ML17188A115
| ML17188A115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17188A113 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-98-05, 50-237-98-5, 50-249-98-05, 50-249-98-5, NUDOCS 9803310094 | |
| Download: ML17188A115 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000237/1998005
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
Report Nos:
Licensee:
Facility:
- Location:
Dates:
Inspectors:
Approved by:
9803310094 980326
ADOCK 05000237
G
REGION Ill
50-237; 50-249
50-237 /98005(DRS ); 50-249/98005(DRS)
Commonwealth Edison (ComEd)
Dresden Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
6500 N. Dresden Road *
Morris, IL 60450
Febn.-!ary 9 - March 3, 1998
R. Bailey, Reactor Inspector
J. Ellis, Reactor Inspector (in training)
M. N. Leach, Chief, Operator Licensing Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dresden Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
NRC Inspection Reports 50-237/98005; 50-249/98005
This inspection report contains the findings and conclusions from the inspection of the licensed
reactor operator (RO) and senior reactor operator (SRO) requalification training programs. The
inspection included a review of training administrative procedures and operating examination
material; observation and evaluation of operator performance and licensee evaluators during a
requalification operating examination; an assessment of simulator fidelity; an evaluation of
program controls to assure a systems approach to training; and a review of requalification
training records. In addition, the inspectors observed a period of control room operations. The
inspectors used the guidance in inspection procedures (IP) 71001 and 71707.
Operations
The inspectors concluded that licensed operators discharged their duties in an efficient
and professional manner. The control room operators were very attentive to the control
panel indications and promptly communicated any abnormalities. The control room
decorum was businesslike. (Section 01.1)
In general, the licensed operator continuing training program was implemented in
accordance with program guidance and met the regulatory requirements. (Section 05)
The inspectors identified a violation in which procedures addressing the operations of a
safeguards diesel generator were lacking appropriate guidance and the level of detail
among related procedures were not consistent. (Section 03.1)
The inspectors identified a violation in which documentation of medical qualification data
- and test results for an operator performing the function of a licensed operator was not
maintained or made available for NRC review upon request. (Section 05.6)
2
Report Details
I. Operations
01
Conduct of Operations .
01.1
Control Room Observations
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors observed routine control room activities and a shift turnover during the
inspection week, performed a dual unit panel walk-down, reviewed control room logs,
and questioned operators about plant and equipment status.
b.
Observations and Findings
Control room operators were noted to be monitoring control room indications
methodically and often. Control room operator demeanor was professional and
communications were clear and concise. The control room operators were especially
vigilant during a pre-job brief to review operator responsibilities and discuss safety
measures for a control rod exercise. This was reinforced during the execution of the
control rod alignment evolution. Access to the control room was properly controlled by
the control room supervisor which resulted in a quiet, businesslike environment in the
control room.
c.
- Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that licensed operators discharged their duties in an efficient
and professional manner. The control room operators were very attentive to the control
panel indications and promptly communicated any abnormalities. The control room
decorum was businesslike.
03
Operations Procedures and Documentation
03.1
Procedure Review - Diesel Generator Operations
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operating procedures relating to the startup,
shutdown, and testing of the safeguards emergency diesel generators. The following
procedures were referenced:
DOP 6500-09, Bus 24-1 to Bus 34-1 Tie Breaker Operation Utilizing U2(3) DIG,
Revision 07
DOP 6600-02, Diesel Generator 2(3) Startup, Revision 16
3
DOP 6600-03, Diesel Generator 2(3) Shutdown, Revision 11
DOS 6600-01, Diesel *Generator Surveillance Tests, Revision 55
DOS 6600-12, Diesel Generator Tests - Endurance and Margin/Full Load
Rejection/ECCS Fast Start, Revision 12
OAP 07-50, "Conduct of Safe Operations," Revision 01, January 04, 1998
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed four licensed operators during the performance of two
evaluated job performance tasks on the plant specific simulator. The first task directed
an operator to start the Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator (D/G) and adjust the speed and
voltage in accordance with surveillance procedure DOS 6600-01. The second task,
which was performed by a different licensed operator, directed an operator to load the
Unit 2/3 DIG on to Bus 23-1 in accordance with surveillance procedure DOS 6600-01.
The inspectors noted during the performance of the first task that the licensed operators
had difficulty in obtaining the precise values of 60 Hertz and 4160 Volts which was
required by procedure to place the synchroscope in service. Section 12.2.3 of OAP 07-
50, stated, in part, that operations procedures were to be adhered to and complied with
.
.
for a given operation or task. The inspectors noted that the installed meters lacked
precise measurement capability and the governor control response was imprecise. A
review of surveillance procedure DOS 6600-01 and the vendor's manual revealed the
following deficiencies:
(1)
Step 1.12.a. and b. of DOS 6600-01, Procedure section, directed the operator to
adjust D/G speed to 60 Hertz and voltage to 4160 Volts and referenced the
Technical Specification (TS).4.9.A.2.c. surveillance requirements. TS 4.9.A.2.c
stated, in part, that generator voltage and frequency would be verified to be 4160
+/- 420 volts and 60 +/- 1.2 Hz once the diesel's synchronous speed was obtained.
While the TS allowed for instrumentation error, the procedure required a precise
setting which was difficult to obtain at best.
(2)
GM Electro-Motive Stationary Power operating manual for the AB20 Generators,
3rd Edition, July 1979, was reviewed for consistency. The inspectors noted that
the vendor's manual recommended the following sequence of actions prior to
loading the DIG: set the voltage regulator to on, adjust bus and generator
voltages until matched, adjust bus and generator frequency until matched, then
turn on the synchroscope. The licensee acknowledged that the vendor
recommended actions were good industry practices to prevent a high transient
current or reverse power trip during synchronizing operation, but felt that the
guidance provided in Step 1.12.a. and b. was adequate.
The inspectors noted during the performance of the second task that one operator
immediately loaded the DIG to approximately 200 KW following closure of the output
4
breaker and just before placing the synchroscope to off. When questioned, the operator
- stated a need to load the DIG in order tq prevent a reverse power trip condition. Further
. questioning revealed that the operator had been previously trained to take such an
action. However, the inspectors were unable to substantiate the claim that DIG
operations training had been provided to support the greater action taken. The
inspectors determined that the operator's action was consistent with industry practices
observed at other facilities.
A review of procedure DOS 6600-01 and other operating procedures revealed the
following differences:
(1)
(2)
Step 1.12.c of DOS 6600-01, Procedure section, directed the operator to perform
the following steps in sequence: turn the synchroscope on, adjust the DIG
voltage and governor controls until synchronized with the 4 Kv system, close the
DIG output breaker, turn the synchroscope off, and raise the DIG load to 2470 to
2600 KW.
- Step 1.5 of DOS 6600-12, Procedure section, substeps d through k, contained
operator actions to load a DIG on to the appropriate bus (similar to DOS 6600-
01 ). The inspectors noted that the procedure's format was not consistent with
. other procedures reviewed. Additionally, the inspectors noted that substep j
contained the operator action to load the DIG to an indicated 2470 to 2600 KW
while monitoring DIG parameters such as voltage (4160 +/- 420) and frequency
(60 +/- 1.2). The inspectors determined that the requirement to monitor voltage
and frequency while loading the DIG was unique to this procedure.
The inspectors continued the review of related DIG procedures which addressed loading
revealed the following deficiencies:
(1)
- Step E. 7 of DOP 6600-02, Precaution section, stated that a failure to set droop
to 5, voltage to 4160 Volts and frequency to 61 Hertz may prevent the DIG from
coming up to speed and voltage in the event of an AUTO START. The
inspectors noted that the frequency setting specified was not conservative or
consistent with the 60 Hertz setting noted in other DIG operating procedures and
the requirements specified in TS 4.9.A.2.c.
(2) * * Step G.2 of DOP 6600-02, Procedure section, stated that at Panel 902(3)-8,
observe Diesel red RUN light and Volt, AC Ampere, and Kilowatt meters. The
inspectors noted that the precautions and limitations section did not contain any
acceptance criteria and no where else in the procedure was a quantitative
reference found. Indication of improper DIG operation would require operator
understanding or skill of the craft which was .not emphasized during the previous
requalification training biennial cycle.
(3)
Step G.1.g of DOP 6500-09, Procedure section, stated, in part, to unload the
Unit 2 DIG AND open DIG 2 to Bus 24-1 Automatic Control Breaker (ACB}, then
5
shutdown the Unit 2 DIG per 6600-03. However, Step G.1 through G.3 of DOP
6600-03, Procedure section, directed an operator to reduce DIG load to zero
whrle regulating voltage, THEN open the Unit 2 DIG to Bus 24-1 ACB. In a
review of the GM Electro-Motive Stationary Power operating manual for the
AB20 Generators, 3rd Edition, July 1979, the inspectors noted that the vendor's
manual recommended the following sequence of actions to remove generator
load: decrease the load while monitoring the wattmeter and ammeter readings
until both indicated approximately zero, then trip open the main circuit breaker
and set the voltage regulator to off position. The licensee was made.aware of
the procedure discrepancy in August 1997 following completion of a licensed
operator initial examination (Inspection Report No. 50-2371249:97304(DRS)).
Licensed operator candidates' performance during the use of DOP 6500-09 was
diverse and resulted in more than one unanticipated reverse power trip of the
Unit 2 DIG. The inspectors were not made aware of any planned revision or
change to the above procedures at the time of thjs inspection.
Technical Specification 6.8.A required that written procedures be established,
implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. TS 6.8.A applied to
emergency diesel generator procedures DOP 6500-09 and DOP 6600-02. The failure to
maintain adequate procedural guidance addressing the loading and unloading evolution
for a safeguards diesel generator was a violation of Tech Spec 6.8.A
(VIO 50-2371249:98005-01 ) ...
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded .that the licensee's procedural guidance for loading and
unloading the diesel generators was not being implemented consistently and deviated
from accepted industry practices. Also, the inspectors determined that current
procedural guidance was inadequate to prevent a high current transient event or an
unplanned reverse power trip under all conditions. The failure to maintain adequate
procedural guidance addressing the operation of a safeguards diesel generator was a
violation of regulatory requirements.
6
05
Operator Training and Qualification
05.1
Operating History
a.
Inspection Sc6pe (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the Dresden Generating Station's operating history from
January 1997.to January 1998 to determine if any operator errors occurred that could be
attributed to ineffective or inadequate training. That review included the following:
Past NRC inspection reports
Most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP-15) report
Selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs).
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors noted several events related to personnel error and design/installation
deficiencies. Recognized operator knowledge weaknesses and performance
deficiencies were addressed in licensed operator requalification training. Safety related
limiting conditions for operations were also included in the requalification training*
. program as they related to the recent change to standardized technical specifications.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensed operator requalification training program had
provided operators with lessons learned and presented training on significant industry
events.
05.2
Requalification Examinations
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed the training department's sample plan and compared that with
the written examinations and operating tests administered during the inspection period.
A review of previously administered written examinations and operating tests was also
done to verify compliance with program guidance.
TDl-523, "Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Examinations," Revision 02,
February 1996
b.
Observations and Findings
Training instruction TDl-523 was used to evaluate the examination material used during
the annual requalification evaluation period. The inspectors made the following
observations:
7
(1)
The written exam material, which consisted of a Section A and Section B, was
constructed in accordance with program guidelines and provided an effective
evaluation 'tool. Section A made good use of the plant specific simulator and
Section B required a broad spectrum of plant procedures to answer the *
questions provided.
(2)
The plant walk-through (JPM) exam material, which consisted of 5 JPMs per set,
was constructed in accordance with program guidelines and provided an
effective evaluation tool. Multiple sets of JPMs were utilized which built one
- upon another (i.e. one JPM required an operator to start up an emergency diesel
generator while a.nether JPM required the next operator to.synchronize and load
the running emergency diesel generator).
(3)
. The dynamic simulator exam, which consisted of 2 scenarios, was constructed in
accordance with program guidelines and provided an effective evaluation tool.
Each scenario contained sufficient safety significant tasks to test the operating
crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and
emergency conditions.
However, the inspectors noted that one JPM task (Master Trip Solenoid Test) lacked
discrimination value, as written. The task was procedurally driven but only required the
operation of one control switch which was manipulated twice for satisfactory completion
of the assigned task. The inspectors discussed the concern with the licensee. The
licensee acknowledged that the task had low discrimination value and removed it from
their examination bank. A JPM task containing an appropriate level of discrimination
was substituted.*
- c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensed operator requalification ~xaminations were
prepared in accord.ance with program guidance and contained an appropriate level of
difficulty to distinguish between a competent and non-competent operator.* The annual
examination material also incorporated major attributes of the regulatory guidance that
governs operator licensing standards.
05.3
Requalification Examination Administration Practices
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors performed the following to assess the licensee's practices regarding
requalification examination administration, simulator performance (fidelity), and security
measures:
Observed requalification operating examination administration
Observed requalification written examination administration
8
Interviewed licensee personnel (operators, instructors, training supervisor, and
evaluators)
Reviewed the licensee's administrative procedures
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors observed the administration of ten JPMs (six on the plant specific
simulator, four on the plant facility) during the operating examination. Foliowing
completion of each JPM group, each evaluation team members was observed
conducting a performance debrief with the respective licensed operator. This feedback
included observed deficiencies during each JPM performance and the proposed grading
of that performance (pass or fail).
Inspectors observed administration of one dynamic simulator set, which consisted of two
- scenarios, for one operating crew. The licensed senior reactor operators (SRO) were
rotated between scenarios to allow each one to be evaluated in a technical specification
. required position. Immediately following each dynamic scenario termination, the
evaluators gathered to discuss the need for follow-up questions of each crew member.
After which, the evaluation team met to discuss individual and crew performance. Upon
completion of the scenario set, the evaluation team met to discuss crew performance
and assign a final grade of pass or fail. The evaluation team debriefed the crew on
overall performance shortly following the dynamic set termination arid prior to the end of
the day .
The inspectors observed the written examination (Section A and Section B)
administration using the plant specific simulator and plant procedure. The inspectors
determined that the program guidance was being implemented as outlined.
The inspectors observed the following deficiencies during the JPM evaluation process:
(1)
During the performance of one in-plant JPM, the evaluator became distracted
(i.e. making notes on the evaluation sheet) while the operator was simulating
performance of a fuse removal evolution. During this time, the evaluator
acknowledged the operator's verbal response of performance but a visual
confirmation by the eval.uator was not requested and credit was given for
satisfactory performance. The inspectors observed no adverse performance by
the licensed operator.
(2)
During the performance of one in-plant JPM, the evaluator asked a follow-up
question of the operator to clarify hi.s understanding of the simulated
performance of a control switch (i.e~ did the switch have a pull-to-lock feature?).
The operator's response was acknowledged and accepted as correct without any
independent verification. When questioned, the evaluator noted that the licensed
operator was an electrical engineer and a statement was made "He should
know!"
9
(3)
During the performance of two inplant JPMs, the evaluators did not consistently
require the operators to find/locate tools or procedures, as required, when
performing a task for the first time. Additionally, the same evaluators did not
consistently emphasize management's expectation to use place-keE;lping during
procedural execution.
The inspectors determined that the previously mentioned deficiencies had a minimal
impact on the effectiveness of the evaluation process. These deficiencies were
discussed with the licensee's evaluation team. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
final evaluation scores and agreed with the evaluation team's assessment of each
operators' performance.
c~
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was implementing the Licensed Operator
Requalification Training (LORT) program in accordance with program guidance and
regulatory requirements stated in 10 CFR Part 55.59. Also, the licensee's evaluation
team conducted themselves in a professional manner and maintained the proper
oversight role, as evident by a high level of detail discussed during the crew/individual
critique of performance.
05.4
Requalification Training Program Feedback System
a.
. Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors performed the following to assess the licensee's training program
feedback system effectiveness:
Reviewed operator and instructor comments on the feedback system
Reviewed revisions to the requalificatipn program _
Interviewed licensee personnel (op~rators, instructors, training supervisor)
b.
Observations and Findings
Through observations and interviews, the inspectors determined that a mechanism for
evaluating performance weaknesses and providing feedback of that evaluation to the
licensed operators was functioning properly. A review committee was actively involved
in the requalification training process to address any weaknesses that were discovered
during operator evaluations and requalification examinations. Other portions of the
feedback system, such as immediate feedback to operator questions during classroom
and simulator training sessions, were functioning properly .
10
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors determined that the feedback portion of the Systematic Approach to
Training (SAT) program was properly implemented and functioning.
05.5
Remedial Training Program
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors performed a review of the following records and procedures to assess
the licensee's remedial training program effectiveness:
Proposed remediation training plans
Completed remediation packages
OAP 08-01, "Training Program Administration," Revision 07, May 01, 1997
TPD-103, "Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program," Revision 01,
January 06, 1998
TDl-523, "Licensed Operator Annual Requalification Examinations," Revision 02,
February 1996
TDl-105, "Performance Evaluation Committee," Revision 06, February 1996
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed three remediation packages (dated 3/3/97, 2/2/98, and 2/9/98)
associated with operating crew failures. Two of the remediation packages addressed
the failure of all crew members in one competency area with all critical tasks being
completed satisfactorily. The third remediation package addressed a failure of all crew
members to satisfactorily complete a critical task involving termination of an injection
path. In the latter case, the inspectors noted that some of the individual operator
performance summary sheets did not contain a comment addressing the poor
performance even though specific problems with crew and individual performance was
identified on the team evaluation sheet. The inspectors noted that the evaluation team
leader was responsible for ensuring each individual* performance sheets contained the
appropriate level of comments.
Section 8.e.(5) 9f TDl-523 stated, in part, that the results of each scenario,
including any identified weaknesses, shall be recorded on Form C, Dynamic
Evaluation/Individual Performance Summary by the lead evaluator.
The inspectors determined that, while the level of detail varied among the remediation
packages, no evidence of an improper or inadequate level of remediation and re-testing
was apparent.
11
The inspectors noted that two distinct forms were used for documenting performance
deficiencies and recommending remediation training. Even though both forms required
the same basic information, the level of management review was different. The
following observations were noted during the review of the associated procedures:
(1)
Step E.1 of DAP 08-01 stated, in part, that Training Program Descriptions
(TPDs) were designed to describe and implement specific training programs, and
that Training Department Instructions (TDls) were procedures used in
conjunction with DAP 08-01 to implement the training policies and processes.
Also, Section D.1 of Supplement 8, "Performance Review Committee Charter," in
DAP 08 stated, in part, that a formal performance review (PRC) was to be
conducted when a trainee failed to meet the established knowledge or skills
performance standard established in the respective TPD and the PRC's
recommendation and the Line Manager's decision would be recorded on a
NTAFT form, "Performance Evaluation Data Sheet." The inspectors noted that a
NTAFT form was used to document both the 2/2/98 and 2/9/98 performance
deficiencies and recommended remedial training'.
(2)
Section A.1.2 of TPD-103 referenced the use of training instruction TDl-523
when performing annual requalification e.xams:
Section 9 of TDl-523 stated, in part, that a failure of any portion of the annual
requalification examination required prompt action as described in training
instruction TDl-105 to determine a remediation program and subsequent training.
Section 8 of TDl-105 stated, in part, that the Training Supervisor would record
the committee's recommendation on a TDl-105 Form A, "Performance
Evaluation Committee Data Sheet," and the appropriate Line Supervisor would
record the final decision on Form A and sign it. The inspectors noted that a TDl-
105 Form A was*utilized to document the 3/3/97 performance deficiencies and
recommended remedial training.
The inspectors determined that while the requirements for performance review and
remediation training were adequate, programmatic overlap existed. The inspectors
discussed the findings with the licensee. The licensee informed the inspectors that a
conscious effort had been put in place to use the NTAFT form for documentation of.
performance, but agreed to review the findings.
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors conduded that the remediation program was being implemented in
accordance with regulatory requirements. However, the inspectors determined that the
inconsistencies in program implementation occurred based upon conflicting procedural
guidance .
12
05.6
Conformance With Operator License Conditions
a.
Inspection Scope (71001)
The inspectors reviewed medical records, operations logs, and watchstander proficiency
lists, and interviewed operations personnel to determine the status of active operator
licenses to assess the facility and licensed operators' compliance with 10 CFR 55.53
license condition requirements.
b.
Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed 8 licensed operator m~dical records (11% of the total available)
which included 4 licensed operators that were due for medical review by the end of *
January 1998. The medical records for the 4 licensed operators due in January 1998
did not contain current medical data, which was requested. A short time later, the
licensee provided copies for 3 of the 4 records, but acknowledged that one record could
not be located and was not available for review. Following an investigation, the licensee
informed the inspectors that the record in question had been misplaced and could not
be located. The licensee initiated prompt corrective action to have the licensed operator
immediately re-evaluated by a physician. The licensee reported to the inspectors that
the licensed operator had been verified to be medically qualified to perform licensed
duties and a partial set of test results from January 1998 had been located.
The inspectors reviewed TDl-502, "Administrative Process for NRC Licenses," Revision
03, Jan1:1ary 1996, which included a process for addressing biennial medical
examinations. Methods Section 2.c of TDl-502 stated, in part, that the medical
examination would be completed at least 60 days prior to the medical expiration date to
ensure on time processing. Also, Methods Section 2.d stated, in part, that the NRC
review nurse would forward a "Certification of Medical Examination by Facility Licensee"
- NRC Form 396 to the License Coordinator. The inspectors identified that none of the 4
medical records reviewed, with expiration dates in January 1998, had a current NRC
Form 396. Also, the inspectors identified that the medical evaluation dates for the 4
records reviewed were performed less than 30 days from the expiration date.
1 o. CFR 55.27, "Documentation," requires that the facility licensee maintain the results of
medical qualification data arid test results, and provide the documentation to the
Commission upon request Failure to maintain adequate controls to ensure availability
of current medical data and provide such data to the NRC upon request on February 13,
1998, constitutes a violation of this requirement (VIO 50-2371249:98005-02). The
- inspectors determined that the failure occurred due to an improper application of TDl-
502 to ensure medical exams were scheduled at least 60 days prior to expiration date
and to followup on the supporting documentation in a timely manner. *
c.
Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's program to ensure licensed operator
compliance with regulatory requirements was inadequate. The licensee's administrative
13
guidelines were not beirig implemented in accordance with program guidance to ensure
a timely review and verification. This became apparent when a medical record could not
be located when requested by the inspectors. The failure to maintain appropriate
documentation of medical data and provide that to the NRC upon request was a
violation of regulatory requirements.
Management Meetings
X1
Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors met with licensee representatives on February 13 and March 3, 1998, to discuss
- the scope and findings of the inspection. During the exit meetings, the inspectors discussed the
processes reviewed by the inspectors during the conduct of this inspection and the likely
content of the final inspection report. Licensee representatives did not identify any documents
or processes as proprietary.
14
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
G. Abrell, Regulatory Assurance/NRG Coordinator
S. Barrett, Operations Manager
T. Eason, Operations Training Superintendent
T. Fuhs, Corporate Nuclear Licensing Assistant
B. Higgins, LOC Group Leader
L. Jordan, Training Manager (Acting)
S. Kuczynski, Shift Operations Technical Superv'isor
- D. Lauterbur, IL T Group Leader
.w. Lipscomb, Site Vice President Assistant
R. Reisner, SROL Training Coordinator
C. Richards, Q&SA Supervisor
P. Swafford, Station Manager
F. Spangenberg, Regulatory Assurance Manager
R. Ganser, IONS Resident Inspector
B. Dickson, Jr., Resident Inspector
K. Riemer, Senior Resident Inspector
15
j
0
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
Licensed Operator Requalification Program Evaluation
Plant Operations
Opened
50-2371249:98005-01
50-2371249:98005-02
Closed
NONE
Discussed
NONE
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
failure to maintain adequate procedure guidance.
for DIG operations
failure to maintain medical data documentation per
a licensed operator
16
Enclosure 3
SIMULATION FACILITY REPORT
Facility Licensee: Dresden Generating Station, Units 2 and 3
Facility Licensee Dockets No: 50-237, 50-249
Operating Tests Administered: February 11 - 13, 1998
This form is to be used only to report observations. These observations do not constitute audit
- or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of
noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or
approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in future
evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following iterns were observed
(if none, so state):
DESCRIPTION
NONE