ML17258A485
| ML17258A485 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1982 |
| From: | Kister H, Wiggins J, Zimmerman R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A483 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-81-24, IEB-80-15, NUDOCS 8201290032 | |
| Download: ML17258A485 (22) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1981024
Text
Report
No. 50-244/81-24
Docket No. 50 244
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT,
Region I
50244-811105
50244-811113
50244-811114
50244-811119
50244-811202
License
No. DPR-18
Priority
Category
Licensee:
Rochester
Gas
and Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester,
New York 14649
Fac i 1 ity Name
R.
E. Ginna Nucl ear
Power Pl ant
Inspection at:
Ontario,
an, Senior Resident
Inspector
Inspection conducted:
November 1-December
31,
1981
e
Inspectors:
R. /+
R.
P. Zi
dat
signed
J
. Wiggi s
Reactor Inspector
d te signed
Approved by:
H. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects
Section IC, Division of Resident
8
Project Inspection
date signed
/a~s
2
dat
signed
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on November
1 thru December 31,
1981
Re ort No.'50-244 81-24)
reas
Ins ecte
Routine,
ons te, regu ar,
ac
s
z t an
wee en
snspection
by the
res
ent inspector
and
one regional-based
inspector
(140.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).
Areas inspected
included plant operating records; surveillance testing; maintenance;
Licensee
Event
Reports; fire protection program implementation; periodic and special reports; follow-
up on TMI Lessons
Learned;
IE Bulletin followup; licensee
action
on previous inspection
findings; and accessible
portions of the facility during plant tours.
Results:
Of the ten areas
inspected;
two items of noncompliance
were identified in two
areas
aFailure to follow plant operating procedures
- Paragraph
7; Failure to submit
a thirty day written report of degraded
mode operation - Paragraph
8).
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
'
'820fQ900$ ~
00244',
AOOCY 0500 PDR,
Q
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DETAILS
1.
Per sons
Contacted
The below listed technical
and supervisory level personnel
were
among those
contacted:
E. Beatty, Operations
Supervisor
J. Bodine,
gC Engineer
L. Boutwell, Maintenance
Supervisor
C. Edgar,
I
8
C Supervisor
D. Filkins, Supervisor Kealth Physics
and Chemistry
D. Gent, Results
and Test Supervisor
G. Larizza, Technical
Engineer
T. Meyer, Nuclear
Engineer
R. Morrill, Training Coordinator
J.
C. Noon, Assistant Plant Superintendent
C. Peck,
Operations
Engineer
B. guinn, Health Physicist
B. A. Snow. Plant Superintendent
S. Spector,
Maintenance
Engineer
J. Straight, Fire Protection
and Safety Coordinator
R. Wood, Supervisor of Nuclear Security
The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee
personnel
during
the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Inspector Follow Item (244/81-11-01):
Routine tours of the Auxiliary
Building indicate that decontamination efforts following the spring refueling
outage
have
been completed
and overall housekeeping
has
been
improved and main-
tained at satisfactory levels.
3.
Review of Plant
0 erations
a 0
GeneraI
The inspector
reviewed plant operations
through direct inspection through-
out the reporting period.
Activities in progress
included routine full
power operations
and recovery from a manual reactor trip on 11/14.
The
manual trip was initiated following indications of two dropped control rods
and the inadvertent actuation of portions of the fire suppression
system
(paragraph 7).
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Shift Lo s and
0 eratin
Records
Operating logs and records
were reviewed against Technical Specification
and administrative
procedure
requirements.
Included in the review were:
Control
Room Log
Daily Surveillance
Log
Shift Supervisor's
Log
Plant Recorder Traces
Plant Process
Computer Printout
Station Event Reports
Maintenance
Work Orders
and Trouble
daily during control
room
surveillance
daily during control
room
surveillance
daily during control
room
surveillance
daily during control
room
surveillance
daily during control
room
surveillance
11/1/81 through 12/31/81
1 1/1/81 through 12/31/81
The logs and records
were reviewed to verify that entries
were being properly
made; entries involving abnormal
conditions provided sufficient detail to
communicate
equipment status,
deficiencies,
corrective action restoration
and
testing;
records
were being reviewed
by management;
operating orders did not
conflict with the Technical Specification or reporting requirements;
logs
and records
were maintained in accordance
with Technical Specification
and
administrative
procedure
requirements.
Plait Tour
During the course of the inspection, tours of the following areas
were conducted:
Control
Room
Auxiliary Building
Intermediate Building (including control point)
Service Building
Turbine Building
Diesel Generator
Rooms
Battery
Rooms
Screenhouse
Yard Area and Perimeter
2.
The following observations
resulted
from the tours:
a ~
Monitoring instrumentation.
Process
instruments
were observed
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for correlation
between
channels
and for conformance with Technical
Specification requirements.
Annunciator Alarms.
Various alarm conditions which had
been re-
ceive
and ac
now edged were observed.
These
were discussed
with
shift personnel
to verify that the reasons for the alarms
were
understood
and corrective action, if required,
was being taken.
Shift mannin
.
Control
room and shift manning were observed for
con ormance with 10 CFR 50.54 (K), Technical Specifications,
and
administrative procedures.
Radiation
rotection controls.
Areas observed
included control point
operat on, posting of ra sat>on
and high radiation areas,
compliance
with Radiation
Work Permits
and Special
Work Permits,
personnel
monitor-
ing devices
being properly worn, and personnel
frisking practices.
E ui ment lineu s.
Valve and electrical
breakers
were verified to be in
t e posit on or condition required
by Technical Specifications
and plant
lineup procedures
for the applicable plant mode.
This verification in-
cluded control board indications daily and field observations
made during
plant tours.
E ui ment ta
in .
Selected
equipment, for which tagging requests
had
een >nitrate
, was observed to ver ify that tags were in place
and the
equipment in the condition specified.
Fire
rotection.
Fire detection
and fire fighting equipment
and controls
were
o serve
for conformance with Technical Specifications
and adminis-
trative procedures.
This area is discussed
in paragraph
6.
Securit
.
Areas observed for conformance with regulatory requirements,
t e sste security plan and administrative procedures,
included vehicle
and personnel
access,
protected
and vital area integrity, escort
and
badging.
Plant housekee in'ontrols.
Plant conditions were observed for con-
ormance wit
a ministratsve
procedures.
Storage of material
and
components
was observed with respect to prevention of fire and safety
hazards.
Housekeeping
was evaluated with respect to controlling the
spread of surface
and airborne contamination.
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
4.
Ins ector Witnessin
of Surveillance Tests
a.
The inspector witnessed
the performance of surveillance testing of selected
components
to verify that the surveillance test procedure
was properly ap-
proved and in use; test instrumentation
required
by the procedure
was cali-
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brated
and in use; Technical Specifications
were satisfied prior'to removal
of the system from service; test
was performed
by qualified personnel;
the
procedure
was adequately detailed to assure
performance of 'a satisfactory
surveillance;
and test results satisfied the procedural
acceptance
criteria,
or were properly dispostioned.
b.
The inspector witnessed
the performance of:
Periodic Test (PT)-2.1, Safety Injection System
Pumps,
Revision
31,
November 4, 1981, performed'ovember
5, 1981.
PT-2.3.1,
Post Accident Charcoal Filter Dampers,
Revision 8,
April 29, 1981, performed
November 12, 1981.
PT-26, Containment
Fan Recirculation Unit HEPA Filter Bank
Testing, Revision 5,
May 14, 1981, performed
November 17, 1981.
PT-22.2,
Personnel
Hatch Door Seal
Leak Rate Test, Revision 7;
June 9, 1981, performed
November 17, 1981.
Calibration of screenhouse
level transmitter
LT-3005, performed
December 23, 1981.
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
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Ins ector llitnessin
of Plant Maintenance
and Modifications
a ~
During the inspection period, the inspector
observed
various maintenance
and problem investigation activities to verify compliance with regulatory
requirements,
including those stated in the Technical Specifications;
com-
pliance with administrative
and maintenance
procedures;
compliance with
applicable
codes
and standards;
required
gA/gC involvement; proper use of
safety tags;
proper equipment alignment
and use of'jumpers;
personnel
quali-
fications; radiological controls ".for woi ker protection; retest requirements;
and ascertain reportability as required
by Technical Specifications.
In a
similiar manner the implementation of design
changes
and modifications were
reviewed.
Compliance with requirements
to update
procedures
and drawings
were verified and post modification acceptance
testing
was evaluated.
b.
The inspector witnessed
the following maintenance activities:
troubleshooting 'C'afety Injection
Pump breaker from Bus 16,
performed
November 5, 1981,
(paragraph 7)
flush of plugged spent fuel pool demineralizer,
performed
November 6, 1981.
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
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C.
Following a recent resin changeout in the spent fuel pool demineralizer,
no flow was experienced
through the demineralizer.
The licensee
attempted
to unplug the demineralizer
by flushing the resin back through the fill
line and into a Low Specific Activity (LSA) shipping box located in an un-
shielded
area
on the top floor of the Auxiliary Building which receives
substantial traffic.
Low activity was anticipated
from the relatively fresh
resin batch;
however, initial contact readings
on the fill line and
LSA box,
taken
by a health physics technician,
indicated approximately
30 REM/HR.
A
local continuous air monitor also alarmed
due to the high direct radiation
level.
The operation
was stopped
and
a precautionary
evacuation of the Aux-
iliary Building was conducted.
Air samples
and radiation surveys
were taken
and the area
roped off to prevent access
at a 100 MR/HR dose rate.
The
box was moved by fork lift into the shielded
drumming station area,
and nor-
mal access
to the area
was restored within several
hours.
The maximum dose
received
by an individual involved in the flush or transport evolution of
the resin
was approximately
700 MR.
The resin from the
LSA box has subsequently
been
pumped to the spent resin
tank and procedures
to pump the remaining resin in the demineralizer
and
fill line directly to the spent resin tank are being developed.
6.
Fire Protection
S stem
During the inspection period, the licensee
declared
the Fire Signaling System
complying with the November 17,
1981
commitment date discussed
in NRC's
Fire Protection Safety Evaluation dated February
14,
1979 and modified by sub-
sequent
NRC and licensee
communications.
The inspector
reviewed several
aspects
of the Fire Protection
program for confor-
mance with Technical Specifications
and administrative procedures.
a ~
The inspector
noted
numerous
outstanding Trouble Reports
documenting fire
seals
needing repair.
The reports did not provide sufficient information
to determine
the operability of the seals.
Periodic Test (PT)-13.1.14, Fire
Barrier Penetration
Seals,
from which the Trouble Reports
were generated,
contained
acceptance
criteria which went beyond that needed to assure
op-
erability.
The inspector
was unable to determine
from discussions
with
licensee
personnel
which seals, if any, were considered
The
licensee
representative
committed to reinspect
the seals
in question
using
revised acceptance
criteria which more specifically defined the critical
attributes of the seals.
Further, the licensee representative
stated that
the guality Control
and Results
8 Test Departments
would jointly inspect
the remaining fire seals listed in PT-13. 1. 14; and the group responsible
for performing future fire seal
inspections
would be determined
by January
29, 1982.
Findings associated
with the licensee's
inspection
are discussed
in para-
graph 7.
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b. 'uring review of the fire service water system lineup the inspector noted
that
a recent Engineering
Work Request
(1832B), Fire Signaling System,
changed
the required position of several
valves.
The changes
in system
lineup made
by the
EWR were not,
as of November
19, 1981, revised in the
Control
Room flow prints or plant procedures.
As a result, the licensee
representative
committed to the following actions:
The as-found fire service water system would be determined
by
November 20, 1981.
The required valve lineup for the newly modified fire service
water system would be determined
and the system aligned accordingly
by November 23, 1981.
Applicable prints and procedures
would be corrected to show the
correct system
by November
24, with a comprehensive
valve lineup
procedu} e established
and implemented
by December
15, 1981.
Administrative controls would be established
by December
15, 1981,
to ensure that valves
whose
tamper switches
were inoperative,
would
be locked in the proper position.
The guality Assurance
Department
would perform
a comprehensive
audit
of the fire signaling system modification reviewing design control;
procedural
implementation revision and control;
and system turnover
to the Operations
Department.
The audit will be performed
by Harch
15, 1982.
The inspector verified completion of each
commitment by the required date.
Results of the guality Assurance audit will be reviewed
by the inspector
upon completion.
(81-24-01)
7.
Licensee
Event
Re orts
LER's)
The inspector
reviewed the following LER's to verify that the details of the event
were clearly reported,
and to verify the accuracy of the description of cause
and
adequacy of corrective action.
The inspector determined
whether further informa-
tion was required,
and whether generic implications were Involved.
The inspector
also verified that the reporting requirements
of Technical Specifications
and
station administrative
and operating
procedures
had
been met; that appropriate
corrective action
had been taken; that the event
was reviewed
by the Plant Op-
erations
Review Committee;
and that the continued operation of the facility was
conducted within the Technical Specification l.imit.
81-16:
1C Safety Injection
Pump Breaker Failure - November 5,. 1981
(Repeat
Event
MLE M-02 and 81-05).
During routine surveillance testing, the 'C'afety In-
jection
Pump failed to close onto Bus 16.
The
pump
had
been
proven operable
using
the
Bus 14 breaker earlier in the test.
As a result of previous problems with
the closing circuit logic associated
with the breaker,
the licensee
removed the
breaker for examination
and
a spare
was installed
and satisfactorily tested.
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testing of the faulty breaker identified a weak lockout coil as the cause for
the failure.
81-'17:
Fire Spray/Sprinkler
System Inoperable-Nay/June
1981.
Several
portions
o1. ttte spray/sprinkler
system were removed from service to allow modification.
Continuous fire watches
were maintained until the systems
were restored to op-
eration during September
1981.
The above written report was not submitted within the Technical Specification
required time period,
and is further discussed
in paragraph
8.
81-18:
Fire Suppression
System
Zones-December
2, 1981.
Following
tTie inadvertent actuation of por,tions of the Fire Suppression
System,
as discussed
below in LER 81-19, three
zones
have
been temporarily isolated to preclude the
effects of a similiar inadvertent operation.
As described
in J. Haier's
(RG8E)
letter to D. Crutchfield
(NRC) dated
November 19, 1981,
a preaction
system will
be installed in the three areas
by replacing the existing open
heads
and nozzles
with fusible links in closed
heads.
Continuous fire watches
have
been posted
pending completion of the modification.
The three affected suppression
system
zones
are
as follows:
Zone S-15; Intermediate
Bui'lding basement
in the vicinity of rod drive
system
Zones
S-03 and S-04; Auxiliary Building mezzanine floor in the vicinity
of Bus 16.
81-19:
Inadvertent Fire Suppression
System Actuation-November
14, 1981.
During
Vunctlonal testing of the modified fire suppression
spray/sprinkler
system,
an
inadvertent actuation occurred following the performance of a lamp test
on Satel-
lite Station 'A'SSA).
SSA, located in the relay room, supplies
power to the
smoke detector s associated
with the fire protection
system in all areas
except
the relay room.
The lamp test tripped the supply circuit breaker,
which upon
resetting
randomly actuated spray/sprinkler
systems
in the following areas:
Screenhouse
basement
Control
Room water curtain (outside north wall)
Computer
Room Halon System
Control
Room Air Handling
Room
Oil Storage
Room
Intermediate Building basement
Mater spray in the Intermediate
Building resulted in the trip of one
RPS motor-
generator set,
and
a small
amount of water entering the control rod drive power
switchgear cabinet.
In response
to two dropped control rods,
caused
by the above
condition, the control
room operators
manually tripped the reactor from full power.
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All systems
operated
properly following the trip.
The unit was returned to service
on November
15, after drying wetted components
and verifying proper operation.
The inadvertent actuation
was
due in part to an apparent
design deficiency.
The
power supply to SSA originating from Instrument
Bus 'B's converted to DC, and
is supplied to
SSA through
a circuit breaker
designed to trip at 2.5 amps.
current readings
taken during steady state conditions,
subsequent
to the inadver-
tent actuation,
indicated approximately 2.4 amps.
Additionally, an extended
lamp
test was determined to draw approximately
an additional 1.0 amps.
The licensee
and supplier,
Gamewell, are currently reviewing the power supply design.
The li-
censee
intends to modify the
SSA as necessary
to increase
system reliability.
In
addition, several
suppression
zones
have
been temporarily isolated
as discussed
above in LER 81-18.
Although modification is warrented,
there is adequate
assurance
in the interim that
the
SSA will function as required.
Suppression
flow through automatic initiation
is dependent
on two smoke detector s alarming in a particular fire zone.
Each
de-.
tector in alarm draws about
50 milliamps.
Functional testingcof detector
combin-
ations prior to November 14, did not result in a trip of the
SSA supply breaker.
During the lamp test
on November
14, the supply breaker tripped, deenergizing
SSA.
Site Contingency
(SC) Procedure-3.16.2.3,
Satellite Station 'A'tartup Following
Lockout, provides the necessary
steps to follow for reenergizing
following a loss of power.
The procedure requires
disconnecting
each solenoid valve
actuator associated
with the fire suppression
deluge valves to prevent inadvertent
actuation of the fire system
due to transients
when power is suddenly restored.
The
individual performing the test did not have SC-3.16.2.3 available at the work site
and reenergized
SSA without first disconnecting
each solenoid valve actuator.
The
inadvertent actuation resulted.
Failure to follow procedure
SC-3.16.2.3 is contrary
to Technical Specification 6.8. 1 and is considered
an item of noncompliance.
(81-
24-02)
The inspector will continue to follow licensee
actions concerning the power supply
design for SSA.
(81-24-03)
01-20:
Seals
Not Intact Novem-ber 19,
1901.
Burin9,li-
censee
performance of surveillance test PT-13.1.14, Fire Barrier Penetration
Seals,
two fire seals
from the 'A'attery
Room were identified as not being installed.
Fireproof. board
was found to be installed
on both sides of the penetration with no
foam having been installed.
A fire watch was posted
as required.
The licensee
stated that improved training of installers
and more supervision of actual
work will
be provided.
Administrative Control of Re ortin
Re uirements
a ~
Several
portions of the fire suppression
spray/sprinkler
system were taken
out of service for modification and remained out of service for several
months
as listed below.
Technical Specification 3.13.3.1
states that with
a portion of the spray/sprinkler
system out of service for greater
than
fourteen days,
a Thirty Day Written Report shall
be submitted outlining the
cause of the inoperability and the plan for restoring the system to operable
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status.
Failure to submit such
a report is contrary to TS 3.14.3.1
and is
considered
an item of noncompliance.
(81-24-04)
~Sstem
Removed from Service
Returned to Service
'A'iesel Generator
Room
'B'iesel
Generator
Room
Cable Tunnel
June
10,
1981
May 6,
1981
June 5,
1981
September
16,
1981
September
16,
1981
September
4,
1981
b.
The operating shift personnel
use Administrative Procedure
(A)-52.4, Control-of
Limiting Conditions for Operating
Equipment, to track actions required
by a
Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO).
A separate
A-52.4 is generated
and completed for each
LCO that is entered.
The
'open'-52.4's
remain
on the shift supervisor's
desk until all required actions
are completed, with a copy given to the Operations
and Maintenance
Engineers.
Although individual A-52.4's were generated for each portion of the spray/
sprinkler system
when removed from service,
and
a fire watch was posted with-
in an hour as required, the A-52.4's were not adequately
reviewed to ensure
compliance with Technical Specification reporting requirements.
The inspector stressed
to licensee
management,
that during the past year
several
noncompliances
have
been
noted concerning reporting requirements,
and that although part of the reason
stemmed
from a misinterpretation of
Technical Specifications,
a review of administrative controls appeared
warranted.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspector's
comment.
9.
Followu
on IE Bulletins
IEB
The inspector
reviewed facility records,
interviewed licensee
personnel
and
observed facility equipment/components
to verify that:
licensee
management
received
and reviewed the bulletins in accordance
with administrative procedures;
information discussed
in the licensee's
bulletin response
was accurate;
corrective action was taken
as discussed
in the reply; and,
the licensee's
response
was within the time period required.
IEB 80-15, Possible
Loss of Emergency Notification System
(ENS) Mith Loss of
OFF:s~ite
ower.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
Bulletin response
dated
August 29, 1980;
Preventive Action Report 69-80 dated
June 24, 1980;
and
an August 28,
1981
memorandum
from the Office Supervisor to the Plant Superintendent.
The memo-
randum discussed
information obtained from New York Telephone
describing the
power supply to the Emergency Notification System.
Power to the
ENS is supplied
/
I
'lf
l
I
separate
from other station
power sources
and is expected to remain reliable
during a loss of offsite power.
In addition, the inspector
reviewed Administra-
tive Procedure
A-56 "Communication Systems at Ginna Station", Revision 3, Sep-
tember 22, 1980.
Section 3.6.1.1 of A-56 implements
a one hour
NRC notification
for failures of the
ENS.
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
10.
Followu
Ins ection - Three Mile Island
Lessons
Learned
Im lementation
III.E.1.1
System Evaluation - Short Term
Reference:
IE Inspection
Report 81-21
The licensee
performed
an endurance test of the 'B'otor Driven Auxiliary
Pump
on November',
1981.
The test
was performed in accordance
with
Periodic Test (PT)-16.4, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump Recirculation
Flow Test, Revision 0, October 7, 1980.
Based
on the inspector's
review of test
data,
the licensee
appears
to have satisfied the requirement
and associated
commitment as addressed
in the referenced
inspection report.
11.
Review of Periodic
and
S ecial
Re orts
Upon receipt, periodic and special
reports submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to
and 6.9.3 were reviewed
by the inspector.
This
review included the following considerations:,
the report included the information
required to be reported
by NRC requirements;
test results and/or supporting in-
formation were consistent with design predictions
and performance specifications;
planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems;
determination
whether any information in the report required classification
as
an
abnormal
occurrence;
and the validity of the reported information.
Within the
scope of the above,
the following periodic reports
were reviewed
by the inspector.
Monthly Operating Report for October,
1981.
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
12.
Exit Interview
At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection,
meetings
were held
with senior facility management
to discuss
the inspection
scope
and findings.
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