ML17250A761
| ML17250A761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/16/1980 |
| From: | Randy Hall BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| To: | Ferguson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17250A760 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8011140626 | |
| Download: ML17250A761 (8) | |
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Di2OOKHAVi.Nfxt"iH'i!rhl I.'z)<<'i,/ilr )i Y ASSOC.'-IAli i
> i)f'~l'~li i'!r'lill!I, INC, DF'5.)or)ment of Nuclear I our< ry tr,')t<ul, t! iv Y<><t'<1<1/3
(.><<,~.:.t.>2l ~r 4 J(rrrc 16, 1980 Nr. Robert L. Ferguson Chemi cal Engi neeri ng U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc:r:rrrission Hashington, D.C.
20555 RE:
Safe Shutdown Arr<<lysis, )t.E. Giiina Nuclear Power Plant
Dear Bob:
A mini-review of tlie )t.):.
Girrrr,r Nirclear Power Pl,iiit )'.<<s )i(<rr (o:i)>letirt by E. f)acDougall
<<.rd,V. L(tt.i<.r'i wit)r the assistance of J.
)')(~;rrr.
lli(. fol-lowing items <<re doc(r-:.rite> <>:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Ad(!()ir<<cy (il ))ocillm ilts
) i'ovided.
Adequacy of Corr5(>>'rrarrc(
t.o tlie SER.
Ap)1Ltldix )t lr)d A)>)k'.!l(lix A )t(.'view Ot)rer Co'rrrr'e>>ts oii t:lie ).i(.<'.rrsee's Submittal
<<nd Poteriti<<1 Pr.obli."is foi t.)ro Final Review.
I.
ADE UACY OF DOCU<~)ENTS )')tOV)D),)i The submittal coiisists nf b<<sic<<lly three parts icloiitiiii<liii S< ctioiis IV, V, and VI.
Sectioii IV is <<>>titl(d "Geireral Shutdowll l ct)i<i.)"-
Irl tliis s(iction the licerrsee disciiss< s, i>>.:o reirhat detailed t:<rrrrs,
)i<yaw.")rirt<)<rwrr will proceed.
To a()(quatoly ov<<liiite t.Iris s(ction in conjirrr(:t.iorr wit.)r Si<:I )on V, P'<ID's, Operati>>g
<lnd
).lila!1 g('licy C)r<<');list Procedures,
)>>st ru::<>>t: <<>>(l l i>gic Drawings and Llectric'il 5)r.,rwi>>gs
.>>.(. riecessary.
Sect lo>>
V i., o>>tit)<r)
"Specific Shutdown l')('.L)ro<)s,"
tlllfol'trill<rtclySection V is less tli.>>i.')r< cific
<<xcept to state cert<iiri rrrodi5icat'.ioii;; ivill be made.
Tli( <)ot.;rils ol t)>>.sv pro<)-
ifications are>>ot inclir<lod ioi r.(vi(w.
Section VI is orititl<<l "l'in)ro.e() )<ii<t-ifications" a)id is 2-1/0
)rag<.s lori<l.
Section Y which st,it(s t)<<r,.o<)it ic<<tiiiii
<<re required t'!L< s 30
)r;r<,<.s.
Tli<<)<'t.,lil t,'liat is pres(i>>t<<l iri i<< t rorr Vl i.'egated by the f'ict it. is iiol: <<1(.>>
w)ric)r, if any of t.li(si ri<i )il rc.rt i<irr.', wr I) be applied in wli;it <li('.i...
0 ll
To:
R.L'. Ferguson J iiii('
Section VI is unacceptable b<.cause it does not come forth willi,: <:.,>>
method of., accomplishing a task.
Cven if an exaiiiple nr two had b<
~ < ~ ii <liv. i.,
-start on the evaluation could be made.
ihe..pproaches listed in Vl A, l',
>>i<t C could very well be satisfactory if they meet all existing NRC
'>>i<i oth< r ii:-
quired codes and guidelines.
- However, we feel the burden is on th<
~ lie< ii" <i.
to make a detailed alternate shutdown method for the staff to revi<.w.
The isolation amplifiers, descrili(<i in Section VI, could pr<iv i<I<<.. iti-factory isolation, but again, we feel it's the licensee's job to pr(!; o..<.
specific details'hat meet the r<<quireme>>ts of IEEE 279 and 384 aii<l;!'.li<.r Wl!C requirements and applicable codes.
Hhe>> this is done, we can make a rovii:w ot tlie proposal.
The sam is true for "Transfer Devices."
The proposal to re-route cables from the fire area, Separatioii Re<tuir('-
ments, is an acceptable approacli.
The separation requirements of Il.l:E 384 in l!art 5 - Addition,il S< f>>>> 1-tion Analysis" is not acceptable.
IEEE 384 allows separation of oiily I" I!<-
tween redundant circuits in covered trays.
Tlie Sa>>dia tests demo>>'t.rat<.<l tliit.
this separation criteria is not a(leqiiat>>.
th. recommend that the i<<. tuir<m.>>t.
'of Appendix R Section II E be foll<!w<<d.
The end result is that this subi<iittal do<.s>>ot provide suffi<<ient
<l<i<'-ii-mentation in sufficient detail to perfonii a detailed review of this submit.t.al iinr an Appendix R a>>d Appeiidix A r< view.
Lle recommend the NRC rc<t<iest f>>11 size (readable)
PAID's, plus the <<bove listed
<toc<mients.
In addit:io>>,
t.l>> ~
licensee should furt:her develop t.li< co>>t:<<>>ts of this submittal so t.liat. a i <-
viewer can independently deteniii>>e t;liat safe sliutdown in the event: of a fi'Ie is possible.
II..
ADE UACY QF CONFOR'tAHCE TO Till: Sl:.R Item 3.2.l of'he SER addresses t,lie requiremeiits for the saf<
shiit.<t<iw>>
aiialysis.
The following is extracle<l fr<!m the SER-3.2.1 Shutdown Anal sis - lli>> li<<< iisee is coiiducting a stu<ly to:
(I) identify various means of liriiigiiigtlie plant to, and mai>>t.ai>>i>><t the safe shutdown conditinii, (2) determine whether safe
.".t>>it<tow>> ca>>
ho acliieved without <<q<iii!m<>>t/
cables in any o>>e fire>>.<..i,
.iii<l (3) identify modifications>><<<<ssary t,o l>> es<<rve the safe shiit,<tew>>
capability if safe sl>>it<t<iw>> c.iiiiiot li< acliieved or lllaltltiill<'(l f<il-lowing a mclgor fiie iii,iiiy t ir<<>>.(! l.
I Tiie s<ibmittal addresses
<<11
<~t tli<
i <<l>>ii e::i< iit.s of Item 3.2. l
<!f tl>>
'(\\
Sl'l..
Ilc;;ever, as stated i>>
1 L)v<
t ll<'
<<t ills,".ii<l (tocumentatio>>,>>.<
iii
~ ii:,i t.o co>>fiiv that safe shut<i(!w>> iri tl>>
ot
'i fii<< is possible.
C I
111.
R)')"".i'D)X R Rf<l) RPI't Ht)IX A REVIEtf The sirbrnittal does noL provide sufficient deL,ill L<) il )<)w;>> oview to t)ie standar<ls provi<led iri Rppendix R and Appendix R.
l oi
<.x rrrrf)l<, t,his sub-rnittal does not describe tlie justification for sepirraLiori
<)f fir <
ir<<as by distance
- alone, raLher tlian by barriers as requir<<l by Rpp<.ii:lix lt, Section 111 h oii page 39.
Tiiis review must await the receipt ol furt.)r<.r d tiiils as re-quested above-IY.
OT)tER COY:~EHTS OH TllE LICENSEE'S SUB))ITTRL RI,)>
) Oi).N)-)R). )'f;t))tLENS FOR THE FINAL )(EV I EH 1.
The cover letter states "specific iiiodificiiLioriswill b<<. proposed after the staff lias reviewed and co:lcurre<l wit;)i.t.)i<i tissinnptions and shutdown niethods presented in the c:clos<i) <."
llii. staLeinent is consistent with tire submittal and cxplai>>s the <)if'f iculLy with performing a niini-review.
An approach of t.)ris typ<. will inake a re-view of safe s)iirtdown very tine consuririn<g for, bol.li the plant a>>d for the tlRC.
It is possible to say this subrrrittal is;i start in the i ight dir<<ctiori; but a review is not possil)l>> oii.'i'f'e sli<<tdown due to the.lrick o> <lotail provided.
2.
T)ie lice>>s<
o.'. shoiild justify why tire assur)if)f iori t)i;it. "Lli<. pressure boillldary lilt('.<Jl i ty of a val ve punip casl ll<J,
)')l pt'. i)i'.alrk ls assullled not: to be effect.<<) by the fire" stated oii pa<le 1-1 ol'li<i siibrnittal; 3.
51<rLernerrt s siic)i as "In general, fire barr i< rs oi sli ice is iised to maintain sopar.at.iron betvreen fire areas.
C,.))le t.r.,rys tli;it go from one i'ir iroa to another
~ma receuirn i'iro.:Logs to pravriit fire i'ra<
spreadin<)
fi.om <>>i>> area to the adjacent ai<"i" fr oiii pag<'I-I are 1 n ideqira t;<<.
Uiiless detail s are pi ov i de<I t li it..ilpp<)rt w)ry these statem.nts are <<cceptable it cannot he sliow>> t)r,rt..:;rfe':,)rirtdown is possible.
V.
CO))CLUSIONS Based on the i>>fonrr,:t:roil presented to date, it. is>>ot. ))Ossil)l>> to con-firm safe sliiit<lown c,iii b<,lc)iioved during or after;iiiy fii.<.
l)i<i.< fore, it is recomi:end d t)rat tli<. i!RC i.<.,iect tliese alternat>>
sysL<in>> <<pl>> o,icli<>>, and req-uiree the more coiis<.iv,il.iv<i <ledicated shutdown syst< iis h<. i))it.,rl)<<l.
The r<<'.<)rrrrrerr<),rt:ion for. <le<licated systems l)eiii t iiist.,il1<'I is l),ised on the fol 1 owi lig:
Ite'i 3.2.1 of Lli< Sl)l it.<)rrires the licensee l<) <<)rr<)r:,.t
.i stir<)> to iden-tify v;irio<<s in<<aiis of')r irrr<)ing the plant Lo, a)i<) rniiii'..:rrrirri) it; at; the slfe sliirtdow>> <<ori<lit.i<)n.
Also the liceiis<<.. i., to
<I, t< ir::i>>
~ i")i.th r safe sliiiLdowii c,iii l)<,ichieved without eqirip, rlt/< ll)l(". irr.'.iiy f ir <'i"ea, and Lo i<)entify w)r,it. iio<lifications are ii<cess,iiy f<)i.;.,if< s))<it<)own.
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~ The licensee discusses, in g rr<.r~rl, 16 sh<<L<lown methods in SecLi<rrr )Y.
Then, the subiiiittal review'9 l ire Areas sL<<ting which rn t)iod fr <'ii:.'~.
tion IV will be used to shut.dowii srrd w)ric)>>rrodifications, in gen'i ll, are required.
The difficulty with this approacli arises frorrr the lack of detail pi'o-v id<:d in the submittal.
In the event t,he licensee provides sufiici< rit.
detail to evaluate this submittal it is co>>coivable that t)ie pro)i<iso<l alternate shutdown systcrirs coiil<l become acc<<pt:able.
REFERENCES 1.
- k. E.
Gi nna, Safe Shutdown - Fire Study, December 1979.
2.
Draft Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, t~ray 2, 1980.
3.
Appendix A to Branch Technical PosiLion APCSB 9.5-1, USNRC, August 23, 1976.
4.
Safety Evaluation Report, Robert E. Girina l<ucl<<ar Power Plant, Unit 1, Nuclear Regul,atory Commission, D<<c<.iirber 6, 1978.
Respectfully your',
Q.(~(~pm. 7
.+ober.t:
1:.. )lail, Gi oiip Leader ReacLor E>>9 i >>eer i iig Analysis
)'EH EM<.VL:sd cc.:
Y. Benaroya
)f- )erato J. )'levan V. Lettieri H. Levine E. tlacDougall
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