ML17194B350
| ML17194B350 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/19/1982 |
| From: | Oconnor P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LSO5-82-10-060, LSO5-82-10-60, NUDOCS 8211060599 | |
| Download: ML17194B350 (2) | |
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Docket No. \\'.[0-237 /249 LSOS-82-10-060 MEMO RAN OUM FOR:
THRU:
October 19, 1982 Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing, NRR Frank J. Miraglia, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment, Dl DISTRIBUTION Docket :'
NRC PDR Local PDR NSIC NTIS ORB Reading DCrutchfield HSmith PO' Connor RPurple JHeltemes ELJordan JMTaylor Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5, DL Regional Administrator Resid.ent Inspector FROM:
Paul W. O'Connor, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #5, Dl FMiraglia
SUBJECT:
EVALUATION OF THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF DRESDEN UNIT NOS*. 2 AND 3 DURING ONGOING EQUIPMENl '
QUALIFICATION REVIEW Our l.(Q.~tractor, the Franklin Research Center (i]fRC) completed its review of the licensee's response to our Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on -
Equipment Environm~ntal Qualification for the Dre~an Station Units 2 and 3 dated June Q~\\ 1981.
As~ result of that review, the FRC concluded that the licensee has.stated that the equipment is environmentally qualified, or has provided a t~chnically sound ratioriale or additjonal infonnat1on as a basis for justif1catfon for continued plant operation, with one exception. The exception pertains to eight temperature switches located in the re~ctor water cleanup (RWCU) room.
These switches are for steam leak detection in the RWCU.
The licensee does not claim that th&;)switches are en.vironmentally qualified, and{iil~ns to_,
replace them with environmentally qualified components.
Early in 1982 we reviewed the justification for \\t~nterifiill operation of.
Dre.sden Station Units 2 and 3. At that time we were able to conclude that the licensee had provided sufficient supplemental infonnation to support its justification for interim safe operation. A summary of our evaluation of continued q:>:]jration using the unqualified switches and our conclusion is presenteij below.
- The licensee had stated that the components in question are of relatively t"§if.!!1E1le constructi~n, and are typically designed for and utilized in
- industrial applications where the operating temperature range requirement is well 1n excess of the 2.00°F that fs required for postulated post-accident conditions.
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NRC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-335-960
Darrell October 19, 1982 The FRC concluded that, although most devices of this type are designed for operation at temperatures consistent with. the design basis event conditions. the licensee had not specified the manufacturer and model number of the device, and no evidence was provided to demonstrate that the devices have been tested and operated sucessfully under all high energy line break (HELB) conditions. The licensee also had not assessed
.the consequences of the devices failing to work.
Since the FRC evaluation, the licensee h'.§;s provided further infonnation on the devices in ques,tion.
The devices are SCAM ~odel S-51-1 temperature switches, having simple resistance-thennometer sensbrs, and designed to operate and alann at temperatures in the range o-;!00°F. This is well above the 200°F postulated post-accident conditions. The devices are placed at various locations in the room, so that they will see different temperatures at onset of an accident, and so provide diversity. They are eight-fold redundant, so that simultaneous failure of all is un*likely.
The switches provide an alarm function only, and initiate no automatic.
action. The purpose of the devices is to detect a steam leak in the RWCU and to alann. Should_ they all.nfail, radiation monitors located in the RWCU room would alann and the f&uid discharging from the leak would.
be *collected in the sump and cause a level alann to be initiated.
This infonnation supports our earlier conclusions regarding* interim safe operability of the Dresden units; and will be considered by FRC p8.Jor to issuance of its Final Technical Evalu~tion Report on Equipment Environmental Qualification at Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2.
In summary, the staff found, based on FRC's review, that the licensee had provided acceptable justfficatfon(fg'"}- interim ope,Eatfon with one exception.
The staff* has further evaluated the exception and has detennfned that the licensee has submitted appropriate additional fnfonnation and has provided suitable justification to pennft continued operat'ron. The staff concludes, therefore, that continued operation until *completion o...,f the lfcensee_'s environmental qualification program will not present'Y_ndue risk to the public health and safety.
The staff fs continuing to review the licensee's environmental qualification program. If any additional quali ffcation de ff cf encies are i dentiff ed during the progress of this revie\\i, the licensee will be requested to reverify the justification for continued oe>eratfon.
The staff will review this infonnation to ensure that continued operation until completion of the licensee's environ-mental qualification program will not present undue risk to the public health and safety.
Original signed by/
Paul W. O'Connor, Project Manager tt/tq fr Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of L icensin NRCFORM318(10-80)NRCM0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY USGPO: 1981-33a-960