ML17228B583
| ML17228B583 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1996 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Tobin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B582 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-96-10, 50-389-96-10, NUDOCS 9608090153 | |
| Download: ML17228B583 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1996010
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report
Nos ~
50-335/96-10
and 50-389/96-10
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
Facility Name:
St.
Lucie Plant Units
1 and
2
License Nos.:
and NPF-16
Inspection
Conducted:
June
24 - 27,
1996
Inspector:
Wi lia
J Tob'enior Safeguards
Inspector
/
Approved by:
P ul
E.
redrickson,
Chief
Special
Inspection
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Da
e Signed
ate Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This inspection
was conducted to review the corrective actions
taken
by the
licensee
in response
to the findings of a licensee
audit of the Fitness
For
Duty Program.
Results:
The identified deficiencies
in the Fitness
For Duty Program
had
been
appropriately
addressed.
After the conclusion, of the audit, additional
issues
were identified that resulted
in the licensee
reevaluating
and
expanding the corrective actions.
An inspector followup item will monitor
these efforts.
9608090i53
960726
ADOCK 05000335
8
0
REPORT DETAILS
1.0
Persons
Contacted
1. 1
- A. Cummings,
Corporate
Fitness
For Duty Coordinator
- E. Benkin, Licensing Supervisor
- W. Bladon, guality Manager
A. Feder,
Medical
Review Officer
R.
Lammer,
Raytheon Supervisor
J.
Lechka,
Speakout
Supervisor
- J. Scarola,
General
Manager
- E. Weinken,
Licensing Manager
- W. White, Security Manager
A. Villoldo, Corporate
Access Coordinator
Other licensee
employees
contacted
during this inspection
included
engineers,
technicians,
security force members,
and administrative
personnel.
1.2
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
- H. Hiller,
NRC Senior Resident
Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.0
guality Assurance
Audit (81700)
Between January
19 and March 7,
1996, the licensee
conducted
an audit
(gAS-FFD-96-1) of the Fitness
For Duty and Access Authorization Programs
at
both it's operating nuclear sites
and at the Corporate Office in Juno
Beach,
The purpose of this inspection
was to review the adequacy of the
licensee's
corrective actions for the results of that audit.
By correspondence
dated April 5,
1996, the audit report for Audit gAS-FFD-96-1
was furnished to the appropriate levels of Corporate
and site management
as
well as line supervision.
The audit found several
examples of individuals who
were randomly chosen for drug
and alcohol testing not having
been tested
because
they were not onsite
when the Fitness
For Duty Coordinator
(FFDC)
sought
them out for testing.
The auditors
noted that
on numerous
occasions
earlier,
these individuals were available onsite but the
FFDC did not attempt
to locate
them for the unannounced
random testing.
The auditors
also found
that several
individuals scheduled for "Conditional Followup" testing,
as
a
result of rehabilitation,
were not tested
in accordance
with the frequency
decided
by the Medical
Review Officer (MRO).
Numerous
Fitness
For Duty (FFD)
records
were found to be inaccurate,
incomplete or in conflict with other
existing documents.
In a reply memo to the guality Assurance
Department,
dated April 29, the
Operations
Vice President
concluded that the root causes
of these findings
were the failure to follow procedures
due to
a lack of attention to detail,
and the lack of a self-checking process.
This
memo projected corrective
actions
would be in place
no later than
Hay 1996.
Corrective actions
included
monthly meetings
between representatives
of the Security,
Human Resources
and
Hedical
Departments
to verify compliance with existing procedures
and the
accuracy of access
records.
Additionally, another monthly meeting
between
the
two Site Security Hanagers
and their
FFDCs would include
a detailed review of
the
FFD program to assure that testing
was in fact being conducted
as required
by procedures.
An additional
measure
taken
was to document to the
FFDCs the
expectation
from their supervisors,
the Security Hanagers,
that this increased
level of accountability
was to stress
the importance of accurate
records
and
procedural
compliance.
Through interviews with pertinent individuals
and review of Corporate
and site
FFD records,
the inspector determined that these corrective actions
had
been
appropriately
implemented.
However, the inspector did find that subsequent
to this audit,
but prior to
corrective action completion,
the licensee
had identified that the St.
Lucie
FFDC on April 26 erroneously
recorded
into the
FFD computer
system
a negative
alcohol test
as being
a positive test,
and, that
on April 18 the St Lucie
FFDC
erroneously
recorded
a positive drug test
(cocaine)
as
a negative test.
These
errors
were discovered
because
the licensee's
FFD procedure,
"Processing
and
Reporting Tests Results," requires that
an individual at the Corporate office
verify the site-generated
data in the FFD/Access
computer
system prior to the
final granting of a clearance.
With respect to the April 26 event,
the
individual who tested
negatively for alcohol
(but who was recorded
as
a
positive)
was not given site access
because
he continued in his pre-access
training and processing
status
before the error was discovered
at the
Corporate office on Hay 14.
Once the licensee
discovered this error, the
individual was appropriately
processed
and authorized
access.
The individual
who on April 18 tested positive for drugs
(but who was recorded
as
a negative)
also
was not given site access
because
the Corporate coordinator found the
error on April 23 and denied further clearance
processing.
The licensee
responded
to these errors
by providing
a site representative
to daily monitor
the activities of the St Lucie
FFDC to assure
data accuracy
and record
verification.
The licensee further informed the inspector that although the
position at the Corporate office that found the errors of the St Lucie
FFDC
will be vacated
as
a result of a recent reorganization,
the procedural
requirement will be
assumed
by another position at the site.
Subsequent
to
the inspection,
the inspector learned that the St.
Lucie
FFDC had
been
replaced.
In conclusion,
the inspector verified that corrective actions resulting from
Audit gAS-FFD-96-1
had
been appropriately
implemented;
however,
the
FFDC
problems identified at St,
Lucie subsequent
to the audit revealed
the
continuing
need for the Site
FFDC to exercise strict procedural
adherence.
An
Inspector
Followup Item (96-10-01) will be opened to review the licensee'
reorganization
of it's
FFD Staff within the Site Security Department.
3.0
Exit Heeting
The Exit meeting
was held
on June
27 with those
so noted in paragraph
1.
The
inspector
advised
the licensee of the preliminary results of the inspection.
The licensee
responded
that further corrective measures
were being considered
to improve the accuracy of the
FFD Program at all of it's sites.
No
dissenting
comments
were voiced.