ML17191A877
| ML17191A877 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1998 |
| From: | Travers W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Kingsley O COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17191A878 | List: |
| References | |
| 3-96-036, 3-96-036S, 3-96-36, 3-96-36S, IA-96-493, NUDOCS 9809240048 | |
| Download: ML17191A877 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2051111 0001 EA 96-493 Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley President, Nuclear Generation Group Commonwealth Edison Company A TIN: Regulatory Services Executive Towe rs West Ill 1400 Opus Place, Suite 500 Downers Grove, IL 60615
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION September 18, 1998 (NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 3-96-036 AND 3-96-036(S))
Pear Mr. Kingsley:
This refers to the June 29, 1996 compromise of the NRC operator licensing examination, which was scheduled to be administered at the Commonwealth Edison Company's (ComEd) Dresden Station on July 8, 1996. On July 1, 1996, Com Ed representatives notified the NRC that a copy of the NRC examination had been found in a photocopy machine at the Dresden Station.
Based on this notification, the NRC examination was canceled and the NRC Office of Investigations (01) initiated an investigation into the matter. The investigation led to the criminal convictions of two former ComEd employees for their willful activities that compromi~ed the integrity of the NRC operator licensing examination. At the time these two former ComEd employees willfully compromised the integrity of the NRC examination, they were also applicants for NRC operator's licenses. Pertinent information developed by 01 during the. *.
investigation was provided to ComEd by letters dated June 9 and July 1; 1998, and an open predecisional enforcement conference with ComEd regarding the matter was conducted in the NRC Region Ill office on July 7, 1998.
Based on the findings of an 01 investigation, on June 29, 1996, two former ComEd employees, who were also applicants for NRC operator's licenses, compromised the integrity of an NRC operator licensing examination. The two former employees entered the unlocked Dresden Station licensing instructors' office on June 29, 1996, to look for their student performance a!1d progress evaluations. According to the former employees, ComEd licensing instructors maintained old examination questions and in-plant job performance measures in the instructors' office, and it was common knowledge among applicants that the keys to the locked desks and filing cabinets in the instructors' office were kept in a secretary's desk. After entering the unlocked instructors' office, the two former employees obtained the keys to one of the licensing instructors' desks and began searching through the instructor's files. While searching through
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these files, the two former employees discovered the NRC operator licensing examination, which was scheduled to be administered at ComEd's Dresden Station on July 8, 1996. One former employee made photocopies of the NRC examination questions while the second former employee stood at the window to watch for anyone entering the training building. On June 30, 1996, one of the two former employees returned to the instructors' office and made additional -r -=..
copies of the NRC examination questions for his. personal use, and he left the instructors' office-*** -
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2 without realizing that he had left several photocopies of NRC examination questions in the photocopier sorting bin. The examination compromise was identified by a ComEd licensing instructor on July 1, 1996, and reported to the NRC. The NRC operator licensing examination was in the ComEd licensing instructor's desk because it had been given to the licensing
- instructor for review and storage on June 28, 1996. The 01 investigation into this matter further determined that on June 30, 1996, one of the two former Com Ed employees also found reactor simulator alarm printouts related to the NRC examination in a trash receptacle.
Based on the information obtained during the 01 investigation and the information presented by ComEd at the enforcement conference, the NRC has determined a violation of NRC requirements has occurred. The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice).
The causes of the violation are rooted in practices associated with the control of examination materials and the lack of personal integrity of the individuals involved. The NRC notes that the control of examination materials at the time of the violation was neither rigorous nor adequate to prevent premature disclosure of sensitive test material. Furthermore, it is noted that personal integrity among employees at an NRG-licensed facility is absolutely essential to the safe operation of the facility and to protection of public health and safety. This was not the case for two of the individuals involved in this matter, and the willful activities of these two individuals caused Com Ed to be in violation of 1 O CFR 55.49, which prohibits license applicants and facility licensees from engaging in any activity that compromises the integrity of an NRC operator licensing examination.
As discussed at the enforcement conference, the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, Rev.1, does not specifically provide a severity level categorization example for this violation. Ther:efore, the major considerations used in assessing the severity levelforthis violation were the lack of examination security, the willful nature of the violation, and the potential for adverse impact upon the operation of the Dresden Nuclear Station and upon public health and safety. In this case, two applicants were within several days of taking their licensing examination when they obtained copies of the NRC examination materials. Had these applicants used these materials to prepare for the NRC examination, the individuals could have been granted an operator's license without successfully demonstrating t~at the subject matter was actually learned.
Accordingly, the NRC considers this violation to be of safety significance, and has categorized the violation at Severity Level Ill.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 was considered for a Severity Level 111 violation occurring on June 29, 1996. Because the Dresden Station was the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the two years prior to this.
violation, 1 the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the Civil penalty assessment process in Section Vl.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit for the Identification factor was warranted because Com Ed A Notice of Violation categorized at Severity Level Ill and a $50,000 civil penalty were issued on June 13, 1996, concerning the failure, from 1991 to March 1996, to promptly identify and correct known deficiencies in structural steel located in the corner rooms for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection system of Units 2 and 3 (EA 96-115).