ML17193B180

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Discusses Screening/Selection Criteria for Unresolved Safety Issues.Issue Screened Out If Initial Screening Criteria in SECY-80-325 Are Met.Lists Questions Issues Should Address for Consideration
ML17193B180
Person / Time
Site: Dresden 
Issue date: 11/25/1980
From: Hanrahan E
NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE)
To: Ahearne J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML17193A968 List:
References
NUDOCS 8103180958
Download: ML17193B180 (13)
v • d • e


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consideration a pro?osed revision to the definition cf an Unresolved Safety

! s s u e * ( l' S I).

0? E s t c t e d tr, c, t \\'.' h i1 e it 1n* a s no t E: s s e n t i a 1 to f o r r.,:. 11.Y c h c.:: s e the official ~efinition, it w2s im?ortant to clarify the official interc~e tation of the existir'ic defir.ition to eliliiinate a:n::.*ic:uities that result in a broader sco~e t~in ~s desirable.

~s rEq~ested by your office, OPE has explored further the screening/selection criteria for.Unresolved Safety Issues (USI's).

Screening/selection criteria, which could be app1ied as an official interpre-tation of the existing definition or new criteria cssociated with a revised definition, can be vie~ed in two parts. First, criteria should be provided to sc:een out those issues that do not sctisfy certain e1e~ents of the definition of a US!.

Secondly, criteria should be provided with regard to how issues passing the initial screening test should be addressed when presented to the Comission for approval as ne'l'i' USI's.

Our recox..;nd2tions for your further consiceration for changes in the existing screening/selection criteria are provided below.

An issue or recom~endation should be screened out from further consideration as a USI if it meets one or more of the initial screening criteria listed in SECY-80-325 (copy attached) or one of the additional criteria listed be 1 O~':

1.

The issue is related to safety improvements where existing protection is adequc.te.

2.

The issue includes prograr;r;;atic rr.2tters involving il'i1p1er;ientation of issue reso1utions already achieved.

3.

The issue includes collections of related issues in lieu of focused critical issues.

(In this regard, an attempt should be made to define the issue so that matters extraneous to the issue a;e eliminated.)

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Jirn ~ilhoan (OPE}

634-3295 2108180 Cf ~ts

(_ ~~p1i:2tion of the above initial scree~in; criteria st,J~ld result in identifi-cation of sharply foc~se~ issues where the t~si~ 2~equa:y cf the te:h~icc.1 basis for existing safety requirements is in doubt and new knowledge rnwst be deY~loped to res~lve that doubt.

Sele:tion Criteria Issues which pass the initial screening criteria and are then prese~ted to the C0~~ission for consideration as USI's sh~uld address the follo~ing c:u~stions:

1.

i:~.ct is the kno1-:n and/or p:*tential deficien:y in the technical be.sis of existing staff 5uides/req~ire~2nts?

2.

l:~.::t present safety requfrer,1ents appear to be ir.ad::quate or in doubt?

3.

i.*~.at r.e'n' kno'l';ledge_ must be developed to either confirm the adeq:.:acy of the technical bases hhich support existing require~ents or to define

~ew r~qLlire~ents that ~ould restore a~eq~ate protection?

4.

i:;..::.t e:ctior.s c.re being taken on operating ree:ctors pending develo;:i::-;ent of new kno~ledge necessary to resolve the issue?

hpplicction of Proposed Screening/Se1ection Criteria If the revised set of criteria had been applied to the original list of USI's, it does not sppear the list would have been altered significantly.

One USI -- System Interactions (A-17) --

~ould probably have required a rewrite to better focus the issue. Others wou1d have required a rewrite to answer the four proposed questions once they had passed the initial screening test.

If the revised scre~ning criteria were ap~lied to the seven candidates proposed in SECY-80-325, the following issues would probably be eliminated as USI's:

1.

Long-Term Upgrading of Training and Qualifications of Operating Personnel

2.

Operating Procedures

3.

C6ntro1 Room Design Issues of SECY-80-325 most likely to be presented to the Corrrnission as candidatei as USI's (pending answers to the proposed set of questions)

\\i.'OUl d be:

l.
  • Shutdown Decay fieat Removal Requirements 2; Seismic Qualification of Equip~ent in Operating Plants
3.

Safety Implications of Control Systems The i~sue of 11Cons.ideration of Degraded or t*~=1ted Cores in Safety Revie"toi,.S 11 presented in SECY-80-325 would most likely be revised to a more focused issue.

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~~~licc.tion of the revised set of criteri! to A~OD 2n~ ACRS ite~~ -- D.C.

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1p1ns e:nd Use of Highly Com~ustible Ge:ses in Vitc.1 Areas, Effects of High Energy Pipe 6reck on s~cll Lines, and Failure of ~o~-Q:..:e:lified Equiprn2nt in a SE: i s ~ i c Eve:-, t - -

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Certain issues were identified in SECY-eJ-325 es reqLliring further study to be~ter c'efine the sc.fety co~:Ern or to essess their signif icc.nce in order to c'e":.e:-fi.ine \\'-.'hether they shc:iuld be desi9r.c.ted as USI 's.

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7h:ise issues. ~h~. ~!~isfy (1) ~!:>ove ire ~sic!.11y.. b~:b-*/ioo~fo9; t.h!t Init~!1 Sc~c=nino Criteri~

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~ S sue or rt:i:.Oi-:l"7~~r1G~i on r.~$De;n SClc~ned cut from furthex-consiC:e:rations ~s l..n Ur,re;so1\\'ed Safety Issue if it r.r::ets one or rcre of the fo11o~dng)

  • p1ant.s~:fe~y. e.g., trc.nsport.ctfon of r~cHoact1\\'e w:teiiE.1s.
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.A *s~ff posit1on on t~ 1~sue or N:co~nd~tion has b-e-en

.(,~ve:1ooed or ccu1ci b~ de:ve1oced-~.ith'\\n 6 ronths. The

~urpose cf.this cr1ter1on is to e1i~ir.ate those ~ssues that ire ne~r r-eso1ution tnd, ther-efore, do not const1ttJte tru1y *unresoin:d* issues. Such 1ssues do not \\:c.r:r~nt the

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a VS! tnd can rzasor.ab1y be er a1r~2.cy is inc1uded in *~h; current pro;r~-::.

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The issue er re-~c:-;-;:-r.:ncaticn requires a poiicy decision rath::r than a t:::h:-.i-c~1 so1ution.

The ~urpcse cf this cdt1;rion is to e1iritin~t..e th:ise is!=ues

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In so:ne cases, the r-esu1ts of these p~1icy d~:isions r.2y requi~ cesigr.c.~io:-.

cf ~ew Unresolved Safety Issues.

S~fety Issues to be Enc1 osure *s p:-o\\'i des candidates and th~ rcsu1ts of the ini~ia1 scre:r~

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cont1nues to product:- heat (de-cay hEct) h'hich f:'lust be re;;,oved from the prfr.::.ry syste::-*.

Th:- pr1r,cij:-c.1 r..c-e:ns for rt:1,:,.,**ing this h=ot in a ortss-urized water reoctor (P~R), in the absence of a laroe loss-o~-co~lant oCCidH1t, is thrO!Jqh tl.e S~C:O.l:, ~enerators to the Secon~ary sidE: of the plant.

.C.1th-.:>u9h rr.::.ny fo:*:C\\'f:'-.e~ts to th~ stear:-1 9enHator c:J>:iliary feed~2~er s~ste~ were required by th~ h~C follo~in9 the T~l-2 accident, providing an alterne:tivc r.*=ans of heat ren:iva1 "-'Ould substantially intre2se the plants' capc.bility to deal with a ~roe:der spectru~ of tran-sients ~nd accidents ~nd po~entially could, therefore, signific~ntly reduce the ovErall risk to the public. Consequently, this Unresolved S2fety Issue 11ill fo.. *estisc.te alternative r.Eans of decay heat re;;;-.:ival in Pi.'?. plcrits, us*;nq exist.inc e~'.JiVE!'lt,,.~,ere p~55ible. This st'J:y \\;*ill consist of a ~2neric syste~s ev21uction and ~ill result in recc~en-d~tions r29:rding the desir2bi1ity of ~nd possible design requ1re~ents for e;n C! 1 t.:: rn= ti ve de-ccy he= t re2)va 1 F12th:>d (ot Ler Hien that r1ori-:-;a l ly c5sociated hith the st~:.;:-, ger.erator rnd secor1dary s_yste::-:).

This Un:-esohed Safety Issue also ~ill investi9ate the need and possible design re~uire~~nts for

  • ii-:-1~rovir19 reliobility of de:c:y :1.::z.t re::-'1Jval capeicity in b:>iling I * - "" ~ r r - - c' - rs ( t"
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SeisGic 0Ja1ification of Equip~2nt in Operatinq Plants (Task A-46)

The desiqn crit/er,\\ end methods for the seismic qualification of r..echanical and electrical equ'ip::-2nt in nuclear p:i**:er plants ~.ave undergeine siqnificant change during the course of the corr~-;-;ercial nuclear poh*er program.

Consequently, the margins of safety provided in existing equip~ent to resist sei smi ca lly induced 1 cads and perform the intended safety functions r;;:.y var_v considerably. The seismic qualification of the equip::-.ent in operating plants must, therefore, be re2ssessed to ensure the ability to brin9 the plant to ~ safe shutdown condition when subject to a seismic event.

The objettive of this Unresolved Safety Issue is to establish an explicit set of quidelines that could be used to judge the adeq~acy of t[-.e seisr:,ic qu~lificc:tion of :"!*:-::chjnir:al ;".nd elr:ctrical cquir.;;-.-;2r.t nt ;111 operat~ng plants in lieu of atte~~ting to b5ckfit current desicn criteria for new plants. This guidance will concern equipment reouired to safely shu{down the plant, as ~ell as equip~ent whose function is not required for-safe shutdo.,..*n, but \\\\'hose failure could result in cdverse conditions

\\:hich mi!'.Jht impair shutdo¥.*n functions.

$5fety Implications of Control Systems (Task A-47)

This issue concerns the ootential for accidents or transients beinq made r:1ore severe as a 1esu1t of control syste-:-;-; failures or malfunctions~

Th~se fcilu:-e:s or r..~'ifur1ctions r..ay occur ir1.:e;;t:r1der.t1y or cs a rE:su1t of the accid2nt or transient unjer consideration en~ would be i~ addition to any control syste:~ failure that mav hcve initiated the eve:nt.

~lt~~un~ it is c2~2rally believed that cohtrol syste~ fail~res are n~t li~E:lv to result in loss of safe:tv functions ~hie~ cou1d lead to serious eve:r,ts or result in c.ondit ions that safety systei'.:S are not at.1 e to cc~~ ~it~, in-depth studies have net been perfor~ed to supoort this belief. The potential for an accident that ~ould affect a ~crticular c.o~~rol sys:e~---and the effects of the control system failure~---will difft:r fro~ plant to plant. Therefore, it is not likely t~at it will b~ V':s-::.'ie to d-=velop c;enedc c.ns;:ers to th=se cc*~1:e:-ns, b'Jt rc:.1-.er p~c~.t-s"=:-:ific rev~e1.. *s \\>.'ill be re<:.u*ire::l.

The pur~.:;se of U-,~s L'r.resol\\'er1 Sbft:ty Issue is to. de:fine oeneric ciiteria that r~y be u~~d for n1ant-s~ecific reviews.

A specific subtask cf this issue will be to study U.2 s:e:c.::- ce:-.e:reitor O't'E:rfill trcnsie:r,t in Pi,~s and the r~a:*~::ir.o*.trfi11 trc.r:sier.t in E\\.'?-s to dc-temine and de:fine the need for preventive c.~d/or ~iticating design measures to acco8~)date this transient.

,j

~vdrooen Co~trol reasures and Effects of Hydroge:n 6urns on Safety f~uip;2nt (T2~~ {-(~)

Postulated reactor accidents ~hich result in e degra1ed or melted core can result in oeneratfon and re1ease to the contain~::nt of laroe ouantities of hydroqe:n.

The:

t,yjr-~9E:n is. fon:-;ed from the re-eiction of the iirconium fuel cl~dding with stea~ at hioh tem~::ratures and/or by radio1ysis of

~*r:ter.

Experience 9a*ined from the Tl-'.1-2 accide:nt indicates that ~:e r:-.cy

~ant to require mQre specific design provisions for handling laraer hydro9en releases than currently reauired by the regulations particularly for s~5ller, low pressure contain~ent designs.

This l'SI \\>'ill 'investigate r..::ans to pre-diet the qu.:ntity and release rate of hydroqen follo~ing de-graded core ac~idents and various ~eans to cope

\\:ith laroe releases to the containm::~t SJ:h as inErting of the contain~2nt or controlled burning. The potential effects of proposed hydrogen control r.r:asures on safety including the effects of hJ1droqen burns on safety related equip~ent ~ill also be investigated.

/

PAGE 1-2 3

4-7 8-9 10-11 12-15 16-18 19-20 21-22 23-24 25-26 27-29 30-31 32-33 34-36 37-40 41-42 43-44 HO..

A-3, A-1 A-2 A-4, A-7 A-8 A-9 A-10 A-11 A-12 A-17 A-24 A-36 A-39 A-40 A-43 A-44 T A B L E 0 F C 0 H T E H T S A-5 TASK Mt~AGER CHARLES BURGER STEVE HJSFORD JACK STROS~IDER CHRISTOPHER GRIMES CLIFFORD ANDERSON ASHOK THADAHI DICK SNAIDER RICHARD JOHNSON DICK SNAIDER JOHN ANGELO ANDREW JZUKIEWICZ HANK GEORGE TSUNG SU GOUTAM DAGCHI ALECK '.iERKIZ PATRICK BARAHOWSKY DESCRIPTION OVERVIEW COMPLETED USI'S WATER HAMMER ASYMMETRIC BLOWDOWH LOADS OH REACTOR PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEMS W, CE, & BW STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INTEGRITY MARK I CONTAINMENT LONG-TERM PROGRAM MARK II CONTAINMENT POOL DYNAMIC LOADS-LONG TERM PROGRAM ATWS BWR FEEDWATER NOZZLE CRACKING REACTOR VESSEL MATERIALS TOUGHNESS FRACTURE TOUGHNESS OF STEAM GENERATOR AHO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SUPPORTS SYSTEMS INTERACTION IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS HEAR SPENT FUEL DETERMINATION OF SAFETY RELIEF VALVE CSRV) POOL DYNAMIC LOADS AND TEMPERATURE LIMITS FOR BWR CONTAIHMEHTS SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA-SHORT TERM PROGRAM CONTAINMENT EMERGENCY SUMP PERFORMANCE STATION BLACKOUT

PROGRAM OVERVIEW -

PROJECTED DATES FOR ISSUING HRC STAFF REPORTS 1978 HRC AHHUAL REPO~T A-12, Steam Generator & Auqust 1979 Reactor Coolant Pump Support A-17, Systems Inter-actions A-24, Qualifications of Class IE Safety-Related Equipment A-39, SRV Pool Dynamic Loads A-40, Seismic Desiqn Criteri<'

A-43, Conti'linment Emerqency Sump Performance?

A-44, Station Dlackout

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Phase I - September 1979 Phase II - September 1980 Phase I-Cinterim position) 197?

Phase II - H/S October 1979 Phase I -

1979 Phase II -

1981 JANUARY 11, 1980

--~fl~Q~U A l\\~O~O~K~-

CURRENT Complete-Hovc:-mber 14, May 15, 1981 1979 Pha SP. I-April 15, 1980 Phase I - Octobl?r 15.

198 1 Phase. II-May 15, 1981 Phase II - H/S Complete-January 1980 December 15. 1980 Mark I -

Fl:'bruary 1980 Mark I -

Complete F P.bru., ry 198 0 Mark II -

March 1980 Mark II -

M;ir~h 1, 198' Mark III -

March 1980 Mark III -

May 1, 1981 Phase I-February 29, 1980 Phase II -

Ho chanqe Phase I-Frbruary 15, 198 1 Phase II -May 30, 1981 September 1983 Oclobur 1982 Meetinqs scedulC?d with [PRI i'llld Industry qroupc. in P"crml:C to resolvn use of fri'lcturr mechanics methods for sur.port qualification. NUREG-0577 i~q,,.d fp1 public comment on Nov. 14, 1979.

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Siqtiific:ant schedule dc>li!y du tti addition of. damonst:rat t 011

  • ~roRr"am for Phase I.

HUREG-0588 Issued For rublic Comment. Comment pariod endrd March 17, 1980.

Ev;ilu;il~ion of comments delayed by tem~mr~rv '"a<<11111rn*~

of task managP.r.

Task procnedinq consistrn~ wi4

'.;Cht>dule for Mi'lrk II.

D,..1.,v in recnipt of vrndor inror-mation will delay resolution for Mark :rrr. 1.;

Sump test facility ~h;ikrdown complete and tr.st i nq un cl*~ r1~;iy.

Trchnical Assist~nce Con~r;ic~s with ORNL illld Sandi;i h;ivr bec>n issued.

PROGRAM OVERVIEW -

PROJECTED DATES FOR ISSUING NRC STAFF REPORTS 1978 NRC ANNUAL REPORT Water Hammer 1980 Asymmetric Blowdown Early 1979 Loads A-4,A :m Generator Tube 1i:egr i ty Mark I Lonq Term Proqrc:im Mc:irk II Progrc:ims ATWS DWR Nozzle Crc:ickinq Early 1980 October 197 9 October 1980 Recommendations to the Commission in Early 1979 Lc:ite 1979

, Reactor Vessel July 1979 Materic:ils Toughness JANUARY 11, 1980 AQUA BOOK Auqust 1981 Januc:iry 30, 1980 May 30, 1980 Februc:iry 29, 1980

(.,..,.....

lPP*C-'1>-Jan;**-30.--1-980 LTPC2>-Jc:in. 30, 1981 December 1, 1980 February 29, 1980 December 31, 1980 Key:

CURRENT November 15, 198 1 December 15, 1980 February 28, 1981 December 31, 1980

-l-PP-<*h:...'D.e'c{'.'mbr!r-* 1-; *-* 1 '18 O LTPC2)-Mc:irch 30, 1981 June 1, 1981 February 6, 1981 December 31, 1980

( 1) LPP -

Le;id Pl<int PrC'qr;im (2) LTP -

Lonq Term Proqram HIS -

Not Scheduled REMARKS Proqr~m delayed due to reassiqnment of reviewers.

Delay in review c:ind concurrence on Staff NUREG Report.

ImplRmentation proceedinq in parallel with report completion.

Draft NUREG report issued for internal comment.

The Mark I Acceptance Criteria 1-1ere issued on Octobr!r 29, 197 9.

NUREG-0661 with technical resolution was issued in July 1980. Supplement to address results of confirmation t~sl:in~ l:o be issued OecembP.r 31, 1980.

Supplement 1 to NUREG-0487 issu1H.l in Auqust 1980.

Rev. 3 to the A8 Action Plan issued July 1980.

On Sr:!ptember 4, 1980, the staff ~ubmitted an ATWS policy p;iper for Commission consider;J\\:ion. The policy paper proposes a rule to resolve the ATWS issue.

NUREG-0619 issued f~r public l:Om111l!nt on Aµril 30, 1980.

Nr:!w contract with ORNL underway and proqram on current schedule.

DATE COMPLETEO A-6 MARK I SHORT TERM PROGRAM DEC. 1977 A-7 MARK I LONG TERM PROGRAM JULY 1980 A REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE TRANSIENT PRtiECTION A RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS A CONTROL OF llEAVY LOADS NEAR SPENT FUEL A PIPE CRACKS IN BOILING WATER REACTORS SEPT. 1978 1978 JULY 1980 JULY 1980 COMPLETED USI'S

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1..* 1,.1... 11 11*'*:.....,, **. " l REPORTS PUBLISHED NUREG 0408 NUREG-066'.

NUREG-022'*

NO FORMAL REPORT SRP 5.4.7 REVISION NUREG-0612 NUREG-0313 REV. 1 IMPLEMENTATION STATUS COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN INITIATED VOLUNTARILY BY AFFECTED UTILITIES.

COMMISSION HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE ISSUAllCE OF IMPLEMENTATIOH ORDERS BY SECY 80-359, 359A, 359B.

COMPLETE RRRC APPROVED IMPLE-MENTATION PLAN JANUARY 31, 1978 IMPLEMENTATION IHITIA!~D ON FIVE OPERATING PLANTS.

LETTERS INITIATIHG IMPLE-MENTATION ON REMAINING OPERATING REACTORS WILL BE ISSUED IN NEAR FUTURE AH IMPLEMENTATION LETTER IS BEING PREPARED TO SEllD TO EACH BWR APPLICANT AND LICENSEE.

REMARK~

IMPLEMEH11 OPERATIHC NOT COMPl.c IMPLEMENT f'OR COMPL,

DATE COMPLETED MARK I SHORT TERM PROGRAM DEC. 1977 MARK I LONG TERM PROGRAM JULY 1980 REACTOR VESSEL PRESSURE SEPT. 1978 TRANSIENT PRGiECTlON RE'.>IDUAL HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS CONTROL OF llEf\\VY LOADS NEAR SPENT FUEL PIPE CRACKS IN BOILING WATER REACTORS 1978 JULY 1980 JULY 1980

. I/. '*',

COMPLETED USI'S I **f "

111 *"

REPORTS PUBLISHED NUREG 0408 NUf\\:EG-0661 NURl:G-0224 NO FORMAL REPORT SRP 5.4.7 REVISION NUREG-0612 NUREG-0313 REV. 1 IMPLEMENTATION STATU5 COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATlON HAS OEEN INITIAlED VOLUNTARILY BY AFFECTED UTILITIES.

COMMISSION llAS OEEN REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION ORDERS OY SECY 80-359, 359A, 3598.

COMPLETE RRRC APPROVED IMPLE-MENTATION PLAN JANUARY 3 I, 1978 IMPLEMENTATION INITIAT~D ON FIVE OPERATING PLANTS.

LETTERS INITIATitlG IMPLE-MENTATION ON REMAINING OPERATING REACTORS WILL DE ISSUED IN HEAR FUTURE AN IMPLEMEllTATION LETTER IS OEING PREPARED TO SEND TO EACH BWR APPLICANT AND LICENSEE.

REMARKS IMPLEMENTATION FOR OPERATING REACTORS NOT COMPLETE I 1" v'

IMPLEMENT~TION SCHEDULED FOR COMPLETION MID-1983 f

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