ML17256A637
| ML17256A637 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/1983 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0821, RTR-NUREG-821, TASK-03-01, TASK-03-06, TASK-09-03, TASK-3-1, TASK-3-6, TASK-9-3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8304180672 | |
| Download: ML17256A637 (10) | |
Text
"I RESULATURY FORMATION DISTRISUTION SYN (SIDS)
I ACCESSION NBR;8300180672 DOC ~ DATE: 83/04/11 NOTARIZED:.NO DOCKET FACIL;50-240 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant~ Unit ig Rochester G
05000244 AUTH'AME AUTHOR AFF ILIATION HAIERgJ,E, Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp<
RECIPNNAHE RECIPIENT AFFILIATION CRUTCHF IELDz D ~
Operating Reactors Branch 5
SUBJECT:
Forwards responses to SEP Topics III liIII-6 8 IX 3 re tanks. Some seismic upgrading of sodium hydroxide, tank warranted,Mod will be completed during 1984 refueling
- outage, DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E. MAIER Vice Preei0ent
'TCI.CPHONC ARCA CODE 7le 546-2700 April 11, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactox Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Opexating Reactors Branch No.
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatoxy Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
Several issues were summarized in the Ginna Final Integrated Plant Safety Assessment
- Report, NUREG-0821, related to tanks.
These issues are:
SEP Topic III-1: It should be confirmed that curxent com-pxessive and tensile stress requirements axe met for the refueling water storage tank and the boric acid storage tanks.
SEP Topic III-6:
The seismic qualification of the volume control tank and the sodium hydroxide tank should be determined.
SEP Topic IX-3:
An evaluation should be made of the capability of the xeactor makeup water tank to withstand seismic forces and tornado missiles, such that flooding of required safe shutdown equipment would not occur.
The responses are summarized in the three attachments.
Based on the results of these
- analyses, RG&E has determined that some seismic upgrading of the sodium hydroxide tank is warranted.
RGGE expects the modification for the sodium hydroxide tank to be completed during the 1984 refueling outage.
Very truly yours, 8804t80678 8804tl PDR ADQCK 05000244 PDR La.
~P
R SEP Topic III-1 Issues Related to Tanks In RG6E's January 24, 1983 response concerning this SEP
- topic, we stated that we would confirm that the compressive and tensile stress requirements of the current ASME Code are met, for the RNST and the boric acid storage tanks.
Since the RNST was analyzed to current ASME criteria, RG&E has concluded that, following modifications being contemplated by RGEE, the RWST would satisfy the stress criteria.
The roof design load was not checked during the seismic analysis;
- however, it is considered that the roof design load would have an insigni-ficant impact on the overall tank evaluation.
RG&E is presently in the process of reanalyzing the RWST for seismic capacity, based on using seismic response spectra and damping values consistent with the SEP,review (the original analysis was performed to the guidance provided in Regulatory Guides 1.60 and 1.61).
Pending the results of that, analysis, RG&E cannot at this time determine the modifications, if any, which would be required such that the tank would accommodate the SSE.
The criteria to be used in this latter analysis is that the tank not lose its water-retaining ability, and that some margin to failure exist.
It is not considered necessary that current stress allowables be strictly complied with.
The boric acid storage tanks were analyzed during the SEP by the NRC's contractor, and found to be acceptable for the SSE.
Since the real issue is the capability of the tanks to withstand the SSE without failure, and this has been
- shown, RGGE considers this issue resolved.
rtI 1
SEP Topic III-6 "Seismic Qualification of the VCT and NaOH Tank" Volume Control Tank:
This is a vertical cylindrical vessel, located on the intermediate floor of the Auxiliary Building.
The tank body is supported above the floor by four columns.
The tank was analyzed for two separate cases:
full of water, and partially filled, to take into account the sloshing action of the water.
The tank natural frequencies and accelerations were found using the Safe Shutdown Earthquake of 0.2g.
The damping values of 3%,
for the filled tank condition, and 0.5%, for the sloshing condition, were used.
It was determined that the "full" case resulted in the higher stress levels.
As a result of the analysis, RG&E concluded that the VCT would not meet current seismic criteria.
Howevex, the radiological consequences of the failure of this tank have previously been calculated (see Section 14.2.3 of the FSAR) and shown to be substantially lowex than the guideline exposures of 10CFR Part 100; the tank is not used for safe shutdown (the RWST will provide the necessary safe shutdown reactivity and inventory control); and the tank volume is small enough (1500 gallons) not to be of concern with respect to flooding of safety-related equipment.
RGaE, therefore, does not consider that. any modifications should be incorporated.
Sodium Hydroxide Tank:
This is a horizontal cylindrical tank located in the Auxiliary Building.
The tank rests on two steel and concrete saddles.
The method of analysis was to model the tank body and saddles as a cantilever beam with a lumped mass at the fxee end.
The lumped mass included the tank mass and fluid mass.
Tank natural frequencies were found and the accele-rations were obtained for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake of 0.2g, with 3% damping.
, T It was determined that the tank, as pxesently supported,
'ould not meet current seismic criteria.
- However, a minox modification to connect. the tank body to one of the saddles will provide the necessary support.
RGGE intends to install this modification during the 1984 refueling outage.
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". <..l SEP Topic IX-3 Cooling Water Systems The reactor makeup water tank (RMWT) is a vertical cylindrical vessel located on the operating floor of the Auxiliary Building.
This tank has a capacity of 75,000 gallons.
- Thus, concern was expressed relative to the potential flooding of safety-related equipment in the basement of the auxiliary building associated with damage to the tank, resulting from causes such as seismic forces or tornado-generated missiles.
As part of RG&E's Structural Reanalysis
- Program, RG&E has calculated the potential for tornado-generated missiles causing tank perforation.
Based on these calculations, RG&E concluded that the missiles associated with a tornado windspeed of 166 mph would not, damage the RMWT.
Since the design basis tornado for Ginna is expected to be lower than 166 mph, RG&E has concluded that tornado-missile-related damage is not of concern.
RG&E further determined that potential damage to the RMWT was not of safety concern in any case, since the volume of water which could cause flooding of required safe shutdown equipment is greater than the volume of the tank.
The Residual Heat Removal pit is a room approximately 24 x 16 1/2 x 23 70,000 gallons.
The safety-related equipment on the basement floor is more than 8
inches above the floor elevation, which corresponds to about 24,000 gallons.
- Thus, even if the tank were to fail, the required safe shutdown equipment would still be available, using the water-solid steam generator shutdown method previously approved for Ginna by the NRC.
RG&E thus has concluded that the RMWT does not need to be seismically qualified.
This issue is considered to be resolved.
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