ML17192A693

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Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-19,DPR-25,DPR-29 & DPR-30,deleting Requirement to Maintain at Least Three Counts Per Second on Each Source Range Monitor When Only Two Fuel Assemblies Are in Quadrant.Class I & III Fees Encl
ML17192A693
Person / Time
Site: Dresden, Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/15/1980
From: Peoples D
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17192A694 List:
References
NUDOCS 8005200603
Download: ML17192A693 (16)
v • d • e


Text

CommonwAh Edison One First Natio~iaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 8 0 06 2 0 0 6 0 9 Chicago, Illinois 60690 i 15,' 1980 May.

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 Quad Cities Station Units l and 2

  • Proposed Amendment to App~ndix A, Technical Specifications, to
  • change SRM Couht R~te Requirements NRC-Dodket .Nos. 50-237/249 and 50~254/265 ..... ' ... ' '

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to 10' CFR 50.59, Commonwealth Edi.son Co .. proposes to* amend Appen.dix A, Technical Specifications, to Facility Operating Licenses DPR-19,* 25, 29, and 30. for d~esden Units 2 and 3 and *Quad Cities Units l .and 2, respectively. The proposed amendments would

  • delete the requirement to m~intain at-least three (3) counts per*

second (CPS) on each source range mon~tor (SRM) when there. are no more than two (2). fuel"assemblies in a quadrant and they are positioned *~djacent td the ~R~ in that* quadrant ..

The .Gener~l Electric Co. has provided information for the*

Dresden 2/3 and Quad Cities l/2*cores.which st~tes that for all f~el types .in use, a minim~m of nine *(9) uncontrolled fuel assemblies in a 3x3 array would be required to reach *criticality. The basis for requirihg a minimum of 3 CPS on 'the.SRMis whenever core alterations are being performed is to ensure that the neutron flux is being monitored.whenever c~iticality is possible. This basis is satisfied.

by the prbposed Technical Specifications by allowing less than 3 CPS on any SRM only* when two or less fuel assemblies are in that quadrant, and those assemblies are adjacent to the SRM to ensure monitoring. This would allow .all SRM's to have less thaQ 3 CPS only

.i.f eight or less assemblies are in the core (2 per quadrant) and they are adjacent to the SRM's, which cannot provide a critical configuration~* Based on the above, the proposed amendments do not provide a significant hazard to the health and safety of*the public.

These proposed amendment~ .have received On-Site and Off-Site review and approval. Enclosures 1, 2, 3 and 4 contain the proposed revised pages for Dresden 2, Dresden 3, Quad Cities 1, and Quad Ci ties 2, respectively. \\<P~~lt~

n-oo j-;)..0060 ~ u~~b\iOO.

  • l5

Commonwealth Edison Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation May 15, 1980 Page 2 Pursuant to 10 CFR 170, Commonwealth Edison Co. has reviewed the proposed changes and ctetermined them to be two Class III and two Class I Amendments. As such, a fee remittance in the amount of $8,800.00 is provided.

Please address any questions you may have concerning this matter to this office.

Three (3) signed originals and fifty-seven (57) copies of this transmittal are provided for your use.

Very truly yours,

!i't~

D. L. Peoples Director of Nuclear Licensing Enclosure day 1980

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.Enclosure l Dresden Station Unit 2 Proposed Technical Specification ChanQeS Revised Pages: 151 152, 153 j.

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DPR-19 3.10 J.l:'.llTll'G CO;\TIITION FOR OPEHATION 4 .10 H FFU!~T.T'.'G Applicability: Applicability:

Applies to fuel handling and core reactivity Applies to the periodic tcstin~ of those interlocks limitations.

  • a:~d i:;slruments used cluri1~r; refueling.

Objective: Objective:

To assure core reactivity is within capability of To. verify th*.: opcrabilit:,- of in~.~-:.*\.:mc!ltz.tion a?1c!

t;1c ~c~trol rc~ls and to prevent criticality dur~:'lg interlocks used in refueling.

refueling.

Sj)Cdfic:it ion: S;X'cific:it ion:

A. Rc*fucling Inter~ocks A. Hcfacli!1g Interlocks.

The re~ctor mode switch shall be locked in Prio:- to :lny fo('l ha:xllir:g, wi~~1 t'.c ~0::;.d off the "Refuel" position.during core a.Iterations the rc:i.c!:or \*esscl, t'.1c ri:-focling ir.tcrloci:s and the rcft:cling interlocks sh:ill be opcrahle sho.11 he fu:1ctionally tested. Th!'y .sh::i.11 ::i.~sG e~:ccpl as specified in S[Y~eifications 3 .10. D he tc~t~*rJ at wc~:kl_\* frt':'rai~ u~~*rc::ft~r c::1U and 3 .10. E. no ln::~c r r'-~<i'-t! i*,_*d 2-~:d fo; l*~\*.*i::~ ~:'\ !*crai r

,,*or~: :l~:sociat*~d with lhc intc-:-}o(;;..s.

B. Co,rc ?-.ionitoring Il. Core  ;,tonitorin~

  • Dtl~*in~ core :i.ltcratians two Si1:\1 !s s~all be P!*ior to rn~ki:-.~ an~; altcr:1::tio:1~ to the core opcral)lc. one in the core quadi*ant where the ~!Di 1 s sh:.dl be: ft1:1c:tio:1ally tested a!l*.1 fud 01* cantrol rods arc be!n; movccl :incl one chcck<'.d for* :~0::i.~*on rL'":'":r:'J~ . . :;e . .'fiv~rc:!.ft':':-.

in an adjacent quadrant. For aa SIC\i to be foe SiC\I's w:~l i:iecht:~:,!:*( 1bih* .

for rc;S'm:~se.

  • I consiclerec! operable. the following conditions shall .he satisfied:
  • except when the conditions of 3.10.B.2.a an:3 3,10.B.2.b are met.

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3. !0 LDaTl:-.:G CO:\DiTIO~ FOH OPERATIC:\ ~. 10 Sl'.R\'EILLA:\CE REQl'.IR..E~tE ~T
1. T:~~ 5!1~1 s~:dl be ir:scr~cd to the r.orr.::il O ,*,,r.:;.*;-"'
J- *'**;:, ln*;el * (t:sc of s~cial

~ 1-- rno*.-c:::.olc.

ci*..::1'..:i:--.:::; type 1..ic~ccto;:s ciurir.~ i~iti:il f:.:cl .

fo:.<li~g- ::r.J r:i:tjor core ai~crations in place 0f ~:J=-1~*.al d~tcctors o.rc fY..!rmissiblc o.s lo~~ :ls the dc~cctor is co:-1:icctccl ir..~o li:c *

~".".rn~:il S~'.\1 circuit.) *

2. The SR-1 or dunking type detector shall have a r.iinir.un of 3 cps with all rods fully inserted in the oore except when both of the followirig corditions are fulfilled: ~ c**

a) !lo rrore than boo fuel assemblies are present in the core quadrant associated with the SR"I.

r. --

b) t!iilt in core, these fuel assemblies are in locations adjacent. .to the s~.

C. F:.:d Stor:l~C f'ool \V~tcr Li::\*cl

  • c. Fuel Stor:i.gc Pool Water Lc\*cl

\',"hcn~*.-cr i:-radiatcd fuci is stored in th~ fuel Wht::?!lcver irradiated focl is stored in t~e s~r,:*:!;c !JO':>!, the pool w:-.~cr !cyel shall be r.i~i~::ii;:c~ :it a level oi 3:; feet.

fuel stor::i~e poor. the pool lcYcl shall be rccorc:!cd dai!:,*. -

D. Cci'.troi nod and Control Rod Dri\*c

,ia::. :cr*a."lcc D. Control Rod Dri\*c and Control Rod Drive

)I aink:i;:nce

  • A l!'.axinun of o.o ~adjacent cootrol rods separated l:7j 11Dre than two control cells in ;my direction, may t.c withdrawn frCi!l the core for the p.irpose of per-fcr:ning control rod and/or control rod drive maintenance pcOITided the following oo:-di tions ace satisfied:
1. The rc:ictor mode switch shall be locked 1. This surveillance requirement ls the same ir. the re-fuel" position. The re-fueling as given in 4 .10.A.

i;~:l"rlock which prevents more than one C:)nlrol red from bcir.:; withdrawn may be b::p;isscd for 0:-?C of the cor.trol recs on. *.

'"hi ch ma.i;::cn:incc is bcin~ J><'rformcd.

.11 oti:(;r rc-fut.'lin~ interlocks ~hJ.11 b*::!'

oj)cral>le.

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.Bases: DF.>R-19. * ..............* .-

A. Refueling Interlocks . excursion or a critical configuration, thus adequate margin is provided.

During refueling operations, the reactivity potential of the core .is being altered *. It .. B. Core Monitoring is necessary to require certain interlocks and restrict certain refueling procedures such The SRM's are provided to monitor the core that there is assurance that inadvertent during periods of station shutdown and to criticality does not occur. guide the operator during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable To minimize the possibility of loading fuel SRM's in or adjacent to any core quadrant into a cell containing no co11trol rod, it.is where fuel. or control rods are being moved A required that all control rods ore fully assures aclequnte monitoring of that quadrant

  • inserted when fuel is being loaded into the during such alterations. Requiring a minimLUn of 3 reactor core. This requirement assures that counts per second whenever criticality is p:>ssible during refueling the refueling interlocks, * ,provides assurance that neutron flux is being as designed, will prevent inadvertent criti~ monitored. Criticality is considered to be irnp:>ssible cality. The core reactivity limitation of if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant Specifications 3.2 l,!Jnits the core alterations and if these are in 1cx::ations adjacent to the s~~

to assure that the resulting core loading In this case only, the S~\ or dunking type detector can be cont.rolled with the reactivity control count rate is permitted to be less than 3 counts system and interlocks at any t.ime during ?er second.

  • shutdown. or the foll:owing* operating _cycle.
c. Fuel Storage Pool Water Level Addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures,* To assure that there is adequate water to which are in turn backed up by refueling shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of stored in the pool, a minimum pool water the refueling platfonn. When the mode switch level is established. The mininrum water is in the "Refuel" position, interlocks level of 33 feet is established because it ~

prevent the refueling platfonn from being . would be a significant change from the nonnal moved over the core if a control rod is level (37'9") well above a level to assure withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. Likewise, adequate cooling (just above active fuel) if the refueling plat:fonn is over the core and above the level at which the GSEP action with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is is initiated (5' uncontrolled loss of level blocked by the interlocks. With the mode with level decreasing).

  • switch in the refuel position only one control rod' can.be withd~awn. ... * . D. l)Jr:i.ng certain periods. *it" is desirable * ::-:.*:: .::_ ::*:*.

to perform maintenance on two control rod.&

For a new core the dropping of a fuel assembly . and/or control rod ~rives at the same time.

into a vacant fuel location adjacent to .a.** * . This specif!cation provides assurance that*

withdrawn control. rod* does riot resuJ:t in an *. *. * *.-inadvertent c_ttiticali:ty does not occU.r. *

. . . * . ,;, (J\l'rlrisf sucfi" r.Ulint'eria~ce:: ... .. *me~*" . ~ ~

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i Enclosure 2 I' I

I Dresden Station .Unit 3 4.

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P~bposed Technical Specification Changes I 1

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. DPR-25 3.10 LI.\llTl~G C0~1JITION Fon OPERATION

3. 10 HEITELJ1\'G 4.10 HF.fl'.ET.I:'~G Applic:i.hility: Applic:ihi 1i ty:

Appli('s to fuel handling and core reactivity i'..ppli*:s to the periodic testing of those interlocks limitations.  ::u:d i:;struments used chirin~ refueling.

Ohjcc~ivc.: Objective:

To assure core r<:>activity is within capability of *.1 To verify the opcr::ihiJit:; of ins~rume!1tatio~ ancl the control rods :i.ml to prevent criticality during interlocks used in refueli!~g.

r<:>fuclfrg.

  • Spccif!cation:

A. Rdueling lnterlpcks A. llcfueling Interlocks The rc::-,ctor mode switch shall be locked in Prio:- to any fu~l nandiin;, wi~~1 t 1 _c 1-:~Jd 0~-f the "lkfud" position durir.g core alterations the rc:ic~or vessel, t:1e rcf~?cli::; i!*.tcrllx*!:s and the refueling interlocks shall be operable shall he functionally test cc!. Thr->* .shall :iiso c~:ccpt as* s)X'cified in Specifications 3. 10. D be tested at !C(*):l:: ir.tc;:,.*:d:~ th('rC;).ft~r '.::~Ll ar.d 3 . 10 . :*: . no lor~gcr r~cF1Ircd ~~~d foll-:v.*i::~ ~-~1_..- !~cr:tir work ~s::;ociat~d ,,_*ith the inlcrloc:~:s.

B .. Co_rc ?.Tonitoring Il. Core  ;\lqnitorin~

Dt:i-in~ eon' alterations two SR?.I's shall be P~*io!* to makin~ a:1:-* altcr:~::tio;is to the core opcr::i.!Jle. nnc in t~c core quadrant where the SH:'-i 's sh:..:ll he. fu!1ctio:*:alh* tc,..:t~ci a>>:!

fuel or con~rol roe.is are being movcc! an<I one I chcck<<*tl for ~~~ut:*0:1 '!*\... S~~-Y':-:t:: 'Ti1':rc:!.flc-r.

in x1 ::idjaccnt qt::ulrant. For an SIDI to be . S" t::(* . "l .oc.cr:<:c.',;~*(*

\" s wa

    • , .* . . ' <.:n1y 1 *, f or rcsr'J:1se .,

consiclcrcc! o)X'rablc. tJ1e following conditions shall be satisfied:

except when the conditions of 3.10.B.2.a and 3.10.B.2.b are met.

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DPR~25 3.10 LD:ITl~G CO~DiTIO~ FOH OPERATIC.:\ ..

1. Tl~c S!nl s~:tll be ir:~crt6d to the r.crr.-.al orcn!i:-:;; lc\'cl. (t:sc of s~cial rno*.-co.blc, c*.;:i'.-.i~~ t-.*1x- ..ictcctors ciurin~ i:iitial f:.:cl 1

k::,di~g :~.:! r:i:i.jor core ai~cratio:1S i~ place cf ~:,:-1~*.al detectors =i.rc pt.!rmissibl"c :is lo~!; :i.s the dc~cctor is connectcc! ir..to tr.c

-:~rn~al S!~'.\l circuit.)
2. nie ~I or dunking type detector shall have a r.iininlm.of,. 3 CJ:X3 with all rods fully inserted **

in the core except when both of the following corditions are fulfilled:

a) !lo rrore than two fuel assemblies are r*

present in the core quadrant associated with the S!?I.

b) t!lilt in core, these fuel asserblies are in locations adjacent to the S!f1.

C. F-.:cl Stor:i.~c Pool Wa~cr Lc\*cl C. Fuel Storage Pool Water Lc'\*cl Whcnc...-cr irradiated fuci is stored in the fuel

\\'h~ncvcr irradiated fuel is stored in the**

s~or::?;c pool. the pool *w;i.!cr kyel shall be m:-.i:~:ai:~c~ ~t a lc\"el of 33 feet.

  • focl stor=t~c *~oI, the pool lc...-el shall b~

rccorcecl dail;*.

'-iai:i:c~a."lce D. Control Rod Drh*c a.r.d Control Rod Drive l\taintcn:::.nce
  • A maxilmln of two non-adjacent control rods separated by nDre than b<<> control cells in any direction, may be wil:Mrawn frcn the core for the p.irpose of per-fcrming <DOtrol rod and/or control rod dr i 1:e mintcnance provided the following conditions are satisfied:

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1. The rc:ictor mode switch sh3ll be locked 1. This surveillance requirement is the same .

in the **re-fuel position. The re-fueling as given in 4.10.A.

i;*.tl'rlock which prevents more than one

  • c0r.t:-o! rod.from bcir.; \\0ithdrawn maybe.

L::p.isscd for one ot the control rcc!s on

:hich mai~tcna:1cc is bcin~ pc'rfort.H~d.

/.Ii otr.*::r rc-fudin~ ir.tcrlocks ~hall b*~

~;>cr=tblc. '

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Bases:

DPR-25*-

A. Refueling Interlocks excursion or.a critical configuration, thus adequate margin. is. provided.

During refueiing operations, the reactivity

  • potential of *the core is being altered *. It**., B~ Core Monitoring-is necessary to require certain interlocks and restrict certain refueling procedures such The SRM's are provided to monitor the core-*

that there is assurance that inadvertent

  • during periods of station shutdown and to criticality does not occ.tir* guide th~ operator duri.ng refueling operations .

and station startup. Requiring two operable To minimize the possibility of loading fuel SRM's in or adjacent to any core quadrant into a cell containing no control.rod, it is where fuel or control rods are being moved required that all control rods are fully "

inserted when fuel is being loaded into the assures aclequate monitoring of that quadrant 9 ..,.

during such alterations, Requiring a minimum of 3 reactor core. This raquirement assures that counts per second whenever criticality is EX>Ssible durin~ refueling the refueling interlocks, ,provides assurance that neutron flux is being as designed, will prevent inadvertent criti- . monitored. Criticality is consider.ed to be im!'.X)ssible cality. The core reactivity limitation of if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant Specifications 3.2 limits the core alterations *and if these are in* locations adjacent to the. s~.

to assure that the resulting core loading In this case only, the S~*1 or dunking type detector can be controlled with the reactivity control count rate is permitted to be less than 3 counts system and interlocks at any time during per second.

shutdown or the following operating cycle. c. Fuel Storage Pool Water Level Addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures. To. assure that there is adequate water to which are in turn backed up by refueling shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies interlocks on.rod withdrawal and movement of stored in the pool, a minirrn.Jm pool water

  • the refueling platfonn. When the mode switch level is established. The minimum water is in the "Refuel" position, interlocks *level of 33 feet is established because it prevent the refueling platform from being would be a significant change from the normal moved over the core if a control rod is level (37'9") well above a level to assure withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. Likewise, adequate cooling (just above active fuel) if the refueling platfonn is over the core and above the level at which the GSEP action with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is is initiated (5' uncontrolled loss of level blocked by the interlocks. With the mode with level decreasing).

switch in the refuel positiononly one control rod can be withdrawn. D. D.lring certain periods. It is desirable

  • .to perform maintenance on two control rods For a new core the dropping Qf a fuel assembly and/or control rod drives at the same time.

into. a 'Vacant. fuel .location adjacent to a This speci~ication provides assurance that inadvertent criticality does not occur withdrawn *control. rqd 'does not result in *.an. . ~ during 's'uch maintenance:. . . < . U.-L * ** "

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Enclosure 3 Quad Cities Station Unit l.

Proposed Technical Specification Changes Revised Pages: 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-4 j,

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. Ir OUAD CITIES t :,..., DPR-29

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"*'""'. b. Hoist overload.

c. High position limitation.

B. Core Monitoring B.. Core Monitoring During core alterations~ two SRM 's shall be Prior to any alterations to the core, t.he SRM's operable, one in the core quadrant where fuel or control rods arc bcin*g moved and one in an adjacent quadrant. For an SRM to be consid-ered operable, the following conditions shall be satisfied:

  • shall be functionally tested and chcc,kcd for neu1ron response. Thereafter. the SRM 's shall be checked daily for response, except wha~n th e co ndbitions oft. 3,10,13.2.a
  • AA 3 10
  • ,3, 2, are me ,

l I. The SRM shall be inserted to the nor-mal operating level (use or special movable, dunking type deiectors dur-ing initial fuel loading and major core alterations in place of normal de1ec- ...

ton is permissible as long as the detec-tor is connected into the proper circui-try which contains the required rod blocks).

2 *..The SR-1 or dunking type detector shall have a minirr.um of 3 cps with all rods fully in$erted in the core except when both of the following

  • conditions are fulfilled:

a) No rrore' than b.o fuel assemblies are present in th*~ core quadrant assoc:i.ltro with the SR'I, .

b) While in core, tht>se fuel asst'IT.blies are in locations c.cljacent to the S"M, C. Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C.

  • Fuel Storage Pool Water "Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel storage pool, the pool water level shall be storage pool, the pool level shall be. recorded maintained at a level of at least 33 fee~. daily.
  • Rod . Drive Malnteriance A maximum of two nonadjacent control rods separated by more than two control cells in any direction may be withdrawn from the core for ttie purpose of performing control rnJ and/or control rod. drive maintenance provided the following conditions are' satisfied: **.

I. The* reactor mode switch shall be. I. Sufficient control rods shall be with-locked "in. the Refuel *position. The re- drawn prior to performing this *main~

fueling interlock which prevents IT)Ore tenance to demonstrate with a margin than on~ control rod from being with- of0.25% Ak that the core can he made drawn may be bypassed for one or the subcritical al any . time during the *.

control rods on which maintenance is * . maintenance with the strongest opera-being performed. All other refueling . ble control rod fiilly withdrawn ;ind all interlocks shall be operable. other operable rods fully inserted.

2. Specification .3.3.A. I shall he met, or Alternately, if a minimum of eight the control rod directional control
  • control rods surrounding each control valves for a minimum or eight control rOd out or service for maintenance are rods surrounding ea<:h drive out or to be fully inserted and h<ive their

. service for n1ainu:nancc will he dis- directional control valve~ ckctrically armed ckctrically and sulfa:icnt mar- disarmed, the. 0.25% Ak margin will

Qt I AO-CITIES DPR-29 3.10

.. ll:\llTJNG CO:'l.'DITIONS

. .FOR OPERATION BASES .

. . .A. During refueling <'pcrations. the reactivity potcn11al of the wre is hcing altered. It is necdsary to r~*quirc.

  • certain intcrhu:ks :rnd re~tric_t certain n:fueling ruocedures such that there is ussuram*e that inadn*rtent edticality docs not occur. . - . -

. To minimize the possi.bility of loading fuel into a cell containing no control rod. it is required that all control rods are* fully inserted when fuel is heing loaded into the reactor core. This requirement assures that *during refueling. the refueling interlocks will prevent inadvertent criticality as designed. T~e core

  • rtac1ivi1y linutaticin of Specification .J.2 limits the core alterations 10 assure that the resulting core loading can be controlled .with the reactivity control system and interlocks at any time during shutdown or the following operating cycle. *
  • The addition oflarge amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which arc in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platfoi:m.

When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlock.s prevent the refueling platform from being moved .over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. *

  • Likewise, if the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion i_s blocked by the interlocks. Wi*h the mode switch in the Refuel position, only one control rod can be wit~drawn.

I B. - The SRM are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable SRM in or adjacent 10 any c?rc quadrant wher~ fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that quadrant dut'ing Sl;ch alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 counts per sec6nd whenever. criticality is pcmsible provides assurance that neutron flux is ~ing rronitored. Criticality is,:

- considered to :-be impossible if there are no more than t\.XJ nsscmblies in a quadrant and if these 2re in locations adjacent to the SRM. In this case only, the sr~ or dunkirig t~rpe detector. count rate is permitted to be less than 3 counts per second *

.* . C. To assure that there is adequate water to shield and cool the irrndiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool.

a minimum pool water level is estahlished. The minimum water level of 33 feet is cstahlishcd hec:ause it would he a significant change from the normal level (3 7 feel 9 inches). well a hove a level to assure adequate cooling (just a hove active fuel), and above the level at which GSEP action is initiated (5 feet uncontrolled loss of level with level decreasing). *

  • D, During certain periods, it is desirable to perform maintenance on two control rods andior control r~d drives at the sa'me time. This specification provides assurance that inadvertent c:riticality does not-occur during such maintenance. .

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  • The maintenance is performed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling

- interlocks normally availahle during refueling operations as explained in Part A of these bases. In order to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod. it is ncc:essary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one cor1trol rod from being withdrawn ai the same time. The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated with the control. rods remaining in* service ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenance. The

~ *. shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that the core is shut down even if the strongest control rod remaining in service is fully withdrawn. Disarming the directional control valves does not inhibitcbntrol rod scram capability. - -**

E. The inten.t of this specification is to permit the unloading of a significant portion ~f the reactor core for

, such purpost:s.as inscrvice inspection requirements. examination of the core support plate. ct~: Thi~

specification provides assurance that inadvertent critil*;.ility docs not occur during sud1 opl.!ratiori; -

This operation is performed wirh the mode switch *in the Refuel position to provide the refueling interlocks normally available during refueling :1s explained in the bases for Specification 3.1 O.A. In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary 10 hyp:1ss the refueling intcrlod on each withdrawn.control rod whid1 prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at a time. The requirement that the fuel assemhliei. in the cell controlll*d hy the rnntrol rod he removed from the reactor

Enclosure 4 Quad Cities Station Unit 2 .'

l Proposed Technical Specification Changes Revised Pages: 3.10/4.10-2 3.10/4.10-4 t

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QUAD CITIES DPR-30

b. Hoist overlo;;d.
c. High po~i1ion limitation.

B. Core Monitoring B.. Core Monitorin~

During core aheralions. 1wo SRM 's shall be Prior 10 any ahera1ions 10 the core, the SRM~s operable, one in 1he core quadrant where fuel

  • or tontrol rods are being moved and one in an adjacent quadrant. For an SRM to be consid-ered operable, the following conditions shall be satisfied:
  • shall be functionally te~led and checked for neutron response. Thereafter, the SRM 's shall be checked daily for response, except when the conditions of 3.lO~B.2,a*

and 3,10,B,2.b are met, I

I. The SRM shall be inserted 10 the nor-mal operating level (use of special movable, dunkir.g type detectors. dur-ing initial fuel loading and major core *.

alterations in place of normal detec-

  • tors is permissible as long as the detec-tor is. connected into the proper circui-try which contains the required rod blocks).

2 * . The SR-1 or dunking type detector shall have a minirr.um of 3 cps with all rods fully inserted in the core exc*~pt when both of* the following I '

conditions are.fulfilled:

a) No nore than two fuel assemblies are present in th~ core quadrant associated

  • with the SR.'1, b) ~/hile in core, these fuel asserr.blies are in locations c.cljace:nt to the s~.
  • .~ C. Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C. Fuel Storage Pool Water 'Level Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the fuel Whenever irradiated fuel is s1ored in the fuel 1storage pool, the pool water level shall be storage pool, the pool level shall be recorded maintained at a level of at .least 33 feet. daily.

D. Control Rod and Control Drive Maintenance D. Control Rod and Conlrol

  • Rod Drive Maintenance A ~aximum of two nonadjacent control rods separated by more than two control cells in any direction may be withdrawn from the core for the purpose of performing control rod and/or

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control rod drive .main1enance provided the following condi1ions are sa1isfied:

I. The reactor mode switch shall be 1. Sufficient con.trol rods shall be with-locked in the Ref~el position. The re- drawn prior to performing this main-fueling interlock which prevents more tenance to demonstrate with a margin than one control rod from being with- of0.25% Ak that the core can he made drawn may be by.passed for one of the subcritical at any time during tlic control rods on which maintenance is maintenance with the strongest opera-being performed~* All other refueling . ble control rod fully wi1hJrawn :ind µII

  • interlocks shall be operable. other opernblc rods fully insL*rtcJ. *
2. Specification* 3.3.A. I shall be met, or Alternately, if a minimum of eight the control rod direc1ional control control rods surrounding each control valves for a minimum of eight con1rol rod out of service formain1cnance are rods surrounding each drive out of to be fully inserted and have their scrvic;e for mainrcnance will be dis- directional contr_ol valves clcc1rically armed electrically and sufficient mar- disarmed, the 0.25% Ak margin will

......-* * ...:ai.;..._ . . ............. --

QllAD-CITIF.S DPR-30

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3.10 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION BASES

  • A. During refueling operations. the reaciivity potential of the core is being allered. It is necessary to n*quire certain intcrlm:ks and restrict certain refueling pwcedures such that there is assurance that in:tlfrertcnt
  • criticality does not occur. *
  • To minimize the possi.bility ofloading fuelinto a cell conl:1ining no control rod. it is required th.,t. all I

control rods are fully inserted when fuel is being 1.oaded into the reactor core. This requirement :issures I that *during refueling. the refueling interlocks will prevent inadvertent criticality as designed. The core J reactivity limitation ofSpecifkation 3.2 limits the core alterations to assure that the resulting core loading l can be controlled with the reactivity control system and interlocks at any time during shutdo"'.n.Qr the I

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following operating cycle. * *

  • The. addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedur~s. which are I*

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Ii in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refueling platform.

When the mode switch is in the Refuel position, interlocks prevent the refueling platform from being moved over the core. if a control .rod is ~ithdrawn and fuel is on a hoist. * **

. Likewise, if the refueling platform is over the core with fuel on a hoist, control rod motion is bloCked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the Refuel position, only one control rod can be withdrawn.

8.. *The SRM are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the operator I during refueling operations and station startup. Requiring two operable SRM in or adjacent to any <ore I quadrant where fuel or control rods are being moved assures adequate monitoring of that. quadrant during such alterations. Requiring a minimum of 3 c:Ounts per sec0nd whenever criticality is p:>ssible provides assurance that neutron flux is f:'.eing rronitored. Criticality is *

.*j considered to be impossible if there are no more than two assemblies in a quadrant a.nd if these are in locations adjacent to the SR!ll. In this case only, the S' or dunl<ing type

  • detector count rat'e is permitted to be .less than .3 counts per second.

C. To assure that there is adequate water to shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool.

a minimum pool water level is established. The minimum water level of 33 feet is established because it would be a significant change from the normal level (37 feet 9 inches). well above a level to assure adequate cooling (ju~t above active *fuel), and above the level at which GSEP action is initiated ( 5 feet unc.ontrolled loss of level with level decreasing). *

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  • D. : During certain periods, it is desirable to perform maintenance on two control rods and/or control rod drives at the same time. This specification provides assurance that inadvertent criticality does not *occur during such maintenance.

the maintenance is performed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling

  • interlocks normally available during refueling operations as explained in Part A of th~se bases. In order

.1 to withdraw a second control rod after withdrawal of the first rod. it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod which prevents more than one control rod from being withdrawn at the same time. The requirement that an adequate shutdown margin be demonstrated with the control rods remaining in service ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this maintenance. The

  • shutdown margin is verified by demonstrating that the core is shut down even if the strongest control rod remaining in service is folly withdrawn. Disarming the directional control valves does not inhibit control rod scram capability. :
  • E. The intent of this specification is to permit the unloading of a significant portion of the reactor core for such purposes as inservice inspection requirements. examination of the core support plate. etc. This specification provides*assurance that inadvertent <:riticality does not occur during sud1 operation ..

. This operation is per:formed with the mode switch in the Refuel position to provide the refueling

~ interlocks normally available during refueling as explained in the bases for Specification 3.10.A. In order U. *to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to byp;1ss the refueling interlock on each withdrawn"c:ontrol rod which prevents more 1han one control rod from being withdrawn at a time. The requirement that the fuel assemblies in the cell con1rolled by the control rod be removed from the reactor

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