ML17223A946
| ML17223A946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1990 |
| From: | Belisle G, Hallstrom G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17223A945 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-90-19, 50-389-90-19, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 9009240303 | |
| Download: ML17223A946 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1990019
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos. 50-335/90-19
and 50-389/90-19
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Fl 33102
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
Facility Name: St. Lucie Units I and
2
Inspection
Conducted:
August 6-10,
1990
Inspector:
.
G.
.
a
strom
Approved by:
y~G..
e
s e,
se
Test
Programs
Section
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
License
NoseI
ate
sgne
2 -gz-
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection
examined
licensee
actions
in response
to
NRC Inspection
and Enforcement Bulletin (IEB) 88-04 "Potential
Safety-Related
Pump Loss."
The bulletin requested
the licensees
to determine if the operation
of
any safety-related
systems
would result
in dead-heading,
to, evaluate
safety-related
systems
for flow division,
and to evaluate
the
minimum flow
bypass
lines for safety-related
pumps with respect
to
damage
resulting
from
operations
and testing in the minimum flow mode.
Results:
All actions
in response
to the bulletin were stated
to
be completed
by the
licensee
prior to this inspection.
Most licensee
responses
and actions
were
verified to be satisfactory during this inspection.
However, the inspector
was
unable
to independently
verify three
items while
on site
due to lack of
necessary
data.
Additional satisfactory clarifications for the items involved
were
received
by telecopy
on August
16,
1990
and in
a followup telephone
conference
with licensee
personnel
on that date
the inspector
informed the
licensee that Bulletin 88-04 was closed for Plant St. Lucie Units
1 and 2.
Licensee
engineers
and operations
personnel
provided knowledgeable
responses
to
technical
issues
raised
by the inspector during this inspection.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
9009240303
900823
ADQCK 05000335
6
PNU
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- G. Boissy, Plant Manager
- J. Barrow, Operations
Superintendent
- D. Culpepper,
Site Engineering Supervisor
- J. Dyer, guality Control Supervisor
- R. Englmeier, guality Assurance
Superintendent
J. Hallem, Plant Systems
Engineer
- L. Mc Laughlin, Plant Licensing Superintendent
- G. Madden, Plant Compliance
Engineer
- A. Menocal, Nuclear Engineering
Group Supervisor
- G. Pustover,
Senior Project Nuclear Engineer
D. Stuart,
Systems
Engineering Supervisor
- J. West, Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
- D. West, Technical Staff Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
during this
inspection
included
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
and office personnel.
NRC Resident
Inspectors
S. Elrod, Senior Resident
Inspector
(SRI)
M. Scott,
Resident
Inspector
(RI)
"Attended exit interview on August 10,
1990.
and initialisms
used
throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Potential for Safety-Related
Pump Loss
was
issued
May 5,
1988,
due to the potential for damage
of
safety-related
centrifugal
pumps
when operated
in parallel at low flow.
When
one of the
pumps is "stronger"
than the other (i.e.,
has
a higher
developed
head for the
same
flow) it may cause
"dead
heading" of the
weaker
pump; i.e.,
pump impeller operation without fluid flow. This can
lead to pump damage
due to cavitation
and heat buildup.
The inspector
examined the licensee's
responses
to IEB 88-04 dated
July ll and
December
19,
1988;
and
May 26,
1989 to determine
whether
actions
taken were satisfactory.
The July 11,
1988, letter identified the
following safety-related
pumps:
II
SYSTEM
Motor Driven Auxiliary
(MDAFW)
Turbine Driven Auxiliary
(TDAFW)
Low Pressure
Safety
Injection (LPSI)
High Pressure
Safety
Injection (HPSI)
Containment
Spray
(CS)
Boric Acid Makeup
(BAMU)
PUMPS
1A 5
1B
2A 5
2B
1C
2C
1A 5
1B
2A 5
2B
1A, 1B,
5
1C
2A
8( 2B
1A 5
1B
2A 5 2B
lA 5
1B
2A
8( 28
MANUFACTURER
Byron-Jackson
Ingersoll-Rand
Byron-Jackson
Ingersoll-Rand
Ingersoll-Rand
Ingersoll-Rand
Bingham-Willamette
Bingham-Willamette
Byron-Jackson
Ingersoll-Rand
Goulds
Goulds
The
inspector
reviewed
the following additional
documents
to verify
licensee
commitments
contained
in their response:
Documents
associated
with latest
pump vendor
recommendations
for pumps
listed above included;
( 1) licensee
PO PB88636-90081
and October 25,
1988,
letter from Sulzer-Bingham for HPSI
pumps,
(2) licensee
PO PB88636-90080
and October
18,
1988 letter from Ingersoll-Rand for Unit 2
AFW and
CS,
and
Units
1
5
2 LPSI
pumps,
(3) licensee
PO PB88633-90084
and
September
22,
1988 letter from Byron-Jackson for Unit
1
AFW and
pumps,
and (4) July
25,
1988 letter
from Goulds for BAMU pumps.
These
documents
together
with system
design
drawings
established
that
installed miniflow line capacities
are greater
than or equal
to latest
manufacturers's
recommendations
for all
pumps
except Unit
1
(50
gpm
installed versus
150
gpm recommended).
Documents
reviewed to establish
adequacy
of original design
bypass
flow
capacities
included
pump vendor data,
A-E specifications
(e.g.
Combustion
Engineering Specifications
No. 19367-487-401
and
No. 13172-PE-401 for HPSI
pumps),
and calculations
(e.g.
No.
NSSS-038A,
Revision
0,
AFW Pumps
Miniflow Recirculation,
and
No. PSL-O-J-M-90-0019,
Revision 0, Temperature
Rise
During
Minimum Recirculation
Flow Operation).
Calculation
No.
PSL-0-J-M-90-0019 established
the adequacy of a 50
gpm minimum bypass
flow
for unit
1
pumps but did not establish
that the installed orifices were
as per original design.
Documents
reviewed to establish
confidence that
no
damage
to the
above
pumps
has occurred
due to hydraulic instability or inadequate
minimum flow
bypass line capacity included;
1989
and
1990
LERs (both units),
summaries
of Plant
Work Orders
(PWOs) written against
the
above
pumps
from 1987 to
date,
and
summaries
of ASME Section
XI quarterly
pump tests
from 1989 to
date.
The inspector also reviewed
a February
14,
1990 consultant's
report
providing results of a specific inspection of the
1A HPSI
pump to assess
any
damage
which might have occurred
due to inadequate
miniflow or dead
heading of the
pump.
No damage
was identified by the inspection.
After examination 'of the
above
documentation
and field verification the
inspector
concluded that licensee
actions
in response
to
IEB 88-04 were
satisfactory
provided satisfactory
clarification could
be obtained
on
three
items which the inspector
was unable to verify while on site
due to
lack of data.
These included:
( I)
Proper installation of "unidirectional"
minimum flow orifices for
pumps
(both units).
The pertinent
design
drawings
indicated
flow direction for these
50
gpm
(HDAFWP) and,70
gpm
(TDAFWP) orifices.
However the installed orifices
were
not
marked to indicate flow direction
and neither pertinent installation
quality data, clarification of design
drawing,
nor actual
minimum
flow test data
was readily available.
(2)
Adequate
installation
of flow orifices for Unit
2
containment
spray
pumps.
The design
drawings require these non-directional
3 inch
150
gpm flow orifices to be installed within the
2 inch
OD bypass
miniflow lines
using
socket
Piping insulation
prevented
adequate
field verification of the installed orifices
and neither
installation quality data
nor actual
gpm minimum flow test data
was
readily available.
(3)
Adequate
minimum flow orifices for Unit I containment
spray
pumps.
Design drawings for the
50 gpm non-directional orifices were
not available.
The pertinent
pump purchase
specifications
indicated
that they were to have
been
designed
and manufactured
by the
pump
vendor.
However
the installed orifices
appeared
to
have
been
fabricated
in the field and consisted
of threaded
stainless
steel
pipe fittings (two 3/4 inch by 6 inch pipe nipples separated
by a 3/4
inch
which
had
been
welded
into the
bypass
lines.
Clarification that the presently installed orifices were the original
design or were adequate for 50
gpm minimum flow was required.
Additional clarification
received
by
telecopy
on
August
16,
1990
established;
( I) vendor confirmation that
AFW miniflow orifices
were
designed
to
be non-directional,
(2) pre-operational
miniflow tests
for
'unit 2
pumps verified a minimum flow of 151
and
155
gpm,
and
(3) the
original design bill of materials for Unit
1
CS orifices specified 3/4
inch
OD threaded fittings (3/8 inch diameter orifice).
3.
Exit Interview
The in'spection
scope
and findings were summarized
on August 10,
1990, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph I above.
The inspector described
the
areas
inspected
and
discussed
in detail
the
inspection
findings.
No
dissenting
comments
were
received
from
the
licensee.
Proprietary
information
was
reviewed
in the course of this inspection,
but is not
included in this report.
The inspector
completed
review of additional
satisfactory clarifications
on August
16,
1990,
and informed the licensee
that bulletin 88-04
was closed for Plant St. Lucie Units I and 2.
4.
and Initialisms Used in This Report
A-E
BAMU
gpm
IEB
LER
PSL
PWO
Architect-Engineer
System
American Society of Mechanical
Engineers
Boric Acid Makeup System
Containment
Spray System
gallons
per minute
High Pressure
Safety Injection System
Inspection
and Enforcement Bulletin
Licensee
Event Report
Low Pressure
Safety Injection System
Nuclear Steam Supply System
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
System
outside diameter
Plant St. Lucie
Plant
Work Order
Turbine Driver Auxiliary Feedwater
System