ML17209A545
| ML17209A545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1981 |
| From: | Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8101160217 | |
| Download: ML17209A545 (14) | |
Text
REGULAT INFORMATION OISTRISUTIOllISTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR;8101160217 DOC ~ DATEs 81/01/12 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL,:50 389 St ~ Lucie Planti Unit 2F Florida Power 8 Light: Co ~
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~NAME'I)THOR AFFILIATION OLMSTEADFHGJ.
Hearjng Branch RECIP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel
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SUBJECT:
Response
recommending Commission affirm ALAB 603,8 accept clarification of ASLAB.ASLAB requirements, re station blackout are'ppropriate.
pending completion of Task Action-Plan A 04 ~
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UNITED STATES 'OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION In the Matter of FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2)
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NRC STAFF'S
RESPONSE
TO COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 12, 1980 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER William J.
Olmstead Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel January 12, 1981
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Ol/l2/81 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMt1I SSIOff BEFORE THE COhf EMISSION In the Hatter of FLORIDA POWER E( LIGHT COMPANY (St.
Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Unit 2)
Docket No. 50-389 NRC STAFF
RESPONSE
TO COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 12 1980 MEHORANDUt( AflD ORDER I.
INTRODUCTION On December 12, 1980 the Commission issued a Memorandum and Order in which it indicated that it had decided to reconsider its previous determina-tion not to review the decision of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in ALAB-603.+
The Commission directed the Staff to file a brief concerning two generic issues which it felt were raised by the Appeal Board's decision.
Those issues are:
(1)
What are the generic implications of using the threshold proba-bilities in Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan as. guide-lines in determining the design basis events to be used for plant design and operation2 (2)
Granting the need for protective measures against loss of all AC power for some reasonable period of time, is designation of station blackout as a design basis event the appropriate regulatory frame-work in which to consider such measures pending completion of the Staff generic study TAP-A-44?
+1 Florida Power ff Light Co. (St. Lucie Unit 2), ALAB-603, 12 NRC 30 (1980).
2
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The Staff will address the two identified issues in this brief.
II.
BACKGROUND The Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing Board's Initial Decision author-izing issuance of a construction permit for St.
Lucie Unit 2 in October of 1977.
- However, the Board retained jurisdiction over allegations>>hich 2/
were made by Robert D. Pollard in a letter to the Attorney General of the United States.
Those allegations concerned the reliability of the offsite power grid serving the St. Lucie facility.
As a part of its review of those allegations, the Appeal Board posed a number of questions concerning the design-of the St. Lucie facility.
Subsequently, the Appeal Board determined that an evidentiary hearing would be held to explore the stability of Florida
- Power, and Light's electrical grid and the reliability of AC power for St.
Lucie Unit 2.
The Appeal Board summarized its concerns as involving St. Lucie's compliance with General Design Criterion 17 (dealing with offsite and onsite power system requirements);
an analysis of the probability of and consequences that might result from a loss of offsite power with a simultaneous failure of onsite power; whether that sequence of events should be guarded against in designing the plant ("that is, whether it should be a 'design basis'vent");
the measures that might be taken to assure or'ncrease a system reliability; and any ongoing or planned improvements that might enhance the reliability of the FP8L system.
(ALAB-603, 12 NRC 34.)
In the course of its decision the Appeal Board recognized that the Office of Nuclear Reactor 2/
ALAB-435, 6 NRC 541 (1977), affirming LBP-77-27, 5
NRC 1038 (1977).
Regulation had designated station blackout as an "unresolved safety issue" and had taken a number of actions in connection with this issue.
The Board noted however that no final plan for resolution of the matter had been arrived at and that a final plan was not estimated for completion until 1982.
(12 NRC 46, fn. 55.)
The Appeal Board was of the opinion that its resolution of the issue for St. Lucie Unit 2 could not wait the completion of the Staff's generic review.
The Appeal Board found that St. Lucie Unit 2 met GDC-17 but that loss of offsite power at St. Lucie was not a highly improbable event and that the redundant emergency diesels were not themselves highly reliable.
This led the Board to the conclusion that a complete loss of AC power (station black-out} must be considered a design basis event for St. Lucie Unit 2.
The Board required that the Applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report include an analysis demonstrating the ability of St. Lucie to operate through station blackout and a description of training programs and procedures for station operation dur ing a blackout transient and for the restoration of AC power.
Neither the Staff nor the Applicant has sought Commission review of the Appeal Board 's decision.
- However, as a part of the Commission's review of materials related to TAP-A-44, certain memoranda from members of the Staff concerning ALAB-603 came to the Commission's attention.
In a memorandum for Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, from Robert M. Bernero, Director, Division of Systems and Reliability Research, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Mr. Bernero suggests certain impacts which could occur if ALAB-603 is interpreted to endorse the use of Standard Review Plan Section 2.2.3 as a numerical basis for determining what kind of
accident sequences Boards should look at.
The Commission was concerned in its December 12 tiemorandvm and Order that this raised generic'issues regard-ing the impact of the Appeal Board's decision on the regulatory process and called for the brief. herewith being filed.
On December 22, 1980 two of the Administrative Judges who participated in the decision rendered by the Appeal Board in ALAB-603 issued a Memorandum expressing their concern that the Commission was interpreting the ALAB-603 decision to be grounded upon the use o= the "threshold probabilities"in Section 2.2.3 o> the Standard Review Plan.
In the Memorandum the Board indicates that its determination that station blackout should be considered a design basis event at St. Lucie Unit 2 did not'est on any particular SRP probability value but rather upon the Board's independent assessment of the probability of this event as established by the evidentiary record.
To properly context the Staff's discussion in the remainder of this brief of the issues presented by the Commission's memorandum and Order another adjudicatory decision should be mentioned.
The station blackout event which is under consideration in the St. Lucie docket is an unresolved safety issue.
In Gulf States Utilities Com an (River Bend Station, Units 1
and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977), the Appeal Board established a standard of evidence which must be met concerning unresolved generic safety issues wnlci>
have implications for the particular reactor being reviewed by a Board.
The River Bend Appeal Board found that unresolved issues could not be disregarded in individual licensing proceedings because they had generic applicability but that there must be some explanation concerning why operation or construc-tion could proceed even though an overall solution had not been found.
I The explanation furnished must be sufficient to enable a licensing board to determine whether (1) the problem has already been resolved for the reactor under study; (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that a
satisfactory solution will be obtained before the reactor is put in opera-tion; o! (3) the problem would have no safety implica-.ions*until after several years of reactor operation
- and, should it not be resolved by then, l
alternative means will be available to insure that continued operation (if permitted at all) would not pose an undue risk to the public.
3/
Task Action Plan A-44 (Station Blackout),
appi vv'ed in July 1980, states the technical issue to be:
(a) whether the probability of station blackout may be too high, and (b) what the consequences of station blackout are; that is,
~ whether severe core damage may result.
Thus, to properly resolve the station blackout issue in St. Lucie, consistent with the River Bend
- decision, the Appeal Board had to determine the applicability of TAP A-44 to St. Lucie.
Of course, by its own terms TAP A-44 requires an examination of 4/
probability of occurrence before a conclusion can be reached concerning the applicability of the issue to a particular reactor.
III.
ARGUtlENT A.
Section 2.2.3 of the SRP Should Not Be Used as a Guideline in Determinin Desi n Basis Events and Is Not Re uired b
ALAB-603 The first issue designated by the Commission for discussion in the context of ALAB-603 is the use of Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan.
Q3 See Summary of River Bend at n.6, Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Units 1 8, ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 248 (1978).
Q4 The Staff had presented the status of TAP A-44 to the Appeal Board as a
part of its evidentiary case at the hearings in December 1979.
~ 6 The Cormission's December 12, 1980 Memorandum and Order specifically affirms ALAB-603 for the St. Lvcie construction perm.t proceeding.
At issue is whether CAB-603 and by implication ALAB-444 (River Bend) have generic implications
.wal ranting Commiss on direction or clarification.
Given th=
Appeal Board's clarification, it is clear that ALAB-603 should not be ir.:er-preted to mandate use of Section 2.'2.3 of the Standard Review Plan to establish threshold probability numbers for determining design basis events.
However, if Section 2.2.3 were to be us-" as asis ;or determin-i->
the design basis events to be used for plant design and operation, it would have a severe impact on the regulatory process.
There are a large number of accident sequences with estimated probability of occurrence (frequency}
greater than 10
/reactor year which could produce or result in core melt or severe core damage.
If Staff resources were to be used to evaluate each of these sequences, particularly those at the lower end of this range, substantial additional staff personnel would be required without achieving a proportional reduction of risk to the public health and safety due to their low likelihood of occurrence.
Unless Staff r esources were significantly augmented, diversion of current resources to carry out such evaluations could actually result in an increase in risk to public health and safety.
Systematic efforts to identify the risk dominance sequences for evaluation are underway by the Staff.
P B.
Station Blackout Should Be Considered as Part'of the Design Basis of Nuclear Power Plants and Designating TAPA-44 a Design Basis Event.
Is an A
ro riate Re ulator Framework in Which to Consider It.
The second issue raised by the Commission's Order is whether designating station blackout as a design basis event is the appropriate regulatory framework in which to consider protective measures against loss of all AC power for some reasonable period of time.
ALAB-603 does not specifically define design basis
- event, although it is evident that the Appeal Board only used the term to denote those events which if not dealt with, made less probable or mitigated could pose undue risk to the public and were sufficiently probable that they should be considered in evaluation of plant safety.
"Design basis events" are not defined in the regulations.
The term "design basis" is defined in 10 CFR 6 50.2(a):
"Design basis means that information which identifies the specific functions to be performed by a structure,
- system, or component of a facility, and the specific values or ranges of values chosen for controlling parameters as reference bounds for design.
These values may be (1) restraints derived from generally accepted "state-of-the-art" practices for achieving functional goals, or (2) requirements derived from analysis (based on calculation and/or experiments) of the effects of a postulated accident for which a structure,
- system, or component must meet its functional goals."
Thus, the Appeal Board's disposition of TAP A-44 in St. Lucie was con-sistent with the treatment given sequences required to be considered part of a facility s design basis.
In view of the logic of River Bend it was appropriate for the Appeal Board to impose the conditions it did to provide for adequate protection at St. Lucie for the station blackout scenario.
Nothing in ALAB-603 requires those particular mitigative measures at other facilities nor precludes them if circumstances warrant.
The Staff believes it is appropriate to p'rovide reasonable assurance that station blackout can be.accommodated at a particular facility pending the generic resolution of TAP A-44, and is taking steps to do so.
Consequently, the Appeal Board's treatment (i.e. designating station blackout a design basis event) is, in the Staff's view, the appropriate regulatory framework in which to consider such measures in light of what the Board ordered to be done.
IV.
C0VCLuSIot~
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the NRC Staff recommends that the Commission affirm ALAB-603 and accept the clarification issued by the Appeal Board.
Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan should not be used to determine design basis events to be used for plant design and operation.
The measures required by the Appeal Board to accommodate station blackout at St.. Lucie are appropriate and are consistent with the designation of the event as one which should be considered within the design basis of the facility pending completion of the Staff generic study, TAP A-44.
Respectfully submitted, iam J.
0 ead Assistant Chi f Hearing Counsel Oated at Bethesda, Maryland this 12th day of January, 1981.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFOR:
THE COMMISSION In the Matter of FLORIDA POWER
& LIGHT COMPANY
)
)
(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit 2)
)
Docket No. 50-389 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NRC STAFF
RESPONSE
TO COMMISSION'S DECEMBER 12, 1980 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 12th day of January 1981.
- Richard S. Salzman, Esq.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555
- Dr.
W.
Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Martin Harold Hodder, Esq.
1131 N.E. 86th Street Miami, Florida 33138
'errance J.
Ande'rson, Esq.
University of Miami School of Law Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Dr. David L. Hetrick Professor of Nuclear Engineering University of Arizona Tucson, Arizona 85721 Dr. Frank Hooper Resource Ecology Program School of Natural Resources University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 Harold F. Reis, Esq.
Lowenstein,
- Newman, Reis
& Axelrad 1025 Connecticut
- Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Norman A. Coll, Esq.
- Steel, Hector
& Davis 1400 S.E. First National Bank Bldg.
Miami, Florida 33131
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C, 20555
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L(ashington, D.
C.
20555 Hr. Samuel J. Chilk Office of the Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormnission Washington, D.C.
20555 Leonard Bickwit, Esq.
General Counsel Office of the. General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hashington, D.C.
20555 William J.
Olgistead Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel