ML17252A406
| ML17252A406 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1966 |
| From: | Commonwealth Edison Co |
| To: | US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| References | |
| Download: ML17252A406 (50) | |
Text
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<':,;_. DOCKE.T NUMBER. 8-29-66
_,-~ V!" " RR.OD. & UTll. FAC.. 50-~41 UNITE[) STATES AT0>1IC ENERGY C0\11-.IISSIO:'J In the ~latter of the Appiication of COMMO~WEALTil EDISON C0~1PANY I.*
. APPLICANT'S EXHI~IT NO. 1 SUM\IARY DESCRI PT! ON OF DRESDE:{ U~I T
- 3.
AND EVALUATION OF CONSIDERATIO~S HlPORTANT -to SAFE TY .-
.. ~ .....
. ****-*'- - ...........iv:. ...... l~O INTRODUCTIO~ l, l l.cneral
- Subsequent to the issuance of Provisional Construction Pc rm i t No , CPP R- 1 S on January l 0 , 1 9 6 6 in AE C Dk t *. No , 5 0 - 2 3 7 authorizing construction.of Unit 2 ~t Dresden Nuclear Power Station~ Cornmonwe~lth Edison Company determined, subject to the receipt of the necessary authorizations, to proceed with the.construction of Unit 3 adjacent to Unit 2 (see Plat~ l~
.tation Perspec.tive)', It was also determined that Dresden Units 2 and 3 would be identical in virtually all respects, ~ design.*.*.
concepts and criteria, capacity and components, and that any. improvements incorporateJ in Unit 3 would also be incorporated. 1 i in Unit 2, . Accordingly, the only differences the design of Units 2 and ,3 relate solely to the location* of c6nte~plated in
....... I f
equipment and, for desired diversity, thci use by Unit 3 of the l
~
345 KV sy~tem as a source of normal auxiliary powcir, rather than i the 138.KV system source to be used for Unit 2. e The design of Unit 3, howevei, differs fr6m the Unit 2 i f r
*design which was reviewed by the AEC in Dkt, No. 5-0-237 prior to issuance of CPPR-18* because of (i) changes in .the interconn~.ctions.
of c~rtain auxiliary systems and sharing certain c6mmon facilities, (ii) changes relatc<l to ~roviding a turbine-generator for Unit 3
- which is approximately 2% larger in ~apacity than originally con-sidered for Unit 2, (iii) change~* developed in finalizing .the design of Uni ts 2 and .. 3, and. (iv) refinements in certain analyses.
~ *All changes irt the Unit 2 design required to conform with w .the Unit 3 <lesion will be submitted for review bv a~endme~ts of the Unit 2 r!ant Design and Analysis Report file<l in AEC Dkt, No. 50-237~ .*
- 2 Each of the differences in the Unit 3 design from that previously review~d for Unit 2 are identified and analyzed in the Unit 3 Plant Design and Analysis Report as arncinded filed in Docket No, 50-249, Plate 2, attached hereto~ provides an index to. each section of the Unit 3 Report in whi~h a change in design is. described or analyzed.. Nore of such changes involve any chanr,es in* the Principal Arcl1itectural and Engineering Criteria, set forth in section 4,0 hereof, which ftovern the developm~nt of the
.* design of both Unit5 2 and 3,
- A detailed evaluation has been made of the manner in.
which the Unit .3 design satisfies the "General Design Crit'eria for Nucleai: Power Plants" published by the Atomic Energy Commission on Nover.iber 2 2, 1965 and utilized by the AEC staff for evaluati.on
~* ....
of Unit 2 in AEC Kt, No, 50-237, Such evaluation is set forth in Appendix H of the Unit 3 Plant Design and Analysis Report, Since Appendix H was filed as a part of Amendment No, 1 to the Unit 3 Plant Design and Analysis Report, ~everal design 9:hanges have been effected by subsequent amendments, principally Amendment No, 5, Specifically, s~ch changes provide (i) in lieu 6f one of the two isolation condenser sister.is qriginally proposed, a high pressure coolant injection system which, in addition to ierving as a backup fo~ the rema~riing isolation condenser system,. can restore any loss df coolan~ resulting from postulated breaks of limited size in the primary I system~ (ii) additi6nal redundancy in components of each of the core .spray systems, (iii) a low pressure coolant injection syste~ capable of promptly rcfloo<ling the core to prevent significant core melting after a postulated
*accident resulting in the loss of coolant at the maximum credible
- 3 rate~ (iv) redundancy in emergency power, (v) emergcn~y'coolant supply, (vi) automatic relief valve operation, (vii) two separate
~nd independent tontainmcnt spray systems for each unit 2 an<l 3, and (viii) redundant components in the rod worth minimizer *.
Each of the foregoing changes provides additional
~ssurance that the Commission's General Design Criteria will be satisfied and that Unit 3 can be constructed and op~ratcd without j~opardizing public health and safety, 1.2 Applicability to Statement of Issues in Notice of Hearing
. 1.
This <locuraent is responsive principally to the fir~t issue, and incideritally to th~ fourth issue, stitcd in the Notice
*of Hearing issued herein*dated August 22, 1966, With respect *to su~paragraph (1) of the first issue, the following sections 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, s.oi ~nd 6,0 provide a description of the propoi;d design or the facili'ty, set forth the principal architectural and cngin~ering criteria for design and identify the major features of components on which technical inforD~tion is r~quired *
. &ection 6,0 also commits the Applicant to furnish such technical information ~nd, therefore, is responsive to subparagraph (2)
*of* the first issue, In.relation to the issues raised in subparagraph (3) of the first issue, the Applicant c9n~i<lers that there arc n6 unresolved s~fety questions respetting Unit 3 rind, accor<lingly, that a research and development program is not required to resolve safety questions. Even though further tests and design effort are required to confirm analyses and establish final detail~d design of certain ~omponents, these are matters which lie beyond the . issues relevant at this* stage of the licensing process. As was
ill f I
- ~;. .*. i
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stated in the Initial Decision dated December 29, 1965 entered in AEC Dkt. 50-237, "all such efforts will be analyzed and
~valuated by the Applicant and the Staff as the project goes forward~ arid all will be consid~red prior to licensing the facility for operation."
Whil~ the document in its entirety is responsive to subparagraph (4) (~ther than the clause respecting unresolved
- saf~~y questions) of the first is~ue, the Applicant consi<lriis that sections 2.0, 1~0 and 8.0 are particul~rly relevant in .this 9cspec.t. * * :1
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- 2;0 SITE AND ENVIRONS The site for Dresden Unit 3 is the Dresden Nucleai Power Station 6wned by Com6onwealth and consisting of approximately 953 acres in Goose Lake Township, Grundy County, Illin6is. In addition, Coramonwealth leases from the State of Illinois approximate~y 17 acres lyirig in t~o narrow strips of river frontage along the northeast and east edges of th~ Station. The Station bouridaries generally follow the Illinois Rivet to the north, the Kankakee River to the east, a
. country road from Devin~ extended eastwa~d to the Kankakee 'Ri~er on
- th.e south and the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railroad right-of-way on* the west.
The Dresden Station serves as the site for Dresden Unit 1, a General *Electric boiling water ~eactor,_which is and has ~een:in
.~Operation since 1960. D~6sden Unit 2, located immediately west of Unit 1, is under const_ruction pursuant to CPPR- ~8 issued. January 10, 1966 pursuant to the Initial Decision entered in AEC Dkt. 50-237.
Dresden Unit 3 is to be located immediately west of and adjace~t to *
- 9unit .2 .. The eastermost unit, Unit _l, will be situated approximately
- O.S mile from the center line of the Kankakee River to the east and
';the westernmost unit, Unit 3, will be locaied approximately *orte mil~ ...
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f~om t~e west boundary_ of the site and all of the*units will be
- situ~ted approximat~ly 0.5 mile~outh of the center line of the navi-gational channel in the Illinois River and O.S mile no~th of the south boundary of the site (see'Plat~s 3 and 4).
There are no residences .on the site. Portion~ of the site* outside the fenced area occupied by Unit 1 and re~uired in the cbn-
- struction of Units 2 and 3 *are leased to a neighboring fanaer for cattle grazing and p~oducii6n of field crops.
Dresden.Nuclear Power Station was thorou~hly investigated-as a
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site for . an~Jt'\~~f~~,to be sUit/able by the 195 6.:wh~1\ *{l!~* C;ons t nict ion permit.* for.
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- DresJen Un.lt .~P./(c::c~:R:~;z,'),. ~\ra.s. is*sucd.::* 1'.h<<¢<:successfuL operation o.f
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- 1 since . _: i S>,9;,Q:;~t~nfL'.J:4l¢ ..'.e:f)vi r_ohs-: mq:'h'~J~oting* programs carried on
~by National Laboratory
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- in 1965 <luting t~e~
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cpurse of ., . .. Studies in the areas of*
.d m,et e oro l ogr /:g_~o~fiifer.:;: /~):iiAJiio 1oiy. *. hr~~ .r:q(tp*gy *. popu i at ion <lens i ty . and ** ' _. ~
usage i~.;:~*t~H~~~i~i~'~;j~~e'.e p;epZ~~~~~~d subm~tted for r~VieW by '* *,* .*...
*.the A.to mi c En*.~j<gy~':¢omffi:f~:s:.'f.'.on, arid otJi.e-( *~g6y(rnmental agencies, including the Office* o~.;~.~~~9}~~~*~~~~.\~~seats~Y5~~~i~&iCalsurvey;. Fis.h and lHld"
'.t:Jye'.':V~"-*~.~ .*_~fopartment*;::a.f,\;~_rye., Interior and the Coast and*
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- 1ife Service* .o:f
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Geodetic $urvef'.~~T,:'}tr.~\,e* }):* *?'~>>~Departri).~'n.~*~>>.9.( ~oinmerce .and seismc:dogic .
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. consultants efl)p,nqy:,(:~:9/!?x:;* :~n~>:;At~rnl c *i;;ne:r*g*y y~bmmi s s ion, as we 11 ~A? . the
- Atomic. S afetY~~~}~.~~~.~~l~f;'i6~fd, ;,~.,~~~~t~*~fso; 2 3;. On . the basis *of ...
such studies> a,n9st.~. ~'.r~¢,W:iJ.'.*}~as conc:i:u:ge~w*.by,:a)l of the foregoing ** 4an'cies that *:'~11~;*:::_:*6;~,~"si:'.~-*;s*~~t*i6n;.'pib.i.~~~:~T: ~**suitable*, site for construe- .** I~.* ' * '.:{:~-~*~*~-~;r ,'>~~*, <*,<, > " * : \ .... ~*"j;,:::*: '" ** * *' "* * ' ti on and opcrati_on'.":J>;f. Ufait. 11,z*. (S~e -ln'it_i~=~ .Decision dated December 29,** *
.. 19 65 , * .ent e
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~*a111:~f-~~*;ru:e:I:t~¢:~*}T8.;_f.ic;l f e.vi'e}i~*:*,i;!q,u,al}Y support the *con cl us ion , ..
and *operatic:in .*
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- De.ta i 1 s **.
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Volµ r.ie I If Report subr.iitted* .: .** in .AEC Unit* 3; Plane Oe;s*:1;gtf.-.c<a:J:ld';~;:Ana'lys.1s,Report**. :~':>> *. * '. ~. ::
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*.3. 0 *SLJi.IMARY DESCRIPTIO:~ OF THE FACILITY 3,1 Introduction Dresden Uhit 3 i~ to be a G~neral Electric boiling water re~ctor identical in its design features to Dresden Unit 2, the con-
. struction of which was recently authorized in the proceedings on the application of the Commonwealth Edison Company in Atomic Energy Commission Docket 50-237. Certain common facilities are provided
. for Units* 1, 2 and 3 which are ~ummarized in Sect ion 5- hereof*
.Almost alJ of the features o~ Unit 3 have been demonstrat~d e succes~fu~ly in the operation of one or more of the General Electric boiling water reactors \vhich have been constructed,. including the basic fuel design, zircaloy fuel cladding, hydraulically operated controi rods, in-core neutron monitoring inStrtirnentation, pressure suppression*
.. containment and radioactiv~ waste control. All new ~eatures {see Section 6.0 hereofj which have not yet been utiliz~d on an operating reactor ~ill have been demonstrat~d on Dresden Unit i, whi~~-~ill ~e*
placed intd operatiori approximately one jear prior to Unit 3. *
*e of the PlantA technical description of Unit 3 is given in Section I-4.0 Design arid Anafysis Report~ The following is intended to highlight the principal design features which are signfficant to*,
safety considerations, and Table 1 summarizes plant design-features and sotrte data appropriate to achieve a react qr theraal. otitput of 2255 ~*fi'l. While some of the paraneters listed in the table may be refined as design and procurement progresse~, the *final design will satisfy the principal architectural and enzineering criteria for desigri as set forth in Section 4 hereof. A drawing of the reactor
**and containnent typical of that contemplated for Unit 3 is shown in Plate s .*
:-~- *-** .*---****-----.*- --- . .. -* __ '. ... - . **.-***-. **-- - *-*- .. 0. -
3.2 Reactor Pri~ary Svstem The reactor is a single cycl6, fotced circulation, boilinc water rcact6r producing steam foi dircc~ use in ihe stea~ turbine; The fuel for the rc~ctor cor~ consists of sli~htly enriched uranium dioxide pellets contained in seal~d Zir~aloy-2 ttibes. These fuel to<ls are assembled irito individual fuel assemblies of 4Q fuel rods each~ A complete core loading consists of 724 fuel assemblies. Control of the core is achieved by 177 movable control rods arid 324 temporary contr61 surtairis. The control rods consist of assembli~s of 3/16-inch diameter, sealed, stainless steel tubes con-9ning ~ompacted boron powder and held in a cruciform array by a stainless steel sheath fitted with castings at each end. The. conttol rods are of the bot tom- entry type and are* moved vertically within the corci by individual, hydraulically operated, locking piston typ~
~ohtrol rod drives. The control rod is withdrawn or inserted at a . . . .. ~
_______ __:. _______________ -------*--*-**-----**-**---**-------------~-.:._-~_**_.-**--.---*~-. limited rate, one rod at a time, for power level control and f.1.ux shaping ~uririg reactor operation. Stored energy ?~ailable from gas-chargcd accumulators and from reactor pressure provides hydraulic r9er*for rapid simultaneous insertion of all control rods**ror r.eactor< shutdown. Each drive has its own separate coritrol arid scram device~: Th~ teciporary control curtains fabricated of boron stainless steel will be fixed between fuel channels during th~ early life of the. ini ti a 1 core to supp lemcn t the con t-ro 1 rods. Reactor power 1eve1
.cont~ol is. augmented by controlling the r~circu1ation flow~rate th;ough; the reactor core.
A standby liquid control system is provided as an independerit redund~nt control mechanism to be used. in the remote ~v~nt that the con~rol rod system become inoperative. The reactot pressure vessel contains the reactor core and
- structure,* the steam separators and dryers, the jet punps, the cont ro 1
- --------------------~----------* ---:-- *:-- ---------------:-~--9--* -;., -----:----*- -----,----------~---
rod guide tubes, the feed0ater, core spray and standby liquid control spargers, and other cornponenis. The main connectiohs to the reactor* vessel include the steam _lines, jet purap recirculation lines, feed-
- water liri~s, control rod drive thimbl~s and oth~r cdnne6tions fdr core cooling~ Plate 6 is a*cut-away view of the reactor vessel, and core.
arrangement. Reactor coolant 'enters the bottom of the core and flows
...... -~ -*** .. - -** .... :---~:---***-**-* __ .:...:...
* * ' * * * "I '
upHard through the fuel assemblies where boiling pro<luces steam__*___ _T~.!~_: _ _ _.__ _ steam wate_r mixture** is separated by steam separato~s and dryers 1 ocated
**rithin the upper portion of the reactor vessel,* and the steam -passes . . ' ' .
the core inlet- through jet p~mps lo~ated . . . within the . r~actor ves~el. .
- The motive force for the jet pumps is supplied by th~ water from the,~_':;.'_--
t~o reactor coolant recirculatiori loops. The recirculation~pump* motors receive electrical pm*rer from variable frequency motor.:.
. generator _sets which are used to vary. pump speed and the resultant
-*-* -_ 9ecirculation _flow rate as a means._ of reactor power level control. 3,3 Containment Systems_
~Unit 3 employs an independent primary containment sysieM *
- identic)1.l to that for Dresden Unit 2, The primary contain_ment, con-
.; Sisting'-' of a drywell ~ a pressure-'SUppression char.1ber' and* intercon.-
_necting vent pipes, provides the printipal containment barrier
. surrounding ihe ~eactor pressure vessel and recirculation co~ling system. Any leakage -from the primary contairnnent is to the seconda.ry containlilent system which consists_of the reactor building, the-standby'
-_gas tteatment system, and- the 310 foot stack. These l~tter features; - :
_of the secondary containment are conmonto.both.Units 2 and 3. _ _The primary ccmt~i!iment .is: d~signed to accommodate the'
--*---~*-'--*.....:...* ****-. ........... ~----**
.. 10 press*ures and tesperatures which \'/ould result fror.1 pr occur sub- ! :f . .
_A._ *. -* sequent to a failure equivalent to a circumferential rupture of a re- ..
. circulation l i'ne \ii th in the primary co11tainment. .*~he pressure sup-pression chamber is a steel torus~~haped pressure vessel approximately h~lf filled with water, and loc~t6d below and encircling the drywell.
The vent system from the drywell terminates below the watei level of
*A.
the pressure suppression chamber so that in the event of .a pipe failure
'~*
~*in the drywell the released steam would pass directly to the water.whet~
...fr~:
.. , it' \'/OUld .be condense.p. This transfer bf energy to the water p9ol uould.
. tleducc rapidly (lii thin 3~ seconds) the residual pressure in the dry.-
well and substantially reduce the potential for subsequent*leakag~ from the primary containment. Two featutes .are included in the primary containment design to aid* iti maintaining the i~tegrity of the primary cbntainmcnt
-system: indefinitely in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
*; . . . . . . . . . ~~* .
iFirst, two independent, redundant cooling systems are inclu<led for the remov~l:of ~eat within the <lrywell and .the. pressure suppfe~sion
- 9=hamber. Second, provision is made in the containment structure i design t~ inert oi control the composition of the contairiment
};
iatmosphere d~ring plant operation. The iriert atmosphe~e is
- intended to pieclu<le a hydrogen~6xy~en reaction should.any
*appreciable *metal~wnter reaction occur subs~q~ent to a loss~of-coolant accident.
Tbe primary safeguards functions of th~ secondary contain-ment are to minimize ground level release 6£ airborne raJioacti~e mate.rials' and to provide for controlled, filtered, and elevated
.release" oi:the:building atr.tosphere under accident con<litions~
The reactor ~uilJitig .which encom~asses the primary containment of
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Units 2 and 3 provides secondary containment when the primary
*containment is in service, and primary containment during periods when the primary containment is open.* .For these reasons, the
~ea~tor building is de~igned as a controlled leakage structure.
A standby gas treatment system is provided to treat the reactor building atmosphere and exhaust it .t6 the 310 foot stack during containment isolation conditions.
- Th~ safeguards features of both the primary containment
- and the ieactor bui~ding tire capable of being tested periodically.
- 9 3.4 Auxiliary and Standby Coolin~ Systems In addition to the turbine gcrierator and main condenser*
-~:system, multiple independent auxiliary systems are provided for*
*reactor and containment coolirtg under various normal and abnoima1 conditions~
(a) A shutdown cooling system is provided which circ~lates w~ter from the reactor through heat exchang~rs and back to iRi reactor for.the ~emoval of reactor decay heat. e . (b) An isolation condenser system is provided for dissipation of decay heat when the reactor is under *full pressure and isolated from the main coridenscr. The isolation condenser has its own contained cooling water with replenishnent from two independent sources.*.* (c) A hiih. pressure coolant injection system is pro~ided f6r dissipation of <lecay heat as* backup to the isolation* condenser,
- ana to provide coolant ihventory control and heat dissipation to
.the suppressi6n chamber ~ndcr postulated slow depressurizat~on acci<l~nts.
(<l) Two core spray systems are designed to ptmp. water *unc.lcr *
*.' accident. conditions ff om the" press lire suppression. chamber. pool .
> .* 12 dirc~tly t~ the reactor core by a spray header or sparger mounted in the reactor vessel above the core. (e) A low pressure coolant injection system is provided to pu~p ~at~r from the suppression chamber pool thr6ugh heat exchangers directly.t6 the itiner v~ssel surrounding the core, thus reflooding the core and ~aintaining cooling of .the fuel a~~emblies s~~sequent to postulated loss of coolant accident. (~) *An emergency coolant supply system, ~rovided by a cross-tie
. between the service -.wate.r system and the feedwater system, makes *.-available an* inexhaustib..le supply of cooling water to the core and*
containment independent of all other cooling water sources* *. (f) . In addition, the d~sign provides for two indcpendcint primary containment spray cooling systems which pump water under accident conditions from the pressure supp~ession ~hamber pooi -~ through .a hca~ exchanger to spray nozzles discharging into the drywe l I. 3.5 *Plant Control ~ncl Instrumentation e.* Reactor power i~ controlled by movement of ~ontrol rods ind by regulation of the recirculation flow rate, Control rods are used to bring t~e react6r thr~ugh the full range of power and io shape the core power distribution, Load following ~nd adjust-ments in reactor pow~r level are-' *acc6mplishe<l. with recirculation
*, flow cont ro 1. Proce<lura. 1 cont ro 1s *---****
supplemented by protective dev:i ce_~ .... _: .. :_.
~re used so that .thermal perfotrnarice does not exceed established limits. Also, to mini~ize the c~ri~e~~~~ces of postulated r~activit~
in~ertion, a rod worth minimizer is provided to resttict control rod patterns to those in *which ~he worth *of any tod d6es ~ot exceed a nominal 9.* ozs~.
*********"'"'-~ _, ., .'. . 13 - .
A bypass -system having a capacity oE approximately 40% of sicam*flo~ at rateJ load is supplied with. the turbin~ to restrict* oVeiprcssure transients resultinn fro~ ~udden turbine cont~oi:
* .* ~alve or stop valve cldsure, P~~tial load rejectiori can be
. accommodated___~.?:' _t_he ~~ap~_d acti_?.!l. ()f _the !bypass system.
Tho ronetor protoetion systom ovorriJos the nbove* eontrol
. ~ystems to initiate any required safety a~tion. The .reactor protect~on
*~ *.. ~ystem auto~ati~ally initiates appropriat~ action ~henever'.th~ *: _;
..
- plant* conch tions monitored by* th.e system approach pre-established .
- limits, ..The. reactor pro..tection system acts to shutdown the
. ' ~
. reactor, . close .isolation v'alves, .*or . initiate . .
the.. op'eration . . of ... " J : - **.*
- other safeguards *systems* as required, **Components of the reactor -*1:.'*:.i1 *.
.protection s~tem can be removed from service. for testing an<l .* ...
. \ . . ' . . . .
. *. n1aintenance. without interruptin'g plant. 0°perations. and without" ,,;, .**:
negating the ability of the protection s~si~m.to p~rf~rm its.*
- . -~.~.
~rotcctive function~ upon ieceipt of the appropri~te signal~.
Instrumentation . is proVided for. continuotis monito~ing of .
. *' . . . ' .-. . *: ~ .
9the radioactivity of specific process. systems and to. provide* alarms o:r .signals for app~opriate corre.ctive'* actions, In addition, * *.
. *.. tadiation surveillance of the site arid .*environs wiil' .be maintain~'<l~
Controls n~cessary, for safe operation of the reactor
***_* are:locat~d. in the Unit 3 coritro~ room 'in ~he turbine building.. . . ..'..
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- Fuei.Storage and. Handling New fue 1 .*is*. stored in . a dry vault. in the*. reactor bl.ii ldi.ng ~' **'
. . kefueli.ng: is: conducted ~nder :w~ter': and. 'the irraiiated .fuel. is
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~torecl under* wate~ i~ :*the. react'or. bui !ding'. until' shipment £.rain*
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_ _ _ _ _ _ .. ,*-6-..... .,...,._ ** ._o:,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ...... _ . . . . _ _ . : .. -~---*-------------*- -~-- ......~.... ~_, ___ , ... --* - --
- 14 ..
3.7 Elect~ical System The electrical output of Unit 3 will teed into the 345 KV
*~ network through five 345 KV circuits. The ptimary feat~re of 'the
* :\ . electric power system serving Dresden Station is th~. <liversi ty of
*~ dependable power ~ources, physically i~olatcd so that any one
~?.
*
- instrument of failure affecting one source of supply will not I~communicate .~o alternate .souices, . thus. assuring a co~ti~uous . sourc~
*r of auxiliary power
~ .
ta Unit
.. . ~
- 3. Auxili~ry .
power can be supplied . from 9ive separate and independent sources: Unit 2, Unit 3, the 345 KV
*~.transmission syst~m, the standby diesel generator system anU *a
*~34.S ~V line. Three standby <liescl.gcn~ratots.ar~ provided, any two
~
~f which ~an .
serve the emergency . . re~uirements 6f oh~ unit and the
.. ' i . :..-- .
';pormal shutdown requirements .of the other.
* '.'1: A station batt'ery for Unit 3 is used for all controls vital
*~ ~*
lo plant safety and.to power ~~rt~i~ fu~ctio~s r~~~irecl for a safe
~hutdown, such as closing of isolation .
yalves,~openi~g valves to
* * . e isolation cooling system, providi~g. lighting, and required Y: ..
*~instrumentation. Exarn~les ~f su~h ~equir~d instrucicntation arc the
. iCOntrol rod position indic~tQrs arid- a ~eutro~ channel to ~onitor th~
core during. shutdown.
.3,8 R~dioactiVe Waste tontr~l
- qaseous ,. liqui.d and .solid waste control fa*ci li ties are.
provided. to limit the ~e.lea*se of :ra<li.'oactive ~aterfals.* froi:t tfre site
. . . ... ,, ' )
. in' accord~nce with. applicabie . ' . .
regul~tion's .
~.
'* \ .*
*, I *, *.* ;
. . . ,' , *~..
- r * ' *, ** ** '
**'. '('
- , ,'* '*'* I*
,___ -*-""-'-~** ~ ... --~----***-.------ . --...;---.:--.. ..:.----**-----------*";"' -h _. ~h*.- .... .:...... ---
* . .' I .. ........ . I TABLE 1 j
P~INCIPAL*QE~IGN FEATURES O~ DRESDEN UNIT l i .
. ." .\
~ '
.* 1*.
' Net Electrical Outp~t 715 M!~
.. :._ - *. ;, : ~
. *. ~
*Reactor.
Thermal Output .. .. ~ .. *.* .. 2255 ~JW
,... Core Operating Pre.sstite* .. * . . . .. ~ .. *, *. *, :.: 1000 psio*
.~ Total Core Flow R~te . l. * *.. ~ - 98 x 106C:-1b/hr
~-..
~\
*~,i.
Steam F.l ow Rate ..*.. ,, . '. *.. '* :\ :*.
,: . *... ** . - S.62 x . 106 lb/hr l Core Circumscribed Core
.Dia~ete~.
.:,; *~ . 189.7 inthes Active Length . ' ;. 12 feet
*Fuel Assembly : : *;*. *.
. Number of Fue 1 Assembi ies * - 724 Fuel Rod Array ':',*,* .
*.. ~ '
.7 x 7 Cladding* ~*laterial . . *; **.* ....... Zi rcalov- 2*
- Fuel ,Material *... :~ .: " -- .
_i_ U02 .
.*, * -'*i
- Active* Fue*l Length . ...
~
144 inches Cladding Outside Di~~et~r* . .. ~:
.. /:
..: .. O.S?O inch tladding Thickriciss . *._*. 0.036 inch*
Fuel Channel ~laterial
- Zircaf6y-4
, - Control Svstem \:* *. ~*
. 1: .
1:
.. . .. ., _. .. .. '\ ';
of ~*lovable
, . ~ -.' *- ~ ., ' .
~--- .~ .. . 177 Number Control Rods '
- . .f Shape of ~lovable Control Rods: ** *. ,: * * *
- Cruciforr:i
-.,'.*:._-._. Pitch of ~*lovable Control Ro<ls. _. . .. ,, * *' -. 12 .o inches
_ Control Material in ~lovable Control Rods** * *
- Boron Carbide _
*, ..* :~. Type of Control Dr.ives . > -- * .. -* * * *:* ... 'Bottom entry,* - *
-~- * *, hydraulic actuat*etl
**. ':J* ~-laterial in Tcmp.ora.ry Control Curtains . **: *
- Boron - Stainless
.* : ~" \ :: :"\. . '.
steel*
- . *.{}'.'.~Number ~£ Temporary Cont red* *curt.~ins -*** .., .**: 324
'* **:;* Control of* Reactor Power *Output_, , ** .. **._ . *.. ,. ,. Movement of c6ritrbL "tj, * * * .'I** **
_~ rods arid variatio~
.:_ ¥ : .. ****
6£ coolant flow *
. : ." ~ -* , .. .: : . .. . . -~ .. :*. . :-:- .:-* ~*: . . rate
. .. ' £:Ore Design .Data and. Opera t l.rig: Conditions:.;:~:**. *:** .
~.. ~
~ow~r Density* * . .. .. _ . 36. 7. kw/liter*:
Heat Tran sf er. Surface: Area* .. * . 63,527 sq. ft. - .--*
-' Average Heat* Flu£:),*\~::*. *. ... *116,300 Btu/hr*ft2.:
349 ,.ooo.
- .' **; Maxiinum**.11ea.t> Flux.* .:... - *** - ,, . -
. - Btu/hr;. ft2 *
' ;'.' . . ',.< :*, *..: - ~* .~. :': ' ' . *,.:.. *. *J . . . . . .
'.* . : *** 1
.; . .. - - - ~ ;. :_,>-; ~ .. -< .:; -. '.:. *.. *-.
~ -: .:
;: . *.:' !_"* *. .: \
* :.. * .i: ** -.:* * .* ..,*. "'.. :** * .;* - - : :;, . *.t.; ~.* - .) ~ . ,. c . ,. . :
. *.*. ..1 ~
,* ,*J*.*
;.,!.: /' * , ' .. - *.. l:i*
~.',.. <'.* * '*, : :> ... :
; *I '*: '...* ; '.' * *', .._ . " *
. '; "1 ' . . .~: ... ~ ' ,'"-:.: **." .... *.)
-. 16 ~
Core *Desi gri Data and* Opera t 1ng Conditions* (Cont'd) Minimum Critical Heat Flux Ratio at Overpower - E'lual to or*GrenterThan_ 1. 5
- Core Average Voids of Coo 1arit within AS_$emb ly_**. * * *",* 37%
Core Average Exit Quai ity of Coolant:* .. * -* ", * ....
~ithin Assemblies * ' " .
9.9% Peakin~ Fa~tors OesiQn Power Total Peaking Pictor .. . ... Additional Allowanc~ £or Overpower, .*** .. . .. . 3. 1 .-2b
'Nuclear Design Data . . .
A In.itial Av~rage Fue'J.. Enrichment**. ,_:.* .. 2. 0 % .
- .~ Water/U02 Volume Ratio . ** \ 2.38 Excess Reactivity of Clean Core *
'.(Uncontrolled) at 6J°F. * * * * " *** *0.26~k-*
Tot a 1 Worth of
- Cb ri tr o l * * ** ... 0
- 3 OAk
- Reactivity of Core with Ai 1 co*rit:rol .Rods ln.. *. : O. 96 k
- Worth* of Standby Liquid Con.tro-1* Syste*rn _:-.* ., . >:.
* * - ' * ,* ' * * ' : * ' ** < * * : * * * * * ~**: .-, ; ... * *; * (. ** .: **** '
o.* i7Ak
' * -~ .... *** . . *' '1 .:
- Reactor Vessel . . ...
J. * * ' ' *: ~ .. - :"* * * *
* .~.
- ~ - .": ' .. *:. ',* ,,_ . . ::,'.:: . ~- ...
I , * ** *,. .* ....... Inside Diameter :,**;. - ...,,.: .\ .. :, 20 ft. - 11 in. Overall Length 68 ft. - 7 5/8 in. Design Pressure *'* . .,* _.* ... .,* : 12 SO ps.i &:. **... * .
. .. -. . . .. - \,
Co6lant Recirculation L66ps .. .
- . ' ~
Location .of Recirculat':ion -_Loops ..*. *' ..... ::*. :::,<: : Containment Drywell
.A ,Number of Recirculation Loops' * * '*' ,. .'.*.' . 2
- Pipe Size . ** ** * * * *
- 28 inches . f~. .
Number of Jet Pu.mp-s .*;*~.. -'~ ... 8
. 20 Location of Jet Pumps .. _ .. * * ** * .*. * .. - . Inside Reactor Vessel*
*. :.. ~**.
. . -~
Ptimarv Containm~nt **;: . .. ...... * :-: ;/ ..... : .
-, *** 1;.: * * *,
~ ' . ' *. i .
.'..Type* *. : :::, ... .... ' ' .. * . -*
Pressure Suppressi9n Design Pressure of *D~ywe°l l Ves'se f *** :. * *- '
-~ (..
- 62 psiz Design pressure of Suppre,ssion ~, ';*.
C.hamber Vesse 1 .. .
~... .
. '* . ,' f *:. ~- ..
.. *62 psig .
*. -~:l_aximmn Leakage .. *Rate*.* . ... . -.**..... *.*
Less "than 0. 5% Free.
'*: :, ~ '- "
*: Volume per Day Secondary: Containment-. . ......
-:"I:ype *.* ..: ...
- Reinforced concrete ~nG
.: *~ : ~ steel su~erstruct~i~ *
,,_*. . . :~ ' : . ..
. " .:; '* .. ***.: * "* ' * **
- with met a 1
- s i <ling* ~
.. :. *: *~:: . .: '" '
*:oesfgn Pr~ss~rf
~.
*.. t.nternal.. _._.. . . . -* .
0.25 psig
- i
...... ".).* ...
- - ,_ _ _ ,_ .... ,.-;;;;:7*r.: 0
*~ ~--------
......... ~-- . *-- __ ,.,,.,.-***'**:*-- *-**
.... *~ "; .
* '17 . '*..;. _' *. . .,
Secol')dary Con tai nni'cnt: .' ( Cor1t' d}
~iaximum . In leakage . . .
Rate .*.. , :~:10-0% free velum~ per day at:.* 0,25 in, water neg~ti~e pressurq
- Stroctuial 0~$i~ri *
~
. . ~ ..
"~' .. '
Seismi~ Re~i$t~nce * .. * . . .
- f. *.*'
0, lg . Sustained \\'irt'cl Loading;. . *.*..*.' ..,._, . llO mph Control RoonL.:Shfefding
- Dose not to excee<l 500 mrem in
,' ... 8 hours under accident conditior aisuming full cor~ melt
~ ! *. . . . . .
- Unit E led: r.ical .S,ys:t:e.ms . ., .. *'* ..
*.<*.~*Number o"f rh~~rning Power Sources:: :, *... s 345 KV
- . : . :: . ~i ..; : . ~ : ;
l 34.5 KV
' ~- .. ***. . . . *. . : . . . . -_:
~epar_ate p.c)i-ier ;S:o.urces Provided:*" 2 Auxiliary transformers .....
;; .>.'.*.,-.. ;* ... , ..* .
- 3 Standby diesel generators_.*:.'
** * .. _*. .. . ** : .:.<* shared. bet,~een Uni ts 2. and 3'
- _,;:;
.. ~ *: , *
- 1 Standby .transfotmer*
. . ., 1 Station battery
*- ~ :
- .~
.**. R'eactor In*~'t.ruinentation. System
- ' . - *.. ... ' *. :. ~ - :*. . ' - : *... *: : . . ' .... *~ .,
~ . .*
Location Qf ~eut'r,on ;.1onit6r System_. : In-core.. ",
.. :. ~--- .-
. Ranges of Nuc r~ar , I i'l!=i t rumen tat ion , *-* * . . . . . . . ..
- Startup ,Rarjge * .* * **'Source. to *0~01%-rated power; .
I ntet:r.i'~:d iate.' Range * ~:; Q. 0001 F to .10 %. ra.ted power~*
- 0 . ,
- i. ,. .
Power. Ra*rige *. . *. ,:-* <- 1%. to 1~5% rated ;pow:er * .*. *' *....
' I*
. : :. *. : *. . ~
*~eactor £>r9tec.tio:.fi System ... **,*.
.* ~ ,
;_-' ~ :'.:Number o~ Ch_an_~els in Reactor *** ., ._..
- ... . , . Protection System. *.. *. .
- _. . * : * *. 2 *
. * *.. Number of Channels Reouire<l .to Stra:m* *
. . ' or Ef{ect Other' Protective Functions . 2
. , ; , Number. of* .Sensor*s p'e,r-_ ~loni-tored .* .* * ....
'* Varia~le iri Erich Chanrtel *
- 2
* "M~th6d to;. Pr,event:. Um{arranted \~i. th~ >. *
. . . . ': drawal
' . ~* ~ . . -*
.of . Co*ntrol Rods*
.. . . . . *. * *.
- Automatic interiocks
~ \ .
s~~rn-~;~f.. Systems and Functions
~-~ !
Other Erigin~erecl Safeglj(:lnls 6£ cool the core under a~sumed
. ., .: ~ .
-.. :_;::; . . c"(/.*;,. to
'_ *. . " . loss of c'oolant accident; . .
,' /""* .. ;*. capability to reflood the core
*. :, . :<' <, f o 11 owing coo 1 ant 1 o s s * .
.. . *_:: Lo\-i P;es_s~r*e'. . .do~,lrini*.I~ject~~n:H , , ,... : < T~ *provide a means* 6£ coofi;n~-" th({
. *, *; *.. *.i. . Sys~em . ** ;:<*. ": O;.* :/ .. <; *:,. ;., * . :: , . - ,. ' '* t*ore by .ref l ood i ng- the core . s.ub""
. ., .. '< ; .. ,>**$.equent to.a postulated loss.of
. . -; :. *." \*'coolant* accide.nt ,' * *
~*:<
. ~*. . . . '. ~ ~~**. : , :*-
*.: "- .' ' : *... -.... . . . ':* *; ~* :. . *.:.
. . .* : .. "\}~~;'<. _ .. : *. *-.. ~- ..
- 1 'l i ' ' *, :. : . .i *.* ' **. *
~ *-=-*.t..*.~- . . . . . .,. . _ *-*,,.~ .... ,. : .....
.. .1 s -
. ~: .
- ~ -~**~ ..: ..
Other Engineered Sateguards - SufumarY 6f Systems and Functions (Cont'd) 2 Cont'ainment . Spray .coo~ing * .* * * :::. To* remove cnerzy from primary *
.Systems . . *:~ . . . :*containment subsequent to assumed loss of .coolant accident.
**High Pressure Cc:>olaht _Injection . To provide backup cooling capacity
.~rs. ~*crn:* .: <..:..*:** **.,* :;* ..*.
' ~*: '. . . ,.
. to the isolation cbndenser and to
*,.' ': *. *! :* . .'** provide high pre~sur~ cool~nt
'*_r :
.:**. .... makeup for postulated slow. . . . .
. . i. depres SU Ti za ti on ace i cl en t Se ... _:','_ .*
~
- .=:.,. . .'_. *,-
- . **~ .:
*.To provide an inexhaustible supp}y
- of water to the core ~nd coht~iri~
ment independent of ~11 other cdr~
- coo 1 i ng *methods.
.. _Rod *velo~ity: Limit~r:.*
.. *To limit the free fall of a cdntibL
. .; ~ :*. '
. . ... *' ' ... . :_ . ,~ ..
*>.:* rod from *the core to approx fmate l )4 t*' * *.. * / ,* . *
- five f~ct p~r secohd... *
.-*~.Control R()d-~Dr'ive Thi:*mble Suppo~t : . To prevent a ,control rod,,*driv~* .*..
'" .. , * ... * .. *.... ' *mechanism fro'm fall inc away.Tr.qm*.
- ~ .:_ *. . .
** ... :* . .. . _*the* reactor. nre. s-sure vessel --*in*:.t*11u
. ~
.. '. .. * ....'.;.<. unlikely.eveitt of a,;. *.:f~ilure 'of."ti
?. * * .. * . drive thimble. ** * ..
. Main S~~am .Lin~ :r101.,r::*Re~t'ric.tors *'>.<A constriction in each main ste~~: *
. *.. ***.,, line to re<luce rate of blow-:do'w'n<
~~ ~~:n~.a~~ ~~ri!~l~~~~. severanc-e
* ~
**_..; t
. : .:X:,-:*;* "*'
.**.t.': ..__,**.
- Isolation Con<le*n~e.t:.: > ;: *., . _\: ,:-...
- To avoid overheating of the r'.eac:t,ot
. *:.' -.~... :: ' . . *.. *.* *: *** fuel in the event that reactor '.
..... " ** feed\~ at e r cap ab i 1 i t y. i s l o s t' *a n'<l
..... '.*** *.... * . ... .., ... * . -.. '
- other normal heat removal systems:
'1-*
*** \~hich require a-c electrica) :p.o_~'i.er
- .. * * * .. ' * ** . . for opera t ion are not av a i 1 a~ _l. e .~: . .
',._ '; * - : :.** : " * ' ' ~ * ' * '*:I
-;:_* . .* To effect reactor cont~inmen~t ; ;_ ::.
***-* * * . * ._ '**
- _au_tomatically \.,rhen r_equi~ecl.:tin<ler
~>. *:*~*-** ~)*.: ., . pos.tu.late<l accident conditi.ons~.--;'
*:*:i , .... *.:. '.
. Primary Coritainment lnetting System* To provi~fo fne.rt a*trno-spher-e **l~ri . . ~th'e.
,_.... *:~" * ~.*. *. *.... ---,.. :.;.~,. .-**1irimary con~ainn1ent* system* *to** *pre-
.... *i.
. .. \
.. ' . :, . *' ,*. " .... *_* .* . elude a hy<lro5en-oxygen' reac't'io_n.~
. ". *' ' *.' ~ . **- * , * , sub s*e q u en t t o a* post u 1 at e d . c o.O 1 an~
- loss accident...
. . . , <~**,t :*,:
.: . ; ... *' *~ . -.:.:- : ..
~ .~- ~-.:. ..
'* :* ....* :, _:,:. . ;~. : ...
*:-: ... .. ,; ' -~ '*: ..
*=*:.;,.; .. -. ... ::--*\
.* ./
- 19 ;
Othei E~cinected Safeguaids - Su~maty.~f Systems an<l Functions (Cont'd) Siandbf Gas T~eat~eni Sy~tem ~o provide a rneans for removal of particulates and halogens from Units 2 artd 3 reactor b~il<linz aiY.
... ;,
- under* postulated accident con-ditions prior to discharge of the
.filtered air through the Units 2 and 3 stack, Also provides a
.means for maintaining the react~r building ~t a negative pressur~ s-0
*
- that 16akage is into the reactor building and thus prevents groilnd l~vel release~of building air.:undc1
*postulated accident *conditions,*,;;*
- , ~tandby Liqu~d *c*ont:to} ~sys~em .... :, :,~To pr~vide a. redundant, i~depcnd~rit 9.* ... * . .*, .. *'
. , : back-.tip *control rnech an ism in t,he
*. event >that* the* cont ro1 system be-*
*comes*. inoperable. * *** *
~* ._~. ;
.,.* . * -*. * *: ; ~ 1' * *' * *' . ~ :* ..
~
' ~ .* -~ ..*.
' ' .. ' . ~ . :
.**. ~*
*~**. .
- ~.. ".
;1 . .
~ .~ . . :~ '
~
,_ .i:
'*' ' .' ~ ...
*~ .. .. : :. ~ .... ;*. .. . :. , . ;..~.;.* **.
,\**
;._< *. ..~ 1
~ ...
~ ,:_
'. . ,,:_ ~* ~ : . **" .* . .:*:. ..... , ,,:*
*. : '... ~.
. ... ,; .... ..*.. : : ... ~. ' . -*
. ~*
.... - .f'., *. **,*
**i
.:{
\ *.. ' .. ,., ***_. ..
.. .. ~: ..
""* *.**/ .. :.
~- ' .. '.. "".
- ,* ~ -~
'*, .. ;: .. . : *.~'.
- .- . ~-. .: . "'
1, . ::, . ,* ~ 20 .;,
. ~ ..
' * ,f
. . '*: .* ... : .. ,. ~ .
*** .. *.',*-.** .. ., '\. *::*
-~ .
4.0* PRINCIPAL .ARCHITECTURAL AND ENGINEERING CRITERIA FOR DESIGN
! :. . ~
. . . :* *rhe. p_ri~'cipal **architectural *and. eng.ineering cri te.ria for
' . design fo~ '.the planf are .* s~nl~~rized below .* *. . ..
4,1. '.Plant.Design*.*
; .(*
.r .
.Pri1_1cipa1: ?tructures and equipment '~hi ch nay serve either.
- :*: *to prevent: ~cciden~ s *or to rniti gate their consequences wi 11 . be * * .;* . .
.. ><};.designed,* fabrlc~tcd, ~nd: erected* in a~cord~nce with. applicabH~ . *:~- .... *:" .. *. >*~odes and**~O withstand'th e most ~~:Vere* ear.thquakes, .fl~_odir)'g con*****, ..
0
.' . ~ " .
l ~ ** t ' , *
- ~" . . .l .di tions'. w_indstorms, ice conditions' **temperature* and othe*r* . *,,,;. . *.. *.
.. ~*deleieri6~s natu~~1 pheno6ena ant{~ipat~d .~t th~ site during. the
- ' rifetime: of" this \f~it *. .*: ....
a.* Th~'primary cdntainment, including the drywell, pressure.
- -~-.:... ....-~.-* . *.**,
..** ~:. suppressiofr -~cha~b~:i, . associat~d access* op*enings *and penetrat:.,t~-~s ~.*
....."~will be <lesign~d ~ fabricated and* ~re~t~d to accommodate, :without . (.' '. .* .
. :**.**failure~ ~he. ;r~s~utes a~d _~emperat~re_~ resulting from o*r st~bsequent . **
. *;:__.* . :to the dou~le-:ende<l rupture or* equivalent failure of any. coolant pip*~ . :* *
> ~~ri t"~t*\ tii~ ~rfiv~ 1!.. .*.. **. . .. *:
.. :...... k( ..... ~.b~~--. :J>~rovisi9,ns 1-Jill be made.ho.th for*the removal of heat. ftom
'.:*: ;. ;~i;th*i*n the .k:i-'i,~a~y con.ia'inment and. for. such other measures as may
;::***~ . >:-.*<--**:~*:> ... *; .- *::=5"-~;*,~> . :,.' ;:**\ *-~,. ...... *.* ('.. ' *.... ~
i~ *>*:he* necessary to mairit.ain the 'integrity of the containme~t system as . ,. ' .
- .>--.. long *as '.h*ec*~*s*~*~~y fol l,owin~ .a loss of coolant accident. ; .
* ;: :; .' : . c~~ :*. ; Jhe*-:r_~*~~tci.r: .lrnilding, 'en*c~inp*a~sirig the pr.imary containP.ie~t:**.:.
c ;_-~ ~*.-***-~** :*: .. **,:-;.-*.* -l<*::>. _:. "\ '*.:*:*.*_1 *:*-.~:J -:** . . .*.: *.:._'. <
- ... *.system, .\.ffl:i_ p;rc)vid,c cc;mtain*m~nt '~hen that. system is open an.d
~*:: > - ..... *:*1*--:~ : *;.:f..'_ *.~'::~.,~:*--*~" .* .. *:. ~ . *.:~:** ..~-.::*.* .** :, . . _* ...*. ... . . .... *." . . *: *. *. .. . -,'. secon<lary<..cdrtt~inr.'lent.< when the. prirna,ry. c:ontaininerit system is .closed~ <>_::* . :_ i._;:~; '.* ) .* . (;;:'. .'.,_:;\_'.:< _:.c. *: *. ~* ' , *, . . '*~ * :*' . ' . . . .. . : : . .. ,.
t* ; ' l >t ~,, *~ : * *' :* : ; * * * ' * * ' ' ' .' * ,
- I ., *
.. ! . .*,.* * *..* ,,.*;: ' . -,. . : : . 1 ;,*
' .. ~- I, .: '. l ,,' *, * '* : ; * * '.
' ~ . .. '*~ . ~ *, *.
. .'** . **.1 *,*.
. ~ .- '.r, . ., ' ,* '
.:.~- ---.-:--- ~~*---***-*-- -** **--*
21
*. ~~ ' *
- d. *.**'.Provi*s:iori. *wl'll be made for initial preoperational pressure_.,': -
and ieak fa:~e,t~si'.i~*g~*of the entire primary containment system and.
*for l~ctk r*~t'd'::t*~~\t'irig' at periodic intervals after the. facility has
*: '>comrri~nced operat1on.
- Provision will* also *be made for demonstrating.
- th~ -*f~n.~~iodar'.:i~i.e~ri.~y
**.--......... -*.:-'*:** . -- . ~* . . . . ..
of reactor:~~; .l.di~g containment. e~:- The .integrity oof syste~ and stich. * * (.
. . ~ . .
the complete contaihmerit
. *._*::_ other e'ngincered,*:safeguards as may *be necessary ,.;i 11 be designed
. and'mairit~h1Cd ,so 'tha-t.off-site d.oses resulting_ from postuiated_.*
' :** accide_rit5.*Wil1 ,be *below* the values stated in- 10 CFR 100.
- * :~ 4 ,3 ReaCtor Sy;tem . . .*. . . .. .* ~' :
* *.'. - ...._____ a *.. A direct-cycle boiling water reactor .will be empl_oyed to*
. **. . produce. ste.arn* <<~t 1000** psfg for use in-*~* steam-driven tur.bi.ne- ..; ,...
~ '
*: ... * . **~ :
.* ****generator~ .The :tefe.rence de.sign th~rmal. output of the reactor is .*. '.' *.
*.. : . approxim~~-e~:y. 2;2.SS. M~H~ .
. '/. *: .**. i.i'/ -
- ... ~ *' _;_ -: -** '
. . :. :'.* ;:-~- . , ...
___ , :-7*:. ***~:-.~ - ..
. .' *. ,_b~. Tfi'e rea,~'tor'.\.,ill be *fueled wit;h slightly eririth~d uranium* .. :*>_:*./,-
qfo~~-~.~~ ;~9.:~~~;~i..h~*~.::dr. ;::zJ:r:~a loy. clad fuel rods._* ___ - --*------ . --- .... *-~--:____ ::*:*:.:_,:.-.*_: *"' __.,.-' '- .* *..
*:"
- c. -,>'._T.f{e<'°iil.~:~~imum *2ritital he~t :frux ratio and ~aximum fuel , .. *:
-~'enter,t~~.pe,~ture _*valuated at the design. overpower condition ~i 11 ,' ;
.. *be .below values* which could lead to rod failures. . . ". * * .*. 1
-* 1 * --:*-, * ,** ~.' - : , - ' * * * - ' *** ; * : * * ** ' '
**... __ )l~-- Fu~l*-~.rgd.~ladding thickness*~.,.(11 be designed to"maintain ".*:*:* _:'.
"". cla<lding_::fnt~g:ri~:y: . . throughout the anticipated fuel *life~*: Fission .
. '..::.{~, g*as r~i..e*~~~'(,.,~:~jh.i~.t~e-'rods and other *factors* affec:ting *desig,n lif~*,_,:::,* *, ... /,:'
... ':~*.<*must b¢. cohs'i~er'~d for the maximum expected.exposures.* * * .***. *-~ *, .. .__
- <
- ::*:~:-_*: -.~:_-~::~.-:~. i~~-'.\,ea.2tor and plant: will he d.esigned so that there* will.\"'
... : ~ . . :.'**. - .. *.: . ' .** *:*" . .....,.. ' ..,.. .***.* ' *: . . .. . *.. " . ' '. . .. . ... :.:" ', ...
. - be rio r'nh~rcirit ~:~ndericy for und.amped o*s.cillations. *. . . .
--~ -~
.' -:**_.. : '" ': ******** :. * .:.'. . , ' * * '. '
- 1 -: * ** * * * - * * *; * .' * * * * : * * ** - * * *
,. *.. - '**~ : :
.*. :f. ::*.'fhe'*r_¢ac~or>will be designed to accommodate tripping of
.. \
. . ' .'. . i *. .:. . . . . ....*. :~ ::*.. : . ; . . . . . . : : .'-~ . .. . . . . .. .. . . > * * ' * * * *
- _; ,"/ , the tti!~,i11e.""gen~i;it~r,**1oss 'of .power*: to :the* *rea.ctor recirculation.
*<.'*: ..'_.<*.. ~_; .*.*-~_.*., **-~;*,;: *. . .1<'.\*:.'*:** ., ___ *.,.**::._-.:* '.. '"*:**_ :. ... :., ***: . ~ _: ... *:.* ...* ... * ... *. *.' ... _ .*:. *. . *: _._....
.* :;:::s*ystem*:a.n~-
... '.*: *_) ~: . -~
ot. . h~r ::-5:.t~:ti.oJ) :~*rans1ents an~ ma_neuve.r_s \Jhit:h-r.i~gh.t b~ ..
<: .. ', *!'-:~**.~ ..-:~:**..:.~*-**.::~:**:;*.* ..:*-:'.**.'1."*' ._ \' .~ . *." :,: ..:**:' .;... . .. ~ .. f** .** : , . ....:: ... *., * -:. * ~ * ****. ~ *.*.*
.;* .' eJC'pe.~t~d -l'li~hol.it.'toiri:p.ro'm.ising,sa.f~ty and without fuel. damage~**.**.*.*
.::: . *::* */.. . . .. '.. . *:.. .. . ... *.... ; . ~~ . . *_ ~ ,: . -~: *... '.' ~> *~ : , .*~.' .~*.. '* *;. . . ' : ........ : . .. . ;, .... : . . ' . .... ~ .. :: *. . *" .. . . .. . . ' ' ..
.' I*.**
~ .';' *' .. :*. - 22 g~- Thtr6~ctor ~ill include s~parate systems includin~
overpressure-scram, the .isolation condenser, safety valves~ and turbine ~ypass, ~~ p~event *serious primary reactor system over-pre ssurc
- h *. Po\:ier excusions which could .result from any credible teactivity.ad<li~i&n a~ciderit will not cause damage, either by motion *or: ruptl1re:;* to t~e pressure vessel or impair operation of
' required* saf~guards. 1:..
lo'*. . . ", .' ..
.. . , . *. i *. He(lt reinovdl. systems will be provided which are capable
*~of :*~~"~e~y acc~~~o:d~ting . .
core decay heat under all credible cir-. cumstanccs, ~ncl~cling isoiation from the main condenser an°<l. loss
. :_: I.
of coolant from: :tJ:ie reactor. Each diff~rent system so provided
- ~111 have apptopri*te r~<luri<lafit features.. . . ,**: *.
- .. .*.. ----* *****---1 '* .
j, *.. Rea~~ivi ty :~h_ut<lown capability shal 1 be provided. to make.
~nd hold ~he ~ore adequately subcritical by control rod acti6n,
. . .- . . .. . . ;,.~;;.~ .
£tom any p6int in th~ operating cycle and at any temperatur~ down
- to room temperature., assuming that. any one control rod is .fui ly
. '. :9wi'thdrawn and unavailab.le for use, k, *Redundant_ backup reactivity shutdown capability will' be
- ... -- ~- .. ... :
*** ~iovided independent of normal reacti~ity control proiisi6ns.~ This.*
*~-
system wi 11. have the capabi 1 i ty, with' adequate margin' to shut down.
, r .*
the reactor from any operating c_ori<lition,
*: A.4 Coritrol ~nd Instrumentation
* .. a,*.*. The pl;rnt will be provided wlth a centralized control
.. room having adequate shiel<ling to permit occupancy during all design'
~{cc id en i
....... . s i tu at i on s *
) ; ~.
b~ There will be suffic.i.ent :inte.rlocks *or other. protective de-.
. - ...... '. --* .'* ,_, **-** '-P" '" -* oo** * ..:*," ' **~ *- ***** *** ---**-***-* .:.:...., _ _* * * .
- vl.ces so ,that procedural controls.are ~ot the oniy mean~ of 'preventing
*' -;-**- ........... ***--****-*-**. ,_,, .. *.. *...... .: ....~-~:.:* : ..... ; .... ::..* ~:.:,;!- . .... :.,_ -~-~-- *--*'----***..:.*....:..:.:..._!..:, *. __ :-- . ***-*--*--*-*-**-*** .. ***-* .. **.>**-- .. **.: ** : ....:*..*.: ***-***-****.
\.'
.c. A reliable ~eactor protection system will be provided
. to automatically initiate appropriate action wheneve~ plant conditions appioach pre-established limits. Periodic testing
*capability will be prdvided. Sufficient redundancy will be pro-vid~d s6. that failure or removal from s~rvice of any One component
*or portion of the system .will not precl~de scram or actuation of other protective .devicei.~hbn required.
4.5 Electrical Power : Sufficient normal and emcrgen~y au~ilitiry sources df
*-elect ri.ca 1 power will be provided to assu.r.c . a cap ability. for.
prompt shutdown and continued maintenance of th~ plant in.a safe 2ondition un<ler all credible circu~stances. 4.6 Radioactive Waste Control
- a. Gaseous, liquid and s~lid ~aste c6ntrol facilities ~ill *
~
be designed so that discharge of effluents dnd off-site shipm~nt~: shall be in accordance ~ith 10 CFR 20. *..'..
\ ...
- b. Process and discharge stre~ms*will be app~opriatcly*:.\ '
monitored and s~~h automatic features i~torpdrdted as :may be
.necess~ry to prevent releases above the permi*ssible limits of
- 10 CFR 20.
4.7 Shielding.~nd Acce~s C6ntrol
.:~ . **., .
The radiation shieldirig.in the unit*and the station accc~i: * .. control patterns ,.,,ill be such th-at the dos.es shall not exceed those*. sp?cified in 10 CFR 20.
- 4. 8
- Fue 1 Han<l ling. and Storage*
Ap~ro~riate ~uel han<llin~ and stora~e facilities will b~. provided .to' preclude accidental. criticality anq to provide cooling
'for speni fuel. ~* ' .
'~* '
- *. :* ' , ',}~-'(D:~ff'}' . .* ' -
24 -
.* .. 5,*0 I\!T.ERACTI0:-1~.* .. oF* UNITS 1, 2 AND 3
. .* . -{-* -..>.:.!{ <ffo.-L:-:~ . !'*~ .: ,_._
*As .nofe*<::L:.'ab<<:>ve in Section 3,0, certain portions of the
~ ..-*f:.;//)~.>{~:*~::
.. *,-,*.station a.r.e.. iiti,1_*~{¢d;-. -~~ c9mmon or are shared wholly or partially by th~ 'thre:e::Jiirt},' ' ' ... -,' ..
.*The criteria followed for the design of this multi*unit* 'sta;f.i'on* wi:t'h reaard to the sharing of components, systems,
' .. . '. . . -~* . :~ .,>> ;*,, ,( . :,_, . :. 0 ...
and facilities<.'is "'that: each unit will operate independently 'of . '., each other, ' .. A ~;~ 1 fun ct ion of equipment or an opera tor error in .-..***o***
... any of the .. ; '~* * :
uri.it~\~~~.1'/.1':hot
'J ' ~
*affect the continued operation of the. ',' :.'*'..: '.> .
*'.1" '!;.
<:,-.r¢main'ing linfts9 .'-._:{.fk,¢\~lse, if by the ,sharing of a COT'lpohent,
*~: .}* ~ ..
'_ ~1*.
*:*~.--stem,* ~r **i~.-~i;'lft;.~, ~h~* _s~fety *of the plant is increased, then ......
~ .. . . * ' : ~ ** ~. : ~., . - - . ' *. f.' ' . *
-~. '~
. such sh a.ring .w'i11' b'e --~_cc*omplished, * . * . ' :: . ._1 * *. .' ;. ....
,* 1.:' * : ...
** .. * * ' .J' ,1 !*. ' ,., ' " .... *: .
There ar.,e" ~ n~_ml;>er of systems: and facilities which are*
*sh a, red by a11 th~c~ '6ni~i;but which are not safety related.
... -'*: ':, .'</: *::)~'.:~.:. ,.~~*. ~'*. . *</~-- . :~~ ~>-*. . ....* -*; .' -:. .... *_.. '~ . . . . . .
inclttde such :fac'i~l-iti:e's "as* the Administration *Building, Access
"'*: .~ ,'. ;* .. '
.# '> *~
- I ; * ,
Control Build.i1ig:, {Mach~ne Shop 1 Laundry, Sewage Trea.trrient Plant, *.' ': ': ~i'.' ~ s*c~u\i:~'}f Fer:~}ng.
. . and Plant. Cert a in s er v i c e fa c i 1 i t i e s . are * . a 1 so * .~
*shared includi~*g.:*the Fire. Protection .system, Ci_rculating Water . * *:_:.'."T*~**:*"'- *
- tf'*t em, Service Water Sysiem, Make-up 'oe~ineral i zer SystC~; S~rvic~ ' '" /
Air System, C1.n~l Heating System, Failure of such sys_te1:1s would *hot .. *::.. '
**.. ** : ~/ *1:.i/
j e op a rd i z e s a f {t Y::
- of.th~ units , . . . . :, . .
. ',I*
~ _**... ~-:~.i--~-...~*.**,~~< * .* :.:_. >. . ~* ' '~ *~*. . .* *.::--.-*::--~-.~.:,,
. .-; *_*: Foll'b\~ihg ***i!( *~a **summary of . other shared systems and ..",. * .. _*,*,, *
" . *" . .**'. .....*".:. '_.*.-, *:."*,-::,',:i*.:* ,* '**.*:-. . :_ ... ' . *' ' . .: ' ,,*.: . , . . *....:. *"
.* . faci,lities (cf \.,rhich:: s"peci~l attention *has been directed to assure "' ..
I .~ '* * ' *., ' ~ *'~ ** *, ,.:. ~- t _, * * * . *
- .-'*ade_qtia*~*~.- ~~y~'.:11s**~q~~::*~~£*~.ty*:during nqrmal .operation of the_.units ancl .:*r* ,*..
I;* .. * ......:_*: ' . -**. . :l~: ...~.~.*--'~.~Ll':~*:*~*-;~~.'. .,<*:!:***-.*.. . : .. ,. *",1,')':* :
-.
- post.ula t.ed* '°a~cfJ:d.~'jyt .conditions.* ,1**
*-~~ : . *. :* .**. "l. ::**~*~*1.*~:~f:~*~~*~*:,~~~ ..~1~*:~~. ~~:>'*. =*., .* .. * .* *** 'l . . . *~* : .
*;;a, Site ":ahd*Q'.f £*Site En vi rans . ~*loni tor ing
. *_< ...\>*:. ~i\: :{tY; ;<~>> *>.< ,_: .*. . : . * *
- The.\_~r~:~:~.nt'. ehV.i rons
- morii tor ing prograns wil 1 be cont.inuecl, :" *.:
0 ,-~',1 .. ";. * ..<*;;i*~\~':<;::~~-~.*~~:*~.~ *, \ : < * * :~ ~ * **
.. with* inufti.;_un:i;:t'::~.~~~.;r*c;i:t':l.911 *. : The *purpose qf the program is to provid.e*~ '._
., '* ~d*equ;a,te'.~.d6.i;~*pi~iki<~-q~, ..the integrated Dresden- Station cor.iplex *and* .... ,.. *
': ..... *., .. "~*.:"*.' :~ ~:\:.::~~:_..<:~:<'.~~;:~~~-.;~~:*:~**::~~:-..;*. -:~>;. :* ::p...
1 ... ** ** ..... *... J ..* ' ". *
.*I, 1
'to a~s.ur,~.*'.t.h;(;\~Y;t~.~~-*:.r,e. q4i.rern_ents .of.-1.0 CFR. *20. are .met for the com.:. ** :.*
- - -- --~* .. *-*. . **------- *----
25 -
;i.
. \..' . ........
*b
- New Fue 1 _Storage
.* Unit 1 will continue to utilii~ its own new fuel vault~'
_~hereas the storage vault for Units z*and 3 has been specifically designed for use as a common new.fuel storage facility.
- c. Reactor building Closed Cooling Water System
- ~.
This system serves as an interf~te bet~ecn certain cither
** systems which are exposed to the reactot and the river water, and prevents potenti~l leakage of radioactive materials directly to the river. Sharing of these systems provides greater flexibility
- .,: 9_0£ 'plai:t operations., which is assessed as contributing* to overall* . :. .
. plilnt safety *. **.* *'
d~ Auxiliary Power System '. ,._' i.,, The three units are tied together.electrically only
).
.. *. throtlgh the Edison transmlssfon system. Unit 3 derives its
. : . 't.
*auxiliary power from the 345 KV system and Unit 2 from the 13~ KV ', *.'
sys tern. An e 1ec t rica 1 fault in one au xi 1 i ary e lee tr ica 1 sys*tem will not propagate to the tither auxiliary systems.
- e, Standby Diesel Gcn~rator System The standby diesel generator systen includes three diesel*
. generators, any two of which are capable of furnis.hing power ' . . ~... .
~~. ;_.iequiremenii for operation of e~ergency equipment. ori on~ unit and
* . normal 'shutdown power for the other.
f.. Station Battery
- Each unit has a separate station battery. However, a lOO'~ercent capa~ity spare batt~ry charger is provided which can be coti~ected to the d-c system of either Unit 2 or Unit 3.
- El~~tri~~l breakers are interlocked to prevent conriecting the d-c
~ ; .
' - : :: *system?- of **both Units together,
* .. * '\ ,.
- .. ' '~ *~
*./
(.,':
- 26
- g. Liquid and Solid Radioactiv~ Waste Control T}1 e r a ~h.,r as t c fa c i 1 it y for Units
- 2 and 3 is des i g n e d for use as a common radioactive chemical treatment plant. The purpose** ......:. *...... '
. of the plant is to --~~o-~~.s_s_ liquid radioactive wastes for reuse_; ______________ .,
to discharge treated w*astes to the river, and to concentrate certain wastes fo~ storage and off-site shipment. The Uni~ 1 ra<lw~ste facility is entirely separate from
- .*the facility for Units 2 and 3. Both facilities are designed to maintain the concentrations of radioactive wast~s released to th~
9environment within the lirni ts of 10 CFR 20. *.The aggregated
*.discharges of liquid wastes will remain within limits now*applica5le solely to Unit 1.
- h. Gaseous Radioactiv6 Waste The gaseous waste effluents from Units 2 and 3 ~ill use a common 310-foot stack. Un i t 1 w i 11 cont in u e to d i s ch a r g e .its _
.;.::-.~- .,
~ . gaseous. effluents from its o~n 300-foot stack. The current stack r~lease limits set forth in the Dresden Unit. 1 F~cility License 9 DP_R-2, as amended, wi 11 _apply to aggrega~:: ..~~ ~-=-a-~es from _~-11 ....~~ree units. The radioactive effluent from each uriii is monitored and
.. --- -- . -* *-* ***-**----- .. *------* *- ****- _____: ..... \ ... .::.....
1 .... '. '- filtered, and capability is provided for isolatinc the source from
- ~ *:; * 'the :environs.* The summation of Unit 1, 2 and 3 stack gas r~dio-.
**>ac.tivity level will be indicated* in each control.room~
i *. Inerting Gas Supply System The inerting gas supply system for Units 2 ~nd 3 is
~hared, although. each unit has its own gas makeup system.
j * ' Common Turbine Building
,y '
- The' turbines for Uni ts 2 and 3 are housed in a single The turbine buiiding veritiiation air supply and
.. ','..,*exhaust syste.ms are operated as a yembined system. ...,, ,' .
* .. **. *l
. ;I l
...*: k. Reactor Containment I
Units 2 and 3 h~ve separate and independent primary cori~ . *.* *.......* I
~ainfuents ~nd pressure suppression systems. The secondary I
.iI containment for each unit below the operating floor.level is I constructed to serve its own tinit. The 'operating floor will be l
open and common to both units, Both units share the same it~ndby :1 i gas trcatm~nt, ventilaii~n and heating systems, each having .!
- ~ca~~cities to acc6mmodate the combined secondary containment vol~me, *J
- 1. Control Rooms 11*1
. Evaluations have been made of the i_nter-plnnt. effects* ..
. *i of postulated accidents, It has been ascertained th~t an ~ccid~nt
... ' . . : *'I in any one of th~ unit~, up to and in~luding maximum postulated.
accidents, ,-.,i 11 not pr~vent access to the control rpom of any of.
. i
- * * * * . * . * .r .w
*the uni ts or prevent* safe. opera ti cm or shutdown of the other* untt.s ~
**1
- . -~-~;.-
. ,{'.
*. . ~-;
\ . ~: .
~
J. *.. * ~ *. ,*.,... *\,
*1.
' . :; ~ '
~{
-. -~ .. - \'"
.i: ... ,.-: *-: r
~ .:.
I. ***
~ .
i *'
?*. 29
* .*. Reference Sectibri in Plant Item Design and Analysis Report High Pressure Cool~nt. Injection System *.:
.Amendment No. 5 Low Pressure Coo 1 ant. Inject ion_
system Amendment No~ 5 Ernergen~y Coolant Suppl)' Amendmen.t . No.* 5
.. ~
i .* *
*. :~.
*'. ....' ***.* :.* . \,
*'i. ..... '* .. * .. --:*
r.*. .,
,ii..
/(*.
' ~: , ..:. :_'.*'
*.)
~
'~:
- i'.*. ' .1
' ~ ' . :.
... ~ ..
i ..
. ,. " *1 ** :
*' /,
.. :;* *i' ',*,' . ,*
',I*
.,h***
.i : "\,\
" .. **. . . 30 *
. 7.0 -EVALUATION OF PLANT SAFETY
--The general ~ateg~ards objectives o~ the design of Unit 3 are to protect the plant equipment and to prevent radi~tion* expbsute
*.:... '.in excess of a small fraction of established limits. to. any persons*
bn or off* the station premises, either durini normal operation or during accident conditions. In order* tb meet these obj~ctivei, the p1ant design hnd
. op~ration incl~<le the fcill6Wing: **
*.*a. Means for ~ositive control of plant process parameters
- )*-important to safety. . * * .. I
- b. . Inherent safety. features and automatic devices ar*e incli1<led in ihe design to prevent an operator erior or equipment.rnalftinctiori fro~ catisi~g an accident, Te~ts are ~opdutt~d periodically to assute* ,
~r6per functioning o~*such devices.*
... c *. Multiple barriers are provided, to contain the radioactive i*i:'......
The core is con~ervatively ~esigried to operated with .. *
.. thermal parameters* signifi.cantly below those which could cause fu(;!l'.
*. e damage.**.* ..
* ..
- di The plant_ operating personnel are thoroughly knowledgeable _'in
.. the p larit operating characteristics, and are *t ra ine.d to fol l_ow wri*tte~. procedures to minimize the. occurrence of operating. errors.
This .section *surnnarizes_,'the significance of these important. features*a~ they relate*t~ safety of Dresden Unit 3, 7,1
- Normal Pl~nt Ope~ation, .* -.. ~-
*Dresden Unit 3is.designed to operate sa~fely under all ... ".'..rto~mal operating r.lodes for which the plant is' designed. These -,
. ; .*** operating. mo<les include su'stairied full 'pcJ\ie'r -opera'tion, starting
- .,.*'up, shutt.in*e *down, load changing or =maneuvering, refueling, hot.
I.
*-**-i' ---- * * - - - - - - * -
- 31
** .standby, and shutdown. The plant is also designed to prevent
*tadiatioh *exposures in excess of a small fraction of acceptable
; : *. levels to persons on or off the plant premises under acci<leht.
condition~ as well as*.the normal oper~ting . conditions. This safety of operation* is accomplished by incorporating
- specific engineered and -inherent* safety features in *the design of
.. the pla~t. The extent to which these features provide the desired le~els of sat~ty is summarized in the follo~ing paragraphs. l., ' ..... .,.*
a* Control 6f ~Plant Power dutput Duririg nor~al plant op~r~tions, within.the reactor core is accomplished by* means of two basic the control of reactivity .
- .*,~ ..... .
. ( .... . .
... -~. :.. :.-.
power and reactivitj control syste~s. Grosi-ie~~tor powei an~
' .... *. - ; . . . ~~ .* :., .. '*
* : power distributions within tiie core are controlled by the control*' * -
.**; '. ,'. .* rods* which are. manipulated by the operator. ' Reactor power can '~*- .-
" ~
also be. adjusted and con.tr~*1*1ed over a. range of approximately . *.. . '.':_,': ,, ..
* :*** < : * :"- ;";~*
'. :*: : , 30 percent by v ariat iori of coo 1 ant *r~ci rcu.l at ion flow rate. through. ; **:_
,. ' ... , . the core
- I
- These functions are accomplished by.the operato*r*. from*.. *:".,,
* :.:. the control. roo~~
The rate. of power increase is . limited by the rate at which* ,- "
.. , . *.-.control rods can be- withdrawn; .~nd the rate of variation of the .,,-- ... - .
recirculation flow *. Control rods are oper~ted one at a time arid
- 1*** .
are withdrawn in a syinmet r i cal p_at tern ,from the core. In this manner
.* **~tis estimated that full ltia~ p6wer 6peratiori ~an be achieved at
.a*. ra~e
\
of appro~ ima te ly 3% per minute. This .rate is sufficientlf s'iow*that load changes are always under control by the operator~
*.. and ariy *maneuvering transients ate accommodated wel 1 within' the.*,_ '..-
- .. ' inse:rt io~. or' ~he*. hydritl.l 1 ic~ l ly a*c~t.iated contr~l rods.* : ,' .
. f . . :_- *.
. ' ~ ; . . .;* ..
- -
- ----*-:--:--**** ***--;-** ...... --~-~---**- -* ... --.-
~ -~ ---*- - -*- .. *.
~ 32
- ... ~\.'
The performance of the re~ctor core and the indication of reactor. power leve 1 are continuously monitored by the neutron ** monitcirinri ~ystcm, the sensors of .which ~re located in the reactoi core.; Thii syst~m effici~ntly and accur~t~ly .pr~vidc~ power level monitori~g from source range to full po~er on a gross and local basis *.
- The local pO\'ler monitoring instrumentation is designed t()_* :: ....
- monitor local fuel element heat flux continuously and provide
* -~* * . I
.*;*:*.:_:.information to perrn:lt eva~*uatio~ of the critical core parameters.:, ..*:.**...
....... ' .... ~h~ sign~l~ from th~ h~utr6n rnon{toring system have the .
** . . . cap~~ility* t~ initiate a scram, and this is accomplis~ed through
*r* ..
*5. ~ *:, .
the logic circuit of the reactor protection sjste~. *.. : .
.. \*
~ M *
- The reactor pr.otect ion sys tern a 1 so recci ves s igna 1 s from .: ..
. ...*~-
. . r:*
.,__ , *.*~other. process parameters to shutdown the reactor when established .* ,1': ! ... \;- limits are reached*, a.nd to i'ni tiate ~ther prote~tive furicti<:!J~ .. as:...
- re qui red.
i ' *.. *. -. .. , , . The design of the reactor.core nuclear perforriance .. : ', ' .. :
.
- cha~acteristics. incl~<le several features which contribute to a .~ '. _., '*
favor ab 1 e nu.clear <lynami c response under transient con<li t ions. . .*_*.
* . The nuclear response. characteristics provide strong negative. *
.. *~ ' ..
.* ': *' .* reactivity f eedhack under severe transient con di t ipns, contri~ute, * * ; . *
-*~ .- . .
,*negative' reactivity. feedback con.sistent with the requirements of .. ': < .
. . . ': overali plant nuclear hydrodynamic stability,. and provide a " I response which regulates or damps chanees fn power level and in:
~pati~l the distribution bf power production in the core to a
!eve 1 co.ns i stent .\d th safe and e fficie.nt ope rat ion. The response
*characteristic~ aie inherent in ihe design ~f ihe plant and result ..
fro~ the ne~aii~e d6pplei c6efficieni of r~a~tivity of the fuel, *
*~*.*:,;~_"the negative moderator*. temperature i:::'oeff icient', *and the .ne:gative *.'**
33 -
-*. ~ *:
, * 'The ~hove* coefficients, togethe.r with the regulating or* ' .' .. - : ..
.. . .*: ~ . ,. :. .
; control*. devices'-* including . . .
the control . . rods, 'the' flow control, . ': ~ (. : ... . and *the l'nitial pressure regulator~ complement each other to
.. achieve stable, well-controlled plant periormanc~:over the entire rang~ of pbw~r ope~ation, b, Contrdl of Core. Cooling The pl~nt is provided with four methods of removing heat,,
from, the .core, *.These heat removal syst.er.is, t.ogether with the core .
~;design. . .
f~atur~~.* pro~ide . . . assurance th~t adeq~ate core cooling is
. "-~ .. '
uil'.ie~ ..... ,* ..
- avai!aple a11 'norma'. modes Of plant operation, and under
- 0 . *: *.....
- ..
- certain conditions of equ~pment malfunctions or operator errors, ~.' > *
'. ~--' <. *: '- . *,:- . ~-0.. <: .
- and include. the. following: *(a) The shutdown cooling system is the* ; .... ;
norma 1 mode of: re~oving. decay* heat" when the .reactor is depressuri ~ed ,~ :
- condense*r~ b~ck~p (b) the i's.oiation with froni the high pressure '" . : ' *'
- _i-... .' .'
coolant inject~~n syste, r~m6~es decay heat when the react-Or is 1'.i '* pressurized arid, is() lated :from otl~er cooling systems, (c) the~.~turb'irye and/or th~ mriin.c6ndenser is the principal heat sin~ ~hen.the ;:- ..
, . -:*.-reactor i*s.,at hot standby,. is in full".opeiatio*n, or is starting up .. ,*
- ~*o*r shutti~g ,down;*and ' . '
'(d)' the 'relief vavles discharge steam to the suppres~ioh 2~am~e~ tirider pr~ssure tra~sient condi~ions where it is
'condensed 0 .
1:.*a'nd: :fuakeup 'water is' added to the' reactor' by. the,' feedwatet*~*
*system,~
\', ,;*** :* ..- .. *.*,.*
;.,. -.. Th:ese** systems are in addition to* those *which are* used :under , ..
. ' i ,*' ' " . .
~ ,* Con.t ro 1: of Fue 1 Hah<l lin.g"
** ' j. * * * ** -:. l. ***
*" The" equipment *and procedures use.cl in the handling and i !
st*orage.~,f £~e1:ar.e 'designed* to perIT1it.safe; efficient refue~lin*g*
~-- ~ :.*,:. *. . " ; >".: .":' . ~*:i
- . of the .reattor.~',:.
! " . *'... . " . * *,: -": \*.:.. " . *. -~: *. . .
R,eplace1;1ent fu~l :fs s~o*red* in a concrete vatil t in
,.: . *. ,* . . . . \ ' . : **' '.~. . l.,
- 1 0
** * * ' * * * .* !,, I,, ,* 1, *
. - . '. ;; .. ) . ';:: .....~: . " ' i . . :*- . ., *, :. . . >....
'~*
.>:' I '~: . . . . {i.: *.:
* \ " *
- I '* . *' ' . * ,:
.j . *, . . .: . *' .. * * : ' ' ' ' J* ' ~ '. ~l.,*: "f< .'*
- 34 -
\I * * ' '
the reactor building. The vault i~ provided with radiation
. monitors, aml the *s.torage design prevents criticality even if.
.. .the storage vault were flooded with water. All entrances to the vault~ in~luding fuel delivery doors arid personnel openings, are cap~b)e of being locked.
The fuel pool fo~ storage of spent fuel assemblies is also ./ . located in the reactor building. The racks in which the fuel *,_.,. .... assemblies are placed are bolted to the floor and are designed
' ..~
io ensure subcriticality in the pool, The pool water removes heat. e and shields against (adioactivity, both .of which are generated by** .*,, thi decay of fission prod~cts in the stored fuel. Transf&r of
" irradiated fuel from the reactor core to the refueling pool* is
. ~-'
accomplished under water for control of airborne contamination~ *-* *
. .~
*. The new and spent fuel assemblies are handled by special hoist~(,
. cranes and g;apples during the .refueling or maintenance work. These
*,* .. ** ;...~.'-* ...
in~lude the building service crane, the refueling plaiform anJ:_ho{sts, reactor service plitform, and the jib.hoists .* Each of these i~
.9*. designed with interlocks and special safety fea.ttires to assure .that. ***,**
***fuel loading and handling *can be .conducted only under specific -safe *. *
..conditions,Coritrol d~ of Radioactive Wastes The radioactive waste 5onttol systems are de~izned to
.. *co}lect ..potebtially .radioactive wastes; and process and.dispose of ...t"n.em:
... in.a.safe manner without limiting plant operations or availability; ..
~ Equip~en.t, inst rumen tat ion~ and operating *procedures are designed
.* .. ._.so. that. ~the* discharge of radioactive wastes will not exceed*
.. [ . **"
s
** _: p'er.~is .ib i'e\ i eve ls.
The iiquid ra:dioactive \rnste control system is designe.d *'t'o* 'provid'e a* means* for processing potenti_ally radioactive :*
liquids, nnd to collect process liqui<l wastes in batches which
*. may be sampled and analyze~ to determine* their suitability for *.. *.--
.release through the discharge c~nal i~to the river. ~aseous was~es from all three units are provided with a holdup time for decay then are filtered_ before being discharged to the atmosphere.
It is anticipated that the total off~site dose fro~ combindd operation of all three plants will be less tl1an one percent of the 6ff-plant permissible annual dose. . *' ei Control of ,Radiation Levels an<l Personnel Exposure
. **., Unit.3 is provid~d with two types* of installed radiation monit_oring systems which are utilized to maintain continuO'lls
. surveillance and monitoring of the r~diation levels associated . *,'
w~th plant operations. The first type consists of several process
. radiation monitoring systems which provide a continuous* indication** ......
. ***. ~nd record of radioactivity at or near the discharge point of tho~e *. .**** .. ' process lines that can release radioactive effluents to the ~. ~~*vi.rans* directly~ These monitors are capabl~ of measuring the radioactive '
*..* material content of such effluents 'to a suff1cient degree. of .. . _.,**
*: accuracy to indicate that maximum.Jpe'rmis-sible,. release rate.s are ** .. *.-:
tiot being exceeded. Provisions are also made fot monitoring the
.* .~-- ..
,: . ':" 'normai ly radioactive fluids which are contained or stored. in the.*: ..***
.- .-~ . ,* .,
various plant process 'systems. The second type is the area radi~tion monit~ri~g system
,, **_:;which. provides a recor<l of gamma radiation levels at selected . ,: .... ~
- .- 16cations within th~ various*buildings, and the system is design~<l to alarm*when radiation levels exceed preselected values.* Radiation*_,._, ,
s~ieldini is
*includ~d in ~he plant design to minimize the exposure .7.
. -<:*o'f pl.ant personnel to radiation ema.nating.frora.the reactor, turbine~
; :'.*.and their~ au~iliary systems *.
- /-
36 Ad<litional shielding is ~rovi<le<l so that the dose .... ** _( received by plant personnel in the control room in 8 hours, under design accident con<lftions, would not exceed 500 mrern. 7.z* Inherent Safety Features of the Reactor I Th~ b6iling water ~ower reactor to be used in Unit 3 has inherent safety featLlrcs derived from the material~, configuration, ,. and opetating modes specified in the design *. Many plarit .eq~ipmeni~
*failures and/or plant man~uve~s ~re acco~modated by- the reactor~ . .. . .
without.violation or normal steady ~tate operating limits *. the
- e react~r 1 ;'
I . characteristics of importance in this regard are:
*~
a, The characteristically l~rge and virtually insttiritaneous~ negative Doppler coefficient of 'reactivity of slightly enrich.ed '**,_.. uranium dioxide fue 1. provides *an inherent mechahism for ter~inat inn:'.> ~. nuclear transients.
- b. The steam void coefficient of reactivity, as in the. *l-"'.'_;.* case*
of.: Doppler, also provides a negative reactivity feedback which tends to limit power excursions ~nd contribute~ to .the over-all plant : ,
.... ***1
- 9. stability.
Void~ and Doppler also tend to suppre~s peaks caused by improper. rod withdrawal, As an example of the benefits of the above nuclear . *;,;
.. ~
I,
*characteristics, ~orisider the loss of power to the pumps which
, -.. ; supply the recirculation flow, !f such loss were to occur at full -*
.. /' ..
power the reactor po~cr would fall to a level consistent with the r~iaining riat~ral circulation flow rate, No i~actoi scram would
~- .. ,
*be .:nec.essary.
* * .*-. Another example of the se lf-1 imi ting tendency of tne
~:>(,:reactor 'is' the case of "improper rod withdra\fa1 during a-startup~
~*
')*!.
t * .: *
- .' * ~ ' ' J :*' I *. ~ '. *. : *, *
.... 37
. :. . .~
In the event. ~hat improper rod withdrawal should produce a rising - .* period.~s sho~t as on~ seccind, the excursiqn ~ould be terminated at a low power level by Dbppler and v6id feedback and no scram would be necessary ~o ~~otect .the fuel. In .this case, howe~er, a scram does occur* as the result of action by the intermediate range
- l instrumentation.
_,. The manner in which these inherent safety features and
.. ~--
*~other design features contribute .
to normal safe operatipn .. oJ . the* . plant were discussed'above. Summarized below ate the safety .** *:.**
;e features incorporated in the several engineere.d. saf e~uards and' in
. ':1:
*' the. containment systems *. ... *" .
7,3 Engirieere<l Safeguards *.. ***.
*The tiormal pl~nt control systems maintairt plant variable~ .
within narrow operating limits. *These.systens are.thoroughly*:*,
- engineered and backed up by a significant amount of experience in sy_stem design and plant operation. Even. if an improbable op~-iatiori .*
- error or equipment failure allows plant variables to exceed thcJ r
- op~rating limits, an extensi~e system ot engineeie<l safegua;ds e terminates the transient .and* limits the effects to levels far below....- . ... * ..
those ~hich are of concern. Enginee~ed ~~feguards include th6se which back up normal ~ontrol syst~m~, those which offer ~ddi~ional*,
- .> -~ *.. '..
... 'protection against a reactivity excursion, those. which act to prevent ...
* * ..
- a loss of coolant, and those which provide core cooling :l.n the *.:.* ....
*.;: . ~event.of.a l~ss,of normal coolant. The containment and its . cooling::-~.':"
and, :inerting systems provide additional protection .to the publi~."'- ".
*:A sufficient shutdo,~n m'aq~in is maintained so th.at* .the* ,
- . ~
. (
~-.: '.
*'* :reac~or can be shui do~n in th~ c~ld* conditi6n wiih .one i6ntt61*
" -- *.. : rod ~omp lete ly OU t of the core *at any time in core 1 i fe *.. The' .
)> '.
- . . .' ..; 38 reactor ~an be ~hut down from operating power conditions with .. ".
. *. . -~*-
insertion . of.. :onl}' a .. few rods because. . of. the reduced reactivity
* . due to hot fue 1 and moder a tor an<l to* :fission pr"oduc t neutron absorbers. in the. fue_l. *.At ~~y time. during co*re life, many. rods have to* be withdrawn in ordei to bring the core critical.
t'~ * . In addition a cprnpletely rci<luri<lant, separate ahd independent* netitron .absorbing shutdown system is supplied~ The
* ~* . l
; manually initiated standby liquid control system injects a neutron.< .
*<*. absorbing . .
solution directly. . into . the rea*ctor 1noderator . in "quanti.ty . .* .
*.. ****sufficient to* sh.ut .the. react"or .down and maintain shutdown wi ti~ . the
,,. *reactor* in t'he .ther~ally cold, fission. product-.free condition. . *'*
'** * .- This **system* '~ould b.e used orily in the* abnormal case wherein .: ...
control rods cotild not.be inserted into the core~
**--*-**------ .... ---~~- -** - ...... ~ ... - .. *-**- ... -----* .... - .. *--
' .. The reactor. protection system supplements the normal rErattpr.:':'*:
~*;
- .***t '.
. :' *. power, pressure, water level,. and radioactivity con.trot systems.::
;. : **. *. ~ ..... ;,. . ., ..
The reactor protect ion* system autoli1a ti ca 11 y detects non*- standard .. . .*:*: .. plant c6ndiiions and initiates reactor scr~~ in.time;~o ~rovi<le
'9 *protective ma_rgin against core damage. The system iDi'tiates .
reactor .scram on high neutron flux, hi,gh pressure in either. the. . *...
'/'
reactor or ~rjwell, high ta~iatio~ in a steam line, or.clos~re
* . *: '.' ,*'_ .I ~-/~' .
Stea~ li~e
*:,** .*:.of the main isola.tiqn valves among others. The : ...-***
*-.-*:_:_* -*- *-*-****- ****** **-*- .. --*-**-* .._... :..'. ...._,.:.:.._ .. .;.____ .:__.:_'~7;:.:. ..:..-;***-
. * * :.: .: equipment.. used i.n the re.actor protection* syst.em, from the. sensors ..
. ::! >'through . th.e tir.cuitry and including the .. solenoid operat~d scram.*.*.>
;* .~ ~ :.-* . . '*-: '****
. . :-,: pi.lot val~*es in.'the control rod .hydraulic system, 'is highly ._ ,* .*
' . . *~ *~ : . *_
.>:;.',.' .. reliable a'n*.d'-,i.s duplicated for high probability of proper scram .
. ' ,** . \ ,. ~ .
,: . . actionwhen 'ne'e°ded,
~; *::~;* ~,A.[>noraja l ~ y high insert i ~.ns of reactivity are prevented **
.:*. l -:_ :" * . ' * .. .. .~* . ' : .
**.:\-~.:*by '.the .. iirilitatio*~*5.: ori. controi. ~od* driv~ wi th~ra\\1al. speed and ~ .:
< \ **.' r 1' ....~:<. ,: * * ':, ', * ~ -. . ", I ' '
i' *1*:** *:~ f*.~ ... :"*.:.* ... ; ... :* .. *.:.*-,* . *, .: . . :.*-.):. *.. :. ~* . ~:-~**(
*, . *:**: ' ..'* ' .*' . -, .... ~*. :. .
~:: ~>-' *. _*--)-' <*- ~ i-<~r~~<-i~~:jf::~::;.* . . . *\ - 39 -*.. * *c~~i:r ~f** -~f .th~ ra.t.e,. ~f 1
moderator temperature change. The desiens of -_.--, ..
; . * , 1' *;
- ,_ *~ -
- 'the' con t:ro 1' rod to. cont ro 1 rod drive co~pl ing and the cont ro 1 rod *:-**.
- ~- ~: ., . .. . . . .. *. .\ - *i .:. - - .' . *, .* . . .- .
> 1
~ ,, '
dri~ve . .
-.thimble-preclude. an equipment failure -which cou Id al low the
. :. .. . ~ . , ._.. ' . ' . . . -. . . .
.. : '~*.>control rod to be rer.ioved from the core more rapidly than the_ control
- ~~~ tod ~~i~e
- nor~~l*~ithd~~~al mode._ - Ne~crth~l~ss, three engineered
" - ~.
- ::***;safeguards have b.een included. as suµplcmentary protection. The movement***
.*. I
_',of the control. rod drive. thimble and control rod is restricted by the ..:;**. -~: .,...
<[thimble support, so that only negligible changes in core reactivity .' *' ... *
\ ...
. "\rnuld re'sult, even if the control rod drive thimble circur;iferentially':*:'
~' *.~J
<;.(9"1pt~red ~ .- If a control rod were to become separated fror.i *its drive, - **.: .
- '
- .~.'stick' with in the' core. and suhsequ~nt ly 'fa 11 f ror
- i the co~e, .the - "rod , :. -. .. .
~
. :; *ve!'ocity limiter". would limit its free fall velocity.* A rod *worth T *._ ' . :.: .... *.,
- _.., _.~';, '.~ *.*
*. . *.* ~~ ._ ;-
(>;minimizer computer limits the establishment of control rod con-' . **:. */ ..
- ..*;_t:; : '; . . . *... ' ' . *.: :... 1 ..'. :.. ' '* *.
. ; . .~' . ., . ; .figurations* sci that the 'ni-aximuT!l- reactivity :Insertion rate ~esulting**
I , ..
.':J_:*::
'i~"; from the fre*e fall of a control rod with a rod velocity lir:liter from . : .* f*,> . **_.,.
~*-":';;.* ...
*:>:>:the -core would n_ot cause dai:iage to the prir.iary system.
. The piping of the rea~tor primary system is conserv~tivcly :' ' * *~i.
0 . . : .. .
*,:- 'designed, analvzed, fabricated, and tested to ;>'revent failure. '
'* ~ . '.
- .. !' -~"lever .;
the less, engineered safe guards have been provided to prevent
- .:~ .. :-'relea*se _of harmful amounts' of radioactive mate.rials from the plant - **: ',* .
. .-*. ::even* :i(':a .. ;),ipe*-:ruptur*es. _ If a pipe containing high pressure r~actor .<~y>.* -: >.'.,~~*:;_*\~ate;*~-~~*;~ . *.* ..; - . : . . . . . :t.* *:* .. ' : . fop;~*d/~.--s i:~ni f i .ca~t, rupture
- out~ide . -
'the primary containmerit. ,*'.*; :<.-;;: *
\.,:, <t*h~:.:*.;~pt~;re:*_: wo11i*a** be **aut om at ica lly-'detected and the iso 1 at ion valves< .*::-; (.
*'. * ' * ' <;- * ' * * ' * * ' > I * , ' . ,: " ; *~*:' : ~
. . ,: .. '~ ) .. . ~- *" . ' .. ' ..- . . . : . - ..
. ' ~.'.'.,closed**
. .The .f*our'
*:
- I/ ' ', *' . *-* ..~\
- large* '
high pressure steam ' .
- lines. penetrating the ....., -1: '"*'
-~_.,:~:.::conta{rim~n.~:.)~,~~~. *.f.low'restrictors. If any such line were circurn-* - - x. :~: *.
- ' :., fere:ntfally.* . .:rupt*u~e<l,- the flow restrictors would limit the coolant t *
- I- ,* ' *, I ' * ' ,*' '*\ ',
- (16ss.*r~t~- .. ~~~{-"*th'e-isoiation valves* would ter~in'ate the coolant loss*< ...*. *_,
.> *, *..*._:\c*\.>~;~;:'>_**: . ., . . ,.* . -. ... * ' . ' ._,._ ,. *:.:* ..
- '.**--.,*~o .t~at. no :fuel* ~amage . \.;ould occu*r.-:. '* ....
."" ,: ,; .. :* : *; :'.*: ::; :.. :*! .... ; :'!.~-.* : ::' * :*. : ~ ,. ' .
*.. "\
~'.: ;,./< *_:c' . <:,_
* , .
- 1*
I'. *
- . / '! * ' ) ...
.. ' . ~
*--~--.--;~*, ., *'
~ .' . .. 40 -
.-.- . ~-. ._ J **:::. *.:*
.. :... *.. ! , . . The reactor vessel and piping operate at 1000 psig,
"-:: * '*well below the design pressure of 1250 psig. The vessel and .. *-; ;_-:-_ piping '~ i 1 1 b c in i t i n 11 y h y cl r o st at i ca 11 y t cs t e d at is 6 0 ps i e*
*-The initial pres~urc regulator, the bypass pressure rcgulaior,
... ~'
- . the isolation cone.lenser system, the relief valves, the safet*y valves and the reactor protection system operate to hol<l the
. - ~' '
system at operating pressure. Nevertheless, even if the piping ruptured insi<lc the contain~cnt (where the coolant loss would rtot be terminated by closure of isolation valves), m~ltiplc *
- -::::.~**** i~depcndent. c.oo lant supply systems are provi <led to assure . :'
1
,* ., *continuity of. core cooling. These include either of two c;:orc
...* ~
~
spray* sys terns, . the high pres sure co.cl ant injection sys tern, t.he
* * * *10\-i pressure coolant inject ion sys te, and the e~ergcncy c*oo 1 ant *
*supply system.
' ... ' .. 7.4 *Containment *"*.
" ~ ' :
~uring all phase~ of normal plant operations, Unit~3-has n6 .need for its containment systems. If the containment systems
'..,,:_*:did not exist, the norr.ial radiation exposures: to the operating
.'.;*e_*'.personnel an<l to the public woul<l be no greater than those dis-
* ~ussed above in Paragraph 7.1, "Normal Plant Operation. *;.....
- ** i_: ~
as ~ furthe~ backup safety feat~re~ and in addition to the 'rith~r >* :~: .;~ -~-: :*. ,
.:1:L-> *,~_:*_enginee.red *safe gua rcls \vh ich are pr6vi<led, th~ plant <lesign. '::*-
- '-.~~* .:*:_:::::_ include~ a* m~l tip le barrier conf~inr.ient system whose primary.* *.')
* *, :* . .-_, function. is to mitigate rarii<lly the consequences of postulated ic~i<lent_s* involving the reactor and it~ various* systens~
- '1
*:: . . . *1 The ~rinary containm~nt design ~rnploys a pressute . *:* ..
/:*:.,:->._. supp.ression c:ontainr.ient system_ which houses _the re.acto*r vessel,':* . *:.
' ~ "; ' .
,\~,* ': ".. ~t'h~ *!'eac.to:rcool~nt' and recirculating. loops, and other'.setvi'c:e;*
, ~
'* , .',_ "*r
. :**. . . . .**.*:. *~* *. **~. : : ..
.' *.. - ... - 41
... ;.: '. J
':. \ *'.:::. 'loops. connected to .the.reactor. The pres SU re supp re SS ion sy*s tern ., ;*:*., --.--,.:
- ___
- :._:::_-, * ,~onsists of: a drywell, a pressure suppression chamber \*1hich stores a .laq~e volume. of water, a connecting vent system between>
; ... _-.,_the. dry,~ei1 and the-water pool, isolation valves, containment cooling systems, and other service equi~m~nt.
The primary c~ntainrnent system is fabricated as two
. ~ . ;.
- ". * ~ arg_e pressure vcs se 1s and is designed to withs ta.ncl the peak
"'f.**' . .*. -
-*- ' pr~ssurcs which could occur due to the postulated ru?ture of ~ny
':. v . * ~- * . .
...:~* . -~ . :, . *r:
i~---~~-}: _: :: . reactor
. ~ ; *. pri~ary system pipe inside the drywell. Containment ..~
~--' .. l. * *
- .1
~::_:;*:e ~pi*ay :coo I ing sys terns are* provided to assure continuous c~~ I i~g ** * ' ,
':-*'.;:::. '~,..:.\o.f the 1>°rimary containment under accident conditions. . .... , ..
A rea~tor ~uilding completely encloses the reactor and ... ' '
;* _. ::.: its pressure suppre'ssion primary containment. This structure . :*:.*
- .:;... . *~ ~-:. " ,* ...
provides secondary containment when the primary containP,'lent i~ *.Jn** service, and pro~id~s primary contain~cnt d~ring periods wh~n ..,;.,.. ~~- *.. t~e\ . .....
' 'pressure suppression containment system is open. From a safe- ~
_1.,: * . guards consideration, ~he *principai pur~ose of the.secondary
-,' e containment is to minimize groun<l level release of airborne .. . "'
. radioactive* . .
materials ' . and to provide for. controlled,
*decontaninated,*
elev,a t_e<l, r~ l,ease f.' the building a tmosph~re :under accident".,.,'
. ~ ',..,
0 . .
*;:.;::,'., ),**:~-~:~-~~~~i-~~s-~-.-*
l*' .
. :1 :*** * ~ , ** ~J. ....
~
) ,,_* .... ,
1 * ' . . . :-'.
" *'I*
)'.*
~* . l: > '.
. .' ~-
*.* ': :*i. *...
*, ........ ".* ~-: .....
~. '. ' I ' ' ' :
.~ ; .;. '" ... : '* *. ,:'.'
. . , .. ; -~~. *. * .. * :
- *. ~~
~ "~- *..
,l
. *' . ... : . .' *~ :*: ... :...
. -~' *.,*
*. ~ ' . ,' : *.T '.
~
~ ,.
' * ;: f, '. ' . '
. ~.
1,
.~*
*,. ~-~ .. *. >.* ...
*f_'r*
*'i" *; ...
*I . * *, ..... *
'-.~ ~ .. *, ' .' .... , .. : ' '
t *'.
"I r* .:_:1
."1.:"r *~.'~ ,* ', . "**..
* .,,._
- f . * .
'*' _.,--.,-~ .
~ *:'::*~\-~; :-:--***~'-* .,;:~-, .-..-/-;-*- --.-:*--:-- ---
. ~ ,. '. 'f"' . . . . .~ ~' * '! ' \* .'/; ~ . * . * ~* 42 ~
. '."l . . .' . . *~. ' .. .. *..:**
* . *' *;r '. ~ *' '.' ., * *>~ ~ ., ** *'. .*
>\'.>'.'(:~'-0 *.SU\l~IAR.Y Qr: .OFF-SITE EFFECTS *.* ':*
! . * .: ~ .... ,.....
0.-'. .. :..' .* ,... *. *.*
- ,~-. '* "-"
- AnCt:lys*es 'have been made to evaluate the off-site effects
~* . . . ., ' .
<'.;:."from _b~th norma-1;.piant operation and postulated adcident conditions*:=**.-**.
Outing noimal f~ll p~~cr ope~ation of the plant it is anti cip.~t.ed* that th~ ma~imum annual average** exposure to persons
,J _.;
,.i. off-sit~ will not excee<l .approximatelt.S m~em~. Th is may b-e ..
- ~;, ~o~pared with th~ limitations of 10 CFR 20 of 500 mrems ~er year~ ' . ', ,* .. ~- .
':: ~.... *: \,~ . .... .*
*~ .: f .* t~d gener~l classes of postulated accidents have b~eri:~*.
,. .... ~,I:
'I ' . '*
.:_:* ..'. : '.:\:analy:~ed; namely' reactivity *transient accidents typified by' ....
.. j-:-._ f, ... ... * . .. - * "-* -:-.: ~- : the' rod c.Irop and fue 1 loading .ace id en ts' and compo~en t fail urc ':.'
r*,'.
~ .~.I - .. ~:
ac~idents such as. the ~*team line .'break. and a loss* of c~olant~ * '
*I' *
*,.. * * '* The :£ oi 1 owing summarizes .the* maximur.t. cal cu 1 a ted per sonne 1 doses ,
.'. .' . ~" : ' . .
'.*' ..':;at' :the.site bo.undary for .the'*above accidents.
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Ace i.dent * .. * *.Total Accident: Exposure Rem*:,., .. ...
. '\ _W_h_o_l_e_8_o_d_,_y Th v r o i <l
~*. Roe.I Drop 3.i x 10~22 1.7 x 10- 12
. Fuel Loading 3.2xl0-* 2.8xl0.f!"".**:
. : *.. Ste.am Line Break 6.s x .10-6 3.2 x io-2
*Loss.of Coolant
- 4.2 x l~- 4 5.4 x lo- 4 .. -
-._::9
.." It h~s been,tonclude<l from these analyses that the- ~ **......
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,. On the basis* of the 'fo_regoing the *Applicant respectfully*
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*.sub mi ts that: '.'
'*: .:!, ~~--~. ..*: .. a* *A discriptirin_ of the pr6p6sed esign qf* Un{t 3, including
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the piincipal architect~ral and cngine~ring criteria therefor,
*. has been furnished;.
b, . App 1 i cant has
- ident if ie<l the major new features *incorporated'. **: .,: .
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- .~~-.:in the <lcsign of Uri it. 3 which have not been demonstrated in* actuar.*
* * .;.* 6peration of *other rtuclear p.ower plants;.* ** .*,: .*:
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- c*,. There a"re *TtO unresolved safety questions other than :,.,
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tho~~ related to the demonstratiori of th6 effectiveness a~d ' *:-**:*., '
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**::*reliability of such new fcatu'i-es by actual .operation;
.d~ *.The effectiveness and reliability of such new features wi11 *
*c be ~e~ori;traied*b;*t~~ ~p~ration of other simiiar boiling wat~~~
reactor plants now undet const~uction ~nd by ~re-operitio~al and.
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-~ initial st.artup tests of Unit 3 prior .to the last .date stated in
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the applic~tioti for completion of ~onstruction of such unit; and . l
- e*
e* Taking into consider~tion the charact~ristics of the sit~ .. . ... and e11virons and the proposed design of Unit 3, such facility can .. '>*_.: ...
*,;;... __ t>e'consJru<;:ted a11µ operated *within the.limitations established by.* .....: ..
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.. * ~* 10 CFR io,'. \vi thin* the site ~riteria *set forth in 10 CFR 100 and ...... ~~.; ,. ~.~,.* ...
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- . <without *und:4e . .:ris:~ to* the. health_,~_and: safety of the P':1blic.'
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. e Plate 1. Station Perspec t iv
INDEX TO SECTIONS OF UNIT 3 PLANT DESIGN A~D ANALYSIS REPORT I N Wfl I Cl I UN I T 3 DES I GN DE SC RI PT l 0 :--SS AN D ANALYSES DIF FERS FRO>*I T!IOSE REVIEWED IN AEC DOCKET 50-237 A. Changes in Interconnections .and Sharing of Auxiliary Systems and Common Facilities Section Reference in Unit 3 Item Plant Design and Analysis Report General Description Section I-7 Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) Section V-4 Turbine Building Section I-4 Radwaste Building Section VI-2 New r:uel Storaze Section I X-1 Spent Fuel Shipping Facility Section I X-1 Service l'Ja~ter System Section I X-5 Reactor Building Cooling Water System Section I X-5 Turbine Building Cooling Water System Section IX-5 Reactor Building Heating & '"' Ventilation System Section V-4 Turbine Builuinz Heating & Ventilation System Section I-7 ;......_;.. ~ . Standby Gas Treatment System Section V-4
~lake-up 1Va te r System Section I X-5 ~lake-up Demineralizer Section I X-5 Fire Protection System Section I X-5 Circulatin g Water System Section I X- 2 kadioact ivc Wast e Control Systems Liquid Waste Control Section VI-2 Gaseous Waste Control Section VI-3 Solid Waste Control Section VI-4 Standby Power Sources 34.S KV Line Section VII-I 2500 KVA Standby Tran~f ormer Section VII-2 Standby Diesel Generator System Anendnent No. 5 Control Room J Section I X-4 B~ Changes Related to the Provision of a Turbine Gene rator Approximately 2% Larr.er in Capacity Than Originall y Considered Section Referen ce in Unit 3 I ten Plant Desi~n and Analy~is Report Turbine Section IX-2 I I $"'
- - Section Referen ce in Unit 3 Item .Plant Desi~n and Analysi s Roport Reactor Vessel Ove rall Lengt h Inside Section I-4 Fuel Rod Pitch Section IV-1 Reactor Recirculating Loops Design Pressures Section V-2.3 Primary System Hydrostatic Test Section V-2.6 Primarv Containment Svstem Section V-3 Drywell External Design Pressure Downcomer Vent Pressure Loss Factor Drywell Free Volume Pressure Suppr~ssion Chamber Free Volume
- Recirculation Linc Pipe Supports Section V-3.2 Drywcll NOT Section V-3.2 Pressure Suppression Section V-3.3 Ch amber :rnT Penetrations of Primary Section V-3.4 and V-3.S Containment and Isolation Valves Containment Inerting System Section V-3.7 Circulating Water System Section IX-2.6 Feedwater Heaters Section IX-2.10 Isolation Condenser System Section V-5.2.3 and Amendments
- High Pressure Coolant I,njection System Amendment 5 .;_. ~;..* .
Core Spray Systems Section J-3.7.3b and Amendment S Low Pressure Coolant Injection System Amendment 5 Containment Spray Cooling Systems Amendment 5 Emergency Coolant Supply Amendment 5 Automatic Relief Valve Actuation Amendment 5 D. Refinements in Certain Analvses Section Reference in Unit 3 Item Plant Design and Analysis Report Inadvertent Isolation Valve Section XI-2.S.l Closure J Loss of Auxiliary Power Section XI-2.7.3 TIP System Gui<le Tube . Failure Section XI-2.7.1 Control Rod Drop - Section XI-3.1.6 Radiological Effects Fuel Loading Accident Section XI-3.2 Steam Line Ru?ture Outside Reactor Building Section XI-3.3 Loss-of-Coolant Inside Drywell Section V-3.7.2 Section XI-3.4 Section XI-3.S.4 Ana lyt ica 1 ~lethods Section XI-4
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MAP OFAREA SURROUNDING PLAN'
- ... __ , r.::.L.c_i:- i a~ 41( -~
PL ATE 3
I STAT E *a F ILLINOIS
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27,26:'. 34J35*~
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lZZZJ AREA LEASED FROM STATE OF ILUNO!S UNIT I SECURITY FENCIHG
- - - - UNIT Z SECURITY Fli:llCING
- FARM l'ENCING
~. Station Property Plat
ISOLATION CONDENSER 1 I 1 ORYWELL PRESSURE SUP~RESSION SYSTEM Plate 5. Artist's Conception of Typical Reactor and Containment
lh CORE MONITOR SLEEVE
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