ML17195A215

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Integrity of Dresden Station,Units 2 & 3,Quad Cities Station,Units 1 & 2 & LaSalle County Station,Unit 1 RCPB Sys, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML17195A215
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Quad Cities, LaSalle, 05000000, 05000239
Issue date: 07/31/1983
From: Nagata P
EG&G, INC.
To: Koo W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17195A216 List:
References
CON-FIN-A-6429, RTR-NUREG-0313, RTR-NUREG-313 EGG-FM-6250, GL-81-04, GL-81-4, TAC-46658, TAC-46659, TAC-46669, TAC-46670, TAC-48487, NUDOCS 8406210193
Download: ML17195A215 (51)
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGRITY OF THE DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2 AND 3, QUAD CITIES STATION UNITS l AND 2, AND LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT l REACTOR CGOLANT BOUNDARY* PIPING SYSTEM Published July 1983 Peter K. Nagata Materials Engineering Branch Materials Sciences Division EG&G Idaho, Inc. Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Responsible NRC Individual and Division: W. H. Koo/Division of Engineering Docket No.: 50-237, -249, -254, -265, -373 TAC No.: 46658, 46659, 46669, 46670, 48487 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6429 ...... --**-* -*--......... -.., ::-*****: --...-.~- ***:*:* *-*:-** -- -*- . ~*

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ABSTRACT. NUREG-0313, Rev. 1,. Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for* BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping~ is the NRC staff 1s revised acceptable methods to reduce intergranular stres~ corrosion cracking in* boiling water reactors~ The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-Q4.of Commonwealth Edison* concerning whether* Dresden 2 and. 3, Quad Cities: l and 2,. and LaSalle l meet NUREG-0313, Rev. l are evaluated by EG&G: Idaho, Inc. in this report *. Particular attention was given the leak

  • detection systems. described in Regulatory Guide 1.45, Reactor* Coolant Pressure Boundar Leak Detections* stems, referenced by Parts IV.B.1.a.(l) an oun on pages an

-0313, Rev. l. FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program being conducted for the U.:S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation~ Division of Licensing, by EG&G Idaho, Irie., Materials Engineering Branch *. . The. U.S *. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the* work under the authorization, B&R 20 19 10 11 *. ii . J _,....._.~ -....

  • .~

SUMMARY

NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Cbolant Pressure Boundary Piping, is the NRC staff 1s revised acceptable methods to reduce intergranular stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors. The responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 of Commonwealth Edison concerning whether Dresden 2 and 3,

  • Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 are evaluated by EG&G Idaho, Inc. in this report. Particular attention was given the leak detection systems described in Regul~tory Guide 1.45, Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection S~stems, referenced by Parts IV.B.1.a.(l) and (2) found on pages I and 8 of OREG-0313, Rev. 1.

As may be observed in the following table, Dresden, Quad Cities, and Lasalle do not meet any of the parts of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 evaluated in this document.. The following table is a synopsis of the EG&G Idaho, Inc. evaluation of Commonwealth Edison Company's response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04. Part of NUREG-0313, Revi 1 Evaluated Section II. I I. C. Section I I I. III.C. Section IV. Evaluation a* Does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Provides alternative to NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.B.1.a.(l) Does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.B.1.a.(2) Does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 IV.B.l.b. Did not provide data in response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 IV.B.l.b.(3) Did not provide data in response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 IV.B.l.b.(4) Did not provide data in response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 ii i Additional Data Reguiredb Discrepancy Yes Minor Yes Minor Yes Major No Major Yes Minor Yes Minor Yes Minor .. --***-**--*-** ***-:-*--*,-**:~-:****~-~-~-~-:.. *'.*:;:-:;--:~~-**.:,.----.-**-... -***----~-., -.... -,-**-.:*---*---:.. --:*~----*-*-*:*:--':***-:.*7"*- **-.,.---.-.,.-_-.. ~...--.***

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  • Letter*. 81-04 Section V~

Provides alternative to NUREG._0313,: Rev.* 1 asee Tables and 3 for additional information. bsee Tables and 4 for additional information. iv Yes Minor Yes Minor No None

l..

CONTENTS ABSTRACT........... **.......................................... **....... ii

SUMMARY

iii

1.

INTRODUCTION......................... **.............................

2.

EVALUATION......................................................... 4

2. 1 NUREG-0313, Rev.

Guidelines.............................. 4 2.2 D1scussion of Tables....................................... 4 2.3 Discrepancies............................................... 5

3.

CONCLUSIONS......... **..................................... **..... **... 7

4.

REFERENCES....................................................... 44 TABLES

1.

Review of Licensee's Response to NRC Generic Letter 81-04 8

2.

Summaries of Evaluation of Licensee's Responses 28

3.

Differences between NUREG-0313, Rev. and Licensee's Responses **.*.***.*...............*...*..........***.*.*....*.... 31

4.

Add it ion a 1 Data Required of Licensee 39 v --**.-**--:-;-:--.. ---:=~:-:-.-:-... *.-**--.*.* --*-- -*--.-.-. ----.r:~~:-~ .. i.i>*.~.*.. :.~*-;:;.;**~*.... ~:ji****

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1 I ' l i:: -~ TEC_HNICAL EVALUATION OF INTEGR ITV OF THE DRESDEN STATION_ UNITS 2 AND 3, QUAD CITIES STATION UNITS 1 AND 2, AND LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT l REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY PIPING SYSTEM

1.

INTRODUCTION Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of austenitic stainless steel (SS) piping has been observed in boiling water reactors (BWRs) since December 1965. 1 The NRC established a Pipe Crack Study Gr~up (PCSG) in January 1975 ~o study the problem. 2 The PCSG issued two documents, NUREG-75/067 Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactors3 and ~n implemen~ation document, NURE~-0313, Rev. o. 2 After cracking in large-diameter piping was discovered for the first time in the Duane Arnold BWR in 1978, a new PCSG was formed. The new PCSG in turn issued two

  • reports, NUREG-0531, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants4 and NUREG-0313, Rev. l, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping~

5 NUREG-0313, Rev. l is the implementing document of NUREG-0531 and discusses the augmented inservice inspection (!SI) and leak detection requirements "for plants that cannot comply with the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines" of NUREG~0313, Rev. l.5 NRC Generic Letter 81-0~ requested each licensee "to review all ASME Code Class l and 2 pressure boundary piping, safe ends, and fitting material, including weld metal to determine if (they) meet the material selection, testing and processing guidelines in" NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.6 The generic letter offered the option of providing a description, schedule, and justification for alternative actions that would reduce the susceptibility of pressure boundary piping and safe ends to intergranular stress corrosion crackirig (ISSCC) or increase the probability of early detection of leakage from pipe cracks *

.i ; i ~I

e.

Hr response to: NRc* Generic Letter* 81-04, Commonwealth Edi son (CE) .submitted* a letter* on July 7, 1981,.7 which ref~renced a January 10, 1978 letter.8-A request for information from the NRCstaff elicited additional letters frb~ CE on. Decem~er 28, 19829 and January 18, 1983~ 10 Another information source was* a letter on SEP Topic V-5, Reactor* Coo 1 ant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection (June* 23, 1982). 11 EG&G Idaho personnel evaluated these letters, and this report provides:

l.

A brief summary of the 1 icensee

  • s response to ~ach part of NUREG-0313, Rev. l..

l~ A discussion of areas where t~e.licensee doe~ not meet the guidelines or requirements of NUREG*0313~ Rev. l.a 3~ A brief discussion of the licensee's proposed alternatives to NUREG-0313, Rev. l;.however, no determination of acceptability is niade on these alternatives. 4~ An identification of all areas ~here th~ licensee has not provided . sufficient* information to judge the 1 icensee

  • s program.
    • There is an effort underway. to revise. NUREG-0313, Rev. *l by NRC in light of research on )GSCC and recent instances of IGSCC at Nine Mile Point (March 1982) and Monticello (October 1982).

Because of this contemplated revision of.NUREG~0313r Rev. 1, the following issues will not be evaluated.

1.

The licens~e's proposed Technical Specifications to implement the requirements, with the exception of the. 1 eak detection requirements in NUREG-0313, Revision 1, Sections IV.B.La~(l) and IV.B.l.a.(2).

a. Part I II of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 contains guide 1 i nes; Part IV contains requirements.

2

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2~. The acceptability of licensee-proposed augmented inservice inspection ( I~I) sampling criteri"a. *

3.

Credit for past operating experience a~d inspection results.

4.

The acceptability of* induction heating stres_s improvemen~ ( IHS I), heat sink welding (HSW), and weld overlay as alternates to augmented ISI. 3

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  • , 2.

EVALUATION 2~r NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 Guidelines The* g~idelines and requirements outlined in NUREG-0313~ R~v. 1 form the basis. of this.evaluation. The NUREG-0313,. R~v. 1 guidelines are found in Parts III. and V and the-requirements in Parts 11 and IV of that document. Part 11 discusses implementation of material selection, testing~ and processing guidelines. *Part IIL surmnarizes acceptable methods. to ~inimize IGSCC susceptibility with respect to the material selection, testing, and processing guidelines. Part IV deals with leak ~etection and inservice inspection requirements of nonconforming (i.e., not meeting the guidelines of Part !IL of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) piping. Part V discusses general recormnendati ans *. 2.2 Discussion of Tables Table 1 has the complete text Parts II through V of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 on the left side so that the ~eader may be.able to refer to it as the topics are discussed. The right side surmnarizes the licensee's responses, lists the differences betweerr the licensee's proposed implementation program and NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, and identifies the additional data.required to evaluate the lice~see's response. Many sect i ans in Parts. I I throl,!gh IV of NUREG..;0313, Rev. are not discussed in the right hand column. In these cases, one of thecormnents below will be used. 0 0 0 Not applicable because the construction permit for this plant has been issued~

  • Not applicable because the operating license for this plant has been issued *.

Not applicable.because the plant has been constructed. 4

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o.

The licensee has: not furpished data on this topic in his responses to NRG.Generic Letter 81-04. o No comment made bec*ause alternative plans were not evaluated. / Table 2 lists the summaries of the licensee's responses to NRC questions on implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 gu~delines. Therefore, in Table 2 the reader is able to read all the summaries in one table without having to search Table 1 for all the s1..:mmaries. The same compilation applies to Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 lists the differences between the licensee's proposed implementation program and that recommended in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Table 4 lists the areas where additional information is required to properly evaluate the licensee's proposed implementation program. All the items in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are listed in their respective tables in the order they appear in Table 1. 2.3 Discrepancies Any alternate proposal that did not meet a specific guideline or requirement of NUREG-0313, Rev. l was considered a discrepancy. Evaluation of alternate proposals was outside the scope of this task, as indicated in Section 1 of this report. Licensees have submitted definitions of "nonservice sensitive" and augmented ISi proposals that differ from NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. These differences are considered minor because the NRC staff is considering major modifications to those requirements. An exa~ple of a minor discrepancy is the use of the stress rule index (SRI) to choose which welds would be subjected to augmented ISi. If the alternate proposal to leak detection doe~ not meet the requirements in NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, it was considered a major discrepancy because NRC is not considering major modifications to those requirements. 5 . -.~--:-- --*-------------:-

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An example of a maj_or* discrepancy is. a* licensee's. not proposing Technical Specifications to implement leak. dete-ction requ.irements in NUREG-0313, Rev. l.. Only major-discrepancies _are. 1 isted in the-Conclusions. section. (* --~---~---~~~-~------------.. -*~-,---c--*------------~---, ----------:------*~---------

3.

CONCLUSIONS Conunonwealth Edison*s Dresden, Quad Cities, and LaSalle plants have the following major discrepancies: IV.B.l.a.(l} Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems CE has not adequately demonstrated that their leak detection and monitoring systems meet those described in Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45. IV.B.l.a.(2} Leak Detection Requirements C~ has not proposed a requirement for shutdown after a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the Technical Specifications for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1. CE has.not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less} into the Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 Technical Specifications. There are minor discrepancies as well as the major ones listed above. These minor discrepancies are not listed here. However, while the licensee*s alternate proposals that have been classified as minor discrepancies might be acceptable under the anticipated revision of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, it should not be inferred that approval of those alternate proposals has been given. The licensee has not supplied sufficient information to evaluate his responses to topics 11.C, 111.C~, IV.B.l.a.(l}, IV.B.l.b., IV.B.l.b.(3} and (4), IV *. B.2.bq and IV.B.2.b.(6}. Table 4 lists the required information for each topjc. 7

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...... *.*................... *.. ~.' ~~... ; ' '*.: .........,,. ~.. CX> TABLE l. REVIEW OF LICENSEE'S RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC LETTER 81-04 Excerpts from NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 II. IMPLEMENTATION OF MATERIAL SELECTION, TESTING, ANO PROCESSING GUIDELINES I I.A. p.e. p.c. For plants under review, but for which a construction permit has*not *been issued, all ASHE Code Class 1, 2, and 3 lines should conform to the guidelines state4 in Par~ Ill~ For plants that have been issued a construction permit but not an ope rat Ing 11cense, a 11 ASHE Code Class l, 2, and 3 ltne.s should conform to the guidelines stated in Part Ill unless it can be demonstrated to the staff that implementing the guidelines of Part IJI would result' in undue* nardshlp. For cases In whlcn tne guidelines of. Part Ill are not complied with, additional. measures should be taken for.Class 1 and 2 lines In accordance with the guld.ellnes stated *in Part IV of this document. For plants that nave been Issued an operating license, NRC designated "Service Sensltfve" lines. (Part IV. B) should be*modlfled to conform to the guidelines stated In Part Ill, to the extent practicable. When "Service Sensitive* and other* Class 1 and 2 lines do not meet the guidelines of Part III, additional measures.should be taken In accordance with *the guidelines stated In Part IV of this document. Lines that experience cracking during service and. require replacement should be* replaced with piping that conforms to tne guidelines state_d In Part 111. EG&G Idaho Evaluation - DRESDEN 2 ANO 3, QUAD C nI ES 1 AND 2, AND LASALLE 1 A. Not applicable.because the ~onstructlon permii for this plant has been Issued~

  • 8~

Not applicable because the operating license for tnls plant has been issued. C.

SUMMARY

Commonwealth Edison (CE) does not have a schedule for replacement of nonconforming "service seris.ttfve 1' lines for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities I and.2. CE has replaced some pipe on LaSalle l.

  • CE does not meet' NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 In this matter for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2.

CE has not Indicated whether the* pipe they have replaced fS all the nonconforming "sP.rvic;e sen~itive* piping at LaSalle 1. DIFFERENCES

  • NUREG-OjlJ, Rev. l requires that nonconforming NRC-~esignated *service sensitive" linP.s be replaced ~It~

corrosion-resistant materials to the extent practical. Also, lines that experience cracking should be *replaced with corrosion-resistant materials. CE does not have a replacement schedule for nonconforming "service *sensitive" pipe for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities l and 2. Instead, replacement materials have been purchased and replacing the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe will bf! done if needed. H . l

i ! J I I j . I i l

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j I j l.O Ill.

SUMMARY

OF ACCEPTABLE METHODS TO MINIMIZE CRACK SUSCEPTIBILITY--RATERIAL SELECTION, TESTING, AND PROCESSING GOIOELINES Ill.A. Selection of Materials Only those materials described ln Paragraphs and 2 below are acceptable to the NRC for installation in*BWR ASHE Code Class 1, 2, and 3 piping.systems. Other materials may be used when evaluated and accepted by the NRC. IIl.A.l. Corrosion-Resistant Materials All pipe and fitting material including safe ends, thermal sleeves, and weld metal should oe of a type and grade that has been demonstrated to be highly resistant to oxygen-assisted stress corrosion In the as-installed condition. Materials that have been so demonstrated include ferritic steels, "Nuclear Grade* austenitic stainless steels,* Types 304L and 316L austenttic stainless steels, Type CF-3 cast stainless steel, Types CF-8 and Cf~8H*cast austenitic stainless steel with at least 5% ferrite, Type 308L stainless steel weld metal, and other austenitic stainless steel weld metal with at least 5% ferrite content. Unstabilized wrought austenitic stainless steel without controlled low carbon has not been so demonstrated except when.the piping ts in the solution-annealed condition. The use of such ..... ~.::* ~...... :** -**.1** *. *.. : CE has completed the following on LaSalle 1: The core spray lines, LPCI piping, and RWCU piping have been changed from stainless steel Type 304 to car.hon steel. The core spray safe-ends and transition spools have been replaced with carbon steel components. The CRD return line has been eliminated; nozzle N-10 capped; CRD pressure equalization equipment installed; and carbon steel eliminated from CRO service lines.10 ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED If there is any nonconforming "service sensitive* piping that has not been replaced in LaSalle 1, indicate what their disposition will be--replac1~ent or augmented ISi. A. The. l lcensee has not furnished clata on this paragraph in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04. See comment on Part 11.C. above.

1.

The comments on II I. A. *also apply here. r i l r I I ~ ! f ~ f f I f I I I I i

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  • mater1al (1.e., regular grades of Types 304 and 316 stainless steels) should be avoided.

If such material is used, the as-1nstalled piping including welds should be in the solution-annealed condition. Where regular grades of Types 304 and 316 are used and welding or heat treatment 1s required, spec1al measures, such as.those described in Part 111.C, Processing of.Materials, should be taken to ensure that IGSCC will not occur. Such measures may include (a) solution annealing subsequent to the welding or heat treatment, and lb) weld cladding of materials to be welded using procedures that have been demonstrated to reduce*residual stresses and sens1t1zation of surface materials.

  • These materials have controlled low carbon (0.02S max) and nitrogen '(o.1s max) contents and meet all requirements, including mecnanical property requirements, *of ASME specification for regular grades of Type 304 or 3lb stainless steel pipe.

111.A.2. *Corrosion-Resistant Safe Ends. and Thermal Sleeves All unstab1lized wrought austenit1c stainless steel materials used for.safe ends and thennal sleeves without controlled low carbon contents (L-grades and Nuclear Grade) should be tn. the solution-annealed cond.itlon. If as a consequence of fabrication, welds joining these*materlals are not solution annealed, they should be made between cast (or weld overlaid) austenltic stainless.steel surfaces. (5X minimum ferrite) or other materials having high resistance to oxygen-assisted stress corrosion. The joint design must be such that any hlgn-stress areas In unstabilized wrought austenltic stainless steel without controlled low carbon content,. wnlcn may become sensitized as a result of the welding process, Is not exposed to the re.actor cool ant. Thermal sleeve attachments that is welded to the pressure boundary and form crevices where impurities may accumulate should not be exposed to a BWR coolant environment.

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2.

The corrments on 'II.A. also apply here. i 1: i ' f. ( l' j: -~,, ' L**

I i j i i l i., l r l l l ! 1 . j i "I .j . *.I i ._...... ~.. w....... r... ~..... 111.B. Testing of Materials For new installat1on, tests should be made on all regular grade sta1nless steels to be used 1n the ASHE Code Class 1, 2, and 3 p1p1ng systems to demonstrate that the material was properly annealed and 1s not suscept1ble to IGSCC. Tests that have been used to determine the suscept1b111ty of IGSCC include Pract1ces A*

  • and E** of ASTM A-262, "Recommended Practices for Detecting Suscept1bi11ty to lntergranular Attack in Stainless Steels" and the electrochemical potentiok1net1c react1vat1on (EPR) test. The EPR test 1s not yet accepted by the NRC.

If the EPR test ls used, the acceptance cr1ter1a applied must be evaluated and accepted_by the NRC on a case~by-case basts.

  • Pr act lee*. A--Oxa l1c acid etch test for class 1f1cat 1on of etch structures of stainless steels.
    • Practice.E--Copper-copper sulfate-sulfuric acid test for detecting suscept1b111ty to 1ntergranular attack in sta1nless steels.

111.c. Process1ng of *Mater1als Corrosion-resistant cladding w1th a duplex microstructure (51 minimum ferrite) may be applied to the ends of Type 304 or 316 stainless steel.

  • pipe for the purpose of avoiding IGSCC at
  • weldments.

Such cladd1ng, which is intended to (a) m1n1m1ze the HAZ on the p1pe inner surface, (b) mov*e the HAZ away from the highly stressed -region next to the attachment weld, and (c) 1solate the weldment from the environment, may be applied under the following cond1t1ons: B. The licensee has not furnished d~t~ on this paragraph 1n his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04. C.

SUMMARY

CE is proposing to apply induction heating stress improvement (IHSI) to LaSalle l. The NRC has not accepted this process, but it is under consideration. More data on the IHSI process t~ be used are needed. DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. l indicates that the use of processes like IHSI as an alternate to augmented ISi ls permitted though not accepted by the NRC..These processes wi 11 be considered on a case-by-case basis. CE has indicated that "proposals are being evaluated, and negotiations are 1n progress for the application of induction heating stress improvement program to the Unit 2 recirculation system piping. Our present goal is to have this Unit 2 work completed before Unit 2 start-up 1 ~ith Unit l similarly treated during a future outage". ADOITIONAL OATA REQUIRED Supply the Process Specification of the !HSI process proposed to be used.

N IV. 111.C. L

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.y For 1n1t1al construct1on, prov1ded that all of the p1p1ng 1s solut1on ~nnealed after claacring. For repair weld1ng and modification to in-place systems in operating plants and plants under. construction. When the repair welding.or modification requires replacement of pipe, the replacement pipe should be solution-annealed after.cladding. Corrosion-resistant cladding applied In the

  • t1eld" (I.e., without subsequent solution annealing of the pipe) 1s acceptable only on that portion of the pipe that has not been removed from the piping system. Other "field" applications of corrosion-resistant cladding are not acceptable.

Other processes that have been found by laboratory tests to minimize stresses and* IGSCC 1n austen1t1c stainless steel weldme~ts include induction heating.stress Improvement (!HSI) and heat sink welding (HSW); Although the use of these processes as an alternate to augmented inservtce Inspection Is not yet accepted by the NRC, these processes may be permissible and'wtll be considered on a case-by-case basts provided acceptable supportive d.ata ~re submitted to the NRC INSERVICE INSPECTION. AND LEAK DETECTION RE8UIREMENTS FOR BWRs WITH VARVING DEGREES OF cONFORMAN E to*. MATERIAL SELECTION, TESTING, ANU PROCESSING GUIDELINES IV.A. For plants whose ASME Code* Class 1, 2, and 3 pressure boundary ptptng meets the gutdeltn~s of Part Ill, no augmented tnservice Inspection or leak detection requirements beyond.those specified tn the 10 CFR 50.55a(g), *1nserv1ce Inspection Requirements" and plant Techntca 1 Spec tf1cat ions for leakage detection are nec~ssary. . IV.~. ASHE Code Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary piping that does not meet guidelines of Part* Ill is designated *Nonconforming* and must have additional tnservtce Inspection and more stringent leak detection requirements. The degree of augmented inservice inspection of such piping depends on whether the specific *Nonconforming" p1p1ng runs are classified as "Service Sensitive.a The "Service Sensitive" lines were and wi 11 be designated by the NRC and are defined

  • as those that have experjenced cracking of a generic nature, or that are considered to be particularly susceptible to *cracking because of a combination of high local stress, material
l.

The corrments on 111.C. ~lso apply here.

2.

The corrments on 111.C. also apply t1ere. A. The licensee has not fur~ished data on this paragraph 1~ his responses to NRC Ge~eric Letter 81-04. B. The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81-04. *

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w condition, and high oxygen content in the relatively stagnant, intermittent, or low-flow coolant. Currently, for the nonconforming ASHE Code Class 3 piping, no additional inservice inspection beyond the Section XI visual examination is required. Examples of piping considered to be "Service Sensitive* include but are not limited to: core spray lines, recirculation riser lines,* recirculation bypass lines (or pipe extensions/stub tubes on plants where the bypass lines have been removed), control rod drive (CRO) hydraulic return lines, isolation condenser lines, recirculation Inlet lines at safe ends where crevices are formed by the welded thermal sleeve attachments, and shutdown heat exchanger lines.

  • If cracking should later be found in a particular piping run and considered to be generk, it wl 11 be designated by the NRC as "Service Sensitive."
  • Since no IGSCC has been observed In the domestic plants and in view of the possible high radiation exposure to the inspection personnel, surveillance and monitoring means other than those specified In Section IV of this report for recirculation riser lines will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Leakage detection and augmented inservlce Inspection requirements for "Nonconforming" lines and "Nonconforming, Service Sensitive" lines are specified below: IV.8.1. "Nonconforming" L1nes That Are Not "Service Sensitive" IV.8.1.a. Leak Detection: The reactor coolant leakage detection systems should be operated under the Technical Specification requirements to enhance the discovery of unidentified leakage that may include through-wall cracks developed in austenitlc stainless steel piping. ... !-:.. * ** ~:~ **

1.

The comments on IV.B. also apply here.

a.

The comments on IV.B. also apply here.

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1 i I .I : IV.B. l.a.(l) The leakage detection system provided should include sufficiently diverse leak detection methods with adequate sensitivity to detect and measure small leaks in a timely manner and to identify the leakage sources within the practical 1fm1ts. Acceptable leakage detection an~ monitoring systems are described in Section* C, Regulatory Position of Regulatory Gufde 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure 804ndary Leakage Detection . Syst.ems. 11 Particular attention should be given to upgrading and calibrating those leak. detection systems that will provide prompt Indication of an *Increase In leakage rate: Other equivalent leakage detection and collectio~ systems will b£! reviewed on a case-b~-cas~ basts.

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(1)

SUMMARY

CE has not adequately demonstrated that their leak detection and monitoring systems meet those described In Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45. DIFFERrnCES The nine subsections of Section C of Regulatory Gulde 1.45 are discuss~d below. C. 1 CE has stated that leakage to the primary reactor containment* from identified sources ls collected such that

a.

the flow rates are monitored separately from unidentified leakage,11 and \\,, '

b.

the total flow rate Can be established !!nd mon f tored. 11 C,2 It is not clear from the Dresden 2 and 3, and Quad Citfes 1 and 2, Final Safety Analysts Report (FSAR) that unjdentified leakage to the primary reactor containment can be collected and the flow rate.monitored with an accuracy of 1 gpm or better. C.3 The methods used to detect leakage in Dresden 2 .and 3, Qu~d Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 Include the following. The systems used tri each method are 1 isted.

b.
c.

Sump level arid flow monitor1ng--Flow recorders and alarms In floor drain 'sump Airborne particulate r~d1oactivlty monltoring--lleactor building ~Ir monftortng Condensate flow from air coolers ls monitored at the equipment dr~ln sump. The systems listed above meet those rec01T111ended In Section C.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.45:

  • C.4 It is not clear whe_ther provisions have been made fn the Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cltjes 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for.signs of intersystem leakage.

C.5 The Dresden 2 leak detection systems cannot meet the 1 gpm in \\ h or less sensitivity requirement. I It is not known whether the Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 leak detection systems can meet the 1 gpm In one 1 h or less sensitivity requirement. 't

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7f'...... <'.~*~--.. ~*.. 't-v... i.. ___.. n.....,....,.,.._..._,..... ____.._, C.6 The Dresden 2 lP.akage detection systems are not capable of performing their functions followl~g seismic events that.do not require shutdown. It is not clear whether the Dresden 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1 airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to the SSE. C.7 The conrnents below pertain to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1. *Indicators and alarms for the required leakage detection system are provided *.in the main control room. Procedures for converting various indications to a con111on leakage f,quivalent are available to the operators. It ls not known whet.her calibration* of the indicators accounts.for the needed independent variables. C.8 Some of the Dresden *2 leak detection systems enumerated in Reference 11 cannot be calibrated or tested during operation. It ls not known whether Dresden.3, Quad Cities land 2, and LaSalle*] leak detection systerns c~n be calibrated or tested during operation. ~ C.9 The Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1.and 2, and LaSalle l FSAR include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage. The Dresden 3, Quad Cit!es l and 2, and LaSalle 1 Technical Specificiations have statements similar to the following ri~garding availabi 1 ity of systems for detecting and monitoring leakage: "Both the sump and air sampling systems shall be operable during reactor power operation. From and after the date that one of these systems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor power operation is ~~rmissible only during the succeeding 7 days.* No mention of leakage detection system availability is made In the Dresden 2 Technical Specifications or Reference 9. It cannot be dete.rmined from the above whether Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1 meet Regulatory Guide 1.45, Section C. ADDITIONAL DATA REQUI_REO I. Indicate whether provisions have been made In the Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle l FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of intersystem leakage (Subsecti9n C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

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I I I i l i IV.B.1.a.(2) Plant shutdown should be tntttated for inspect ton.and corrective action when any leakage detection system Indicates, wtthtn a period of 24 hours or less, an increase tn rate of untdenttfled leakage in* excess of 2 gallons per minute or Its equivalent, or when the total unidentified leakage attains.a rate of 5 gallons per minute or Its equivalent, whichever occurs first. For sump level monitoring systems with fixed-measurement Interval method, the level should be monitored at 4-hour intervals or less. '*:~t..,.:_,-;.. ~.. **:.:~.'

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2.

Indicate whether caltbratinn of the Indicators accounts for the needed independent variables* (Subsection C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

3.

Indicate whether the leak detection systems In Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1. and 2, and LaSalle 1 can detect'a leakage-of 1 gpm in I h or less (Subsection C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.45).

4.

Enumerate.~hich leakage detection systems In Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1

  • remain operable following seismic events that dQ not require plant shutdown.

Also, indicate for* the above plants if the airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functto~al when subjected to the SSE (Suhsectton C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.45). *

5.

Please provide the data for the D~esden 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 leak detection systems in the table attached to the back of Tab le 1 (Subsect ton C.8.of Regulatory Gulde 1. 45). 6: Please indicate the availahi 1 ity of various types of leakage detection Instruments (Subsection C~g of Regulatory Gulde 1.45).

7.

Indicate whether the unidentified leakage to.the prtmarY reactor containment in Dresden 2 and 3 and_ Quad Ctttes 1 and 2 can he collected and the flow rate monitored with.an accuracy of 1 gpm or better (Subsection C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.45). (2)

SUMMARY

CE has not proposed a requirement for shutdown.aft~r a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the* Technical Specifications for Dresden 2 and 3, Q~ad Ctttes 1. and 2, and LaSalle 1. CE has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less) into the Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 Technical Specif teat tons. -DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. requires that reactor shutdown be Initiated when there is a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in-24 h. FOr sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less. . CE does not consider the above provision necessary. Therefore, CE will not include it in the Technical Specifications for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1.7 i ~\\..

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c 1 i ) .. j .'l 'I i I ' l IV.B. 1.a.(3) Unidentified leakage should include all leakage other than: IV.B.1.a.(3)(a) Leakage Into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packjng leaks that are captured, flow metered, and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or 1v.e.,1.a.(3)(b) Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to Interfere with the operations of un1dent1fied leakage monitoring systems or not to be from a through-wall crack in the piping within the reactor coolant pressure boundary. IV.B. l.b. Augmented lnservlce Inspection: Inservice inspection of the "Nonconforming, Nonservice Sensitive" lines should be conducted in accordance with the following program:*

  • Th1s program is largely taken from the requfrements of ASHE Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, referenced In the paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 5D.55a, "Codes and Standards.*

(3) ADDITIONAL DATA REQtJIR.f,_!! None. CE's defln1tlon of unidentified leakage for LaSalle 1 meets NUREG-0313, Rev. 1* (FSAR Section 5.2.5). It can*not be determinec1 whether Dresden 2 and 3 and Q11ad Cities 1 and 2 meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 regarding the definition of unidentified leakage. (a) The cornnents on IV.B. 1.a.(3) also apply here. (b) The cornnents on IV.B. 1.a.(3) also apply here.

b.

SUMMARY

CE has not provided information on the au~mented ISi program of nonconforming "nnnservice sens1t1ve ASHE Code Class 1 pipe f9r Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSa lie 1. DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that "nonservice sensitive* pipes be subject to an augmented ISi program. Selection methods for pipes to be examined and other technical details* are found in Part IV.B.1.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2 CE identified the "nonservice sensitive" pipe as the main recirculation system piping and cleanup system suction piping. Since at that time no widespread IGSCC was observed on "large diameter (>10 in.)* piping, no augmented ISi program was felt warranted.a Therefore, no augme11tecl ISi program was described and no Technical Specificati9n changes were proposed. It should be noted that the whole recirculation system is now considered "sP.rvice sensitive" by the NRC. LaSalle 1 CE has not Identified the "nonservice sensitive" pipe in LaSalle 1 nor has CE provided details on the augmented ISi prograni if they have one.

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Iy.B.1.b.(l) For ASHE Code Class. 1 components and piping, each.pressure-retaining dissimilar metal weld subject. to inservice inspection . requirements of :section XI should be examined.at least once in no more than BO months (two-thirds of the time prescribed in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel.Code* Section XI). Such examination should include all internal attachment welds that are not through-wall welds but. are ~elded to or form part of the pressure boundar.y. IV.B.l.b.(2) The following ASHE Code Class 1 pipe welds subject to inservice inspection

  • requirements of Section XI should be examined at least once in no more than 80 mon~hs:

( 1) ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

a.

Identify the "nonservice sensitive" piping systems and enumerate the welds therein ( IV.B. *of NUREG-0313, Rev: 1)

b.

Identify the propor~lo~ of the nonconforming * "nonservlce sensitive" piping that Is bein9 Inspected (IV.B.2.bi of NUREG-0313! Rev. 1)

c.

Identify the Stress Rule Index Numbers for the welded joints In the nonconfor*mlng "nonservice sens1tiye" piping.( IV.Bi 1.b. (6) of NUREG..,0313, Rev. 1) ~. Identify the proposed inspection interval for each system of nonconforming "nonservlce sensitive'!** piping (IV.B.1.b. of ~UREG-0313, Rev, 1) e, Identify the methods for au9mcnted ISi of t~e nonconforming "nonservice sensitive* piping (Iy.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. ))..

f.

Provide a copy of the speclf.1cat1ons for the augmented ISi method or methods (IV,B.3. of NUREG-0313, R!!V. 1 ~ Identify each of the augmented *1s1 methods used and the training and certification levels the individuals using those methods received. Indicate if cracked specimens are used in your training (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) *. T11e conmtints on IV.B.1 *. b. also apply here. (2) The comments on 1y.e.1.b. ~lso apply her~~ I: 'C*, I. I \\. L" f,. ~. r* ( ~: r

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IV.B.l.b.(2)(a) All welds at terminal ends* of pipe at vessel nozzles;

  • Terminal ends are the extremities of piping runs that connect to structures, components (such as vessels, pumps, valves) or pipe anchors, each of which acts as rigid restraints or provides at least two degrees of restraint to piping thermal expansion.

IV.B.l.b.(2)(b) All welds having a design combined primary plus secondary stress range of 2.4Sm or more; IV.B.l.b.(2)(c) All welds having a design cumulative fatigue usage factor of 0.4 or more; and IV.B. l.b.(2)(d) Sufficient additional welds with high potential for cracking to make the total equal to 25S of the welds in each piping system. IV.B.1.b.(3) The following ASHE Code Class 2 pipe welds, subject to inserv1ce inspection requirements of Sect1on XI, in residual heat removal systems, emergency core cooling systems, and containment heat removal systems should be examined at least once in no more than 80 months: (a) The comments on IV.B. l.b. also apply here. (b) The conrnents on IV.B.1.b. also apply' here. (c) The comments on IV.B. l.b. also apply.here. (d) The comments on IV.B. l.b. also apply here. (3) ~UMMARY CE has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected per Part iv.a. l.b.(3) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1.

  • Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASHE Code Class 2 pipes will be ~nspected and what inspectfon procedures will be used.
  • DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that nonconforming ASHE Code Class l and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISi program.

The augmented ISi program for.ASHE Code Class l piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISi requirements :differ for ASME Code Class 2 pfpes to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and IV.B. l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. CE has submitted the augmented ISi program for nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the ASHE Code Class*l and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Therefore, CE's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated. This applies to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle l.

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j .I I ! ' l I IV.8.1.b.{J){a) All welds-of the tenninal ends of ptpe at* vessel nozzles, and 1v.e..1,b. (J)(b) At least lOS of the ~elds selected proporttonately from the followtng tategortes: IV.8. l.b.{J){b)(t) Clrcumferenttal welds at locattons.where the stresses under tne loadings resulting froin ~plant condittons as calculafed by the sum of Equattons (9) and (10) tn NC-3652 exceed o.8 (1.2sh +sA);. IV.8.1.b.{J)(b)(ti) *Welds at tenntnal ends of piptng, tncluding branch run~; IV.8.l.b.(3)(b)(ttt) Dlsstmilar metal welds; IV.8.1.b.(J)(b)(iv) .Welds at structural IV.8.1:~.(J)(b)(v) . dtscontinutties; ah~ Welds*that cannot be pressure. tested tn accordance with IWC-5000

  • The welds to be examtned shall be dtstrtbuted approximately equally among runs "(or portions of*runs) that are essentially
  • stmilar tn destgn, stze, system function, and service conditions.

.V.8.1.b.(4) Tne followtng ASHE Code Class 2 pipe welds tn systems other than residual neat removal systems, emergency core cooltng systems, and containment heat removal systems, wnich are subject to tnservlce Inspection requtrements of Section XI, should be Inspected at least once in no more than 80 months: ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

1.

Identify which ASHE Code Class 2 pipe will !>e inspected per Part Iy.8.1.b.(3) for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1:

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for "nonservice sensitive" ASME C~de Class 2 pipe. (a) The corrments on IV.8.1.b. also apply here. (b) The corrments on Iy.8. 1.b.* a~so apply ~ere. (I) The corrments on IV.8.1,b. i!lso a11ply here, (,ti) The corrments on IV.8.1.b. also apply here, (tii)The corrments on 1v.e..1.b. also apply ~ere. * (iv) The corrments on IV.8.1.b. also apply here. (y) T~e corrments on IV.8. 1.b. also apply ~ere. ( 4)

SUMMARY

CE has not tdentified those nonconfonJ!tng "nonseryice sensitive" ptpes which are to be inspected per Part Iy.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Data are needed to determine which "nonservice sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used. l*.*

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\\ '\\ IV.8. l.b.(4)(a) All welds at locations where the stresses under the loadings resulting from *Normal a and "Upset* plant conditions including the operating basis earthquake (QBE) as calculated by the sum of Equations (9) and (10) in NC-3652 exceed 0.8 (l.2Sh +SA); IV.8.1.b.(4)(b) All welds at terminal ends of piping, Including branch runs; IV.B.1.b.(4)(c) All dissimilar metal welds; IV.B.1.b.(4)(d) Additional welds with high potential for cracking at structural discontinuities* such that the total number of welds selected for examination equal to 2si of the circumferential welds in each piping system.

  • Structural discontinuities Include pipe weld joints to vessel nozzles, valve bodies, pump casings, pipe fittings (such as elbows, tees, reducers, flanges, etc., conforming to ANSI Standard B 16.9) and pipe branch connections and fittings.

DIFFERENCES NUREG-D313, Rev. 1 requires that nunconforming ASHE Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented ISi program for ASHE Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augme.nted ISi requirements differ for ASHE Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per rarts IV.B.l.b.(3) ~nd IV.B.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. CE has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the ASHE Code Class:.. 1 and Class 2 piping, and between the ASHE Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and IV.B.l.b.(4} of

  • NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Therefore, CE's program for ASHE Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

This applies to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and. LaSalle 1. ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

1.

Identify which ASHE Code Cl~ss 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(4).

2.

Identify the Inspection procedures for "nonservlce sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe. (a) The comments on IV.B. l.b.(4) a.lso apply here. (b) The comments on IV.B.1.b.(4) also apply he1*e. (c) The comments on IV.B. 1.b.(4) also apply here. (d) The comments on IV.B. l.b.(4) also qpply here. ( i.. i r f I t l t~ i Ii I' i l*

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N N n.e. J.li. (6) If examination of (1), (2), (3), and (4) above conducted during the first 80 months reveal no incidence of stress corrosion cracking, the examination frequency thereafter can revert to 120 months as prescribed In Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Samp 1 i ng p h*ns other than those described jn (2), (3), and (4) above will be reviewed on a case-by-case ~asfs. 1 v,e.2. "Nonconforming* Lines That are *service Sens1t1ve 0 IV.8.2.a. IV.8.2.b. ~eak Detectjon: r~e leakage detection requirements, described 1n IV.B.1.a. above, should oe impl!!f11ented. Augmented l11servic~ ~nspect1on: (5) The Hcensee has not furnished <lata on this paragrapti in his responses to ~RC Generic Letter 81-04~ (6) The licensee has not fur11ished data on this par~graph

  • in his responses to NRC ~enerj~ Letter 81-04.
a.

The comnents made in Parts IV.B. l.a.(1) and 1y.e.1.a.(2) apply.he~~- C~ has not provi~ed information on the augmented ISi program for nonconforming "service sensitiven ASHE. Code Class 1 pipe for Dresden 2 and 3, Qu~d Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1. CE has*also classified some systems-"nonservice

  • ~ensitive"-that should be ~service sensiiive".

DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313,-Rev~ 1 requires that "service sensitive" pipes be subject to an augmented ISi program. Selection methods for pipes to be examined and other technical details are ~ound in Part-{V.B.2.b. of ~URE~-0313, Rev. 1. - CE has Identified the following systems as "service sensitive" for Dre~den Z and j and Quad Cities l and 2: core spray, rectrcul_ation bypass' 1 ines, shutdown cooling, low pressure coolant injection, isolation condenser, residuad heat removal, an~* control rod drive systems piping. It should be noted that the whole recirculation system is now considered "service sensitive" by the NRC. No piping systems were classified els "service sensitive* for LaSalle 1. Various pipln~ 0 systems were mentioned, but' they were not classified. No technjcal details on the augmented ISi program for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 were provided by CE.

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i,, j ,1 I ' j i i N w IV.B.2.b. (1) The welds and adjoining areas of bypass piping of the discharge valves fn the main recirculation loops, and of the austenitic stainless steel reactor core spray pfpfng up to and Including the second Isolation valve, should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examtnatton need not be closer than 6 months, ff outages occur more frequently than 6 months. This requirement applies to all weld~ fn all bypass lines whether the 4-fnch valve ts kept open or closed during operation. In the event these examinations f fnd the piping free of unacceptable Indications for three successive inspections, the examination may be ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

a.
b.
c.
d.

Identify the "service sensitive* pfpfng systems and enumerate the welds therein (IV.B. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) Identify the proportion of the nonconforming "service sensitive* pipe that f s being inspected ( IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. l) Identify the fnspectfon interval of each system of the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe (IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. l) Identify the Stress Rule Index Numbers for the welded joints fn the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe (IV.B. l.b. (6) qf NUREG-0313, Rev. l)

e.

Identify the methods for augmented ISi of the nonconforming "service sensitive" pfpe (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

f.

Provide a copy of the specifications for the . augmented ISi method or methods (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

g.

Identify each of the augmented ISi methods used and the training and certification levels the Individuals using those methods received. Indicate ff cracked specimens are used in your training (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1). (1) The conments on IV.B.2.b. also apply here. ~. ~. 1. I_; I f:: f.. r I ! I I i I 1, r f i t* i* L r " ~ r:

I .i j } I I IV.8.2.b.(2) 1y.8.2.b.(3) IV.~.2.b.(4) i . extended to each 36-month period (plus or minus by as much as 12 months) coincident with a refueling outage. In these*cases, the successive examination may be

  • limited to all welds in one bypass pipe run and one reactor core spray piping run *. If unacceptable flaw indicat1ons are detected, the remaining piping runs in each group should be examined.

In the event these 36-month period examinations reveal no unacceptable indications for three successive inspections, the*welds and adjoining areas of these piping runs should be examined as described in IV.8.1.b(l) for dissimilar metal welds and in IV.8.l.b(2) for ot~er welds.

  • The dissimilar metal.welds and adjoining areas of other ASHE Code Class 1 *service Sensitive" pip1ng should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations need not be closer *than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than 6 months.

Such examination should include all internal attachments that are.not through-wal 1 welds but are welded to or form part of the pressure boundary. The welds and adjoining areas of.

  • other.ASHE Code Class 1 "Service Sensltive**piping should be examined using the sampling plan described tn IV.8. 1.b(2) except that the frequency of such examinations should be at
  • each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages.

Successive examinations need not be closer than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than 6 months. The adjoining areas of internal attachment welds in recirculation inlet lines at safe ends where crevices are formed by the welded thermal sleeve attachments should be examined at each reactor refueling outage or at other scheduled plant outages. Successive examinations' need not be closer than 6 months, if outages occur more frequently than 6 months.

  • .. *. *' ~.................... -*

(2) The comments on IV.8.2.~. also apply ~er~~ (3) The comments on *iv,8.2.~. aho apply here: (4) The comments 9n IV.8.2.b. al~o apply h~re. [.' I' i. L* r I*. t*,,.. i< 1*: r,;:.; j'". l t t I

i. r

(. r*

l I 1 I I 1 l I IV.8.2.b.(5) l I .i I I -1 l .J I 'j I l I

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,*. ::l IV.8.2.b.(6) . :j i .\\ I

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N l <.11

  • 1 i
  • 1.,

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'l i .l In the event the examinations described in (2), (3) and (4) above find the piping free of unacceptable 1nd1cat1ons for three succe*ss1ve inspections, the examination may be extended to each 36-month period (plus or minus by as much ~s 12 months) coinciding* with a refueling outage *. In the event these 36-month period examinations reveal no unacceptable indications for three successive inspections, the frequency of examination may revert to BO-month periods (two-thirds the time. prescribed in the ASME Code Sect 1on XI). The area, extent, and frequency of

  • examination of the augmented inservice inspection for ASME Code Class 2 *service Sensitive" lines will be determined on a case~by-case basis.

(5) The comments on IV.8.2.b. also ~pply here. ( 6)

SUMMARY

CE has not identified those nonconforming *service sensitive" _pipes which are to be inspected per Part IV.8.2.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1

  • Data are needed to determine which *service sensitive*

ASME Code Class 2 p~pes will be inspecte4 and what inspection procedures.will be used. DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that nonconforming ASME Cod\\Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISi rogram. The augmented ISi program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that requir~d on Class 2 piping

  • CE has submitted the augmented ISi program for nonconforming "service sensitive" piping, but has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping. Therefore, CE's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated.

Thi~ applies to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1. ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED

1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.8.2.b.(6).

2.

Identify the 1nspect1on procedures for "serv1CI)! sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipe.

j i .i l * 'j

1

,i I I I l .I 'I

  • I
j
    • 1
l

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  • .1 1 N

O'I IV.8.3. Nondestructive Examination* (NOE) Requirements The method of examination and volume of material to be examined, the allowable Indication standards, and examination procedures should comply with the requirements set forth In the applicable Edition and Addenda of the ASME Code, Section XI,* specified in Part (g), "Inservlce Inspection Requirements,* of 10 CFR 50.SSa, "Codes and Standards.* In some cases, the code examination procedures may not be effective for~detectlng or evaluating IGSCC and other ultrasonic (UT) procedures or advanced nondestructive examination techniques may be required to detect *and evaluate stress corrosion cracking In austenltlc stainless steel piping. Improved UT procedures have been*

  • developed by certain organizations. These Improved UT detection and evaluation procedures that have been or can be demonstrated to the.NRC to be effecttve In detecting IGSCC should be used In the lnservlce Inspection.

Recommendations.fqr the development and eventual Implementation* of these Improved techniques are Included In Part v. V. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS The measures outlined In Part II I of this document provide for positive actions that.are consistent with current technology. The lmplenientatfon of these actions should markedly reduce, the susceptibility of stainless* steel piping to stress corrosion cracking in BWRs. It ls recogn,zed tha~ additional means could be used to limit the extent of stress corrosion cracking of BWR. pressure boundary piping materials and to Improve the overall system integrity. Th.ese Include plant design and operational procedure considerations to reduce system exposure to potentlally*aggresslve environment, improved material selection; special fabrication and welding techniques, and provisions for volumetrk 1nspect1on*capab1lfty In the design of weld joints. The use of such means to limit IGSCC or to Improve plant system inte.grlty will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

3.

The licensee has not furnished data on this paragraph in his responses to NRC Generic Letter 81~04. V.

SUMMARY

NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 has 1 i~ted areas recommended for further consideration'. CE has proposed other means of reduci[lg LaSalle l '~ susce~tlbillty to IGSCC. DIFFERENCES NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 lists areas recommended for further consideration to decrease the susceptibility to IGSCC. The. use of other means drawn from these areas to !lecrease* susceptibility to IGSCC will be reviewed on a case-by-case bas ls.

  • CE has taken the follo~ing actions ~o reduce LaSalle l's susceptlblllty to IGSCC:
1.

The feedwater sparger has been redesigned with ne~ spray nozzles which decrease thermal cycle stresses.*

2.

CRD drive water is now taken from the condensate system for a low oxygen.source (14-200 ppb) of water, Instead of ~he condensate storage tank: 10 ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED None. .e

f.

~-*. i.' \\.. F i.*

-+ 'l J . I I L -~

  • 1
  • i QUESTIONS ON DRESDEN 2 AND 31 QUAD CITIES 1 AND 2~ AND LASALLE 1 LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS (Iy.B. l.)

System Has the System Been Incorporated? Leak Rate Sensitivity Time Required to Achieve Sensitivity Earthquake for Which Function is Assured Control Room Indication for Alarms and Indicators Documentation Reference Testable During Normal Operation?

-.~

i
  • .~l

- *--* -- - _... -~... -* *- -- -- ~*L.... ~ -,,_ -. ?....,.., -- *-**... *-. __.__.... ** :--~ -. - ,;-._,.... -* --. - -*..... ~:*.:-*--*.*.:.. _ _.._.:~~*-:-*:*.., :~..... ~._::__.,. ___ *----.... -*... *.--* TABLE 2 'SUMMARIES OF EVALUATION OF LICENSEE'.$ RESPONSES l.I.C Material Selection,. Testing, and* Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License Commonwealth Edison (CE) does not have a schedule-for replacement of nonconfonning* "service. sensitive" 1 ines for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2. CE has replaced some pipe on LaSalle l~ CE-does not meet NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 in this matter for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2. CE *has not indicated whether the pipe they have replaced is all the nonconforming* "service sensitive" piping at LaSalle 1. III.C. Processin~ of Mate~ials CE is proposing to apply induction heating stress improvement (IHSI) to LaSalle 1. The NRC has not accepted this process, but it is under consideration. More data on the !HSI proc~ss to be used are needed. IV.B.l.a.(l) Lea~ Detection and Monitoring Systems CE has not adequately demonstrated that their leak detection and monitoring systems meet those described in Section C of Regulatory Guide.1.45. 28

'-~~*;

"-"-"' *=*-*"'""'-;.' ~~--.-.:....._:_*

  • ..:..:........~*----~-----.: _... ____..__._~ __._ __.__~----' --~----... -*-...... __,,. ___ !:.;.*. ::. -~--* ** ---- - *----"-::.. -~----~ -~--~---;........:....:._,..._, ** -

IV.B~l.a.(2}. Leak Detection Requirements CE has not proposed a requirement for shutdown afte~ a 2-gpm increase in unidentified leakage in 24 h into the Technical Specifications for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 *. CE. has not proposed a requirement for monitoring the sump level at 4-h intervals (or less) into the Dresder. 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 Technical Specifications. IV.B.l.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming 11Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe CE has not provided information on the augmented ISI program of nonconforming 11nonservice sensitive" pipe for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle l; IV.B.l.b.(3) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming 11Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe CE has not identified those nonconforming 11nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be ~nspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(3) of.NUREG-0313, Rev. 1

  • Data are needed to determine which 11nonservice sensitive" ASME Code.

Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used. IV.B. 1.b(4) Augmented IS! of Nonconforming 11Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe CE has not identified those nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" pipes which are to be inspected pe~ Part IV.B.l.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. 29 ~ -~,.-.... --.... --- - -... .. *- ---.-** ---.. --.-----.-----------*---- *---------- **--:-**--.--**:*--*~7---*-".--.,-* *.-.:--: --**----****-*--*-**... *--- ~. **--.. -

  • -***--:**--*~**...,.*:t,__:~.~-*~-:---:*

Data are needed to determine* which 11nonserv.ice sensitive*~* ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used. IV.8~2.b. Augmented.* ISl of Nonconforming "Service Sensitive" Pipe CE has not provided information* on the augmented IS I program for nonconforming "service sensitive" ASM~Code Class 1 pipe for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities*l ahd 2, and LaSalle l. CE has also classified some systems 11nonservite sensitive"* that should be

  • "service sensitive".

IV~B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming 11ServiceSensitive 11 ASME Code Class 2 Pipe '1 i CE has not identified those noncohforming "service sensitive" pipes. which are to be inspected per Part IV.B.2~b.{6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. l. Data are needed to determine which "service sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 pipes will be inspected and what inspection procedures will be used. V. Other Actions by Licensee to Lower IGSCC Susceptibility . NUREG-0313, Rev; 1 has listed areas reconunended for further consideration. CE has proposed other means-of reducing LaSalle l's *susceptibility

  • to IGSCC.

30.

('. TABLE' 3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUREG-0313, REV. AND LICENSEE'S RESPONSES II.C Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that nonconf0rming NRC-designated "service sensitive" lines be replaced with corrosion-resistant materiaf~'to t.h.e ~xt~nt practical*. Also, lines that experience cracking should b~ replaced with corrosion-resistant materials. CE doe~ not have a replacement schedule for nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2. Instead, replacement materials have been purchased and replacing the nonconforming "service sensitive" pip~ will be done if needed. 8 CE has completed the following on LaSalle 1: The core* spray lines,. LPCI. piping, and RWCU piping have been changed from stainiess*steel Type 304 to carbon steel. The core spray safe-ends and transition spools have been replaced with carbon steel components. The CRD return line has been eliminated; nozzle N-10 capped; CRD pressure equalization equipment installed; and carbon steel eliminated from CRD service lines. 10 III.C. Processing of Materials NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 indicates that the use of processes like IHSI as an alternate to augmented ISI is permitted though not accepted by the NRC. These processes will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 31 -*-***-----**~--. *--*---~~, -----..........: _.,_...,...---,..-*.. ---*.-*:-----.---7

    • -:*::-:;:-:--~*
)

~.-.* - - -* -* --* **-------- ~-*

  • ___ _, *--- --**---------h*O _

_r ___._ ______.,_M.; ----'-...:..--~---=----!~......:...... **-'-*--*--'-- * --'*--- * **-.0.***-*-"'*=--*- *... **---~--:-.".L-~:.. ~:.--*.__:~-~ *..:-*:;~'l - ***~* --*,.:, 'G":.~--'-* - __, __..; __ CE has indicated that "proposals are being. evaluated, and negotiations are in progress fbr the application of induction heating stress improvement. program to the Unit 2 recirculation system piping. Our present: goal is to* have.this Unit 2 work completed before Unit 2. start-up with* Unit l similarly treated during a future: outage!' *. 10 IV.B. l.a. (l) Leak. Detection* and. Monitoring Systems The nfoe subsections of Section C of Regulatory Guide 1.45 are discussed below. c.. l

  • CE has stated that leakage to the primary reactor containment f~om identified source~ i~ collected such that
a.

the flow rates are monitored separately from unidentified leakage, 11 arid

b.

the total flow rate can be established and monitored. 11 C.2.

  • rt is not clear from tne Dresden 2 and 3, and Quad Cities l and 2, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that unidentified leakage to the primary reactor containment can be collected and tne flow* rate monitored with an accuracy of 1 gpm or better.

C.3 The methcids used to detect leakage in Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and. 2, and: LaSalle 1 include the following. The systems used in-each method are 1 isted.

a.

Sump level and flow monitoring--Flow recorders and alarms -in floor drain sump:

b.

Airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring--Reactor building air monitoring 32

i*--*.-*.,_*_ 1 .I i l J C.4 C.5

c. 6 C.7
c.

Condensate flow from air coolers is monitored at the equipment drain sump. The systems listed above meet those recormnended in Section C.l of Regulatory Guide 1.45. It is not clear whether provisions have been made in the Dresden 2 and 3,. Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 FSAR to monitor systems connected to the RCPB for signs of i ntersystem.1 ~.akage... The Dresden 2 leak detection systems cannot meet the gpm in 1 h or less sensitivity requirement. 11 It is not known.whether the Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 leak detection systems can meet the 1 gpm in 1 h or less sensitivity requirement. The Dresden 2 leakag~ detection systems are not capable of performing their functions following seismic events that do not require shutdown. 11 *It is not clear whether the Dresden 3,,*Quad £ities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 airborne particulate radioactivity monitoring system remains functional when subjected to the SSE

  • The colTITlents below pertain to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities and 2, and LaSalle 1.

Indicators and alarms for the required leakage detection system are provided in the main control room. Procedures for converting various indications to a colTITlon leakage equivalent are available to the operators. It is not known whether calibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables. 33

r~:,_*..:...:_~.. ;.:_ .. -**.~----*...;_ :: ~.:.:_ ___...... :..._ *--*-'-*-.:._..::.._.,. ___... ___,_.. ~.. :_..:.:..., _,... ___.:-:..~*..:..:. ..t*:-:~~;::::-::.:.::.L_:.. .:.~*-~,~;;.:,.. ;5~.._.:~:{.~_,:;_.::.... 2.-~L-...:~.. ;..:~.;:..;_;£,::.~... ~:.~... :...:.:'.~.. ~_.:...:.:..:.:..:..._.._~~--:.:-..:*~;::.~~~-:~:~.-.-:.. :~"::-.:_::.:~-:..:.;-S:.!..':::L:.::.*..-; : ~ '~ j -i

  • 1

'"' j ~ -~ ;. '{ ) '1. ' ' J

0::
  • 4 A

.;1 .) .! J .J c.a* Some of the Dresden 2 leak detection systems enumerated in Reference 11 canno~~e-calibrated or tested during operation~ It i~.notknown whether Dresden 3, Quad. Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle* 1 leak detection* systems can be' calibrated or tested during* operation. C.9*

  • .. The* Dresden 2'.and. 3, Quad Cities rand 2,. and LaSalle l FSAR include limiting conditions fo~ identified* and unidentified leakage *.

The Dresden 3, Quad Cities l and 2,. and Las*a11e 1 FSAR have statements similar to the following regarding availability or systems. for detecting. and monitoring* leakage:. 11Both the sump and air sampling systems shall be operable* during reactor power* operation. From and after the date that one of these systems is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, reactor power operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7*d_ays. 1114 No ~ention of leakage detectjon system* availability is made i~ the Dresden 2 Technical Specifications or Reference 9. It cannot be determined from the above whether Dresden 2 ~nd 3, Quad Cities l and 2,. and LaSalle l meet Regu.latory Guide 1.45, Section C. IV.B.l.a.(2) Leak Detectiorr Requirements NUREG~0313, Revr 1 requires. that reactor shutdown be initiated when there i~.a 2-gpm increase in unidentifi~d leakage in 24 h. For sump level monitoring systems with the fixed-measurement-interval method, the level should be monitored every 4 h or less. CE does* not* consider the above prov1s1on necessary. Therefore, CE will not include it in the Technical Specifications for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1.7 34 ~* -~--------.--. ----------.,-----..,---.. -.-. -c-*.-------. ----. ---~*-*c....-*---::--'.7** -.. -. --.

:,.,:*-*--;c:-:".'C'C"""'**.*.*~::::;~T7"T:"*;-.-;--.*.-:;

\\ e e IV.8.1.b. Augmented ISI of N_onconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" Pipe NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that "nonservice sensitive" pipes be subject to an augmented ISI program *. Selection methods for pipes to be examined and other technical details are found in Part IV.8.1.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2 CE identified the "nonservice sensitive" pipe as the main recirculation system piping and cleanup system suction piping. Since at that time no widespread IGSCC was observed on "large diameter (>10 in.) 11 piping, no augmented ISi program was felt warranted. 8. Therefore, no augmented ISI program was described and no Technical Specification changes were proposed. It should be noted that the whole recirculation system is now considered "service sensitive" by the NRC. LaSalle 1 CE has not identified* the "nonservice sensitive" pipe in LaSalle 1 nor has CE provided details on the augmented ISi program if they have one. IV.8.1.b.(3) Augmented ISi of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe . NUREG-0313, Rev. 1 requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2. piping be subjected to an augmented ISi program. The . augmented ISi program for ASME Code Class 1 piping differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISi requirements differ for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be inspected per Parts IV.8.1.b.(3) and IV.8.1.b.(4) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. 35

  • 1 CE" has submitted the augmented IS I. program for nonconforming*

"nonservic~sensitive" piping~ but has not distinguished between the .ASME Code Class land Class 2 piping, and between* the ASME Code Class 2*pipes. which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.(3) and I.V~B.1~b.(4) of.NUREG-0313, Rev. 1. Therefore~ CE's ~rogram.for ASME Code Class. 2 piping~cannot. be evaluated-This applis to Dresden 2 and 3~ Quad.Cities l and 2, and LaSall~ 1. IV.B.J.b. (4) Augmented ISI of* Nonconforming "Nonservi.ce Sensitive" ASME Code Clas~ 2 Pipe NUREG-0313,. Rev. l requires that nonconforming ASME. Code Class l and Cl ass: 2. pi ping be subjected* to an *augmented IS I program. The. augmented. ISL program for ASME Code Class 1 pip.ing* differs from that required on Class 2 piping. Also, augmented ISI requirement~ differ for ASME Code Class 2 pipes to be. inspected per Parts IV.B. l.b.(3) and IV.B. l.b. (4) of NUREG-0313,. Rev. l. CE has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming: "nonservice sensitive"* piping, but has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class l and Class 2 piping, and between the ASME Code Class 2 pipes which are to be inspected per Parts IV.B.l.b.{3) and lV.B. l.b. (4) of NUREG-0313,. Rev. 1. Therefore, CE's program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated. This applies to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1. IV.B.2.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming 11Service*Sensitive 11 Pipe* NUREG~0313, Rev~. l requires.*that "~ervice sensit{ve" pipes be* subject to an augmented.IS! program. Selection methods'-for pipes to be examined and other*.technical details* are found in Part. IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. l* *.

36.

CE has identified the following systems as 11service sensitive 11 for Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities l and 2: core spray, recirculation bypass lines, shutdown cooling, low pressure coolant injection, isolation condenser, residual heat removal, and control rod drive systems piping.8* It should be noted that the whole recirculation system is now considered 11service sensitive 11 by the NRC. No piping systems were classified as 11service sensitive 11 for -~..... LaSalle 1. Various piping systems were mentioned, but they were not classified. lo No technical details on the augmented ISI program for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle l were provided by CE. IV.B.2.b.(6) Augmented ISI of Nonconforming 11Service Sensitive** ASME Code Class 2 Pipe KUREG~0313, Rev. l requires that nonconforming ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping be subjected to an augmented ISI program. The augmented* ISI program for ASME Code Class piping differs from that required pn Class 2 piping. CE has submitted the augmented ISI program for nonconforming 11ser.vice sensitive 11 piping, but has not distinguished between the ASME Code Class 1 and Class 2 piping. Therefore, CE 1s program for ASME Code Class 2 piping cannot be evaluated. This applies to Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1. V. Other Actions by Licensee to Lower IGSCC Susceptibility NUREG-0313, Rev. l lists areas reconvnended for further consideration to decrease the susceptibility to IGSCC. The use of other means drawn from these areas to decrease susceptibility to IGSCC will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. 37 /

  • -* -***----------- *-- :**** ------..----: ------*----- ~--:-*-------*--*-*r-~

..... ~.-:----.. -. -., -.. ~. ..,.,_..-:--:-~~~7~;-~~--::-;-~:-;;*:~~~--~.-,:.*;' ~ *-:7*~.;;-::---;7~-,.*:-:*- ------:---:-:--:~;;:,.

  • _*~-- _.. _,-:-*-~-
  • _.J

. 1 .~*~ ) .** :i

  • .~... :

CE has. ~aken the fbllowing actions to reduce LaSalle l's susceptibility to.IGSCC:.

l.

The feedwater sparger has been redesigned with new spray nozzles which decrease thermal cycle ~tresses~

2.

CRD drive water* is now taken from the condensate system.for a low oxygen source (14-200 ppb) of water, instead of the condensate storage tank.lo 38

  • .~

.. ~--.. --.--;----*-**~--

  • --. -----:---*---**----- --- -..,-----.----,..-.---H* ~-*---------*.--::----:*:~:--;-*** * --

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~
  • ~

TABLE 4 ADDITIONAL DATA REQUIRED OF. LICENSEE II.C* Material Selection, Testing, and Processing Guidelines for BWRs with an Operating License If there is any nonconforming "service sensitive" piping that has not been replaced in LaSalle 1, indicate what their disposition

  • w.i'f 1.. be..::rep l' acement;. o'r augmented IS I.

111.C. Processing of Materials Supply the Process Specification of the IHSI process proposed to be used. IV.B. l.a.(l) Leak Detection and Monitoring Systems

1.

Indicate whether provi~ions have been made in the Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 FSAR to monitor ~ , systems connected t~ th~RCPB for signs of intersystem -r.; ..... ~ leakage (Subsection C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.45). 2~ Indicate whether talibration of the indicators accounts for the needed independent variables (Subsection C.7 of Regulatory Guide 1.45) *...

3.

Indicate whether the leak detection systems in Dresden 3, Quad Cities l and 2, and LaSalle 1 can detect a leakage of l gpm in l h or less (Subsection C.5 of Regulatory

4.

Guide 1. 45)

  • Enumerate which leakage detection systems in Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle 1 remain operable following seismic events that do not require plant shutdown.
Also, indicate for the above plants if the airborne particulate
39.

,..,.~-. -*;.. --.~- ~-*..-------.--*-"'"-..... ---

  • ,*.~*:... _"; *..
  • radioactivity* monitoring.:system remains-fonctiana 1 when subjected to the SSE (Subs~ction C.6 of Regulatory Gui de l.. 45).,
5.

Please provide the data for th~ Dresden 3, Quad Cities and 2,. and. LaSalle-l Teak* detect.ion systems in the table attached to the ~ack of Table 1 (~ubsection C.8 or Regulatory Gu.ide l.45) *.

6.

Please: indicate. the avai 1abi1 ity, of various types of 1 eakage detection instruments (Subsection C.9 of* Regulatory Guide:l.45). T. Indicate whether* the unidentified leakage to the primary reactor containment in Dresden 2 and 3 and Quad Cities 1 and 2 can be collected ~nd the flow rate-monitored with an accuracy of 1 gpm 6r better (Subsection C.2. of Regulatory Guide*l.45). IV~B~l.a.(2) Leak Detecti-0n Requirements None. IV.B.l.b. *Augmented ISI of Nonconforming* "Nonserv*ice* Sensitive" ASME Code Cl ass 2 Pipe.

a.

Identify the "nonservice sensitive" piping ~jstems and enumerate the.welds therein (IV.B. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

b.

Identify.the proportion of the nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping th~t is being inspected (IV.B.2.b~ of NUREG-0313, Revr 1)

e.

Identify the Stress* Rule Index Numbers for ~he welded joints* in* the nonconforming 11nonservice:sensitive 11 piping (IV~B~l.b *. (6) of NUREG-0313, Rev~. 1) 40 ,_....=---------*------------------------.--~------------*----'-----------.. ----- ---* -*---- ________ _....,..... -------:-*,, _____ _...... ----.---------- ______.,.,...... _.

I* I

d.

Identify the proposed inspection.interval for each system of nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping (IV.B.l.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1).

e.

Identify the methods for augmented ISi of the nonconforming "nonservice sensitive" piping (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

f.

Provide a copy of the specifications for the augmented ISi method or methods (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

g.

Identify each of the augmented ISi methods used and the training and certification levels the individuals using those methods received. Indicate if cracked specimens are used fo your training (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1). IV.B. l.b.(3).Augmented ISi of Nonconforming "Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe

1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe ~ill be inspected per Part IV.B.l.b.(3) for Dresden 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, and LaSalle i.

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for "nonservice sensitivew ASME Code Class 2 pipe. IV.B.l.b.(4) Augmented ISi of Nonconforming ".Nonservice Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe

1.

Identify which ASME Code Class 2 pipe will be inspected per Part IV.B.2.b.(4).

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for "nonservice sensitive"* ASME Code Class 2 pipe~ 41 -~

______.... _;*,. _____...:.:..... __ :...... ____ _;:... ~--......,.~ --~--... -*'-"'"*-*-**** --*--'r.:.... -____.. / ---** -*-. ___.;.:~,,: ___ ~.. ~-*....,,..:...,.:.:.:..._:.:_ ;*:*..:~.:. __... _:_...... ;. ___ :.__.:........ ____.. __ :_~,_: _____....;._;.. :................ -... :..:..-:.-.. -- -*---.. :... -*""'"'"-***......... ;._ -**-**...:.._.;.,..,.:*_;*:....... :*., -~---.:..:.. :.".;.t.-.::,;.~--=~... j* IV.s.2*.b. Augmented ISI of Nonconforming "Service* Sensitive" Pipe

b.

Identify the "service sensitive" piping systems and enumerate the weld~therein (IV.B. of NUREG~0313, Rev. 1) Identify the proportion of the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe that is being inspected (IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313F Rev. 1)

c.

Identify the. inspection interval. of each system of the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe (IV.B.2.b. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) d.. Iderit.ify the Stress Rule* Index Numbers for the welded: joints in the nonconforming "service sensitive" pipe (IV.B.l.b.(6) of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

e.

Identify the methods for augmented ISI of the nonconforming 11 servi~e sensitive" pipe (IV.B.3~ of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1)

f.

Provi.de a copy of the specificatfons for.the augmented ISI method or methods (1V.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1) *

g.

Identify each* of the* augmented ISI methods used and the training ~nd certification levels the individuals using those methods received. Indicate if cracked specimens are used in your training (IV.B.3. of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1). IV.B.2.b.(6) Augm~nted ISI Of Nonconforming 11 Servic~- Sensitive" ASME Code Class 2 Pipe

l.

Identify which ASME Code Cl ass 2 pipe wi 11 be inspected per. Part IV.B.2.b.(6). 42

*---***-----*-----.,..-------**-;- --*-**---=----.. *--:"'":"':*:--*-----.-----*-.----*-:---*---- *-*--**.. **:** --**--* ***--* --

- ~. --**- -*** ---*-*........ -:-*----.. -:**-:-:-*-*--... -

,-1.'

2.

Identify the inspection procedures for "service sensftive" ASMECode Class 2 pipe *. V. Other Actions by Licensee to Lower IGSCC Susceptibility None. .. ~ ... :.. ~ . *-.::. ~.. .. :...;,. ~.*. 43 --*.* *-:**;-!-**--**-.-- **-:--...-:-*** '**--,--.-*-,.=--* ~---. .. ~

....:..: ___ *-----~-:.:-**-*-~.:.--~.:.~._.'.. ~.~-:-.-*-**-**-----~---- *-*---- -* _)_: ______, ___ _

..:...... --. -* -~*** --------*---------. . ~ . 4.. REFERENCES

1.

E *. D. Eason et al~r The Cost Effectiveness of Countermeasures to Inter ranular Stress Corrosion Crackin in BWR Pipin, EPRI NP-1703,

2.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report on Material Selection and ProcessinR Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, OSNRC Report NO EG-0313, July 1977.

3.

U.5'. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Report, Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking in Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping of Boiling Water Reactor Plants, USNRC Report.NUREG-75/067, October 1975. 4.. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants, USNRC Report NUREG-0531, February 1979.

5.

U.S. NuclearRegulat.ory Commission, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processin~ Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping, OSNRC Report NO EG-0313, Rev. 1,. July 1980.

6.

D. G *. Eisenhut letter to all BWR licensees (except Humboldt Bay and La Crosse), "Implementation of NUREG-0313, Rev. 1, Technical Report on Material Selection and Processin Guidelines for BWR Coolant Pressure Boundart Piping Generic Task A-42, 11 Generic Letter 81-04, February 26, 198.

7.

L. O. Del George to D. G. Eisenhut letter, July 7, 1981 {NRG Accession No.:. 8107140437).

8.

M. S. Turbak to D.. K. Davis letter,. January 10, 1978 (NRG Accession No~: None Given).

9.

C. W. Schroeder to G. C. Lainas letter, December 28, 1982 (NRG Accession No.: 8301030238).

10.

T. J.- Rausch to H. R. Denton letter, January 18, -1983 (NRG Accession N.o.: NoneGiven).

11.

P~ O'Connor to L. 0. DelGeorge letter, June 23, 1982 (NRG Accession No.: NoneGiven). 44. . ------* --*------.---------*-------- --*-*----*- *--------------~--* -----:-----***--*-***--- --- *-*- -- **- - -*- -*. -

NR~FCil~335 11'fl.ar1 - U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. REPORT NUMBER (Auignttd by DDCJ BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET EGG-FM-6250
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Techni ca I Eva 1 ua t l on of 1 ntegr1 ty of the
2. (Lt11111t1 blttnlc J Dresden Station Units 2 & 3, Quad Cities Station Units 1

& 2, and LaSalle County Station Unit 1 Reactor Coolant

3. RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.

Boundary Piping System

7. AUTHOR!Sl
5. DATE REPORT COMPLETED MONTH July

'I YEAR 1983

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS (lncludtl Zip Codt1J DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTH l YEAR July 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc.
6. (Lt111Vt1 blank}

Idaho Fa Tl s, ID 83415

8. (Lt111Vt1 blank}
~

,t;:.

12. SPONSORING ORGAN.IZATION NAM.E AND.MAI LING. ADDRESS (lncludtl Zip CodtlJ
10. PROJECT/TASK/WORK UNIT NO.

Division of Licensing Office of Nuc1ear Reactor Reguiation

11. FIN NO.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission A6429 ~j.*. Washington, DC. 20555

13. TYPE OF REPORT I

Pt?RIOO COVERED (Inclusive dates)

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. (Le11Vt1 blank)
16. ABSTRACT (200 words or lt1ss}
  • .*;I
17. KEY WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a. DESCRIPTORS

.:*~

  • .1
  • ~*.

17b. IDENTIFIERS/OPEN-ENDED TERMS

18. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
19. SECURITY CLASS (This t'f1port/
21. NO. OF PAGES Unclassified Unlimited 20.11cu11TY CLASS (Thispagtl/

nc as~ifiPtf

22. PRICE s

NRC FORM 335 111-811}}

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