ML17229A646
| ML17229A646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/11/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17229A645 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-98-01, 50-335-98-1, 50-389-98-01, 50-389-98-1, NUDOCS 9803050080 | |
| Download: ML17229A646 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1998001
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos:
License
Nos:
Report
Nos:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Date:
Inspector:
Approved by:
50-335,
50-389
50-335/98-01.
50-389/98-01
Power
8 Light Co.
St. Lucie Nuclear
Plant, Units
1
dm 2
6351 South
Ocean Drive
Jensen
Beach.
FL
34957
January
23,
1998
Lori C. Stratton,
Safeguards
Inspector
George A. Belisle, Chief
Special
Inspection
Branch
Division of Radiation Safety
9803050080 9802li
ADOCK 05000335
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units
1
8
2
NRC Inspection Report
Nos. 50-335/98-01
and 50-389/98-01
This routine,
announced
inspection
was conducted in the area of plant support
by a regional
safeguards
inspector.
The specific area evaluated
was the
Physical Security Program for Power Reactors.
One apparent violation of regulatory requirements
with two examples
was
identified in the area of access
controls (Section S2.1).
S2
S2. 1
Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
a.
The inspector
reviewed the circumstances
surrounding
an access
control
event that occurred
on January
2,
1998,
as reported
by the licensee in
Licensee
Event Report
(LER) 98-S01-0.
rv
i
On December
31,
1997,
a contract
employee
was favorably terminated,
and
his site access
was requested
to be unassigned
from the security
computer
on that day. along with 21 other contract
employees.
The
individual was not notified of his termination
and reported to the site
on January
2,
1998.
The individual entered the protected
area at
6:55 a.m.
Upon entrance into the protected
area,
the employee
was
notified by the contract supervisor that
he had been terminated.
The
individual left the protected
area at 7:03 a.m.
The employee
had
protected
and vital area
access
as of the time of his entry on
January
2,
1998.
Upon review of termination request
records,
the
security badging office determined that two of the 21 individuals
.
requested .to be terminated
on December
31,
1997 . had not had their
badges
unassigned.
In addition to the employee
who entered the
protected
area
on January
2, another contract employee's
badge
was not
unassigned.
This second
employee
had protected
and vital area
access;
however, this individual did not return to the site.
Section 13.4.4 of the Physical Security Plan,
Revision 50, dated
November 24,
1997, states.
"Upon notification of the voluntary
termination or the termination for cause of an individual authorized
unescorted
access,
Plant Security Supervision shall ensure that the
individual's picture badge
and keycard are immediately retrieved
and
keycard
and hand geometry access
capabilities
are inactivated."
Section 5.3(d) of the Physical Security Plan states.
"Only those
individuals with identified need for access
and having appropriate
authorization,
shall
be granted unescorted vital area
access."
Upon discovery that the individuals'ccess
was not unassigned,
security
immediately terminated their access capabilities.
The inspector
determined that
a validation process of badge
unassignments
existed in
the Secondary
Alarm Station,
where badging terminations
were processed
after hours,
and on weekends
and holidays.
However, the badging office,
which normally processes
termination requests,
did not have the same
rigorous verification oversight.
Both of the termination requests
that
security failed to complete were to be processed
in the badging office.
The licensee
determined that as
an interim action, all badging
'terminations
would be accomplished
in the Secondary
Alarm Station.
The
inspector determined that procedural
revisions to standardize
the
badging termination
and verification processes
were completed January
5.
1998.
These procedural
revisions allowed the licensee to process
termination requests
in both the Secondary
Alarm Station
and the badging
office.
As
a result of this event. disciplinary actions were taken
against culpable licensee
personnel.
The licensee's
failure to inactivate
a voluntarily terminated
individual's keycard
and hand geometry immediately, which resulted in an
unauthorized
individual having access to protected
and vital areas for
approximately two days,
was one example of an apparent violation of
regulatory requirements.
Additionally, the li.censee's
failure to
inactivate
a voluntarily terminated individual's keycard
and hand
geometry,
which resulted in an unauthorized individual having an
opportunity to gain access to both protected
and vital areas
was
a
second
example of an apparent violation of regulatory requirements.
(EEI 50-335,
389/98-01-01)
One apparent violation of regulatory requirements
with two examples
was
identified in the area of access
control.
XI
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented
the inspection results during
a telephone
conference
on January
26.
1998 to licensee
management.
The licensee
'cknowledged the findings presented.
Although reviewed during this
inspection.
proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS
CONTACTED
Licerma
D. Fadden,
Services
Manager
G.
Madden, Licensing
E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager
W. White, Security Manager
M. Miller, Senior Resident
Inspector
J.
Munday, Resident
Inspector
e
INSPECTION
PROCEDURES
USED
IP 81700:
Physical Security Program for Power
Reactors
ITEMS OPENED,
CLOSED,
AND DISCUSSED
50-335,
389/98-01-01
Failure to terminate two
individual's access
~ capabilities
(Section
S2. 1)
I
t