ML17207A894
| ML17207A894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1980 |
| From: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17207A895 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003180031 | |
| Download: ML17207A894 (6) | |
Text
R. Reid FN 4 1880 Enclosure 3 provides our evaluation of all but two items 'left open. in the fire protection,SER...
The two,remajninjNitemsry Fire Brigade Size and Fire Brigade Training will be addressed in future correspondence.
In
- addition, we have re-evaluated cer'tain other 'items which had been found acceptable in the SER.
The re-evaluation of these latter items evolved from the course of our review -of the open items and from the closer scrutiny of the licensee's Fire Protection Evaluation report necessitated by that review.
The 're-eva]uation resulted in requirements for additional plant and fire protection system modification's..
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These requirements should be transmitted to the licensee.
We request a
response within 30 days that indicates which.alternative will be sa'tisfied; however,'f the licensee chooses not to satisfy this requirement, a meeting should be arranged within.the same 30 'days with appropriate management individuals prior to initiating an order.
Contact:
E. Sylvester, X27877
Enclosures:
1.
Resolution of Incomplete Items - Status 2.
Evaluation of Design Details 3.
Evaluation of Incomplete Items G. Lainas, Chief lant Systems Branch Division of Operating Reactors cc w/enclosures:
D. Eisenhut R.,Tedesco W. Gammil1 G. Lainas R. Ferguson E. Sylvester T. Lee H. George L. Derderian C. Heft T.'ambach P; Erickson V. Benaroya P. Matthews J..Stone, I8E I. Asp, Gage-.Babcock R. Hall, BNL J. Boccio, BNL OFIo!CC)
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Enclosure 1
ST.
LUCIE UNIT 1
RESOLUTION OF INCOMPLETE ITEMS - STATUS Fi.re Pump Controller Fire Water Supply Safe Shutdown Capability Fire Brigade Size Fire Brigade Training Emergency Lighting Containment Hose Stations Hose House Equipment Emergency Breathing Equipment Fire Barrier Staff Evaluation Requirement Requi rement Requirement Incomplete Incomplete Requirement Requirement Requi rement Requi remen t Compl ete Licensee Res onse Due 30 days 30 days 30 days None None 30 days 30 days 30 days 30 days None 3.1.4 Upgrade Existing Fire Pumps 3,6 Fire Door Evaluation Informati on Requirement
- 3. 7 Yenti 1 ation Duct Penetrati ons Requirement 1/80 30 days 30 days 3.8.5 Fire Dampers 3.9 Cable Spreading Room Fire Barrier 3.12. 7 Smoke Detectors 3.13.3 Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection System 3.14.5 Automatic Sprinkler System Complete Information Information Information Information None Not scheduled 3/80 6/80 5/80
Enclosu ST. LUCIE'UNIT 1 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW EVALUATION'OF MODIFICATIONS The following provides an evaluation of the design descriptions submitted by the licensee for proposed modifications.
Numbers in parentheses following each heading refer to the sections of our previously issued SER which address these modifications.
Fire Door Evaluation (3.6)
Item 3.6 of the SER indicates that an evaluation will be made o'f the fire rating of all doors in barriers separating fire areas and fire zones.
Based on this study existing doors in fire barriers will be upgraded where necessary to meet the fire rating of the barrier or the highest fire loading on either side of the barrier.
Florida Power and Light Company responded to this item in their letter dated August 24,
- 1979, This submittal included a listing of the safe shutdown related fire areas with the fire loading in BTU/FT2 for each area.
It also contained a discussion concluding that upgrading or the installation of new fire doors is not necessary with the exception of the doors between the diesel generator rooms.
The addition of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire doors between the diesel generator rooms was previously required, and was identified in modification 3.14.2 of the'ER.
The licensee's submittal on this item is inadequate.
It does not indicate the location of the doors, the rating of the wall it is installed in, and the type of door presently installed.
In addition, the licensee has justified the lack of fire doors in some areas on the low fire load calculated for the area.
The calculated fire load does not include the combustible cable insulation and jacketing in the area, nor does it include a reasonable amount of transient combustibles that might be expected in each area as a result of maintenance operations.
The licensee should protect door openings in all fire barriers enclosing safety-related fire areas with doors, frames and hardware that have been approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory.
The fire rating for such fire door installations shall be equivalent to that required for the barrier up to a maximum of a three hour rating.
However, the required fire rating of barriers may be reduced if the lower rating is supported by a fire hazard analysis which includes in
the area fire loading the heat of combustion of the installed cable insulation and jacketing, other installed combutible materials and a
reasonable amount of transient combustibles that might be expected in each area. as a result of maintenance operations.
Vent Duct Penetrations (3.7) item number 3.7 of the SER indicates that the utilitywill reevaluate the ventilation duct penetraiions of barriers enclosing safety related systems.
Based on this study, fire or smoke dampers will be provided at locations where the evaluation shows that potential effects due to an unmitigated fire could affect safe shutdown.
By letter dated August 24, 1979, Florida Power and Light Company responded to this design modification with only a listing of the fire areas of the plant which are safe shutdown related and with the fire loading in BTU/FT2 for each area.
No mention of upgrading was made by the licensee.
The licensee's response to this item is unacceptable because it does not indicate where existing ventilation duct penetrations are
- located, the type and size of these penetrations, and the fire rating of the penetrations.
In addition, the licensee has justified the lack of fire dampers in some areas on the low fire load calculated for the area.
The calculated fire load does not include the combustible cable insulation and jacketing in the area, nor does it include a reasonable amount of transient combustibles that might be expected in each area as a result of maintenance operations.
The licensee should protect penetrations for ventilation systems, in all fire barriers enclosing safety-related fire areas, by fire dampers and associated hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory.
The fire rating for such fire damper installations shall be equivalent to that required for the barriers up to a maximum rating of three hours.
However, the required fire rating of barriers may be reduced if the lower rating is supported by a fire hazards analysis which includes in the area fire loading the heat of combustion of the installed cable insulation and jacketing, other installed combustible materials and a reasonable amount of transient combustibles that might be expected in each area as a result of maintenance operations
Fire Damper - Control Room/HVAC Room (3.8.5)
Item number 3.8.5 of the SER indicates that the licensee will provide an evaluation of the need for fire rated dampers in the ducts between the control room and the mechanical equipment room (HVAC Room).
Tne licensee referenced thi s modification for their letter of August 24, 1979 and it was further discussed with the staff at St.
Lucie during the site visit on October 16-19, 1979.
During this discussion it was indicated by the Florida Power and Light personnel that the undampered ventilation duct penetrations in the wall separating the control room from HVAC room were part of the emergency ventilation system.
This system contains a charcoal filter although it can be isolated from the rest of the system by manually operable dampers.
As indicated by the
- licensee, the normal ventilation systems serving the control room is provided with a smoke detector in the air intake duct with alarm capability and can be manually shut off.
Penetrations through the control room enclosure by this system are provided with fire dampers.
8ased on this information, the lack of fire dampers in the ducts between 1
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