentoffuelassemblies,andexpectedcyclelengthorenergy.SeveraloftheTechnicalSpecifications(TS)addresslimitswhichareassociatedwithreactorphysicsparametersthatmaychangewitheachreload,requiringtheprocessingofchangestotheTStoupdatetheselimitseach"fuelcycle.ThepracticeofplacingthesecyclespecificparametersintheTechnicalSpecifications'asresultedincycledesignsthatw'erebasedondesignrestrictionsthatavoidedchangestotheTechnicalSpecifications.InGenericLetter88-16,theNRCprovidedguidanceforremovalofcyclespecificreactorphysicsparametersthatarecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodologyfromtheTechnicalSpecifications.ThegenericletterprovidesforremovaloftheseparametersbyplacingtheminaCoreOperatingLimitsReport(COLR)thatwouldbesubmittedtotheNRCfollowinganychangeinthereactorphysicsparameters.TheCOLRisbeingestablishedatGinnaStationtoavoidtheunnecessaryburdenofchanginglimitswhicharedeveloped'singanNRCapprovedmethodology.ThisproposedrevisiontotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisadministrativeinnaturesinceitdoesnotchangeanyofthelimitsorsurveillancerequirements.TheuseofaCOLRprovidesmoreflexibilityforoperationandcoredesign,inthatitallowschangesoftheparameterstobemadeconsistentwiththeburnupandenergyconstraintsofthecyclewithoutrequiringaLicenseAmendment,yetitassuresthattheNRCisinformedofthereactorphysicsparametersthatarebeingusedforeachcycle.AcrossreferencebetweentheproposedCOLR,thecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications,andtheproposedGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsis'providedonthefollowingpage.AsampleCOLRforGinnaStationfollowsthecrossreferencetable.Revision0oftheCOLRwillbesubmittedtotheNRCinaccordancewithproposednewTS5.6.5uponimplementationofthenewtechnicalspecificationsin1996.Hay1995 COLRCROSSREFERENCETOTHECURRENTGINNASTATIONTSANDTOTHEPROPOSEDGINNASTATIONITSCOLRGINNASTATIONTS¹GINNASTATIONITS¹2.12.22.32.4 2.52.62.72.72.82.8'.92.102.112.122.13FIGURE1FIGURE2FIGURE3FIGURE43.10.1.1,3.1.3.13.10.1.23.10.1.33-10.2.23.10.2.23.10.2.83.10.2.10A2.3.1.2D2.3.1.2ENR'.3.1.1A3.3.1.1BNR'.8.1EFIGURE3.10-2FIGURE3.10-1FIGURE3.10-33.10.2.10ALCO3.1.1LCO3.1.3LCO3.1.5LCO3.1.6LCO3.2.1'CO3.2.2LCO3.2.3LCO3.2.3LCO3.3.1LCO3.3.1LCO3.4.1LCO3.5.1LCO3.5.4LCO3.7.12LCO3.9.1LCO3.1.1LCO3.1.6LCO3.2.1LCO3.2.3'hesearenewrequirementsthatarenotcurrentlyintheR.E.GinnaTechnicalSpecifications.May1995 R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantCoreOperatingLimitsReportCycle25DraftAThisreportisnotpartoftheTechnicalSpecifications.ThisreportisreferencedintheTechnicalSpecifications. TABLEOFCONTENTS,1.0COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORT.............'.......................22.0OPERATINGLIMITS.................................................32.12.22.32.42.52.62.7SHUTDOWNMARGIN...........................................3MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT.........................3ShutdownBankInsertionLimit.........................3ControlBankInsertionLimits.............................4HeatFluxHotChannelFactor................................4NuclearEnthalpyRiseHotChannelFactor..............4AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE..............................42.8ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation.................2.9RCSPressure,TemperatureandFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits.........2.10AccumulatorBoronConcentration........2.11RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)BoronConcentration...2.12SpentFuelPoolBoronConcentration........2.13BoronConcentration.................3.0UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERS........~~~~~~t

6.0REFERENCES

......................................................7TARGETBANDLIMITSASAFUNCTIONOFRATEDTHERMALPOWER...11TABLE1UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERS..12FIGUREI*REQUIREDSHUTDOWNMARGIN.................................8FIGURE2CONTROLBANKINSERTIONLIMITS.............................9FIGURE3K(Z)-NORMALIZEDFo(Z)ASAFUNCTIONOFCOREHEIGHT......10FIGURE4AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEACCEPTABLEOPERATIONLIMITSANDCOLRCycle25,.DraftA R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantCoreOperatingLimitsReportCycle25DraftA1.0COREOPERATINGLIMITSREPORTThisCoreOperatingLimitsReport(COLR)forGinnaStationhasbeenpreparedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification5.6.5.TheTechnicalSpecificationsaffectedbythisreportarelistedbelow:3.1.13.1.33.1.53.1.63.2.13.2.23.2.33.3.13.4.13.5.13.5.43.7.123.9.1"SHUTDOWNMARGIN(SDH)""MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(MTC)""ShutdownBankInsertionLimit""ControlBankInsertionLimits""HeatFluxHotChannelFactor(Fo)""NuclearEnthalpy,RiseHotChannelFactor(F"~)""AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)""ReactorTripSystem(RTS)Instrumentation""RCSPressure,Temperature,andFlowDeparturefromNucleateBoiling(DNB)Limits""Accumulators""RefuelingWaterStorageTank(RWST)"~"SpentFuelPool(SFP)BoronConcentration""BoronConcentration"COLRCycle25,DraftA 2.0OPERATINGLIMITSThecycle-specificparameterlimitsforthespecificationslistedinSection1.0arepresentedinthefollowingsubsections.TheselimitshavebeendevelopedusingtheNRCapprovedmethodologiesspecifiedinTechnicalSpecification5.6.5.AllitemsthatappearincapitalizedtypearedefinedinTechnicalSpecificationl.1,"Definitions."2.1SHUTDOWNMARGIN(LCO3.1.1)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.1.12.1.2TheSHUTDOWNMARGINinMODE2withK,<<<1.0andMODES3and4whenthereactorcoolantpumpsareOPERABLEandinoperationshallbegreaterthanorequaltothelimitsspecifiedinFigurel.TheSHUTDOWNMARGINinMODE4whenthereactorcoolantpumpsarenotOPERABLEandinMODE5shallbegreaterthanorequaltotheoneloopoperationcurveofFigure1.2.2MODERATORTEMPERATURECOEFFICIENT(LCO3.1.3)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.2.1TheModeratorTemperatureCoefficient(MTC)limitsare:TheARO/HZP-MTCshallbelesspositivethan+5.0pcm/'Fforpowerlevelsbelow70%RTPandlessthanorequalto0-.pcm/'Fforpowerlevelsatorabove70%RTP.TheARO/RTP-MTCshallbelessnegativethan-42.9pcm/'F.where:AROstandsforAllRodsOutHZPstandsforHotZeroTHERMALPOWERRTPstandsforRATEDTHERMALPOWER2.3ShutdownBankInsertionLimit(LCO3.1.5)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.3.1Theshutdownbankshallbefullywithdrawnwhichisdefinedas>221steps.COLRCycle25,DraftA 2.4ControlBankInsertionLimits(LCO3.1.6)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.4.12.4.2ThecontrolbanksshallbelimitedinphysicalinsertionasshowninFigure2.'Thecontrolbanksshallbemovedsequentiallywitha100(+5)stepoverlapbetweensuccessivebanks.ll2.5HeatFluxHotChannelFactorF(LCO3.2.1)(LimitsgeneratedusingReferences1and2)2.5.1Fo(Z)<~F)~K(Z)whenP>0.5PFo(Z)<~F*K(Z)0.5whenP<0.5where:Zistheheightinthecore,Fo=2.32,K(Z)isprovidedinFigure3,andTHERMALPOWERP=RATEDTHERMALPOWER2.6NuclearEnthalRiseHotChannelFactorF"(LCO3.2.2)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.6.1F"~<F~*(1+PF~*(1-P))where:FRTPPF~=0.3,andTHERMALPOWERP=RATEDTHERMALPOWER2.7AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(LCO3.2.3)(LimitsgeneratedusingReferences1and3)2.7.12.7.2TheAXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(AFD)targetbandist5%.TheAFDacceptableoperationlimitsareprovidedinFigure4.COLRCycle25,DraftA 2.8ReactorTriSstemRTSInstrumentation(LCO3.3.1)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference4)2.8.1OvertemperatureATSetpointParameterValuesParameterOvertemperatureATreactortripsetpointOvertemperatureATreactortripdepressurizationsetpointpenaltycoefficientOvertemperatureATreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientHeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantsf(AI)breakpointf(AI)slopeValueK)=1.20K2=0.000900K3=0.02097,=25sec72=5sec+13%AI1.3%ATJ%AI2.8.2OverpowerATSetpointParameterValuesParameterOverpowerATreactortripsetpointOverpowerATreactortripheatupsetpointpenaltycoefficientOverpowerATreactortripthermaltimedelaysetpointpenaltycoefficientHeasuredlead/lagtimeconstantf(AI)breakpointf(AI)slopeValueK4=1.077Ks=0.0forT(T'0.0011folT>TK,=0.0262forincreasingT=0.00fordecreasingT7'3=10sec+13%AI1.3%ATJ%AI2.9RCSPressureTemeratureandFlow

DearturefromNucleateBoilin()NB(((((C)3.4.()(LimitsgeneratedusingReference5)2.9.12.9.22.9.3Thepressurizerpressureshallbe>2205psig.TheRCSaveragetemperatureshallbeg577.5'F.TheRCStotalflowrateshallbe>170,

200gpm.COLRCycle25,DraftA 2.10AccumulatorBoronConcentration(LCO3.5.1)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.10.1Theboronconcentrationofeachaccumulatorshallbe>1800ppmand<2900ppm.2.11RefuelinWaterStoraeTankRWSTBoronConcentration(LCO3.5.4)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.11.1TheRWSTboronconcentrationshallbe>2000ppmand<2900ppm.2.12SentFuelPoolSFPBoronConcentration(LCO3.7.12)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference6)/2.12.1TheSFPboronconcentrationshallbe>300ppm.2.13BoronConcentration(LCO3.9.1)(LimitsgeneratedusingReferences1and6)2.13.1TheboronconcentrationsofthehydraulicallycoupledReactorCoolantSystem,therefuelingcanal,andtherefuelingcavityshallbe>2000ppm.3.0UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSThesetpointsandinputparametersfortheUFSARChapter15accidentanalysesarepresentedinTable1.Thevaluespresentedinthistableareorganizedbasedonsystemandmajorcomponentswithineachsystem.ThefailureofacomponentorsystemtomeetthespecifiedTable1valuedoesnotnecessarilymeanthattheplantisoutsidetheaccidentanalysessince:(1)anindicatedvalueaboveorbelowtheTable1valuesmaybeboundedbytheTable1values,and(2)thesetpointorparametermaynotsignificantlycontributetotheaccidentanalysesfinal'results.ThemajorsectionswithinTable1are:1.0ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)2.0MainFeedwater(MFW)3.0AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFW)4.0MainSteam(MS)System5.0TurbineGenerator(TG)6.0ChemicalandVolumeControlSystem(CVCS)7.0EmergencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)8.0Containment9.0ControlSystems10.0SafetySystemSetpoints11.0SteamGeneratorsCOLRCycle25,DraftA

4.0REFERENCES

2.3.5.6.1WCAP-9272-P-A,WestinghouseReloadSafetyEvaluationMethodology,July1985.WCAP-9220-P-A,WestinghouseECCSEvaluationModel-1981Version,Rev.1,February1982.WCAP-8395,PowerDistributionControlandLoadFollowingProcedures-TopicalReportSeptember1974.WCAP-8745-P-A,DesignBasesfortheThermalOverpowerhTandThermalOvertemperature4TTripFunctions,September1986.WCAP-11397-P-A,ImprovedThermalDesignProcedure,April1989.WCAP-11596-P-A,qualificationofthePHOENIX-P/ANCNuclearDesignSystemforPressurizedWaterReactorCores,June1988.COLRCycle25,DraftA 3hChC9'U0o2CfLllCLC9lL(1500,1.45)(1500,1.00)ACCEPTABLEOPERATIONONELOOPOPERATIONTWOLOOPOPERA'IIONUNACCEPTABLEOPERATION(0,180)(0,2.45)15001000500COOLANTBORONCONCENTRATlON(ppm)FIGUREIREQUIREDSHUTDOMNMARGINCOLRCycle25,DraftA (0,53)220>200L180(0,184~160~140.F120o1QQo8060m40o200018.34,')(66.6,)BBank(100,184)CBankankDB(30,0102030405060.708090100CorePower(Percentof1520MINT)*Thefullywithdrawnpositionisdefinedas~222steps.FIGURE2CONTROLBANKINSERTIONLIMITSCOLRCycle25,DraftA 1.250.75TotalFq=2.3200.25CoreHeight0.006.0010.8012.00K(Z)1.0001.0000.940 0.647002468COREHEIGHT{ft)1012FIGURE3K(Z)-NORMALIZEDF~(Z)ASAFUNCTIONOF'COREHEIGHTCOLR10Cycle25,DraftA 100(-11>90)DONOTOPERATEINTHISAREAWITHAFDOUTSIDETHETARGETBANDl--------.(1180)80Cl~O06040l~(<1,50)ACCEPTABLEOPERATIONWITHAFD"'""""""""OUTSIDETHETARGETBANDWITHc1HRPENALTYDEVIATIONTIMEACCEPTABLEOPERATION(31/0)200<0-20-100102030AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCE(%)FIGURE4AXIALFLUXDIFFERENCEACCEPTABLEOPERATIONLIMITSANDTARGETBANDLIMITSASAFUNCTIONOFRATEDTHERMALPOWERCOLRCycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSGEM¹ITEM/NAMEVACuaREMARKS:1.0ReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)Upperheadvolwe,ftUpperPienunvoiune,ftTopoffuelvolune,ftInletnozzle(s)volune,totaloftwo,ftOutletnozzle(s)volune,totaloftwo,ftActivefuelvolune,ftBottomoffuelvoiune,ftLowerPienunvolune,ftDowncomervolune,abovebottomofcoldleg,ftDowncomer,lowercoreplatetoelevationofthebottomofthecoldlegvotune,ftBarrelbaffle,lowercoreplatetouppercoreplatevolune,ft'otalvoiune,ftHotlegpipevoltep'erloopvolwe,ftaColdlegvoiuneperloop+crossover,ftsRC.Ixmpvoiuneperpurp,ftColdlegpipeID,in./Pm@suctionID,in.HotlegpipeID,in.Designpressure,psigDesigntemperature,FColdLegandHotLegCenterlineElevation300.0580.250.343.237.4367.611.0514.3138.4278.2128.52449.178.7crossover"-140.7coldleg=46.819227.5/3129(28.969)2485650246'0"Aboveuppersupportplate.Bottomofuppercoreplatetotopofuppersupportplate.Includesoutletholesinthebarrel.Topofactivefueltobottom.ofuppercoreplate,insidebarrelbaffle.Includesnozzleforgingprotrusionintovessel.Doesnotincludematingholeinbarrel,thisisincludedintheUpperPlenenvolwe.BottomoffueltotopoffuelTopoflowercoreplatetobottomofactivefuel.BelowtopoflowercoreplateAbovebottomofcoldlegelevationtobottomofuppersupportplateTopoflowercoreplatetoelevationofbottomofcoldlegTopoflowercoreplatetobottomofuppercoreplate.IncludesnozzlesO.ReactorCoolantPuapHead-CapacityandNPSHcurvesforreactorcoolantIxlps/HomologousCurvesRatedRCIxmjpheadandflow,ft8gpmRatedRCpstptorqueandefficiencyQratedhead/flow,ft-lb,fractionRCPPm@RatedPower(hot,556degreesF)RCPNotorRatedSpeed,RPHKomentofinertiaofpunpandmotor,Ib-ft~RCpm@power,lA!t(max/min)SeeNSRL252;90,00084Kefficiencyathotconditions4842BHP118980,00010,8HomologousCurvesareavailableinRETRANPm@powervarieswith,RCStempfromapprox8HWtto10HMtCOLR12Cycle25,DI'aftA 0 TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSZSSETPOZNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:Ratedpower,NMtReactorpoweruncertainty,)lRTPBypasspriortoThimblePlugDeletion,XUpperheadbypass,XUpperheadterrperature,degreesFHeattransferarea,ftAveragecoreheatflux,Btu/hr-ftn15204.5llproprietary59626,669189,440NeedstobeupdatedtoaccountforthimbleplugdeletionTeaperaturecanbeusedtobackouttheupperheadbypass.flow1.31.3.1FuelAsserrrbliesHeightTotal,inches(lengthfrombottomofassemblytotopnozzle)FuelRodLength,inches(lengthfrombottomofpintotopofpin)Active,inches-159.935149.138141.41.3.2FuelAsseahlyGeometryNessoffuel,LbnNessofclad,ibmNumberoffuelpinsperfuelassembly(FA)No.ofFuelAssembLiesFuelpinpitch,in.BottomnozzleweightandvoluneTopnozzle,w/insert,weightandvoluneFuelAssemblyresistance(coredPf(flow)],psif(lb/hr)FuelAssemblyfreeflowarea,in105,50025,9271791210.5569~1lbs.31.5in18.15lbs.62.9in'oredeltaP"-20.4psiorflow=186400gpm34.75Note:thisvalueincludesthirrhleplugs.Thimbleplugsarebeingremoved.Hoplugvaluesare20.0at170,200singleassembly1.3.3FuelpingeometryPelletdiameter,in.Clad00/ID,in./in.0.34440.400/0.35141.3.4ControlRod4InstrrmentGuideTubesNo.ofcontrolrodguidetubesNo.ofinstrunentguidetubesControLRodGuidetubeupperpart00/ID,in./in.InstrunentGuidetubeOD/ID,=in./in.Guidetubelo~erpart00/ID,in./in.160.49/0.5280.395/0.3500.4445/0.4825COLR13Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:ControlRodDropTimes,maxiaxlns,sec.Controlrodmaxicx!nwithdrawalrate,in./min.Controlrodmaxiaxzninsertionrate,pcm/sec.ControlrodinsertionlimitsHotchannelradialpeakingfactorHeatFluxHotchannelfactorFOHon-LOCA2.4LOCA3.04590SeeCOLR1.662.32AllowancesareaddedtotheTechSpecallowablevalue.PressurizerCodesafetyvalveflowcapacity,ibm/hr288,000Ratingat2485psigplus3XaccmalationCodesafetyvalveopentimeCodesafetyvalvesetpoint2485psigToleranceiss3X.0.8secsealclearingtimeCrosbyHodelHB.BP-86,size4K26SprayvalveSprayvalveSprayvalveSprayvalvePORVnumberflowcapacity,gpm/valvesetpoint-startopen/fullopentimeconstant,sec.PORVflowcapacity,ibm/hrPORVCvPORVopentimePORVclosetimeBackupHeatersHinimxnheatercapacityrequiredforLOOP,kllHeaterbankcontrollertypePORVsetpoint[normal)open/close,psigPORVsetpoint[LTOP]open/close,psigPORVblowdowncharacteristicHeatercapacityw/bankcapacityandsetpoints,kMControlbanks2002260/231052179,00050gpm/(psid)1/21.87sec+transmitter3.95sec+transmitter2335/23154248000kMat2250psigand400kMat2220psigFullonat2210psigandresetsat2220psig100proportional400klJProportionalAssedvalueSteamflowat2335psigRatingisforliquidrelief.ValvecharacteristicisquickopeningseeCopesVulcanSelectingandSizingControlValves8/75,page8,Table18forCvvstravelcurve.LTOPstransmitterisFoxboroE11GH-HSAE1,withatimeresponseof1sec(timeto90Xoffinalvalueforstepinput)LTOPstransmitterisFoxboroE11GH-HSAE1,withatimeresponseof1sec(timeto90Xoffinalvalueforstepinput)Presswizervol~(s)(100X/OXpower)Mater,ft(100X/OXpower)Steam,ft(100X/OXpower)396/199404/601COLRCycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOZNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSITEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:Total,ft'ressurizerID,ft-inSurgelineID,in.SpraylineID,in.Surgelinevoiune,ft80083.624in/claddingthicknessis0.188in8.753.06218.4Surgelineis10inschedule1401.4.2PressurizerLevelLowerleveltapelevationUpperleveltapelevationPressurizerlevelvsXpowerDistanceKotLegCenterlinetoLowerTap,ftHaxinxmlevelallo~edforsteambubble,X257'275'XpowerLevel0X19.5X100X49X10.75087Pressurizerlevelisrampedlinearlybetweenthesepoints.1.5RCSFlows,TemperatureandPressuresTotalreactorcoolantflow,gpm(15Xplugging)Totalreactorcoolantflow,gpm(15Xplugging)Averagereactorcoolanttemperature,degreesF(Fullpower/H2P)Reactorcoolantpressure,psigReactorcoolantflowuncertainty,XnominalReactorcoolanttemperaturemcertainty,degreesFReactorcoolantpressureuncertainty,psiDNBLimit(safetyanalysis)170,200 173,800573.5/54722353.1s301.52typicalcell1.51thimblecellUsefornonDHBUseforstatisticalDHB1.6LowTeaperatureOvers~reProtection(LTOP)HiniauaRCSventsize,squareinchesNo.ofSIIxmnpscapableofinjection(PORVs/vent)HaxinaiapressurizerlevelforRCPstart,X0/1381.7FuelHandling/DoseCalculationsHaxiaunreactorcoolantgrossspecificactivityHaxiaunreactorcoolantdoseequivalent1-131HaximmsecondarycoolantdoseequivalentI-131Hinimiareactorcoolantboronconcentration,ppmHinisazareactorcoolantlevelHinisunspentfuelpoollevelHiniaxsaspentfuelpoolboronconcentration,ppmSpentfuelpooltemperature,degreesF(min/max)100/EpCi/gm1.0pCi/gm0.1pCi/gm200023ftaboveflange23ftabovefuel30050/180COLR15Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSITEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALVEREMARKS:Hinisxlaspentfuelpoolcharcoalfilterefficiency,XiodineremovalHiniaunpostaccidentcharcoalfilterefficiency,XiodineremovalHinisxzacontrolroomcharcoalfilterefficiency,XiodineremovalHinimzatimebetweenreactorcriticalityandfuelmovement,hrs.SourceTermsusedfordosecalculationsHaxisxlnGasDecayTankXenon-133concentration,C9090 90100TID14844,MCAP-7823100,00020HainFeedwater(HFM)FeedwaterteaperatureversusloadPowerTemperature102X425F70X385F30X322FOX100F100Xdesigntempis432degreesFFeedwaterSuctionTemperaturevsPower,nominalFeedwaterSuctionPressurevsPower,nominalPower98X70X50X30X,Power98X70X50X30XTemperature345F319F295F259FPressure 277pslg282psig305psig370psig2.13.0Head-CapacityandHPSMcurvesHead-CapacityandHPSRcurvesformainfeedwaterpumpsHainFeedwaterIxmp-RatedHeadHainFeedwaterpump-RatedTorqueHainFeedwaterpump-HomentofInertiaElevationofsteamgeneratorinletnozzleElevationofmainfeedwaterpump,ftElevationofcondensatepump,ft~HFMregulatingvalveopentimeondemand,secHFMregulatingvalveclosetimeondemand,secHFMregulatingvalveCv,fullstrokeLowloadHFMregulatingvalveCv,(bypassvalves)HFMHeaterresistance(deltaP)AuxiliaryFeedwater(AFM)Hiniaxmdesigntemperatureofthewatersourceservicewater/CST(degreesF)SeeHS&L2150'89.612257.75250.8331048.7seeNS&L32(*)(50Selectedflowsplitsareprovidedformodelvalidation.ElevationisatcenterofshaftHFMtransientsuse20secstroketimeAssunedvalue.Actualvalue=493.6.EffectiveCv:includesbypasslineDesigndataontheHighPressureHeaters(2inparallel)isprovidedInitialAFMwatersourcearetheCSTslocatedintheServiceBldg.SafetyRelatedsourceis,theServiceMatersystem(lake).~ValuedifferentforCNHTintegrity.COLR16Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:VFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVacuaREMARKS:Haxinundesigntemperatureofthewatersourceservicewater/CST(degreesF)StartuptimefortheauxiliaryfeedwaterImps,secHiniauadelayforAFWstart,secHaxiauadelayforAFWstart,secAFWcontrolvalveopentimeondemand,secAFWcontrolvalveCv(flowisf(dP)lTDAFWP,msxinuaflow,gpmAFM,miniaunflows,bothgenerators'intact,gpaHinicLmdelayforstandbyAFWstart,min80,100TDAFM-0,HDAFM-1HDAFW-47,TDAFWatLOLevelbothSGsH/A600TDAFMP200/SGHDAFWP200/SG10InitialAFWwatersourcearetheCSTslocatedintheServiceBldg.'afetyRelatedsourceistheServiceWatersystem(lake).*TDAFWstartsonLOlevel(17K)inbothgensorUVonbothunit4Kvbusses.HDAFWstartsonSI(seq),orLOleveleitherSG,ortripofbothHFPorANSACHDAFMaccelerationtimetestresultsshowapproximately1.5s.ForHDAFM,LOOPonsequenceris47sec.TDAFWstartsatnominal17)'nbothSGsHDAFWcontrolvalvesarenormallyopenandthrottleclosedtocontrolflowbetween200-230gpmHDAFMPvalvesare3Rockwellmodel¹A4006JKNYstopcheckvalves.TDAFWcontrolvalves(4297,4298)are3Fisher¹470-HS.SBLOCAassunes300gpmperSGwiththefailureofoneDG4.0HainStemSystem(HS)Location(andelevation)ofcondensercheapvalvesandatmosphericreliefvalvesFullloadsteamlinepressuredrop,psiNSIsolationvalveclosetime[fullopentofullclose)closetime,secHSIsolationvalveCv(flowisf(dP))CSD-elev256'.875ARV-elev289'.563approx45HSIV-5.0checkvalve-1.0HSIV-23500checkvalve-17580Thisestimate,tothegovernorvalves,isprovidedforcoaparisonpurposesonly.Thecheckvalveisassumedtoclosein1secunderreverseflow.41NeinStemCodeSafetyValvesHwherofvalves(4perline)Valveflowcapacities-Total,Ibm/hr86621000Ratedflow(3XaccumlationperASHE,SectionIII):1085pslgo~~~~~.~~~~~~.~~797@700Ibm/hr(each)1140psig~~~o~~~o~~~~~~~~837y600ibm/hr(each)COLR17Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVACuaREMARKS:ValveFlowvsSGpressure(psia),totalperbank(4valves),ibm/sec.KunberofvalvesinbankValvesetpoint(s),(first/lastthree),nominal,ps1911101115112011251131113611411151116111661173 1181119012001205120912111085/1140040 91141 191222 223225 227 228342 494 646799859920931ValvesareCrosby¹HA-656R'10Setpointtoleranceis-1X/+3X.Kodelvalvesetpointat1.01(nominal),andfullflowat1.04(nominal).Valveblowdowncharacteristic15K,maxinua4.2AtmosphericreliefvalvesKo.AtmosphericreliefvalvesAtmosphericreliefvalvesetpoint/Air.operated,PS1gAtmosphericreliefvalvesetpoint/Booster,psigAtmosphericreliefvalvecapacity,tkm/hr210501060313550at1060psigDuring'otStandbyoperationsetpointisloweredtocontrolnoloadTavgKaxflowis3800005.05.1Turbinegenerator(TG)CondenserKo.ofcondenserdunpvalvesCondenserdipvalveopentime,secCondenserdumpvalveclosetime,secCondenserckmpvalvesetpoint(s)CondenserdumpvalveCv(flowisf(dP))ForTT:Tavg>5554valves,>5634valves;noTT:Tref+124valves,Tref+204valvesAssumingclosetime=openingtimeOnTTvalvescontrolopenat6.7X/F(PlD)above547withfullopensetpointsasdescribed.On10Ksteploaddecreasesameratiowitha6FdeadbandfromTrefDesignCv(240)fromdesignconditions(302,500ibm/hrsatsteamat695psig)6.0Chemical.andVolmcControlSystem(CVCS)CVCScapacity/pmp3pmps,60gpmmaxeachHormalops:2chargingpumps-oneismanualat15-20gpmandtheotherinautomatic.ChargingpumpsarePDPsw/46gpmtotal-8gpmtoseals-3gpaleakage+5gpmintoRCS.40gpmletdownCOLR18Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYszsSETPOzNTsANDINPUTPARAMETERsTEMITEM/NAME.VALUEREMARKS:CVCSminimm/punp,gpmTypeofcontroller(e.g.,P+I)andgains15PID100K,180sec,10sec6.1ReactorNak~MaterSystem(RW)RHMcapacity/pump2pcmps,60gpneach7.07.1.1EaeriiencyCoreCoolingSystem(ECCS)ECCSDeliveryvsRCSPressureResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)DeliveryvsRCSPressureHiniaunRHRDelivery,trainfailureHiniaasnRHRDelivery,twopumpsrunning,onelineblockedRCSPressure(psia)155152150 14012010080 60402014.7RCSPressure(psia)155 154152150 140120100806040 2014.7Delivery(gpm)0002506488369851115 12321338 1365Delivery(gpm)0 0'160252516830105612431406155216861720LOCAAppendixKcase.Tra>nfa>lureresultsinonepumprunningwith10Kdegradationwithonelineblocked.LOCAAppendixKcase(offsitepoweravailable).Twopumpsrunningwith10Kdegradationwithonelineblocked.7.1.2SafetyInjection(SI)DeliveryvsRCSPressureHininamSIdelivery,2pumpsoperating,onelinePressspilling(ps'I9)1375130012001100 10009008007006005004003002001000Delivery'gpm)0.062125 167201229 253273 289305321336352 368394SpillLOCAAppendixKcase.Trainfailure(gpm)resultsintwopumpsrunningwith5X465degradationwithonelinespillingto465conteinnent.465465465 465465465465 465465465465 465465COLR19Cycle25,DraftA

TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOZNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:HininamSIdelivery,3pumpsoperating,non-LOCAHinisLIaSldelivery,2pcsoperatingnon-LOCAHaxiramSldelivery,3pumpsoperating,SGTRPress(psia)13901315121511151015915 815715 61551541531521511515Press(psia)1390131512151115101591581571561551541531521511515Press(psig)13751300120011001000900 800700600 5004003002001000DeliveryLoop'A'BI1687147 193231266297325 352377 400423445465 485DeliveryLoop'A'BI869121162 197228255281305328350370 390409427LoopP(gpm)76128 180221 258290320 348 374398421443 464485504(gpm)Loop1997163214257295329 360390418444469 493516 538(gpll)Loop871126169206 239269296322346369391412432452Loop8(gpm)84141 198245285321 354385413440466490514536558Usedfornon-LOCAtransients,5XpsrpdegradationUsedfornon-LOCAtransients,SXputtp"degradation.TheKYPIPEmodelassuaesnopulpdegradation.LoopAand8pressuresaresetequal.UsedforSGTR.COLR20Cycle25,DraftA TASLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSZSSETPOXNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:7.3AccrllatorsNakerofaccirlatorsTotalvolrlre,each,ftLiquidvolune,fto-min/maxLiquidvolrmre,fta-BestEstimateInitialpressure,psig-Hinirmin/HaxirlmrInitialteeperature,FBoronconcentration,pprr(min/max)217501126/11541140700/7901051800/2900LBLOCANote-EOanalysesuseamaxirmmconcentrationof3000ppm7.4RUSTTemperature,min/max,degreesFHinirmlrRUSTvolurre,galRUSTboronconcentration,ppm(min/max)60/80300,0002000/2900Note-EQanalysesuseamaxirmmrconcentrationof3000ppm8.0ContairmentInitialcontairmentpressure,psiaInitialcontairmrenttemperature(LOCA/SLB)degreesFInitialrelativehrmridity,ISUtemperaturemin/max,degreesFNaxirrLrrrcontainrrentleakage,wtX/daymin-14.5max-15.790/1202035/800.2HiniaunisusedforLOCAanalysis.Haxirmirrisusedforthecontairmentintegritycases(SLB)~LOCAtemperaturelowerforPCTcalculations.SLBhigherforcontaiwrentintegrity8.1ContairaentHeatSinksListingofPassiveHeatSinks,quantities,materials,andconfigurationsseeNSRL8.2Densities,ThermalConductiviticsandHeatCapacitiesofHeatSinksInsulationdensity,conductivity,capacity6.67.ibm/fte0.0208BTU/hrFft2.0BTU/ftF141ibm/ftto150ibm/ft0.73to0.81BTU/hrFft0.21BTU/ibmFnote:minirmirrconductivitycorrespondstomaxirmmrdensity,andmaxirmmrconductivitycorrespondstominirrxrrrdensity.Steeldensity,conductivity,capacityStainlesssteeldensity,conductivity,capacityContairerentfreevolrine,min/max,cu.ft.GroundTorperature(degreesF)490ibm/ft28to30BTU/hrFft0.111BTU/ibmF496Ibm!ft15BTU/hrFft0.11BTU/ibmF1,000,000/1,066,00055belowgradetemperatureCOLR21Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEMXTEM/NAMEVArUEREMARKS:OutsideAirTeeyerature,min/max,degreesFHTCforoutsidesurfaces.10/1001.65BTU/hrftzdegreesFContainnentfancoolerperformanceTemp(degF)120220240260,280286NinNax(X106BTU/hr)2.054.5535.199.240.8113.846.8129.352.9145.554.7150.4Contairmentsprayflow,min/max,each,gpm1300/18008.3DelaysforCRFCsandSprayPuapsCRFCdelay,offsitepoweravailable,secondsCRFCdelay,offsitepowernotavailable,secondsContaiwentSpray,1300gpmeachpm',maxiezmdelay,secContairmentSpray,1800gpmeachpunp,miniatedelay,secContaiwentDesignpressure,psigDistanceBasementfloortoSpringline,feetDistanceSpringlinetotopofdome,feet344428.5-onepap26.8-twopumps9/(14wLOOP)60 9552.5includes2.0secSIdelayincludes2.0secSIdelayTh>sdelay>sfromthet>meContairaentHi-Hisetpointisreached.Itincludesinstrwentdelayandspraylinefilltime.Thisdelayisfromthetimeofbreak.8AContairmntsunupNinimmwtXofNaOHTank309.0ControlSystems(Reactor,FM,PrzrLevel,Turbine,AFM)Tavgversuspo~erPressurizerpressureandlevelalgorithmsSGsecondarylevelalgorithmN/AN/ATavgrampslinearlyfrom547degreesFatDXpowerto573.5degreesFat100XpowerPressurizerpressuresetpointisconstantat2235psig.Pressurizerlevelrampsfrom19.5Xto49Xfor0to100Xpower(547-573.5degreesF).Levelranysfrom39XatOXpowerto52Xat20Xpowerandremainsconstantat52Xto100Xpower.(Powerfromturbine1ststagepress.)10.010.110.1.1SafetySystemSetpointsReactorProtectionSystemPowerrangehighneutronflux,highsettingnominalaccidentanalysisdelaytime,sec1~091.180.5COLR22Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETP01NTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:10.1.2Pouerrangehighneutronflux,LousettingnominaLaccidentanalysisdelaytime,sec0.2500.3500.510.1.3OverteaperaturedeltaTnominaL accidentanalysisdelaytime,sec10.1.4OverixwerdeltaTnominal accidentanalysisdelaytime,secVariableVariable6.0VariableVariable2.0Totaldelaytime-fromthetimethetemperaturedifferenceinthecoolantloopsexceedsthetripsetpointuntiltherodsarefreetofallNotexplicitlymodelledinsafetyanalysis10.1.5HighpressurizerprcssurenominaL~pslgaccidcn'tanalysis~psiadelaytiae,sec24102.010.1.6i.oupressurizerpressurenominaL,psigaccidentanalysis,psiadelaytime,sec18731760(non-LOCA)1715(LOCA)1890(SGTR)2.010.1.7LoureactorcoolantfLounominal accidentanalysisdelaytime,sec91Xofnormalindicatedflow87Xperloop1.010.1.8Lou-louSGLevelnominalaccidentanalysisdelaytime,sec17XofthenarroMrangeLevelspanOXofnarroMrangelevelspan2.0MhiletripsetpointcouldbeasloMas16X,AFiiInitiationlimitsto17X10.1.9TurbineTrip(Loufluidoilpressure)tnominal,psig45COLR23Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:accidentanalysisdelaytime,sec2.0Notexplicitlymodeledinsafetyanalysis10.t.t0Undervoltagenominal,Vaccidentanalysisdelaytime.sec3150H/AH/ANotexplicitlymodeledinsafetyanalysis10.1.11Underfrequencynominal,Hzaccidentanalysisdelaytime57.7H/AM/ANotexplicitlymodeledinsafetyanalysis10.1.12Intermediaterangenominalsafetyanalysisdelaytime,sec0.31M/AN/AMotexplicitymodeledinsafetyanalysis10.1.13SourceRangenominal,cpsaccidentanalysis,cpsdelaytime,sec1.4E+51.0E+2.010.1.14HighPressurizerlevelnominalaccidentanalysisdelaytime,sec0.900.9382.010.210.2.110.2.1.1EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystemSafetyInjectionSystemHighcontairmentpressureNominalsetpoint,psigAccidentAnalysissetpoint,psigDelaytime,sec4.06.0<<3444rr/LOOP<<onlymodeledinaccidentanalysisforstartofcontairvt>>ntfancoolers.Timedelaysareforstartofcontairi>>ntfancoolers.10.2.1.2LoupressurizerpressureNominalsetpoint,psigAccidentAnalysissetpoint,psig17231715COLRCycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSZSSETPOZNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSITEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:Delaytime,sec2.010.2.1.3LowstemlinepressureNominalsetpoint,psigAccidentAnalysissetpoint,psigDelaytime,sec514372.72.0SeeNSKLSeeNSSL10.2.2ContaimentSprayNominalSetpoint,psigAccidentanalysissetpoint,psigDelaytime,sec2832.528.5SeeHSSLDelaytimeincludestimetofilllines.SeeHSSL10.2.3AFUSystemLow-lowstemgeneratorwaterlevel"NominalSetpointAccidentanalysissetpointDelaytime,sec17X,ofnarrowrangeinstruaentspaneachsteamgenerator0Iofnarrowrangeinstrunentspaneachsteamgenerator2.0Apositive11KerrorhasbeenincludedtoaccountfortheSGlevelmeasurementsystematacontaianentteaperatureof286F10.24StemLineisolation10.2.4.1HighuntairmntpressureNominalSetpoint,psigAccidentanalysissetpointDelaytimeH/AH/ANotexplicitlymodeledNotexplicitlymodeled10.2.4.2Highstemflow,coincidentwithlowTavgandSlNominalSetpoint/AccidentanalysissetpointDelaytime0.49E6lb/hrequivalentsteamflowat755psigandTavg<545FN/ANote:flowsetpointisbelownominalfullpowerflowandthereforethisportionoflogicismadeupatpowerNotexplicitlymodeledNotexplicitlymodeled.Steamlineisolationis'assutedconcurrentwithSi<i.e.2sdelay+5svalvestroke)10.24.3High-highstemflow,coincidentSINominalSetpointAccidentanalysissetpoint3.686lb/hrequivalentsteamflowat755psigN/ANotexplicitlymodeledCOLR25Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15ANALYSISSETPOINTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:DelaytimeN/ANotexplicitlymodeled.SteamlineisolationisassunedconcurrentwithSi(i.e.2sdelay+5svalvestroke)10.2.5Feedwaterisolation10.2.5.1NighstemgeneratorwaterlevelNominalSetpointAccidentanalysissetpointDelaytime67XofthenarrowrangeinstrunentspaneachSG100XofthenarrowrangeinstrunentspaneachSG2.0Lnstrunentlooponly11.0OriginalStemGeneratorsOSGsecondaryoutletpressureatOXfullpower,pslgSteamtemperatureatOXfullpower,FOSGcollapsedLiquidLevelatOXfullpower,XNRSOSGtotalLiquidmassperSGatOXfullpower,lbnOSGsecondaryoutletpressureat100Xfullpower,psigSteamtemperatureat100Xfullpower,FOSGcollapsedliquidLevelabovetubesheetat100XfuLLpo~er,ftOSGtotalLiquidmassperSGat100Xfullpo~er,LbmHeatLoadperSG,Btu/hrPrimaryflowperSG,Lb/hr-DesignSteamflowperSG,Lb/hr-DesignSecondarydesignpressure,psigSecondarydesigntetnperature,FNo.oftubesperSGTubeOD,in.Tubeaveragewallthickness,in.Haxinxnnmoisturecarryover,XSecondaryheattransferarea,ftnperSGPrimaryheattransferarea,ftperSGTubelength(s)Haxinxsn,ftHininnin,ftAverageeffectiveLength,ft100554739130,120815522.538.7585,4102602000000336000003290000108555632600.8750.050.2544,43039,40671.36557.14659.5ASDsetpointtocontrolTavgat547F.Assumed=toTavgNominalvalue,analysiseastjustifyassunederrorbandCLRCrunusingnewSGconditionswithwaterlevelat55.5XNRL(38.75'bovetubesheet)ThisvalueisforOXpluggingandafoulingfactorof.00002.ThisvalueisfornewSGconditionsThisisamaxinxsnvalue,usedtogeneratethismassvaluebelow.Amininnnnvaluewouldbe35.5XNRL.Valueconsideredsteamgeneratornewconditions,withwaterlevelat55.5Xnarrowrange(38.75>abovetubesheet)Hininnrnwallthicknessnotspecified",Includestubesheet(2*22)includestubesheet(2~22)AbovetubesheetCOLR26Cycle25,DraftA TABLE1:UFSARCHAPTER15'ANALYSlSSETPOTNTSANDINPUTPARAMETERSTEM¹ITEM/NAMEVALUEREMARKS:OverallOSGbundleheight,ftelevation-286.549ftorTubesheetthicknessis22inches33.031ftabovebottomoftubesheetNarrowrangeleveltapLocations(elevations),ftlliderangeleveltaplocations(elevations),ftSecondarynozzletonozzledP9fullpower,psiPrimarynozzletonozzledPwithnopluggedtubesSecondaryvolune,ft(water,volune01525/0Wt)-nominaLSecondaryvoluae,ft(steamvolune01525/0NMt)-noainalPrimarytotalvoluneperSG,fthmHotlegheadvoluneperSG,ftColdLegheadvoluneperSG,ftTubeprimaryvoluneperSG,ftDownccmerlevelversusdowncomervoluneprofileCirculationratio(100Xpower)TotalvoluneversuslevelSGPrimaryHeadCladdingThicknessNaxiaamSGtubeleakage,gpm287.474/299.401256.349/299.40116.532.3psi9flow=33.64E6lb/hr1681/28212898/1758942.3133.4133.4675.5SeeNS&L4.4SeeNS&L5/160.5/SGEstimatevalueAnATHOSmodeloftheOSG'swasused.TheCirculationratioisthedowncomerflowdividedbytheoutletflow.ConfirmedwithCLRCrun.Actualvaluelimitedto0.1gpm/SGduetostressconcernsCOLR27Cycle25,DraftA ATTACHMENTGR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantRCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)May1995

Animportantsafetyconsiderationisthattheplantbeoperatedwithintheboundsofthereactorcoolantsystempressureandtemperaturelimits,andthattheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionsystemenabletemperatureandthePORVactuationsetpointsbesettoappropriatelimits.Additionally,itisessentialtosafetythatarequirementtomaintaintheplantwithintheappropriateboundberetainedintheTechnicalSpecifications.However,thespecificvaluesoftheselimitsmaybemodifiedbylicensees,withoutaffectingsafety,providedthechangesaremadeinaccordancewithanNRCapprovedmethodologyandconsistentwithallapplicablelimits.NUREG-1431providesforremovaloftheseparametersbyplacingtheminaPressureandTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)thatwouldbesubmittedtotheNRCfollowinganychangeinthereactorvesselpressureandtemperatureoperatingparametersprovidedthelimitsforthecurrentreactorvesselfluenceperiodarecalculatedusingNRCapprovedmethodology.ThePTLRisbeingestablishedatGinnaStationtoavoidtheunnecessaryburdenofchanginglimitswhicharedevelopedusinganNRC-approvedmethodology.Thisallowscontinuedtrendingofthisinformation,eventhoughpriorNRCapprovalofthechanges'otheselimitswouldnotberequired.ThemethodologyfordeterminingpressureandtemperaturelimitsisdetailedinWCAP-14040,RevisionI,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownCurves",datedDecember1994.ThemethodologyfordeterminingtheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionSystemenabletemperatureandthePORVactuationsetpointsisdetailedincorrespondencefromR.C.Mecredy,RGEE,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,datedMay5,1995.Asaconsequence,theNRCreviewofproposedchangestopressureandtemperaturelimitsisprimarilylimitedtoconfirmationthattheupdatedlimitsarecalculatedusinganNRCapprovedmethodologyandconsistentwithallapplicableanalysislimits.AnychangestothePTLRwillbeprovidedtotheNRCuponissuanceasrequiredbytheproposedTS5.6.6.ThisproposedrevisiontotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsisadministrativeinnaturesinceitdoesnotchangeanyofthelimitsorsurveillancerequirements.AcrossreferencebetweentheproposedPTLR,thecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications,andtheproposedGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsisprovidedonthefollowingpage.AsamplePTLRforGinnaStationfollowsthecrossreferencetable.Revision0ofthePTLRwillbesubmittedtotheNRCinaccordancewithproposednewTS5.6.6uponimplementationofthenewtechnicalspecific'ationsin1996.May1995 PTLRCROSSREFERENCETOTHECURRENTGINNASTATIONTSANDTOTHEPROPOSEDGINNASTATIONITSPTLRGINNASTATIONTS¹GINNASTATIONITS¹2.12.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.22.3FIGURE1FIGURE23.1.2.1.A3.1.1.1.K 3.1;1.1.K3.1.1.1.K3.1.1.1.K3.153.153.15'.153.15.1.AFIGURE3.1-1FIGURE3.1-2LCO3.4.3LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.10LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.6LCO3.4.7LCO3.4.10LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.12LCO3.4.3LCO3.4.3Hay1995 R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantRCSPressureandTemperatureLimitsReportCycle25DraftAThisreportisnotpartoftheTechnicalSpecifications.ThisreportisreferencedintheTechnicalSpecifications. TABLEOFCONTENTS1.0PRESSUREANDTEHPERATURELIHITSREPORT........-....~~~~~~~~~~~~~22.0OPERATINGLIHITS...................................................32.1RCSPressureandTemperatureLimits..........................32.2LowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionTemperature...........................SystemEnable~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0~32.3LowTemperatureOverpressureProtection-SystemSetpoints.....

33.0REFERENCES

....................'.....................................4FIGURE1ReactorVesselHeatupLimitations............................5FIGURE2ReactorVesselCooldownLimitations..........................6PTLRCycle25,DraftA

R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantPressureandTemperatureLimitsReportCycle25Draft,A1.0RCSPressureandTemeratureLimitsReortPTLRThisPressureandTemperatureLimitsReport(PTLR)forGinnaStationhasbeenpreparedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofTechnicalSpecification5.6.6.TheTechnicalSpecificationsaddressedinthisreportarelistedbelow:3.4.33.4.63.4.73.4.10 3.4.12RCSPressureandTemperature(P/T)LimitsRCSLoops-NODE4RCSLoops-MODE5,LoopsFilledPressurizerSafetyValvesLowTemperatureOverpressureProtection(LTOP)SystemPTLRCycle25,DraftA 2.0OPERATINGLIMITSThecycle-specificparameterlimitsforthespecificationslistedinSection1.0arepresentedinthefollowingsubsections.TheselimitshavebeendevelopedusingtheNRCapprovedmethodologiesspecifiedinTechnicalSpecification5.6.6.Theselimitshavebeendeterminedsuchthatallapplicablelimitsofthesafetyanalysisaremet.AllitemsthatappearincapitalizedtypearedefinedinTechnicalSpecification1.1,"Definitions."2.1RCSPressureandTemeratureLimits(LCO3.4.3andLCO3.4.12)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference1)2.1.1TheRCStemperaturerate-of-changelimitsare:a.Amaximumheatupof60'Fperhour.b.Amaximumcooldownof100'Fperhour.2.1.2TheRCSP/TlimitsforheatupandcooldownarespecifiedbyFigures1and2,respectively.2.2LowTemeratureOverressureProtectionSstemEnableTemerature(LCOs3.4.6,3.4.7,3.4.10and3.4.12)(LimitsgeneratedusingReference2)2.2.1TheenabletemperaturefortheLowTemperatureOverpressureProtectionSystemis>330F.2.3LowTemeratureOverressureProtectionSstemSetpints(LCO3.4.12)2.3.1PressurizerPower0cratedReliefValveLiftSettinLimits(LimitsgeneratedusingReference2)TheliftsettingforthepressurizerPowerOperatedReliefValves(PORVs)is<424psig.PTLRCycle25,DraftA

3.0REFERENCES

2.WCAP-14040,"MethodologyUsedtoDevelopColdOverpressureMitigatingSystemSetpointsandRCSHeatupandCooldownLimitCurves,"Revision1,December1994.LetterfromR.C.Mecredy,RG&E,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,

Subject:

"TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgram,"datedMay5,1995.PTLRCycle25,DraftA 2,5002,2502,000HdroLimitLIMITINGMATERIALCIRCUMFERENTIALWELDLIMITING1/4TRTgm=21D'FLIMITING3/4TRTNO~178F1,750G~~1,500tllKDm1,250tOLLIKlLm1,000OIX:UnacceptableOperation60'F/hrCRITICALITYLIMIT329'F750500Acceptable0eration250.050100150200250300350400450500RCSCOLDLEGTEMPERATURE('F)FIGUREIREACTORVESSELHEATUPLIMITATIONSAPPLICABLEFORTHEFIRST29EFPYPTLRCycle25,DraftA 250022502000LIMITINGMATERIALCIRCUMFERENTIALWELDLIMITING1/4TRTN~r-210'FLIMITING3/4TRT~r=178'F,1750C91500m1250m1000OK750500250CooldownRatesF/Hr0204060~100UnacceptableOperationAcceptableOperation050100150200250300350400450500RCSCOLDLEGTEMPERATURE('F)FIGURE2REACTORVESSELCOOLDOWNLIMITATIONSAPPLICABLEFORTHE'IRST29EFPYPTLRCycle25,DraftA AttachmentHEvaluationof24-MonthSurveillanceIntervalsMay1995 IncludedwiththeTechnicalSpecificationImprovementProgramforGinnaStation,isachangeinthesurveillanceintervalswhicharebasedonfuelcyclelengths.ThecurrentGinnaStationTSdefineafuelcycledurationas18monthswhichisproposedtobeincreasedto24monthsinthisLAR.SincetheproposedITS(andcurrentGinnaStationTS)alsocontainaprovisiontoallowmostsurveillancestobeextendedupto25%oftheirspecifiedinterval,thiswouldextendthemaximumallowedsurveillanceintervalfrom22.5monthsto30months.TheincreasedsurveillanceintervalsarebeingproposedeventhoughGinnaStationisonlygoingfrom12monthcyclesto18monthcyclesfollowingthespringrefuelingoutagein1996.However,theproposedchangeprovidesgreaterflexibilityforplanningpurposesandpreventstheneedforsignificanttechnicalspecificationchanges(similartothisLAR)ifGinnaStationweretochangeto24monthrefuelingintervalsinthefuture.TheNRChaspublishedGenericLetter91-04(Ref.1)whichprovidesguidancetolicenseeswhenconsideringanincreaseinspecifiedsurveillanceintervalsupto24months.ThepurposeofthisAttachmentistoevaluatetheincreasedsurveillanceintervalsinaccordancewithReference1.ThisattachmentisorganizedbasedonthethreeenclosurestoGenericLetter91-04.Afourthsectionisalsoprovidedtodiscusstheimpactonmechanicalandelectricalcomponentsingeneral.Therefore,SectionAdiscussesthetechnicalspecificationchangeswhicharerequiredforthischange.SectionBprovidesanevaluationofinstrumentdriftandsafetyanalysisassumptionswithrespecttotheincreasedsurveillanceintervals.SectionCprovidesanevaluationof10CFR50,AppendixJrequirementswhileSectionDdiscussestheimpactonmechanicalandelectricalcomponents.SectionEcontainsthelistsofreferencesusedinthisattachment.A.TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONCHANGESREQUIREDGenericLetter91-04specifiesrequiredchangestoseveraltechnicalspecificationstoaddressincreasedsurveillanceintervals.ThesespecificationsarediscussedbelowwiththeLCOnumbersreferringtothoseinAttachmentCofthisLAR:SteamGenerator(SG)InspectionIntervals(SR3.4.13.1)ThegenericletterproposesthatthisSRandtheprogramdescribedinSpecification5.5.9berevisedtomakeSGtubeinspectionsperformancebased.Assuch,theSGtubeinspectionintervalscouldbefrom24monthsupto40monthsdependingonwhich"inspectionresultscategory"theSGtubeswereplacedinduringtheprevioustwoinspections.ThecurrentGinnaStationTS,andproposednewITS,donotcontaintheseinspectionresultscategories.TheSGinspectionprogramisprovidedinnewSpecification5.5.9anddiscussedinmoredetailintheGinnaStationgualityAssuranceManual,AppendixB(Ref.2).Inaddition,RG&EisplanningtoreplacetheSGsduringthe1996refuelingoutage.TheSGtubeinspectionprogramwillthenbeupdatedfollowingtheSGreplacementinaccordancewithindustryrecommendations.Therefore,nochangeinSGinspectionfrequencyisproposedwiththeincreaseinsurveillanceintervals.May1995 2.ReactorCoolantSystemOperationalLEAKAGE(LCO3.4.13)ThegenericletterproposesthatthisLCOberevisedtoplaceadditionalrestrictionsonprimary-to-secondaryleakagethroughtheSGtubes.Thisrestrictionwouldlimitleakageto100gallonsperdaythroughanySGinwhichtheresultsoftwopreviousinspectionsareintheC-2Category.Asdiscussedabove,thecurrentGinnaStationTSdonotcontainspecificcategoriesforleaktestingfindings.Therefore,thischangewouldnotspecificallyapplytoGinnaStation.However,theproposedLCO3.4.13limitsprimary-to-secondaryleakageto0.1gpmperSGasaveragedover24hourswhileinMODESI,2,3,and4whichunderworse-caseconditionsamountsto144gallonsperday.Thisisonlyslightlyhigherthanthegenericletterproposed100gallonsperdayafter24monthsofoperation,butsignificantlylessthanthemaximumallowed500gpmduringthefirst24months.Inaddition,RGEEanticipatesreplacingtheSGsduringthe1996refuelingoutage.Therefore,nochangeinprimary-to-secondaryLEAKAGElimitsisproposedwiththeincreaseinsurveillanceintervals.EVALUATIONOFINSTRUMENT'DRIFTANDSAFETYANALYSISASSUMPTIONSReferenceIrequiresthatinstrumentdriftandthesafetyanalysisassumptionsbeaddressedwhenproposinganincreaseinsurveillanceintervalsupto24months.Theseitemsareaddressedby7questionsprovidedinEnclosure2tothegenericletter.Priortorespondingtothesevenquestions,thefollowingisasummaryoftherevieweffortwhichwasinitiatedinordertorespondtothesequestions.Thefirststeptobeperformedwastodeterminetheinstrumentationpopulationwhichisimpactedbytheproposedincreasedsurveillanceinterval.ThispopulationissummarizedinTable1.Second,themakeandmodelsofeachinstrumentationcomponentwhichistestedduringtheserefuelingcyclebasedsurveillanceswasdetermined.Thetestingresultsoverafiveyearperiodforasampleoftheidentifiedinstrumentationpopulationwasthenobtained.ThesesamplesizesweredeterminedbasedonReference3fora95/95confidencelevel.InstrumentationandcontrolsimportanttothesafeandreliableoperationofGinnaStationarecalibratedinaccordancewithapprovedinstrumentationcalibrationprocedures.Ingeneral,anInstrumentCalibrationDataSheetspecifyingcalibrationvaluesandacceptancecriteriaisprovidedforeachinstrument.Eachtimeaninstrumentiscalibrated,itscurrentsetpoint(s)orcalibrationvalue(s)aremeasuredandrecordedontheapplicableDataSheet.Thesevaluesarethe"asfound"instrumentcalibrationvalues.The"asfound"instrumentcalibrationvaluesmaydifferfromthe"desired/calculated"valuesspecifiedontheDataSheetduetothecombinedeffectsofoneormoreofthefollowinginstrumentuncertainties:2May1995 a~b.c~d.Instrumentaccuracy(Ia)Instrumentdrift(Id)Instrumentcalibrationtolerance(It)Testequipmentaccuracy(HTE)Thestatisticalworst-caseeffectsoftheseuncertaintiesareincorporatedintothedesignanalysesoftheInstrumentSetpointVerificationProject(Ref.4)andusedtoevaluatetheadequacyofexistinginstrumentsetpointsandcalibrationvaluesspecifiedinthecalibrationprocedures.Thetotalinstrumentuncertainty(TIU)isgivenby:TIU=[Ia+Id+It+HTE']"The"asfound"acceptancecriteriaorallowabletoleranceband(ATB)specifiedontheDataSheetistypically+1.0%oftheinstrument'scalibratedspanandis,infact,the"It"termdescribedabove.Ifduringaninstrumentcalibrationan"asfound"valueiswithintheATB,nootheractionisrequired.Theinstrumentmaybeleftasisuntilthenextcalibrationinterval.However,ifan"asfound"valueisoutsidetheATB,theinstrumentmustbeadjustedorrecalibratedbackintotheATBasrequiredbythecalibrationprocedure.Ineithercase,the"asleft"calibrationdataisrecordedontheDataSheet.TheData,Sheetsforthesampleinstrumentationpopulationwerereviewedfortheperiodfrom1990through1994(i.e.,atotalof5surveillancesbasedon12monthrefuelingcycles).AdditionalDataSheetsfrom1989and1995surveillanceswerealsousedwhenneededtoprovidethedesiredfiveyearhistory.ForthefirstyearDataSheet,the"desired/calculated"valuewassubtractedfromthe"asfound"valueandrecordedforeachcalibrationpoint.Dependingontheinstrumentationdevice,upto10calibrationpointsareprovided.Thiscomparisonwasperformedforeachpoint.ForthesecondyearDataSheet,the"asfound"valueissubtractedfromthefirstyear"asleft"value.Thisiscalculatedforeachcalibrationpoint.Thethirdyear"asfound"valuesarethencomparedtothesecondyear"asleft"valuesandsoonuntilfiveyearsofdataareavailable.The"asfound"minus"asleft"valuesrepresenttheobservedinstrumentcalibrationvariance,inpercentofspan,forthatcalibrationinterval(typicallyIyear).Afterexaminingthehistoryofeachofthecalibrationpoints,thecalibrationpointwiththeworst-caseconsecutivethree,yearvarianceisselected.Ifthisworst-casecalibrationpointiswithintheTIUband,a36monthcalibrationintervalhasbeendemonstratedtobeacceptablewhichislongerthanthe30monthmaximumbeingrequestedinthisLAR.IfthisvalueisoutsidetheTIUband,thesetpoint.analysismustbereviewedtodetermineifanyoriginalconclusionsofthisstudyneedtobechangedorifthesurveillanceintervaloraccidentanalysisneedstobechanged.Usingthisacceptancecriteria,theresultsofthisreviewindicatedthatallinstrumentationwerewithintheTIUbandexceptforveryrareoccasionswhichcanbeadequatelyexplained(e.g.,oneyear"spike"thatwasnotobservedintheremainingfouryearsorinanyoftheremainingpopulation).-3-Hay1995 Asaresultofusingthisinformation,thesevenquestionsprovidedinReference1canbeanswered:Confirmthatinstrumentdriftasdeterminedbyas-foundandas-leftcalibrationdatafromsurveillanceandmaintenancerecordshasnot,exceptonrareoccasions,exceededacceptablelimitsforacalibrat'ioninterval.2.~ResonseForthepurposeofthisquestion,"acceptablelimits"isdefinedastheTIUasdiscussedabove.Therefore,basedonthereviewoftheinstrumentationrecordsfortheselectedsamplesizes,RG&Ehasconfirmedthatinstrumentdriftasdeterminedby"asfound"and"asleft"calibrationdatahasnotexceededacceptablelimitsfora'calibrationintervalupto36monthsexceptforrareinstanceswhichcanbeadequatelyexplained.IConfirmthatthevaluesofdriftforeachinstrumenttype(make,model,andrange)andapplicationhavebeendeterminedwithahighprobabilityandhighdegreeofconfidence.Provideasummaryofthemethodologyandassumptionsusedtodeterminetherateofinstrumentdriftwithtimebaseduponhistoricalplantcalibrationdata.~ResonseTheinstrumentdriftvaluesusedinthesetpointstudywereselectedbasedonvendorrecommendations,engineeringjudgement,andhistoricaldata.8asedonthisinformation,RG&Ehasconcludedthatinstrumentdriftgenerallyoccursshortlyafterthecalibrationofthedevicesuchthatanincreasedsurveillanceintervalisnotexpectedtoresultinanysignificantincreaseindrift.However,theinstrumentdriftasassumedinthesetpointstudyhasbeenreviewedwithrespecttothesamplepopulationdiscussedaboveandfoundtobeacceptable.3.Confirmthatthemagnitudeofinstrumentdrifthasbeendeterminedwithahigh'probabilityandahighdegreeofconfidenceforaboundingcalibrationintervalof30monthsforeachinstrumenttype(make,modelnumber,andrange)andapplicationthatperformsasafetyfunction.ProvidealistofthechannelsbyTSsectionthatidentifiestheseinstrumentcalibrations.May1995 ~ResonseEachinstrumentwhichperformsasafetyfunctionasassumedintheaccidentanalysisfordesignbasisaccidentsandtransientsandcontainedwithintechnicalspecificationswasorganizedbasedoninstrumenttype.Asamplesizewasselectedforeachidentifiedinstrumenttypewiththeplantsurveillancerecordsobtainedandreviewed.Thisreviewconfirmedthatforacalibrationintervalofupto30months,themagnitudeofinstrumentdriftoveranobserved36monthperiodwasboundedbythoseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.AlistofthechannelsaffectedbytheincreasedsurveillanceintervalsisprovidedinTable1.ThistableissortedbySurveillanceRequirementwhichiseffectivelybyTSsection.Confirmthatacomparisonoftheprojectedinstrumentdrifterrorshasbeenmadewiththevaluesofdriftusedinthesetpointanalysis.lfthisresultsinrevisedsetpointstoaccommodatelargerdrifterrors,provideproposed7Schangestoupdatetripsetpoints.Tfthedrifterrorresultinarevisedsafetyanalysistosupportexistingsetpoints,provideasummaryoftheupdateanalysisconclusionstoconfirmthatsafetylimitsandsafetyanalysisassumptionsarenotexceeded.~ResonseAcomparisonoftheprojectedinstrumentdrifterrors(asbasedonthehistoricaldatareview)withthesetpointanalysishasbeenperformed.ThisreviewhasdeterminedthatnoTSchangesarerequiredandthatnosafetyanalysisassumptionsarerequiredtoberevisedtosupportthischange.Confirmthattheprojectedinstrumenterrorscausedbydriftareacceptableforcontrolofplantparameterstoeffectasafeshutdownwiththeassociatedinstrumentation.~ResonseTheinstrumenterrorsascausedbydriftovera36monthintervalhavebeenshowntoremainwithinthevaluesusedinthesetpointanalysisfor18monthcycles.Therefore,theprojectedinstrumenterrorsascausedbydriftareacceptablefortheproposedincreasedsurveillanceinterval.Confirmthatallconditionsandassumptionsofthesetpointandsafetyanalyseshavebeencheckedandareappropriatelyreflectedintheacceptancecriteriaofplantsurveillanceproceduresforchannelchecks,channelfunctionaltests,andchannelcalibrations.-5-Hay1995 ~ResonseThesetpointanalysiswasperformedbasedonthevaluesprovidedwithintheplantsurveillanceprocedures.Sincethesetpointanalysisvaluesremainvalid,nochangestoplantsurveillanceproceduresarerequiredtosupportthischange.7.Provideasummarydescriptionoftheprogramformonitoringandassessingtheeffectsofincreasedcalibrationsurveillanceintervalsoninstrumentdriftanditseffectonsafety.~ResonsesCurrently,RGEEhasanextensivereliabilitycenteredmaintenance(RCM)programwhichcontainsallinstrumentationsystemsrequiredbytechnicalspecifications.Inaddition,theMaintenanceRule(10CFR50.65)isrequiredtobefullyimplementedbyJuly10,1996.Sincethisrulerequiresverificationoftheeffectivenessofmaintenance,theresultsofinstrumentationcalibrationsmustbemonitored.RGSEproposesthatthismonitoringinclude,asaminimum,'thetypeofverificationtorespondtothesequestions.Thatis,comparisonofthe"asfound"versus"desired/calculated"valueswillbeperformedtoensurethatthevaluesasassumedinthesetpointanalysisremainvalid.ThisverificationwillbeperformedconsistentwiththerequirementsoftheMaintenanceRuleprogram.SincetheMaintenanceRuleimplementationdateofJuly10,1996isonlyafewweeksafterthecompletionofthe1996refuelingoutage,atwhichtimeGinnaStationwillbeginitsfirst18monthfuel'ycle,therequiredmonitoringandassessmentprogramwillbeimplementedbythisdate.EVALUATIONOF10CFR50,APPENDIXJRE(UIREMENTSThecurrent10CFR50,AppendixJspecifiesthatTypeBandCcontainmentisolationvalvesandbarriersshallbeleaktestedeachrefuelingbutinnocaseatintervalsgreaterthan24months.Inaddition,theproposedITSdonotallowuseofthe25%surveillanceextensionforthesetests.Consequently,aplanton24monthfuelcyclescouldconceivablyrequireashutdownsolelyforthepurposeofperformingTypeBandCleakagetesting.TheproposednewAppendixJrule(Ref.5)wouldcorrectthisdiscrepancybyallowingTypeBandCleakagetestingsurveillanceintervalstobeperformancebasedandallowgreaterflexibilitywithrespecttofuelcyclelengths.Thisruleisanticipatedtobeimplementedlaterthisfall.GenericLetter91-04recognizedthattheNRCstaffwasdevelopingtheproposedchangestoAppendixJ.However,duetotheunknownimplementationdateandfinalwordingoftheproposed.rule,thegenericletterprovidesguidanceonhowtoprepareanexemptiontotherequirementsofAppendixJtosupporttheincreasedfuelcyclelength.RGIlEisnotrequestinganexemptionto10CFR50AppendixJat'thistimeforthefollowingreasons:-6-May1995 1.TheproposedAppendixJruleisanticipatedtobecomeimplementedatthesametimeastheconversiontoITSforGinnaStation.Withthisrulechange,theexemptionisnolongerrequired.2.GinnaStationisnotplanningtoconvertto24monthcyclesintheneartermwhichwouldrequireanexemptionunderthecurrentAppendixrequirements.Theexistingruleallowsamaximumof24monthsbetweenTypeBandCleakagetestingwhichis6monthslongerthantheplanned18monthcycleswhichprovidesadequatemargin.Therefore,anexemptionto10CFR50,AppendixJforTypeBandCleakagetestingisnotrequiredatthistime.EVALUATIONOFMECHANICALANDELECTRICALCOMPONENTSGenericLetter91-04alsorequiresconsiderationofthesurveillanceintervalchangeandtheeffectonsafetyforitemsotherthaninstrumentation.AreviewoftheproposedITSforGinnaStationshowsthatthemechanicalandelectricalcomponentscanbegroupedinto3categoriestoevaluatethesurveillanceintervalchange.EachofthesecategoriesarediscussedindetailbelowandpresentedinTables2-4:VerificationofPumpandValveActuationEvery24Months(Table2)ThesesurveillancesessentiallyconsistofverifyingthatpumpsandvalveswhichreceivesometypeofESFASsignalwillactuatetotheircorrec'tpositiononarefuelingoutagebasis.WiththeexceptionoftheMSIVs,allcomponentsaslistedinTable2receiveatleastquarterlytestinginaccordancewiththeInserviceTestingProgram.Thistestingdoesnotverifytheentireactuationinstrumentationstringbutverifiesthattheassociatedpumpsandvalvescanactuate,typicallywithactuationperformedfromthecontrolroom.TheMSIVsarenotrequiredtobetestedatpowerduetothepotentialforareactortripasnotedintheISTProgram.However,theMSIVsaretestedeachcoldshutdown.Thevalvesarealsoin-serieswithnon-returncheckvalveswhicharecreditedintheaccidentanalysisassupportingisolationoftheSGsfollowingadesignbaseaccident.Therefore,anincreaseinsurveillanceintervalfortheseverificationsisconsideredacceptable.2.VerificationofReactivityandPowerDistributionParameters(Table3)Theseverificationsareperformedonceeachcycleoruponremovalofthereactorvesselheadtoverifyparameterswhichcouldhavebeenchangedduringtheshutdown.Thesesurveillancesarethensupplementedwithadditionalperiodicsurveillancestoensurethatthereactivityandpowerdistributionparametersremainwithintheaccidentanalysisassumptions.Consequently,increasingthefuelcyclelengthupto24monthswillnotadverselyimpacttheLCOsassociatedwiththese.surveillancessincethesurveillancesareonlyperformedonceaftereachrefuelingorremovalofthevesselhead.-7-May1995 3.MiscellaneousVerifications(Table4)IncludedwithinTable4arevarioussurveillancesthatdonotfallintoeitheroftheabovetwocategoriesbutwhosefrequencyisbasedonfuelcyclelength.Thesesurveillancesareeitherrelatedtothereactortripsystem,ESFAS,orvariouscomponentperformancemeasures.ThereactortripsystemandESFASrequiredtestsarefunctionalverificationswhichcangenerallyonlybeperformedbelowMODE4.GinnaStationhasnotobservedfailuresofthesefunctionsduringprevioustestingsuchthatanincreasedsurveillanceintervalisnotexpecttobeofconcern.Withrespecttocomponentperformancemeasures,severaloftheitemsaslistedonTable4arenewsurveillanceswhichdidnotpreviouslyexistwithinthetechnicalspecifications.TheseincludeSR3.4.1.3,SR3.6.2.2,SR3.6.7.1,andSR3.7.4.1.Therefore,afrequencyof24monthsisashorterfrequencythanpreviouslyexisted.Fortheremainingsurveillances,anincreasedsurveillanceintervalisnotexpectedtobeofconcernsincethecomponentsaretypicallytestedtosomedegreeonamorefrequentbasis(e.g.,dieselgenerators).Inaddition,implementationoftheMaintenanceRulewillrequireconsiderationofthesecomponentsperformancehistorybeginningin1996asdiscussedabove.Therefore,achangeinsurveillanceintervalisconsideredacceptable.REFERENCESGenericLetter91-04,ChangesinTechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceIntervalstoAccommodatea24-NonthFuelCycle,datedApril2,1991.GinnaStationgualityAssuranceManual,AppendixB.MIL-STD-105D,SamplingProcedures'andTablesforInspectionByAttributes.RGEEEngineeringWorkRequest(EWR)5126,"GuidelinesforInstrumentLoopPerformanceEvaluationandSetpointVerification,"August1992.ProposedAppendixJrule.-8-May1995 SR8FrequencyTable1-InstrumentationRequirementSR3.3.1.1024MonthsSR3.3.1.1324MonthsSR3.3.1.1424MonthsSR3.3.1.1524MonthsSR3.3.1.1624MonthsSR3.3.1.1724MonthsPerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofPressurizerPressure-Low,PressurizerPressure-High,PressurizerWaterLevel-High,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop),ReactorCoolantFlow-Low(TwoLoops),UndervoltageRCPs,SGWaterLevel-LowLow,TurbineTrip-LowAutostopOilPressure,TurbineTrip-TurbineStopValveClosure,PowerRangeNeutronFlux,IntermediateRangeNeutronFlux,SourceRangeNeutronFlux,Overpower~TandOvertemperature~TFunctions.VerifyinterlockforPowerRangeNeutronFlux-LowandIntermediateRangeNeutrontripFunctions.VerifyinterlockforSourceRangeNeutronFluxtriFunction.VerifyinterlockforPressurizerPressure-Low,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low,RCPBreakerPosition(TwoLoops),andUndervoltage-BusllAandllBtriFunctions.VerifyinterlockforReactorCoolantFlow-Low(SingleLoop)andRCPBreakerPosition(SingleLootriFunctions.VerifyinterlockforTurbineTriFunctions.SR3.3.2.5SR3.3.2.6SR3.3.3.2SR3.3.4.2SR3.3.5.324Months24Months24Months24Months24MonthsPerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofSI,ContainmentSpray,SteamLineIsolation,FeedwaterIsolation,andAFWinitiation.VerifyinterlockforthePressurizerPressure-LowandSteamLinePressure-LowFunctions.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofallPAMSinstrumentation.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofLOPDGStartInstrumentation.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofcontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemactuationinstrumentation.SR3.4.12.824MonthsSR3.4.15.324MonthsPerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachrequiredPORVactuationchannel.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentsumpmonitor.May1995 SR8SR3.4.15.4SR3.7.6.2SR3.9.2.2Freuency24months24Months24MonthsTable1-InstrumentationRequirementPerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONoftherequiredcontainmentatmosphereradioactivitymonitor.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONforeachhydrogenrecombineractuationandcontrolchannel.PerformCHANNELCALIBRATIONofeachsourcerane.-10-Hay1995 SR¹SR3.5.2.5SR3.5.2.6SR3.6.3.5SR3.6.6.9SR3.6.6.10SR3.6.6.11SR3.6.6.12SR3.6.6.13SR3.7.2.3Table2Frequency24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months-PumpandValveActuationRequirementVerifyeachECCSautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedsinalactuation.VerifyeachfCCSpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.Verifyeachautomaticcontainmentisolationvalveactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedsinalactuation.Verifyeachautomaticcontainmentsprayvalveintheflowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedsignalactuation.Verifyeachcontainmentspraypumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.Verifyeachcontainmentrecirculationfancoolerunitstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.Verifyeachpost-accidentcharcoalfiltertraindamperactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.Verifyeachsprayadditivevalveintheflowpathactuatestothe.correctpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.VerifyeachHSIVcancloseonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.SR3.7.5.5SR3.7.5.6SR3.7.5.7SR3.7.8.2SR3.7.8.324Months24Honths24Months24Months24MonthsVerifyeachAFWvalveintheflowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.VerifyeachAFWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.VerifyeachSAFWtraincanbeactuatedandcontrolledfromthecontrolroom.VerifyeachSWautomaticvalveintheflowpathactuatestothecorrectpositiononanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.VerifyeachSWpumpstartsautomaticallyonanactualorsimulatedactuationsinal.-ll-Hay1995 Table2-PumpandValveActuationSR8SR3.7.9.3Frequency24HonthsRequirementVerifythecontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemactuatesonanactualorsimulatedactuation'sinal.-12-Hay1995 Table3-ReactivityandPowerDistributionSR¹SR3.1.2.1SR3.1.3.1SR3.1.3.2SR3.1.4.4SR3.1.6.1SR3.1.7.1FreuencyOnceaftereachrefuelingOncepriortoenteringHODEfollowingeachrefuelinOncepriortoenteringHODEfollowingeachrefuelinOncepriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadOncepriortoachievingcriticalityPriortoreactorcriticalityaftereachremovalofthereactorheadReuirementVerifymeasurecorereactivityiswithin+1%a,k/kofpredictedvalues.VerifyHTCiswithinupperlimit.ConfirmthatHTCwillbewithinlimitsat70%RTPandatEOL.Verifyroddroptimesofeachrod.VerifyestimatedcriticalcontrolbankpositioniswithinthelimitssecifiedintheCOLR.VerifyeachHRPIagreeswithin12stepsofthegroupdemandpositionforthefullindicatedrangeofrodtravel.-13-Hay1995 SR0SR3.3.1.11SR3.3.1.12SR3.3.2.4SR3.3.5.2SR3.4.1.3SR3.6.2.2SR3.6.7.1SR3.7.4.1SR3.8.1.6SR3.8.1.7SR3.8.1.8SR3.8.1.95.5.25.5.10Frequency24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Months24Honths24Months24Months24MonthsTable4-MiscellaneousRequirementPerformTADOToftheHanualReactorTrip,RCPBreakerPosition,andtheSIInputfromESFAStriFunctions.PerformTADOToftheTurbineTriFunctions.PerformTADOTofESFASManualInitiationandAutomaticActuationLogic,andAFWactuationofHFWumbreakeroenin.PerformTADOTofcontrolroomemergencyairtreatmentsystemactuationinstrumentation.VerifyRCStotalflowrateiswithinlimitsecifiedintheCOLR.Verifyonlyonedoorineachairlockcanbeopenedatatime.Operateeachhydrogenrecombinerblowerfanfor>5minutes.PerformacompletecycleofeachARV.VerifytransferofACpowersourcesfromthepreferredoffsitecircuittothealternateoffsitecircuit.VerifyeachDGdoesnottripduringandfollowinaloadrejectionof>295kW.VerifyeachDG'snonsafetyautomatictripsarebypassedonanactualorsimulatedSIsignal.Verifyloadsheddingof480VsafeguardsbusesandstartofeachDGonanactualorsimulatedLOPsinalinconjunctionwithaSIsinal.Integratedleaktestsforprimarycoolantsourcesoutsidecontainment.Allventilationfiltertestsrequiredtobeperformedonceevery18monthsperRG1.52arenow24months.-14-Hay1995 ItIIIlp(*l-*YplI}}

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